    [JPRT 107-32]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       107th Congress                                      S. Prt.
                             JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
       1st Session                                         107-32
    _______________________________________________________________________

                        COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
                               PRACTICES FOR 2000

                                   VOLUME II

                                   ----------

                                  R E P O R T

                                SUBMITTED TO THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                                  U.S. SENATE

                                    AND THE

                      COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                     BY THE

                              DEPARTMENT OF STATE

         IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
                       ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov  Phone (202) 512�091800  Fax: (202) 512�092250
                  Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001107th Congress

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr, Delaware, Chairman
    PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
    CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
    RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
    PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
    BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Isdland
    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
    JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
        Virginia
                         Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
                Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

                      COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                       HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         TOM LANTOS, California
    JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
    PETER T. KING, New York              BRAD SHERMAN, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
    AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
    JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado         BARBARA LEE, California
    RON PAUL, Texas                      JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    NICK SMITH, Michigan                 JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
    JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania        EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
    ERIC CANTOR, Virginia                GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
    BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
             Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
                   Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
          Kristin Gilley, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Foreword.........................................................   vii

    Letter of Transmittal............................................    ix

    Preface..........................................................    xi

    Overview and Acknowledgments.....................................  xiii

    Introduction.....................................................  xvii

                                    Volume I

    Africa:
        Angola.......................................................     1
        Benin........................................................    16
        Botswana.....................................................    25
        Burkina Faso.................................................    36
        Burundi......................................................    46
        Cameroon.....................................................    59
        Cape Verde...................................................    85
        Central African Republic.....................................    91
        Chad.........................................................   103
        Comoros......................................................   115
        Congo, Democratic Republic of................................   122
        Congo, Republic of...........................................   156
        Cote d'Ivoire................................................   166
        Djibouti.....................................................   193
        Equatorial Guinea............................................   204
        Eritrea......................................................   215
        Ethiopia.....................................................   228
        Gabon........................................................   253
        Gambia, The..................................................   262
        Ghana........................................................   272
        Guinea.......................................................   294
        Guinea-Bissau................................................   310
        Kenya........................................................   317
        Lesotho......................................................   345
        Liberia......................................................   353
        Madagascar...................................................   367
        Malawi.......................................................   374
        Mali.........................................................   382
        Mauritania...................................................   391
        Mauritius....................................................   407
        Mozambique...................................................   415
        Namibia......................................................   433
        Niger........................................................   446
        Nigeria......................................................   455
        Rwanda.......................................................   479
        Sao Tome and Principe........................................   493
        Senegal......................................................   496
        Seychelles...................................................   507
        Sierra Leone.................................................   513
        Somalia......................................................   524
        South Africa.................................................   537
        Sudan........................................................   557
        Swaziland....................................................   579
        Tanzania.....................................................   588
        Togo.........................................................   608
        Uganda.......................................................   622
        Zambia.......................................................   642
        Zimbabwe.....................................................   656

    East Asia and the Pacific:
        Australia....................................................   683
        Brunei.......................................................   693
        Burma........................................................   700
        Cambodia.....................................................   723
        China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).........................   736
        China (Taiwan only)..........................................   824
        East Timor...................................................   836
        Fiji.........................................................   846
        Indonesia....................................................   858
        Japan........................................................   899
        Kiribati.....................................................   912
        Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.......................   914
        Korea, Republic of...........................................   927
        Laos.........................................................   938
        Malaysia.....................................................   950
        Marshall Islands.............................................   985
        Micronesia, Federated States of..............................   989
        Mongolia.....................................................   992
        Nauru........................................................   999
        New Zealand..................................................  1002
        Palau........................................................  1008
        Papua New Guinea.............................................  1012
        Philippines..................................................  1017
        Samoa........................................................  1036
        Singapore....................................................  1040
        Solomon Islands..............................................  1054
        Thailand.....................................................  1062
        Tonga........................................................  1076
        Tuvalu.......................................................  1079
        Vanuatu......................................................  1082
        Vietnam......................................................  1085

                                   Volume II

    Europe:
        Albania......................................................  1107
        Andorra......................................................  1118
        Armenia......................................................  1121
        Austria......................................................  1137
        Azerbaijan...................................................  1147
        Belarus......................................................  1164
        Belgium......................................................  1192
        Bosnia and Herzegovina.......................................  1200
        Bulgaria.....................................................  1223
        Croatia......................................................  1241
        Cyprus.......................................................  1260
        Czech Republic...............................................  1271
        Denmark......................................................  1290
        Estonia......................................................  1294
        Finland......................................................  1302
        France.......................................................  1306
        Georgia......................................................  1318
        Germany......................................................  1341
        Greece.......................................................  1355
        Hungary......................................................  1371
        Iceland......................................................  1383
        Ireland......................................................  1390
        Italy........................................................  1399
        Kazakhstan...................................................  1407
        Kyrgyzstan...................................................  1434
        Latvia.......................................................  1450
        Liechtenstein................................................  1457
        Lithuania....................................................  1462
        Luxembourg...................................................  1471
        Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of.......................  1474
        Malta........................................................  1485
        Moldova......................................................  1489
        Monaco.......................................................  1503
        Netherlands, The.............................................  1506
        Norway.......................................................  1513
        Poland.......................................................  1517
        Portugal.....................................................  1535
        Romania......................................................  1542
        Russia.......................................................  1555
        San Marino...................................................  1605
        Slovak Republic..............................................  1608
        Slovenia.....................................................  1621
        Spain........................................................  1626
        Sweden.......................................................  1637
        Switzerland..................................................  1645
        Tajikistan...................................................  1656
        Turkey.......................................................  1670
        Turkmenistan.................................................  1707
        Ukraine......................................................  1718
        United Kingdom...............................................  1742
        Uzbekistan...................................................  1760
        Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of..............................  1780

    Near East and North Africa:
        Algeria......................................................  1823
        Bahrain......................................................  1836
        Egypt........................................................  1848
        Iran.........................................................  1869
        Iraq.........................................................  1890
        Israel and the occupied territories..........................  1908
        Jordan.......................................................  1950
        Kuwait.......................................................  1968
        Lebanon......................................................  1983
        Libya........................................................  1998
        Morocco......................................................  2007
        The Western Sahara...........................................  2050
        Oman.........................................................  2055
        Qatar........................................................  2064
        Saudi Arabia.................................................  2071
        Syria........................................................  2087
        Tunisia......................................................  2100
        United Arab Emirates.........................................  2120
        Yemen........................................................  2131

    South Asia:
        Afghanistan..................................................  2157
        Bangladesh...................................................  2175
        Bhutan.......................................................  2201
        India........................................................  2212
        Maldives.....................................................  2263
        Nepal........................................................  2271
        Pakistan.....................................................  2286
        Sri Lanka....................................................  2325

    Western Hemisphere
        Antigua and Barbuda..........................................  2351
        Argentina....................................................  2356
        Bahamas......................................................  2371
        Barbados.....................................................  2377
        Belize.......................................................  2383
        Bolivia......................................................  2390
        Brazil.......................................................  2403
        Canada.......................................................  2431
        Chile........................................................  2440
        Colombia.....................................................  2453
        Costa Rica...................................................  2498
        Cuba.........................................................  2506
        Dominica.....................................................  2526
        Dominican Republic...........................................  2530
        Ecuador......................................................  2551
        El Salvador..................................................  2563
        Grenada......................................................  2577
        Guatemala....................................................  2581
        Guyana.......................................................  2615
        Haiti........................................................  2625
        Honduras.....................................................  2642
        Jamaica......................................................  2662
        Mexico.......................................................  2671
        Nicaragua....................................................  2701
        Panama.......................................................  2719
        Paraguay.....................................................  2734
        Peru.........................................................  2745
        St. Kitts and Nevis..........................................  2776
        Saint Lucia..................................................  2779
        St. Vincent and the Grenadines...............................  2784
        Suriname.....................................................  2789
        Trinidad and Tobago..........................................  2796
        Uruguay......................................................  2802
        Venezuela....................................................  2809

    Appendixes:
        A. Notes on preparation of the reports.......................  2829
        B. Reporting on worker rights................................  2831
        C. Selected international human rights conventions...........  2833
        D. Explanation of chart in Appendix C........................  2836
        E. FY 2000 U.S. economic and military assistance--actual
          obligations................................................  2837
        F. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting
          record.....................................................  2849
        G. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting
          table......................................................  2851
        H. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights......  2854

                                    FOREWORD

                                  ----------

        The country reports on human rights practices contained
    herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance
    with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
    of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative
    requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
    amended.
        The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations
    that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not.
    They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the
    consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance
    legislation.

                                           Jesse Helms,
                              Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

                                          Henry J. Hyde
                        Chairman, Committee on International Relations.

                                     (vii)

    ?

                             LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  ----------

                                           Department of State,
                                     Washington, DC, February 25, 2001.
    Hon. Jesse Helms,
    Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
        Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
    am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
    Practices for 2000, prepared in compliance with sections
    116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
    amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
    amended.
        We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
    can provide any further information.
                Sincerely,
                                        Barbara Larkin,
                              Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
        Enclosure.

                                      (ix)

                                    PREFACE

                                  ----------

                          HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

        I am pleased to transmit to the United States Congress this
    25th edition of the Department of State's Country Reports on
    Human Rights Practices.
        For the past quarter of a century, these reports have grown
    in breadth and stature every year. As such they reflect our
    country's deep and abiding commitment to universal human rights
    and the unprecedented growth in democracy, freedom, and human
    rights throughout the world.
        The year 2000 saw many improvements in human rights--from
    the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana to the
    defeat of an entrenched dictator in Serbia and the election of
    a new president in Mexico. At the same time, the continued
    deterioration of conditions in China and Cuba and the abusive
    policies pursued by the regimes in Iraq and Sudan and a number
    of other countries offer proof that the battle to promote
    universal human rights is far from finished. We who believe in
    human freedom and the rule of law must not lose sight of the
    challenges that lie before us.
        This year's report covers 195 countries. No country, our
    own included, can claim a perfect human rights record; nor
    should any seek exemption from international scrutiny. Each
    nation must be accountable for the way it treats its citizens.
    The purpose of these reports, therefore, is to provide to the
    best of our ability a comprehensive and accurate report on the
    human rights conditions in every country.
        The interest in these annual Country Reports can be seen in
    the hundreds of thousands of hits our web site at www.state.gov
    will receive from every part of the world over the next few
    days, and in the countless discussions, both public and
    private, that will follow. The Report for the year 2000 thus
    takes its place within the context of a new and revolutionary
    era of global human discourse. It is my deepest hope,
    therefore, that these reports can stimulate new dialogue and
    provide new encouragement for all countries to strengthen their
    commitments to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.
        I would like to thank all those who had a hand in preparing
    this year's Country Reports--whether overseas or in the
    Department of State. Without their dedication and hard work, a
    report of this quality and scope would simply be impossible.
                                               Colin L. Powell,
                                                    Secretary of State.
                          OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

                                  ----------

                          HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

    Why The Reports Are Prepared
        This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
    of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the
    Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section
    504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974, as amended. The law
    provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the
    Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
    Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and
    complete report regarding the status of internationally
    recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A)
    in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B)
    in all other foreign countries which are members of the United
    Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human
    rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports
    on several countries that do not fall into the categories
    established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by
    the congressional requirement.
        The responsibility of the United States to speak out on
    behalf of international human rights standards was formalized
    in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation
    creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of
    State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In
    1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for
    Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal
    requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
    account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
    and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
    annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only
    countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 195
    reports are submitted.
    How The Reports are Prepared
        In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen
    further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections
    in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to
    corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts
    were made to link mission programming to the advancement of
    human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights
    and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the
    Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a
    broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking
    issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 2000
    human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by
    hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S.
    Government employees.
        Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the
    reports, gathered information throughout the year from a
    variety of sources across the political spectrum, including
    government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists,
    human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This
    information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign
    Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying
    and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of
    human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of
    individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human
    rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
    governments.
        After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were
    sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of
    Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other
    State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate,
    analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on
    their own sources of information. These included reports
    provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
    government officials, representatives from the United Nations
    and other international and regional organizations and
    institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers
    also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee
    issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal
    matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant
    information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly
    as possible.
        The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for
    shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance,
    training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve
    as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private
    groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized
    human rights.
        The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
    internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and
    worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
    Human Rights. There rights include freedom from torture or
    other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
    from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or
    clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of
    the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
        Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human
    dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons
    have the inalienable right to change their government by
    peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of
    expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion,
    without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
    origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a
    necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the
    reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights,
    including the right of association; the right to organize and
    bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory
    labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age
    for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
        Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
    the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of:
    Editor in Chief--William E. Dilday; Editor in Chief Ex
    Officio--Marc J. Susser; Senior Advisor--Leslie A. Gerson;
    Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical Editor--Larry
    Arthur; Senior Editors--Frank B. Crump, Susan F. Kovalik,
    Gregory P. Moody, Diana D. Perry-Elby, Rachel D. Settlage;
    Editors--Sara M. Allinder, Stefanie R. Altman, Liana Brooks,
    Cynthia R. Bunton, Michelle Eyrich Day, Claire Ehmann, Imogen
    Fua, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan, Amy E.
    McKee, Martine K. Miller, Donald E. Parker, Jennifer M.
    Pekkinen, Yvette Saint-Andre, John J. Sheerin, Jolynn M.
    Shoemaker, James C. Todd, William J. Tomlyanovich, Stephen W.
    Worrel; Assistant Editors--Eric M. Barboriak, Melanne A. Civic,
    George T. Constantine, Douglas B. Dearborn, Thomas F. Farr,
    Carol G. Finerty, Stephen M. Epstein, Nancy Hewett, Peter
    Higgins, Alden H. Irons, Herman Keizer, Susan E. Keogh, Richard
    Marshall, Janet L. Mayland, Edmund McWilliams, Susan
    O'Sullivan, Maria B. Pica, Tamara J. Resler, Daniel J. Schuman,
    Christopher Sibilla, Wendy B. Silverman, Danika Walters, James
    D. Wulff; Editorial Assistants--Phillip L. Antweiler, Timothy
    Brittingham, Paige E. Chabora, Andrew Chen, Lewis K. Elbinger,
    Charles W. Evans, Dr. Sudha Haley, Rashid U. Haq, Kristy L.
    Hofkens, Adrienne Lauson, David G. Leyden, Coleman Mehta,
    Philip A. Mirrer-Singer, Mark N. Templeton, Steven A.
    Wagenseil, Melissa A. Waters, Gerri L. Williams, Anne Zollner;
    Technical Support--Mitchell R. Brown.

     INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR THE
                                   YEAR 2000

                                  ----------

                   I. The 25th Edition of the Country Reports

        For the past quarter of a century, the Country Reports on
    Human Rights Practices have chronicled the ebb and flow of
    human rights, bearing witness to the conditions that affect
    people's lives in every nation of the world. Yet despite all
    the suffering--or perhaps because of it--the cause of human
    rights is stronger now than ever.
        The expansion of democracy and human freedom that the world
    has experienced over the past 25 years has many causes. This
    expansion rests on the fundamental belief that there are rights
    and freedoms to which every human is entitled no matter where
    he or she resides. This idea is so powerful and so universal
    that it gains strength with every passing year.
        The primary focus of the Country Reports always has been
    events in the countries that the reports cover. If newspapers
    are the first drafts of history, the reports are surely the
    second drafts, carefully researched cross-sections of the good
    and bad that transpire around the world every year. But the
    reports are not just history. They are documents backed by the
    full weight of the U.S. people and Government. They speak for
    those who have no voice, bearing witness for those who have not
    had access to free trials, nor have enjoyed other fundamental
    human rights and protections. As the reports have done since
    their first appearance in March 1977, they represent the
    nation's commitment to respect for universal human rights and
    its interest in promoting these rights in every country of the
    world. The reports are a tangible manifestation of the
    Department of State's intense focus on human rights issues.

                             II. The Year in Review

        The year saw a number of advances in human rights,
    democracy, and fundamental freedoms. The Yugoslav people voted
    Slobodan Milosevic out of office in September, ending more than
    a decade of authoritarian rule and offering hope for a new,
    more tolerant and democratic era in Yugoslavia. Nigeria
    continued to make progress in its transition to democracy,
    while a peaceful transfer of authority took place in Ghana
    following generally free and fair elections. Ethiopia and
    Eritrea signed a peace accord in December, ending a conflict
    that created at least a million internally displaced civilians
    in both countries. The election of Vicente Fox marked the first
    time in modern Mexican history that a member of an opposition
    party was elected President. Peru's decision to renew its
    acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American
    Court of Human Rights appeared to represent a renewed
    commitment to the rule of law. And South Korean President Kim
    Dae Jung's engagement policy led to some easing of tensions
    with North Korea.
        U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterated the United
    Nation's support for the promotion of human rights and
    instructed its agencies to place emphasis on both reporting and
    programming initiatives that strengthened respect for human
    rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
    Yugoslavia continued to try alleged war criminals, including a
    war crimes trial based on charges of rape and other sexual
    violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also
    continued to try persons for genocide-related crimes. At the
    regional level, a number of institutions continued to work to
    strengthen democratic norms and practices. The Organization of
    African Unity denied a seat at its summit to Cote d'Ivoire due
    to its 1999 coup. The Organization of American States (OAS)
    sent a mission to Peru in the wake of elections that
    international and domestic observers deemed to be seriously
    flawed. The Government subsequently announced new elections
    that are scheduled to take place in April 2001. The OAS mission
    also sponsored a dialog among government, opposition
    politicians, and civil society representatives aimed at
    reforming the country's beleaguered democratic institutions.
    The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe engaged
    in active and public human rights reporting in Kosovo and
    monitored elections in a number of countries. A number of
    member states of the Council of Europe began to publish reports
    of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
        At the international level, the global spread of democracy
    was affirmed in both governmental and nongovernmental arenas.
    The Governments of over 100 countries that have chosen a
    democratic path and that represent every region of the world,
    level of development, and various historical experiences,
    convened a June ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, under
    the rubric of a Community of Democracies. Participants endorsed
    the Warsaw Declaration, which committed their Governments to
    uphold democratic principles and practices. The Community of
    Democracies meeting sought to enhance cooperation among
    participating Governments through several avenues, including an
    informal caucus at the U.N. General Assembly to share
    information and support democracy-related issues and
    resolutions within the U.N. system.
        At the same time these positive trends took place, China's
    poor human rights record worsened during the year, as the
    authorities intensified their harsh measures against
    underground Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists, destroyed
    many houses of worship, and stepped up their campaign against
    the Falun Gong movement. China also sharply suppressed
    organized dissent. In Burma the military continued its severe
    repression, holding Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for
    much of the year, detaining her supporters, imprisoning many
    religious believers, and coercing numerous persons, including
    children, into forced labor. North Korea's situation remained
    among the worst in the world: The Government stifled all
    dissent and widely curtailed freedom of religion, political
    prisoners were held in forced labor camps, and malnutrition
    remained widespread. In Afghanistan the Taliban continued to be
    a major violator of human rights, severely restricting women's
    and girls' access to education, medical facilities, and
    employment. Iraq remained under the complete domination of one
    of the world's most repressive regimes, as security forces
    routinely executed, tortured, beat, raped, or otherwise
    intimidated and abused any perceived political opponents.
    Cuba's overall human rights record remained poor, as the
    Government retained tight surveillance over anyone considered a
    potential opponent. The human rights situation in Belarus
    worsened in a number of areas, as the Lukashenko regime took
    severe measures to neutralize political opponents and repressed
    all calls for democracy. Turkmenistan remained one of the most
    totalitarian countries in the world, as the Committee on
    National Security maintained tight control over the country,
    and a personality cult centered around President Saparmurat
    Niyazov continued. In Israel and the occupied territories,
    following the outbreak of violence in September, Israeli
    security forces sometimes used excessive force in contravention
    of their own rules of engagement, killing approximately 300
    Palestinians and injuring thousands in response to violent
    demonstrations and other clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and
    Gaza. Palestinian security forces and members of Fatah's Tanzim
    killed numerous Israeli soldiers and civilians in the cycle of
    violence.
        Continuing internal conflict marred the human rights
    situation in a number of countries. In Colombia both
    paramilitary and guerrilla groups continued to commit acts of
    violence and other serious abuses in many parts of the country,
    with numerous massacres of civilians and the murder, kidnaping,
    and intimidation of human rights defenders, trade unionists,
    journalists, and other targeted groups. War, exacerbated by
    external intervention, continued to wrack the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo, enabling perpetrators of human rights
    violations to enjoy virtual impunity in large portions of the
    country. The Government of Sudan continued its bombing of
    civilian population centers, support for slave taking, and
    forced religious conversions, while preventing international
    humanitarian assistance from reaching large portions of the
    country. Numerous credible reports of human rights abuses by
    Russian forces in Chechnya, which included extrajudicial
    killings, torture, and rape, provoked widespread condemnation
    and calls for accountability; the Chechens committed numerous
    abuses as well, such as the execution of prisoners. In
    Indonesia security forces were responsible for numerous
    instances of indiscriminate shootings of civilians, torture,
    beatings, and other abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere,
    and the Government was ineffective in deterring social,
    interethnic, and interreligious violence in the Moluccas and
    Sulawesi.

            III. Developments in Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor

        Global Democratic Trends: The year witnessed new strides
    towards the globalization of democracy. Many, if not most,
    governments, civil society leaders, and multilateral
    institutions now pursue and promote open economies and freer
    societies. A majority of people in the world now live in
    democratic countries or countries that have begun to implement
    some democratic and political reforms. The overall trend
    remains one of positive, incremental change, despite some
    reversals.
        Elections bolstered democratic transitions in Croatia,
    Ghana, Mexico, Suriname, and Yugoslavia during the year. An
    active civil society and increasingly independent media helped
    to ensure the success and transparency of these elections.
    Setbacks included continuing conflict in the Middle East and
    Africa, a coup in Fiji, and a breakdown of the Government and
    law and order in the Solomon Islands. In China, despite
    widespread Government abuses, important aspects of civil
    society continued to develop. Seriously flawed elections took
    place in other countries, most notably in Azerbaijan,
    Kyrgyzstan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Haiti.
        On the nongovernmental side, increased global networking
    among organizations and private citizens mirrored the growth of
    active civil societies at the national level. The World Forum
    on Democracy, held jointly with the Warsaw Community of
    Democracies Ministerial in June, brought together an
    unprecedented international gathering of scholars, civic,
    religious, labor, and business leaders to assess the challenges
    to democracy. The Forum provided to the ministerial assembly
    recommendations that included convening the informal caucus of
    democracies that was launched at the United Nations in the
    fall. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
    from over 80 countries also met in Sao Paulo during November to
    consider how to meet the challenges to democracy. They
    developed a list of practical steps NGO's could take in their
    own countries to support the democratic process.
        Integrity of the Person: In Algeria reports of abuses such
    as torture and arbitrary detention continued to decrease during
    the year; however, extrajudicial killings by security forces
    and terrorist groups claimed the lives of many hundreds of
    persons. The torture of political opponents is widespread in
    Uzbekistan. Cameroon's security forces reportedly killed many
    dozens of persons over a 6-month period in the city of Douala,
    and the abuse of detainees throughout the country remained
    endemic. The brutality associated with the Revolutionary United
    Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone abated somewhat; however, there
    continued to be reports of serious abuses, such as
    extrajudicial killings, rapes, and beatings in the 60 percent
    of the country that the Government does not control. The RUF
    also committed human rights abuses in Guinea. The Libyan
    government resorted to intimidation to control the political
    opposition, as security forces arbitrarily arrested and
    detained individuals who frequently were held incommunicado or
    tortured.
        Press Freedom: Freedom of the press remains nonexistent in
    such countries as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Turkmenistan. There
    were severe restrictions on the press in Sudan, Uzbekistan, and
    China, except in Hong Kong. The disappearance of Ukrainian
    Georhiy Gongadze, whose alleged remains were found late in the
    year, raised serious concern about press freedom in Ukraine. In
    Russia Kremlin efforts to gain control over a major independent
    television network posed a threat to hard-won press freedom as
    well. In Iran dozens of newspaper offices were closed, and a
    number of Iran's most prominent journalists and editors were
    arrested or harassed as hard-line elements within the
    Government sought to silence their critics. However, there was
    some easing of press restrictions in Syria, and the press in a
    number of countries in North Africa continued to demonstrate
    more freedom.
        Religious Freedom: The year saw the continuation of
    religious repression and discrimination in every region of the
    world. Based on the Department's Annual Report on International
    Religious Freedom 2000 (issued in September and covering the
    period July 1999 through June 2000), all five countries
    designated as ``countries of particular concern'' by the
    Secretary of State in 1999--Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and
    Sudan--were redesignated. This designation reflects the
    particularly severe violations of religious freedom by the
    Governments of those countries. In each the situation remained
    serious; in some--notably China--religious repression
    increased.
        In Uzbekistan, despite the release of some religious
    prisoners, the Government continued to incarcerate and abuse
    others because of their religious beliefs and practices. In
    particular some Muslims were vulnerable to mistreatment because
    of their alleged association with terrorists. The Government of
    Turkmenistan failed to allow non-Sunni Muslims and non-Russian
    Orthodox Christian believers to register, despite earlier
    promises to do so, and continued its crackdown on Protestant
    worshipers and its suppression of practitioners of other faiths
    for not being registered. In Russia there were concerns about
    the uniform implementation by local officials of federal
    regulations requiring the reregistration of religious groups
    and organizations. In Georgia there was increased
    discrimination against some religious minorities, including
    Jehovah's Witnesses. In Laos some religious prisoners were
    released, but the practice by certain local officials of
    forcing Christians to sign renunciations of their faith
    continued, as did the harsh treatment of Christians in prison.
        In Saudi Arabia non-Muslim public worship is prohibited,
    and the Government detained and subsequently deported several
    persons whom it considered to have violated the prohibition.
    The Government supports the Sunni Muslim majority, and
    discrimination against members of the Shi'a minority persists.
    Pakistan's blasphemy law continued to be abused and directed
    against the country's religious minorities, in particular the
    Ahmadiya and Christian communities. In Europe some states have
    adopted or are considering discriminatory legislation or
    policies that tend to stigmatize expressions of religious faith
    by certain groups by wrongfully associating them with dangerous
    ``sects'' or ``cults.''
        On a more positive note, religious life in a number of
    countries of the New Independent States continued to progress
    during the year, as some governments tried with varying degrees
    of success to bring local and regional officials into line with
    national policy. In Azerbaijan the treatment of religious
    groups continued to improve, as it has since President Aliyev's
    public commitment to religious liberty in 1999.
        Women: The year saw women's human rights attract more
    international attention than in the past, but actual gains
    worldwide were limited. In Egypt women were granted the right
    to divorce on grounds of incompatibility. In Rwanda a law was
    passed that improves women's rights in inheritance, family
    matters, and credit. Despite some progress made in these and
    other areas, serious problems remain. In many parts of Africa,
    female genital mutilation continued to damage the physical and
    psychological health of women and girls. Societal
    discrimination prevented women in many countries from taking
    advantage of economic opportunities. In Afghanistan the
    Taliban's restrictions on education and work continued to
    confine women to the home. Traditional patriarchal societies
    continued to devalue women and girls. In China coercive family
    planning practices continued to harm women and female children,
    despite some government experimentation with noncoercive
    practices. In a number of countries in the Middle East and
    South Asia, so-called honor killings and dowry deaths continued
    to be major problems.
        Violence against women remained a pervasive problem,
    cutting across social and economic lines. Domestic and sexual
    violence against women is found on every continent. While
    governments publicly condemned violence against women, too few
    took concrete steps to address it.
        Children: Children are among the most vulnerable of any
    group in society and face particular threats to their human
    rights. Around the world, children face dangerous and unhealthy
    conditions, working in factories, fields, and sweatshops, as
    domestic servants, or, in some cases, as prostitutes. The
    trafficking of children for forced labor, prostitution, and
    pornography is a growing and lucrative business for criminals.
    In many cities large numbers of street children lack shelter,
    food, education, and support and are vulnerable to many forms
    of abuse, despite the best efforts of governments and NGO's. In
    countries such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and
    Uganda, armed rebels force children to serve as soldiers or
    recruit them with promises or threats. In many countries,
    children are denied access to education--in some cases because
    they cannot afford the fees for books and uniforms, in others
    because they must work to support their families--thereby
    severely reducing their chances for a better life. Many
    governments deny girls the opportunity to attend school or
    complete their schooling.
        Some improvements in the lives of children took place
    during the year, as some governments took steps to aid children
    and strengthen protection of their rights. For example, in
    Venezuela some 500,000 children attended school for the first
    time when the Government prohibited registration fees. The
    Government of Tunisia sponsors an immunization program that
    targets preschool age children and reports that over 95 percent
    of children are vaccinated. At the end of the year, the
    Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the National Observatory of
    Children's Rights began a human rights awareness campaign
    regarding the plight of child maids that received widespread
    media exposure. The Minister of Justice in Benin established a
    National Commission for Children's Rights, which held its
    initial session in July; the Benin Government also has made
    serious efforts to combat child abuse and trafficking in
    children. In March several government agencies in the
    Philippines signed a memorandum of agreement on the handling
    and treatment of children involved in armed conflict, which
    treats child insurgents as victims to be rescued and
    rehabilitated, rather than as enemies to be neutralized and
    prosecuted. The United Nations opened two important documents
    for signature during the year: the Optional Protocol to the
    Convention on the Rights of the Child Concerning Children in
    Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
    the Rights of the Child Concerning the Sale of the Child. NGO's
    also are extremely active in the field of children's rights
    throughout the world, advocating legal reform and providing
    services.
        Worker Rights: During the year, there were countervailing
    negative and positive trends affecting worker rights. Among the
    positive developments, over 50 countries ratified the
    International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on the
    Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention 182), the most rapid
    international approval for any convention in the organization's
    81-year history. The U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000
    encouraged international community ratification of the
    convention by linking ratification to continued eligibility for
    Generalized System of Preferences status. The act also
    incorporated worker rights criteria into trade preference
    eligibility for African and Caribbean Basin programs.
        For the first time, the ILO adopted a resolution that
    called for measures to secure compliance with fundamental
    worker rights. In November the ILO's Governing Body judged that
    the Government of Burma had not taken effective action to deal
    with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced labor. It
    called on all ILO member states to take appropriate measures to
    ensure that Burma does not perpetuate or extend its system of
    forced or compulsory labor.
        Among negative trends during the year was the impunity with
    which a dramatically increasing number of trade unionists were
    killed, tortured, and intimidated in Colombia. Elsewhere a
    growing trend toward the negotiation of individual contracts
    between companies and workers and the resort to the formation
    of ``cooperatives'' in place of trade unions deprived workers
    of the protection afforded by union representation and of
    protection under national labor legislation.
        Trafficking in Persons: Trafficking in persons poses a
    serious challenge to human rights. This rapidly growing global
    problem affects countries and families on every continent.
    Traffickers prey upon women, children, and men from all walks
    of life, and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers
    particularly exploit women and children who suffer from poverty
    and are marginalized within their own societies--the most
    vulnerable segments of the population. Trafficking has grown
    significantly in recent years and serves as one of the leading
    sources of revenue for international criminal organizations--in
    part because it is low-risk and high-profit. In some countries,
    local police and immigration and customs officials are involved
    or complicit in trafficking. Traffickers deprive their victims
    of their basic human dignity, subject them to inhuman and
    degrading treatment, and treat them as chattel that can be
    bought and sold into forced and bonded labor across
    international and within national borders. Victims often find
    themselves in a strange country, unable to speak the language,
    and without identification or documentation. Many are subject
    to violent and brutal treatment by their captors. Some come
    from countries in which the police and other authorities are a
    source of repression rather than a source of help, and they are
    reluctant to seek assistance. Many are threatened with
    retribution against themselves or their families should they
    try to escape. Many victims face additional risks from
    dangerous working conditions, including the threat of harm from
    exposure to dangerous pesticides or sexually transmitted
    diseases.
        The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to
    quantify. Reliable estimates range from 700,000 to 2 million
    persons trafficked globally each year. Victims are trafficked
    into sweatshop labor, prostitution, domestic servitude, unsafe
    agricultural labor, construction work, restaurant work, and
    various forms of modern-day slavery. Governments around the
    world have taken steps to combat these heinous practices,
    enacting legislation to criminalize trafficking and strengthen
    penalties against it, and taking steps to aid victims. In
    December 81 countries signed the Trafficking in Persons
    Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
    Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the U.N.
    Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. More
    countries are expected to sign the Trafficking Protocol in the
    coming months. NGO's are especially active in the
    antitrafficking field; their efforts globally include awareness
    campaigns, the provision of medical and psychological support
    and shelter for victims, as well as job training.
        Corporate Responsibility: In recent years, partnerships
    among governments, businesses, and civil society to promote
    human rights, support civil society, and address corporate
    responsibility needs have expanded. Two of the best-known
    examples are the Sullivan Principles and the U.N. Global
    Compact, which encourage corporations, on a voluntary basis, to
    recognize international human rights, labor, and environmental
    standards. During the year, a group of major oil, mining, and
    energy companies; human rights and corporate responsibility
    organizations; and an international trade union federation
    worked with the U.S. and British Governments to forge a set of
    voluntary principles on security and human rights. The
    principles provide a mechanism for a continuing dialog on
    important security and human rights issues.

                    IV. History of the Human Rights Reports

        The first edition of the Country Reports was a product of
    its times. While the United States had been at the forefront of
    the international human rights movement since the end of World
    War II and the creation of the United Nations, the Cold War and
    the gradual ending of colonialism dominated the first decades
    of that movement. However, the early 1970s gave rise in the
    Congress and throughout the country to new concepts and
    measures of accountability. An important force behind this
    changing environment was an ever-growing community of NGO's
    whose global outlook, commitment to human rights, and access to
    the media helped shape public opinion and government
    decisionmaking.
        In 1973 Representative Donald Fraser held hearings on human
    rights in the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
    International Organizations. That same year, a sense of
    Congress resolution was passed urging the Nixon Administration
    to link U.S. foreign assistance programs to respect for human
    rights within those recipient countries. The Congress amended
    the Foreign Assistance Act 3 years later to require the
    Secretary of State to transmit to Congress ``a full and
    complete report'' every year concerning ``respect for
    internationally recognized human rights in each country
    proposed as a recipient of security assistance.''
        Thus in March 1977, the first volume of Country Reports was
    submitted to Congress. The report covered 82 countries. Because
    it focused on nations with whom the United States had formal
    security assistance programs, most of them were longstanding
    allies and friends. The initial report was brief--only 143
    pages--and at the end of each entry was a rating, taken from
    Freedom House, judging whether the country was free, partly
    free, or not free.
        Like any innovation, the new report had its critics. To
    some the very existence of such a document harmed relations
    with the very nations with which the United States had
    established the best ties. To others the report fell short of
    full disclosure. Such criticism has helped improve the reports
    ever since. They now cover virtually every country of the world
    and include a level of detail that would have stunned earlier
    readers.
        For the 1978 report, 33 additional countries that received
    U.S. economic assistance were added to the original 82. The
    next year, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended again to
    require an entry on each member of the United Nations. The 1979
    report thus expanded to 854 pages and covered 154 countries,
    including for the first time discussions of Cuba, the Soviet
    Union, and the People's Republic of China.
        By then the basic format of the report had been
    established, although it would undergo many modifications over
    time. The first section was Respect for the Integrity of the
    Person, and it included, as it still does, subsections on
    torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
    arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial;
    and invasion of the home. The second section was entitled
    Government Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of such Vital
    Needs as Food, Shelter, and Health Care. Third was Respect for
    Civil and Political Liberties. This section included separate
    subsections on freedom of speech, press, religion, and
    assembly; freedom of movement within the country for travel and
    immigration; and freedom to participate in the political
    process. Fourth was Government Attitude and Record Regarding
    International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
    Violations of Human Rights.
        In 1980 a subsection was added on disappearances. The
    following year's report saw a recasting of the section on
    fulfillment of vital needs as Economic and Social
    Circumstances. The 1982 report added subsections on political
    and extrajudicial killing and disappearances and expanded the
    discussions on freedom of speech and the press, peaceful
    assembly, religion, movement, and the political process. The
    following year, the right of citizens to change their
    government was added. In 1986 a new section entitled
    Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or
    Social Status was introduced, along with another section on the
    Status of Labor.
        In 1989 a subsection was added on the use of excessive
    force and violations of human rights in internal conflicts. The
    labor section was revised to include specific discussions of
    the right of association, the right to organize and bargain
    collectively, minimum age for employment of children, and
    acceptable conditions of labor. The 1993 report saw an
    expansion of the discrimination section to include specific
    discussions of the rights of women, children, the indigenous,
    people with disabilities, and national, racial, and ethnic
    minorities. In 1993 the reports appeared on the Department of
    State's web site for the first time, an event that dramatically
    increased the number of individuals who had immediate access to
    them. Additional coverage on refugees and asylum was added 3
    years later. In 1997 the subsection on forced and bonded child
    labor was upgraded substantially. In 1998 the report was
    published for the first time in two volumes.
        Later in 1998, Congress passed the International Religious
    Freedom Act, which mandated annual reports on the state of
    international religious freedom in every country. The first of
    these reports appeared in September 1999, the same year that
    Congress requested that a new section be added to the reports
    on trafficking in persons. The reports that year also included
    a new focus on access to political prisoners and genocide.
                                     Michael E. Parmly,
                           Acting Assistant Secretary of State,
                          Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

                                    EUROPE

                                  ----------

                                    ALBANIA

        Albania is a republic with a multiparty parliament, a Prime
    Minister, Ilir Meta, and a President, Rexhep Meidani, elected by the
    Parliament. The Prime Minister heads the Government; the presidency is
    a largely ceremonial position with limited executive power. The
    Socialist Party (SP) and its allies won 121 of 155 parliamentary seats
    in 1997 general elections held after a 5-month period of chaos and
    anarchy due to the collapse of pyramid schemes. Observers deemed the
    elections to be acceptable and satisfactory under the circumstances.
    Local elections were held in October and, despite some procedural
    shortcomings and some irregularities, were conducted in a tense but
    generally peaceful atmosphere and were judged by the Organization for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to have showed ``significant
    progress'' toward meeting international standards. The Constitution
    provides for an independent judiciary; however, continued political
    instability, limited resources, political pressure, inexperienced and
    untrained personnel, and widespread corruption weaken the judiciary's
    ability to function independently and efficiently.
        Local police units that report to the Minister of Public Order are
    responsible principally for internal security. One of the most serious
    problems involving public order and internal security is the fact that
    the police officers largely are untrained and often unreliable. The
    international community continued to provide training, advice, and
    equipment to improve the quality of the police forces; however,
    unprofessional behavior and corruption remained a major impediment to
    the development of an effective, civilian police force. The Ministry
    also has a small force of well-trained and effective police officers
    organized into special forces units to combat organized crime. The
    Government further consolidated public order throughout the country
    during the year, building on the progress that had been made in the
    previous year; however, serious problems remain in the area of
    policing. The police are affected by, and are sometimes part of, the
    country's widespread corruption. The National Intelligence Service
    (SHIK) is responsible for both internal and external intelligence
    gathering and counterintelligence. The military has a special 120-man
    ``commando'' unit, which operates in an antiterrorist role under the
    Minister of Defense. During times of domestic crisis, the law allows
    the Minister of Public Order to request authority over this unit; this
    was done as a precautionary measure during the October local elections.
    The police committed human rights abuses.
        Albania is a poor country in transition from central economic
    planning to a free market system, and many questions related to
    privatization, property ownership claims, and the appropriate
    regulation of business remain unresolved. More than 20 percent of the
    rural population lives under the official poverty line; in urban areas
    the figure is 11 percent. Overall, 17 percent of the country's
    population lives below the official poverty line. The country continued
    to experience slow but stable economic progress. Inflation was
    negligible during the year. The gross domestic product (GDP) grew by
    about 7 percent to an estimated $3.8 billion (532 billion lek). The
    official unemployment rate was 17.5 percent, a slight decrease from the
    18 percent of the previous year. With two-thirds of all workers
    employed in agriculture--mostly at the subsistence level--remittances
    from citizens working abroad are extremely important, as is foreign
    assistance. The GDP may be underestimated because considerable income
    is thought to be derived from various organized and semiorganized
    criminal activities. A variety of other unreported, noncriminal gray
    and black market activities, such as unlicensed small businesses, along
    with the Government's inability to collect fully accurate statistics,
    also contribute to the GDP's underestimation.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in some areas; however, numerous, serious problems remained. The
    opposition Democratic Party (DP) alleged that the Government was
    responsible for the killing of one of its members during the year.
    Police killed a DP demonstrator when a crowd of DP members attacked the
    police station and other public buildings in Tropoja. The police beat
    and otherwise abused suspects and prisoners. The DP often credibly
    complained about incidents of police harassment of its members and of
    the dismissal of some of its members from official positions for
    political reasons. The police at times arbitrarily arrested and
    detained persons, and prolonged pretrial detention is a problem. The
    judiciary is inefficient, and subject to corruption. Executive pressure
    on the judiciary remains, but decreased slightly. There were complaints
    of unqualified and unprofessional judges and credible accounts of
    judges who were intimidated or bribed by powerful criminals. The
    Government occasionally infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    Government respect for freedom of speech and of the press improved
    slightly; however, police at times beat and detained journalists, and
    academic freedom was constrained. Violence and discrimination against
    women and child abuse were serious problems. The Government took some
    steps to improve the treatment of ethnic minorities; however, societal
    discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, particularly
    against Roma, persisted. Child labor was a problem. Vigilante action,
    mostly related to traditional blood feuds, resulted in many killings.
    Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed cases of political killings by the Government, despite
    repeated claims by the DP that its members were harassed, beaten, and
    sometimes killed by government agents.
        In May a DP activist in Vlore was killed by unidentified persons
    immediately following a party rally. The DP claimed that government
    agents were responsible; however, the Government claimed it was a
    revenge killing by criminals. The Albanian Helsinki Committee expressed
    concern over the killing and appealed to government authorities to make
    all efforts to solve the case. There were no reports concerning a
    governmental response in this case.
        In November police killed a DP demonstrator when a crowd of DP
    members attacked the police station, courthouse, and other public
    buildings in Tropoja.
        The public prosecutor in Gjokastra investigated the cases of
    Kastriot Brega and Bardhyul Balliu, who died while in police custody
    and found insufficient evidence to justify prosecuting the officers
    involved. In 1999 the DP claimed that over 21 members, supporters,
    local government officials, and former national party officials were
    killed during 1997-99. The DP claimed that at least three of its
    members were killed during 1998: The chairman of the local branch of
    the Democratic Party of Kish-Arra village of Shkoder, the deputy
    chairman of the polling station in the Gjinar commune of the Elbasan
    district, and the chairman of the DP branch of Boric village in Malesia
    e Madhe. The DP accused the Government of failing to investigate these
    crimes, noting that no suspects were tried for the murders. The
    Democrats asked for the creation of an independent investigatory group
    that would oversee the investigation of these crimes (which the DP
    considers to be political). The Government did not create such a group
    but an investigation was continuing at year's end.
        The Council of Europe continued to express concern over the
    Government's lack of progress in investigating the 1998 assassination
    of senior DP Member Azem Hajdari. A police investigation was launched
    in December 1999 and some progress was reported, but the case had not
    been resolved as of year's end.
        The country continued to experience high levels of violent crime.
    Many killings occurred throughout the country as the result of
    individual or clan vigilante actions sometimes connected to traditional
    ``blood feuds,'' or in conflicts involving various criminal gangs.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
    motivated disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution stipulates that ``no one can be subject
    to torture, or cruel and brutal treatment;'' however, the police often
    beat suspects in the process of arresting them, and the Albanian
    Helsinki Committee reported that the police beat or otherwise
    mistreated prisoners. The Penal Code makes the use of torture a crime
    punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. According to the Albanian
    Helsinki Committee, major police stations were the sites of the worst
    abuses of detainees, and all stations were overcrowded.
        There were a number of reports of police violence. Four DP
    activists from the Lezhe region were pulled over and beaten by masked
    special police forces on a road north of Tirana in March. In April the
    daily Gazeta Shqiptare reported a number of police abuse cases in
    Elbasan, Lushnja, and Fieri, where more than 20 persons were taken into
    custody and subjected to beatings and maltreatment. In May the daily
    Albania reported the serious maltreatment of a number of persons
    arrested on charges of theft of public property. While police generally
    handled the DP demonstrations following the October elections in a
    restrained manner, there were instances where police beat and
    mistreated DP supporters (see Section 2.b.).
        In November Amnesty International (AI) reported that police
    arrested DP supporter Besnik Papa and held him at a police station in
    Tirana, where allegedly he was beaten so severely that he required
    hospital treatment.
        Several credible sources cited the police station at Elbasan as a
    source of a number of physical abuse cases. There are at least five
    cases of abuse pending against police officers; however, none of these
    cases had been prosecuted successfully by year's end.
        Police at times beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        There were no reports of investigation nor action taken against
    police who beat multiple persons in the towns of Spotalte and Cerrick
    in 1999.
        There were no reports of investigation nor action taken in the
    December 1998 case in which Besnik Jak, the leader of the Tirana
    University student hunger strike, was beaten while in police custody,
    nor in the 1999 case of Besim Biberaj, who suffered multiple broken
    bones as a result of beatings while in custody at a Tirana police
    station.
        Police receive some training and equipment, but there is a
    continuing need for further training and for improving investigative
    skills. Foreign governments continued police training programs that
    aimed at improving technical expertise, operational procedures, and
    respect for human rights, but the overall performance of law
    enforcement remained weak. In preparation for the October local
    elections, training was provided to police on how to deal with election
    security and how to respond to the needs of election observers.
    According to the Ministry of Public Order, more than 1,300 policemen
    received some training during the year, and 116 policemen received
    training abroad.
        Police corruption remains widespread. Sources in the Ministry of
    Public Order stated that more than 190 police officers were fired from
    their jobs during the year because of incompetence, lack of discipline,
    or violations of the law.
        Prison conditions remained poor and most prisons are overcrowded;
    however, efforts were made to improve the situation during the year.
    While the Government financed most improvements, it also has received
    international assistance. During the year, construction began on a new
    prison in Peqin, financed by the Italian government, which will house
    250 to 300 inmates.
        Overcrowding in prisons resulted in poor living conditions. In
    addition, because of overcrowding, prisoners are also held in prisons
    in Greece and Italy. According to Greek Ministry of Justice sources,
    more than 3,500 Albanians are in pre-detention centers and more than
    1,500 are serving sentences in Greece, 120 of whom are juveniles. Over
    1,500 prisoners are serving sentences in Italian prisons. Juveniles
    sometimes share cells with adults are a result of the shortage of cell
    space. Women are held separately from men.
        The country has no juvenile justice system. Children's cases go
    before judges who have not received any education in juvenile justice,
    and juveniles live in detention facilities with adults. Over 100
    children are serving sentences in adult prisons. In September an 8-year
    school for juveniles who are serving prison terms was opened. This is
    the first school of its kind in the country. Family visitation is
    allowed in prisons.
        The Government cooperated with the International Committee of the
    Red Cross and with other nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). There
    were no reports of refusal to permit access for prison inspections by
    either domestic or international groups.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Article 27 paragraph 1
    of the Constitution forbids arbitrary arrest and detention. However,
    police at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 1995
    Penal Procedures Code sets out the rights of detained and arrested
    persons. By law a police officer or prosecutor may order a suspect into
    custody. Detained persons must be informed immediately of the charges
    against them and of their rights. A prosecutor must be notified
    immediately after a suspect is detained by the police. Within 48 hours
    of the arrest or detention a court must decide, in the presence of the
    prosecutor, the suspect, and the suspect's lawyer the type of detention
    to be imposed. Legal counsel must be provided free of charge if the
    defendant cannot afford a private attorney; however, this right to
    legal counsel is not known widely and police often fail to inform
    suspects of it. As a result of a lack of resources, access to legal
    information remains difficult for citizens, including legal
    professionals and, sometimes, judges.
        There have been numerous cases in which persons have been
    unlawfully detained longer than the Penal Code's 48 hour limit. For
    example, two persons, Hysen and Valbona Ymeri, were detained in
    Lushnja, but their paperwork was not sent to the prosecutor's office
    until 6 days later.
        International organizations claim that prostitutes and trafficked
    women have been kept in detention for more than 2 days without charges
    being brought against them (see Section 6.f.).
        In September 1999, a DP newspaper alleged that three persons from
    the northern city of Kukes were held in police custody for more than 16
    months without trial. No further information on this case was available
    at year's end.
        Bail in the form of money or property may be required if the judge
    believes that the accused otherwise may not appear for trial.
    Alternatively a suspect may be placed under house arrest. The court may
    order pretrial confinement in cases where there is reason to believe
    that the accused may leave the country or is a danger to society.
        The Penal Procedures Code requires completion of pretrial
    investigations within 3 months. The prosecutor may extend this period
    by 3-month intervals in especially difficult cases. The accused and the
    injured party have the right to appeal these extensions to the district
    court. In practice lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. Delayed
    investigations also are a serious problem, and many persons are
    detained for periods that exceed the time limits set by law.
        There were no clear cases of detainees being held for strictly
    political reasons. However, the DP continued to claim that the Chairman
    of the Legality Party (the Monarchists), Ekrem Spahia, and 12
    supporters were being tried unfairly for participation in the events of
    September 14, 1998, which followed the assassination of the DP
    parliamentarian, Azem Hajdari, by unknown persons (see Section 1.a.).
    Spahia and the others were released during the year; however, their
    trials still were pending at year's end.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, continued political instability,
    limited resources, political pressure, and endemic corruption weaken
    the judiciary's ability to function independently and efficiently.
    Corruption remains a serious and widespread problem, especially with
    the growth of organized crime, and judges are subjected to both bribery
    attempts and intimidation. In May the High Council of Justice removed
    two judges from Tirana for disciplinary violations. International legal
    experts commented that the judges' removal was characterized by greater
    respect for due process and legal procedures than past similar
    instances.
        Many court buildings were destroyed in the civil unrest in 1997,
    and although all have reopened, important records and legal materials
    were lost permanently. Long case backlogs are typical. The removal of
    court budgets from the control of the Ministry of Justice to a
    separate, independent body, the Judicial Budget Office, and the
    establishment of a school for magistrates in 1999 were useful steps
    towards strengthening the independence of the judiciary. A board
    chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court runs the Judicial
    Budget Office. All other board members are judges.
        The judicial system is composed of district courts of the first
    instance, military courts, six courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court.
    There also is a separate and independent Constitutional Court. The
    Supreme Court hears appeals from the Courts of Appeal, while the
    Constitutional Court reviews those cases requiring constitutional
    interpretation.
        The President heads the High Council of Justice, which has
    authority to appoint, discipline, and dismiss judges of the courts of
    first instance and of the courts of appeal. Judges who are dismissed
    have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition to the
    President, the Council consists of the Minister of Justice, the head of
    the Supreme Court, six judges (chosen by sitting judges), two
    prosecutors (selected by the prosecutors), and four independent lawyers
    named by the Parliament.
        The President of the Republic nominates the President and Vice
    President of the Supreme Court, and the Parliament elects all of the
    Supreme Court's justices. The President selects four of the nine
    members of the Constitutional Court; five are elected by the
    Parliament. Parliament has the authority to approve and dismiss the
    judges of the Constitutional Court and the members of the Supreme
    Court. According to the law, dismissal only may be ordered after
    conviction for a serious crime or for mental incompetence. There were
    no new developments in the 1999 appeal of the former Chief Judge of the
    Supreme Court, who was dismissed from his position 3 years before the
    expiration of his mandate.
        Constitutional Court justices serve, in theory, maximum 9-year
    terms, with three justices rotating every 3 years. Justices of the
    Supreme Court serve for 7 years.
        Under the 1998 Constitution, the President appoints the prosecutor
    general with the consent of the Parliament. The President appoints and
    dismisses other prosecutors on the recommendation of the prosecutor
    general. The prosecutor general restructured his office in December
    1999 into divisions that focus on specific crimes.
        Parliament approves the courts' budgets and allocates funds. Each
    court may decide how to spend the money allocated to it. The Ministry
    of Justice provides and approves administrative personnel. The Ministry
    of Justice also supervises bailiffs' offices.
        Due to limited material resources, in many instances the court
    system is unable to process cases in a timely fashion. Public opinion
    holds the judiciary, in particular, responsible for the Government's
    failure to stop criminal activity. Tension continued between the police
    and the judiciary, despite some improvement in relations between police
    and prosecutors, especially outside Tirana. Each side cites the
    failures of the other as the reason criminals avoid imprisonment. The
    courts accuse the police of failing to provide the solid investigation
    and evidence necessary to prosecute successfully, and the police allege
    that corruption and bribery taint the courts.
        The Constitution provides that all citizens enjoy the right to a
    fair, speedy, and public trial, except in cases where the necessities
    of public order, national security, or the interests of minors or other
    private parties mandate restrictions. Defendants, witnesses, and others
    who do not speak Albanian are entitled to the services of a translator.
    If convicted the accused has the right to appeal the decision within 5
    days to the Court of Appeals.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
    provides for the inviolability of the individual person, of dwellings,
    and for the privacy of correspondence; however, the Government
    sometimes infringed on these rights. During the year, a number of
    persons complained to the Albanian Helsinki Committee that police,
    during their weapons collection campaign, did not use proper legal
    procedures to conduct house searches. Citizens also complained to the
    Committee that many of these searches were conducted late at night
    without any authorization. At least one individual complained to the
    Ombudsman that he was not adequately compensated for some land taken
    for public use. The Ombudsman referred the case to the Constitutional
    Court.
        There were no reports of wiretapping by Government authorities
    during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Law on Fundamental Human
    Rights and Freedoms provides for freedom of speech and of the press,
    and the Government generally respected these rights; however, police at
    times beat journalists. The media are active and unrestrained but have
    developed little sense of journalistic responsibility or professional
    integrity. With few exceptions, the print media lacks a mature, trained
    professional staff.
        Sensationalism is the norm in the newspapers, and the political
    party-oriented newspapers in particular print gossip, unsubstantiated
    accusations, and outright fabrications. Some publications appear to be
    making efforts to improve professional standards and to provide more
    balanced and accurate reporting.
        Attacks on journalists continued--both beatings by the police and
    attacks by unknown assailants. In March according to the daily
    Shekulli, a policeman in Korca beat a journalist from the independent
    radio station ABc. The journalist claimed he was beaten because the
    policeman considered him to be a spokesman for the opposition. In April
    while taping a fight between a group of citizens and members of the
    National Guard, a cameraman and journalists were spotted and beaten by
    Guard members. In May two journalists from TV ATN 1 were detained
    illegally by police officers and beaten while in detention.
        Political parties, trade unions, and various societies and groups
    publish their own newspapers or magazines, and competition with
    commercial publications is very keen. An estimated 200 publications are
    available, including daily and weekly newspapers, magazines,
    newsletters, and pamphlets. Five newspapers and two magazines are
    published in Greek in the south (see Section 5). The difficult economic
    situation and readers' distrust of the press again resulted in a
    significant drop in newspaper sales during the year. The total daily
    circulation of all newspapers dropped from about 65,000 copies to less
    than 50,000 copies. This came after a drop in 1999 from 75,000 to
    65,000 copies. According to a recent survey of the Albanian Media
    Institute, 60 percent of the persons interviewed believed that media
    stirred up trouble in the country; only 23 percent said that the media
    played a positive role. The opening of many new private radio and
    television stations is another reason for the drastic drop in
    circulation. According to the same survey, 65 percent of the public
    prefers to get its news from the private electronic media.
        Albanian Radio and Television (RTVSh) is the sole public
    broadcaster in the country. RTVSh is composed of national television
    and national radio. National television broadcasts 17 hours a day and
    covers over 91 percent of the population. Public television broadcasts
    2 hours a day via satellite. National radio broadcasts in two channels
    for 18 hours a day. Its signal covers 90 percent of the country's
    territory. Broadcasting issues are governed by the National Council of
    Radio and Television, a 15-member body elected by the Parliament. Radio
    Gjirokastra broadcasts a 45-minute program for the Greek community in
    the country every day (see Section 5). The Albanian Media Institute
    survey found that 58 percent of those questioned believed that
    regardless of the improvement in the programming of the public
    television channel, it still is regarded as a mouthpiece for the
    Government.
        Over 75 private television stations and 30 private radio stations
    operate. The National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasters
    (NCRT) awarded broadcasting licenses, but several broadcasters failed
    to pay for their licenses or abide by the regulations governing the
    licenses. In 1999 the Government established new licensing and
    oversight procedures to promote a more stable broadcasting environment.
    The NCRT made licenses available to existing local television
    broadcasters that were operating previously in an unregulated climate.
    In December the NCRT licensed 2 national television stations, 45 local
    television stations, 31 local radio stations, and 1 national radio
    station. The wide availability of satellite dishes provides citizens
    with easy access to international programming.
        The broadcast media exceed the print media in influence, audience
    penetration, and caliber of news reporting and public affairs
    programming. However, political affiliation is pervasive in
    programming. The OSCE reported that one new nationwide television
    station, TVArberia, provided for balanced and fair election reporting
    during the local elections in October. However, the majority of
    stations were blatantly one-sided in their political coverage.
        Academic freedom continues to be limited. University professors
    complain that some faculty members are hired or fired for political
    reasons and that students who have the right political connections get
    preferential treatment regardless of their personal qualifications.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on
    Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the right of
    peaceful assembly and the Government generally respected this right in
    practice. According to the law, organizers must obtain permits for
    gatherings in public places, which the police may refuse to issue for
    reasons such as security and traffic. In practice rallies and
    demonstrations were very common, the Government made no concerted
    efforts to prevent them, and the police generally maintained order with
    due respect for citizens' rights; however, during DP demonstrations
    before the October elections, the police beat and mistreated some DP
    supporters (see Section 1.c.). Police killed a demonstrator in November
    when a group of DP members attacked the police station, courthouse, and
    other public buildings in Tropoja. In some cases, individuals claimed
    that the police or secret agents of the SHIK intimidated them because
    of their participation in opposition rallies, while others claimed that
    they were fired from their jobs because they participated in opposition
    rallies.
        The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the
    right of association, and the Government generally respected this
    right. A political party must apply to the Ministry of Justice for
    official certification. It must declare an aim or purpose that is not
    anticonstitutional or otherwise contrary to law, describe its
    organizational structure, and account for all public and private funds
    it receives. Such certification is granted routinely.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    According to the 1998 Constitution, there is no official religion and
    all religions are equal. However, the predominant religious communities
    (Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) enjoy de facto recognition by
    the authorities that gives them the legal right to hold bank accounts,
    own property and buildings, and to function as legal entities based on
    their historical presence in the country.
        Religious movements--with the exception of the three de facto
    recognized religions--can acquire the official status of a legal entity
    only by registering under the Law on Associations, which recognizes the
    status of a nonprofit association irrespective of whether the
    organization has a cultural, recreational, religious, or humanitarian
    character.
        The Religious Council of the State Secretariat has been replaced by
    the State Committee on Cults, which is not composed of representatives
    of religious groups. The Government does not require registration or
    licensing of religious groups; however, the State Committee on Cults
    maintains a working knowledge, but not official records, of foreign
    religious organizations. The chairman of the committee has the status
    of a deputy minister.
        Foreign clergy, including Muslim clerics, Christian and Baha'i
    missionaries, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus
    Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and many others freely carry out
    religious activities. The State recognizes the de facto existence of
    the Bektashis but they did not have the right to their own
    representative in the former State Secretariat of Religions. There is
    no indication of Bektashis' activities being placed under the
    supervision of the Sunni community.
        According to official figures, there are 29 religious schools in
    the country with some 2,745 students. The State Committee has the right
    to approve the curricula of religious schools.
        The Government has not yet returned all the properties and
    religious objects under its control that were confiscated under the
    Communist regime in 1967. In cases where religious buildings were
    returned, the Government often failed to return the land surrounding
    the buildings. The Government also is unable to compensate the churches
    adequately for the extensive damage that many religious properties
    suffered. The Orthodox Church has complained that it has had difficulty
    in recovering some religious icons for restoration and safekeeping.
        The Albanian Evangelical Alliance, an association of more than 100
    Protestant Churches, has complained that it has encountered
    administrative obstacles to building churches, accessing the media, and
    receiving exemptions from customs duties. The growing evangelical
    community continues to seek official recognition and participation in
    the religious affairs section of the Council of Ministers.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and
    Freedoms provides for freedom of movement within the country and for
    freedom to leave the country and return, and the Government respects
    these rights in practice.
        A problem that arose as a result of uncontrolled internal migration
    is local registration and status. As a result of such internal
    migration, thousands of citizens are denied access to certain basic
    services such as education and medical care. In many educational
    institutions, students must have, among other documents, an official
    document from the district authorities that acknowledges that they are
    inhabitants of the district. The lack of such documents prevents many
    students from attending school. The effects of uncontrolled internal
    migration became apparent during the October local elections when tens
    of thousands of inhabitants were registered in more than one place,
    resulting in many inaccuracies in the voter lists.
        Citizens who fled the country during or after the Communist regime
    are able to return, and if they lost their citizenship, they are able
    to have it restored. Citizens born in the country who emigrate may hold
    dual citizenship.
        The Constitution gives foreigners the right of refuge in the
    country, and a 1998 asylum law includes provisions for the granting of
    refugee status, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1961 Protocol. The Government accepts
    the entry of refugees, does not expel those with valid claims to
    refugee status, and works with the international community to provide
    housing and support for them. The Government provides for first asylum,
    but no appeals procedure mechanism was in place at year's end.
        The country hosted approximately 4,000 registered refugees during
    the year. The refugee population overwhelmingly is Kosovar; only 28
    refugees identified themselves as coming from outside the borders of
    the former Yugoslavia. Humanitarian relief organizations provided
    social service support for the refugee community and coordinated
    further assistance through a network of NGO's that provide health care
    coverage, insurance, and limited training. The Government continued to
    play a key role in facilitating and coordinating the work of these
    groups. The vast majority of refugees continued to live with host
    families. There were approximately 500 registered Kosovar refugees and
    a small number of other refugees left in the country at year's end.
        Organized criminal gangs have made the smuggling of illegal
    immigrants--Albanians, Kurds, Pakistanis, Chinese, Turks, and others
    from the Middle East and Asia--a lucrative business. Italy is the most
    common destination. The Government has taken a number of measures to
    stop the flow, but a lack of resources and corruption among law
    enforcement forces, hinders its efforts. Italian military and border
    patrol squads operate in various coastal zones in Albania in an effort
    to stop the flow of illegal immigrants. In September following an
    incident in which two Italian Guardia di Finanza police were killed
    while combating traffickers, Parliament enacted a new, stronger law
    that, if implemented, should make it easier for police to seize the
    speedboats used primarily for illegal smuggling of persons. It enables
    the police to confiscate speedboats, on land or water, that are used in
    illegal activities and those that are unregistered. Individuals who
    have become stranded in Albania while trying to use this illegal
    pipeline are eligible for a ``care and maintenance'' program run by the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Albanian Red Cross
    and can have their cases evaluated by UNHCR officials. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution states that ``Governance is based on a system of
    elections that are free, equal, general, and periodic;'' citizens
    elected a government in 1997 in what international observers considered
    to be a satisfactory process, given the proceeding months of chaos and
    anarchy.
        In October despite procedural shortcomings and some irregularities
    in a few localities, citizens took part in local elections in a tense
    but generally peaceful atmosphere that were judged by the OSCE to have
    shown ``significant progress'' toward meeting international standards.
    International monitors considered the second round of voting ``less
    transparent and inclusive'' due to the failure to address inaccuracies
    in the voter lists, invalid ballots, and election complaints. Serious
    irregularities, including intimidation of election commission members,
    the destruction of one ballot box, and fraud in three other voting
    centers were reported in Himara.
        The Constitution prohibits the formation of any party or
    organization that is totalitarian; incites and supports racial,
    religious, or ethnic hatred; uses violence to take power or influence
    state policies; or is nontransparent or secretive in character.
        No legal impediments hinder the full participation of women and
    minorities in government, and the major political parties have women's
    organizations and have women serving on their central committees;
    however, women continue to be underrepresented in politics and
    government. In the Parliament, 10 of 155 members are female (1 of whom
    serves as deputy prime minister). In the current Government two
    ministers are female. Ethnic Greeks constitute the largest minority.
    They are represented in the current Government and participate actively
    in various political parties.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government generally permitted human rights and related
    organizations to function freely. The Albanian Helsinki Committee, the
    Albanian Human Rights Group, the Society for Democratic Culture, the
    Albanian Media Institute, the Albanian Institute for Contemporary
    Studies, and the Women's Center were among the most active domestic
    NGO's involved in human rights activities. Despite the assistance of
    international donors, the work of all of these organizations is
    hampered by a shortage of funds and equipment; the Government
    cooperated only minimally with these local groups.
        A wide variety of international human rights NGO's visited or
    operated within the country with the cooperation of the Government and
    generally without restriction. These organizations are free to publish
    and disseminate their findings, including criticisms of the Government.
        In February Parliament elected the country's first national
    People's Advocate (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman's office, with the support
    of western governments and the OSCE, has already reviewed over 250
    cases of alleged human rights abuses. These include citizen complaints
    of police and military abuse of power, lack of enforcement of court
    judgments in civil cases, wrongful governmental dismissal, and land
    disputes (see Sections 1.c. , 1.e. , and 1.f.). The Ombudsman's office
    has had some success in cases, but it still is too early to judge
    whether it will genuinely be effective.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions prohibits discrimination
    based on sex, race, ethnicity, language, or religion; however, women
    and some minority groups complain that discrimination continues in
    practice.
        Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse are serious
    problems. In the country's traditionally male-dominated society,
    cultural acceptance and lax police response result in most abuse going
    unreported. Rape is punishable by law, as is spousal rape; however, in
    practice spousal rape is not reported or prosecuted. The concepts of
    spousal rape and sexual harassment are not well established, and,
    consequently, such acts often are not considered crimes. No government-
    sponsored program protects the rights of women. An NGO maintains a
    shelter in Tirana for abused women, but the facility has the capacity
    to house only a few victims at a time. The same NGO also operates a
    hotline that women and girls can call for advice and counseling. The
    line received thousands of calls during the year. In 1999 the Advice
    Center for Women and Girls, an NGO, conducted a poll that showed that
    as many as 64 percent of females claimed to be victims of domestic
    violence.
        Many men, especially those from the northeastern part of the
    country, still follow the traditional code known as the ``kanun,'' in
    which women are considered and treated as chattel. Also under the
    kanun, it is acceptable to kidnap young women for brides. This practice
    continues in some areas of the northeast.
        Women are not excluded, by law or in practice, from any occupation;
    however, they are not well represented at the highest levels of their
    fields. The Labor Code mandates equal pay for equal work, but no data
    are available on how well this principle is implemented in practice.
    Women enjoy equal access to higher education, but they are not accorded
    full and equal opportunity in their careers, and it is common for well-
    educated women to be underemployed or to work outside the field of
    their training. An increasing number of women are beginning to venture
    out on their own, opening shops and small businesses. Many are
    migrating along with men to Greece and Italy to seek employment.
        Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of prostitution is a
    serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government's commitment to children's rights and
    welfare is codified in domestic law and through international
    agreements. The law provides for the right to at least 8 years of free
    education and also authorizes private schools. School attendance is
    mandatory through the eighth grade (or until age 18, whichever comes
    first). However, in practice many children leave school earlier than
    allowed by law in order to work with their families, especially in
    rural areas. According to recent statistics issued by the Ministry of
    Public Order and the Commission for Reconciliation of Blood Feuds, more
    than 2,000 children are endangered by blood feuds involving their
    families.
        Child sexual abuse rarely is reported, but authorities and NGO's
    believe that it exists. According to the Ministry of Public Order, more
    than 300 cases of child sexual abuse were reported during the year.
    According to the Center for the Protection of Children's Rights (CRCA),
    more than 2,000 children between the ages of 13 and 18 are involved in
    prostitution rings. According to the same organization, a large number
    of children (as many as 4,000) work as child prostitutes in Greece, and
    trafficking in children is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Criminals may kidnap children from families or orphanages to be sold to
    prostitution or pedophilia rings abroad. Within the country, Roma
    children often work as beggars and the police generally ignore the
    practice. In Tirana and other cities, it is common to see children
    selling cigarettes and other items on the street.
        People with Disabilities.--Widespread poverty, unregulated working
    conditions, and poor medical care pose significant problems for many
    disabled persons. The disabled are eligible for various forms of public
    assistance, but budgetary constraints mean that the amounts that they
    receive are very low. No law mandates accessibility to public buildings
    for people with disabilities, and little has been done in this regard.
        Religious Minorities.--Relations among the various religious groups
    are generally amicable, and tolerance is widespread. Society largely is
    secular. Intermarriage among religious groups is extremely common.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that Orthodox
    churches were the targets of vandals.
        The Archbishop of the Orthodox Church concluded that attacks on
    church property in the past were a result of vandalism rather than
    religious repression.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government played a
    constructive role in maintaining the nation's generally positive record
    on the treatment of minorities. While no recent official statistics
    exist regarding the size of the various ethnic communities, ethnic
    Greeks are the most organized and receive the most attention and
    assistance from abroad. There also are small groups of Macedonians,
    Vlachs, and Roma.
        Greek-language public elementary schools are common in much of the
    southern part of the country, where almost all ethnic Greeks live.
    However, there are no Greek-language high schools. There is a Greek
    chair at the University of Gjirokaster. The Greek minority association,
    Omonia, continued to press the authorities for more measures to protect
    the rights of the Greek minority, including the creation of additional
    Greek-language classes in some parts of the south. In May a fact-
    finding mission of the Albanian Helsinki Committee visited the ethnic
    Greek area of Dropulli. Every village in this zone has its own
    elementary-middle (8-year) school in the Greek language, regardless of
    the number of students. Five newspapers are published in the Greek
    language in this area, in addition to 15 Greek papers and magazines
    distributed throughout the southern Albanian region. Radio Gjirokastra
    broadcasts a 45-minute program for the Greek community. Every teacher
    who teaches in the schools of the Greek minority zone receives, in
    addition to the salary given by the Albanian Government, a substantial
    monthly compensation of about $140 (50,000 drachmas) from the Greek
    Government. Likewise retirees who belong to this community, in addition
    to the pension received from the Albanian Government, get substantial
    monthly compensation from the Greek Government.
        Classes in the Macedonian language are available to students in the
    districts of Pogradeci and Devolli, on the border with the former
    Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian Government provides
    texts for these classes free of charge. A considerable number of
    students from this area study at the universities of Skopje and Bitola.
    A small group of ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs live in the northern
    part of the country. A fact-finding mission of the Albanian Helsinki
    Committee visited the area in April and found that these communities
    have decreased in number because many of their members emigrated to
    Montenegro. This minority is not subject to any discrimination. People
    from this area receive scholarships from the Montenegrin Government for
    their children to study in Montenegro. No discrimination was reported
    against the Vlachs, who speak their own Romanian-related language as
    well as Albanian, or against the Cams, non-Orthodox ethnic Albanians
    who were exiled from Greece in 1944. Both groups live mainly in the
    south.
        Two distinct groups of Roma, the Jevg and the Arrixhi (Gabel), are
    established in the country. The Jevg tend to be settled in urban areas
    and generally are more integrated into the economy than the Arrixhi.
    Roma are the most neglected minority group. Broadly speaking they
    suffer from high illiteracy, poor public health conditions, and marked
    economic disadvantages. Roma encounter much societal discrimination.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form
    independent trade unions. The 1993 Labor Code established procedures
    for the protection of workers' rights through collective bargaining
    agreements. Two major federations act as umbrella organizations for
    most of the country's unions: The Independent Confederation of Trade
    Unions of Albania (membership around 118,000) and the Albanian
    Confederation of Trade Unions (membership around 100,000). Both
    organizations again experienced a drop in membership during the year.
    Some unions chose not to join either of the federations. No union has
    an official political affiliation, and the Government does not provide
    any financial support for unions.
        The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions and other legislation
    provides that all workers, except the uniformed military, the police,
    and some court officials have the right to strike. The law forbids
    strikes that are declared openly to be political or that are judged by
    the courts to be political.
        Unions are free to join and maintain ties with international
    organizations, and many did so during the year.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizens in all
    fields of employment, except uniformed members of the armed forces,
    police officers, and some court employees, have the constitutional
    right to organize and bargain collectively. In practice unions
    representing public sector employees negotiate directly with the
    Government.
        Labor unions do not operate from a position of strength, given the
    country's very high level of unemployment. Effective collective
    bargaining in these circumstances is difficult, and agreements are hard
    to enforce.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Law on Major
    Constitutional Provisions and the Labor Code prohibit forced or
    compulsory labor; however, trafficking in women for purposes of
    prostitution is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.). The law also
    forbids forced or bonded labor by children; however, there were reports
    that children are trafficked and forced to work abroad as prostitutes
    or beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age of employment at 16
    years and limits the amount and type of labor that can be performed by
    persons under the age of 18. Children between the ages of 14 and 16
    legally may work in part-time jobs during summer vacation. Primary
    school education is compulsory and free through age 18 or the eighth
    grade, whichever comes first; however, in rural areas, children
    continue to assist families in farm work.
        The Ministry of Labor may enforce minimum age requirements through
    the courts, but no recent cases of this actually occurring were known.
    In Tirana and other cities, it is common to see children selling
    cigarettes and other items on the street. The Government has not yet
    signed ILO Convention 182.
        The law forbids forced or bonded labor by children; however,
    trafficking in children is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for all
    workers over the age of 16 is approximately $50 (6,380 lek) per month,
    which is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. Many workers look for second jobs, which are
    difficult to find. Remittances from those working abroad are very
    important for many families. The law provides for social assistance
    (income support) and unemployment compensation, but these are very
    limited, both in terms of the amounts received and the number of
    persons actually covered. The average wage for workers in the public
    sector is approximately $100 (13,201 lek) per month.
        The difference between the monthly average wage of persons who live
    in the rural and urban areas is considerable: Persons who work and live
    in urban areas earn almost 50 percent more than those who live and work
    in rural areas. Data from the National Institute of Statistics
    indicated that in rural areas more than 20 percent of persons live
    under the official poverty line, while in urban areas the figure is 11
    percent. Nationwide over 17 percent of the population live under the
    official poverty line. No data are available for private sector wages,
    but they are believed to be considerably higher than in the public
    sector.
        The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although in practice hours
    typically are set by individual or collective agreement. Many persons
    work 6 days a week.
        The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, but
    it has limited funds to make improvements in the remaining state-owned
    enterprises and a limited ability to enforce standards in the private
    sector. Actual conditions in the workplace generally are very poor and
    often dangerous. In 1999 there were five deaths recorded in the
    construction industry; the victims' families did not receive any
    financial support from the state social security administration because
    the workers were not insured. The Labor Code lists the safety
    obligations of employers and employees but does not provide specific
    protection for workers who choose to leave a workplace because of
    hazardous conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not criminalize
    trafficking in persons, although anti-kidnaping laws may be used to
    prosecute such cases; however, trafficking in women for the purpose of
    prostitution and trafficking in children are serious problems. While
    the exact number of Albanian women that are trafficked is unknown, an
    Albanian NGO estimates that there were about 30,000 working abroad as
    prostitutes, in Turkey and other countries during the year. The country
    also is one of the major transit countries for the trafficking of women
    from Moldova and Romania in particular, and from Bulgaria, Russia, and
    Ukraine. These women are brought into the country, mainly through
    Montenegro, then clandestinely transported to neighboring countries
    such as Italy and Greece. Trafficking in children also is a serious
    problem. Criminals may kidnap children from families or orphanages to
    be sold to pedophilia rings abroad.
        Police treatment of women trafficked from Albania and third
    countries remains a problem. There is a lack of appropriate facilities
    for such women, and trafficked women often are detained in police
    stations for extended periods of time (see section 1.d).
        Trafficked women periodically are arrested and prosecuted for
    prostitution. The Italian Guardia di Finanza (Fiscal Police), which
    patrols the Adriatic for traffickers, claims to turn back between five
    and eight scafis (rubber boats used by traffickers) each night,
    although not all of these necessarily involved trafficked women.
        The Government has begun to initiate limited law enforcement and
    legal reforms to combat the problem; however, porous borders, poorly
    trained and corrupt law enforcement and judiciary officials, legal
    loopholes, and lack of government will have hampered these efforts. The
    Prosecutor General's Office confirmed that very few cases against
    traffickers were presented during the year.
        Several NGO's address the problem of trafficking on case-by-case
    basis; however, given the scope of the trafficking problem and limited
    resources to address individual reintegration, most victims of
    trafficking receive little or no assistance. The reintegration of
    trafficked women to their homes sometimes is problematic. In some
    cases, women simply are returned to the family members who sold them to
    traffickers in the first place, or to the same situation from which
    they were trafficked, which often leads to these women being re-
    trafficked. In addition victims of trafficking often are forced or
    deceived into bonded labor and live in violent and abusive conditions,
    which leaves them with physical and mental scars. As a result,
    sheltering, counseling, and reintegrating victims is a difficult
    undertaking.
        The International Organization for Migration and the International
    Catholic Migration Commission have established an inter-agency referral
    system that enables a group of organizations to jointly provide return
    and reintegration assistance to women who are victims of trafficking.
    From January through June, 65 women were returned through the program.
    This system also provides a framework to assist with temporary shelter
    and return assistance for trafficking victims from other countries that
    want to return from Albania to their home countries.
                                   __________

                                    ANDORRA

        The Principality of Andorra is a constitutional parliamentary
    democracy. Two Princes with joint authority, representing secular and
    religious authorities, have headed the Principality since 1278. Under
    the 1993 Constitution, the two Princes--the President of France and the
    Catholic Bishop of Seu d'Urgell, Spain--serve equally as heads of
    state, and are represented each in Andorra by a delegate. Elections
    were held in 1997 to choose members of the ``Consell General'' (the
    Parliament), which selects the head of government. The judiciary
    functions independently.
        Andorra has no defense force and depends on neighboring Spain and
    France for external defense. The national police, under effective
    civilian control, have sole responsibility for internal security.
        The market-based economy is influenced significantly by those of
    its neighbors France and Spain. After some years of a serious
    recession, the economy is undergoing a period of economic expansion.
    Commerce and tourism are the main sources of income. Because of banking
    secrecy laws, the financial services sector is growing in importance.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
    dealing with individual instances of abuse.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions.
        In June an attorney filed a complaint against the director of the
    police, 2 police commissioners and 11 members of the police force,
    alleging he was arrested illegally. This case was still pending at
    year's end.
        In spite of the request of the Council of Europe's Committee for
    the Prevention of Torture, the Government has declined thus far to
    modify the law to provide arrested individuals access to an attorney
    from the moment of arrest. Legislation now provides legal assistance
    only 24 hours after the time of arrest.
        In May the country became part of a network of 47 states with
    prisoner transfer arrangements permitting qualifying prisoners to serve
    their sentences in their own country.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The highest judicial body is the five-member Superior Council of
    Justice. One member each is appointed by: The two Princes; the head of
    government; the President of the Parliament; and, collectively, members
    of the lower courts. Members of the judiciary are appointed for 6-year
    terms.
        The judiciary provided citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
    process.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides citizens with safeguards
    against arbitrary interference with their ``privacy, honor, and
    reputation,'' and government authorities generally respect these
    prohibitions. Private dwellings are considered inviolable. No searches
    of private premises may be conducted without a judicially issued
    warrant. Violations are subject to effective legal sanction. The law
    also protects private communications.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system, combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice. Since adoption of the 1993 Constitution, the Government has
    registered various parties; some of them have dissolved.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Constitution acknowledges a special relationship between the Roman
    Catholic Church and the State, ``in accordance with Andorran
    tradition.'' The Catholic Church receives no direct subsidies from the
    Government, although some payment is provided to the church for
    maintenance of birth and death records. Catholic religious instruction
    is available to students in public schools on an optional basis,
    outside of both regular school hours and during the time frame set
    aside for elective school activities, such as civics or ethics. The
    Catholic Church provides teachers for these classes, and the Government
    pays their salaries. The Government professes willingness to provide
    instruction in other religions on the same basis, if parents so
    request; however, at years end no parent's requested instruction in any
    religions other than the Catholic religion.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It
    is government policy not to expel persons having valid claims to
    refugee status, and there were no reports of such expulsions. The issue
    of first asylum did not arise during the year.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although
    progress has been made and there are no formal barriers, few women have
    run for office. One out of 28 Members of Parliament is a woman, and 1
    woman holds a cabinet level position.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government accepts international and nongovernmental
    investigations of allegations of human rights abuses. Approximately 10
    human rights associations exist in the country, the most active being
    the Association of Immigrants in Andorra (AIA) and the Association of
    Andorran Women (AAW). The first defends the rights of foreign
    residents. The second actively supports women's rights. The latter
    collaborates with the Department of Public Health and Social Welfare to
    help battered women, single parent families, and others in need. In
    spite of demands from the two organizations, the Government has
    declined to create a department specifically for women's issues.
        In one case, a citizen filed a complaint with the European Court of
    Human Rights when the judge in his case disallowed his appeal to the
    Constitutional Court. The appeal contended that his trial was not
    sufficiently impartial. However, the court, after studying the case,
    did not accept the complaint and stated that no violation of human
    rights had occurred.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution declares that all persons are equal before the law
    and prohibits discrimination on grounds of birth, race, sex, origin,
    religion, opinions, or any other personal or social condition, although
    the law grants many rights and privileges exclusively to citizens. The
    Government effectively enforces these provisions.
        Women.--There is no specific legislation regarding violence against
    women. Article 8.2 of the Constitution is applied in such cases. The
    AIA and the AAW received more than 60 complaints of physical and
    psychological violence against women, as compared with 4 in 1999. The
    associates maintained that the number is increasing. They also asserted
    that such domestic violence existed at all levels of society. Women
    suffering from domestic violence requested help from Women's
    Associations, but very rarely filed a complaint with the police. No
    complaints are known to have been filed with the police by year's end.
        In theory there is no legal discrimination against women, privately
    or professionally; however, the AAW reported that in practice, there
    have been many cases of women dismissed from employment due to
    pregnancy. Discriminatory wage differentials were reportedly common,
    with some women's wages an average of 32 percent lower than their male
    counterparts' earnings. The Association actively promoted women's
    issues through information exchanges and limited direct support to
    those in need.
        Children.--The Government's commitment to children's welfare is
    demonstrated by its systems of health care and education. Free public
    education begins at age 4 and is compulsory until age 16. The
    Government provides free nursery schools, although the existing number
    falls short of the need.
        On September 7, the Government signed an optional protocol of the
    Convention of the Rights of Children related to selling of children,
    child prostitution, and child pornography.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. The law mandates access to new buildings for people
    with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
    practice.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Spanish nationals are the
    largest group of foreign residents, accounting for approximately 43
    percent of the population. Other sizable foreign groups are Portuguese,
    French, and British. A small but fast growing group of immigrants,
    especially from North Africa, work mostly in agriculture and
    construction.
        Although the Constitution states that foreign legal residents enjoy
    the same rights and freedoms as citizens, some immigrant workers
    believed that they did not have the same rights and security. Recent
    legislation has improved the quality of life for immigrant workers.
    Nevertheless, many immigrant workers hold only ``temporary work
    authorizations.'' These permits are valid only as long as the job
    exists for which the permit was obtained. When job contracts expire,
    temporary workers must leave the country. The Government prohibits the
    issuance of work permits, unless workers can demonstrate that they have
    a fixed address with minimally satisfactory living conditions.
        More than 4,000 immigrants do not have work permits or residence
    permits because the quota for immigration is not as high as the number
    of workers needed and employed in the country.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the right
    of all persons to form and maintain managerial, professional, and trade
    union associations without prejudice. In accordance with constitutional
    provisions, a registry of associations was established in 1996 and is
    being maintained. Strikes were illegal under the old system, and the
    new Constitution does not state explicitly that strikes are permitted.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution states that both ``workers and employers have the right to
    defend their own economic and social interests.'' Parliament is charged
    with adopting legislation to regulate this right in order to guarantee
    the provision of essential services, such as the vital services of
    doctors, nurses, and police. Antiunion discrimination is not prohibited
    under the law. Approximately 600 associations exist in the country and
    have registered within the Government's Register of Association by
    year's end, this figure includes cultural associations, workers
    associations, foreign associations, colleges and attorney's, colleges
    of physicians, and a police trade union. No unions have emerged among
    workers in the private sector. No figure is available regarding the
    percentage of unionized labor. A partial reason for this circumstance
    is that no statue regarding labor relations and unionization has been
    elaborated. Even the police union functions more as a professional
    association than as a syndicate.
        In November the Government signed the European Social Charter.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
    prohibit forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children
    specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Children under the age of 18 normally are prohibited from
    working, although in exceptional circumstances children ages 16 and 17
    may be allowed to work. The Labor Inspection Office in the Ministry of
    Social Welfare, Public Health, and Labor enforces child labor
    regulations. The law does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by
    children specifically; however, such practices are not known to occur
    (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The workweek is limited to 40
    hours, although employers may require overtime from workers. The legal
    maximums for overtime hours are 66 hours per month and 426 hours per
    year. An official minimum wage is set by government regulations. Other,
    higher wages are established by contract. The minimum wage is
    approximately $3.45 (674 pesetas) per hour and approximately $599
    (116,827 pesetas) per month. The minimum wage barely provides a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. The Labor Inspection Office
    enforces minimum wage observance. Workers can be dismissed with 15
    days' to 6 months' notice, depending on how long they have been working
    for the company. A minimal indemnification of 1 month's salary per year
    worked is paid if a worker is fired without justification.
        A dismissed worker receives unemployment and health benefits for
    only 25 days. A board composed of Andorran nationals, although they
    represent only a small portion of the work force, controls retirement
    benefits. The Labor Inspection Service hears labor complaints.
        The Labor Inspection Service sets occupational health and safety
    standards and takes the necessary steps to see that they are enforced.
    During the past year, the Labor Inspection Service filed 145 complaints
    against companies for violating labor regulations, and it has the
    authority to levy sanctions and fines against such companies. The law
    authorizes employees to refuse certain tasks if their employers do not
    provide the customary level of protection. No legislation grants
    workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
    without jeopardy to their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    in, to, from, or within the country. Nor is the country a transit point
    for traffic in persons. However, the law does provide punishment for
    traffickers of illegal workers.
                                   __________

                                    ARMENIA

        Armenia has a Constitution that provides for the separation of
    powers; however, the directly elected President has extensive powers of
    appointment and decree that are not balanced by the legislature or an
    independent judiciary. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who
    is in charge of the Cabinet. Robert Kocharian was elected President in
    a multi-candidate election in 1998 after former President Levon Ter-
    Petrossian was forced to resign by his former political allies in the
    Government and Parliament. There were flaws in both rounds of the 1998
    presidential elections. Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE) observers witnessed very substantial irregularities and
    concluded that the elections seriously challenged international
    democratic norms in regard to most key criteria. These irregularities
    inflated the number of votes for Kocharian. Nonetheless, the 1998
    elections, the May 1999 Parliamentary and October 1999 municipal
    elections, and several 2000 by-elections showed continued improvement
    over past elections with respect to voting practice and vote-counting,
    as well as the ability of a pluralistic group of candidates to campaign
    freely. Although irregularities marred both the parliamentary and local
    elections in 1999, OSCE observers categorized the former as a relevant
    step toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but stated that they
    still failed to meet international standards, with problems in many
    precincts such as inaccurate or obsolete voting lists, the presence of
    unauthorized personnel during the voting and counting processes, and
    possible irregularities involving voting of military personnel. Some
    local observers reported that 1999 municipal elections and by-elections
    in 2000 also were flawed by poor voter lists and by disappearance or
    non-distribution of unmarked ballots. The Parliament differs from
    previous ones in two important ways: First, members are required to
    serve full-time and not to hold jobs outside the legislature, and
    second, the number of seats was reduced from 190 to 131. The current
    majority, made up of a coalition called Unity, includes the two largest
    parties, the Republican Party and the Peoples' Party. Unity is assisted
    by a group of loosely organized independents who call themselves the
    Stability Bloc. This Bloc split in December with a minority faction
    renaming itself the ``Democrats.'' Some deputies from Unity left the
    group during the year over policy differences and formed a bloc called
    Hayastan, which opposes the Government on some issues, and reduced but
    not eliminated Unity's majority. The legislature approves new laws,
    must confirm the Prime Minister's program, and can remove the Prime
    Minister by a vote of no confidence. Both the Government and the
    legislature can propose legislation. The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice, judges are subject to
    pressure from the executive branch and corruption.
        The Ministries of Internal Affairs and of National Security,
    formerly one ministry which split in 1999, are jointly responsible for
    domestic security, intelligence activities, border controls, and the
    national police force. Members of the security forces committed human
    rights abuses.
        The transition from a centralized, controlled economy to a market
    economy continued to move forward, although the industrial sector still
    is not functioning at peak capacity and its output remains low.
    Unemployment remains high, resulting in a high degree of income
    inequality, but the exact figure is difficult to quantify. This is
    because a significant amount of economic activity, perhaps as much as
    40 percent, is not captured by government accounting or taxation;
    unemployment is approximately 12.1 percent according to the Government;
    however, other services estimate the unemployment rate to be
    approximately 50 percent. Women form a disproportionately large number
    of the unemployed. Most small and medium-sized enterprises have been
    privatized, as has most agricultural land. All landowners now have
    received titles to their land, which are protected by the Constitution.
    The passage of a bill establishing a strict and transparent system for
    bidding on privatization of the electrical distribution network in
    August, was seen as a major step forward in establishing a system for
    fair and transparent privatization of state enterprises. Out-migration
    remains a serious problem. The gross domestic product (GDP) increased
    about 2.5 percent, to about $600 per capita. Inflation fell to below 1
    percent for the year. Foreign assistance and remittances from Armenians
    abroad play a major role in sustaining the economy, although the
    financial crisis in Russia, where many Armenians have gone to look for
    work, cut deeply into the flow of remittances. The Government is
    working to resolve its current budget deficit through increasing the
    tax collection rate, as well as by continuing cuts in most areas of
    government spending.
        The Government's human rights record was poor in several important
    areas, and although there were improvements in a few areas, problems
    persist in numerous areas. Substantial intervention by local power
    structures in the election process continues to restrict citizens'
    ability to change their Government peacefully. There were no reports
    that members of the security forces committed extrajudical killings due
    to severe beatings and mistreatment in detention. However, there were
    no reports of government action against individuals who may have been
    responsible for the reported 54 deaths in custody in 1999. Members of
    the security forces routinely beat detainees during arrest and
    interrogation, arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without
    warrants, and did not respect constitutional protections regarding
    privacy and due process. Impunity remains a problem, and the Government
    rarely investigates abuses by members of the security forces. Prison
    conditions did improve; however, they still are harsh and life-
    threatening. Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. During the year,
    parliamentary commissions were allowed to visit military camps and hear
    complaints about abuses from recruits. The judiciary is subject to
    political pressure and does not enforce constitutional protections
    effectively. There are some limits on press freedom, and many
    journalists practice self-censorship. State television, which refrains
    from criticizing government policy, remains the major source of news
    for most of the population, but independent television and newspapers,
    along with private radio stations, offer substantial competition. The
    nongovernmental media often criticize the country's leadership and
    policies. Burdensome registration requirements hinder freedom of
    association. The law places some restrictions on religious freedom,
    including a prohibition against proselytizing by religions other than
    the Armenian Apostolic Church. Registration requirements for religious
    groups kept Jehovah's Witnesses from operating legally, and 41
    Jehovah's Witnesses are in jail for refusing military service. The
    Government places some restrictions on freedom of movement.
    Discrimination against women, the disabled, and minorities remains a
    problem. The plight of street children is a significant problem.
    Trafficking in women and girls also is a problem.
        After President Kocharian's election in 1998, a number of
    commissions were established, and a constitutional referendum was
    proposed, with the goal of improving human rights and reforming the
    judiciary. By year's end, none of the proposed recommendations had been
    implemented, and no referendum had been held.
        In October 1999, five terrorists entered the National Assembly and
    killed the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, six
    other deputies or members of the Government, and wounded at least five
    more persons. An investigation of the killings, conducted by the Deputy
    Prosecutor General, resulted in the detention of 19 persons, including
    a deputy of the National Assembly, the then presidential chief of
    staff, and the deputy chief of state television. Five persons
    subsequently were released after spending several months in jail when
    evidence proved insufficient to charge them. Another detainee died in
    prison in September, apparently of accidental electrocution. The trial
    of the remaining accused was scheduled to begin in late October but was
    postponed at the request of defense attorneys and is scheduled to begin
    in February 2001.
        Defense attorneys and the press accused the Deputy Prosecutor
    General of using coercion, including physical abuse of the accused, to
    extract evidence, and President Kocharian expressed concern that the
    rights of the accused be respected.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings. The Government took no action by year's
    end regarding 54 cases of deaths in custody in 1999, which the
    International Helsinki Federation had asked it to investigate. The
    cases of Stepan Gevorgian and Arsen Stepanian were closed during the
    year due to lack of evidence.
        There were a significant number of deaths of military servicemen
    reportedly due to mistreatment and training related accidents (see
    Section 1.c.).
        According to an August announcement by the prosecutor general's
    office, in 1999 there were 54 deaths in custody due to beatings and
    mistreatment in detention. No information on such incidents were
    available by year's end. Norayr Yeghiazarian, a detainee awaiting trial
    in connection with the October 1999 shootings in Parliament (see
    below), was found dead in his cell in September. The Ministry of
    National Security announced, and other prisoners in his cell confirmed,
    that he was accidentally electrocuted through improper handling of an
    electrical appliance.
        Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening, and medical
    treatment is inadequate. There were a number of deaths in prison due to
    disease (see Section 1.c.). The International Committee of the Red
    Cross (ICRC) signed an agreement with the Government in June to open a
    tuberculosis facility for inmates.
        Former Minister of Interior and Mayor of Yerevan Vano Siradeghian
    was charged with 10 counts of murder and plotting to commit murder and
    his trial began on January 10. On April 1, the National Assembly voted
    to strip Siradeghian, a National Assembly deputy, of his parliamentary
    immunity. Siradeghian disappeared on April 3 and is believed to have
    fled the country. In a court case related to Siradeghian, an armed gang
    led by Armen Ter-Sahakian went on trial in May. All of the gang members
    were former Interior Ministry employees and confessed to various
    misdeeds prior to the trial. In their confessions, the nine accused,
    claimed to have been members of a hit squad that carried out several
    murders on Siradeghian's orders, including the murder of Armenian
    Railroads Director Hambartzum Ghandilian, Ashtarak district executive
    committee chairman Hovhannes Sukiasian, and the attempted murder of
    Vladimir Grigorian, Head of the Prosecutor General's investigative
    department. They also confessed to extortion, robbery, and illegal
    possession of weapons. All were found guilty in August. Ter-Sahakian
    and Alik Grigoryan were sentenced to death, while the remaining six
    accused received prison terms from 4 to 11 years. The death penalty
    currently is in abeyance and is expected to be abolished soon, in such
    a case it is expected that the two death sentences would be commuted to
    lengthy imprisonment.
        Another court case related to Siradeghian involved the trial of a
    group of 11 persons led by Vahan Harutyunian, former Deputy Minister of
    Interior and ex-Commander of Internal Troops. All of 11 were found
    guilty of murder, attempted murder, abuse of power, and complicity in
    murder. The prison terms for six of them varied from 6 to 15 years,
    while five subsequently were released under the terms of two amnesties
    passed by the National Assembly in 1997 and 1998. Several of those
    convicted announced that they would appeal.
        On October 27, 1999, five terrorists opened fire on a session of
    Parliament with automatic weapons. They killed the Prime Minister, the
    Speaker of Parliament, the two Deputy Speakers, the Minister for
    Special Projects, and three deputies, and wounded the Minister of
    Privatization and four other deputies, some critically. According to
    reported statements by the gunmen both before and after they
    surrendered to security forces, their motives appeared to be both
    political and personal.
        The Deputy Prosecutor General (who is also the military prosecutor)
    was placed in charge of the investigation of the shootings. By the end
    of 1999, 19 persons, including a National Assembly deputy (who was
    stripped of his immunity by a vote of that body), the then-presidential
    chief of staff and advisor, and the deputy chief of state television,
    had been imprisoned under legal provisions permitting the detention of
    criminal suspects whether or not they had been accused legally. The
    investigation was criticized by attorneys for the accused, by the
    media, and by representatives of human rights organizations for alleged
    human rights abuses, including physical and mental coercion of the
    detainees. Gagik Jahangiran, the military prosecutor investigating the
    case, repeatedly rejected calls for the creation of a special
    Parliamentary investigation to ensure an impartial investigation.
    During the year, four of the accused, including the presidential
    advisor, the Parliamentarian, and the deputy chief of state television,
    were released, and charges against them dropped. The military
    prosecutor admitted that the evidence was insufficient to hold them.
    One detainee was released on bail for health reasons, and another
    prisoner was found dead in his cell in September (see above). The
    trials of the 13 accused are scheduled to begin in February 2001 due to
    requests by the attorneys for the accused that they have time to
    evaluate the evidence.
        No progress was announced in the investigation of the December 1998
    killing of Deputy Minister of Defense Vahram Khorkhoruni. In September
    1999, the death of Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security
    and Head of Internal Troops Artsrun Margarian, who was found shot in
    February 1999, officially was ruled a suicide. In March a guilty
    verdict was reached in the case of Dr. Hrant Papikian, who was held in
    connection with an alleged previous attack on Margaryan; Papikian
    appealed to the Court of Cassation, which reduced his sentence to 10
    months; and since he already had served that amount of time, he was
    released on March 22.
        Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict occasionally resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        In July the Government unilaterally released five Azeri prisoners
    of war (POW's) under OSCE/ICRC auspices; Azerbaijan reciprocated by
    unilaterally releasing two Armenian POW's. In August Armenia released
    another recently captured POW, and announced that it now held only one
    Azeri soldier, who did not wish to be repatriated (which the OSCE
    verified), and one Azeri civilian, who was believed to be a criminal
    fleeing Azeri police.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and laws prohibit torture; however, the
    practice of security personnel beating pretrial detainees during arrest
    and interrogation remains a routine part of criminal investigations,
    and prosecutors rely on such confessions to secure convictions. Most
    cases of police brutality go unreported, due to fear of police
    retribution. Impunity remains a problem.
        In 1999, there were 54 cases of death in custody due to beatings
    and other abuse (see Section 1.a.).
        Attorneys for the 19 detainees held in the October 1999 killings in
    Parliament claimed in the media that the accused were being held in
    inhuman conditions and were beaten during interrogations.
    Representatives of the government-appointed Commission on Human Rights,
    after several attempts, were able to see the detainees and were told by
    the men that they had been coerced physically and mentally into
    confessions. The Commission reported no obvious evidence of physical
    abuse. A parliamentary commission was allowed to see imprisoned Deputy
    Mushegh Movsesian and confirmed that he showed signs of having been
    abused physically. The four detainees released in mid-year told media
    that they had been mistreated. Former presidential Chief of Staff
    Alexan Harutyunian said that as part of his release agreements, he had
    promised not to talk to the media about the details of his case.
        Although defense lawyers may present evidence of torture in an
    effort to overturn improperly obtained confessions, and according to
    law all such charges must be investigated, judges and prosecutors
    routinely ignore such complaints even when the perpetrator can be
    identified.
        The Government has not conducted investigations of abuse by
    security services except in rare cases where death has resulted and
    under pressure from human rights groups. The number of deaths of
    conscripts from training accidents and physical abuse decreased by 18
    percent compared with 1999, according to government figures. While this
    number cannot be verified, based on information from a human rights
    group, the figure of 16 to 20 noncombat deaths per month from all
    causes during the year appears to be accurate. Amnesty International
    stated that a conscript arrested for being absent without leave was
    beaten so badly in August 1998 that he subsequently died. The case
    currently is pending in the Echmiatsin regional court. There are no
    separate military courts (see Section 1.e.). Military cases, many of
    which are settled administratively, that do go to trial in civilian
    courts are handled by the military prosecutor's office.
        The Ministry of Defense cites reasons of ``national security'' in
    declining to provide exact details on some cases, citing the fact that
    the country remains technically in a state of war with Azerbaijan.
        During the year members of the Yezidi ethnic-religious minority
    continued to complain that ``hazing'' and beating of conscripts, common
    throughout the former Soviet Union, especially are severe for Yezidi
    conscripts (see Section 5). In July parents of recruits killed or
    injured during the training process held demonstrations for several
    days near the presidential palace and met with officials of the
    presidency (but not with the President himself) to discuss their
    complaints.
        In April police reportedly did not intervene to prevent harassment
    and abuse of members of Jehovah's Witnesses by local hoodlums (see
    Section 5.). Yezidis complain that police fail to respond to crimes
    committed against Yezidis.
        Homosexuals complain that police physically and mentally abuse
    them, especially if they have no means to pay police extortion. Persons
    accused of homosexuality in the military generally are believed to
    suffer beatings and other physical abuse above and beyond that
    inflicted on other recruits.
        There were unsubstantiated reports that security authorities
    confine persons in mental institutions as a form of detention (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Facilities are
    often overcrowded, and food is inadequate to preserve health unless
    supplemented by assistance from families. Medical and sanitary
    facilities in prisons are inadequate. Tuberculosis and other
    communicable diseases are common, and there were a number of deaths
    from such diseases during the year. Although, in principle, an
    agreement has been reached to transfer responsibility for prisons from
    the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice with a goal
    of improved oversight, no formal action to that effect was taken by
    year's end. Physical abuse by guards and other prisoners is a problem.
    In August the Prosecutor General's office announced that 54 prisoners
    had died in prison of in 1999, the highest count for any year since
    independence in 1991. The Government's Human Rights Commission visited
    the main prison in Gyumri in October and reported that it found
    conditions there to be ``shocking'' with the prison filthy, cold, and
    in poor repair. Officials were indifferent to the welfare of the
    prisoners. The Commission reported that complaints mailed to them by
    prisoners were intercepted and given instead to the prison's warden.
        According to his lawyer, the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff
    continued to physically abuse former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan
    while he awaited trial on corruption charges (see Section 1.d.). While
    Bleyan's appeal that his case be dropped was refused, in July the
    Presidential Human Rights Commission recommended that Bleyan be
    detained under more humane conditions.
        The ICRC had free access to detention facilities run by the
    Ministry of Interior. In these facilities, the ICRC is able to visit,
    according to its standard modalities, any prisoner in whom it has an
    interest, whether in prisons or in local police stations. The ICRC also
    had free and regular access to remaining POW's from the Nagorno-
    Karabakh conflict in the prison of the Ministry of National Security
    and in military police stations. The ICRC also had access to POW's in
    Nagorno-Karabakh. In July and August, Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged
    POW's under OSCE and ICRC auspices (see Section 1.b.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Authorities continued to
    arrest and detain criminal suspects without legal warrants, often on
    the pretext that they were material witnesses. The police frequently
    imprisoned detainees without notification of their family members.
    Often several days pass before family members obtain information about
    an arrest and the person's location. Security agencies often restrict
    access of lawyers and family members to prisoners until the preliminary
    investigation phase is complete, a process that can last weeks. During
    the investigation of the October 1999 shootings, five persons were
    arrested and held for a period of approximately 5 months in the
    Ministry of National Security's special detainment facilities. They
    then were released and charges against them were dropped (see Section
    1.a.).
        The Government allowed ICRC representatives and a parliamentary
    investigating committee to visit those detained in relation with the
    October 1999 shootings. The detainees also were permitted contact with
    lawyers, although their attorneys complained that this contact was
    insufficient and restricted. However, requests by a local human rights
    monitoring group to visit the men to check allegations of physical and
    mental abuse against the prisoners were denied.
        The transitional provisions of the Constitution provide that
    Soviet-era procedures for searches and arrests were to continue until
    the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code came into effect in
    January 1999. Although the Criminal Procedure Code entered into force,
    the Criminal Code remains under consideration in Parliament (see
    Section 1.e.). A suspect may be detained for no more than 12 months
    pending trial, after which the suspect must be released or tried;
    however, this latter provision is not always enforced. There is no
    provision for bail, although detainees may sign a document and remain
    at liberty under their own recognizance pending trial.
        Former Education Minister Ashot Bleyan was held by law enforcement
    officials for several months after being charged in 1999 with
    embezzlement of public funds intended for the purchase of textbooks
    (see Section 1.c.). Bleyan's lawyer charged, both in 1999 and during
    the year, that his client has been abused physically and kept in harsh
    conditions in an attempt to force a confession. Bleyan's July appeal to
    have his case dropped was denied, but the Presidential Commission on
    Human Rights recommended in July that his conditions of imprisonment be
    eased. After an 8 month trial, Bleyan was sentenced to 8 years in
    prison in October for embezzlement of state property. Bleyan has
    claimed that the charges against him were fabricated for political
    reasons (see Section 1.e.).
        On October 30, Arkady Vardanyan a Moscow-based Armenian businessmen
    who is a Russian citizen, led a demonstration in Yerevan of
    approximately 10,000 persons calling for the removal of the Government.
    After the demonstration, Vardanyan was taken into custody and sentenced
    to 11 days detention on the charge that he had a permit for a
    demonstration but not a march (see Section 2.b.). After 11 days,
    Vardanyan was not released; however, one of his attorneys that was
    arrested with him was released. The Prosecutor General's office
    announced that Vardanyan was being charged with seeking and advocating
    the overthrow of the Government by violence. A trial date has not been
    set. Russian consular officers are allowed access to Vardanyan in
    prison in order to ensure that his rights are respected.
        At year's end, 41 Jehovah's Witnesses were in detention for refusal
    to serve in the military services (see Section 2.c.).
        Armed forces recruiters sometimes take hostages to compel the
    surrender of draft-evading or deserting relatives (see Section 1.f.).
        A local human rights group has made unsubstantiated allegations
    that there are cases in which security authorities use confinement in
    mental institutions as an alternative form of detention.
        The ICRC reported that civilian and military personnel on all sides
    of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still occasionally may engage in
    cross-border hostage-taking, sometimes to win release of a friend or
    relative held on the other side but more often for financial gain. The
    ICRC, in coordination with the OSCE, has facilitated a number of
    prisoner exchanges, most recently in August, but has no access to
    undeclared hostages.
        There were no reports of forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution nominally
    provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, courts are
    subject to pressure from the executive branch and to corruption. The
    Constitution's provisions do not insulate the courts fully from
    political pressure. Other legal and constitutional provisions make
    judges and prosecutors dependent on the executive branch for their
    employment. The inherited Soviet system views the court largely as a
    rubber stamp for the prosecutor and not a defender of citizens' rights.
    Though legislation passed in 1998 reduced significantly prosecutor's
    supervision of civil cases, prosecutors still greatly overshadow
    defense lawyers and judges during trials. Under the Constitution, the
    Council of Justice, headed by the President, the Prosecutor General,
    and the Justice Minister, appoints and disciplines judges for the
    tribunal courts of first instance, review courts, and the Court of
    Appeals. The President appoints the other 14 members of the Justice
    Council and 4 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges. This authority
    gives the President dominant influence in appointing and dismissing
    judges at all levels. Judges are subject to review by the President
    through the Council of Justice after 3 years, unless they are found
    guilty of malfeasance.
        The 1995 Constitution required a new three-level court system. The
    highest court, the Court of Cassation, began functioning in the summer
    of 1998. Judges for the two lower-level courts, the appellate court and
    courts of the first instance, began functioning in January 1999. First
    instance courts try most cases, with a right of appeal to the Court of
    Appeals and then to the Court of Cassation. The Constitutional Court
    rules on the conformity of legislation with the Constitution, approves
    international agreements, and decides election-related legal questions.
    It can accept only cases proposed by the President, by two-thirds of
    all parliamentary deputies, or election-related cases brought by
    candidates for Parliament or the presidency. Due to these limitations,
    the Constitutional Court cannot ensure effectively constitutional human
    rights safeguards.
        The selection of judges was based on: Their scores on a multiple
    choice test to determine their fitness to be judges under the new
    system based on previously published information regarding the new
    legal codes, and their interviews with the Minister of Justice. Next,
    the list of nominations was approved by the Council of Justice and,
    finally, by the President. About 55 percent of the appointed judges in
    1999 had been judges under the old structure. Based on the results of
    this 4-stage selection, 123 judges were appointed to the new courts in
    January 1999. Unless they are found guilty of malfeasance, their tenure
    is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
        The judicial system continued to be in transition. As part of the
    package of judicial reform legislation mandated by the Constitution, in
    1999 both prosecutors and defense counsels began a process of
    retraining and recertification in order to retain their positions,
    which still is occurring.
        A proposed new Criminal Code, which is intended to clarify
    contradictory provisions of the law and create a more unitary, modern,
    and workable legal system has not yet been approved. The new draft
    Criminal Code consists of general and special parts; the general part
    passed second reading in Parliament in November 1997, but the special
    part, presented for a second reading in November 1998, failed to obtain
    a quorum and had not been reconsidered by year's end. Two other new
    codes, the Civil Code and the Criminal Procedures Code, were passed in
    the summer of 1998.
        The new criminal procedure code does not allow detainees to file a
    complaint in court prior to trial to redress abuses by the procuracy,
    police, or other security forces during criminal investigations. Under
    the new code, the police may detain individuals for up to 12 hours
    before notifying family members, witnesses have no right to legal
    counsel during questioning while in police custody--even though failure
    to testify is a criminal offense--and detainees must seek permission
    from the police or procuracy to obtain a forensic medical examination
    to substantiate a report of torture.
        Under the proposed new judicial code, prosecutors are expected to
    continue to have more influence than judges do.
        A commission to amend the Constitution's chapter on the judiciary,
    the second such body to undertake this task, reportedly is working on
    measures to increase judicial independence that are critical to the
    success of judicial reform. In July the President discharged by decree
    old members and appointed new members to the commission. Such
    constitutional revisions must pass both Parliament and a national
    referendum.
        The military legal system operates essentially as it did during the
    Soviet era. There is no military court system; trials involving
    military personnel take place in the civil court system and are handled
    by military prosecutors. Military prosecutors perform the same
    functions as their civilian counterparts; pending the passage of the
    new Criminal Code, they operate in accordance with the Soviet-era
    Criminal Code. In 1998 the military prosecutor abolished military ranks
    for the prosecutors in his service. In November 1999, the military
    prosecutor was named deputy prosecutor general and placed in charge of
    the investigation into the October 1999 shootings in Parliament.
        All trials are public except when government secrets are at issue.
    Defendants are required to attend their trials unless they have been
    accused of a minor crime not punishable by imprisonment. Defendants
    have access to a lawyer of their own choosing. The court appoints an
    attorney for any defendant who needs one. Defendants may confront
    witnesses and present evidence. The Constitution provides that those
    accused of crimes shall be informed of charges against them; however,
    the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence is ineffective,
    and acquittals are rare once a case comes to trial. Defendants and
    prosecutors have the right of appeal.
        There were no reports of political prisoners; however, supporters
    of both Ashot Bleyan and Arkady Vardanyan claimed that the two were
    political prisoners. Bleyan was imprisoned on charges of embezzlement,
    and Vardanyan was detained on charges of attempting to overthrow the
    Government by force.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unauthorized searches and
    provides for citizens' rights to privacy and confidentiality of
    correspondence, conversations, and other messages. The security
    ministries must petition a judge for permission to wiretap a telephone
    or intercept correspondence. The judge acting alone must find a
    compelling need for the wiretap before granting the agency permission
    to proceed. No evidence of illegal wiretapping came to public attention
    during the year.
        The law requires security forces to obtain a search warrant from a
    judge before conducting a search. Security forces were refused warrant
    issuance due to lack of evidence in several cases; however, in practice
    there were charges that searches continued to be made without a
    warrant, both in regard to the October 1999 killings in parliament and
    in the arrest of Arkady Vardanyan (see Section 2.b.). The Constitution
    provides that the judiciary must exclude evidence obtained without a
    warrant. Legislation passed in 1997 to improve security of bank
    deposits has been enforced.
        There continued to be violations of the right to privacy during
    army conscription drives. Armed forces recruiters sometimes take
    hostages to compel the surrender of draft-evading or deserting
    relatives. There are credible reports of improper, forced conscription
    of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who by law are exempt from
    military service. The parents of such refugees are reluctant to
    complain because they fear reprisals against their sons. There were no
    reported cases of punitive conscription of males who offended local
    officials. Sweep operations for draft-age men have ceased to be carried
    out, although police sometimes maintain surveillance of draft-age men
    to prevent them from fleeing the country.

        Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and the press; however, while the Government
    generally respects freedom of speech, there are some limits on freedom
    of the press, and journalists practice self-censorship. There is no
    official censorship, publications present a variety of views, and the
    opposition press regularly criticizes government policies and leaders,
    including the President, on sensitive issues such as the Nagorno-
    Karabakh peace process and privatization.
        However, to avoid retribution experienced in years past on the part
    of powerful officials and other individuals, most journalists practice
    self-censorship, particularly in reporting on major corruption or
    national security issues. Journalists remain cautious in their
    reporting, and the range of subjects the Government considers sensitive
    for national security reasons is relatively large. Some members of the
    press, but not all, have access to army facilities and places of
    detention. Even in cases where they do have such access, permission for
    media to visit them involves a prolonged and cumbersome bureaucratic
    process.
        Newspapers, with the exception of Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (a joint
    venture between Parliament and its staff) and Respublica Armenia (which
    ceased publication in June), are privately owned. The state printing
    house and distribution agency both now function as commercial
    enterprises, with no visible government intervention.
        The editor of the sensationalist political tabloid Oragir and its
    successor Haykakan Zhamanak, Nikol Pashinian, was found guilty in 1999
    of libel, slander, libeling a public official, and contempt of court
    (for not publishing a retraction demanded by a court) and sentenced to
    1 year of corrective labor and ordered to pay a fine of $25,000 (13.5
    million drams). Pashinian appealed the judgement and did not pay the
    fine; other Armenian journalists, who up to then had been largely
    nonsupportive of his case, passed a resolution denouncing the
    punishment as unduly harsh and for several weeks rallied almost daily
    in front of the President's office demanding a more lenient sentence.
    In January Pashinian's sentence was reduced to a 1-year suspended
    sentence by an appeals judge who said the original sentence in fact was
    too harsh.
        No legal actions were announced during the year regarding the
    beatings of the Haykakan Zhamanak staff on December 23, 1999. The
    offices of Haykakan Zhamanak were invaded by approximately a dozen men
    who beat and kicked Pashinian and other male members of the staff. The
    gang reportedly was led by a local businessman who was angered by an
    article in Haykakan Zhamanak that accused him of corruption. Pashinian
    afterwards announced that he would not file charges against his
    assailants, but that he expected them to apologize to all journalists
    for the attack. No legal action was taken in the case of arson at the
    Yerevan office of the Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya in December 1999.
    A police investigation was unable to reach any conclusions, and the
    case was closed during the year.
        Newspapers operate with extremely limited resources, and none are
    completely independent of patronage from economic or political interest
    groups or individuals. Due to prevailing economic conditions, total
    newspaper circulation is small (40,000 copies, by the Department of
    Information's estimates, or about 1 copy per 100 persons). The state-
    owned newspaper printing and distribution companies have been
    privatized, except for a small government stake.
        State institutions that previously had tended to exert control over
    the media have lost most of their functions. The Department of
    Information, created in 1997 to replace the disbanded Ministry of
    Information, continued to exist, but with no clear purpose beyond
    allocating small government subsidies to newspapers and occasionally
    interceding with the state-owned newspaper distribution agency to
    forward a share of its receipts to the newspapers. A board created in
    late 1997 with representatives from the President's Office, Government,
    and Parliament, to supervise the transformation of the state-owned
    press agency, printing, and newspaper distribution into commercial
    enterprises, has not been active during the past 3 years.
        There were no complaints of official government pressure on
    independent news media; however, the President's office continued to
    influence state television news coverage significantly. In March
    opposition parties demanded that the President remove the Chief of
    State Television for allegedly slanting coverage of the investigation
    into the October 1999 attack on Parliament, but the President's office
    refused to concur. The most widely available of the two state-owned
    television channels takes policy guidance from the Government; it
    presents mostly factual reporting but avoids editorial commentary or
    criticism of official actions. During elections the coverage of
    political parties on state television and other media generally was
    balanced and largely neutral. Singlemandate candidates were not
    entitled to free programming, but there were no restrictions on paid
    time. In Yerevan and major regional media markets, private television
    stations now offer independent news coverage of good technical quality.
    Most radio stations are private. Opposition parties and politicians
    receive adequate news coverage and access on these channels.
    Legislation has not been passed yet to regulate the current arbitrary
    and nontransparent process of license issuance.
        Draft broadcast and media laws, the subject of intensive discussion
    among journalists, were revised extensively, and the draft of a new
    media law passed in Parliament in October was later signed by the
    President with reservations. While the new media law meets many
    previously expressed demands by media and human rights groups about
    assuring freedom of the media, it still contains loopholes that could
    be used to impose greater control of the media by government bodies. In
    response to media and the human rights group's concerns about these
    areas, the President announced that he would submit those chapters of
    the law to the Constitutional Court so that the possible loopholes
    could be closed. One new measure announced in October 1998, a 25-fold
    increase in licensing fees for television broadcasters, was expected to
    have a serious effect on struggling private stations; at the time of
    this announcement, these stations appealed for the measure's
    cancellation. After the President's intervention, the overall increase
    in licensing fees was significantly lowered to five-fold. The few
    international newspapers and imported magazines are not censored. There
    are no restrictions on reception of satellite television and other
    foreign media, and this material is not censored.
        The Government partially respects academic freedom. There are more
    than 80 private institutions of higher education. The curriculum
    committee of the Ministry of Education must approve the curriculum of
    all schools that grant degrees recognized by the State, seriously
    limiting the freedom of individual schools and teachers in their choice
    of textbooks and course material; according to the Ministry, only 15
    schools have applied for such licensing.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there
    are some important exceptions. There are cumbersome registration
    requirements for all political parties, associations, and
    organizations. The process of registering an organization is time-
    consuming, and some human rights or political organizations have been
    compelled by the Government to revise their bylaws several times in
    order to have their registrations accepted. No human rights or
    political organizations reported problems with registration during the
    year. During the period of political turmoil after the October 1999
    shootings, several opposition groups held antigovernment demonstrations
    without government intervention. During the July demonstrations by
    parents of killed or injured military recruits (see Section 1.c.),
    three demonstrators were detained for allegedly assaulting a security
    officer, but were released in a few hours.
        On October 30, Arkady Vardanyan, a Moscow-based Armenian
    businessmen who is a Russian citizen, led a demonstration in Yerevan of
    approximately 10,000 persons calling for the removal of the Government.
    Some of these persons subsequently marched to the President's office.
    Prior to the demonstration, Vardanyan was detained at his home, taken
    for questioning, and later released. Vardanyan's family and lawyers
    charged that security forces forced their way into the house and
    ransacked it. After the demonstration, the house again was searched by
    security forces and Vardanyan was taken into custody and sentenced to
    11 days detention on the charge that he had a permit for a
    demonstration but not a march (see Section 1.d.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the law specifies some restrictions on the religious
    freedom of adherents of faiths other than the Armenian Apostolic
    Church, which has formal legal status as the national church.
        The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience, which was amended in 1997,
    establishes the separation of church and state, but grants the Armenian
    Apostolic Church special status. The law forbids ``proselytizing''
    (undefined in the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic Church and
    requires all religious denominations and organizations to register with
    the State Council on Religious Affairs. Petitioning organizations must
    ``be free from materialism and of a purely spiritual nature,'' and must
    subscribe to a doctrine based on ``historically recognized holy
    scriptures.''
        A Presidential decree issued in 1993 supplemented the 1991 law and
    strengthened the position of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The decree
    enjoins the Council on Religious Affairs to investigate the activities
    of the representatives of registered religious organizations and to ban
    missionaries who engage in activities contrary to their status. The
    Council on Religious Affairs took no action against missionaries during
    the year, and even members of Jehovah's Witnesses, which are not
    registered, were allowed to engage fairly openly in missionary
    activity.
        In 1996 Parliament passed legislation tightening registration
    requirements by raising the minimum number of members required for
    registration from 50 to 200 adults. The law banned foreign funding for
    churches whose centers are outside the country. The 1996 legislation
    also mandated that religious organizations, except the Armenian
    Apostolic Church, need prior permission from the State Council on
    Religious Affairs to engage in religious activities in public places,
    travel abroad, or to invite foreign guests to the country. Despite
    these mandated restrictions, in practice there is no restriction on
    travel by the religious personnel of any denomination, including those
    that are unregistered. Members of unregistered minority religious
    organizations are allowed to bring in small quantities of religious
    literature for their own use, but large shipments by unregistered
    groups are prohibited.
        One group of Russian ``old believers'' and some congregations of
    Yezidis remain unregistered, according to the State Council on
    Religions, because they do not wish to register; these groups have not
    complained of religious discrimination.
        As of year's end, registered religious groups had reported no
    adverse consequences from the 1996 law. The ban on foreign funding has
    not been enforced and is considered unenforceable by the Council on
    Religious Affairs. The Council has such limited resources that it has
    not performed any acts except the annual reregistering of religious
    groups. No registered religious group was denied reregistration under
    the amended law. All existing registered denominations have been
    reregistered annually except the Hare Krishnas, whose members by 1998
    had dropped below even the previous membership threshold of 50.
        However, the Council on Religious Affairs continued to deny
    registration to Jehovah's Witnesses, no longer on the grounds that the
    group does not permit military service, but because its ``illegal
    proselytism'' allegedly is integral to its activity and because of the
    dissatisfaction and tension caused in some communities by its public
    preaching. The State Council on Religions and Jehovah's Witnesses
    continued to negotiate changes in the group's charter that would bring
    it into compliance with the law, but in May the State Council again
    refused to register the group, and a June statement by the head of the
    council accused Jehovah's Witnesses of continuing to practice ``illegal
    preaching. ``
        Forty-one members of Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention,
    charged with draft evasion or, if forcibly drafted, with desertion. A
    regional Jehovah's Witnesses official said that this higher number was
    because Jehovah's Witnesses receiving draft notices now are reporting
    directly to police and turning themselves in as draft evaders, rather
    then being inducted and then claiming conscientious objector status.
    Around 41 members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were in hiding from
    the draft. Alternative nonmilitary service is not available under
    current law to members of Jehovah's Witnesses. The President's office
    stated in March 1999 that a law was being drafted that would regulate
    alternative service for Jehovah's Witnesses and other conscientious
    objectors, but no action has been taken by year's end.
        According to the law, a religious organization that has been
    refused registration may not publish newspapers or magazines, rent
    meeting places on government property, broadcast programs on television
    or radio, or officially sponsor the visas of visitors. Members of
    Jehovah's Witnesses continue to experience difficulty renting meeting
    places and report that private individuals who are willing to rent them
    facilities frequently are visited by police and warned not to do so.
    Lack of official visa sponsorship means that visitors of Jehovah's
    Witnesses must pay for a tourist visa. When shipped in bulk,
    publications of Jehovah's Witnesses are seized at the border. Although
    members supposedly are allowed to bring in small quantities of printed
    materials for their own use, officials of Jehovah's Witnesses reported
    that mail from one congregation to another, which they said was meant
    for internal purposes rather than for proselytizing, still was
    confiscated by overzealous customs officials. Despite these legal
    obstacles, members of Jehovah's Witnesses continue their missionary
    work fairly visibly and reported a gain in membership during 1999.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
    repatriation; however, the Government places restrictions on some of
    these rights. The Constitution and laws require that passports be
    issued to all citizens except convicted felons; however, in cases of
    permanent residents who wish to relocate abroad permanently, an exit
    stamp may be denied to those persons who possess state secrets, to
    those subject to military service, to those who are involved in pending
    court cases, and to those whose relatives have lodged financial claims
    against them. The exit stamp is valid for up to 5 years and can be used
    as many times as an individual chooses to travel. Men of military age
    must overcome substantial bureaucratic obstacles to international
    travel. The Government does not restrict internal movement, and
    citizens have the right to change their residence or workplace freely.
    They must negotiate with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy to
    register these changes, but this practice is now more of a nuisance
    than an impediment. In addition, registration of a residence is a
    difficult process, particularly for those who live in a rented
    dwelling.
        Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted between Armenia and
    Azerbaijan in 1988, ethnic minorities on both sides have been subject
    frequently to discrimination and intimidation, often accompanied by
    violence intended to drive them from the country. Almost all the ethnic
    Azeris living in Armenia at the time, some 185,000 persons, fled to
    Azerbaijan. Of the 400,000 ethnic Armenians then living in Azerbaijan,
    330,000 fled and gained refugee status in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
        The National Assembly passed a law on citizenship in 1996 that
    provides for refugees of Armenian ethnicity to gain citizenship,
    provided that they are stateless and have resided in the country for
    the past 3 years. In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for
    the law and began new efforts to encourage refugees to accept Armenian
    citizenship. Although around 25,000 have done so, most are reluctant to
    become citizens, fearing the loss of free housing, military service
    exemptions, and other benefits accorded refugees.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
    in assisting ethnic Armenian refugees.
        The refugee law has no provisions in the law for granting refugee
    and asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
    respects the right of first asylum in principle, but in the absence of
    a law specifying procedures for formal recognition of political asylum,
    the small number of Sudanese and other migrants not of Armenian
    ethnicity only rarely can obtain residence permits, and their legal
    status remains unclear.
        Border officials have no training on asylum issues. In some cases,
    persons denied permission for legal residence are subjected to fines
    for illegal residence when they attempt to depart the country. There
    were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they
    feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Serious flaws in the 1998 presidential election continued to
    restrict the constitutional ability of citizens to change their
    government peacefully. Serious breaches of the election law and
    numerous irregularities in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and the
    1996 and 1998 presidential elections, resulted in a lack of public
    confidence in the integrity of the overall election process.
        In both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections, OSCE observers
    witnessed very substantial irregularities and concluded that the
    elections seriously challenged international democratic norms in regard
    to most key criteria. There were unusually high voter turnouts in
    certain areas, particularly in the second round, and these increases
    corresponded directly to high vote percentages for then Acting
    President Kocharian. Based on detailed analysis of the results tracked
    by observer reports in certain districts, it appears that ballot box
    stuffing, discrepancies in vote counts, a large number of unauthorized
    persons in polling stations, and other fraud perpetrated by local power
    structures inflated the number of votes for Kocharian by well over
    100,000 votes in the second round, which he won by approximately
    290,000 votes. Some military units were compelled to vote without
    exception for Kocharian, and officials used pressure to encourage a
    large turnout for the ``official'' candidate. Voters enjoyed a full
    spectrum of choices among candidates; all presidential candidates were
    provided opportunities to present themselves to the electorate through
    the provision of free and paid access to state media. However, state
    television provided coverage biased heavily in favor of the acting
    president. The electoral process fell far short of the authorities'
    commitments to their citizens. There were no legal consequences for
    electoral fraud. The Government pursued only minor violations, and no
    penalties were announced. There was no criminal investigation of the
    amply documented ballot box stuffing.
        The 1999 parliamentary and municipal elections and several by-
    elections during the year represented a step toward compliance with
    OSCE commitments, but failed to meet international standards fully. For
    example, the May 1999 parliamentary elections showed continued
    improvement toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but still failed
    to meet international standards. Nonetheless, during the election
    observers from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
    Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) categorized the 1999 Parliamentary elections as a
    relevant step towards compliance with OSCE commitments and noted
    improvements in the electoral framework and the political environment
    of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression were
    respected during the campaign. The May 1999 elections took place under
    a new electoral code that represented an improvement compared with
    previous legislation and incorporated some recommendations of
    international organizations. For example, the code provides for the
    accreditation of domestic nonpartisan observers. It abolishes one level
    of election bureaucracy (the community election commissions), and
    provides for the courts to address electoral complaints during the
    campaign rather than after results are announced. However, the
    authorities never submitted the draft code to ODIHR for comments prior
    to its adoption as had been promised.
        Despite the provisions of the new code, election administration was
    uneven on election day. In many precincts, election officials,
    candidates' proxies, and domestic observers worked together to provide
    transparent voting and counting procedures. The areas of most concern
    witnessed by OSCE/ODIHR observers included the poor quality of the
    voter lists, which were often outdated or inaccurate, mistakes in
    registration and voting by military personnel, problems in the
    formation of the election commissions and the status of their members,
    and the presence of unauthorized personnel in precincts during voting
    and counting procedures. Thousands of voters had to appeal to local
    courts on election day in order to cast their votes, after finding that
    their names had been left off local voter lists. Opposition parties
    such as the National Democratic Union, the Self Determination Union,
    the Communist Party, Hayrenik, and Azatutuyun criticized the exclusion
    of numerous residents from the lists. The Central Election Commission
    blamed the omissions on the negligence of some civil servants. Twelve
    criminal cases related to parliamentary election fraud, involving 16
    persons, currently are under investigation by the Prosecutor General's
    office.
        In a July 1999 by-election in Yerevan's Achapniak district,
    violence erupted when armed supporters of one of the candidates beat
    and opened fire on supporters of another candidate. The Central
    Elections Commission suspended this vote and declared it invalid. A
    criminal investigation was started, resulting in the arrest of 12
    persons; the police still are seeking 10 more persons allegedly
    involved in the Achapniak violence. According to the Prosecutor
    General's office 12 persons eventually went to prison for the
    Achapianak disturbances. Of those, 8 were sentenced to 2 years each,
    while the remaining 4 got probationary terms of 16 to 20 months and
    were released on probation. The Achapniak by-election subsequently was
    held again with the two candidates involved in the altercation taken
    off the ballot and took place without incident.
        In the October 1999 municipal elections, the three major problems
    were: The politicization of election commissions, obsolete or incorrect
    voter lists, and the use of old seals (the election law mandates that
    new ones be provided by regional election commissions for each
    election, as a check on ballot box stuffing), presumably because the
    funds were lacking to buy new seals.
        Several Parliamentary by-elections and a mayoral election in the
    town of Goris were held during the year. Most of the byelections were
    carried out peacefully. After hearing extensive evidence about
    irregularities in Yerevan's Arabik district, the Constitutional court
    ordered the cancellation of the results in the July by-election. The
    election was held again, and a different candidate won. An appeal by
    the winner of the first election was considered but subsequently
    rejected by the Central Elections Commission.
        In Goris where the incumbent mayor had been removed by the
    provincial governor in June for alleged impropriety in the conduct of
    his office, the ousted incumbent, who lost the July election, claimed
    that there were significant irregularities, including ballot-box
    stuffing. The incumbent appealed the results; however, the appeal was
    denied in December.
        The Government has confirmed that a national census, previously
    suspended for budgetary reasons, is expected to take place in 2001.
    There is to be a test census in three regions in early 2001. This has
    raised political concerns about the integrity of the process that is to
    create new electoral districts, since existing voter rolls and other
    population records are outdated and seriously flawed throughout the
    country.
        Under the Constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister
    and plays a role in the final selection of qualified candidates for
    judgeships. The Constitution provides for independent legislative and
    judicial branches, but in practice these branches are not insulated
    from political pressure from the executive branch.
        The Government appoints the 10 regional governors (marzpets) and
    the mayor of Yerevan. The Constitution gives local communities the
    right to elect local authorities. However, local elected officials have
    limited powers and are overshadowed in practice by the appointed
    governors, who can remove them from office.
        The National Assembly consists of 131 deputies; 56 are elected on a
    proportional basis and 75 on a district-by-district majoritarian basis.
    Regular sessions are held twice a year: the first from mid-September to
    mid-December, and the second from early February until mid-June. Given
    the press of legislative business connected with the total reform of
    the legal system, special sessions frequently are called, but may not
    last more than 6 days.
        There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and
    minorities in government and politics; however, due to traditional
    social attitudes, both groups are underrepresented in all branches of
    government. There are no female cabinet ministers, although there are
    several female deputy ministers. Only 4 of the 131 deputies in the
    Parliament are women. There are no minority representatives in the
    Cabinet or in the Parliament.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
            NonGovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are several human rights NGO's organizations that are active
    and operate openly, criticize abuses publicly, and publish their
    findings on government human rights violations. In general public
    access to information on human rights cases usually is adequate, with
    extensive media coverage of significant court cases, but there was less
    openness after the October 1999 shootings by civilian and military
    prosecutors. However, nongovernmental human rights organizations often
    report funding difficulties, and at least one, the well-respected
    Helsinki Association, had to close its offices for part of the year due
    to lack of funds. The Helsinki Committee continued to operate and did
    receive permission to have access to detention facilities, and has made
    several visits.
        As part of the commitments it made in advance of joining the
    Council of Europe (COE), the Government permitted monitoring of its
    human rights practices by the COE and reaffirmed this right for the
    ICRC, which retains full access to civilian detention facilities.
        An office created by the prosecutor general in July 1997 to
    communicate with international observers was responsive to requests for
    information, although information about criminal cases stemming from
    elections remained relatively general and incomplete.
        Current electoral law allows local and international observer
    organizations to monitor all elections, and such organizations reported
    no impediments to being allowed to observe the 1999 elections and this
    year's by-elections.
        In 1998 President Kocharian appointed a prominent opposition
    politician to head a new human rights commission headed by Paruyr
    Hairikyan within the President's office. The commission exists
    essentially as a reference bureau and has no formal legal powers;
    however, it has had a modest impact in getting authorities to review
    official actions on issues ranging from apartment allocations to police
    behavior, in some cases winning official reconsideration. It refers
    such cases to the appropriate agency, but it does not follow up on
    specific issues. During the year, the commission visited those accused
    in the October 1999 killings, visited the Gyumri jail, and frequently
    visited military units to hear human rights complaints by soldiers. The
    Parliamentary Commission on National Security, Defense, and Interior,
    headed by Vahan Hovhanissian, has taken on a greater role this year by
    making regular visits to military units to hear complaints by soldiers
    as well.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status.
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, gender,
    religion, disability, language, or social status; however, cultural and
    economic factors prevent women, ethnic and religious minorities, and
    persons with disabilities, from participating fully in public life. The
    religion law discriminates against some religious groups.
        Women.--There is no specific law banning violence against women,
    and few cases of rape, spousal abuse, or other violence against women
    were reported; however, their number likely is higher than the
    statistics indicate. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported
    to the police, and women are not protected from it. Several
    nongovernmental organizations exist in the Yerevan and Gyumri areas,
    which provide shelter and assistance to battered women.
        During the year, the Prosecutor's Office registered 15 cases of
    rape. The law (the old Soviet Criminal Code) cites specific punishments
    for rape, forced abortion, forbidding a woman from marrying, and
    discrimination in hiring due to pregnancy.
        Prostitution is not illegal, and according to anecdotal evidence,
    most prostitutes stopped by police for street-walking, simply are sent
    to a hospital or physician for a medical check-up. Although, the
    Criminal Code does not forbid prostitution itself, keeping brothels is
    prohibited. According to an investigation conducted by journalists,
    more than 1,600 prostitutes were registered by the police, around 800
    in the Yerevan area. A study of Yerevan prostitution done by an
    international NGO showed that while some operate by telephone, the vast
    majority are what is known as streetwalkers, with their ``class'' and
    desirability defined by the area of the city in which they operate.
        An international NGO reports that the problem of battered wives is
    much more widespread then the Government or local human rights groups
    will admit. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported to the
    police, and women are not protected from it. Many cases are not
    reported to police in some cases because women are afraid of physical
    harm if they do so, afraid that police will refuse to take action and
    instead return them to their husbands, and in others because they are
    embarrassed to make ``family matters'' public. Several NGO's in the
    Yerevan and Gyumri areas provide shelter and assistance to battered
    women; however, embarrassment and concerns for family honor make the
    problem particularly sensitive and difficult to quantify. Even women's
    groups and health professionals decline to offer specific figures, but
    do not indicate that such violence is especially common. At least four
    cases were reported in the press of women who died as a result of
    domestic violence. During the year, 13 persons were prosecuted for
    attempted rape.
        In view of the phenomenon of Armenian women working as prostitutes
    in Russia and the Middle East, it is likely that trafficking in women
    and girls (particulary from the country) is more of a problem than the
    Government and women's organizations have recognized openly. Twenty-six
    cases of trafficking in women or procuring are now in the courts (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Police authorities announced in 1999 that there were numerous cases
    of organized procuring under investigation, but since the main
    initiators lived abroad, mostly in the Middle East, police were unable
    to arrest them.
        Males often play a dominant role in many societal institutions.
    Although women have been present in the work force for several
    generations, tolerance for broadening gender roles and for any gender
    behavior is low especially in the regions. In the workplace, women
    receive equal pay for equal work, but generally are not afforded the
    same professional opportunities given to men and often are relegated to
    more menial or low-skill jobs. The 1972 Law on Employment prohibits
    discrimination in employment, but the extremely high unemployment rate
    makes it difficult to gauge how effectively the law has been
    implemented to prevent discrimination. Formerly, labor unions protected
    women's rights, in the workplace at least nominally, but the weakness
    of unions has rendered them less effective in this role (see Section
    6.a.). According to official statistics, women make up 63.8 percent of
    those officially registered as unemployed (approximately 181,000).
    Currently there are more women receiving university and postgraduate
    education than men. This may in part be accounted for by the Nagorno-
    Karabakh situation, which necessitates a high number of males in
    military service, and in part by the economic situation, which has
    caused males to emigrate in search of employment.
        Children.--The Government does not have the economic means to
    provide fully for the welfare of children. Education is free,
    universal, and compulsory through age 14, then optional through age 16
    (complete secondary education). However, many facilities are
    impoverished and in poor condition, and teachers are forced to tutor
    pupils privately to supplement salaries that are low and irregularly
    paid. Some teachers are known to demand bribes from parents in return
    for good or passing grades for their children. Free children's health
    care is available for all children through the age of 8 for treatment
    of some diseases and for emergency cases, but is often of poor quality,
    with an increasing trend toward overt or concealed payment of fees for
    service.
        Girls and boys receive equal educational opportunities. The
    Government focuses its efforts regarding children's rights and welfare
    on measures to insulate large families--those with four or more
    children--from the effects of the country's current difficult
    circumstances. The Government similarly directs foreign humanitarian
    aid programs toward most socially vulnerable families and single parent
    families. Despite social programs, the problem of street children
    remains significant. However, the family tradition is strong, and child
    abuse does not appear to be a serious problem. Trafficking in girls is
    a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for the right
    to social security in the event of disability. The 1993 Law on Invalids
    provides for the social, political, and individual rights of the
    disabled, but does not mandate the provision of accessibility for the
    disabled. During the year, expenditures for the health sector increased
    to $3.2 million (1.7 billion drams) from the projected level, which
    affected persons with disabilities, who are supposed to be treated
    free. According to the former Minister of Social Security, the social
    sector budget was budgeted at $2.8 million (1.57 million drams). In the
    current economic circumstances, and in an effort to meet international
    financial institution guidelines on reduction of the budget deficit,
    the Government has had difficulty fulfilling its commitments in this
    area.
        The Government's enforcement of the rights of the disabled remains
    rudimentary. Legal safeguards for those with psychiatric problems are
    inadequate to protect patients' rights. There is societal
    discrimination against the disabled. Hospitals, residential care, and
    other facilities for the seriously disabled do not meet international
    norms. There were unsubstantiated reports that security authorities
    used confinement in mental institutions as an alternative form of
    detention (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        Religious Minorities.--There was no reported violence against
    minority religious groups. However, newer religious groups are viewed
    with suspicion, especially by some mid-level clergy in the Armenian
    Apostolic Church and their supporters in the bureaucracy.
        In April Jehovah's Witnesses returning from a religious service in
    Yerevan reported being verbally and physically abused by local thugs
    while police watched but did not intervene. In August the mayor and
    town council published a decree expelling two members of Jehovah's
    Witnesses from the town of Talin, near Yerevan, for alleged
    ``agitation.''
        As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, anti-
    Muslim feeling persists among the populace, and the few remaining
    Muslims keep a low profile. There is only one mosque open for prayers.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is approximately
    95 percent ethnic Armenian. The Government does not discriminate
    against the small, officially recognized ``national'' communities,
    although the economic and social situation of such groups has
    deteriorated substantially since independence in 1991. Groups that the
    Government includes in this category are Russians, Jews, Kurds,
    Yezidis, Georgians, Greeks, and Assyrians. As a result of the Nagorno-
    Karabakh conflict, there is no significant Azeri minority (see Section
    2.d.). Several hundred Azeris or persons of mixed Azeri heritage still
    living in the country maintain a low profile in the face of societal
    discrimination.
        The Constitution grants national minorities the right to preserve
    their cultural traditions and language, and the 1992 Law on Language
    provides linguistic minorities with the right to publish and study in
    their native language. There are token publications in minority
    languages, but the Government has devoted minimal resources to
    maintaining minority language schools. The large network of Russian-
    language schools has diminished significantly in recent years. In
    practice virtually all students, including members of the Yezidi and
    Greek communities, now attend Armenian-language schools, with very
    limited classes available in their native tongues. In the Yezidi
    community, a high percentage of pupils do not attend school, partly for
    family economic reasons and partly because of discrimination from
    ethnic Armenian students and teachers.
        Yezidi leaders continued to complain that police and local
    authorities subject their community to discrimination. The Yezidis,
    whose number is estimated at 54,000 by Yezidi leaders, speak a Kurdish
    dialect and practice a traditional, nonChristian, non-Muslim religion
    with elements derived from Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Animism. They
    cite numerous incidents of unfair adjudication of land, water, and
    grazing disputes, nonreceipt of privatized agricultural land, an
    unusually high number of beatings of Yezidi conscripts in the army (see
    Section 1.c.), and lack of police response to even serious crimes
    committed against Yezidis. The Yezidi complaints likely reflect
    societal discrimination as well as the more general problem of poorly
    functioning local Government bodies.
        In March the country's first Congress of National Minorities since
    1991 was held. At the conference human rights did not appear to be a
    major concern. Yezdis and Ukrainians complained of unfair treatment in
    regard to forced military service. Most representatives demanded more
    government aid for native-language newspapers and for broadcasting
    minority directed programs on television.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides employees
    with the right to form and join trade unions and the right to strike.
    The Constitution stipulates that the right to form associations--
    including political parties and trade unions--may be limited with
    respect to persons serving in the armed services and law enforcement
    agencies. A 1993 Presidential decree prohibits the Government and other
    employers from retaliating against strikers and labor leaders, but
    workers have little confidence in this protection. In practice labor
    organization remains weak due to high unemployment and the weak
    economy. Workers have neither the financial resources to maintain a
    strike nor enforceable legal protection against retaliation, and
    existing unions play a relatively passive role. However, there were no
    reports of retaliation against strikers or labor leaders. The
    purportedly Independent Labor Federation created in December 1997 took
    no action during the year.
        The absence of active unions and of accurate employment data
    precludes a reliable estimate of the percentage of the workforce that
    is unionized.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations;
    however, none have done so to date.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is not practiced. The Constitution provides all citizens
    with the right to a just wage no lower than the minimum set by the
    Government. Although the 1992 Law on Employment provides for the right
    to organize and bargain collectively, voluntary and direct negotiations
    do not take place between unions and employers without the
    participation of the Government, because most large employers remain
    under state control. The near collapse of major industrial production
    has undercut the organization of labor unions.
        The Government encourages profitable factories to establish their
    own pay scales. Factory directorates generally set the pay scales
    without consultation with employees. The Arbitration Commission
    adjudicates wage and other labor disputes.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the 1992 Law on Employment prohibit forced and bonded labor, including
    that by children, and it generally is not known to occur; however,
    trafficking in women and girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--According to the 1992 Law on Employment, 16 years is the
    minimum age for employment. Children may work from the age of 14 with
    the permission of a medical commission and the relevant labor union
    board.
        The Law on Employment is enforced by local community councils,
    unemployment offices, and, as a final board of appeal, the arbitration
    commission. Children under the age of 18 are not allowed to work in
    difficult or dangerous jobs, night labor, or jobs that require over 6
    hours of work per day, although waivers in the latter two cases can be
    applied for by children 16 years or over.
        According to the Ministry of Social Welfare some children are
    involved in family businesses, as well as some other business
    activities, up to the age of 12 years, in sectors like agriculture
    where it is not forbidden by law. Children are forbidden specifically
    from engaging in arduous or dangerous employment, even if it is their
    families business without permission by the Ministry of Social Welfare
    which is granted only on a case by case basis. Forced or bonded labor
    by children is prohibited, and it generally is not known to occur;
    however, trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the minimum
    wage by decree. In October 1998, Parliament quintupled the national
    minimum wage to less than $10 (5,000 drams) per month; however, the
    minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
    a worker and family. The majority of the population lives below the
    officially recognized poverty line as a result of economic dislocations
    caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1988 earthquake, the
    conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the resulting blockade by Azerbaijan and
    Turkey, and disruptions in trade. However, a significant amount of
    economic activity takes place unrecorded and untaxed by local
    authorities. The extent to which this improves the overall economic
    situation is unknown.
        The majority of industrial enterprises are either idle or operating
    at a fraction of their capacity. Some furloughed workers still are
    receiving minimal partial compensation from their enterprises, but most
    are no longer receiving any payment if they are not working. The
    standard legal workweek is 40 hours; many persons work multiple jobs.
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to clean and safe
    work places, but Soviet-era occupational and safety standards remain in
    force. Labor legislation from 1988 places responsibility on the
    employer and the management of each firm to ensure ``healthy and
    normal'' labor conditions for employees, but it provides no definition
    of healthy and normal. The employment situation is such that workers
    are reluctant to complain or remove themselves from hazardous working
    conditions due to the risk of losing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons specifically, although it does prohibit exploitation by
    force of persons for financial gain, and trafficking in women and girls
    from the country is a problem. However, specific information on
    trafficking is difficult to obtain and there is little information
    about trafficking within the country. The Criminal Code specifically
    prohibits the keeping of what generally are considered to be brothels.
    Prostitution itself is legal. Armenian women work as prostitutes in the
    Middle East and Russia, and in the past there have been reports of
    trafficking in women and girls to these countries. It is likely that
    trafficking in women and girls is more of a problem than the Government
    and women's organizations have recognized openly. According to
    international NGO's, the Government appears to be focusing more on
    prostitution within the country then on trafficking. There were reports
    that older girls in local orphanages were approached with offers to
    engage in prostitution, either locally or abroad. Police officials
    announced the investigation of numerous cases of procuring but said
    that they were unable to arrest the main offenders because they resided
    in the Middle East rather than in Armenia (see Section 5). Cases of
    trafficking in women currently in court are being prosecuted under the
    Criminal Code prohibition on brothels.
                                   __________

                                    AUSTRIA

        Austria is a constitutional democracy with a federal parliamentary
    form of government. Citizens choose their representatives in periodic,
    free, and fair multiparty elections. In February a new right-of-center
    coalition came to power, comprised of the conservative People's Party
    (OVP) and the far-right Freedom Party (FPO). The judiciary is
    independent.
        The police are subordinated to the executive and judicial
    authorities. The national police maintain internal security. The army
    is responsible for external security. The police are generally well
    trained and disciplined, although some members of the police were
    responsible for instances of human rights abuses.
        The country's highly developed, market-based economy, with its mix
    of technologically advanced industry, modern agriculture, and tourism,
    affords its citizens a high standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. There were some reports of abuse by
    police, which involved occasional beatings but mainly involved verbal
    abuse and threats. Inclusion of the FPO in the Government was met with
    widespread, generally peaceful protests in Vienna and other large
    cities throughout the country. Many human rights organizations and
    minorities feared that the country's general climate of tolerance and
    respect for ethnic and religious diversity would worsen. This resulted
    in a sharp increase in attention to and scrutiny of the country's human
    rights situation by foreign governments, the Council of Europe, other
    European Union (EU) member states, and nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's). A number of reports published by such observers expressed
    concern about ambiguous racist and/or xenophobic comments of senior FPO
    leaders, which it was feared would legitimize intolerance aimed at
    minority groups. In September a group of 3 human rights experts
    selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, as
    accepted by the other 14 members of the EU, released a report on the
    situation of minorities, refugees, and immigrants in the country, which
    concluded that appropriate legal protection was available for these
    groups. The new Government passed a comprehensive prominority rights
    bill providing expanded constitutional protections for the six
    officially recognized minorities. Violence against women is a problem,
    which the Government is taking steps to address. Trafficking in women
    for prostitution remains a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In May two drug-related deaths of foreign-born suspects while in
    pretrial custody temporarily revived a debate about police brutality.
    On May 3, a 26-year-old Nigerian asylum applicant, Richard Ibekwe, also
    known as Peter Weah Richard, died while in pretrial detention for
    suspected drug offenses. Witnesses reported that police officers beat
    Ibekwe in the course of his arrest 2 weeks prior to his death. On May
    5, a 40-year-old Slovakian also died while in police custody. Official
    autopsies confirmed that both men died of drug overdoses. Due to
    allegations of police brutality, an internal investigation into
    Ibekwe's death was begun. The results were still pending at year's end.
        In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while
    being deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped
    shut to control his violent behavior (see Section 2.d.).
        In March 1999, Franz Fuchs was convicted for killing 4 Roma in 1995
    and injuring 15 other persons in a letter bomb campaign conducted
    between 1993 and 1997 (see Section 5).
        A French appeals court is considering an Austrian government
    request for the extradition of the terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez
    (alias ``Carlos the Jackal''). Austria formally has sought the
    extradition of ``Carlos'' since French authorities captured him in
    1994. He is wanted on charges of manslaughter, kidnaping, and blackmail
    in connection with the terrorist attacks at Vienna's Organization of
    Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) headquarters in December 1975.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Although the Constitution prohibits such practices,
    government statistics for 1999 showed 365 complaints against federal
    police officials for ``unjustified use of force,'' compared with 356 in
    1998. Of the 365 complaints, 292 resulted in investigations, compared
    with 288 in 1998. Four officers were convicted of excessive use of
    force in 1999; one officer was convicted in 1998. Types of abuse ranged
    from slander to kicking and hitting, resulting mainly in bruising. Some
    of the violence appeared to be racially motivated. An Interior Ministry
    survey on the ``ethics of police conduct'' among policemen revealed
    that half of the 2,000 policemen interviewed stated that they would not
    report their colleagues in cases of misconduct.
        In January two U.S. citizens involved in a dispute with a Viennese
    nightclub alleged mistreatment by the police. Injuries included wrist
    nerve damage and slight bruising. One of the men is HIV positive and
    was denied access to his medication during his approximately 12-hour
    incarceration. The two alleged that such mistreatment was directed
    against them because of their homosexuality and nationality.
    Investigation into this case was suspended by the public prosecutor's
    office due to lack of evidence. In a separate case, a drug suspect who
    was allegedly beaten during arrest later died in custody (see Section
    1.a.).
        In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while
    being deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped
    shut to control his violent behavior. Two of the three police officers
    who accompanied him were suspended, and a committee was created with
    the goal of ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human
    rights while carrying out their duties (see Section 2.d.).
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In
    individual cases, investigating judges or prison directors have
    jurisdiction over questions of access to the defendant.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
    this prohibition.
        In criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial
    detention for up to 48 hours; however, in cases of charges of
    ``aggressive behavior,'' an investigative judge may decide within that
    period to grant a prosecution request for detention of up to 2 years
    pending completion of an investigation. The grounds required for such
    investigative detention are specified in the law, as are conditions for
    bail. The investigative judge is required to evaluate an investigative
    detention after 2 weeks, 1 month, and every 2 months after the arrest.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The Constitution provides that judges are independent in the
    exercise of their judicial office. Judges cannot be removed from office
    or transferred against their will. There are local, regional, and
    regional higher courts, as well as the Supreme Court as the court of
    highest instance. The system of judicial review provides for extensive
    possibilities for appeal. Trials have to be public, and have to be
    conducted orally. Persons charged with criminal offenses are to be
    considered innocent until proven guilty. While the Supreme Court is the
    court of highest instance for the judiciary, the Administrative Court
    acts as the supervisory body over the administrative branch, and the
    Constitutional Court presides over constitutional issues.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press, and the Government generally respects this right
    in practice; however, stringent slander laws tend to discourage reports
    of police brutality, and foreign observers--including the European
    Court of Human Rights--have concluded that the use of libel procedures
    to protect politicians may hamper freedom of speech and the press. A
    conviction for libel by a criminal court cannot be appealed to the
    Constitutional Court. In most cases, judgments are handed down by a
    court of appeals, which does not rely on case law. Several FPO
    politicians have been accused of paying police officers to obtain
    confidential information in order to discredit opponents of the FPO. An
    investigation is underway under the auspices of an independent
    committee. A number of officers have been suspended pending the
    completion of the investigation. Since 1986 Joerg Haider, the former
    FPO leader and current governor of Carinthia, has engaged in over 350
    libel suits against media outlets and individuals. Following the
    negative reaction to the FPO's inclusion in the Government, Haider
    called for the prosecution of deputies critical of the Government under
    a provision of the Criminal Code. Justice Minister Dieter Boehmdorfer
    (FPO) received extensive criticism for his initial support for this
    measure. Publications may be removed from circulation if they violate
    legal provisions concerning morality or public security, but such cases
    are extremely rare.
        The Government monopoly in national radio has been dismantled. A
    1993 law permitted licensing of regional private radio stations. There
    are currently 36 commercial and 9 community radio stations. By the end
    of 1999, 75.2 percent of citizens listened to state-run radio stations,
    and 17 percent listened to private stations. While a law establishing
    terrestrial frequencies for private television stations is expected to
    be passed in 2001, the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF)
    currently retains its monopoly on terrestrial television broadcasts.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly and association, except for Nazi
    organizations and activities (an exception stipulated also in the
    Austrian State Treaty of 1955). The Law on the Formation of
    Associations states that permission to form an organization may be
    denied if it is apparent that the organization would pursue the illegal
    activities of a prohibited organization.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion of individuals and the Government generally respects this
    right in practice. However, the status of religious organizations is
    governed by the 1874 ``Law on Recognition'' of churches and by a
    January 1998 law establishing the status of ``confessional
    communities.'' Religious recognition under the 1874 law has wide-
    ranging implications; for example, the authority to participate in the
    state-collected religious taxation program; to engage in religious
    education; and to import religious workers to act as ministers,
    missionaries, or teachers. Although in the past nonrecognized religious
    groups have had problems obtaining resident permits for foreign
    religious workers, administrative procedures adopted in 1997 have
    addressed this problem in part. Officially, 75.3 percent of the
    population are Roman Catholic, and there are 11 other recognized
    religious organizations.
        Religious organizations may be divided into three different legal
    categories (listed in descending order of status): Officially
    recognized religious societies, religious confessional communities, and
    associations.
        Under the law, religious societies have ``public corporation''
    status. This status permits religious societies to engage in a number
    of public or quasi-public activities that are denied to other religious
    organizations. The Constitution singles out religious societies for
    special recognition. State subsidies for religious teachers, at both
    public and private schools, constitute one of the benefits provided to
    religious societies that is not granted to other religious
    organizations.
        Previously some nonrecognized religious groups were able to
    organize as legal entities or associations, although this route has not
    been available universally. Some groups even have done so while
    applying for recognition as religious communities under the 1874 law.
    Many such applications for recognition were not handled expeditiously
    by the Ministry of Education and Culture; in some cases, years passed
    before a decision was made. Following years of bureaucratic delay and
    an administrative court order instructing the Education Ministry to
    render a decision, in 1997 the Ministry denied the request for
    recognition of Jehovah's Witnesses. Jehovah's Witnesses appealed this
    decision to the Constitutional Court.
        In January 1998, a law went into effect that allows nonrecognized
    religious groups to seek official status as confessional communities
    without the fiscal and educational privileges available to recognized
    religions. Religious confessional communities, once they are recognized
    officially as such by the Government, have juridical standing, which
    permits them to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in
    their own names and contracting for goods and services. To apply groups
    must have 300 members and submit to the Government their written
    statutes, describing the goals, rights, and obligations of members,
    membership regulations, officials, and financing. Groups also must
    submit a written version of their religious doctrine, which must differ
    from that of any existing religion recognized under the 1874 law or
    registered under the new law, for a determination that their basic
    beliefs do not violate public security, public order, health and
    morals, or the rights and freedoms of citizens. A religious
    organization that seeks to obtain this new status is subject to a 6-
    month waiting period from the time of application to the Ministry of
    Education and Culture. The new law also sets out additional criteria
    for eventual recognition according to the 1874 law, such as a 20-year
    observation period (at least 10 of which must be as a group organized
    as a confessional community under the new law) and membership equaling
    at least two one-thousandths of the country's population. Many
    religious groups and independent congregations do not meet the 300-
    member threshold for registration under the new law. Only Jehovah's
    Witnesses currently meet the higher membership requirement for
    recognition under the 1874 law.
        In a decision issued in March 1998, the Constitutional Court voided
    the Education Ministry's decision on Jehovah's Witnesses and ordered a
    new decision based on the January law on the Status of Confessional
    Communities. In July 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses received the status of a
    confessional community. According to the 1998 law, the group is now
    subject to a 10-year observation period before they are eligible for
    recognition.
        The nine religious groups that have constituted themselves as
    confessional communities according to the 1998 law are: Jehovah's
    Witnesses, the Baha'i Faith, the Baptists, the Evangelical Alliance,
    the Movement for Religious Renewal, the Pentecostalists, the Seventh-
    Day Adventists, the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the Hindu religious
    community. After initially filing for confessional community status,
    the Church of Scientology withdrew its application from consideration.
    The Ministry rejected the application of the Sahaja Yoga group; in 1998
    the group appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court. A decision
    was still pending on this case at year's end. Proponents of the law
    describe it as an opportunity for religious groups to become officially
    registered as religious organizations, providing them with a government
    ``quality seal.'' However, numerous religious groups not recognized by
    the State, as well as some religious law experts dismiss the purported
    benefits of obtaining status under the law and have complained that the
    law's additional criteria for recognition under the 1874 law obstruct
    claims to recognition and formalize a second-class status for
    nonrecognized groups. Experts have questioned the law's
    constitutionality.
        After the Education Ministry granted Jehovah's Witnesses the status
    of Confessional Community, the group immediately in 1998 requested that
    it be recognized as a religious group under the 1874 law. The Education
    Ministry denied the application, on the basis that, as a confessional
    community, Jehovah's Witnesses would need to submit to the required 10-
    year observation period. The group has appealed this decision to the
    Constitutional Court, arguing that a 10-year observation period is
    unconstitutional. A decision was still pending at year's end.
        Also in 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses filed a complaint with the
    European Court for Human Rights, arguing that the group has not yet
    been granted full status as a religious entity under the 1874 law,
    despite having made numerous attempts for more than 2 decades. A
    decision was still pending at year's end.
        Religious organizations that do not qualify for either religious
    society or confessional community status may apply to become
    associations. This status is granted relatively freely, although
    associations do not have legal standing and are unable to purchase
    property, churches, or engage in other activities permitted to the
    other two legal categories.
        The Government continued its information campaign against religious
    sects that it considered potentially harmful to the interests of
    individuals and society. In September 1999, the Ministry for Social
    Security and Generations issued a new edition of a controversial
    brochure that described numerous nonrecognized religious groups in
    negative terms, which many of the groups deemed offensive. This
    brochure includes information on Jehovah's Witnesses, despite its
    status as a confessional community. On April 6, the new Minster for
    Social Security and Generations, Elisabeth Sickl (FPO), announced plans
    to support the training of ``specialists'' among teachers and youth
    leaders in order to sensitize them to the dangers posed by some
    nonrecognized religious groups to the young. She also pledged to
    include representatives from provincial governments in an
    interministerial working group to decide on measures to ``protect
    citizens from the damaging influence of sects, cults, and esoteric
    movements.'' These statements were interpreted in some circles as
    evidence that the Freedom Party's participation in government may
    strengthen efforts to curb the role of nonrecognized religious groups.
    Sickl left office in October. Her successor has made no public
    statements on this issue. The federal office on sects continues to
    collect and distribute information on organizations considered sects.
    Under the law, this office has independent status, but its head is
    appointed and supervised by the Minister for Social Security and
    Generations.
        In April 1999, the Conservative People's Party (OVP) convention
    formally accepted a decision made by the party's executive board in
    1997 that party membership is incompatible with membership in a sect.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict
    movement, including emigration. Citizens who leave the country have the
    right to return at any time.
        The new coalition adopted the policy of the outgoing SPO-led
    cabinet that the Government needs to focus on integration prior to
    considering any new immigration. In June Economics Minister Martin
    Bartenstein (OVP) issued a decree liberalizing existing employment
    restrictions for certain groups of legal aliens, paving the way for
    their integration into the labor market. Also in June, the
    Constitutional Court rejected the current upper age limit of 14 for the
    visa category of family reunification as too restrictive. The
    Government did not decide on its response to this decision but is
    considering adopting the EU standard of age 16 as the cutoff for this
    category. In the first 6 months of the year, the number of illegal
    aliens seized by police was 20,606, an 18.4 percent increase over the
    same period in 1999.
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in
    accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government
    subscribes to the ``safe country'' concept, which requires asylum
    seekers who enter illegally to depart and seek refugee status from
    outside the country. In response to continuing criticism by the office
    of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations, the Government passed an amendment to the
    1991 asylum law in 1997 designed to bring some improvements to the
    ``safe country'' rule and the appellate procedure. The Government
    cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations
    generally approve of the 1997 asylum law, but there is still some
    dissatisfaction with its implementation. A January amendment to the
    1997 asylum law, which authorizes the Ministry of Interior to draw up a
    ``white list'' of ``safe third countries,'' drew sharp criticism from
    human rights and refugee advocacy groups. There is widespread
    opposition to this concept based on the fear that it compromises the
    principle of individual investigation of claims. This principle was
    upheld in a February 1999 ruling of the administrative court and again
    in a March 2000 ruling. In both cases the High Court reversed a denial
    of asylum made on the basis of the ``safe third country'' rule.
        Making government care available to all needy asylum applicants
    until their claims are processed was a focal point of the year's agenda
    of the UNHCR regional office. In principle asylum applicants are
    entitled to federal assistance for food, shelter, and medical care.
    However, the Federal Care Provisions Act specifically states that there
    is no corresponding legal right for applicants. The result is that
    asylum applicants denied assistance have no legal recourse if denied
    these benefits. The Government grants assistance to only one-third of
    all asylum applicants who face financial hardship; one-third are forced
    to rely on charitable assistance, and the remaining applicants
    abandoned their applications and are believed to have left the country
    to apply for asylum elsewhere. Individuals found to be bona fide
    refugees by government authorities are not sent back to the countries
    from which they fled. Asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected by
    the Federal Asylum Office may appeal to the independent Federal Asylum
    Senate; the Administrative Court is the court of last instance.
        Of the estimated 95,000 Bosnian refugees who arrived between April
    1992 and July 1993, the Government provided temporary protected status
    (TPS), similar to first asylum, to 47,000, which made them eligible to
    receive government assistance without having to file asylum
    applications. Most of the other 48,000 refugees were deemed to have
    other means of support, either from families already present in Austria
    or from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The overwhelming number
    of all Bosnian refugees has been integrated into the labor market. They
    now hold ``gastarbeiter'' status, which means that their residency
    permit is evaluated each year on the basis of the country's overall
    labor demand. Many of the refugees have chosen voluntarily to return to
    their homeland, a process that still continues. The Government's
    program of assistance for Bosnian war refugees in TPS expired on July
    31. As of that date, approximately 300 Bosnian refugees formerly in TPS
    remained in the country and are now being supported by the social
    welfare system.
        During the Kosovo crisis, Austria accepted an estimated 10,000 to
    15,000 refugees. A total of 5,080 Kosovar Albanians were evacuated
    directly from Macedonia and admitted to Austria under cover of TPS.
    Also, the immigration law was modified to allow Kosovar Albanians
    already in the country in a variety of statuses to extend their stay.
    In December approximately 1,593 Kosovar Albanians of the total of 5,080
    refugees under TPS remained in the country. They receive public
    assistance under a care program similar to the one set up during the
    Bosnian crisis. The Interior Ministry has agreed to extend the July
    2000 deadline for the repatriation of approximately 1,200 Kosovar
    refugees in three categories: 1) those needing protection, 2) those
    supported financially by relatives residing legally in Austria, and 3)
    Kosovars who earlier were granted temporary protected status or asylum
    and already were integrated into the labor market. The Government has
    said that the 226 Kosovars in need of protection would be permitted to
    stay in the country for at least another year, whereas the other two
    categories are to be granted humanitarian residence status temporarily
    until new immigration quotas become formally available in 2001.
        Preliminary figures for asylum applications during the year
    indicate a decrease by almost 10 percent from 1999 figures to 18,290.
    In 1999 there were 20,096 asylum applications, a significant increase
    over the 1998 total of 13,805. In 1999 3,434 applications were accepted
    and 3,573 were denied, compared with 500 approvals and 3,491 denials in
    1998. The 1999 approval figure includes asylum seekers from the Federal
    Republic of Yugoslavia (2,953), Afghanistan (108), Iran (99), Iraq
    (80), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (26). The record 1999
    approval rate of 49 percent (compared with 11.5 percent in 1998) is
    attributed to the Kosovo conflict. Improved border controls resulting
    from the 1997 full implementation of the Schengen Agreement have led to
    an increase in asylum applications. Aliens who formerly used the
    country as a transit point increasingly are filing asylum applications
    upon arrival.
        In May 1999, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant, Marcus
    Omofuma, died while being deported to Lagos via Sofia, Bulgaria (see
    Section 1.a.). Because of Omofuma's violent, uncooperative behavior,
    accompanying Austrian police physically restrained him, including
    taping his mouth shut to silence his loud outcries. Omofuma lost
    consciousness during the flight and was pronounced dead upon arrival in
    Sofia. The incident prompted a complete review of internal procedures
    regarding deportations. Two of the three police officers who
    accompanied Omofuma were suspended. The Interior Ministry created the
    Human Rights Advisory Council, composed of representatives from the
    Justice and Interior Ministries, as well as NGO's, to ensure that the
    police and gendarmerie respect human rights while carrying out their
    duties. In addition, the Ministry announced a new policy requiring that
    all potentially violent individuals be deported via chartered aircraft,
    rather than on commercial flights. The investigation into the Omofuma
    case is ongoing. Civil charges, filed on behalf of Omofuma's daughter
    stating that Omofuma's human rights were violated, are also pending.
        In August the Human Rights Advisory Council released a report
    criticizing the conditions of deportation detention for minors as not
    meeting minimum international standards. The council's report to the
    Ministry of Interior lists 43 recommendations aimed at correcting the
    implementation of current legal provisions or at amending the law.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully. Citizens exercise this right in practice through
    periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage. National elections were held in October 1999, in which the
    Social Democrats (SPO) won 65 seats in Parliament; the Freedom party
    (FPO) 52; the People's Party (OVP) 52; and the Green Party 14. On
    February 4, the OVP and FPO formed a right-of-center coalition
    government, headed by the OVP.
        Women play an active role but are underrepresented in government
    and politics. Approximately 27 percent of the Members of Parliament and
    5 of 16 cabinet members are women.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. In some cases, they have been dissatisfied with the
    information that the authorities have supplied in response to specific
    complaints. There have been no reports of discrimination against
    organizations that report on human rights.
        Following the inclusion of the FPO in the Government, several NGO's
    expressed concern that the country's climate of tolerance and respect
    for ethnic and religious diversity would worsen. During the summer, a
    group of 3 human rights experts, accepted by the other 14 EU member
    states, conducted a review of the rights of minorities, refugees, and
    immigrants in the country. Their report, published in September,
    concluded that appropriate legal protection was available for
    minorities.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law provides for protection against any of these kinds of
    discrimination in employment, provision of welfare benefits, and other
    matters, and the Government generally enforces its provisions
    effectively. There were allegations that police abused homosexuals (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. An estimated
    300,000 women are abused annually. Police and judges enforce laws
    against violence; however, less than 10 percent of abused women are
    estimated to file complaints. Overall, the Association of Houses for
    Battered Women estimates that one-fifth of the country's 1.5 million
    adult women has suffered from violence in a relationship. In July 1999,
    legislators passed an amendment to the 1997 Law on the Protection
    Against Violence in the Family, extending the period during which
    police can expel abusive family members from family homes. Between
    January and June, the injunction to prevent abusive family members from
    returning home was applied in 1,687 cases. The Government also sponsors
    shelters and help lines for women.
        Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). While
    prostitution is legal, trafficking for the purposes of prostitution is
    illegal.
        Most legal restrictions on women's rights have been abolished. In
    1994 the European Court of Justice ruled that the country's law
    prohibiting women from working nights was not permissible and gave the
    Government until 2001 to adapt its legislation to gender-neutral EU
    regulations. Legislation went into effect in January 1998, requiring
    that collective bargaining units take action by 2001 to eliminate
    restrictions on nighttime work for women.
        In October the Freedom Party replaced Social Security and
    Generations Minister Elisabeth Sickl with FPO Member of Parliament
    Herbert Haupt. The Government received extensive criticism for
    replacing the head of this ministry, which oversees women's affairs,
    with a man. A Federal Equality Commission and a Federal Commissioner
    for Equal Treatment oversee laws prescribing equal treatment of men and
    women. Sixty percent of women between the ages of 15 and 60 are in the
    labor force. Despite substantial gains, women's incomes continue to
    average 30 percent less than those of men.
        In September the U.N. Committee on Elimination of Discrimination
    Against Women released a report criticizing the new Government's
    treatment of women, including its decision to abolish the Federal
    Women's Affairs Ministry and fold its portfolio into the newly created
    Ministry of Social Affairs and Generations. The Committee was
    especially concerned about immigrant women's access to employment.
        As of January 1, 1998, women were allowed to serve in the military
    voluntarily. On April 1, 1998, the first two women began training. On
    December 1, 1998, the first women, both doctors, were taken into the
    military. The long-term expectation is that women may make up about 5
    percent of the military. As of August, there were a total of 104 women
    serving in the military. This includes 6 officers, 2 of whom currently
    are serving in peacekeeping operations abroad, and 13 noncommissioned
    officers (NCO's). There are 7 women currently undergoing officer
    training and 52 training to be NCO's. The remaining 26 are training as
    high-level athletes. There are no restrictions on the type or location
    of assignments given to women.
        Although labor laws provide for equal treatment for women in the
    civil service, they remain underrepresented. To remedy this
    circumstance, a 1993 law requires hiring women of equivalent
    qualifications ahead of men in civil service areas in which less than
    40 percent of the employees are women; however, there are no penalties
    for failing to attain the 40 percent target. Critics of the Government
    raised the issue of sexual equality in a proposed ``objectivity law''
    on personnel appointments in the civil service. They are asking for
    provisions that provide parity between men and women on personnel
    appointment panels.
        Women may be awarded compensation of up to 4 months' salary if
    discriminated against in promotions because of their sex. The Labor
    Court also can order employers to compensate victims of sexual
    harassment.
        Women's rights organizations are partly politically affiliated, and
    partly autonomous groups. In voicing their concerns, they receive wide
    public attention. Despite fears of women's rights groups, the new
    coalition asserted that these groups would continue to receive
    government subsidies.
        Children.--Laws protect the vast majority of children's rights
    established in international conventions and in some respects go beyond
    them. Each provincial government and the federal Ministry for Youth and
    Family Affairs has an ``Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents''
    whose main function is to resolve complaints about violations of rights
    of children.
        While 9 years of education are mandatory for all children,
    beginning at age 6, the Government also provides free education through
    the level of technical or vocational programs or university.
    Educational opportunity is equal for girls and boys. Comprehensive,
    government-financed medical care is available for all children without
    regard to gender.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although
    heightened awareness of child abuse has led the Government to increase
    its efforts to monitor the issue and prosecute offenders. The growing
    number of reported incidences of child abuse is considered a result of
    increased public awareness of the problem. According to the Penal Code,
    sexual intercourse between an adult and a child (under 14 years of age)
    is punishable with a prison sentence of up to 10 years; in case of
    pregnancy of the victim, the sentence can be extended to up to 15
    years. In 1999 the Ministry of Justice reported 690 cases of child
    abuse involving either intercourse with a minor (paragraph 206 of the
    Penal Code) or attempted intercourse with a minor (paragraph 207). Of
    these, 519 cases were investigated. In 1998 there were 745 cases
    involving the same sections of the Penal Code, of which 554 were
    investigated, resulting in 252 convictions.
        Stricter regulations on child pornography went into effect in 1997.
    Under the new laws, any citizen engaging in child pornography in a
    foreign country becomes punishable under Austrian law even if the
    actions are not punishable in the country where this violation was
    committed. The laws also entail more severe provisions for the
    possession, trading, and private viewing of pornographic materials. For
    example, exchanging videos is now illegal even if done privately rather
    than as a business transaction.
        People with Disabilities.--The law protects disabled individuals
    from discrimination in housing, education, and employment. In July
    1997, Parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution explicitly
    requiring the State to provide for equal rights for the disabled ``in
    all areas of everyday life. `` The law requires all private enterprises
    and state and federal government offices to employ 1 disabled person
    for every 25 to 45 employees, depending on the type of work. Employers
    who do not meet this requirement must pay a fee to the Government, and
    the proceeds help finance services for the disabled such as training
    programs, wage subsidies, and workplace adaptations. However, the law
    has received some criticism, since many observers believe that
    penalties are too low to discourage companies from bypassing the
    requirement. No federal law mandates access for the physically
    disabled; some public buildings are virtually inaccessible to those
    unable to climb stairs.
        Mentally retarded women can be sterilized involuntarily at the
    request of parents; in the case of minors; or, by request of the
    responsible family member or by court order, in the case of adults. One
    political party has called for restrictive legislation to make it more
    difficult to sterilize mentally retarded women; however, no legislative
    action has ever been taken on this proposal.
        Religious Minorities.--Members of various nonrecognized religious
    groups complained of discrimination and harassment by the public. The
    head of the Lutheran Church in Burgenland, Gertrude Knoll, who spoke
    out against intolerance and xenophobia at a February political
    demonstration, was subjected to hate mail and threats against herself
    and her family. It was widely assumed, but never proven, that FPO
    supporters were behind the hate campaign.
        The leader of the country's Jewish community reported that persons
    within the community who took a stand against racism and xenophobia
    (including himself) were subjected to verbal and written threats. The
    FPO's attitudes against foreigners and minorities reportedly led some
    members of the Jewish community to consider leaving the country.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--While statistics for the first
    half of the year showed a marked increase in the number of official
    complaints of neo-Nazi, right-wing extremist, or xenophobic incidents,
    the Interior Ministry estimates that figures for the calendar year
    indicate a slight overall decrease compared to 1999. In 1999 the
    Ministry recorded 311 rightwing incidents, 15 anti-Semitic incidents,
    and 52 xenophobic incidents, which led to a total of 25 convictions. In
    1998 there were 244 reported rightwing incidents, 31 anti-Semitic
    incidents, and 8 xenophobic incidents, with 41 convictions. The
    Government expressed concern over the activities of extreme-right
    skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, many with links to organizations in other
    countries. Despite ongoing budgetary austerity, the Government retained
    the previous year's funding levels for ethnic minorities in the 2000
    budget.
        In August the domestic media reported that the European Commission
    Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) issued a confidential report to
    the Government recommending the swift implementation of additional
    measures against racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance.
    Members of the Commission reportedly expressed ``deep concern about the
    extensive use of racist and xenophobic remarks by Austrian
    politicians.''
        In July the Government passed a comprehensive prominority rights
    bill providing expanded constitutional protections for the country's
    six officially recognized minorities. In response to a longstanding
    demand by minority representatives, the governing coalition committed
    to ``honor and promote its historic minorities'' as a constitutionally
    anchored policy goal. In a related development, the Government approved
    the placement of bilingual town signs in Croat- and Hungarian-speaking
    areas of Burgenland province, an action pending since 1955. The
    Government also agreed to continue funding, albeit at lower levels,
    privately run minority radio stations. In Carinthia Governor Haider
    promised to fulfill a longstanding demand by the resident Slovene
    minority for a dedicated seat in the provincial assembly. Haider also
    promised to implement additional prominority measures in the province's
    preschool system. Minority representatives acknowledged all these
    measures, but some critics contend that the recent spate of prominority
    measures is clearly a result of EU sanctions.
        In October 1999, authorities arrested 69 suspected neo-Nazis in the
    province of Upper Austria. The group had contacts with neo-Nazis in
    several other countries. In a separate action in November 1999, 17
    skinheads in the same province were charged with violation of the law
    against neo-Nazi activities.
        In March 1999, Franz Fuchs was convicted of conducting a
    xenophobic, deadly letter bomb campaign between 1993 and 1997. He was
    sentenced to life imprisonment but committed suicide in February.
        During the national election campaign, the Freedom Party exploited
    the fears of many citizens that EU expansion and a continued influx of
    asylum seekers and refugees from the Balkans and other areas would
    result in uncontrolled immigration. The Vienna FPO chapter widely
    distributed placards carrying anti-immigrant slogans, including a call
    to stop ``overforeignization.''

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and
    join unions without prior authorization, under general constitutional
    provisions regarding freedom of association. In practice trade unions
    have an important and independent voice in the political, social, and
    economic life of the country. Fifty-two percent of the work force are
    organized into 13 national unions belonging to the Austrian Trade Union
    Federation (OGB), which has a highly centralized leadership structure.
    Association of national unions with the OGB is voluntary. Individual
    unions and the OGB are independent of government or political party
    control, although formal factions within these organizations are allied
    closely with political parties.
        Although the right to strike is not provided explicitly in the
    Constitution or in national legislation, it is universally recognized.
    Historically strikes have been comparatively few and usually of short
    duration. A major reason for the record of labor peace is the
    unofficial system of ``social partnership'' among labor, management,
    and government. At the center of the system is the Joint Parity
    Commission for Wages and Prices, which has an important voice on major
    economic questions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
    right to organize and bargain collectively. Almost all large companies,
    private or state-owned, are organized. Worker councils operate at the
    enterprise level, and workers are entitled by law to elect one-third of
    the members of the supervisory boards of major companies. Collective
    agreements covering wages, benefits, and working conditions are
    negotiated by the OGB with the National Chamber of Commerce and its
    associations, which represent the employers. The Joint Parity
    Commission sets wage and price policy guidelines. A 1973 law obliges
    employers in enterprises with more than five employees to prove that
    job dismissals are not motivated by antiunion discrimination. Employers
    found guilty of this offense are required to reinstate workers. Labor
    and business representatives remain in a longstanding disagreement over
    how to comply with the obligation under the International Labor
    Organization's Convention 98 to provide legal protection to employees
    against arbitrary dismissals in firms with five employees or fewer.
        Typically legal disputes between employers and employees regarding
    job-related matters are handled by a special arbitration court for
    social affairs. The OGB is exclusively responsible for collective
    bargaining. The leadership of the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of
    Commerce, and the OGB are elected democratically.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
    prohibited by law and generally is not practiced. Trafficking in women
    for the purpose of forced prostitution remains a problem (see Section
    6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        Former forced laborers have filed suits against Austrian companies
    that used forced labor provided by the Nazi government. In October an
    agreement was signed between the Government, attorneys representing
    former forced and slave laborers, and representatives of foreign
    governments, providing for compensation for former forced and slave
    laborers. In July Parliament unanimously passed legislation authorizing
    the payment of $418 million (6 billion ATS) for victims of forced and
    slave labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum legal working age is 15 years. The Labor
    Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs effectively enforces the
    law. The Government has adopted laws and policies to protect children
    from exploitation in the work place. The law prohibits forced and
    bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition
    effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated national
    minimum wage. Instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set
    minimums by job classification for each industry. The generally
    accepted unofficial minimum gross income is $11,200 (168,000 ATS) per
    year. Every worker is entitled to a variety of generous social
    benefits. The average citizen has a high standard of living, and even
    the minimum wages are sufficient to permit a decent living for workers
    and their families.
        Although the legal workweek has been established at 40 hours since
    1975, more than 50 percent of the labor force is covered by collective
    bargaining agreements that set the workweek at 38 or 38+ hours.
        Extensive legislation, regularly enforced by the Labor Inspectorate
    of the Ministry of Social Affairs, provides for mandatory occupational
    health and safety standards. Workers may file complaints anonymously
    with the Labor Inspectorate, which may bring suit against the employer
    on behalf of the employee; however, this option is rarely exercised, as
    workers normally rely instead on the Chambers of Labor, which file
    suits on their behalf.
        The Labor Code provides that workers have the right to remove
    themselves from a job if they fear ``serious, immediate danger to life
    and health'' without incurring any prejudice to their job or career.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no single law covering
    trafficking in persons generally, but several laws contain provisions
    that apply to this problem. Trafficking for the purpose of prostitution
    is illegal, and the law provides for a jail sentence of up to 10 years
    for convicted traffickers. Prostitution itself is legal. Another law
    covers trafficking in persons for purposes other than prostitution.
    NGO's report that enforcement is weak and that convicted traffickers
    generally receive sentences of less than 3 years imprisonment. A
    leading domestic NGO reports that the country has shifted from being a
    transit country to a major final destination, primarily for women from
    Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union who are
    trafficked into prostitution and other forms of forced dependency.
    Convictions for trafficking in women and children increased by 162
    percent. Police estimate that one-fourth of trafficking in women in the
    country is controlled by organized crime. Austria is particularly
    attractive to traffickers due to its geographic location and to the
    fact that citizens of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary do not
    require visas to enter the country. On March 24, the Interior Ministry
    announced draft legislation to enact stronger penalties against alien
    smuggling. The maximum penalty for the most serious offenses would
    increase from 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. In the first 6 months of the
    year, the authorities arrested 133 smugglers of persons.
        A witness protection program granting temporary resident status to
    women willing to testify against their traffickers went into effect on
    January 1, 1998. In the past, because so few witnesses agreed to
    testify against their traffickers, prosecution was difficult, and those
    trafficked often simply were expelled from the country. The witness
    protection plan is aimed at generating more support from witnesses;
    however, victims still rarely agree to testify, due to fear of
    retribution. The temporary resident status allows victims to stay in
    the country only during a trial; no provisions are made for them to
    stay in the country following their testimony. Virtually all victims
    are deported. Various NGO's, with the support of the Government, have
    begun to broaden their assistance and strong support for battered
    spouses to include those women seeking to flee from the prostitution
    traps created by criminal elements. There is one NGO center that
    provides comprehensive counseling, educational services, and emergency
    housing to victims of trafficking.
                                   __________

                                   AZERBAIJAN

        Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of government.
    Heydar Aliyev, who assumed presidential powers after the overthrow of
    his democratically elected predecessor in 1993, was reelected in
    October 1998 in a controversial election marred by numerous, serious
    irregularities, violations of the election law, and lack of
    transparency in the vote counting process at the district and national
    levels. President Aliyev and his supporters continue to dominate the
    government and the multiparty 125-member Parliament. Parliamentary
    elections held in November showed some progress over the flawed 1995
    elections in that political pluralism was advanced; however, there were
    numerous serious flaws; and the elections did not meet international
    standards. Serious irregularities included the disqualification of half
    of the prospective candidates in the single mandate elections, a flawed
    appeals process, ballot box stuffing, manipulated turnout results,
    premarked ballots, severe restrictions on domestic nonpartisan
    observers, and a completely flawed vote counting process. The
    Constitution, adopted in a 1995 referendum, established a system of
    government based on a division of powers among a strong presidency, a
    legislature with the power to approve the budget and impeach the
    President, and a nominally independent judiciary. The judiciary does
    not function independently of the executive branch and is corrupt and
    inefficient.
        The police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of
    National Security are responsible for internal security. Members of the
    police continue to commit numerous human rights abuses.
        Azerbaijan continued to affirm its commitment to an economic
    transition from central planning to a free market; however, reforms
    stagnated in practice. Economic growth has been spurred by substantial
    foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector, but it is offset by
    widespread corruption and patronage. While government statistics
    pointed to continued economic growth during the year, the real economy
    continues to be affected by a low level of foreign business activity
    due largely to low oil prices in 1999, a lack of oil industry
    infrastructure, widespread corruption and a deteriorating business
    climate. Consistently high oil prices appear to be reversing that
    trend. The country has rich petroleum reserves and significant
    agricultural potential. Oil and oil products are the largest export,
    followed by cotton and tobacco. Other key industries are chemicals and
    oil field machinery. The government signed new oil production sharing
    agreements with foreign oil companies and a group of eight oil
    companies formed a sponsors group and began engineering studies for the
    Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline. Agriculture employs 36
    percent of the labor force and makes up 22 percent of the gross
    domestic product (GDP). The leading crops are wheat, fruit and
    vegetables, cotton, tobacco, and grapes. Privatization of industry was
    postponed while the government rewrote its privatization laws to bring
    them up to international standards. On August 10, President Aliyev
    issued a decree to implement the new privatization law adopted by the
    Parliament in May. Large enterprises remain almost exclusively under
    government control and operate at a fraction of their capacity. The
    accumulation of large wage arrears is common. Private retail
    enterprises, cotton gins, and grain mills are proliferating. More than
    90 percent of the nation's farmland is now in private hands, but new
    small farmers have poor access to credit and markets, and commercial
    agriculture remains weak. Per capita GDP is approximately $500 per
    year. Much of the labor force is employed in the state sector where
    wages are low. The overall economic situation of the average citizen
    remains tenuous, although in urban areas a growing moneyed class with
    trade and oil-related interests has emerged. According to official
    statistics, the economy now is only 60 percent of the size of the
    economy in 1991. According to the World Bank, 60 percent of the
    citizens live in poverty. Severe disparities of income have emerged
    that are attributed partly to patronage and corruption.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were improvements in a few significant areas, serious problems remain.
    The Government continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their
    government peacefully. Police tortured and beat persons in custody,
    arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and conducted searches and
    seizures without warrants. In most instances, the Government took no
    action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a
    handful of cases. Prison conditions remained harsh, and some prisoners
    died as a result of these conditions. Lengthy pretrial detention is
    still a problem. The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and subject to
    executive influence. Corruption continued to pervade most government
    organs, and it is widely believed that most persons in appointed
    government positions and in state employment purchased their positions.
    During the year a total of five presidential pardons and amnesties
    resulted in the release of approximately 300 prisoners, including some
    political prisoners. The Government holds about 50 political prisoners.
    The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
    continues to limit freedom of speech and of the press. Although the
    Government abolished censorship in August 1998, government officials
    throughout the year sought to intimidate independent and opposition
    newspapers by suing them for defamation. As a result, journalists
    practiced self-censorship. Nevertheless, scores of opposition and
    independent newspapers continue to publish and discuss a wide range of
    sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues. Criticism of the
    Government and of the Aliyev family is not uncommon; however,
    journalists were subject to violence on occasion by unknown assailants
    who sought to stop media criticism of the Government. The Government
    continued to deny broadcast licenses to all truly independent
    organizations that applied to open television and radio stations. The
    Government also tightly controls official radio and television, the
    primary source of information for most of the population.
        The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association.
    Although local authorities in Baku permitted several demonstrations to
    take place, the locations negotiated with the city government were not
    those preferred by the opposition and were subject to heavy police
    surveillance. Baku authorities broke up unsanctioned demonstrations and
    pickets throughout the year. Opposition political parties tried to hold
    smaller-scale meetings and seminars throughout the country; although
    many do take place, local authorities refuse to sanction some. The
    Government continues to refuse to register some political parties.
    There are currently 38 registered political parties, 20 of which are
    considered to be opposition parties. The Government registered the
    opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party after a long delay in February.
    After a series of crackdowns on religious groups in the summer and fall
    of 1999, the Government improved its record on religious liberty
    following President Aliyev's public commitment to do so in November
    1999. The Government acted to redress earlier harassment by lower-level
    government and security officials, including arrests, deportation
    orders, and a failure to register religious groups. However, harassment
    of some non-traditional religious groups by lower-level and local
    government officials continued. The authorities broke up religious
    observances, and bureaucratic harassment, including lengthy delays in
    registration, continued for some religious organizations. The
    Government at times restricted freedom of movement. The Government
    controlled the electoral process. Although parliamentary elections held
    in November showed some improvement over the flawed 1995 elections,
    numerous serious irregularities marred the process. The Government
    criticized certain domestic human rights activists. Domestic human
    rights NGO's routinely experience problems with registration. Violence
    and discrimination against women and discrimination against certain
    religious minorities are problems. The Government limits some worker
    rights. Trafficking in persons, particularly women for the purpose of
    forced prostitution, is a problem.
        After years of interethnic conflict between Armenians and
    Azerbaijanis, Armenian forces and forces of the self-styled ``Republic
    of Nagorno-Karabakh'' (which is not recognized by any government)
    continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. A cease-fire
    was concluded in 1994, and the peace process continues. Beginning in
    1999, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia held a series of direct
    meetings to discuss a compromise resolution. These meetings have yet to
    yield concrete results. Exchanges of fire occurred sporadically along
    the Azerbaijan-Armenian border and along the line of contact with
    Nagorno-Karabakh, causing numerous casualties. Military operations of
    1989-94 continue to affect the civilian population to this day. There
    were four civilian and four military casualties during the year caused
    by landmines. In 1999 three persons were killed and five were wounded
    by landmines. These landmines were laid near the disputed area by the
    governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Karabakh Armenian
    authorities. There are approximately 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees and
    internally displaced persons (IDP's) who cannot return to their homes
    in Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories and approximately
    300,000 Armenians who cannot return to Baku and other cities in
    Azerbaijan.
        The Government of Azerbaijan does not exercise any control over
    events inside of Nagorno-Karabakh. Little information is available on
    the human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh due to limited access to
    the region by foreign diplomatic officials. In March Nagorno-Karabakh
    ``President'' Arkady Ghukasian was injured by gunfire while travelling
    from his office to his residence. Samuel Babayan, the former chief of
    the ``Nagorno-Karabakh Defense forces'' and former ``Minister of
    Defense'', his brother Karen (currently mayor of Stepankert), and 25
    others were taken into custody in connection with the shooting. On
    March 28, authorities arrested Vahram Aghajanian, a journalist who
    writes for an opposition newspaper in Nagorno-Karabakh, and accused him
    of slandering the ``Prime Minister.'' He was held without charge for 2
    weeks after his arrest, and then given a 1-year sentence for defamation
    of character. In April he was released from prison after an appeals
    court suspended his 1-year sentence. There were some reports that the
    Armenian Apostolic Church enjoys at least quasi-official status, and
    that the practice of some other religious faiths, such as evangelical
    Christianity, is discouraged.
        Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict continue. They result in injuries and deaths among combatants
    and occasionally civilians. The taking of prisoners, including
    civilians, occurs. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
    and the occupied territories continued to prevent the return of
    hundreds of thousands of IDP's to their homes.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government officials.
        There were a few reports of deaths of prisoners due, at least in
    part to prison conditions while in official custody. Several prisoners
    were killed during a reported uprising at a prison in January 1999 (see
    Section 1.c.). The Government still has not released a report on the
    prison uprising.
        Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict occasionally resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians.
        There were four civilian and four military casualties due to
    landmines during the year. In 1999 three persons were killed and five
    were wounded by landmines laid near the disputed area of Nagorno-
    Karabakh. These mines were laid by the governments of Azerbaijan and
    Armenia and the Karabakh Armenian authorities.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        During the year, 16 Azerbaijani and 2 Armenian POW's were released.
    The Government of Azerbaijan claims it has released all Armenian POW's.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) repeatedly asked
    the concerned parties for notification of any person captured in
    relation to the conflict, access to all places of detention connected
    with the conflict, and release of all such persons. The ICRC also urged
    the parties to provide information on the fate of persons reported as
    missing in action. Since 1997 the ICRC has collected from concerned
    family members the names of approximately 2,300 missing Azerbaijani
    nationals allegedly held by Armenia.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Torture is illegal; however, there are credible reports
    that prison guards tortured inmates, and that the police beat prisoners
    during arrest, interrogation, and pretrial detention. On September 1,
    the Government enacted a new criminal code that bans acts of torture
    and makes perpetrators liable for up to 10 years imprisonment. A
    definition of torture, in line with that contained in the U.N.
    Convention on Torture, was also adopted. The Government does not hold
    most members of the police accountable for their actions, and impunity
    continues to be a problem. In most instances, the Government took no
    action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a
    handful of cases. In a 1999 report, Human Rights Watch noted that the
    most severe and routine physical abuse of detainees takes place just
    prior to and during the preliminary investigation, as police and other
    investigators ``isolate detainees from all contact with the outside
    world, and beat and coerce confessions from suspects and statements
    from witnesses.''
        Prison conditions are harsh. The quality of food, housing, and
    medical care is poor. Prisoners must rely on their families to provide
    food and medicine. There are widespread and credible reports that
    authorities deny or give inadequate medical treatment to prisoners with
    serious medical conditions. Tuberculosis is a problem. Approximately
    2,000 prisoners have been treated for tuberculosis. Due to the absence
    of systematic screening of the prison population, patients often start
    treatment when they are already seriously ill and there is only a 55
    percent cure rate. Authorities severely limit opportunities for
    exercise and visits by lawyers and family members of prisoners in
    security prisons. Some prisoners are kept in ``separation cells'' often
    located in basements, in which prisoners reportedly are denied food and
    sleep in order to elicit confessions from them with no physical
    evidence of abuse. Men and women are housed in separate prison
    facilities. On March 20, President Aliyev signed two human rights
    decrees. One permitted the ICRC to begin prison visits, which allowed
    the ICRC access to all places and to all detainees within its mandates,
    both sentenced and unsentenced. The second decree provided for
    adherence to the U.N. Convention on Torture.
        The first visit of ICRC representatives took place on June 23 to
    Gobustan prison. ICRC visits to the Bailov Detention Center in Baku
    began on September 6. The ICRC also still had access to prisons where
    persons of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were detained. Local human
    rights organizations were able to continue their visits to prisons;
    however, one local organization has been denied access since July.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Authorities arbitrarily
    arrest and detain persons without legal warrants. Often authorities do
    not notify family members after arrests. Frequently it is days before
    family members are able to obtain information as to whether authorities
    have arrested someone, and where authorities are holding the detainee.
    Family members do not enjoy the right of visitation. Authorities
    generally deny bail to detained individuals and often do not inform
    detainees of the charges against them. While the situation appears to
    be improving gradually, lengthy pretrial detention is still a problem.
    In July 1999 the Constitutional Court ruled that detainees could have
    access to a lawyer from the time of detention rather than only after
    they have been charged with a crime, but access to lawyers is often
    poor. In the past, police sometimes detained relatives of suspects
    being sought in an attempt to force the family to reveal a suspect's
    whereabouts (see Section 1.f.).
        Twenty-three members of opposition parties were still in custody at
    year's end for their alleged participation in an unsanctioned
    demonstration in Sheki on November 18. Some of these demonstrators
    violently attacked government buildings and law enforcement officials.
    Throughout the year, opposition members were detained for participating
    in unsanctioned demonstrations and later released by police without
    further charges.
        Members of opposition political parties were more likely to
    experience official harassment than other citizens. In response to
    publication of a series of articles insulting the residents of the
    autonomous republic of Nakhchivan published by Yeni Musavat in
    February, five opposition politicians and the author of the articles
    were detained by officials in Nakhchivan (see section 2.a.). All were
    subsequently released.
        In July police arrested four participants at an unsanctioned
    demonstration in support of opposition Azerbaijan National Independence
    Party leader, Etibar Mammedov. Two of the four were imprisoned while
    awaiting their trial, which was delayed numerous times. All eventually
    were fined and released.
        Police forcibly dispersed an unsanctioned demonstration on April
    29. The demonstrators made up of a cross-section of opposition party
    members attempted to assemble at a downtown Baku square to demand free
    and fair parliamentary elections in November. The Government refused to
    issue a permit for the demonstration and ordered police to break up the
    rally. A number of protesters and journalists covering the
    demonstration were injured; dozens were arrested and detained before
    being released without charges (See sections 2.a. and 2.b.). In 1999,
    police beat, harassed detained, and arrested members of evangelical
    Christian and other groups, and seized their documents and property.
    This year there were few reports of such incidents, and there has been
    substantial improvement in the treatment of evangelical Christian
    groups (see Section 2.c.).
        In July police arrested and detained worshippers of a Pentecostal
    church in Baku (see Section 2.c.).
        In August Ramiz Hasanov, head of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party's
    (ADP) Ganja Branch, was arrested for allegedly concealing knowledge of
    a coup d'etat planned by Ganja's ex-police chief Natiq Effendiyev. No
    trial date was set by year's end. There were credible reports that
    local authorities harassed ADP party members while they campaigned for
    the party in the period prior to parliamentary elections.
        In August a member of the Nakhchivan branch of the opposition
    Musavat Party-demanding free and fair parliamentary elections in
    November-attempted to hijack a domestic flight from Nakhchivan to Baku.
    He was subsequently disarmed and arrested after the plane landed safely
    in Baku. Days later, Yeni Musavat opposition journalist Rauf Arifoglu
    was arrested for allegedly concealing a weapon, which many believe may
    have been planted by police, and for concealing prior knowledge of the
    hijacking attempt. Arifoglu was detained for six weeks and later
    released in October. A trial date for Arifoglu was not set by year's
    end. Local police detained several members of the opposition Popular
    Front Party in Nakhchivan under suspicion for complicity in the
    hijacking. All later were released. Local police also arrested a Yeni
    Musavat reporter soon after his arrival in Nakhchivan to cover the
    hijacking. Police did not disseminate any information about the
    journalist's whereabouts until his release 2 days later (see Section
    2.a.).
        Rza Guliyev and Etibar Guliyev, nephews of exiled opposition
    politician Rasul Guliyev, were both convicted of large-scale
    embezzlement in 1999 and 2000, and are currently serving 7 year jail
    sentences. The actions taken against Guliyev's nephews appeared to be
    politically motivated. Rasul Guliyev was forced to resign as Speaker of
    the Parliament in 1996 and now is living abroad. He is accused by the
    government of large-scale embezzlement and an arrest warrant has been
    issued based on the results of an investigation by the Prosecutor
    General's office. Guliyev claims that he and his attorney are unable to
    see these charges.
        On September 1, the Government promulgated several new legal codes,
    replacing codes from the Soviet era. These included: a new criminal
    code, a family code, a civil code, a civil procedures code, and a code
    on administrative violations. Officials cooperated with foreign
    advisers to develop the new codes in accordance with Western European
    standards. However, the Government had not implemented completely some
    of these codes by year's end.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice judges do not function
    independently of the executive branch. The judicial system is subject
    to the influence of executive authorities. The President appoints
    Supreme and Constitutional Court judges, subject to confirmation by
    Parliament. The President directly appoints lower level judges with no
    requirement for confirmation. In April qualifying exams for judges were
    administered for the first time. Over half of the approximately 1,000
    test takers passed the written portion of the exam, which international
    legal observers say was conducted fairly. However, there were numerous
    reports of fraud during the oral portion of the test, where many
    positions were allegedly bought and sold. The judiciary is widely
    believed to be corrupt and inefficient.
        During the year, the Constitutional Court formed in 1998 made a
    number of decisions, which demonstrated a more independent body. In
    February it reregistered the opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party
    following a long and drawn-out appeal by the party. In August it also
    decided to declare unconstitutional the retroactive application of a
    clause in the election law that required parties to be registered 6
    months in advance of the announcement of the elections. In November it
    voided the results of the Parliamentary elections in four additional
    districts (the Central Election Commission (CEC) originally recommended
    the results in 7 districts be voided).
        Courts of general jurisdiction may hear criminal, civil, and
    juvenile cases. District and municipal courts try the overwhelming
    majority of cases. The Supreme Court also may act as the court of first
    instance, depending on the nature ad seriousness of the crime.
        The Government organizes prosecutors into offices at the district,
    municipal, and republic level. They are ultimately responsible to the
    Minister of Justice, are appointed by the President, and are confirmed
    by Parliament. The Constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors
    and defense attorneys before the courts. In practice, prosecutors'
    prerogatives outweigh those of defense attorneys. Investigations often
    rely on obtaining confessions rather than obtaining evidence against
    suspects. No judge has dismissed a case based on a prisoner's claim of
    having been beaten.
        Cases at the district court level are tried before a panel
    consisting of one judge and two lay assessors. The judge presides over
    and directs trials. Judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in
    convictions back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation.''
    Such cases either may be dropped or closed, occasionally without
    informing either the court or the defendant. The Constitution provides
    for public trials except in cases involving state, commercial, or
    professional secrets, or matters involving confidentiality of personal
    or family matters.
        The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence in
    criminal cases and for numerous other rights, including an exclusionary
    rule barring the use of illegally obtained evidence and for a suspect's
    right to legal counsel and to be informed immediately of his legal
    rights, and of the charges against him. However, the Government has not
    made significant efforts to enforce these rights throughout the
    criminal justice system. Defendants may confront witnesses and present
    evidence. The court appoints an attorney for indigent defendants.
    Defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal. The Government
    generally has observed the constitutional provision for public trial.
    Foreign and domestic observers generally are able to attend trials.
        The Law on Advocates and Advocate Activity entered into force on
    January 27. It contains some useful features, such as rules on
    professionalism, and a call for people to pass a bar exam. Many legal
    observers find the law difficult to understand and question whether its
    implementation will improve the rule of law. The International League
    for Human Rights (ILHR) considers the law a step back, because they
    believe it restricts the independence of lawyers and the ability of
    independent lawyers to defend victims of human rights abuse by
    requiring defense lawyers in criminal cases and pre-trial detentions to
    belong to the collegium of advocates. The collegium remains the
    principal regulatory body of the legal profession under the new law.
        The Government held approximately 50 political prisoners at year's
    end. Some political prisoners were released following five presidential
    pardons and amnesties during the year. The Government continues to
    assert that it holds no political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for secrecy of
    correspondence and telephone conversations, subject to limits provided
    by law in criminal investigations or in prevention of a crime. The
    Government infringed on these rights. The Constitution allows searches
    of residences only with a court order or in cases provided by law.
    However, citizens widely believe that the Ministry of National Security
    monitors telephones and Internet traffic, especially those of
    foreigners and prominent political and business figures. Police often
    conducted searches without a warrant, and investigations sometimes
    resulted in confining the individuals to their city of residence or a
    brief jail sentence for questioning. There were credible allegations
    that police continued to intimidate and harass family members of
    suspects (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        There were credible reports that individuals linked to opposition
    parties were fired from their jobs (see Section 2.d.). In September,
    the wife of an ADP leader in Khanlar province was fired from her job
    for collecting signatures for the party's proportional list candidates
    running in the November parliamentary elections. In Gabala two ADP
    members were summoned by local authorities and instructed to stop
    collecting signatures or they would be fired. In Sheki two ADP members
    were arrested while collecting signatures and then later released. Low-
    level harassment of certain religious groups continued, despite an
    overall improvement in religious liberties (see Section 1.c. ,1.d. ,
    and 2.c.).
        In June 1999 a court ruled in favor of a group of Muslim women who
    sued for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport photos. In
    September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling;
    the case remained on appeal in the prosecutor general's office at
    year's end (see Section 2.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press and specifically outlaws press
    censorship; however, the Government in some cases restricts these
    rights in practice. The Government did not take any overt measures to
    reinstitute press censorship, which was abolished in 1998; however,
    actions taken by several prominent government officials, including the
    ongoing series of libel suits resulting in large fines (which would
    immediately bankrupt any independent or opposition newspaper), created
    an atmosphere in which editors and journalists exercise self-
    censorship. Most of the excessive fines were appealed; however, in
    those cases in which there were rulings, most appeals were denied.
    Prominent opposition politicians and independent newspapers criticized
    the government without reprisal.
        On February 11, President Aliyev signed a new law on media into
    effect. Although an improvement over the previous law, in many respects
    it falls short of international standards. In particular, one section
    of the law permits the Government to shut down any newspaper that has
    been convicted of a crime (mainly libel) three times within the period
    of one year. During the year, this part of the law was used in an
    attempt to shut down one newspaper, Uch Nogte. The paper continued to
    publish until it won an appeal, which overturned the verdict.
        While the press debated a wide variety of sensitive topics
    throughout the year, other factors restricted the public's ability to
    be informed about and discuss political issues. Editors complain that
    they feel under continuous and growing pressure to moderate criticism
    of the Government and of figures associated with the ruling circle.
    During the year, direct criticism of President Aliyev became less
    frequent. On May 8, Elmar Husseinov found the office to his weekly
    journal, Monitor Weekly (formerly Monitor), sealed by the Baku tax
    inspectorate, allegedly for printing articles critical of Aliyev. Most
    newspapers are printed in the Government's publishing house. The
    Government's near monopoly of publishing facilities and its control
    over the price of newsprint give it leverage over the press, a critical
    matter given the precarious finances of most opposition newspapers.
    Some editors complain about having their print runs limited by the
    state printing press, and many cite the threat of increases in paper
    and printing prices as a constraint on the freedom of the press.
        The spate of lawsuits by prominent government officials against
    opposition or independent media outlets also had a negative effect on
    freedom of the press in practice. Courts invariably ruled in favor of
    the government plaintiffs, while ruling against opposition plaintiffs
    pursuing similar charges against progovernment media outlets in most
    cases. It appears that the extremely high financial penalties levied by
    the courts were designed to repress criticism rather than to foster
    responsible journalism. The provision in the new media law that permits
    the Government to shut down a newspaper after it loses three lawsuits,
    adds a powerful weapon to the Government's arsenal of intimidation.
    Libel suit fines worsened the atmosphere for press freedom. Telescope
    and Alem Newspapers were fined about $1,000 (5 million and 4.5 million
    Manats respectively). Sara Television (which was shut down in the fall
    of 1999 on the grounds that Azerbaijani law prohibits foreign ownership
    of domestic television stations) was fined $55,000 (250 million
    Manats). The Minister of Culture brought suit against Hurriyet
    Newspaper and won a $220 (1 million Manats) fine. There were over 25
    legal actions taken against journalists and media outlets during the
    year, according to the Committee to Protect the Rights of Journalists.
    Media outlets were fined a total of $175,600 (803.5 million Manats).
    These sums are very high, given the country's poor economic situation;
    however, none have been paid. The chairman of Azeravtonagliyyat State
    Concern (a government-run enterprise) claimed his honor and dignity
    were offended and filed a lawsuit against the independent Avropa
    newspaper. During the appeals process, the fines against the newspaper
    were reduced. Avropa was subsequently charged with tax evasion--the
    second of three charges required to shut it down. Media outlets
    credibly claimed publicly and privately that the threat of fines and
    lawsuits forced them to exercise self-censorship.
        Journalists were subject to violence. More than 60 separate
    incidents of harassment or intimidation of journalists were reported
    during the year, according to local sources. Among the incidents
    reported were threatening telephone calls, assaults by unidentified
    persons, beatings by policemen during demonstrations or picketing, and
    attacks on premises and property. For example, in February a mob
    attacked the local headquarters of the opposition newspaper Yeni
    Musavat in the autonomous Nakhchivan Republic. The riot allegedly was
    triggered by an article highly critical of local authorities and
    residents of Nehram, hometown of former Parliament foreign affairs
    committee chairman, Rza Ibadov. Police did not intervene to halt the
    attack. However, several policemen including senior police officials
    responsible for that area, were later fired, and others were suspended
    or reprimanded. Also in February, an independent Sara Television's vice
    president was injured seriously in an assault by an unidentified
    person. Despite promises of rapid action, police did not determine the
    identity of any of the assailants. While the Government denies any
    relationship with the assailants, the incidents involved opposition
    journalists who were warned to stop criticizing government officials or
    policies. In a separate incident in November, a group of women from
    Mastaha village in Nakhchivan entered Yeni Musavat headquarters to
    protest an article that criticized a local official. The women
    subsequently filed a lawsuit against the newspaper claiming its staff
    had assaulted them during the confrontation. Yeni Musavat brought a
    countersuit against the women, to which the courts had responded by
    year's end.
        On April 29, police beat 17 journalists covering an unsanctioned
    opposition demonstration in Baku.
        On August 29 Rauf Arifoglu editor-in-chief of Yeni Musavat, was
    arrested on charges of attempted hijacking, terrorism, and illegal
    possession of arms (see Section 1.d.).
        Media outlets seek powerful patrons and align themselves with
    political parties and government factions to give themselves financial
    and legal protection. Current economic difficulties have contributed to
    the vulnerability of the media as former advertising revenues,
    primarily from foreign companies, have decreased. Most media have
    chosen to sacrifice their editorial independence to survive. However, a
    large number of newspapers continued to publish. One reliable source
    put the number of registered newspapers at 600, and the number actually
    publishing at least once a month at nearly 100. These included
    independent newspapers and newspapers with overt links to major and
    minor opposition parties. Government-run kiosks and 27 independent news
    distributors distributed opposition and independent newspapers. A
    number of editors continued to complain that the government-run kiosks
    refuse to carry their newspapers or claim to have sold all received
    copies while, in fact, retaining many unsold copies in stock.
        The Government tightly controlled official radio and television,
    the source of information for much of the population because newspapers
    too expensive for most persons. Television and radio stations require a
    license to operate, and the Government used this requirement to prevent
    several independent stations from broadcasting. Since 1993 no truly
    independent broadcaster has received a frequency from the State
    Commission on Radio and Television frequencies and the Ministry of
    Communications. There are a limited number of private television
    stations, whose broadcasts can be received only in Baku or in local
    areas outside the capital. Only one of the private stations is not
    directly under the control of a government official, and it is believed
    widely that this station also has compromised its independence.
    Independent radio, preferred by the overwhelming majority of listeners,
    largely is oriented to entertainment, but one independent station
    broadcasts on political topics. Opposition parties had limited access
    to the official electronic media. The Government periodically used
    state television to conduct campaigns of denunciation and harassment
    against political parties and leaders critical of the Government.
    Various talk shows, such as ``Nezer Nugtasi'' and ``NEBZ'' broadcast by
    privately-run, independent television channels, aired views of both
    government and opposition officials. A series of spacebridge shows
    which linked Azerbaijani and Armenian officials to discuss the Nagorno-
    Karabakh conflict began in the fall. During the parliamentary election
    campaign in November, local broadcasters aired several western-style,
    political roundtables, which featured representatives from the
    government and opposition discussing various news issues of the day.
    The state television channel provided representatives of each
    participating political party in the election at least one late evening
    addition to time purchased from the independent television stations for
    short campaign slots by party leaders; however, these broadcasts were
    blocked in certain outlying areas of the country.
        On July 14, the Government cut electricity from the independent
    channel ANS for 15 minutes in order to censor an interview with Chechen
    field commander Shamil Basayev. The Government asserted that it
    censored the 15-minute interview because it contained terrorist
    propaganda.
        In late August and early September, the State Television and Radio
    Company, AzTV, conducted a campaign against the Musavat Party and its
    leader, Isa Gambar, following the hijacking by a Musavat party member
    of an Azeri airliner on a flight from Nakhchivan to Baku (see Section
    1.d.). The campaign featured coverage of meetings at collective farms,
    hospitals, clinics, and other state enterprises where the Musavat Party
    was criticized for its alleged complicity with terrorism.
        At year's end, there were eight independent television stations
    operating outside of Baku. Four additional independent stations that
    were closed in 1999 reopened during the year; however, their legal
    status remained unclear. The state commission on radio and television
    frequencies had not granted these stations frequencies by year's end,
    which are required for official registration with the Ministry of
    Justice. Without registration, these stations are subject to closure at
    any time by the local or national authorities.
        In October the Ministry of Communications shut down the privately
    run ABA Television for 10 days, in connection with allegations of tax
    evasion. The investigation was initiated one and a half years ago and
    continued at year's end.
        In November Yeni Musavat, the newspaper of the opposition Musavat
    Party was found guilty of publishing an article insulting the Saatly
    district electoral commission. The court fined the newspaper $200 (1
    million Manats). Yeni Musavat had claimed that the outcome of the 1995
    parliamentary poll in Saatly, in which President Aliyev's brother
    Djalal was elected, was falsified. The suit against the newspaper was
    brought by Ragim Azizov, who was appointed as the Saatly election
    commission chairman only after the 1995 election.
        Three Russian and three Turkish television stations and radio
    programs are rebroadcast locally through Azerbaijani facilities and are
    seen and heard in most parts of the country. Radio free Europe/Radio
    Liberty and the Voice of America broadcast without restriction. There
    are no restrictions on reception of foreign stations via satellite.
    There is one 24-hour French language radio station in Baku and a
    British Broadcasting Company station that offers news programs in
    Russian, English, and Azerbaijani. The Government granted new broadcast
    licenses to a few foreign radio stations, plus several regional
    television stations directly under the control of the local executive
    commission. The Government has not acted for more than a year on the
    applications to broadcast of more than 10 independent broadcasters.
        The Government allowed limited Internet access. There are 5
    Internet service providers and 4 vendors sell accounts. Both providers
    and vendors have formal links with the Ministry of Communications. In
    September the Ministry abruptly shut down one provider for unknown
    reasons. The shutdown allegedly involves the refusal to pay new, higher
    fees for the use of Ministry of Communications telephone lines, but it
    is widely believed that the real issue was the Ministry of
    Communication's desire for a monopoly over this market. The Ministry of
    Communications and certain individuals either in the Ministry or
    closely aligned with it apparently seek to maximize both government and
    personal revenues from this lucrative and growing source of income.
    Internet costs average $.30 (1,400 Manat) per hour (one-tenth the cost
    in 1998). Although few citizens can afford home computers or access
    fees, Internet cafes, which are widespread in Baku and other cities,
    offer affordable internet access. Many persons believe that the
    Government monitors Internet traffic, especially that of foreign
    businesses and opposition intellectuals and leaders (see Section 1.f.).
        Appointments to government-controlled academic positions are
    heavily dependent on political connections. Nevertheless, several
    professors with tenure are active in opposition parties. There were no
    complaints of violation of academic freedom or of censorship of books
    or academic journals.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
    this right on occasion. Authorities frequently prevented political
    parties critical of the Government from conducting indoor meetings as
    well as outdoor gatherings. The Government did allow some opposition
    parties to organize so-called ``pickets'' (demonstrations with less
    than 50 participants) and to stage larger rallies far from the city
    center. Authorities cited security considerations repeatedly to ban any
    larger demonstrations in the center of town throughout the year. During
    the year, authorities cancelled numerous protests and rallies. At
    year's end, the Government held 23 persons who were detained during
    demonstrations which took place in Sheki on November 18.
        The Government detained persons at unauthorized rallies and
    meetings throughout the year, but most were released without charges
    after a brief period of detention. Police forcibly dispersed an
    unsanctioned demonstration on April 29. The Government allowed several
    opposition demonstrations to take place in Baku during the spring and
    summer. For example, Government sanctioned opposition rallies were held
    on August 5 and 12. In August and September, journalists and members of
    NGO's held unsanctioned rallies in Baku to protest the imprisonment of
    opposition newspaper editor Rauf Arifoglu (see Section 1.d.). Police in
    Baku intervened on October 28 to prevent 40 members of the Civil Unity
    Party, which supported former President Ayaz Mutalibov, from holding a
    protest demonstration in the city center. The party's leaders were
    warned earlier not to have the demonstration, which was intended to
    protest the refusal of the authorities to register the party. Several
    would-be demonstrators were beaten and injured. Opposition
    demonstrators were prevented from assembling in downtown Baku on
    November 25, because their rally had not been sanctioned by the local
    authorities. On November 18, demonstrations took place in several
    cities around the country including Baku, where approximately 4,000
    persons gathered to protest the flawed parliamentary elections. Outside
    Baku some rallies drew over 1,000 demonstrators, who protested not only
    the elections but energy shortages in the region. In the regions where
    protesters received permission from local authorities to demonstrate,
    the protests proceeded peacefully. However, protesters without permits
    were dispersed by government authorities, with some arrests in the
    regional capitals. Protests in Agdash and Sheki led to violence, as
    police and demonstrators clashed. There were also protests in the
    regions over the reintroduction of energy cutbacks that had been
    suspended before the elections.
        The Government repeatedly turned down requests for demonstrations
    in support of former Communist leader and President Ayaz Mutallibov,
    who now lives in Russia. Heads of local governments in several
    different sections of the country repeatedly refused the requests of
    opposition Members of Parliament, such as Popular Front first deputy
    chairman of the ``reformers'' faction Ali Kerimov, to hold organized
    meetings with constituents and interested citizens. On several
    occasions, central government authorities intervened to overrule the
    local authorities and allowed Kerimov and other opposition Members of
    Parliament to hold meetings.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, in
    practice the Government continued to restrict this right on occasion.
    The Government requires political parties to register. There are
    currently 38 registered political parties. Some of these are affiliated
    with or support the President's party. At least 20 registered parties
    are considered opposition parties. In February the Government
    registered the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, which is lead by former
    Parliament speaker Rasul Guliyev. Other unregistered parties have not
    met the legal requirements for registration. Nevertheless, unregistered
    political parties continued to function openly. Members of unregistered
    political parties can run for president but must be sponsored by a
    registered party or an independent ``voters initiative group.'' Members
    of unregistered parties may run for Parliament, but only as
    independents in a direct constituency, not on a party list. A party
    must be registered to run a list of candidates. Members of unregistered
    parties can run in municipal elections only as independents, or as
    nominees of a registered party or another voter initiatives group.
        Credible reports of acts of harassment (including beatings) of
    opposition political figures continued. There were credible reports
    that individuals linked to opposition parties (and their relatives)
    were fired from their jobs. Shahid Abbasov, chairman of the local
    branch of the Musavat Party in Nakhchivan, was abducted on October 19
    and beaten by masked men who demanded that he stop criticizing the
    chairman of Nakhchivan's parliament. The Government has not yet
    returned the Popular Front's headquarters nor many of its regional
    offices, which were seized in 1993.
        Explicitly ethnic or religious based parties have not been
    registered.
        The Government generally allowed private associations to function
    freely. The Ministry of Justice requires private organizations to
    register but does not always grant this registration freely and
    expeditiously. There are credible reports that the Government refuses
    to register many new human rights NGO's. Nevertheless, unregistered
    associations functioned openly. Many of the most active NGO's are
    affiliated with opposition political parties. The President signed a
    new law on ``public associations'' in October.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides that persons of
    all faiths may choose and practice their religion without restrictions,
    and the Government generally respected these rights for most citizens;
    however, Government authorities continued to harass on occasion foreign
    and Azerbaijani members of nontraditional religious groups. Such
    harassment was less frequent than in the previous years. Until late in
    1999, the Government frequently used clauses in the Law on Religious
    Freedom and other laws to restrict religious activity by foreigners and
    nontraditional religious groups, particularly in the fall of 1999, when
    police and security officials disrupted a number of services, detained
    ministers, and ordered foreigners deported. Although President Aliyev
    has enunciated a clear policy of respect for religious freedom, lower
    level officials continued to attempt to restrict religious activity by
    local nontraditional groups.
        Following a spate of attacks on members of non-traditional
    Christian groups in the summer and fall of 1999, President Aliyev in
    November 1999 announced to the National Security Council, and later in
    a nationwide television broadcast, that the Government henceforth would
    abide by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
    standards of religious liberty. In conformity with his directives,
    government officials subsequently took steps to rectify some past
    violations of these standards, including the registration of a number
    of religious organizations that previously had been denied
    registration, and the reinstatement of selected group members who had
    been fired from their jobs for their religious affiliation. However the
    Religious Affairs Department, the government office charged with
    implementing the country's laws on religion, continued to delay
    selectively the registration of a few groups and to intervene
    selectively in the importation of religious literature.
        The most common restriction on religious freedom results from the
    requirement in the Law on Religion that all religious organizations be
    registered by the Government in order to function legally. In principle
    a group obtains approval from the Department of Religious Affairs and
    then applyies for formal registration with the Ministry of Justice. The
    Government stated that by year's end it had registered 39 Muslim and
    ``other'' religious groups. However, in practice, the process suffers
    from a lack of transparency, particularly within the Department of
    Religious Affairs. This office, an independent entity subordinated
    directly to the Council of Ministers, has been a bottleneck in the
    registration process. As a result, several Christian groups still
    experience problems with registration.
        Registration enables a religious organization to maintain a bank
    account, legally rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity.
    Lack of registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a
    religious group to function. Unregistered groups often continue to
    operate, but participants are subject to arrest, fines, and--for
    foreigners--deportation. Religious groups are permitted to appeal
    registration denials to the courts, but the only group to do so to
    date--the Pentecostal ``Word of Life'' Church--lost its case in May
    1998. In 1998 Human Rights Watch alleged that the officials responsible
    for registration took bribes to facilitate registration. The Catholic
    Church was registered in April 1999. Following the President's public
    commitment, the Government, specifically the Department of Religious
    Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice, took action on several
    applications by religious groups for registration that had been
    languishing, in some cases for years. The Evangelical Cathedral of
    Praise and the Nehemiah were registered in December 1999, as were the
    Jehovah's Witnesses. Prompted by the President's statements, some other
    religious groups that had been operating under continual low-level
    harassment because the Religious Affairs Department earlier had denied
    them registration were finally registered. In March the Community of
    Mountain Jews and the ``Love'' Baptist Community were registered.
    However, a small number of religious groups remain unregistered and
    continue to suffer from low-level government harassment.
        In July police broke up an officially registered Pentecostal church
    service at the home of a member. Worshippers were detained and harassed
    for several hours before being released. The next day, the police
    apologized for their actions; however, the woman owner of the home in
    which the service took place was subjected to harassment by court
    officials who ordered her to stand trial for violating outdated
    administrative codes. The judge dismissed the case as unconstitutional
    and inconsistent with the 1996 law on religious freedom.
        Some government bias against foreign missionary groups persisted.
    There were instances early in the year in which authorities harassed
    groups for disseminating religious materials without all the required
    permits. Since their registration in December 1999, Jehovah's Witnesses
    have been able to hold large gatherings for the first time in 3 years.
    However, on April 1, in what the Jehovah's Witnesses themselves refer
    to as an isolated incident, a meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was
    dispersed by police who claimed that they lacked permission from the
    mayor's office. The manager of the venue subsequently declined to
    permit them to use it again.
        The Law on Religion subordinates all Islamic religious
    organizations to the Azerbaijan-based spiritual directorate of Caucasus
    Muslims. In June 1999, a court decided in favor of a group of Muslim
    women who sued for the right to wear Islamic head scarves in passport
    photographs. In September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the lower
    court ruling; the case was on appeal in the Prosecutor General's office
    at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
        The Law on Religion also permits the production and dissemination
    of religious literature with the approval of the Department of
    Religious Affairs and with the agreement of local government
    authorities. The Government interpreted this provision to mean that
    only religious groups can engage in such activity and argues that
    booksellers and other entrepreneurs are forbidden to import and sell
    religious materials. For example, in September customs officials at the
    Azerbaijan-Russian border confiscated a new shipment of religious books
    for the owner of a legally registered bookstore in Baku. Officials
    alleged that the bookseller did not have the right to ``import such
    books into the country.'' Only half of these books were released
    subsequently to the bookseller at year's end.
        There is official concern about ``foreign'' (mostly Iranian and
    ``Wahhabist'') Muslim missionary activity, which in part is viewed as
    seeking to spread fundamentalist Islam, which is viewed as a threat to
    stability and civil peace.
        In those portions of Azerbaijan controlled by ethnic Armenians, all
    ethnic Azerbaijanis have fled and those mosques that have not been
    destroyed are not functioning. Animosity toward the Armenian population
    elsewhere in Azerbaijan forced most Armenians to depart, and all
    Armenian churches, many of which were damaged in ethnic riots that took
    place over a decade ago, remain closed (see Section 5). As a
    consequence, the estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Armenians who remain in
    Azerbaijan are unable to attend their traditional places of worship.
    The Jewish community has freedom to worship and conduct educational
    activities and, during the year, enjoyed the public support of the
    Government.
        Places of worship seized by the former Soviet Government during the
    Communist era from the Catholics, the Lutherans, and the Baptists have
    not been returned to those groups.
        Some government officials share the strong popular prejudice
    against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to Christianity and
    other religions (see section 5). For example, an ethnic Azerbaijani was
    subjected to administrative fines by local officials in Baku in July
    1999 for possessing Christian literature, and another ethnic
    Azerbaijani reported that he was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned in
    August 1999 for changing his religious affiliation and becoming a
    member of Jehovah's Witnesses. No such incidents have been reported
    since the President's decree in October 1999.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    of citizens to choose freely their place of domicile and to travel
    abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these
    provisions; however, at times the Government restricted freedom of
    movement. At times it limited the movement of members of opposition
    parties. The internal residence regime (``propiska'') still is imposed
    on internally displaced persons, who are required to register their
    location with the authorities, and may reside only in approved
    locations. Residents of border areas in both Azerbaijan and Iran travel
    across the border in this restricted zone without visas. Foreigners and
    citizens require a visa to travel to the Autonomous Republic of
    Nakhchivan.
        The Government officially recognizes freedom of emigration. Jewish
    emigration to Israel and other countries is not restricted by the
    Government. The remaining Armenian population in Azerbaijan (other than
    Armenians residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan) is
    approximately 10,000 to 30,000, almost exclusively persons of mixed
    descent or in mixed marriages. While official government policy is that
    ethnic Armenians are free to travel, low-level officials seeking bribes
    harassed Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin who sought to emigrate
    or obtain passports.
        There were no draft notifications that restricted movement during
    the year. Draft-age men must obtain documents from military officials
    before they can leave for international travel. Travel restrictions
    sometimes are placed on military personnel, or persons possessing
    sensitive national security information.
        The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's)
    from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is approximately 800,000; 200,000 of
    these are refugees and over 600,000 are IDP's. Armenians have settled
    in parts of the occupied territories. However, Armenians have not
    allowed the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were forced out
    of the now-occupied territories to return to their homes. The
    Government provides little assistance to these persons, and
    international support to the refugees is declining. Most of these IDP's
    continue to live in camps and other temporary shelters, at below-
    subsistence levels, without adequate food, housing, education,
    sanitation, or medical care. The parties to the conflict have cut
    normal trade and transportation links to the other side, causing severe
    hardship to civilians on all sides.
        The Constitution provides for political asylum consistent with
    international norms. The Government depends on international assistance
    for refugees and IDP's. It cooperates with international organizations
    to provide aid for them. The Government cooperates with the office of
    the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. These organizations
    report full and unrestricted access to the refugee population.
        The Government provides a minimal allowance to the IDP's themselves
    in the form of a bread allowance of $4 (18,000 Manats) per month per
    family as well as an additional $2 (9,000 Manats) per month for each
    child. Many of the IDP's complain of ``processing fees'' by local
    officials in the amount of approximately 10 percent, further reducing
    their already minimal allowances.
        The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. In May
    1999, the Parliament passed a new law on refugees; however, this has
    not yet been implemented. There are no procedures for granting first
    asylum. There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a
    valid claim to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution and election law allow citizens to change their
    government by peaceful means; however, the Government continues to
    restrict citizens' ability to change their government peacefully by
    interfering in elections. Azerbaijan is a republic with a strong
    presidency, and a legislature that the Constitution describes as
    independent. However, in practice the legislature's independence from
    the executive is marginal. The Parliament exercises little legislative
    initiative independent of the executive. Opposition parties continued
    to be active inside and outside the Parliament, agitating for their
    views in their newspapers and through public statements. As a result of
    the flawed November parliamentary elections, the New Azerbaijan Party
    led by President Aliyev, held the overwhelming majority of seats in the
    125-member Parliament (71 seats plus 25 seats belonging to nominally
    independent parties loyal to the president). Opposition members held 16
    seats in the newly elected parliament at year's end, according to
    official results. However, opposition members temporarily boycotted
    parliamentary sessions to protest election results and called for new
    nationwide elections. In response to international criticism, the
    authorities voided results in 11 disputed districts and announced
    repeat elections would take place in those districts in January 2001.
        The Government, with assistance from the OSCE's Office of
    Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, (ODIHR) drafted new
    legislation for the Central Election Commission (CEC), in advance of
    the parliamentary elections, which included a provision to provide a
    veto for opposition members on the CEc. The Government also drafted and
    passed a new election law incorporating most OSCE/ODIHR recommendations
    for reform into the final text. The omission of several important
    recommendations, however, sparked a temporary boycott by the opposition
    in the CEc. Shortcomings of the law included: signature requirements
    and verification procedures for candidates; absence of provisions for
    domestic non-partisan observers; and a lack of transparency of the vote
    tabulation procedures at the territorial election commission (TEC)
    level. In response to the boycott, the Government revoked the
    opposition's power to veto CEC decisions. Opposition members later
    resumed participation in the CEc.
        The November parliamentary elections showed some improvement over
    previous elections since 1993 in that political pluralism was advanced,
    but they did not meet international standards due to numerous serious
    irregularities. During the preelection period, parties and candidates
    had better opportunities to conduct campaigns. Opposition parties were
    represented on election commissions at all levels; however, opposition
    representatives were marginalized or bypassed from the decision making
    process on sensitive issues by the CEC majority. On several occasions
    the CEC adopted critical decisions outside official sessions and
    without the approval of the required two-thirds majority. The Central
    Election Commission originally disqualified the Musavat Party and the
    Azerbaijan Democratic Party claiming that their registration documents
    were falsified. However, on October 8, following international
    criticism and a letter from President Aliyev, the CEC reversed its
    initial ruling and issued a statement consenting to the registration of
    slates of candidates from eight opposition political groups, including
    these two opposition parties. All political parties that sought to
    actively contest the election were able to register for the
    proportional ballot, in which 25 out of 125 Members of Parliament were
    elected. In the single-mandate elections, in which 100 of 125 Members
    of Parliament were elected, half of the prospective candidates were
    disqualified from registering, and the appeals process was flawed.
    Individual candidates were harassed, and some were beaten up or
    detained. Potential candidates reported that individuals who signed
    their petitions were asked to remove their names by police.
        International observers reported that election day was marred by
    numerous instances of serious irregularities. These observed
    irregularities led to serious doubts about the accuracy of the
    officially recorded vote totals. Observers reported ballot stuffing,
    manipulated turnout results, and premarked ballots. The Party observers
    frequently suffered intimidation, harassment, and sometimes arrest,
    while carrying out their legitimate activities. Unauthorized local
    officials often controlled the process and sought to influence voters.
    In several instances, international observers were denied access to
    polling stations and frequently were expelled from election commission
    premises. Observers from domestic NGO's and several opposition parties
    participated on election day. In a reversal of earlier practice, an
    October law on non-governmental organizations banned election
    monitoring by representatives of NGO's that received more then 30
    percent of their budget from foreign sources. This appeared targeted at
    preventing For The Sake of Civil Society, the only NGO capable of
    mounting a nation wide monitoring effort from doing so. Main opposition
    parties told international observers and journalists that their
    monitors reported widespread procedural violations and called for
    repeat nationwide elections. On November 7, the CEC announced that it
    would investigate and take immediate measures concerning all cases of
    violation of law and other shortcomings observed by the international
    and local observers on election day. At year's end, repeat elections
    were scheduled to occur in eleven districts.
        The 1998 presidential election was an improvement over the previous
    elections, especially in regard to reduced multiple voting and the
    presence of domestic observers. However, some domestic and
    international observers witnessed ballot stuffing and irregularities in
    vote counting, and some were barred from observing the vote counting.
    Neither domestic nor international observers were allowed to monitor
    the compilation of the national vote totals. Precinct vote totals were
    never reported. The observed irregularities and lack of transparency in
    vote counting led to serious doubts about the accuracy of the 76
    percent of the vote officially recorded for president Aliyev. In August
    1999, newspapers quoted the chairman of the CEC as admitting that
    Aliyev's vote total was overstated by 12 to 15 percent. International
    observers, including the OSCE/ODIHR, concluded that the election did
    not meet international standards.
        The 1995 Constitution required that the country's first ever
    municipal elections be held by November 1997. However, the elections
    were delayed repeatedly until December 1999. The municipal election
    process was deeply flawed and were criticized heavily by observers,
    including the Council of Europe, which noted numerous instances of
    ballotbox- stuffing, voter intimidation, and other violations. The
    legislation governing the elections reflected some recommendations of
    international observers, but several serious problems were not
    remedied. The process of selecting territorial and precinct electoral
    commissions to oversee the municipal elections and the process for
    registering candidates were marred by widespread irregularities
    favoring the ruling party.
        There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
    politics; however, they are underrepresented in elective offices, since
    traditional social norms restrict women's roles in politics. The
    practice known of family voting, where men often cast the votes of
    their wives and other female members of their families exists but is
    declining in the country. There are 11 female Members of Parliament and
    2 women with ministerial rank.
        There are no restrictions on the participation of minorities in
    politics as individuals; however, explicitly ethnically or religiously
    based parties have not been registered. Members of indigenous ethnic
    minorities occupy some senior government positions.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several human rights organizations monitor the human rights
    situation in the country. For the most part, the Government posed no
    obstacles to the presence of international human rights groups. Some of
    these groups investigate human rights abuses and disseminate their
    findings through the media. However, the Government has been critical
    of certain domestic human rights activists who have raised politically
    sensitive issues.
        The Government has demonstrated some willingness to discuss human
    rights problems with international and domestic NGO's. The ICRC has had
    access to prisoners of war as well as civilians held in relation to the
    conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In June the ICRC began its first visits
    to special security and other prisons (see Section 1.c.).
        Government officials occasionally criticize human rights activists.
    The Government registered the Azerbaijan Human Rights Center (AHRC) in
    November 1999 and until the summer of 2000; Eldar Zeynalov, Chairman of
    the AHRC, was routinely granted access to prisons. No official reason
    has been given for the recent denial of access. The center operates
    normally, and Zeynalov continues to publish articles regularly about
    the human rights situation in the country including lists of
    individuals he believes to be political prisoners, and he has faced no
    legal action. Zeynalov opened a new chapter of the organization in the
    western part of the country in August. At year's end the Government
    sharply criticized several human rights activists for allegedly
    providing inaccurate lists of political prisoners to visiting Council
    of Europe parliamentarians.
        The Ministry of Justice regularly denies registration to human
    rights NGO's, some of which are linked to opposition political parties,
    although it has not tried to halt their activities. Registration
    enables a human rights organization to maintain a bank account legally,
    rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity. Lack of
    registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a human rights
    group to function.
        The ICRC conducted education programs on international humanitarian
    law for officials of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and for
    university and secondary school students.
        In August 1999, the Government created the Commission on Human
    Rights, funded by a $400,000 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) grant,
    which is headed by Justice Minister Fikret Mammedov. The Commission has
    not yet taken any significant actions. The Ministry of Justice also in
    August established a new human rights office within the ministry, but
    by year's end had not defined its agenda.
        A foreign NGO representative working on democracy promotion was
    murdered on November 30 in Baku. Local officials are cooperating with
    International law enforcement officials on the ongoing investigation.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights without respect to
    gender, race, nationality or national origin, religion, language,
    social status, or membership in political parties, trade unions, or
    other public organizations; however, in the wake of the Nagorno-
    Karabakh conflict, there is widespread anti-Armenian sentiment in
    society. Preventing discrimination is not a major Government priority.
        Women.--Discussion of violence against women is a taboo subject in
    Azerbaijan's patriarchal society, but it remains a problem. In rural
    areas, women have no real recourse against violence by their husbands,
    regardless of the law. Rape is severely punished, but, especially in
    rural areas, only a small fraction of offenses against women are
    reported or prosecuted. According to official statistics, there were 44
    reported rapes during the year; the Society for the Defense of Women's
    Rights (SDWR) claims that rape is on the increase and that the official
    number is underreported, especially from conservative rural areas.
    There are no government sponsored or funded programs for victims of
    violence. There are no specific laws concerning spousal abuse or
    spousal rape.
        Prostitution is a significant problem, particularly in the capital
    city of Baku. Most women become prostitutes in order to support their
    family members, and sometimes it even is encouraged by the family due
    to the large amount of money to be made. In February 1999, the Society
    for the Defense of Women's Rights (SDWR) held a conference to highlight
    concerns over the growing incidents of prostitution and sexually
    transmitted diseases. At the conference, it was reported that there are
    more than 30 illegal houses of prostitution in Baku alone, the majority
    of which are allegedly run by high-ranking officials in government and
    frequented by members of the prosecutor's office and the police. Women
    engaged in prostitution are not liable to criminal charges since
    prostitution is considered a personal matter.
        Pornography is prohibited, and the age of sexual consent is 16.
        Trafficking in women is a problem, and the country is a source and
    transit point for trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
        Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including the
    right to participate in all aspects of economic and social life;
    however, societal discrimination is a problem. In general women have
    extensive opportunities for education and work. However, traditional
    social norms continue to restrict women's roles in the economy.
    Representation of women is sharply lower in higher levels of the work
    force. There are few women in executive positions in leading economic
    enterprises.
        Twenty-four women's NGO's are registered, compared with 18 in 1999.
    The Society for the Defense of Women's Rights (SDWR) spends most of its
    time fighting unique post-Soviet problems. It has helped divorced
    women, widows, and wives whose husbands are in prison, all of whom have
    become socially and legally vulnerable since the fall of the Soviet
    Union. It assisted widows whose landlords privatized their apartments
    and then evicted them. The SWDR also worked with divorced women who
    feel that they have been treated unfairly by divorce courts. Several of
    the 24 women's NGO's deal with the problems of prostitution and
    trafficking in women(see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Constitution and laws commit the Government to
    protect the rights of children to education and health; however,
    difficult economic circumstances limit the government's ability to
    carry out these commitments. Education is compulsory, free, and
    universal until the age of 17. The Constitution places children's
    rights on the same footing as those of adults. The Criminal Code
    prescribes severe penalties for crimes against children. The Government
    provides minimum standards of health care for children, although the
    quality of medical care overall is very low. The Government has
    authorized subsidies for children in an attempt to shield families
    against economic hardship in the wake of price liberalization, but
    these subsidies do not come close to covering the shortfall in family
    budgets. There are a large number of refugee and displaced children
    living in substandard conditions in refugee camps and public buildings.
    Children sometimes beg on the streets of Baku and other towns.
        There is no known societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--The Law on Support for the Disabled,
    enacted in 1993, prescribes priority for invalids and the disabled in
    obtaining housing, as well as discounts for public transport, and
    pension supplements. The Government does not have the means to fulfill
    its commitments. There are no special provisions in the law mandating
    accessibility to buildings for the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--There is considerable popular concern about
    the conversion of ethnic Azerbaijanis to faiths considered alien to
    Azerbaijani traditions. Proselytizing by foreigners is against the law;
    however it does occur and there is widespread popular hostility towards
    groups that proselytize (largely evangelical Christians, but also
    Muslim missionary groups), and toward Muslims who convert to other
    faiths. Opposition to proselytizing within the population thus far has
    been limited to verbal criticism and appears focused against two
    groups. The first consists of evangelical Christian and so-called
    ``nontraditional'' religious groups. There is some evidence of
    widespread prejudice against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to
    Christianity. During the year, articles periodically appeared in pro-
    government and independent newspapers and electronic media crudely
    depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the identity of
    the nation. The perceived threat from such groups is primarily cultural
    rather than religious. Often these articles attempt to associate
    evangelists with the foreign intelligence agencies, portraying them as
    part of a plot to undermine or control Muslim Azerbaijan.
        Occasionally popular reaction goes beyond verbal criticism. In
    August 1999, a crowd of Muslims reportedly broke into a Baptist summer
    camp in Nardaran, threatening inhabitants and causing significant
    property damage. Police made no attempt to intervene and said that they
    found no evidence of the incident.
        There has been significant improvement for the Jehovah's Witnesses
    this year. Since their registration in December 1999, church members
    have been able to conduct prayer services freely and proselytize with
    minimal interference by the authorities. In September 1999, several
    members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were subjected to humiliation
    and degradation when a factory manager assembled the plant's work force
    and berated the members of Jehovah's Witnesses for betraying their
    country by adopting a new religion. During the event, the father of one
    of the members of Jehovah's Witnesses publicly disowned her for
    adopting the new religion. In November 1999, the factory reinstated the
    members with full back pay (see Section 2.c.).
        There is societal hostility toward Muslim groups, mostly from Iran,
    which seek to spread political Islam. Newspaper articles appear
    periodically depicting certain foreign-backed Muslim missionaries as a
    threat to stability and civil peace, and in some cases, as part of an
    Iranian strategy to destabilize and ultimately establish control over
    the country.
        Reflecting the intense popular hostility toward Armenians that
    prevails in the country and the forced departure of most of the
    Armenian population, all Armenian churches, many of them damaged in
    ethnic riots which took place over a decade ago, remain closed. As a
    consequence, ethnic Armenians who remain in Azerbaijan, estimated to
    number between 10,000 and 30,000, are deprived of an opportunity for
    public worship. A similar situation exists in the Armenian-controlled
    portions of Azerbaijan, from which the Armenians forced approximately
    800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis to flee their homes and where those mosques
    that have not been destroyed are not functioning.
        Jews generally do not suffer from societal discrimination; however,
    according to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, two Baku synagogues
    were desecrated in the fall of 1998. No arrests have been made.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The outbreak of hostilities,
    anti-Armenian riots, and economic collapse in the final years of the
    Soviet union led to the expulsion of almost all Armenians and the
    departure of Russians and others. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000
    Armenians still live in Azerbaijan, mostly women with ethnic
    Azerbaijani or Russian husbands. Most seek to shield their national
    identity. Some have changed their nationality, as reported in their
    passports, to Azerbaijani. With the nearly complete departure of the
    Armenian population, the number of problems reported by this ethnic
    minority has decreased. Armenians have complained of discrimination in
    employment and harassment at schools and workplaces and of the refusal
    of local government authorities to pay pensions. Armenian widows have
    had permits to live in Baku revoked. However, some persons of mixed
    Armenian-Azerbaijani descent continue to occupy government positions.
        Indigenous ethnic minorities, such as the Talysh, Lezghis, Avars,
    and Georgians, do not suffer discrimination. However, Meskhetian Turks
    displaced from Central Asia, as well as Kurdish displaced persons from
    the Armenian-occupied Lachin region, complain of discrimination.
        In the area of the country controlled by insurgent (Armenian)
    forces, the Armenians forced approximately 800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis
    to flee their homes. The regime that now controls these areas
    effectively has banned them from all spheres of civil, political, and
    economic life.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association, including the right to form labor unions; however, one
    or another sub-branch of the government-run Azerbaijani Labor
    Federation organizes most industrial and white-collar workers. The
    overwhelming majority of labor unions still operate as they did under
    the Soviet system and remain tightly linked to the Government. Most
    major industries remain state-owned.
        An independent Union of Oil Workers that was displaced by a pro-
    government union in 1997 has not been revived. In 1997 the State Oil
    Company (SOCAR) formed a pro-government union, the Azerbaijan Union of
    Oil and Gas Industry Workers, which took over the former Independent
    Oil Workers Union without a vote of the union membership. It continues
    to operate without a vote of its rank and file workers. An independent
    group of oil workers, the Committee to Defend the Rights of Azerbaijani
    Oil Workers, operates outside of established trade union structures and
    promotes the interests of workers in the petroleum sector.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no
    legal restrictions on strikes or provisions for retribution against
    strikers.
        The Azerbaijan Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) has 1.5 million
    members, of which approximately 800,000 are active members. The
    Government-run Azerbaijan Labor Federation has 300,000 members. Trade
    unions are prohibited by law from engaging in political activity (even
    though, as individuals, members of trade unions can participate in
    political activities).
        Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate with
    international bodies; in November the ATUC became a member of the
    International Confederation of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1996 law
    provides for collective bargaining agreements to set wages in state
    enterprises. A labor inspectorate was established in 1997. However,
    these laws have not produced an effective system of collective
    bargaining between unions and enterprise management. Government-
    appointed boards and directors run the major enterprises and set wages.
    Unions effectively do not participate in determining wage levels. In a
    carryover from the Soviet system, both management and workers are
    considered members of the professional unions.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    allows forced or compulsory labor only under states of emergency or
    martial law or as the result of a court decision affecting a condemned
    person, and the government has not invoked this clause; however, women
    are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section
    6.f.). Two departments in the General Prosecutor's office (the
    Department of Implementation of the Labor Code and the Department for
    Enforcement of the Law on Minors) enforce the prohibition on forced or
    compulsory labor. There are no constitutional provisions or laws
    specifically prohibiting forced and bonded labor by children; however,
    such practices are not known to occur. There were no reports during the
    year of compulsory cotton picking by children or adults.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Primary school
    education is compulsory, free, and universal. Children are normally in
    school until the age of 17. The law allows children between the ages of
    14 and 15 to work with the consent of their parents and limits the
    workweek of children between the ages of 14 and 16 to 24 hours per
    week. Children at the age of 15 may work if the workplace's labor union
    does not object. There is no explicit restriction on the kinds of labor
    that 15-year-old children may perform with union consent. The Labor and
    Social Security Ministry has primary enforcement responsibility for
    child labor laws. With high adult unemployment, there have been few, if
    any, complaints of abuses of child labor laws. The law does not
    prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children; however,
    such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the
    nationwide administrative minimum wage by decree. It is $3.00 (12,500
    manats) per month. This wage is not sufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. The recommended monthly
    wage level to meet basic subsistence needs was estimated to be $50
    (215,000 manats) per person. Since practically all persons who work
    earn more than the minimum wage, enforcing its low level is not a major
    issue in labor or political debate.
        The disruption of economic links with the rest of the former Soviet
    Union continues to affect employment in many industries. Idle factory
    workers typically receive less than half of their former wage. Under
    these conditions, many workers rely on the safety net of the extended
    family. More workers and unemployed persons turn to second jobs and
    makeshift employment in the informal sector, such as operating the
    family car as a taxi, selling produce from private gardens, or
    operating small roadside shops. Until the Russian financial crisis many
    persons (estimates range from between 1 to 2 million) supported
    themselves on remittances from relatives working in Russia, primarily
    as street traders. This source of support was reduced severely during
    1999 and has not rebounded, although reliable statistics as to the
    precise amounts involved are not available. Combinations of these and
    other strategies are the only way for broad sectors of the urban
    population to reach a subsistence income level.
        The legal workweek is 40 hours. There is a 1-hour lunch break per
    day and shorter breaks in the morning and afternoon. The Government
    attempts to enforce this law in the formal sector, but does not enforce
    these rules in the informal sector where the majority of citizens work.
        Health and safety standards exist, but usually they are ignored in
    the workplace. Workers cannot leave dangerous work conditions without
    fear of losing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Azerbaijan is a source and a transit
    point for trafficked men, women, and children. Azerbaijanis themselves
    are trafficked into northern Europe, particularly to the Netherlands
    and Germany, where many unsuccessfully sought asylum. Women usually are
    sent to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Western Europe, mainly
    Germany, to participate as workers in the sex industry (for example, in
    strip clubs) and as prostitutes. Women from Iran, Russia, and sometimes
    Iraq, are transported through Baku to the UAE, Europe, and occasionally
    the United States for the same purposes. Under the new criminal code,
    the act of forcing an individual into prostitution carries a 10 to 15
    year jail term, which is a harsher sentence than the previous code.
        A locally based international organization currently is promoting
    an awareness campaign about the exploitation of women. Several of the
    country's women's NGO's claim to deal with the problems of trafficking
    in women and prostitution. There is no mechanism to return trafficked
    women to Azerbaijan and no support services for female victims of
    trafficking.
                                   __________

                                    BELARUS

        Belarus has a form of governance in which nearly all power is
    concentrated in the hands of the President and a small circle of
    advisors. Since his election in July 1994 to a 5-year term as the
    country's first President, Alexsandr Lukashenko has consolidated power
    steadily in the executive branch through authoritarian means. He used a
    November 1996 referendum to amend the 1994 Constitution in order to
    broaden his powers and extend his term in office. Lukashenko ignored
    the then-Constitutional Court's ruling that the Constitution could not
    be amended by referendum. As a result, the current political system is
    based on the 1996 Constitution, which was adopted in an
    unconstitutional manner. Most members of the international community
    criticized the flawed referendum and do not recognize the legitimacy of
    the 1996 Constitution, legislature, or Alexsandr Lukashenko's
    continuation in office beyond the legal expiration of his term in July
    1999. Parliamentary elections were held in October, the first since the
    1996 referendum. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE)/Office of Democratic Institution and Human Rights (ODIHR)
    concluded that the elections fell short of international standards and
    were neither free nor fair. Although the amended Constitution provides
    for a formal separation of powers, the President dominates all other
    branches of Government. The legislature that ended its work in November
    2000 was not elected directly, but was created out of the remnants of
    the former Parliament, which Lukashenko disbanded soon after the 1996
    referendum. The Constitution limits the legislature to meeting twice
    per year for no more than a total of 170 days. Presidential decrees
    made when the legislature is out of session have the force of law,
    except--in theory--in those cases restricted by the 1996 Constitution.
    The 1996 Constitution also allows the President to issue decrees having
    the force of law in circumstances of ``specific necessity and
    urgency,'' a provision that Lukashenko has interpreted broadly. The
    judiciary is not independent.
        Law enforcement and internal security responsibilities are shared
    by the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal
    Affairs (MVD), both of which answer directly to the President. Civilian
    authorities do not maintain effective control of the security forces.
    Under Lukashenko's direction, the presidential guard--initially created
    to protect senior officials--continued to act against the Lukashenko's
    political enemies with no judicial or legislative oversight. On May 25,
    1999, the Law on the State Guard officially entered into force. The
    law, which had been operative on a de facto basis for a number of
    years, gives the President the right to subordinate all security bodies
    to his personal command. Members of the security forces have committed
    numerous human rights abuses.
        The country's political leadership opposes any significant economic
    reforms and remains committed ideologically to a planned economy. The
    authorities claimed that the gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6
    percent, but most independent analysts doubted that figure and said
    that any growth that has occurred was the result of ``aggregate
    production'' fueled by continued massive credits to the debt-ridden
    state sector. Officials claimed that per capita GDP remained constant
    at approximately $1,400, but in real terms it was much lower. The
    majority of workers are employed in the state industrial and
    agricultural sectors, where wages are lower than the national average
    and wage arrears are chronic. Although the unreliability of official
    statistics makes it difficult to assess accurately economic conditions,
    living standards for many segments of society continued to decline.
    Authorities reported that average monthly wages were just over $70 a
    month by year-end, although independent analysts reported the figure
    was lower. Residents of small towns and rural areas, where incomes are
    particularly low, sustain themselves through unreported economic
    activity and small gardens.
        The Government's human rights record was very poor and worsened
    significantly in many areas. The authorities severely limit the right
    of citizens to change their government, and Lukashenko took severe
    measures to neutralize political opponents. The authorities did not
    undertake serious efforts to account for the disappearances that
    occurred in the previous year of well-known opposition political
    figures. Security forces continued to beat political opponents and
    detainees. There were reports of severe hazing in the military during
    the year. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces arbitrarily
    arrested and detained citizens, and the number of apparently
    politically motivated arrests increased, although many of those
    arrested soon were released. Prolonged detention and delays in trials
    were common and also occurred in a number of politically sensitive
    cases. The security services infringed on citizens' privacy rights and
    monitored closely the activities of opposition politicians and other
    segments of the population. Severe restrictions on freedom of speech,
    the press, and peaceful assembly continued, and the authorities did not
    respect freedom of association. The authorities continued to impose
    limits on freedom of religion and restricted freedom of movement.
    Government security agents monitored closely human rights monitors and
    hindered their efforts. Domestic violence and discrimination against
    women remained significant problems. Pressures against the Roman
    Catholic and Protestant churches as well as societal anti-Semitism
    persist. Authorities continued to harshly restrict workers' rights to
    associate freely, organize, and bargain. Trafficking in women is a
    problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing.--here were no reports of
    political or other extrajudicial killings.
        There were several cases of opposition figures who disappeared in
    recent years (see Section 1.b.). The opponents of the regime have been
    missing for such a long period of time, with no credible effort on the
    part of the Government to account for their whereabouts. Human rights
    monitors believe that they have been killed for their involvement in
    political activities.
        b. Disappearance.--There have been several cases of opposition
    figures who disappeared in recent years.
        On July 7, Dimitry Zavadsky, a cameraman for the Russian television
    network ORT, disappeared at the Minsk National Airport while waiting
    for Pavel Sheremet, another ORT journalist, to arrive from Moscow. When
    Sheremet arrived at the airport, Zavadsky was missing, but his car was
    found locked in the airport parking area. In 1997 Zavadsky and Sheremet
    were arrested by Belarusian authorities for crossing the Belarusian-
    Lithuanian border illegally while filming a documentary critical of the
    Lukashenko regime. In a politically motivated trial, Sheremet and
    Zavadsky were given 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences,
    respectively. Authorities accused the opposition of organizing
    Zavadsky's disappearance, calling it a provocation, and later
    threatened Sheremet with potential charges of slander for an interview,
    published in the independent press, in which Sheremet blamed Lukashenko
    and security services for Zavadsky's disappearance. A criminal
    investigation of the disappearance was opened, but no progress had been
    reported by year's end (see Section 2.a.). In November ORT Journalist
    Pavel Sheremet reported that several current and former police
    officers, including members of the elite Almaz Unit of the Ministry of
    Interior, have been arrested as suspects in the Zavadsky case. The
    authorities have not confirmed that those arrested are suspects in the
    Zavadsky case, nor have they confirmed their identities. Lukashenko
    fired the head of the KGB and the Prosecutor General following the
    release of a letter, reportedly written by a KGB officer, alleging that
    Zavadsky was killed by a group of former and current security service
    officers. The letter also alleged that senior authorities prevented
    investigators from fully examining the case. Lukashenko claimed that
    the letter was a fabrication and promised to renew the investigations
    into the disappearances; however, no further progress was made at
    year's end.
        On May 7, 1999, former Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Zakharenko
    disappeared shortly after he told his family in a telephone
    conversation that he was on his way home. Zakharenko, a close associate
    of the then-detained former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir, disappeared
    after voting began in an opposition presidential election initiative,
    in which Chigir was one of the principal candidates. An investigation
    began 6 months later, and there is still no evidence that the
    authorities have taken concrete steps to resolve the case. The
    Government also failed to present any information on the investigation
    despite a request from the U.N. Working Group on Involuntary
    Disappearances. The authorities also have harassed and hindered the
    investigations of Zakharenko's disappearance by independent
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In December Zakharenko's wife
    and children received political asylum in a Western European country,
    where they had been residing since August, after accusing Lukashenko of
    direct involvement in Zakharenko's disappearance.
        On September 16, 1999, following a meeting earlier during that day
    broadcast on state television in which Lukashenko ordered the chiefs of
    his security services to crack down on ``opposition scum,'' 13th
    Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Viktor Gonchar disappeared, along with
    his local business associate Anatoliy Krasovsky. A high profile
    antigovernment politician, Gonchar was considered an active fundraiser
    for the opposition. Shortly before his disappearance, Gonchar
    telephoned his wife to inform her that he was on his way home. Broken
    glass and blood were discovered later at the site where relatives and
    friends of the men believe the vehicle in which the two were travelling
    may have been stopped. As with the disappearance of Zakharenko, there
    is no evidence of progress by official investigators to resolve these
    cases.
        In June Interpol officially notified Belarusian law enforcement
    agencies that former national bank Chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova, who
    disappeared in April 1999 from an apartment where she had been under
    house arrest since 1997, was located in a Western European country.
    Vinnikova reported in several interviews with the press that she went
    into hiding to escape suspected conspiracies against her life.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The 1996 Constitution provides for the inviolability of
    the person and specifically prohibits torture, as well as cruel,
    inhuman or degrading treatment; however, police and prison guards beat
    detainees and prisoners. Law enforcement and prison officials may use
    physical force against detainees and prisoners only if the latter are
    violent, have refused to obey the instructions of the prison
    administration, or have violated ``maliciously'' the terms of their
    sentences. However, human rights monitors have credibly reported that
    investigators coerce confessions through beatings and psychological
    pressure. Although such behavior is against the law, the authorities
    seldom, if ever, punishes those who commit such abuses. Guards use
    force against detainees to coerce confessions as well as during routine
    activities. Police also beat demonstrators (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.b.). On November 20, the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued
    conclusions and recommendations on the third periodic report on the
    country. The Committee cited concern over the deterioration in the
    human rights situation and noted numerous continuing allegations of
    torture and inhuman treatment or punishment committed by state
    officials or with their acquiescence. These violations appeared to have
    been committed against political opponents of the regime and peaceful
    demonstrators.
        On January 14, Oleg Volchek, a human rights monitor and chairman of
    a nongovernmental commission investigating the disappearance of former
    Internal Affairs Minister Yury Zakharenko, filed a complaint with the
    Minsk city prosecutor after a lower court refused to bring criminal
    charges against police who beat him following his arrest on July 21,
    1999. Volchek was so severely beaten that he was treated for the
    injuries he sustained. The police, who denied involvement in the
    beating, claimed that Volcheck attacked them and sustained his injuries
    when he fell and hit his head on a table. Volchek's attorney and other
    human rights monitors believe that the authorities attempted to cover
    up the beating. Volchek's appeal to the Minsk City Court also later was
    denied.
        On March 1, opposition activists Tsimafey Dranchuk, Leanid
    Malakhaw, and Filip Klikushyn were arrested for demonstrating in front
    of the Presidential Administration Building and, on March 3, were
    sentenced to 5 days imprisonment. While being transported from the
    courthouse to a detention facility, 18-year-old Dranchuk was beaten by
    militia officials which resulted in serious head injuries. On March 5,
    he was taken to a Minsk clinic, where his injuries were diagnosed as
    severe by doctors. Malakhaw and Klikushyn reportedly were beaten by the
    authorities at the same time as Dranchuk, although they did not sustain
    serious injuries. They went on a hunger strike to protest their
    sentences and abuse. Their hunger strike did not produce any result and
    they were released after 5 day's detention.
        On March 25, in a violent crackdown, uniformed and plainclothes
    security forces beat and detained demonstrators gathering on Yakub
    Kolas Square in downtown Minsk. According to human rights observers,
    over 300 demonstrators were arrested and detained. Many of them were
    beaten severely (see Section 2.b.). Yuri Belenky, deputy chair of the
    conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian Popular Front, was
    severely beaten and later hospitalized. Security forces reportedly hit
    Belenky in the face with a truncheon, put his jacket over his head,
    knocked him off his feet, and continued to kick him. Belenky was
    detained for 3 days, after which time a government doctor diagnosed him
    with a concussion. Belenky's appeals to prosecutors and the courts to
    bring charges against the security forces responsible for the beating
    were denied.
        According to the Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) of the OSCE,
    in an ``unwarranted and superfluous show of force'', five demonstrators
    who participated in the April 26 Chernobylsky Shlaykh (the Chernobyl
    Path) march were ``forcibly and violently'' detained by the militia
    (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
        ``Dedovshchina,'' the practice of hazing new recruits through
    beatings and other forms of physical and psychological abuse,
    apparently has not abated. In the first 5 months of this year,
    according to government statistics, 30 cases were reported. Efforts by
    family members and human rights monitors to investigate these cases and
    other reports of Dedovshchina were blocked by government authorities.
        Prison conditions are poor and are marked by severe overcrowding,
    shortages of food and medicine, and the spread of diseases such as
    tuberculosis, syphilis, and HIV/AIDS. Conditions at prison hospitals
    are poor, according to human rights monitors. Detainees in pretrial
    detention facilities also reported poor conditions and denial of
    medical treatment, which contributed to their declining health while
    they awaited trial. Although official statistics on prison overcrowding
    are not available, OSCE AMG officers who visited a detention facility
    in Vitebsk during June 1999 noted that in 1 cell, 16 female prisoners
    shared 10 beds, while in another, 14 prisoners between the ages of 14
    and 17 shared 8 beds.
        In 1999 a government amnesty was announced for lesser offenders
    designed to decrease the prisoner population. Another amnesty was
    approved by the National Assembly on June 30. Acting Minister of
    Internal Affairs Mikhail Udovikov announced on June 9 that 9,700
    prisoners had received early release or a reduction in their sentences
    under the 1999 amnesty and that the amnesty could be applied to 10,700
    prisoners in jail and 2,400 on parole at that time under the new
    legislation. Prior to the new amnesty, there were approximately 61,000
    prisoners, according to Udovikov. It is unclear to what extent the new
    amnesty was implemented. According to Udovkiov, the amnesty only
    applied to war veterans, underage persons guilty of minor crimes,
    pensioners, and the disabled. Those guilty of economic crimes could
    only receive amnesty after payment of financial restitution.
        Male and female prisoners are housed separately. Following an
    inspection of a correctional facility for women in Gomel on June 1999,
    Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov noted in an interview with
    the official press that, although it was intended to house only 1,350
    inmates, it then held 2,800. NGO's reported that prison conditions did
    not improve during the year.
        On March 1, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and political prisoner
    Vladimir Kudinov was transferred to solitary confinement in a
    punishment cell for 7 days for alleged misconduct, which included
    reportedly stopping morning exercises and having left a smoking area
    too early (see Section 1.d.). Kudinov previously was punished for
    participating in a chess tournament without prison approval and for
    other violations of ``internal routine.'' Kudinov also was denied,
    without explanation, visits by family and a priest. According to human
    rights monitors, these punishments were imposed to exclude Kudinov from
    the list of those eligible for amnesty or early parole.
        On July 11, Ivan Lemyashewski, the former head of a group of
    advisors to the Council of Ministers, issued an open letter to
    Lukashenko calling for an end to the politically motivated harassment
    of his family. On June 21, Lemyashewski's son, Ilya, was shot in the
    chest by a masked man. The shooting followed an earlier attempt by
    security forces to recruit Ilya to spy on his father. When he refused,
    Ilya reportedly was warned that ``grave consequences'' would follow.
    Lemyashewski's car was reportedly tampered with, resulting in an
    accident, and the family reported receiving numerous threatening
    telephone calls. The threats and attacks apparently were in retaliation
    for his resignation from the Government (see Section 2.a.)
        Human rights monitors sometimes were granted access to observe
    prison conditions, although the authorities did not honor some requests
    to meet with individual prisoners.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile.--The authorities have
    amended only slightly the Soviet-era law on detention, and during the
    year security forces continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain
    citizens, most often in connection with demonstrations, some of which
    were not authorized. Politically motivated arrests continued, although
    most of those arrested were released within a few days.
        The Criminal Procedure Code provides that police may detain a
    person suspected of a crime for 24 hours without a warrant, within
    which time the procurator is notified. The procurator then has 48 hours
    to review the legality of the detention. If the procurator deems the
    detention legal, a suspect can be held for a maximum of 10 days without
    formal charge. However, usually once the decision is made to hold a
    suspect, formal charges are filed. Once a suspect is charged, a trial
    must be initiated within 2 months, although in some cases the
    procurator general can extend pretrial detention to 18 months to allow
    for further investigation. Alternatively, a suspect who has been
    charged can be released on a written pledge not to flee, in which case
    there is no time limit on pretrial investigation. The law allows
    detainees the right to apply to the court (rather than the procurator)
    to determine the legality of their detentions. However, in practice
    suspects' appeals to have their detentions reviewed by the courts
    frequently are suppressed because detainees are at the mercy of
    investigators, and detention officials are unwilling to forward the
    appeals. There is no provision for bail under the current legal code.
        By law detainees may be allowed unlimited access to legal counsel,
    and, for those who cannot afford counsel, the court appoints a lawyer.
    However, investigators routinely fail to inform detainees of their
    rights and conduct preliminary interrogations without giving detainees
    an opportunity to consult counsel. The information gained then is used
    against the defendant in court. Even when appointed by the State,
    defense attorneys are subordinate to the executive branch. Access by
    family members to those detained is restricted severely in practice and
    they frequently are not notified when a family member, even a juvenile,
    has been detained.
        On January 19, Aleksandr Abramovich, leader of the Borisov branch
    of the Social Democratic Party, was arrested by police near the Minsk
    city court before the beginning of the trial of former Prime Minister
    Mikhail Chigir ( see Section 1.e.). Abramovich was holding a sign
    calling for an end to the prosecution of opposition leaders. Abramovich
    was sentenced to 7 days in jail. In February Abramovich again was
    arrested and sentenced to 35 days in jail for staging three
    unsanctioned demonstrations: One against the war in Chechnya, one
    against the trial of Chigir, and one against the trial of a local
    businessman. On April 25, Abramovich again was arrested during a rally
    held in Borisov to mark the 14th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.
    At the rally, Abramovich criticized the Government and was arrested
    immediately after he ripped apart a picture of Lukashenko. Abramovich
    was sentenced to 5 days in jail for ``petty hooliganism.''
        On February 4, police in Grodno arrested Vladimir Sowtsa, a member
    of the United Civic Party and an activist in the local union of
    entrepreneurs, for spreading leaflets about a nationwide strike, which
    began on February 1. Sowtsa was detained for several hours and then
    taken to a court where he was fined $7.50 (6,600 rubles) and later
    released.
        On February 29, while collecting signatures on a petition against
    the country's union with Russia, two activists of the Belarusian
    Popular Front were detained for several hours by police and later
    charged with illegal distribution of printed materials.
        On March 1, Filipp Klikushin, Leonid Malakhov, and Timofei Dranchuk
    were arrested by police for staging an unsanctioned protest near the
    Presidential Administration in central Minsk in support of those who
    had disappeared (see Section 1.c.).
        On March 23, five youth activists, two of whom were under 18 years
    of age, were detained by police for distributing leaflets announcing
    the freedom day march on March 25 marking the 1918 founding of the
    Belarusian National Republic. One of the activists, Sergei Shevlakov,
    reported that his family was not notified of his detention until almost
    4 hours after the incident, in violation of the administrative offenses
    code. All five reportedly were verbally threatened and abused by police
    while in detention.
        On March 25, approximately 700 demonstrators gathered on Yakub
    Kolas Square in Minsk for the ``day of freedom'' march. On March 24,
    Minsk city authorities banned the demonstration, despite requests from
    foreign and domestic human rights observers to allow the demonstration
    to proceed peacefully. Shortly after the demonstrators gathered on the
    square, military and police special forces, dressed in riot gear, waded
    into the crowd using clubs and began to beat and detain demonstrators.
    According to local human rights lawyers, over 300 demonstrators were
    arrested and prosecuted for their participation in the event. Many
    leading opposition politicians were arrested in connection with the
    demonstration and sentenced to 5 to 7 days imprisonment (see Section
    2.b.).
        On March 25, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and independent journalist
    Valery Shchukin, was arrested by police in Vitebsk while covering an
    opposition rally marking the 1918 founding of the Belarusian National
    Republic. Shchukin was tried and sentenced to 10 days in jail for
    participating in an unsanctioned demonstration. At the same event,
    Vladimir Pleshchenko, a local opposition activist, was arrested and
    later sentenced to 10 days in jail. Roman Solovyan, also a local
    opposition activist, was arrested and sentenced to 5 days in jail.
        On April 26, Anatoly Fyodorov, a local leader of the Belarusian
    Popular Front, was arrested by police for organizing an unauthorized
    demonstration in Mogilev on the 14th anniversary of the Chernobyl
    disaster. Also on April 26, opposition activists Yury Kuzmitsky, Denis
    Yeryomenko, and Sergei Terekhov were arrested while participating in
    the Chernobilski Shlyakh demonstration. Kuzmitsky, who severely was
    beaten by police, was sentenced to 5 days detention for participation
    in the demonstration. Yeryomenko was convicted of illegal use of flags,
    pennants, emblems, symbols, or placards for carrying a caricature of
    Lukashenko. Terekhov was sentenced to 3 days' detention for ``speaking
    of the President in foul language'' (see Section 2.b.).
        On May 1, 14 opposition and human rights activists were detained by
    police in Mogilev during a May Day rally in the town's central square.
    The activists were carrying white-red-white flags and opposition signs
    and were taken to a police station where they were detained for several
    hours.
        On May 21, Aleksandr Abramovich, Anton Tsylezhnikov, and Alesya
    Ysyuk were arrested by police in Borisov while demonstrating in support
    of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. Abramovich and Tsyalezhnikov
    were sentenced to 15 and 10 days' incarceration respectively, and Ysyuk
    was fined $404 (390,000 rubles).
        On June 20, United Civic Party activists Aleksei Radzivnow and
    Vladimir Romanovski were detained by police for staging a protest
    against restrictions on political activity near the Minsk Government
    Building in downtown Minsk; they were released later the same day.
        On June 29, Alexander Abramovich again was arrested and sentenced
    to 12 days in jail for a demonstration on June 19 in Borisov in which
    protestors chained themselves to a flagpole and demanded the
    resignation of the chairman of the Borisov City Executive Committee.
        On July 27, Katsyaryna Haravaya and Igar Paremski were arrested and
    sentenced to 5 and 7 days in jail, respectively, for staging an
    unsanctioned demonstration in Gomel in which they protested against the
    establishment of a ``fascist regime'' in Belarus.
        Unidentified, nonuniformed officials working for the security
    services regularly apprehend participants in antigovernment
    demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). There are credible reports that
    plainclothes security officials sometimes infiltrate antigovernment
    demonstrations in order to either report on opposition protestors or
    provoke clashes between demonstrators and police. Security officers on
    occasion also preemptively have apprehended organizers and individuals
    considered to be potential participants prior to demonstrations,
    including those that had been sanctioned by theauthorities.
        On February 10, in an article in the independent newspaper
    Narodnaya Volya, Oleg Baturin, a senior official in the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs, reported that a clash between demonstrators and
    security officials at the freedom march I on October 17, 1999, was
    provoked by plainclothes security officers under orders from the
    Ministry of Internal Affairs. Following publication of the article,
    Baturin and his brother, fearing for their personal safety in Belarus,
    claimed political asylum in Poland. On July 19, Baturin sought refuge
    at a Western embassy in Minsk and claimed that he had been abducted by
    unknown assailants, who he later identified as Belarusian security
    service agents, and was returned forcibly to Belarus. On July 21,
    Baturin was granted safe passage out of Belarus, to take up political
    asylum in another country. While some of the facts of Baturin's
    kidnaping remain unclear, most independent human rights observers
    believe that his charges against the authorities were the reason for
    his mistreatment.
        Security force officials regularly detained journalists and NGO
    officials during the year (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
        Following demonstrations security officials have held some
    detainees incommunicado. In addition to the hundreds of antigovernment
    protestors whom authorities held for several hours or days, there were
    several prominent political detainees whom the Lukashenko regime held
    for prolonged periods of time in pretrial detention, some for over a
    year.
        On November 11, 1997, former Minister of Agriculture Vasily Leonov
    was arrested on charges of large-scale embezzlement and bribery. Leonov
    was held for over 2 years in pretrial detention, during which he
    suffered two heart attacks. Leonov also went on a hunger strike to
    protest the refusal of prison authorities to provide him with medical
    supplies brought by his relatives. On January 14, Leonov was sentenced
    to 4 years in prison and confiscation of property for large-scale
    embezzlement and bribery (see Section 1.e.).
        In February 1998, police arrested Andrei Klimov, a successful
    entrepreneur and member of the Parliament that was illegally dissolved
    in late 1996, on charges of embezzlement and other financial
    irregularities. Klimov's supporters and human rights observers believe
    that his arrest and prosecution was politically motivated because
    Klimov is an outspoken critic of President Lukashenko and had
    participated in a commission that examined violations of the law and
    the Constitution by the President. Klimov's period of pretrial
    detention was extended on several occasions. He was severely beaten by
    prison guards on December 13, 1999, following his refusal to leave his
    cell as a sign of protest. The presiding judge ordered that he be
    brought to the courtroom. He was beaten by guards and forcefully
    dragged into the courtroom in torn clothing and without any shoes.
    Although he was clearly in need of medical attention, an ambulance was
    not called until several hours later. On March 17, Klimov was convicted
    of large-scale embezzlement and forgery and sentenced to 6 years'
    imprisonment and loss of property (see Section 1.e.).
        Statistics on the current number of persons in pretrial detention
    and the average length of pretrial detention were not available. Acting
    Minister of Internal Affairs Mikhail Udovikov, in a speech to
    Parliament on June 9, said that approximately 100,000 people were in
    pretrial detention or under some form of punishment. In comparison in
    August 1998 there were approximately 11,000 persons in pretrial
    detention.
        The authorities do not use forced exile, although there were
    credible reports that the security services threatened opposition
    political activists and trade union leaders with criminal prosecution
    or physical harm if they did not cease their activities and depart the
    country.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is not
    independent and is unable to act as a check on the executive branch and
    its agents. Reforms adopted to support the independence of the
    judiciary in 1995 remained unimplemented. The 1996 constitutional
    referendum further subordinated the judiciary to the executive branch
    by giving the President the power to appoint 6 of the 12 members of the
    Constitutional Court, including the chairman. The remaining six are
    appointed by the Council of the Republic, which itself is composed of
    individuals appointed by the President or elected by individuals
    influenced by the President. The President also appoints the chairmen
    of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court. The President also
    has authority under the Constitution to appoint and dismiss all
    district and military judges.
        The criminal justice systems follows the former Soviet model and
    has three tiers: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme
    Court. Several modifications have been made, brought about by the new
    Constitution, including direct presidential appointments. The
    Constitutional Court was established in 1994 to adjudicate serious
    constitutional issues, but, dependent on the executive branch, it does
    not challenge presidential initiatives. In addition the Constitutional
    Court has no means to enforce its decisions.
        Judges adjudicate trials; only in capital offense trials in which
    the defendant pleads not guilty and demands a jury trial do juries
    determine innocence or guilt. Judges are dependent on the Ministry of
    Justice for sustaining court infrastructure and on local executive
    branch officials for providing their personal housing. In addition
    judges owe their positions to the President. Although the Procurator's
    Office denies it, there were widespread and credible reports that
    ``telephone justice'' (the practice of executive and local authorities
    dictating to the courts the outcome of trials) continues.
        On May 18, in a speech to the Belarusian-Russian Union
    Parliamentary Assembly, covered by the media and widely criticized by
    human rights monitors as evidence of the absence of judicial
    independence, Lukashenko denied allegations of human rights abuses in
    Belarus and said they were ``far-fetched and overblown beyond reason in
    the West...We have no such violations.'' He acknowledged that a
    ``number of once famous persons,'' such a former Prime Minister Chigir
    and others, had been prosecuted over the past few years. However,
    ``they were caught stealing and got what they deserved...Everybody is
    equal before the law...Overseas politicians lack objectivity because
    they surround criminals, thieves, and hooligans with a halo of
    political martyrs.''
        Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the
    district, regional, and republic levels. They ultimately are
    responsible to and serve at the pleasure of the Procurator General who,
    according to the Constitution, is appointed by the Council of the
    Republic. Prosecutors are not independent and do not have authority to
    bring charges against the President or the presidential administration.
    On May 24, Constitutional Court Chairman Grigory Vasilevich told
    journalists that a local prosecutor had been correct in rejecting a
    complaint brought earlier against a presidential administration
    official. According to Vasilevich, Article 125 of the 1996 Constitution
    charges the Procurator General and other public prosecutors with the
    task of ``control over the compliance of the ministries, other agencies
    subordinate to the Council of Ministers, local representative and
    executive authorities, enterprises, institutions, nongovernmental
    organizations, officials, and private figures to laws, decrees, edicts,
    and other legal acts.'' Procurators do not have authority to bring
    charges against an official of the Presidential Administration, he
    said, because it is under the authority of the President, and not the
    Council of Ministers.
        In May 1997, Lukashenko issued presidential Decree No. 12,
    ``Several Measures on Improving the Practice of Lawyers and Notaries,''
    which, according to international legal experts and human rights
    monitors, seriously compromised the independence of lawyers from the
    authorities. The decree, which ostensibly was issued in response to
    allegedly exorbitant attorneys' fees, subordinated all lawyers to the
    Ministry of Justice, which controls the licensing of lawyers, and
    placed the bar association under much greater Ministry of Justice
    control.
        In August 1999, while on an inspection tour in the Brest oblast in
    the western part of the country, Lukashenko told local reporters that
    he personally exercised control over ``certain'' ongoing judicial
    cases, including that of former Prime Minister and opposition leader
    Mikhail Chigir. Lukashenko stated, ``I have them under control, I am
    not going to allow any injustice there myself.'' On August 30, 1999
    during a government interagency commission on crime covered by the
    official media, President Lukashenko reportedly stated, ``It is natural
    for the Head of State to exercise control over one criminal case or
    another...especially in our country, where the Head of State controls
    all the branches of power--legislative, executive, and judicial.''
        Human rights monitor and defense attorney Vera Stremkovskaya was
    threatened with disbarment following her public criticisms of the
    Lukashenko regime while on visits abroad in 1998 and during the year.
    In an attempt to hinder Stremkovskaya's activities, Ministry of Justice
    officials also have launched investigations and issued warnings to her
    human rights NGO (see Section 4).
        The Constitution provides for public trials, although exceptions
    can be made in cases established by law (for example, in cases of rape
    or on grounds of national security). Defendants have the legal right to
    attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence on their
    own behalf. However, these rights are not always respected in practice.
    The right to be represented by counsel also is not always respected in
    practice. While the 1996 Constitution establishes a presumption of
    innocence, in practice defendants frequently must prove their
    innocence. According to statistics from the Belarusian Helsinki
    Committee, in 1998, criminal charges were brought by prosecutors
    against 59,700 individuals. Of these, only 272, or less than one-half
    percent were found to be not guilty.
        Both defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal, and most
    criminal cases are appealed, according to legal sources. In appeals
    neither defendants nor witnesses appear before the court; the court
    merely reviews the protocol and other documents from the lower court's
    trial. Appeals rarely result in reversals of verdicts.
        Antigovernment protestors arrested after demonstrations were
    subjected to assembly line-style trials, often without the right to
    counsel or the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses.
        On January 14, former Minister of Agriculture Vasily Leonov was
    sentenced to 4 years in prison and confiscation of property for large-
    scale embezzlement and bribery. Under the provisions of amnesty
    legislation, Leonov was released from prison on October 5 after nearly
    3 years imprisonment. Leonov allegedly accepted bribes of furniture
    worth approximately $52 (42,459 rubles) and foodstuffs worth $90
    (73,383 rubles). Leonov had been arrested on November 11, 1997; he
    arrest was videotaped and broadcast on national television. In the
    videotape, police officers were shown taking U.S. dollars out of
    Leonov's desk. The following day, referring to Leonov's arrest,
    Lukashenko said law enforcement agencies would ``root out corruption''
    without respect for rank. Legal experts and human rights monitors noted
    that the trial was rife with abuse of legal procedure, including the
    use of evidence taken under duress and later recanted, in violation of
    the Criminal Code.
        On June 8, Mogilev regional authorities announced the sale of
    property belonging to Leonov, confiscated by the Government following
    his conviction. The house and accessory buildings were offered for sale
    at a total of $4,500 (approximately 4,320,000 rubles). According to the
    human rights organization Charter '97, the authorities published the
    announcement of the sale in state-run newspapers without waiting for a
    hearing on a lawsuit brought by family members to block the sale.
    Authorities also reportedly refused to let the Leonov family buy the
    property back.
        On March 17, a Minsk court sentenced 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy
    Andrei Klimov to 6 years in prison on fabricated charges of alleged
    malfeasance and large-scale embezzlement in the handling of government
    contracts at a property development firm which he had run. Klimov,
    whose trial began in July 1999, had been in pretrial detention since
    February 1998 (see Section 1.c.). International and local human rights
    observers believe that the trial and conviction were politically
    motivated to punish Klimov for his involvement in a 1996 impeachment
    drive against President Lukashenko. On August 22, Klimov's appeal was
    denied by another Minsk court without comment. Human rights monitors
    believe the appeals court overlooked numerous procedural violations in
    rejecting the appeal.
        On May 19, the political show trial of opposition leader and former
    Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir concluded with his conviction for
    exceeding his authority as Prime Minister in granting a delay in
    payment of customs duties to a company. The court sentenced Chigir to a
    3-year prison term suspended for 2 years. The court also ordered him to
    pay $220,000 in damages. The OSCE and other legal observers noted that
    the judgement involved irregularities in legal procedure and was
    designed to prevent Chigir from posing a challenge to the Government in
    presidential elections scheduled for 2001. Chigir had been arrested on
    March 30, 1999, just prior to a public ceremony to register his
    participation in an opposition-organized presidential election
    initiative aimed at drawing attention to the upcoming end of
    Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office. It also followed several
    warnings from government security officials to Chigir that he cease his
    political activities. Despite protests from the OSCE and a number of
    foreign governments, Chigir remained in pretrial detention from March
    30 until November 30, 1999.
        On May 30, speaking at a meeting of participants of a government-
    organized ``social-political dialogue,'' Lukashenko said Chigir's
    sentence was lenient. Speaking to the head of the OSCE AMG, Lukashenko
    said ``on your instructions, if you want, as a result of your pressure,
    although I did not welcome it, your client (Chigir) was forgiven a lot
    ... Were it not for the OSCE, Chigir would have to serve at least 5
    years first in a cell and then somewhere in a prison.'' Lukashenko's
    comments were condemned widely by local human rights monitors as
    further evidence that Chigir's trial was politically motivated because
    of his opposition to the Lukashenko regime. On August 18, the Supreme
    Court, following appeals from both Chigir and the procurator, returned
    the case to the city court for further investigation. In her appeal,
    Chigir's attorney, Yulia Chigir, cited numerous procedural
    irregularities, including the unlawful time limit placed on the defense
    to familiarize itself with the lower court protocol. On December 5, the
    Supreme Court vacated the sentence against Chigir and returned the case
    to the procurator's office for further investigation. The panel of
    judges ruled that the investigators and the judges in the previous
    trial failed to fully examine the facts of the case. At year's end, no
    trial date was set.
        On June 19, Nikolai Statkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Social
    Democratic Party, and 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Valery Shchukin were
    convicted of active participation in group actions disturbing the peace
    and were sentenced to 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences,
    respectively. Statkevich and Shchukin had been arrested immediately
    following the march for freedom on October 17, 1999, which resulted in
    clashes between protestors and riot police. Statkevich also was charged
    with active participation in group actions disturbing the peace for an
    unauthorized demonstration held on June 27, 1999. The trial, which
    began on April 24, was marked by violations of judicial procedure. In
    many cases, witnesses were unable to identify Statkevich or Shchukin
    and appeared to have been coached. Most human rights observers
    considered the trial to be politically motivated. On August 25, the
    Supreme Court, citing procedural and investigative irregularities,
    upheld an appeal brought by Statkevich and Shchukin, vacated their
    sentences and returned the case to the Minsk city court for
    investigation and a new trial.
        On July 12, 1999, Vladimir Ravkov, vice rector of the Gomel State
    Medical Institute, was arrested along with 17 other members of the
    institute, on corruption charges. Of the 18 arrested, only Ravkov
    remained in jail pending trial at year's end. Investigators have
    refused to allow Ravkov's wife, Natalya Ravkova, to defend him in
    court. Prison administrators reportedly denied Ravkov adequate medical
    treatment. Human rights monitors reported that this case appears to be
    politically motivated because of past criticism by the Gomel Medical
    Institute of government neglect of Chernobyl-related problems.
        On October 20, Julia Chigir, wife of Mikhail Cigir, was found
    guilty of violent resistance to a police officer and given a 2 year
    suspended sentence. On May 19, Julia Chigir bit the ear of a police
    officer when he forcibly attempted to block her entrance and that of
    her supporters, into a Minsk City courthouse on the day of Mr. Chigir's
    sentencing. The OSCE and human rights monitors noted that the court's
    ruling contradicted eyewitness accounts of the events on May 19 and
    that the ruling was politically motivated.
        Although the authorities have allowed representatives of the OSCE
    AMG to visit Supreme Soviet Deputies Klimov and Kudinov and former
    Agriculture Minister Leonov, authorities have refused permission to
    other foreign diplomatic and human rights observers to visit the same
    prisoners (see Section 1.d.). On July 5, the Procurator General's
    Office denied the OSCE AMG permission to visit Vladimir Ravkov, the
    jailed vice rector of the Gomel State Medical Institute, whose arrest
    appears to be politically motivated and who is reported to be in poor
    health.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against
    illegal interference in a citizen's personal life, including invasion
    of privacy, telephone, and other communications; however, the
    Government does not respect these rights in practice. Although the
    inviolability of the home also is provided for by the Constitution,
    which states that ``no one shall have the right to enter, without legal
    reason, the dwelling and other legal property of a citizen against such
    a citizen's will,'' in practice government monitoring of residences,
    telephones, and computers continued unabated. The KGB is believed
    widely to enter homes without warrants, conduct unauthorized searches,
    and read mail. Political, human rights, and other NGO's state that
    their conversations and correspondence are monitored routinely by the
    security services. Some opposition figures report a reluctance to visit
    some foreign embassies due to fear of reprisal.
        Nearly all opposition political figures assume that the authorities
    monitor their activities and conversations. The Lukashenko regime does
    nothing to refute these assumptions. Militia officers assigned to stand
    outside diplomatic missions are known to keep records of visits by
    political opposition leaders. In addition even regime officials do not
    appear to be exempt from monitoring.
        In June United Civic Party Chairman Anatoly Lebedko, a vocal
    opponent of the Lukashenko regime, discovered a listening device
    connected to a telephone in his apartment. Independent analysts believe
    that the device was made and planted in the apartment by the security
    services.
        Security officials routinely raided and searched the apartments of
    opposition politicians, often without a warrant. For example, on April
    19, police and KGB officers conducted an unlawful search of the
    apartment of Galina Yurina, an opposition activist, confiscated
    leaflets for an upcoming opposition-organized demonstration as well as
    personal items and detained Yurina for several hours. On August 23,
    Yurina was stopped by security officials, and leaflets advocating the
    boycott of parliamentary elections were seized from her car without a
    warrant.
        Security forces sought to recruit Ilya Lemyashewski, son of the
    former head of a group of advisors to the Council of Ministers, to spy
    on his father. On June 21, after his refusal to do so, Ilya was shot in
    the chest by a masked man (see Section 1.c).
        On July 31, 75-year-old Vasily Starovoitov, the former director of
    the Rassvet agro-industrial enterprise, appealed to police to file
    criminal charges against two men who attempted to enter his house and
    threatened him on July 28. Starovoitov had been released from a
    corrective labor camp in November 1999 after 2 years' imprisonment for
    allegedly embezzling state credits. Domestic human right groups believe
    that Starovoitov was arrested to draw attention away from a poor
    harvest on heavily subsidized state farms. Two men reportedly
    telephoned Starovoitov and said that they wanted to deliver a message
    from imprisoned former Agriculture Minister Leonov (see Section 1.e.).
    Shortly after the call, two men approached the door of Starovoitov's
    house and identified themselves as police and KGB investigators and
    threatened Starovoitov with violence if he did not let them in. The
    police were called and the intruders were arrested. The incident was
    under investigation at year's end.
        The KGB, the MVD, and certain border guard detachments have the
    right to use wiretaps, but under the law must obtain a prosecutor's
    permission before installation. The prosecutor's office exercised no
    independence and therefore the ``due process'' provision regarding
    wiretaps is effectively meaningless. The Presidential Guard (or
    security service) formed in 1995, reportedly continued to conduct
    surveillance activities of the President's political opponents. There
    is no judicial or legislative oversight of the Presidential Guard's
    budget or activities, and the executive branch repeatedly has thwarted
    attempts to exercise such oversight.
        In 1999 the National Assembly revised the administrative offenses
    code to increase the penalties for those who obstruct KGB officers. For
    example, an article of the legislation prohibits preventing KGB
    officers from entering the premises of a company, establishment or
    organization, and for failing to allow audits or checks to be made, as
    well as for unjustified restriction or refusal to provide information,
    including access to company information systems and databases. This
    revised code remains in effect.
        In 1997 the Ministry of Communications renegotiated contracts for
    supplying telephone service. The new contracts forbid subscribers from
    using telephone communications for purposes that run counter to state
    interests and public order. The Ministry has the right to terminate
    telephone service to those who breach this provision.
        Presidential Decree No. 218, issued in 1997, prohibits the import
    and export of printed, audio, and visual information that could
    ``damage'' the economic and political interests of the country (see
    Section 2.a.). This decree remains in effect.
        On November 23, 1999, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 40, which allows
    the authorities to nationalize the property of any individual if the
    President determines that the individual has caused financial damage to
    the State. There were reports that this decree had been used,
    particularly against businessmen. Authorities also threatened to seize
    the property of former Central Bank Chair Tamara Vinnikova.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech, as well as the freedom to receive, retain, and
    disseminate information; however, the regime restricts these rights in
    practice. The executive branch continued its suppression of freedom of
    speech. Despite the constitutional provisions, a 1998 government decree
    limited citizens' right to express their own opinions. Although
    independent media remain widely available in Minsk, as part of a
    continuing crackdown on opposition activity, the authorities stepped up
    its campaign of harassment against the independent media. The
    authorities continued to restrict severely the right to a free press
    through near-monopolies on the means of production of newsprint, means
    of distribution on national level broadcast media, such as television
    and radio, and by denying accreditation of journalists critical of the
    regime. The authorities also kept up economic pressure on the
    independent media by pressuring advertisers to withdraw advertisements,
    as well as by fines and other administrative harassment. Employees at
    some state-run enterprises are discouraged from subscribing to
    independent newspapers and journals.
        In 1996 Lukashenko signed a decree ordering that all editors in
    chief of state-supported newspapers would henceforth be official state
    employees and would become members of the appropriate local level
    government council. Another decree granted the Ministry of Press the
    authority to assign graduates of state-supported journalism schools to
    work in state-owned media organizations as a means of payment for their
    schooling. These decrees remain in effect.
        Presidential Decree No.5, issued in 1997, prohibits a range of
    broadly defined activities and limits freedom of expression. For
    example, the decree prohibits individuals from carrying placards or
    flags bearing emblems that are not registered officially with the
    state, as well as emblems, symbols, and posters ``whose content is
    intended to harm the state and public order, rights and legal interests
    of the citizens.'' The decree also bans activities that are
    ``humiliating to the dignity and honor of the executive persons of
    state bodies.'' This decree has been used to prosecute and fine those
    carrying symbols emphasizing the country's independence, such as the
    red and white flag.
        The Defamation Law makes no distinction between private and public
    persons for the purposes of lawsuits for defamation of character. A
    public figure who has been criticized for poor performance in office
    may ask the prosecutor to sue the newspaper that printed the criticism.
    In June 1998, the lower house of the National Assembly approved a bill
    that stipulated that public insults or libel against the President
    could be punished by up to 4 years in prison, 2 years in a labor camp,
    or a large fine. However, there were no reports that anyone was
    arrested or charged subsequently for this offense, and the bill
    apparently was devised principally as a means of intimidation. Its
    provisions remain in effect.
        In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree that prohibited
    and restricted the movement of certain goods across customs borders.
    The decree specifically prohibited the import and export of printed,
    audio, and video materials, or other news media containing information
    ``that could damage the economic and political interests of the
    country.'' Some bulletins affiliated with the opposition published
    outside of the country appeared to be targeted by the decree. Although
    in previous years there were a number of incidents in which customs
    officials confiscated opposition materials at the country's borders,
    there were no recent reports of such incidents.
        In January 1998, more stringent regulatory provisions, introduced
    by amendments to the Law on Press and Other Mass Media that were
    adopted by the Council of the Republic in December 1997, went into
    effect. The new regulatory provisions grant greater authority to the
    authorities to ban and censor critical reporting. For example, the
    State Committee on the Press was given authority to suspend for 3
    months publication of periodicals or newspapers without a court ruling.
        On December 17, 1999, Lukashenko signed new amendments to the law
    ``On Press and Other Media.'' The amendments ban the media from
    disseminating information on behalf of political parties, trade unions,
    and NGO's that are not registered with the Ministry of Justice.
        On April 7, a new presidential decree came into effect on ``the Use
    by Legal Entities of the Name of the Republic of Belarus.'' The decree
    allows only legal entities specially authorized by the President to use
    the name of the country in its title. According to the decree and
    independent legal experts, the independent press is barred from using
    the country name in its titles.
        Independent newspapers are available widely in Minsk, but outside
    of the capital most towns only carry local newspapers, only some of
    which are independent. On January 20, authorities forced the Orsha-
    based Filon Kmita Center to stop publishing its daily newspaper,
    Kutseyna, after the paper was denied official registration. Kutseyna
    was known for its critical reports on the Government. Despite repeated
    appeals from foreign and domestic human rights observers, the paper was
    not registered and did not reopen.
        In February the editors in chief of the country's six largest
    independent newspapers sent an open letter to Prime Minister Uladzimir
    Yarmoshyn demanding the end to the discriminatory measures that the
    state uses against them. The letter noted that the state postal service
    recently raised distribution rates for independent papers by 400 to 600
    percent, while the State-owned publications received distribution
    discounts. It also stated that the large increases undermine the
    freedom of the press.
        On April 24, the Grodno City Executive Committee refused to
    register the independent newspaper Reporter, which often is critical of
    theauthorities, on the grounds that the editors could not prove that
    they were occupying legal office spaces. Later, a second application
    for registration also was rejected by the City Executive Committee
    without further explanation. On August 25, it was reported that the
    city executive denied registration for a third time. In its rejection
    notice, the city executive reportedly stated that there was ``a
    sufficiency of newspapers in Grodno and no need for another one.''
        On May 11, the Supreme Economic Court of Belarus rejected an appeal
    by the independent newspaper Nasha Niva of a warning issued by the
    State Press Committee in March. The newspaper was warned for publishing
    a reader's letter which the committee said expressed ``intolerance
    toward the Russians'' in violation of Article 5 of the Media Law, which
    bans the use of the media for inciting ethnic enmity or discord. The
    letter, entitled ``I Envy Chechnya,'' was critical of Russian
    atrocities in Chechnya and supported the defense of Belarusian language
    and culture. On May 15, Nasha Niva was warned for a second time for
    publishing an article entitled ``Infection of Fascism: Lukashenko is
    Copying Hitler'' by Semyon Sharetsky, the 13th Supreme Soviet chairman
    currently in self-imposed exile in Lithuania. The warning reportedly
    was issued under Article 5 of the Media Law for the ``inadmissibility
    of abusing the freedom of mass information.'' Article 16 of the media
    law states that a newspaper can be closed after receiving more than one
    warning within a year.
        On May 29, two leading independent newspapers critical of the
    Government, Narodnaya Volya and Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta (BDG),
    received warnings for alleged ``abuses of the freedom of mass
    information'' under Article 5 of the Law on Media. The BDG was warned
    for publishing an article on February 22 by Semen Bukchin entitled
    ``Prayer in a Birkenau Concentration Camp.'' The State Press Committee
    alleged that the article created ``tensions in Polish-Jewish''
    relations. A second warning was issued to BDG for publishing a response
    to Bukchin's article, which ``offended the citizens of the Russian
    Federation.''
        Narodnaya Volya was issued a warning for an article by Ivan
    Makalovich which contained the question ``Should we Ask NATO for
    Help?'' A second warning was issued for printing an article by Sergi
    Popkov, deputy head of the conservative Christian Party of the
    Belarusian Popular Front (CCP). According to the State Press Committee,
    the CCF was not registered with the Ministry of Justice, and therefore
    the article should not have been published.
        On June 2, the Mogilev-based independent newspaper De Facto was
    issued a warning by the State Press Committee for publishing the same
    article by Semyon Sharetsky entitled ``The Infection of Fascism:
    Lukashenko is Copying Hitler'' that Nasha Niva was warned for in May.
    According to the State Press Committee, Sharetksy's article ``incites
    ethnic hatred.''
        On September 5, authorities banned the first national nonstate
    press festival, scheduled to be held on September 8 and 9 in Vitebsk.
    No reason was given for the authorities' decision and festival
    organizers planned to reschedule the festival for late September in
    another city. The Belarusian Association of Journalists said the ban
    was part of a government effort to inhibit the work of the independent
    press.
        On September 13, the office of the Magic publishing house was
    raided, and the owner and President Yuri Budzko was charged with
    ``propagandizing an electoral boycott.'' The Magic publishing house is
    the printing press for the country's leading nonstate newspapers.
    During the raid, copies of the independent newspaper Rabochy were
    seized and its editor Viktar Ivanshkevich was arrested. On October 11,
    Magic's bank accounts were frozen prior to a tax inspection. In
    September police seized 100,000 copies of a special edition of the
    Belorussian Free Trade Union newspaper Rabochy and arrested the
    newspaper's editor in chief Victor Ivashkevich, the newspaper's legal
    advisor Dmitry Kostyukevich, and Yuri Budko the owner of the Magic
    publishing house where the newspaper was being printed. The newspaper
    called on voters to boycott the October elections to the National
    Assembly. Ivashekvich and Kostyukevich were charded and later convicted
    and fined under Article 167 of the Administrative Code for publicly
    calling on an election boycott. The charges against Budko were
    dismissed by a separate court.
        On October 16, tax authorities raided the offices of Magic and
    seized the company's printing equipment. In connection with the
    investigation and seizure, the company's bank accounts were frozen on
    October 11. The equipment originally had been leased by Magic from the
    Belarus-Soros Foundation (BSF) and then later from the open society
    institute, which received ownership of the equipment when the BSF
    ceased its operations in 1997. The tax authorities seized the equipment
    to cover fines owed by the BSF for alleged tax violations. On December
    18, the Belarusian Supreme Economic Court upheld the seizure of the
    equipment. Most independent human rights monitors believe the
    authorities selectively enforced the law in this case to hinder the
    printing and distribution of independent media critical of the current
    authorities.
        Independent journalists were frequently barred by government
    authorities from covering events or arrested in the course of doing so.
        On March 1, officials of the presidential security service detained
    three journalists covering an unsanctioned opposition demonstration
    near Lukashenko's residence. The three journalists, reporters from
    Radio Liberty and the independent Belarusian news service Belapan and a
    Reuters photographer, were detained for several hours and later
    released.
        On March 16, six journalists from the satirical journal Navinky
    were detained by plainclothes police after participating in the Freedom
    March II demonstration in Minsk (see section 2.b.). The journalists
    were held for several hours without explanation and released the
    following morning.
        On March 25, in a violent crackdown on an opposition-organized
    rally to commemorate the 82nd anniversary of the Belarusian National
    Republic, 35 foreign and local independent journalists were beaten and
    detained. Journalists reported that they were not given an explanation
    as to why they were being detained, and, in some instances, the police
    used violent force to arrest the journalists. Journalists reportedly
    were searched, equipment was confiscated, and film exposed. The
    journalists were released later the same day.
        On April 28, Yahor Mayorchyk, a freelance reporter for Radio Free
    Europe/Radio liberty (RFE/RL) was summoned to a military enlistment
    office where he reportedly was interrogated by KGB officers for 90
    minutes. The KGB officers reportedly threatened that if Mayorchuk did
    not cooperate with the KGB, ``the same thing would happen as to
    Babitsky.'' The KGB officers were referring to RFE/RL journalist Andrei
    Babitsky, who was arrested by Russian authorities in Chechnya for his
    coverage of the war there, held captive for 40 days, and faced trumped
    up charges of treason.
        On May 1, two independent journalists were arrested while covering
    an opposition demonstration in Mogilev. Igor Irkho, a journalist with
    the De Facto newspaper, reportedly was assaulted physically by the
    police and had his camera damaged. He and Alexander Alexandrovich, a
    reporter for the Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta, were detained for several
    hours by local militia before being released.
        On May 2, five journalists from the Reporter newspaper gathered in
    Lenin Square in Grodno to protest the city government's refusal to
    register their paper. Minutes after gathering on the square, the
    journalists were arrested by local police and detained for several
    hours.
        On October 20, tax authorities launched an investigation into the
    accounts of the independent newspaper De-Fakto. On November 20, De-
    Fakto was fined over $1,770 (2 million rubles) for alleged unpaid taxes
    and fines. On October 25, the State Committee on Press issued a warning
    to the Belarusian Language Society for an article that appeared in its
    newspaper, Nasha Slova, by an unregistered organization, the Grodno
    Association of Democratic Veterans of War and Labor. On November 21,
    the State Committee on press issued a fourth warning to the independent
    newspaper Pahonya, based in Grodno, for publishing a statement by an
    unregistered organization, the Grodno initiative, an association of
    local opposition organizations. After two warnings, legal proceedings
    can be initiated to close a newspaper. Also, under the administrative
    code, publishing materials on behalf of unregistered organizations is
    punishable by a fine and, if repeated, by up to 15 days imprisonment.
    On November 15, the bank accounts of Novaya Gazeta, in the town of
    Smorgon, were blocked. Human rights monitors said these incidents were
    part of a government-wide pattern aimed at restricting the activities
    of independent press.
        On December 12, police in Osipovichy, raided an apartment where
    Nikolai Tomashov, editor of the independent newspaper Panorama, and
    journalist Igor Simbirov were working on the next issue of the
    newspaper. Simbrov was beaten by police, a search was conducted and
    documents and a computer were seized. Simbirov and Tomashov were then
    taken to the procurator's office where they were charged with
    slandering government officials.
        Until government authorities shut it down during 1996, Radio 101.2
    had been the sole Belarusian-language independent station in the
    country. The Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth, a government-
    subsidized presidential youth organization, was permitted to take
    control of Radio 101.2. An independent Belarusian-language crossborder
    radio station, Radio Ratcija, based in Poland, began operation during
    the year. However, in April the Foreign Ministry's special commission
    for accrediting foreign journalists refused to register four of the
    radio station's journalists based in Belarus.
        State-controlled Belarusian Television and Radio (B-TR) maintained
    its monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Its news
    programs regularly featured reporting that was biased heavily in favor
    of the current authorities, sharply critical of opposition politicians,
    and failed to provide an outlet for opposing viewpoints. Local,
    independent television stations operated in some areas and relatively
    were unimpeded in reporting on local news. However, most of these
    stations reported that they were under pressure not to report on
    national-level issues or were subject to censorship.
        On March 10, Yaraslaw Beklyamishchaw, director and host of the
    ``Krok-2'' talk show on B-TR, was dismissed from his position after
    inviting opponents of the Government to appear on his program. One of
    the guests on the program was Yury Khashchavtski, producer of a
    documentary film about Lukashenko entitled ``An Ordinary President.''
    The official reason for his dismissal was ``a flagrant violation of the
    rules of presentation of the program on the air and its noncompliance
    with the cue sheet.'' Beklyamishchaw sued B-TR for unlawful dismissal,
    and on June 14, B-TR agreed to an out-of-court settlement of the case.
    In March 1998, the Presidential Administration issued an internal
    directive entitled ``On Strengthening Countermeasures Against Articles
    in the Opposition Press.'' The directive, which remains in effect,
    specifically lists 10 independent media organizations covered by these
    provisions and prohibits government officials from making comments or
    distributing documents to nonstate media. It also forbids state
    enterprises from advertising in nonstate media. Although the directive
    does not restrict directly independent media or impinge on the right of
    citizens to receive information, it does restrict government officials
    in speaking to the independent media and gives further advantages to
    the state press.
        In July Dimitry Zavadsky, a cameraman for the Russian television
    network ORT, disappeared at the Minsk National Airport while waiting
    for Pavel Sheremet, another ORT journalist, to arrive from Moscow. When
    Sheremet arrived at the airport, Zavadsky was missing, but his car was
    found locked in the airport parking area. In 1997 Zavadsky and Sheremet
    were arrested by Belarusian authorities for crossing the Belarusian-
    Lithuanian border illegally while filming a documentary critical of the
    Lukashenko regime. In a politically motivated trial, Sheremet and
    Zavadsky were given 2-year and 18-month suspended sentences,
    respectively. Government authorities accused the opposition of
    organizing Zavadsky's disappearance, calling it a provocation, and
    later threatened Sheremet with potential charges of slander for an
    interview, published in the independent press, in which Sheremet blamed
    Lukashenko and Belarusian security services for Zavadsky's
    disappearance. A criminal investigation of the disappearance was
    opened, but no progress had been reported by year's end (see Section
    1.b.).
        A 1997 Council of Ministers decree nullified the accreditation of
    all correspondents and required all foreign media correspondents to
    apply for accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the
    application form for accreditation requested biographic information, as
    well as a record of the applicant's journalistic activity. Journalists
    who were residents of Belarus also were required to register with the
    state tax authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has used its
    authority to deny accreditation to four journalists from Radio Ratcija,
    and there were reports that other journalists from foreign media
    outlets have been threatened with a loss of their accreditation for
    reporting on opposition-related activities.
        In January the authorities and the state-run media began a campaign
    of harassment against poet and writer Vasil Bykov. Bykov, a leading
    proponent of ``Glasnost'' in the 1980's and a literary prize winner,
    recently had returned to the country after several years. According to
    the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Bykov fled to Germany as a result of
    the harassment. On January 28, the OSCE representative on freedom of
    the media, Freimut Duve, wrote a letter to the Belarusian Minister of
    Foreign Affairs urging the Government to end its campaign of harassment
    against Bykov. In his letter, Duve said ``today in Belarus we have
    favorable conditions for the return of the ideology that dominated
    during Soviet times.''
        On August 11, 1999, the international NGO Reporters sans Frontiers
    described the Government as an enemy of the Internet. A public
    statement issued by the organization noted that citizens were not free
    to explore the Internet independently. Although there are several
    Internet service providers in the country, they are all state
    controlled. The Lukashenko regime's monopoly on Internet service
    results in high prices, poor quality, and limited service and allows
    for the monitoring of practically all e-mail. Although the authorities
    have full control, it does not appear to be cutting off access
    entirely, and those who do have access appear to be able to contact a
    full range of unfiltered web sites. A June survey by an independent
    polling organization found that less than 3 percent of the population
    has access to the Internet.
        The Lukashenko regime restricts academic freedom. A sharply
    critical Human Rights Watch report released in July 1999 detailed
    government restrictions on academic freedom. The report noted that the
    authorities had suppressed research on controversial topics,
    recentralized academic decisionmaking, and maintained a ban on
    political activity on campuses. At the same time, a ``systematic
    crackdown'' on political dissent on campuses had targeted outspoken
    students and lecturers who were threatened with expulsion, often for
    their off-campus political activity. The report also asserted that
    state university authorities issued reprimands and warnings to
    politically active lecturers, independent historians, and other
    academics. It stated that university employees who challenge the status
    quo are told to curtail political activities or change the focus of
    their academic inquiry. University administrators target research into
    politically sensitive issues, such as the Belarusian independence
    movement during the Soviet era, a theme that is seen to challenge the
    State's policy of integration with Russia and is discouraged heavily.
        In June four students of the Minsk State Linguistic University were
    prevented from taking final exams because they refused to become
    members of the Belarusian patriotic Youth Union, a pro-Lukashenko
    student association that has been connected to violent attacks on
    opposition activists in the past.
        The Lukashenko regime continued to harass students engaged in
    antigovernment activities, such as demonstrations. Some students were
    expelled for their participation in demonstrations. In June the
    Belarusian State University initially rejected the graduation thesis of
    Pavel Severinets, the leader of the Malady Front, the youth branch of
    the Belarusian Popular Front. Severinets wrote and defended his thesis
    in the traditional version of the Belarusian language. After appeals
    from human rights groups, Severinets' dissertation was approved.
        Over 30 university students, who were expelled for their
    participation in street demonstrations, were assisted in continuing
    their studies in the Czech Republic by private NGO's. Sergei Martselev
    and Nikolai Privarnikov were expelled from the international relations
    faculty of the Belarusian State University for their participation in
    demonstrations in 1999. Vadim Kinopatsky was expelled from the
    Belarusian Agro-Technical University, also for his participation in
    demonstrations in late 1999.
        In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree, effective as of
    the 1997-98 academic year, requiring students who receive free
    university education from the state to accept jobs assigned by the
    authorities upon graduation. Although it remains unclear how
    universally this decree is enforced, there were reports that graduates
    in the medical and teaching professions were required to accept
    government jobs upon graduation. On April 11 and 12, approximately 20
    student activists from the National Association of Belarusian Students
    held a demonstration at the Minsk State Medical Institute to protest
    the assigning of graduates to jobs in areas contaminated by radiation
    from the Chernobyl disaster.
        On September 8, the Ministry of Justice issued a second warning to
    the National Association of Belarusian Students (NABS) for using
    unregistered symbols. According to the Ministry, the color and size of
    the association's letterhead was incorrect. On March 23, the NABS was
    warned by the Ministry of Justice for using the word ``Miensk,'' an
    older spelling of Minsk, in its documents. Two warnings in 1 year is
    sufficient for the authorities to initiate proceedings to close the
    organization down. The second warning was nullified by the Supreme
    Economic Court on September 22. Most human rights observers believe the
    warnings were part of a larger crackdown on independent NGO's (see
    Section 4).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Lukashenko
    regime severely restricts this right in practice. Organizers must apply
    at least 15 days in advance to local officials for permission to
    conduct a demonstration, rally, or meeting. The local government must
    respond with a decision not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled
    event.
        Aleksandr Lukashenko issued Decree No. 5 in 1997 in part to
    regulate what he termed the ``orgy'' of street protests taking place.
    The decree further limits citizens' ability to assemble peacefully by
    restricting the locations where rallies may take place and allowing
    local authorities to put strict limits on the number of participants.
    The decree also prohibits the display of unregistered flags and
    symbols, as well as placards bearing messages deemed threatening to the
    State or public order (see Section 2.a.). The decree, along with
    subsequent amendments adopted by the acting legislature, imposes severe
    penalties on those who violate the law, particularly the organizers of
    events. The decree allows for either monetary fines or detention for up
    to 15 days, but courts frequently impose high fines that those
    convicted cannot pay. When individuals fail to pay fines, authorities
    threaten to confiscate their property. The courts punished organizers
    of rallies with fines of several times the average monthly wage.
        Public demonstrations occurred frequently in Minsk but were always
    under strict government control, including through open videotaping of
    the participants by the police and plainclothes security officers.
    Demonstrations also occurred in other parts of the country but were
    less frequent especially in areas in the east close to the border with
    Russia. Following some sanctioned and unsanctioned demonstrations,
    police and other security officials continued to round up, beat,
    detain, and try to coerce confessions from some demonstration
    participants (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On January 18, Yawhen Asinski was sentenced to 2 years of
    corrective labor for participating in an opposition organized march on
    October 17, 1999. Asinski initially was charged with participating in
    group actions disturbing the peace, a charge punishable by up to 2
    years in prison. That charge later was dismissed, and he was convicted
    of violent resistance to a police officer on duty when video evidence,
    displayed at the trial, showed that Asinski was not an active
    participant in the demonstration.
        On February 3, police in Minsk arrested five participants in an
    unsanctioned demonstration near the Russian Embassy against Russian
    atrocities in Chechnya. On February 5 and 9, seven participants in
    unsanctioned demonstrations against the Chechnya conflict also were
    arrested. Philip Klikushin and Leonid Malakov, who were arrested on
    February 9, reported that they were beaten by police.
        On March 1, three opposition activists were arrested by
    presidential security services while staging an unsanctioned
    demonstration near Lukashenko's residence on the anniversary of the
    arrest of Victor Gonchar (see Section 1.b.). As soon as the activists
    assembled, they were arrested along with three journalists covering the
    event (see Section 2.a.).
        On March 17, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators participated in the
    Freedom March II. While security services maintained a strong presence,
    the event proceeded peacefully. However, Minsk schools and universities
    reportedly required students to be present at evening school events,
    apparently in an effort to prevent them from participating in the
    demonstrations. Following the demonstration, President Lukashenko spoke
    to reporters while visiting Brest on March 16 and said that ``people
    holding a grudge'' against the Government, such as ``market
    speculators,'' dominated Freedom March II, which was billed as a youth
    demonstration against the Government. Following Lukashenko's remarks,
    the deputy chairman of the Minsk City Executive Committee said that
    organizers of the demonstration failed to keep their promise not to
    block traffic and banned all further street demonstrations in Minsk.
    While the ban only was enforced selectively, Minsk City authorities
    frequently denied permission for demonstrators to march in the city,
    except to a park on the outskirts of the city.
        According to local human rights lawyers, more than 300 of some 700
    demonstrators, including 35 journalists were arrested and prosecuted
    for their participation in the March 25 Day of Freedom March (see
    Section 1.c., 2.a., and 1.d.). All the detainees were forced into
    police vehicles and taken to an Interior Ministry facility in Minsk.
    Some were searched illegally, and they were not allowed to contact
    colleagues, family, or friends. Film shot by press photographers
    reportedly was confiscated and exposed.
        On April 18, local authorities in Borisov banned an opposition-
    organized demonstration scheduled for April 25, to commemorate the 14th
    anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe. On April 20, the Minsk City
    Executive Council followed the Borisov City Council's decision and
    banned opposition organizations from staging demonstrations or marches
    in downtown Minsk on April 26, known as the Chernobylsky Shlyakh
    (Chernobyl path). On April 25, 1 day before the scheduled event, Minsk
    authorities reversed their decision and approved the march route from a
    park near the city center to a park on the outskirts of the city. Over
    30,000 demonstrators participated in the march on April 26. According
    to the OSCE AMG, organizers of the march responsible for the sound
    equipment were detained for several hours following the conclusion of
    the demonstration.
        Also on April 26, a small group of demonstrators remained at the
    park after the initiation of the march. According to the OSCE AMG, in
    an ``unwarranted and superfluous show of force,'' special units of the
    militia conducted a ``brutal raid'' on the group in which five
    demonstrators were detained forcibly and violently. The demonstrators
    were later released. On April 27, opposition activist Yury Kuzmitsky
    was sentenced to 5 days' imprisonment for his participation in the
    demonstration under charges of minor hooliganism. Denis Yeryomenko was
    convicted of ``illegal use of flags, pennants, emblems, symbols or
    placards'' for carrying a caricature of Lukashenko. On April 28, Sergei
    Terekhov was sentenced to 3 days' imprisonment for ``speaking of the
    President in foul language'' at the demonstration.
        In Mogilev on April 26, over 100 demonstrators marched in an
    unsanctioned demonstration commemorating the Chernobyl disaster.
    Anatoly Fyodorov, the local leader of the Belarusian Popular Front, was
    arrested and charged with organizing an unsanctioned demonstration. On
    May 1, in Mogilyev, dozens of opposition activists and 13 journalists
    were arrested when they attempted to stage a counter-demonstration to
    the officially sanctioned pro-Lukashenko rally held in the town square.
    Four organizers of the demonstration were later prosecuted for
    organizing an unsanctioned demonstration.
        On April 28, the Minsk City Executive Committee banned all street
    demonstrations on May 1, Labor Day. The May 1 holiday has been a
    traditional day for pro- and antigovernment demonstrations. The
    opposition Social Democratic Party and the opposition Belarusian Party
    of Communists applied for permission to demonstrate in the center of
    Minsk but were denied. Later, the pro-Lukashenko Communist Party of
    Belarus, headed by the deputy head of the Minsk City Executive
    Committee, was given permission to hold a demonstration in the center
    of Minsk.
        On May 7, the Minsk City Executive Committee banned a rally at
    victory square in the city center, organized by the opposition
    conservative Christian Party to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the
    victory over the Nazis. On May 10, the Minsk City Executive banned the
    opposition Belarusian Social Democratic Party from holding poetry
    readings in Yanka Kupala Park in the city center.
        On May 19, Dimitry Marchuk and Yan Grib, two opposition activists,
    were arrested while demonstrating outside the court house at the
    sentencing of former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. (see Section 1.e.).
    The demonstrators, who were chanting ``freedom to Chigir,'' were
    charged with using foul language, detained for several hours, and later
    fined. On May 21, local activists from the Belarusian Social Democratic
    Party demonstrated on the central square in Borisov in support of
    former Prime Minister Chigir. Aleksandr Abramovich, Anton Telezhnikov,
    and Alesya Yasyuk were arrested by local militia and charged with
    organizing an unsanctioned demonstration. Abramovich was sentenced to
    15 days' imprisonment, Telezhnikvo to 10 days imprisonment, and Yasyuk
    was issued a $404 (390,000 rubles) fine (see Section 1.d.).
        On May 30, opposition activists Alexei Balashov and Sergei Garstuk
    were detained by police for hanging a white-red-white flag with a black
    mourning strip on Lenin Square in downtown Brest in commemoration of
    the 53 people killed in a stampede in a Minsk metro station in 1999.
    The activists were detained for several hours and charged with
    violating the law on mass gatherings and assemblies.
        On June 19, Aleksandr Abramovich again was sentenced to 12 days'
    imprisonment for staging an unsanctioned demonstration in Borisov on
    June 15, in which demonstrators chained themselves to a flagpole in
    front of the city government building and demanded the resignation of
    the city executive chairman.
        On June 20, United Civic Party activists Vladimir Romanovsky,
    Galina Goncharik, Lyudmila Bozhok, and Aleksei Rodionov were arrested
    for holding an unsanctioned rally near the Minsk city government
    building to protest the city government's repeated banning of
    opposition demonstrations. Romanovsky later was fined $400 (390,000
    rubles) for organizing the rally. Deputy Chairman of the Minsk City
    Executive Committee, Viktor Chikin, warned the trio that UCP activists
    needed to apply for permission to hold such demonstrations and further
    warned there would be harsher punishment if they continued to violate
    the laws on assembly.
        On July 10, Minsk city authorities banned an annual Catholic
    procession in the center of Minsk commemorating the feast of Corpus
    Christi. The march, which regularly attracted up to 5,000 participants,
    had been held annually since 1991. A second appeal by the organizers
    also was denied. The denial of the march was considered by many human
    rights observers to be part of a larger crackdown on non-Orthodox
    religious groups (see Section 2.c.).
        On July 18, three activists of the Belarusian popular front were
    convicted by a court in Zaslavl, in the Minsk region, and issued
    warnings for ``attempting to organize a meeting with the community''
    and for ``violating street demonstration regulations'' on July 4. On
    July 4, the activists were attempting to organize an unsanctioned rally
    when they were arrested by police. On July 27, activists of the
    Belarusian Social Democratic Party staged an unsanctioned protest in
    front of the Gomel regional executive committee offices against the
    establishment of a Fascist regime in Belarus. Yekaterina Gorovaya and
    Igor Romanov were arrested by local police and sentenced to 5 and 7
    days' imprisonment, respectively, for organizing an unsanctioned
    demonstration.
        On August 3, Alekandr Abramovich and local activists of the
    Belarusian Social Democratic Party held a rally in the center of
    Borisov to protest authorities efforts to curb dissent and urge
    authorities to resume the supply of hot water in the city. Police
    arrested Abramovich and four others. Abramovich was sentenced to 15
    days' imprisonment for organizing an unsanctioned protest. In the first
    9 months of the year, Abramovich spent over 100 days in detention for
    allegedly violating regulations on assemblies and demonstrations.
        On August 6, local authorities in the town of Byarza, in the Brest
    region, banned the local branch of the Belarusian Popular Front from
    holding a public meeting with town residents. Authorities in nearby
    Belaazyorsk also banned a similar meeting the following day.
        On September 16, human rights and opposition activists staged a
    demonstration in Minsk on the anniversary of the disappearance of
    Victor Gonchar and Anatoly Krasovsky. The demonstrations was banned by
    the city authorities. At the conclusion of the demonstration,
    plainclothes men and uniformed police beat and detained several
    participants, including journalists monitoring the event. Charges
    against the participants later were dropped.
        Prior to the parliamentary elections on October 15, law enforcement
    authorities banned small and large demonstrations across the country
    advocating an election boycott and arrested and fined hundreds of
    activists promoting the boycott (see Section 3).
        The Belarusian authorities increased harassment of homosexuals. On
    February 21, Minsk police raided and closed, without explanation, a
    disco club known as a meeting place for homosexuals. On September 7,
    Minsk city authorities banned a Gay Pride-2000 parade in downtown
    Minsk, scheduled for September 9. On September 7, Minsk authorities
    also closed another night club where festivities were being held to
    mark the opening of the Gay Pride-2000 weekend. In 1999 the Ministry of
    Justice denied registration to country's only lesbian and gay rights
    NGO.
        Authorities provide for freedom of association; however, the
    authorities do not respect and severely restricts this right in
    practice. According to members of parties in opposition to the
    President, authorities frequently deny permission to opposition groups
    to meet in public buildings. Employees at state-run enterprises are
    discouraged from joining independent trade unions (see Section 6.a.).
    The authorities regularly harass members and supporters of opposition
    parties and confiscate leaflets and publications. Officials have warned
    alumni of foreign-sponsored education programs against continued
    affiliation with their programs' sponsoring agencies.
        On January 26, 1999, Aleksandr Lukashenko issued Decree No. 2,
    requiring all political parties, trade unions, and nongovernmental
    organizations to reregister with authorities by July 1. Such public
    associations completed a lengthy reregistration process in 1995. The
    timing of the decree, which increased the scope of operations and
    number of members that organizations would need to demonstrate to
    qualify for reregistration, apparently was intended as a method of
    political intimidation at a time of increased opposition activity. On
    July 1, 1999, regulations that prohibited private organizations from
    using private residences as their legal addresses were announced. In
    view of government control or ownership of many office buildings, the
    regulations had the effect of complicating the reregistration process.
        After the reregistration process had begun, the authorities
    announced that organizations would have to alter their charters to
    indicate recognition of the 1996 Constitution and that the words
    ``popular'' or ``national'' could not be used in their titles. On
    December 17, 1999, an amendment to the Law on Public Associations went
    into effect that prohibits political and social organizations from
    using the words ``Belarus,'' ``Republic of Belarus,'' ``national'' or
    ``popular'' in their titles. Also in December 1999, Lukashenko signed
    into law a bill on amendments to the Administrative Offenses Code that
    would make any work on behalf of an unregistered NGO punishable by
    fines. Although most of the major political parties and unions that
    applied were allowed to reregister, according to the Assembly of
    Belarusian Prodemocratic NGO's, only 1,268, or 57 percent of the NGO's
    in existence when the reregistration law went into effect were
    reregistered by the summer of 2000. A total of 202 NGO's were rejected
    by the Ministry of Justice for reregistration on various grounds, and
    31 were still in the process of reregistering at year's end.
        On April 11, the Gomel regional court ordered a local association
    for the unemployed, founded in 1992 by human rights monitor Yevgeny
    Murashko, to be closed for failure to comply with the January 1999
    decree on NGO reregistration. On May 16, Malady Front, the youth wing
    of the Belarusian Popular Front, applied for registration under the new
    legislation. On August 17, the Ministry of Justice notified the Malady
    Front that its application was still ``under consideration,'' the
    application later was rejected.
        On July 17, the Francisak Skaryna Belarusian language society (BLS)
    was issued a warning by the Ministry of Justice under Article 28 of the
    Law on Public Associations for misuse of the organization's seal.
        On July 19, the opposition United Civic Party received two written
    warnings from the Ministry of Justice also for misuse of blank forms
    and seals. One warning was issued because the party's e-mail address
    was printed too close to the seal on the party's letterhead. A third
    warning was issued on July 31 to the party for allegedly illegally
    establishing a party cell at a chemical factory. By September the party
    had been issued a total of five warnings. Although two warnings are
    sufficient for the Justice Ministry to close an organization, the
    warnings appeared to be attempts to intimidate and harass opposition
    political organizations, and no attempts had been made to close the
    organizations as a result of these warnings.
        Authorities continued to attempt to limit severely the activities
    of NGO's (see Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the authorities restrict this right in practice.
    Although Article 16 of the 1996 amended Constitution, which resulted
    from an illegal referendum, reaffirms the equality of religions and
    denominations before the law, it also contains restrictive language
    that stipulates that cooperation between the State and religious
    organizations ``is regulated with regard for their influence on the
    formation of spiritual, cultural, and country traditions of the
    Belarusian people.''
        Since his election as the country's president in July 1994,
    Lukashenko has pursued a policy of favoring the Orthodox Church as the
    country's chief religion and harassing other non-Orthodox religions.
    Lukashenko and the authorities encourage a greater role for the
    Orthodox Church. The President grants the Orthodox Church special
    financial advantages that other denominations do not enjoy and has
    declared the preservation and development of Orthodox Christianity a
    ``moral necessity.'' On April 30, Lukashenko said on state radio that
    ``nobody will disturb our Orthodoxy'' and pledged that the State ``will
    do everything for the Church to be a pillar of support for our State in
    the future.'' In December 1999, Lukashenko said that politicians and
    the Head of State bear responsibility for preserving Christian values,
    for maintaining religious peace in society, and for harmonious
    cooperation between the State and the Church. Lukashenko also said that
    the Church should be more active in promoting the unity of Slavic
    nations because Slavic integration is in the interests of both the
    State and the Church. In 1998 Lukashenko pledged state assistance to
    the Orthodox Church and stressed that Orthodoxy would remain the ``main
    religion.''
        The State Committee on Religious and National Affairs (SCRNA),
    which was established in 1997, categorizes religions and denominations.
    Some are viewed as ``traditional,'' including Russian Orthodoxy, Roman
    Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam (as practiced by a small community of
    ethnic Tatars with roots in the country dating back to the 11th
    century); some are viewed as ``nontraditional,'' including some
    Protestant and other faiths; and some are viewed as ``sects,''
    including Eastern religions and other faiths. The authorities deny
    permission to register legally at the national level to some faiths
    considered to be nontraditional and to all considered to be sects.
    Without registration it is extremely difficult to rent or purchase
    property in order to hold religious services.
        The authorities deny some minority religious faiths permission to
    register officially and treats them as sects. In 1998 SCRNA official
    Vyacheslav Savitskiy announced that ``11 destructive religious
    organizations, which have been denied registration after expert
    examination, illegally function in the country.'' In April 1999, a
    conference organized by the Orthodox Church and the National Assembly
    discussed the need to introduce legislation to combat ``destructive
    sects'' that operate illegally in the country. More recently the
    authorities continued to deny repeated attempts by the Belarusian
    Orthodox Autocephalous Church (BOAC) to register. Following a raid by
    local police on a private house where a prayer service was being held,
    Ivan Spasyuk, a BOAC priest, went on a hunger strike on November 7,
    1999, in order to protest the authorities' refusal to register his
    parish in the Grodno region. On November 28, 1999, at the urging of his
    family and parishioners, Spasyuk called off the hunger strike. Local
    courts so far have refused to hear appeals made by the BOAC to overturn
    the Lukashenko regime's decision not to register their churches.
    Because of ongoing registration problems, including the inability to
    register a seminary, the BOAC is unable to train a sufficient number of
    priests to meet the growing needs of its parishioners.
        A number of Protestant faiths confront a situation in which they
    are refused registration because they do not have a legal address and
    are refused property that could qualify as a legal address because they
    are not registered. The Full Gospel Pentecostal churches regularly are
    refused registration in this way. Article 272 of the Civil Code states
    that property may only be used for religious services once it has been
    converted from residential use. However, the authorities decline to
    permit such conversion to unregistered religions. Religious groups that
    can not register often are forced to meet illegally or in the homes of
    individual members. Several charismatic and Pentecostal churches have
    been evicted from property they were renting because they were not
    registered as religious organizations. A number of nontraditional
    Protestant and other faiths have not attempted to register because they
    do not believe that their applications would be approved. The
    publication of religious literature for unregistered religions likely
    would be restricted in practice, especially at state-controlled
    publishing houses. However, there were no reports of restrictions on
    the importation of religious literature. State employees are not
    required to take any kind of religious oath or practice elements of a
    particular faith. However, the practice of a faith not viewed to be
    traditional, especially one not permitted to register, could
    disadvantage possible advancement within the bureaucracy or state
    sector.
        Citizens are not prohibited from proselytizing; however, the
    authorities enforce a July 1995 Council of Ministers decree that
    controls religious workers in an attempt to protect Orthodoxy and
    prevent the growth of evangelical religions. A 1997 Council of
    Ministers directive prohibits teaching religion at youth camps. In
    February 1999, the Council of Ministers passed Decree No. 280 which
    expanded upon these earlier regulations. The decree appears to
    stipulate, among other things, that among foreign religious workers,
    only male clergy may engage in religious work upon invitation from a
    religious organization already officially registered, a provision that
    could be invoked to prohibit female religious clergy, such as Catholic
    nuns, from engaging in religious activity. However, this provision has
    not been tested in the courts.
        During the year, the authorities stepped up its efforts to curb the
    role of foreign clergy. In April the Council of Ministers introduced
    changes to its regulations, that allow internal affairs agencies to
    expel foreign clergymen from the country by not extending their
    registration or by denying them a temporary stay permit. Under the new
    regulations, these authorities are allowed to make decisions on
    expulsion on their own or based on recommendations from religious
    affairs councils, regional executive committees, or from the religious
    affairs department of the Minsk City Executive Committee. Appeals to
    judicial bodies are not provided for.
        As part of efforts to curb the influence of foreign clergy, on
    March 18, two law enforcement officials entered the Roman Catholic
    church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross in Brest, during a church
    service, and arrested Catholic Priest Zbigniew Karolak, a Polish
    citizen, for allegedly violating visa regulations and charged that his
    religious work was ``illegal.'' Regional government officials had
    criticized publicly Karolak for his ``undermining views.'' In addition
    a court in Brest issued warnings to four supporters of Karoljak for
    staging an unauthorized demonstration following the priest's arrest.
    Karolak departed the country in June, following warnings from
    authorities that he would be removed by force if he did not depart the
    country. Subsequent to Karolak's departure, a Brest regional court in
    November overturned the legality of the deportation order and a police
    order barring Karoljack from entering the country for 10 years. In
    February the Belarusian pastor of a Pentecostal church was warned by
    SCRNA authorities that a public sermon was performed in his church by a
    citizen of Ukraine in violation of the law on religion and that a
    future violation of the law would lead to a revocation of his church's
    registration.
        Foreigners generally are prohibited from preaching or heading
    churches, at least with respect to what the authorities view as
    nontraditional faiths or sects, which include Protestant groups.
    Foreign missionaries may not engage in religious activities outside the
    institutions that invited them. One-year validity, multiple-entry,
    ``spiritual activities'' visas, which are required officially of
    foreign missionaries, can be difficult to get, even for faiths that
    registered with the authorities and have a long history in the country.
    Foreign clergy or religious workers who do not register with the
    authorities or who have tried to preach without government approval or
    without an invitation from, and the permission of, a registered
    religious organization, have been expelled from the country. Approval
    often involves a difficult bureaucratic process.
        Officially sanctioned newspaper attacks on minority faiths
    increased. For example, on April 19, the Narodnaya Gazetta, a state-
    owned and published newspaper, carried an article with the headline
    ``The Prospect Looms for Belarus to Become a Protestant Republic, or We
    are Incessantly Being Urged to Deny the Faith of our Ancestors.'' The
    article stated that Protestant groups engage in fanatical rituals,
    including the ritual use of human blood and human sacrifice. The
    article claimed that Protestant groups present a threat to the country
    and urged the Government to take steps to protect Orthodoxy. In a
    similar article in January, state-owned Narodnaya Gazetta criticized
    the leader of the BOAC, Ivan Spasyuk, accusing him of criminal
    activities and characterized the church as the ``spiritual followers of
    Hitler.'' Attacks on Protestant faiths have also appeared on state-
    owned television. In November and December, a documentary entitled
    ``Expansion'' was aired on state television, which alleged that
    Protestant community carried out fanatical rituals. Protestant pastors
    appealed to the courts to stop the television programs, but they were
    denied.
        Societal anti-Semitism persists, and the Lukashenko regime has done
    little to counter the spread of anti-Semitic literature. In January the
    World Association of Belarusian Jewry and the Human Rights Center
    stated that Lukashenka was anti-Semitic and said that the government
    had refused to establish Jewish schools, help maintain Jewish
    cemeteries and historic monuments, or create memorials to Belarusian
    Holocaust victims. In May the Minsk city court refused to hear an
    appeal brought by Jewish organizations to stop the publishing and sale
    of the book ``War According to Mean Laws,'' published by the Orthodox
    printing house, which, among other anti-Semitic writings, included the
    ``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' and blamed Jews for societal and
    economic problems in the country (see Section 5). There has been a
    noticeable lack of government action in redressing instances of anti-
    Semitic vandalism in previous years. In April tax inspectors prohibited
    the central synagogue in Minsk from distributing Matzoh for Passover
    among members of the Jewish community. The tax inspectors reported that
    the synagogue would need to obtain a special license, register as a
    taxpayer, and open a store that would meet certain additional
    requirements, thereby effectively making distribution during the
    Passover celebration impossible.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--According to the Constitution, citizens
    are free to travel within the country and to live and work where they
    wish; however, the authorities restrict these rights in practice. The
    authorities issues internal passports to all adults, which serve as
    primary identity documents and are required for travel, permanent
    housing, and hotel registration.
        In June 1999, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an
    article of the Administrative Code barring enterprises, establishments,
    and organizations from employing persons without a ``propiska'' (pass)
    or the compulsory registration of their residence address. Under
    article 182 of the Administrative Code, employers faced fines for
    giving jobs to persons who had no stamp in their passport indicating
    that their residence and their new place of employment were located in
    the same city or district. However, it remains unclear to what extent
    this court decision actually has affected local security officials. In
    practice the right to choose one's residence remains restricted. In
    November 1999, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced a three-stage
    program to replace the ``propiska'' system, but there were no reports
    that this program was implemented.
        Official regulations on entry and exit require citizens who wish to
    travel abroad to receive first a ``global'' exit visa in their
    passport, valid for between 1 and 5 years. Once the traveler has these
    documents, the law does not restrict travel. The authorities have
    delayed issuing ``global'' exit visas to some opposition activists in
    an effort to hinder their political activity abroad.
        Following the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1996, the
    Lukashenko regime took measures aimed at limiting the travel of
    opposition politicians who refused to submit to the legislature created
    by the November 1996 referendum. Parliamentarians who did not join the
    new legislature could no longer travel on their diplomatic passports,
    despite the fact that these individuals had been assured that they
    would retain their status as deputies until their terms of office
    expired. Although their diplomatic passports were not confiscated, the
    border guards reportedly had a blacklist of opposition members who were
    to be denied exit from the country if they used a diplomatic passport.
    Subsequent to the 1997 refusal by border guards to allow former Supreme
    Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and Parliamentary Deputy Anatoly
    Lebdeko to travel abroad on their diplomatic passports, a number of
    members of the former Supreme Soviet have either acquired regular
    passports and have been allowed to travel abroad or have departed from
    Russia using their Belarusian diplomatic passports. The Government has
    delayed issuing passports to several opposition politicians, sometimes
    for several months, in an effort to restrict their travel abroad for
    political activities.
        According to official data, the State did not deny any citizen
    permission to emigrate. However, legislation restricting emigration by
    those with access to ``state secrets'' remained in effect, and any
    citizen involved in a criminal investigation also was ineligible to
    emigrate. Prospective emigrants who have been refused the right to
    emigrate may appeal to the courts.
        The Constitution gives aliens and stateless persons the same rights
    as citizens, except in cases established by law, international
    agreement, or the Constitution. The Constitution also allows the state
    to grant refugee status to persons who were being persecuted in other
    states for their political and religious convictions, or because of
    nationality. There is no law on first asylum, nor has it signed
    readmission agreements with any of its neighboring states.
        The authorities cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. In 1997 the authorities implemented for the first time the
    1995 law on refugees, granting refugee status to a group of Afghans.
    The UNHCR reported that throughout the year, 169 applications were
    submitted for refugee status and 219 applications were rejected at the
    registration stage. The Deputy Minister of Labour told journalists in
    July that 2,000 aliens applied for refugee status in Belarus since 1997
    and 385 applications were approved. Of the 385 applicants 294 were from
    Afghanistan. The Ministry reported that illegal aliens in the country
    were estimated to number between 150,000 and 200,000 during the year.
        The UNHCR noted in its July report that the Minsk city and Minsk
    region migration services regularly refuse to accept illegally arriving
    new refugee applicants and instruct such persons to apply with
    migration authorities in other regions. Regional migration services
    also continued to deny registration of refugee applications for refugee
    status of those asylum seekers who came though countries considered as
    safe (mainly Russia).
        The UNHCR had no reports of any case of bona fide refugees being
    forced to return to countries in which they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government.
        The Lukashenko regime severely limits the rights of citizens to
    change their government. In October parliamentary elections occurred
    for the first time since the disputed referendum of 1996. The elections
    followed a year of intense domestic and international activity that
    sought to create conditions for democratic elections. According to
    OSCE/ODIHR, these elections failed to meet international standards for
    democratic elections. In particular the elections fell far short of
    meeting the minimum commitments for free, fair, equal, accountable, and
    transparent elections. Despite some minor improvements since previous
    elections, the process remained seriously flawed.
        In the October election, 769 candidates were nominated for the 110
    seats. Of the 769, 551 were eventually registered by the District
    Election Commissions (DEC's). The Government severely restricted public
    participation on the electoral commissions. The Central Election
    Commission (CEC) accepted 23 more, who appealed their initial rejection
    by the DEC's and the Supreme Court accepted the appeals of 5
    individuals who were rejected by the CEC. A total of 578 candidates
    ultimately registered, 11 later withdrew, and one had his registration
    cancelled. Candidate registration procedures were abused systematically
    to prevent undesirable candidates, especially those opposed to the
    regime. Campaign activities were regulated excessively and heavily
    biased state-controlled media severely limited candidates access to the
    media and voter choice. Political coverage during the election period
    in both the electronic and print media was dominated by the president
    and executive branch. During the election, provisions for early voting,
    mobile ballot boxes, vote counting and the aggregation of results fell
    far short of minimum transparency requirements for independent
    verification. There were widespread reports of citizens employed in
    state enterprises, students and teachers, and those in the military
    being forced to vote or risk losing their position. Voter turnout in
    many constituencies fell below the required 50 percent threshold, but
    electoral authorities falsified and amended voter lists to raise
    turnout to the required minimum.
        Numerous rallies and boycotts were held throughout the campaign;
    some were peaceful, and others were disrupted by government authorities
    (see Section 2.b.). During the election campaign, coverage of politics,
    including the election was very limited. Political coverage in both the
    electronic and print media was dominated by the President and executive
    branch.
        The possibilities of electoral choice had been limited severely by
    earlier changes promulgated by Lukashenko in the country's initially
    democratic constitution. In November 1996, the executive branch
    conducted a controversial constitutional referendum that was neither
    free nor fair, according to credible international observers, including
    representatives of the European Union and the OSCE. Many members of
    Parliament and of the Constitutional Court actively opposed
    Lukashenko's proposals for both substantive and procedural reasons. The
    justices asserted that the referendum gave Lukashenko control over the
    legislative and judicial branches of Government and extended his term
    in office. They also criticized it on procedural grounds as an
    unconstitutional means to eliminate the Constitution's checks and
    balances and grant the President virtually unlimited powers.
        In the period leading up to the referendum, opponents of
    Lukashenko's proposals were denied access to the media, election
    officials failed to record the names of early voters, and no texts of
    the proposed Constitution were made available to voters until several
    days after citizens began voting. As a result of these irregularities,
    the head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced prior to
    the event that he would not be able to certify the results of the
    referendum. Lukashenko promptly fired him, although the Constitution in
    force at the time gave the Parliament the exclusive authority to
    appoint and dismiss the CEC chairman. Members of the security forces
    forcibly removed the head of the CEC from his office. Shortly
    thereafter Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir resigned in protest at
    Lukashenko's refusal to cancel the widely criticized referendum.
        Most members of the international community chose not to send
    election monitors to observe the referendum because of the illegitimacy
    of the entire process. International human rights organizations
    protested the conduct of the referendum.
        The Constitutional Court formally ruled that the issues posed in
    Lukashenko's referendum could not be decided legally through a
    referendum and that its results should be purely advisory, consistent
    with the Constitution. However, after winning the referendum--according
    to the authorities' own official count--Lukashenko began to implement
    it immediately. The new Constitution established a bicameral
    legislature. Its 110 member house was formed out of the membership of
    the existing Supreme Soviet; deputies volunteered or were lured by
    promises of free housing and other benefits to serve in the body. The
    64-member upper house was created by a combination of presidential
    appointments and elections by the 6 regional or oblast councils and the
    Minsk city council. The transition left 86 electoral districts
    underrepresented because the new Constitution reduced the number of
    representatives, and also because a full Supreme Soviet had never been
    seated, largely due to the executive branch's restrictive intervention
    in the 1995 parliamentary elections.
        On August 31, 1999, legislative amendments to the 1996 Referendum
    Law, which the OSCE AMG declared were not in accordance with
    international standards, came into force. The amended law provides that
    referendums may be initiated by the President, the President's National
    Assembly, or 450,000 signatories of a petition--including a minimum of
    30,000 in the City of Minsk and in each of the country's six oblasts.
    The law makes 10 percent of all signatures subject to verification, and
    all signatures may be invalidated if the commission finds just 1
    percent (4,500 signatures) to be faulty. It also gave the President the
    prerogative to decide on the validity of referendum results.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    there are no legal restrictions on their participation. With the
    exception of the judiciary, social barriers to women are strong, and
    men hold virtually all of the leadership positions. In the legislature,
    women held 10 of 97 seats in the lower house and 19 of 62 in the upper
    house. The deputy chair of the upper house is a woman. The Minister of
    Social Security is the only female member of the Council of Ministers.
    The head of the Government's Central Election Commission also is a
    woman.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights.
        Several domestic human rights groups are active in the country;
    however, members of domestic human rights groups reported that the
    authorities hindered their attempts to investigate alleged human rights
    violations. The authorities monitored NGO correspondence and telephone
    conversations. It also attempted to limit severely the activities of
    NGO's through a time consuming reregistration process, denial of
    registration, questionable tax audits, and other means (see Section
    2.b.).
        On May 20, the Minsk office of the Association for Legal Assistance
    to the Population, a local NGO providing legal assistance to opposition
    activists and the families of persons who have disappeared, was robbed
    under suspicious circumstances. Computers with files related to the
    investigation of the disappearance of former Interior Minister Yury
    Zakharenko, among other items, were stolen (see Section 1.b.). Most
    human rights observers believed that the robbery was perpetrated by
    members of the security services. On May 29, in a similar incident, the
    offices of the Human Rights Center, headed by human rights lawyer Vera
    Stremkovskaya, was burglarized, and files of human rights violations
    stolen. There were no reports that authorities made credible efforts to
    investigate these incidents.
        On August 26, the Ministry of Justice issued a warning to the Human
    Rights Center for using unregistered symbols. It issued similar
    warnings to other influential local human rights organizations,
    including Viasna (Spring), the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, and
    Charter '97. On August 27, the Youth Organization Civic Forum was
    issued a warning for printing an article about poor living conditions
    at university dormitories in its newspaper. Civic Forum previously was
    issued two warnings for misuse of symbols. These warnings were part of
    an overall effort by authorities to hinder the work of human rights
    organizations critical of the Lukashenko regime.
        The country's poor human rights record continued to draw the
    attention of many international human rights organizations. In general
    the authorities have been willing to discuss human rights with
    international NGO's whose members have been allowed to visit the
    country; however, the authorities have increased its harassment of
    international NGO's working in the country. One way in which the
    authorities regularly harassed NGO's was through taxes. In February the
    International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Pro Media office, an
    international NGO working on freedom of media issues, reported a
    pattern of harassment from the tax police, involving independent media
    outlets with which it was working: Some organizations working with
    IREX/Pro Media were fined or had their bank accounts frozen. Tax
    authorities have seized the Foundation's Magic Printing Press as well
    (see Section 2.a.).
        On May 31, an employee of the Belarus office of a Western legal NGO
    foiled an attempted burglary of its Minsk office. When asked to provide
    identification, one of the three burglars claimed that they represented
    official law enforcement agencies. Although the local police were
    contacted, they refused to provide assistance, and no further
    investigation into the incident was made by the authorities. The NGO
    believes the burglary attempt was connected to their efforts to advise
    and support human rights and rule of law projects. In 1998 after
    protracted negotiations, the authorities approved the opening in Minsk
    of the OSCE's AMG office. Although the authorities often have
    disregarded OSCE intervention on human rights cases and its advice on
    draft legislation, the OSCE's presence in Minsk provides a potentially
    important forum for dialog on these issues. In September 1999, through
    OSCE-brokered meetings initiated by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's
    Belarus ad hoc committee Chairman Adrian Severin, government and
    opposition representatives began a dialog to try to resolve the
    country's ongoing constitutional and political crisis. By the end of
    1999, the process had been brought to a standstill and in February 1999
    the Lukashenko regime withdrew from the dialog and created a sham
    sociopolitical dialog with handpicked proregime NGO's. The new dialog
    likewise did not produce any results. On March 25, while observing an
    opposition demonstration in Minsk (see Section 2.b.), an officer of the
    OSCE AMG was arrested forcibly and detained for several hours, despite
    the fact that he clearly identified himself as a diplomatic observer
    and claimed diplomatic immunity.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status.
        The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law
    and have the right, without any discrimination, to equal protection of
    their rights and legitimate interests. However, the Constitution does
    not prohibit specifically discrimination based on factors such as race,
    sex, or religion. The Law on Citizenship, grants citizenship to any
    person living permanently on the territory of the country as of October
    19, 1991. Those who arrived in the country after that date and wish to
    become citizens are required to submit an application for citizenship,
    take an oath to support the Constitution, have a legal source of
    income, and have lived in the country for 7 years.
        Women.--Although statistics are not available, domestic violence,
    including spousal abuse against women, is a significant problem,
    according to women's groups. However, spousal abuse is punishable under
    the Criminal and Administrative Codes.
        Non-severe beating is punishable by a fine or up to 15 days
    imprisonment. More serious offenses are punishable under the Criminal
    Code by up to 15 years in jail. Women's groups indicate that police
    generally are not hesitant to enforce the laws against domestic
    violence, and that the courts are not reluctant to impose sentences.
    The main problem is a general reluctance among women to report
    instances of domestic violence. Violence against women was not the
    subject of extensive media coverage, marches, or demonstrations during
    the year.
        Although the authorities and local human rights observers report
    that prostitution does not yet appear to be a significant problem in
    the country, there is much anecdotal evidence that it is growing. Local
    street prostitution appears to be growing as the economy deteriorates,
    and prostitution rings operate in state-owned hotels. Young women
    seeking to work or travel abroad also are vulnerable to sexual
    exploitation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs claims that very few
    women are deported back to the country for engaging in prostitution;
    however, it acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations may
    actively try to recruit and lure Belarusian women into serving as
    prostitutes in Western Europe and the Middle East. Trafficking in women
    is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment reportedly is widespread, but no specific laws
    deal with the problem other than laws against physical assault.
        The law requires equal wages for equal work; however, such is not
    always the case in practice. Women have significantly fewer
    opportunities for advancement to the upper ranks of management. Women
    report that managers frequently take into consideration whether a woman
    has children when considering potential job candidates. At a roundtable
    on April 20 on ``The Problem of the Trade in Women in Belarus,'' it was
    reported that the average length of unemployment for women was 18.4
    months versus 5 months for men. In 1999 the Government reported that
    approximately 64 percent of those considered to be long-term unemployed
    are single mothers.
        The level of education of women is higher than that of men. Women
    make up approximately 58 percent of workers with a higher education and
    approximately 66 percent of workers with a specialized secondary
    education. In these sectors, between two-thirds and three-fourths of
    employees (mostly women) live beneath the official poverty level. Women
    legally are equal to men with regard to property ownership and
    inheritance.
        Women's groups are active; most focus on issues such as child
    welfare, environmental concerns (in the aftermath of Chernobyl), and
    the preservation of the family. There is an active women's political
    party. A private university in Minsk established the country's first
    gender studies faculty in 1997.
        Children.--The authorities are committed to children's welfare and
    health, particularly as related to consequences of the nuclear accident
    at Chernobyl, and, with the help of foreign donors, tried to give them
    special attention. By law everyone is entitled to health care,
    including children. There does not appear to be any difference in the
    treatment of girls and boys. Children begin school at the age of 6 and
    are required to complete 9 years, although the authorities make 11
    years of education available at no cost and began to develop a 12-year
    education program. Higher education also is available at no cost on a
    competitive basis. Families with children receive token government
    benefits, such as discounted transportation. According to a 1999 World
    Bank study, the majority of those living in poverty are families with
    multiple children or single mothers.
        As part of the Lukashenko regime's efforts to promote a union with
    Russia and to reduce the influence of opposition movements, the
    authorities continued to discourage the promotion of, or the teaching
    of, students in the Belarusian language by limiting the availability of
    early childhood education in Belarusian. In its June report, the
    Belarusian Helsinki Committee reported that only 30 percent of students
    in primary schools are instructed in Belarusian. In Minsk only 11 of
    the 242 middle schools teach in the Belarusian language. In other
    regional cities, the numbers were significantly lower. The authorities
    continued to claim that the only schools that have been closed which
    taught in the Belarusian language are those that experienced
    diminishing enrollment.
        There does not appear to be a societal pattern of abuse of
    children.
        People with Disabilities.--A 1992 law mandates accessibility to
    transport, residences, businesses, and offices for the disabled;
    however, facilities, including transport and office buildings, often
    are not accessible to the disabled. The country's continued difficult
    financial condition makes it especially difficult for local governments
    to budget sufficient funds to implement the 1992 law. The central
    authorities continue to provide some minimal subsidies to the disabled.
    However, continued high inflation and sharp decline in the value of the
    ruble greatly reduced the real worth of those limited subsidies.
        Religious Minorities.--Societal anti-Semitism exists but usually is
    not manifested openly, although antiminority faith sentiments are
    rising (see Section 2.a.). In the past, Lukashenko and other officials
    have used coded anti-Semitic language in their attacks on perceived
    opponents.
        No arrests were reported in the April 1999 arson attack on the
    synagogue in Minsk or in a number of cases of desecration of Jewish
    cemeteries in 1997 and 1998. Some instances of vandalism appeared to be
    related to anti-Semitism. On May 11, the Minsk city court upheld the
    dismissal by an inferior court of a suit filed by Jewish organizations
    and individuals against the authors and publishers of the book ``The
    War According to Mean Laws.'' The book published by the Orthodox
    Initiative and distributed in Orthodox bookstores, includes the
    ``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' and other anti-Semitic articles and
    blames Belarusian Jews for social and economic problems in the country.
    A Minsk district court ruled in March that the book contained
    ``scientific information'' and dismissed the suit. The Union of
    Belarusian Jewish Associations and Communities and the World
    Association of Belarusian Jews, both of which joined in the suit,
    consider the book anti-Semitic and punishable under the Criminal Code
    for inciting religious and ethnic hatred (see Section 2.c.). On
    December 27, unidentified assailants threw firebombs at a synagogue in
    Minsk. A security guard was able to extinguish the fire before serious
    damage occurred. No progress has been reported on the incident.
        Action by the authorities has been noticeably lacking in redressing
    instances of anti-Semitic vandalism in previous years. According to the
    Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress, a number of
    small, ultra-nationalist organizations operate on the fringes of
    society, and a number of newspapers regularly print anti-Semitic
    material. One of these newspapers, Slavianskaia Gazeta, although
    distributed locally, reportedly was published in Moscow. Anti-Semitic
    material from Russia also circulates widely.
        Many persons in the Jewish community remain concerned that the
    Lukashenko regime plans to promote greater unity with Russia may be
    accompanied by political appeals to groups in Russia that tolerate or
    promote anti-Semitism. Lukashenko's calls for ``Slavic solidarity'' are
    well received and supported by anti-Semitic, neo-Fascist organizations
    in Russia. For example, the organization, Russian National Unity, has
    an active local branch. Its literature is distributed in public places
    in Minsk. The concept of a ``greater Slavic union,'' the leadership of
    which Lukashenko seeks, is a source of concern to the Jewish community
    given the nature of support that it engenders.
        The country's small Muslim community, with roots in the country
    dating to the Middle Ages, does not report significant societal
    prejudice. However, on August 9, 1999, the Slonim mosque--the first
    mosque to open in the country during the last 60 years--was vandalized
    just prior to the holding of a Tatar youth convention in the city. The
    are no further developments on the investigation of the incident.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution upholds the right of
    workers, except state security and military personnel, to form and join
    independent unions on a voluntary basis and to carry out actions in
    defense of worker rights, including the right to strike; however, these
    rights are not respected in practice. The independent trade union
    movement still is in its infancy. The Belarusian Free Trade Union
    (BFTU) was established in 1991 and registered in 1992. Following the
    1995 Minsk metro workers strike, the President suspended its
    activities. In 1996 BFTU leaders formed a new umbrella organization,
    the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BCDTU), which
    encompasses 4 leading independent trade unions and is reported to have
    approximately 15,000 members.
        The authorities have taken numerous measures to suppress
    independent trade unions. Members of independent trade unions, were
    arrested for distributing union literature, had union material
    confiscated, were denied access to work sites, were subjected to
    excessive fines, and were pressured by their managers and state
    security services to resign from their jobs because of trade union
    activities. Although the BFTU later was registered, its local unions
    were denied registration by local authorities in many towns, including
    Bobruisk, Grodno, Mogilev, and Orsha among others. In the Brest Oblast,
    only 5 of 12 local unions of the BFTU were registered by June, and in
    numerous instances union activists and members were fired, without
    cause, for their union activities.
        On January 26, 1999, Lukashenko signed Decree No. 2 ``On certain
    Measures to Improve the Activities of Political Parties, Trade Unions,
    and Other Public Associations Activities,'' which among other
    requirements, requires trade unions to have a minimum of 10 percent of
    the workers of an enterprise in order to form and register a local
    union. The Decree also obliged existing registered unions to reregister
    and meet the new requirements. Free trade union leaders reported that
    this decree has had the effect of making registration, and therefore
    union activities, nearly impossible in many of the larger state-owned
    enterprises. Some local unions have been denied registration under this
    decree.
        In February the management of the Mogilev Automobile Factory (MAZ)
    unilaterally suspended its collective bargaining agreement with the
    local union of the BFTU, evicted the organization from its office, and
    confiscated office equipment. Several BFTU activists were dismissed by
    MAZ management in connection with their union activities.
        The authorities continue to discourage employees at state-run
    enterprises from joining independent trade unions. In July 1999,
    Lukashenko signed Decree No. 29 on ``Tightening Labor Discipline.'' The
    decree, which has as one of its aims the placement of all workers on
    individual rather than collective contracts, was criticized heavily by
    both independent and official union leaders, who believe that it was
    designed principally to enable the Presidential Administration to
    increase its control over the labor sector.
        The Official Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), formerly
    the Belarusian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union Central Council
    of Trade Unions, consists of approximately 4.5 million workers
    (including retirees) and is by far the largest trade union
    organization. According to official union federation figures, 92
    percent of the workforce is unionized. Although wary in the past of
    challenging the regime seriously, some FTUB leaders have become
    increasingly vocal in their criticism of the policies of the Lukashenko
    regime. In retaliation the Government has subjected some FTUB officials
    to threats and harassment.
        On July 20, the Presidential Administration released a statement
    condemning ``attempts by some union leaders to thrust a groundless
    thesis that the Government violates unions' rights upon Belarusian
    public opinion and the international community.'' The statement accused
    unions of engaging in ``political activities . . . which cause direct
    damage to the labor movement and aggravates the socioeconomic problems
    of society.'' In a July 27 speech to an agriculture conference,
    Lukashenko criticized the trade unions, the FTUB, and FTUB President
    Goncharik personally, for a ``lack of constructive activity'' and
    blamed them for the loss of trade privileges with another country. On
    July 31, as part of the authorities' campaign of harassment of the
    FTUB, FTUB bank accounts were frozen following an unexplained
    investigation of the union's records by the state committee for
    financial investigations. FTUB accounts were frozen again on September
    28 by tax authorities conducting an unspecified investigation. The
    account later was released. In an October 11 speech to the FTUB
    Congress, Prime Minister Yermoshyn told trade union leaders to ``stop
    agitating people and get to work'' and accused the FTUB of engaging in
    politics rather than focusing on the needs of workers.
        During the year, members of the Independent Trade Union of Belarus
    faced continual pressure at their workplace to join state unions or
    lose their jobs. Typically members of the Union smuggled copies of the
    newspaper Rabochi into their workplace under their clothing. On
    December 16, police detained 7 members of the Interdependent Trade
    Union of Steel Workers and confiscated 3,000 copies of Rabochi outside
    the entrance to the Minsk Automobile Plant.
        On September 14, FTUB members reportedly were pressured by the
    management of Dzerzhinsky, a subsidiary of the state-owned electronics
    manufacturer Integral, to break with their union and join a management-
    established and -run union. The FTUB reported that union members at
    other Integral plants have been similarly threatened. Under reported
    pressure from management and government authorities, employees at
    Tsvetotron, a state electrical equipment factory, voted to quit the
    union of electrical workers, a member of the FTUB.
        Tight control by the Lukashenko regime over public demonstrations
    (see Section 1.d. and 2.b.) makes it difficult for unions to strike or
    to hold public rallies to further their objectives. For example, a
    demonstration planned for November 15, organized by workers of the
    Minsk Tractor Works and the Minsk Engine Works to protest low pay and
    wage arrears was banned. Other demonstrations similarly were banned
    throughout the year. A strike organized by market vendors and
    entrepreneurs in February against new tax regulations, although
    ultimately successful, was marred by numerous arrests, confiscation of
    union literature, and anti-strike pressure from local officials. Market
    vendors staged a similar strike on November 23. Union members sometimes
    undertook work stoppages, usually in response to late payment of wages.
        On July 3, noting that the authorities failed to respect the rights
    of workers, suppressed trade union rights and harassed union leaders,
    and that the authorities had not taken sufficient steps to conform to
    internationally recognized labor rights, a foreign government suspended
    the country's trade benefits.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation
    dating from the Soviet era provides for the right to organize and
    bargain collectively. Some analysts believe that the presidential
    decree on labor discipline (see Section 6.a.), which aims at placing
    all workers on individual rather than collective contracts, could
    significantly threaten the principle of collective bargaining. Since
    the economy still is largely in the hands of the State, unions usually
    seek political redress for the economic problems. Workers and
    independent unions have recourse to the court system. The authorities
    and state-owned enterprises have hindered the ability of workers to
    bargain collectively and, in some instances, arbitrarily suspended
    collective bargaining agreements (see Section 6.a.).
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor, except in cases when the work or service to be
    performed is fixed by a court's decision or in accordance with the law
    on the state of emergency or martial law; however, there were some
    reports of forced labor. For example, on July 12, town authorities in
    Ivatsevichy, in the Brest region, sent letters to local industrial
    enterprises and state institutions ordering them to increase the
    ``voluntary'' participation of their employees in harvesting of
    livestock fodder by 20 percent. Workers who refused to ``volunteer''
    for the harvest were ordered to pay a fine of $5 (5,000 rubles) or
    approximately 15 percent of their average monthly salary. The order had
    the effect of forcing local individuals to work in the fodder harvest.
    The constitutional provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies
    to all citizens, although its application to children is not specified.
    With the possible exception of juvenile prisoners, forced and bonded
    labor by children is not known to occur.
        d. State of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment.--
    The law establishes 16 as the minimum age for employment. With the
    written consent of one parent (or legal guardian), a 14-year-old child
    may conclude a labor contract. The Prosecutor General's office
    reportedly enforces this law effectively. The constitutional provision
    prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, although
    its application to children is not specified.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Real wages improved slightly
    over the last year to approximately $40 (48,000 rubles) to $60 (72,000
    rubles) a month. The minimum wage of $3 (3,600 rubles) a month does not
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and a family.
    Agriculture workers are paid approximately 39 percent less than the
    average monthly wage. The country's continuing economic problems make
    it difficult for the average worker to earn a decent living. Major wage
    arrears continued to grow, especially in the agricultural sector.
        The Constitution and Labor Code set a limit of 40 hours of work per
    week and provide for at least one 24-hour rest period per week. Because
    of the country's difficult economic situation, an increasing number of
    workers find themselves working considerably less than 40 hours per
    week. Factories reportedly often require workers to take unpaid
    furloughs due to shortages of raw materials and energy, and a lack of
    demand for factory output.
        The law establishes minimum conditions for workplace safety and
    worker health; however, these standards often are ignored. Workers at
    many heavy machinery plants do not wear even minimal safety gear, such
    as gloves, hard hats, or welding glasses. A State Labor Inspectorate
    exists but does not have the authority to enforce compliance, and
    violations often are ignored. The high accident rate is due to a lack
    of protective clothing, shoes, equipment, nonobservance of temperature
    regulations, the use of outdated machinery, and inebriation on the job.
        On January 4, Aleksandr Lukashenko issued a new decree, despite the
    protests of independent trade unions, lowering the level of disability
    allowances paid by the State or state enterprises in the result of
    workplace injuries. Under the decree, industrial injury suits also are
    to be covered by the Civil Code, rather than the Labor Code.
    Independent union leaders believe workplace injuries should be reviewed
    under the Labor Code, under which compensation is more generous. There
    is no provision in the law that allows workers to remove themselves
    from dangerous work situations without risking loss of their jobs.
        f. Trafficking In Persons.--There is no specific law against
    trafficking in women. The authorities are just beginning to recognize
    the problem of trafficking in women. In 1999 a Board of Morals and
    Illegal Distribution of Drugs was created by the Ministry of Interior,
    but the work has been hardly efficient. In partnership with the U.N.
    Development Program (UNDP), the Gender Information and Policy Center
    (GIPC) was established by the Ministry of Social Welfare which also
    deals with this issue. The country is both a source and transit point
    for women and girls being trafficked to Central and Western Europe for
    purposes of prostitution. Information from such scattered destinations
    as the Netherlands, Lithuania, and Bosnia, refer to Belarus among the
    source countries for women being trafficked to or through their
    countries, and other anecdotal evidence suggests that the Russian Mafia
    is active in trafficking young women, who end up as prostitutes in
    Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Western Europe. The Ministry of Internal
    Affairs acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations actively may
    try to recruit and lure women into serving as prostitutes in Western
    Europe and the Middle East.
        Women seldom report incidences of trafficking to police because of
    a generally negative public opinion about law enforcement authorities,
    shortcomings in legislation, and the insufficient protection of victims
    and witnesses.
        In April a seminar was held in cooperation with the Ministry of
    Interior and NGO's in which NGO's elaborated on programs devoted to
    warning the public about the problem. The Belarus Young Christians
    Women Association (BYCWO) implements a project aimed at informing women
    of the risks associated with employment abroad and the minimization of
    possible dangers for women. No information is available on state or
    non-governmental initiatives to help victims return to their countries.
    Crisis centers established by some NGO's do provide psychological
    assistance to victims of violence. Such centers, however, do not have
    specialists dealing with victims of trafficking.
                                   __________

                                    BELGIUM

        Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch
    who plays a mainly symbolic role. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet),
    led by the Prime Minister, holds office as long as it retains the
    confidence of the lower house of the bicameral Parliament. Belgium is a
    federal state with several levels of government, including national,
    regional (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), and community (Flemish,
    Francophone, and German) levels. The judiciary is independent.
        The Government maintains effective control of all security forces.
    The Police Judiciaire and the Gendarmerie currently share
    responsibility for internal security with the municipal police, but the
    two organizations are to be merged at the federal level, and the
    Gendarmerie and municipal police are to be integrated at the local
    level under a reorganization plan scheduled to be implemented in 2001.
        The country is highly industrialized, with a vigorous private
    sector and limited government participation in industry. The primary
    exports are iron and steel. The economy provides a high standard of
    living for most citizens.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
    dealing with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking
    steps to combat violence against women and trafficking in persons.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
    reports that officials employed them.
        In addition to the integration of the police forces, a
    reorganization plan calls for the creation of an independent oversight
    body for the federal police and also for the creation of a new
    anticorruption unit.
        Prison conditions vary. Newer prisons meet international standards.
    Older facilities meet or nearly meet minimum international standards
    despite their Spartan physical conditions and limited resources. In
    August the prison system, designed to hold some 7,500 prisoners, held
    8,395. The Government instituted a pilot project intended to reduce
    overcrowding in prisons by using electronic surveillance at home for
    prisoners near the end of their sentences.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these
    prohibitions. Arrested persons must be brought before a judge within 24
    hours. Pretrial confinement is subject to monthly review by a panel of
    judges, which may extend pretrial detention based on established
    criteria (e.g., whether, in the court's view, the arrested person would
    be likely to commit further crimes or attempt to flee if released).
    Bail exists in principle under the law but is granted rarely. The
    Government does not separate convicted criminals and pretrial
    detainees. Pretrial detainees receive different privileges from
    convicted criminals, such as the right to more frequent family visits.
    Approximately 40 percent of the prison population consists of pretrial
    detainees. Arrested persons are allowed prompt access to a lawyer of
    their choosing or, if they cannot afford one, to an attorney appointed
    by the State.
        In July the Government came under intense criticism for the
    detention of Fehriye Erdal, a Kurdish woman accused of involvement in a
    terrorist attack in Turkey in which a prominent businessman was killed.
    Erdal was arrested in Knokke in October 1999 and charged with weapons
    violations. The Government refused the Turkish Government's extradition
    request for Erdal because of the possibility that she could face the
    death penalty in Turkey. The Government also refused to try her on the
    terrorism charges in Belgium because of a technicality in the
    international agreement requiring such action. After a month-long
    hunger strike, Erdal was released from prison in August and placed
    under house arrest pending a trial on the weapons charges. The trial
    was not expected to begin until early 2001.
        In June over 800 British football fans were arrested for disturbing
    the peace during outbreaks of hooliganism at the Euro 2000 soccer
    championship. Most were deported immediately to the United Kingdom but
    five were held for trial under the new summary trial act (see Section
    1.e.). Credible reports indicate that some innocent bystanders were
    caught up in the police action and held incommunicado for as long as 36
    hours without adequate food or water.
        The law prohibits exile, and the Government does not employ it.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The judicial system is organized according to specialization and
    territorial jurisdiction, with 5 territorial levels: Canton (225),
    district (27), provinces and Brussels (11), courts of appeal (5), and
    for the whole Kingdom--the Cour de Cassation. The latter is the highest
    appeals court.
        Military tribunals try military personnel for common law as well as
    military crimes. All military tribunals consist of four officers and a
    civilian judge. At the appellate level, the civilian judge presides.
    The accused has the right of appeal to a higher military court.
        Each judicial district has a Labor Court, which deals with
    litigation between employers and employees regarding wages, notice,
    competition clauses, and social security benefits.
        The judiciary enforces the law's provision for the right to a fair
    trial. Charges are stated clearly and formally, and there is a
    presumption of innocence. All defendants have the right to be present,
    to have counsel (at public expense if needed), to confront witnesses,
    to present evidence, and to appeal.
        As part of an ongoing program of judicial reform, the Government's
    summary trial act became effective on April 1. This act, which covers
    crimes punishable by 1 to 10 years' imprisonment, allows a prosecutor
    to issue an arrest warrant for the immediate appearance in court of an
    offender caught in the act of committing a crime. The warrant expires
    after 7 days and the court must render its verdict within 5 days of the
    initial hearing. The first conviction under this act, against a British
    citizen accused of hooliganism during the Euro 2000 soccer championship
    (see Section 2.b.), was overturned on appeal, and the defendant was
    retried under regular procedures. Several human rights organizations
    claim that summary trial violates the presumption of innocence and
    jeopardizes the right to a full and fair defense. By year's end, the
    courts had not ruled on the legality of the summary trial act.
        In 1999 the Government created a High Council on Justice to
    supervise the appointment and promotion of magistrates. In early 2000,
    the Council formally was instituted, and members were elected. The
    Council is designed to serve as a permanent monitoring board for the
    entire judicial system and is empowered to hear complaints against
    individual magistrates.
        Following a review of the judicial system, the Government
    implemented several reforms that granted stronger rights to victims of
    crime. These measures allow victims to have more access to information
    during an investigation, as well as the right to appeal if an
    investigation does not result in a decision to bring charges. As part
    of its program of judicial reform, the Government undertook to open
    ``justice houses'' in each of the 27 judicial districts. These
    facilities combine a variety of legal services under one roof,
    including legal aid, mediation, and victim's assistance. As of
    September, 14 of the proposed justice houses had opened. Personnel at
    some of the justice houses complained publicly about high workloads and
    staffing shortages.
        In 1999 Parliament enacted legislation that further defines crimes
    against humanity, war crimes, and genocide and also imposes penalties
    for such crimes. In 2000, as a result of the new law, the courts became
    a forum for trying alleged human rights violations by high profile
    participants in past and present conflicts in Central Africa, the
    Middle East, and South America.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanction. However, there were reports that Muslim women
    in traditional dress or headscarves in some cases were subjected to
    discrimination in admission to school (see Section 2.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these
    freedoms, and the Government respects these rights in practice. An
    independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
    political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
        The Government operates several radio and television networks but
    does not control program content. Boards of directors that represent
    the main political, linguistic, and opinion groups supervise programs.
    A government representative sits on each board but has no veto power.
    Private radio and television stations operate with government licenses.
    Almost all homes have access by cable to television from other Western
    European countries and elsewhere. Satellite services are also
    available.
        There are restrictions on the press regarding libel, slander, and
    the advocacy of racial or ethnic discrimination, hate, or violence. A
    1999 law prevents political parties that espouse discrimination from
    receiving federal funds.
        In August in response to a request from the League for Human
    Rights, the Namur district court issued an injunction to halt
    distribution of a subscription-only newsletter that published the names
    of 50 convicted or accused pedophiles. The publisher also was ordered
    to remove the list from his Internet site and pay a fine of $22,200
    (BFr 1 million) for every copy distributed in any form. The court ruled
    that publication of the names constituted an invasion of privacy.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
    respects this provision in practice. Citizens are free to form
    organizations and establish ties to international bodies; however, the
    Antiracism Law (see Section 5) prohibits membership in organizations
    that practice discrimination overtly and repeatedly. In May the Ghent
    appeals court overturned a 1999 district court ruling that the ``Hells
    Angels'' are a private militia and should be disbanded. However,
    several members of the group were convicted of criminal offences.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Government does not hinder the practice of any faith. The law accords
    ``recognized'' status to Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism,
    Anglicanism, Islam, and Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, and these
    religions receive subsidies from general government revenues. Taxpayers
    who object to contributing to religious subsidies have no recourse. By
    law each recognized religion has the right to provide teachers at
    government expense for religious instruction in schools, but not all
    avail themselves of this right. For recognized religions, the
    Government pays the salaries, retirement, and lodging expenses of
    ministers and also subsidizes the renovation of church buildings.
        The Government also supports the freedom to participate in
    nonconfessional philosophical organizations (laics). Laics serve as a
    seventh recognized ``religious'' group, and their organizing body
    receives funds and benefits similar to the six recognized religions.
        In spite of Islam's status as a recognized religion, spokesmen for
    the Council of Muslims report that women and girls in traditional dress
    or headscarves in some cases are subjected to discrimination in
    employment and school admissions.
        The lack of independent recognized status generally does not
    prevent religious groups from freely practicing their religions.
        In September 1999, 110 national police officers raided Church of
    Scientology facilities and the homes and businesses of about 20 members
    of the Church. One member's home in France was raided simultaneously by
    the French authorities. At year's end, an investigation continued, and
    no arrests had been made.
        In April the Belgian authorities began refusing visas to
    missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to
    enter the country for missionary work. Similar visas had been processed
    for decades without problems. In July the Ministry of Interior
    instituted temporary procedures designed to ensure the issuance of
    visas to these missionaries and undertook to establish permanent
    procedures by October 2000. At year's end, visas were being issued,
    albeit at a much slower pace than in the past. The Government still had
    not devised new permanent procedures for visa issuance but was
    continuing its talks with church leaders to solve the problem.
        The Evangelical Association (a group of evangelical Christian
    organizations) continued to claim discrimination due to the
    Government's refusal to grant it recognized status separate from the
    Protestant religion. Despite the Government's refusal, it is
    negotiating with the group in an effort to ensure that the Evangelical
    Association enjoys the same benefits as recognized religions. The
    Government is mediating discussions to enable the Evangelical
    Association to obtain representation in the leadership of the
    recognized Protestant church.
        In 1998 Parliament adopted recommendations from a 1997 commission's
    report on government policy toward sects, particularly sects deemed
    ``harmful'' under the law. The report divided sects into two broadly
    defined categories: It characterized a ``sect'' as any religious-based
    organization, and a ``harmful sect'' as a group that may pose a threat
    to society or individuals. One of the primary recommendations was to
    create a government-sponsored Center for Information and Advice on
    Harmful Sectarian Organizations. The center began limited operations in
    October 1999 and is now fully operational and open to the public. The
    Government tasks the center with collecting publicly available
    information on a wide range of religious and philosophical groups and
    providing information and advice to the public regarding the legal
    rights of freedom of association, privacy, and freedom of religion. The
    center is authorized to share with the public any information it
    collects on religious sects but, despite its name, the regulations
    prohibit it from categorizing any particular group as harmful. In May
    the Government announced the composition of an interagency coordination
    group designed to work in conjunction with the center to coordinate
    government policy on sects. The coordination group's first meeting was
    held in October. The Government also named a national magistrate and
    one magistrate in each of the 27 judicial districts to monitor cases
    involving sects.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        In January (as a result of a December 1999 act of Parliament) the
    Government announced a ``regularization'' program for three categories
    of undocumented aliens: Those who had applied for asylum at least 4
    years earlier and had received no answer or a negative answer; those
    whose medical condition made a return to their country of origin
    inadvisable; and those who could not return to their country of origin
    for political reasons. Undocumented aliens who could demonstrate
    evidence of a lasting integration into their community also were
    allowed to apply. Successful applicants were to be granted legal
    residence status. During the application period, January 10 to 30, the
    Government received 32,662 applications representing 50,600
    individuals. Human rights groups criticized both the border controls
    that were imposed during the application period to prevent undocumented
    aliens living in other countries from applying and the slow pace of the
    approval process. The Government initially promised to complete the
    review of all applications by July 2001; however, by December it had
    processed only 1,570 of the 32,662 files.
        In March Parliament amended the nationality code to facilitate
    acquisition of Belgian citizenship. Under the terms of the amended
    code, foreigners can apply for naturalization after living legally in
    the country for 3 years. Stateless persons and refugees can apply after
    2 years. Moreover, foreigners who have maintained their residence in
    the country for 7 years may acquire citizenship simply by declaring
    their intent to their local municipal authorities. Adult foreigners
    living outside the country may declare their Belgian nationality as
    soon as one parent legally has acquired it.
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee or asylee status
    in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
    provides first asylum and reported receiving 42,691 new asylum
    applications during the year compared with 35,777 during 1999. Only
    about 10 percent of applications normally are approved. The number of
    asylum applications continued to rise dramatically throughout the year.
    For example, the Government received 5,300 applications in the month of
    October.
        The Government, in partnership with the International Organization
    for Migration (IOM), provides relocation assistance to unsuccessful
    asylum applicants who agree to repatriate voluntarily to their country
    of origin. Unsuccessful applicants who do not leave voluntarily are
    subject to deportation. During the year, more than 10,000 unsuccessful
    asylum applicants were repatriated to their country of origin, either
    voluntarily (5,382) or through forced deportation (4,835). This total
    is double the number of repatriations in 1999. According to the
    Government, no unsuccessful applicants are repatriated forcibly to
    countries where they can demonstrate a credible fear of persecution.
        In response to complaints about slow processing time and the large
    backlog of asylum applications, the Government adopted a ``last in,
    first out'' policy in processing new applications. This policy is
    intended to reduce processing time for current applicants.
        The special asylum status granted to Kosovar refugees expired in
    September 1999. The Government, with the cooperation of the IOM,
    provided financial assistance to Kosovars who voluntarily returned to
    their homes. The rest were permitted to apply for asylum through the
    regular application process.
        Undocumented asylum seekers arriving by air whose claims do not
    appear legitimate are not allowed to enter but are held in a closed
    detention center at the airport for up to 5 months while awaiting
    deportation or voluntary repatriation. The children of such asylum
    seekers do not attend school. Those applicants whose claims appear to
    be legitimate are released to 1 of 27 open asylum centers for shelter
    and assistance. These centers have a total capacity of 5,000 beds. The
    centers, funded mainly by the Government and the Belgian Red Cross,
    have been overtaxed by the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, and
    the Government has solicited assistance from municipalities to handle
    the overflow. Municipal assistance commissions are expected to provide
    an additional 1,400 beds.
        In November a working group created by the Minister of Interior to
    reform the Government's immigration and asylum procedures issued its
    report. Its recommendations included: Ending financial aid to asylum
    seekers (only aid in kind--food and shelter--will be provided);
    increasing by 10,000 the number of beds available at open shelters;
    establishing 10 registration offices at the borders (applicants will
    have to apply immediately upon entering Belgium and also will have to
    supply information on the route they followed to get to Belgium);
    creating a ``fast track'' processing procedure for applicants whose
    claim appears on the surface to be noncredible; and increasing funding
    and manpower for the regularization effort. The Government's goal for
    implementation of the new procedures, many of which must be approved by
    Parliament, is January 1, 2002. Some human rights groups criticized the
    new policies as being ``repressive and restrictive.''

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
    peacefully, and citizens ages 18 and older exercise this right in
    practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis
    of universal and compulsory (under penalty of fine) suffrage. Direct
    popular elections for parliamentary seats (excluding some Senators
    elected by community councils and others elected by Senate members) are
    held at least every 4 years. Opposition parties operate freely.
        In 1998 the European Court of Justice censured Belgium for its
    failure to comply with a European Council directive requiring member
    states to accord to all citizens of European Union (EU) countries
    resident in another EU country the right to vote in municipal
    elections. In 1998 Parliament amended the Constitution to extend that
    right to EU citizens and passed implementing legislation in January
    1999. By the July 31 closing date for registration, a total of 87,858
    non-Belgian European Union citizens had registered to vote in the
    October 2000 municipal elections.
        The Federal Government is responsible for such matters of state as
    security, justice, social security, and fiscal and monetary policy. The
    regional governments are charged with matters that directly affect the
    geographical regions and the material well-being of their residents,
    such as commerce and trade, public works, and environmental policy. The
    linguistic community councils handle matters more directly affecting
    the mental and cultural well-being of the individual, such as education
    and the administration of certain social welfare programs.
        Women are underrepresented in government but hold some senior
    positions. Of 18 federal ministers, 3 are women. In the Federal
    Parliament, 36 of 150 house members and 20 of 71 Senators are women.
    Federal law requires that one-third of all candidates in national and
    local elections be women.
        The existence of communities speaking Dutch, French, and German
    engenders significant complexities for the state. Most major
    institutions, including political parties, are divided along linguistic
    lines. National decisions often take into account the specific needs of
    each regional and linguistic group.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Numerous human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
    to their views.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        While the law already prohibits discrimination based on these
    factors, in December the Council of Ministers, in order to consolidate
    and clarify existing laws, voted to introduce legislation in Parliament
    to outlaw all forms of discrimination. The Government enforces
    antidiscrimination law. With Dutch, French, and German as official
    languages, the country has a complex linguistic regime, including
    language requirements for various elective and appointive positions.
    The law prohibits the official financing of any racist or xenophobic
    party or any party that does not respect human rights.
        Women.--A 1998 study commissioned by the Ministry of Employment and
    Labor (which is also responsible for equality issues) reported that the
    number of women who acknowledged suffering from repeated domestic
    physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives rose from 6.3
    percent in 1988 to 16.8 percent in 1998. The same study found that
    women between 30 and 39 years of age made more official complaints
    about physical violence in 1998 than their counterparts a decade
    earlier (although part of this increase was attributed to a greater
    willingness to come forward).
        A 1998 law defines and criminalizes domestic violence, with the aim
    of protecting married and unmarried partners. Women's groups believe
    that the 1998 law is an important step in recognizing domestic violence
    as constituting an offense distinct from other forms of aggression. The
    law allows social organizations to represent victims of domestic
    violence in court provided that they have the victim's consent. A 1999
    law allows police to enter a home without the consent of the head of
    household when investigating a domestic violence complaint. According
    to its proponents, the police do not use the law enough. The Government
    still has not implemented other provisions of the 1999 law that require
    it to establish and maintain a database of accurate statistics on
    domestic violence.
        A number of shelters and telephone help lines are available
    throughout the country. In addition to providing shelter and advice,
    many offer assistance on legal matters, job placement, and
    psychological counseling for both partners. Approximately 80 percent of
    these organizations' budgets are provided by one of the three regional
    governments.
        The law prohibits organizing prostitution or assisting immigration
    for the purpose of prostitution, but not prostitution itself. A 1995
    law defined and criminalized trafficking in persons, but cases of
    trafficking in women continued (see Section 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment is illegal. The Government has implemented
    procedures to monitor sexual harassment claims. Victims of sexual
    harassment have the right to sue their harassers under existing law.
    According to a 1999 revision of the law on equal opportunity in the
    workplace, sexual harassment can be a form of sexual discrimination.
    The act outlaws discrimination in hiring, working conditions,
    promotion, wages, and contract termination. Despite these laws, most
    cases of sexual harassment are resolved informally. A study by the
    Ministry of Defense found that 54 percent of women in the armed forces
    had been subjected to abusive language, 36 percent had experienced
    unwelcome physical contact, and 4.6 percent reported being the victim
    of sexual harassment involving physical violence.
        Equal treatment of men and women is provided for in the
    Constitution, federal law, and treaties incorporated into law. The
    Government actively promotes a comprehensive approach to the
    integration of women at all levels of decisionmaking. The Division of
    Equal Opportunity, a part of the Ministry of Labor, focuses
    specifically on issues affecting women, including violence against
    women, sexual harassment, and the participation of women in the
    political process. At mid-year the unemployment rate was 10.1 percent
    for women compared with 7.2 percent for men. The net average salary for
    a woman is only 84 percent of the national net average salary. In 1996,
    the last year for which comparative statistics are available, women in
    blue collar jobs earned 79 percent of the salary of their male
    counterparts. The average salary for women in white collar jobs was
    only 70 percent of the salary of their male counterparts.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public
    education and health care. It provides compulsory education up to the
    age of 18. The Francophone and Flemish communities have agencies
    specifically dealing with children's needs.
        Government and private groups provide shelters for runaways and
    counseling for children who were abused physically or sexually.
        There are comprehensive child protection laws. Children have the
    right to a voice in court cases that affect them, such as divorce
    proceedings. The law states that a minor ``capable of understanding''
    can request permission to be heard by a judge, or that a judge can
    request an interview with a child. The law is designed to combat child
    pornography by the use of high penalties for such crimes and for those
    in possession of pedophilic materials. The law permits the prosecution
    of Belgian residents who commit such crimes abroad and provides that
    criminals convicted of the sexual abuse of children cannot receive
    parole without first receiving specialized assistance and must continue
    counseling and treatment upon their release from prison.
        In March Parliament amended the Constitution to include an article
    on children's rights. The new article stipulates that every child has
    the right to respect for his or her moral, physical, mental, and sexual
    integrity.
        Belgium is both a transit point and a destination for trafficking
    in children (see Section 6.f.).
        Child Focus, the government-sponsored center for missing and
    exploited children, reported that it handled 1,503 cases in 1999 and
    722 cases in the first 4 months of 2000. Nearly 12 percent of the cases
    reported from January to April involved sexual exploitation.
        Child prostitution is of limited scope.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
        People with Disabilities.--The law provides for the protection of
    disabled persons from discrimination in employment, education, and in
    the provision of other state services. The Government mandates that
    public buildings erected since 1970 be accessible to the disabled and
    offers subsidies to induce the owners of other buildings to make
    necessary modifications. However, many older buildings are not
    accessible.
        The Government provides financial assistance for the disabled. It
    gives special aid to parents of disabled children and to disabled
    parents. Regional and community programs provide other assistance, such
    as job training. Disabled persons are eligible to receive services in
    any of the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, or Brussels), not just
    their region of residence.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Belgium is a pluralistic
    society in which individual differences in general are respected, and
    linguistic rights in particular are protected. Some 60 percent of
    citizens are native Dutch speakers, about 40 percent are French
    speakers, and fewer than 1 percent are German speakers.
        The Antiracism Law penalizes the incitement of discrimination,
    hate, or violence based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. It is
    illegal for providers of goods or services (including housing) to
    discriminate on the basis of any of these factors and for employers to
    consider these factors in their decisions to hire, train, or dismiss
    workers.
        In 1999 the Government-sponsored Center for Equal Opportunity and
    the Fight Against Racism, which is tasked with investigating complaints
    of discrimination based on race, handled 919 complaints, 18 of which
    led to court action. In March 2000, the Government extended the mandate
    of the center to include all forms of discrimination. In its 2000
    report, the center drew attention to discrimination against non-
    Belgians in certain categories of public service jobs. The report also
    referred to a study on behalf of the International Labor Organization
    (ILO), which revealed persistent discrimination against immigrants in
    private sector employment. However, the center reported that it found
    very little discrimination in eligibility for, and the payment of,
    social security benefits.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers have
    the right to associate freely, which includes the freedom to organize
    and join unions of their own choosing. The Government does not hamper
    such activities, and workers fully and freely exercise their right of
    association. About 60 percent of workers are members of labor unions.
    This number includes employed and unemployed workers. Unions are
    independent of the Government but have important links with major
    political parties. The Government does not require unions to register.
        In its 1999 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts on the
    Application of Conventions and Recommendations reiterated its criticism
    that the Government should adopt legislation establishing ``objective,
    predetermined, and detailed criteria'' to enable employers'
    organizations and trade unions to have access to the National Labor
    Council. Because of restrictive interpretation of the legislation in
    force, only the Christian, Socialist, and Liberal trade union
    confederations have access to the National Labor Council. This
    criticism was not repeated in the organization's 2000 report, although
    the Government took no action on the issue.
        Unions have the right to strike, and even strikes by civil servants
    and workers in ``essential'' services are tolerated. However, seamen,
    the military, and magistrates have no right to strike. In 1999 the
    Gendarmerie obtained a limited right to strike as part of the police
    reform package; this provision is to be implemented by April 1, 2001.
        Even though many strikes begin as wildcat actions, strikers are not
    prosecuted for failure to observe strike procedures in collective
    bargaining agreements. Crimes committed during a strike action, such as
    causing bodily harm or damage to property, are clearly illegal strike
    methods, which the authorities prosecute.
        Federal police have the right to strike. The Government has the
    authority to order necessary forces back to work during a strike in
    order to maintain law and order.
        The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in its
    ``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2000'' again
    mentioned that for several years employers made applications to civil
    courts to end strikes. The report added that, more recently, judges
    tended to rule that labor conflicts are not within their jurisdiction.
    This stance reinforced the widely accepted practice that any discussion
    of the right to strike is a subject for collective bargaining between
    workers and employers and not a legal matter. Although draft laws were
    submitted, no action has been taken by Parliament to end the legal
    confusion.
        Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
    are free to affiliate with international labor bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    organize and bargain collectively is recognized, protected, and
    exercised freely. Every other year the employers' federation and the
    unions negotiate a nationwide collective bargaining agreement, covering
    2.4 million private sector workers, that establishes the framework for
    negotiations at the plant and branch levels. In 1998 employers and
    unions agreed on a nationwide collective bargaining agreement that
    focused on collective bargaining at the branch and plant levels and
    limited compensation increases to 5.9 percent for the 1999-2000 period.
    The agreement covered cost of living adjustments, wage increases, and
    job creation measures.
        The law prohibits discrimination against organizers and members of
    unions and protects against the termination of contracts of members of
    workers' councils, members of health or safety committees, and shop
    stewards. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are
    required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Effective
    mechanisms such as the labor courts exist for adjudicating disputes
    between labor and management.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, and generally it is not known to occur;
    however, trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The law also prohibits
    forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this
    prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15, but
    education is compulsory until age 18. Youths between the ages of 15 and
    18 may participate in part-time work/study programs and may work full
    time during school vacations. The labor courts effectively monitor
    compliance with national laws and standards. There are no industries
    where any significant child labor exists. The Government prohibits
    forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this prohibition
    effectively (see Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in children is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
    wage for workers over 21 years of age is approximately $1,030 (BFr
    46,338): 18-year-olds must be paid at least 82 percent of the minimum,
    19-year-olds 88 percent, and 20-year-olds 94 percent. The minimum wage,
    coupled with extensive social benefits, provides workers with a decent
    standard of living. Minimum wages in the private sector are set in
    biennial, nationwide collective bargaining meetings (see Section 6.b.),
    which lead to formal agreements signed in the National Labor Council
    and made mandatory by royal decree for the entire private sector. In
    the public sector, the minimum wage is determined in negotiations
    between the Government and the public service unions. The Ministry of
    Labor effectively enforces the law regarding minimum wages. By law the
    standard workweek cannot exceed 39 hours and must have at least one 24-
    hour rest period. Many collective bargaining agreements set standard
    workweeks of 35 to 38 hours. The law requires overtime pay for hours
    worked in excess of the standard. Work done from the 9th to the 11th
    hour per day or from the 40th to the 50th hour per week is considered
    allowable overtime. Longer workdays are permitted only if agreed upon
    in a collective bargaining agreement. These laws and regulations are
    enforced effectively by the Ministry of Labor and the labor courts.
        The law calls for comprehensive provisions for worker safety.
    Collective bargaining agreements can supplement these laws. Workers
    have the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their
    safety or health without jeopardy to their continued employment, and
    the law protects workers who file complaints about such situations. The
    Labor Ministry implements health and safety legislation through a team
    of inspectors and determines whether workers qualify for disability and
    medical benefits. The law mandates health and safety committees in
    companies with more than 50 employees. Labor courts effectively monitor
    compliance with national health and safety laws and standards.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law defines and criminalizes
    trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women and children is a
    problem. Under the law, victims of trafficking who provide evidence
    against the trafficker are granted temporary residence permits and are
    eligible to receive aid from government-funded reception centers. Since
    1994 the majority of cases were victims of either sexual or economic
    exploitation. The victims of sexual exploitation increasingly are women
    under age 18. A magistrate is designated in each judicial district to
    supervise cases involving trafficking in persons. A national magistrate
    is in charge of coordinating the various antitrafficking initiatives.
    An antitrafficking unit also has been established in the Gendarmerie.
    In each of the three regions (Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels), the
    Government has designated (and subsidizes) a nonprofit organization to
    provide assistance to victims of trafficking. The Center for Equal
    Opportunity and the Fight Against Racism (see Section 5), which is
    tasked with monitoring the treatment of trafficking victims, complained
    that the designated nonprofit organizations lack the funds and staff to
    assist properly the growing number of victims. The Government reported
    significant increases in witness testimony and the successful
    prosecution of traffickers. An average of 130 victims have taken
    advantage of the residency program in recent years.
        Belgium is both a transit point and destination for trafficking in
    women and children. In September 1999, the three government-designated
    nonprofit organizations involved in assisting victims of trafficking in
    persons reported 185 active cases of trafficking in women from over 30
    countries. The largest number of victims were Albanian. Cases on 28
    children from 7 different countries also were active; the largest
    number were from Albania and Macedonia. According to statistics
    compiled by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, nearly 2,000
    unaccompanied minors requested asylum in 1999, most from the former
    Yugoslavia and central Africa. Because of the difficulties involved in
    traveling to Belgium from those areas, the International Organization
    for Migration believes that many of these unaccompanied minors were
    brought in by traffickers or assisted by professional smugglers.
        In June 58 Chinese immigrants were found dead of suffocation in a
    truck at the British seaport of Dover. They apparently had boarded the
    truck in Belgium before it departed by ferry from the port of
    Zeebrugge. Police suspect that an organized smuggling ring was
    involved. The Government was criticized in Parliament for failing to
    provide effective immigration control at Belgium's seaports and
    airports. During the first 6 months of the year, 1,105 illegal aliens
    were apprehended as they attempted to transit the port of Zeebrugge,
    compared to 1,440 for all of 1999. In November the Government announced
    its program for reforming asylum and immigration procedures (see
    Section 2.d.).
        In an ongoing program began during the year, the Government, under
    the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, dispatched attaches to
    several source countries to provide in-depth analysis of the
    trafficking situation in those countries. These attaches, whose stays
    can last anywhere from a few weeks up to 2 years, also are responsible
    for coordinating antitrafficking information campaigns to warn locals
    about the potential consequences of being the victim of a trafficking
    organization.
        The Government has worked closely with the International
    Organization for Migration (IOM) to develop innovative programs to
    combat human trafficking and to assist its victims. For example, the
    Government has provided funding for information campaigns in countries
    of origin to warn women of the dangers of trafficking. It also has
    provided funding to the IOM to assist the voluntary return of victims
    to their home countries and to assist them in readjusting once they
    have returned home.
        In 1996 the authorities uncovered a suspected pedophile/child
    pornography and trafficking ring. Five suspects remained under
    investigation, including the accused ringleader, Marc Dutroux. In
    December the Government announced that his trial would not begin until
    September 2002. Lengthy delays in bringing this case to trial have led
    to widespread public cynicism and suspicion about the investigation of
    this case in particular and about the judicial system in general.
                                   __________

                             BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

        The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
    Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) ended the 1991-95 war and created the
    independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, previously one of the
    constituent republics of Yugoslavia. The agreement also created two
    multiethnic constituent entities within the state: The Federation of
    Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS).
    The Federation, which has a postwar Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) and Croat
    majority, occupies 51 percent of the territory; the RS, which has a
    postwar Bosnian Serb majority, occupies 49 percent. The Constitution
    (Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords) establishes a statewide government with
    a bicameral legislature, a three-member presidency (consisting of a
    Bosniak, a Serb, and a Croat), a council of ministers, a constitutional
    court, and a central bank. The Accords also provided for the Office of
    the High Representative (OHR) to oversee implementation of civilian
    provisions. The High Representative also has the power to impose
    legislation and remove officials who obstruct the implementation of the
    Dayton Accords. The entities maintain separate armies, but under the
    Constitution, these are under the ultimate control of the presidency of
    Bosnia and Herzegovina. Municipal elections held in April and general
    elections conducted in November were generally free of violence,
    although there were some voting irregularities in both elections.
    Multiethnic parties committed to building on the foundation established
    at Dayton, such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP), made inroads
    against the support for the nationalist, ethnically based parties in
    the November elections, resulting in a state House of Representatives
    almost evenly divided between the two groups. In the RS, the ethnically
    based Serb Democratic Party (SDS) maintained its dominant position,
    while the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and
    Herzegovina (HDZ) remained strong in Croat-majority municipalities. The
    Party of Democratic Action (SDA) remained the largest nationalist
    Bosniak party. Although formally independent, the judiciary remains
    subject to influence by political parties and the executive branch and
    is unable to prosecute complex or even simple crimes fairly and
    effectively.
        One of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
    Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was established in March 1994 and
    transformed the government structure of the Bosnian territories under
    Bosniak and Croatian control. The President of the Federation appoints
    the Prime Minister subject to parliamentary approval. The Federation
    Parliament is bicameral. Federation structures continue to be
    implemented only gradually. Major steps were the creation of canton
    governments, the unification of Sarajevo under Federation control in
    spring 1996, and the 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections of the Federation
    Parliament. However, serious ethnic and political rivalries continue to
    divide Croats and Bosniaks. Parallel Bosniak and Croat government
    structures continued to exist in practice.
        The Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the other entity
    that makes up Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997-98, most of the RS
    political and administrative agencies moved from Pale, a stronghold of
    former Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic,
    to Banja Luka. The President and Vice President were elected in
    November for 4-year terms. The RS National Assembly is unicameral and
    elected on a proportional basis. The November general elections in the
    Republika Srpska were relatively free and fair, and resulted in the
    nationalist parties, led by the SDS, increasing their strength at the
    expense of the pro-Dayton moderates.
        Demilitarization of the city of Brcko, which was made a ``self-
    governing neutral district'' in March, was completed in February. A
    districtwide multiethnic police force also was established. The
    internationally appointed supervisor is empowered to address such
    issues as taxation, law enforcement, district management, and
    composition of the district assembly.
        The State-level Constitutional Court declared during the year that
    a number of provisions of the entity constitutions were
    unconstitutional; they had been challenged in a lawsuit filed by
    Presidency member Alija Izetbegovic in 1998. The court ruled
    unconstitutional provisions in both entity constitutions that
    designated a specific ethnic group or groups as ``constituent'' in that
    entity, making clear that the three major ethnic groups--Serbs, Croats,
    and Bosniaks--as well as ``others,'' are constituent in both entities.
    The decision also invalidated parts of the entity constitutions that
    named an official language or script, or that called for government
    support for one church, among other provisions. The decisions
    established the principle of ethnic equality in the country; however,
    this decision of the court has not yet been implemented in practice.
        The Constitution gives the Government of each entity and the
    individual cantons within the Federation responsibility for law
    enforcement in accordance with internationally recognized standards.
    The Stabilization Force (SFOR), led by NATO, continued to implement the
    military aspects of the Dayton Accords and to attempt to create a
    secure environment for implementation of the nonmilitary aspects of the
    settlement, such as: Civilian reconstruction, the return of refugees
    and displaced persons, elections, and freedom of movement of the
    civilian population. The International Police Task Force (IPTF), which
    was established by the U. N. under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords,
    monitors, advises, and trains the local police. The IPTF also may
    investigate human rights abuses. Local police in both entities have
    violated international standards and discriminated on political,
    religious, and ethnic grounds; however, these cases decreased compared
    with 1999. During the year, police in both the Federation and the RS
    used internal affairs units to investigate and dismiss officers for
    committing abuses. Police continued to suffer from the legacy of a
    Communist system, with ``special'' or secret police operating in all
    areas. These forces operated outside the normal police chain of
    command, exceeding ethnic quotas and reporting directly to the senior
    political leadership. In addition to locally recruited police forces,
    each entity also maintains an army. Security forces committed human
    rights abuses, primarily police brutality, in many parts of the
    country.
        The economy remains weak and dependent upon international
    assistance. Gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated at $5 billion;
    per capita GDP doubled, at approximately $1,350. GDP continued to be
    lower in the RS than in the Federation. The entity governments have
    made only minor structural reforms in privatization, banking, and
    taxation. Official unemployment estimates range from 40 to 50 percent,
    and many individuals are forced into the informal economy for work.
    Workers in the ``gray'' market typically receive no benefits, but those
    with formal employment often are paid only partial salaries and months
    late. Pensions and other benefits are also paid only in part and are
    delayed 6 months or more due to a lack of government resources. The
    continued return of refugees from abroad is expected to compound the
    problem of job creation and to reduce remittances. International
    assistance provided loans to the manufacturing sector and guidance on
    structural reform.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. The
    degree of respect for human rights continues to vary among areas with
    Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb majorities. There was one
    death in custody (a suicide), and isolated instances of political,
    ethnic, or religious killings continued. Killings due to bombs also
    continued. The police continued to commit human rights abuses during
    the year, and serious problems persisted. Police continued to commit
    abuses in many parts of the country, principally the physical abuse of
    detainees. Members of security forces also abused and physically
    mistreated other citizens. Police also used excessive force, or did not
    ensure security, to discourage minority resettlement in majority areas.
    Prison conditions met prisoner's basic minimum needs for hygiene and
    access to medical care; however, overcrowding and antiquated facilities
    continued to be a problem.
        In the RS, police detained suspects for long periods of time before
    filing charges; lengthy prearraignment detention was a problem in
    numerous cases in the Federation as well. However, there were fewer
    cases of arbitrary arrest and detention than in the previous year.
    Confusion over the rules governing local arrest, detention, and
    prosecution of suspects for The Hague-based International Criminal
    Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) led in some instances to
    questionable detentions in both the Federation and the RS. The RS
    continued its de facto refusal to take action against any Serbs
    indicted by the ICTY. In contrast, RS authorities have made arrests of
    Serbs based solely on warrants issued by the Federal Republic of
    Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia); however, in a recent case the authorities
    later released the suspects.
        The judiciary in both entities remained subject to influence by
    dominant political parties and by the executive branch. Overlapping and
    poorly defined layers of judicial responsibility and outdated
    procedures made the administration of justice sporadic and vulnerable
    to manipulation. In many areas, close ties exist between courts of law
    and the ruling parties, and those judges and prosecutors who show
    independence are subject to intimidation by the authorities. Even when
    independent decisions were rendered, local authorities often refused to
    carry them out. Authorities in all areas infringed on citizens' privacy
    rights.
        Authorities and dominant political parties exerted influence over
    the media, and freedom of speech and of the press was restricted to
    varying degrees in the different entities. Government threats against
    journalists increased during the year. Academic freedom was restricted.
    Authorities continued to impose some limits on freedom of assembly and
    association. Religious discrimination remained a problem. Both
    governments and private groups continued to restrict religious practice
    by minorities in majority areas. Although freedom of movement continued
    to improve, some restrictions remained in practice. At times, mobs
    blockaded roads, restricting freedom of movement.
        Discrimination against women persists, and violence against women,
    in particular domestic violence, is a persistent yet underreported
    problem. Severe discrimination continued in areas dominated by Serb and
    Croat ethnic groups, with some discrimination in Bosniak-majority
    areas, particularly regarding the treatment of refugees and displaced
    persons. The political leadership at all levels, in varying degrees but
    more so in the RS than in the Federation, continued to obstruct
    minority returns in certain localities. Local authorities and mobs (in
    most cases believed to be organized or approved by local authorities)
    harassed minorities and violently resisted their return. The
    destruction of minority-owned houses continued in some areas of the RS
    and in Croat-controlled areas of the Federation. Marginal economic
    conditions and discrimination in the educational system also
    complicated returns. Enactment of property legislation proceeded in
    both entities under pressure from the international community, but
    implementation was sporadic and slow. Mob violence was a serious
    problem in the eastern RS. In December, several returning Bosniaks were
    wounded and one killed by mine explosions, raising suspicions that the
    mines had been laid to deter return. There were several killings of
    Bosniaks in the northern RS in the fall that may have been ethnically
    motivated. Ethnic discrimination remains a serious problem.
    Prostitution is widespread, and trafficking in women and girls to and
    within the country is a serious problem.
        During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR
    to apprehend alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more
    aggressive approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY,
    which began in the summer of 1997, resulted in the apprehension of 5
    indictees out of the 96 publicly indicted by the Tribunal (one
    committed suicide rather than submit to arrest). This brought the total
    number of indictees taken into custody since the Tribunal's inception
    to 48. At year's end there were 38 persons in ICTY custody either
    awaiting trial, involved in ongoing trials, released provisionally, or
    awaiting transfer to begin serving their sentences. Three indictees
    already are serving sentences. There were 27 public indictees still at
    large at year's end. ICTY trials during the year resulted in six
    convictions and one acquittal.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by police; however, there was one death
    in custody. Violent incidents continued throughout the year, many
    between members of different ethnic groups or political parties.
        A prisoner died in Mostar West prison where he was being held on
    charges of aggravated assault. An investigation by the IPTF's Human
    Rights Division determined the death a suicide and found no evidence to
    suggest police abuse or irregularities.
        Federation authorities made several arrests in connection with the
    March 1999 killing of Federation Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar.
    In spite of ethnic divisions within the police and political
    interference from some quarters, the investigation, one of the most
    politically contentious in Bosnia, was continuing in cooperation with
    officials in third countries at year's end. By contrast, a series of
    attacks on Croat policemen in Travnik in 1999 remains unsolved, mainly
    due to political interference.
        Many, if not most, of the perpetrators of killings and other brutal
    acts committed in previous years remained unpunished, including war
    criminals indicted by the ICTY, individuals responsible for the up to
    8,000 persons killed by the Bosnian Serb Army after the fall of
    Srebrenica, and those responsible for up to 13,000 others still missing
    and presumed killed as a result of ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia. The
    local prosecution of war crimes cases has proceeded slowly due to
    political interference, but Bosnian authorities made some progress
    during the year with the arrest of several suspects that have been
    charged and are to be tried in the Bosnian courts.
        There was an increase in the number of arrests by Federation police
    of war crimes suspects for local prosecution, particularly in Croat
    areas of the Federation. Officers of the Federation Interior Ministry
    arrested suspected Croat war criminal Dominik Ilijasevic August 28 in
    Kiseljak. Erhad Poznic and Ivan Suljo, former Croat special police
    officers charged in connection with the disappearance and presumed
    execution of 13 Bosniak prisoners of war in Mostar in 1993, both
    surrendered voluntarily to cantonal authorities in September. In
    addition, Dragan Stankovic, a Bosnian Serb indicted for local
    prosecution for actions targeting the Bosniak civilian population in
    Foca in 1992, was arrested by cantonal police in Gorazde on September
    20, while crossing through Federation territory. A Croat police
    official in Travnik surrendered himself to a Sarajevo court in March
    following his reported indictment on war crimes charges. The court
    subsequently released the officer, ultimately explaining that he had
    been questioned as a witness in an ongoing war crimes investigation.
        During the year, there were continued efforts on the part of SFOR
    to apprehend alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more
    aggressive approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY,
    which began in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the
    apprehension of 5 indictees out of the 94 publicly indicted by the
    Tribunal. All were detained forcibly, and none voluntarily surrendered
    to NATO troops. On October 13, Janko Jancic committed suicide rather
    than submit to arrest by SFOR troops. This brought the total number of
    indictees taken into custody since the Tribunal's inception to 48. At
    year's end there were 38 persons in ICTY custody.
        On January 25, SFOR troops detained Mitar Vasiljevic, allegedly a
    member of the paramilitary ``White Eagles,'' who is accused of killing
    over 100 Bosnian Muslim civilians in the Visegrad area. On March 5,
    SFOR arrested Dragoljub Prcac. Prcac is accused of being the deputy
    commander of the Omarska concentration camp, whose 3,000 Bosnian Muslim
    and Bosnian Croat captives were held in inhuman conditions. Momcilo
    Krajisnik, a senior Bosnian Serb politician before, during, and after
    the war, was arrested on April 3. Krajisnik is charged with genocide,
    crimes against humanity, and other war crimes for his direction of
    efforts to ethnically cleanse the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
    Herzegovina. SFOR arrested Dragan Nikolic on April 21; he is charged
    with crimes against humanity and other violations committed while he
    was in command of the Susica concentration camp and for participating
    in inhuman acts against more than 500 civilians. The alleged commander
    of the ``Keraterm'' concentration camp, Dusko Sikirica, was arrested by
    SFOR on June 25. Keraterm camp held over 3,000 Bosnian Muslim and
    Bosnian Croat captives in inhuman conditions. Of the 27 publicly
    indicted persons still at large at the end of the year who remain in
    the country, the majority reportedly live in the RS. Although RS
    cooperation with the ICTY has improved, RS authorities made no effort
    to arrest indictees. The ICTY during the year issued 6 convictions and
    1 acquittal. This brings the total number of convictions to 13 since
    the ICTY's inception.
        In January, Zeljko Raznjatovic, also known as ``Arkan,'' a
    notorious paramilitary commander from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who
    was indicted by the ICTY, was shot and killed by unknown assailants in
    the lobby of a hotel in Belgrade. In Prnjavor in the RS, a Bosniak man
    was killed in March in a hand grenade explosion on his property (see
    Section 1.c.). An unknown assailant shot and killed Ljubisa Savic, also
    known as Mauser, the former RS Minister of Interior Chief of Uniformed
    Police, on June 7 in Bijeljina. Savic was indicted for alleged unlawful
    conduct during a murder investigation by the Sokolac prosecutor in
    March (see Section 1.c.). His death was seen by many as the result of
    conflicts between Serb political factions and criminal elements. In
    mid-December, in Glogova, near the Serb hard-line town of Bratunac, a
    Bosniak was killed when a mine exploded while he was clearing his
    property. After an investigation, RS authorities concluded that the
    mines were recently placed as a booby trap to prevent return (see
    Section 1.c.).
        There were no developments in the IPTF investigation of the death
    in police custody of a Bosniak returnee who had killed the leader of an
    Orthodox religious association in 1999.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances during the year. There still are an estimated 20,000 to
    30,000 persons missing from the wars in 1991-95.
        The OHR in late 1997 negotiated an agreement among the Bosniak,
    Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb commissions for missing persons to
    expedite exhumations across the interentity boundary line (IEBL). The
    OHR reported that the remains of 1,308 persons had been recovered
    during the year. These numbers were significantly lower that the
    previous year because the Government did not provide promised funds for
    exhumation until May. The International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC) reported that since 1995 it received requests from family
    members to trace 20,484 people missing from the war years, including
    16,979 Muslims, 719 Croats, 2,537 Serbs, and 249 others. A total of
    2,231 of these persons were accounted for (292 of whom were found
    alive). The ICRC noted that the Working Group for Tracing Missing
    Persons, which serves as a channel for passing tracing requests to
    local authorities, had ceased functioning in July, due to lack of
    cooperation from local authorities and a dispute over the rotating
    chairmanship among the Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat
    representatives. The group had not resumed work by year's end and
    negotiations currently are underway to reform the working group.
        In August the Missing Persons Institute (MPI) was inaugurated to
    coordinate the recovery and identification of remains, provide support
    to families of the missing, and apply political pressure to Bosnian
    officials to provide information on missing persons. MPI is a state
    institution that assumed many of the functions previously carried out
    by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), which
    continues to conduct regional identification activities in the
    countries of the former Yugoslavia. In August MPI began the first
    systematic in-country DNA identification program and began collecting
    blood samples from living family members of missing persons to assist
    in the identification of recovered remains. In its first month of
    operation, the DNA program tested 28 presumptive identifications, which
    were based on circumstantial evidence such as clothing and personal
    items found on the body. The testing confirmed 19 identities and
    excluded 9.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the right to freedom from
    torture and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; however, in all
    areas of the country, police and prison officials abused and physically
    mistreated persons at the time of arrest and during detention.
        A pattern of poor police protection and of violence against
    minority communities continued in several areas. Police in Stolac,
    Drvar, Gacko, and Srebrenica proved unwilling or unable to contain the
    numerous instances of arson designed to intimidate returnees. While
    there was some improvement in the behavior of local police in the RS
    and the Federation toward returning minorities, there still were
    numerous instances of poor police protection in several areas. In
    February the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) called for
    increased police patrols after an attempted arson attack on a Bosniak
    home in the settlement of Ilici in southwest Mostar. In March the OHR
    suspended the deputy police chief and three policemen in Kopaci, a
    suburb of Gorazde in the eastern RS, who, despite being stationed
    around a Bosniak house, failed to prevent a Serb from throwing a
    grenade at it. In Srebrenica, police failed to apprehend anyone
    responsible for more than 12 burnings of houses occupied by minority
    families in June and July. In July in Janja police stood by and watched
    as rioters burned three houses and damaged 15 others during a protest
    against Bosniak returns that was sparked by the scheduled eviction of
    three Serb families. The subsequent police investigation was marked by
    significant omissions, and police refused to identify suspects during
    court hearings. In the Federation, returning Serbs in Drvar were
    subjected to physical attacks and intimidation during attempts to evict
    temporary Croatian occupants.
        At times some police officers impeded the enforcement of the law by
    their unwillingness to carry out eviction orders for persons illegally
    occupying homes of internally displaced persons (IDP's). Government
    leaders in both the RS and the Federation often used a variety of
    tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the return of IDP's
    (see Section 2.d.).
        The IPTF made significant progress in its efforts to restructure
    and increase professionalism in the police forces. The IPTF completed
    its programs to provide human dignity and basic skills training to all
    Federation police officers and neared completion of officer training in
    the RS. The IPTF continued its certification of Federation and RS
    police and also decertified officers on a variety of charges. This
    process involved written and psychological examinations, as well as
    background investigations. In addition, an IPTF unit in The Hague
    checks the names of all police officials through the ICTY database. In
    August the RS police academy graduated its third multiethnic class.
    Minority officers are beginning to be deployed in areas where minority
    returns are occurring. All Federation canton governments have agreed to
    an ethnically mixed police force in principle; however, many cantonal
    governments continue to resist integration in practice. In the
    Federation police include Croat, Bosniak, and Serb officers and
    generally reflect the appropriate ethnic mix within each canton.
    However, Bosniak and Croat police in the Federation often operate under
    separate, parallel budget and command structures, divided along ethnic
    lines. Police in the RS generally do not meet target standards of
    ethnic representation, as mandated by various agreements. Cooperation
    between the RS and the Federation Interior Ministries often is better
    than cooperation between federation cantons. The integration of women
    into the police forces is uneven but improving, with substantial female
    representation in the Brcko district and in recent police academy
    classes in both the RS and the Federation.
        IPTF certification of officers proceeded more slowly in the RS, but
    there was progress on significant law enforcement reforms. An
    interentity agreement negotiated under U.N. auspices allows the
    voluntary redeployment of officers across entity lines to redress
    ethnic imbalances. By year's end, 33 officers had volunteered for
    redeployment (22 from the Federation and 11 from the RS). Police
    officials attempted to recruit more minority candidates; individual
    cantons in the Federation held positions open for minority candidates.
    Since 1999 international monitors have been establishing an IPTF
    physical presence within police facilities to ensure proper IPTF
    monitoring of police reforms. Authorities in the RS are implementing a
    policies and procedures manual that institutes, among other reforms, a
    public information bureau and internal affairs unit. Under these
    reforms, the RS authorities continue to remove officers accused of
    graft or brutality. Professional standards units have reviewed over
    1,000 cases, substantiating approximately 35 percent of complaints
    received and administering punishments ranging from fines to
    suspensions. A total of 20 officers were removed and 16 cases were
    registered for criminal prosecution.
        On January 14, the IPTF Commissioner removed the provisional
    authorization to exercise police powers from seven police officers in
    the Federation. The removals were enforced for violations ranging from
    illegal deprivation of liberty to assault on civilians in custody and
    assault while off duty. In one case, an officer shot and injured a
    civilian while intoxicated. There were scattered reports of police
    brutality throughout the country, although local professional standards
    units were increasingly active in holding law enforcement officers,
    including senior officials, accountable for their actions.
        In June the Human Rights Chamber ruled that the Federation army had
    violated the human rights of two Serbs who were shot and detained while
    driving near Sarajevo in 1996. The two were detained at various
    locations for over a month before appearing before a judge and were
    released 15 days later by the then-Higher Court of Sarajevo. A month
    after their detention, the Army launched an investigation a month after
    their detention into whether they had committed war crimes. The Chamber
    ruled that the treatment of one of the two men during detention
    constituted torture and that both men suffered inhuman and degrading
    treatment and punishment because they were Serbs. During the year,
    there were no reports of the Army detaining civilians.
        On March 1, the Sokolac prosecutor indicted nine former RS police
    officers for their alleged unlawful conduct during the investigation
    into the murder of the Deputy Chief of the Pale Public Security Center
    (PSC), Srdan Knezevic, in August 1998. Among those indicted were the
    former RS Minister of Interior Chief of Uniformed Police (who was shot
    to death by unknown persons in June), Head of the Pale PSC Crime Unit,
    and the Chief of Staff of the Pale PSC. The charges included unlawful
    deprivation of freedom, extraction of statements by duress,
    maltreatment during the discharge of duty, illegal search, failure to
    render aid, and unauthorized photography. Several of the indictees had
    been cited by the IPTF for illegal deprivation of liberty, torture, and
    ill-treatment of 14 suspects and witnesses, as well as coercing several
    detainees into confessing and into signing incriminating statements.
        Sporadic violence against international community representatives
    continued throughout the year. On January 31, a hand grenade was thrown
    at the IPTF police station in Pale in the RS, damaging three vehicles.
    On April 3, a hand grenade was thrown at a SFOR patrol near Modrica in
    the RS. Two cars and a shop were damaged. On June 21, a landmine
    damaged an SFOR armored personnel carrier near Gacko in the RS. Three
    SFOR soldiers were wounded in the incident, which followed protests
    against minority refugee returns to the area. On July 24, six rocket-
    propelled hand grenades were fired at the living quarters of the Joint
    Commission Observer in Zvornik. The attack was similar to one carried
    out in May 1998. The attack damaged the house, but did not result in
    any casualties. RS police arrested two suspects, and still are
    searching for another. On August 3, a false bomb threat was made
    against offices in Zenica that house international community
    organizations, local government, media, and NGO's. In August, an IPTF
    monitor was assaulted and slightly injured in the Zvornik area by
    unknown assailants.
        Federation and RS government officials also were attacked. The
    private business premises of Mostar mayor Safet Orucevic were damaged
    in a rock throwing incident on May 15. An improvised explosive device
    detonated in a Travnik municipal office in June, injuring one employee.
    An official vehicle used by the RS Minister of Information was
    destroyed by an explosion in Banja Luka on June 15. In July municipal
    officials in Maglaj complained of death threats during the eviction of
    foreign-born Islamists who illegally were occupying homes owned by
    displaced persons. A car belonging to the head of the local refugee
    government department in Modrica in the RS was heavily damaged by a
    hand grenade on August 7. Early in the year, a cantonal judge in
    Sarajevo received death threats during the deportation proceedings of a
    naturalized Bosnian citizen who was wanted on international terrorism
    charges. In August the interior minister of Central Bosnia canton
    received threats following the arrest of a Croat war-crimes suspect.
    There was no progress reported by year's end in the Foca police chief's
    investigation of the attack of the Foca IPTF station. There was no
    progress reported by year's end by the RS police on the investigation
    of the death of municipal council member Munib Hasanovic.
        A number of housing authorities responsible for implementing
    property law were threatened or assaulted. The head of the Banja Luka
    housing authority resigned after receiving death threats. He had been
    under pressure not to carry out evictions of Croatian Serbs and war
    veterans illegally occupying property owned by displaced persons. On
    April 10, the head of the housing authority in Bijeljina was stabbed
    and seriously wounded. Police determined that the assailant was a
    displaced person who was dissatisfied with the manner in which his case
    had been handled. The perpetrator was arrested and sentenced to 60 days
    in prison. On April 29, the head of the Stolac Housing Board was beaten
    by an alleged illegal occupant, who also attempted to stab him. Local
    police did not respond adequately and the IPTF subsequently issued two
    noncompliance reports against local police and continued to monitor the
    investigation. On December 7, the head of housing in Pale resigned
    after receiving threats for implementing property laws.
        A few violent incidents marred the municipal elections on April 8.
    Two such incidents were directed against the international community,
    while others resulted from intraethnic conflict between political
    parties within ethnic communities (see Section 3). There were no
    violent incidents involving international community representatives
    during the November elections, as had been the case in past elections.
        Individual and societal violence motivated by ethnic conflict
    continued to be a serious problem, and numerous bombings, shootings,
    and assaults caused deaths, injuries, and significant material damage;
    however, violence decreased compared with 1999. Such violence often was
    connected to the return of refugees and displaced persons to their
    prewar homes in areas where the returnees are now a minority. A growing
    level of violence associated with criminal activity compounded the
    problem.
        There continued to be numerous violent incidents directed at
    returning refugees. In Posavina, a Croat returnee's windows were broken
    by Croat HDZ hard-liners. There have been reports of intimidation
    against Serbs in Drvar. On January 18, the newly renovated house of a
    returning Bosniak refugee in Aladinici, near Stolac (currently a Croat
    majority area), was burned. The next night another Bosniak house, still
    under construction, was destroyed. In early March, three Bosniak houses
    in Janja were set on fire and three of the inhabitants injured. In
    March a group of Serbs in Vlasenica in the RS beat a number of Roma who
    had been deported from refugee camps in Italy. On March 11, a group of
    Serbs threw a hand grenade at a house holding more than a dozen Bosniak
    heads of families in Kopaci, the Serb suburb of Gorazde. The Bosniaks
    were the first returnees to the suburb and previously had been camped
    nearby in tents for more than 5 months, waiting for Serb authorities to
    evict illegal Serb occupants from their property.
        Also in March, there were several attacks against returning
    Bosniaks near the RS town of Prnjavor. On March 21, a hand grenade
    severely injured a Bosniak male who had returned with his family to the
    settlement of Babanovac only 1 week earlier. On March 23, another
    Bosniak family physically was threatened and told to leave the area. On
    March 24, a hand grenade exploded and killed a Bosniak returnee who was
    burning trash on his property in the Prjnavor settlement of Lisnja (it
    remains unclear whether the grenade was placed deliberately in the fire
    to harm the Bosniak or merely was there by accident).
        In April a group of approximately 100 Bosnian Serbs stoned 6
    Bosniaks who were rebuilding their houses in Brcko. On April 26, a mine
    exploded in the house of a Croat returnee in the Modrica area of the
    RS, damaging the dwelling but injuring no one. On May 11, several buses
    carrying 180 Bosniak women to a memorial ceremony to mark the 8th
    anniversary of a massacre in the Bratunac area were stoned by an angry
    mob of Serbs. At least 10 Bosniak women were injured slightly by broken
    glass. RS authorities charged 29 Serbs for disturbing the peace several
    days later (see Sections 2.b. and 5). In late May there were minor
    attacks on Bosniak returnees and Croat IDP's outside of Stolac. The
    next day the governor of the canton visited the return site to
    criticize the incidents.
        On June 21, an unidentified person fired at the office of the
    Association of Refugees from Derventa in Bijelo Brdo. On June 25, a
    hand grenade exploded under the truck of a Bosniak returnee to Janja in
    Bijeljina municipality. The explosion damaged the house and garage.
        Arsonists set fire to more than a dozen Bosniak returnee homes in
    and around Srebrenica in the summer in an effort to intimidate
    returnees. No one was injured but property was significantly damaged
    and, in some instances, destroyed. One fire was timed to coincide with
    the July 12 ceremony at Potocari marking the 5th anniversary of the
    Srebrenica massacre. Several of the homes had been renovated recently.
    None of the perpetrators were arrested.
        On July 24 a crowd of 250 Serbs, protesting against the eviction of
    Serbs in Janja, rioted in a Bosniak neighborhood of the town, burning 2
    Bosniak houses, destroying several vehicles, and stoning 6 other
    dwellings. Two hand grenades exploded during the incident, injuring
    several people. Local police and SFOR looked on without intervening.
    Approximately 11,000 Bosniaks lived in Janja before the war; only 700
    had returned by July.
        In mid-August a bomb destroyed a cafe in downtown Glamoc that was
    owned by a Bosniak returnee. Three days later the owner's father's
    rebuilt home was set on fire. The OHR dismissed the Croat mayor of
    Glamoc on September 8, partly due to his inaction regarding these two
    incidents.
        On August 23, a group of Serb IDP's angry over their displaced
    circumstances blocked the Zvornik-Vlasenica road for several hours.
    When police broke up the blockade, they were assaulted by the crowd and
    12 police officers were injured.
        On September 9, a Bosniak house in Srebrenica, which had been empty
    after a Serb had vacated it, was set on fire.
        On September 12, the vehicle used by the head of the Banja Luka
    branch of the RS Ministry for Refugees was destroyed in an explosion.
    The explosion appeared to have been an attempt to intimidate the
    official, who is in charge of evicting illegal occupants and returning
    refugees to Banja Luka.
        In mid-December, there were two mine incidents that may have been
    deliberate attempts to deter Bosniaks from returning. In the destroyed
    village of Glogova, near the Serb town of Bratunac, a Bosniak was
    killed when a mine exploded while he was clearing his property. After
    an investigation, RS authorities concluded that the mines were recently
    placed as a booby trap to prevent return. In southern Bosnia, outside
    the Serb town of Gacko, a landmine exploded under a car carrying
    Bosniaks to the refugee village of Fazlagica Kula. The occupants were
    severely wounded, but survived. The OHR suspects that the mine was set
    recently. These landmine incidents prompted OHR to make a statement
    criticizing what appeared to be increasing violence against returnees.
        There was no progress in the local authorities' investigation of a
    car bomb that injured a Bosnian Croat police officer in Travnik in
    1999. There was no investigation into 1999 incidents of arson of homes
    of Bosniak returnees in Borovnica. There was no progress in the
    investigation by canton and Federation antiterrorism officers into a
    bomb explosion at the home of Ivan Saric, former middle Bosnia canton
    governor, in a village outside Gornje Vakuf in 1999.
        While prison standards for hygiene and access to medical care meet
    prisoners' basic needs, overcrowding and poor, antiquated facilities
    are chronic problems. There was one report of a death in custody in
    Mostar West prison (see Section 1.a.).
        International community representatives were given widespread and
    for the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and
    prisoners in the RS as well as in the Federation.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were fewer cases
    of arbitrary arrest and detention in both the Federation and the RS
    compared with 1999. In prior years, police in both entities enjoyed
    great latitude based on Communist-era criminal procedure laws that
    permitted them to detain persons for up to 6 months without bringing
    formal charges against them. The Federation revised these laws in 1998,
    removing this power from police and vesting it solely in the
    investigative judge. The Communist-era detention laws remain in force
    in the RS.
        Federation law permits prearraignment detention of up to 24 hours;
    in the RS prearraignment detention may extend for 3 days. International
    monitors report numerous instances in which these deadlines have been
    violated. In one case, a detainee was held for 11 days in the
    Federation before appearing before a judge. Some accused persons have
    been in detention for several years while awaiting a final action by
    the appellate court. The absence of psychiatric facilities in the
    Federation and RS has led to persons being detained rather than
    properly treated.
        Human rights NGO's contend that there are cases in which persons
    who ostensibly are detained on criminal charges actually are
    incarcerated for political reasons. For example, Ibrahim Djedovic, a
    parliamentary deputy for the Democratic National Union (DNZ), which the
    ruling Bosniak SDA views as a renegade party due to its activities
    during the war, was arrested and jailed in May 1997 for war crimes,
    after he arrived in Sarajevo to take up his parliamentary seat. The
    ICTY investigated Djedovic and decided not to arrest him for his
    alleged activities. Most local and international observers believe that
    Djedovic was arrested due to his political affiliation and not because
    of alleged war crimes. Although the Sarajevo cantonal court convicted
    and sentenced Djedovic to 10 years in 1998, he was released in March
    after winning an appeal and returned to his seat in the Federation
    Parliament.
        There were no reports that forced exile generally was used as a
    legal punishment. There were no reports during the year of attempts by
    local Croat authorities to expel returning Serbs in some Croat-
    dominated areas of the Federation, as had been the case in the past.
    However, Croat hard-liners in Capljina continued to intimidate Serb
    returnees. The Croatian Government also continued to deny electricity
    to Serb returnees in Ivanica, a small town in Bosnia near Dubrovnik.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Both the Federation and RS
    Constitutions provide for an independent judiciary; however, the
    executive and the ruling nationalist political parties continue to
    influence the judicial system. Party affiliation and political
    connections weighed heavily in the appointment of prosecutors and
    judges. The legal system is unable to adequately protect the rights of
    either victims or criminal defendants because of its inefficient
    criminal procedure codes and complicated trial procedures.
        The judicial hierarchy in the Federation varies among its different
    constituent cantons. In the seven mixed or Bosniak cantons, original
    court jurisdiction exists in both municipal and cantonal courts, with
    more serious offenses typically tried in the cantonal courts. Appeals
    are taken to the Federation Supreme Court. However, in the three Croat-
    dominated cantons, the municipal courts have exclusive original
    jurisdiction over all offenses, and appeals are heard by the cantonal
    courts. The Croat-dominated cantons refuse to recognize the appellate
    jurisdiction of the Federation Supreme Court; however, no litigant has
    attempted to appeal to the Federation Supreme Court yet. The differing
    judicial practices in the cantons of the Federation present obstacles
    to prosecutors, criminal defendants, defense attorneys, and civil
    litigants and their attorneys.
        In August 1999, the OHR imposed a law allowing the Federation
    Supreme Court to claim immediate jurisdiction as the ``court of first
    instance'' in cases involving terrorism, organized crime, smuggling,
    and intercantonal crime, which would be difficult for lower courts to
    try because of pressure from political parties. However, no such cases
    had been tried in the Supreme Court by year's end.
        The Federation Constitution provides for the appointment of judges
    by the President, with the concurrence of the Vice President and the
    approval of the Assembly, to an initial term of 5 years. Judges may be
    reappointed following this initial term to serve until the age of 70.
        The RS judicial hierarchy includes a Supreme Court to provide for
    the unified enforcement of the law and a Constitutional Court to assure
    conformity of laws, regulations, and general enactments with the
    Constitution. The RS has both municipal and district courts, with the
    district courts having appellate jurisdiction. Judges are appointed and
    recalled by the National Assembly and have life tenure.
        In June 1999, judicial associations in both entities adopted
    identical codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors. In August 1999,
    the OHR imposed laws strengthening the Federation prosecutor's office
    and protecting the identity of witnesses in sensitive cases in the
    Federation. There have been no test cases to date, however. The
    international community continued training programs in the Federation
    to familiarize judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the police
    with the Federation's reformed Criminal Code, which entered into effect
    in November 1998. The RS has not adopted similar criminal law reforms
    yet. Some NGO's expressed concern over the judicial selection process
    in eight federation cantons, especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla. Legal
    experts argued that the laws on judicial selection in those two cantons
    were inconsistent with the canton and Federation Constitutions.
        Both the Federation and RS Constitutions provide for open and
    public trials and give the accused the right to legal counsel.
        The Dayton Peace Accords also created the Human Rights Commission
    for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of the Human Rights Chamber
    and the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Chamber may consider alleged
    violations of the European Convention on Human Rights if the matter is
    within the responsibility of one of the parties to the Dayton Agreement
    and occurred after its signing. Decisions of the Chamber are final and
    may not be appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Ombudsman may
    investigate allegations of human rights abuses either on his or her own
    initiative or in response to any party, or may refer matters to the
    Chamber.
        Human rights organizations reported that judicial institutions in
    both entities were controlled or influenced by the ruling parties.
    Likewise, the various prosecutorial offices throughout the two entities
    remained subject to political pressure. There were numerous anecdotal
    reports of politicians pressuring judges to rule in favor of the local
    party members in cases before the courts. Courts often were reluctant
    or unwilling to try cases of human rights abuse referred to them. A
    lack of resources and a huge backlog of unresolved cases provided a
    convenient excuse for judicial inaction. Even when the courts rendered
    a fair judgment, local officials often refused to implement their
    decisions. This was especially the case for those who won decisions
    mandating eviction of illegal occupants from their property, although
    this improved somewhat during the year under pressure from the
    international community. In addition, organized crime elements sought
    to pressure judges, especially in central Bosnia and Herzeg-Neretva
    canton.
        The Federation and the RS maintain separate structures of courts
    and prosecution agencies, with little or no cooperation across the
    entity line. Although there have been isolated instances in which the
    1998 Memorandum on Inter-Entity Legal Cooperation has been used
    successfully, little sustainable progress has been made in creating
    viable and effective structures for such cooperation. For example,
    there is no mechanism between the Ministries of Interior to enable
    arrest warrants to be executed throughout the country.
        In the Federation, the High Representative implemented the Law on
    Judicial and Prosecutorial Service on May 17. In the RS, the National
    Assembly adopted the Law on Courts and Court Service and the Law on the
    Public Prosecutor's Office. These laws provide a merit-based,
    nonpolitical structure for the appointment and dismissal of judges and
    prosecutors and provide uniform standards for their professional
    conduct. The laws provide for a review period, during which all
    prosecutors and sitting judges who fall below the standard of
    professionalism set out in the laws will be removed. Review commissions
    were established in June and began reviewing files in September.
        The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber continued to grow rapidly
    (see section 4) as more citizens turned to the Chamber to redress human
    rights violations after national institutions and domestic courts
    failed to provide an effective remedy.
        In February the Human Rights Chamber ordered a retrial for Sretko
    Damjanovic, who was convicted by a military court in Sarajevo in 1993
    of war crimes against the civilian population. The Chamber ruled that
    Damjanovic had not been granted a fair trial in the proceedings that
    led to the rejection of his petition for a retrial. In May and October
    1997, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court had denied his request to reopen
    proceedings and his appeal was finally rejected by the Federation
    Supreme Court in February 1998. The Chamber stated that the cantonal
    court's reasoning for rejecting the appeal was ``grossly inadequate and
    devoid of the appearance of fairness'' and that Damjanovic did not have
    a fair chance to appeal to the Federation Supreme Court.
        In February the Sarajevo Cantonal Court acquitted Bosniak Ibrahim
    Djedovic of charges of war crimes. Djedovic had been convicted and
    sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in October 1998, after a trial that
    was viewed by international observers as unfair.
        On August 4, Sarajevo Canton police arrested former Interior
    Minister and Bosniak organized crime figure Alija Delimustafic on
    ``abuse of power'' charges filed by the Federation Prosecutor.
    Delimustafic is purported to have ties across the political spectrum.
    Some observers believe that his arrest and arraignment indicate that
    the Bosnian judicial system is attempting to address the most serious
    corruption cases. Others are doubtful that the law enforcement
    community will have the political support to successfully prosecute the
    case.
        No new trial was held in the May 1999 RS Supreme Court case in
    which the court ruled that three Bosniaks were wrongfully convicted of
    1996 murders of four woodcutters.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to ``private
    and family life, home and correspondence'' and the right to protection
    of property; however, authorities in all areas infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights.
        In the RS, police routinely conduct searches of private homes
    without obtaining search warrants, citing emergency provisions in the
    law even in routine cases. This problem has not been observed in the
    Federation.
        Since the war, large numbers of citizens have been unable to
    reclaim their real property, either private or collectively owned, to
    which they had occupancy rights under the Communist system. Enactment
    of property legislation has proceeded in both entities under pressure
    from the international community. In October 1999, the High
    Representative issued several directives intended to accelerate
    evictions and enable more returns. However, implementation of the
    revised property laws has been extremely slow. In the Federation, as of
    the end of October, 54 percent of the property claims had been
    adjudicated and 25 percent of the property returned. As of the same
    time in the RS, only 28 percent of the property claims had been decided
    and 11 percent of property returned. By some estimates, resolving
    property claims in the RS at the current rate will take another 10
    years. The political leadership at all levels in both entities, but
    especially in the RS and in Croat areas of Herzegovina, continues to
    obstruct minority returns by delaying needed reforms and not
    implementing evictions and other property-related decisions. In
    Sarajevo, delays persisted due to the large backlog of cases, but
    political manipulation and obstruction decreased. During the year,
    approximately 10,000 Serbs returned to Sarajevo Canton, usually because
    of evictions of illegal occupants from their homes.
        Throughout the country, membership in the political party
    affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to
    obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of
    socially owned enterprises (see Sections 2.b., 3, And 5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides a
    general statement supporting freedom of speech and of the press. Actual
    laws regarding freedom of the press are delegated to the cantons in the
    Federation and to the central authorities in the RS. Freedom of speech
    and of the press was respected partially in the Federation and in the
    western RS, but to a lesser extent in the eastern RS. Within the
    Federation, press freedom was restricted more severely in Croat-
    majority areas. The primary restraints on press freedom are control of
    the principal media by governing political parties and the politicized
    use of tax and financial inspections instigated by the dominant
    nationalist parties. In Croat-majority areas of the Federation, party-
    controlled media are the dominant electronic media and source of
    information. While there were some improvements in the development of a
    free and independent press, most media continued to be biased
    noticeably. In addition, threats to journalists from Government and
    extremist groups increased during the year.
        Some opposition and independent newspapers operate in the Bosniak-
    majority areas of the Federation and in the RS, principally in Banja
    Luka. Dnevni Avaz, which in the past was controlled largely by the SDA
    party, is the daily with the highest circulation. It has noticeably
    distanced itself from the SDA during the year. Dani and Slobodna Bosna
    are the most influential independent magazines in the Federation. One
    of the few independent magazines in the RS is Reporter, a weekly
    published by a former correspondent of the Belgrade-based independent
    magazine Vreme. Nezavisne Novine is an independent newspaper published
    previously only in the RS, but is now distributed in the Federation.
        There are two printing facilities in the Federation; the
    government-controlled Oko company and the facility owned by the
    newspaper Dnevni Avaz. After a series of labor strikes at Oko in late
    June, Dnevni Avaz took over printing of almost all publications
    previously printed by Oko until the strike ended several months later.
    In the RS, the state-owned printing company, Glas Srpski, has a virtual
    monopoly.
        The ruling parties exerted economic pressure by refusing to allow
    state-owned companies to advertise in the independent media. Some
    independent media in the two entities, for example, Dani and Reporter,
    assist in the distribution of each other's publications in their
    respective entities.
        The number of registered threats against journalists increased
    during the year. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE)-sponsored media helpline, established in November 1999,
    registered 128 cases of possible violations of the rights of
    journalists from November 1999 through October. Complaints of abuses to
    the helpline increased markedly during the April municipal elections
    and the November general elections. Intimidation of journalists and
    media outlets most commonly took the form of verbal or written threats
    to stop a particular line of inquiry or a concerted effort to harass
    media outlets through the misuse of government agencies, by performing
    tax audits or cutting off power and telephone lines. Groundless
    defamation lawsuits also were used against journalists, as well as
    actual physical attacks.
        In a survey conducted among representatives of 50 media outlets
    attending a countrywide journalist conference, 62 percent responded
    that they personally had experienced intimidation and interference with
    their work, including direct and indirect pressure applied by both
    political parties and elected or appointed officials.
        In April a journalist for Dnevni Avaz was assaulted by the driver
    of Federation Prime Minister Edhem Bicakcic, allegedly because of
    critical articles about the Prime Minister. Bicakcic initially refused
    to take responsibility for the actions of his driver or to discipline
    him, but after strong pressure from the international community, he
    took mild disciplinary action.
        Zeljko Kopanja, the editor in chief of Nezavisne Novine who lost
    both legs in a car bomb in October 1999, was threatened several times
    during the year by unknown persons. In June RS authorities arrested six
    individuals, including two former members of the RS police
    antiterrorist brigade, for attempted blackmail of Kopanja; however,
    they had not been charged in connection with the bombing by year's end.
        On June 10, Edin Avdic, a journalist from the weekly Slobodna
    Bosna, was assaulted at the entrance to his home hours after he
    received verbal threats from SDA Chief of Cultural Affairs Muhamed
    Korda. The journalist claims Korda warned him to stop writing articles
    about the cultural activities of the SDA. Avdic claimed that his
    attackers repeated the warning and added that next time he would be
    killed.
        On August 12, Srpsko Oslobodenje journalist Ljubisa Lazic was
    assaulted on the premises of Radio Srpsko Sarajevo by Marko Asanin,
    president of the regional board of the Srpsko Sarajevo Independent
    Party of Social Democrats (SNSD). According to Lazic, the attack was
    allegedly the culmination of a series of threats and harassment by
    Asanin, who at one point attempted to have local media excluded from
    sessions of the assembly of the Srpsko Novo Sarajevo municipality.
        On September 20 in Doboj, municipal SDS leader Milan Ninkovic
    publicly threatened Radio ZOS director and Oslobodenje correspondent
    Azemina Mulahuseinovic during an interview on NTV Doboj. On October 9,
    Deputy Manager of Glas Srpski Anton Kasipovic sustained serious head
    injuries during an assault by unknown persons. The police conducted an
    investigation but there was no progress at year's end.
        In April leaflets were distributed in the hard-line Croat town of
    Livno insulting the editor in chief of the independent radio station
    Studio N and one of its journalists. The pamphlet accused the two of
    being ``miserable mercenaries'' and ``spitting and vomiting on
    everything that represents Croat legal authority in Livno.'' Studio N
    had been the object of politically motivated pressures in the past,
    including the March 1999 beating of the wife of the journalist
    mentioned in the pamphlet.
        On June 6, tax authorities raided the daily Dnevni Avaz. Agents of
    the Federation Tax Administration initially arrived without explanation
    or a court order. These provisions were eventually met, but only after
    distribution of the newspaper was delayed. The Tax Administration
    subsequently presented Dnevni Avaz with a bill for $450,000 (928,000
    KM) for unpaid taxes in 1998, which the newspaper contested and claimed
    it is unable to pay. The raid followed the newspaper's transformation
    from partisan reporting in favor of the nationalist SDA party to more
    neutral reporting. The newspaper's transformation began in late 1999,
    before the April municipal elections, in which the SDA fared poorly.
    Editor in chief Mensur Osmovic said the newspaper had received threats
    from the SDA leadership for months and claimed that the main reason for
    the audit was Dnevni Avaz's articles about corruption implicating SDA
    leaders. Federation Prime Minister Edhem Bicakcic publicly attributed
    SDA losses in the elections to loss of control over the media and
    explicitly said Dnevni Avaz had to be brought under control.
        There was a decrease in the selective application of the slander
    laws by authorities to punish opponents since the High Representative
    suspended criminal penalties for libel in July 1999. Previously the
    possibility of imprisonment for slander and libel often was used to
    threaten journalists. In December 1999, the Federation presented a
    draft Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Defamation and Libel,
    which was criticized severely for the excessive fines it sanctioned.
    The law had not yet been adopted at year's end. Although fewer
    allegations of defamation are reaching the courts, the overall number
    of cases remains high, due to a slow rate of resolution and court
    backlogs.
        In March Slobodna Bosna editor Senad Avdic, who was convicted of
    defamation in June 1999, appealed his case. Bakir Alispahic, a public
    official, successfully charged Avdic with defamation over articles
    stating that Alispahic was a party to illegal financial transactions
    involving several banks, including Narodna Banka. Avdic has requested
    that his case be retried subsequent to resolution of a case involving
    Narodna Banka, which revealed evidence that may support his claims.
        The Independent Media Commission (IMC), established by the High
    Representative in 1998, is empowered to regulate broadcasting and other
    media in the country. In this capacity, the IMC licenses broadcasters,
    manages and assigns spectra for broadcasting, sets licensing fees, and
    enforces adherence to the code of practice. The IMC has broad authority
    to punish violations to the code of practice. It may issue warnings,
    impose fines, suspend or terminate licenses, seize equipment, and shut
    down operations of any broadcaster or media outlet in violation of the
    code of practice. The IMC issued numerous fines for violations of
    broadcasting standards to stations in both entities during the year.
        The largest television broadcasters are Radio Television Bosnia and
    Herzegovina (RTV BiH) in the Federation and Radio Television of
    Republika Srpska (RTRS) in the RS. The international community launched
    the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) in 1997 as a cross-entity broadcaster
    and source of objective news and public affairs programming. However,
    only a minority of viewers cites the OBN as their key source of news.
    Independent television outlets include TV Hayat, Studio 99, OBN Banja
    Luka affiliate Alternative TV (ATV), and several small television
    stations located throughout the country. Some of these broadcasters
    originally were municipal stations. They have not yet been fully
    privatized, and their legal ownership status remains unclear.
        The High Representative's decision of July 1999 to restructure the
    broadcasting system of Bosnia and Herzegovina still has not been
    implemented fully. The restructuring was to liquidate the existing
    broadcaster, Radio Television Bosnia and Herzegovina, and create a
    statewide public broadcasting corporation, the Public Broadcasting
    System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PBS BiH). Plans to incorporate
    elements of the OBN into the new PBS BiH still have not been
    implemented due to difficulties linked to producing a quality PBS news
    and public affairs program.
        The July 1999 decision also established Radio Television of the
    Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTV FBiH) as the public
    broadcasting company of the Federation. RTV FBiH is to broadcast on two
    channels offering a blend of Bosniak and Croat programming. The High
    Representative's decision specifies that ``programming must be based on
    truth, must respect human dignity and different opinions and
    convictions, and must promote the highest standards of human rights,
    peace and social justice, international understanding, protection of
    democratic freedoms and environment protection.'' The OHR appointed all
    21 members of the Board of Governors, including the 7 members who were
    to have been chosen by Parliament. SDA officials attempted to delay the
    transition to RTV FBiH and have attempted to exert influence on members
    of its new Board of Governors.
        The August 1999 decision by the High Representative imposing
    amendments to the RS broadcasting law has not been implemented fully.
    These amendments required Serb Radio Television (SRT) to change its
    name to Radio Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS). The High
    Representative required RTRS to comply with the country's broadcasting
    laws, regulations promulgated by the IMC or its successor, and the laws
    of the RS. On July 27, the High Representative dismissed the RTRS Board
    of Governors for obstructing international efforts to improve RTRS
    programs and management. The High Representative mandated that the new
    Board work with RS authorities and international experts to develop new
    legislation for the RTRS to bring it into conformance with
    international standards for public broadcasting.
        Until February Mostar-based Erotel TV conducted an extensive
    operation that retransmitted programs from state-run Croatian
    Television. The IMC declared Erotel broadcasts illegal in November
    1999, but Erotel refused to go off the air until the IMC, with SFOR and
    OHR assistance, forcibly shut down Erotel's transmitters on February
    17. Nationalistic Croat television continued to be broadcast by HTV-
    Mostar, which is owned by the three Croat municipalities in Mostar and
    is financed by the HDZ.
        Radio broadcasting in the Bosniak-majority areas of the
    Federation--particularly in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla--is diverse.
    Opposition viewpoints are reflected in the news programs of independent
    broadcasters. Independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in the
    RS, particularly in Banja Luka. Nez Radio and Radio Pegas report a wide
    variety of political opinions. Local radio stations broadcast in Croat-
    majority areas, but they are usually highly nationalistic. Local Croat
    authorities do not tolerate opposition viewpoints. One exception is
    Studio 88, in Mostar, which broadcasts reports from both sides of that
    ethnically divided city.
        Academic freedom was constrained. In the Federation, Serbs and
    Croats complained that SDA party members receive special treatment in
    appointments and promotions at the University of Sarajevo. The
    University of Banja Luka limits its appointments to Serbs. All
    institutions suffer from a lack of resources and staff. The University
    of Mostar remains divided into eastern and western branches, reflecting
    the continued ethnic divide in the city. However, the East Mostar
    University, despite persistent reports of ethnic discrimination, has
    significant ethnic diversity in its student body and staff. The rector
    of West Mostar University, Marko Tadic, was forced out of office by the
    university board of directors following his efforts to reform the
    University, which has been politicized and dominated by Croat
    nationalists since the war. Tadic had introduced strict standards for
    hiring and retention of faculty, removed photos of Croatian generals
    and other nationalist symbols, initiated contact with the Bosniak
    University in East Mostar, and proposed a review of the legitimacy of
    degrees issued during and immediately following the war.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, authorities imposed
    some limits on this right in practice. Opposition political parties
    freely staged rallies and campaign events during the April and November
    elections in Bosniak-dominated areas, although several parties decided
    not to operate in Croat-dominated areas out of concern for their
    safety. In the November election campaign, the SDP and other
    multiethnic parties increased their campaign activities in the RS;
    however, in general few non-Serb opposition parties or candidates
    campaigned in the RS (see Section 3).
        Refugees returning to visit homes in the RS or commemorate war dead
    were harassed and subject to violence in several incidents. On May 11,
    several buses carrying 180 Bosniak women to a memorial ceremony to mark
    the 8th anniversary of a massacre in the Bratunac area were stoned by
    an angry mob of Serbs. At least 10 Bosniak women were slightly injured
    by broken glass. RS authorities charged 29 Serbs for disturbing the
    peace several days later (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and a wide
    range of social, cultural, and political organizations functioned
    without interference; however, authorities imposed some limits on this
    right and indirect pressure constrained the activities of some groups.
    Although political party membership was not forced, many viewed
    membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way for
    residents to obtain, regain, or keep housing and jobs in the state-
    owned sector of the economy (see Section 6.a.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, including private and public worship, and in general,
    individuals enjoyed this right in predominately mixed and religious
    majority areas. However, the efforts of individuals to worship in areas
    in which they are an ethnic and religious minority were restricted by
    government and institutional harassment, and sometimes by societal
    violence. Some incidents resulted in damage to religious edifices and
    cemeteries.
        Administrative and financial obstacles to rebuilding religious
    structures impeded the ability of minorities to worship and even
    impeded their return in many areas. RS authorities have obstructed
    attempts to rebuild the 83 mosques in the RS that were destroyed during
    the war. A June 1999 Human Rights Chamber decision ordering the RS to
    swiftly grant the Islamic community the necessary permits for
    reconstruction of seven of Banja Luka's destroyed mosques largely has
    been ignored. RS authorities refused to issue necessary permits for the
    reconstruction of any of the mosques or other Islamic community-owned
    buildings in Banja Luka, particularly the symbolically important
    Ferhadija Central Mosque. The RS government allowed the Muslim
    community to block off the site, but has not yet allowed reconstruction
    to begin. In December Ivan Mandic, an HDZ hard-liner and the head of
    Mostar Municipality Southwest (MSW) refused to grant permission for
    reconstruction of Baba Besir Mosque, one of three mosques in MSW that
    were destroyed during the war. Reconstruction of a mosque near Zvornik
    began in May, and Islamic leaders declared reconstruction of a mosque
    in Kozarac complete in August.
        In December the Human Rights Chamber concluded that local
    authorities in Bijelina had prevented reconstruction of five mosques
    that had been destroyed in 1993 and had allowed buildings to be
    constructed on two of the former mosque sites, a parking lot on one,
    and flea markets on the remaining two. RS authorities had ignored an
    order by the Chamber in 1999 to halt construction on one site. The
    Chamber ordered that permits be granted for reconstruction of the five
    mosques. No action by the authorities has been taken by year's end.
        In February the Human Rights Chamber determined that the municipal
    government of Prnjavor, in the RS, had discriminated against its
    Islamic community by closing the local Muslim cemetery. The municipal
    government had ordered a Bosniak to move his deceased wife's remains
    from the Muslim cemetery to a ``new'' Muslim cemetery. At a February
    1999 Human Rights Chamber hearing concerning the case, evidence
    indicated that there was in fact no new Muslim cemetery in the area and
    that no reasonable grounds existed for closing the old Muslim cemetery
    (nearby Catholic and Orthodox cemeteries remained open). Prnjavor
    municipal authorities were ordered to allow burials within a month. By
    the end of the year, Prnjavor authorities had complied with the order
    and removed the ban on Muslim burials.
        Public schools offer religious education classes, which, in theory,
    are optional. However, schools generally do not hire teachers to offer
    religious education classes to students of minority religions. In some
    cases, children who choose not to attend the religion classes offered
    are subject to pressure and discrimination from peers and teachers.
    Schools in Sarajevo canton, except for non-Bosniak schools, offer only
    Islamic religion classes. In Croat-majority West Mostar, minority
    students theoretically have the right to take classes in non-Catholic
    religions; however, this option does not exist in practice. Orthodox
    symbols are present in public schools throughout the RS. For a variety
    of reasons, minority families with children have been slow to return to
    the RS. Consequently, municipalities have not been compelled yet to
    address the issue of minority religious education. On May 10, the
    Education Ministries of both entities and the Deputy Federation
    Education Minister agreed on a standard curriculum, which requires all
    schools to teach the shared cultural heritage of all three communities.
        In Bosniak-dominated Zenica, the Catholic school closed temporarily
    in March after school officials received a bomb threat. Although local
    authorities later discovered that the threat was a hoax, Zenica's few
    remaining Catholics are concerned for their safety. On June 25, an
    explosive device destroyed a Catholic chapel in Zivinice.
        In Croat-dominated areas of Herzegovina, Muslims feel pressure not
    to practice their religion in public and have been the subject of
    violent attacks. For example, in the Croat- dominated western Bosnian
    town of Glamoc, a building housing all of the local Muslim
    organizations and the apartment of a Muslim cleric was bombed and
    damaged seriously in April.
        In April RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik shared the stage at an
    interfaith conference in the RS government's headquarters in Banja Luka
    with the newly appointed Mufti of Banja Luka and three other Muslim
    clerics. In Mostar religious leaders representing all groups except
    Catholics attended celebrations for Muslim, Jewish, and Orthodox
    holidays.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for ``the
    right to liberty of movement and residence,'' and freedom of movement,
    including across the IEBL, continued to improve; however, some limits
    remained in practice. The IPTF and SFOR completed the dismantling of
    all permanent police checkpoints in 1999, greatly enhancing freedom of
    movement.
        Freedom of movement improved significantly with the introduction of
    universal license plates in 1998. The new plates do not identify the
    vehicles as being registered in predominantly Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, or
    Bosnian Croat areas.
        Accurate statistics on refugee returns remained difficult to
    obtain. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
    between the end of the war in 1995 and October 31, 364,391 persons who
    left the country had returned. More than 174,000 returned from Germany
    alone, due to the German Government's policy of actively pressuring
    refugees to return to Bosnia. Most of those returning from Europe were
    unable to return to their prewar homes in the RS. Efforts by hard-line
    Croats to resettle returning refugees and consolidate the results of
    ethnic cleansing have ceased for the most part. The UNHCR reported that
    during the year there were 67,445 registered minority returns
    countrywide. Although the return figures are much less exact for those
    returning from other places within the country, the UNHCR reported that
    336,504 IDP's returned to their prewar homes between the end of the war
    and October, or roughly 20,000 during the year. While different refugee
    organizations provide different estimates on the numbers of minority
    returns, they all agree that the rate of minority returns during the
    year was more than twice that of 1999.
        In the spring, the international community began a concerted effort
    to compel the entity authorities to implement the property laws.
    Pressure from OHR (more than 20 obstructionist officials were dismissed
    in late December 1999) and a publicity campaign in the local media
    reinforced the message that illegal occupancies could not continue
    indefinitely. By the spring, with the pace of evictions growing
    rapidly, particularly in the RS, the number of returns also increased.
    Families and individuals increasingly abandoned occupied property
    voluntarily, with some returning to their heavily damaged or even
    destroyed dwellings. Although many of such returnees were Bosniaks,
    substantial numbers were Serbs and Croats. According to the UNHCR,
    35,836 Bosniaks, 11,591 Croats, and 18,852 Serbs returned to areas
    where they are in the minority.
        Pressure from evictions, combined with an increased sense of
    security in most areas of the country and an awareness that
    international assistance was not inexhaustible, prompted an increase in
    returns during the first half of the year. By April the rate of return
    was three times higher than for the same period in 1999. Although the
    pace decreased somewhat over the summer as it became apparent that
    reconstruction assistance would not be able to match the number of
    returnees, the rate of returns during the year was more than twice that
    of 1999. Thousands of returnees lived in tents or improvised shelters
    in their former villages and towns, hoping for assistance in rebuilding
    their homes.
        However, many problems remained to prevent returns, including the
    obstruction by hard-liners of implementation of property legislation,
    political pressure for individuals to remain displaced in order to
    increase ethnic homogeneity of the population in a specific area, and
    the lack of an ethnically neutral curriculum in public schools (see
    Section 5). For example, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC)
    reported that Roma from the RS (most of whom are Muslim) who were
    forced out of their homes allegedly have had serious difficulties
    returning to their prewar homes. The ERRC reported that Roma have had
    to pay financial compensation, ranging from $1,500 to $5,000 (3,000 to
    10,000 KM) to Serbs occupying their prewar homes in order to move back.
    The ERRC also reported that some Roma's homes are occupied by RS
    government bodies.
        The 1998 Sarajevo Declaration was intended to showcase Sarajevo as
    a model city in terms of tolerance. The declaration was to provide for
    improvements in areas that hindered return: Legislation, housing,
    security and public order, employment, and education, with a goal of
    20,000 minority returns for the canton during 1998. This number of
    returns was not reached until February. During the year, with the
    implementation of the October 1999 revised property laws, the rate of
    evictions in the city increased considerably and the pace of decisions
    increased; however, a large backlog of cases remains. Many of those
    evicted returned to their destroyed property in the eastern RS, where
    some received reconstruction assistance.
        During 1998 the Federation army unlawfully took control of 4,000
    former Yugoslav military (JNA) apartments that had been abandoned and
    repaired by a Dutch company. Prewar residents continue to wait to
    return to these apartments, while authorities encouraged occupants to
    begin the purchasing process. After inadequate action by local
    authorities, several of these cases were brought before the Human
    Rights Chamber. No returns to former JNA apartments have taken place.
    There have been no reports to indicate progress in resolving this issue
    during the period covered by this report.
        The continued influence of ethnic separatists in positions of
    authority also hindered minority returns. Much of Croat-controlled
    Herzegovina and towns in eastern RS remained resistant to minority
    returns. IDP's living in those areas, even those who privately
    indicated interest in returning to their prewar homes, frequently were
    pressured to remain displaced, while those who wished to return were
    discouraged, often through the use of violence. In particular, IDP's in
    the hard-line RS areas of Bratunac and Srebrenica, mostly from
    Sarajevo, were intimidated from attempting to return (see Section
    1.c.). For example, in June Serb IDP's living in Kotorsko blocked the
    main Sarajevo-Brod highway for several hours after Bosniaks began
    returning to the village to clean their property. The Serbs were angry
    because they were unable to return to their homes in Vozuca, which
    continue to be occupied by Bosniak refugees from Srebrenica. Several
    days after the blockade, Bosniaks blocked another portion of the
    highway to call attention to Serb harassment and intimidation, which
    was obstructing their return to Kotorsko. In mid-July several hundred
    Bosniaks blocked a main road near Maglaj, in central Bosnia, to protest
    the impending eviction of Muslim fundamentalist families occupying Serb
    property in the village of Bocinja. The blockade lasted for several
    days. However, within weeks of the end of the blockade, authorities
    began evicting Muslim families from Bocinja without incident.
        Despite these obstacles, ethnic minority refugees and IDP's began
    returning to their destroyed villages in increasing numbers in some
    areas of Herzegovina and the eastern RS. For example, in the spring
    Bosniaks began returning to Zepa, the outskirts of Foca, and even
    villages near Visegrad. In the summer, several Bosniaks returned to
    Srebrenica town, and dozens more returned to several outlying villages.
    Elsewhere in the RS, Bosniaks began returning to the center of Prijedor
    and Doboj. Serb returns accelerated in the Capljina area of
    Herzegovina. However, local government officials continue to obstruct
    minority returns to Drvar and to harass Serb returnees.
        Government leaders in both the RS and the Federation often have
    used a variety of tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the
    return of IDP's (see Section 1.c.).
        The increased number of ethnically integrated police forces helped
    improve the climate for returns, although security remained inadequate
    in some areas.
        The continued depressed state of the economy throughout the country
    and the consequent lack of employment opportunities for returnees
    remained a serious obstacle to a significant number of returns. As a
    result, most minority returnees were elderly. This placed a burden on
    receiving municipalities. Younger minority group members, who depend on
    adequate wages to support families, generally remained displaced,
    especially in cases in which they had managed over the past 7 years to
    find work.
        Officially, the Government grants asylum and refugee status in
    accordance with international standards. The Government generally
    cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. During the year, approximately 3,000 refugees from
    the Kosovo conflict continued to reside in refugee camps in Bosnia.
    Some are planning to return to Kosovo, with some seeking asylum abroad.
    Approximately 5,000 to 10,000 Serbs who fled Kosovo or Serbia during
    the Kosovo confrontation are believed to be in the RS in private
    accommodation. Less than 1,000 Sandzaks are believed to still reside in
    private homes. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
    a place where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Although a permanent election law is not yet in place, the Dayton
    Accords commit the parties to ``ensure that conditions exist for the
    organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically
    neutral environment'' and to ensure the right to ``vote in secret
    without fear or intimidation.'' The Dayton Peace Accords gave the OSCE
    primary responsibility for the organization and supervision of the
    country's post-war elections. The OSCE organized and supervised general
    elections in 1996, 1998, and November; municipal elections in 1997 and
    April; and special elections for the RS National Assembly in 1997. The
    OSCE released a draft of the election law in December 1999 that would
    transfer responsibilities for running elections to the Government, but
    it has not been adopted yet by the Parliament.
        In July President Alija Izetbegovic announced that he would resign
    from the three-person Bosnian presidency in October. Because the
    Bosnian Constitution did not specify the succession procedure, the
    parliamentary assembly adopted a controversial law establishing a
    procedure that gave final decision to the indirectly elected House of
    Peoples over the House of Representatives. Wolfgang Petritsch, the High
    Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, imposed an amendment to
    rectify this shortcoming. The Bosniak speaker of the Parliament, Halid
    Genjac, was named to serve as Izetbegovic's temporary replacement. At
    year's end, a permanent replacement had not been elected.
        The November general elections were held without violence, although
    there were incidents of voter intimidation, multiple voting, and
    illegal preelection campaigning. The OSCE issued 28 decisions
    sanctioning or censuring parties or individuals for violations of
    election rules, ranging from slogans fostering ethnic hatred to
    obstructing audits of party financing. While most voting irregularities
    were not significant enough to influence the outcome, an HDZ-organized
    referendum held on election day provided a platform for nationalist
    rhetoric that likely increased support for nationalist parties,
    particularly among Croat and Bosniak voters. Voter turnout during the
    April and November elections was around 65 percent. Compared with
    previous years, there was a large decrease in the number of absentee
    ballots during both elections; however, such a decrease most likely was
    a result of refugee returns to Bosnia and a lower level of interest
    among voters abroad. By the end of the year, the process of
    implementing results of the November general elections was still
    underway.
        Municipal elections held in April largely were peaceful; however,
    several incidents, some violent, occurred. Two incidents were directed
    against the international community, while others resulted from
    conflict between political parties within ethnic groups. A Bosnian Serb
    male, acting alone, attacked an IPTF member with a stick near a polling
    place in Bijeljina in the RS. The OSCE reported that there were no
    major attempts at fraud, manipulation, or disruption of the election
    process, but observers noted widespread problems with incomplete voting
    lists that discouraged or prevented some citizens from voting. While
    nationalist parties in Serb- and Croat-dominated areas continued to
    attract the support of a significant portion of the electorate, the
    moderate, multiethnic parties, such as the SDP, gained strength. A
    number of electoral reforms that are contained in the draft election
    law, including provisions for preferential and open list voting,
    multimember constituencies, and new campaign finance regulations, were
    applied during the April municipal elections.
        Implementation of the results of the April municipal elections was
    smoother than in 1997, according to the OSCE. A greater familiarity
    with the laws at the local level improved the process, although 5
    months after the elections, 20 of the 146 municipalities had still not
    completely implemented the results. The OSCE screening of candidates to
    eliminate those candidates who illegally occupied refugee homes, held
    conflicting positions, or who previously had been removed from office
    by the High Representative, partially contributed to the delay.
    Obstructionism caused delays in some municipalities, such as in Vares,
    where the SDA repeatedly nominated unacceptable candidates who were
    rejected by the OSCE.
        Continued party control of the media and security apparatus
    precluded full citizen participation without intimidation, especially
    in Bosnian Croat areas and parts of the RS. To varying degrees, all
    major parties attempted to exclude other parties in areas they control.
    This was especially true in areas controlled by the SDS or the HDZ.
    However, observers believe that recent changes to the media law in the
    RS and the new media law in the Federation have improved the situation
    somewhat (see Section 2.a.).
        A democratically elected, multiethnic local government is to
    administer the Brcko municipality as a district under the direct
    oversight of the Brcko supervisor. Until new laws are issued or
    existing laws adapted, the supervisor retains discretion as to which
    laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in Brcko. A new district statute
    was issued by the supervisor on December 7 1999, and a districtwide
    multiethnic police force was established officially in January.
        Women generally are underrepresented in government and politics,
    although a few women, such as the former President of the RS, have
    occupied prominent positions. In the three legislatures, women were
    underrepresented seriously. To address this concern, election rules
    established by the OSCE prior to the 1998 general elections required
    parties to include no fewer than 3 members of each gender among the top
    10 names on their candidate lists. However, in the state-level House of
    Representatives (lower house), 2 of 42 deputies are women, compared
    with 12 before the November elections. There were no women in the
    state-level House of Peoples (upper house), whose representatives are
    appointed by the entity legislatures, prior to the November elections;
    the current upper house still was being formed by year's end. In the
    Federation legislature, 21 of 140 deputies in the House of
    Representatives are women. In the RS unicameral legislature, 15 of 83
    deputies are women, compared with 19 before the most recent elections.
    During the April municipal elections, the Provisional Election
    Commission mandated that one in every three candidates be a woman. 590
    women were elected, constituting 18 percent of successful candidates.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The authorities generally permitted outside investigations of
    alleged human rights violations. International and local NGO's involved
    in human rights appear to operate with relative freedom. The OHR
    reports that foreign government and NGO human rights monitors were able
    to travel without restriction in all areas of the country.
    International community representatives were given widespread and for
    the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and prisoners
    in the RS as well as in the Federation.
        While monitors enjoyed relative freedom to investigate human rights
    abuses, they rarely were successful in persuading the authorities in
    all regions to respond to their recommendations. Monitors'
    interventions often met with delays or outright refusal.
        The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber and the Office of Human
    Rights Ombudsperson, two institutions created under Annex 6 of the
    Dayton Accords to investigate and adjudicate human rights violations,
    continued to expand during the year. During the first 11 months of the
    year, the Chamber's caseload increased to 6,353 registered cases and
    the Chamber issued 632 final case decisions. The pace of decisions
    issued by the Chamber increased due to the body of jurisprudence that
    the Chamber established in its previous 3 years of existence and to
    which the Chamber is now able to refer. In addition, the Chamber's
    increased experience in adjudicating human rights cases has led to more
    efficient operation. While governmental cooperation with the Chamber is
    still weak, the Federation made progress in implementing Chamber
    decisions, including many occupancy-rights cases and compensation-
    awards cases. While the efforts by the Federation to implement Chamber
    decisions have generally brought it into compliance with almost all
    decisions, the RS has made minimal or no effort to implement decisions
    of the Chamber. The cases implemented in the RS so far have required
    relatively simple actions by the Government, such as canceling eviction
    orders for residents who still were living in contested houses. In
    February the RS National Assembly passed a law establishing an
    ombudsperson committee for the RS, a three-person, multiethnic
    institution; the first three Ombudspersons were appointed at the end of
    April.
        Cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague is a key factor in the
    implementation of the Dayton Accords and the establishment of respect
    for human rights. In 1998 RS Prime Minister Dodik altered the RS policy
    of defiance of the Tribunal and the Dayton Accords by instructing his
    officials to cooperate with the ICTY; however, no action was taken in
    practice. A majority of the 26 ICTY public indictees who remain at
    large reportedly live in the RS, some allegedly in Prijedor and Foca.
    RS authorities made no effort to arrest these indictees.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The parties agreed in the Dayton Accords to reject discrimination
    on such grounds as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or
    other opinion, national or social origin, or association with a
    national minority. Nevertheless, there were many cases of
    discrimination.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Credible NGO observers
    reported that violence against women, including spousal abuse and rape,
    remained widespread and underreported. A report by the International
    Helsinki Federation for Human Rights estimates that about 30 percent of
    women in the country are victims of domestic violence; however, there
    is little data available regarding the extent of the problem.
    Throughout the country, rape and violent abuse are considered criminal
    offenses. The laws prohibit rape in both the Federation and the RS.
    Spousal rape and spousal abuse are also illegal in the Federation.
    However, domestic violence usually was not reported to the authorities;
    a sense of shame reportedly prevents some victims of rape from coming
    forward to complain to authorities.
        The police have little or no training in investigating cases of
    domestic violence, and there were reports of police inaction in cases
    of domestic violence and sexual assault. According to human rights
    groups, in one case, a police officer from Zvornik was accused of
    raping two teenage girls. The father reported the incident to the local
    police station, but the officers on duty did not record the complaint.
    When the police finally interviewed the victims, the accused officer
    was allowed to be present in the room. The IPTF has requested an
    independent investigation. The OHR reported that in one case, police
    answering a call about domestic abuse noticed injuries on the woman and
    her minor daughter, but offered only to take them to the hospital. The
    woman, who had previously reported other incidents of abuse to the
    police, later committed suicide. In Canton 4, a police officer hung up
    on a midnight call from a daughter calling for help when her father
    threatened her mother with a knife. No record of the complaint was
    made. The IPTF has called for an investigation and for disciplinary
    action against the duty officer.
        Trafficking in women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
    Union for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious and growing
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police primarily arrest
    women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or those managing
    the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced or forced into
    prostitution have little recourse (see Section 6.f.).
        There is little legal discrimination against women, and women serve
    as judges, doctors, and professors; however, a male-dominated society
    prevails in both entities, particularly in rural areas, with few women
    in positions of real economic power or political power.
        Women have been discriminated against in the workplace in favor of
    demobilized soldiers, and a small but increasing number of gender-
    related discrimination cases have been documented. Anecdotal accounts
    indicate that women and men receive equal pay at socially owned
    enterprises but not necessarily at private businesses. Women are
    entitled to 12 months' maternity leave and may be required to work no
    more than 4 hours per day until a child is 3 years old. However, women
    in all parts of the country encounter problems with regard to the
    nonpayment of maternity leave allowances and the unwarranted dismissal
    of pregnant women and new mothers. A woman with underage children may
    not be required to perform shift work.
        Children.--The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is
    incorporated by reference in the Dayton Accords and has the effect of
    law in both entities. The end of the fighting brought a major
    improvement in the human rights of children. During the war nearly
    17,000 children were killed, 35,000 were wounded, and over 1,800 were
    permanently disabled.
        Social services for children are in extremely short supply.
    Disabled children lack sufficient medical care and educational
    opportunities. Education is free and is compulsory through the age of
    15 in both the Federation and the RS. The most serious issue is the
    ethnic division of the education system. Students in minority areas
    frequently face a hostile environment in schools that do not provide an
    ethnically neutral setting. At times minority children are barred from
    attending school at all. Local education officials excuse such abuses
    by claiming that minority children should have their own schools and
    curricula. Obstruction by politicians and government officials has
    slowed international efforts to remove discriminatory material from
    textbooks and enact other needed reforms.
        Steps were taken during the year to integrate minority students
    into some schools. In May approximately 85 Bosniak children who had
    been attending home schools in Stolac were integrated into the Stolac
    Elementary School, which previously had taught only Croat children.
    Similar integration took place in Vares. However, segregation and
    discrimination are entrenched in Bosnian schools, particularly in
    religious education (see Section 2.c.). For example, in Sarajevo only
    Muslim religion classes were offered in public schools, which denied
    children of other faiths the opportunity to study their own religious
    traditions in school. In August Romani refugees from Kosovo protested
    the local authorities' decision that Romani children from the
    Smrekovica refugee center in Breza could not attend the local primary
    school. Although the UNHCR had arranged for 60 Romani children from the
    camp to enroll in a local primary school, the mayor intervened to
    prevent the children from enrolling, allegedly because of a lack of
    space at the school. In a compromise, two rooms in the camp were
    converted into classrooms; however, at year's end the children still
    were barred from the local school.
        There was no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    Nonetheless, they continue to suffer disproportionately from the
    societal stress of the postwar era. There have been credible but
    unconfirmed reports that children are trafficked to work in begging
    rings (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Trafficking in girls for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Federation Government is required by
    law to assist disabled persons to find employment and to protect them
    against discrimination. In the RS, discrimination against the disabled
    also is prohibited by law. Currently there are few jobs available, and
    thousands of newly disabled victims entered the job market after the
    war. The Government has limited resources to address the special needs
    of the disabled. There are no legal provisions mandating that buildings
    be made accessible to the physically disabled. There are a number of
    international NGO's that assist the disabled in the country.
        Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are identified
    closely in the country. The Interreligious Council, established in 1997
    and composed of the main leaders of the country's four major religious
    communities--Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Jewish--
    continued its efforts to promote national reconciliation. The OSCE and
    the OHR facilitated many interfaith meetings at the local level as
    well.
        However, throughout the country, religious minorities were
    pressured and were intimidated by the ethnic/religious majority.
        On June 25, a Catholic chapel in Zivinice in the RS reportedly was
    destroyed by an explosive device. Also in June, unknown persons broke
    into the home of a Catholic priest in Derventa parish.
        RS authorities continue to impede the rebuilding of the mosques in
    the RS destroyed during the war, despite requests from the Muslim
    community for reconstruction (see Section 2.c.). Religious minorities
    throughout the country occasionally faced limited interference from the
    authorities in their right to worship freely. However, Catholic priests
    reported that they were able to conduct masses in the RS with little or
    no problems.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Claimed ``ethnic differences''
    were used to justify the war and remain a powerful political force in
    the country. Although some politicians still support the concepts of a
    ``Greater Serbia'' and a ``Greater Croatia,'' mixed communities exist
    peacefully in a growing number of areas, including Sarajevo and Tuzla.
    The SDS, HDZ, and to a lesser extent the primarily Bosniak SDA sought
    to manipulate the movement of persons and the access to housing and
    social services that they control to ensure that the ethnic groups with
    which they are associated consolidate their position in their
    respective geographic regions. Some hard-line local authorities in the
    eastern RS sought to keep information regarding the right to return and
    conditions in return sites from reaching displaced persons in their
    areas, so as to dissuade them from attempting to return to their former
    homes.
        In 1998 the RS passed new property legislation establishing a
    claims process at the municipal level. The High Representative extended
    the deadline to file claims on socially-owned apartments until April
    19. In addition in October 1999, the OHR issued a series of decrees
    amending a number of property laws in both entities to provide all
    citizens just and equal protection of their property rights, which is
    considered essential in order for IDP's to return to their former
    homes.
        Despite hopeful signs in some areas, harassment and discrimination
    against minorities continued throughout the country, often centering on
    property disputes. These problems included desecration of graves,
    arson, damage to houses of worship, throwing explosive devices into
    residential areas, harassment, dismissal from work, threats, assaults,
    and, in some cases, killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        On April 11, a group of Bosniaks attacked five Romani men in
    Banovici, reportedly because the Bosniaks believed the Roma had voted
    for a nonnationalist political party in the municipal elections.
    Amnesty International reported that local police present at the scene
    made no effort to protect the Roma.
        Ethnic tensions remained high in Brcko. In mid-October, about 1,000
    Bosnian Serb students staged violent protests for 3 days to demand
    separate schools from those of Muslims and Croats. The protests began
    after a group of Bosnian Serb students beat a Bosniak student; after
    the beating, Bosniak students demanded better security and Serb
    students began calling for separate schools. Currently, Serb and
    Bosniak students share high school buildings but attend classes in two
    shifts.
        Bosnian Serb and Croat politicians seek to increase the ethnic
    homogeneity of the population in areas they control by discouraging
    IDP's of their own ethnicity from returning to their prewar homes if
    they would be in the minority there. Hard-liners also encourage members
    of their groups currently living in areas where they are minorities to
    move to areas where their ethnic group is the majority. Hard-line
    Bosnian Croats continued to discourage some Croat returns to central
    Bosnia and actively have recruited displaced Croats to resettle in
    Herzegovina; however, this intimidation has decreased and 4,147 Croats
    returned to Central Bosnia Cantons during the year. Although the new RS
    Government officially supports the right to return, it continues to
    obstruct returns on many levels. Bosniak authorities appear tacitly to
    support some Bosniak resettlement efforts, including resettlement of
    returnees, in ``strategic'' areas of the Federation where Bosniaks are
    in the minority.
        In some cases, opponents of refugee returns used violence,
    including sporadic house burnings, and orchestrated demonstrations in
    an effort to intimidate returnees. In mid-December in the RS, the house
    of a Bosnian Croat returnee from Croatia was stoned by hard-line Croats
    opposed to his return. While incidents of violence have decreased due
    to improved security and freedom of movement, other forms of
    discrimination have not. In particular discrimination in employment and
    education are now key obstacles to sustainable returns. Widespread
    firing of ethnic minorities during and after the war has not been
    reversed in most cases, and members of the ethnic majority in a region
    often are hired over former employees who are minorities. Favoritism is
    also shown to veterans and families of those killed during the war.
    There recently have been more reported cases of employment
    discrimination based on political affiliation.
        Vague provisions in the labor law passed in the Federation in
    October 1999 allowed employers to create barriers for minorities
    seeking to regain employment. Amendments passed in August clarified the
    law; however, the authorities did not enforce it consistently and
    discrimination persists. There were no provisions in RS law to prevent
    discrimination in hiring and firing outside the Constitution until
    passage of a labor law in September. Several court cases regarding
    discrimination are pending; however, workers seldom obtained protection
    from the courts, which barely function.
        Throughout the country, membership in the political party
    affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest method to
    obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of
    socially owned enterprises. Membership also was influential in
    obtaining or keeping housing (see Section 2.b.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitutions of the Federation
    and the RS provide for the right of workers to form and join unions, as
    do recently passed labor laws in both entities. There are no legal
    restrictions on who may join unions, and the right of minority workers
    to join unions is protected in both entities. However, in practice
    union membership in the RS is overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb and in the
    Federation overwhelmingly Bosniak. Bosnian Croats have informal labor
    organizations in areas where they are the dominant ethnic group, but
    generally are represented by the Federation union. A joint-entity union
    has been established in the district of Brcko. Union membership is
    mandatory for officially employed workers in the RS; in the Federation,
    approximately 70 percent of the official workforce is unionized.
        Unions legally are independent of the Government and political
    parties, but are highly politicized. There are no legal restrictions on
    forming new unions; however, in practice one union confederation in
    each entity represents all workers. A new confederation of trade unions
    tried to register with the Federation, but was unsuccessful due to
    political interference by the established confederation. In the RS, the
    sector-based branches of the union confederation have become
    increasingly independent, and one branch successfully has broken off
    from the umbrella organization.
        Unions have the right to strike and increasingly have used that
    right to pressure for payment of overdue salaries or wages, protest or
    demand changes in management, and voice their opinion on economic
    reform and government policy. Indeed, protest is often the only way to
    compel the payment of salaries or wages. Most strikes are legal;
    however, the Government claimed that some were illegal (on the grounds
    that they were not announced far enough in advance, or 48 hours) in an
    attempt to avoid negotiations. A Law on Strikes governs strike activity
    in both entities, and retaliation against strikers is prohibited. There
    were several major strikes, including those by teachers and health care
    workers, due to arrears in salaries of several months or more.
        The Government was found to be in violation of ILO Convention 111
    (on employment discrimination) and 158 (on termination of employment)
    in November 1999 because of its failure to act in the case of workers
    at Aluminj Mostar who were dismissed because of their non-Croat
    ethnicity during the war. Aluminj Mostar has protested the ILO ruling,
    arguing that it did not have the opportunity to respond to the union
    complaint.
        Both the Federation and RS passed comprehensive labor legislation
    in August and September as part of loan conditions established by the
    World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This legislation brings
    the legal code in line with most international standards; however,
    implementing provisions were not in place by year's end.
        Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
    affiliate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is provided for in the Law on Working Relations in the RS
    and in a comprehensive collective agreement in the Federation; however,
    collective bargaining rarely is used. The substantial number of
    government employees, particularly in the RS, permits the Government to
    remain highly influential in determining the overall level of wages in
    each entity.
        The Law on Labor in both entities prohibits discrimination by
    employers against union members and organizers, in accordance with ILO
    standards. However, discrimination continues (see Section 5).
        There were no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children; however, women and girls were trafficked for the purpose of
    forced prostitution (see Section 6.f). The country is a major transit
    point for illegal immigrants; the International Organization for
    Migration (IOM) confirmed one case of a man being trafficked for forced
    labor and held against his will (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children in the
    Federation and in the RS is 15 years. The law on labor prohibits
    children from performing hazardous work, such as night work. Child
    labor is not known to be a problem; however, children sometimes assist
    their families with farm work and odd jobs. Children are covered under
    the Constitution's prohibition against forced or compulsory labor, and
    such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). There have
    been credible but unconfirmed reports that children are trafficked to
    work in begging rings (see Section 6.f.). Trafficking in girls for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage in the
    Federation is $100 (200 KM); in the RS it is $32 (65 KM). The minimum
    wage was insufficient to provide for a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. Many workers have outstanding claims for payment of
    salaries and pensions.
        The legal workweek is 40 hours, and overtime pay is required by
    law; however, ``seasonal'' workers may work up to 60 hours per week.
    Rest and vacation rules exceed international standards. For example,
    women are allowed 1 year of maternity leave.
        Occupational safety and health regulations generally are ignored
    because of the demands and constraints imposed by an economy devastated
    by war. Neither entity has completed passage of new laws to enforce
    international worker rights standards. Workers cannot remove themselves
    from hazardous working conditions without endangering their continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a serious and growing problem. The
    country is mainly a destination point, and to a lesser extent an origin
    and transit point, for women and girls who are trafficked for the
    purpose of forced prostitution. Most victims are from Eastern Europe
    and the former Soviet Union. A significant number of women are
    manipulated or coerced into situations in which they work in brothels
    in conditions close to slavery. The country is extremely vulnerable to
    trafficking in persons, because of weak laws, almost nonexistent border
    controls, and corrupt police who are bribed easily. As many as 5,000
    trafficked women may be working in the country. Previous estimates of
    the problem by the Office of the U. N. High Commissioner for Human
    Rights (OHCHR) were overinflated due to unavailability of hard
    statistics; however, credible sources report that the problem is
    growing. From March 1999 to January 2001, there were 384 confirmed
    cases of women trafficked for sexual exploitation; 236 women were
    returned to their home countries. The IPTF reports that they have
    encountered approximately 4,000 women in their raids of bars and
    estimate that 10 percent of the women have been trafficked. The IOM
    confirmed two cases of Bosnian women who were trafficked to other
    countries. Organized crime elements control the trafficking business.
        The majority of trafficked women in Bosnia come from Moldova,
    Romania, and Ukraine, but also come from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
    and Bulgaria. The ages of the trafficked women averaged 22.8 years,
    ranging between 16 and 33 years of age. Less than 5 percent of the
    women were minors. Many of these women were lured by the promise of
    well-paying jobs abroad, and came in hope of improving their
    socioeconomic situation. Many women responded to advertisements that
    offered work in Italy or Germany as dancers, waitresses, and domestic
    servants. Most of the trafficked women cross through Yugoslavia or
    Hungary before entering the country. Many of them are sold in Belgrade,
    and from there are smuggled across the Drina river at Zvornik and
    Bijeljina into the country. Some traffickers brought in the women and
    girls specifically to work in the country's brothels. For a variety of
    reasons, traffickers stranded or abandoned some women en route to other
    countries. Some women are trafficked to Croatia to work as prostitutes
    there or to be trafficked to other countries. Trafficked women often
    are sold several times between different bar owners after arriving in
    Bosnia. Prices vary between $500 and $1,500 (1,000 to 3,000 KM) per
    woman, and the women often are expected to repay their ``owners'' this
    amount out of their allotted share of the earnings. There have been
    reports of trafficked women being physically and sexually assaulted,
    denied food, and threatened. A significant proportion of the
    traffickers is female.
        There have been credible but unconfirmed reports that children
    (boys and girls) are trafficked to work in begging rings, mainly in
    Sarajevo (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
        It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police arrest primarily
    women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or those managing
    the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced or forced into
    prostitution have little recourse. Authorities generally treat
    prostitution as a minor violation committed by the woman involved;
    however, the police do not charge employers or customers with any
    crimes. In most cases, the police do not conduct thorough
    investigations against the bar owners and others involved in the
    recruitment, transportation, and movement of such women, and
    prosecutions of those involved are rare. Women convicted of
    prostitution may be fined, imprisoned for 60 days, or deported. In the
    fall of 1999, the OHR issued directives governing police raids on
    brothels to ensure that trafficked women were provided assistance.
    While these directives reportedly have been followed, raids are
    infrequent. The country's deportation laws permit local police to
    release trafficked individuals in neighboring jurisdictions or across
    the border in Croatia. Police in Bihac, Gradacac, and Tuzla have broken
    up trafficking rings in recent years and deported the women. It is
    estimated that there are some 300 to 600 brothels in the country.
    Brothel operators reportedly earn $50 (100 KM) per hour per woman; in
    some cases women forced to work in brothels reportedly receive as
    little as $13 (25 KM) per month for personal expenses and are forced to
    find other money (often through begging) for essentials, including
    condoms. Other prostitutes reportedly earn $100 (200 KM) per month.
    Police in the Federation and the RS arrested and deported Russian and
    Ukrainian women working as prostitutes.
        Police officials in Brcko have been removed from office for
    involvement in prostitution, and there are allegations that police
    officers in other cities also may be involved. A May report by UNMBIH
    and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
    documented evidence of complicity by local police, international
    police, or SFOR in 14 out of 40 cases that it investigated between
    March 1999 and March 2000. In one case, an SFOR civilian paid $3,057
    (7,000 KM) to purchase two women from a brothel owner. On the basis of
    his misconduct, the man was relieved of his duties and barred from the
    SFOR area of operations; he left the country and no further action was
    taken.
        In many cases women are afraid to testify against their traffickers
    and the judicial system offers them little protection. There are no
    witness protection programs for women who testify against their
    traffickers. There have been confirmed reports of witnesses being
    threatened in court despite the presence of local police and
    international representatives. Local officials have been slow to bring
    charges of intimidation.
        The country is also a major transit point for illegal immigrants,
    and the IOM confirmed one case of a man being trafficked for forced
    labor and held against his will (see Section 6.c.).
        The Government has done very little to combat the problem of
    trafficking. However, the IOM and several NGO's, both local and
    foreign, are addressing the issue. The IOM has established a program to
    repatriate trafficked women who seek to return home. As of November,
    nearly 160 women had been repatriated through IOM's program. There are
    a number of shelters that house trafficked women while they await
    return to their countries of origin.
        The IPTF works with local police forces to free trafficked persons
    and to crack down on traffickers. However, there have been very few
    arrests to date. On October 30, Sarajevo Interior Ministry officers
    raided a nightclub and arrested 3 persons allegedly involved in
    trafficking the 17 women who were found there.
                                   __________

                                    BULGARIA

        Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically
    elected government. President Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic
    Forces (UDF) began a 5-year term of office in January 1997 following
    his election in late 1996. UDF leader Ivan Kostov currently serves as
    Prime Minister. The judiciary is independent but suffers from
    corruption and continues to struggle with structural and staffing
    problems.
        Internal security services are the responsibility of the Ministry
    of the Interior and include the National Police, the National Service
    for Combating Organized Crime, the National Security Service (civilian
    domestic intelligence), the National Gendarmery Service (paramilitary
    police), and the Border Police. Although government control over the
    police is improving, it still is not sufficient to ensure full
    accountability. The Special Investigative Service (SIS), which provides
    investigative support to prosecutors on serious criminal cases, is a
    judicial branch agency and therefore not under direct government
    control. Some members of the police committed serious human rights
    abuses.
        The country is in transition from an economy dominated by loss-
    making state enterprises, concentrated in heavy industry, to one
    dominated by the private sector. Around 80 percent of state assets
    destined for privatization--including enterprises in the chemicals,
    petroleum processing, and metallurgy sectors--have already been sold in
    a process that featured uneven degrees of transparency. Principal
    exports are agricultural products, tobacco products, chemicals and
    metals, although light industry--including textiles and apparel--is
    growing in importance. The private sector accounts for approximately 60
    percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Following a severe economic
    and political crisis in early 1997, a reformist government introduced a
    macroeconomic stabilization program based on a currency board. The
    program succeeded in bringing down inflation from triple digits in
    1996-97 to only 6.2 percent in 1999. The economy grew by 3.5 and 2.4
    percent in 1998 and 1999, and the Government forecasts more robust
    growth over the next several years. Between 4 and 5 percent growth was
    forecast for the year. The annual per capita GDP of $1,600 provides a
    relatively low standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, several serious problems remained in some areas,
    while there were improvements in a few others. The authorities were
    responsible for extrajudicial killings; police were responsible for the
    deaths of at least five persons during the year, and a Bulgarian
    military officer was accused of responsibility for the death of a
    conscript recruit. Security forces beat suspects and inmates and often
    arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Problems of accountability
    persist and inhibit government attempts to end police abuses.
    Conditions in many prisons and detention facilities were harsh, and
    there remained some instances of prolonged pretrial detention, although
    the Government has noticeably improved its performance in preventing
    defendants' period of pre-trial detention from exceeding the statutory
    limit (normally 1 year). The judiciary is underpaid, understaffed, and
    has a heavy case backlog; corruption is a serious problem. The
    Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. There were no reports
    of police abuse of journalists, although there were several unexplained
    incidents of violence against journalists by unknown parties.
    Constitutional restrictions on political parties formed on ethnic,
    racial, or religious lines effectively limit participation for some
    groups. Police, local government authorities, and private citizens
    continued to obstruct the activities of some nontraditional religious
    groups. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
    problems. Discrimination and societal violence against Roma were
    serious problems, resulting in one death. Because of a lack of funds,
    the social service system did not assist homeless and other vulnerable
    children adequately, notably Romani children. Security forces harassed,
    physically abused, and arbitrarily arrested and detained Romani street
    children. Child labor was a problem. Trafficking in women and girls was
    a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, law enforcement or military
    personnel killed at least six persons, of which one was a member of the
    Roma ethnic minority.
        The Ministry of Interior Act regarding the use of firearms by law
    enforcement officials permits them to use firearms to apprehend persons
    committing crimes or who have committed crimes, even if the crimes are
    only minor. Law enforcement officers also may use firearms to stop the
    escape of a person who has been arrested for any crime.
        On March 4, a police officer shot and killed Boyan Yovchev in
    Varna. The police officer was indicted by the military prosecutor for
    negligent homicide, which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years
    imprisonment. The defendant reached a plea bargain agreement, received
    a 2-year suspended sentence, and was fired from the police force.
        On June 14, Miroslav Marinov died in the hospital from injuries
    sustained while in police custody in Vratsa. Marinov had been released
    from police custody shortly before his death, and reportedly told
    family and friends before he died that he had been beaten severely by
    police. A police inquiry in response to the complaint concluded that
    there was no evidence that police officers were responsible for
    Marinov's death; no charges were filed.
        On July 5, Trycho Lyubomirov, a 19-year-old Roma man suspected by
    police of car theft, was shot and killed by police in Sofia, reputedly
    while attempting to flee police custody. Witnesses alleged that
    Lyubomirov was in handcuffs at the time that he was shot, according to
    human rights monitors. A police officer involved in the incident was
    charged by the military prosecutor with negligent use of a firearm,
    which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. The case was
    awaiting trial at year's end.
        On August 5, Emil Arnudov of Asenovgrad was beaten severely by two
    on-duty policemen after he allegedly caused a disturbance in a bar. He
    died of his injuries on August 15. One policeman was charged with
    homicide by the military prosecutor as a result of the incident, and
    remains in custody pending trial. The second policeman was cleared of
    responsibility. The regional police chief received a reprimand.
        On November 17, Rebin Yumer Mohamed, a 16-year-old Iraqi national
    of Kurdish heritage, was shot and killed by border police in an attempt
    to illegally cross the border into Bulgaria. Authorities stated that
    the boy was hit by a stray bullet, after a border patrol officer fired
    warning shots into the air. Mohamed was 1 of approximately 100 Kurdish
    refugees who were apprehended attempting the crossing. The shooting was
    ruled justifiable by the military prosecutor.
        On November 21, Dimitur Dimitrov, a conscript soldier, died of
    asphyxiation while running laps while wearing a gas mask. He reportedly
    had been ordered to do this by his commanding officer as punishment for
    tardiness. An investigation into the incident was pending at year's
    end.
        On July 28, Dimitrichka Marinova, a 41-year-old Roma woman, was
    shot and killed by a private security guard in the town of Dolni
    Chiflik, while trespassing in an apricot orchard. Police initially
    reported the shooting as accidental. The guard was later convicted and
    received a 2-year suspended sentence in a plea bargain agreement.
        The case of the 1999 killing of Gancho Vuchkov was closed without
    an indictment. There were no developments in the 1999 killing of Tancho
    Vasev. There were no developments in the investigation of the death of
    Kostadin Sherbetov, who died in police custody in 1999.
        The police officer sentenced in the 1998 killing of Yordan Yankov
    had his prison sentence reduced on appeal to a suspended sentence. The
    monetary damage penalty was allowed to stand. There were no
    developments in the 1998 killing of Tsvetan Kovatchev.
        Two police officers involved in the 1997 beating death of Mincho
    Surtmachev each had their sentences reduced on appeal. One was
    acquitted and released by the court, while the second received a 4-year
    sentence, of which he served 2 1/2 years and then was released. The
    court confirmed the monetary damage award to the victim's family of
    approximately $3500 (7000 leva). These cases are now closed.
        Two suspects are known to remain under active investigation for the
    1996 murder of former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov. Police arrested
    one man suspected of being the killer, who remains in police custody
    while the case is being investigated. Angel Vasiliev, who is suspected
    of ordering the murder, has been released from police custody after
    spending 1 year in jail, but reportedly remains under investigation.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, despite this prohibition,
    police commonly beat criminal suspects and members of minorities, at
    times to extract false testimony. In particular security forces
    physically abused street children, the majority of whom are Roma.
        Police are allowed to shoot any fleeing criminal suspect. On
    January 11, police shot and seriously injured Stefan Yordanov, a Romani
    man, in Burgas District. A nongovernmental organization (NGO) filed a
    complaint with the Regional Military Prosecution of Sliven; however,
    the Sliven prosecutor refused to open an investigation.
        On April 29, according to unconfirmed NGO reports, a 16-year-old
    Rom, Tsvetalin Petrov, suffered third-degree burns after allegedly
    being doused with an inflammable liquid and set on fire while in
    custody in the Vidin police station. Petrov had been arrested for
    breaking and entering and theft near Vidin. Police claimed Petrov was
    set on fire by an unknown perpetrator. An investigation is pending with
    the military prosecutor's office.
        On May 10, Atanas Dzhambazov, a 14-year-old Roma, was shot and
    wounded in the head and arm by a policeman while trespassing on the
    grounds of a factory near Sliven. Dzhambazov was taken to the hospital
    by relatives after allegedly being left at the scene by the police
    officer. An August 20 decision by the Sliven Military Court found the
    policeman, Surchanoy, guilty of negligence and imposed a fine of about
    $250 (500 leva). A civil lawsuit was pending at year's end.
        On August 6, an NGO reported that police officers severely beat
    Orhan Ahmedov and Marin Georgiev, two Romani men from Varbitsa. Ahmedov
    and Georgiev filed a complaint at the Sliven Regional Police
    Department. The next day the two men obtained medical certificates
    documenting their injuries and filed a complaint with the Regional
    Military Prosecutor's Office of Sliven. In August the Military
    Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation; the case remained
    pending at year's end.
        There were no reports of police abuse of journalists; however,
    there were several unexplained instances of violence against
    journalists by unknown persons (see Section 2.a.).
        According to Ministry of Interior (MOI) data, 20 cases of police
    brutality were confirmed for the period January 1 to June 30, out of a
    total of 179 complaints of police brutality filed. The police generally
    have refused to make investigative reports available to the public. The
    MOI statistics reflect only those complaints registered by the alleged
    victims. Human rights monitors report that they receive many more
    complaints from persons who are too intimidated to lodge an official
    complaint with the authorities.
        Reports continue that criminal suspects in police custody run a
    significant risk of being mistreated, most often during the initial
    interrogation. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) conducted a
    survey in prisons of incarcerated persons arrested after January 1 and
    found that 49 percent (compared with 51 percent in 1999) of interviewed
    prisoners reported that police officers used physical force against
    them during arrest; 44 percent (compared with 53 percent in 1999)
    reported mistreatment at police stations. Romani prisoners reported
    being abused more frequently than other prisoners. Very seldom are
    allegations of police abuse properly investigated nor are the offending
    officers consistently punished. In particular the Military Prosecutor's
    office has not investigated incidents of alleged police abuse
    thoroughly or expeditiously.
        Crime and corruption remained primary concerns of the Government
    during the year. It is too early to judge the long-term effects of
    changes in the Criminal Procedure Code, which became effective on
    January 1. These changes reduced the size of the SIS while reserving to
    it the responsibility for handling the most serious crimes. At the same
    time, many investigative duties were devolved to the police and the
    Government made a significant effort to provide training in
    investigative techniques to police officers. The criminal justice
    system is still in transition and questions about its effectiveness
    remain: It is not always clear exactly what duties the SIS has in fact
    retained, and there is little evidence that devolution of powers to
    police yet has resulted in increased numbers of completed
    investigations.
        Observers have noted modest improvement in the efficiency of moving
    cases through the criminal system, although many serious systemic flaws
    remain. The police struggled without result over the difficult issue of
    how to resolve a large backlog of outstanding investigation cases, some
    as much as 10 years old, which they inherited from the former pre-
    reorganization investigative service.
        There were several incidents of violence and harassment by private
    citizens of Roma during the year (see Section 5).
        Many observers allege that some members of the police, particularly
    in remote areas, are complicit in trafficking in persons, mostly women
    and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c.,
    6.d., and 6.f.).
        Conditions in some prisons are harsh and include severe
    overcrowding, inadequate lavatory facilities, and insufficient heating
    and ventilation. The SIS's parallel network of jails and prisons
    contains many of the harshest detention facilities. NGO prison monitors
    reported that brutality committed by prison guards against inmates
    continued to be a problem. Prison authorities sustained their battle
    against tuberculosis (TB), instituting a new procedure for regular
    testing. The overall magnitude of the TB problem remained steady during
    the year. The process by which prisoners may complain of substandard
    conditions or of mistreatment does not function effectively.
        The Government generally cooperated with requests by independent
    observers to monitor conditions in most prisons and detention
    facilities. However, unlike last year's relatively free access to SIS
    detention facilities, which was granted for the first time in 1999,
    human rights observers began to encounter significant procedural
    roadblocks to obtaining access. These administrative obstacles, while
    not denying access outright, dramatically increased the difficulty and
    amount of staff time on the part of observers necessary to secure
    access. Human rights monitors continued to enjoy good access to regular
    prisons. Observers still are prohibited from interviewing detainees in
    the SIS facilities, unlike in regular prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention;
    however, police often arbitrarily detain and arrest street children,
    the majority of whom are Roma.
        The Constitution provides for access to legal counsel from the time
    of detention. However, a 1999 survey of prisoners conducted by the
    Bulgaria Helsinki Committee (BHC) found that 54 percent of prisoners
    complained that they had no lawyer present during preliminary
    investigations. BHC believes this figure remained broadly valid during
    the year. Police normally obtain a warrant from a prosecutor prior to
    apprehending an individual; otherwise, in emergency circumstances
    police may detain individuals for up to 24 hours on their own
    authority; however, authorities must rule on the legality of such
    detention by the end of that time period. If the person is released
    without being charged before the 24-hour period elapses, there is no
    judicial involvement in the case. Human rights observers charge that
    police commonly handle minor offenses by arresting the suspect, beating
    him, and releasing him within the 24-hour period. Defendants have the
    right to visits by family members, to examine evidence, and to know the
    charges against them. Charges may not be made public without the
    permission of the Prosecutor General. In the interests of a speedy
    trial, investigations now are prescribed by law to last no more than 2
    months under normal circumstances, although this period may be extended
    to 6 months by the head regional prosecutor, and up to 9 months by the
    Prosecutor General.
        The Government noticeably improved its record during the year in
    observing the statutory limit of 1 year of pre-trial detention (or 2
    years in the case of the most serious crimes). While human rights
    lawyers noted some continuing violations of this policy, increasingly
    these situations have become uncommon exceptions rather than common
    practice. A legal consensus also seems to have emerged that the pre-
    trial detention limits apply cumulatively to all of the separate
    periods of detention, in cases where defendants' cases have been sent
    to the courts for review, and returned to prosecutors for further
    investigation. This is a change from earlier practice, when such a
    situation restarted the clock on the defendant's pretrial detention. A
    remaining loophole is that many cases may be formally deemed to be in
    the ``on-trial'' phase for an extended period of time. This occurs when
    a case file has been presented to the court by prosecutors, but has not
    yet been acted upon by the judge. Cases may, not uncommonly, languish
    for months in this situation, while the defendant remains in custody.
    The Ministry of Justice reported that as of year's end, there were 947
    accused persons in pre-trial detention, 1,110 defendants incarcerated
    while in the ``on trial'' phase, and 7,514 convicted prisoners. Among
    the changes recently made to the Criminal Procedure Code was increased
    oversight by judges of pre-trial detention and conditions of bail.
    Under the new rules, only judges may determine the necessity of holding
    suspects in custody and to set bail.
        In the event of a conviction, the time spent in pretrial detention
    is credited toward the sentence. The Constitution provides for bail,
    and some detainees have been released under this provision, although
    bail is not used widely.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the Constitution, the
    judiciary is granted independent and coequal status with the
    legislature and executive branches; however, the judiciary continues to
    struggle with problems such as low salaries, understaffing, antiquated
    procedures, corruption, and a heavy backlog of cases. Partly as a
    legacy of communism and partly because of the court system's structural
    and personnel problems, many citizens have little confidence in the
    judicial system. Human rights groups complain that local prosecutors
    and magistrates sometimes fail to pursue vigorously crimes committed
    against minorities. Many observers believe that reforms are essential
    to establish a fair and impartial, as well as efficient, judicial
    system. The Government began an ambitious training program to upgrade
    the expertise of the judiciary with the help of international donor
    organizations during the year.
        The court system consists of regional courts, district courts, and
    Supreme Courts of Cassation (civil and criminal appeal) and
    Administration. A Constitutional Court, which is separate from the rest
    of the court system, is empowered to rescind legislation that it
    considers unconstitutional, settle disputes over the conduct of general
    elections, and resolve conflicts over the division of powers between
    the various branches of government. Military courts handle cases
    involving military personnel (including police personnel) and some
    cases involving national security matters. The Constitutional Court
    does not have specific jurisdiction in matters of military justice.
        Local observers contend that organized crime influences the
    prosecutor's office. Few organized crime figures have been prosecuted
    to date, but in 1997 the Government made the battle against organized
    crime a priority and reformed the Penal Code to that end. The Ministry
    of Interior has requested and received assistance from Western
    countries in its efforts to close legal loopholes and strengthen
    enforcement capabilities against criminal economic groupings engaged in
    racketeering and other illegal activities.
        Judges are appointed by the 25-member Supreme Judicial Council and,
    after serving for 3 years, may not be removed except under limited,
    specified circumstances. The difficulty and rarity of replacing judges
    virtually regardless of performance often has been cited as a hindrance
    to effective law enforcement. The 12 justices on the Constitutional
    Court are chosen for 9-year terms as follows: One-third are elected by
    the National Assembly, one-third appointed by the President, and one-
    third elected by judicial authorities.
        The Constitution stipulates that all courts shall conduct hearings
    in public unless the proceedings involve state security or national
    secrets. There were no reported complaints about limited access to
    courtroom proceedings. Defendants have the right to know the charges
    against them and are given ample time to prepare a defense. The right
    of appeal is provided for and is used widely. Defendants in criminal
    proceedings have the right to confront witnesses and to have an
    attorney, provided by the state if necessary in serious cases.
        Human rights observers consider ``Educational Boarding Schools''
    (formerly known as ``Labor Education Schools'') to which problem
    children can be sent as little different from penal institutions.
    However, since the schools are not considered prisons under the law,
    the procedures by which children are confined in these schools are not
    subject to minimal due process. Several human rights organizations have
    criticized this denial of due process. Children sometimes appear alone
    despite the requirement that parents must attend hearings; the right to
    an attorney at the hearing is prohibited expressly by law. Decisions in
    these cases are not subject to judicial review, and children typically
    stay in the Educational Boarding Schools for 3 years or until they
    reach majority age, whichever occurs first. In late 1996, the
    Parliament enacted legislation that provided for court review of
    sentencing to such schools, set a limit of a 3-year stay, and addressed
    other problems in these institutions (see Section 5). Human rights
    activists dismiss this court review provision as a formality, since the
    child is not present to speak on his or her own behalf (nor is the
    defense lawyer or the child's parents).
        There was no progress in a case begun in 1993 relating to the
    forced assimilation and expulsion of ethnic Turks in 1984-85 and 1989.
    Further action on this case now appears unlikely ever to take place.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    home, the right to choose one's place of work and residence, and the
    freedom and confidentiality of correspondence, and government
    authorities generally respect these provisions.
        One NGO complained that the Minister of Interior's discretionary
    authority to authorize telephone wiretaps and electronic listening
    devices without judicial review in certain instances is excessive.
    Although it is unknown to what extent this authority is employed,
    highly-publicized media accounts during the year highlighted the
    Government's employment of electronic surveillance. A public scandal
    ensued when a listening device was discovered in the home of the
    Prosecutor General, although the government denied that the device had
    ever been actively employed.
        The Bulgaria Helsinki Committee also has alleged that warrants to
    investigate suspects' private financial records sometimes are abused to
    give police broad and openended authority to engage in far-ranging
    investigations of a suspect's family and associates. There are regular,
    albeit not conclusive or systematic, reports of mail, especially
    foreign mail, being delayed or opened.
        Traffickers in persons use threats against women's families and
    family reputations to ensure obedience (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice. A variety of media outlets presents a
    broad spectrum of opinion; however, the Government exerts an undue
    influence on the media via official channels such as the National
    Council for Radio and Television (NCRT), a quasi-governmental body that
    governs national media and regulates private broadcasters, and through
    less direct means such as steering advertising revenue away from media
    outlets that are critical of government policies. Surveys show that
    significant numbers of journalists feel constrained in their reporting
    because of government influence. One-third of journalists surveyed
    claimed that they had received outside pressure of some sort, whether
    from government officials or business interests, in response to
    material they had written or broadcast. Prosecutors are regarded widely
    as wielding an intimidating influence over journalists who are critical
    of the judicial process. A variety of newspapers are published freely
    by political parties and other organizations representing the full
    spectrum of public opinion. Journalists frequently color their reports
    to conform with the views of their owners.
        There were several instances of violent attacks on journalists,
    including physical assaults and bombings of newspaper offices, although
    no individuals have been seriously injured. In none of the cases have
    the perpetrators or their motives been uncovered. In February a
    reporter for the news weekly Kapital who frequently reports on the
    judicial system and on military affairs had his car blown up in front
    of his home; no one was injured in the explosion.
        Libel is punishable under the Criminal Code. In March the
    Parliament enacted modified amendments to the Penal Code, after
    President Petar Stoyanov had vetoed the original version in January.
    Responding to the President's concerns, the Parliament reduced the
    fines for libel and defamation by half to approximately $7,000 (15,000
    leva). Even this reduced fine remains a heavy penalty in the context of
    the country's economy. The new provisions did eliminate imprisonment as
    a penalty for libel. Journalists charged with libel or defamation also
    have reduced rights of appeal for libel sentences under the new law.
    Libel remains, under the new law, a criminal offense, as opposed to a
    matter of civil law, and makes losing defendants criminal convicts.
    However, press freedom monitors reported that the courts generally are
    embracing a more enlightened view of libel than in the past and are
    recognizing the principle of ``true facts and free comment'' as being
    legitimately within the bounds of journalistic expression.
        In February the Interior Minister filed a libel suit against the
    editor in chief of the Kyustendil-based newspaper Nova Bulgaria, which
    had alleged in print that the Minister, prior to assuming office in the
    Interior Ministry, had defended a company involved in illegal
    activities. The Minister later withdrew the charges.
        In June Parliament enacted a new Law on Access to Public
    Information, with the ostensible purpose of establishing broader public
    access to government information. The law has been criticized widely;
    however, for being vague in its provisions and enabling arbitrary
    denials of information. A majority of journalists believe that the new
    law actually hampers rather than facilitates public access to
    information.
        There are 261 electronic media outlets in Bulgaria, which
    represents a 60 percent increase in the number of radio and TV stations
    since last year. The number of television outlets that broadcast news
    and public affairs programming has more than doubled from 54 in 1999 to
    124 during the year, and the number of radio stations reached 123. In
    April the Government awarded a license for the first privately-owned
    television channel with nationwide coverage to the Balkan News
    Corporation, a company owned by Rupert Murdoch. The appearance of the
    new station, though still in its infancy, reanimated the competitive
    market for broadcast journalism talent in the country, and has spurred
    new programming initiatives from Bulgarian National Television (BNT).
    In August the State Telecommunications Commission (STC) launched a
    competition for a second nationwide private TV channel. The new license
    was awarded in October. The STC also launched a competition for
    licensing the first nationwide private radio station. The procedure for
    licensing private radio stations is undergoing regulatory changes
    expected to be finalized in early 2001. Some private radio stations
    complained that government policies allocating transmission strength on
    the monopoly state-owned radio transmission network gives the Bulgarian
    National Radio programming an unfair advantage.
        Television and radio news programs on the state-owned media present
    opposition views, but opposition members claim that their activities
    and views are given less broadcast time and exposure than the those of
    the ruling party. There are no formal restrictions on programming; both
    television and radio provide a variety of news and public interest
    programming.
        Bulgarian National Television launched Turkish-language newscasts
    for the first time on October 2, for the benefit of the country's
    ethnic Turkish minority. Local affiliates of Bulgarian National Radio
    broadcast limited Turkish-language programming in regions with ethnic-
    Turkish populations.
        Foreign government radio programs such as the British Broadcasting
    Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of
    America have good access to commercial radio frequencies.
        Private book publishing remained unhindered by political
    considerations.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and the Government
    generally respected this right in practice. The authorities require
    permits for rallies and assemblies held outdoors, but most legally
    registered organizations routinely were granted permission to assemble.
    Vigorous political rallies and demonstrations were a common occurrence
    and generally took place without government interference.
        The Government has undertaken to respect the rights of individuals
    and groups to establish freely their own political parties or other
    political organizations; however, there are constitutional and
    statutory restrictions that restrict the right of association and limit
    meaningful participation in the political process. For example, the
    Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along
    religious, ethnic, or racial lines and prohibits ``citizens'
    associations'' from engaging in political activity. This provision is
    designed to prevent the development of parties based on a single ethnic
    or other group that could prove divisive for national unity by stirring
    up ethnic tension for political purposes. Nonetheless, the mainly
    ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in
    Parliament. The other major political parties generally accept the
    MRF's right to participate in the political process. Additionally, the
    mainly ethnic Roma ``Free Bulgaria'' party has been allowed to operate
    freely and has achieved some success in local elections.
        The Constitution also prohibits organizations that threaten the
    country's territorial integrity or unity, or that incite racial,
    ethnic, or religious hatred. The Government has refused since 1990 to
    register a self-proclaimed Macedonian rights group, OMO- Ilinden, on
    the grounds that it is separatist. Aside from its symbolic importance,
    lack of registration denies the group the status of being a legal
    entity. This makes it impossible for the organization (in its own name)
    to make contracts, hire staff, rent or buy office space or meeting
    space, or other such normal administrative functions. There were no
    reports of any prosecutions for membership in this group.
        On February 29, the Constitutional Court, Bulgaria's final
    authority on the matter, ruled that the political party United
    Macedonian Organization (OMO)-Ilinden-Pirin (not the same organization
    as the similarly named OMO-Ilinden noted above, although there are
    links between the groups) was unconstitutional on separatist grounds.
    The court ruled that leaders of OMO-Ilinden-Pirin have advocated the
    secession of the Pirin-Macedonia region of southwest Bulgaria and its
    annexation by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. OMO-Ilinden-
    Pirin leaders plan to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
        Notwithstanding the Constitutional Court decision, the Government
    allowed OMO-Ilinden-Pirin to hold public celebrations on Macedonian
    holidays in April and again in August; however, a similar event was
    prohibited in September by an order of the regional prosecutor's
    office.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for
    some non-Orthodox religious groups. The legal requirement that groups
    whose activities have a religious element register with the Council of
    Ministers restricted the activities of some religious groups prior to
    or in the absence of registration. Affected groups included the
    Unification Church and the Church of the Nazarene (which has tried
    repeatedly to register for more than 5 years). Furthermore, several
    municipal governments established local registration requirements for
    religious groups, despite the lack of clear legal authority to do so.
    In some cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a
    pretext for interference with some groups and employed arbitrary
    harassment tactics against others. Some church groups circumvent the
    administrative obstacles created by a lack of registration by
    registering as NGO's. Technically it remains illegal for a church to
    conduct any religious activities through its NGO-registered
    organization, although the Government sometimes tacitly allows such
    groups to conduct worship so long as they keep a very low profile.
    There are periodic reports of police using lack of local or national
    registration as a pretext to confiscate signboards and materials,
    detain or expel religious workers, and deny visas or residence permits
    to foreign-national missionaries. During the year, the ability of a
    small number of religious groups to conduct services freely came under
    occasional attack, both as a result of action by local government
    authorities and because of public intolerance.
        The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the
    ``traditional'' religion. The Government provides financial support for
    the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as several other religious
    communities perceived as holding historic places in society, such as
    the Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths. These groups benefit
    from a relatively high degree of governmental and public tolerance.
        Religious freedom NGO's note with concern a tendency by certain
    municipalities to enact regulations that may be used to limit religious
    freedoms if a perceived need arises. For example, the Sofia
    municipality forbids references to miracles and healing during
    religious services, a provision that many fear may be employed as a
    pretext to ban or interrupt services by charismatic evangelical groups.
    The regulation cites a Communist-era law dating from 1949, which
    technically still is in effect and which forbids foreigners from
    proselytizing and administering religious services in the country. The
    decree, although subsequently modified in response to NGO objections,
    is still criticized by religious rights groups as containing provisions
    that are either discriminatory or ambiguous and open to abuse. Other
    municipalities have enacted similar regulations. The City Council in
    Burgas maintained its refusal to register the local branch of Jehovah's
    Witnesses, despite the fact that they were registered by the central
    government. The council asked the group to prove that they had not been
    banned in any European Union country in order to be registered. Plovdiv
    municipality passed an ordinance that forbade the distribution in
    public places of ``religious materials or pornography.'' The 1949 law
    also has been criticized in its own right as an outmoded potential
    impediment to free religious activity. However, despite the law's
    continued technical validity, foreign missionaries can and do receive
    permission to proselytize in the country. A new law on religious
    activity was pending in Parliament but had not yet been moved to the
    floor of the National Assembly for a vote by year's end.
        In March two members of Jehovah's Witnesses in Turgovishte were
    detained briefly by police and charged with disruption of public order
    under a city ordinance for public proselytizing.
        In April several missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of
    Latter Day Saints (aka the Mormon Church) in Plovdiv were challenged by
    police while distributing literature and were required to go to the
    police station. They were charged with distributing brochures without a
    license. Also in April, border police refused a member of the Jehovah's
    Witnesses entry into the country, reportedly on the grounds that she
    had been deported from the country in 1997 for practicing her then-
    unregistered faith.
        In May a volunteer worker for the Christian Unity Foundation was
    beaten severely in Maritsa when he attempted to conduct a scheduled
    screening of a documentary-style film of the life of Jesus Christ. The
    film itself was stolen from his car. The attack was carried out by six
    to eight youths, under the apparent direction of a Bulgarian Orthodox
    priest.
        On June 21, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses were expelled from
    the city of Petrich for distributing literature without being
    registered with the municipality, although the church does have central
    government registration.
        In July and August, the Mormon Church encountered a number of
    politically inspired legal and administrative obstacles at the local
    and regional levels to its efforts to build a new church and
    administrative center in Plovdiv. One political party in particular,
    which has several seats on the city council in Plovdiv, led protest
    marches as well as filing several administrative challenges to the
    construction. Ultimately with the support of the local mayor, the
    building was completed.
        On December 13, about 2,000 Orthodox clergy and Church members
    marched in Sofia to protest the Government's refusal to register the
    Holy Synod headed by Patriarch Maxim. The Government refuses to
    register the synod citing an administrative court ruling that there are
    two Orthodox Churches in the country.
        There were no developments in the ongoing lawsuit of the Gabrovo
    schoolteacher who claims that she was pressured to resign because of
    her Pentecostal faith.
        A number of religious groups have complained that foreign
    missionaries and religious leaders experience difficulties in obtaining
    and renewing residence visas in the country. The issuance of residence
    permits appears to be subject to the whim of local authorities. Human
    rights groups also have protested the cancellation of residence status
    of several persons on undisclosed national security grounds, alleging
    that the action was a pretext for religious discrimination.
        For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on
    attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. A
    school for imams, a Muslim cultural center, university-level
    theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely.
    In December 1999, the Ministry of Education announced that schools
    would begin offering classes on Islam in regions with a significant
    Muslim minority, and in December 2000 the implementing decree took
    effect, with classes beginning in 80 schools starting in January 2001.
    However, some ethnic Turkish activists have complained that the
    implementing decree requires that these classes be taught in Bulgarian
    rather than Turkish. Since 1997 religious classes on the Bible have
    been available to students whose parents approve such instruction.
    Bibles and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were
    imported and printed freely, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish
    publications were published on a regular basis.
        Although previously during compulsory military service most Muslim
    conscripts were placed in construction units rather than serving in
    combat-role military units, these units were converted into a state-
    owned construction firm in August, which no longer employs conscript
    military labor. It is unclear how this will affect military assignments
    of Muslim conscripts (see Section 5).
        There were no indications that the Government discriminated against
    members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners
    of properties that were nationalized during the Communist regime. The
    Government in general actively has supported property restitution for
    the legally recognized organization representing the Jewish community,
    although the return of two lucrative commercial Jewish communal
    properties continues to encounter administrative obstacles and legal
    challenges.
        At the Department of Theology of Sofia University, all students are
    required to present a certificate of baptism from the Orthodox Church,
    and married couples must present a marriage certificate from the Church
    in order to enroll in the Department's classes. It remains impossible
    for non-Orthodox applicants to be admitted to the Department of
    Theology.
        The Government refused to recognize an alternative Patriarch
    elected by supporters in 1996, and the schism that opened in the
    Orthodox Church in 1992 continued, despite the death of this
    alternative Patriarch in April 1999. The Government nevertheless
    encouraged the feuding factions to heal their prolonged rift. By year's
    end, these efforts had not met with success.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement within the country and the right to leave it, and these rights
    are generally not limited in practice; however, there are two
    exceptions. One exception relates to border zones where access is
    limited for nonresidents (the border zones extend 1.2 to 3 miles inward
    from each border). Another exception is the Ministry of Interior policy
    that denies issuance of an international passport to any Bulgarian
    citizen who has ever been convicted of any crime, with no statute of
    limitations. This policy effectively prevents such persons from
    travelling abroad.
        Every citizen has the right to return to the country, may not be
    forcibly expatriated, and may not be deprived of citizenship acquired
    by birth.
        The Government grants asylum or refugee status in accordance with
    the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Law on Refugees, which went into
    effect August 1, 1999, regulates the procedure for granting refugee
    status as well as the rights and obligations of refugees. The Agency
    for Refugees, formerly the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and
    Refugees, is charged with following this procedure and cooperating with
    the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
        The Government provides first asylum. In recent years, domestic and
    international human rights organizations have expressed concern over
    the Government's handling of asylum claims and reported that there may
    have been cases in which bona fide refugees were turned away at the
    border. No such cases were reported during the year. However, because
    NGO's lack institutionalized access to the country's borders, it is
    often difficult for them to monitor the Government's handling of asylum
    cases. For the first 6 months of the year, the Ministry of Interior
    reported that 703 persons applied for refugee status. Authorities
    granted 76 applicants refugee status, while 14 persons were granted
    temporary humanitarian status. Refugee applications came predominantly
    from citizens of Armenia (186), Afghanistan (178), and Iraq (130).
        The Agency for Refugees reports that it has received 5,938
    applications for asylum from its inception in 1993 through December. Of
    these, 902 persons currently are listed as holding approved asylum or
    other humanitarian residence status. Domestic and international human
    rights organizations complain that the adjudication process is slow,
    but the UNHCR notes that the Agency for Refugees has begun a major
    restructuring project to reduce the adjudication time to a period of 3
    months. The restructuring project itself is expected to take 4 years.
    In 1997 and 1998, the UNHCR, in cooperation with an NGO, opened three
    transit centers near the Greek, Turkish, and Romanian borders and
    assisted the Government with opening a small reception center in Banya.
    Plans to open a reception center at the Sofia airport continue to be
    delayed due to a lack of funding. However, the UNHCR currently is
    working on plans to open a transit center in Kapitan Andreevo, on the
    border with Turkey.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government and head of
    state through the election of the President and of the members of the
    National Assembly, although the constitutional prohibition of parties
    formed on ethnic, racial, or religious lines has the effect of
    circumscribing access to the political party process for some groups
    (see Section 2.b.). Suffrage is universal at the age of 18.
        No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
    government and politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women hold
    just under 11 percent of the seats in the current Parliament. However,
    a number of women hold elective and appointive office at high levels,
    including three cabinet-level posts and several key positions in
    Parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the
    United Democratic Forces parliamentary group (the dominant party in the
    Government) are both women.
        No legal restrictions hinder the participation of minorities in
    politics, apart from the prohibition of ethnically, racially, or
    religiously based parties. However, while ethnic Turks' representation
    in the National Assembly is close to commensurate with their share of
    population, there was only one Romani Member of Parliament. Both groups
    are underrepresented in appointed governmental positions, especially
    leadership positions.
        Roma groups are demanding that existing political parties adopt
    platforms pledging more representation and other improvements for Roma
    in return for Roma support.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic and international human rights groups operate freely,
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
    Human rights observers reported uneven levels of cooperation from
    various national and local government officials during the year. The
    new Law on Access to Public Information has opened new channels of
    information which have sometimes proved quite helpful to human rights
    monitors. In other cases, NGO's have found government offices
    completely unresponsive to information requests under the public
    information law. Human rights observers also have experienced some new
    difficulties in getting information previously easy to obtain, from
    prosecutors for example, and have reported greater procedural
    difficulties than in the previous year in gaining access to SIS
    detention facilities.
        The police demonstrated a new level of cooperation with human
    rights NGO's in providing human rights training to police officers. The
    National Police Service invited the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee (BHC)
    to conduct a human rights awareness training seminar with 500 senior
    police officers (precinct commander and above), with the active
    participation of the deputy commander of the National Police.
    Subsequently BHC, the Human Rights Project (HRP), and representatives
    of the Council of Europe, conducted a smaller training seminar on
    International Law and Police Practice. In general human rights monitors
    detected a new receptivity and a more meaningful dialogue on the part
    of the Government and police officials toward human rights concerns,
    with one NGO crediting the Interior Minister personally with
    demonstrating greater openness and attention to the issue. However,
    this change at senior levels, has not yet resulted in noticeable
    changes in police practice at the working level.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and
    protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination
    still exists, particularly against Roma and women.
        Women.--Violence against women is a serious and common problem, but
    there are no official statistics on its occurrence. The Animus
    Association Foundation (AAF), an NGO that offers assistance and support
    to female victims of violence, estimates that one in five women suffers
    from spousal abuse. Spousal rape is a crime, but it rarely is
    prosecuted. According to a survey by a local polling agency, 80 percent
    of rapes involve a known assailant. The law exempts from state
    prosecution certain types of assault if committed by a family member,
    and the Government generally does not assist in prosecuting crimes of
    domestic assault unless the woman has been killed or injured
    permanently. Courts and prosecutors tend to view domestic abuse as a
    family rather than criminal problem, and in most cases, victims of
    domestic violence take refuge with family or friends rather than
    approach the authorities. Police often are reluctant to intervene in
    cases of domestic abuse, even if a woman calls them seeking protection
    or assistance. No government agencies provide shelter or counseling for
    victims. In Sofia the NGO Nadya De Center provides shelter to battered
    women, and AAF opened a new crisis center that provides short-term
    emergency shelter for female victims of violence. There were 15 crisis
    centers around the country which provide assistance to women victims of
    violence at year's end.
        NGO observers report a generally improved public attitude toward
    issues of violence against women in recent years. After several years
    of activism on the part of various NGO groups, the taboo against
    acknowledging and talking about domestic violence and violence against
    women has been broken. Observers also note some increased sensitivity
    on the part of police to the issue. AAF reports that it now
    periodically receives client referrals from police, which was unknown
    in the recent past.
        The courts prosecute rape, although it remains an underreported
    crime because of the stigma which society attaches to the victim. The
    maximum sentence for rape is 8 years; convicted offenders often receive
    a lesser sentence or early parole. According to the Ministry of
    Interior, 254 rapes and 30 attempted rapes were reported during the
    first half of the year.
        During the year, AAF reported that it handled 1,089 cases of
    domestic violence, 86 cases of sexual violence, and 534 cases or
    inquiries related to trafficking in women. AAF directly counseled 24
    actual returned victims of trafficking. The large increase in the
    number of cases related to trafficking in women is the result of a
    major information campaign, organized by the International Organization
    for Migration, which has publicized more widely the AAF's counseling
    services (see Section 6.f.). However, the actual incidents of each form
    of violence is certainly much higher, as these represent those cases in
    which the victims (or, in some trafficking cases, an overseas women's
    group) was willing and able to contact AAF. The Association also
    operates a 24-hour hot line for women in crisis that is staffed by the
    Association's volunteer counselors, backed up by 13 full-time
    professional therapists.
        In 1997 the Government enacted a law against trafficking in women,
    and trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see Sections
    6.c and 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment is a problem; it is not illegal.
        Many of the approximately 30 women's organizations are associated
    closely with political parties or have primarily professional agendas.
    Some observers believe that women's organizations tend to be associated
    with political parties or professional groups because feminism has
    negative societal connotations. Of those organizations that exist
    mainly to defend women's interests, the two largest are the Women's
    Democratic Union in Bulgaria, heir to the group that existed under the
    Communist dictatorship, and the Bulgarian Women's Association, which
    disappeared under communism but has reemerged with chapters in a number
    of cities.
        The Constitution forbids privileges or restrictions of rights on
    the basis of sex, and women are not impeded from owning or managing
    businesses, land, or other real property and do not suffer from
    discrimination under inheritance laws. However, women face
    discrimination both in terms of job recruitment and the likelihood of
    layoffs. Official figures show the rate of unemployment for women to be
    higher than that for men. Women are much more likely than men to be
    employed in low-wage jobs requiring little education, and the National
    Statistical Institute reports that as of November, the average salary
    of a woman was 76.8 percent of the average salary of a man. Statistics
    show that women are equally likely to attend universities, but they
    have less opportunity to upgrade their qualifications and generally end
    up in lower-ranking and lower-paying positions than their male
    counterparts. Fewer girls than boys are attending school, especially
    among minorities. Women generally continue to have primary
    responsibility for child rearing and housekeeping even if they are
    employed outside the home. Since 80 percent of employed women work in
    the lowest-paying sectors of the labor force, they often must work at
    two jobs in addition to their household duties in order to provide for
    their families. Female-headed households frequently live below the
    poverty line. There are liberal provisions for paid maternity leave;
    however, these actually may work against employers' willingness to hire
    and retain female employees. This is especially noticeable in higher-
    paying positions in the private sector, where many women with
    engineering degrees are compelled to work as secretaries.
        No special government programs seek to address economic
    discrimination or integrate women better into the mainstream of society
    and the economy, although much NGO activity is focused on these
    activities.
        Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
    children's welfare but, with limited resources, falls short in several
    areas. For example, it maintains a sizable network of orphanages
    throughout the country. However, many of the orphanages are in
    disrepair and lack proper facilities. Human rights monitors are sharply
    critical of the serious deficiencies in all government-run institutions
    for children, including orphanages, ``educational boarding schools''
    (reform schools), and facilities for the mentally handicapped. These
    facilities are plagued by inadequate budgets, poorly-trained and
    unqualified staff, and inadequate oversight. NGO monitors further
    allege that even food budgets are highly deficient, with many
    institutions dependent on the uneven flow of private donations to feed
    their charges.
        Government efforts in education and health have been constrained by
    serious budgetary limitations and by outmoded social care structures.
    The Constitution provides for mandatory school attendance until the age
    of 16. However, fewer girls than boys are attending school, especially
    among minorities.
        On September 15, approximately 300 Romani children from the Nov Put
    Romani neighborhood began the school year by being bussed to one of
    seven mixed regular schools in the town of Vidin. Starting in the
    school year 2000/01, Romani children from the settlement have attended
    nonsegregated schools as a result of local and international
    nongovernmental initiatives. Educational standards in the all-Romani
    school in Nov Pat are low, according to NGO reports.
        There are few provisions for due process of law for Romani and
    other juveniles when they are detained in Educational Boarding Schools
    (formerly Labor Education Schools) run by the Ministry of Education.
    Living conditions at these reform schools are poor, offering few
    medical, educational, or social services. Generally, staff members at
    many such institutions lack the proper qualifications and training to
    care for the children adequately. Degrading and severe punishment, such
    as the shaving of a child's head, reduction in diet, severe beatings,
    and long periods of solitary confinement, are common at the schools. In
    1996 the Ministry of Education acknowledged problems at the schools and
    attributed the cause to a lack of funding. In late 1996, Parliament
    enacted legislation providing for court review of sentencing to such
    schools and addressing other problems in the reform school system (see
    Section 1.e.), but these provisions do not seem to function. The
    decision to commit a child to an Educational Boarding School is made by
    a local Commission for Combating Juvenile Delinquency, which is
    generally not held accountable in any meaningful way to any higher
    authority. Standards differ among these local commissions in how
    closely prescribed procedures are followed. Human rights monitors
    report that in many localities, contrary to law, a child may be held in
    such a facility for months on the basis of a police referral, before
    the local commission convenes to make a decision on the case. The
    U.N.'s Common Country Assessment for Bulgaria reports that children in
    these facilities ``might be subject to physical abuse'' and upon
    leaving these homes ``may be emotionally scarred and ill-prepared to
    face the outside world.''
        The vast majority of children are free from societal abuse,
    although some Romani children are targets of frequent skinhead violence
    and arbitrary police detention; the homeless or abandoned particularly
    were vulnerable. There are reports that family or community members
    forced some minors into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    Police made little effort to address these problems. Some observers
    believe that there is a growing trend toward the use of children in
    prostitution, burglaries, and narcotics distribution. Trafficking in
    girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections
    6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons by law receive a range
    of financial assistance, including free public transportation, reduced
    prices on modified automobiles, and free equipment such as wheelchairs.
    However, as in other areas, budgetary constraints mean that such
    payments occasionally fall behind. Disabled individuals have access to
    university training (since 1999 students with disabilities must pay the
    university's initial application fee but are exempt from semester fees
    if accepted) and to housing and employment; however, architectural
    barriers are a great hindrance in most older buildings, including
    schools and universities. Problems of general unemployment and economy
    undermine initiatives aimed at advancing equal opportunity for the
    disabled. The great majority of the disabled are unemployed.
        Labor laws intended to protect the interests of the disabled and
    create greater employment opportunity sometimes have a mixed effect. On
    one hand, the law provides incentives for small firms to hire disabled
    workers. For example, the Bureau of Labor pays the first year's salary
    of a disabled employee. On the other hand, workers with disabilities
    are entitled to shorter working hours, which often leads to
    discrimination against them in hiring practices. According to the law,
    any enterprise employing more than 50 persons must hire a certain
    number of disabled workers (between 3 and 10 percent, depending on the
    industry). Those who fail to do so must pay a fine, the proceeds of
    which go to a fund for the disabled. Nevertheless, due to low fines and
    delays in the judicial system, compliance rates are extremely low.
        Recent public works have taken the needs of persons with
    disabilities into account. Sofia's new subway system was designed with
    wheelchair access to stations. Nevertheless, enforcement of a 1995 law
    requiring improved structural access for the disabled has lagged in
    existing, unrenovated buildings.
        Policies and public attitudes prevalent during the Communist era,
    which separated mentally and physically disabled persons, including
    very young children, from the rest of society have persisted. Some
    complain that the effective segregation of disabled children into
    special schools has lowered the quality of their education. However, in
    a recent positive development, construction of a training and
    rehabilitation center for the disabled youth in Pomorie began in 1999.
    The center aims to improve the overall physical and intellectual state
    of disabled youth and to encourage them to acquire new skills and
    participate more actively in the social life of the country.
        Religious Minorities.--Discrimination, harassment, and general
    public intolerance of ``nontraditional'' religious minorities (i.e.,
    the great majority of Protestant Christian denominations) remained a
    problem, although the number of reported incidents decreased during the
    past 2 years. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations
    among the Orthodox populace is widespread and pervasive across the
    political spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in
    a veneer of ``patriotism,'' intolerance of the religious beliefs of
    others enjoys widespread popularity. Such mainstream public pressure
    for containment of ``foreign religious sects'' inevitably influences
    policymakers. Nevertheless, there were fewer reported incidents of
    harassment of religious groups during the past 2 years as society
    appeared to have become more accepting of previously unfamiliar
    religions.
        Certain religions, including both groups denied registration and
    those officially registered, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, faced
    discriminatory practices, as did other groups, which despite full
    compliance with the law, were greeted with hostility by the press,
    segments of the public, and certain government officials (see Section
    2.c.).
        Non-Orthodox religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, the
    Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and the Open Bible
    Fellowship, have been affected adversely by societal attitudes.
    Numerous articles in a broad range of newspapers as well as television
    documentaries, drew lurid and inaccurate pictures of the activities of
    non-Orthodox religious groups, attributing the breakup of families and
    drug abuse by youths to the practices of these groups and alleging that
    evangelicals were drugging young children.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Turks constitute almost
    10 percent of the population. In the 1992 census, 3.7 percent of the
    population identified itself as Romani; however, the real figure
    probably is closer to 6 or 7 percent, since many persons of Romani
    descent tend to identify themselves to the authorities as ethnic Turks
    or Bulgarians. Ethnic Bulgarian Muslims or ``Pomaks'' are a distinct
    group of Slavic descent, constituting 2 to 3 percent of the population,
    whose ancestors converted from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. Most are
    Muslim, although a number have become atheists or converted back to
    Christianity. These are the country's largest minorities. There are no
    restrictions on speaking Turkish in public or the use of non-Slavic
    names.
        Voluntary Turkish-language classes in public schools, funded by the
    Government, continued in areas with significant Turkish- speaking
    populations, although some observers complained that the Government was
    discouraging optional language classes in areas with large
    concentrations of Muslims. The Ministry of Education has estimated that
    approximately 40,000 children now study Turkish. Some ethnic Turkish
    leaders, mainly in the MRF, demanded that Turkish-language classes be
    made compulsory in areas with significant ethnic Turkish populations,
    but the Government has resisted this effort.
        Roma activists and NGO's were disappointed broadly with the
    relative lack of progress demonstrated by the Government in
    implementing its framework program for Roma integration, the Program
    for Social Integration of Roma, which was unveiled in 1999. Aside from
    the hiring of a number of individual Roma representatives in various
    institutions of local, regional, and the national government, there has
    been little discernible progress in delivering on the program.
        Attacks by private citizens on Roma continued, and Roma continued
    to suffer incidents of discrimination. There were numerous accusations
    of police and private citizen assaults on Roma.
        In the village of Mechka, near Pleven, the February murder of an
    ethnic-Bulgarian man poisoned relations between the ethnic-Bulgarian
    and Roma communities. Ethnic Bulgarian residents widely blamed the Roma
    for the killing, as well as for a spree of petty crimes, which had
    swept the neighborhood for several years. For several weeks, ethnic
    Roma were prevented from entering the city center, and a complete
    boycott against doing any business--buying or selling--with the Roma
    persisted for some months. This boycott created economic hardship for
    the Roma community, particularly because of the lack of opportunities
    to sell the dairy products, which form the livelihood of the Roma
    villagers in Mechka. The situation was further exacerbated when a Roma
    man in the act of breaking into a carpentry shop was shot in the leg by
    a booby trap, which had been set by the shop owner. The shop owner was
    arrested for the illegal use of a firearm. However, by September the
    situation in Mechka had calmed considerably and returned more or less
    to normal, after police arrested two non-local ethnic-Bulgarians for
    the February murder. Human rights NGO's closely following the case
    commended the Pleven police for handling the investigation in a
    professional and restrained manner, despite the highly inflamed local
    passions. Although the Roma villagers complained that they were
    detained disproportionately for questioning in the murder
    investigation, there were no allegations of any mistreatment or abuse.
        According to unconfirmed NGO reports, on August 23 in Gradishte,
    two Roma men, Paskal Paskalev and Ognyan Milenov, were hospitalized
    after Tsvetan Tsvetanov shot them with a homemade shotgun. Tsvetanov
    later claimed he shot the men accidentally while shooting at stray
    dogs, although the victims allege that Tsvetanov attacked them in their
    woodworking shop.
        On November 11, in Botevgrad, Asen Sashev, a 14-year-old Roma
    youth, was shot and injured by his neighbor Marko Markov during an
    altercation. Markov, a fireman, shot Sashev with his government-issue
    handgun. The Sofia Military Court ruled Markov blameless in the
    incident; an appeal to the Military Appellate Court was pending at
    year's end.
        Beginning on November 4, 1999, and continuing throughout the year,
    a group of ethnic Bulgarian residents of a Burgas neighborhood
    persisted in a petition drive and periodic calls for the expulsion of
    Roma and the demolition of Romani houses in the neighborhood.
        Police harass, physically abuse, and arbitrarily arrest Romani
    street children (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There was one arrest in
    the 1998 attack on eight Romani boys by skinheads in Sofia. Little
    progress has been made in other cases of violence against Roma during
    previous years, and these largely remain in the investigatory phase.
        As individuals and as an ethnic group, Roma faced high levels of
    discrimination. Roma encounter difficulties applying for social
    benefits, and rural Roma are discouraged by local officials from
    claiming land to which they are entitled under the law disbanding
    agricultural collectives. Many Roma and other observers made credible
    allegations that the quality of education offered to Romani children is
    inferior to that afforded most other students. The Government largely
    has been unsuccessful in attracting and keeping many Romani children in
    school. Schools in most Romani neighborhoods suffer from chronic
    absenteeism and very low graduation rates. However, an ethnic
    reintegration effort began in schools in Vidin in September. The
    program, with the help of international donor funding, uses a voluntary
    busing plan to enroll Romani children in various higher-quality,
    predominantly ethnic Bulgarian schools around the district. Many Romani
    children arrive relatively unprepared for schooling; many of them are
    not proficient in the Bulgarian language. Poverty has led to widespread
    school truancy as many children in Romani ghettos cannot afford shoes
    or basic school supplies and instead turn to begging, prostitution, and
    petty crime on the streets. A social milieu that often does not highly
    value formal education also is a contributing factor. Lack of effective
    government infrastructure and programs and economic and social factors
    thus combine to deprive increasing numbers of Romani youths of an
    education and a better future. Early indications are that some recent
    initiatives undertaken by the Government and by Romani NGO's are
    achieving some small successes in mitigating these problems, for
    example by providing free lunches and subsidizing textbook and tuition
    costs.
        Workplace discrimination against minorities continued to be a
    problem, especially for Roma. Employers justify such discrimination on
    the basis that most Roma only have elementary training and little
    education.
        Previously it had been common for ethnic Turkish and Romani
    conscripts to be shunted into military construction battalions during
    compulsory military service. This practice raised serious concerns both
    of discrimination and forced labor, particularly since the units
    sometimes accepted commercial construction contracts in addition to
    military construction projects. However, in August the Government
    completed the transformation of these units into a state-owned company
    that no longer employs conscript labor. It remains to be seen how
    future ethnic minority conscripts will be integrated into the
    mainstream of the military. There are only a few ethnic Turkish, Pomak,
    and Romani officers in the military, and an insignificant number of
    high-ranking officers of the Muslim faith.
        Ethnic Turkish politicians maintain that, although their
    community's popularly-elected representation in the National Assembly
    is roughly commensurate with its size, ethnic Turks are
    underrepresented significantly in appointed positions in the state
    administration. Ethnic Turks and Roma are also seriously
    underrepresented in the ranks of the police agencies, and virtually
    non-existent in senior law enforcement positions.
        Both ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Muslims complain that the
    procedures for restoring their original names (after their forcible re-
    naming to Slavic names during the 1970s and 80s) is excessively
    burdensome and difficult to accomplish.
        Several thousand persons, mainly in the southwest, identify
    themselves as ethnic Macedonians, most for historical and geographic
    reasons. Members of the two organizations that purport to defend their
    interests, OMO-Ilinden and TMO-Ilinden, are believed to number in the
    hundreds (see Section 2.b.). The Government does not recognize
    Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group, and the group is not enumerated
    in official government statistics.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of all workers to form or join trade unions of their own choice,
    and this right was generally exercised freely. Estimates of the
    unionized share of the work force range from 30 to 50 percent. This
    share continues to shrink as large firms lay off workers, and most new
    positions appear in small, nonunionized businesses.
        The two largest trade union confederations are the Confederation of
    Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (CITUB) and Podkrepa, which
    together represent the overwhelming majority of organized workers.
    Trade unions are required to demonstrate their membership strength
    through a periodic census of their members; however, employer
    representative organizations are not similarly required to demonstrate
    whom they represent in the trilateral process. The unions have called
    for new legislation requiring employer organizations also to
    demonstrate membership strength.
        Doctors and dentists expressed dissatisfaction with a new union
    structure that they claim the Government imposed upon them in 1998, an
    action which some maintain violates an ILO convention. The trade unions
    allege that this organization is not truly a labor representative
    organization, but simply a government- mandated fee collection agency.
    They also believe it impedes the opportunity for a genuine trade union
    to represent medical professionals.
        The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the right to strike when other means
    of conflict resolution have been exhausted, but ``political strikes''
    are forbidden. Workers in essential services (primarily the military
    and the police) also are subject to a blanket prohibition against
    striking, although such workers on occasion held an ``effective
    strike'' in which they stop or slow their activities for 1 or 2 hours.
    The CITUB confederation argues that the number of workers classified as
    essential and ineligible to strike is excessive and unfairly restricts
    the right of many ordinary civil servants to exercise their worker
    rights.
        The Government generally does not interfere with legal labor
    strikes, and a number of work stoppages took place.
        The Podkrepa labor union has complained that an amendment to a 1990
    law, passed in March 1998, facilitated the Government's ability to
    declare a strike illegal. Under this amendment, workers no longer have
    the right to appeal when a strike is declared illegal. Podkrepa
    maintains that this provision is unconstitutional and violates an ILO
    convention. The union has raised these concerns repeatedly to the
    Government in the context of negotiations over proposed changes to the
    Labor Code. A complaint has been made to the ILO Committee of Experts.
        Another serious concern for the labor movement is the widespread
    use of temporary contracts to evade the worker protections of permanent
    staff. Many workers, who are effectively permanent staff, are hired
    under short-term contracts that are renewed at the end of each month or
    each quarter. When an employer decides to fire someone, it is legally
    simply a non-renewal of contract, rather than a severance action that
    would entail payment of benefits.
        No restrictions limit affiliation or contact with international
    labor organizations, and unions actively exercise this right.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    institutes collective bargaining, which was practiced nationally,
    regionally, and on the local level. The legal prohibition against
    striking for key public sector employees weakens their bargaining
    position; however, these groups were able to influence negotiations by
    staging protests and engaging in other pressure tactics without going
    on strike. Labor unions have complained that while the legal structure
    for collective bargaining was adequate, many employers failed to
    bargain in good faith or to adhere to agreements that were concluded.
    Labor observers viewed the Government's enforcement of labor contracts
    as inadequate.
        The Labor Code's prohibitions against antiunion discrimination
    include a 6-month period for redress against dismissal as a form of
    retribution. However, there is no mechanism other than the courts for
    resolving complaints, and the burden of proof in such a case rests
    entirely on the employee.
        In several instances, an employer was found guilty of antiunion
    discrimination, but the employers appealed the decisions. The backlog
    of cases in the legal system delayed further action, effectively
    postponing, perhaps indefinitely, redress of workers' grievances.
        The same obligation of collective bargaining and adherence to labor
    standards prevails in the six export processing zones, and unions may
    organize workers in these areas.
        On November 1, about 5,000 demonstrators in Sofia protested draft
    changes in the country's labor legislation that many workers felt would
    reduce their rights.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
    forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The Slavovitsa
    Boys' Reform School, which had been found to use forced child labor to
    produce goods for sale, has been closed by the Ministry of Education.
        The previous practice of shunting minority and conscientious
    objector military draftees into work units that often carried out
    commercial construction and maintenance projects was a form of
    compulsory labor; however, these units have been converted into a
    state-owned enterprise which does not use conscript labor (see Sections
    2.c. and 5).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 16
    years; the minimum age for dangerous work is 18. Employers and the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) are responsible for
    enforcing these provisions. Child labor laws are enforced well in the
    formal sector, but NGO's believe that children increasingly are
    exploited in certain industries (especially small family-owned shops,
    family farms, construction, and periodical sales) and by organized
    crime (notably for prostitution and distribution of narcotics). A soon-
    to-be-published ILO-commissioned report on ``Problems of Child Labor in
    the Conditions of Transition in Bulgaria'' reports on the results of a
    study conducted during the summer. The study found that 6.4 percent of
    children between the ages of 5 and 17, or about 80,000 children, were
    involved in paid employment in the informal sector. Of these, 55
    percent were between the ages of 15 and 17, while 45 percent were
    younger than 15 years old. These figures exclude children performing
    unpaid work within the household or on a family farm. Underage
    employment in the informal and agricultural sectors is believed to be
    increasing as collective farms are broken up and the private sector
    continues to grow. In addition children are known to work on family-
    owned tobacco farms, and local NGO's reported children working on
    nonfamily-owned farms for meager monetary or in-kind wages (e.g.,
    food). NGO observers also report that institutionalized children often
    hire themselves out to do agriculture labor for a modest income, during
    periods when they are allowed out of the residential facility.
        Forced and bonded labor by children also is forbidden by law;
    however, trafficking in young girls for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national monthly minimum
    wage is approximately $31 (73 leva), which is not enough to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family (the average
    industrial wage is approximately $107 or 246 leva). Nonpayment of wages
    and wage payments in arrears has been a growing problem with certain
    employers, including state enterprises. The CITUB labor confederation
    estimates that there is an overall backlog of $50 million in unpaid
    wage arrears owed to public sector workers and workers in enterprises
    which are wholly or partly state-owned. The Constitution stipulates the
    right to social security and welfare aid assistance for the temporarily
    unemployed, although in practice such assistance often is late.
        The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at
    least one 24-hour rest period per week. The MLSP is responsible for
    enforcing both the minimum wage and the standard workweek. Enforcement
    generally is effective in the state sector (aside from wage arrears),
    but is weaker in the private sector.
        A national labor safety program exists, with standards established
    by the Labor Code. The Constitution states that employees are entitled
    to healthy and nonhazardous working conditions. The MLSP is responsible
    for enforcing these provisions. Conditions in many cases worsened due
    to budget stringencies and a growing private sector that labor
    inspectors do not yet supervise effectively. Protective clothing often
    is absent from hazardous areas (goggles for welders and helmets for
    construction workers, for example). The overall standard of living of
    workers stabilized in 1998 after suffering a severe downturn during the
    economic crisis of late 1996 and early 1997. The pervasive economic
    crisis and imminent, long-overdue privatizations continue to create a
    heightened fear of unemployment, leading to a reluctance on the part of
    workers to pursue wage and safety demands. Joint employer/labor health
    and safety committees to monitor workplace conditions, required by new
    legislation passed in 1999, remained in developmental stages at year's
    end.
        Under the Labor Code, employees have the right to remove themselves
    from work situations that present a serious or immediate danger to life
    or health without jeopardizing their continued employment. However, in
    practice refusal to work in situations with relatively high accident
    rates or associated chronic health problems would result in the loss of
    employment for many workers.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--In 1997 the Government enacted a law
    against trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women and girls
    remains a serious problem. The country is both a source and a transit
    country for human trafficking. A 1997 amendment to the Penal Code on
    trafficking in women introduced longer prison sentences (to existing
    kidnaping penalties already in force) in those cases where the victim
    is under 18 years of age, is offered to another person for sexual
    abuse, or is trafficked abroad for sexual abuse. However, no suspected
    traffickers have been brought to trial, possibly because victims are
    afraid to confront their former criminal controllers when there are no
    government- sponsored programs to assist or protect victims of
    trafficking. Some judges and prosecutors also report that they feared
    reprisals from organized crime figures. There are two police units that
    specifically address the problem of trafficking in persons. One is part
    of the border police and the other is in the Ministry of Interior's
    organized crime fighting agency. High-level Ministry of Interior
    officials cooperated closely with foreign governments and the
    International Organization for Migration to support a research project
    and information campaign to combat trafficking.
        La Strada, a Netherlands-based NGO, reports that Bulgarian women
    constitute one of the largest groups of victims of forced prostitution
    in Western and Central Europe. Approximately 10,000 Bulgarian women,
    many under the age of 18, may be involved in international trafficking
    operations, but no official statistics are available. Village girls as
    young as 14 years of age have been kidnaped and smuggled over the
    border. This is a very lucrative business for Bulgarian criminal
    organizations, and there have been widespread albeit unconfirmed
    reports of local police involvement in trafficking in some areas.
    Victims of trafficking range from those who were duped into the belief
    that they would have good and respectable employment, to those who
    expected to work as prostitutes but were unprepared for the degree of
    violence and exploitation to which they would be subjected. A factor
    contributing to the high number of trafficking victims from the country
    is the high unemployment rate among young women. Furthermore, because
    it may be very difficult for young women to obtain visas to work in
    Western Europe, false job agencies that promise to simplify the process
    can be very successful in luring trafficking victims. The process of
    transforming girls into prostitutes generally takes place before they
    even leave the country. The women typically are taken to a large town,
    isolated, beaten, and subjected to severe physical and psychological
    torture. Some trafficking victims from countries to the east are kept
    in Bulgaria for several weeks where they are subjected to psychological
    and physical abuse to make them more submissive before they are shipped
    to their destination points. Once the women leave the country, their
    identity documents are taken away, and they find themselves forced to
    work as prostitutes in cities across Europe. Victims routinely report
    that traffickers took away their passports and visas, and forced them
    to stay illegally in countries. The women may be required to pay back
    heavy financial debts to the agency that helped them depart the
    country, leaving them in virtual indentured servitude. Traffickers
    punish women severely for acts of disobedience. Traffickers also use
    threats against the women's families and family reputations to ensure
    obedience.
        Relevant authorities and NGO observers report that thousands of
    Bulgarian women have been trafficked to Poland, the Netherlands and the
    Czech Republic, while others are trafficked to Germany, Belgium,
    France, Canada, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo),
    Romania, Hungary, Macedonia, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Women
    reportedly have been trafficked into Bulgaria from the former Soviet
    Union and Macedonia, also for forced prostitution. The country also is
    a transit point for traffickers bringing women to Greece. The northeast
    and southwest border regions are where most trafficking occurs, since
    women are sent more easily to former socialist countries with less
    strict visa requirements.
        The AAF reported handling 24 cases of returned victims of
    trafficking in women during the first half of the year.
        Technical and bureaucratic obstacles hamper governmental assistance
    to female victims of violence. Many victims of trafficking and forced
    prostitution are too young to have worked previously; the lack of
    previous work experience disqualifies them from receiving social
    security assistance. If they are runaways with no registered address to
    which they can return, they are ineligible for humanitarian assistance.
    They also are largely ineligible for government assistance programs,
    most of which are in some way tied to previous employment status.
    Victims are not encouraged to file complaints, as there is no mechanism
    in place to protect witnesses.
        Prevailing public attitudes often stigmatize victims, although
    there are some signs that this may be changing slowly. There is one
    NGO-sponsored 24-hour hot line for women in crisis, including victims
    of trafficking, with trained volunteers as well as professional
    therapists to counsel victims. The NGO also coordinates with government
    agencies and other NGO's to find assistance for trafficking victims.
        On April 18, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
    launched a trafficking awareness campaign. The campaign publicized the
    availability of NGO counseling facilities, and AAF reported an increase
    in cases related to trafficking during the year.
        The Government increased its efforts during the year to address the
    problem of trafficking on an interagency effort involving all relevant
    government agencies, including law enforcement and social policy
    agencies. The Government also has increased its international
    cooperation in this area, both through the Southeast Europe Cooperation
    Initiative (SECI) Anti-Crime Center in Bucharest and in bilateral
    efforts.
                                   __________

                                    CROATIA

        The Republic of Croatia is a constitutional parliamentary democracy
    with a strong presidency. President Stjepan Mesic of the Croatian
    People's Party (HNS) was elected in February to a 5-year term to
    replace President Franjo Tudjman who died in office in December 1999;
    Ivica Racan is the Prime Minister. International observers
    characterized the elections as ``calm and orderly,'' noting that in
    general, ``voters were able to express their political will freely,''
    although some problems remained. The President serves as Head of State
    and commander of the armed forces, nominates the Prime Minister who
    leads the Government, and approves certain appointments in local and
    regional government. On January 3, an opposition coalition defeated the
    ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party in voting for the lower
    house of Parliament. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE) observers stated that the parliamentary elections
    represented ``marked progress'' toward meeting OSCE standards. The
    combination of a new President and a new democratic coalition in
    Parliament helped to increase the transparency of the role of the
    President and to end the blurring of the powers of the Presidency with
    those of the Government and the ruling party. The judiciary increased
    its independence as the Government reduced efforts to exert political
    influence over court decisions. The judiciary continued to suffer from
    bureaucratic and funding problems, as well as instances of political
    influence at the local level.
        The Ministry of Interior oversees the civilian national police, and
    the Ministry of Defense oversees the military and military police. The
    national police have primary responsibility for internal security but,
    in times of disorder, the Government may call upon the army to provide
    security. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control
    of the professional security forces; however, the police occasionally
    committed human rights abuses.
        The new Government embarked on essential economic reforms, but the
    transition to a market-based, free enterprise economy continued to
    proceed slowly. While agriculture is mostly in private hands and the
    number of small enterprises is increasing, industry and media
    enterprises largely are either still controlled by the State or
    deliberately were transferred under the Tudjman regime in
    nontransparent, noncompetitive processes to individuals sympathetic to
    the HDZ. In July an investment law was passed to remove some obstacles
    to foreign direct investment. Government spending, although lower than
    in previous years, remained high. Unemployment reached 22.4 percent at
    year's end, was much higher in the war-affected areas, and may rise
    further as nonproductive, formerly state-run enterprises are
    liquidated. The standard of living for most of the population has yet
    to recover to prewar levels. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
    was $4,100 (33,210 kuna). Nonpayment of wages continued to be a serious
    problem. Banks began lending again following a liquidity crisis of
    previous years. Economic growth resumed after several years of decline,
    and the exchange rate and prices remained stable. Income from tourism
    was up over 30 percent over 1999, nearly reaching prewar levels.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; its human rights record improved during the year, but serious
    problems remained in some areas. The Government's conduct of the
    January and February elections improved citizens' ability to change
    their Government peacefully. Police occasionally abused prisoners. The
    Government continued to charge and arrest persons for war crimes
    committed during the 1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. Lengthy
    pretrial detention, particularly for ethnic Serbs indicted for war
    crimes, continued to be a problem. The judiciary remained a problem as
    a pattern of arrests of ethnic Serbs for war crimes apparently based on
    extremely weak evidence continued from previous years. The courts
    continued to be subject to occasional political influence on the local
    level and suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency, insufficient
    funding, and a severe backlog of cases. The Government's respect for
    citizens' privacy rights improved; however, the restitution of occupied
    property to (mostly ethnic Serb) refugees returning to the country
    remained problematic.
        The Government's respect for freedom of speech and press improved
    markedly, but some problems remained. Reports of the harassment of
    journalists and censorship virtually ceased. However, reform in public
    broadcasting has been slow, and an estimated 900 libel lawsuits against
    journalists remained pending due to backlogs in the judicial system.
    Parliament did not pass legislation to amend the law on state-owned
    television and radio (HRT) during the year. The Government respected
    academic freedom. The Constitutional Court struck down laws that
    allowed excessive governmental interference in the operation of
    associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Respect for
    freedom of religion improved somewhat during the year; however,
    restitution of nationalized property remains a high, and unaddressed,
    priority for several religious communities.
        The Government took some steps to facilitate the return of refugee
    citizens (mostly ethnic Serbs) and the return of persons internally
    displaced by the 1991-95 conflict, including the establishment of a
    coordinative commission to address issues in war-affected areas and the
    reform of laws that previously discriminated against ethnic Serb
    refugees. Although the number of refugees returning to their homes
    accelerated during the year, serious problems remained. The
    coordinative commission lapsed into inactivity by year's end, and no
    significant progress was made on the restitution of private property or
    resolution of the right to previously socially owned property, and this
    continued to be the greatest obstacle to refugee returns.
        Two rounds of presidential elections and one round of parliamentary
    voting were conducted in a calm and orderly fashion, and the Government
    addressed some irregularities and improved the process with each round.
    However, the OSCE noted continuing problems: While many refugees in
    neighboring countries, mostly ethnic Serbs, continued to be unable to
    assert their citizenship and exercise their right to vote, the Law on
    Citizenship grants voting rights to ethnic Croats born abroad but who
    have no permanent residence in Croatia.
        The Government's record of cooperation with international human
    rights and monitoring organizations improved somewhat, although
    problems remained. The Council of Europe, citing progress on human
    rights, decided to terminate its permanent monitoring of Croatia in
    September, and the OSCE terminated its police monitoring group in the
    Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) in October. In the first half of the
    year, the Government took steps to improve cooperation with the
    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
    however, cooperation slowed in the second half of the year, and the
    Government was reluctant and slow in providing timely access to
    witnesses and documentary evidence. Some of the Tribunal's requests for
    cooperation remained outstanding at year's end. The Government's
    Ombudsman for Human Rights met periodically with human rights groups
    and investigated, upon receipt of complaints, individual cases of human
    rights violations.
        Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. Ethnic
    minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, faced serious discrimination.
    While some progress was made, ethnic tensions in the war-affected areas
    remained high, and abuses, including ethnically motivated harassment
    and assaults, continued to occur. There were two ethnically motivated
    murders during the year. The country is a transit point and lesser
    source and destination country for trafficking in persons.
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        There were two ethnically motivated killings of Serbs during the
    year (see Section 5).
        In August Milan Levar, a former police officer who previously
    provided information to the ICTY about the 1991 massacre of civilians
    in the town of Gospic, was killed at his Gospic home. Government
    leaders condemned the killing, but an intensive police investigation
    had not led to any arrests by December.
        During the year nine persons were killed by landmines laid by
    Croatian and Serb forces during the 1991-95 war. Three persons also
    were killed in related demining incidents. The Croatian Center for
    Demining reported that from 1991 through the end of the year, 1,320
    mine incidents were recorded in which 365 persons were killed (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In July the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights released
    its second report on human rights violations during the 1995 military
    operation ``Storm'' in which Croatian forces recaptured rebel Serb
    areas in the Krajina region. The report identifies over 600 ethnic Serb
    civilians who were killed or reported missing in ``sector north.'' No
    indictments have ever been brought for the events described in the
    report.
        Courts continued adjudicating war crimes cases arising from the
    1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. In an improvement over the
    record of the previous Government, which prosecuted very few ethnic
    Croats and then in often politicized trials, several ethnic Croats were
    detained during the year for war crimes or other crimes committed
    during the conflict. Five persons, including Tihomir Oreskovic, were
    arrested in September on suspicion of war crimes committed during the
    1991 Gospic massacre. A sixth suspect was arrested in December. At
    year's end, four were in pretrial detention and two were released but
    remained under investigation. In September two military intelligence
    officers were arrested in Zadar for suspicion of involvement in the
    1993 Ahmici massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four others were
    arrested but later released on suspicion of providing the officers with
    false identities to facilitate their escape. At year's end, the two
    arrestees remained in detention as the investigation proceeded. In May
    the long-delayed retrial of soldier Mihajlo Hrastov began. The Supreme
    Court in 1993 ordered the retrial after Hrastov was acquitted in 1992
    of the massacre of 13 Serb prisoners in Karlovac in September 1991. At
    year's end, the trial was adjourned while the prosecution sought
    witnesses to the massacre. Also at year's end, the retrial was
    beginning in the case of 6 soldiers originally acquitted in the 1995
    massacre of 16 elderly Serbs in the villages of Varivode and Goscici.
    In November the Supreme Court admitted committing an error in 1997 when
    it amnestied Antun Gudelj, who had been convicted of the July 1991
    murder of moderate Osijek police chief Josip Reichl-Kir (see Section
    1.e.).
        Trials of ethnic Serbs continued; however, a pattern of arresting
    Serbs for war crimes based on extremely weak evidence continued from
    previous years (see Section 1.e.). In May a Vukovar court convicted 11
    ethnic Serbs of 22 indictees for war crimes committed during the fall
    of Vukovar in 1991; 21 of the defendants were tried in absentia (see
    Section 1.e.). The only individual to defend himself in person was
    Stefan Curnic, who was convicted and received a 15-year sentence.
    International observers assessed the evidence against Curnic as
    credible but noted that he had been incarcerated since December 1998
    without a trial (see Section 1.d.). In July five ethnic Serbs (the
    ``Sodolovci group''), whose 1999 conviction for war crimes was
    overturned by the Supreme Court and remanded to a lower court for a
    retrial, were acquitted for lack of evidence (see Section 1.e.). In
    Osijek in October, 15 ethnic Serbs (the ``Baranja group'') were
    arrested on 1991 war crimes indictments despite the fact that those
    indictments had little or no supporting evidence. Eight of these
    individuals remained incarcerated at year's end. There were at least 19
    arrests of ethnic Serb refugees returning to Croatia after they had
    been cleared for return, in violation of return procedures established
    between the Government and UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
        Progress was made on the exhumation of graves and identification of
    persons missing from the 1991-95 war at a number of sites in the
    Danubian region. Throughout the country, the bodies of 3,197 victims
    have been exhumed from mass and individual graves since the war (see
    Section 1.b.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        Government figures in December showed that 1,567 persons (mostly
    ethnic Croats) remained missing in cases unresolved from the 1991-95
    military conflict. However, this number does not reflect approximately
    900 additional persons (mostly ethnic Serbs) believed to be missing
    since mid-1995, who were reported to the Government of the Federal
    Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) or to international organizations.
    There has been significant progress on the recovery and identification
    of the remains of ethnic Croats; but efforts to identify missing ethnic
    Serbs continued to be hampered by political and bureaucratic obstacles.
    Throughout the country, 3,197 victims have been exhumed from mass and
    individual graves since the war, including 73 during the year. The
    remains of 110 persons were identified positively during the year. In
    July and November the government commission charged with responsibility
    for locating missing persons held a meeting with its Yugoslav
    counterpart to exchange information on the missing and detained; these
    meetings had been suspended since March 1999. In September the
    Government formalized the status of the commission by legalizing it as
    a government office with a separate budget. The September changes also
    integrated the Danubian Subcomission for Missing Persons into the
    office as a working group. In the past, the lack of transparency
    regarding the commission's authority and budget hampered its efficient
    operation.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, mistreatment, or cruel
    or degrading punishment; however, police occasionally abused prisoners.
        In October the OSCE terminated its uniformed Police Monitoring
    Group (PMG) in the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia), assessing that
    the local police performance was satisfactory and the security
    situation in the region was stable. The PMG was replaced by a smaller
    cadre of civilian police observers. There were periodic reports of
    ethnic tensions between ethnic Serb and Croat police officers in the
    Danubian region. For example, one ethnic Croat police officer ``dry-
    fired'' his unloaded pistol into the face of an ethnic Serb colleague.
    The officer received a short suspension from duty, and credible
    observers expressed concern that mid-level police supervisors failed to
    take the incident seriously or adequately punish the perpetrator.
    However, upon being informed of the incident, the assistant Interior
    Minister ordered a thorough investigation. The commander of the station
    where the incident took place was replaced by year's end.
        The number of reported ethnic incidents in the Danubian region fell
    to less than half its 1999 level. This development largely was due to a
    real decrease in the number of ethnic incidents. However, there were
    reports of the failure of some police officers to regularly classify
    ethnic incidents as such, and of a reluctance of ethnic Serbs to report
    harassment because of a sense that such incidents have become
    commonplace. Continuing problems include poor police investigative
    techniques, acute social sensitivity to ethnic issues, indecisive
    middle management in the police, and pressure from hard-line local
    politicians. These factors impede development of local police
    capability. In the Danubian region in particular, and depending upon
    the ethnicity of the complainant, inconsistent police response to
    housing disputes remained a problem. In May in consultation with OSCE,
    the Interior Ministry began a reform and restructuring of its field
    police presence that is intended to close 106 substations and, through
    attrition, reduce the country's uniformed police-to-population ratio to
    a level closer to that of other European countries. In December the
    Government passed a new law on police, creating the position of
    Director of Police and providing senior police officials more authority
    to implement reforms at the precinct level.
        During the year, 13 persons were injured by landmines laid by
    Croatian and Serb forces during the 1991-95 war. Five persons also were
    injured in related demining incidents. The Croatian Center for Demining
    reported that from 1991 through the end of the year, 1,320 mine
    incidents were recorded, in which 1,281 persons were injured (see
    Section 1.a.).
        In October judge Marko Rogulja, an ethnic Serb judge on the Vukovar
    municipal bench in the Danubian region, was threatened by a mob (that
    included the county prefect) shortly after he had issued a decision to
    evict an ethnic Croat police officer from a home he was occupying that
    was owned by an ethnic Serb. The eviction never was carried out and the
    case later was transferred to another judge. No public officials,
    either at the municipal or national level, made any public statement
    about the incident or otherwise condemned the harassment of a judge.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. Police
    reportedly occasionally abused prisoners. Jails are crowded, but not
    excessively so, and family visits and access to counsel generally are
    available, albeit not consistently at all phases of the criminal
    proceedings (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides for rights of accused persons, but the Government does not
    always respect due process provisions for arrest and detention. Police
    normally obtain arrest warrants by presenting evidence of probable
    cause to an investigative magistrate. Police may make arrests without a
    warrant if they believe a suspect might flee, destroy evidence, or
    commit other crimes; such cases of warrantless arrest are not uncommon.
    The police then have 24 hours to justify the arrest to a magistrate.
        Detainees must be given access to an attorney of their choice
    within 24 hours of their arrest; if they have none and are charged with
    a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years' imprisonment, the
    magistrate appoints counsel. The magistrate must, within 48 hours of
    the arrest, decide whether to extend the detention for further
    investigation. Investigative detention generally lasts up to 30 days,
    but the Supreme Court may extend the period (for a total of not more
    than 6 months) in exceptional cases. Once the investigation is
    complete, detainees can be released on their own recognizance pending
    trial unless the crime is a serious offense, or the accused is
    considered a public danger, may influence witnesses, or is a flight
    risk.
        Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem, particularly
    for ethnic Serbs accused of war crimes. Suspects generally are held in
    custody pending trial, and there have been several cases of pretrial
    detention lasting for several months or years, including individuals
    awaiting the prosecutor's appeal of their acquittal. For example, in
    the case of Stefan Curnic, who was convicted for war crimes,
    international observers noted that he had been incarcerated since
    December 1998 without a trial (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). The
    practice of posting bail after an indictment is available but is not
    common.
        The Government continued to apply the 1996 Amnesty Law (which
    amnestied acts of rebellion by ethnic Serbs) in an arbitrary and unfair
    manner. While some improvement was noted early in the year, in October
    the state prosecutor directed local prosecutors to reopen old war
    crimes cases and execute dormant arrest warrants, although there
    appeared to be no new evidence to justify the arrests. As a result,
    although there only were 7 such arrests during the first 9 months of
    the year, there were at least 36 during the final 3 months. For
    example, in October 15 ethnic Serbs were arrested in Baranja in the
    Danubian region (8 of whom still were incarcerated at year's end) for
    1991 indictments for war crimes, despite the fact that those
    indictments had little or no supporting evidence (see Sections 1.a. and
    5). Because the arrests were not based upon new evidence, they violated
    letters of agreement between the U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern
    Slavonia (UNTAES) and the Government reached under the auspices of the
    1995 Erdut Agreement. Government officials later justified the arrests
    by calling these agreements ``gentlemen's agreements'' and ``merely
    verbal agreements.''
        Several ethnic Serb defendants continued to be held in detention
    for extended periods as their cases slowly progressed through the
    overburdened judicial system. In April in the Lepoglava Prison, 27
    ethnic Serb prisoners engaged in a 2-week hunger strike to protest
    shortcomings in the application of the Amnesty Law, particularly the
    slow pace of their proceedings and the Government's failure to
    reexamine previous convictions based on unfair procedures or weak and
    contradictory evidence.
        There were at least 19 cases of ethnic Serb refugees being arrested
    upon return to the country, in violation of clearance procedures agreed
    upon by the Government and the UNHCR. In four of these cases the
    subject later was released after being amnestied under the Amnesty Act
    or when charges were dropped. In August Dusan Jokic was arrested on a
    warrant for a 1995 robbery conviction while on a U.N.-organized visit
    to his prewar home in Obrovac. In September charges were dropped under
    the Amnesty Law and Jokic was released. Also in August, Slavko Drobnjak
    was arrested in Petrinja based on a previous conviction in absentia for
    1991 war crimes. In October Miljan Strunjas was arrested in Karlovac, a
    week after returning to the country, on suspicion of committing 1991
    war crimes. International observers did not question the Government's
    right to prosecute criminals but expressed concern that arrests of
    persons who had been cleared for return and informed by authorities
    that there were no outstanding charges against them would harm the
    process of refugee returns. In the autumn, the Government streamlined
    its clearance procedure to process requests more efficiently for
    refugees intending to return.
        In the Danubian region monitors noted that police occasionally
    called ethnic Serbs to police stations for ``voluntary informative
    talks,'' which amounted to brief warrantless detentions intended to
    harass Serb citizens.
        Two Serb police officers in Borovo Selo and Ilok (both in the
    Danubian region) were arrested in 1999 for war crimes despite the fact
    that they previously were cleared for police duty by the Ministry of
    Interior. One of the officers was convicted of war crimes and sentenced
    to 15 years in prison. The other remained in investigative detention at
    year's end, pending trial. At least four Serb police officers were
    arrested during the year on war crimes charges and remained in
    detention. There were no reports of Serb officers fleeing to Yugoslavia
    when they learned they were the subject of investigations.
        The Constitution prohibits the exile of citizens. In 1998 the
    Government established procedures for Croatian Serbs who fled the
    country during the conflict to have their citizenship recognized,
    obtain personal documentation, return to Croatia, and reclaim their
    property and social benefits. Implementation of these procedures
    continued to be slow and uneven (see Section 2.d.). During the year,
    27,900 persons who were refugees in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
    were able to return to Croatia in returns organized by the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The pace of organized returns during
    the year was 50 percent higher than in 1999, in large part because of
    the new Government's commitment to facilitate the process. Of
    approximately 250,000 ethnic Serbs who fled their homes, organized
    returns since the end of the conflict in 1995 through December totaled
    37,144. In addition an estimated 30,000 persons returned outside of
    official programs.
        Ethnic Serbs requiring personal documentation to return to or
    regularize their status within the country continued to report
    difficulties, delays, and contradictory requirements from local
    officials charged with issuing documents. However the number of such
    reports was lower than in the past. Several NGO's reported that despite
    the central Government's commitment to facilitate the documentation
    process, obstructions often were caused by recalcitrant local
    officials.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is autonomous and
    independent under the Constitution; however, it suffers from instances
    of political influence at the local level, and a large backlog of over
    1.1 million cases and funding shortfalls remain.
        The judicial system consists of municipal and county courts, the
    Administrative court, and the Supreme Court. The independent
    Constitutional Court both determines the constitutionality of laws,
    governmental acts, and elections and serves as the court of final
    appeal for individual cases. A parallel commercial court system
    adjudicates commercial and contractual disputes. The State Judicial
    Council (consisting of a president and 14 members serving 8-year terms)
    is a body independent of both the judiciary and the Ministry of
    Justice. It is charged with the appointment and discipline, including
    removal, of judges and public prosecutors. The lower house of
    Parliament nominates and elects persons for membership on the Council.
    The 11 judges of the Constitutional Court are elected for 8-year terms
    in the same manner, while all other judges are appointed for life.
        In the past, the State Judicial Council was criticized for the
    politicization of its decisions. In March the Constitutional Court
    struck down some provisions of the Law on the State Judicial Council
    and criticized the Council for failing to abide by several court
    decisions and for lack of transparency in making judicial appointments.
    The Constitutional Court also directed the Council to repeat the
    confirmation process for 16 judges (including 5 Supreme Court
    nominations) that were improperly rejected by the council. However,
    because four members resigned from the Council during the year in
    protest over its politicization, the Council was not able to convene to
    act on this court order. Amendments to the Law on the State Judicial
    Council passed in December, in response to the Supreme Court ruling,
    were designed to depoliticize the Council and judicial appointments
    and, by extension, improve the quality and the number of sitting
    judges. The amendments empower the Minister of Justice (rather than the
    Council) to nominate and discipline Court presidents. They also
    introduce more transparency into the appointment and discipline of
    judges by, inter alia, providing for the Constitutional Court to review
    such proceedings.
        Judges are constitutionally prohibited from being members of any
    political party. Under the new Government, the judiciary has been
    subject to less political influence than was the case under the
    previous regime, although reports of political influence at the local
    level continued. The politicization of hard-line judges appointed by
    the previous Government, who at times made decisions in a
    nontransparant manner seemingly at odds with the evidence or the law,
    also continued to be a problem. The Constitutional Court in particular
    has demonstrated during the year a commitment to impartial and
    nonpolitical rulings that have helped to overcome the legacy of the
    previous regime and to lay the foundation for an increased respect for
    the rule of law.
        The greatest problems facing the judiciary are inexperienced judges
    and bureaucratic inefficiencies and funding shortfalls which, over the
    years, have created a massive backlog estimated at over 1.1 million
    cases, some dating back 30 years or more. Cases may drag on for years.
    The inexperience of young and recently appointed judges continued to be
    a problem. There continued to be areas of the country without a
    permanent judge. In August and September, three convicted felons were
    released because they did not receive their second instance (Supreme
    Court) decisions within the statutory limit of 30 months. Justice
    Ministry and Supreme Court officials noted that cases often would
    languish for extended periods at the first instance court and then be
    passed to the Supreme Court just days or weeks before the 30-month
    limit expired. Compounding this problem were scheduling inefficiencies
    at the Supreme Court, where there is a 10,000 case backlog and only 35
    judges who do not have access to modern court technologies and case
    management techniques. As a result of these prisoner releases, the
    Supreme Court streamlined its procedures in the autumn and no more such
    releases were reported. According to the president of the Association
    of Croatian Judges, the Government failed to provide the financial
    means necessary for the regular operation of the courts.
        Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial
    and a variety of due process rights in the courts, citizens were
    sometimes denied fair trials. Courts tried and convicted in absentia
    persons for war crimes. In May a Vukovar court convicted 11 ethnic
    Serbs out of a total of 22 Serb indictees for war crimes committed
    during and after the fall of Vukovar in 1991; 21 of the defendants were
    tried in absentia. The only individual to defend himself in person was
    Stefan Curnic, who was convicted and received a 15-year sentence.
    International observers assessed the evidence against Curnic as
    credible but noted that he had been incarcerated since December 1998
    without a trial (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). In August and October,
    authorities arrested at least 19 ethnic Serbs for war crimes, in an
    apparent breach of established return procedures (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.d.).
        In July five ethnic Serbs (the ``Sodolovci group''), whose 1999
    convictions for war crimes were overturned by the Supreme Court and
    remanded to the Osijek court for a retrial, were acquitted for lack of
    evidence. The 1999 convictions were, according to international
    observers and ethnic Serbs, based on improper judicial procedures and
    weak evidence. In October the Minister of Justice reported that 69
    ethnic Serbs were in Croatian jails for charges relating to wartime
    events, including 61 held for war crimes.
        In November the Supreme Court admitted committing an error in 1997
    when it amnestied Antun Gudelj, who had been convicted of the July 1991
    murder of moderate Osijek police chief Josip Reichl-Kir. At year's end,
    the Constitutional Court had not ruled yet on whether to order Gudelj
    rearrested and retried.
        Little or no progress was made in thousands of cases of illegal
    occupancy in which the legal property owner (typically a returning Serb
    refugee) had a positive court decision and legal right but was unable
    to recover occupied property. Judicial decisions overwhelmingly favored
    ethnic Croats in property claims involving returning refugees and
    displaced persons. In those cases in which the court ruled in favor of
    a non-Croat, only a handful of judicial orders for the eviction of a
    Croat occupant of a Serb-owned home have ever been carried out by the
    police (see Section 1.f.). Many cases of illegal occupancy involve
    current or former members of the Croatian military or police forces,
    and local authorities systematically refused to act against them on
    behalf of lawful owners. The only recourse for the lawful owner was to
    return to court to demand implementation of the first decision, a time-
    consuming and costly procedure that only rarely resulted in
    implementation.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution declares the home inviolable;
    however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. Only a
    court may issue a search warrant, which must justify the search. Police
    may enter a home without a warrant or the owner's consent only to
    enforce an arrest warrant, apprehend a suspect, or prevent serious
    danger to life or property. The Government's respect for citizens'
    privacy improved measurably; however, the restitution of occupied
    private property to (mostly ethnic Serb) refugees returning to the
    country remained a problem. Very few property owners and apartment
    tenants were able to recover their prewar dwellings.
        Despite a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that several elements of
    the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified Property were
    unconstitutional, the vast majority of the thousands of ethnic Serb
    property owners who fled homes that later were occupied by ethnic
    Croats remained unable to access their property. A 1998 program for the
    return of refugees and displaced persons, which included mechanisms for
    property restitution and reconstruction, did not have the full force of
    law. The program was implemented very slowly, and only a handful of
    cases of property restitution were recorded during the year, as both
    national and local authorities declined to take steps to displace
    temporary occupants in favor of the original owners. Backlogs in the
    judicial system represented a further impediment to timely resolution
    of housing disputes. Governmental promises made in the autumn to reform
    and streamline the housing commissions were unfulfilled at year's end.
    Further, only a handful of claims by ethnic Serbs for reconstruction
    have been considered.
        Despite orders from the national Government, local authorities
    (including local housing commissions) often did not take steps to
    regulate occupancy rights or to initiate lawsuits against individuals
    who refused to vacate occupied premises. This situation largely
    remained unchanged from the previous year. Thousands of returning
    ethnic Serb displaced persons and refugees continued to remain shut out
    of their homes, although in many cases the occupier's house had been
    reconstructed so there was no impediment to the occupier's return home.
    In some cases, the Government failed to furnish reconstructed houses
    with basic utilities, discouraging returns. In other instances,
    returnees who gained access to their property were held responsible for
    water and power bills accumulated by temporary occupants, and
    authorities refused to reconnect the services until the bills were
    paid. Local housing commissions often were purposefully dysfunctional
    and failed to resolve housing disputes, or when functional legally were
    powerless to implement their own decisions under an existing legal
    framework that still was unaddressed by the Government.
        An ongoing problem was the continued occupation of homes belonging
    to Croatian Serbs by refugees from neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and
    Yugoslavia, as well as ``priority category'' ethnic Croat citizens,
    i.e., active duty or former members of the military, widows, and
    orphans. Meanwhile, ethnic Croats wishing to return to their homes in
    the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) generally were able to recover
    their homes by evicting ethnic Serbs occupying them. Many Serb
    returnees were unable to move into looted and devastated homes that the
    Government defined as habitable. Of the total 7,123 applications for
    repossession of property recorded by the government Office for
    Displaced Persons and Refugees at the end of August 1999, less than
    one-fourth were listed as returned to their owners. No update was
    available at year's end.
        No progress was made to resolve the thousands of cases of persons
    (mostly ethnic Serbs) who lost their claims to their prewar socially-
    owned apartments due to their absence for more than 6 months during the
    conflict. Ethnic Serbs were affected disproportionately because no
    mechanism existed by which they could return to the country in order to
    claim their property or because they had lived in the occupied parts of
    the country and missed the chance to purchase their prewar apartments.
        Incidents of grenade attacks against property and arson related to
    housing disputes were reported during the year (see Section 5).
        The Constitution provides for the secrecy and safety of personal
    data, and this provision generally was respected. In line with a March
    Constitutional Court ruling, the Parliament in May adopted amendments
    to the internal affairs law that revoked the Interior Minister's
    sweeping discretionary powers to wiretap. The amendments grant
    wiretapping authority only in cases where the Criminal Code may be
    violated or there is a threat to the country's sovereignty, and they
    establish an independent board to oversee all wiretapping. In July the
    three members of the independent board were appointed; they are
    nonpartisan nonparliamentarians who will report to the parliamentary
    Intelligence Committee. In September the Interior Minister announced
    that several intelligence officials were disciplined and prosecuted for
    illegal wiretapping.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of thought and expression, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice, although some problems remained. The
    Constitutional provisions specifically include freedom of the press and
    other media, speech, and public expression, as well as the free
    establishment of institutions of public communication. Since the new
    Government took office in January, there has been a marked improvement
    in respect for freedom of speech and the media.
        Reports of harassment including threats, wiretapping, surveillance,
    and beatings of journalists largely ceased. Official harassment in the
    form of job loss, banishment from the air (for nonpayment of excessive
    fees), and overzealous tax enforcement has stopped. Self-censorship
    (not covering controversial stories for fear of libel lawsuits) largely
    has ceased. No incidents of censorship of the electronic media were
    reported. The government campaign of harassment of the independent
    media through the use of libel suits stopped, although the estimated
    900 libel cases from previous years (including 70 lawsuits filed
    against the satirical weekly Feral Tribune) have not concluded due to a
    slow and overburdened judicial system.
        In February the Constitutional Court struck down legal provisions
    that allowed defamation cases against journalists to be tried under
    ``urgent proceedings,'' meaning that the case would come to trial
    within 8 days, seriously prejudicing the defendant's ability to prepare
    a case. In May the Constitutional Court struck down a law that allowed
    prosecutors to file criminal charges against journalists for defamation
    of certain senior state officials. In June Parliament passed a bill
    amending the law to bring it in line with this ruling by formally
    rescinding the provision the court had struck down. However, by year's
    end, the Government still had not amended the Penal Code articles
    authorizing the prosecution of journalists who publish ``state
    secrets,'' articles that were abused in the past. The Government
    continued to control the regulatory framework and licensing of radio
    and television, including the selection of members of the managing
    council and the Council for Radio and Television. By year's end, the
    Government had not passed legislation to address these issues. While
    management changes at government-controlled radio and television (HRT)
    in the spring improved the quality of news programming, the Government
    was slow to fulfill its overall reform commitments (primarily due to
    the difficulty in reducing the bloated HRT workforce). A truly
    independent nationwide television station did not yet exist by year's
    end.
        The population continued to rely on government-run radio and
    television for news; however, a network of independent local television
    stations is producing Vijesti, a competing nightly news program. As a
    result of the 1999 Telecommunications Law, ``networking'' allowed
    independent media to achieve national coverage. Croatian Cable Network,
    an independent network of 8 television stations, was able to broadcast
    Vijesti, offering the first real competition to HRT'S Dnevnik program.
    The latter still was the most widely watched national news program, and
    was more balanced than in the past. HRT continued to enjoy an
    overwhelming advantage as the recipient of the bulk of advertising
    revenues and subsidies from government taxes on television users. These
    subsidies create an unfair advantage for the HRT over any independent
    television station that tries to compete, since the independents'
    ability to purchase programming, etc., is far less than that of the
    HRT. Similar problems exist in radio broadcasting. The Catholic Church
    operates the only private national radio station, but it invites other
    denominations to participate in ecumenical programming (see Section
    2.c.). The new Government (unlike the previous regime) did not close
    independent media outlets for nonpayment of (often exorbitant)
    licensing fees.
        Nearly all distribution of newspapers and magazines continued to be
    controlled by Tisak, a once-profitable firm that operates 1,700 news
    kiosks. Due to mismanagement, Tisak faced bankruptcy proceedings and
    still owed large debts to print media publishers. These debts, and the
    fact that the bankruptcy case is unlikely to be resolved quickly, put
    severe financial pressure on newspaper and magazine publishers. The
    trial of Tisak chief Miroslav Kutle for forgery and abuse of power in
    Tisak's collapse was ongoing at year's end. Tisak is now administered
    by the Government's Privatization Fund and there are no longer
    complaints that Tisak manipulates the distribution of print media by
    leaving some areas oversupplied with publications and others
    undersupplied. Foreign newspapers and journals continue to be available
    in the larger urban areas throughout the country; however, because of
    their high cost they remain largely inaccessible to many.
        Academic freedom was respected. Under the new Government, there
    have been no reports of restraints on academic freedom through control
    of research funds or otherwise. The previous dean of the University of
    Zagreb's philosophy faculty, a hard-liner closely associated with the
    previous Government, was replaced in October.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    respected this right in practice. A 1999 law permits assembly for
    registered demonstrations at approved locations, and while this law was
    less restrictive, it does not make transparent the process for
    approving or denying the registration of an assembly, there were no
    reports that it was used discriminatorily.
        In March, thousands peacefully marched to protest the 45-year
    sentence served on General Tihomir Blaskic by the ICTY.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association. In February
    the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the 1997 Law on
    Associations that had increased the Government's ability to restrict
    the right of association through interference in the registration and
    operation of associations and nongovernmental organizations. Parliament
    did not pass new proposed legislation by year's end to comply with this
    ruling and to reduce governmental interference and make registration
    less onerous.
        The Government continued to operate an office for cooperation with
    NGO's that coordinates NGO efforts with government initiatives on human
    rights and civil society. Budget cuts reduced this office's
    disbursements to NGO's and civic organizations from $3.7 million (31.6
    million kuna) in 1999 to $2.5 million (20.5 million kuna) during the
    year.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    conscience and religion and free public profession of religious
    conviction, and the Government respects these rights in practice. No
    formal restrictions are imposed on religious groups, and all religious
    communities are free to conduct public services and to open and run
    social and charitable institutions. Roman Catholicism is the majority
    faith, and there are smaller Eastern Orthodox, Christian, Muslim, and
    Jewish communities. Croatian Protestants from a number of denominations
    and foreign clergy and missionaries actively practice and proselytize.
        The overall situation for freedom of religion improved somewhat
    during the year. Government officials have expressed publicly a
    commitment to improving the climate for religious freedom, but their
    approach during the year was ad hoc, addressing problems as they arose
    rather than setting uniform nondiscriminatory standards for all
    communities. Early in the year, the Government established a
    ``Commission for Relations with Religious Communities'' whose purview
    includes the rights of minority religions, religious instruction in
    schools, and restitution of nationalized property. This commission
    replaced a similar office under the previous government. However,
    leaders of minority religious communities, who would like to use the
    commission to secure the same benefits as those enjoyed by the Catholic
    Church, reported that no substantive progress was made by year's end.
        While there is no official state religion, the Roman Catholic
    Church is one of the most powerful national symbols and enjoys a
    historic relationship with the state not shared by other denominations.
    Approximately 85 percent of the population are Catholic. This
    relationship is codified in the ``concordats'', a series of 1997
    bilateral treaties between the Government and the Vatican that regulate
    many aspects of church/state relations from the recognition of
    marriages to state subsidies for the church. The Catholic Church
    receives state financing to support pensions for priests and nuns
    through government-managed pension and health funds. Other religious
    communities still do not have such an agreement with the State, nor is
    there a law that regulates these issues. (Orthodox priests and imams
    have been paying their contributions to the health and pension funds
    from their own resources, in order to be covered by a pension plan.) In
    July the Catholic Church signed an agreement with the state-run
    broadcaster (HRT) to provide regular, extensive coverage of Catholic
    events (as much as 10 hours per month). Other denominations receive
    about 10 minutes broadcast time per month. Separately the Catholic
    Church operates the only private national radio station, but it invites
    other denominations to participate in ecumenical programming (see
    Section 2.a.).
        The previous HDZ Government implemented restitution of religious
    property in a discriminatory manner. The Government signed a concordat
    with the Vatican in 1998 that provided for the return of all Catholic
    Church property confiscated by the Communist regime after 1945. This
    agreement stipulates that the Government would return seized properties
    or compensate the Church where return is impossible. Some progress has
    been made with some returnable properties being restituted, but there
    has been no compensation to date for nonreturnable properties.
        No such agreements exist between the Government and other religious
    groups. The Orthodox community filed several requests for the return of
    seized properties, and some cases have been resolved successfully,
    particularly cases involving buildings in urban centers. However,
    several buildings in downtown Zagreb have not been returned, nor have
    properties that belonged to monasteries, such as arable land and
    forest. In December 1999, the Government returned to the Jewish
    community a site in downtown Zagreb where the main synagogue was
    located until its destruction in World War II. However, other Jewish
    properties, including some Zagreb buildings, have not been returned.
    The Jewish community identifies property return as one of its top
    priorities.
        Catholic marriages are recognized by the State, eliminating the
    need to register them in the civil registry office. The Muslim and
    Jewish communities, seeking similar status, have raised this issue
    repeatedly with the Government, but there has been no resolution by
    year's end.
        Zagreb Archbishop Josip Bozanic took office in 1997 and has sought
    a role for the Catholic Church independent of the Government. Bozanic
    has been active in publicly promoting ethnic reconciliation and the
    return of refugees. The Catholic Church consolidated its privileged
    position among the several religious communities, but at the same time
    has improved ecumenical dialogue, particularly with the Serb Orthodox
    Community. In February Orthodox and Catholic bishops met in Yugoslavia,
    in June Orthodox Patriarch Pavle visited Croatia and met with Bozanic,
    and in August they met again in Belgrade.
        Notions of religion and ethnicity are linked closely in society,
    but the majority of incidents of discrimination are motivated by
    ethnicity rather than religion or religious doctrine. There were
    persistent reports of vandalism to Serb Orthodox cemeteries and
    structures, as well as to a Jewish community center (see Section 5).
        The Ministry of Defense employs 19 Catholic Priests to tend to
    Catholics in the military. However, neither Orthodox nor Muslim clerics
    were given this opportunity. A Catholic priest is present and gives a
    blessing at the oath-giving ceremony upon entering the army, but other
    clerics have not been invited to participate. The Government requires
    that religious training be provided in schools, although attendance is
    optional. Schools filling the necessary quota of seven minority
    students per class are allowed to offer separate religion classes for
    these students. In classes not meeting this quota, minority students
    may fulfill the religion requirement by bringing a certificate that
    they received classes from their religious community. Generally the
    lack of resources, minority students, and qualified teachers impeded
    religious instruction in minority faiths. Jewish officials noted that
    basic information provided to students about Judaism was inaccurate,
    and their offers to improve the material continued to go unheeded.
        Foreign missionaries occasionally reported difficulty in obtaining
    appropriate working visas, but under the new Government immigration
    authorities have made a conscious effort to process their visa requests
    more expeditiously than in the past. Missionaries do not operate
    registered schools, but the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
    (Mormon) community provides free English lessons, normally followed by
    religion class. The Muslim community has a secondary school in Zagreb,
    but the Ministry of Education continued to refuse to recognize its
    diploma; a lawsuit to resolve the matter was pending at year's end.
    About 20 students per year graduate from the school.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution generally provides for
    these rights, with certain restrictions. All persons must register
    their residence with the local authorities. Under exceptional
    circumstances, the Government legally may restrict the right to enter
    or leave the country if necessary to protect the ``legal order, health,
    rights, or freedoms of others.''
        There were at least 19 arrests of ethnic Serb refugees returning to
    Croatia after they had been cleared for return, in violation of return
    procedures established between the Government and UNHCR (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.d.).
        There were no reports that the Government revoked citizenship for
    political reasons. The Government's procedures to verify and document
    the citizenship of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs who fled the
    country after the military operations in 1995 improved slightly during
    the year; however, this process for the most part has remained slow and
    uneven. International observers assessed that delays and obstacles more
    often were created by limited resources and overburdened consular
    offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia than by willful
    discrimination.
        During the year, 27,900 persons who were refugees in Yugoslavia and
    Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to return to Croatia in returns organized
    by the UNHCR (see Section 1.d.).
        A significant number of internally displaced persons remains in the
    country, although not all are under the Government's direct care. While
    the government reported some 57,000 persons (34,000 internally
    displaced and 23,000 refugees, mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina and
    Yugoslavia) with refugee or displaced person status at year's end, this
    number does not reflect fully an additional 140,000 former refugees
    (nearly all ethnic Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina) who have become
    citizens of Croatia.
        International monitors and NGO's assessed that the emigration of
    ethnic Serbs from the Danubian region to third countries continued, but
    at a much slower pace than in previous years. Despite the fact that the
    Government continued an intensive program to repair thousands of
    damaged homes in the Danubian region, government officials, NGO's, and
    international observers assessed that the reduction of population
    movements into and out of the region to a trickle indicates that the
    returns process is nearing its completion there. In the first 9 months
    of the year, only 3,004 (mostly ethnic Croat) displaced persons
    returned to their prewar homes within the region, and 2,688 (mostly
    ethnic Serb) displaced persons left the region for prewar homes
    elsewhere in Croatia. Of 70,000 (mostly ethnic Croats) who fled the
    region during the conflict, 49,000 have returned. Overall the ethnic
    Serb population in the region has fallen from a prewar number of 70,000
    to an estimated 55,000 persons. While ethnic tensions continued in the
    Danubian region, the overall security situation was stable. The most
    salient disincentive to returns was the poor state of the regional
    economy.
        President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan made frequent public
    statements encouraging the return and reintegration of all Croatian
    citizens to their prewar homes. These commitments were supported by
    several initiatives. In March the Government established a commission
    to address issues in the war-affected areas. While the commission
    largely had concentrated its efforts on the Danubian region, it made
    little progress effecting return and reintegration throughout the other
    war-effected regions of the country and lapsed into inactivity at
    year's end. Also in March, the Government signed a joint declaration
    with the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina to cooperate in
    a number of technical areas to facilitate two-way refugee returns. Some
    efforts were made to help register the return of 2,000 refugees from
    Bosnia; however, the other provisions of the declaration remained
    unfulfilled at year's end. In June the Government brokered the signing
    of a joint statement by leaders of the Croatian Serb and Bosnian Croat
    communities in Croatia that encourages returns and repossession of
    private property in an atmosphere of respect for human and civil
    rights; however, little progress was made during the year on property
    restitution. In June and July, the Government reformed two laws that
    previously discriminated against ethnic Serb returnees. The Law on
    Reconstruction regulates access to reconstruction assistance and the
    Law on Areas of Special State Concern provides incentives to revitalize
    war-affected areas.
        Notwithstanding the reform of the two laws, there has been no
    significant administrative or legislative progress on restitution of
    property. The greatest outstanding obstacle to the return of all
    Croatian citizens is their inability to regain access to their prewar
    homes and properties. Existing mechanisms for the return of private
    property have worked best in the Danubian region where returnees tend
    to be ethnic Croats seeking to regain their homes from ethnic Serbs who
    are occupying them. Nearly every other instance of restituted property
    occurred pursuant to a private agreement between the owner and
    occupier.
        In May the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the Law
    on the Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees that prohibited
    evictions unless alternative accommodation was provided for the
    evictee. This provision had the effect of reinforcing the legal
    precedence of temporary occupants over that of property owners, and it
    provided an easy means for hard-line officials to obstruct the process
    of minority returns. The law continued to contain other discriminatory
    language, notably the failure of positive amendments enacted in
    November 1999 to be applied retroactively, and that therefore allowed
    existing discriminatory definitions of ``displaced person'' and
    ``refugee'' to remain in effect.
        There were persistent reports that humanitarian and reconstruction
    assistance was not distributed fairly by government agencies. The
    Government allowed free access to all displaced persons by domestic and
    international humanitarian organizations and permitted them to provide
    assistance. However, the Government at times accused international
    organizations of bias in providing assistance only to ethnic Serb
    returnees.
        The Government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian and
    international organizations assisting refugees. The Government began
    implementation of the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Thus persons seeking
    refuge (notably from Kosovo and Yugoslavia) are given ``temporary
    protection.'' Separately asylum seekers are processed by the Interior
    Ministry under the Law on Residence of Aliens. A working group of
    Interior Ministry and UNHCR officials continued its work drafting new
    legislation on asylum to meet international standards. The country
    provides first asylum and there were no reports of persons claiming
    asylum being returned to countries where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        All citizens over 18 years of age have the right to vote by secret
    ballot. The President is limited by the Constitution to two 5-year
    terms. President Stjepan Mesic was elected in two rounds of voting in
    January and February to a 5-year term to replace President Franjo
    Tudjman, who died in office in December 1999. The elections generally
    were well conducted, and irregularities (particularly at out-of-country
    polling stations) during the first round were addressed at the second
    round. OSCE monitors characterized the elections as ``calm and
    orderly,'' noting that ``voters were able to express their political
    will freely;'' however, problems remained. The Citizenship Law and
    electoral legislation grant citizenship, and thereby the franchise, on
    purely ethnic grounds to ethnic Croats abroad with no genuine link to
    the country. Meanwhile the Government failed to ensure that many
    Croatian Serbs, who fled in 1995 and who wished to assume the
    responsibilities of Croatian citizenship, were able to document their
    Croatian citizenship in order to vote and ultimately to return.
    Progress on the documentation and return of ethnic Serb refugees
    continued to be slow (see Sections 1.d and 2.d.).
        The Parliament comprises the (lower) House of Representatives and
    the (upper) House of Counties. During the January elections, an
    opposition coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the
    Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) won a majority of the lower house,
    ending 9 years of HDZ party rule. OSCE monitors characterized the
    voting as having made ``marked progress'' toward meeting OSCE
    standards. The 1999 electoral law that regulated the voting allowed
    independent monitoring by NGO's and the establishment of multiparty
    voting commissions.
        Other concerns about the electoral process remained. The electoral
    law reduced the number of lower house seats reserved for ethnic
    minorities from seven to five (although minorities make up about 15
    percent of the population). Previous legislation more closely matched
    the minority representation to the size of the minority population, and
    the 1999 reduction in minority seats was especially disadvantageous to
    ethnic Serbs.
        Women and minorities were underrepresented in government and
    politics, although there were no legal restrictions on their
    participation. After the January lower house elections, 32 of 151 lower
    house seats were held by women, and 11 by ethnic (non-Croat)
    minorities. Of the upper house's 68 seats, 4 were held by women and 3
    by ethnic minorities. On the local level, Milan Djukic, an ethnic Serb
    member of Parliament, was elected mayor of the town of Donji Lapac in
    September. Djukic thus became the first member of an ethnic Serb party
    to win a mayoralty outside of the Danubian region.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A variety of domestic and international human rights NGO's operate
    without government interference, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. The Government generally is
    cooperative. The Parliamentary Ombudsman for Human Rights received over
    1,500 individual complaints during the year. The Ombudsman met
    periodically with human rights groups and NGO representatives who
    reported that the Ombudsman is largely reactive, responding to
    individual complaints rather than setting an agenda for greater respect
    for human rights. Because it is a parliamentary rather than
    governmental office, the Ombudsman's authority to order compliance from
    government ministries is limited.
        A number of NGO's, the largest being Citizens Organized to Monitor
    Elections (GONG) and Voice 99 (Glas 99), were active in organizing pre-
    electoral informational campaigns and in election monitoring at the
    January and February elections.
        NGO's have difficulty soliciting contributions or donations to
    support their work, in part because there is no tax benefit for donors.
    NGO's also must pay taxes on contributions classified as income. Thus
    many human rights groups rely on international donations and government
    funding to pursue their work. NGO representatives reported that the new
    Government's attitude towards NGO's was improved significantly over
    that of the previous regime. NGO's were no longer harassed for
    criticizing the Government, and the Government's office for cooperation
    with NGO's, while operating with limited resources, was active in
    coordinating NGO and governmental efforts on human rights and civil
    society. However, while cooperation with government officials in Zagreb
    improved, a lack of follow-through on central government commitments by
    local authorities continued to be a problem.
        International organizations, including the European Community
    Monitoring Mission, the OSCE, and the UNHCR among others, operated
    freely. In March the Government established a commission to address
    refugee returns and housing reconstruction in war-affected areas. This
    commission met periodically with NGO's, representatives of ethnic
    communities, and international organizations. However, after early
    promise, the commission lapsed into inactivity by year's end (see
    Section 2.d.). The Council of Europe (COE) in September, citing
    progress on human rights, decided to end its permanent monitoring of
    Croatia. Of 21 obligations which Croatia assumed when it joined the COE
    in 1996, 4 remained outstanding: The abolishment of discriminatory laws
    regulating refugee returns, full cooperation with ICTY, transformation
    of HTV into a private television station, and amending the
    constitutional law on minorities. In October the OSCE, citing a stable
    security environment in the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia) and
    satisfactory local police performance there, terminated its police
    monitoring group in the region. The police monitoring function was
    assumed by a smaller cadre of civilian observers.
        Committees in the Parliament and in the Government were tasked
    specifically with human and minority rights issues, and they met
    periodically throughout the year to discuss topics and legislation
    within their purview. The parliamentary Committee participated in
    several legislative initiatives including the package of laws on
    minority rights passed in May.
        The Government's record of cooperation with the ICTY improved
    during the year; however, problems remained and several of the ICTY's
    requests remained unfulfilled at year's end. In February the Government
    formalized the status of the ICTY office in Zagreb (pending since 1996)
    and conceded the tribunal's jurisdiction to investigate possible war
    crimes committed during the 1995 military operations ``Flash'' and
    ``Storm'' (disputed by the previous regime). In March indictee Mladen
    Naletelic (``Tuta'') was transferred to The Hague; he was the only
    publicly indicted war criminal known to be in Croatia (ICTY requested
    his extradition beginning in December 1998). In April tribunal
    investigators conducted a field investigation in Gospic with full
    governmental support; in 1999 the previous regime refused ICTY's
    request to conduct this investigation. In April the Parliament passed a
    declaration of cooperation with ICTY that confirmed the tribunal's
    jurisdiction and supported the punishment of all war criminals
    regardless of ethnicity or level of responsibility. In May the
    Government granted ICTY researchers long-sought access to archives.
    However, the authorities remained reluctant and were slow to provide
    timely access to witnesses and documentary evidence. Each time the
    Government fulfilled a tribunal request, hard-liners both within the
    Government and in society responded with harsh criticism.
        In November ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte commented on the
    Government's cooperation in a report to the UN Security Council,
    noting, ``there has indeed been an improvement in relations when
    compared with the previous policy of obstruction and delay adopted by
    the former Government.'' However, she continued, ``where Croatia
    perceives cooperation to be against its political or narrow security
    interests, a real difficulty still exists.'' Del Ponte went on to list
    a series of unfulfilled requests and disappointing developments,
    including the failure to provide requested materials in the trial of
    Dario Kordic, government leaks of ICTY documents, and a negative media
    campaign against the Tribunal fueled by these leaks. In December the
    Government passed a 13-point statement outlining its concerns and
    objections to some elements of its relationship with the ICTY. At
    year's end, both sides were working to resolve these difficulties.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution specifies that individuals shall enjoy all rights
    and freedoms, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion,
    political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth,
    education, social status, or other attributes. Additionally members of
    all national groups and minorities shall have equal rights. While most
    of these rights were observed in practice, serious deficiencies
    continued, particularly with regard to ethnic discrimination of Serbs
    and Roma.
        Women.--Although the Government collected only limited statistics
    on the problem, credible NGO observers reported that violence against
    women, including spousal abuse, remained a widespread and underreported
    problem. Alcohol abuse and poor economic circumstances for veterans of
    the military conflict were cited as contributing factors. Rape and
    spousal rape are illegal under the Penal Code; however, NGO's report
    that many women do not report rape or spousal rape.
        During the autumn session of Parliament, the Government revoked
    1997 Penal Code amendments that removed domestic violence from the
    categories of crimes to be prosecuted automatically by the state
    attorney. Thus a domestic violence case can again be initiated based
    on, for example, suspicions of health care workers or police rather
    than requiring the victim to press charges. Legislation passed in the
    autumn created a specific Penal Code provision for family violence to
    replace inadequate existing provisions, and to direct that perpetrators
    of family violence, in addition to punishment, be placed under
    supervision and receive psychiatric treatment. Amendments to the Law on
    Misdemeanors passed in the autumn are designed to protect victims by
    extending detention (for up to 30 days) of perpetrators of family
    violence, even during the defendant's appeal. There is only one women's
    shelter, in Zagreb.
        The Government's Commission for Gender Equality participated in
    U.N.-sponsored Beijing Plus Five activities in June but overall was not
    very effective, according to NGO's and women's activists. Failing to
    collect statistical data on violence and discrimination against women,
    the Commission relied on data from 1996 and 1997 during Beijing Plus
    Five activities. The Commission's already small budget was slashed to
    60 percent of its 1999 level and planned initiatives to encourage
    women's employment were not implemented for lack of resources.
        The country is a transit point and lesser source and destination
    country for trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual
    exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Workplace sexual harassment is a violation of the Penal Code's
    section on abuse of power but is not specifically included in the
    employment law. NGO's reported that in practice, women often did not
    resort to the Penal Code for relief for fear of losing their jobs.
        The law does not discriminate by gender. However, in practice women
    generally hold lower paying positions in the work force. Government
    statistics from previous years showed that, while women constituted
    roughly 50 percent of the work force, they occupied few jobs at senior
    levels, even in areas such as education and administration where they
    were a clear majority of the workers. Considerable anecdotal evidence
    suggested that women hold by far the preponderance of low-level
    clerical, labor, and shopkeeping positions. Women in these positions
    often are among the first to be fired or laid off, particularly in
    times of corporate restructuring. NGO's and labor organizations
    reported a practice in which women received short-term work contracts
    renewable every 3 to 6 months, creating a climate of job insecurity for
    them. While men occasionally suffered from this practice, it was used
    disproportionately against women to dissuade them from taking maternity
    leave, although there were fewer reports of this practice during the
    year than in the previous year. Legislation was passed in 1999 limiting
    the use of short-term work contracts to a maximum of 3 years.
        While there is no national organization devoted solely to the
    protection of women's rights, many small, independent groups were
    active in the capital and larger cities. Among the most active were
    B.A.B.E. (``Be Active, Be Emancipated'') and the Center for Women
    Victims of War.
        Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
    Education is free and mandatory through grade 8 (generally age 14).
    Schools provide free meals for children, subsidized daycare facilities
    are available in most communities even for infants, medical care for
    children is free, and the Labor Code authorizes 1 full year of
    maternity leave and 3 years' leave for women with twins or more than
    two children. The majority of students continue their education to the
    age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting any notable
    exception. Romani children face serious discrimination in schools, and
    nearly all drop out by grade 8. While there is no societal pattern of
    abuse of children, 1 NGO operating hotlines for sexual abuse victims
    recorded 62 cases of abuse of children in 1 month in the city of Split.
        People with Disabilities.--The 1997 Law on Social Welfare and the
    Law on Construction specify access to public services and buildings for
    persons with disabilities; however, the construction rules do not
    mandate retro-fitting of facilities and are not always enforced, so
    access to such facilities is often difficult. While people with
    disabilities face no openly discriminatory measures, job opportunities
    generally are limited. Special education also is limited and poorly
    funded.
        Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are closely linked in
    society, and religion sometimes was used to identify and single out
    non-Croats for discriminatory practices. However, most such incidents
    appeared to be motivated by ethnicity and not religion or religious
    doctrine. The close identification of religion with ethnicity
    periodically caused religious institutions to be targets of violence
    (see Section 2.c.), and there were persistent reports of vandalism to
    Serb Orthodox cemeteries and structures. In January two crucifixes were
    damaged on the property of the local Orthodox priest in Tenja, and
    windows were broken at an Orthodox Church in Borovo. In April swastikas
    were painted on the walls of the Jewish community center in Zagreb. No
    arrests were made in these incidents. In August unidentified
    perpetrators broke into the Orthodox Church in the Danubian town of
    Branjina and wrote anti-Serb messages on the walls; no arrests were
    made.
        There were no further developments in the case of an August 1999
    attack on the home of Mufti Sevko Omerbasic, the head of the Islamic
    community in the country. No one was charged in the August 1999
    desecration of a memorial plaque in Cakovec marking the site of the
    synagogue destroyed during the Hungarian occupation in World War II.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Constitutionally, ethnic
    minorities enjoy the same protection as other self-identified ethnic
    and religious groups; however, in practice a pattern of open and
    sometimes severe discrimination continued against ethnic Serbs and
    other minorities in a wide number of areas, including the
    administration of justice, employment, housing, and freedom of
    movement. A pattern of persistent and sometimes violent harassment and
    intimidation of ethnic Serbs in the war-affected regions continued to
    be a serious problem. Early in the year, senior government officials
    emphasized their commitment to non-discriminatory treatment of
    minorities; however, in some instances, government leaders failed to
    condemn highly-publicized incidents of discrimination and harassment of
    ethnic Serbs.
        In May the Government passed a package of laws on minority rights,
    including a Constitutional law, that added nine new recognized
    minorities to the existing list of seven in the Constitution, including
    Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes. Some observers, including ethnic Serb
    leaders, criticized the apparent haste and secrecy with which the
    constitutional law was passed. Government officials indicated that
    further amendments on minorities and local self-government would
    complement the Constitutional law; however, these amendments were not
    passed by year's end. Two other laws passed in May guaranteed equal
    status for minority languages and delineated minority educational
    rights. Nevertheless ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma,
    continued disproportionately to suffer discrimination. Ethnic Serb
    leaders reported improved communication with government officials, in
    contrast to the often tense relations under the previous Government.
        There were two ethnically motivated killings, symptomatic of ethnic
    tensions throughout the country and particularly in the war-affected
    areas. In March on the Adriatic island of Vir, a 38-year-old ethnic
    Serb, who had returned to Croatia a week earlier after spending 8 years
    as a refugee in Yugoslavia, was beaten to death by three ethnic Croats
    shouting anti-Serb slogans. The perpetrators were arrested quickly, and
    international monitors assessed the police performance as satisfactory.
    However, the Government did not issue a statement condemning the
    incidents until several days had passed. At their October trial, two
    suspects were convicted of murder (receiving 10 and 9-year sentences)
    and the third was acquitted. During the same week, a 73-year-old ethnic
    Serb woman was stabbed to death in the western Slavonian town of
    Slatina by an ethnic Croat after an argument about war-related issues.
    The perpetrator was arrested quickly, was convicted of aggravated
    murder, and was sentenced to 9 years in prison.
        Intimidation and violence against Serbs continued in war-affected
    areas during the year. In May about 50 ethnic Croats disrupted a
    ceremony in Veljun of mostly ethnic Serbs commemorating victims of a
    World War II Fascist massacre; one woman urinated on the memorial, and
    Serb leader Dr. Milorad Pupovac was escorted out of the area for his
    own protection. Two weeks later, five ethnic Croats entered the area at
    night and damaged the memorial; all were arrested, but in August the
    charges against them were dropped for lack of evidence. In June in
    nearby Slunj, a group of ethnic Croats unveiled a memorial to a
    notorious World War II Fascist Colonel. President Mesic and Prime
    Minister Racan condemned these incidents. During the summer, anti-Serb
    posters appeared in several areas (Karlovac, Sisak, and Erdut)
    containing photos and the names of local ethnic Serbs and accusing them
    of war crimes. Police investigated these incidents and identified
    suspects, but prosecutors did not press charges and police did not
    always make arrests. The poster incidents, in particular, appeared
    designed to intimidate returning Serb refugees.
        In the autumn, vigilante ``wanted'' lists (similar to the anti-Serb
    posters that appeared during the summer) accusing ethnic Serbs of war
    crimes appeared in the Danubian region. Some lists appeared on the
    Internet and others were posted in public places and delivered to
    ethnic Serb homes in the area. These lists both reflected and
    exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region. No senior government
    official condemned them. In October 15 ethnic Serbs (the ``Baranja
    group'') were arrested in Osijek on 1991 war crimes widely believed to
    be based on weak evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). This led to
    speculation that the Osijek prosecutor was responding to the vigilante
    lists in pursuing the cases. Also in October, Judge Rogulja, an ethnic
    Serb on the Vukovar bench, was threatened by a mob of local Croats
    (that included county prefect Petar Cobankovic) shortly after he had
    issued a ruling to evict a Croat police commander who was occupying a
    home belonging to an ethnic Serb. The eviction never was carried out
    and the case later was transferred to another judge. No public
    officials, either at the municipal or national level, made any public
    statement about the incident or otherwise condemned the harassment of a
    judge (see Section 1.c.).
        Property destruction and other forms of harassment often arose from
    disputes between home occupiers of one ethnicity and returning
    homeowners of another. The number of ethnic incidents reported to the
    police in the Danubian region fell to less than half its 1999 level.
    This development likely was due to a number of factors: A real decrease
    in the number of ethnic incidents, the failure of some police officers
    to regularly classify ethnic incidents as such, and a reluctance of
    ethnic Serbs to report harassment because of a sense that such
    incidents have become commonplace. Verbal and legal harassment,
    forcible evictions, and assaults occurred regularly (see Section 2.d.).
    The number of incidents in the Danubian city of Vukovar and the nearby
    town of Tenja remained particularly high. An ongoing problem was the
    accessibility of weapons left over from the war, including firearms and
    explosives, which frequently were used in incidents of harassment
    during the year. Ethnically motivated incidents of various levels of
    severity occurred at a rate of over 50 per month. In about two-thirds
    of these cases, the victim was an ethnic Serb. In addition to the two
    murders, serious incidents included several assaults and throwing of
    hand grenades onto private property. In March a group of ethnic Croats
    went from house to house in the Danubian town of Erdut terrorizing
    ethnic Serbs, including the local Orthodox priest and the local mayor.
    The 1,270 member police force in the Danubian region comprised 42
    percent ethnic Serb and 53 percent ethnic Croat officers. There were
    periodic reports of tensions and incidents between ethnic Serb and
    Croat officers.
        The situation was similar in other war-affected regions, with high
    levels of ethnic tension, particularly in areas where ethnic Serb
    refugees were returning to their prewar homes in large numbers.
    Observers expressed particular concern about the town of Benkovac in
    the Dalmatia region, where local Serbs expressed a lack of confidence
    in the performance and the impartiality of the local police force. In
    response the assistant Interior Minister investigated the Benkovac
    situation during the summer and replaced two senior local police
    officials. In April a hand grenade exploded in the garden of an ethnic
    Serb in the Dalmatian town of Imotski causing minor damages but no
    injuries; no arrests were made. In May in Cista Mala in the Dalmatian
    region, a 68-year-old ethnic Serb was beaten by four ethnic Croats, one
    of whom cut the victim with a knife and urinated on him. Local police
    apprehended the perpetrators quickly. The main perpetrator was
    convicted of assault and was serving a 1-year sentence at year's end.
    The ethnic Croat mayor of the neighboring town of Cista Velika
    expressed his regret over the incident.
        The Constitution and the package of minority laws passed in May
    provide the legal basis and right for education in the languages of
    recognized minorities. However, problems remained. For example, in
    textbooks the history of the former Yugoslavia has been omitted in
    favor of a more nationalistic Croat interpretation, and new textbooks
    have used derogatory adjectives in reference to minorities. Government
    pledges to provide more balanced textbooks went unfulfilled. In July
    the Education Minister directed five county prefects outside the
    Danubian region to survey their students to determine how many would be
    interested in classes conducted in Serbian. Such classes already are
    available in the Danubian region.
        The Citizenship Law distinguishes between those who have a claim to
    Croatian ethnicity and those who do not. Ethnic Croats are eligible to
    become citizens, even if they were not citizens of the former Socialist
    Republic of Croatia, as long as they submit a written statement that
    they consider themselves Croatian citizens. Persons who are not ethnic
    Croats must satisfy more stringent requirements through naturalization
    in order to obtain citizenship. Even those who previously were lawful
    residents of Croatia in the former Yugoslavia (see Section 1.d.) were
    compelled to provide proof of previous residence and citizenship not
    demanded of ethnic Croats. NGO's assisting ethnic Serbs with
    documentation issues continued to report local officials applying this
    legal double standard. These obstacles to ethnic Serbs' ability to
    document their citizenship led to discrimination in other areas,
    including the right to vote (see Section 3). While a citizenship
    application is pending, the applicant is denied social benefits
    including medical care, pensions, free education, and employment in the
    civil service. Denials frequently were based on Article 26 of the
    Citizenship Law (which stipulates that citizenship can be denied to
    persons otherwise qualified for reasons of national interest) and
    Article 8 (which requires that a person's actions demonstrate that they
    are ``attached to the legal system and customs of Croatia'' and that
    they have maintained a permanent residence on the territory of Croatia
    for the 5 years preceding the application for citizenship). However,
    the Interior Ministry began recognizing the period that (mostly ethnic
    Serbs) spent outside the country as refugees as applicable to the 5-
    year residency requirement.
        In March the Government established a commission led by Deputy
    Prime Minister Goran Granic to address issues in the war-affected
    areas. It met several times in various formats, bringing together
    government ministries, the international community, NGO's, and
    representatives of the ethnic communities. However, the commission
    lapsed into inactivity by year's end.
        A serious and ongoing impediment to the return and reintegration of
    ethnic Serb refugees is the failure of the Government to recognize or
    ``convalidate'' their legal and administrative documents from the
    period of the 1991-1995 conflict. Despite the 1997 adoption of a
    convalidation law to allow the recognition of documents issued by the
    rebel Serb para-State, this legislation was not put into practice fully
    because several ministries failed to adopt implementing instructions.
    While the law itself did not include a deadline for filing
    applications, a decree issued by the previous regime did fix an April
    1999 filing deadline (impossible to meet for many ethnic Serbs who
    still were refugees outside the country). Even persons who filed before
    this deadline experienced arbitrary delays and obstructions. Without
    the recognition conferred by the law, citizens (almost exclusively
    ethnic Serbs) continued to be unable to resolve a wide range of
    problems including pensions, disability insurance, unemployment
    benefits, the recognition of births, deaths, and marriages, and even
    confirmation of time served in prison. The majority of requests are
    from elderly persons and relate to pension and employment histories
    from occupied territories during the conflict. This made resumption of
    a normal life almost impossible for this group. Also, contrary to the
    law, the state pension fund unilaterally and improperly denied some
    pension applications from ethnic Serbs. In 1999 one NGO providing legal
    assistance had files on 9,000 unresolved convalidation cases in Osijek
    alone.
        Serb property owners whose homes were occupied by ethnic Croat
    refugees from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, mostly from Bosnia
    and Kosovo, remained unable to access their property, despite the 1998
    program for returns, which mandated multiethnic ``housing commissions''
    to implement property restitution. A lack of alternative housing in
    many areas and the lack of political will to evict ethnic Croat
    occupiers without alternative housing in favor of Serb homeowners
    resulted in only a handful of restituted properties outside of the
    Danubian region (see Section 1.f.).
        Discrimination and violence against Roma continued. The 1991
    Yugoslav census counted only 6,700 Roma in Croatia, but government
    officials and NGO's agree that this was a serious undercount and that
    the true number of Croatian Roma may be 30,000 to 40,000. Protective of
    their culture and reluctant to assimilate, Roma faced a host of
    obstacles, including language (many, especially women, have only
    limited Croatian language skills), lack of education, lack of
    citizenship and identity documents, high unemployment, and societal
    discrimination, and lack of Government will to address such abuses.
    There were no reports of police beatings of Roma during the year.
        The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) reported that on April 23, a
    group of 15 ethnic Croats beat a 23-year-old Romani man in Luka,
    northwest of Zagreb. Human Rights Watch reported that in May, local
    authorities in Varazdin County ordered 420 Roma to move from their
    settlement in the village of Strmec Prodravski after refusing to allow
    them to build more permanent homes and a water and electricity supply.
    The ERRC also reported that on June 1, a group of youths allegedly beat
    and threatened to rape a 9-year-old Romani girl in Zagreb. After her
    family confronted the attackers, a larger group of youths reportedly
    went to the Romani family's house, threw a brick through a window,
    damaged their car, and yelled insults at the family. The police then
    intervened and detained three of the attackers and four Roma.
        An estimated 10 percent of Croatian Romani children begin primary
    school, and of these only 10 percent go on to secondary school. There
    were only an estimated 50 Romani students in secondary school
    throughout the country during the year. Those individuals going beyond
    secondary school tended to leave the settlements and assimilate into
    mainstream society, depriving Romani communities of valuable skills. In
    several instances, including in Varazdin and Zagreb, local officials
    segregated Romani students into separate classes without the same level
    of materials or instructors available to regular students.
        The situation of other minority groups--such as Slovaks, Czechs,
    Italians, and Hungarians--did not reflect discrimination to the same
    extent as that of the Serb and Roma communities.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers are entitled to form or join
    unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. There is an
    active labor movement with one major and four minor national labor
    federations and independent associations of both blue-and white-collar
    members. Approximately 64 percent of workers are members of unions. In
    general unions are independent of the Government and political parties.
        The law prohibits retaliation against strikers participating in
    legal strikes. Workers only may strike at the end of a contract or in
    specific circumstances mentioned in the contract. The Supreme Court has
    ruled in the past that workers may not strike for nonpayment of wages.
        In December facing budget cuts, the Government unilaterally
    abrogated collective bargaining agreements with five public sector
    unions. While this action was legal under the terms of the agreements,
    it sparked protests and created concerns about the Government's respect
    for employment rights.
        When negotiating a new contract, workers are required to go through
    mediation before they can strike. Labor and management choose the
    mediator together. If they cannot agree, the Labor Law calls for a
    tripartite commission of labor, business, and government
    representatives to appoint one. The tripartite commission began to meet
    regularly during the year and prepared its first list of mediators.
    Arbitration never is mandatory but can be used if both sides agree.
    Only after submitting to mediation and formally filing a statement that
    negotiations are at an impasse is a strike legal. If a strike is found
    to be illegal, any participant can be dismissed, and the union held
    liable for damages. No strikes were found to be illegal during the
    year.
        The right to strike is provided for in the Constitution with these
    limitations and with additional limits on members of the armed forces,
    police, government administration, and public services. During the
    year, authorities permitted frequent labor demonstrations both in
    Zagreb's main square and in front of the Parliament. The strikes were
    nearly all over nonpayment of wages. The employees of NAMA, a
    department store chain, staged several demonstrations during the year
    over this issue. In addition farmers in eastern Slavonia staged several
    demonstrations over nonpayment for their produce. On December 8, the
    public employee unions held a nonviolent nationwide strike calling for
    higher wages.
        Laws limiting the right to assembly were not used against labor
    demonstrations during the year.
        The ILO Committee of Experts in 1999 requested the Government, in
    consultation with trade unions, to set criteria and a time frame for
    the division of office space and property formerly owned by the unions
    during the Communist era. While the five labor confederations signed
    the preliminary agreement, there was no further progress on this issue
    by year's end. In April the Ministry of Defense returned a Zagreb-area
    facility that had been used since 1990 as an army training site to the
    UATUC confederation.
        Unions may affiliate freely internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is protected by law and practiced freely. The Labor Code
    governs collective bargaining contracts, protection for striking
    workers, and legal limitations on the ability of employers to conduct
    ``lockouts'' during labor disputes.
        The transition to private enterprise and a free market economy kept
    labor unions under pressure at the same time that they were making
    progress towards establishing themselves as genuine trade unions,
    representative of their members rather than the Government.
    Unemployment remained high at 22.4 percent at year's end overall and
    much higher in some war-affected areas. The nonpayment of wages
    continued to be a serious problem; over 100,000 workers (10 percent of
    the workforce) failed to receive their salaries on time. During the
    summer, the Government signed an agreement with unions providing that
    all state-owned companies (the assets of which were controlled by the
    Croatian privatization fund) would pay salaries on time; however, some
    unions complained that the Government did not abide by this commitment.
    A further problem was that when salaries were not paid, associated
    contributions into the social welfare system also lagged, with the
    result that unpaid workers also were denied health coverage.
        The Labor Code deals directly with antiunion discrimination issues.
    It expressly allows unions to challenge firings in court. No reports of
    systematic firings on grounds of ethnicity were reported during the
    year. However, in the high-profile ``Magma'' case, violations of labor
    rights were alleged. The Minister of Economy, Goranko Fizulic, his
    wife, and a U.K.-based investment company were co-owners of the
    ``Magma'' company in Zagreb. When workers unionized early in the year,
    Fizulic assured them that he would respect their wishes. Soon after,
    the union's president, all eight members of the executive board, and
    three union organizers were fired. The workers still were challenging
    the firings in court at year's end. Generally citizens' attempts to
    seek redress through the legal system were hampered seriously by the
    inefficiency of the court system, where cases often languished for
    months or years before reaching a final resolution (see Section 1.e.).
    There were no reports of the Government employing coercion or other
    illegal methods to induce striking employees to return to work. There
    were no further developments in the investigation of the beating of the
    vice president of the Locomotive Engineers Union by unknown assailants
    during tense contract negotiations in 1999.
        There were no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
    these practices; however, there were occasional instances of women
    trafficked through the country for the purpose of forced prostitution
    (see Section 6.f.). While legislation does not explicitly cover
    children, the constitutional ban is comprehensive in this area, and the
    Government enforces this prohibition effectively. The Ministry of Labor
    and Social Welfare is the agency charged with enforcing the ban on
    coerced or forced labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years
    (the same as the ILO Convention standard), and it is enforced by the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Children may not be employed
    before reaching the legal age and are not allowed to perform work that
    is harmful to their health or morality. There is no reported pattern of
    abuse of child labor. Workers under the age of 18 are entitled to
    special protection at work and are prohibited from heavy manual labor
    and night shifts. Education is free, universal, and mandatory up to the
    age of 14, generally. Children usually finish secondary school, and a
    high proportion go on to university. The broad constitutional
    prohibition against forced or compulsory labor encompasses children,
    and there were no reported instances of such cases.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1999 the Government signed a
    collective bargaining agreement establishing a minimum wage of about
    $210 (1,700 kuna) per month. In July the government Bureau of
    Statistics estimated that the average net monthly wage was
    approximately $400 (3,275 kuna), which is not sufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family.
        National regulations provide for a 42-hour workweek including a 30-
    minute daily break, a 24-hour rest period during the week, and a
    minimum of 18 days of paid vacation leave annually. Workers receive
    time-and-a-half pay for any hours worked beyond 42. However, most
    unions have negotiated a 40-hour workweek.
        Health and safety standards are set by the Government and are
    enforced by the Ministry of Health. The 1997 Health and Safety Law
    allowed unions to appoint health and safety stewards in companies, but
    their activities are regulated by collective agreements. In practice
    industries are not diligent in meeting standards for worker protection.
    It is common, for example, to find workers without hardhats on
    constructions sites and for workers to remove safety devices from
    dangerous equipment. Workers can in theory remove themselves from
    hazardous conditions at work and would have recourse through the courts
    if they felt that they had been dismissed wrongfully for doing so;
    there were no reports of wrongful dismissal complaints over workplace
    safety during the year.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons. However, existing laws can be used to
    prosecute traffickers. No statistical information on trafficking
    exists, although U.N. officials tracking the issue regionally and local
    NGO's indicate that Croatia is primarily a transit country, as well as
    a lesser source and destination country for women trafficked to other
    parts of Europe for forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    Women reportedly were trafficked through Bosnia-Herzegovina and
    Yugoslavia to Croatia, where some remained to work as prostitutes or
    are trafficked to other destinations.
        Public awareness of trafficking is low. There were no government or
    NGO programs to deal with the prevention of trafficking during the
    year; however, government officials and NGO's are working to develop an
    antitrafficking strategy.
        There were few support services available for trafficking victims.
    There is one women's shelter that occasionally helps trafficked women.
                                   __________

                                     CYPRUS

        Prior to 1974, Cyprus experienced a long period of intercommunal
    strife between its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. In
    response the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) began
    peacekeeping operations in March 1964. The island has been divided
    since the Turkish military intervention of 1974, following a coup
    d'etat directed from Greece. Since 1974 the southern part of the island
    has been under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
    The northern part is ruled by a Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983
    that administration proclaimed itself the ``Turkish Republic of
    Northern Cyprus'' (``TRNC''). The ``TRNC'' is not recognized by the
    United States or any other country except Turkey. The two parts are
    separated by a buffer zone patrolled by the UNFICYP. A substantial
    number of Turkish troops remain on the island. In both the government-
    controlled areas and in the Turkish Cypriot community democratic
    principles generally are respected. Glafcos Clerides was reelected
    President of the Republic of Cyprus in 1998; in April 2000 Rauf
    Denktash was declared ``President'' after ``Prime Minister'' Dervish
    Eroglu withdrew following the first round of Turkish Cypriot elections.
    The judiciary is independent in both communities.
        Police in the government-controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot
    community are responsible for law enforcement. Police forces operating
    in the government-controlled area are under civilian control, while
    military authorities direct Turkish Cypriot police forces. In general
    the police forces of both sides respect the rule of law, but instances
    of police abuse of power continued.
        Both Cypriot economies operate on the basis of free market
    principles, although in each community there are significant
    administrative controls. The government-controlled part of the island
    has a robust, service-oriented economy, with a declining manufacturing
    base and a small agricultural sector. Tourism and trade generate 22
    percent of gross domestic product and employ 29 percent of the labor
    force. In 2000 per capita income was approximately $12,902, inflation
    was 4.5 percent, and unemployment was 3.5 percent. Growth was 4.8
    percent, compared with 4.5 percent in 1999. The Turkish Cypriot economy
    is handicapped by restrictions imposed by the Government of Cyprus and
    other international institutions. In addition it relies heavily on
    subsidies from Turkey and is burdened by an overly large public sector.
    It, too, is basically service-oriented, but has a smaller tourism and
    trade base--accounting for 14 percent of gross domestic product
    employing 10 percent of the workforce--and a larger agricultural
    sector. During the year, per capita income in the north was
    approximately $5,263, and inflation was 60 percent. Growth in the north
    was 5.3 percent in 2000, compared with 4.9 percent in 1999.
        The Government of the Republic of Cyprus generally respected human
    rights; however, instances of police brutality continued to be a
    problem.
        The Turkish Cypriot authorities generally respected human rights;
    however, police abuse of suspects' and detainees' rights continued. The
    authorities also continued to restrict freedom of movement. Since
    December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have banned most
    bicommunal contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots,
    including previously frequent meetings in Nicosia's buffer zone. They
    sometimes attempted to prevent Turkish Cypriots from travelling to
    bicommunal meetings off the island as well. In May Turkish Cypriot
    officials lowered the ``visa'' fees for crossing the buffer zone. The
    Turkish Cypriot authorities have taken some steps to improve the
    conditions of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the territory
    under their control, but the treatment of these groups still falls
    short of Turkish Cypriot obligations under the Vienna III Agreement of
    1975.
        Violence against women and trafficking in women for forced
    prostitution remained problems in both areas.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        Turkish Cypriot authorities still have not conducted a credible
    investigation of the 1996 murder of a prominent leftist Turkish Cypriot
    journalist, Kutlu Adali, who wrote articles critical of Turkey's role
    in the north.
        In 1996 Turkish Cypriot civilian police killed a Greek Cypriot
    demonstrator who had entered the U.N. buffer zone, and the police
    participated in the beating death of another. Again, there has not been
    any significant investigation by Turkish Cypriot authorities of the
    killings. The family of one of the deceased filed a case against Turkey
    in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which declared the case
    admissible in June 1999. The case was pending at year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Both the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the
    basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit
    torture, the law in both communities prohibits such practices, and the
    authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; however,
    instances of Cypriot police brutality against suspects in detention
    continued, mostly involving non-Cypriots. One officer was tried and
    acquitted in March in connection with the October 1998 beating of
    illegal immigrant detainees by members of a special police unit (see
    Section 2.d.).
        On December 21, the ECHR found the Cypriot Government guilty of
    police abuse during the 1995 arrest for drug smuggling of Turkish
    Cypriot Erkan Egmez and ordered the Government to pay Egmez $16,000
    (10,400 pounds sterling) in compensation.
        The former European Commission on Human Rights agreed in January
    1998 to investigate complaints by nine Turkish Cypriots that Greek
    Cypriot police mistreated them in 1994 and expelled them to the north.
    The complainants allege they were threatened with death if they
    returned to the south and that Greek Cypriot police were responsible
    for the death of one complainant's son, who did return to the south
    later in 1994. The Cypriot Government denies all the charges; the
    Commission took oral evidence in the case in Nicosia in September 1998.
    The case was pending at year's end.
        While there were no public allegations of police brutality in the
    Turkish Cypriot community, there were credible reports of pervasive
    police abuse of power and routine harsh treatment of detainees (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Prison conditions in general meet minimum international standards.
    According to a report issued in May by the government Ombudsman,
    prisoners with psychiatric problems in the south do not receive proper
    medical care. Persons incarcerated in jails in the south on minor
    charges are mixed with more hardened, violent criminals.
        The Cypriot Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities permit
    prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Throughout Cyprus the
    police respect laws providing for freedom from arbitrary arrest and
    detention. Judicially issued arrest warrants are required. No one may
    be detained for more than a day without referral of the case to the
    courts for extension of the period of detention. Most periods of
    investigative detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days before formal
    charges are filed. Attorneys generally have access to detainees; bail
    is permitted. The Government of Cyprus claims the right to deport
    foreign nationals for reasons of public interest whether or not they
    have been charged with or convicted of a crime.
        Some abuses of power occur at the hands of the Turkish Cypriot
    police, generally at the time of arrest. Suspects sometimes are not
    permitted to have their lawyers present when testimony is being taken,
    a right provided under the Turkish Cypriot basic law. Suspects who
    demand the presence of a lawyer may be threatened with stiffer charges
    or even physically intimidated. A high percentage of convictions in the
    Turkish Cypriot community are obtained with confessions made during
    initial police interrogation under these conditions. According to
    credible reports, police are known to abuse their right to hold persons
    up to 24 hours before having to go before a judge. Police officers use
    this tactic against persons suspected of serious crimes or believed to
    have behaved in a manner deemed insulting to the officer. The suspects
    are then released within 24 hours without charges having been filed.
        On December 1, Greek Cypriot police arrested Omer Gazi Tekogul for
    possession of 2 kilograms of heroin near the village of Pyla, located
    in the United Nations Buffer Zone. Shortly after Tekogul's arrest, a
    Turkish Cypriot official told UNFICYP that Greek Cypriots would
    ``disappear'' in retaliation for Tekogul's arrest (this statement was
    later repudiated by Rauf Denktash). On December 13, Turkish Cypriot
    authorities arrested Greek Cypriot Panicos Tziakourmas for possession
    of marijuana. An SBA police investigation points to Tziakourmas being
    seized by Turkish Cypriots on SBA territory and found no evidence of
    marijuana. Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that Tziakourmas was
    arrested in the north. Both cases were pending at year's end.
        Exile is prohibited specifically by the Constitution and by the
    basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community, and is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is legally
    independent of executive or military influence in both communities, and
    it is independent in practice.
        On both sides, most criminal and civil cases begin in district
    courts, from which appeals are made to Supreme Courts. No special
    courts exist for security or political offenses.
        Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United
    Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due
    process, and the right of appeal. Throughout Cyprus, a fair public
    trial is provided for in law and accorded in practice. Defendants have
    the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by counsel
    (at government expense for those who cannot afford one), to confront
    witnesses, and to present evidence in their own defense.
        On the Turkish Cypriot side, civilians deemed to have violated
    military zones or military regulations are subject to trial in a
    military court. These courts consist of one military and two civilian
    judges and a civilian prosecutor. Members of the Turkish Cypriot bar
    have complained that civilian judges tend to defer to their military
    colleagues in such hearings.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic law
    governing the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions to protect
    the individual against arbitrary interference by the authorities, and a
    judicial warrant is required for a police official to enter a private
    residence. Although authorities on both sides generally respected these
    provisions in practice, police on both sides have subjected members of
    the other community resident in their area to surveillance (see Section
    5).
        The Turkish Cypriot authorities restrict the ability of Greek
    Cypriots and Maronites living in the north to change their place of
    residence at will (see Section 5).
        In May Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that Greek Cypriots
    and Maronites resident in the north may bring their spouses to reside
    with them in the north. Greek Cypriot marriage certificates will be
    recognized as proof of marriage. Previously this required special
    permission, which was difficult to obtain. One such marriage took place
    during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and of the press
    are provided for by law, and these rights are respected in practice
    throughout the island. The proliferation of party and independent
    newspapers and periodicals in both communities enables ideas and
    arguments to circulate freely. Opposition papers frequently criticize
    the authorities. Several private television and radio stations in the
    Greek Cypriot community compete effectively with the government-
    controlled stations. In addition to 2 smaller, university-run radio
    stations, 11 private radio stations operate in the Turkish Cypriot
    community along with 4 private television stations. International
    broadcasts are available without interference throughout the island,
    including telecasts from Turkey and Greece.
        In 1998 Turkish Cypriot officials filed a number of court actions
    against newspapers and journalists, alleging that certain articles
    ``damaged the prestige of the state.'' Five complaints against the
    Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper Avrupa were consolidated into one court
    action. In December 1999, a court ruled that the newspaper was liable
    and fined it approximately $215,000 (120 billion Turkish lira). In May
    2000 court bailiffs seized the newspaper's computers and other
    equipment to satisfy partially the court judgement. The newspaper was
    closed for a day until alternate production facilities were found. In
    July the owner-editor of the same newspaper, two journalists and a
    photographer from the newspaper, and a Turkish Cypriot ``security
    forces officer'' and his wife were taken into custody on suspicion of
    espionage. The journalists and photographer were released later without
    being charged. The owner-editor and the ``officer'' and his wife were
    released but barred from leaving the north. They were not formally
    charged and faced rearrest at any time. The same newspaper was
    acquitted in September of charges based on a 1998 story alleging that
    Turkish Cypriot soldiers assaulted a Turkish Cypriot family after a
    dispute over housing.
        Restrictions sometimes were imposed on the ability of journalists
    to cross the buffer zone to cover news events. The Cypriot Government
    denied entry to the south for visiting Turkish journalists who arrived
    in Cyprus through ports of entry in the north. In retaliation Turkish
    Cypriot authorities sometimes required Greek Cypriot journalists to
    purchase a ``visa'' to enter the north, which the journalists refused
    to do. Current Turkish Cypriot policy, while applied inconsistently, is
    to permit Greek Cypriot journalists travelling as a group to cover
    events in the north without paying a ``visa'' fee, but not to allow
    Greek journalists entry unless they pay the fee. Individual Greek
    Cypriot journalists usually also must pay the fees.
        Academic freedom generally is respected throughout the island.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The freedom to
    hold meetings, associate, and organize is protected by law, and the
    Government respects these rights in practice.
        Although Turkish Cypriot authorities also generally respected these
    rights, they imposed restrictions on bicommunal meetings (see Section
    2.d.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion generally is
    respected. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes five
    religions that are exempt from taxes and receive government subsidies.
    Other religions may register routinely as nonprofit organizations and
    receive tax exemptions, but not subsidies. In the Turkish Cypriot area,
    no religion is recognized in the basic law, but Islamic institutions
    receive tax exemptions and subsidies through the Wakf religious trust;
    no other church receives exemptions or subsidies. Although missionaries
    have the legal right to proselytize in both communities, missionary
    activities are monitored closely by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church
    and by both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities.
        Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part of the island and
    non-Muslims in the north are allowed to practice their religions.
    Restrictions on the right of Greek Cypriots resident in the north to
    visit Apostolos Andreas monastery were eased in 1998; they now may
    visit the monastery without restriction. Maronites may not visit
    certain religious sites in the north located in military zones.
    Armenians may not visit any religious sites in the north. A Greek
    Cypriot application to allow a second priest to reside in the north to
    assist the elderly Orthodox priest already in the north has been
    pending for more than 3 years.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
    enjoy freedom of movement within their respective areas. Both
    authorities respect the right to travel abroad and to emigrate. Turkish
    Cypriots have difficulty traveling to most countries because travel
    documents issued by the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'' are
    recognized only by Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots use Turkish travel
    documents instead.
        Republic of Cyprus authorities discourage travel to the northern
    part of the island. They permit only day travel by tourists to the
    north, sometimes arbitrarily refuse permission to non-Cypriots to cross
    to the north, and pressure foreigners working in Cyprus not to cross to
    the north. They have declared that it is illegal to enter Cyprus except
    at authorized entry points in the south, effectively barring entry into
    the government-controlled area by foreigners who have entered Cyprus
    from the north. Turkish Cypriots traveling to the south must seek prior
    permission from the Turkish Cypriot authorities and must provide the
    Turkish Cypriot authorities with an itinerary and the purpose of their
    travel. To pass the Greek Cypriot checkpoint, Turkish Cypriots must
    provide their planned itinerary to the checkpoint police. They do not
    need to notify the checkpoint police in advance but do need to prove
    they are Turkish Cypriots. There is no limit on how long they may
    remain in the south.
        Turkish Cypriot authorities generally allow visits to the north by
    persons who initially enter Cyprus in the south, but they have denied
    entry to foreigners of Turkish Cypriot origin who enter Cyprus in the
    south. In 1995 the Turkish Cypriot authorities instituted a policy
    under which foreign nationals of Greek Cypriot origin would be
    permitted to visit the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. However,
    implementation of the procedures has remained inconsistent, and
    visitors of Greek Cypriot or Armenian origin, or even persons having
    Greek or Armenian names, may face considerable difficulties entering
    the north.
        In May Turkish Cypriot authorities lowered ``visa'' fees at the
    main Nicosia checkpoint to 1 pound sterling. Greeks and Greek Cypriots
    still must obtain a formal ``TRNC visa'' to visit the north. Maronites
    are charged the same 1 pound sterling fee each time they cross.
    Requests to cross into the north must be submitted 48 hours in advance.
        Following an agreement in 1997 on reciprocal visits to religious
    sites, a number of visits again occurred during the year. The Cypriot
    Government permitted over 1,400 Turkish Cypriots to make a pilgrimage
    to a Moslem shrine in the south in March and allowed another 1,300 to
    travel in June. In April a group of approximately 1,950 Greek Cypriots
    visited the Apostolos Andreas monastery in the north.
        On July 1, Turkish forces established a new manned checkpoint in a
    location adjacent to the Greek Cypriot village of Strovilia and the
    British eastern SBA. Although access to Strovilia has been largely
    unimpeded, the checkpoint now provides Turkish forces the ability to
    control the approach to the village. Despite protests from UNFICYP and
    others, Turkish forces remained at the contested checkpoint in
    violation of the status quo.
        On July 31, Greek Cypriot officials denied Turkish Cypriots land
    passage to Kokkina. Visits to this pocket of land--surrounded by the
    government-controlled area--that contains a memorial are included in
    the 1997 reciprocal visit agreement. In August and November Turkish
    Cypriot officials denied access to southern Greek Cypriots to visit the
    Apostolos Andreas monastery.
        In 1996 the ECHR ruled 11 to 6 that Turkey committed a continuing
    violation of the rights of a Greek Cypriot woman by preventing her from
    going to her property located in north Cyprus. The ruling reaffirmed
    the validity of property deeds issued prior to 1974. The Court also
    found in this case that ``it was obvious from the large number of
    troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus that the Turkish
    army exercised effective overall control there. In the circumstances of
    the case, this entailed Turkey's responsibility for the policies and
    actions of the ``TRNC.'' In July 1998 the court ordered Turkey to pay
    the woman approximately $915,000 in damages and costs by October 28,
    1998. The Turkish Government stated that it cannot implement the
    Court's decision, which it contends is a political decision, and argued
    that the land in question is not Turkish but is part of the ``Turkish
    Republic of Northern Cyprus.'' The Council of Europe (COE) during 2000
    continued to call on the Turkish Government to comply with the Court's
    decision. In July the COE Committee of Ministers issued a resolution
    deploring Turkey's lack of compliance and strongly urging it to comply
    fully and without further delay with the ECHR judgment. About 150
    similar cases filed by Greek Cypriots against Turkey have been declared
    admissible by the ECHR, but no judgement was issued on any of the other
    cases by year's end.
        Turkish Cypriot authorities in the past had approved most
    applications for Turkish Cypriots to participate in bicommunal meetings
    in the U.N.-controlled buffer zone, but on December 27, 1997, they
    suspended Turkish Cypriot participation in these meetings pending a
    reevaluation of bicommunal activities. The ``suspension'' soon became
    an effective Turkish Cypriot ban on bicommunal contacts on Cyprus.
    Whereas in 1997 thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
    participated in bicommunal events, in which mixed groups met to discuss
    such topics as the environment, family violence, management techniques,
    business operations, and legal questions, the Turkish Cypriot ban
    halted almost all of those contacts. However, since June Turkish
    Cypriot authorities have eased the ban. On a case-by-case basis, the
    Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed some Turkish Cypriots to
    participate in bicommunal events in and across the buffer zone. Greek
    Cypriots still must obtain a Turkish Cypriot ``visa'' to visit the
    north. Turkish Cypriot authorities also attempted to interfere with
    some bicommunal events taking place outside Cyprus by requiring civil
    servants to seek permission from their respective employer and the
    Turkish Cypriot ``Ministry of Foreign Affairs'' before confirming their
    participation. Enforcement of the policy has been inconsistent, with
    some public officials permitted to attend off-island bicommunal events.
    Private citizens have been allowed to travel to off-island bicommunal
    events.
        In recent years, Turkish Cypriot authorities have announced the
    easing of restrictions on the approximately 580 Greek Cypriots and
    Maronites living in the north. Turkish Cypriot authorities usually
    grant the applications of Greek Cypriot residents in the north to visit
    the government-controlled area. The limit on visits to the south was
    extended in 1998 from 15 days per month to a total of 6 months per
    year. The applicants must return within the designated period or risk
    losing their right to return and to keep their property, although this
    rule rarely is enforced in practice. In 1997 Turkish Cypriot
    authorities also eliminated the previous monthly limit on visits by
    close family relatives of Greek Cypriots and Maronites resident in the
    north (it was once per month until 1996 and twice per month
    thereafter). A limit on overnight stays also was increased from 2 days
    and 3 nights, to a ``reasonable period'' (said period to be determined
    by Turkish Cypriot authorities), with extensions possible. However,
    there are reports that Turkish Cypriot authorities have prevented
    family relatives from extending their stays in the north. There are
    also reports that Turkish Cypriot authorities have prevented unlimited
    travel to the north (as accorded by the 1997 elimination of a limit on
    visits) by family relatives. Greek Cypriots visiting from the south
    still may not travel in the north in their personal vehicles but must
    use taxis or buses and pay the crossing fee. In September, after a 4-
    year wait, Turkish Cypriot authorities allowed the wife of the Orthodox
    priest resident in the north to rejoin her husband. The wife had left
    the north to care for the couple's children.
        Similar restrictions exist for visits by Maronite residents of the
    north to the government-controlled areas, but they are applied much
    more loosely than restrictions on Greek Cypriots, and Maronite travel
    is relatively free. However, Maronite residents also must pay the
    required crossing fees.
        While in the past the Turkish Cypriot authorities permitted school
    holiday and weekend visits to the north only by children under the ages
    of 16 (male) and 18 (female), the age limits for Maronite students and
    female Greek Cypriot students were lifted entirely in 1998. In May
    Turkish Cypriot officials announced that male Greek Cypriot students of
    military draft age who can show documentation proving they are full-
    time students, and therefore not yet performing military duties, may
    continue to visit the north.
        According to regulations announced in October 1998, the Turkish
    Cypriot authorities no longer require Greek Cypriots or Maronites
    resident in the north to obtain police permits for internal travel in
    the north. They may use private vehicles registered and insured in the
    north. Implementation of the new policy has been inconsistent.
        The Government generally cooperates with the office of the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With the increasing number of
    illegal immigrants finding their way to Cyprus in small boats, the
    Government of Cyprus is receiving a growing number of asylum
    applications: 300 to 400 per year. These cases are referred to the
    local UNHCR office for evaluation. If recognized as a refugee, the
    applicant is granted a 3-year residence permit renewable for 3
    additional years. If applicants meet the criteria for refugee status,
    they are permitted to remain and are given temporary work permits.
    However, applicants generally are not granted permanent resettlement
    rights. Applicants are permitted to remain until resettlement in a
    third country can be arranged.
        In January, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Cyprus legislature passed
    an asylum law designed to grant temporary residence to asylum
    applicants until their applications are reviewed by the competent
    government authority. The law is designed to transfer responsibility
    for the asylum application process from the UNHCR to the Government.
    However, there have been delays in establishing a relevant government
    authority, and the UNHCR continues to review asylum applications. In
    July the Government established a 130-bed detention facility for
    housing arriving immigrants until their cases can be evaluated. In the
    north, authorities generally cooperated with refugee authorities.
    Working with the assistance of a local nongovernmental organization
    (NGO), the UNHCR recognized 2 persons as refugees in 1999 and 15
    persons as refugees in 2000.
        In 1998-2000 groups of illegal immigrants attempting to reach
    Western Europe instead landed on Cyprus after their overcrowded vessels
    encountered problems at sea. A group of 34 Syrian Kurds, all of whom
    applied for asylum with the UNHCR, arrived on November 15. On December
    12, the UNHCR notified the Government of the 34 pending asylum
    applications. The same day, under a bilateral agreement between Cyprus
    and Syria for the return of all illegal immigrants departing from
    Syrian ports, the Government returned the immigrants to Syria. The
    Government did not consult with the UNHCR prior to the return of the
    Syrian Kurds.
        On September 13, 266 persons arrived on Cyprus from Lebanon after
    Greek Cypriot authorities rescued them from a sinking boat. The
    immigrants were held on a boat in Limassol port until Cypriot
    authorities, under an agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon calling for
    the return of illegal immigrants departing from any Lebanese port,
    transported them to Lebanon October 3. Despite requests to the
    Government, representatives of the UNHCR did not meet with the
    immigrants and were unable to determine their asylum status.
        According to the Government, no individuals recognized as refugees
    were returned to countries where they credibly feared persecution.
        A group of 100 persons, all of whom applied for political asylum,
    arrived in June 1998. Only 23 were granted asylum. Most of those who
    did not receive asylum were detained and then deported against their
    will in late 1998 and early 1999. Prior to that, in October 1998, a
    special police unit was filmed by local television cameras kicking and
    beating the detainees with batons, while stopping a protest during
    which the detainees burned their bedding. An examination of the
    immigrants, mostly Africans, by a forensic pathologist revealed that
    most were injured, some seriously. The Attorney General ordered an
    investigation, and charges were brought against the officer in charge.
    In July the officer was acquitted of using excessive force in quelling
    the protest. Later in July, the Attorney General appealed the court's
    decision; the appeal was pending at year's end.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Multiparty political systems exist throughout Cyprus. Under the
    Republic's Constitution, political parties compete for popular support
    actively and without restriction. Suffrage is universal, and elections
    are held by secret ballot. Elections for the office of President are
    held every 5 years; in February 1998 President Clerides won reelection
    to a new 5-year term. Elections for members of the House of
    Representatives are held every 5 years or less.
        The Turkish Cypriots living in northern Cyprus elect a leader and a
    representative body every 5 years or less; in December 1998 they chose
    a new ``National Assembly.'' In April 2000 Rauf Denktash was named
    Turkish Cypriot leader after his opponent, ``Prime Minister'' Dervish
    Eroglu, withdrew between the first and second round of voting.
        Under the 1960 Constitution, voting took place on a communal basis.
    Therefore, since the breakdown in 1963 of bicommunal governing
    arrangements, and since the 1974 de facto partition of the island,
    Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area are barred
    from voting there, although they may travel to the north to vote in
    elections. Similarly, Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
    are barred by law from participating in Turkish Cypriot elections. They
    are eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must travel to the
    south to exercise that right. Officials in the north representing Greek
    Cypriots and Maronites are appointed by the Government of Cyprus and
    are not recognized by Turkish Cypriot authorities.
        In both communities, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics, although they face no legal obstacles to participating in the
    political process. Women hold some cabinet-level, judicial, and other
    senior positions. In the House of Representatives, women hold 4 of 56
    seats; in the ``National Assembly'' in the north, women hold 4 of 50
    seats.
        In addition to their normal voting rights, the small Maronite,
    Armenian, and Latin (Roman Catholic) communities also elect special
    nonvoting representatives from their respective communities who sit in
    the respective legislative bodies.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            rights
        A number of organizations in both parts of the island consider
    themselves human rights groups; however, they generally are concerned
    with alleged violations of the rights of their community's members by
    the other community. Groups with a broad human rights mission include
    organizations promoting awareness of domestic violence and others
    concerned with alleged police brutality.
        No restrictions prevent the formation of human rights groups.
    Representatives of international human rights organizations have access
    throughout the island. Government officials are generally cooperative
    and responsive to their views.
        The United Nations, through the autonomous tripartite (United
    Nations, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot) Committee on Missing Persons
    in Cyprus (CMP), is attempting to resolve the problem of missing
    persons who remain unaccounted for since the intercommunal violence
    beginning in 1963-64 and the events of July 1974 and afterwards. The
    CMP has made little progress. However, in November 1999 the CMP met
    formally for the first time since early 1996 and agreed in principle to
    resume investigations in 2000. However, no resumption of meetings
    occurred during the year. In July 1997, the leaders of the Greek
    Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities agreed to collect and share
    information on missing persons by the end of September 1997, outside of
    the CMP process. Information finally was exchanged in January 1998.
    Further progress has been delayed due to Turkish Cypriot reluctance to
    proceed without first fully accounting for those who may have been
    killed in internal Greek Cypriot fighting in July 1974 prior to the
    landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus.
        Since June 1999 the Government of Cyprus has been conducting
    exhumations of gravesites in the south that may contain the remains of
    persons missing since 1974. So far 46 Greek Cypriots have been
    identified through DNA testing. Of those, 17 were listed among the
    missing since 1974; the remaining 29 were known to be dead, but the
    locations of their graves were unknown. In July 2000 the Government of
    Cyprus released a list of 1,493 Greek Cypriot missing persons whose
    cases have been submitted to the CMP for investigation.
        A report by the former European Commission of Human Rights,
    released in September 1999, held Turkey responsible for violations of
    human rights in Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military
    intervention. The result of a complaint by the Government of Cyprus,
    the report rejected the Turkish argument that the ``TRNC'' is an
    independent state and instead ruled that it is ``a subordinate local
    administration of Turkey operating in northern Cyprus.'' Turkey was
    held responsible for continuing human rights violations against Greek
    Cypriots missing since 1974, and their surviving relatives, and for
    violations concerning the homes and properties of displaced Greek
    Cypriots from 1974, as well as violations of the rights of Greek
    Cypriots still living in north Cyprus. In a September 20 hearing before
    the European Court of Human Rights, the Court reserved judgement on the
    report until a future undetermined date.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Legislation in both communities provides for protection against
    discrimination based on sex, religion, or national, racial or ethnic
    origin. While each community generally respects such laws, significant
    problems remain with the treatment of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites
    living in the north and, to a lesser extent, with the treatment of
    Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area.
        Women.--Spousal abuse in the Greek Cypriot community is receiving
    increasing attention, and the problem is believed to be significant. An
    NGO formed to address the domestic abuse problem reported 591 cases
    during 2000, compared with 747 cases in 1999, with 83.2 percent of the
    reported victims women, 14.3 percent children, and 2.3 percent men. The
    NGO notes that the decrease in cases in 2000 should not be interpreted
    as an actual decrease in the incidence of domestic violence. A shortage
    in volunteer staff during the year decreased the number of the
    organization's domestic abuse hot line operating hours. A shelter for
    battered women opened in 1998.
        A 1994 law aimed at making spousal abuse easier to report and
    prosecute initially had little effect because key provisions were
    unfunded and unimplemented. However, funding increased and progress was
    made in implementation during the year, with all cases reported to the
    police being referred to the courts and measures taken to ensure that
    such cases are treated as serious criminal charges, not simply as
    family disputes. Additionally amendments to the law during the year
    have facilitated the prosecution of suspected offenders. Many suspected
    cases of domestic violence still do not reach the courts, largely
    because of family pressure and the wife's economic dependence on her
    husband. Very few cases tried in the courts result in convictions.
    Little public discussion of domestic violence occurs in the Turkish
    Cypriot community, although a report issued by the NGO Women's Research
    Center described such violence as common. A women's shelter that opened
    in 1994 closed in 2000 due to lack of use. The shelter's location was
    well known in the community, and women seeking assistance feared being
    discovered by their spouses. Domestic violence cases are rare in the
    Turkish Cypriot legal system, since they often are considered a
    ``family matter.''
        ``Honor'' crimes, in which women are victimized and even killed by
    relatives for alleged acts that dishonor the family, occur in the
    government-controlled area and in the north and are prosecuted in both
    areas. However, no such deaths have occurred in recent years on the
    island.
        There is no law against sexual harassment law in the government-
    controlled area. Although prohibited by law in the north, sexual
    harassment is not widely discussed, and any such incidents are largely
    unreported. Republic of Cyprus law forbids forced (but not voluntary)
    prostitution. However, credible reports continue that women, generally
    East Asian or Eastern European night club performers, are trafficked
    and forced into prostitution in both communities (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        The Greek Cypriot press frequently reported on the mistreatment of
    some maids and other foreign workers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
        Throughout Cyprus, women generally have the same legal status as
    men. Greek Cypriot women married to foreign husbands were given the
    right to transmit citizenship to their children automatically in 1998
    legislation. A 1998 Turkish Cypriot law on marriage and divorce
    provides for more equal treatment of husbands and wives. Under the law,
    the man no longer is considered legally the head of the family and does
    not have the exclusive right to decide the family's place of residence.
    The wife may retain her surname but must add the husband's surname.
    Turkish Cypriot women may now marry non-Muslim men. In cases of
    divorce, the court decides on a fair distribution of the family's
    assets, with each partner assured a minimum of 30 percent. In dividing
    assets, the judge must take into account which partner is receiving
    custody of the children and provide sufficient means to support them.
        Legal provisions in both communities requiring equal pay for men
    and women performing the same job are enforced effectively at the white
    collar level, but Turkish Cypriot women employed in the agricultural
    and textile sectors routinely are paid less than their male
    counterparts.
        Children.--Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities
    demonstrate a strong commitment to children's welfare. There is no
    difference in the health care and educational opportunities available
    to boys and girls. Free education through age 15 is compulsory in both
    communities.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--In Cyprus generally, disabled persons do
    not appear to be discriminated against in education or the provision of
    state services. In the Greek Cypriot community, disabled persons who
    apply for a public sector position are entitled to preference if they
    are deemed able to perform the required duties and their qualifications
    equal those of other applicants. Legislation also mandates that new
    public building and tourist facilities provide access for the disabled,
    although little has been done to enforce this law. In the Turkish
    Cypriot community, regulations require businesses to employ 1 disabled
    person for every 25 positions they fill, although enforcement is
    inconsistent. While there is increasing awareness of the issue, the
    Turkish Cypriot community has not yet enacted legislation to mandate
    access for the disabled to public buildings and other facilities.
        Religious Minorities.--Greek Cypriots living in the north report
    that unused Orthodox churches continue to be vandalized. An Orthodox
    Church in the north is located in the center of an as yet unopened
    resort hotel constructed during the year on the grounds surrounding the
    Church. Turkish Cypriots complain that unused mosques in the south have
    been treated similarly. A previously unknown Greek Cypriot nationalist
    organization claimed responsibility for an arson attack on a mosque in
    the south in August 1999. Damage was light. The authorities repaired
    and built a fence around the mosque and pledged to increase protection
    of Muslim sites. No one had been arrested for the attack by year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Both the Government of Cyprus
    and the Turkish Cypriot administration have constitutional or legal
    bars against discrimination. The basic agreement covering treatment of
    Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and Turkish Cypriots
    living in the south remains the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. This
    agreement provides for voluntary transfer of populations, free and
    unhindered access by the UNFICYP to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living
    in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south, and facilities
    for education, medical care, and religious worship. Turkish Cypriot
    noncompliance with some of the provisions of the Vienna III Agreement
    made daily life difficult for Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in
    the north. At year's end, there were 427 Greek Cypriots and 154
    Maronites resident in the north.
        Some of the approximately 300 Turkish Cypriots living in the
    government-controlled area face difficulties in obtaining
    identification cards and other government documents, especially if they
    were born after 1974. Turkish Cypriots also appear to be subjected to
    surveillance by the Greek Cypriot police. However, they make few formal
    complaints to the UNFICYP.
        UNFICYP access to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
    remains limited. Despite recent improvements in living conditions for
    Greek Cypriots and Maronites, no Greek-language educational facilities
    for Greek Cypriot or Maronite children in the north exist the beyond
    elementary level. Parents thus are forced in many instances to choose
    between keeping their children with them or sending them to the south
    for further education (in which case Turkish Cypriot authorities no
    longer allow them to return permanently to the north). Turkish Cypriot
    authorities screen all textbooks sent from the south to the Greek
    Cypriot schools, causing lengthy delays and shortages of up-to-date
    texts. Turkish Cypriot authorities did not approve about 20 percent of
    the books sent to the north in September, and the books were returned.
    A request by the Government of Cyprus to send a fourth teacher to the
    Greek Cypriot school in the north was rejected by Turkish Cypriot
    authorities. Both Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north are
    unable to change their place of residence at will. Although the Vienna
    III Agreement provides for medical care by a doctor from the Greek
    Cypriot community, only care by a Turkish Cypriot doctor registered
    with Turkish Cypriot authorities is permitted. Additional telephones
    have been installed for Greek Cypriots living in the north, although
    they, like Turkish Cypriots, must pay higher, ``international'' fees to
    call the south.
        In May 1999 a Maronite house in the village of Asomatos was
    demolished by the Turkish military. Military officials indicated that
    the action was an error and promised to rebuild the house. However, it
    had not yet been rebuilt by year's end. Maronites still lack some
    public services available in most other Turkish Cypriot areas.
        In 1998 Turkish Cypriot authorities announced they were reviewing
    legislation that bans Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north from
    bequeathing real property to heirs residing in the south. Such property
    would no longer be seized by the Turkish Cypriot authorities but would
    be taken into temporary custody pending probate of the will. However,
    it is not clear whether Turkish Cypriot legal provisions exist to
    facilitate the transfer of Greek Cypriot- and Maronite-owned property
    in the north to heirs in the south. Therefore, the practical effect of
    the 1998 announcement remains unrealized.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except for members of
    the police and military forces, have the legal right to form and join
    trade unions of their own choosing without prior authorization.
    However, in the government-controlled area, police officers are
    permitted to join associations that have the right to bargain
    collectively, although not to strike. More than 70 percent of the Greek
    Cypriot work force belongs to independent trade unions. Approximately
    50 to 60 percent of Turkish Cypriot private sector workers, and all
    public sector workers, belong to labor unions.
        In the Turkish Cypriot community, union officials allege that
    various firms have been successful in establishing ``company''
    organizations and then applying pressure on workers to join these
    unions. Officials of independent labor unions also have accused the
    Turkish Cypriot authorities of creating rival public sector unions to
    weaken the independent unions. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO) had not yet acted on these complaints by the end of September
    2000.
        In both communities, trade unions freely and regularly take stands
    on public policy issues affecting workers and maintain their
    independence from the authorities. Two of the major trade unions, one
    in each community, are affiliated closely with political parties. Both
    of the other major unions are independent.
        All workers have the right to strike, and several strikes occurred.
    In the south, no major strikes occurred. In December in the north,
    discontent with a worsening economic situation precipitated a general
    strike that was supported by the major trade and teachers unions. In
    the northern part of the island, a 1978 court ruling gives employers an
    unrestricted right to hire replacement workers in the event of a
    strike, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the right to strike.
    Authorities of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities
    have the power to curtail strikes in what they deem to be ``essential
    services,'' although this power rarely is used.
        Unions in both parts of Cyprus are able to affiliate with
    international trade union organizations, although Greek Cypriot unions
    sometimes object to recognition of Turkish Cypriot unions formed after
    1963.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions
    and confederations by law are free to organize and bargain collectively
    throughout Cyprus. This right is observed in practice in the
    government-controlled areas, and most wages and benefits are set by
    freely negotiated collective agreements. However, Greek Cypriot
    collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable. In the rare
    instances when such agreements are believed to have been infringed, the
    Ministry of Labor is requested to investigate the claim. If the
    Ministry is unable to resolve the dispute, the union may call a strike
    to support its demands.
        In the Turkish Cypriot community wage levels are reviewed several
    times a year for both private sector and public sector workers, and a
    corresponding cost-of-living raise is established. A special commission
    composed of five representatives each from organized labor, employers,
    and the authorities conduct the review. Union leaders contend that
    private sector employers are able to discourage union activity because
    the enforcement of labor and occupational safety regulations is
    sporadic, and penalties for antiunion practices are minimal. As in the
    Greek Cypriot community, parties to a dispute may request mediation by
    the authorities.
        Small export processing zones exist in the port of Larnaca and in
    Famagusta, but the laws governing working conditions and actual
    practice are the same as those outside the zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
    this prohibition is generally observed. However, there were credible
    reports that foreign women were forced into prostitution (see Sections
    5 and 6.f.). Foreign maids and illegal foreign workers allegedly are
    subject to the nonpayment of wages and the threat of deportation (see
    Section 6.e.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--In both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities,
    the minimum age for the employment of children in an ``industrial
    undertaking'' is 16 years of age. Turkish Cypriots may be employed in
    apprentice positions at the age of 15. There are labor inspectors in
    both communities. However, in family-run shops it is common to see
    younger children working after school, and according to press reports,
    children as young as 11 or 12 years of age work in orchards during
    their school holidays in the Turkish Cypriot community. Laws prohibit
    forced and bonded child labor, and these laws are enforced effectively
    in both communities (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage in
    the Greek Cypriot community, which is reviewed every year, is
    approximately $426 (266 Cyprus pounds) per month for shop assistants,
    practical nurses, clerks, hairdressers, and nursery assistants, rising
    to $459 (287 Cyprus pounds) after 6 months' employment. This amount is
    insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. All other occupations are covered under collective bargaining
    agreements between trade unions and employers within the same economic
    sector, and the wages set in these agreements are significantly higher
    than the legislated minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage in the
    Turkish Cypriot area, while subject to frequent review because of high
    inflation, was approximately $253 (158 Cyprus pounds) per month as of
    September. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. Unskilled workers typically earn about
    $416 (260 Cyprus pounds) per month, which is barely adequate to support
    a family.
        In the Greek Cypriot community, the standard workweek in the
    private sector is an average of 39 hours for white-collar workers and
    38 hours for blue-collar workers. In the public sector, it is 38 hours
    during the winter and 35 hours in the summer. In the Turkish Cypriot
    community, the standard workweek is 38 hours in the winter and 36 hours
    in the summer. Labor inspectors effectively enforce these laws.
        Reports on the mistreatment of maids and other foreign workers are
    frequent in the Greek Cypriot press. These reports usually involve
    allegations that maids, often from East or South Asia, were mistreated
    by their employers or fired without cause in violation of their
    contracts. Many women do not complain to authorities, fearing
    retribution from their employers. Those who do file charges run the
    risk of being fired and then deported.
        A significant percentage of the labor force in the north consists
    of illegal workers, mostly from Turkey. According to some estimates,
    illegal workers constitute as much as 25 percent of the total work
    force there. There are frequent allegations that such workers are
    subject to mistreatment, including nonpayment of wages and threats of
    deportation.
        In recent years, steps were taken to improve health and safety
    standards in the workplace in the government-controlled area. A 1997
    law harmonized health and safety standards with those in the European
    Union (EU). The law incorporates EU principles and standards for health
    and safety in the workplace and complies fully with the 1981 ILO
    convention on occupational health and safety. A second 1997 law
    requires employers to provide insurance liability coverage for work-
    related injuries. According to labor union officials, these laws are
    effectively enforced.
        Occupational safety and health regulations are administered
    sporadically at best in the Turkish Cypriot area. In both areas,
    factory inspectors process complaints and inspect businesses in order
    to ensure that occupational safety laws are observed. Workers in the
    government-controlled area can remove themselves from dangerous work
    conditions without risking loss of employment. Turkish Cypriot workers
    who file complaints do not receive satisfactory legal protection and
    may face dismissal.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--In January the Cypriot legislature
    passed a law making it a felony to engage in the sexual exploitation
    and trafficking of adults (with or without their consent) and children.
    The law obligates the State to provide protection and support for
    victims and provides for punishment of up to 20 years' imprisonment. No
    cases were reported by year's end. In January the Turkish Cypriot
    ``National Assembly'' passed a law designed to regulate the hiring of
    women in nightclubs, including penalties for women and employers that
    engage in prostitution. The law does not prohibit trafficking. A
    holdover from British preindependence law currently makes it illegal in
    both communities to procure a woman for prostitution, although the
    crime is only a misdemeanor. Corruption among law enforcement and
    immigration personnel is an obstacle to the effective policing of
    trafficking in both communities. For example, the Chief of the
    Immigration Department in the government-controlled area was arrested
    in September 1999 for illegally issuing visas to female nightclub
    workers and pub owners and was on trial at year's end.
        During the year credible reports continued that women were
    trafficked into both communities for the purpose of prostitution.
    Agents in Eastern Europe recruited young women for prostitution in the
    Greek Cypriot community. The women entered either illegally after
    authorities were bribed or on temporary 3-month work permits. They then
    sometimes were forced to surrender their passports or forced to stay
    beyond the period of their work permits and in some cases were not paid
    their full salaries. The authorities arrested nightclub operators for
    profiting from prostitution, and the Government made some effort to
    protect women who bring complaints against employers by allowing them
    to remain to press charges or facilitate their return home. However,
    many of the women are reluctant to press charges, fearing retaliation
    by employers or deportation. A similar pattern exists of the
    recruitment and hiring of Eastern European women to work in the Turkish
    Cypriot community, and reports persist of restrictions on nightclub
    workers, such as confiscation of their passports by employers.
                                   __________

                                 CZECH REPUBLIC

        The Czech Republic is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with
    a bicameral Parliament. Following elections in June 1998, Prime
    Minister Milos Zeman formed a minority government comprised almost
    exclusively of members of his left-of-center Social Democratic Party.
    The Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. President Vaclav
    Havel was reelected in January 1998 by a narrow margin and remains an
    internationally recognized advocate of human rights and social justice.
    Although the country essentially has completed the reform of political
    structures initiated after the 1989 ``Velvet Revolution,'' some
    institutions are still in a state of transformation. The judiciary is
    legally independent but is hampered by structural and procedural
    deficiencies and a lack of resources.
        The Ministry of the Interior oversees the police. The civilian
    internal security service, known as the Security and Information
    Service (BIS), reports to the Parliament and the Prime Minister's
    office through the Foreign Minister, who is a Deputy Prime Minister.
    Police and BIS authorities generally observe constitutional and legal
    protection of individual rights in carrying out their responsibilities.
    However, some members of the police committed human rights abuses.
        The economy is market-based, with over 80 percent of the gross
    domestic product (GDP) produced by the private sector. After 2 years of
    contraction, the economy grew by 2.8 percent during the first three
    quarters of the year. Inflation dropped to 3.9 percent, while
    unemployment leveled off at 8.8 percent. The work force is employed
    primarily in industry, retail trade, and construction. Leading exports
    are machinery and transport equipment, and intermediate manufactured
    products. The GDP per capita in 1999 stood at approximately $5,400
    (186,300 Czech crowns).
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
    however, problems remain in several areas. Occasional police violence
    remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials
    are problems, due to a lack of resources for the judicial system. There
    is some violence and discrimination against women. Discrimination and
    sporadic skinhead violence against the Romani community remain
    problems. Trafficking in women and children is a problem. Since January
    1999, the Human Rights Council, headed by the Commissioner for Human
    Rights, has advised the Government on human rights issues and prepared
    legislative proposals for improving human rights in the country. In
    December the Parliament named former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl as
    Ombudsman for Human Rights.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearances.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and there were no
    reports of such practices; however, police occasionally used excessive
    force and abused their authority.
        In May police clashed with anarchists attempting to disrupt a
    skinhead rally; the anarchists complained of being singled out for
    arbitrary arrest and beatings. Similar allegations were made after
    police prevented anarchists from disrupting neofascist rallies in
    October and November.
        During violent antiglobalization protests surrounding the September
    International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings in Prague, 123
    police officers were injured, many by cobblestones thrown by rioters
    (see Section 2.b.). Police arrested 900 protesters for destruction of
    property, disturbing the peace, blocking roadways, and attempting to
    disrupt the meetings. Most were released within 1 or 2 days. Police
    brought charges against 20 persons; by December 6 all had been released
    on bail. After their release, many of those detained complained of poor
    treatment and abuse before and during their detention. Most complaints
    were of illegal detention; overcrowded cells; lack of food and toilet
    facilities; no immediate access to lawyers or telephones; and rough
    treatment, strip searches, and intimidation by police and prison
    officials. Some protesters stated to NGO's monitoring police behavior
    that they had seen numerous people whom they believed had been beaten
    by the police and prison officials. One Spanish and two Danish
    protesters claimed police beat them while they were in custody. A
    Polish protester, who is suing the Czech police, stated that uniformed
    police had beaten him repeatedly over the course of his 24-hour
    detention, during which he had been chained in his cell, denied access
    to a lawyer, and not allowed to use toilet facilities. Numerous foreign
    demonstrators claimed that they were arrested despite behaving
    peacefully. Arrested protesters also reported that police and prison
    officials were wearing masks and were not wearing or were covering
    their identification numbers. A South Korean scientist and visiting
    professor at Charles University not participating in the protest was
    arrested and held for 24 hours. He complained of abuse while in
    detention.
        Government officials expressed satisfaction with overall police
    conduct during the protests, although they did not reject the
    possibility of misconduct by individual officers. However, local and
    international human rights organizations expressed concern about police
    behavior during the protests; 15 members of the European Parliament
    sent an open letter to government leaders urging a thorough
    investigation. In October the Ministry of the Interior initiated an
    investigation into complaints of police misconduct. By year's end, the
    Ministry of the Interior had received 373 complaints, 60 of which led
    to investigations. Only two cases of possible police misconduct were
    found (one for illegal fingerprinting and one for a covered
    identification number). No misconduct was found in the case of the
    Danes, the Spaniard, or the South Korean; the case of the Polish
    protester was still ongoing. Several other cases were still under
    investigation at year's end, including that of a police officer
    photographed standing over a fallen protester wielding a club. Other
    cases were suspended for lack of evidence. An NGO monitoring the police
    gathered testimony of police misconduct from over 50 protesters and
    filed at least 2 lawsuits against the police. That organization has
    expressed dissatisfaction with the Ministry of the Interior's
    investigations.
        According to press reports, an American/Austrian dual citizen
    detained during the riots jumped from a police station window, breaking
    her leg. She stated through her attorney that she had paid a fine for
    participating in the riots but had not been released at that time. In
    addition she complained of ``aggressive and improper'' police behavior
    toward her during detention. The Ministry of the Interior investigation
    into her complaint found no police misconduct.
        The police force has been restructured significantly; the majority
    of officers have been recruited since the 1989 revolution. Public
    approval ratings for the police reached a 10-year high after their
    overall good performance during the IMF/World Bank meetings. Petty
    police corruption remains a problem, although enforcement against it
    has improved. During the year, 389 members of the police force were
    charged with criminal offenses, a 12 percent increase over 1999, which
    the authorities credit to better enforcement efforts. The most common
    offenses cited were police officers fining motorists for traffic
    offenses, then keeping the money, and auto accident insurance fraud.
    Punishments include suspension from duty, fines, and prison sentences.
    Police sometimes failed to take sufficient action in cases of threats
    or attacks against Roma.
        In December police officer Marian Telega was sentenced to 18 months
    in prison and 2-and-a-half years' probation for his involvement in the
    1998 death of Rom Milan Lacko. Telega drove the car that hit and killed
    Lacko after he was beaten by skinheads and left in the road (see
    Section 5). In September Rom Martin Tomko accused a Brno police officer
    of stopping him in the street and, after an argument, beating him and
    leaving him unconscious in a park. Three police officers have been
    charged with inflicting bodily harm.
        In October a Prague court rejected a complaint against a special
    police unit alleged to have used excessive force to contain a group of
    anarchists and radical environmentalists rioting in downtown Prague in
    1998.
        The case of a Brno city police officer charged with using excessive
    force to break up a late night party outside a theater in 1995 still
    was awaiting a formal court decision at year's end. In the meantime,
    the officer continues to serve on the police force but faces suspension
    or other internal disciplinary action if convicted.
        The trial of one of the three Communist-era investigators charged
    with torturing political prisoners in the 1950's ended in acquittal in
    January. The trial of the other two was postponed for health reasons
    (see Section 1.e.). The case of two former secret police officers
    accused of torturing dissident Vladimir Hucin was still being
    investigated at year's end. The Office for the Documentation and
    Investigation of the Crimes of Communism (UDV) continued to investigate
    cases of torture and misconduct from the Communist era (see Section
    1.e.).
        Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a
    problem (see Section 5).
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is
    overcrowding in many prisons, but it declined during the course of the
    year. In March the general director of the prison service announced
    that the country's prisons would temporarily refuse entry to convicts
    who have been sentenced to 2 years in prison or less. In February and
    March, prisoners in several facilities rioted and staged hunger strikes
    to protest overcrowding, deteriorating facilities, and insufficient
    food and clothing. The protests ended after a week. In May the prison
    system was at 120 percent of capacity, in some areas as high as 180
    percent; there were approximately 23,000 prisoners in the country. By
    year's end, the system was at 110 percent of capacity; some prisons
    were at 135 percent. There were 21,547 prisoners and 9,890 prison
    guards. Women and men are housed separately. Attorney and family visits
    are permitted. The authorities follow these guidelines in practice.
        The Government permits visits by human rights monitors. However,
    during the IMF/World Bank protests, observers were not allowed into two
    detention facilities in Branik and Ocelarska Street (see Section 4).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
    prohibition in practice. Police may hold persons without charge for up
    to 48 hours, during which time they have the right to counsel. The lack
    of experienced police investigators and qualified judges, combined with
    a still evolving legal environment, have contributed to a backlog of
    court cases. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 300 judges and 88
    prosecutors are needed to fill vacant positions. Pretrial detention may
    last legally as long as 4 years for cases considered ``exceptionally
    grave'' under the Criminal Code. Pretrial detention for most crimes may
    last as long as 2 or 3 years, with mandatory judicial review intervals
    beginning at the end of the first 6 months of detention. If the court
    does not approve continued detention during a judicial review, the
    suspect must be released. In practice few pretrial detainees are held
    for longer than 2 years. The law does not allow bail for certain
    serious crimes. A suspect may petition the appropriate investigating
    authorities at any time for release from detention. The average length
    of pretrial detention is now 195 days. As of November, the number of
    pretrial detainees was 6,353, about one third of the prison population.
        The law prohibits exile, and the Government observes this
    prohibition in practice.
        Since 1993 local courts and foreign police have expelled to
    Slovakia ``Slovaks'' without proper citizenship or residency papers.
    Some of these expulsions involve ``Slovak'' Roma who have never been in
    Slovakia. By the first half of 1997 (latest available statistics), a
    total of 851 ``Slovaks'' had been expelled administratively or
    judicially by the authorities. A February 1998 presidential amnesty
    (that was expected to affect three-fourths of all expulsion sentences
    issued between January 1, 1993 and February 2, 1998) granted amnesty to
    those receiving expulsion sentences for crimes in which the punishment
    was less than 5 years' imprisonment. However, according to one NGO that
    follows this issue, some courts have not implemented this amnesty.
    Courts have not imposed expulsion sentences since the implementation of
    a new citizenship law in 1999, which allows ``Slovaks'' and others to
    legalize their status. There have, however, been complaints from Roma
    activists that local officials in some areas are refusing to process
    Czech citizenship applications for ``Slovak'' or stateless Roma
    families (see Section 5).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is impartial and independent in practice.
    Judges are not fired or transferred for political reasons. Structural
    and procedural deficiencies as well as a lack of training and resources
    hamper the effectiveness of the judiciary. Ministry of Justice
    proposals for judicial reform, including term limits for Constitutional
    Court judges, a mandatory retirement age for judges, and measures to
    streamline the legal process, failed in Parliament at several points
    throughout the year. In October Justice Minister Otakar Motejl resigned
    after Parliament repeatedly rejected his attempts at broad judicial
    reform.
        The court system consists of district, regional, and high courts.
    The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal. In addition the
    separate Constitutional Court has final authority for cases concerning
    the constitutionality of legislation.
        The law stipulates that persons charged with criminal offenses are
    entitled to fair and open public trials. They have the right to be
    informed of their legal rights and of the charges against them, to
    consult with counsel, and to present a defense. The State provides
    lawyers for indigent defendants in criminal and some civil cases
    through the bar association. All defendants enjoy a presumption of
    innocence and have the right to refuse to testify against themselves.
    They may appeal any judgments decided against them. The authorities
    observe these rights in practice.
        The 1991 lustration (vetting) law, passed to prevent Communistera
    collaborators from taking up senior government responsibilities,
    continues to bar many former Communist Party officials, members of the
    people's militia, and suspected secret police collaborators from
    holding a wide range of elective and appointive offices for 5 years,
    including appointive positions in state-owned companies, academia, and
    the media. In 1995 Parliament extended this legal constraint to
    December 31, 2000, overriding a veto of President Havel. In February
    the Chairman of the Government's privatization agency was dismissed
    after presenting a falsified lustration certificate clearing him of
    cooperation with Communist-era state security. In November the Chamber
    of Deputies again extended the validity of the law over the veto of
    President Havel until a new civil service law and security law are
    passed and implemented. The extended law exempts from the lustration
    process people born after December 1, 1971, an exemption not included
    in the earlier version. Some private employers also have required
    applicants to produce lustration certificates proving noncollaboration.
    By October the special section of the Interior Ministry handling
    lustration requests had processed 8,200 lustration certificates,
    bringing the total since 1991 to 395,500. During the year, 3 percent of
    the applications did not receive confirmation of a clear record, in
    line with the average of 3.2 percent since 1991. Those who did not
    receive confirmation of a clear record may file a civil suit against
    the Interior Ministry for a charge similar to slander. Twenty such
    suits were filed during the year; court decisions were still pending at
    year's end.
        Defenders of the lustration law argue that individuals who
    systematically destroyed the lives of others in order to gain
    advantages for themselves within the Communist system should not be
    entrusted with high state responsibilities. However, the law has been
    criticized for violating human rights principles prohibiting
    discrimination in employment and assigning collective guilt. It also
    has been criticized because the screening process is based on the
    records of the Communist secret police, which many believe are
    incomplete or unreliable. Citizens unjustly accused of collaboration
    may suffer diminished career prospects and damaged personal
    reputations. In its November assessment report on the Czech Republic
    for European Union (EU) accession, the European Commission again noted
    the need to eliminate the law.
        Some actions taken by state authorities and the Communist Party
    during the 1948 to 1989 Communist regime are being investigated as
    criminal acts under a 1993 law by a government office, UDV, established
    for this purpose. The UDV was established in 1995 and is an independent
    part of the Czech Police Office of Investigations. The UDV is empowered
    to launch and conduct prosecutions and propose filing suits to state
    attorney's offices. As of October, the UDV had investigated 2,756 cases
    under its jurisdiction, and recommended action against 152 individuals.
    Charges have been filed in court against 44 persons. Nine of those have
    been sentenced; five were placed on probation and four received
    unconditional sentences, the longest of which was 5 years'
    imprisonment. Nearly 2,000 cases have been dropped due to the death of
    suspects or witnesses, various presidential amnesties, or statutes of
    limitation. The trial in Uherske Hradiste of three Communist officials
    charged with torturing political prisoners in the 1950's ended in
    January. One of the three was acquitted; the case was postponed against
    the other two for health reasons (see Section 1.c.). The UDV is still
    working with Charles University to prepare ``moral trials'' to discuss
    crimes whose offenders cannot be punished due to their death or to the
    expired statue of limitations on the cases. It targets primarily cases
    of: Torture (see Section 1.c.); border shootings; treason connected
    with the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; state persecution
    of opponents of the Communist regime; and investigation of Czech
    authorities who negligently allowed exposure of citizens to hazardous
    waste after the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. Although the statute of
    limitations for many of the Communist-era crimes under investigation by
    the UDV was set to expire this year, Parliament voted in December 1999
    to suspend the statute of limitations for serious crimes committed
    during the Communist regime and enabled the UDV to continue
    investigating these cases. In September the Interior Ministry extended
    the UDV's mandate indefinitely and broadened the period of years it
    should investigate to include 1945 through 1948.
        In July the case of Communist-era judge Pavel Vitek was submitted
    to a regional prosecutor. A district court ruled earlier that Pavel
    Vitek, who was one of the judges in a show trial against seven persons
    who were accused falsely of murdering Communist officials in 1951,
    could not be tried for his role in the case because the statute of
    limitations had expired. However, the Supreme Court ruled in December
    1999 that he could be tried for aiding and abetting murder. The
    prosecutor had not yet returned the case to trial by year's end.
        In February the Prosecutor General returned the case of former
    Communist officials Milos Jakes and Jozek Lenart to the UDV for further
    investigation. The two were to be charged with high treason for
    attending a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Prague on the day after
    the Warsaw Pact invasion and for discussing the creation of a new
    ``workers' and farmers''' government; they were not indicted by year's
    end.
        The UDV also opened three new high-profile cases: The unexplained
    death in August 1967 of American citizen Charles Jordan, in which
    involvement of the Czech state security service is suspected; Communist
    officials' responsibility for and attempts to cover up a 1981 mining
    accident in which 65 miners were killed; and the alleged attempts of
    two former Communist officials to conceal and protect Nazi war criminal
    Werner Tutter in the 1960's. Prosecution of former Czechoslovak Premier
    and Interior Minister Lubomir Strougal relating to the arming of the
    People's Militia, a paramilitary force of the former Communist Party,
    was halted; he still faced charges of abuse of public office at year's
    end.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Electronic surveillance, the tapping of telephones,
    and the interception of mail require a court order; government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions in practice, and
    violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
        Unlike in 1999, there were no reports of Roma filing complaints
    against the police for illegal searches during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. Individuals can and do speak out on political issues and
    freely criticize the Government and public figures. A wide variety of
    newspapers, magazines, and journals owned by a variety of Czech and
    foreign investors are published without government interference. The
    press law was updated in February to conform to EU norms.
        The electronic media are independent. There are 3 national
    television stations--1 public (with 2 separate channels) and 2
    private--and more than 61 private radio stations in addition to Czech
    Public Radio. A third private television station, TV3, can be viewed
    only in certain regions or through cable and satellite. The leading
    television channel, Nova, is privately owned. International arbitration
    continues on a dispute over its ownership and alleged fraud and
    commercial misconduct by the station's license holder; several courts
    found in his favor during the course of the year. Citizens also have
    access to foreign broadcasts via satellite, cable, and the Internet.
        On January 1, a new Freedom of Information Act took effect. The law
    provides for freedom of access to information under the control of
    state and local authorities as well as other institutions affecting the
    rights of citizens.
        In November President Havel signed an amendment to the Penal Code
    that imposes prison terms of between 6 months and 3 years for denying
    the Nazi Holocaust and the Communist genocide. The amendment also
    outlawed the incitement of hatred based on race, religion, class,
    nationality, or other group.
        In February the lower house of Parliament approved a press bill,
    minus its most controversial provision requiring that the press present
    responses from persons or parties who believed their reputations had
    been sullied by media reports, even if the information were correct.
    Opponents of the measure maintained that this provision would create an
    unfair burden on the press and represented an unwise regulation of free
    expression.
        A 13-member Television and Radio Council has limited regulatory
    responsibility for policymaking and answers to the parliamentary media
    committee, which exercises broad oversight of the Council and must
    approve its members. The Council can issue and revoke radio and
    television licenses and monitors programming. The Council continued to
    be the target of criticism during the year for its lack of initiative
    and ineffective action in addressing a high profile ownership dispute
    at the country's largest private television channel. There is also a
    nine-member Czech Television (CTV) Council charged with oversight of
    the Public Czech Television. The Council became embroiled in a
    controversy over political influence on CTV in mid-December when it
    dismissed the CTV general manager. The council hired a new manager 8
    days later who was alleged to be subject to political influence. In
    protest, news staff began producing their own version of the principal
    CTV and public affairs programs. The newly appointed management was
    prevented from entering CTV studios and began simultaneous broadcast of
    its own news and public affairs programs. By year's end, the situation
    had not been resolved.
        In January a Prague court dropped charges of defaming a people and
    inciting racial hatred against far-right National Alliance leader
    Vladimir Skoupy, who had questioned whether the Nazi Holocaust had
    taken place (see Section 5).
        Charges of slander, assault on a public office, and inciting racial
    discord filed against prominent national Romani leader Ondrej Gina in
    November 1999 were dropped in March. The mayor and city council of
    Rokycany formally had pressed charges against Gina for remarks that he
    had published about the mayor and the city on an Internet site about
    discrimination against Roma. Local police had concluded that these
    remarks constituted a criminal act and turned the case over to the
    state prosecutor for action. The mayor and city council had argued that
    Gina's remarks were malicious enough to constitute ``defamation of the
    Czech nation'' and ``harm to the reputation of the city of Rokycany at
    home and abroad (see Sections 1.f. and 5.).''
        In September police brought charges of abetting in the commission
    of a crime against two journalists who refused to reveal their source
    of information in a case involving an alleged slander campaign against
    a member of the Government. Such charges are usually brought only in
    cases in which police have no other means of solving a serious crime,
    such as murder. Journalists and journalists' professional organizations
    criticized the charges as an attempt to stifle freedom of the press. In
    October President Havel pardoned the two journalists, who then called
    for the case to continue in order to establish a legal precedent on the
    press' right to protect sources. A state attorney in November agreed to
    proceed with the prosecution; however, no trial had begun by year's
    end.
        The closely watched false accusation and libel case of Zdenek Zukal
    continued. Zukal faces three charges of criminal libel for reporting
    that police had provided false information in their investigation of
    high-level corruption in Olomouc. Originally Zukal had been charged
    with slander for publishing documents he knew--or should have known--to
    be forgeries. Local authorities later changed the charge to false
    accusation 1 day before a planned presidential pardon. Zukal's trial
    has been delayed on numerous occasions and was ongoing at year's end.
        At year's end, former television reporter Tomas Smrcek was awaiting
    trial on charges of deliberately endangering classified data. In a 1999
    report on possible Czech intelligence service coverup of one of its
    official's drunk driving offense, Smrcek allegedly showed a classified
    document on the air. Smrcek faces up to 8 years in prison.
        In October the far-right Republican Party (SPR-RSC) brought suit
    against the Human Rights Commissioner and the Ministry of the Interior
    for incitement to racial and ethnic hatred. The Ministry, at the
    proposal of the Human Rights Commission, has made a public tender for
    grant proposals for a study of the Republican Party (SPR-RSC) and its
    racist and anti-Semitic policies.
        In September a member of the far-right Republican Party (SPRRSC)
    was sentenced to 10 months in prison and 2 years' probation for
    spreading racial and national hatred. The man had placed photos of
    current Czech leaders in a display case with anti-Semitic labels (see
    Section 5).
        In December publisher Michal Zitko was fined approximately $53,000
    (2 million Czech crowns) and given a 3-year suspended sentence and 5
    years' probation for supporting and disseminating hate speech. Zitko
    had translated and published Adolf Hitler's ``Mein Kampf'' with no
    editorial commentary. The police seized 300 copies of the book. Also in
    December, a state attorney brought similar charges against Vit Varak
    for selling ``Mein Kampf'' on the Internet.
        In December 1999, President Havel pardoned a Romani woman accused
    of defaming the Czech nation for comments she allegedly made about the
    construction of a wall dividing Roma and Czech communities in Usti nad
    Labem (see Section 5).
        The law provides for academic freedom but forbids activities by
    established political parties at universities.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of persons to assemble peacefully, and the
    Government respects these rights in practice; however, it may restrict
    assemblies that promote hatred and intolerance, advocate suppression of
    individual or political rights, or otherwise jeopardize the safety of
    the participants. Permits are normally required for demonstrations, but
    police generally do not interfere with spontaneous, peaceful
    demonstrations. In October police detained around 900 antiglobalization
    protesters rioting outside the IMF/World Bank meetings (see Section
    1.c.) and pressed charges against 20 of them.
        The law forbids political party activity at universities (see
    Section 2.a.).
        The Constitution provides for the right of persons to associate
    freely and to form political parties, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Either the Government or the President may submit a
    proposal to the Supreme Court calling for a political party to be
    disbanded. Organizations, associations, foundations, and political
    parties are required to register with local officials or at the
    Interior Ministry, but there is no evidence that this registration is
    either coercive or arbitrarily withheld. Prime Minister Zeman has
    called periodically for the Interior Ministry to reexamine or cancel
    the official registration of skinhead organizations and others
    propagating racial hatred or fascism. In March the Ministry of the
    Interior cancelled the registration of a neo-Nazi organization that had
    propagated anti-Semitic sentiment (see Section 5). In October the
    Ministry also refused to register the National Party, an extreme right-
    wing organization, as a civic association (see Section 3). It also
    started an investigation into the charter and program of the far-right
    Patriotic Republican Party.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State
    subsidizes all religions that are registered officially with the
    Ministry of Culture. There are 21 state-recognized religions. To
    register a church must have at least 10,000 adult members permanently
    residing in the country. For any churches that the World Council of
    Churches already has recognized, only 500 adult members permanently
    residing in the country are necessary. Churches registered prior to
    1991 are not required to meet these conditions. The Jewish community,
    which numbers only a few thousand, constitutes one such exception. One
    group, the Unification Church (UC), was denied registration in January
    1999 when the Department of Churches determined that it had obtained
    the required proof of membership by fraud; the UC is contesting the
    decision in court. In July the Ministry of Culture requested a
    clarification from the Jehovah's Witnesses addressing their beliefs
    concerning blood transfusions. The Society for the Study of Sects and
    New Religious Trends, a religious observer NGO, accused the Jehovah's
    Witnesses of concealing the religion's restrictions on blood
    transfusions during its 1993 registration process. Unregistered
    religious groups, such as the small Muslim minority, may not own
    community property legally, although they are otherwise free to
    assemble and worship in the manner of their choice. Their members can
    and do issue publications without interference.
        In March and May 1999, the Government established two commissions
    to improve church-state relations. One is a ``political'' commission
    with representation from the main parties currently in the lower
    chamber of Parliament, and the second is a ``specialist'' commission
    composed of experts including lawyers, economists, and church
    representatives. The commissions advise the Government on church-state
    relations, the status of churches and methods of their financing, as
    well as church-related property questions. Members of the commissions
    also have advised the Ministry of Culture on a proposed new Law on the
    Freedom of Religious Belief and on the Status of Churches and Religious
    Societies. The proposal being considered is modeled on the religious
    registration law in effect in Austria. It would impose a two-tiered
    registration system, lowering the membership requirement for the first
    tier (non-profit religious association with limited tax benefits) to
    300, but raising the membership requirement for the second tier (full
    religious association with benefit of state funding and property
    rights) to approximately 20,000. The new law would also impose a 10year
    observation period on all first-tier organizations wishing to obtain
    second-tier status. Currently registered churches would automatically
    receive second-tier status. The proposed changes have been criticized
    by some unregistered religious groups (including the Muslims and the
    Church of Scientology) and nongovernmental observers as prejudicial
    against minority religions. Some argue that government agencies for the
    dissemination of information on ``harmful sects'' assume that the
    groups on which they maintain such information are automatically
    suspect, when in fact they are legitimate religious organizations.
        Missionaries for various religious groups, including the Church of
    Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah's Witnesses, are present
    in the country. Although they proselytize without hindrance within the
    country, a more restrictive law on visas for resident foreigners has
    complicated their efforts and drawn criticism. The new law went into
    effect January 1. It requires that aliens apply for work visas before
    entering the country and provide financial information when doing so.
    The law is aimed at stopping illegal workers and does not specifically
    prohibit religious workers.
        In March the Government negotiated a framework agreement on the
    protection and preservation of the remnants of a medieval Jewish
    cemetery uncovered in 1997 at a commercial construction site in
    downtown Prague. More than 100 sets of remains removed by
    archaeologists in 1999 were to be reburied at the site. The remaining
    graves on the site were to be encased in cement. The Government agreed
    to pay $1.2 million (45 million Czech crowns) in compensation to the
    Czech Insurance Company, owner of the site. Twenty-five adjacent
    parcels believed to contain intact graves from the same cemetery were
    designated a national cultural monument. Minister of Culture Pavel
    Dostal published an editorial piece in July concerning the negotiations
    over the cemetery that many observers considered anti-Semitic. Dostal
    denied any anti-Semitic intent. In September the remains were buried in
    the New Jewish Cemetery in Prague instead. Although the local Jewish
    community considers the matter settled, some international Jewish
    groups expressed dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Czech
    Insurance Company implemented the March agreement.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
    to travel domestically and abroad, as well as for emigration and
    repatriation, and the Government respects these rights in practice.
    Czechs who emigrated during the period of Communist rule frequently
    return to visit or live. A law passed in September 1999 permits such
    persons to regain citizenship without having to relinquish a foreign
    citizenship that they acquired during that time. Citizenship is not
    revoked for political reasons.
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
    in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A legal and institutional framework is
    in place for the processing of refugees and asylees. A new law on
    asylum that came into effect on January 1 improves refugee processing.
    It establishes a list of ``safe countries of origin'' from which
    applicants are unlikely to receive asylum, provides financial support
    for towns with refugee camps, and increases access to legal advice for
    asylum seekers. No independent body has been established to handle the
    appeals of those denied refugee status. The Government provides first
    asylum and cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
    Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country for migrants.
    The Government fully funds an integration program to assist those
    granted refugee status in locating housing and receiving other social
    assistance. Two reception centers, six camps, and six integration
    centers are provided for recognized refugees. As of the end of 1999,
    the Government granted citizenship to 3,200 former citizens of Slovakia
    and 564 former citizens of other countries. The new citizenship law
    passed in September 1999 enabled thousands more ``Slovaks'' to become
    citizens (see Section 5).
        From 1993 to 1999, 20,434 asylum applications were filed, of which
    838 received formal refugee status for resettlement. During the year,
    8,773 applications for asylum were filed. Through August, 100
    applications were approved. In 1999, 79 persons received refugee status
    out of a total of 7,217 applications. Persons from Afghanistan, Russia,
    Slovakia, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, and India submitted the most asylum
    requests during the first half of the year. Of the 441 asylum
    applicants from the Russian Federation, 212 are Chechens. In addition
    migrants from economically disadvantaged countries in Central and
    Eastern Europe often enter the country to take up illegal residency or
    in transit to the West. In 1999 border police prevented 32,325 illegal
    entry attempts, down by 25 percent from 1998. Through the end of
    November, 30,651 illegal migrants were stopped at the borders. The
    camps set up in 1999 for Kosovar Albanian refugees are closed and there
    is not a significant number of Kosovar Albanian refugees who remain in
    the country.
        A growing concern is the smuggling of large groups of refugees and
    economic migrants into and across the country, which lacks specific
    laws criminalizing alien smuggling. Organized rings promoting illegal
    employment abroad operate with impunity, freely advertising their
    services in dozens of local papers and on the Internet. In spite of
    existing legislative gaps, the police are taking action against large-
    scale trafficking rings under organized crime statutes and a law
    criminalizing the ``illegal crossing of the state border.'' The
    authorities are working with neighboring countries to tighten border
    controls. In December 1999, Parliament passed new legislation on
    residence and visas. The new law considerably tightens previous rules
    for change of status and extension of stay and requires visas in
    advance for everyone but tourists. The number of illegal migrants
    detained by Czech authorities declined by 25 percent from 1998 to 1999,
    a result of stepped-up efforts and international cooperation. The
    number of illegal migrants detained by Czech authorities through
    September is roughly the same as over the same period in 1999. Illegal
    migrant groups were composed primarily of persons from Romania,
    Moldova, Ukraine, Afghanistan, India, Bulgaria, and Vietnam. There were
    no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they
    feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government by democratic means, and citizens exercise this right in
    practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis
    of universal suffrage. Citizens above the age of 18 are eligible to
    vote by secret ballot in national, regional, and local elections.
    Elections for 14 new regional governors and parliaments were held
    November 12. These were the first elections for the new regional-level
    administration, created to improve citizens' access to democratically
    elected institutions. The elections were free and fair but turnout was
    low. Opposition groups, including political parties, function openly
    and participate without hindrance in the political process. Citizens
    may join political organizations or vote for the political party of
    their choice without government interference. Political parties must
    register with the Ministry of the Interior. In October the Ministry
    denied registration to the far-right National Party because its
    constitution granted its leader a veto and prohibited its members from
    joining other associations. In December the Ministry publicly announced
    that it was conducting an investigation of the constitution of the far
    right Patriotic Republican Party to determine if the party should be
    deregistered. A new citizenship law passed in September 1999 remedied
    the situation for some persons, predominantly Roma, who were
    enfranchised under the former Czechoslovakia but who were unable to
    obtain Czech citizenship at the time of the split with Slovakia,
    despite birth or long residency in the Czech Republic. They lacked
    voting and other rights due to restrictions under the previous
    citizenship laws (see Section 5). Amendments to the election law passed
    in July make it possible for nonresident Czechs to vote in national
    elections for the first time.
        The Government of Prime Minister Milos Zeman took office in July
    1998. The Government consists almost exclusively of members of the
    Prime Minister's left-of-center Social Democratic party, the first
    nonrightist government since 1989. In addition to the largest
    opposition party, former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civil Democratic
    Party, which has formally agreed to support the minority Social
    Democratic Government under certain conditions, the opposition consists
    of the Communist Party and a coalition of four small centrist and
    center-right parties. The Constitution mandates elections to Parliament
    at least every 4 years, based on proportional representation. In July
    the Parliament approved a new system with 35 smaller electoral
    districts in place of the former 8 large electoral districts. The new
    law also lowers government subsidies to political parties and raises
    the percentage of votes needed for parties running in coalition to
    enter Parliament. To enter Parliament, a single party must obtain 5
    percent of the votes cast in the election; however, coalitions must
    obtain 5 percent of the votes per party (i.e. a three-party coalition
    would have to receive 15 percent of the votes cast to enter
    Parliament). The President and a group of opposition senators have
    challenged the law's constitutionality, complaining that the new law
    discriminates against small parties and prevents free political
    competition. An amendment to the party financing law enacted in
    September over a presidential veto increases the government subsidy to
    Members of Parliament and Senators. The President is elected by
    Parliament and serves a 5-year term. The President has limited
    constitutional powers but may use a suspense veto to return legislation
    to Parliament, which then can override that veto by a simple majority
    of all members.
        There are no restrictions, in law or practice, on women's
    participation in politics; however, they are underrepresented, and
    relatively few women hold high public office. None of the 16 cabinet
    ministers in the Government at year's end was a woman. A ``shadow''
    cabinet comprised of prominent women politicians and activists was
    formed in March. The 200-member Chamber of Deputies has only 30 female
    deputies, including 1 deputy speaker. There are 10 female senators in
    the 81-member Senate.
        No seats are reserved in either house for ethnic minorities.
    Slovaks, of whom there are an estimated 300,000, are almost all
    ``Czechoslovaks'' who elected to live in the Czech Republic after the
    split. For the most part, these Slovaks define their interests in the
    context of national politics, not along ethnic lines; there is no
    Slovak party in Parliament.
        Most of the estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Roma have not been fully
    integrated into political life (see Section 5). Roma themselves have
    been unable to unite behind a program or set of goals to advance their
    interests within the democratic structures of the country. Few Roma
    serve in local government structures, although some have been appointed
    to advisory positions in government ministries. There is currently one
    representative of Romani background in the Parliament.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operate without government restriction, and
    government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
    views. The best-known human rights groups are the Czech Helsinki
    Committee and the Tolerance Foundation (an umbrella organization).
    There are also many single-issue groups.
        During the IMF/World Bank protests in September, members of the
    nongovernmental legal observer teams (OPH) were not allowed into two
    facilities where arrestees were being held. Despite agreeing before the
    protests to an access procedure for OPH observers, police at stations
    in Branik and Ocelarska Street refused entry to observers. During the
    investigation of possible police misconduct that followed (see Section
    1.c. and 2.b.), the police and Ministries of Justice and Interior were
    responsive to OPH's views.
        In July 1999, Parliament passed legislation needed to create a $14
    million (500 million Czech crowns) endowment to be used by 39 NGO's
    that work on issues of social welfare, health, culture, education,
    human rights protection, and the environment. In June the Government's
    Council for Nongovernmental Organizations announced it would be
    dedicating an additional $37.5 million (1.5 billion Czech crowns) for
    organizations focusing on human rights and the environment.
        Former U.N. Human Rights Commission expert Petr Uhl has served as
    the Government's Commissioner for Human Rights since 1999. The Human
    Rights Commissioner serves as head of the government Committee for
    Nationalities and of the Interministerial Commission for Romani
    Community Affairs, established in 1997 (see Section 5). A Council for
    Human Rights with 10 representatives of government ministries and 10
    human rights activists was established in January 1999. The Council for
    Human Rights advises the Government on human rights issues and proposes
    legislation to improve the observation of human rights in the country.
        On December 12, pursuant to legislation passed a year earlier, the
    Chamber of Deputies elected former Justice Minister Otakar Motejl
    ``Public Rights Protector'' or Ombudsman. Motejl, a political
    independent, resigned from the justice post in October. No Deputy
    Ombudsman was selected. By year's end, Motejl was still hiring and
    training staff, opening his office, and beginning public outreach. The
    Ombudsman will addresses citizens' complaints of violations of civil
    and human rights and freedoms by government entities. However, he will
    have no legal power to sanction offending individuals or offices.
        In each house of Parliament there is a petition committee for human
    rights and nationalities, which includes a subcommittee for
    nationalities. A government-sponsored Council for Nationalities advises
    the Cabinet on minority affairs. In this body, Slovaks and Roma have
    three representatives each; Poles and Germans, two each; and Hungarians
    and Ukrainians, one each. In November the Government signed the
    European Charter on Minority and Regional Languages; the Chamber of
    Deputies continued debate on a law on ethnic minorities at year's end.
    There is also a government commission staffed by members of the NGO and
    journalist communities that monitors interethnic violence.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens and
    prohibits discrimination. Health care, education, retirement, and other
    social services generally are provided without regard to race, sex,
    religion, disability, or social status. In practice Roma face
    discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and housing, and
    women face discrimination in employment.
        Women.--The actual extent of violence against women is unknown;
    however, some studies by experts indicate that it is more common than
    publicly acknowledged. Public debate about it is rare, despite the
    efforts of women's groups to focus public attention on the problem. The
    Government maintains a comprehensive awareness and prevention program
    designed to address issues of trafficking, abuse, and violence against
    women. ROSA, an NGO that helps women in trouble, estimates that 1 in 10
    women in domestic situations suffer from emotional or physical abuse,
    and that 30 percent of the abusers are university educated. The press
    occasionally reported on the problem of violence against women and
    trafficking in prostitutes. A 1998 research study conducted by Prague's
    Sexological Institute indicated that 13 percent of women are forced
    into sexual intercourse under threat of violence. Spouses or partners
    are responsible for 51 percent of rapes, with an additional 37 percent
    of the attacks committed by men known to the victims. Only 12 percent
    of rape victims are attacked by strangers. According to police
    statistics, there were 500 rapes reported countrywide during the year,
    although researchers at the Institute estimate that only 3.3 percent of
    rape victims report the crime to the police. Approximately 80 percent
    of criminal rape cases are solved. Gender studies experts reported that
    women were ashamed to report rape or speak about it, and that the
    police were not equipped to help, either by attitude or training.
    However, to improve police responsiveness and prosecution efforts, the
    Ministry of the Interior runs a training program in protocols for
    investigating family violence and sexual crime cases.
        According to Elektra, a help center for abused women, rape victims
    can seek psychological help through any help line or crisis center.
    Crisis centers that help rape victims include White Circle of Safety,
    an association for crime victims that provides free psychiatric and
    legal help, and Riaps, a help line that counsels persons who experience
    any kind of trauma. A total of 54 state-supported shelters with 771
    beds are located in most major cities and towns and accept women who
    have been raped or abused; local NGO's provide medical and social
    assistance to women. According to NGO's, the situation has improved in
    recent years, but there are still not enough shelter spaces to meet the
    demand.
        Legislation does not address spousal abuse specifically; however,
    the Criminal Code covers other forms of domestic violence. An attack is
    considered criminal if the victim's condition warrants medical
    treatment (incapacity to work) for 7 or more days. If medical treatment
    lasts less than 7 days, the attack is classified as a misdemeanor and
    punished by a fine not exceeding approximately $100 (3,000 Czech
    crowns--approximately one fourth of the average monthly wage). Repeated
    misdemeanor attacks do not result in stricter sanctions on the abuser.
    The police are training specialized personnel to handle domestic
    violence; however, they do not yet engage in regular contact with
    welfare and medical services. However, in 1998 the Police Academy and
    secondary police schools introduced, into both the introductory and
    continuing education curriculums, instructional material to improve the
    identification and investigation of domestic violence and sexual abuse
    cases and to sensitize police to the treatment of victims.
        Forced prostitution (pimping) is illegal; prostitution is not,
    although local communities have the right to regulate it and enforce
    restrictions. The Interior Ministry estimates that up to 25,000 persons
    currently earn a living from the sex industry. Prostitution and sex
    shops are particularly prevalent in the border regions with Germany and
    Austria, where international vehicular traffic is heaviest. Trafficking
    in prostitutes is forbidden by law, and trafficking in women is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment, long ignored by the media and by society, was
    the focus of more attention during the year. A new labor law approved
    in May includes a definition of and prohibition against sexual
    harassment. The law defines sexual harassment as unwanted,
    inappropriate or offensive sexual behavior, acceptance or rejection of
    which could be interpreted by another employee as affecting her status
    in the workplace. A recent study commissioned by the newspaper Lidove
    Noviny noted that nearly half of the country's working women have been
    subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. A study by the Defense
    Ministry in 1996 found that nearly half of female soldiers experienced
    harassment on duty. The concerns of women's groups over workplace
    sexual harassment have previously been ignored or dismissed. In 1999,
    however, a university student became the first woman to win a civil
    sexual harassment lawsuit.
        Women are equal under the law and in principle receive the same pay
    for the same job. Women represent roughly half of the labor force,
    though they are employed disproportionately in professions where the
    median salary is relatively low. Women's median wages lag behind those
    of men by roughly 20 percent, although the gap is narrowing. In May
    Parliament approved legislation banning discrimination in hiring and
    employment based on sex. Women enjoy equal property, inheritance, and
    other rights with men. The unemployment rate for women exceeds that for
    men by about one-third (10 percent to 7.8 percent) and a
    disproportionately small number of women hold senior positions.
        A 1991 employment law bans discrimination on the basis of sex;
    however, in practice employers remained free to consider sex, age, or
    even attractiveness when making hiring decisions, since this did not
    necessarily constitute ``discrimination'' under then current legal
    interpretation. Employers often openly used such factors as age, sex,
    and lifestyle in their employment solicitations. July 1999 and May 2000
    amendments to the law explicitly prohibit employment discrimination
    based on a variety of factors, including sex, race, skin color, sexual
    orientation, language, faith, health and family status. Repeated
    offenses are punishable by fines of up to one million Czech crowns. By
    midyear, the employment office in Plzen had warned around three dozen
    companies of discriminatory language in their classified job listings.
    No fines were levied; the discriminatory passages were removed in each
    case.
        Children.--The Government demonstrated its commitment to children's
    welfare through its programs for health care, compulsory education
    through age 15 (through age 14 in special schools), and basic
    nutrition. Girls and boys enjoy equal access to health care and
    education at all levels. Education is free and compulsory from age 6 to
    age 15.
        Child abuse and trafficking in children (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.) continued to receive press attention during the year. The
    conviction of a group of foreigners for pedophilia was covered widely
    as were reports of pedophile activities in border areas with Germany. A
    British disc jockey and three other foreigners were convicted in May on
    charges of pedophilia and sentenced to 33 months in prison. Press and
    government reports throughout the year indicated that Central Europe is
    still a popular destination for pedophiles due to its convenient
    location and low risk of sexually transmitted disease. Some experts
    estimate that the number of visits to the country, primarily by West
    Europeans, for the purpose of abusing children has increased 20 percent
    since 1997. Dissemination of child pornography, whether by print,
    video, CD-ROM, or the Internet is a criminal act. In July the
    Government approved a National Plan Combating Commercial Sexual Abuse,
    giving the Ministry of the Interior coordinating responsibilities. Laws
    against child pornography are enforced; in January a Czech was
    sentenced to 1 year in prison for offering a child pornography CD-ROM
    on the Internet. Court convictions against persons guilty of child sex
    abuse are reported routinely in the media.
        Since 1990 the number of reported cases of child abuse roughly
    doubled; this increase appears to be the result of increased awareness
    of the problem and more effective police training and action. Laws
    criminalize family violence, physical restraint, sexual activity, and
    other abuse of a minor. A Children's Crisis Center was established in
    1995 and is 70 percent state supported. The Fund for Endangered
    Children estimates that the total number of children suffering from
    physical, psychological, and sexual abuse is 20,000 to 40,000, but only
    about one-tenth of such cases are registered by the police. Between 50
    and 100 children die each year as a result of abuse and violence within
    the family. According to NGO's, there are approximately 10,000 children
    living in institutional settings and 4,000 foster families supported by
    the Government and various NGO's.
        Romani children often are relegated to ``special schools'' for the
    mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. Both a government program
    and various private initiatives exist to prepare Romani children for
    mainstream schools. In June 1999, the European Roma Rights Center
    (ERRC) filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court on behalf of 12
    Romani families in Ostrava, alleging that the disproportionate number
    of Romani children in special schools constitutes de facto segregation
    throughout the educational system. The Ostrava Court in October 1999
    dismissed the case, stating that despite evidence of a pattern of
    discrimination, individual cases of discrimination had not been proved
    since due process with respect to psychological evaluation and testing
    with parental consent had been followed in each child's case. The Court
    also ruled that it was not competent to force the Ministry of Education
    to provide nondiscriminatory education. In April the ERRC took the case
    to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; a decision is
    pending. In February an amendment to the law governing schools
    eliminated the restriction on ``special school'' graduates from
    applying to regular secondary schools (see Section 5).
        People with Disabilities.--The disabled suffer disproportionately
    from unemployment, and the physically disabled experience difficulty in
    obtaining access to buildings and public transport. Access to education
    can be a problem, due to the lack of barrier-free access to public
    schools, although there is at least one barrier-free school in each
    district. Many buildings and means of public transportation remain
    inaccessible to those in wheelchairs, although access is improving. In
    Prague 22 of 48 metro stations and 4 bus lines are accessible to the
    disabled. A 1994 Economic Ministry regulation and an update to the 1998
    Construction Code require architects to ensure adequate access for the
    disabled in all new building projects, as well as in older buildings
    undergoing restoration. These regulations are applied in practice. In
    July the Government passed a law requiring access for the disabled to
    all museums. Also in July the Government required the State Fund for
    Transportation to provide transportation subsidies for the disabled.
    Businesses in which 60 percent or more of the employees are disabled
    qualify for special tax breaks. Numerous NGO's support social
    assistance programs to diminish the disadvantages faced by the
    disabled. These NGO's report that, although problems persist, the
    situation of the disabled is receiving more attention and is vastly
    improved from that of only a few years ago. The integration of the
    disabled into society has not been the subject of significant policy or
    public debate.
        Religious Minorities.--In January a court in Jesenik sentenced Jiri
    Tuma to 10 months in prison for displaying racist and anti-Semitic
    symbols in public and propagating a movement that suppresses citizens'
    freedoms and rights. Also in January a court dropped charges of
    inciting racial hatred against Vladimir Skoupy, a leader of the
    National Alliance. At an October 1999 rally, Skoupy had questioned
    whether the Holocaust had ever occurred. A local prosecutor stated that
    because Holocaust denial was not illegal (a law passed in September
    criminalizes Holocaust denial) and because Skoupy's comments were not
    insulting or belittling, he could not be convicted (see Section 2.a.).
        In March Minister of Interior Vaclav Grulich officially disbanded
    and canceled the registration of the National Alliance, an extreme
    right-wing, neo-Nazi organization whose leaders consistently have
    propagated anti-Semitic sentiment and publicly questioned the
    occurrence of the Holocaust (see Section 2.b.). The Patriotic Front, an
    extreme right-wing association accused of denying the Holocaust, was
    warned by the Interior Ministry in November 1999 that it was violating
    human rights and fundamental freedoms. A month later, the Association
    changed its charter to eliminate offending sections and has made no
    further public anti-Semitic statements.
        At an April rally, members of the National Alliance and another
    extreme right-wing entity, the Patriotic Front, threatened to deface or
    remove explanatory plaques installed at the urging of the North
    American Boards of Rabbis in March on the historic Charles Bridge in
    Prague. The plaques, in Czech, English, and Hebrew, describe the origin
    of a medieval sculpture of Christ on the Cross--one of many sculptures
    on the bridge--that bears an offensive Hebrew inscription.
        In December 1999, as part of a display on the struggles of the
    extremist right-wing Republican Party (SPR-RSC) that was hung in front
    of the local party headquarters in Decin, photographs of President
    Havel, Prime Minister Zeman, Civic Democratic Party Leader Klaus, and
    Freedom Union chairman Jan Ruml were labeled ``Jewish Free Masons and
    Murderers of the Czech Nation.'' The exhibit also included a list of
    ``Jews and Jewish Half-Breeds'' in politics that included the names of
    Havel, Zeman, and Klaus. The list was removed a few days later. A
    member of the Republican Party responsible for the display was arrested
    in January and in September sentenced to 10 months in prison and with 2
    years' probation for spreading hatred and racism (see Section 2.a.). In
    December a publisher, Michal Zitko, was fined $53,000 (2 million Czech
    crowns) and given a 3-year suspended sentence and 5 years' probation
    for supporting and disseminating hate speech. He had published without
    editorial comment or annotation a Czech-language version of Hitler's
    ``Mein Kampf.'' (See Section 2.a.) In December a state attorney brought
    charges of disseminating hate speech and propagation of a movement
    aimed at suppressing rights and freedoms against Vit Varak for selling
    ``Mein Kampf'' on the Internet.
        The case of a man charged with organizing a ring in Plzen that
    produced and distributed racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic materials
    was ongoing at year's end. In February 1999, police arrested 12 members
    of the ring and confiscated numerous racist publications, along with
    membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
    organized movement with ties to groups in several other European
    countries. Charges were dropped against all others involved, but the
    leader still faces up to 8 years in prison for supporting and
    propagating a movement aimed at suppressing rights and freedoms. In
    December police in Zlin uncovered another group distributing neo-Nazi
    recordings, publications, and badges. A 21-year-old woman was charged
    with suppressing rights and freedoms. Police confirmed the existence of
    over 20 underground magazines with small circulations propagating
    fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism.
        In February 1999, police in Plzen arrested 12 leaders, producers,
    and distributors of racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic materials. The
    raid netted large amounts of fascist and racist materials, including
    membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
    organized movement with ties to groups in several other European
    countries. Those arrested were charged with supporting and propagating
    a movement dedicated to the suppression of the rights and liberties of
    citizens, an offense punishable by up to 8 years in prison. The owners
    of the firms charged with having produced the fascist and antiSemitic
    materials face the loss of their operating licenses. The case against
    those arrested is still pending. Police confirmed the existence of over
    20 underground magazines with small circulations propagating fascism,
    racism, and antiSemitism.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--After ethnic Slovaks, the
    largest minority is the Romani population, officially estimated to
    number between 200,000 and 250,000. Roma live throughout the country
    but are concentrated in the industrial towns along the northern border,
    where many eastern Slovak Roma were encouraged to settle in the homes
    of Sudeten Germans transferred to the West more than 40 years ago.
        Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty, unemployment,
    interethnic violence, discrimination, illiteracy, and disease. They are
    subject to popular prejudice, as is affirmed repeatedly by public
    opinion polls. Nearly 65 percent of the respondents in a September
    opinion poll admitted to an unfavorable opinion of Roma and to racial
    intolerance, with more than 50 percent saying that there were too many
    non-Czechs living in the country. A court case charging editors of a
    Republican Party (SPR-PSC) magazine (leaders of this extreme right-wing
    party espouse anti-German and anti-Romani policies) with publishing
    offensive statements against Roma was filed with a Prague district
    court in January 1998 and was still before the court at year's end.
        The State funds television and radio programs for Roma on public
    stations and also supports Romani press publications. Until July there
    was one full-time Romani anchorman on television. He was placed on
    administrative leave after being charged with tax and welfare fraud and
    after the resolution of his case did not return to the air. There is
    one full-time anchorman of Ghanaian background on TV Nova. During the
    year, more and better information on Romani issues became available in
    the mainstream press and other sources. A November poll showed that a
    majority of Czechs (53 percent) believe that the media cover Romani
    issues well. To improve media reporting on Romani issues, a Romani
    journalism course was established in the College of Publicity, and the
    first students graduated in February of 1999. There has been a
    Department of Romani Language Studies at Charles University in Prague
    since 1991, and additional university-level Romani language study
    program exist in Usti nad Labem and Brno.
        However, efforts by NGO's and individuals in the health and
    education fields to improve living conditions for the Roma have had
    only minimal impact, sometimes due to the attitudes or intransigence of
    local authorities. Romani leaders themselves have had limited success
    in organizing their local communities, which often are disunited and
    where many are reluctant to foster contacts with the majority.
        Members of skinhead organizations and their sympathizers most often
    perpetrate interethnic violence. Roma are the most likely targets of
    such crimes, although other ``dark-skinned'' individuals come under the
    same attacks. An estimated 5,000 skinheads are active in the country.
    The Documentation Center for Human Rights recorded more than 1,800
    racially motivated attacks over the past 8 years, in which nearly 32
    persons died. Last year police recorded 364 ``racially-motivated or
    extremist crimes,'' up from 316 in 1999. However, police and courts
    sometimes are reluctant to classify crimes against Roma as racially
    motivated, and the actual figures likely are higher.
        In November 1999, some 30 skinheads attacked between 60 and 70 Roma
    in a restaurant in Ceske Budejovice; 6 persons were injured. Police
    subsequently charged 23 skinheads with racially motivated violence;
    they now face sentences of up to 3 years in prison. In July the trial
    of the 23 skinheads began; the process is currently ongoing.
        In August 1999, some 30 skinheads attacked several Romani homes in
    a village near Jaromerice nad Rokytnou, which resulted in injuries to 2
    Roma and damage to several cars and houses. The raid lasted
    approximately 1 hour. The skinheads threw bricks and stones at the Roma
    while yelling racist epithets. Police charged 12 persons with rioting,
    property damage, and violence, although they were not charged with
    racially motivated crimes. A decision in the case was still pending at
    year's end.
        In July 1999, a group of skinheads attacked a 27-year-old Rom in a
    bar in Jesenik with pool cues, pool balls, and other objects, as they
    shouted racial epithets at him. Police charged six persons involved in
    the attack with defamation of race and disturbing the peace. In January
    a court ruled that the assault was not an organized attack and
    therefore the six could not be tried as a group. The court then found
    four of the attackers not guilty and placed two of them on probation.
    In July the Justice Ministry filed a complaint before the Supreme Court
    against the court's decision to try each defendant separately. In
    August the court overturned the previous verdict and criticized the
    lower court for its ruling that the attack was not an organized one.
    The case returned to the lower court for a new decision based on the
    Supreme Court's instructions.
        In a November 1998 incident in the city of Hodonin, a group of
    skinheads attacked an elderly American citizen for apparently defending
    a young Rom whom the skinheads were harassing while dining in the same
    restaurant. After exchanging words with the man, the skinheads waited
    for him outside, and after a short chase, attacked him and left him
    seriously injured and unconscious on the ground. The incident was
    captured by the security cameras of a nearby gasoline station. Charges
    later were filed against the main attacker. During the trial, the
    prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had a previous
    conviction for shooting a pistol into a group of Romani youth in front
    of a nightclub (he was subsequently pardoned by President Havel). On
    July 19, a judge convicted him of attempted bodily harm and disturbing
    the peace, rejecting the more serious charge of assault with racial
    motivation. He was given a 2-year suspended sentence, the most lenient
    allowable. The judge also declined to impose any monetary sanction on
    the defendant. The judge ruled that as the victim had, according to
    testimony by an expert medical witness, suffered no permanent physical
    damage (a claim disputed by the victim), a stiffer sentence was
    unwarranted. In November an appeals court again rejected the
    prosecutor's contention that race had been a motive in the attack. The
    court lengthened the sentence by 6 months, still suspended, and 3
    years' probation. The court also imposed on the defendant a fine of
    $3,000 (12,000 Czech crowns) to cover the victim's medical expenses.
        The sentences of three skinheads found guilty of the 1995 murder of
    Rom Tibor Danihel were confirmed. The Justice Minister had filed a
    complaint in 1999 against the High Court for annulling the convictions
    on technical grounds.
        Rom Milan Lacko died in 1998 after being beaten by a group of
    skinheads, then being hit and killed by a vehicle driven by police
    officer Marian Telega (see Section 1.c.). In 1998 the skinheads charged
    with beating Lacko then leaving him in the road were given suspended
    sentences. The court absolved the attackers of responsibility for
    Lacko's death, placing the blame on the truck that allegedly hit him.
    After that acquittal, five skinheads were fined and given prison terms
    of 12 to 14 months for appearing at the trial wearing swastikas and
    making racial jokes and insults to the media, the victim's family, and
    supporters in the courthouse. The case was re-opened in October when
    experts testified that Lacko had died as a result of being hit by a car
    driven by a police officer. In December the court sentenced four young
    men to sentences of 3 years in prison, 1 year in prison, 2 years of
    probation, and 1+ years of probation. All four were found to be
    indirectly responsible for Lacko's death; the one defendant who
    admitted to attacking the victim was convicted of attempting to cause
    bodily harm and given the longest sentence. Police officer Marian
    Telega was given an 18-month sentence and 2-and-a-half-years'
    probation.
        Prime Minister Zeman consistently called for the cancellation of
    the official registration of groups sympathetic to the skinhead
    movement. In March the Minister of Interior officially disbanded and
    canceled the registration of the National Alliance, an extreme right-
    wing, neo-Nazi organization whose leaders consistently have propagated
    anti-Semitic and anti-Roma sentiment (see Section 2.b.). A 1999 police
    raid in Plzen led to the arrest of 12 skinhead leaders, distributors,
    and producers of Nazi materials. Another extreme right wing group, the
    Patriotic Front, changed its charter to eliminate offending sections
    after being warned in November 1999 by the Interior Ministry that it
    was violating human rights and fundamental freedoms. The raid also
    netted large amounts of fascist and racist materials, including
    membership lists, indicating that the group was part of a large, well-
    organized movement with ties to the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary,
    and Slovenia. Those arrested were charged with dissemination of fascist
    propaganda, an offense with a maximum penalty of 8 years in prison. The
    raid was executed prior to a planned skinhead rally in Line, near
    Plzen, and forced the cancellation of the event. Charges were dropped
    against all but the leader, who faces up to 8 years in prison for
    supporting and propagating a movement aimed at suppressing rights and
    freedoms.
        In July a series of attacks against Roma and Romani homes and
    facilities took place in Rokycany. On July 5, three young men attacked
    a group of six Roma in Osek, near Rokycany. Two victims were slightly
    injured. The attackers were charged with race defamation and organized
    assault. On July 14, an unknown perpetrator broke a window at a Romani
    community center run by Romani activist Ondrej Gina and threw gasoline
    into the facility; no fire ignited. The same night, Gina received
    anonymous racist phone calls and a bomb threat at his home. Also that
    night, a group of young men on motorbikes threw Molotov cocktails at
    the house of another Rom, Jiri Gina (no relation to Ondrej Gina). Three
    17-year-old members of a previously unknown group, Czech Lion (Cesky
    Lev), were arrested and charged with a racially motivated attack. At
    year's end, investigation of the case continued; the three accused were
    not in police custody.
        In August a state prosecutor filed charges of tax evasion and
    welfare fraud against Ondrej Gina; his son, Ondrej Gina Jr.; and Gina
    Jr.''s wife. Gina Jr., the only Romani anchorman on Czech television,
    took administrative leave from his job. In October a court halted
    proceeding against Gina Jr. and his wife after they admitted to having
    presented false information on their tax return and fraudulently
    collecting social benefit payments. They agreed to pay back around $650
    (25,000 Czech crowns). Gina Jr. did not return to his previous
    anchorman position. In November additional charges of fraud relating to
    management of Romani Community funds were filed against the elder Gina.
    The investigation against him was ongoing at year's end. Several Romani
    organizations have accused Rokycany authorities of racism and selective
    prosecution.
        In September three policemen in Brno allegedly stopped Rom Martin
    Tomko arbitrarily on the street, asked for his identity documents,
    then, after an argument, beat Tomko and left him unconscious in a park
    (see Section 1.c.). In December two of the policemen were charged with
    abuse of public office and inflicting bodily harm. The third, who was
    off duty at the time of the attack, was charged with disturbing the
    peace and inflicting bodily harm.
        Other attacks were reported throughout the year. In January in Novy
    Jicin a man attacked two Roma men at a disco while shouting racial
    slurs. He was charged with defamation of a nation or race and with
    rioting. The case was still pending at year's end. In February a group
    of approximately 15 skinheads, cheered on by bar patrons, attacked and
    beat five Roma in a bar in Nachod while shouting racial epithets. One
    attacker was charged with rioting, but no racial motive was ascribed to
    the attack by investigators. In July on a road near the village of
    Osek, three men followed, verbally harassed, and then attacked six
    Roma. Police charged the three with rioting and defamation of race.
    Both cases are still pending.
        In November media reported on a Romani family in Ostrozska Nova Ves
    that received racist threats during the year. On one occasion an
    unknown person broke a window in their home, leaving a letter with a
    swastika threatening to kill them unless they moved out of town. Police
    were still investigating the case at year's end.
        There were reports of racially motivated Roma-instigated attacks on
    others during the year. In October a Rom attacked townspeople with a
    hatchet while shouting racist insults. A July Ministry of Interior
    report indicated that Roma were the perpetrators in 12 percent of
    racially motivated attacks in 1999.
        In August the founder of an NGO dedicated to improving Czech
    attitudes towards ethnic minorities received violent, racist threats
    via e-mail and telephone. In September thousands of Czech mobile phone
    users received electronic messages on their phones promising free phone
    time for every Roma they killed.
        Racial and ethnic tensions and discrimination in society continued
    to be the object of much media attention during the year. Even when
    federal authorities have spoken out on these issues, local attitudes
    often have proven impervious to change. In October 1999, local
    authorities in Usti nad Labem built a wall dividing a Romani apartment
    complex from its non-Romani neighbors across the street. After a
    national and international outcry against the wall, the Government
    negotiated its removal in November 1999, agreeing to provide a grant of
    $250,000 (10 million Czech crowns) to improve social conditions in the
    area. The houses of Czechs who refused to live near the Romani
    community were bought for $79,000 (three million crowns); one of the
    houses was converted into a new police station; the others remain
    unoccupied. A playground was opened on the street in September and
    trash is now collected regularly there (neighbors' complaints of
    children playing in the street and uncollected trash littering the area
    had led to the proposal of the wall's construction). A portion of the
    dismantled wall now stands in the municipal zoo. In a February opinion
    poll, however, threefourths of those surveyed blamed the wall
    controversy on the Roma's inability to adapt to rules of normal social
    behavior. Several NGO-supported projects aimed at improving Czech/Roma
    relations in the area were started during the year.
        In October the Committee for the Compensation of Romani Holocaust
    Victims unveiled commemorative plaques at the site of a Romani
    concentration camp in Lety. In 1999 the Government provided $12,500
    (500,000 Czech crowns) for the project when a poll showed that only 11
    percent of respondents were willing to assist in financing the Lety
    Project (and less than one-fourth were aware that Roma were persecuted
    under the Nazi regime). The Government completed the transfer of
    archives related to the site to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. In
    1999 the Human Rights Commission recommended the removal of the pig
    farm built on the site in 1974, yet it remains.
        Roma wishing to integrate face practical difficulties in the areas
    of employment and education. Estimated unemployment among Roma is 70
    percent, with many unemployed Roma subsisting on government support or
    earnings from illegal activities. Some employers refuse to hire Roma
    and ask local labor offices not to send Romani applicants for
    advertised positions. An amendment to the Labor Code prohibits hiring
    and employment discrimination based on ethnic origin, but no
    enforcement statistics are yet available. Under the law, individual
    Roma do not have the right to file discrimination complaints; action
    must come from governmental authorities. Many Roma are qualified only
    for lowpaying jobs as manual laborers, since very few complete
    secondary education. A higher-than-average share of the Romani
    population applies for partial or full disability pensions due to the
    occurrence of advanced-stage malignant diseases resulting from the
    neglect of preventive health practices or the lack of available medical
    care in areas with above-average Romani populations. In June the
    Government approved a Plan for Roma Integration aimed at combating
    discrimination against the Romani community. The plan tasked the Human
    Rights Commissioner with proposing legislation in 2001 designed to give
    advantage to Romani firms in placing public orders.
        The integration of Romani children into mainstream schools
    frequently is impeded by language and cultural barriers. Official
    estimates indicate that less than 20 percent of the Romani population
    completed the ninth grade, and less than 5 percent completed high
    school. A significant number of Romani children are transferred at an
    early age, after a psychological exam, to ``special schools'' for the
    mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. According to unofficial
    government estimates, Romani children make up 60 percent or more of
    pupils placed in these special schools, although Roma constitute less
    than 3 percent of the population. Some Romani parents do not send their
    children to school regularly due to a fear of violence, the expense of
    books and supplies, or the lack of a strong cultural emphasis on
    education among some Roma. In 1999 12 Romani families filed suit in the
    Constitutional Court to protest the ``de facto segregation'' of Romani
    children into special schools. The lawsuit requested the establishment
    of a compensatory educational fund, an end to racial segregation within
    3 years, and the development of an educational reform plan. However,
    the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in November 1999 and
    stated that it did not have the power to order the Ministry of
    Education to create programs to end racial discrimination. In April the
    families took the case to the European Court of Human Rights in
    Strasbourg; a decision is pending. The Ministry of Education later took
    steps independently to implement some of the recommended changes. In
    December 1999, the Parliament revoked the restriction on students in
    special schools from applying to attend mainstream secondary or upper-
    level public schools. The legislation was drafted by Parliament's sole
    Romani representative and constituted a significant step in opening
    access to higher education to the Romani minority. In addition the
    Ministry of Education is working on changes to the psychological exam
    given to Czech children that many claim is culturally biased against
    Romani children. Children are assigned to ``special schools'' based on
    poor results on the exam.
        In 1993 the Government created the framework for a number of year-
    long programs (so-called zero grades) to prepare disadvantaged youths
    for their first year in school. Many districts with high concentrations
    of Roma participate in the program, which is funded solely by local
    authorities. More than 100 zero grades now operate throughout the
    country. Some districts tracking local Romani students report that up
    to 70 percent of the children who attend zero-grade training
    successfully enter and remain in mainstream schools. Another
    educational initiative continued placing Romani ``assistant teachers''
    into the primary and special school system. Their function is to help
    teachers communicate with Romani pupils and encourage cooperation
    between schools and Romani parents. According to the Ministry of
    Education, there are now 200 Romani assistant teachers in the school
    system, which is an increase from 144 last year. In 1999 the Education
    Ministry began using joint Romani-Czech language textbooks in 60
    elementary schools to help overcome the barrier in the early school
    years between Romani children and non-Romani speaking teachers. The
    Ministry of Education ordered a textbook for use in schools on the
    cultural and historical roots of the Romani minority and on successful
    members of the Romani community. Local NGO's support additional studies
    and private initiatives to prepare Romani children for mainstream
    schools. Some Roma refuse to cooperate with compulsory vaccinations for
    children or are refused treatment by general practitioners who have
    full quotas of subsidized patients.
        ``Roma advisors'' or ``Roma assistants,'' created by the Interior
    Ministry to advise local authorities on Romani issues, now serve in all
    73 of the country's district offices and at the Prague, Brno, Ostrava,
    and Plzen town halls. Over 60 percent of the advisors are Roma. The
    positions, originally slated for elimination at the time of a scheduled
    federal restructuring, will continue under the title of ``regional
    advisors for ethnic minorities'' beginning in 2003. Many advisors have
    made a significant contribution to their communities, but some Romani
    communities have complained of advisors' ineffectiveness and called for
    their removal. The advisors themselves have in some cases felt hindered
    by the lack of procedural instructions for carrying out their duties
    and a clear legal mandate.
        Roma also face discrimination in housing and other areas of
    everyday life. Despite constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, a
    civil law framework to implement these provisions has not been
    incorporated into specific offenses under the Criminal Code. Some
    restaurants, pubs, and other venues refuse service to Roma and post
    signs prohibiting their entry. The only Romani Member of Parliament
    reported having been denied entry to restaurants and clubs on numerous
    occasions. A civil court awarded her damages this year from a club
    owner in Brno who had refused her entry. Rokycany pub owner, Ivo
    Blahout, who in 1995 refused to serve Romani patrons, was fined $200
    (8,000 Czech crowns) in May. He had been acquitted previously three
    times; he appealed the sentence but no decision had been made by year's
    end.
        There were occasional reports of anti-Roma petitions, which
    complained that Roma are noisy on the street, listen to loud music,
    make messes, and spoil the neighborhood. In January 400 residents of
    Karlovy Vary signed a petition against a plan to open a Romani cultural
    center in the Doubi town district.
        Beginning in 1997, when over 1,200 Roma submitted applications for
    refugee status in Canada and the United Kingdom, Romani families have
    continued to emigrate. The numbers applying to the United Kingdom have
    decreased; most requests for asylum there are denied. Roma began
    applying in greater numbers for asylum in other European countries such
    as Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands, and in New Zealand. An
    estimated 10,000 Czech Roma have emigrated in the last 3 years. Roma
    activists state that the motive for the increased emigration is fear of
    racism, violence, and discrimination. A February poll indicated that 62
    percent of Czechs believe the Roma are departing for economic reasons.
    In December the Government of New Zealand announced the imposition of a
    visa regime with the Czech Republic effective in 2001 in response to
    the growing number of Romani asylum applicants. The Honorary Czech
    Consul in New Zealand reacted by declaring that the Roma were not
    Czechs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned his comment.
        The Government and some local municipalities reported some success
    with programs designed to deal with drug addiction and crime prevention
    in the Romani community during 1999. In December 1998, the
    Interministerial Commission for Romani Community Affairs was expanded
    to include 12 government representatives and 12 Romani representatives,
    as well as the Commissioner for Human Rights and his deputy. The
    revamped Commission has taken an increasingly active role in resolving
    disputes between Romani communities and their non-Romani neighbors in
    towns such as Usti nad Labem and Rokycany, as well as promoting
    positive initiatives in housing, education, and discrimination. The
    Commission was budgeted $625,000 (25 million Czech crowns) for projects
    to assist in integration of Roma. There also was an active effort
    underway during the year to identify, train, and recruit qualified Roma
    to serve in law enforcement. The first group of police trainees
    completed the national police academy's course in Romani language and
    culture, designed to facilitate police officers' improved communication
    and response to the Romani communities in their precincts. One
    government initiative, the three ``Romani-inspector'' positions
    authorized to penalize shop and restaurant owners who refuse service to
    Roma, has been criticized for ineffectiveness and lack of resources.
        In June the Human Rights Commission concluded its seven-month
    ``Project Tolerance'' campaign. The $250,000 (10 million Czech crowns)
    project consisted of public opinion polls on Czech attitudes towards
    ethnic minorities and foreigners; ``tolerance rides'' (information
    campaigns in which Romani and non-Romani educators visited schools to
    talk about racism and the history of the different ethnic groups in the
    country); teacher training; funding for Romani cultural events; and a
    webpage. The campaign also included a series of billboards, radio,
    newspaper, and television advertisements designed to promote public
    discussion of racial tolerance and to improve public opinion toward
    Roma. In September the commission announced that the project would
    continue for another year.
        In September 1999, Parliament passed a law to allow former
    Czechoslovak citizens who have lived in the country since 1993 to claim
    citizenship by simple declaration. This bill was created to remedy the
    de facto stateless situation of some Czech Roma, who were estimated to
    number between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The law also regularizes the
    status of children in foster care who lacked citizenship or permanent
    residency status. However, the law only provides for citizenship for
    those who have resided continuously in the country since 1993. Certain
    persons who went abroad for extended periods, including some asylum
    seekers and those expelled from the country by authorities, may face
    added difficulty in filing for citizenship under the new law. Roma
    activists claimed that some local officials are refusing to process
    Czech citizenship applications for ``Slovak'' or stateless Roma
    families in violation of the law. In one case a ``Slovak'' applicant
    was denied Czech citizenship illegally then required to leave the Czech
    Republic, thus losing his continuous resident status and voiding his
    citizenship claim. The law does not provide benefits to those who were
    denied citizenship and benefits and expelled between 1993 and 1999.
    Many local authorities and Roma are also apparently unaware that any
    changes to the citizenship law have been made.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
    right to form and join unions of their own choice without prior
    authorization, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Union membership continued to decline during the year.
        Most workers are members of unions affiliated with the Czech/
    Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS). The CMKOS is a democratically
    oriented, republic-wide umbrella organization for branch unions. It is
    not affiliated with any political party and carefully maintains its
    independence.
        Workers have the right to strike, except for those whose role in
    public order or public safety is deemed crucial. The law requires that
    labor disputes be subject first to mediation and that strikes take
    place only after mediation efforts fail.
        There were no major strikes during the year. The Association of
    Independent Trade Unions, comprised of seven unions, staged a token
    strike protesting unpaid wages, unemployment, and pension reform in
    March, blocking a Prague road and halting train service in some areas.
        Unions are free to form or join federations and confederations and
    affiliate with and participate in international bodies. This freedom
    was exercised fully.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for collective bargaining, which generally is carried out by
    unions and employers on a company basis. The scope for collective
    bargaining is more limited in the government sector, where wages are
    regulated by law.
        The 2000 ICFTU Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights alleges that
    some employers refused to bargain or used obstructive tactics to
    prevent collective agreements from being concluded.
        There are 11 free trade zones. Their workers possess and practice
    the same right to organize and bargain collectively as other workers in
    the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
    it generally is not used; however, trafficking in women and children
    for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.d.
    and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates a minimum working age of 15
    years, although children who completed courses at special schools
    (schools for the mentally disabled and socially maladjusted) may work
    at the age of 14. These prohibitions are enforced in practice. The law
    prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government
    effectively enforces this prohibition (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    However, trafficking in children is a problem. Employment conditions
    for children aged 15 to 18 are subject to strict safety standards.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum wage
    standards. In June the Government increased the minimum wage by 500
    Czech crowns to 4,500 per month, about $113. Due to currency exchange
    rate shifts, this represented no change in dollar terms from the
    minimum wage of a year ago (approximately $115 or 3,600 Czech crowns).
    The monthly average is approximately $337 (13,473 Czech crowns) per
    month. Average net wages are 2.8 times as high as official sustenance
    costs. The minimum wage provides a sparse standard of living for a
    worker and family, although allowances are available to families with
    children. Retraining efforts, carried out by district labor offices,
    seek to provide labor mobility for those at the lower end of the wage
    scale. The enforcement of minimum wage standards was not a problem
    during the year.
        In May the standard workweek was reduced to 40 hours from 42+,
    effective January 1, 2001. It also requires paid rest of at least 30
    minutes during the standard 8-hour workday, as well as annual leave of
    4 to 8 weeks, depending on the profession. Overtime ordered by the
    employer may not exceed 150 hours per year of 8 hours per week as a
    standard practice, although the local employment office may permit
    overtime above this limit. The Labor Ministry enforces standards for
    working hours, rest periods, and annual leave.
        Government, unions, and employers promote worker safety and health,
    but conditions in some sectors of heavy industry are problematic,
    especially those awaiting privatization. Industrial accident rates are
    not unusually high. The Office of Labor Safety is responsible for
    enforcement of health and safety standards. Workers have the right to
    refuse work endangering their life or health without risk of loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific laws prohibit trafficking in
    women and children, and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
    of forced prostitution is a problem. The Czech Republic is a source,
    transit, and destination country for trafficking in persons from the
    former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Czech women and
    girls are trafficked to Western Europe, such as to Germany. Organizing
    prostitution or pimping also is illegal and punishable by a prison term
    of up to 8 years, with a term of up to 12 years if the victim is under
    the age of 15. (Adults can be prosecuted for engaging in sexual
    activity with a minor under the age of 15.) There have been numerous
    convictions of traffickers as a result of proactive investigative
    efforts on the part of law enforcement officers. The Czech Police
    Organized Crime Division includes a Unit on Trafficking in Persons,
    established in 1995, which cooperates with other nations to enforce
    these laws. In February the Czech office of the International
    Organization on Migration (IOM) completed the first stage of an
    extensive information and media campaign aimed at educating women about
    avoiding entrapment in trafficking for prostitution schemes and
    providing information on organizations that assist victims of
    trafficking.
        In March, 13 people were arrested in West Bohemia for luring women
    from Russia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine and forcing them into prostitution,
    among other charges. Also in March, a raid in Austria broke up an
    international ring that trafficked Czech and Hungarian women into
    prostitution. Police maintain close contact with the IOM and other
    NGO's in order to provide services to women left penniless and homeless
    after trafficking arrests.
        The full extent of trafficking in children is unknown; however,
    convictions of child sex offenders are reported routinely in the media.
    For example, the May conviction of a group of foreigners for pedophilia
    was covered widely, as were the cases of several German citizens who
    were detained in cities near the CzechGerman border and who reportedly
    had traveled regularly to the Czech Republic for the purpose of
    soliciting sexual activity from adolescents (particularly young Roma).
    Following these incidents, police personnel took measures to prevent
    this type of ``sex tourism'' more effectively. Police maintain patrols
    in high-risk areas, enforce curfew-type policies more actively, and
    work to raise public awareness of the issue through the media. In two
    separate cases in February, men in the Teplice region were arrested for
    providing Czech children to German pedophiles. Despite increased police
    efforts, press reports still indicate that in many border regions
    sexual tourism with adolescents continues. In November police conducted
    raids at 7 nightclubs in 4 districts of the country, arresting 10
    persons.
                                   __________

                                    DENMARK

        Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democratic
    rule. Queen Margrethe II is Head of State. The Cabinet, accountable to
    the unicameral Parliament (Folketing), leads the Government. A Social
    Democrat-led minority coalition remained in power following a narrow
    election victory in 1998. The judiciary is independent.
        The national police have sole responsibility for internal security.
    The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security
    forces.
        Denmark has an advanced, market-based industrial economy. One-half
    of the work force is employed in the public sector. The key industries
    are food processing and metalworking. A broad range of industrial goods
    is exported. The economy provides residents with a high standard of
    living.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
    and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
    instances of individual abuse. The Government is taking serious steps
    to deal with violence against women. Trafficking in women is a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
    reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors. But in July the
    U.N. Committee Against Torture criticized the Government for the number
    of prisoners held in isolation and the length of time spent in
    isolation. In response the Government revised prison rules on the
    length of isolation permitted and the reasons for assigning isolation.
    Previously all prisoners who refused to participate in work programs
    were isolated. Under the new rules, the percentage of prisoners in
    isolation dropped from 9.8 percent in 1999 to 3.7 percent in 2000.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
    prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The judicial system consists of a series of local and regional
    courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex.
        The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
    judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of
    the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        A permit is required for public demonstrations, but the Government
    uses objective criteria in evaluating requests and does not
    discriminate in issuing permits.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. It also
    provides for an official state religion, the Evangelical Lutheran
    Church, which is subsidized by the Government. The Evangelical Lutheran
    faith is taught in public schools, but students may withdraw from
    religious classes with parental consent.
        The Government does not require that religious groups be licensed,
    but the State's permission is required for religious ceremonies, for
    example, weddings, if they are to have civil validity. And registered
    religions enjoy certain tax exemptions. In 1999 an independent,
    government-appointed Council published guidelines for future approval
    of religious organizations that are linked to the 1969 Marriage Act.
    The guidelines established clear requirements that religious
    organizations must fulfill, which include providing a written text of
    the religion's central traditions; descriptions of its most important
    rituals; an organizational structure accessible for public control and
    approval; and constitutionally elected representatives who can be held
    responsible by authorities. Additionally, the organization must ``not
    teach or perform actions inconsistent with public morality or order.''
        Scientologists continued to seek official approval as a religious
    organization. Their first application for approval was made in the
    early 1980's and rejected; the second application was made in mid-1997
    and withdrawn in early 1998. The second application was resubmitted in
    1999 and withdrawn again in early 2000, shortly before a decision by
    the Government was expected. In withdrawing the application, the Church
    of Scientology asked the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs for
    additional time to respond to reports about Scientology that had
    appeared in the media. By year's end the application had not been
    resubmitted.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum and provided
    it to 2,099 persons in the first 6 months of 2000 and to 4,526 persons
    in 1999. A total of 9,627 aslyum applications were filed during the
    year, compared with 6,950 in 1999. There were no reports of the forced
    expulsion of refugees to a country where they feared persecution or of
    those having a valid claim to refugee status.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
    peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
    periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage.
        The territories of Greenland (whose population is primarily Inuit)
    and the Faroe Islands (whose inhabitants have their own Norse language)
    have democratically elected home rule governments whose powers
    encompass all matters except foreign affairs, monetary affairs, and
    national security. Greenlanders and Faroese are Danish citizens with
    the same rights as those in the rest of the Kingdom. Each territory
    elects two representatives to the Folketing.
        Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of
    government. In the current government, 9 of 20 ministers are women, as
    are 67 of the parliament's 179 members. There are two parliamentarians
    of mixed ancestry from Greenland and an ethnic Turkish parliamentarian.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative
    and responsive to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Government's operations and extensive public services do not
    discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. The law prohibits
    discrimination on the basis of sex, and the Government enforces it
    effectively. Discrimination on the basis of race is covered by two
    laws, which prohibit racial slander and denial of access to public
    places on the basis of race. The rights of indigenous people are
    protected carefully.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is
    taking steps to combat it. An umbrella nongovernmental organization
    reports that in 1998, women's crisis shelters were contacted
    approximately 9,000 times, compared with 9,961 times in 1997. A total
    of 2,054 women stayed at shelters during 1999, compared with 1,934
    women in 1998. There were 355 reported rapes in the first 9 months of
    1999, compared with 346 in all of 1999. Rape, spousal abuse, and
    spousal rape are all criminal offenses.
        The law requires equal pay for equal work, but some wage inequality
    still exists. The law prohibits job discrimination on the basis of sex
    and provides recourse, such as access to the Equal Status Council, for
    those so affected. Women hold positions of authority throughout
    society, although they are underrepresented in senior business
    positions. Women's rights groups effectively lobby the Government in
    their areas of concern, such as wage disparities and parental leave.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution was a problem
    (see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. Education is compulsory through the age of
    16 and is free through the university level. The Ministries of Social
    Affairs, Justice, and Education oversee implementation of programs for
    children.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. In 1997 the
    Folketing passed legislation that banned the physical punishment of
    children by adults, including their parents.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. Building regulations require special facilities for the
    disabled in public buildings built or renovated after 1977 and in older
    buildings that come into public use. The Government enforces these
    provisions in practice.
        Indigenous People.--The law protects the rights of the inhabitants
    of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland's legal system seeks to
    accommodate Inuit customs. Accordingly, it provides for the use of lay
    persons as judges and sentences most prisoners to holding centers
    (rather than to prisons) where they are encouraged to work, hunt, or
    fish during the day. Education in Greenland is provided to the native
    population in both the Inuit and Danish languages.
        In 1999 a court ruled that the government unjustly resettled
    Greenland Inuits in 1953 in order to accommodate the expansion of a
    U.S. Air Force base in northwest Greenland. The court ordered the
    government to pay compensation to the displaced Greenlanders and their
    descendants. The compensation is substantially less than the defendants
    sued for, and the case was still under appeal in the Supreme Court at
    year's end. In 1999 the office of Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen
    issued a joint declaration with the home rule chairman of Greenland
    apologizing for the way the decision on the resettlement was reached
    and the manner in which it was carried out.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The inflow of ethnically and
    racially diverse refugees and immigrants has provoked a degree of
    tension between Danes and immigrants (mostly Iranians, Palestinians,
    Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans until 1992; more recently refugees are
    overwhelmingly from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia). In response to
    publicity concerning the involvement of foreigners in street crime and
    allegations of social welfare fraud committed by refugees, Parliament
    passed tighter immigration laws, which took effect in 1999. Family
    reunification is now more difficult, and immigrants and refugees can no
    longer acquire permanent residence by living in the country for 18
    months; rather they must now reside for 3 years and demonstrate that
    they have integrated into society. Additionally, they receive a special
    integration allowance that is 20 percent lower than the social benefits
    that citizens receive. Critics claim that this provision violates the
    1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In response to
    a perception of high criminality by asylum applicants, in September the
    Interior Minister suggested that convicted offenders (who did not
    receive jail time for their offenses) be isolated on one of the
    country's deserted islands. The proposal provoked a mixed response from
    parliamentarians but an overwhelmingly positive approval rating from
    average citizens. At year's end, the subject still was being debated,
    but the Government had taken no action.
        Incidents of racial discrimination and racially motivated violence
    occur but are rare. The Government effectively investigates and deals
    with cases of racially motivated violence. On September 9, two persons
    threw firebombs at an asylum center in the town of Holeby. The fire was
    brought under control, and no one was injured, but the event
    nonetheless upset the asylum applicant community. No one was arrested
    or charged in the crime.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law states that all workers,
    including military personnel and the police, may form or join unions of
    their choosing. Approximately 80 percent of wage earners belong to
    unions that are independent of the Government and political parties.
    All unions except those representing civil servants or the military
    have the right to strike.
        Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations, and
    they do so actively.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers and
    employers acknowledge each other's right to organize. Collective
    bargaining is protected by law and is widespread in practice. The law
    prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union members
    and organizers, and there are mechanisms to resolve disputes. Employers
    found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to reinstate
    workers fired for union activities. In the private sector, salaries,
    benefits, and working conditions are agreed upon in biennial or
    triennial negotiations between the various employers' associations and
    their union counterparts. If the negotiations fail, a national
    conciliation board mediates, and its proposal is voted on by management
    and labor. If the proposal is rejected, the Government may force a
    legislated solution on the parties (usually based upon the mediators'
    proposal). The agreements, in turn, are used as guidelines throughout
    the public as well as the private sector. In the public sector,
    collective bargaining is conducted between the employees' unions and a
    government group led by the Finance Ministry.
        Labor relations in Greenland are conducted in the same manner as in
    Denmark. Greenland's courts are the first recourse in disputes, but
    Danish mediation services or the Danish Labor Court also may be used.
        There is no umbrella labor organization in the Faroes, but
    individual unions engage in periodic collective bargaining with
    employers. Disputes are settled by mediation.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded
    labor, by adults or children, is prohibited by law, and this
    prohibition is enforced effectively by the Government. However, women
    are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment is 15 years. The
    law sets a minimum of 13 years of age for any type of work. The law is
    enforced by the Danish Working Environment Service (DWES), an
    autonomous arm of the Ministry of Labor. Export industries do not use
    child labor. Forced and bonded child labor is prohibited and does not
    occur (see Section 6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on
    the worst forms of child labor in August.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No national minimum wage is
    mandated legally, but national labor agreements effectively set a wage
    floor. The lowest wage paid is currently about $10 (82 kroner) per
    hour, which is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. The law provides for 5 weeks of paid vacation per
    year. A 37-hour workweek is the norm, established by contract, not by
    law. However, the law requires at least 11 hours between the end of one
    work period and the start of the next.
        The law also prescribes conditions of work, including safety and
    health; the duties of employers, supervisors, and employees; work
    performance; rest periods and days off; and medical examinations. The
    DWES ensures compliance with labor legislation. Workers may remove
    themselves from hazardous situations or weapons production without
    jeopardizing their employment rights, and legal protections cover
    workers who file complaints about unsafe or unhealthy conditions.
        Similar conditions of work are found in Greenland and the Faroes,
    except that the workweek is 40 hours. As in Denmark, the workweek is
    established by contract, not by law.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, but the penalties are not severe. Trafficking in women for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. In October the Government
    rejected a proposal to harmonize trafficking penalties in the European
    Union at 8 years' imprisonment because it believed Danish sentencing
    rules were sufficient. The authorities cooperate with international
    investigations.
        Trafficking involved the importation of women mostly from Eastern
    Europe and Southeast Asia, some of whom were lured by the prospect of
    higher wages and a better life, but found themselves forced into
    prostitution. The perpetrators usually were suspected of being part of
    organized crime. No statistics were available on how many women are
    involved in prostitution.
        In June a regional conference on trafficking generated considerable
    public debate that carried over into the Parliament. In December, the
    Government set up a working group in the Ministry of Gender and
    Equality to address trafficking; a report is expected in 2001. Several
    Parliamentarians proposed changing the law regarding trafficking to
    make the penalties much more severe. To illustrate the light sentences,
    in the spring, a trafficker who received his second conviction for
    trafficking several Colombian women into the country was sentenced to
    only 8 months in jail.
        The Government does not provide medical or legal assistance
    directly to victims, and there is no governmental or nongovernmental
    entity specifically concerned with victims of trafficking. Several
    government-supported organizations provide these services on an ad hoc
    basis. In July one nongovernmental organization assisted a Colombian
    trafficking victim in a precedent-setting case in which the woman
    testified against her traffickers and subsequently received asylum in
    Denmark.
                                   __________

                                    ESTONIA

        Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. The Constitution established
    a 101-member unicameral legislature (State Assembly), a prime minister
    as Head of Government, and a president as Head of State. The judiciary
    is independent.
        Efforts to develop and strengthen a Western-type police force
    committed to procedures and safeguards appropriate to a democratic
    society are proceeding, with police leadership actively working to
    professionalize the force. The police, who are ethnically mixed, are
    subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Corrections personnel
    are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The security service,
    called Security Police, is subordinate to the Interior Ministry but
    also reports to the Prime Minister. Police and corrections personnel
    continued to commit human rights abuses.
        Estonia has a market economy. Reflecting the extent of post-1992
    reforms, the European Union in 1998 invited Estonia to begin accession
    negotiations. Services, especially financial and tourism, are growing
    in importance compared to historically more prominent light industry
    and food production. The privatization of firms, including small,
    medium, and large-scale enterprises, is virtually complete. The
    Government is working on privatizing the remaining state-owned
    infrastructure enterprises.
        Economic growth increased after a slowdown due to the 1998 Russian
    financial collapse, with experts predicting gross domestic product
    (GDP) growth of between 3 and 5 percent in 2000. Per capita GDP is
    about $3,536 per year. Some 90 percent of exports (textiles, food
    products, wood, and timber products) now are directed to western
    markets. Unemployment is about 14 percent but is significantly higher
    in rural areas and in the northeast.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    and the large ethnic Russian noncitizen community; however, problems
    remained in some areas. The major human rights abuses continued to be
    mistreatment of prisoners and detainees and the use of excessive force
    by the police. Prison conditions are poor; however, the Government
    began a multiyear program to improve them. While some officials in the
    United Nations, the Russian Government, and members of the local ethnic
    Russian community continued to criticize the Citizenship Law as
    discriminatory, notably for its Estonian language requirements, the
    OSCE as well as other international fact-finding organizations,
    including the Finnish Helsinki Committee, confirmed that the
    Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        In 1998 President Lennart Meri created an international commission
    for research into crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country
    from 1940-91. The Commission began work in 1999 and held three formal
    meetings during the year. In November 1999 the Commission authorized
    sending an investigator to study materials in the Russian and German
    archives on this subject; it met again in June and November 2000.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, there continued
    to be credible reports that police used excessive force and verbal
    abuse during the arrest and questioning of suspects. Punishment cells
    (``kartsers'') continued to be used, in contravention of international
    standards.
        Prison conditions remained poor, although there were some
    improvements. By mid-year the prison population was a record 4,800
    inmates. A lack of funds and trained staff continued to be serious
    problems. Overcrowding was reported in every major prison except one.
    The percentage of prisoners suffering from tuberculosis was much higher
    than in the general population. The Government refurbished some prison
    buildings. Modest gains were made in hiring new prison staff and
    retaining existing personnel. Work and study opportunities for
    prisoners increased slightly since the Government implemented new
    programs. As of August, 162 prisoners were released in the calendar
    year under the Government's early release program for prisoners. One
    prisoner was killed by another during the year.
        The Government began to implement a multiyear plan to refurbish and
    restructure all of the country's prisons. The State Assembly, in
    addition, adopted a law authorizing the construction of a prison in
    Tartu that will be largely financed by the Nordic Investment Bank.
    However, a plan to close the overcrowded and antiquated Tallinn Central
    Prison was scrapped.
        The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and
    laws forbid arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government
    generally observes these prohibitions. Under the Constitution, warrants
    issued by a court are required to make arrests. Detainees must be
    informed promptly of the grounds for the arrest and given immediate
    access to legal counsel. If a person cannot afford counsel, the State
    will provide one. A person may be held for 48 hours without formally
    being charged; further detention requires a court order. A person may
    be held in pretrial detention for 2 months; this term may be extended
    for a total of 12 months by court order. Police rarely violate these
    limits. By late August, 1,382 of the 4,744 prisoners were awaiting
    trial.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution establishes an
    independent judicial branch, and the judiciary is independent in
    practice. The judiciary operates through a three-tier court system:
    Rural and city courts; district courts; and the State Court (which
    functions as a supreme court). The district and State Courts are also
    courts for ``constitutional supervision.'' At the rural and city
    levels, court decisions are made by a majority vote with a judge and
    two lay members sitting in judgment. All judges and lay judges must be
    citizens. The President nominates and the State Assembly confirms the
    Chief Justice of the State Court. The Chief Justice nominates State
    Court judges who are subject to confirmation by the State Assembly. He
    also nominates the district, city, and rural court judges who then are
    appointed by the President. Judges are appointed for life.
        The role of the Chancellor of Justice and the ombudsman were
    combined under legislation passed by the State Assembly in 1999. The
    State Assembly rejected a proposal for an independent ombudsman. The
    chancellor-ombudsman is to handle complaints by private citizens
    against state institutions; however, the position of chancellor was
    vacant at mid-year.
        The Constitution provides that court proceedings shall be public.
    Closed sessions may be held only for specific reasons, such as the
    protection of state or business secrets, and in cases concerning
    minors. The Constitution further provides that defendants may present
    witnesses and evidence as well as confront and cross-examine
    prosecution witnesses. Defendants have access to prosecution evidence
    and enjoy a presumption of innocence.
        The Government continued to overhaul the country's criminal and
    civil procedural codes. An interim Criminal Code that went into effect
    in 1992 basically revised the Soviet Criminal Code by eliminating, for
    example, political and economic crimes. This code has been amended
    several times, most recently in June. The Code of Criminal Procedure
    was adopted in 1994.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires a search warrant for the search and
    seizure of property. During the investigative stage, warrants are
    issued by the prosecutor upon a showing of probable cause. Once a case
    has gone to court, the court issues warrants. The Constitution provides
    for secrecy of the mail, telegrams, telephones, and other means of
    communication. Police must obtain a court order to intercept
    communications. Illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in court.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects
    constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and of the
    press. Four major national Estonian language and two Russian-language
    dailies are published, in addition to important weeklies. Foreign
    newspapers and magazines are available widely. All newsprint, printing,
    and distribution facilities are private companies.
        In a well-reported 1997 case, a prominent journalist was tried and
    convicted for insulting the spouse of a prominent politician in a
    newspaper interview and was fined. All levels of the judiciary upheld
    the sentence. The European Court of Human Rights agreed in 1998 to hear
    the case, but it was still pending at mid-year.
        The Law on Language prohibits the use of any foreign language on
    public signs, advertisements, and notices, including election posters.
    The prohibition on campaign posters written in a language other than
    Estonian resulted in protests by one political party.
        State (public) broadcast media, including one nationwide television
    channel (Estonian Television/ETV), continue to receive large government
    subsidies. At the same time, ETV broadcasts commercials. Although a
    basic decision has been made to combine ETV and Estonian (state/public)
    Radio into one entity, no real movement toward that end has taken
    place. The Estonian Broadcasting Council fired the director of ETV in
    1999 for management failures, because of ETV's financial difficulties,
    and for ``undisciplined behavior.'' The courts said that he could not
    be fired, whereupon he returned to work but finally resigned during the
    year. A new general director, with a background in banking, was
    appointed in the summer.
        There are several major independent television and radio stations.
    Several Russian-language programs, mostly produced in Estonia, are
    broadcast over state and private/commercial television channels. The
    Government has played a key role in encouraging Russian-language
    programs on state television. Over the past 3 budgetary years, the
    ability of ETV's Russian-language department to create self-produced,
    high-quality programs has been reduced greatly due to the Government's
    large cuts in the department's budget. Russian state television,
    Ostankino programs, and commercial channels in Russia are widely
    available by cable.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to assemble freely, but noncitizens are
    prohibited from joining political parties, although they may form
    social groups. Permits for all public gatherings must be obtained 3
    weeks prior to the date of the gathering. The authorities have wide
    discretion to prohibit such gatherings on public safety grounds but
    seldom do so. There were no reports of government interference in mass
    gatherings or political rallies.
        The Constitution provides for the right of free association, and
    the Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The 1993 Law on Churches and Religious Organizations requires all
    religious organizations to have at least 12 members and to be
    registered with the Interior Ministry and the Board of Religion.
    Leaders of religious organizations must be citizens with at least 5
    years' residence in the country.
        The majority of citizens are nominally Lutheran, but following
    deep-seated tradition, there is wide tolerance of other denominations
    and religions. Persons of varying ethnic backgrounds profess Orthodoxy,
    including communities of the descendants of Russian Old Believers who
    found refuge in Estonia in the 17th century. The Estonian Apostolic
    Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to
    Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation,
    reregistered under its 1935 statute in August 1993. Since then, a group
    of ethnic Estonian and Russian parishes preferring to remain under the
    authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the
    Soviet occupation has insisted that it should have claim to the EAOC
    name. Representatives of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates
    agreed in 1999 that the Moscow Patriarchate would register under a new
    name. In July the Moscow Patriarchate submitted a new name proposal,
    but the Interior Ministry rejected it on the grounds that a close
    reading of the registration papers revealed variations of the name.
    Throughout the dispute, worship has occurred freely in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits free movement within the
    country, and it is honored in practice. The law also provides for the
    right of foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation for citizens.
    Passports serve as identification but do not have to be carried at all
    times. There are no exit visas.
        The Government does not restrict the right of noncitizen
    residents--persons who are citizens of another country or stateless
    persons--to foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation, although some
    noncitizens complain of delays in obtaining travel documents. The
    majority of noncitizens are ethnic Russians. In 1994 the Government
    began issuing alien passports, which are issued to resident aliens not
    in possession of any other valid travel document. Such aliens included:
    (1) Persons who are designated as stateless; (2) foreign citizens who
    lack the opportunity to obtain travel documents from their country of
    origin or from another state; (3) persons who file for Estonian
    citizenship and pass the language examination if required; and (4)
    aliens who are permanently departing Estonia. The Government already
    has approved the issuance of alien passports to noncitizens intending
    to study abroad and has agreed to issue them to former military
    personnel who cannot or do not want to take out Russian citizenship. By
    November 30, 108,982 persons had applied for alien passports, and
    122,152 alien passports were issued, including prior years.
        The Government deported a relatively small number of illegal
    aliens, usually those caught in criminal acts. A total of 10 illegal
    aliens were held as internees by September, pending deportation or a
    court order granting them residence. Internees are held in a wing of a
    regular prison. In 1999 Finland and Estonia entered into a cooperation
    agreement to construct a new facility for illegal aliens and asylum
    seekers in East Viru County.
        Domestic law is in conformity with the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1999 the
    State Assembly passed amendments to domestic refugee law that delegated
    authority from the Government to the Citizenship and Migration Board,
    clarified the refusal of refugee status, and established a state
    registry for asylum. Also, starting on October 1, 1999, temporary
    residence permits may be granted to persons whose applications for a
    residence permit are based on an international agreement. Asylum
    applicants come under the overall annual 0.1 percent quota for
    immigrants (not including Westerners, who are exempt from the quota).
    The program began as scheduled, and as of December 1, 2000, 47 persons
    had applied for asylum, of whom 10 were still waiting for a reply. Of
    the applicants processed, 4 were granted asylum, 15 left the country,
    and 1 died. The Citizenship and Migration Board turned down the
    remaining 18 applications on the grounds that the applicants did not
    fufill the criteria for refugee status as defined in the 1951 U.N.
    Convention.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government. In March 1999,
    free and fair elections to the State Assembly were held. The new
    Government is a coalition of the Pro Patria, Moderate, and Reform
    Parties. Four ethnic Russians are Members of the State Assembly.
    Indirect presidential elections were held in 1996. When the State
    Assembly failed to muster the required two-thirds majority to elect the
    President, an Electoral Assembly consisting of Members of the State
    Assembly and representatives of local governments convened and
    reelected the incumbent, Lennart Meri.
        Only citizens can vote in parliamentary elections and be members of
    political parties. However, according to law, resident noncitizens and
    those who have lived permanently in the area for at least 5 years
    preceding the election can vote but not run for office in local
    elections.
        Approximately 1.1 million of the total population of 1.43 million
    are citizens. Of those, approximately 113,000 received their
    citizenship through the naturalization process. Holders of permanent or
    temporary residence permits number approximately 300,000, 80 percent of
    whom are ethnic Russians. Illegal residents number 30,000 to 50,000
    persons, mostly ethnic Russians; they are not included in the census
    figures.
        In 1995 the State Assembly adopted a new Citizenship Law that
    extended the residency requirement for naturalization from 2 to 5 years
    and added a requirement for knowledge of the Constitution and the
    Citizenship Law to the requirement for Estonian language capability.
    Persons who were legal residents in the country prior to July 1, 1990,
    are exempt from the 5-year legal residence and 1-year waiting period
    requirements. The law allows the Government to waive the language
    requirement but not the civic knowledge requirement for applicants who
    have Estonian-language elementary or higher education, or who have
    performed valuable service to Estonia. In 1998 the Citizenship Law was
    amended to grant citizenship to stateless children born after February
    26, 1992, to legally resident stateless parents (upon the parents' or
    guardians' application). As of September 1, parents had applied for
    citizenship for 539 such children: 427 of the applications were
    approved.
        On October 1, 1999, the Government dropped the immigration quota on
    the issuance of residence permits to those noncitizens who settled in
    the country prior to July 1, 1990, and who have not departed the
    country subsequently. In April the State Assembly approved an amendment
    to the law on aliens under which the annual immigration quota will not
    be applied to non-Estonian spouses of Estonian citizens if the spouses
    have a common child up to 15 years of age or if the female spouse is
    more than 12 weeks pregnant. In addition the amendment also states that
    the quota will not apply to children up to 15 years of age if the
    parents are applying for a residence permit.
        By law the following classes of persons are ineligible for
    naturalization: Those filing on the basis of false data or documents;
    those not abiding by the constitutional system or not fulfilling the
    laws; those who have acted against the State and its security; those
    convicted of felonies; those who work or have worked in the
    intelligence or security services of a foreign state; or those who have
    served as career soldiers in the armed forces of a foreign state,
    including those discharged into the reserves or retired. (The latter
    includes spouses who have come to Estonia in connection with the
    service member's assignment to a posting, the reserves, or retirement.)
    A provision of the law allows for the granting of citizenship to a
    foreign military retiree who has been married to a native citizen for 5
    years.
        Between 1992 and August 1, 112,822 persons received citizenship
    through naturalization. The vast majority of these persons, 87,712,
    were naturalized by the end of 1996. In 1997 the Russian embassy
    reported that some 120,000 persons had obtained Russian citizenship;
    however, the Embassy declined to supply the Government with a list. The
    number of Russian citizens may be lower since the Russian Embassy does
    not appear to keep records of those who die or leave the country. As of
    November 30, the Government had issued 116,289 permanent and 29,482
    temporary residence permits. During the year a surge in noncitizens
    filing for or renewing residency permits resulted in long lines and
    delays at overtaxed registration offices. The problems precipitated the
    dismissal of the director of the Citizenship and Migration Board.
        While some officials in the United Nations, the Russian Government,
    and members of the local ethnic Russian community continued to
    criticize the Citizenship Law as discriminatory, notably for its
    Estonian language requirements, the OSCE as well as other international
    fact-finding organizations, including the Finnish Helsinki Committee,
    confirmed that the Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.
        Bureaucratic delays and the Estonian language requirement are also
    cited as disincentives for securing citizenship. The Government has
    established language-training centers, but there is a lack of qualified
    teachers, financial resources, and training materials. Some allege that
    the examination process, which 75 to 90 percent of persons pass, is
    arbitrary.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government or politics. However, women are underrepresented in
    government and politics. Among the 101 Members of Parliament are 18
    women. Two ministers are women. There are four ethnic Russian deputies
    in the State Assembly. The law was amended in 1999 to place language
    requirements on Members of Parliament; Russian speakers protested.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not restrict the formation or functioning of
    human rights organizations. In response to allegations of the poor
    treatment of ethnic minorities, the President established a Human
    Rights Institute, which first convened in 1992. The purpose of the
    Institute is to monitor human rights in the country and to provide
    information to the international community. It investigates reports of
    human rights violations, such as allegations of police abuse and the
    inhuman treatment of detainees. In 1997 the Institute established an
    information center in the heavily ethnic Russian town of Kohtla-Jarve.
    In addition, because of tensions surrounding the adoption of the
    Elections Law and the Aliens Law in 1993, the President established a
    roundtable composed of representatives of the State Assembly, the Union
    of Estonian Nationalities, and the Russianspeaking population's
    Representative Assembly. An analogous but independent roundtable meets
    in the county of East Virumaa. Also, with initial funding from the
    Danish Government, a nongovernmental legal information center in
    Tallinn provides free legal assistance to individuals--citizen and
    noncitizen alike--seeking advice on human rights-related issues.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination for any reason; however,
    reports continued of discrimination against ethnic Russian residents.
    The Government reports that no court cases charging discrimination were
    filed during the year.
        Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, continued
    to be the subject of increasing discussion and media coverage and is
    reportedly common. Rape and attempted rape occur relatively
    infrequently. In the first 8 months of the year, there were reports of
    29 rapes and 7 attempted rapes, compared with 50 rapes and 29 attempted
    rapes for all of 1999. However, studies show that 40 percent of crime
    in the country goes unreported, including domestic violence. Even when
    the police are called, the abused spouse often declines to press
    charges.
        Both the Center of Women Citizens and a roundtable of women's
    organizations were established in 1998. Although women have the same
    legal rights as men and, in theory, are entitled to equal pay for equal
    work, this is not true in practice. While women's average educational
    level was higher than that of men, their average pay in general was
    lower, and the trend did not seem to be improving. There continue to be
    female- and male-dominated professions. Women constitute slightly more
    than half of the work force. They also carry major household
    responsibilities.
        Children.--The Government's strong commitment to education is
    evidenced by the high priority that it gives to building and
    refurbishing schools. The Government provides free medical care for
    children and subsidizes school meals.
        There is no societal pattern of child abuse, but studies, including
    one published by the local U.N. Development Program office during the
    year, found that a significant proportion of children had experienced
    at least occasional violence at home, in schools, or in youth gangs. In
    the first 7 months of the year, police registered 22 cases of sexual
    abuse involving 13 female victims and 9 male victims, all below age 16.
    In the same period, there were 31 cases of procurement for prostitution
    of victims younger than 16. Also in the first 6 months of the year,
    there were 2 rape cases in which the victim was younger than 14.
        People with Disabilities.--While the Constitution contains
    provisions to protect disabled persons against discrimination, and both
    the Government and some private organizations provide them with
    financial assistance, little has been done to enable the disabled to
    participate normally in public life. There is no public access law, but
    some effort to accommodate the disabled is evident in the inclusion of
    ramps at curbs on new urban sidewalk construction. Public
    transportation firms have acquired some vehicles that are accessible to
    the disabled, as have some taxi companies. In June the State Assembly
    adopted amendments to the Citizenship and Aliens Law that make it
    possible for persons with serious sight, hearing, or speech impediments
    to become naturalized citizens without having to pass an examination on
    the Estonian Constitution and language.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population is
    1.43 million. Ethnic Russians total approximately 29 percent, and
    nonethnic Estonians total approximately 37 percent. During the years of
    the country's forced annexation by the Soviet Union, large numbers of
    non-Estonians, predominantly ethnic Russians, were encouraged to
    migrate to Estonia to work as laborers and administrators. These
    immigrants and their descendants now compose approximately one-third of
    the total population; about 40 percent of them were born in Estonia.
    Approximately 8 percent of the population of the pre-1940 Republic was
    ethnic Russian.
        The OSCE mission in Estonia, established in 1993, continued to
    promote stability, dialog, and understanding among communities. The
    President's Roundtable also continued to work toward finding practical
    solutions to the problems of noncitizens. The Government during the
    year instituted an integration program for the years 2000-07 aimed at
    fostering the integration the non-Estonian-speaking portion of the
    population into Estonian society.
        The Law on Cultural Autonomy for citizens belonging to minority
    groups went into effect in 1993. The tradition of protection for
    cultural autonomy dates from a 1925 law. Some noncitizens termed the
    law discriminatory, since it restricts cultural autonomy only to
    citizens. The Government replied that noncitizens can participate fully
    in ethnic organizations and that the law includes subsidies for
    cultural organizations.
        Some noncitizens, especially Russians, continued to allege job,
    salary, and housing discrimination because of Estonian language
    requirements. Despite repeated Russian allegations of human rights
    violations against the noncitizen population, both the OSCE mission in
    Estonia and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities declared
    that they could not find a pattern of human rights violations or abuses
    in the country. The Government in 1998 addressed two outstanding
    recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
    by simplifying the civic knowledge portion of the naturalization
    process and passing legislation to grant automatic citizenship to
    children born after February 26, 1992, to resident stateless persons
    upon parental application. Also, at least 10 nongovernmental
    organizations develop and implement local programs to assist the
    integration of non-Estonians into society.
        Russian government officials and parliamentarians echoed these
    charges of discrimination in a variety of forums. In 1998 the
    Government accepted a Russian Government proposal to establish a high-
    level commission to examine all aspects of bilateral relations. One of
    the subgroups of the commission would examine the humanitarian aspects
    of the Russian minority in Estonia and possibly of the Estonian
    minority in Russia. Although there has yet to be a formal session of
    the commission, its cochairs met in St. Petersburg in July.
        Other than for land ownership, the 1993 Property Ownership Law does
    not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens for purposes of
    business or property ownership. A 1996 law on land ownership further
    liberalized land ownership by foreigners; such ownership now is
    restricted only in certain strategic areas. All legal residents of
    Estonia may participate equally in the privatization of state-owned
    housing.
        Estonian language requirements for those employed in the civil
    service went into effect in 1993. As originally passed, the Law on
    Public Service required state employees to be proficient in Estonian in
    1995. In December 1995, the State Assembly amended the Law on Public
    Service to allow noncitizen local and national government employees
    without adequate Estonian to continue working until February 1, 1997.
    No noncitizens were to be hired after January 1, 1996. This amendment
    reflected the Government's awareness that in some sectors, the number
    of employees with inadequate Estonian remained high. On February 9,
    1999, the State Assembly again amended the Law on Language, requiring
    that all public servants, service personnel, and sole proprietors be
    able to use the Estonian language. While the Government is to establish
    regulations pertaining to and describing the level of proficiency, the
    actual proficiency is to be determined through examination. Non-
    Estonian citizens who have obtained at least primary education
    proficiency in the language are exempted from the requirement to pass a
    language examination. On July 27, 1999, the Government issued the
    implementation decree for the amendments to the language law regarding
    public sector employees as well as those employed in the medical
    profession. Some 150 ethnic Russian prison officials are expected to be
    fired in January for noncompliance with the language requirement.
        Following several rounds of consultations with European Commission
    experts, the Government presented, and the State Assembly approved on
    June 14, amendments to the Language Law that brought it into conformity
    with European Union (EU) recommendations regarding language
    requirements for persons working in the private sector. For employees
    of private enterprises, nonprofit organizations, and foundations, as
    well as sole proprietors, the amended law established a requirement of
    proficiency in the Estonian language if it was in the public interest.
    The OSCE Commissioner for National Minorities concluded that the
    amended law was largely in conformity with Estonia's international
    obligations and commitments.
        The language office liberally grants extensions to persons who can
    explain their failure to meet the requisite competence level in 4
    years. Estonian language training is available; however, some claim
    that it is too costly. Some Russian representatives have asked for free
    language training. They have charged also that the language requirement
    for citizenship is too difficult. There has been a proposal to make the
    language requirement less rigorous. The examination fee for either
    language test--for employment or citizenship--is 15 percent of the
    monthly minimum wage, although it is waived for the unemployed. The
    government office that conducts language examinations was forced to
    close for several months because of funding shortfalls. An EU program
    exists to reimburse language training costs for those who pass the
    examination.
        In districts where more than one-half of the population speak a
    language other than Estonian, the inhabitants are entitled by law to
    receive official information in that language.
        All residents, whether or not they are citizens, can complain
    directly to the State Court about alleged violations of human or
    constitutional rights. The State Court justices review each case and
    have decided in favor of complainants. All decisions are in Estonian,
    but if a complaint is received in a language other than Estonian
    (usually Russian), the court provides a translation.
        Two court cases begun in 1998 were resolved in May, when a court
    acquitted the leader of a Russian military pensioners' group in
    northeast Estonia and three other activists of charges that they
    fomented racial hatred by staging demonstrations. The pensioners'
    leader organized an unauthorized assembly in the city of Sillamae and
    claimed that the human rights of the Russian pensioners in the region
    were abused by the Government.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to form and join a union or employee association. The Central
    Organization of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) came into being as a
    wholly voluntary and purely Estonian organization in 1990 to replace
    the Estonian branch of the official Soviet labor confederation, the
    All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The EAKL has 58,000 members.
    Another trade union, the Organization of Employee Unions, split from
    the EAKL in 1993 and has 45,000 members. A central union of food
    processing and rural workers was established in 1997. About one-third
    of the country's labor force belongs to one of the three labor
    federations.
        The right to strike is legal, and unions are independent of the
    Government and political parties. The Constitution and statutes
    prohibit retribution against strikers. In June 5,000 energy, metal, and
    mining union workers staged a protest action in Ida-Virumaa county.
        Unions may join federations freely and affiliate internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While workers
    have the legally acquired right to bargain collectively, collective
    bargaining is still in its infancy. According to EAKL leaders, few
    collective bargaining agreements have been concluded between the
    management and workers of a specific enterprise. However, the EAKL has
    concluded framework agreements with producer associations, which
    provide the basis for specific labor agreements, including the setting
    of the minimum wage. The EAKL also was involved with developing the
    country's post-Soviet era Labor Code covering employment contracts,
    vacation, and occupational safety. The Labor Code principles prohibit
    antiunion discrimination, and employees have the right to go to court
    to enforce their rights. In 1993 laws covering collective bargaining,
    collective dispute resolution, and shop stewards were enacted.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor although it does not specifically
    prohibit forced and bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). The
    Labor Inspections Office effectively enforces this prohibition.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution forbids forced or bonded labor. The
    statutory minimum age for employment is 16 years. Minors 13 to 15 years
    of age may work provided that they have the written permission of a
    parent or guardian and the local labor inspector. The work may not
    endanger the minor's health or be considered immoral, cannot interfere
    with studies, and must be included on a Government-prepared list.
    Government authorities effectively enforce minimum age laws through
    inspections. There were no reports of forced or bonded labor by
    children in enterprises (see Section 6.c.); however, there were
    instances of families forcing their children to engage in peddling or
    begging.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government, after
    consultations with the EAKL and the Central Producers Union, sets the
    minimum wage. The monthly minimum wage is $82 (EEK 1,400). The minimum
    wage is not sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent
    standard of living. About 5 to 6 percent of the work force receive the
    minimum wage. The average monthly wage in the second quarter was about
    $296.
        The standard workweek is 40 hours, and there is a mandatory 24hour
    rest period. According to EAKL sources, legal occupational health and
    safety standards are satisfactory, but they are extremely difficult to
    achieve in practice. The National Labor Inspection Board is responsible
    for enforcement of these standards, but it has not been very effective
    to date. The labor unions also have occupational health and safety
    experts who assist workers to bring employers in compliance with legal
    standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous
    work situations without jeopardy to their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, the existing criminal codes regarding kidnaping,
    extortion, and involuntary prostitution are used to address this
    problem. There were no official reports during the year that persons
    were trafficked in, to, or from the country. However, it is generally
    understood that job advertisements placed from abroad that request
    females are in some cases associated with international prostitution
    rings.
        The Government concluded several interstate cooperation agreements
    concerning fighting crime including human trafficking. It also
    concluded several bilateral agreements on the extradition of Estonian
    citizens accused of trafficking in other countries.
                                   __________

                                    FINLAND

        Finland is a constitutional republic with an elected head of state
    (President), a Parliament, a head of government (Prime Minister), and
    an independent judiciary.
        The security apparatus is controlled effectively by elected
    officials and supervised by the courts.
        The economy is mixed but primarily market based. It provides
    citizens with a high standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking serious
    steps to address the problem of violence against women. There were
    reports of trafficking in persons.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    observes this prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme
    Administrative Court, and the lower courts. The President appoints
    Supreme Court justices, who in turn appoint the lower court judges.
        The law provides for the right to fair public trial, and the
    judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Local courts may conduct a
    closed trial in juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship cases, or when
    publicity would offend morality or endanger the security of the state.
    In national security cases, the judge may withhold from the public any
    or all information pertaining to charges, verdicts, and sentences. The
    law provides for sanctions against violators of such restrictions.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Nontraditional religious groups freely profess and propagate their
    beliefs. Such groups are eligible for some tax relief (e.g., they may
    receive tax-free donations), provided they are registered with the
    Government as religious communities. The Government's procedures for
    recognizing religious communities remained under review at year's end.
    About 87 percent of the population belongs to two state churches, the
    Lutheran and the Orthodox. All citizens belonging to one of these state
    churches pay, as part of their income tax, a church tax. These church
    taxes are used to defray the costs of operating the state churches.
    Those who do not want to pay the tax must notify the tax office.
        Such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ
    of Latter-Day Saints have been active in the country for decades. In
    1998 the Ministry of Education turned down the application of the
    Finnish Association of Scientologists to be registered as a religious
    community. This was the first time that an applicant had been denied
    church status. The Scientologists' application was pending for nearly 3
    years while the Government awaited additional information that it had
    requested from the association. The association acknowledged that it
    had not responded to the Government's request. The Education Ministry's
    decision can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. The
    Scientologists have not yet done so, but they have indicated that they
    may begin the process anew and reapply for recognition as a church.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
    Approved refugees and asylum seekers are processed directly for
    residence. The issue of the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid
    claim to refugee status.
        A total of 3,106 persons applied for asylum in 1999, up from 1,272
    in 1998. As many as 1,516 of them were Slovakian Roma. By August 20,
    2000, 2,472 persons had already submitted their applications for
    asylum. Of these applications, 1,192 were submitted by Polish Roma. In
    1999 the Directorate of Immigration processed 2,725 applications,
    awarding asylum to 29 persons and residence permits to 467. Government
    officials attribute the sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers
    from 1998 to the first half of 2000 to two factors: the 1999 fighting
    in Kosovo and the increase in 1999-2000 asylum applications from
    Slovakian and Polish Roma. The Government imposed a visa regime on
    Slovakian citizens in July 1999. Although the restriction was lifted in
    November of that year, it was reimposed in January 2000 for 6
    additional months after a large number of Slovakian Roma again entered
    the country and requested asylum.
        On July 10, a new asylum law took effect, under which immigration
    authorities must process an application within 7 days of the initial
    asylum examination. Asylum seekers who are rejected have 8 days in
    which to appeal the decision, after which time they are deported. This
    law is expected to decrease the number of asylum seekers substantially.
    Under the previous system, the processing of applications could take
    over a year. If the applicant received a negative decision, the
    processing of the appeal could take several years. Some members of the
    public and even politicians within the ruling coalition opposed the new
    law, citing the short period during which asylum seekers can appeal the
    rejection of their application. However, the Government defended the
    law by stating that it only can provide public resources and services
    to asylum seekers who have legitimate concerns about their safety and
    welfare in their home countries. Particularly in regard to Slovakian
    and Polish Roma, officials noted that the two source countries were
    aspirants for European Union (EU) membership and pointed out the
    contradiction of supporting Slovakia and Poland for EU membership while
    also offering asylum to their citizens.
        In 1999 a law went into effect to promote the integration of
    immigrants into society. This law is unrelated to the new statute
    governing asylum procedures; it is aimed instead at assisting those who
    have been granted asylum.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of
    government. There are 75 women in the 200-member Parliament, and 7 in
    the 18-member Cabinet. The President, who is elected directly, and the
    Speaker of Parliament are women. A 1995 law requires a minimum of 40
    percent membership from each sex on all state committees, commissions,
    and appointed municipal bodies.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
    to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, age,
    origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, or disability, and the
    Government effectively enforces these provisions.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is
    taking steps to combat it. Police statistics for 1999 recorded 2,825
    cases of domestic violence, 117 more than the previous year. Of the
    victims, 2,290 were women, and 535 were men. A total of 514 cases of
    rape were reported to the police in 1999, compared with 463 in 1998.
    Government experts say that as many as half, if not more, of all rape
    cases may go unreported. The law specifically criminalizes rape,
    spousal rape, and domestic abuse. The law provides for stringent
    penalties for violence against women; the police and the courts
    vigorously enforce this provision.
        The number of calls to the police concerned with domestic violence
    is not compiled centrally but is estimated at 10,000 to 12,000
    annually. Shelter officials state that the figure represents less than
    half of the number of actual incidents. Most of the persons seeking
    shelter are women between 25 and 35 years of age, either married or in
    a common-law relationship. Nearly one-third are immigrants.
        The Union of Shelter Homes as well as the municipalities maintain
    homes all over the country for female, male, adult, and child victims
    of violence. The total number of shelters is around 20. The criteria
    for what counts as a shelter has changed. In the past battered persons
    in need of shelter could be given keys to apartments where they could
    spend the necessary length of time prior to returning home. These
    apartments were included in the 1999 statistics. Now, the minimum
    requirement for a shelter is 24-hour staff.
        A study published in 1998 indicated that the typical victim of
    family violence is a young woman between 18 and 24 years of age who is
    married or is living in a common law relationship. The study concluded
    that every fifth married woman or woman involved in a common law
    relationship has suffered from violent behavior at the hands of her
    partner. The study also concludes that as many as 40 percent of all
    women over the age of 15 have experienced some form of family violence.
    (The study considers psychological and verbal abuse as ``violence.//)
        In 1997 the Government began a special program to promote women's
    equality during the period from 1997 to 1999. This program consisted of
    30 projects, 1 of which focused on violence against women and domestic
    violence. The project against violence offered nationwide support for
    women in need and for men to combat their own tendencies to resort to
    violence. This project has been regarded as the most significant
    component of the women's equality program in that it has helped to
    break the taboo about the subject. The program may be renewed once the
    Government evaluates the results. The Government also promised to
    maintain a program against prostitution and violence until 2002.
        The government-established Council for Equality coordinates and
    sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as workers, mothers,
    widows, or retirees.
        The Constitution calls for the promotion of equality of the sexes
    in social activities and working life, the latter particularly in the
    determination of remuneration. In 1985 the Parliament passed a more
    detailed comprehensive equal rights law that mandates equal treatment
    for women in the workplace, including equal pay for ``comparable''
    jobs. In practice comparable worth has not been implemented because of
    the difficulty of establishing criteria, but the Government, employers,
    unions, and others continued to work on implementation plans. Women's
    average earnings are 82 percent of those of men, and women still tend
    to be segregated in lower paying occupations. While women individually
    have attained leadership positions in the private and public sectors,
    there are disproportionately fewer women in top management jobs.
    Industry and finance, the labor movement, and some government
    ministries remain male dominated. Some 60 percent of physicians are
    women. Women serve in the armed forces. The Government's equality
    ombudsman monitors compliance with regulations against sexual
    discrimination. Of the 63 complaints processed by the Ombudsman between
    January 1 and June 30, 10 cases were judged to be violations of the
    law. In such cases, the law provides for correction of the situation as
    well as compensation for the complainant.
        There were reports of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. There is no pattern of societal abuse of
    children, and the national consensus supporting children's rights is
    enshrined in law.
        There were reports of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--Although since the 1970's the law has
    required that new public buildings be accessible to people with
    physical disabilities, many older buildings remain inaccessible. No
    such law applies to public transportation, but each municipality
    subsidizes measures to improve accessibility to vehicles. Local
    governments maintain a free transport service that provides a minimum
    of 18 free trips per month for a disabled person. The deaf and the mute
    are provided interpretation services ranging from 120 to 240 hours
    annually. The Government provides subsidized public housing to the
    severely disabled.
        Indigenous People.--Sami (Lapps), who constitute less than 0.1
    percent of the population, benefit from legal provisions that provide
    for the protection of minority rights and customs. Sami language and
    culture are supported in the Constitution and financially by the
    Government. Sami receive subsidies to enable them to continue their
    traditional lifestyle, which revolves around reindeer herding. Sami
    have political and civil rights and are able to participate in
    decisions affecting their economic and cultural interests.
        In 1998 the President issued instructions on implementing an EU
    directive on the use of minority and regional languages. The
    directive's purpose is to ensure that the use of minority languages is
    permitted in school, the media, dealings with administrative and
    judicial authorities, economic and commercial life, and cultural
    activities. The Sami language belongs to the category of a minority
    language used regionally.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The number of immigrants rose
    from 18,000 in 1987 to 90,000 in 2000. Concurrent with this increase,
    concern has arisen about increasing expressions of racist and
    xenophobic behavior. Antiforeigner or racist violence has been
    reported. Leading government figures, including the President, have
    condemned such violence. The Government is attempting to address this
    problem in part through an indepth study of attitudes toward different
    ethnic groups. The government study examines discrimination in working
    life, looks into popular attitudes toward foreigners, and charts the
    attitudes of those authorities involved in immigration affairs--police,
    teachers, social workers, border guards, and employment office
    personnel. The popular attitudes survey found that half of those
    interviewed acknowledged some feelings of xenophobia or prejudice. The
    study continued at year's end.
        While the Government implemented new legislation during the year
    making it somewhat more difficult to gain political asylum (see Section
    2.d.), other government-sponsored initiatives were aimed at improving
    the situation of noncitizens. In 1999 a law promoting the enhanced
    integration of immigrants into society went into effect. In addition
    the Government in 1997 issued policy guidelines for promoting tolerance
    and combating racism.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    rights of trade unions to organize, to assemble peacefully, and to
    strike, and the Government respects these provisions. About 87 percent
    of the work force is organized. All unions are independent of the
    Government and political parties. The law grants public sector
    employees the right to strike, with some exceptions for the provision
    of essential services. In the first half of the year, there were 72
    strikes (most of them minor and brief), of which 58 were wildcat
    strikes.
        Trade unions freely affiliate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective
    bargaining agreements usually are based on income policy agreements
    between employee and employer central organizations and the Government.
    The law protects workers against antiunion discrimination. Complaint
    resolution is governed by collective bargaining agreements as well as
    labor law, both of which are enforced adequately.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and this prohibition generally is
    observed in practice; however, there were reports of trafficking in
    persons (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced and bonded labor
    by children and adults, and such practices do not exist. The Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see
    Section 6.c.). Youths under 16 years of age cannot work more than 6
    hours a day or at night, and education is compulsory for children from
    7 to 16 years of age. The Labor Ministry enforces child labor
    regulations. There are virtually no complaints of the exploitation of
    children in the work force. The Government ratified ILO Convention 182
    on the worst forms of child labor in January.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated minimum
    wage, but the law requires all employers--including nonunionized ones--
    to meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining agreements
    in the respective industrial sector. These minimum wages generally
    afford a decent standard of living for workers and their families.
        The legal workweek consists of 5 days not exceeding 40 hours.
    Employees working shifts or during the weekend are entitled to a 24-
    hour rest period during the week. The law is enforced effectively as a
    minimum, and many workers enjoy even stronger benefits through
    effectively enforced collective bargaining agreements.
        The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, and
    the Labor Ministry effectively enforces them. Workers can refuse
    dangerous work situations without risk of penalty.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not explicitly prohibit
    trafficking in persons, although existing statutes address a range of
    trafficking-related crimes, and there were reports that trafficking
    occurred. Finland is a secondary destination-transit country for such
    trafficking. The Government believes that most such trafficking
    involves women and girls for prostitution. The Government and
    nongovernmental organizations are making a considerable effort to
    counter trafficking, e.g., through the Government's leading role in the
    EU's antitrafficking ``STOP'' project.
                                   __________

                                     FRANCE

        France is a constitutional democracy with a directly elected
    president and National Assembly and an independent judiciary.
        The law enforcement and internal security apparatus consists of the
    Gendarmerie, the national police, and municipal police forces in major
    cities, all of which are under effective civilian control. Members of
    those police forces committed some human rights abuses.
        The highly developed, diversified, and primarily market-based
    economy provides residents with a high standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide a means of dealing with
    individual instances of abuse. The police committed one extrajudicial
    killing. There were instances of the abuse of detainees, particularly
    foreigners, by law enforcement officers. Long delays in bringing cases
    to trial and lengthy pretrial detention are problems. Violence and
    threats against ethnic and religious minorities continued to decline;
    however, in October there were over 100 anti-Semitic incidents,
    including firebombings. The Government has taken important steps to
    deal with violence against women and children. The Government took
    steps to combat trafficking in women.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings by government officials.
        Law enforcement officers have used excessive forceparticularly
    directed against immigrants--resulting in deaths, although there is no
    evidence of a pattern of such abuses.
        In April a police officer shot and killed 25-year-old Ryad Hamlaoui
    while he was attempting to steal a car in Lille-Sud. The police officer
    believed that Hamlaoui was armed and that he was firing in self-
    defense, but the authorities later determined that Hamlaoui was
    unarmed. The officer was suspended from duty, detained, and was charged
    with murder. The case was under investigation at year's end. The
    incident was followed by peaceful daytime demonstrations in Lille to
    protest the killing, and 3 nights of rioting.
        There were no developments in the judicial investigation of a
    police officer who shot and killed 17-year-old Habib Mohamed in
    Toulouse in 1998. Mohamed allegedly staggered away injured after being
    shot. The police officers involved reportedly failed to follow him, and
    also failed to follow required procedures to report that their weapons
    were fired. The investigation continued at year's end.
        A judicial investigation into the 1998 death of Mohammed Ali Saoud,
    who died following police intervention in a violent domestic
    disturbance, continued at year's end. The police had fired rubber
    bullets at Saoud and restrained him physically.
        In February the public prosecutor recommended to the investigating
    judge that no charges be brought against two of the police officers
    involved in the 1997 fatal shooting of 16yearold Abdel-Kader Bouziane.
    In March the investigating judge disagreed, and ruled that the police
    officers should be tried by the Court of Assizes. In October the
    chambre d'accusation (the prosecuting chamber of the criminal court) of
    the Paris Court of Appeals ruled that the charges against two of the
    officers should be dropped. The same court charged a third policeman in
    December; he is expected to be tried by the Court of Assizes. An appeal
    was pending at year's end.
        In November 1997, the gendarme who shot and killed Franck Moret was
    released by the correctional court in Valence, prompting the family of
    the deceased to appeal the judgment. In July 1998, the appeals court
    overturned the decision of the correctional court and sentenced the
    officer to an 18-month suspended prison term. The officer appealed the
    court's decision, and on January 5, the Court of Cassation ruled in his
    favor and reversed the decision of the appeals court.
        The trial of three police officers involved in the 1991 death of
    18year-old Aissa Ihich, who allegedly was beaten by police officers and
    subsequently died of an asthmatic attack because he allegedly was
    refused medication, was scheduled to begin in January 2001. A case
    against a doctor still was pending at year's end.
        On April 19, a bomb exploded at a restaurant near Dinan, and killed
    a female employee. The ``Breton Resistance Army'' claimed
    responsibility for an earlier bomb in Pornic, which damaged buildings
    but caused no injuries, but denied responsibility for the Dinan
    bombing; however, the police determined that similar explosives were
    used in both incidents. According to press reports, the investigation
    was at a standstill by year's end.
        The investigation into the 1998 killing of Corsican Prefet Claude
    Erignac continued at year's end. According to press reports, a total of
    nine persons have been detained in connection the killing. Yvan
    Colonna, who is presumed to have fired the shots that killed Erignac,
    was still at large and was believed to be hiding on the island at
    year's end.
        In June 1999, SOS-Attentats organization (the nongovernmental
    organization (NGO) which represents the 170 persons who were killed in
    the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772) brought a civil case against Libyan
    leader Mu'ammar alQadhafi for ``aiding and abetting voluntary
    homicide.'' In October 1999, the Paris prosecutor's office challenged
    the antiterrorism magistrate's decision to investigate the civil
    complaint, and the case reached the Court of Appeals on September 8.
    The Court ruled that Qadhafi had no sovereign immunity for terrorist
    acts. In October the Paris prosecutor's office appealed this decision
    to the Court of Cassation. A final decision is expected in May or June
    2001.
        In September 1999, an investigating judge decided that Nazi war
    criminal Alois Brunner should be tried in absentia on charges of crimes
    against humanity. Brunner previously was sentenced to death in absentia
    by a French military court in 1954, but vanished and was believed to
    have been living in Syria. According to press reports, in 1992 the
    Damascus publication Lettre d'Orient announced that Brunner had died,
    but Syrian authorities and Brunner's ex-wife and daughter refused to
    confirm or deny the report. The Chambre d'Accusation reviewed the
    investigating judge's decision in November 1999 and agreed in December
    1999 that the case should be sent to the Court of Assizes for a trial.
    The deliberations of the Court of Assizes continued at year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearance.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
    punish officials who employ them. There were reports that law
    enforcement officers used excessive force, particularly against
    immigrants; however, no complaints or criminal reports were filed.
    Isolated instances of police abuse occurred, but there is no evidence
    of a pattern of abuse.
        In May the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT),
    an organ of the Council of Europe, visited the country as part of its
    regular program of periodic visits to member states. A report is
    expected in 2001.
        The Government is in the process of instituting certain judicial
    and administrative reforms that address mistreatment of detainees by
    law enforcement officials. In June Parliament passed a law that created
    a national commission on security ethics to oversee the actions of law
    enforcement officials and to investigate complaints of police abuse
    from witnesses or victims; the commission subsequently was established.
        An administrative investigation into a March 1997 incident in which
    riot police beat a few dozen persons demonstrating against the National
    Front (FN) in Marseille continued at year's end. According to
    eyewitnesses, the police allegedly used excessive force by beating
    demonstrators and using tear gas grenades to keep the anti-FN
    demonstrators away from their FN counterparts.
        In July 1999, the authorities arrested Mauritanian army Captain Ely
    Ould Dah in Montpellier, in response to accusations by two Mauritanian
    refugees living in France. The refugees alleged that Dah was
    responsible for torture inflicted upon them when they were soldiers in
    Mauritania in 1990 and 1991 and were suspected of taking part in an
    attempted coup d'etat against Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Taya.
    Dah was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the International
    Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the French League of Human
    Rights under the International Convention Against Torture. The
    authorities detained him for questioning; the Montpellier Court of
    Appeal released him in September 1999, but required that he remain in
    the country. In April Dah violated the terms of his release and
    returned to Mauritania. According to the International Federation of
    Human Rights Leagues, the Court of Appeals continued to investigate the
    allegations at year's end.
        In December 1999 and January, the main Corsican separatist groups
    agreed to a ``cease fire'' in order to allow elected Corsican officials
    to engage in a dialog with the Government. In July the Government and
    Corsican officials agreed to a plan that would give more legislative
    authority to Corsica's elected officials. Although the cease fire is
    still in effect, after the July agreement there were several bombings
    in Corsica (with some minor injuries) and one shooting attack in which
    Jean-Michel Rossi, a writer and former Corsica nationalist militant,
    and his bodyguard, Jean-Claude Fratacci, were killed. In December a
    bomb exploded at the police barracks in Corsica; a policeman was
    injured.
        Prison conditions generally exceed minimum international standards;
    however, public debate continued on the adequacy of prison conditions.
    According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 262 deaths of persons
    in custody in 1999, of which 125 were suicides. In May the NGO
    International Observer of Prisons (IOP) published a report that
    criticized prison conditions. The report concluded that prisons are
    overcrowded, have unacceptable hygienic conditions, and provide
    inadequate food to inmates. The report focused on the problems that
    result from overcrowded prison cells and stated that as of December 1,
    1999, the average rate of occupation in prisons was 119 percent of
    intended capacity. There were no reports of incidents of alleged
    brutality by prison guards during the year; however, the IOP reported
    in May that two such incidents occurred in 1999.
        On July 5, the National Assembly and Senate each released the
    conclusions of a special investigation that each body performed
    concerning prison conditions. The investigations were prompted by a
    book written by Veronique Vasseur, the head medical officer at La Sante
    prison in Paris, which was published in January. Vasseur's book
    criticized living conditions and the availability of health care in La
    Sante prison, and led to public debate over general prison conditions.
    After 5 months of investigations, the National Assembly and Senate each
    concluded that prison reforms were necessary; however, their reform
    proposals differed. The National Assembly noted a vast difference in
    prison conditions across the country and concluded that a prison reform
    law was needed to mandate universal standards for all prisons. The
    Senate, noting more specific problems such as overcrowded cells and
    inadequate numbers of guards, concluded that a universal law would not
    be effective and instead recommended that the Government focus on
    specific problems requiring more immediate attention.
        Observers have criticized the current prison oversight mechanism as
    being ineffective because there is no external administrative oversight
    outside of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for both
    prison administration and the discipline of prison officials. In March
    the working group known as the Canivet Commission delivered its report
    on a draft code of ethics for prison guards to the Minister of Justice.
    Among other things, the commission recommended creating an office of
    prison inspectors, headed by a person named by the President, which
    would have the power to conduct investigations and to evaluate prison
    conditions and policies. The Government was considering this
    recommendation and the possibility of a code of ethics for prison
    guards at year's end.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these
    prohibitions.
        The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its
    inability to process suspects quickly. Some suspects spend many years
    in prison before a trial even starts. According to the Prison
    Administration, as of January 1, approximately 18,100 of the 51,411
    persons held in jails and prisons were awaiting trial. A system of bail
    exists.
        In June Parliament passed the ``presumption of innocence'' bill,
    which includes provisions that address pretrial detention and which are
    designed to reduce the number of persons held in jails and prisons
    awaiting trial; however, none of the bill's provisions were in effect
    at year's end. The bill establishes a new system of ``detention
    judges'' (to be implemented in 2001), who are to decide if a suspect is
    to be kept in detention pending trial. Generally pretrial detention
    only is allowed if there is a possibility that the suspect may be
    sentenced (if convicted) to more than 3 years in prison for crimes
    against persons and to more than 5 years in prison for crimes against
    property. The bill also gives detainees the right to see their lawyer 1
    hour after being detained by the police.
        On October 31, the Paris correctional court released the last of
    the 53 suspects who had been arrested in May 1998 in a roundup of
    suspected Islamic terrorists. The court cited insufficient evidence.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The court system includes local courts, 35 regional courts of
    appeal, and the highest criminal court, the Court of Cassation, which
    considers appeals on procedural grounds only. In January the Court of
    Cassation announced that defendants no longer would be required to
    present themselves to be taken into custody in order to pursue an
    appeal to the Court of Cassation. The ``presumption of innocence''
    bill, passed by the Parliament in June (see Section 1.d.) contains a
    provision that allows defendants to seek ``reexamination'' of a court
    decision that has been found by the European Court of Human Rights
    (ECHR) to have violated the European Convention on Human Rights.
        The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its
    inability to process suspects quickly (see Section 1.d.).
        On May 23, the ECHR ruled that the Government violated Article 6 of
    the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Leonardus Van
    Pelt. Van Pelt was arrested for drug trafficking in Spain in January
    1987, extradited to France in November 1987, tried, and convicted in
    February 1990 by the Bobigny District Court. He challenged aspects of
    subsequent appeals proceedings, including the requirement that he
    present himself to be taken into custody by law enforcement officials
    in order to pursue an appeal before the Court of Cassation. The ECHR
    ruled that some of these proceedings violated Van Pelt's right to a
    fair trial.
        On July 20, the ECHR ruled that the Government violated Article 6
    of the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Adrian Caloc.
    The Court rejected Caloc's argument that he had been ``treated in an
    inhuman or degrading manner'' by police authorities when he was
    arrested in 1998, but the Court ruled that Caloc's complaint against
    the police was not heard and decided within a ``reasonable amount of
    time.'' Because of lengthy police investigations and numerous appeals,
    it took more than 7 years for Caloc to obtain a final decision on his
    complaint.
        In cases of serious crimes, investigating judges detain suspects
    for questioning and direct the criminal investigation that occurs
    before a case is tried. In some cases this procedure has resulted in
    lengthy detentions of suspects before they are tried (see Section
    1.d.). The chambre d'accusation reviews the investigating judge's
    investigation to determine whether the charge established by the
    investigating judge is appropriate. The Court of Assizes investigates
    and decides cases involving the most serious offenses.
        In March the Paris Court of Appeal reconsidered the convictions of
    33 of the 138 persons tried in the October 1998 ``Chalabi network''
    case. The court cleared four persons of all charges and released them;
    it upheld the convictions and sentences of the other persons.
        As a result of the motion for retrial submitted in January 1999,
    new evidence was discovered in the case of Omar Raddad, who was
    convicted of killing his employer in 1994. The resulting reports are
    scheduled to be released in the spring of 2001, at which time the Court
    of Cassation may decide to revise the original verdict.
        Raddad's attorney had argued that a key defense witness in the
    original trial was expelled on a technicality.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.
        The judge investigating the wiretapping cases deemed inappropriate
    by the National Commission for the Regulation of Wiretapping (NCRWT)
    completed his investigation at the end of 1999 and presented his
    findings to the Paris public prosecutor's office in February; the
    office was considering the matter at year's end. According to the
    annual report of the NCRWT, the number of administrative wiretaps put
    in place in 1999 remained constant. The quota on the number of
    administrative wiretaps, which was set by the Prime Minister in 1997,
    did not change during 1999, and the number of administrative wiretaps
    put in place during 1999 was below the quota. Wiretapping is recognized
    legally as a right of the Government.
        Debate continues over whether Muslim girls have the right to wear
    headscarves in public schools (see Section 2.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        On May 22, the Paris district court ruled that an Internet company
    violated the law by permitting the public display of Nazi artifacts for
    sale on the Internet (see Section 5).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There
    are regular demonstrations on various issues, which occur generally
    without incident. In October the Paris prefecture denied a request by
    the Church of Scientology for a permit for a demonstration involving
    10,000 participants. The Church alleged discrimination; however, the
    prefecture justified the denial based upon the proposed size and
    duration of the demonstration, which would make it difficult to
    maintain public order. The group rented a private park outside Paris in
    which to hold their gathering.
        In December police clashed with demonstrators protesting the
    European Union summit held in Nice. The protesters used Molotov
    cocktail bombs, stones, and steel police barriers; police responded
    with tear gas, water cannons, and clubs. More than 20 persons were
    injured in clashes between police and protesters. On December 6,
    approximately 12 persons were injured when police officers used tear
    gas to prevent demonstrators in Ventimiglia from travelling to the
    summit.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion
    and the separation of church and state, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice; however, the Government took some
    actions during the year that affected religious minorities that it
    describes as ``sects.'' The 1905 law on separation of church and
    state--the foundation of current legislation on religious freedom--
    makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of faith.
        Religious groups may register as ``associations cultuelles''
    (associations of worship) or as ``associations culturelles'' (cultural
    associations); religious groups normally register in both of these
    categories. Associations in these two categories are subject to certain
    management and financial disclosure requirements. An association of
    worship is exempt from taxes, but can organize only religious
    activities; it may not operate a school, print publications, or employ
    a board president. A cultural association is a type of for-profit
    association whose goal is to promote the culture of a certain group;
    although not exempt from taxes, it may receive government subsidies for
    its cultural and educational operations (such as schools). Religious
    groups must apply with the local prefecture to be recognized as an
    association of worship and therefore receive tax-exempt status under a
    1905 statute. The prefecture, upon reviewing the documentation supplied
    regarding the association's purpose for existence, then can grant that
    status; however, the prefecture can decide to review a group's status
    if the association receives a large donation or legacy that comes to
    the attention of the tax authorities. If the prefecture determines that
    the association is not in fact in conformity with the 1905 law, its
    status can be changed, and it can be required to pay a 60 percent tax
    rate on present and past donations.
        For historical reasons, contrary to practice in the rest of the
    country, the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed (Protestant), and Roman
    Catholic religions in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine enjoy
    special legal status. Adherents of these four religions may choose to
    have a portion of their income tax allocated to their church in a
    system administered by the central Government.
        The State subsidizes private schools, including those that are
    church affiliated. Central or local governments also own and provide
    upkeep for other religious buildings constructed before 1905, the date
    of the law separating church and state.
        Some religious minorities have experienced problems with the
    wearing of special religious clothing. For example, debate continued
    over whether denying some Muslim girls the right to wear headscarves in
    public schools constituted a violation of the right to practice their
    religion. Various courts and government bodies have considered the
    question; however, there has been no definitive national decision on
    the issue. In June 1999, the Government Commissioner recommended that
    the administrative court repeal its October 1998 to expel a girl who
    refused to remove her headscarf. The Government Commissioner stated
    that no threat to public order was posed and that the school
    administrator was incompetent to make the definitive decision. In
    October 1999, the Conseil d'Etat reaffirmed a ban on headscarves in
    public schools.
        The Government's response to some minority groups that it views as
    ``sects'' or ``cults'' has been to continue to encourage public
    caution. In 1996 the National Assembly's parliamentary commission, also
    known as the Gest or the Guyard Commission, issued a report that
    defined sects as groups that place inordinate importance on finances;
    cause a rupture between adherents and their families; are responsible
    for physical as well as psychological attacks on members; recruit
    children; profess ``antisocial'' ideas; disturb public order; have
    ``judiciary problems;'' and/or attempt to infiltrate organs of the
    State. Government officials have stated that ``sects'' are
    ``associations whose structure is ideological and totalitarian and
    whose behavior seriously oppresses fundamental liberties as well as
    social equilibrium.'' (These attributes are in addition to specific
    criminal behavior prohibited by law.) The Commission's report
    identified 173 groups as sects, including Jehovah's Witnesses and the
    Church of Scientology. The report was prepared without the benefit of
    full and complete hearings regarding the groups identified on the list.
    Groups were not told why they were placed on the list, and, because the
    document exists as a commission report to the National Assembly, there
    is no mechanism for changing or amending the list short of a new
    National Assembly commission inquiry and report.
        The Government has not outlawed any of the groups on the list;
    however, the ensuing publicity contributed to an atmosphere of
    intolerance and bias against minority religions. Some religious groups
    reported that their members suffered increased intolerance after having
    been identified on the list. A number of individuals who belong to
    groups on the list continued to report discrimination during the year--
    for example, the loss of a job or the denial of a bank loan--which they
    believe occurred because of their affiliation with a ``sect.'' In a
    November 1998 report, the International Helsinki Federation criticized
    the identification of the 173 groups, which it stated ``resulted in
    media reports libeling minority religions, the circulation of rumors
    and false information, and incitement of religious intolerance.'' The
    Commission's findings also led to calls for legislative action to
    restrict the activities of sects, which the Government rejected on
    grounds of religious freedom. Instead, the Justice Ministry issued a
    directive to all government entities to be vigilant against possible
    abuses by sects, and all government offices were instructed to monitor
    potentially abusive sect activities.
        In 1996 the Government created an interministerial working group on
    sects (known as the Observatory on Sects) to analyze the phenomenon of
    sects and to develop proposals for dealing with them. The working
    group's final report in 1996 made several proposals, including the
    granting of legal standing to organizations that oppose sects; a
    modification of the law requiring associations to divulge information
    regarding the sources and management of their finances related to their
    effort to obtain tax-exempt status; a limit on the allocation of public
    campaign funds in order to limit public financial support for small
    fringe groups; the creation of a representative in each prefecture to
    provide information on sects to local officials; the creation of a
    permanent commission at the European Union level to reinforce
    international cooperation in controlling sect activities; and measures
    to restrict group members' entry into professional training programs.
        In March a Paris Correctional Court fined Jacques Guyard, the
    president of the parliamentary commission and a drafter of the 1996
    National Assembly report on socalled sects, approximately $2,850
    (20,000 francs) in response to complaints by three groups that were
    named in a parliamentary commission's June 1999 report on the financing
    of religious groups named in the original report. The court also
    ordered Guyard to pay approximately $12,850 (90,000 francs) in damages.
    The Federation of Steiner Schools, the New Brotherly Economy, and ``le
    Mercure Federale'' (an anthroposophical medical association) had filed
    a complaint against Guyard for slander for calling the groups ``sects''
    in a June 1999 television interview. The court found that Guyard had
    made accusations against these groups when existing evidence did not
    warrant even a serious inquiry into their activities. The court noted
    that the parliamentary commission's report resulted from written
    declarations from persons claiming to be victims of anthroposophy, but
    that the parliamentary commission had not heard any of the claims in
    person, and that there was no supporting documentation for accusations
    that the groups had used mental manipulation, pressured persons to give
    them money, or used practical medicine that endangered lives. The court
    rejected Guyard's attempts to qualify his statements, and also rejected
    a request from Guyard's lawyer for parliamentary immunity. The 1999
    report in question focused on multinational groups, especially
    Jehovah's Witnesses and Scientologists. The stated basis of concern was
    that these groups may use excessive or dishonest means to obtain
    donations, which then are transferred out of the country and beyond the
    reach of French tax authorities.
        In October 1998, the Government issued a new decree disbanding the
    Observatory on Sects and creating an ``Interministerial Mission to
    Battle Against Sects'' (mission interministerielle de lutte contre les
    sectes). Although the decree instructs the commission to ``analyze the
    phenomenon of sects,'' it does not define what is meant by the term
    ``sect,'' or how sects differ from religions. The Interministerial
    Mission also is charged with serving as a coordinator of periodic
    interministerial meetings, at which government officials are to
    exchange information and coordinate their actions against sects. In
    December 1998, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular urging state
    prosecutors to cooperate with the Interministerial Mission in bringing
    actions against sects.
        On February 7, the Interministerial Mission submitted its 1999
    annual report to the Prime Minister, which addressed the perceived
    problem of sects or cults. The report specifically raised the
    possibility of the dissolution of movements which, being ``in essence
    and in action totalitarian'' are dangerous to their members and to
    democracy in general. The report urges government action to deal with
    sects or cults according to their degrees of dangerousness, such as
    groups that limit personal freedoms of members, ``new age'' groups, and
    ``absolutist'' groups which are totalitarian in nature. However, the
    report does not advocate new legislation to abolish groups considered
    to be dangerous. The report presents two options: The use of criminal
    cases against individuals for violating existing laws, which rarely is
    done; and the use of existing administrative and political means--a
    1936 decree against ``factious leagues"--which would require action by
    the Council of Ministers and the assent of the President. The report
    specifically cites concerns regarding the Church of Scientology and the
    ``Solar Temple'' group.
        On December 21, the Interministerial Mission against Sects
    submitted its 2000 annual report. The report highlighted the
    globalization of sect/cult influence, specifically in underdeveloped
    countries and focused on the ``infiltration'' of NGO's by sects/cults.
    Within the context of developments within the country, the report
    evaluated the influence of sect/cult movements in the three overseas
    departments (Guyana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique). A case study examined
    the anthroposophical movement, founded by Austrian Rudolf Steiner, and
    recommended sustained vigilance over the Steiner schools.
        On June 22, the National Assembly passed on its first reading a
    private bill that would tighten restrictions on religious and other
    organizations. This bill--which amended an earlier version that had
    originated in and had been passed by the Senate in December 1999--
    included the following clauses: (1) criteria for the dissolution of so-
    called ``sects,'' (2) the prohibition of sect publicity in
    ``vulnerable'' areas (i.e., near schools and hospitals), (3)
    prohibition of the reconstitution of dissolved ``sects'' under a
    different name, and (4) establishment of the new crime of ``mental
    manipulation.'' The Justice Minister at the time, who attended the
    National Assembly vote, noted that certain provisions of the bill would
    help ``victims'' of ``sects,'' but warned that other provisions might
    threaten fundamental liberties, such as freedom of association and
    belief. She questioned whether certain clauses were in conformity with
    the European Convention on Human Rights and called for a ``parallel
    reflection'' on these points to be organized by human rights groups
    when the Senate reconsidered the bill. On November 8, the Senate held
    hearings on the bill. Representatives from the Catholic, Protestant,
    Jewish, and Muslim faiths, who had not been consulted previously,
    expressed their concerns that the provisions of the bill could be
    abused. The Senate was not expected to schedule the next reading of the
    bill until April 2001.
        In December 1998, the National Assembly debated and passed a
    private bill that would allow two specific antisect groups, both
    classified as ``public utilities,'' to become parties to court actions
    involving sects. Its main provisions, with some modifications, were
    integrated into a separate bill on legal reform aimed at strengthening
    the presumption of innocence and victims' rights (see Section 1.d.). In
    June Parliament passed that bill, which contains a provision that
    allows some associations that aid individuals against groups that
    ``create or exploit psychological or physical dependence'' to become
    civil parties to certain criminal proceedings involving such groups.
    This provision is intended to allow antisect groups to become civil
    parties in certain proceedings involving sects.
        Some observers are concerned about the scrutiny with which tax
    authorities have examined the financial records of some religious
    groups. The Government currently does not recognize all branches of
    Jehovah's Witnesses or the Church of Scientology as qualifying
    religious associations for tax purposes, and therefore subjects them to
    a 60 percent tax on all funds they receive. In June the Conseil d'Etat
    decided that 2 branches of the 11 branches of Jehovah's Witnesses could
    be recognized as religious associations according to the 1905 law and
    thus be exonerated from certain tax obligations.
        In January 1996, the tax authorities began an audit of the French
    Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, and in May 1998, the tax
    authorities formally assessed the 60 percent tax against donations
    received by Jehovah's Witnesses from September 1992 through August
    1996. In June 1998, tax authorities began proceedings to collect the
    assessed tax, including steps to place a lien on the property of the
    National Consistory of Jehovah's Witnesses. The tax proceedings
    continued at year's end. In July a Nanterre court decided against the
    French Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, ruling that the Jehovah's
    Witnesses would have to pay over $42 million (300 million francs) in
    back taxes to the fiscal authorities. In the same month the Jehovah's
    Witnesses appealed the Nanterre court's decision to the Versailles
    Court of Appeals, the appeal was pending at year's end.
        The authorities previously took similar action against the Church
    of Scientology. In the case of the Paris church, the Ministry of
    Finance refused to grant the church authorization to import funds to
    pay the claimed taxes although the church offered to pay the total
    amount of all taxes assessed, a percentage of which would have come
    from outside the country. Subsequently in December 1997, the Government
    filed legal action for the claimed amount against the former officers
    of the Paris church and against the Church of Scientology International
    (a California nonprofit organization). The hearing in this legal action
    was deferred pending a decision regarding a 1998 administrative claim
    filed with the Conseil d'Etat by the Paris church that the Minister of
    Finance acted improperly in refusing to allow the church to import
    funds to pay the assessed taxes. In January 1999, the Conseil d'Etat
    requested the advice of the European Court of Justice. On March 14, the
    Court ruled that French law was incompatible with European Union laws
    regulating the free flow of capital; however, the Court ruled that such
    regulations could be allowed if required on the grounds of a threat to
    public security or public policy. The Court ruled the French laws were
    not sufficiently detailed and, on December 8, the Conseil d'Etat found
    the State at fault and upheld the decision of the European Court of
    Justice. However, the judgment's practical effect was limited because
    the affected churches had dissolved themselves and been reconstituted
    in the intervening period under different names.
        In July 1997, a Court of Appeals in Lyon recognized Scientology as
    a religion in its opinion in the conviction of Jean-Jacques Mazier, a
    former leader of the Scientologists, for contributing to the 1988
    suicide of a church member. In response the Minister of the Interior
    stated that the court had exceeded its authority and that the
    Government does not recognize Scientology as a religion. The Government
    appealed the Court of Appeals decision, but in June 1999, the Court of
    Cassation rejected the Government's appeal, but the Court stated that
    it lacked the authority to decide if Scientology was a religion.
        There have been a number of court cases against the Church of
    Scientology, which generally involved former members who sue the Church
    for fraud, and sometimes for the practice of medicine without a
    license. In October the Paris prefecture denied a request by the Church
    of Scientology for a permit for a demonstration (see Section 2.b.); the
    group held their gathering in a private park.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The law provides for the grant of refugee/asylee status in
    accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government provides
    first asylum. In 1999 the Government received 30,907 requests for
    asylum and issued 4,659 refugee certificates (a document issued to
    successful asylum applicants). The Government generally cooperates with
    the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports of the
    forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. On September 24, voters approved a referendum to
    shorten the term of the President from 7 years to 5 years. Abstention
    rates for the vote were almost 70 percent.
        There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
    politics or government; however, they remain significantly
    underrepresented in public offices, especially at the national level.
    Eleven of 32 cabinet members, 20 of 321 senators, and 57 of 577
    deputies in the National Assembly are women. The European Union
    Parliament includes a larger French female presence--40 percent of the
    country's elected representatives are female. To increase women's
    participation, some parties have established quotas for them on
    electoral lists or in party management. In June 1999, a joint session
    of both the Senate and the National Assembly approved a constitutional
    amendment on the principle of ``equal access of men and women to
    electoral mandates and elective functions.'' In May the Parliament
    adopted a law that implemented the constitutional amendment. The law
    provides that, starting with the municipal elections in March 2001,
    political parties are to have equal numbers of women and men on their
    lists of candidates. The President and the Prime Minister continued
    discussions on modernizing the country's political institutions,
    including measures to encourage a greater number of women in political,
    social, and public positions.
        The citizens of the ``collective territory'' of Mayotte and the
    territories of French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia
    determine their legal and political relationships to France by means of
    referendums, and they elect deputies and senators to the French
    Parliament, along with the overseas departments.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of local and international human rights
    organizations operate freely, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
    cooperative and responsive to their views. The National Consultative
    Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR)--which has nongovernmental as well
    as government members--also monitors complaints and advises the
    Government on policies and legislation. It is an independent body in
    the Office of the Prime Minister.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Statutes ban discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnic
    background, or political opinion, and the Government effectively
    enforces them.
        Women.--The Penal Code prohibits rape and spousal abuse, and law
    enforcement authorities vigorously enforce these laws; however,
    violence against women remains a problem. The Ministry of Interior
    reported that in 1999 there were 7,958 rapes and 12,732 instances of
    other criminal sexual assault. The penalties for domestic violence vary
    according to the type of crime and range from 3 years imprisonment and
    a fine of approximately $42,450 (300,000 francs) to 20 years in prison.
    The penalty for rape is 15 years in prison, which may be increased due
    to other circumstances (such as the age of the victim or the nature of
    the relationship of the rapist to the victim). The Government sponsors
    and funds programs for women who are victims of violence, including
    shelters, counseling, and hot lines. Numerous private associations also
    assist abused women.
        Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution
    is legal; acting as a pimp is not. A government agency, the Central
    Office on the Treatment of Human Beings (OCRTEH), addresses trafficking
    in women, prostitution, and pimping.
        The law prohibits sex-based job discrimination and sexual
    harassment in the workplace; however, these laws have encountered
    difficulties in implementation. Women's rights groups criticize the
    scope of the law as narrow and the fines and compensatory damages as
    often modest. For example, the law limits sexual harassment claims to
    circumstances where there is a supervisorsubordinate relationship but
    fails to address harassment by colleagues or a hostile work
    environment.
        The law requires that women receive equal pay for equal work, but
    this requirement often is not implemented in practice. Reports by
    various governmental organizations and NGO's indicates that men
    continue to earn more than women, and unemployment rates continue to be
    higher for women than for men. For example, a report released in
    September 1999 by National Assembly Deputy Catherine Genisson indicated
    that in the country's 5,000 largest firms, the average difference in
    salary between men and women is 27 percent. A study by the National
    Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies indicated that in March
    the unemployment rate for women was 11.9 percent, compared with 8.5
    percent for men.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. The Ministry for Family Affairs oversees
    implementation of the Government's programs for children.
        There are strict laws against child abuse, particularly when
    committed by a parent or guardian. In 1999 there were approximately
    18,500 reported cases of mistreatment (physical violence, sexual abuse,
    mental cruelty, or severe negligence) of children. Approximately 4,800
    of these cases involved reports of sexual abuse. Special sections of
    the national police and judiciary are charged with handling these
    cases. The Government provides counseling, financial aid, foster homes,
    and orphanages, depending on the extent of the problem. Various
    associations also help minors seek justice in cases of mistreatment by
    parents.
        Some immigrants from countries where female genital mutilation
    (FGM) is customary subject their children to this practice, which is
    condemned widely by international health experts as damaging to both
    physical and psychological health. Authorities prosecute FGM cases
    under the provisions of the Penal Code, which states that acts of
    violence towards children that result in mutilation shall be tried in
    the highest criminal court. Since 1993 the Government and private
    associations have undertaken a campaign to inform immigrants that FGM
    is contrary to the law and would be prosecuted.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. A 1991 law requires new public buildings to be
    accessible to the physically disabled, but most older buildings and
    public transportation are not accessible.
        Religious Minorities.--The number of anti-Semitic incidents
    increased in the fall, due in part to increased unrest in the Middle
    East. According to the annual NCCHR report on racism and xenophobia,
    released in the spring, there were a total of 51 threats and 9 acts of
    violence in 1999, compared with 73 threats and 1 act of violence in
    1998.
        During October more than 100 anti-Semitic incidents, ranging from
    graffiti to harassment to firebombing, occurred across the country,
    mainly as a result of increasing tensions in the Middle East. For
    example, on October 10, a synagogue in Trappes was set on fire and
    destroyed. The city government allowed the congregation to use a city
    hall for the celebration of one of the Jewish high holy days. On
    October 12-14, local authorities in Strasbourg recovered several
    Molotov cocktails that had been planted in a synagogue. On October 14,
    a synagogue in Lyon was rammed by a car and then caught fire. Three
    synagogues in the Paris suburb of Bagnolet and a Jewish shop in Toulon
    were firebombed. On October 17, six incendiary devices were discovered
    outside a Jewish school in Paris. On October 23, a synagogue in
    Marseille was firebombed. It appeared that youths were responsible for
    many of these incidents, and some arrests were made. Government
    leaders, members of the Jewish community, the Paris Grand Mosque, the
    Protestant Federation, and the French Conference of Bishops strongly
    criticized the violence. The Government increased police security for
    Jewish institutions.
        On May 22, the Paris district court ruled that an Internet company
    violated a law prohibiting defamation and incitement to hate crimes
    when it permitted the public display of Nazi artifacts for sale on the
    Internet. Following a hearing on July 24, the judge postponed
    implementation of the order. On November 21, a judge upheld the
    verdict, and ordered the company to block access from the country to
    sites offering Nazi memorabilia within 3 months.
        In October 1999, the Court of Cassation upheld a Bordeaux court's
    1998 conviction of Maurice Papon for his actions as secretary general
    of the Prefecture of Gironde from 1942 to 1944. Papon was found guilty
    of complicity in committing crimes against humanity for his role in the
    deportation of hundreds of Jews to Nazi concentration camps during the
    World War II German occupation. The Bordeaux court had sentenced him to
    10 years' imprisonment; however, he had not been detained because he
    had appealed to the Court of Cassation, and just before that court's
    ruling, Papon fled from his home. His failure to appear resulted in an
    automatic rejection of his appeal. On October 22, 1999, he was arrested
    in Switzerland and returned to France; he remained in prison at year's
    end. In April Papon filed an appeal to the European Court of Human
    Rights; the appeal was pending at year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Anti-immigrant sentiments led
    to various incidents, including occasional attacks on members of the
    large Arab/Muslim and black African communities. The annual NCCHR
    report noted a continuing decrease in the number of reported incidents
    of racist threats79 threats were reported in 1999, a decrease from 91
    in 1998. However, the number of reported incidents of racist violence
    increased to 12 in 1999 from 8 in 1998. There were no deaths due to
    racist violence in 1999.
        The Government strongly condemns such actions and attacks and has
    strict antidefamation laws. Government programs attempt to combat
    racism and anti-Semitism by promoting public awareness and bringing
    together local officials, police, and citizen groups. There are also
    antiracist educational programs in some public school systems. The
    annual NCCHR report suggested that the Government continue to
    strengthen its laws against racist acts.
        According to the 1999 public opinion poll reported in the annual
    NCCHR report, 12 percent of those polled admitted to being ``rather
    racist,'' 27 percent admitted to being ``a little racist,'' 30 percent
    said they were ``not very racist,'' 29 percent said that they were
    ``not at all racist,'' and 2 percent had no response.
        Romani asylum seekers often remain in the country after their
    claims have been denied. They do not have official papers, which limits
    their access to health care and education. They often live in crowded
    conditions without proper sanitary facilities.
        The Administrative Court in Nantes continued to consider the June
    1998 appeal of Moroccan national Khaddouj Tahir at year's end. In 1997
    Tahir was refused naturalization because she wore a hejab veil during
    her final interview. Naturalization officials stated that ``her
    garments showed a refusal to integrate into the French community.''
    According to the law, applicants for naturalization must demonstrate
    their assimilation into French society as well as their loyalty to the
    French nation.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association for all workers. Trade unions exercise significant
    economic and political influence, although less than 10 percent of the
    work force is unionized. Unions have legally mandated roles (as do
    employers) in the administration of social institutions, including
    social security (health care and most retirement systems), the
    unemployment insurance system, labor courts, and the Economic and
    Social Council, a constitutionally mandated consultative body.
        Unions are independent of the Government, and most are not aligned
    with any political party. However, many of the leaders of the General
    Confederation of Labor and its unions belong to the Communist Party.
        Workers, including civil servants, are free to strike except when a
    strike threatens public safety. One-fourth of all salaried employees
    work for the Government. The number of workdays lost to strike action
    in the private sector increased during the year, and the number of
    strikes increased. Most of the widely publicized national strikes or
    protests occurred in the public sector or affected state-owned
    companies, and were called principally over implementation of the 35-
    hour workweek, salaries, privatization or reorganization plans, and
    working conditions (of which hours, staffing, and personal security
    were the primary issues). Teachers and health care workers mounted
    several strikes and protests over pay, personnel levels, and government
    efforts to reform the health and educational systems. Public
    transportation workers in Paris and other cities struck repeatedly in
    support of demands related to the implementation of a 35-hour workweek
    or the deployment of additional security personnel to deal with
    violence directed at transportation personnel. Railway workers also
    mounted strikes in support of demands related to the 35-hour workweek.
    Unions representing armored car workers mounted numerous strikes,
    including a 2-week national strike in May, to demand increased
    compensation and stricter security measures following several robberies
    in which several union members were killed. Air traffic controllers
    struck to protest European Union efforts to centralize air traffic
    control across Europe. Workers at two airlines struck during a busy
    spring travel period to protest anticipated job losses resulting from
    the takeover of their company by a foreign carrier. Truck drivers
    blocked border points and ports early in the year over concerns that
    European regulations for work-hours in their sector would deprive them
    of reductions called for under the move to a 35-hour workweek. In
    September owners of taxis, trucking companies, and fishing boats
    blockaded roads and ports over rising fuel prices.
        The law prohibits retaliation against strikers, strike leaders, and
    union members, and the Government effectively enforces this provision.
        Unions freely join federations and confederations, including
    international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers,
    including those in the three small export processing zones, have the
    right to organize and bargain collectively. The law strictly prohibits
    antiunion discrimination; employers found guilty of such activity are
    required to correct it, including the reinstatement of workers fired
    for union activities.
        A 1982 law requires at least annual bargaining in the public and
    private sector on wages, hours, and working conditions at both plant
    and industry levels, but does not require that negotiations result in a
    signed contract. In case of an impasse, government mediators may impose
    solutions that are binding unless formally rejected by either side
    within a week. If no new agreement can be reached, the contract from
    the previous year remains valid. Over 90 percent of the private sector
    work force are covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated
    at national or local levels. Trilateral consultations (unions,
    management, and Government) also take place on such subjects as the
    minimum wage, the duration of the legal workweek, temporary work,
    social security, and unemployment benefits. Labor tribunals, composed
    of worker and employer representatives, are available to resolve
    complaints.
        The law requires businesses with more than 50 employees to
    establish a works council, through which workers are consulted on
    training, working conditions, profit sharing, and similar issues. Works
    councils, which are open to both union and nonunion employees, are
    elected every 2 years.
        The Constitution's provisions for trade union rights extend to the
    country's overseas departments and territories.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
    the Government effectively enforces this provision.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--With a few exceptions for those enrolled in certain
    apprenticeship programs or working in the entertainment industry,
    children under the age of 16 may not be employed. Generally, work
    considered arduous or work between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. may
    not be performed by minors under age 18. Laws prohibiting child
    employment are enforced effectively through periodic checks by labor
    inspectors, who have the authority to take employers to court for
    noncompliance with the law. The law prohibits forced or bonded child
    labor, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The administratively determined
    minimum wage, revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises 2
    percentage points, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
    for a worker and family. The hourly wage was changed to $5.60 (42.02
    francs) as of July 1. Since February the legal workweek is 35 hours for
    firms of 20 or more workers. Overtime, under the 35-hour workweek, is
    capped at 1,600 hours per year for most workers. Firms of less than 20
    workers have until January 2002 to reduce their workweek to 35 hours.
    For these firms, the legal workweek is 39 hours, with a minimum break
    of 24 hours per week. Overtime work is restricted to 9 hours per week.
        The Ministry of Labor has overall responsibility for policing
    occupational health and safety laws. Standards are high and effectively
    enforced. The law requires each enterprise with 50 or more employees to
    establish an occupational health and safety committee. Over 75 percent
    of all enterprises, covering more than 75 percent of all employees,
    have fully functioning health and safety committees. Workers have the
    right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of
    persons; however, trafficking in women is a problem. In the past, the
    country has been primarily a transit point for women trafficked for
    sexual purposes from Africa, South America, and Eastern and Southern
    Europe, despite stringent laws that prohibit such trafficking. The
    country is now also a destination for trafficked women, as increasing
    numbers of women from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the
    Balkans are trafficked to work as prostitutes in cities, often under
    harsh conditions.
        Prostitution is legal; however, the law prohibits pimping,
    including aiding, assisting, maintaining, or profiting from the
    prostitution of another, and the public solicitation of another person
    for the purpose of inciting sexual relations also is illegal. Pimps and
    traffickers usually are prosecuted under these laws. Aiding, abetting,
    or protecting the prostitution of another person; obtaining a profit,
    sharing proceeds or receiving subsidies from someone engaged in
    prostitution; or employing, leading, corrupting, or pressuring someone
    into prostitution are punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a fine
    of up to approximately $140,000 (1 million francs). Penalties rise to
    up to 10 years in prison and up to approximately $1,400,000 (10 million
    francs) if a minor or several persons are involved, or if force is
    used. Pimping by organized groups is punishable by up to 20 years in
    prison and a fine of up to $2,800,000 (20 million francs). The use of
    ``torture'' or ``barbarous acts'' in the course of pimping is
    punishable by up to life imprisonment and up to $4,200,000 (30 million
    francs) in fines. These laws are enforced to various degrees--according
    to one press report, the most visible pimps are arrested, while those
    who work quietly go unnoticed.
        Several law enforcement agencies are involved in the effort to
    combat trafficking. The Central Office for the Repression of
    Trafficking in Humans is under the authority of the central criminal
    investigation directorate of the police judiciare, which handles
    organized crime. It centralizes information and coordinates operations
    to counter trafficking, and maintains contacts with the police, the
    Gendarmerie, foreign and international law enforcement authorities, and
    NGO's. Regional services of the police judiciare also combat
    trafficking, and the police judiciare has brigades to combat pimping in
    Paris and Marseille. Local police forces also address problems of
    prostitution and pimping.
        In the past, the country was a transit point for victims; however,
    in 1997 police began to see organized rings of traffickers, primarily
    from southeast Europe. The number of young women brought to the country
    to work as prostitutes continues to increase, in part because
    traffickers throughout Europe have benefited from the open borders
    under the Schengen Accords. Some victims come as a result of fraud or
    force; some are brought by a friend, or a friend of a friend; others
    have worked as prostitutes in their home countries, and are willing to
    continue the practice to pay for their immigration papers. In 1999
    OCRTEH reported investigations into rings operating out of the Czech
    Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Albania, Ecuador, Benin,
    Poland, and the former Yugoslavia. Much of the flow is now from Eastern
    Europe and the Balkans, but women from Africa and Latin America, who
    often enter the country through Marseille or the Spanish border, also
    have been trafficked into the country.
        The number of women from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
    and the Balkans has increased markedly, and has received increased
    press attention. For example, in March French and Belgian police
    dismantled an international trafficking ring organized in Paris and run
    from Brussels. This network trafficked women from the former Yugoslavia
    through Italy into forced prostitution in Brussels and Paris. Police
    dismantled the ring after French officials noticed that a number of
    prostitutes were traveling two or three times a week to Brussels on the
    highspeed train, apparently to pay their ``protectors.'' French
    officials arrested and extradited three Albanians. In January OCRTEH
    dismantled an Albanian trafficking ring in Toulouse. After reportedly
    being sequestered for several weeks and subjected to rape, torture, and
    threats against their families if they tried to escape, the women
    reportedly were sold for around $1,250 (9,000 francs), which included a
    ``guarantee'' that they would work as prostitutes for 3 months.
        In May the magazine Le Nouvel Observateur quoted the Commissaire of
    OCRTEH as saying that two-thirds of the foreign prostitutes in the
    country were from Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union),
    whereas in the previous few months, they represented only onethird. The
    magazine also reported that in Nice, women have responded to
    advertisements for waitresses or models that appeared in newspapers in
    Kiev or Moscow; and in Strasbourg, the number of prostitutes has more
    than doubled in the past 5 years--approximately two-thirds of the women
    are Czechs or Bulgarians.
        There are numerous NGO's that deal with trafficking in persons and
    prostitution. The Scelles Foundation, which has a center for
    international research and documentation of sexual exploitation,
    provides information to the media on the issue, and supports other
    associations in the country and around the world. The NGO L'Amicale du
    Nid works directly with prostitutes.
                                   __________

                                    GEORGIA

        The 1995 Constitution provides for an executive branch that reports
    to the President and a legislature. The President appoints ministers
    with the consent of the Parliament. In April Eduard Shevardnadze was
    reelected to a second 5-year term as President in an election marred by
    numerous serious irregularities. International observers strongly
    criticized this election due to interference by state authorities in
    the electoral process, deficient election legislation, an insufficient
    representative election administration, and unreliable voter registers.
    The country's second parliamentary elections under the 1995
    Constitution were held in October 1999, which the Organization for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized as a step
    toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments. Local elections were
    held for the first time in November 1998. The country's first
    multiparty parliamentary elections after independence from the Soviet
    Union in 1991 followed a military coup in 1992 that ousted the elected
    government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and brought Shevardnadze to power as
    head of a provisional government. The civil war and separatist wars
    that followed weakened greatly central government authority, not only
    in separatist Abkhazia and Ossetia, but also in other areas of the
    country, and the extent of central authority and control remain in
    question. Central government authority is limited in the autonomous
    region of Ajara. The Constitution provides for an independent
    judiciary; however, it is subject to executive pressure.
        Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that erupted in
    the early 1990's are unresolved. Cease-fires are in effect in both
    areas, although sporadic incidents of violence occur in Abkhazia. These
    unresolved conflicts, together with problems created by roughly 300,000
    internally displaced persons (IDP's), pose a continuing threat to
    national stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia,
    and most ethnic Georgians a large plurality of the population--were
    expelled from or fled the region. In 1994 Russian peacekeeping forces
    representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed in
    Abkhazia with the agreement of the Government and the Abkhaz
    separatists. Although there has been no agreement on the return of
    IDP's to Abkhazia, a limited number have returned on their own to the
    Gali region of southern Abkhazia. As a result of fighting in May 1998,
    almost all of the 53,000 Georgian IDP's who had returned to the Gali
    region of Abkhazia again fled. After May 1998, IDP's continue to travel
    back and forth to the Gali region and as many as 40,000 may be living
    in the Gali Region on a more or less permanent basis. A Russian
    peacekeeping force also has been in South Ossetia since 1992 and is
    part of a joint peacekeeping force with Ossetians and Georgians in
    South Ossetia. Repatriation of Georgians to South Ossetia and of
    Ossetians to the rest of Georgia has been slow. The Government has no
    effective control over Abkhazia or much of South Ossetia. Almost no
    IDP's have returned to other parts of Abkhazia.
        The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) and Procuracy have primary
    responsibility for law enforcement, and the Ministry of State Security
    (MSS, formerly the KGB) plays a significant role in internal security.
    In times of internal disorder, the Government may call on the MOI or
    the army. Elected civilian authorities do not maintain adequate control
    over the law enforcement and security forces. Members of the security
    forces committed an increased number of serious human rights abuses.
        The Government made efforts to develop a market-based economy. Key
    exports are scrap metal, manganese, wine, mineral water, and
    agricultural products. Agriculture represents approximately 30 percent
    of gross domestic product (GDP). Per capita GDP for the first 9 months
    of the year was estimated at $486. According to the Georgian Department
    of Statistics, approximately 52.6 percent of the population is living
    below the poverty level. The rate of economic growth continued to slow
    and the eastern part of the country suffered a drought. There was a
    growing fiscal deficit, as revenue collection continued to be very low.
    Government salaries and pensions were still in arrears.
        The Government's human rights record worsened, and was poor in
    several key areas. Numerous serious irregularities in the April
    presidential election limited citizens' right to change their
    government. According to the Government and nongovernmental
    organization (NGO) human rights monitors, security forces continued to
    beat and otherwise abuse detainees, force confessions, and fabricate or
    plant evidence. Reports of police brutality increased throughout the
    year. Several deaths in custody were blamed on physical abuse, torture,
    or inhuman or life-threatening prison conditions, and most government
    promises of reforms remain unfulfilled. The Ministry of Justice gained
    formal jurisdiction over the prison system from the Ministry of
    Interior in 1999; however, this transfer of responsibility was
    accomplished without adequate fiscal resources and consequently
    exacberated the already harsh conditions. Moreover, the MOI retains a
    significant role in prison staff and investigations. Minister of
    Justice Mikheil Saakashvili, appointed in October, acknowledged serious
    shortcomings in the prison system and initiated steps to address them.
    Saakashvilli fired some corrupt administrators, released some inmates
    to reduce overcrowding, and took steps toward creating a prison
    inspection system that would include NGO participation. Authorities
    allegedly continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Corruption
    in law enforcement agencies is significant and pervasive. In addition,
    despite numerous investigations, large-scale corruption on the part of
    lower level and high government officials still is tolerated widely as
    an inevitable consequence of economic hardship and low salaries. Local
    human rights groups reported that security force brutality against
    them, harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention of their members
    increased during the year, especially after April. Senior government
    officials, including the President, acknowledged serious human rights
    problems and sought international advice and assistance on needed
    reforms; however, neither the President nor other senior officials took
    concrete steps to address these problems, and Parliament failed to
    budget adequately for mandated reforms. Law enforcement agencies made
    little progress in adapting these practices to democratic norms, and
    impunity remains a problem.
        The judiciary is subject to pressure and corruption and does not
    always ensure due process; judicial reform efforts to create a more
    independent judiciary were undercut by failure to pay judges in a
    timely manner. As a result of the Law on Common Courts, many corrupt
    and incompetent judges were removed from the bench and replaced by
    judges who passed a qualifying exam and vetting process. There were
    lengthy delays in trials, and prolonged pretrial detention remains a
    problem. The Criminal Procedures Code, which was passed in 1997, was
    amended in 1999 and again in the summer in response to complaints by
    security forces that legislated reforms would hamper criminal
    investigations. Parliament also repealed provisions in the 1998
    Criminal Code that would have allowed citizens under investigation
    access to the courts prior to trial. Procuracy reform was stalled.
    Human Rights Watch released a highly critical report in October that
    detailed new restrictions on due process and other setbacks to judicial
    reform. Law enforcement agencies and other government bodies
    occasionally interfered with citizens' right to privacy. The press
    generally was free; however, security forces and other authorities on
    occasion intimidated and used violence against journalists. The
    Government restricted freedom of assembly, and law enforcement
    authorities dispersed numerous peaceful gatherings. Government
    officials infringed upon freedom of religion. Discrimination against
    and harassment of some religious minorities are problems. Violence and
    discrimination against women are problems. Trafficking in women for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem.
        Growing citizen awareness of civil rights and democratic values and
    the continued evolution of civil society provided a partial check on
    the excesses of law enforcement agencies. A number of independent NGO's
    are active in defense of the rights of individual citizens and
    religious groups. International observers noted that most NGO activity
    is concentrated in Tbilisi. Criticism from the press and the NGO
    community and timely intervention from government and parliamentary
    human rights monitors, played an important role in halting the abuse of
    citizens detained by the police in a few specific cases.
        There was little information available on the human rights
    situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to limited access to these
    regions.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government
    agents. Security force abuses reportedly resulted in several deaths in
    custody.
        The Government stated that 61 prisoners died in prison, and it
    appears that 5 prisoners died in jail or prison hospitals in pretrial
    detention during the year. Human rights NGO's and the press report that
    physical abuse, torture, and inhuman prison or pretrial detention
    conditions contributed to a number of these deaths. The authorities
    attributed the majority of these deaths to illness. On May 31, Mamuka
    Rizhamadze was found hanged in a Kutaisi jail. He was arrested in
    Tkibuli on May 24 but had not been charged. The official autopsy stated
    that he committed suicide; however, an independent autopsy, carried out
    at the request of his relatives, concluded that there were numerous
    injuries to his body and that a blow to his head killed him before he
    was hanged. Police claim that Rizhamadze threatened them with a grenade
    and that they acted in selfdefense.
        Authorities attributed nine deaths in 1999 to suicide, including
    that of Ivane Kolbaya, who in February 1999, fell to his death from a
    fifth floor window of the Ministry of Internal Affairs while being
    questioned about his alleged involvement in a theft. An international
    human rights NGO brought this case to the Government's attention, as
    well as four others, including the 1998 death of Gulchora Dursunova and
    the 1997 deaths of Akaki Iacobashvili and Eka Tavartkiladze. In 1999
    the National Security Council requested that the Procuracy determine
    the legality of the decisions made in these cases. The Procuracy upheld
    decisions affirming the ruling of suicide in all cases. Two police
    officers were charged in Kolbaya's case, but the court returned the
    case to the Procuracy for further investigation. On December 4, 1999,
    Zaza Tsitsilashvili allegedly threw himself to his death from the sixth
    floor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The investigation did not
    result in any charges. However, family members say that his corpse
    showed evidence of being beaten.
        On October 16, Antonio Russo, a reporter for Radio Radicale was
    found dead outside of Tbilisi. His colleagues feared that he may have
    been murdered in reprisal for coverage of the conflict in neighboring
    Chechnya, Russia. Some persons believe that Russo may have been killed
    to prevent him from publishing materials on the Russian use of banned
    chemical weapons in Chechnya. There have been no allegations and there
    is no evidence implicating the Government in Russo's death. The
    Government is conducting and ongoing investigation into the murder.
        Killings were committed by elements on both sides of the separatist
    conflict in Abkhazia, including by partisan groups and by Abkhaz
    separatists. The partisan groups in the past have received government
    support and training; however, the Government claims that it no longer
    controls nor supports the partisans. The partisans are viewed by the
    general public as criminal gangs engaged in smuggling, extortion, and
    other illegal activities. The number of incidents of abuse decreased
    from the previous year. Killings and other abuses on both sides of the
    conflict have not been investigated, prosecuted, or punished.
        Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces laid tens of thousands of
    landmines during the 1992-1993 fighting. The 2000 Landmine Monitor
    Report states that in 1999 and 2000, there continued to be numerous
    reports that groups from Georgia, allegedly linked to the Georgian
    Government infiltrated into Abkhazia and laid antipersonnel mines. The
    Government crticized these partisan groups and arrested some of their
    leaders. There has been a reduction in the number of persons killed or
    injured by landmines, primarily because a large number of persons have
    left the mined territories.
        b. Disappearance.--Georgian partisan/criminal groups active in
    Abkhazia periodically took hostages, usually in exchange for captured
    compatriots. Abkhaz and Georgian officials agreed on joint efforts by
    their law enforcement agencies to prosecute those responsible for this
    and other criminal activity that threatened to destabilize the cease-
    fire. The September 12 detention in Zugdidi of David Shengalia, the
    leader of one of the partisan bands, reduced tensions to some extent
    through the end of the year. During the year, there were several
    instances of hostage taking by criminal groups for ransom purposes. All
    of these kidnapings are believed to have been criminal or economic and
    not political.
        In June two U.N. officials, a foreign businessman, and their Abkhaz
    interpreter were abducted in Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge. They were handed
    over to Georgian authorities on June 5 without payment of the $300,000
    ransom demanded by their kidnapers.
        Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff members
    were abducted in the Pankisi Gorge in August. The three staff members
    were released on August 13, one week later.
        On November 30, two Spanish businessmen were abducted and held
    captive in Pankisi Gorge. Authorities still are searching for them.
        Two U.N. observers were abducted in Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge on
    December 10, and released 3 days later after negotiations with
    presidential representative Emzar Kvitsiani; reportedly no ransom was
    paid. Svan bandits are believed to be responsible for the abduction, as
    well as for a previous abductions of U.N. officials in October 1999 and
    2000.
        In Abkhazia, an autonomous republic in Georgia, six Georgians were
    taken hostage in Abkhazia's Gali region on August 23 and were released
    3 days later as a result of mediation by members of the U.N. Observer
    Mission and the CIS peacekeeping forces. The Abkhaz hostage takers did
    not receive the $2,050 (5,000 lari) they had demanded initially.
        Georgian and Abkhaz commissions on missing persons reported that
    the fates of more than over 1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz
    who disappeared as a result of the war in Abkhazia still are unknown.
    Abkhaz and Georgian officials agreed on joint efforts to determine the
    whereabouts and repatriate the remains of missing fighters. The ICRC
    cooperated in the effort through its Red Cross message system.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
    members of the security forces continued to torture, beat, and
    otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees, usually to extract money or
    confessions. International and domestic observers note that incidents
    of police abuse increased following the April presidential elections.
    Serious abuses and police misconduct continue and corruption and
    criminality, such as the fabrication or planting of evidence, remain
    problems. Widespread impunity remains a problem. Many human rights
    observers argue that the police increasingly believe that they will not
    be held accountable for such actions.
        The most serious incidents of abuse occur in the investigative
    phase of pretrial detention when suspects are interrogated by police.
    Human rights observers and lawyers noted that abuses occur more
    frequently at the time of arrest and in police stations, rather than in
    pretrial detention facilities, as was previously the case. Human rights
    advocates noted a growing number of confessions made in police
    stations. Some observers charge that police also also conducted
    investigations in apartments outside the police stations to avoid
    registering detainees. According to human rights observers, those who
    suffer such abuse are held routinely for lengthy periods in pretrial
    detention to give their injuries time to heal (see Section 1.e.). For
    example, David Sturva claimed that in September police tortured him
    with beatings and electric shocks, and attempted to suffocate him.
    Medical examinations confirmed his charges. Police also abused other
    detainees (see Section 1.d.).
        Police agents within the prison population allegedly committed
    abuses in pretrial detention facilities. For example, Paata Skhirtladze
    was beaten and his ear was bitten off by another prisoner (see Section
    1.d.). Another prisoner initially confessed on video camera that he was
    ordered to torture another inmate and force narcotics on him. Charges
    were brought against him for this incident, but he subsequently
    recanted his confession (see Section 1.e.).
        Police misconduct reportedly was worse outside Tbilisi, where
    awareness of laws and citizens' rights is lower and human rights NGO's
    are less active. However, one prominent human rights group notes that
    at the village level personal relationships work to prevent the sorts
    of abuse found in the larger towns and cities.
        Despite an overall culture of impunity, some policemen were
    arrested or administratively disciplined in high-profile cases of
    physical abuse or deaths in custody. According to the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs, 35 administrative inquiries were performed, 21
    policemen were reprimanded administratively; and 6 policemen were
    dismissed in connection with police abuses. However, recent changes to
    the Criminal Procedures Code weakened a detainee's ability to
    substantiate claims of such abuses (see Section 1.e.). In general,
    accountability tended to occur only in extreme cases, such as those
    resulting in death, and even then it is rare (see Section 1.a.). Many
    observers claimed that prosecutors frequently are reluctant to open a
    criminal case against the police or close a case for lack of evidence.
    Observers believe that many instances of abuse go unreported by victims
    due to fear of reprisals or lack of confidence in the system.
        Domestic human rights advocates reported that allegations of the
    use of torture, such as electric shock, to extract money or confessions
    significantly increased during the year. Human Rights Watch reported in
    1999 that mistreatment and physical abuse of detainees continued to be
    rampant. However, some observers noted that when the Ministry of State
    Security (as opposed to the Interior Ministry) managed the
    investigation, allegations of physical abuses were rare.
        In the past, security forces have tortured some defendants in
    politically sensitive cases, such as those involving members of the
    former Gamsakhurdia government and members of the paramilitary
    Mkhedrioni (see Section 1.e.). Local human rights observers alleged
    that abuses continued to occur in two pretrial detention facilities,
    Isolator Five in Tbilisi and the pretrial facility in Kutaisi. Isolator
    Five, in the basement of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs
    headquarters, the facility in which is detainees suspected of a serious
    crime or whose cases had political overtones incarcerated. As a
    condition of membership in the Council of Europe, Isolator Five was to
    be closed as of January 1, 2000; however, domestic human rights
    organizations claim that the facility remains open and serves the same
    function, only under a different name. According to local human rights
    observers, despite calls by senior law enforcement officials for
    investigators to show restraint, many persons who were detained in
    Isolator Five afterwards reported that they were beaten or otherwise
    abused. Often the threat of incarceration in this facility was
    sufficient to induce a confession.
        In contrast to those arrested in connection with the 1995
    assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze, in general those
    persons arrested in May 1999, for plotting against the Government and
    those arrested for the 1998 assassination attempt against President
    Shevardnadze reportedly were not mistreated. However, one suspect, Otar
    Melikadze, reported in June that investigators had tortured him.
    Although human rights observers noted that the Procuracy collected
    evidence, for use in the court proceedings, the families and state-
    appointed advocates of the defendants had limited access to them.
    Melikadze, Soso Nadiradze, Archil Panjikidze, and David Tsotsoria, who
    were arrested for plotting against the Government, initiated a hunger
    strike, claiming that they and their lawyers did not have access to
    their case files.
        Government officials acknowledged that Ministry of Internal Affairs
    personnel in the past routinely beat and abused prisoners and
    detainees. Government officials continued to claim that a lack of
    proper training, poor supervision of investigators and guards, and lack
    of equipment often resulted in abuse. For example, investigators in the
    past were trained to obtain confessions rather than use physical
    evidence to assemble a case. After law enforcement agencies expressed
    concern that the safeguards contained in the new Criminal Procedures
    Code would make it difficult for them to combat crime, amendments to
    the code in 1999 and during the year reinstated many of their powers
    (see Section 1.e.).
        International and local human rights observers expressed concern
    that corruption is related to the number of police officers nationwide.
    According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are 13,881 police
    officers; however, NGO's estimated that there are 35,000 police
    officers. The Government was unable to pay the salaries for the police
    force. Consequently, police solicited bribes from the general
    population, especially motorists, and also from suspects detained on
    suspicion of criminal activity. The period between an arrest and a bail
    hearing was another opportunity for solicitation of bribes. According
    to international and domestic observers, the police sometimes attempt
    to extort money from suspects in exchange for not officially
    registering an arrest. Police reportedly approached suspect's family
    and offered to drop charges in exchange for a bribe.
        Members of Parliament's Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic
    Relations and local human rights groups independently investigated
    claims of abuse. There was a significant increase in the number of
    claims filed; however, fear prevented many persons from filing claims,
    and not all claimants followed their claims all the way through to
    trial. The Committee noted that since the presidential election, claims
    shifted from requests for assistance to complaints about mistreatment
    and violations by the police and Procuracy, as well about of the
    Procuracy's failure to pursue criminal investigations of alleged
    violators. The National Security Council's human rights advisor also
    has a mandate to investigate claims of abuse. The Constitution mandates
    a human rights defender or ombudsman. The role of the ombudsman's
    office is to offer assistance to those who believe that abuse has
    occurred or a right has been violated; however, the law does not
    provide the ombudsman with the authority to forward a complaint to a
    court with a recommendation that it be reviewed prior to trial.
        Police officers reportedly sometimes beat and raped prostitutes.
        Members of the security forces beat members of religious minorities
    (see Section 2.c.).
        Police reportedly harassed and at times abused street children (see
    Section 5).
        Prison conditions are inhuman and life threatening. Facilities lack
    adequate cell space, medicine, and food. Infrastructure is crumbling
    due to lack of resources and corruption in the prison administration.
    The President pardoned 1,500 prisoners in April 1999, and 1,700
    prisoners in October 1999 as a means of alleviating crowding; however,
    observers still consider the prisons to be overcrowded. The problem was
    exacerbated by the hasty transfer of responsibility for prison
    administration to the Ministry of Justice, which was unprepared to take
    over, according to human rights observers and government officials. The
    authorities acknowledged that conditions are inhuman and life
    threatening; however, they did not take effective steps during the year
    to address the fundamental problems.
        On January 20, a riot broke out in Kutaisi's preventive detention
    Ward 2, reportedly triggered by the rape of a prisoner. As the result
    of an investigation, nine officials were dismissed, including the head
    of the ward. Some human rights groups claim that rape by inmates is
    common in prisons. Khvicha Kvirtia claimed that, while he was in
    prison, the head of the prison regularly beat him. He also claimed that
    those prisoners who had no money to bribe officials were tortured.
        Torture and physical abuse of prisoners led to deaths in custody.
    The prison mortality rate reportedly was high; however, human rights
    NGO's claim that authorities kept the official rates artificially low
    by releasing prisoners who were terminally ill or by sending prisoners
    to the hospital when they are on the verge of death. Additionally,
    monitors state that deaths of prisoners without families usually went
    unreported. The OSCE also noted an increase in the number of deaths in
    prison in the first 3 months after the transfer of authority to the
    Ministry of Justice. Most of the deaths during the year were attributed
    officially to medical causes, usually tuberculosis. According to the
    ICRC, tuberculosis is widespread in the prison system. In recognition
    of this fact, the ICRC continued a joint program with authorities begun
    in 1997 to reduce the incidence of the disease. In 1999 a prisoner
    reportedly weighing just 66 pounds was released from a Rustavi prison;
    he died within three days. Observers reported an increase in violence
    among prisoners, sometimes resulting in deaths. The increase was
    attributed to the insufficient and demoralized guard staff. One
    observer stated that the failure to pay guard staff and the loss of
    promotion possibilities due to the penitentiary reform created a
    staffing problem.
        Temur Papuashvili, a suspect in an alleged 1999 coup plot, died in
    custody on January 3, reportedly due to illness. However, the Ministry
    of State Security began an investigation into the death after
    allegations that Papuashvili had been poisoned. Two days later, the
    investigation was closed, apparently at the request of Pauashvili's
    mother and wife.
        In accordance with requirements stipulated by the Council of
    Europe, the responsibility for the prisons was transferred from the
    Minister of Internal Affairs (MOI) to the Ministry of Justice on
    January 1, 2000. Although the Ministry of Justice is responsible for
    overall administration of the prison system, the law on prisons permits
    MOI personnel to continue to staff the prisons. The MOI also maintains
    several of its own cells in the various prisons. Other legislation also
    permits the MOI to conduct investigations among inmates to gather
    evidence for trials without judicial approval. Local and international
    human rights observers noted little change in prison conditions. No
    significant personnel changes or restructuring occured prior to the
    appointment of Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili in October.
    However, following a number of officials were removed. Advocates noted
    an improvement in access for family members and to the telephone since
    the transfer of authority.
        The ICRC had full access to detention facilities, including those
    in Abkhazia, in accordance with its customary procedures, which include
    meetings with detainees without the presence of third-party observers
    and regular repetition of visits. The OSCE mission, whose mandate
    includes prison visits, reported bureaucratic delays but no serious
    problems in obtaining access to prisoners and detainees. However, local
    human rights groups reported that they have increasing difficulty in
    visiting detainees, especially in cases with political overtones.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    includes provisions to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest and
    detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions.
    The Constitution provides for a 9 month period of maximum pretrial
    detention, mandated court approval of detention after 72 hours, and
    imposes restrictions on the role of the prosecutor (see Section 1.e.).
    The old Soviet Criminal Code had been amended to implement these
    constitutional safeguards and was superseded in 1997 by the Criminal
    Procedures Code. These amendments generally, although not always, were
    observed, as prosecutors continue to maintain undue influence over
    criminal procedures. A new Criminal Code was enacted in June 1999.
        Judges issue warrants and detention orders, and suspects must be
    charged within 3 days. Pretrial investigatory detention is limited to 9
    months in accordance with the Constitution, instead of 18 months as
    allowed by the old Soviet code. Judges may extend pretrial detention by
    3 month intervals up to 9 months. Human rights NGO's stated that the
    amendments to the old Soviet Code made the pretrial detention period
    less arbitrary; however, international and domestic observers also
    stated that such detention usually is longer--sometimes as much as 2
    years--because this protection routinely is interpreted to include only
    the Procuracy's investigative period, not the defense's investigative
    period as well. Reportedly, police frequently detain persons without
    warrants. At year's end, there were 8,676 persons in custody, including
    both prisoners serving sentences and suspects held in pretrial
    detention.
        A new Criminal Procedures Code, along with other legislation to
    implement constitutional protections and restrict the powers of the
    Procuracy and the police, was passed by Parliament in 1997; however,
    implementation was delayed until May 1999 (see Section 1.e.). Following
    enactment of the New Criminal Code in June 1999, the Criminal
    Procedures Code was amended substantially in July of that year. A
    number of amendments sought to harmonize the Criminal Procedures Code
    with the new Criminal Code. However, several amendments significantly
    weakened protections against arbitrary arrest and detention.
    Specifically, the changes imposed severe restrictions on a detainee's
    access to the courts in the pretrial period. According to Human Rights
    Watch, before these amendments were enacted a defendant could complain
    directly to the court prior to a trial regarding abusive actions
    committed by the police or the Procuracy during a criminal
    investigation and could request a forensic medical examination. Under
    the ammended provisions, a defendant can file a complaint of abusive
    investigation only with the Procuracy. The Procuracy's decision cannot
    be appealed to the courts. Human rights NGO's state that this hinders a
    detainee's ability to substantiate a claim of police misconduct,
    especially in view of the close ties between the Procuracy and the
    police and the delays such requests entail. Human Rights Watch and
    other human rights advocates stated that permission for an independent
    forensic medical examination rarely is granted. It is difficult for
    those under criminal investigation to obtain objective medical
    examinations in a timely manner to substantiate reports of physical
    abuse. If a medical examination is not conducted within 3 to 4 days of
    the incident it becomes difficult to establish the cause of a
    detainee's injuries. In the courts, only a state employed forensic
    medical examiner--which in the vast majority of the criminal cases is
    an employee of the Ministry of Health's Judicial Medical Expert
    Center--can testify about the detainee's injuries. Human rights
    advocates criticize the state forensic examiners as biased in favor of
    the Procuracy.
        The amendments also eliminated the right of a witness to be
    accompanied by a lawyer when being questioned by the police. A witness
    can be held by the police for 12 hours without being charged. Human
    rights monitors claimed that the police frequently charge witnesses as
    suspects at the end of this period. Human Rights Watch also reported
    that police often called in a detainee's lawyer as a witness, thereby
    denying him access to his client. Human Rights Watch released a highly
    critical report in October that detailed new restrictions on due
    process and other setbacks to judicial reform.
        According to observers, including the OSCE and the Association of
    Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, police frequently treat
    individuals in their custody with brutality; however, correct legal
    procedures were observed more often once a detainee entered officially
    into the system. Police often failed to inform detainees of their
    rights and prevented access to family members and lawyers. While
    officially suspects are charged within 3 days of registration,
    observers claim that police frequently delay registering detainees for
    long periods in order to seek bribes in return for dispensing with
    registration altogether (see Section 1.c.). Authorities often held
    prisoners who were tortured and abused in police stations and pretrial
    detention for lengthy periods in order to give their injuries time to
    heal (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Police often claim that injuries
    were sustained during or before arrest.
        On June 18, Paata Skhirtladze was arrested for ``exhibitionism''
    and later charged with two ritual murders and deaths. He allegedly was
    subjected to abuse in Isolator Five. His ear was cut off, apparently by
    a fellow prisoner, and he was forced to swallow it. Skhirtladze
    apparently confessed to the murders, but human rights observers believe
    he did so under pressure and connect the abuse of Skhirtladze to his
    affiliation with the Osho community, a spiritual movement.
        In September the police stopped and searched David Sturua in
    Tbilisi's Saburtelo neighborhood. Upon finding keys in his bag, they
    charged Sturua and his friends with involvement in multiple burglaries.
    Sturua was taken to an MOI detention cell. He was not permitted to
    notify family members or contact a lawyer. He claims that he was
    subjected to torture, including attempted suffocation, electric shocks,
    and beatings. Medical examinations confirm Sturua's charges. The
    ombudsman asked the MOI to investigate (see Section 1.c.).
        Lasha Kartvelishvili, arrested for allegedly killing a police
    officer, claimed he was beaten severely and denied access to his lawyer
    before being charged. He was charged 14 days after his arrest (the
    legal limit is 72 hours) following the intervention of government human
    rights advocates. An independent medical examination found numerous
    injuries. Police say that he sustained his injuries falling down the
    stairs. Family members argued that he was tortured. The lawyer that his
    family retained to defend Kartvelishvili repeatedly was denied access
    to his client. Kartvelishvili never formally filed a complaint and
    assented to the official explanation of his injuries. He remained in
    prison at year's end.
        The Criminal Procedures Code established a system of bail; however,
    observers note that it rarely is employed.
        There were no cases of forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary often does
    not exercise full independence. Judicial impartiality is limited. The
    judicial reform process, which was completed in 1999, had some success
    in leading to the appointment of a larger number of more highly
    qualified judges; however, local and international observers agree that
    judicial authorities continue to defer to pressures from the executive
    branch and well-connected special interests. Investigators routinely
    plant or fabricate evidence and extort confessions in direct violation
    of the Constitution. Judges are reluctant to exclude evidence obtained
    illegally over the objection of the Procuracy.
        Results of the judicial reform effort were uneven. Judicial
    incompetence and corruption, including the payment of bribes to judges,
    is still a significant problem. Although there were reports by several
    trial attorneys and local NGO's in Tbilisi that some cases were being
    handled in a more and expeditious manner since the reform, progress
    outside of Tbilisi was not as marked. Observers commented that although
    judges were better educated, they are hindered by lack of practical
    experience. Human rights organizations point to poor access to case law
    as a further contributing factor. Due to the Government's fiscal
    crisis, judges' salaries were not paid for a 6-month period, creating
    an incentive to corruption. Pressure from extensive family and clan
    networks was extensive.
        The 1997 Law on the Courts, which was designed to enhance judicial
    independence, established a three-tier court system. Implementation of
    the law was completed in 1999. At the lowest level are district courts,
    which hear routine criminal and civil cases. At the next level are
    regional courts of appeal, which serve as appellate courts for district
    courts; they started functioning in May 1999. The regional (``city'')
    courts also try major criminal and civil cases, review cases, and
    either confirm verdicts or return cases to the lower courts for
    retrial. The Supreme Court acts as a higher appellate court and remains
    the court of first instance for capital crimes and appeals from the
    Central Election Commission.
        A separate Constitutional Court was created in 1996. Its mandate
    includes arbitrating constitutional disputes between branches of
    government and ruling on individual claims of human rights violations.
    The Court interpreted this latter function narrowly, agreeing to rule
    only in cases in which the complainant alleged that the violation was
    sanctioned by law. The court only considers one case at a time. Since
    its inception in 1996, many of the cases filed with the court have been
    heard and decided. The Court's rulings have demonstrated judicial
    independence.
        Administration of the court system was transferred from the
    Ministry of Justice to the Council of Justice in 1997. The Council has
    12 members, 4 selected from within each branch of government. The law
    established a three-part testing procedure for current and prospective
    judges to be administered by the council. The testing procedure was
    designed to reduce judicial incompetence and corruption. The
    Constitutional Court ruled in November 1998 that sitting judges could
    not be removed, thereby hampering the Government's attempts at judicial
    reform. The Parliament responded with a law stating that judges' terms
    would not be renewed beyond 2001 if they did not take and pass the
    examination, thereby observing the decision of the Constitutional
    Court, yet forcing the judges to qualify themselves through
    examination.
        The first judges' examination was administered in February 1998. A
    total of 5 examinations were administered by the end of 1999, and some
    250 judges had passed. A total of 176 judges passed both the exam and a
    vetting process and replaced judges who had not.
        Supreme Court justices also were required to take the examination.
    They resisted the requirement, arguing that the exam was an
    infringement on judicial independence and that, since they were
    confirmed by Parliament, they already were subject to public scrutiny
    and review. The Court's Chief Justice appointed 12 new justices, 10 of
    whom had passed the judicial exams. Some observers have alleged that
    the Supreme Court's decisions are subject to political and other undue
    influences.
        Aside from the judicial system, law enforcement as a whole still
    has not undergone significant reform. Payment of bribes to policemen
    and Procuracy officials reportedly is common (see Section 1.c.). The
    Procuracy is identified as part of the judicial system in the
    Constitution, and there were calls from legislators and others to move
    the Procuracy into the executive branch.
        According to the Constitution, a detainee is presumed innocent and
    has the right to a public trial. A detainee has the right to demand
    immediate access to a lawyer and to refuse to make a statement in the
    absence of counsel. The detaining officer must inform the detainee of
    his rights and must notify the detainee's family of his location as
    soon as possible. However, these rights are not observed fully in
    practice. Authorities frequently do not permit detainees to notify
    their families of their location. Defense attorneys and family members
    often have difficulty obtaining permission from investigators to visit
    clients. Investigators seldom inform individuals of their rights. There
    were lengthy delays in trials. Human Rights Watch noted that defense
    counsel is not required to be present at any pretrial hearings and that
    defendants and their attorneys regularly complained that they were not
    notified of scheduled hearings.
        Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police are not obliged to
    allow a lawyer to enter a police station unless hired by a detainee.
    Local police authorities limited lawyers' access to detainees. In 1999
    the Tbilisi city council initiated a project with a local NGO to create
    a system under which lawyers would be placed in Tbilisi police stations
    to advise detainees of their rights without charge. The project was
    implemented intermittently at the beginning of the year, but then was
    halted due to lack of funding and legal difficulties. Participating
    lawyers complained that there was low public awareness of the program
    and that local police authorities limited their access to detainees.
    For example, in 1999 one lawyer witnessed police beating a detainee;
    when she began to question the police, she was pushed out of the room.
    When representatives from NGO's and the Government arrived at the
    station, the police chief denied that any beating had occurred. While
    the district prosecutor promised to investigate the case, there had
    been no investigation by year's end. The Parliamentary Committee on
    Human Rights and National Minorities also created a card listing a
    citizen's rights in case of arrest. By year's end, it had distributed
    25,000 or 31,000 printed cards to students, NGO's, and visitors to the
    Committee.
        In 1999 the Tbilisi city council initiated a project with a local
    NGO to create a system under which lawyers would be placed in Tbilisi
    police stations to advise detainees of their rights without charge. The
    project was implemented intermittently at the beginning of 2000, but
    then was halted due to lack of funding and legal difficulties.
    Participating lawyers complained that there was low public awareness of
    the program, and that local police authorities were limiting their
    access to detainees.
        Parliament passed the legislation required to implement
    constitutional protections in 1997. The implementing legislation
    included the Criminal Procedures Code and the Law on the Procuracy.
    These laws were designed to create a legal system with adversarial
    trials by reducing the powers of the Procuracy, increasing the rights
    of defense attorneys, and enhancing the independence and authority of
    the judiciary; however, amendments to the Criminal Procedures Code
    adopted in 1999 and significantly weakened many of these provisions. As
    in the Soviet period, prosecutors continue to direct criminal
    investigations, supervise some judicial functions, and represent the
    State in trials. Most criminal trials continued to follow the Soviet
    model. Prosecutors continued to wield disproportionate influence over
    outcomes. The Criminal Procedures Code prohibits the same judge who
    signed a warrant from hearing the case; this rule frequently was
    violated outside of Tbilisi, since few regions have more than one
    judge.
        The Soviet system of state-employed criminal defense attorneys
    began to break down in 1998. Individuals who could afford to pay were
    able to obtain the attorney of their choice in both criminal and civil
    cases. In instances where defendants were unable to afford legal
    counsel, attorneys were assigned to a case upon the recommendation of
    the Procurator's Office by the Office of Legal Assistance, a part of
    the state-controlled Bar Association. In certain cases, defendants were
    pressured to accept a state-appointed attorney. The Procuracy not only
    had control over state-appointed lawyers; it also determined whether a
    defendant's request to change lawyers was granted. However, several
    NGO's provided free legal services for those whose human rights were
    violated in Tbilisi and one NGO was planning to open regional offices
    in 2001. Human Rights Watch noted that detainees sometimes are coerced
    by procurators to accept state-appointed attorneys or other attorneys
    who do not vigorously defend their interests.
        The quality of attorneys is uneven. In addition, licensing of
    forensic medical examiners and other experts is not an assurance of
    competence.
        International and local human rights groups agree that there are
    some political prisoners but disagree as to the number, giving
    estimates ranging from 25 to 54. A number of these individuals--
    including members of the Mkhedrioni, Gamsakhurdia supporters, and state
    security personnel committed criminal acts and were tried and sentenced
    for them on criminal grounds, although they may have had political
    motives. According to some local observers, detained political leaders
    of Gamsakhurdia's supporters never took up arms and should be
    considered political prisoners. Several, including Valter Shurgaia,
    Zviad Dzidziguri, and Zaur Kobalia, were still in prison at year's end.
    These individuals--political leaders of Gamsakhurdia's movement--were
    tried and convicted on poorly substantiated charges of treason,
    banditry, and illegal possession of weapons. They are serving sentences
    ranging from seven to twelve years. President Shevardnadze pardoned
    about ten political prisoners during the year, including former
    National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani and Nicholas Kvezereli. The
    latter was convicted, along with Jaba Ioseliani, of the 1995
    assassination attempt on the President. Two others who were imprisoned
    for attempting to assassinate Shevardnadze also were released. The 1998
    trial of Jaba Ioseliani, the head of the Mkhedrioni, and 14 other
    alleged conspirators in the 1995 assassination attempt on President
    Shevardnadze was characterized by the same violations found in other
    recent trials with political overtones. The Government consistently
    violated due process both during the investigation and the trial.
    Torture, use of forced confessions, fabricated or planted evidence,
    denial of legal counsel, and expulsion of defendants from the courtroom
    took place. Ten of the defendants claimed to have been beaten or
    tortured and coerced to confess during the investigative stage of the
    case. They allegedly were tried and convicted on poorly substantiated
    charges of treason, banditry, and illegal possession of weapons or have
    not yet been convicted. Some procedures were violated for those
    suspected of involvement in the 1998 assassination attempt on the
    President. The suspects were held beyond the legal maximum period of
    pretrial detention (see Section 1.d.).
        On February 2, four Zviadists (followers of Gamsakhurdia) began a
    hunger strike demanding amnesty for all political prisoners. They were
    joined by a number of sympathizers outside the prison. A local NGO,
    Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, and journalists were
    denied permission to visit the hunger strikers in prison. On April 8,
    the hunger strike ended after Chairman of Parliament Zurab Zhvania
    promised that the Parliament would deal with the question of strikers'
    amnesty, as well as the matter of amnesty for all involved in the 1992-
    93 civil war.
        On April 20, President Shevardnadze pardoned or reduced the term
    for 279 prisoners convicted in connection with the civil war and many
    participants in the 1995 assassination attempt, including Mkhedrioni
    leaders Jaba Ioseliani and Dodo Gugeshashvili. On April 22, the
    Parliament passed a resolution on national reconciliation. The
    resolution required the Procuracy to review the cases of those
    convicted in connection with the civil war and to create a list of
    convicts to be released by July 30. By year's end, 85 Zviadists were
    released under the program. Most of those remaining in prison had been
    charged or convicted of murder.
        Tengiz Asanidze, who was pardoned by President Shevardnadze in
    October 1999, remained in prison in Ajara. The authorities in Ajara
    refused to release him and later accused him of abduction and of
    financial crimes. He was awaiting trial at year's end. Asandize ran as
    a presidential candidate; as a result, the OSCE was able to visit him
    in prison. The Council of Europe's High Commissioner on Human Rights,
    Jose Alvaro Gil-Robles, visited Asanidze in June. Both Amnesty
    International and Gil-Robles have requested Asanidze's release.
        On October 1, 12 prisoners escaped from Tbilisi's prison hospital
    and were subsequently recaptured. Those who escaped included former
    Finance Minister (in the Gamsakhurdia administration) Guram Absanidze
    and two others who had been charged with an alleged assassination plot
    against the President. Observers suspected that the escape involved
    collusion; it was unclear whether this involved prison staff only or
    higher authorities as well. The escapees also included Vakhtang
    ``Loti'' Kobalia, former leader of military forces loyal to former
    President Gamsakhurdia in the civil war against the paramilitary
    Mkhedrioni and the national guard in 1992-93. Kobalia had been
    sentenced to death for murder and treason in 1996; his sentence later
    was commuted to 20 years. Their trial, together with eight other
    defendants, was due to resume on October 2 but was postponed following
    the escape.
        The Government allows international human rights and domestic
    organizations to visit political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids the wire tapping of
    telephones and other forms of interference in an individual's private
    life without court approval or legal necessity; however, in practice
    law enforcement agencies and other government bodies occasionally
    monitored private telephone conversations without obtaining court
    orders. The Government stated that state security police and state tax
    authorities sometimes entered homes and places of work without prior
    legal sanction in emergency cases as permitted by the Criminal
    Procedures Code. Police sometimes stopped and searched vehicles without
    probable cause in order to extort bribes (see Section 1.c.). Police
    misconduct and corruption undermined public confidence in government,
    especially the law enforcement agencies.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution, the 1991 press
    law, and other legislation provide for freedom of the press; however,
    although the independent press was generally free, several instances of
    intimidation of journalists occurred. According to journalists and
    NGO's, security and other authorities on occasion attempted to
    intimidate the press through public comments, private admonitions and,
    in some cases, violence. During the year, journalists were able to
    publish wide-ranging and extremely critical views of officials and
    their conduct. However, some journalists practice self-censorship. The
    Administrative Code enacted in 1999 contains a freedom of information
    section that provides for public access to government meetings and
    documents; however, few journalists have employed it. Libel laws
    inhibit investigative journalism. The Civil Code and other legislation
    make it a crime to insult the honor and dignity of an individual and
    place the burden of proof on the accused. Some advocates noted that the
    Government fails to register freedom of information act requests, as
    the Administrative Code requires. Moreover, they claimed that since the
    law contains no time limit for response, the release can be delayed
    indefinitely and the requesting party has no grounds for appeal.
        Some 200 independent newspapers are in circulation. The press
    increasingly served as a check on government, frequently criticizing
    the performance of high-level officials. Increasingly, independent
    newspapers have replaced the government-controlled press as the
    population's source of information. The highest-circulation independent
    daily newspaper, Alia, has a national circulation nearly 20 percent
    higher than the government-controlled daily. However, independent
    newspapers continue to struggle in the regions, due largely to the
    population's lack of purchasing power. Several newspapers are
    relatively serious and reputable sources of information, although lack
    of financial resources hinders overall journalistic development. The
    circulation of most newspapers is limited to at most a few thousand
    copies, and usually much less. Few newspapers are editorially
    independent and commercial viability; they usually are subsidized by
    and subject to the influence of their patrons in politics and business.
    High printing costs and general poverty, especially in the countryside,
    limited the circulation of most newspapers to a few hundred or a few
    thousand readers. The Government finances and controls one newspaper
    (which also appears in Russian-, Azeri-, and Armenian-language
    versions) and a radio and television network with a national audience;
    they reflect official viewpoints.
        Most persons continue to get their news from television and radio.
    The Government's monopoly on television news was broken when Rustavi-2,
    a member of the independent television network TNG, emerged in 1998 as
    an important alternative to state television, after successfully
    resisting 2 years of government attempts to shut it down. It now is
    considered the only station other than the state-run channel with a
    national audience. In addition to Rustavi-2, there are seven
    independent television stations in Tbilisi. An international NGO that
    works with the press estimated that there are more than 45 regional
    television stations, 17 of which offer daily news. While these stations
    are ostensibly independent, a lack of advertising revenue often forces
    them to depend on local government officials for support. Some regions,
    such as Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kutaisi, have relatively independent
    media. Rustavi-2 has a network of 15 stations, 5 of which broadcast
    Rustavi-2's evening news program daily. Independent newspapers and
    television stations continued to be harassed by state tax authorities.
    Stations desiring benefits and better working relations with
    authorities, practice self-censorship.
        Journalists stated that they are vulnerable to pressure from the
    authorities, as well as from business and societal elements. For
    example, Clara Abramia claimed that the police harassed her after she
    criticized the Internal Affairs Minister in a series of published
    articles. According to press reports, the Minister had requested that
    the Procuracy bring a criminal case against her, but the Procuracy
    refused citing a lack of evidence. She was granted political asylum in
    Sweden in February.
        Gia Abdalaze, a photographer for Kviris Palitra newspaper, alleged
    that four police officers beat him and broke his camera outside the
    Tbilisi Sports Palace on April 8. He was attempting to photograph
    police beating several youths who were attending a pre-election
    concert. He filed a complaint with the Saburtelo district police and
    the Procuracy. He claimed that the police threatened that they would
    plant narcotics on him and beat his family. The Procuracy never filed
    charges against the police. A group of NGO's protested the beating.
        On May 19, Akaki Gogichaishvili, the lead reporter for ``60
    Minutes,'' Rustavi-2's weekly investigative journalism series,
    announced that he had received a death threat indirectly from the
    Procurator's office. He was warned to stop broadcasting or face
    criminal charges, and then via a relative he was told to leave the
    country for his own safety. Following Gogichaishvili's May 19
    announcement, NGO's and members of the public gathered to protest the
    threats on his life. This threat allegedly was connected to allegations
    of corruption in the Georgian writers' union broadcast on his February
    26 and April 2 programs. In May the President issued a directive to the
    Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs, the Procurator, and
    the Chamber of Control to investigate the allegations made by 60
    minutes against the union. On May 11 the union was exonerated of
    corruption charges. Prior to the incident in May, Gogichaishvilli and
    others on his staff had received death threats and been harassed.
        On July 27, in Tbilisi, Vasiko Silagadze, a reporter for Eco Digest
    was beaten severely and his right thumb and forefinger slashed after he
    wrote a series of stories about alleged corruption of senior officials
    in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Silagadze claimed that he was
    attacked again on September 7. The Procuracy was investigating the
    first attack at year's end.
        On August 16, a mob led by Orthodox extremists, attacked
    journalists at a courtroom in Tbilisi (see Section 2.c.).
        In October President Shevardnadze publicly criticized the daily
    newspaper Rezonansi for reporting comments by an opposition politician
    in Parliament who called for the overthrow of the ``Shevardnadze
    regime.'' He asked the Procuracy to investigate the newspaper, which he
    stated had a history of provocative, antigovernment news coverage.
        On October 16, Antonio Russo, a reporter for Radio Radicale, was
    found dead outside of Tbilisi (see Section 1.a.).
        On October 14, 1999, George Kupuradze, a reporter for Rezonansi
    newspaper, and Sergei Belousov, a photographer, alleged that they were
    beaten severely by Devnoz Gabatashvili and other policemen when they
    tried to intervene on behalf of another person whom they claim was
    being beaten by police. Kupuradze suffered a concussion. He lodged a
    formal complaint and reportedly identified all three police officers
    involved at an identification procedure in the Gldani procurator's
    office. Only Gabatashvili was brought to trial and was charged with
    exceeding his authority and intentionally inflicting injury. Kupuradze
    alleged that the police officers tried to bribe him not to pursue the
    case. The Tbilisi court began hearing the case, but found the
    investigation inconclusive and referred the case back to the
    Procurator's office for further investigation. Kupuradze appealed, but
    the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in September.
        In 1998 the trial of two journalists from the independent newspaper
    Orioni who reported allegations of sexual harassment and homosexuality
    in the armed forces was postponed indefinitely in April 1998. At that
    time, government and military officials reportedly responded by
    threatening the reporters with arrest, demanding the names of sources,
    and filing a civil lawsuit that charged defamation. One of the two
    journalists, Amiran Meskheli, was detained for allegedly having evaded
    military service. He subsequently was conscripted and assigned to the
    unit about which he had reported. Human rights monitors considered this
    an attempt at intimidation and filed a lawsuit to overturn his
    conscription. Meskheli remained free on bail.
        The lack of an active journalists' association limited the
    effectiveness of media advocacy. Media observers noted that few
    journalists and government officials, especially in the regions,
    understand the legal protections afforded journalists and few have the
    resources to hire a lawyer to pursue court cases. Some have enlisted
    the assistance of the NGO community.
        The 1999 Law on Post and Communications removed the
    telecommunications licensing process (including radio and television)
    from the direct control of the Minister of Communications and
    established an independent, self-financed, three-person regulatory
    commission to create an open and transparent process. However, the
    commission has not yet become active.
        Channel 25 is the only independent television station broadcasting
    in Ajara, and has been operating since 1998. On February 14, it
    broadcast its first uncensored news coverage. On February 19, three of
    the four owners of the station alleged that they were coerced by Ajaran
    regional government officials and Mikhail Gagoshidze, chairman of
    Ajaran Television and Radio, to cede 75 percent of the company's shares
    to Gagoshidze. The owners stated that in return they were forced to
    take $50,000 (100,000 laris) in cash. The same day, Batumi mayor Aslan
    Smirba physically assaulted Avtandil Gvasalia, the station's commercial
    director. Smirba claimed that he had a right to own the station, as he
    had helped the company get permission to broadcast. The owners brought
    suit against Gagoshidze, but lost their case in Ajara regional court.
    The case was in the appeal process at year's end.
        The Government does not limit access to the Internet.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission
    from the authorities; however, both the national Government and local
    governments sometimes restrict this right in practice. A 1997 law on
    freedom of assembly requires political parties and other organizations
    to give prior notice and obtain permission from local authorities if
    they intend to assemble on a public thoroughfare. Members of the local
    NGO community believe that the law violates the Constitution and have
    sought to have it overturned by the Constitutional Court. However the
    Court refused to hear the case, explaining that a test case must be
    brought before it in order for it to consider the challenge, and that,
    an individual must prove that he has been harmed by this law. Most
    permits for assembly are granted without arbitrary restriction or
    discrimination; however, this is not the case for Zviadists, supporters
    of former President Gamsukhardia. Extreme Zviadists never have accepted
    any successor to the Gamsakhurdia government as legitimate and held
    demonstrations demanding that the present Government resign. The
    Government viewed the public rallies of the Zviadists as a threat
    because of the publicity they generated for themselves and against the
    Government. The police broke up one of their rallies held in May 1999
    and another in October. A hunger strike involving several hundred
    persons and conducted in the shell of Gamsakhurdia's burnt-out villa in
    Tbilisi since mid-June 1999 was not disturbed and continued at year's
    end.
        During the year, numerous rallies were held throughout Tbilisi and
    in other cities to protest pension and wages arrears. Police did not
    interfere. In June approximately 300 displaced persons gathered outside
    the Constitutional Court to demand payment of their overdue allowances.
    The police prevented the group from protesting in front of the
    Parliament. During the fall, demonstrations protesting energy shortages
    were common and allowed to proceed without hindrance. In February
    Zviadist politician Leila Tsomaia was beaten by two unidentified men in
    Tbilisi and hospitalized with a concussion. Zviadists claimed that she
    was beaten in order to prevent a rally the following day. She never
    filed a complaint. On April 6, Tsomaia and another opposition
    politician, Luisa Shakashvili, were escorted by the police out of the
    city, allegedly to prevent them from participating in a rally. In
    February 1999, she and Tamila Nikoldaze, a fellow Zviadist, had been
    pardoned and released from prison. They had been incarcerated on
    charges of civil disorder for attempting to stage a rally in front of
    Tbilisi university in 1997.
        During the year, the police broke up rallies or gatherings and
    meetings held by various religious groups or watched while members of
    the public disrupted them (see Section 2.c.). Local authorities several
    times prevented Jehovah's Witnesses from conducting open-air assemblies
    on private and public property. In September police did nothing to
    prevent and allegedly participated in the break-up of two such
    assemblies in Zugdidi and Marneuli by followers of a radical former
    Orthodox priest, Father Basil Mkalavishvili. Jehovah's Witnesses
    reported ongoing threats and harassment by local police and other
    authorities in the fall (see Section 2.c.). On December 15, in the
    village of Uraveli, a group of 100-150 persons surrounded a house where
    40 Jehovah's Witnesses had gathered and forced them to flee the area.
    On December 18, Father Mkalavishili and his followers tried to disrupt
    construction work on a Pentecostal meeting hall in Tbilisi. On December
    19, followers of Father Mkalavishvili tried to enter Guram
    Markozashvili's Tbilisi residence in order to force him to sign a
    document stating that he would no longer conduct meetings of Jehovah's
    Witnesses in his home.
        According to press reports, police prevented a group of Chechens
    from starting a public walk for peace to Azerbaijan from the Akhmeta
    district on February 14. One participant allegedly was beaten. The
    authorities reportedly stated that the action was not registered and
    therefore was illegal.
        In the Baghdati region of Imereti, police attempted to prevent a
    foreign labor union official and representatives of the Free Trade
    Union of Teachers of Georgia ``Solidarity'' (FTUTGS) from holding a
    meeting (see Section 6.a.).
        Some rallies of opposition presidential candidate Jumber
    Patiashvili were disrupted, and in some areas he was denied permission
    to use public buildings (see Section 3).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice. Authorities
    granted permits for registration of associations without arbitrary
    restriction or discrimination. However, on June 24, the Tbilisi
    appellate court overturned the registration of two organizations
    affiliated with Jehovah's Witnesses on the grounds that there was no
    law regulating the registration of religious organizations (see Section
    2.c.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, local police and security officials harassed several non-
    Orthodox religious groups, particularly local and foreign missionaries,
    including Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, and Hare Krishnas.
        The Constitution recognizes the special role of the Georgian
    Orthodox Church in the country's history without further defining it,
    but also stipulates the independence of the Church from the State. The
    tax code grants tax exemptions only for the Orthodox church and not for
    any other religion. The Georgian Orthodox Church has lobbied Parliament
    and the Government for laws that would grant it special status and
    restrict the activities of missionaries from nontraditional religions.
    Various draft laws, some modeled on the Russian law on religion, have
    been rejected by Parliament.
        Certain members of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the public view
    non-Orthodox, so-called ``sects'' as a threat to the Church and
    Georgian cultural values, a perception that some politicians exploited
    during elections. Local police and security officials at times harassed
    foreign missionaries and non-Georgian Orthodox congregations or did not
    intervene when others harassed them. For example, on September 16, the
    police and followers of the excommunicated priest Basil Mkalavishvili
    prevented Jehovah's Witnesses from holding a convention in Marneuli by
    stopping buses, physically attacking followers and burning and looting
    the convention site (see Section 2.b.). Jehovah's Witnesses allege that
    police actively participated in these activities, and at least one
    eyewitness confirmed that police did not impede the so-called
    Basilists. The head of the Marneuli district administration was
    dismissed on September 19 for undisclosed reasons following the
    incident there. An investigation was being conducted at year's end.
        On September 9, police impeded buses from traveling to a Jehovah's
    Witnesses convention in Zugdidi. The convention began as scheduled, but
    was cut short due to pressure from local authorities, according to
    Jehovah's Witnesses. As the convention was dispersing, unidentified
    persons attacked some followers, looted the private property on which
    the convention was held, and burned the rostrum. According to Jehovah's
    Witnesses, the attackers were dressed in special forces uniforms.
        On May 29, 1999, the police violently broke up a public prayer
    meeting of the Assembly of God in the Gldani district of Tbilisi,
    beating a number of members, pushing a 60-year-old woman to the ground,
    and screaming threats of murder. Church members sued police and prior
    to the subsequent civil trial, Ministry of Internal Affairs officials
    repeatedly harassed the pastor and members of the congregation. At the
    trial on August 16, 1999, the judge ruled that the police had not
    violated the individuals' constitutional rights. The group filed an
    appeal and incurred further harassment from law enforcement
    authorities. On August 29, 1999, a riot allegedly instigated by the
    police broke out at one of the organization's churches. Some members
    were beaten, and the police confiscated some members' documents,
    forcing the victims to retrieve them at the police station.
        In July and August Customs officials and security officials
    impounded over 40 tons of religious materials being imported by
    Jehovah's Witnesses. The materials were not released, despite
    intervention by the National Security Council official responsible for
    human rights. The Customs Department stated that it had received
    notification that the Tbilisi Appellate Court had annulled Jehovah's
    Witnesses' organizational registration and therefore legally had to
    hold the literature. Jehovah's Witnesses filed suit against the Customs
    Department and officials in August; and their literature was released
    in December.
        In September the Government refused to extend the visa of the
    official representative of the Watchtower Society (Jehovah's Witnesses)
    to the Caucasus; however, he later was issued a visa.
        In October 1999, a Jehovah's Witnesses' worship service of 120
    parishioners in the Gldani section of Tbilisi was attacked violently by
    renegade Georgian Orthodox group (see Section 5). (The leader of this
    group was excommunicated from the Church due to its radical and
    confrontational stance). The Gldani police refused to intervene.
    Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, 1999, the
    case was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal
    charges. Despite the advocacy by the National Security Advisor for
    human rights on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses, in January the Gldani
    regional prosecutor's office returned the case to the city prosecutor's
    office, stating that no violation had occurred. The group continues to
    press for prosecution of the police's behavior in this and similar
    subsequent incidents. Instead, the official in charge of the
    investigation decided in June to charge one of the plaintiffs with
    hooliganism. On September 28, the two were given suspended sentences of
    6 months and 3 years, respectively. The two witnesses are planning to
    appeal their conviction. The judge also refered for further
    investigation the case of two followers of excommunicated priest Father
    Basil Mkalavishvili, who were charged with burning Jehovah's Witnesses
    literature during the same incident; however, unlike those of Jehovah's
    Witnesses, these cases were later dismissed.
        A member of parliament brought a civil suit in April 1999 to ban
    Jehovah's Witnesses, arguing that the organization is antiOrthodox,
    antistate, and antinational. Appeals by Jehovah's Witnesses to an
    appellate court and then to the Supreme Court contending that the suit
    was groundless were refused. The Supreme Court stated that the lower
    court first must hear the case. In November 1999, the lower court judge
    remanded the issue to an academic study group to study the literature
    of Jehovah's Witnesses. In February the Isani-Samgori district court
    dismissed the lawsuit based on the opinion of an academic panel. The
    case was appealed to the Tbilisi district appeals court, and on June
    23, the court ruled in favor of the member of parliament. Jehovah's
    Witnesses' appealed to the Supreme Court; a hearing was scheduled for
    January 2001.
        On January 16, two members of Jehovah's Witnesses were attacked on
    the street in Gldani. On February 13, another pair of members was
    attacked. They filed a complaint with both the police and the
    prosecutor; both refused to pursue charges.
        On August 20, the chief of the Tianeti District police and three
    other policemen reportedly dispersed a service in a Baptist Church and
    looted the property. The pastor allegedly was taken to the police
    station and threatened with future arrests. No action had been taken
    against the policemen by year's end.
        On September 28, police raided a Hare Krishna meeting house in
    Tbilisi and confiscated a large amount of religious literature.
        The Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church have
    been unable to secure the return of churches closed during the Soviet
    period, many of which later were given to the Georgian Orthodox church
    by Soviet authorities. A prominent Armenian church in Tbilisi remained
    closed. The Armenian Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church, and
    Protestant denominations have had difficulty obtaining permission to
    construct new churches, reportedly in part as a result of pressure from
    the Georgian Orthodox Church. However, a new Catholic Church opened in
    Tbilisi in 1999 and another in Batumi during the year.
        Regular and reliable information about the ``Republic of
    Abkhazia,'' which is not recognized by any country and over which the
    government of Georgia does not exercise control, is difficult to
    obtain. The Abkhaz ``President,'' Vladislav Ardzimba, issued a decree
    in 1995 that banned Jehovah's Witnesses in Abkhazia. It remains in
    effect. A number of members of Jehovah's Witnesses were detained
    subsequently. Five persons who were detained in April 1999 for
    violating the decree were released in early May after their counsel
    argued that their detention violated a freedom of conscience clause in
    the Abkhaz Constitution.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution, the 1993 Law on
    Migration, and other legislation generally provide for these rights,
    and the Government generally respected them in practice. Registration
    of an individual's place of residence is not required, nor were
    internal passports. Old Soviet passports bearing ``propiskas'' (proof
    of legal residence in a particular locality) were accepted as proof of
    identity because passports and identity cards are expensive and
    difficult for many members of the electorate to obtain, especially in
    poorer and more remote rural areas.
        On July 21, border guards prevented Jehovah's Witnesses traveling
    from Armenia from entering the country, claiming that the group no
    longer was a legal organization in Georgia. Only after official
    authorization by the head of the border guards were the followers
    permitted to cross.
        Approximately 275,000 so-called ``Meskhetian Turks,'' who were
    expelled from southern Georgia to Central Asia by Stalin in the 1940's,
    still face both official and public opposition to their return in the
    face of threats by local ethnic-Armenian inhabitants of the Samtske-
    Javakheti region and officials of the government of Armenia that their
    return to the region would cause a violent reaction. Many of the
    Meskhetians were expelled a second time from Central Asia when the
    Soviet Union broke up and remain stateless.
        In 1996 President Shevardnadze issued a decree authorizing the
    return of 1,000 Meskhetians per year for 5 years. The decree has never
    been implemented, and to date only a few hundred Meskhetians have
    returned as illegal immigrants. The Government has provided housing for
    most of them, but because they were to be the subject of a separate
    law, which has not yet been passed, they were deprived early in 1998 of
    their refugee status and, consequently, of their housing subsidy. Most
    of the approximately 600 Meskhetians living in the country have
    Georgian citizenship.
        In December 1997, Parliament passed a law entitled ``Recognizing
    Georgian Citizens as Political Victims and Social Protection of the
    Repressed.'' This law, intended to rehabilitate victims of the Soviet
    era, specifically excluded the Meskhetians, whom it identified as the
    subject of a separate law. Draft legislation regarding Meskhetians has
    yet to be introduced in Parliament.
        In March 1999, a presidential decree was issued to address the
    Meskhetian issue. It established the State Commission on the
    Repatriation and Rehabilitation of the Population Deported from
    Southern Georgia. In connection with its accession to the Council of
    Europe in April 1999, the Government undertook to begin the process of
    Meskhetian repatriation within 3 years. In July 1999, the Government
    announced that it had granted citizenship to 36 Meskhetians.
        The 1994 quadripartite agreement between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia,
    and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on repatriation in
    Abkhazia called for the free, safe, and dignified return of internally
    displaced persons (IDP's) and refugees to their homes. The Abkhaz
    separatist regime prevented virtually any official repatriation and
    unilaterally abrogated the agreement in late 1994. From 1994 to May
    1998, an estimated 53,000 of the 283,000 IDP's and refugees from
    Abkhazia returned spontaneously, most to the southern part of the Gali
    district. In May 1998, the unstable security situation in Gali
    deteriorated into open warfare between the Abkhaz militia and Georgian
    partisans and MOI troops. The partisans were defeated and, in the
    aftermath, many of the Georgian returnees fled once again as their
    homes were burned and looted by Abkhaz separatist forces.
        In January 1999, the Abkhaz separatists unilaterally invited IDP's
    to return to Gali starting on March 1, 1999, but did so in the absence
    of measures acceptable to the Georgian Government for ensuring their
    safe return and security. The move did not affect significantly the
    return of IDP's to Gali, who continued to travel back and forth to Gali
    to tend their property. Since May 1998, IDP's continue to travel back
    and forth to the Gali region and as many as 40,000 may be living in
    Gali on a more or less permanent basis.
        The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of
    thousands of IDP's and refugees. Ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia
    fled to Georgia proper and Ossetians from South Ossetia and other
    Georgian regions fled to Russia. In 1997 the UNHCR began a program to
    return IDP's and refugees to their homes. Both sides created obstacles
    that slowed the return. There were about 24,000 Ossetian refugees
    living in North Ossetia, Russia. To date about 370 Ossetian families
    from Russia have returned, the majority to South Ossetia. The South
    Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the repatriation of ethnic
    Georgians to South Ossetia, although approximately 200 families
    returned. For political reasons, South Ossetia continued to press for
    the return of all Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to
    their original homes in other Georgian regions. In 1997 the Government
    publicly recognized the right of Ossetian refugees to return to their
    homes in Georgia but took little action to facilitate their return.
    Persistent opposition by Georgian authorities, especially at the local
    level, over the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the
    organized return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. During the
    year, approximately 13 Ossetian refugee families returned to South
    Ossetia, 11 Ossetian refugees returned to Georgia proper, and 32
    Georgian IDP families returned to South Ossetia. Since the outbreak of
    hostilities in the Chechnya region of Russia in September 1999, the
    Government has registered approximately 7,000 refugees from that
    region. Most were women and children and settled in the Pankisi Gorge.
        There is no effective law concerning the settlement of refugees or
    the granting of political asylum, including first asylum, in accordance
    with the principles of 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Parliament passed an asylum law in
    March 1998, but it is not fully consistent with international standards
    as set out in the U.N. Convention.
        According to the UNHCR, the Government processed no asylum cases
    during year, one in 1999, and none in 1998. There were no reports of
    the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution and the 1995 parliamentary and presidential
    election laws provide citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully through regular elections; however, the April
    presidential elections were marred by numerous serious irregularities
    and limited this right in practice. An elected president and parliament
    govern most of the country.
        Presidential elections were held on April 9. There were seven
    official candidates, although two candidates, Aslan Abashidze and
    Tengiz Asanidze, withdrew less than 24 hours before the election. Only
    two candidates campaigned actively: the incumbent, President Eduard
    Shevardnadze, and Jumber Patiashvili, both former leaders of the
    Georgian Communist Party during the Soviet period. International
    observers strongly criticized the election. The CEC reported that
    Shevardnadze won with over 78 percent of the vote to Patiashvili's 16
    percent, in contrast to observer estimates of 50 to 70 percent of the
    vote for Shevardnadze and 30 percent for Patiashvilli. The OSCE noted
    serious irregularities, including instances of ballot stuffing, group
    voting, groups of identical signatures on voters lists, media bias, and
    lack of transparency in vote counting and tabulation. Some observers
    also noted a police presence in polling places and insufficiently
    representative electoral commissions at all levels. The OSCE noted that
    the situation deteriorated in the counting process. In general
    procedural safeguards were not implemented. The CEC annulled the
    election results of six polling stations.
        During the campaign period, Patiashvili protested unfair media
    coverage. Eleven candidates applied for registration to the CEC. Seven
    parties nominated and registered independent candidates through a
    procedure that was not fully transparent. Former President
    Gamsakhurdia's finance minister Guram Absanidze, who was accused of
    organizing an assassination attempt against President Shevardnadze in
    1998 (see Section 1.e.), applied to register as a presidential
    candidate. The CEC rejected his application, since he had not been
    living in the country for 2 years before the election. On August 31,
    the Supreme Court overturned this decision. At year's end, Absandze was
    awaiting trial after his escape from prison and subsequent recapture in
    October.
        The Revival Bloc, a coalition of opposition political parties also
    known as the Batumi Alliance and closely linked to Ajaran leader Aslan
    Abashidze, claimed that the election discredited the political process
    in the country. A number of smaller political parties boycotted the
    election, and another party urged the electorate to vote against all
    candidates. A number of opposition rallies were disrupted by police or
    bureaucratic obstacles were erected to prevent their organization (see
    Section 2.b.).
        Extensive amendments to the electoral laws were adopted less than
    three weeks before the presidential election, causing confusion in the
    administration of the election. There was inadequate time to implement
    some of the amendments properly. The OSCE also raised concerns about
    the transparency of the candidate registration process and ballot
    distribution.
        Parliamentary elections were held in October 1999. Thirteen
    electoral blocs and 34 political parties fielded candidates for 150
    proportional and 75 majoritarian seats. The Citizens' Union of Georgia
    (CUG), chaired by President Shevardnadze, won an outright majority.
    International observers judged the conduct of the elections throughout
    the country to be a step towards compliance with OSCE commitments, but
    noted that the election process did not meet all commitments. A number
    of irregularities were noted, including restrictions on freedom of
    movement, which on occasion prevented political parties and observers
    from exercising their rights. A second round was held on November 14,
    which OSCE observers described as well-conducted in some districts but
    marred with irregularities in others. The OSCE cited in particular
    intimidation of members of precinct election commissions and instances
    of ballot stuffing in Tbilisi, Abasha, and Chkhorotsku. The OSCE noted
    problems such as the election law's provision permitting the ruling
    party to dominate all levels of the election administration, the CEC's
    insufficiently transparent vote tabulation, and the CEC's poor handling
    of election complaints. In the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, dominated
    by Ajaran supreme chairman Aslan Abashidze, fraud was widespread. There
    was no voting in these elections in the separatist regions of Abkhazia
    and South Ossetia, which remain outside government control. Ten Members
    of Parliament from Abkhazia elected in 1992 had their terms extended.
        The local governments elected in November 1998 were expected to
    have more authority over how local government is run; however, lack of
    funding from the central government (in lieu of an independent tax
    base), corruption, and the absence of legislative guidelines made it
    difficult for them to exercise authority. The opposition criticized the
    Government for retaining the power to appoint the mayors of the largest
    cities and regional chairmen, who were not always from the area they
    serve.
        The division of power between the central and local governments
    remained a key issue in the country's transition to democracy.
        The degree of actual autonomy to be exercised by the ``Autonomous
    Ajaran Republic'' was at the center of this debate during the year.
    Ajara's post-independence relationship to the rest of the country still
    was undefined and, in matters such as elections, Ajara's authorities
    claimed that regional laws took precedence over national laws. The
    Revival Party, the dominant political party in Ajara led by Aslan
    Abashidze, the supreme chairman of the Ajaran Autonomous Republic,
    boycotted the national Parliament for much of the year in a dispute
    with the CUG over the degree of autonomy in Ajara. The party took part
    in the October 1999 parliamentary elections as the major opponent to
    Shevardnadze's CUG. The Government was reluctant to challenge
    interference in the local electoral process by the Ajaran authorities
    because it sought to avoid encouraging threats of separatism in this
    ethnically Georgian, but historically Muslim region.
        In the November 1998 local elections, the mayor was elected by a
    direct vote in Batumi, in contrast to the other major cities. In the
    October 1999 parliamentary elections, international and domestic
    observers reported various forms of intimidation and abuses in Ajara,
    as well as outright fraud.
        In April the Parliament granted the former autonomous Soviet
    Republic of Ajara the constitutional status of an autonomous republic.
    The division of authorities and competencies between the national and
    Ajaran governments had not yet been defined.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
    women's NGO's took an active role in the 1999 parliamentary election
    season, engaging candidates in discussions about issues of concern to
    their memberships. In the 235-seat Parliament, women were represented
    poorly in the 1999 election with only 16 women winning seats. Only two
    women held ministerial posts.
        Representation of national minorities decreased in the new
    Parliament from 16 members to 13 members; there were 6 ethnic Armenian
    representatives and 4 ethnic Azeris in the new Parliament. Ethnic
    Armenians in 1995 constituted 11 percent of the population as a whole,
    while ethnic Azeris made up 3.8 percent of the population. Other
    minority groups represented include Ossetians, Kurds, Jews, and Greeks.
        ``Presidential elections'' were held in Abkhazia in October 1999.
    International organizations, including the U.N. and the OSCE declared
    them illegal. Georgian authorities criticized them as having no legal
    basis, as they had the Abkhaz local elections of March 1998, on the
    basis that a majority of the population has been expelled from the
    region.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government generally respected the right of local and
    international organizations to monitor human rights but continued to
    restrict the access of local human rights groups to some prisoners (see
    Section 1.c.).
        There are a number of credible local organizations that monitored
    human rights, most of them in Tbilisi. Other local human rights groups
    that are extensions of partisan political groups have little
    credibility or influence. Local human rights NGO's reported that the
    Government was slightly less responsive during the year. They continued
    to view the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights as the most
    objective of the Government's human rights bodies. The National
    Security Council's human rights advisor was engaged on some human
    rights matters, including those of Jehovah's Witnesses (see Section
    2.c.).
        The constitutionally mandated Office of Public Human Rights
    Defender, or ombudsman, was created in 1995. The first ombudsman was
    appointed to the position in November 1997 and chose to focus on social
    and economic issues, rather than on defending political and civil
    rights. He resigned in August 1999. On July 16, Nana Devdariani was
    appointed to the position. While government representatives have been
    effective in individual cases, neither they nor the NGO's have been
    successful in prompting systemic reform. NGO's can and do bring suits
    to courts of the first instance on behalf of persons whose rights have
    been abused.
        In 1997 the UNHCR and the OSCE mission established a joint human
    rights office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, to investigate security incidents
    and human rights abuses. The office, which has operated sporadically
    because of fluctuating security conditions, provides periodic findings,
    reports, and recommendations. The human rights office in Sukhumi
    registered relatively few complaints of abuse by de facto police and
    judicial authorities in the region.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens without
    regard to race, language, sex, religion, skin color, political views,
    national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, social status, land
    ownership, or place of residence, and the Government generally
    respected these rights. The Constitution stipulates Georgian as the
    state language. Ethnic Armenians, Azeris, Greeks, Abkhaz, Ossetian, and
    Russian communities prefer to communicate in their native languages or
    in Russian. Both Georgian and Russian are used for interethnic
    communication.
        Women.--The Criminal Code, in force since June 1, classifies
    marital rape and sexual coercion as crimes. There are no laws that
    specifically criminalize spousal abuse or violence against women.
    According to a poll conducted in 1998 by the NGO Women for Democracy,
    younger women reported that spousal abuse occurs with some frequency
    and, since it is a social taboo to go to the police or otherwise to
    raise the problem outside the family, it is reported or punished only
    rarely. Spousal abuse is reportedly one of the leading causes of
    divorce. Domestic violence continued to rise as economic conditions
    became more difficult. Police did not always investigate reports of
    rape. A local NGO, with the help of an international NGO, opened a
    shelter for abused women in the spring of 1998. The Government
    established a hot line for abused women, but provided no other
    services. There are currently anonymous telephone services specialized
    in assisting female rape victims, but there are no shelters,
    specialized services, or other mechanisms to protect and assist them.
    In February the President approved a national action plan on combating
    violence against women, which charged the Ministries of Internal
    Affairs, Labor, Health and Social Affairs with providing support to
    victims; however, this plan was not implemented at year's end. Sexual
    harassment, reportedly a problem in the workplace, was not
    investigated.
        Kidnaping of women for the purpose of marriage continues to occur,
    especially in rural areas, although the practice is declining. Such
    kidnapings are often arranged elopements; however, these abductions
    often occur against the will of the intended bride, and sometimes
    involve rape.
        Prostitution is not a criminal offense. There were proposals to
    create legal controls for prostitution, in part to prevent the spread
    of venereal diseases. The President has indicated his opposition to the
    idea.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace is a
    problem, especially as economic conditions worsen, according to a U.N.
    Development Program report.
        The Civil Code gives women and men equal inheritance rights. A
    number of women's NGO's, including the women's group of the Georgian
    Young Lawyers' Association, the Women's Center, and Women for
    Democracy, promote women's rights. NGO's supported a 1998 poll of women
    conducted by Women for Democracy, which found a gap between the
    perceptions of older and younger women. Older women tended to view
    their place in traditional society as an honored one; younger women
    reported that although there were no real barriers to a professional
    life or to a good education, discrimination and harassment in the
    workplace were problems. Younger women also reported that the economic
    balance had shifted in their favor, as many traditionally male jobs
    disappeared due to the depressed economy. Women's access to the labor
    market was improving but remained primarily confined, particularly for
    older women, to low-paying and low-skilled positions, often without
    regard to high professional and academic qualifications. Many women,
    especially of the generation under the age of 35, hold highly
    professional positions. However, these are a lower percentage than men.
    A study released by the Caucasus Center for Sociological Studies during
    the year noted that 72 percent of working women no longer believe that
    they should have a dependent role in the family. However, almost half
    of these women stated that they would compromise this belief to
    preserve the family unit. Many women seek employment abroad.
        A study released in 1999 reported that women were paid 78 percent
    of men's wages in the public sector and 67 percent of men's wages in
    the private sector. The Government's data noted a wider disparity in
    both categories. Reportedly, men were given preference in promotions.
    Of the 105,000 unemployed persons throughout the country, 55 percent
    were women. Women rarely fill leadership positions. The Government had
    no active efforts focused on women's issues. According to the UNDP,
    employers frequently withhold benefits connected to pregnancy and
    childbirth.
        Children.--Government services for children were extremely limited.
    The 1995 Health Reform Act withdrew free health care for children over
    the age of 3 years. While education is officially free, many parents
    were unable to afford books and school supplies, and most parents have
    to pay for their children's education. The Ministry of Education
    announced in that it was beginning an overhaul of the educational
    system; however, no action had been taken by year's end.
        There was no societal pattern of abuse of children, but difficult
    economic conditions broke up some families and increased the number of
    street children. The private voluntary organization Child and
    Environment noted a significant increase in the number of homeless
    children following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It estimated that
    there are currently more than 2,500 street children in Tbilisi due to
    the inability of orphanages and the Government to provide support. The
    organization opened a shelter in 1997. The Ministry of Education opened
    a second shelter in July 1998. However, even together, the two shelters
    can accommodate only a small number of the street children. Outside of
    Tbilisi, even in areas of acute need such as Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and
    Batumi, no such facilities or services existed. The children
    increasingly survive by turning to criminal activity, narcotics, and
    prostitution. Police increasingly harassed and abused street children.
    Despite a cultural tradition of protecting children, the Government
    took little official action to assist street children due to a lack of
    resources.
        The Isolator for street children in Gldani is allegedly overcrowded
    and children frequently are abused. In September police beat and
    detained Sasha Duchenko in the Gldani facility for 3 days before his
    parents were informed. His parents had reported him missing to their
    local district police station. However, the child had not been
    registered and his parents at first were told that he could not be
    found. The police then tried to extort money for the boy's return. The
    child was released only after a public protest.
        The lack of resources negatively affected orphanages as well. In
    all orphanages children received inadequate food, clothing, education,
    and medical care; facilities lacked heat, water, and electricity. The
    adult staff was paid poorly and had many months of unpaid wages. The
    staff often diverted money and supplies provided to the orphanages for
    its own use.
        The Criminal Code states that child prostitution and pornography
    are punishable by imprisonment of 3 months to 3 years.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no legislated or otherwise
    mandated provision requiring access for the disabled. However, the 1995
    Law on the Social Security of Disabled Persons mandates that the State
    ensure appropriate conditions for the disabled to use freely the social
    infrastructure and to ensure proper protections and supports. The Law
    on Labor has a section that includes the provision of special discounts
    and favorable social policies for those with disabilities, especially
    disabled veterans.
        Many of the state facilities for the disabled that operated in the
    Soviet period have been closed because of lack of government funding.
    Most disabled persons are supported by family members or by
    international humanitarian donations.
        Religious Minorities.--The Georgian Orthodox Church repeatedly has
    spoken out against so-called ``sects'' and argued that foreign
    Christian missionaries should confine their activities to non-Christian
    areas. Foreign missionaries continued to report harassment on the part
    of extremist Orthodox groups, local police, and security officials (see
    Section 2.c.).
        There was no pattern of anti-Semitism. The Jewish community
    experienced delays in the return of property confiscated during Soviet
    rule. A court ordered a former synagogue, rented from the Government by
    a theater group, to be returned to the Jewish community in 1997. The
    theater group refused to comply and started a publicity campaign with
    anti-Semitic overtones to justify its continued occupation of the
    building. In December 1997, President Shevardnadze promised Jewish
    leaders that the synagogue would be returned before the celebration of
    2,600 years of Jewish settlement in Georgia, on September 9, 1998.
    However, the President's order was not enforced and the building
    remained in the hands of the theater group. The district court ruled
    again in February 1999 that the synagogue building must be returned to
    the Jewish community and ordered the city to find other premises and
    provide compensation for the theater company. However, the case was
    appealed and on, July 3, the Tbilisi appellate court overturned the
    February 1999 decision. The Jewish community plans to appeal to the
    Supreme Court.
        On April 19, Jehovah's Witnesses services were dispersed in four
    different cities in the western part of the country. Complaints were
    lodged, but no charges were filed. On May 17, the excommunicated priest
    Basil Mkalavishvili and his followers held a protest demonstration
    outside Parliament, demanding that the Georgian Orthodox Church be
    declared the state religion and that Jehovah's Witnesses be banned. The
    Basilists also tried to beat an official of Jehovah's Witness and
    burned a photograph of a prominent human rights activist who has been
    active on behalf of oppressed religious minorities. On May 18, the
    Basilists held a rally in front of Parliament to protest the activities
    of nontraditional religious groups and NGO's.
        In January and February police and prosecutors refused to prosecute
    persons who attacked members of Jehovah's Witnesses.
        On July 28, in Gldani a large mob of Father Basil Mkalavishvili's
    supporters encircled and forcibly stopped a busload of Jehovah's
    Witnesses traveling to a religious gathering in Marneuli. The attackers
    disabled the bus by puncturing a tire, and they shoved, pushed, and
    struck the men, women, and children as they left the vehicle. Shortly
    thereafter the attackers traveled to Marneuli and demanded that the
    local police disperse the religious gathering. In August more then a
    dozen followers of Basilia assaulted two members of Jehovah's
    Witnesses. These two attacks followed a court decision on June 26 to
    revoke the registration of Jehovah's Witnesses in the country.
        In early August, a prayer meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was broken
    up by unidentified armed men. In Kutaisi, two traffic police officers
    stopped a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, tore up his religious
    literature, and beat him.
        On August 16, a mob of 80 Orthodox extremists, wielding metal
    crosses and icons, disrupted a packed courtroom in Tbilisi after the
    testimony of an Orthodox woman accused of sharing in an earlier violent
    attack on Jehovah's Witnesses. The mob attacked journalists, lawyers,
    and members of Jehovah's Witnesses who were in the courtroom.
        In October 1999, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the
    Gldani section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently
    by members of a religious sect led by the excommunicated priest Basil
    Mkalavishvili. The Gldani police refused to intervene. Sixteen persons
    were injured in the attack. President Shevardnadze, in a televised
    appearance, publicly criticized the attack and called for prosecution
    of the attackers. On December 25, 1999, the case was forwarded to the
    Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges. Despite appeals by the
    National Security Advisor for Human Rights, the Gldani regional
    prosecutor's office returned the case to the city prosecutor's office
    in January, stating that no violation had occurred. The group continues
    to press for prosecution of police in this and similar subsequent
    incidents (see Section 2.c.). The official in charge of the
    investigation decided instead in June to charge two of the plaintiffs,
    as well as two Basilists, with hooliganism. On August 16 and 17, at the
    first hearing of the trial in Gldani-Nadzaladevi court, Basilists
    attacked journalists, human rights advocates, and members of Jehovah's
    Witnesses. The police did not intervene and the Procuracy is conducting
    an investigation. The trial resumed without incident on September 18
    and on September 28, the two Jehovah's Witnesses were found guilty and
    given suspended sentences. The two Basilists were not convicted and
    their cases were returned to the Procuracy for further investigation.
        On August 26, a cross-erected at the Zedazeni Monastery by the
    international Georgian Youth Foundation to commemorate the war in
    Abkhazia was blown up. This apparently was due to the organizer's
    association with a religious group led by Boris Ivanov. On August 31
    the patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church criticized the violence.
    On October 1, a meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses was disbanded by police
    in Tsageri, according to the group's public affairs office in Tbilisi.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
    respected the rights of members of ethnic minorities in nonconflict
    areas but limited selfgovernment and played a weaker role in ethnic
    Armenian and Azeri areas (see Section 3). The Government reportedly
    provided less funding for schools in ethnic Azeri and Armenian areas
    than in other parts of the country. School instruction in non-Georgian
    languages is permitted.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1997 Law on
    Trade Unions provide for the right of citizens to form and join trade
    unions. The Law on Collective Agreements was passed in 1997.
        The principal trade union confederation is the Amalgamated Trade
    Unions of Georgia (ATUG). The ATUG is the successor to the official
    union that existed during the Soviet period. The union broke from the
    central Soviet labor confederation in 1989. Its present structure was
    established in 1992, after the union had resisted efforts first by the
    Gamsakhurdia Government and later by the State Council to bring the
    union under government control. The ATUG consists of 31 sectoral
    unions. Representatives to the ATUG congress elected its leadership
    indirectly for a period of 5 years in 1995; elections were held again
    in November.
        The organization officially claims 600,000 members but acknowledges
    that the number of active, dues-paying members is lower. The union has
    no affiliation with the Government and receives no government funding
    (except for support to send 200 children each year to summer camp). The
    union sees its primary role as defending the economic and social
    interests of workers, a departure from its Soviet predecessor, which
    was essentially an administrative body concerned with property and
    finance rather than with worker rights. The ATUG supported public
    sector strikes by teachers, medical service employees, and energy
    sector workers. These were mostly wildcat actions. In each case, the
    issue was unpaid wages. On December 23, 1999, the ATUG led a
    demonstration in front of the State Chancellery to demand that back
    wages and pensions be paid. The State Minister met with leaders and
    promised to meet with unions in January to resolve the problem;
    however, no meetings took place by year's end.
        On January 31, 1999, President Shevardnadze signed a decree that
    ordered all governmental agencies to consult and negotiate with unions.
    During the year, the Health and Social Welfare Ministry took steps
    toward negotiating agreements with unions.
        In 1998 the ATUG brought suit against the Ministry of Internal
    Affairs for illegally firing 220 employees in the MOI's visa office.
    The suit was to be decided on a case-by-case basis. To date several
    employees have been ordered reinstated, but the MOI has refused to do
    so.
        There are two trade unions independent of the ATUG. The Free Trade
    Union of Teachers of Georgia ``Solidarity'' based in Kutaisi (FTUTGS)
    successfully struck for payment of teachers' back wages in 1999. The
    Independent Trade Union of Metropolitan Employees was formed in Tbilisi
    during the year.
        On June 22, the police initially prevented a foreign official of a
    teachers' union, accompanied by representatives of the FTUTGS, from
    meeting with teachers in Bagdati, a town in the Imereti region. Local
    authorities allegedly told the minivan driver that his van would be
    confiscated if he were to transport the group to Bagdati. When the
    group entered Bagdati on foot, the local police chief and district
    administrator each claimed that the FTUTGS had no right to organize the
    meeting. Eventually, the foreign official was able to conduct a
    meeting, although members of the local ATUG teacher's union disrupted
    it.
        There are no legal prohibitions against affiliation and
    participation in international organizations. The ATUG worked closely
    with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In
    February a delegation from the ICFTU held a joint conference with
    International Labor Organization (ILO) and the ATUG in Tbilisi. During
    that time, the ICFTU reviewed the ATUG's application for membership in
    ICFTU and recommended admittance. The AFTUG became a full member of the
    ICFTU in November.
        In December 1999, the ICFTU reported that the Ministry of Labor was
    abolished. There has not been an assessment on the impact of this
    action.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and
    bargain collectively, and this right is respected in practice. The law
    prohibits discrimination by employers against union members. Employers
    may be prosecuted for antiunion discrimination and forced to reinstate
    employees and pay back wages. The ATUG and its national unions report
    frequent cases of management warning staff not to organize trade
    unions. Some workers reportedly complained of being intimidated or
    threatened by employers for union organizing activity. These include
    teachers in the Imereti region; employees of various mining,
    winemaking, pipeline and port facilities; and the Tbilisi municipal
    government. Observers also claim that employers fail to transfer
    compulsory union dues, deducted from wages, to union bank accounts. The
    Ministry of Labor investigated some complaints but no action has been
    taken against companies that allegedly have violated workers' rights.
        On August 22, the Free Trade Union of Teachers of Georgia
    ``Solidarity'' organized a demonstration in front of government offices
    in Kutaisi to demand payment of back wages to teachers in the Imereti
    region's school system. According to several school principals, the
    governor of the Imereti region told them that the FTUTGS was a
    ``negative force'' and should be resisted. Since then, a number of
    FTUTGS members allegedly were fired, regardless of seniority, when
    layoffs or staff reduction took place. According to a foreign union
    expert, the FTUTGS complained of increased pressure from the school
    authorities in the second half of the year, including principals
    instructing teachers not to join the union and actively preventing
    teachers from attending meetings.
        In 1999 the FTUTGS conducted a number of successful actions for the
    payment of back wages in Kutaisi.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor and provides for sanctions against
    violators, and in general there were no reports of its use; however,
    trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a problem (see
    Section 6.f.). The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by
    children and enforced this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--According to current legislation, the minimum age for
    employment of children is 16 years; however, in exceptional cases, the
    minimum age can be 14 years. The Ministry of Labor enforced these laws,
    and generally they were respected. The Government prohibits forced and
    bonded labor by children and enforced this prohibition effectively (see
    Section 6.c.). The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs enforces child
    labor laws.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The state minimum wage was
    raised in 1999 to $10.80 (20 lari) a month. There is no state-mandated
    minimum wage for private sector workers. The minimum wage is not
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. In general salaries and pensions were insufficient to meet
    basic minimum needs for a worker and family. The state statistics
    department of Georgia estimates that over half the population lives at
    or below the poverty line. Average wages in private enterprises were
    $75 to $100 (150 to 200 lari) monthly; in state enterprises, $15 to $30
    (30-60 lari).
        The law provides for a 41-hour work week and for a weekly 24-hour
    rest period. The Government work week often was shortened during the
    winter due to the continuing energy crisis. The Labor Code permits
    higher wages for hazardous work and permits a worker to refuse duties
    that could endanger life without risking loss of employment.
        The old Soviet labor code, with some amendments, is still in
    effect. A new labor code has not been adopted.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws concerning
    trafficking in women, and it is a problem. Trafficking in women is not
    prosecuted as a separate offense under the criminal law; however, other
    offenses connected to trafficking can be found in the Constitution and
    different laws such as those on slavery, forced labor, and illegal
    detention.
        Information on trafficking is difficult to obtain, and little, if
    any research is done on the subject. Anecdotal reports indicate that
    the country is both a source and transit country for trafficking;
    however, due to slow economic development, poverty, and unemployment,
    it is not a final destination for a significant number of trafficked
    women. Women are primarily trafficked to Turkey and Greece, where many
    work in the adult entertainment sector or as prostitutes, including
    those who thought that they would actually be employed as waitresses in
    bars and restaurants or domestic help. There is also evidence that
    Russian and Ukrainian women have been trafficked through the country to
    Turkey, sometimes using fraudulently obtained Georgian passports.
        There is no evidence linking traffickers to government authorities.
    The absence of laws aimed specifically at trafficking, together with
    police indifference, make it difficult for the government to pursue
    criminal cases against suspected traffickers.
        There are no government policies that deal with the problem of
    trafficking. There are now several NGO's in country that are involved
    in dealing with trafficking and its victims. During the year, the NGO
    Women Aid Georgia received international funding to launch a wide-scale
    public information drive to educate women about the dangers of
    trafficking.
                                   __________

                                    GERMANY

        The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary
    democracy; citizens periodically choose their representatives in free
    and fair multiparty elections. The head of the Federal Government, the
    Chancellor, is elected by the Bundestag, the first of two chambers of
    Parliament. The powers of the Chancellor and of the Parliament are set
    forth in the Basic Law (Constitution). The 16 states represented in
    Parliament in the Bundesrat enjoy significant autonomy, especially as
    concerns law enforcement and the courts, education, the environment,
    and social assistance. The judiciary is independent.
        Law enforcement is primarily a responsibility of state governments,
    and the police are organized at the state level. The jurisdiction of
    the Federal Criminal Office is limited to counterterrorism,
    international organized crime, especially narcotics trafficking,
    weapons smuggling, and currency counterfeiting. Police forces in
    general are well trained, disciplined, and mindful of citizens' rights,
    although there have been instances in which police committed human
    rights abuses.
        A well-developed industrial economy provides citizens with a high
    standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with cases of individual abuse. There were instances in which police
    were accused of human rights abuses, mostly against foreign residents
    and asylum seekers. Instances of societal violence and harassment
    directed at foreign residents continued as well, some resulting in
    deaths. After a 13.7 percent decline in rightwing-motivated crime in
    1999, preliminary figures for the year suggest a significant increase
    in the number of such crimes. Moreover, the number of proven or
    suspected violent rightwing crimes (most of which resulted in bodily
    harm to the victim) during the year rose by more than 12 percent, from
    746 to 840, continuing a trend found in 1999. The Government is taking
    serious steps to address the problem of violence against women and
    children. Women continue to face some wage discrimination in the
    private sector, as do members of minorities and foreigners. Trafficking
    in women and girls is a serious problem, with Germany being both a
    destination and a transit country. The Government has taken the lead in
    coordinating federal and state efforts to combat trafficking and aid
    its victims.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        In December 1999, suspected Red Army Faction member Andrea Klump
    was extradited from Austria to stand trial for her alleged role in
    various terrorist acts, including two murders, committed in the 1980's.
    Her trial began in November and continued at year's end. In 1999
    Michael Steinau and Bernhard Falk, members of a leftwing terrorist
    organization, the Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ), were convicted on four
    charges of attempted murder and sentenced in connection with a series
    of bombing attacks in 1995. Steinau was sentenced to 9 years'
    imprisonment. Falk, who was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment,
    appealed his sentence in May, and his case continued at year's end.
        An investigation continued in the case of Aamir Ageeb, a Sudanese
    asylum seeker, who died in May 1999 during a deportation flight while
    in the custody of Federal Border Police. The Border Police apparently
    physically subdued the man during takeoff because he was resisting
    deportation violently, and they did not notice until Ageeb stopped
    struggling that he was not breathing. As a result of this incident, the
    Federal Interior Ministry has instituted new deportation procedures
    that prohibit methods that could hinder breathing.
        The trial of four individuals accused of the 1986 bombing of the
    Berlin La Belle discotheque, which began in 1997, continued at year's
    end. The attack killed one Turkish and two U.S. citizens and injured
    230 persons.
        In January Johannes Weinrich, a German terrorist, was convicted of
    one count of murder and five counts of attempted murder in connection
    with a 1983 bomb attack on the French cultural center in what was then
    West Berlin. The trial of Hans-Joachim Klein began in October and
    continued at year's end. Klein was charged with three murders during
    the 1975 attack by left-wing terrorists on a convention of the
    Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna,
    Austria.
        Violence by rightwing extremists against marginalized social
    groups, such as the homeless and foreigners, resulted in a number of
    deaths during the year. In June a Mozambican immigrant was beaten and
    kicked to death in Dessau by three rightwing extremists who were
    caught, tried, and convicted; one was sentenced to life in prison and
    the two others were sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment each (see
    Section 5). Groups of rightwing extremists beat and kicked to death at
    least five homeless men during the year. In each case, police arrested
    the alleged perpetrators and they were charged with the crimes; several
    have been convicted and sentenced to prison terms.
        On January 25, two rightwing extremists were sentenced in Lower-
    Saxony to 5 years' imprisonment in a youth detention center for their
    attack in August 1999 on a German man, who died the following day from
    his injuries. The 44-year-old victim had spoken critically about
    xenophobia to one of the perpetrators. The youths, who were drunk at
    the time, broke into the victim's apartment and kicked him and stabbed
    him with a broken glass.
        The trial of 11 rightwing defendants accused of causing the 1999
    death of an Algerian asylum seeker in Brandenburg ended in November
    with 8 defendants being convicted of negligent homicide and all 11
    being found guilty of lesser crimes (see Section 5). Three of the
    convicted youths were sentenced to 2 to 3 years' detention in a youth
    facility, and the others received suspended sentences or warnings. The
    family of the victim filed an appeal demanding stiffer sentences, and
    10 of the 11 youths appealed their convictions. The case continued at
    year's end.
        As of October, seven cases remained before the courts concerning
    individuals involved in the shooting deaths of East Germans who
    attempted to flee to West Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
    In July former East German defense minister Heinz Kessler was sentenced
    to 7-and-a-half years' imprisonment, while three other former Socialist
    Unity Party (SED) leaders were acquitted. In January the Federal
    Constitutional Court upheld the conviction of former East German
    Politburo member Egon Krenz, who had been sentenced to 6-and-a-half
    years' imprisonment for his role in East Germany's shoot-to-kill policy
    at the East-West border. Krenz began serving his sentence on January
    13. His appeal to the European Court for Human Rights was heard in
    November, and a decision is expected in the spring of 2001. On
    September 6, Berlin's governing mayor pardoned Krenz's two
    codefendants, Guenter Schabowski and Guenther Kleiber, who each had
    received 3-year sentences; the men were released on October 2 in a
    gesture of reconciliation on the 10th anniversary of German
    reunification the following day.
        The Government continued to cooperate in bringing war criminals
    from the former Yugoslavia to justice. In October, for example, the
    Government signed an agreement with the International War Crimes
    Tribunal for Yugoslavia to have a convicted Bosnian war criminal serve
    his 20-year sentence in a German prison.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
    generally respect these prohibitions. However, Amnesty International
    published a report in July 1999 that found that police treatment of
    foreigners in custody showed ``a clear pattern of abuse.'' In September
    an Iranian family facing deportation claimed that police held the
    father's arms behind his back, pushed his head down and then held him
    on the ground in a manner that hindered his breathing. Two older
    children who tried to help were allegedly slapped. Border Police claim
    that the father and an older child were violently resisting
    deportation. Human rights and asylum-assistance organizations have
    called for an investigation.
        The Government investigates abuses and prosecutes police who
    mistreat persons in custody. For example in July, authorities in Dessau
    initiated an investigation against three officers accused of
    mistreating a man from Burkina Faso who had been arrested for drug
    dealing. The accusations were found to be without merit. In July the
    Federal Court of Justice upheld the convictions of three police
    officers from Bernau, Brandenburg, for physically mistreating
    Vietnamese detainees in 11 cases in 1993 and 1994. Moreover, the Court
    ordered a lower court to consider stiffer penalties for the two
    officers originally sentenced to probation.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Basic Law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
    prohibition. A person can be arrested only on the basis of an arrest
    warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, unless the person is
    caught in the act of committing a crime, or the police have strong
    reason to believe that the person intends to commit a crime. Any person
    detained by police must be brought before a judge and charged within 24
    hours of the arrest. The court then must issue an arrest warrant
    stating the grounds for detention or order the person's release.
        Police often detain known or suspected rightwing and leftwing
    radicals for brief periods when they believe such individuals intend to
    participate in illegal or unauthorized demonstrations. For example, in
    August police in Thuringia took into temporary custody 53 persons who
    were suspected of heading for illegal rallies to mark the 13th
    anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess (see Section 5). The rules
    governing this type of detention are different in each state, with
    authorized periods of detention ranging from 1 to 14 days, provided
    judicial concurrence is given within 24 hours of initial apprehension.
        If there is evidence that a suspect might flee the country, police
    may detain that person for up to 24 hours pending a formal charge. The
    right of free access to legal counsel has been restricted only in the
    cases of terrorists suspected of having used contacts with lawyers to
    continue terrorist activity while in prison. Only judges may decide on
    the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail exists but seldom is
    employed; the usual practice is to release detainees unless there is
    clear danger of flight outside the country. In these cases, a person
    may be detained for the course of the investigation and subsequent
    trial. Such decisions are subject to regular judicial review, and time
    spent in investigative custody applies toward the sentence. In cases of
    acquittal, the Government must compensate the individual.
        The Government does not use forced exile, which is prohibited by
    the Basic Law.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Basic Law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The court system is highly developed and provides full legal
    protection and numerous possibilities for judicial review. Ordinary
    courts have jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. There are four
    levels of such courts (local courts, regional courts, higher regional
    courts, and the Federal Court of Justice), with appeals possible from
    lower to higher levels. In addition to the ordinary courts, there are
    four types of specialized courts: administrative, labor, social, and
    fiscal. These courts also have different levels, and appeals may be
    made to the next higher level.
        Separate from these five types of courts is the Federal
    Constitutional Court, which is Germany's supreme court. Among other
    things, it reviews laws to ensure their compatibility with the
    Constitution and adjudicates disputes between different branches of
    government on questions of competencies. It also has jurisdiction to
    hear and decide claims based on the infringement of a person's basic
    constitutional rights by a public authority.
        The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
    process, although court proceedings are sometimes delayed due to ever
    creasing caseloads. For simple or less serious cases, the Government
    adopted a procedure allowing for an accelerated hearing and summary
    punishment at the local court level. The maximum sentence for such
    cases is limited to 1 year, and if a sentence of 6 months or more is
    expected, a defense counsel must be present.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, of
    Correspondence.--The Basic Law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.
        In October a Lower Saxony court ruled that a school district could
    not refuse to hire an Islamic teacher because she wished to wear a
    traditional headscarf in the classroom. The school district said it
    would appeal the decision. In 1998 a Muslim teacher sued the Stuttgart
    school district over its decision not to hire her because she wore a
    headscarf. Although a local administrative court dismissed her suit,
    she appealed the ruling and the case continued at year's end (see
    Section 2.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom
    of the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An
    independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
    political system combine to ensure freedom of speech--with some
    limits--and of the press, including academic freedom. Freedom of speech
    does not extend to the possession or distribution of the propaganda of
    proscribed organizations or to statements endorsing Nazism or denying
    the Holocaust, all of which are illegal.
        The authorities seek to block what they consider dangerous material
    on the Internet. The 1997 Teleservices Law bans access to prohibited
    material (for example, child pornography and Nazi propaganda), and the
    Government has explored ways to expand cooperation in countering
    Internet crime. In June the Justice Ministry cosponsored a major
    symposium on combating the spread of hate materials on the Internet,
    and it proposed voluntary measures for Internet service providers and
    companies doing online business, as well as improved international law
    enforcement cooperation. The Federal Criminal Office in February hosted
    a similar event, bringing service providers and domestic law
    enforcement officials together to discuss ways to enhance cooperation.
    German officials estimate that there are approximately 800 Internet
    sites with what they consider objectionable or dangerous rightwing
    extremist content.
        In December the Federal Court of Justice ruled that German laws
    against Nazi incitement could apply to individuals who post Nazi
    material on Internet sites available to users in Germany, even if the
    site resides on a foreign server. The Court overturned a lower court
    decision that such material was not subject to criminal prosecution in
    the case of German-born Australian Holocaust revisionist Frederick
    Toben, who had, among other things, posted material denying the
    Holocaust on his Internet site. Previously in November 1999, Toben, had
    been sentenced to 10 months in prison (7 months already served were
    applied to that sentence) for denying the Holocaust and that Nazis
    killed millions of Jews. At that time, the lower court had ruled that
    Toben could not be prosecuted for Holocaust denial material he had
    posted on a website in Australia. He was released from a Mannheim
    prison after posting a bond. Toben is the director of the Adelaide
    Institute, which questions the reality and scope of the Holocaust.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
    practice. Permits must be obtained for open-air public rallies and
    marches. State and local officials have the authority to deny such
    permits when public safety concerns arise or when outlawed
    organizations attempt to hold public assemblies. For example, rallies
    and marches by neo-Nazis and rightwing radicals commemorating the death
    of Nazi official Rudolf Hess are banned routinely.
        The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. The Basic Law permits the banning of
    organizations whose activities are found to be illegal or opposed to
    the liberal democratic order as established by the Basic Law. The
    Federal Constitutional Court is the only body that can outlaw political
    parties; under this provision, the Court in the 1950's banned a neo-
    Nazi and a Communist party. Federal or state governments may ban other
    organizations, and legal recourse against such decisions is available.
    Such banned organizations include a number of groups that authorities
    generally classify as rightwing or leftwing, foreign extremist, or
    criminal in nature. In addition several hundred organizations were
    under observation by the Federal and state Offices for the Protection
    of the Constitution (OPC). The OPC's are charged with examining
    possible threats to the democratic system; they have no law enforcement
    powers, and OPC monitoring by law may not interfere with the
    organizations' continued activities. In observing an organization, OPC
    officials seek to collect information, mostly from written materials
    and first-hand accounts, to assess whether a threat exists. More
    intrusive methods would be subject to legal checks and require evidence
    of involvement in treason or terrorist activities.
        In August the Government established a commission of experts to
    examine whether evidence against the rightwing extremist National
    Democratic Party (NPD) would meet the threshold to support a legal ban,
    which was widely demanded after a surge of rightwing extremist activity
    in the summer months. Based on the commission's recommendations, in
    November the Government agreed to petition the Federal Constitutional
    Court to ban the NPD. Although the Bundestag and Bundesrat formally
    supported this decision, the Government had not yet submitted the
    petition to the Court at year's end. On September 14, the Federal
    Interior Minister banned the rightwing extremist skinhead organization
    ``Blood and Honor'' and its youth organization, ``White Youth,'' citing
    the groups' rejection of the constitutional order as a justification.
    While the ban (the first issued by the Federal Government since 1995)
    allows the Government to seize the groups' assets, members are free to
    reconstitute themselves under a new name.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Most religious organizations enjoy tax-exempt status, a designation
    that requires them to operate on a nonprofit basis and contribute
    socially, spiritually, or materially to society.
        Church and state are separate, although historically a special
    relationship exists between the State and those religious communities
    that have the status of a ``corporation under public law.'' Religions
    enjoying this status may request that the Government collect church
    membership taxes on their behalf. However, not all religious groups
    take advantage of this privilege, since the Government charges an
    administrative fee for doing so. State governments subsidize various
    institutions affiliated with public law corporations, such as church-
    run schools and hospitals. State subsidies also are provided to some
    religious organizations for historical and cultural reasons. Many
    religions and denominations have been granted public law corporation
    status; among them are the Lutheran and Catholic Churches, Judaism, the
    Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Seventh-Day Adventists,
    Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, Christian Scientists, and the
    Salvation Army. Applications from several Islamic groups are pending in
    various states.
        In December the Federal Constitutional Court overturned a lower
    court's ruling that denied Jehovah's Witnesses public law corporation
    status and remanded the case back to the lower court. The case stemmed
    from an April 1993 decision of the Berlin state government that denied
    the church public law corporation status, a decision upheld in 1997 by
    the Federal Administrative Court. The Administrative Court concluded
    that the group did not offer the ``indispensable loyalty'' towards the
    democratic state ``essential for lasting cooperation'' because, for
    example, it forbade its members from voting in public elections. In
    overturning this decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that
    forbidding church members to vote or to perform military service were
    not sufficient justifications for withholding from the church public
    law corporation status. The Court added that the judiciary should not
    evaluate the compatibility of church doctrine with the democratic
    order, but only judge such cases on the actual behavior of the church
    and its members. Although the Court found that Jehovah's Witnesses in
    Germany follow the rule of law and demonstrate no intent to overthrow
    the government or political system, it did not grant them public law
    corporation status. It instead returned the case to the lower court
    with instructions to examine whether the Jehovah's Witnesses use
    coercive methods to oppose their members leaving the congregation and
    whether their child-rearing practices conform to German human rights
    standards. The case continued at year's end.
        With an estimated 3 million adherents, Islam is the third most
    commonly practiced religion in Germany (after Catholicism and
    Lutheranism). All branches of Islam are represented in the country,
    with the vast majority of Muslims in Germany coming from a large number
    of other countries. This has, at times, led to societal discord, such
    as local resistance to the construction of mosques or disagreements
    over whether Muslims can use loudspeakers in residential neighborhoods
    to call the faithful to prayer. There also remain areas where German
    law conflicts with Islamic practices or raises religious freedom
    issues. In November the Government published a comprehensive, 93-page
    report on ``Islam in Germany'' which examined these issues in response
    to an inquiry from the Bundestag.
        In October the Lueneburg administrative court ruled that the state
    education ministry must employ a teacher who was barred in 1999 from
    wearing a headscarf in the classroom. The Lower Saxony education
    ministry had refused to employ the Muslim woman after she completed her
    training because state officials took the position that allowing a
    teacher to wear a headscarf on the job would violate the religious and
    political neutrality legally required of all civil servants, including
    teachers. (Members of Christian religious orders are similarly not
    allowed to wear their habits while teaching at public schools, although
    habits are permitted in denominational schools.) The state has vowed to
    appeal the ruling and has said it will not hire the woman until it has
    exhausted its legal options. In March the Stuttgart administrative
    court dismissed a similar suit filed by a Muslim woman who was denied a
    teaching position in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The state minister of
    education supported the school district's decision not to hire the
    woman because the Ministry argued the headscarf was a political symbol
    of female submission rather than a religious practice prescribed by
    Islam. The woman appealed the ruling, and the case was pending at
    year's end. In the meantime she accepted a teaching position at a
    public school for Muslims in Berlin, where she is allowed to wear a
    headscarf. Muslim students generally are free to wear headscarves to
    school (see Section 1.f.).
        The right of Muslims to ritually slaughter animals was the subject
    of two court cases during the year. In November the Federal
    Administrative Court ruled that the Islamic Community of Hesse was not
    a religious community as provided for in Germany's animal protection
    laws and could not, therefore, receive a waiver to laws requiring an
    animal to be stunned before slaughter. The Court did not rule on
    whether Islam prescribes the exclusive consumption of ritually-
    slaughtered meat, noting that such decisions were beyond the scope of
    the courts. A similar case was heard by the Federal Constitutional
    Court and a decision was pending at year's end.
        Most public schools offer religious instruction in cooperation with
    the Protestant and Catholic churches and will offer instruction in
    Judaism if enough students express interest. A nonreligious ethics
    course or study hall generally is available for students not wishing to
    participate in religious instruction. The issue of Islamic education in
    public schools is becoming increasingly topical in several states. In
    February the Federal Administrative Court upheld previous court rulings
    that the Islamic Federation qualified as a religious community and thus
    must be given the opportunity to provide religious instruction in
    Berlin schools. The decision drew criticism from the many Islamic
    organizations not represented by the Islamic Federation. The Berlin
    state government has expressed its concerns about the Islamic
    Federation's alleged links to Milli Gorus, a Turkish group classified
    as extremist by the Federal OPC. In November Bavaria announced that it
    would offer German-language Islamic education in its public schools
    starting in 2003.
        Several states have published pamphlets, which are provided to the
    public free of charge, detailing the beliefs and practices of non-
    mainstream religions. Many of the pamphlets are factual, but the
    inclusion of some religious groups in publications covering known
    dangerous cults or movements may harm their reputations. For example
    publications from the Hamburg state government and state-run youth
    welfare offices in Lower Saxony, Thuringia, and Schleswig-Holstein,
    describe theologically conservative or minority Christian groups and
    imply that they can be harmful to their adherents. Scientology is the
    focus of many such pamphlets, some of which warn of alleged dangers
    posed by Scientology to existing political and economic structures and
    to the mental and financial well-being of individuals. For example, the
    Hamburg OPC publishes ``The Intelligence Service of the Scientology
    Organization,'' which claims that Scientology tries to infiltrate
    governments, offices, and companies, and that the church spies on its
    opponents, defames them, and ``destroys'' them.
        The Church of Scientology, which operates 18 churches and missions,
    remained under scrutiny by both federal and state officials who contend
    that its ideology is opposed to democracy and that it is not a religion
    but an economic enterprise. Since 1997 Scientology has been under
    observation by the Federal and state OPC's, except in Schleswig-
    Holstein where the state constitution does not permit such observation
    (see Section 2.b.). Observation is not an investigation into criminal
    wrongdoing, and the Government has filed no criminal charges against
    Scientology since observation began. However, in April the Federal OPC
    concluded in its 250-page annual report for 1999 that the reasons for
    initiating observation of Scientology in 1997 still were valid. The six
    pages in the report covering Scientology described those aspects of the
    organization's beliefs that were deemed undemocratic, quoting from the
    writings of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard and Scientology-
    published pamphlets and books. In 1998 the Church of Scientology filed
    a suit in a Berlin state court to enjoin the Berlin interior ministry,
    under whose authority the OPC falls, from further observation of the
    organization and its members. The case was pending at year's end.
        Scientologists continued to report discrimination because of their
    beliefs. A number of state and local offices share information on
    individuals known to be Scientologists. The Federal Government uses its
    ``Defense Clause'' (commonly referred to as a ``sect filter'') for
    procurement involving some training and consulting contracts,
    specifically those that may provide opportunities for mental
    manipulation or behavior modification. The sect filter requires a
    bidder to declare that the firm rejects and will not employ the
    ``technology of L. Ron Hubbard'' within the framework of the contract,
    and that the firm does not require or permit employees to attend
    courses and seminars conducted via this ``technology'' as part of its
    business function. Some state and local agencies, businesses (including
    several major international corporations), and other organizations
    require job applicants and bidders on contracts to sign similar ``sect
    filters.'' The Federal Property Office has in several cases barred the
    sale of real estate to Scientologists, nothing that the Finance
    Ministry has urged that such sales be avoided, if possible.
        At the state and local level, some governments also screen
    companies bidding on contracts for training and the handling and
    processing of personal data, and in April the Hamburg administrative
    court dismissed the suit of two Scientology members against the city-
    state for its use of ``sect filters.'' In the state of Bavaria,
    applicants for state civil service positions must complete
    questionnaires detailing any relationship that they may have with
    Scientology; the form specifically states that employment will not be
    considered if the form is not completed. Moreover Bavaria has
    identified some state employees as Scientologists, sometimes years
    after they were first employed, and has required them to complete the
    questionnaire. Some of these employees have refused and two of them
    have filed suit in Bavarian courts. In October the Munich labor court
    ruled that the state cannot require employees to complete the
    questionnaire in the absence of evidence that the employee is involved
    in anticonstitutional behavior. The court further stated that even if
    the Scientology Church were to be found to be anticonstitutional, an
    individual's mere membership in the organization could not justify the
    Government delving into that person's private life in the absence of
    illegal behavior on his or her part.
        The interministerial group of mid-level federal and state officials
    that exchanges information on Scientology continued its periodic
    meetings. The group published no report or policy compendium during the
    year and remained purely consultative in purpose.
        In December the Federal Social Court in Kassel upheld a lower
    court's ruling that membership in the Church of Scientology was not, in
    and of itself, reason to deny a person a professional license. In 1999
    the State Social Court of Appeals in Rhineland-Palatinate ruled that
    the Federal Labor Office had in 1994 incorrectly refused to renew a
    Scientologist's license to run her au pair agency based solely on her
    Scientology membership. The case was remanded to the state court to
    clarify whether the specific individual's membership in the Church of
    Scientology has any bearing on her reliability as an au pair agent. The
    case continued at year's end.
        Some private sector entities have followed the governments' example
    in using ``sect filters,'' often using them for a much broader range of
    contracts. On at least one occasion a foreign firm wishing to do
    business in the country was asked to declare any affiliation that it or
    its employees might have with Scientology. Private firms that screen
    for Scientology affiliations frequently cite OPC observation of
    Scientology as a justification for discrimination and have on occasion
    quoted advice they say they have received from state or local
    government officials as to the legality of the ``sect filter.''
        Late in 1999, allegations that Microsoft's Windows 2000 contained a
    ``Trojan Horse'' or ``back door'' that would permit the Church of
    Scientology to obtain information from an unsuspecting user's system
    surfaced in the technology trade press. These allegations arose after
    Hamburg's sect commissioner expressed public concern about the software
    because a firm whose chief executive officer is a Scientologist
    developed a disk defragmenting component for Windows 2000. Critics
    claimed--with no proof--that the defragmenter would secretly send
    personal data from individual computers to Scientology offices.
    Microsoft yielded to German pressure and allowed the German Federal
    Office for Security in Information Technology (BSI) to investigate the
    software. BSI conducted various tests but failed to find any evidence
    of or anything that in any way validated the concerns regarding the
    existence of a ``Trojan Horse'' or ``back door.'' Nevertheless in
    December Microsoft published instructions on how to remove the disk
    defragmenter from Windows 2000 as an alternative to further testing by
    BSI.
        In February the German branch of Amway Limited dismissed 10
    distributors because of their admitted association with Scientology,
    which the company claimed could damage the company's image. Parent
    company representatives claimed that the distributors refused to comply
    with the firm's prohibition against proselytizing in connection with
    their Amway activities, a policy that applies to all religious beliefs,
    and that other known Scientologists continue to work for the company.
    In at least one case, a major bank unilaterally closed the accounts of
    a law firm that had represented the Scientology Church.
        Scientologists have taken their grievances to the courts, with
    mixed results. Some individuals who had been fired because they were
    Scientologists sued their employers for ``unfair dismissal.'' Several
    have reached out-of-court settlements with employers. For example in
    March, a woman who had been summarily dismissed from her position in
    the bond department of a bank because of her association with
    Scientology received $27,300 (DM 60,000) under a settlement with her
    former employer.
        Major political parties continued to exclude Scientologists from
    membership, arguing that Scientology is not a religion but a for-profit
    organization whose goals and principles are antidemocratic and thus
    incompatible with those of the political parties. However, there has
    been only one known enforcement of this ban. A Bonn court upheld the
    practice in 1997, ruling that a political party had the right to
    exclude from its organization those persons who do not identify
    themselves with the party's basic goals.
        Public exhibitions by Scientologists in a number of cities to
    explain themselves to citizens encountered difficulties. In April the
    Visitor's Bureau of the Federal Press and Information Office intervened
    with a Berlin hotel, forcing the hotel to cancel Scientology's
    reservations for rooms for an exhibit titled ``What is Scientology?''
    The hotel claimed that the Visitors' Bureau threatened to cancel
    several hundred thousand dollars worth of reservations if Scientology
    were allowed to exhibit in the hotel. Scientology was able to rent
    space elsewhere but incurred substantial extra expenses related to the
    last minute move of the exhibit. In Frankfurt a late February
    Scientology exhibit in the cafe of a well-known, city-owned museum
    sparked significant criticism, with city officials speaking out openly
    against Scientology and the exhibit. However, Scientology's recently
    established information office in Frankfurt has generated little or no
    public controversy. A Scientology exhibit at the Leipzig book fair in
    March provoked complaints about what some visitors considered
    aggressive marketing tactics, and fair authorities were reviewing
    whether to allow the exhibitors to return next year. In April
    Scientology was able to rent the public congress center in Hanover for
    a 2-day exhibition, after a hotel cancelled its reservation when it
    learned that Scientology had made the booking.
        There were no new attempts to deregister Scientology organizations
    previously registered as non-profit organizations, but the judgments in
    two such earlier cases were appealed during the year. The government of
    Baden-Wuerttemberg appealed a decision by the Stuttgart Administrative
    Court, which ruled that a Scientology organization could not be
    deregistered as a nonprofit organization because its activities were
    used to accomplish its ideological purposes. The case was pending at
    year's end. The Celebrity Center Munich, a Scientology-affiliated
    organization that was stripped of its status as a nonprofit
    organization in 1995, has appealed a 1999 upper court ruling upholding
    that decision. The case was pending at year's end.
        The Government continued its policy of not engaging in dialogue
    with the Church of Scientology this year.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Basic Law and subsequent legislation
    provide for the right of foreign victims of persecution to attain
    asylum and resettlement in accordance with the standards of the 1951
    U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. Both the Federal Government and state governments cooperate
    with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees, although
    immigration matters are primarily a state-level responsibility.
        For ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
    the Basic Law provides both for citizenship immediately upon
    application and for legal residence without restrictions. On January 1,
    a new law came into effect that grants citizenship to children born to
    legal foreign residents. Individuals can retain both German citizenship
    and that of their parents until the age of 23, when they must choose
    one or the other. The law also decreased the period of residence in the
    country required for legal foreign residents to earn the right to
    naturalization from 15 to 8 years.
        The Basic Law and subsequent legislation provide for the right of
    foreign victims of persecution to attain asylum and resettlement.
    Criteria for granting asylum were tightened by several provisions
    enacted in 1993. Individuals attempting to enter via a ``safe third
    country'' (any country in the European Union or adhering to the Geneva
    Convention on Refugees) are ineligible for asylum and can be turned
    back at the border or returned to that ``safe third country'' if they
    manage to enter Germany. Persons coming directly from any country which
    officials designate as a ``safe country of origin'' normally cannot
    claim asylum in Germany, and individuals whose applications are
    rejected on these grounds have up to 2 weeks to appeal the decision, a
    time period critics consider too brief. Individuals who arrive at an
    international airport and who are deemed to have come from a ``safe
    country of origin'' can be detained at an airport holding facility. In
    these cases, the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees
    must make a decision on an asylum application within 48 hours or allow
    the person to enter the country. The person may appeal a negative
    decision to an administrative court within 3 days, and the court must
    rule within 14 days or allow the individual to enter the country.
    Although stays in the airport facility thus are supposed to be limited
    to a maximum of 19 days, applicants whose claims were rejected, but who
    could not be immediately deported have been held at the airport for
    months, a practice criticized by refugee assistance groups and human
    rights advocates (see Section 1.c.). However, the Constitutional Court
    upheld the constitutionality of the amendments in 1996.
        Applicants who enter Germany and are denied asylum at their
    original administrative hearing may challenge the decision in court,
    and 80 percent of applicants denied asylum do so. Approximately 3 to 4
    percent of such rejections are overturned. The rejected applicant is
    allowed to remain in country during the course of the appeal, which
    usually takes at least a year and sometimes significantly longer. In
    October the Government announced changes to the regulations governing
    asylum seekers and employment. Starting January 1, 2001, applicants for
    asylum and civil war refugees will be allowed to work after a 1-year
    waiting period. The Government estimates that approximately 75,000
    foreigners will be entitled to work under the new rules. Some
    foreigners whose asylum applications were rejected, but who would be
    endangered if they were sent back to their home country, such as those
    fleeing civil wars, receive temporary residence permits--the so-called
    small asylum. However, they are expected to leave when conditions in
    their home country allow for their safe return. The vast majority of
    the approximately 345,000 Bosnians and the approximately 200,000
    Kosovars whom Germany admitted during the conflict in the former
    Yugoslavia fall into this category. Once their residence permits
    expire, these people can be deported. Individuals who fail to cooperate
    during the deportation process or who are deemed liable to flee to
    avoid deportation can be held in predeportation detention, with the
    average detention period lasting 5 to 6 weeks.
        Refugee assistance organizations have expressed concern about how
    certain provisions related to the right of asylum have been interpreted
    by the courts, notably the practice of excluding ``quasi-governmental''
    persecution as a basis for granting asylum. In August the Federal
    Constitutional Court ruled that lower courts had erred in denying
    asylum to three Afghan applicants because their persecutors were not a
    state government but members of a Mujahidin group (defined as a
    ``quasi-governmental entity''). The case was remanded back to the lower
    court with instructions to reconsider the issue of quasi-governmental
    persecution, and a decision was pending at year's end. In response to
    the Constitutional Court ruling, the federal Office for the Recognition
    of Foreign Refugees has postponed making decisions in all current
    asylum cases involving quasi-governmental persecution until the lower
    court reissues its ruling.
        During the year, 78,564 persons applied for asylum, an almost 17.4
    percent decrease over the same period in 1999 and the lowest level
    since the amendment of the asylum law in 1993, when the criteria for
    granting asylum were tightened. The approval rate for first-time
    applicants was around 3 percent, and an additional 7.9 percent of
    rejected applicants received temporary protection from deportation.
        State authorities, working in close cooperation with the
    International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR, and other
    domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), continued to repatriate
    Bosnian refugees, unless they qualified for an extension of stay on
    certain humanitarian grounds. According to unofficial estimates,
    approximately 25,000 Bosnian refugees remained in country at year's
    end. Among those were up to 15,000 who were considered traumatized or
    were with family members who were deemed too traumatized to return to
    Bosnia. In November the Federal and state interior ministers decided at
    their annual meeting to grant severely traumatized Bosnians and their
    family members, including unmarried adult children, temporary residence
    permits for the duration of their medical treatment. In addition some
    older Bosnian refugees, as well as some categories of Kosovars (such as
    orphaned children, ethnically mixed couples from areas with no minority
    protection, and war crimes tribunal witnesses) will be allowed to stay
    in the country.
        The Government continued to support voluntary return programs for
    refugees from the former Yugoslavia, providing financial incentives of
    between $765 and $2,250 (DM 1,350 to DM 4,500) to help cover travel and
    resettlement costs; many states provided additional resettlement funds.
    The Government repatriated approximately 48,000 Kosovars under such
    voluntary programs through December. However, failure to accept
    voluntary repatriation subjects these refugees to the threat of
    deportation, and forces them to leave their personal property behind
    and excludes them from reentering the country for a 5-year period.
        The right of most Kosovar refugees to stay in the country expired
    in the spring, and most states began regular deportations in March. By
    the end of the year, 6,800 Kosovar refugees had been deported, among
    them approximately 1,300 ex-offenders. Some national officials, the
    UNHCR, and domestic refugee support organizations have cautioned that
    the refugees' place of origin and ethnicity should be given careful
    consideration in the implementation of Kosovar returns.
        An investigation is ongoing into the 1999 death of a Sudanese
    asylum seeker who died during a deportation flight while in the custody
    of the Federal Border Police (see Section 1.a).
        In June the Federal Government appointed a commission of experts to
    examine every aspect of immigration and to propose administrative or
    legislative changes if deemed necessary. The commission held its first
    meeting in September and is expected to present its recommendations in
    mid-2001.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Basic Law provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections. Members of Parliament's
    first chamber, the Bundestag, are elected from a mixture of direct-
    constituency and party-list candidates on the basis of universal
    suffrage and secret balloting. The second chamber, the Bundesrat, is
    composed of delegations from state governments.
        Women are somewhat underrepresented in government and politics,
    although the law entitles them to participate fully in political life,
    and a growing number are prominent in the Government and the parties.
    Slightly under 31 percent of the members of the Bundestag are female.
    Women occupy 6 of 15 Federal Cabinet positions. On the Federal
    Constitutional Court, 5 of the 16 judges are women, including the Chief
    Justice. Three of the parties represented in the Bundestag are headed
    by women: the Christian Democratic Union, the Greens/Alliance 90 (co-
    chaired by a woman and a man), and the Party of Democratic Socialism.
    All of the parties have undertaken to enlist more women. The Greens/
    Alliance 90 Party requires that women constitute half of the party's
    elected officials; and 57.5 percent of the Party's federal
    parliamentary caucus members are women. The Social Democrats had a 40-
    percent quota for women on all party committees and governing bodies
    and met that goal. The Christian Democrats required that 30 percent of
    the first ballot candidates for party positions be women, a goal which
    it met.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
    to their views.
        In December the Bundestag voted to create the National Institute
    for Human Rights, an autonomous foundation whose function will be to
    monitor human rights both domestically and abroad and to promote
    education and scientific research in the field.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits denial of access to housing, health care, or
    education on the basis of race, religion, disability, sex, ethnic
    background, political opinion, or citizenship. The Government enforces
    the law effectively.
        Women.--While violence against women is a problem and almost
    certainly is underreported, it is prohibited by laws that are enforced
    effectively. The Government has implemented a vast array of legal and
    social structures to combat it. Societal attitudes toward such violence
    are strongly negative, and legal and medical recourse is available.
    Police statistics on rape, including attempted rape and spousal rape,
    showed a 4.4 percent decrease from 7,914 cases in 1998 to 7,565 cases
    in 1999.
        The Government conducted campaigns in the schools and through
    church groups to bring public attention to the existence of such
    violence and proposed steps to counter it. The Federal Government has
    supported numerous pilot projects throughout the country. For example
    there are 435 ``women's houses'', including 115 in the eastern states
    (excluding Berlin), where victims of violence and their children can
    seek shelter, counseling, and legal and police protection.
        Trafficking in women and forced prostitution also are illegal;
    however, trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see
    Section 6.f.). In recent years, the Federal Ministry for Women and
    Youth has commissioned a number of studies to gain information on
    violence against women, sexual harassment, and other matters.
        Union contracts typically identify categories of employment in
    which participants are to be paid less than 100 percent of the wage of
    a skilled laborer covered by the same contract. Women are represented
    disproportionately in these lower-wage scale occupations.
        In January the European Court of Justice ruled that Germany's
    prohibition on women in combat roles in the armed forces violated
    European Union directives against discrimination based on gender. The
    Government accepted the ruling and in December completed the process of
    amending the Constitution to open all military jobs to women on a
    voluntary basis. The first group of 244 women are scheduled to report
    for duty on January 2, 2001.
        The Government continued to implement its multiyear action plan,
    ``Women and Occupation,'' adopted in 1999. The program promotes the
    equality of women and men in the workforce, including increased
    vocational training for women, greater representation of women in
    political advisory councils, and the promotion of female entrepreneurs
    through government grants and participation in regional projects
    earmarked for women. The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly,
    Women, and Youth also announced a multiyear initiative designed to
    increase the number of girls who receive training in information
    technology (IT) and in media careers, with the goal of raising the
    number of IT-training slots to 60,000 by 2003 and the share of female
    IT-trainees to 40 percent by 2005.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. Public education is provided and is
    mandatory through the age of 16.
        The Government recognizes that violence against children is a
    problem requiring its attention. Police figures recorded 15,279 cases
    of sexual abuse of children in 1999, a 7.9 percent decrease from 16,596
    in 1998. Officials believe that the number of unreported cases may be
    much higher. The 1990 Child and Youth Protection Law stresses the need
    for preventive measures, and the Government has taken account of this
    in stepping up its counseling and other assistance.
        The Criminal Code was amended in 1993 and in 1997 to further
    provide for the protection of children against pornography and sexual
    abuse. For possession of child pornography, the maximum sentence is 1
    year's imprisonment; the sentence for distribution is 5 years. The 1993
    amendment makes the sexual abuse of children by German citizens abroad
    punishable even if the action is not illegal in the child's own
    country.
        Trafficking in girls is a serious problem (See Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against the
    disabled in employment, education, or in the provision of other state
    services. The law mandates several special services for disabled
    persons, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. The
    disabled are entitled to assistance to avert, eliminate, or alleviate
    the consequences of their disabilities and to secure employment
    commensurate with their abilities. The Government offers vocational
    training and grants for employers who hire the disabled. The severely
    disabled may be granted special benefits, such as tax relief, free
    public transport, special parking facilities, and exemption from radio
    and television fees.
        The Federal Government set guidelines for the attainment of
    ``barrier-free'' public buildings and for modifications of streets and
    pedestrian traffic walks to accommodate the disabled. All 16 states
    have incorporated the federal guidelines into their building codes, and
    98 percent of federal public buildings follow the guidelines for a
    ``barrier-free environment.''
        Religious Minorities.--The number of crimes classified by the
    authorities as anti-Semitic fell in 1999 to 871, a 17.5 percent
    decrease from 991 in 1998. In the first 6 months of the year, anti-
    Semitic crimes rose 3.3 percent over the same period in 1999, from 287
    to 297. These incidents included 7 cases of bodily injury, one case of
    arson, 14 cases of desecration of graves, and 254 ``other'' crimes that
    include the distribution of anti-Semitic materials or the display of
    symbols of banned organizations. For example, in March the police
    arrested eight youths for allegedly painting anti-Semitic slogans,
    swastikas, and other symbols on tombstones in a Jewish cemetery in
    Guben, Brandenburg. The overwhelming majority of the perpetrators of
    anti-Semitic acts were frustrated, largely apolitical youths and a
    small core of rightwing extremists.
        On April 20, a firebomb was thrown at a synagogue in Erfurt,
    Thuringia. Neighbors discovered and extinguished the fire before the
    building was damaged seriously. Two teenagers were arrested and
    convicted. The first was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and the
    second to 2 years and 2 months. On October 2, a Dusseldorf synagogue
    sustained minor damage after being firebombed. In December police
    arrested two men of Arab origin in connection with the crime.
        In June four rightwing youths threw a brick through the window of
    an Islamic prayer house in Gera, Thuringia. No one was injured during
    the attack, and the youths were arrested and charged shortly
    thereafter.
        In the July U.S.-German Agreement on the establishment of the
    German foundation, ``Remembrance, Responsibility and Future,'' Germany
    agreed to ensure that all Holocaust era insurance claims made against
    German insurance companies that come within the scope of the
    International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC)
    handling procedures are processed by the companies and the German
    Insurance Association on the basis of these procedures.
        Scientologists continued to report instances of societal
    discrimination (see Section 2.c.). There was no progress during the
    year in the investigation of the 1998 bombing of the grave of Heinz
    Galinski, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany until his
    death in 1992.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Preliminary Federal Criminal
    Office statistics for the year show a 39 percent increase in the
    overall number of proven or suspected rightwing crimes compared with
    1999, from 10,037 to approximately 14,000, reversing the past several
    years' downward trend. Moreover the number of violent rightwing crimes
    (including murder, attempted murder, and attacks that result in bodily
    injury, arson and bombings) rose more than 12 percent, from 746 in 1999
    to 840 during the year, including the beating deaths of at least five
    homeless men (See Section 1.a.). In 1999 the number of violent
    rightwing crimes rose 5.4 percent.
        The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC)
    reported that 51,400 persons were active in rightwing circles in 1999,
    a decrease of 4 percent from 53,600 in 1998. They included 37,000
    members of rightwing political parties, 2,200 neo-Nazis, 4,200 members
    of other rightwing groups, and some 9,000 violence-prone individuals
    (an almost 10 percent increase from 8,200 in 1998). Perpetrators of
    rightwing extremist violence were predominantly young, male, and low in
    socioeconomic status; they often committed such acts spontaneously and
    while inebriated. Most of the violent individuals (85 percent of whom
    are ``skinheads'') could best be described as rightwing-oriented,
    having loose, if any, practical or ideological ties to organized
    extremist groups. As in previous years, the percentage of crimes with
    proven or suspected rightwing background was disproportionately high in
    the east; the Federal OPC reported that more than half of rightwing
    ``skinheads'' live in the east, an area with only 21 percent of the
    population. In addition to these rightwing extremists, the Federal OPC
    estimates that there are some 7,000 violence-prone leftwing extremists,
    whose primary targets are their rightwing counterparts.
        On June 11, Alberto Adriano, a Mozambican immigrant, was beaten to
    death by three rightwing extremists as he walked home through a park at
    night in Dessau, Saxony-Anhalt. Three perpetrators were convicted; a
    24-year-old defendant was sentenced to life in prison, while two 16-
    year-old accomplices were sentenced to 9 years in a youth facility. The
    24-year-old and one of the juveniles have appealed their sentences, and
    the case continued at year's end.
        On July 16, three Kosovar Albanian children were injured when a
    firebomb was thrown through the window of the shelter for asylum
    seekers where they were staying in Ludwigshafen, Rhineland-Palatinate.
    Police arrested four skinheads 4 days later, and they were charged with
    the crime.
        The Federal Government and state governments remain firmly
    committed to combating and preventing rightwing violence. The
    Chancellor and leaders of all political parties publicly denounced
    rightwing violence after a surge of such activity in the summer months.
    In August and in November, Federal and state interior ministers agreed
    on a slate of measures to combat extremist violence, which includes
    increased physical protection of Jewish and other potential targets,
    the creation of a national register of violent rightwing extremists,
    stepped up patrolling or video monitoring by the border police in
    transit stations, and the prosecution of illegal rightwing content on
    the Internet. The Federal Border Police established a hotline for
    concerned citizens to report rightwing crimes. The Government also
    announced that it would use $34 million (DM 75,000,000) from the
    European Union Social Fund for antirightwing initiatives, to be
    cofinanced by the states or communities wishing to apply for project
    funds. In addition a number of state and local governments initiated
    programs to crack down on rightwing extremist activities and to engage
    young people considered most ``at risk'' for rightwing behavior.
        On August 2, a bomb at a Dusseldorf train station injured 10 recent
    Russian immigrants, among them 6 Jews. Because the group followed the
    same route each day, police have not ruled out that they were the
    specific targets of a xenophobic or anti-Semitic attack. No arrests
    have been made in the case.
        Isolated attacks targeting Turkish establishments and individuals
    occurred. Although some attacks were linked to rightwing perpetrators,
    many were attributed to intra-Turkish political or private disputes.
    None was directly attributable to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a
    banned organization. In August a 43-year-old Kurd was arrested and
    indicted for his alleged actions as a PKK functionary, including his
    order for Kurdish demonstrators to occupy foreign embassies and
    consulates in Germany after the 1999 arrest and return to Turkey of PKK
    leader Abdullah Ocalan.
        The trial of 11 rightwing extremists charged with the February 1999
    death of Algerian asylum seeker Farid Guendoul in Brandenburg ended in
    November with the convictions of 8 defendants on charges of negligent
    homicide and of all 11 for lesser charges. The suspects were found
    guilty of having caused Guendoul's death when they failed to assist him
    after he threw himself through a glass door to escape the skinheads,
    who were chasing him and yelling, ``Foreigners out!'' Guendoul bled to
    death. Of the 11 persons convicted, 10 have appealed their convictions,
    while Guendoul's family appealed what they consider the too-lenient
    sentences: 3 youths were sentenced to 2 to 3 years' term in a youth
    facility while the others received suspended sentences or warnings.
    Since its dedication, a memorial to Guendoul has been desecrated a
    number of times by suspected rightwing extremists.
        Since 1997 the Government has taken steps to protect and foster the
    languages and cultures of national and ethnic minorities that
    traditionally have lived in the country (e.g., Sorbs, Danes, Roma,
    Sinti, and Frisians). Although the Government has recognized the Sinti
    and Roma as an official ``national minority'' since 1995, the Federal
    and state interior ministries have resisted including Romani among the
    languages to be protected under relevant European statutes. Critics
    contend that the Sinti/Romani minority is the only official national
    minority that does not have unique legal protection, political
    privilege, or reserved representation in certain public institutions.
        There were no reports of violent anti-Roma or Sinti incidents,
    similar to the 1998 desecration of a Magdeburg memorial to Roma and
    Sinti murdered during the Nazi era.
        Resident foreigners and minority groups continued to voice credible
    concerns about societal and job-related discrimination. Unemployment
    affects foreigners disproportionately, although this is sometimes due
    in part to inadequate language skills or nontransferable professional
    qualifications of the job seekers. The Federal Government and all
    states have established permanent commissions to assist foreigners in
    their dealings with government and society.
        On January 1, a new citizenship law came into effect that allows
    children born to legal foreign residents to become citizens (see
    Section 2.d.).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The right to associate freely, choose
    representatives, determine programs and policies to represent workers'
    interests, and publicize views is recognized by the Basic Law and
    freely exercised. About 29 percent of the total eligible labor force
    belongs to unions. The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) represents
    about 82 percent of organized workers.
        The Basic Law provides for the right to strike, except for civil
    servants (including teachers) and personnel in sensitive positions,
    such as members of the armed forces. In the past, the International
    Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the Government's definition of
    ``essential services'' as overly broad. The ILO was responding to
    complaints about sanctions imposed on teachers who struck in the state
    of Hesse in 1989 and, earlier, the replacement of striking postal
    workers by civil servants. In neither case did permanent job loss
    result. The ILO continues to seek clarifications from the Government on
    policies and laws governing the labor rights of civil servants.
        Compared with previous years, strike activity declined further in
    1999. According to preliminary data for 1999, only 2,000 workers
    participated in strikes, and only 13,000 work days were lost. There
    were no notable strikes during the year.
        The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) participates in various
    international and European trade union organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Basic Law
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and this
    right is widely exercised. Due to a well-developed system of autonomous
    contract negotiations, mediation is used infrequently. Basic wages and
    working conditions are negotiated at the industry level. However, some
    firms in the eastern part of the country have refused to join employer
    associations or have withdrawn from them and then bargained
    independently with workers. Likewise, some firms in the west withdrew
    at least part of their work force from the jurisdiction of employer
    associations, complaining of rigidities in the industrywide,
    multicompany negotiating system. However, they have not refused to
    bargain as individual enterprises. The law mandates a system of ``works
    councils'' and worker membership on supervisory boards, and thus
    workers participate in the management of the enterprises in which they
    work. The law thoroughly protects workers against antiunion
    discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Basic Law
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced or bonded child
    labor, and there were no reports that it occurred, apart from
    trafficking in women and forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        In July agreement was reached among seven nations, German
    companies, and victims' representatives on the establishment of a
    German foundation which will distribute funds for payments to private
    and public sector Nazi era forced/slave laborers and others who
    suffered at the hands of German companies during the Nazi era. Germany
    and German companies will each contribute $2.3 billion (DM 5 billion)
    to the foundation, which is established under German law. The
    foundation concluded agreements with partner organizations that are to
    receive foundation funds in order to process and pay claims according
    to agreed procedures and be subject to audit. Payments are expected to
    commence in 2001.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children
    under the age of 15, with a few exceptions: those 13 or 14 years of age
    may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver newspapers
    for up to 2 hours per day; and those 3 to 14 years of age may take part
    in cultural performances, albeit under stringent curbs on the kinds of
    activity, number of hours, and time of day. The Federal Labor Ministry
    effectively enforces the law through its Factory Inspection Bureau.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or
    administratively determined minimum wage. Wages and salaries are set
    either by collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer
    federations or by individual contracts. Covering about 90 percent of
    all wage- and salary-earners, the collective bargaining agreements set
    minimum pay rates and are enforceable by law. These minimums provide an
    adequate standard of living for workers and their families. The number
    of hours of work per week is regulated by contracts that directly or
    indirectly affect 80 percent of the working population. The average
    workweek for industrial workers is 36 hours in the western part of the
    country and about 39 hours in the eastern states.
        In September the Federal Constitutional Court refused to review a
    case filed by a civil servant in east Berlin, who had argued
    unsuccessfully that the prevailing system of different rates of pay for
    public service workers in the east and west were unconstitutional. The
    Court ruled that lower wages in the east were justifiable due to
    differences in the economic situation in both parts of the country and
    that the pay gap had narrowed steadily since 1992.
        Federal regulations limit the workweek to a maximum of 48 hours.
    Provisions for overtime, holiday, and weekend pay vary depending upon
    the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
        Foreign workers are protected by law and generally receive
    treatment equal to that of citizens. However, foreigners who are
    employed illegally, particularly in the construction industry in
    Berlin, are susceptible to substandard wages. Wage discrimination also
    affects legal foreign workers to some extent. For example, foreign
    teachers in some schools are paid less than their German counterparts.
    In addition seasonal workers from Eastern Europe who come to Germany on
    temporary work permits often receive wages below normal German
    standards. Furthermore workers from other European Union countries
    sometimes are employed at the same wages that they would receive in
    their home country, even if the corresponding German worker would
    receive a higher wage.
        An extensive set of laws and regulations on occupational safety and
    health incorporates a growing body of European Union standards. These
    provide for the right to refuse to perform dangerous or unhealthy work
    without jeopardizing employment. A comprehensive system of worker
    insurance carriers enforces safety requirements in the workplace. The
    Labor Ministry and its counterparts in the states effectively enforce
    occupational safety and health standards through a network of
    government bodies, including the Federal Institute for Work Safety. At
    the local level, professional and trade associations--self-governing
    public corporations with delegates both from the employers and from the
    unions--oversee worker safety.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and forced
    prostitution are forbidden by law; however, trafficking in women and
    girls is a serious problem. The laws against trafficking in women were
    modified in 1992 and 1998 to deal more effectively with problems
    stemming from the opening of the country's eastern borders; trafficking
    in persons is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment.
        Germany is a destination and transit country for trafficked women.
    Estimates vary considerably on the number of women and girls trafficked
    to and through the country, ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 per year. Most
    trafficking victims are women and girls between the ages of 16 and 25
    who are forced to work as prostitutes. According to police statistics,
    less than + of 1 percent of trafficking victims are men or boys. Of the
    women trafficked to the country through fake employment offers,
    arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures, 80 percent come from
    Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily
    from Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The other 20 percent of
    trafficking victims come from Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin
    America.
        The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women, and Youth
    heads an interagency working group to coordinate the efforts of state
    and federal agencies to combat trafficking and to aid victims of
    trafficking. The Ministry has lobbied states successfully to provide
    victims of trafficking who have been detained by police 4 weeks to
    leave the country, rather than have them face immediate deportation.
    The 4-week grace period allows the victims time to decide whether to
    cooperate with police on investigations of those suspected of
    trafficking. Those who cooperate, although they are very few in number,
    are granted a temporary stay for at least part of the proceedings and
    may be eligible for witness protection at the state level. In three
    cases during recent years, the children of women in such witness
    protection programs were brought to the country to prevent possible
    retaliation against them due to their mother's testimony. However,
    protection ends once the case is concluded. Trafficking victims who
    cannot afford to pay for their return tickets home may be eligible for
    state and federal funds for transportation and some pocket money.
        The Federal Government has embarked on a multiyear ``Action Plan to
    Combat Violence Against Women,'' introduced in December 1999. This
    effort includes the creation of a number of combined federal and state
    working groups, with the participation of relevant NGO's, to address in
    as comprehensive a manner possible legislative changes, public
    educational campaigns, and opportunities for greater institutional
    cooperation. Under this program, the Government plans to spend
    approximately $373,000 (DM 822,000) over 3 years to establish a
    ``National Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Women and Violence
    Against Women in the Migratory Process.'' The Federal Government
    continued its funding of six counseling centers for women from Central
    and Eastern Europe, and most states and many communities cofinanced
    institutions that help counsel and care for victims of trafficking. The
    Government publishes a brochure that provides information on residency
    and work requirements, counseling centers for women, health care,
    warnings about trafficking, and information for sex-industry workers
    that is printed in 13 languages and distributed by NGO's and German
    Consulates abroad.
                                   __________

                                     GREECE

        Greece is a constitutional republic and multiparty parliamentary
    democracy in which citizens choose their representatives in free and
    fair elections. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the
    majority of parliamentary seats for a second consecutive term in
    parliamentary elections held in April. Its leader, Constantine Simitis,
    has been Prime Minister since 1996. The New Democracy Party is the main
    opposition party. The judiciary is independent.
        The national police and security services are responsible for
    internal security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of
    all security forces. The police and security services are subject to a
    broad variety of restraints. Some members of the police and security
    forces nevertheless committed human rights abuses.
        Greece has a market economy with a large public sector that
    accounts for some 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Residents
    enjoy a relatively advanced standard of living. Structural adjustment
    funds from the European Union (EU) account for approximately 4 percent
    of the country's GDP.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Security force
    personnel sometimes abused persons. Overcrowding and harsh living
    conditions continued in some prisons. Police sweeps resulted in the
    detention of undocumented immigrants under often squalid conditions.
    There are legal limits on the freedom of association of ethnic
    minorities. Overall, leaders of minority religions noted a general
    improvement in government tolerance, but some legal restrictions and
    administrative obstacles on freedom of religion persisted. The
    Government sometimes placed human rights monitors, including foreign
    diplomats, non-Orthodox religious groups, and minority groups under
    surveillance. Violence against women and trafficking in women for the
    purpose of forced prostitution are problems. Discrimination against
    ethnic minorities remained a problem, although it is decreasing.
    However, Roma continued to suffer widespread discrimination. Although
    it reaffirmed individuals' right of self-identification, the Government
    continues formally to recognize as a minority only the Muslim minority
    specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. As a result, some individuals
    who define themselves as members of a minority find it difficult to
    express their identity freely and to maintain their culture, although
    problems in this area decreased during the year. Muslims note positive
    developments in education and in the living conditions in villages.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
    officials.
        In the 1998 case of a Romani man killed by police in Partheni,
    Thessaloniki, the policemen were acquitted in March on all charges. The
    court found that they fired in self-defense.
        In the 1998 case of a foreign student killed by a policeman, the
    policeman received a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment for involuntary
    manslaughter in November; he has appealed the judgment.
        Isolated incidents of terrorism continued during the year. A
    British military attache was shot and killed in June by the terrorist
    group November 17. The group has claimed responsibility for 22 killings
    during the past 25 years, but no one has ever been arrested and charged
    in these cases.
        There was no resolution of the cases of seven doctors accused of
    manslaughter in 1998 in connection with the case of an alleged hostage-
    taker in an Athens hospital or of a policeman who in 1996 shot and
    killed a Romani man at a roadblock in Livadia.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and a 1984
    law (that has never been invoked) makes the use of torture an offense
    punishable by a sentence of 3 years' to life imprisonment; however,
    security force personnel occasionally abused persons, including Roma
    (see Section 5).
        In August two foreigners accused police in Crete of mistreatment
    while under detention.
        The 1998 case of three policemen who allegedly beat two Romani
    teenagers was still pending in September 2000 (see Section 5). The 1996
    case of five police officers accused of beating an Iraklion man also
    remained pending.
        In 1997 a man on Rhodes accused three policemen of beating him
    while in custody. The three accused officers were charged, but the
    charges were dropped later by the prosecutor in December 1999.
        Immigrants--mostly Albanian citizens--accused police of physical,
    verbal, and other mistreatment (including the confiscation and
    destruction of their documents), particularly during police sweeps to
    apprehend illegal immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
        Numerous anarchist and terrorist groups attacked a wide spectrum of
    targets, mostly commercial property, during the year. The firebombing
    of vehicles, drive-by shootings of buildings, and bombings at
    commercial establishments, mostly late at night, were widespread.
        The Ministry of Public Order opened a Bureau of Internal Affairs in
    October 1999 to investigate cases of police misbehavior. The Bureau
    took several disciplinary measures, including dismissal and suspension,
    against officers involved in corruption. The corruption mostly involved
    trafficking, bribes for illegal construction, and drugs.
        Conditions in some prisons remained harsh due to substantial
    overcrowding and outdated facilities. As of July, the Ministry of
    Justice reported that the total prison population was 8,131 (of whom
    2,775 were foreigners), while the total capacity of the prison system
    was 4,825.
        Non-EU illegal aliens awaiting deportation at the Drapetsona police
    detention center in Piraeus staged another hunger strike in April to
    protest what was described by a human rights organization as a ``lack
    of adequate exercise, lack of natural daylight, insufficient sanitary
    facilities, restriction on visits, inadequate food, severely limited
    access to medical treatment, and no access to social services.'' Poor
    conditions also were reported at the Amygdaleza detention center for
    illegal alien women.
        The Ministry of Justice continued its program to improve prison
    conditions and expand capacity. Construction is underway on four new
    prisons. The Government has been inconsistent in permitting prison
    visits by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). There were no reports
    of restricted prison access this year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    requires judicial warrants for all arrests, except during the actual
    commission of a crime, and the law prohibits arbitrary arrest orders;
    the authorities respected these provisions in practice. The police by
    law must bring persons who are detained or arrested before an examining
    magistrate within 24 hours. The magistrate must issue a detention
    warrant or order the release of the detainee within 3 days, unless
    special circumstances require a 2-day extension of this time limit.
        Defendants brought to court before the end of the day following the
    commission of a charged offense may be tried immediately, under an
    ``expedited procedure.'' Although legal safeguards, including
    representation by counsel, apply in expedited procedure cases, the
    short period of time may inhibit defendants' ability to present an
    adequate defense. Defendants may ask for a delay to provide time to
    prepare their defense, but the court is not obliged to grant it. The
    expedited procedure was used in less than 10 percent of misdemeanor
    cases; it does not apply in felony cases.
        The effective maximum duration of pretrial detention is 18 months
    for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Defense lawyers assert that
    pretrial detention is exceedingly long and overused by judges. A panel
    of judges may grant release pending trial, with or without bail.
    Pretrial detainees made up 31 percent of those incarcerated,
    contributing to overcrowding, according to government sources. A person
    convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment or
    less may, at the court's discretion, pay a fine instead of being
    imprisoned.
        Throughout the year, the police conducted large-scale sweeps and
    temporarily detained large numbers of foreigners under often squalid
    conditions while determining their residence status (see Section 2.d.).
    Some of the foreigners are detained on an indefinite basis with no
    judicial review, which, according to the NGO Human Rights Watch,
    constitutes arbitrary detention.
        Exile is unconstitutional, and no cases have been reported since
    the restoration of democracy in 1974. In a significant step, the
    Government in 1998 repealed Article 19 of the Citizenship Code, which
    permitted it to revoke the citizenship of Greek citizens of non-Greek
    ethnic origin who traveled outside Greece. Between 1955 and 1998,
    according to then-Minister of Interior Papadopoulos, some 60,000
    citizens lost their citizenship under the old law. The 1998 law had no
    provision for retroactive application. About 400 individuals who lost
    their citizenship in the past under Article 19 continued to reside in
    Greece. Following the repeal of Article 19, most of these individuals
    were issued identification documents characterizing them as stateless,
    but they were permitted to apply to reacquire Greek citizenship. Most
    of these 400 persons had not had their applications adjudicated by
    year's end (also see Section 2.d.).
        Article 20 of the Citizenship Code, which permits the Government to
    strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary to the
    interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state,'' remained in
    force. In the past, this article affected Greek citizens abroad who
    asserted a ``Macedonian'' ethnicity. There have been no reports of
    Article 20 being invoked by the Government since 1998 (also see Section
    2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    independence of the judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
        The judicial system includes three levels of civil courts, (first
    instance, appeals, and supreme) and three levels of criminal courts
    (first instance--divided into misdemeanor and felony divisions,
    appeals, and supreme), appointed judges, and an examining magistrate
    system, with trials by judicial panels.
        The Constitution provides for public trials, unless the court
    decides that privacy is required to protect victims and witnesses or
    the cases involve national security matters. Defendants enjoy a
    presumption of innocence, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt, the right to present evidence and call witnesses, the right of
    access to the prosecution's evidence, the right to cross-examine
    witnesses, and the right to counsel. Lawyers are provided to defendants
    who are not able to afford legal counsel only in felony cases. Both the
    prosecution and the defense may appeal.
        Defendants who do not speak Greek have the right to a court-
    appointed interpreter. According to several immigrant associations in
    Athens, the low fees paid for such work often result in poor
    interpretation. Foreign defendants who depend on these interpreters
    frequently complain that they do not understand the proceedings of
    their trials.
        The legal system does not discriminate on the basis of sex,
    religion, or nationality; however, there were some exceptions:
    nonethnic Greek citizens are prohibited legally from settling in a
    large ``supervised zone'' near the frontier (although this prohibition
    is not enforced in practice); and a 1939 law (also not enforced in
    practice) prohibits the functioning of private schools in buildings
    owned by non-Orthodox religious foundations.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits the invasion of privacy and
    searches without warrants, and the law permits the monitoring of
    personal communications only under strict judicial controls; however,
    these safeguards do not appear to be entirely effective. The security
    services continued to monitor some human rights groups, such as the
    Greek Helsinki Monitor (see Section 4), non-Orthodox religious groups,
    minority group representatives, and foreign diplomats who met with such
    individuals. Some human rights monitors reported suspicious openings
    and diversions of mail. The Government apparently took no steps to stop
    such practices or to prosecute those involved.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights in practice. Legal restrictions on free speech
    nevertheless remain in force.
        Articles of the Penal Code that can be used to restrict free speech
    and the press include Article 141, which forbids exposing the friendly
    relations of the Greek state with foreign states to danger of
    disturbance; Article 191, which prohibits spreading false information
    and rumors liable to create concern and fear among citizens and cause
    disturbances in the country's international relations and inciting
    citizens to rivalry and division, leading to disturbance of the peace;
    and Article 192, which prohibits inciting citizens to acts of violence
    or to disturbing the peace through disharmony among them. Those
    convicted in the past were allowed to convert their prison sentences,
    up to 3 years, into a fine of approximately $14 (5,000 drachmae) per
    day.
        According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a renowned violinist and a
    composer were given prison sentences in March for defamation based on
    statements made during newspaper interviews. In such criminal
    defamation cases in the past, the defendant typically has been released
    on bail pending appeal, and no jail time is ever served. In November
    1999, according to HRW, two journalists for Eleftherotypia were
    indicted for defamation for alleging that the Lesvos police were
    associated with smugglers. Also, in December 1999 an Athens court
    convicted Dimitris Rizos, publisher of Adesmeftos Typos, of aggravated
    defamation of the publisher of another newspaper with the same name.
        In a 1997 case, two journalists were convicted of publishing
    classified government documents; their convictions were still under
    appeal at the Supreme Court in September 2000.
        On matters other than the question of ethnic minorities, there is a
    tradition of outspoken public discourse and a vigorous free press.
    Satirical and opposition newspapers routinely attack the highest state
    authorities. Members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities
    freely publish periodicals and other publications, often in their
    native language. The Constitution allows for seizure (though not prior
    restraint), by order of the public prosecutor, of publications that
    insult the President, offend religious beliefs, contain obscene
    articles, advocate violent overthrow of the political system, or
    disclose military and defense information. However, seizures are very
    rare; none have occurred since 1998.
        A Thessaloniki court of first instance ruled in September in favor
    of a former Member of Parliament (M.P.), Mimis Androulakis, whose novel
    ``M to the Power of N'' was banned from circulation in seven northern
    prefectures in May as a ``blasphemous'' book because of sexual
    connotations regarding the relationship between Christ and Mary
    Magdalene. The court ruled that the novel was a ``work of art'' and
    thus protected by the Constitution.
        The Constitution provides that the state exercise ``immediate
    control'' over radio and television. Once the state monopoly on radio
    and television ended in 1989, numerous private stations began
    operations in an essentially unregulated market while the Government
    sought to draft and implement legislation on licensing and frequency
    allocations. The National Radio and Television Council (NRTC) has an
    advisory role in radio and television licensing, whereas the Ministry
    of Press and Mass Media has final authority.
        A 1995 law established ownership and technical frequency limits on
    electronic media; the Government and media outlets disputed application
    procedures and frequency allocations. In December 1998, the Government
    passed legislation designed to legalize stations operating with pending
    applications; with more applicants than available frequency spectrum,
    not all stations will gain licenses. The Government occasionally closes
    stations for violating intellectual property rights or interfering with
    civil aviation, military, and law enforcement transmissions. In
    December 1999, Channel Station 2000, an Evangelical radio station, was
    closed. The station's owners stated that the closure was because of
    religious content (although other non-Orthodox stations continue to
    operate unhindered), whereas the Government asserted that the station's
    broadcasts sporadically interfered with military channels. In January
    2000, the station legally resumed operation. State-run stations tend to
    emphasize the Government's views but also report objectively on other
    parties' programs and positions. Private radio and television stations
    operate independently of any government control over their reporting.
    Turkish-language television programs are available widely via satellite
    in Thrace.
        The 1998 conviction of Abdulhalim Dede, the Muslim owner of Radio
    Isik, for illegal construction of a new radio antenna intended to
    extend the range of the station, was upheld on appeal in June. The
    court reduced the sentence from 8 to 2 months in jail but suspended
    enforcement pending Dede's appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
    Court decided in May 2000 that Abdulhalim Dede did not receive a fair
    trial on a fifth charge of illegal construction of a new radio antenna
    intended to extend the range of the station. Dede paid a $1,368
    (500,000 drachmae) fine in lieu of 2 months jail for his initial
    conviction.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Police permits are issued routinely for public
    demonstrations, and there were no reports that the permit requirement
    was abused.
        In the spring of 1999, a large number of demonstrations occurred in
    Athens and Thessaloniki to protest NATO actions in Kosovo, and
    demonstrations took place against the visit of President Clinton in
    November 1999. Pro-Serb activists in Thessaloniki continued to
    demonstrate against the U.S. periodically, most notably in the spring
    of 2000, when U.S. troops travelling to and from the Kosovo
    peacekeeping mission were transiting northern Greece. In demonstrations
    organized by the Orthodox Church, over 100,000 supporters gathered in
    Athens and Thessaloniki in the summer of 2000 to protest the
    Government's decision to remove notation of religion on the national ID
    card.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, which the
    Government respected; however, the courts continue to place legal
    restrictions on the names of associations involving ethnic minorities
    (see Section 5).
        Government authorities legally recognize the existence of the
    Muslim minority but contend that other ethnic/linguistic or religious
    groups have no legal basis for official recognition as ``minorities.''
    The Government has affirmed an individual, but not a collective, right
    of self-identification. However, in 1997 it signed (but had not yet
    ratified) the European Framework Convention for the Protection of
    National Minorities.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the Eastern
    Orthodox Church of Christ (Greek Orthodoxy) as the ``prevailing''
    religion; it also provides for the right of all citizens to practice
    the religion of their choice; however, while the Government respects
    this right, non-Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles
    or legal restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits
    proselytizing and stipulates that non-Orthodox rites of worship may not
    disturb public order or offend moral principles.
        The Orthodox Church wields significant political and economic
    influence. The Ministry of Education and Religion supervises the
    Church, and the Government provides some financial support by, for
    example, paying the salaries of clergy, subsidizing their religious
    training, and financing the construction and maintenance of Orthodox
    Church buildings.
        The Orthodox Church and the Jewish and Muslim religions are
    considered by law to be ``legal persons of public law.'' Other
    religions are considered ``legal persons of private law.'' In practice
    a primary distinction is that establishment of other religions'
    ``houses of prayer'' is regulated by the general provisions of the
    Civil Code regarding corporations. For example other religions cannot,
    as religious entities, own property; the property must belong to a
    specifically created legal entity rather than to the church itself. In
    practice this places an additional legal and administrative burden on
    non-Orthodox religious community organizations. Parliament passed a law
    in July 1999 that extended legal recognition to Catholic churches and
    related entities established prior to 1946.
        Two laws from the late 1930's require recognized or ``known''
    religious groups to obtain house of prayer permits from the Ministry of
    Education and Religion in order to open houses of worship. By law the
    Ministry may base its decision to issue permits on the opinion of the
    local Orthodox bishop, but Ministry officials state that they no longer
    obtain the opinion of the Orthodox bishop when considering house of
    prayer permit applications. According to ministry officials, once a
    ``known'' religion receives a house of prayer permit, applications for
    additional houses of prayer are approved routinely. Minority religious
    groups have requested that laws regulating house of prayer permits be
    abolished. Many provisions of these laws are not applied in practice,
    but local police still have the authority to bring minority churches to
    court, as demonstrated in the case of the 16 churches charged but
    acquitted on December 12 in Thessaloniki for operating without a house
    of prayer permit.
        The only recent application for recognition as a known religion at
    the Ministry was submitted in February by the Scientologists of Greece.
    Although the deadline mandated by law for processing the applications
    is 3 months, it took the Ministry until October to decide that it would
    not recognize the Scientologist community as an ``official'' religion.
        A 1997 tax bill imposed three new taxes on all churches and other
    nonprofit organizations. Leaders of some non-Orthodox religious groups
    claimed that all taxes on religious organizations were discriminatory,
    even those that the Orthodox Church has to pay, since the Government
    subsidizes the Orthodox Church while other groups are self-supporting.
    The Government also pays the salaries of the two official Muslim
    religious leaders and provides them with official vehicles.
        Approximately 94 to 97 percent of the country's 10.6 million
    citizens adhere at least nominally to the Greek Orthodox faith. With
    the exception of the Muslim community (some of whose rights,
    privileges, and related government obligations are covered by the 1923
    Treaty of Lausanne), the Government does not keep statistics on the
    size of religious groups. Ethnic Greeks account for a sizeable
    percentage of most non-Orthodox religions. The balance of the
    population is composed of Muslims (officially estimated at 98,000
    although some Muslims claim up to 110,000 countrywide); accurate
    figures for other religions are not available. Protestants, including
    evangelicals (approximately 30,000); Jehovah's Witnesses (50,000);
    Catholics (50,000); Jews (5,000); plus small congregations of the
    Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), Scientologists,
    the Baha'i Faith, and other Christian denominations are scattered
    throughout the country.
        Several religious denominations reported difficulties in dealing
    with the authorities on a variety of administrative matters. Privileges
    and legal prerogatives granted to the Greek Orthodox Church are not
    extended routinely to other recognized religions. The non-Greek
    Orthodox churches must make separate and lengthy applications to
    government authorities on such matters as gaining permission to move
    places of worship to larger facilities. In contrast Greek Orthodox
    officials have an institutionalized link between the church hierarchy
    and the Ministry of Education and Religion to handle administrative
    matters.
        The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which is still in force, gives Muslims
    in Western Thrace the right to maintain social and charitable
    organizations (``wakfs'') and provides for muftis (Islamic judges and
    religious leaders with limited civic responsibilities) to render
    religious judicial services.
        The Muslim population, concentrated in Western Thrace with small
    communities in Rhodes, Kos, and Athens, is composed mainly of ethnic
    Turks but also includes Pomaks and Roma. The approximately 10,000
    member Muslim community in Athens (composed primarily of economic
    migrants from Thrace) has no mosque or state-appointed cleric to
    officiate at various religious functions, including funerals. Members
    of the Muslim community often transport their deceased back to Thrace
    for religious burials. In June the Parliament approved a bill allowing
    construction of the first Islamic cultural center and mosque in the
    Athens area. According to official sources, a total of 287 mosques
    operate freely in Western Thrace and others on the islands of Rhodes
    and Kos. Construction of a long-delayed mosque in Kimmeria, Thrace was
    completed in 1998, although its minaret remained unfinished. The issue
    is one of local sensitivities rather than religious motivation, and the
    religious operation of the mosque has not been affected.
        Differences remain within the Muslim community and between segments
    of the community and the Government over the means of selection of
    muftis. Under a 1991 law, the Government appointed two muftis and one
    assistant mufti, all resident in Thrace. The appointments to 10-year
    terms were based on the recommendations of a committee of Muslim
    notables selected by the Government. The Government argued that it must
    appoint the muftis because, in addition to their religious duties, they
    perform judicial functions in civil and domestic matters under Muslim
    religious law, for which the State pays them.
        Some Muslims accept the authority of the two officially appointed
    muftis; other Muslims, with support from Turkey, have ``elected'' two
    different muftis to serve their communities (although there is no
    established procedure or practice for election). The courts repeatedly
    have convicted (14 times in 5 years) one of the elected muftis for
    usurping the authority of the official mufti. All of the respective
    sentences remain suspended pending appeal. The other elected mufti, who
    was convicted in 1991 of usurping the authority of the official mufti,
    appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In December 1999, the
    Court ruled that the conviction violated his freedom of religion and
    self-expression, but it did not rule on the question of his legal
    status as mufti.
        Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also
    continues over the management and self-government of the wakfs,
    regarding the appointment of officials as well as the degree and type
    of administrative control. A 1980 law placed the administration of the
    wakfs in the hands of the appointed muftis and their representatives.
    In response to objections from some Muslims that this arrangement
    weakened the financial autonomy of the wakfs and violated the terms of
    the Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996 presidential decree put the wakfs under
    the administration of a committee for 3 years as an interim measure
    pending the resolution of outstanding problems. The interim period was
    extended indefinitely in 1999.
        Muslim activists complained that the Government regularly lodges
    tax liens against the wakfs although they are in theory tax-free
    religious foundations. Under a national land and property registry law
    that came into full effect in January 1999, the wakfs, as with all
    property holders, must register all of their property with the
    Government. The law permits the Government to seize any property that
    owners are not able to document; there are built-in reporting and
    appeals procedures. The wakfs were established in 1560; however, due to
    the destruction of files during the two world wars, the wakfs are
    unable to document ownership of much of their property. They have not
    registered the property, so they cannot pay assessed taxes. To date the
    Government has not sought to enforce either the assessments or the
    registration requirement.
        Protestant groups constitute the second largest religious group
    after the Greek Orthodox Church. Some groups, such as the evangelicals
    and Jehovah's Witnesses, consist almost entirely of ethnic Greeks.
    Other groups, such as the Latter-Day Saints and Anglicans, consist of
    an approximately equal number of ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. Non-
    Greek citizen clergy reported difficulty renewing their visas during
    the year because the Government does not have a distinct visa category
    for religious workers. The Government, by virtue of the Orthodox
    Church's status as the prevailing religion, recognizes de facto its
    canon law. The Catholic Church in 1999 unsuccessfully sought government
    recognition of its canon law (the official ``constitution'' of the
    Church).
        As part of new obligations under the Schengen Treaty and the Treaty
    of Amsterdam, all non-European Union citizens face a more restrictive
    visa and residence regime than they did in the past.
        Although Jehovah's Witnesses are recognized as a ``known''
    religion, they continued to face some harassment in the form of
    arbitrary identity checks (although reduced from 1998), difficulties in
    burying their dead, and local officials' resistance to their
    construction of churches (which in most cases was resolved quickly and
    favorably). In Thessaloniki in late 1999, the Government Tax Office
    refused to recognize Jehovah's Witnesses as a nonprofit association and
    imposed an inheritance tax for property willed to them. The individuals
    appealed the decision in 2000, and byyear's end, the case still was
    pending. In 1999 a European Court of Human Rights case was resolved
    when the Government admitted surveillance of an adherent and promised
    that it would never conduct surveillance of Jehovah's Witnesses again.
        In previous years, the armed forces consistently refused to exempt
    Jehovah's Witnesses' clergy from mandatory military service. In 1998 a
    law providing an alternative form of mandatory national service for
    conscientious objectors took effect. All clergy now are exempt from any
    service. The law provides that conscientious objectors may work in
    state hospitals or municipal services for 36 months. Conscientious
    objector groups characterized the legislation as a positive first step
    but criticized the 36-month alternative service term, which is double
    the regular 18-month period of military service.
        Evangelical parishes are located throughout the country. Members of
    missionary faiths report difficulties due to constitutional and legal
    prohibitions on proselytizing. Church officials express concern that
    antiproselytizing laws remain on the books, although such laws no
    longer hinder their ministering to the poor and to children. In
    December 1999, the Government, applying legislation covering radio and
    television broadcasts, shut down an evangelical radio station over a
    technical issue on transmission frequency; however, the station resumed
    operation legally a few months later once the case was adjudicated.
        The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has about 80
    missionaries in the country each year, for approximately 2year terms.
    Church leaders report that their permanent members (nonmissionaries) do
    not encounter discriminatory treatment. However, the police
    occasionally detained Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses (on average every
    2 weeks) after receiving complaints that individuals were engaged in
    proselytizing. In most cases, these Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses
    were held for several hours at a police station and then released with
    no charges filed. Many reported that they were not allowed to call
    their lawyers and that they were verbally abused by police officers for
    their religious beliefs. In 1998 the European Court of Human Rights
    found the Government in violation of the European Convention on Human
    Rights for convicting Protestants of proselytizing in past cases. There
    were no proselytizing-related court cases during the year.
        Scientologists, most of whom are located in the Athens area,
    practice their faith through a registered nonprofit philosophical
    organization. According to the president of the Greek Scientologists,
    the group chose to register as a philosophical organization because
    legal counsel advised that the Government would not recognize
    Scientology as a religion. In a step toward gaining recognition as a
    religion, Scientologists reapplied for a house of prayer permit in
    February. The application was rejected by the Ministry of Education and
    Religious Affairs on October 17 on the grounds that Scientology ``is
    not a religion.''
        The Bishop of Athens heads the Roman Catholic Holy Synod. CARITAS,
    a charitable organization, and the Missionaries of Charity (Mother
    Teresa's order of nuns) also operate in the country. Legal recognition
    of the Catholic archdiocese of Athens, earlier denied, was granted in
    July 1999. The Jewish community numbers approximately 5,000 adherents;
    the majority live in the Athens and Thessaloniki regions. In October
    1999, a rededication of a synagogue in Hania, Crete as a house of
    prayer and a cultural center was marred by public criticism of the
    event by the regional governor. The Minister of National Education and
    Religion, and other government and Greek Orthodox officials lent their
    support to the rededication.
        Religious instruction in Orthodoxy in public primary and secondary
    schools is mandatory for all Greek Orthodox students. Non-Orthodox
    students are exempt from this requirement. However, Jehovah's Witnesses
    have reported some past instances of discrimination related to
    attendance at religious education classes or other celebrations of
    religious or nationalistic character. Members of the Muslim community
    in Athens are lobbying for Islamic religious instruction for their
    children. The neighborhood schools offer no alternative supervision for
    the children during the period when religious issues are taught. The
    community has complained that this forces the parents to have their
    children attend Orthodox religious instruction by default.
        The Government decided in the summer to remove the notation of
    religious affiliation on national identity cards. This sparked a
    national debate on the role of the Church in society. For example, the
    issue led Archbishop Christodoulos to organize religious protest
    rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens in June. Both demonstrations drew
    over 100,000 supporters. Archbishop Christodoulos vociferously
    criticized the Government and has started collecting signatures to
    petition the Government to allow religious affiliation as an option on
    national identity cards.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. Unlike
    in the past, there were no reports of assertions by Muslim leaders that
    the Government routinely withheld permission from Muslims seeking to
    change their legal residence, which determines where they vote, from
    rural to urban communities within western Thrace or from elsewhere in
    Greece to Thrace.
        A section of the Citizenship Code, Article 20, permits the
    Government to strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary
    to the interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state.'' While
    the law as written applies equally to all Greeks regardless of ethnic
    background, to date it has been enforced, in all but one case, only
    against citizens who identified themselves as members of the
    ``Macedonian'' minority. The Government has not revealed the number of
    Article 20 cases that it pursued. There were no reports of such cases
    during the year. Dual citizens who are stripped of Greek citizenship
    under Article 20 sometimes are prevented from entering the country
    using the passport of their second nationality.
        The Government offers asylum under the terms of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It
    cooperates with the local office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR). In June 1999, a presidential decree took effect that
    significantly expanded the rights of asylum seekers and brought the law
    into compliance with UNHCR minimum standards on asylum procedures.
    UNHCR commented on its good relations with police during the year. The
    Government did not forcibly deport refugees during the year to
    countries where they feared persecution.
        Individuals recognized as refugees under the terms of the U.N.
    convention are eligible for the residence and work permits that are
    necessary to settle permanently. In the first 6 months of 2000, 1,295
    individuals submitted applications for refugee status; 132 individuals
    were recognized as refugees. Another 43 were granted temporary
    residence on humanitarian grounds until return to their countries
    becomes possible. The remaining 1,120 cases were pending.
        The Government usually does not recognize the concept of first
    asylum rights for refugees. UNHCR has expressed its concern over the
    fact that very few applicants are granted asylum on first application
    to the authorities; most who are granted asylum succeed on their second
    try, when UNHCR participates. Interpretation services are lacking, as
    are adequate personnel who would ensure timely access to the asylum
    process for all those who seek it. UNHCR also has expressed its concern
    that there exists no publicly funded legal aid system for free
    counseling to asylum seekers and refugees.
        Anecdotal evidence suggests that thousands of individuals from
    Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran enter the country illegally each
    year; only a small percentage eventually apply for official refugee
    status. Some of those who do not apply remain illegally, often living
    in camps or in NGO shelters where conditions range from adequate to
    very poor. Others proceed to Western Europe, often applying for asylum
    there. In January an accident involving a truck that carried 80
    smuggled persons from Turkey killed 6 of them and wounded several
    dozen. Other accidental deaths occurred in similar circumstances. In
    the largest immigrant smuggling operation ever reported, a Turkish ship
    carrying 655 illegal migrants bound for Italy was seized off Chios on
    October 20. The applications of those aboard who wanted to apply for
    asylum were being processed; none were forcibly deported. The
    Government usually does not seek out such individuals for deportation;
    since Greece and Turkey do not have a readmission agreement, the
    Government finds it practically impossible to deport formally
    individuals who enter Greece from Turkey.
        Deportations of both illegal and legal immigrants, abusive
    treatment by police, and inconsistencies and inequities in the way
    employers provide wages and benefits were common. The police conducted
    many large-scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by immigrants,
    temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals while determining
    their residence status. The detainees were held in squalid conditions:
    A report by Human Rights Watch in December cited severe overcrowding
    and a lack of sufficient exercise, sleeping accommodations, adequate
    food, or medical care. The only government-funded center for asylum
    seekers is old and in need of repair.
        The Organization for the Employment of Human Resources (OAED), a
    government agency, reported that by 2000, 386,000 illegal aliens, out
    of an estimated total alien population of 700,000, had applied for
    legal status or a ``white card,'' under a program designed to
    regularize the residency status of illegal, (usually economic)
    immigrants. A few, mostly Albanian, white card holders were able to
    meet all the requirements of the law and receive a ``green card,''
    which serves as a residence permit and allows the immigrants to live
    and work in the country for a limited period of time. OAED issued
    159,807 green cards by July. Some 80 percent of the green cards issued
    so far are of 1-year duration. A new application is required to extend
    the card for an additional year. Holders of a white card may reside and
    work legally on a short-term basis while meeting the other requirements
    necessary to obtain a green card. Press reports cite the obstacles of a
    complex bureaucracy and the unwillingness of employers to pay social
    security contributions as primary reasons for the limited ability of
    white cardholders to advance to the green card application process. The
    OAED estimated that out of a total of 386,000 white cardholders in
    1998, 163,000 simply dropped out of the green card application process.
    Legislation provides for the green card program to remain in effect
    until the end of 2001. Atyear's end the Government proposed a bill to
    establish a new legalization process. Press reports estimated that it
    would take 3 years just to process the applications already submitted.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Greece is a multiparty democracy whose Constitution provides for
    full political rights for all citizens and for the peaceful change of
    governments and of the Constitution. The Government headed by Prime
    Minister Constantine Simitis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
    (PASOK) won in free and fair elections in September 1996 and again in
    April 2000. Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. Voting
    is mandatory for those over age 18, but there are many conditions that
    allow citizens not to vote, and penalties are not applied in practice.
    Members of the unicameral 300-seat Parliament are elected to maximum 4-
    year terms by secret ballot. Opposition parties function freely and
    have broad access to the media.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no
    legal restrictions hinder their participation, and their numbers are
    slowly increasing. During the year, women held 2 of 20 ministerial
    positions in the Government and 3 of 29 subministerial positions. Of
    the 300 members elected to Parliament in April, 31 were women.
        While the Government generally respects citizens' political rights,
    there are occasionally charges that it limits the right of some
    individuals to speak publicly and associate freely on the basis of
    their self-proclaimed ethnic identity, thus impinging on the political
    rights of such persons. However, in the 2000 parliamentary elections,
    one Muslim was elected in Thrace, from PASOK. A second Muslim became a
    Member of Parliament (M.P.) in September after winning a court
    challenge to the eligibility of the seated M.P. for violating a
    constitutional provision.
        Romani representatives report that local authorities sometimes have
    deprived Roma of the right to vote by refusing to register them.
    However, Romani activists also report that some municipalities
    encourage Roma to register. Municipalities can refuse to register Roma
    who do not fulfill basic residency requirements, which many Roma have
    trouble meeting.
        In 1996 the Government transferred responsibility for oversight of
    all rights provided to the Muslim minority under the Treaty of Lausanne
    (including education, zoning, administration of the wakfs, and trade)
    from elected local governors to a government-appointed regional
    administrative official, the periferiarch of Eastern Macedonia and
    Thrace. Some minority members charged that the transfer reduced their
    ability to use the democratic process to influence decisions that
    affect them. The Government stated that it made the change because the
    central authorities could administer Greece's treaty obligations more
    effectively. In 1994 the Government set up a system to elect nomarchs
    to govern at the provincial level. These officials work in close
    cooperation with both elected mayors and local leaders (Christian and
    Muslim). Members of the Muslim community noted that this
    decentralization has been a positive factor in local and regional
    development.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government allows domestic human rights organizations to
    operate, but cooperation with them varies. The security services on
    occasion monitor contacts of human rights groups, including listening
    in on conversations held between those groups and human rights
    investigators and diplomats and questioning contacts (see Section
    1.f.). Monitors view this surveillance as a form of intimidation that
    deters others from meeting with investigators.
        The government ombudsman's office, which opened in 1998, received
    781 complaints in the first 8 months of the year directly related to
    human rights issues, of which 455 were processed. Human rights cases
    constituted 26 percent of all cases, an increase of 30 percent compared
    with the full year in 1999. The office has proved to be an effective
    means for resolving human rights and religious freedom concerns.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality before the law irrespective
    of nationality, race, language, religious or political belief; however,
    government respect for these rights in practice was uneven.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The incidence of
    violence against women reported to the authorities is low; however, the
    General Secretariat for Equality of the Sexes (GSES), an independent
    government agency that operates the only shelter for battered women in
    Athens, believes that the actual incidence is ``high.'' According to
    press and academic estimates, there were approximately 4,500 cases of
    rape in 1999. Reportedly only 6 to 10 percent of the victims contact
    the police, and only a small fraction of the cases reaches trial.
    Conviction rates on rape charges are low for first time accused, but
    sentences are harsh for repeat offenders. Spousal rape is a crime.
        The GSES asserts that police tend to discourage women from pursuing
    domestic violence charges and instead undertake reconciliation efforts.
    The GSES also claims that the courts are lenient when dealing with
    domestic violence cases. GSES, in cooperation with the Ministry of
    Public Order, continued during the year training courses begun in 1999
    for police personnel on how to treat domestic violence victims.
        Facilities for battered women and their children often are staffed
    inadequately to handle cases properly. Two government shelters provide
    relevant services in Athens and Piraeus, including legal and
    psychological advice. Battered women also can go to state hospitals and
    regional health centers. In June the Secretariat started operating a
    24-hour emergency telephone hot line for abused women to call for help.
    An interministerial committee composed of the GSES, the Ministry of
    Public Order, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of
    Justice, was established in 1999 to focus on women's issues.
        Prostitution is legal. Prostitutes must register at the local
    police station and carry a medical card that is updated every 2 weeks.
    While the number of Greek women entering the profession has declined
    steadily over the years, according to the police and academic sources,
    trafficking in women for prostitution, mostly from the former Soviet
    republics, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, has increased sharply in
    recent years (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). It is estimated that fewer
    than 1,000 prostitutes are ethnic Greeks, and approximately 20,000 are
    of foreign origin--most in the country illegally.
        Most prostitutes who are arrested are foreigners who are
    apprehended for noncompliance with legal requirements. While national
    data on such arrests is not available, police reports estimate that
    4,197 women were arrested for prostitution from December 1998 through
    December 2000. A total of 1,693 were arrested during 2000, compared
    with 2,267 in 1999. Media reports implicated several police officers as
    participants in prostitution rings. The press alleged on a number of
    occasions that police accepted bribes from traffickers or pimps or
    forced illegal immigrants to have sex with them and then channeled them
    into prostitution rings. The vice squad unit of the police was
    disbanded for a couple of weeks in 1998 in part as a result of these
    allegations.
        Trade unions report that lawsuits for sexual harassment are very
    rare: according to the unions, only four women have filed such charges
    in the past 3 years. In all four cases, the courts reportedly imposed
    very lenient civil sentences. The General Confederation of Greek
    Workers (GSEE) women's section reports that sexual harassment is a
    widespread phenomenon, but that women are discouraged from filing
    charges against perpetrators by family members and coworkers since they
    believe they might be socially stigmatized.
        Women enjoy broad constitutional and legal protection, including
    equal pay for equal work. However, the National Statistical Service's
    most recent data, for the fourth quarter of 1998, show that women's
    salaries in manufacturing were 71 percent of those of men in comparable
    positions; in retail sales, women's salaries were 88 percent of those
    of men in comparable positions.
        Although relatively few women occupy senior positions, in recent
    years women entered traditionally male-dominated occupations such as
    the legal and medical professions in larger numbers. However, women
    still face discrimination when they are considered for promotions in
    both the public and private sectors. Women also are underrepresented in
    labor unions' leadership. According to the women's section of the GSEE,
    58.6 percent of the country's long-term unemployed are women, while
    women constitute only 38 percent of the work force. To ameliorate the
    situation, the GSES established two regional employment offices for
    women in Thessaloniki and Patras. It also continued to provide
    vocational training programs for unemployed women and programs to
    reinforce entrepreneurship, subsidies to women for setting up an
    enterprise, information and counseling to unemployed women, and created
    childcare facilities to assist unemployed women to attend training
    courses and look for a job.
        Children.--The Government is committed to providing adequate basic
    health and education services for children. Education is compulsory
    through the ninth grade, but the legislation does not provide for
    enforcement or penalties. University education is public and free.
        Several government organizations have responsibility for children's
    issues. The National Welfare Organization, which has a nationwide
    network of offices, is active in the field of child protection. A 1998
    law combined the National Welfare Organization with two similar
    entities in 1999 to provide better services. The services of the new
    organization were regionalized to provide greater access to child
    welfare services and funding prioritized according to regional needs.
        Penal law prohibits the mistreatment of children and sets penalties
    for violators, while welfare legislation provides for preventive and
    treatment programs for abused children and for children deprived of a
    family environment; it also seeks to ensure the availability of
    alternative family care or institutional placement.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. No national data
    exist on the incidence of child abuse; authorities other than police
    are not required to report such cases. In a 10-year clinical study of
    200 cases of abused children, the Institute of Child Health (ICH)
    reports that 59.5 percent involved physical abuse, 20 percent involved
    neglect, and 21 percent involved children who were not abused at the
    time but had a history of abuse. (The study did not cover victims of
    sexual abuse.) An ICH prevalence study of child sexual abuse among 740
    university students revealed an incidence rate of 7 percent among boys
    and 17 percent among girls prior to age 18. Societal abuse of children
    in the form of pornography and child labor is rare. Child prostitution
    is a growing phenomenon, particularly in some parts of immigrant
    communities of central Athens.
        Children's rights advocacy groups claim that the protection of
    high-risk children in state residential care centers is inadequate and
    of low quality. They cite lack of coordination between welfare services
    and the courts, inadequate funding of the welfare system, and poor
    staffing of residential care centers as systemic weaknesses in the
    treatment of child abuse. Many NGO's make honest efforts to cover the
    gap, but they are not manned by professionals, lack supervision from
    the State, and do not have built-in evaluation systems. Two municipal
    shelters for battered children opened in Athens in 1999. Child health
    specialists note that the number of children in residential care
    facilities is decreasing, while the number in foster care is rising.
    Child health specialists say that some social groups, such as Roma and
    illegal immigrants, are underserved.
        In recent years, the number of street children who panhandle or
    peddle at city intersections on behalf of adult family members or for
    criminal gangs increased. According to the Ministry of Public Order, 78
    percent of these children are Albanian, 12 percent are from other
    Balkan countries, and 10 percent are Romani. The Government implemented
    measures to combat this phenomenon, which included the institutional
    placement of children up to 12 years old, therapeutic consultations
    with their families, and the deportation of juveniles 12 to 17 year
    old. Street children are rounded up regularly by police. However, it is
    believed widely that even those who were deported managed to return
    eventually.
        In August police detained a group of 35 Roma children from Albania,
    between the ages of 3 months and 11 years old, who were begging or
    being exploited by beggars in the streets. Police apprehended 20
    adults, identified as parents. Police believe that this was the largest
    child exploitation ring ever uncovered in the country. The group of
    Roma was deported. A children's NGO, A Child's Smile, claims that many
    street children are victims of abuse. Based on the findings of a study
    it carried out in Thessaloniki in 1999, the majority of street children
    are between the ages of 8 and 14. Some 60 percent of the children are
    from Albania, and most have been separated from their parents, who
    remain in their native country. They are brought to Greece by someone
    posing as their guardian or parent. In most cases, their parents, faced
    with extreme financial difficulties in Albania, agreed to send their
    child to Greece in exchange for a small percentage of the monthly
    earnings.
        People with Disabilities.--Legislation mandates the hiring of
    disabled persons in public and private enterprises that employ more
    than 50 persons. However, the law reportedly is enforced poorly,
    particularly in the private sector. The law states that disabled
    persons should account for 3 percent of staff in private enterprises.
    In the civil service, 5 percent of administrative staff and 80 percent
    of telephone operator positions are reserved for disabled persons.
    Recent legislation mandates the hiring of disabled persons in the
    public sector from a priority list. The disabled are exempt from the
    civil service exam. Persons with disabilities have been appointed to
    important positions in the civil service.
        The Construction Code mandates physical access for disabled persons
    to private and public buildings, but this law, too, is enforced poorly.
    A 1997 survey showed that over 60 percent of public buildings are not
    accessible to persons with mobility problems. Ramps and special curbs
    for the disabled have been constructed on some Athens streets and at
    some public buildings, and sound signals have been installed at some
    city street crossings. Since 1993 the Government has been replacing old
    city buses with new ones designed to accommodate the disabled. The new
    Athens subway lines provide full access for the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Greeks tend to link religious affiliation
    very closely to ethnicity. In the minds of many Greeks, an ethnic Greek
    is also Orthodox Christian. Non-Orthodox citizens have complained of
    being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek
    when they revealed their religious affiliation. Non-Orthodox citizens
    also have claimed that they face career limits within the military and
    the civil service due to their religions.
        In the military, generally only members of the Greek Orthodox faith
    become officers, leading some members of other faiths to declare
    themselves Orthodox. Only two Muslim officers have advanced to the rank
    of reserve officer.
        Although in the past there have been numerous cases of
    discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for business licenses,
    tractor ownership, or property construction, both Muslim and Christian
    leaders report that these discriminatory practices have ended.
        Members of minority faiths have reported incidents of societal
    discrimination, such as local bishops warning parishioners not to visit
    clergy or members of minority faiths and neighbors requesting that the
    police arrest missionaries for proselytizing. Some non-Orthodox
    religious communities believe that they have been unable to communicate
    with officials of the Orthodox Church and claim that the attitude of
    the Orthodox Church toward their faiths has increased social
    intolerance towards their religions. The Orthodox Church has issued a
    list of practices and religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses,
    Evangelical Protestants, Scientologists, Mormons, Baha'is, and others,
    which it believes to be sacrilegious. In 1999 there was an incident in
    which local Orthodox clergy and local government officials mobilized to
    demolish a government-approved house of prayer in the process of
    construction by Jehovah's Witnesses in Halkidiki in northern Greece.
    The incident was resolved swiftly through the intervention of police
    forces. Officials of the Orthodox Church have acknowledged that they
    refuse to enter into dialog with religious groups considered harmful to
    Greek Orthodox worshipers; church leaders instruct Orthodox Greeks to
    shun members of these faiths.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--An increase in xenophobia
    paralleled an increase in the number of non-Greeks living and working
    in the country. Antiforeigner sentiment is directed mainly at Albanians
    (who make up over three-fifths of the alien population). Landlords in
    Athens and other parts of the country routinely refuse to rent to
    Albanians, even to that country's diplomats.
        Significant numbers of Greek citizens identify themselves as Turks,
    Pomaks, Vlachs, Roma, Arvanites (Orthodox Christians who speak a
    dialect of Albanian), or ``Macedonians'' or ``Slavomacedonians.'' Most
    are integrated fully into society. The Government formally recognizes
    only the ``Muslim minority'' specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
    although it stated publicly in August 1999 that members of that
    minority could identify themselves individually as belonging to
    different ethnic groups. However, the Government failed to acknowledge
    formally the existence of non-Muslim ethnic groups, principally
    Slavophones, under the term ``minority.'' As a result, some individuals
    who define themselves as members of a minority find it difficult to
    express their identity freely and to maintain their culture. Most of
    the Muslim minority (officially estimated to number 98,000) are
    ethnically Turkish or Turcophone and live in Western Thrace. The Muslim
    minority also includes Pomaks and Roma. Many Greek Muslims, including
    Pomaks, identify themselves as Turks and say that the Muslim minority
    as a whole has a Turkish cultural consciousness. While use of the terms
    ``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' (``Turk'' and ``Turkish'') is prohibited
    in titles of organizations, individuals legally may call themselves
    ``Tourkos.'' To most Greeks, the words ``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos''
    connote Turkish identity or loyalties, and many object to their use by
    Greek citizens of Turkish origin. The 8month prison sentence of a dozen
    Muslim teachers, convicted in 1996 for using the name ``Turkish
    Teachers of Western Thrace'' in a union document, remained suspended
    pending appeal. In December the Supreme Court overturned an appeals
    court decision that upheld a 1986 trial court's order to close the
    ``Turkish Union of Xanthi'' because of the use of the word ``Turkish''
    in the organization's name. The Supreme Court stated that the court's
    decision should be based on the organization's activities and not its
    name, and it therefore ordered the appeals court to review the case.
        The Treaty of Lausanne provides that the Muslim minority has the
    right to Turkish-language education, with a reciprocal entitlement for
    the Greek minority in Istanbul (now reduced to about 3,000 persons).
    Western Thrace has both Koranic and secular Turkish-language schools.
    Under a 1952 educational protocol, Greece and Turkey may exchange
    annually 35 teachers on a reciprocal basis for service in Istanbul and
    Western Thrace. Due to the dwindling needs of the small and aging Greek
    population in Istanbul, in recent years the Greek side limited the
    exchanges to 16 teachers per country. There were no complaints during
    the year from Muslim leaders about bureaucratic barriers preventing
    Turkish teachers from working in Thrace.
        In 1999 the Government approved 19 Turkish textbooks for use in the
    secular Turkish-language schools (referred to as ``minority'' schools
    in Thrace). Under a 1960 bilateral protocol, Turkey provides copies of
    the approved texts for use in the schools of Western Thrace. The books
    arrived in May 2000.
        In Western Thrace over 8,000 Muslim children attended Turkish-
    language primary schools. An additional 150 attended 2 bilingual middle
    schools with a religious curriculum. Approximately 700 attended
    Turkish-language secondary schools, and approximately 1,300 attended
    Greek-language secondary schools. In the past, many Muslims reportedly
    went to high school in Turkey due to both the limited number of places
    in the Turkish-language secondary schools, which are assigned by
    lottery, and parent preference. However, the lottery system was not
    used during the year, and all students who applied were admitted. In
    1999 the Government instituted an European Union-funded program for
    teaching Greek as a second language to Muslim children, primarily for
    those students in the Greek-language public schools, to improve their
    academic performance and chance of obtaining postsecondary education in
    Greece. In addition the Government offered further opportunities for
    minority students to learn Greek through preschool, kindergarden,
    afterschool, and summer school courses.
        Government incentives encourage Muslim and Christian educators to
    reside and teach in isolated villages. However, in a 1999 law, the
    Government cancelled the program of incentives for Christian educators
    teaching temporarily in minority schools. Teachers Union
    representatives complained that the move would discourage Christians
    from seeking temporary teaching positions in minority schools. The law
    permits the Minister of Education to give special consideration to
    Muslims for admission to universities and technical institutes.
    Universities and technical institutes are required to create a certain
    number of places for Muslim students each year; 400 spaces were
    available for the 2000-2001 school year. Under this law, 123 Muslim
    students entered Greek universities and technical institutes during
    1999. Approximately 1,700 other Muslim students entered via the
    national examination process open to all Greeks and were attending
    universities and technical schools.
        The rate of employment of Muslims in the public sector and in
    state-owned industries and corporations is much lower than the Muslim
    percentage of the population. Muslims in Western Thrace claim that they
    are hired only for lower level, part-time work. The Government claims
    and Muslims and Christians note that a lack of fluency in written and
    spoken Greek and the need for university degrees for high-level
    positions limit the number of Muslims eligible for government jobs.
        Public offices in Thrace do their business in Greek; the courts
    provide interpreters as needed. Since 1998 there have been no claims of
    discrimination against Muslims who apply for business licenses, tractor
    ownership, or property construction. Muslims and Christians in Thrace
    commended the Government for the basic public services (electricity,
    water, and telephone) provided to Muslim villages in recent years.
        Other than in one multicultural elementary education ``pilot
    school,'' the Government does not provide instruction in Greek as a
    second language to Turcophone children in the Athens area. Muslim
    parents report that their children are unable to succeed in school as a
    result of this policy. The Government maintains that Muslims outside
    Thrace are not covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore do not
    enjoy those rights provided by the treaty.
        Unlike in the past, there were no reports of assertions by Muslim
    leaders that the Government routinely withheld permission from Muslims
    seeking to change their legal residence, which determines where they
    vote, from rural to urban communities within western Thrace or from
    elsewhere in Greece to Thrace.
        The Government refuses to acknowledge formally the existence and
    ``minority'' status of ethnic/linguistic groups, such as Vlachs and
    Slavophones, other than the Muslim minority specified in the Treaty of
    Lausanne. As a result some individuals who define themselves as members
    of a minority find it difficult to express their identity freely and to
    maintain their culture.
        Northwestern Greece is home to an indeterminate number (estimates
    range widely, from under 10,000 to 50,000 or more) of citizens who
    still speak at home a Slavic dialect, particularly in Florina province.
    A small number of them identify themselves as belonging to a distinct
    ethnic group and assert their right to ``Macedonian'' minority status.
    Their assertions generate strong objections among the 2.2 million non-
    Slavophone Greek inhabitants of the northern Greek region of Macedonia,
    who use the same term to identify themselves. The Government will not
    recognize the Slavic dialect as a ``Macedonian'' language distinct from
    Bulgarian. Members of the minority assert that the Government pursues a
    policy designed to discourage use of their dialect. Government
    sensitivity on this issue stems from concern that members of the
    ``Macedonian'' minority may have separatist aspirations. Greece's
    dispute with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over that
    country's name heightened this sensitivity. Complaints of government
    harassment and intimidation directed against these persons decreased
    significantly since 1998 and ceased in 2000.
        In July 1999, three Muslim Members of Parliament and a number of
    Greek human rights organizations issued a letter calling on the
    Government to recognize legally the right of self-identification for
    members of all minorities, including the Muslim and ``Macedonian''
    minorities. Senior government officials in August 1999 reaffirmed an
    individual, but not a collective, right of self-identification.
        Roma continued to face discrimination from some local authorities
    and society at large. The Prime Minister's Office for Quality of Life,
    responsible for coordinating government projects for Roma, estimates
    the total Romani population to be 150,000 to 200,000. Nonofficial
    sources estimate the total at 250,000 to 300,000. Most of the Roma in
    Western Thrace are Muslims; elsewhere the majority are Greek Orthodox.
    Many Roma are settled permanently, mainly in the Athens area. Others
    are either mobile, working mainly as agricultural laborers, peddlers,
    and musicians throughout the country, or live in camps. The number of
    Roma who move around the country is decreasing gradually as families
    settle mainly into slums and camps around major cities. There are
    approximately 70 Romani camps with a total camp population between
    100,000 and 120,000 persons.
        At a September 1999 Implementation Review Meeting in Vienna of the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Greek
    delegation recognized that the situation of Roma in Greece was
    ``unsatisfactory and unacceptable'' and committed the Government to
    remedy the situation. Government representatives identified as
    impediments to progress the lack of a unified voice from the Roma
    community and the widespread social prejudice against them.
        In 1999 the Ministry of Interior completed a survey on the housing
    needs of the Roma; in March 2000 it established an interministerial
    committee to coordinate government action for them. Most Romani camps
    have no running water or electricity, much less garbage disposals or
    sewage treatment. Local authorities harass and threaten to evict Roma
    from their camps. The Roma of Tyrnavos, Thessaly, attempted to build
    their own lavatories in order to improve their living conditions, but
    local authorities pulled them down and imposed fines for violating
    construction codes. The Ministry of Defense allocated land in 1999 and
    houses in December 2000 at a former army camp (Gonou) for the Roma of
    Evosmos, Thessaloniki, to occupy. (The 3,500 Roma were evicted in 1998
    from their homes of some 30 years and then evicted from 4 other sites
    in the following 15 days.)
        The NGO Greek Helsinki Monitor reported that many communities of
    Roma tent-dwellers were evicted or threatened with eviction during the
    year. A number of evictions took place in Athens from the location that
    will host the 2004 Olympics. In August 1999, local authorities evicted
    30 Roma families from an area in Ioannina, which they had been renting
    for 7 years. In June 2000, the municipal authority of Nea Kios,
    Peloponnese, issued a decision to evict all 300 Roma from the region
    because the municipality claimed that the Roma contributed to the high
    crime rate. Police were asked to take action and implement the decision
    within 48 hours. A Roma hut was set on fire by unknown perpetrators.
    Human rights NGO's held the municipal authority responsible for the
    arson because of its decision to declare the Roma presence
    ``undesirable.'' The decision of the municipal authority was repealed
    following the intervention of the Ombudsman's Office. In August
    municipal authorities in Crete attempted to evict over 100 Roma from
    their homes of 15 years in Nea Alikarnasos; the national ombudsman
    stopped the action.
        Roma experience police abuse more frequently than some other
    groups. In September police were accused of beating Roma during a
    routine traffic stop in Nafplio. The trial of three policemen accused
    of beating two Romani teenagers in Mesolonghi in May 1998 still had not
    begun in September.
        Roma frequently face discrimination in employment and in housing,
    particularly when attempting to rent accommodations. The approximately
    400 Roma families in Tyrnavos, Thessaly, live in tents because the
    authorities refuse to include the area in city planning.
        Romani representatives report that some local authorities have
    refused to register Roma as residents in their municipalities. Until
    registered with a municipality, no citizen can vote or exercise other
    civic rights such as obtaining an official marriage, commercial, or
    driver's license, or contributing to social security.
        Government policy is to encourage the integration of Roma. The
    Prime Minister has designated a member of his staff to coordinate the
    efforts of all government ministries having a role in their
    integration, and the Ministry of Interior established an
    interministerial committee with the same aim. Poverty, illiteracy, and
    social prejudice nevertheless continue to plague large parts of the
    Romani population; these problems are most severe among the Roma who
    are mobile or who live in slums. The illiteracy rate among Roma is
    estimated at 80 percent. However, the Ministry of Education reported
    that the illiteracy rate is dropping among the Roma children, because
    the school enrollment rate increased by 17 percent and the dropout rate
    decreased to 75 percent as a consequence of an identity card system,
    set up by the Ministry, which allows students to change schools more
    easily as their parents move. The idea of setting up satellite
    elementary schools near Romani camps has been set aside in favor of the
    policy of integration (except for preschool centers).
        The integration of Roma into social security systems is quite low.
    It is estimated that 90 percent of Roma are not insured by the public
    social security systems, since they are unable or unwilling to make the
    required contributions. Like other qualified citizens, indigent Roma
    are entitled to free health care. However, their access to health care
    at times is hindered by the fact that their encampments are located far
    from public health facilities. The Municipality of Pyrgos, Peloponnese,
    issued health cards to the Roma living permanently in the area and
    established a preschool center close to the Roma camp near the Alfeios
    River.
        The Ministry of Health and Welfare continued work on projects to
    address the chronic problems of the Roma community. The projects
    included training courses for civil servants, policemen, and teachers
    to ``increase sensitivity to the problems of the Roma,'' the
    development of teaching materials for Roma children, and the
    establishment of youth centers in areas close to Roma communities. The
    Ministry established six such centers.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
    for the right of association. All workers, with the exception of the
    military, have the right to form or join unions. Police have the right
    to form unions but not to strike.
        Approximately 26 percent of wage earners (nearly 650,000 persons)
    are organized in unions. Unions receive most of their funding from a
    Ministry of Labor organization, the Workers' Hearth, which distributes
    mandatory contributions from employees and employers. Workers,
    employers, and the state are represented in equal numbers on the board
    of directors of the Workers' Hearth. Approximately 10 public sector
    unions have dues-withholding provisions in their contracts, in addition
    to receiving Workers' Hearth subsidies.
        Over 4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral
    federations and 2 umbrella confederations, 1 for civil servants (ADEDY)
    and 1, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), for private
    sector employees. Unions are highly politicized, and there are party-
    affiliated factions within the labor confederations, but day-to-day
    operations are not controlled by political parties or the Government.
    There are no restrictions on who may serve as a union official.
        Legal restrictions on strikes include a mandatory period of notice,
    which is 4 days for public utilities and 24 hours for the private
    sector. Legislation mandates a skeleton staff during strikes affecting
    public services, such as electricity, transportation, communications,
    and banking. Public utility companies, state-owned banks, the postal
    service, Olympic Airways, and the railroads also are required to
    maintain a skeleton staff during strikes.
        The courts have the power to declare strikes illegal, although such
    decisions seldom are enforced. However, unions complain that this
    judicial power serves as a deterrent to some of their members from
    participating in strikes. The courts declared some strikes illegal
    during the year for reasons such as failure of the union to give
    adequate advance notice of the strike or the addition of demands by the
    union during the course of the strike. However, no striking workers
    were prosecuted.
        Fewer strikes took place during the year than ever before, and
    those that occurred were fairly brief and nondisruptive. Strikes by
    public sector employees, including mass transport employees, lasted
    between 1 and 5 days and primarily concerned securing timely pay
    increases and greater job security.
        Unions are free to join international associations and maintain a
    variety of international affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively in the
    private sector and in public corporations. These rights are respected
    in practice. There are no restrictions on collective bargaining for
    private sector employees.
        In 1997 and 1998 civil servants were accorded the right to organize
    and bargain collectively with the Ministry of Public Administration.
    The civil servants confederation conducted official negotiations with
    the Ministry of Interior for the first time in 1999.
        In response to union complaints that most labor disputes ended in
    compulsory arbitration, legislative remedies were enacted in 1989 that
    provided for mediation procedures, with compulsory arbitration as a
    last resort. A 1992 law established a National Mediation,
    Reconciliation, and Arbitration Organization that applies to the
    private sector and public corporations (the military and civil service
    excluded).
        Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. The Labor Inspectorate or a
    court investigates complaints of discrimination against union members
    or organizers. Court rulings have mandated the reinstatement of
    improperly fired union members.
        Three free trade zones operate according to European Union
    regulations. The labor laws apply equally in these zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits all forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children, and the Ministry of Justice enforces this prohibition;
    however, women and girls are trafficked into the country for the
    purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The
    Government may declare the ``civil mobilization'' of workers in the
    event of danger to national security, life, property, or the social and
    economic life of the country. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO) Committee of Experts has criticized this power as violating the
    standards of ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. The Government did not
    resort to civil mobilization during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment in the industrial sector is
    15 years, with higher limits for certain activities. The minimum age is
    12 years in family businesses, theaters, and the cinema. These age
    limits are enforced by occasional Labor Inspectorate spot checks and
    generally are observed. However, families engaged in agriculture, food
    service, and merchandising often have younger family members assisting
    them, at least part time. The Constitution contains a blanket
    prohibition of compulsory labor. Although no specific legislation
    explicitly prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, such
    practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.), except among some
    Roma and immigrants (see Section 5).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Collective bargaining between
    the GSEE and the Employers' Association determines a nationwide minimum
    wage. The Ministry of Labor routinely ratifies this minimum wage, which
    has the force of law and applies to all workers. The minimum wage of
    $17.40 (6,986 drachma) daily and $389.20 (155,943 drachma) monthly,
    effective July 1, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
    for a worker and family. The maximum legal workweek is 40 hours in the
    private sector and 37+ hours in the public sector. The law provides for
    at least one 24-hour rest period per week, mandates paid vacation of 1
    month per year, and sets limits on overtime.
        Legislation provides for minimum standards of occupational health
    and safety. Although the GSEE characterized health and safety
    legislation as satisfactory, it charged that enforcement, the
    responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, was inadequate. Legislation
    passed in 1999 places the Labor Inspectorate under a central authority
    in compliance with ILO Convention 81. Workers do not have the legal
    right to remove themselves from situations that they believe endanger
    their health. However, they do have the right to lodge a confidential
    complaint with the Labor Inspectorate. Inspectors have the right to
    close down machinery or a process for a period of up to 5 days if they
    see safety or health hazards that they believe represent an imminent
    danger to the workers.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically
    criminalize trafficking in persons, but other statutes in the Penal
    Code are used to prosecute such cases. Arrests and court cases for
    prostitution by unlicensed foreign women, and cases against their
    traffickers, have increased, but remain at a very low level. Fines and
    sentences for traffickers are minimal.
        Greece is both a transit and destination country for trafficked
    women. Trafficking in women for prostitution in Greece has increased
    sharply in recent years. At any give time, some 16,000 to 20,000
    trafficked women are in the country, according to unofficial estimates.
    Approximately 2,400 trafficked women were deported from Greece during
    the year; many are quickly brought back into the country, according to
    official sources. While the Government is stiffening its border
    controls, in part because of the European Union Schengen Agreement
    requirements, there are fissures through which many women are brought
    into the country from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Local
    police corruption also plays a role in facilitating their entry into
    the country.
        According to a Panteion University professor, 75 percent of foreign
    female prostitutes are not told why they are being brought to Greece.
    Some women arrive as ``tourists'' or illegal immigrants who seek work
    and are lured into prostitution by club owners who threaten them with
    deportation. Some women are kidnaped from their homes by their fellow
    countrymen and smuggled into Greece where they are ``sold'' to local
    procurers. The victims of this practice are often minors. Frequently
    connections exist between illegal prostitution and other criminal
    activities.
                                   __________

                                    HUNGARY

        Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected
    legislative assembly. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the leader of the
    FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, heads a coalition Government formed after
    elections in May 1998 by FIDESZ, the Independent Smallholders' Party,
    and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The Government respects the
    constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.
        The internal and external security services report directly to a
    minister without portfolio, and the police report to the Interior
    Minister. Credible reports of police abuses persist, although their
    frequency has declined compared with last year.
        The Government demonstrated a sustained commitment to economic
    reform, resulting in a successful transition to a fully functioning
    market economy. The private sector accounts for 85 percent of gross
    domestic product. Services, trade, and government employ about 67.4
    percent of the labor force. The proportion of the labor force involved
    in industry has declined to only 33 percent. Major exports include
    manufactured goods (30.3 percent) and machinery and transport equipment
    (58.5 percent). Unemployment has declined substantially to around 6
    percent. However, an estimated 25 percent of the population live in
    poverty, with elderly pensioners, dependent housewives and children,
    and Roma most affected. The large Roma population is eight times more
    likely to be poor than the remainder of the population.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Although the
    authorities addressed problems in specific cases, police continued to
    use excessive force against suspects. Police also harassed and abused
    both Roma and foreign nationals. In practice the authorities do not
    always ensure due process in all cases. Prosecutors and judges may
    impose what amounts to unlimited pretrial detention, although the
    Government expanded legal provisions for the right to fair trial.
        The electronic media are a mix of state-owned and privately owned
    national, local, and regional radio and television, with private
    stations dominating audience share by a wide, and ever-widening,
    margin. After taking office in 1998, the Government publicly declared
    its intention to ``balance'' the media in order to encourage more
    extensive attention to the conservative values and themes that the
    Government promotes. After 2 years in office, the Government recognized
    that it was only one (although an influential) player in the media
    market, and decided to stop pursuing such balance. In spite of numerous
    dismissals of journalists in the state-owned radio and television,
    certain members of the governing coalition still publicly contend that
    these outlets are overrepresented by liberal, opposition-leaning
    journalists. The junior coalition partner, the Smallholders, submitted
    a proposal to the Parliament to investigate the pre1990 political
    activities of state-employed journalists. Although certain news
    analysis programs on state media often function as platforms for right-
    wing voices, the main news programs remain largely politically neutral.
        Violence against women and spousal abuse of women remain serious
    problems. Sexual harassment and discrimination on the job also remain
    serious problems. Steps have been taken to improve the rights of women
    and persons with disabilities. Anti-Semitic and racial discrimination
    persisted, but no new attacks were reported this year. Societal
    discrimination against Roma remains a serious problem. Trafficking in
    women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a growing
    problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In December an unsuccessful Cameroonian asylum applicant died while
    being deported; his feet were cuffed after his repeated efforts to
    break free (see Section 2.d.). The official report cites heart attack
    as the cause of death.
        Trials continued in a number of cases of men charged with crimes
    against humanity for shooting into crowds of demonstrators with machine
    gun fire and for throwing hand grenades, all at the time of the 1956
    Revolution. The defendants were tried in 1993. At the time, they were
    charged with murder, but acquitted because the 15-year statute of
    limitations for such a charge had passed. The new trial became possible
    after the Supreme Court overturned the previous verdicts in June 1999,
    stating that these cases should be tried as war crimes, which have no
    time limit. In these cases, the issue before the courts was whether
    each specific individual is guilty of a war crime, an argument that can
    be made because a civil war was in progress at the time, and all
    defendants were members of the border guards, police, or military.
    Byyear's end, 10 cases had concluded with guilty verdicts. Those
    accused were sentenced to short prison terms that subsequently were
    suspended, were stripped of their rank, and had their pensions reduced
    accordingly.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other such practices. No
    known incidents of torture occurred. An investigation into allegations
    of torture made in early 1999 by a confessed mass murderer concluded
    during the year without enough evidence to bring charges against any
    police officers. Police abuses continued, including use of excessive
    force, beatings of suspects, and harassment. Police also continued to
    harass and physically abuse Roma and foreign nationals. In 1999, 2,397
    reports of police abuse were filed compared with 2,296 in 1998. Of
    these complaints, only 377 resulted in court cases, compared with 312
    in 1998. In 845 cases, no investigation occurred. Many of the cases
    that did make it into the court system were still pending atyear's end;
    no accurate data on convictions were available. Historically, 10 to 15
    percent of such cases result in conviction. In the first 6 months of
    the year, policemen were convicted in five cases. Also in the first 6
    months of the year, the National Police Headquarters reports the
    following number of incidents of police abuse to be: 5 cases of forced
    questioning, 8 cases of abuse against Roma, and 16 cases of abuse
    against foreigners. Punishments include fines, probation, and the
    imposition of suspended sentences. In 1997 the Budapest central
    district court sentenced four police officers to 1 to 2 years in prison
    for the exceptionally severe beating of a detainee under interrogation.
    The appeals court suspended the sentences, and three out of the four
    officers continue to serve as police officers. According to a report by
    the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, persons detained by police complain
    of abuse, but very few file official complaints because they do not
    expect positive results and fear that the complaint may affect their
    cases adversely. Some sources attribute the rise in numbers of reports
    of police abuse to a growing willingness to seek official redress in
    these instances. The Romani minority community and dark-skinned
    foreigners are the most common victims of police abuse, with Roma
    bearing the brunt. In June 1999, after several incidents of police
    brutality against Roma in Hajduhadhaz, the Ministry of Interior
    admitted that the town had the highest level of reported police
    violence in the country, and that half of the town's police force was
    under investigation for allegations of abuse. In May the Debrecen
    County Court convicted three of five officers charged with abuse and
    sentenced them each to prison terms of 2 years and 5 months. A Roma
    rights organization reported that in Budapest in June 1999, three
    police officers beat and kicked a Romani university student as he
    walked through a park. When the man told the officers that he would
    report their abuse, they beat him further. The Rom filed a lawsuit
    against the officers; the case was still pending atyear's end. Despite
    such occurrences, the Ombudsman for Minority Affairs believes that the
    situation is, at worst, remaining constant, and possibly is marginally
    better. The Ombudsman continues to promote a uniform anti-
    discrimination law.
        The police and Interior Ministry are working to change the police's
    authoritarian image, and human rights organizations report that police
    generally are more cooperative with outside monitoring of police
    behavior. However, these efforts are hampered by low salaries and a
    lack of physical resources. A 1997 study by the Ombudsman's office,
    which investigates constitutional violations in the public sector,
    denounced police corruption but noted that it was unsurprising that it
    existed, given police officers' low pay and poor working conditions.
    The Ombudsman found that working conditions in the vast majority of
    police offices were unsuitable. In 1999 the Interior Ministry, as part
    of the Government's general anticorruption plan, launched a program to
    fight corruption in law enforcement. The program promotes reform of the
    systems for recruitment and training at the National Police and the
    Border Guards. Applicants for these organizations have to pass a
    thorough psychological test; in addition their financial situation and
    other risk factors are examined. The program also prepares law
    enforcement officers to recognize and avoid ``corruption situations.''
    As part of the program, the Interior Ministry has added 86 new officers
    to the Office for Supervision and Control.
        Police frequently harass foreign residents, particularly
    nonEuropeans. At times, police showed indifference towards foreigners
    who had been victims of street crime.
        Prisons are overcrowded but meet minimum international standards.
    The population of prisons and detention centers as of September was
    15,769 persons (4,264 of whom were in pre-trial detention), or 160
    percent of capacity, which represents an increase of over 600 prisoners
    from the end of 1999. Tougher maximum sentences have contributed to the
    increase of the prison population. The age of most prisoners is now
    between 25- and 40-years-old. Between 65 and 70 percent of prisoners
    earn wages while in prison, either from work performed in prison or
    from workrelease programs. Some programs allow prisoners to spend
    weekends at home. A recent change in philosophy led to more efforts to
    rehabilitate criminals for their eventual return to normal life. Civil
    organizations and foundations assist in the rehabilitation process.
    According to officials, the general health of prisoners declined in the
    last few years. The chief Ombudsman issued a report on prison
    conditions and facilities in 1997. A new predetention center was opened
    in the summer, and two new prisons are scheduled to open within the
    next 2 years. A 1999 survey among prisoners about alleged abuse
    concluded that abuse by prison personnel was not a problem.
        The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police must inform
    suspects upon arrest of the charges against them but may hold them for
    a maximum of 72 hours before filing charges. The law requires that all
    suspects be allowed access to counsel prior to questioning and
    throughout all subsequent proceedings, and that the authorities provide
    counsel for juveniles, the indigent, and the mentally disabled;
    however, credible reports suggest that police do not always allow
    access to counsel, particularly for minor crimes. Bail has been
    available to citizens since January, when a new Criminal Code entered
    into force. It is also available to foreigners, but rarely is used.
        The Police Act permits police to hold suspects in public security
    detention (PSD) in the following cases: In which the suspect has no
    identity papers; in which blood or urine tests must be performed to
    determine blood alcohol content; or if the suspect continues to commit
    a misdemeanor offense in spite of prior warning. Suspects may be held
    in PSD for up to 24 hours. Such detainees are not always informed of
    the charges against them, because such periods of ``short'' detention
    are not defined as ``criminal detention'' and so are not considered to
    be covered by the Criminal Code.
        On December 18, a 30-year-old unsuccessful Cameroonian asylum
    applicant, Ebune Christian Ecole, died while being deported by police
    at Budapest Airport (see Section 1.a.). Ecole's repeated protests and
    attempts to break free led the captain of the SABENA flight, which was
    to transport him out of the country, to refuse to take him on board.
    Police then proceeded to further restrain Ecole by shackling his feet,
    at which point he reportedly fainted. Emergency Medical Technicians
    were unable to revive him. The official report of his death cites heart
    attack as the cause. Local NGO's have called for a thorough
    investigation of the circumstances surrounding Ecole's death.
        Pretrial detention, based on a warrant issued by a judge, is
    initially limited to 1 year while criminal investigations are in
    progress; it may be extended indefinitely on the prosecutor's motion
    (provided the judge concurs). According to the new Criminal Procedure
    Law, pretrial detention is to be limited to a maximum of 3 years, after
    which the case expires automatically if formal charges are not brought.
    The lack of a bail system gives tremendous leeway to the judge. In 1999
    the average length of pretrial detention was 3.5 months, although
    nearly 10 percent of detainees were held for periods ranging from 8 to
    12 months. In addition foreigners usually are held until their trial
    since they are considered likely to flee the country. Roma allege that
    they are kept in pretrial detention longer and more frequently than
    non-Roma (see Section 1.e.). The law provides for compensation when a
    detainee is released for lack of evidence, but the procedure rarely is
    exercised since detainees must undertake a complicated legal procedure
    to pursue their claims. The Minister of Justice, on behalf of the
    State, decides on compensation. The amount depends on the case and can
    cover the costs of the trial, attorney's fees, lost wages, and some
    other miscellaneous sums.
        The law does not provide for exile, and it is not employed.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair, although
    sometimes slow, process.
        Under the Constitution, the courts are responsible for the
    administration of justice, with the Supreme Court exercising control
    over the operations and judicial procedure of all the courts. There are
    three levels of courts. Original jurisdiction in most matters rests
    with the local courts. Appeals of their rulings may be made to the
    county courts or to the Budapest municipal court, which have original
    jurisdiction in other matters. The Supreme Court is the final court of
    appeal, while the Constitutional Court is the final court on
    constitutional matters. In the case of military trials, appeals also
    may be addressed to the Supreme Court. Under the new Criminal Procedure
    Law enacted in January, an intermediate court of appeal was to be
    established between the metropolitan/county courts and the Supreme
    Court. These intermediate courts are designed to alleviate the current
    backlog of court cases and permit lower courts to hear simple cases.
    Critics of the new system charge that it would instead slow court
    procedures and increase costs. Although passed and signed by
    Parliament, the Government delayed indefinitely the implementation of
    the new level of courts, citing budgetary constraints. A National
    Judicial Council (NJC) was established in 1997 to nominate judicial
    appointees and oversee the judicial budget process. The NJC will also
    oversee the implementation of the fourth level of courts.
        The Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing the
    constitutionality of laws and statutes brought before it as well as
    their compliance with international treaties that the Government has
    ratified. Citizens may appeal directly to the Constitutional Court if
    they believe that their constitutional rights have been violated.
    Parliament elects the Court's members to 9-year terms, which may be
    renewed; no renewals have been made to date. The retirement age of the
    Constitutional Court judges is 70 years. No judge or member of the
    Supreme or Constitutional Courts may belong to a political party or
    engage in political activity.
        The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the authorities
    respected this right in practice. Counsel is appointed for indigent
    clients, but public defenders are paid poorly--less than $5 (1,000 Huf)
    for the first hour of the trial and less than $2.50 (500 Huf) for each
    additional hour--and do not give indigent defendants priority. Lawyers
    often meet indigent clients for the first time at trial.
        Defendants are entitled to counsel during all phases of criminal
    proceedings and are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Judicial
    proceedings are generally investigative rather than adversarial in
    nature. The public defender system provides generally substandard
    service. (There is no public defender's office, as such; private
    attorneys may or may not choose to serve in this capacity. Since public
    defenders are paid only for the hours spent in trial, little to no
    preparation is done and lawyers often meet their clients for the first
    time at the trial.)
        In selected cases, judges may agree to a closed trial to protect
    the accused or the crime victim, such as in some rape cases. In October
    1998, the victim protection office was established in the Ministry of
    the Interior. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, witnesses (and in
    some cases, victims, judges, and translators) are to be protected by
    having their personal data kept closed, in a separate location from the
    case files. For specially protected witnesses, court appearances are
    unnecessary; they are to be questioned personally by the judge. In July
    1999, Parliament passed a resolution calling for a new victim
    protection plan, which would provide new identities and homes for
    victims and their family members. A bill must be submitted by December
    31, 2001. There is no jury system; hence judges are the final arbiters.
    Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, prosecutors are to have greater
    influence over their cases. Plea bargaining, which is known as a
    ``trial waiver,'' is now available to prosecutors.
        Military trials follow civil law and may be closed if national
    security or moral grounds so justify. In all cases, sentencing must
    take place publicly.
        Many human rights and Romani organizations claim that Roma receive
    less than equal treatment in the judicial process. Specifically they
    allege that Roma are kept in pretrial detention more often and for
    longer periods of time than nonRoma. This allegation is credible in
    light of general discrimination against Roma; however, there is no
    statistical evidence because identifying the ethnicity of offenders is
    not allowed under the data protection law. Since the majority of Roma
    fall into the lowest economic strata, they also suffer from poor
    counsel and unenthusiastic representation.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law provides that the prosecutor's office may
    issue search warrants. Police must carry out house searches in the
    presence of two witnesses and must prepare a written inventory of items
    removed from the premises. Wiretapping, which may be done for national
    security reasons and for legitimate criminal investigations, requires a
    court's permission. These provisions appear to be observed in practice.
    During the last 2 years, there were no publicized reports that police
    entered private residences without warrants to check foreigners'
    identification.
        In August 1998, Prime Minister Orban stated that FIDESZ politicians
    and their families were the targets of illegal secret surveillance in
    1997. Orban claimed that the investigators, whose identity he did not
    reveal, sought damaging information to use in the spring 1998
    elections. Opposition (former government) leaders vigorously denied the
    accusations. In its final report issued in the spring, the
    parliamentary committee formed to investigate the matter did not find
    evidence to support allegations of widespread misconduct.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this right
    in practice. However, during the year the FIDESZ-led coalition
    Government actively attempted to counterbalance what it considers a
    leftwing bias in news coverage through its influence on personnel
    decisions within the state-owned media. Nonetheless, a wide variety of
    views and opinions is available among the highly competitive print and
    broadcast media.
        After the transition from communism, the majority of print media
    outlets were purchased by foreign publishing companies. In addition
    numerous new publications made the local print market much more
    competitive. Political opposition sources claim that this competition
    was utilized by the coalition in its attempt to balance the print
    media, some elements of which the Government views as too liberal and
    anticoalition. Advertisements from state-owned companies and financial
    institutions were awarded to progovernment papers, which also tend to
    receive better access to government sources.
        Parliament passed a media law in 1996 creating institutions
    designed to foster a free and independent electronic media. The law
    provided for the creation of nationwide commercial television and radio
    and was intended to insulate the remaining public service media from
    government control. The National Television and Radio Board (ORTT), the
    regulatory agency created by the 1996 Media Law, has continued to
    monitor news broadcasts for equal treatment of all political parties.
    Several commercial stations were warned publicly by the ORTT during the
    year for giving more time to one party over others.
        The state broadcast media continue to lay off large numbers of
    journalists and administrative personnel to reduce overhead. Opposition
    figures have accused the Government of firing journalists based on
    political bias. State-owned media (Hungarian Radio, Hungarian
    Television, and Duna TV) operate with incomplete Boards of Trustees
    representing only coalition nominees, an issue debated in the
    constitutional court and in the Parliament.
        On March 14, some 6,000 demonstrators marched across Budapest to
    demand an independent supervisory board for the broadcast media. The
    demonstration was organized by the Socialist Party, trade unions, and
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); representatives of other
    opposition parties also took part.
        Academic freedom generally is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. There are essentially no restrictions on peaceful
    public gatherings. In general the Government does not require permits
    for assembly, except when a public gathering is to take place near
    sensitive installations, such as military facilities, embassies, or key
    government buildings. Police sometimes may alter or revoke permits, but
    there is no evidence that they abuse this right.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Any 10 or more persons may
    form an association, provided that it does not commit criminal offenses
    or disturb the rights of others. Associations with charters and elected
    officers must register with the courts.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and members of all faiths are allowed to practice their
    religion freely. There are 92 officially recognized religions. A group
    needs 100 members (or 100 signatures) to register as a religion in any
    county court. There is no preferred religion, although not all
    religions receive state support. State support is in the form of funds
    negotiated each year between the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and the
    Finance Ministry. A 1996 law allows citizens to donate 1 percent of
    their taxes to any religion, and a 1997 law extended this option by
    allowing citizens to donate 1 percent to any religion and 1 percent to
    a civil organization or public institution. In 1999 the Ministry of
    Cultural Heritage provided $11.24 million (2.81 billion Huf) for the
    reconstruction of church properties and monuments and for other
    investments. In May the Government passed an amendment to existing tax
    laws that confirmed sales tax exemption for country's historic
    denominations and for NGO's. However, minority religions (including
    Adventists, Pentecostals, Methodists, and all Eastern religions) cannot
    reclaim sales tax under the amendment, which they feel threatens to
    marginalize them even further. The churches took the case to the
    Supreme Court, which chose not to review it. However, in December the
    Government passed a new amendment to replace that which had passed in
    May. The new amendment set criteria under which direct contributions to
    churches are tax deductible; these criteria limit the benefit to 14 of
    the some 90 registered churches in the country.
        In 1997 the Government signed a treaty with the Vatican to return
    church property confiscated by the Communist regime; the treaty also
    provided for a minimum state payment (separate from the annual
    negotiated support) of $7.8 million (1.7 billion Huf). Similar compacts
    were signed with the country's three other historical religions in
    1998. The Jewish community receives $2.6 million (608 million Huf), and
    the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches each are entitled to $4.3 million
    (1 billion Huf). Religious schools receive support per child in the
    same way that state schools do. Religious orders and schools have
    regained some property confiscated by the Communist regime.
        Several synagogues have been built since World War II, generally
    replacing older demolished synagogues. The first completely new
    synagogue built since the war was constructed in 1998 at a Jewish
    summer camp in Szarvas.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on the
    movement of citizens within or outside the country, including on the
    rights of emigration and repatriation. However, local authorities have
    in some cases tried to expel Roma from towns or have taken advantage of
    situations (eviction for nonpayment of bills or condemnation of Roma
    homes) to relocate and concentrate Romani populations, in effect
    creating ghettos. The Government may delay but not deny emigration for
    those who have significant court-assessed debts or who possess state
    secrets. Those with about $40,000 (over 10 million Huf) in public debt
    may be denied travel documents. The Government requires that foreigners
    from countries that do not have a visa waiver agreement with Hungary
    obtain exit visas each time they leave the country, although blanket
    permission sometimes is available.
        A total of 6,247 refugees from the former Yugoslavia are registered
    in the country. Most are in private housing, with only 506 housed in 3
    permanent and 2 temporary refugee camps, or ``reception centers,'' run
    by the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), formerly known as
    the Office of Migration and Refugee Affairs (ORMA). (In January the
    Government established OIN as a central authority for asylum and
    immigration matters.) In addition to the three government-owned camps,
    two additional temporary camps are used through contracts with the
    NGO's that run them. They have been operating since 1991 and 1993,
    largely as a result of the influx of refugees fleeing the various
    conflicts and incidents of ethnic cleansing to the south. The
    Government estimates that there are as many as 5,000 asylum seekers and
    as many as 40,000 to 60,000 immigrants (the vast majority from Romania)
    living in the country in unregistered status; the local office of the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes that these figures
    is too high. OIN began drafting amendments to the country's asylum laws
    in June to comply with existing European Union (EU) regulations.
        The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the local
    office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations assisting
    refugees. In 1999 the Government granted 313 out of 11,499 applicants
    refugee status under the Geneva Convention; 1,776 applicants were
    granted temporary protected status. During the first 9 months of this
    year, 151 out of 5,720 applicants were granted refugee status and 567
    were allowed to stay on temporary protected status. The number of
    applicants, excluding Yugoslav citizens, increased by 8 percent. Of
    11,299 applications submitted in 1999, 1,176 were Afghan, 1,176 from
    Bangladesh, 506 from Iraq, 228 from Sri Lanka, and 3,306 were from the
    former Yugoslavia. While the high number of Afghan refugees is not
    unusual, the significant increase in Yugoslav applicants in 1999
    corresponded with the onset of a series of crises in Kosovo. In the
    months following the cessation of hostilities, many of these
    applications were withdrawn, and OIN authorities believe that many more
    refugees simply have gone home. A March 1998 law lifted Hungary's
    geopolitical reservation to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government now
    adheres completely to the provisions of this Convention. Under the old
    law, the Government only handled claims from European asylum seekers,
    and the UNHCR handled all other claims. The increase in caseload
    resulting from this change and from events in Kosovo and the resulting
    NATO action placed a tremendous strain on the OIN's resources, leading
    to the high number of pending cases and increasing the processing time
    per application. Prospective refugees who seek only to transit to
    Western Europe are encouraged to return to their countries of
    departure. There were approximately 1,831 asylum seekers located in 3
    permanent and 2 temporary reception centers as of September 27. The
    Government has been criticized by NGO's and Western countries for
    inhuman conditions in detention facilities and the arbitrary
    application of asylum procedures. In February 1999, the Parliament's
    human rights Ombudsman criticized the conditions in border facilities
    as ``uncivilized and intolerable.'' In response to this criticism, the
    Government has closed down the worst buildings within the centers and
    has begun the construction of others. There is an ongoing project to
    refurbish the border guards' community shelters. Of the eight currently
    in operation, three have been fully refurbished and reopened, and one
    reopened early in the year. The conditions in the older facilities are
    not good. The country, which has been dealing with refugee issues on a
    large scale for only the past 10 years, has borne a great deal of the
    refugee burden resulting from the Kosovo crisis, and the Government has
    sought to work with NGO's to improve conditions.
        Aliens caught trying to cross the border illegally may apply for
    refugee status or are housed temporarily at one of eight border guard
    facilities throughout the country pending deportation. During the first
    6 months of the year, 910 persons occupied the facilities, while in
    1999 there were between 500 to 600 occupants. During the first half of
    the year, 5,798 illegal aliens were apprehended, while in 1999, 12,438
    were apprehended. While police seek the timely deportation of detainees
    who do not qualify for refugee status, a shortage of funds and the
    detainees' lack of property or documentation, such as passports, often
    result in lengthy stays. In 1999 the authorities expelled 12,000
    foreigners from the country; however, there were no reports of the
    forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens age 18 and over have the right to change their government
    through national elections held at least every 4 years. Members of
    Parliament are elected through a complex voting procedure for
    individuals and party lists. The FIDESZHungarian Democratic Civic Party
    heads the coalition with the Smallholders' Party and the Hungarian
    Democratic Forum (the latter two parties formed the government
    coalition between 1990 and 1994 with the Christian Democrats, one
    segment of which later merged with FIDESZ.) The opposition includes the
    extreme rightwing Hungarian Justice and Life Party and two leftwing
    parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Free Democrats.
        No legal impediments hinder women's participation in government or
    the political process, although they are underrepresented in relation
    to their percentage of the population; only 33 of 386 parliamentary
    representatives are women, and 1 woman serves in the Cabinet. Few women
    occupy other leadership positions in the Government or political
    parties. Despite the lack of ensured minority representation, there are
    several Members of Parliament, including one ethnic German and one
    ethnic Slovak, who are members of ethnic minorities; however, none
    specifically represents their respective minority populations. There
    are no Romani Members of Parliament.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Numerous human rights organizations operate without government
    restriction or interference. Many NGO's report that the Government is
    generally responsive to their requests for information. An increasing
    number of NGO's are involved in the law-making process. However,
    individual police units and prosecutors reportedly are uncooperative at
    times, particularly in cases involving Roma or police abuses. There is
    also a 21member parliamentary Committee for Human, Minority, and
    Religious Rights.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and
    protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination
    still exists, particularly against Roma. This is due to widespread
    prejudice, lack of positive reporting, and lack of opportunity for
    advancement.
        Women.--Spousal abuse is believed to be common, but the vast
    majority of such abuse is not reported, and victims who come forward
    often receive little help from authorities. While there are laws
    against rape, often it is unreported for cultural reasons. Police
    attitudes towards victims of sexual abuse are often reportedly
    unsympathetic, particularly if the victim was acquainted with her
    abuser. Laws recognize rape within marriage. Women's rights
    organizations claim that 1 woman in 10 is a victim of spousal abuse and
    that societal attitudes towards spousal abuse are ``archaic.'' In 1999
    there were 4,668 reports of crimes against family, youth, and sexual
    morality; 4,589 such crimes were reported in 1998. In 1999 women were
    the victims of 103,855 crimes; they were the victims of 106,211 crimes
    in 1998.
        The law does not prohibit sexual harassment in the work place. A
    1995 report prepared under the auspices of the U.N. to evaluate
    compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
    Against Women termed sexual harassment in the workplace as ``virtually
    epidemic.'' Women's groups report that there is little support for
    efforts to criminalize sexual harassment, and that harassment is
    tolerated by women who fear unemployment more than harassment. Under
    present law, acts of sexual harassment may be prosecuted under the
    defamation statutes (if violent, they are considered sexual
    misconduct).
        Legally women have the same rights as men, including identical
    inheritance and property rights. In September 1999, the Office for
    Women's Issues started operating an anti-discrimination hot line, which
    operates 10 hours a day and offers free legal advice to women who feel
    that they were discriminated against with respect to employment.
    According to the head of the office, the hot line receives 20 to 30
    calls per day. While there is no overt discrimination against women,
    the number of women in middle or upper managerial positions in business
    and government remains low, although the number of women in the police
    and the military has risen significantly over the past several years,
    with significant increase in 1999. Women are heavily represented in the
    judiciary and in the medical and teaching professions. A Women's
    Representative office was established in the Ministry of Social and
    Family Affairs to address women's issues more effectively. As of August
    1, the Women's Representation Secretariat became an independent
    department within the Ministry.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights.
    Education is mandatory through 16 years of age, and employment is
    illegal below the age of 15. There is no societal pattern of child
    abuse, although NGO's report that neglect and abuse are common in state
    care facilities. In 1999 children were the victims in 8,977 crimes,
    while in 1998 they were the victim of 8,769 crimes.
        People with Disabilities.--Government sources estimate that between
    600,000 and 1 million persons (6 to 10 percent of the population) are
    disabled. Of these, 300,000 to 350,000 are considered seriously
    disabled and receive increased government benefits. A law that was
    passed in 1998 requires that all public buildings be made accessible to
    the disabled within 10 years. A Council for the Disabled was
    established in January 1999, under the chairmanship of the Minister of
    Social and Family Affairs. The Council serves as an advisory board to
    the Government. At present services for the disabled are limited, and
    most buildings are not wheelchair accessible. A 1997 decree requires
    all companies that employ over 20 persons to reserve 5 percent of their
    jobs for the physically or mentally disabled, with fines of up to 75
    percent of the average monthly salary for noncompliance. In 1999 such
    fines yielded $6 million (approximately 1.77 billion Huf) for
    rehabilitation funds for the disabled. While the Government appears to
    be ready to consider reviews for mentally disabled patients under
    limited guardianship, U.S.-based NGO Mental Disability Rights
    International (MDRI) and local NGO Hungarian Mental Health Interest
    Forum (PEF) note that contrary to internationally recognized norms, no
    review procedures exist for patients under plenary guardianship. MDRI
    and PEF also criticize the use of cages in government facilities for
    the mentally disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Early in the year, the Council of Europe's
    Commission Against Racism and Intolerance published a report that
    criticized the ``latent anti-Semitism'' in some media, in some elements
    of Parliament, and in society.
        On November 2, some 30 gravestones were vandalized in Budapest. The
    damage to the stones was estimated to be $16,000 (5 million Huf).
        In July 1999, two skinhead members of the Arrow Cross Movement
    admitted to defacing 15 graves in a Jewish cemetery in Szombathely. The
    skinheads painted anti-Semitic graffiti on gravestones shortly before a
    Holocaust commemoration was to take place on July 3 in the cemetery.
    The desecration was criticized sharply by President Goncz. In November
    1999, a municipal court found the two youths guilty and sentenced one
    skinhead to 1 year in prison, which was commuted to 3 years' probation,
    while the second skinhead was sentenced to 8 months in prison, which
    was commuted to 2 years' probation. No new incidents of skinhead
    violence were reported during this year.
        In August 1999, the ``Protocols of the Elder of Zion,'' a notorious
    anti-Semitic forgery, was published and available for purchase in a
    Hungarian translation for the first time since World War II. The Jewish
    community in Nagykoros filed a complaint against the publication with
    the Prosecutor General. The publication also was criticized by the
    Calvinist Church and the Catholic Church, which expressed concern over
    the increasing problem of lack of ``respect and tolerance'' toward
    various religious communities. Also in August 1999, the Ministry of
    National Cultural Heritage criticized any defamation of religion and
    announced that it supported a call by the Confederation of Hungarian
    Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ) for the publication of a scholarly work
    in the country addressing the book's false claims. The Ministry of
    Culture later sponsored a lecture and reception to introduce that book.
        In November 1999, MAZSIHISZ asked the Cabinet to take action
    against ``Fascist, racist, and anti-Semitic'' outbreaks that were a
    source of public concern. The organization objected to the planned
    rehabilitation of the country's World War II Prime Minister Laszlo
    Bardossy, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and the publication of
    anti-Semitic books. MAZSIHISZ argued that the law should be changed to
    prohibit the denial of the Holocaust. In response to the concerns of
    the Jewish Community, Orban tasked an official in the Ministry of
    Culture to oversee issues of concern to the Jewish community.
        MAZSIHISZ and international Jewish organizations criticized as
    unfair a 1998 decision by the Government to provide $128 (30,000 Huf)
    each to the heirs of Holocaust victims. In February 1999, the president
    of MAZSIHISZ said that hundreds of Holocaust survivors were returning
    compensation payments to the Government, protesting that the small
    amounts were an insult. Previous awards to the heirs of victims
    distributed by the Communist regime were $4,255 (1 million Huf). The
    Orban Government provided the 30,000 Huf figure as a line item in the
    Fiscal Year 1999 budget, stating that this amount was all that could be
    paid out without budget imbalances. Opposition parties were seeking to
    hold a special parliamentary session on this and other issues, but the
    Government was opposed to resolving the issue in this manner. Although
    the figure of $128 was accepted originally by the leaders of the Jewish
    Community who had negotiated with the Government, it generally is
    agreed that the amount is too small, and it is a matter of ongoing
    renegotiation. In December the Constitutional Court ruled that the
    negotiated amount was unconstitutional. After this ruling, the Prime
    Minister instructed the Ministry of Justice to investigate the matter
    further and to draw up a new compensation proposal.
        On March 20, the Budapest court sentenced Ehrem Kemal (Gyorgy Kemal
    in Hungarian) to 2 years imprisonment for inflammatory anti-Semitic
    speeches made in 1997. The sentence was suspended and replaced with 5
    years probation. Kemal has appealed, and the case has been forwarded to
    the Supreme Court.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The 1993 Law on National and
    Ethnic Minorities' Rights recognizes individuals' minority rights, as
    well as establishes the concept of collective rights of ethnic
    minorities, and states that it is their inalienable collective right to
    preserve their ethnic identity. The law also permits associations,
    movements, and political parties of an ethnic or national character and
    mandates the unrestricted use of ethnic languages. For an ethnic group
    to be recognized as such it has to have at least 100 years' presence in
    the country, and its members have to be citizens. On this basis,
    minority status is granted specifically to 13 national or ethnic groups
    (among which Roma are by far the most numerous). Other groups may
    petition the Chairman of Parliament for inclusion if they believe that
    they fulfill the requirements.
        The law considers the establishment of local minority
    selfgovernments as a precondition for the enforcement of the rights of
    ethnic minorities. For this reason, local minority selfgovernment
    elections, in conjunction with local government elections, have been
    held since 1994. Any of the 13 minorities can set up a minority self-
    government if at least 50 valid votes are cast in settlements with
    fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and if at least 100 votes are cast in
    larger settlements. Since ethnicity is not registered officially,
    voting on minority selfgovernments is not limited to the minorities
    themselves; all the voters receive a minority ballot in addition to the
    local government ballot. The elected local minority self-governments
    can elect their national minority self-governments; all 13 minorities
    have formed national self-governments. To improve cooperation between
    local and national minority self-governments, the establishment of
    county level self-governments is planned for next year. This model of
    minority self-government has been criticized mainly on two grounds:
    first, several minority representatives have objected to the fact that
    members of the majority can vote for minority candidates and thus
    influence minority politics. The Government is currently collecting
    proposals for an amendment to the minority law to define more precisely
    both the competencies of minority self-governments and their source of
    financial support. Second, critics call for an increase in the
    competence of the minority self-governments and considerably more
    financial resources for them. However, this would require modification
    of the law, which is not expected in the near future.
        There were 770 Romani minority self-governments elected in the
    local elections in October 1998, a significant increase over the 477
    elected self-governments in the first minority elections held in 1994.
    The new self-governments began operating in January 1999. Of these, 738
    continue to function; the discrepancy reflected the number that ceased
    functioning between 1999 and this year due to a lack of funds. With
    some funding from the central budget and some logistical support from
    local governments, these bodies seek to influence and oversee matters
    affecting minorities. The Romani minority poses a special challenge for
    the system of national minority self-governments. In contrast to other
    minorities for whom the preservation of their identity and culture is
    the basic goal, the Roma also have to contend with the fact that they
    generally belong to the lowest socio-economic strata of Hungarian
    society. Ethnicity and poverty coincide with Roma; therefore, the
    Romani selfgovernments are faced with the task of improving the lives
    of their constituents with no additional resources. The concept of
    minority self-governments is in itself new, and policies still are
    evolving.
        In 1995 Parliament appointed an Ombudsman--currently an ethnic
    German--specifically charged with defending minority rights.
        Roma constitute at least 5 percent of the population, with some
    estimates going as high as 9 percent. In view of the higher birth rate
    among Roma compared with the general decline in the Hungarian
    population, this percentage is likely to remain constant or grow. This
    fact causes concern among a substantial portion of the majority
    population. Germans, the second largest minority group, constitute
    about 2 percent of the population. Smaller communities of Slovaks,
    Croats, Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Greeks, Serbs, Slovenes,
    Armenians, Ruthenians, and Bulgarians are recognized as ethnic
    minorities. Ethnicity and religion are only optional questions, so this
    may or may not provide a more accurate estimate of the actual numbers
    of the minority populations.
        Education is available to varying degrees in almost all minority
    languages. There are minority-language print media, and the state-run
    radio broadcasts 2-hour daily programs in the mother tongue of major
    nationalities, i.e., Romani, Slovak, Romanian, German, Croatian, and
    Serbian. State-run television carries a 30-minute program for each of
    the larger minority groups, complemented by 5-minute weekly news
    bulletins.
        Conditions of life for the Romani community are significantly worse
    than among the general population. Roma suffer from discrimination and
    racist attacks and are considerably less educated, with lower than
    average incomes and life expectancy. The percentage of the country's
    Roma graduating from high school in 1993 was 1.6 percent compared with
    23.8 percent for non-Roma; only 0.24 percent of Roma graduated from
    university compared with 9.45 percent for non-Roma. The unemployment
    rate for Roma is estimated to be 70 percent, over ten times the
    national average. With unemployment benefits exhausted and social
    services stretched thin, Roma often confront desperate situations. As
    of January 1, the Government has reduced the limit on unemployment
    benefits from 1 year to 9 months, which affects the Romani community
    disproportionately, with its high unemployment rate, and exacerbates
    the poverty of this large segment of society. This may likely reinforce
    negative stereotypes of Roma as poor, shiftless, and a social burden.
        Roma continue to suffer widespread discrimination in education,
    housing, and access to public institutions, including restaurants and
    pubs. Roma and other civic organizations highlighted the practice of
    placing Roma children in remedial education programs designed for
    children with mental disabilities or low academic performance,
    resulting in a form of de facto segregation. Although the children
    could be returned to the regular school system, only a small percentage
    return. In September 1999, the Minister of Education and the
    parliamentary Ombudsman for Minority Rights announced at a press
    conference that there is segregation in the country's educational
    system. The statement followed the publication of a report by the
    Ombudsman's office that found that the high proportion of Romani
    children in ``special schools'' for the mentally disabled was a sign of
    prejudice and a failure of the public education system. Schools for
    Roma are more crowded, more poorly equipped, and in markedly poorer
    condition than those attended by non-Roma. Only 1.5 percent of the
    Romani community graduate from high school, while 0.001 percent
    graduate from college or university. There are programs aimed at
    increasing these numbers (the Romaversitas program supports Romani
    students finishing degrees in institutions of higher education), and
    there are Departments of Roma Studies in the Teachers' Training College
    in Pecs and Zsambek. However, the impact has yet to be significant. The
    Hungarian Helsinki Committee found that there are 132 segregated
    schools throughout the country. The Government contests these claims of
    human rights organizations and states that the Romani schools are
    designed to provide intensive help for disadvantaged children. An
    interministerial committee was established in the fall of 1999 and is
    led by the Minister of Justice. This committee was tasked with
    assigning Romani affairs desk officers in each ministry. There is
    currently such a desk officer in the Ministry of Education, who is
    himself a Rom. Several ministries have already accomplished this task,
    including the Ministry of Education, whose desk officer is a Rom.
        In what is considered a landmark case, in July 1998 a court ordered
    a bar owner in the city of Pecs to pay a $750 fine and take out a
    newspaper advertisement apologizing for refusing to serve a Rom.
        Local officials have in some cases taken advantage of rules
    prohibiting overcrowded, unsafe, or unsanitary housing, or have
    punished nonpayment of utility bills by evicting Roma families, among
    others, from residences without providing alternative housing as the
    law requires. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) has reported cases
    of forced evictions during the year. For example, in the town of Ozd,
    ERRC visited apartment buildings from which Roma were forced to leave
    for renovations, many without having been given alternative housing for
    the duration and who may return only if they pay high fees for the
    costs of renovation. In some areas, this relocation and concentration
    of Roma populations has, in effect created ghettos. During the summer,
    laws on the tenancy of flats were amended to ease administrative
    procedures for evicting squatters. Under the new procedures, notaries
    public may authorize evictions and are required to enforce the order
    within 8 days, even if an appeal has been filed against the decision.
    Local NGO's worry that Roma families will bear the brunt of the new
    rules, saying that it expands the power of local officials to remove
    Roma from their homes.
        The Government sponsors programs both to preserve Romani languages
    and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic assimilation.
    Oversight and budgetary control of the Coordination Council for Roma
    Affairs and the Office of National Ethnic Minorities were shifted from
    the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of Justice. In July 1999,
    the Government published an action plan designed to improve living
    conditions in Romani communities, with specific focus on public health,
    education, and work training. However, the plan provides no additional
    funds; rather, it redistributes already inadequate resources.
        Early in the year, the Council of Europe's Commission Against
    Racism and Intolerance published a report that criticized the living
    conditions of the country's Roma population. It contends that the legal
    protection of Roma is ineffective and that regulations banning
    discrimination are insufficiently implemented. Government officials
    stress that the situation of the country's Roma is an issue that it is
    addressing.
        Widespread popular prejudice against Roma continues. Police
    commonly abuse them (see Section 1.c.). Foreigners of color reported
    harassment by police and at border control checkpoints. The Martin
    Luther King Organization (MLKO), which documents assaults on nonwhites,
    reported a gradual decrease in the number of such incidents over the
    past several years, with three such cases in the first 9 months of the
    year. However, MLKO sources believe that many cases go unreported.
        In 1997 changes to the Penal Code made it easier to enforce and
    stiffen penalties for hate crimes committed on the basis of the
    victim's ethnicity, race, or nationality. The law has already been
    applied several times.
        In March the Prime Minister's Office brought legal action against
    Peter Szegvari, a high-ranking official in the office, for having
    suggested that contraceptives be distributed to the Romani population
    to combat ``excessive multiplication.''
        In October 1999, a group of skinheads attacked two Roma at a pub in
    Kakucs. One Rom suffered serious injuries as a result of the beating.
    Local police began an investigation in the case, but no results were
    reported by year's end.
        In August 1999, a group of approximately 30 persons attacked a
    Romani family in a village near Nyiregyhaza. The attackers beat male
    members of the family, eight of whom were treated in the hospital for
    injuries. Local police reported that they interrogated two suspects in
    the case.
        Discrimination, poverty, and unresolved social problems continue to
    drive Roma emigration. In July, 47 members of a Roma clan from the
    village of Zamoly made the news this year when they applied for refugee
    status in France and indicated their intent to file suit against the
    Hungarian Government at the Strasbourg International Human Rights
    Court. Following 3 years of increasing tensions over adequate housing
    between members of the clan and the local community, 47 members of the
    family travelled to Strasbourg, where they have sought asylum. The
    Strasbourg court has agreed to review that asylum case and is
    temporarily housing and maintaining the 47 applicants. In 1998 an
    investigation by the Ombudsman for Minority Affairs concluded that the
    local mayor had indeed denied basic social services due to the Roma.
    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the asylum claims by
    announcing that the Roma family was free to return.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the
    right of unions to organize and bargain collectively and permits trade
    union pluralism. Workers have the right to associate freely, choose
    representatives, publish journals, and openly promote members'
    interests and views. With the exception of military personnel and
    police officers, they also have the right to strike. Under a separate
    1992 law, public servants may negotiate working conditions, but the
    final decision on increasing salaries rests with Parliament.
        The largest labor union organization is the National Confederation
    of Hungarian Trade Unions, the successor to the former monolithic
    Communist union, with over 735,000 members. The Democratic League of
    Independent Unions and the Federation of Workers' Councils have
    approximately 100,000 and 56,000 members, respectively.
        There are no restrictions on trade union contacts with
    international organizations, and unions have developed a wide range of
    ties with European and international trade union bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    permits collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry level,
    although the practice is not widespread and is discouraged actively in
    the growing private sector. Labor organizations appear willing to
    cooperate with one another; this is particularly evident in their
    relationship in forums such as the National Labor Affairs Council
    (OMT), which succeeded the Interest Reconciliation Council in April and
    which provides a forum for tripartite consultation among
    representatives from management, employees, and the Government. The OMT
    discusses issues such as wage increases and the setting of the minimum
    wage, which is negotiated centrally within the OMT in order to control
    inflation. Individual trade unions and management may negotiate higher
    wages at the plant level. The new Government disbanded the Ministry of
    Labor and split its work between the Ministry of Economy (covering
    policy issues) and the newly created Ministry of Social and Family
    Affairs (covering employment issues and responsible for drafting
    laborrelated legislation). In January the Government assigned all labor
    responsibilities to the Ministry of Economy. Employers are prohibited
    from discriminating against unions and their organizers. The Ministry
    of Economy enforces this provision.
        There are no export processing zones per se, but individual foreign
    companies have been frequently granted duty-free zone status for their
    facilities.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
    the Ministry of Economy enforces this prohibition.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see
    Section 6.c.). The Labor Code forbids labor by children under the age
    of 15 and regulates labor conditions for minors (14 to 16 years of
    age), including prohibitions on night shifts, hard physical labor, and
    guaranteed overtime payments. The National Labor Center enforces these
    regulations in practice, and there does not appear to be any
    significant abuse of this statute. Education is compulsory through age
    16. Roma are far more likely than non-Roma to stop attending school
    before age 16. The Government converted the family allowance into a
    school attendance allowance in September. This measure was intended to
    ``force'' children to go to school, but some Romani NGO's fear that
    this may be another form of discrimination against Roma, many of whom
    live in small villages with no high schools within manageable distance.
    Furthermore, the extreme poverty of many Roma makes it difficult for
    them to clothe their children appropriately for school. Taking away the
    family allowance is thus seen by Roma as punishment for neglecting to
    do something that they cannot afford. By the Government, however, it is
    perceived as a way to provide incentives for greater commitment to
    education among Roma and as an effort to end a cycle of poverty in
    which impoverished Roma bring up large and illiterate families, whose
    members themselves later may become public burdens.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The OMT establishes the legal
    minimum wage, which is subsequently implemented by Ministry of Economy
    decree. The minimum wage, $85 (25,500 Huf) per month, is insufficient
    to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. This is
    only 35 percent of the average wage. Many workers supplement their
    primary employment with second jobs, and there are reports that many
    citizens, while officially earning the minimum wage, actually make
    more. Reporting the minimum wage is a way for both employer and
    employee to avoid paying higher taxes.
        The Labor Code specifies various conditions of employment,
    including termination procedures, severance pay, maternity leave, trade
    union consultation rights in some management decisions, annual and sick
    leave entitlement, and labor conflict resolution procedures. Under the
    Code, the official workday is set at 8 hours; however, it may vary
    depending upon the nature of the industry. A 24-hour rest period is
    required during any 7-day period.
        Labor courts and the Ministry of Economy enforce occupational
    safety standards set by the Government, but specific safety conditions
    generally are not consistent with internationally accepted standards.
    The enforcement of occupational safety standards is not always
    effective in part due to the limited resources that the Ministry of
    Economy is able to commit to enforcement. In theory workers have the
    right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment. Foreign firms generally meet or
    exceed international standards for occupational safety.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the country was once primarily
    a source for women and children trafficked for the purpose of forced
    prostitution, it increasingly is a transit and destination point as
    well. Hungarian women are trafficked to Western Europe or other parts
    of the world, primarily to Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the
    Netherlands but also to Canada, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.
    Hungary receives persons from Eastern Europe, especially from Russia,
    Ukraine, and Romania, who either use the country as a point of transit,
    or who remain in the country as their final destination. According to
    the Office of International Migration (IOM), in 1998 3,200 persons were
    trafficked in the country, which makes up one quarter of all illegal
    migrants apprehended. In 1999 348 human smugglers were arrested, while
    this year the number rose to 569. These figures include both those who
    assist in the illegal migration of others and those trafficking in
    persons. The penalty for trafficking is between 1 and 5 years in
    prison; however, if an organized trafficking ring is involved, the
    sentence can be doubled. A recent amendment to the alien law provides
    for immediate expulsion from the country of foreign traffickers. The
    Government has concluded agreements with 10 European countries to
    facilitate improved police cooperation to combat organized crime and
    trafficking in persons. However, prosecution of traffickers is
    difficult because there is no legislation to protect victims.
    Parliament passed a resolution in July 1999 that called for a victim
    protection plan to be implemented no later than August 2001. Initial
    steps already taken include the creation of a Victim Protection Office
    in the Ministry of Interior, the establishment of a victim protection
    fund, and the posting of information brochures on victim protection in
    every police station. Branches of a new Victim Protection Office, which
    provide psychological support services and legal advocacy for victims,
    safeguard their rights, and attempt to minimize the trauma of trials,
    began operating in a few towns in the fall of 1999. This office does
    not deal exclusively or even primarily with victims of trafficking.
        Many of the victims of trafficking are brought to the country by
    organized crime syndicates, either for work in Budapest's thriving sex
    industry or for transit to Western Europe or North America, to which
    some Hungarian smuggling rings also provide babysitters, housekeepers,
    and manual laborers. Russian-speaking organized crime syndicates are
    active in trafficking women primarily from Ukraine and other countries
    of the former Soviet Union to the EU via Hungary. Hungarian victims are
    mainly young women, although they also include men, middle-aged women,
    and children. They are recruited at discos and modeling agencies,
    through word-of-mouth, or even through open advertisements in local
    papers and magazines. Some know that the purpose of the trip is to
    perform illegal work, while others simply think they are using a back-
    door means of attaining a visa. Others plan to work but believe that
    the appropriate papers and permission will be obtained by the
    organizers, who turn out to be traffickers. IOM continued a program
    funded by the European Union to raise awareness of the problem of
    trafficking and to educate potential victims.
                                   __________

                                    ICELAND

        Iceland is a constitutional republic and a parliamentary democracy
    in which citizens periodically choose their representatives in free and
    fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
        Elected officials control the police force, which scrupulously
    observes and enforces the laws that ensure protection of human rights.
        Iceland has a mixed, open economy that provides residents with a
    high standard of living. The leading exports, fish and other marine
    products, account for almost 70 percent of export revenues. An
    abundance of cheap hydroelectric power provides a comparative advantage
    for the main manufacturing activity--aluminum smelting. Aluminum is the
    second leading export. Growth was expected to approach 4 percent in
    1999.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. Human rights monitors expressed
    concern about the Government's frequent use of solitary confinement for
    remand prisoners. The Government is taking steps to deal with violence
    against women. Some societal discrimination against women persists,
    especially in the area of equal pay. Instances of suspected trafficking
    in women were reported.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
    or punishment are prohibited by law and do not occur.
        Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
    Most of the country's small prison population (less than 100 inmates
    total) is held at Litla Hraun Prison in Reykjavik, which includes a
    state-of-the-art detention facility opened in 1995. However, the prison
    system still uses a substandard jail (Hegningarhusid in downtown
    Reykjavik) to hold a small number of prisoners, where the individual
    cells lack toilets and sinks.
        Human rights monitors have expressed concern about the use of
    illegal drugs by some inmates at Litla Hraun Prison and about the lack
    of social services to help inmates overcome drug addiction and prepare
    them for eventual release. Despite the small inmate population at Litla
    Hraun, the authorities have not been able to stop narcotics from being
    smuggled into the prison.
        In a 1999 report, the European Committee for the Prevention of
    Torture (CPT) expressed concern during its visit to Litla Hraun prison
    in 1998 that nearly all detainees still were placed in solitary
    confinement while their cases were under investigation. While the
    average duration of solitary confinement was between 2 and 3 weeks, the
    CPT noted that in some cases, solitary confinement lasted up to 3
    months. Under the strictest form of solitary confinement, prisoners
    cannot leave their cells, except briefly to exercise alone or to use
    the showers, and are not allowed to listen to the radio, watch
    television, or receive visitors other than their lawyers, the prison
    doctor, and a chaplain. In November 1999, the supervising doctor at
    Litla Hraun wrote to prison authorities, warning that the mental health
    of several prisoners awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges could
    be in danger due to the extended time that they were expected to spend
    in solitary confinement.
        In a preliminary response to the CPT report on September 30, 1999,
    the Government argued that solitary confinement was absolutely
    necessary in some circumstances to keep suspects from tampering with
    witnesses, destroying evidence, or hindering the investigation. On the
    other hand, it conceded that ``in the vast majority of cases''
    incarceration alone was sufficient to protect the integrity of
    witnesses and evidence. However, the Prison and Probation
    Administration's statistics show that solitary confinement has been the
    rule rather than the exception, with most of those arrested being
    placed into solitary confinement, at least initially.
        In May the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of an
    Icelandic woman who had been denied compensation for wrongful arrest on
    the grounds that she had not cooperated with police. The woman was held
    in solitary confinement for 5 weeks in 1989 in connection with a drug
    case before being cleared and released. The Government since has
    changed the law to make it easier for victims of wrongful arrest to
    receive compensation, recognizing the principle that all detainees
    should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
        With the closing of the Sudumuli remand prison in 1996, the
    Government passed a law in 1998 that allows pretrial detainees to be
    incarcerated with the general prison population. Some human rights
    monitors claim that this law is inconsistent with the country's
    obligations under the European Human Rights Convention and European
    prison rules issued by the Council of Europe.
        Juveniles who are 15 years of age or older can be sentenced to
    prison terms, but the vast majority of juvenile offenders are given
    probation or suspended sentences or agree to attend a treatment program
    instead of going to jail. In the rare instances when juvenile offenders
    are incarcerated, they are confined with the general adult prison
    population due to the lack of a separate detention facility for
    juveniles. In its 1999 report, the CPT stated that it was ``very
    concerned'' about the current situation and recommended that the
    Government take ``immediate steps . . . to ensure that juvenile
    prisoners are held separately from adults.'' In signing the u.n.
    Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, the Government entered a
    reservation on the provision requiring the separation of adult and
    juvenile prisoners. Government officials said that it is not practical
    to establish and operate a separate facility for juvenile prisoners in
    a small country like Iceland because the requirement to incarcerate a
    juvenile occurs so infrequently.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
    for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this
    provision in practice.
        There are two levels of courts. A five-member Judicial Council
    appointed by the Minister of Justice administers the district courts,
    while the Supreme Court guards its independence and fairness by
    administering itself. All judges, at all levels, serve for life.
        The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
    process. Juries are not used, but multijudge panels are common,
    especially in the Supreme Court, which hears all appeals. Depending on
    the seriousness of the case, a Supreme Court panel can include from
    three to seven judges. Defendants are presumed innocent. They are
    provided access to legal counsel of their own choosing with sufficient
    time to prepare their defense. For defendants unable to pay attorneys'
    fees, the state covers the cost, as set by the court, but defendants
    are required to reimburse the state. Defendants have the right to be
    present at their trial, to confront witnesses, and to participate
    otherwise in the proceedings. No groups are barred from testifying, and
    all testimony is treated alike. The courts have the discretion to allow
    the introduction of evidence obtained illegally by the police. With
    limited exceptions, trials are public and conducted fairly, with no
    official intimidation. Defendants have the right to appeal.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the official state religion is
    Lutheranism, the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. The salaries of Lutheran
    ministers are paid by the state. Citizens 16 years of age and above are
    presumed to be members of the state church and are required to support
    the church by paying a tax, unless they designate another religious
    denomination to receive their tax payment. The religion tax payment of
    persons who choose not to belong to any specific, organized religious
    group goes to the University of Iceland. Religious instruction in
    Christianity is required in the public schools, although students may
    be exempted.
        A new law passed by Parliament in December 1999 (Law No. 108) sets
    specific conditions and procedures that religious organizations must
    follow in order to be recognized officially and registered by the
    State. Such recognition is necessary in order for religious
    organizations other than the state church to receive a per capita share
    of church tax funds. The 1999 law is narrower in scope than the 1975
    law it replaced and applies only to religious organizations that are
    seeking to be, or are already, officially recognized and registered. No
    restrictions or requirements are placed on unregistered religious
    organizations, which have the same rights as other groups in society.
    The law is considered necessary to deal with frequent attempts by
    individuals to obtain recognition of religious organizations simply to
    receive the tax income benefits.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        Although neither the Constitution nor the 1965 Law on the
    Supervision of Foreigners includes provisions for granting refugee or
    asylee status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, in practice the Government
    adjudicates cases in accordance with their principles. The Government
    cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
    International Committee of the Red Cross, and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees.
        However, human rights monitors have expressed concern about the
    lack of a modern and comprehensive immigration law to govern the
    processing of asylum seekers and to provide a framework for the
    handling of foreigners and immigrants in general. In particular there
    is concern that the Supervision of Foreigners Law gives police and
    custom officers at ports of entry too much discretion to deny admission
    to asylum seekers whose claims they deem to be not ``credible.''
        In response the Government states that official discretion is
    rarely exercised and that none of the 42 individuals who were denied
    entry to the country during the first 9 months of 2000 requested
    asylum. Nevertheless, many government officials agree that a
    comprehensive and modern immigration law is necessary.
        In view of the country's geographic isolation and the lack of
    direct transportation from any traditional source of refugees, the
    question of first asylum rarely arises. However, the Directorate of
    Immigration (which is responsible for adjudicating applications for
    asylum) and the Icelandic Red Cross (which houses and assists asylum
    seekers under a contact with the Government) report that 24 individuals
    applied for asylum during the year, compared with 17 in 1999. None was
    found to qualify for refugee status (several cases were still under
    consideration or on appeal), but the 1999 application of an individual
    who claimed to be 17 years old and fleeing persecution in central
    Africa was approved. It was the first application for asylum status
    ever approved. There were no reports of asylum seekers being detained
    or forcibly expelled during the year.
        The Government accepted 23 UNHCR-designated ``quota'' refugees from
    the former Yugoslavia during the year, continuing a program begun in
    1996 of bringing in 20 to 25 refugees from the region each year. In
    1999 the Government also admitted 75 Kosovar refugees into the country,
    37 of whom since returned to Kosovo with the financial support of the
    Government. Local government authorities in the towns where refugees
    settle take a strong interest in helping them adapt to their new
    environment. The Icelandic Red Cross, in cooperation with the Refugee
    Council of the Ministry of Social Affairs, developed a support family
    program, whereby at least three Icelandic families are enlisted to
    assist each refugee or refugee family. The refugees immediately are
    granted work permits and assisted in finding jobs. For the first year,
    they also are given free housing, utilities, and health care and
    receive a stipend so that they can participate daily in a special half-
    day language course designed specially for them. Refugees generally are
    successful in assimilating into society, but their children generally
    drop out of school earlier than children of citizens.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The most recent elections to the Althingi
    (unicameral Parliament) were held in May 1999.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, but no legal
    or practical impediments hinder their participation. Some human rights
    monitors criticized the Minister of Justice (herself a woman) for
    filling a vacancy on the Supreme Court during the year by choosing the
    sole male candidate (who had never served on the bench) over three
    experienced female district court judges. Only one of the nine Supreme
    Court justices is a woman. Similarly, only 2 of 12 ministerial
    permanent secretaries (civil servants who function as deputy ministers)
    are women.
        Women have greater representation in politics. Of the 12 government
    ministers, 4 are women, and women hold 24 of the 63 seats in
    Parliament. There has been a marked increase in the number of female
    parliamentarians elected since the Women's List (WL), a feminist
    political party, was founded in 1983. The WL forced the established
    political parties to nominate more female candidates or face losing
    support. The WL disappeared from the scene as the result of a political
    party merger, but its legacy survives. Women's issues have moved into
    the mainstream of political debate, and all of the major political
    parties now have at least one woman in a prominent leadership position.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
    responsive to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The country's ethnically homogenous population is strongly
    egalitarian and opposed to discrimination based on any of these
    factors. The law and practice generally reflect this attitude.
        Women.--Violence against women continued to be a matter of concern.
    A public women's shelter offers counseling and protection to victims of
    domestic violence and their children. Approximately 340 women used the
    shelter during the year, 94 of whom sought temporary lodging, while the
    rest asked for counseling or information. About 60 children accompanied
    their mothers to the shelter during the year. At a rape trauma center,
    between 300 and 400 women and children seek assistance annually. Both
    facilities are financed by national and municipal governments, as well
    as by private contributors. The emergency ward of the National Hospital
    in Reykjavik has a special staff to care for rape victims. It reports
    approximately 100 visits per year associated with incidents of sexual
    abuse.
        A police program to train officers in correct interrogation
    procedures in rape and sexual abuse cases appears to be addressing
    prior concerns that police indifference and hostility to female victims
    did not assure proper attention and consideration for victims of such
    abuses. Parliament passed legislation in May that gives courts the
    power to issue restraining orders, an action that human rights monitors
    praised as a potentially useful legal tool in keeping abusive husbands
    away from their spouses.
        A large majority of victims nevertheless decline to press charges,
    and even more forgo trial, fearing publicity in this small, tightly
    knit society. With an increasing number of interracial marriages,
    mostly involving Icelandic men and Asian women, there is concern that
    these new Asian immigrants are not assimilating well into local society
    and could be vulnerable to mistreatment. To address this concern, the
    city of Reykjavik offers these immigrant women emergency accommodation,
    counseling, and information on legal rights, language training, and
    Icelandic societal norms.
        There were indications that some foreign women were trafficked to
    work as striptease dancers or prostitutes against their will (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The sale of sex for money is not illegal per
    se, but it is against the law for someone to engage in prostitution as
    his or her main source of income. It is also illegal to act as an
    intermediary in the sale or procurement of sex.
        The rate of participation by women in the labor market is high. In
    part this reflects the country's comprehensive system of subsidized day
    care, which makes it affordable and convenient for women to work
    outside the home. The Act on the Equal Status of Men and Women requires
    that preference be given to the hiring and promotion of women in areas
    where they are underrepresented, as long as they are equal in all other
    respects to their male job seekers. Despite laws that require equal pay
    for equal work, a sizeable pay gap continues to exist between men and
    women. A survey by a union in Reykjavik showed that women, on average,
    earned 30 percent less than men. A 12 percent difference in pay is
    attributable to the fact that men work 4.2 more hours per week than
    women, but the rest of the gap is unexplained.
        Parliament passed legislation during the year that gives fathers
    the same right as mothers to paid leave upon the birth of a child. When
    the law is fully implemented in 2003, both mother and father will be
    allowed to take 3 months of paid leave, with an additional 3 months
    that can be taken by either parent or shared between them. Previously,
    a mother was given 6 months of paid maternity leave and the father just
    2 weeks. The new leave requirements apply equally to the public and
    private sectors.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights through its well-funded systems of public education
    and medical care. School attendance is compulsory through the age of
    15. About 85 percent of students continue to upper secondary education,
    which is financed completely by the State. The Government provides free
    prenatal and infant medical care, as well as heavily subsidized
    childcare. The Office of the Children's Ombudsman in the Prime
    Minister's Office has a mandate to protect children's rights,
    interests, and welfare by, among other things, exerting influence on
    legislation, government decisions, and public attitudes.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
        In an effort to improve the rate of prosecution of child sexual
    abuse and lessen the trauma to the child, the Government in 1998
    established the Children's Assessment Center. The objective of the
    center is to create a safe and secure environment where child victims
    feel more comfortable talking about what happened to them and are not
    subjected to multiple interviews. The center brings together police,
    prosecutors, judges, doctors, and officials from child protection
    services. However, a 1999 change in the Code of Criminal Procedure
    inadvertently undermined the center by making judges (instead of the
    police) responsible for the investigatory interview of abused children
    and by allowing these interviews to be conducted in specially designed
    rooms at district courthouses. In September the Supreme Court upheld
    the right of a Reykjavik district court judge to hold an investigatory
    interview in the courthouse rather than at the assessment center. As of
    September, only about 20 percent of child sexual abuse cases were being
    handled through the center, a development that human rights monitors
    claim is a step backwards in the protection of children's rights.
        People with Disabilities.--Disabled individuals are not subject to
    discrimination in employment, education, or the provision of other
    state services. A 1992 law calls for the disabled to have the right to
    ``all common national and municipal services'' and provides that they
    be given assistance to ``make it possible for them to live and work in
    normal society with others.'' The law also provides that the disabled
    should receive preference for a government job when they are qualified
    equally, or more qualified, than regular applicants.
        Building regulations updated in 1998 call for public
    accommodations--such as hotels, restaurants, banks, and stores--as well
    as government buildings to be accessible so that persons in wheelchairs
    have access without assistance. Building regulations also specify that
    elevators in such buildings should be large enough to accommodate
    wheelchairs and that 1 percent of parking spaces (a minimum of one
    space) should be reserved for disabled use only. Moreover, the
    regulations specify that, to the extent possible, the sidewalk outside
    the main entrance of a public accommodation or government building
    should be heated so that it remains clear of ice and snow throughout
    the winter.
        The 1997 Planning and Building Act provides that violations of
    these regulations are punishable by a fine or a jail sentence of up to
    2 years. However, the country's main association for the disabled
    complains that enforcement is lax and that penalties are rarely
    assessed for noncompliance. Access to new buildings tends to be good,
    while efforts to make old buildings more accessible have lagged. A
    government committee is currently doing a systematic survey of all
    state-owned buildings in the country to evaluate their accessibility.
    Since 1995 the Reykjavik city government, in cooperation with local
    associations representing bicycle riders and the blind, has been
    systematically beveling sidewalks at intersections throughout the city
    to facilitate the movement of pedestrians, bicyclists, and disabled
    persons in wheelchairs. The city is spending about $175,000 a year on
    this project, which it aims to have completed by 2006.
        In what was heralded as a major human rights victory for the
    disabled, the Supreme Court ruled in December that the Government's
    practice of basing a disabled person's social security payment on the
    income of his or her able-bodied spouse or partner was
    unconstitutional. The Court said that such means testing violated
    constitutional protections regarding equality and support for the
    disabled and that it was contrary to the country's obligations under
    the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. At
    year's end, the Government appointed a committee to study the court
    ruling, a move that the Association of Disabled Persons criticized as a
    delaying tactic. It called on the Government to take immediate action
    to end the means testing and reimburse disabled persons for past
    reductions in their social security payments.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Concern was voiced during the
    year that the rapidly increasing number of foreigners being brought
    into the country to meet the labor shortage in fish processing and
    other less desirable occupations could lead to future problems,
    especially in the event of an economic downturn. At the end of 1999,
    7,271 foreigners were living in Iceland, or about 3 percent of the
    population, according to the statistics office. However, persons of
    foreign origin actually constituted 4 or 5 percent of the population
    when account is taken of individuals who were born in foreign countries
    but have since become citizens. New work and residence permits were
    issued at a rate of about 150 per month during the year. Many of these
    ``temporary'' workers come from Central and Eastern Europe and the
    former Soviet Union, and the Directorate of Immigration expected most
    of them to seek to remain permanently rather than return to their
    countries of origin.
        Human rights monitors expressed concern about the establishment in
    1997 of an ultra-nationalist organization called the Association of
    Icelandic Nationalists, whose motto is ``Iceland for Icelanders.'' The
    avowed aim of the association is to prevent further settlement of
    foreigners of other than European origin in the country. Some human
    rights monitors claim that the Government is not living up its
    obligations under Article 4 of the International Convention on the
    Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination because there is no
    law that prohibits organizations that promote and incite racial
    discrimination.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers make extensive use of the
    right provided by the Constitution to establish organizations, draw up
    their own constitutions and rules, choose their own leaders and
    policies, and publicize their views. The resulting organizations are
    controlled neither by the Government nor by any single political party.
    Unions take active part in Nordic, European, and other international
    trade union bodies. With the exception of limited categories of workers
    in the public sector whose services are essential to public health or
    safety, unions have had and used the right to strike for many years.
    Approximately 80 percent of all eligible workers belong to unions.
    During the year, 3 major strikes took place: A 2-week strike in the
    spring by most of the unskilled and semiskilled labor unions outside of
    Reykjavik, a 2-month strike during the summer by the main bus drivers'
    union, and a 2-month strike at the end of the year by secondary school
    teachers. The teachers' strike, which was the longest such strike in
    the country's history, led some students to leave school and take up
    full-time jobs.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Union
    membership is not impeded in law or practice. Employers are required to
    withhold union dues (1 percent of gross pay) from the pay of all
    employees, whether or not they are union members. This is because union
    dues help support, among other things, disability, strike, and pension
    funds to which all workers are entitled.
        The various trade unions and management organizations periodically
    negotiate collective bargaining agreements that set specific terms for
    workers' pay, hours, and other conditions. New collective bargaining
    agreements were negotiated in the spring of 2000, and most will expire
    in either 2003 or 2004. The Government played only a minor role in the
    bargaining process, providing mediation assistance in a few cases
    (through the State Mediator's Office) while generally encouraging wage
    restraint to limit inflation. The new contacts provide that if
    inflation exceeds expectations during the first year, the unions have
    the right to seek renegotiation of the wage terms. In recent years, the
    Government has played almost no role in the private sector collective
    bargaining process, other than generally to encourage wage restraint
    that would help to limit inflation.
        Labor courts effectively adjudicate disputes over contracts and
    over the rights provided for in the 1938 Act on Trade Unions and
    Industrial Disputes, which prohibits antiunion discrimination. By law
    employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to
    reinstate workers fired for union activities. In practice the charges
    are difficult to prove.
        In 1996 Parliament passed legislation updating the labor laws and
    bringing them into compliance with the European Convention on Human
    Rights.
        There are no export processing or other special economic zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is prohibited by law and does not occur; however, some women
    reportedly were coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes
    (see Sections 5 and 6.f.), and work permit practices could leave
    workers vulnerable to abuse by employers (see Section 6.e.). The law
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
    the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section
    6.c.). The law requires children to attend school until the age of 16
    and prohibits the employment of younger children in factories, on
    ships, or in other places that are hazardous or require hard labor.
    This prohibition is observed in practice. Children 14 or 15 years old
    may be employed part time or during school vacations in light,
    nonhazardous work. Their work-hours must not exceed the ordinary work
    hours of adults in the same occupation. The Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration enforces child labor regulations.
        The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
    child labor in May.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No minimum wage is mandated
    legislatively, but the minimum wages negotiated in the various
    collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees
    in those occupations, whether they are union members or not. Union
    membership is so extensive and effective that labor contracts afford
    even the lowest paid workers a sufficient income for a decent standard
    of living for themselves and their families.
        Workers are protected by laws that effectively provide for their
    health and safety as well as for unemployment insurance, paid
    vacations, pensions, and reasonable working conditions and hours. The
    standard legal workweek is 40 hours, which includes nearly 3 hours of
    paid breaks. Work exceeding 8 hours in a workday must be compensated as
    overtime. Under changes that took effect during the year, workers are
    entitled to 11 hours of rest (up from 10 hours previously) within each
    24-hour period and to a day off every week. Under defined special
    circumstances, the 11-hour rest period can be reduced to 8 hours, but
    the worker must then be compensated with 1.5 hours of rest for every
    hour he received less than 11 hours. The day off can be postponed by a
    week, in which case the worker has a right to 2 additional hours off in
    the following week. Health and safety standards are set by Parliament
    and administered and enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs through
    its Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which can close down
    workplaces until safety and health standards are met. Workers have a
    collective, not an individual, right to refuse to work in a place that
    does not meet the criteria of occupational safety and health. Firing
    workers who report unsafe or unhealthy conditions is illegal.
        However, in the case of newly arrived foreign workers or refugees
    (i.e., those who have been in the country for less than 3 years), human
    rights monitors expressed concern that the Government's practice of
    issuing the applicable work permit to the employer rather than to the
    individual concerned could leave the worker vulnerable to abuse by the
    employer.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically
    criminalize trafficking in persons; however, a number of provisions in
    the Penal Code can be used to prosecute such cases.
        Although no charges have ever been filed, trafficking in women is
    suspected in connection with the hundreds of foreign women who enter
    the country to work in striptease clubs. The main concern is that some
    of the women, especially those from Eastern and Central Europe, are
    being brought to Iceland under false pretenses and then coerced to work
    as striptease dancers or prostitutes. The police believe that the
    foreign women also may be used to bring illegal drugs into the country.
        Parliament passed legislation in May that closed a loophole that
    allowed striptease dancers to enter the country and perform without a
    work permit for up to 4 weeks under an exemption given for ``artists.''
    Now any foreign woman (except those from the Nordic area and countries
    of the European Economic Area) seeking to come to the country to work
    as a striptease dancer must first obtain work and residence permits,
    which are typically valid for 3 months. However, the Government has not
    yet put any numerical limits or other controls on the issuance of work
    permits for foreign striptease dancers. The clubs are allowed to bring
    in as many as they want. One check is provided by the Icelandic
    Federation of Labor. The Federation reviews the work permit
    applications and labor contacts for striptease dancers (under the law,
    all work permit applications must be reviewed and approved by the
    ``relevant'' labor union) and ensures that the dancers are afforded the
    minimal labor protections and benefits.
        The number of women entering the country for such work, while still
    based on anecdotal evidence, has fallen to a few hundred since they can
    now stay longer legally. Byyear's end, there had been no arrests in
    connection with these activities.
                                   __________

                                    IRELAND

        Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a long tradition of
    orderly transfer of power. The Government consists of an executive
    branch headed by a prime minister, a legislative branch with a
    bicameral parliament, a directly elected president, and an independent
    judiciary.
        The national police (Garda Siochana) are under effective civilian
    control and have primary responsibility for internal security. Since
    the police are an unarmed force, the army acts in their support when
    necessary--the latter under the effective civilian control of the
    Minster for Defense. Ireland's principal internal security concern has
    been to prevent the spillover of terrorist violence from Northern
    Ireland. With the signing of the Good Friday Peace Agreement on April
    10, 1998, virtually all parties in Northern Ireland acknowledged the
    goals of democracy, peace, and reconciliation. All major paramilitary
    groups, on both sides of the border, have declared permanent cease-
    fires. Members of the police have committed some human rights abuses.
        Ireland has an open, market-based economy that is highly dependent
    on international trade. Over the last 2 decades it has been a large net
    recipient of funds from the European Union (EU), and this assistance
    has helped to address imbalances in the socioeconomic environment.
    Strong economic growth over the past few years lowered unemployment to
    4.4 percent, the lowest in 30 years.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens. Human rights problems arise primarily from: Instances of
    abuse by the police; prison overcrowding and substandard facilities;
    the continuation of special arrest and detention authority and the
    nonjury court; the occasional censorship of films, books, and
    periodicals; violence and discrimination against women; the abuse of
    children; and discrimination against asylum seekers and Travellers (an
    itinerant ethnic community).
        As stipulated in the Good Friday Agreement, the Government
    established a human rights commission in July, which is to cooperate
    with a parallel commission in Northern Ireland. The human rights
    commissions are to provide information and promote awareness of human
    rights, comment on human rights draft legislation referred to them by
    the legislatures, make recommendations to the governments on the
    adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, and initiate court
    proceedings or provide assistance to individuals doing so. The Good
    Friday Agreement also mandates equivalency with regard to protection of
    human rights in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. To this
    end, the Government atyear's end was preparing legislation which would
    allow for an 'interpretive incorporation' of the European Convention on
    Human Rights into Irish law.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        During the year, the Garda in the Republic of Ireland and the Royal
    Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland cooperated in questioning
    87 persons in connection with the August 1998 Omagh bombing that killed
    29 people and injured hundreds. To date only one person, Colm Murphy,
    has been charged in connection with the bombing. Murphy, an Irish
    citizen charged with conspiracy to cause an explosion, is expected to
    stand trial in Dublin in 2001. In October 2000, at the conclusion of
    the inquests of 28 of the 29 victims, the RUC announced that it knew of
    15 suspects responsible for the bombing but lacked evidence sufficient
    to charge and prosecute them.
        In May 1999, the Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains, a
    joint body made up of representatives from the Republic and Northern
    Ireland, began efforts to locate the remains of nine persons, termed
    the ``disappeared,'' abducted and killed by the Irish Republican Army
    (IRA) in the 1970's.
        Pursuant to joint Irish and British legislation granting limited
    immunity to IRA members involved in these acts, information was given
    to the Commission by the IRA on the location of the nine bodies. In
    1999 the remains of three of the nine victims were recovered and
    returned to their families. In January 2000 the Commission halted
    excavations until May, when digging resumed for another 3 weeks
    following receipt of new information from the IRA. At the end of May,
    the Commission again suspended the search pending new information from
    the IRA. Work had not resumed byyear's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and officials generally
    did not employ them. However, there were instances of abuse of
    detainees and prisoners. While the mistreatment of persons in police
    custody is not widespread, detainees filed a number of cases claiming
    damages for injuries sustained while in police custody.
        Human rights organizations have called for the establishment of an
    independent ombudsman or authority to investigate complaints against
    the police. It would replace the current statutory board, the Garda
    Siochana (Police) Complaints Board, through which the Garda authorities
    investigate alleged misconduct by their peers. In 1999 the Board
    received 1,264 complaints, a decrease from 1,400 complaints in 1998.
    The complaints included charges of criminal behavior (mistreatment or
    abuse). After a review process conducted in accordance with the 1986
    Garda Siochana (Complaints) Act, 192 cases were referred to the
    Director of Public Prosecutions, who directed that members of the Garda
    Siochana be prosecuted in 9 of those cases. None of the 9 cases
    reportedly resulted in convictions.
        The Board also referred 20 of the complaints to an internal
    disciplinary body in 1999. Of the nine cases dealt with byyear's end,
    five were found to involve wrongdoing. The Board in addition sent 28
    complaints directly to the Garda Commissioner for disciplinary action.
        In response to a pan-European program, ``Police and Human Rights
    1997-2000,'' the Garda Commissioner in late 1999 launched the Garda
    Siochana Human Rights Initiative for 1999-2000 in order to further
    develop policing practices that uphold human rights. This initiative
    focused on the training of officers (from the senior level to incoming
    students), a review of practices and procedures, and increased
    coordination and cooperation with NGO's. In addition to this
    initiative, the Government introduced the recording of questioning of
    suspects in Garda stations, a practice designed to deter further abuse
    or mistreatment.
        Ireland has a low incarceration rate (80 inmates per 100,000
    population), and the prison regime is generally liberal. However, the
    physical infrastructure of many prisons is inadequate. Following
    charges that prisons are overcrowded and lack in-cell sanitation
    facilities such as toilets and running water, many are undergoing
    renovation. In addition prisons lack sufficient health care facilities
    and services. Cloverhill remand prison and Mountjoy women's prison (the
    Dochas Center), both unable to accept inmates at their initial openings
    in 1999, are now fully operational. These new facilities are designed
    to accommodate a further 1,200 prisoners and thereby help reduce
    overcrowding.
        Prisoners with complaints of mistreatment by prison officials or
    negligence of health and safety due to prison conditions have ready
    access to mechanisms for redress. However, according to the Justice
    Department, no allegations of mistreatment of prisoners were leveled
    against the Prison Service during the year, and no similar claims were
    left outstanding from previous years. However, 44 complaints were made
    in 1998, the last year for which statistics are available. The
    authorities continued to arrest and incarcerate at Portlaoise prison
    persons involved in paramilitary activity. Conditions for these inmates
    are the same, if not better, than those for the general prison
    population.
        Domestic and international human rights monitors are permitted to
    visit prisons without reservation. The Council of Europe's Committee
    for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment (CPT) visited prisons in 1998. In December 1999, the
    Government responded to the CPT's report with plans for improving
    conditions. In May 2000 the Government published a followup report as
    requested by the CPT.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    stipulates that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty without
    due process under the law; however, special arrest and detention
    authority continued. A detainee has the right to petition the High
    Court, which is required to order release unless it can be shown that
    the person is being detained in accordance with the law. The 1984
    Criminal Justice Act provides for an initial period of detention of 6
    hours, with an extension of another 6 hours when a police officer of
    the rank of superintendent or above so directs, in cases in which there
    are grounds for believing that such detention is necessary for the
    proper investigation of an offense. A continuation of detention of 8
    hours overnight is possible, to allow a detainee to sleep.
        In cases covered by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, the
    initial period of detention without charge is 24 hours on the direction
    of a police superintendent; detention can be extended another 24 hours
    by a judge. This act allows police to arrest and detain for questioning
    anyone suspected of committing a ``scheduled offense,'' i.e., one
    involving firearms, explosives, or membership in an unlawful
    organization. Although the stated purpose of the act is to ``prevent
    actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the
    authority of the state,'' it is not restricted to subversive offenses.
    Therefore, the police have broad arrest and detention powers in any
    case involving firearms. However, under the terms of the
    Decommissioning Law enacted in 1997 in support of the Northern Ireland
    peace process, proceedings may not be instituted against persons in
    relation to any offense that may be committed in the course of
    decommissioning illegally held arms in accordance with an approved arms
    decommissioning scheme.
        The 1939 act also provides for the indefinite detention, or
    internment, without trial of any person who is engaged in activities
    that are ``prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or
    to the security of the State.'' While this power has not been invoked
    since the late 1950's, the Government could do so by simply issuing a
    proclamation.
        An amendment to the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act was enacted
    in the wake of the Omagh bombing in 1998. The amendment allows police
    to detain suspects in certain crimes, usually involving serious
    offenses with firearms or explosives, for 48 hours, with a possible 24-
    hour extension if approved by a judge.
        The legislation also curtails the right of silence. Under the
    amendment, if the accused was informed of the consequences of remaining
    silent to questions regarding his whereabouts, associations, or
    actions, then the accused's silence may be used as corroborative
    evidence of guilt. The accused person's failure to respond to
    accusations of membership in an illegal organization also may be used
    as corroborative evidence of guilt. However, the accused cannot be
    convicted based solely on his refusal to speak.
        Membership in or leadership of an illegal organization carries a
    possible life sentence under the new amendment (illegal organizations
    are defined by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act). The word of a
    police superintendent can be used as corroborative evidence of
    membership. Collecting information to aid in a serious offense carries
    a penalty of up to 10years' imprisonment, a fine, or both. Withholding
    information that could prevent a ``serious'' offense or that could aid
    in the apprehension or conviction of a perpetrator also is illegal,
    with a penalty of up to 5years' imprisonment, a fine, or both.
        The Government established a committee, chaired by a justice of the
    district court, to investigate allegations that the legislation
    violates international human right conventions. The legislation, which
    was set to expire in June, was extended in July for an additional 12
    months. The committee was expected to report its findings by the end of
    the year.
        The 1996 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act permits detention
    without charge for up to 7 days in cases involving drug trafficking.
    However, to hold a suspected drug trafficker for more than 48 hours the
    police must seek a judge's approval.
        Following approval in 1996 of a referendum calling for stricter
    bail laws, legislation was enacted in 1997 that allows a court to
    refuse bail to a person charged with a serious offense where it is
    considered reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of another
    serious offense. A schedule of serious offenses is contained in the
    bill; the offense must be one that carries a penalty of 5years'
    imprisonment or more. In May the courts implemented the entire bail act
    following a delay due to a lack of prison accommodations.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The judicial system includes a district court with 23 districts, a
    circuit court with 8 circuits, the High Court, the Court of Criminal
    Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The President appoints judges
    recommended by the Judicial Appointment Board, who choose from a list
    presented by the Government.
        The Director of Public Prosecutions, a state official with
    independent status, prosecutes criminal cases. Jury trial is the norm.
    The accused generally may choose an attorney. For indigent defendants,
    the State assumes the cost of counsel under the criminal legal aid
    scheme.
        However, the Constitution explicitly allows ``special courts'' to
    be created when ``ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the
    effective administration of justice and the preservation of public
    peace and order.'' In 1972, under the 1939 Offenses Against the State
    Act, the government created a nonjury ``Special Criminal Court'' (SCC)
    to try ``scheduled offenses'' (see Section 1.d.). Largely a reaction to
    the spillover of paramilitary violence from Northern Ireland, the use
    of the SCC was justified over the years to address the problem of jury
    intimidation in cases involving defendants with suspected paramilitary
    links. The continued need for the SCC is being kept under review by the
    Government.
        During the first 6 months of the year, the SCC indicted 25 persons
    and held 14 trials, compared with 25 indictments and 18 trials in all
    of 1999. In addition to ``scheduled offenses,'' the Director of Public
    Prosecutions can have any nonscheduled offense tried by the SCC if he
    certifies that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the
    effective administration of justice and the preservation of public
    peace.
        In lieu of a jury, the SCC always sits as a three-judge panel. Its
    verdicts are by majority vote. Rules of evidence are essentially the
    same as in regular courts, except that the sworn statement of a police
    chief superintendent identifying the accused as a member of an illegal
    organization is accepted as prima facie evidence. Sessions of the SCC
    are usually public, but judges may exclude certain persons other than
    journalists. Appeals of SCC decisions are allowed in certain
    circumstances.
        Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, releases continued of
    those imprisoned for crimes related to the terrorist campaign in
    Northern Ireland. Prisoners belonging to organizations that have
    declared permanent cease-fires and who have committed themselves to
    work through peaceful, democratic means are the only persons qualified
    for this program. All releases were completed by July.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution and the law prohibit such practices,
    government authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and
    violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides
    individuals with the right to ``express freely their convictions and
    opinions.'' However, freedom of the press is subject to the
    constitutional qualification that it not ``undermine public order or
    morality or the authority of the state.'' The publication or utterance
    of ``blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter'' is prohibited by the
    Constitution. While the press in practice operates freely, the 1961
    Defamation Act (which puts the onus on newspapers and periodicals
    accused of libel to prove that defamatory words are true) and the 1963
    Official Secrets Act (which gives the State wide scope to prosecute
    unauthorized disclosures of sensitive government information) are
    believed to result in some self-censorship.
        Broadcasting remains mostly state controlled, but private sector
    broadcasting continues to grow. There are 43 independent radio stations
    and an independent television station. Expanded access to cable and
    satellite television is lessening considerably the relative influence
    of state-controlled broadcasting. The Broadcasting Complaints
    Commission oversees standards and investigates complaints about
    programming. The 1960 Broadcasting Act empowers the Government to
    prohibit the state-owned radio and television network from broadcasting
    any matter that is ``likely to promote or incite to crime or which
    would tend to undermine the authority of the state.'' It was on this
    basis that the government banned Sinn Fein (the legal political front
    of the Irish Republican Army) from the airwaves from 1971 to 1994.
    Following Sinn Fein's agreement to participate in the Northern Ireland
    peace process and the declaration of the IRA cease-fire, the Government
    restored Sinn Fein's access.
        The Office of the Film Censor must classify films and videos before
    they can be shown or sold. Distributors pay fees to finance the
    censor's office. Under the 1923 Censorship of Films Act, the censor has
    the authority to cut or ban any film that is ``indecent, obscene, or
    blasphemous'' or which tends to ``inculcate principles contrary to
    public morality or subversive of public morality.'' As of October, no
    theatrical films were banned during the year, but 125 videos were
    banned, mainly because of their pornographic or violent content.
    Decisions of the censor can be appealed to a nine-member appeal board
    within 3 months, but neither the censor nor the appeal board is
    required to hear arguments or evidence in public or to state the
    reasons for its decisions.
        Books and periodicals are also subject to censorship. The 1946
    Censorship of Publications Act calls for a five-member board to examine
    publications referred to it by the customs service or the general
    public. It also can examine books (but not periodicals) on its own
    initiative. The board can prohibit the sale of any publication that it
    judges to be indecent or obscene. As of October, the board had not
    banned any books or periodicals. In 1999 the board banned the
    mainstream In Dublin magazine for carrying advertisements for ``massage
    parlors,'' which were regarded by the board as solicitations for
    prostitution. The publishers challenged the ban in court, and the
    board's ruling was overturned on the condition that the magazine take
    out the advertisements. In 1999 the board did not ban any books, but it
    banned 8 periodicals, compared with 15 books and 10 periodicals in
    1998.
        In 1996 Veronica Guerin, a journalist and crime reporter with the
    Sunday Independent newspaper, was murdered. The murder was seen as an
    attempt by criminal elements to silence press coverage of their
    activities. The incident shocked public opinion and led to the adoption
    of new legislation to combat narcotics-related crime. The courts
    convicted two men, Paul Ward (November 1998) and Brian Meehan (July
    1999), in connection with the murder and sentenced them to life
    imprisonment. As of October, a third, John Gilligan, extradited from
    the United Kingdom, was awaiting trial; three other men have been
    sentenced on lesser charges related to the Guerin case. No incidents of
    violence against journalists have been reported since Guerin's murder
    in 1996.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides citizens with the right to ``assemble peaceably and without
    arms'' and to form associations and unions; however, it also allows the
    State to ``prevent or control meetings'' that are calculated to cause a
    breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general
    public. Under the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, it is unlawful
    to hold any public meeting on behalf of, or in support of, an illegal
    organization. Although the law mandates the prosecution and
    incarceration of persons for mere membership in a terrorist
    organization, the Government allows meetings and assemblies by some
    groups that are associated with illegal terrorist organizations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice
    of any faith. Even though overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Ireland has no
    state religion. However, most primary and secondary schools are
    denominational, and the Catholic Church partially controls their boards
    of management. The Government provides equal funding to the schools of
    different religious denominations. Although religious instruction is an
    integral part of the curriculum, parents may exempt their children from
    such instruction. There is no discrimination against nontraditional
    religious groups.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--There is complete freedom of movement
    within the country, as well as freedom to engage in foreign travel,
    emigration, and repatriation.
        The existing refugee law, enacted in 1996, has been implemented
    only partially and was under review. The law gives effect to the 1990
    Dublin Convention, harmonizing European Union asylum procedures, and it
    also makes provision for program refugees (those invited by the state
    to apply for asylum; in 1999 mostly Kosovars). The law also expressly
    forbids the forced return of persons to a country where they fear
    persecution.
        The Government grants refugee or asylee status in accordance with
    the provision of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and it cooperates with the office of
    the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government drew up
    specific administrative procedures for implementation of the convention
    in consultation with the UNHCR. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that
    these procedures were binding on the Department of Justice, Equality,
    and Law Reform.
        The large increase in the number of asylum seekers continued to
    cause problems, severely straining the Government's processing system
    and societal acceptance (see Section 5). A total of 10,938 asylum
    seekers entered the country during the year. As of July, over 5,000 new
    applications were filed. The total number of applications awaiting
    processing as of December was 6,972; most applicants were from Romania
    and Nigeria. The Government provided first asylum in 211 cases during
    the year. An equal or larger number of asylum applications are expected
    in 2001.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution. Measures taken to speed the lengthy
    processing time of applications (currently about 18 months), including
    recruitment of additional staff, have had little impact because of the
    increasing number of refugee applications. The Government improved the
    situation of asylum seekers awaiting review of their applications by
    allowing those who filed before July 26, 1999, and have been waiting
    over 12 months, to work in Ireland. The Government established a new
    Garda (police) National Immigration Bureau to monitor and track
    nonnationals who are the subject of deportation orders. The new Bureau
    also plans to: Coordinate activities leading to deportation,
    operational strategies and resources at ports of entry, and strategies
    to combat trafficking in illegal immigrants; strengthen international
    liaison on immigration issues; administer the nonnational registration
    service; and enforce immigration law generally.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage for citizens over the age of 18. Several political
    parties have seats in the bicameral Parliament. Members of the Dail
    (House of Representatives)--the chamber that carries out the main
    legislative functions--are popularly elected; in the Seanad (Senate),
    most members are elected by vocational and university groups, and the
    others are appointed by the Prime Minister. The President is popularly
    elected for a 7-year term and is limited to 2 terms. An appointed
    Council of State serves as an advisory body to the President.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although the
    President is a woman, only 22 of the 166 deputies in the Dail and 11 of
    the 60 senators are women. Of the 15 government ministers, 3 are women,
    as are 3 of the 17 junior ministers. Two women sit on the 26-member
    High Court; 2 of the 8 Supreme Court judges are women.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
    cooperative and responsive to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution forbids state promotion of one religion over
    another and discrimination on the grounds of religion, profession,
    belief, or status. However, until recently few laws implemented these
    provisions of the Constitution. The 1998 amended Employment Equality
    Act went into effect in October 1999. It outlaws discrimination in
    relation to employment on the basis of nine distinct discriminatory
    grounds: Gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation,
    religious belief, age, disability, race, and membership in the
    Traveller community. The 2000 Equal Status Act outlaws discrimination
    in the provision of goods, facilities, and services on the basis of the
    nine grounds listed above.
        Women.--Domestic violence and emotional abuse are common. In
    response to what it sees as a ``hidden'' and ``severely under
    reported'' issue, the National Steering Committee on Violence Against
    Women (a multiagency government body) began a public outreach campaign
    in December 1999. The campaign aims to facilitate victims' reporting of
    domestic and other types of violence by informing women of the
    resources available and rallying public support for victims. There are
    24 women's shelters, funded in part by the Government. According to the
    Dublin Rape Crisis Center, the overall number of reported rapes
    continued to rise. However, calls to the center registered a slight
    decrease: 7,243 calls were received between July 1999 and June 2000,
    compared with 7,500 calls received over the same period in the previous
    year, probably due to changes in the call system. For the 1999-2000
    period, the center estimated that 28 percent of rape and child sexual
    abuse victims reported the crime to police and that 10 percent of these
    cases resulted in convictions, with 39 percent of cases still pending.
    Recent rape victims and victims raped by a stranger were more likely to
    have reported the rape to police.
        A 1990 law criminalizes rape within marriage, and the 1995 Civil
    Legal Aid Act provides for free legal advice to victims in cases of
    serious sexual assault. In rape cases, the State brings the case
    against the accused, with the complainant (victim) acting as a witness.
    Until 2000, as a witness, the victim was afforded no legal
    representation. The 2000 Sex Offenders Bill provides that ``separate
    legal representation will be provided to complainants in rape and other
    serious sexual assault cases where application is made to adduce
    evidence or to cross-examine the complainant about his or her past
    sexual experience.''
        Discrimination against women in the workplace is unlawful, but
    inequalities persist regarding pay and promotions in both the public
    and the private sectors. Women hold about 43 percent of public sector
    jobs but are underrepresented in senior management positions. A 1999
    government report found that at least 50 percent of state-sponsored
    bodies have no guidelines for dealing with sexual harassment and no
    policy on equal opportunity. The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act,
    the 1977 Employment Equality Act, and the amended 1998 Employment
    Equality Act provide for protection and redress against discrimination
    based on gender and marital status. The Equality Authority monitors the
    implementation of these acts. According to 1998 statistics, women's
    earnings have increased more rapidly than men's since 1985, albeit from
    a lower starting point. The weekly earnings of women in industry still
    averaged only 65 percent of those of men in 1998.
        Women's participation in the work force still is hampered by the
    lack of adequate childcare facilities. To encourage the participation
    of parents, both men and women, in the work force, the Government
    included in its 2000-2006 national development plan in March an equal
    opportunities childcare program, under which approximately $275 million
    (250 million Irish pounds) was allocated to fund measures to improve
    childcare availability and quality.
        The 1994 Maternity Protection Act provides a woman with 14 weeks of
    paid maternity leave and the right to return to her job. A 1998
    Parental Leave Act allows a child's mother and father each to take 14
    weeks of unpaid leave to care for a child under the age of 5. Although
    each parent has a separate entitlement to parental leave, the leave is
    not transferable, i.e., the mother cannot take the father's leave or
    vice versa. Parental leave does not affect a mother's right to
    maternity leave.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and health care. Under the 1991 Child Care Act, education is
    free and compulsory for children from 6 to 15 years of age. The act
    places a statutory duty on government health boards to identify and
    help children who are not receiving adequate care, and it gives the
    police increased powers to remove children from the family when there
    is an immediate and serious risk to their health or welfare. The
    Minister of State (junior minister) for Health has special
    responsibility for children's policy, including monitoring the
    implementation of the Child Care Act by the eight regional health
    boards. The 1987 Status of Children Act provided for equal rights for
    children in all legal proceedings.
        The sexual abuse of children continued to receive significant media
    attention. The Dublin Rape Crisis Center reported that 58 percent of
    calls to its crisis line involved child sexual abuse, and only 13
    percent of the incidents had occurred within 1 year preceding the call.
    The 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act strengthens and updates
    measures to protect children from sexual exploitation, including any
    exchange of information on the Internet that implies a child is
    available for sex.
        People with Disabilities.--The government Commission on the Status
    of People with Disabilities estimated in 1996 that 10 percent of the
    population have a disability. Under the 1998 Employment Equality Act,
    it is unlawful to discriminate against anyone on the basis of
    disability in relation to employment. The 1991 Building Regulations Act
    established minimum criteria to ensure access for people with
    disabilities to all public and private buildings constructed or
    significantly altered after 1992, but enforcement is uneven. A National
    Disability Authority (NDA) began operations in 1999 with a budget of
    $2.7 million (2 million Irish pounds). The NDA is to set disability
    standards, monitor the implementation of these standards, and engage in
    research and the formulation of disability policy. The Authority's new
    strategic plan was awaiting approval by the Government atyear's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 25,000 nomadic
    persons regard themselves as a distinct ethnic group called
    ``Travellers,'' roughly analogous to the Roma of continental Europe.
    The ``travelling'' community has its own history, culture, and
    language. The Travellers' emphasis on self-employment and the extended
    family distinguishes them from the rest of society.
        Travellers regularly are denied access to premises, goods,
    facilities, and services; many restaurants and pubs, for example, will
    not serve them. Despite national school rules that provide that no
    child may be refused admission on account of social position,
    Travellers frequently experience difficulties in enrolling their
    children in school. Sometimes they are segregated into all-Traveller
    classes. According to 1998 government statistics, of 4,978 Traveller
    families, approximately 1,191 live on roadsides or on temporary sites
    without toilets, electricity, or washing facilities. Many Travellers
    are dependent on social welfare for survival and are unable to
    participate in the mainstream economy because of discrimination and a
    lack of education.
        The 1998 Employment Equality Act outlaws job discrimination against
    Travellers. A 1993 task force on the travelling community produced a
    comprehensive report in 1995 on various aspects of Travellers' lives,
    including education, work, accommodation, health, and discrimination. A
    monitoring committee is overseeing implementation of the
    recommendations of the report, some of which have resulted in the
    formation of special committees in the Departments of Education,
    Environment, and Health to examine Traveller difficulties in these
    areas.
        A 1998 law, entitled the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act--
    recommended by the 1995 task force--obliges local elected officials to
    draw up and implement Traveller accommodation plans on a 5-year basis
    and requires Traveller input in the process. In the event of a failure
    to agree on a draft plan, county and city managers are responsible for
    their adoption and implementation. According to traveller groups, the
    act was implemented with mixed results during its first 2 years.
        The growing immigration of foreign workers has been accompanied by
    societal discrimination and racial violence against the newcomers.
    These developments have sparked public debate over the openness of
    society to immigrants and how to address outbreaks of xenophobic
    incidents of violence. Although asylum seekers have the right to work
    if their cases remain pending for over a year, 4 in 10 claimed to have
    experienced racism and discrimination from recruiters and employers
    while looking for work, according to a study commissioned by the Irish
    Refugee Council. Racially motivated incidents occurred frequently,
    involving physical violence, intimidation, and verbal slurs. A British
    citizen visiting Dublin was stabbed and seriously wounded in June while
    defending his black wife and son from attack. A Dublin bus driver was
    convicted and fined under the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act
    in September as a result of a verbal exchange, which included racist
    slurs, with a black passenger. Groups of young people reportedly
    targeted white foreigners as well for verbal harassment and violent
    attacks. Government officials spoke out against racism and xenophobia,
    and in July racism was one of two major topics addressed at a
    government-sponsored NGO forum on human rights. In addition the
    Government initiated a public outreach campaign welcoming immigrants.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The right to join a union is provided
    for by law, as is the right to refrain from joining. About 48 percent
    of workers in the private and public sectors are members of unions.
    Police and military personnel are prohibited from striking, but they
    may form associations to represent themselves in matters of pay,
    working conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely
    exercised in both the public and private sectors. The 1990 Industrial
    Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and union leaders;
    the Government effectively enforces this provision through the
    Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment. A number of strikes
    occurred during the year, including a nurses' strike, a bus drivers'
    strike, a train engineers' strike over wages, and a hauliers' (truck
    drivers) ``go-slow'' over fuel prices. All concluded peacefully, with
    the unions involved achieving some, if not all, of their goals.
        The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) represents 64 unions in
    the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The ICTU is independent
    of the Government and political parties.
        Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and
    affiliate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
    have full freedom to organize and to engage in collective bargaining.
    The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act and the 1977 Employment Equality
    Act make the Equality Authority responsible for the investigation of
    allegations of antiunion discrimination. If the Authority is unable to
    effect resolution, the dispute goes before the Labor Court, which
    consists of one representative each for the employer and the union,
    plus an independent chairperson. The 1977 Unfair Dismissals Act
    provides for various forms of relief in cases where employers are found
    guilty of antiunion discrimination, including the reinstatement of
    workers fired for union activities.
        Most terms and conditions of employment are determined through
    collective bargaining, in the context of a national economic pact
    negotiated every 3 years by the ``social partners,'' i.e., unions,
    employers, farmers, and the Government. The latest version of these
    agreements, the Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness, was signed in
    April.
        The 1990 Industrial Relations Act established the Labor Relations
    Commission, which provides advice and conciliation services in
    industrial disputes. The Commission may refer unresolved disputes to
    the Labor Court, which may recommend terms of settlement and may set up
    joint employer-union committees to regulate conditions of employment
    and minimum wages in a specific trade or industry.
        The export processing zone at Shannon Airport has the same labor
    laws as the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced and bonded
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
    does not occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--By law children are required to attend school through the
    age of 15. Under the terms of the 1997 Protection of Young Persons Act,
    employers may not employ those under the age of 16 in a regular full-
    time job. Employers may hire 14- or 15-year-olds for light work on
    school holidays, as part of an approved work experience or educational
    program, or on a part-time basis during the school year (for children
    over the age of 15 only). The act incorporates international rules on
    the protection of young workers drawn up by the International Labor
    Organization (ILO) and the European Union; it sets rest intervals and
    maximum working hours, prohibits the employment of 18-year-olds for
    late night work, and requires employers to keep specified records for
    workers who are under 18 years of age. Enforcement is reportedly lax,
    but violations appear to be rare. The law prohibits forced and bonded
    child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively
    (see Section 6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor in December.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A new national minimum wage,
    $4.84 (4.40 Irish pounds) per hour, went into effect on April 1. This
    wage alone would not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
    and family. Low-income families continue to be entitled to benefits
    such as subsidized housing and children's allowances.
        The standard workweek is 39 hours. Working hours in the industrial
    sector are limited to 9 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime
    work is limited to 2 hours per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in
    a year. The Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment is
    responsible for enforcing four basic laws dealing with occupational
    safety that provide adequate and comprehensive coverage. No significant
    complaints arose from either labor or management regarding enforcement
    of these laws. Regulations provide that employees who find themselves
    in situations that present a ``serious, imminent and unavoidable risk''
    may leave without the employer being able to take disciplinary action.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Recent legislation criminalizes
    trafficking in persons, which so far is limited and infrequent. The
    1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, criminalized trafficking in
    children for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with penalties of up
    to life imprisonment. The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill passed
    in October was upheld as constitutional but has not yet been
    implemented. It will criminalize the activities of persons trafficking
    in illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. There is no specific
    legislation addressing the trafficking in women for sexual criminal
    activities. According to an NGO, trafficking in women does not receive
    much attention from organizations or the Government.
                                   __________

                                     ITALY

        Italy is a longstanding, multiparty parliamentary democracy.
    Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by
    the president of the Council (the Prime Minister). The Head of State
    (President of the Republic) nominates the Prime Minister after
    consulting with leaders of all political forces in Parliament. The
    current Parliament was elected in free and democratic elections in
    April 1996. The judiciary is independent, but critics complain that
    some judges are politicized.
        The armed forces are under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
    Control over the Carabinieri, a military security force, was
    transferred in March from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of
    Defense; however, the Ministry of Interior retains authority over this
    force in matters of internal security. Four separate police forces
    report to different ministerial or local authorities. Under exceptional
    circumstances, the Government may call on the army to provide security
    in the form of police duty in certain local areas, thereby freeing the
    Carabinieri and local police to focus on other duties. For several
    years, the army supported the police in Sicily and in the province of
    Naples, areas with high levels of organized crime. The army left Naples
    at the end of 1997 and Sicily in 1998 but was redeployed back to both
    locations for a short period in 1999, during which time special actions
    were in progress against organized crime. In September the Government
    sent an augmented force to Naples of 500 police and Carabinieri, some
    of whom wore military-style camouflage battle dress uniforms, to combat
    criminal violence in the city. Amnesty International (AI) reported
    numerous allegations that the police used excessive force against
    individuals, often Roma, refugees, and, increasingly, women, at the
    time of arrest and initial detention.
        Italy has an advanced, industrialized market economy, and the
    standard of living is high. Small and midsized companies employ from 70
    to 80 percent of the work force. Major products include machinery,
    textiles, apparel, transportation equipment, and food and agricultural
    products. The Government owns a substantial number of enterprises in
    finance, communications, industry, transportation, and services, but
    privatization is moving forward at a measured pace.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
    and the law and the judiciary generally provide effective means of
    dealing with instances of individual abuse; however, there were
    problems in some areas. There were isolated reports of police abuse of
    detainees; such accusations are investigated by the judiciary. Prisons
    are overcrowded. The pace of justice is slow, and perpetrators of some
    serious crimes avoid punishment due to trials that exceed the statute
    of limitations. Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem. The
    Government has taken steps to combat violence against women and child
    abuse; however, they remain problems. Societal discrimination against
    women and discrimination and sporadic violence against immigrants and
    other foreigners continue to be problems. Child labor, mainly involving
    immigrant children, persists in the underground economy but is
    investigated actively. Exploitation of clandestine immigrants is
    widespread. Trafficking in women and girls to the country for
    prostitution and forced labor is a growing problem, as is trafficking
    in children.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
    officials.
        On May 20, 1999, Massimo D'Antona, a senior adviser to the Minister
    of Labor, was shot and killed outside his home in Rome. The Red
    Brigades, a terrorist movement, claimed responsibility for the killing.
    A suspect detained by police in Rome in May subsequently was released,
    and the investigation continued atyear's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and cruel or degrading
    punishment; however, there were reports of isolated incidents in which
    police abused detainees. Amnesty International, the U.N. Human Rights
    Commission (UNHRC), the U.N. Committee Against Torture, and the U.N.
    Special Rapporteur on Torture regularly assess the country's judicial
    and prison system. The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Antigone,
    which is composed mainly of lawyers, magistrates, and academics,
    promotes the rights of detainees, works closely with the European
    Commission for Prevention of Torture, and monitors the prison system.
        According to a report issued by AI in June, there are numerous
    allegations of the deliberate use of excessive force against
    individuals detained in connection with common criminal offenses or in
    the course of identity checks. Allegations of mistreatment relate to
    the time of arrest and first 24 hours in custody and concern both
    citizens and foreigners, with an increasing number of women appearing
    as alleged victims. A high proportion of the allegations received by AI
    concern foreign nationals (many of them from Africa), as well as Roma.
    In a May letter to penal authorities, AI expressed concern over suits
    filed the previous month by inmates of the Sassari District Prison, who
    had been subjected to cruel and degrading punishment. In a separate
    communication, AI referred to allegations of mistreatment at newly
    established temporary detention centers for aliens (see Section 2.d.).
        Overcrowded and antiquated prisons continue to be a problem. The
    prison system has a capacity of 35,000 but holds over 53,000 detainees,
    of whom 3,500 were added in 1999 alone. Older facilities tend to lack
    outdoor or exercise space, compounding the difficulties of close
    quarters. Approximately 54 percent of detainees are serving sentences;
    the other 46 percent consist mainly of persons awaiting trial or the
    outcome of an appeal. Nearly one in three pensioners has been jailed
    for a drug violation. One in four is an alien. Of drug users, almost 10
    percent are HIV positive. Over 80 prisoners died while in jail in 1999;
    53 committed suicide, with a reported 920 unsuccessful suicide attempts
    and some 6,500 acts of self-mutilation.
        In the spring these conditions led to protests both by prisoners
    and guards. A 2-day guard strike in Sassari that left inmates without
    food or water led to a prisoner riot in March, which was followed by
    retaliation by prison guards in April. In early May, 82 Sassari guards
    and wardens were arrested in connection with the April abuses. These
    arrests provoked sympathy strikes and demonstrations by prison guards
    across the country, who protested their low pay, long hours, and the
    conditions of tension and risk under which they work. During the same
    period, prisoner protests broke out at several jails and the Parliament
    debated proposals for decriminalizing certain crimes, the shortening of
    sentences, alternative punishments to imprisonment, and the expulsion
    of non-EU nationals who are sentenced to prison terms. The Pope's call
    in June for a Jubilee-Year clemency increased the pressure on
    parliamentarians and raised prisoner expectations; however, proponents
    of such measures could not obtain the necessary twothirds support in
    each chamber. The Government and opposition forces were unable to
    agree, and no action was taken byyear's end.
        The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison
    conditions by parliamentarians, local human rights groups, the media,
    and other organizations.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Detainees are allowed
    prompt and regular access to lawyers of their choosing (although
    occasional lapses in this general rule have been alleged) and to family
    members. If detainees are indigent, the State provides a lawyer. Within
    24 hours of being detained, the examining magistrate must decide
    whether there is enough evidence to proceed to an arrest. The
    investigating judge then has 48 hours in which to confirm the arrest
    and recommend whether the case goes to trial. In exceptional
    circumstances, usually in cases of organized crime figures, where there
    is danger that attorneys may attempt to tamper with evidence, the
    investigating judge may take up to 5 days to interrogate the accused
    before the accused is allowed to contact an attorney. The U.N. Human
    Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body for the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recommended that this 5-day
    period be reduced and that all detainees have access to legal advice
    immediately upon arrest.
        Preventive detention can be imposed only as a last resort, or if
    there is clear and convincing evidence of a serious offense, such as
    crimes involving the Mafia, or those related to drugs, arms, or
    subversion. In these cases, a maximum of 2 years of preliminary
    investigation is permitted. Except in extraordinary situations,
    preventive custody is not permitted for pregnant women, single parents
    of children under 3 years of age, persons over 70 years of age, or
    those who are seriously ill. Preventive custody can be imposed only for
    crimes punishable by a maximum sentence of not less than 4 years.
        Magistrates' interrogations of persons in custody must be recorded
    on audio tape or videotape to be admissible in judicial proceedings.
    Prosecutors are required to include all evidence favorable to the
    accused in requests for preventive detention. The defense may present
    any favorable evidence directly to the court.
        There is no provision for bail, but judges may grant provisional
    liberty to suspects awaiting trial. As a safeguard against unjustified
    detention, panels of judges (liberty tribunals) review cases of persons
    awaiting trial and rule whether continued detention is warranted.
    Persons in detention include not only those awaiting trial, but also
    individuals awaiting the outcome of a first or second appeal (see
    Section 1.e.). The Constitution and the law provide for restitution in
    cases of unjust detention.
        The law prohibits punishment by internal exile or exile abroad.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
        There are three levels of courts. A 1998 law that aimed to
    restructure and expedite the judicial process established that a single
    judge would hear cases at the level of courts of first instance.
    Implementation of the measure's civil provisions began in June 1999,
    while changes in criminal proceedings took force in January. At the
    second level, separate courts hear appeals for civil and penal cases.
    Decisions of the Court of Appeals can be appealed to the highest court,
    the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) in Rome, but only for reasons
    related to correct application of the law, not a case's merit.
        The law provides for trials to be fair and public, and the
    authorities observe these provisions. The law grants defendants the
    presumption of innocence. Defendants have access to an attorney
    sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense and can confront
    witnesses. All evidence held by prosecutors normally is made available
    to defendants and their attorneys. Defendants can appeal verdicts to
    the highest appellate court.
        Both domestic and European institutions criticize the slow pace of
    justice in the country, which is due in part to cumbersome and
    frequently changing procedures, unclear or contradictory legal
    provisions, and an inadequate number of judges. In April the National
    Statistical Institute (ISTAT) reported that the average trial lasts 35
    months; appeal procedures can add another 59 months. The length of
    trials varies by region; those in the north tend to be shorter than
    those in the south. The European Court of Human Rights noted the high
    number of complaints filed against the country in 1999 and the number
    of adverse decisions (44 of 120) that the court rendered. These
    decisions almost always centered on excessive trial delays. In June the
    Council of Europe's (COE) Committee of Ministers reiterated to the COE
    parliamentary assembly that excessive delays in the administration of
    justice constituted ``an important danger, in particular for the
    respect of the rule of law.'' While noting that Italian authorities
    shared these concerns, the ministers observed that the trend in the
    number of new cases referred to the Court had not changed.
        Excessive trial delay has also complicated the outcome of judicial
    processes involving ``clean hands'' investigations of corruption
    launched in 1991. Public prosecutors uncovered numerous instances of
    illegal arrangements between businessmen and political figures,
    including illicit financing of political parties, as well as ties
    between elected officials and organized crime. Over 1,300 persons were
    either convicted and sentenced or accepted plea bargains. Those
    sentenced to prison terms, generally for periods of 3 years, were able
    to benefit from a legal system that allows alternative punishment for
    persons whose sentences do not exceed 4 years. Thus few individuals
    served jail sentences as a result of the trials. The most sensational
    cases involved multiple accusations against two former prime ministers,
    Giulio Andreotti and Silvio Berlusconi. With regard to the latter, two
    cases ended at the appeals level (following lower court convictions)
    when judicial delays and maneuvers caused the trials to exceed the
    statute of limitations. Berlusconi won acquittals in two other appeals
    cases, however, as well as one at a lower court level, and cited these
    outcomes as vindication, signifying that the original charges had been
    an effort by elements in the judiciary to achieve political objectives
    through prosecutorial means. Milan's chief public prosecutor retorted
    that Berlusconi's criticisms were aimed at undermining the legitimacy
    of investigating magistrates. In the case of (now) senatorforlife
    Andreotti, prosecutors relied heavily in two separate trials on
    testimony by turncoat Mafia witnesses (``pentiti''). These trials ended
    with court criticisms of both the prosecution and defendant. The court
    stated that prosecutors failed to produce concrete evidence backing up
    vague and contradictory testimony by the pentiti. Other court
    observations, which asserted that Andreotti had lied at the trial, fell
    short of resolving doubts about his conduct.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law safeguards the privacy of the home, and the
    authorities respect this provision. Searches and electronic monitoring
    may be carried out only under judicial warrant and in carefully defined
    circumstances. Violations are subject to legal sanctions.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and the press, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press.
        However, courts are sensitive to criticism and impose fines for
    ``defamation.'' In May Member of Parliament Alessandra Mussolini was
    sued for $600,000 (1.2 billion lire) by two judges on the highest
    appeals court. Mussolini had criticized as a ``killer sentence,'' a
    court ruling that failed to consider the pregnancy of a rape victim as
    an aggravating factor, warranting a heavier penalty. In July a court
    levied a $27,000 (55 million lire) fine against weekly magazine
    Panorama for a 1997 article that defamed anti-Mafia prosecutors in
    Palermo.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    does not restrict the right of peaceful assembly, including protests
    against government policies, except in cases where national security or
    public safety is at risk. Permits are not required for meetings, but
    organizers of public demonstrations must notify the police in advance.
        Catholic Church authorities strongly opposed gay community plans to
    hold a world pride week in Rome during the first week in July, calling
    it a provocation and an affront to the Church's Jubilee Year. However,
    the event was held, with the cooperation of national and municipal
    authorities.
        While allowing general freedom of association, the Constitution and
    law prohibit clandestine associations, those that pursue political aims
    through force, that incite racial, ethnic or religious discrimination,
    or that advocate fascism. Professional associations organize and
    operate freely.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        Roman Catholicism is not the state religion but it is the dominant
    one, in the sense that most citizens were born and raised under
    Catholic principles, which form part of their culture. Roman Catholic
    religious instruction is offered in public schools as an optional
    subject. Students who do not opt to attend can elect to take an
    alternative course or, in some schools, have a free class period. A
    1929 agreement between the Catholic Church and the Government, which
    was revised in 1984, accords the Church certain privileges. For
    example, the Church can select Catholic religion teachers, whose
    earnings are paid by the State. This privilege has led to charges of
    unconstitutional discrimination.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and the Law provide for
    these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. Citizens
    who leave are ensured the right to return. The Constitution forbids
    deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. Parliament has not
    yet repealed the XIII transitory provision of the 1947 Constitution,
    which forbids male heirs of the former king, Umberto I of Savoy, from
    entering the country. For this reason, in December 1999, royal
    descendant Vittorio Emanuele IV filed a suit in the European Court of
    Human Rights in Strasbourg challenging the validity of this
    constitutional bar. In March the European Parliament voted against
    including a reference to the Savoy case in its human rights report.
        Political asylum is obtained according to the provisions of the
    1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. However, the country still lacks a specific law on political
    asylum; such a law has been pending before Parliament since 1997. The
    Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It provides
    first asylum to refugees fleeing hostilities or natural disasters. Such
    refugees are granted temporary residence permits, which must be renewed
    periodically and do not ensure future permanent residence.
        In 1999 the Ministry of Interior approved 912 asylum requests and
    disapproved some 12,000 others. (In 1998, 7,674 persons applied for
    asylum, of whom 1,045 were found eligible.) Nationals of Yugoslavia,
    Iraq, Turkey, and Iran accounted for over half of the approvals. An
    immigration law passed in February 1998 levies high fines and penalties
    for land, air, and sea carriers that board passengers without
    documentation. There is a huge influx, mainly by sea, of Albanians,
    Serbs, Kurds, North Africans, Chinese, Nigerians, and other West
    Africans, many of whom enter the country intending to transit to other
    member states of the European Union. In April the Government approved a
    migration accord with Albania (similar to previous such accords with
    Tunisia and Morocco) aimed at promoting regular annual emigration of
    5,000 Albanians. More aggressive coastal patrolling helped reduce
    illegal immigrant landings in the south. A total of 16,100 illegal
    immigrants landed in the first 7 months of the year, compared with
    35,200 in the same period in 1999 (due largely to the conflict in
    Kosovo). Some 37,200 such entrants were repatriated over the first 7
    months of the year, compared with 34,800 in 1999.
        Most illegal migrants paid fees to smugglers; some risked death, as
    smugglers unloaded their human cargo at sea to avoid capture by patrol
    boats. Others were forced to engage in illegal activities, were paid
    substandard wages, or forced to work as prostitutes to pay off debts
    incurred for their passage (see section 6.f.).
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons having a
    valid claim to refugee status.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. There are no restrictions on women's participation
    in government and politics; however, few women hold elected office:
    women hold 4 of 24 cabinet positions, 24 of 325 Senate seats, and 69 of
    630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
        In October the Senate gave final approval to a constitutional
    change allowing an estimated 3.9 million Italians abroad to vote, and
    seting aside 12 seats in the 630-seat Chamber of Deputies and 6 in the
    315-seat Senate to represent them. However, the law's implementation
    required administrative action that did not take place byyear's end.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
    responsive to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex (except
    with regard to hazardous work), religion, ethnic background, or
    political opinion, and provides some protection against discrimination
    based on disability, language, or social status. However, societal
    discrimination persists to some degree.
        Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. A 1998 ISTAT
    survey (the first one nationwide) reported that at least 9.4 million
    women between the ages of 14 and 59 had experienced some form of sexual
    violence during their lives. The NGO Telefono Rosa which provides a hot
    line through which abused women can obtain legal, medical, and other
    assistance, reports that nearly half of all complaints it receives
    nationally involve physical violence, much of it at home.
        Legislation to protect women from physical abuse, including by
    family members, was updated and strengthened in 1996. The revised law
    makes the prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women easier
    and shields women who have been objects of attack from publicity. The
    law treats spousal rape in the same manner as any other rape. Law
    enforcement and judicial authorities are not reluctant to bring
    perpetrators of violence against women to justice, but victims
    sometimes do not press charges due to fear, shame, or ignorance of the
    law. Telefono Rosa notes that the entry of more women into the police
    force has contributed greatly to an increased willingness of female
    victims of violence to cooperate with police. Acting on behalf of local
    government administrations, some 60 local women's associations maintain
    and run shelters for battered women.
        In December 1999, the Labor Ministry and major trade union
    confederations agreed on a code of conduct regarding sexual harassment
    in the workplace. The code, which follows a 1991 EU recommendation, is
    to be attached to national sectoral labor contracts as they are
    negotiated. Telefono Rosa reports that previous ad hoc labor contract
    sexual harassment provisions have worked as a deterrent to workplace
    harassment both in the public and private sectors.
        Trafficking in illegal immigrant women and girls for prostitution
    and forced labor is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Women enjoy legal equality with men in marriage, property, and
    inheritance rights. Males and females enjoy equal access and treatment
    with regard to education, health, and other government services. Many
    NGO's actively and effectively promote women's rights. Most are
    affiliated with labor unions or political parties.
        A number of government offices work to ensure women's rights. The
    Ministry for Equal Opportunity is headed by a woman. In addition, there
    is an equal opportunity commission in the office of the Prime Minister.
    The Labor Ministry has a similar commission that focuses on women's
    rights and discrimination in the workplace, as well as equal
    opportunity counselors who deal with this problem at the national,
    regional, and provincial government levels. However, many counselors
    have limited resources with which to work. A decree approved in May
    requires civil service recruiters to explain in writing their motives
    for hiring or promoting a man rather than a woman as a manager. The
    rule was designed to promote women's access to the higher echelons of
    public administration and is to apply in offices where women managers
    number less than a third of the total.
        In February 1999, the European Union directive regulating night
    work for women was incorporated into the law, thus amending the 1977
    law that had prohibited night shifts for women. With some exceptions
    (if pregnant, the mother of a child below 3 years of age, or the mother
    of a disabled person), women now are allowed to work at night. Liberal
    maternity leave, introduced to benefit women, adds to the cost of
    employing them, with the result that employers sometimes find it
    advantageous to hire men instead. A March law on parental leave, which
    grants mothers and fathers an equal right to take leave when a child is
    sick, is aimed at offering equal opportunity without penalizing women
    at work.
        According to research conducted by Eurostat, the statistical office
    of the European Commission, women's salaries are 23.5 percent lower
    than men's for comparable work. They are underrepresented in many
    fields, such as management and the professions. According to a recent
    report based on ISTAT data, women account for 36 percent of the labor
    force, with yearly growth in female employment of 2 percent (compared
    with 0.2 percent for men). The National Council for Economy and Labor
    (CNEL) reported that in 1998, 3 percent of executives in large firms
    were women, a figure that rose to 5 percent in mid-size firms and 8
    percent in small firms. In 1999 women occupied 19.1 percent of public
    offices, 11.3 percent of teaching positions, and 3.8 percent of media
    executive positions. Employed women are more likely to have a high
    school diploma (34.7 percent) than employed men (28.5 percent). The
    comparable figures for a university degree are 13.8 percent for women
    and 9.4 percent for men. Unemployment figures show that women still are
    lagging. In 1999 male unemployment was 9.6 percent, while female
    unemployment was 16.8 percent. Youth unemployment (ages 15 to 24) was
    30.2 percent for men (53.5 in the south) and 39.0 percent for women
    (66.9 in the south).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare. As of academic year 1999-2000, schooling
    became compulsory for children from age 7 to age 18; those unable (or
    unwilling) to follow the academic curriculum are allowed to shift to
    vocational training at age 15. This reform was intended to reverse the
    middle and secondary school dropout rate, which had been high.
        Abuse of children is recognized as a societal problem; an estimated
    90 percent of violence against minors is committed within their own
    families. Social workers counsel abused children and are authorized to
    take action to protect them. The NGO Telefono Azzurro maintains two
    toll-free hot lines for reporting incidents of child abuse. Research
    conducted on behalf of the Government by a private institute estimates
    the number of minors involved in cases of violence (including
    prostitution) to be 10,000 to 12,000. There are 1,880 to 2,500 minors
    who work as street prostitutes, of whom 1,500 to 2,300 were trafficked
    illegal immigrants (predominantly Albanians, other eastern Europeans,
    and some Nigerians), many of whom were forced into prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.). Social Service International (a domestic NGO) assists in
    repatriating unaccompanied immigrant minors.
        Several laws and government programs enhance the protection
    available for minors. In 1996 minors offices staffed by trained police
    (often women) were established in police stations around the country to
    offer emergency help for minors and families in distress, as well as
    counsel in dealing with other government social and judicial entities.
    A 1997 law established an information gathering network to collect data
    on the condition of minors. A 1998 immigration law formalized an office
    in the Ministry of Social Affairs that protects the rights of
    unaccompanied immigrant minors. (In 1997 this office screened and
    authorized entry permits for nearly 48,000 minors and 3,000
    accompanying adults.) In 1998 the Parliament enacted a law to combat
    pedophilia, child pornography, the possession of pornographic material
    involving children, sex tourism involving minors, and trafficking in
    children (also see Section 6.f.). The law established a special police
    unit to monitor and prosecute Internet sites devoted to promoting
    pedophilia.
        People with Disabilities.--In January a new law replaced previous
    legislation that forbade discrimination against disabled persons in
    employment, education, or the provision of state services. The new law
    requires companies having 15 or more employees to hire one or more
    disabled workers: those with 15 to 35 employees must hire 1 disabled
    worker, those with 35 to 50 must hire 2 , and, for larger companies 7
    percent of the work force must consist of the disabled. Companies
    hiring the disabled are granted certain benefits, including lower
    social security contributions, while the cost of worker training is
    borne by the Government. The new law also provides for more severe
    sanctions against violators.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some traditional minorities,
    including French and German speaking Alpine communities in the north
    and a mixture of German and Slovene speakers in the northeast, enjoy
    special autonomous status. The special rights of these areas
    (respectively the Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, and Friuli
    Venezia Giulia) include use of non-Italian languages in government
    offices and public schools in the former two.
        Roma are another traditional minority, but without a specific
    geographic base. Of a national total of 115,000, some 70,000 are
    citizens--most of whom can trace ancestry in the country to the late
    fourteenth century. Most of these Roma live in the center and south, in
    conditions indistinguishable from those of other Italians. Roma in the
    north, whose numbers have swelled with the arrival of 40,000 immigrants
    from the former Yugoslavia, live in more precarious conditions.
    Although many municipalities are building permanent settlements, poor
    housing, limited employment prospects, and inadequate educational
    facilities remain problems. With limited income and job opportunities
    available, some turn to begging or petty crime, generating in turn
    repressive measures by police authorities. Roma communities complain
    that their language does not enjoy the same privileged status as that
    granted to minority languages in the autonomous regions.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
    establish trade unions, join unions, and carry out union activities in
    the workplace. The unions state that they represent between 35 and 40
    percent of the work force. Trade unions are free of government controls
    and have no formal ties with political parties. The right to strike is
    embodied in the Constitution and is exercised frequently. In April
    following a period of multiple land, sea, and air transport sector
    strikes, a new law changed provisions of a 1990 measure that restricted
    strikes affecting essential public services (e.g., transport,
    sanitation, and health). The new law defined minimum service to be
    maintained during a strike as 50 percent of normal, with staffing by at
    least one-third the normal work force. The law established compulsory
    cooling off periods and more severe sanctions for violations. Besides
    transport worker unions, the law also covers lawyers and selfemployed
    taxi drivers. In May a Transport Ministry regulation required all
    national labor contracts involving employment sectors covered by the
    law to adjust contract provisions to the new rules. These changes were
    backed by the three major national trade union confederations, which
    sought to avoid inconvenience to tourists and the traveling public
    alike during the Catholic Church's Jubilee Year.
        Unions associate freely with international trade union
    organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain
    collectively, and these rights are respected in practice. By custom,
    although not by law, national collective bargaining agreements apply to
    all workers, regardless of union affiliation. The law prohibits
    discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. It
    requires employers that have more than 15 employees and who are found
    guilty of antiunion discrimination to reinstate any workers affected.
    In firms with less than 15 workers, an employer must provide the
    grounds for firing a union employee in writing. If a judge deems the
    grounds spurious, he can order the employer to reinstate or compensate
    the worker.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
    generally it does not occur; however, some illegal immigrants and
    children were forced into prostitution (see Section 5), and trafficking
    in illegal immigrant women for prostitution and forced labor, as well
    as trafficking in illegal immigrant children, are problems (see Section
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law forbids the employment of children under age 15
    (with some limited exceptions). There also are specific restrictions on
    employment in hazardous or unhealthful occupations for men under age
    18, and women under age 21. The enforcement of minimum age laws is
    difficult in the extensive underground economy. Estimates of the number
    of child laborers differ, ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 children (the
    most probable figure may be in the area of 50,000). Most of these cases
    involve immigrants, but instances involving Italian children also have
    been reported. Illegal immigrant child laborers from Northern Africa,
    the Philippines, Albania, and especially China have entered in record
    numbers every year since 1989, and the influx from China is rising.
    According to the Carabinieri, an estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese work
    in sweatshop conditions near Florence, with many minor children working
    alongside the rest of their families to produce scarves, purses, and
    imitations of various brand name products. Many of these factories,
    which face threats of infiltration or coercion by Chinese organized
    crime, are equipped with escape tunnels to thwart labor inspections.
    Carabinieri officers who work on child labor developed a videocassette
    program to educate schoolchildren on child labor laws, their rights as
    specially protected workers, and workplace hazards.
        The Government, employers associations, and unions continue their
    tripartite cooperation on child labor. Their periodic consultations,
    begun in 1997, cover such matters as better enforcement of school
    attendance regulations; programs to reduce the number of school
    dropouts; faster assistance for families in financial difficulty;
    further restrictions on exceptions to the minimum wage law; and
    canceling economic or administrative incentives for companies found to
    make use of child labor, whether domestically or abroad. The Prime
    Minister's office provided a toll-free telephone number to report
    incidents of child labor. The footwear and textile industries have
    established a code of conduct that prohibits the use of child labor in
    their international as well as national activities; the code is
    applicable to subcontractors as well. In 1999 a child labor clause was
    attached to the national labor contract in the health sector, whereby
    the parties committed themselves not to use surgical tools produced by
    child labor. The law forbids forced or bonded labor involving children,
    and the Government generally enforces this prohibition effectively;
    however, some illegal immigrant children were forced into prostitution
    (see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and some of them were trafficked (see
    Section 6.f.).
        The Government ratified International Labor Organization (ILO)
    Convention 182 prohibiting the worst forms of child labor following
    completion of parliamentary action in May.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are not set by
    law, but by collective bargaining agreements on a sector by sector
    basis. These specify minimum standards to which individual employment
    contracts must conform. When an employer and a union fail to reach an
    agreement, courts may step in to determine fair wages on the basis of
    practice in comparable activities or engagements, although this rarely
    happens in practice.
        A 1997 law reduced the legal workweek from 48 hours to 40. Most
    collective agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour workweek. The
    average contractual workweek is 39 hours but is actually less in many
    industries. Overtime work may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average
    of 12 hours per week.
        The law sets basic health and safety standards and guidelines for
    compensation for on-the-job injuries. For most practical purposes,
    European Union directives on health and safety also have been
    incorporated into the law. Labor inspectors are from the public health
    service or from the Ministry of Labor. They are few in number, given
    the scope of their responsibilities. Courts impose fines and sometimes
    prison terms for violation of health and safety laws. The Workmen's
    Compensation Institute reports that there were a million accidents in
    1999, involving 1,309 deaths. Accidents occur with the greatest
    frequency in the underground economy, which employs between 3.5 and 5
    million workers. Workers have the right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not address
    specifically trafficking in persons, it can be prosecuted through
    application of provisions of a 1958 law on prostitution and other
    articles of the Penal Code. Trafficking in women and girls for
    prostitution and forced labor is a growing problem.
        Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploitation
    involves vulnerable, illegal immigrants, most of whom come from Nigeria
    and Eastern Europe. The country is also a destination for trafficked
    women and girls. Varying estimates suggest that nearly 20,000 foreign
    women--from Albania, Nigeria, Romania, Moldavia, Ukraine, and other
    countries of Eastern Europe--are involved in prostitution, of whom some
    1,500 (according to the social research institute Parsec) may be
    trafficked forcibly. For some, Italy is only a point of entry, and
    their ultimate destinations are elsewhere in Western or Northern
    Europe. Trafficking in children for sweatshop labor is a particular
    problem in Tuscany's expanding Chinese immigrant community, where
    children are considered to be part of the family ``production unit''
    (see Section 6.d). The Chinese consulate in Florence cooperates with
    Carabinieri in persuading families to enroll their children in school.
        The Ministry of Equal Opportunity leads an intergovernmental
    committee charged with monitoring trafficking and coordinating
    government activity to combat it. Other members include the Ministries
    of Social Affairs, Justice, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, as well as a
    special anti-Mafia prosecutorial unit. Major lay and Catholic NGO's
    concerned with trafficking, among which Parsec and Caritas are the most
    active, cooperate with this body.
        While most prostitution involves women fleeing economic destitution
    in their home countries, those who are trafficked forcibly are often
    unable or reluctant to contact the police for help. A 1998 immigration
    law, for which implementing regulations were completed in November 1999
    and assistance programs established in February, provided temporary
    residence/work permits to such women who seek to escape their
    exploiters. The legislation permits a temporary stay for victimized
    women. During this time, victims are provided with shelter, benefits,
    and services such as counseling and medical assistance, in cooperation
    with NGO's. They also may be permitted to work or study. If the victim
    agrees to cooperate with law enforcement and judicial authorities, the
    residence permit and services are extended for the length of the
    criminal proceedings. In July the Government set up a toll-free
    telephone number to help victims take advantage of this program and in
    its first month of operation received 7,000 calls for help. As a result
    of these and related policies, almost 750 women were able to benefit
    from these programs in their first weeks of operation, and significant
    increases in witness testimony and successful prosecution of
    traffickers were reported. In October the Ministry of the Interior
    hosted an international conference on trafficking in persons to focus
    attention on the issue.
        In August 1998, a law was passed to combat abuses against children,
    including trafficking in children. The NGO, End Child Prostitution,
    Pornography and Trafficking (ECPAT), was a main advocate for this law,
    which criminalizes prostitution or pornography involving minors, even
    if committed abroad. In conjunction with other concerned NGO's, ECPAT
    has worked to ensure that police treat juvenile prostitutes as victims
    of trafficking, not criminals. In May ECPAT and components of the
    tourism industry (tour companies, travel agents, computer reservation
    system personnel, airline companies, airport authorities, and trade
    unions) initiated a voluntary code of conduct designed to impede sex
    tourism.
                                   __________

                                   KAZAKHSTAN

        The Constitution of Kazakhstan concentrates power in the
    presidency. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the dominant political
    figure. The Constitution, adopted in 1995 in a referendum marred by
    irregularities, permits the President to dominate the legislature and
    judiciary, as well as regional and local governments; changes or
    amendments to the Constitution are nearly impossible without the
    President's consent. President Nazarbayev was elected to a new 7-year
    term in a 1999 election that fell far short of international standards.
    Previous presidential elections originally scheduled for 1996 did not
    take place, as President Nazarbayev's term in office was extended in a
    separate 1995 referendum, also marred by irregularities. Parliamentary
    elections held in October 1999 were an improvement on the presidential
    election but still fell short of the country's commitments as a member
    of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
        A law passed in June would allow the President to maintain certain
    policy prerogatives and a seat on the National Security Council after
    he leaves office. The 1995 Constitution limited Parliament's powers
    more than previously, notably by precluding it from appropriating state
    money or lowering taxes without executive branch approval. However,
    Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) have the right to introduce legislation,
    and some bills introduced by M.P.'s have become laws. The judiciary
    remained under the control of the President and the executive branch.
    The lack of an independent judiciary made it difficult to root out
    governmental corruption, which was pervasive, although some corrupt
    officials were removed from office.
        The Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the
    Soviet-era Committee on State Security (KGB)) is responsible for
    national security, intelligence, and counterintelligence. In practice
    it also plays a role in law enforcement. It also oversees the external
    intelligence service, Barlau. The chairman of the KNB reports directly
    to the Prime Minister and President. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
    (MVD) supervises the criminal police, who are poorly paid and widely
    believed to be corrupt. Both the KNB and the MVD police monitored
    government opponents, the opposition press, human rights monitors, and
    some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), who claimed that KNB and
    MVD officials pressured them to limit activities objectionable to the
    Government. The KNB continued efforts to improve its public image by
    focusing on fighting government corruption, religious extremism,
    terrorism, illegal arms exports, and organized crime. Members of the
    security forces committed human rights abuses.
        The country is rich in natural resources, particularly petroleum
    and minerals. The Government has made significant progress toward a
    market-based economy since independence. It has successfully privatized
    small- and medium-sized firms and many large-scale industrial complexes
    and has attracted significant foreign investment, primarily to the
    energy and minerals sectors. The agricultural sector, which represents
    about 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), has been slower to
    reform since the Government has not established a legal basis for
    private land ownership. Official statistics indicate that the long fall
    in real wages after independence stopped in 1997. The average annual
    wage in 1999 was approximately $1,180 (167,560 tenge). The average
    monthly nominal wage in 2000 was $95.14 (13,521 tenge). Real wages grew
    5.3 percent in 2000 over 1999 figures. According to government data, in
    the first 3 quarters of the year approximately 25.5 percent of the
    population had incomes below the ``minimum subsistence level'' of $27
    (3,969 tenge) per month, compared with 34.5 percent whose incomes were
    below the 1999 minimum subsistence level of $24 (3,394 tenge) per
    month.
        Rising oil prices in the second half of 1999 combined with the
    positive effects of an April 1999 decision to allow the currency to
    float helped the country to post GDP growth of 1.7 percent in 1999,
    after a 2.5 percent fall in GDP the previous year. GDP per capita also
    increased slightly to $1066 (127,000 tenge). Inflation, which initially
    spiked after the currency fell following the April 1999 decision to
    float the currency, has been under control and was 9.8 percent in 2000.
    Real GDP grew by 9.5 percent.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. The
    Government severely limits citizens' right to change their government,
    and democratic institutions remain weak. The OSCE concluded that
    presidential elections in January 1999 fell far short of international
    standards, although it saw some improvement in the Parliamentary
    elections held later in the year. The Government barred two opposition
    politicians from competing in the presidential elections on
    administrative grounds and authorities harassed opposition candidates
    during both election campaigns. During the year, government officials
    began a series of conferences on electoral reform with opposition
    leaders and others under the auspices of the OSCE, although the Central
    Elections Commission moved to effect electoral commission changes
    before waiting for the conclusion of the conferences. The legal
    structure, including the Constitution adopted in 1995, does not fully
    safeguard human rights. Members of the security forces committed
    extrajudicial killings as a result of abuse of military conscripts and,
    reportedly, through mistreatment of individuals in custody. President
    Nazarbayev spoke out against police use of torture, and there were a
    number of cases in which the Government pressed criminal charges
    against police accused of mistreating individuals in their custody.
    However, human rights monitors criticized the efforts as inadequate.
    Prison conditions remained harsh. The Government began a process of
    transferring authority over prisons from the MVD to the Justice
    Ministry, a step that human rights monitors had long sought, but the
    effect of this change could not be determined as of year's end. The
    Government on some occasions used arbitrary arrest and detention, and
    prolonged detention is a problem. The judiciary remains under the
    control of the President and the executive branch, and corruption is
    deeply rooted. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
        The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. The
    Government harassed much of the opposition media, and government
    efforts to restrain the independent media continued. Vague laws
    concerning the media, state secrets, libel, and national security
    increased pressure on the media to practice self-censorship. The
    Government introduced draft amendments to the Law on Media in October
    that, if enacted, would constitute a step backward for the independent
    media. However, the Government continued to issue new licenses for
    various types of media and, according to the Government, the number of
    media outlets increased. The Government continued to own some major
    printing and distribution facilities and to enjoy influence over those
    owned privately. Academic freedom is not respected. The Government
    imposes significant restrictions on freedom of assembly. At least two
    organizers of unsanctioned demonstrations were arrested and fined or
    imprisoned. The Government imposes significant restrictions on freedom
    of association, and complicated and cumbersome registration
    requirements hinder organizations and political parties. Some political
    parties increased their organizational activities successfully. The
    Government sometimes harasses those whom it regards as religious
    extremists. Domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
    There was discrimination against women, the disabled, and ethnic
    minorities. The Government discriminated in favor of ethnic Kazakhs.
    The Government limited worker rights; it tried to limit the influence
    of independent trade unions, both directly and through its support for
    state-sponsored unions, and members of independent trade unions were
    harassed. Workers continued to protest chronic nonpayment of wages.
    Child labor persists in agricultural areas. There was evidence of
    trafficking in women and in at least one case customs and border
    officials were under investigation for complicity in trafficking.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated extrajudicial killings.
        Members of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings as
    a result of abuse of military conscripts and, reportedly, through
    mistreatment of individuals in custody.
        In July 28-year-old Kairat Sabdenov, the son of an M.P., died from
    internal injuries that he sustained from a police beating in Kokshetau
    after he had been detained following a car accident. In December police
    charged the policeman who allegedly beat Sabdenov with murder. Five
    policemen were charged with improper performance of their duties and
    one from the Akmola Oblast MVD was relieved of his post for
    investigating the accident scene improperly.
        Ivan Prokopenko died in a detention center in Aktobe on March 1. He
    had been arrested 2 months earlier on suspicion of having stolen $250
    (36,750 tenge) worth of wooden poles. Human rights monitors reported
    that a doctor who examined the body and the boy's parents saw evidence
    of brain trauma, burns, and cuts. The Aktobe city prosecutor found in
    October that Prokopenko had died from head injuries suffered when he
    slipped and fell, hitting his head on the concrete floor. The
    authorities indicated that their investigation had found no other
    injuries and they closed the case.
        In April a man named Bekov died in a hospital from injuries he had
    said he sustained when police in Almaty detained and beat him. An
    official investigation was launched, but no further information was
    available at year's end.
        According to press reports, a criminal case was brought against a
    police sergeant in Makhtaaralsk (Shymkent Oblast) for the 1999 beating
    death of a 24-year-old man, Nurzhan Saparov, who was in custody
    following his arrest for disturbing the peace. At year's end,
    reportedly four police officers were awaiting trial charged with
    responsibility for his death.
        On December 1, a District court fined Lieutenant Colonel
    Zhanteleyev 2 month's wages in the 1998 death of Yalkynzhan Yakupov,
    whose body was found hanging in the Chunjua District police station.
    However, the court dismissed the charges of abuse of power and illegal
    detention against the Colonel. Zhanteleyev was amnestied under the
    December 2000 general amnesty.
        Reports indicate that deaths caused by military hazing persist. The
    Deputy Chief of the General Staff reported 17 cases of death due to
    mistreatment in the first 6 months of 1998. No statistics on the
    incidence of this form of mistreatment have been available since that
    time. However, there are some reports that military personnel engaging
    in hazing have been prosecuted, and the Government has begun a program
    to improve training of military forces on social and legal issues. (See
    Section 1.c.)
        Harsh prison conditions led to the deaths of some persons in
    custody, many from disease (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one must be subject to
    torture, violence or other treatment and punishment that is cruel or
    humiliating to human dignity;'' however, police tortured, beat, and
    otherwise abused detainees, often in order to obtain confessions.
    Government officials acknowledged the seriousness of the problem and
    undertook some efforts to combat it. There were no reports of police
    beating protestors as they have done in earlier years. In a speech to
    law enforcement officials on April 19, President Nazarbayev criticized
    police use of an ``arsenal of torture (that) can surprise the most
    extreme sadists.'' President Nazarbayev referred in his speech to cases
    where law enforcement officials seared one detainee with a hot iron and
    poured cold water over another as he stood naked outside in cold
    weather. He said that the use of such tactics was ``widespread.''
    Prosecutors brought criminal charges against 70 police officers for the
    unlawful use of violence against citizens during the year and
    disciplinary actions were taken against hundreds more. More than 20
    Interior Ministry (MVD) employees reportedly were convicted on such
    charges. Human rights observers believe that these cases cover only a
    small fraction of the incidents of police abuse of detainees, which
    they characterized as routine. Training standards and pay for police
    are very low, and individual law enforcement officials often are
    supervised poorly.
        Some of the instances of mistreatment occur in prisons, and the
    Government formally transferred authority over prisons from the
    Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry in a move intended to reduce
    such abuses. The actual transfer of authority will be implemented over
    a period of 2 years. In March 2000, the MVD opened a training center
    for penitentiary system employees in Pavlodar. Together with the OSCE
    and Prison Reform International (PRI) the Government has undertaken
    training abroad for 15 instructors from this new institute to review
    penal policies, including human rights of prisoners.
        On April 26, three teenagers widely believed to have been tortured
    in detention slit their throats in a Zhanatas courtroom after being
    sentenced to prison terms for fighting with police. One of the 3, 17-
    year-old Kairat Seidakhmetov, died from the self-inflicted injury. The
    Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights (KIBHR) and
    independent television stations charged that police repeatedly tortured
    these 3 boys and the 17 other individuals charged in the same case. One
    reportedly suffered a concussion and two broken arms. Police reportedly
    cut the feet of another and stuck needles under the fingertips of
    detainees under interrogation. One female detainee charged that police
    repeatedly raped her. The detainees, some of whom confessed, reportedly
    had no access to lawyers. Reports of the mistreatment led to
    demonstrations in Zhanatas in February and again in April following
    Seidakhmetov's suicide. The July 4 edition of the official
    Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper reported that the Chief of the Legal
    Bureau of the Presidential Administration visited Zhanatas to
    investigate the allegations of police torture. The head of the city
    police force was fired and other MVD employees reprimanded, but
    criminal charges brought against the policemen involved in the case
    were later dropped.
        Almaty authorities brought criminal charges against two policemen
    for beating opposition activist Aleksei Martynov in custody in December
    1999. A trial began in August but had not been concluded at year's end.
    No arrests were made in connection with the assault against opposition
    activist Andrei Grishin in November 1999, shortly after he published a
    newspaper article critical of a new museum dedicated to President
    Nazarbayev. Law enforcement authorities claimed that Grishin never
    filed a complaint. Grishin said he filed a complaint with the Almaty
    city prosecutor's office in December 1999 and was subsequently
    interviewed by an Interior Ministry official in January. The
    authorities took no actions against police who allegedly beat 70
    members of an Islamic group from Taraz whom they detained in July 1999.
    The authorities took no actions against police accused of beating a
    group of female hunger strikers in Aralsk in April 1999. Police closed
    investigations, without making arrests, into 1998 assaults against
    opposition activist Amirzhan Kosanov and a Kazakhstani employee of a
    foreign embassy. The latter assisted diplomats in making contacts with
    opposition and human rights figures. Police detained a suspect in
    connection with the 1998 assault against opposition activist Yelena
    Nikitenko but did not bring charges, according to official sources,
    because Nikitenko, who moved away from Kazakhstan, was unavailable to
    testify.
        Six unidentified men assaulted Sergey Bondartsev, a youth organizer
    for the opposition Republican National People's Party (RNPK), in Almaty
    on April 9. Bondartsev suffered serious internal injuries that required
    two operations. At the time of the assault, Bondartsev was organizing a
    demonstration in support of opposition figure Madel Ismailov, who had
    earlier in the week been sentenced to a jail term (see Section l.d.).
    The demonstration did not take place. Law enforcement authorities made
    no arrests in the case, claiming that Bondartsev had never filed a
    complaint. Bondartsev asserted that he filed a complaint and that
    police from the Medeu district of Almaty interviewed him about the
    assault while he was in the hospital. The attack clearly appeared to
    have been premeditated.
        MVD and other government officials participated in a September
    conference in Almaty on combating police use of torture that was
    organized by the OSCE, the KIBHR and the Government of Germany. They
    acknowledged that police use of torture and other abuses were
    widespread.
        Army personnel continued to subject conscripts to brutal hazing,
    including beatings and verbal abuse. No statistics were available on
    the extent of the problem. The Army launched a campaign to punish
    violators of a new antihazing policy in 1998, and the Government has
    taken action occasionally against officials charged with abuses, often
    levying administrative sanctions such as fines for those found guilty.
    A military court in Zhambul region sentenced a sergeant to death by
    firing squad in December. The court ruled the man was guilty of killing
    two persons and of desertion to avoid responsibility for beating up a
    soldier under him.
        Prison conditions remained harsh and sometimes life-threatening due
    to inadequate resources. In 1998, 1,290 inmates, more than 1 percent of
    all prisoners, died from disease, mostly tuberculosis, aggravated by
    harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions and inadequate
    medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). In 2000, 498 prisoners died in
    custody. More than 200 of these deaths were due to illness, mostly
    tuberculosis. Another 170 gravely ill prisoners died shortly after
    release from prison. Government officials indicate that improved
    treatment undertaken in cooperation with the World Health Organization
    (WHO) has reduced the deaths from tuberculosis. In 1999, 384 prisoners
    died of the disease in custody and 409 were released on humanitarian
    grounds due to illness and died at home (see Section 1.c.).
        Overcrowding, inadequate prison diet, and a lack of medical
    supplies and personnel contributed to the spread of tuberculosis and
    other major diseases. Government officials reported that l0,000, or 12
    percent of all, prisoners suffered from tuberculosis. Government
    representatives assert that the incidence of tuberculosis is declining,
    in part as a result of cooperation with WHO to improve conditions for
    both prisoners and the civilian population. These figures do not differ
    significantly from figures provided by human rights observers. The
    Government's senior prisons official acknowledged that the number of
    prisoners with AIDS is growing. The number infected reportedly grew
    from 256 in 1999 to 263 in 2000, although the authorities maintain that
    the prisoners were infected before being incarcerated. Experts believe,
    however, that many cases go unreported. Prison guards, who are poorly
    paid, steal food and medicines intended for prisoners. Violent crime
    among prisoners is common. Prisoners protested poor living conditions
    in prison through mass self-mutilation. According to the official
    press, 44 prisoners in Arkalyk reportedly cut open their abdomens on
    July 13. Some 57 prisoners in an Almaty Juvenile Detention Center cut
    open their abdomens and wrists on August 11. None of the prisoners
    died. The deputy head of the Arkalyk prison and the head and deputy
    head of the Almaty juvenile facility were fired as a result of these
    incidents.
        According to the Interior Ministry, during the year there were
    approximately 80,000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold 60,000. A
    1999 amnesty reduced the total prison population by about 15,000, but
    the population nearly returned to pre-amnesty levels within a year. The
    chief national prosecutor deplored overcrowded conditions in an Astana
    detention center he visited in March, noting that cells of 200 square
    feet contained 20 detainees each. He reportedly ordered the release of
    several of the detainees.
        The Government followed up its 1999 general prison amnesty in
    December with a law to provide amnesty in the first 6 months of 2001
    for 18,200 inmates, shorten the terms of an additional 2,500, and
    terminate approximately 3,000 pending criminal cases. The 1999 amnesty
    resulted in the release of over 15,000 prisoners. Prisoners are allowed
    one 4-hour visit every 3 months, but additional visits may be granted
    in emergency situations. Some prisoners are eligible for 3-day visits
    with close relatives once every 6 months. Juveniles are kept in
    separate facilities.
        Although there is no known statutory requirement, human rights
    monitors and journalists wishing to visit prisons must receive
    authorization from the MVD. Although the Government sometimes created
    obstacles for those who requested access to prisons, the KIBHR reported
    that its representatives sometimes, but not always, received
    authorization. The KIBHR visited men's, women's, and juveniles' prisons
    during the year. Prison experts from the OSCE visited prisons in Akmola
    and East Kazakhstan oblasts. Two international NGO's, the Dutch
    Interchurch Aid and Penal Reform International (PRI), accompanied KIBHR
    on prison visits in Pavlodar during the year. PRI also visited prisons
    for juveniles and women in Almaty. On September 6, the Minister of
    Justice announced that the Government had decided to transfer
    responsibility for prisons from the Ministry of the Interior to the
    Ministry of Justice. Human rights monitors had called for the change,
    which President Nazarbayev endorsed in a September 1 address to
    Parliament.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government used
    minor infractions of the law frequently related to unsanctioned
    assembly to arrest and detain government opponents (see also Section
    2.b.). On April 6, authorities in Almaty arrested, tried, and convicted
    labor movement leader Madel Ismailov for organizing an unsanctioned
    demonstration and for contempt of court. The Court sentenced Ismailov
    to 15 days in jail. Ismailov served a 1-year prison sentence in 1998-99
    for publicly calling the President a ``scoundrel.'' The demonstration
    in question, a regular monthly pensioners' protest over living
    conditions, took place on January 30. The contempt of court charge
    stemmed from Ismailov's refusal to answer a summons to appear in court
    on April 5. Ismailov went to the courthouse on April 5 but refused to
    enter when, he and press reports alleged, the authorities refused to
    allow his lawyer or supporters to enter with him.
        A court in Almaty on April 24 sentenced two members of the
    opposition Republican National People's Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK),
    Pyotr Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev, to 3+ years in prison for a
    weapons offense. An appeals court upheld the convictions. Afanasenko
    and Ibrayev, former KNB officers, served as bodyguards to RNPK leader
    Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Although it appeared there could be a factual
    basis for the charges against Afanasenko and Ibrayev, the OSCE and
    international and domestic human rights observers charged that
    government prosecution and sentencing of them was politically
    motivated. Some human rights observers also criticized the authorities
    for incarcerating Afanasenko and Ibrayev in ordinary prisons rather
    than in special institutions created to protect former members of the
    security forces from possible retribution by other prisoners.
        A member of the RNPK, film director Rashid Nugmanov, a long-time
    resident of France, was detained by customs and tax officials upon
    arriving on an international flight to Almaty on May 24 and summoned to
    appear before the tax police on May 25. His brother, Murat, an Almaty
    businessman, was also summoned by tax authorities on May 24. Details of
    the investigation were unclear. RNPK and human rights observers alleged
    that the investigation of Rashid Nugmanov was motivated politically.
        The chief of the Almaty branch of the RNPK, Alikhan Ramazanov, and
    an activist of the party, Nurlan Bakirkhanov, were brought to trial in
    Medeu District Court on June 7 for organizing an unsanctioned mass
    gathering on May 31. Both were fined $205 (29,000 tenge).
        The law sanctions pretrial detention. According to the
    Constitution, police may hold a detainee for 72 hours before bringing
    charges. The Criminal Code allows continued detention for much longer
    periods with the approval of the General Prosecutor of the Republic.
    Lower-ranking prosecutors may approve interim extensions of detention.
    In practice police routinely hold detainees, with the sanction of a
    prosecutor, for weeks or even months without bringing charges, and
    prolonged detention is a serious problem. The General Prosecutor's
    office was reported in the official Russian-language newspaper
    Kazakhstanskaya Pravda as stating that law enforcement authorities held
    more than 7,000 persons in custody longer than legally allowed in 1998.
    Government officials have subsequently denied this, but no other
    statistics concerning the scale of this practice have been made
    available. Additionally, short (3hour) and long (72-hour) detentions
    for ``suspicion'' are used widely.
        A bail system exists, but government officials indicate that only
    47 persons were released on bail in the first 8 months of the year (no
    figure for total detainees was available, but 28 persons were released
    on bail out of the 26,598 persons detained in the first 8 months of
    1999).
        According to the Constitution, every person detained, arrested, or
    accused of committing a crime has the right to the assistance of a
    defense lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation.
    This right generally is respected in practice. Human rights monitors
    allege that law enforcement officials have pressured prisoners to use
    certain attorneys or to refuse the assistance of an attorney, sometimes
    resulting in a delay before the accused sees a lawyer. Detainees also
    may appeal the legality of detention or arrest to the prosecutor before
    trial, but in practice most persons refrain from making an appeal due
    to fear of reprisal for doing so. If the defendant cannot afford an
    attorney, the Constitution provides that the State must provide one
    free of charge. Human rights organizations allege that many prisoners
    are unaware of this provision of the law. The Government's reluctance
    to provide a lawyer is partly attributed to a shortage of funds to pay
    court-appointed lawyers to which defendants are entitled. Some lawyers
    are reluctant to defend clients unpopular with the Government.
        Almaty authorities detained well-known criminal defense lawyer
    Anatoly Ginzburg for 3 days in July after Ginzburg agreed to defend a
    man charged in a high-profile murder case. Ginzburg remained under
    investigation for allegedly stealing documents from the MVD in 1994,
    although no charges were filed. According to one press report, Ginzburg
    had been warned by ``the authorities'' not to defend Anatoly Adamov,
    the former deputy director of the national arms export agency,
    Kazspetsexport, in connection with the April 15 murder of
    Kazspetsexport director Talgat Ibrayev. Ginzburg and human rights
    monitors alleged that the authorities detained Ginzburg in order to
    dissuade him from defending Adamov. In July the Union of Lawyers of
    Kazakhstan sent an open letter to the heads of the national law
    enforcement agencies to protest the Ginzburg case and a ``universal''
    pattern of abuse of the rights of criminal defense lawyers. The letter
    charged that law enforcement authorities infringe on the rights of
    lawyers to meet confidentially, and as often as necessary, with
    defendants; deny lawyers access to government buildings, including the
    courts; search the lawyers' belongings when allowing them to enter; and
    surreptitiously record lawyers' conversations with clients. In response
    to the letter, the Coordinating Council of the National Law Enforcement
    Agencies, under the chairmanship of the Prosecutor General, passed a
    resolution in August calling on the agencies to abide by the law and,
    where necessary, to draft new statutes guaranteeing that lawyers can
    effectively do their work. However, a representative of the local
    lawyer's association maintained that the Government had not passed any
    statutes facilitating lawyers' work by year's end.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
    not use it.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Government interference and
    pressure compromised the court system's independence throughout the
    year--a situation based largely on legislative, administrative and
    Constitutional arrangements that in practice subjugate the judiciary to
    the executive branch of government. A presidential decree signed in
    September sought to lessen executive branch control of the judiciary by
    moving responsibility for the courts' administrative support from the
    justice ministry to the Supreme Court, though its ultimate impact
    remained uncertain.
        There are three levels in the court system: Local; oblast
    (provincial); and the Supreme Court. According to the Constitution, the
    President proposes to the upper house of Parliament (the Senate)
    nominees for the Supreme Court. (Nominees are recommended by the
    Supreme Judicial Council, members of which include the chairperson of
    the Constitutional Council, the chairperson of the Supreme Court, the
    Prosecutor General, the Minister of Justice, Senators, judges, and
    other persons appointed by the President.) The President appoints
    oblast judges (nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council) and local
    level judges from a list presented by the Ministry of Justice. The list
    is based on recommendations from the Qualification Collegium of
    Justice, an institution made up of deputies from the lower house of
    Parliament (the Majilis), judges, public prosecutors, legal experts,
    and Ministry of Justice officials. Under a change introduced in
    December, the President appoints the collegium chairman.
        According to legislation passed in December 1996, judges are
    appointed for life, although in practice this means until mandatory
    retirement at age 65. Under a 1995 presidential decree on the courts
    and the status of judges, the President can remove judges, except
    members of the Supreme Court or chairmen of judicial collegia, upon
    recommendation of the Minister of Justice. (The Minister's
    recommendations must in turn be based on findings by either the Supreme
    Judicial Council or Qualification Collegium of Justice that the judge
    failed to, or was no longer capable of, performing his duties.) The
    President can request, based on recommendations from the Supreme
    Judicial Council, that the Senate remove members of the Supreme Court
    or chairmen of judicial collegia.
        The 1995 Constitution abolished the Constitutional Court and
    established a Constitutional Council. The Council rules on election and
    referendum challenges, interprets the Constitution, and determines the
    constitutionality of laws adopted by Parliament. The President directly
    appoints three of its seven members, including the chairman, and has
    the right of veto over Council decisions. The Council can overturn a
    presidential veto if at least two-thirds, or five, of its members vote
    to do so. At least one presidential appointee must therefore vote to
    overturn the President's veto in order for the Council to overrule the
    President. Citizens do not have the right to appeal to the Council
    about the constitutionality of government actions, although they were
    allowed to make such appeals to the former Constitutional Court. Under
    the Constitution, only the President, chairperson of the Senate,
    chairperson of the Majilis, Prime Minister, one-fifth of the members of
    Parliament or a court of law may appeal to the Constitutional Council.
    The Constitution states that a court shall appeal to the Council if it
    ``finds that a law or other regulatory legal act subject to application
    undermined the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen.''
        Local courts try less serious crimes, such as petty theft and
    vandalism. Oblast courts handle more serious crimes, such as murder,
    grand theft, and organized criminal activities. The oblast courts also
    may handle cases in rural areas where no local courts are organized.
    Judgments of the local courts may be appealed to the oblast-level
    courts, while those of the oblast courts may be appealed to the Supreme
    Court. There is also a military court.
        The Constitution and the law establish the necessary procedures for
    a fair trial. Trials are public, with the exception of instances in
    which an open hearing could result in state secrets being divulged, or
    when the private life or personal family concerns of a citizen must be
    protected.
        According to the Constitution, defendants have the right to be
    present, the right to counsel (at public expense if needed), and the
    right to be heard in court and call witnesses for the defense.
    Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, are protected from self-
    incrimination, and have the right to appeal a decision to a higher
    court. Legal proceedings are to be conducted in the state language,
    Kazakh, although Russian also may be used officially in the courts.
    Proceedings also may be held in the language of the majority of the
    population in a particular area. In most cases, these rights are
    respected. However, cases involving government opponents frequently are
    closed. Labor movement leader Madel Ismailov alleged that the Medeu
    district court in Almaty refused to allow the public to observe an
    administrative trial against him in April (see Section 1.d.).
        The problem of corruption is evident at every stage and level of
    the judicial process. Lawyers and human rights monitors alleged that
    judges, prosecutors or other officials solicit bribes in exchange for
    favorable rulings in nearly all criminal cases. Judges are poorly paid.
    According to the Minister of Interior, in 2000 the Government dismissed
    613 MVD officers and initiated criminal proceedings against 105 for
    corruption related crimes. The Prosecutor General stated that 9 senior
    prosecutors, 8 district prosecutors and 3 department heads had been
    fired for similar offenses. The Ministries of Justice and Internal
    Affairs have received additional funding to increase salaries for law
    enforcement agents and judges. Human rights monitors allege that these
    government actions only scratch the surface of the problem. According
    to press and other accounts, judicial positions can be purchased.
        There were no political prisoners. However, opposition and human
    rights activists charged that the prosecution and imprisonment of Pyotr
    Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev was politically motivated (see Section
    1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Despite Constitutional protections, the Government
    infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that citizens have
    the right to ``confidentiality of personal deposits and savings,
    correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other
    messages.'' However, limitation of this right is allowed ``in cases and
    according to procedures directly established by law.'' The KNB and
    Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the concurrence of the general
    prosecutor's office, can and do interfere with citizens' privacy and
    correspondence. The Criminal Procedure Code allows the police and KNB
    to conduct searches or monitor telephone calls and mail without a
    warrant if they inform the General Prosecutor's office within 24 hours
    of such activity. Some government opponents complained that the
    Government monitored their movements and telephone calls.
        A central, state-run billing center for telecommunications services
    opened during the year. Few companies complied with government
    requirements to route their services through the center; those that did
    comply routed service only for the city of Almaty through the center.
    The Government presented the creation of the center as an attempt to
    ensure that all telecommunications traffic was being taxed properly.
    NGO's, opposition figures, and human rights monitors expressed concern
    that the Government would use the center to enhance its ability to
    monitor telecommunications and control the availability of information
    on the Internet. Government officials denied that this was their
    intent. As of year's end there was no effort to systematically block
    access to web sites. However, clients of the two largest Internet
    providers, Kazakhtelecom and Nursat, were blocked from direct access to
    the opposition Evrasia website from September 15 to October 15. They
    still could access the site through proxy servers. Users of other
    Internet services could access the site without difficulty.
        A 1999 decree that would have required telecommunications companies
    to conform their equipment to KNB standards was repealed on May 22.
    Human rights monitors and many potentially affected companies had
    sharply criticized the decree.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1999 press
    and media law provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however,
    the Government restricted these freedoms in practice. The Government
    harassed independent and opposition media, and as a consequence many
    journalists practiced self-censorship.
        The media law reaffirms the Constitutional provision for free
    speech and prohibits censorship; however, the Government takes
    advantage of the law's vague language effectively to restrict media
    freedom. For example the law prohibits the mass media from
    ``undermining state security'' or advocating ``class, social, race,
    national, or religious superiority'' or ``a cult of cruelty and
    violence.'' Under the law, owners, editors, distributors, and
    journalists can be held responsible for violations. The law also
    requires all media to register with the Government, but it does not set
    forth an appeals process, other than through the courts, if
    registration is denied. A vaguely written 1998 law on national security
    similarly restrains media freedom. It gives the Prosecutor General the
    authority to suspend the activity of news media that undermine national
    security. A 1999 state secrets law established a list of government
    secrets the release of which is proscribed in the Criminal Code. Much
    of the information on the expansive list was vaguely defined and
    thereby likely to inspire media self-censorship. The law defines, for
    example, certain foreign policy information as secret if ``disclosure
    of this information might lead to diplomatic complications for one of
    the parties.'' The list of state secrets enumerated in the law also
    included all information about the health and private life of the
    President and his family. Also defined as state secrets was basic
    economic information such as the volumes and scientific characteristics
    of national mineral reserves and the amount of government debt owed to
    foreign creditors.
        In an April 19 speech to law enforcement officials, the President
    called for the verification of mass media compliance with the media and
    national security laws and how the media are financed. The President
    sharply criticized much of the national mass media, including the
    Khabar state television channel, which is operated by his eldest
    daughter. He accused Khabar of tendentious reporting; he accused other
    unnamed media outlets of ``inciting national strife, insulting the
    dignity of the people, coming out against the Constitutional system
    (and) disparaging their country.'' Consistent with public assurances on
    April 24 by the Minister of Culture, Information, and Social Accord
    that the President's speech did not presage a crackdown on the media,
    government policy toward the media did not appear to change after the
    President's speech. However, human rights monitors charged that the
    tone of the President's speech reinforced a climate of media self-
    censorship and law enforcement harassment of the media. Nonetheless,
    new licenses for media of various forms continued to be issued and,
    according to the Government, the number of media outlets in the country
    increased.
        In October the Government introduced draft amendments to the media
    law that would limit foreign media rebroadcasters to per cent of a
    station's total air time, hold media outlets responsible for the
    accuracy of foreign media they rebroadcast, and force websites to
    register as media outlets. Journalists and NGO's charged that the draft
    law would infringe freedom of speech.
        The Government continued to be in a strong position to influence
    most printing and distribution facilities and to subsidize periodicals,
    including many that supposedly were independent. Although publications
    expressing views independent of the Government continued to publish,
    the Government took measures to punish publications that reported
    certain undesirable stories and harassed two publications that were
    affiliated with one of the opposition parties, measures taken with the
    evident intention of intimidating certain media critics. These actions
    and the resulting widespread belief that the Government was cracking
    down on independent media effectively resulted in widespread media
    self-censorship. In January a court in Ust-Kamenogorsk ordered the
    local HBC-Press newspaper to suspend publication for 3 months. The
    court found, and an appeals court subsequently upheld, that the
    newspaper had violated the media law by publishing an article calling
    for the overthrow of the country's constitutional system. The article
    in question contained a public appeal from the leader of a Russian
    nationalist group arrested in November 1999 for plotting to overthrow
    the local government in Ust-Kamenogorsk. The newspaper had received a
    copy of the appeal at a news conference attended by other local media.
    The editor of HBC-Press asserted that representatives of the KNB at the
    press conference did not warn journalists not to publish the press
    release. HBC-Press went out of business without resuming publication
    after the court-ordered suspension.
        The key subject considered ``off limits'' by journalists was
    personal criticism of the President and his family. Most newspapers did
    not present the story, widely reported in the western press, about
    alleged American and Swiss investigations into possible illicit
    payments by a foreign businessman to President Nazarbayev and two
    former Prime Ministers. However, The Globe, a small-circulation
    Russian-English bilingual newspaper based in Almaty, dedicated most of
    one edition to the subject. Law enforcement authorities visited the
    newspaper's office on the day the issue appeared, July 6, to summon its
    publisher for questioning. The visit appeared to be in response to the
    content of the July 6 edition, although government officials
    characterized the visit as a routine tax inspection. The Globe stopped
    printing for a month after refusing, its management claimed, to agree
    to a request from its government-owned publishing house to refrain from
    including such controversial material. About 1 month after resuming
    publication, the newspaper announced that the publishing house would no
    longer print the newspaper following inclusion of an article critical
    of the Prime Minster. However, the newspaper continued to publish, and
    no charges were brought against the publisher, who remained abroad.
        The Government took steps that inhibited the publication and
    distribution of newspapers affiliated with the opposition. The tax
    police temporarily seized newspapers during investigations of various
    printing houses; they were later returned. Government actions appeared
    to focus in particular on two newspapers associated with RNPK, the
    party of former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Twenty-First
    Century (XXI VEK) and SolDat. Both newspapers had difficulty finding
    printing houses willing to publish them, resulting in several missed
    editions. Twenty-First Century finally purchased its own small printing
    machine but on December 27 unknown individuals allegedly broke into
    their offices and short-circuited the machine. Customs officials seized
    a run of Soldat newspaper when the editors tried to bring it across the
    border from Russia. These papers were also later returned. SolDat also
    attempted to print in the Kyrgiz Republic twice during the year, but
    both runs were confiscated by customs at the border. However, both
    newspapers continued to appear during the year.
        The KNB reportedly was investigating SolDat and its editor in
    chief, Yermurat Bapi, in connection with a complaint that the newspaper
    insulted the honor and dignity of the President, an offense proscribed
    in the Criminal Code. The complaint arose from two articles in the
    newspaper's June 22 edition that reported corruption allegations
    against the President. The articles were purportedly reprints from
    Western publications.
        In June a government-run publishing house refused to continue
    printing SolDat. The Ministry of Agriculture publishing house had been
    printing the newspaper for 8 months. The chief of the publishing house
    told journalists that he acted because the newspaper's editors failed
    to meet unspecified contractual obligations. The management of SolDat
    denied the charge. After SolDat subsequently began publishing in
    Russia, its management claimed that customs officials at a border
    crossing point near Semipalatinsk seized an entire print run of the
    newspaper on July 5. Editor in chief Bapi, who was transporting the
    newspapers, said that customs officials justified the action because
    Bapi misstated the number of newspaper bundles he was transporting.
    SolDat management publicly charged that officials seized the newspaper
    because it contained articles critical of President Nazarbayev on the
    occasion of his 60th birthday. Twenty-First Century continued to have
    difficulty finding printing houses willing to publish it, though it
    managed to circulate with inferior print quality. On April 27, the tax
    police in Almaty seized an entire print run of the newspaper at a
    publishing house because of alleged tax violations by the printer.
    Government authorities said that the seizure was directed at the
    printer, not the newspaper.
        The independent newspaper Nachnyem's Ponedelnika, which specializes
    in investigative articles about government corruption, continued to
    face a number of defamation lawsuits, many from government officials.
    After finding in favor of a defamation suit brought by the association
    of judges, a court in Almaty ordered the seizure of the newspaper's
    assets, along with the personal assets of its founder and executive
    director, on May 24. Police confiscated the newspaper's print run,
    financial records, office equipment, and furniture, on the next day. In
    June a judge in Almaty fined Nachnyem's Ponedelnika $350,000 (50
    million tenge) for infringing on the name of another newspaper. The
    fine was reduced to $2,000 (290,000 tenge) by an appeals court in July.
    Management of Nachnyem's Ponedelnika alleged that these and other
    lawsuits against it were politically motivated and that prosecutors,
    the tax police, and the mayor of Almaty were harassing the newspaper.
    Government officials denied they were conducting a campaign against the
    newspaper, and maintained that reckless allegations in the newspaper
    were responsible for the spate of civil law suits against it.
        Government's influence over media outlets is extensive. According
    to government statistics, there were 1,258 mass media and information
    agencies in the country as of September 1, 76 percent of them privately
    owned. However the Government runs the newspapers that appear most
    frequently, five times a week, a number of privately owned media are
    believed to be controlled by members of the President's family, and
    many of those which are nominally independent, particularly Kazakh-
    language print media, receive government subsidies. There are a number
    of newspapers that are produced by government ministries, for example,
    Kazakhstan Science, which is published by the Ministry of Science. Each
    major population center has at least one independent weekly newspaper.
    There are 11 major independent newspapers in Almaty.
        The Government controls nearly all broadcast transmission
    facilities. There are 45 independent television and radio stations (17
    television stations, 15 radio stations, and 13 combined television and
    radio stations). Of these, 11 are in Almaty. There are only two
    government-owned, combined radio and television companies; however,
    they represent five channels and are the only stations that can
    broadcast nationwide. Regional governments own several frequencies;
    however, independent broadcasters have arranged with local
    administrations to use the majority of these. An organization of
    electronic media, the Association of Independent Electronic Media of
    Central Asia (ANESMI), exists, but it is divided and weak.
        On March 31, the independent Almaty television channel 31 fired
    Tatiana Deltsova, the chief editor of its nightly news program, under
    what the station president publicly alleged was a government threat to
    close the station. The reported cause of Deltsova's dismissal was an
    article that she presented March 30 about vandals' attacks earlier that
    day on the homes of three leading Government opponents (see Section
    2.b.). Government officials reportedly had expressed their
    dissatisfaction previously with Deltsova's coverage of the opposition.
    At year's end, Deltsova was hosting a new news program on the
    television company TAN, an independent television station.
        There were no reports, as there were in 1998, that the Government
    threatened not to renew broadcast licenses of outoffavor independent
    stations. There were also no frequency auctions; many members of the
    independent media and human rights monitors believed that the
    Government used the auctions in the past to harass and even eliminate
    independent media.
        During the campaign for the January 1999 presidential election,
    many members of the independent media reported Government pressure not
    to cover opposition candidates. Media coverage of the campaign for the
    October 1999 parliamentary elections was extensive and featured all
    candidates. A nationally televised 2 + hour live debate on Khabar state
    television featured representatives of the nine registered parties that
    were participating in the party-list section of the vote. Despite these
    improvements over the presidential election, independent media around
    the country reported official pressure to give the majority of their
    parliamentary election coverage to the propresidential Otan party. They
    also reported that government authorities told them to limit coverage
    of, and to focus on negative news about, the RNPK and Azamat opposition
    parties, as well as the Orleu (``Progress'') opposition movement. Some
    television editors claimed that they were told categorically not to
    cover certain opposition candidates. An RNPK candidate, Twenty-First
    Century newspaper editor Bigeldy Gabdullin, charged, correctly, that
    his free broadcast was not shown in his home constituency of Talgar.
        The Constitution provides for the protection of the dignity of the
    President, and the law against insulting the President and other
    officials remained on the books. The 1999 media law did not control, as
    did the earlier media law, advertising in the mass media. One law
    restricts alcohol and tobacco advertising on television. The 1999 media
    law prohibited violence and all ``pornography'' from television
    broadcasts.
        Academic freedom is circumscribed. As is the case for journalists,
    academics cannot violate certain taboos, such as criticizing the
    President and his family. During the presidential election campaign of
    1999, there were widespread credible reports that university and school
    administrators coerced faculty, students, and the parents of
    schoolchildren to sign nominating petitions for the reelection campaign
    of President Nazarbayev. Administrators reportedly pressured faculty to
    join the propresidential Otan party formed later in 1999. According to
    credible reports, authorities in Karaganda pressured the administration
    of the private Bolashak University to cancel a scheduled April 11
    lecture by a leading critic of the Government, political scientist
    Nurbulat Masanov. An MVD officer was reportedly fired in April for
    allowing Masanov to deliver a lecture at the MVD senior officers
    school. Masanov was unemployed since faculty at the state Al-Farabi
    University in Almaty voted in 1998 not to renew his contract, allegedly
    over his political views. Unknown vandals attacked Masanov's apartment,
    as well as those of two other opposition activists, in March (see
    Section 2.b.). Course topics and content generally are subject to
    approval by university administrations. There were reports that
    university students in private as well as state universities sometimes
    had to pay bribes for admission and good grades.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for peaceful assembly; however, the Government and the law
    impose significant restrictions. The 1998 law on national security
    defined as a threat to national security ``unsanctioned gatherings,
    public meetings, marches, demonstrations, illegal picketing, and
    strikes'' that upset social and political stability.
        Under the law, organizations must apply to the local authorities
    for a permit to hold a demonstration or public meeting at least 10 days
    in advance, or the activity is considered illegal. In some cases, local
    officials routinely issued necessary permits. However, opposition and
    human rights monitors complained that complicated procedures and the
    10-day notification period made it difficult for all groups to organize
    public meetings and demonstrations. They reported that local
    authorities, especially those outside the largest city, Almaty, turned
    down most applications for demonstrations in central locations.
    Officials in Almaty authorized a March 31 demonstration in the center
    of the city by members of the opposition RNPK, although party members
    alleged that the authorities were complicit in allowing students from
    Interior Ministry and olympic-games training schools to disrupt the
    event.
        In the early morning hours of the day preceding the demonstration,
    unknown persons vandalized the Almaty apartments of RNPK activists
    Nurbulat Masanov and Amirzhan Kosanov as well as of another well-known
    opposition figure, Seidakhmet Kuttykadam of the Orleu movement. The
    vandals cemented or jammed shut the apartment doors, cut electrical and
    telephone lines, painted threatening graffiti, and hurled a rock
    through a window into a bedroom where Kosanov's infant daughter was
    asleep. The three activists publicly charged that government agents
    working through the KNB were responsible for the crimes. Government
    officials denied the charge and suggested that the victims might have
    orchestrated the incidents to attract sympathy, a charge the activists
    denied. During the week following the incident, Kosanov received a
    series of messages threatening him and his family. Law enforcement
    investigations into the incidents were closed without arrests. On March
    31, the President of Almaty's independent Television-Radio Channel 31
    acting under what he said was government pressure, fired the station's
    news editor for including a report about the vandalism incidents on the
    nightly news (see Section 2.a.).
        There were numerous peaceful, unsanctioned demonstrations by
    workers and pensioners protesting difficult economic conditions and the
    nonpayment of wages. For the most part, law enforcement authorities did
    not interfere in the demonstrations or take action against the
    individuals who participated; however, there were some exceptions. In
    March a court in Astana sentenced a labor union leader to 24 hours in
    jail for organizing an unsanctioned demonstration by striking
    construction workers (see Section 6.a.). The authorities arrested well-
    known government opponent Madel Ismailov (see Section 1.d.), who took
    part in the longstanding monthly pensioners' demonstrations in Almaty;
    other participants were not arrested. On April 20, the city court of
    Ust-Kamenogorsk suspended the activities of the local chapter of the
    Pokoleniye pensioners' movement for 3 months, charging that the group
    systematically carried out unsanctioned demonstrations. On December 13,
    the Bostandyk district court of Almaty found Sakhib Zhanabayeva guilty
    of organizing an unsanctioned mass gathering and sentenced her to 5
    days in jail. Zhanabayeva, an activist of the Kazakhstan Workers
    Movement, had taken part in a protest by pensioners on November 30.
        The chief of the Almaty branch of the RNPK, Alikhan Ramazanov, and
    an activist of the party, Nurlan Bakirkhanov, were brought to trial in
    Medeu District Court on June 7 for organizing an unsanctioned mass
    gathering on May 31. Both were fined $205 (29,000 tenge).
        The RNPK claimed that it was denied access to hotels and other
    venues in Almaty in May and June. Allegedly the Government had told
    hotels and other venues in Almaty not to provide their premises for
    meetings of political parties or movements.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government and the law impose significant restrictions on this right.
    Organizations that conduct public activities, hold public meetings,
    participate in conferences, or have bank accounts must be registered
    with the Government. ``Membership organizations,'' such as churches or
    political parties, must register in each of the 14 provinces where they
    have active members, whereas ``nonmembership organizations,'' such as
    NGOs, only register at the national level. Registration on the local
    level requires a minimum of 10 members and on the national level, a
    minimum of 10 members in at least 7 of the 14 oblasts. In addition a
    registration fee of $135 (19,845 tenge) is required, and most
    organizations must hire lawyers or other consultants to expidite their
    registrations through the bureaucracy. This increases the registration
    cost by approximately $200 (29,400 tenge). Some groups consider these
    costs to be a deterrent to registration.
        The Constitution prohibits political parties established on a
    religious basis. The Government has refused to register ethnically
    based political parties on the grounds that their activities could
    spark ethnic violence; however, the small Kazakh ethnic nationalist
    ``Alash'' Party was registered for the 1999 parliamentary elections.
    The Constitution bans ``public associations"--including political
    parties--whose ``goals or actions are directed at a violent change of
    the Constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the republic,
    undermining of the security of the state (and), fanning of social,
    racial, national, religious, class, and tribal enmity.'' All of the
    major religious and ethnic groups have independently functioning
    cultural centers.
        To participate in elections, a political party must register with
    the Government. The Government registered 3 new parties in addition to
    the 10 registered to participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections.
    At least three parties registered in 1999 were widely viewed as
    opponents of President Nazarbayev. Under current law, a party must
    submit a list of at least 3,000 members from a minimum of 9 oblasts.
    (The cities of Almaty and Astana count as oblast-equivalents in
    addition to the 14 oblasts for this purpose.) The list must provide
    personal information about members, including date and place of birth,
    address, and place of employment. For many citizens, the submission of
    such personal data to the Government is reminiscent of the tactics of
    the former Soviet KGB and inhibits them from joining parties. Under the
    law, members of unregistered parties may run for elected office as
    individuals but not as party members. The party affiliation of
    candidates does not appear on ballots for candidates in single-mandate
    parliamentary constituencies. Since the 1999 elections, 10 members of
    the lower house of Parliament (Majilis) are elected on the basis of
    proportional, party-list voting. Two registered opposition parties,
    Azamat and the RNPK, increased their organizational activities. They
    participated in training seminars, were active in public political
    debates, and held press conferences.
        The Minister of Internal Affairs rescinded in October a directive
    that MVD claimed gave law enforcement officers the right to attend any
    meetings of political parties and NGO's. This claim, to which human
    rights monitors and opposition party leaders had strongly objected, had
    been upheld by the Supreme Court in July. Authorities had first
    asserted this claim when they brought charges against Bigeldy
    Gabdullin, a leading figure in the opposition RNPK, for obstructing the
    work of a state organ. The charges arose from a December 1999 incident
    in which Gabdullin insisted that a senior MVD officer leave a meeting
    of RNPK officials at the RNPK office in Almaty. An Almaty court
    convicted Gabdullin on January 25 and fined him $35 (5,000 tenge). The
    conviction was upheld on appeal. The judge in the case said she based
    her decision on the presidential decree on the organization and conduct
    of peaceful meetings, rallies, pickets, and demonstrations, which
    authorizes law enforcement agents to attend certain public gatherings.
    However, Gabdullin's lawyer stressed that article 11 of the decree
    explicitly exempts indoor meetings of public associations, such as
    political parties, that are held in accordance with law and the group's
    charter.
        The Constitution prohibits foreign political parties and foreign
    trade unions from operating. In addition the Constitution prohibits the
    financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal
    entities and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the various denominations worship largely without
    government interference; however, the Government sometimes harasses
    Islamic and Christian groups whose members it regards as religious
    extremists. The Constitution defines the country as a ``secular''
    state. The constitution also requires foreign religious associations to
    carry out their activities, including the appointment of the heads of
    religious associations, ``in coordination with appropriate state
    institutions.'' In general the Government does not interfere with the
    appointment of religious leaders or other activities of foreign
    religious associations, although foreign missionaries have encountered
    some visa problems.
        Religious organizations, including churches, must register with the
    Ministry of Justice in order to receive legal status. Without
    registration, religious organizations cannot buy or rent real property,
    hire employees, obtain visas for foreign missionaries, or engage in any
    other legal transactions. Although religious organizations, unlike
    other nongovernmental organizations, are entitled by law to carry out
    their activities without government registration, in practice many
    local officials insisted that they register and in a few instances,
    disrupted services by unregistered groups. Registration requires an
    application submitted by at least 10 persons and is usually a quick and
    simple process. Some religious groups out of favor with the Government
    have encountered difficulties registering in certain jurisdictions.
    These groups include Jehovah's Witnesses and some Korean Protestant
    groups, as well as Muslim groups independent of the Mufti (the national
    leader of Islam). Foreign missionaries require state accreditation.
    Witnesses reported continued difficulties with registration in
    Pavlodar, Osakarovka and Kzyl-Orda in 2000. One group of Jehovah's
    Witnesses in Petropavlovsk has attempted to register five times. They
    received four rejections and still have no answer to their latest,
    September 9, application. One human rights monitor asserted that the
    Government typically claims that religious groups' charters do not meet
    the requirements of the law. For example, Kazakhstani law does not
    allow religious groups to engage in educating children without
    education ministry approval, and many religions include education in
    their charters.
        A 1999 law on education forbids the activities of educational
    institutions, including religious schools, that have not been
    registered by the Ministry of Education. Although no religious schools
    are known to be registered, the Government apparently took no action
    against religious schools over registration pending full implementation
    of the law. On December 19, First Deputy Minister of Education Erlan
    Aryn sent a letter to all regional education departments rescinding an
    earlier ban on visits to schools by religious figures, humanitarian and
    other aid from religious organizations, and the rental of facilities to
    religious groups.
        Government officials frequently expressed concerns about the
    potential spread of religious extremism from Afghanistan and other
    states. Despite concerns about regional security threats from groups
    claiming a religious basis, the Government did not impose new legal
    restrictions on religious freedom. Draft restrictive amendments to the
    law on religion, withdrawn by the government in March 1999, were not
    reintroduced. However, the country's highest law enforcement officials
    called for toughening the religion law. The Procurator General of the
    Republic and the Interior Minister both called for prohibiting the
    activities of unregistered religious organizations. In February the
    Interior Minister publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the
    presence of conservative Muslims in the country and criticized a local
    official for attending a stadium meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses. The
    KNB has characterized the fight against ``religious extremism'' as a
    top priority of the internal intelligence service. The official
    Russian-language newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, and the official
    television station, Khabar, present as objective news allegations that
    unregistered religious groups present a threat to national security and
    social cohesion.
        The Ministry of Justice has requested that Jehovah's Witnesses
    amend their charter to eliminate education as a religious activity.
    However there were no reports that the Government shut down religious
    schools. Information on the number of such schools, if any, operating
    in Kazakhstan, was not available.
        In September an education ministry official announced that the
    Foreign Ministry would ``recall'' all Kazakhstani students studying in
    religious institutions outside Kazakhstan, a step considered by some
    observers to be aimed primarily at preventing young Muslims from being
    radicalized by militant Islamic education abroad. The official said
    that the measure was intended to protect the country against religious
    extremism. It was unclear how the Government would implement the
    policy. The Government announced that several students studying in
    Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey would return voluntarily by year's end.
        On June 26, the Third Congress of Muslims in Kazakhstan voted to
    appoint Absattar Derbisaliyev as the new mufti (spiritual chief) of the
    national Muslim organization. Senior government officials, including
    reportedly the Chief of the Presidential Administration and the
    Minister of Culture, Information, and Public Accord, took part in the
    Congress. Some Muslims alleged that the government officials engineered
    Derbisaliyev's appointment and the resignation of his predecessor.
    Derbisaliyev publicly denied that government officials present at the
    Congress influenced the votes of congress participants, arguing that
    they were not there when the voting was conducted.
        Some local officials continued to maintain, contrary to law, that
    unregistered religious organizations could not conduct religious
    activities. Local KNB officials disrupted meetings in private homes of
    unregistered groups of Jehovah's Witnesses in Pavlodar, Osakarovka and
    Kyzl-Orda. In March the city prosecutor's office in Astana, the
    national capital, issued a written warning to a group of schismatic
    Baptists for not being registered. Earlier in the month, the head of
    the local Astana office of the Ministry of Culture, Information, and
    Social Accord visited the leader of the schismatic Baptists to
    recommend that the church alter its charter prohibition against seeking
    government registration and apply for registration. In September a
    Baptist congregation in Astrakhanka was ordered to close by the
    district court until it complied with registration requirements.
    Earlier, the pastor had been fined $10 (1,500 tenge) for failing to
    register the church. In September KNB official confiscated Bibles and
    other literature from a prayer group in Kyzl-Orda and had not by year's
    end returned the documents despite the Prosecutor's order to do so. Law
    enforcement authorities in Akmola Oblast, the province that includes
    Astana, conducted regular inspections of religious organizations in
    order, they asserted, to prevent the development of religious extremism
    and to ensure that religious groups pay taxes.
        Representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses alleged incidents of
    harassment by a number of local governments. They claimed that city
    officials in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent sometimes blocked the group
    from renting stadiums or other large public or private sites for
    religious meetings. In other cities, officials allowed the church to
    rent facilities for such gatherings. Church representatives alleged in
    March that the director of one facility in Almaty told them that city
    officials had given instructions not to rent space to Jehovah's
    Witnesses. A city official denied the allegation. Church
    representatives also alleged that the Prosecutor's Office in Kostenai
    requested information from the church about its clergymen,
    organizational structure, and schools, and that in April documents of
    Jehovah's Witnesses congregations in Taraz and Abay were inspected. The
    church faced difficulties registering communities of church members in
    Petropavlovsk, where registration has been denied several times, and
    Aktau, although it ultimately was registered in Aktau. On June 7, local
    KNB and Interior Ministry officers, accompanied by local government
    officials, raided a prayer house belonging to a registered community of
    Jehovah's Witnesses in the village of Derbesek (South Kazakhstan
    Oblast). The officers confiscated religious literature and church
    correspondence. Church representatives complained to district and
    oblast KNB officials that the raid was illegal because the officers did
    not have a prosecutor's warrant. In response the director of the KNB
    department for South Kazakhstan Oblast wrote a letter confirming that
    no evidence of ``illegal missionary activity'' was discovered and that
    the local KNB officers who participated in the raid had been ordered to
    return the seized literature and correspondence, which they did at the
    end of June.
        On occasion the authorities took action against groups engaged in
    proselytizing. In December, two female Jehovah's Witnesses were
    arrested and detained for one day for proselytizing in Talgar. The
    police confiscated their documents but returned them after three days.
    No charges were filed. On December 15, two Krishna Consciousness
    devotees were detained in Aktobe for selling Krishna books on the
    street. Police confiscated 20 books, but later released the women
    without charges. However, one Krishna leader reported that in most
    oblasts officials leave their followers alone. In July in Akshoki, near
    the Chinese border, members of a Baptist church reported that local KNB
    officials, police and clergy incited a crowd to threaten a group
    preaching Christianity and burn Christian literature. One member was
    severely beaten by a group of eight men who demanded he convert to
    Islam. Government officials declined to comment on this incident.
        Foreign missionary activity is authorized under law, but only when
    missionaries are accredited by the State. In practice many missionaries
    operate without accreditation. Although legally entitled to register
    religious organizations, foreign missionaries generally find that to be
    registered they had to list a majority of local citizens among the 10
    founders of the religious organization. Some foreign missionaries,
    whose presence is unwelcome to some Muslim and Orthodox citizens, have
    complained of occasional harassment by junior government officials. In
    particular evangelical Protestants working in schools, hospitals, and
    other social service institutions have alleged government hostility
    toward their efforts to proselytize. Jehovah's Witnesses reported
    difficulties obtaining visas for foreign missionaries to visit
    Kazakhstan. Other missionaries are harassed by local officials
    regularly. On June 7, immigration officials at Almaty airport refused
    to admit an American missionary. The missionary, who held a valid visa,
    alleged that airport authorities did not give an explanation for his
    exclusion, saying only that the reasons were secret. The missionary
    suggested that his exclusion might have been related to problems that
    he had experienced 6 months earlier with customs officials in Russia,
    where he had performed religious work. He subsequently was denied a
    visa to return to Russia. Government officials subsequently confirmed
    the refusal to grant entry to the missionary and indicated that his
    name matched one on an immigration lookout list that had been
    circulated to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
        Other foreign missionaries, unwelcome to some Muslim and Orthodox
    citizens, have complained of occasional harassment by low-level
    government officials. In particular evangelical Protestants working in
    schools, hospitals, and other social service institutions have alleged
    government hostility toward their efforts to proselytize. Kazakhstan's
    small Jewish population continued to revive. Following the foundation
    of the Jewish Congress of Kazakhstan in December 1999, seven new
    synagogues opened during the year.
        The authorities took no actions against police who allegedly beat
    70 members of an Islamic group from Taraz who were detained and
    ultimately released in 1999. The Government invited the national
    leaders of the two largest religions, Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, to
    participate jointly in state events. Leaders of other faiths
    participated in some events, especially in Almaty. In December 1999,
    during a visit to the United States, the President presented to the
    Lubavitcher community documents relating to the father of the late
    Lubavitcher rabbi, Menachem Schneerson. Joint appearances by the
    Islamic mufti and the Orthodox archbishop, often in the presence of the
    President, were intended to promote religious and ethnic harmony. Some
    members of other faiths, including Muslims not affiliated with the
    national Muslim organization headed by the mufti, criticized the
    Government's inclusion of the mufti and archbishop in state events as
    official favoritism and a violation of the Constitutional separation of
    church and state. Many also believe that the distinction government
    officials sometimes make between ``traditional'' and ``nontraditional''
    religions violated the fundamental standard of equality among
    religions.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    to emigrate and the right of repatriation; both are respected in
    practice. The Law on National Security prohibits persons who had access
    to state secrets through their work from taking up permanent residence
    abroad for 5 years after leaving government service. Citizens have the
    right to change their citizenship, but are not permitted to hold dual
    citizenship.
        According to the Constitution, everyone who is legally present in
    the country has the right to move freely on its territory and freely
    choose a place of residence except in cases stipulated by law. This
    provision formally abolished the ``propiska'' system of residence
    permits, a holdover from the Soviet era, which ended in 1991, and
    replaced it with a system of registration. However, in practice
    citizens still are required to register in order to prove legal
    residence and obtain city services. Registration in most of the country
    generally was routine, but it was difficult to register in Almaty due
    to its relative affluence and local officials' fears of overcrowding.
    The Government can refuse to register a citizen, just as it did under
    the propiska system, in order to limit the number of persons who can
    move to a certain city or area.
        There were no further reports of government efforts to restrict the
    movement of foreigners around the country. There were no further
    reports of foreigners being detained for entering restricted areas that
    were not clearly marked. Likewise, there were no further reports by
    foreigners that they were denied access or required to pay exorbitant
    entry fees to ostensibly free national parks. There were no reports
    that the authorities refused to approve the assignment of foreign aid
    workers to towns considered ``sensitive,'' as had been the case in
    earlier years. Internal visas are no longer required for foreigners
    traveling outside Almaty.
        An exit visa is required for citizens who wish to travel abroad.
    Although refusals are rare in general, some opposition political
    figures encountered difficulties obtaining exit visas. The deputy
    chairman of the RNPK, Gaziz Aldamzharov, did not receive an exit visa
    for a trip he planned in February. He reported that immigration
    authorities told him that the visa could not be issued because of an
    unspecified criminal investigation against him. He ultimately received
    a visa after the dates of his intended travel. There have been reports
    of some officials demanding bribes for exit visas. It is usually
    necessary to meet a number of bureaucratic requirements before the exit
    visa is issued. A permanent exit visa is much more difficult to obtain.
    It requires criminal checks, documents from every creditor stating that
    the applicant has no outstanding debts and letters from any close
    relatives with a claim to support from intending emigrants giving their
    concurrence to the exit visa. In October the President and then-
    Minister of Internal Affairs announced their intention to eliminate the
    exit visa requirement for temporary visits or permanent residence
    abroad, but no action had been taken by year's end.
        Foreigners must have exit visas, although they receive them
    routinely as part of their entry visa. Foreigners who overstay their
    original visas, or who did not receive exit visas as part of their
    original visas, must get exit visas from the immigration authorities
    before leaving. Foreign visitors are required to register, depending on
    their circumstances, either with the immigration officials who admit
    them at the airport or with the local office of visas and registration
    (OVIR). Many foreigners complained that the process was
    bureaucratically cumbersome. Foreigners are no longer required to
    register in every city they visit. One registration with OVIR is
    sufficient for travel throughout the country. Immigration authorities
    occasionally refused to allow foreigners without proof of registration
    to leave the country.
        Authorities used the 1999 Law on State Secrets to justify
    confiscating the passport of Amirzhan Kosanov, an official of the
    opposition RNPK, as he tried to fly to the United Kingdom on November
    25 (see Section 3). Kosanov, who had traveled abroad during the 3 years
    between his departure from government service and full implementation
    of the state secrets law, said that he had a valid exit visa and U.K.
    entry visa for the November trip. Almaty migration police in October
    had tried to seize Kosanov's passport. The Government alleged that
    Kosanov had access to state secrets when he served as press secretary
    to former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, the leader of the RNPK;
    that Kosanov had refused to sign a standard non-disclosure agreement
    and follow other simple procedures prescribed by the law; and that
    other former officials with knowledge of sensitive information had been
    allowed to travel after complying with the procedures. The Government
    is not known to have used the Law on State Secrets to block the foreign
    travel of any other former officials since the law's passage in 1999.
        The Government accords special treatment to ethnic Kazakhs and
    their families who fled during Stalin's era and wish to return. Kazakhs
    in this category are entitled, in principle, to citizenship and many
    other privileges. Anyone else, including ethnic Kazakhs who are not
    considered refugees from the Stalin era, such as the descendants of
    Kazakhs who moved to Mongolia during the previous century, must apply
    for permission to return. However, it is the stated policy of the
    Government to encourage and assist all ethnic Kazakhs living outside
    the country to return, if they wish.
        The Government usually cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. In 1999 the Government ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the
    Government did not pass implementing legislation for the Refugee
    Convention by year's end. The absence of implementing legislation left
    unclear many aspects of the status of refugees, such as whether they
    have a right to work.
        Following the passage of a 1997 migration law and the creation of
    the Agency for Migration and Demography, the Government began in 1998
    to register asylum seekers and to determine their status in
    consultation with the UNHCR. The Government in most cases allowed UNHCR
    access to detained foreigners. Ethnic Kazakh migrants are automatically
    eligible for citizenship, although the Government has granted
    citizenship to only about 10 percent of the 191,000 Kazakh migrants.
    Migrants from other CIS countries are not considered to be refugees as
    they may travel and settle freely in any CIS country. The Government
    has not allowed refugees without passports to register and has
    restricted registration largely to refugees from Afghanistan. All non-
    CIS citizens are considered to be intending immigrants. However, in
    practice the Government is tolerant in its treatment of local refugee
    populations. Only the President can grant political asylum; he is known
    to have done so only once since independence in 1991.
        The Agency for Migration integrates the UNHCR and a local NGO,
    Kazakhstan Refugee Legal Support, into the process of reviewing refugee
    claims. However, the limited resources of the agency impeded the
    processing of many cases. Asylum claims were processed only in Almaty,
    which is as far as 2,000 miles from other major Kazakhstani cities. The
    Agency for Migration and the courts took a restrictive approach to many
    asylum claims, apparently out of a desire to limit the number of
    refugees. The Government's desire to control the size of the refugee
    population appeared to be motivated by the country's difficult economic
    situation and national security concerns stemming from the national
    origins of many asylum seekers. The UNHCR estimated that there were
    approximately 18,000 refugees in the country (at least 10,000 Chechens
    from Russia and about 5,000 persons from Tajikistan, 2,500 from
    Afghanistan, and 500 from other countries). There was a large influx of
    Chechens fleeing the conflict with the central authorities in Russia.
    Consistent with the Minsk Convention on Migration within the CIS, the
    Government did not formally recognize the Chechens as refugees.
    However, the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR and Chechen
    organizations, did grant indefinite legal resident status to Chechens
    until they could return home to safe conditions. By September the
    Government registered 1,211 asylum seekers and accorded refugee status
    to about two-thirds of them. The Government continues to give priority
    to the return of ethnic Kazakhs in order to increase the percentage of
    Kazakhs in the overall population and to offset the large-scale
    emigration of ethnic Russians and Germans. Since independence
    approximately 190,000 ethnic Kazakhs, mostly from other CIS countries,
    Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Turkey, China, and Saudi Arabia have
    immigrated. The Government struggled to find resources for integration
    programs for these immigrants, some of whom lived in squalid settings.
    The problem of integrating the Kazakh migrants was compounded by the
    inability of about 90 percent of them to obtain Kazakhstani
    citizenship, to which theoretically they are entitled by law. Without
    citizenship, the migrants do not have clear rights to own property,
    open businesses, or conduct other legal transactions.
        Agreements between Kazakhstan and Russia that established broad
    legal rights for the citizens of one country living on the territory of
    the other and provided for expeditious naturalization for citizens of
    one country who moved to the other entered into force in 1999.
        Kazakhstan and China agreed in December 1999 not to tolerate the
    presence of ethnic separatists from one country on the territory of the
    other. Human rights monitors were concerned about the impact of this
    agreement on Uyghurs from China present in Kazakhstan. The Government
    did not consider any asylum claims from Uyghurs; it was unclear whether
    any Uyghurs applied. In general the Government was tolerant toward the
    Chinese Uyghur population. There were no known cases of the Government
    returning Uyghurs to China since February 1999, when the Government
    returned three Uyghurs. The Chinese authorities had accused the three
    of murdering a policeman; Amnesty International reported evidence that
    at least one was wanted for ``separatist'' activities. Some reports
    indicate that the three men were subsequently executed upon return to
    China, but this information has not been confirmed.
        There were no reports that the Government forcibly repatriated
    refugees in the period covered by this report to any country where they
    feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for a democratic government; however, in
    practice the Government severely limited the right of citizens to
    change their government. The Constitution concentrates power in the
    presidency, granting the President considerable control over the
    legislature, judiciary, and local government. Modifying or amending the
    Constitution is nearly impossible without the consent of the president.
    President Nazarbayev was elected to a 7-year term in a 1999 election
    that fell far short of international standards. He extended his
    previous term of office via a deeply flawed 1995 referendum without a
    contested presidential election (which, according to the Constitution
    then in force, should have been held in 1996).
        The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the
    Cabinet. His appointment of the Prime Minister, but not of cabinet
    members, is subject to parliamentary consent. He has the power to
    dismiss Parliament. If Parliament does not act within 30 days on bills
    the President designates as urgent, the President can issue the bills
    as decrees with the force of law. He appoints judges, senior court
    officials, and all regional governors. He directly appointed the
    chairman and members of the Central Elections Commission (CEC) who
    oversaw the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections in
    1999. In accordance with the Constitution, the lower house of
    Parliament (Majilis) confirmed the CEC chairman and members nominated
    by the President in May.
        President Nazarbayev won his current term in office in a 1999
    election held nearly 2 years earlier than previously scheduled. The
    previous October, the President and the Parliament passed in 1 day,
    without any prior public notice, a series of 19 constitutional
    amendments that enabled them 1 day later to call the early presidential
    election. Among other changes, the constitutional amendments extended
    the presidential term of office from 5 to 7 years and removed the 65-
    year age limit on government service. (President Nazarbayev would be 65
    year of age before the end of his current 7-year presidential term.)
    The Constitutional amendments also extended the terms of members of
    Parliament from 4 to 5 years for the lower house (Majilis) and from 4
    to 6 years for the Senate. Government opponents and international
    observers criticized the short-notice call of early elections because
    it did not leave enough time for the government to implement promised
    electoral reforms and for intending candidates to organize effective
    campaigns.
        The Government imposed onerous requirements on candidates seeking
    to qualify for the presidential ballot. Candidates were required to
    submit petitions with approximately 170,000 signatures collected in
    equal proportions from at least 11 of the country's 16 regions (the 14
    oblasts plus the cities of Almaty and Astana). They also were required
    to pass a Kazakh-language test and to make a nonrefundable payment of
    1,000 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately $30,000), although
    an equal sum was then provided to each registered candidate for
    campaign expenses. Although three candidates, in addition to President
    Nazarbayev, qualified for the ballot, two of them, then-Senator Engels
    Gabassov and then-Customs Committee chairman Gani Kasymov, were known
    as supporters of the President and widely believed to be running at
    government behest.
        In October 1998, less than 1 week after the early presidential
    election was called, the Government resorted to a provision of the
    presidential decree on elections, passed in May 1998, that prohibited
    persons convicted of administrative offenses from running for public
    office within a year of their conviction. A district court in Almaty
    summoned on less than 24 hours' notice 5 leading government opponents--
    former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, former Social Democratic
    party leader Dos Kushim, Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement leader Irina
    Savostina, Azamat movement co-chairman Petr Svoik, and Tabigat
    ecological movement leader Mels Yeleusizov--to face charges of
    participating in the October 1998 meeting of an unregistered
    organization called For Fair Elections. The court convicted all five.
    Despite the judgment against him, Kazhegeldin, the most widely known
    opposition figure, applied for registration as a candidate in the
    presidential election. The presidentially appointed CEC disqualified
    his candidacy under the provision of the presidential decree on
    elections that then served as the election law. The Supreme Court
    upheld the disqualification. The CEC also used the election law
    provision to disqualify the presidential candidacy of Amantai Asylbek,
    leader of the Attan antinuclear testing movement, because of a 3-day
    jail sentence that he received in February 1998 for participating in an
    unsanctioned demonstration.
        The Government harassed President Nazarbayev's opponents throughout
    the presidential election campaign. According to credible reports,
    government agents repeatedly pressured managers of conference
    facilities to deny access at the last moment to government opponents
    who had arranged to use the facilities for meetings and press
    conferences. When opposition meetings and press conferences did take
    place, electricity at the facilities often was interrupted. Government
    attempts to disrupt opposition meetings appeared to have extended
    beyond national borders when the management of a Moscow hotel withdrew
    permission at the last moment for a December 1998 opposition congress.
    Communist Party leader Serykbolsyn Abdildin, the only candidate from
    the ranks of the preelection opposition who qualified for the
    presidential ballot, publicly complained that local officials loyal to
    the President impeded his attempts to hold campaign rallies and
    meetings. As recently as November, authorities used the State Secrets
    Law to confiscate the passport of RPNK official Amirzhan Kosanov as he
    tried to travel to the United Kingdom (see Section 2.d.).
        Assaults on two of Kazhegeldin's advisers appeared to have been
    politically motivated and, government critics charged, sanctioned by
    the Government. In addition, Kazhegeldin claimed that two gunshots were
    fired at him on the eve of the press conference at which he announced
    his presidential candidacy. Unknown assailants beat one of his public
    relations advisers, Yelena Nikitenko (see Section 1.c.) and beat his
    press spokesman, Amirzhan Kosanov. Several days before the attack,
    officials of the al-Farabi National University in Almaty forced
    Nikitenko to resign from the faculty because of her political
    activities. Government officials alleged that the Kazhegeldin campaign
    staged or invented all three attacks. Following the announcement of
    Kazhegeldin's candidacy, the then first deputy chairman of the KNB held
    an unprecedented press conference at which he made admittedly
    unsubstantiated allegations of financial malfeasance against
    Kazhegeldin. The tax authorities brought an action against Kazhegeldin
    during the campaign and, according to credible reports, threatened
    actions against other government opponents. At a news conference,
    Kazhegeldin supporters showed videotape of police repeatedly pulling
    over Kazhegeldin's car for unspecified ``inspections.'' Kazhegeldin
    also claimed that border control officials at the Almaty airport tried
    to prevent him and his family from taking a flight out of the country.
    An attack on a Kazakhstani employee of a foreign embassy also appeared
    to be motivated politically and, human rights observers believe,
    sanctioned by the Government. In December 1998, three men beat the
    employee outside his apartment as the employee returned home. The
    employee suffered a cracked rib, some internal injuries, and required
    stitches to close wounds near both eyes. The attackers stole the
    employee's briefcase but did not try to steal his wallet and other
    valuables. The absence of robbery as a motive and the fact that the
    employee's responsibilities included assisting diplomats in making
    contacts with political opposition and human rights figures suggested
    that the attack was motivated politically. Law enforcement authorities
    closed the investigations into all of these cases without arrests. A
    suspect was identified in the Nikitenko case but no charges were
    brought, allegedly because Nikitenko had left the country and was
    unavailable to identify her assailant.
        The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of
    the OSCE announced in December 1998 that it would not meet the
    Government's request to send a presidential election observation
    mission. In its public explanation, the ODIHR cited concerns about the
    exclusion of two opposition candidates, unequal access to the media,
    and coerced support for President Nazarbayev. The ODIHR sent a small
    election assessment team to report to the OSCE on the full election
    process. The assessment team concluded that the presidential election
    fell ``far short'' of Kazakhstan's commitments as an OSCE participating
    state. It cited in particular the exclusion of candidates, the short
    duration of the election campaign, obstacles to free assembly and
    association, the use of government resources to support President
    Nazarbayev' s campaign, unequal access to the media, and the flawed
    presidential decree that served as the election law.
        A newly elected bicameral legislature took office in December 1999.
    The lower house (Majilis), consisting of 77 members, was elected
    directly in October 1999. Under amendments to the Constitution passed
    in 1998, membership in the Majilis elected in 1999 included 10 new
    seats assigned proportionally to political parties based on the
    percentage of votes they received nationally (with a minimum vote
    threshold of 7 percent). As before the other 67 seats were attributed
    by single mandate districts. The upper house (the Senate) consists of
    39 members 32 of whom are elected directly by members of oblast and
    city parliaments; the President appoints the remaining 7 senators. (The
    number of senate seats was reduced from 42 in accordance with the
    Government's 1997 decision to reduce the number of oblasts from 19 to
    14. Each oblast elects two senators, as do the cities of Almaty and
    Astana.) Elections were held in September 1999 for 16 Senate seats. The
    May 1999 election law requires candidates for both houses to meet
    minimum age and education requirements and to pay a nonrefundable
    registration fee of 25 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately
    $50070,000 tenge). This fee represented a 75 percent decrease over
    previous registration fees, which opposition figures, human rights
    monitors, and the OSCE/ODIHR had considered a barrier to participation.
    The election law does not require Majilis candidates to collect a
    certain number of signatures in order to be placed on the ballot;
    however, Senate candidates must obtain signatures from 10 percent of
    the members of the local assemblies in their oblasts in order to be
    placed on the ballot. Political parties wishing to compete for the 10
    proportionally allocated seats in the Majilis must be registered by the
    CEC and regional electoral commissions in two-thirds of the principal
    administrative jurisdictions (the 14 oblasts, plus the former and new
    capital cities, Almaty and Astana). The Constitution states that
    participation in elections is voluntary. One of the Constitutional
    amendments passed in October 1998 rescinded the requirement that at
    least 50 percent of eligible voters participate in order to make an
    election valid. Experts had cited the old requirement as one of the
    causes of fraud and vote inflation in past elections.
        The legislature exercises little oversight over the executive
    branch, although it has the Constitutional authority to remove
    government ministers and vote no-confidence in the Government. The
    Constitution and other arrangements allow the executive branch to
    dominate the legislature. Although Parliament must approve the overall
    state budget, the Constitution precludes Parliament from increasing
    state spending or decreasing state revenues without executive branch
    approval. The executive branch used this authority to block legislation
    drafted by Members of Parliament. Nearly all laws passed by Parliament
    originate in the executive branch. The executive branch controls the
    budget for Parliament's operations; it has not provided funds for
    Members of Parliament to hire staff, a situation generally viewed as
    decreasing Parliament's effectiveness. Should Parliament fail to
    consider within 30 days a bill designated as ``urgent'' by the
    President, the President may issue the bill by decree. Although the
    President has never resorted to this authority, it gives him additional
    leverage with Parliament. While the President has broad powers to
    dissolve Parliament, Parliament can remove the President only for
    disability or high treason, and only with the consent of the
    Constitutional Council, which largely is controlled by the President
    (see Section 1.e.).
        The introduction, for the 1999 parliamentary elections, of 10 new
    seats in the Majilis distributed by party-list vote enhanced the role
    of political parties, which, with the exception of the Communists, were
    previously very weak. The Communist Party and three propresidential
    parties--Otan (Fatherland), the Civic Party, and the Agrarian Party--
    divided the 10 new party-list seats in the 1999 parliamentary election.
    No candidate nominated by a non-Communist opposition party won a seat
    in the Parliament. One member of the opposition RNPK won a seat after
    running as an independent candidate. The RNPK withdrew its party-list
    slate after two of its candidates, Akezhan Kazhegeldin and Madel
    Ismailov, were declared ineligible. (They were the only two candidates
    rejected of more than 600 applicants for Majilis contests.) Of the more
    than 600 other candidates, about half who won ran as independents. Many
    of them were former government officials with strong presumed sympathy
    for the progovernment parties.
        Many activities of Parliament remained outside public view. In June
    1999, Parliament banned the press and other outsiders from observing
    the vote of confidence in the Government. Final totals in the
    parliamentary vote of confidence were made public, but not the votes of
    individual members. The Parliament invited nongovernmental
    representatives to observe at least four meetings. Many draft bills
    were held closely and published in the press only after passage and
    signature by the President. In 2000 the Parliament became more open by
    publishing important draft laws (for example, the tax code) and by
    meeting with NGO's on others (for example, the local self-government
    law).
        Although an improvement in many ways over the most recent
    presidential election, parliamentary elections held in 1999 were marred
    by election law deficiencies, executive branch interference in the
    electoral process, and a lack of government openness about vote
    tabulations. There was convincing evidence of government manipulation
    of results in some cases. The OSCE mission sent to observe the
    elections concluded that the elections were ``a tentative step'' toward
    democracy but ``fell short of (Kazakhstan's) OSCE commitments.'' The
    OSCE also expressed concern that parliamentary runoff races were
    conducted just 2 weeks after first-round voting, which left no time for
    the CEC and the courts to act on hundreds of complaints filed about the
    conduct of first-round voting and the campaign.
        The May 1999 election law replaced a presidential decree that had
    served as the election law. It lowered candidate registration fees by
    75 percent but failed to correct other deficiencies of the decree it
    replaced. The law maintained a system of territorial, district, and
    precinct electoral commissions subject to regional and local government
    authorities, who recommend commission members. It failed to incorporate
    suggestions for creating a more open vote tabulation process. It also
    maintained more than 40 administrative provisions that bar candidates
    convicted of administrative offenses from running for office for a
    year, although one offense was eliminated from the list of
    disqualifying offenses.
        The CEC issued regulations to ameliorate some of these deficiencies
    in time for the parliamentary elections, but the effects were limited.
    For example the CEC filled vacant seats on electoral commissions by
    lottery among all registered political parties. However, the initiative
    affected only 25 percent of commissions and was limited to 1 seat per
    commission, each of which usually consists of 7 members. Regulations
    that clarified the rights of election observers significantly improved
    the ability of observers to monitor vote counts at the precinct level.
    However, observers could not, in the end, use the information they
    obtained to corroborate or challenge official results. The CEC
    ultimately released comprehensive precinct- and district-level vote
    tallies for only 1 of 67 single-mandate districts, despite repeated
    requests from the OSCE and other observers. With the exception of the
    one district for which comprehensive results were released, the CEC
    never issued the order of finish or final totals for Majilis candidates
    who neither won nor qualified for a run-off.
        The Government, prior to the 1999 parliamentary elections, removed
    participation in the activities of an unregistered organization from
    the list of administrative offenses that potentially could disqualify
    candidates for public office. However, more than 40 other
    administrative offenses remained on the list. Among these offenses were
    participation in unsanctioned demonstrations or rallies, an offense
    that the Government has used to charge its opponents (see Section
    2.b.). The Government presented rescission of the administrative
    offense as a measure to enable the five opposition leaders convicted of
    participating in the For Fair Elections meeting to run for Parliament.
    Two of the five successfully registered as candidates. However, the CEC
    declined to register Akezhan Kazhegeldin due to a December 1998
    administrative conviction for contempt of court. The conviction arose
    from Kazhegeldin's failure to respond in person to the For Fair
    Elections charge. (Kazhegeldin argued at the time that he met the law's
    requirements by sending his attorney.) The chairperson of the CEC
    publicly encouraged Kazhegeldin to seek the overturn of his contempt of
    court conviction 1 week before the registration deadline for the
    parliamentary elections. A successful appeal by Kazhegeldin would have
    made him eligible, according to the CEC, to run in the parliamentary
    election. Kazhegeldin subsequently wrote to the Supreme Court
    requesting that it overturn his contempt conviction, but the court
    ruled that his letter did not constitute a proper legal appeal.
        Within a day of the CEC exclusion of Kazhegeldin's candidacy,
    Russian authorities detained Kazhegeldin on a pre-existing warrant
    issued 2 months earlier by the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan. The
    Government requested the extradition of Kazhegeldin, who was living in
    exile, in connection with allegations that he had laundered illicit
    funds received while serving as Prime Minister from 1994 to 1997.
    Following protests from international human rights groups, the
    Prosecutor General dropped his extradition request, and the Russian
    authorities released Kazhegeldin. In July Kazhegeldin was detained
    again in Italy on charges of corruption, pursuant to an Interpol
    warrant posted by Kazakhstan. Italian authorities released him shortly
    thereafter. The investigation of Kazhegeldin, while possibly grounded
    in facts, appeared motivated politically.
        The CEC barred the 1999 parliamentary candidacy of Madel Ismailov
    because of his February 1998 criminal conviction for insulting the
    President (see Section 1.d.). Ismailov had sought to register as a
    candidate on the RNPK party list. The election law precludes candidates
    convicted of criminal offenses from running for office for 3 years
    following their convictions.
        A flawed provision in the electoral law was used to disqualify from
    the 1999 parliamentary election another RNPK candidate, deputy party
    chairman Gaziz Aldamzharov, after he apparently received a majority of
    votes in an election in Atyrau. The CEC annulled the second round of
    the Atyrau election, as well as two other second-round elections, but
    gave no specific reason in its official decree. The electoral law
    precludes all candidates who participated in an invalidated election
    from running in a make- up election, regardless of who was responsible
    for the violations that led to invalidating the election. The CEC
    interpreted this provision to exclude from the 3 rerun elections all of
    the approximately 500 candidates who ran unsuccessfully for any Majilis
    seat in 1999. Although the CEC did not formally specify the reason for
    invalidating the Atyrau election, the CEC chairperson said in a
    television interview that district and precinct electoral officials in
    Atyrau refused to certify protocols after a series of disturbances that
    the chairperson attributed to the ``opposition.'' These disturbances
    included alleged bomb threats, alleged falsification of ballots, and
    the incursion into one polling station of four masked men who opened
    and overturned ballot boxes. Given widespread expectations that
    Aldamzharov would receive a majority of votes in Atyray,
    unsubstantiated CEC allegations that the ``opposition'' disrupted
    voting in Atyrau appeared contrived.
        There were widespread, documented allegations that regional and
    local executive authorities (akims) interfered with the parliamentary
    elections during the campaign and in the voting process. In one case,
    the chief election commissioner for the Ili district (Almaty Oblast)
    resigned because, he alleged, the district akim ordered him to deliver
    a victory for the akim's favored candidate. The commissioner, like most
    election officials a government employee, offered to resign from his
    full-time government job in addition to his electoral responsibilities.
    A significant number of complaints filed in several regions indicated
    that akimats and, through them, other employers threatened supporters
    of opposition candidates with job loss. In one such case, the akimat of
    the capital city, Astana, allegedly threatened to fire more than 20
    government employees for their support of a nonfavored candidate. There
    were also reports that tax inspectors and some KNB officials
    intimidated opposition candidates, their supporters, and the
    independent media. Akimats used government personnel and other
    resources, including office space, to support ``favored'' candidates
    and to distribute campaign literature for the propresidential Otan
    party. On first- and second-round voting days, international and
    domestic observers found akimat representatives ``supervising'' the
    work of putatively independent precinct electoral commissions in
    numerous locations throughout the country.
        The failure of the CEC to release most precinct- and district-
    level vote tallies undermined the credibility of election results.
    Evidence of official vote tampering in many districts exacerbated this
    problem. The OSCE observation mission obtained copies of flagrantly
    falsified protocols (reports of official results). During the first
    round of voting OSCE observers found multiple vote protocols prepared
    in one Almaty polling station. OSCE and domestic observers reported
    that precinct officials frequently did not use official protocol forms
    to record results in the presence of observers or filled out the
    official forms in pencil. District election officials, especially in
    first-round elections, generally refused to allow observers to witness
    the tabulation of results from various polling stations. Observers'
    access to district vote tabulations improved in the second round of
    voting after the CEC issued new instructions for preparing protocols
    and instructed district officials to cooperate with observers.
    Nevertheless, the district election commission in Atyrau refused
    initially to allow OSCE observers into the district commission office.
    District officials ultimately allowed the observers into their office
    but subsequently recommended that they leave because the commission
    ``could not assure the (observers') safety.''
        Government officials said that President Nazarbayev took
    disciplinary actions against some local officials for interfering with
    the parliamentary elections but this could not be confirmed; the
    Government did not release any details such as the names of the
    officials, their offenses, or punishment.
        In February a team of OSCE representatives visited Astana to
    discuss the final OSCE report on the parliamentary elections.
    Government officials agreed during the visit to an OSCE proposal for a
    series of roundtable discussions of the electoral reforms recommended
    in the report. The agreement called for broad participation in the
    discussions, including by representatives of the Government, all
    registered political parties, other political movements, and NGO's.
    After some delays, the first of four planned sessions took place on
    September 2 in Astana. Participants agreed to a future work plan with
    the inclusion of the OSCE and all political parties registered in 1999
    in a parallel government working group on electoral reform. The
    remaining sessions were scheduled for 2001; the leading opposition
    parties and movements took part, as did approximately 15 Members of
    Parliament from across the political spectrum. The CEC and
    representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and
    Culture, Information, and Public Access also took part. Shortly after
    the September session, and with only a few days' notice, the CEC
    announced that it would organize new regional and local electoral
    commissions without waiting for the issue to be discussed in subsequent
    sessions. The CEC said it had to act because the terms of the previous
    commissions were expiring. Other roundtable participants criticized the
    CEC for failing to discuss its plans to reconstitute the commissions or
    to give political parties more notice that they would be invited to
    nominate candidates.
        The Constitution and laws significantly constrain the independence
    of the judiciary (see Section 1.e.). A Constitutional Council replaced
    the Constitutional Court in August 1995 when the new Constitution was
    adopted. The President appoints three of its seven members, including
    the chairman. A two-thirds majority of the Council is required to
    overrule a presidential veto. All judges below the level of the Supreme
    Court are appointed directly by the President. The President's nominees
    for the Supreme Court are subject to Senate confirmation.
        According to the Constitution, the President selects Governors of
    oblasts (the ``akims''), based on the recommendation of the Prime
    Minister; they serve at the discretion of the President, who may annul
    their decisions. All adult citizens (at least 18 years of age) have the
    right to vote. Membership in political parties or trade unions is
    forbidden to members of the armed forces, employees of national
    security and law enforcement organizations, and judges.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no
    legal restrictions on the participation of women and minorities in
    politics, but the persistence of traditional attitudes means that few
    women hold high office or play active parts in political life. At the
    end of the year, no women held ministerial portfolios, although one had
    ministerial rank and several deputy ministers were women. There were no
    female provincial governors (akims). Of 39 Senate members, 5 are women;
    of 77 Majilis members, 8 are women.
        Although minority ethnic groups are represented in the Government,
    ethnic Kazakhs hold the majority of leadership positions. Nearly half
    the population are non-Kazakhs according to the national census
    completed in 1999. Non-Kazakhs hold 1 of 3 positions as vice premier
    and head 2 of 14 government ministries and the national bank. Non-
    Kazakhs also are underrepresented in the Majilis and the Senate. In
    Parliament 8 of 39 senators are non-Kazakhs, and 19 of 77 members of
    the Majilis are non-Kazakhs.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of
    Law (formerly the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human Rights) and the
    Almaty Helsinki Commission are the most active of a small number of
    local human rights organizations. They cooperate on human rights and
    legal reform issues. Although these groups operated largely without
    government interference, limited financial means hampered their ability
    to monitor and report human rights violations. Law enforcement
    investigators closed an investigation into a November 1999 fire that
    destroyed the main office and archives of the Bureau for Human Rights
    in Almaty. The Almaty fire department concluded that arson was the
    probable cause of the fire. It absolved the organization from potential
    civil liability for the fire. However, investigators identified no
    suspects and made no arrests. Some human rights observers complained
    that the Government monitored their movements and telephone calls.
        The Civil Code requires NGO's to register with the Government, and
    most NGO's are registered; however, some continue to operate without
    legal standing. An increasing number of government officials made an
    effort to work with domestic and foreign NGO's, although others
    persisted in asserting that NGO's should stay out of sectors of
    government interest. A coalition of NGO's played an apparently
    unprecedented role in government consideration of draft local
    government laws. After successfully delaying passage of what was widely
    viewed as flawed legislation on this subject early in the year, the
    coalition successfully lobbied Parliament to publish the draft. That
    draft was withdrawn in December for revision. Some NGO's chose not to
    register because they objected to the requirement of registration in
    principle or because they did not have the money to pay the
    registration fee. Others believe that they were not eligible to
    register because they promoted the interests of one ethnic group or
    religion and are considered by some to violate the constitutional ban
    on inciting social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal
    enmity. The new Criminal Code that took effect in 1998 criminalized the
    activity of NGO's that are not registered. In 1998 five leading
    opposition figures were convicted for participating in a meeting of an
    unregistered NGO, the For Fair Elections group (see Section 3).
        The Government permitted international and foreign NGO's and
    multilateral institutions dealing with human rights to visit the
    country and meet with local human rights groups as well as government
    officials. The International Labor Organization, the International
    Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the UNHCR, the
    International Organization on Migration, and the OSCE have permanent
    offices in the country. The Constitution forbids ``the financing of
    political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and
    citizens, foreign states and international organizations.''
        The Presidential Commission on Human Rights is a consultative body.
    It prepares annual reports to the President that can be released to the
    public only with the President's consent. At the end of 1998, the
    Commission made public its annual report to the President for the first
    and only time by publishing an expurgated version of its report for
    1997. The report focused almost exclusively on ``economic and social
    rights,'' for example, the right to a decent standard of living. It
    concluded that the country consistently abides by human rights
    principles and suggested that those who blame the Government for social
    problems should realize that individual well-being ultimately is the
    responsibility of the individual. The Commission reached out to
    independent human rights organizations but made little progress in
    establishing itself as an Ombudsman. In general the Government showed
    greater willingness to focus on abuses highlighted by human rights
    monitors and individual citizens in the criminal justice system and to
    investigate allegations of corruption but tended to deny or downplay
    charges of abuses of civil liberties and political rights. In general
    the Government tended to deny or ignore charges of specific human
    rights abuses that were levied by human rights monitors and individual
    citizens. In its report to the President for 1997, the Commission
    charged that many domestic NGO's are oriented towards developed
    countries' standards and do not realize that progress towards a market
    economy and civil society is a slow, gradual process. It said that
    NGO's sympathetic to ``left-wing radicals'' have nothing constructive
    to offer.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that ``everyone is equal before law and
    court. No one may be subjected to any discrimination for reasons of
    origin, social position, occupation, property status, sex, race,
    nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of
    residence, or any other circumstances.'' However, the Government does
    not enforce this provision effectively on a consistent basis. The
    Government has favored ethnic Kazakhs in government employment and,
    according to many citizens, in the process of privatizing state
    enterprises.
        Women.--According to human rights groups, there is considerable
    domestic violence against women. A local NGO, the Feminist League,
    estimates that hundreds of thousands of women are the victims of
    spousal abuse. The Interior Ministry reported that family members or
    domestic partners were responsible for about onethird of the nearly
    8,500 crimes against women registered in the first half of 1999. During
    the same period, 81 women were killed by family members. The Feminist
    League reported that the levels of domestic violence remained
    approximately the same in 2000. Karaganda oblast reported 3,060 crimes
    against women in the first 6 months of 2000, including 33 murders and
    53 rapes. Almaty police reported 49 murders, 134, rapes and 936
    assaults against women during the first nine months of the year. There
    was no information on the percentage of these crimes successfully
    prosecuted, but police often are reluctant to intervene in domestic
    disputes, considering them to be the family's business, unless they
    believe that the abuse is life threatening. However, new domestic
    violence units opened during the year within the Almaty and Astana
    police departments. A women's crisis center in Almaty maintains that
    the Almaty police are very effective when there is a complaint.
    However, the police cannot detain a person legally for more than 72
    hours if the victim refuses to provide a written complaint. In most
    cases, women refuse to follow through with charges. The maximum
    sentence for wife beating is 3 years, but few such cases are
    prosecuted. A government commission on women and family continued to
    draw attention to the issue of domestic violence. Law enforcement
    authorities reported that 288 persons were convicted of rape in the
    first 8 months of 1999, although the total number of reported rapes was
    unavailable. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, prosecutors can
    initiate a rape case, absent aggravating circumstances such as gang
    rape, only upon the application of the victim. There were unconfirmed
    reports that prosecutors sometimes interpreted this provision to
    require rape victims to pay for forensic testing, pay the expenses of
    prosecution, and personally prosecute rape cases themselves. The
    punishment for rape can range from 3 to 15 years' imprisonment. There
    is very little reporting on rape in the press. There is no law
    specifically against spousal rape, which is proscribed under general
    rape laws.
        Trafficking in women is a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
        There is no legal discrimination against women, but traditional
    cultural practices limit their role in everyday society and in owning
    and managing businesses or real property. The President and other
    members of the Government speak in favor of women's rights, and
    official state policy (adopted in 1997) states that constitutional
    prohibitions on sex discrimination must be supported by effective
    government measures. Women are underrepresented severely in higher
    positions in state enterprises and overrepresented in low-paying and
    some menial jobs. Women have unrestricted access to higher education.
    Approximately 30 women's rights organizations are registered, including
    the Feminist League, Women of the East, the Almaty Women's Information
    Center, and the Businesswomen's Association. In September the
    Government announced the creation of a $4.5 million (661 million tenge)
    fund to provide loans to female entrepreneurs. However, as of year's
    end, the fund had not distributed any loans.
        Children.--The Government is committed in principle to children's
    rights, but as in many other areas, budget stringencies and other
    priorities severely limit its effectiveness in dealing with children's
    issues. Education is mandatory through the llth grade, although
    students may begin technical training after the 9th grade. Secondary
    education is both free and universal. Kazakhstani law provides for
    equal access to education by both boys and girls. There is no societal
    pattern of abuse against children. Rural children normally work during
    harvests (see Section 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--Citizens with disabilities are entitled
    by law to assistance from the State. There is no legal discrimination
    against the disabled, but in practice, employers do not give them equal
    consideration. There are laws mandating the provision of accessibility
    to public buildings and commercial establishments for the disabled, but
    the Government does not enforce these laws. However, improvements to
    facilitate access are not uncommon in Almaty and Astana. Assisting
    disabled persons is a low priority for the Government. Mentally ill and
    mentally retarded citizens can be committed to institutions run by the
    State. These institutions are poorly run and inadequately funded. The
    NGO, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights, observed that
    the Government provides almost no care for the mentally ill and
    mentally retarded due to a lack of funds.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to results of the
    1999 census, the population of about 15 million consists of
    approximately 50 percent Kazakhs and 33 percent ethnic Slavs (Russians,
    Ukrainians, Belarusians, and others) with many other ethnic groups
    represented, including Uzbeks (2.5 percent), and Germans (2.4 percent).
        The Government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazakhs
    in government employment, where ethnic Kazakhs predominate, as well as
    in education, housing, and other areas. However, the Government has
    largely abandoned the explicit ``Kazakhification'' campaign of the 1st
    year of independence (1991- 1992). President Nazarbayev has emphasized
    publicly that all nationalities are welcome. Nonetheless, many non-
    Kazakhs are anxious about what they perceive as expanding preferences
    for ethnic Kazakhs. Many ethnic Kazakhs believe that such preferences
    are needed to reverse 200 years of discrimination against their
    community.
        Most of the population speaks Russian; only about one-half of
    ethnic Kazakhs speak Kazakh fluently. According to the Constitution,
    the Kazakh language is the state language. The Constitution states that
    the Russian language is used officially on a basis equal with that of
    the Kazakh language in organizations and bodies of local self-
    administration. Some ethnic Russians believe that Russian should be
    designated as a second state language. The Government is encouraging
    more education of children in the Kazakh language, but it has done
    little to provide Kazakh-language education for adults. A 1997 language
    law intended to strengthen the use of Kazakh without infringing on the
    rights of citizens to use other languages has not been funded
    sufficiently to make Kazakh-language education universal.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    provide for basic worker rights, including the right to organize and
    the right to strike; however, the Government at times infringed on
    worker rights. Activist unions came under government pressure for
    holding unsanctioned demonstrations and marches.
        A new Labor Code took effect on January 1. Among many other
    revisions, the new law provides for individual contracts between an
    employer and each employee, but allows ``optional'' collective labor
    contracts. It also allows unions to represent an employee in labor
    disputes, but an employee may choose other representation.
        Most workers remained members of state-sponsored trade unions
    established during the Soviet period, when membership was obligatory.
    At most enterprises, the state-sponsored unions continued to deduct 1
    percent of each worker's wage as dues. The state unions under the
    Communist system were, and for the most part still are, organs of the
    Government and work with management to enforce labor discipline and to
    discourage workers from forming or joining independent unions.
        A collective bargaining law gives workers the right to join or form
    unions of their choosing and to stop the automatic dues deductions for
    the state unions. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTUK,
    formerly the Independent Trade Union center of Kazakhstan) claims
    membership of about 250,000 persons; however, the actual number of
    independent trade union members is estimated to be much lower. The pro-
    Government Federation of Trade Unions claims 4 million members;
    however, that figure is regarded as too high. To obtain legal status,
    an independent union must apply for registration with the local
    judicial authority at the oblast level and with the Ministry of
    Justice. Registration is generally lengthy, difficult, and expensive.
    The process of registering a union appears to be completely subjective,
    with no published criteria. No unions were registered or denied
    registration during the year. The two major independent trade union
    confederations are registered. Courts may cancel a union's
    registration, as a provincial court did in Kentau in 1998.
        The law does not provide mechanisms to protect workers who join
    independent unions from threats or harassment by enterprise management
    or state-run unions. Members of independent unions have been dismissed,
    transferred to lower paying or lower status jobs, threatened, and
    intimidated. According to independent union leaders, state unions work
    closely with management to ensure that independent trade union members
    are the first fired in times of economic downturn.
        Unions and individual workers exercised their right to strike
    during the year, primarily to protest the nonpayment of wages and in an
    attempt to recover back wages owed to workers. The nonpayment of wages
    continued to be the priority issue for workers. Early in the year,
    workers of the Uralsk ``Mettalist'' factory, led by the independent
    trade union of the factory, conducted mass meetings demanding the full
    payment of salaries. The company subsequently prohibited one of the
    union's leaders, Vlaoimir Podzhidaev, a member of the local city
    council, from entering the factory's territory. In addition police
    detained the union's chairman, Ainur Kurmanov, on March 31. Kurmanov
    alleged that police drugged and beat him, and detained him without
    charges for 7 days. He claimed that a local television station
    subsequently slandered him by showing footage of his ``drunk'' behavior
    in police custody.
        According to the law, workers may exercise the right to strike only
    if a labor dispute has not been resolved by means of existing
    conciliation procedures. In addition the law requires that employers be
    notified that a strike is to occur no less than 15 days before its
    commencement. There were numerous strikes throughout the country to
    protest the nonpayment of wages and unsafe working conditions.
    Construction workers in Astana held a series of strikes complaining of
    the degradation of their working conditions under foreign contractors.
    According to the CFTUK, the Turkish construction company ``Okan Holding
    Isot,'' under various pretexts, fired 125 of its employees in Astana
    shortly after the employees formed an independent labor union in
    November 1999. Workers at the company began a strike on March 29 to
    demand recognition of the union, collective bargaining, and the timely
    payment of wages. Police detained 8 out of 19 participants for 5 hours
    the same day. The workers were tried the following day and the leader,
    J. T. Sharipov, was sentenced to one day in jail for organizing an
    unsanctioned demonstration. The other seven were warned and then
    released.
        Independent unions complain about a provision in the Constitution
    that forbids the financing of trade unions by foreign legal entities
    and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations. After
    independence in 1991, independent trade unions received financial
    assistance from the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI). Most
    of this assistance ended in 1996 when funding was reduced, and FTUI
    currently provides no funding. Independent trade unions have sought new
    means of support; some associations of trade unions were able to
    receive financing from foreign sources by registering as ``public
    organizations'' rather than labor unions. The law does not forbid other
    nonmonetary types of assistance such as training, participation in
    which appeared to increase.
        By law unions freely may join federations or confederations and
    affiliate with international bodies. Most independent trade unions
    belong to the CFTUK, headquartered in Astana. The Independent Miners
    Federation of Kazakhstan and the State Miners' Union of Karaganda are
    members of the Miners' International Federation. Unions belonging to
    the CFTUK are not members of international federations but are able to
    maintain contacts with foreign trade union federations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law permits
    collective bargaining and collective agreements. If a union's demands
    are not acceptable to management, it may present those demands to an
    arbitration commission composed of management, union officials, and
    independent technical experts. Unions routinely appealed to arbitration
    commissions.
        The new Labor Law that took effect January 1 reduced the role of
    unions by requiring employers and employees to negotiate individual
    labor contracts. Collective bargaining agreements are allowed as long
    as they do not reduce protections afforded to the workers in their
    individual contracts or under law. Previously the terms of contracts
    were set only by law and collective bargaining agreements. The new law
    also gave employers the right to fire an employee without the consent
    of the employee's union.
        There is no legal protection against antiunion discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones. Free economic zones enjoy all
    the privileges of export processing zones as well as other tax
    privileges and abatements, but labor conditions there appear to be no
    different from elsewhere in the country. On August 1, the President
    signed a decree abolishing the last free economic zone to become
    effective on January 1, 2001.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor except ``at the sentence of the court or in the
    conditions of a state of emergency or martial law,'' and it is
    generally not known to occur; however, in 1999 there were reports that
    some persons were required to provide labor or the use of privately
    owned equipment with no, or very low, compensation to help gather the
    annual grain harvest.
        The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
    labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years, but only for
    parttime work (5 hours a day) that is not physically onerous. A child
    between the ages of 14 and 16 may work only with the permission of his
    or her parents. Education is compulsory to age 16, and the law
    stipulates harsh punishment for employers who exploit children under
    this age. Responsibility for enforcement rests with the Ministry of
    Labor, for administrative offenses punishable by fines, and the MVD for
    criminal offenses. The Criminal Code allows for fines up to $25,000
    (3,675,000 tenge) and 2 years in prison in cases where a minor is
    injured or placed in unhealthy conditions. Children from the ages of 16
    to 18 can work full time provided that they are not required to do any
    heavy work. The Government has acknowledged that children in this age
    group work in construction and other heavy industries but report that
    duties for children are limited to washing windows, general cleaning,
    laying tile, and similar nonstrenuous activities. Although the
    Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
    children, the sale, trafficking, and abduction of children or hiring
    minors for exploitation are punishable with up to 12 years in prison.
    There were no reports of forced or bonded child labor (see Section
    6.c.), and abuse of child labor is generally not a problem; however,
    child labor is used routinely in agricultural areas, especially during
    harvest season.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 the Government resumed
    setting a minimum wage. The minimum monthly wage remained at its 1999
    level of approximately $20 (2,680 tenge). The Government raised the
    minimum monthly pension to approximately $25 per month (3,500 tenge)
    and cleared pension arrears. These amounts do not provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family and fell far short of the
    minimum subsistence amount for one person as calculated in 1998 by the
    Kazakhstan Institute of Nutrition.
        The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although most enterprises
    maintained a 40-hour workweek, with at least a 24hour rest period. The
    Constitution provides that labor agreements stipulate the length of
    working time, vacation days, holidays, and paid annual leave for each
    worker.
        Although the Constitution provides for the right to ``safe and
    hygienic working conditions,'' working and safety conditions in the
    industrial sector are substandard. Safety consciousness is low. Workers
    in factories usually do not wear protective clothing, such as goggles
    and hard hats, and work in conditions of poor visibility and
    ventilation. Management largely ignores regulations concerning
    occupational health and safety, which are not enforced by the Ministry
    of Labor and the state-sponsored unions. Workers, including miners,
    have no legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
    without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in persons, although government officials generally
    maintained that prosecutors could effectively charge traffickers under
    the existing Criminal Code. Article 270, Illegal Involvement in
    Prostitution, provides punishment of up to 3 years in jail.
    Prostitution connected with organized crime is punishable by up to 5
    years in jail. According to Article 135, kidnaping of persons is
    punishable by a term of up to 7 years. An organized group working for
    sexual or other exploitation can be punished with up to 15 years in
    jail and confiscation of property.
        There are no official statistics on trafficking, but women's rights
    groups and the IOM report additional indications that the problem is
    serious and growing. However, experts estimate that from 5,000 to
    70,000 women have been victimized in the past 10 years. The higher
    figure was the result of a survey of Almaty women completed in April,
    the Crisis Center for Women and Children. In 1999, 25 women were
    repatriated from greece, 21 from the United Arab Emirates, 16 from
    Turkey and 3 from Israel, according to the MVD. In December the press
    reported that 2,000 women were sent to South Korea for prostitution; 2
    had been repatriated. All of the trafficking cases known to the IOM
    involve women between the ages of 18 and 25 who had been trafficked for
    purposes of sexual exploitation. According to the Kazakhstan Crisis
    Center for Women and Children, most women are recruited with promises
    of good jobs or marriage abroad. The organization blames the rising
    number of women being trafficked from the country on the lack of
    employment opportunities and lack of information about trafficking. The
    KNB reported in June that it broke up a trafficking ring that
    specialized in sending women to the United Arab Emirates for
    prostitution. Criminal charges were brought against five alleged
    members of the ring. The five were arrested while trying to board a
    woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai. The official press
    reported that customs officers and border officials were under
    investigation for complicity with the ring.
        The Government has no programs to target trafficking in women.
    However senior government officials presented reports on the problem,
    including the lack of appropriate legislation, during a November
    conference on trafficking in persons. The participants adopted a
    resolution which called for revision of legislation to make trafficking
    illegal; a distinction between victims of trafficking and illegal
    migrants, and a joint governmental, NGO and international organization
    approach to the problem.
        Nongovernmental efforts to combat trafficking in persons increased.
    The Kazakhstan Crisis Center for Women and Children published a
    brochure warning of the danger of trafficking in women and conducted a
    survey to measure the level of awareness of the trafficking problem. In
    response to international organizations' efforts to raise awareness of
    the problem, local feminist leagues have also begun to get involved.
    The Feminist League of Kokshetau discovered that 50 local women had
    been sent to Greece for prostitution. Four regional workshops on
    trafficking in Aktau, Petropavlosk, Kokshetau, and Shmkent were held
    during the year.
                                   __________

                                   KYRGYZSTAN

        Although the 1993 Constitution defines the form of government as a
    democratic republic, President Askar Akayev dominates the Government.
    Both presidential and parliamentary elections were held during the
    year, and both were marred by serious irregularities. In October
    President Akayev was elected to his third term. Although the
    Constitution only allows an individual to serve two presidential terms,
    the Constitutional Court ruled that Akayev could serve a third term
    because he had been elected to his first term under the old Soviet-era
    Constitution. The Government disqualified otherwise qualified
    candidates through conviction on questionable criminal charges.
    Observers reported instances of ballot box stuffing, voter
    intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts, and the presence of a large
    number of local and regional administration officials in and around the
    polling stations. Parliamentary elections were held in February and
    March, the second such elections since independence in 1991. For the
    first time, 15 of the Legislative Assembly's 60 seats were distributed
    proportionally based on party lists; however, political parties remain
    weak, and the Government took numerous actions that disadvantaged
    opposition political parties. The Government used judicial proceedings
    in numerous instances to prevent prominent political opposition
    candidates from participating in or winning office in the parliamentary
    and presidential elections. The Parliament has become increasingly
    active and on occasion has blocked presidential initiatives; however,
    in many areas it still does not check the power of the President
    effectively. The judiciary also is dominated by the executive branch.
    Beginning in August, there were continuous military engagements in the
    southwest of the country, near the border with Tajikistan, between
    government forces and armed insurgents.
        Law enforcement responsibilities are divided among the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs (MVD) for general crime, the Ministry of National
    Security (MNB) for state-level crime, and the procurator's office for
    both types of crime. Both the MVD and the MNB deal with corruption and
    organized crime. These ministries inherited their infrastructure from
    their Soviet predecessors. Both appear to be under the general control
    of the Government and generally conform their actions to the law.
        Border guards are under the full control of the Government. Some
    members of the police committed human rights abuses.
        The country is poor and mountainous, with a rough balance between
    agricultural and industrial production. Cotton, tobacco, vegetables,
    and sugar are the primary agricultural exports. The country also
    exports hydroelectric power, gold, antimony, and mercury. The
    Government has carried out progressive market reforms, although some
    reforms have not been implemented fully. The economy was stable during
    the year. According to government figures, gross domestic product
    growth (GDP) growth was 5 percent. Inflation was estimated at 9.6
    percent. The country faces an external debt of roughly $1.69 billion.
    Industrial production remains significantly below preindependence
    levels. The level of hardship for pensioners, unemployed workers, and
    government workers with low salaries or unpaid benefits continues to be
    high. Government figures indicate the average annual salary is $165
    (8,072 soms), while the subsistence level is estimated at $295 (14,463
    soms). Foreign assistance plays a significant role in the country's
    budget.
        The Government's human rights record worsened and was poor in
    several key areas. The Government limits citizens' ability to change
    their Government. Prison conditions are very poor, and there were many
    cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. Executive domination of the
    judiciary limited citizens' rights to due process. Executive branch
    interference affected verdicts involving prominent opposition figures.
    The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press.
    Authorities pressured journalists who criticized individual members of
    the Government. The Government used bureaucratic means to harass and
    pressure the independent media, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
    and the opposition. The Government at times restricted freedom of
    assembly; in particular, there were serious problems with political
    parties' rights to free assembly. The Government at times inhibited
    freedom of association. The Government generally respected freedom of
    religion; however at times it infringed on this right. The Government
    harassed and pressured human rights groups. Violence against women is a
    problem that authorities often ignore, and societal discrimination
    against women persists. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
    of forced prostitution also is a persistent problem. Child abuse is a
    problem, and there is a growing number of street children.
    Discrimination against ethnic minorities and child labor are problems.
        Armed insurgents in the country's southwest areas along the Tajik-
    Kyrgyz/Kyrgyz-Uzbek border took citizens and foreign nationals hostage
    in August.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        There were no further developments in the January 1998 beating
    death by police of Muratbek Sulaimanov.
        The criminal investigation of the 1998 police beating and killing
    by burial alive of Sergei Skromnov continues. Two police officers
    suspected of the killing are in detention. A third police officer was
    released on bail.
        Nigmat Bazakov, a leading representative of the ethnic minority
    Uighur community was murdered on March 28. The identity of the
    perpetrator is unknown. Figures in the Uighur community indicated that
    the killing likely was a criminal, business-related act, and not linked
    to government discrimination against Uighurs. Bazakov had run for a
    seat in the legislative assembly in the second parliamentary election
    but lost in Bishkek's eighth district.
        In early August, fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
    (IMU), an organization opposed to the present Uzbek Government, crossed
    the Tajik-Kyrgyz border and engaged Kyrgyz security forces. As of
    October 9 when fighting ended, a total of 30 government troops were
    killed. It was estimated that 120 IMU partisans died and 200 were
    injured. No new attacks had occurred by year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances due to action by the Government or domestic groups.
        In August armed insurgents entered the Southern Batken Oblast from
    Tajikistan and took a number of citizens and foreign nationals hostage.
    There were military engagements between the Government and the
    insurgents, who identified themselves as members of the IMU. Some of
    the hostages escaped uninjured after 6 days of captivity. The other
    hostages were released unharmed several days later.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, the
    supervision of conditions for pretrial detainees is poor, and abuses,
    such as beatings to extract confessions, sometimes occur. Police
    patrols are supervised poorly, are not always paid promptly, and
    sometimes commit crimes. Police sometimes used ill-defined charges to
    arrest persons (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
        On March 22, police in Kara Bura, Talas Oblast, reportedly used
    excessive force to break up a peaceful demonstration. Between 70 and
    120 demonstrators were arrested. Approximately half were released the
    following day, and the remainder were eventually released. The
    participants were protesting irregularities in the February 20 and
    March 12 rounds of parliamentary elections (see Section 2.b.).
        Several police officials were charged with issuing passports
    specifically for use in the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.).
        In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded their authority by
    trying major crimes, using torture to extract confessions, or even
    levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as stoning and death
    sentences have abated, and there were no reports of such action during
    the year (see Section 1.e.).
        Prison conditions (including overcrowding, food shortages, and lack
    of heat and other necessities) are very poor. Those detained by the MNB
    rather than the MVD are kept in MNB facilities; after conviction, they
    go to a regular prison. In June 1999 a new Criminal Procedure Code went
    into effect, replacing the previous 1994 Soviet-era Criminal Code. The
    new code contains the right for attorney-client visits of unlimited
    number and duration; however official permission still is required. The
    code also greatly expands the rights of defense lawyers to obtain all
    evidence gathered during the course of the investigation. Prison visits
    by family members are at the discretion of the investigator during the
    investigation phase. After conviction, family members may visit
    regularly.
        In principle nonfamily visitors seldom are permitted. However, some
    citizens, including local human rights monitors, usually can obtain
    official permission for a visit through personal connections. The
    International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited Feliks Kulov,
    an opposition political leader, in March when he was in jail; however,
    it does not have full access to prisons (see Section 1.d.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The judicial system
    continues to operate, in many cases, under Soviet laws and procedures,
    and authorities generally respect these provisions in practice;
    however, there were many cases of arbitrary arrest and detention
    related to the Parliamentary and presidential elections. The
    Procurator's Office determines who may be detained, arrested, and
    prosecuted. The MNB, the MVD, and the General Procurator carry out
    investigations. Since 1990 persons arrested or charged with crimes have
    had the right to a defense counsel, who is required to visit the
    accused within the first 3 days of incarceration. However, sometimes
    the accused first sees the defense counsel only at the trial.
        The Criminal Code permits the Procurator to detain suspects for 72
    hours before releasing them or charging them with a crime. The
    Procurator must issue an arrest warrant before a person can be
    detained. If a suspect is charged, the Procurator must advise defense
    counsel immediately. The accused usually remains in detention while the
    Procurator investigates and prepares the case for trial. The Procurator
    has discretion to keep the accused in pretrial detention for up to 1
    year, but there are conditions for provisional release before trial.
    After 1 year, the Procurator must release the accused or ask Parliament
    to extend the period of detention. Since independence there have been
    no known instances in which Parliament has been asked to extend a
    detention. The Criminal Procedure Code requires notification of a
    detainee's family by the investigator within 12 hours of detention.
    This requirement often is not observed in practice.
        The Government used judicial proceedings in numerous instances to
    prevent prominent political opposition candidates from participating in
    or winning office in the parliamentary and presidential elections. For
    example, on January 25, the Government began criminal proceedings
    against People's Party opposition leader and registered parliamentary
    candidate Daniyar Usenov based on 4-year-old assault charges that had
    been withdrawn long before by the person allegedly assaulted (see
    Sections 1.e. and 3).
        The Government arrested opposition party Ar-Namys activist Emil
    Aliyev on March 9, 3 days before the second round of the parliamentary
    elections. The charges related to alleged fraud in a 1994 loan
    transaction. Aliyev was released from custody on August 14 for reasons
    of poor health. Also on March 9, the Government declared the Issyk-Kul
    election invalid. The Government subsequently charged Omurbek
    Suvanaliyev, a leader of the Ar-Namys party and candidate in that
    election, with fraud, which made him ineligible to run in the repeat
    election.
        On March 22, the Government arrested opposition political leader
    Feliks Kulov at a hospital where he was receiving treatment for cardiac
    problems. The arrest followed his defeat in a parliamentary election
    and the announcement of his intention to run in the presidential
    election. He was arrested on suspicion of participating in illegal
    activities by members of the Kalkhan antiterrorist squad, while he
    headed the Security Ministry in 1997-1998. Kulov also was suspected of
    misappropriating some $22,000 that the Security Ministry received from
    commercial firms. After his arrest, demonstrations were held demanding
    his release. On April 5, the Government terminated People's Party
    leader Daniyar Usenov's conditional release and took him into custody,
    despite no violation of the terms of his conditional release. He was
    released later that same day by intervention of President Akayev.
        The MNB continues to monitor the Uighur community (a Turkic people
    native to western China) closely. In the past, it arrested Uighurs on
    ill-defined charges. In March the MNB arrested a resident ethnic Uighur
    from China for lacking a residence permit and for possession of Islamic
    literature that was deemed fundamentalist by the authorities. He
    reportedly was deported forcibly to China (see Section 2.c.).
        In Jalalabad Oblast, throughout the year, the MNB detained more
    than 20 persons for membership in the Khieb-Ut-Takhrir Islamic
    organization and distribution of its literature. The Government has
    prosecuted criminally 11 of those detained for alleged possession of
    material containing appeals of an extreme character.
        The Government does not employ forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, despite extensive reforms in the court
    system and a large body of new law, the executive branch continues to
    dominate the judiciary.
        Cases originate in local courts; they may move to appeals courts at
    the district or regional level and finally to the Supreme Court.
    Separate courts of arbitration handle civil disputes, and traditional
    elders' courts handle low-level crime in rural areas.
        Defendants are afforded the same constitutional protections in both
    military and civilian courts, although military court proceedings can
    be closed to the public. A civilian can be tried in a military court if
    one of the codefendants is a member of the military.
        Local elders' courts are found in almost every oblast and region.
    They exercise their authority by trying petty crimes, such as robbery,
    hooliganism, or theft. In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded
    their authority by trying major crimes, using torture to extract
    confessions or even levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as
    stoning and death sentences have abated, and there were no reports of
    such action during the year. Local elders' courts are under the
    supervision of the Procurator's Office, but they may not receive close
    oversight due to the fact that many such courts are located in remote
    regions, which makes monitoring difficult.
        The Procurator brings cases to court and tries them before a judge
    and two ``people's assessors'' (pensioners or citizens chosen from
    labor collectives). The accused and the defense counsel have access to
    all evidence gathered by the Procurator. They attend all proceedings,
    which are generally public, and are allowed to question witnesses and
    present evidence. In practice, all members of the court have equal
    rights. Anyone in the courtroom may question witnesses. Witnesses do
    not always recapitulate their evidence in court; instead they affirm or
    deny their statements in the Procurator's files.
        The court compares the facts as presented by the Procurator and the
    defense, and in most cases makes its decision after receiving all
    available information in each case. The court may render one of three
    decisions: innocent; guilty; or indeterminate, that is, the case is
    returned to the Procurator for further investigation. The decision of a
    court to return a case to the Procurator for further investigation may
    not be appealed, and accused persons are returned to the Procurator's
    custody, where they may remain under detention. In practice there was
    considerable evidence of executive branch interference in verdicts
    involving prominent political opposition figures.
        The Procurator, not the judge, is in charge of criminal
    proceedings. Thus the courts are widely perceived as a rubber stamp for
    the Procurator and for high-ranking Government officials and not as the
    protectors of citizens' rights. In addition very low judges' salaries
    have led to a well-grounded view among lawyers and citizens that all
    but a very few scrupulously honest judges are open to bribes or
    pressure.
        The Government introduced in 1999 several judicial reform measures,
    including a proposal to establish an independent judicial budget,
    creation of judicial judgment enforcement procedures, and independent
    judicial training; however, but no progress was made during the year in
    implementing these measures. Generally accepted international
    practices, including the presumption of the innocence of the accused,
    exist in law but are not always respected.
        Judges do not hold positions for life. As provided in the
    Constitution, terms for judges range from 15 years for Constitutional
    Court judges to 3 years for first-term local judges. In 1993 a new
    system of court administration was introduced; judges are tested on
    their knowledge of the law and new civil codes. If judges fail these
    tests, they may be disqualified from holding office. The process
    appears to have increased judicial professionalism, and a number of
    judges have been removed due to poor performance on the exams. Some
    removals appear to have been subjective, but most lawyers and judges
    consider the system to be a fair measure of competence.
        The appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial
    system has led to charges by non-Kyrgyz that the system is arbitrary
    and unfair and that the courts treat Kyrgyz more leniently than members
    of other groups; however in December an ethnic Korean was appointed
    head of the Supreme Court. Although systematic discrimination is not
    clearly evident, allegations that it exists are credible in some cases.
    There are also complaints by Uzbeks, and even by ethnic Kyrgyz, that
    the southern portion of the country is underrepresented in the
    judiciary.
        Economic crimes such as tax evasion, embezzlement, and theft of
    government property, including electric power, are common. Prosecution
    for these crimes is relatively rare and sometimes appears to be
    directed at opponents of the Government. Legislators in the past have
    used their parliamentary immunity to avoid being brought to court.
    However, an October 1998 referendum included an amendment that limited
    immunity to official acts only.
        Trials took place in March and September for two of the three
    Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) who were arrested in 1999 for
    misappropriation of state property, abuse of power, and tax evasion.
    One M.P. was found guilty and sentenced to time served during the
    course of the investigation. The other was sentenced to 14 years'
    imprisonment and confiscation of his property. The case of the third MP
    remains under investigation.
        The Government frequently used the judicial process to eliminate
    key political opposition leaders from participation in elections and
    narrow the range of choice for voters. A number of judicial actions
    against individuals apparently were motivated politically.
        On June 27, the Government began the trial of opposition Ar-Namys
    Party leader Feliks Kulov in a closed military court on charges of
    instigation of and accessory to fraud and abuse of power for personal
    interests. He was held in custody from March 22 through August 7. Legal
    provisions allow the judge discretion to release Kulov pending trial;
    however, he was not released. The military court acquitted Kulov of all
    charges on August 7, but the military Procurator appealed the
    acquittal. On September 11, the Appeals Court ruled in the Procurator's
    favor and returned the case to the lower court for possible retrial.
    The Supreme Court denied Kulov's appeal of the Appellate Court's
    decision. The Government began a new trial on the same charges on
    October 3. The Government denied Kulov the right to representation by
    two Russian lawyers on the grounds that his case involved sensitive
    information and therefore foreign attorneys could not participate.
        There were no reports of political prisoners; however, the
    Government detained Feliks Kulov, Emil Aliyev, and Daniyar Usenov on
    grounds that appeared to be politically motivated (see Section 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unlawful entry into a home
    against the wishes of the occupant and states that a person's private
    life, privacy of correspondence, and telephonic and telegraphic
    communications are protected. The law and procedures require the
    General Procurator's approval for wiretaps, searches of homes,
    interception of mail, and similar acts. A change in the law in 1995
    weakened these protections by allowing the Procurator to give approval
    for searches over the telephone; thus no written proof exists to verify
    that the search was approved. Furthermore, in certain cases, law
    enforcement officers first may carry out a search and then get approval
    ex post facto within 24 hours. If approval is not given, any evidence
    seized is inadmissible in court.
        Organizational structures responsible for violations during the
    Soviet era have remained largely in place; however, there were no
    reports of violations of citizens' privacy. There were concerns by
    citizens active in politics or human rights problems that the privacy
    of their communications was violated, but evidence to that effect is
    not available.
        The MNB continues to monitor the Uighur community (see Section
    1.d.)

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these
    rights.
        The 1992 law on the mass media provides for freedom of speech and
    of the mass media and outlines registration procedures. It identifies
    prohibited material: Government and commercial secrets; material
    advocating war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious
    groups; desecration of national norms, ethics and symbols such as the
    national seal, flag, or anthem; pornography; and encroachment on the
    honor and dignity of a person. Two laws related to the media, On
    Guarantees and Free Access to Information and On The Protection of the
    Professional Activities of Journalists, were adopted in December 1997.
        The Government closed three newspapers during the year by refusing
    to publish them. Kapitalism and Litsa stopped publishing in October,
    and Res Publica was closed for 4 months. One journalist was arrested as
    a direct result of journalistic activities.
        All media must register with the Ministry of Justice and wait for
    ministry approval before beginning to operate. The media law states
    that the registration process requires 1 month. During the year, there
    were no reports of media organizations that could not register in a
    timely manner.
        Libel is a criminal, not a civil, action. The Government attempted
    at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 to amend the Criminal Code
    to remove libel; however, its efforts were defeated in Parliament by an
    overwhelming majority. As a result of the October 1998 referendum, the
    Constitution now includes language that precludes Parliament from
    passing laws that infringe on free speech. However, to date there has
    been no implementing legislation for this amendment.
        There are approximately 40 to 50 independent newspapers and
    magazines, including some with local, not national, standing. There are
    also several hours daily of independent television and radio
    broadcasting. However, state television, radio, and government
    newspapers receive government subsidies, which permit the Government to
    influence media coverage. Additionally, the State's printing house,
    Uchkun, is the only newspaper publisher in the country.
        Uchkun refused to print the independent newspaper Res Publica for 4
    months during the year. This action was taken pending Res Publica's
    full payment of a fine awarded to the president of the state television
    and radio corporation in an earlier honor and dignity suit. Uchkun also
    refused to deliver Res Publica to the regions via its distribution
    system after it resumed publishing the newspaper. Res Publica also
    experienced distribution problems with the state postal system prior to
    the presidential elections, and the newspapers were confiscated from
    kiosks by authorities in Osh and Jalalabad.
        The opposition Kyrgyz-language newspaper Asaba again was subjected
    to pressure and intimidation shortly after the newspaper's owner
    declared his candidacy to run in the Presidential election. Two honor
    and dignity suits were lodged against the newspaper, a longstanding tax
    dispute continued, and a long-dormant debt case was reactivated against
    the newspaper. A Bishkek district court ruled on October 20 that Asaba
    must pay $105,000 (5 million soms) in compensation to parliamentary
    deputy Turdakun Usubaliev for having insulted him repeatedly over a
    period of 8 years Seven Asaba journalists also were ordered to pay $20
    to 30 (1,500 soms) each for articles critical of Usubaliyev. The
    newspaper had lodged a counter suit against Usubaliyev accusing him of
    insulting the newspaper and its journalists. The judge ruled in favor
    of the counter suit, Usubaliyev must pay the newspaper $1,000 (50,000
    soms).
        After a year of government harassment, tax investigations, and
    change of its editorial leadership and direction, the independent daily
    newspaper Vecherny Bishkek muted its criticism of the Government.
        In June an independent journalist from Jalalabad was sentenced to 2
    years' imprisonment and fined $2,250 (108,000 soms) for libeling a
    judge. After spending 5 weeks in jail, the journalist upon appeal was
    released and his fine was reduced to $210 (10,080 soms). Three NGO's,
    Internews, the Association of Journalists, and the Osh Media Resource
    Center provided legal representation for the journalist. On October 27
    the independent newspaper Res Publica was fined $5,000 (25,000 soms)
    for an article it published 2 years earlier that criticized the
    Ministry of Justice's decisions to revoke the registration of the
    Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights in September 1997 and to register in
    1998 an alternative body with the same name that was loyal to the
    Government.
        The Government harassed the owner, the editor, and a journalist of
    the independent newspaper Delo No. These journalists underwent lengthy
    interrogations by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and their offices
    and homes were raided and searched. A case is pending against the
    newspaper, alleging that it published state secrets during its coverage
    of the closed trial of Feliks Kulov. The Government also pressured
    independent television stations. The Government interfered with the
    stations' programming, particularly their coverage of politics,
    elections, and candidates. During Feliks Kulov's pretrial
    incarceration, the Government directed stations to air a documentary
    program that was highly critical of Kulov. Government interference with
    independent television and radio stations continues.
        There are two television stations in Osh that broadcast in Uzbek:
    Osh Television broadcasts in Uzbek part of the time--although the
    station has been criticized by the Government for airing too much Uzbek
    language programming--and Mezon Television, all of whose programs are
    in Uzbek. The latter was founded by the Mezon Uzbek Ethnic Center to
    serve the needs of the large Uzbek population in Osh. A case was
    pending against Mezon Television for broadcasting a candidate's
    political advertisement, which allegedly had the potential to inspire
    interethnic hatred during the parliamentary elections.
        Although Osh Television has a license to broadcast, its dispute
    with the National Agency for Communications (NAC) continues. The NAC
    required Osh Television to change its broadcast frequency. The station
    and the association of journalists continue to protest the change as
    unfair and not justified technically. It also would impose a financial
    hardship on the station. The NAC's directive that Osh Television switch
    channels was postponed until the end of the year. In addition Osh
    television is engaged in an ongoing dispute with the tax authorities
    for what it considers unfair tax assessments.
        Some independent media continue to operate despite these pressures.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; however, at times
    the Government restricted this right in practice. The Government on
    occasion used force to disrupt peaceful demonstrations and officials,
    including those at local levels, sometimes use regulations that require
    registration of rallies and demonstrations to restrict this right. The
    law requires official written permission for holding assemblies,
    rallies, and demonstrations.
        Permits are required for public marches and gatherings but are
    routinely available. Rallies and demonstrations are held regularly in
    front of the Government Building and in other places. Throughout the
    year, several peaceful protests were held outside the President's
    office. Those demonstrating included pensioners, political and human
    rights monitors, and ethnic groups living in the country, such as
    Uighurs and Kurds. During the year, there were many demonstrations
    protesting the results of the parliamentary elections and the arrests
    of opposition figures. On March 25, approximately 500 demonstrators
    gathered in front of the Constitutional Court in Bishkek to demonstrate
    against the results of the second round of parliamentary elections.
    This demonstration was held without incident. Throughout the spring,
    demonstrations were held by supporters, particularly in the Talas
    Oblast in support of Feliks Kulov (see Section 3). While the police and
    local authorities did not disrupt the majority of demonstrations, there
    were instances when the Government either broke up peaceful
    demonstrations, or harassed those protesting. There are credible
    reports that police used excessive force to break up a peaceful
    demonstration in Kara Bura (Talas Oblast) on March 20. Over 100
    demonstrators were arrested. In April demonstrators who were protesting
    Kulov's arrest throughout downtown Bishkek were required to move from
    the steps of a government building to a park. Local authorities stated
    that the demonstrators did not obtain the required permit and that the
    demonstrations were impeding traffic and creating disturbances. The
    demonstrators subsequently were moved to another, less public, area of
    Bishkek. Pro-Kulov demonstrators also gathered in front of various
    government offices and the White House. They also demonstrated in front
    of the U.S. Embassy and the office of the Organization for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These demonstrations were peaceful and
    were not broken up by police.
        The opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (``DDK'') was
    denied a permit to organize a demonstration in front of the White
    House.
        Demonstrations also were held in support of opposition People's
    Party Leader Daniyar Usenov, who was arrested and briefly detained
    after the second round of the parliamentary elections.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
    while the Government generally respects this right, at times local
    authorities inhibited it in practice.
        The 1991 Law on Public Organizations, which includes labor unions,
    political parties, and cultural associations, requires registration of
    these organizations with the Ministry of Justice. Excessive caution by
    some officials is a contributing element for the delay some
    organizations experience in registering. Ultimately all organizations
    that sought registration during the year were registered. The Kyrgyz
    Committee for Human Rights (KHCR) was reregistered in 1999; however,
    due to government pressure its president, Ramazan Dyryldaev, fled the
    country (see Section 4).
        In June 1999 Parliament passed a new law on NGO's. This law
    distinguishes NGO's from political parties, labor unions, and religious
    organizations and lowers the required number of members for
    registration. The President signed this law into effect at the end of
    1999.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the law provide for
    freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right
    in practice; however, the Government occasionally infringes on this
    right. The Constitution provides for a secular state and the separation
    of church and state, and the Government does not support any one
    religion. The Government expressly forbids the teaching of both
    religion and atheism in public schools.
        In 1996 the Government created a State Commission on Religious
    Affairs (SCRA), officially in order to promote religious tolerance,
    protect freedom of conscience, and oversee laws on religion. The
    Commission quickly became active and has overseen the registration of
    over 300 religious institutions, of which 210 are Christian
    denominations. According to a 1997 presidential decree, all religious
    organizations must register with the SCRA, which must recognize the
    registrant as a religious organization; each congregation must register
    separately. Subsequently a religious organization must register with
    the Ministry of Justice to obtain status as a legal entity, which is
    necessary to own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise engage in
    contractual activities. However, if a religious organization engages in
    commercial activity, it is required to pay taxes in accordance with the
    tax code. In practice the Ministry has never registered a religious
    organization without prior registration by the SCRA. There were no
    known instances during the year of the Commission refusing attempts by
    religious groups to register, although the process sometimes is
    cumbersome, taking a month on average. The Unification Church, which is
    registered as a social, rather than a religious organization, has
    ``semiofficial status''.
        Islam is the single most widely practiced faith. Official sources
    estimate that up to 80 percent of the populace Muslim. There are
    approximately 1,225 mosques in the country, of which 700 are
    registered. Approximately 17 percent of the population is Russian
    Orthodox. There are 40 houses of prayer for other Christian
    denominations. There were no reports of interference by authorities
    with worship services.
        A number of missionary groups operate in the country. They operate
    freely, although they are required to register with the Government.
    There is anecdotal evidence of periodic tension between followers of
    conservative Islam and foreign missionaries in rural areas. Government
    authorities indicated that they would monitor the activities of the
    Unification Church, which is led by Reverend Moon. The Unification
    Church currently is not active in the country, but it has a presence
    through the charity organization of Reverend Moon's wife. There were no
    reports of interference with its activities during the period covered
    by this report.
        The Government is concerned about the threat of political extremism
    in the guise of conservative Islam, whose followers it labels
    ``Wahabbis''. The sentencing in May of three Uighur Islamic militants
    who were charged with the 1998 bombings in Osh added to the
    Government's concern about ``Wahhabist'' elements operating in the
    country. Armed incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
    in August, as well as between August and October 1999, also increased
    the Government's apprehension about radical Islam and the actions of
    its followers.
        According to a March 21 Amnesty International report, Jelil Turadi,
    an ethnic Uighur Chinese national was arrested in Bishkek for not
    having a necessary residency permit. Unofficial sources stated that
    after a police search of his apartment turned up religious material
    that was deemed fundamentalist, Turadi was taken into custody for
    possessing ``Wahabbist'' material, and after being interrogated by
    Chinese and Kyrgyz security agents, was deported back to China.
        On September 6, security forces arrested a 23-year-old man in Kara
    Suu and charged him with instigating ``national, racial and religious
    enmity.'' He admitted to security forces that he belonged to the banned
    fundamentalist organization Hezeb-E-Tahrir. According to press
    accounts, eight persons were arrested in August for distributing
    literature produced by the IMU.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--In general government policy allows free
    travel within and outside the country; however, certain Soviet-era
    policies continue to complicate internal migration, resettlement, and
    travel abroad. Under the Soviet-era law still in force, citizens need
    official government permission (a propiska) to work and settle in a
    particular area of the country. Strictly speaking the propiska affords
    the right to reside in a given city or region. In addition home and
    apartment owners legally can sell their property only to buyers with
    such permission. In practice many employers traditionally have refused
    to provide employment to any applicant residing illegally. However,
    this law has not been enforced recently. Persons now move within the
    country, purchase homes, and sell businesses without hindrance.
        There is no law on emigration. In August 1999, a presidential
    decree stated that exit visa requirements would be abolished by October
    1999, and the law was fully implemented by the end of the year.
    Citizens now can travel abroad without an exit visa; however, some
    travelers still may be required to present letters of invitation to
    validate their passports for international travel for their first trips
    abroad, or for the purpose of emigration. After validation of the
    passport, travel is unrestricted. A Soviet-era law prohibits emigration
    within 5 years of working with state secrets. No one is believed to
    have been barred from emigration under this statute during the year.
    After validation of the passport, travel is unrestricted. All passport
    applications are reviewed by the Ministry of National Security.
    Emigration of both ethnic Russian and Russian-speakers has risen
    significantly since independence due to fears of discrimination, the
    threat of continued fighting in the south, and the issue of dual
    citizenship (an agreement recognizing dual citizenship has not been
    signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan). Since independence over 300,000
    ethnic Russians and 200,000 Russian-language speakers have emigrated
    from the country (see Section 5).
        Emigrants are not prevented from returning to the country, and
    there is reportedly a small but steady flow of returnees.
        The armed militants who crossed the border into southern portions
    of the country from Tajikistan caused an estimated 1,139 citizens to
    flee their homes and left them internally displaced. Most of those
    displaced have returned to their homes. The Government, assisted by
    NGO's and international organizations, rendered assistance to the
    displaced.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees.
        According to the UNHCR, there were approximately 140 refugees from
    Chechnya in the country who were granted first asylum. An additional
    11,671 were granted refugee status. Of this number, 1,000 were from
    Afghanistan, and the remainder from Tajikistan. Twenty-two asylum
    requests from Tajikistan were denied. Since 1993 the country has
    offered ``first asylum'' to those who have qualified for first asylum
    status.
        There were no reports of expulsion of those having a valid claim to
    refugee status. However, there were reports of Uighurs opposed to
    Chinese policies being repatriated forcibly to China where they feared
    persecution. The UNHCR assisted approximately 669 Tajik refugees to
    return to Tajikistan during the year.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully; however, in practice citizens' ability to do so
    is limited. During the year both presidential and parliamentary
    elections were held and both were marred by serious irregularities.
        The Constitution mandates presidential elections every 5 years.
    There is a two-term limit. Although the Constitution only allows an
    individual to serve two presidential terms, the Constitutional Court
    ruled that Akayev could serve a third term because he had been elected
    to his first term under the old Soviet-era Constitution. However the
    Government took steps to disqualify otherwise qualified candidates
    through conviction on questionable criminal charges.
        Akayev was elected to a third term as President on October 29 in an
    election that did not follow international standards for equal, free,
    fair, and accountable elections. Restrictions on the registration of
    candidates limited the field to six candidates, and there was
    intervention by local officials in the electoral process. The OSCE/
    ODIHR stated that ``international standards for equal, free, fair, and
    accountable elections were not met.'' Although six competing candidates
    offered the electorate some political choice, the restrictive process
    of candidate registration excluded a number of prominent opposition
    leaders from the election. Harassment of opposition candidates'
    activities negatively influenced the fairness of the campaign. Pressure
    against a major domestic election-monitoring NGO violated fundamental
    freedoms, a setback from the parliamentary elections. Executive
    authorities, mostly at local and regional levels, interfered in the
    functioning of election commissions and the electoral process in
    general. Campaign restrictions and biased media failed to ensure free
    and fair conditions for candidates. Central Election Commission
    chairman Sulaiman Imanbaev conceded that violations occurred but
    accused the OSCE of bowing to pressure from unnamed political forces to
    give an overly negative evaluation of the election.
        The law requires a demonstration of Kyrgyz language competency
    before final registration as a presidential candidate. According to the
    Election Code Article 61, command of the language is the ability to
    read, write, express one's thoughts and speak publicly. The examination
    is given by a linguistic commission. The procedure for evaluating the
    examination is not transparent, and the OSCE noted that the difficulty
    of the exam was not uniform for all candidates. Examination results
    eliminated seven candidates from the race, including several native
    Kyrgyz speakers. In September the Constitutional Court heard and
    rejected a challenge of the requirement brought by two candidates.
    According to the OSCE, the language test was used to limit the
    possibilities of participation by opposition candidates.
        The administration of voting procedure technically was correct. All
    six candidates remained on the ballot through election day. The
    independent media continued to appear until election day, although the
    Government interfered with the distribution of opposition newspapers.
    There were candidate observers in most, if not all precincts, although
    they tended to be poorly trained and unwilling to challenge precinct
    commissions when their rights as observers were violated. The
    Government excluded independent observers representing the constituent
    organizations of the ``Coalition of NGO's for Democracy and Civil
    Society'' from polling places. A pattern emerged whereby local
    Coalition representatives were denied admittance to polling places when
    the polls opened, then allowed to enter later in the day after they
    sought relief through the courts, then again denied access on technical
    grounds at the end of the voting day. As a result, Coalition
    representatives were not present in many polling places for the vote
    count.
        According to information released by the Central Election
    Commission, Akayev received 74.4 percent of the vote; his closest
    opponent Omurbek Tekebayev received 13.6 percent. The election was
    flawed in numerous ways including ballot box stuffing, voter
    intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts, a large presence of local
    and regional administration officials in and around the polling
    stations, and the discovery during opening procedures in a precinct in
    Bishkek of 700 ballots marked for Akayev in a ballot box that was
    supposed to be empty. In some instances, election observers were unable
    to witness the counting procedure to verify that votes were tallied for
    the candidate indicated on the ballot.
        In February and March, the first and second rounds of parliamentary
    elections were held. The Constitution provides for parliamentary
    elections every 5 years. For the first time, 15 of the Legislative
    Assembly's 60 seats were distributed proportionally based on party
    lists. The OSCE noted that executive and judicial branch interference
    in the electoral process continued through the runoffs, despite
    international criticism of these practices following the first round.
    In decisions that appear politically motivated, a number of prominent
    opposition candidates were disqualified or deregistered before the
    runoffs, despite having led the voting after the first round. Although
    there were improvements in overall election administration on the day
    of the vote, the process was marred by serious irregularities in a
    number of key electoral districts. There were allegations of ballot
    tampering, government intimidation of voters, and harassment of
    campaign officials in the elections of a number of opposition leaders.
        Prior to the parliamentary elections, the Government took numerous
    actions which disadvantaged opposition political parties. Four
    political parties, including one of the most popular opposition
    parties, the People's Party, were blocked from competing because their
    charters did not state specifically they could compete in elections for
    state bodies. In a legal challenge, the courts upheld this restriction
    in the election law. Eight parties were barred from competing because
    they were registered less than 1 year prior to the announcement of
    elections. This included a second major opposition party, the Ar-Namys
    Party, and the progovernment party Adilet. The participation of three
    registered parties, including the opposition Democratic Movement of
    Kyrgyzstan, subsequently was challenged on the grounds that their
    nominating conventions were conducted improperly.
        In March a district election commission deregistered opposition
    candidate Daniyar Usenov from the second round elections on technical
    grounds related to his alleged failure to include ownership of an
    apartment in his financial disclosure statement. On March 11, after the
    parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
    decision, but neither the Supreme Court nor the Central Election
    Commission (CEC) would permit a repeat of the election so that Usenov
    could run in his district. In another instance, on March 9 the
    Government declared the Issyk-Kul election invalid. The Government
    subsequently charged Omurbek Suvanaliyev, a leader of the Ar-Namys
    Party and candidate in that election, with fraud, making him ineligible
    to run in the second election.
        On March 10, the Government attempted to deregister Parliamentarian
    and candidate Omurbek Tekebayev in Bazar-Korgon for filing an allegedly
    false financial disclosure form. However, the court did not rule in the
    Government's favor. Before the court decision was rendered, hundreds of
    Tekebayev's supporters demonstrated and blocked streets in his
    district.
        Opposition candidate Feliks Kulov competed in both rounds of the
    elections but lost badly in the second round amid credible allegations
    of ballot tampering. His supporters demonstrated against the election
    in his district and in Bishkek for several months. The OSCE determined
    that in the second round of election, in district 44 (in which Kulov
    ran) there was clear evidence of systematic fraud committed by both
    state and election authorities. In the second round, more than 10
    candidates were automatically declared winners as a result of their
    opponents' refusal to run or, in 9 cases, the Government's cancellation
    of the opponents' registration.
        The conduct of elections in many places, especially in Talas and
    Jalalabad, was seriously flawed. Problems included credible reports of
    a massive increase in advance voting, vote buying, premarked ballots,
    ballots shown to officials before being deposited in the ballot box,
    and an atmosphere of intimidation in the election district, including
    threats to students of arrest and eviction from dormitories and
    confiscation of driver's licenses from truck drivers.
        Amendments approved in a 1996 constitutional referendum, which was
    marred by serious flaws, strengthened the formal power of the President
    and his advisers, who dominate the Government. The Parliament tends to
    be subordinate to the executive branch but shows increasing signs of
    independence, such as the overriding of presidential vetoes. During the
    year, Parliament adopted 33 laws, of which the President signed 11. The
    overwhelming majority of local government officials, including mayors
    and governors, continue to be appointed by the President, but the first
    elections for local legislative bodies were held in October 1999. The
    elections were flawed but were an improvement over the l996 referendum.
        Political parties remain weak. There are 27 registered political
    parties, 15 of which qualified for the proportional representation
    component of the parliamentary elections. To receive any of the 15
    seats available under proportional representation, parties must receive
    5 percent of the overall vote. The remaining seats are held by single-
    mandate candidates. In the lower chamber, 29 of 60 members elected in
    2000, including those elected to party seats, claimed party
    affiliation. In addition there is a parallel structure involving 3
    factions with a total of 23 members. In the upper chamber, the People's
    Representatives Assembly, 7 of 45 members claim party affiliation.
        Women and most ethnic minorities are underrepresented in government
    and politics. Women hold only 7 of 105 seats in the legislature. The
    Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court
    are women. The Democratic Party of Women participated in the
    parliamentary elections and won two party seats, earning 13 percent of
    the party-list votes. Russians and Uzbeks are underrepresented in
    government positions, although the newly named First Deputy Prime
    Minister, is an ethnic Russian, as was his predecessor. In December an
    ethnic Korean was appointed head of the Supreme Court.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operated in an increasingly hostile environment
    and were faced with continuous government pressure to curtail their
    activities, especially activities related to the parliamentary and
    presidential elections. Despite this pressure, most groups were able to
    continue investigating and publishing their findings on government
    interference with elections, as well as on human rights cases.
        The Government repeatedly threatened leaders of the Kyrgyz
    Committee for Human Rights (KCHR), the NGO Coalition for Democracy and
    Civil Society (Coalition), and the Republican party with criminal
    action for their activity on behalf of opposition political leaders and
    their supporters. On March 29, the Bishkek city prosecutor sent the
    Coalition a warning that the Coalition, together with the KCHR, the
    Public Union for Social Defense of the Population, Union of Kyrgyz
    Children and Women, and several political parties violated a law that
    prohibits the destabilization of society by preparing and distributing
    flyers that appealed for public support of Ar-Namys candidate Feliks
    Kulov (see Sections 1.d, 1.e, and 3). On March 30, the Bishkek city
    prosecutor summoned KCHR chairman Ramazan Dyryldayev and Republican
    Party chairman Giyaz Tokombayev and delivered the same warning.
        In June the Minister of Justice stated that since the Coalition was
    not registered as a public association with the Ministry, it did not
    have the right to receive funds from abroad to support its activities,
    nor could it assess internal political developments. Although no formal
    action was taken against the Coalition, threats against and
    intimidation of the coalition continued throughout the year.
        On May 31, the Government opened a criminal case against KCHR
    chairman Ramazan Dyryldayev for failure to comply with provisions of
    the Labor Code related to the firing of an employee. The fired employee
    in question was terminated during the period when the Government
    deregistered the KCHR and registered a different organization under
    different leadership under the KCHR's name. Also in May, the Government
    charged former KCHR deputy chairman Eleman Mambetaipov with
    misappropriation of furniture located in a room rented by the KCHR from
    the Ministry of Agriculture. At the trial, the judge would not accept
    evidence that the property in question was in its proper place. On July
    14, Mambetaipov was given a year prison sentence. Dyryldayev has
    remained abroad since July. In July police attempted to force their way
    into the office of the KCHR in an effort to locate him.
        In June the Government held a political roundtable including some
    political parties, NGO's, and social movements. The OSCE initially
    planned to hold such an event under its auspices. A preparatory
    committee consisting of nine representatives from the Government, nine
    representatives from NGO's, and nine representatives from political
    parties was established for the event. During the preparatory stage,
    two political parties, Ar-Namys, whose leader was in jail, and Kairan
    El, withdrew from the process because their conditions for
    participation were not met. On June 3, the Government withdrew from the
    preparations in favor of holding its own event. The majority of NGO's
    on the preparatory committee and five political parties refused to
    participate in the Government's roundtable due to unilateral changes of
    the agenda and the format of the discussion introduced by the
    Government. The OSCE withdrew its support for the event after the
    Government's refusal to abide by the formulation worked out by the
    preparatory committee but attended the event as an observer. OSCE
    observers stated that the meeting had flaws, including the absence of
    significant opposition elements and a failure to alleviate tensions
    that arose after the parliamentary election.
        The Government formed a progovernment NGO called the Association of
    NGO's (the Association). There are reports that local authorities apply
    pressure on independent NGO's to become affiliated with the government-
    organized Association. Only those NGO's with independent sources of
    funding are able to resist this pressure.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for the rights and freedom of individuals
    and prohibits discrimination, including that based on language, and the
    Government expresses a strong commitment to protecting the rights of
    members of all ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, as well as
    those of women; however, in practice it does not always ensure these
    rights effectively.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Research conducted in
    1996 on violence against women showed a noticeable increase in such
    incidents since independence in 1991. Activists note that rape is
    becoming more common. It is not clear whether the incidence of rape or
    only the reporting of such attacks is becoming more common, but
    authorities often ignore such attacks. Government statistics indicate
    that in 1999, there were 400 to 450 crimes against women, but many
    crimes never are reported due to psychological pressures, cultural
    traditions, and apathy by law enforcement officials. The Government has
    not devised a program to deal with this problem, and the number of
    shelters for battered women is not increasing to meet the need. The
    Umut (Hope) Center opened in 1997 to provide basic protection as well
    as psychological, legal, and medical counseling for battered women and
    girls. The Umut Center has organized biweekly discussions and training
    for women to advise and counsel them about their rights. It provides 10
    days of emergency shelter, clothing, and meals for battered women as
    well as employment counseling and legal services. In 1998 the director
    attributed the rise in the number of women visiting the shelter to the
    country's severe economic crisis, which had led to increased violence
    against women. Umut received grants from a variety of foreign sources
    during the year, and provided shelter for 165 persons and provided
    advice to 1,524 others through its hot line. Umut also offers
    psychiatric counseling to victims. There were internationally funded
    crisis centers for women in need of such assistance in both Talas and
    Jalalabad.
        In 1997 the NGO Tendesh opened a crisis center in Naryn with a hot
    line to support women affected by violence. It provides psychological,
    legal, and medical assistance. Another center, Sezim, opened in April
    1998 in Bishkek with a staff of lawyers, psychologists, and doctors,
    and operates a crisis hot line for the public. Staff members conduct
    training, debates, and seminars on women's rights and family planning.
    During the year, at least three new programs were introduced to address
    the needs of women by NGO's. The Congress of Women has set up legal
    clinics for women throughout the country to help counsel women on legal
    issues and women's' issues. Center Mercy embarked on a program to find
    employment in handicraft production for mothers of large families. The
    Center for Women's Initiative Aigerim introduced programs to assist
    with needy families.
        Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a growing problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Discrimination against women persists. The law gives equal status
    to women, and they are well represented in the work force, in
    professions, and in institutions of higher learning. Women are
    prominent in law, medicine, accounting, and banking. They also play an
    active role in the rapidly growing nongovernmental sector.
        During the parliamentary elections, NGO's embarked on programs to
    help educate women in the electoral process and on their voters'
    rights. The Center of Women's Initiative Aigerim helped train women to
    monitor during the parliamentary elections. According to Counterpart
    Consortium, 293 NGO's dealing with women's issues operated in the
    country during the year, of which 25 deal with women's advocacy. In
    1999 women's advocacy NGO's sent an appeal to the Government,
    Parliament, journalists, international organizations, as well as other
    NGO's in support of women's rights. Nonetheless deteriorating economic
    conditions have had a severe effect on women, who are more likely than
    men to lose their jobs. According to a U.N. Development Program report,
    as of January, the unemployment figures for women were considerably
    larger (58,300) than those for men (48,100). For women the average
    wages were lower than $13 per month (637 soms), and for men $18 per
    month (881 soms). Women with children under the age of 16 account for
    67 percent of unemployed women. Women make up the majority of
    pensioners who have felt the negative effects of the country's economic
    downturn as inflation has eroded pensions that often are paid late.
    Women's groups express general concern about the situation of rural
    women. With the end of communism, traditional attitudes toward women
    are reasserting themselves strongly in the countryside, where women are
    relegated to the role of wife and mother, and educational opportunities
    are curtailed. Data indicate that women are becoming less healthy, more
    abused, less able to work outside the home, and less able to dispose of
    their earnings independently.
        Family law prohibits divorce during pregnancy and while a child is
    younger than 1 year of age. A special expert counsel under the State
    Commission on Family, Women, and Youth Issues reviewed all legislation
    for a gender perspective and submitted its recommendations to
    Parliament. The findings demonstrate that while women's rights are
    supported by legislation, the principle of women's equality is not
    always observed.
        The women's advocacy NGO community is becoming increasingly
    organized. As a result of conferences held in 1999 an appeal was sent
    to the Government, Parliament, journalists, NGO's, and international
    organizations in support of women's rights.
        Children.--The socioeconomic situation does not effectively provide
    decent living conditions for all children. Basic needs for shelter,
    food, and clothing seldom are met, and the Government does not take
    effective measures to address these needs. After independence, vaccine-
    preventable diseases such as diphtheria, polio, and measles reemerged.
    A range of serious nutrition-related problems affects a large number of
    children, especially in rural areas. Traditional social safety measures
    are now inadequate to cope with the social pressures that affect
    families, and in major cities children regularly are observed begging
    or selling cigarettes. There are increasing reports of abandonment due
    to parents' lack of resources to care for children.
        Education is compulsory for the first 9 years, and the country has
    a 97 percent literacy rate. However, the educational system has
    suffered material and financial hardships, and conditions continue to
    deteriorate due to an acute shortage of budgetary and material
    resources. The Government established two funds, Jetkinchek and Kadry
    XXI Veka (Cadres the 21st Century), to provide educational benefits for
    low-income and disabled children. Jetkinchek, a Presidential
    Educational Program, created in 1999, provides assistance such as pens,
    books, clothes to low-income children. The program is funded primarily
    by the Government but has received assistance from international
    organizations. Kadry XXI Veka is another government program financed by
    international organizations that helps talented youth continue their
    education abroad.
        The Law on Education requires that secondary education be free and
    universal. However, financial constraints prevent the Government from
    implementing this for all students. According to the Criminal Code, the
    penalty for infringing on a student's right to obtain free secondary
    education ranges from receiving a public reprimand to 1 year of forced
    labor. The law penalizes parents who do not send their children to
    school or obstruct their attendance. Many of those families who can
    afford it choose to send their children to more expensive private
    schools. Moreover those families that keep their children in public
    schools must pay administrative fees. These costs add up and are
    difficult for families, particularly large ones, to bear.
        The Government and its Commission on the Affairs of Under-age
    Children disseminate information regarding children's rights among both
    children and adults. The Ministries of Justice, Education, Science and
    Culture, and Health as well as the state television and radio company
    and various NGO's also help disseminate information including by
    translations into Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek in order to reach those
    segments of the population that speak different languages. There are
    also plans to publish textbooks on human rights problems for high
    school students, with information on children's rights. The Talent
    Support Fund, an NGO funded by Save the Children and UNICEF, produced a
    series of educational television programs titled ``The Rights of
    Children in Kyrgyzstan'' to help educate the population.
        Human rights groups and the Kyrgyz Children's Fund (KCF) monitor
    the condition of children. Human rights groups note that children who
    are arrested usually are denied lawyers. Police often do not notify
    parents of children who are arrested, and neither parents nor lawyers
    generally are present during questioning, despite laws to the contrary.
    Children often are intimidated into signing confessions.
        The KCF is concerned about the growing number of street children,
    many of whom have left home because of abusive or alcoholic parents.
    Social workers and police regularly conduct street sweeps to locate
    abandoned children. Children who are found are sent to orphanages and
    police holding centers depending on the amount of space available. The
    KCF has one shelter in Bishkek to provide food, clothing, and schooling
    to approximately 30 children In 1999, the Svetlii Put shelter (formerly
    known as the Ak Zhol shelter), was reestablished with assistance from
    UNICEF. During the year, the shelter received training assistance from
    UNICEF and cared for approximately 32 children. The SOS Children's
    Village, funded by the Austrian organization Kinder Dorf International
    and other foreign and domestic organizations, opened in 1998 to care
    for orphans. Approximately 110 children and 14 mothers live in this
    village, which offers housing and a kindergarten.
        Girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.).
        The forced marriage of underage girls has become more common, and
    the authorities often tacitly approve this practice. Cultural
    traditions and social structures discourage victims from going to the
    authorities.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government passed the Law on Social
    Protection of Invalids in 1991 and adopted amendments in October 1998.
    The amendments provide for convenient access to public transportation
    and parking for the disabled; subsidies for mass media sources that
    make their services available to the hearing or visually impaired; and
    free plots of land to construct a home. Social facilities for the
    mentally disabled are strained severely, as budgets have fallen and
    workloads remain heavy. In one program facilitated by foreign
    volunteers, local high school students have begun to visit special
    institutions such as those for the mentally disabled.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are reports of
    discrimination in the treatment of citizens who are not ethnic Kyrgyz.
    The most recent statistical data reflect the following ethnic breakdown
    of the population: 61.2 percent are Kyrgyz; 14.9 percent are Russians;
    14.4 percent are Uzbeks; 1.1 percent are Tatars; 0.3 percent are
    Germans; and others constitute 8.1 percent. Members of the minorities
    allege discrimination in hiring, promotion, and housing. They complain
    that government officials at all levels favor ethnic Kyrgyz.
        Russian-speaking citizens (those who do not speak Kyrgyz) also
    allege that a ceiling exists in government employment that precludes
    their promotion beyond a certain level. The representation of ethnic
    Kyrgyz at senior and intermediate levels of government is
    disproportionately high, giving credence to perceptions that career
    opportunities in government are limited for those who are not ethnic
    Kyrgyz. There also were complaints about discrimination against non-
    Kyrgyz in the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).
        Since independence, over 300,000 ethnic Russians and 200,000
    Russian-language speakers have emigrated. In order to help stem the
    tide of migration, the Government passed legislation elevating Russian
    to the status of an ``official language.'' On May 20, President Akayev
    issued a decree to moderate emigration by improving the situation of
    ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. During the year, a bilateral
    agreement was signed with Russia on the legal status of Russian
    citizens living in Russia and Kyrgyz citizens living in Russia. This
    agreement is to provide maximum social benefits possible under Kyrgyz
    law for those Russian citizens living in the country.
        The Constitution designates Kyrgyz as the state language, but it
    provides for preservation and equal and free development of Russian and
    other languages spoken in the country. Kyrgyz increasingly is replacing
    Russian, and the Government has announced that by 2010 all government
    documents are to be in Kyrgyz. A new draft law that was introduced in
    November allows for Russian to be used in the workplace until measures
    can be established to change to Kyrgyz. On March 20, President Akayev
    issued a draft decree calling for all high and middle-level government
    officials to have sufficient proficiency in Kyrgyz, with the aim to
    have all official business conducted in Kyrgyz by 2005. This draft
    decree was not enacted into law as a result of widespread criticism.
    Candidates in the 2000 presidential elections were required to
    demonstrate ability in Kyrgyz. Some otherwise qualified candidates were
    disqualified on the basis of exams, the fairness of which was
    questioned (see Section 3).
        University education is carried out largely in Russian (although
    Kyrgyz instruction is available in some departments in some
    universities, where textbooks are available), so that Russian-language
    capability remains an important skill for those who wish to pursue
    higher learning.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor law provides for the
    right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions, and there is
    no evidence that the Government has tried to obstruct the formation of
    independent unions. The Federation of Trade Unions of Kyrgyzstan, the
    successor to the former official union, remains the only trade union
    umbrella organization in the country, although unions are not required
    to belong to it. The Federation forms one part of a bilateral
    commission, along with the Cabinet. Each year the two parties sign an
    agreement on ``cooperation.'' There is one small independent union, the
    Union of Entrepreneurs and Small Business Workers, whose membership
    reached approximately 80,000. Precise numbers for the Federation's
    membership are not available, but it is significantly larger than other
    unions.
        The Federation has been critical of government policies, especially
    privatization, and their effect on working class living standards. The
    Federation still regards itself as being in a process of transition,
    during which it is adjusting its relations with the Government, with
    other unions in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and with
    other foreign unions. Growing numbers of smaller unions are not
    affiliated with the umbrella organization.
        The law calls for practices consistent with international
    standards.
        While the right to strike is not codified, strikes are not
    prohibited. There were no retaliatory actions against strikers, nor
    were there instances of abuse generally directed at unions or
    individual workers. During the year, there were several instances when
    workers repairing the Bishkek-Osh Highway went on strike against
    foreign companies that employed them since they did not receive payment
    for their work. In November vendors at the Dorodoi Market in Bishkek
    went on strike to protest against the decision of the Dorodoi Market's
    administration to allocate preferred selling areas to Chinese merchants
    over local merchants.
        The law permits unions to form and join federations and to
    affiliate with international trade union bodies. Since independent
    unions are still in their infancy, no meaningful affiliation with
    international trade union bodies has taken place.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    recognizes the right of unions to negotiate for better wages and
    conditions. Although overall union structure and practice are changing
    only slowly from those of the Soviet era, there is growing evidence of
    active union participation in state-owned and privatized enterprises.
    The Government sets the minimum wage, and then each employer sets its
    own wage level.
        The law protects union members from antiunion discrimination, and
    there were no recorded instances of discrimination against anyone
    because of union activities.
        There are Free Economic Zones (FEZ's) that can be used as export
    processing zones. The minimum wage law does not apply to the
    approximately 3,000 workers in ordinary FEZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids
    forced or compulsory labor, as well as forced or bonded labor by
    children; however, women and girls are trafficked for the purpose of
    forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Although the majority of children are enrolled in school,
    child labor is a problem.
        Provisions of the Labor Code, the Law on Public Safety, and the Law
    on the Protection of Rights of Underage Children address child labor.
    The Labor Code provides for the protection of children from economic
    exploitation and from work that poses a danger to their health, or
    spiritual, physical, mental, or academic development. The Labor Code is
    contradictory in the requirements it sets for the minimum age of
    employment in work that can harm their physical and moral well being
    (i.e. employment in casinos, bars, night clubs, etc.). Article 285
    states that such work is prohibited for those under age 21; however,
    Article 319 prohibits such employment for those under age 18. According
    to Article 317 of the Labor Code, those between 14 and 16 years of age
    are permitted to perform strenuous work with parental consent. However,
    minors less than 18 years of age cannot work in underground conditions.
    Minors between 18 and 21 years of age may not perform hazardous or
    manual work. Article 319 sets the maximum daily hours of work for those
    between 14 and 16 years of age at 5 to 7 hours respectively. Underage
    children cannot work beyond this limit or during night shifts. These
    laws also apply to disabled children who work.
        Given its budget constraints and lack of resources, the Government
    is unable to enforce adequately these laws. Although those employers
    who are caught violating the Labor Code can be charged with
    disciplinary, financial, administrative, or criminal penalties, the
    punishment is usually minimal.
        Child labor is becoming more widespread both in towns and rural
    areas. Since many children are ``self-employed'' (selling newspapers,
    carrying handcarts at markets, selling cigarettes and candy on the
    streets, etc.) or work for their families, it is very difficult for the
    Government to determine if their work schedule and environment conform
    to government regulations. Families are traditionally large, and it is
    sometimes necessary for children to work at an early age to help
    support the family on the family farm or in the family business.
        According to reports from various NGO's, child labor is
    particularly evident in the south. During the fall, classes are
    cancelled, and children are sent to fields to pick cotton. During the
    summer, children are used to harvest tobacco and are involved in all
    steps of production from the actual picking of the leaves to the
    preparation for shipping. Some fields are located on school grounds,
    and the income earned goes directly to the schools, not to the
    children. Children also are involved in family enterprises such as
    shepherding, bread baking, selling products at roadside kiosks, and
    growing fruits and vegetables.
        The Prosecutor's Office and the State Labor Inspectorate are
    responsible for enforcing employers' compliance with Labor Code laws.
    The legislative assembly has established a special commission on
    education, women's affairs, the family, and minors, which oversees the
    legal protection of the interests of minors whenever new laws are
    discussed in Parliament. Public control of compliance with the labor
    code is enforced by trade unions, a function holdover from the Soviet
    period.
        The Government has undertaken additional initiatives to help
    protect minors from forced labor. Since the budget is facing severe
    funding constraints, many children who are entitled to receive help do
    not.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but
    does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government mandates a
    national minimum wage at a level theoretically sufficient to assure a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. The legal minimum
    wage is about $2.50 (100 soms) per month. In practice this wage is
    insufficient to ensure a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family, and therefore industries and employers set the minimum level
    wages that actually are paid. The Federation is responsible for
    enforcing all labor laws, including the law on minimum wages. Minimum
    wage regulations largely are observed. However, the enforcement of
    labor laws is nonexistent in the growing underground economy. Market
    forces help wages in the unofficial sector keep pace with official wage
    scales.
        The standard workweek is 41 hours, usually within a 5-day week. For
    state-owned industries, there is a mandated 24-hour rest period in the
    workweek.
        Safety and health conditions in factories are poor. Despite the
    recent improvement in economic growth, the previous deterioration in
    enforcement of existing regulations continued to hamper investment to
    improve health and safety standards. In March 1999, the State
    Inspectorate of Labor was established to protect and educate workers as
    well as also inform business owners on their respective rights and
    responsibilities. A 1992 law established occupational health and safety
    standards, as well as enforcement procedures. Besides government
    inspection teams, trade unions are assigned active roles in assuring
    compliance with these measures, but the deterioration of the economy
    has led to an uneven compliance record among businesses. Workers have
    the legal right to remove themselves from unsafe working conditions,
    and workers who choose not to work in an unsafe environment may find
    employment elsewhere. However, in practice refusal to work in
    situations with relatively high accident rates or associated chronic
    health problems could result in loss of employment, although only if
    informal methods of resolution failed.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides that those involved in
    trafficking can be sentenced up to 15 years' imprisonment; however,
    very few traffickers are caught, and those that are receive lenient
    sentences or fines. A lack of coordination between government agencies
    involved in migration issues, the obscure wording of laws regarding
    trafficking issues, and corruption contribute to the problem. The
    trafficking of Kyrgyz women and girls,largely to Turkey, Germany, and
    the United Arab Emirates for the purpose of forced prostitution, is a
    growing problem. According to the International Office of Migration
    (IOM), approximately 4,000 women and 7 boys were trafficked abroad in
    1999. Often women are trafficked through deception. They are lured
    abroad under the pretext of legitimate employment (i.e. waitresses, au
    pairs, dancers, etc.), and by the time they discover the true intent of
    the traffickers, they find themselves without the money for return
    tickets, without documents, and are forced to agree to the conditions
    and terms of the employers. A flourishing sex trade draws girls, as
    young as age 10, from destitute mountain villages. Several media
    articles have raised public awareness of the problem. The Ministry of
    Interior had planned to establish a special police unit to combat
    trafficking but was unable to do so due to lack of funding.
        According to IOM, fraudulent passports are issued to those being
    trafficked. Eleven law enforcement officers have been accused of
    preparing fraudulent documentation for trafficked women, and criminal
    proceedings have begun against three of the accused officers. During
    the year, 4 persons were tried and sentenced to prison terms for
    trafficking; 18 persons were tried and sentenced in 1999.
        Trafficked women do not normally receive assistance due to lack of
    understanding of the problem. Many have reported being victimized by
    law enforcement officials upon their return.
                                   __________

                                     LATVIA

        Latvia is a parliamentary democracy. The Prime Minister, as chief
    executive, and the Cabinet are responsible for government operations.
    The President, as Head of State, is elected by the Parliament (Saeima).
    The Saeima elected Vaira Vike-Freiberga to a 4-year term in June 1999.
    The October 1998 elections for the 100-seat Parliament and the national
    referendum to amend the Citizenship Law to meet European standards were
    free and fair. The judiciary is independent but not well-trained,
    efficient, or free from corruption.
        The security apparatus consists of: The national police and other
    services, such as the Special Immigration Police and the Border Guards,
    who are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior; municipal police under
    local government control; the military Counterintelligence Service and
    a protective service under the Ministry of Defense; and the National
    Guard, an element of the national armed forces, which also assists in
    police activities. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective
    control of the security forces. The Constitution Protection Bureau
    (SAB) is responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. Some
    members of the security forces, including police and other Interior
    Ministry personnel, committed human rights abuses.
        Privatization essentially is complete, although some large utility
    companies remain in state hands including the national electric
    company, railroads, and shipping. The currency remained stable and
    traded freely; unemployment was 7.8 percent, and annual inflation was
    1.8 percent. Per capita gross domestic product was approximately
    $2,950.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    and the large resident noncitizen community; however, problems remained
    in certain areas. Members of the security forces, including the police
    and other Interior Ministry personnel, sometimes used excessive force.
    In most instances, the Government took disciplinary measures against
    those responsible. Prison conditions remained poor. Lengthy pretrial
    detention was a problem. The inefficient judiciary did not always
    ensure the fair administration of justice. Women are discriminated
    against in the workplace. Domestic violence, trafficking in women
    (including minors), and child prostitution and abuse are significant
    problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        In March 1999, a member of the security police shot and killed two
    persons and injured three others during a bar fight in Jelgava. In
    October he was sentenced to 20 years in prison; he appealed to the
    Supreme Court, which affirmed the verdict of the lower court.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there were
    credible reports that police and prison guards mistreated persons. In
    September 1999, four prison guards at Riga Central Prison were
    dismissed for excessive use of force against prisoners.
        In conjunction with the Soros Foundation and the National Human
    Rights Office (NHRO), the Ministry of Interior continued its programs
    for educating police officers about human rights concerns. In 1999 a
    local nongovernmental organization (NGO) established a free legal
    advisory service for prisoners and others who believe that they were
    victims of police abuse (see Section 4).
        Prison conditions remained poor, although human rights groups noted
    some improvements during the year. Prison cells often are overcrowded
    severely. Inadequate sanitation facilities, persistent shortages of
    blankets and medical care, and insufficient lighting and ventilation
    are common problems, as is the shortage of resources in general. Most
    jails badly need renovation. The Government has taken additional steps
    to upgrade certain facilities. The NHRO records complaints of
    violations of the right to humane treatment and respect of dignity.
    During the year, 47 prisoners filed complaints concerning their
    treatment, and 19 persons filed such complaints relating to the police.
    The NHRO investigates each complaint. Human rights groups are alarmed
    by the number of drug-resistant tuberculosis cases in the prisons, and
    the Government has received assistance from several foreign
    organizations to address this problem. Although the number of
    tuberculosis cases has decreased, the Riga central prison hospital
    remains overcrowded at close to 200 percent capacity.
        At a prominent conference attended by human rights groups and
    government officials in November, the deputy director of the prison
    administration and the Prosecutor General criticized the the Government
    for its failure to improve the Criminal Code and provide resources to
    the judicial system. Two youths committed suicide in July while in
    pretrial detention awaiting trial for murder. They were held in the
    same cell, one for 17 months, the other for 5 months. The archaic
    provisions of the Criminal Code make it difficult to investigate and
    move a case forward in the court system. Press reports estimate that 70
    percent of all juveniles in prisons are awaiting trial. While most have
    been waiting for about 2 years, some have been waiting 4 years or more.
    Unlike convicts, those in pretrial detention are not allowed to work or
    go to school, have limited contact with outside NGO's or family, and
    suffer considerably worse living conditions than prisoners in general.
    The deputy director of the prison system also noted the lack of work
    and job training for inmates and the need to provide social support to
    inmates after release.
        The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires the
    Prosecutor's Office to make a formal decision whether to charge or
    release a detainee within 72 hours after arrest. Charges must be filed
    within 10 days of arrest. There were no known instances of arbitrary
    arrest. The responsibility for issuing arrest warrants was transferred
    from prosecutors to the courts in 1994. Detainees have the right to
    have an attorney present at any time. These rights are subject to
    judicial review but only at the time of trial. According to credible
    reports, these rights are not always respected in practice, especially
    outside of Riga.
        According to Ministry of Interior personnel, detainees awaiting
    trial spend an average of 2 years in prison, but many have been there
    much longer. More than 40 percent of all inmates are in pretrial
    detention. Complaints were filed by 94 prisoners during the year
    concerning their right to a just and timely trial.
        The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
    use.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
    provision in practice. However, the courts must rely on the Ministry of
    Justice for administrative support, and the judiciary is not well
    trained, efficient, or free from corruption.
        The judicial structure is composed of district (city) courts,
    regional courts, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court. The
    Constitutional Court is a seven-judge panel that is authorized to hear
    cases regarding constitutional issues at the request of state
    institutions or individuals who believe that their constitutional
    rights were violated.
        The Government continued to reform the judicial system. In 1995 it
    completed the establishment of regional courts to hear appeals of lower
    court decisions. For more serious criminal cases, two lay assessors
    join the professional judge on the bench. Corruption in the judicial
    system reportedly is widespread. In 1997 the judges appointed to
    preside over the trial of the president of the collapsed Bank Baltija,
    Aleksander Lavent, resigned from the case, citing alleged political
    pressure from the Government. The accusation came after the judges
    released Lavent to house arrest following a heart attack that he
    suffered in the courtroom on the first day of the trial. In December
    1998, the courts determined that Lavent had recovered his health, and
    he was returned from house arrest to prison. The trial of Lavent and
    his alleged accomplices resumed briefly in the fall, but it was
    suspended again at year's end 1999. The trial resumed in 2000 but was
    suspended again due to the defendant's illness. On July 27, Lavent
    filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights accusing the
    Latvian courts of violating his right to a fair and speedy trial. In
    October Lavents led a hunger strike with several other prisoners to
    protest lengthy pretrial detention.
        Most judges have inadequate judicial training, and the court system
    is too weak to enforce many of its decisions. A major difficulty in
    enforcing court decisions is the continuing lack of an effective
    bailiff or sheriff system. In 1999 a new criminal law went into force,
    which allows for more alternative punishments, including community
    service. Despite the new law, alternative punishments are utilized
    rarely by the courts.
        Court decisions are not published systematically, nor is there a
    centralized index for those that are published. Trials may be closed if
    state secrets might be revealed or to protect the interests of minors.
    All defendants have the right to hire an attorney, and the State will
    lend funds to destitute defendants for this purpose. Defendants have
    the right to read all charges, confront all witnesses, and may call
    witnesses and offer evidence to support their case. They also may make
    multiple appeals.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires that law enforcement authorities have
    a judicial warrant in order to intercept citizens' mail, telephone
    calls, or other forms of communication. The laws protecting privacy
    apply to citizens and noncitizens equally. There were no credible
    reports of the unsanctioned wiretapping of the telephone conversations.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice. The 1991 Press Law prohibits
    censorship of the press or other mass media. Most newspapers and
    magazines are privately owned. Newspapers in both Latvian and Russian
    publish a wide range of political criticism and viewpoints.
        A large number of independent television and radio outlets
    broadcast in both Russian and Latvian, and the number of persons
    receiving satellite television broadcasts continued to increase.
        The Law on the Media, revised in October 1998, contains a number of
    restrictive provisions regulating the content and language of
    broadcasts. No less than 51 percent of television broadcasts must be of
    European origin, of which 40 percent should be in the Latvian language.
    However, these provisions are not always implemented. In addition
    foreign investment may not exceed 20 percent of the capital in
    electronic media organizations.
        There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for peaceful assembly, and the authorities may not prohibit
    public gatherings; however, organizers of demonstrations must provide
    advance notice to local authorities, who may change the time and place
    of public gatherings for such reasons as fear of public disorder. In
    1997 the Saeima passed legislation on public demonstrations that
    requires protesters to remain specified distances from foreign
    missions, the Saeima, the Prosecutor's Office, and certain other public
    institutions. While the law purports to imitate Western European
    statutes, independent human rights organizations find its provisions
    contradictory and confusing. Numerous demonstrations nevertheless took
    place peacefully and without government interference during the year.
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to associate in
    public organizations; however, the Law on Registering Public
    Organizations bars the registration of Communist, Nazi, or other
    organizations whose activities would contravene the Constitution.
    Noncitizens can join and form political parties, but there must be at
    least 200 citizens in the party and at least half of the total
    membership must be citizens. More than 40 political parties are
    registered officially.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, bureaucratic problems for minority religions persist. There is
    no state religion, but the Government distinguishes between
    ``traditional'' (Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believers,
    Baptists, and Jewish) and ``new'' religions.
        Although the Government does not require the registration of
    religious groups, the 1995 Law on Religious Organizations accords
    religious organizations certain rights and privileges when they
    register, such as status as a separate legal entity for owning property
    or other financial transactions, as well as tax benefits for donors.
        By law any 10 citizens or permanent residents over the age of 18
    may apply to register a church. Congregations functioning in the
    country for the first time that do not belong to a church association
    already registered must reregister each year for 10 years.
    Congregations numbering 10 or more of the same denomination having
    permanent registration status may form a religious association. Only
    churches with religious association status may establish theological
    schools or monasteries. A decision to register a church is made by the
    Minister of Justice.
        According to Ministry of Justice officials, most registration
    applications are approved eventually once proper documents are
    submitted. The Ministry has registered over 1,000 congregations.
    Problems arise and registration is denied because the Law on Religious
    Organizations does not permit simultaneous registration of more than
    one religious union (church) in a single confession. Because of this
    provision, the Government can not register any splinter groups,
    including an independent Jewish congregation, the Latvian Free Orthodox
    Church, and a separate Old Believers group. The Christian Scientists
    have been refused registration due to opposition from the Doctors
    Association.
        Shortly after the renewal of independence in 1991, the Vatican,
    with the support of the Latvian Catholic community, requested
    negotiations for a reestablishment of the 1922 Concordat, which existed
    between Latvia and the Vatican during Latvia's period of independence
    between World War I and World War II. In 1996 the Prime Minister
    established a working group to negotiate a new agreement. This
    agreement reportedly would grant the Roman Catholic Church privileged
    status. The negotiations have led to some concern among members of
    other religions. If approved it is expected that adherents of other
    faiths would seek similar recognition and benefits for their own
    religious community. In November the draft agreement was submitted to
    the Saima for review.
        Visa regulations require that religious workers present either an
    ordination certificate or evidence of religious education that
    corresponds to a Latvian bachelor's degree in theology. The visa
    application process still is cumbersome. However, difficulties in this
    area diminished, and Citizenship and Migration Department officials
    have worked to ease the situation. The Government cooperated to resolve
    several difficult visa cases in favor of missionary workers.
        Foreign evangelists and missionaries are permitted to hold meetings
    and to proselytize, but the law stipulates that only domestic religious
    organizations may invite them to conduct such activities. Foreign
    religious denominations have criticized this provision.
        The law provides that religion may be taught to students in public
    schools on a voluntary basis only by representatives of Evangelical
    Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believer, Baptist, and Jewish
    religions. The State provides funds for this education. Students at
    state-supported national minority schools also may receive education on
    the religion ``characteristic of the national minority'' on a voluntary
    basis. Other denominations may provide religious education in private
    schools only.
        The Latvian Lutheran Church established its own clergy education
    center, the Luther Academy in Riga, in 1998. The Roman Catholic Church
    also has its own seminary but wants to establish its own separate
    faculty of theology at the University of Latvia or, alternatively, join
    forces with a Catholic university elsewhere in Europe that would issue
    degrees. The University of Latvia's theological faculty is now
    nondenominational.
        Citizen's passports currently indicate the ethnicity of the bearer.
    Jews are considered an ethnic group and are listed as such rather than
    Latvian, Russian, etc.
        Jewish community leaders have regained a number of major properties
    around the country, and they report that the legal framework for
    restitution of religious property is adequate. While restitution of a
    few Jewish properties proceeds, the process is slow, complex, and often
    delayed by legal wrangling and bureaucratic obstacles.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government
    has readmitted noncitizens who claimed refugee status in a foreign
    country, or who voluntarily abandoned their permanent residence and
    then decided to return to the country to live and work. Noncitizens who
    left the country as refugees based on Soviet-era persecution have no
    difficulty returning on foreign refugee travel documents for business
    reasons or for family visits. The Government also extends protections
    to noncitizen residents who travel abroad.
        The 1995 Law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens stipulates
    that registered permanent resident noncitizens enjoy the right to
    establish and change residences, travel abroad, and return to the
    country. Noncitizens, as well as citizens, may be granted amnesty.
    However, certain rights are denied to noncitizens. They are prohibited
    from working as armed guards or criminal trial attorneys. Noncitizens
    may own land only under complex procedures but may not purchase land in
    the border zones. The law also provides for the issuance of a
    noncitizen travel document that certifies these rights.
        The Government works closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees, and the Law on Asylum Seekers and Refugees complies with all
    provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Special immigration police and border
    guards units help prescreen asylum requests. Decisions of the Citizens
    and Migration Affairs Office can be appealed to the Asylum Appeals
    Board in the Ministry of Justice.
        The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during the
    year and never has arisen. According to statistics provided by the
    immigration police, during the year 1,126 aliens were detained for
    questioning. Of those, 218 were deported, and 79 departed voluntarily.
    The Government has approached Russia and Belarus about concluding
    refugee readmission agreements, the lack of which poses a major barrier
    to effective control of the eastern border. However, by year's end
    agreements had not been concluded.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. Free and fair elections for Parliament were held in
    1998, and in June 1999 the Parliament elected the President. In the
    1998 election, candidates from 6 of the 21 participating parties,
    representing a broad political spectrum, won Saeima seats, and 72
    percent of eligible voters participated.
        The election law prohibits persons who remained active in the
    Communist Party or various other pro-Soviet organizations after January
    13, 1991, or who worked for such institutions as the former Soviet
    Committee for State Security, from seeking elected office. Noncitizens,
    most of whom are ethnic Russians, are not allowed to vote; however,
    many ethnic Russians are Latvian citizens and can vote.
        On December 15, 1999, the Supreme Court upheld a regional court
    decision that the extreme Russian nationalist of the Equal Rights
    Movement and Riga city council deputy Tatyana Zhdanok was not eligible
    to run for public office due to her pro-Soviet activites after Janury
    13, 1991. After the Riga City Council annulled her election, Zhdanok
    filed suit against the Latvian Government in the European Court of
    Human Rights.
        Following the restoration of independence in 1991, citizenship was
    accorded immediately only to those persons who were citizens of the
    independent Latvian Republic in 1940 and their direct descendants.
    After independence the status of approximately 670,000 persons, mostly
    ethnic Russians, changed from citizens of the Soviet Union to
    noncitizen residents in Latvia. Since 1995 about 39,000 persons have
    become citizens. Approximately 35 percent or 14,00 of these persons
    were naturalized in 2000 alone. Owing to the Russification policy
    pursued during the Soviet era, ethnic Latvians constitute only 56
    percent of a total population of 2.5 million, and 78 percent of
    citizens. Ethnic Latvians do not constitute a majority in three of
    Latvia's seven cities.
        The 1998 Citizenship Law includes a Latvian language and residence
    requirement for those seeking to naturalize, as well as restrictions on
    former Soviet intelligence and military personnel. The law also
    requires applicants for citizenship to renounce previous non-Latvian
    citizenship, to have knowledge of the Constitution and Latvian history,
    and to pledge allegiance to Latvia. At present, according to
    Naturalization Board figures, nearly 95 percent of applicants pass the
    citizenship tests on the first attempt.
        In addition a 1998 referendum brought the citizenship law into
    compliance with Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
    (OSCE) standards. Children of noncitizens born after August 1992 are
    entitled to citizenship upon application.
        International observers, including the resident OSCE mission,
    credit the Government with establishing a competent and professional
    Naturalization Board with offices throughout the country to implement
    the law. In the estimation of the NHRO, the OSCE, and various NGO's,
    the Board has sought to apply the law fairly.
        International experts, government officials, and domestic human
    rights monitors agreed that Latvia must continue to place high priority
    on and devote sufficient resources to implementing the citizenship law
    in a fair and impartial manner, as well as seek ways to expedite
    naturalization and promote social integration. Working with the
    European Union and the U.N. Development Program, the Government also
    has implemented a long-term nationwide Latvian language teaching
    program for adults and children in non-Latvian schools.
        There are no ethnic restrictions on eligibility to hold political
    office. Nonethnic Latvians, including ethnic Russians and the first
    Roma deputy in the Saeima, serve in various elected bodies. Women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. There are 20 women in the
    100-member Saeima. Two women are in the 15-member Cabinet of Ministers.
    For the first time, the President of the country is female.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A growing number of NGO's devoted to research and advocacy on human
    rights issues, including prison conditions and women's and children's
    rights, operate without government restriction. Several organizations
    deal with issues of concern to local noncitizens and other nonethnic
    Latvians, presenting them to the courts and the press.
        The Government engages in dialog with NGO's working on human rights
    issues. The NHRO is an independent governmental institution with a
    mandate to promote human rights, provide information on human rights,
    investigate individual complaints, and initiate its own investigation
    into alleged violations. The office acts as a general ombudsman on
    social issues and handles a variety of individual complaints, primarily
    concerning problems receiving social benefits.
        A number of NGO's provide assistance to those who wish to complain
    of police abuse or abuse in prisons.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        According to the 1922 Constitution, all citizens are equal under
    the law. In 1998 the Saeima passed amendments to the Constitution that
    granted constitutional protection to fundamental human rights. The
    amendments supersede provisions of the 1991 Constitutional Law, which
    had served in the interim, and contain constitutional provisions for
    the exercise of the freedoms of speech, religion, association, the
    press, and other basic liberties. The amendments also provide for
    protection from discrimination due to race, sex, religion, language, or
    disability. Only citizens can vote or hold government office. There are
    some restrictions on land purchases by noncitizens.
        Women.--Despite legal protections, international observers and
    human rights groups increasingly are concerned about problems facing
    women. Although no overall statistics are available, sources indicate
    that domestic violence against women, often connected with alcohol
    abuse, is significant and underreported. Women who are victims of abuse
    often seem to be uninformed about their rights and reluctant to seek
    redress through the justice system. Human rights groups assert that the
    legal system, including the courts, tends to downplay the seriousness
    of domestic violence and that the police are sometimes reluctant to
    make arrests in such cases.
        There are no shelters designed specifically for battered or abused
    women. There is one shelter in Riga where homeless women with children
    may reside for up to 2 months. Likewise, there are no specific rape or
    assault hot lines; however, two crisis hot lines are managed by NGO's.
        Police do not compile figures for domestic violence as a distinct
    category. Instead, episodes are placed under more general categories
    such as assault or battery. During the year, 107 rape cases were
    reported.
        Both adult and child prostitution are widespread, often linked to
    organized crime, and abetted by economic problems (see Section 6.f.).
    The Government estimates that 3,000 persons work as prostitutes. The
    NHRO reports that adult prostitutes have no legal protections.
    Prostitution is legal; procuring is not. There are no state
    institutions to assist prostitutes. However, the private Latvian Center
    for Gender Problems provides medical help and social support for
    prostitutes.
        Sexual harassment of women in the workplace, although illegal, is
    reportedly common. Cultural factors tend to discourage women from
    coming forth publicly with complaints of abuse.
        Women possess the same legal rights as men. The Labor Code
    prohibits women from performing ``hard jobs or jobs having unhealthy
    conditions,'' which are specified in a list agreed upon by the Cabinet
    and labor unions. The code also bans employment discrimination. In
    reality women frequently face hiring and pay discrimination, especially
    in the emerging private sector. According to the Central Statistics
    Bureau, the number of women in the lower income brackets exceeds that
    of men by 75 percent, while men outnumber women two to one in upper
    income levels. The Ministry of Welfare has designated a one-person
    office with responsibility for gender issues.
        Women's advocacy groups are growing in size and number. They are
    involved in finding employment for women, lobbying for increased social
    benefits, and assisting victims of domestic abuse.
        Children.--The law on the rights of the child and the
    constitutional provisions on children are based on Western European
    models and provide for various protections, including health care and
    legal protections against physical abuse. However, resources are not
    adequate to ensure observance of these provisions. There is a national
    center for the protection of the rights of the child.
        Evidence suggests that abandonment and child abuse, including
    sexual abuse, are relatively widespread, as is child prostitution. An
    estimated 12 to 15 percent of prostitutes are considered juveniles,
    that is, between the ages of 8 and 18. Although in theory the
    Constitution and the Law on the Rights of the Child protect children,
    these rights only are enforced sporadically in the case of child
    prostitutes. Schooling is mandatory through the ninth grade, between
    the ages of 7 and 16, and free through the 12th grade, or age 18.
    Despite the existence of laws on mandatory education, truancy is
    widespread and growing. A few children's advocacy groups are active,
    particularly in lobbying for legislation to protect children's rights
    and for increased welfare payments for children.
        Law enforcement authorities have won court suits to remove children
    from abusive parents and secured convictions in child molestation
    cases.
        Trafficking in young girls for forced prostitution abroad is
    increasing (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for protection of
    the disabled against discrimination; the 1992 Law on the Medical and
    Social Protection of Disabled provides for their right of access to
    public facilities. Provisions in the Labor Law and other laws aim to
    protect the disabled from bias in the workplace and from job
    discrimination. In 1998 the Cabinet adopted a framework document
    entitled ``Equal Opportunity for Everyone.'' The document is designed
    to coordinate the efforts of all branches of Government in assisting
    the disabled. The Government supports special schools for disabled
    persons. It does not enforce uniformly a 1993 law requiring buildings
    to be accessible to wheelchairs, and most buildings are not. However,
    some larger cities, including Riga and Ventspils, have undertaken an
    extensive wheelchair ramp building program at intersections.
        Religious Minorities.--In August the magazine Kapitals published a
    derogatory article about Jews and business. The public and senior
    government officials immediately condemned the article. The editor of
    the magazine resigned, and senior officials of the company apologized.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Of the country's more than 2.4
    million inhabitants, approximately 1 million persons are of non-Latvian
    ethnicity, including more than 700,000 ethnic Russians, 100,000 ethnic
    Belarusians, almost 64,000 ethnic Ukrainians, and more than 60,000
    ethnic Poles. More than 74 percent of the country's inhabitants are
    citizens, including nearly 400,000 persons who belong to national or
    ethnic minorities. There are approximately 583,000 resident
    noncitizens, of whom an estimated 68 percent are Russian; 12 percent,
    Belarusian; 9 percent, Ukrainian; and smaller percentages of Poles,
    Lithuanians, Jews, Roma, Germans, Tatars, Estonians, and Armenians.
        Ethnicity is identified in the passport of Latvian citizens but not
    in the passports of Latvia's noncitizen residents. Groups such as Roma
    and Belarusians have complained that, because the passport is a basic
    form of identification, this requirement has opened them to various
    forms of discrimination based on ethnicity.
        On December 9, 1999, the Saeima passed a revised version of the
    language law, which went into effect on September 1, 2000. The language
    law regulates the uses of language that affect public safety, health
    care, protection of the consumer, and labor rights. The law requires
    that documents submitted to the Government be translated into Latvian,
    including company reports and records, except in cases of emergency. If
    a public event is coorganized by the State, one of the working
    languages must be Latvian. Labels and user instructions for goods sold
    must be in Latvian, although other languages can be present as well.
    The law and its implementing regulations meet international standards.
    However, the implementation of this law remains a matter of public
    debate and continued international attention.
        In July 1998, the police arrested Vilis Linins, the chief ideologue
    of the ultranationalist Thundercross organization, which was suspected
    of terrorist attacks against Soviet memorials and other targets. On May
    29, 2000, Linins was found guilty of several acts of vandalism and
    sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and fined $35,000 (21,000 lats).
    This was the first case where a political group was convicted of
    violent acts carried out to promote its political goals.
        The Government financially supports education in both Latvian and
    Russian, as well as in eight other minority languages. However, under
    the revised Education Law, the Government is implementing a bilingual
    education program at the elementary school level. The goal of this
    program is to facilitate the eventual transition to Latvian-language
    secondary schools by 2004. Although all non-Latvian-speaking students
    in public schools are supposed to learn Latvian and to study a minimum
    number of subjects in Latvian, there is a shortage of qualified
    teachers.
        State-funded university education is in Latvian, and incoming
    students whose native language is not Latvian must pass a language
    entrance examination. However, several private institutions offer
    higher education in Russian.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Trade Unions stipulates
    that workers, except for the uniformed military, have the right to form
    and join labor unions of their own choosing. Union membership is about
    30 percent of the work force. Free elections for union leadership are
    held every 4 years.
        The law does not limit the right to strike, but there were no major
    strikes during the year. The law bans the dismissal of employees who
    have invoked the right to strike. No cases of such dismissals have been
    reported.
        Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have established
    contacts with European labor unions and international labor union
    organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
    have the right to bargain collectively and are largely free of
    government interference in their negotiations with employers. The law
    prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers. The
    Government's ability to protect the right to organize in the private
    sector is weak.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and it generally is
    not practiced. Inspectors from the Ministry of Welfare's State Labor
    Inspection Board or Inspectorate enforce this ban. However, trafficking
    in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad is a significant
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 15
    years, although children between the ages of 13 and 15 years may work
    in certain jobs outside of school hours. The law restricts employment
    of those under the age of 18; for example, by banning night shift or
    overtime work. Schooling is compulsory until age 16 and free until age
    18. State authorities are lax in their enforcement of child labor and
    school attendance laws. There generally is no evidence of forced or
    bonded labor involving children, which is prohibited by law (see
    Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in young girls for prostitution is
    a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage is
    about $82 (50 lats), far below the amount that trade union officials
    describe as the bare minimum for survival.
        The Labor Code provides for a mandatory 40-hour maximum workweek
    with at least one 42-hour rest period weekly, 4 weeks of annual
    vacation, and a program of assistance to working mothers with small
    children. The laws establish minimum occupational health and safety
    standards for the workplace, but these standards frequently are
    ignored. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from
    hazardous work situations without endangering their continued
    employment, but these standards also frequently are ignored in
    practice.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--In May the Criminal Code was revised to
    make it illegal to forcibly send a person to a foreign country for the
    purpose of sexual exploitation. There were no prosecutions by year's
    end.
        There were instances of trafficking in women for purposes of forced
    prostitution. Prostitution is a significant problem in Riga, and there
    is evidence that trafficking in women (including minors) for
    prostitution abroad also is increasing. The country is primarily a
    source or transit country rather than a destination.
                                   __________

                                 LIECHTENSTEIN

        The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and
    a parliamentary democracy. The reigning Prince is the head of state;
    all legislation enacted by the popularly elected Parliament (Landtag)
    must have his concurrence. The Parliament elects and the Prince
    appoints the members of the Government and of the independent
    judiciary. In July the Prince decided to postpone the ongoing debate on
    a new Constitution until after parliamentary elections in 2001.
    Consultations between the Prince and Parliament's constitutional
    commission collapsed in April over diverging views on the executive
    powers of the monarch.
        The Interior Ministry effectively oversees the regular and
    auxiliary police forces. There is no standing military force.
        Liechtenstein has a prosperous, highly industrialized, free
    enterprise economy with a vital service sector. It participates in a
    customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national
    currency. As a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), its 32,000
    citizens enjoy a very high standard of living. Unemployment fell to 1.1
    percent during the year.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. Violence against women is a
    problem. The Government is working to eliminate societal discrimination
    against women.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
    reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
    freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government
    observes these provisions. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must
    bring suspects before an examining magistrate, who must either file
    formal charges or order release. The law grants suspects the right to
    legal counsel of their own choosing; counsel is provided to indigents.
    Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the
    examining magistrate has reason to believe the suspects are a danger to
    society or will not appear for trial.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judicial system has three tiers: Lower court; high court;
    and Supreme Court. In addition an Administrative Court hears appeals
    against government decisions. The State Court protects the rights
    accorded by the Constitution, decides conflicts of jurisdiction between
    the law courts and the administrative authorities, and acts as a
    disciplinary court for members of the Government.
        The Constitution provides for fair public trials and judicial
    appeal, and an independent judiciary respects these provisions.
        The Constitution authorizes the Prince to alter criminal sentences
    or pardon offenders. However, if the offender is a member of the
    Government and is sentenced for a crime in connection with official
    duties, the Prince can take such action only if the Parliament requests
    it.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for personal liberty and for
    the inviolability of the home, postal correspondence, and telephone
    conversations. No violations were reported. Police need a judicial
    warrant to search private property.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--An independent press, an effective
    judiciary, and a democratic political system combine to ensure freedom
    of speech and of the press. Two daily newspapers are published, each
    representing the interests of one of the two major political parties,
    as is one weekly newsmagazine. One state and one private television
    station broadcast, along with a private radio station, and residents
    freely receive radio and television broadcasts from neighboring
    countries. An information bulletin is also issued by the third party
    (Freie Liste) represented in Parliament. There are no limits on access
    to the Internet.
        In October 1999, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) fined
    Prince Hans-Adam II for abusing one of his subject's freedom of speech.
    The ECHR reprimanded the monarch for refusing to reappoint a judge,
    Herbert Wille, who disagreed with him in an ongoing constitutional
    debate. In a public lecture held in 1995, Wille said that the State
    Court should decide on cases of disagreement between citizens
    (represented in parliament) and the Prince. The Prince wrote Wille
    shortly afterwards that the opinions that he expressed disqualified him
    from office, and in 1997 he refused to endorse Parliament's support for
    Wille's reappointment as head of the administrative court. The ECHR
    found that Hans-Adam II had curbed Wille's right to free speech and
    ordered him to pay $59,000 (100,000 Swiss francs) in costs and damages.
    In his response on the following day, Prince Hans-Adam II stated that
    he took note of the judgement of the ECHR; however, the Prince had not
    reappointed Wille to the court by year's end. The Prince further stated
    that he and his successors will no longer publish the reasons for such
    appointment decisions. The 100,000 Swiss francs in costs and damages
    were paid out to Willie and his two legal counsels in February.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice
    of any faith. The relationship between the Government and the Catholic
    Church currently is being redefined, and a new agreement is scheduled
    for 2002. The Government contributes to the Catholic Church, as well as
    to other denominations. The finances of the Catholic Church are
    integrated directly into the budgets of the national and local
    governments. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory
    in all schools, but the authorities routinely grant exemptions for
    children whose parents request them.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have unrestricted freedom to
    travel in the country, to emigrate, and to return.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. On
    July 3, the Government signed a trilateral agreement with Switzerland
    and Austria regarding the return of persons entering the country
    without permission. The treaty was ratified on October 25.
        The Government provides first asylum; however, the country's lack
    of an airport or international train station means that it receives few
    requests. The 1998 asylum law is in accord with the U.N. 1951
    Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Since its passage, the
    number of asylum requests has increased. Those persons who enter from
    Austria without permission still are returned to Austrian authorities
    in accordance with a 1955 bilateral agreement.
        The Government granted collective protective status to Kosovar
    immigrants in the fall of 1998, following rising numbers of asylum
    applications. In April 1999, the Government decided that children under
    age 20 and spouses of guest workers from Kosovo could enter the country
    on request. In total the Government granted temporary protective status
    to 748 immigrants from Kosovo. In September 1999, the Government
    stopped granting collective asylum and set a deadline 8 months later
    (May 31) for repatriations.
        By October 1999, 505 Kosovars left the country voluntarily, 481 of
    whom agreed to their repatriation before the May 31 deadline and thus
    benefited from government financial and material assistance in
    coordination with Switzerland's refugee repatriation program. Beginning
    in June, 19 Kosovars were ``forcibly'' repatriated, but only 1 was
    repatriated under police escort. To avoid repatriation, 92 Kosovars
    disappeared. An additional 115 Kosovars, whose asylum applications are
    pending, remained in the country awaiting a decision on their
    applications.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        The country is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary
    democracy. The monarchy is hereditary in the male line. The 25member
    unicameral legislature is elected every 4 years. Suffrage is universal
    for adults over age 18, and balloting is secret. Political parties
    operate freely. Citizens regularly vote on initiatives and referendums.
        Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although
    since gaining the right to vote in 1984, a growing number have been
    active in politics. A woman, the Foreign Minister, is one of the five
    members of the Cabinet, and another is a Member of Parliament. Women
    serve on the executive committees of the major parties. In June 1999,
    women's organizations, political parties, and the Government's Bureau
    for the Promotion of Equal Rights for Women and Men held a convention
    to promote greater participation by women in politics.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        International and domestic human rights groups operate without
    government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive
    to their views.
        The sole local human rights organization, Justitia et Pax, is an
    informal group of about 10 members who monitor prison conditions and
    assist foreign workers with immigration matters.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
    language, or social status, and the authorities respect these
    provisions. The law also prohibits public incitement to violence or
    public agitation or insult directed against a race, people, ethnic
    group, or state.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) estimate that one in five women is a victim of
    physical or psychological violence. There is 1 women's shelter, which
    provided refuge for 33 women, only 12 of whom were citizens, and 30
    children during the year. Annual government financing for the shelter
    is approximately $140,000 (240,000 Swiss francs). The law prohibits all
    forms of domestic violence, and the Government vigorously enforces the
    law.
        NGO's assume that, as in neighboring countries, trafficking in
    women occurs, but no specific cases have been documented (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        Societal discrimination still limits opportunities for women in
    fields traditionally dominated by men. Men earn more than women. In
    accordance with a 1992 constitutional amendment mandating equality for
    women, Parliament amended a significant number of laws to provide for
    equality of treatment. For example, Parliament revised the citizenship
    law, the employment law, the law on labor conditions, the tax law, and
    the divorce law. The process of amending laws is almost complete. In
    March 1999, Parliament passed legislation on equal opportunity for
    women and men. The law is designed to eliminate discrimination and
    sexual harassment in the workplace and to create conditions that allow
    both women and men to combine work and family. It entered into force in
    May 1999. In April 1999, the Government approved a plan to promote
    equal opportunity and to create conditions that allow both men and
    women to combine work and family. Measures include: Raising public
    awareness about the new law; improving programs and infrastructure for
    traditional and single-parent families, such as affordable housing and
    childcare; promoting educational and career opportunities for women;
    and raising recognition for work in the home to the same level as for
    work outside the home. The Government took steps to end all forms of
    discrimination against women. In December 1999, the Government signed
    the optional protocol to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All
    Discrimination Against Women.
        Three women's rights groups were active. Their chief concerns were
    public affairs, information, legal counseling, lobbying, and other
    political activities.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. The Government provided compulsory, free,
    and universal primary school education for children of both sexes for 9
    years, normally until the age of 16.
        The Government supported programs to protect the rights of children
    and matches contributions made to the four NGO's that monitor
    children's rights. A children and youth service belonging to the Office
    for Social Services oversaw the implementation of government-supported
    programs for children.
        In September the Government signed two optional protocols to the
    1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. One protocol strictly
    regulates the drafting of minors into the armed services, and the other
    forbids child prostitution and child pornography as well as trafficking
    in children.
        In November the Government established a Commission for the
    Coordination of Professionals in Cases of Sexual Offences against
    Children. The group consisted of experts from different backgrounds and
    focused on assisting professionals (counselors, therapists, and
    physicians) who deal with sexual offences against children. The
    Commission takes a comprehensive approach to sexual offences against
    children.
        During the year, two children allegedly were abused sexually by
    acquaintances, but the prosecutor's office dropped the case after
    further inquiries undermined the validity of the allegations. The
    suspect, a Brazilian national, no longer resides in the country.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
        People with Disabilities.--Although the law expressly does not
    prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities, complaints of
    such discrimination may be pursued in the courts. Amendments to the law
    on insurance for the disabled, which were intended to improve the
    economic situation of disabled persons, came into force in 1997.
        The Government requires that buildings and government services be
    made accessible for people with disabilities, but in general they are
    not, particularly old buildings.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In its 1998 security report,
    the Government confirmed the existence of a small number of rightwing
    extremists, consisting of about 20 skinheads between the ages of 20 and
    30, and about as many followers of a slightly younger age. A 1999
    government survey of 700 young persons indicated that approximately 20
    percent of youths expressed ambivalence toward or sympathy for
    extremist views, while 4 percent supported extremist views. Incidents
    of violence increased in 1999, according to the survey. On August 19,
    an adolescent from former Yugoslavia was injured in a fight with a
    local youth. The attack appeared to have been motivated racially. The
    rightwing extremists have not been publicly active. One case of
    repeated verbal attacks against Kosovar refugees was reported to a
    local NGO. In November 1999, a local youth was fined $375 (600 Swiss
    francs) and sentenced to 2 weeks of social work for putting a racist
    web site on the Internet. There were no reports of rightwing propaganda
    on the Internet during the year.
        Parliament adopted national antiracism legislation in December
    1999. The law entered into force on February 11 and makes it a crime to
    produce or distribute racist propaganda, deny or trivialize genocide
    and crimes against humanity, engage in racist or religious
    discrimination, deny services to a particular group, or support racist
    organizations. Violations are punishable with a maximum 2-year prison
    sentence. On March 1, the country acceded to the U.N. Convention
    against Racial Discrimination. On June 18, voters approved a referendum
    that changed naturalization requirements to facilitate the
    naturalization of long-term residents, but it required that applicants
    relinquish their citizenship in other countries.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners,
    are free to associate, join unions of their choice, and select their
    own union representatives. Due to the country's small size and
    population, only one trade union operates, representing about 13
    percent of the work force. However, the sole trade union looks after
    the interests of nonmembers as well. It is a member of the World
    Confederation of Labor but is represented on an ad hoc basis by a Swiss
    union.
        Workers have the right to strike except in certain essential
    services. No strikes were reported during the year. The law does not
    provide specific protections for strikers. Employers may dismiss
    employees for refusing to work; such dismissals may be contested. In
    1997 the Government incorporated EEA guidelines into its domestic labor
    law. These guidelines require that, among other things, employers
    consult in cases of projected mass dismissals and submit employment
    contracts in written form.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively.
    However, collective bargaining agreements generally are adapted from
    ones negotiated by Swiss employers and unions.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. Except by
    implication, the law does not forbid forced and bonded labor by
    children specifically, but such practices are not known to occur. NGO's
    assume that trafficking in women occurs, but there were no reports of
    specific cases (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Government does not prohibit forced and bonded labor
    by children specifically, but such practices are not known to occur
    (see Section 6.c.). The law generally prohibits the employment of
    children under 16 years of age. However, exceptions may be made for the
    limited employment of youths at least age 14 and for those who leave
    school after completing their 9 years of compulsory education. Children
    ages 14 and older may be employed in light duties for not more than 9
    hours a week during the school year and 15 hours a week at other times.
        Inspections are adequate. No employers have been fined or
    imprisoned for violations of the law. The Government devoted adequate
    resources and oversight to child labor policies. The Department for
    Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy effectively
    supervised compliance with the law.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage. The number of working poor households has not increased in recent
    years. In 1999 36 households (0.3 percent) depended on public welfare
    to obtain a yearly minimal income, set at $10,700 (17,720 Swiss francs)
    for a one-person household, and were considered working poor. A total
    of 458 households (2.7 percent) received public assistance. The law
    sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours for white-collar workers and
    employees of industrial firms and sales personnel, and 48 hours for all
    other workers. With few exceptions, Sunday work is not allowed. Workers
    over age 20 receive at least 4 weeks of vacation; younger workers
    receive at least 5 weeks.
        The law sets occupational health and safety standards, and the
    Department for Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy
    effectively enforces these provisions. The law provides for a hearing
    in cases in which workers remove themselves from dangerous situations.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons.
        NGO's assume that, as in neighboring countries, trafficking in
    women occurs, but no specific cases have been documented. Although
    there were no reports of trafficking during the year, six cases of
    trafficking in persons (assistance with illegal immigration) were
    reported in 1999. In most cases, the traffickers concerned were
    relatives of illegal immigrants.
                                   __________

                                   LITHUANIA

        Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy with a Constitution adopted
    by referendum in 1992. The Constitution established a 141-member
    unicameral legislature, the Seimas; a directly elected president; and a
    government whose ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister,
    appointed by the President, and approved by the Seimas. The Government
    exercises authority with the approval of the Seimas and the President.
    The judiciary is independent.
        A unified national police force under the jurisdiction of the
    Interior Ministry is responsible for law enforcement. The State
    Security Department is responsible for internal security and reports to
    Parliament and the President. The police committed a number of human
    rights abuses.
        Since its independence in 1990, Lithuania has made steady progress
    in developing a market economy. Most housing and small businesses are
    privatized, and the contribution of the private sector to gross
    domestic product amounts to more than 70 percent. Trade is diversifying
    and expanding both to the West and the East. Agriculture employs the
    largest number of workers (20 percent). Major exports include textiles,
    mineral products, machinery, and electronic appliances. Inflation from
    January to August remained low at 0.3 percent. Per capita GDP in 1999
    was $2,878. During the first half of the year, real GDP reportedly
    increased by 2 percent. However, unemployment continued to remain high
    at over 11 percent. (It was above 15 percent according to a labor
    market survey.)
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, problems remained in some areas. Police on occasion
    beat detainees and misused detention laws. The Government has made some
    progress in bringing police corruption under control. Prison conditions
    remained poor, and prolonged detention in a small number of cases
    remained a problem. State media continued to be subject to political
    interests. Violence and discrimination against women and child abuse
    were serious problems. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
    of forced prostitution was a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        In 1998 the President formed the International Commission to
    Investigate the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in
    Lithuania. The Commission includes historians, human rights
    representatives, representatives of international Jewish organizations,
    and lawyers from Lithuania and a number of foreign countries. The
    Government allotted $37,500 (150,000 litas) to establish a full-time
    working secretariat for the Commission. The secretariat was in
    operation by October 1999, and the first research group of the
    Commission began work in December 1999.
        In August 1999 a court found six persons guilty of complicity in
    the January 1991 coup attempt. The defendants were former leaders and
    officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party who were sentenced to
    prison terms of from 3 to 12 years for crimes that included
    premeditated acts of murder and inflicting serious bodily harm. Defense
    lawyers appealed the verdict, but their appeal was still under
    consideration at year's end.
        Formal charges were filed against alleged war criminals Aleksandras
    Lileikis and Kazys Gimzauskas. After being stripped of his U.S.
    citizenship in 1996 for concealing his World War II activities,
    Lileikis returned to Lithuania. He was accused of acts of genocide
    committed when he headed the security police of the Vilnius district
    under Nazi control. Lileikis's trial was postponed several times due to
    his poor health; he died at age 93 without trial on September 27.
        Gimzauskas, who served as Lileikis's deputy during the war,
    returned to Lithuania in 1993. On October 13, 2000, the Vilnius
    regional court decided to try the case of Gimzauskas in absentia due to
    his poor health. The court hearing started in November. It is expected
    that the court will hear the case and make a decision regarding guilt,
    but that there would be no sentence imposed. After considering the
    case, the court also can adopt a resolution on whether Gimzauskas'
    actions in this particular case constituted a crime or not, thus
    formally closing the case.
        In June 1999, the Prosecutor General's Office of Special
    Investigations filed genocide charges against Vincas Valkavickas, who
    returned to Lithuania in June 1999. In July 1999, a case was initiated
    against Petras Bernotavicius, a resident of the United States, and
    Antanas Gudelis, an Australian citizen. In July 1999, the prosecutor
    launched an investigation into the role of Kazys Ciurinskas in a
    separate war-related criminal case. No substantial progress was
    reported in the latter four cases by the end of the year.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        There is a growing problem of women being forced or sold into
    prostitution by organized crime figures. Their families often believe
    that they disappeared or were kidnaped (see Sections 5, 6.c., and
    6.f.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and there
    were no reports of its use; however, police sometimes beat or otherwise
    physically mistreat detainees. The press reported that incidents of
    police brutality are becoming more common. In many instances, the
    victims reportedly are reluctant to bring charges against police
    officers due to fear of reprisals. According to the Ministry of
    Interior, during the first 6 months of the year no police officers were
    charged with abuse of power or sentenced. In 1999 four officers were
    charged and one was sentenced for this crime.
        The Interior Ministry states that district police inspectors are
    the most negligent in the force. To strengthen the integrity of the
    police, the Inspectorate General of the Interior Ministry was given
    administrative autonomy in 1997. In 1999 the Inspectorate General was
    reorganized into an office of the Inspector General, and some functions
    of the Inspectorate were delegated to the internal investigations
    division at the police department. The Inspector General cannot
    investigate abuses on his own authority but can act only on the order
    of the Minister.
        In the past, noncommissioned military personnel committed human
    rights abuses by hazing recruits, despite efforts to quash the
    practice, which was inherited from the former Soviet armed forces. As
    living conditions improve for military personnel, human rights
    violations committed by noncommissioned officers have declined
    significantly. During the year, seven criminal cases were filed for
    ``systemic degrading treatment'' or breach of discipline involving
    violence (the relevant legal codes). According to the Ministry of
    National Defense, most trauma inflicted on conscripts is psychological
    rather than physical. The Ministry believes that a lack of
    professionalism among noncommissioned officers--rather than ethnic,
    regional, or social factors--is a primary factor in cases of hazing,
    and it is working actively to improve their skills and judgment. In
    1999 the Seimas approved a new disciplinary statute for the armed
    forces, and the military police formed by a 1998 law are charged with
    maintaining discipline. The disciplinary statute sets procedures for
    the investigation of disciplinary offences, provides for the right to
    appeal, and lists the types of punishments.
        Prison conditions are poor. Due to limited resources, most prisons
    are overcrowded and poorly maintained. One local human rights group
    claims that the administration of penal institutions does not do enough
    to prevent violence among prisoners. During the first 9 months of the
    year, 35 deaths were recorded among prisoners (16 of them killings) as
    well as 524 injuries, mostly self-inflicted (in order to escape abuse
    from fellow inmates or guards).
        The Government is attempting to reform the prison system with
    international assistance; however, progress has been very slow. In
    September the Seimas adopted a new Criminal Code. The prison department
    was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Justice Ministry,
    heralding the beginning of practical reforms in the correctional
    system. New hygiene norms came into effect in 1999 that require a
    certain amount of space for each convict to assure healthy and safe
    conditions. However, in 2000 the budget allotted $5 million (20 million
    litas) less for running 14 correctional institutions than in 1999.
    Funding only covers minimal needs and on average amounts to 75 cents
    for three meals per prisoner per day. Thus prison overcrowding
    persists, particularly in pretrial detention.
        As a result of the funding shortfall and overcrowding, a Law on
    Amnesty was passed in April that reduced the number of prisoners and
    detainees from 15,000 (as of January 1, 2000) to 9,000 (as of July 1,
    2000). As of August 30, there were 7,045 prisoners, including 251 women
    and 125 juveniles (2 women). There were 1,612 detainees, including 68
    women and 99 juveniles (2 women). The latter are held separately from
    adults.
        Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides that no person may be arbitrarily arrested or detained;
    however, there were instances of prolonged detention. Under the law,
    police temporarily may detain suspects for up to 48 hours, based upon
    reliable evidence of criminal activity and approval by an investigator
    or prosecutor. Pretrial detention applies only in the case of felonies
    and when it is impossible to prevent flight by other means or to allow
    unhindered investigation. A district judge, acting on a prosecutor's
    application, may order longer pretrial detention, which can last up to
    6 months and may be extended using the same procedure for periods not
    to exceed 18 months in total. However, in practice the prison
    department admits that pretrial detention has in some instances
    exceeded 18 months. The prison department faults a slow justice system
    that cannot bring cases to trial expeditiously. Bail in theory is
    available, but it is not used widely. The Constitution provides for the
    right to an attorney from the moment of detention (see Section 1.e.).
        In an effort to cope with the rise in violent organized crime, the
    1997 Law on the Prevention of Organized Crime allows for the imposition
    of restrictions on the freedom of a person who by his actions might
    ``restrict the rights and freedoms of other persons, create conditions
    for the emergence and development of social and economic preconditions
    of organized crime, or pose a threat to public security.''
        The Government is addressing concerns that periods of detention
    were excessive. The Prosecutor General is stepping up his monitoring of
    the investigation of cases, and additional and better qualified judges
    are being added.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
        The Constitution and the 1994 Law on Courts established a four-tier
    court system: The Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals; district courts;
    and local courts. The local courts are tribunals of first instance for
    all cases that are not assigned to some other court by law. The Supreme
    Court's Senate of Judges, consisting of the Supreme Court chairman, the
    division chairmen, and other members of the Supreme Court, rules on the
    decisions by lower domestic courts that may violate the European
    Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution also established a
    Constitutional Court and allowed for specialized courts for
    administrative, labor, family, and other purposes.
        The administrative courts began functioning on May 1, 1999. The
    main function of administrative courts is to investigate the legality
    and validity of administrative acts and conflicts in the sphere of
    public administration and taxation. The creation of administrative
    courts completed national court reform, a process that started in 1995.
    The Ministry of Justice is moving towards a system of specialization of
    judges in district and local courts according to the types of cases.
        A new Civil Code was adopted in July. It will enter into force in
    July 2001. The Civil Code complies with the requirements of the
    European Convention on Human Rights and takes into account the
    jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The Seimas adopted
    a Criminal Code in September 2000. It will enter into force
    simultaneously with the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was still
    under preparation at year's end.
        The Constitutional Court, at the request of the President, members
    of the Seimas, the Government, or the judiciary, reviews the
    constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, as well as that of
    actions by the President and the Cabinet. The Constitutional Court's
    authority to issue the final word on subjects within its jurisdiction
    is unquestioned; it is the country's ultimate legal authority with no
    further appeal of its rulings.
        The 1996 Law on Commercial Arbitration provides for the
    establishment of arbitration institutions and the abolition of the
    economic court (abolished in 1998). The law provides for private
    dispute resolution by an arbitration tribunal, either organized by a
    permanent arbitration institution or by the parties themselves.
        The Prosecutor General exercises oversight responsibility through a
    network of district and local prosecutors who work with police
    investigators--employed by the Ministry of the Interior--in preparing
    the prosecution's evidence for the courts.
        The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel for
    defendants. In practice the right to counsel is abridged by the
    shortage of trained advocates, who find it difficult to cope with the
    burgeoning numbers of criminal cases brought before the courts. Outside
    observers have recommended the establishment of a public defender
    system to regularize procedures for the provision of legal assistance
    to indigent persons charged in criminal cases. By law defense advocates
    have access to government evidence and may present evidence and
    witnesses. The courts and law enforcement agencies generally honor
    routine, written requests for evidence. By law a judge may decide to
    hold a closed trial in a limited number of circumstances.
        Government rehabilitation of over 50,000 persons charged with anti-
    Soviet crimes during the Stalin era led to reports in 1991 that some
    persons who allegedly were involved with crimes against humanity during
    the Nazi occupation had benefited from this rehabilitation. A special
    judicial procedure was established in 1997 to examine each case in
    which an individual or organization raised an objection that a
    rehabilitated person may have committed a crime against humanity.
    During the first 8 months of 2000, the Supreme Court overturned the
    rehabilitation of 15 persons.
        Parliamentarian Audrius Butkevicius, a former Minister of National
    Defense, was charged in 1997 with several counts of corruption.
    According to the Lithuanian Human Rights Association, the case was
    based on false information from the State Security Department.
    Butkevicius's pretrial detention was prolonged without the decision of
    a judge. The parliamentary ombudsman said that there were many similar
    cases and confirmed that the authorities had violated the law.
    Typically, he wrote, judges and prosecutors wrongly interpret the law
    to mean that pretrial detention can be extended automatically when a
    case is submitted to a court of law. In 1998 Butkevicius was sentenced
    to 5+ years in prison, fined $12,500 (50,000 litas), and half of his
    property was confiscated. On May 12, 1999, the Supreme Court rejected
    Butkevicius's appeal. Butkevicius's lawyers appealed to the European
    Court of Human Rights, and in September the Court agreed to review the
    case; but it had not been resolved by year's end 2000. Butkevicius was
    released on March 20 after serving two-thirds of his 5+-year jail term.
    He resumed his seat in the Parliament. However, the court decided that
    he had not completed the sentence at least 65 days before election day,
    and thus he was not allowed to be a candidate for the parliamentary
    elections in October.
        In November the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced
    that it would try three new cases against Lithuania. The cases were
    brought by former Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius, former Kaunas
    Police Commissioner Stasys Sipavicius, and businessman Arvydas
    Stasaitis. The ECHR found that Stasaitis' entire period of detention
    (1996-2000) may have been unjustified. He was charged with large-scale
    financial crime. Slezevicius was accused of abusing his position as
    Prime Minister when he withdrew his personal funds from a Lithuanian
    bank just days before it failed. The case was accepted because charges
    against him were investigated for too long (4 years) and never came
    under scrutiny in a court of law. Sipavicius spent 10 months in custody
    before his trial on charges of abusing his powers in a major smuggling
    case. He was sentenced to the 10 months served for neglecting his
    duties and released in court. Sipavicius complained that the charges
    against him suddenly were changed and that he had not had time to
    prepare to defend himself against the new charges.
        Through December 2000, the ECHR ruled against the Government in 5
    cases involving various breaches of conventions, laws, and regulations
    concerning arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy,
    and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The
    authorities do not engage in indiscriminate or widespread monitoring of
    the correspondence or communications of citizens. However, with the
    written authorization of a prosecutor or judge, police and security
    service personnel may engage in surveillance and monitoring activities
    on the grounds of national security. Except in cases of hot pursuit or
    the danger of disappearance of evidence, police must obtain a search
    warrant signed by a prosecutor before they may enter private premises.
        However, it is assumed widely that law enforcement agencies have
    increased the use of a range of surveillance methods to cope with the
    expansion of organized crime. There is some question as to the legal
    basis for this police surveillance, but there are no known legal
    challenges to such surveillance.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice.
        Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and
    restrictions on disclosure are prohibited, unless the Government
    determines that national security is involved. Under a 1996 media law,
    the media created a special ethics commission and an ombudsman to
    address complaints and seek conciliation in potential libel cases. This
    ombudsman position later was established and funded by the Seimas.
        The independent print media are flourishing and comprise a wide
    range of newspapers and magazines. Radio and television include a mix
    of state and private stations. National television and radio are in the
    process of being transformed into an entirely public entity; however,
    attempts to make it independent financially from the Government have
    lagged.
        There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the rights of peaceful assembly and association, and the
    Government respects them in practice.
        The Communist Party of Lithuania and other organizations associated
    with the former Soviet regime continued to be banned.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government generally respects this provision in
    practice. A 1995 law grants religious communities, associations, and
    centers property rights to prayer houses, homes, and other buildings.
    Article 5 of this law mentions nine religious communities that have
    been declared ``traditional'' by the law and therefore are eligible for
    governmental assistance: Latin Rite Catholics; Greek Rite Catholics;
    Evangelical Lutherans; Evangelical Reformers; Orthodox; Old Believers;
    Jews; Sunni Muslims; and Karaites. In 1999 the Hasidic Chabad Lubavich
    community was recognized by the Ministry of Justice as a part of the
    Jewish religious community, thereby gaining the status of an official
    religious community that the rest of the Jewish community had enjoyed
    since 1995. Other religious communities are not eligible for financial
    assistance from the Government, but there are no restrictions on their
    activities or property rights. Nontraditional foreign religious workers
    must obtain work permits, and they face difficult bureaucratic
    requirements in obtaining residence permits from officials who regard
    them as representatives of cults and sects. These religious workers
    complain of unofficial harassment. There are no restrictions on the
    activities of other religious communities. In 1999 the Seimas amended
    the Law on Religious Communities and Associations. The amendment
    provides funding from the national budget for educational institutions
    of traditional religious organizations. The Government Department of
    European Law has warned publicly that this amendment discriminates in
    favor of traditional religious communities versus nontraditional; the
    law is expected to come into effect in 2001.
        Under 1995 legislation, the Catholic community has been more
    successful in having its property returned than the Jewish community;
    an agreement between Jewish community leaders and the World Jewish
    Restitution Organization signed in 1995 never has been implemented.
    However, some religious property, including 26 synagogues, was returned
    to the Jewish community, mostly from 1993 to 1996.
        The law provides for the restitution of private property to
    citizens, but the deadline for filing claims has passed. A number of
    successful claims were made, and others still are pending. A lack of
    funds for compensation and protracted bureaucratic obstacles are the
    primary problems preventing the return of private property. The
    Government has taken no action on the problem of heirless (community)
    property and has no plans to do so.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the law, citizens and permanent
    residents are permitted free movement within the country and the right
    to return to the country, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. There are no restrictions on foreign travel.
        Under 1997 and 1998 legislation, the Government grants refugee
    status to qualified applicants in accordance with the provisions of the
    1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol.
        There is a registration center for migrants and asylum seekers in
    the town of Pabrade, where 30 illegal immigrants were registered in
    August, and a refugee reception center for asylum seekers in the town
    of Rukla, where 56 persons were registered. Living conditions at the
    center for refugees in Rukla are modern, safe, and healthy. The center
    has benefited from financing from other European countries. The center
    in Pabrade is overcrowded and rundown, but construction was underway on
    a new complex there. As of September, of a total of 2,765 foreigners
    initially settled at the Pabrade center (since 1997), 1,884 eventually
    were deported. Irregular migration reached its peak in 1997. By mid-
    2000 it had decreased by more than 400 percent due to improved border
    control, the adoption of new and strict laws against human smuggling,
    and the more effective detention and return of migrants to their
    countries of origin. However, counter to this trend, illegal
    immigration from CIS countries and Afghanistan was on the rise. The
    Government continued its efforts to stop illegal migrants by
    negotiating readmission agreements with Russia and Belarus, the two
    countries used by most migrants to reach Lithuania, but no progress had
    been made by year's end. A border demarcation agreement with Belarus
    was ratified. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
    arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. Of 141 seats in the Seimas, 71 are elected
    directly, and 70 are elected through proportional representation. Only
    those parties that receive more than 5 percent of the total ballots (or
    7 percent for coalitions) are allowed representation in the Parliament.
        In 1998 independent candidate Valdas Adamkus was elected President
    by a narrow margin. Following the resignation of Prime Minister
    Gediminas Vagnorius, the Seimas endorsed the 14member Cabinet of Prime
    Minister Rolandas Paksas, a member of the ruling Conservative Party, to
    carry out the amended program of the Government. Paksas resigned in
    October 1998 in opposition to a government oil privatization contract.
    The next Prime Minister, Andrius Kubilius, stepped down after the
    October 2000 general elections, and Rolandas Paksas, who switched
    parties and became leader of the Liberal Union, was sworn in as Prime
    Minister.
        Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although
    there are no legal restrictions on their participation. The number of
    female parliamentarians in the new 141-seat Seimas, elected in October,
    is 14 compared with 24 in the previous Seimas; as in the previous
    government, there is 1 female minister in the new 14-member Cabinet.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Most government authorities cooperate with local nongovernmental
    organizations and actively encourage visits by international and
    nongovernmental human rights groups. A key exception in the past was
    the Ministry of Interior, which continually refused to release
    information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related
    incidents. The Ministry is more willing to share such information;
    however, it has released few statistics or reports. The Association for
    the Defense of Human Rights in Lithuania is an umbrella organization
    for several small human rights groups, all of which operate without
    government restriction.
        The division of human rights of the department of international law
    and European integration in the Ministry of Justice monitors law and
    legal practice to determine whether they are in accord with the
    country's international obligations.
    Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, disability, or ethnic background; however, discrimination
    against women in employment and other areas persists.
        Women.--The abuse of women at home is reportedly common, especially
    in connection with alcohol abuse by husbands, but institutional
    mechanisms for coping with this problem are developing slowly. A
    women's shelter funded in part with Norwegian assistance is now in
    operation. According to one sociological survey published in 1997, 20
    percent of women reported experiencing an attempted rape, while another
    33 percent reported having been beaten at least once in their lives.
    During the first 6 months of the year, 154 rapes were reported, but
    only 78 were registered and prosecuted. Official statistics on the
    incidence of abuse of women in the home are not reported separately
    from other categories of assault. Persons convicted of rape generally
    receive sentences of from 3 to 5 years in prison.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.).
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for men and women;
    however, women continue to face discrimination. Official policy
    specifies equal pay for equal work. The Law of Realization on Equal
    Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men came into effect on March 1,
    1999. The Office of the Ombudsman for Equal Opportunities of Women and
    Men was established in May, and the Seimas appointed lawyer Ausra
    Burneikiene as ombudsman. The Ombudsman's Office is an independent
    public organization, accountable to the Seimas, which oversees the
    implementation of the law and investigates complaints concerning
    violations of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. The
    ombudsman also has some enforcement powers in this regard, and the new
    Criminal Code envisions criminal sanctions for discrimination or
    harassment. Generally, men and women receive the same pay for
    comparable work, but women are underrepresented significantly in some
    professions and in the managerial sector as a whole. Women are
    underrepresented in businesses. Significant inequalities in society
    based on gender continue, and conservative views about the role of
    women persist. In 1999 the Ministry of Education and Science abolished
    preferential university entrance criteria. Since then the equal
    opportunities ombudsman also closely followed admission examinations to
    high schools. During the period from March to August, the ombudsman
    received 20 complaints based on gender discrimination. During the
    period from July 1999, when the ombudsman's office began operating, to
    March 2000, 35 complaints were registered.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
    rights and welfare through a system of public education and medical
    care. The Government provides compulsory, free, and universal primary
    school education for children through the age of 15 or 9th grade. The
    Government provides low-cost health care for all children. A special
    office in the Ministry of Social Security and Labor oversees
    implementation of the Government's program for children, and an
    ombudsperson for children was established during the year.
        The Ministries of Social Security and Labor and of the Interior
    share official responsibility for the protection of children's rights
    and welfare. By the end of April 1999, the Minister of Justice had
    appointed 85 judges in the district courts for hearings in juvenile
    criminal cases and cases related to children's rights (adoption and
    paternity matters). Starting in 1994, the Children's Rights Office of
    the Ministry of Social Security and Labor (also known as the Children's
    Rights Protection Council) began to take on many of the functions
    formerly handled by the Interior Ministry and its police officers
    throughout the country, thereby focusing more attention on the social
    welfare needs of children. As of January 2000, the service identified
    36,856 children in abusive and dysfunctional families, a 44 percent
    increase compared with 1995. The number of such families grew by 65
    percent over the same period.
        The ombudsperson's office for children, established in November, is
    taking over most of the functions of the Children's Rights Protection
    Council. In August an adoption service at the Ministry of Social
    Security and Labor was established to oversee implementation of the
    1993 Hague Adoption Convention. The Office of Family and Children at
    the Ministry of Social Security and Labor formulates and implements the
    Government's program for family and children.
        Child abuse is a problem. Child abuse in connection with alcohol
    abuse by parents is a serious problem. The prevalence of authoritarian
    values in family upbringing has discouraged more active measures
    against child abuse; however, the press has reported increases in
    cruelty to children, including sexual abuse, intentional starvation,
    beatings, and murder. Authorities reported that two children were
    killed by their parents in 1998; however, the media widely reported on
    five cases during the year. The penalties for violence and cruel
    behavior against underage persons were made stricter in 1999, providing
    for imprisonment terms of from 1 to 2 years. No department or
    organization collects information on child abuse.
        There is one rehabilitation center in the country for children who
    have been abused sexually. The Penal Code provides for terms of up to 3
    year's imprisonment for sexual abuse and from 1 to 4 years'
    imprisonment for exploiting children in the production of pornography.
    There is no official data on the exploitation of children in
    pornography cases.
        Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The 1991 Law on Integrating Disabled
    People provides for a broad category of rights and public benefits to
    which disabled people are entitled legally. Legal provisions for access
    to buildings for the disabled are in place but are not enforced widely;
    the vast majority of public buildings remain inaccessible to the
    disabled.
        In 1999 there were 544,674 adults and 13,276 children with
    disabilities. The latest data available shows that in 1998 spending for
    disabled persons was $166 million (666.58 million litas) or 1.55
    percent of GDP, with various assistance programs being implemented. A
    project in Kaunas to build an apartment building for persons with
    disabilities has not been finished due to a lack of funds and the
    pending privatization of the state institution that was to have
    supervised the project. A center for deaf children and a program for
    children with special orthopedic problems have been in effect since
    1997.
        Religious Minorities.--A certain level of anti-Semitic sentiment
    persists in the country, reflected in sporadic public incidents of
    anti-Semitism and sensationalist exploitation of anti-Semitism for
    commercial gain. In November the Prosecutor General launched an
    official criminal investigation into anti-Semitic articles published on
    October 18 in the national daily newspaper Lietuvos Aidas (circulation
    10,000). The President, Prime Minister, and the journalists' union
    publicly condemned the articles. The Penal Code provides for a sentence
    of from 2 to 10 years' imprisonment for incitement of racial or
    national hatred or incitement of violence against foreigners. The
    investigation continued at year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minority ethnic groups--
    including Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and
    Karaites--make up roughly 20 percent of the population. Members of the
    Polish Parliament criticized the Government in February over alleged
    discrimination against the Polish minority.
        Many nonethnic Lithuanian public sector employees by law were
    required to attain a functional knowledge of the Lithuanian language
    within several years, although the authorities have been granting
    liberal extensions of the time frame in which this competence is to be
    achieved. In the first half of the year, 223 persons took the language
    portion of the citizenship test, and 209 persons passed. From January
    to August, 352 persons were naturalized (compared with 567 in 1999 and
    550 in 1998). There is no documented evidence of job dismissals based
    on the language law. The authorities have indicated that the intent of
    the law is to apply moral incentives to learn Lithuanian as the
    official language of the State; they have asserted that no one would be
    dismissed solely because of an inability to meet the language
    requirements.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on
    Trade Unions recognize the right of workers and employees to form and
    join trade unions. The Law on Trade Unions formally extends this right
    to employees of the police and the armed forces, although the
    Collective Agreements Law of 1991 does not allow collective bargaining
    by government employees involved in law enforcement and securityrelated
    work.
        In 1990 the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Union's
        All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which includes 23 of 25
    trade unions, renamed itself the Confederation of Free Trade Unions
    (CFTU) and began asserting increased independence from its Soviet
    parent organization. In 1993 the CFTU joined eight other unions that
    also had been part of the All-Union Central Council to form the
    Lithuanian Trade Union Center (LTUC).
        Four major trade union associations work within the trilateral
    commission, which is composed of representatives of the Government,
    trade unions, and employers' organizations: The LTUC (110,000 members
    as of June 2000), the Lithuanian Workers' Union or LWU (52,000
    members), the Association of Lithuanian Trade Unions (41,650 members),
    and the Lithuanian Work Federation (over 15,000 members).
        The Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions provide for the right
    to strike, although public workers in essential services may not do so.
    No major strikes took place during the year; 56 other labor actions
    occurred during the first 8 months of the year.
        There are no restrictions on unions affiliating with international
    trade unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Collective
    Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining and the right of
    unions to organize employees, although several provisions reportedly
    hinder the establishment of new unions. Probably as a result of the
    discrediting of labor unions during the Soviet period, only 10 percent
    of enterprises have trade unions. Some 10 to 15 percent of the
    workforce is unionized. Collective negotiations regarding labor
    relations, including wages, are not very widespread. Workers often
    present their own case against their employer. Negotiations are more
    common in enterprises that have trade unions.
        According to the law, unions, in order to be registered, must have
    at least 30 founding members in large enterprises or have a membership
    of one-fifth of all employees in small enterprises. Difficulties
    commonly arise in state enterprises in which employees are represented
    by more than one union. LWU officials charge that managers in some
    state enterprises discriminated against LWU organizers and have on
    occasion dismissed employees in retribution for their trade union
    activities. The LWU also charged that the judicial system was slow to
    respond to LWU grievances regarding dismissals from work. LWU
    representatives claimed that state managers sometimes preferred the
    CFTU/LTUC over LWU unions as collective bargaining partners.
        In general trade union spokesmen said that managers often determine
    wages without regard to trade union preferences, except in larger
    factories with well-organized trade unions. The Government issues
    periodic decrees that serve as guidelines for state enterprise
    management in setting wage scales. The LWU and the LTUC engage in
    direct collective bargaining over wages at the workplace level. Wage
    decisions increasingly are being made at the enterprise level, although
    government ministries still retain some control over this sphere in
    state-owned enterprises. The LWU reports that it supplements its
    bargaining efforts with active lobbying in government ministries that
    own enterprises.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    specifically prohibits forced labor by all, including children, and
    this prohibition generally is observed in practice; however,
    trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution
    is a problem (see Sections 1.b., 5, and 6.f.). Families of women who
    are trafficked often believe they have disappeared or been kidnaped.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children without
    parental consent is 16 years; with the written consent of parents, it
    is 14 years. Complaints about the infringement of child labor
    regulations generally are referred to local prosecutors who investigate
    the charges and take legal action to stop violations. Child labor
    problems appear to be rare.
        The Constitution specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children, and this prohibition generally is observed in practice;
    however, girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution
    (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for
    every person's right to receive just payment for work.
        The legal minimum wage has been stable at $107.50 (430 litas) per
    month since December 1999. The minimum wage does not provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. The average wage in July
    2000 was $275 (1,100 litas) per month, which is a 0.5 percent increase
    since July 1999. The Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Social
    Security and Labor periodically adjust the minimum wage. Every 3 months
    these government bodies must submit their minimum wage proposals to the
    Seimas, which has the right to approve or revise the minimum wage
    level. Enforcement of the minimum wage is almost nonexistent, in part
    because the Government does not want to increase unemployment.
        The 40-hour workweek is standard, with a provision for at least one
    24-hour rest period. For a majority of the population, living standards
    remain low. Some 65 percent of the expenditures of the poorest 16
    percent of households goes for food, compared with 30 percent for food
    in the top 10 percent.
        The Constitution provides that workers have the right to safe and
    healthy working conditions. The State Labor Inspection Service
    implements the Labor Safety Law. From January to July, the Labor
    Inspection Service received 2,169 complaints and declarations, of which
    more than 1,458 were found to have merit. Of the complaints, 90.5
    percent involved abuses of labor laws while only 9.5 percent dealt with
    working conditions. The most numerous abuses include illegal employment
    (working without a written contract), wage arrears, and time off.
        In October the Seimas passed amendments to the Law on Safety at
    Work. The law now complies with European Union directives and outlines
    clear responsibility of the employer for the safety and health of
    employees at work. The 1993 Labor Safety Law sets out the rights of
    workers facing hazardous conditions and provides legal protection for
    workers who file complaints about such conditions. Workers may remove
    themselves from hazardous job conditions without losing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
    forced prostitution was a problem. A 1998 law criminalizes trafficking
    in persons for purposes of sexual abuse: the penalty is 4 to 8 years'
    imprisonment. There were no prosecutions under this statute during the
    year.
        The country is a source, transit point, and destination for
    trafficking in women. Women from Belarus, Russia (Kalingrad District),
    Latvia, and the Lithuanian countryside are trafficked to major cities.
    Some are trafficked further to Western Europe and elsewhere. Germany,
    Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria are major destinations,
    based on the figures of women subsequently deported from these
    countries to Lithuania.
        A number of women, some underage, have been enticed or forced into
    prostitution and sold abroad by organized crime figures. Many are lured
    by deceptive offers of seemingly innocent jobs such as household
    helpers, bar dancers, or waitresses. Women also are tricked into
    prostitution through false marriage advertisements. Their families
    often are unaware of their predicament and believe that they have
    disappeared or been kidnaped. However, it is difficult to determine
    what percentage were enticed or coerced and how many departed
    voluntarily. Of those returned to Lithuania as deportees, 70 percent
    reportedly said that they knew what type of work they were going to
    undertake.
        Experts from nongovernmental organizations consider government
    efforts to prevent trafficking in persons and search for missing
    persons unsatisfactory. In July the border police were instructed to
    pay more attention to young persons, particularly females, traveling
    abroad. Since January statistics on deported persons are being
    collected. During the first half of the year, 1,618 persons were
    deported back to Lithuania. Most of them worked or attempted to work
    illegally, stayed illegally in other countries, or were turned back at
    the border. The absolute majority of them are citizens of Lithuania.
    There are no specific government assistance programs for victims of
    trafficking; however, the police offer protection for witnesses.
        The media report extensively on trafficking in persons. A local
    nongovernmental organization, the Missing Persons' Families Support
    Center, received a foreign grant during the year to conduct an
    awareness campaign on trafficking in persons.
                                   __________

                                   LUXEMBOURG

        Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic,
    parliamentary form of government. The role of the Grand Duke is mainly
    ceremonial and administrative. The Prime Minister is the leader of the
    dominant party in the popularly elected Parliament. The Council of
    State, whose members are appointed by the Grand Duke, serves as an
    advisory body to the Parliament. The judiciary is independent.
        The Government effectively controls the security apparatus, which
    consists of the police and gendarmerie.
        Luxembourg has a prosperous market economy with active industrial
    and service sectors. The standard of living and the level of social
    benefits are high.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
    and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
    individual instances of abuse.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
    reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. The
    Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        From December 1999 to May 2000, 6 inmates committed suicide at the
    penitentiary in Schrassig, which houses 330 inmates. A report
    commissioned by the Government cited poor management, rampant drug use,
    and an insufficient number of trained personnel at the prison to cope
    with the inmates' medical and psychological problems. In October the
    Minister of Justice appointed a new prison director and allocated $1.3
    million (LUF 60 million) to fund antidrug programs at the penitentiary.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions.
        Judicial warrants are required by law for arrests except in cases
    of hot pursuit. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must lodge
    charges and bring suspects before a judge. Suspects are given immediate
    access to an attorney, at government expense for indigents. The
    presiding judge may order release on bail.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The independent judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court, whose
    members are appointed by the Grand Duke. One of the country's three
    Justices of the Peace has jurisdiction over minor criminal, civil, and
    commercial cases, and one of two District Courts hears more serious
    cases. The Youth and Guardianship Court rules on matters concerning the
    protection of young people.
        Defendants are presumed innocent. They have the right to public
    trials and are free to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence.
    Either the defendant or the prosecutor can appeal a ruling; an appeal
    results in a completely new judicial procedure, with the possibility
    that a sentence may be increased or decreased. In response to a 1995
    decision by the European Court of Human Rights, the government
    established an administrative court system to review citizen challenges
    to legislation.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        The Government failed to act on its 1999 pledge to introduce
    legislation to reform an 1869 press law that requires journalists to
    reveal confidential sources, following the 1998 police search of a
    journalist's office who had alleged corruption on the part of the
    Interior Minister.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The
    Government requires and routinely issues permits for public meetings
    and demonstrations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
    no state religion, but the State pays the salaries of Roman Catholic,
    some Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish clergy, and several local
    governments maintain sectarian religious facilities. The Anglican and
    Islamic congregations continued to wait for a decision by the
    Department of Religion regarding requests for government funding made
    several years ago.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and
    provides first asylum. The law provides for the granting of refugee or
    asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not
    expel those having a valid claim to refugee status, and there were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
        The country has a refugee population of 4,681, some 4,400 of whom
    come from Montenegro, according to government reports. This number
    represents more than 1 percent of the total population. In March the
    Government passed legislation to create a status of temporary
    protection for refugees and to modify procedures to adjudicate requests
    for asylum. The Government received some 600 new requests for asylum
    during the year. Of the 1,800 total asylum requests examined, 100 were
    approved.
        In March the Government enacted a financial assistance program to
    encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their countries of
    origin. In April the Government created a service council to assist
    those refugees wanting to utilize the financial aid program. By August
    some 280 refugees returned voluntarily to their countries of origin, 5
    were forcibly returned to Albania, and 29 were transferred to other
    European Union member states under the 1993 Dublin Convention.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Luxembourg is a multiparty democracy. Suffrage is universal and
    compulsory for citizens 18 years of age and above, and balloting is
    secret. National parliamentary elections are held every 5 years.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    they are active in political life. Of 60 members of Parliament, 10 are
    women, as are 4 members of the Cabinet.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operate without government restriction.
    Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
        In June the Government established the Consultative Commission on
    Human Rights. This 22-member independent body acts as a consultant to
    the Government on human rights issues. The commission can propose
    measures to the Government to increase the protection and promotion of
    human rights and also serves as the national correspondent for the
    Vienna-based European Observatory of Racial and Xenophobic Phenomena.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits racial, sexual, or social discrimination, and the
    Government enforces these provisions. Blatant societal discrimination
    occurs only rarely.
        Women.--In 1999 shelters provided refuge to 368 women and 413
    children, a slight decrease from 1998 levels. Information offices set
    up to respond to women in distress reported that they received 4,364
    telephone calls in 1999. The Government funds organizations that
    provide shelter, counseling, and hot lines. Women enjoy the same
    property rights as men. In the absence of a prenuptial agreement,
    property is divided equally upon the dissolution of a marriage.
        The law mandates equal pay for equal work, and the Ministry for the
    Promotion of Women has a mandate to encourage a climate of equal
    treatment and opportunity. However, according to government reports,
    women are paid 20 to 30 percent less than men for comparable work. The
    Government cites the interruption in the careers of women caused by
    childbirth and their maternal roles as one reason for the disparity. To
    date there have been no work-related discrimination lawsuits. Women
    constitute 38 percent of the work force.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. The law mandates school attendance from the
    ages of 4 to 16. Schooling is free through the secondary level, and the
    Government provides some financial assistance for postsecondary
    education.
        In September at the millennium summit of the United Nations, the
    Government signed two children's rights protocols: The Protocol to the
    Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
    Prostitution, and Child Pornography, and the Protocol to the Convention
    on the Rights of the Child Concerning the Implications of Armed
    Conflict.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. A physicians'
    organization estimates that approximately 200 cases of child abuse are
    treated in hospitals each year that result in legal proceedings. This
    group is working to reform judicial procedures to permit videotaped
    testimony in court proceedings and the testimony of child
    psychiatrists, as well as the coordination of hospital records in child
    abuse cases. In May the Government set up a hot line for young persons
    in distress; by the end of the year it had received 183 calls.
        In 1999 the Government passed a comprehensive new law dealing with
    the sexual exploitation of children. The law increased penalties for
    adults who traffic in children, facilitate child prostitution, or
    exploit children through pornography. The law also extended the
    country's criminal jurisdiction over citizens and residents who engage
    in such activities abroad. No such trafficking was reported during the
    year.
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
    people with disabilities in employment, education, and the provision of
    other state services. The law does not directly mandate accessibility
    for the disabled, but the Government pays subsidies to builders to
    construct ``disabled-friendly'' structures. Despite government
    incentives, only a modest proportion of buildings and public
    transportation are modified to accommodate people with disabilities.
        The Government helps disabled persons obtain employment and
    professional education. Businesses and enterprises with at least 25
    employees by law must fill a quota for hiring disabled workers and must
    pay them prevailing wages. The quotas are fixed according to the total
    number of employees; employers who do not fulfill them are subject to
    sizable monthly fines. The Government provides subsidies and tax breaks
    for employers who hire the disabled. There have been no known
    complaints of noncompliance with the disability laws.
        Despite strong legal protections, the Government acknowledged that
    laws establishing quotas for businesses that employ over 25 persons are
    not applied or enforced consistently, and there is a particular problem
    in the case of persons with mental disabilities. The Government was
    reviewing the effectiveness of the disability legislation, particularly
    the provisions that establish quotas, at year's end.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the right to
    associate freely and choose their representatives. About 57 percent of
    the working population belongs to a trade union. Membership is not
    mandatory. Unions operate free of governmental interference. The two
    largest labor federations are linked to, but organized independently
    of, major political parties. The law prohibits discrimination against
    strike leaders, and a labor tribunal deals with complaints.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
    government workers who provide essential services. Legal strikes may
    occur only after a lengthy conciliation procedure between the parties.
    The Government's National Conciliation Office must certify that
    conciliation efforts have ended for a strike to be legal. No strikes,
    legal or illegal, occurred during the year.
        Unions maintain unrestricted contact with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for and protects collective bargaining, which is conducted in
    periodic negotiations between centralized organizations of unions and
    employers. Enterprises having 15 or more employees must have worker
    representatives to conduct collective bargaining. Enterprises with over
    150 employees must form joint works councils composed of equal numbers
    of management and employee representatives. In enterprises with more
    than 1,000 employees, one-third of the membership of the supervisory
    boards of directors must be employee representatives.
        The law provides for the adjudication of employment-related
    complaints and authorizes labor tribunals to deal with them. A tribunal
    can fine an employer found guilty of antiunion discrimination, but it
    cannot require the employer to reinstate a worker fired for union
    activities.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor by children and adults, and it is not known
    to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
    of 16 and requires all children to remain in school until the age of
    16. Apprentices who are 16 years old must attend school in addition to
    their job training. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child
    labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        Workers under the age of 18 have additional legal protection,
    including limits on overtime and the number of hours that can be worked
    continuously. The Ministries of Labor and Education effectively monitor
    the enforcement of child labor and education laws.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for minimum
    wage rates that vary according to the worker's age and number of
    dependents. The minimum wage for a single worker over the age of 18 is
    $6.34 (LUF 285) per hour. Supporting a family is difficult on the
    minimum wage, but most employees earn more than the minimum.
        The law mandates a maximum workweek of 40 hours. Premium pay is
    required for overtime or unusual hours. Employment on Sunday is
    permitted in continuous-process industries (steel, glass, and
    chemicals) and for certain maintenance and security personnel; other
    industries have requested permission for Sunday work, which the
    government grants on a case-by-case basis. Work on Sunday, allowed for
    some retail employees, must be entirely voluntary and compensated at
    double the normal wage; employees must be given compensatory time off
    on another day, equal to the number of hours worked on Sunday. The law
    requires rest breaks for shift workers and limits all workers to a
    maximum of 10 hours per day including overtime. All workers receive at
    least 5 weeks of paid vacation yearly, in addition to paid holidays.
        The law mandates a safe working environment. An inspection system
    provides severe penalties for infractions. The Labor Inspectorate of
    the Ministry of Labor and the Accident Insurance Agency of the Social
    Security Ministry carry out their inspections effectively.
        No laws or regulations specifically provide workers the right to
    remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
    continued employment, but every worker has the right to ask the Labor
    Inspectorate to make a determination, and the inspectorate usually does
    so expeditiously.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country. In August the Ministry of Labor
    denied allegations made by a European Parliament Deputy that Luxembourg
    is a ``turntable'' for trafficking in women. The Deputy's report stated
    that the Government grants limited entry visas to Eastern and Central
    European women to work as performers in cabarets. The Ministry said
    that it issued 146 limited visas during the year to women who had
    received job offers as janitors, hairdressers, and other similar
    positions.
                                   __________

                     MACEDONIA, FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF

        Macedonia, which became independent in 1991 following the breakup
    of Yugoslavia, is a parliamentary democracy led by a coalition
    government. It has a popularly elected president. In multiparty
    parliamentary elections held in October and November 1998, opposition
    parties defeated parties of the governing coalition in voting that
    international observers concluded was conducted fairly and reflected
    the will of the electorate. International observers considered the
    conduct of the first round of voting for president on October 31, 1999,
    to be satisfactory; however, there were allegations of fraud and ballot
    stuffing in the second round on November 14, and the Supreme Court
    ordered another vote in most of the country's ethnic Albanian polling
    stations, which was conducted on December 5. That final round also was
    marred by irregularities; however, international observers concluded
    that these likely did not affect the final outcome and resulted in the
    election of President Boris Trajkovski. The judiciary is generally
    independent, although at times inefficient.
        The Ministry of Interior oversees the uniformed police, criminal
    police, border police, and the state intelligence service. Municipal
    police chiefs are responsible to the Ministry of Interior, not to
    municipal leaders. The Ministry is under the control of a civilian
    minister; a parliamentary commission oversees operations. The Ministry
    of Defense shares with the border police responsibility for border
    security. Some members of the police occasionally committed human
    rights abuses.
        The economy is in transition from Yugoslav-style communism to a
    market-based system. Most firms are privatized, large money-losing
    state enterprises are being restructured, and inflation has remained
    below 4 percent in recent years. However, during the year, the
    transitive effects of introducing a new Value Added Tax system, coupled
    with a year-end surge in fuel prices, caused inflation to reach about
    10 percent. The economy improved substantially after the lifting of the
    Greek embargo and the suspension of international sanctions against
    Serbia, both in 1995, before which the gross domestic product (GDP) had
    fallen an estimated 50 percent. Growth resumed slowly in 1996 and
    continued at about a 5 percent rate until the outbreak of the Kosovo
    crisis in the spring of 1999. The crisis cut many firms off from
    customers in Serbia and made the transportation of goods to and from
    other parts of Europe more difficult and expensive. The overall
    economic effects of the Kosovo crisis were quite negative, but the
    local and regional influx of international funds related to
    humanitarian efforts and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission has
    helped stem the economic decline and generated positive growth. The
    economy made broad-based gains during the year, and GDP grew about 6
    percent. Unemployment was high; the gray economy was large. Some
    workers received their pay weeks or months late.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, serious problems remained in several areas. Police
    were accused of extrajudicial killings involving at least two deaths of
    detainees in custody, and the Government took inadequate steps to
    clarify the circumstances or discipline responsible officers. Police on
    occasion abused suspects and prisoners, in particular Roma and ethnic
    Albanians. Arbitrary arrest and detention were problems. The Government
    was working to end the practice of police compelling citizens to appear
    for questioning, pursuant to a 1997 law; however, incidents involving
    the use of such practices still occurred. Another 1997 law imposes some
    limitations on religious practices. The Government took inadequate
    measures to ensure the security of the electoral process during
    nationwide local elections, resulting in incidents of violence and
    procedural problems that were strongly criticized by the OSCE. Societal
    discrimination against minorities, including Roma, ethnic Albanians,
    ethnic Turks, and ethnic Serbs, was a problem. Ethnic minorities
    continued to make progress in securing more representation in
    Government and politics, although ethnic Macedonians still hold a
    disproportionately high number of positions. Violence and
    discrimination against women remained problems; trafficking in women
    and girls for prostitution was also a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, there were credible reports of
    at least two deaths in police custody. An ethnic Albanian suspected of
    involvement in the January 11 murder of three police officers died
    under suspicious circumstances while in police custody in January. The
    official report stated that the suspect died of a drug overdose, but
    friends and family members who saw the body before the burial charged
    that he was shot. No autopsy report has been made public. A second
    ethnic Albanian suspect died in police custody in February after his
    arrest for theft. Authorities reported his death to be a suicide, but
    his family claimed that he died due to injuries received while being
    questioned. On May 14, an ethnic Albanian man died in a Skopje prison.
    The Government did not take adequate steps to investigate, to inform
    the public, or to discipline the responsible officers in any of these
    cases. During a December 1998 police raid on the home of an ethnic
    Albanian suspect believed to have stockpiled illegal arms, the
    suspect's father was killed by police gunfire. A government inquiry
    cleared the police of any wrongdoing, but the incident remained
    controversial.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances attributed to government agents.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such treatment and punishment;
    however, police occasionally used excessive force during the
    apprehension of criminal suspects, and they occasionally abused
    prisoners, especially members of ethnic minorities.
        Following the killing of three police officers outside Aracinovo on
    January 11, police beat numerous ethnic Albanian residents, destroyed
    property, and used tear gas in raids. One of the three suspects
    arrested in connection with the killings died in police custody (see
    Section 1.a.). Human Rights Watch reported that nine other suspects
    were arrested and beaten in custody and that some were forced to sign
    confessions. An investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman found that
    the police had used excessive force in Aracinovo and recommended an
    internal investigation. Although some families were compensated for
    damage to their property, the Government did little to address police
    abuse in the wake of the incident.
        There are credible reports of occasional police violence against
    Roma, including beatings during arrest and while in detention. Roma
    rights organizations also complained of police harassment of Roma and
    accused the police of reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination
    by consistently siding with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes
    involving Roma.
        On April 21, police reportedly beat an ``Egyptian'' couple (the
    country's Egyptians consider themselves distinct from Roma) near Ohrid
    at a traffic stop. The husband, a taxi driver, was arrested for not
    presenting the necessary permits, although he later claimed that he had
    presented them. Police allegedly beat the man in custody and kept him
    in jail for 8 days. According to the European Roma Rights Center
    (ERRC), a police officer reportedly beat a 20-year-old Romani man with
    a truncheon at the police station in Stip on January 9. Police
    reportedly beat a 16-year-old Romani boy in the village of Krivolak on
    May 14. Police officers and non-Romani civilians reportedly attacked
    and severely beat six Romani men in Stip on May 26.
        The vast majority of Kosovar refugees returned to Kosovo during the
    second half of 1999; most of those who remain are Roma. Several
    thousand Roma refugees are housed in collective centers or in private
    accommodations. According to the ERRC, the police allegedly beat and
    detained a Romani refugee from Kosovo on September 10. In October the
    Roma residents of the Suto Orizari collective center began a series of
    protests over the food served to them. The World Food Program (WFP)
    inspected the facility and reviewed the food situation; WFP concluded
    that the water system at the center was barely adequate and needed
    improvements, but that the food rations given to refugees were up to
    international standards.
        There were three attacks on police stations during the year. On
    February 2, a bomb exploded in front of the Directorate of Interior in
    Kumanovo. No one was reported injured in the explosion.
        There were some incidents of violence during the September
    elections. Police beat an opposition supporter; several police officers
    were suspended pending an investigation. There were a few shootings by
    members of political parties. In another incident, a Member of
    Parliament fired into a crowd of demonstrators (see Section 3).
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards; however,
    there were two deaths in custody. Prisons meet basic needs of food,
    hygiene, and access to medical care. Men and women are held separately.
    While juveniles are also supposed to be held separately, limited
    facilities sometimes result in older juveniles being confined with
    adults.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
    the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Government agreed to allow the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons under
    procedures which the ICRC finds acceptable, but has not yet agreed to
    commit to those procedures in a binding, written agreement with the
    ICRC.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution states
    that a person must be arraigned in court within 24 hours of arrest. The
    maximum length of pretrial detention was increased in 1998 from 90 to
    180 days by constitutional amendment. The accused is entitled to
    contact a lawyer at the time of arrest and to have a lawyer present
    during police and court proceedings. Arbitrary arrest and detention are
    problems. Although the law requires warrants for arrests, this
    provision frequently is ignored, and it is not uncommon for a warrant
    to be issued some time after an arrest. According to human rights
    observers and criminal defense attorneys, police sometimes violate the
    24-hour time period within which a suspect must be arraigned and deny
    immediate access to an attorney.
        The Government has not yet ended completely the practice of police
    compelling citizens to appear at police stations through an
    ``invitation'' for ``informative talks.'' Although a law on criminal
    procedures was passed in 1997 that states that police cannot force
    citizens to appear for these sessions without presentation of a court
    order, the practice continued to be applied on occasion. Roma rights
    organizations accuse the police of arbitrarily arresting and detaining
    Roma, and there are credible reports of such police actions.
        The police continued a pattern of selective enforcement of various
    laws and regulations against individuals and businesses linked with the
    political opposition. The police initiated a series of raids on
    businesses in 1999, seized records, and briefly detained some 20
    enterprise directors and officers to question them on charges of
    corruption and failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the individuals who
    were questioned or whose offices were raided were connected to
    opposition political parties, and the raids were widely viewed as
    having been politically motivated. The Government publicly defended
    itself against media criticism of its actions by releasing information
    on the alleged crimes under investigation, but no charges were ever
    brought against the subjects of the raids. During the year several
    opposition-oriented media outlets and other firms were the subject of
    tax inquiries; in one case official action was initiated to tear down
    an illegally constructed building erected by an opposition-oriented
    media owner (see Section 2.a.). The authorities defended their actions
    as being based upon law, but the individuals and firms involved noted
    that while tax and construction offenses are very common, the
    Government appeared to take enforcement actions mostly against entities
    linked to the opposition. A similar police raid in December 1999
    against the director of a company involved in a dispute with the
    Government resulted in a media outcry and the suspension by the
    Ministry of Interior of the local chief of police who conducted the
    operation.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice, although the court system is still developing and is
    sometimes inefficient and slow.
        The court system is three tiered and comprises municipal courts,
    district courts, and a Supreme Court. A Constitutional Court deals with
    matters of constitutional interpretation.
        The Constitutional Court has a mandate to protect the human rights
    of citizens but has not taken action in any case in this area. In
    addition the Constitution provides for a public attorney to protect the
    constitutional and legal rights of citizens when violated by bodies of
    state administration and other agencies with public mandates. The
    Office of the People's Ombudsman was created and became functional in
    1997 (see Section 4).
        Trials are presided over by judges appointed by the Republican
    Judicial Council (an independent agency) and confirmed by Parliament.
    The judges are assisted by two members of the community who serve
    essentially as consulting jurors, although the judge makes the final
    decision. Court hearings and the rendering of verdicts are open to the
    public except in some cases, such as those involving minors and those
    in which the personal safety of the defendant is of concern. Trials
    cannot be televised, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, although
    the court in certain cases can authorize the presence of television and
    film cameras.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
    government authorities generally respect these prohibitions. Opposition
    political leaders accused the Government of wiretapping their
    telephones and released some transcripts of telephone conversations
    from late in the year that they claimed proved the truth of their
    charges. An investigation into the charges is underway.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights in practice.
        Several daily newspapers are published in Skopje, as well as
    numerous weekly or periodical political and other publications. Most
    towns and municipalities have local newspapers. Government-subsidized
    newspapers in the Albanian and Turkish languages are published and
    distributed nationally by the leading news publishing house. The
    Government subsidizes some other newspapers and magazines. The process
    of granting media subsidies is not transparent, leading to charges of
    political bias in government support for the independent media. Several
    privately owned publications have a wide distribution throughout the
    country, and some are considered to be oriented toward opposition
    political parties. The media that remain partially state owned are
    government oriented but report on opposition press conferences and
    statements and in general provide coverage of the major opposition
    parties. The leading newspaper publisher is still partially government
    owned and controls one of only two modern, high-speed printing
    facilities in the country, as well as many newspaper kiosks. Following
    the parliamentary elections in late 1998, influence over this publisher
    passed to the new Government. International monitors noted that the
    media provided generally unbiased coverage of the full spectrum of
    political debate. However, media outlets often reflected the views of
    one or another political party.
        Distributors of foreign newspapers and magazines must obtain the
    permission of the Ministry of Interior. All such requests during the
    year were approved. Media reports indicated that one edition of the
    Albanian newspaper Bota Sot was confiscated in Gostivar and Tetovo
    because it contained articles critical of the leadership of the
    Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). The party denied any involvement
    and quickly arranged for the articles in question to be reprinted and
    run in the local Albanian language newspapers. Foreign newspapers,
    including those from neighboring countries, are available throughout
    the country.
        State-run radio and television is in countrywide competition with
    two private television stations and one private radio station that are
    licensed to broadcast nationally. The state broadcast media also face
    the competition of dozens of small independent local radio and
    television stations throughout the country. The Broadcast Council
    issues licenses to broadcasters, in a process that international
    observers consider generally meets international norms. License fees
    collected from private broadcasters are supposed to help subsidize the
    state-run system, but collections are inconsistent. Dozens of illegal,
    ``pirate'' radio and television stations operate without licenses and
    pay no fees.
        Individuals and opposition political groups criticize the
    Government, but during the year media complaints arose over alleged
    intimidation of newspapers and television companies critical of the
    Government. The intimidation took the form of law enforcement action
    against the media companies and their financial backers in areas such
    as tax collection and checks of building permits, areas in which there
    is widespread noncompliance among private companies. One notable case
    involved the Government's order to tear down a building belonging to
    the owner of an opposition-oriented media company because of a supposed
    failure to obtain the proper building permit. The Government eventually
    reversed its order, but the incident left the impression that officials
    were selectively enforcing laws in an effort to control the behavior of
    the media (see Section 1.d.).
        On May 12, the Government introduced a draft law on information to
    replace existing regulations from the Communist era. Local journalists
    and international press groups criticized the draft law and provisions
    that would require local journalists to obtain government-issued press
    accreditation. The law remained pending at year's end.
        The Government respects academic freedom. Because government-
    recognized higher education is not yet available in the Albanian
    language (except for teacher training), some ethnic Albanians claim
    that they do not have complete academic freedom. They want to see the
    currently unauthorized Albanian-language Tetovo University gain legal
    status, or a new accredited private institution to be established, so
    that they can study in their native language at the university level
    (see Section 5).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice. Advance notification of large
    meetings is optional; political and protest rallies occur regularly
    without major incident. Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of
    specific religious facilities, must be approved in advance by the
    Ministry of Interior and can only be convened by registered religious
    groups (see Section 2.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice. Political
    parties and organizations are required to register with a court. More
    than 40 political parties are registered, including ethnically based
    parties of Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Roma.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    However, the 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups limits some
    aspects of religious practice, although the law does not appear to be
    enforced consistently. While the Macedonian Orthodox Church is
    mentioned by name in the Constitution, it does not enjoy official
    status.
        The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups designates the
    Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic community, and the Roman
    Catholic Church as ``religious communities,'' while all other religions
    are designated ``religious groups.'' However, despite the difference in
    designation, there is no legal difference between the two categories.
        The law places some limitations on religious practices. For
    example, only a citizen may found a religious group. The law also
    stipulates that anyone carrying out religious work be registered with
    the Government's Commission on Religious Communities and Groups.
        The Government requires that religious groups be registered. The
    1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups contained a
    number of specific requirements for the registration of religious
    groups that were struck down by the Constitutional Court in 1999.
    Subsequently there was considerable confusion over which procedures
    still applied, and several foreign religious groups experienced delays
    in their efforts to register. During the year, the Government acted to
    make the remaining requirements more transparent, but the process
    remained slow and cumbersome. At least one international Protestant
    church was granted legal registration, and several others are at some
    stage of the process. One Islamic group withdrew its 1998 application
    for registration but continues to operate openly without taking further
    steps toward legal registration, and the Government has not taken any
    enforcement actions against the group. The Government no longer keeps a
    count of registered religious groups and communities.
        Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific religious
    facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Interior and
    can only be convened by registered religious groups.
        The refusal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the self-
    proclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church has led to difficulties for
    ethnic Serbs who wish to worship in their own church. On several
    occasions in 1998 the Government refused Serbian Orthodox priests
    permission to enter the country because of the recognition issue. No
    Serbian Orthodox priests attempted to enter the country for religious
    purposes during the year. In December 1999 a delegation from the
    Macedonian Orthodox Church traveled to Istanbul to consult with
    Orthodox leaders on ways to end the impasse with the Serbian Orthodox
    Church.
        On March 10, the Jewish community of Skopje inaugurated a new
    synagogue. The Government supported the opening of the synagogue; the
    mayor of Skopje and former President Gligorov attended the events.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government generally respects them in practice.
        Citizenship in the old Yugoslav system was national, but all
    records and processing were at the level of the individual republics,
    so some residents at the time of independence had Yugoslav citizenship
    that became citizenship in other newly independent former republics.
    During the first year of independence, beginning with the adoption of
    the Constitution in November 1991, any Yugoslav citizen who had legal
    residence (of any duration) in the republic could acquire citizenship
    by simple application. The Law on Citizenship adopted in November 1992
    established new procedures for conferring citizenship, and under its
    transitional provisions citizenship was granted essentially
    automatically to any legal resident who applied before November 1993.
    Despite this 2-year window of opportunity for residents to become
    citizens by simple application, several thousand residents did not
    regularize their status before November 1993. Some of these persons,
    and others who arrived in the country later, have complained that the
    provisions of the Law on Citizenship that followed the transition
    period are too restrictive and have prevented them from obtaining
    citizenship. For example, after the transition period the law required
    applicants for naturalization to have 15 years of residency. The law
    also affects many Roma who wish to become citizens, particularly with
    regard to difficulties they encountered in establishing residence and
    meeting requirements of a regular income. During 1999 the 15-year
    residence requirement was lowered to 10 years, in conformity with the
    Council of Europe Convention on Citizenship, but the enabling
    legislation needed to fully implement the change still was not
    completed. New procedures instituted in 1998 have made the citizenship
    application process considerably more transparent; the Macedonian
    Helsinki Committee has full access to all files, and the office within
    the Ministry of Interior that processes the cases works closely with
    the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in
    Skopje. A total of 2,124,599 citizens have established their status
    since independence; since the end of the early procedures for gaining
    citizenship, 140,495 individuals have applied through the Ministry of
    Interior, and about 96 percent of those applications have been
    approved. About 2,000 new applications for citizenship are received
    annually by the Ministry of Interior.
        During the 1999 crisis, over 360,000 Kosovars found refuge in
    Macedonia. Following the conclusion of the crisis, the great majority
    of those refugees still in the country returned to Kosovo; the
    exception were the Roma, who feared returning because of dramatically
    deteriorated relations with the ethnic Albanian Kosovars. During the
    year, the overall number of refugees continued to decrease, and at
    year's end only 7,600 registered refugees remained. In addition
    officials estimate that about another 2,000 unregistered individuals
    remain. Of the registered refugees, approximately 60 percent are Roma.
    The largest number of registered Roma refugees (about 1,200) reside in
    the Suto Orizani collective center. Roma also reside in collective
    centers at Dare Bombol, Llubanci, Saraj, and Struga. Ethnic Albanian
    refugees all reside at the Radusa collective center. In all only about
    2,100 of the total registered refugee population reside in centers;
    however, the remaining 5,500 live with host families or in rental
    accommodations. During the year there were several Roma protests about
    living conditions and food at the collective centers, although
    international donors and administrators judge conditions to meet
    generally accepted standards.
        Continued tensions in the Presevo region of southern Serbia also
    generated potential for refugee flows during the year, but by year's
    end only a small number of Presevo residents had chosen to come to
    Macedonia; they did not enter as refugees, but rather as temporary
    visitors.
        Macedonia provides first asylum, and there were no reports of
    persons being returned to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The country's third parliamentary elections were
    held in October and November 1998 and resulted in an opposition victory
    and a peaceful change of government. The unicameral Parliament governs
    the country. The Prime Minister, as head of government, is selected by
    the party or coalition that produces a majority in the Parliament. The
    Prime Minister and the other Ministers may not be Members of
    Parliament. The Prime Minister is formally appointed by the President,
    who is head of state, Chairman of the Security Council, and commander
    in chief of the armed forces.
        The Government was accused by opposition leaders and the media of
    harassing members of the opposition prior to the presidential elections
    held in October 1999. In the summer of 1999, police conducted a number
    of raids on businesses and charged some 20 enterprise directors with
    corruption and failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the enterprise
    directors singled out for this treatment belonged to an opposition
    party (see Section 1.d.).
        On October 31, 1999, the first round of balloting in the
    presidential election was held. There were six candidates on the
    ballot, representing every major political party, including both ethnic
    Albanian parties. International observers reported that the conduct of
    the first round was satisfactory, and the candidates who received the
    most votes advanced to the second round. The ruling VMRO (Internal
    Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) candidate Trajkovski gained the
    majority of the votes cast in round two on November 14, but the
    opposition SDSM (Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia) candidate
    claimed fraud and appealed the results. International observers agreed
    that irregularities occurred in some areas of the country in the second
    round, and the Supreme Court ruled that round two should be rerun in
    230 polling precincts, all of which were predominantly ethnic Albanian.
    The voting held on December 5, 1999, was as flawed as the previous
    round, according to international monitors, who reported numerous
    incidents of ballot stuffing and other problems in some polling
    stations. Trajkovski again gained the majority of votes cast, and the
    SDSM filed a list of complaints of irregularities. Claiming that the
    Government was incapable of conducting a fair vote in the contested
    precincts, the SDSM later withdrew those complaints and did not press
    for another repeat of the voting. President Trajkovski was sworn into
    office on December 15, 1999.
        Nationwide local elections held in September drew OSCE and other
    international criticism due to poor organization, sporadic violence,
    and voting irregularities. While the voting was calm and orderly in
    most of the country, serious incidents of violence caused the polls to
    be closed in several municipalities. Irregularities and intimidation in
    other areas further marred the process. The worst election day problems
    included some blatant cases of ballot stuffing, some smashing of ballot
    boxes, incidents of unauthorized persons being present at polling
    stations in an intimidating manner, and shooting incidents in Debar and
    Ohrid that left four persons wounded. In Debar a Democratic Party of
    Albania (DPA) activist shot a Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)
    activist on September 10, although investigators concluded that the
    incident was personally ``- rather than politically--motivated. In
    Ohrid two opposition members belonging to the SDSM were shot, one in
    the head, causing serious injury. Several arrests were made in these
    cases, and charges were brought against individuals who had been
    identified as participants in violent acts; however, in several cases
    the perpetrators remained unknown at year's end. These problems caused
    the elections to be rerun in several areas, and the Government did not
    act decisively to prevent some repetition of the same difficulties
    during the reruns. During the campaign period, six Members of
    Parliament (M.P.'s) from the ruling party defected to an opposition
    party, and their homes were surrounded briefly by crowds of angry party
    loyalists; some property damage occurred before police moved to protect
    the homes. Following an incident in which an opposition supporter was
    beaten by police during the campaign, several police officers were
    suspended pending an investigation. In Skopje approximately 200
    demonstrators threatened a Member of Parliament at his home; in
    response he fired several pistol shots into the crowd, lightly injuring
    two persons. The police, slow to respond to the initial disturbance,
    later charged the M.P. with illegal use of a firearm. A local NGO
    reported the alleged beating of a group of Roma in the town of Strumica
    on September 24, the day of the second round of the local elections.
    Non-Romani men allegedly beat Roma in the street with their fists and
    rubber truncheons. Many electoral difficulties were judged by
    international observers to have resulted from a weak and ambiguous Law
    on Local Elections, and they criticized the State Electoral Committee
    for not acting to anticipate or overcome those weaknesses.
        Although no formal restrictions exist on the participation of women
    in politics and government, they are severely underrepresented in these
    areas. The Government has two female ministers. In the Parliament, 9 of
    120 members are women, an increase from 4 women in the previous
    Parliament. In Muslim communities, especially among more traditional
    ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect disenfranchised due to the
    practice of family/proxy voting through which men vote on behalf of the
    women in their families (see Section 5).
        A number of political parties represent the interests of
    minorities, including ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, ethnic Serbs, and
    Roma. Two ethnic Albanian parties and the Roma party have members in
    the Parliament; the ruling government coalition includes one of the two
    major ethnic Albanian parties, as well as the Romani party. The
    Parliament includes 25 ethnic Albanian members, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1
    Rom, and a small number of Vlachs. Minorities nonetheless maintain that
    political structures continue to be biased against them. Partly to
    address these concerns, the electoral law includes elements of
    proportional representation. A total of 35 of the 120 parliamentary
    members are chosen on the basis of proportionality, while the other 85
    members are elected in single-member districts. Some ethnic Albanians
    and Roma complain that discrimination against them in citizenship
    decisions effectively disenfranchises them (see Section 2.d.).
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government generally is responsive to the concerns of human
    rights groups. Human rights groups and ethnic community representatives
    meet freely with foreign representatives without government
    interference. Several independent forums for human rights exist and
    operate freely, but their activities have not been prominent.
        The Office of the Ombudsman, established in 1997, is active;
    however, most complaints filed with the office do not relate to human
    rights issues.
        The Government allows independent missions by foreign observers.
    The Kosovo crisis led many international NGO's to establish new offices
    in the country, staffed by scores of international workers; many of
    these organizations have a strong interest in human rights issues. The
    Government generally has been cooperative in its dealings with these
    and other international organizations concerning such issues.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens
    regardless of their sex, race, color of skin, national or social
    origin, political or religious beliefs, property, or social status.
    However, societal discrimination against ethnic minorities and the
    protection of women's rights remain problems.
        Women.--Violence against women, especially in the family setting,
    is a persistent and common problem. Criminal procedures are available
    to victims of rape, including limited legal recourse in the case of
    marital rape. Cultural norms discourage the reporting of such violence,
    and criminal charges on grounds of domestic violence are very rare.
    Public concern about violence against women is not evident in the
    media, although some women's groups are working to raise awareness of
    the issue. Shelters for victims of spousal abuse are operated by NGO's.
    A hot line remains open but has limited hours. The Government offers
    some limited support for victims of domestic violence, but relies
    heavily on international donor support to maintain a hot line and
    shelter.
        Trafficking in women and girls for prostitution and pornography is
    a growing problem (see Section 6.f.). Traffickers have recruited women
    and girls from other countries, especially Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania,
    and Ukraine, to work as prostitutes in several towns (see Section 6.c.
    and 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is a problem, but no
    statistics are available to indicate its scope. Maternity benefits
    include 9-months' paid leave, and benefits are received in practice.
    Women also retain the right to return to their jobs for 2 years after
    giving birth.
        The Constitution provides that women possess the same legal rights
    as men. Macedonian society, in both the Muslim and Christian
    communities, is strongly patriarchal, and the advancement of women into
    nontraditional roles is limited. Women are underrepresented severely in
    the higher levels of the private sector, although some professional
    women are prominent. Women from some parts of the ethnic Albanian
    community do not have equal opportunities for employment and education,
    primarily due to traditional and religious constraints on their full
    participation in society. In Muslim communities, especially among more
    traditional ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect disenfranchised
    due to the practice of family/proxy voting through which men vote on
    behalf of the women in their families (see Section 3).
        Women's advocacy groups include the Humanitarian Association for
    the Emancipation, Solidarity, and Equality of Women; the Union of
    Associations of Macedonian Women; and the League of Albanian Women.
        Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of
    children; however, in some areas it is limited by resource constraints.
    Education is compulsory through the eighth grade, or to the age of 15
    or 16. At both the primary and secondary levels, girls in some ethnic
    Albanian communities are underrepresented in schools. The Ministry of
    Education encourages ethnic minority students, especially girls, to
    enroll in secondary schools. Secondary education is free to all.
    Medical care for children is adequate but is hampered by the generally
    difficult economic circumstances of the country and by the weak
    national medical system.
        Trafficking in girls for prostitution and pornography is a growing
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
        People with Disabilities.--Social programs to meet the needs of the
    disabled exist to the extent that government resources allow.
    Discrimination on the basis of disability is forbidden by law; however,
    in practice this mandate is not enforced. No laws or regulations
    mandate accessibility to buildings for disabled persons.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of 2.2 million
    is composed of a variety of national and ethnic groups, mainly
    Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Vlachs. All citizens
    are equal under the law. The Constitution provides for the protection
    of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of
    minorities, including state support for education in minority languages
    through secondary school and the official use of ethnic minority
    languages in areas where ethnic minorities make up a majority of the
    population.
        Ethnic tensions and prejudices are present in society. The
    Government is committed to a policy of peaceful integration of all
    ethnic groups into society but faces political resistance and continued
    popular prejudices regarding the means to achieve this goal (hiring
    quotas, affirmative action in school admissions, education in minority
    languages, etc.).
        Representatives of the ethnic Albanian community, by far the
    largest minority group with 23 percent of the population according to
    government statistics, are the most vocal in charging discrimination.
    The underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the military and police
    is a major grievance in the community. Despite government efforts to
    recruit more ethnic Albanians, the police force remains overwhelmingly
    Slavic Macedonian, even in areas where the ethnic Albanian population
    is large. Members of ethnic minorities constitute 8.7 percent of the
    law enforcement officers of the Ministry of the Interior; in the
    primarily ethnic Albanian cities of Tetovo and Gostivar the respective
    figures are 17 percent and 12 percent. To raise the percentage of
    ethnic minority police officers, the Government for several years has
    set a recruiting quota of 22 percent for enrolling minority students at
    the police secondary school. Attrition has kept the graduating classes
    from retaining that percentage of ethnic minorities.
        The military continues efforts to recruit and retain minority
    officers and cadets. The military is composed mostly of short-service
    conscripts, drawn from all ethnic groups. The proportion of ethnic
    Albanians in the ranks is estimated to be about 25 percent, but the
    proportion is significantly lower in the officer corps. Minorities
    constitute about 12 percent of the total of officers, noncommissioned
    officers, and professional soldiers; about 15 percent of the cadets at
    the military academy are from ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities
    constitute about 11 percent of Ministry of Defense civilian employees.
    The Deputy Minister of Defense and 2 of a total of 10 general officers
    are ethnic Albanians.
        The Constitution provides for primary and secondary education in
    the languages of the ethnic minorities. Primary education is available
    in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and Serbian. Albanian-language
    education is a crucial issue for the ethnic Albanian community; it is
    seen as vital for preserving Albanian heritage and culture. Almost all
    ethnic Albanian children receive 8 years of education in Albanian-
    language schools. The number of ethnic minority students who receive
    secondary education in their native languages is increasing and was
    about 15 percent in 1999, up from 14 percent in 1998. However, only
    about half of ethnic minority students go on to high school, partly
    because of the lack of available classes in minority languages at the
    secondary level and partly because the traditional nature of parts of
    Albanian society leads many families in rural areas to see no need to
    educate their children, particularly girls, beyond the eighth grade.
        At the university level, ethnic minorities are underrepresented,
    but there has been much progress in increasing the number of ethnic
    minority applicants and students since independence in 1991. There are
    eased admission requirements for minorities at the universities in
    Skopje and Bitola for up to 23 percent of entering places, although the
    quota has not always been filled. In 1991 302 ethnic minority students
    attended university; in 1998 1,073 attended, representing about 16
    percent of all university students; no updated figures were available
    for the year. Most university education is conducted in the Macedonian
    language; there is Albanian-language university education only for
    students at Skopje University's teacher training faculty, for students
    studying to be teachers at Albanian-language primary and secondary
    schools. An obstacle to increasing university attendance of ethnic
    Albanians and Roma, especially for girls, is their low but slowly
    increasing enrollment in secondary education.
        In July the Government adopted legislation to address longstanding
    demands by ethnic Albanians for university-level courses taught in the
    Albanian language with the passage of a new Law on Higher Education.
    The new law authorizes private institutions of higher learning and,
    under an OSCE sponsored plan, a new internationally funded institution
    is being created which would be designed to conduct classes in
    Albanian, English, and Macedonian, with initial funding coming from
    foreign donors. Plans have been made for construction to begin early in
    2001. This legislation was designed to resolve the question of Tetovo
    University, a private Albanian-language institution that the
    authorities declined to accredit but tacitly allowed to function. The
    new, internationally funded institution would allow ethnic Albanians to
    study in their own language; however, courses in Macedonian must also
    be provided in at least two subjects. The law received the support of
    the Albanian party in the ruling government coalition; however, many
    ethnic Albanians, who favor recognition and funding of Tetovo
    University, did not support the new institution.
        The new Government met one major demand of the ethnic Albanian
    community in 1999 by agreeing to change the 15-year residence
    requirement for naturalization to 10 years (see Section 2.d.); however,
    enabling legislation still is pending to complete that change. The new
    Government has continued previous governments' rejection of demands for
    legalizing use of the Albanian language in dealings with the central
    Government and in the Parliament and for allowing official use of the
    Albanian flag.
        Ethnic Turks, who make up about 4 percent of the population, also
    complain of governmental, societal, and cultural discrimination. Their
    main complaints center on Turkish-language education and media. One
    continuing dispute has been over the desire of parents who consider
    themselves Turkish to educate their children in Turkish despite the
    fact that they do not speak Turkish at home. The Education Ministry
    refuses to provide Turkish-language education for them, noting that the
    Constitution provides for education in the native languages of
    minorities, not in foreign languages. Some parents have hired teachers
    of their own, although this kind of private education is not authorized
    legally.
        Ethnic Serbs, who constitute about 2 percent of the population,
    also complain about discrimination and their inability to worship
    freely in the Serbian Orthodox Church (see Section 2.c.).
        There were credible reports of occasional police violence and
    harassment against Roma during the year. Roma rights organizations also
    complain of police harassment of Roma and accuse the police of
    reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination by consistently siding
    with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes involving Roma (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In June five Romani houses in Stip burned under suspicious
    circumstances; police suspected arson.
        Relations between Roma and other citizens were strained during 1999
    as a result of dislocations of Roma caused by the Kosovo crisis.
    According to the 1994 census, there were 43,700 Roma in the country
    (2.0 percent of the population). Romani leaders claim that the 1994
    census seriously undercounted the actual number of Roma. There were
    incidents of societal violence against Roma (see Section 1.c.). In 1999
    approximately 6,000 Roma fled Kosovo and took up residence in the
    country. They left not only because of the direct dangers of the
    conflict, but also because of the hostility of ethnic Albanian
    Kosovars, who widely consider the Roma to have supported the Serbs and
    to have committed theft and other crimes against ethnic Albanians
    during the crisis. The new Roma arrivals initially were sheltered in a
    refugee camp (about 2,000 persons) and under host family arrangements
    (about 4,000 persons) that were underwritten by the international
    relief community. During the year, all of the registered Romani
    refugees were staying with host families or in collective centers. The
    presence of these Romani refugees is not popular among ethnic
    Albanians, who largely share the view of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars
    concerning both Roma and Serbs. Ethnic Macedonians also express
    irritation at the new arrivals, many of whom settled in Skopje, and
    some of whom frequent busy traffic intersections to beg, wash car
    windows, or sell small items. The Macedonian Roma already tended to
    occupy the lowest economic position of society, and the new arrivals
    added to the ranks of the very poor. Optional Romani-language education
    has been offered at several primary schools since 1996, but there has
    been limited demand and no pressure for a more extensive curriculum.
    According to Romani community leaders, up to 10 percent of Romani
    children never enroll in school, and of those who do, 50 percent drop
    out by the fifth grade, and only 35 to 40 percent finish the eighth
    grade. There is some Romani-language broadcasting.
        There are also a number of ethnic Macedonian Muslims and Bosnian
    Muslims in the country. Some ethnic Macedonian Muslims contend that
    they are identified too closely with ethnic Albanians, most of whom are
    also Muslim, and with whose policies the ethnic Macedonian Muslims
    often disagree.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to form trade unions, but this right is restricted for members of
    the military, police, and civil service. Independent trade unions have
    been allowed to organize since 1992, when an Association of Independent
    and Autonomous Unions was formed. However, there is still a national
    trade union. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Macedonia is the
    successor organization to the old Communist labor confederation. It
    maintains the assets of the old unions and is the Government's main
    negotiating partner on labor issues, along with the Chamber of the
    Economy. While its officers may tend to oppose strikes because of the
    legacy of the past, they appear to be genuinely independent of the
    Government and committed to the interests of the workers they
    represent.
        The total number of strikes during the year was 100 to 150, which
    included many protest work stoppages of a few hours or less. The
    reasons for the strikes included demands for overdue pay, workers'
    objections to government changes in management personnel at some state-
    owned entities, and objection to various decisions related to
    privatization. Strikes were generally small and confined to company
    grounds, although in September 1999 striking workers at a government-
    owned smelting plant blocked a major highway for several hours,
    protesting government plans to close the plant if a private purchaser
    or partner could not be found. Most strikes were calm and well
    organized and took place without serious incident.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution implicitly recognizes employees' right to bargain
    collectively, a concept that nonetheless is still in its infancy.
    Collective bargaining takes place, but in the country's weak economic
    environment employees have very little practical leverage. Legislation
    in this area has yet to be passed by Parliament.
        An export processing zone is being developed with the advice and
    financial support of the Taiwanese Government and various Taiwanese
    businesses. No date has been set for the beginning of operations.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children; however,
    trafficking of women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a
    growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The constitutional minimum age for employment is 15 years.
    Children legally may not work nights or more than 40 hours per week.
    Education is compulsory through grade eight, or to the ages of 14 or
    15. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for
    enforcing laws regulating the employment of children. These laws are
    generally enforced; however, the authorities are reluctant to attempt
    to enforce these laws on Roma. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor
    by children; however, trafficking in girls for prostitution and
    pornography is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The average monthly wage was
    about $158. The minimum wage is by law two-thirds of the average wage;
    however, it was not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
    for a worker and family. The average month's worth of food for a family
    of four exceeded average incomes by about 20 percent. This economic
    situation meant that few workers could support a family on their wages
    alone. Many households are dual-income, and many persons take on
    additional work, often in the gray market.
        Yugoslavia had extensive laws concerning acceptable conditions of
    work, including an official 42-hour workweek with a minimum 24-hour
    rest period and generous vacation and sick leave benefits. The
    Government adopted many of these provisions, including the workweek and
    rest period. However, high unemployment and the fragile condition of
    the economy led many employees to accept work conditions that do not
    comply with the law. Small retail businesses in particular often
    require employees to work far beyond the legal limits.
        The Constitution provides for safe working conditions, temporary
    disability compensation, and leave benefits. Although laws and
    regulations on worker safety remain from the Yugoslav era, they are not
    enforced strictly. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is
    responsible for enforcing regulations pertaining to working conditions.
        Under the law, if workers have safety concerns, employers are
    obliged to address dangerous situations. Should an employer fail to do
    so, employees are entitled legally to leave the dangerous situation
    without losing their jobs; however, this does not happen often, if
    ever, in practice.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits
    trafficking for the purpose of prostitution; however, trafficking in
    women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a growing problem.
    Trafficking in persons for the purpose of illegal immigration is not
    prohibited specifically by law but is covered by immigration
    regulations. The country is a source, transit, and destination point
    for trafficking in persons. Traffickers have recruited women from other
    countries, especially Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine,
    to work as prostitutes in several towns. Women are trafficked through
    the country on their way to West European countries, especially Italy.
    There are no reliable estimates of the number of victims of trafficking
    in the country.
        Trafficking in women is not treated as a priority on either the
    governmental or nongovernmental level. Trafficking is handled by the
    Interior Ministry Department on Organized Crime. The Government
    cooperated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to
    provide shelter and assistance to trafficked women on an ad hoc basis
    in several cases, and late in the year a small center was opened to
    establish such services on a more regular basis.
        Police expelled 108 prostitutes from Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
    Russia in December. Deputy Interior Minister Rifat Elmazi said the
    police intend ``to deport all prostitutes from other countries.'' The
    Government cooperated with the IOM to arrange passage of these and
    other trafficking victims to their home countries. Very few traffickers
    have been caught, and the owners of the establishments where the women
    worked have either fled or managed otherwise to avoid prosecution.
                                   __________

                                     MALTA

        Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy. The
    chief of state (President) appoints as the head of government (Prime
    Minister) the leader of the party that gains a plurality of seats in
    the quinquennial elections for the unicameral legislature. The
    judiciary is independent.
        The appointed commissioner who commands the police is under the
    effective supervision of the Government and may be either a civilian or
    career member of the force.
        The economy is a mixture of state-owned and private industry, with
    tourism and light manufacturing as the largest sectors, and it provides
    residents with a moderate to high standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with instances of individual abuse. An independent judiciary upholds
    the Constitution's protections for individual rights and freedoms.
    Violence against women is a problem, and societal discrimination
    against women persists, but the Government has taken steps to address
    both issues.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet minimal
    international standards, and the Government permits visits by human
    rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
    law prohibit arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions. The police may arrest a person for
    questioning on the basis of reasonable suspicion but within 48 hours
    must either release the suspect or lodge charges. Arrested persons have
    no right to legal counsel during this 48-hour period. Persons
    incarcerated pending trial are granted access to counsel. Bail normally
    is granted. In June the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the
    Government had violated articles 5/3 and 5/4 of the European Convention
    on Human Rights by holding a Tunisian citizen in custody for 2 years
    prior to trial, thereby denying the accused prompt due process.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The Chief Justice and 16 judges are appointed by the President on
    the advice of the Prime Minister; judges serve until the age of 65, and
    magistrates serve until the age of 60. The highest court, the
    Constitutional Court, interprets the Constitution and has original
    jurisdiction in cases involving human rights violations and allegations
    relating to electoral corruption charges. The two courts of appeal hear
    appeals from the civil court, court of magistrates, special tribunals,
    and from the criminal court, respectively. The criminal court, composed
    of a judge and nine jurors, hears criminal cases. The civil court first
    hall hears civil and commercial cases that exceed the magistrates'
    jurisdiction; the civil court's second hall offers voluntary
    jurisdiction in civil matters. The court of magistrates has
    jurisdiction for civil claims of less than $2,207 (1,000 Maltese liri)
    and for lesser criminal offenses. The juvenile court hears cases
    involving persons under 16 years of age.
        The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an impartial
    court. Defendants have the right to counsel of their choice or, if they
    cannot pay the cost, to court-appointed counsel at public expense.
    Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. They may confront
    witnesses, present evidence, and have the right of appeal.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanctions. Police officers with the rank of
    inspector and above may issue search warrants based on perceived
    reasonable grounds for suspicion of wrongdoing. Reportedly only the
    Home Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister may issue warrants for
    telephone tapping, and then only in drug-related cases and matters
    relating to national security.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. However, the 1987 Foreign Interference Act bans
    foreign participation in local politics during the period leading up to
    elections. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        Diverse views are expressed in four daily newspapers, seven
    weeklies, and five Sunday editions. A total of 6 television stations, a
    commercial cable network, and 19 radio stations function freely.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    state-supported religion is Roman Catholicism. The Government and the
    Catholic Church participate in a foundation that finances Catholic
    schools. The church transferred nonpastoral land to this foundation as
    part of the 1991 Ecclesiastical Entities Act. Parts of the proceeds
    accruing from the dispersal of the land are transferred to the
    foundation to support free education of church school students.
    Students in government schools may decline instruction in Catholicism.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not arbitrarily
    restrict movement within the country, foreign travel, or emigration. A
    court order may prohibit the departure from the country of anyone who
    is the subject of a formal complaint alleging nonfulfillment of a legal
    obligation, such as the nonpayment of a debt or nonsupport of an
    estranged spouse.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The passage of a new refugee law in
    February expanded due process and the protection available to refugee
    applicants and formalizes what had been a system of de facto refugee
    status. However, enabling legislation and regulations had not been
    implemented by year's end. Under the law, the position of commissioner
    for refugees, as well as an appeals board will be established. In
    addition to the current humanitarian temporary protected status, the
    law provides for refugee status, access to free social services and
    education, residence permits, and travel documents. Work permits for
    refugees are issued on a case-by-case basis.
        The UNHCR considers approximately 165 immigrants to be refugees and
    another 215 to be applicants. The authorities expel or repatriate those
    determined to be ineligible for refugee status. However, the Government
    did not force the return of any persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
    September 1998 elections, six women were elected to Parliament, three
    in each party, and one received a ministerial post. The Government has
    taken steps to include more women in civil service and other government
    positions.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
    Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
    views
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination based on race,
    place of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex. The
    Government respects this prohibition. Alleged victims of job
    discrimination may apply directly for relief to the Employment
    Commission of the first hall of the Civil Court in the appropriate
    jurisdiction.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women is a problem. During the
    first 6 months of the year, 235 cases of domestic violence were
    reported to the Police Domestic Violence Unit. A special police unit
    and several voluntary organizations provide support to victims of
    domestic violence. For women who are threatened or physically abused,
    the Government also maintains an emergency fund and subsidizes
    shelters. During the year, 53 women used the shelters.
        The Government set up a hot line in 1996 to assist victims of abuse
    through counseling and through referrals to legal assistance and
    shelters.
        A committee was set up during 1998 to review existing family
    legislation and propose amendments dealing with domestic violence. Its
    findings were under consideration by the Government.
        Prostitution is a serious offense under the law, and stiff
    penalties are reserved for organizers. Rape and violent indecent
    assault carry sentences of up to 10 years imprisonment. The law treats
    spousal rape the same as other rape. Divorce and abortion are not
    legal.
        The Constitution provides that all citizens have access, on a
    nondiscriminatory basis, to housing, employment, and education. While
    women constitute a growing portion of the work force, they are
    underrepresented in management. Cultural and traditional employment
    patterns often direct them either into traditional ``women's jobs''
    (such as sales clerk, secretary, bank teller, teacher, or nurse) or
    into better paying jobs in family-owned businesses or select
    professions (e.g., academia or medicine). Therefore women generally
    earn less than their male counterparts.
        Women's issues are handled by the Department of Women's Rights
    under the Minister of Social Policy. The Minister is a prominent member
    of the Government who is also Deputy Prime Minister and the Nationalist
    Party's deputy leader. Legislation enacted in 1993 granted women
    equality in matters of family law, and a 1991 constitutional amendment
    committed the Government to promote equal rights for all persons
    regardless of sex. The Government has taken steps to ensure that
    legislation is gender neutral to the degree possible. Redress in the
    courts for sexual discrimination is available. The Government's policy
    on gender abandoned the concept of introducing gender-based quotas in
    the civil service. The Government is sponsoring a report to study the
    prevalence of sexual harassment.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and health care. It provides compulsory, free, and universal
    education and free health care for children through age 16. The
    Government voices concern for children's rights and welfare but
    addresses those concerns within family law. In September the Government
    signed the Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and
    the Nairobi Protocol.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. The number of
    reported cases of child abuse has grown as public awareness has
    increased. For the first 6 months of the year, 434 cases of child abuse
    were reported. The introduction of a ``helpline'' telephone number to
    report suspected cases of child abuse has been effective.
        People with Disabilities.--The law provides for rights for the
    disabled. The Persons with Disabilities Act built on provisions in the
    1969 (public employment) and 1992 (accessibility) laws. The new law
    requires the private sector to apply equal employment guarantees
    already in place in the public sector. During the year for the first
    time, private development project plans must include access for the
    disabled. Government and private sector efforts to advance the status
    of the disabled are improving.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 2,000 men of
    North African origin are married to Maltese women. This community has a
    mosque and a separate school.
        Owners of some bars and discos reportedly discourage or prohibit
    darker-skinned persons from entering. In a February report, the leisure
    industry acknowledged that such incidents do occur and recommended
    corrective steps to both the Government and industry. In September the
    Government announced that it plans include criminalization of ``racial
    hatred'' in proposed amendments to the Criminal Code.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate
    freely and to strike, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. Only noncivilian personnel of the armed forces and police are
    prohibited from striking. There are 36 registered trade unions,
    representing about 50 percent of the work force. Although all unions
    are independent of political parties, the largest, the General Workers'
    Union, generally is regarded as having close informal ties with the
    Labor Party.
        Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible
    minister may refer labor disputes either to the Industrial Tribunal (a
    government-appointed body consisting of representatives of government,
    employers, and employee groups) or to binding arbitration. The
    International Labor Organization Committee of Experts objects to a
    provision of the act that permits compulsory arbitration to be held at
    the request of only one of the parties, but neither unions nor
    employers appear to object to this provision. In practice a striking
    union can ignore an unfavorable decision of the Tribunal by continuing
    the strike on other grounds. During the first 6 months of the year, one
    strike was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
        There is no prohibition on unions affiliating internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
    free, in law and practice, to organize and bargain collectively. Unions
    and employers meet annually with government representatives to work out
    a comprehensive agreement regulating industrial relations and income
    policy.
        Under the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not take action
    against any employee for participation or membership in a trade union.
    Complaints may be pursued through a court of law, through the
    Industrial Tribunal, or through the Tribunal for the Investigation of
    Injustices (presided over by a judge of the Superior Court); however,
    most disputes are resolved directly between the parties. Workers fired
    solely for union activities must be reinstated.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children younger than
    age 16. This injunction generally is respected, but some underage
    children were employed during summer months, especially as domestics,
    restaurant kitchen help, or vendors. The Department of Labor enforces
    the law effectively, but it is lenient in cases of summer employment of
    underage youths in businesses run by their families. The Government
    prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition
    effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The weekly legal minimum wage is
    $96 (44 Maltese liri) for persons under age 17; $99 (45 Maltese liri)
    for 17-year-olds; and $105 (48 Maltese liri) for persons age 18 and
    over. Additionally a mandatory bonus of $10 (4 Maltese liri) per week
    is paid. This minimum wage structure provides a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family with the addition of government
    subsidies for housing, health care, and free education. Wage Councils,
    composed of representatives of government, business, and unions,
    regulate work hours; for most sectors the standard is 40 hours per
    week, but in some trades it is 43 or 45 hours per week.
        Government regulations prescribe a daily rest period, which is
    normally 1 hour. The law mandates an annual paid vacation of 4
    workweeks plus 4 workdays. The Department of Labor effectively enforces
    these requirements.
        Enforcement of the 1994 Occupational Health and Safety (Promotion)
    Act is uneven, and industrial accidents remain frequent. Workers may
    remove themselves from unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to
    their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits
    trafficking in persons, although traffickers may be prosecuted under
    the Immigration Act for unlawful entry or unregulated status.
        There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
    through, or within the country.
                                   __________

                                    MOLDOVA

        Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and
    in 1994 adopted a constitution that provides for a multiparty
    representative government with power divided among a president,
    cabinet, parliament, and judiciary. International observers considered
    the 1996 presidential and 1998 parliamentary elections to be free and
    fair, but authorities in the separatist Transnistrian region interfered
    with citizens' ability to vote. President Petru Lucinschi's 4-year term
    ends in January 2001. The Parliament, which was dismissed at the end of
    the year, was composed of: The Communist Party with 40 seats, centrist
    parties with 39 seats, a rightwing party with 9 seats, and 13
    independents. The Parliament amended the 1994 Constitution on July 21
    by voting to transform the country into a parliamentary republic,
    significantly reducing the President's powers and changing the
    presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. The
    amendment also eliminated the President's ability to introduce
    legislation for Parliament's consideration. The Constitution provides
    for an independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted
    undue influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the
    year that judicial independence continued to increase.
        The country remains divided, with mostly Slavic separatists
    controlling the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border. This
    separatist regime has entered into negotiations with the national
    Government on the possibility of a special status for the region.
    Progress in resolving the ongoing conflict has been blocked by the
    separatists' continuing demands for statehood and recognition of the
    country as a confederation of two equal states. The Organization for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation, and
    Ukraine act as mediators. The two sides generally have observed the
    cease-fire of 1992, which ended armed conflict between them, but other
    agreements to normalize relations often have not been honored. In the
    second half of the year, Russian State Commission chairman Yevgeniy
    Primakov launched a new initiative for a resolution of the
    Transnistrian issue. A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, enjoys
    local autonomy in the southern part of the country. The Gagauz elected
    a new governor (Bashkan) and 35 deputies to their Popular Assembly in
    free and fair elections in September 1999. The stability of the
    agreement on autonomy was put in doubt as differences developed between
    the Gagauz and central authorities over the distribution of tax
    revenues, budget allocations, and property ownership.
        The Ministry of Internal Affairs has responsibility for the police.
    The Ministry of National Security renamed by Parliament the Information
    and Security Service (ISS) was placed under Parliament's control. The
    Border Guards are no longer under ISS control, but are a separate
    agency. The ISS has the right to investigate, but not to arrest. The
    Constitution assigns to Parliament the authority to investigate the
    activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ISS, and ensures
    that they comply with existing legislation. Some members of the
    security forces committed a number of human rights abuses. General
    Aleksei, the head of the Anti-Organized Crime and Corruption Department
    under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was suspended from his position
    and is under investigation for misuse of funds. The General
    Prosecutor's office is conducting the investigation, which was still
    ongoing at year's end.
        The country continued to make progress in economic reform.
    International observers viewed the Government of Prime Minister Braghis
    as strongly proreform. The economy is largely based on agriculture.
    Citizens and foreigners can buy and sell land at market prices.
    However, foreigners cannot buy agricultural land, nor can agricultural
    land be resold for a period of 5 years. Over 900 of approximately 1,000
    large collective farms have applied for the Government's land
    privatization program. By year's end, approximately 634,000 landowners
    have received title to almost 1.7 million plots of land. The leading
    exports are foodstuffs, wine, tobacco, clothing, and footwear. The
    gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated officially at about $312
    (3900 lei) per capita but may be considerably underestimated because of
    activity in the large shadow economy and underreporting for tax
    purposes. According to some estimates, the shadow economy accounts for
    about two-thirds of the national economy. The officially reported
    median salary is $33 per month (410 Moldovan lei). According to
    government statistics about 80 percent of the population lives below
    the poverty level and 20 percent of the population is classified as
    extremely poor. Some 65.4 percent of the poorest people live in rural
    areas. According to the results of the Government's household budget
    survey for the first quarter of the year, the monthly disposable income
    per person was about $15.50 (193 Moldovan lei) and 92 percent of the
    population lives on less than $1 per day. A majority of citizens cannot
    afford to buy fish, meat, milk and other dairy products on a regular
    basis. Malnutrition is recongnizable in the rates of anemia for
    children, and the percentage of young men not physically fit for
    military,service. The infant mortality rate is increasing, life
    expectancy is decreasing, and deaths in childbirth are increasing. The
    GDP increased by 1.9 percent during the year. GDP per capita was $353
    (439 Moldovan lei). A program privatizing state-owned enterprises and
    real estate based on vouchers issued to all citizens is complete. The
    exchange rate remained stable for most of the year, with local currency
    depreciation in the beginning of the year and its slow appreciation in
    mid-year. Inflation for the year was 18.4 percent. The country has
    considerable foreign debt. The economic situation is worse in
    Transnistria.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
    however, there were problems in some areas. The police occasionally
    beat and otherwise abused detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions
    remained harsh, with attempts to improve them are hampered by lack of
    funding. While the executive branch has exerted undue influence on the
    judiciary, there were indications during the year that judicial
    independence continued to increase. It is widely believed that security
    forces monitor political figures, use unauthorized wiretaps, and at
    times conduct illegal searches. The Constitution potentially limits the
    activities of the press, political parties, and religious groups. In
    the past, journalists have practiced self-censorship, due to fear of
    protracted legal battles. A recent Supreme Court decision tightened the
    requirements for bringing such suits. The law also imposes restrictions
    on some religious groups. Societal discrimination and violence against
    women persisted. The Constitution allows parents the right to choose
    the language of education for their children. Trafficking in women and
    girls was a very serious problem.
        The Transnistrian authorities continued to be responsible for
    abuses, including questionable detentions, harassment of independent
    media, restrictions on freedom of religion, and discrimination against
    Moldovan/Romanian speakers.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings in the country or
    its separatist region.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman,
    or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were credible
    reports that police sometimes beat and abused prisoners or suspects.
        From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place in Chisinau between
    police and students protesting the municipal decision to cancel their
    free public transport privileges (see Section 2.b.). Press reports
    alleged that Ministry of Interior police used excessive force against
    the students. An unspecified number of students suffered injuries and
    approximately 400 were detained; however, no official charges were
    filed and the students were subsequently released. The Chisinau
    municipal Prosecutor's Office was investigating the incident at year's
    end. Subsequent protests over wage arrears were peaceful (see Section
    1.d.).
        A businessman alleged that the police kidnaped his brother for 3
    days in July 1999. The police reportedly tortured him, then released
    him after charging him with drunkenness and resisting arrest. The
    businessman also charged that this was a case of racketeering and
    involved persons from the prosecutor's office as well as the police.
    The Prosecutor's Office announced in December 1999 that physical
    assault charges were pending against three police officers, but the
    case was dismissed on April 17 for lack of evidence. There was no
    investigation into the racketeering charges.
        Conditions in most prisons remain harsh, with serious overcrowding.
    Cell sizes do not meet local legal requirements or minimum
    international standards. Conditions are especially harsh in prisons
    used to hold persons awaiting trial or sentencing. These prisons suffer
    from overcrowding, bad ventilation, and a lack of recreational and
    rehabilitation facilities. Conditions for those serving sentences are
    better only marginally. According to the 1999 Human Development Report
    of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2.3 percent of the
    total number of inmates are children. There are separate facilities for
    children and teenaged prisioners; most are in detention camps. The
    incidence of malnutrition and disease, especially tuberculosis, is high
    in all facilities. The medical section of the Department of
    Penitentiaries released figures of 1,871 inmates with tuberculosis and
    124 with HIV/AIDS. Abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or by jailers
    themselves, ostensibly for disciplinary reasons, has been reduced by
    the dismissal or retirement of some of the worst offending guards;
    however, the practice likely continued at diminished levels. The
    Ministry of Justice administers the prison system. Attempts to improve
    prison conditions are frustrated by a lack of financing.
        Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons. Local and
    international human rights monitors were allowed to visit prisons in
    Moldovia, and Council of Europe (COE) monitors were allowed to visit
    some prisoners in Transnistria; however, COE monitors were not allowed
    to inspect prisons in Transnistria.
        After questionable trials in 1993, four ethnic Moldovans continued
    to serve sentences in Transnistria for alleged terrorism-related crimes
    (see Section 1.e.). At the end of July 1999, one of the four, Ilie
    Ilascu, wrote a letter to the press claiming to be on his 77th day of a
    hunger strike and alleging a number of abuses by the Transnistrian
    authorities. A member of the OSCE mission visited him in July 1999 and
    observed that he did not appear to be in imminent danger. At the end of
    1999, he still was claiming to be on a hunger strike. In December 1999,
    the wives of all four complained that they were not able to visit,
    although they were allowed to send food. In March a Commonwealth of
    Independent States (CIS) official visited Ilascu, but OSCE members were
    not allowed to accompany him. None of the visitors made any observation
    of imminent danger to the state of health of the prisoner. In May
    Moldovan Parliamentary President Diacov visited Ilascu. This was the
    first time a senior government official met with him. The visit was
    filmed and televised by local television stations (see Section 1.e.).
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited these
    prisoners in 1992 and again in 1993 in Tiraspol, but later were denied
    visitation. The ICRC continued negotiating with Transnistrian officials
    at year's end to visit the prisoners with an international medical
    team. In June the Government of Moldova officially requested a retrial
    of the Ilascu group in a third country OSCE member state. In August
    Ilascu himself conveyed to a visiting Council of Europe official that
    he wanted a retrial. Some OSCE member states are considering the
    Government's request; however, at year's end, no state had yet
    confirmed its willingness to do so.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The former Soviet Code
    on Penal Procedure remains in force with some amendments, and
    authorities respect its provisions. New penal and civil codes and the
    Code on Punishment for Minor Offenses were undergoing hearings in
    Parliament. The July session of Parliament decided that the Prosecutor
    General's office would no longer supervise the implementation of laws.
    Its function was restricted to criminal prosecution, presentation of
    formal charges before a court, and overall protection of the rule of
    law and civil freedoms. The Prosecutor General's office is under the
    judiciary branch. A law was passed during the year to make the
    Prosecutor General's office an independent body within the Supreme
    Council of Magistrates. Judges issue arrest warrants based on cases
    being presented by prosecutors. Under the Constitution, a suspect may
    be detained without charge for 24 hours. The suspect normally is
    allowed family visits during this period. The 24-hour time limit is not
    always respected, especially if a person is arrested late on a Friday
    or on a weekend. If charged a suspect may be released on personal
    recognizance or pending trial. There is no system of bail, but in some
    cases, in order to arrange release, a friend or relative may give a
    written pledge that the accused will appear for trial. Suspects accused
    of violent or serious crimes generally are not released before trial.
        The Constitution permits pretrial arrest for an initial period of
    30 days, which may be extended up to 6 months. Detentions of several
    months are fairly frequent. In exceptional cases, Parliament may
    approve extension of pretrial detention on an individual basis of up to
    12 months. The accused has the right, under the Constitution, to a
    hearing before a court regarding the legality of his arrest. According
    to figures provided by the Ministry of Justice, 3,477 persons of a
    total prison population of 9,449, were held in confinement awaiting
    trial at year's end (these statistics do not include persons held in
    Transnistria).
        According to the Constitution, a detained person must be informed
    immediately of the reason for his arrest and must be made aware of the
    charges as quickly as possible. The accused has the right to a defense
    attorney throughout the entire process, and the attorney must be
    present when the charges are brought. Many lawyers point out that
    access to a lawyer generally is granted only after a person has been
    detained for 24 hours. If the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the
    State requires the local bar association to provide one. Because the
    State is unable to pay ongoing legal fees, defendants often do not have
    adequate legal representation.
        From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place in Chisinau between
    police and students protesting the municipal decision to cancel their
    free public transport privileges (see Section 2.b.). Press reports
    alleged that Ministry of Interior police used excessive force against
    the students. An unspecified number of students suffered injuries and
    approximately 400 were detained; however, no official charges were
    filed and the students were subsequently released. The Chisinau
    municipal Prosecutor's Office was investigating the incident at year's
    end (see Section 1.c.).
        The Transnistrian authorities have imposed a state of emergency
    that allows law enforcement officials to detain suspects for up to 30
    days, reportedly without access to an attorney. Such arbitrary
    detention procedures usually have been applied to persons suspected of
    being critical of the regime and sometimes last up to several months.
    According to a credible report by Amnesty International (AI), many
    pretrial detentions in Transnistria fit this description; however,
    there were no reports that Transnistrian authorities used this
    provision during the year.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the executive branch has exerted undue
    influence on the judiciary. Many observers believe that arrears in
    salary payments also make it difficult for judges to remain independent
    from outside influences and free from corruption. There were continuing
    indications during the year that judicial independence was increasing.
        Since 1997 prosecutors have the right to open and close
    investigations without bringing the matter before a court, which gives
    them considerable influence over the judicial process. The Constitution
    provides that the President, acting on the nomination of the Superior
    Court of Magistrates, appoints judges for an initial period of 5 years.
    This provision for judicial tenure is designed to increase judicial
    independence. Beginning during the year, judges being considered for
    reappointment were required to take a specialized training course at
    the Judicial Training Center. At the end of this training, they are
    tested. The test is evaluated by the Superior Council of Judges and the
    results are considered when making reappointment decisions. This
    process was designed to increase the professionalism of the judges.
        The judiciary consists of lower courts of the first instance, five
    appellate courts (tribunals), a Higher Court of Appeals, a Supreme
    Court, and a Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court supervises and
    reviews the activities of the lower courts and serves as a final court
    of appeal.
        By law defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent. In
    practice prosecutors' recommendations still carry considerable weight
    and limit the defendant's actual presumption of innocence. Trials
    generally are open to the public. Defendants have the right to attend
    proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Defense
    attorneys are able to review the evidence against their clients when
    preparing cases. The accused enjoys a right to appeal to a higher
    court. Because of a lack of funding for adequate facilities and
    personnel, there is a large backlog of cases at the tribunal and Higher
    Appeals Court levels. Court decisions involving the restitution of
    salary or a position are not always implemented.
        To date no pattern of discrimination has emerged in the judicial
    system. The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to have
    an interpreter both at the trial and in reviewing the documents of the
    case. If the majority of the participants agree, trials may take place
    in Russian or another acceptable language instead of Moldovan/Romanian.
        There continued to be credible reports that local prosecutors and
    judges extort bribes for reducing charges or sentences. In January
    1999, a judge in the Chisinau economic court was arrested for allegedly
    accepting a bribe to reduce a fine against a firm. He was convicted and
    sentenced to 10 years in prison.
        Prosecutors occasionally use bureaucratic maneuvers to restrict
    lawyers' access to clients.
        The Constitutional Court showed signs of increasing independence
    during the year. The Court reviewed 90 cases during the year, a 40
    percent decrease from 1999. The Court declared unconstitutional 16
    laws, 1 parliamentary decision, and 4 government acts. In the period
    since Parliament passed the July 5 amendment to the constitution, the
    court has been called upon to issue a number of rulings on the
    interpretation of the amendment and subsequent implementing
    legislation. Despite the political rivalry between the President and
    the Parliament, the court's decisions have generally been regarded as
    fair and objective. On October 10, the Court ruled recent legislation
    requiring political parties be registered for 2 years before
    participating in elections to be unconstitutional.
        There were no reports of political prisoners outside Transnistria.
        In Transnistria four ethnic Moldovans, members of the ``Ilascu
    Group,'' (one of whom, Ilie Ilascu, is an elected member of the
    Romanian Parliament but has never been able to take his seat) remained
    in prison following their conviction in 1993 for allegedly killing two
    separatist officials (see Section 1.c.). International human rights
    groups raised serious questions about the fairness of the trial; local
    organizations alleged that the Moldovans were prosecuted solely because
    of their membership in the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD), a
    Moldovan political party that favors unification with Romania. Family
    members have been allowed access. In April 1999, the Ilascu Group filed
    a case with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against the
    Government of Moldova and the Russian Federation. In June 1999, the
    ECHR registered the case and began examining it. The ECHR notified both
    Governments during the year that it would hear the case and ordered
    them to file their responses by September 25. Both governments
    submitted their documents on October 25, which were sent by the ECHR to
    the Ilascu Group's lawyers. Lawyers for the Ilascu Group are scheduled
    to present their case before the ECHR in January 2001. The President of
    the Parliament of Moldova, Dumitru Diacov, visited Ilascu on May 16.
    This was the first time a senior government official met with Ilascu.
    The visit was filmed and then broadcast by local television stations.
    International organizations continued to pressure the Transnistrian
    authorities to retry the Ilascu Group in another OSCE-member state;
    however, by year's end no country had expressed willingness to retry
    them. In July 1999, the Transnistrians issued a moratorium on capital
    punishment, which in effect suspended implementation of Ilascu's death
    sentence.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Prosecutors issue search warrants; however, in some
    instances searches are conducted without warrants. Courts do not
    exclude evidence that was obtained illegally. There is no judicial
    review of search warrants. The Constitution specifies that searches
    must be carried out ``in accordance with the law'' but does not specify
    the consequences if the law is not respected. It also forbids searches
    at night, except in the case of flagrant crime.
        It is widely believed that security agencies continue to use
    electronic monitoring of residences and telephones without proper
    authorization. By law the prosecutor's office must authorize wiretaps
    and may do so only if a criminal investigation is under way. In
    practice the prosecutor's office lacks the ability to control the
    security organizations and police and prevent them from using wiretaps
    illegally.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the law
    provide for freedom of speech and of the press, although with some
    restrictions. The Government does not limit freedom of speech, and the
    print media express a wide variety of political views and commentary.
    National and city governments subsidize a number of newspapers, but
    political parties and professional organizations, including trade
    unions, also publish newspapers. Most newspapers have a circulation of
    less than 5,000.
        Although the number of media outlets that are not owned and
    operated publicly by the State or a political party is growing, most of
    these independent media still are in the service of a political
    movement, commercial interest, or foreign country, and secure large
    subsidies from these sources. There are several independent radio
    stations, including one religious station, with some stations
    rebroadcasting programs from Romania and Russia. There are three
    independent television stations in the Chisinau area and one in the
    city of Balti. The Government owns and operates several radio stations
    and a television station that covers most of the country. A number of
    local governments, including Gagauzia, operate television and radio
    stations. The Association of Electronic Press was founded in September
    1999. The Association of Independent Press was founded in July 1997.
        The 1995 Moldovan Audiovisual (AV) law requires a minimum of 65
    percent of broadcasting be in the state (Moldovan/Romanian) language.
    The law did not specify if the 65 percent rule applied to all broadcast
    content or only that locally produced. In August the Audio-Visual
    Council (AVC) suspended the licenses of two radio stations and two
    television channels for their failure to respect the 65 percent
    requirement. On September 20, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
    revocation of the licenses and ordered the AVC to enforce the
    revocation. A court case brought by the Club of Romanian and Western
    University Graduates, against a number of other stations for failure to
    respect the 65 percent rule, was decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
    This decision forced the AVC to suspend the licenses of several other
    radio and television stations. This decision caused much controversy
    within the country and abroad. The Transnistrian authorities
    immediately proclaimed it further proof of their need to be independent
    of Chisinau. The Communist faction in Parliament demanded that the
    court decisions be annulled and the audiovisual legislation be
    modified. Several groups, among them the Student Association at the
    Academy of Economic Studies and a group of performing artists and
    composers, spoke out against the closure of television and radio
    stations under this law, as did the OSCE High Commissioner for National
    Minorities and the Head of the OSCE mission in Moldova. The law also
    elicited strong criticism from Russia. The television and radio
    stations continued broadcasting despite suspension of their licenses,
    because the AVC had no real means to enforce the suspension. In October
    Parliament passed an amendment to the AV law, specifying that the 65
    percent rule applied only to locally produced broadcast content. This
    allowed the AVC to reinstate the suspended licenses, because the
    affected stations were primarily repeater stations for foreign produced
    material.
        The Constitution restricts press freedoms, forbidding ``disputing
    or defaming the State and the people'' and political parties that
    ``militate'' against the country's sovereignty, independence, and
    territorial integrity. These restrictions lack implementing legislation
    and are not invoked. In the past, criticism of public figures had
    resulted in a number of lawsuits. Consequently to avoid lengthy
    lawsuits, journalists practiced self-censorship. The Supreme Court in
    1999 overturned an article in the Civil Code that allowed public
    figures to sue for defamation without distinguishing between their
    public and private persons. Under the Court's 1999 ruling, parties
    filing lawsuits must prove that the information was false and
    defamatory and published recklessly or with intentional malice. Since
    the 1999 decision, the plaintiffs generally have lost in cases where
    suits have been filed against journalists and media organs.
        Legislation was passed in May giving access to public information.
    Journalists and ordinary citizens now have the right to obtain
    information from government organizations, which must also provide a
    timetable of when they will supply the information; however, at year's
    end the Government had not yet put into place the necessary mechanisms
    to respond to public inquiries.
        The Government does not restrict foreign publications. However,
    Western publications do not circulate widely since they are very
    expensive by local standards. Russian newspapers are available, and
    some publish a special Moldovan weekly supplement. The country receives
    television and radio broadcasts from Romania, France, and Russia. A
    small number of cable subscribers receive a variety of foreign cable
    television programs. Parliament prohibited the use of locally based
    foreign media outlets from accepting political ads and publishing
    editorials in favor of a particular candidate. Of the two major
    newspapers in Transnistria, one is controlled by the regional
    authorities and the other by the Tiraspol city government. There is one
    independent newspaper in Tiraspol and one in the northern Transnistrian
    city of Ribnitsa. At times the independent newspapers criticize the
    Transnistrian regime and have been harassed by separatist authorities.
    Other print media in Transnistria do not have a large circulation and
    appear only on a weekly or monthly basis. Nonetheless some of them also
    criticize local authorities. The one independent television station is
    trying to enlarge its broadcast radius, but produced less than 10 hours
    of programming per week. The official Transnistrian television station,
    which previously had enjoyed a virtual monopoly of advertising
    revenues, continued to resist the independent station's expansion. Most
    Moldovan newspapers do not circulate in Transnistria although they are
    available in Tiraspol. Circulation of all print media in Transnistria
    is hampered by the closed nature of the society. The independent
    newspaper in Tiraspol, the Novaya Gazeta, was effectively shut down
    from January to August 1999 through the repeated confiscation of its
    press run by the Transnistrian authorities. Authorities did not present
    search warrants or court orders authorizing these confiscations. After
    a number of legal proceedings in which Transnistrian courts ruled the
    interventions illegal, and an intervention by the OSCE, the newspaper
    began to publish again in August 1999, although with a sharply limited
    circulation and under a modified name (Samya Novaya Gazeta). An
    independent newspaper in Ribnitsa was almost put out of business by two
    costly libel suits by local officials during the year.
        Article 34.5 of the Constitution prohibits censorship and the
    Government does not officially censor books, films, or any other media;
    however, members of Parliament and other government officials often
    contact a media outlet with complaints about their reporting, which
    usually results in the criticism being toned down. Internet access is
    not limited by the government, but is prohibitively expensive; however,
    Internet cafes are plentiful in major cities.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and authorities respected
    this right in practice. Mayors' offices issue permits for
    demonstrations; they may consult the national government if a
    demonstration is likely to be extremely large. On March 20,
    approximately 5,000 teachers and other protesters went on strike in
    front of the government building, protesting the nonpayment and low
    level of teachers' salaries. Although over 500 police officers and
    cadets were present with riot gear and gas masks, the protest remained
    peaceful.
        From April 17 to 19, violent clashes took place between police and
    as many as 20,000 students, reportedly from every higher education
    institution in Chisinau, protesting the municipal decision to cancel
    the students' free public transportation privileges. Both police and
    students sustained serious injuries, including broken arms and legs
    (see Section 1.c.). It is estimated that some 400 students were
    detained over the 3 days. The incident was currently under
    investigation by the Chisinau municipal prosecutor's office at year's
    end.
        On September 7, about 180 pensioners and others demonstrated
    peacefully in downtown Chisinau against the municipal withdrawal of
    free transportation on trolleys and buses for pensioners. The
    pensioners later enlarged their grievances to include a call for a
    larger increase in the size of pension deemed necessary to maintain a
    decent standard of living. Approximately 2,500 pensioners returned to
    protest on November 1, demanding an increase in their monthly payments
    and the provision of free public transportation. In December pensioners
    staged a small, peaceful demonstration protesting pension arrears;
    there was a similar demonstration in support of veterans who had
    illegally occupied a building earmarked for parliamentary delegates.
    Police did not use force at any of the demonstrations.
        The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and
    other social and political organizations, and authorities respected
    this right in practice. Private organizations, including political
    parties, are required to register, but applications are approved
    routinely. The Constitution forbids parties that ``militate against the
    sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Moldova.'' A
    total of 30 parties met the requirement of the October 1998 law
    requiring 5,000 members and are registered officially. An amendment to
    this law, which required that parties must have been registered for at
    least 2 years before taking part in elections, was ruled
    unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in October. Parties
    registered for less than 2 years will therefore be allowed to
    participate in February 2001 elections.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government generally permits the free
    practice of religion; however, a 1992 law on religion that codifies
    religious freedoms contains restrictions that couldand in some
    instances did--inhibit the activities of some religious groups. The law
    provides for freedom of religious practice, including each person's
    right to profess his religion in any form. It also protects the
    confidentiality of the confessional, allows denominations to establish
    associations and foundations, and states that the Government may not
    interfere in the religious activities of denominations. The procedures
    for registering a religious organization are the same for all groups.
    In the territory under effective control of the Moldovan authorities
    the Bessarabian Orthodox Church is the only religious group presently
    denied registration.
        Several religious organizations face difficulties registering or
    conducting religious activities in the area under control of the
    Transnistrian authorities.
        The law on religion as amended to legalize proselytizing--in
    principle bringing the legislation in line with the ECHR--went into
    effect in June 1999. However, the law on religion explicitly forbids
    ``abusive proselytizing.'' Abusive is defined as ``an attempt to
    influence someone's religious faith through violence or abuse of
    authority.'' Although some Protestant groups were concerned that the
    previous prohibition on proselytizing could inhibit their activities,
    the Government has not taken legal action against individuals for
    proselytizing.
        Although Eastern Orthodoxy is not designated in the law on religion
    as the official religion, it continued to be a strong religious force
    and exerted significant influence. A notable example has been that of
    the Bessarabian Orthodox Church. The Government denied recognition to
    the Bessarabian Orthodox Church in October 1992, March 1996, August
    1996, and March 1997. The Bessarabian Orthodox Church was formed in
    1992 when a number of priests broke away from the Moldovan Orthodox
    Church, which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The
    Bessarabian Orthodox Church, which sees itself as the legal and
    canonical successor to the pre-World War II Romanian Orthodox Church in
    Bessarabia (the part of Moldova between the Nistru and Prut Rivers),
    subordinated itself to the Bucharest Patriarchate of the Romanian
    Orthodox Church. The Government consistently has refused to register
    the Bessarabian Church, citing unresolved property claims and stating
    that the Bessarabian Church is a ``schismatic movement.'' The issue has
    political as well as religious overtones, because it raises the
    question whether the Orthodox Church should be united and oriented
    toward Moscow, or divided with a branch oriented toward Bucharest.
    (Leaders of the Moldovan Orthodox Church appear more interested in
    independence than in links to Moscow.) In 1997 the Supreme Court
    overturned an appellate court decision affirming the right of the
    Bessarabian Church to register with the Government. However, the
    Supreme Court's decision was based on a procedural issue rather than on
    the merits of the case. The Bessarabian Church appealed the case to the
    European Court of Human Rights in June 1998. The Government submitted
    its response in February, arguing that registering the Bessarabian
    Church would interfere with an internal matter of the Moldovan Orthodox
    Church. There was no decision by year's end.
        In January 1998, authorities in Transnistria canceled the
    registration of Jehovah's Witnesses. Repeated attempts by Jehovah's
    Witnesses to reregister have been denied or delayed. Transnistrian
    officials regularly confiscate religious tracts from members of
    Jehovah's Witnesses, most recently in January, because the group is not
    registered properly. According to local leaders of Jehovah's Witnesses,
    two preachers were arrested and detained for several days in April
    1999. The Church of the Living God has been denied registration in five
    towns in Transnistria. Baptist leaders have complained that they are
    not allowed to distribute religious literature or organize public
    meetings in Transnistria. Non-Orthodox groups complain that they
    generally are not allowed to rent property and often are harassed
    during religious services.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
    within the country, and there are no closed areas. Citizens generally
    are able to travel freely; however, there are some restrictions on
    emigration. Close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant
    must give their concurrence. The Government also may deny permission to
    emigrate if the applicant had access to state secrets. However, such
    cases are very rare, and none were reported during the year. It is
    generally accepted that a large number of Moldovan citizens are working
    in foreign countries without having legal status in those countries.
    Figures on emigration from a variety of official Moldovan sources are
    statistically inaccurate; however, current government estimates claim
    that between 600,000 and 800,000 Moldovans are illegally working
    outside the country due to economic depravation. Estimates indicate
    that the majority of them are working in Russia, Romania, Ukraine and
    Bulgaria. There also are occasional news stories of arrests of illegal
    Moldovans in South Africa and South Korea. The Interior Ministry
    reported in October that 2,240 Moldovan citizens working illegally
    abroad had been extradited back to the country.
        Travel between Transnistria and the rest of the country is not
    prevented. There are regularly scheduled buses and trains. However, the
    separatist authorities often stop and search incoming and outgoing
    vehicles. In May 1999, the Moldovan Government established fixed and
    mobile ``fiscal posts'' to control smuggling of untaxed goods from
    Transnistria.
        Moldova is not a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government has no
    processing procedures for potential refugees resident in the country.
    According to a representative of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
    (UNHCR) about 10 to 15 people per month arrive in Moldova seeking
    refuge. Many originate in Chechnya, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and
    Nigeria. Most are detained at the airport until they can be deported.
    The Chechens, Russian speakers who physically resemble resident
    Moldovans, are more successful in gaining admission. The Government
    formally started cooperating with the UNHCR in late 1997.
        The approximately 60 to 100 Chechen refugees who arrived in Moldova
    during the year led to controversy between the Government and the UNHCR
    over the extent of legal protection refugees should receive. According
    to a UNHCR representative, the authorities frequently fail to inform
    the UNHCR of the arrival of refugees or disregard UNHCR guidance and
    advice. At the urging of the UNHCR, the Government accelerated the
    submission of a law on refugees to the Parliament, but it had not been
    passed by year's end.
        The issue of providing first asylum has never arisen formally.
    There were no official reports of the forced return of persons to a
    country where they feared prosecution; however AI reported a case in
    which such a forced return took place. According to AI, a Kurdish Turk,
    allegedly a leader in the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), was seized on
    July 13 by unidentified men in Chisinau and flown to Turkey where he
    faces charges that could carry a death sentence. Local human rights
    organizations charge that the Government failed to follow correct
    procedures in the case. There are allegations that national security
    officers were involved; however, the authorities deny them.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have voted in multiparty presidential and parliamentary
    elections in 1996 and 1998 respectively. International observers
    considered the elections to be free and fair, but Transnistrian
    authorities have interfered with citizens' ability to vote in these
    elections.
        The Constitution adopted in 1994 provided for the division of power
    among the popularly elected President, the Cabinet, the Parliament, and
    the judiciary. The President as Head of State, in consultation with the
    Parliament, appoints the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who functions
    as the head of government. A minister can be dismissed only with the
    assent of the Prime Minister. Some observers believe that the
    Constitution does not define adequately how executive powers are to be
    shared between the President and the Prime Minister. The President held
    a nonbinding referendum in May 1999, asking if citizens wanted a
    stronger presidency. Based on a 65 percent positive response, the
    President proposed an initiative to revise portions of the Constitution
    in August 1999. The proposal sought to create a ``presidential
    republic'' with more power in the hands of the chief executive. Two
    groups of parliamentarians presented alternative constitutional
    amendments to create a ``parliamentary republic.'' On July 5,
    Parliament acted on the proposals and voted to amend the 1994
    Constitution to transform the country into a parliamentary republic,
    significantly reducing the president's powers and changing the
    presidential election from a popular to a parliamentary vote. The bill
    was sent to the President who vetoed it and sent it back to parliament.
    The Parliament overrode the veto on July 21 and the bill became law.
        In September Parliament passed implementing legislation. According
    to this legislation, three-fifths of the vote in Parliament are
    required to elect a candidate, and the vote must be held by secret
    ballot. If Parliament fails to elect a candidate in the first round of
    voting, a runoff can be held between the two leading candidates. If the
    runoff fails to produce a winner, another vote can be held within 15
    days. If Parliament fails to elect a president after the second round
    of voting, the sitting President can dissolve Parliament.
        On December 1, Parliament held the first round of the presidential
    election. Two candidates competed for the position of President:
    Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin and Constitutional Court
    President Pavel Barbalat. Several Parliamentarians did not respect the
    secret ballot and the results of the first round of voting were
    declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. A repeat of the first
    vote was held on December 4. Neither candidate secured the necessary
        three-fifths majority of the vote, therefore a runoff was held on
    December 6; however, both candidates were again unsuccessful in
    securing a three-fifths majority. A second round of voting on December
    21 ended in disarray when several parties boycotted the vote,
    preventing Parliament from achieving the required quorum to hold the
    vote. The Constitutional Court however ruled that the December 21
    Parliamentary session, although unsuccessful, constituted the legal
    second round of elections. Thus on December 31, Moldovan President
    Petru Lucinschi dissolved the Parliament and scheduled new
    parliamentary elections for February 25, 2001. His decision to dissolve
    Parliament was made on the grounds that Parliament had failed to elect
    a new president according to the constitutional procedure and
    timeframe, a position supported by the Constitutional Court.
        The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and
    other socio-political organizations. However, the controversial Article
    41 of the Constitution states that organizations that are ``engaged in
    fighting against political pluralism,'' the ``principles of the rule of
    law,'' or ``the sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity''
    of the country are unconstitutional. Small parties that favor
    unification with neighboring Romania have charged that this provision
    is intended to impede their political activities. The Association of
    Victims succeeded in registering as a political party, but a request to
    change its name to the National Romanian Party, was refused. Following
    an appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the organization could
    change its name. The Ministry of Justice followed the decision of the
    Court of Appeals and registered the party under its new name in
    December.
        A law on administrative and territorial reform went into effect in
    January 1999 and reduced the number of administrative districts from 42
    to 12. New districts included the municipality of Chisinau, the Gagauz
    autonomous region, and the Transnistrian region. Citizens voted for
    mayors and newly created district and municipal councils in May 1999
    elections. Twenty-three parties and a number of independent candidates
    participated in the campaign. Although the parties in Parliament won
    most of the posts, a leftist party, not in Parliament, gained several
    positions in the north, and independents were elected throughout the
    country. Transnistrian authorities did not allow citizens to vote in
    their region. The Gagauz did not participate in the May 1999 elections
    but held separate elections in September 1999 for governor (Bashkan)
    and 35 deputies to its Popular Assembly.
        In 1991 separatist elements, assisted by uniformed Russian military
    forces in the area and led by supporters of the 1991 coup attempt in
    Moscow, declared a ``Dniester Republic'' in the area of the country
    that is located between the Dniester River and Ukraine. Fighting flared
    briefly in 1992 but ended after Russian forces intervened, and a truce
    has held since. Russian, Ukrainian, and OSCE mediators have attempted
    to encourage the two sides to reach a settlement that preserves
    Moldovan sovereignty and independence while granting a measure of
    autonomy to Transnistria. In 1997 the Transnistrian authorities signed
    a memorandum of understanding with the Government. Since then further
    negotiations have been inconclusive, and there was no significant
    progress towards a settlement by year's end. In August Russian State
    Commission chairman Yevgeniy Primakov launched a new initiative for a
    resolution of the Transnistrian issue. The initiative recommended the
    federalization of Moldova and the creation of a Russian-led OSCE
    peacekeeping force.
        Women are underrepresented in leading positions both in government
    and political parties, although there are no restrictions in law or
    practice on the participation of women or minorities in political life.
    Women hold 8 of 101 parliamentary seats. All female parliamentarians
    formed a club in September 1999 to unite efforts to improve the social
    condition of women and children. The Association of Moldovan Women, a
    sociopolitical organization, competed in the 1998 parliamentary
    elections but was unable to gain parliamentary representation. Russian,
    Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Gagauz minorities are represented in
    Parliament, with deputies elected from nationwide party lists rather
    than local districts. Debate takes place in either the Moldovan/
    Romanian or Russian language, with translation provided.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several local human rights groups exist. They operate without
    interference except in the Transnistrian region. The local Helsinki
    Watch Organization maintains contacts with international human rights
    organizations, as does the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. AI established a
    satellite office in Chisinau in 1997 and has become active in the
    country, although the authorities in Tiraspol impede its activities in
    the Transnistrian region. Amnesty, a local human rights nongovernmental
    organization (NGO) unaffiliated with Amnesty International, applied for
    registration in Transnistria, as required by the Transnistrian
    ``Constitution.'' Their petition took 8 months to be approved (as
    opposed to the usual 2 months) and their members were called in
    separately by the police for questioning. Two members reported they had
    received veiled death threats.
        Citizens may appeal to the EHCR in Strasbourg if they believe their
    rights have been violated or Moldovan laws are not in accordance with
    the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
    Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). In the first half of the year, citizens
    filed 50 cases with the ECHR. The majority of the cases dealt with lack
    of social protection and salary and pension arrears accumulated by the
    Government. At year's end, none of the cases had been resolved. Most
    citizens are unaware of the convention and their rights to legal
    remedies in general.
        Parliament passed the Law on Parliamentary Advocates in October
    1997, which created three positions of parliamentary advocates
    (ombudsmen) and established an independent center for human rights.
    Parliament appointed the three advocates, with equal rights and
    responsibilities, in February 1998 for 5-year terms. A parliamentary
    advocate may only be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of
    Parliament, which gives them substantial independence. Parliamentary
    advocates are empowered to examine claims of human rights violations
    and advise Parliament on human rights issues. Advocates also have the
    right to submit any legislation to the Constitutional Court for a
    review of constitutionality, even if no specific case has been brought
    before them. The advocates oversee the operation of a human rights
    center, which opened in April 1998 with the support of the U.N.
    Development Program. The center provides training for lawyers and
    journalists, visits jails, tries to influence legislation, and conducts
    seminars and training programs. In 1999 with financial aid from the
    Government of the Netherlands, it organized eight seminars and 17
    training sessions on human rights issues. Of the approximately 7,300
    complaints handled by the center this year, the majority involved
    private property violations, labor rights, access to justice, personal
    security, right to life and personal dignity issues. The center also
    held approximately 80 specialized seminars and educational training
    programs for police, penitentiary personnel, judges, prosecutors,
    public administration officials, and law students.
        The Government has supported the work of the OSCE, which has had a
    mission in the country since 1993 to assist in efforts to resolve the
    separatist conflict. The OSCE participates in the Joint Control
    Commission-composed of Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and Transnistrian
    members-which reviews violations of the cease-fire agreement. The
    mission generally enjoys access to the security zone along the river
    dividing the separatist-controlled territory from the rest of the
    country.
        The Government has cooperated with the ICRC in the past, permitting
    visits to prisoners from the 1992 conflict. In August Transnistrian
    separatist authorities agreed in principle to allow the ICRC access to
    the four members of the original Ilascu Group, who have remained in
    prison since 1993 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.); however, the visit had
    not taken place by year's end.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that persons are equal before the law
    regardless of race, sex, disability, religion, or social origin. There
    are remedies for violations, such as orders for redress of grievances,
    but these are not always enforced.
        Women.--Spousal violence is known to occur, although the Government
    does not keep official data on incidences of domestic violence. A
    prominent women's rights advocate asserts that one-half of women are
    victims of domestic violence. The Government supports educational
    efforts, usually undertaken with foreign assistance, to increase public
    awareness of this problem and to train public officials and law
    enforcement officials in how to address domestic violence. The Criminal
    Code does not specifically address crimes of domestic assault, and the
    Government rarely prosecutes domestic assault crimes under its general
    assault laws; however, women abused by their husbands have the right to
    press charges. Husbands convicted of such abuse may receive prison
    sentences (typically up to 6 months). There is no law on spousal rape.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 382 cases of spousal abuse
    cases during the year, including 95 resulting in serious bodily injury,
    10 murder attempts, and 72 murders.
        The First Lady and the mayor of Chisinau initiated a project in
    October 1999 to open a women's shelter in Chisinau. The city donated a
    former kindergarten to a private organization to operate the shelter,
    and a member of Parliament was named as executive director of the
    organization. By year's end, the shelter had not yet opened due to lack
    of funds. A private organization operates a confidential service to
    provide support to abused spouses, including a hot line for battered
    women. According to knowledgeable sources, women generally do not
    appeal to police or the courts for protection against abusive spouses
    because they are embarrassed to do so and are not convinced that the
    authorities would react positively, as the police generally do not
    consider spousal abuse a serious crime. The Ministry of Internal
    Affairs recorded 193 cases of rape and 22 cases of attempted rape, an
    11 percent decrease from the same period in 1999. Women's groups
    believe that the numbers of rapes and incidents of spousal abuse are
    underreported.
        Trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see Sections 6.e.
    and 6.f.).
        The law provides that women shall be equal to men; however,
    according to statistics, women have been affected disproportionately by
    growing unemployment. By law women are paid the same as men for the
    same work, although they still are victimized by societal
    discrimination. There are a significant number of female managers in
    the public sector and in banking. The president of the country's
    largest bank is a woman.
        Children.--There is extensive legislation designed to protect
    children, including extended paid maternity leave and government
    supplementary payments for families with many children. Free, basic
    education is compulsory for 9 years, and may be followed by either
    technical school or further study leading to higher education. The
    requirement can change at the discretion of the Minister of Education
    or budgetary constraints. During the year, many inadequately funded
    schools in the countryside started charging parents for their
    children's education. While not technically illegal, it runs counter to
    the educational guarantees of the government. This resulted in many
    children being kept at home by their parents. Children are sent to work
    in the fields or to find other work in violation of the child labor
    laws. Some credible estimates state that as many as 25 percent of the
    students in the countryside are no longer in school. The health system
    devotes extensive resources to childcare.
        There are no statistics on child abuse, but it is believed to be
    widespread. Observers allege that women begging on the streets of
    Chisinau often sedate their babies in order to spend long hours begging
    without having to take time out to attend to their babies' needs. Child
    support programs suffer from inadequate funding.
        The situation of children in the country's orphanages is generally
    very bad. Official estimates put the number of orphans at about 10,000,
    although NGO's estimate up to 30,000 children. Among the major problems
    are insufficient food, warehousing of children, lack of heat in the
    winter, and disease. Most of these problems are caused by lack of
    funding. One orphanage director lost his job for selling the food
    earmarked for the children on the black market. He also was rumored to
    have sterilized forcibly a teenage girl in his care.
        Homeless children live on the streets of Chisinau and other large
    urban areas. Reliable statistical information is not available,
    although estimates were as high as 1,000 in 1998.
        The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced in December 1999 that it
    had uncovered a network trafficking children for purposes of adoption
    between Moldova and Uzbekistan. According to the Ministry, 18 children,
    most of them under one year of age, were sold in Tashkent during 1998
    and 1999 for an average price of between approximately $2,000 and
    $3,000 (approximately 25,000 `` 37,000 Moldovan lei). The Ministry of
    National Security stopped a similar ring that trafficked children
    between Moldova and Israel in 1995.
        Trafficking in girls for forced prostitution between the ages of 15
    to 18 years is a very serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against
    persons with disabilities; however, there are no laws providing for
    access to buildings, and there are few government resources devoted to
    training persons with disabilities. The Government does provide tax
    advantages to charitable groups that assist the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--There were no reports during the year of
    incidents such as that in May 1999 when a group of about 500 Orthodox
    Christians led by 4 to 6 priests attacked a small group of Baptists in
    the village of Mingir, injuring 3 persons, and partially destroying a
    Baptist church.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the 1989 census,
    the population is about 4.3 million, of which 65 percent are ethnic
    Moldovans. Ukrainians (14 percent) and Russians (13 percent) are the
    two largest minorities. A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, lives
    primarily in the southern regions of the country. The Gagauz are
    largely Russian-speaking and represent about 3.5 percent of the
    population. Official statistics put the Roma population at 11,600,
    although estimates from the OSCE and Roma NGO's range from 50,000 to
    200,000. The Government announced in September that it would allocate
    money from the budget to conduct a national census in 2001; however, no
    action had been taken by year's end.
        The issue of minority rights and the language issue are closely
    related, particularly in the perceptions of the Russian speaking
    minority and the Moldovan/Romanian speaking majority. Moldovan/Romanian
    was declared at independence to be the state language; however, in 1989
    Russian was designated a language for interethnic communication. The
    1990 citizenship law offered an equal opportunity to all persons
    residing in the country at the time of independence to adopt Moldovan
    citizenship. The OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
    Rights described the law as very liberal. A new law permitting dual
    citizenship went into effect in August. According to this law, dual
    citizenship can be obtained through birth, marriage, on the basis of a
    bilateral agreement (although no such agreements are in effect), or if
    it is provided by an international accord to which the country is a
    party. Naturalization requirements of the new law include a
    ``sufficient knowledge'' of the state language and constitution.
        Parliament has postponed indefinitely the implementation of
    language testing, which was called for in the 1989 language law and was
    to have begun by 1994. According to the law, a citizen should be able
    to choose which language to use in dealing with government officials or
    commercial entities. Officials are required to know Russian and
    Moldovan/Romanian ``to the degree necessary to fulfill their
    professional obligations.'' Since many Russian speakers do not speak
    Moldovan/Romanian (while most educated Moldovans speak both languages),
    they argued for a delay in the implementation of the law in order to
    permit more time to learn the language. The Constitution provides
    parents with the right to choose the language of instruction for their
    children.
        In October 1999, the Parliament approved the Government's decision
    to grant district status to Taraclia, a region in the south with a 64
    percent ethnic Bulgarian majority. The vote reversed the results of the
    territorial-administrative reform begun in January 1999, which had
    eliminated Taraclia's district status and subsumed it under a region
    where Bulgarians would no longer constitute a majority. Voters in the
    Taraclia district approved a referendum in January 1999 specifying they
    not be included in the larger district, with 88 percent of eligible
    voters participating and 92 percent voting in favor of the referendum.
        In the separatist Transnistrian region discrimination against
    Moldovan/Romanian speakers continued. State schools are required to use
    the Cyrillic alphabet when teaching Romanian. Many teachers, parents,
    and students objected to the use of the Cyrillic script to teach
    Romanian. They believe that it disadvantages pupils who wish to pursue
    higher education opportunities in the rest of the country or in
    Romania. (Cyrillic script was used to write the Romanian language in
    Moldova until 1989, since ``Moldovan,'' as it was then called, was
    decreed officially during the Soviet era to be a different language
    from Romanian, which is written in the Latin alphabet. The 1989
    language law reinstituted obligatory use of the Latin script. As a
    result of an agreement between the Government and the separatist
    authorities, eight schools in the separatist region obtained permission
    in 1996 to use the Latin alphabet, with salaries and textbooks to be
    supplied by the Moldovan Ministry of Education. These schools are
    considered private schools by the local authorities. They must pay rent
    for their facilities and meet local curriculum requirements, building
    codes, and safety standards. The Government still has no budgetary
    provisions to pay the high rents of such facilities. As a result,
    classes were held in local homes or run in shifts in the few available
    buildings.
        After delaying its opening and threatening to keep it closed,
    separatist authorities allowed the Romanian Language School (Latin
    alphabet) in Tiraspol to open in September 1999 without restriction
    from the authorities. The Ministry of Education and the Romanian
    government supplied books to the school and the UNHCR provided
    furniture and vehicles. The school is running three to four shifts per
    day to accommodate the number of students.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions
    enacted by Moldova's thenSupreme Soviet remains in effect and provides
    for independent trade unions. Laws passed in 1989 and 1991, which give
    citizens the right to form all kinds of social organizations, also
    provide a legal basis for the formation of independent unions. The 1994
    Constitution states that any employee may found a union or join a union
    that defends workers' interests. However, there have been no known
    successful attempts to establish alternate trade union structures
    independent of the successor to the Soviet trade union system.
        The successor organization is the General Federation of Trade
    Unions (GFTU). The GFTU's continuing role in managing the state
    insurance system and its retention of former official union
    headquarters and vacation facilities provide an inherent advantage over
    other groups who might wish to form a union. The growing
    dissatisfaction with the GFTU's policies resulted in several splits
    within the organization; however, these informal splinter groups have
    been unsuccessful in forming a new independent union. Virtually all
    employed adults are members of a union.
        Government workers do not have the right to strike, nor do those in
    essential services such as health care and energy. Other unions may
    strike if two-thirds of the members vote for a strike in a secret
    ballot. There were several labor actions for payment of wage arrears,
    including a number of strikes by teachers, health care workers, and
    spouses of police officers in various parts of the country.
        Unions may affiliate and maintain contacts with international
    organizations. The GFTU became a member of the International
    Confederation of Trade Unions in 1999.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law, which
    is based on former Soviet legislation, provides for collective
    bargaining rights; however, wages are set through a tripartite
    negotiation process involving government, management, and unions. The
    three parties meet and negotiate national minimum wages for all
    categories of workers. Then each branch union representing a particular
    industry negotiates with management and the government ministries
    responsible for that industry. They may set wages higher than the
    minimum set on the national level and often do, especially if the
    industry in question is more profitable than average. Finally on the
    enterprise level, union and management representatives negotiate
    directly on wages. Again they may set wages higher than negotiators on
    the industry level.
        There were no reports of actions taken against union members for
    union activities. The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions provides that
    union leaders may not be fired from their jobs while in leadership
    positions or for a period after they leave those positions. There were
    no reports of such firings this year.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced and compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to
    occur; however, trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see
    Section 6.f.). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded
    labor by children; however, trafficking in girls for purposes of forced
    prostitution is a very serious problem (see Section 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for unrestricted employment is 18 years.
    Employment of those between the ages of 16 and 18 is permitted under
    special conditions, including shorter workdays, no night shifts, and
    longer vacations. The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and the
    Family is primarily responsible for enforcing these restrictions, and
    the Ministry of Health also has a role. Child labor is not used in
    industry, although children living in rural areas often assist in the
    agricultural sector. Education is compulsory for 9 years (see Section
    5). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children; however there were reports of trafficking in girls (see
    Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum monthly
    wage of $9 (100 Moldovan lei), for those employed by the state and
    $12.75 (150 Moldovan lei) for those employed by private firms, but this
    is used primarily as a basis for calculating pensions, scholarships,
    and fines. The average monthly wage of approximately $33 (410 Moldovan
    lei) does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. The lowest wages are in the agricultural sector, where the
    monthly average is approximately $17 (216 Moldovan lei). Due to severe
    budgetary constraints, the Government and private sector often do not
    meet payrolls for employees, and workers conducted labor actions to
    protest wage arrears several times during the year (see Section 2.b.).
    The Constitution sets the maximum workweek at 40 hours, and the Labor
    Code provides for at least 1 day off per week.
        The State is required to set and check safety standards in the
    workplace. The unions within the GFTU also have inspection personnel
    who have a right to stop work in the factory or fine the enterprise if
    safety standards are not met; however, this right is rarely exercised.
    Further, workers have the right to refuse to work, but they may
    continue to draw their salaries if working conditions represent a
    serious threat to their health. However, in practice the depressed
    economic situation has led enterprises to economize on safety equipment
    and generally to show little concern for worker safety issues. Workers
    often do not know their rights in this area. The Ministry of Labor
    reported 83 serious industrial injuries, 38 of which resulted in death
    during the year. The Ministry of Labor has announced it will publish a
    new statistical report on labor standards in April 2001.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    and it cannot be prosecuted under other statutes, and trafficking in
    women and girls is a very serious problem (see sections 5 and 6.c.).
    The new criminal code under consideration in Parliament does contain a
    prohibition on trafficking in persons. Although no statistics are
    available, Moldova is a source country for women and girls, who are
    trafficked to various locations, including Turkey, Greece, Italy,
    Kosovo, and Israel for forced prostitution. The International
    Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that more than 50 percent of
    the women working in forced prostitution in Kosovo are from Moldova.
    Turkey deports approximately 2,500 Moldovan women for prostitution
    yearly. Women and girls reportedly are trafficked to Italy and Greece
    through Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Albania. There are also reports
    that women are trafficked to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, France,
    Spain, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. A prominent women's
    rights activist and member of Parliament states that more than 10,000
    Moldovan women are working as prostitutes in other countries. The large
    profits of the trafficking industry allow traffickers to exploit
    opportunities for the corruption of officials. There have been
    unsubstantiated reports by local NGO's of involvement by government
    officials; however, no official charges have been made. Women and girls
    accept job offers in other countries, ostensibly as dancers, models,
    nannies, or housekeepers. Then traffickers take their passports,
    require them to ``repay'' a sizeable sum, and force them into sexual
    bondage. It is common for traffickers to recruit women from rural
    villages; the women are brought to larger cities and then trafficked
    abroad.
        Apart from a 1999 documentary shown on state television the
    problem, the Government has taken few steps to prevent the trafficking
    of women or to assist victims; however, it slowly is beginning to
    address the problem. In addition to participating in a Southeast
    European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Human Trafficking Task Force,
    the Government started a working group in May to implement a project of
    the IOM on trafficking in women and girls. The group consists of the
    Vice-Prime Minister, the Ministers of Labor, Justice, and External
    Affairs, and three Parliamentarians involved in women's issues. The
    group created a special law enforcement unit within the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs, during the year. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
    proposed strengthening laws against trafficking in women in the new
    criminal code; however, the amendment had not yet been sent to
    Parliament by year's end. There are no government-operated assistance
    programs for victims.
        Several NGO's made efforts, with foreign assistance, to combat the
    problem through information campaigns and job training for women. Save
    the Children works with victims, especially repatriated girls. There
    are also local NGO's involved in public school programs to educate
    young women about the dangers of prostitution and to establish a hot
    line for those in need of advice. The IOM established an office in
    Chisinau in January.
                                   __________

                                     MONACO

        Monaco is a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign Prince
    plays a leading role in governing the country. The Prince appoints the
    four-member Government, headed by a Minister of State chosen by the
    Prince from a list of candidates proposed by France. The other three
    members are the Counselor for the Interior (who is usually French), the
    Counselor for Public Works and Social Affairs, and the Counselor for
    Finance and the Economy. Each is responsible to the Prince. Legislative
    power is shared between the Prince and the popularly elected 18-member
    National Council. In addition, there are three consultative bodies
    whose members are appointed by the Prince: The 7-member Crown Council;
    the 12-member Council of State; and the 30-member Economic Council,
    which includes representatives of employers and trade unions.
        In addition to the national police force, the ``Carabiniers du
    Prince'' carry out security functions. Government officials control
    both forces.
        The principal economic activities are services and banking, light
    manufacturing, and tourism.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. The Constitution distinguishes
    between those rights that are provided for all residents and those that
    apply only to the approximately 5,000 residents who hold Monegasque
    nationality. The latter enjoy free education, financial assistance in
    case of unemployment or illness, and the right to vote and hold
    elective office. Women traditionally have played a less active role
    than men in public life, but this is changing; women currently hold
    both elective and appointive offices.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet or
    exceed minimum international standards, and the Government permits
    visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
    observes these prohibitions. Arrest warrants are required, except when
    a suspect is arrested while committing an offense. The police must
    bring detainees before a judge within 24 hours to be informed of the
    charges against them and of their rights under the law. Most detainees
    are released without bail, but the investigating magistrate may order
    detention on grounds that the suspect either might flee or interfere
    with the investigation of the case. The magistrate may extend the
    initial 2-month detention for additional 2-month periods indefinitely.
    The magistrate may permit family members to see detainees.
        The Government does not use forced exile on its own nationals .
    However, sometimes it expels non-Monegasque nationals who violate of
    residency laws or who have committed minor offenses, such as disorderly
    conduct.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the 1962 Constitution, the
    Prince delegated his judicial powers to an independent judiciary. The
    law provides for a fair, public trial, and an independent judiciary
    respects these provisions. The defendant has the right to be present
    and the right to counsel, at public expense if necessary. As under
    French law, a three-judge tribunal considers the evidence collected by
    the investigating magistrate and hears the arguments made by the
    prosecuting and defense attorneys. The defendant enjoys a presumption
    of innocence and the right of appeal.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices and
    Government authorities generally respect these rights in practice.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. However, the Monegasque Penal Code prohibits public
    denunciations of the ruling family, a provision that the media respect
    in practice. Several periodicals are published. Foreign newspapers and
    magazines circulate freely, including French journals that specifically
    cover news in the Principality. Foreign radio and television are
    received without restriction. There are no restrictions in the access
    to the Internet. Stations that broadcast from the Principality operate
    in accordance with French and Italian regulations.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides citizens with the rights of peaceful assembly and association.
    Outdoor meetings require police authorization, which is not withheld
    for political or arbitrary reasons. Formal associations must be
    registered and authorized by the Government.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman Catholicism
    is the state religion.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Residents move freely within the country
    and across its open borders with France. Monegasque nationals enjoy the
    rights of emigration and repatriation. They can be deprived of their
    nationality only for specified acts, including naturalization in a
    foreign state. Only the Prince can grant or restore Monegasque
    nationality, but he is obliged by the Constitution to consult the Crown
    Council on each case before deciding.
        In light of its bilateral arrangements with France, the Government
    does not grant political asylum or refugee status unless the request
    also meets French criteria for such cases. The number of cases is very
    small. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
    country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Authority to change the government and to initiate laws rests with
    the Prince. The 1962 Constitution cannot be suspended, but it can be
    revised by common agreement between the Prince and the elected National
    Council. The Prince plays an active role in Government. He names the
    Minister of State (in effect, the Prime Minister) from a list of names
    proposed by the French Government. He names as well the three
    Counselors of Government (of whom the one responsible for the interior
    is usually a French national). Together the four constitute the
    Government. Each is responsible to the Prince.
        Only the Prince may initiate legislation, but the 18-member
    National Council may propose legislation to the Government. All
    legislation and the adoption of the budget require the Council's
    assent. Elections for National Council members, which are held every 5
    years, are based on universal adult suffrage and secret balloting. Both
    political parties currently are represented on the Council. There is
    one independent member.
        The Constitution provides for three consultative bodies. The seven-
    member Crown Council (composed exclusively of Monegasque nationals)
    must be consulted by the Prince on certain questions of national
    importance. He may choose to consult it on other matters as well. The
    12-member Council of State advises the Prince on proposed legislation
    and regulations. The 30-member Economic Council advises the government
    on social, financial, and economic questions. One-third of its members
    come from the trade union movement, and one-third from the employers'
    federation.
        Women are active in public service. The Mayor of Monaco, one member
    of the Crown Council, four members of the National Council, and four
    members of the Economic Council are women.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        While the Government imposes no impediments to the establishment or
    operation of local groups devoted to monitoring human rights, no such
    groups have been formed. Outside groups have not sought to investigate
    human rights conditions.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that all Monegasque nationals are equal
    before the law. It differentiates between rights that are accorded to
    nationals (including preference in employment, free education, and
    assistance to the ill or unemployed) and those accorded all residents
    for example, freedom of religion and inviolability of the home.
        Women.--Reported instances of violence against women are rare.
    Marital violence is prohibited strictly and any wife who is a victim
    may bring criminal charges against her husband. Women are represented
    fairly well in the professions; they are represented less well in
    business. The law governing transmission of citizenship provides for
    equality of treatment between men and women who are Monegasque by
    birth. However, women who acquire Monegasque citizenship by
    naturalization cannot transmit it to their children, whereas
    naturalized male citizens can.
        Children.--The Government is committed fully to the protection of
    children's rights and welfare and has well-funded public education and
    health care programs. The Government provides compulsory free and
    universal education for children. There is no societal pattern of abuse
    of children.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government mandated that public
    buildings provide access for the disabled, and this objective has been
    largely accomplished.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to form unions, but
    fewer than 10 percent of workers are unionized, and relatively few of
    these reside in the Principality. Unions are independent of both the
    Government and the Monegasque political parties. The Monegasque
    Confederation of Unions is not affiliated with any larger labor
    organization but is free to join international bodies.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike in conformity
    with relevant legislation. However, government workers may not strike.
    Strikes are rare. The last strike occurred in 1996, when the Monegasque
    Confederation of Unions organized a 1-day work stoppage by bank,
    transportation, and factory employees.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the free exercise of union activity. Agreements on working
    conditions are negotiated between organizations representing employers
    in a given sector of the economy and the respective union. Antiunion
    discrimination is prohibited. Union representatives can be fired only
    with the agreement of a commission that includes two members from the
    employers' association and two from the labor movement. Allegations
    that an employee was fired for union activity may be brought before the
    Labor Court, which can order redress, such as the payment of damages
    with interest.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
    Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and enforces
    this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years; those
    employing children under that age can be punished under criminal law.
    Special restrictions apply to the hiring, work times, and other
    conditions of workers 16 to 18 years old. The Constitution prohibits
    forced and bonded child labor, and the government enforces this
    prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for full-
    time work is the French minimum wage plus 5 percent, that is
    approximately $6.90 (42.76 French francs) per hour. The 5 percent
    adjustment is intended to compensate for the travel costs of the three-
    quarters of the workforce who commute daily from France. The minimum
    wage is adequate to provide a decent living for a worker and family.
    Most workers receive more than the minimum. The legal workweek is 39
    hours. Health and safety standards are fixed by law and government
    decree. These standards are enforced by health and safety committees in
    the workplace and by the government Labor Inspector.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within or through the country.
                                   __________

                                THE NETHERLANDS

        The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary
    legislative system. Executive authority is exercised by the Prime
    Minister and Cabinet representing the governing political parties
    (traditionally a coalition of at least two major parties). The
    bicameral Parliament is elected through free and fair elections. The
    judiciary is independent.
        Regional police forces are primarily responsible for maintaining
    internal security. The police, the royal constabulary, and
    investigative organizations concerned with internal and external
    security are under effective civilian authority.
        The market-based economy is export oriented and features a mixture
    of industry, services, and agriculture. Key industries include
    chemicals, oil refining, natural gas, machinery, and electronics. The
    agricultural sector produces fruit, vegetables, flowers, meat, and
    dairy products. Living standards and the level of social benefits are
    high. Unemployment is 2.7 percent; however, long-term unemployment,
    particularly among ethnic minorities, remains a problem.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. Problems include violence and
    discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in women and
    children, and discrimination against minorities. The Government is
    taking steps to deal with all of these problems.
        Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which are two autonomous
    regions of the kingdom, also feature parliamentary systems and full
    constitutional protection of human rights. In practice respect for
    human rights in these islands generally is little different from that
    in the European Netherlands. The islands' prison conditions remain
    substandard.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them.
        The Government took steps in 1999 to facilitate the filing of
    complaints about police behavior, to create uniform complaint
    procedures, and to ensure that complaints are assessed by an
    independent committee.
        Prison conditions in the Netherlands meet minimum international
    standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        The Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
    Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has urged the
    Governments of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba to
    improve the ``inhuman'' conditions in Curacao's Koraal Specht prison
    and in cell blocks at the police stations on the islands of St.
    Maarten, Bonaire, and Aruba. The CPT's criticism focused on
    overcrowding, extremely poor sanitary conditions, poor food, and
    insufficient ventilation. The Committee also criticized widespread
    corruption and the mistreatment of prisoners by guards at Koraal
    Specht. In May the CPT specifically criticized the Government for not
    doing enough to prevent outbursts of violence among prisoners--
    including sexual assaults--and the use of riot police to guard
    prisoners at the Koraal Specht prison.
        The Dutch Government repeatedly offered financial assistance to the
    Government of the Netherlands Antilles for the construction of a new
    juvenile wing, a maximum security facility, and other improvements at
    Koraal Specht. The Government also sent experts on prison organization
    and the training of guards. Steady progress has been made in improving
    conditions (prisoners now have mattresses, hygiene and food have
    improved, and construction began on a new wing to relieve
    overcrowding). The entire prison complex is being renovated, and a new
    facility is being built. The Antillean Government reached agreement
    with a private company to supply expert personnel who are to reorganize
    prison management and train mid-level staff during a period of 1 year.
    The management team began work on September 1 and is being paid by the
    Dutch Government. New wardens and security guards also were hired.
        The Governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba allow access
    by nongovernmental organizations to prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
    prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. A pyramidal
    system of cantonal, district, and appellate courts handles both
    criminal and civil cases. The Supreme Court acts as the highest
    appellate court and ensures the uniform interpretation of the law. In
    criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of innocence and
    the right to public trial, to counsel (virtually free for low income
    persons), and to appeal. The law provides for the right to a fair
    trial, and the independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. State
    subsidies are provided to religious organizations that maintain
    educational facilities.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports
    of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee
    status. The Government does not provide first asylum as such, but most
    asylum seekers (86 percent in 1999), except those who obviously came
    from a ``safe country of origin'' or stayed for some time in a ``safe
    third country,'' are permitted to apply for resident status. In 1999
    the Government turned down 75 percent of the asylum requests that were
    processed. However, up to 30 percent of those whose applications were
    denied nonetheless were permitted to stay temporarily on humanitarian
    grounds or as long as their country of origin was considered unsafe.
        The Government's asylum policy is designed to protect genuine
    refugees while excluding economic migrants and illegal immigrants. In
    the early 1990's, the Government adopted several measures to curb the
    relatively high influx of asylum seekers. This policy initially
    resulted in the desired decrease, but as other countries adopted even
    stricter laws, the influx rose again to 45,217 in 1998, a 31 percent
    increase over 1997. In 1999 the number of asylum seekers fell to
    41,306. A new series of harsher rules aims to discourage economic
    migrants at all stages of the asylum process, by means of a stricter
    intake, the accelerated processing of asylum requests, limited appeal
    procedures, and a denial of social assistance to asylum seekers who are
    screened out. Several of the measures are scheduled to come into effect
    in 2001.
        The Justice Ministry estimates on the basis of interviews with
    applicants that two-thirds of asylum seekers came to the country via
    alien smuggling organizations.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        No restrictions in law or in practice hinder the participation of
    women and minorities in government and politics; women are nevertheless
    underrepresented. A total of 52 of the 150 members of the second
    chamber of Parliament are women, as are 4 of the 15 cabinet ministers.
    However, the two Deputy Prime Ministers are women. The Government
    pursues an active policy to promote the participation of women in
    politics and public administration.
        Although a minority, women also hold positions in the Parliaments
    and Cabinets of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
    Government officials are very cooperative and responsive to their
    views.
        In view of its longstanding tradition of hosting international
    legal tribunals, the Government facilitated the trial of two Libyans
    accused of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which
    killed 270 persons. By agreement among the parties, the Government
    provided Camp Zeist to the United Kingdom as an extraterritorial venue
    for the trial, which began in 1999 and is being conducted under
    Scottish law. The trial continued at year's end.
        The Government also hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for
    the Former Yugoslavia and the headquarters of the International
    Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of any of these
    factors or political preference. The Government generally is effective
    in enforcing these provisions. Under the Equal Treatment Act,
    complainants may take offenders to court under civil law.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. A recent report by the
    Utrecht University's human rights department showed that about 1 out of
    25 women, particularly of ethnic minority groups, are victims of
    violence by their former and present partners. Each year 60 to 80 women
    and 40 children die of domestic violence.
        The Government supports programs to reduce and prevent violence
    against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of 48
    government-subsidized shelters offering the services of social workers
    and psychologists. In addition battered women who leave their domestic
    partners become eligible for social benefits, which include an adequate
    basic subsidy as well as an allowance for dependent children.
    Nongovernmental organizations also advise and assist women who are
    victims of sexual assault. Marital rape is a crime and carries the same
    penalty as nonmarital rape, a maximum of 8 years' imprisonment. Spousal
    abuse carries a one-third higher penalty than ordinary battery.
        In addition to helping victims of sexual abuse, the Government has
    pursued an active prevention campaign through commercials and awareness
    training of educators. A recent evaluation showed that, on average, the
    campaign positively influenced two-thirds of the population.
        Prostitution is legal, and since 1999 the law no longer treats
    ``organizing the prostitution of somebody else'' as a crime when done
    with the consent of the prostitute. However, any form of forced
    prostitution remains punishable. All brothels now require licenses
    issued by local governments with strict conditions to be observed by
    brothel owners. The Government's assumption is that by decriminalizing
    prostitution, licensing brothel operators, and improving working
    conditions and health care for prostitutes, while at the same time
    prohibiting the employment of minors and illegal immigrants,
    prostitution would be less susceptible to criminal organizations
    trafficking in women and children. An additional advantage is that the
    licensing system would make prostitution more transparent and easier
    for the police to monitor. Between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals are
    employed in prostitution. It is estimated that half of all prostitutes
    originate in non-European Union countries and are residing illegally in
    the country. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
    prostitution remains a problem, which the Government is giving priority
    to fighting (see Section 6.f.).
        The law requires employers to take measures to protect workers from
    sexual harassment; research shows that about 245,000 women, or 6.6
    percent of the female working population, are confronted with sexual
    intimidation in the work place each year. The Government funds an
    ongoing publicity campaign to increase awareness of the problem. As the
    largest employer, it has taken measures to counter harassment among
    civil servants, for example, in the police force.
        Women increasingly are entering the job market, but traditional
    cultural factors and an inadequate number of day care facilities tend
    to discourage them--especially women with young children--from working.
    One-third of women stop working after the birth of their first child.
    The participation of women in the labor market increased significantly
    in the last 25 years, from 29 percent of the working-age female
    population in 1975 to 58 percent in 2000. The Government wants to raise
    this figure to at least 65 percent in 2010 through various measures,
    including an expansion of child care facilities and special leave
    programs. About 42 percent of women hold part-time jobs. In 1998 the
    Government established favorable conditions for part-time employment by
    adopting a law that prohibits employers from treating part-time workers
    differently from those in full-time jobs.
        Women often are underemployed and have less chance of promotion
    than their male colleagues. They often hold lower level positions than
    men, mostly because of their part-time status. According to the
    Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the difference in earnings
    between men and women is 23 percent. Some women nevertheless are making
    steady progress by moving into professional and high-visibility jobs.
        In 1988 the Government started affirmative action programs for
    women. Collective labor agreements usually include one or more
    provisions to strengthen the position of women. Legislation mandates
    equal pay for equal work, prohibits dismissal because of marriage,
    pregnancy, or motherhood, and provides the basis for equality in other
    employment-related areas. A legislatively mandated Equal Treatment
    Commission actively pursues complaints of discrimination in these areas
    as well as allegations of pay discrimination.
        The social welfare and national health systems provide considerable
    assistance to working women with families. Women are eligible for 16
    weeks of maternity leave with full pay. The Parental Leave Law allows
    parents to take (unpaid) full-time leave during 3 months and to extend
    the leave over a period longer than 6 months to care for children up to
    8 years old. Persons working fewer than 20 hours per week also are
    entitled to parental leave.
        Children.--The Government works to ensure the well-being of
    children through numerous well-funded health, education, and public
    information programs. The Council for the Protection of Children,
    operated through the Ministry of Justice, enforces child support
    orders, investigates cases of child abuse, and recommends remedies
    ranging from counseling to withdrawal of parental rights. The
    Government also maintains a popular hot line for children and a network
    of pediatricians who track suspected cases of child abuse on a
    confidential basis.
        An estimated 50,000 children are victims of child abuse each year,
    although only approximately 15,000 formal reports of child abuse are
    registered. As a result of abuse, 40 children died in 1998. The U.N.
    Commission on Childrens' Rights in 1999 questioned the Government about
    its performance in this area. In particular the United Nations
    questioned the long waiting list for assistance to abused children.
    Approximately 7,000 abused children are on the waiting list.
        The age of consent is 16. Sexual intercourse with minors under age
    12 always constitutes a criminal offense; in cases involving minors
    between the ages of 12 and 16, an interested party must file a
    complaint. The new prostitution law imposes heavier penalties on
    prostitution activities involving minors. Maximum penalties vary
    between 6 years' imprisonment for sex with minors (in the context of
    prostitution) under age 18, 8 years for sex with minors under 16 years
    of age, and 10 for sex with minors under 12 years. International sex
    tourism involving the abuse of minor children is prosecutable. Since
    1996 several Dutch citizens have been tried and convicted for the abuse
    of minors in other countries.
        Trafficking in female African youths for the purpose of
    prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        The maximum penalty for child pornography is 4 years' imprisonment
    and 6 years in the event of financial gain. The law allows for
    provisional arrest, house searches, and criminal financial
    investigations. The mere possession of child pornography is punishable,
    but exemptions are made for scientific or educational use. However,
    these exemptions caused some problems with two child pornographic
    collections claimed to be of historic value. The age at which minors
    are allowed to act in pornographic movies was expected to be raised
    shortly from 16 to 18 years.
        The Government has begun a national offensive against child
    pornography on the Internet. The police monitored the Internet in a
    year-long pilot project that ended in August. Another police
    investigation showed that child pornography on the Internet has
    increased. The police discovered that a large portion of new
    photographs are processed digitally into pornographic material. The law
    does not yet include a provision to fight this new form of child
    pornography. The current law is aimed at the abuse of children, but the
    children shown on the manipulated pictures in fact have not been
    abused.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. Local governments increasingly mandate access to public
    buildings for the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--There were a number of complaints about
    anti-Semitism on Internet sites set up by Dutch citizens.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The traditionally homogeneous
    nature of society has changed in recent decades due to the influx of
    immigrants and asylum seekers who make up about 9 percent of the
    population. Despite comprehensive policies to promote the integration
    of racial and ethnic minorities, integration remains a problem. In
    general citizens are averse to discrimination and unequal treatment and
    support integration. Society has become increasingly alert to racial
    discrimination, and various organizations monitor violations.
        The Government pursues an active campaign aimed at increasing
    public awareness of racism and discrimination. According to the latest
    statistics, 112 persons or organizations were tried on discrimination
    charges in 1997 (latest statistics available). The chief public
    prosecutor set up the National Expertise Center on Discrimination in
    2000 to improve the prosecution's handling of discrimination cases.
        A central government organization was set up in 1999 to fight
    racial discrimination and to collect nationwide statistics on incidents
    of discrimination, but it has yet to work out a uniform system. The 29
    local antidiscrimination bureaus together registered about 3,000
    complaints per year in recent years. Many complaints concern
    discrimination in the workplace.
        In 1998 the Equal Opportunities Committee received 104 complaints
    relating to race or nationality and ruled in 53 cases of
    discrimination. Its rulings on such issues as headscarves, dismissal,
    accent, and language requirements are of major importance because they
    are applied widely. Most complaints concerned the labor market,
    including denial of promotion, discrimination in the work place,
    unequal pay, and dismissal.
        At the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the University
    of Leiden each year investigates the extent of rightwing and racist
    violence. It reported an increase from 201 registered incidents in 1996
    to 313 in 1998, but it assumed that the problem is more widespread
    because many cases remain unregistered. The 313 cases in 1998 were
    subdivided as follows: Threats 157; abuse 41; painting slogans 41;
    vandalism 27; bomb threat 23; other 24. Only a limited number of
    incidents can be attributed to rightwing extremism: about 19 percent of
    the 313 cases in 1998. However, that percentage was much higher in the
    past, which may be connected with the steady decline in membership of
    rightwing groups from about 1,400 in 1997 to some 600 in 1999. Most of
    the racist violence is committed at random and arbitrarily by youths
    often under the influence of alcohol. The culprits rarely are tracked
    down. In 1998 the culprits were identified in only 22 of the 313 cases.
    Only half of all discrimination cases are prosecuted.
        Immigrant groups also face some discrimination in housing and
    employment. These groups, concentrated in the larger cities, suffer
    from a high rate of unemployment. The Government has worked for several
    years with employers' groups and unions to reduce minority unemployment
    levels to the national average.
        The 1998 Act on the Stimulation of Labor Participation by Ethnic
    Minorities is intended to increase job opportunities for ethnic
    minorities. It requires employers with a work force of over 35 persons
    to register their non-Dutch employees. Employers are to strive for a
    composition of their work force that reflects the regional working
    population. They must submit their annual social action plans,
    including recruitment targets, to the regional labor bureaus. The Labor
    Inspectorate oversees implementation of the law. Despite these efforts,
    unemployment among ethnic minorities is still about four times higher
    than within the ethnically Dutch workforce. In May the U.N. Committee
    on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized the Government
    for not doing enough to prevent discrimination in hiring. It
    recommended that the Government take steps to reduce segregation in
    schools and create a police force whose composition reflects the entire
    population.
        A campaign beginning in April, in which several ministries,
    government job centers, and the Dutch small business association
    pledged to find jobs for some 20,000 persons from ethnic minorities
    before May 2001, had succeeded in recruiting just 240 persons by the
    end of August.
        With the proliferation of Internet web sites, the dissemination of
    racial and discriminatory material on Internet has also increased. The
    privately run Discrimination on the Internet Registration Center
    received 181 complaints in 1999 about 360 controversial statements,
    subdivided by category as follows: Racism 147, anti-Semitism 91, denial
    of the Holocaust 21, sexual preference 46, religion 15, discrimination
    against asylum seekers 12, incitement to violence 6, and ``other'' 19.
    It also investigates web sites and home pages on its own. Over 70
    percent of the statements are removed voluntarily at the Center's
    request. In 2 cases in 1999, the Center requested that criminal
    proceedings be initiated; such a request was still under review in 18
    other cases; and another 25 cases were being prepared. Four cases were
    passed on to the Government's antidiscrimination office for action.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Membership in labor unions is open to
    all workers including armed forces personnel, the police, and civil
    service employees. Workers are entitled to form or join unions of their
    own choosing without prior government authorization, and unions are
    free to affiliate with national trade union federations. This right is
    exercised freely.
        Unions are free of control by the Government and political parties.
    Union members may and do participate in political activities.
        All workers have the right to strike, except for most civil
    servants who have other institutionalized means of protection and
    redress. Industrial relations are very harmonious, and strikes are
    infrequent. In 1999 some 75 labor days per 1,000 workers were lost,
    mostly over union demands for higher pay and a 36-hour workweek. By law
    retribution against striking workers is prohibited.
        About 28 percent of the work force is unionized, but union-
    negotiated collective bargaining agreements usually are extended to
    cover about three-quarters of the work force. The white-collar unions'
    membership is the fastest growing.
        The three union federations are active internationally, without
    restriction.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    organize and bargain collectively is recognized and well established.
    Discrimination against workers because of union membership is illegal
    and does not occur.
        Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in the framework of
    the ``Social Partnership'' developed between trade unions and private
    employers. Representatives of the main union federations, employers'
    organizations, and the Government meet each autumn to discuss labor
    issues, including wage levels and their relation to the state of the
    economy and to international competition. The discussions lead to a
    central accord with social as well as economic goals for the coming
    year. Under this umbrella agreement, unions and employers in various
    sectors negotiate sectoral agreements, which the Government usually
    extends to all companies in the sector.
        Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Union federations and
    employers' organizations are represented, along with independent
    experts, on the Social and Economic Council. The Council is the major
    advisory board for the Government on policies and legislation regarding
    national and international social and economic matters.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by the
    Constitution and generally does not occur; however, trafficking in
    women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem
    (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Mandatory
    attendance at school ends at age 16, or after at least 12 years of
    education. Those still in school at the age of 16 may not work more
    than 8 hours per week. The law prohibits persons under the age of 18
    from working at night, overtime, or in areas dangerous to their
    physical or mental well-being. Anyone working more than 4.5 hours per
    day is entitled to a 30-minute break. The laws are enforced effectively
    by the tripartite Labor Commission, which monitors hiring practices and
    conducts inspections.
        Holiday work and after school jobs are subject to very strict
    rules, which are set in the Work Time Act, the Child Labor Regulation
    (for children under age 16), and the Working Conditions Decree.
    Observance of the rules is overseen by the Social Ministry's Labor
    Inspection Office. Although child labor is banned, an increasing number
    of children work for pay during holidays. The parents of such children
    are to be reported officially by labor inspectors, and the Public
    Prosecutor may decide to prosecute the parents for violating the ban on
    child labor. In 1999 the labor inspections showed that one out of four
    companies violated the regulations applying to holiday work, including
    by employing children under age 13.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and this
    prohibition is enforced effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for adults is
    established by law and can be adjusted every 6 months to changes in the
    cost-of-living index. Over the last few years, the statutory minimum
    wage has been pegged to the average wage in collective labor contracts.
    The gross minimum wage is about $1,000 (2,448 guilders) per month. For
    workers earning the minimum wage, employers currently pay $3,750 a year
    (6,000 guilders) in premiums for social security benefits, which
    includes medical insurance. Only 3 percent of workers earn the minimum
    wage because collective bargaining agreements, which normally are
    extended across a sector, usually set a minimum wage well above the
    legislated minimum. The Government, unions, and employers have taken
    measures to increase the number of minimum wage jobs and to decrease
    employers' social payments in order to lower the cost of hiring new
    workers and to create more jobs, especially for the long-term
    unemployed.
        A reduced minimum wage applies to young persons under the age of
    23--one of the groups with the highest rate of unemployment--and is
    intended to provide incentives for their employment. This wage ranges
    from 34.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers 16 years of age
    to 85 percent for those 22 years of age. The legislated minimum wage
    and social benefits available to all minimum wage earners provide an
    adequate standard of living for workers and their families.
        Although the law sets a 40-hour workweek, the average workweek for
    those with full-time jobs is 37+ hours. This workweek is the result of
    agreements reached in collective bargaining on shorter workweeks, often
    in conjunction with more flexible working hours. This combination makes
    it possible to adapt shorter working hours to the specific situation in
    a particular business or branch of industry.
        Working conditions, including comprehensive occupational safety and
    health standards set by law and regulations, are monitored actively by
    the tripartite Labor Commission. Enforcement is effective. Workers may
    refuse to continue working at a hazardous work site. The Ministry of
    Labor and Social Affairs also monitors standards through its Labor
    Inspectorate.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically criminalizes alien
    smuggling and trafficking in persons, both of which are problems. The
    maximum sentence for trafficking in persons is 6 years. In cases
    involving minors, severe physical violence, or organized trafficking,
    the maximum sentence is 10 years. The maximum sentence for alien
    smuggling is 8 years.
        The Government has an active policy to combat trafficking in
    persons, including a more aggressive prosecution policy as well as
    closer international cooperation. A number of police forces have
    established special units to deal with the problem. The Justice
    Minister appointed a national rapporteur on trafficking in persons in
    April. The rapporteur is to study the extent of the problem and report
    annually to the Government.
        The country is a major destination for trafficked women. According
    to the Justice Ministry, 20,000 to 30,000 persons work in prostitution,
    about half of them illegal residents from non-EU countries. Many come
    from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Eastern Europe, and Nigeria. The
    Foundation Against Trafficking in Women estimates that each year some
    3,000 women and girls are brought into the country for the purpose of
    prostitution. With the introduction of the new prostitution law, which
    prohibits the employment of prostitutes in the country illegally, the
    Government seeks to intensify the fight against criminal organizations
    trafficking in women and children (see Section 5).
        In 1998 a ruling was obtained under the Aliens Law to prevent
    illegal residents, who may have become victims of trafficking, from
    being expelled before investigations are completed. Victims are allowed
    3 months to consider pressing charges. Victims who do so are allowed to
    stay in the country until the judicial process is completed. During
    this period, victims receive legal, financial, and psychological
    assistance. In special circumstances, residence permits are granted on
    humanitarian grounds. After completion of the judicial process, illegal
    prostitutes returning to their native countries are eligible for
    temporary financial assistance.
        African women, in particular those from Nigeria, make up a sizeable
    portion of foreign women illegally working as prostitutes. According to
    the authorities, the most widely used ploy for trafficking African
    women is the fraudulent use of special asylum procedures for minors,
    who are virtually ensured entry. Although most such women are not
    actually under age 18, all claim to be. Once at the open-door asylum
    center, they remain for a few days and then disappear, only to turn up
    later as prostitutes in the country or elsewhere in Europe. Most such
    young African women are under extreme pressure to work as prostitutes.
    According to the Terre des Hommes organization, their families have
    signed contracts with trafficking organizations, often sanctioned by
    ``voodoo'' priests. The girls strongly believe in the magical power of
    voodoo.
        A Dutch study of prostitutes from Central and Eastern Europe shows
    that five out of six, ``liberated'' from trafficking organizations in
    the Netherlands, knew exactly that they were to be employed in the sex
    industry when they accepted the offer of their recruiters. Some 40
    percent already had worked as prostitutes in their native country. The
    study concluded that most such women came to the Netherlands
    voluntarily, and only after their arrival, did they become victims of
    their traffickers. They are often treated as slaves: intimidated,
    threatened, and locked up.
                                   __________

                                     NORWAY

        Norway is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy
    with King Harald V as the Head of State. It is governed by a prime
    minister, cabinet, and a 165-seat Storting (Parliament) that is elected
    every 4 years and cannot be dissolved. The judiciary is independent.
        The national police have primary responsibility for internal
    security, but in times of crisis, such as internal disorder or natural
    catastrophe, the police may call on the armed forces for assistance. In
    such circumstances, the armed forces are always under police authority.
    The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security
    forces.
        Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy
    combining private and public ownership that provides a high standard of
    living for residents. The key industries are oil and gas, metals,
    engineering, shipbuilding, fishing, and manufacturing (including fish
    processing equipment). The leading exports are oil and gas,
    manufactured goods, fish, and metals. During the year, 80.6 percent of
    workers were in the service sector (including public service), and 13.3
    percent were in the manufacturing sector.
        The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens, and
    the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
    individual instances of abuse. Violence against women and abuse of
    children are problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them.
        The Government in the past has been criticized for its practice of
    indefinite detention, often in solitary confinement with restricted
    communications, for suspects during the investigation of criminal cases
    (most recently in September 1999 by the Council of Europe's Committee
    for the Prevention of Torture). Restrictions were used sometimes to
    pressure prisoners to be more cooperative during investigations. In
    response to international criticism, the Government was reevaluating
    its practices and by year's end had made some changes. In September the
    Government tightened the requirements for restricting prisoners'
    communications and visitation rights. In June two working groups
    commissioned by the Ministry of Justice presented their recommendations
    for a more comprehensive reform of the practice. The reports will form
    the basis for a white paper, which is expected to be presented to the
    Parliament in 2001. Prison conditions meet minimum international
    standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
    Appellate Court (committee), superior courts, county courts for
    criminal cases, magistrate courts for civil cases, and claims courts.
    Special courts include the Impeachment Court (composed of
    parliamentarians), the labor court, trusteeship courts, fishery courts,
    and land ownership severance courts.
        All courts, some of which date to laws passed in the 11th century,
    meet internationally accepted standards for fair trials, including
    providing counsel to the indigent. The law provides for the right to a
    fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this
    right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Both the Constitution and the law prohibit such
    practices, government authorities generally respect these prohibitions,
    and violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in
    practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government generally respects them in
    practice.
        In August a small, previously unknown neo-Nazi group was denied
    permission to stage a Rudolf Hess commemorative march in downtown Oslo;
    the group then staged an illegal march in the nearby town of Askim; a
    counter demonstration by 15,000 persons took place in Oslo on August
    19.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway,
    which is supported financially by the State, and to which 93 percent of
    the population nominally belong. The Constitution requires that the
    King and one-half of the Cabinet belong to this church. The
    relationship between church and State is increasingly debated by the
    public. The Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act permits
    prospective employers to ask applicants for employment in private or
    religious schools, or in day care centers, whether they respect
    Christian beliefs and principles.
        In July 1998, the Government suspended two priests in the Church of
    Norway and asked the courts for approval legally to terminate their
    priesthood due to insubordination and disloyalty. The priests openly
    refused to accept religious and spiritual guidance from their bishop,
    with whom they were in disagreement on a number of social issues (such
    as gay rights). In January 2000, the Alta district court ruled that the
    priests' employment could not be terminated legally. Upon taking office
    in March, the new Labor Party Government appealed the ruling to a
    higher regional court, which had not ruled by year's end.
        Other denominations operate freely. A religious community is
    required to register with the Government only if it desires state
    support, which is provided to all registered denominations on a
    proportional basis in accordance with membership. In 1995 the
    Parliament introduced the subject ``religious knowledge and education
    in ethics'' into the national school system. The class teaches the
    ethical values of Christianity, as well as Christian beliefs and the
    main features of Christianity. All children must attend this mandatory
    class; there are no exceptions for children of other faiths.
    Organizations for atheists as well as Muslim communities have contested
    the legality of forced religious teaching, but the Oslo city court
    twice has ruled against their arguments. The case was being tried in a
    regional appellate court. Because of its potential for setting a
    precedent, the case is expected to go ultimately to the Supreme Court.
    Workers belonging to minority denominations are allowed leave for their
    religious holidays.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Government grants refugee or asylee status in
    accordance with the the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
        During the year, the Government granted protective residency to
    8,231 persons. The total included: Political asylum for 97 persons;
    temporary collective residency permits for 2,019 Iraqi Kurds;
    individual residency permits for 2,856 persons; and asylum as U.N.
    quota refugees for 1,485 persons. Immigration authorities rejected
    4,899 applications for protective residency. In addition 1,778 persons
    received residency status through a family reunification program.
        The collective 1-year residency permits that were granted to
    Kosovar Albanians in 1999 expired in August 2000, and all members of
    this group were encouraged to return to Kosovo voluntarily. The
    Government gives financial aid for repatriation to all Kosovar
    Albanians who do so. Of almost 8,000 Kosovar Albanians who sought
    refuge in Norway during and after NATO's campaign in Kosovo, 1,500
    returned voluntarily in 2000 (3,600 returned voluntarily in 1999). Of
    those who had previously gone back to Kosovo, 1,063 came back to Norway
    once again in 2000. When the collective residency permits expired, the
    Kosovar Albanians could apply for individual permits--and most did. By
    year's end, most had been rejected. However, in October all Kosovar
    Albanian families with small children were granted so-called postponed
    implementation of deportation until after March 1, 2001. The decision
    was based on complaints made by the UNHCR and other onsite U.N.
    agencies in October 2000 that Kosovo could not handle a major influx of
    returning refugees before the winter. However, as the March 1 extension
    deadline passes, a mass repatriation of Kosovar Albanians is expected
    in the spring and summer of 2001.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a
    valid claim to refugee status or of persons being forcibly returned to
    countries where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The law provides citizens with the right to change their Government
    peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
    periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage.
        Women are increasingly well represented at all levels of
    government. However, no restrictions in law or practice hinder their
    participation. Women lead 8 of the 18 government ministries. They hold
    60 of the 165 seats in Parliament (36.4 percent), chair 5 of 12
    standing committees in Parliament, and lead 2 of the 6 main political
    parties. A woman heads the Parliament.
        In addition to participating freely in the national political
    process, in 1997 Norwegian Sami (formerly known as Lapps) elected their
    own constituent assembly, the Sameting, for the third time. Under the
    law establishing the 39-seat body, the Sameting is a consultative group
    which meets regularly to deal with ``all matters which in [its] opinion
    are of special importance to the Sami people.'' In practice the
    Sameting has been most interested in protecting the group's language
    and cultural rights and in influencing decisions on resources and lands
    where Sami are a majority.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
    to their views.
        When the new Labor Government took office in March, the Prime
    Minister transferred the human rights portfolio from the Ministry of
    Development, Cooperation, and Human Rights to the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs. The new Government reversed the previous government's decision
    to appoint a minister for human rights issues. In 1999 the previous
    government presented a white paper to the Parliament on human rights,
    which addresses how the country can improve the state of human rights
    both domestically and internationally. On November 2, 2000, the
    Parliament's committee on foreign affairs supported the previous
    government's proposal and stressed the importance of incorporating
    human rights into law and society in general. The white paper was
    debated and passed in Parliament on November 14. It then was sent back
    to the respective ministries for implementation.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition in practice.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Public and private
    organizations run several shelters that give battered women an
    alternative to returning to a violent domestic situation. In 1999 the
    country's 14 shelters registered 9,183 overnight stays. In addition 967
    other women contacted the shelters for advice or counseling. During the
    year, 555 rapes were reported, along with 126 attempted rapes. The
    police believe that increases in reported rapes and domestic abuse in
    recent years have been largely due to greater willingness among women
    to report these crimes. The police vigorously investigate and prosecute
    such crimes. They also instituted special programs to prevent rape and
    domestic violence and to counsel victims.
        The rights of women are protected under the 1978 Equal Rights Law
    and other regulations. According to that law, ``women and men engaged
    in the same activity shall have equal wages for work of equal value.''
    However, the equal rights ombudsman's office, which monitors
    enforcement of the law, confirms that women generally receive 10 to 15
    percent less pay and benefits than men for work of ``equal value.''
        The equal rights ombudsman processes complaints of sexual
    discrimination. In 1999 there were 254 written complaints and 393
    telephone inquiries to the ombudsman. Women filed 40 percent of the
    complaints, men 28 percent, organizations 23 percent, and the remainder
    were filed by the ombudsman's office. The increase in men filing
    complaints is related to an increase in postdivorce child custody
    cases.
        In 1995 the Parliament adopted a harassment amendment to the
    Working Environment Act, which states that ``employees shall not be
    subjected to harassment or other unseemly behavior.'' Employers who
    violate these provisions, including the harassment clause, are subject
    to fines or prison sentences of up to 2 years, depending on the
    seriousness of the offense.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of
    education and medical care. The Government provides education for
    children through the postsecondary level. There is no difference in the
    treatment of girls and boys in education or health care services. An
    independent Children's Ombudsman Office, within the Ministry of
    Children and Families, assures the protection of children in law and in
    practice.
        Abuse of children is a problem. A total of 191 sexual assaults on
    children by nonfamily members were reported, along with 96 such
    assaults by family members. The latter is a substantial decrease from
    the 153 cases reported in 1999. Children's rights advocates have
    expressed concern that authorities may have found investigation of
    these crimes so difficult that they have not pursued investigations in
    some legitimate cases. The Government is examining this problem. In
    1999 welfare services assisted 23,800 abused or neglected children (2.1
    percent of children under 18). Of these, 4,950 received assistance in
    the home (such as financial assistance, guidance and support for
    parents, or temporary stays at respite homes).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. The law mandates access to public buildings for people
    with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
    practice.
        Indigenous People.--Apart from a tiny Finnish population in the
    northeast, the indigenous Sami constituted the only significant
    minority group until the influx of immigrants during the 1970's. In
    recent years, the Government has taken steps to protect Sami cultural
    rights by providing Sami language instruction at schools in their
    areas, radio and television programs broadcast or subtitled in Sami,
    and subsidies for newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami. In a
    rare political statement in October 1999 at the opening of the third
    Sami Parliament, King Harald V publicly apologized to the Sami people
    for repression under Norwegian rule. In 1997 the Government created the
    position of Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Local Government and
    Regional Affairs to deal specifically with Sami issues. When the Labor
    Party Government took office in March, new State Secretary Steinar
    Pedersen--of Sami origin like his predecessor--took over responsibility
    for coordinating government policies for the Sami minority.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
    right to associate freely and to strike. The Government changed the
    wage negotiating process in 1996, shifting negotiations from the
    national to the local and company level. During the year, almost
    100,000 workers in the private and public sectors went on strike, an
    80-year high. The strikes were settled mainly through negotiations,
    although compulsory arbitration was used to settle a 2-week oil
    workers' strike. The strikers achieved the largest wage settlement in
    many years and also obtained a fifth week of annual leave.
        The Government has the right, with the approval of the Parliament,
    to invoke compulsory arbitration under certain circumstances. The
    Government came under increasing criticism in 1995 for resorting to
    compulsory arbitration too quickly during strikes. In addition this
    procedure, which was also invoked several times in the 1980's,
    particularly in the oil industry, was criticized repeatedly by the
    Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization, which
    argued that the situations were not a sufficient threat to public
    health and safety to justify invoking compulsory arbitration. The
    Supreme Court is reviewing a case that will allow it to rule on whether
    the national process in this regard violates the country's
    international commitments.
        After the 1998 wage negotiations, the Government appointed a
    committee with representatives from all employer organizations and
    employee unions to look at the present practice of using compulsory
    arbitration in especially difficult labor conflicts. Its mandate is to
    provide a new system for handling labor conflicts and wage
    negotiations, and avoid situations in future labor conflicts that could
    lead to the use of compulsory arbitration. The committee is expected to
    present its proposal by April 1, 2001. The Ministry of Regional Affairs
    takes the position that it is not the legislation itself that needs to
    be amended, but the way in which this legislation is interpreted by the
    parties in labor conflicts and implemented by the Government.
        With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force, unions
    play an important role in political and economic life, and the
    Government consults them on important economic and social problems.
    Although the largest trade union federation is associated with the
    Labor Party, all unions and labor federations are free of party and
    government control.
        Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate
    internationally. They maintain strong ties with such international
    bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All workers,
    including government employees and military personnel, exercise the
    right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is
    widespread, with most wage earners covered by negotiated settlements,
    either directly or through understandings that extend the contract
    terms to workers outside the main labor federation and the employers'
    bargaining group. Any complaint of antiunion discrimination would be
    dealt with by the Labor Court, but there have been no complaints in
    recent years.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is
    prohibited by law and does not exist. The Government prohibits forced
    and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
    occurred. The Directorate of Labor Inspections (DLI) ensures compliance
    and is effective. Domestics, children, or foreign workers are not
    required to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Children 13 to 18 years of age may be employed part time
    in light work that will not affect adversely their health, development,
    or schooling. Minimum age rules are observed in practice and enforced
    by the DLI. Education is compulsory for 9 years. School is mandatory
    through the ninth grade; most children stay in school at least until
    the age of 18. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section
    6.c.). The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
    child labor in December.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Normal working hours are
    mandated by law and limited to 37.5 hours per week. The law also
    provides for 25 working days of paid leave per year (31 days for those
    over age 60). A 28-hour rest period is mandated legally on weekends and
    holidays. There is no specified minimum wage, but wages normally fall
    within a national scale negotiated by labor, employers, and the
    Government. Average income, not including extensive social benefits, is
    adequate to provide a worker and family with a decent living.
        The 1977 Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act provides
    for safe and physically acceptable working conditions for all employed
    persons. Specific standards are set by the DLI in consultation with
    nongovernmental experts. According to the act, environment committees
    composed of management, workers, and health personnel must be
    established in all enterprises with 50 or more workers, and safety
    delegates must be elected in all organizations. Workers have the right
    to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health. The
    DLI ensures effective compliance with labor legislation and standards.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically criminalizes
    trafficking in persons, but existing labor and immigration statutes may
    be used in such cases.
        Norway is becoming a destination country for trafficked women,
    according to an OSCE report.
                                   __________

                                     POLAND

        Poland is a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty political
    system. Free and fair presidential elections were held in October,
    resulting in the re-election of President Aleksander Kwasniewski.
    Executive power is shared by the Prime Minister, the Council of
    Ministers, and to a lesser extent, the President. The Parliament is
    bicameral (Senate and Sejm). The Government formed after free and fair
    elections in 1997 was a two-party coalition composed of the center-
    right Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) party anchored by the
    Solidarity Labor Union and the Centrist Freedom Union (UW), also with
    origins in Solidarity. The majority government dissolved in June when
    UW withdrew and five of its ministers resigned; AWS is now a minority
    government. Parliamentary elections are next scheduled for fall 2001.
    The judiciary is independent but inefficient.
        Internal security forces and the armed forces are subject to
    effective civilian control by the Government. Since 1996 the civilian
    Minister of Defense has had clear command and control authority over
    the military chief of the general staff as well as oversight of
    military intelligence. Civilian control was reinforced further by a
    restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and general staff undertaken
    as part of the country's entry into NATO in April.
        After several years of strong growth in the mid-1990's, the economy
    slowed starting in 1998 as a result of the Russian financial crisis and
    economic slowdown in the country's largest export markets in Europe.
    Gross domestic product (GDP) growth dropped to 4.1 percent in 1999 and
    stayed at this level in 2000. After dropping steadily through the last
    decade, inflation began increasing again in 1999, climbing as high as
    11.7 percent in the summer but dropping to 8.5 percent in December
    2000. The ongoing process of restructuring, and increasing numbers of
    youths entering the labor force, have increased unemployment in recent
    years. The official unemployment rate was 15 percent at year's end.
    Since 1989 most small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises have
    been privatized, and the Government has launched privatizations of
    major state-owned enterprises such as insurance, telephone, airline,
    power generation, petroleum refining, steel, coal, and banks.
    Significant reforms are underway in other areas as well, including
    pensions, health, decentralization of government, and education. Still
    to be addressed are the agriculture sector, a major part of the economy
    (employing more than 25 percent of the labor force), and lagging
    development in rural areas.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
    however, problems remain in some areas. Prison conditions are generally
    poor. A cumbersome legal process, poor administration, and an
    inadequate budget hamper the court system. Lengthy pretrial detention
    occurs occasionally. Court decisions frequently are not implemented,
    particularly those of the administrative courts, and simple civil cases
    can take as long as 2 or 3 years. As a result, public confidence in the
    judicial system is low. Many poorly paid prosecutors and judges have
    left public service for more lucrative employment. The threat of
    organized crime has provoked legislative responses that raise questions
    regarding the right to privacy. The Government maintains a large number
    of wiretaps without judicial review.
        There are some marginal restrictions in law and in practice on
    freedom of speech and of the press. With few exceptions, the Criminal
    Code provides protection for journalists' sources. Spousal abuse
    continues to affect many women. Women continue to experience serious
    discrimination in the labor market and are subject to various legal
    inequities as a consequence of paternalistic laws. Child prostitution
    is a problem. There were incidents of desecration of graves in both
    Jewish and Catholic cemeteries and anti-Semitic graffiti on Jewish
    buildings. The Government has worked constructively toward resolving
    issues of concern to the Jewish community. There is some societal
    discrimination and violence against ethnic minorities. Although the
    right to organize unions and bargain collectively largely was observed,
    some employers violated worker rights provided for by law, particularly
    in the growing private sector. Trafficking in women and children in,
    to, and from the country is a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In January 1998, a police officer was charged with the beating
    death of 13-year-old Przemek Czaja following a basketball game in the
    Baltic coast city of Slupsk. The officer was sentenced in May 1999 to 6
    years in prison. In December 1999, the appeals court increased the
    sentence to 8 years. The defendant has lodged an appeal to the Supreme
    Court. At year's end, the defendant was still free on appeal. On March
    7, the District Court in Koszalin decided that the defendant should be
    examined by psychiatrists from the Szczecin Medical Academy.
        A police officer indicted in connection with the shooting deaths of
    two unarmed civilians and the wounding of another in Brodno, a suburb
    of Warsaw, was sentenced in December 1999 to 7 years in prison. His
    appeal was pending at year's end.
        On October 30, the Lublin Appeals Court sentenced the former Lomaz
    police chief to 4.5 years in prison (originally he was sentenced to 15
    years in 1998, but he appealed the decision). The October verdict is
    final.
        Trials related to extrajudicial killings during the Communist
    period continued in 1999. A new trial began in a Katowice appeals court
    in October 1999 in the case of 22 riot policemen accused of killing
    miners during the Communist martial law era after a 1998 appeals court
    decision annulled their acquittals. In September 1999, the decision of
    a district court was upheld in the case of the appeal of two officers
    convicted in 1997 of the 1983 Communist era beating death of Grzegorz
    Przemyk.
        One officer was sentenced to 2 years in prison for participating in
    the beating, and the other officer was found not guilty of attempting
    to destroy the file in the case. In November 1999, the Supreme Court
    ordered a new trial for former Communist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski and
    nine other officials who allegedly ordered police to shoot workers
    during the 1970 riots in Gdansk. The Court ruled that the trial that
    began in the Gdansk provincial court should be started over in the
    Warsaw district court. No new trial date was set. In December 1999,
    lawyers representing miners submitted a motion requesting the retrial
    of former Communist Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak for his role in
    the pacification of the Wujek mine, but a Katowice district court did
    not rule on the motion by year's end. In December 1999, the Warsaw
    regional court ruled that Kiszczak's health made it possible for him
    (although to a limited degree) to face the court and thus rejected a
    defense motion to suspend his trial because of poor health. Kiszczak
    appealed; the trial was still pending at year's end.
        On October 30, the retrial began in Warsaw of General Wladyslaw
    Ciaston, one of the two former Communist Security Services (SB)
    generals accused (and acquitted in 1994) of having directed the 1984
    murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko. Popieluszko upset the Communist
    regime during martial law for openly supporting the cause of the then-
    outlawed Solidarity trade unions in his sermons. He was tortured to
    death in October 1984 by the secret police at the time and became a
    martyr and the ``patron saint'' of Solidarity. In March 1996, the
    appeal court ordered a retrial. The other accused general was excused
    from the trial in January of this year for health reasons.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Criminal Code prohibits torture, and there were no
    reported incidents of it. Unlike in the previous year, there were no
    reports of police using force to disperse violent protestors or to
    break up illegal roadblocks.
        In June 1998, a Gdansk court indicted 11 riot policemen for their
    participation in the October 1997 beating of soccer fans attending a
    match in the town of Gdynia. The officers' activities, which took place
    before, during, and after the match, both at the stadium and at a
    nearby bar, were captured on videotape. A civil case against the
    officers, launched by the father of one of the teenage victims, also
    was pending. Both civil and criminal cases stemming from the incident
    were pending at year's end. The civil case against the officers ended
    during the year; it was suspended pending resolution of the criminal
    case. Public television was fined $2,400 (10,000 PLN) and the private
    television station TVN $1,200 (5,000 PLN) for airing tapes of the
    incident. Both stations also must apologize to the victim on their main
    news programs. Initially the court acquitted the police officers but
    the prosecutor appealed; the criminal case was still pending at year's
    end.
        Prison conditions are still generally poor, according to reports by
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); overcrowding, damp cells, and a
    lack of medical treatment are the chief problems. According to a July
    1998 report by the National Penitentiary Authority, the prison system
    is in urgent need of additional funding. Of 156 detention facilities,
    100 require considerable renovation. At the same time, the National
    Penitentiary Authority's annual budget continued to fall; it has
    declined by approximately 34 percent since 1991. The Ombudsman for
    Human Rights complained about the safety of prisoners, noting that
    inmates are often the victims of violent attacks by other prisoners.
    Civil litigation against the prison administration in the 1996 case of
    an 18-year-old mentally retarded boy who was beaten and sodomized by
    fellow inmates was considered by the Bydgoszcz district court in
    February; the case was still pending at year's end. The Ombudsman also
    suggested in 1999 that the prison population be reduced, including by
    decriminalizing certain offenses, pointing out that the ratio of
    prisoners to rehabilitation officers is very poor.
        The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
    this prohibition. Courts rather than prosecutors issue arrest warrants.
    The law allows a 48-hour detention period before authorities are
    required to bring a defendant before a court and an additional 24 hours
    for the court to decide whether to issue a pretrial detention order.
    During this period, access to a lawyer normally is limited. Once a
    prosecutor presents the legal basis for a formal investigation, the law
    provides for access to counsel. Detainees may be held in pretrial
    detention for up to 3 months and may challenge the legality of an
    arrest through appeal to the district court. A court may extend this
    pretrial confinement period every 3 months for up to 18 months until
    the trial date. Total time of temporary arrest until the first sentence
    rendered by the court of lower instance cannot be more than 2 years.
    However, under certain circumstances, the 2-year period may be extended
    further by the Supreme Court. Bail is available, and most detainees are
    released on bail pending trial.
        The Government does not employ forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. However, the judiciary remains inefficient and lacks
    resources and public confidence.
        The Government continues to restructure the court system in order
    to streamline and accelerate the legal process. At present there is a
    four-tiered court and prosecutorial structure. The courts consist of
    regional, provincial, and appellate divisions, as well as a Supreme
    Court. These tiers are subdivided further into five parts: Military,
    civil, criminal, labor, and family. Regional courts are courts of first
    instance, while appellate courts are charged solely with appeals.
    Provincial courts have a dual responsibility, handling appeals from
    regional courts while enjoying original jurisdiction for the most
    serious types of offenses. Appellate courts handle appeals tried at the
    provincial level, and the Supreme Court only handles appeals about
    questions of law. The prosecutorial system mirrors the court structure
    with national, provincial, appellate, and regional offices.
        Judges are nominated by the national judicial council and appointed
    by the President. They are appointed for life and can be reassigned but
    not dismissed, except by a court decision. The Constitutional Tribunal
    rules on the constitutionality of legislation. In October 1999,
    Constitutional Tribunal decisions became final and binding, after a 2-
    year interim period following the entry into force of the new
    Constitution during which a two-thirds majority in the Sejm could
    overrule its decisions.
        The court system is cumbersome, poorly administered, overstaffed,
    and underfunded. There are numerous inefficiencies, most notably the
    fact that many districts have more criminal judges than prosecutors.
    These factors contribute to a lack of public confidence. Many effective
    judges and prosecutors have left public service for the more lucrative
    private sector. Court decisions frequently are not implemented.
    Bailiffs normally ensure the execution of civil verdicts such as damage
    payments and evictions. However, according to some observers, they are
    underpaid, subject to intimidation and bribery, and have a mixed record
    of implementing court decisions. Civil and administrative rulings
    against public institutions such as hospitals often cannot be enforced
    due to a lack of funds. Simple civil cases can take as long as 2 to 3
    years before resolution, and the pretrial waiting time in criminal
    cases can be several months. The backlog and the costs of legal action
    appear to deter many citizens from using the justice system at all,
    particularly in civil matters such as divorce. The long wait for
    routine court decisions in commercial matters is an incentive for
    bribery and corruption.
        All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. At the
    end of a trial, the court renders its decision orally and then has 7
    days to prepare a written decision. A defendant has the right to appeal
    within 14 days of the written decision. Appeals may be made on the
    basis of new evidence or procedural irregularities.
        Criminal cases are tried in regional and provincial courts by a
    panel consisting of a professional judge and two lay assessors. The
    seriousness of the offense determines which is the court of first
    instance. Once formal charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to
    study the charges and consult with an attorney, who is provided at
    public expense if necessary. Once the defendant is prepared, a trial
    date is set. Defendants are required to be present during trial and may
    present evidence and confront witnesses in their own defense. Since
    1995 prosecutors have had the authority to grant witnesses anonymity at
    trial if they express fear of retribution from the defendant. This law,
    designed to help combat organized crime, impairs defendants' right to
    confront their accusers. In 1996 reforms were made that provide for a
    two-level appeal process in most civil and criminal matters;
    previously, citizens enjoyed access only to a one-step appeal process.
        Trials are normally public. However, the courts reserve the right
    to close a trial to the public in some circumstances, such as divorce
    cases, trials in which state secrets may be disclosed, or cases whose
    content might offend ``public morality.'' (See Section 1.f.) The courts
    rarely invoke this prerogative.
        The current Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure went into
    effect in September 1998. However, in March 1998 the European Court of
    Human Rights (ECHR) unanimously ruled that a provincial appellate
    court's examination of the verdict in the presence of the prosecutor,
    but not the defendant or his representative, infringed on the European
    Convention on Human Rights provisions concerning fair trial. Article
    451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to take account of
    all implications of the March 1998 ruling of the ECHR. This amendment
    came into force on September 1.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
    correspondence; however, the Government maintains, without judicial
    review or oversight, a large number of wiretaps. There is no
    legislation that provides for the general right to privacy. However, a
    1998 law prohibits the collection of information about a person's
    ethnic origin, religious convictions, health condition, political
    views, or membership in religious, political, or trade union
    organizations. The law allows for certain exceptions, specifically, the
    gathering of information without a person's permission by courts,
    hospitals, or organizations if the information pertains to their
    members. All exceptions are subject to some restrictions. A few
    continuing practices (such as a requirement to fill out ``creed'' or
    ``nationality'' items in some questionnaires) became illegal, effective
    April 1999. Violators of these provisions are subject to imprisonment
    for up to 3 years. The Ministry of Justice reports that from March 1998
    to September of this year, the office of the prosecutor received 324
    notifications of crimes pursuant to Articles 49 to 54 of the 1998 Law
    on Personal Data Protection. Of those, 304 have been closed; the office
    declined to prosecute 90 cases; 39 cases were referred to the court;
    and 170 cases were discontinued by the court. In nine cases, the
    prosecutor recommended conditional discontinuance. There is no record
    of a conviction obtained in any case.
        In response to the growing threat of organized crime and money
    laundering, Parliament permitted the police and intelligence services
    to monitor private correspondence and to use wiretaps and electronic
    monitoring devices in cases involving serious crimes, narcotics, money
    laundering, or illegal firearms sales. Under the Criminal Code, the
    Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior, both political
    appointees, must authorize these investigative methods. In emergency
    cases, the police may initiate an investigation that utilizes wiretaps
    or the opening of private correspondence at the same time that they
    seek permission from the ministers. Estimates on the number of
    wiretapping devices installed annually at the request of the police
    vary widely; however, a high-ranking public prosecutor in 1998 put the
    number at 4,000. After interventions by the Human Rights Ombudsman, the
    Prosecutor General curtailed the number of warrants for wiretapping.
    Levels are reportedly back at pre-1998 levels, over 4,000.
        Parliamentarians and human rights groups expressed concern about
    the lack of control over this type of surveillance. There is no
    independent judicial review of surveillance activities, nor is there
    any control over how the information derived from investigations is
    used. A growing number of agencies have access to wiretap information,
    and the Police Code allows electronic surveillance to be used for the
    prevention of crime as well as for investigative purposes. As is the
    case under the Criminal Code, police must obtain permission from the
    Ministers of Justice and Interior before initiating wiretap procedures.
        The law forbids arbitrary forced entry into homes. Search warrants
    issued by a prosecutor are required in order to enter private
    residences. In emergency cases, when a prosecutor is not immediately
    available, police may enter a residence with the approval of the local
    police commander. In the most urgent cases, in which there is no time
    to consult with the police commander, police may enter a private
    residence after showing their official identification. There were no
    reports that police abused search warrant procedures.
        A law on ``lustration'' or vetting went into effect in November
    1998. The law, designed to expose government officials who collaborated
    with the Communist-era secret police, bans from office for 10 years
    those caught lying about their past. The law requires officials to
    provide sworn affidavits concerning their possible cooperation with the
    secret police; the public interest spokesman (lustration prosecutor)
    then verifies the affidavits and brings suspected cases of
    misrepresentation before the lustration court, a special three-judge
    panel whose decisions may be appealed. Several high-profile cases came
    before the court during the year, including that of a Deputy Defense
    Minister who was judged to have lied in his affidavit; the case is
    currently on appeal. Many of these cases are closed to the public
    because they involve classified documents. In accordance with the
    presidential election law, all candidates for the October presidential
    elections were vetted in August; after some controversy surrounding the
    lustration of President Kwasniewski and former president Walesa, all
    passed muster. Critics continue to voice concern that the procedures
    may be unfair, in view of the likelihood that secret police records
    were subject to loss or tampering. In June Parliament agreed on a
    chairman for the Institute of National Remembrance, creation of which
    the lustration law mandated in order to organize all communist-era
    secret police files and eventually give citizens access to information
    in files compiled on them.
        In June 1998, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled unconstitutional a
    1997 draft law envisioning the possible removal from service of judges
    proven to have violated judicial independence by issuing unjust
    verdicts between 1944 and 1989 at the request of the Communist
    authorities. Disciplinary proceedings against the judges in question
    were to be initiated by the Minister of Justice, the presidents of the
    appellate or regional courts, the National Judiciary Council, or
    individuals who felt wronged by court verdicts. In December 1998, the
    Sejm addressed the issue and adopted amendments to the law requiring
    that procedures against accused judges be initiated before December 31,
    2002. The law went into effect in January 1999. According to the
    National Judiciary Council, at the end of the year, 10 cases had been
    filed against 13 judges.
        Men are not permitted to marry without parental permission until
    the age of 21, whereas women may marry at the age of 18 (see Section
    5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects these
    rights; however, there are some marginal restrictions in law and
    practice. Nonetheless, the press is vigorous and independent.
        The Criminal Code states that an individual who ``publicly insults
    or humiliates a constitutional institution of the Republic of Poland''
    is subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years, while an
    individual who insults a public functionary is subject to a fine or
    imprisonment of up to 1 year. In December 1999, the trial began in
    Elblag in the case of Andrzej Lepper, who was accused of insulting
    Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek and state officials in January 1999; the
    case was still pending at year's end. Prosecutors charge that during a
    road blockade in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Lepper called Buzek's cabinet a
    ``government of national betrayal, a government of dilettantes,
    traitors to Poland.'' He is said to have called the Prime Minister and
    another political leader ``bandits and criminals.'' In May the Warsaw
    district court ruled that the daily newspaper ``Zycie'' must apologize
    to President Aleksander Kwasniewski for publishing untrue information
    suggesting that the President had contacts with Russian spies. However,
    the court rejected the President's demand that Zycie pay $0.6 million
    (2.5 million PLN) in damages in favor of flood victims. The President
    said he would not appeal the verdict, while Zycie said that it would.
    This provision of the Criminal Code also can be used by individual
    citizens and businesses ``to protect their good name.'' In March 1998,
    Network Twenty One, which sells Amway products, and seven of its
    employees used the provision to prevent the broadcast, showing, or
    copying of a 1-hour documentary critical of the company and its
    practices. The documentary had not been shown by year's end.
        The case against talk show host Wojciech Cejrowski, charged with
    publicly insulting President Kwasniewski, was decided against the
    defendant in April 1998; it since has been appealed and still was
    pending decision at year's end. Also pending was a 1995 case against
    presidential candidate Leszek Bubel for violating a section of the
    Penal Code that prohibits acts that ``publicly insult, ridicule, and
    deride the Polish nation, the Polish Republic, its political system, or
    its principal organs.'' Bubel had claimed publicly that a former head
    of the Presidential Chancellery protected a group of criminals.
        There was no progress during the year in the ongoing investigation
    into the case of Mikolaj Siwicki for publishing an allegedly hate-
    mongering book that could damage the nation's interests.
        The Criminal Code also stipulates that offending religious
    sentiment through public speech is punishable by a fine or a 3-year
    prison term. In 1995 a provincial court charged presidential candidate
    Leszek Bubel with violating this article by publishing a pamphlet
    containing anti-Semitic ``humor.'' A verdict on the case was still
    pending at year's end.
        In July 1999, the Warsaw district court revoked the 1998 decision
    of prosecutors not to start proceedings against the leftist newspaper
    Trybuna for insulting Pope John Paul II in one of its articles. In 1997
    Tadeusz Rydzyk and AllPolish Youth director Roman Giertych, both acting
    on behalf of the Council for the Coordination of the Defense of the
    Dignity of Poland and Poles, originally filed charges against Trybuna
    for its alleged insults of the Pope. In April 1998, the Warsaw
    prosecutor's office decided to drop the case; subsequently, some 1,500
    persons appealed to the Warsaw district court to reopened. In the wake
    of the lost lawsuit, Trybuna had to apologize twice for publishing the
    article. A separate suit against the author was ended when he died, but
    it appears that the Prosecutor's Office may charge the then editor-in-
    chief of the paper for having allowed the article to go to press. At
    least one civil suit related to the Trybuna case was still pending at
    year's end.
        The State Secrets Act allows for the prosecution of citizens who
    publish or otherwise betray state secrets. Human rights groups
    criticize this law, since it restricts the right of free speech of
    private citizens.
        The Criminal Code regulates the protection of journalistic sources.
    The code grants news sources absolute protection, except in cases
    involving national security, murder, and terrorist acts. Pursuant to
    the law, statutory provisions are applied retroactively if their terms
    are beneficial to the accused. Journalists who refused to divulge
    sources prior to the new code's enactment also can avoid sanctions by
    invoking ``journalistic privilege.''
        There is no restriction on the establishment of private newspapers
    or distribution of journals; private newspapers and magazines flourish.
    There was no progress in the ongoing privatization of RUCH, a national
    network of newspaper kiosks.
        The national radio and television broadcasting council (KRRiTV) has
    broad powers in monitoring and regulating programming on radio and
    television, allocating broadcasting frequencies and licenses, and
    apportioning subscription revenues to public media.
        In order to encourage the KRRiTV's apolitical character, the nine
    KRRiTV members are obliged legally to suspend any membership in
    political parties or public associations. However, they are chosen for
    their political allegiances and nominated by the Sejm, the Senate, and
    the President following political bargaining, thus raising potentially
    serious questions about the independence of broadcasting oversight from
    political influence.
        The broadcasting law stipulates that programs should not promote
    activities that are illegal or against state policy, morality, or the
    common good. The law, whose constitutionality has been confirmed by the
    Constitutional Tribunal, requires that all broadcasts ``respect the
    religious feelings of the audiences and in particular respect the
    Christian system of values.'' This provision has never been used as a
    means of censorship, although the restrictions theoretically could be
    used as such.
        Private television broadcasters operate on frequencies selected by
    the Ministry of Communications and auctioned by the KRRiTV. Private
    radio flourishes on the local, regional, and national levels alongside
    public radio.
        The Government owns 2 of the 3 most widely-viewed television
    channels and 17 regional stations, as well as 5 national radio
    networks. PAP, the national wire service, was privatized partially in
    1997, and a five-member supervisory board is preparing the service for
    full privatization. However, there was no progress at year's end.
    Although public television remains a major source of news and
    information, private broadcast television, satellite, and private cable
    services (domestic and foreign) are available across most of the
    country. Cable services, available in all major cities, carry the main
    public channels, two nationwide private networks (Polsat and TVN), as
    well as local and regional stations and a variety of foreign offerings.
        The law on radio and television requires public television to
    provide direct media access to the main state institutions, including
    the presidency, ``to make presentations or explanations of public
    policy.'' The President and the Prime Minister have complained
    occasionally of the other's abuse of the access privilege. Both public
    and private radio and television provide coverage of all ranges of
    political opinion.
        Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints
    are widely available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications
    from abroad.
        The Internet is widely available and is not regulated.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
    practice. Permits are not necessary for public meetings but are
    required for public demonstrations; demonstration organizers must
    obtain these permits from local authorities if the demonstration might
    block a public road. For large demonstrations, organizers also are
    required to inform the local police of the time and place of their
    activities and their planned route. Every gathering must have a
    chairperson who is required to open the demonstration, preside over it,
    and close it.
        Unlike in 1999, there were no violent clashes between police and
    demonstrators during the year.
        The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
    generally respects this right in practice. Private associations need
    government approval to organize and must register with their district
    court. The procedure essentially requires the organization to sign a
    declaration that commits it to abide by the law. However, in practice
    the procedure is complicated and may be subject to the discretion of
    the judge in charge.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Citizens
    enjoy the freedom to practice any faith they choose. Religious groups
    may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive
    contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without government
    interference. There are 15 religious groups in the country whose
    relationship with the State is governed by specific legislation and 140
    other religious communities. The legislation outlines the internal
    structure of the religious groups, their activities, and procedures for
    property restitution. There are no government restrictions on
    establishing and maintaining places of worship. More than 95 percent of
    Poles are Roman Catholic, but Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and
    much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations meet freely.
    Although the Constitution provides for the separation of church and
    state, a crucifix hangs in both the upper and lower houses of
    Parliament. State-run radio broadcasts Catholic mass on Sundays, and
    the Catholic Church is authorized to relicense radio and television
    stations to operate on frequencies assigned to the Church, the only
    body outside the KRRiTV allowed to do so.
        Religious communities may register with the Government, but they
    are not required to do so and may function freely without registration.
    Registration requires that the group have submitted the names of 100
    members as well as information regarding the group itself. This
    information on membership must be confirmed by a notary public,
    although the registration itself often appears to be a formality. Four
    new religious communities were registered during the year. All churches
    and recognized religious groups share the same privileges, such as
    duty-free importation of office equipment and reduced taxes.
        Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their
    children in compliance with their own religious and philosophical
    beliefs, religious education classes continue to be taught in the
    public schools at public expense. While children are supposed to have
    the choice between religious instruction and ethics, the Ombudsman's
    office states that in most schools, ethics courses are not offered due
    to financial constraints. Catholic Church representatives are employed
    to teach religious classes in the schools. Such classes constitute the
    vast majority of all religious education classes offered, since the
    population of the country is approximately 95 percent Catholic.
    However, parents can request religious classes in any of the religions
    legally registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish. Such
    non-Catholic religious instruction exists in practice, although it is
    not common; the Ministry of Education pays the instructors. Priests
    receive salaries from the state budget for teaching religion in public
    schools.
        In mid-year the Government announced plans to establish by
    September, a department within the Ministry of Interior to monitor the
    activities of ``new religious groups'' and cults; by year's end, the
    new department had not yet been formed.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the Constitution does not
    address freedom of movement, the Government does not restrict internal
    or foreign travel. Citizens who leave the country have no trouble
    returning. There are no restrictions on emigration.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons
    with a valid claim to refugee status. Foreigners recognized as refugees
    under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
    its 1967 Protocol are granted full refugee status and permission to
    remain permanently. The Government received 4,519 petitions for refugee
    status during the year, compared with 2,864 for all of 1999. Including
    petitions carried over from 1999, 76 have been approved, 2,626 were
    denied, and 1,206 discontinued or abandoned. The increase from 1999 can
    be attributed to the marked increase in Chechen refugees. The
    Government approved 22 Chechens for refugee status prior to August,
    when they ceased granting approvals for political reasons.
        The 1997 Aliens Act addresses immigration issues. Human rights
    organizations generally view the Aliens Act as positive. The law gives
    all prospective refugees access to a procedure for adjudicating refugee
    status and established an independent board to which prospective
    refugees can appeal negative status decisions by the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs. Refugee advocates note that the board serves as an
    impartial and independent adjudicator of appeals. The law does not
    recognize the concept of first asylum or any other form of temporary
    protection.
        The new Aliens Act would, for the first time, include the category
    of humanitarian assistance as a reason for re-settling aliens. The
    Government currently only has categories for asylum seekers and for
    refugees (for example, those who qualify under the Geneva Convention
    standards). A new category would be created for those who do not
    qualify as refugees but who cannot be returned to their countries of
    origin. Previously the Government had to find creative means of
    allowing refugees to stay in the country, as the Government did during
    the Kosovo conflict when they issued 1-year residency permits.
        The new Aliens Act would create the Office of Repatriation and
    Aliens. This office would control the various refugee boards and
    agencies as well as have some political control over the border guards.
    The law would also create an expedited system of refugee processing.
    Aliens would receive an answer to their petition within 2 days. If they
    were denied, they would be able to appeal to the refugee board, from
    whom they would receive an answer within 5 days. If their claims were
    found to be ``manifestly unfounded,'' they would be denied and no
    further appeal would be available to them. This would represent a
    significant change from the current system, in which refugees could
    wait up to 3 months for the first answer and could then appeal all the
    way to the Supreme Court.
        During the year, the Government cooperated with the UNHCR and the
    Polish NGO Caritas in a program monitoring portions of the country's
    eastern and western borders from offices in Bialystok and Zgorzelec.
    The UNHCR reports that the Government has been cooperative as the
    offices monitor relevant issues such as tracking asylum cases.
        The UNHCR reports isolated incidents of the border guards turning
    away potential refugees, in particular Chechen refugees. In addition
    UNHCR expressed concern during the year over the fate of unaccompanied
    children seeking asylum in the country. It urged that procedures and
    practices concerning the appointment and maintenance of supervisors and
    guardians for minors be improved.
        Many of the problems that the Government faces in dealing with
    aliens present in the country center around funding. The Government
    receives significant EU funds for upgrading its refugee processing
    system, which includes money for such things as fingerprinting
    equipment and running the refugee centers. However, the Government has
    very little money available to send aliens who have been denied
    petitions back to their country of origin (only 20 were returned by air
    in 1999). Most denied applicants simply receive a letter informing them
    that their petition has been denied and that they should leave the
    country. The Government does not have funding to help assimilate those
    persons who receive permission to permanently reside in the country.
    The approved petitioners receive funds from various NGO's, but this
    money covers only basic living needs, and not services such as language
    training, medical care, or other social benefits.
        The country is becoming a destination point for refugees, rather
    than simply a transit point. The UNHCR reports that significantly fewer
    persons are abandoning their refugee applications and that fewer
    persons are leaving the country after receiving status. The National
    Labor Office also estimates that as many as 200,000 foreigners are
    working illegally in the country, while the International Organization
    for Migration (IOM) estimates that some 300,000 irregular migrants are
    present at any given moment in the country. The IOM also reports that
    in recent years, 10,000 to 15,000 foreigners annually have been
    apprehended crossing the border into the country. Most of the illegal
    residents come from the countries of the former Soviet Union, although
    an increasingly larger number are coming from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
    Sri Lanka. Poland's relatively strong economic growth and its status as
    an EU candidate country are mainly responsible for this phenomenon, and
    illegal and legal immigrants alike can find employment in the country.
        The UNHCR has been working with government officials, police, and
    hospital personnel to sensitize them to the plight of refugees and
    train them in better ways of handling refugees. As part of this
    campaign, in September the UNHCR, in conjunction with the domestic NGO
    Polska Akcja Humanitarska and the entertainment agency 'Alter Art,'
    hosted a ``Refugee Day'' in Warsaw that featured bands, food, and
    entertainment appealing to younger persons.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully. This
    right is provided for in the Constitution and exists in practice. All
    citizens 18 years of age and older have the right to vote and to cast
    secret ballots, and voting is voluntary. The country is a multiparty
    democracy. A permanent, democratic Constitution entered into force in
    1997. Free and fair presidential elections were held in October.
    Multiple candidates ran and had access to the media. President
    Kwasniewski was re-elected to a second (and final) 5-year term in the
    first round with 53 percent of the vote.
        Executive power is divided between the President and a government
    chosen by the Sejm, or lower house of Parliament. There is also an
    upper house (the Senate). The Constitution provides for parliamentary
    elections at least once every 4 years. The President, elected for 5
    years, has the right, in certain very limited cases and after seeking
    the opinion of the Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, to shorten the
    Sejm's term of office. Whenever the Sejm's term of office is shortened,
    the Senate's term automatically is shortened as well. Parliament may
    impeach the President.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 13.7
    percent of parliamentarians (63 of 460) are women, and presently none
    of the 19 cabinet ministers is a woman. The Speaker of the Senate is
    the only female parliamentary leader, and none of the leaders of the
    nation's largest political parties are women.
        Two members of the German minority party are Members of Parliament
    (M.P.s) (see Section 5). The electoral law exempts ethnic minority
    parties from the requirement to win 5 percent of the vote nationwide in
    order to qualify for seats in individual districts.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
    responsive to their views.
        The Helsinki Foundation, a major NGO, conducts human rights
    investigations without government interference. Members of the
    foundation report that the Government displays a generally positive and
    helpful attitude towards human rights investigations. However, some
    domestic NGO's believe that a hostile regulatory climate is developing
    in parts of the government bureaucracy.
        The Office of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (the
    Ombudsman), established in 1987, is the Government's watchdog for human
    rights. The Ombudsman's office is an effective, independent body with
    broad authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights and
    liberties. The Ombudsman registers each reported case and files
    grievances, where appropriate, with the relevant government office. He
    has no legislative authority and is sworn to act apolitically. The
    Government cooperates with his office.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that ``no one shall be discriminated
    against in political, social, or economic life for any reason
    whatsoever.'' The Government attempts to ensure that these provisions
    are observed; however, violence and societal discrimination against
    women and ethnic minorities persist.
        Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Women's
    rights advocates report that unofficial statistics are similar to those
    of previous years, although there are no recent comprehensive surveys.
    Physical abuse is illegal and spousal rape is treated the same as other
    types of rape. In 1996 some 9 percent of women polled by the Public
    Opinion Research Center admitted to being beaten repeatedly by their
    husbands. Women's organizations assert that the number of women
    suffering from domestic abuse is probably much higher. They explain
    that battered women usually refuse to admit abuse even to themselves.
    Violence against women remains hidden, particularly in small towns and
    villages. Government and police statistics do not differentiate between
    male and female victims of violence. Police intervene in cases of
    domestic violence, and husbands can be convicted for beating their
    wives. In 1998 the police, in cooperation with the State Agency for
    Solving Alcoholic Problems, introduced the so-called ``blue card,'' a
    record-keeping system designed to better document incidents of spousal
    abuse. Sentences for abuse of family members range from 3 months to 5
    years, or from 2 to 10 years if the victim attempts suicide as a result
    of the abuse. However, statistics suggest that a large majority of
    convictions result in suspended sentences. According to a spokesman for
    the police, there were 23,147 cases of family abuse reported during the
    year, with 161 of those being of particularly severe abuse. According
    to NGO's, the courts often treat domestic violence as a minor crime,
    pronounce lenient verdicts, or dismiss cases.
        According to the Women's Rights Center Report published during the
    year, there has been significant progress in raising public awareness
    of the problem of violence against women. The topic received increasing
    coverage in the media during the year, most notably through a highly
    visible media campaign. In addition an increasing number of NGO's are
    addressing the problem. Fifteen centers have been established to assist
    victims, to provide preventive treatment as well as resocialization
    counseling to perpetrators, and to train personnel working with victims
    of domestic violence. As of July 6, an Office of Victims' Rights
    Spokesman at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has
    been established. The main task of the office is to ensure that victims
    of violence are treated with respect by law enforcement and the
    judicial system. The office provides legal and psychological assistance
    for victims and their families.
        The law has no provision for restraining orders to protect battered
    women against further abuse. For example, in divorce cases, courts
    frequently grant a divorce but do not issue a property settlement,
    sending the woman back to live with the abusive husband. This problem
    is exacerbated by a lack of alternative housing in the country. Women's
    advocacy groups also have complained about the small number of state-
    supported shelters for battered women.
        According to police statistics, the frequency of rape is
    increasing. During the year, there were 2,399 cases reported, compared
    with 2,029 in 1999. NGO's report that women often are unwilling to
    report the crime and estimate that the actual number of rapes is 10
    times higher than reported statistics suggest.
        Trafficking in women is a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        While laws specifically addressing sexual harassment do not exist,
    social awareness is increasing, as are mechanisms with the potential to
    deal with the problem. For example, the Criminal Code states that
    whoever takes advantage of a position of power in a relationship to
    gain sexual gratification may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison.
    According to a Supreme Court advisory opinion, such a relationship can
    occur between employers and employees, between supervisors and
    subordinates, or between teachers and students. However, this provision
    can be invoked only when alleged sexual harassment occurs between a
    supervisor and an individual in a subordinate position. Abuse of power
    cannot be claimed when harassment occurs between persons of equal rank.
    In August a prosecutor charged a former director of a hospital
    emergency ward of sexually harassing six nurses; the case was still
    pending at year's end. Public discussion of the problem of sexual
    harassment is relatively new, but women increasingly are talking about
    the problem and speaking out against it.
        The Constitution provides for equal rights regardless of gender and
    grants women equal rights with men in all areas of family, political,
    social, and economic life, including equal compensation for work of
    similar value. However, in practice women frequently are paid less for
    equivalent work, mainly hold lower level positions, are discharged more
    quickly, and are less likely to be promoted than men. According to the
    1999 government statistical bulletin, men have a higher employment rate
    (54 percent) than women (45.9 percent), and women have a higher
    unemployment rate (13.5 percent) than men (11.7 percent). Despite a
    generally higher level of education, women earn on average 30 percent
    less than men. In August 1999, the U.N. Human Rights Commission
    expressed its concern about the situation and agreed that women are
    discriminated against in the labor market.
        Women are employed in a wide variety of professions and
    occupations, and a number of women occupy high positions in government
    and in the private sector. Although clauses in social insurance law
    limit child sick care benefits to women, since June 1999, both men and
    women have the right to claim child sick care. The pension law passed
    in late 1998 did not change the mandatory earlier retirement for women
    at age 60 (65 for men). As a result women get about 60 percent of the
    average pension that men receive. In December the Constitutional
    Tribunal ruled that the law setting retirement age at 60 for women and
    65 for men is discriminatory, as it reduces women's chances of
    promotion and better pensions. Based on this verdict women can appeal
    to the labor court if employers insist that they retire at 60. The law
    does not address equality in hiring practices (there are no legal
    penalties for discriminatory behavior in this area), and advertisements
    for jobs frequently indicate a gender preference. Although women have
    access to a number of previously forbidden careers since the Labor Code
    was modified in 1996, they still are prevented from working underground
    or in jobs that require heavy lifting. In March 1999, the Parliament
    failed to approve the proposed law on equal status that would have
    remedied some of these inequalities. Apart from the Constitution, there
    is no other legal provision for equal rights for women.
        The Ombudsman for Human Rights monitors the rights of women within
    the broader context of human rights. Observers note that the broad
    scope of the office's mandate dilutes its ability to function as an
    effective advocate of women's issues. In 1997 the government
    Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs within the Cabinet replaced the
    government Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family, a change that many
    women's rights groups perceived as an example of discrimination. There
    are several women's rights NGO's. Among the most notable are the Polish
    Foundation for Women and Family Planning and the Women's Rights Center.
    These groups are active advocates of gender equality and advance their
    goals through research, monitoring, and publishing. There are several
    church-sponsored women's advocacy organizations, but their cooperation
    with other women's NGO's is limited.
        Women have the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their
    foreign-born spouses.
        Children.--The Constitution extends some state protection to the
    family and children and the Sejm appointed an ombudsman for children's
    rights in June, although he resigned in August. A replacement was being
    sought at year's end. The Government sponsors some health programs
    targeted specifically at children, including a vaccination program and
    periodic checkups conducted in the schools. In reality, budget
    shortfalls prevent complete implementation of these programs. There are
    no procedures in schools to protect children from abuse by teachers; in
    fact, the teachers' work code provides legal immunity from prosecution
    for the use of corporal punishment in classrooms.
        Violence against children is illegal. A provision of the Criminal
    Code threatens those who physically or psychologically abuse a juvenile
    with a prison sentence of 3 months to 5 years. If the victim attempts
    suicide the sentence is increased, as it is if the perpetrator is found
    to have acted with extreme cruelty. Abuse rarely is reported, and
    convictions for child abuse are even more rare. There is no societal
    pattern of abuse of children; however, trafficking in children is a
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Young men and women are treated unequally in terms of the age of
    majority. Men and women reach majority at the age of 18 under the Civil
    Code. However, a young woman can reach majority at the age of 16 if she
    has entered into marriage with the consent of her parents and the
    guardianship court. In addition men are not permitted to marry without
    parental consent until the age of 21, whereas women may do so at the
    age of 18 (see Section 1.f.). Lawmakers' rationale for this difference
    in treatment is the assumption that it is better that men entering
    compulsory military service not be encumbered with families.
        People with Disabilities.--There were approximately 5.5 million
    disabled persons in the country by year's end, and the number is
    expected to reach 6 million by the year 2010. During the year, the
    Central Bureau of Statistics (GUS) reported that 17 percent of disabled
    persons able to work are unemployed. Advocacy groups claim that the
    percentage is much higher. GUS data from 1999 indicate that 48.7
    percent of the disabled have no more than an elementary school
    education, compared with 33.7 percent of those without disabilities,
    and that only 4.2 percent have a university education, compared with
    8.2 percent of the nondisabled.
        The Constitution provides for aid to disabled persons ``to ensure
    their subsistence, professional training, and social communication,''
    and a number of laws protect the rights of the disabled. However,
    implementation falls short of rights set forth in the legislation.
    Public buildings and transportation generally are not accessible to the
    disabled. Current law provides only that buildings ``should be
    accessible.''
        The law creates a state fund for the rehabilitation of the disabled
    that derives its assets from a tax on employers of over 50 persons,
    unless 6 percent of the employer's work force are disabled persons.
    While the fund has adequate resources, its management has encountered
    difficulties, including frequent changes in leadership. According to
    press reports, the fund has 4,000 grant applications pending. During
    the year, the fund had $0.4 billion (1.8 billion PLN) at its disposal.
    Thirty percent of this sum was spent for social rehabilitation and the
    rest for professional rehabilitation. The fund has branches in all 16
    provinces. According to the August 1997 revision of the law on
    professional and social rehabilitation, 5 to 10 percent of the fund can
    be used to assist disabled children.
        A 1996 law allows individuals from certain disability groups to
    take up gainful employment without the risk of losing their disability
    benefits. Previously, disabled individuals from those groups lost their
    benefits once they began to work.
        Religious Minorities.--Current law places Protestant, Catholic,
    Orthodox, and Jewish communities on the same legal footing, and the
    Government attempts to address problems that minority religious groups
    face. Among the most important of these problems is that of property
    restitution. The laws governing restitution of communal property allow
    for the return of churches and synagogues, cemeteries, and community
    headquarters, as well as buildings that were used for other religious,
    educational, or charitable activities. The laws included time limits
    for filing claims; in several cases the deadlines have expired, and no
    additional claims may be filed. Restitution commissions (composed of
    representatives of the Government and of the affected religious
    community) are continuing to adjudicate previously filed claims. The
    Government established four separate commissions to process the claims
    of the Catholic, Lutheran, and Orthodox Churches, and the Jewish
    community. A fifth commission to handle the claims of other religious
    groups became active on September 1.
        The Concordat, a treaty regulating relations between the Government
    and the Vatican, took effect in April 1998.
        The time limit for applications by the Catholic Church expired in
    December 1991. At the end of December, 2,512 of 3,045 claims filed by
    the Catholic church had been concluded, with 1,184 claims settled by
    agreement between the church and the party in possession of the
    property (usually the national or a local government); 859 properties
    were returned through decisions of the commission on property
    restitution, which rules on disputed claims; 456 claims were rejected;
    and 13 cases were expected to go to court. The local Jewish community's
    deadline for filing claims under the 1997 law expires in 2002. By
    year's end, 532 had been filed. Of those 532 claims, by year's end the
    commission on property restitution considered and closed 145 cases; 78
    of the 145 cases were closed by an agreement between the parties. As of
    early in the year, Lutheran claims for 1,200 properties had resulted in
    392 cases being closed with the return of the properties in question
    (the deadline for filing such claims was August 1993). Seventy-four
    claims were filed by the Orthodox Church, one property has been
    transferred, and the commission is considering another 20 claims.
        Laws on religious communal property do not address the private
    property of any group, and laws on communal property restitution do not
    address the issue of communal properties to which third parties now
    have title, leaving several controversial and complicated cases
    unresolved. In a number of cases over the years, buildings and
    residences were built on land that included Jewish cemeteries that were
    destroyed during or after World War II. For example, a school for
    disabled children now stands on the site of a completely destroyed
    Jewish cemetery in Kalisz. The existence of the school complicated the
    issue of returning the cemetery to the Jewish community. Efforts
    continued during the year to reach a resolution acceptable to all
    concerned.
        Units set up to monitor new religious movements that are being
    trained to deal with criminal activities by sects have been criticized
    by Adventist church leaders, who allege that the ``anti-sect'' training
    material gives a distorted picture of minority religions that could
    lead to discrimination against them.
        Relations between the various religious communities are generally
    amicable, although anti-Semitic feelings persist among certain sectors
    of the population, occasionally manifesting themselves in acts of
    vandalism and physical or verbal abuse. It is not always clear that
    vandalism of graves is anti-Semitic in nature. Surveys in recent years
    show a continuing decline in anti-Semitic sentiment and avowedly anti-
    Semitic candidates fare very poorly in elections.
        Sporadic and isolated incidents of harassment and violence against
    Jews continue to occur in the country, often generated by skinheads and
    other marginal societal groups. Occasional cases of cemetery
    desecration, including both Jewish and Catholic shrines, also occurred
    during the year. Government authorities consistently criticized such
    actions and made efforts to prevent similar acts from occurring in the
    future, for example, by increasing police patrols around Jewish sites.
    No arrests or prosecutions took place after any of these events.
        In February near Katowice, some 60 graves were desecrated in what
    apparently was an attempt to steal and sell the stones from the local
    Catholic cemetery; no one was charged in the case. Later in the month,
    two other Catholic cemeteries were desecrated with Satanist graffiti,
    one near Zamosc and one near Wroclaw. Perpetrators in the case were not
    found and the investigation was discontinued.
        In March hooligans vandalized a monument to martyred priest Jerzy
    Popielusko; no one was arrested in the case. Also in March, the
    citizens of Lodz took action of their own accord to clean up anti-
    Semitic (and other) graffiti in the town. The same evening as the
    clean-up, vandals spray-painted anti-Semitic and anti-Roma graffiti on
    the home of Marek Edelman, the last surviving commander of the 1943
    Warsaw ghetto uprising. The attack was criticized strongly by both the
    President and the Prime Minister. The case was investigated, but no
    perpetrators were identified and the investigation was discontinued.
        In April anti-Semitic and anti-Roma graffiti were painted on the
    Wall of the Jewish cemetery at Oswiecim (Auschwitz). The perpetrators
    were not caught. The town paid to have the graffiti removed. Also in
    April, on 2 successive nights, vandals in Krakow painted swastikas and
    anti-Semitic graffiti on the walls of a local museum, whose site once
    had housed a pharmacy operated by the only non-Jewish Pole to live in
    the Krakow ghetto. The pharmacy's owner had received the Israeli
    ``righteous among nations'' award for the help he rendered to many Jews
    during the war. Although the local public housing authorities
    responsible for maintenance of the property painted over the graffiti
    the following afternoon, the next evening the vandals wrote anti-
    Semitic slogans over the fresh paint. The second set of graffiti was
    painted over the next morning. Local police vowed to step up patrols in
    the area but no arrests were made by year's end.
        Also in April, Satanist graffiti defaced some 20 gravestones in a
    Catholic cemetery in a village near Poznan. The vandals were never
    identified. In August a group of eight to nine teenagers armed with
    clubs attacked a Buddhist center in Krakow. The teenagers assaulted
    three persons inside the center, one of whom required hospitalization,
    and broke windows and smashed furniture. Center representatives said
    the attack was the most serious in a series of incidents--including
    assaults on Buddhists visiting the center, breaking windows, and
    threatening graffiti--that began earlier in the year. Although the
    center has been open since 1991, this is the first year that it became
    the target of such attacks. The Krakow prosecutor initiated an
    investigation into the case and two persons have been arrested in
    relation to the case. The investigation is ongoing and legal
    proceedings against the arrestees continued at year's end.
        The ``Pope's Cross,'' located on the grounds of a former Carmelite
    convent in Oswiecim adjacent to the Auschwitz concentration camp
    museum, remained in place at year's end.
        In April Opole University fired professor Dariusz Ratajczak for
    publishing a book denying the Holocaust. The firing followed the
    unsuccessful prosecution of Ratajczak in December 1999 for violating
    the law on the preservation of national remembrance, a provision of
    which criminalizes public denials of Nazi and communist-era crimes. The
    University announced that Ratajczak had violated ethical standards and
    would be barred from teaching at other universities for 3 years.
        In January 1999, vandals damaged or destroyed 57 gravestones in the
    Jewish cemetery in Krakow. In May 1999, the cemetery was vandalized
    again when unidentified perpetrators overturned 30 gravestones and set
    fire to the main door of the pre-burial house. Perpetrators in these
    events were not found and the investigation into the cases was
    discontinued. The local Jewish community now pays for two guards and
    two guard dogs at the cemetery, where such incidents have ceased.
        In July 1999, unknown vandals sprayed swastikas and anti-Semitic
    graffiti on the Jewish community headquarters in Bielsko-Biala.
    According to the mayor of Bielsko-Biala, city police officers were
    ordered to guard the building after the attack and an investigation
    opened in 1999 into the case was discontinued in 2000. There were no
    further incidents reported during the year.
        In May during the 12th March of the Living from Auschwitz to
    Birkenau to honor victims of the Holocaust, several hundred Poles
    joined the Presidents of Israel and Poland as well as some 6,000
    marchers from Israel and other countries. This was the largest
    participation of Polish citizens in the event to date. Government
    officials participating in the march included M.P.s, the province's
    governor, and Oswiecim's mayor and city council chairman.
    Schoolchildren, Boy Scouts, the Polish-Israeli Friendship Society, and
    the Jewish Students Association of Poland also participated in the
    march.
        Investigations continued into the May 1998 desecration of graves in
    the Warsaw Jewish cemetery and the July 1998 vandalism of a plaque
    commemorating Jewish Holocaust victims in Rzeszow. No charges have been
    filed to date, and the Rzeszow case was still under investigation at
    year's end.
        In September dignitaries from Poland, Israel, the United States,
    and other countries (including Prince Hassan of Jordan) gathered in
    Oswiecim (Auschwitz) to commemorate the opening of the refurbished
    Chevra Lomdei Mishnayot synagogue and the Auschwitz Jewish Center. The
    synagogue, the sole synagogue in Oswiecim to survive World War II, and
    an adjacent Jewish cultural and educational center, provide visitors a
    place to pray and to learn about the active pre-war Jewish community
    that once existed in Oswiecim. The synagogue was the first communal
    property in the country to be returned to the Jewish community after
    the fall of communism under a 1997 law allowing restitution of Jewish
    communal property.
        On November 11, some 400 persons participated in a demonstration in
    Katowice officially organized by the No To Europe Association; some of
    the participants chanted anti-Semitic slogans and burned the EU and
    Israeli flags. The association's head told prosecutors investigating
    the case that only some 30 percent of the rally's participants were
    actual members of his organization.
        There is some public concern about the growth of groups perceived
    to be ``sects'' and the influence of non-mainstream religious groups,
    especially in the wake of press reports of the deaths of a few young
    persons in circumstances suggesting cult activity.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law provides for the
    educational rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to be
    taught in their own language. There were 5 Lithuanian-language
    textbooks in use during the year and the number will probably increase
    to 8 or 9 in 2001. The Ministry of Education fully finances their
    publication and uses Lithuanian minority representation on development
    of the texts. The issue of Lithuanian minority rights, including
    language instruction, is routinely addressed during governmental talks
    at the highest levels.
        The Romani community, numbering around 30,000, faces
    disproportionately high unemployment and was hit harder by economic
    changes and restructuring than were ethnic Poles, according to its
    leaders. The national Government does not discriminate overtly against
    Roma, though discrimination against Roma is commonplace in society at
    large and some local officials have been known to discriminate by not
    providing services in a timely manner or at all. Romani leaders
    complain of widespread discrimination in employment, housing, banking,
    the justice system, the media, and education. There have been
    occasional incidents of skinheads clashing with Roma and racially
    motivated violence directed at Roma. The central Government is
    cooperating with local governments to develop and finance programs to
    assist the poorest Roma. Some local governments are becoming more
    active in dealing with the problems of local Romani communities. In the
    southern town of Nowy Sacz, where some of the country's poorest Roma
    reside, the local government launched a new initiative to improve the
    lives of the city's Roma. The initiative calls for hiring a special
    liaison to the Romani community, improving housing and access to
    utilities (sewers and running water), and expanding educational
    opportunities for Roma. The Government has also mounted an advertising
    campaign featuring a famous Polish actor that emphasizes tolerance and
    friendly attitudes towards foreigners and refugees resident in the
    country. A November poll showed no significant change in Polish
    attitudes toward other nationalities. The highest negative attitude is
    towards Roma and Romanians (64 percent and 63 percent); Russians,
    Ukrainians and Belarussians (57 percent, 58 percent, 50 percent); and
    Jews (49 percent).
        The small Ukrainian and Belarussian minorities occasionally
    experience petty harassment and discrimination. Individuals of African,
    Asian, or Arab descent have experienced verbal or other types of abuse,
    including physical abuse. In February an African-American woman was
    kicked at the Czestochowa train station, in what she felt was a
    racially-motivated attack. In April a group of African-American
    military personnel visiting Wroclaw in connection with a NATO exercise
    were singled out for harassment by a group of skinheads. Part of the
    group was involved in a shoving match outside of a local restaurant,
    which ended when a larger group of military personnel arrived and the
    skinheads dispersed. In a second related incident, three of the
    servicemen were cornered by a group of skinheads carrying bottles who
    identified themselves as ``white racists.'' In June two African-
    Americans were verbally harassed by a group of skinheads in Gdansk.
    They did not respond to the taunts and there was no further incident.
        The German minority in Opole province makes up one-third of the 1
    million inhabitants of this area of Poland that was part of Germany
    prior to World War II. Some members of the community complain that not
    enough German is used in the province's schools and that the minority
    rights bill will not successfully pass Parliament. However, two members
    of the German minority party are able to voice such concerns as Members
    of Parliament (see Section 3).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers,
    including civilian employees of the Armed Forces, police, and frontier
    guards have the right to establish and join trade unions of their own
    choosing. The law sets minimum size requirements for establishing a
    trade union: 10 persons may form a local union, and 30 may establish a
    national union. Unions, including interbranch national unions and
    national interbranch federations, must be registered with the courts. A
    court decision refusing registration may be appealed to an appeals
    court. During the year, the number of officially registered national-
    level unions remained at about 360, about the same as in 1999. No
    precise data exist on work force unionization, although the trend
    continues to be downward. Recent studies suggest that only 9 to 10
    percent of workers belong to a union. As a rule, newly established
    small- and medium-sized firms were nonunion, while union activity in
    most cases carried over into privatized (former state-owned)
    enterprises. The Independent Selfgoverning Trade Union (NSZZ)
    Solidarity has a verified regular dues-paying membership of about 1
    million. Small spin-offs from mainstream Solidarity include the rival
    factions Solidarity '80, August '80, and the Christian Trade Union
    Solidarity (Popieluszko). There are no reliable estimates of their
    membership.
        The other principal national unions are those affiliated with the
    All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), the formerly Communist-aligned
    confederation established in 1984 as the sole legal alternative to
    then-outlawed NSZZ Solidarity, and its teachers' affiliate, the Polish
    Union of Teachers (ZNP). The OPZZ reports that its membership has
    dropped by more than 50 percent in recent years to about 1.7 million,
    but this figure is unverified, and independent sociological surveys
    suggest that its regular dues-paying membership is considerably less
    than Solidarity's. A recent survey found that Solidarity represents
    some 7.6 percent of all Polish workers, while the OPZZ represents only
    3.6 percent (one estimate put OPZZ membership at roughly 700,000 to
    800,000 workers). According to a 1999 study by the State Labor
    Inspectorate, out of some 27,000 local union organizations, Solidarity
    had 13,500 organizations, the OPZZ had 11,000 organizations, and
    Solidarity '80 had 770 organizations.
        The law on collective bargaining, in force since 1994, does not
    require union membership figures to be verified or based on dues-paying
    members in order for unions to be considered ``representative''
    negotiating partners for management and government. Solidarity
    protested some unions' (largely OPZZ affiliates) participation in
    negotiations with the Government on the grounds that their membership
    figures remain unproved.
        Most trade unions were active in politics at all levels. Trade
    unions are affiliated with political parties and scores of union
    activists were parliamentarians, and several became senior government
    officials. Solidarity plays a key role in political life. With 62
    deputies, 27 senators, dozens of ministers, governors, and other senior
    national and local officials, the union serves as the backbone of the
    ruling AWS coalition. The OPZZ has 42 deputies, about one-quarter of
    the opposition Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) caucus.
        Unions have the right to strike except in ``essential services.''
    However, labor leaders complain that the 1991 Act on Collective Dispute
    Resolution prescribes an overly lengthy process before a strike may be
    called. Employers consider the law too lenient, since it allows only
    one-quarter of the work force to vote to call a strike. As a result, as
    many as 60 to 90 percent of strikes called in recent years have been
    technically ``illegal'' because one or both of the sides did not follow
    each step exactly as required by law. Labor courts act slowly on
    deciding the legality of strikes, while sanctions against unions for
    calling illegal strikes, or against employers for provoking them, are
    minimal. Arbitration is not obligatory and depends on the agreement of
    disputing parties. Unions allege that laws prohibiting retribution
    against strikers are not enforced consistently and that fines imposed
    as punishment are so minimal that they are ineffective sanctions to
    illegal activity. Workers who strike in accordance with the law retain
    their right to social insurance but not to pay. However, if a court
    rules a strike ``illegal,'' workers may lose social benefits, and
    organizers are liable for damages and may face civil charges and fines.
    The social partners (unions, employers, and the Government) continued
    to work out ambiguities in dispute resolution mechanisms in the new
    Labor Code, which went into effect in 1996, and which represented a
    major overhaul of communist-era labor regulations.
        The number of strikes in the first 6 months of the year remained
    relatively low and dropped to 6 from 25, compared with the same time
    period in 1999. There were strikes lasting for a few days in public
    transportation, health, armaments, and metallurgy sectors. Railroad
    (PKP) workers struck for a few hours during the year, demanding overdue
    payments, changes in the privatization process, and protesting layoffs.
        In November hundreds of nurses began hunger strikes and protests
    throughout the country to protest the Government's failure to pay wage
    increases. In December the Sejm passed a bill giving the nurses a
    raise. The nurses found the offer unsatisfactory, and the matter was
    still pending conclusion at year's end.
        Unions have the right to join labor federations and confederations
    and to affiliate with international labor organizations. Independent
    labor leaders reported that these rights were observed in practice.
    Solidarity is a full member of the International Confederation of Free
    Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, and the European Trade
    Union Confederation.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1991 Law on
    Trade Unions created a favorable environment for trade union activity.
    However, labor leaders report that the 1991 law has not prevented
    employers from discriminating against workers who attempt to organize
    or join unions, particularly in the growing private sector. The law
    also has not prevented employer harassment of union members for labor
    activity. The ICFTU alleges that the sanctions provided in the law
    against acts of antiunion discrimination are not sufficiently
    dissuasive.
        The 1991 law provides for parties to take disputes first to labor
    courts, then to the prosecutor general, and, in the last resort, to the
    Supreme Court. In a typical year, Solidarity takes several thousand
    cases to labor courts, several hundred to the Prosecutor General, and
    dozens to the Supreme Court for resolution. In an overwhelming majority
    of these cases, the courts ordered employers to correct practices or
    reinstate dismissed workers or unions to reimburse employers for
    activity found to be illegal. However, penalties are minimal and are
    not an effective deterrent.
        Enterprise-level collective bargaining over wages and working
    conditions increasingly characterized the labor relations system. Labor
    and management are adapting their relationship to the demands of a
    market economy, but experience in modern labor relations is still in
    its early stages. Many enterprises rolled over agreements concluded in
    earlier years.
        Since its formation in early 1994, the Tripartite Commission
    (unions, employers, and the Government), currently chaired by Labor
    Minister Longin Komolowski, has become the main forum that determines
    national-level wage and benefit increases in such politically sensitive
    areas as the so-called budget sector (health, education, and public
    employees), while rendering opinions on pension indexation, energy
    pricing, and other important aspects of social policy. The Commission
    serves as an important forum in which the social partners air
    differences, discuss grievances, and often negotiate agreements before
    problems erupt into social conflict.
        Many disputes arose because of the weakness of the employer side of
    the union/employer/Government triangle. Key state sector employers
    (largely in heavy industry and the budget sector) still were unable to
    negotiate independently with organized labor without the extensive
    involvement of central government ministries to which they are
    subordinate, although the Government repeatedly stated that its
    intention was not to be drawn into labor disputes. This weakness
    complicated and politicized the Government's labor relations system.
    Claiming that the Government was refusing seriously to discuss labor
    issues with it, the OPZZ suspended participation in the commission in
    April 1999 and stayed away all throughout this year.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor
    does not exist, except for prisoners convicted of criminal offenses,
    and otherwise is prohibited by law, including that performed by
    children. There were no reports of forced or compulsory labor by
    children.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law contains strict legal prescriptions about the
    conditions in which children may work. Education is universal and
    mandatory until age 18, and public schools are free of charge. The
    Labor Code forbids the employment of persons under the age of 15. Those
    between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed only if they have
    completed primary school and if the proposed employment constitutes
    vocational training and is not harmful to their health. The age
    requirement rises to 18 years if a particular job might pose a health
    danger.
        Child labor is not a problem, although the State Labor Inspectorate
    reported that increasing numbers of minors now work, and that many
    employers violate labor rules in employing them (by underpaying
    workers, paying them late, etc.). Inspectors found violations on stud
    farms, in restaurants, and, in some instances, in small private sector
    businesses and factories. Sanctions for illegal employment of children
    range from warning letters through orders to cease the work of under-
    age employees. These orders can be enforced through the police to
    demand the transfer of under-age employees or shut down all or part of
    the offending workplace, or, working through the Ministry of Labor, to
    impose fines ranging from $5 to $125 (20 to 500 PLN) per offense. Cases
    may also be referred to an administrative tribunal, which can levy
    fines of up to $1,250 (5,000 PLN). Jail sentence may be imposed if the
    infractions are serious enough; such cases generally involve serious
    injury or death. In 1999, the last year for which figures are
    available, the State Labor Inspectorate (PIP) conducted 1,494
    investigations involving some 12,000 possible underage employees. Fines
    were levied in 417 of these cases, amounting to some $35,000 (140,000
    PLN). The number of cases sent to the administrative tribunal were 358.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, the
    unions, and employers' organizations negotiate a revised national
    minimum wage every 3 months. The minimum monthly wage in state-owned
    enterprises is approximately $162.50 (700 PLN), which constitutes no
    real increase over 1999 figures. This amount was insufficient to
    provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living in view of
    rising prices. A large percentage of construction workers and seasonal
    agricultural laborers from the former Soviet Union earn less than the
    minimum wage. The large size of the informal economy and the small
    number of state labor inspectors make enforcement of the minimum wage
    very difficult. As long as unemployment remains high, workers often
    agree to inferior working conditions and lower pay in order to find or
    keep their jobs.
        The standard legal workweek is 42 hours, which allows 6- or 7-hour
    days, including at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires
    overtime payment for hours in excess of the standard workweek.
        The Labor Code defines minimum conditions for the protection of
    workers' health and safety. Provisions are strict and extensive, and
    trade unions have the right to stop production or extract a worker from
    dangerous working conditions without jeopardizing the worker's
    continued employment. However, enforcement is a major problem because
    the Labor Inspectorate is unable to monitor the state sector
    sufficiently, much less the private sector, where a growing percentage
    of accidents take place. In addition there is a lack of clarity
    concerning which government or legislative body has responsibility for
    enforcing the law. The Labor Inspectorate can shut down workplaces in
    which it finds unsafe conditions. In 1999, the last year for which
    figures are available, there were 16 shutdowns of either a part or of a
    whole workplace.
        In the 41,011 work-related accidents reported during the first 6
    months of the year, 277 individuals were killed and 602 seriously
    injured. The Government's Central Statistical Office reported that most
    accidents were in the public sector, while most serious accidents were
    in the private sector, where proportionally more deaths also occurred.
    Solidarity contends that the problem lies not in the law, which
    establishes safe standards, but in enforcement, because employer
    sanctions for illegal behavior are minimal. Standards for exposure to
    chemicals, dust, and noise are exceeded routinely. Workers may remove
    themselves from dangerous working conditions without losing their jobs,
    but there were reports that fears of such loss prompted some to stay on
    the job.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and children is
    illegal and several specific provisions in the Criminal Code address
    this issue; however, it remains a problem. The Criminal Code prohibits
    trafficking in human beings, and pimping, and imposes sentences of up
    to 10 years on those convicted. It also bans recruiting or luring
    persons into prostitution; penalties for this offense are also up to 10
    years. The most severe sentences are reserved for individuals
    trafficking in children and those luring women into prostitution
    abroad. Statutes on trafficking were most recently revised in 1998.
        Due to the illicit nature of the activity, it is difficult to
    estimate the numbers of women who are trafficked. There was an increase
    in numbers of prosecutions from 1998 to 1999. In 1998 the police
    reported 70 cases (18 cases of trafficking and 52 of luring women and
    children into prostitution); in 1999 they reported 184 (8 cases of
    trafficking and 176 cases of luring women and children into
    prostitution). It is not clear whether this increase is due to a growth
    in the number of women trafficked or to greater activity by the Polish
    authorities. According to a recent press report, road prostitution has
    doubled since 1998. However, in 1999 there was a police crackdown on
    highway trafficking and prostitution in response to a letter from the
    Polish Episcopate to the Prime Minister, and the Polish police report
    that the crackdown resulted in an estimated 20 percent decrease in such
    activity. Nonetheless, the international NGO La Strada, which focuses
    on trafficking in women and girls worldwide, and other sources report
    that this did not represent an overall decrease in the problem. Rather
    the activities were moved to secondary roads and agencies. La Strada
    also estimates that 90 percent of cases handled by Polish prosecutors
    are the results of deportations from Germany to Poland that are
    initiated and investigated in Germany. According to La Strada, Polish
    authorities lack the resources to initiate and investigate cases
    originating within Poland.
        It is particularly difficult to estimate the extent to which
    children are victims of trafficking. Trafficking in children is
    reported to be marginal; that which exists appears to be in connection
    with illegal adoption. Police authorities deal with child traffickers
    more severely, in part because laws on statutory rape are easier to
    prosecute. As a result the activity has been driven completely
    underground. Child prostitution is a crime, while prostitution of
    adults is neither banned nor regulated by law, making it more difficult
    for the police to pursue. The authorities do not always recognize
    trafficking in children since minors can be trafficked on false
    documents identifying them as adults. Twenty of the 184 cases initiated
    by prosecutors in 1999 involved victims who were minors.
        Poland is a source, transit, and destination country for trafficked
    women and girls. Polish women are trafficked into the sex trade to
    Germany and other Western European countries through such means as fake
    employment offers, arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures.
    Women and girls are trafficked into Poland primarily from east and
    south central Europe, where they are recruited from areas with low
    socioeconomic conditions, sometimes quite openly. Many believe that
    they are accepting employment as waitresses or maids in the west. While
    they are en route to what they believe to be their destinations, their
    passports and identity papers are taken away from them. Stripped of
    their personal identity, the women and girls are kept under the control
    of the traffickers through fear and intimidation. They are required to
    serve a minimum number of clients each day in order to earn their keep.
    They are threatened with violence, and those who resist are raped or
    beaten. If they try to flee, their legs may be broken. There are also
    reports of victims being killed by their traffickers. Since the border
    guards and police may regard them as criminals who have violated
    passport laws, the women and girls are afraid to turn to officials for
    help. They have no legal status and there are no public resources
    available to assist them. When detained by the police, they may be
    deported to the border, where they are met by traffickers who quickly
    provide them with new travel documents and return them to Poland. One
    official mentioned the case of a Bulgarian woman who had been arrested
    in Poland four times, each time under a different name. Bulgaria is the
    largest single source of foreign women trafficked in Poland. Women from
    Bulgaria tend to be from the Turkish and Roma minorities. There are
    also significant numbers of women from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and
    Latvia. Recently there also have been reports of Roma women from
    Romania who are trafficked on Bulgarian documents. Those women and
    girls with the lowest socioeconomic status are most vulnerable, and
    subjected to the worst conditions. For example, Roma and ethnically
    Turkish Bulgarians tend to be employed on highways. They may spend a
    few months in Poland before they are trafficked further west. In
    contrast, women from other countries of Eastern Europe are also
    trafficked in agencies run as brothels. Educated Polish and Russian
    women are more likely than others to be employed voluntarily by escort
    services.
        In the last few years, trafficking has become increasingly
    organized and has been associated with a rampant growth in document
    fraud. As many as 90 percent of the women and girls trafficked in the
    country have false travel documents, and the trafficking of a single
    woman will involve a whole network of criminals. One criminal will
    recruit the woman; the second will provide false travel documents and
    traffic her across the border. A third criminal will supervise her work
    with clients, functioning as a pimp. La Strada reports that last year a
    large scale ``auction'' of women was held at a convention of
    traffickers meeting at a major hotel outside Warsaw. Polish authorities
    are investigating reports that such auctions occur regularly; one news
    source indicates that such auctions take place regularly. Prices paid
    for women and girls who are trafficked reportedly range from $2,000 to
    $4000 (4,000 to 8,000 DM). They are usually trafficked by nationals
    from the same source country. For example, Bulgarian women are
    trafficked by Bulgarians and Ukrainians by Ukrainians. Foreign
    traffickers systematically pay a percentage of their receipts to Polish
    traffickers operating out of the same region.
                                   __________

                                    PORTUGAL

        The Portuguese Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
    President, a Prime Minister, a Parliament freely elected by secret
    ballot in multiparty elections, and an independent judiciary.
        Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the Ministries
    of Justice and Internal Administration. Security forces are controlled
    by, and responsive to, the Government. They occasionally committed
    human rights abuses.
        Portugal has a market-based economy. The service sector (with
    tourism playing a prominent role) is the leading source of employment,
    while employment in agriculture and industry continues to be static or
    decline. Manufacturing provides about 35 percent of total economic
    output. The principal exports are textiles, machinery, and vehicles.
    The standard of living has increased: per capita gross domestic product
    is approximately $10,000 (2.15 million escudos).
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Credible reports
    continued that security personnel occasionally beat detainees. Prison
    conditions remained poor but improved somewhat. There were lengthy
    delays in holding trials. Violence against women and trafficking in
    women are problems, as are discrimination and violence against Roma,
    minorities, and immigrants. The Government is taking active steps to
    deal with the problem of child labor.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In a widely reported January incident in Porto, Alvaro Rosa
    Cardoso, a member of the Roma community, died from internal abdominal
    bleeding after a violent encounter with police. The officers had been
    called to the scene of a local disturbance. The two officers alleged to
    be responsible were charged, but in August a court found the officers
    not guilty since it could not be determined whether the internal
    bleeding was due to the fight before the arrest or the alleged police
    mistreatment afterwards. Cardosa's family continued to blame the death
    on police mistreatment.
        A similar event happened on the same day in another part of the
    city in which Paulo Silva died of internal bleeding which may have come
    about during an arrest for drug use. This case was reopened in October
    and was pending at year's end.
        An inmate was reported to have died as a result of beatings by
    prison guards in Vale de Judeus in 1997; however, the Ministry of
    Justice later determined that the inmate committed suicide.
        No one was ever charged or disciplined in the case of the death of
    Olivio Almada, whose body was found in 1996. He was last seen in the
    company of three police officers.
        Three PSP officers were convicted on criminal charges related to
    the death in custody in 1996 of Carlos Areujo. The officers appealed
    the verdict, and their case remained in the appeals process at year's
    end. Disciplinary proceedings against the officers were deferred until
    after the criminal case is resolved.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture, inhuman or degrading
    treatment or punishment, and the use of evidence obtained under torture
    in criminal proceedings; however, credible but infrequent reports
    continued that police and prison guards beat and otherwise abused
    detainees, particularly non-Europeans.
        In an attempt to respond to past negative reports on the treatment
    of detainees and to consolidate alleged improvements in the system, new
    legislation entitled ``Regulations on the Material Conditions of
    Detention in Police Establishments'' was adopted in May 1999. The law
    provides detailed guidelines covering all aspects of arrest and
    custody.
        According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Amnesty
    International (AI), a National Republican Guard (GNR) infantry sergeant
    reported in August 1999 that in spite of the new regulations, the
    mistreatment of detainees was ``virtually systematic.'' In November
    1999, the General Inspectorate of Internal Administration (IGAI) opened
    an inquiry into the sergeant's allegations and began disciplinary
    proceedings against him personally, on unrelated charges. However, the
    IGAI stated that these proceedings were not in response to the
    allegations he made.
        AI also brought to light the alleged mistreatment of Jorge Manuel
    da Conceicao Simoes. He was arrested in May 1999 on suspicion of
    possessing drugs and allegedly was beaten when he refused to sign a
    confession. In a September 1999 Madeira incident, also reported by AI,
    Marco Fernandes claimed to have been beaten by police with a pipe and a
    police radio. Judicial and disciplinary proceedings were opened and
    remained pending at year's end.
        A police officer who used electroshock torture in Sintra in 1999
    was fired from the force. A civil case against him was ongoing at
    year's end. Police were disciplined for misconduct during a January
    1999 street festival in Lisbon.
        In late 1997, two police officers were accused of having violated
    sexually a female drug addict in 1994. The supervisors of the officers
    initially delayed the opening of an investigation, but in December 1997
    the divisional commander in Lisbon suspended the officers and ordered
    an investigation. The officers subsequently were fired and jailed,
    according to the Inspector General's office.
        In April AI released a report covering the last 6 months of 1998,
    which noted the mistreatment of prisoners and excessive use of force by
    the police. In September 1997, Marcelino Soares, a 17-year-old inmate
    at the Caxias prison, reportedly was beaten and confined to an
    isolation cell for 3 days by guards for complaining that prison
    authorities had blocked visits by his brother. The guards involved in
    this case were fired, according to the Ministry of Justice.
        Prison conditions remained poor; however, the Directorate General
    of Prison Services (DGSP) has taken steps to improve them. Prison
    crowding remains a major problem, but due to higher levels of funding
    and DGSP-led improvements, the rate of overcrowding went from a 1996
    high of 57.5 percent (14,177 prisoners and 8,999 places) to a low of
    13.4 percent (12,728 prisoners and 11,221 places) as of September 1.
        By year's end, every cell was equipped with proper hygiene
    facilities. Health problems such as hepatitis and drug dependency
    nevertheless continued, and prisoners suffer from a high AIDS infection
    rate. In 1999 the health services director of the Bureau of Prisons
    reported that 7 out of every 10 convicts entering the prison system
    were infected with AIDS, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C. An estimated 20
    percent of the total prison population is infected with AIDS.
    Tuberculosis was also on the rise. Prison health services, although
    still not adequately staffed, have benefited from increased spending on
    health services, the use of local health care providers to help prison
    inmates, and the construction of new health care facilities in many
    prisons.
        Reports persisted about the mistreatment of prisoners by prison
    guards, severe overcrowding, poor medical treatment and the spread of
    contagious diseases, drug addiction, and cold temperatures in winter.
    Prisoners alleged that at Linho the warden and other supervisory staff
    seemed powerless to stop daily beatings of inmates by guards. Prison
    authorities deny these reports and point to the existence of organized
    violence among inmates. According to AI, other prisons where brutality
    by guards was alleged were Pinheiro da Cruz and Angra Heroismo. To help
    combat brutality by guards, the General Directorate of Prison Services
    began using resources from AI; all guards participate in mandatory
    training conducted by AI on such topics as nonviolent control of
    prisoners and conflict resolution.
        An independent ombudsman, chosen by the Parliament, investigates
    complaints of mistreatment by the police and prison authorities. IGAI
    also conducts internal investigations in cases of alleged mistreatment.
    Police officers receive training in human rights and proper
    investigative procedure. However, NGO's have been critical of the slow
    pace of police investigations in general and internal investigations by
    the police in particular.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    Human rights organizations reported no difficulties in gaining access
    to inmates at detention facilities.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the
    Government respects its provisions in practice.
        Under the law, an investigating judge determines whether an
    arrested person should be detained, released on bail, or released
    outright. A person may not be held more than 48 hours without appearing
    before an investigating judge. Investigative detention is limited to a
    maximum of 6 months for each suspected crime. If a formal charge is not
    filed within that period, the detainee must be released. In cases of
    serious crimes, for example, murder or armed robbery, or of more than
    one suspect, investigative detention may last for up to 2 years and may
    be extended by a judge to 3 years in extraordinary circumstances. A
    suspect in investigative detention must be brought to trial within 18
    months of being charged formally. If a suspect is not in detention,
    there is no specified period for going to trial. A detainee has access
    to lawyers; the state assumes the cost if necessary.
        Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
    impartial.
        The court system, laid out in the Constitution, consists of a
    Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of Justice, and judicial courts
    of first and second instance. There is also a Supreme Court of
    Administration, which deals with administrative and tax disputes, and
    which is supported by lower administrative courts. An audit court is in
    the Ministry of Finance.
        All trials are public except those that may offend the dignity of
    the victim, such as in cases of sexual abuse of children. The accused
    is presumed innocent. In trials for serious crimes, a panel of three
    judges presides. For lesser crimes, a single judge presides. At the
    request of the accused, a jury may be used in trials for major crimes;
    in practice, requests for jury trials are extremely rare.
        The judicial system provides citizens with a fair legal process.
    However, frequent critics point to a large backlog of pending trials
    resulting from inefficient functioning of the courts. A new law passed
    during the year aims to reduce the case backlog by increasing the
    number of judges. The bill also has provisions to reduce the time it
    takes a lawyer to become a judge. Another new law provides for
    witnesses to testify in cases heard in distant jurisdictions via
    teleconference. Also the Ministry of Justice announced in November a
    plan to speed the service of subpoenas. Many factors, from the
    underutilization of technology (case folders are still sewn closed by a
    large number of ``needlemen/women''), to the heretofore confusing and
    drawn out method of serving subpoenas, to the reluctance of the justice
    system to change old ways of doing things all contribute to the backlog
    problem. The extremely slow pace of the judicial process was cited as
    contributing to a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on
    Human Rights in a 1999 report from the European Court of Human Rights
    (ECHR).
        In March the ECHR ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay a fine to
    three plaintiffs in three separate civil cases. The first case involved
    two sets of proceedings that lasted nearly 11 years. The second case
    was not resolved after 7 years, and the third case had continued for
    4.5 years. In April the ECHR ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay a
    fine to a corporate plaintiff in a case that had lasted over 17 years
    without a final resolution. Many similar examples of judicial delay and
    backlog are reported in the press.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids such practices, and the
    Government respects these provisions in practice. Violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution (law) provides
    for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects
    these rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary,
    and a functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom
    of speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        In a September freedom of the press case, the ECHR found in favor
    of Vicente Jorge Silva, a former editor of the center-left daily,
    Publico, in his appeal of a decision of the Constitutional Court. In
    1993 he published a scathing editorial highly critical of the policies
    of a local politician running for public office. The politician sued
    for ``abuse of freedom of the press,'' but Silva won the case in
    criminal court. Upon appeal two higher courts found in favor of the
    politician. The ECHR determined that the Constitutional Court had
    failed to support the freedom of the press in Silva's case.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The Roman
    Catholic Church is the dominant religion; it receives tax exemptions
    and other privileges unavailable to other denominations. Although the
    overwhelming majority of citizens are Roman Catholic, other religions
    practice freely.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
    these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The law provides for granting refugee or asylee status in
    accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. Persons who qualify as refugees
    are entitled to residence permits. There were no reports of the forced
    expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status. However, the
    Government almost never rules that an asylum seeker has a ``valid''
    claim. Immigration authorities attempt to distinguish among political,
    humanitarian, and temporary refugees, but the Government continues to
    maintain that the majority are economic refugees using Portugal as a
    gateway to the other European Union ``Schengen'' countries.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections on the basis of universal
    suffrage. Portugal is a multiparty parliamentary democracy.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. However,
    they and minorities have full political rights and participate actively
    in political life. Women head the Ministries of Health and of
    Environment. There are 49 female members of the 230-member Parliament.
    Race is rarely an issue in politics; persons of minority origin have
    achieved political prominence. Some persons advocate laws mandating
    female quotas on political party lists, but such legislation has not
    been passed. Some political parties nevertheless adopted their own
    internal quotas.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic (and international) human rights groups
    operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
    their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
    generally cooperative, although most groups complain of slow
    investigations or remedial actions.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution forbids discrimination based on ancestry, sex,
    language, origin, religion, political or ideological convictions,
    education, economic situation, or social condition, and the Government
    enforces these prohibitions.
        Women.--Domestic and other violence against women is reportedly a
    common but hidden problem for which few seek legal recourse. According
    to the first national report on family violence, presented in March
    1999, police agencies recorded 2,889 cases of family violence during
    the period October 1998 through January 1999. Of the 633 family
    violence crimes reported in January, more than two-thirds involved acts
    of physical violence and occurred between spouses or partners. Of the
    victims, 81 percent were women, and 87 percent of the suspects were
    men.
        According to the 1999 statistics of a major NGO providing services
    to victims of crime, 46 percent of the 4,653 cases it handled involved
    domestic violence, and in the vast majority of those cases the target
    of the violence was women. The same NGO agreed with the Governmental
    Commission for Equality and Women's Rights that the frequency of
    violent incidents is probably the same, but increased publicity and
    resources have increased the number of victims who seek help. The law
    provides for criminal penalties in cases of violence by a spouse, and
    the judicial system shows no apparent reluctance to prosecute suspects
    accused of abusing women. Changes to the Penal Code in May granted any
    interested party the ability to file charges in domestic violence
    cases. However, traditional societal attitudes still discourage many
    battered women from recourse to the judicial system.
        The toll-free hot line for victims of domestic violence, in service
    since November 1998, now operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In its
    first 6 months of operation, approximately 64 percent of the calls
    related to acts of physical violence, while 30 percent related to
    psychological concerns. The majority of callers (66 percent) were
    themselves victims. Women between the ages of 25 and 35 accounted for
    about 29 percent of the calls, while about 31 percent were women
    between the ages of 35 and 45. Although calls came from all over the
    country, the vast majority came from the large urban centers of Lisbon
    and Porto. These percentages have remained essentially unchanged.
        Parliament has continued to address the problem of domestic
    violence with the passage of several laws in recent years. One provided
    for the expansion of the system of shelters for victims. Educational
    campaigns for the public and specialized training for the police also
    were strengthened. The creation of domestic violence units in the
    police, and of a new domestic violence category in the Attorney
    General's report on crime, were mandated by one of the new laws in May.
    Perpetrators of domestic violence now can be barred from contact with
    their victims, and in extreme cases, the police can order the immediate
    expulsion of a perpetrator from the victim's dwelling. The law also
    calls for the development of new programs to teach anger management to
    the perpetrators of domestic violence and to assist victims with the
    professional development necessary to live independent lives.
        In August 1999, Parliament passed legislation to establish a
    national support network and a system of compensation for victims of
    domestic violence. In May 2000 Parliament changed the legal definition
    of domestic violence, the net result of which was expected to give
    police and the courts more leverage to prosecute such cases and remove
    some of the burden of bringing charges from the victim.
        Prostitution is legal, but procurement is not. Trafficking in women
    for the purposes of forced prostitution continues to be problem (see
    Section 5 and 6.f.). Prostitution is linked closely to other types of
    organized crime, especially international narcotics trafficking.
    Specific legislation prohibits forced prostitution and trafficking in
    human beings. The Nest, an NGO, operates economic and social recovery
    programs for prostitutes.
        The Civil Code provides for full legal equality for women. Sexual
    harassment, a problem that continues to gain public attention, is
    covered in the Penal Code as a sex crime, but only if perpetrated by a
    superior and in the workplace. The penalties are 2 to 3 years'
    imprisonment. As in the case of domestic violence, socially ingrained
    attitudes discourage many women from taking advantage of the legal
    protection available.
        The Commission on Equality in the Workplace and in Employment, made
    up of representatives of the Government, employers' organizations, and
    labor unions, is empowered to examine, but not adjudicate, complaints
    of sexual harassment, but it receives few. It does review numerous
    complaints of discrimination by employers against pregnant workers and
    new mothers, who are protected by law. Maternity leave was increased in
    2000 from 90 days to 120 days with full pay and benefits. Also after
    return to work a new mother (or father) may take time off every day to
    nurse or feed an infant. If pregnant or nursing women or new fathers
    are fired, they may take their complaint to the government Equality
    Commission (CITE), which was established to deal with equal opportunity
    complaints. If CITE finds that the employee's legal rights were
    violated, the employer must reinstate the worker and pay double back
    pay and benefits for the time at work missed due to the wrongful
    firing.
        Women increasingly are represented in university student bodies,
    business, science, and the professions. However, a gap remains between
    male and female salaries: according to the most recent figures
    available (1997), women earned an average of 77 percent of men's
    earnings. Women make up the majority of university graduates.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. The Government provides 9 years of
    compulsory, free, and universal education for children through the age
    of 15. The Government provides free or low cost health care for all
    children up to the age of 15. A special office in the Directorate
    General of Health oversees implementation of the Government's programs
    for children. A 9-year period of education is compulsory. A 1996 study
    by the European Commission indicated that only 50 percent of children
    receive preschool education. To counter this problem, the Ministry of
    Education instituted a pilot project on early childhood education in
    the Algarve region in 1997. This program proved successful. More
    teachers were hired, and more new schools were constructed in remote
    places. Preschool education became free for 5 year olds in 1998 and was
    scheduled to become free for 3 and 4 year olds by 2001. Each year the
    number of students enrolled in preschool has increased. In the 1998-99
    school year, 207,109 attended; in 1999-2000, the number increased to
    218,225; and in the 2000-2001 school year, 230,000 students attended
    preschool.
        The National Children's Rights Commission is charged with
    implementing the principles of the International Convention on the
    Rights of the Child. The Commission operates under the aegis of the
    High Commissioner for the Promotion of Equality and of the Family and
    includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Health,
    Education, and Solidarity, as well as from leading NGO's. The quasi-
    independent Institute for the Support of Children organized a network
    of 48 NGO's dedicated to helping at-risk youth. The University of
    Minho's Institute for the Study of Children is a research center
    dedicated solely to the study of children's issues. The Institute for
    the Support of Children organizes public awareness programs, serves as
    an information clearinghouse for NGO's working on childrens' issues and
    promotes legislation protecting children's rights. It provides
    telephone and in-person counseling, intervention, and prevention
    services in cases of child abuse and neglect. It also operates services
    assisting the at-risk youth known as ``criancas da rua''--``street
    kids.''
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child
    labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
        Following the uncovering of a pedophile ring in Madeira in 1997,
    the Parliament passed a law in 1998 that enlarged the definition of
    pedophilia to include the consumers of child pornography as well as the
    producers.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of other
    state services. The law mandates access to public buildings for persons
    with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
    practice. However, no such legislation covers private businesses or
    other facilities.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal minority groups
    are immigrants, legal and illegal, from Portugal's former African
    colonies. There is also a resident Romani population of approximately
    40,000 persons, who are the subject of some discrimination and
    violence.
        In 1999 the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
    Discrimination conducted a periodic review of the Government's
    obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of
    All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In its report, the Committee
    expressed concern about racial discrimination and xenophobia in the
    country, including violence against blacks, Roma, immigrants, and
    foreigners--frequently perpetrated by skinheads. While acknowledging
    efforts by the Government to combat such acts, the Committee urged that
    the law be extended to prohibit all racist groups. According to an NGO
    that tracks racist and xenophobic issues, activities by racist groups
    are increasing, and the police response to such actions tends to be
    inconsistent.
        The law permits victims and antiracism associations to participate
    in race-related criminal trials by lodging criminal complaints,
    retaining their own lawyers, and calling witnesses. In 1999 the
    Parliament approved a new set of antiracism laws, reiterating
    antidiscrimination sections of the Constitution and the Penal Code. The
    new laws prohibit and penalize racial discrimination in housing,
    business, and health services. They also provided for the creation of a
    new Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination to work
    alongside the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities.
    However, by year's end the new commission had yet to be established.
        The growing number undocumented persons who enter the country
    illegally in order to work is a problem. Recent economic growth has
    created a need for many workers, especially in the construction and
    service sectors. These undocumented workers, usually ethnic minorities,
    are allowed to remain and work but have no access to health care,
    education, or other social services. Parliament rejected legislation
    during the year that was intended to bring them into the social
    services system.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers in both the private and
    public sectors have the right to associate freely and to establish
    committees in the workplace to defend their interests. The Constitution
    provides for the right to establish unions by profession or industry.
    Trade union associations have the right to participate in the
    preparation of labor legislation. Strikes are permitted by the
    Constitution for any reason, including political causes; they are
    common and generally are resolved through direct negotiations.
    Policemen and members of the armed forces may not strike. The
    authorities respect all provisions of the law on labor's rights.
        Two principal labor federations exist, the Workers' General Union
    (UGT) and the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP). No
    restrictions limit the formation of additional labor federations.
    Unions function without hindrance by the Government and are associated
    closely with political parties.
        There are no restrictions on the ability of unions to join
    federations or of federations to affiliate with international labor
    bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions are free
    to organize without interference by the Government or by employers.
    Collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and is
    practiced extensively in the public and private sectors.
        Collective bargaining disputes usually are resolved through
    negotiation. However, should a long strike occur in an essential sector
    such as health, energy, or transportation, the Government may order the
    strikers back to work for a specific period. The Government rarely has
    invoked this power, in part because most strikes last only 1 to 3 days.
    The law requires a ``minimum level of service'' to be provided during
    strikes in essential sectors, but this requirement is applied
    infrequently. When it is applied, minimum levels of service are
    established by agreement between the Government and the striking
    unions, although unions have complained, including to the International
    Labor Organization (ILO), that the minimum levels were set too high.
    When collective bargaining fails, the Government may appoint a mediator
    at the request of either management or labor.
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the authorities
    enforce this prohibition in practice. The General Directorate of Labor
    promptly examines complaints.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
    including by children, is prohibited and generally does not occur.
    Specific legislation prohibits trafficking in persons; however,
    trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years. There are instances
    of child labor, but the overall incidence is small and is concentrated
    geographically and sectorally. The greatest problems are reported in
    Braga, Porto, and Aveiro and tend to occur in the clothing, footwear,
    construction, and hotel industries. Government agencies have noted a
    recent gradual shift from child labor in industries to the home, where
    children work in family businesses. The extensive national network
    designed to combat child labor is beginning to shift some of its
    resources in this direction. The Government prohibits forced and bonded
    child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section
    6.c.).
        In 1998 the Government created a commission called Plan for the
    Elimination of Exploitation of Child Labor (PEETI). Working with
    several NGO's, PEETI has developed an integrated program of education
    and training in which local teams of social workers and educators
    intervene in situations involving dropouts and working children. These
    teams develop programs of scholastic and vocational study tailored to
    the individual child and his community. PEETI gives ``scholarships'' to
    help offset the loss of income to the family. In the first year of
    PEETI'S existence, 600 teenagers were involved. The Government also
    created in 1996 the National Council Against the Exploitation of Child
    Labor (CNETI), a multiagency body that coordinates government efforts
    to eliminate child labor. CNETI is the successor to the National
    Children's Rights Commission CCNCTI.
        In a first-of-its-kind study, conducted in conjunction with the ILO
    in 1998, the Government polled 26,500 families, with separate
    questionnaires for parents and children, to try to measure the
    incidence of child labor. According to this survey, as many as 20,000
    to 40,000 children under the age of 16 may be engaged in some form of
    labor. The majority of these cases consist of daily chores on family
    farms, which do not prevent school attendance. However, the study
    estimates that as many as 11,000 children may be working for nonfamily
    employers, a figure that represents 0.2 percent of the labor force. The
    next comprehensive study of the problem is scheduled for April 2001.
        The key enforcement mechanisms of labor laws falls to labor
    inspectors. Because of an increase in the minimum working age from 15
    to 16 in 1997, the total number of child labor cases has increased in
    the last few years. However, according to the Ministry of Labor and
    Equality, the incidence of child labor is decreasing as a result of
    government efforts to combat child labor and a move towards a higher
    technology industrial base (with a corresponding need for better
    educated and skilled labor). The Ministry reported a 74 percent
    decrease in child labor cases from 1997 to 2000. The Minister of Labor
    attributed this decrease to the extensive reorganization of groups
    fighting this problem and the effectiveness of new programs being
    carried out. Portugal's fight against exploitative child labor is no
    longer limited to inspectors' visits to factories and farms, but
    includes policies designed to address some of the root causes of this
    problem.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage legislation covers
    full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages
    18 years and over. For 2000 the monthly minimum wage was approximately
    $284 (63,800 escudos). Along with widespread rent controls, basic food
    and utility subsidies, and phased implementation of an assured minimum
    income, the minimum wage affords a basic standard of living for a
    worker and family. Only 9.2 percent of the work force received the
    minimum wage.
        Employees generally receive 14 months' pay for 11 months' work: the
    extra 3 months' pay are for a Christmas bonus, a vacation subsidy, and
    22 days of annual leave. The maximum legal workday is 8 hours, and the
    maximum workweek is 40 hours. There is a maximum of 2 hours of paid
    overtime per day and 200 hours of overtime per year, with a minimum of
    12 hours between workdays. The Ministry of Employment and Social
    Security monitors compliance through its regional inspectors.
        Employers legally are responsible for accidents at work and are
    required by law to carry accident insurance. An existing body of
    legislation regulates safety and health, but labor unions continue to
    argue for stiffer laws. The General Directorate of Hygiene and Labor
    Security develops safety standards in harmony with European Union
    standards, and the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible for their
    enforcement. However, the Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and
    inspectors to combat the problem of work accidents effectively. Workers
    injured on the job rarely initiate lawsuits. A relatively large
    proportion of accidents occurs in the construction industry. Poor
    environmental controls in textile production also cause considerable
    concern.
        While the ability of workers to remove themselves from situations
    where these hazards exist is limited, it is difficult to fire workers
    for any reason.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific legislation prohibits
    trafficking in persons, which nevertheless is a problem. Under the
    Penal Code, trafficking in persons is punishable by 2 to 8 years'
    imprisonment. Parliament passed legislation during the year that
    established training programs for those who provide services for
    victims of trafficking. The Commission for Equality and Women's Rights
    has two working groups, one to oversee the training of social service
    workers and the other to inform victims of their legal rights; both are
    providing services.
        However, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
    prostitution continues to be a problem. International trafficking rings
    take Portuguese women abroad, often to Spain, and bring foreign women
    to Portugal. The Portuguese women involved tend to be from poorer areas
    and are often, but not always, drug users. Women from Brazil and from
    Lusophone Africa also are involved, as are women from non-Lusophone
    countries such as Senegal.
        Russian mafia organizations are present in the country in
    increasing numbers, largely as the networks behind the trafficking in
    Eastern European women. One such network reportedly sells Moldovan and
    Ukrainian women for the equivalent of around $4,000 each. The
    authorities broke up one such ring in 1999 that was headed by a nuclear
    scientist from the former Soviet Union.
                                   __________

                                    ROMANIA

        Romania is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty, bicameral
    parliamentary system. Prior to the end-of-year elections, Prime
    Minister Mugur Isarescu was the Head of Government, and President Emil
    Constantinescu, who was elected directly, was the Head of State. On
    December 29, Adrian Nastase was sworn into office as the new Prime
    Minister, and Ion Iliescu was elected President on December 10. The
    judiciary is a separate branch of the Government; however, in practice
    the executive branch exercises influence over the judiciary.
        Several different security forces are responsible for preserving
    law and order and protecting against external threats. The laws that
    established these organizations are somewhat vague, and their security
    responsibilities overlap. All security and intelligence organizations
    operate under the authority of civilian leadership. The Ministry of the
    Interior supervises the national police, which have primary
    responsibility for security, and the border police. Some police
    officers committed serious human rights abuses.
        Romania is a middle-income, developing country in transition from a
    centrally planned economy to a market economy. The private sector
    accounted for 61.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and employed
    61.9 percent of the work force, primarily in agriculture, commerce, and
    services. Although privatization is under way, government ownership
    remains dominant in the industrial sector. From 1993 through October
    2000, 7,108 firms were privatized; 1,162 during the year. Approximately
    1,200 firms are left in the State Privatization Fund's portfolio,
    including several of the country's largest firms. The economy
    contracted 6.6 percent in 1997, 5.4 percent in 1998, and 3.2 percent in
    1999. However, GDP grew 2 percent during the year. GDP per capita in
    1999 was about $1,512. Exports decreased 1.5 percent in 1998 and rose
    2.4 percent in 1999. Inflation increased from 40.6 percent in 1998 to
    54.8 percent in 1999. Official statistics significantly understated
    economic activity because of the size of the informal economy.
        The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens;
    however, several serious problems remained. Police use of excessive
    force resulted in one death. Some police officers continued to beat
    detainees. The Government investigated police officers suspected of
    abuse and in some cases indicted those accused of criminal activities
    in military courts. However, investigations of police abuses generally
    are lengthy and inconclusive and rarely result in prosecution or
    punishment. While some progress was made in reforming the police, cases
    of inhuman and degrading treatment continue to be reported. The
    Government promised important modifications to the criminal code in
    1998, but no such changes were made. Prison conditions did not meet
    minimum international standards, and overcrowding remained a serious
    problem, despite improvements made in 1999. The judiciary remained
    subject to executive branch influence. Violence and discrimination
    against women remained serious problems. There was a large number of
    impoverished homeless children in large cities. Societal harassment of
    religious minorities still remained a problem, and religious groups not
    officially recognized by the Government sometimes complain that they
    receive discriminatory treatment from the authorities. Discrimination
    and instances of societal violence against Roma continued. Child labor
    was a problem. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
    prostitution was a problem.
        The Ombudsman's Office, which was established in 1997, registered
    3,326 complaints as of early September 2000, 4,372 complaints in 1999,
    2,985 in 1998, and 1,168 in 1997. The Ombudsman's role still is not
    fully clear to the public. Many complaints were rejected because they
    related to problems with the judiciary and not the administration.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, Amnesty International and
    APADOR-CH, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the
    International Helsinki Federation, reported one case in which police
    used excessive lethal force against a member of the Romani minority.
        On May 21, a police officer shot and killed Petre Letea, a Romani
    man, and wounded Marian Pilos in Bucharest as they were attempting to
    escape in a car. Police had stopped to ask Letea what he was doing in a
    parked car by an apartment block. When told that he was waiting for two
    friends, police entered the apartment block and found two men
    attempting to burglarize an apartment. The men fled. One disappeared,
    while the other, Pilos, got into Letea's car, and Letea drove away. The
    police officer who had remained on the street opened fire on the car,
    shooting Letea in the head and killing him and wounding Pilos with a
    shot in the back. A 1994 law on the organization of the police force
    allows police to shoot in order to stop persons who are fleeing from
    attempts to take them into custody. The law also allows the use of
    firearms against persons who have escaped detention or run away from an
    escort.
        On November 30, Sorin Moldovan, deputy chairman of the Hunedoara
    County branch of the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) was
    killed by an unknown assailant. It was unclear whether the murder was
    politically motivated. Moldovan was the head of the Hunedoara customs
    office and had been sentenced for taking bribes in 1997; the Supreme
    Court later lifted his sentence.
        In several cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly due to
    police brutality during 1999, investigations and trials still are
    dragging on. There was no progress in the investigation of the death of
    Aurel Uluiteanu in police custody in September 1999 in Barcanesti.
    There were no further developments in the case of Cristian-Venus
    Dumitrescu, who allegedly was beaten by police in September 1999 and
    died after he ``threw'' himself out of a third floor window en route to
    a police station. There was no progress in the investigation of the
    death of Sevastian Apostol, a Rom killed by police while trying to flee
    a bar where he had a serious conflict with the owner and other clients.
    There was no further investigation into the August 1999 case of Elinoiu
    Toader, who died after being beaten by police. There was no further
    investigation into the killing of Radu Marian, an unarmed Rom who was
    killed in October 1999 during a police raid on a group of cigarette
    smugglers.
        According to the Government, the chief of police in Valcele was
    indicted in June 1999 for the illegal use of his weapon in the 1996
    killing of Mircea-Muresul Mosor, a Rom from Comani who was shot in the
    back and killed while in police custody. A lower court found the police
    officer not guilty, but the prosecutor's office appealed the verdict in
    May 1999; the superior court's decision still was pending at year's
    end.
        In several earlier cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly
    due to police brutality, investigations and trials still are dragging
    on, years later.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or
    Punishment
        The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading
    punishment or treatment, and these prohibitions generally were
    respected in practice; however, there were credible reports that police
    beat detainees and used excessive force.
        Amnesty International cited numerous reports of torture and
    mistreatment. In 1999 in seeking to cover up the death of Elinoiu
    Toader, a witness allegedly was beaten to induce him to sign a
    statement that Toader had died as a result of alcohol abuse. At least
    two other witnesses were threatened similarly (see Section 1.a.).
        Romani NGO's claimed that police used excessive force against Roma
    and also subjected them to brutal treatment and harassment (see Section
    5). In one case excessive force reportedly resulted in death (see
    Section 1.a.).
        On January 8, Constantin Vrabie, of Candesti, was beaten severely
    by police officers in Buzau County. In December 1999, Vrabie had been
    fined approximately $30 (600,000 lei) for failure to produce
    identification and insulting the police. On the evening of January 8
    Vrabie, a friend named Valentin Barbu, and two more friends were
    stopped by three plainclothes policemen who took Vrabie and Barbu to a
    van and allegedly beat them. The two men were then taken to the Buzau
    police station. Vrabie was reportedly fined $10 (200,000 lei) for
    insulting the police and Barbu was admonished. Medical examination of
    Vrabie by the Buzau county hospital after he was released noted that he
    had massive bruises on his eye, lip, and forehead. Marks on Vrabie's
    lips and eye were still obvious on February 4 when he was interviewed
    by APADOR-CH representatives. Vrabie reportedly filed a complaint with
    the military prosecutor's office and challenged his fine. Barbu also
    reportedly filed a complaint.
        On January 25, Silviu Rosioru from Buzau County became involved in
    an altercation with several police officers from the Buzau intervention
    unit in a bar. The police threw Rosioru to the floor, handcuffed him,
    kicked him, and beat him with their batons. Rosioru was placed into a
    police van and then beaten on the way to Buzau police station. Rosioru
    was fined $10 (200,000 lei) for insulting the bar owner and refusing a
    reasonable request to provide personal identification. Rosioru claims
    that his signature was falsified on his police report, which claimed
    that he confessed to these crimes. Police officers allegedly subjected
    a witness to the incident to pressure and intimidation to ensure that
    her statement was consistent with police reports. The chief of the
    Bazau intervention unit was reported by local press reports to have a
    record of violence. As a result of this case and the Vrabie case, both
    involving the Bazau County intervention unit, several police officers
    in the unit, including the commander, were administratively sanctioned,
    and several were removed from the unit.
        On February 14, Alexandru Botu, of Prunaru village in the county of
    Teleorman, was reportedly beaten seriously by police. Botu had stopped
    in front of the shop S.C. Dina to talk to some acquaintances. The shop
    owner, the brother of Prunaru's mayor, had had an altercation with
    Botu's brother, beating him, in January. Botu finished his conversation
    and began to cross the street when he was stopped by the police chief
    and his deputy and led back to the shop. The shop owner closed the shop
    and its blinds and left. The policemen proceeded to beat Botu for about
    half an hour. A villager who heard Botu scream alerted Botu's wife, who
    rushed to the shop and took Botu home. The next day he was taken to
    Alexandria hospital where he was diagnosed with a series of deep
    bruises and two broken ribs. When interviewed by APADOR-CH
    representatives a month later he was still in poor physical condition.
        On May 18, in Bucharest a police officer shot Mugurel Soare, a
    Romani man, in the head and severely injured him. Police reports
    claimed that Soare and his brother, Vipan Soare, were chasing their
    former brother-in-law, Sorin Cutea, in order to kill him. When detained
    by three plainclothes policeman sitting nearby in an unmarked car, who
    been informed of the chase by Sorin Cutea, Soare attacked one officer,
    allegedly injuring him with a knife, and was shot in the scuffle that
    followed. However, local newspapers later reported that witnesses to
    the incident claimed that Soare was unarmed. Soare's right side remains
    paralyzed, and he is unable to speak. He is reportedly unlikely to make
    a full recovery. The case remained under investigation.
        Police reportedly abused journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        In April 1998, a policeman with whom he had refused to share a pool
    game beat Nicolae Iloaie of Tandareni. Iloaiei was hospitalized for 90
    days. When he asked for a certified medical report for the forensic
    laboratory, the physician in charge refused to issue it. The case
    remained under investigation. In May 1998, a policeman shot Marian
    Ciulei from Brasov in the leg while he was running from a confrontation
    in a discotheque. The case remained under investigation.
        In April 1998, the Government responded to the 1997 report of the
    U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
    Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Special Rapporteur received
    allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the police. The
    Government in its response promised in 1998 to make modifications to
    the criminal code and to detention regulations, but no such
    modifications have been made.
        Judicial cases involving military personnel and the police are
    tried in military courts. Local and international human rights groups
    criticize this system, claiming that the military prosecutor's
    investigations are unnecessarily lengthy and often purposefully
    inconclusive, and that some military prosecutors sometimes block proper
    investigation of alleged police abuses. The Government declined to
    provide updated information on cases of alleged police abuse from 1998
    and 1997.
        Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards;
    however, the prison system is improving slowly as efforts increase to
    bring prisons in line with these requirements. The year's prison budget
    increased 74 percent over the 1999 budget. There are now a total of 41
    penal units, 34 prisons, (an increase from 33 prisons in 1999), 5
    prison hospitals, and 2 juvenile detention facilities. Nevertheless,
    overcrowding remains a serious problem, although it has improved
    slightly from 1999. On September 22, 49,540 people, including 1,571
    minors, were under detention. The legal capacity of the system was
    33,464.
        In May 1999 a law providing for alternative sentences for minor
    offenses went into effect. The law provides for community service
    instead of a prison sentence and is aimed at reducing the prison
    population.
        Human rights organizations continued to report the abuse of
    prisoners by other prisoners and prison authorities. Prisons continued
    to use the ``cell boss'' system, in which some prisoners are designated
    to be in semiofficial charge of other prisoners. There were attempts to
    ameliorate this system in some prisons by giving the inmates some input
    in the selection of these ``cell bosses.'' Prison guards wore firearms
    only when guarding prisoners working outside the prison, correspondence
    was no longer opened routinely, and inmates had the right to telephone
    calls. Prison authorities introduced some vocational training programs
    to assist inmates' future integration into society.
        The Government permitted prison visits by human rights monitors,
    and several NGO's made such visits.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids the
    detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without an arrest warrant
    from a prosecutor, who may order detention for up to 30 days, and
    authorities generally respected this provision in practice. Detention
    can be extended past the 30-day limit only by a court ruling. Detainees
    have the right to apply for bail and may ask for a hearing before a
    judge. Such a request must be granted within 24 hours.
        However, police often appear to take advantage of Article 16,
    Section b in the Police Organization Law 26 of 1994, which states that
    persons endangering the public, other people, or social order and whose
    identity cannot be established, can be taken to a police station.
    Police often use this provision of the law to detain people for up to
    24 hours at a police station.
        Police often do not inform citizens of their rights. The law
    requires the authorities to inform arrestees of the charges against
    them and of their right to an attorney at all stages of the legal
    process. Police must notify defendants of this right in a language they
    understand before obtaining a statement. However, the prosecutor's
    office may delay action on a request for a lawyer for up to 5 days from
    the date of arrest.
        Under the law, minors detained by police and placed under guard in
    a center for the protection of minors are considered by judicial
    authorities to be in detention or under arrest if their age is more
    than 16, or, if aged between 14 and 16, they have consciously committed
    a crime. However, since the Penal Code does not apply to minors in
    these centers until their cases are referred to a prosecutor, police
    are permitted to question them without restriction and may hold those
    suspected of criminal offenses for up to 30 days in such centers. This
    law appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, and both Amnesty
    International and local human rights groups have called on the
    Government to change it.
        According to APADOR-CH, the Interior Ministry issued new
    instructions on detention in 1999 that provide for the confidentiality
    of discussions between detainees and their lawyers.
        Exile was not used as a means of punishment.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the terms of a 1992 law, the
    judicial branch is independent of other government branches; however,
    it remains subject to influence by the executive branch. Although
    members of the Senior Council of Magistrates, which controls the
    selection, promotion, transfer and sanctioning of judges, are appointed
    by Parliament from a list provided by the courts and prosecutorial
    offices represented on the council, the Justice Minister may avoid the
    appointment of members he does not want by simply keeping them off the
    agenda.
        The 1992 law reestablished a four-tier legal system, including
    appellate courts, which had ceased to exist under Communist rule.
    Defendants have final recourse to the Supreme Court or, for
    constitutional matters, to the Constitutional Court. The 1992 law that
    reorganized the judicial system divided the Prosecutor General's Office
    into 16 local offices (paralleling the appeals court structure) and
    established an office at the Supreme Court; the law also curtailed
    certain powers of the Prosecutor General, including the right to
    overturn court decisions and bypass appeals courts by going directly to
    the Supreme Court.
        The law provides for fair public trial and the presumption of
    innocence. The Penal Code requires that an attorney be appointed for a
    defendant who cannot afford legal representation or is otherwise unable
    to select counsel. In practice the local bar association provides
    attorneys to the indigent and is compensated by the Ministry of
    Justice. Either a plaintiff or a defendant may appeal. These provisions
    of the law are respected in practice. The law provides that confessions
    extracted as a result of police brutality may be withdrawn by the
    accused when brought before the court.
        In a notable case in January 1999, a criminal appeals court ruled
    against miners' union leader Miron Cozma and overturned the
    Government's implicit deal to protect Cozma from prosecution for his
    role in a miner's strike.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--During the year there were no reported instances of
    interference with individual citizens' right to privacy.
        The Constitution provides for protection against the search of a
    residence without a warrant, but this protection is subordinate to
    ``national security or public order.'' The 1992 National Security Law
    defines national security very broadly and lists as threats not only
    crimes such as terrorism, treason, espionage, assassination, and armed
    insurrection but also totalitarian, racist, and anti-Semitic actions or
    attempts to change the existing national borders. Security officials
    may enter residences without proper authorization from a prosecutor if
    they deem a threat to national security ``imminent.''
        The Constitution states that the privacy of legal means of
    communication is inviolable; thus, the Romanian Internal Intelligence
    Service (SRI) is prohibited legally from engaging in political acts
    (for example, wiretapping on behalf of the Government for political
    reasons). However, the law allows the security services to monitor
    communications on national security grounds after obtaining
    authorization. The law requires the SRI to obtain a warrant from the
    ``public prosecutor specially appointed by the General Public
    Prosecutor'' in order to carry out intelligence activities involving
    ``threats to national security.'' It may engage legally in a wide
    variety of operations to determine if a situation meets the legal
    definition of a threat to national security, or to prevent a crime.
        Legislation that permits citizens access to secret police files
    kept by the Communist government was passed in 1999. Under the law, any
    Romanian or foreign citizen who had Romanian citizenship after 1945 is
    entitled to have access to his file; a council approved by Parliament
    reviews the files and release the information unless it was a state
    secret or could threaten national security. The files remain in the
    custody of Romania's intelligence services. This law has been
    criticized on the grounds that it exempts files of current employees of
    the intelligence services for review, and changes the definition of
    informer to require actual payment. Many informers were unpaid
    volunteers.
        The NGO Romani CRISS reported that on September 26, police evicted
    12 Romani families from an apartment building in Bucharest. According
    to the testimony of the evicted Roma, they did not receive prior notice
    of the evictions, nor did the police present them with warrants for
    eviction. During the eviction police reportedly intimidated and
    harassed the families. The police station chief stated that the
    eviction was conducted pursuant to the permission of the prosecutor's
    office of the Sector Three Court of Bucharest. A spokesperson for the
    Bucharest city government stated that the Roma were illegally occupying
    the building and that they were housed in a hostel after their
    eviction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
    for freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, it limits the
    bounds of free expression by prohibiting ``defamation of the country''
    and ``offense to authority;'' the Government respected the
    constitutional provisions in practice.
        An amended Penal Code passed by Parliament in 1996 rectified many
    of the shortcomings of the former, Communist-era code. However, the new
    version is criticized by human rights organizations and professional
    journalists for retaining jail terms for those convicted of libel or
    slander, including journalists. Despite official promises that jail
    terms would be removed from penalties for libel and calumny, Parliament
    has yet to amend the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Consequently,
    Articles 205 and 206 concerning libel and calumny and articles 238 and
    239 concerning offense to authority and defamation of character are
    still in force.
        On the recommendation of the Council of Europe, legislation that
    would reduce the sentence for violating Article 205 to a fine instead
    of a prison term, and that would decrease a violation of Article 206 to
    3 to 12 months instead of the previous 2 to 6 years passed the Chamber
    of Deputies in June. This legislative package would have abolished
    Article 238, which criminalizes an offense against authority, along
    with Article 239, paragraph 1, which establishes a crime of verbal
    outrage against the authorities. However, the legislation failed to
    pass in the Senate during the year.
        The Government failed to rescind the prohibitions on ``defamation
    of the nation'' and ``defamation of public officials'' used to harass
    and punish journalists who report governmental or bureaucratic
    corruption. In 1999 several journalists were arrested and tried during
    the year for reporting on corruption by local government officials;
    journalists who were investigating corruption cases were also targets
    of violence.
        There were reports of police abuse of journalists. In May police
    severely beat Valentin Dragin, a Constanta-based journalist, while he
    was trying to photograph a party hosted by Constanta County's police
    chief. Dragan suffered several injuries, including a broken leg. He
    received most of his injuries from press officer Major Marian Saragea.
    The Interior Ministry still was investigating the matter.
        Independent media continued to grow in an increasingly competitive
    market. Several hundred daily and weekly newspapers are published.
    Several private television stations broadcast nationwide, with the
    largest reaching approximately 20 percent of the rural and 80 percent
    of the urban market. There are 72 private television stations and 162
    private radio stations. Approximately 2.8 million households were wired
    for cable, giving significant portions of the population access to both
    private and foreign broadcasts. Romanian State Television (RTV) and
    Radio Romania remained at year's end the only national broadcasters
    capable of reaching the bulk of the rural population. Independent
    stations continued to enlarge their coverage throughout the country by
    over-the-air, cable, and satellite transmissions. A French media group
    received a license for a private radio nationwide broadcasting
    operation in 1999 and is operating. Romania plans to bid licenses for
    another nationwide radio license in the future.
        Foreign news publications may be imported and distributed freely,
    but high costs, relative to domestic publications, limit their
    circulation.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected that
    right in practice. The law on public assembly provides for the right of
    citizens to assemble peacefully while unarmed but states that meetings
    must not interfere with other economic or social activities and may not
    be held near locations such as hospitals, airports, or military
    installations. Organizers of demonstrations must inform local
    authorities and police before the event. Authorities may forbid a
    public gathering by notifying the organizers in writing within 48 hours
    of receipt of the request. The law prohibits the organization of, or
    participation in, a counterdemonstration held at the same time as a
    scheduled public gathering.
        The law forbids public gatherings to espouse Communist, racist, or
    Fascist ideologies or to commit actions contrary to public order or
    national security. Unauthorized demonstrations or other violations are
    punished by imprisonment and fines.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Political parties gain
    legal status if they have at least 10,000 members. (The minimum
    membership required was increased in 1996 in order to reduce the number
    of small parties.) Associations may be granted legal status with proof
    of only 20 founding members and over 200 supporting members.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government generally does not impede the observance of
    religious belief. However, several denominations continued to make
    credible allegations that low-level government officials and Romanian
    Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. The press
    reported several instances when adherents of minority religions were
    prevented by others from practicing their faith, and local law
    enforcement authorities did not protect them. Members of religious
    communities not officially recognized by the Government during the year
    again accused government officials of harassment--allegations denied by
    the Government. Proselytizing that involves denigrating recognized
    churches is perceived as provocative.
        Under the provisions of a 1948 decree, the Government recognizes 14
    religions. A December 1989 decree reestablished the Catholic Church of
    the Byzantine rite, or Greek Catholic Church, which had been merged
    forcibly with the Romanian Orthodox Church by the communists in 1948.
    Only the clergy of these 15 recognized religions are eligible to
    receive state financial support. The number of adherents each religion
    had in the last census determines the proportion of the budget each
    recognized religion receives. Representatives of minority religious
    groups dispute the 1992 census results, claiming that census takers in
    some cases argued with citizens over their religious affiliation or
    simply assigned an affiliation in some cases even without inquiring
    about religious affiliation.
        The Government requires religious groups to register. To be
    recognized as a religion, religious groups must register with the State
    Secretariat for Religious Denominations and present their statutes,
    organizational, leadership, and management diagrams, and the body of
    dogma and doctrines formally stated by a religion. Representatives of
    religious groups that sought recognition after 1990 allege that the
    registration process was arbitrary and unduly influenced by the
    Romanian Orthodox Church. They also allege that they did not receive
    clear instructions concerning the requirements and that often the time
    frame in which a decision on their application has to be made is not
    respected by the State Secretary of Religions. Not one religious group
    has succeeded in receiving religion status since 1990. For example,
    although the Romanian Supreme Court has recognized that Jehovah's
    Witnesses are a religion, the State Secretariat for Cults and the
    Military Court of Appeals refuse to do so.
        The Government registers religious groups that it does not
    recognize as ``independent religions'' either as religious and
    charitable foundations or as cultural associations. This registration
    process was simplified, in theory, by a new law enacted on May 1. The
    Government currently interprets this law as forbidding religious groups
    registered as associations or foundations from building churches or
    other buildings designated as houses of worship.
        The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 86 percent of
    the population nominally adheres, predominates. The official
    registration of religious associations is extremely slow because of
    bureaucratic delays; in this regard, smaller religious groups have
    criticized the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs for its
    obstructionist tactics in favor of the Romanian Orthodox Church. A
    draft bill on religious denominations proposed in September 1999, which
    most religious groups objected to on the grounds it would have
    increased state control over religious activity and made the Romanian
    Orthodox Church the national church, was withdrawn in February.
        The Greek Catholic Church has made only limited progress in
    recovering its properties taken by the Romanian Orthodox Church after
    its forced merger in 1948. Of approximately 2,600 properties to which
    it has claim, only a handful have been returned. The Greek Catholics
    say they have received 136 churches, while the Government claims 142
    churches have been returned as of this year. The Greek Catholic Church
    has very few places of worship. Many followers still are compelled to
    hold services in public places or parks (260 such cases, according to
    Greek Catholic reports) because most of the former Greek Catholic
    churches have not been returned. A joint Orthodox and Greek Catholic
    committee formed by government decree in 1990 has failed to resolve the
    issue due to Orthodox resistance, despite the scaling back of the Greek
    Catholic requests from 2,600 properties to 300 churches. Restitution of
    the existing churches is important to both sides because local
    residents, who prize tradition, are likely to attend their local church
    whether it is Greek Catholic or Orthodox. Thus the number of believers
    and share of the state budget allocation for religions is at stake. The
    historical Hungarian churches, including the Hungarian Roman Catholic
    and the Hungarian Protestant Reformed, Evangelical, and Unitarian
    churches, largely have not received their property back from the
    Government. Out of 1,400 to 1,450 buildings claimed by the Hungarian
    churches, they have received about 10. The Jewish community reported in
    May that out of 21 properties nominally returned by the Government, it
    only has obtained actual possession of 5.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on
    travel within the country, except for certain small areas reserved for
    military purposes. Citizens who wish to change their place of work or
    residence do not face any official barriers. The law stipulates that
    citizens have the right to travel abroad freely, to emigrate, and to
    return. In practice citizens freely exercise these rights.
        The 1996 refugee law implemented the provisions of the 1951 United
    Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. This legislation established a refugee office in the Interior
    Ministry to receive, process, and house asylum seekers. The Ministry
    received 807 applications for asylum in the first 6 months of 1999;
    more recent figures were unavailable.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations. In mid-1998 the
    Interior Ministry and the Labor Ministry began funding programs to
    assist asylum seekers and refugees. Financial support provided by the
    Government (reimbursable loans for a period of 6 to 9 months) is
    minimal, usually not enough to cover basic needs. The Government
    provides temporary accommodation in only a few locations; more
    facilities are to open as funds are made available. Programs for
    integrating refugees into society are developing slowly. An increasing
    number of transiting illegal migrants regards the country as a
    springboard to the West.
        There were no reports during the year of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government through periodic and free elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
        In November and December the left-center Democratic Socialist Party
    of Romania (PDSR) won a near majority in the legislature and the PDSR
    candidate, Ion Iliescu, won the Romanian presidency. The PDSR planned
    to govern as a minority government. The extremist, xenophobic Greater
    Romania Party (PRM) won the next largest share of parliamentary and
    presidential votes. Allegations of widespread voting fraud by the
    losing PRM candidate, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, were not judged credible.
        No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
    government or politics; however, societal attitudes are a significant
    impediment, and women are underrepresented significantly in government
    and politics. Before the November 26 elections, there were 2 women out
    of 143 senators, and 25 women out of the 343 deputies in the lower
    house of Parliament, or 5.6 percent of total seats in Parliament.
    However, after the November elections, the percent of women in
    Parliament increased to 9.8 percent. Prior to the November elections,
    there was one female cabinet member; the current cabinet has five
    female members.
        The Constitution and electoral legislation grant each recognized
    ethnic minority one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, provided
    that the minority's political organization obtains at least 5 percent
    of the average number of valid votes needed to elect a deputy outright
    (1,784 votes in the 1996 elections). Organizations representing 15
    minority groups elected deputies under this provision in 1996. Ethnic
    Hungarians, represented by the UDMR, obtained parliamentary
    representation through the normal electoral process. Roma are
    underrepresented in Parliament because of low Roma voter turnout and
    internal divisions that worked against the consolidation of votes for
    one candidate, organization, or party. One Romani parliamentarian, the
    former Romani minority representative, joined the PDSR and sits in the
    legislature in addition to the one seat provided for Roma by the
    Constitution and electoral legislation.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic human rights monitoring groups include the Romanian
    Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH), the independent Romanian Society for
    Human Rights (SIRDO), the League for the Defense of Human Rights
    (LADO), the Romanian Institute for Human Rights, and several issue-
    specific groups such as the Young Generation of Roma and the Center for
    Crisis Intervention and Study, also a Romani NGO. Other groups, such as
    political parties and trade unions, continued to maintain sections
    monitoring the observance of human rights. These groups, as well as
    international human rights organizations, functioned freely without
    government interference.
        The Government cooperates with local and international monitoring
    groups, although some offices are slow to respond to inquiries. Local
    human rights monitoring agencies have found it difficult to obtain
    statistics concerning police abuses. The General Inspectorate of
    Police, which is responsible for investigating such abuses, responds
    unevenly to inquiries from monitors. Often victims are reluctant to
    come forward, and the Government does not promote transparency in this
    regard.
        The Ministry of the Interior stiffened conditions for prison visits
    by human rights organizations in February. The new regulations, which
    are authorized by internal regulations the Ministry does not release to
    the public, require the visit be requested by a prisoner, and be
    announced 3 to 4 days in advance.
        With the aim of protecting citizens against abuses or capricious
    acts of public officers, the Ombudsman's Office envisioned under the
    1991 Constitution was instituted by law in March 1997, and its first
    appointee, Paul Mitroi, took office in June 1997. However, due to a
    lack of office space, the office began working at normal capacity only
    at the beginning of 1998; by November it had received 4,255 cases. The
    office is registering these complaints and is obliged by law to provide
    an initial response within a year of the date they were recorded. It
    deals not just with human rights but with all facets of citizens'
    interaction with the Government.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, nationality,
    ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion and political
    allegiance, wealth, or social background. However, in practice the
    Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and women,
    Roma, and other minorities are subject to various forms of extralegal
    discrimination. Homosexuals reportedly have been the victims of police
    brutality in the past.
        In September the Government issued emergency ordinance number 137
    which outlaws discrimination based on a number of factors and
    introduces the ability to sue on the grounds of discrimination. An
    emergency ordinance has the effect of law unless it is nullified by the
    Parliament.
        Women.--Violence against women, including rape, continued to be a
    serious problem. Both human and women's rights groups credibly reported
    that domestic violence is common, and a 1999 report by the U.N.
    Children's Fund (UNICEF) emphasized that violence against women in the
    workplace is not uncommon since their subordinate position exposes them
    to greater risk. According to UNICEF, the country has an average of 108
    sexual incidents per 1,000 women and 41 assaults per 1,000 women. Under
    a government pilot project begun in 1997, a shelter for victims of
    domestic violence opened in Bucharest in 1997. The shelter can
    accommodate only four persons. It received 490 calls for help during
    1998 on a hot line, and registered 230 walk-in victims. The prosecution
    of rape is difficult because it requires both a medical certificate and
    a witness, and a rapist can avoid punishment if he marries the victim.
    There is no specific legislation dealing with spousal abuse or rape,
    and successful prosecution of spousal rape is almost impossible. Police
    are often reluctant to intervene in instances of domestic violence.
        In April the Romanian edition of Playboy published a satirical
    article that explained in graphic detail how to beat one's wife without
    leaving marks. International and domestic protests led to apologies by
    Playboy's foreign editors and local publisher, and in July the Romanian
    edition of Playboy published an article on the costs of domestic
    violence.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution
    continues to be a growing problem. Several domestic prostitution rings
    are active (see Section 6.f.).
        The Constitution grants women and men equal rights. However, in
    practice the Government does not enforce these provisions, nor do the
    authorities focus attention or resources on women's issues.
        Few resources are available for women who experience economic
    discrimination. Despite existing laws and educational equality, women
    have a higher rate of unemployment than men, occupy few influential
    positions in the private sector, and earn lower than average wages. In
    1996 the Government created a department in the Ministry of Labor and
    Social Protection to advance women's concerns and family policies. This
    department organizes programs for women, proposes new laws, monitors
    legislation for sexual bias, targets resources to train women for
    skilled professions, and addresses the problems of single mothers,
    especially in rural areas. In 1998 this department organized with the
    U.N. Development Program a series of conferences on ``promoting gender
    politics.'' An Ombudsman was created within the department for child,
    woman, and family protection in 1998, but the total budget for women's
    programs for 1999 was less than $75,000.
        Children.--The Government administers health care and public
    education programs for children, despite scarce domestic resources.
    International agencies and NGO's supplement government programs in
    these areas. However, living conditions in all child care institutions
    very seriously deteriorated in 1999 for financial and administrative
    reasons and did not improve during the year. Inspectors who visited
    institutions and identified humanitarian needs at the request of the
    European Union Commission reported that while conditions were not
    equally bad in all institutions, the general situation in the summer
    could only be described as unacceptable in terms of basic
    infrastructure as well as hygiene, medical care, nutrition, and general
    assistance. According to official statistics, there were approximately
    60,000 orphans in state institutions.
        There was no perceptible societal pattern of abuse against
    children. Nevertheless large numbers of impoverished and apparently
    homeless, but not necessarily orphaned, children were seen on the
    streets of the larger cities. The Government does not have statistics
    defining the scope of the problem. NGO's working with children remained
    particularly concerned about the number of minors detained in jail and
    prison. These NGO's continued to seek alternative solutions, such as
    parole for juveniles. Because time served while awaiting trial counts
    as part of the prison sentence but does not count towards time to be
    served in a juvenile detention center, some minors actually requested
    prison sentences.
        The prevalence of child labor in the Roma community is widespread
    (see Section 6.d.).
        The sexual exploitation of children continued to attract press
    attention, and the police staged a few high-publicity arrests of
    foreign pedophiles. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Other issues, such as
    adequate legislation to protect children, received less attention. The
    law does not outlaw pedophilia expressly. Instead, pedophiles are
    charged with rape, corporal harm, and sexual corruption.
        People with Disabilities.--Difficult economic conditions and
    serious budgetary constraints contributed to very difficult living
    conditions for those with physical or mental disabilities. Many
    disabled persons cannot make use of government-provided transportation
    discounts because public transport does not have facilitated access.
    The law does not mandate accessibility for the disabled to buildings
    and public transportation. According to official statistics, there were
    3,500 disabled children living in state institutions.
        Religious Minorities.--Most mainstream politicians publicly have
    criticized anti- Semitism, racism, and xenophobia. However, the fringe
    press continued to publish anti-Semitic harangues. The Romanian
    Orthodox Church has attacked the ``aggressive proselytism'' of
    Protestant and neo-Protestant groups.
        In October a 19th century synagogue in Timisoara was vandalized and
    several religious items were stolen. A Jewish cemetery was desecrated
    in Turnu-Severin. There was no progress in the investigations of the
    desecrations of Jewish cemeteries in Galati and Transylvania in 1999.
    On December 28, two men attacked a guard at the Jewish History Museum
    in Bucharest and vandalized the exhibit. No arrests had been made at
    year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Department for the
    Protection of National Minorities has the responsibility to monitor the
    specific problems of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, to
    maintain contacts with minority groups, to submit proposals for draft
    legislation and administrative measures, to maintain permanent links
    with local authorities, and to investigate complaints.
        Ethnic Hungarians, numbering more than 1.6 million, constitute the
    largest and most vocal minority, and their UDMR party was a coalition
    member in the ruling Government for most of the year. Many of the
    issues addressed in the Romanian-Hungarian treaty of 1996 were
    implemented. Progress was made on economic issues, high-level visits,
    and infrastructure improvements such as border crossings. A government
    decree on Hungarian-language minority education was enacted and went
    into force in 1999. The decree permits students in state-funded primary
    and secondary schools to be taught in their own language, with the
    exception of secondary school courses on the history and geography of
    Romania.
        The Romani population, officially estimated by the Government at
    400,000, is estimated by the European Commission to number between 1.1
    and 1.5 million. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) reported a case
    of ethnically motivated violence against Vasile Florica, a Rom, and his
    family in April. Non-Romani villagers in Palos repeatedly beat Florica
    and attacked his wife and children. Florica filed a complaint with the
    Military Prosecutor's Office against a police officer and four civilian
    perpetrators; the case remained under investigation. Romani groups
    complain of routine police brutality, prejudice, and racial harassment
    at the local level. Four people arrested, tried, and convicted in a
    1993 incident in Hadareni, in which three Roma died in a house burning,
    were released in 2000 after serving their sentences. The victims are
    considering appealing to the European Court of Justice, arguing that
    the sentences given to the perpetrators were too light at 2 to 6 years.
        In February Bucharest-based Roma organizations filed charges
    against Marcel Flueraru, a journalist for the National, for using
    racist language in an article. On March 21, Radio Free Europe/Radio
    Liberty reported that Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Roman stated
    that the Government had an obligation to ``protect 23 million Romanians
    against the few thousand Gypsies'' who were damaging the country's
    image abroad. The NGO Romani CRISS reported a job announcement, posted
    in Bucharest's Third Sector Labor Force Office by a private firm called
    S.C. Guard, which stated, ``no Roma accepted.'' Romani CRISS filed a
    complaint with the Ombudsman's Office but had not received a response
    as of October 10. There was no further progress on the ban on Roma in
    the Iasi County hospital, where Roma who cannot afford to pay for
    medical treatment and cannot prove that they have medical insurance
    provided by the State are banned from the hospital. Some steps have
    been taken toward establishing an institutional framework to improve
    the conditions of the Roma, but in practice little progress has been
    made. The Department for the Protection of National Minorities and a
    working group of Roma associations set up by the Roma community signed
    an agreement for drafting a strategy for the protection of the Roma
    minority. However, the Roma office within the GOR is still understaffed
    with two civil servants. Meanwhile, the Roma population continues to be
    subject to societal discrimination.
        According to Human Rights Watch, the ERRC lodged applications
    against Romania with the European Court of Human Rights regarding cases
    of violence and destruction of property in Casinul Nou (1990) and
    Plaiesii de Sus (1991). These cases had been denied in Romanian courts
    in part because the statute of limitations had expired before they
    could initiate final appeals, due to the slowness of the court system.
    Police in both cases failed to conduct on-site investigations.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers except certain public
    employees have the right to associate freely, engage in collective
    bargaining, and form and join labor unions without previous
    authorization. Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of
    Interior personnel are not allowed to unionize. Trade unions may
    acquire property, support their member's exercise of their profession,
    establish mutual insurance funds, print publications, set up cultural,
    teaching and research bodies, establish commercial enterprises and
    banks, and borrow money. Limitations on the right to strike apply only
    to industries that the Government considers critical to the public
    interest and to other public employees. No workers may be forced to
    join or withdraw from a union, and union officials who resign from
    elected positions and return to the regular work force are protected
    against employer retaliation. The majority of workers are members of
    about 18 nationwide trade union confederations and smaller independent
    trade unions.
        The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 2000
    ``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights'' reported that
    violations of trade union rights continued in practice. The unions
    reported that the Government interfered in trade union activities,
    collective bargaining, and strikes. The requirements to register a
    union were excessive.
        Amendments to Romania's 1991 law on labor disputes in November 1999
    brought some improvements and eliminated many restrictions. It widened
    the scope of the right to strike, although it continues to be difficult
    to hold a legal strike because of lengthy and cumbersome procedures.
    Union members complained that unions must submit their grievances to
    government-sponsored conciliation before initiating a strike, and they
    were frustrated with the courts' propensity to declare illegal the
    majority of strikes on which they have been asked to rule. Past studies
    indicated that the labor legislation adopted in 1991 falls short of
    International Labor Organization (ILO) standards in several areas,
    including the free election of union representatives, binding
    arbitration, the financial liability of strike organizers, the
    restriction of eligibility for trade unions, and the restriction of
    eligibility for trade union membership and offices to ``employees.''
    Although the 1991 legislation supports collective bargaining as an
    institution, the contracts that result are not always enforceable in a
    consistent manner. Unions representing a wide range of economic sectors
    carried out strikes during the year, often protesting wage levels that
    did not keep pace with the rate of inflation. Early in the year,
    railway workers went on strike and only returned after a court
    determination that their strike was illegal. Additionally public
    education was suspended for several weeks until the Government awarded
    back wages and a pay increase to teachers. Utility company employees,
    lawyers, defense industry workers, textile workers, and public finance
    workers also carried out strikes, pressing for higher wages during the
    year. While most of these strikes ended with government promises to
    improve wages and working conditions, union leaders complain that these
    agreements frequently are not implemented.
        The November 1991 collective labor dispute law defined the
    conciliation, mediation, and arbitration procedures under which strikes
    can be conducted. An important provision from both the labor and
    management perspective was the establishment of tripartite arbitration
    panels. The list of arbitrators must be approved by the economic and
    social council where trade unions and employers associations each have
    one-third of the membership.
        In January 1999 striking coal miners from the Jiu valley launched a
    march on Bucharest to protest mine closures. Due to previous violent
    miners' demonstrations the government denied them permission to march
    to Bucharest. Defying the Government decision, the miners continued on
    and attacked law enforcement officials. However, the Government
    succeeded in restoring order, and the perpetrators of the violence were
    arrested and tried.
        The law stipulates that labor unions should be free from government
    or political party control, a provision that the Government has honored
    in practice. Unions are free to engage in political activity and have
    done so.
        Labor unions may form or join federations and affiliate with
    international bodies. The National Confederation of Trade Unions-Fratia
    and the National Union Bloc are affiliated with the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union
    Confederation. The Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania
    is affiliated with the World Labor Confederation. Representatives of
    foreign and international organizations freely visit and advise
    domestic trade unionists.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
    the legal right to bargain collectively, but collective bargaining
    efforts are complicated by continued state control of most industrial
    enterprises and the absence of independent management representatives.
    Basic wage scales for employees of state-owned enterprises are
    established through collective bargaining with the Government. Public
    employees may bargain for everything except salaries, which are set by
    the Government.
        Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law.
        Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country,
    including in the four free trade zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection generally
    enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women and girls for
    the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.-- The minimum age for employment is 16 years, but children
    as young as the age of 15 may work with the consent of their parents or
    guardians, although only ``according to their physical development,
    aptitude, and knowledge.'' Minors are prohibited from working under
    dangerous or hazardous conditions. Violations of the child labor laws
    are punishable by imprisonment for periods of from 2 months to 3 years,
    although there is no recent evidence of anyone being charged or
    convicted under this law. Working children under the age of 16 have the
    right to continue their education, and the law obliges employers to
    assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has
    the authority to impose fines and close sections of factories to ensure
    compliance with the law. There is no recent evidence of anyone being
    charged or convicted under this law. The Constitution prohibits forced
    and bonded child labor, and the Government generally enforces this
    provision; however, trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 5,
    6.c., and 6.f.).
        A department in the Office of the Prime Minister was established in
    1997 responsible for child protection. Local organizations were
    established in the counties and city of Bucharest to enforce child
    labor laws. As of September, the Ministry of Labor and Social
    Protection confirmed that violations of the child labor laws have not
    been controlled.
        There are no accurate statistics of the number of illegally
    employed children. However, there is growing recognition of the
    problem. The Ministry of Education reported that 500,000 children under
    the age of 15 left school in 1997-98, which is approximately 20 percent
    of the school-age population. The prevalence of child labor in the Roma
    community is widespread (see Section 5). As the economy continues to
    restructure and as the gray market grows, the incidence of child labor
    is expected to increase. In March the ILO and the Ministry of Labor and
    Social Protection agreed to form a task force to collect data and
    assist in organizing a national steering committee to combat child
    labor. The first meeting of the committee was held on July 4. The ILO
    is to provide $600,000 to assist 1,500 children to return to school.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most wage rates are established
    through collective bargaining at the enterprise level. However, they
    are based on minimum wages for specific economic sectors and categories
    of workers that the government sets after negotiations with industry
    representatives and the labor confederations. Minimum wage rates
    generally are observed and enforced. During the year, the minimum
    monthly wage, an equivalent of about $30 (700,000 lei), did not keep
    pace with inflation and did not provide a decent standard of living for
    a worker and family. Prices for utility services such as water and
    heating have risen dramatically. However, basic foodstuffs and
    pharmaceutical products still are subject to price ceilings. Housing is
    no longer subsidized. A proposal to raise the minimum wage to 1 million
    lei was approved in November.
        The Labor Code of 1991 provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours
    or 5 days, with overtime to be paid for weekend or holiday work or work
    in excess of 40 hours. It also includes a requirement for a 24-hour
    rest period in the workweek, although most workers receive 2 days off.
    Paid holidays range from 18 to 24 days annually, depending on the
    employee's length of service. The law requires employers to pay
    additional benefits and allowances to workers engaged in particularly
    dangerous or difficult occupations. The Labor Code was to be revised
    during the year. However, trade unions and business associations were
    not included in the drafting discussion. No agreement could be reached
    on changes and no new legislation was presented to Parliament by year's
    end.
        Some labor organizations lobby for healthier, safer working
    conditions on behalf of their members. However, neither the government
    nor industry, which is still mostly state owned, has the resources
    necessary to improve significantly health and safety conditions in the
    workplace. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has established
    safety standards for most industries and is responsible for enforcing
    them. However, it lacks sufficient trained personnel for inspection and
    enforcement, and employers often ignore its recommendations. In 1999 a
    department was established within the Ministry to conduct comprehensive
    safety inspections. European Union PHARE funds have assisted in
    building capacity within the new department. Although they have the
    right to refuse dangerous work assignments, workers seldom invoke it in
    practice, appearing to value increased pay over a safe work
    environment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women is an
    underreported but serious problem. The law is vague and outdated and
    does not address trafficking directly. Those involved in trafficking
    may be prosecuted for such offenses as prostitution and procurement,
    falsifying documents, assisting individuals to cross borders illegally,
    blackmail, forced labor, or illegal deprivation of freedom.
        Romania is both a source and a transit country for trafficked women
    and girls. The full extent of the problem is not known, since neither
    the Government nor NGO's maintain statistics on this issue; however,
    there is evidence that the problem is growing. The International
    Organization for Migration (IOM) office in the country reported that
    during the year about 141 women and girls were repatriated from sexual
    slavery by December, including 7 from Cambodia and 5 from Moldova.
    Figures for 1999 were less than 10. The number of individuals
    prosecuted for prostitution and procurement has been increasing since
    1997, but this phenomenon appears to be partially due to an increased
    awareness of the problem among law enforcement officials as well as to
    an increase in the activities themselves. The IOM Romania estimates
    that as many as 20,000 women are trafficked from Romania each year.
        It is estimated that there are between 20,000 to 22,000 illegal
    immigrants, and that part of this total is a result of illegal
    trafficking. According to official statistics, 28 groups that tried to
    transit the country illegally were discovered in 1998. Women reportedly
    were trafficked to Serbia, Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and
    Herzegovina, Greece, Italy, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
    Poland, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and Cambodia. Romania remains a
    popular transit country for persons, especially women, being trafficked
    from the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and other parts of the former
    Soviet Union. Iasi and Timisoara are major centers. Romania is also a
    source country; in 1997 the Government of Turkey deported some 7,000
    Romanian women. Authorities in the Netherlands broke up a trafficking
    ring late in 1999 that victimized some women from Romania. In May of
    this year, the Romanian embassy in Abu Dhabi had under its protection 3
    Romanian women who alleged that they were brought to the United Arab
    Emirates under false pretenses and were forced to engage in
    prostitution. Their passports were allegedly confiscated by their
    traffickers. In August Cambodian police and U.N. human rights officers
    rescued seven women from Romania and Moldova who had been trafficked
    and forced into prostitution there.
        Women often are recruited to work abroad by friends, relatives, or
    newspaper advertisements. According to the IOM, most women were unaware
    that they would be forced into prostitution. A minority of trafficked
    women are sold into prostitution by their parents or husbands or are
    kidnaped by trafficking rings. Ministry of Interior officials reported
    that trafficking rings appear to be operated primarily by Romanians.
    Several domestic prostitution rings are active.
        No separate IOM statistics exist for children trafficked to other
    countries. The Romanian NGO Sanse Egale Pentru Femei (Equal
    Opportunities for Women) reports that cases of trafficking in children
    rose from 8 in 1997 to 43 in 1999. In 1998, the NGO Save the Children
    dealt with 101 cases of children, mostly Roma, being taken to Germany
    and Italy and being forced to work as beggars or petty thieves.
    Trafficking of girls for prostitution is also a problem. The country
    has an extensive system of orphanages with approximately 60,000
    dependents, and many are complicit in letting girls escape into
    prostitution. Children forced out of orphanages between the ages of 16
    and 18 often have no identity documents, very little education, and
    few, if any job skills. NGO's estimate that many girls from these
    orphanages fall victim to trafficking networks.
        Legislation is generally inadequate to deal with this issue, and
    while the Government is beginning to recognize trafficking as a
    problem, it has not yet been able to mount any effective efforts to
    combat it. Corruption in the police force, particularly in local
    forces, also may contribute to the problem. Police officials often deny
    that Romania is a source country for trafficking; however, acceptance
    of the problem is slowly growing.
        One problem raised by law enforcement officers is that victims
    transiting or leaving the country may be doing so voluntarily, under
    the false belief they are accepting legitimate jobs or are unaware of
    the exploitation they will face if they are aware that they are to be
    prostitutes. Victims returned to Romania in the past have been
    prosecuted for the crime of leaving the country illegally, reducing
    their willingness to return or to cooperate with law enforcement
    authorities. Because there is no legislation that directly addresses
    trafficking, victims have no way to press charges against traffickers.
    The law also does not ensure a woman's safety if she decides to speak
    out against a trafficker. Legislation for the protection of minors is
    similarly inadequate.
        A very small number of local NGO's deal with trafficking issues.
    There are two shelters for victims of sexual abuse. Some NGO's
    expressed fear of reprisal from organized crime groups as a deterrent
    that prevents them from taking aggressive action against traffickers.
    NGO's are having some success in providing training for and working
    with local police forces on trafficking.
        Awareness of human trafficking is low. No large-scale awareness
    campaigns have been launched to publicize the issue and the dangers of
    accepting employment abroad. The IOM, working with local NGO's, plans
    to start a campaign in 2001.
        The Southeastern Europe Cooperation Initiative's task force on
    trafficking in human beings met twice during the year. As part of this
    initiative a seven man police unit of officers fully dedicated to
    combating human trafficking was established in November and December.
                                   __________

                                     RUSSIA

        The 1993 Constitution established a governmental structure with a
    strong head of state (a president), a government headed by a prime
    minister, and a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly) consisting of
    the State Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house).
    Unlike its predecessor, this Duma is characterized by a strong pro-
    presidential center that puts a majority within reach of almost all
    presidential priorities. Both the President and the Duma were selected
    in competitive elections, with a broad range of political parties and
    movements contesting offices. President Vladimir Putin was elected in
    March, and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov took office in May. Both the
    presidential elections and the December 1999 Duma Elections were judged
    by international observers to be largely free and fair, although in
    both cases preelection manipulation of the media was a problem. There
    were credible reports in March of election fraud in some locations;
    however, there was no evidence that such abuses affected the outcome of
    the presidential election. There were some modifications to the
    legislature and administrative structures; however, democratic
    institution building continues to face serious challenges, in part due
    to significant limitations on the state's financial resources. The
    judiciary, although still seriously impaired by a lack of resources and
    by high levels of corruption, has shown signs of limited independence.
        The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security
    Service (FSB), the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are
    responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government. The FSB
    has broad law enforcement functions, including fighting crime and
    corruption, in addition to its core responsibilities of security,
    counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. The FSB operates with only
    limited oversight by the Procuracy and the courts. The primary mission
    of the armed forces is national defense, although they have been
    employed in local internal conflicts for which they are prepared
    inadequately, and they are available to control civil disturbances.
    Internal security threats in parts of the Russian Federation in some
    recent cases have been dealt with by militarized elements of the
    security services. These same organizations are tasked with domestic
    law enforcement. Members of the security forces, particularly within
    the internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit numerous, serious
    human rights abuses.
        Economic recovery following the August 1998 financial crisis and
    the steep ruble devaluation continued to exceed expectations. Gross
    domestic product (GDP) grew 3.5 percent in 1999, and according to
    preliminary estimates was 7.6 percent in 2000. Industrial production
    increased by 9 percent in 2000. GDP was estimated at $197.1 billion for
    the year. In 1999 inflation was 36.5 percent; by year's end it was 20.2
    percent. The ruble's devaluation continued to give domestic producers a
    significant cost advantage over imported goods, although the ruble has
    appreciated approximately 10 percent since the 1998 crisis. Economic
    growth during the year was led by a recovery in domestic demand, with
    net exports contributing less than in previous years. Real income grew
    in the first half of the year by 8.7 percent, compared with the same
    period in 1999 but remained 10 percent lower than in 1998 and 25
    percent lower than in 1997. Average wages increased to $89 per month by
    year's end, compared with $66 per month in the fall of 1999. However,
    approximately 36 percent of citizens continue to live below the
    official monthly subsistence level of $35. Official unemployment was
    10.2 percent, down from 12 percent at the beginning of the year.
    Reported levels of barter transactions--which make up a significant
    element in the economy--declined steadily in 1999, stabilizing during
    the last quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of the year. Corruption
    continued to be a negative factor in the development of the economy and
    commercial relations.
        Although the Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens in many areas, serious problems remain, including the
    independence and freedom of the media and the conditions of pre-trial
    detention and torture of prisoners. Its record was poor in Chechnya,
    where the Russian security forces demonstrated little respect for basic
    human rights and there were credible reports of serious violations.
    There were numerous reports of extrajudicial killings by both the
    Government and Chechen separatists. Beatings by security officials
    throughout the country resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Law
    enforcement and correctional officials tortured and severely beat
    detainees and inmates. Police also beat, harassed, and extorted money
    from persons. Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh and
    frequently life-threatening. According to human rights groups,
    approximately 11,000 detainees and prison inmates die in penitentiary
    facilities annually, some from beatings, but most as a result of
    overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and lack of
    medical care. The Government made little progress in combating abuses
    committed by soldiers, including ``dedovshchina'' (violent hazing of
    new recruits). Military justice systems consistent with democratic
    practices remained largely underdeveloped. While the military Procuracy
    reported decreases in the number of reported crimes and hazing
    incidents in 1999, human rights groups continued to receive the same
    number of complaints of such abuses and claimed that only about 10 to
    12 percent of serious cases are reported. Existing laws on military
    courts, military service, and the rights of service members often
    contradict the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees,
    elevating arbitrary judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law.
        Arbitrary arrest and detention and police corruption remain
    problems. Police and other security forces in various parts of the
    country continued their practice of harassing citizens from the
    Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, and darker-skinned persons in general
    through arbitrary searches, detention, beatings, and extortions on the
    pretext of fighting crime and enforcing residential registration
    requirements. In August human rights groups in Moscow complained of
    increased detentions of persons from the Caucasus. Lengthy pretrial
    detention remained a serious problem. Institutions such as the Ministry
    of Internal Affairs have attempted to educate officers about
    safeguarding human rights during law enforcement activities through
    training provided by other countries; however, such institutions remain
    largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent
    with standards of law enforcement in a democratic society. The
    President and the Government were mostly silent about violations of
    human rights and democratic practice. While the President made
    statements about the need for a ``dictatorship of law,'' the Government
    has not institutionalized the rule of law required to protect human
    rights. Most abuses occur at lower levels, but government officials do
    not investigate the majority of cases of abuse and rarely dismiss or
    discipline the perpetrators.
        The Government made no progress during the year in the
    implementation of constitutional provisions for due process, fair and
    timely trial, and humane punishment. In addition the judiciary often
    was subject to manipulation by central and local political authorities
    and was plagued by large case backlogs and trial delays. There were
    some indications that the law was becoming an increasingly important
    tool for those seeking to protect human rights; however, serious
    problems remain. For example, in August the Procurator appealed the
    December 1999 ruling by a St. Petersburg judge that found Aleksandr
    Nikitin, a retired Soviet Navy captain and environmental reporter, not
    guilty on charges of treason and espionage. The Presidium of the
    Supreme Court rejected this appeal on September 13, ending Nikitin's
    four year legal battle with the FSB and the Procurator.
        Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
    Government technical regulations that require Internet service
    providers and telecommunications companies to invest in equipment that
    enables the FSB to monitor Internet traffic, telephone calls, and
    pagers without judicial approval caused serious concern. However, in
    response to a challenge by a St. Petersburg journalist, the Supreme
    Court ruled in September that the FSB is required to obtain and show
    court approval to telecommunications companies before it can proceed to
    initiate surveillance. Past practices raised questions among many
    observers about whether the FSB would abide by this ruling.
        The Government's record on media freedom worsened and significant
    problems persist. There was persistent evidence of government pressure
    on the media. Federal, regional, and local governments continued to
    exert pressure on journalists by: initiating investigations by the
    federal tax police, FSB, and MVD of media companies such as independent
    Media-Most; selectively denying access to information (including, for
    example, statistics theoretically available to the public) and filming
    opportunities; demanding the right to approve certain stories prior to
    publication; prohibiting the tape recording of public trials and
    hearings; withholding financial support from government media
    operations that exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to
    influence unduly the appointment of senior editors at regional and
    local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; and removing
    reporters from their jobs and bringing libel suits against them. The
    disappearance and subsequent arrest and prosecution of Radio Liberty
    reporter Andrey Babitskiy caused great concern, since there was
    credible evidence that the Babitsky case was politically motivated and
    that units of the Federal Government were involved in trying to silence
    critical reporting about the Chechen conflict.
        The Federal Government took few steps to mitigate the potentially
    discriminatory effects of a 1997 religion law that required national
    and local religious organizations to register or reregister with the
    Government. By year's end approximately 70 percent of religious
    organizations had managed to register or reregister their local
    organizations successfully. There were numerous reports that religious
    organizations from certain minority or ``nontraditional'' denominations
    either were denied registration or experienced long delays in
    reregistration. The delays in reregistration are in part due to the
    slow pace at which the federal Ministry of Justice at first
    disseminated the regulations and guidelines to local authorities and to
    understaffing both at the Ministry of Justice and at local levels.
    However, delays and rejections also are due in part to discrimination
    by some local officials. Religious organizations and human rights
    experts have suggested repeatedly that the law be amended to extend the
    period for reregistration to prevent a situation in which a large
    number of religious organizations are left unregistered and therefore
    vulnerable to legal liquidation by court order after year's end. No
    extension was implemented by year's end. While the previous
    presidential administration promised to implement measures to
    discourage local authorities from attempting to liquidate (i.e.,
    eliminate the organization's status as a juridical person) unregistered
    religious organizations, President Putin and the Government did not to
    comment on the law by year's end. Critics of the Religion Law fear
    that, while the law does not require the closure of unregistered
    religious organizations, that may be the practical effect of losing
    legal status. Discriminatory practices at the local level were
    attributable in part to the decentralization of power that took place
    during the Yeltsin administration, as well as to government inaction
    and widely held discriminatory attitudes; it remains unclear whether
    President Putin's efforts to strengthen central authority throughout
    the country might in some cases affect the situation for religious
    minorities.
        Despite constitutional protections for citizens' freedom of
    movement, the Government places some limits on this right, and some
    regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow)
    restrict movement through residence registration mechanisms. These
    restrictions, although repeatedly challenged in city court (most
    recently in September with success by a human rights organization),
    remain largely in force and are tolerated by the Federal Government.
    The presence of these restrictions, which increased following terrorist
    bombings in September 1999 and were reinvigorated following an
    explosion in Moscow in August, demonstrated the continued obstacles to
    the enforcement of judicial rulings.
        Government institutions intended to protect human rights are still
    weak and lack independence but are becoming more active. Human Rights
    Ombudsman Oleg Mironov has played an increasingly public role in
    promoting human rights, speaking out on human rights abuses in pretrial
    detention, Chechnya, psychiatry, and on religious freedom. Mironov has
    an office with 150 staff members who investigate human rights
    complaints and promote human rights education. The Presidential Human
    Rights Commission, chaired by Vladimir Kartashkin, also investigates
    human rights complaints and promotes human rights education. Kartashkin
    currently is working with the armed forces to introduce human rights
    training manuals for soldiers. Nonetheless, the Presidential Commission
    has not played a vital role and receives limited financial support from
    the Government. The Office of Vladimir Kalamanov, the Presidential
    Representative for Securing and Defending Human Rights and Freedoms in
    Chechnya, is understaffed, underfunded, and has as limited mandate.
    While Kalamanov worked with the Council of Europe and the
    nongovernmental organization Memorial, he lacked a prosecutorial
    mandate and even the independence and resources to monitor human rights
    abuses adequately. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in the human
    rights field documented and reported on human rights violations;
    however, they also reported some limited governmental interference.
    Some environmental and human rights groups complained of harassment
    from the Procuracy, tax police, and the FSB. In August armed masked men
    accompanied by a local police official in uniform raided the office in
    Moscow of the Glasnost Public Foundation, a human rights organization,
    holding personnel at gunpoint for nearly 40 minutes.
        Violence against women, and the abuse of children remain problems,
    as does discrimination against women and religious and ethnic
    minorities. People with disabilities continue to face immense problems
    from both societal attitudes and lack of governmental support. Societal
    discrimination, harassment, and violence against members of some
    religious minorities remained a problem. Although there were
    improvements in some areas, there were continued reports of religious
    violence in the North Caucasus and several serious anti-Semitic
    incidents to which the government did not adequately respond. There
    were credible allegations of politically motivated government
    interference in the internal affairs of the Jewish community. There are
    some limits on worker rights, and there were reports of instances of
    forced labor. Trafficking in women and young girls is a serious
    problem.
        Chechen separatists reportedly committed abuses, including the
    killing of civilians and Russian security forces they captured.
    Government officials accused separatists of organizing and carrying out
    a series of bomb attacks throughout the country beginning in September
    1999 and continuing into the year; hundreds of civilians were killed or
    injured.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed political killings by agents of the Government.
        During the conflict in Chechnya in February, there were credible
    reports that the military used indiscriminate force in areas of
    significant civilian populations, resulting in numerous deaths (see
    Section 1.g.). There also were credible reports that military forces
    engaged in extrajudicial killings in Chechnya. For example, on February
    5 Russian riot police and contract soldiers (men hired by the military
    for short-term service contracts) executed at least 60 civilians in
    Aldi and Chernorechiye, suburbs of Grozny. The perpetrators raped some
    of the victims and extorted money, later setting many houses on fire to
    destroy evidence. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), authorities
    suspended their investigation of the incident, and there were no
    indications that those responsible for similar incidents in late 1999
    were apprehended or punished (see Section 1.g.). According to the
    Presidential press service, since the start of the second war in
    Chechnya, 35 cases relating to crimes committed by servicemen against
    the local population were initiated; seven have been found guilty.
    NGO's argue that this is only a fraction of the true number of cases
    and there is little or no progress in accountability. According to HRW,
    no one has been held accountable for the extrajudicial killings of 130
    civilians in Alkjan-Yurt, Staropromyslovski, and Novye Aldi in late
    1999 and 2000.
        A number of government officials were murdered throughout the
    country. Some of these killings appear to have been politically
    motivated, connected with the ongoing strife in Chechnya, and others
    may be connected to local politics. For example, on December 5 Svetlana
    Semenova, SPS regional coordinator for the Leningrad Oblast was
    murdered; that same day the Mayor of Murom, Petr Kaurov was also
    murdered. It is not clear whether these incidents were politically
    motivated.
        An estimated 11,000 detainees and prisoners died during the year
    (see Section 1.e.). Hazing in the armed forces resulted in the deaths
    of servicemen (see Section 1.c.).
        On August 11, a bomb exploded in a crowded Moscow pedestrian way at
    the Pushkinskaya metro station, killing 12 people and injuring nearly
    90. Government officials implied at first that Chechnya-based Islamic
    extremist groups were responsible for the bombing and arrested four
    Muslim suspects from the Northern Caucasus. However, investigators have
    not ruled out the possibility that the incident was a result of feuding
    between rival criminal gangs.
        According to media reports in February, a woman was being held in
    connection with the murder of a prominent member of Parliament, Galina
    Starovoitova. Starovoitova was shot outside of her apartment in 1998 in
    what appeared to be a political killing. In 1999 a former police
    officer became a suspect in the assassination, but charges were dropped
    due to lack of evidence.
        There were no developments in the 1999 killings of the St.
    Petersburg Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Gennadiy Tuganov and
    Deputy Mayor Mikhail Menevich. In the case of St. Petersburg
    legislative assembly Deputy Viktor Novoselov, police arrested the
    killers but had no information on who hired them.
        On November 9, a military court began hearings against five former
    military intelligence officers accused of organizing the murder of
    ``Moskovskii Kosomolets'' journalist Dmitri Kholodov. A sixth
    defendant, the head of a bodyguard agency, is charged with complicity.
    Kholodov was killed by a suitcase bomb in 1994; at the time of his
    murder, he was investigating widespread corruption among the military
    leadership.
        There were no developments in the 1998 murder of St. Petersburg
    city official Yevgeniy Agarev, although the investigation into the case
    reportedly continues. There were no developments in the 1998 murders of
    Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation to the Chechen Republic
    Akmal Saidov, Dagestani mufti Said-Mukhamed Abubakarov, or Chechen
    official Shadid Bargishev.
        Religious figures also were kidnaped and killed in Chechnya during
    the year (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 5).
        There were credible press reports that Chechen separatists tortured
    and killed a number of civilians and Russian captives. For example, on
    September 10, separatists shot and killed Mayor of Oktyabrskoye village
    Bukara Akhmatov. Government officials accuse separatists of organizing
    and carrying out a series of bomb attacks throughout the country
    beginning in September 1999. Since then, authorities have tied
    incidents in Dagestan and several cities in Southern Russia to
    separatists. Authorities have produced evidence and tried and convicted
    at least six persons for bombings around Russia. In addition
    separatists have executed summarily Russian soldiers whom they have
    taken prisoner (see Section 1.g.).
        There has been no resolution to the December 1998 beheading of four
    foreign telecommunications workers, whom kidnapers had been holding
    hostage in Chechnya for 2 months.
        Government forces and Chechen Separatists have used landmines
    extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since August 1999 (see Section
    1.g.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were reports of Government involvement in
    politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya. According to credible
    reports, units of the Government were involved in the detention and the
    temporary disappearance of journalist Andrey Babitskiy in January. The
    Government at first denied any knowledge of Babitskiy's whereabouts,
    but after considerable international pressure officials asserted that
    the journalist was in the custody of ``local Chechens.'' Despite
    assurances that Babitskiy would be released on February 2, Russian
    officials declared the following day that he had been delivered to
    Chechen separatists in exchange for three Russian prisoners of war.
    However, separatists denied they had participated in such an exchange
    or that they held Babitskiy. Almost 2 months after his initial
    disappearance, Babitskiy was released but then was held by Russian
    authorities at a detention center in Makhachkala, Dagestan. Authorities
    stated that he had been charged with carrying a falsified passport.
    Babitskiy subsequently claimed that the passport was thrust upon him,
    essentially to set him up to be arrested. Journalists and human rights
    activists believe Babitskiy was targeted by the Government for his
    critical reports on the conflict in Chechnya. Babitskiy was tried in
    Makhachkala in September and convicted of possession and use of a false
    passport. However, he was covered under the amnesty granted for the
    anniversary of World War II and was released (see Sections 1.g. and
    2.a.).
        The NGO Memorial claimed in October that the total number of
    detainees had exceeded 15,000 persons. Many of these persons
    disappeared, but the majority were bought back by relatives. Memorial
    estimated that the number of individuals unaccounted for was somewhere
    between several hundred to one thousand.
        In a December report, Vladimir Kalamanov, the President's Special
    Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya, stated that his office had
    received complaints of 853 disappearances by year's end. His office
    forwarded a list of 462 missing residents of Chechnya to the Ministry
    of Interior. Forty-eight of the 462 were found to have been convicted
    and incarcerated into corrective labor institutions. According to this
    report, the Government began 34 criminal cases in connection with the
    disappearances of persons after their detention, including the Chairman
    of the Chechen Parliament, R.A. Alikhagiyev. Several media reports in
    October claimed that Alikhagiyev was being held in Lefortovo prison by
    the FSB; however, to at year's end there is no word on his whereabouts.
        In 1999 Chechen president Maskhadov's adviser on relations with
    ethnic Russians, himself a Russian, was kidnaped in Grozny.
        On March 5, 1999, unknown assailants abducted Major General
    Gennadiy Shipgun--the Interior Ministry's special envoy to Chechnya--
    from his airplane at Grozny airport. Although the motives behind
    Shipgun's kidnaping are unclear, Russian press reports indicate that
    his role in the 1994-96 Chechen war earned him much local animosity.
    Chechen law enforcement officials later claimed to have issued arrest
    warrants for six unnamed assailants. Russian authorities reported that
    what most likely were Shipgun's remains were found in May; forensics
    tests were being conducted in a laboratory in Rostov at year's end.
        There has been no progress in the case against the alleged
    kidnapers of a foreign missionary and university instructor, who was
    kidnaped in the Dagestan capital of Makhachkala in November 1998. In
    1999 Dagestani law enforcement officials told the Russian press that
    they had arrested four unnamed suspects in connection with the case.
    Russian and Ingush interior ministry troops later freed the victim on
    June 29, 1999. Other religious figures also were kidnaped (see Sections
    1.a. and 5).
        Kidnaping frequently is used by criminal groups in the Northern
    Caucasus, some of which may have links to elements of the separatist
    forces. The main motivation behind such cases apparently is ransom,
    although some cases have political or religious overtones. Many of the
    hostages are being held in Chechnya or Dagestan. For example, Alla
    Geyfman, the daughter of a Jewish businessman, was held for nearly 7
    months by a Chechen gang demanding ransom. She was freed in February by
    security forces.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits torture,
    violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment;
    however, there are credible reports that law enforcement personnel
    regularly use torture to coerce confessions from suspects and that the
    Government does not hold most of the torturers accountable for their
    actions. There were credible reports that Government and separatist
    forces in Chechnya tortured detainees. There are also claims of abuse
    of psychiatry by authorities. Institutions such as the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding
    human rights during law enforcement activities through training
    provided by other countries but remain largely unreformed and have not
    yet adopted practices fully consistent with law enforcement in a
    democratic society. Since torture has never been defined in a
    subsequent law or the Criminal Code and is only mentioned in the
    Constitution, it is difficult to charge perpetrators. Police only can
    be accused of exceeding granted authority, a far milder violation of
    the Criminal Code.
        Prisoners' rights groups, as well as other human rights groups,
    documented numerous cases in which law enforcement and correctional
    officials tortured and beat detainees and suspects. Human rights groups
    describe the practice of torture as ``widespread.'' Numerous press
    reports indicate that the police frequently strike persons based on
    little or no provocation or use excessive force to subdue those whom
    they arrest. Reports by refugees, NGO's, and the press suggest a
    pattern of beatings, arrests, and extortion by police against persons
    with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus, Central Asia,
    or Africa. However, press reports and human rights groups indicate that
    police in some republics engage in beatings and torture as part of
    investigative procedures as well. Police also increasingly harassed
    defense lawyers, including beatings and arrests, and intimidated
    witnesses (see Section 1.e.). Police are reported to plant drugs and
    other false evidence as pretexts for arrests, arrest and detain persons
    based on their political views and religious beliefs, and conduct
    illegal searches of homes. Police also are reported often to extort
    money from suspects, their friends, and their relatives.
        According to Human Rights Watch's (HRW) report on torture in Russia
    released in November 1999, torture by police officers usually occurs
    within the first few hours or days of arrest and usually takes one of
    four forms: beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation
    using gas masks or bags (sometimes filled with mace); electric shocks;
    or suspension of body parts (e.g. suspending a victim from the wrists,
    which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of torture are
    difficult to substantiate because of lack of access by medical
    professionals and because the techniques used often leave few or no
    permanent physical traces.
        Research conducted by HRW indicates that the country's justice
    system encourages police to resort to torture and hampers an adequate
    defense of the accused. Law enforcement entities are expected to meet
    an unreasonably high 80 percent target rate for solving crimes, despite
    the loss of experienced officers and underfunding since the breakup of
    the Soviet Union. The official rate for crimes solved in 1998 was 74.4
    percent; experts consider a 30 to 40 percent rate to be consistent with
    democratic practices and international standards for due process.
        In 1999 Sergey Pashin, a Moscow judge and rule of law activist,
    stated repeatedly that, in the cases that come before him, confessions
    often have been coerced from suspects through beatings. He also charged
    that ``witnesses'' often have been beaten to force them into
    testifying, when in fact they may have no knowledge of the case. As
    Pashin has told the press, he estimates that out of 1,200 official
    torture complaints received in the country annually, only 20 criminal
    investigations are opened, and only 3 or 4 go to trial. Human Rights
    Ombudsman Oleg Mironov estimated in October that 50 percent of
    prisoners with whom he spoke claimed to have been tortured. In April
    1998, the Permanent Human Rights Chamber, an advisory presidential
    committee, concluded that torture was ``common'' among representatives
    of the Ministry of Interior, and that it was ``widespread and
    systematic,'' especially in the pretrial stages of law enforcement.
    Yakov Pister, head of the administration of the Procurator General's
    office, testified to the Chamber that the Criminal Code has no
    definition of torture, and that no statistics were gathered on the use
    of torture. He blamed police reliance on torture as a means of
    gathering evidence on a lack of professional training.
        HRW noted that, assuming that they are aware of their rights under
    the law, defendants often are not granted access to defense attorneys
    or to medical treatment. Pretrial detention conditions are so miserable
    that defendants sometimes confess simply to be moved to relatively
    easier prison conditions. Retractions of forced confessions usually are
    ignored. The accused can spend many months or even years in pretrial
    detention because the current criminal procedure code allows judges to
    send cases back for investigation an unlimited number of times (see
    Section 1.e.).
        Under the ``Operation Clean Hands'' program, created in 1995, MVD
    officials continued to combat police crime. By the end of 1998, more
    than 34,000 citizen complaints were lodged against police officers.
    Over 2,100 cases were initiated against police personnel. Of that
    number, 922 were group crimes, and 127 included civilian perpetrators.
    For example, in Ulyanovsk court, proceedings were initiated against
    five militiamen on charges of ``exceeding their authority,'' for
    regularly subjecting young male suspects to torture. A Ministry of
    Justice (MOJ) official estimated that during the first nine months of
    the year, the number of cases initiated against police personnel was
    similar to the number registered during the same period in 1999, with
    108 convictions in the first six months of the year.
        Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not
    limited to the practice of ``dedovshchina'' (the violent, sometimes
    fatal, hazing of new junior recruits for the armed services, MVD, and
    border guards), continued during the year. Press reports citing serving
    and former armed forces personnel, the Military Procurator's Office,
    and NGO's monitoring conditions in the armed forces indicate that this
    mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods in the
    face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings. Press
    reports also indicate that this type of mistreatment resulted in
    permanent injuries and deaths among servicemen. Soldiers often do not
    report hazing to either unit officers or military procurators due to
    fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or
    even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There
    are also reports that officers in some cases use beatings to discipline
    soldiers whom they find to be ``inattentive to their duties.''
        In July 1999, the Main Military Procurator's Office (MMPO) reported
    that cases involving the abuse of military position or authority
    increased by 23 percent. Half of such cases involved physical violence.
    However, the MMPO also recorded a 14 percent drop in reported crimes
    during 1999 and a 10 percent decrease in reports of hazing. Statistics
    for the year were unavailable, although MMPO officials estimated that
    from January to June, over 4,800 investigations into allegations of
    human rights abuses were initiated.
        Both the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committee (USMC) and the MPPO
    also noted an increase in the number of reports about ``nonstatutory
    relations'' in which officers or sergeants physically assault or demean
    their subordinates. This tendency commonly is attributed to stressful
    conditions throughout the armed forces and to the widespread placement
    of inexperienced reserve officers, on active duty for 2 years, in
    primary troop leadership positions. In 1998 every second draftee
    expressed concern that his life, health, or sanity would be threatened
    during the period of military service by such incidents.
        In the navy, investigations reportedly uncovered about 20 incidents
    of nonstatutory treatment of sailors since the beginning of 1999 just
    on the aircraft carrier cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov. Similar activity,
    including the theft of hardware and weapons by sailors seeking to
    escape hazing, reportedly was uncovered on the heavy nuclear cruiser
    (and flagship) Petr Velikiy in 1999. According to press reports, in
    September, a warrant officer on a Pacific Fleet ship became drunk and
    began to beat enlisted men on board. As a result, 41 sailors, over half
    the ship's company, left the ship and went to the Pacific Fleet
    Headquarters to complain about repeated, savage beatings by drunken
    noncommissioned officers. Admiral Rasskazov told the press that sailors
    complain to him or to prosecutors every day. In the same article, a
    prosecutor revealed that, as of July 10, criminal cases had been filed
    in Vladivostok against naval officers and sailors who ``tortured''
    their subordinates and shipmates.
        Other reported abuses of armed forces personnel included the
    practice by officers and sergeants of ``selling'' soldiers to others as
    slave labor (to build dachas, etc.) or to other officers who have a
    military need for personnel but are not able to work through the
    system, most often linked to units in the Northern Caucasus military
    district. The USMC reported that such practices continue. In one recent
    complaint received in the USMC's Moscow office, a soldier was allegedly
    sold for approximately $2 (50 rubles) to another unit. In another case,
    an officer bought a soldier for 10 bottles of vodka. The USMC continues
    to receive complaints about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
    accused it of being among the worst of the branches in its human rights
    record.
        The MMPO continues to cooperate with the USMC to investigate
    allegations of abuse and established telephone and postal ``hot lines''
    to receive reports directly from soldiers. Nonetheless, the USMC
    believes that the majority of hazing incidents and assaults are not
    reported, due to fear of reprisals, indifference of commanders, and
    deliberate efforts to cover up such activity. The USMC estimates that
    only 10 to 12 percent of serious incidents are reported; it received
    nearly 4,000 complaints in its Moscow office alone during the year.
        According to the armed forces' Medical Service, approximately 45
    percent of military personnel committing or attempting suicide were
    driven to it by either physical abuse or the often inhuman conditions
    of military service. Nonpayment of wages could also be a factor,
    although nonpayment decreased significantly during the year. (However,
    contract soldiers serving in Chechnya complained of chronic nonpayment,
    and in some cases, such as in Rostov on the Don in September, they
    engaged in protests). The USMC reported in 1997 that in 60 percent of
    the cases brought to the authorities attention, there was an official
    finding that abuse had taken place, and that some disciplinary action
    was taken as a result. These figures remained unchanged by year's end.
    The deteriorating quality of the armed forces, cited as the main reason
    for the breakdown in discipline, is aggravated by negligence during the
    conscription process. A rise in the acceptance of draftees who are
    unfit for military service allegedly also is contributing to crime
    within the armed forces. Draft evasion is common, including the
    reported ``purchase'' of unwarranted medical deferments by potential
    conscripts otherwise ineligible for one of the many categories of legal
    deferment. The Military Procuracy continued its campaign against draft
    evasion and cracked down on conscription abuses. The USMC reported that
    after the spring draft, police often dragged unsuspecting recruits
    without documents, regardless of their mental or physical health, into
    draft board offices.
        Degrading and substandard living conditions persist throughout the
    armed forces, principally due to insufficient funding. August
    television reports of naval housing in the Murmansk region showed
    decrepit, crowded apartments even for officers.
        Despite the acknowledged seriousness of the problem, the leadership
    of the armed forces has made only superficial efforts to implement
    substantive reforms in training, education, and administration programs
    within units to combat abuse. Their limited efforts were due at least
    in part to lack of funding and the leadership's preoccupation with
    urgent reorganization problems and the fighting in Chechnya.
        There was still no law providing for the constitutional right to
    alternative civilian service, and the proposal for an all-volunteer
    armed forces has been put off indefinitely by the Government's
    inability to raise military pay sufficiently. Although some regional
    authorities have attempted to introduce alternative service programs,
    national legislation necessary to implement the constitutional right to
    alternative service has not been passed by the Duma. Without such
    legislation there is no legal basis beyond the constitutional language
    itself for any alternative service program. As a result, the courts
    often rule against the individual based upon the legal requirements
    relating to military service.
        The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment
    prevalent during the Soviet era has ended. However, human rights groups
    charge that psychiatric hospitals continue to conceal their archives
    and their practices. Further, authorities reportedly still sometimes
    abuse the practice of psychiatry for other purposes. The Independent
    Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with several human rights
    organizations, has criticized the use of psychiatry in
    ``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects'' and in testifying
    against ``nontraditional'' religions in court cases. In deprogramming
    cases, authorities allegedly use pseudo-psychological and spiritual
    techniques to ``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious
    groups (see Section 2.c.). Human rights groups are concerned about
    court-appointed ``expert commissions'' charged with evaluating rituals,
    beliefs, and the mental health of believers. Groups assert that the
    commissions lack objectivity and often act under pressure from regional
    authorities negatively disposed toward the religious denominations.
        Yuriy Savenko, Head of the Independent Psychiatric Association of
    Russia (originally formed during the Soviet era when psychiatric
    hospitals were used to punish dissidents), and other human rights
    activists such as the Moscow Helsinki Group head Lyudmila Aleksyeva,
    criticized the trial of Platon Obukhov, a Russian diplomat charged with
    espionage. Although independent psychiatrists deemed Obukhov mentally
    unfit to stand trial, a court-appointed commission found him competent.
    Human rights activists charge that the evaluation was based on
    political considerations and pressure from the FSB. Obukhov's case is
    currently under appeal.
        Prison conditions are extremely harsh and frequently life
    threatening. Since 1998 the penitentiary system has been administered
    centrally from Moscow by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of
    Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the
    Ministry of Education all maintain penal facilities. There are five
    basic forms of custody in the criminal justice system: Police detention
    centers, pretrial detention (SIZO's), correctional labor colonies
    (ITK's), prisons designated for those who violate ITK rules, and
    educational labor colonies (VTK's) for juveniles. Responsibility for
    operating the country's penal facilities falls under the Ministry of
    Justice's Main Directorate for Execution of Sentences (GUIN). The
    country's penal institutions remain extremely overcrowded. According to
    January statistics of the Public Center for Penitentiary Reform (PCPR),
    1,060,000 persons were incarcerated in the prison system run by GUIN.
    By year's end, PCPR estimated there had been a decrease of prisoners
    that brought the total to 912,100, approximately 655 per 100,000
    persons of the population at large. While this number only includes
    prisoners in the GUIN system, PCPR estimates that approximately 90
    percent of all prisoners fall into this system. Conditions for
    detainees and prisoners in most government facilities remain extremely
    harsh. According to the 1995 Law On the Detention of Those Suspected or
    Accused of Committing Crimes, inmates must be provided with adequate
    space, food, and medical attention. Although most of the law's
    provisions went into effect at the end of 1996, the authorities were
    not able to ensure compliance, due in part to lack of funds, most
    judges' failure to use the option of bail, and a very large prison
    population.
        Conditions in police station detention centers vary considerably,
    but as a rule are harsh. In most cases, detainees are not fed and have
    no bedding, places to sleep, running water, or toilets.
        Suspects awaiting completion of criminal investigation, trial,
    sentencing, or appeal, are confined in a Special Isolation Facility
    (SIZO), which is a pretrial detention facility, mainly for a person who
    is awaiting trial. Persons can spend up to three years awaiting trial
    in a SIZO. Around 280,000 persons are held in the 195 SIZO's. Around
    65,000 are held in police detention centers with another 5,000 to 6,000
    in special facilities for the homeless. Convicts on occasion are
    imprisoned in SIZO's because there is no transport to take them
    elsewhere. Conditions in SIZO's remain extremely harsh and pose a
    serious threat to life and health. Health, nutrition, and sanitation
    standards in penal facilities remain low due to a lack of funding. Head
    lice, scabies, and various skin diseases are prevalent. Prisoners and
    detainees typically rely on families to provide them with extra food.
    The PCPR estimates that SIZO's are filled to 230 percent of capacity.
    In larger cities such as Moscow, the average space per prisoner amounts
    to 0.5 cubic meters. In the majority of police detention centers there
    is no shower and no outdoor exercise, and inmates are fed only twice a
    day. To alleviate overcrowding, the Government announced an amnesty (to
    reach 120,000). According to PCPR, on September 1 more than 99,000
    inmates were released in an amnesty (358 of them were juveniles). The
    total number amnestied was expected to reach 120,000 by November. While
    the amnesty has affected the overall number of prisoners, by most
    accounts the greatest decrease is due to the increased use of
    alternative punishments such as selective parole for certain offences.
    In some regions such as Murmansk, more than 70 percent of all convicted
    offenders are given sentences not involving incarceration. In 1998 the
    occupancy rate for the overall penitentiary system was 112 percent.
    Special facilities exclusively for women are filled to 1.5 times of
    capacity, according to a study financed by Penal Reform International.
    As of September, there were 40,800 women held in correctional labor
    colonies, according to the MCPCJR. Under such conditions, prisoners
    sleep in shifts, and there is little, if any, room to move within the
    cell. In most pretrial detention centers and prisons, there is no
    ventilation system. Poor ventilation is thought to contribute to
    cardiac problems and lowered resistance to disease. Cells are
    overcrowded and stiflingly hot in the summer.
        Correctional labor colonies (ITK's) hold the bulk of the nation's
    convicts. Of the 742 ITK's, 644 are designated for men (122 of these
    are ``timber'' correctional colonies). Although they are not as crowded
    as SIZO's, guards reportedly severely discipline prisoners to break
    down resistance. Prisoners sometimes are humiliated, beaten, and
    starved. According to the PCPR, conditions in the ITK's are better than
    in SIZO's prisons only to the extent that there is fresh air. In the
    timber correctional colonies, where hardened criminals serve their
    time, beatings, torture, and rape by guards reportedly are common. A
    total 678,500 male prisoners and 40,800 female prisoners are held in
    the ITK's. Of the 34 colonies for women, there are a few special
    facilities for children to be held with their mothers (465 children up
    to 4 years old). In the educational labor facilities, there are 19,000
    males and 1,100 females. The country's ``prisons''--distinct from the
    labor colonies or ITK's--are penitentiary institutions for those who
    repeatedly violate the rules in effect in ITK's.
        Educational labor colonies for juveniles (VTK's) are facilities for
    from 14 to 20 years of age. The PCPR's September statistics indicate
    that there were approximately 20,000 persons in the 64 educational
    colonies, some 19,000 males and 1,000 females. Conditions in VTK's are
    significantly better than in ITK's, but juveniles in VTK's and juvenile
    SIZO cells reportedly also suffer from beatings, torture, and rape. The
    PCPR reports that such facilities have a poor psychological atmosphere
    and lack educational and vocational training opportunities. Many of the
    juveniles are from orphanages, have no outside support, and are unaware
    of their rights. There currently are two prisons for children in
    Moscow. Boys are held in small crowded, smoky cells with adults.
    Schooling in the prisons for children is sporadic at best, with
    students of different ages studying together when a teacher can be
    found.
        According to statistics provided by the PCPR, the proposed federal
    budget as of the end of September allocated $778 million (14 billion
    rubles) for the upkeep of the GUIN system. According to GUIN, $1.3
    billion (23 billion rubles) are needed to maintain the system
    adequately. However, the full allotment is not always spent. For
    example, in a Ryazan educational colony for females, less then $1 (18
    rubles) per day for each inmate is considered necessary. In the budget,
    the institution is allotted only 10 rubles per inmate, while in
    actuality, less than four rubles actually make it to the institution.
    There are no steps underway at present to increase the portion of the
    budget allotted to GUIN.
        According to the PCPR, conditions in penal facilities vary among
    the regions. Some regions offer assistance in the form of food,
    clothing, and medicine. NGO's and religious groups offer other support.
        Inmates in the prison system often suffer from inadequate medical
    care. Detention facilities have infection rates of tuberculosis far
    higher than in the population at large. Tuberculosis in the general
    population and especially in prisons is considered by health and human
    rights experts to be not only a national, but an international health
    threat. PCPR estimates that 96,000 prisoners suffer from infectious
    tuberculosis--approximately 42 to 43 percent of all tuberculosis
    patients in Russia. A total of 25,000 of these prisoners are infected
    with a drug-resistant form of the disease. Some 90,000 of the overall
    patients, mostly under 30 years of age, are incarcerated in SIZO's. Of
    these, 26,000 are in special prison hospital wards for tuberculosis,
    42,000 in medical facilities, and 17,000 in isolation in prison
    facilities, with the rest being held among the healthy prison
    population. The Saratov oblast administration, concerned with the
    tuberculosis crisis in facilities located there, fully funded the
    tuberculosis-related medicinal needs of prisoners, according to the
    PCPR. GUIN is working the with Soros Foundation to develop programs in
    some regions to combat tuberculosis.
        HIV/AIDS infection rates are also a source of concern. The PCPR
    estimated that there were 8,000 prisoners infected either with HIV or
    who had developed AIDS, but the lack of adequate health care precludes
    estimating the true number of such prisoners and suggests that this is
    an underestimate. Space shortages do not allow for separate facilities
    for prisoners with AIDS.
        Statistics on the number of detainees and prisoners who were killed
    or died and on the number of law enforcement and prison personnel
    disciplined for the use of excessive force are not released publicly.
    PCPR estimates that around 11,000 prisoners died in penitentiary
    facilities during the year (2,500 of whom died in SIZO's). Most died as
    a result of overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, or lack of medical
    care (the leading cause of death was heart disease), but some died due
    to beatings. The Procuracy General claimed that it receives
    approximately 1,000 complaints of torture per year, but no reliable
    figures are available. The press often reports on innocent individuals
    mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZO's; some of the reported
    cases include habitual abuse by the same officers.
        Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, is common.
    There are elaborate inmate-enforced caste systems in which informers,
    homosexuals, rapists, prison rape victims, child molesters, and others
    are considered to be ``untouchable'' and treated very harshly, with
    little or no protection provided by the prison authorities.
        At a March 1999 joint hearing at the Human Rights Chamber of the
    President's Political Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice,
    the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy
    General developed a plan to address the ``critical'' state of the
    national penal system. The proposals forwarded to the Government and
    the State Duma included provisions such as another amnesty and changes
    in the Criminal Code that could yield a prison population decrease of
    400,000 over 1 year.
        According to the PCPR, Aleksandr Zubkov, Deputy Director of GUIN in
    the Ministry of Justice, stated that the only way to reduce the prison
    population is to change the Criminal Code provisions regarding
    pretrial, parole and probation, and postconviction release measures.
    Zubkov stated that the Criminal Code is too severe and allows
    unjustifiably wide use of custody as a measure of restraint (as opposed
    to bail or release on the prisoner's own recognizance, for example).
    The PCPR called for greater use of alternatives to custody, such as
    bail and house arrest. Moreover, the PCPR reported that detainees spend
    too long in pretrial detention, in many cases as long as 3 years or
    more. The Ministry of Justice concurs with the PCPR that limits must be
    placed on time in detention awaiting trial.
        Moscow-based human rights groups make infrequent visits to prisons
    in the Moscow area, and they have neither the resources nor a national
    network to investigate conditions in all 89 regions. The pretrial
    detention centers and filtration camps for suspected Chechen fighters,
    are not usually accessible to human rights monitors (see Section 1.g.).
    In May, the ICRC began to visit persons detained by Russian
    authorities. The ICRC works throughout Russia and is especially active
    in the North Caucasus. They are currently carrying out regular prison
    visits, but by agreement with the Government, their findings are kept
    confidential. The ICRC provides advice to authorities on how to improve
    conditions.
        In January and February the remand prison at Chernokozovo was the
    principal detention center for those detained in Chechnya. Prolonged
    beatings to the genitals and to the soles of the feet, rape, electric
    shocks, tear gas and other methods of torture were used at the center.
    Guards subjected detainees to humiliation and degrading treatment. At
    least one person was beaten to death. Often prison guards and other law
    enforcement officers use torture to coerce confessions or testimony.
    Conditions improved at Chernokozovo in mid-February; however, an
    increasing number of detainees subsequently were held elsewhere and
    continued to suffer abuses, including torture, according to Human
    Rights Watch. The Government has allowed ICRC access to some facilities
    in the North Caucasus where Chechen detainees are held.
        In one of many reported incidents, a Chechen man described how he
    saw federal guards puncture detainees' eardrums and file their teeth
    and damage their lips with a file forced into their mouths--an
    apparently new form of torture. In another reported incident, a Chechen
    man was pulled from his cell, homosexually raped, and taunted with
    anti-Chechen epithets. In the case of the Chernokozovo prison, the
    torture of prisoners by federal guards came to light in part through
    reports of Andrey Babistkiy, a reporter for Radio Liberty who was
    himself detained and beaten there. According to credible reports, units
    of the Government were involved in the detention and disappearance of
    Babitskiy in January for his reporting in Chechnya (see Section 1.b.
    and 2.a.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain serious problems. The Constitution provides that the
    arrest, taking into custody, and detention of persons suspected of
    crimes are permitted only by judicial decision. Under the 1997 code the
    maximum sentence for all offenses increased from 15 years to 30 years.
    Criminal proceedings continue to be governed both by the 1997 Criminal
    Code and the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code, adopted in 1960.
        Efforts to achieve Duma approval of a new Criminal Procedure Code
    have been unsuccessful.
        There are credible reports from throughout the country that police
    detain persons without observing mandated procedures and fail to issue
    proper arrest warrants or receipts for confiscated property. This is
    especially true for persons from the Caucasus. There are credible
    reports that security forces continue regularly to single out persons
    from the Caucasus for document checks, detention, and extortion of
    bribes. In 1999 Moscow city law enforcement authorities frequently
    detained persons unlawfully for alleged violations of registration
    requirements, especially in response to the terrorist bombings in
    September 1999, when authorities detained some 2,000 persons and
    deported more than 500, according to NGO's. Russian forces commonly
    rounded up and detained groups of Chechen men at checkpoints along the
    borders and during ``mop-up'' operations following military
    hostilities, and engaged in severe beating and torture.
        In the absence of measures to implement the procedural safeguards
    contained in the Constitution, suspects often were subjected to uneven
    and arbitrary treatment by officials acting under the current Criminal
    Procedure Code and presidential decrees. The code gives procurators
    authority to issue an order of detention without a judge's
    authorization and, if police believe that the suspect has committed a
    crime or is a danger to others, to detain him for up to 48 hours
    without a warrant.
        The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide that
    detainees are entitled to have a lawyer present from the time of
    detention, during questioning following detention, and throughout
    investigation up to and including the formal filing of charges. This
    procedure generally is followed in practice. The PCPR reports that
    detainees are given the opportunity to have access to a lawyer in
    accordance with their rights. However, the Center notes that the high
    cost of legal fees and the poor quality of court-appointed public
    defenders for those lacking the funds to engage counsel effectively
    deny the majority of suspects competent legal representation. As a
    result, many prisoners do not exercise this right because they believe
    it useless. Families have access to individuals in pre-trial detention;
    however, in initial detention by the police in precincts, they may at
    times not be granted access.
        Articles 47 to 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide that in
    certain cases the court, an investigator, or a procurator is to provide
    the suspect with an advocate free of charge if the suspect cannot
    afford one. A president of a collegium of advocates must appoint a
    lawyer within 24 hours after receiving such a request. However, lawyers
    (advocates) try to avoid these cases since the Government does not in
    fact reimburse them for this work as it is supposed to do. As a result,
    in many cases indigent defendants receive little or no assistance
    during the investigation stage of the case, and such in-court
    assistance as they do receive may be rendered by poorly trained
    lawyers. At times the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning
    cannot be exercised even when the suspect can afford to pay for a
    lawyer. Human rights NGO's report that in many cases investigators deny
    access to a lawyer by various means, including restrictions on the time
    when the suspect can see his lawyer (which may mean that the lawyer has
    to wait for days to get a meeting with the client).
        A 1997 presidential decree allows police to detain persons
    suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 10 days without bringing
    charges. The law overturned two previous presidential decrees (of 1994
    and 1996) that allowed detention for up to 30 days. The 1997 decree
    also instructed the Government to submit to the Duma a draft federal
    law on preventing vagrancy and providing social rehabilitation of the
    homeless. However, according to Duma and NGO sources there is not yet
    any such draft law under consideration.
        The Criminal Procedure Code specifies that only 2 months should
    elapse between the date an investigation is initiated and the date the
    file is transferred to the procurator so that the procurator can file
    formal charges against the suspect in court. However, investigations
    seldom are completed that quickly. Some suspects spend 18 months or
    longer in detention under harsh conditions in a SIZO while the criminal
    investigation is conducted. The PCPR reports terms of pretrial
    detention extending up to 3 years, with the average ranging from 7 to
    10 months. However, in some extreme cases the PCPR reports detention
    periods of up to 5 years due to financial constraints and poor
    investigative and court work.
        The Code provides that a prosecutor may extend the period of
    criminal investigation to 6 months in ``complex'' cases. If more time
    is required in ``exceptional'' cases, the Procurator General personally
    can extend the period up to 18 months. Extensions of the investigation
    period often are issued without explanation to the detainee. Until the
    investigation is completed, the suspect is under the jurisdiction of
    the Procurator's office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs. There is no procedure for a suspect to plead guilty
    during the investigative period, although if a suspect informs the
    investigator that he is guilty, the period of the investigation usually
    is shorter than if he maintains his innocence. Suspects frequently fear
    exercising their right to request judicial review of their detention
    due to fear of angering the investigating officer.
        There also were credible reports that persons were detained far in
    excess of the permissible periods for administrative offenses, in some
    cases so that police officials could extort money from friends or
    relatives of detainees. The situation has improved somewhat since the
    issuance of the 1997 presidential decree that annulled a previous
    decree that had allowed for 30-day detentions. However, the practice of
    detaining individuals in excess of permissible periods is common, and
    this often is done for the purpose of extorting money.
        The use of bail is rare, even if suspects are not flight risks or
    have not been charged with violent crimes. This aggravates overcrowding
    in pretrial detention and, due to delays in bringing cases to trial,
    results in many suspects remaining in pretrial detention for longer
    than the maximum penalty they might face if convicted. In the
    juveniles' prisons, boys and girls (in separate facilities) are
    incarcerated in the facility for up to several years while they await
    trial and sentencing.
        Delays also plague the trial stage. Although the Criminal Procedure
    Code requires court proceedings to begin no more than 14 days after the
    judge issues an order designating the location of the trial, congestion
    in the court system frequently leads to long postponements. Judges
    often do not dismiss cases involving improper investigations or
    indictments, particularly if the procurator's case has political
    support or if the case is controversial. Such cases often are returned
    to the procurator for further investigation.
        Some regional and local authorities have taken advantage of the
    system's procedural weaknesses to arrest persons on false pretexts for
    expressing views critical of the Government. Human rights advocates in
    the regions have been charged with libel, contempt of court, or
    interference in judicial procedures in cases with distinct political
    overtones. Others have been charged with other offenses and held either
    in excess of normal periods of detention or for offenses that do not
    require detention at all (see Section 4).
        On June 2, Taisa Isayeva, a Chechen journalist, was arrested at the
    border checkpoint ``Nizhny Zaramag'', between North Ossetia and
    Georgian controlled Ossetia. Isayeva, who works for the Chechen Press
    agency based in Georgia, was detained at the border because she was
    carrying a video camera and a portable computer.
        On October 3, Primorye Regional FSB authorities opened a criminal
    case against Vladimir Schurov, Director of the Sonar Laboratory of the
    Pacific Oceanographic Institute (POI). He was charged with divulging
    state secrets, unlawful transfer of dual use technologies, and also for
    organizing a criminal group. Schurov has denied all charges.
        Russian authorities took measures in two ``espionage'' cases
    involving foreigners who worked with Russians and obtained information
    the authorities considered sensitive. In both cases, proceedings took
    place behind closed doors and the defendants and their attorneys
    encountered difficulties in learning the details of the charges. In
    both cases, the circumstances suggested that the security services were
    seeking to discourage foreigners on issues they considered to be
    sensitive.
        In November 1999 disarmament researcher Igor Sutyagin of the USA
    Canada Institute was detained on suspicion of espionage. No information
    about the specific charges was made public. At first the case appeared
    to focus on his work on a study of civil-military relations funded by
    the Canadian Defense Ministry. Sutyagin's family stated that the study
    did not deal in secret matters and was partially funded by the Russian
    Defense and Foreign ministries. Evidence in the case is secret and
    lawyers stated that Sutyagin received copies of the details on December
    15. The trial was recessed until January 9, 2001.
        Throughout the year there have also been numerous other cases of
    individuals charged with treason and detained. In August 1999
    Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soyfer filed a complaint
    in Vladivostok municipal court alleging that in early July 1999 the FSB
    confiscated a large number of documents from his apartment, the removal
    of which was not covered by its warrant and not documented in the FSB's
    official record of the search. While under investigation the FSB
    dropped the case stating that Soyfer fell under the November amnesty.
    Soyfer appealed this decision to clear his name, arguing that he was
    innocent, and that there was no basis or need to amnesty him. The court
    agreed, passing the case back to the FSB for either investigation and
    prosecution, or dropping charges.
        In October 1999 Vladimir Slivyak, director of the antinuclear
    organization Eco-Defense, announced at a press conference that Moscow
    police detained and questioned him for a few hours in September about
    his possible involvement in the August bombing of the Manezh shopping
    center in Moscow. One of Slivyak's coworkers reportedly had been framed
    on charges of drug possession. Natalya Minonova of Chelyabinsk also was
    detained and questioned by police officers in September as she and four
    other activists were on their way to city hall to deliver a letter
    protesting the potential import of spent nuclear fuel into the country.
    Authorities charged all five with hooliganism. Reportedly authorities
    told another activist in Voronezh to report to the police station for
    an ``informal conversation'' on the topic of an antinuclear camp near
    the NovoVoronezh nuclear power plant and threatened him with drug
    possession charges if he failed to appear.
        St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets ruled at the end of 1999 that
    Aleksandr Nikitin, an environmentalist and retired Soviet Navy captain,
    was not guilty on charges of espionage and treason. Although
    prosecutors later appealed the decision, the Presidium of the Supreme
    Court on September 13 upheld the acquittal. Legal observers believe
    that the legal foundations of the Golets ruling were sound and that it,
    along with the Supreme Court decision, may provide an important
    precedent in combating abuses by the FSB.
        Nikitin's case was characterized by serious violations of due
    process. There were credible charges that his detention was politically
    motivated. The FSB detained Nikitin in St. Petersburg in February 1996
    on suspicion of espionage and revealing state secrets, crimes
    punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Nikitin had been working with
    the Bellona foundation, a Norwegian environmental NGO, on the
    publication of a report detailing the hazards posed by nuclear waste
    generated by the Northern Fleet, in which Nikitin served. Indictments
    cited classified decrees that were made available to Nikitin's defense
    team only at the beginning of the trial, which finally commenced in
    October 1998, nearly 3 years after Nikitin's detention. In his December
    1999 ruling, Judge Golets argued that the secret decrees used to charge
    Nikitin violated every citizen's right to access to the law and
    therefore were not binding under the Constitution. Moreover, according
    to the ruling, investigators failed to adhere to the Criminal Code
    during the investigation and violated Nikitin's constitutional rights.
    The case against Nikitin was finally closed by the September ruling of
    the Supreme Court presidium that the prosecutor's appeal of Nikitin's
    acquittal was without merit. However, the Federal Tax Police continued
    to harass him, claiming that the money provided by Bellona for his
    legal defense was taxable income.
        Media-Most chairman Vladimir Gusinskiy was detained in Moscow's
    Butyrka Prison for three days in June, in connection with the General
    Procuracy's criminal fraud case against him. Gusinkiy left Russia in
    July, shortly after the Procuracy dropped its criminal case against
    him. Later it became known that Gusinskiy signed an agreement with
    Gazprom-Media chief Alfred Kokh just before leaving the country in
    which he pledged to sell a controlling share of his media enterprises
    to Gazprom. Gusinskiy insisted publicly that he had signed under
    duress, citing a protocol to the agreement that was co-signed by Press
    Minister Mikhail Lesin. Many observers interpreted the protocol as a
    quid pro quo in which the Government agreed to drop its criminal
    investigations of Gusinskiy and Media-Most in exchange for receipt by
    Gazprom of a controlling share in NTV and
        Media-Most. Later in the year, the General Procuracy cited
    Gusinskiy's refusal to appear for further questioning on a broader
    criminal fraud case against Media-Most as grounds for seeking his
    extradition. At year's end, Gusinskiy remained in Spain under house
    arrest as Spanish officials considered the Government's extradition
    request.
        No new arrests of human rights monitors were documented during the
    year.
        In July 1999 after 20 months in pretrial detention, military
    journalist and active-duty officer in the Pacific Fleet Grigoriy Pasko
    was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for dereliction of duty but
    immediately was released under the prisoner amnesty. However,
    prosecutors subsequently appealed the sentence and the military
    collegium of the Supreme Court dismissed the earlier conviction and
    sent the case back to Vladivostok to be retried for the more serious
    charges of espionage and treason. The trial is expected to begin in
    March 2001. Pasko originally was charged with treason and espionage
    after reporting on radioactive contamination by Russian Pacific Fleet
    sailors dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan. The trial was
    marked by a number of irregularities, including the judge's decision to
    remove one of Pasko's defense attorneys for contempt of court and also
    a key witness recanting earlier testimony claiming it had been made
    under duress from investigators. The Committee to Protect Journalists
    and the Glasnost Defense Fund observed that the case is still a
    powerful disincentive to investigative reporting (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and there are signs of limited judicial
    independence; however, the judiciary does not yet act as an effective
    counterweight to other branches of government. Efforts to develop an
    independent judiciary continue. Judges remain subject to some influence
    from the executive, military, and security forces, especially in high
    profile or political cases. The judiciary still lacks sufficient
    resources and is subject to corruption.
        The judiciary is divided into three branches: The courts of general
    jurisdiction, subordinated to the Supreme Court; the arbitration court
    system under the High Court of Arbitration; and the Constitutional
    Court. Civil and criminal cases are tried in courts of primary
    jurisdiction, courts of appeals, and higher courts. The general court
    system's lowest level is the municipal court, which serves each city or
    rural district and hears over 90 percent of all civil and criminal
    cases. The next level of courts of general jurisdiction are the
    regional courts. At the highest level is the Supreme Court. Decisions
    of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately
    superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The
    arbitration court system consists of city or regional courts as well as
    appellate circuit courts subordinated to the High Court of Arbitration.
    Arbitration courts hear cases involving business disputes between legal
    entities and between legal entities and the state. Qualifying Collegium
    nominate judges for approval (by the President), remove them, and
    approve requests by prosecutors to investigate judges. Approximately
    1,000 justices of the peace were appointed in 33 regions throughout the
    country during the year. These judges handle family law and criminal
    cases where the maximum sentence is 2 years.
        Low salaries and lack of prestige make it difficult to attract
    talented new judges and contribute to the vulnerability of existing
    judges to bribery and corruption. Judges have received some incremental
    salary increases aimed at improving the quality of judges recruited and
    raising the retention rate. Although judges' pay has improved, working
    conditions remain poor, and support personnel continue to be underpaid.
        The 2000 government budget increased funding for the judicial
    system; however, it is not enough to cover all of the system's needs.
    Not all of the money allocated was dispersed and regional
    administration support is still needed.
        Judges are subject to intimidation and bribery from officials and
    others. As judges generally bear responsibility both for reaching a
    verdict and handing down a sentence, they are logical targets for
    intimidation. In July 1999, the chair of the Primorskiy Kray
    arbitration court, Tatyana Loktionova, announced that Primorskiy Kray
    Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko had been interfering in the court's
    activities and that she and her colleagues feared for their personal
    safety. The governor blamed the court for bankrupting the region's
    enterprises and destroying its economy and persuaded then-Prime
    Minister Putin to authorize an internal investigation of the
    arbitration court for possible illegal conduct. Loktionova was removed
    from the court but appealed to the Supreme Court for reinstatement. On
    August 23, the Supreme Court's Board of Appeal upheld the lower court's
    ruling removing Loktionova from the bench. Loktionova appealed to the
    Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In October the Moscow
    City Collegium of Judges removed Moscow City Judge Sergey Pashin from
    the bench for ostensible infractions of professional etiquette.
    However, most observers believe that Pashin was removed for political
    purposes, as punishment for his outspoken views criticizing judicial
    colleagues on cases ranging from the conscientious objector Neverovskiy
    in Kaluga to the legal procedures surrounding Media-Most. Pashin
    appealed the Collegium's decision to a higher body and he was later
    reinstated.
        The Criminal Code provides for the court to appoint a lawyer if the
    suspect cannot afford one. The Society for the Guardianship of
    Penitentiary Institutions often is called upon by judges to provide
    legal assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any
    representation. This society operates primarily in Moscow, although it
    uses its connections throughout the country to appeal to legal
    professionals to represent the indigent. However, in many cases the
    indigent receive little legal assistance, because funds are lacking to
    pay for trial attorneys for them and public defenders are poorly
    trained.
        Because the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning often is
    not exercised (see Section 1.d.), many defendants recant testimony
    given in pretrial questioning, stating that they were denied access to
    a lawyer or that they were coerced into making false confessions or
    statements. Nevertheless, human rights monitors have documented cases
    in which convictions were obtained on the basis of testimony that the
    defendant recanted in court, even in the absence of other proof of
    guilt.
        In the 80 regions where adversarial jury trials have not yet been
    introduced, criminal procedures are weighted heavily in favor of the
    prosecutor. The judge or panel of judges conducts the trial by asking
    questions based on a prior review of the evidence. Reports indicate
    that in practice the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence
    often is disregarded. Judges are known to return poorly developed cases
    to the prosecution for additional investigation rather than risk
    confrontation with powerful prosecutors. Moreover in certain cases the
    Criminal Procedure Code allows them to do so with no limitation on the
    number of times the case can be investigated. The Constitutional Court
    partly addressed this issue in an April 20, 1999, decision that held
    that part of the article of the Code providing for this practice was
    unconstitutional. The practice of repeatedly returning cases for
    further investigation greatly increases the time that defendants spend
    in SIZO's (see Section 1.c.).
        Defense attorneys, defendants, and the general public reportedly
    favor jury trials and the more adversarial approach to criminal
    justice. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials continue to prefer
    trial by judges and the inquisitorial system.
        The Independent Council of Legal Expertise reported that defense
    lawyers increasingly were the target of police harassment, including
    beatings and arrests. Professional associations at both the local and
    federal levels reported abuses throughout the country. They charge that
    police are trying both to intimidate defense attorneys and to cover up
    their own criminal activities. For example, on March 28 Moscow defense
    lawyer K. Moskalenko was assaulted by members of Moscow's Organized
    Crime Unit of the MVD while attempting to assist a client illegally
    detained by the Unit at a residence. Moskalenko complained to the
    Procurator, but her complaint was rejected at the end of April. The
    Glasnost Public Foundation criticized the September 30 arrest of public
    defender Mikhail Konstantinidiy in Novorossiysk. Konstantinidiy was
    arrested for purported ``illegal entrepreneurial activity,'' which
    human rights activists believe was concocted in retaliation for the
    lawyer's successes against an oil company and a local politician.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy
    rights. The Constitution states that officials can enter a private
    residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a
    judicial decision. It permits the government to monitor correspondence,
    telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with
    judicial permission. It prohibits the collection, storage, utilization,
    and dissemination of information about a person's private life without
    his consent. Legislation to implement these provisions was passed as
    part of the country's new criminal code, which provides for criminal
    penalties. However, problems remain, and no one has ever been convicted
    of violating those safeguards. There were reports of electronic
    surveillance by government officials and others. Moscow law enforcement
    officials reportedly entered residences and other premises without
    warrants. For example, on October 19, three investigators from the
    Organized Crime Unit and Economic Crime Unit of the MVD entered the
    premises of the Moscow Choral Synagogue without a warrant and searched
    the offices of Moscow Chief Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt (see Section
    2.b.).
        Internet experts and right-to-privacy advocates say that
    interagency technical regulations called SORM-2 (SORM is the Russian
    acronym for System for Operational Investigative Measures), which were
    issued by the Ministry of Communications, the FSB, the Federal Agency
    of Government Communications and Information, and other agencies
    present a serious threat to privacy rights, and violate the Civil Code,
    the Constitution, and international norms. SORM-2 is an amendment to
    SORM telecommunications regulations. The original SORM, issued in 1995,
    granted security services the power to monitor all telecommunications
    transmissions for investigative purposes. It required a warrant to
    carry out such monitoring, in accordance with the Constitution and
    other provisions of the law. SORM-2 extends to the FSB the same kind of
    monitoring power over Internet communication that it had for
    telecommunication, but without ensuring judicial oversight.
        Internet service providers were required to install, at their own
    expense, a device that routes all Internet traffic to an FSB terminal.
    Those providers that did not comply with the requirements faced either
    loss of their licenses or denial of their license renewal. While SORM-2
    framers claim that the regulation does not violate the Constitution or
    the Civil Code because it still requires a court order, right to
    privacy advocates say that there is no mechanism to ensure that a
    warrant is obtained before the FSB accesses private information. There
    appears to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to
    Internet traffic without a warrant.
        On July 25 Minister of Communications Leonid Reyman issued an order
    implementing the last stage of SORM. According to the order, registered
    by the Ministry of Justice on August 9, the FSB is no longer required
    to provide to the telecommunications and Internet companies any court
    documentation or any information about targets of interest. Human
    rights activists suggest that this order only formalizes the practices
    established since SORM was introduced. However, Pavel Netupskiy, a St.
    Petersburg journalist, challenged Reyman's order in court, claiming
    that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court examined the case and
    ruled September 25 partially in Netupskiy's favor, leaving the
    requirement that the FSB conduct monitoring only by court order and
    that it provide information to the company about the target of
    surveillance. However, despite the court ruling, adequate oversight and
    enforcement of this constitutional provision and the court order are
    lacking. On September 12 Putin signed the ``Doctrine of Information
    Security of the Russian Federation'' which offers general language on
    protecting citizens' constitutional rights and civil liberties but also
    includes specific provisions that would justify greater state
    intervention. The Doctrine gives much leeway to law enforcement
    authorities in carrying out SORM surveillance of telephone, cellular,
    and wireless communications.
        Allegations continue to circulate that officers in the special
    services, including authorities at the highest levels of the MVD and
    the FSB, have used their services' power to gather compromising
    materials on political and public figures as political insurance and to
    remove rivals. Similarly, persons in these agencies, both active and
    retired, were accused of working with commercial or criminal
    organizations for the same purpose.
        There are credible reports that regional branches of the FSB
    continue to exert pressure on Russian citizens employed by Western
    firms and organizations, often with the goal of coercing them into
    becoming informants.
        Government forces in Chechnya looted valuables and foodstuffs from
    houses in regions that they controlled (see Section 1.g.).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--The indiscriminate use of force by government
    troops in the Chechen conflict resulted in widespread civilian
    casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons,
    the majority of whom sought refuge in the neighboring republic of
    Ingushetiya. The Federal Government has been fighting a war against
    separatists in Chechnya since August 1999 following attacks by Chechen
    separatists in neighboring Dagestan. In the fall of 1999, government
    forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen
    villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the
    territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev.
    Attempts by government forces to regain control over Chechnya were
    accompanied by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery,
    particularly in the fall 1999 campaign to retake the capital, Grozny.
    There were numerous reports of attacks on civilian targets, including
    the bombing of schools and residential areas. In early 2000 a large-
    scale offensive military campaign by government forces continued
    against the separatists. That offensive campaign largely ended
    following federal occupation of most of Chechnya by late spring,
    although federal forces remained engaged in an intensive anti-
    insurgency campaign against separatist guerillas. The security
    situation prevented most foreign observers from travelling to the
    region, and the Federal Government enforced strict controls on press
    access. NGO's reported that federal authorities in some cases
    confiscated recording devices and communications equipment at the
    border. These restrictions made independent observation of conditions
    and verification of reports very difficult. Nevertheless, there were
    numerous credible reports of human rights abuses and atrocities
    committed by federal forces.
        Federal authorities continued to claim that government forces
    utilized ``high precision'' weapons and tactics against the rebels;
    however, a wide range of reports indicated that government military
    operations resulted in many civilian casualties and the massive
    destruction of property and infrastructure. The number of civilian
    fatalities caused by federal military operations cannot be verified,
    and estimates of the total number of civilian dead vary from the
    hundreds to the thousands. For example, on December 20, seven students
    were killed when Russian forces fired mortar rounds on Grozny State
    Pedagogical Institute. The procurator was investigating the incident at
    year's end. The number of civilians wounded by federal forces also
    could not be verified, although reports from hospitals that still were
    operating in the region indicated that the majority of patients were
    mine or ordnance victims, and that such weaponry was the primary cause
    of death. Throughout the conflict, accusations were made by both sides
    about the use of chemical weapons. However, no credible evidence has
    been offered to support these claims.
        In addition to casualties attributable to indiscriminate use of
    force by the federal armed forces, many atrocities reportedly were
    committed by individual federal servicemen or units. Command and
    control among military and special police units often appeared to be
    weak, and a culture of lawlessness, corruption and impunity flourished.
    This culture fostered individual acts (by government forces) of
    violence and looting against civilians. For example, according to HRW
    and press reports, on February 5, Russian riot police and contract
    soldiers (men hired by the military for short-term service contracts)
    executed at least 60 civilians in Aldi and Chernorechiye, suburbs of
    Grozny. The perpetrators reportedly raped some of the victims and
    extorted money, later setting many of the houses on fire to destroy
    evidence.
        According to HRW and other NGO reports, Russian soldiers executed
    at least 38 civilians in the Staropromyslovski district between
    December 1999-January 2000. Most of the victims were women and elderly
    men, and all apparently were shot deliberately by Russian soldiers at
    close range. Similar events also occurred in Katr Yurt, were hundreds
    of already displaced persons were forced to flee, persons were killed,
    and houses were burned. Russian forces allegedly did this because
    Chechen fighters had passed through the village after the retreat from
    Grozny on February 5. In November 1999, government troops opened fire
    on doctors and other medical staff at a psychiatric hospital, injuring
    three persons. According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped
    civilian women in Chechnya in December 1999 in the village of Alkhan-
    Yurt and in other villages.
        According to human rights NGO's, federal troops on numerous
    occasions looted valuables and foodstuffs in regions they controlled.
    Many internally displaced persons (IDP's) reported that they were
    forced to provide payments to, or were otherwise subjected to
    harassment and pressure by, guards at checkpoints. There were also
    widespread reports of the killing or abuse of captured fighters by
    federal troops, as well as by the separatists, and a policy of ``no
    quarter given'' appeared to prevail in many units. A private wounded in
    the conflict told representatives of the Union of Soldiers Mother's
    Committee (USMC) organization that the commander of his unit gave the
    order that no prisoners should be taken and no one should be left alive
    in Grozny. Federal forces reportedly beat, raped, tortured, and killed
    numerous detainees. The human rights NGO Memorial compiled a list of
    300 missing captured rebels, some of whom had not been seen in 6
    months. Federal forces reportedly ransomed Chechen detainees to their
    families. Prices were said to range from several hundred to thousands
    of dollars.
        Armed forces and police units reportedly routinely abused and
    tortured persons held at so-called filtration camps, where federal
    authorities claimed that fighters or those suspected of aiding the
    rebels were sorted out from civilians.
        There were some reports that federal troops purposefully targeted
    some infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian
    population, such as water facilities or hospitals. The NGO Physicians
    for Human Rights reported that that physicians in Grozny Ambulatory
    Clinic #5 and Grozny City Hospital #4 stated that their hospitals were
    destroyed. The indiscriminate use of force by federal troops resulted
    in massive destruction of housing and commercial and administrative
    buildings, as well as the breakdown of gas- and water-supply facilities
    and other types of infrastructure. Representatives of international
    organizations and NGO's who visited Chechnya also reported little
    evidence of federal assistance for rebuilding war-torn areas.
        International organizations estimate that the number of IDP's and
    refugees who left Chechnya as a result of the conflict reached a total
    of about 280,000 at its peak in late spring. Of this total, most went
    to Ingushetiya (245,000). Some 6,000 Chechen IDP's were reported in
    Dagestan, 3,000 in North Ossetia, and 6,000 in Georgia. About 20,000
    Chechen IDP's reportedly went to other regions of the Russian
    Federation. Federal refugee policy aimed at repatriating IDP's as soon
    as possible back to Chechnya. However, as of early fall, federal
    authorities promised that no one would be repatriated forcibly.
    Reliable information on the number and status of displaced persons
    within Chechnya was especially difficult to obtain, due to heavy
    fighting and limited outside access to the region. The United Nations
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that at times as many
    as 150,000 persons were displaced within Chechnya and lacked access to
    humanitarian assistance. There were approximately 6,000 Dagestani IDP's
    in Dagestan. NGO's also estimated that at least a quarter of a million
    residents, including almost the entire Russian, Armenian, and Jewish
    populations, migrated from Chechnya as a result of the current conflict
    and the first war of 1994-96.
        At various points during the conflict, authorities restricted the
    movement of IDP's fleeing Chechnya. According to some reports by NGO's,
    early in the conflict border guards at times permitted only ethnic
    Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to the Russian press,
    some displaced persons were transported by bus back to parts of
    Chechnya that were under government control. In 1999 refugees at the
    border sometimes had to live in the open, without access to food or
    water. Russian border guards and police officers on the border between
    Chechnya and neighboring regions reportedly required Chechen refugees
    to pay money to pass. According to UNHCR, the authorities early in the
    year prevented medical supplies destined for hospitals from entering
    Chechnya. There also were many credible reports that Russian guards at
    checkpoints within Chechnya demanding money to allow persons to pass.
    Some refugees also had trouble moving about because their documents had
    been lost, stolen, or confiscated by Russian authorities. Currently
    8,000 persons live in railway carriages in the region. During the year,
    4,000 others who had been living in railway cars were transferred to a
    winterized tent camp. According to the Council of Europe (COE), about
    2,000 persons live in harsh conditions in rail wagons in Sernovodsk
    without sufficient heating and appropriate sanitation facilities, which
    puts them at risk of contagious diseases.
        While Russian media coverage of events in Chechnya was extensive,
    most journalists and editors appeared to be exercising self-censorship
    and avoiding subjects embarrassing to the Government (see Section
    2.a.). Since the resumption of the war in October 1999, federal
    authorities--both military and civilian--limited journalists' access to
    war zones and confiscated reports and equipment, citing threats to the
    safety of reporters. After November 1999, additional accreditation--
    besides the usual Foreign Ministry accreditation--was required for
    entry to the region. In some cases, foreign journalists publicly
    complained that military officials in the northern Caucasus region made
    it excessively difficult for them to receive local press accreditation.
    In one instance in September, Associated Press reporter Ruslan Musayev
    was detained, beaten, and held in a covered pit for 24 hours until he
    paid Russian soldiers to release him.
        In April U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) Mary Robinson
    visited Chechnya to investigate allegations of human rights abuses.
    However on the visit, according to Robinson's report to the UNCHR,
    Russian authorities denied her access to a number of locations,
    including five detention centers where Amnesty International alleged
    that Russian guards committed abuses against Chechen detainees. She
    also was denied access to villages near Grozny where Russian troops
    were accused of killing and raping civilians. Robinson did meet with
    IDP's in Ingushetiya, who provided firsthand testimony of alleged
    violations of human rights by Russian military, militia, and Ministry
    of Interior forces in Chechnya. Authorities asserted that Robinson
    distorted the true nature of the state of affairs and that Russia never
    hid the truth about the situation in Chechnya.
        In response to international criticism of the human rights
    situation in Chechnya, several official Russian organizations were
    established to examine alleged human rights violations in the republic.
    In February President Putin appointed Vladimir Kalamanov as special
    Presidential Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya. Kalamanov's
    office, with a staff of 25 persons, including 3 experts on loan from
    the COE, opened branches in Moscow and a number of locations in the
    North Caucasus to take complaints about alleged human rights
    violations. In April Pavel Krasheninnikov, Chairman of the State Duma
    Committee on Legislation, was elected head of a newly created
    Independent Commission on Human Rights in the North Caucasus. In
    September the Commission opened nine offices in Chechnya and three in
    Ingushetiya. Together Kalamanov's office and Krasheninnikov's
    Commission heard thousands of complaints from citizens, ranging from
    destruction or theft of property to rape and murder. However, neither
    organization was empowered to investigate or prosecute alleged offenses
    and had to refer complaints to the military or civil prosecutors. By
    the end of the year, the prosecutors had opened more than 100 cases of
    alleged crimes. Almost all of these concerned alleged violations of
    military discipline and other common crimes. The Presidential
    Administration press service reported that 38 cases relating to crimes
    committed by servicemen against the local population were opened, and
    that seven servicemen were convicted by year's end. The charges against
    the seven service men were not known. The Federal Government did not
    comply with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution's calling
    for a broad-based, independent commission of inquiry to investigate
    alleged human rights violations and breaches of international
    humanitarian law.
        Chechen separatists also committed abuses, but--as with the many
    reported Russian violations--there were difficulties in verifying or
    investigating them. According to unconfirmed reports, separatists
    killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human
    shields, forced civilians to build fortifications, and prevented
    refugees from fleeing Chechnya. For example, the rebel fighter Akhmed
    Ibragimov reportedly murdered 34 fellow villagers, including 3
    children, after 1 of the villagers refused to dig trenches. One witness
    described seeing four bodies of persons who were crucified on spikes by
    separatists for cooperating with federal authorities in Grozny.
        Separatists allegedly killed and attempted to kill numerous Chechen
    officials loyal to the Federal Government. For example, on May 31,
    Grozny Mayor Supyan Makhchayev was wounded and his aide and a Russian
    official were killed by a car bomb. According to press reports, Chechen
    rebels opened fire on an EMERCOM (Ministry of Civil Defense,
    Emergencies, and the Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters)
    Car on June 9 in Grozny, killing three Russian epidemiologists and
    wounding three others. In July Ruslan Khamidov, head of the
    administration of the settlement of Alkhan-Yurt, was killed in his
    home. On August 4, head of the Nozhay-Yurtovskiy Rayon Administration
    Isita Gayribekova was wounded and her brother and sister killed in a
    bomb explosion at the home of their mother. Chechen separatists started
    a series of suicide attacks in June. Two Chechen women detonated a
    truck packed with explosives at a Russian army base west of Grozny.
        Human rights NGO's reported that Chechen separatist units abused
    civilians and endangered their lives by provoking Russian
    counterattacks on civilian areas. The rebels took up positions in
    populated areas and fired on Russian forces, thereby exposing the
    civilians to Russian counterattacks. When villagers protested, they
    sometimes were beaten or fired upon by the rebels.
        Separatist military units also reportedly abused, tortured, and
    killed captured Russian soldiers. In one incident, rebel sources
    reported that they executed nine Russian prisoners after Moscow refused
    to exchange them for a Russian officer accused of raping and killing a
    Chechen woman. In another incident reported by an NGO, a Chechen
    witness described seeing the body of a Russian soldier with his throat
    cut. When asked by the witness why the soldier was killed, the rebel
    fighters purportedly replied that it was their standard practice to
    slit the throats of Russian captives.
        Individual rebel field commanders were reportedly responsible for
    funding their own units, and some allegedly resorted to drug smuggling
    and kidnaping and ransom to raise funds. As a result, it often was
    difficult, if not impossible, to make a distinction between rebel units
    and simple criminal gangs. Some rebels received financial and other
    forms of assistance from foreign supporters of international terrorism.
    The international terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden reportedly sent
    funds, personnel, and material to elements in the rebel camp. According
    to press reports, as many as 400 of Bin Laden's followers may have
    joined the rebels from his base in Afghanistan (see Section 1.a.).
        Government forces and Chechen separatists have used landmines
    extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since August 1999. In April, the
    country announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. There is not
    accurate information on the number of those killed by landmines
    throughout Russia.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and numerous national and regional
    media reflect a multitude of opinions; however, government pressure on
    the media persisted and in some respects increased significantly,
    resulting in numerous infringements of these rights. The Government
    exerted pressure on journalists, particularly those who reported on
    corruption or criticized officials, by: selectively denying them access
    to information (including, for example, statistics theoretically
    available to the public) and filming opportunities; demanding the right
    to approve certain stories prior to publication; prohibiting the tape
    recording of public trials and hearings; withholding financial support
    from government media operations that exercised independent editorial
    judgment; attempting to influence the appointment of senior editors at
    regional and local newspapers and broadcast media organizations;
    removing reporters from their jobs; and bringing libel suits against
    journalists. Faced with continuing financial difficulties and increased
    pressure from the Government, many media organizations saw their
    autonomy erode during the year. The Glasnost Defense Foundation (GDF),
    an NGO that tracks violations of the rights of journalists in the
    countries of the former Soviet Union, estimates that several hundred
    lawsuits and other legal actions were brought by government agencies
    against journalists and journalistic organizations during 1999, the
    majority of them in response to unfavorable coverage of government
    policy or operations. During the year, judges rarely found for the
    journalists; in the majority of cases, the Government succeeded in
    either intimidating or punishing the journalist. On October 4 the
    Kirovskiy district court of Kazan ordered the local television company
    ``Efir'' to compensate Anatoliy Vasilyev, a former candidate to the
    State Council of Tatarstan, for airing a program which, according to
    the court, falsely accused Vasilyev of deceiving his business partners.
    On November 1, Kirovskiy district court in Yekaterinburg ruled that an
    article in the local newspaper ``Vecherniye Vedomosti Yekaterinburga''
    accusing Arkadiy Chernetskiy, the mayor of Yekaterinburg, of applying
    illegal methods in his election campaign, was false. The court ordered
    the newspaper to print a disclaimer, and to pay damages to Chernetskiy.
    On November 9, the Sovietskiy district court in the city of Bryansk
    required the local newspaper ``Bryanskoye Vremya'' to print an apology
    and to compensate Bryansk governor Yuriy Lodkin, who sued the paper for
    criticizing him in a way that he considered insulting.
        With some exceptions, judges appeared unwilling to challenge
    powerful federal and local officials. Stiff fines for journalists were
    a common result of these proceedings; jail terms occasionally were
    handed down as well. Such rulings served to reinforce the already
    significant tendency toward self-censorship. Not infrequently
    journalists were attacked physically, although in the majority of these
    cases, no direct link was ever established between the assault and the
    authorities who reportedly took offense at the reporting in question.
    The financial dependence of most major media organizations on the
    Government or on one or more of several major financial-industrial
    groups continued to undermine editorial independence and journalistic
    integrity in both the print and broadcast media.
        The concentration of ownership of major media organizations--
    already a serious threat to editorial independence in 1999--increased
    during the year. The largest media empires (including media outlets
    owned by the federal, regional, and local governments) remained intact.
    However, Media-Most, the country's largest independent company was
    under pressure by the Government and the Government resumed operational
    control of ORT. In particular, government structures, banking
    interests, and the state-controlled energy giants UES and Gazprom
    continued to dominate the Moscow media market even as they extended
    their influence into the regions. Continuing financial difficulties
    exacerbated this problem during the year, weakening the fiscal
    positions of most news organizations and thereby increasing their
    dependence on financial sponsors and, in some cases, the federal and
    regional governments. Although advertising revenues began to return to
    1998 levels, they did not do so completely. As a result, the media's
    autonomy and concomitant ability to act as a watchdog remained weak. In
    key respects, private media organizations across the country remained
    dependent on the Government during the year. According to the GDF, some
    90 percent of print media organizations continued to rely on state-
    controlled concerns for paper, printing, or distribution, while many
    television stations were forced to rely on the state (in particular,
    regional committees for the management of state property) for access to
    the airwaves and office space.
        Moreover, journalists continued to depend on local authorities for
    accreditation to major news events. Reports of both favoritism toward
    reporters associated (or aligned) with the federal or local
    administration and denial of access to journalists representing
    independent media organizations were widespread. The Presidential
    Administration, for example, refused to accredit a reporter from the
    Moscow-based newspaper Novyye Izvestiya for President Putin's summer
    visit to China and Japan. Novyye Izvestiya has frequently criticized
    the President since his election in March. Kommersant Daily has also
    reportedly been denied access to some official sources. Moreover, in
    the immediate aftermath of the Kursk submarine sinking, the Government
    denied site access to all media except the official network, Russian
    Television and Radio (RTR), a decision that gave rise to heavy
    criticism from the majority of media outlets.
        The GDF also reported that officials continued to manipulate a
    variety of other ``instruments of leverage'' (including the price of
    printing at state-controlled publishing houses) in an effort to apply
    pressure on private media rivals. The Foundation noted that, as in
    1999, this practice was more common outside the Moscow area than in the
    capital itself. Private print and broadcast media, like other
    enterprises, were vulnerable to arbitrary changes in the policy and
    practice of tax collection. Although media still routinely receive tax
    breaks on high-cost items such as paper, the GDF and other media NGO's
    documented numerous instances of use by the Government of tax levers to
    pressure media across the country. Further, the Government occasionally
    sought to limit reporting on tax matters. In Volgograd oblast, for
    instance, local tax police in November declared the entry into force of
    an ``Agreement on Cooperation'' which stipulated that all information
    related to the activities of the tax police should be ``cleared'' with
    the relevant authorities prior to publication. In certain cases,
    journalists were even forbidden to cite sources from the local tax
    service. A number of local newspapers, including Volgogradskaya Pravda,
    Inter, Gorodskiye Vesti, and Delovoye Povolzhye were reportedly
    pressured into signing the agreement. This agreement came on the heels
    of a similar agreement with the FSB in Volgograd, binding the same
    publications to inform the FSB before they publish any materials
    related to the security service. National independent media, such as
    NTV, expressed concern that such contracts would serve as examples for
    other regions around the country.
        The private media continue to face more direct challenges from the
    Government as well. The Government owns about 150 of the 550 television
    stations in the country and nearly one-fifth of the 12,000 registered
    newspapers and periodicals. Of the three national television stations,
    the State owns Russian Television and Radio (RTR) and a majority of
    Russian Public Television (ORT); it also maintains ownership or control
    of major radio stations (Mayak and Radio Rossii) and news agencies
    (ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti). At the regional and local levels,
    governments operated or controlled a much higher percentage of the
    media than in Moscow; in many cities and towns across the country,
    government-run media organizations were the only major source of news
    and information, according to the GDF. Thus, in many media markets,
    citizens received information mainly from unchallenged government
    sources. In efforts to control the media, federal authorities issued
    orders and formulated doctrines designed to limit free expression and
    electronic privacy. On June 22 President Putin signed an amendment to
    the law on mass media that places restrictions on media coverage of
    narcotics issues, banning reporting on: ``The location of illegal trade
    in drugs;'' ``methods of narcotics consumption''; and ``the composition
    of drugs.'' Media outlets which violate these bans could be closed
    after two warnings. Newspapers did not successfully challenge the
    legality of the amendment during the year. On September 12 President
    Putin approved an Information Security Doctrine which had been adopted
    by the Security Council on June 23. The 40-page document outlined
    ``threats to Russian national security'' in the fields of ``mass media,
    means of mass communication, and information technology.'' Sergey
    Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council, claimed that the goals of
    the document are ``the protection of the rights of the individual,
    freedom of speech, and the prohibition of censorship.'' However, the
    doctrine immediately raised concerns among journalists that its real
    purpose may be to consolidate government control over the mass media.
    Many observers viewed it as an indication that the Kremlin considers
    the media as ``yet another sphere subject to the administration and
    control of the government.'' Although the document reaffirms the
    state's commitment to preserve the freedoms of expression and of access
    to information, it contains numerous clauses that are extremely vague,
    and which according to critics, can be interpreted very broadly by
    lawmakers and bureaucrats. Of particular concern, for example, were the
    clauses calling for an ``increase in propaganda activity to counter the
    negative effects of the dissemination of misinformation about the
    internal policies of the Russian state''; and ``clarification of the
    status of foreign journalists and media outlets'' working in the
    country, in order to ``place them on an equal footing with the domestic
    media.''
        The system of operative and investigate procedures (SORM) continued
    during the year to limit the electronic privacy of both citizens and
    foreigners (see section 1.f.).
        Government intimidation and censorship, both direct and indirect,
    remained a significant problem during the year. On January 17
    Aleksander Khinshtein, a journalist with Moskovskiy Komsomolets and TV-
    Center known for his frequent vitriolic attacks on senior Government
    officials, was visited at his home by armed FSB agents who demanded
    that the journalist accompany them to the city of Vladimir for
    ``psychiatric testing.'' (Khinshtein produced documentation to the
    effect that he was ill and, in the end, was not forced to leave his
    home.) Police also charged the journalist with falsification of his
    Moscow driver's license; Khinshtein denies any wrongdoing. Khinshtein
    and many other independent observers characterized the arrest as ``an
    act of intimidation designed to send a message.'' The case was closed
    on February 16. On March 15 the Moscow daily Novaya Gazeta reported
    that its computer network was hacked, preventing the publication of
    that day's edition. Dmitriy Muratov, the newspaper's editor in chief,
    told the GDF that the hacking occurred on the very day that the
    newspaper was to publish a number of articles exploring irregularities
    in the financing of Vladimir Putin's election campaign. Muratov
    categorically ruled out any possibility of an ``accidental'' or
    ``technical'' failure. Muratov also stated that his newspaper had come
    under ``increased pressure from the authorities'' in connection with
    its reporting on corruption in the Government and the war in Chechnya.
    Moreover, Muratov stated that the newspaper was offered financial
    ``favors'' on a number of occasions in exchange for ``reconsidering its
    political stance.'' The perpetrators of the computer attack were never
    identified.
        The Government has also brought considerable pressure to bear on
    the largest media conglomerates. The most notable example of this
    phenomenon was the high-profile conflict between the Kremlin and Media-
    Most (owned by Vladimir Gusinskiy). The conflict, which became public
    in the summer of 1999, intensified significantly in 2000. Government-
    controlled media, including the RTR and the government-aligned ORT,
    continued to ``expose'' Media-Most's debts to state structures,
    including the energy giant Gazprom. The state filed a lawsuit against
    Media-Most and demanded repayment to the state-controlled
    Vneshekonombank of a $42.2 million credit. In March the state-backed
    Gazprom repaid Credit Suisse-First Boston a $211 million Media-Most
    loan that the firm had guaranteed in 1998. Immediately following the
    repayment, Gazprom demanded that Media-Most repay this debt, refusing
    to accept shares in the holding's outlets as a form of repayment.
    Media-Most executives and most media experts maintain that Gazprom
    acted at the behest of the Putin administration. On October 18 a
    district court in Moscow found for Media-Most in its suit against the
    FSB for ``slandering its business reputation'' as a result of
    information the FSB made public earlier in the year. The court held
    that the FSB must apologize for this on ORT during prime time; the FSB
    has appealed this decision.
        Notwithstanding this pressure, the Media-Most media companies
    (including the NTV, the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the news daily
    Segodnya, and the weekly Itogi) which are generally well regarded for
    their relative professionalism and independence, did not cede editorial
    ground. These media outlets continued to criticize President Putin and
    his administration on a wide range of problems, including the Kremlin's
    media policy. On May 11 masked law enforcement officers raided the
    offices of Media-Most in central Moscow and confiscated documents and
    technical equipment. The authorities charged that the holding's
    security service illegally recorded telephone conversations. Media-Most
    called the raid ``a politically motivated attack on freedom of the
    press.'' In a statement, the Russian Union of Journalists termed it
    ``an unconstitutional act aimed at intimidating the independent
    media.'' On June 11 Media-Most chief Vladimir Gusinskiy was arrested on
    charges of embezzlement of state property in the course of the 1995
    privatization of Russkoye Video, a television production company in St.
    Petersburg. (The head of Russkoye Video remained in jail, although no
    formal charges have yet been brought against him.) While observers
    expressed differing opinions on the legitimacy of the charge, most
    disinterested analysts considered the arrest to be an ``excessive''
    measure. Gusinskiy was released 3 days after his arrest following
    widespread domestic and international criticism. Although the
    progovernment media defended the arrest, arguing that ``everyone is
    equal before the law,'' politicians, journalists, and observers in
    opposition to the Kremlin agreed that the case was politically
    motivated and that it augured poorly for the future of freedom of
    expression. After Gusinskiy's release, law enforcement officers once
    again raided the Media-Most headquarters and Gusinskiy's private
    residence, where they inventoried his property, reportedly in
    connection with the ``Russkoye Video'' case. On July 27 Gusinskiy left
    the country to join his family in Spain. On September 19 both Media-
    Most and Gazprom Media acknowledged that Gusinskiy, Media Minister
    Mikhail Lesin, and Gazprom Media head Alfred Kokh signed an agreement
    in July to sell Media-Most for $300 million in cash and $473 million in
    debt to Gazprom Media. The agreement, published in the media in
    September, contained a paragraph on the dropping of criminal charges
    against Gusinskiy, who later declared the agreement ``null and void''
    for having been signed under duress--in his own words, ``at
    gunpoint''--and indeed under the direct threat of imprisonment. Gazprom
    alleged that Media-Most hid assets in offshore companies. Deputy
    Procurator General Vasiliy Kolmogorov said on September 19 that if
    these allegations were substantiated, he would launch a criminal case
    against the holding (see Section 1.d.).
        On December 8 the Media Ministry ordered independent privately-
    owned MAKS-TV in Sochi closed. According to the Ministry, the Station
    had violated both the law on advertising, by running a commercial for
    Ararat cognac in September, and the law on elections in early December.
    MAKS-TV went back on the air in late December.
        The Kremlin has also reportedly sought to strengthen its control
    over the country's most widely watched television network, ORT. In
    September the weekly ``Sergey Dorenko Show,'' a widely watched news
    analysis program, was taken off the air abruptly after Dorenko aired a
    program on September 2 highly critical of President Putin's handling of
    the Kursk submarine disaster. ORT General Director Konstantin Ernst, a
    Putin appointee, reportedly instructed Dorenko to produce ``a program
    the Kremlin could be happy with.'' When Dorenko refused, the program
    was terminated on September 9. Other senior journalists at ORT, such as
    Tatyana Koshkaryeva and Rustam Narsikulov, were also dismissed. On
    December 5 a group of law enforcement agents wearing masks and
    bulletproof vests searched the offices of ORT, confiscating boxes of
    financial documents. ORT had allegedly failed to pay customs duties on
    imported films that it broadcast between 1996 and 1998. The Prosecutor
    General stated that ``there was no need to apply force'' during the
    search and demanded the resignation of the investigator who led the
    raid.
        Freedom of the press came under the greatest challenge in the
    country's farthest regions. On April 14 local authorities in the city
    of Saratov made changes to a front-page article in the local issue of
    the Moscow-based daily, Izvestiya, which leveled criticism against
    Saratov Governor Dmitriy Ayatskov. Phrases containing ``unfriendly''
    content were edited out prior to the publication. Mikhail Kozhokin,
    Izvestiya's editor in chief, described this censoring action as an
    example of ``the new phenomenon of oblast-level censorship.'' On April
    19 St. Petersburg police confiscated the entire issue of the local
    newspaper, Moya Stolitsa, saying that the newspaper ``lacked proper
    registration documentation.'' However, according to editor in chief
    Aleksey Razoryonov, the real issue was the newspaper's political
    leanings, not the registration documentation. The newspaper frequently
    carried articles critical of St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev.
    According to the GDP, on April 26 police once again confiscated issues
    of Moya Stolitsa from street vendors. However, the newspaper continued
    to publish. On May 1, police in Kamensk-Uralskiy, Sverdlovskiy Region,
    ordered Artyem Schadrin, a cameraman of the local television company
    Gong-TV, to erase a videotape showing participants at a May Day rally
    beating up his colleague, Gong-TV correspondent Konstantin Litvinenko.
    The police also warned Denis Poteryayev, a photographer of the local
    newspaper Novyy Kompas, not to publish the pictures he took during the
    rally. Later that day, several police officers visited the newspaper
    and ordered Poteryayev to expose the film containing the photographs in
    their presence. The journalist complied. On May 5, local authorities in
    Rostov-on-Don ordered the destruction of an entire issue of the local
    newspaper Perekrestok Kentavra. The newspaper contained an editorial
    about the upcoming inauguration of President Putin and a collage
    depicting Putin as a Nazi officer. The publication of ``fascist
    symbolism,'' including Nazi imagery, is prohibited by law.
        On July 26, local authorities arrested Irina Grebneva, the editor
    of Vladivostok newspaper Arsenyevskiye Vesti, on charges of ``petty
    hooliganism.'' Grebneva published uncensored, profanity-ridden
    transcripts of phone conversations of top regional officials, including
    Primorye Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. Grebneva was convicted of the
    charges on which she was arrested and sentenced to 5 days in jail. When
    she was denied the right to appeal the decision, she launched a hunger
    strike to protest the sentence. Arsenyevskiye Vesti is one of the few
    local newspapers which regularly criticized Governor Nazdratenko and
    his allies. The governor and local authorities have sued the paper for
    libel 22 times since Nazdratenko was elected in 1995. All of the cases
    are pending.
        Journalists who publish critical information about local
    governments and influential businesses, as well as investigative
    journalists writing about crime and other sensitive issues, continued
    to be subjected to threats of physical violence, beatings, and murder.
    A number of independent media NGO's have characterized beatings of
    journalists as ``routine,'' noting that those who pursued investigative
    stories on corruption and organized crime found themselves at greatest
    risk.
        The press and media NGO's reported a number of killings of
    journalists, presumed to be related to the journalistic work of the
    victims, and dozens of other bodily assaults on journalists. As in
    1999, police seldom identified the perpetrators of crimes against
    journalists. On July 16, Igor Domnikov, a Moscow journalist from Novaya
    Gazeta died in the hospital after a brutal beating in April. According
    to Dmitriy Muratov, editor in chief of Novaya Gazeta, the killing was
    directly linked to his professional activities. Press reports after the
    incident speculated that Domnikov was mistaken for his colleague Oleg
    Sultanov, an investigative reporter who has written extensively on
    alleged corruption in LUKOIL and the FSB. On July 18, Andrey Barys, a
    reporter from Uralskiy Rabochiy, was attacked by three unidentified
    assailants in the city of Kachkanar (Sverdlovsk oblast), where he had
    traveled to do a story on a criminal group headed by Valeriy Volkov.
    Shortly after his arrival in Kachkanar, Barys discovered that he was
    being followed by a group of men. Later, the men attacked Barys,
    telling him, ``Don't poke your nose into Volkov's affairs!'' After the
    beating, the men advised Barys to leave the city. The next day, Barys
    attempted to contact the local police, but the police chief refused to
    hear his complaint. On July 21, a correspondent of the local
    Yekaterinburg TV company ASV Prestige, Sergey Melnikov, was badly
    beaten; Melnikov and his colleagues contend that the attack was the
    result of his reporting on the city's illegal drug trade. The
    journalist had to be hospitalized with serious head injuries. No
    arrests were made.
        On July 26 Sergey Novikov, president of Smolensk's only independent
    radio station, Vesna, was killed in his apartment building. Since 1999
    the radio station had repeatedly denounced corruption within the ranks
    of the regional administration, the courts, and the police. A month
    before his death, Novikov wrote an open letter to Smolensk governor
    Aleksandr Prokhorov that included the names of officials suspected of
    corruption. The Ministry of the Interior classified the murder as a
    contract killing and has not ruled out a link to Novikov's work as a
    journalist. On August 23 journalists from local Pskov newspapers were
    denied access to a meeting of Governor Mikhaylov with the employees of
    the farm Krasnyy Luch. When a journalist from Pskov Lenta Novostey,
    Tatyana Mustaykina, tried to convince the guards to let her in, Yuriy
    Kusov, an officer of local administration, arrived, grabbed Mustaykina
    by the hair, and attempted to force her to the ground. When Kusov
    realized that the episode was being filmed by a cameraman, he tried
    unsuccessfully to confiscate the camera. In October, the Pskov
    Procuracy decided that Kusov could be charged on administrative
    charges. Kusov was summoned to but replied he was sick. On November 9,
    the GUVD Chief received Kusov's request to close the case due to
    expiration of statute of limitations and the case was closed.
        On September 22, Iskander Khatloni, a Radio Free Europe/Radio
    Liberty journalist was murdered in Moscow. The police have opened an
    investigation but have not so far released any information.
        On December 17, Oleg Lure, an investigative journalist for Novaya
    Gazeta was severely beaten by five assailants. The assailants did not
    take either his money or valuables. Lure believes the attack was
    related to his articles touching on the interests of such individuals
    as the presidential chief of staff, the State Duma deputy, and his most
    recent article on alleged kickbacks to Kremlin officials. Police are
    investigating the incident.
        No progress was made in the investigation of the August 1998
    beating death of Anatoliy Levin-Utkin, deputy editor of Yuridichesky
    Petersburg Segodnya.
        The country's Northern Caucasus continued to be a dangerous region
    for Russian journalists. Kidnapings and assaults remained serious
    threats. In addition, federal authorities--both military and civilian--
    limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated reports and
    equipment. Special accreditation besides the usual Foreign Ministry
    accreditation was required for entry to the region. In some cases,
    foreign journalists publicly complained that military officials in the
    northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to
    obtain local press accreditation.
        The best-known example of the violation of the rights of a
    journalist operating in this region is that of Radio Liberty's Andrey
    Babitskiy. Babitskiy's coverage of the conflict in Chechnya prompted an
    angry reaction from the Government and the armed forces; the latter
    frequently accused the correspondent of ``conspiring with Chechen
    rebels.'' On January 8 security agents raided Babitskiy's Moscow
    apartment and confiscated several items. On January 15, Babitskiy was
    reported ``missing'' in Chechnya. Although the Government denied at
    first any involvement in the case, Interior Ministry spokesman Oleg
    Aksenov acknowledged on January 28 that law enforcement authorities had
    arrested Babitskiy in Chechnya on the grounds that he ``lacked the
    proper accreditation.'' On February 3, Acting Procurator General
    Vladimir Ustinov stated that Babitskiy had been ``exchanged'' for three
    Russian prisoners of war. Ustinov later revised his statement,
    explaining that Babitskiy had been released and that the journalist had
    ``gone over to the Chechen rebels'' of his own volition. However, later
    on, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, a senior Presidential aide for public
    information on Chechnya, confirmed that Babitskiy had indeed been
    exchanged, and Interior Minister Vladimir Rushaylo defended the
    exchange as ``correct and justified.'' On February 8, a group of
    prominent Russian journalists issued a statement saying, ``Until we
    learn the truth about this story, we have every reason to think that
    the Russian government suspended not only freedom of speech, but also
    the rule of law itself, and is moving toward totalitarianism.''
    Babitskiy subsequently was released but was later taken into custody in
    Makhachkala, Dagestan, by Government forces on charges of ``carrying a
    falsified passport. On February 28, Acting President Putin announced
    publicly that there was no need to detain Babitskiy further, and the
    RFE/RL correspondent was released that day and sent back to Moscow. In
    October Babitskiy was tried and convicted in a court in Makhachkala of
    this offense but was immediately amnestied under an amnesty granted in
    honor of World War II. Babitskiy had trouble obtaining a passport;
    however, he did receive one and is now working abroad.
        On February 2, Russian troops in Chechnya detained Giles Whittell,
    Moscow Bureau Chief of the Times of London. Presidential aide Sergey
    Yastrzhembskiy said at a press conference that the journalist was
    detained and returned to Moscow because he ``lacked accreditation
    allowing him to work in Chechnya.'' The GDF issued a statement
    characterizing the Chechnya accreditation requirements of the Russian
    authorities as ``illegal.''
        On February 15, the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti reported
    that Yastrzhembskiy announced an official order denying journalists
    access to the Chechen capital of Grozny ``for 2 to 3 weeks.'' The order
    additionally limited journalist access to military hospitals by
    requiring that interviews take place only ``under the supervision of
    representatives of federal troops.'' On March 3, federal troops in the
    Chechen city of Mozdok confiscated and destroyed an ORT videotape
    containing interviews with Russian soldiers. According to ORT
    correspondent Roman Perevezentsev, the crew had traveled into Mozdok to
    report on casualties among Russian troops in a recent combat operation
    in the Chechen village of Pervomayskoye. On March 15 the Russian
    Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting, and Mass
    Communications issued a statement that warned the Russian mass media
    that providing air time or news-space to Chechen rebel leaders would be
    considered a violation of the counterterrorism laws. In April the
    Ministry issued specific warnings to the newspapers Kommersant and
    Novaya Gazeta for publishing interviews with Chechen president Aslan
    Maskhadov. No further action was taken. The new Information Security
    Doctrine approved by the Security Council in August implies that
    foreign media outlets, such as Radio Free Europe Liberty, represent a
    danger to the state. Human rights activists and journalists fear that
    media freedom could be even more severely restricted.
        The Government generally respects academic freedom; however, human
    rights activists question whether recent cases such as Sutyagin and
    others discourage academic freedom and contact with foreigners on
    issues that might be deemed sensitive.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides citizens with the right to assemble freely, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. Organizations must obtain permits in
    order to hold public meetings. The application process must begin
    between 5 and 10 days before the scheduled event. Citizens freely and
    actively protested government decisions and actions. Permits to
    demonstrate were granted readily to both opponents and supporters of
    the Government. However, certain religious denominations such as
    Jehovah's Witnesses have been either denied permission to assemble, or
    once Ministry of Justice officials issued permission, local officials
    have withdrawn it.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. Public
    organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders
    with the Ministry of Justice. A 1995 registration law specified that
    organizations had until July 1999 to reregister. When the deadline
    expired, some human rights monitors expressed concern that an estimated
    10,000 NGO's would be vulnerable to possible ``liquidation''
    (elimination of juridical status by court order) by local authorities
    who were hostile to human rights or opposition political activity. In
    November 1999, the Federation Council rejected a bill passed by the
    Duma to extend the reregistration deadline by a year, a move which
    human rights activists marked as a potentially serious blow to freedom
    of association. The Ministry of Justice maintained that there were not
    a large number of liquidations as a result of the passing deadline.
    Most of the organizations that wanted to register were able to do so
    with the notable few whose names or charters were unacceptable to the
    authorities (e.g., Yablokov's Ecology and Human Rights).
        However, a February report, prepared by the NGO Human Rights
    Information Center and the Center for Development of Democracy and
    Human Rights, cited Ministry of Justice statistics indicating that only
    57.8 percent of the total number of organizations managed to reregister
    by the July 1999 deadline. According to the report, 42.2 percent of
    organizations became liable to liquidation of their juridical status.
    The report further claimed that only 12 percent of Moscow organizations
    succeeded in registering or reregistering. The report claimed that the
    net result was to reduce the overall number of organizations and to
    eliminate ``politically undesirable'' organizations from certain
    regions. While the numbers are high, many organizations continued to
    work without registration, while others reregistered under a new name.
    Reasons for failure to register varied, but a common thread was the
    request by the Ministry of Justice for many organizations to refrain
    from citing ``defense of human rights'' as one of their goals. The
    Ministry demanded that organizations such as Ecology and Human Rights,
    Glasnost Public Foundation, and Memorial remove such references since,
    according to the Constitution, NGO's are not among the institutions
    authorized to ``defend'' human rights. According to the reasoning used
    by the MOJ, such organizations can only aid the government and lawyers
    in the defense of such rights. Ecology and Human Rights managed to
    register in August, but only as a branch of an organization registered
    in St. Petersburg by prominent activists Aleksandr Nikitin and Grigoriy
    Pasko. Despite the apparent high number of unregistered groups, many
    organizations are defunct or changed names. Lyudmila Alekseyvena, Chair
    of the Moscow Helsinki Group, reported that the majority of groups that
    desired to register were able to do so, although sometimes this came
    after repeated attempts.
        In addition to submitting their bylaws and the names of their
    leaders, political parties must present 5,000 signatures and pay a fee
    to register. The Constitution and the Law on Elections ban the
    participation in elections of organizations that profess
    anticonstitutional themes or activities.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, although the Constitution also provides for the equality of
    all religions before the law and the separation of church and state, in
    practice the Government does not always respect the provision for
    equality of religions, and in some cases local authorities imposed
    restrictions on some groups.
        In 1997 the Duma enacted a new, restrictive, and potentially
    discriminatory law on religion. This law replaced the progressive 1990
    religion law that had helped facilitate a revival of religious
    activity. The new law ostensibly targeted so-called totalitarian sects
    or dangerous religious cults. However, the intent of some of the law's
    sponsors appears to have been to discriminate against members of
    foreign and less well-established religions by making it difficult for
    them to manifest their beliefs through organized religious
    institutions. The Presidential Administration has been mostly silent on
    implementation of the law. Implementation of the 1997 law on religion
    has varied in the regions. To a great extent, implementation depends on
    the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Justice in each area which
    are responsible for registering new organizations, reregistering
    existing organizations, and liquidating those that do not manage to
    reregister. In some areas such as Moscow, minority religious
    denominations like the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Salvation Army have
    not been able to reregister local religious organizations.
        The 1997 law on religion has many ambiguous and contradictory
    provisions. The law creates various categories of religious communities
    with differing levels of legal status and privileges, distinguishes
    between religious ``groups'' and ``organizations,'' two mutually
    exclusive registration categories, and creates two categories of
    organizations: ``regional'' and ``centralized.'' A religious ``group''
    is a congregation of worshipers that does not have the legal status of
    a juridical person. However, groups are permitted to rent public spaces
    and hold services. Moreover, the law does not purport to abridge the
    rights of individual members of ``groups.''
        Organizations, both local and centralized, are considered juridical
    persons, enjoy tax exemptions, and are permitted to proselytize,
    conduct liturgical services and other religious activities, establish
    religious schools, host foreign religious workers, and publish
    literature.
        Under the 1997 religion law, representative offices of foreign
    religious organizations are required to register with state
    authorities. In practice foreign religious representatives' offices
    (those not registered under the law) have opened without registering or
    have been accredited to a registered Russian religious organization.
    However, these representative offices cannot carry out religious
    activities and do not have the status of a religious organization.
        Critics of the law have claimed that it violates the Constitution's
    provision of equality before the law of all confessions. In particular,
    many religious groups criticized the law's 15 year requirement and
    feared the consequences of the law's provisions limiting the actions of
    foreign religious missionaries. Officials at the local level have used
    the law to restrict the activities of religious minorities.
        Human rights activists welcomed a March 1999 and December 2000 open
    letter to the President and Duma by Human Rights Plenipotentiary Oleg
    Mironov, in which he criticized the 1997 religion law and recommended
    changes to bring it into accordance with the Constitution and
    international norms for religious freedom. In practice the registration
    process--which involves simultaneous registration at both the federal
    and local levels--requires considerable time, effort, and legal expense
    and has proven onerous for a number of groups. International and well-
    funded Russian religious organizations, in particular, began the
    reregistration process soon after publication of the regulations.
    Russian Pentecostal groups, which have a solid and growing network of
    churches throughout the country, sought guidance from the Ministry of
    Justice on reregistration as early as November 1997. One of the larger
    organizations, the Russian Unified Fellowship of Christians of the
    Evangelical Faith (which traces its origins back to the early 1900's),
    reregistered as a centralized religious organization by late March
    1998. It has since incorporated many smaller, newer Pentecostal groups
    within its structure. However, nearly 500 Pentecostal local religious
    organizations did not succeed in reregistering and are now subject to
    liquidation of their status as juridical persons.
        The vast majority of organizations attempting to reregister as
    central organizations succeeded, although there were a few notable
    exceptions: Salvation Army, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and a faction of
    the Muslim communities under the Mufti Tayzhuddin. By year's end, the
    Ministry of Justice estimated that 70-75 percent of local religious
    organizations needing to reregister had done so. However, these figures
    are misleading, since in some cases the organizations no longer exist.
    The Russian Orthodox Church reregistered between 65-75 percent of its
    organizations, Protestant communities 78 percent, Muslim 60 percent,
    Jewish 80 percent, Buddhists 65 percent, and Catholic 70-80 percent.
    All organizations, according to the Congress of Religious Jewish
    Communities of Russia (KEROOR) and the Federation of Jewish Communities
    of Russia (FEOR) have reregistered at year's end. However, one of
    KEROOR's local Moscow organizations has not been able to register as a
    new organization, applying already three times unsuccessfully.
        By year's end no religious organization had ceased operations as a
    result of the law; however the Salvation Army has had problems in
    Moscow trying to extend office leases and operate its food distribution
    program because landlords and social services personnel have assumed it
    has been liquidated.
        Jehovah's Witnesses reported that since the 1997 law went into
    effect they managed to register or reregister 97 percent of their
    organizations. A total of 190 of those were organizations already
    extant which had to reregister. Some 156 were new organizations
    registering for the first time. There were several regions such as
    Tartarstan, Moscow, Chelyabinsk, and Kalbadrino-Balkaria where
    organizations experienced problems.
        Hare Krishnas have experienced no problems at the federal level;
    however, they have encountered significant opposition from the Russian
    Orthodox Church. For many years the group operated underground, and in
    1999 it successfully registered as a religious organization and
    received permission to lease a building in Moscow to use as a temple.
    The city has slated the area in which the current central temple is
    located as part of a new ring road, however, and Hare Krishnas have
    experienced problems in trying to obtain permission to build a new
    complex. The Krishna Movement has grown to more than 130 centers across
    the country and nearly 100,000 believers. They have experienced
    problems in the Krasnador Oblast, particularly. The Procurator General
    of Moscow has opened an investigation into the group's liturgy as of
    October. Investigators claim they are examining whether the literature
    ``incites criminal acts''.
        The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints registered or
    reregistered all of its organizations requiring registration by year's
    end but continued to encounter problems in registering four of its new
    organizations in Chelyabinsk, Tver, and Tatarstan. In September the
    directorate of justice in Chelyabinsk rejected the local registration
    application of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints for a
    seventh time. Even without registration, the church continued to hold
    regular services without incident, although its missionaries
    experienced problems in registering with the local visa office; this
    required them to stay in a hotel in a different city and then travel to
    the area for brief periods.
        The Society of Jesus (Jesuits) was denied federal registration
    because the order's status, which is independent of a local bishop,
    does not meet requirements contained in the 1997 law's provisions.
    However, an April 13 the Constitutional Court ruling authorized the
    Jesuits to be registered. This ruling in Rossisskaya Gazeta referred
    extensively to passages in the November 1999 Constitutional Court
    ruling (which effectively legalized registered organizations existing
    at the time of the passage of the 1997 law). The April ruling also
    specifically refuted points cited by the Ministry of Justice as reasons
    for initial refusal. By year's end they were registered.
        Around sixty percent of Muslim organizations managed to reregister.
    The large percentage that did not is due partly to an internal struggle
    between the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in European Russia
    and Siberia, based in Ufa and led by Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, and the
    Moscow-based Russian Council of Muftis, led by Chief Mufti Ravil
    Gainutdin. Due to the refusal to register Mufti Tayzhuddin's group as a
    central organization, many local organizations did not manage to
    reregister in time. Additionally, many rural parishes either did not
    know they needed to reregister or did not know how to go about
    reregistering.
        The delays in reregistration are in part due to the slow pace at
    which the federal Ministry of Justice at first disseminated the
    regulations and guidelines to local authorities and to understaffing
    both at the Ministry of Justice and at local levels. Although the
    Ministry of Justice claims that internal organizational disputes, which
    lead to the failure of many religious leaders to prepare documentation
    properly, is to blame for the slow pace of registration. However,
    delays and rejections also are due in part to discrimination by some
    local officials against what they believe are ``sects,'' such as
    Scientologists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and others. In many
    instances, the Ministry of Justice asks for additional information and
    demands changes in the organizational structure and by-laws of some
    groups to ensure that they are in conformance with the law. In other
    instances, groups are rejected with no explanation. Another problem is
    the lack of congruence between regional and federal laws. As of 1999,
    of 89 regions, 30 had laws and decrees on religion that violated the
    Constitution by restricting the activities of religious groups.
    Government authorities have attempted to deal with this by introducing
    a federal register of laws to ensure that laws conformed to the
    constitution.
        The Moscow city authorities continued to create difficulties for
    some religious denominations. The Moscow Directorate of Justice
    continues to refuse registration to Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow,
    despite the precedent set by the federal Ministry of Justice's April
    30, 1999, decision to reregister Jehovah's Witnesses at the federal
    level. The Directorate has refused four applications for local
    registration by Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses for unclear reasons. In this
    case, the Judge has appointed an ``expert panel'' to assess the merits
    of the organization as a religion. In some cases, human rights groups
    have accused such panels of lacking objectivity and ruling according to
    political allegiance rather than legal criteria. In November the
    Salvation Army was denied registration by the Moscow City Appeals
    Court, which refused to register their Moscow branch as a Local
    Religious Organization (LRO). The Appeals Court upheld a lower court
    ruling that the organization could only be accorded the status of
    ``representative of a foreign religious organization'' since its
    headquarters is abroad. This denial has implications for other
    religious groups since it may affect the registration of Roman
    Catholics, Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses.
        Although it can be a slow and costly process, the judicial system
    has provided an appeal process for religious organizations threatened
    with loss of registered status or ``liquidation'' as a religious
    organization under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law. Some local
    churches initially denied local registration have been registered
    following successful lawsuits, as in the case of the Evangelical
    Lutheran Mission in Khakasiya in November 1998, when the federal
    Supreme Court overturned the verdict of the Khakasiya Supreme Court. In
    February 1999 the Supreme Court of Khakasiya rejected the regional
    procurator's request to nullify the registration of the Evangelical
    Lutheran Mission; the procurator plans to appeal the case. In 1998 a
    local Procuracy opened a civil case against the Word of Life
    Pentecostal Church in the Far Eastern city of Magadan under Article 14
    of the 1997 religion law, accusing the Church of using cult practices
    to manipulate its members. After a lengthy delay, a Magadan municipal
    court finally dismissed the case in May due to insufficient evidence, a
    decision that was upheld in June by the Magadan oblast court. However,
    the Church fears that the same Procuracy soon may try to open a
    criminal case. The Word of Life Church also won a court battle for
    reregistration in March. A church member employed by the Government who
    was threatened with the loss of her job late in 1998 was still at her
    post as of June. Church officials report that two other church members
    were fired because of their religion, but such allegations are
    difficult to prove. Also, tax investigations on two separate charges
    continue. Church members reported that negative stories about them
    repeatedly appeared in the local state-controlled press, with no
    mention of their court victories. Despite the court case and other
    difficulties, the Word of Life Pentecostal Church continues its normal
    activities.
        The Government has restricted the activities of a number of foreign
    missionaries and of congregations associated with them. There were
    reports that four foreign missionaries were being refused visas to
    return to the country. The former pastor of the Vanino Baptist Church
    in the Khabarovsk region was banned from receiving a visa based on
    allegations that he violated customs regulations and evaded property
    taxes; however, it appears that local authorities violated their own
    regulations and refused to take necessary actions (such as providing a
    timely tax assessment), which would have enabled the pastor to comply
    with the law. An official of the Church of Christ in Magadan also faced
    a criminal charge for failing to report $8,000 to customs officials,
    reportedly because he feared that the money would be stolen. He was
    acquitted in December 1999, primarily because the investigation and
    prosecution were marred by serious violations of due process by local
    authorities. Local authorities then defied a court ruling to return the
    money, returning it briefly only to confiscate it a few minutes later,
    citing administrative customs regulations not applicable to the case.
    The third case, regarding the Church of Christ in Volgograd, appears to
    have been a response to articles in the local press accusing a church
    official of being a spy. Those allegations may have led local
    authorities to recommend to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a visa
    be refused. A member of the local congregation, reported in May that
    since local authorities no longer object to the missionary's return, it
    appears to be federal authorities who still are refusing to authorize
    issuance of a visa. A fourth missionary, of the Evangelical Free Church
    of America, who entered the country legally with a visa sponsored by a
    Moscow congregation, has been refused registration to reside in
    Naberezhniy Chelniy, Tartarstan. The missionary, who is married to a
    Russian citizen, also has been refused permission to register as a
    resident foreign spouse of a Russian citizen. The letter of refusal he
    received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs' local passport control
    office cited ``national security'' concerns.
        Critics contend that the Federal Government should be more active
    in reversing discriminatory actions taken at the local level and, when
    necessary, reprimanding the officials at fault. Also according to
    critics, the federal authorities need to take action to ensure that
    regional and local legislation or other actions do not contradict
    constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. Government
    officials have established consultative mechanisms to facilitate
    government interaction with religious communities and to monitor
    application of the law on religion. Federal authorities and Moscow
    human rights monitors often have limited information about what is
    happening in the regions, however. According to various sources, most
    citizens, especially those living in the regions, still are skeptical
    about the protection of religious freedom and are reluctant to assert
    their rights due to fear of retaliation. Some local and municipal
    governments reportedly prevented religious groups from using venues,
    such as cinemas, suitable for large gatherings. In many areas of the
    country, government-owned facilities are the only available venues. As
    a result, in some instances denominations that do not have their own
    property effectively are denied the opportunity to practice their faith
    in large groups. Jehovah's Witnesses organized a convention to take
    place in Ivanovo on July 7-9. On July 4, the deputy head of the city
    administration issued an injunction prohibiting the convention. The
    Jehovah's Witnesses local leader, Yevgeniy Borisov, ignored the
    injunction and went ahead with the convention. However, on July 31, the
    Ivanovo Oktyabrskiy district court ruled that Borisov had violated the
    administrative order and sentenced him to 2 months of ``correctional
    activities'' (not incarceration) and forfeiture of 20 percent of his
    salary during this period. The Jehovah's Witnesses appealed this
    ruling, and the Regional Court of the Federal Judiciary System
    overturned the lower court ruling on the basis that the city
    administration's injunction violated federal law. On October 10, the
    Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sergeir Airiyev, one of the Jehovah's
    Witnesses who had been accused by local officials of breaking the law
    by organizing a religious convention in Kislovodsk.
        Reports of official harassment and punishment for religious belief
    or activity continued. Despite legal registration, members of some
    religions--including Protestant groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the
    Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints--continue to face
    discrimination in their ability to rent premises and conduct group
    activities. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses report that in Volgograd,
    on August 20, national and religious extremists broke up their
    religious meetings and whipped some of their members. Criminal charges
    have been brought, but no prosecution or conviction has occurred to
    date. In six cases in St. Petersburg and Moscow, police arrested and
    harshly treated Jehovah's Witnesses while they were engaged in publicly
    discussing their religious views with neighbors. Two of these cases
    occurred in the Northern Administrative county in Moscow (where the
    trial to ban Jehovah's Witnesses will be heard). In four other cases,
    two men and two women were beaten by hooligans while engaged in public
    evangelizing work. Charges have been filed with the police. Jehovah's
    Witnesses report that there are currently about 20 cases across Russia
    where local authorities have arbitrarily refused to issue permits for
    construction, renovation, or occupancy of buildings to be used as
    houses of worship for Jehovah's Witnesses. In regard to a proposed
    house of worship in St. Petersburg, the Governor's Office is said to
    have stated that Jehovah's Witnesses had enough places of worship and
    any permit was subject to the feelings of local residents. Jehovah's
    Witnesses also report that in Alagir, Northern Ossetia, local
    authorities sealed the door of a newly built house of worship on July 5
    and prohibited its use despite the fact that all permits had been
    obtained.
        The Church of Scientology has been in conflict with authorities
    since a February 1999 raid on its Hubbard Center in Moscow by the tax
    police, FSB, and procurator. Since then the organization has faced
    charges that it engaged in a commercial enterprise without a license.
    The case is still pending. The Church has been repeatedly refused in
    its efforts to reregister its national center and register local
    religious organizations. While the Church has succeeded in registering
    50 ``Dianetics Centers'' as social organizations, it has only managed
    to register 1 Church of Scientology in Moscow as of October. The Church
    reports that authorities have impeded the operation of its centers in
    Dmitrograd, Khabarovsk, and Izhevsk.
        Groups such as the Catholic Church have complained about undue
    attention from the authorities in Moscow, being forced to submit to
    unwarranted fire inspections, document verifications by the Ministry of
    Interior, and harassment of believers at a Sunday Mass.
        Property disputes are among the most frequent complaints cited by
    religious groups. Many synagogues, churches, and mosques were returned
    to communities to be used for religious services. The Federal
    Government met the requirements of the 1993 presidential decree on
    communal property restitution, and the decree continues to guide the
    ongoing process. According to statistics from the Ministry of State
    Property, as of 1999 over 2,000 federally owned properties had been
    returned to religious communities since 1989. However, jurisdiction in
    most cases is at the regional level, and there is no centralized source
    of information on these cases. One Ministry of Culture official
    responsible for restitution of religious historical monuments estimated
    early in 1999 that over 3,600 transfers of religious buildings had
    occurred at the regional level and that approximately 30 percent of
    property designated for return had been transferred back to its
    original owners at both the federal and regional levels. Nonetheless,
    there continue to be reports of religious property that has not been
    returned. For example, the Roman Catholic Church of Saints Peter and
    Paul in Moscow has not been returned to the Catholic Church despite
    numerous appeals to the authorities and court. Twice in 1997 the
    Arbitration Court ruled against the Church. However, the Catholic
    Church continues to press for the return of this property despite the
    rulings.
        Some Protestant faiths have suggested that the Russian Orthodox
    Church influences the Government regarding land allocated for churches
    of other religious groups. The Russian Orthodox Church denies such
    influence. The Jewish community, which had some success on communal
    property restitution, faces the same obstacles as other religious
    communities on the issue of the return of Torah scrolls, many of which
    are in state museum collections. In May the Ministry of Culture turned
    over 60 Torah scrolls to the Congress of Religious Jewish Communities,
    welcomed by the Jewish community.
        In its preamble (which government officials insist has no legal
    force), the 1997 religion law recognizes the ``special contribution of
    Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and
    development of Russia's spirituality and culture.'' It accords
    ``respect'' to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and certain
    other religions as an inseparable part of the country's historical
    heritage. Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative nationalist
    circles as the de facto official religion of the country. Many Russians
    firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox
    Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian.
        The Russian Orthodox Church was involved actively in drafting the
    1997 law on religion. It has special arrangements with government
    agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual
    counseling to members of the armed forces. These arrangements do not
    appear to be available to other religions. In particular, Muslim
    religious leaders have complained that they are not permitted to
    minister to Muslim members of the armed forces. The head of the Moscow
    Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Moscow
    and all Russia, participates in most high-level official events and
    appears to have direct access to and influence with officials of the
    executive branch. Even well-established foreign religious organizations
    have been characterized by the Orthodox leadership as ``dangerous and
    destructive sects.'' In addition, during the year the Russian Orthodox
    Church entered into formal agreements with the Ministries of Education,
    Interior, and Tax. In the latter case, October press reports indicated
    that the Church has agreed to cooperate with the tax authorities in
    investigating tax infractions by religious organizations. However, the
    nature of such cooperation remains vague. The Ministry of Education
    sent a letter in September to the rectors of higher education
    establishments throughout the country alleging that 700 ``foreign''
    religious groups--including the True Orthodox Church, Jehovah's
    Witnesses, and the Salvation Army--are involved in military espionage
    and the encouragement of separatist activity, and blames foreigners for
    allegedly encouraging splits within the ``traditional'' Russian faiths,
    the Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists.
        The Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with
    several human rights organizations, criticized the use of psychiatry in
    ``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects'' (see Section 1.c.).
    In such cases, authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual
    techniques to ``treat'' persons who were members of new religious
    groups. Human rights monitors condemned the secret video taping of a
    Pentecostal Church's service in Kostroma, which was introduced as
    evidence of hypnosis in a court case against the church in October. The
    Association of Independent Psychiatrists claimed that not only was the
    video taping illegal, but that the quality was so poor that any sort of
    conclusion drawn from it would be questionable. In addition, both human
    rights activists and independent psychiatrists believe that the
    ``expert commission'' appointed to review the tape was biased.
        Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and
    societal discrimination, authorities have generally not inhibited the
    free practice of their religion. Other religions, including Buddhism
    and Shamanism, are practiced in specific localities where they are
    rooted in local traditions.
        President Putin issued public expressions of sympathy for Jews and
    made a public appearance at the opening and on the first night of
    Hanukkah at a Jewish Cultural Center in Moscow. Nevertheless, he and
    his administration were accused by some members of the Jewish community
    and some in the press of fomenting division within the community by
    supporting as head Rabbi of Russia the FEOR head Rabbi, Berel Lazar
    over the long-time Chief Rabbi of Russia, Adolf Shayevich. Shayevitch,
    is associated with a Jewish community organization headed by Vladimir
    Gusinskiy, owner of Russia's sole independent television network, which
    has been critical of President Putin and his support for Government
    forces in Chechnya. Fears of Kremlin interference in the Internal
    Affairs of the Jewish Community were reignited when, on October 19 law
    enforcement authorities conducted an illegal search of the Choral
    Synagogue's offices of Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, who is aligned with
    Rabbi Shayevich. While officials claimed that the search was not
    directed against the synagogue or Jewish community, but rather against
    the Media-Most Security Service then owned by Gusinskiy that was
    guarding the premises, investigators nevertheless focused on the Moscow
    Jewish Community's charter, membership lists, and the synagogue's
    financial documents. Moreover, during the search, investigators told a
    synagogue employee present that they were looking for evidence of money
    laundering. Organizations such as the Union Councils of Soviet Jews
    have accused the administration of harboring anti-Semitic figures. On
    September 7, Aleksandr Ignatov, identified as head of an office in the
    Presidential Administration, published an essay in the Nezavisimaya
    Gazeta claiming that a ``Chasidic para-Masonic group'' stood behind a
    supposed ``world government'' that was leading the drive for
    globalization. Subsequent to the publication of this anti-Semitic
    piece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the Kremlin had
    established that as of October there was no Ignatov in the rolls of the
    Presidential Administration, and that it was conducting an internal
    investigation of the events surrounding the article's publication. It
    is unclear whether Ignatov indeed had been an official in the
    Presidential Administration.
        Newly elected Kursk Governor Aleksandr Mikhaylov made anti-Semitic
    statements that were published in newspapers and aired on a television
    network. The Jewish community urged Putin to separate himself from the
    Governor. The Presidential District Representative Poltavchenko
    reprimanded Governor Mikhaylov in public and Mikhaylov apologized for
    his comments to the press.
        The Federal Government states that it has moved forward on its
    promised initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism, but only
    limited steps have been taken. In November 1998, the Duma adopted a
    resolution against public statements damaging to interethnic relations
    in the country. In March 1999, the Government presented to the Duma a
    draft law on combating political extremism. The Duma is still
    considering a draft law forbidding ``Nazi symbols and literature.''
    Separately the Procurator General sent to regional procurators in
    January 1999 a letter describing the Moscow city procurator's
    experience in combating political extremism with instructions to cut
    off distribution of any literature or printed material depicting Nazi
    symbols. The Government also states that in implementing the
    presidential decree on extremism, it conducted interagency
    consultations, beginning in June 1999 and continuing on a quarterly
    basis, which involve the Presidential Administration, the judiciary,
    law enforcement bodies, and experts from outside the Government. A
    government review of the implementation of existing laws against acts
    of national, racial, and religious hatred revealed that 25 criminal
    investigations were conducted in 1998, and 10 were opened by June 1999.
        A prominent public figure who has regularly engaged in anti-Semitic
    remarks is Krasnodar region's former Governor Nikolay Kondratenko.
    During his tenure, the governor's speeches often contained anti-Semitic
    remarks and stereotypes and blamed Jews and alleged Jewish conspiracies
    for the country's problems. For example, Kondratenko had said that the
    essence of Russian history is the Russian battle against Jewish
    domination. He blamed ``Zionists'' for the war in Chechnya, for the
    destruction of the Communist Party, for attacks on the Russian Orthodox
    Church, and for introducing homosexuality into the country. According
    to credible reports, Kondratenko urged the firing of Jewish public
    employees in the region.
        Particularly troubling to human rights groups and some of the
    Russian media has been the very public support of Kondratenko by the
    Kremlin-backed party Yedinstvo. Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey
    Shoygu, who heads Yedinstvo, openly encouraged Kondratenko to run again
    in the December elections. According to NTV reports, the Kremlin sent
    public relations specialists to the region in early September to
    organize a ``grass roots'' campaign of support for Kondratenko's
    candidacy, although Kondratenko decided against running for another
    term.
        Several religious groups encountered extremist violence this year,
    with little or belated response from the local authorities (see Section
    5).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
    the right to choose their place of residence freely; however, some
    regional governments continue to restrict this right through
    residential registration rules that closely resemble the Soviet-era
    ``propiska'' (pass) regulations. Although the rules, which came into
    effect at the beginning of 1996, were touted as a notification device
    rather than a control system, their application has produced many of
    the same results as the propiska system. Corruption in the registration
    process in local police precincts is a problem. Police demand bribes in
    processing registration applications and during spot checks for
    registration documentation.
        While citizens are free to travel within the country, the
    Government also imposes registration requirements on domestic travel.
    All adults are issued internal passports, which they must carry while
    traveling and use to register with local authorities for visits of more
    than 3 days (in Moscow, 24 hours). However, travelers not staying in
    hotels usually ignore this requirement. Citizens must register to live
    and work in a specific area within 7 days of moving there. Russian
    citizens changing residence within the country, as well as persons with
    a legal claim to citizenship who decide to move to Russia from other
    former Soviet republics, often face enormous difficulties or simply are
    not permitted to register in some cities. In 1999 UNHCR and refugee
    rights NGO's cited Stavropol, Krasnodar, Moscow, and St. Petersburg as
    being the cities least open to migrants (although some NGO's dispute
    including St. Petersburg on this list). This continued to hold true
    this year. The cost of permanent registration is only $0.30 (8 rubles).
    Temporary registration is available for periods ranging from 45 days to
    6 months and costs $0.16 (4 rubles and 18 kopeks) regardless of the
    length of stay. The Government and many residents of Moscow and other
    large cities defend registration as necessary in order to control
    crime, keep crowded urban areas from attracting even more inhabitants,
    and gain revenue.
        There have been several disputes between the central authorities
    and regional governments regarding internal ``passports,'' identity
    documents required for obtaining many governmental services. On
    December 15, the Presidents of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and a
    presidential representative of the Volga federal district reached an
    agreement on resuming the issuance of passports to residents of the two
    republics. Both leaderships suspended issuing passports three years ago
    to protest the failure of new Russian passports to indicate the
    bearer's ethnicity. Under the agreement, a special page will be
    inserted in passports issued in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan giving the
    bearer's data in the national language.
        While federal law provides for education for all children in the
    country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to the
    children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants because
    they lack residential registration. Similarly, while the Moscow
    procurator's office has upheld the right of migrants to receive
    publicly available medical care, those services are frequently denied
    to unregistered persons, migrants, and asylum seekers.
        The city of Moscow frequently is cited by NGO's for violating the
    rights of nonresidents and ethnic minorities, as well as the rights of
    those legitimately seeking asylum. Mayor Luzhkov has in the past called
    for the expulsion from Moscow of Chechens and other persons from the
    Caucasus. Moscow police, particularly special duty OMON (special forces
    unit of the Ministry of Interior) units, conduct frequent document
    checks, particularly of persons who are dark-skinned or appear to be
    from the Caucasus or elsewhere. Such checks on many occasions have
    involved police entering residences without warrants. There are many
    credible reports that police fined unregistered persons in excess of
    legal requirements and did provide proper documentation of the fine.
    According to HRW, it is not unusual for darker-skinned persons to be
    stopped at random and for officers to solicit bribes from those without
    residence permits.
        In connection with bomb explosions in August and September 1999
    which Moscow officials attributed to terrorists from the Northern
    Caucasus, Mayor Luzhkov issued an ordinance on September 13, 1999,
    requiring all temporary residents in Moscow since January 1, 1999 to
    reregister within 3 days with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
    Reportedly 74,000 temporary residents sought reregistration, and
    approximately 15,500 were refused. In order to reregister, residents
    had to demonstrate a legal place of work, payment of city taxes, and a
    legal place of residence. Moscow authorities also restricted the
    arrival of new residents to the city and increased road checks and
    checks in train stations and marketplaces for these new arrivals. Law
    enforcement officials conducted searches of 26,500 apartments, 180
    hotels, 415 guest houses, and 548 nightclubs and cafes. Police
    continued to conduct road checks at train stations, but the number of
    people detained was reportedly much less then last year. Human rights
    NGO's claim that authorities detained some 2,000 persons and expelled
    500 from Moscow (see Section 1.d).
        In April, the Movement for Human Rights in Moscow joined forces
    with the procurator general to challenge Moscow's registration
    requirements in Moscow City Court. In September the procurator's
    office, in what many believe was a political concession, withdrew its
    support for the lawsuit. Nevertheless, on September 25 the Moscow City
    Court ruled that the city's rules on registration were
    unconstitutional, violating the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of
    movement. The Supreme Court overturned an earlier similar decision by
    the Moscow City Court and forced the court to hear the case again. In
    October the requirement was still in effect, and the practice--which
    police reportedly use mainly as a threat to extort money--continues.
        The 1999 Moscow Helsinki Group's (MHG) human rights report
    highlighted restrictions placed by the authorities on Meskhetian Turks.
    During 1989-90 some 90,000 Meskhetians were forced by ethnic conflicts
    to leave the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. An estimated 60,000
    Meskhetians remain in the Russian Federation. More than 13,000 of them
    settled in Krasnodar Kray, and approximately 700 settled in the
    Kabardino-Balkaria Republic. Authorities in Krasnodar Kray and the
    Karbardino-Balkaria Republic deny the Meskhetians the right to
    register, which deprives them of all rights of citizenship, despite the
    provisions of the Constitution that all Meskhetians who were residing
    in the Soviet Union at the time of its collapse are entitled to
    citizenship. Meskhetian Turks living in Krasnodar, like other ethnic
    minorities, are subject to special registration restrictions, for
    example, having to register as a ``guest'' every 45 days. According to
    the MHG, in May 1998 Krasnodar Kray authorities initiated an attempt to
    compel Meskhetians to emigrate to Turkey. By September 1998 it was
    believed that almost 90 families had left the region for Turkey.
    Krasnodar human rights groups continue to state that the situation in
    Krasnodar has not improved. In December, the speaker of the Krasnodar
    Duma stated in a interview that approximately 30 families had left the
    region but later returned.
        The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to emigrate.
    The Government imposes nominal emigration taxes, fees, and duties. On
    average it takes three months to process a passport application,
    although it can take much longer if documentation is needed from
    elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
        Some liberal principles regarding emigration procedures were
    codified formally in a 1996 law on exit from and entry into the
    country. This law abolished the old Soviet requirement that, in order
    to emigrate, citizens must receive a stamp permitting ``permanent
    residence abroad'' (PMZh)--essentially a propiska for those living
    outside the country. The law required the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
    through its Office of Visas and Registration (OVIR), to establish
    regulations for eliminating this practice within six months of the
    passage of the law. However, implementation of the law (which was to go
    into effect early in 1997) is still incomplete. According to the
    International Organization for Migration (IOM), border guards continue
    to require a PMZh-like stamp of all emigrants, and the passport control
    agency OVIR continues to issue it.
        Another feature of the 1996 law is the codification of the legal
    grounds for denying foreign travel documents to citizens who had access
    to state secrets. Under the new law, access to such classified material
    can occur only with the consent of the citizen, established in the form
    of a written contract that states that the signatory understands that
    he has been given access to state secrets and that his ability to
    travel abroad may be restricted. The law envisions a maximum period of
    delay under normal circumstances of five years, and it grants the
    interagency Commission on Secrecy the right to add an additional 5-year
    term to the period of delay if the Commission finds that a person had
    access to particularly sensitive materials. This latter provision has
    raised serious concerns among human rights advocates who monitor
    arbitrary and excessive powers on the part of the Government to
    restrict foreign travel. There was one report that the provision was
    applied in a restrictive manner. According to human rights monitors, in
    1999 the FSB told Raisa Isakova, a former researcher at a secret
    institute in Omsk, that if she did not sign compromising testimony
    against the Jewish Agency (an NGO that promotes emigration to Israel),
    her application for an exit visa to Israel would be denied. When she
    refused to sign, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed her that she
    was ineligible for a visa until 2003.
        If a citizen had access to classified material, police and FSB
    clearances are necessary to receive an external passport. Persons
    denied travel documents on secrecy grounds can appeal the decision to
    an interagency commission (called the Ivanov Commission) chaired by the
    First Deputy Foreign Minister. The Ivanov Commission cannot rule on
    whether the material should or should not be classified, but it can
    rule on the legality of travel restrictions imposed and on whether or
    not the traveler actually had access to materials requiring a travel
    restriction. Since it was established in 1994, the Ivanov Commission
    has granted travel permission to approximately 90 percent of
    appellants.
        Other grounds for denial of the right to travel abroad are military
    conscription or assignment to civilian alternative service (although in
    fact the Duma has failed to pass legislation implementing the
    constitutionally provided right to civilian alternative service), being
    under investigation for or serving a sentence for a crime, evasion of a
    court-ordered obligation, or providing false information on a passport
    application. The requirement that citizens satisfy obligations to
    immediate relatives, such as material support for parents, was
    eliminated except for court-ordered obligations such as alimony
    payments.
        Emigrants who resettled permanently abroad have been able to visit
    or repatriate without hindrance. However, visiting emigrants who
    departed without first obtaining a PMZh stamp have been stopped at the
    border and prevented from departing the country (although they may
    enter without difficulty), since they could present neither a
    nonimmigrant visa to another country nor evidence of permission to
    reside legally abroad.
        The current conflict in Chechnya resulted in a large number of
    internally displaced persons (see Section 1.g.). International
    organizations estimate that the number of IDP's who left Chechnya as a
    result of the conflict reached a total of about 280,000 at peak. Of
    this total, most of the IDP's went to Ingushetiya (245,000), 6,000 were
    reported in Dagestan, 3,000 in North Ossetia, and 6,000 in the Republic
    of Georgia. A total of 20,000 Chechen IDP's were reported to have gone
    to other regions of the Russian Federation. Reliable information on the
    number and status of displaced persons within Chechnya itself was
    especially difficult to obtain due to heavy fighting and limited
    outside access to the region. At times as many as 200,000 persons were
    estimated by the UNHCR to be displaced within Chechnya and without
    access to humanitarian assistance. In addition, 6,000 Dagestani IDP's
    were reported displaced within Dagestan. At various points during the
    conflict, authorities restricted the movement of the IDP's fleeing
    Chechnya. According to some reports by NGO's, border guards at times
    permitted only ethnic Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to
    the press, some displaced persons were transported by bus back to parts
    of Chechnya that were under Russian Government control. Refugees at the
    border sometimes had to live in the open, often without access to food
    or water. Russian border guards and police officers on the border
    between Chechnya and neighboring regions--and at checkpoints within
    Chechnya--reportedly required Chechen refugees to pay money to pass.
    According to UNHCR, authorities early in the year prevented medical
    supplies for Chechen hospitals from entering Chechnya; however since
    spring they have been able to do so. Some refugees also had trouble
    moving about because their documents were lost, stolen, or confiscated
    by Russian authorities. The NGO Civic Assistance estimated in October
    that only 141,870 of 171,000 IDP's were able to register and thereby
    receive aid (see Section 1.g.). In April North Ossetia's Deputy Prime
    Minister stated that an estimated 15,000 South Ossetian refugees, who
    fled to North Ossetia from Georgia in the early 1990's to escape ethnic
    violence, should be sent back to the country. North Ossetian officials
    claim that refugees occupying sanatoria and tourist facilities have
    deprived the republic of millions of rubles in income.
        Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported that federal
    and republic authorities at times pressured the IDP's to return from
    Ingushetiya to Chechnya. According to these reports, government
    officials singled out persons from Chechen towns and districts that
    were designated as ``safe'' by the Government. According to some
    accounts, refugee camp administrators announced that persons from these
    areas would no longer receive food rations. After international
    criticism of these actions, government officials publicly said that
    they would not pressure or compel refugees to return to Chechnya. At
    the same time, authorities consistently announced their determination
    to repatriate all refugees back to Chechnya as soon as possible.
        The Government rarely provides first asylum. It cooperates to a
    limited extent with the UNHCR and the IOM. Both organizations assist
    the Government in developing a humane migration management system; this
    includes effective and fair refugee status determination procedures. As
    of July 31, the UNHCR had registered 40,000 asylum seekers who
    originated from outside the territories of the former Soviet Union
    since 1992. The UNHCR estimates that only 11,000 of these are active
    cases, i.e., persons still seeking asylum or receiving UNHCR
    assistance. The remainder either integrated into Russian society, left
    the country, or have been resettled or repatriated. According to the
    NGO Civic Assistance, as of October, the Government had granted refugee
    status to only 39 petitioners.
        According to UNHCR, as of October, the Government had granted
    refugee status to 238 petitioners this year. Of the 238, 141 were from
    outside the CIS countries and 97 were from the ``near abroad'' or other
    CIS countries.
        According to the UNHCR, between 1993 and November 1999, the
    Government granted refugee status to only 491 persons from outside the
    former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states; all but 17 of those
    individuals were from Afghanistan. By contrast, the comparable figure
    for former citizens of the Soviet Union apart from the Baltic states
    (mainly ethnic Russians) who were granted refugee status by the former
    Federal Migration Service (FMS) is 98,188. The Government acted more
    expeditiously for the latter group and applied a more lenient standard.
        The UNHCR and Amnesty International were working with the FMS and
    border officials to ensure that interviews of potential refugees are
    conducted in a timely fashion, that the UNHCR is allowed access to
    potential refugees in airport transit lounges, and that deportations of
    potential refugees are delayed until cases are adjudicated. However,
    under government reorganization, the FMS was disbanded with its
    functions and responsibilities transferred to other ministries. There
    continues to be widespread ignorance of refugee law both on the part of
    officials (MVD, EMERCOM, Border guards) and would be petitioners.
        According to Civic Assistance, involuntarily displaced persons and
    asylum seekers suffer the greatest difficulties in cities with
    restrictive registration regulations. Their migrant registration
    documents generally are not recognized by the MVD officials who control
    registration. They often are subject to harassment, unauthorized
    detention, and extortion of bribes.
        A large number of workers and students from Africa and Asia who
    came to work or study in accordance with treaties between their
    countries and the former Soviet Union remain in the country. The
    Government has not deported them but encourages their return home. The
    number of persons in Russia from these countries has increased in
    recent years due to the recent arrival of persons seeking refugee
    status.
        The situation of asylum seekers and refugees at Moscow's
    Sheremetyevo-2 Airport continues to be of major concern to the UNHCR.
    Improperly documented passengers are deported systematically, including
    persons who demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in their
    countries of origin. If a passenger wants asylum, Aeroflot gives out
    telephone numbers for FMS and UNHCR, but these numbers are not posted
    publicly anywhere in the transit zone. Despite repeated UNHCR
    recommendations, there are also no signs in the transit area to advise
    asylum seekers about the refugee status determination process at the
    airport. Undocumented travelers are not allowed to leave the transit
    zone and often are returned to the carrier on which they entered the
    country. Legally bound to provide food and emergency medical care for
    undocumented travelers, the airline returns them to their point of
    departure as quickly as possible. (Airlines are fined if an
    undocumented passenger is admitted to Russia but not if the passenger
    is returned to the country of origin.) Human rights organizations
    allege that Aeroflot improperly deports hundreds of asylum seekers.
    Until 1998 the FMS Point of Immigration Control (PIC), whose officials
    are responsible for processing requests for refugee status, was located
    outside of the transit zone, where asylum seekers were unable to reach
    it. The PIC now has a fully equipped office inside the transit zone,
    which UNHCR staff are also permitted to use.
        The PIC interviews almost exclusively persons referred to it by the
    UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the process is neither fair or
    effective; as of the end of 1998, the PIC had not yet rendered any
    decisions in favor of asylum seekers. As of late 1998, 82 percent of
    asylum seekers who managed to contact the UNHCR were deported before
    the former FMS made a determination of refugee status. The actual
    number of deportees is presumed to be higher, as many asylum seekers
    did not have an opportunity to contact the UNHCR.
        The treatment of asylum seekers in the transit zone can be harsh.
    The UNHCR has received reports of physical and verbal abuse of transit
    passengers by police officers and Aeroflot employees. Authorities
    rarely release passengers from the transit zone, unless there is a
    medical emergency.
        A group of about 1,400 to 2,000 Armenian refugees evacuated from
    Baku in the wake of late 1980's ethnic violence still are housed in
    ``temporary quarters'', usually in Moscow hotels or workers'
    dormitories. They are unable to return to Azerbaijan and are not
    accepted by Armenia; they also lack residency permits for Moscow. They
    have been invited to apply for Russian citizenship, which would entitle
    them to the benefits accorded to Russian forced migrants, but
    representatives of the community have stated that they do not believe
    such a step would improve their situation materially. They also have
    rejected offers of relocation to other regions, because they allege
    that the alternative housing that they are offered frequently is not
    suitable or available. Their situation remains precarious as the
    formerly state-owned hotels in which many reside are privatized. A
    number of eviction orders already were served in such cases. Despite
    official promises, their status and permanent housing had yet to be
    resolved by year's end.
        The Constitution does not permit the extradition to other states of
    persons who would be persecuted there for their political beliefs or
    for actions (or inaction) that are not considered a crime in the
    Russian Federation. However, according to press reports and the UNHCR,
    in December 1999 the Government deported seven North Korean refugees to
    China in an apparent violation of the Refugee Convention, despite
    promises to allow them to travel to South Korea for third country
    resettlement. The exact reason for the return of these refugees is
    unclear. The Government of China reportedly returned the seven to North
    Korea. Moreover, in the past there were instances in which opposition
    figures were deported to countries of the former Soviet Union to face
    charges that were political in nature. Under the 1993 Commonwealth of
    Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil, Family, and
    Criminal Affairs, persons with outstanding warrants can be detained for
    periods of up to 1 month while the Procurator General investigates the
    nature of outstanding charges against the detainee. This system is
    reinforced informally but effectively by collegial links among senior
    law enforcement and security officials in the various republics of the
    former Soviet Union. Human rights groups allege that this network is
    employed to detain opposition figures from the other former Soviet
    republics without actual legal grounds.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
        The Constitution also provides the President and the Prime Minister
    with substantial powers, which they used to dominate most areas of
    administration and daytoday policy making and to limit the independence
    of the judicial branch. The judiciary is showing signs of limited
    independence in cases such as the Supreme Court acquittal of Nikitin,
    religious freedom cases in a number of reforms dealing with
    registration, and in the SORM case. Unlike its predecessor, this Duma
    is characterized by a strong pro-presidential center that puts a
    majority within reach for almost all presidential priorities.
    Competitive elections for various regional and local offices were held
    during the year, including elections for the chief executives in 44 of
    the country's 89 regions. Observers generally viewed the elections as
    free and fair. Challengers were able to defeat incumbents in almost
    one-third of the races for regional executive positions and losing
    candidates generally accepted the legitimacy of the voting results.
    There were problems in a number of regions relating to unequal access
    to the media, non-compliance with financial disclosure requirements,
    and use of ``administrative resources'' (such as government staff and
    official media) by incumbents to support their candidacies. Voters
    generally had the opportunity to choose among all serious candidates,
    but a regional court in the Kursk region struck the name of incumbent
    Governor Aleksandr Rutskoy from the ballot for alleged campaign law
    violations on the eve of the October 22 election. Many observers
    considered this court action to be politically motivated and arbitrary,
    particularly in light of similar campaign law violations allegedly
    committed by other incumbents, but the Supreme Court sustained the
    lower court decision on appeal.
        A democratic election for the President took place in 1996 for the
    first time in the history of Russia as an independent state. Former
    President Yeltsin was reelected in a generally free and fair election.
    After President Yeltsin's December 31, 1999, resignation, Vladimir
    Putin assumed the post of acting President. In March, in an election
    that was generally considered to be free and fair, Putin was elected
    President. While the opposition and the media leveled accusations of
    widespread election fraud, most international observers concluded that
    the results of the election were valid. There were credible reports of
    election fraud in some locations, particularly in the Republic of
    Dagestan and a few other regions with a long history of falsifying
    votes, but there was no evidence that such abuses were systematic or
    that they affected the choice of the new President. Problems with
    voting that did occur were due to a lack of attention to proper
    procedure or carelessness rather than to premeditation. Vote counting
    was generally transparent and absent of fraudulent intent.
        In elections that were judged by international observers largely to
    be free and fair, a more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December
    19, 1999. Elections were conducted in all 89 of the country's regions,
    including 12 of the 15 districts of the Chechen Republic, where polling
    was suspended for the Duma elections. This election had a 69 percent
    voter turnout, and was the first democratic transfer of power in the
    country. In spite of efforts made by authorities to prepare for safe
    and orderly elections in the Chechen Republic, observers stated that
    many of the conditions associated with democratic elections could not
    be met.
        Many observers pointed to problems with biased media coverage of
    the presidential election campaign. Paid political advertisements in
    newspapers often are disguised as legitimate news stories. Campaigns
    pay ``under the table'' for stories favorable to their candidate, which
    allows them to bypass limits on campaign spending. In the final days of
    the presidential campaign, ORT (at that time aligned with the
    Presidential Administration) aired a false story reporting on a
    ``grass-roots'' initiative by a supposed group of homosexuals to
    support the Yabloko candidate Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. During the same
    period ORT aired several investigative reports about Yavlinskiy's
    supposed financial links to the head of Media-Most, Vladimir Gusinskiy.
    During these reports, footage of Gusinskiy, who is also the president
    of the Russian Jewish Congress, showed the Media-Most head in Jewish
    settings. Critics accuse ORT of playing on anti-Semitic sentiments
    within Russian society to discredit Yavlinskiy.
        In July the Federal Assembly passed legislation according to which
    regional executive and legislative leaders will appoint members of the
    Federation Council instead of serving in that body themselves. Also
    during the year the President appointed high-level presidential
    representatives to exercise a range of oversight and coordination
    responsibilities in seven newly established federal districts. He
    established an advisory State Council consisting of leaders of all 89
    regions. The net effect of these modifications to Russia's legislative
    and administrative structures for democratic development was not
    entirely clear at year's end.
        In March 1999, President Yeltsin signed the Law On the Basic
    Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate
    in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal Law on Public
    Associations. These laws clarify which political public associations
    may participate in elections; add restrictions on preferential media
    coverage, donations, and financial or material support from foreign
    entities for campaign-related activities; introduce measures to reduce
    the number of noncompetitive political parties and candidates on the
    ballot; increase the level of information available to voters about
    candidates' financial and criminal history; and introduce provisions
    allowing multi-candidate constituencies. Changes to the Voting Rights
    Act affect legislation on both the federal and regional levels of the
    Russian Federation. The Constitutional Court was expected to rule on
    Voting Rights Act provisions that pertain to holding referendums, which
    may compel lawmakers to reconsider the law.
        There were reports of politically motivated violence and
    intimidation during the gubernatorial campaign in St. Petersburg.
    Yabloko activists reported that police and others harassed them during
    the campaign and prevented them from distributing campaign literature.
    Not long after the presidential elections in March, two Yabloko student
    activists, Dmitriy Barkovskiy and Konstantin Suzdal, reported an
    attempt by the FSB to recruit them to spy on the political party.
    According to press reports, the students were threatened with dismissal
    from Baltic State Technical University, where they studied, and with
    conscription to fight in Chechnya if they refused. When they refused,
    they were expelled from the university. Barkovskiy is currently in
    hiding.
        Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov's office set up a working group to
    monitor electoral rights violations in both the 1999 Duma elections and
    2000 Presidential elections. In August 1999, Mironov called for
    legislation to increase the transparency of elections funding. To date
    no legislation has been passed.
        Political parties generally are organizationally weak and rise and
    fall quickly. There are two exceptions `` the Communist Party and the
    pro-Putin ``Unity'' Party. In December, Putin submitted draft
    legislation that would require parties to have 10,000 members in order
    to be registered, with no less than 100 members in each region. The
    draft law would grant political parties a partial monopoly on running
    candidates for legislative office, erect serious hurdles for the
    registration of new political parties and give the executive branch and
    procuracy broad powers to regulate, investigate, and even close down
    parties. The law is scheduled for its first review in February 2001.
        On November 29, State Duma deputies approved the first reading of a
    bill that would allow some regional leaders to seek a third and fourth
    term in office. The bill would amend an existing law, passed in October
    1999, that forbids heads of regions to serve more then two terms in
    office. The law was passed on January 31, 2001.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
    December 1999 elections, 32 female deputies were elected to the 450-
    member Duma, a decrease from the 46 female deputies in the Duma elected
    in 1995. Only one woman, Valentina Matviyenko, serves as a Cabinet
    Minister.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Many domestic and international human rights groups operate freely.
    Most investigated and publicly commented on human rights problems,
    generally doing so without government interference or restrictions.
    Human rights monitors have worked mostly unhindered by authorities in
    recent years; however, some local officials harassed human rights
    monitors (see Section 1.d.). The Government's attitude towards human
    rights NGO's varied. Officials such as Vladimir Kalamanov and Oleg
    Mironov regularly interact and cooperate with NGO's. The level of
    cooperation tends to depend on the perceived threat to national
    security or level of opposition that an NGO might pose. For example,
    NGO's monitoring prison conditions enjoy an excellent relationship with
    Government authorities, while those monitoring Chechnya enjoy a more
    tense relationship. On August 30, a uniformed militia officer and
    several armed masked men entered the offices of Glasnost Public
    Foundation, a human rights group that has been critical of official
    actions in Chechnya and abuses by the security services in general.
    Activists were planning a conference about the security services at the
    time of the raid. The authorities held participants on the floor at
    gunpoint for nearly 40 minutes while they checked documents of
    individuals and of the foundation. After the press learned of the
    incident and began to call the Glasnost offices, the security officials
    left without arresting anyone. Human rights activists viewed this raid
    as an act of intimidation on the part of authorities.
        Several NGO's are headquartered in Moscow and have branches
    throughout the country. Some of the more prominent human rights
    organizations are the Public Center for Prison Reform, the Society for
    the Guardianship of Penitentiary Institutions, the Glasnost Public and
    Defense Funds, Memorial, the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights,
    the Union of Soldiers' Mothers' Committees, the Mothers' Rights
    Foundation, and the Moscow Helsinki Group. Several of these groups are
    recognized by government and legislative officials for their expertise
    in certain fields, and such groups participate (with varying degrees of
    success) in the process of drafting legislation and decrees. Also, the
    prominent human rights organization Memorial worked with the offices of
    Vladimir Kalamanov, Special Presidential Representative for human
    rights in Chechnya, turning to Kalamanov to provide security for trips
    to the regions.
        Various types of regionally based human rights groups are being
    established. Socioeconomic rights groups are the most numerous and
    monitor issues such as unpaid wages and benefits. There are fewer
    civil-political rights groups, but according to Memorial these are
    growing in number. These groups include ``generalist'' organizations
    that cover the range of human rights issues and ``specialist''
    organizations that cover only one issue. Public legal centers have been
    formed, due to the critical lack of legal advice that is available to
    the general public. These centers usually are run on a part-time basis
    by lawyers who, while they cannot afford to offer trial counsel or
    actual legal work, offer advice at no cost on legal rights and recourse
    under the law. Resources for human rights work became even scarcer
    after the 1998 financial crisis, threatening the work of NGO's. Most
    groups rely on foreign support in the form of grants to maintain
    operations.
        Regional groups generally receive little, if any, international
    support or attention. Although at times they reported that local
    authorities obstructed their work, criticism of the Federal Government
    and regional authorities usually is permitted without hindrance. The
    threshold appears to be criticism of a specific political leader in the
    region (usually the governor or a senior law enforcement official).
    Local human rights groups have far fewer opportunities to interact with
    legislators in developing legislation than their Moscow counterparts;
    some are excluded from the process entirely by local authorities.
        Because of the risk of kidnaping and ongoing military conflict (see
    Sections 1.b. and 1.g.), NGO's largely withdrew from Chechnya; some
    still operate but on a limited basis working from Ingushetia.
        The Government's human rights institutions lack independence but
    some of them appear to be making efforts to promote human rights. The
    Office of the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman appears to be
    working actively to develop its authority and public profile. Since
    taking office, Ombudsman Oleg Mironov has worked on becoming an
    increasingly high-profile government spokesman on human rights issues,
    despite earlier criticism by human rights organizations due to his lack
    of human rights expertise. Mironov's office has grown to over 150
    employees and has several specialized sections responsible for
    investigating complaints of human rights abuses. The effectiveness of
    Mironov's office in assisting individual victims cannot yet be assessed
    accurately. However, Mironov continues to expand the scope of his
    activities, attempting to promote broader compliance with international
    human rights standards. During the summer of 1999, Mironov established
    a department of human rights education within his office. The staff of
    six, headed by Anatoliy Azarov (a former director of the Moscow School
    of Human Rights), developed guidelines and materials for teaching human
    rights to the public. The office also established a section on
    religious freedom. Perhaps most importantly, Mironov's office has
    issued four reports detailing human rights abuses in areas ranging from
    psychiatry to pretrial detention. In eight of the regions, regional
    human rights ombudsmen established operations in a similar manner as
    Mironov. In many other regions, human rights commissions were set up.
    However, the effectiveness of the regional ombudsmen and committees
    differs significantly from region to region.
        The President's Human Rights Commission, now composed primarily of
    government officials (unlike the 1993-96 commission under Sergey
    Kovalev, which included a large number of human rights monitors),
    appeared largely inactive during the year. Some human rights groups
    continued to complain that the Commission's focus has changed from
    advocacy of human rights to defending the Government's policy and that
    the Commission has failed to engage well-established human rights
    NGO's. According to Commission chair Vladimir Kartashkin, his role is
    mainly consultative and investigatory, without powers of enforcement.
    Kartashkin receives little financial support from the Government and
    has a very small staff that spends most of its time responding to
    letters from the regions.
        The country has yet to comply with the UN Commission on Human
    Rights (UNCHR) resolution on Chechnya provisions to facilitate visits
    to the region by UN special rapporteurs and special representatives of
    the Secretary General. The country reportedly invited only the Special
    Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, and Special Rapporteur
    for Violence against Women, but explicitly de-linked these invitations
    to the resolution. The country did not invite the Special Rapporteur on
    Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
    Executions, or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
    Internally Displaced Persons.
        Citizens can file appeals to the European Court of Human Rights
    (ECHR) in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations that
    occurred after Russia's May 5, 1998, accession to the Council of
    Europe. Complainants need no longer exhaust all appeals in Russian
    courts before they can turn to the European Court. According to the
    press, the ECHR received 914 complaints from Russia, 60 of which are
    based on human rights violations in Chechnya. However, because the
    Government refused so far to respond to the initial complaints accepted
    by the ECHR (a procedural requirement), no cases have yet been heard.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, language, social status, or other circumstances. However,
    both official and societal discrimination still exist.
        Women.--Domestic violence remains a major problem, since victims
    rarely have recourse to protection from the authorities. Police
    frequently are reluctant or unwilling to involve themselves in what
    they see as purely domestic disputes. Many women are deterred from
    reporting such crimes because of this and because the housing system
    makes it difficult either to find housing outside the family dwelling
    or to expel an abusive spouse, even after a final divorce action. The
    underlying problem is that much of society, including some leaders in
    the human rights community, do not acknowledge domestic violence as a
    problem or do not believe it to be an area for concern outside the
    family. No reliable statistics exist to evaluate the true extent of the
    problem. There is a general lack of understanding of these problems in
    the legal community, and there is no legal definition of domestic
    violence. Some forms of battering are addressed in the new Criminal
    Code but are defined too narrowly to apply to most cases. There is also
    no national political will to consider these problems seriously. More
    than four dozen versions of a national civil law to address domestic
    violence have failed to make any progress in the Duma. Women's NGO
    monitor Yelena Yershova has pointed out that law enforcement
    authorities distinguish between crimes committed outside the home and
    ``acts of violence'' committed at home. In the latter case, such acts
    often are not treated as crimes, but rather as a domestic affair. In
    the first six months of the year, 4,787 persons were convicted of rape.
        There are no current statistics on the reported rape or attempted
    rape of women. The Ministry of Interior states that in 1998 there were
    9,014 cases of rape and attempted rape reported. In 1998 a HRW Europe
    researcher estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of rapes are reported to
    police. HRW further reported that Yekaterina Lakhova, former President
    Yeltsin's then-adviser on women's issues, estimated in 1997 that 14,000
    women are killed by husbands or family members each year. However, HRW
    notes that these statistics underestimate the extent of the problem,
    due to underreporting of these crimes by victims. In 1996 the MVD
    estimated that 80 percent of violent crimes occurred in the home.
        Hospitals and members of the medical profession provide assistance
    to women who have been assaulted. However, some doctors are reluctant
    to ascertain the details of a sexual assault, fearing that they may be
    required to spend long periods in court.
        Trafficking of women for sexual exploitation is a very serious
    problem, particularly because of lack of adequate employment
    opportunities. Reliable statistics on the number of women involved are
    difficult to obtain (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Despite serious problems and difficulties in addressing these
    problems, many effective projects are underway. Approximately 40 crisis
    centers for women are in operation throughout the country, and their
    number continues to grow. The crisis centers formed an association in
    order to coordinate their efforts better, and they chose Marina
    Pisklakova, the Director of the crisis center ANNA, as President. The
    association held its first national conference September 1999, in
    Moscow. Since the conference, ANNA has been working with the Ministry
    of Interior to organize a class to educate police on domestic violence.
    Nongovernmental work in this area is recognized and supported by
    several government entities.
        Women report sexual harassment in the workplace, and anecdotal
    information suggests that many potential employers seek female
    employees who are receptive to sexual relations. The phrase, ``without
    complexes,'' is used occasionally in job advertisements. Some firms ask
    applicants for employment to complete a form including the abbreviation
    ``VBO,'' a Russian abbreviation for ``possibility of close relations,''
    to which the applicant is expected to reply ``yes'' or ``no.'' There is
    no law in the legal code that prosecutes sexual harassment.
        Credible evidence suggests that women encounter considerable
    discrimination in employment. NGO's continue to accuse the Government
    of participating in discriminatory actions against women, contending
    that the Government seldom enforces employment laws concerning women.
    Article 19 of the Constitution states that men and women have equal
    rights and opportunities to pursue those rights. In addition Article 2
    of the labor code prohibits discrimination, further stating that every
    person has the right for equal pay for equal work. Employers prefer to
    hire men, thereby saving on maternity and child-care costs and avoiding
    the perceived unreliability that accompanies the hiring of women with
    small children. The problem of age-based discrimination is very
    relevant to women. Employers try to avoid the requirement of a three
    year paid maternity leave for childcare. Women continue to report cases
    in which they are paid less for the same work that male colleagues
    perform. There has been no recent substantial research in this area, so
    exact figures are difficult to ascertain.
        Job advertisements often specify sex and age groups, and sometimes
    physical appearance as well. Women's average incomes generally are
    estimated to be significantly below average male incomes. Professions
    dominated by women are much lower paid than those dominated by men.
    Moscow human resources managers privately admit that discrimination
    against women in hiring is common. Unemployment, at 10.2 percent of the
    workforce, also disproportionately affects women.
        In July 1999, Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued a decree
    permitting men in the republic to have up to four wives. According to
    Aushev, the decision came in response to the republic's demographic
    situation, and he appealed to the Duma to make the necessary changes in
    the family code; the law was ruled unconstitutional.
        Children.--The Constitution assigns the Government some
    responsibility for safeguarding the rights of children. The State
    endeavors to provide, within its limited means, for the welfare of
    children. While federal law provides for education for all children in
    the country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to
    the children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants
    because they lack residential registration (see Section 2.d.).
        The educational system includes both private and public
    institutions. Children have the right to free education until the 11th
    grade (approximately 17 years old). Students are obligated to stay in
    school until the 9th grade. Boys and girls are treated equally in the
    school system. Health care for children is legally free, although the
    quality varies and individuals incur significant out of pocket
    expenses.
        A Family Code regulating children's rights and marriage and divorce
    issues came into effect in 1996; however, implementation of the code
    has been slow. Many Moscow charitable organizations established
    productive relations with the city government to address the needs of
    disabled children, as well as other vulnerable groups.
        The position of many children deteriorated since the collapse of
    communism because of falling living standards, an increase in the
    number of broken homes, and domestic violence. According to press
    reports, 40 percent of all children live below the poverty line.
    Children on the street often become dependent on illegal narcotics. To
    combat the growing number of children being abducted, police
    organizations are establishing programs to protect children.
        Figures for homeless children are unreliable at best. Nationwide
    they range from 1 to 4 million. Oleg Zykov, head of the No to
    Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Foundation, estimates that there are about
    15,000 street children in Moscow alone. The St. Petersburg NGO
    Perspektiva estimate that about 3,000 children are actively involved in
    street life there and that 500 to 600 of these actually live on the
    streets. Many of these children have come from the regions, only to be
    sent back to where they came from by city police. One shelter director
    complained that young girls from Chechnya also were returned there,
    despite the danger to them. Homeless children often engage in criminal
    activities, receive no education, and are vulnerable to drug and
    alcohol abuse. Some young girls who find themselves on the street turn
    to prostitution in order to survive (see Section 6.f.).
        An estimated 50,000 children run away from their homes each year.
    The main reasons children run away appear to be family violence,
    financial problems, or social problems such as drug or alcohol abuse by
    one or both of the parents. In Moscow approximately 6,000 children per
    year are brought to the Center of Temporary Isolation of Minor
    Delinquents (COVINA). These children stay in COVINA for no more than 30
    days. During this period, the child's guardian is located and his or
    her case is investigated. However, in 90 to 95 percent of these cases,
    the police simply return the child to the family or to the institution
    from which the child ran away. Many officials consider domestic
    problems as private and prefer not to interfere.
        In St. Petersburg local and international NGO's provide a variety
    of services for the homeless. In particular Perspektiva: Medecins du
    Monde (MDM) supports homeless children with a ``social hotel'' and a
    medical/social consultation center that provides medical help,
    vaccines, and referrals to hospitals and orphanages. Perspektiva also
    organizes specialized training seminars for medical and social
    professionals and city officials engaged in work with homeless youth.
        As the former Soviet Union opened to the international community,
    attention focused on the status of orphans and the disabled, who were
    removed from mainstream society and isolated in state institutions. A
    complex and cumbersome system was developed to manage their life-long
    institutionalization. Three different ministries (Education, Health,
    and Labor and Social Development) assumed responsibility for different
    age groups and categories of orphans. Rather than focus on the needs of
    the child, the system revolves around the institution itself. Child
    welfare is easily lost within the bureaucracy; little clear recourse
    exists in instances of abuse by the system. Human rights groups allege
    that children in state institutions are provided for poorly (often
    because funds are lacking) and in some cases are abused physically by
    staff.
        While there are no comprehensive studies of the effects of the
    orphanage system, its costs, and the extent of its problems, several
    groups have compiled important information. Many NGO's including Human
    Rights Watch and Mental Disability Rights International, have called
    for reform to the child protection system. Several approaches have been
    proposed to reform the orphanage and have been implemented by regional
    governments with the help of international donors.
        A 1997 report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development,
    which is cited often, indicate that there are approximately 600,000
    children registered as orphans. Of these children, 10 percent are
    orphans with no parents and 90 percent are ``social orphans,'' who have
    at least one living parent who has given up the child to the State for
    a variety of reasons. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of registered
    orphans increased by 30 percent and the number residing in institutions
    by 35 percent. Concurrently, the number of children in foster families
    increased by 46 percent (most children are related to the members of
    their foster families). However, the number adopted has remained fairly
    consistent, with an overall increase of only 2 percent.
        Although comprehensive statistics are not available, the prospects
    of children/orphans who are disabled physically or mentally are
    extremely bleak. The label of ``imbecile'' or idiot, which signifies
    ``uneducable,'' is almost always irrevocable. The most likely future is
    a lifetime in state institutions. Even the label of ``debil,'' or
    lightly retarded, follows a person throughout his or her life on
    official documents, creating barriers to employment and housing after
    graduation from state institutions. One study conducted by the Rights
    of the Child program of the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights
    found that on graduation from a state institution for the lightly
    retarded at age 18, 30 percent of orphans became vagrants, 10 percent
    became involved in crime, and 10 percent committed suicide. Even for
    those orphans classified as ``normal,'' life after institutionalization
    poses serious problems, as they may lack the necessary social,
    educational, and vocational skills to function in society.
        The existing system provides little oversight and no formal
    recourse for orphans who have been misdiagnosed as mentally ill or
    retarded, abused, or neglected. Facilities to which such children are
    remanded frequently use unprescribed narcotics to keep children under
    control. Boris Altshuler of the Rights of the Child Program has called
    for the establishment of an ombudsman for the rights of children with
    the power to enter and inspect children's facilities at any time of day
    or night without advance notification. Since 1998 the Ministry of Labor
    and Social Development has been working with the U.N. Children's Fund
    on a pilot program to establish regional children's rights ombudsmen.
    According to the Ministry and the Rights of the Child NGO, there are
    now ombudsmen in the cities of Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg and in
    the regions of Novgorod, Kaluga, and Volgograd, and there are plans to
    establish new ombudsmen in two other regions. Ombudsmen can only write
    a letter requesting an inquiry by law enforcement authorities, assist
    those whose rights have been violated to understand their legal rights,
    and make suggestions to legislators (local, regional, and federal) on
    ways to improve legislation.
        Trafficking in children and young girls is a problem (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        Conditions for children in prisons and pretrial detention are a
    problem (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.)
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution does not address
    directly the issue of discrimination against disabled persons. Although
    laws exist that prohibit discrimination, the Government has not
    enforced them. The meager resources that the Government can devote to
    assisting disabled persons are provided to veterans of World War II and
    other conflicts. Special institutions exist for children with various
    disabilities, but do not serve their needs adequately. The Government
    does not mandate special access to buildings for the disabled. The NGO,
    Society for the Defense of Invalids, is working to broaden public
    awareness and understanding of problems concerning the disabled.
        A 1995 law requires that firms with over 30 employees to either
    reserve 3 percent of their positions for persons with disabilities or
    contribute to a government fund to create job opportunities for the
    disabled. The law also removed language defining an ``invalid'' as a
    person unable to work. However, the Government has not implemented this
    law. Some persons with disabilities find work within factories run by
    the All-Russian Society for the Disabled, but the majority are unable
    to find work and frequently are discouraged from working, forced to
    subsist on social benefits.
        The December 1998 Human Rights Watch report ``Abandoned to the
    State,'' documented the conditions which persist in many orphanages,
    including in special state orphanages for the disabled. Being disabled
    is still a serious social stigma in the country, an attitude that
    profoundly influences how institutionalized children are treated. Many
    physically or mentally disabled children are considered ineducable,
    even those with only minor birth defects. According to the report, many
    disabled children are confined to beds around the clock or to rooms
    that are lit, heated, and furnished inadequately. The children are
    given only minimal care by low-paid unskilled workers with no training
    in the care of the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--Until its abolition by presidential decree on
    September 22, 1998, the Moscow-based State Committee for the
    Development of the North was charged with representing and advocating
    the interests of indigenous people. With only a small staff, its
    influence was limited. The Committee's functions were transferred to
    the new Ministry for Regional Affairs and Nationalities, which is
    directed by presidential decree to take ``into account the need for
    singling out the most important issues of northern territories'' as one
    of its priorities. A 1999 bill, signed into law by President Yeltsin,
    on indigenous ethnic communities, provides them with support,
    permitting the creation of self-government bodies, and permitting them
    to seek compensation if economic development threatens their lands. In
    some areas local communities have organized to study and make
    recommendations regarding the preservation of the culture of indigenous
    people. People such as the Buryats in Siberia; the Tatar and Bashkiri
    in the Urals; the people of the North, including the Enver, Tafarli,
    and Chukchi; and others work actively to preserve and defend their
    cultures, as well as the economic resources of their regions. In this
    context, some groups in the far eastern part of the country criticized
    the Government for not developing an overall concept for the
    development of indigenous people. Most believe that they are treated
    equally with ethnic Russians, although some groups believe that they
    are not represented or are underrepresented in regional governments.
    The principal problems for indigenous people center on distribution of
    necessary supplies and services, particularly in the winter months for
    those who live in the far north.
        Religious Minorities.--Incidents of societal violence apparently
    based on religious belief decreased this year. Nevertheless, some
    serious incidents were recorded. On August 20, a group of extremists in
    Volgograd accosted a group of Mormons, beat four Russian members and
    threatened foreign missionaries. The same day, the same group similarly
    attacked Jehovah's Witnesses in Volgograd, beating a minister with a
    ``Cossack'' whip. Members of the victimized groups have accused the
    authorities of being slow to investigate these incidents and make
    arrests. To date there has been no prosecution in the Volgograd
    incidents despite the fact that the identity of at least one of the
    accused perpetrators is known to authorities. On September 17, a group
    of extremists burst into a school in Ryazan where Jewish classes were
    being held and smashed windows, furniture, and an art exhibit made by
    the children, shouting death threats at the teachers present.
    Subsequent to the attack, the extremists left slogans on the school
    threatening to return and kill all the Jews. Police and local
    administration officials initially appeared to dismiss the case. Only
    after international and Moscow media began to probe the case did the
    authorities announce that four suspects were identified and would be
    charged with ``hooliganism.'' As of October, local officials reported
    that they had identified and detained one suspect, but that he had
    inexplicably disappeared. An editor of the local newspaper Vechermi-
    Ryazan was threatened with dismissal for publishing an article related
    to the incident. There have been no developments in solving the
    bombings of two Moscow synagogues in May 1999 and in July 1999.
        As foreign or so-called nontraditional religions in the country
    continue to grow, many Russians continue to feel hostility toward these
    ``foreign sects,'' perhaps influenced by negative reports in the mass
    media and public criticism by Russian Orthodox Church officials and
    other influential figures. These sentiments appear to have sparked
    occasional harassment and even physical attacks.
        During the Jubilee Bishops' Conference of the Russian Orthodox
    Church, August 13-16, the Church issued a document entitled
    ``Fundamental Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church's Relations
    with Other Faiths.'' In the document the Church identifies
    denominations such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons as
    proselytizing ``cults'' whose operations on the ``canonical'' territory
    of Russia must be stopped. According to the document, the mission of
    other ``traditional'' confessions is possible only under the condition
    that they refrain from proselytizing or tempt the faithful away from
    the Church with material goods. Occasionally opposition to the
    dissemination of information came from religious groups. From time to
    time the Russian Orthodox Church has criticized the press for what it
    called ``anti-church publications,'' but stopped short of imposing any
    church sanctions against particular authors or editors. However, the
    Church appealed to authors of what it considered inaccurate accounts of
    church history to ``realize the sinfulness of their evil deeds.''
        Minority religious groups frequently complain of discriminatory
    stories in the media. Newspapers have published sensational or biased
    articles criticizing both traditional and nontraditional religious
    minorities. In October Russian Muslim groups complained of biased
    portrayal of Russian Muslims in a Russian State Television documentary
    entitled ``Half Moon in the Caucasus.'' The documentary, Muslims claim,
    exaggerated the influence of radicals and implied that all Muslims were
    working to support the Chechen separatists.
        Following large-scale emigration over the last two decades, between
    600,000 and 700,000 Jews remain in the country (0.5 percent of the
    total population). While Jewish emigration rates are significantly
    lower than during the Soviet period, the number of Jews emigrating to
    Israel for economic and other reasons increased approximately 70
    percent from January 1998 to January 1999. The vast majority of Jews--
    80 percent--live in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Jews continue to
    encounter societal discrimination, and government authorities were
    criticized for insufficient action to counter it.
        Several reports of acts of intimidation were linked to anti-Semitic
    groups or motives during the year. Anti-Semitic leaflets, graffiti, and
    articles continued to appear in some regions, such as St. Petersburg,
    Ryazan, and Krasnodar. On September 7, an anti-Semitic article appeared
    on the pages of the prominent daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, reportedly
    authored by Kremlin official Aleksandr Ignatov. In the article, Ignatov
    refers to a ``Chasidic para-Masonic'' group standing behind ``world
    government'' and globalization. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
    reported in October that no one by that name was employed in the
    Presidential administration and that an internal investigation was
    under way (see Section 2.c.). The attack in Ryazan on a Jewish School
    was one of the first incidents of its kind during the year. The attack
    was followed by the publication of an extremely anti-Semitic article in
    the Vechernyaya Ryazan, a local newspaper, accusing the local Jewish
    organization of orchestrating the attack to gain publicity and foreign
    financial support. A Jewish cemetery in Nizhniy Novgorod was vandalized
    in July. Police apprehended the juvenile offenders within 2 weeks,
    earning support from the local Jewish community, and received a reward
    from FEOR. On September 29, an orthodox Jew associated with the Moscow
    Choral Synagogue was attacked by a group of ``skin heads''. Similar
    attacks have occurred on Africans and African-Americans in Moscow and
    other cities.
        The ultranationalist and anti-Semitic Russian National Unity (RNE)
    paramilitary organization, formerly led by Aleksandr Barkashov,
    appeared to have splintered and lost some of its support in the
    regions. The group ousted Barkashov in September, and several of its
    affiliates split off from the organization, unhappy with the current
    leadership. The RNE claims a membership of 100,000 in 64 federation
    chapters, but press reports estimate its membership at 12,000, and it
    is registered officially in 22 regions. According to various pollsters,
    the radical movement appears to have won some degree of national name
    recognition and may enjoy the support of up to 3 percent of the
    population. According to press accounts, the RNE managed to get a
    representative elected to the local administration in Saratov. In
    Borovichiy the RNE and another local Fascist group, Mertvaya Voda, were
    active, according to local Jewish leaders, and desecrated Jewish
    graves, mailed death threats to Jews, and displayed anti-Semitic
    posters. The local Borovichiy Duma passed a decree in December 1998
    prohibiting RNE activities and the distribution of its propaganda, and
    in March 1999 city and law enforcement officials formed a commission to
    counteract the RNE's activities and propaganda. In April 1999,
    officials from the Borovichiy city administration invited the Harold
    Light Center, a Jewish NGO, to present a 2-day seminar on combating
    anti-Semitism and extremism. In August, a group of city and regional
    officials traveled to San Francisco to meet with law enforcement
    officials dealing with hate crimes, and in October the San Francisco
    officials traveled to Russia and participated in a hate-crimes seminar
    with their Russian colleagues.
        Jewish NGO's claimed that anti-Semitic themes figured on the eve of
    the presidential elections, citing ORT's airing of a report showing
    opposition figure Grigoriy Yavlinskiy supported by Jewish leader
    Vladimir Gusinskiy, wearing a yarmulke and participating in a meeting
    with Jewish leaders (Rabbis included) in a cynical attempt to discredit
    Yavlinskiy among those who would find the association troublesome.
        A prominent public figure who regularly used anti-Semitic remarks
    was former Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko (see Section
    2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In July 1998, the presidential
    Human Rights Commission issued an official statement noting that ``the
    increase in the threat of fascism'' was ``taking on visible and ominous
    features,'' and that incitement of national, racial, and religious
    enmity was ``taking on an increasingly organized nature.'' It noted the
    increasing number of extremist groups that advocated racial supremacy
    and ``national xenophobia'' and commented that such groups were moving
    with increasing frequency from combat training (under the guise of
    sports training) to ``acts of direct terror, hoodlum attacks on persons
    of 'unwelcome' nationality, the desecration of cemeteries, and
    explosions of monuments.'' The statement followed a number of
    wellpublicized incidents that spring, including several racially
    motivated attacks on members of minorities, particularly Asians and
    Africans. Attacks generally appeared to be random, inspired by racial
    hatred, and carried out by private individuals or small groups, some of
    whom were known to local law enforcement authorities for their racial
    intolerance or criminal records. In December, an African-American
    student was beaten on a tram in Moscow.
        Roma and persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia face widespread
    societal discrimination, which often is reflected in official attitudes
    and actions. Police reportedly beat, harassed, and solicited bribes
    from persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the Caucasus,
    Central Asia, or Africa. Discrimination against persons from the
    Caucasus and Central Asia also increased concurrently with new measures
    at both the federal and local levels to combat crime. Law enforcement
    authorities targeted persons with dark complexions for harassment,
    arrest, and deportation from urban centers, particularly after the
    August 1999 bombing in Moscow. In Moscow such persons are subjected to
    far more frequent document checks than others and frequently are
    detained or fined in excess of permissible penalties, often without
    formal documents recording the infraction being drawn up and presented
    by police.
        During the year, members of ethnic or racial minorities were the
    victims of beatings, extortion, and harassment by ``skinheads'' and
    members of other racist and extremist groups. Arrests seldom are made
    in most such attacks, many of which have been reported by human rights
    organizations. Many victims, particularly refugees who lack residence
    documents recognized by the police, choose not to report such attacks
    or report indifference on the part of police. On October 21, a group of
    ``skinheads'' in Moscow attacked Vietnamese residents in front of their
    dormitory. When Vietnamese residents poured out of the dormitory to
    assist in fending off the attackers, police intervened to protect the
    ``skinheads.'' No arrests were made.
        The Government reported that in 1998 authorities investigated 25
    criminal cases on charges of incitement to national, racial or
    religious hatred. In July 1999, 10 cases were opened, and courts have
    ruled on 9 of them. Chechen IDP's and the Civic Assistance Committee
    for migrants reported that Chechens face great difficulty in finding
    lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the
    usual rent for an apartment.
        In February 1999, the republican legislature in Bashkortostan
    passed a law naming Bashkiri and Russian as its two official languages,
    but excluded Tatar. There are more Tatars than Bashkir in the republic,
    and Tatars constitute 30 percent of the republic's population. The
    legislature of the republic of Tatarstan appealed to the Bashkortostan
    legislature to include the language, but the appeal was rejected. On
    January 21, some 20 Tatars protested a draft version of the language
    law outside the republican legislature, and authorities arrested 7 of
    the protesters. The law still remains in effect.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
    right to form and join trade unions, but practical limitations on the
    exercise of this right continue to arise from governmental policy and
    the dominant position of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of
    Russia (FNPR), the successor organization to the Communist trade
    unions. Approximately 55 percent of the work force is unionized (of an
    estimated 72.4 million workers), and approximately 4 percent of union
    members belong to independent unions. However, there is no
    authoritative data on union membership, because there was no mandatory
    reregistration of union members following the Soviet era, during which
    all workers were registered as trade union members. Union membership
    overall has fallen as a result of economic restructuring, including the
    closing of some enterprises and a resistance by some foreign companies
    to trade union activities.
        The FNPR claims that some 80 percent of all workers belong to the
    FNPR, although International Labor Organization (ILO) representatives
    state that 60 percent is a more accurate estimate. The FNPR thus
    largely dominates the union movement and provides a practical
    constraint on the right to freedom of association. The FNPR inherited
    the bulk of the property of its predecessors, including office and
    recreational property. The majority of its income comes from sources
    other than dues, such as rental income, sale of real estate, and fees
    for member services. Its unions frequently include management as part
    of the bargaining unit or elect management as delegates to its
    congresses. The FNPR and other trade union federations act
    independently on the national political level, but FNPR unions
    sometimes are affiliated closely with local political structures.
    Political parties often act in parallel with unions, for example, in
    calling for a national day of protest.
        Benefits of membership presently vary depending on union
    affiliation and generally discourage the formation of new unions. These
    benefits are largely financed by the Social Insurance Fund. As the
    largest group of trade unions, FNPR enjoys a privileged position with
    regard to the distribution of state funds at the municipal, oblast, and
    federal levels. It routinely decides who receives benefits, such as
    child subsidies and vacations, based on the politics or affiliation of
    union members. However, the new tax code, effective January 1, 2001,
    will include a single social tax and essentially end trade union
    control over the distribution of social benefits at the federal level.
    FNPR sees this as a threat to its dominant role. Other trade unions
    worry that a consolidation of social security assets in the federal
    budget and an additional layer of bureaucracy in the distribution of
    benefits will lead to reduced benefits for workers and the public in
    general.
        The number of court decisions supporting the right of association
    and ruling in favor of employees increased during the year. However,
    the enforcement of these court decisions remains a problem. Moreover,
    most workers do not understand or have faith in the legal structure,
    fear possible retaliation, and thus are reluctant to bring cases to
    court. For example, the Association of Flight Personnel at Vnukovo
    Airport (an independent union) won an out-of-court dispute over unpaid
    monthly bonuses in December 1998. Members of the union, who numbered
    100 at the time, subsequently found themselves excluded from the list
    of payees. The only reason appeared to be their union membership, as
    those who quit the union immediately received bonuses. In January 1999,
    the union filed a lawsuit. After several postponements, management
    agreed in March to pay the remaining 10 members bonuses owed since
    December 1998.
        Management and FNPR local unions often work together to discourage
    the establishment of new unions. In August 1999, management at the Alit
    Factory and the Sverdlovsk Oblast FNPR leadership convened a ``trade
    union conference'' where a newly elected chairman of a local
    construction workers' union was dismissed from her position. The
    chairman filed a case in the municipal court, claiming that management
    and the oblast committee of FNPR were not authorized to convene a local
    union's conference and that conference participants were not even
    members of the local union. The municipal court refused to hear the
    case. The chairman appealed the decision to the Oblast Court, which
    ruled in her favor. The case has been sent back to the lower court for
    review.
        In accordance with the federal Law on Public Organizations, all
    civic organizations founded before 1994 were required to reregister
    with the Ministry of Justice by July. The registration procedure for
    NGO's requires that the local departments of justice check all articles
    of charter documents for compliance with existing laws. However, the
    registration procedures for unions are governed by the Law on Trade
    Unions, which specifies that registration requires a simple
    ``notification'' and submission of documents. Departments of Justice
    throughout Russia have ignored the procedures set out by this law and
    continually refused to register new unions by requiring changes in
    charter documents or confirmation of attendance at founding
    conferences. In one case in Sverdlovsk Oblast, the local Department of
    Justice demanded that founders of a trade union sign again the founding
    documents in the presence of a Justice Department official, a procedure
    not required in any law. Such practices have prevented the registration
    of new unions or the reregistration of existing ones.
        Department of Justice officials extended their authority far beyond
    the letter of the law and in some cases canceled the registration of
    unions. In 1997 the Sverdlovsk Court of Arbitration canceled the
    registration of a local union of utility workers at management's
    request. The Supreme Arbitration Court in June cancelled the initial
    ruling and sent the case back to the lower court for review. Recovery
    of registration will allow the union to again become a legal entity and
    reinstate its chairman, who had been illegally fired. In March the
    leader of a union of ambulance drivers in Nizhniy Tagil received a
    warning from the local procurator's office, demanding that she stop
    interfering with the work of her ambulance depot. The municipal court
    ruled that the leader be fined. The leader appealed the case, and the
    Sverdlovsk Oblast Court ruled in her favor in May. In the opinion of
    independent lawyers, these actions contradict the laws governing union
    registration and are a direct and illegal attempt to discourage labor
    activism.
        Court rulings have established the principle that nonpayment of
    wages--still by far the predominant grievance--is an individual dispute
    and cannot be addressed collectively by unions. As a result, a
    collective action based on the nonpayment of wages is not recognized as
    a strike, and individuals are not protected by the labor law's
    protection against being fired while on strike. Prior to 1999,
    collective actions on this issue were considered strikes if they
    concerned violations of a collective bargaining agreement that
    specified the time frame for wage payments.
        The right to strike is difficult to exercise. Most strikes are
    considered technically illegal, because the procedures for disputes are
    exceedingly complex and require coordination of information from both
    sides, even before courts are involved. Strikes may be reviewed by a
    civil court to establish their legality. The Russian Law on Resolution
    of Collective Labor Disputes specifies that if a strike could affect
    the safety or health of citizens, then a minimum level of essential
    services must be provided. Under such a definition, it is difficult to
    exclude any public sector employees. After a trade union declares a
    strike, the trade union, management, and local executive authority have
    5 days to agree on the required level of essential services. If no
    agreement is reached--which is often the case, the local executive
    authority simply decrees the minimal services. The local executive
    authority also often sets the minimal level of essential services at
    roughly the same level as the average work load. Moreover, the civil
    court has the right to order the confiscation of union property to
    settle damages and losses to an employer if a strike is found to be
    illegal and not discontinued before the decision goes into effect. As a
    result, an increasing number of strikes are organized by strike
    committees, rather than unions. Reprisals for strikes are also common,
    although strictly prohibited by law. In August 1998, workers at St.
    Petersburg's Oktyabrskaya Railroad declared a strike over nonpayment of
    wages, management's refusal to conduct collective bargaining with the
    local union, and noncompliance with health and safety standards. Strike
    participants were sent on forced leave with reduced pay. Management
    claimed there was no work for them at the depot. The workers filed
    cases against management, but the local court ruled against them in
    April. All participants in the strike have been subject to transfer to
    ``idle time'' due to low ticket sales.
        In 1995 transportation unions complained that because
    transportation can be considered an essential service that must be
    provided under law, their right to strike is denied. The Constitutional
    Court agreed and found that banning industry-wide strikes was
    unconstitutional and that each needs to be considered on a case-by-case
    basis. However, a subsequent 1995 federal Law on Railways banned
    railway strikes in contradiction to the Constitution. After successful
    negotiations with the air traffic controllers' union to avoid a strike,
    the Government drafted a regulation that became law in 1999 to ban all
    strikes in the air traffic sector. In addition to the railway and air
    traffic sector, strikes are banned by workers at nuclear power stations
    and by members of the military, militia, government agencies, and
    disaster assistance organizations.
        Union leaders have been followed by the security services, detained
    for questioning by police, and subjected to heavy fines, losses of
    bonuses, and demotions. In January the death of a youth in Polevskoy
    allegedly was due to the trade union activism of his parent who was a
    leader of the regional trade union center. The leader had received
    threats to her job and family after filing cases against the local
    prosecutor's office, municipal court, and police concerning misuse of
    funds. The leader subsequently left her position. There were no further
    developments in the investigation of the son's death by year's end.
        According to an International Labor Organization report, on January
    27, 1999, unknown assailants murdered Gennadiy Borisov, a leader of the
    Vnukovo Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union at the entrance
    to his apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists
    began picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being
    paid for 4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged
    illegal practices involving the company's shares. To date, there have
    been no significant developments in this case, and it reportedly is
    still open.
        There were no prolonged strikes during the year. According to
    official statistics, wage arrears in the first half of the year fell by
    over 80 percent in real terms when compared with the same period in
    1998. Nonpayment of wages, which had motivated strikes in previous
    years, grew less prevalent. The number of strikes fell by 25 percent in
    1999 and continued to fall this year. Unions may freely form
    federations and affiliate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--The law provides for the
    right of collective bargaining, but this right is not always protected.
    The law requires employers to respond to a trade union's initiative and
    negotiate with the union, but no time limit is specified. Moreover, the
    law does not require management to sign the agreement, even after both
    sides have signed protocols approving a draft text. As a result, the
    right to conclude a collective agreement is often not protected.
    Employers often ignore the requirement to negotiate and refuse to come
    to the bargaining table or refuse to provide financial information
    demanded by trade unions. In the past, employers have successfully
    refused to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, particularly for
    unions not affiliated with the FNPR. However, some progress has been
    made in this area. In December 1999, the trade union of employees of
    the State TV and Radio Company filed suit against management because of
    the latter's refusal to enter into collective bargaining negotiations.
    Management demanded that the union prove it was authorized to
    participate in collective bargaining, which it did twice. The court
    ruled that management should start negotiating a collective bargaining
    agreement. Management appealed the ruling, but the higher court left
    the decision unchanged--a significant victory for the trade union.
        An estimated 14 percent of enterprises have officially registered
    collective bargaining agreements. (FNPR claims that approximately 80
    percent of its enterprises have such agreements.) It is not obligatory
    to register collective agreements, and it is very likely that there are
    far more collective agreements than those actually registered. However,
    a gap in the law, which fails to establish the employer's legal
    identity, often makes collective agreements ineffective. A lack of
    clear identification under the Law of the Employer has made nonbinding
    tripartite tariff agreements (with labor, management, and government
    participation) nonbinding at the municipal, regional, national, and
    industrial levels and has brought their legal validity into question.
    Even after an agreement is signed, employers often claim that the
    ``employer representative'' was not authorized to represent the factory
    involved.
        In December the Duma was scheduled to consider two draft versions
    of a new Labor Code. The Government proposed the first in 1999, while
    prounion deputies in the Duma support the second. The government draft
    seeks to increase labor mobility and reduce the so-called gray economy.
    However, trade unionists view the government draft as antiunion and
    fear that it will undercut collective bargaining because of its
    emphasis on individual labor agreements, provision for entities other
    than unions to represent workers, and restrictions of collective
    bargaining to legal entities that essentially eliminate local trade
    union representation. The prounion draft strengthens trade union rights
    and guarantees for workers, including repayment of delayed wages with
    interest and employees' right to stop working if payment is delayed
    more than 10 days.
        There are no export processing zones. Worker rights in the special
    economic zones and free trade zones are covered fully by the existing
    Labor Code and are the same as in other parts of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children; however,
    there were some reports of its use relative to adults. Officers have
    reportedly sent soldiers under their charge to work on farms to gather
    food for their units or perform work for private citizens or
    organizations. Women are trafficked from the country for the purpose of
    forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). There were no reports of
    forced or bonded labor by children.
        According to credible media reports, significant numbers of foreign
    workers from countries of the former Soviet Union are forced to work
    without pay because their passports are held by firms that brought them
    into the country. Similar reports describe North Koreans brought in to
    work in the construction and timber industries in the Russian Far East,
    with salaries remitted to their Government.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits regular employment for children
    under the age of 16 and also regulates the working conditions of
    children under the age of 18, including banning dangerous, nighttime,
    and overtime work. Children may, under certain specific conditions and
    with parental approval, work in apprenticeship or internship programs
    at the ages of 14 and 15. Such programs may not pose any threat to the
    health or welfare of children. The Ministries of Labor and the Interior
    are responsible for child labor issues. Local police authorities are
    responsible for conducting inspections of entities suspected of
    violating child labor laws; however, investigations are entirely
    complaint-driven.
        Accepted social prohibitions against the employment of children and
    the availability of adult workers at low wages generally prevent
    widespread abuse of child labor legislation. However, the transition
    from a planned to a market economy has brought with it drastic
    economic, political, and social changes. An increase in the number of
    children working and living on the streets is largely the result of
    deterioration in the social service infrastructure, including access to
    education and health care. In some cases, economic hardship has
    undermined traditions and social customs, and eroded the protection
    families traditionally provided to children. Homeless children are
    especially at risk for exploitation in prostitution or criminal
    activities. Children often are used by their parents to lend credence
    to their poverty when begging.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, some girls were trafficked abroad for the purpose of forced
    prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage of
    $4.70 (132 rubles) remains well below the official subsistence level of
    $35 (1,234 rubles) per month and is insufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. Approximately 37 percent of
    the population have incomes below this survival minimum, compared with
    38 percent in 1999. Most workers receive several times the monthly
    minimum, and the minimum wage is essentially an accounting reference
    for calculating university stipends, pensions, civil service wages, and
    social benefits. It is not a number used for real salaries. Enterprises
    often use this number to avoid taxation by reporting the number of
    employees paid at the minimum wage instead of reporting actual
    salaries. According to Ministry of Labor statistics, unreported wages
    currently account for about 12 percent of the gross domestic product.
    Legally paid wages account only about 36 percent of the total income of
    citizens. In addition, much of the population continues to reside in
    low-rent or subsidized housing and receives various social services
    from enterprises or municipalities. Dependence on such subsidies, in
    conjunction with the residency registration system--illegal but widely
    practiced--generally prevents relocation to find work.
        The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at
    least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires premium pay for
    overtime work or work on holidays. Workers have complained of being
    required to work well beyond the normal week, that is 10- to 12-hour
    days, of abrogations of negotiated labor agreements, and of forced
    transfers.
        Despite a steady decline since the 1998 crisis, the nonpayment of
    wages continues to be the most widespread abuse of the Labor Code,
    especially for workers in the education, medicine, and coal sectors.
    While the overall problem of nonpayment of wages appeared to diminish
    greatly, total wage arrears at the end of November remained high and
    equaled over $1 billion (36.8 billion rubles). While some enterprises
    still force their employees to take wages in barter, the practice is
    much less prevalent than in the period before or immediately after the
    1998 financial crisis. The International Confederation of Trade Unions
    (ICFTU) contends that the total bill of wage arrears is now more than
    $15 billion.
        An increasing number of workers owed back wages seek relief through
    the court system, but the process is lengthy. Courts often are willing
    to rule in favor of employees, but the collection of back wages remains
    difficult. Courts often insist that cases be filed individually, in
    contradiction to the Law on Trade Unions, thereby undercutting union
    attempts to include the entire membership in one case. This insistence
    also makes the process lengthier and more difficult for the affected
    workers and exposes them to possible retaliation. It is widespread
    practice to remove the names of workers who win judgments for back
    wages, but have not yet received the wages, from the list of those who
    can buy food on credit from the company store.
        Labor mobility continues to be a problem. For various reasons, many
    workers are not able to move to other areas of the country in search of
    work. Many are constrained economically because their savings were
    destroyed by the rampant inflation of the early 1990's and the
    nonpayment of wages. Their freedom to move in search of new employment
    is limited further by the system of residency permits. Other workers
    effectively are tied to enterprises that can give them only credits at
    the company cafeteria and grocery and the hope of future salary
    payments. The knowledge that workers cannot easily move across regions
    and find employment has made managers in some one-factory towns
    reluctant to lay off workers. Because of the inability of local
    employment agencies to provide benefits or to absorb laid-off employees
    from some factory towns, local governors and mayors often overturn the
    enterprises' decisions to lay off workers who are not really working.
    Other factors, such as the availability of subsidized housing and
    cultural ties to locations, also inhibit the movement of workers. By
    decriminalizing the nonpayment of wages and by maintaining the system
    of residency permits, the Government has restricted even further the
    mobility of labor.
        The law establishes minimal conditions for workplace safety and
    worker health, but these standards often are not enforced. Workers wear
    little protective equipment in factories, enterprises store hazardous
    materials in open areas, and smoking is permitted near containers of
    flammable substances. Funds remain limited for safety and health in the
    workplace.
        The Labor Code guarantees workers the right to remove themselves
    from hazardous or life-threatening work situations without endangering
    their continued employment and entitlements to such compensations as
    shorter hours, increased vacations, extra pay, and pension benefits for
    working under such conditions. However, the pressure for survival often
    displaces concern for safety. There continue to be reported cases of
    miners removing the supports from mineshafts and selling them for scrap
    metal. Doctors and nurses have been known to sell health and safety
    equipment at hospitals to patients' families in order to supplement
    salaries that often remain below the minimum subsistence level.
        The risk of industrial accidents or death for workers remains high,
    although reliable recent statistics on accident and death rates at the
    workplace are not available. After repeated requests went unanswered,
    members of a St. Petersburg local locomotive engineers' union this year
    sued management to obtain information on health and safety risks
    associated with their work and measures taken to address these
    problems. The workers based their case on a federal law that grants
    employees the right to obtain information on their working conditions
    and occupational hazards. Hearing of the case has been postponed.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and young girls is
    a problem, but there are no reliable estimates of its scope. There is
    no special legislation nor has the Government established special task
    forces on the issue. However, there are several articles of the
    Criminal Code that relate to trafficking of persons. For example,
    Article 322, the principal legal statute against trafficking in
    persons, provides for punishment of up to 5 years' imprisonment for
    unlawful violation of Russian borders by a ``group of persons in prior
    arrangement or by an organized group either using violence or the
    threat of violence.'' Crossing the country's borders without required
    documentation is punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years.
    Regarding trafficking of women, Article 133 prohibits forcing a person
    into sexual activity; Article 240 prohibits drawing a person into
    prostitution by force or threat of force, and Article 241 prohibits the
    organization and maintenance of a house of prostitution. Prostitution
    itself is not illegal in the country.
        Russia is a country of origin for trafficking in persons,
    especially in the trafficking of women. However, the authorities often
    dispute the extent to which trafficking occurs, and who believe that
    estimates are based on too little information. The difficulty is that
    law enforcement bodies consider that most of the illegal activity takes
    place outside its borders and therefore is not within their
    jurisdiction. The country also serves as a transit and destination
    country for a large portion of women trafficked from the New
    Independent States to Western Europe. There are reports that women from
    Tajikistan are trafficked to Russia. Women reportedly are trafficked to
    European Union countries, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States.
    Reportedly women also are trafficked within the country. Women (most
    often young girls) usually are transferred from provincial areas to
    Moscow and St. Petersburg.
        Due to a continuing lack of adequate employment opportunities, a
    significant number of women are victims of international trafficking
    for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics on the number of women
    involved are difficult to obtain. NGO's allege that Russian organized
    crime increasingly is involved in trafficking in women and children,
    but reliable data are not available. Women often respond to
    advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad, where they are forced
    into prostitution. A comprehensive 2-year study of trafficking in the
    former Soviet Union, completed in 1997 by the Global Survival Network,
    an international NGO, remains one of the few sources of information on
    the scope of this problem. The study concluded that most women who are
    trafficked are unwitting participants who respond to advertisements
    while searching for legitimate work. Some government officials and law
    enforcement agencies acknowledge that a trafficking problem exists.
    However, the belief that women are aware of the risks involved is still
    pervasive. According to data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
    more then half of the women engaged in prostitution abroad learned
    about the nature of their future occupation before leaving the country.
    NGO's contend that women are more often told they are would be
    hostesses, exotic dancers, hotel workers, models, etc. They further
    claim that even those who agreed to be sex workers did not agree to the
    kinds of working and living conditions to which they were subjected, or
    to the loss of their documentation and the lack of pay. According to
    credible reports in the national media, there are significant numbers
    of foreign workers from countries of the former Soviet Union who are
    forced to work without pay because their passports are held by firms
    which brought them into the country.
        There are no known specific measures undertaken by law enforcement
    bodies in order to prevent the export of women for the purpose of
    sexual exploitation. The criminal persecution of representatives of the
    ``business'' usually takes place in connection with cases whose
    investigation is performed within the framework of cooperation with
    international law enforcement structures. The Ministry of the Interior
    believes that the ``trafficking in women'' problem is the
    responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Consular Services
    abroad. However, NGO's charge that exploited women commonly are refused
    help by Russian consular officials abroad. Women rarely seek the
    assistance of local authorities nor do they file complaints against the
    agencies that recruited them once they are back in the country because
    they often do not trust the law enforcement authorities.
        The Government does not provide assistance to trafficking victims.
    Victims of trafficking can turn to a crisis center or other NGO's that
    render assistance to women victims of sexual and other kinds of abuse.
    There are 40 crisis centers and NGO's that render assistance to female
    victims of sexual and other kinds of abuse.
        There are no Government initiatives to return trafficked women.
    Unless deported by the host country, women must pay their own way home.
    Some women who return have reportedly told NGO's that they were unable
    to communicate with local law enforcement in their destination country.
    Women reported that their documentation was withheld and that without
    it they were not able to gain assistance from the Russian consulates.
        There are also reports of officers ``selling'' soldiers. The Union
    of Soldiers' Mothers Committee reported in October that this practice
    remains widespread, especially in Chechnya. According to the Committee,
    they received reports that the going rate for a soldier was $2 (50
    rubles). In one egregious case in September, a soldier in Chechnya
    reportedly was purchased for 10 bottles of vodka (see Section 1.c.).
        Law enforcement bodies take the trafficking of children more
    seriously. There are reports of children being kidnaped or purchased
    from orphanages for sexual abuse, child pornography, and body parts.
    There are no statistics available, but law enforcement acknowledge that
    Internet child pornography is an increasing business. There is also
    some evidence of trafficking for organs and body parts. In a much
    publicized case near Moscow, police set up an undercover operation
    which resulted in the arrest of a grandmother and uncle of an 8 year
    old boy, who had sold the child for $90,000 to persons who admitted
    they wanted the boy for sale of his body parts.
                                   __________

                                   SAN MARINO

        San Marino is a democratic, multiparty republic. The popularly
    elected Parliament (the Great and General Council (GGC)) selects two of
    its members to serve as the Captains Regent (co-Heads of State). They
    preside over meetings of the GGC and of the Cabinet (Congress of
    State), which has 10 other members (Secretaries of State), also
    selected by the GGC. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has
    some of the prerogatives of a prime minister. The Government respects
    the law's provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
        Elected officials effectively control the centralized police
    organization (the Civil Police) and the two military organizations (the
    Gendarmerie and the Guardie di Rocca).
        The principal economic activities are tourism, farming, light
    manufacturing, and banking. In addition to revenue from taxes and
    customs, the Government also derives revenue from the sale of coins and
    postage stamps to collectors throughout the world and from an annual
    budget subsidy provided by the Italian Government under the terms of
    the Basic Treaty with Italy.
        The authorities generally respect citizen's rights in practice;
    however, although the Parliament and the Government have demonstrated
    strong commitment to the protection of human rights, some laws
    discriminate against women, particularly with regard to the
    transmission of citizenship.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
    reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
    these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process. The judicial system requires that the country's lower
    court judges be non-Sammarinese citizens, with the aim of assuring
    impartiality.
        A local conciliation judge handles cases of minor importance. Other
    cases are handled by the non-Sammarinese judges who serve under
    contract to the Government. The final court of review is the Council of
    Twelve, a group of judges chosen for 6-year terms (4 replaced every 2
    years) from among the members of the GGC.
        The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
    judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices. Government
    authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations.
    Although it does not formally offer asylum to refugees, the Government
    has permitted a few individuals to reside and work in the country. The
    issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the year;
    nor were there any reports of the forced repatriation of refugees.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    they face no legal impediments. In 1974 the first female member was
    elected to the GGC. Since then, women have served on the Council as
    Secretary of State for Internal Affairs and as Captain Regent. All
    women's branches of the political parties have been integrated into the
    mainstream party organizations, where women hold important positions.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no domestic human rights organizations, although the
    Government does not impede their formation. The Government has declared
    itself open to outsiders' investigations of alleged abuses, but there
    have been no known requests.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
    disability, language, or social status, and the authorities respect
    these provisions. The law also prohibits some forms of discrimination
    based on sex, but vestiges of legal as well as societal discrimination
    against women remain.
        Women.--The law provides for the protection of women from violence,
    and occurrences of such violence, including spousal abuse, are rare.
        Several laws provide specifically for the equality of women in the
    workplace and elsewhere. In practice there is no discrimination in pay
    or working conditions. All careers are open to women, including careers
    in the military and police as well as the highest public offices.
        However, one law discriminates against women by stipulating that a
    woman who marries a foreigner cannot transmit citizenship to her
    husband or children, but that a man who marries a foreigner can do so
    to both his wife and their children. In a September 1999 referendum,
    the electorate by a very narrow margin failed to confirm a change to
    the law that was approved by Parliament in June 1999. The proposed law
    would have provided for the transmission of Sammarinese citizenship by
    women, but it was narrowly defeated despite support by all political
    parties.
        The September 1999 referendum also failed to confirm a provision
    that would have revoked the citizenship of women who acquired
    citizenship through marriage 5 years after a divorce, if they no longer
    resided in the country. This provision was included in the proposed law
    after the Government had noted that several Eastern European women
    recently had married significantly older citizens, presumably with the
    aim of acquiring citizenship.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
    rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public education
    and medical care. No differences are apparent in the treatment of girls
    and boys in education or health care, nor is there any societal pattern
    of abuse directed against children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. A 1992 law established guidelines for easier access to
    public buildings, but its implementation remained incomplete.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--By law all workers (except the armed
    forces but including the police) are free to form and join unions. A
    1961 law sets the conditions for the establishment of a union. Unions
    may form domestic federations or join international labor federations.
        Union members constitute about half of the country's work force
    (which numbers about 10,300 Sammarinese citizens plus 4,000 Italians
    from the country's total population of about 25,000 persons).
        Trade unions are independent of the Government and the political
    parties, but they have close informal ties with the parties, which
    exercise strong influence on them.
        Workers in all nonmilitary occupations have the right to strike. No
    general strikes occurred in at least the last 10 years. However, during
    this period some brief sector-wide and company strikes took place.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.
        The law gives collective bargaining agreements the force of law and
    prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Effective mechanisms
    exist to resolve complaints. Negotiations are conducted freely, often
    in the presence of government officials (usually from the Labor and
    Industry Departments) by invitation from both the unions and the
    employers' association. For the last several years, all complaints have
    been resolved amicably by a ``conciliatory committee'' composed of
    labor union and business association representatives and government
    officials.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor, including by children, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
    the Government enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The
    minimum working age and compulsory education age ceiling is 16 years.
    The Ministry of Labor and Cooperation permits no exceptions. Most
    students continue in school until age 18.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Since January 1, the legal
    minimum wage has been approximately $1,100 (2.29 million lira) per
    month, which affords a decent living for a worker and family. Wages
    generally were higher than the minimum.
        The law sets the workweek at 36 hours in public administration and
    37+ hours in industry and private business, with 24
        consecutive hours of rest per week for workers in either category.
        The law stipulates safety and health standards, and the judicial
    system monitors them. Most workplaces implement the standards
    effectively, but there are some exceptions, notably in the construction
    industry.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                SLOVAK REPUBLIC

        The Slovak Republic became an independent state in 1993, following
    the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Its
    Constitution provides for a multiparty, multiethnic parliamentary
    democracy, including separation of powers. Prime Minister Mikulas
    Dzurinda took office after parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998.
    The first direct presidential elections were held in May 1999. Both
    elections were declared free and fair by the Organization for Security
    and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and
    Human Rights (ODIHR). The Slovak Republic chose to carry over the
    entire body of CSFR domestic legislation and international treaty
    obligations, which still are being renewed or updated. The Constitution
    provides for an independent judiciary; however, some experts allege
    that the Ministry of Justice's logistical and personnel authority
    allows it to exert some influence on the judicial system.
        The national police, which fall under the jurisdiction of the
    Ministry of Interior, are the primary law enforcement agency. In
    addition to domestic law enforcement, they also have responsibility for
    border security. The Slovak Information Service (SIS), an independent
    organization reporting directly to the Prime Minister, is responsible
    for all civilian security and intelligence activities. A parliamentary
    commission composed of legislators from ruling and opposition parties
    oversees the SIS. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective
    control of the security forces. Police committed some human rights
    abuses.
        The Slovak Republic continued to make progress in the transition to
    a market-based economy, with more than 83 percent of the gross domestic
    product (GDP) now generated by the private sector. The economy is
    largely industrial, with only 5 percent of the GDP generated by
    agricultural production. Major exports are iron and steel products,
    vehicles and automobile parts, audio and video equipment, machinery and
    transport equipment, petroleum products, and organic chemicals. GDP
    growth reached 2 percent during the year. The economy's growth is
    fueled by foreign demand as exports increased by 30 percent in the
    third quarter of the year. Inflation grew by 12 percent, lower than
    expected, due to a combination of increases in regulated prices,
    growing competition on the retail market, and lower than expected
    domestic demand. Slow growth is largely the result of the failure of
    the previous government to implement structural reforms, such as
    financial sector privatization and industrial restructuring. The GDP
    per capita was $3,569 during the year. This provided most of the
    population with an adequate standard of living. The unemployment rate
    was 18.8 percent at year's end, reaching almost 30 percent in some
    areas. A disproportionate number of unemployed are Roma, who face
    exceptional difficulties in finding and holding jobs, partly as a
    result of discrimination. According to the law, social benefits of
    those unemployed over 2 years were cut in half. Savings have been
    transferred to municipalities to pay for community service jobs. More
    than 64,000 jobs have been created to date, of which over half have
    gone to the Roma minority.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the human rights situation improved during the year;
    however, problems remained in some areas. Police on occasion allegedly
    beat and abused Roma. Although the practice under the former government
    of using the SIS to conduct surveillance of many political figures,
    journalists, and their spouses nearly has been eliminated, there were
    allegations in October that this surveillance continues on both
    opposition and government politicians. The absence of government
    intimidation removed the pressure on journalists to practice self-
    censorship. Media monitors report that government politicization of the
    state-owned electronic media nearly has been eliminated; and although
    the potential for political interference with Slovak Television (STV)
    and Slovak Radio (SRO) exists because they are reliant on government
    funds, no threats of retaliation for negative reporting of government
    actions were reported. On May 17, the Parliament approved a Freedom of
    Information Act, which grants citizens access to virtually all
    unclassified information from national and local government offices.
    Discrimination and violence against women remain problems. Cases of
    abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled were
    reported. Ethnic minorities, in particular Roma, faced societal
    discrimination. The frequency of skinhead attacks on Roma appeared to
    remain the same during the year. Police sometimes failed to provide
    adequate protection against these attacks or to investigate such cases
    vigorously. Some anti-Semitic incidents occurred, and limited societal
    discrimination against the Hungarian minority persists, mainly in
    regions where only small numbers of the ethnic Hungarian minority
    reside. There were instances of trafficking in women and girls.
        During the year, the Government initiated investigations into some
    serious crimes. In 1999 the Government created the position of special
    government commissioner for Roma issues in the Office of Deputy Prime
    Minister for Human Rights and Minorities. However, the Government still
    has not fulfilled the United Nations (UN) recommendation to create a
    national committee for human rights and a human rights ombudsman. The
    government Office for Human Rights and National Minorities established
    an ad hoc working group in June to examine existing anti-discrimination
    legislation. The group completed an in-depth analysis of the
    legislation in December and found that although anti-discrimination
    provisions in the Penal Code are sufficient, improvements in the Civil
    Code and more effective implementation of all legislation are needed.
    The cabinet approved an action plan to prevent all forms of
    discrimination and intolerance.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political killings by government officials.
        However, former Prime Minister Meciar's party, the Movement for a
    Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), alleges that the January 1999 killing of
    Jan Ducky, the former Economy Minister under the Meciar Government and
    head of the national gas distribution monopoly, was the result of a
    political vendetta. Ducky was killed in the lobby of his apartment
    building a week after the authorities filed charges against him for
    financial mismanagement and illegal property transfers while at the gas
    monopoly. Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner publicly speculated that
    Ducky might have been killed to prevent his testimony. In November the
    Bratislava district court ruled to halt the criminal prosecution of
    Ukrainian citizen Oleg T. due to lack of incriminating evidence,
    although the appeals court has not yet confirmed this decision. The
    investigation into the murder of Ducky continued at year's end.
        The August 1999 case of a police officer allegedly shooting a 21-
    year-old Rom during interrogation is still under investigation, and the
    police officer involved was dismissed this year for violating the law
    by interrogating the Rom alone when he had access to a gun. The
    Government has appointed independent investigators to examine the case
    further; the investigation continued at year's end.
        There was no progress during the year in the on-going investigation
    of the 1996 death of Robert Remias. There has been widespread press
    speculation that elements of the security services under the Meciar
    administration were involved in his death.
        In November 1999, Minister of Justice Jan Carnogursky established a
    department for the documentation of crimes committed by the communist
    regime. The commission provides legal advice regarding restitution and
    rehabilitation after imprisonment or persecution during the communist
    regime. The commission responded to approximately 250 requests during
    the year. The commission also prepared draft legislation to assist
    victims of the communist regime.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, both
    national and city police on occasion allegedly beat suspects in
    custody. Police reportedly use pressure and threats to discourage Roma
    from pressing charges of police brutality (see Section 1.e.). Credible
    sources say that the police sometimes tolerate violence against Roma by
    not thoroughly investigating attacks against them in a timely and
    thorough manner or by coercing Roma to refrain from submitting
    incriminating evidence (see Sections 1.e. and 5.). Some police also
    infringe on the rights of Roma to social benefits and housing (see
    Section 2.d.). In 1998 and 1999, Roma in the town of Vrable lodged
    complaints against local law enforcement officer Roman Frajka for
    allegedly attacking teenage Romani boys. The Ministry of Interior
    investigated the case and found Frajka not guilty. The case was closed
    and no official charges or further complaints were registered against
    him this year.
        Residents of African and Asian origin continued to complain that
    police fail to investigate skinhead attacks against them.
        The 1995 case of the violent abduction of the former president's
    son, Michal Kovac, Jr. to Austria, during which he was tortured,
    remains unsolved. The Government actively reinvestigated the case in
    which former SIS personnel are alleged to be implicated. Interior
    Minister Pittner released a report in January 1999 attesting to the
    SIS's influence over the Ministry of Interior under Meciar, especially
    over the investigative and criminal police sections. In February 1999,
    the police arrested two former high-ranking officers of the SIS. The
    Constitutional Court concluded that amnesties granted to Gustav Krajci
    and a second official involved in the case, Jaroslav Svechota, by
    former Prime Minister Meciar shielded them from prosecution. Police
    closed their investigation in April. Twelve persons, most of whom were
    formerly members of the SIS, were charged. Former SIS head Ivan Lexa
    was the primary person accused.
        In April 1999, the Parliament lifted the immunity of former SIS
    head Ivan Lexa in five of the seven criminal cases in which he
    allegedly was implicated. Subsequently he was placed in preliminary
    detention; however, he was released later on the decision of a regional
    court due to insufficient evidence. On September 4, the Bratislava
    district court issued an international warrant for the arrest of Lexa,
    who allegedly had fled the country. Lexa faces several charges,
    including abuse of power, fraud, and money laundering. Following the
    issuance of the international arrest warrant, Slovak police applied for
    Interpol's help in finding and detaining him. Lexa's attorneys have
    charged that the Government's continued pursuit of their client is
    unfair persecution since they argue that he cannot be prosecuted
    because of Meciar's amnesties. However, the Government's investigation
    into Lexa's involvement in crimes for which he had not received amnesty
    continues.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
    these prohibitions.
        A person accused or suspected of a crime must be given a hearing
    within 24 hours and be either set free or remanded by the court. During
    this time, the detainee has the right to an attorney. If remanded by a
    court, the accused is entitled to an additional hearing within 24
    hours, at which time the judge either sets the accused free or issues a
    substantive written order placing the accused in custody. Some critics
    argue that the initial 24-hour detainment period, during which time
    investigators must gather all evidence, which can be submitted, to the
    prosecutor, is not sufficient and occasionally results in the release
    of guilty suspects. A Ministry of Justice judicial reform committee
    recommended lengthening the initial detainment period to 72 hours.
        In April Special Forces broke into the residence of former Prime
    Minister Vladimir Meciar, and detained and transported him to
    Bratislava to question him concerning his alleged misuse of authority
    as a public official. His supporters called the action an excessive use
    of force and an illegal and politically motivated indictment. Police
    defended the action and stated that it was in accordance with the law.
        Investigative detention may last 18 to 40 days, with further
    pretrial detention permitted. The total length of pretrial detention
    may not exceed 1 year, unless the Supreme Court extends it, after
    determining that the person constitutes a serious danger to society.
        Pretrial detainees constituted roughly 26.7 percent of the total
    prison population, and the average pretrial detention period was 7.2
    months. The law allows family visits and provides for a court-paid
    attorney if needed. A system of bail exists. Noncitizens may be held
    for up to 30 days for identification purposes or for 18 to 40 days in
    investigative detention. Detainees have the right to see an attorney
    immediately and should be notified of this right; however, one
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports that not all detainees are
    notified of their rights.
        The law allows monthly family visits upon request and receipt by
    detainees of a package of up to 10 pounds every 2 weeks. Attorney
    visits are allowed as frequently as necessary, and consular visits are
    allowed upon request by the judge.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes this
    prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
    courts that are independent, impartial, and separate from the other
    branches of government; however, some critics allege that the
    dependence of judges upon the Ministry of Justice for logistical
    support, the granting of leave requests, and other services undermines
    their independent status. Also, the Ministry of Justice can demote
    presidents and vice presidents of the courts for any reason, although
    they remain judges, and it has done so. Although not specified in
    legislation, in practice the Judicial Council, an independent
    organization of lawyers and judges, recommends nominations for
    presidents of courts, and the Minister of Justice then officially
    nominates the recommended judge. The Ministry has denied nomination of
    only one of the council's recommendations. This practice increases the
    independence of the judicial branch.
        The court system consists of local and regional courts, with the
    Supreme Court as the highest court of appeal except for on
    constitutional questions. There is a separate Constitutional Court--
    with no ties to the Ministry of Justice--that considers constitutional
    issues. In addition there is a separate military court system, the
    decisions of which may be appealed to the Supreme Court and the
    Constitutional Court. Under the Constitution, the President appoints
    Constitutional Court judges to 7-year terms based upon parliamentary
    nominations. Parliament elects other judges, based on recommendations
    from the Ministry of Justice, and can remove them for misconduct.
        Many activists make credible allegations that some judges are
    corrupt and that adequate safeguards against corruption do not exist.
        Persons charged with criminal offenses are entitled to fair and
    open public trials. They have the right to be informed of the charges
    against them and of their legal rights, to retain and consult with
    counsel sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense, and to confront
    witnesses. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. Defendants also
    have the right to refuse to make self-incriminating statements, and
    they may appeal any judgment against them.
        According to existing legislation, suspects are presumed innocent
    during the appeal process, and if that process lasts more than 3 years,
    the suspect will be released. Critics say that this rule occasionally
    results in the release of dangerous criminals.
        Human rights monitors continued to charge that police and
    investigators are reluctant to take the testimony of witnesses,
    particularly Roma, to skinhead attacks on Roma, and police on occasion
    have failed to investigate cases of skinhead violence when the skinhead
    did not admit the crime (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Some NGO's have
    defended the police, contending that the real fault lies in the
    legislation, which states that only evidence that is collected by the
    investigator in the 24-hour detention period can be considered in the
    decision on whether to hold the suspect. Furthermore human rights
    monitors reported that police used the device of countercharges or
    threats of countercharges to pressure Roma victims of police brutality
    to drop their complaints. They also reported that medical doctors and
    investigators cooperated with police by refusing to describe accurately
    the injuries involved, and that lawyers often were reluctant to
    represent Roma in such situations, for fear that this would have a
    negative effect on their law practice.
        Credible sources say that it is increasingly difficult for citizens
    who are disadvantaged economically to obtain noncriminal legal
    representation, and therefore it is becoming more difficult for some
    who may have had their rights infringed upon to take further legal
    action. The Ministry of Justice has initiated a program in which free
    legal advice is offered in seven cities every Wednesday for 5 hours.
    However, a legal NGO claimed that a more systematic approach is
    necessary. The practice of Chamber of Advocates leadership encouraging
    their membership to avoid indigent cases has been eliminated. The
    Slovak bar association currently is preparing a program to encourage
    lawyers to accept pro-bono cases.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights, but the authorities
    sometimes infringed upon them. The Criminal Code requires police to
    obtain a judicial search warrant in order to enter a home. The court
    may issue such a warrant only if there is a well-founded suspicion that
    important evidence or persons accused of criminal activity are present
    inside, or if there is some other important reason. Police must present
    the warrant before conducting the house search or within 24 hours after
    the search.
        Some Roma activists have alleged that local police detachments on
    occasion have entered Roma premises without a search warrant.
        The 1993 police law regulates wiretapping and mail surveillance for
    the purposes of criminal investigation, which may be conducted on the
    order of a judge or prosecutor only in cases of extraordinarily serious
    premeditated crimes or crimes involving international treaty
    obligations. There were allegations in October that SIS surveillance
    continued on both opposition and government politicians (see Section
    2.a). Unlike during the previous year, there were no known reports of
    alleged government surveillance of Roma.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice. The print media are free and
    uncensored. Individuals report that they feel able to criticize the
    Government without fear of reprisal. However, there were many
    allegations in October that this surveillance continues on both
    opposition and government politicians (see Section 1.f.).
        Newspapers and magazines regularly publish a wide range of opinions
    and news articles. The politicization of state-owned broadcast media,
    which was a significant problem under the previous Government, no
    longer is evident. There were no reported cases of journalists being
    intimidated or threatened in attempts to influence their reporting
    during the year.
        The potential for political interference exists because STV and SRO
    are reliant on government funds; there have been no reports of such
    interference this year. However, STV and SRO officials assert that
    government officials do not threaten retaliation if they do not report
    the news to the Government's liking.
        In one case the Government used libel laws to suppress criticism of
    political or other leaders, and some human rights activists have
    criticized the section of the Penal Code that prohibits the defamation
    of the republic. The Government does not use tax laws or allocations of
    newsprint or advertising revenue to suppress criticism of political and
    other leaders or the expression of viewpoints not favored by the
    Government.
        On February 16, former HZDS Member of Parliament (M.P.) Frantisek
    Gauleider rescinded his complaint to the European Court for Human
    Rights in Strasbourg against the Slovak Republic for his 1996 expulsion
    from Parliament, after the Government agreed to a conciliation
    agreement and financial compensation.
        On March 23, the editor-in-chief of the extreme nationalist weekly
    Zmena, Vladimir Mohorita, was found guilty of defaming the Government
    in an article in which he used inflammatory rhetoric to criticize the
    Government for its decision to open its airspace to NATO flights during
    the Kosovo crisis. Mohorita called the decision a ``shameful and
    fratricidal act,'' denounced the Cabinet as a ``government of mass
    murderers,'' and attacked the ``crazy Satanists from the United
    States.'' He received a 4-month suspended sentence with 2 years
    probation. The law under which he was charged, Article 102 of the Penal
    Code, had been passed under the Government of former Prime Minister
    Vladimir Meciar.
        On May 17, the Parliament approved a Freedom of Information Act,
    effective January 1, 2001, which grants citizens access to virtually
    all unclassified information from national and local government
    offices.
        None of the 26 journalists fired from the STV in 1999 have pursued
    legal action or received legal relief.
        Three boards appointed by a majority vote of Parliament supervise
    radio and television broadcasting. The Slovak Television Council and
    the Slovak Radio Council establish broadcasting policy for state-owned
    television and radio. The Slovak Council for Radio and Television
    Broadcasting issues broadcast licenses and administers advertising laws
    and some other regulations. The Radio and Television Council has made
    significant progress in fostering the spread of private broadcasting,
    for which it has issued 27 radio and 78 television and cable television
    licenses. TV Markiza, a private company with a signal covering two-
    thirds of the country, is the most watched station.
        The Government does not censor books, films, or plays; it also does
    not limit access to the Internet.
        Money has been reallocated to minority groups for the publication
    of minority language newspapers. However, the media monitoring
    organization Memo said that from April until June, Slovak media devoted
    only one percent of their combined airtime to minority issues. In
    addition Roma received no positive coverage, and the Czech, Ukrainian,
    and Ruthenian minorities received no coverage.
        The law provides for academic freedom. Unlike the previous
    government, the current Government neither intervenes in the
    administration and funding of institutions of higher education, nor
    approves all professors' appointments. Many of the school
    administrators who were appointed based solely upon political
    favoritism during the previous regime have been replaced. The practice
    of diverting money from the older, then pro-opposition, universities
    largely has been reversed. In April the Parliament passed legislation
    establishing a private Catholic university in the town of Ruzomberok,
    which officially opened in September. It received a state subsidy of
    $200,000, which constitutes 70 percent of the school's budget. The use
    of bribery by some students to increase their chances for acceptance
    into some more prestigious faculties is believed widely to result in
    unequal access for economically disadvantaged students.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    Registration is not required, but under existing law, only registered
    churches and religious organizations have the explicit right to conduct
    public worship services and other activities. However, in practice no
    specific religions are banned or discouraged by the authorities. In
    order to register as a church, a religious organization must collect
    the signatures of 20,000 persons with long-term residency in the
    country. Some experts argue that the requirement to collect 20,000
    signatures is too stringent and unfairly limits the registration of
    smaller churches. The State provides financial benefits, including
    subsidies for clergy and office expenses, only to the 15 registered
    churches and religious organizations.
        In February 1999, police arrested two former high officials in the
    SIS for involvement in the 1995 effort to discredit the chairman of the
    Slovak Bishops Conference. Allegedly the SIS framed the Bishop for
    selling religious art for personal gain. If convicted, former Chief of
    the SIS Counterintelligence Unit Jaroslav Svechota and Deputy Director
    of the Surveillance Unit Robert Beno would face sentences of between 5
    and 12 years in jail. SIS involvement in the case was proven, and
    property was returned; however, the court had not made any rulings
    regarding Svechota or Beno by year's end.
        By law churches and religious organizations could apply for the
    return of their property that had been confiscated by the communist
    government; the deadline for these claims was December 31, 1994. The
    property was returned by the State, by municipalities, by state legal
    entities, and under certain conditions by private persons. The main
    obstacles to the resolution of outstanding restitution claims are the
    Government's lack of financial resources, and bureaucratic resistance
    on the part of those entities required to vacate restitutable
    properties. While the Orthodox Church reported that six of the seven
    properties on which it had filed claims already had been returned, the
    Catholic Church and the Federation of Jewish Communities (FJC) reported
    lower rates of success. The FJC is dissatisfied with the Government's
    failure to discuss compensation for property that belonged to Jewish
    families who no longer have living heirs.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        According to a legal rights NGO, although the law requires state
    administrators to register all citizens, some local police officers
    refused to give a registration stamp to Romani citizens, which prevents
    them from receiving social benefits and housing.
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in
    accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. During the year,
    1,556 persons applied for asylum. Of these cases and cases held over
    from previous years, none were granted citizenship, 10 were accepted as
    refugees, 123 claims were rejected, 1,366 persons terminated their
    cases, and 400 cases were pending at year's end.
        On April 19, Parliament amended the law on refugees to no longer
    require asylum seekers to register at the migration office within 24
    hours of entering the country.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a
    valid claim to refugee status; however, some refugee claimants had
    difficulty in gaining access to initial processing.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
    through the periodic free election of their national representatives.
    All citizens over the age of 18 are eligible to vote, and voting is by
    secret ballot. The Constitution reserves certain powers to the
    President as Chief of State (directly elected by the citizens), but
    executive power rests with the Prime Minister. Legislative power is
    vested in the National Council of the Slovak Republic (Parliament).
        On August 31, charges against former Minister of Interior, Gustav
    Krajci, for abuse of power and forgery of ballots in the 1997
    referendum on direct presidential elections were dropped. As deputy
    chairman of the central election commission, Krajci allegedly deleted
    from the referendum ballot the question on holding direct elections for
    president and marked the new ballot with the commission's official
    stamp, without notifying the commission of the change. Legal
    proceedings were halted because of a Constitutional Court ruling that
    Krajci was covered by an amnesty issued by former Prime Minister Meciar
    while the latter was temporarily exercising presidential authority.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2
    female ministers, 1 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges appointed in
    November 1999 is a woman, and women hold 21 seats in the 150-member
    Parliament. In the last parliamentary elections, only 273 of the 1,618
    candidates (17 percent) were women.
        The large ethnic Hungarian minority, whose coalition gained 15
    seats in Parliament in the September 1998 elections, is well
    represented in Parliament and the Government. One ethnic Hungarian sits
    on the Constitutional Court. Roma are not represented in Parliament,
    but a Rom holds the position of Government Commissioner for Roma
    Issues.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally are
    cooperative and responsive to their views. A 1996 law requiring NGO's
    and foundations to reregister and have substantial financial resources
    in order to operate, eliminated some foundations, primarily dormant
    groups. However, no organization was denied registration or faced any
    other major problem in continuing to operate. Some NGO leaders
    continued to allege that the current Government at times is
    unresponsive to their requests.
        Roma calls for Deputy Prime Minister Csaky's resignation had little
    effect. The Roma community appeared more satisfied with the performance
    of his office during the year; however, there has been an increase in
    dissatisfaction among Roma with the performance of the Government's
    commissioner for Roma Issues, Vincent Danihel. The Roma community has
    called for Danihel's resignation to little effect.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination and provides for the equality of
    all citizens. However, enforcement is uneven, with different minority
    groups reporting that their members often receive no government
    assistance with complaints about discrimination. Health care,
    education, retirement benefits, and other social services are provided
    regardless of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
    status; however, there were credible reports by human rights monitors
    that indicate that Roma continued to suffer from discrimination in
    employment, housing, schooling, health care, and the administration of
    state services. Deputy Prime Minister Csaky's office appointed a
    commission in May to examine existing anti-discrimination legislation
    and determine whether additional legislation is necessary. The
    committee completed its assignment in December. The result of the
    committee's findings indicate that the Penal Code sufficiently
    addresses anti-discrimination concerns, but both improved legislation
    protecting civil rights and better implementation of the legislation is
    needed.
        Women.--Violence, particularly sexual violence against women,
    remains a serious and underreported problem. According to Ministry of
    Interior statistics, both domestic and public violence against women
    has been increasing: 1,000 cases of public violence were registered in
    1997, compared with 276 in 1985. Domestic violence in 1997 included
    2,656 cases, compared with 1,874 in 1995 when statistics first were
    kept. Further police statistics indicate that from 1995 to 1997, 69.8
    percent of all violent crimes occurred at home, with 90 percent of the
    victims being women or children. One NGO's regional research showed
    that 38 to 40 percent of women were victims of domestic violence. A
    national poll from this year indicated that as many as one in five
    women are subjected to some form of physical violence in the home, and
    that 70 percent of all violence against women occurs in the home.
    Police estimate that two-thirds of female rape victims fail to report
    their cases. Police treat spousal abuse, other violence against women,
    and child abuse in the same way as other criminal offenses; sections in
    the criminal code specifically address rape, sexual abuse, and
    trafficking in women.
        Legislation has not yet recognized and defined the term domestic
    violence. There is one consulting center for abused women in the
    country. There is no shelter for battered women without children, but
    there are three family shelters for victims of child and spousal abuse.
    In the view of some NGO's, the lack of relevant data on domestic
    violence is used by police authorities to downplay the extent of
    domestic violence.
        Many activists argue that existing legislation does not
    specifically address domestic violence and fails to protect victims
    sufficiently, but noted that the Government adopted a law that
    addresses specifically abuse of family members. As a result of
    amendments to the criminal code that took effect in 1994, prostitution
    is not illegal. However, the code prohibits activities related to
    prostitution, such as renting apartments for conducting prostitution,
    spreading sexually transmitted diseases, or trafficking in women for
    the purpose of prostitution. Trafficking in women is a problem, and the
    Government views it with concern (see Section 6.f.).
        Women are equal under the law. They have the same property,
    inheritance, and other legal rights as men. However, discrimination
    against women remained a problem. According to sociological studies,
    women receive approximately 85 percent of men's wages for similar work.
    However, the definition of similar work is not defined precisely. For
    example, women may have fewer years' experience on the job due to time
    spent out of the work force raising a family. Women earn, on average,
    22 percent less than men.
        In December 1997, the Gender Center for Equal Treatment of Men and
    Women was founded. The Center is an independent NGO that cooperates
    with the U.N. Development Program and the Government. The Government's
    Coordinating Committee for Women's Affairs (including NGO's) has done
    little to implement the 1997 national action plan meant to reduce
    violence against women, protect women's health, and reduce women's
    economic disadvantages.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
    rights and welfare through its system of public education and medical
    care. The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of the Government's
    programs for children. The Constitution, the law on education, the
    Labor Code, and the system of assistance payments to families with
    children each address in part the issue of children's rights. Education
    is universal, free, and compulsory for 9 years, or until the age of 15.
        Abuse of children remains a problem and is underreported. Experts
    from various state institutions dealing with child abuse claim that
    there are significant discrepancies between official figures on child
    violence and the actual situation. A 1999 survey of over 7,000 children
    conducted by an NGO offering resources to abused children indicated
    that 12 percent of children are victims of sexual abuse, while 20
    percent are victims of physical abuse. According to available police
    statistics, child beating and sexual abuse are on the rise. In 1997
    there were 1,083 reported cases of crimes against children. Among the
    most frequent crimes committed against children were: Nonpayment of
    child support, sexual violence, and beatings. In the past 10 years,
    only 127 cases of abused children were reported officially, while the
    actual number is likely 20 to 30 times greater. According to
    independent research, 25 percent of all children are punished
    physically on a regular basis. The lack of legislation protecting
    children in state institutions presents a problem.
        Youth criminality has increased as well. In 1990 children under the
    age of 15 reportedly committed 226 crimes; in 2000 this number rose to
    4,159. Juveniles (15 to 18 years of age) committed 5,565 crimes during
    the year. Child prostitution is not addressed specifically in the
    Criminal Code, but is covered by more general provisions in the law.
    The Penal Code was amended in September 1999 to include a provision
    outlawing child pornography.
        The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), several NGO's, and other
    institutions dealing with children's issues have called for amendments
    to the law on families, particularly the part on relations between
    parents and children. Although new departments dealing specifically
    with children's issues have been established in the Ministries of
    Education and Social affairs, the Government has not yet created an
    ombudsman's office to defend children's rights, as UNICEF recommended
    in 1999. In June the Ministry of Social Affairs established a
    Commission on the Rights of the Child. The Commission provides
    information to children regarding their rights and performs the duties
    traditionally fulfilled by an ombudsman. There are two regional
    emergency hot line numbers for abused children and one counseling help
    line.
        Existing legislation appears to place emphasis on parents' rights
    over children's rights. Current legislation allows parents to place
    their child in a state-run institution for abandoned children, and as
    long as contact is maintained once every 6 months, the child remains in
    the custody of the parents and cannot be adopted. NGO leaders claim
    that existing legislation protects aggressors before victims. If a
    husband or wife is guilty of child and/or spousal abuse, it is often
    the victim who is forced to leave the family home. However, legislation
    was amended in 1999 to allow children who are victims of physical or
    sexual abuse to seek assistance and treatment, without parental
    consent.
        Trafficking of girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution and implementing
    legislation provide for health protection and special working
    conditions for mentally and physically disabled persons, including
    special protection in employment relations and special assistance in
    training. A 1994 decree provides incentives to employers who create a
    ``sheltered'' workplace (i.e., a certain percentage of jobs set aside
    for the disabled). The law also prohibits discrimination against
    physically disabled individuals in employment, education, and the
    provision of other state services. Nevertheless, experts report
    discrimination in the accessibility of premises and access to education
    (especially higher education), and in 1998 the quotas for mandatory
    hiring of disabled citizens were lowered in accordance with employers'
    wishes. Although not required specifically by law, another 1994
    Government decree mandates accessibility for new public building
    construction. The decree provides for sanctions but lacks a mechanism
    to enforce them. A spokeswoman for an NGO dealing with the disabled
    said that due to pressure from a number of NGO's and the willingness of
    the Dzurinda Government, accessibility has been improving, particularly
    regarding new construction; however, many barriers remain. NGO's
    complained that other legislation, including the provision of jobs for
    the disabled, while on the books, often is ignored.
        Religious Minorities.--Despite an order by former Prime Minister
    Meciar to withdraw a controversial history book entitled the ``History
    of the Slovak Republic and the Slovaks'' by Milan Durica, it remains
    available in schools. The book has been criticized widely by religious
    groups and the Slovak Academy of Sciences for gross inaccuracies and
    distortions, particularly in its portrayal of wartime Slovakia and the
    deportation of Jews and Roma.
        In March the city council of the town of Zilina announced its
    decision to install a plaque honoring the Nazi-collaborationist and
    wartime Slovak President, Jozef Tiso, on the city's Catholic community
    center. High-level politicians including President Rudolf Schuster and
    Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda publicly condemned the proposal. The
    council eventually reversed its decision.
        On May 18, the Government sponsored a national conference on
    racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance. At the conference
    the President announced that he would dedicate September 10 as a
    memorial day to victims of the Holocaust; the event took place as
    announced.
        In September the Government approved an agreement between the
    Vatican and the Republic. In February the Ministry of Education and the
    Institute of Judaism undertook a joint educational project on Jewish
    history and culture that is targeted to elementary and high school
    teachers of history, civic education, and ethics. This project is
    intended to assist in educating the public about Jewish themes and
    increase tolerance toward minorities. The Government currently is
    seeking to obtain membership in the task force for international
    cooperation on Holocaust education, remembrance, and research.
        In July 1999, the FJC in the Slovak Republic expressed its concern
    over the desecration of the monument to Holocaust victims located in
    the old city in Bratislava. Investigation into the case revealed that
    it was one of pure vandalism; no connection to racism was found.
        In November 1999, Parliament passed legislation compensating Slovak
    citizens who were deported to German-controlled concentration camps
    during World War II on the basis of their nationality, race, or
    religion. For each month of deportation, those eligible are to receive
    a cash sum of $75 (SK 3,000), plus a $.75 (SK 30) addition to their
    monthly pension. Direct heirs of deceased victims, who at the time of
    deportation were minors, are entitled to a lump sum of up to
    approximately $2,500 (SK 100,000). The legislation disqualifies the
    nearly 700 Slovak Jewish survivors from southern Slovakia, which was
    under Hungarian control during World War II, because they received
    compensation from the Hungarian Government.
        In May 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a prior verdict that the
    publisher of Zmena weekly had to publish an apology to the honorary
    chairman of the FJC for abusing his person and offending his religious
    feelings. The apology still was not published by year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides
    minorities with the right to develop their own culture, receive
    information and education in their mother tongue, and participate in
    decisionmaking in matters affecting them. The Government continued to
    provide funding for cultural, educational, broadcasting, and publishing
    activities for the major ethnic minorities, but at greatly reduced
    levels. However, there is no comprehensive law against discrimination.
        The largest minority is the ethnic Hungarian minority. It is
    concentrated primarily in the southern part of the country, with a
    population registered at 568,714 at the end of 1999 (150,000 of whom
    are thought to be Roma who speak Hungarian and choose to declare
    themselves as ethnic Hungarian). Most ethnic Hungarians and ethnic
    Slovaks living in mixed areas continued to coexist peacefully, but in
    recent years there have been occasional expressions of anti-Hungarian
    sentiments by Slovak nationalists. In 1998 the Slovak Government and
    the Government of Hungary signed an implementation agreement for their
    1996 bilateral treaty, which called for the establishment of
    commissions to deal with the treatment of ethnic minorities. The
    commissions were established in February 1999.
        A 1999 minority language law provides for the use of minority
    languages in official activities. According to the law, in places where
    a minority group constitutes at least 20 percent of the population, the
    minority language can be used in contacts with government officials.
    The law was deemed acceptable by the OSCE High Commissioner on National
    Minorities and the European Union. However, all members of the
    Hungarian coalition voted against the law because they felt that it did
    not ensure that the provisions in the new law would take precedence
    over the existing state language law. The Hungarian minority felt that
    a more comprehensive law was necessary, and that this law did not
    protect the use of Hungarian in cultural and educational activities.
    The Cabinet held numerous negotiations regarding the European Charter
    on Minority Languages, in an attempt to reach a solution acceptable to
    all government parties.
        The special parliamentary advisory committee for Roma issues that
    was created in February 1999 met only twice this year.
        In January 1999, Parliament amended three laws to permit bilingual
    recordkeeping at schools with Hungarian or other minority language
    instruction. As a result of these changes, the Ministry of Education
    ordered report cards in both Hungarian/Slovak and Ukrainian/Slovak
    versions.
        Roma constitute the second largest ethnic minority, estimated by
    experts to number up to 500,000 citizens, although the Government
    officially reported 83,988 Roma in the country. Police on occasion beat
    Roma, and in a 1999 case allegedly shot a Rom during questioning at the
    police station (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). They suffer
    disproportionately from high levels of poverty and unemployment.
    Credible reports by human rights monitors indicated that Roma continued
    to suffer from discrimination in employment, housing, schooling, health
    care, and the administration of state services. Discrimination is most
    severe in the eastern part of the country, where unemployment is higher
    and the Romani population is larger. Among Roma living in settlements
    in the east, the unemployment rate is nearly 100 percent. In urban
    areas in the east, incidents of Roma being denied admission to certain
    hotels, restaurants, and swimming facilities are widely reported.
    According to the Office for Protection of Legal Rights (KPO), Roma are
    often segregated in hospitals, particularly in maternity wards, and
    some say Roma receive inferior care. The Ministry of Health promised in
    July to investigate the claim and to ensure that all citizens receive
    equal care and that wards are not segregated; the Ministry was
    continuing its investigation at year's end. The practice of
    unemployment offices identifying Roma in their records by placing an
    ``R'' next to their name in the register was eliminated by order from
    the National Labor Bureau. Romani children disproportionately are
    placed in special schools for the mentally retarded in many cases due
    to their insufficient knowledge of the Slovak language.
        In August 1999, the Government increased the budget for the office
    of Special Government Commissioner for Roma Issues Vincent Danihel. The
    office's budget totaled $667,000 (SK 30 million) in 2000; it funded 102
    Roma projects. It also allocated about $375,000 (SK approximately 15
    million) for special projects aimed at improving the situation of Roma,
    including ``Headstart'' programs for Roma in 10 schools; training for
    Roma and non-Roma mayors, local government officials, and police
    officers; publication of two Romani textbooks in Slovak, Hungarian, and
    the Romani language; public television programs to educate the public
    about the Romani minority; support for the Kosice Roma secondary art
    school; and support for regional Roma cultural centers, social advisory
    bodies, and health care programs.
        In September 1999, the Cabinet approved a new program, ``the
    Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the Solution of the Problems of the
    Roma Minority,'' for addressing issues of the Romani minority. While
    many Romani leaders and experts on Roma issues believe that the
    strategy is a positive step, they also criticized it for lacking
    specific proposals, being formulated with limited input from Roma, and
    not allocating sufficient resources. On April 7, the Cabinet approved
    an additional $241,000 (approximately SK 10.5 million) for 56
    assistance projects aimed at improving infrastructure and housing in
    Roma settlements.
        During the year, approximately 3,387 Slovak citizens applied for
    asylum in Western European countries, mainly Belgium, the Czech
    Republic, Finland, Netherlands, and Norway, of which only 9 cases have
    been adjudicated successfully. Many human rights organizations claim
    that these asylum seekers migrate in order to receive the generous
    benefits to pay back incurred debt from high interest loans they have
    received from moneylenders. Allegedly the moneylenders organize these
    trips for the Romani families.
        Illegal high interest moneylending to economically disadvantaged
    Roma occurs frequently and occasionally results in Roma losing all
    possessions including housing. The Government has not developed a
    concrete strategy to deal with this problem.
        On August 4, SNS M.P. Vitazolslv Moric proposed setting up
    reservations for Slovak Roma who refuse to assimilate into society. He
    further said, ``It is clear that many mentally retarded people are born
    into Romani communities, why should the State allow a moron to create
    another moron and thus raise the percentage of morons in our nation?''
    In response to his statements, the Slovak Romani initiative (RIS) filed
    a suit with the general prosecutor against Moric. On September 22,
    Parliament voted to lift his parliamentary immunity, thus allowing
    criminal prosecution on the grounds of instigating racial hatred.
        Skinhead violence against Roma was a serious problem, and human
    rights monitors reported that police remain reluctant to take action.
    Occasionally police also infringed on Roma rights to social benefits
    and housing (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). Attacks against Roma
    continued at 1999 levels, however; these cases received increased media
    attention. The authorities sometimes tolerate such attacks. In May
    1999, a Banska Bystrica court ruled that a crime that was committed by
    a skinhead against a Rom could not be racially motivated since they are
    of the same race.
        On April 28, the Banska Bystrica district court issued a guilty
    verdict for the crime of bodily harm with a racial motive. The court
    found a skinhead guilty of racially motivated damage to health and
    sentenced him to 2 years in prison plus 3 years' probation for his 1996
    verbal and physical abuse against a Rom. Lawyer Jan Hrubala claimed
    that this was the first time authorities had applied ``racially
    motivated crimes'' provisions of the Penal Code to an assault case.
        Roma citizens have established their own police patrols in the
    largely Roma-populated Kosice suburb, Lunik Ix, because of the alleged
    inability of local police to protect effectively the area. The unit was
    established and funded by the local self-government with assistance
    from the Society for Personal Safety of the Slovak Republic and has
    been successful in patrolling the area.
        Members of Zebra, an organization representing interracial
    marriages, said that citizens of racially mixed background are denied
    equal access to opportunity. Further, they claim that skinhead violence
    has increased, and that police fail to protect adequately citizens from
    this violence.
        Skinheads reportedly continued distributing racist materials to the
    mailboxes of Romani families in Kosice, Trebisov, and Plavecky Strvtok.
        An international poll released in September indicated that 79
    percent of Slovaks have a negative view of Roma, 46 percent believe
    that too many non-Slovaks reside in the Slovak Republic, and only 54
    percent believe that Roma should have the same rights as Slovaks.
        On January 7, skinheads beat an African American citizen. The
    victim sought medical treatment for a contusion in his head. The case
    was still pending at year's end.
        On January 29, five skinheads attacked a black man in Bratislava
    and called him a black pig. The suspects were arrested but a racially-
    motivated verdict was not applied.
        On February 17, eight male teenagers attacked two Japanese tourists
    in Bratislava. According to a police spokesperson, they were not
    seriously injured. The tourists apparently left the country after
    lodging a complaint with the police.
        In March two Roma from the eastern town of Michalovce voluntarily
    came to the police station for questioning. They were allegedly beaten
    by some police officers. The victims suffered several injuries
    including broken legs, hands, and ribs. When questioned about the
    incident, the police first claimed the action was justified but later
    admitted that it was unwarranted. Both policemen involved in the case
    were subsequently dismissed from active duty.
        On March 11, approximately 20 supporters of the skinhead movement
    attacked 2 Brazilians and 2 Angolans in Bratislava. One of the victims
    escaped, but the skinheads beat the remaining three with baseball bats
    while shouting racist slogans. The case was still pending at year's
    end.
        On March 27, 10 skinheads verbally abused an Afro-Slovak family
    with 3 small children, one of whom was disabled. When the family got
    into their car, the skinheads started to hit it with baseball bats. The
    family went to the police, who informed them that charges could not be
    filed because no one was injured.
        On June 18, three Afghan men were attacked during a benefit concert
    for refugees organized by the UNHCR. All three victims were treated for
    injuries while one was hospitalized suffering from a concussion. The
    UNHCR spokesperson expressed disappointment over police reaction to the
    attack, claiming that ``the officers just stood by for 2 or 3 minutes
    while the beatings took place.''
        On July 21, a group of 50 Roma armed with machetes, knives, axes,
    and iron rods allegedly forced a moving car to stop and attacked one of
    its occupants. The 21-year-old non-Roma victim is expected to spend up
    to 6 months in the hospital to recover. Police are investigating the
    motive for the attack.
        Anastazia Balazova, Roma mother of eight, died of injuries from a
    beating by unknown assailants in her Zilina home on August 20. On
    September 23, Zilina regional police placed two suspects in custody and
    confirmed that the attack was racially motivated. Three suspects are
    currently imprisoned, one of whom is a Rom. The investigation continued
    at year's end; no conclusion had been made regarding whether or not the
    crime was racially motivated.
        On August 30, Rom Jan Sudman was shot and injured in his hand by a
    pellet gun while doing clean-up work in the public works program. The
    case is currently under investigation. Allegedly other Roma
    participating in the public works program have also been attacked by
    skinheads, and citizens are deliberately throwing litter out their
    windows in response to their participation.
        There was no progress during the year in a number of 1999 cases of
    violence against Roma. Many cases of skinhead violence that occurred in
    1999 were dropped due to lack of witnesses.
        During the most recent census (1991), 14,000 citizens registered
    themselves as Ukrainians, and 17,000 registered themselves as
    Ruthenians. However, the statistical office does not differentiate
    between Ruthenian and Ukrainian; it records 32,747 persons in the
    Ruthenian/Ukrainian ethnic group. The current Government also considers
    the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities as a single group. However,
    about 50,000 persons listed Ruthenian as their native language in the
    1991 census. Ruthenians disagree that they are Ukrainians, and that
    their language is only a Ukrainian dialect. In September 1998, Slovak
    State Radio started broadcasting a long-promised daily regional program
    for the Ruthenian minority in Presov. However, after the 1998
    parliamentary elections, this broadcasting was discontinued, and the
    broadcast is now in Ukrainian. There is a television broadcast in
    Ruthenian on STV, which is aired once every 2 months. In addition the
    Ruthenian minority receives state funding to publish a biweekly
    newspaper in Ukrainian. A representative of the Ruthenian Revival
    Organization stated that Ruthenian language instruction is provided in
    two schools in the northeast. There is an institute for minority
    languages at Presov University in the northeast. Two instructors at the
    Institute teach Ruthenian culture and language.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to form and join unions, except in the armed forces.
    Approximately 45 percent of the work force is unionized. Most unions
    are independent of the Government and political parties but lobby those
    entities in order to gain support for union positions on key labor
    issues.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no
    restrictions on this right. The national statistical office reported no
    official strikes during the year.
        However, an increasing number of strike alerts and unofficial
    strikes were reported during the year. Many of these actions
    anticipated layoffs or protested the nonpayment or partial payment of
    salaries due to restructuring of the company or insolvency. Local
    unions also held strike alerts.
        There were no instances of retribution against strikers or labor
    leaders. Relevant legislation on collective bargaining prohibits the
    dismissal of workers legally participating in strikes. However,
    according to this law, a strike is legal and official only if it is for
    the purpose of collective bargaining; if it is announced in advance;
    and if a list of strike participants is provided. If the strike is not
    considered to be official, strikers are not ensured protection.
        Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
    to affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for collective bargaining. Following the September 1998
    parliamentary election the KOZ decided to reenter tripartite
    negotiations with employers and the Government. However, unions have
    expressed dissatisfaction with the Government, claiming that it has not
    included them in important decisionmaking and does not give adequate
    attention to their demands.
        The law on citizens' associations prohibits discrimination by
    employers against union members and organizers. Complaints may be
    resolved either in collective negotiations or in court. If a court
    rules that an employer dismissed a worker for union activities or for
    any reason other than certain grounds for dismissal listed in the Labor
    Code, the employer must reinstate the worker. There were no reports of
    abuses targeted against unions or workers.
        In July the Railway Workers, with the support of the ILO, appealed
    to the Government to amend the Act on Collective Bargaining to lower
    the quorum of employees necessary for the declaration of a strike and
    to eliminate the requirement that a list of employees participating in
    a strike be provided to the employer. Although the Government has
    developed draft amendments to this legislation, no agreement has been
    reached to date.
        The 1996 Customs Act regulates free customs zones and customs
    warehouses. Firms operating in such zones must comply with the labor
    code; there have been no reports of special involvement by the trade
    unions to date. No special legislation governs labor relations in free
    trade zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the
    Constitution and the employment act prohibit forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively; however, trafficking in women
    and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see
    Sections 5 and 6.f.). The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and
    Family, as well as district and local labor offices, have
    responsibility for enforcement.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Government ratified ILO convention 182 in 1999; it
    came into force in December, and the Government adheres to its
    standards. The law sets the minimum employment age at 15 years.
    Children must remain in school for 9 years, or until the age of 15,
    although this requirement is not enforced strictly, particularly for
    the Romani minority. Workers under the age of 16 may not work more than
    33 hours per week; may not be compensated on a piecework basis; may not
    work overtime or night shifts; and may not work underground or in
    specified conditions deemed dangerous to their health or safety.
    Special conditions and protections, though somewhat less stringent,
    apply to young workers up to the age of 18. The Ministry of Labor
    enforces this legislation. There were no reports of violations. The law
    and the Constitution prohibit forced and bonded child labor, and the
    Government enforces these prohibitions effectively; however, instances
    of trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was $93 (SK
    4,000) per month during the year. Even when combined with special
    allowances paid to families with children it did not provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. The Ministry of Labor is
    responsible for enforcing the minimum wage. No violations were
    reported. The standard workweek mandated by the Labor Code is 42.5
    hours, although collective bargaining agreements have achieved
    reductions in some cases (most often to 40 hours). For state
    enterprises, the law requires overtime pay up to a maximum of 8 hours
    per week, and 150 hours per year, and provides 5 weeks of annual leave.
    Private enterprises can compensate their employees for more hours of
    overtime than stipulated by the law. There is no specifically mandated
    24-hour rest period during the workweek. The trade unions, the Ministry
    of Labor, and local employment offices monitor observance of these
    laws, and the authorities effectively enforce them.
        The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that the
    Office of Labor Safety effectively enforces. For hazardous employment,
    workers undergo medical screening under the supervision of a physician.
    They have the right to refuse to work in situations that endanger their
    health and safety and may file complaints against employers in such
    situations. Employees working under conditions endangering their health
    and safety for a certain period of time are entitled to paid
    ``relaxation'' leave in addition to their standard leave.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits
    trafficking in persons in all forms; however, there were instances of
    trafficking in women and girls. The country is a source country, a
    transit country, and a destination country for such victims of
    trafficking. There is no evidence of government involvement in or
    tolerance of trafficking, and the Ministry of Interior is involved in
    activities to combat trafficking. According to the Ministry of
    Interior, there were 13 documented cases of Slovak women being forced
    into prostitution in other countries or foreign women being forced into
    prostitution in the Slovak Republic during the year, of which 11 were
    resolved. A case can be documented either when a trafficked person
    files a complaint with the police or when the police initiate a
    criminal investigation against a suspected trafficker. During the year,
    there were 11 investigations opened against pimps, of which 7 were
    resolved. The problem received more public attention this year, but it
    is still likely that there are more cases than those that are
    documented. There are no NGO's or organizations that have as their main
    purpose to specifically provide support to victims of trafficking;
    however, women's NGO Fenestra provides support for these victims. In
    April a women's NGO, the Alliance for Women, sponsored a conference on
    trafficking.
        In July an 18-year-old Roma girl from Hencovce was allegedly
    kidnaped, taken to the Czech Republic where she was sold for $93, and
    forced into prostitution. This case is pending. Other Roma women have
    reported similar stories. Some NGO's argue that the women voluntarily
    chose the profession and then claim they were forced in order to avoid
    contempt from their community when they return, while others contend
    they were true victims of trafficking.
        A report issued by the Ministry of Interior states that the Slovak
    Republic is a transit country for persons being trafficked mainly to
    Austria, the Czech Republic, and Germany for the purpose of forced
    prostitution. There were also reports of Slovak women being trafficked
    to Western Europe with promises of work as models, waitresses, and au
    pairs. Their passports were allegedly confiscated, and they were
    allegedly forced to work in adult entertainment clubs or as
    prostitutes. According to the report, 3 cases of trafficking were
    prosecuted in 1998 and 11 in 1999. There were four prosecuted cases of
    forced prostitution in 1998 and nine cases in 1999.
        Some women from Russia and Ukraine reportedly are trafficked
    through the Slovak Republic on their way to countries such as Turkey,
    Greece, Italy, Germany, and Serbia, where they are forced to work as
    prostitutes. According to a report on trafficking in women issued by
    the Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department in March 1999,
    women from the Slovak Republic work in Sweden as prostitutes. In four
    1998 court cases involving women trafficked to Sweden, some women came
    from the Slovak Republic, among other countries. Although previously it
    was primarily a source country, increasingly women from less prosperous
    eastern countries (including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and
    Bulgaria) find themselves trafficked through and to the Slovak
    Republic.
                                   __________

                                    SLOVENIA

        Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional republic.
    Power is shared between a directly elected president, a prime minister,
    and a bicameral legislature. Since the country's independence with the
    breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, free, fair, and open elections have
    characterized the political system. In October elections were held to
    elect representatives to the Parliament's lower house. The Government
    respects constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in
    practice.
        The police are under the effective civilian control of the Ministry
    of the Interior. By law the armed forces do not exercise civil police
    functions.
        The country has made steady progress toward developing a market
    economy. Although ``social property'' was abolished in 1998, the
    Government continues to own 50 percent of the economy, particularly in
    the financial sector, utilities, and the port of Koper. Trade has been
    diversified toward the West and the growing markets of Central and
    Eastern Europe. Manufacturing accounts for most employment, with
    machinery and other manufactured products constituting the major
    exports. Labor force surveys put unemployment at 7.6 percent, but
    registration for unemployment assistance was 13.6 percent. Inflation
    was 6.1 percent in 1999, while real gross national product grew 4.9
    percent. The currency is stable, fully convertible, and backed by
    substantial reserves. The economy provides citizens with a good
    standard of living.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
    dealing with individual instances of abuse. An ombudsman deals with
    human rights problems, including citizenship cases. Police on occasion
    beat and abused Roma. Violence against women is a problem.
    Approximately 13,000 non-Slovene (former Yugoslav) residents who had
    been without legal status since independence in 1991, some due to the
    Government's slow processing of their original applications, and others
    because they had never applied, were offered legal residence in late
    1999. A total of 12,862 persons applied for legal residence: 7,861 were
    accepted; 264 were refused; and 4,737 were still being processed at
    year's end. These minorities reported some discrimination. There were
    instances of trafficking in women.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment
    as well as ``humiliating punishment or treatment;'' however, police on
    occasion beat Roma, allegedly resulting in severe injuries in some
    cases. Danko Brajdic, a Rom, was beaten by the police and admitted to a
    hospital with severe injuries. Sadik Kemalj, a Rom and former citizen
    of Slovenia, allegedly left the country without a passport and was
    beaten by police at the border when he attempted to return with a
    Macedonian passport. The authorities have not announced the filing of
    charges or the imposition of disciplinary measures in any of these
    cases.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and were not
    the subject of complaint by any human rights organization.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
    the media.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest or deprivation of liberty, and the
    Government respects these provisions in practice.
        The authorities must advise detainees in writing within 24 hours,
    in their own language, of the reasons for the arrest. Until charges are
    brought, detention may last up to 6 months; once charges are brought,
    detention may be prolonged for a maximum of 2 years. Some 26 percent of
    the average prison population of 1,100 inmates are in pretrial
    detention at any given time. The law also provides safeguards against
    self-incrimination. These rights and limitations are respected in
    practice.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The judicial system consists of district courts, regional courts, a
    court of appeals, an administrative court, and the Supreme Court. A
    nine-member Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of
    legislation. Judges, elected by the State Assembly (Parliament) upon
    the nomination of the Judicial Council, are constitutionally
    independent and serve indefinitely, subject to an age limit. The
    Judicial Council is composed of six sitting judges elected by their
    peers and five presidential nominees elected by the Parliament.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, including
    provisions for: Equality before the law, presumption of innocence, due
    process, open court proceedings, the right of appeal, and a prohibition
    against double jeopardy. Defendants by law have the right to counsel,
    without cost if need be. These rights are respected in practice,
    although the judicial system is so burdened that justice frequently is
    protracted. In some instances, criminal cases reportedly have taken 2
    to 5 years to come to trial. The problem is not widespread, and
    defendants are released on bail except in the most serious criminal
    cases.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
    privacy, ``personal data rights,'' and the inviolability of the home,
    mail, and other means of communication. These rights and protections
    are respected in practice, and violations are subject to effective
    legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of thought, speech, public association, the press, and other
    forms of public communication and expression. Lingering self-censorship
    and some indirect political pressures continued to influence the media.
        The press is now a vigorous institution emerging from its more
    restricted past. The major media do not represent a broad range of
    political or ethnic interests, although there is an Italian-language
    television channel as well as a newspaper available to the ethnic
    Italian minority who live on the Adriatic Coast. Hungarian radio
    programming is common in the northeast where there are approximately
    8,500 ethnic Hungarians. Bosnian refugees and the Albanian community
    have newsletters in their own languages.
        Four major daily and several weekly newspapers are published. The
    major print media are supported through private investment and
    advertising, although the national broadcaster, RTV Slovenia, enjoys
    government subsidies, as do cultural publications and book publishing.
    Seven local television channels are available and four of them are
    independent private stations. Numerous foreign broadcasts are available
    via satellite and cable. All major towns have radio stations and cable
    television. Numerous business and academic publications are available.
    Foreign newspapers, magazines, and journals are widely available.
        In theory and practice, the media enjoyed full journalistic
    freedom. However, for over 40 years the country was ruled by an
    authoritarian Communist political system, and reporting about domestic
    politics may be influenced to some degree by self-censorship and
    indirect political pressures.
        The election law requires the media to offer free space and
    broadcasting time to political parties at election time. Television
    networks routinely give public figures and opinion makers from across
    the political spectrum access via a broad range of public service
    programming.
        The Constitution provides for autonomy and freedom for universities
    and other institutions of higher education. There are two universities;
    each has numerous affiliated research and study institutions. Academic
    freedom is respected, and centers of higher education are lively and
    intellectually stimulating.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the rights of peaceful assembly, association, and
    participation in public meetings, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. These rights can be restricted only by an act of
    Parliament in circumstances involving national security, public safety,
    or protection against infectious diseases.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. No person
    can be compelled to admit his religious or other beliefs. There are few
    formal requirements for recognition as a religion by the Government.
    Religious groups, including foreign missionaries, must register with
    the Ministry of the Interior. Registration entitles such groups to
    value added tax rebates on a quarterly basis. All groups in the country
    report equal access to registration and tax rebate status. Foreign
    missionaries (including a Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
    (Mormon) mission) and religious groups (including Hare Krishna,
    Scientology, and Unification organizations) operate without hindrance.
        The appropriate role for religious instruction in the schools
    continues to be an issue of debate. The Constitution states that
    parents are entitled ``to give their children a moral and religious
    upbringing. . . .'' Before 1945 religion was much more prominent in the
    schools, but now only those schools supported by religious bodies teach
    religion.
        The Roman Catholic Church was a major property holder in the
    Kingdom of Yugoslavia before World War II. After the war, much church
    property--church buildings and support buildings, residences,
    businesses, and forests--was confiscated and nationalized by the
    Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Slovenian independence
    in 1991, Parliament passed legislation calling for denationalization
    (restitution or compensation) within a fixed period. However, a
    subsequent change of government in 1992 led to a virtual standstill in
    denationalization proceedings for several years. At year's end, over
    one-half of all cases had been adjudicated at the initial
    administrative level, representing over two-thirds of the total value
    of all cases. However, an increase in administrative processing in turn
    has led to a judicial backlog.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides that each
    person has the right to freedom of movement, to choice of place of
    residence, to leave the country freely, and to return. Limitations on
    these rights may be made only by statute and only where necessary in
    criminal cases, to control infectious disease, or in wartime. In
    practice citizens travel widely and often.
        The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum in accordance
    with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
    its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the office of the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. The Government has provided asylum
    (or ``temporary protection'') to refugees but on a very limited basis
    in recent years. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
    arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared prosecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides that elections should be held at least
    every 4 years. Citizens have the right to change their government,
    voting by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. The country
    has a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. The President
    proposes a candidate to the legislature for confirmation as Prime
    Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the political parties
    in the Parliament.
        No restrictions hinder the participation of women or minorities in
    politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Of the 90 Members of Parliament, 13 are women, while 3 of 18
    cabinet ministers are women. During the October 15 Parliamentary
    elections, an increased number of women were nominated to run by
    political parties; however, the majority of these female candidates
    were assigned to run in districts in which their parties had little
    chance of winning (based on 1996 election results). The Prime
    Minister's Office has an active agency for monitoring and promoting the
    participation by women in public life.
        The Constitution stipulates that the Italian and Hungarian ethnic
    communities each are entitled to at least one representative in the
    Parliament, regardless of their population.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Independent human rights monitoring groups promote respect for
    human rights and freedoms and freely investigate complaints about
    violations. The Government generally does not place obstacles in the
    way of investigations by international or local human rights groups.
        An independent ombudsman appointed by Parliament deals with human
    rights problems, including so-called ``economic rights.'' The incumbent
    is regarded as fair, but he lacks the power to enforce his opinions. In
    addition Parliament has been criticized as a major factor in the slow
    progress of property restitution (``denationalization''), casting doubt
    on the ombudsman's ability to alter the pace of the process. The
    ombudsman criticized the Government for the slow pace of legal and
    administrative proceedings, in criminal and civil cases, as well as in
    denationalization proceedings.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality before the law, and the
    Government observed this provision in practice. According to the 1991
    census, the population is approximately 2 million, of whom 1.7 million
    are ethnic Slovenes and the remainder are persons of 23 other
    nationalities. There were some 50,000 Croats, 48,000 Serbs, 27,000
    Muslims, 8,500 Hungarians, and 3,000 Italians.
        The Constitution provides special rights for the ``autochthonous
    Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities,'' including the right to use
    their own national symbols, enjoy bilingual education, and benefit from
    other privileges. It also provides for special status and rights for
    the small Romani community, which are observed in practice.
        Women.--While violence against women occurs and almost certainly is
    underreported, the awareness of spousal abuse and violence against
    women is on the rise. During 1999 and 2000, 224 persons were charged
    with offenses including domestic violence (82), ``brutality'' (25),
    ``threat to safety'' (27), and other unspecified offenses that resulted
    in injuries (51). In 1998 83 men were charged with rape. In 1998 10,021
    misdemeanor charges of ``endangering safety in a private place'' were
    filed. Although no breakdown of victims is available by sex for 1998,
    records from previous years indicate that at least 40 percent, or
    approximately 4,000 cases, involved domestic disputes where women were
    threatened. Three shelters are available for battered women, which are
    partially funded by the State. The shelters operate at capacity (about
    40 beds combined) and turn away numerous women every year. In cases of
    reported spousal abuse or violence, the police actively intervene, and
    criminal charges are filed. Although the law allows police to fine both
    parties in cases of domestic violence, in practice fines and arrests
    are reportedly confined to men only.
        Slovenia is primarily a transit country for trafficking in women
    for prostitution, although it is also a destination country (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Equal rights for women are a matter of state policy. There is no
    official discrimination against women or minorities in housing, jobs,
    or education. Under the Constitution, marriage is based on the equality
    of both spouses. The Constitution stipulates that the State shall
    protect the family, motherhood, and fatherhood.
        In rural areas, women, even those employed outside the home, bear a
    disproportionate share of household work and family care, because of a
    generally conservative social tradition. However, women frequently are
    encountered in business and in government executive departments.
        Equal pay for equal work for men and women is the norm. Although
    both sexes have the same average period of unemployment, women still
    are found more often in lower paying jobs. On average women's earnings
    are 85 percent of those of men.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. The Government provided compulsory, free,
    and universal primary school education for children through grade 9
    (ages 14 and 15). The Government provided universal health care for all
    citizens, including children.
        The Constitution stipulates that children ``enjoy human rights and
    fundamental freedoms consistent with their age and level of maturity.''
    Moreover, special protection from exploitation and maltreatment is
    provided by statute. Social workers visited schools regularly to
    monitor for any incidents of mistreatment or abuse of children.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. The law mandates access to buildings for the disabled,
    and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. Modifications
    of public and private structures to ease access by the disabled
    continued slowly but steadily.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minorities make up about 12
    percent of the population; most are nationals of the former Yugoslavia.
    Ethnic minorities face a complex reality. ``Autochthonous'' groups in
    general are provided special rights and protection by the Constitution.
    Three of these groups--Italians, Hungarians, and Roma--are identified
    in the Constitution for special treatment, and the first two are
    assigned representation in Parliament. Other ``autochthonous'' groups
    include some 500 ethnic Germans and fewer than 100 Jews.
        However, ``new minorities"--ethnic Serbs, Croats, Kosovar
    Albanians, and nonautochthonous Roma from Kosovo and Albania--are
    unprotected by special provisions of the Constitution and face some
    societal and governmental discrimination. Many of these 5,000 to 10,000
    non-Slovene citizens of the former Yugoslavia migrated internally to
    Slovenia during the decades leading to independence because of the
    economic opportunities. Most opted not to take Slovene citizenship
    during a 6-month window in 1991-92 and have been living in the country
    as essentially stateless persons since then, while others were without
    residence status because of slow processing of their applications by
    the Government. In 1999 Parliament offered these persons permanent
    resident status; a 3-month window for applications closed at the end of
    1999. A total of 12,862 persons applied for legal residence: 7,861 were
    accepted; 264 were refused; and 4,737 still were being processed at
    year's end.
        The Roma are best characterized as a set of groups rather than as
    one community. Some have lived in the country for hundreds of years,
    while others are very recent migrants. Police on occasion beat Roma
    (see Section 1.a.). A lack of cohesion prevented the Romani communities
    from taking advantage of their special constitutional status, although
    the Government also failed to implement fully the special legislation
    on Romani status called for in Article 65 of the Constitution. Roma
    report discrimination in employment, which in turn complicates their
    housing situation. In education the Government has attempted to involve
    more Romani children in formal education at the earliest stages, both
    through enrichment programs and through inclusion in public
    kindergartens. However, despite a renewed emphasis on assistance
    programs in the 1990's, Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty and
    unemployment.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution stipulates that
    trade unions, their operation, and their membership shall be free and
    provides for the right to strike. Virtually all workers, except police
    and military personnel, are eligible to form and join labor
    organizations. In 1993 the Parliament for the first time passed
    legislation restricting strikes by some public sector employees.
    However, after government budget-cutting, some public sector
    professionals (judges, doctors, and educators) became increasingly
    active on the labor front.
        Labor has two main groupings, the Association of Free Slovene Trade
    Unions, and the Union of Slovene Rail Workers, with constituent
    branches throughout the country. A third, much smaller, regional labor
    union operates on the Adriatic coast. Unions are formally and actually
    independent of the Government and political parties, but individual
    union members hold positions in the legislature. The Constitution
    provides that the State shall be responsible for ``the creation of
    opportunities for employment and for work.''
        There are no restrictions on unions joining or forming federations
    and affiliating with like-minded international union organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The economy is
    in transition from the former Communist system, which included some
    private ownership of enterprises along with state-controlled and
    ``socially owned'' enterprises. In the transition to a fully market-
    based economy, the collective bargaining process is undergoing change.
    Formerly, the old Yugoslav Government had a dominant role in setting
    the minimum wage and conditions of work. The Government still exercises
    this role to an extent, although in the private sector, wages and
    working conditions are agreed annually in a general collective
    agreement between the ``social partners:'' The labor unions and the
    Chamber of Economy. There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
        Export processing zones exist in Koper, Maribor, and Nova Gorica.
    Worker rights in these zones are the same as in the rest of the
    country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children, and
    there were no reports of forced labor by adults or children; however,
    police reported 20 cases of trafficking in women for prostitution in
    1999 (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16. Children must remain
    in school through grade 9 (ages 14 and 15). During the harvest or for
    other farm chores, younger children do work. In general urban employers
    respect the age limits. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $252 (59,150
    tolars) per month, which provides a decent standard of living for the
    average worker and family. The workweek is 40 hours. In general
    businesses provide acceptable conditions of work for their employees.
    Occupational health and safety standards are set and enforced by
    special commissions controlled by the Ministries of Health and Labor.
    Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe conditions
    without jeopardizing their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law on ``enslavement'' prescribes
    criminal prosecution for a person who ``brings another person into
    slavery or a similar condition, or keeps another person in such a
    condition, or buys, sells or delivers another person to a third party''
    or brokers such a deal. Sentences for enslavement convictions range
    from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. Persons also can be prosecuted for
    pimping or pandering ``by force, threat or deception.'' The penalty
    ranges from 3 months' to 5 years' imprisonment or, in cases involving
    minors or forced prostitution, 1 to 10 years' imprisonment.
        The country was primarily a transit point for trafficking in
    persons, although it was also a destination country. Police interest in
    the issue was limited; victims were not encouraged to file complaints
    and very few cases were reported to the police. Police reported 20
    cases in 1999 in which the country was a destination for prostitutes
    from Ukraine. Statistics on prosecutions were not available. The
    Government had no programs in place to prevent trafficking or to assist
    victims. There were no NGO's that dealt specifically with trafficking.
                                   __________

                                     SPAIN

        Spain is a democracy with a constitutional monarch. The Parliament
    consists of two chambers, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. In
    March Jose Maria Aznar of the Popular Party (PP) was reelected Prime
    Minister, with the title President of the Government. The next national
    elections are scheduled for March 2004. The Government respects the
    constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
        There are three levels of security forces. The National Police are
    responsible for nationwide investigations, security in urban areas,
    traffic control, and hostage rescue. The Civil Guard polices rural
    areas and controls borders and highways. Autonomous police forces have
    taken over many of the duties of the Civil Guard in Galicia, parts of
    Catalunya, and the Basque country. The security forces are under the
    effective control of the Government. The security forces also maintain
    anticorruption units. Some members of the security forces committed
    human rights abuses.
        The economy is market based, with primary reliance on private
    enterprise. Although a number of public sector enterprises remain in
    key areas, the Government's policy has been to privatize as many of
    them as possible. The economy grew during the second quarter at a 4.2
    percent annual rate. The annual inflation rate at the close of 1999 was
    2.9 percent; in the third quarter of 2000 it was 3.6 percent.
    Unemployment in the third quarter dropped to 14.2 percent, continuing
    its downward trend.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, including cases
    of police brutality, lengthy pretrial detention, and delays in trials.
    Government investigations of alleged human rights abuses by the
    security forces are often lengthy, and punishments light. The
    Government is taking steps to deal with the problem of violence against
    women. Incidents of racism and rightwing violence against minorities
    and discrimination against Roma continued to be problems. There were
    instances of forced labor and child labor. Trafficking in women for the
    purpose of forced prostitution was a problem.
        Throughout the year there were ongoing judicial proceedings related
    to the involvement of former government officials in the Antiterrorist
    Liberation Groups (government-sponsored death squads known by their
    acronym, GAL), which killed 27 persons between 1983 and 1987, including
    10 persons with no connection to the terrorist group Basque Fatherland
    and Liberty (ETA), the ostensible target of the GAL.
        In December 1999, ETA ended its 14-month unilateral cease-fire and
    launched a new campaign of terrorism. ETA attacks claimed 23 lives
    during the year. ETA sympathizers also conducted a campaign of street
    violence and vandalism in the Basque region. Judicial proceedings
    against members of ETA continued. Spanish and French police arrested
    dozens of suspected ETA members and collaborators.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudical killings by government
    agents.
        No developments were reported in the following ongoing cases: The
    March 1997 case of a Civil guard officer who allegedly shot a Moroccan
    boy in the back and killed him; the appeal of police officer Antonio
    Barrionuevo's conviction in the 1996 killing of Portuguese citizen
    Manual Abreu Silva; and the deaths of eight prison inmates under
    suspicious circumstances in 1996-97.
        Five individuals were convicted during the year in the GAL case of
    Jose Ignacio Zabala and Jose Antonio Lasa, who were kidnaped, tortured,
    and killed in 1983. Enrique Rodriguez Galindo, a Civil Guard general,
    and Julen Elgorriaga, the then civil governor of Guipuzcoa, each
    received sentences of 71 years' imprisonment. An additional three Civil
    Guard officers were sentenced to 69 and 67 years' imprisonment. Miguel
    Brecia Guillen was sentenced in 1999 to 68 years in jail for the 1986
    murder of two French citizens. The state prosecutor recommended closure
    of the 1984 Monbar case for lack of evidence. Other cases in which
    security forces are alleged to have committed murder in the mid-1980's,
    such as those of Ramon Onaederra, Mikel Zabaltza, and Robert Caplanne,
    remain open but are unlikely to be prosecuted, also due to lack of
    evidence.
        ETA declared an end to its 14-month ``cease-fire'' in December 1999
    and resumed its terrorist activities. ETA's declared aim is to
    establish an independent Basque state in the Basque region of northern
    Spain and southern France. By year's end, ETA car bombings and
    shootings resulted in the deaths of 23 victims.
        The ETA attacks began on January 21 when an ETA car bomb killed Lt.
    Col. Pedro Blanco in Madrid. On February 22, an ETA car bomb in Vitoria
    killed Basque Socialist Party Spokesman Fernando Buesa and his
    bodyguard. On March 6, an ETA car bomb exploded in San Sebastian,
    injuring eight persons. ETA assailants shot and killed newspaper
    columnist Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle on May 7 in Navarra. On June 4,
    ETA shot and killed Popular Party councilman Jesus Maria Pedrosa in
    Durango. On June 25, an ETA car bomb injured seven in Getxo.
        An ETA car bomb detonated in the central shopping district of
    Madrid on July 12, injuring eight people. City councilman Jose Maria
    Martin Carpena was shot and killed in front of his family on July 15 in
    Malaga. On July 16, an ETA car bomb injured the wife of a civil guard
    in Agreda. On July 29, Juan Maria Jauregui, former Socialist Party
    delegate to Guipuzcoa, was shot and killed. On August 8, an ETA car
    bomb killed Basque businessman Jose Maria Korta. In Madrid 6 hours
    later, another ETA car bomb injured 11 persons. On August 9, an ETA
    assailant shot and killed army Lt. Francisco Casanova in Navarra.
        On August 20, ETA killed two civil guards in the northern region of
    Huesca by planting a bomb under their patrol car. On August 30, an ETA
    assailant shot and killed Popular Party town councilman Manuel Indiano
    Azaustre in his Guipuzcoa candy shop. On September 13, an ETA assailant
    shot and severely wounded Jose Ramon Recalde, a former Socialist Party
    Counselor, at his home in San Sebastian. On September 20, ETA
    assailants shot and killed Popular Party town counselor Jose Luis Ruiz
    Casado near Barcelona. ETA killed a military doctor in Andalucia on
    October 16 and a prison official in Victoria on October 22. An ETA car
    bomb took the life of a Supreme Court judge and three persons in Madrid
    on October 30. An ETA assailant shot and killed former Health Minister
    Ernest Lluch in Barcelona on November 11. ETA ended the year with the
    killing of its fifth Popular Party town counselor and a policeman, both
    near Barcelona. It was the bloodiest year of ETA violence since 1994.
    ETA publicly claimed responsibility for these attacks.
        Legal actions against ETA members continued. Spain obtained the
    extradition of the former leader of ETA, Francisco Mugica Garmendia,
    from France in February. He faces charges that include involvement in
    23 killings, illicit possession of explosives, and falsification of
    documents. In February a court sentenced ETA member Mikel Azurmendi
    Penagaricano to 36 years in prison for the killing of Army Lt. Miguel
    Peralta in 1994. On July 6, a court sentenced members of the Andalucian
    command of ETA to a total of 108 years in prison for crimes committed
    in 1997 and 1998, when the group tried to murder the then mayors of
    Granada and Seville. On July 25, a court convicted ETA member Ramon
    Aldasoro for his participation in the March 1988 bombing of a police
    barracks and sentenced him to 67 years' imprisonment.
        In March Amnesty International (AI) appeared before the Basque
    Parliament and made a strong appeal for ETA to stop violating human
    rights through murder, kidnaping, and intimidation. AI expressed its
    support for the Government's 1999 compensation law for victims of ETA
    terror but called on the Government to compensate victims of government
    torture as well. AI also criticized the Government for permitting
    suspected terrorists to be held incommunicado for up to 5 days after
    arrest.
        Several organizations are dedicated to the concerns of victims of
    terrorism, among them the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT).
    AVT was founded in 1981 and serves 1,300 families, providing legal and
    psychological counseling. The Government supports its work.
        A Spanish extradition request for former Chilean dictator Augusto
    Pinochet was denied after a lengthy judicial review in the United
    Kingdom. Spanish courts sought to try Pinochet for his involvement in
    the disappearance of 600 Spaniards under Chilean and Argentine
    governments in the 1970's and 1980's. On March 2, the United Kingdom
    Minister of Home Affairs allowed Pinochet to return to Chile without
    trial on grounds of ill health.
        No developments occurred in case of the 1999 international arrest
    warrants for former Argentine junta Generals Galtieri and Videla,
    Admiral Massera, and 95 lower ranking military officers. The High Court
    refused jurisdiction in December in the the criminal suit filed by
    indigenous Guatemalan leader Rigoberta Menchu against eight former
    Guatemalan military and civilian leaders for human rights abuses.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such acts; however, suspects charged
    with terrorism routinely assert that they have been abused during
    detention, and other detainees sometimes make similar charges. The
    Government investigates allegations of torture and also permits outside
    parties to investigate them.
        On May 20, Antonio Fonseca, an illegal African immigrant, died
    after his arrest in Arrecife. Witnesses contend that police
    aggressively detained Fonseca. One claimed that four officers beat
    Fonseca before he reached his holding cell. The police chief of
    Arrecife denied the accusations, claiming that Fonseca's contusions
    resulted from his struggle to escape. In September Interior Minister
    Mayor Oreja announced that two investigations and autopsies indicated
    that Fonseca died of natural causes and that there was no basis for
    prosecution of the arresting officers.
        No developments were reported in the following cases from previous
    years: The November 1998 case of two policemen in Melilla who were
    charged with raping a Moroccan girl; the trial that began in November
    1998 of six members of the Civil Guard who were accused of torturing
    three suspected ETA members in 1992; the complaint filed against the
    police in the beating of Ivan Gonzalez in September 1997.
        In April a Madrid court sentenced a policeman to 5 years'
    imprisonment for the July 1994 illegal detention and beating of a man
    from the Madrid suburb of Majadahonda.
        ETA sympathizers engaged in extensive street violence in the Basque
    region throughout the year. On February 25, 8 families were evacuated
    from their homes in Vizcaya after 30 hooded individuals threw Molotov
    cocktails at a bank in the central square. Molotov cocktails also were
    thrown into the home of Jose Luis Lopez de la Calle, member of the
    anti-ETA Ermua forum and columnist, on February 28. (ETA subsequently
    killed Lopez de la Calle in May.) Incidents of street violence in
    support of ETA, called the ``kale barroka'' in the Basque language,
    increased during the year: 681 acts of street violence were reported in
    the Basque region and neighboring Navarra during the year. The Basque
    police and the Spanish National Police arrested over 160 persons in
    connection with the street violence.
        Prison conditions generally meet or exceed minimum international
    standards.
        In Madrid prisons there were 21 reports of abuse during 1999. In
    the first 3 months of 2000, eight cases were reported. On February 24,
    17 prisoners in San Sebastian's Martutene Prison began a sit-in and
    hunger strike in solidarity with ETA prisoner Daniel Derguy, who had
    been fasting for 60 days in a French prison.
        No developments were reported in the March 1998 investigation into
    31 cases of alleged abuse and negligence by prison officials in 1996
    and 1997 that led to 8 inmate deaths. The Supreme Court awarded
    $115,000 (20 million pesetas) to the family of Juan Antonio Fernandez,
    a prisoner who was killed by a fellow inmate in the Madrid prison of
    Carabanchel in March 1997.
        Basque activists continued to demand that all imprisoned ETA
    terrorists be moved to prisons in the Basque region or the adjacent
    region, Navarra. As of March, 378 ETA terrorists were in jail.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors,
    including the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of
    Torture.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions in practice.
        A suspect may not be held for more than 72 hours without a hearing
    except in cases involving terrorism, in which case the Penal Code
    permits holding a suspect an additional 2 days without a hearing and
    the possibility of incommunicado detention, provided that a judge
    authorizes such action.
        At times pretrial detention can be lengthy. By law suspects may not
    be confined for more than 2 years before being brought to trial, unless
    a further delay is authorized by a judge, who may extend pretrial
    custody to 4 years. In practice pretrial custody is usually less than a
    year. However, criticism is heard in legal circles that some judges use
    ``preventive custody'' as a form of anticipatory sentencing. In late
    2000, approximately 20 percent of the prison population was in pretrial
    detention (9,446 inmates out of 44,866 total), although that number
    included convicted prisoners whose cases were on appeal.
        The law on aliens permits detention of a person for up to 40 days
    prior to deportation but specifies that it must not take place in a
    prison-like setting.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
        The judicial structure consists of local, provincial, regional, and
    national courts with the Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitutional
    Court has the authority to return a case to the court in which it was
    adjudicated if it can be determined that constitutional rights were
    violated during the course of the proceedings. The National High Court
    handles crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The European
    Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter in cases concerning human
    rights.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and
    the authorities respect this right in practice. There is a nine-person
    jury system.
        Defendants have the right to be represented by an attorney (at
    state expense for the indigent). They are released on bail unless the
    court believes that they may flee or be a threat to public safety.
    Following conviction, defendants may appeal to the next highest court.
        The law calls for an expeditious judicial hearing following arrest.
    However, the AVT and others have criticized delays in the judicial
    process, which can result at times in lengthy pretrial detention (see
    Section 1.d.) and delays in trials. In cases of petty crime, suspects
    released on bail sometimes wait up to 5 years for trial.
        Human rights groups such as the Association Against Torture and
    members of the press complain that many persons convicted of offenses
    constituting violations of human rights avoided sentencing by
    prolonging the appeals process and that sentences for persons convicted
    of such offenses are unduly light. According to AI, custodial sentences
    of less than 1 year and a day customarily are not served in such cases.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the privacy of the home
    and correspondence. Under the Criminal Code, government authorities
    must obtain court approval before searching private property,
    wiretapping, or interfering with private correspondence. The
    antiterrorist law gives discretionary authority to the Minister of the
    Interior to act prior to obtaining court approval in ``cases of
    emergency.''

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Opposition viewpoints, both from political parties
    and nonpartisan organizations, are reflected freely and widely in the
    media.
        The Catalunya regional government's failure in 1999 to renew
    broadcast licenses for three Catholic Church radio stations was
    challenged successfully in the Catalunya Supreme Court in March. The
    court ruled that the criteria used by the regional government to award
    licenses placed disproportionate emphasis on the use of Catalan
    language in the programming. The government of Catalunya elected not to
    appeal the decision.
        On March 2, the Supreme Court prohibited the radical Basque party
    Euskal Herritarrok (EH) from using free broadcast time in the public
    media. The pro-ETA newspaper Egin and its affiliated radio station
    (Egin Irratia) were closed in 1998. Gara--another pro-ETA newspaper--
    has since emerged. An investigation into the alleged subordination of
    Egin's editorial line and hiring practices to ETA's command and the use
    of coded classified ads to coordinate ETA strategy still was underway.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
    no state religion, although Catholicism is the predominant religion and
    receives some government funding. Jews, Muslims, and Protestants have
    official status and also receive some support from the Government.
    Other recognized religions, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons,
    are covered by constitutional protections but receive no assistance.
    Religions not recognized officially are treated as cultural
    associations. Religious courses are offered in public schools but are
    not mandatory.
        There are some allegations that the Government discriminates
    against non-Catholic religions, principally by not providing to other
    churches all of the privileges accorded to the Catholic Church.
        In 1999 Parliament approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the
    Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive
    ``sects.'' A 1989 law on sects already had authorized the police to
    investigate their activities, and a special unit was created for that
    purpose. The resolution was preceded by press accounts of a death under
    unusual circumstances of a member of Jehovah's Witnesses and the arrest
    of the leader of a group called The Orientation in April 1999.
        Also in April 1999, a Helsinki Human Rights Federation report
    criticized the Government for discrimination against ``new religions.''
        The decision of the regional government of Cataluyna not to renew
    three local radio broadcasting licenses of the Catholic Church was
    overturned in court in March (see Section 2.a.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within and
    outside the country, to emigrate, and to repatriate, and the Government
    respects these rights in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, including the
    Spanish Committee for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR), in assisting
    refugees and asylum seekers. Under a 1994 law, asylum requests are
    adjudicated in a two-stage process with the Office of Asylum and
    Refugees (OAR) making an initial decision on the admissibility of the
    application for processing. The Interministerial Committee for Asylum
    and Refuge (CIAR) examines the applications accepted for processing.
    The CIAR includes representatives from the Ministries of Interior,
    Justice, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and a nonvoting member of the UNHCR.
    The decision of the CIAR in each case must be approved by the Minister
    of the Interior.
        The 1994 law eliminated the distinction between asylum status and
    refugee status. This distinction was eliminated to prevent applicants
    from drawing out judicial proceedings by applying first for refugee
    status and then for asylum, if the former was denied.
        The UNHCR advises the authorities throughout the process.
    Applicants for asylum have the right to have their applications sent
    immediately to the local office of the UNHCR. The authorities are not
    bound by the judgment of the UNHCR in individual cases, but they often
    reevaluate decisions with which the UNHCR does not agree. Appeals of
    rejection at either stage may be made to the National High Court, and
    appeals of the National High Court's decisions may be made to the
    Supreme Court.
        Asylum requests may be made from outside as well as within the
    country. From outside anyone can request asylum from a Spanish
    diplomatic or consular representative. Illegal immigrants are permitted
    to apply for asylum. Those who lack visas or permission to enter may
    apply at the border or port of entry. The applicant in such cases may
    be detained until a decision is made regarding the admissibility for
    processing of the application. In cases of persons who apply inside the
    country, a decision must be reached within 2 months, but in cases of
    persons who apply at a port of entry this period is reduced to 72
    hours. The period for filing an appeal in such cases is 24 hours. The
    Ombudsman (see Section 4) challenged the legality of this form of
    detention before the Constitutional Court. The Court issued a
    preliminary decision in which it ruled that this form of detention does
    not deprive the detainee of his liberty. This provisional decision
    allowed the Government to continue to detain applicants without
    modifications to its detention procedures.
        Applicants have the right by law to free legal assistance,
    regardless of where they are when they apply for asylum. This
    assistance is available from the first step in the process through any
    appeals of unfavorable decisions. The applicant also has the right to
    the assistance of translators and interpreters, and the OAR admits
    documents in any language without requiring an official translation.
        In 1999 the Government received 8,405 requests for political
    asylum. Only 294 of the applicants were granted refugee status. An
    additional 679 were permitted entrance on humanitarian grounds. In the
    first 5 months of 2000 the Government received 3,010 requests for
    political asylum. The majority of applicants came from Algeria,
    Romania, Sierra Leone, and Armenia. The number of persons granted
    asylum has dropped steadily during the past 5 years.
        The ombudsman expressed his concern over the high percentage of
    applications not admitted for processing (68.5 percent in 1997 and 56.6
    percent in 1998). However, many persons with falsified documents are
    rejected early in the process. Many such applicants come from
    politically stable but economically impoverished countries.
        The Government's practice of substituting temporary admittance on
    humanitarian grounds for granting asylum also has been criticized. The
    former status includes some restrictions on access to the labor market
    and welfare payments, although it does grant the applicant residency
    and work permits. Another concern is that in some cases individuals
    whose asylum requests were turned down may have been expelled while
    their appeals were still in progress, although no statistics are
    available. The law allows the applicant a 15 day grace period in which
    to leave the country if refugee status is denied. Within that time
    frame, the applicant may appeal the decision, and the court of appeal
    has the authority to prevent the initiation of expulsion procedures,
    which normally begin after the 15th day.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
        A new law on immigration was passed in January and took effect in
    April. Although the new law does not include any specific mandates
    regarding work permits, it does recognize the rights of immigrants to
    peaceful assembly and association. The law grants eligibility for
    emergency health care to all immigrants and for all forms of health
    care to minors and pregnant women.
        The new law prompted thousands of illegal aliens to seek to
    regularize their status. Between March and July, immigrants submitted
    about a quarter of a million applications. Of the 131,700 applications
    reviewed, 85,526 received legal status. The Government later concluded
    that the law, by granting illegal and legal immigrants many of the same
    rights, promoted increased illegal immigration. The authorities
    intercepted 3,569 aliens entering illegally via the Straits of
    Gibraltar in all of 1999. By August 2000, the authorities had already
    intercepted 7,833. The Government amended the immigration law in
    December to increase sanctions on employers who hire illegal aliens and
    to draw a sharper distinction between the rights afforded to legal
    versus illegal immigrants. Under the amended law, illegal aliens do not
    have the right to join unions or strike.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which all
    citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote by secret
    ballot. At all levels of government, elections are held at least every
    4 years. In the 1996 national elections, the Popular Party ended 13
    years of Socialist (PSOE) rule, and Jose Maria Aznar became President
    of the Government. The Popular Party received an absolute majority in
    the 2000 parliamentary elections. The next national elections are
    scheduled for March 2004.
        Governmental power is shared between the central government and 17
    regional ``autonomous communities.'' Local nationalist parties give
    political expression to regional linguistic and cultural identities.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    they are increasing their participation in the political process. Of 19
    Cabinet Ministers, 3 are women. The President of the Senate and the
    Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies are women. The number of female
    Members of Parliament increased after the 2000 elections: of the 350
    members of the lower house, 99 are women. Of 259 Senators, 63 are
    women. In the 1999 European Parliament elections, both the PP and PSOE
    placed women at the top of their lists. On the PSOE list, 50 percent of
    the candidates were women.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of nongovernmental human rights groups, including the
    Human Rights Association of Spain in Madrid and the Human Rights
    Institute of Cataluyna in Barcelona, operate freely without government
    interference. The Government cooperates readily with international
    organizations, international nongovernmental human rights groups, and
    independent national groups investigating allegations of human rights
    abuses.
        The Constitution provides for an ombudsman, called the ``People's
    Defender,'' who as part of his duties actively investigates complaints
    of human rights abuses by the authorities. The ombudsman operates
    independently from any party or government ministry, must be elected
    every 5 years by a three-fifths majority of the Congress of Deputies,
    and is immune from prosecution. He has complete access to government
    institutions and to all documents other than those classified for
    national security reasons and may refer cases to the courts on his own
    authority. The ombudsman has a staff of approximately 150 persons and
    received some 25,000 complaints during the year. The majority of the
    complaints pertained to education and social services, although some
    dealt with discrimination, domestic violence, and mistreatment by law
    enforcement agencies.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens. In
    1995 the Parliament modified the Penal Code to make it a crime to
    ``incite, publicize, or otherwise promote abuse or discrimination of
    people or groups'' because of race, ethnicity, nationality, ideology,
    or religious beliefs. However, incidents of racism and rightwing
    violence against minorities and discrimination against Roma continued
    to be problems.
        Women.--Sexual abuse, violence, and harassment of women in the home
    continued to be problems. According to the Government, at least 40
    women and 6 men died as a result of domestic violence during the year.
    During 1999 over 25,000 women filed complaints of abuse against their
    husbands or partners, compared with 19,621 complaints in 1998. In 2000
    5,722 criminal complaints were filed against husbands for abuse of
    their wives, as well as 14,846 misdemeanor complaints. However, experts
    believe that only 10 percent of violent acts against women are reported
    to the authorities. The Women's Institute, which is part of the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, counseled 104,856 women
    concerning domestic violence and legal aid in 1998 compared with 86,893
    in 1997. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that from
    600,000 to 800,000 cases of domestic abuse occur each year.
        In 1998 the Government unveiled a 3-year, $60 million (9 billion
    pesetas) ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The plan criminalizes the
    violation of restraining orders and the infliction of psychological
    violence and calls for a quadrupling of the number of offices that
    assist victims and an expansion of medical and legal services. (Rape,
    spousal rape, and spousal abuse were already crimes.) Other provisions
    of the plan include: Public awareness campaigns in the media and in the
    schools; the establishment of a domestic abuse database to streamline
    judicial investigations; increased access of victims to public housing;
    and greater linkage between medical, police, legal, and counseling
    services in order to promote an integrated approach to treating
    victims. Public service announcements and press articles drawing
    attention to the problem of domestic violence were ubiquitous
    throughout the year.
        Women's rights' advocates, while acknowledging that the plan
    incorporated many of their demands, expressed disappointment with
    several of its omissions. The Federation of Separated and Divorced
    Women criticized the plan as lacking in specifics, particularly its
    public sensitization campaigns. According to the Federation, the plan's
    key shortcoming is that it fails to make the issuance of a restraining
    order automatic upon filing a complaint. Currently, a restraining order
    is issued only after a guilty verdict.
        The Government has invested over $15.2 million (2.288 billion
    pesetas) in the plan. Since the plan was approved, 9 special services
    units and 54 Civil Guard units staffed by 110 women have been created
    to assist battered women. There are special sections in the police
    department to deal with violence against women, which are staffed by
    trained female officers, and there are approximately 25 shelters for
    battered women. There are 54 official centers in all for mistreated
    women. A toll-free hot line advises women where to go for government
    shelter or other aid if mistreated.
        On April 9, the Government announced an initiative that would
    complete the 1998 ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The initiative
    calls for 5,000 lawyers specializing in domestic violence to be
    assigned throughout the country. The Government hopes that the presence
    of these lawyers will encourage women to come forward with complaints
    of violence or domestic abuse.
        A 1999 law allows for an ``immediate'' divorce upon conviction of a
    husband for domestic violence. The socially conservative political
    parties (PP and nationalist parties) tended to favor this bill. Womens'
    groups and the more left-of-center political parties (PSOE and NI)
    opposed the bill, due to concern that a woman's right to divorce her
    abusive husband would be dependent on an inefficient legal system that
    often takes years to complete a single criminal proceeding.
        A 1989 law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, but very
    few cases have been brought to trial under this law. Police received
    319 sexual harassment complaints during the year. Meanwhile the number
    of women in the labor market is increasing steadily. The Government
    recognizes the difficulties faced by women in the workplace. According
    to a 1998 decree, employers no longer have to pay social security
    benefits to someone filling in for a worker on leave either for
    maternity, adopting children, or in other similar circumstances.
    Previously, companies hired substitutes for only 10 percent of workers
    on maternity leave. The Government hopes to raise this figure to 25
    percent. A ministerial order to increase women's presence in sectors in
    which they currently are underrepresented provides a 2-year reprieve
    from paying social security taxes to employers who hire women in these
    sectors. The 1999 National Employment Action Plan gives priority to
    battered women who search for employment.
        The Minister of Social Affairs reports that women constitute 43
    percent of the work force. However, according to the Taxation Agency
    (Agencia Tributaria) and its 1997 report ``Employment, Salaries and
    Pensions'' completed by the Institution of Fiscal Studies, women hold
    only 18 percent of better paying positions. The female unemployment
    rate was 23 percent in 1999, down from 26.6 percent in 1998. It was
    still more than double the 11.1 percent unemployment rate for 1999 for
    men. Women outnumber men in the legal, journalistic, and health care
    professions but still play minor roles in many other fields.
        Discrimination in the workplace and in hiring practices persists. A
    1998 study of 100 labor union contracts revealed that 38 contracts
    failed to use gender-neutral language, 22 employed gender-specific job
    titles resulting in the imposition of discriminatory wage differentials
    (i.e., the salary of a male secretary, ``secretario,'' was 13 percent
    higher than that of a ``secretaria'' in one food processing industry
    contract), and only 17 addressed the problem of sexual harassment.
    Discriminatory wage differentials continue to exist. A 1999 report by
    the General Workers' Union shows that women's salaries are 30 percent
    less than those of their male counterparts.
        Women are equal under the law for divorce, inheritance, and
    business purposes.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily
    from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
    welfare through well-funded and easily accessed programs of education
    and health care. Education is compulsory until age 16 and free until
    age 18. The Constitution obligates both the State and parents to
    protect children, whether or not born in wedlock. The Ministries of
    Health and Social Affairs are responsible for the welfare of children
    and have created numerous programs to aid needy children. Numerous
    NGO's further children's rights. For example a school help program for
    the protection of children has a team of experts who work with
    educators to help identify abused or abandoned children in the
    classroom.
        The 1995 Law of the Child gives legal rights of testimony to minors
    in child abuse cases; it also obliges all citizens to act on cases of
    suspected child abuse and, for the first time, sets out rules regarding
    foreign adoptions. Under the Penal Code, children under the age of 18
    are not considered responsible for their actions and cannot be sent to
    prison.
        A 1996 penitentiary law lowered the maximum age that a child can
    remain with an incarcerated mother from 6 to 3 years. When the children
    reach their third birthday, they are sent to live with relatives or are
    placed in an institution. Some prisons have special units for mothers
    with children under age 3. The units usually include a kindergarten,
    psychological support, and programs for children to get out of prison
    regularly. Family groups with children under the age of 3 can now stay
    together in cases where both parents are convicts.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for the State to
    provide for the adequate treatment and care of the disabled, ensuring
    that they are not deprived of the basic rights that apply to all
    citizens. The law aims to ensure fair access to public employment,
    prevent discrimination, and facilitate access to public facilities and
    transportation. The national law serves as a guide for regional laws;
    however, levels of assistance and accessibility differ from region to
    region and have not improved in many areas.
        The Penal Code continues to allow parents or legal representatives
    of a mentally disabled person to petition a judge to obtain permission
    for the erilization of that person. In 1994 the Constitutional Court
    held that sterilization of the mentally infirm does not constitute a
    violation of the Constitution. In practice many courts have authorized
    such surgery. Religious groups continue to protest this ruling.
        The labor market reform laws of 1997 and 1998 worked out between
    the Government, labor, and management provided for incentives to hire
    individuals from groups underrepresented in the work force, such as the
    disabled. In the 1998 agreement, the Government agreed to subsidize
    partially the costs of hiring the disabled for part-time work.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Public opinion surveys indicate
    the continued presence of racism and xenophobia, which result in
    discrimination against minorities. A February poll conducted by the
    Government's polling organization regarding attitudes towards
    foreigners found that Spaniards feel most identification with other
    Western Europeans and Latin Americans. There is less acceptance of
    immigrants from Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. In February hundreds of
    Spanish villagers attacked the Moroccan immigrant population of El
    Ejido (Almeria) with baseball bats and iron rods. The riot was sparked
    by the murder of a Spanish woman by a Moroccan immigrant. The
    disturbance lasted 4 days and was followed over the course of several
    weeks by smaller outbreaks of anti-Moroccan immigrant violence.
        On January 25, the Council of Europe cited a resurgence in
    nationalism, sometimes violent, which manifested itself in intolerance
    towards Roma, Africans, and Arabs. The Council recommended that the
    Government implement the antiracist provisions of the Penal Code;
    provide better statistics on racist attacks and vulnerable groups; deal
    with the marginalization of Roma and immigrants; and combat the
    activities of rightwing networks.
        Roma continue to suffer discrimination in jobs, schools, and
    housing. According to a report issued by Gypsy Presence, the largest
    Roma-rights NGO, as many as 1 million Roma may live in the country. The
    organization estimates that half of this population is under 16 years
    of age and two-thirds are under the age of 25. The report states that
    one-third of Roma families are not economically self-sufficient. Romani
    activists attribute the high incidence of Romani informal sector
    employment in agriculture and peddling (an estimated 75 to 80 percent)
    to discrimination and historical marginalization. Although the Madrid
    High Court of Justice struck down in 1999 a city ordinance prohibiting
    peddling, Gypsy Presence reports that local authorities continue to
    find ways to enforce the ban. According to the organization, several
    other municipalities have enacted similar statutes, and this has been
    detrimental to the economic welfare of many Roma. Romani women suffer
    even more acute difficulties when seeking employment, since employers
    are reluctant to hire women from ethnic groups with high birth rates.
        A 1998 study found that only 35 percent of Romani children are
    integrated fully into the educational system. About 60 percent of
    Romani children do not complete primary school, and only very few
    progress to middle school and beyond. According to a Gypsy Presence
    report, one-fifth of teachers describe themselves as anti-Roma, and
    one-fourth of students say that they would like to see Roma expelled
    from school. Truancy and dropout rates among Roma are very high, and
    Romani parents, over 80 percent of whom are functionally illiterate,
    often do not see the value of an education or are unaware of the
    educational opportunities for their children.
        A shooting incident in the village of Albaladejo in 1999
    illustrated the problems that even economically successful Roma can
    face. According to an NGO, the victim in the case was Juan Jose Garcia
    Garcia, who at one time was accused of drug dealing and assaulting
    Civil Guards but was acquitted of both charges. However, Civil Guards
    continued to harass him, often stopping him for identity checks or not
    wearing a seatbelt. According to Gypsy Presence, after being refused
    service at a bar, Garcia arranged to meet an employee of the bar, who
    later appeared at the appointed place with a another man, shot Garcia,
    and left him for dead. Garcia was able to contact his wife by cellular
    phone, and help arrived in time to save him. After the two assailants
    were apprehended, the residents of Albaladejo turned out in force to
    protest their incarceration and petition for their release. The mayor
    often led the demonstrations. In June a court freed the two accused
    after they posted bond in the amount of $3,333 and $2,666 (500,000 and
    400,000 pesetas respectively). Garcia and his family left Albaladejo.
        In April 2000 the Department of Social Services announced a plan to
    relocate 300 Roma immigrants from a rural area to Madrid to improve
    their living conditions. The Roma were provided amenities such as
    running water, electricity, toilets, trash services, showers, and a
    community area in return for attending employment training. The project
    cost $2 million (350 million pesetas). As of July 25, 17 of the Roma
    participants had secured outside employment.
        Quasi-organized rightwing youth groups (called ``skinheads'' by the
    press) continued to commit violent acts throughout the year,
    terrorizing minorities. According to a 1999 report by the NGO Movement
    Against Intolerance, which the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
    helped prepare, the number of persons involved in ultrarightist groups
    more than quintupled since 1995: at least 10,400 citizens are known to
    be involved in such groups, and the actual number could be as high as
    20,800. Movement Against Intolerance reported in March the presence of
    Spanish neo-Nazi groups on the Internet, aiming their attacks at
    Maghrebi immigrants. Through their web pages, these groups urged others
    to take violent action against all immigrants of North African descent.
        In 1999 an NGO urged the Government to halt neo-Nazi activites in
    the formerly deserted village of Los Pedriches in the southeast.
    Foreign neo-Nazis were said to be organizing camps in the village. The
    authorities were monitoring the situation closely. After press
    attention, the groups reportedly left the village.
        No arrests were made in July 1999 incidents in which a mosque in
    Gerona and a building in Banyoles that housed immigrants from Senegal
    and the Gambia were burned.
        A language or dialect other than Castilian Spanish is used in 6 of
    the 17 autonomous communities. The Constitution stipulates that
    citizens have ``the duty to know'' Castilian, which is the ``official
    language of the state,'' but it adds that other languages also can be
    official under regional statutes and that the ``different language
    variations of Spain are a cultural heritage which shall . . . be
    protected.''
        The Law of the Catalan Language, approved by the Catalan regional
    legislature (Generalitat) in 1998, stipulates the use of Catalan as the
    official language in local government and administrative offices,
    regional courts, publicly owned corporations, and private companies
    subsidized by the Catalan regional Government. Spanish-speaking
    citizens have the right to be addressed in Spanish by public officials.
    The legislation also establishes minimum quotas for Catalan-language
    radio and television programming. Controversy continued over the
    language law implementing legislation and related regulatory measures.
    Facing strong resistance from film distributors, the regional
    government in March annulled legislation that required foreign films
    distributed in sufficient quantities also to be dubbed and distributed
    in Catalan.
        In June an administrative court in Tarragona considered a challenge
    to a local university regulation that imposed extensive use of Catalan
    in university affairs. The court, although leaving some of the
    regulation intact and declaring itself not competent to rule on the
    constitutionality of the linguistic law, struck down several sections
    of the regulation. For example, the court found that the regulation's
    treatment of certain administrative issues and a requirement that staff
    use Catalan at all public university functions exceeded university
    authority and autonomy and were not in conformance with other laws.
    Another court challenge involved the propriety of the same university's
    discipline of a professor for supplying copies of the university
    entrance examination in Spanish, rather than Catalan, to two students
    requesting Spanish versions. The court ruled in December that the
    professor was excluded wrongly from the administration of the
    examinations and praised her for defending the students' rights. The
    court clearly implied that the university's regulation limiting access
    to the exmination in Spanish was discriminatory and said that it was
    permissible to foster the use of Catalan but not to do so in a manner
    that excludes or limits the use of Spanish. The university
    administration responded that it had no intention of modifying its
    regulation and intended to appeal the continued suspension of certain
    aspects of the regulation. Notwithstanding its response, in May it
    began supplying the entrance examination in Spanish to those who
    requested it.
        The European Parliament in September declined to investigate
    allegations brought by Spanish-speaking activists that the linguistic
    law discriminated against Spanish-speakers. Both Galicia and Valencia
    have laws stating that it is the duty of the Government to ``promote''
    their regional languages in schools and at official functions.
        The debate continued over the extent to which the Basque language
    (Euskera) should be promoted. The Union of Basque-Speaking Lawyers,
    affiliated with the pro-ETA HB political party, intensified its
    campaign against the use of translation services in trials of Basque-
    speaking citizens.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except those in the
    military services, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, are entitled
    to form or join unions of their own choosing. About 15 percent of the
    workforce is unionized.
        Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their
    representatives, determine their policies, represent their members'
    interests, and strike. They are not restricted or harassed by the
    Government and are independent of political parties. A strike in
    nonessential services is legal if its sponsors give 5 days' notice. Any
    striking union must respect minimum service requirements negotiated
    with the respective employer. The right to strike was interpreted by
    the Constitutional Court to include general strikes called to protest
    government policy. There were 632 strikes in 1998, a decrease of 53
    from 1997. The number of striking workers in 1998 was 680,500, an
    increase of 29,900 on the previous year. The number of workdays lost to
    strikes in 1998 was 1,280,900, a decrease of 555,900 on the previous
    year. The number of workdays lost to strikes continued to decrease in
    1999 and 2000. In December government workers held a protest march and
    general strike over their demands for salary increases that kept pace
    with inflation.
        Unions are free to form or join federations and affiliate with
    international bodies and do so without hindrance.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1980 statute
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Trade
    union and collective bargaining rights were extended in 1986 to all
    workers in the public sector except military personnel. Public sector
    collective bargaining in 1990 was broadened to include salaries and
    employment levels, but the Government retained the right to set these
    if negotiations failed. Collective bargaining agreements are widespread
    in both the public and private sectors; in the latter they cover 60
    percent of workers, notwithstanding that only about 15 percent of
    workers are actually union members.
        The law prohibits discrimination by employers against trade union
    members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in the labor
    courts. The law gives unions a role in controlling temporary work
    contracts to prevent the abuse of such contracts and of termination
    actions. Unions nonetheless contend that employers discriminate in many
    cases by refusing to renew the temporary contracts of workers engaging
    in union organizing. More than one-third of all employees are under
    temporary contracts.
        Labor regulations and practices in free trade zones and export
    processing zones are the same as in the rest of the country. Union
    membership in these zones is reportedly higher than the average
    throughout the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited, and the law
    is enforced effectively; however, there were instances of trafficking
    in women who were forced into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
    of Children.--The statutory minimum age for the employment of children
    is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is primarily
    responsible for enforcement. The minimum age is enforced effectively in
    major industries and in the service sector. It is more difficult to
    enforce on small farms and in family-owned businesses, where some child
    labor persists. Legislation prohibiting child labor is enforced
    effectively in the special economic zones. The law also prohibits the
    employment of persons under the age of 18 at night, for overtime work,
    or in sectors considered hazardous. The law prohibits forced or
    compulsory labor by children, and it is enforced effectively (see
    Section 6.c.).
        In 1998 UNICEF called for an investigation into child labor on
    tomato farms in Badajoz. According to Red Cross personnel providing
    assistance to migrant farm workers there, over 200 children under the
    age of 16, the majority Portuguese citizens, worked 10-hour days and
    earned less than $14 (2,000 pesetas) per day. Many of the children were
    less than 10 years old.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was set in
    December 1999 for 2000 and is $14.16 (2,356 pesetas) per day or $424.80
    (70,680 pesetas) per month, a 2 percent increase compared with 1999.
    The legal minimum wage for workers over 18 years of age is considered
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. The rate is revised every year in line with the consumer price
    index and is enforced effectively by the Ministry of Labor and Social
    Affairs.
        The law sets a 40-hour workweek with an unbroken rest period of 36
    hours after each 40 hours worked. Workers enjoy 12 paid holidays a year
    and a month's paid vacation.
        Several press stories reported that illegal immigrants worked for
    substandard pay and in substandard working conditions. The Inspectorate
    of Labor reported 2,724 cases of labor rights violations related to
    immigrants during the first 8 months of the year.
        Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions and
    occupational health and safety rules, but bureaucratic procedures are
    cumbersome and inefficient. Safety and health legislation is being
    revised to conform to European Union (EU) directives. The 1995 Law to
    Prevent Labor Risks is the basis for the completion of the rest of the
    EU directives. The National Institute of Safety and Health in the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Security has technical responsibility for
    developing labor standards, but the Inspectorate of Labor has
    responsibility for enforcing the legislation through judicial action
    when infractions are found. Workers have firm legal protection for
    filing complaints about hazardous conditions, but easily replaced
    temporary workers may be reluctant to use this protection due to fear
    of losing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides for sentences of up to
    3 years' imprisonment and a fine for trafficking in persons.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, primarily
    from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, appears to be growing.
        The Guardia Civil announced a plan in May to focus on trafficking
    in women for prostitution and made 162 arrests from May to the end of
    the year. In February police arrested 19 persons for trafficking in
    women for prostitution in Andalucia. The network controlled 235 women,
    most were from Eastern Europe. In March police in Taragona and
    Castellon arrested 7 Moldovan nationals for operating a trafficking
    network which brought 520 women from Eastern Europe into Spain for
    purposes of prostitution. In late December, the Guardia Civil arrested
    a network of 30 traffickers. The coordinated arrests occurred in
    Madrid, the Basque region, and several other cities. The women were
    from Latin America.
        At least three such rings were broken up in 1999. One ring was run
    by Russians and Azerbaijanis and involved the trafficking women from
    Eastern Europe. Another, which police in Castilla-La Mancha broke up in
    mid-July, brought women to the country from Africa, Europe, and South
    America. In August police in Andalucia detained 51 persons and broke up
    a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. In all
    these cases, women were promised jobs and given the necessary documents
    to enter the country. Upon arrival their documents were seized, and
    they were taken to alternative clubs and forced to have up to 10 sexual
    encounters per day.
        Most women apprehended in raids are Latin Americans who entered the
    country legally as tourists (most from countries whose citizens do not
    require visas), but who began working as prostitutes instead. Profits
    in the sex industry are 10 times higher than those in other occupations
    commonly filled by migrants (waitresses, maids, etc.). Nonetheless,
    officials concede that significant numbers of women are trafficked to
    Spain by eastern European Mafia groups that ruthlessly exploit their
    victims. A Chinese gang, which forced migrants to submit to abortions,
    was apprehended. Media attention to the issue of international
    trafficking in women has encouraged NGO's and others to demand
    protection for victims. The April immigration law provides protections
    for trafficking victims who cooperate with police against traffickers.
    Press accounts state that authorities detained 163 pimps and freed 865
    foreigners from abusive situations in the first half of the year. The
    half-year figures surpass the totals for all of 1998. A 1999 Civil
    Guard study estimated that 10,000 women were working in sex clubs, of
    whom 90 percent were immigrants.
        The NGO Doctors of the World, which works with prostitutes,
    estimated during the year that 60 percent of the 45,000 female
    prostitutes were immigrants. Doctors of the World reported that 69
    percent of these immigrant prostitutes were from Sub-Saharan Africa, 21
    percent were from Latin America, and 8 percent were from Eastern
    Europe.
                                   __________

                                     SWEDEN

        Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty parliamentary
    democracy. The King is Chief of State. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime
    Minister, exercises executive authority. The judiciary is independent.
        The Government effectively controls the police, all security
    organizations, and the armed forces.
        Sweden has an advanced industrial economy, mainly market based, and
    a high standard of living, with extensive social welfare services.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. The Government has longstanding
    programs to deal with violence against women and abuse of children and
    took steps against trafficking in women. Neo-Nazi violence remained a
    problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In June a police officer was charged with breach of duty, serious
    ill treatment, and causing the death of another, in a March incident in
    which he shot a fleeing suspect. The police officer reportedly fired a
    warning shot, then shot the man from behind because he was convinced
    that the suspect was armed.
        In June a prison escapee died after being caught and restrained by
    four prison guards. Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are concerned
    that the man may have died as a result of excessive use of force by the
    guards. The guards were suspended pending the results of a police
    investigation into the death.
        The Prosecutor General closed his review of the initial
    investigation of a 1995 case in which a man died in police custody,
    acknowledging that there had been flaws in the investigation. He urged
    that a further, independent investigation be carried out into how the
    authorities had handled the different aspects of the case. No one was
    ever prosecuted for the death, although the two policemen involved were
    convicted of a minor offense in 1996. A report by the parliamentary
    Ombudsman concluded that the current procedure for dealing with
    complaints against the police was inadequate and proposed that an
    independent system be established. In June the Minister of Justice
    decided to appoint a commission of inquiry to look into past deaths in
    custody in order to propose safeguards. NGO's remain very interested in
    such cases.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
    generally respect such prohibitions. Complaints of the excessive use of
    force by the police are infrequent. Thorough investigations have
    produced no evidence of a systemic problem. Typically, police officers
    found guilty of abuse are suspended or otherwise disciplined.
        Five cases of excessive use of force by policemen during the year
    were under investigation. Three officers were fined for excessive use
    of force in October 1999, but there were no reported cases of policemen
    being fired for committing crimes in the course of their duties--
    including the use of excessive force.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions. Arrests are by warrant. The police must
    file charges within 6 hours against persons detained for disturbing the
    public order or considered dangerous, and within 12 hours against those
    detained on other grounds. The law requires arraignment within 48
    hours. The time between arrest and the first court hearing may be
    extended to 96 hours for detainees considered dangerous, likely to
    destroy evidence, or likely to flee. In cases involving more than one
    individual and in the case of foreigners, courts can and do order
    continued detention for 2 weeks at a time while police are
    investigating. Such detentions can be protracted, particularly in drug
    cases. Other than such dangerous suspects, detainees routinely are
    released pending trial. Bail as such does not exist. If a person files
    for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with an official investigation,
    a court may order detention for up to 3 months, with judicial review
    every 2 weeks.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The judicial system is composed of three levels of courts: District
    courts, a court of appeals, and a Supreme Court. All criminal and civil
    cases are heard first in district court regardless of the severity of
    the alleged crime.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
    independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law limits home searches to investigations of
    major crimes punishable by at least 2 years' imprisonment. The
    authorities respect this provision. Normally the police must obtain
    court approval for a search or a wiretap. However, a senior police
    official may approve a search if time is a critical factor or the case
    involves a threat to life. The national police and the Prosecutor
    General's Office submit a report to Parliament every year detailing all
    of the electronic monitoring done during the previous year. In April
    the Minister of Justice presented a proposal to expand the use of
    police wiretapping. According to the proposal, wiretapping would be
    allowed only if serious drug crimes or serious crimes that would result
    in at least 4 years' imprisonment were suspected. A parliamentary
    decision is likely in 2001. A court must grant permission for wiretaps
    on a case-by-case basis. NGO's were critical of the Ministry's
    proposal.
        In 1997 journalistic investigations focused attention on the
    country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization. The majority of
    persons sterilized were disabled either mentally or physically. Such
    operations were known for years to have taken place under pre-World War
    II legislation, most of them without force. It initially was reported
    that between 1934 and 1976, 62,888 forced sterilizations were carried
    out, 95 percent of them on women. In 1999 a government-appointed
    commission concluded that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 of these
    sterilizations were forced. The commission gave priority to the
    question of damages to victims and also looked into the possible
    existence of other categories of victims. The commission concluded its
    inquiry in 1999, and Parliament decided to pay damages of approximately
    $21,000 (175,000 krona) to each victim. By October 1,925 persons had
    applied for compensation. By year's end, some 1,300 had received
    payment. The Government allocated additional resources to pay
    compensation since the number of applicants far exceeded expectations.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    provisions in practice. Most newspapers and periodicals are privately
    owned. The Government subsidizes daily newspapers, regardless of
    political affiliation. Broadcasters operate under a state concession.
    Until a few years ago, the State had a monopoly over ground-based
    broadcasting, but a variety of commercial television channels (one
    ground-based and several via satellite or cable), and several
    commercial radio stations now exist.
        The Government may censor publications containing national security
    information. A quasi-governmental body excises extremely graphic
    violence from films, television programs, and videos.
        Criticism of child pornography is widespread, and the debate on the
    legality of ownership of pornographic material continued. A 1999 law
    criminalizes the possession and handling of child pornography. It also
    is illegal to publish or distribute such material. The Queen remains a
    strong and popular advocate of children's rights and an active opponent
    of child pornography.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects
    this right in practice. Police require a permit for public
    demonstrations. The authorities routinely grant such permits, with rare
    exceptions to prevent clashes between antagonistic groups or due to
    insufficient police resources to patrol an event adequately.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. The debate that began in
    1999 over the possible criminalization of neo-Nazi organizations
    continued.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects that right in practice. The
    Government does not hamper the practice or teaching of any faith.
        The country maintained a state (Lutheran) church for several
    hundred years, supported by a general ``church tax'' (although the
    Government routinely grants exemptions). However, in 1995 the Church of
    Sweden and the Government agreed to a formal separation, which became
    effective during the year, but the Church still is to receive some
    state support. The reform also made it possible for all religious
    communities to register by fulfilling certainmainly organizational--
    requirements. The principles governing state support to all religious
    communities have been laid down in a new special act of law.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The law and regulations incorporate the precepts of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    They are also consistent with the European Union's (EU) Dublin
    Convention. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees; it also provides first asylum. In keeping with international
    agreements, the Government reviewed applications for asylum more
    thoroughly than before. The number of applications for asylum decreased
    in 1999 to 11,231 (from 12,844 in 1998). Applicants included 3,576
    Iraqi citizens, 1,812 from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 854
    Iranians. The Government approved 5,597 applications in 1999. A total
    of 6,835 persons sought asylum through July 2000. Nearly 11 percent of
    the country's population is foreign born.
        The Government carries out expeditious returns of asylum seekers
    from EU countries or from countries with which there are reciprocal
    return agreements. In many cases, asylum seekers were deported within
    72 hours of arrival, and NGO's were critical of their lack of access to
    legal counsel. To remedy this situation, the Government is
    experimenting with pilot programs at selected border crossings to
    provide expeditious legal assistance. Most of these are cases of
    persons who passed through or have asylum determinations pending in
    other EU countries. Applications can remain under consideration for
    long periods of time with applicants in uncertain status. Because of
    the appeals process in the courts, cases can extend for several years.
    These cases are few in number.
        The principal complaint of NGO's is that the country lacks a
    transparent process for making decisions in asylum cases. They maintain
    that the asylum procedures lack rules to guide the conduct of
    authorities to ensure legal protection for asylum seekers. The
    procedures accord great discretion to individuals in decisionmaking
    positions. According to the NGO's, the decisionmakers use arbitrary,
    unspecified, and inconsistent criteria. NGO's are particularly critical
    of the unclear burden of proof and the lack of an appeals process to an
    independent court. Four cases, in which the Government sought to return
    asylum seekers to countries where they feared persecution, were pending
    at the U.N. Committee Against Torture; the Committee was expected to
    review the cases in the fall of 2000.
        The Government conducted a review of the safety of countries that
    are considered safe third countries. NGO's raised the issue of
    insufficient protection for returnees to countries without a reciprocal
    return agreement. While these countries provide safe asylum, they are
    often reluctant to accept asylum seekers deported from European
    countries. Despite the Government's review, late in the year the
    authorities ordered the deportation of two Iranian asylum seekers to
    Tehran. The deportation was halted after the U.N. Committee Against
    Torture decided to review both cases to determine if the individuals
    would face torture if returned to Tehran.
        A total of 3,752 Kosovar Albanian refugees were granted temporary
    residence permits in 1999, initially valid for 11 months. By July more
    than 2,500 of the refugees had returned to Kosovo. The Government has
    accepted over 100,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The
    Government provides grants to Bosnians to travel to their homeland in
    order to determine if they wish to be repatriated. It also provides
    financial incentives for returnees, but there is no forced
    repatriation. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
    a country where they feared persecution.
        In March the Government withdrew a proposal envisaging changes to
    its temporary protection regulations in a situation of mass
    immigration. The proposal was withdrawn following massive criticism by
    the political opposition, the UNHCR, NGO's, and the parliamentary
    Committee on Social Insurance.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. Citizens exercised this right most recently in
    1998. Elections to the 349-member unicameral Parliament are held every
    4 years.
        Women participate actively in the political process and Government.
    They constitute 43.6 percent of the Parliament and 55 percent of the
    Cabinet. The governing Social Democratic Party largely kept its pledge
    to place women in half of all political appointments at all levels.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several private organizations actively monitor issues such as the
    impact of social legislation, anti-immigrant or racist activities, and
    the condition of the indigenous Sami population. The official ombudsmen
    publicize abuses of state authority and may initiate actions to rectify
    such abuses. Government agencies are in close contact with a variety of
    local and international groups working in the country and abroad to
    improve human rights observance, and they are very open to dialog and
    input from these groups.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
    the Government respects this provision.
        Women.--A total of 19,982 reported cases of assault against women
    (excluding rape) were reported in 1999, compared with 20,516 in 1998.
    Most involved spousal abuse. In three-quarters of the assaults, the
    perpetrator was an acquaintance of the victim. Reported abuse against
    women occurs disproportionately in immigrant communities. On average 33
    murders of women and girls are reported each year, half of them by men
    closely related to the victim. The number of reported rapes of persons
    over age 15 was 1,747 in 1999, compared with 1,386 in 1998. The law
    does not differentiate between spousal and nonspousal rape. In 1998
    (latest statistics available) 4,928 cases of violence against women
    were prosecuted, as were 243 rape cases, 208 of which were sexual
    assaults on persons over age 15.
        Trafficking in women from Russia and the Baltics for purposes of
    forced prostitution continues to be a small but serious problem (see
    Section 6.f.). The purchase or attempted purchase of sexual services
    became illegal in 1999.
        The Government has longstanding programs to deal with violence
    against women. The law provides complainants with protection from
    contact with their abusers, if so desired. In some cases, the
    authorities help women obtain new identities and homes. The Government
    provides electronic alarms or bodyguards for women in extreme danger of
    assault. Both national and local governments help fund volunteer groups
    that provide shelter and other assistance to abused women. The
    authorities strive to apprehend and prosecute abusers. Typically, the
    sentence for abuse is a prison term--14 months on average--or
    psychiatric treatment. However, women complain about short sentences
    and the early release of offenders.
        The law prohibits sexual harassment and specifies clearly
    employers' responsibilities to prevent and--if applicable--to
    investigate sexual harassment in the workplace and to formulate and
    post a specific policy and guidelines for the workplace. Employers who
    do not investigate and intervene against harassment at work can be
    obliged to pay damages to the victim. As with other forms of
    discrimination, women and men may take complaints to the courts or to
    their unions. To combat gender discrimination in the longer term, the
    Equal Opportunities Act requires all employers, both in the public and
    private sector, actively to promote equal opportunities for women and
    men in the workplace.
        The law requires employers to treat men and women alike in hiring,
    promotion, and pay, including equal pay for comparable work. According
    to 1998 statistics, women's salaries were 82 percent of men's salaries.
    Adjusting for age, education, and occupational differences between men
    and women, women average 91 percent of men's salaries. The equal
    opportunity Ombudsman, a public official, investigates complaints of
    gender discrimination in the labor market. Women and men also may
    pursue complaints through the courts. A third option, and by far the
    most common, involves settling allegations with the employee's labor
    union as mediator. In 1999 gender discrimination cases by 94 women and
    16 men were registered with the equal opportunity Ombudsman. The courts
    did not rule on any of the cases in 1999 (pending the resolution of 1
    of the cases in the European Court of Justice), 11 were settled through
    mediation, 22 were withdrawn, and 72 were dropped. The remainder were
    pending. In the past, many of these cases involved salary
    discrimination.
        All employers with more than 10 employees must prepare an annual
    equality plan, including a survey of pay differences between male and
    female employees. The equal opportunity Ombudsman reviews these plans.
        Women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization,
    thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976.
    The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or
    physically, and 95 percent were women. In May 1999, Parliament decided
    to pay damages in such cases (see Section 1.f.).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free,
    and universal primary school education for children for 9 years. It
    also provides free medical and dental care for all children up to the
    age of 16 (19 for dental care). Parents receive some $1,000 per year
    for each child under 16 years of age. An official children's Ombudsman
    monitors the Government's programs.
        The Government allocates funds to private organizations concerned
    with children's rights. An NGO, Children's Rights in Society, offers
    counseling to troubled youngsters. The Government remains active
    internationally in efforts to prevent child abuse.
        Although the physical abuse of children appears relatively
    uncommon, the public and authorities remain concerned by consistent
    data indicating an increase in cases over the past several years. The
    number of reported cases for children under the age of 15 rose to 5,919
    in 1999, up from 5,642 in 1998. The number of reported cases of sexual
    abuse of children under the age of 15 was 2,969 in 1999 and 2,756 in
    1998. The U.N. Children's Committee criticized the Government, stating
    that it provides less protection for the children of immigrant and
    disadvantaged groups.
        The law prohibits parents or other caretakers from abusing children
    mentally or physically in any way. Parents, teachers, and other adults
    are subject to prosecution if they physically punish a child, including
    slapping or spanking. Children have the right to report such abuses to
    the police. The authorities respect these laws, and the usual sentence
    is a fine combined with counseling and monitoring by social workers.
    However, if the situation warrants, authorities may remove children
    from their homes and place them in foster care. Foster parents
    virtually never receive permission to adopt long-term foster children,
    even in cases where the parents are seen as unfit or seek no contact
    with the child. Critics charge that this policy places the rights of
    biological parents over the needs of children for security in permanent
    family situations.
        People with Disabilities.--With one exception, there are no
    specific laws that prohibit discrimination against persons with
    disabilities, but considerable efforts are made to ensure that the
    disabled enjoy equal opportunities. A 1999 act prohibits discrimination
    against disabled persons in the workplace. In May the Parliament
    adopted a national plan on disability policy that provides for freedom
    of access and social support as basic rights for disabled citizens.
    Since 1994 the country has had an Ombudsman for disability issues. The
    Government provides disabled persons with assistance aimed at allowing
    them to live as normal a life as possible, preferably outside an
    institutional setting. This support may include a personal assistant
    for the severely disabled, plus improvements in the workplace's
    accessibility to wheelchairs. Government assistance also encompasses
    services such as home care or group living. Regulations for new
    buildings require full accessibility, but the Government has no such
    requirement for existing public buildings. Many buildings and some
    public transportation remain inaccessible. Deaf children have the right
    to education in sign language. The parents of disabled children and
    disabled workers under the age of 65 receive financial assistance every
    7 years to buy a car adapted to the person's disability.
        Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization,
    thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976.
    The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or
    physically (see Section 1.f.). In 1999 Parliament decided to pay
    damages in such cases.
        Indigenous People.--The country counts at least 17,000 Sami
    (formerly known as Lapps) among its 8.87 million inhabitants (Sami
    organizations place that number somewhat higher, 25,000 to 30,000). In
    1993 the Government allowed the formation of a Sametinget, or Sami
    Parliament, as an advisory body to the Government. Under the current
    Government, Sami issues fall under the Ministry of Agriculture.
        The Sami continue a protracted struggle for recognition as an
    indigenous people under a variety of international agreements, such as
    International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169. Historically,
    the Government resisted granting the Sami such rights. For example,
    Sami children had no right to education in their native language until
    the provision of such education to immigrant group children under a
    1977 law forced the Government to grant Sami at least equal treatment.
    As a result of such education, northern Sami dialects have enjoyed a
    recent renaissance. However, Sami dialects in the southern portions of
    traditional Sami lands now may have too few native speakers to survive
    as living languages. In 1997 the Government initiated an inquiry into
    whether the country could ratify ILO Convention 169. The inquiry was
    published in 1999 and concluded that the country could ratify the
    convention, but that it should not be ratified until a number of steps
    relating to Sami land rights are taken. No further steps were taken
    during the year.
        In 1994 the Government removed from the Sami the right to control
    hunting and fishing activities on Sami village lands, permitting
    instead totally unlimited hunting and fishing activity on all
    government property. Sami leaders continued to protest this change
    during the year.
        Some Sami state that they face discrimination in housing and
    employment on an individual basis, particularly in the southern
    mountain regions. In January the Government officially recognized the
    Sami people as a national minority in the context of its ratification
    of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National
    Minorities.
        Religious Minorities.--The Government continued to take proactive
    steps to combat anti-Semitism by increasing awareness of Nazi crimes
    and the Holocaust. Under its living history project, the Government
    provides educational material on the Holocaust to schoolchildren and
    families throughout the country. The media are also active in
    publicizing and condemning neo-Nazi activity.
        The Government declared January 27, the anniversary of Auschwitz's
    liberation, as a national day of remembrance. In January Sweden hosted
    a large, high-level international conference on Holocaust education.
    The Stockholm international forum on the Holocaust was attended by over
    40 countries and over 20 heads of state and government.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 11 percent of
    Sweden's population is foreign born, with the largest groups being from
    Finland, Iran, and the former Yugoslavia. ``Skinhead'' and neoNazi
    related violence increased during the year. Neo-Nazi activity in the
    past was rarely lethal or well organized and was directed mostly at
    immigrants. However, cases over the last couple of years are notable
    for the fact that they mainly targeted white, native, non-Jewish
    citizens. Crimes with racial overtones increased, but only 13 per cent
    of the racist crimes reported could be linked directly to neo-Nazis.
    Violent incidents with racial overtones have averaged about 100 per
    year in recent years, although no official statistics are kept.
        Three neo-Nazis were sentenced in January to life imprisonment for
    killing two police officers during the course of a May 1999 bank
    robbery. Two young neo-Nazis were sentenced to 11 years in prison in
    April for the murder of a trade union official in October 1999. A third
    defendant was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment for being an
    accessory.
        The public continued to urge a tougher stance against neo-Nazi
    groups. Several demonstrations against violence and racism were
    organized all over the country. The Government supports volunteer
    groups that oppose racism and xenophobia. As a result of the 1999 press
    campaign against 62 of the country's leading neo-Nazis, 5 were expelled
    from their unions, and 1 was fired from his job.
        Most estimates place the number of active neo-Nazis at fewer than
    2,000, and there appears to be little popular support for their
    activities or sentiments. Many citizens doubt whether such youth
    actually embrace neo-Nazi ideology, and the Government supports
    activities by volunteer groups working against racism. The Government
    investigates and prosecutes race-related crimes, although in many
    clashes between Swedish and immigrant youth gangs, authorities judge
    both sides to be at fault. Neo-Nazi groups operate legally, but serious
    discussion has been taking place about outlawing such groups. The
    Supreme Court ruled that it can be illegal to wear xenophobic symbols
    or racist paraphernalia. Rightwing groups, which have and exercise the
    right to demonstrate, are not permitted to display signs and banners
    with provocative symbols at their rallies.
        The Ombudsman for racial discrimination reported in January that
    complaints of ethnic discrimination in the labor market increased by 50
    percent in 1999 to 184 cases, compared with 122 cases in 1998. The
    increase could be linked to a new law, introduced in May 1999, which
    provides easier redress.
        A government committee presented a report that proposed a
    tightening of the laws against Nazi and racist crimes. The committee
    proposed that a new charge be introduced, ``seriously disorderly
    conduct,'' in order to be able to prosecute people for crimes that do
    not fall under ``agitation against ethnic groups.''
        In January the Government decided to ratify the Council of Europe's
    Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the
    European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The decision
    implies that the Sami people, Swedish Finns, Tornedal-Finns, Roma, and
    Jews are recognized as national minorities. It means that the
    Government should support and protect minority languages such as Sami,
    Finnish, and Yiddish. A new law that gave effect to the conventions
    entered into force on April 1.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The work force is approximately 80
    percent unionized. Career military personnel, police officers, and
    civilian government officials, as well as private sector workers in
    both manufacturing and service industries, are organized. Most business
    owners belong to counterpart employer organizations.
        Unions and employer organizations operate independently of the
    Government and political parties (although the largest federation of
    unions has always been linked with the largest political party, the
    Social Democrats). The law protects the freedom of workers to associate
    and to strike, as well as for employers to organize and to conduct
    lockouts. Within limits protecting the public's immediate health and
    security, public employees also enjoy the right to strike. These laws
    are respected fully and are not challenged.
        Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. They
    are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
    Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation among others.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Management-
    labor cooperation tends to be excellent and nonconfrontational. Labor
    and management, each represented by a national organization by sector
    (for example retailers and engineering industries), negotiate framework
    agreements every 2 to 3 years. More detailed company-level agreements
    put such framework agreements into effect at the local level. New
    framework agreements were signed during 1998, with most valid until
    2001. In contrast with the recent past, most agreements with labor
    unions now provide for a degree of individualized pay, including merit
    bonuses.
        The law provides both workers and employers with effective
    mechanisms for resolving complaints. The vast majority of complaints
    are resolved informally. The law protects union officials and members
    from dismissal or reprisals for official union activities. In some
    instances, unions even demand collective agreements regardless of the
    views and union status of employees. The Government is studying ways to
    strengthen the system of public mediation. During the year, a new
    government office, the Mediation Institute, began functioning. During
    1999 there were seven legal and two illegal strikes. No strikes or
    lockouts were reported during the year, apart from two small wildcat
    actions in October.
        Agreement was reached in 1997 between 12 employer associations and
    8 unions representing 800,000 manufacturing employees on steps to
    prevent strikes and lockouts, such as requiring serious wage
    negotiations to start 3 months before a collective agreement expires
    and appointing a mediator if an agreement has not been reached after 2
    months. As a result of this agreement, wages increased by approximately
    3 percent in 1998 and a further 3 to 3.5 percent in 1999. Similar
    agreements were signed in the municipal sector and in the retail-
    commercial and service sectors.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, and the authorities effectively enforce
    this ban. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
    the Government enforces this prohibition effectively. However, women
    are trafficked to the country for the purposes of forced prostitution
    (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Compulsory 9-year education ends at age 16, and the law
    permits full-time employment at that age under the supervision of local
    authorities. Employees under age 18 may work only during the daytime
    and under supervision. During summer and other vacation periods,
    children as young as 13 years may work part time or in ``light'' work
    with parental permission. Union representatives, police, and public
    prosecutors effectively enforce this restriction. The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
    prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage law. Wages are set by collective bargaining contracts, which
    nonunion establishments usually observe as well. Even the lowest paid
    workers can maintain a decent standard of living for themselves and
    their families through substantial benefits (such as housing or day
    care support) provided by social welfare entitlement programs. However,
    cutbacks in these programs have made it harder for some workers to make
    ends meet, particularly low-paid single women with children.
        The standard workweek is 40 hours or less. Both the law and
    collective bargaining agreements regulate overtime and rest periods.
    For workers not covered by a labor agreement, the law stipulates a
    limit for overtime at 200 hours a year, although exceptions may be
    granted for key employees with union approval; some collective
    bargaining agreements put the limit at 150 hours. The law requires a
    rest period after 5 hours of work but does not stipulate a minimum
    duration; in practice it is usually 30 minutes. The law also provides
    all employees with a minimum of 5 weeks of paid annual leave; labor
    contracts often provide more, particularly for higher ranking private
    sector employees and older public service workers. Amendments to the
    labor law in 1997 made it easier for employers to hire workers for
    limited periods, as well as empowering local unions to agree to
    exceptions to last-in, first-out laws.
        Currently the focus of concern is on the psychosocial aspect of
    health and safety. Occupational health and safety rules are set by a
    government-appointed board and monitored by trained union stewards,
    safety ombudsmen, and, occasionally, government inspectors. These
    standards are very high, making workplaces both safe and healthy.
    Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop unsafe activity immediately
    and to call in an inspector. An individual also has the right to halt
    work in dangerous situations in order to consult a supervisor or safety
    representative.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit such
    trafficking, although traffickers are prosecuted under other statutes.
    Women are trafficked to the country for forced prostitution. In 1999
    the Government initiated six court cases against individuals involved
    in trafficking. The 11 cases prosecuted in 1998-99 resulted in 6
    convictions. All of the accused traffickers are Swedish residents with
    family and personal ties to Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle
    East. The affected women in these cases, numbering 200 to 500 per year,
    came principally from Central Europe, the Baltic states, and Russia.
    The women typically are recruited in their own countries to come and
    work as cleaners, babysitters, or similar employment. Some reportedly
    were ``purchased'' from other traffickers and brought into Sweden. A
    1998 baseline report stated that considerable additional information
    available to the police suggests that the problem of trafficking is
    more widespread than the few prosecutions indicate.
        The Government and the EU provided funds to the Foundation of
    Women's Forums to combat trafficking in women in the Nordic and Baltic
    nations by creating interactive networks that link NGO's and research
    institutions that deal with prevention and the rehabilitation of
    trafficked women.
                                   __________

                                  SWITZERLAND

        Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal structure.
    The bicameral Parliament elects the seven members of the Federal
    Council, the highest executive body, whose presidency rotates annually.
    Because of the nation's linguistic and religious diversity, the Swiss
    political system emphasizes local and national political consensus and
    grants considerable autonomy to individual cantons. Voters approved a
    new Constitution in April 1999 that came into force on January 1, 2000.
    The judiciary is independent.
        The armed forces are a civilian-controlled militia based on
    universal military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no
    standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential
    headquarters staff. Police duties are primarily a responsibility of the
    individual cantons, which have their own police forces that are kept
    under effective control. The National Police Authority has a
    coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law enforcement.
    There were allegations of occasional abuses by police.
        Switzerland has a highly developed free enterprise, industrial, and
    service economy strongly dependent on international trade. The standard
    of living is very high.
        The Government generally respects human rights, and the law and
    judiciary provide effective means of dealing with individual instances
    of abuse. There continue to be allegations by nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) of occasional police harassment directed against
    foreigners, particularly asylum seekers, including arbitrary detention.
    Violence against women is a problem, and the Government is continuing
    to take serious steps to address it. Trafficking in women for forced
    prostitution increased. Some laws still tend to discriminate against
    women. There continue to be reports of verbal abuse against foreigners
    by private citizens.
        The new Constitution approved by voters in 1999 provides for new
    protection for citizens' rights, including the principle of equal
    opportunity for the disabled and the right to strike.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        Human rights groups strongly criticized police for the death of 27-
    year-old Palestinian Khaled Abuzarifeh, who died at Zurich-Kloten
    airport while being forcibly deported in March 1999. In January Zurich
    cantonal authorities announced that forensic tests showed that
    Abuzarifeh died of suffocation. For deportation he was strapped into a
    wheelchair and adhesive tape was placed over his mouth to prevent him
    from shouting. According to airport police, such restraints were
    permitted because Abuzarifeh's physical resistance thwarted a first
    deportation attempt. Cantonal authorities claim no longer to be using
    adhesive tape to cover the mouth during deportations. In connection
    with Abuzarifeh's death, three police officers and a doctor were placed
    under formal investigation of charges of manslaughter by culpable
    negligence.
        Fulgence Niyonteze, the former mayor of the Rwandan town of
    Mushubati, sought asylum in Switzerland in 1994 and was arrested in
    1996. In May 1999, a military court convicted him of crimes committed
    during the 1994 genocide, including murder (taking part in the massacre
    of Tutsis), attempted murder, incitement to murder, and war crimes. He
    was sentenced to life imprisonment. Niyonteze was tried by a military
    tribunal because Swiss law stipulates that alleged war crimes and
    violations of the Geneva Conventions be tried by a military tribunal.
        On May 26, 2000, a military appeal court heard Niyonteze's appeal
    of his sentence of life imprisonment. The court found Niyonteze guilty
    of war crimes and violations of the Geneva Conventions but dropped the
    first charges of murder and incitement to murder and declared that a
    military tribunal had no authority to try such offenses when committed
    abroad by a civilian. The military appeal court sentenced Niyonteze to
    14 years in prison. Both the public prosecutor and Niyonteze filed
    appeals of the sentence.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution proscribes such practices, and there were
    no reports of violations. There were allegations by NGO's and some
    individuals of occasional police harassment of foreigners, particularly
    asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.).
        Brazilian national Luis Felipe Lourenco was arrested in 1998 in
    Geneva on charges of theft of a credit card. A prison guard allegedly
    beat him while he was in custody. Prison authorities reportedly waited
    2 hours before transporting Lourenco to the hospital, where he was
    diagnosed with a perforated lung and damage to his spinal cord.
    Lourenco is paralyzed in all his limbs as result of the injuries that
    he claims to have suffered while detained. The prison administration
    maintained that Lourenco's injuries were incurred when he threw himself
    against a door.
        On August 28, a Geneva magistrate decided not to indict the guard
    for negligence causing bodily harm, as Lourenco had demanded, on the
    grounds that there was insufficient evidence for criminal charges. The
    magistrate based the decision primarily on the results of a medical
    study of Lourenco's injuries but also took into consideration the
    guard's previously unblemished record. In their report, the three
    medical experts consulted by the magistrate stated that they failed to
    establish the truth with certainty, but that they deemed the guard's
    version of events, that Lourenco's injuries were self-inflicted, more
    plausible. In October Lourenco's lawyers filed an appeal of the
    magistrate's decision with the Genenva Criminal Court.
        No new developments occurred in the case of Clement Nwankwo, a
    Nigerian human rights monitor who accused the Geneva police of
    mistreatment during his arrest in 1997. Having exhausted domestic
    remedies unsuccessfully, Nwankwo is appealing his case to the European
    Court of Human Rights. NGO's believe that the Nwankwo case underscores
    overall problems with police treatment of foreigners, especially asylum
    seekers in Geneva and perhaps elsewhere. Their concern was echoed in a
    1997 report by the U.N. Committee Against Torture, which expressed
    concern about ``frequent allegations of ill-treatment'' inflicted in
    the course of arrests and police custody. The report also noted a lack
    of independent mechanisms in the cantons to provide certain legal
    protections such as the possibility, ``especially for foreigners,'' to
    contact their family or a lawyer in case of arrest and to be examined
    by an independent doctor on entering police custody, after each
    interrogation, and before being brought before an investigating
    magistrate or being released. Responding to these concerns, in 1998 a
    team of experts appointed by the Federal Office of Justice presented a
    preliminary study identifying possible characteristics of a future
    federal-level code of penal procedures that would replace the cantonal
    codes. The study recommends granting fundamental protections to
    detainees in police custody, including the introduction of a legal
    right to inform relatives or third parties of their arrest. However,
    the committee did not recommend a provision for access to a lawyer from
    the time of arrest.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, although
    some NGO's complain of prison overcrowding. The Government has taken
    measures to improve prison conditions and address overcrowding. The
    Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The legal prohibitions
    on arbitrary arrest and detention generally are respected at all levels
    of government. The cantons are responsible for handling most criminal
    matters, and procedures vary somewhat from canton to canton. In general
    a suspect may not be held longer than 48 hours without a warrant of
    arrest issued by an investigative magistrate. However, asylum seekers
    and foreigners without valid documents may be held for up to 96 hours
    without an arrest warrant. Some NGO's alleged that the authorities
    arbitrarily detained asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.). A suspect may
    be denied legal counsel at the time of detention but has the right to
    choose and contact an attorney by the time an arrest warrant is issued.
    The State provides free legal assistance for indigents who may be
    jailed pending trial. Investigations are generally prompt, even if in
    some cases investigative detention may exceed the length of sentence.
    Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the
    magistrate believes the person is dangerous or will not appear for
    trial. Any lengthy detention is subject to review by higher judicial
    authorities. During the year, about onethird of all prisoners were in
    pretrial detention, and the average length of such detention was 52
    days.
        The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not use it.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        All courts of first instance are local or cantonal courts. Citizens
    have the right to appeal, ultimately to the Federal Court.
        Minor cases are tried by a single judge, difficult cases by a panel
    of judges, and murder (or other serious cases) by a public jury. Trials
    usually are held expeditiously. The Constitution provides for public
    trials in which the defendant's rights are fully respected, including
    the right to challenge and to present witnesses or evidence.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Cantonal laws regulate police entry into private
    premises. These regulations differ widely from canton to canton, but
    all prohibit such practices without a warrant. All government
    authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanction.
        Instances of forced sterilization of women resurfaced in public
    debate during the year. In 1981 the Swiss Academy for Medical Science
    decided that forced sterilization is not permissible if a person is
    incapable of understanding the consequences. This guideline is
    undergoing revision because of what the Academy calls a changed social
    understanding of the sexuality of the mentally disabled. Although no
    data indicates that more pregnancies occur when disabled women and men
    live together in homes, the Academy considers its guideline outdated.
    Draft legislation to revise the Academy's position is in parliamentary
    consultation. The draft would permit forced sterilization in cases when
    no other form of contraception is usable.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom. The authorities
    legally may restrict these freedoms for groups deemed to be a threat to
    the State, but no groups were restricted during the year. In addition
    an article of the Penal Code criminalizes racist or anti-Semitic
    expression, whether in public speech or in printed material.
        Parliamentary immunity protects parliamentarians from prosecution
    for acts that relate to their government position. However, following a
    1998 incident in which a national councilor, Rudolf Keller, made anti-
    Semitic remarks and could not be prosecuted because Parliament refused
    to lift his immunity, the upper house of Parliament voted in 1999 for
    its partial abolishment. However, the National Council, the lower house
    of Parliament, rejected the legislative proposal twice, the second time
    in October, thus preserving the existing rules.
        The nationwide broadcast media are government funded but possess
    editorial autonomy. Private and foreign broadcast media operate freely.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for complete
    freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right
    in practice. There is no single state church, but all cantons support
    at least one of the three traditional denominations--Roman Catholic,
    Old Catholic, or Protestant--with public funds. In all cantons, an
    individual may choose not to contribute to church funding. However, in
    some cantons, private companies are unable to avoid payment of the
    church tax. A religious organization must register with the Government
    in order to receive tax-exempt status. There have been no reports of a
    religious group applying for the ``church taxation'' status that the
    traditional three denominations enjoy.
        Foreign missionaries must obtain a ``religious worker'' visa to
    work in the country. Requirements include proof that the foreigner
    would not displace a citizen from doing the job, that the foreigner
    would be financially supported by the host organization, and that the
    country of origin of religious workers also grants visas to Swiss
    religious workers.
        Religion is taught in public schools. The doctrine presented
    depends on which religion predominates in the particular canton.
    However, those of different faiths are free to attend classes for their
    own creeds during the designated class period. Atheists also may be
    excused from the classes. Parents also may send their children to
    private (parochial) schools or teach their children at home.
        In July 1999, the Business Review Commission of the National
    Assembly issued a report entitled ``Sects or Assimilative Movements in
    Switzerland,'' containing recommendations to the Government on the need
    for state involvement and the creation of national policy. The
    Commission recommended that the Government formulate a ``sect'' policy
    and coordinate the cooperation of researchers and informational and
    counseling committees. In June 2000, the Government rejected the
    Business Review Commission's recommendation to formulate a national
    sect policy. The Government stated that such a policy would conflict
    with the constitutional right to freedom of religious beliefs. The
    Government also opposed the creation of a National Information and
    Counseling Center pointing out that religious matters fall under the
    jurisdiction of the cantons.
        In 1998 the city of Basel passed a law banning aggressive tactics
    for handing out flyers. This action was prompted by complaints about
    Scientologists' methods. In June 1999, Scientology lost a bid in the
    country's highest court to overturn a municipal law that barred persons
    from being approached on the street by those using ``deceptive or
    dishonest methods.'' The Court ruled that a 1998 Basel law, prompted by
    efforts to curb Scientology, involved an intervention in religious
    freedom but did not infringe on it.
        The city of Buchs, St. Gallen, also passed a law modeled on the
    Basel law. However, it is still legal to proselytize in nonintrusive
    ways, such as public speaking on the street or by going door-to-door in
    neighborhoods.
        In Zurich in June 1995 Scientologists appealed a city decision that
    prohibited them from distributing flyers on public property. In
    September 1999, a higher court decided that the Scientologists'
    activities were commercial and not religious, and that the city should
    grant them and other commercial enterprises such as fast food
    restaurants more freedom to distribute flyers on a permit basis.
    Fearing a heavy administrative and enforcement workload, the city
    appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision rejected the
    appeal in June 2000, reinforcing the decision by the previous court
    that the Scientologists' activities were commercial in nature. The
    Supreme Court decision is expected to establish a nationwide legal
    guideline on the issue.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the Constitution and the law,
    citizens are free to travel in or outside the country, to emigrate, and
    to repatriate. Non-Swiss convicted of crimes may receive sentences that
    include denial of reentry for a specific period following the
    completion of a prison sentence.
        Switzerland traditionally has been a haven for refugees, but public
    concern over the high number of asylum seekers entering the country in
    the wake of the Kosovo conflict generated domestic political pressure
    on the Government in 1999 to tighten its policy regarding their
    acceptance. The Government granted temporary asylum to approximately
    63,000 Kosovars seeking refuge from the armed conflict. Following the
    end of hostilities and the deployment of the international protection
    force, the Federal Council in August 1999 deemed a return of refugees
    to Kosovo justifiable and ended its policy of granting temporary asylum
    collectively.
        The Government initially offered material and financial aid to
    refugees leaving the country voluntarily. Some 32,000 Kosovars accepted
    this offer, which ended in May. Since June the Government proceeded
    with forced repatriations, expelling by the end of August some 4,300
    Kosovars--178 of them on special flights in police custody. In May the
    Federal Government granted a delay in departure dates in some 4,000
    cases that involved individual hardship (families with children in
    school, members of ethnic minorities, the elderly, the sick, single
    mothers, and pregnant women). In December approximately 1,500 Kosovars
    with expired temporary residence permits remained in the country. In
    coordination with the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, the Government agreed to
    slow the flow of repatriations in December and in January 2001.
        In August the umbrella organization of refugee aid NGO's criticized
    the Federal Government for some forced repatriations of Kosovo refugees
    that they termed excessively harsh and inhumane. Another human rights
    group, Eyes Open, criticized Zurich cantonal police practices in the
    compulsory repatriations of failed asylum seekers (see Section 1.c.).
    The group noted that the excessive use of hand and leg restraints in
    the return of Conglolese asylum seekers in August gave the impression
    that they were criminals.
        The 1999 asylum law provides for the collective admission of
    victims of violence and authorizes the Federal Council to grant them
    temporary protective status. It also simplifies and accelerates the
    process of applying for asylum. At the same time, the law is designed
    to curtail the misuse of asylum regulations and to enable the more
    rapid repatriation of uncooperative refugees or those who enter the
    country without identity papers. The Government may refuse to process
    the application of an asylum seeker who cannot credibly justify not
    having identity papers. In such a case the applicant must submit an
    appeal to reactivate consideration of the application within 24 hours.
    NGO's contend that such a short time span does not constitute an
    effective remedy and therefore violates the European Convention on
    Human Rights.
        Some human rights NGO's have charged the authorities with abuses in
    connection with the implementation of a 1995 amendment to the Law on
    Foreigners. The amendment is aimed at asylum seekers or foreigners who
    live illegally in the country and who are suspected of disturbing the
    public order or avoiding repatriation. In particular these groups have
    alleged instances of abuse by police, including arbitrary detention as
    well as denial of access to established asylum procedures at the
    country's two main airports. They also charge that police officers use
    the law to detain or harass asylum seekers who were not suspected of
    having disturbed public order. Under the law, police actions are
    subject to judicial oversight, and the Federal Court overturned many
    cases in which it believed that there was insufficient regard for the
    rights of asylum seekers and foreigners. While NGO's claim that the
    situation with regard to arbitrary detention has improved, they contend
    that the denial of access to asylum procedures at the two airports is
    increasing.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum. The Federal
    Office for Refugees estimated that in August the total number of asylum
    applicants and temporary residents living in the country was 143,000.
    (This included recognized refugees, persons granted temporary asylum,
    as well as those who either have a first asylum application pending,
    appealed against a rejection, or were currently awaiting repatriation.)
    A year earlier, in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the figure stood at
    182,000. Some 11,000 new applications for asylum were submitted by the
    end of August, 72 percent less than during the same period last year.
    Refugees whose applications are rejected are allowed to stay
    temporarily, if their home country is experiencing war or insurrection.
    The Government denies having forced persons to return to countries
    where they have a well-founded fear of persecution and insists that
    each case is examined carefully. However, NGO's including the well-
    known Eyes Open organization have accused the Government of sometimes
    expelling rejected asylum seekers even though conditions in their
    native country remain unfavorable.
        In December the independent commission of experts under Professor
    Bergier published a supplement to its 1999 report. The commission found
    that the Government systematically expelled Roma (Gypsies) or turned
    them away at the border during much of the 20th century, including
    during World War II. Thus Switzerland refused asylum to Roma who faced
    persecution in Nazi-occupied territory. The commission report does not
    indicate the number of rejected applicants. In response to the Bergier
    report, the Government expressed to the Roma communities its deep
    regret over its policy prior to, during, and after World War II. In its
    statement the Government mentioned the foundation of ``A Future for
    Swiss Itinerants,'' a fund that it established in 1997 and endowed with
    $600,000 (1 million Swiss francs) to improve living conditions for
    Roma.
        In the same statement, the Government referred to its earlier
    statement following issuance of the Bergier commission report in
    December 1999, in which the Government apologized for its asylum policy
    during World War II, when thousands of Jewish refugees were refused
    entry to the country (see Section 5).
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully (at local, cantonal, and federal levels), and
    citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and
    fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. In addition
    initiative and referendum procedures provide unusually intense popular
    involvement in the legislative process. In April 1999 voters approved a
    new Constitution.
        Women remain underrepresented in government and politics. They were
    disenfranchised until 1971 at the federal level, but since then their
    participation in politics has continued to expand. In 1999 Ruth
    Dreifuss served as the first female President. Women occupy 55 of the
    246 seats in the Parliament, 2 of 7 seats in the Federal Council
    (Cabinet), roughly one-fourth of the seats in the cantonal government
    executive bodies, and one-fifth of the seats in the communal
    executives. In 1999 the electorate overwhelmingly rejected a popular
    initiative to mandate equal gender representation in all federal
    institutions by a ratio of four to one.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A large number of international and domestic human rights groups
    operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
    their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
    cooperative and generally responsive to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of
    race, sex, religion, language, or social status. The Government
    generally enforces these prohibitions effectively, although some laws
    tend to discriminate against women. The new Constitution includes
    provisions for equal rights for the disabled and for minorities.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to a 1997
    government-funded study on domestic violence, one-fifth of all women
    suffer at least once in their lifetimes from physical or sexual
    violence, and about 40 percent suffer from psychological or verbal
    abuse. Another 1998 study estimates that over 100,000 cases of domestic
    violence occur each year.
        The law prohibits wife beating and similar offenses. Spousal rape
    is a crime in the Penal Code. Victims of domestic violence can obtain
    help, counseling, and legal assistance from specialized agencies or
    from nearly a dozen hot lines sponsored privately or by local,
    cantonal, and national authorities. Police have specially trained units
    to deal with violence against women, and victims legally are entitled
    to be heard exclusively by female police officers and judges. A total
    of 732 women and 722 children took refuge in 14 women's shelters across
    the country during 1999. Those in charge of the shelters estimate that
    nearly as many were denied access due to a lack of space and limited
    funding.
        The difficulty in gathering information about the number of
    prosecuted, convicted, or punished spouse abusers stems in part from
    the fact that legal cases are handled by each canton and data are often
    not up-to-date. According to 1998 police criminal statistics, 314 men
    were investigated for rape offenses, and 84 were sentenced.
        The Federation of Women's Organizations and numerous other women's
    NGO's have heightened public awareness of the problem of violence
    against women. In 1998 two government-supported women's organizations
    that fight for equal gender rights jointly conducted the first national
    campaign against violence in relationships. This campaign received
    extensive media coverage.
        Prostitution is legal; however, working by foreigners without a
    valid permit is illegal. The Penal Code criminalizes sexual
    exploitation and trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women is
    a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Although the new Constitution prohibits all types of
    discrimination, and a 1981 amendment provides for equal rights, equal
    treatment, and equivalent wages for men and women, some laws still tend
    to discriminate against women. A 1988 federal marriage law provides
    that in the event of a divorce, assets accumulated during the marriage
    will be divided equally. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
    primary wage earner must be left with sufficient income to remain above
    the poverty level. Since the man is the primary wage earner in most
    marriages, when the income is too low to support both parties, it is
    usually the wife (and children) who are forced to survive on public
    assistance. Statistics from 1999 show that nearly 70 percent of women
    who did not work outside the home while married fell below the poverty
    line immediately after a divorce. Although mandated by a constitutional
    amendment in 1945, no federal law on maternity insurance exists.
        Immigrant women married to a Swiss husband (or immigrants with
    long-term residence permits), who have lived in Switzerland for less
    than 3 to 5 years from date of marriage (length depends on country of
    origin, education, and income level), cannot divorce their husbands
    without the risk of having to leave the country. Their purpose for
    being in Switzerland officially is registered as ``stay with spouse''
    until they receive their own long-term residency permits, and they are
    in danger of losing permission to remain if they divorce. NGO's argue
    that this prevents women with problems from being able to seek help--or
    leave their husbands--without serious consequences.
        A 1996 law includes a general prohibition on gender-based
    discrimination and incorporates the principle of ``equal wages for
    equal work.'' The law also includes provisions aimed at eliminating
    sexual harassment and facilitating access to legal remedies for those
    who claim discrimination or harassment.
        The Federal Office for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women and
    the Federal Commission on Women work to eliminate all forms of direct
    and indirect discrimination. In 1999 a federal level interdepartmental
    working group issued an action plan that outlined strategic goals and
    measures to improve the situation of women. These include measures in
    the areas of education, health, violence against women, the workplace,
    human rights, the media, and the environment. For example, the plan
    calls for financial support for child care facilities at colleges and
    universities to enable a larger number of women to obtain a higher
    education; continued education and support for specialists in the area
    of addiction prevention for women; and ongoing analysis and data
    collection on the issue of wage differences between men and women. The
    working group that issued the plan in 1999 is scheduled to reconvene in
    January 2001 to draft a report to Parliament due in 2002 on federal
    implementation of the action plan.
        On average women earn 20 to 30 percent less than men. A June study
    found that discriminatory behavior by employers accounts for 60 percent
    of the overall wage gap between men and women. Women also are promoted
    less often than men. Individual cases of denial of equal pay for equal
    work are subject to the 1996 law. In 1998, the most recent year for
    which data are available, 26.3 percent of women between the ages of 15
    and 61 were not in the work force; of those in the work force 50.5
    percent worked full time. Women hold 83 percent of all part-time jobs.
        The issue of pre-1970's forced sterilization of some women
    resurfaced in the media this year, when the Swiss Academy for Medical
    Science decided to review its guidelines for the practice (see Section
    1.f.).
        The law prohibits women from working during the 8 weeks after the
    birth of a child. Further measures also protect pregnant and breast-
    feeding women. For example, pregnant women are not allowed to work
    night shifts during the 8 weeks prior to giving birth. The law does not
    provide for compensation; however, 72 percent of working women have
    negotiated maternity benefits with their employers. In June 1999 voters
    rejected a government proposal in a referendum for 14 weeks of paid
    maternity leave at 80 percent pay for working women. The plan would
    also have given low-income new mothers a one time premium. (The
    Parliament had passed draft legislation in December 1998 that provided
    for the maternity benefits mandated by the Constitution in 1945.) It
    was the third time that a maternity benefits scheme had been rejected
    in a popular referendum in 15 years. Hundreds demonstrated to protest
    the vote, and a new proposal appeared in the National Council in July
    2000. In alignment with the European Union, it again called for 14
    weeks of paid maternity leave and asked employers for full pay during
    the first 8 weeks as is consistent with the law prohibiting women from
    working in the first 8 weeks after birth. The new proposal leaves out
    the subsidy for nonworking mothers. The Council of States, the upper
    house of Parliament, followed the lead of the National Council in
    December, and obliged the Federal Government to work out a new
    maternity benefits scheme along the lines of the July 2000 proposal.
    Meantime, women in Geneva Canton will have paid maternity leave
    beginning in July 2001; on December 14 the cantonal parliament passed
    legislation providing for a 16-week leave following delivery at 80
    percent of salary for all women who previously worked in the canton for
    a minimum of 3 months. However, the law is still subject to federal
    approval.
        Children.--Despite the fact that the Government has no special
    program for children and that there is no special governmental office
    for children's matters, the Government demonstrates its strong
    commitment to children's rights and welfare through a well-funded
    public education system and need-based subsidies of health insurance.
    Schooling is free and compulsory for 9 years, from age 6 or 7 through
    age 16 or 17, depending on the canton. Some cantons offer a 10th school
    year. The Government subsidizes the health insurance premiums of low-
    income families.
        The federal and cantonal governments, as well as about 80 NGO's
    that defend children's rights, have devoted considerable attention in
    recent years to child abuse, especially sexual abuse. For convicted
    perpetrators of the latter, the law provides for imprisonment of up to
    15 years. In 1997 amendments to the Federal Penal Code came into effect
    that provide for an increase in the statute of limitations in cases of
    child abuse from 5 to 10 years. In severe cases of sexual abuse, the
    statute is to begin to take effect only when the victim turns 18. There
    is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        To combat child pornography on the Internet, the Federal Office for
    Police provides an Internet monitoring service on its World Wide Web
    page. Individuals who find pornographic material involving children are
    asked to contact the Federal Office via e-mail. According to the Penal
    Code, the production, possession, distribution, or showing of hard
    pornography are punishable with fines or prison sentences. Any
    pornography involving children falls into this category. In March 1999
    an NGO published the first compilation of cases of child pornography
    and prostitution in the country. The study cited 60 cases. Most of the
    victims were girls between 13 and 17 years of age.
        With respect to child abuse abroad, the law provides for
    prosecution only if the act is considered a crime in the country in
    which it took place. Experts have proposed making such acts punishable
    in Switzerland regardless of where the crime took place, but there was
    no legislative action on the problem during the year.
        Parliament's 1997 ratification of the U.N. Convention on Children's
    Rights included five reservations, the most important of which
    concerned children of migrant seasonal workers who are not permitted
    automatically to join their parents. Children of foreigners working as
    migrant laborers are only permitted to visit on tourist visas for a
    period of 3 months at a time. After 3 months, they must return to their
    homeland for 1 month. The Government reexamined the necessity for these
    reservations and included its conclusions in its first report to the
    Committee on Children's Rights in November. All five reservations still
    apply.
        In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 forbidding the
    worst forms of child labor (including child prostitution, forced labor,
    and using children for illegal activities such as drug dealing).
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination
    directed at disabled persons in employment, education, and the
    provision of other state services. Advocates for the disabled have
    called for new measures to ensure greater protection for their rights,
    including easier access to buildings and public transportation.
    However, the Government has not mandated that buildings or
    transportation facilities be made accessible. Article 8 of the new
    Constitution (in effect as of January 1) provides for equal
    opportunities for the disabled. However, it does not include provision
    for making public buildings and facilities accessible. The upper house
    of Parliament discussed this addition in June and decided that the
    requirements for equal treatment as contained in the Constitution were
    sufficient to meet the demands of the disabled.
        A 1995 law exempts disabled men from the tax imposed on those who
    have not fulfilled their military duty.
        Religious Minorities.--In response to the issue of Holocaust era
    assets, the Government and private sector initiated a series of
    measures designed to shed light on the past, provide assistance to
    Holocaust victims, and address claims to dormant accounts in Swiss
    banks. The independent commission of experts under Professor Jean-
    Francois Bergier, charged with examining the country's wartime history
    and role as a financial center, issued its report in December 1999 and
    found that there were more than 24,000 documented rejections of asylum
    seekers during the World War II period, including a large number of
    Jewish refugees who were refused asylum even after authorities were
    aware of the dangers that they faced from the Nazis.
        The Federal Council issued a statement that repeated its previous
    apology for policy errors made during World War II and stated that its
    asylum policy ``was marred by errors, omissions, and compromises.''
    Also in December 1999, the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons
    under Paul Volcker released its report on ``dormant accounts of victims
    of Nazi persecution in Swiss banks.'' The report represents the
    culmination of a 3-year investigation into the fate of victims'
    accounts. The Volcker report recommended that the Swiss Federal Banking
    Commission publish about 26,000 account holders' names, based on their
    probable or possible identity as Holocaust victims. The report also
    made recommendations on the means of resolving claims by victims of
    Nazi persecution or their heirs and the appropriate treatment of
    dormant accounts in the future.
        The Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims received
    approximately $190 million (323 million Swiss francs) in contributions
    from the private sector and the Swiss National Bank. By September the
    fund had allocated but not yet fully paid out an initial contribution
    to holocaust survivors in Israel, Australia, Germany, Latin America,
    and Eastern Europe. In total some 310,000 persons, 88 percent of them
    Jewish, are expected to benefit from the fund. On March 31, 1999, the
    Government's World War II task force became the Switzerland-World War
    II Office, which remains engaged in supporting progress on resolving
    Holocaust assets issues. A $1.25 billion (2.12 billion Swiss francs)
    settlement of the class action lawsuit filed in the United States
    district court in Brooklyn, New York, against Swiss banks was announced
    in August 1998, completed in January 1999, and formally approved by the
    New York judge on July 26, 2000.
        A provisional plan of allocation and distribution was announced on
    September 11. The plan earmarks up to $800 million (1.36 billion Swiss
    francs) to cover outstanding claims against Swiss banks; the remaining
    sum is to be paid out to World War II forced laborers as well as
    refugees who were denied entry to or were harmed while detained in
    Switzerland. To be included in the settlement and thus avoid further
    class action suits, 37 Swiss industrial firms notified the New York
    court that their subsidiaries employed forced labor during World War
    II.
        The Swiss National Bank released a report in 1999 that stated that
    its officials ignored warnings that they were buying looted Nazi gold.
    The bank has contributed approximately $70 million (110 million Swiss
    francs) to the Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims.
        Two Swiss life insurers, both explicitly excluded from the $1.25
    billion settlement, participate in the ongoing efforts by the
    International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims to establish
    a formula and just sum for compensating Holocaust victims or their
    families for policies they held. Both companies agreed to resolve
    outstanding claims of unpaid insurance policies submitted within a
    period of 2 years, starting in February and ending in 2002. The Federal
    Council is seeking legislation to establish a solidarity fund, which
    would assist victims of human rights violations, including those who
    suffered in the Holocaust. In May the Federal Council endorsed and
    returned to Parliament revised legislation concerning a Swiss
    Solidarity Foundation. Under the modified act, the foundation would
    dispose of the proceeds from the management of 500 tons of central bank
    gold reserves recently declared ``excess.'' The Solidarity Foundation
    act has yet to be approved by Parliament. The alternative use of the
    extra gold reserves will be subject to a mandatory referendum.
        In the context of the discussions over Nazi gold and Holocaust era
    assets, anti-Semitic slurs reportedly still remain a problem.
    Government officials, including the President, have spoken frequently
    and publicly against anti-Semitism. From 1995 when an antiracism law
    was enacted until the end of 1998, some 300 court cases were brought
    for violations of the law. Roughly half of them resulted in convictions
    by a court of first instance, but in many cases appeals are pending.
        According to the Government, 104 cases of violation of the Anti-
    Racism Act were brought before the courts between 1995 (when the law
    was enacted) and the end of 1999. A total of 45 resulted in convictions
    (for anti-Semitism, revisionism, and racist oral or written slurs).
    Sentences for convictions included a 15-month prison sentence and a
    fine of $12,000 (20,000 Swiss francs) for the Holocaust denier Jurgen
    Graf. The human rights group Eyes Open was among the NGO's that
    expressed concern over the continued existence of anti-Semitic
    sentiment.
        In November 1998, the Federal Commission against Racism released a
    report on anti-Semitism in the country, which expressed concern that
    the recent controversy over the country's role during World War II had
    to some extent opened the door to expressions of latent anti-Semitism.
    At the same time, the Commission described the emergence of strong
    public opposition to anti-Semitism and credited the Federal Council
    with taking a ``decisive stand'' against anti-Semitism. The Commission
    also proposed various public and private measures to combat anti-
    Semitism and encourage greater tolerance and understanding. In its
    initial response to the report, the Federal Council pledged to
    facilitate implementation of the Commission's recommendations.
        In December 1999, the Federal Council announced the creation of a
    Center for Tolerance in Bern. Planning under the chairmanship of a
    former parliamentarian is continuing, and financing will come from the
    public and private sectors. The center plans to produce exhibits
    designed to teach historical lessons, offer academic research
    opportunities, and host international symposia. A survey published in
    March showed that 16 percent of Swiss hold anti-Semitic notions. Among
    supporters of the rightwing Swiss People's Party the figure was 33
    percent. The study also found that the recent controversy over Swiss
    World War II behavior affected survey results, particularly among the
    older generation. Conversely, 92 percent of young persons polled
    harbored no anti-Semitic sentiments. The survey reflected
    inconsistencies. During the recent period of controversy over the Swiss
    World War II record, public opinion actually strengthened in support of
    antiracism laws. The case of a national councilor who made anti-Semitic
    remarks, but could not be prosecuted because Parliament refused to lift
    his immunity, led to an abortive attempt to restrict parliamentary
    immunity (see Section 2.a.).
        The Federal Court decided on June 7 to uphold a cantonal decision
    granting Scientologists the right to distribute leaflets in public
    areas. However, the court also affirmed that Scientology leaflets serve
    a ``commercial enterprise'' and that distributors must obtain a permit
    to use public areas for their dissemination. The court ruled that
    Scientology does not act as a religious organization in such cases.
    Scientologists previously distributed flyers without the necessary
    permits, protected by the Religious Freedom Act. Several cantons are
    likely to use the precedence of the Federal Court's decision to
    regulate the distribution of leaflets (see Section 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to NGO statistics,
    there were 56 reported incidents directed against foreigners or
    minorities in the first 6 months of the year, compared with 62 for the
    first half of 1999. These figures include instances of verbal and
    written ``attacks,'' which are much more common than physical assaults.
    Investigations of these attacks are conducted effectively and lead, in
    most cases, to the arrest of the persons responsible. Persons convicted
    of racist crimes commonly are sentenced to from 3 days' to 3 years'
    imprisonment with a fine of up to approximately $27,000 (40,000 Swiss
    francs).
        On March 12 the voters of Emmen, a small township in Canton Lucern,
    voted on local foreign residents' applications for citizenship. The
    voters rejected 48 applicants, almost all exclusively from southeast
    Europe, while approving 8 Italians' citizenship bids. Fearing the vote
    was a violation of the European Human Rights Convention, the Swiss
    Federal Council determined to look into the practice. The Emmen vote
    caused a national uproar and prompted several motions in Parliament. In
    response the Federal Council referred the issue to a working group set
    up in 1999, which examines the Government's naturalization practice.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners,
    have the freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice,
    and to select their own representatives. The Government does not hamper
    the exercise of these rights. About one-quarter of the work force is
    unionized.
        The right to strike is recognized legally and exercised freely, but
    a unique labor peace under an informal agreement between unions and
    employers--in existence since the 1930's--has meant fewer than 10
    strikes per year since 1975. The new Constitution provides specific
    protection for the right to strike. In a Basel laundry workers went on
    an almost unprecedented 5-day strike after management of the former
    state enterprise asked some workers to accept a ``industry standard''
    wage of about $1,700 monthly (3,000 Swiss francs). The strike ended on
    December 4 after a tense scuffle between police and pickets and
    protracted negotiations between the two sides and Basel city officials.
    Management agreed to small wage gains and a cost-of-living adjustment
    mechanism that will increase wages gradually to about $2,000 (3,500
    Swiss francs). In the absence of a minimum wage law, labor leaders see
    the worker gains in this first major strike in a decade as a signal for
    revived recruiting and broader public opinion support for the labor
    movement's minimum wage campaign.
        A 1927 law bans public servants, as well as workers in state-owned
    bodies such as the postal service, from striking. However, in November
    voters approved a referendum on a new law concerning employees of the
    Federal Government that generally recognizes the right to strike. Only
    for reasons of national security, safeguarding national foreign policy
    interests, or providing the population with essential goods and
    services may the Government curtail or suspend the right to strike for
    certain categories of government employees. The new law will enter into
    force in steps for different categories of employees between January
    2001 and 2002.
        Unions are independent of the Government and political parties, and
    laws prohibit retribution against strikers or their leaders.
        Unions can associate freely with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--By law workers
    have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the law
    protects them from acts of antiunion discrimination. The Government
    fully respects these provisions. Periodic negotiations between employer
    and worker organizations determine wages and settle other labor issues
    at the local, or infrequently, at the industry sector level. Nonunion
    firms generally adopt the terms and conditions fixed in the unions'
    collective bargaining.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there is no
    specific constitutional or statutory ban on forced or compulsory labor
    in general, and on child labor in particular, such practices generally
    are not known to occur; however, trafficking in women for forced
    prostitution increased (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment of children is 15
    years, and children are in school until this age. Children over 13
    years of age may be employed in light duties for not more than 9 hours
    per week during the school year and 15 hours otherwise. The employment
    of youths between the ages of 15 and 20 is regulated strictly; they
    cannot work at night, on Sundays, or in hazardous or dangerous
    conditions. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs effectively
    enforces the law on working conditions.
        The Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
    labor by children, although such prohibitions are included implicitly
    in the Labor Act. Such forms of labor are not believed to occur (see
    Section 6.c.). In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182
    forbidding the worst forms of child labor (including child
    prostitution, forced labor, and using children for illegal activities
    such as drug dealing).
        Government officials inspect companies that employ children after
    having received complaints. Every year a few employers are fined or
    receive conditional imprisonment for violations of the law.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage. The lowest wages fixed in collective bargaining are generally
    adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. However, the Swiss Association of Trade Unions in a 1999 study
    found that 60,000 full-time workers (or 3.4 percent) fall below the
    poverty line, defined as earning less than approximately $15,500
    (22,900 Swiss francs), which is half of the median wage.
        The 1964 Labor Act established a maximum 45-hour workweek for blue-
    and white-collar workers in industry, services, and retail trades, and
    a 50-hour workweek for all other workers. The law prescribes a rest
    period of 35 consecutive hours plus an additional half day per week.
    New labor legislation, which came into force on August 1, limits annual
    overtime to 170 hours for those working 45 hours per week and to 140
    hours for those working 50 hours per week.
        The law protects legal and illegal foreign workers. However,
    illegal foreign workers are not covered by mandatory health insurance
    in case of illness or accident. Wage discrimination against foreign
    workers is not permitted.
        The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain extensive
    regulations to protect worker health and safety. There have been no
    reports of lapses in the enforcement of these regulations, but the
    degree to which enforcement is effective is unclear. A 1998 law is
    designed to increase flexibility in the workplace and remove
    restrictions on women working at night. A worker may leave a dangerous
    assignment without penalty.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code criminalizes sexual
    exploitation and trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons can
    result in prison sentence of up to 5 years; coercing someone into
    prostitution or restricting a prostitute's personal freedom can carry a
    sentence of up to 10 years in prison. According to a 1999 official
    report, the police are concerned about the growing number of foreign
    women subject to abuse in sex trafficking rings. In the past, victims
    came from Thailand, parts of Africa, or South America; recently an
    increasing number of women come from Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and
    other states of the former Soviet Union. Many victims are forced to
    work in salons or clubs to pay for the cost of their travel and forged
    documents and find themselves in a state of dependency. Traffickers
    sometimes seize victims' passports. Generally the victims do not read,
    write, or speak the country's languages, and are afraid to seek help
    from the authorities.
        Since 1905 the Government has had an office to combat the
    trafficking of girls for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.
    Over the years this office has evolved to include all forms of
    trafficking in persons. The office has existed in its present form
    since 1998 as part of the criminal intelligence unit of the Federal
    Department of Police. In 1998 the Government institutionalized an
    exchange of information on trafficking in persons with NGO's. The
    Department of Foreign Affairs helps fund programs intended to combat
    trafficking from Eastern Europe.
        Because the investigation, enforcement, and prosecution of
    individual trafficking and related cases is the responsibility of the
    cantonal police authorities, the federal human trafficking office also
    supports the cantonal prosecution authorities with information
    concerning trafficking abroad. In major cases the federal government
    establishes contacts with foreign government authorities.
        In March Neuchatel cantonal police announced the arrests of four
    persons, including two African women married to Swiss nationals, on
    trafficking-related charges. The arrests followed an investigation
    initiated when the Swiss consulate in Yaounde became suspicious about
    unusually large numbers of Cameroonian women travelling to Switzerland.
    The consulate informed the federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which
    alerted cantonal police authorities. After an investigation spanning
    several months, the police were able to uncover the organization and
    obtain valuable information on how the ring operated.
        Shortly after the arrests, a Zurich-based NGO submitted a petition
    to the Cabinet and both houses of Parliament that called urgently for
    the establishment of a protection program for trafficking victims. The
    petition was signed by 7,500 individuals, organizations, and
    parliamentarians. Their program would end the automatic expulsion of
    women arrested for illegal prostitution and legalize their stay for the
    duration of investigations and trials. Currently, most women are
    expelled within 96 hours. It would also provide shelter, protection
    from intimidation, counseling centers, and sensitivity training for
    police. The petition also calls for a change in the legal definition of
    trafficking to include not only women forced into prostitution but also
    women whose migration to Switzerland for marriage or domestic work puts
    them in a state of dependency. Parallel to the submission of the
    petition, a parliamentary initiative was launched calling for similar
    measures. The Federal Council (Cabinet) instructed an interdepartmental
    working group to assess the situation and to determine whether a
    revision of the relevant legal articles would be a useful step.
        In order to confront modern forms of trafficking in women,
    especially via the Internet, the federal police have increased the
    number of their agents. In 1997 4 persons were convicted of trafficking
    in women and 13 were convicted of sexual exploitation; and in 1997-98
    police uncovered a large Thai trafficking organization. Its leader was
    arrested, tried, and convicted. He later committed suicide in prison.
        Prostitution is legal; however, it is illegal for foreigners to
    work without a valid work permit. Official police figures estimate that
    approximately 7,050 women work as prostitutes, both legally and
    illegally, mostly in the major Swiss cantons. In March 1999 the
    Government introduced new visa requirements for applicants from four
    South American countries--Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The
    Office for Equality between Men and Women has a program to educate visa
    applicants in their native countries about the methods used by
    traffickers and the dangers of falling victim to them.
                                   __________

                                   TAJIKISTAN

        Tajikistan is ruled by an authoritarian regime that has established
    some nominally democratic institutions. President Emomali Rahmonov and
    an inner circle of fellow natives of the Kulyab region continued to
    dominate the Government; however, Rahmonov's narrow base of support
    limited his control of the entire territory of the country. Rahmonov
    won reelection in a November 1999 election that was flawed seriously
    and was neither free nor fair. As a result of 1997 peace accords that
    ended the civil war, some former opposition figures continue to hold
    seats in the Government. Rahmonov's supporters overwhelmingly won
    February parliamentary elections that were neither free nor fair, but
    were notable for the fact that several opposition parties were allowed
    to participate, and that one opposition party won two seats in
    Parliament. Although the Constitution was adopted in 1994 and amended
    in September 1999, political decisionmaking normally takes the form of
    power plays among the various factions, formerly aligned with the other
    side during the civil war, that now make up the Government. The legacy
    of civil war continued to affect the Government, which still faced the
    problems of demobilizing and reintegrating former opposition troops and
    maintaining law and order while rival armed factions competed for
    power. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
    it is not independent in practice.
        The Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share
    responsibility for internal security, although the Government actually
    relies on a handful of commanders who use their forces almost as
    private armies. Some regions of the country remained effectively
    outside the Government's control, and government control in other areas
    existed only by day, or at the sufferance of local former opposition
    commanders. The soldiers of some of these commanders are involved in
    crime and corruption. The Russian Army's 201st Motorized Rifle
    Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
    peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained in the country and
    continued to have a major influence on political developments; however,
    the division began to transition into a new status on a permanent
    military base after the peacekeeping mandate ended in September. Some
    members of the government security forces and government-aligned
    militias committed serious human rights abuses.
        The economy is a state-controlled system making a difficult
    transition to a market-based one. Most of the work force is engaged in
    agriculture, part of which remains collectivized. Government revenue
    depends highly on state-controlled cotton production. The small
    industrial sector is dominated by aluminum production (another critical
    source of government revenue), although most Soviet-era factories
    operate at a minimal level, if at all. Small-scale privatization is
    over 80 percent complete, but the level of medium to large scale
    privatization is much lower (approximately 16 percent) with the heavy
    industry, wholesale trade, and transport sectors remaining largely
    under state control. Many, but not all, wages and pensions are paid.
    The country is poor, with a per capita gross national product of
    approximately $290, according to World Bank data. The failure of the
    Soviet economic system has been accompanied by a rise in narcotics
    trafficking and other forms of corruption. This development has led to
    clear disparities of income between the vast majority of the population
    and a small number of former progovernment and opposition warlords, who
    control many of the legal and most of the criminal sectors of the
    economy.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor and the
    Government continued to commit serious abuses. The February
    parliamentary elections represented an improvement in the citizens'
    right to change their Government; however, this right remains
    restricted. Some members of the security forces committed extrajudicial
    killings. There were a number of disappearances. Security forces
    frequently tortured, beat, and abused detainees. These forces also were
    responsible for threats, extortion, looting, and abuse of civilians.
    Certain battalions of nominally government forces operated quasi-
    independently under their leaders. Impunity remains a problem, and the
    Government prosecuted few of the persons who committed these abuses.
    Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. The Government
    continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention and also arrested
    persons for political reasons. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a
    problem. Basic problems of rule of law persist. There are often long
    delays before trials, and the judiciary is subject to political and
    paramilitary pressure. The authorities infringed on citizens' right to
    privacy.
        The Government continued to restrict severely freedom of speech and
    the press and essentially controls the electronic media. The Government
    severely restricted opposition access to state-run radio and
    television; however, an opposition newspaper begun in 1998 continued to
    publish, and a number of small television stations were operated by
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Journalists practice self-
    censorship. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
    association by exercising strict control over political organizations;
    it banned three opposition parties and prevented another from being
    registered. A number of parliamentary candidates were prevented from
    registering for the elections. There are some restrictions on freedom
    of religion and on freedom of movement. The Government still has not
    established a human rights ombudsman position, despite a 1996 pledge to
    do so. Violence and against women is a problem, as is discrimination of
    the disabled and religious and ethnic minorities. Child labor is a
    problem. There were some instances of forced labor, including children.
    Trafficking in women is a problem.
        Some former opposition troops committed serious abuses, including
    killings and abductions. There were credible reports that paramilitary
    units threatened, extorted, and abused the civilian population.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Some members of the
    security forces committed extrajudicial killings; however, it was
    difficult to estimate the total number of such killings or to attribute
    responsibility in many cases. Some killings were committed by competing
    government factions for both political and economic motives.
        Harsh prison conditions and lack of food and adequate medical
    treatment resulted in a significant number of deaths of prisoners while
    in custody (see Section 1.c.). There were reports that a member of the
    banned Hizb ut-Tahrir movement died in police custody after being
    arrested (see section 2.c.).
        A number of local officials, businessmen, and professional figures
    were killed during the year, for a variety of political, economic, and
    ethnic reasons. A former Deputy Minister of Security and parliamentary
    candidate, Shamsullo Tobirov, was killed in an attack apparently aimed
    at the mayor of Dushanbe in February. Sirojiddin ``Sergei'' Davlatov,
    chairman of the Gharm district and a former deputy opposition field
    commander, was killed in May. The chairman of the State Radio and
    Television Committee, Saif Rahimov (Rahimzoda) also was killed in May.
    A correspondent for the Khovar state information agency, Aleksandr
    Olpatov, was killed in September. In addition, a number of high-ranking
    figures associated with various competing paramilitary factions were
    killed. For example, the brother of Mullo Abdullo, a former opposition
    field commander in the Karategin Valley, reportedly was killed in
    retaliation for the killing of Davlatov. In most cases, suspects were
    not identified. The competence of the investigators and their
    independence from official interference was questioned. A number of
    apparent murders essentially were concealed, with official news noting
    only that the individual died.
        Both the Government and the opposition used landmines during the
    civil war. Some unmarked mine fields in the Karetegin Valley probably
    killed innocent civilians. According to press reports, a total of 21
    persons were killed during the year by landmines laid along the
    northern segment of the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan border, which winds
    throughout populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most
    places. The Government of Uzbekistan apparently laid the mines as part
    of a counterinsurgency campaign. Some killings were committed by former
    opposition forces and others by independent warlords answering to
    neither the Government nor the former opposition forces. The Government
    also has laid numerous minefields along the border with Afghanistan.
        A landmine brought on board a public bus on the outskirts of
    Dushanbe killed at least five passengers in February; the person who
    carried the mine aboard the bus was among those killed. It was not
    clear whether the mine detonated inside the bus by plan or by accident,
    and there were no developments in identifying the individual or group
    responsible for the incident.
        Terrorists bombed a Protestant church in Dushanbe in October,
    killing seven persons and injuring many more (see Section 1.c. and 5).
        There were reports of instances where Tajik border guards were
    killed on the Afghanistan border. It is unclear whether these cases
    were politically motivated or the result of narcotics trafficking.
        There were no developments in the 1999 murder case of British
    national Abdullah Mugharebi, a resident of Dushanbe and leader of
    Tajikistan's Baha'i community, who was widely believed to have been
    killed by Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalists. There were no
    developments in the 1997 killings of several Russian servicemen, or in
    the 1996 murder of the mufti of Tajikistan.
        There were no developments in the 1999 killings of Tolib Bobev, an
    official of the Popular Unity Party, or Jumakhona Khotami, Ministry of
    Interior press center chief.
        b. Disappearance.--There were a number of disappearances during the
    year; in at least one case security forces apparently were responsible.
    The driver and bodyguard of First Deputy Prime Minster Akbar
    Turajonzoda disappeared briefly in October and appeared in police
    custody. The taking of hostages for revenge or for bargaining purposes
    remained a common occurrence.
        Political pressures, the central Government's lack of control over
    violently competitive factions within and outside the Government, and a
    lack of professional resources hamper police efforts to investigate
    disappearances.
        The sister of Deputy Prime Minister Nigina Sharapovna disappeared
    in February; she later reappeared after ransom apparently was paid. The
    ethnic Uzbek mayor of a town in Khatlon District disappeared in
    September under mysterious circumstances.
        There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Zafar
    Rahmonov, the opposition cochairman of the Joint Commission on Cease-
    fire Observation.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, the Government uses it
    in practice. Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of
    Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody and use systematic
    beatings to extort confessions. In contrast to the previous year,
    however, there were no public allegations that security forces
    mistreated or beat members of opposition parties or their relatives.
    Impunity remains a serious problem, and the Government has prosecuted
    few of the persons who committed these abuses.
        The Government has acknowledged that the security forces were
    corrupted by criminal elements, and that most citizens chose to keep
    silent in the face of official mistreatment rather than risk
    retaliation by the police. In the southern regions of the country, many
    border guards are involved in the drug trade, and the local population
    has made numerous complaints of harassment and human rights abuses
    committed by them.
        Members of Tajikistan's Afghan refugee population, sometimes
    regardless of social status or official connections, are singled out
    for mistreatment by law enforcement authorities. For example, a
    prominent Afghan refugee (a former official of the overthrown Communist
    regime in Afghanistan) credibly claimed that Ministry of Interior
    officers apprehended and beat him, apparently in retaliation for
    previous claims of abuse that were reported publicly abroad (see
    Section 2.d.).
        Journalists regularly risked beatings at the hand of law
    enforcement authorities (or at least armed individuals dressed as and
    claiming to be law enforcement authorities) (see Section 2.a.). For
    example, the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations reported that
    militiamen seized a reporter for the state-owned newspaper Jumhuriyat
    in Dushanbe in August, forced him into a car, beat him en route to a
    militia station, where they beat him so badly that he suffered a
    concussion and hearing loss in one ear.
        There were a number of shootings, bombings, and terrorist attacks
    that resulted in nonlethal injuries and serious property damage. The
    February bombing of a Dushanbe city bus left scores of passengers
    injured (see Section 1.a.). Also in February, the mayor of Dushanbe,
    Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, along with his driver and bodyguard, was
    injured seriously in a failed attempt on his life by terrorists;
    another passenger in the mayor's official vehicle was killed (see
    Section 1.a.). On February 25, 2 days before parliamentary elections, a
    bomb explosion in a parliamentary candidate's office in the town of
    Hissar caused three injuries. Following these events, the central
    Government cracked down on rogue paramilitary groups. This brought a
    greater sense of security to the capital city of Dushanbe. However,
    despite this effort, a Protestant church in Dushanbe was bombed in
    October, leaving approximately 70 persons injured, almost half of them
    seriously (see Section 1.a and 2.c.). The official vehicle of
    Democratic Party leader and presidential cabinet member Mahmadruzi
    Iskandarov was destroyed by a bomb in October; there were no injuries.
    An official vehicle of the European Commission Humanitarian Office was
    destroyed by a bomb in July; there were no injuries.
        According to credible counternarcotics law enforcement authorities
    in the central Government, Tajik and Afghan criminal groups engaged in
    narcotics smuggling across the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border
    threatened, harassed, and committed abuses against the border area
    populations.
        Prison conditions remain harsh and lifethreatening. They fail to
    meet minimum international standards. Prisons generally are
    overcrowded, unsanitary, and disease-ridden, producing a serious health
    threat. This problem reflects in part the self-funded status of most
    prisons, under which before 1992 prisoners grew much of their own food
    or made goods for sale. The general collapse of governmental programs
    and of the economy also meant the virtual disappearance of these
    programs. Some food production has resumed, but is still inadequate.
    Some prisoners die of hunger. Family members are allowed access to
    prisoners only after a guilty verdict, in accordance with the law.
        There was no official action against government forces responsible
    for the deaths of 26 prisoners when they retook Khojand prison in 1997
    after a prison revolt. Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, the brother of a
    political opponent of the President, was arrested in May 1997 on
    narcotics charges that appear fabricated and was sentenced to death in
    1998. Despite appeals for clemency based on a diagnosis of terminal
    cancer, Abdullojonov remained in prison and claimed to have been denied
    proper medical treatment. Government sources say that he was executed
    early in 1999, although other sources maintain that he simply died of
    cancer in prison.
        The Government does permit some prison visits by international
    human rights monitors, including an OSCE visit during the year, in
    which the OSCE found the conditions to be very poor. The Government
    invariably has denied requests by the International Committee of the
    Red Cross (ICRC) to make prison visits in a manner consistent with the
    ICRC's standard modalities.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
    to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The Criminal Code has not
    been amended significantly since independence, and it therefore retains
    many of the defects inherited from Soviet times. The Government claims
    that revision of the Criminal Code is a high priority, but due to the
    size and complexity of the code, the small parliamentary staff, and
    limited time in session for the Oli Majilis (Parliament) progress has
    been slow. There is no projected completion date, and there has been no
    indication of progress toward a comprehensive revision of the Criminal
    Code. Minor modifications to the code in 1999 increased punishment for
    crimes such as rape, theft, and illegal drug use. The system allows for
    lengthy pretrial detention and provides few checks on the power of
    procurators and police to arrest persons. Public order, which broke
    down during the civil war, has yet to be restored fully, and the
    virtual immunity from prosecution of armed militia groups has eroded
    further the integrity of the legal system.
        Police legally may detain persons without a warrant for a period of
    72 hours, and the procurator's office may do so for a period of 10 days
    after which the accused must be officially charged. At that point, the
    Criminal Code permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months. The first
    3 months of detention are at the discretion of the local procurator,
    the second 3 months must be approved at the regional level, and the
    Procurator General must sanction the remaining time in detention. The
    Criminal Code specifies that all investigations must be completed 1
    month before the 15-month maximum in order to allow time for the
    defense to examine government evidence. There is no requirement for
    judicial approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge
    or detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and
    restricted to their place of residence pending trial. Once a case is
    entered for trial, the law states that it must be brought before a
    judge within 28 days. However, it is common for cases to be delayed for
    many months before trial begins. There is no provision for bail, and
    lengthy pretrial detention is a problem.
        The Government made politically motivated arrests, and there are
    credible allegations of cases of illegal government detention of
    members of rival political factions. For example, the bodyguard and the
    former driver of First Deputy Prime Minister Akbar Turajonzoda were
    detained in October, apparently as part of a campaign of intimidation
    by other elements of the Government against Turajonzoda. In most cases,
    the security officers, principally personnel from the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Security, do not obtain arrest
    warrants and do not bring charges. Those released sometimes claimed
    that they were mistreated and beaten during detention (also see Section
    1.c.).
        The number of political detainees was not clear. Since the law
    precludes visits to persons in pretrial detention, and the Government
    denies the ICRC or other observers access to these persons, any
    estimate is uncertain.
        Human Rights Watch reported that by December 1999, the Government
    had granted amnesty to approximately 5,000 United Tajik Opposition
    (UTO) fighters. There were reports of several UTO fighters in the
    Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast being arrested by local authorities
    despite this amnesty. The families of these fighters have appealed, and
    the leader of the Lal-I Badakhshan movement is pursuing their case.
        Border Force units routinely take family members of deserters
    hostage and hold them until the deserters return to duty (see Section
    1.e.).
        The Constitution states that no one can be exiled without a legal
    basis; no laws have been passed so far setting out any legal basis for
    exile. There were no reports of forced exile, although, some opponents
    of the Government are in self-imposed exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1994 Constitution states that
    judges are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution and the
    law and prohibits interference in their activities; however, in
    practice the political leadership and, in many instances, armed
    paramilitary groups directly influence judicial officials at all
    levels. Under the Constitution, the President has the right, with
    confirmation by the Parliament, both to appoint and to dismiss judges
    and prosecutors. Judges at the local, regional, and national level are
    for the most part poorly trained and lack understanding of the concept
    of an independent judiciary. The Government made some progress in this
    respect by instituting regular examinations to screen unqualified
    candidates for judgeships. Bribery of prosecutors and judges appears to
    be a common practice.
        The court system, largely unmodified from the Soviet period,
    includes city, district, regional, and national levels, with a parallel
    military court system. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for the
    lower ones. The Constitution establishes additional courts, including
    the Constitutional Court, which began to function in 1997.
        According to the law, trials are public, except in cases involving
    national security or the protection of minors. The court appoints an
    attorney for those who do not have one. Defendants may choose their own
    attorney but may not necessarily choose among court-appointed
    defenders. In practice arrested persons often are denied prompt, and in
    some cases any, access to an attorney.
        The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all
    investigations of alleged criminal conduct. According to the law, both
    defendant and counsel have the right to review all government evidence,
    to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and testimony. No groups
    are barred from testifying, and all testimony theoretically is given
    equal consideration, regardless of the ethnicity or gender of the
    witness. Ministry of Justice officials maintain that defendants benefit
    from the presumption of innocence, despite the unmodified Soviet legal
    statute that presumes the guilt of all persons brought to trial. In
    practice, bringing charges tends to suggest guilt.
        The obstacles to ensuring fair public trials were evident in the
    murder trial of Dilfuza Nimonova, a 21-year-old woman accused of
    murdering the man who raped her. The Organization for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Tajikistan, which observed the
    trial, reported that the evidence presented by prosecutors against the
    defendant was poor, that the defendant's lawyer was denied access to
    his client, and that the politically well-connected family of the
    victim pressured the judges hearing the case. Members of the security
    forces tortured and beat Nimonova while she was in prison. Authorities
    also forced her to undergo an abortion while in prison. Nimonova was
    sentenced to death, although the Government later commuted her sentence
    to 16 years in prison after President Rahmonov received international
    appeals to intervene in the matter.
        There was no information during the year concerning Bahrom Sodirov,
    who was charged in the February 1997 kidnaping of the Minister of
    Security, 5 United Nations personnel, and 11 others. Sodirov was
    arrested soon after the hostages were released. His trial, from which
    observers were barred, was suspended in late 1997 and has not resumed.
        In contrast with the previous year, there were no new public
    allegations that the Government holds political prisoners. The
    Government and the UTO exchanged multiple lists of prisoners of war and
    political prisoners for exchange as a result of the 1997 inter-Tajik
    talks in Moscow. By November 1999, the Government had released all UTO
    prisoners named on lists submitted by the UTO, with the exception of
    six individuals, of whom the Government claimed no knowledge. The
    families of the six individuals continued to seek their whereabouts
    without success. The Government accepted the UTO's 1998 claim that it
    released all prisoners of war that it held.
        Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, whose arrest and unfair trial in 1997 were
    politically motivated, remained a political prisoner until his
    mysterious death early in 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    home and prohibits interference with correspondence, telephone
    conversations, and postal and communication rights, except ``in cases
    prescribed by law''; however, authorities continued to infringe on
    citizens' right to privacy. Except for in some special circumstances,
    by law police may not enter and search a private home without the
    approval of the procurator. When they do enter and search without prior
    approval, they then must inform the procurator within 24 hours.
    However, police frequently ignored these requirements. There is no
    independent judicial review of police searches conducted without a
    warrant. Police also are permitted to enter and search homes without
    permission if they have compelling reason to believe that a delay in
    obtaining a warrant would impair national security.
        Security forces detained relatives of deserters in order to compel
    deserters to return to duty (see Section 1.d.). According to the OSCE
    mission in Tajikistan, the family of Dilfuza Nimonova (see Section
    1.e.) was harassed at the behest of her alleged murder victim's
    politically well-connected family after Nimonova's family sought
    international intervention in her case. There is also strong evidence
    that Nimonova, a rape victim, was forced to undergo an abortion while
    in prison ( see Section 1.e.).
        Some political parties remain banned. In some cases, the security
    services apparently created difficulties for persons associated with
    opposition parties who sought employment. Other persons were pressured
    to join the ruling party (see Section 2.b.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
    restricts this right in practice. Journalists, broadcasters, and
    individual citizens who disagree with government policies are
    discouraged from speaking freely or critically. The Government
    exercises control over the media both overtly through legislation and
    indirectly through such mechanisms as ``friendly advice'' to reporters
    on what news should not be covered. The Government also controls the
    printing presses and the supply of newsprint and broadcasting
    facilities and subsidizes virtually all publications and productions.
    Editors and journalists fearful of reprisals carefully exercise self-
    censorship.
        The number of independent and local newspapers is increasing, but
    only a handful of them attempt to cover serious news. Several are
    organs of political parties or blocs. The Government exerted pressure
    on newspapers critical of it. Najot, the new official paper of the
    Islamic Renaissance Party, which began weekly publication in October
    1999, continued to publish during the year. It experienced indirect
    government censorship in the early summer, apparently in retaliation
    for publishing a serialized translation of a foreign human rights
    report crtitical of the Government. It temporarily lost its access to
    state-run printing presses and has been forced to rely on a small,
    privately owned printing press to publish its editions.
        Journalists frequently are subject to harassment, intimidation, and
    violence. Sometimes the perpetrators are government authorities, as in
    the case of a reporter for the state-owned newspaper Jumhuriyat, who
    was beaten severely by militiamen in August (see Section 1.b.),
    according to the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations. In other
    cases, the perpetrators are criminal or terrorist elements who are
    believed to have narcotics trafficking connections, as in the cases of
    Ministry of Interior press center chief Jumankhon Hotami, who was shot
    and killed near Dushanbe in 1999, and Sergei Sitkovskii, a Russian
    national working for the newspaper Tojikiston, who was killed in a hit-
    and-run car accident in 1999. Both were investigating narcotics
    trafficking at the time of their deaths. There were no developments in
    their cases by year's end.
        There is one Government-run television network; its several local
    stations cover regional and local issues from an official point of
    view. Opposition politicians have had little access to it, although in
    January and June it broadcast two political party debates organized by
    the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. There are 36
    nongovernmental television stations, not all of which are operating at
    any one time and only a handful of which can be considered genuinely
    independent. The Islamic Renaissance Party was able to begin
    broadcasting a weekly television program on one such station. Some have
    independent studio facilities. These stations continued to experience
    administrative and legal harassment. To obtain licenses, independent
    television stations must work through two government agencies, the
    Ministry of Communications, and the State Committee on Radio and
    Television. At every stage of the bureaucratic process, there are high
    official and unofficial fees.
        The Government continued to prevent independent radio stations from
    operating by interminably delaying applications for broadcasting
    licenses. At least two independent radio stations in Dushanbe have had
    their license applications pending without explanation since the summer
    of 1998.
        Access to the Internet is limited partly by state control. The
    Government allowed a handful of Internet provider companies to begin
    operating during the year, but high fees and limited capacity put
    access to information over the Internet out of reach for most citizens.
        Academic expression is limited principally by the complete reliance
    of scientific institutes upon government funding, and in practical
    terms by the need to find alternate employment to generate sufficient
    income, leaving little time for academic writing.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
    restricts this right in practice and exercises strict control over
    organizations and activities of a political nature. Nonpolitical
    associations, such as trade unions, are allowed to meet. Registered
    organizations must apply for a permit from the local executive
    committee in order to organize legally any public assembly or
    demonstration. Sometimes permits are granted, but the Government
    subsequently has been known to take reprisals against organizers.
    Because fear of reprisal is so widespread, public assemblies or
    demonstrations of a political nature were rare during the year.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice by exercising strict
    control over organizations and activities of a political nature.
    Although freedom of association is permitted for nonpolitical
    associations (including trade unions), this right is circumscribed
    further by the requirement in the Law on Nongovernmental Associations
    that all organizations first must register with the Ministry of
    Justice. This process often is slowed by the requirement to submit
    documents in both Russian and Tajik. The Ministry of Justice's
    verification of the text inevitably delays the granting of
    registration. The Minister of Justice made public statements in support
    of nongovernmental organizations (most of which are involved in social
    work, rather than political activity), and attempted to address
    problems that existing NGO's have experienced with registration and
    taxation. Once registered, an organization may apply for a permit to
    hold a public assembly or demonstration.
        There are five political parties and five ``movements'' registered
    with the Government. Three parties are banned officially: The Party of
    Popular Unity (banned in December 1998), the Agrarian Party (banned in
    April 1999); and the ``Tehran platform'' faction of the Democratic
    Party (banned in December 1999). The Party of Economic and Political
    Revival of Tajikistan was not allowed to register in March 1999 because
    of insufficient membership. The Party of Justice and Progress has not
    been allowed to register since the end of 1999 for unexplained reasons.
        In May 1998, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation
    of political parties with a religious orientation. The opposition UTO,
    international organizations, and foreign governments strongly
    criticized the law for violating the spirit and the letter of the 1997
    peace agreement. In June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special
    Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute, which proposed
    compromise language for the law, banning political parties from
    receiving support from religious institutions. A new version of the law
    including the compromise language was passed in November 1998.
    Subsequently, parties of religious character were permitted to
    register; one such party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, has done so.
        The leadership of certain opposition parties reported threats and
    harassment by the authorities in their workplaces. Many others often
    were pressured to join the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the
    ruling party (see Section 1.f.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, there are some restrictions, and the Government monitors the
    activities of religious institutions to keep them from becoming overly
    political. The vast majority of the population is Sunni Islam, although
    only a small portion is observant: this does not appear to affect the
    religious freedom of the non-Sunni Muslim minority. President Rahmonov
    defends secularism aggressively and describes Islamists as a threat to
    national security. Government policies reflect a pervasive fear of
    Islamic fundamentalism, a fear shared by much of the general
    population.
        According to the Law on Freedom of Faith, the Committee on
    Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers registers religious
    communities and monitors the activities of the various religious
    establishments. While the official reason given to justify registration
    is to ensure that religious groups act in accordance with the law, the
    practical purpose is to ensure that they do not become overly
    political. In 1997 the Government subordinated the Council of the
    Islamic Center (the former Muftiyat) to the Committee on Religious
    Affairs; however, the observant Muslim community apparently did not
    object to this step.
        Although unregistered, recently organized religious communities,
    such as Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups, function with no apparent
    formal restriction. There were no developments in the murder case of a
    prominent member of the Baha'i community, who was widely believed to
    have been killed by Iranian-supported Islamic extremists (see Section
    1.a.). Members of the Baha'i community were occasionally confronted by
    the police guard outside Dushanbe's Baha'i Center and asked why they
    had forsaken Islam. Others were called in by the Ministry of Security
    and also asked why they had changed religious affiliation.
        In May 1998, Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation of
    political parties with a religious orientation (see Section 2.b.). The
    UTO, the largest component of which is the Islamic Renaissance Party
    (IRP, along with international organizations and foreign governments,
    strongly criticized the law for violating the June 1997 peace
    agreement, which included a government commitment to lift the ban on
    member parties of the UTO. The post-independence 1992-7 civil war was
    fought in part over differing views of the role of religion in the
    country. In early June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special
    Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute. Later that month, the
    Commission reported that it had devised compromise language for the
    law, banning parties from receiving support from religious
    institutions. A new version of the law including the compromise
    language was passed in the November 1998 parliamentary session. A
    constitutional amendment passed in a September 1999 referendum states
    that the State is secular and that citizens can be members of parties
    formed on a religious basis. Two representatives from the IRP now sit
    in the lower house of the national Parliament.
        Aside from the registration requirement, there are few official
    constraints on religious practice, but government officials sometimes
    issue extrajudicial restrictions. For example, the mayor of Dushanbe
    has prohibited mosques from using microphones for the five daily calls
    to prayer. There are also reports that some local officials have
    forbidden members of the IRP from speaking in mosques in their region.
    However, this restriction is more a reflection of political than
    religious differences. Government printing houses reportedly are
    forbidden to publish texts in Arabic and as a rule do not publish
    religious literature. There are no longer restrictions on private
    Arabic language schools; however, restrictions on home-based Islamic
    instruction remain. These restrictions appear to be based on political
    concerns, but the effect on private religious instruction is also
    clear.
        The Government has banned specifically the activity of one
    religious faction, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist movement with
    origins in the Middle East, which has developed a significant following
    among the ethnic Uzbek population of northern Tajikistan. This movement
    operates underground and apparently calls for a nonviolent overthrow of
    established authority and the reestablishment of government along the
    lines of the six ``rightly-guided Caliphs'' of early Islamic history.
    According to the Ministry of Security, over 105 members of Hizb ut-
    Tahrir were arrested during the year, and one reportedly died in police
    custody (see Section 1.a.). Fifty-seven of these persons were sentenced
    to between one and two years imprisonment.
        During the year there were three church bombings that occurred
    throughout Dushanbe (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        The Government continued to impose restrictions on the number of
    pilgrims allowed to go on the Hajj. Individuals were not permitted to
    travel in a personal vehicle; persons were required to travel by
    government-owned transportation, primarily buses. There were regional
    quotas on the number of pilgrims, which led to corruption as places
    were sold. Missionaries are not restricted legally and proselytize
    openly; however, the Government's fear of Islamic terrorists prompts it
    to restrict visas for Muslim missionaries.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on them.
        The Government has stipulated that both citizens and foreigners are
    prohibited from traveling within a 15-mile zone along the country's
    borders with China and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs. This restriction is not always enforced along the
    western part of the border with Afghanistan, but a special visa
    generally is required for travelers, including international workers
    and diplomats, to Gorno-Badakhshan. Travel to border areas near
    Uzbekistan in the southwest is not restricted significantly, except
    occasionally at the border, which was closed intermittently by
    Uzbekistan.
        The Ministry of Security inhibits freedom of travel by requiring
    citizens who wish to travel abroad to obtain an exit visa. This process
    sometimes includes lengthy interviews. The Ministry of Security
    sometimes withholds or delays exit visas when it believes that other
    ministries or NGO's are infringing upon its jurisdiction and have not
    adhered to its formalities for foreign travel.
        Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers who wish to remain in the
    city longer than 3 days are supposed to register with central
    authorities, and regulations require registration at the local Ministry
    of Interior office upon arrival and departure from a city. However,
    these regulations largely are ignored in practice. There are no legal
    restrictions on changing residence or workplace.
        There is no law on emigration. Persons who wish to migrate within
    the former Soviet Union notify the Ministry of Interior of their
    departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the borders of the
    former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's
    embassy in order to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad
    are required to inform the Tajikistan embassy or Tajikistan interests
    section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
        Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated may
    do so freely by submitting their applications to the embassy of
    Tajikistan or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian
    embassy or consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a case-by-
    case basis. There is no indication that persons other than those who
    fled the country for political reasons after the civil war, are not
    permitted to return freely. Some persons currently active with the
    Tajik opposition, whose travel documents expired, at times have had
    difficulty obtaining new documents permitting them to return.
        A number of persons remained internally displaced as a result of
    the civil war, but their total number was difficult to estimate. The
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) no longer has estimates on
    the number of internally displaced persons (IDP's). These persons live
    throughout the country and are not concentrated in a single geographic
    area. The Government provides protection and modest assistance, and it
    actively cooperates with international organizations to resettle them.
    Resettlement is voluntary; IDP's are not returned forcibly to dangerous
    conditions.
        The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to persons who
    have entered the country seeking protection, in accordance with U.N.
    refugee criteria. Under the 1994 refugee law, a person granted refugee
    status is provided with the right to work and to move freely throughout
    the country. The State Migration Service (formerly the Department of
    Refugee Affairs) under the Ministry of Labor has responsibility for the
    registration of refugees.
        The State Migration Service handles the registration of Afghan
    refugees in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and Tajikistan's 1994 Law on Refugees. An unresolved
    problem stems from the unofficial government policy of denying official
    status to Afghan spouses of returning Tajik refugees. The UNHCR has
    aided their admission to the country (avoiding their being jailed as
    illegal immigrants); however, their legal status remains uncertain.
    There were no cases during the year. However, members of Tajikistan's
    Afghan refugee population, sometimes regardless of social status or
    official connections, are singled out for mistreatment by law
    enforcement authorities (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. According to the UNHCR, 176 asylum
    seekers submitted requests for refugee status to the State Migration
    Service during the first half of the year, of which 28 were granted by
    mid-year. However, the UNHCR does not have statistics on the number of
    refugees remaining in the country after receiving asylum because the
    majority of such persons use the country as a transit point en route to
    Western Europe. As in 1999, the Government faced the problematic issue
    of several hundred dependent family members and camp followers of
    Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants. As in a similar incident in
    1999, several hundred of these persons were sent in buses to
    Afghanistan. The Government did not consider them for refugee status
    and officially refused to acknowledge even the presence of these
    persons.
        After protests from the UNHCR, the Government cancelled its short-
    lived ``Operation Foreigner,'' in which numerous Afghan refugees in
    Dushanbe were detained by security forces and reportedly slated for
    relocation to refugee camps elsewhere. However, government officials
    continued to maintain that Dushanbe was still ``off limits'' for Afghan
    refugees.
        It remained an question whether the Government would provide first
    asylum to a potential mass influx of refugees fleeing Taliban advances
    in northern Afghanistan; Government and Russian border officials made
    contradictory statements on this issue.
        Following the signing of the 1997 peace accords, all Tajik refugees
    from northern Afghanistan who wished to return, as well as thousands
    from the CIS, returned to the country. There was continued incremental
    progress during the year in returning occupied houses to their original
    UTO fighter owners. Problems remain, although they are almost entirely
    in the Khatlon region.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    Government peacefully and freely through elections of the President and
    members of Parliament; however, the Government restricted this right in
    practice. There was some improvement in the February parliamentary
    elections; however, the 1999 presidential election was seriously
    flawed. While the country made progress in its transition from a
    Soviet-model system to a more open and competitive one, the Government
    remained dominated by President Rahmonov and his inner circle from the
    Kulyab region.
        The 1999 Presidential election was flawed seriously. The
    Government's handling of preparations for the November presidential
    election cast doubt on the possibility that there could be a peaceful
    transfer of power through genuinely free and fair elections. Candidates
    had to contend with a cumbersome registration process requiring them to
    obtain large numbers of signatures during a short period of time. Only
    President Rahmonov, who used his political apparatus throughout the
    country for this purpose, probably ahead of time, was able to do so by
    the deadline. Prospective opposition candidates complained that local,
    progovernment administrators prevented them from gathering signatures.
    Days before the election, an apparently arbitrary Supreme Court
    decision allowed one of the three aspiring opposition candidates,
    Economics and Foreign Economic Relations Minister Davlat Usmon of the
    Islamic Renaissance Party, to register. Although Davlat announced that
    he would boycott the election unless the other two opposition figures
    also were allowed to run, the Central Election Commission included his
    name on the ballot. Davlat told journalists in Dushanbe on November 7
    that he believed that the outcome of the election was rigged and that
    only 20 to 30 percent of voters had participated. President Rahmonov
    enjoyed a virtual monopoly over mass media access, and there were
    obvious irregularities in the operation of polling places, such as
    multiple voting by pro-Rahmonov supporters. The Government claimed that
    98 percent of the electorate voted and that 96 percent of those voting
    supported Rahmonov; the claim lacked credibility.
        A joint mission of the U.N. and the OSCE observed February 27
    elections to the lower house of the new bicameral national Parliament.
    This joint observation mission noted that there were improvements in
    the process compared to previous elections. Six parties, including two
    former segments of the disbanded UTO, were allowed to participate in
    the electoral process. Two seats in the new Parliament are now held by
    members of an openly Islamic political party. However, the joint
    observation mission concluded that the elections failed to meet the
    minimum standards for equal, fair, free, secret, transparent, and
    accountable elections. There were particular problems with the
    independence of election commissions and the conduct of the vote count
    and tabulation of results. State organs, particularly regional and
    local administration officials, interfered in the preparations for and
    conduct of the elections in a manner not foreseen by law and in a way
    that contradicted international standards for democratic elections.
        During the course of the February 27 elections, joint U.N.-OSCE
    observers noted a variety of irregularities in a number of
    constituencies including proxy voting, unsealed ballot boxes, stuffed
    ballot boxes, votes added in favor of a particular party, lack of
    consistency between the sum of votes counted and the number of ballots
    issued, discrepancies between votes considered invalid during the count
    and the final result sheet, and blank copies of protocols signed before
    the counting of ballots and filled in with pencil during the count. The
    observers judged the conduct of the vote to have been ``very good''
    (i.e., no irregularities) in only 13 percent of the 294 polling
    stations observed, while finding it ``good'' (i.e., hardly any minor
    irregularities) in 32 percent, ``acceptable, but not good'' (i.e.,
    several minor irregularities) in another 32 percent, and
    ``unacceptable'' (i.e. major irregularities) in 23 percent of the
    polling stations.
        While state television provided free broadcast time to parties
    competing in the election, it failed to provide balanced news and
    editorial coverage of the campaign. In general, both publicly and
    privately funded broadcasts as well as print media failed to provide
    voters with unbiased information.
        At least one prospective independent candidate for the lower house
    of Parliament was prevented from registering as a candidate in what
    Human Rights Watch called ``a wholly arbitrary candidate registration
    process.'' The decision to prevent this individual from registering
    appeared to have been politically motivated; he earlier had served as
    chairman of an opposition party that had been deregistered prior to the
    November 1999 presidential election.
        Local district assemblies elected the members of the upper house of
    the national Parliament in March, in elections that were not held under
    international observation.
        President Rahmonov's highly centralized People's Democratic Party
    of Tajikistan controls an overwhelming majority of seats in both houses
    of Parliament. This fact, combined with a lack of democratic culture,
    results in a legislative branch that is not genuinely independent of
    the executive branch.
        There are no formal barriers to women's participation in the
    electoral process; however, they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Since the removal of Soviet-era quotas, the number of female
    deputies has declined. In the parliamentary election campaign, only 17
    out of the 365 registered candidates were women, and only 5 of the 17
    were elected. There are two female ministers in the Government.
        While ethnic Uzbeks make up some 25 percent of the total
    population, they are underrepresented in the political system.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government's record on dealing with international and
    nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights abuses was mixed.
    Fear of harrasment and abuse by government or paramilitary elements
    tended to discourage citizens from forming their own human rights
    organizations, although the Government did not block the registration
    of local NGO's dealing with human rights; several such organizations
    exist. The Government did prevent some citizens, especially government
    officials, from participating in international and local seminars
    sponsored by the OSCE, the ICRC, United Nations agencies, NGO's, and
    foreign governments on such topics as the rule of law, an independent
    judiciary, and international humanitarian law. Discussion at such
    seminars, including those held in Tajikistan, was frequently critical
    of the Government.
        The Government first stated the intention of forming a national
    human rights ombudsman position in 1996, and in 1998 agreed to
    establish a national human rights institution and ombudsman position
    with OSCE financial support; however, no institution or ombudsman
    position had been established by year's end.
        Within the Parliament, the Committee on Legislation and Human
    Rights is charged with monitoring human rights violations; however,
    like the rest of the Parliament, it is not independent in practice.
        The OSCE mission in Dushanbe continues to monitor human rights
    issues with the help of its five field offices. However, these field
    offices experienced varying levels of cooperation with local
    authorities. The Government allowed a joint U.N.-OSCE observation
    mission to monitor parliamentary elections in February (see Section 3).
    The mission reported that its team of experts was given every
    assistance and freedom of access that it requested. The joint mission
    issued a series of reports that severely criticized the conduct of the
    elections. The Government's reaction to the reports was mild,
    minimizing the critical aspects of joint mission statements and
    presenting the participation of international observers as evidence of
    a successful democratic exercise.
        The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains a
    delegation in Tajikistan. The Government continued to refuse the ICRC
    unconditional access to prisons in accordance with standard ICRC
    modalities, despite letters received in the past from senior government
    officials that assured that such access would be forthcoming.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for the rights and freedoms of every
    person regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious
    beliefs, political persuasion, or social status and also explicitly
    states that men and women have the same rights; however, in practice
    there is some discrimination as a result of cultural traditions and the
    lingering hostilities from the 1992-97 civil war.
        Women.--Violence against women is widespread. Wife beating is a
    common problem. In both urban and rural areas, many cases of wife
    beating go unreported and many of those cases reported are not
    investigated. There is a widespread reluctance to discuss the issue or
    provide assistance to women in abusive situations, and the Government
    did not propose legislation on the issue. In addition, abduction of
    young women, who are raped or forced to marry their abductors, is
    widely reported.
        The Criminal Code prohibits rape; however, it is widely believed
    that most cases are unreported, and the problem is believed to be
    growing, particularly in urban areas. The threat of rape often is used
    to coerce women. There are no special police units for handling these
    cases. One rape crisis center was established by a local NGO in
    Dushanbe in 1993; there are now 10 such centers in the country. The
    situation is exacerbated by a continued lack of public order, so that
    in many cities, including Dushanbe, women exercise particular care in
    their movement, especially at night. There are no statistics on the
    number of rapists prosecuted, convicted, or punished each year. In one
    widely publicized case, Dilfuza Nimonova, an alleged victim of rape was
    convicted, in a trial of questionable fairness, of having killed the
    man who raped her. She was forced to undergo an abortion (see Section
    1.e. and 1.f.).
        The law prohibits keeping brothels, procuring, making, or selling
    pornography, infecting another person with a venereal disease, and
    sexual exploitation of women; however, prostitutes operate openly at
    night in certain urban areas.
        There are credible reports of trafficking in women (see Section
    6.f.).
        There have been reports of physical harassment of women by
    conservative Muslims in rural areas for not wearing traditional attire.
        According to the law, women have equal rights with men; however
    discrimination against women remains a problem. Articles in the
    Criminal Code protect women's rights in marriage and family matters.
    Girls often are pressured to marry men that they do not choose
    themselves, and polygyny is increasingly common, although it is
    illegal.
        Traditionally there has been a high level of female participation
    in the work force and in institutes of higher learning. There is no
    formal discrimination against women in employment, education, or
    housing; and in urban areas women can be found employed throughout
    government, academic institutes, and enterprises. However, women face
    diminishing opportunities for education and rising poverty. Some women
    hold the same jobs as men, although not in equal numbers. Women
    officially receive equal pay for equal work; however this regulation is
    not always enforced in practice. Divorce rates in urban areas are
    comparatively high, and women tend to carry the burden of child-rearing
    and household management, whether married or divorced. In rural areas,
    women tend to marry younger, have larger families, and receive less
    university education than women in cities. In rural and traditional
    areas, women receive less education in general, often leaving school
    after the eighth year. Due to the prevalence of large families, women
    in rural areas are also much less likely to work outside the home.
    Inheritance laws do not discriminate against women; however, in
    practice, inheritances may pass disproportionately to sons.
        Children.--The Government's lack of financial resources left it
    unable to fulfill its extensive commitments to children's rights and
    welfare, and the government social security network for child welfare
    appeared to have deteriorated. Women are provided 3 years of maternity
    leave and monthly subsidies for each child; health care is free (but
    the quality and quantity of medical services available has declined
    significantly since the Soviet era). Education is compulsory until age
    16; however, the law is not enforced. Public education is intended to
    be free; however, a lack of resources has caused the public school
    system to deteriorate to the point at which it barely functions.
    Parents who can afford to do so send their children to private schools
    (a number of which have been founded since the end of the Soviet
    period), or join together in groups that hire teachers to give their
    children lessons for a fee. Public education is intended to be
    universal; however, a significant number of school-age children--as
    many as one in eight, according to World Bank data--work instead of
    attending school. While most children are enrolled in school up to the
    completion of the secondary level, actual attendance may be lower
    because of the need to supplement family income by working in the home
    or in informal activities. The old Soviet practice, now illegal, of
    closing high schools at cotton harvest time and putting the students to
    work in the field continues in some areas.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--The 1992 Law on Social Protection of
    Invalids stipulates the right of the disabled to employment and
    adequate medical care.
        However, in practice the Government does not require employers to
    provide physical access for the disabled. Financial constraints and the
    absence of basic technology to assist the disabled result, in practice,
    in high unemployment and widespread discrimination. There is no law
    mandating accessibility for the disabled. There are facilities for the
    mentally disabled; however, funding is limited and the facilities are
    in poor condition. Several international NGO's provide limited
    assistance to persons with disabilities.
        Religious Minorities.--Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups experience
    limited prejudice. There were no developments in the 1999 murder of a
    prominent member of Baha'i community (see Section 1.a.). Police made no
    arrests, although militant Islamists aligned with Iran are considered
    the likely perpetrators.
        The authorities continued to investigate the October bombing of a
    Protestant church in Dushanbe (see Section 1.a.). It is believed that
    the attack was meant to destabilize the political situation in the
    country. Prosecutors have charged three students from the Dushanbe
    Islamic Institute with terrorism in connection with the bombing. The
    students confessed to the bombing and stated their motive was
    religious. Investigators already have identified the remaining
    conspirators, and said that the three suspects claimed to be operating
    on their own and not on the orders of someone else. The Government
    believes that the act was independent and not associated with the
    Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or Hiz ut-Tahir.
        On December 31, two churches in Dushanbe were bombed, the Svyato-
    Nikolskii Russian Orthodox Church and a Seventh Day Adventist Church.
    There were no injuries at either church, both of which were closed at
    the time. Government law enforcement and security agencies are
    investigating the bombings. It is believed that these events were
    carried out by religious extremists opposed to foreign missionaries in
    the country.
        Some Muslim leaders occasionally have expressed concern that
    minority religious groups undermine national unity.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Uzbeks make up
    approximately a quarter of the population but are substantially
    underrepresented in government service. The number of Uzbek language
    newspapers, television broadcasts, and schools has declined
    significantly since 1992. With the exception of the trilingual (Tajik/
    Uzbek/Russian) school structure, the Uzbek language has no official
    status. Although the Government permits a daily Uzbek radio broadcast,
    broadcast time is dominated by Tajik and Russian language programs. A
    weekly television broadcast in Uzbek, which ceased in 1999, resumed in
    2000.
        In practice Russian is the language of interethnic communication
    and widely used in government. Ethnic Russians and other Russian
    speakers, for example, Ukrainians, make up less than 2 percent of the
    population. While the Government repeatedly has expressed its desire
    for the ethnic Russian and Slavic populations to remain, economic
    conditions provide little incentive for them to do so, and some local
    Russians and other Slavs perceive an increase in negative social
    attitudes toward them. A Slavic university and a Russian high school
    operate in Dushanbe with Russian as the language of instruction, but
    also include ethnic Tajik and Uzbek students. An agreement ratified by
    the Russian Duma in December 1996 allows for dual Russian and Tajik
    citizenship.
        Tensions persist between ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks in some areas.
    Government officials have organized meetings at the local level to
    resolve conflicts; however, the authorities apparently have not
    arrested or prosecuted suspects in murders of ethnic Uzbeks in July
    1998. Since the signing of the peace treaty in 1997, there have been
    multiple murders of ethnic Uzbeks in the Panj district. Some of these
    cases appear to be a matter of retaliation by returned ethnic Tajik
    refugees for injuries done to them by ethnic Uzbeks during the civil
    war. As a result of these attacks, some ethnic Uzbek families have
    moved to other locations in the district where Uzbeks predominate or to
    neighboring countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Both the Law on Social Organization
    and the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees provide all citizens
    with the right of association, including the right to form and join
    associations without prior authorization, to organize territorially,
    and to form and join federations. According to official figures,
    approximately 90 percent of the labor force is organized.
        The Federation of Trade Unions, a docile holdover from the Soviet
    era, remains the dominant labor organization, although it since has
    shed its subordination to the Communist Party. The Federation consists
    of 19 professional trade unions and claims 1.5 million members,
    virtually all nonagricultural workers. The separate, independent Trade
    Union of Non-State Enterprises has registered unions in over 3,000
    small and medium-sized enterprises, totaling about 30,000 employees
    (according to 1998 figures). Many of the enterprises in which these two
    organizations nominally are present are not functioning because of the
    general economic crisis, and the membership of both has declined as a
    result. The Council of Ministers formally consults both organizations
    during the drafting of social welfare and worker rights legislation.
        The Law on Tariff Agreements and Social Partnerships mandates
    arbitration before a union legally may call a strike. Depending on the
    scale of the labor disagreement, arbitration can take place at the
    company, sector, or governmental level. In the event that arbitration
    fails, unions have the right to strike, but both labor unions have
    disavowed publicly the utility of strikes in a period of deepening
    economic crisis and high unemployment and have espoused compromise
    between management and workers.
        There were no official, union-sanctioned strikes, nor were there
    any wildcat strikes, the last which occurred in 1996).
        The law provides citizens but not unions with the right to
    affiliate freely with international organizations, including
    international labor organizations. It does not prohibit unions from
    affiliating with international organizations; however, there are no
    unions with international affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    organize and bargain collectively is codified in the Law on Trade Union
    Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social Partnerships and Collective
    Contracts, and the Law on Labor Protection. Employees, members of the
    trade union, and management participate in collective bargaining at the
    company level. Negotiations involving an industrial sector include
    officials from the relevant ministry and members of the union's
    steering committee for that particular sector. As the economic
    situation worsens, it is increasingly difficult for enterprises to
    engage in effective collective bargaining.
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, the use of sanctions to
    dissuade union membership, and the firing of a worker solely for union
    activity. Any complaints of discrimination against a labor union or
    labor union activist are considered first by a local labor union
    committee and, if necessary, raised to the level of the Supreme Court
    and investigated by the Ministry of Justice. The law compels an
    employer found guilty of firing an employee based on union activity to
    reinstate the employee.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor, except in cases defined in the law; however, it
    persists in some cases. No labor laws have been passed since the
    adoption of the Constitution in 1994. Neither the Law on Labor
    Protection nor the Law on Employment, both predating the present
    Constitution, specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The
    Soviet practice of compelling students to pick cotton was banned
    officially in 1989; however, high school students in some regions still
    are sent to the fields to pick cotton, particularly in the Soghd
    (formerly Leninabad) area, sometimes with compensation. Residents of
    state or collective farms still may be required to pick cotton,
    although wages usually are not paid and these institutions no longer
    provide the services they once did.
        The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
    children; however, apart from traditional participation by children in
    family agricultural or home craftsman work, such practices are not
    known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--According to labor laws, the minimum age for the
    employment of children is 16, the age at which children also may leave
    school legally. With the concurrence of the local trade union,
    employment may begin at the age of 15. By law workers under the age of
    18 may work no more than 6 hours a day and 36 hours per week. However,
    children as young as 7 years of age can perform household-based labor
    and participate in agricultural work, which is classified as family
    assistance. Many children under 10 years of age work in the bazaars or
    sell newspapers or consumables on the street. Trade unions are
    responsible for reporting any violations in the employment of minors.
    Cases not resolved between the union and the employer may be brought
    before the Procurator General, who may investigate and charge the
    manager of the enterprise with violations of the Labor Code.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and such
    practices generally do not occur, apart from family-based work (see
    Section 6.c.).
        The Government lacks the resources and ability to regulate
    effectively acceptable working conditions for youths, and there were no
    governmental or judicial initiatives to strengthen or enforce child
    labor legislation or regulations during the year. The Government does
    not have a comprehensive policy for the elimination of the worst forms
    of child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The President, on the advice of
    the Ministry of Labor and in consultation with trade unions, sets the
    minimum monthly wage. The nominal minimum daily rate was approximately
    $0.03 (100 Tajik rubles). This rate fell far short of providing a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. The Government
    recognizes this problem and has retained certain subsidies for workers
    and their families at the minimum wage. Although the Government adopted
    a wage indexation law in 1993 and inflation has been high, the law has
    not been implemented.
        Although slightly improved, the economy remained extremely weak
    during the year, with a majority of industrial operations standing
    idle. As factories and enterprises either remained closed or were shut
    down, workers were laid off or furloughed for extended periods.
        Some establishments, both governmental and private, compensated
    their employees in kind with food commodities or with the products
    produced by the enterprise. The employee could then sell or barter
    those products in local private markets.
        The legal workweek for adults (over age 18) is 40 hours. Overtime
    payment is mandated by law, with the first 2 hours of overtime to be
    paid at 1 1/2 times the normal rate and the rest of the overtime hours
    at double time.
        The Government has established occupational health and safety
    standards, but these fall far below accepted international norms, and
    the Government does not enforce them in practice. The enforcement of
    work standards is the responsibility of the State Technical Supervision
    Committee under the Council of Ministers. While new statistics were not
    available, it is virtually certain, given the continuing economic
    decline, that 1993 statistics, which reported that over one-fifth of
    the population worked under substandard conditions, greatly
    underreported the number working under those conditions. Workers can
    leave their jobs with 2 months' notice, but, given the bleak employment
    situation, few choose to do so. The Law on Labor Protection provides
    that workers can remove themselves from hazardous conditions without
    risking loss of employment; however, in view of the poor prospects for
    finding another job, few do so.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and it is a problem. The criminal code prohibits the
    recruitment of minors for sexual exploitation. There are credible
    reports that trafficking is a growing problem with wide ramifications.
    The most common form of trafficking is in women, for ``export'' to the
    Gulf states, Turkey, and Russia. The OSCE has identified several rings
    of traffickers that recruit young women for prostitution abroad. The
    International Organization for Migration is leading an initiative to
    fully research the problem. The Government has taken no significant
    action against trafficking. There is no evidence of official,
    institutional government involvement in the trafficking of persons, but
    it is believed that some individual authorities are involved. It is
    believed that, due to the large number of female Afghan refugees,
    Afghan women may be the subjects of trafficking abroad using Tajikistan
    as the transit country.
                                   __________

                                     TURKEY

        Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament,
    the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which elects the President. In May
    it elected Ahmet Necdet Sezer President for a 7year term. After 1999
    parliamentary elections, Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP),
    the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahceli, and former
    Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a
    Government with Ecevit as Prime Minister. The military exercises
    substantial, but indirect, influence over government policy and
    actions--and politics--in the belief, shared by much of the population
    according to opinion polls, that it is the constitutional protector of
    the State. The Government generally respects the Constitution's
    provisions for an independent judiciary; however, various officials
    acknowledge the need for legislative changes to strengthen its
    independence.
        For over 15 years, the Government has engaged in armed conflict
    with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal until
    recently was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in
    southeastern Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues
    in four southeastern provinces that faced substantial PKK terrorist
    violence. Parliament in July lifted the state of emergency in Van
    province. The level of violence has been low since the second half of
    1999; according to the Government, the number of PKK-related terrorist
    incidents declined almost 90 percent from 1999. The state of emergency
    region's governor has authority over the provincial governors in the
    four provinces, and seven adjacent ones including Van, for security
    matters. Under the state of emergency, this regional governor may
    exercise certain quasi-martial law powers, including imposing
    restrictions on the press, removing from the area persons whose
    activities are deemed detrimental to public order, and ordering village
    evacuations. The state of emergency decree was renewed in Diyarbakir,
    Hakkari, Sirnak, and Tunceli provinces for 4 months in November.
        The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for
    security in urban areas, while the Jandarma (Gendarmerie) carry out
    this function in the countryside. The armed forces, in support of the
    police and particularly the Jandarma, carry out operations against the
    PKK in the state of emergency region, thereby serving an internal
    security function. These operations have declined in number as the
    terrorist threat ebbed. Although civilian and military authorities
    remain publicly committed to the rule of law and respect for human
    rights, members of the security forces, including police ``special
    teams'' and anti-terror squads, other TNP personnel, village guards,
    and Jandarma committed serious human rights abuses such as torture.
        In December 1999, the Government adopted a 3-year disinflation and
    fiscal adjustment program. During the first year of this program the
    Government registered some significant improvements in the
    macroeconomic situation. Inflation was cut nearly in half, to 39
    percent. Economic growth increased significantly, after a recession in
    1999, to about 6 percent of gross national product. This growth
    included a strong increase in imports, fueled partly by an increase in
    world oil prices and the Turkish lira's appreciation against the euro,
    which led to a wider than expected current account deficit. This
    deficit, together with delays in the structural aspects of the reform
    program and other factors, resulted in a large loss of investor
    confidence and capital outflows in November and early December.
    Intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) helped to
    stabilize the situation in December, but the financial situation
    remained fragile at year's end. Another continuing problem is the
    projected deficit in energy sources, as energy demand grows at 9
    percent per year. To find new sources of imported oil and gas, the
    Government is negotiating supply and pipeline agreements with countries
    in the Caspian basin.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in a
    number of areas; however, its record was poor in several other areas,
    and serious problems remain. Extrajudicial killings continued,
    including deaths due to excessive use of force. Unlike the previous
    year, there were no deaths in detention due to torture and no reports
    of mystery killings and disappearances of political activists. Although
    the authorities failed to investigate adequately many past
    disappearances, ongoing investigation of the Turkish Hizbullah
    terrorist organization may lead to resolution of some cases. Torture,
    beatings, and other abuses by security forces remained widespread.
    Police and Jandarma often employed torture and abused detainees during
    incommunicado detention and interrogation. The lack of universal and
    immediate access to an attorney, long detention periods for those held
    for political crimes (especially in the state of emergency region), and
    a culture of impunity are major factors in the commission of torture by
    police and other security forces. In addition the general climate of
    violence engendered by the PKK insurgency and urban leftist and Islamic
    fundamentalist terrorism, combined with a confession-oriented trial
    system, have hampered past efforts to carry out legal prohibitions
    against torture. With the decrease in counterterror operations and
    overall detentions in the southeast, fewer cases of abuse of detainees
    were reported; however, the proportion of cases of abuse remained at
    high levels, and many cases go unreported.
        The rarity of convictions and the light sentences imposed on police
    and other security officials for killings and torture continued to
    foster a climate of impunity that remained the single largest obstacle
    to reducing torture and prisoner abuse. Investigations and trials of
    officials suspected of abuses continued to be protracted and often
    inconclusive. Some important cases dating back several years continued
    without resolution, including the case against police and security
    personnel charged with beating to death 10 prisoners during a prison
    disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996. However, the case against 10 police
    accused of torturing 15 teenagers in Manisa in 1995 concluded in
    November with the conviction of all of the accused police.
        Prison conditions remained poor. Clashes between prisoners and
    prison officials, especially over the issue of newly constructed small-
    cell prisons, which would break up the current ward system, resulted in
    deaths and injuries. In December during government actions to break up
    prisoner hunger strikes and violent protests against small-cell
    prisons, 31 prisoners and 2 security officials perished. Police and
    Jandarma continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, although the
    number of such incidents declined. Prolonged pretrial detention and
    lengthy trials continued to be problems. Prosecutions brought by the
    Government in State Security Courts (SSC's) reflect a legal structure
    that protects state interests over individual rights. The Government
    infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
        Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained a serious
    problem. Some members of the country's political elite, bureaucracy,
    military, and judiciary argue that the State is threatened by both
    ``reactionaries'' (Islamists) and ``separatists'' (Kurdish
    nationalists) and continued to call for parliamentary and judicial
    steps--many involving potential curbs on freedom of expression--to meet
    these threats. Consequently, authorities banned or confiscated numerous
    publications and raided newspaper offices, which encouraged continued
    self-censorship by some journalists.
        Police and the courts continued to limit freedom of expression by
    using restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and several laws, including
    the 1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist propaganda), Article
    312 of the Penal Code (incitement to racial, ethnic, or religious
    enmity), Article 159 (concerning insults to Parliament, the army,
    republic, or judiciary), Article 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic),
    Article 169 (aiding an illegal organization), the Law to Protect
    Ataturk, and Article 16 of the Press Law. During the year there were no
    reports of journalists being returned to jail or trial for violating
    the 3-year ``parole'' following their release under the August 1999
    ``suspension of sentences for journalists'' law. The Committee to
    Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that 14 journalists were imprisoned
    at year's end, compared with 18 in 1999, but some local journalists'
    groups dispute whether all of them are legitimate journalists.
        In September documents became public that allegedly demonstrated
    that senior military figures had debated a plan of action in 1998 to
    discredit Fazilet and HADEP parties, Human Rights Association (HRA)
    Chairman Akin Birdal, and several journalists. Many of the proposed
    actions described in the document did, in fact, occur.
        Prosecutors, courts, and the police continued to take actions
    against those accused of challenging the secular nature or unity of the
    State, generally on the basis of the constitutional restrictions on
    freedom of expression. In August the Government announced a decree that
    would have streamlined procedures for firing civil servants suspected
    of Islamist or separatist tendencies. President Sezer, in a popular
    decision widely viewed as upholding the rule of law, returned the
    decree and argued that Parliament must consider an issue of this
    weight. Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief Huseyin Kivrikoglu issued a
    statement in August reiterating the necessity of such measures and
    urging Parliament to pass appropriate legislation to dismiss civil
    servants who secretly support antistate, Islamist activities, but
    Parliament had not done so by year's end. Government pressure continued
    on the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), widely seen as supporting
    Kurdish cultural and political positions. This included a number of
    police raids and detentions. In June and November, HADEP Secretary
    General Ahmet Turan Demir was convicted of ``disseminating separatist
    propaganda'' and ``supporting an illegal organization;'' his cases are
    on appeal.
        The National Security Council (NSC), a powerful, constitutionally
    mandated advisory body to the Government composed of equal numbers of
    senior military officers and civilian ministers, which is chaired by
    the President, continued to urge the Government to fight against the
    perceived threat of radical Islam and accused Islamist media of
    extremism and undermining the State. In March Islamist former Prime
    Minister Necmettin Erbakan was convicted under Article 312 of the Penal
    Code for ``promoting enmity'' along religious lines, for a speech he
    made in 1994 in which he referred to parliamentarians as ``infidels.''
    His appeal was turned down in July, and he was sentenced to 1 year's
    imprisonment. However, his prison sentence was suspended by the ``Law
    on Probation of Sentences and Deferment of Judgements.'' In August the
    Ankara SSC prosecutor filed an indictment against Fetullah Gulen, the
    leader of a moderate Islamic ``Tarikat,'' a Sufi religious order, on
    charges of plotting to overthrow the State by force. That investigation
    continued at year's end.
        Both HADEP and the Islamist Fazilet Party, whose predecessor
    parties the Government previously had closed, continued to be the
    subjects of closure cases during the year for alleged
    anticonstitutional activities. The cases were pending at year's end,
    and elected officials of both parties remained in office and were able
    to perform their duties.
        The state of emergency governor, courts, police, and the state
    broadcasting oversight body denied the Kurdish population, the largest
    single ethnic group in the southeast, the use of its language in
    election campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some cultural
    activities. Kurdish language broadcasting remains illegal, although
    some senior government officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign
    Minister Ismail Cem, Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, and the head of
    Turkey's intelligence service, have supported publicly the idea of
    legalizing such broadcasts, thereby opening public debate on the issue.
    The military has spoken out against this step. Although printed
    material in Kurdish is legal, the police continue to interfere with the
    distribution of some newspapers, and the governor of the emergency
    region banned some Kurdish-language publications in that predominantly
    Kurdish area. Kurdish music recordings are widely available, but bans
    on numerous songs and singers persist. Few radio stations play Kurdish
    music. The Government's broadcast monitoring agency closed some
    stations for playing banned Kurdish music. In all these cases, the
    Government's argument for doing so was the allegedly objectionable
    political content.
        The police and Jandarma continued to restrict freedom of assembly
    and association by strictly enforcing existing laws against unlawful
    meetings and demonstrations. The police beat, abused, detained, and
    harassed some demonstrators but showed restraint in other instances.
    For example, during the Kurdish holiday of Nevruz, authorities for the
    first time granted permission for a major celebration just outside of
    Diyarbakir. The gathering of more than 80,000 persons was peaceful,
    with no detentions, and the police interacted positively with the
    crowd.
        The Government continued to impose some restrictions on religious
    minorities and on some forms of religious expression, and, at times,
    imposed some limits on freedom of movement. The Government, which
    argues that some human rights groups pursue extremist political
    agendas, continued to harass, indict, and imprison human rights
    monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed in
    public forums. The Diyarbakir branch of the leading human rights
    nongovernmental organization (NGO), the HRA was able to reopen in April
    but the Government ordered it closed again within 3 weeks. It reopened
    in October. Other NGO branches have been closed, temporarily or
    indefinitely, especially in the southeast. The HRA office in Van was
    closed from May to August but has since reopened; however, four HRA
    offices were closed at year's end for activities related to prison
    protests. Former HRA President Akin Birdal returned to prison in March
    to serve out his 9-month sentence for ``inciting hatred and enmity'' in
    nonviolent statements he made about the Kurdish problem and torture. He
    was released in September.
        Violence against women, particularly spousal abuse, remained a
    serious problem, and discrimination against women persisted. Abuse of
    children and restrictions on ethnic minorities remained serious
    problems. Child labor remained a serious problem, although to a
    diminishing degree.
        There are some restrictions on worker rights. Trafficking in women
    and girls to Turkey for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem.
        The situation in the southeast remained a serious concern. The
    Government has long denied the Kurdish population, who are a majority
    in the southeast, basic cultural and linguistic rights. The conflict
    between government security forces and separatist PKK terrorists slowed
    considerably, with only about 45 armed clashes during the year,
    according to the military. Past cases of extrajudicial killings went
    unsolved, and the police and Jandarma tortured civilians. The state of
    emergency authority abridged freedom of expression and association and
    put disproportionate pressure on Kurdish NGO's and HADEP. The number of
    villagers forcibly evacuated from their homes since the conflict began
    is estimated credibly to be between 380,000 and 1 million. There was
    one report of a village burning in October (see Section 1.e and 1.g).
    The Government gave permission for thousands of returns and initiated
    resettlement efforts; some villagers return by themselves. More than
    10,000 persons have returned to their villages or moved to
    ``consolidated villages'' near their original homes.
        In January the Government suspended the sentence of execution for
    convicted PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, pending the results of his appeal
    to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In December the ECHR
    accepted Ocalan's petition and will inquire into allegations regarding
    irregularities of his capture and trial in Turkey. Human rights
    observers, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
    (UNHCHR), had raised several due process concerns in the Ocalan case.
        The Government of Prime Minister Ecevit continued to place a strong
    emphasis on human rights issues; however, Parliament did not pass any
    human rights legislation in the first half of the year. In September
    the Cabinet debated and adopted, as a working and reference document,
    the ``Copenhagen Criteria'' report on steps Turkey must take to be in
    compliance with the European Union (EU)'s political criteria. The
    report, also known as the ``Demirok Report,'' is an ambitious and
    comprehensive work plan of constitutional, legislative, and
    administrative reforms that addresses questions of free speech and
    assembly, the composition and powers of the NSC, and the role of the
    judiciary. In December Parliament passed the ``Law on Probation of
    Sentences and Deferment of Judgements'' granting conditional release to
    thousands of prison inmates and suspending the trials of hundreds of
    others. Some persons jailed on charges related to free expression, or
    to non-violent ``support'' for outlawed organizations, will benefit
    from this measure. Those convicted of torture will not be released, but
    those convicted of mistreatment or murder of detainees may benefit from
    the law. Partly in the context of EU accession requirements, officials
    continued to participate in a wide-ranging public debate on democracy
    and human rights. Senior jurists, the President, politicians, and
    public figures discussed amending the 1982 postmilitary coup era
    Constitution in order to allow greater individual liberties. Public
    discussion of options for dealing with the southeast, particularly
    Kurdish cultural and linguistic issues, was vigorous. In addition the
    parliamentary Human Rights Committee issued a series of reports mid-
    year that detail the existence of torture in prisons and places of
    detention.
        The armed forces emphasize human rights in training for officers
    and noncommissioned officers. Human rights groups attribute the limited
    number of human rights violations by military personnel to this effort.
    Human rights education in primary schools is mandatory, and it is an
    elective in high schools. Police and Jandarma also receive human rights
    training.
        PKK abuses, which were common during its violent 16-year campaign
    against the Government and civilians, slowed considerably and were no
    longer an important factor of daily life in the southeast. In recent
    years, military pressure significantly reduced the PKK's effectiveness,
    and some PKK members--although not all--are heeding Ocalan's call for
    an end to the armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey. Violence
    declined to the point where the public's freedom to travel at night no
    longer is restricted in parts of the southeast. Thousands of heavily
    armed, militarily organized PKK members remain encamped in neighboring
    countries close to Turkey's borders.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Credible reports of
    extrajudicial killings by government authorities continued. Although
    accurate figures were unavailable, figures were down from last year.
    For the first time in many years, the Human Rights Foundation (HRF)
    documentation center reported no deaths of detainees under torture.
    However, in December, 31 prison inmates and 2 security officials died
    following police intervention into widespread hunger strikes and other
    violent protests over F-type prisons (see Section 1.c.). Over the year,
    another five detainees died under suspicious circumstances such as
    alleged suicide. Investigations in these cases were rare, and in some
    cases the prisoners' associates confirmed the case as a suicide. More
    than 20 persons were shot to death by police, Jandarma, and the
    military allegedly for not heeding a ``stop warning'' during arrest or
    commission of a crime, illegal entry into the country, or in accidental
    shootings. In September Jandarma shot and killed Yilmaz Ozcan,
    allegedly while trying to capture him. Ozcan had cut down a tree
    without permission and was supposed to turn himself in for a jail
    sentence. According to the HRF, in October three villagers allegedly
    were killed by soldiers in Hakkari province when they returned to their
    home village to collect walnuts. Relatives who retrieved the bodies
    alleged that the victims' hands were tied behind their backs.
        Some raids on criminals or alleged terrorist and militant safe
    houses by security forces resulted in deaths, sometimes due to
    excessive force. More than 20 persons died during such raids; most were
    allegedly members of the Hizbullah extremist group. Several police also
    died during the raids. More than 25 persons--mainly children or
    military personnel--were killed by mines in the southeast; many more
    were maimed.
        The courts undertook investigations of most alleged extrajudicial
    killings; however, only a few yielded concrete results. The number of
    arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low compared with the
    number of incidents, and convictions remained rare. In November a
    police officer was arrested in Istanbul after fatally shooting a 14-
    year-old bystander during the apprehension of an unarmed robbery
    suspect. Punishments, when handed down, were generally minimal.
    Jurisdictional questions, efforts by the police leadership to protect
    officers, prosecutors' failure to investigate and bring charges, and
    the failure of courts to hand down appropriate sentences were all
    obstacles to resolving the problem of apparent security force impunity
    for such deaths. In some cases, monetary fines have not kept pace with
    the high rate of inflation.
        After the Constitutional Court in January 1999 annulled part of the
    1996 Provincial Authority Law allowing security officers to ``fire
    directly and without hesitation'' at persons who ignored a warning to
    stop, the Government did not issue a new regulation. Therefore, the old
    law on police duties and authorities remains in force, stipulating that
    police must apply certain procedures before firing.
        In cases of past extrajudicial killings by police, Jandarma, or
    prison guards, 24 trials were begun during the year or continued from
    previous years. Another eight trials ended this year. Out of the 67
    police or Jandarma on trial in these 8 cases, 2 were convicted and 65
    were acquitted. In January the Court of Cassation reversed the
    Diyarbakir SSC's verdict that convicted six members of a Jandarma
    antinarcotics squad accused of killing a businessman in 1991. A new
    trial for the six officers began in May.
        The trial continued of six police officers who shot and killed two
    suspects in Adana in October 1999. Four of the officers face sentences
    of between 24 and 30 years, and the chief superintendent and another
    officer face 6 to 15 years in jail on charges of deliberate homicide.
    The officers remain on duty. Two of these officers also had been on
    trial for the January 1998 shooting deaths of three persons in Adana,
    along with another officer. The three were acquitted in April on the
    grounds of self-defense.
        Following an investigation of the September 1999 incident at
    Ulucanlar prison, where Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously
    injured others during a disturbance, a prosecutor ruled that no
    criminal prosecution of the security officials was necessary. A court
    upheld this decision in May. A trial also began in October in the case
    of 85 prisoners for the deaths of 5 other prisoners during the
    incident. In June the Ankara regional administrative court reversed the
    earlier ``nonprosecution'' decision, allowing a case to be opened
    against 150 Jandarma and soldiers. A report by the parliamentary Human
    Rights Committee into the Ulucanlar incident states that security
    forces ``fired with an intent to kill'' and inflicted torture.
    According to the report, medical treatment of prisoners involved in the
    incident was delayed or denied. Furthermore, autopsies of the prisoners
    who died indicated that some may have been shot at close range or
    tortured before being shot, contradicting the authorities' version of
    events. Then-committee chair Sema Piskinsut added publicly that since
    the autopsy findings did not meet international standards and some
    evidence such as prisoners' clothing was removed, the results were
    inconclusive.
        In September the Izmir security directorate police investigation
    board recommended that the policemen accused of killing Alpaslan Yelden
    in custody in July 1999, in an attempt to get his confession, should be
    expelled from the force. A complaint was filed against the policemen at
    the Izmir public prosecutor's office. A court case continues against
    three police officers accused of murdering trade unionist Suleyman
    Yeter in March 1999 while he was in custody at the Istanbul security
    directorate political police center. Yeter had been a plaintiff in an
    ongoing trial of eight police officers who allegedly had tortured and
    raped detainees in 1997.
        On January 20, a final Appeals Court upheld the sentences of 7 or
    more years' imprisonment for five police officers convicted of beating
    journalist Metin Goktepe to death in 1996. The court also ruled that
    the police superintendent on duty, Seydi Kose, should be tried for
    misuse of power rather than murder. In April, Kose was sentenced to 1
    year's imprisonment (8 months' imprisonment on this charge), relieved
    from public service for 5 months, and fined the equivalent of 1 dollar.
    He was released for time served during the trial. Goktepe, a
    correspondent for the left-wing newspaper, Evrensel, died from wounds
    inflicted while in detention in Istanbul in 1996. Police initially
    denied that he was detained, then later said that he died from a fall.
        The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 anti-terror police
    officers charged with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10
    prisoners while quelling a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir, continued
    into its fifth year.
        In March a Trabzon criminal court convicted two policemen for their
    role in causing the deaths of nine persons during riots in Gazi,
    Istanbul in March 1995. The trial, which began in November 1996, was
    moved from Istanbul for security reasons. The court sentenced one
    policeman to a total of 96 years' imprisonment (24 each for four
    victims) but reduced the sentence to 6 years and 8 months, in part
    because the victims had been acting illegally and because the defendant
    surrendered voluntarily. He was released for time served and suspended
    from public service for 4.5 months. Another policeman was given two 24-
    year sentences, but these were reduced, for the same reasons, to 3
    years and 4 months (with a suspension from public service for 2.5
    months). He also was released for time served. The other 18 policemen
    were acquitted because the court ruled that there was no definitive or
    convincing evidence against them.
        The trial continued in Istanbul of policeman Abdullah Bozkurt for
    the 1994 shooting and killing of Vedat Han Gulsenoglu. Bozkurt has not
    appeared for trial sessions for a year, leading to continued
    postponements. According to the victim's lawyer, Bozkurt currently
    works as a policeman in Isparta. He is under a ruling of imprisonment
    in absentia for the duration of the trial. In July the court board
    decided to send a letter to the police station to locate the gun used
    in the incident, to initiate an investigation of why Bozkurt cannot be
    found, and to make a complaint against officials who did not carry out
    Bozkurt's arrest. There were no results of these actions at year's end.
        In November the Diyarbakir Provincial Administrative Board decided
    to refuse a request for prosecution of police officers who allegedly
    killed 18-year-old detainee Hamit Cakar in 1998. Cakar, detained
    following a hunger strike at Diyarbakir's HADEP provincial organization
    building, died in custody allegedly due to ``cardiac problems.''
    Lawyers for Cakar's family have appealed to the Supreme Administrative
    Court (Danistay.)
        The ECHR ruled against Turkey on nine cases during the year in
    which persons had been killed in detention or taken into custody and
    then disappeared. In all of these cases, the court noted that domestic
    legal remedies were insufficient. However, in one case the court ruled
    that security forces were not responsible for the death of a Kurdish
    activist, and that the State had taken reasonable measures to find the
    real killers.
        According to human rights monitors, there were no killings of high-
    profile, pro-Kurdish figures in the southeast or of proKurdish
    politicians, journalists, or lawyers. The HRF reported a nationwide
    total of 10 unsolved killings, some of which may have had a political
    component. In May the Diyarbakir Provincial Chairman for the right-wing
    National Action Party (MHP) was killed while walking near his home. In
    December a human rights activist in Eskisehir was allegedly abducted by
    persons claiming to be police officers, forced to drink pesticide, and
    left for dead (although he was found and taken to a hospital, where he
    recovered). According to information provided by the Governor of
    Eskisehir, the assailants were criminals posing as police officers.
        The PKK discontinued its practice of targeted political murders,
    but it remains armed and in some cases clashed with soldiers, Jandarma,
    and state-paid paramilitary village guards. According to the Turkish
    National Police, during the year, 35 security officials and 24
    civilians died in terrorist incidents, and 270 PKK members were killed
    by security forces (see Section 1.g.).
        In January police discovered evidence of the Turkish Hizbullah
    terrorist group's kidnaping and killing of moderate Islamic business
    figures, religious leaders, and intellectuals, including prominent
    Islamist feminist Konca Kuris. The Government captured dozens of
    alleged Hizbullah militants and in July indicted 21 for a number of
    murders, including those of Ahmet Taner Kislali and Ugur Mumcu. An
    unrelated suspect in Mumcu's killing had been held in custody since the
    previous year; he was released from custody but remains on trial.
        According to the office of the emergency region governor, over
    2,600 persons in that region alone were detained this year on suspicion
    of links to Hizbullah (see Section 1.g.). Some of these were teachers
    and imams. Many alleged Hizbullah members claim that they were tortured
    in custody, a claim that has been supported in some cases by medical
    evidence. Some murders from previous years, especially of moderate
    Kurdish leaders, may have been committed by Hizbullah. A Hizbullah
    suspect reportedly confessed in police custody that he murdered Ramazan
    Sat in 1992 for ``being a PKK member.''
        Far-left armed groups, such as Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C),
    the Islamic Eastern Raider's Front (IBDA-C), and the Turkish Workers
    and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO), continued to commit acts of
    terrorism, in some cases leading to deaths.
        b. Disappearance.--Unlike the previous year, there were no reports
    of disappearances of political activists. Accurate statistics on the
    disappearance of those previously under detention, or seen being taken
    into custody by security forces or law enforcement officials, are hard
    to confirm. However, the HRF claims that there were no such
    disappearances in 2000, compared with 36 of this type in 1999.
        In March a trial ended for two police officers in connection with
    the disappearance of suspect Mural Yildiz in 1995. The two were
    convicted of ``negligence of duty;'' a 3-month prison term was
    converted to a fine of about $2 (1.2 million TL). The judge apologized
    to Yildiz's mother for the fact that inflation had rendered the
    monetary fine meaningless.
        There was no new information available on the case of Aydin Esmer,
    who disappeared according to Amnesty International (AI) in September
    1999 while returning to his home in Diyarbakir province from Mus
    province.
        The body of Omer Cinar, who disappeared in Istanbul in November
    1999, was discovered in one of the ``grave houses'' where Hizbullah
    operatives killed and buried their victims. His body was found in the
    Beykoz district of Istanbul in January, along with nine other bodies,
    and police confirmed his identity.
        No charges have been filed in the 1998 disappearances from Izmir of
    editors Neslihan Uslu, Hasan Aydogan, Metin Andac, and Mehmet Mandal.
    The 1997 disappearances of Ilyas Eren and 73-year-old Fikri Ozgen, who
    allegedly were taken into custody by plainclothes police, were not
    resolved.
        The Government made efforts to investigate and explain some
    reported cases of disappearance. The Ministry of Interior operates the
    Bureau for the Investigation of Missing Persons, which is open 24 hours
    a day. Since 1996, according to the Ministry of Interior, 425
    applications of a political nature for missing persons were made. Of
    these, 88 were found alive, 18 were in prison, 46 died, and 273 were
    still missing at year's end. Most families of persons who disappeared
    hold the Government and security forces responsible and consequently
    avoid contact with the government office. AI criticizes the bureau's
    findings for falling short of the thorough and impartial investigations
    required in accordance with international standards. The Ankara police
    operate a telephone number through which the public can obtain
    information about detainees.
        The PKK's practice of kidnaping young men or threatening their
    families as part of its recruiting effort and abductions by PKK
    terrorists of local villagers and state officials has virtually ended,
    due to reduced PKK capabilities in the southeast and calls by its
    captured leader Ocalan for the PKK to withdraw from its former
    operating areas in the country.
        c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, members of
    the security forces continue to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse
    persons regularly. Despite the Government's cooperation with
    unscheduled foreign inspection teams, public pledges by successive
    governments to end the practice, and government initiatives designed to
    address the problem, torture continues to be widespread. However, based
    on reports from a number of sources, the incidence of torture appears
    to have declined somewhat, especially in the southeast, where there
    have been fewer political detentions.
        Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture
    say that most persons detained for or suspected of political crimes
    usually suffer some torture at the hands of police and Jandarma during
    periods of incommunicado detention before they are brought before a
    court; ordinary criminal suspects also report frequent torture and
    mistreatment by police. The HRF estimates the number of credible
    applications by torture victims at its 5 national treatment centers to
    be approximately 1,030 in 2000, compared with some 700 in 1999. These
    figures include complaints stemming from previous years' incidents. The
    HRF believes that these numbers seriously underrepresent the actual
    number of persons tortured while in detention or prison. Human rights
    advocates believe that thousands of detainees were tortured during the
    year in the southeast, where the problem is particularly serious, but
    that only 5 to 20 percent report torture because they fear retaliation
    or believe that complaints are futile.
        Some of the factors affecting the rate of torture are the use of
    incommunicado detention and the number of detentions in general;
    reduced PKK violence, which has eased treatment by security officials;
    and increased concern about the problem from many sources. Human rights
    monitors report improvement in some areas of the country, especially in
    the first 6 months of the year, but problems continued, especially in
    more rural areas. All report that torture remains widespread in the
    southeast and in large cities.
        Because the arresting officer is responsible for interrogating the
    suspect, officers frequently resort to torture to obtain a confession
    that would justify the arrest. There is allegedly a difference in
    police practice for those arrested for ordinary crimes (who are beaten
    until they give a confession) and those arrested for ``political''
    crimes. If suspects detained under the Anti-Terror Law do not produce
    information and confessions, interrogators often allegedly shift from
    beatings to electric shock, cold water from high-pressure hoses, and
    other methods. Observers say that security officials often torture
    political detainees simply to express anger and to intimidate the
    detainees.
        Human rights monitors and medical experts say that security
    officials often use methods that do not leave physical traces, such as
    beating with weighted bags instead of clubs or fists. A new method that
    was reported is the application of electric shocks to a metal chair
    where the detainee sits, rather than directly to the body. Commonly
    employed methods of torture reported by the HRF's treatment centers
    include: Systematic beatings; stripping and blindfolding; exposure to
    extreme cold or high-pressure cold water hoses; electric shocks;
    beatings on the soles of the feet (falaka) and genitalia; hanging by
    the arms; food and sleep deprivation; heavy weights hung on the body;
    water dripped onto the head; burns; hanging sandbags on the neck; near-
    suffocation by placing bags over the head; vaginal and anal rape with
    truncheons and, in some instances, gun barrels; squeezing and twisting
    of testicles; and other forms of sexual abuse. In some cases, multiple
    torture methods (e.g., hanging and electric shocks) are employed at the
    same time. Other methods used are forced prolonged standing, isolation,
    loud music, witnessing or hearing torture, being driven to the
    countryside for a mock execution, and threats to detainees or their
    family members.
        Female detainees often face sexual humiliation and, less
    frequently, more severe forms of sexual torture. After being forced to
    strip in front of male security officers, female detainees often are
    touched, insulted, and threatened with rape. A poll conducted by an NGO
    called the Legal Counsel Project Against Sexual Harassment and Rape
    (affiliated with the HRA) indicated that three-quarters of female
    detainees had experienced sexual violence, but only one-sixth of those
    who had undergone such violence reported it to the authorities.
        The deputy mayor of Diyarbakir, Ramazan Tekin, was detained in
    January and claimed that he was subjected to severe torture. As a
    result of testimony given during this detention, three HADEP mayors
    were arrested the following month for ``assisting the PKK'' (see
    Sections 2.b. and 4). According to news reports, in March the president
    of HADEP's women's commission in Mardin, Gulistan Durc, alleged that
    she was tortured while in detention. Durc, who was detained under
    suspicion of supporting the PKK, was sent to a Diyarbakir hospital for
    treatment following a medical exam. The governor refused permission to
    put the police officers involved on trial. The prosecutor opposed this
    decision and appealed it to the regional administrative court, which
    upheld the governor's ruling. The prosecutor then agreed to drop the
    case; Durc's lawyer has appealed to the Mardin penal court.
        In May the Izmir SSC acquitted Dr. Zeki Uzun of charges that he
    supported the PKK by providing medical treatment to two female
    terrorists. Uzun, a gynecologist who volunteers at the HRF Izmir
    treatment and rehabilitation center, was taken into custody in October
    1999 during a raid on his private clinic by anti-terror police. He
    credibly reported being tortured in detention. Uzun filed a formal
    complaint against the Izmir anti-terror department, but a prosecutor
    concluded that there were insufficient grounds to pursue a case. In
    August Dr. Uzun opened a compensation case against the Interior
    Ministry for his torture and against some newspapers for slander. His
    attorney applied to the ECHR with a complaint of prolonged detention,
    torture, and violation of Dr. Uzun's individual rights.
        In May the Public Prosecutor's Office in Mardin indicted seven
    police officers for allegedly raping and torturing a female suspect in
    1992. When preparing the indictment the prosecutor accepted an
    alternative medical report by the HRF's Istanbul torture treatment
    center. Prosecutors and courts have used such reports only a few times,
    since normally all medical reports come from state-employed doctors.
    The alleged victim was hospitalized several times during the period of
    her detention. The police officers remain on duty.
        Government officials admit that torture occurs but deny that it is
    systematic. In September State Minister for Human Rights Rustu Yucelen
    said publicly, after visiting a detention center in Icel, that the
    State was opposed to torture and that ``speculation'' that the police
    were using torture was initiated by powers acting against Turkey. In
    response to criticism from the HRA, he said that his remarks had been
    misunderstood and that torture was against state policy. The Ecevit
    Government was in regular dialog with the Council of Europe's Committee
    for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The Government accepted an
    unannounced visit by the CPT in July and invited members of the
    committee to help in the prison crisis in December, and allowed the
    publication of 1999 and 2000 CPT visit reports.
        Regulations on detention were supplemented in 1999 by a directive
    against torture from the Prime Minister, which called for public
    prosecutors to make unscheduled inspections of places of detention. The
    Parliamentary Human Rights Committee also has publicly called on
    prosecutors to carry out this aspect of their job more effectively. The
    Prime Minister asked for reports from prosecutors every 3 months on
    this process. According to officials at the Ministry of Interior, over
    a thousand inspections have been made and these reports are on file
    with the High Council for Human Rights Coordination. According to
    Minister for Human Rights Yucelen, from July to September, a total of
    2,309 inspections (at both police and Jandarma stations) were carried
    out. The reports were not made public. Although some provincial
    authorities said that the inspections uncovered no deficiencies, others
    claimed that they led to some improvements in practices. Human rights
    observers say that the inspections and reports are cursory at best, do
    not include any detainee interviews, and give a false impression of
    government attention to the problem. They also question prosecutors'
    ability to influence police practices. There is little public awareness
    of these visits.
        Private attorneys and human rights monitors continue to report
    uneven implementation of the right to immediate access to an attorney
    by those arrested for common crimes and access after 14 days of
    detention for those detained under the Anti-Terror Law. No immediate
    access to an attorney is provided for under the law for persons whose
    cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. This
    includes individuals suspected of drug trafficking, smuggling, and
    crimes under the Anti-Terror Law. The lack of early access to an
    attorney is a major factor in the occurrence of torture by police and
    security forces.
        State-employed doctors give all medical exams for detainees. The
    Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during
    detention and a second time before either arraignment or release;
    however, the examinations generally are exceedingly brief and informal,
    often lasting less than a minute. In some cases doctors were brought
    reports to sign, but no examinees. Former detainees assert that some
    medical examinations occur too long after the event to reveal any
    definitive evidence of torture. Lawyers contend that medical reports--
    their only basis for filing a claim of torture--are not placed
    regularly in prisoners' files.
        Pressures against doctors continue. In 1999 the governor of
    Istanbul tried to get a doctor fired from her job at Istanbul
    University. The doctor, Sebnem Korur Fincanci, had certified that trade
    unionist Suleyman Yeter had been killed under torture while in
    detention (see Section 1.a.). Fincanci filed suit and a compensation
    trial against the governor opened in May at the Istanbul Penal Court.
    She claimed that he had accused her, in a letter to the university
    president, of ``having sympathy for illegal left-wing views'' and going
    to ``extreme'' lengths to prove that the police officers were guilty of
    Yeter's death. The court ruled that the trial could take place since
    writing the letter was outside the governor's official duties. However,
    in November the Penal Court decided not to pursue the case and
    forwarded the file to the Administrative Court for its consideration.
    Fincanci has appealed.
        Citing security reasons, members of security and police forces
    often stay in the examination room when physicians are examining
    detainees, resulting in the intimidation of both the detainee and the
    physician. Since September, however, Health Ministry regulations have
    allowed doctors to ask security force members to leave during
    examinations. However, some doctors claim that in practice they cannot
    do so because they could face disciplinary procedures or court cases.
    According to the Medical Association and other human rights observers,
    the presence of a security officer--at times the one allegedly
    responsible for torture--can lead physicians to refrain from examining
    detainees, perform cursory examinations and not report findings, or
    report physical findings but not draw reasonable medical inferences
    that torture occurred.
        The law mandates heavy jail sentences and fines for medical
    personnel who falsify reports to hide torture, those who knowingly use
    such reports, and those who coerce doctors into making them. The
    highest penalties are for doctors who supply false reports for money.
    In practice there are few such prosecutions. Dr. Nur Birgen,
    chairperson of a state forensic medical facility in Istanbul, was
    convicted in December of giving false medical reports and concealing
    evidence of torture. The court sentenced her to 3 months' imprisonment,
    less than the normal 6-month minimum sentence, and then commuted the
    sentence to a suspended $1.50 (1 million TL) fine. Birgen had been
    sanctioned in 1998 by the Turkish Medical Doctor's Association, and her
    medical license was ordered suspended for 6 months. However, the
    Justice Ministry concluded that since Dr. Birgen is a state employee,
    the suspension fell under a September 1999 law that offered amnesty for
    administrative punishments for civil servants. The Medical Association
    filed suit objecting to this decision and the Ankara Administrative
    Court ruled that the Justice Ministry's action was illegal. Meanwhile,
    a trial continues against a lawyer who pressed for Birgen's suspension
    for insulting her by comparing her to the Nazi doctor Josef Mengele.
        The investigation, prosecution, and punishment of members of the
    security forces for torture or other mistreatment is rare, and accused
    officers usually remain on duty pending a decision, which can take
    years. According to the TNP, judicial action taken during the year
    against police charged with torture or mistreatment resulted in 72
    convictions, 273 acquittals, and 19 ongoing prosecutions.
    Administrative decisions determined that no trial was needed in 252
    other cases, and that no charges needed to be brought against 140 other
    officers accused of abuse. During the year, 63 police officers also
    were given administrative punishments, such as suspensions, for torture
    or mistreatment, while a decision not to investigate was given in 890
    cases. According to the Jandarma, 253 Jandarma were prosecuted during
    the year, resulting in 52 convictions, 53 acquittals, and 149 ongoing
    trials. No military personnel were prosecuted for torture; there is no
    new information on previous years' trials.
        According to the Justice Ministry, during the year 1,258 cases were
    brought to prosecutors against police and Jandarma, and of these, 664
    investigations are ongoing; 422 indictments were forwarded to the
    courts, and 172 cases did not go forward. The courts concluded 165 of
    the 422 cases they received, resulting in 71 convictions, 79
    acquittals, and 15 not authorized or improper jurisdiction decisions;
    another 257 cases were ongoing.
        Legal, administrative, and bureaucratic barriers impede
    prosecutions and contribute to the low number of convictions for
    torture. The December 1999 Civil Servant Prosecution Law has not
    resulted in an immediate change in approach by the State to allowing
    prosecutions, since civil servants are generally immune from direct
    prosecution unless their superiors grant permission to investigate
    them. The law authorizes prosecutors to begin collecting evidence
    immediately to substantiate claims of torture by security officials,
    but in practice this rarely occurs. Within a 30-day deadline, with a
    possible 15-day extension, a civil servant's supervisor supposedly must
    decide whether that employee can be prosecuted (or whether the employee
    is to be disciplined otherwise). In at least one high-profile case--
    that of Ramazan Tekin, the deputy mayor of Diyarbakir--this deadline
    was not observed. This provision has been widely criticized. Many
    jurists as well as human rights observers have said that the new law
    still falls short of the needed reform. The law allows prosecutors to
    open investigations against persons suspected of falsely accusing a
    civil servant based on ``enmity, hatred or slandering.''
        The failure to enforce domestic and international bans on torture
    fosters a climate of official impunity that encourages the systematic
    abuse of detainees. Detainees state that prosecutors ignore their
    claims of abuse during interrogation. Some prosecutors believe that all
    allegations of torture are manipulated by political organizations such
    as the PKK and claim that detainees fabricate torture claims and injure
    themselves to accuse and defame the security forces.
        Under the criminal procedures law, prosecutors may initiate
    investigations of police or Jandarma officers suspected of torturing or
    mistreating suspects. In cases where township security directors or
    Jandarma commanders are accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain
    permission to initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice,
    because these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of
    judges. Finally, in the state of emergency regions, any prosecution or
    legal action directed at government authorities must be approved by the
    state of emergency Governor. Approval is rare.
        In February the then-chair of Parliament's Human Rights Committee,
    Sema Piskinsut, and two other Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) led an
    unannounced early morning raid on an Istanbul police station. This
    unprecedented raid was based on tips that this particular police
    station was notorious for torture, gathered during a prison research
    trip from women and children who were prisoners. The M.P.'s seized
    several instruments of torture, including a so-called ``Palestinian
    hanger,'' and required the police chief to sign a statement affirming
    that these were found in his station. She showed the torture implements
    to the press and publicly called for an investigation. When the
    investigation appeared to be stalled, another M.P. on her committee
    pressed the Interior Ministry for action. According to the Turkish
    National Police, the many administrative processes necessary to
    investigate the subprovincial security director and the chief of the
    police station, were nearly complete at year's end. However, the public
    prosecutor decided not to pursue a judicial case against the two
    officials. The police station has been pulled down and a new station is
    being constructed, according to an Istanbul M.P. Soon after the raid,
    Interior Minister Tantan met with Parliament's Human Rights Committee
    and said publicly that ``it is a mistake to define human rights only as
    violations by security forces.''
        A higher court reversed a January decision by the Iskendurun chief
    public prosecutor not to prosecute anti-terror police accused of
    sexually harassing, raping with a truncheon, and torturing two female
    high school students arrested in March 1999. The trial of the four
    police officers began in March. However, at the same time, the
    conviction of the two girls on grounds of belonging to a terrorist
    organization and firebombing a bus--a conviction based solely on the
    confessions allegedly obtained under torture--was upheld by the Court
    of Cassation in June. The girls are serving 12-year and 18-year
    sentences.
        Five defendants in Istanbul have been jailed since 1995 without
    having been convicted (they are accused of being members of TIKKO).
    Their trial is pending the outcome of a case against five police
    officers accused of torturing them. At a September hearing in the case,
    none of the accused police officers appeared in court, the case was
    postponed again, and the detainees were sent back to jail.
        Songul Yildiz was acquitted in 1997 on charges of being a PKK
    member. In 1997 two policemen received 10-month suspended sentences for
    mistreatment and were suspended from the police force for 2.5 months;
    both were still on duty by year's end.
        A case against 12 policemen accused of torturing the September 1997
    ``Musa Anter Peace Train'' detainees continues, but charges may be
    suspended under a new law (see Section 4).
        On November 15, the Manisa court sentenced 10 policemen to between
    5 and 10 years in jail for torturing 15 teenagers in Manisa in 1995.
    The court found that the students exhibited evidence of physical and
    psychological torture while under detention; lawyers for the teenagers
    said that their clients were tortured by means of beating, electric
    shocks, hosing with cold pressurized water after having been stripped,
    and sexual abuse. The policemen previously had been acquitted twice due
    to lack of evidence, but each time the appeals court overruled the
    acquittal and ordered a retrial. The policemen cannot appeal the
    November decision again, but have applied to the Court of Cassation to
    reduce their sentences. The case against the students at the State
    Security Court in Izmir ended with their acquittal in late November.
    The Court of Cassation had overturned the January 1997 convictions of
    10 of the students on charges of belonging to an illegal leftist
    organization; 4 other students originally were acquitted.
        Police harass, beat, and abuse demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
    Police also harass and abuse journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        The ECHR ruled against Turkey in several cases of torture from
    previous years. In one case the victim had suffered brain damage. The
    ECHR noted that domestic legal remedies were insufficient because
    prosecutors had not taken adequate steps to investigate the torture
    claims.
        Prison conditions remain poor. With some exceptions (i.e., for
    high-profile political prisoners or for those with gang connections),
    prisons remain plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and very poor
    administration. Despite the existence of separate juvenile facilities,
    juveniles and adults sometimes are incarcerated together, and most
    prisons lack adequate medical care for routine treatment or even
    medical emergencies. Families often must supplement the poor quality
    food. Human rights observers estimate that at any given time, at least
    one-quarter of those in prison are awaiting trial or the outcome of
    their trial.
        In most cases, prisons are run on the ward system. Prisoners with
    similar ideological views are incarcerated together and, in some cases
    indoctrinate and punish their own, resulting in gang and terrorist
    group domination of entire wards. The Ministry of Justice said publicly
    in December that it has not fully controlled the prisons since 1991.
    Efforts by the Ministry of Justice over the past year to construct and
    transfer inmates to a small-group ``F-type'' cell system were
    criticized strongly by human rights groups and prisoners' groups.
    Groups linked to terrorist organizations claimed that the ward system
    was a more humane form of incarceration. Critics of the F-type cells
    claim that these cells allow authorities to isolate single inmates or
    small groups of prisoners from other inmates, and to control prisoners'
    access to water, food, electricity, and toilets.
        In November and December, hundreds of prisoners, mostly affiliated
    with far-left terrorist groups, went on hunger strikes to protest F-
    type prisons, claiming that they intended to starve themselves to
    death. The Government entered the prisons in December, after the fast
    had reached its sixtieth day and negotiations to end it had not been
    successful. During and after the government intervention, at least 31
    inmates and 2 Jandarma were killed. Weapons and other illegal materials
    were found in the cells during the operation. The cause of many of the
    deaths--including those who allegedly set themselves on fire on the
    order of their organization--is unclear. The Government, not following
    normal practice, refused to allow prisoner families or lawyers to see
    autopsy results. No open investigation has been planned, although there
    may be internal disciplinary proceedings for some prison officials.
    Some prisoners were transferred to newly-opened cell-system prisons.
    Two members of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee visited one of
    the new prisons at the end of the year. According to their report, 341
    prisoners from 5 other jails had been transferred to the new cell-
    system prison. Some of them, as well as prisoners in other jails,
    continued their hunger strikes while many others complained of brutal
    handling by the authorities or inadequate medical treatment. Prisoners'
    strikes and demonstrations by supporters' groups and human rights
    organizations, particularly the HRA, continued and in many cases led to
    detentions. Four offices of the HRA were closed in November and
    December for activities relating to the prison protests (see Section
    4.)
        During an attempt to bring prisoners to their court appearances in
    July, prison authorities injured 61 inmates at Burdur Prison. One
    prisoner's arm was torn off by machinery used to break down a wall.
    Inmates alleged that they were tortured following the incident.
        In May and June, the Parliament's Human Rights Committee, under
    then-chairman Sema Piskinsut, released a series of comprehensive and
    highly critical reports on prison conditions throughout the country. In
    October Piskinsut was not re-appointed to chair the committee. Some
    critics of the Government claim that this was in response to her
    activism. She was replaced by Huseyin Akgul of the MHP. The reports
    were based on 2 years of visits by the committee (which includes
    members from all 5 political parties represented in Parliament) and
    interviews with over 8,500 inmates. The reports, which also included
    evaluations of some detention sites such as police cells, alleged that
    torture remains widespread in the prison system and that those in
    positions of authority, including prosecutors and provincial governors,
    were not doing enough to ensure adequate living conditions for inmates.
    AI noted that these reports represented a significant step forward by
    officials in documenting torture as well as prison conditions.
        The Government permits prison visits by representatives of some
    international organizations, such as the European Committee to Prevent
    Torture and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. The CPT visited in
    July, and again in December. However, the Government does not allow
    NGO's to visit prisons except for individuals acting in their capacity
    as lawyers. A delegation from AI visited in April and Human Rights
    Watch (HRW) conducted research into prisons over the course of the
    year. Delegations from AI and HRW met with Turkish officials as part of
    their research into prison issues; however, AI and HRW assert that
    during their return visits in December, following the prison crisis,
    government officials declined to meet with them.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention continued to be problems. To take a person into custody, a
    prosecutor must issue a detention order, except when suspects are
    caught committing a crime. The maximum detention period for those
    charged with individual common crimes is 24 hours, which may be
    extended by a judge to a maximum of 7 days; this period is longer for
    groups. In the state of emergency area, the use of a prosecutor's
    detention order is in practice extremely rare. According to the HRA,
    there was significant improvement in the first 8 months of the year in
    numbers of detentions (21,866) compared with the same period in 1999
    (40,380). However, the HRF claims that in the final 2 months of the
    year there was an upsurge in unregistered detentions in connection with
    prison protests.
        Under the Criminal Code, those detained for individual common
    crimes are entitled to immediate access to an attorney and may meet and
    confer with an attorney at any time. In practice, legal experts assert
    that the authorities do not always respect these provisions and that
    most citizens do not exercise this right, either because they are
    unaware of it, or because they fear possibly antagonizing the
    authorities. The court consistently provides attorneys only to minors
    or deaf-mutes who cannot represent themselves. By law a detainee's next
    of kin must be notified as soon as possible after arrest. In criminal
    and civil cases this requirement is observed.
        In state security cases, the pretrial detention period without
    charge is longer, and the law provides for no immediate access to an
    attorney. The lack of early access to an attorney is a major factor in
    the continued use of torture by security forces. Persons detained for
    individual crimes under the Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a
    judge within 48 hours. Those charged with crimes of a collective,
    political, or conspiratorial nature may be detained for an initial
    period of 48 hours, extended for up to 4 days at a prosecutor's
    discretion and, with a judge's permission, which is almost always
    granted, for up to 7 days in most of the country and up to 10 days in
    the southeastern provinces under the state of emergency. Attorneys are
    allowed access only after the first 4 days.
        Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven
    implementation of these regulations, especially attorney access. AI
    asserts that lawyers rarely are permitted adequate access to their
    clients, even after the fourth day, although they may be allowed to
    exchange a few words during a brief interview in the presence of
    security officers. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
    the secretive nature of arrests and detentions often leaves the
    detainee's lawyer and family members with no information about the
    detention, and police often refuse to disclose the place of detention
    or even the fact that the detainee is being held. Current regulations
    on detention and arrest procedures exempt the authorities from the
    obligation to inform relatives in the case of state security
    detentions. In addition legal limits on detention periods at times are
    circumvented by subjecting a detainee to successive charges or
    falsifying detention records. The police maintain 24-hour monitoring
    bureaus that are required to record detentions on computers. According
    to the HRA, in the state of emergency region the police detain, beat,
    and then release groups after the maximum period of detention in order
    to intimidate them.
        Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned by
    a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment the judge may
    release the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as
    bail, or order him detained if the court determines that he is likely
    to flee the jurisdiction or destroy evidence.
        The decision concerning early access to counsel in such cases is
    left to the public prosecutor, who often denies access on the grounds
    that it would prejudice an ongoing investigation. Although the
    Constitution specifies the right of detainees to request speedy
    arraignment and trial, judges have ordered that some suspects be
    detained indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many such cases involve
    persons accused of violent crimes, but there are cases of those accused
    of nonviolent political crimes being kept in custody until the
    conclusion of their trials.
        On several occasions, the police beat and detained peaceful
    demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). During a September protest
    over prison conditions officers beat the relatives of prisoners. The
    police also beat and detained members of political parties (see Section
    3). Students detained while making a press statement in Istanbul in
    June claimed that they were tortured, and one alleged that the police
    broke her arm.
        The Government does not use forced external exile. It retains the
    authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and in practice the general law courts generally
    act independently of the executive and legislative branches; however,
    various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to
    strengthen the judiciary's independence. The Constitution prohibits
    state authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the
    exercise of judicial power; however, in practice the Government and the
    NSC periodically issue announcements or directives about threats to the
    State, which could be interpreted as instructions to the judiciary. The
    High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which is appointed by the
    President and includes the Minister of Justice, selects judges and
    prosecutors for the higher courts and is responsible for oversight of
    those in the lower courts. The composition of the High Council could
    impact the independence of the judiciary; although the Constitution
    provides for security of tenure, the High Council controls the career
    paths of judges through appointments, transfers, promotions, and other
    matters, and its decisions are not subject to review. Various
    government and judicial officials during the year discussed the need to
    adopt legislative changes to strengthen the independence of the
    judiciary.
        The judicial system is composed of general law courts, military
    courts, the SSC's, and the Constitutional Court, the nation's highest
    court. The Court of Cassation hears appeals for criminal cases,
    including from the SSC's. The Council of State hears appeals of
    administrative cases or those between government entities. Most cases
    are prosecuted in the general law courts, which include civil,
    administrative, and criminal courts. Public servants, including police,
    can be tried only after administrative approval from the governor or
    subgovernor, which are centrally appointed positions.
        The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws,
    decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules and hears cases involving
    the banning of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime
    ministers can be tried in the Constitutional Court as well. However,
    the Court may not consider ``decrees with the force of law'' issued
    under a state of emergency, martial law, or in time of war.
        Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases
    involving military law, members of the armed forces, and may try
    civilians who are accused of impugning the honor of the armed forces or
    undermining compliance with the draft.
        SSC's are composed of panels of five members: Three civilian judges
    and two prosecutors. SSC's sit in eight cities and try defendants
    accused of crimes such as terrorism, gang-related crimes, drug
    smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, and espousing or
    disseminating ideas prohibited by law, such as those ``damaging the
    indivisible unity of the State.'' These courts may hold closed hearings
    and may admit testimony obtained during police interrogation in the
    absence of counsel. SSC verdicts may be appealed only to a specialized
    department of the Court of Cassation (Appeals Court) dealing with
    crimes against state security. During the year, the SSC's dealt mainly
    with cases under the Anti-Terror Law and Section 312 of the Criminal
    Code. Human rights observers cite prosecutions of leaders of the
    political Islamic movement, nonviolent political leaders associated
    with the Kurdish issue, and persons who criticize the military or the
    Government's practices as evidence that the SSC's often serve a
    primarily political purpose.
        PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, sentenced to death in 1999, remained in
    prison at year's end. Carrying out the death sentence still requires
    action and approval by the Justice Ministry, the Council of Ministers,
    Parliament, and the President. The Government in January decided to
    agree to the request of the ECHR to suspend the death sentence process
    until the court completes its judicial processes. In December the ECHR
    accepted Ocalan's petition and will inquire into allegations regarding
    irregularities of his capture and trial in the country.
        The law gives prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise the
    police during an investigation. Prosecutors complain that they have few
    resources to do so, and many have begun to call for ``judicial police''
    who could help investigate and gather evidence. Human rights observers
    and Ministry of Justice officials note that problems can arise from the
    fact that the police report to the Interior Ministry, not to the
    courts.
        Prosecutors are charged with determining which law has been broken
    and objectively presenting the facts to the court. Defense lawyers do
    not have equal status with prosecutors. There is no jury system; a
    judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. Trials for political
    crimes or torture frequently last for months or years, with one or two
    hearings scheduled each month. Proceedings against security officials
    often are delayed because officers do not submit statements promptly or
    attend trials. Illegally gathered evidence may be excluded by law.
    However, this rarely occurs and then only after a separate case
    determining the legality of the evidence is resolved. In practice a
    trial based on a confession allegedly coerced under torture may proceed
    and even conclude, before the court has established the merits of the
    torture allegations.
        In January a ``prisons protocol'' signed by the Ministries of
    Justice, Interior, and Health called for intensified searches of those
    entering prisons, including lawyers and prosecutors. The Bar
    Association claims that defense lawyers are searched intensively, in
    contrast to other personnel, and that the new rule permits prison
    officials to confiscate documents from prisoners that may relate to
    their defense. The State is required to return the documents if they
    are defense-related. The Government issued a second circular, in March,
    requesting that those who conduct the searches do so in a respectful
    manner and bear in mind the right of access and of private
    correspondence between a client and his attorney.
        Defense attorneys routinely are denied access to files that the
    State asserts deal with national intelligence or security matters,
    especially in cases heard by SSC's. Furthermore, attorneys defending
    controversial cases have been subject to legal charges, including
    spurious accusations that they are couriers for clients who are alleged
    terrorists. Hasan Dogan, a Malatya attorney who frequently defends
    suspects in SSC cases, was acquitted in 1999 of charges by an informer
    that he was a member of the PKK or assisted the organization. An
    appeals court reversed his acquittal and he was sentenced to 3 years
    and 9 months. He has appealed this verdict and the case was still
    pending. He also faces the same charge in another case, and was
    sentenced in December to 3 years, 9 months. He has applied for a
    suspension of this punishment. Another case was opened against him for
    insulting the military; results were still pending at year's end. The
    trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers charged in 1993 and 1994 for aiding and
    abetting the PKK, and in a few cases with membership in a terrorist
    organization, continued at the Diyarbakir SSC (see Section 4).
        By law the Bar Association must provide free counsel to indigents
    who make a request to the court, except for crimes falling under the
    scope of the SSC's. In practice only a tiny percentage of defendants
    have lawyers. Bar Associations in large cities, such as Istanbul, have
    attorneys on call 24 hours a day. Costs are borne by the Association.
    Defense lawyers generally have access to the public prosecutor's files
    only after arraignment.
        In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate
    against minorities. Legal proceedings are conducted solely in Turkish
    with some interpreting available; however, some defendants whose native
    language is not Turkish may be disadvantaged seriously. Turkey
    recognizes the jurisdiction of the ECHR. During the year, Turkey lost
    23 cases to which it was a party, most of which pertained to free
    expression, deaths, past disappearances, and torture and was fined $1.2
    million (812 billion TL). In 11 additional cases, mostly relating to
    failure to ensure due process of law, Turkey accepted a friendly
    settlement and paid $150,000 (about 1 billion TL); and the court
    dismissed a further five cases.
        There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners
    in the country. The Government claims that alleged political prisoners
    are in fact security detainees convicted of being members of, or
    assisting, terrorist organizations.
        International humanitarian organizations are allowed access to
    political prisoners, provided the organization can obtain permission
    from the Ministry of Justice. With the exception of the Committee to
    Prevent Torture of the Council of Europe, which has good access, in
    practice few such permissions are granted.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a
    person's domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication;
    however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. With some
    exceptions, government officials may enter a private residence or
    intercept or monitor private correspondence only after the issuance of
    a judicial warrant. These provisions generally are respected outside
    the state of emergency region. If delay may cause harm to the case,
    prosecutors may authorize a search. Searches of private premises may
    not be carried out at night, unless the delay would be damaging to the
    case or the search is expected to result in the capture of a prisoner
    at large. Other exceptions include persons under special observation by
    the security directorate general, places anyone can enter at night,
    places where criminals gather, places where materials obtained through
    the commission of crimes are kept, gambling establishments, and
    brothels. According to a 1999 law that permits wider wiretapping, a
    court order is needed to carry out a wiretap. However, in an emergency
    situation, a prosecutor can grant permission. The wiretap can last only
    3 months, with two possible extensions of 3 months each.
        In the provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of
    emergency governor empowers security authorities to search without a
    warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses,
    associations, or other organizations. The Bar Association maintains
    that it is not constitutional for security authorities in these
    provinces to search, hold, or seize without warrant persons or
    documents. Seven provinces remain under ``adjacent province'' status,
    which authorizes the Jandarma to retain security responsibility for
    municipalities as well as rural areas, and grants the provincial
    governor several extraordinary powers. Due to the improved security
    situation, the use of roadblocks in the southeast decreased.
        With the diminution of PKK terrorism, the formerly widespread
    practice of evacuating villages to prevent their giving aid to the PKK
    has lessened; however, there was a report of one village re-evacuation
    occurring in October (see Section 1.g.).
        Some elements of society complain that a ban on the wearing of
    religious head coverings in government offices, other state-run
    facilities, and universities interfered with citizens' religious
    observance (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Since 1984 the PKK has waged a violent terrorist
    insurgency in southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces
    and civilians. In response, police, Jandarma, village guards, and the
    armed forces conducted an intense campaign to suppress PKK terrorism.
    However, since 1999 almost all such violent activity by the PKK has
    ceased, although some armed clashes between the two sides continued to
    occur. Security forces continued to target active PKK units as well as
    those persons they believed supported or sympathized with the PKK.
    There continued to be few reports of government and PKK human rights
    abuses committed against noncombatants. According to statistics from
    the governor of the state of emergency region, 23,415 PKK members,
    5,029 security force members, and 4,460 civilians have lost their lives
    in the fighting since 1987. During the year, 29 members of the security
    forces and 15 civilians died, according to the military.
        The Government's state of emergency, renewed in Diyarbakir,
    Hakkari, Sirnak, and Tunceli provinces for 4 months in November,
    imposes stringent security measures in those four southeastern
    provinces. The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor
    news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree
    provides for doubling the sentences of those convicted of ``cooperating
    with separatists.'' Informants and convicted persons who cooperate with
    the State may receive rewards and reduced sentences. Only limited
    judicial review of the state of emergency governor's administrative
    decisions is permitted.
        In October the governor of Tunceli formally abolished the food
    embargo in that region, the last large-scale rationing in the region.
    Food rationing also had been justified as a means of denying logistical
    support to the PKK. Provincial authorities deny villagers access to
    some high pastures for grazing, citing security concerns, but have
    allowed other villages access to their high pastures.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no credible allegations of
    serious abuses by security forces during the course of operations
    against the PKK.
        The Government organizes, arms, and pays a civil defense force in
    the region of more than 65,000 persons, which is known as the village
    guards. Participation in this paramilitary militia is mainly voluntary,
    but villagers faced danger from both the PKK and the Government when
    choosing whether or not to join the guard force. Village guards have a
    reputation for being the least disciplined of the Government's security
    forces and have been accused repeatedly of drug trafficking, rape,
    corruption, theft, and human rights abuses. Inadequate oversight and
    compensation contribute to this problem, and in some cases Jandarma
    allegedly have protected village guards from prosecution. In addition
    to the village guards, Jandarma and police ``special teams'' are viewed
    as those most responsible for abuses. However, the incidence of
    credible allegations of serious abuses by security forces, in the
    course of operations against the PKK, is significantly lower than in
    the past.
        There was a report of one village re-evacuation during the year
    (see Section 1.e). Five residents of Akcapinar hamlet said Jandarma
    burned 16 tents, one home, and crops there in early October. Residents
    had apparently returned to the hamlet in May after having received
    permission from local officials but without the requisite permission
    from higher levels within the Government. Between 1984 and 1999, and
    particularly in the early 1990's, a large number of persons were
    displaced forcibly from villages. The practice was justified by the
    Government as a means of protecting civilians or preventing PKK
    guerrillas from obtaining logistical support from the inhabitants.
    Provincial authorities deny villagers access to some high pastures for
    grazing, citing security concerns, but have allowed other villages
    access to their high pastures. The Government reported that 378,000
    persons had ``migrated'' (it disputes the term ``evacuation'') from
    3,165 state of emergency region villages between 1994 and 1999; many
    left before that due to the fighting. The highest credible estimate of
    displaced persons is as high as 1 million. Voluntary and assisted
    resettlements have begun in the region. In some cases, persons may
    return to their old homes; in other cases, centralized villages have
    been constructed. Only a fraction of the total number of evacuees has
    returned, but there is a noticeable increase in the pace of returns.
        After the middle of the year, there appeared to be an upsurge in
    the rate of returns and return requests. About 10,000 persons returned
    to their villages between June and August, according to the state of
    emergency governor. In July he declared that 65,000 of the 131,000
    return requests filed with his office were ``appropriate.'' According
    to the Jandarma, over 28,000 persons returned to the OHAL region and
    adjacent provinces during the year. They state that there are an
    additional 238,900 applications for returns to 621 villages and 461
    smaller hamlets, but only about a third of these claims are appropriate
    (mainly for security reasons) at this time. A July HADEP ``migrant
    commission'' report claimed HADEP had over 23,000 additional requests
    for returns, each petition representing a family. However, some persons
    included on return petitions may not have been aware that a request had
    been made for them. Furthermore, many evacuees have neither the will
    nor the economic means to return.
        Despite the increased pace, returns to date represent a fraction of
    the number of persons who may wish to return. Governors continued to
    provide building materials to some returnees. Activists remain critical
    of government efforts to resettle villagers in government-constructed
    ``central villages'' instead of original village sites. Local Jandarma
    impose limitations on some resettlement efforts. According to news
    reports, in January Jandarma prevented the return of 15 families to a
    village in Sirnak province. The families claimed that the village
    guards who currently occupy their village had burned their homes and
    cut down their orchards.
        The Government continues to deal with the problem of the hundreds
    of thousands of persons displaced from their villages and hamlets.
    According to the Government, its ``East and Southeast Anatolia Action
    Plan'' began in May. The Plan, as well as other government programs,
    has focused on providing assistance to displaced persons and support
    for return to villages or relocation to new, centralized villages. Over
    4,000 persons now live in centralized villages. From June to October,
    financial and other assistance (including young trees, animals,
    beehives, and looms) was provided to over 14,000 persons in 96 villages
    and 87 hamlets.
        Regional cities in the southeast have doubled and tripled in size
    in the past decade, without a commensurate increase in services such as
    schools. Many persons from the area went to major cities in the West of
    the country. A 1998 parliamentary committee investigation concluded
    that the State was partly responsible for the displacements and had
    failed to compensate adequately villagers who had lost their homes and
    lands in the region. However, regional officials report that flows of
    migrants nearly stopped during the year due to waning PKK activity in
    the countryside.
        In contrast to the national average of 45 children per classroom,
    there are typically 60 to 90 children per classroom in eastern and
    southeastern provinces and as many as 80 to 100 in Diyarbakir (most
    schools in the southeast employ a shift schedule for classes to
    accommodate the large numbers). According to the Government, in the
    southeast there was a noticeable improvement in the number of students
    able to attend classes, partly due to improved availability of teachers
    and schools, and partly due to the requirement for an 8-year education.
    During the 1999 to 2000 school year, there were 270,000 students in
    secondary education in the southeast, compared to 240,000 the year
    before. In the state of emergency region, 450 schools are closed,
    although none were closed during the year. Although the Government has
    built boarding schools in the region's larger towns, these new schools
    have not met the demand. Although schools remained open in most urban
    centers in the southeast, rapid migration led to severe overcrowding of
    city schools and chronic teacher shortages. Despite a longstanding
    tradition of boarding schools in the rural areas of the country, some
    ethnic Kurdish leaders have expressed concern that the Government
    constructed boarding schools, rather than rebuild local schools, in
    order to accelerate the process of Kurdish assimilation. According to
    press reports, soldiers in one command of the state of emergency region
    repaired 167 village schools in preparation for the 2000 to 2001
    academic year and during the past year spent about $700,000 (300
    million TL) on health, education, and infrastructure projects in the
    region.
        During the year, Turkish ground forces with air support conducted
    several operations in northern Iraq against the PKK. The Kurdistan
    Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan cooperated with
    the Turkish Government in shutting down certain PKK facilities in
    northern Iraq. Turkish government policy is to target only PKK fighters
    in northern Iraq; however, Turkish planes accidentally killed 38
    civilians in Sedakan, northern Iraq, during an operation in August
    against the PKK. The Government is taking steps to compensate the
    victims' families. At the end of the year, an operation against the PKK
    involving hundreds of Turkish soldiers continued in northern Iraq,
    according to press reports.
        In February Parliament renewed legislation allowing members of
    terrorist organizations (and criminal gangs) to apply for amnesty or
    reductions in sentences, if they provide useful information that helps
    lead to the dissolution of the organization. Government figures are not
    available for the number of persons who applied for the amnesty, but
    human rights attorneys speculate that the number is above 2,500.
    According to press reports, many applicants, including some who were
    members of Turkish Hizbullah, have obtained sentence reductions or
    release.
        The PKK remained almost completely inactive during the year. There
    were reports of internal divisions over jailed PKK leader Ocalan's call
    for ending the armed struggle, but by year's end no rival faction
    appeared to have gained control of the group. Apparently on orders from
    the PKK leadership, several groups of 8 to 10 former militants turned
    themselves in to the authorities, asking for amnesty. They are all
    currently standing trial for charges relating to membership in the PKK.
    Although PKK attacks against civilians and law enforcement personnel in
    the southeast have virtually ended, the military did engage the PKK,
    killing several alleged terrorists. Government authorities acknowledge
    that the level of violent conflict is considerably lower than in the
    past and that the main reason is an absence of PKK activity and the
    fact that the security forces were able to effectively end Hizbullah
    operations.
        Other terrorist organizations, most notably DHKP-C, conducted
    attacks mainly against police targets.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continued
    to limit these freedoms. The Constitution leaves open the possibility
    of restrictions to these freedoms on the basis of defense of the
    secular, unitary, state and protection of public order. The Government,
    particularly the judiciary, limits freedom of expression through the
    use of restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and numerous laws such as
    the following: Article 8 of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating
    separatist propaganda); Penal Code Articles 312 (incitement to racial,
    ethnic, or religious enmity); 159 (insulting Parliament, the army,
    republic, or judiciary); 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic); 169
    (aiding an illegal organization); the Law to Protect Ataturk; and over
    150 articles of the Press Law (including a provision against commenting
    on ongoing trials). While prosecutors bring dozens of such cases to
    court each year, judges dismiss many charges brought under these laws.
    These cases constitute a form of harassment against writers,
    journalists, and political figures.
        Domestic and foreign periodicals that provide a broad spectrum of
    views and opinions, including intense criticism of the Government, are
    widely available. The newspaper business is extremely competitive.
    Government censorship of foreign periodicals is very rare.
        Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence,
    particularly that of television, is correspondingly great. According to
    the High Board of Radio and Television, there are 229 local, 15
    regional, and 16 national officially registered television stations,
    and 1,036 local, 108 regional and 36 national radio stations. Other
    television and radio stations broadcast without an official license.
    The increasing availability of satellite dishes and cable television
    allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several Turkish-language
    private channels. The State owns and operates the Turkish Radio and
    Television Corporation.
        Internet use is growing and faces no government restrictions; in
    fact, some banned newspapers can be accessed freely on the Internet.
    Parliament passed legislation in September 1999 suspending for 3 years
    the sentences of those convicted of crimes in the media, such as
    journalists, writers, and party officials who published articles. The
    Islamist opposition party Fazilet challenged the constitutionality of
    the law because it did not apply to those who committed similar crimes
    through speech. In September the Constitutional Court ruled that this
    complaint had merit and ordered the Government to correct the problem.
    In mid-December, the Government passed the ``Provisional Suspension of
    Sentence Law,'' which in addition to leading to the eventual release of
    thousands of ordinary criminals, may effect the release, and suspension
    of trials, of many persons prosecuted on charges related to free
    expression. The suspension only applies to those whose ``criminal act''
    took place before April 23, 1999.
        Although hundreds of those prosecuted or convicted for free
    expression crimes had their sentences or trials suspended, some writers
    remain in jail. Esber Yagmurdereli, for example, remains imprisoned
    because his conviction in 1998 was for a speech, although his case may
    fall under the ``Provisional Suspension of Sentence Law.'' The CPJ
    reported that 14 journalists were imprisoned at year's end, compared
    with 18 in 1999. According to the Ministry of Interior, 43 journalists
    were in jail in July, of whom 26 had been convicted and the rest were
    still standing trial. The Chairman of the Press Council said, after
    studying the list, that his organization considered only four of these
    to be ``imprisoned for their journalistic practices.'' Other journalist
    associations note that some who are imprisoned for crimes in the media
    are political activists with only tenuous journalistic credentials.
        Under the suspension law, charges are dropped if the journalist or
    writer does not commit the same crime again during the 3-year period;
    if a second offense is committed during this time, the suspension is
    revoked. Human rights advocates, journalists, and other writers
    consider that the conditions for the suspension amount to censorship.
        The law makes it illegal for broadcasters to threaten the country's
    unity or national security and limits the private broadcast of
    television programs in languages other than Turkish. The High Board of
    Radio and Television (RTUK), created in 1994 to regulate private
    television and radio frequencies, monitors broadcasters and sanctions
    them if they are not in compliance with relevant laws. Parliament
    elects the RTUK members (divided between ruling and opposition parties)
    and provides its budget. Although nominally independent, the RTUK is
    subject to some political pressures. In December RTUK banned broadcasts
    of Ozgur Radio for 180 days, claiming that the station had slandered
    Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in a July broadcast.
        The RTUK penalizes private radio and television stations for the
    use of offensive language, libel, obscenity, instigating separatist
    propaganda, or broadcasting programs in Kurdish. Throughout the year,
    the RTUK penalized radio and television stations over 210 times for
    noncompliance with broadcast regulations, according to testimony given
    by the RTUK chairman to a Parliamentary committee in November. In
    general RTUK suspended television broadcasts for a day, and radio
    broadcasts for longer terms such as 3 to 6 months, usually for
    violating laws prohibiting the broadcast of ``terrorist organization
    declarations.'' The human rights monitoring group Mazlum-DER recorded
    closures of 26 television stations for a total of 208 closure days, and
    closures of 24 radio stations for a total of 3,725 days, while the
    Government provided RTUK closure figures of 62 television stations
    closed for 704 days, and 67 radio stations closed for 3,889 days.
        RTUK decisions may be appealed to the provincial administrative
    court and then to the Council of State (Danistay). In some cases, this
    is successful. In February the RTUK gave a 1-day closure punishment to
    CNN TURK, in response to a January broadcast in which a commentator
    asked a program guest if PKK leader Ocalan could be compared with
    former South African President Mandela. According to the RTUK, the
    broadcast ``threatened the existence and unity of the Turkish state''
    and ``encouraged separatism.'' CNN TURK appealed the decision and won.
    Another RTUK closure order, against Channel 6 for its criticism of the
    Government's response to the August 1999 earthquake, was also
    overturned by the Danistay.
        Despite the Government's restrictions, the media criticize
    government leaders and policies daily and have developed a more
    adversarial role vis-a-vis the Government. Lively debates on human
    rights and government policies continued, especially on issues relating
    to Turkey's EU membership process; the role of the military; political
    Islam; and the question of ethnic Kurds as ``minorities.''
    Nevertheless, persons who write or speak out on such highly sensitive
    topics risk prosecution.
        Government decree 430 gives the Interior Ministry, upon the request
    of the state of emergency regional governor, the authority to ban
    distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the
    region. In the event that a government warning is not obeyed, the
    decree provides for a 10day suspension of operations for a first
    offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses. This and other pressures,
    such as RTUK suspensions, lead to self-censorship on some issues.
        SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous issues of
    leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals and banned
    several books on a range of topics. Prosecutors closed numerous
    journals or suspended their operations during the year. The police
    frequently raid offices of small leftist publications, while
    distributors of the pro-Kurdish journals Evrensel and Yeni Gundem
    outside the state of emergency region claim regular harassment and the
    confiscation of their newspapers by the police.
        Journalists, including those from mainstream and western media,
    were harassed periodically and subjected to police abuse while covering
    stories. Two Swedish journalists were arrested, and their film
    confiscated, while visiting a small town near Diyarbakir in April.
    Their film was returned and they were released after the Swedish
    Government protested.
        The Government continued to restrict the free expression of ideas
    by individuals sympathetic to some Islamist, leftist, and Kurdish
    nationalist or cultural viewpoints.
        In April a group of 24 intellectuals sought to challenge legal
    restrictions on expression by republishing the formally banned book
    ``Freedom of Thought'' under the new title ``Freedom of Thought--
    2000.'' The group, which consists of well-known human rights activists,
    actors, journalists, and academicians, notified officials at the
    Istanbul SSC of their actions. The court indicted the group in May,
    demanding sentences ranging from 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for 16
    persons on various charges, including supporting a terrorist
    organization and inciting hatred and enmity. The case was ongoing at
    year's end. In December musician and human rights activist Sanar
    Yurdatapan and Nevzat Onaran, Chairman of the Contemporary Lawyer's
    Association's Istanbul branch, each served 24-day sentences given by a
    military court in connection with the publication of a previous
    ``Freedom of Thought'' pamphlet.
        Nadire Mater was acquitted in September of charges that she
    ``insulted the military'' with her publication, ``Mehmet's Book.''
    Copies of the book were seized in 1999 on order of the Istanbul SSC,
    and Mater and her publisher were charged under Article 159 of the Penal
    Code, with a possible prison sentence of 2 to 12 years. Since part of
    the acquittal was based on the Suspension of Sentences Law for the
    book's early editions, she faces a 3-year ``probation'' period, and if
    she commits the same crime she theoretically would face a resumption of
    her trial. The prosecutor appealed the acquittal, and the ban on the
    book continues. ``Mehmet's Book'' is a compilation of interviews with
    retired conscripts who had served in the southeast. The book records
    without commentary the soldiers' experiences in the field. These rank-
    and-file stories allege corruption, drug abuse, and dishonest handling
    of the press. As many as 40,000 to 50,000 copies have been sold, and
    although the book remains banned it is available in some bookstores.
        The Istanbul SSC brought charges of ``supporting separatist and
    terrorist propaganda'' against the distributors of the CD-Rom version
    of National Geographic magazine's full collection in late 1999. The
    collection included a 1992 article on Kurds that showed a map of the
    region most populated most heavily by Kurds; the article was published
    and circulated in Turkey. In February the court suspended the case in
    line with the ``suspension of sentences'' law, because the publication
    date was before April 1999.
        In March Islamist former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was
    convicted under the Penal Code (Article 312) of ``promoting enmity''
    along religious lines, for a speech he had made in 1994 in which he
    referred to parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' He was sentenced to 1
    year's imprisonment, but his punishment was suspended under the
    ``probational suspension of sentences law'' passed in December. Human
    rights groups and some politicians criticized the verdict as
    undemocratic, but the judiciary and many mainstream politicians
    defended it. Also in March, the chairman of the Islamic business-
    oriented association Musiad was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment
    under the same law, for a 1999 statement in which he referred to
    ``believers and nonbelievers.'' His sentence was suspended.
        Abdurrahman Dilipak, a veteran columnist with the Islamist daily
    Akit, faced multiple charges during the year for articles criticizing
    the Government's policy, especially on religious head coverings and the
    alleged activities of a military group that reportedly monitors
    political Islam. He was convicted in January by the Malatya SSC and
    sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment related to a 1998 conference in
    Malatya. Appeals continued at year's end.
        Former chairman of the HRA Akin Birdal reentered prison in March
    after a 6-month release on medical grounds. He was released on
    September 23 after serving a total of over 9 months' imprisonment on
    charges related to free speech (see Section 4).
        Hasan Guzel, head of the small Rebirth Party and an outspoken
    former Education Minister under the pro-Islamist Refah Party
    government, was released from jail in May after serving 5 months of a
    1-year sentence for ``inciting religious and ethnic enmity,'' based on
    a controversial 1997 speech. In January he was convicted on the same
    charge in a different case relating to a 1998 speech.
        Poet Yilmaz Odabasi entered prison in March to serve a 7-month
    sentence for contempt of court, for having said that he was ``ashamed
    to live in the same age and country'' as the court that convicted him
    in 1997 for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' with his book
    ``Dream and Life.'' He was released in June.
        Cases may be continuing against Dogu Perincek, chairman of the
    Workers' Party, for convictions concerning a 1994 speech delivered at
    the HRA general convention and slandering former Prime Minister Tansu
    Ciller. In September Perincek was acquitted on charges of assisting the
    PKK and possessing secret state documents.
        The trial of Dr. Veli Lok, president of the HRF's Izmir branch, for
    violation of the press law, ended in June. Dr. Lok, Bahri Akkan
    (spokesman for the Izmir Democracy Platform), and Fikret Ilkiz (an
    editor at Cumhuriyet newspaper) were convicted on the basis of an
    article published in October 1999 in Cumhuriyet, in which Lok and Akkan
    were quoted regarding a trial involving other HRF members. Publicly
    commenting on an ongoing court case is forbidden under the Press Law.
    The Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the Izmir prosecutor in
    November 1999, asking him to review the Cumhuriyet article and
    determine if a crime had been committed. The indictment followed
    shortly. Lok and Akkan were sentenced to pay a fine of about $200 (120
    million TL); Ilkiz is to pay about $210 (124 million TL). Lok's
    sentence was suspended for 5 years, and he has appealed.
        In October a Syriac priest was charged under Article 312 for
    ``inciting religious, racial and sectarian hatred'' for comments he
    made to the media about legislation under consideration at that time by
    the U.S. Congress that referred to Armenian genocide. The trial of the
    priest, who spoke in favor of the legislation, began in December. He
    spent one night under arrest but otherwise has been free to continue
    his pastoral duties.
        In April the pro-Kurdish daily Ozgur Bakis ceased publication,
    blaming government pressure (including closure orders, fines,
    investigations of 124 out of 370 editions, and court cases against
    editors). In its place Yeni Gundem newspaper began publication in May
    and was banned in the emergency region a week later. Also in April, the
    state of emergency governor banned four magazines (Ozgur Halk, Yasamda
    Genclik, Ozgur Kadinin Sesi, and Rewsen) from the emergency region. In
    May the governor banned distribution of four newspapers and eight
    journals, including Evrensel Kurdish-language weekly Azadiya Welate
    (which had been banned previously). However, these publications can be
    accessed in the emergency region on the Internet. Throughout the
    country some potential customers are afraid to purchase Kurdish-
    language materials because the possession of such items may be
    interpreted as evidence of PKK sympathies.
        Kurdish-language cassettes and publications are available
    commercially, although the periodic banning of particular cassettes or
    singers continued, especially in the state of emergency region.
    Kurdish-language broadcasts of news, commentary, or discussion are
    illegal throughout the country. One radio station broadcasts in Kurdish
    but is widely believed to be government-sponsored. Kurdish music is
    played on radio and television programs with certain restrictions,
    especially in the emergency zone and adjacent provinces. The state of
    emergency regional governor frequently bans from the region Kurdish
    recordings that may be played legally elsewhere in the country. In
    August he issued an order banning the sale of 242 music recordings,
    most in Kurdish. Stations that play Kurdish songs not on the limited
    play list risk temporary bans or closure. Radio stations that mix small
    amounts of Kurdish songs into their predominantly Turkish broadcasting
    appear to face fewer problems.
        Pro-PKK Medya-TV, which is banned, broadcasts in Kurdish from
    Europe and nevertheless can be received via satellite dish. Another
    station, Kurdistan-TV, based in northern Iraq, can be received via
    satellite, and is not banned. The ECHR ruled against Turkey on some
    cases of free expression, such as the conviction of a newspaper editor
    for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' in 1993.
        The Mesopotamian Cultural Center (MKM), an NGO that seeks to
    promote Kurdish language and culture, continues to operate. Some
    officials alleged that the organization is linked to the PKK. The
    group's centers in the southeast remain closed. Police exert pressure
    against the groups and hinder their activities, and local officials
    monitor and often interrupt their cultural events. Some MKM branches
    report that they were prevented from selling Kurdish-language music
    cassettes and were warned against organizing cultural events. On
    December 30, however, for the first time the Governor of Hakkari
    province in the southeast allowed a Kurdish-language music concert,
    organized by an MKM-sponsored band. Five thousand persons attended the
    concert.
        The Kurdish culture and research foundation (Kurt-Kav) remained
    open and continued some activities, including Kurdish language training
    and a study of Kurdish oral tradition. In February Kurt-Kav was
    acquitted of charges alleging promotion of separatism for its
    sponsorship of scholarships for 30 Kurdishspeaking students. A second
    case on the same charges, based on cooperation with a Swedish
    university to promote study of the Kurdish language, still was pending
    in the courts at year's end.
        Academic freedom generally is respected; however, there is believed
    to be some self-censorship on sensitive topics.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government often
    restricted this right in practice. The authorities may deny permission
    if they believe that a gathering is likely to disrupt public order.
    Significant prior notification of gatherings is required, and the
    authorities may restrict meetings to designated sites.
        The police beat, abused, detained and harassed some demonstrators,
    but showed restraint in other instances. The police appeared to be
    acceding to a November 1999 Security Administration directive that
    called for the use of minimum force in dispersing demonstrations. In
    February, following the arrests of three HADEP mayors in the southeast
    (see Section 3), supporters of the mayors held large, peaceful protests
    in Diyarbakir's center. Police allowed the demonstrations to continue
    even though they were not approved, and there was no violence. Police
    detained several dozen demonstrators during the 3-day protest period.
        In contrast to the previous year, the March 21 Kurdish Nevruz
    (``New Year'') celebrations were marked by calm and respectful behavior
    among participants and security forces. According to press reports and
    initial contacts with activists in the southeast, the police detained
    several hundred unauthorized demonstrators in Mersin, Sanliurfa, Siirt,
    and Adana, but there were reportedly no arrests nor excessive use of
    force (as there had been in the previous year). The authorities for the
    first time granted permission for a major celebration a few miles
    outside of Diyarbakir. The gathering of more than 80,000 persons was
    peaceful, with no detentions, and police treated the crowd well,
    according to a Kurdish activist. Istanbul municipal authorities denied
    permission for a celebration there because the organizers referred to
    ``Newroz,'' on the grounds that since there is no letter ``w'' in
    Turkish, this was a Kurdish spelling.
        On World Peace Day, September 1, the authorities denied permission
    for peace demonstrations in Diyarbakir, Izmir, Ankara, Mersin, and
    Antalya. In Diyarbakir the police reportedly broke up a gathering,
    detaining 30 participants and injuring 10. In Van the police detained
    27 persons, including the HADEP provincial chairman. In Mus the police
    reportedly detained, beat, and tortured the former district president
    of HADEP. In Tunceli a group of 200 persons was allowed to demonstrate,
    and in other cities events took place peacefully.
        In October police disrupted a professional conference in Izmir of
    the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) on the grounds that the meeting,
    which was to have discussed the issue of prison health, was illegal.
    International observers present for the conference noted that police
    officers demanded to videotape all of the proceedings. The TMA
    cancelled the conference.
        Police have detained and, on occasion, mistreated members of groups
    that protested prison conditions, the Ulucanlar prison incident in
    September 1999 (see Section 1.c.), and the installation of ``F-type''
    small cells to replace the current ward system. In June the police
    broke up an anti-prison rally and detained 20 participants, including
    the chair of the Istanbul branch of the HRA, Erin Keskin; when critics
    started to protest those detentions, the police broke up that second
    rally and detained another 30 persons. However, in early August the
    Minister of Justice spoke to demonstrators in front of his Ministry and
    invited some of them to visit a new F-type prison, which they did the
    following day. In August an association of families of political
    prisoners left Istanbul for Ankara by bus to protest F-type prisons and
    warn against the potential of hunger strikes and violence in jails (see
    Section 1.c.). The group alleges that it was stopped while en route
    several times by police and Jandarma, and that some parents were beaten
    with clubs and had to be hospitalized. Hundreds of protesters were
    temporarily detained during the period of hunger strikes in the prisons
    in November and police intervention in December.
        In December, following a terrorist attack on a police bus that
    killed two anti-riot police, thousands of fellow officers staged
    protest marches in all of the country's major cities. The marches
    occurred over several days, despite efforts by senior police officials
    to bring them under control. Several hundred police officers have been
    charged with disobeying orders and marching without a permit; they
    faced disciplinary and judicial proceedings at year's end.
        Dr. Alp Ayan, a psychiatrist with the HRF Izmir Treatment and
    Rehabilitation Center; Gunseli Kaya, who also works at the Center; and
    66 others face charges of ``holding an unauthorized demonstration'' for
    participating in the funeral procession in October 1999 of one of the
    prisoners killed in the September 1999 Ulucanlar incident. Ayan, Kaya,
    and 12 others were held in detention for 3 months before being released
    at the start of their trial in January. The trial continued at year's
    end.
        Six school children, between the ages of 12 and 14 years, were
    acquitted in March of charges of holding an ``unauthorized
    demonstration'' in 1998. The children had held a sign that said ``We
    Want Teachers'' during a rally after no teachers came to school that
    day and previous days.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however,
    associations and foundations must submit their charters for government
    approval, which is a lengthy and cumbersome process.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Turkey as a
    secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship,
    and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and the Government
    generally observed these provisions in practice; however, it imposed
    some restrictions on religious minorities and on religious expression
    in government offices and state-run institutions, including
    universities.
        The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education
    through its Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The Diyanet,
    which some groups claim reflects the beliefs of the Sunni Islamist
    mainstream to the exclusion of Alevi adherents, regulates the operation
    of the country's more than 70,000 mosques. Local and provincial imams,
    who are civil servants, are employed by the Diyanet. The Government
    states that the Diyanet treats equally all that request services.
    During the year, partly in commemoration of the Christian jubilee, the
    Diyanet sponsored several ecumenical events among major religious
    groups, including a meeting in Tarsus in May, which produced a document
    that called for intercommunal understanding.
        A separate government agency, the Office of Foundations (Vakiflar
    Genel Mudurlugu), regulates some activities of religious minorities,
    including those established under the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 (Greek
    Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish), and their affiliated
    churches, monasteries, and religious schools. The Vakiflar, which dates
    back to the Ottoman Empire, must approve the operation of churches,
    monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable religious foundations,
    such as hospitals and orphanages. The Vakiflar oversees 160 minority
    religious foundations, including Greek Orthodox (about 70 sites);
    Armenian Orthodox (about 50); and Jewish (20); as well as Syrian
    Christians, Chaldoneans, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgians, and Maronis.
        In May a court allowed a Protestant church in Istanbul to establish
    itself as a ``foundation.'' Normally all ``religious'' foundations need
    to have been in existence since the early days of the republic in order
    to be deemed as such.
        The population is about 99 percent Muslim, primarily Sunni. In
    addition to the country's Sunni majority, an estimated 12 million
    Alawis (an offshoot of Shi'a Islam) freely practice their faith and
    build ``Cem houses'' (Alawi places of worship). Some Alawis allege
    discrimination in the form of failure to include any Alawi doctrines or
    beliefs in religious instruction classes. Alawis also charge that there
    is a Sunni bias in the Religious Affairs Directorate and claim that the
    Directorate tends to view the Alawis as a cultural rather than a
    religious group. However, some Sunni Islamic political activists charge
    that the secular State favors and is under the influence of the Alawis.
    The Government periodically allocates funds to the Alawi community and
    funds Sunni activities.
        There are several non-Muslim religious minority groups; most are
    concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. These include an
    estimated 50,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians, 25,000 Jews, and roughly
    3,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. There are approximately 3,000
    Protestants; 10,000 Baha'is; an estimated 15,000 Syrian Orthodox
    (Syriac) Christians; and a small, undetermined number of Bulgarian,
    Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians. The number of
    Christians in the southeast has declined as the younger generation,
    especially among Syriacs, leaves the area to live in Istanbul, Europe,
    or North America. In December President Sezer issued a message to
    Turkey's minority religious groups on the occasion of Christmas and
    Hanukah.
        The military and judiciary, with support from other members of the
    country's secular elite, continued to wage a private and public
    campaign against Islamic fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to
    the secular republic (see Section 3). The National Security Council
    (NSC)--a powerful military/civilian body established by the
    Constitution to advise senior leadership on national security matters--
    categorizes fundamentalism as a primary threat to public safety and
    order. The armed forces regularly dismiss individuals whose official
    files reflect participation in Islamist fundamentalist activities. In
    October the military dismissed 44 officers suspected of sympathizing
    with Islamic groups or Kurdish rebels. At a meeting in March, the NSC
    discussed a report that claimed that fundamentalist Islamic elements
    had increased their activities in a number of areas, including
    infiltrating government ministries. However, the same NSC report noted
    that legislative measures have been taken on only 5 points of the
    February 1997 18-point program against fundamentalism. In August
    President Sezer twice refused to sign a ``decree with force of law''
    that would have streamlined the procedures for firing civil servants
    suspected of fundamentalist or separatist tendencies, explaining that
    such a measure should be reviewed by Parliament.
        In a widely publicized August 30 ``victory day'' statement, armed
    forces Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu issued a strong
    message to the Government to take action against Islamic
    fundamentalism. In a reference to the civil servants decree turned back
    twice by President Sezer, Kivrikoglu said that the Government and the
    Parliament should take immediate action to address the problem of
    ``thousands'' of civil servants whose fundamentalist views were
    threatening the secular state. He noted that the military had an
    effective means of getting rid of suspected fundamentalists or
    separatists from its ranks and that the civil service should adopt
    similar measures. Kivrikoglu alleged that the leader of a moderate
    Islamic Tarikat, Fetullah Gulen, plans to undermine the state and said
    that 11 of the 44 officers recently dismissed by the military for
    fundamentalist proclivities were Gulen supporters. Kivrikoglu claimed
    that Gulen supporters had infiltrated the judiciary as well, a charge
    denied by the Minister of Justice.
        Tarikats and other mystical Sunni Islamic, quasi-religious, and
    social orders were banned in the 1920's but largely were tolerated
    until the 1997 call by the National Security Council for strict
    enforcement of the ban against Tarikats as part of its campaign against
    Islamic fundamentalism. However, prominent political and social leaders
    remain associated with Tarikats.
        In March Islamist former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was
    convicted under the Penal Code (Article 312) of ``promoting enmity''
    along religious lines, for a 1994 speech in which he referred to
    Parliamentarians as ``infidels.'' He was sentenced in March to 1 year's
    imprisonment (see Section 2.a). Also in March, the chairman of the
    Islamic business-oriented association Musiad was sentenced to 1 year's
    imprisonment under the same law, for a 1999 statement in which he
    referred to ``believers and nonbelievers.'' His sentence was suspended.
    The Istanbul SSC ordered the confiscation of the June 28 issue of the
    reportedly anti-Semitic newspaper Akit and the June 23-29 edition of
    its related weekly publication Cuma for ``inciting religious hatred,''
    for its treatment of the death of a prominent military official known
    for his secular views. Akit had reported in its coverage that it ``did
    not forgive'' the official for his actions against imam-Hatip schools,
    Koran courses, and students who wear headscarves.
        Religious and moral instruction in state primary and secondary
    schools is compulsory for Muslims. Students who complete primary school
    may study the Koran in government-sponsored schools. The Government
    does not permit private Koran courses.
        Upon written verification of their non-Muslim background,
    minorities considered by the Government to be covered by the 1923
    Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are
    exempted by law from Muslim religious instruction. They may hold their
    own classes or if they want to attend Muslim courses, may do so with
    parental consent. Syriac and other Christians whom the Government does
    not consider to be an official Lausanne Treaty minority are not
    exempted. In August the Syriac community reiterated a 1995 appeal to
    the Government to be considered a Lausanne Treaty minority.
        Government authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine
    pertaining to minority religions, nor do they restrict the publication
    or use of religious literature. While the Government does not recognize
    the ecumenical nature of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, it acknowledges
    him as head of the Turkish Greek Orthodox community and does not
    interfere with his travels or other ecumenical activities.
        The authorities monitor the activities of eastern Orthodox churches
    and their affiliated operations. The Ecumenical Patriarchate in
    Istanbul consistently has expressed interest in reopening the seminary
    on the Island on Halki in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been
    closed since 1971 when the State nationalized most private institutions
    of higher learning. Under current restrictions, including a citizenship
    requirement, religious communities remain unable to train new clergy.
    However, coreligionists from outside the country have been permitted to
    assume leadership positions.
        By law religious services may take place only in designated places
    of worship, although non-Muslim religious services often take place in
    nondesignated places of worship. However, police disrupted several
    Christian religious gatherings on the grounds that they were being held
    in unauthorized locations. On May 24 in Istanbul, several persons
    (including non-Turks) were detained overnight following a police raid
    on a private apartment where a group was holding Protestant services.
    Most of the participants were released the next day and charges were
    dropped; two Turks were held for several days before being released.
    Currently the attendees face charges for unauthorized meetings and
    unauthorized establishment of an education center.
        Minority foundations, including those of religions recognized under
    the Lausanne Treaty, may not acquire property for any purpose, although
    they can lose it. If a community does not use its property because of a
    decline in the size of its congregation over 10 years, the Vakiflar
    takes over direct administration and ownership. There have been no
    reports of minority religions losing their houses of worship or other
    facilities during the year. If such minorities can demonstrate a
    renewed community need, they may apply legally to recover their
    properties. Bureaucratic procedures and considerations relating to
    historic preservation at times have impeded repairs to existing
    religious facilities. Restoration or construction may be carried out in
    buildings and monuments considered ``ancient'' only with authorization
    of the regional board on the protection of cultural and national
    wealth. Syriac Christians have been allowed to renovate their historic
    buildings in Mardin, although their efforts remain closely monitored by
    the authorities. In May Syriac Christians gathered in Elazig to
    celebrate the completed restoration of a 1,800-year-old church.
        The Baha'i community currently is fighting a legal battle against
    government expropriation of a sacred Baha'i site near Edirne. The site
    was granted cultural heritage status in 1993 by Edirne's board of
    natural and cultural riches, a branch of the Ministry of Culture.
    However, in January the Ministry of Education notified the Baha'i
    community that the property had been expropriated for future use by the
    adjacent primary school. The Ministry has deposited funds in the Baha'i
    community's bank account for the expropriated property. In April the
    local administration court in Edirne rescinded its temporary stay of
    execution and allowed the Ministry of Education to implement
    expropriation, although it has not done so. The Baha'i appeal of the
    expropriation continued at year's end.
        There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion
    recognized by the State, interfering with that religion's services, or
    debasing its property.
        No law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions;
    however, religious groups that proselytize occasionally are subject to
    government restrictions or harassment. There are no known estimates of
    the number and religious affiliation of foreign missionaries in the
    country. Many prosecutors regard proselytizing and religious activism
    on the part of evangelical Christians, and particularly Islamists, with
    suspicion, especially when such activities are deemed to have political
    overtones. The police sometimes arrest proselytizers for disturbing the
    peace; courts usually dismiss such charges. If the proselytizers are
    foreigners, they may be deported, but generally they are able to
    reenter the country easily. In a case in March, two Turkish Christians
    were detained for a month on the charge of ``insulting Islam'' by
    distributing Bibles; they were released in May at their first hearing
    when witnesses refused to stand by their signed statements. Their trial
    continued in one of four jurisdictions where cases were opened.
        The Government continued to enforce a more than 50-year-old ban on
    the wearing of religious head coverings at universities or by civil
    servants in public buildings. Some women who wear head coverings, and
    both men and women who actively have shown support for those who defy
    the ban, have lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and
    teachers; some others were not allowed to register as university
    students. The Council of State (Danistay) ruled in a 1999 case that
    universities are public institutions and, as such, have an obligation
    to protect the country's basic principles, including secularism. In
    making its ruling, the Danistay referred to its understanding of a
    ruling by the ECHR in favor of Turkey, which noted that students had to
    abide by university dress codes, and that the wearing of a headscarf
    could be construed as pressure on other students. According to Mazlum-
    DER, during the year 127 teachers lost their jobs for wearing head
    coverings and there were dozens of smallscale protests this school year
    against the headscarf ban.
        Merve Kavakci, elected an M.P. in April 1999 from the Islamist
    Fazilet (Virtue) Party, unsuccessfully sought in May 1999 to be sworn
    in to Parliament wearing an Islamist-style head covering. Kavakci's
    case highlighted the ongoing dispute over the ban on wearing religious-
    style clothing in official settings. She later was stripped of Turkish
    citizenship on the grounds that she had assumed another country's
    citizenship without notifying proper authorities and lost her
    parliamentary privileges. She appealed the verdict on her citizenship,
    and in February the highest administrative court upheld the lower
    court's ruling. The issue of headscarves in Parliament, in terms of
    legislation that would give a final definition to the parliamentary
    dress code, remained unresolved.
        The case to close the Islamist Fazilet Party, which was filed in
    May 1999, was still pending at the Constitutional Court at year's end
    (see Section 3). Although religious affiliation is listed on national
    identity cards, there is no official discrimination.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally enjoy freedom of
    movement domestically and the freedom to travel abroad; however, at
    times the Government limited some of these rights. The Constitution
    provides that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted only in
    the case of a national emergency, civic obligations (military service,
    for example), or criminal investigation or prosecution. As the security
    situation continued to improve in the southeast, security officials
    decreased use of roadblocks and vehicle and passenger searches.
        Although there is no legal internal exile, since 1990 the state of
    emergency region's governor in the southeast has had the authority to
    ``remove from the region,'' for a period not to exceed the duration of
    the state of emergency (in place for 15 years), citizens under his
    administration whose activities ``give an impression that they are
    prone to disturb general security and public order.'' Teachers, party
    officials, and trade unionists have been affected by this provision in
    the past, and dozens of unionists were kept out of the southeast this
    year, according to press reports. In July security officials in Batman
    took the passports of two visiting British parliamentarians who were
    looking into the issue of the Ilisu dam, and also took documents of a
    Republican People's Party (CHP) official and some accompanying
    journalists.
        When Turkey ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which have the force of
    domestic law, it exercised the option of accepting the Convention's
    obligations only with respect to refugees from Europe. Although it has
    not lifted subsequently the geographic limit of its treaty obligation,
    since 1994 the Government has granted temporary asylum to all those
    recognized as refugees. Asylum-seekers apply to the Government for
    temporary protection and to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) for resettlement. If both procedures recognize the asylum-
    seeker as a refugee, UNHCR proceeds with resettlement and submits the
    case to other countries. European refugees are given temporary
    residence permits by the Government, renewable until they achieve
    resettlement or a durable solution.
        Furthermore, the UNHCR intervenes with government officials if it
    disagrees with their negative decisions about individual asylum claims.
    An appeal may be lodged within 15 days of a negative decision by the
    authorities. After the appeal procedure, rejected applicants are issued
    a deportation order that may be implemented after 15 days. According to
    the UNHCR, there were 5,681 asylum seekers during the year; out of
    these cases and some from previous years, UNHCR rejected the asylum
    applications of 4,471 and accepted 2,709.
        A regulation obliges asylum seekers to apply within 10 days of
    their arrival and submit proof of identity in order to register as an
    asylum-seeker. The time limit for registration in the Government's
    asylum program is implemented strictly and remains an obstacle to the
    full access of asylum seekers to refugee status determination
    procedures. During the year, 25 refugees and asylum-seekers were
    returned to a country where they feared persecution, compared with 46
    in 1999 and continuing a steady decline since 1995, according to the
    UNHCR. The obstacles inherent in the Government's asylum procedures
    lead to many refugees being considered as ``illegals.'' This year the
    UNHCR considered that there were approximately 100 refugees not
    registered with the Government. The UNHCR and government authorities
    continue to work to resolve this problem and to find ways to allow
    greater access of all asylum seekers to this procedure.
        If they comply with the asylum regulation's requirements, asylum
    seekers are registered by the Government and processed for eligibility
    determination. Late in the year, the Council of State confirmed
    administrative court rulings since 1997 that concluded that failure to
    submit an asylum claim within a fixed time limit could not be a reason
    not to address the application or grant asylum. The UNHCR has no
    information on discrimination by the Government on the basis of
    nationality. The UNHCR maintains a branch office in Ankara and field
    presences in Istanbul, Silopi, Van, and Agri.
        The mass influx in 1999 of 18,000 Kosovars fell under the 1994
    asylum regulation. The Government allowed Kosovars to enter the country
    freely and de facto allowed them ``first asylum''--to stay until they
    repatriate or resettle voluntarily. An estimated 2,000 persons from
    Bosnia-Herzegovina and several hundred from Kosovo were granted a
    special temporary ``guest'' status; 42 Kosovars and 74 Bosnians still
    reside in former refugee camps. Because there are no visa requirements,
    thousands of Iranians remain in the country for extended periods. The
    Government generally does not allow similar mass influxes from Iraq but
    allows some individuals and families to settle in or transit the
    country en route to permanent resettlement.
        Cooperation between the UNHCR and the Government has continued
    since 1998 in the field of training border guards and other government
    officials responsible for asylum-seekers and refugees. During the year,
    approximately 150 officials received UNHCR-sponsored training in Bursa,
    Izmir, Antalya, Ankara, and Van. The training is very successful and
    has led to increased contact between UNHCR and local, military, and
    judicial authorities. The UNHCR works with local partners including the
    Turkish Red Crescent Society, the Association for Solidarity with
    Asylum Seekers and Migrants, and the Anatolian Development Foundation
    to integrate refugees into society.
        The country continues to be a transit and departure point for
    illegal migrants and asylum seekers of various nationalities en route
    to Europe, who travel in small groups utilizing land routes, boats, and
    ships.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
    Turkey has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which national
    elections are held at least every 5 years, with mandatory universal
    suffrage for all citizens 18 years of age and over. More than 30
    political parties are active (most of them minuscule), 5 of which are
    represented in Parliament. Parliament elects the President as Head of
    State every 7 years or when the incumbent becomes incapacitated or
    dies.
        In addition to these bodies, in accordance with the Constitution,
    the NSC, which includes both military and civilian government leaders
    and is chaired by the President, plays a significant role in shaping
    government policy.
        The Government neither coerces nor forbids membership in any
    political organization; however, the chief public prosecutor may bring
    cases seeking the closure of political parties before the
    Constitutional Court, which may close them down for unconstitutional
    activities. The chief public prosecutor opened cases in 1999 to close
    two significant parties, Fazilet and HADEP, alleging that they were
    centers of illegal activities. These cases were unresolved at year's
    end.
        Government pressure against HADEP continued, based on the
    Government's belief that many HADEP supporters had ties to the PKK or
    supported their agenda. Throughout the year, the police raided dozens
    of HADEP offices, especially in the state of emergency region, and
    detained provincial officials and elected HADEP mayors. For example, in
    September the chair of HADEP'S Sirnak branch and a dozen other
    executives were arrested, and police raided HADEP offices in Istanbul,
    Diyarbakir, Adana, Mersin, and Van. In June HADEP secretary general
    Ahmet Turan Demir was convicted under Article Eight of the Anti-Terror
    Law for ``separatism,'' for a speech he gave in October 1999; in
    November Demir was sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment and a fine of
    $1,168 (800 million TL), and in November he was convicted of ``making
    separatist propaganda'' in a 1998 speech and given another 1-year
    sentence, reduced to 10 months. He has not yet gone to jail for either
    conviction. During the year, the Government brought 10 cases against
    HADEP mayors, most for charges of ``separatist propaganda.'' A case
    against Cihan Sincar, Mayor of Kiziltepe, on the grounds that she had
    referred to ``Kurdistan'' in an interview with a Swedish newspaper,
    ended with her acquittal in November. In December the Ankara SSC opened
    an investigation against HADEP on the grounds that its November party
    congress had extended support for the PKK.
        In February Jandarma arrested the HADEP mayors of Diyarbakir,
    Siirt, and Bingol, mostly based on testimony by the deputy mayor of
    Diyarbakir who allegedly was tortured while in police custody (see
    Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 4). The mayors were charged under Article 169
    of the Penal Code with supporting an illegal organization (the PKK)
    through fundraising activities in Europe and Turkey. The mayors were
    held for 3 days, and the Interior Ministry removed them from office but
    reinstated them after peaceful public protests began. The mayors
    remained free and in office at year's end, pending the outcome of their
    trial, which began in April. They were allowed to travel outside the
    country, although some HADEP officials have been barred for years from
    international travel. In September another aide to the Diyarbakir mayor
    was arrested by the anti-terror police on charges of links to the PKK.
        The military and judiciary, with support from some other members of
    the country's secular elite, continued to wage a private and public
    campaign against Islamic fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to
    the secular republic (see Section 2.c.).
        In August Islamist leader Fetullah Gulen was indicted for
    ``separatism'' and ``forming a criminal gang;'' however, an Istanbul
    court annulled this indictment on appeal. Two weeks later Ankara SSC
    Prosecutor Nuh Mete Yuksel brought another indictment of trying to
    ``change the characteristics of the republic as specified in the
    Constitution.'' Yuksel is seeking the maximum 10-year sentence against
    Gulen under the Anti-Terrorism Law and alleges that Gulen was trying to
    ``infiltrate'' the military.
        The trial continued in Ankara of a group of 33 Islamist politicians
    and business figures who had formed a group called the National View
    Organization. The group, many of whom were members of the banned Refah
    Party, were charged in 1999 with attempting to impose a ``religious
    order'' in contravention of Article 146.1 of the Penal Code (forcibly
    trying to change the constitutional order); some of the defendants face
    the death penalty. The case continued at year's end.
        The Democratic Mass Party (DKP), which the Government closed in
    February 1999, had not yet had its closure decision published. Party
    members cannot legally form or join another party until the closure
    decision is officially published.
        Reports continued of corruption and the abuse of power in the
    security forces, including ties with illegal organizations. The
    Government mounted 21 operations in the final 3 months of the year into
    corruption in banking, exports/imports, rural affairs, drugs, and other
    areas, leading to hundreds of detentions and over 100 arrests. In June
    parliamentary committees cleared former Prime Ministers Yilmaz and
    Ciller of a range of corruption charges relating to their activities
    while in office. Some trials linked to corruption charges, involving
    former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar and M.P. Sedat Bucak, began in
    1998 but were halted in April 1999 when both were elected to the new
    Parliament and gained automatic legal immunity (which had been lifted
    by the previous Parliament). During the year some M.P.''s proposed in
    Parliament that their immunity be lifted. In June Parliament also voted
    to clear Agar of charges of ``establishing a criminal gang'' relating
    to the 1996 Susurluk scandal. In September an alleged 1998 memorandum
    from senior military sources was made public by the media and human
    rights groups. The memo details a plan of discrediting government
    critics, including HADEP and Fazilet parties, the HRA, and specific
    politicians and journalists. In some cases, actions occurred that were
    similar to the memo's recommendations.
        In February a former Batman provincial governor admitted that
    during his 1993 to 1997 term, his office acquired weapons worth $2.6
    million (1.5 trillion TL) to equip extraordinary units fighting the
    PKK. He said that most were given to the Jandarma and some to the
    police; some allegedly were given to village guards as well. The then-
    Prime Minister agreed to fund the purchase in order to ``protect the
    State,'' she explained, although the Ministry of Interior had not
    agreed. The foreignmade weapons entered the country without clearing
    customs. The extralegal aspects of the transaction fueled speculation
    that some weapons may have disappeared. There was no parliamentary
    investigation following the revelations. In December, however, a case
    was opened against four officials from the Foreign Trade
    Undersecretariat's General Directorate of Imports for ``allowing
    illegal importation of weapons by the Batman governate.'' The
    defendants face sentences of between 1 and 4 years.
        There are no legal restrictions on political activity by women, the
    Constitution calls for equal political rights for men and women, and
    many women are active politically; however, women are underrepresented
    seriously in government and politics. There are only 22 women in the
    550-seat Parliament, there are no female ministers in Prime Minister
    Ecevit's 35-member Cabinet, and there are no female governors. However,
    one of the five major political parties is headed by a woman.
        There are no legal restrictions on political activity by
    minorities; however, some minorities are underrepresented in government
    and politics.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Nongovernmental organizations operate in many regions but face
    government obstruction and restrictive laws regarding their operations,
    especially in the four provinces that comprise the state of emergency
    region. The Associations Law governing the activities of most NGO's
    (some fall under the Law of Foundations, and others incorporate
    themselves as businesses) has restrictive provisions regarding
    membership, fundraising, and scope of activities.
        The nongovernmental HRA has branches nationwide and claims a
    membership of about 20,000 persons. In 1990 the HRA established the
    HRF, which operates torture rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir,
    Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and Adana and serves as a clearinghouse for human
    rights information. Other domestic NGO's include the Istanbul-based
    Helsinki Citizens Assembly, the Ankara-based Turkish Democracy
    Foundation, the Turkish Medical Doctor's Association, human rights
    centers at a number of universities, and Mazlum-DER, which is the
    Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples.
    Human rights organizations are represented on the Provincial Human
    Rights Councils currently being formed.
        Human rights monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors involved in
    documenting human rights violations, continued to face detention,
    prosecution, intimidation, harassment, and formal closure orders for
    their legitimate activities. The HRA's Diyarbakir branch was reopened
    in April after having been closed for 3 years. However, several weeks
    later the state of emergency region governor's office ordered the
    branch closed for 3 months. Police allowed the reopening in August but
    within minutes revealed orders to close it for 3 months. The Diyarbakir
    governor allowed it to reopen 2 months later in October. The HRA branch
    in Van was also closed for 3 months in May but reopened in August
    without incident. In February the authorities closed the Malatya HRA
    branch indefinitely for possessing illegal publications (such as banned
    issues of otherwise legal newspapers). However, in April a court ruled
    that there were no criminal grounds for closure, and it reopened in
    June. At the end of the year, mostly for reasons linked to ongoing
    protests over F-type prisons (see Section 1.c.), authorities closed HRA
    branches in Malatya, Gaziantep, Van, and Konya.
        Mazlum-DER's Sanliurfa branch reopened in April. The office had
    been closed since December 1998 after members had made allegedly
    ``separatist'' statements in the press regarding the ban on headscarves
    in public buildings. The Malatya branch remained closed.
        In September an international summer program held by the Helsinki
    Citizen's Assembly (HCA) in Canakkale was closed by Turkish authorities
    two days after opening. Although no official reason was given for
    closure, it is possible that the participation of Armenian students may
    have played a role. The HCA generally has not experienced this kind of
    closure problem.
        The Mersin Migrants' Association (Goc-Der), which was shut down in
    1998, in February was given written permission by the Mersin governor
    to reopen. The Kurdish-led organization assists migrants from the
    southeast. Goc-Der had been closed pending a verdict in a case accusing
    its founders of several technical violations of Turkey's Associations
    Law and of possession of illegal publications. In December 1999, a
    court acquitted the defendants of all but one minor charge and fined
    them $2 (1.5 million TL).
        In May student associations at Diyarbakir's Dicle University and
    Van's Centennial University were closed for 3 months, along with two
    Diyarbakir ``cultural centers.'' In September the leaders of an Islamic
    youth organization (National Youth Foundation) said that the police
    ordered the closure of 28 regional offices of their organization. The
    National Youth Foundation is affiliated with the Islamist Fazilet
    party.
        The harassment of lawyers involved in political cases in the
    southeast continued. An increased number of attorneys are willing to
    defend politically sensitive cases and provide greater mutual support
    within the profession. However, attorneys still face criminal charges
    and other harassment, particularly if they defend clients accused of
    terrorism or illegal political activity, pursue torture cases, or seek
    prompt access to their clients (which police often view as
    interference).
        During the year, attorneys in several cases were charged with
    various offenses (such as acting on behalf of illegal organizations),
    and were detained, searched, or threatened. The lawyer for the
    teenagers tortured in Manisa (see Section 1.c.) was put on trial for
    allegedly showing pictures of the accused policemen to the media,
    although her lawyer claimed that the television cameras had viewed an
    open case file. In November attorney Zeki Ruzgar, who was convicted in
    December 1999 of ``membership in an illegal organization'' and
    sentenced to 15 years in jail, was acquitted of all charges by the
    Court of Cassation.
        The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers entered its sixth year at the
    Diyarbakir SSC, with prosecutors in October calling for significant
    sentences against some of the defendants, who were charged in 1993 to
    1994 with ``aiding and abetting the PKK'' and ``membership in an
    illegal terror organization.'' Allegations in the indictment include
    legal behavior such as filing a petition with the ECHR. Some 16 of the
    lawyers alleged that they were tortured while in incommunicado
    detention after their arrests. The lawyers were free pending trial at
    year's end. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is
    intended to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the
    Government and publicizing human rights violations in the southeast
    (see Section 1.e.).
        In Elazig two lawyers had not yet stood trial based on their 1999
    indictment for ``slandering government officials.'' The new Prosecution
    of Civil Servants law prohibits making false accusations against public
    employees based on ``enmity, hatred, or slandering;'' the lawyers are
    charged with having stated publicly that an alternative medical report
    showed that their client had been tortured by security officials. No
    new cases are believed to have been opened under this provision during
    the year.
        Dr. Seyfettin Kizilkan filed his second appeal to the Court of
    Cassation for a reversal of the Diyarbakir SSC's reconfirmed decision
    to sentence him to more than 20 years' imprisonment for ``assisting and
    sheltering an illegal organization.'' Dr. Kizilkan was the director of
    Diyarbakir's largest hospital and was arrested after police allegedly
    found bomb materials and PKK documents in his home. Dr. Kizilkan and
    his associates maintain that the police planted the evidence. He has
    been transferred out of the state of emergency region to a government
    hospital in the Black Sea region and was free pending the outcome of
    his appeal at year's end. The case against Dr. Zeki Uzun, who was
    accused of aiding illegal organizations by providing medical reports
    and treatment, ended with his acquittal in March (see Section 1.c.).
    Some observers claim that Uzun, and others associated with the Izmir
    HRF Torture Treatment Center, have been harassed for their work with
    torture victims.
        Former HRA Chairman Akin Birdal, who was released from jail in
    September (see Section 2.a.), faces additional charges in two cases. He
    is accused of ``insulting the moral being of the State'' based on a
    1998 speech in Urfa to the HRA, while the other trial is based on a
    1995 speech in Tarsus for ``inciting racial or religious enmity.''
        A court case was opened in 1998 against 12 policemen accused of
    torturing the September 1997 ``Musa Anter Peace Train'' detainees. The
    case was due to continue with the next trial session in March 2001, but
    may be suspended under the newly-passed law for probational release of
    prisoners since the charge was mistreatment (Penal Code Article 245)
    rather than torture (Article 243). Legal proceedings against some of
    the organizers ended in 1998 with an acquittal.
        Representatives of diplomatic missions who wish to monitor human
    rights are free to speak with private citizens, groups, and government
    officials. Security police routinely place such official visitors in
    the southeast under visible surveillance for reasons that may include
    an effort to intimidate those they meet, as well as legitimate
    protection concerns. Visiting foreign government officials and
    legislators were able to meet with human rights monitors.
    Representatives of international governmental organizations were able
    to visit Leyla Zana and Akin Birdal in prison, in accordance with
    Turkey's international obligations. There were no public reports of
    officials representing foreign governments being denied permission for
    such visits.
        In May State Minister for Human Rights Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik
    resigned. He was replaced by Rustu Kazim Yucelen. In September Minister
    Yucelen began a series of meetings with governmental and civil society
    leaders. Ten meetings were held in provinces throughout the country and
    were designed to allow all provinces an opportunity to send
    representatives. The first meeting, in Tunceli, was attended by more
    than 200 government and NGO representatives who discussed human rights
    problems. Participants in other meetings noted the importance of
    establishing such a dialog, and a range of human rights groups took
    part. In late November, the Government passed regulations establishing
    permanent Provincial and Sub-Provincial Human Rights Councils, which
    will institutionalize consultations among NGO's, professional
    organizations, and the Government. These councils are being formed and
    some have held introductory meetings.
        In February the High Council for Human Rights Coordination (HCHRC)
    drafted a report on the reforms needed in order for Turkey to comply
    with the EU'S ``Copenhagen Criteria'' of democratization and human
    rights. The report, also known as the ``Demirok Report,'' was adopted
    by the High Council (composed of representatives from the Justice,
    Interior, Education, Health, and Foreign Affairs Ministries, along with
    representatives of the security forces). The Cabinet adopted the report
    in September as a working and reference document. The report details
    dozens of constitutional, legislative, and administrative reforms
    necessary for compliance with EU political standards and underlines the
    immediate importance of reforms in the area of free expression.
        The mandate of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee is to
    oversee compliance with the human rights provisions of domestic law and
    international agreements, investigate alleged abuses, and prepare
    reports. The Committee undertook a review of systemic human rights
    problems, including but not limited to problems in prisons and other
    places of detention such as police stations (see Section 1.c.). In
    December the Committee formed permanent sub-committees on prisons and
    the Provincial/Sub-Provincial Human Rights Councils.
        In August the Government signed two U.N. covenants, on Civil and
    Political Rights and on Economic and Social Rights. They had not yet
    been ratified by year's end.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state, regards
    all citizens as equal, and prohibits discrimination on ethnic,
    religious, or racial grounds; however, discrimination remains a problem
    in several areas. The Government officially recognizes only Eastern
    Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish adherents as minorities
    covered under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Spousal abuse is
    serious and widespread. According to the Family Research Institute in
    the Prime Minister's office, beating in the home is one of the most
    frequent forms of violence against women. Despite 1998 legislation that
    made spousal abuse illegal, complaints of beatings, threats, economic
    pressure, and sexual violence continue. According to a survey done in
    April by Istanbul University, at least 10 percent of women experience
    violence on a daily or weekly basis.
        Spousal abuse is considered an extremely private matter, involving
    societal notions of family honor. Few women go to the police, who in
    any case are reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes and frequently
    advise women to return to their husbands. The 1998 law allows women to
    apply for restraining orders against their husbands and therefore to
    stay in their own homes. Observers and government officials note that
    this program has been very successful in some of the cities and rural
    areas of the country but less so in the more traditional southeast. The
    law is also limited to spouses, and therefore does not address some
    other sources of violence such as in-laws. Citizens of either sex may
    file civil or criminal charges for abuse but rarely do so.
        There are 9 shelters and 6 consultation centers for battered women;
    in addition the child protection and social services agency provides
    services to victims of domestic violence through its 19 social centers.
    Several private shelters that had previously been in operation closed
    due to lack of funds.
        Laws and ingrained societal notions make it difficult to prosecute
    sexual assault or rape cases. Although national police statistics show
    about 1,200 complaints of rape through November, there is no
    information on what percentage of rape incidents are reported. ``Honor
    murders''--the killing by immediate family members of women who are
    suspected of being unchaste--continue in rural areas and among recent
    immigrants to cities; according to media reports, there may be dozens
    of such murders every year. Under the law, killings that were
    ``provoked'' (such as honor killings) can receive a lighter sentence
    than other types of murders. Because of further sentence reductions for
    juvenile offenders, observers note that young male relatives often are
    designated to perform the killing. Government authorities have tried to
    send a clear message of intolerance for this practice through the
    prosecution of those responsible for the murders, but it continues.
    Another dimension of this problem is suicides among young girls forced
    into marriage. Such suicides are most common in the southeast, where
    suicides have risen more than 50 percent since 1993 and where 80
    percent of suicides are by women. The traditional practice of
    ``virginity testing'' continues, despite governmental regulations
    prohibiting it unless requested by the woman.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Some laws still discriminate against women. The Civil Code
    prohibits granting gender-based privileges or rights but retains some
    discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations.
    Because the husband is the legal head of household, he is authorized to
    choose the domicile and represents the conjugal unit. As parents,
    husband and wife exercise joint child rearing rights, but when they
    disagree, the husband's view often prevails. A single woman who gives
    birth to a child out of wedlock is not considered automatically to be
    the legal guardian of her child; a court decision may be required.
    Divorce law requires that the divorcing spouses divide their property
    according to property registered in each spouse's name. Because in most
    cases property is registered in the husband's name, this provision can
    create difficulties for women who wish to divorce. Under inheritance
    laws, a widow generally receives one-fourth of the estate, and her
    children receive the rest. According to a 1994 government survey,
    households headed by women have 50 percent less income than those
    headed by men.
        The literacy rate for women is 78 percent, compared with 94 percent
    for men, but in rural areas the rate can be as low as 50 percent for
    women, according to 1999 statistics. One reason for this is that men
    must serve in the army, and if they do not know how to read they are
    taught upon entry.
        Particularly in urban areas, women continue to improve their
    position, including in the professions, business, and the civil
    service. They constitute 35 percent of the students in universities.
    However, they continue to face discrimination to varying degrees. Women
    are generally underrepresented in managerial-level positions. Women
    generally receive equal pay for equal work in the professions,
    business, and civil service jobs, although a large percentage of women
    employed in agriculture and in the trade, restaurant, and hotel sectors
    work as unpaid family help. Women may take the examination to become
    governors or subgovernors; several are subgovernors.
        Independent women's groups and women's rights associations continue
    to increase in number. There are many women's committees affiliated
    with local bar associations. Other organizations include the
    Association to Support Women Candidates (Ka-Der), ``The Flying Broom''
    women's advocacy group, the Turkish Women's Union, and the Foundation
    for the Evaluation of Women's Labor. The concept of lobbying for
    women's rights, including greater elected representation, is gaining
    momentum. Women continue to be very active in ongoing debates between
    secularists and Islamists, especially with respect to the right to
    choose whether to wear religious head coverings in public places, such
    as government offices and universities.
        Children.--The Government is committed to furthering children's
    welfare and works to expand opportunities in education and health,
    including a further reduction in the infant mortality rate. The State
    Minister for Women's and Family issues oversees implementation of the
    Government's programs for children. During the year, the Government
    established a Children's Rights Monitoring and Assessment High Council
    to focus on children's rights issues.
        Government-provided education through the age of 14 or the eighth
    grade is compulsory. Traditional family values in rural areas place a
    greater emphasis on advanced education for sons than for daughters; the
    relatively new 8-year compulsory education requirement (implemented in
    1998) was expected to allow more girls to continue their education. In
    practice in rural Anatolia, the literacy rate for girls is very low,
    and many do not complete primary school. The literacy rate for boys,
    most of whom complete primary school, is higher. Some continue on to
    high school, for which they generally must travel or live away from
    home (see Section 1.g.).
        The social security system aims to provide social security and
    health insurance for all its citizens, but there are still gaps in this
    coverage, leaving about 20 percent of families and their children
    without coverage, according to the June UNICEF report on ``The State of
    Women and Children in Turkey.'' Persons not covered by insurance may
    use a special program to access public health care. In terms of
    immunization, infant mortality, and malnutrition, Turkey's standards
    remain at levels that are not compatible with the level of development
    and resources in the country, according to the UNICEF report.
    Currently, only about 40 percent of children aged 12 to 23 months are
    fully immunized. Infant mortality has rapidly declined over the past
    decade, and as of 1998 stood at 43 per 1,000.
        Although the law provides special safeguards for children in police
    custody, police officers and prosecutors frequently circumvent or
    ignore these provisions. The law stipulates that the state prosecutor
    or a designated assistant should carry out interrogations of minors and
    that minors must be provided with lawyers; however, in practice police
    and prosecutors often deny minors access to lawyers and fail to inform
    parents. Children and juveniles detained under the Anti-Terror Law also
    often are held for up to 4 days in incommunicado detention. In
    September the Minister of Justice and the head of Ankara's Bar
    Association signed an agreement allowing the Bar Association to inspect
    two children's prison facilities in Ankara, the first such arrangement.
        Children have suffered greatly from the cycle of violence in the
    southeast. The migration--forced or voluntary--of many families, past
    terrorism against teachers, and school closings in the southeast have
    uprooted children and moved them to cities that are hard pressed to
    find the resources to provide basic, mandatory services such as
    schooling. Many cities in the southeast are operating schools on double
    shifts, with as many as 100 students per classroom (see Section 1.g.).
    The Government has built regional boarding schools to help deal with
    this problem, but they are insufficient in number.
        Instances of child beating and abuse are reported more frequently
    than in previous years, according to women's groups. The increase
    likely is attributable to greater public awareness of the problem.
        Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
    to buildings and public transportation for the disabled. According to
    the June UNICEF report on women and children in Turkey, welfare
    institutions ``provide limited financial, employment and educational
    support to the handicapped.'' According to the report, the number of
    disabled persons is unknown. The Ministry of Education reports that
    there are 1.1 million disabled children in the country. Although there
    are many institutions for the disabled, most attention to disabled
    persons remains at the individual and family level. The Government
    established an ``Administration of Disabilities'' office under the
    Prime Ministry in 1997, with the mandate of developing cooperation and
    coordination among national and international institutions, and to
    conduct research into issues such as delivery of services. Certain
    categories of employers are required to hire disabled persons as 2
    percent of their employee pool, although there is no penalty for
    failure to comply.
        Religious Minorities.--Jews and numerous Christian denominations
    are generally free to practice their religions and report little
    discrimination in daily life. However, there are restrictions on
    clerical training and on the Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul, and police
    disrupted several Christian religious gatherings on the grounds that
    they were being held in unauthorized locations.
        The Government restricts the Orthodox Patriarch by requiring that
    he be a Turkish citizen and that his selection be approved by the
    Government. In addition in 1971 the Government closed the only
    remaining Orthodox theological seminary in the country. As a result,
    Orthodox citizens have no access to theological training--requisite to
    become an Orthodox Priest--in Turkey.
        In May police raided a small Christian congregation in the Avcilar
    district of Istanbul and arrested six Turkish citizens, an American,
    and an Australian. They were charged with opening a Christian training
    institute without legal permission. The defendants were charged with
    violating Law 2911, which ``prohibits unauthorized meetings and
    demonstrations.'' The defendants maintained that they completed the
    required applications to hold meetings with the assistance of local
    police officials. The case is currently pending.
        Jews and numerous Christian denominations freely practice their
    religions and report little discrimination in daily life. Some
    incidents still occur, and extremist groups or individuals target
    minority communities from time to time. However, during the year no
    attacks were reported on minority community properties. No perpetrators
    have been arrested or charged in a 1998 arson attack on the Orthodox
    shrine, now a museum, at Saint Therapon where the custodian was killed;
    nor in the December 1997 bombing at the Orthodox Patriarchate. Police
    protection increased after the 1998 attack, and investigations
    continue. In June, 33 persons were convicted and given the death
    penalty for ``trying to change the constitutional regime,'' for their
    role in setting a July 1993 fire in which 37 secularist intellectuals
    (mainly Alawi Muslims) died.
        No laws prohibit religious conversion. Nonetheless individuals
    contemplating conversion, especially to Christianity, often face family
    and community pressures, and proselytizing remains socially
    unacceptable. Some members of religious minorities claim that they have
    limited career prospects in government or military service as a result
    of their religious affiliation. There are no non-Muslim senior officers
    in the military, according to a senior military official, because non-
    Muslims do not apply to attend the military academy, and officers must
    be graduates.
        Many religious minority members, along with many in the secular
    political majority of Muslims, fear the possibility of Islamic
    extremism and the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics.
    Islamist journals frequently publish anti-Semitic material.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution does not
    recognize the Kurds as a national, racial, or ethnic minority, although
    they are in fact the country's largest ethnic and linguistic minority.
    There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds' participation in political
    and economic affairs, and many M.P.''s, senior officials, and
    professionals are Kurds; however, Kurds who publicly or politically
    assert their Kurdish identity or publicly espouse using Kurdish in the
    public domain risk public censure, harassment, or prosecution. In March
    the Court of Cassation for the first time affirmed a lower court
    decision to allow a Turkish citizen to change registry records and give
    his daughter a Kurdish-language, rather than Turkish, first name. Kurds
    who are long-term residents in industrialized cities in the West are in
    many cases assimilated into the political, economic, and social life of
    the nation, and much intermarriage has occurred over many generations.
    Kurds currently migrating westward (including those displaced by the
    conflict in the southeast) bring with them their culture and village
    identity, but often little education and few skills.
        Private spoken and printed communications in Kurdish are legal;
    however, the use of minority languages, including Kurdish, in
    television and radio broadcasts, by political parties, and in schools
    is restricted by a plethora of laws and even articles of the
    Constitution (see Section 2.a.); these restrictions are invoked
    arbitrarily. Although some senior politicians, including the Prime
    Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem,
    and the head of the intelligence service have asserted that the
    Government should allow Kurdish broadcasting, no changes to the
    applicable laws were made.
        The Government circumscribes the activities of organizations such
    as the MKM, a corporation with branches in several cities outside the
    southeast, which was established to promote Kurdish language and
    culture (see Section 2.a.).
        The Ministry of Education tightly controls the curriculum in
    schools (except foreign-language schools not part of the Turkish
    system). The small numbers of Greek-language students have little
    opportunity to continue their education in Turkey, and consequently
    many go to Greece, often never to return.
        No accurate accounting of the Romani population exists, but it may
    be significant in regions near Bulgaria and Greece. No incidents of
    public or government harassment directed against Roma were reported.
    However, experts claim that Roma experience discrimination, for
    example, regarding employment. In June the head of the Diyanet issued a
    circular instructing muftis to educate the public about Turkish Roma
    and stressing that Islam considers all persons born equal and without
    any sins. The circular instructed muftis to dispel myths that lead to
    discrimination against Roma.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers, except police and military
    personnel, have the right to associate freely and form representative
    unions. This right encompasses civil servants, including
    schoolteachers.
        The Constitution stipulates that no one shall be compelled to
    become, remain a member of, or withdraw from, a labor union. The law
    states that unions and confederations may be founded without prior
    authorization based on a petition to the governor of the province of
    the prospective union's headquarters. Unions are independent of the
    Government and political parties. They must obtain official permission
    to hold meetings or rallies and must allow police to attend their
    conventions and record the proceedings. The Constitution requires
    candidates for union office to have worked 10 years in the industry
    represented by the union. The Supreme Court in 1998 banned the Disk-
    affiliated union in the leather sector, Deri-Is, because it violated
    this article in the Constitution and prohibited it from appealing to a
    higher court. It applied to the ECHR for redress. The International
    Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association has stated
    that this provision is extremely prejudicial to the interests of the
    trade unions and has urged that it be repealed.
        Just over 13 percent of the total civilian labor force (15 years of
    age and above) are unionized. The labor force numbers around 22
    million, with approximately 43 percent employed in agriculture. There
    are four confederations of labor unions: The Turkish Confederation of
    Workers Unions (Turk-Is); the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade
    Unions (Hak-Is); the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK);
    and the National Confederation (Misk). There are also 3 public
    employees unions and 27 independent unions. Unions and their officers
    have a statutory right to express their views on issues directly
    affecting members' economic and social interests.
        Prosecutors may ask labor courts to order a trade union or
    confederation to suspend its activities or to go into liquidation for
    serious infractions, based on alleged violation of specific legal
    norms. However, the Government may not dissolve a union summarily.
        The constitutional right to strike is restricted. For example, the
    Constitution does not permit strikes by civil servants, workers engaged
    in the protection of life and property, and those in the mining and
    petroleum industries, sanitation services, national defense, and
    education. The right to strike is suspended for the first 10 years of a
    company's operations in the nine free trade zones (see Section 6.b.).
        Collective bargaining is required before a strike. The law
    specifies the steps that a union must take before it may strike or
    before an employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding mediation is the
    last of those steps. A party that fails to comply with these steps
    forfeits its rights. Unions are forbidden to engage in secondary
    (solidarity), political, or general strikes, or in slowdowns. The
    employer may respond to a strike with a lockout but is prohibited from
    hiring strikebreakers or using administrative personnel to perform jobs
    normally done by strikers. Article 42 of Law 2822, governing collective
    bargaining, strikes, and lockouts, prohibits the employer from
    terminating workers who encourage or participate in a legal strike. In
    sectors in which strikes are prohibited, disputes are resolved through
    binding arbitration.
        The Government has the statutory power under Law 2822 to suspend
    strikes for 60 days for reasons of national security or public health
    and safety. Unions may petition the Council of State to lift such a
    suspension. If this appeal fails, and the parties and mediators still
    fail to resolve the dispute, the strike is subject to compulsory
    arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. The ILO's Committee of
    Experts and the Committee on the Application of Standards regard the
    Government's application of Law 2822 as too broad, and they have called
    on the Government to limit recourse to compulsory arbitration to
    essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Government
    asserts that the law does not contradict the Committees' principles.
        According to the Labor Ministry, from January through November
    there were 19 strikes in the public sector involving 11,879 workers and
    32 strikes in the private sector involving 6,565 workers. During the
    same period there were also 2 lockouts in the private sector involving
    2,483 workers.
        Public and private sector workers throughout the country went on
    strike during the summer to protest efforts by the Government and
    employers to keep pay raises in line with the Government's planned
    inflation rate of 25 percent.
        Some labor union members faced government limits on freedom of
    speech and assembly (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), while some civil
    service organizations continued to demonstrate for the right to strike
    and for higher salaries. Legislation providing the right to strike for
    civil servants was introduced in the last parliamentary session but was
    not adopted. Civil servants currently have the right to organize and
    engage in collective bargaining.
        All defendants were acquitted in the trial, begun in 1996, against
    Turk-Is Chairmanship Council officials who were charged with violating
    the Associations Law when Turk-Is announced support for political
    parties during the 1995 election. No action has been taken in a second
    trial against Turk-Is officials charged with holding illegal
    demonstrations in 1995 to protest a deadlock in collective bargaining.
        With government approval, unions may and do form confederations and
    join international labor bodies, as long as these organizations are not
    hostile to Turkey or to freedom of religion or belief. The
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which
    Turk-Is had been an affiliate for years, approved DISK as an affiliate
    in 1992; Hak-Is became a member in 1997.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All industrial
    workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and most
    industrial and some public sector agricultural workers are organized.
    The law requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union
    must represent not only 50 percent plus 1 of the employees at a given
    work site, but also 10 percent of all the workers in that particular
    industry. This barrier has the effect of favoring established unions,
    particularly those affiliated with Turk-Is, the confederation that
    represents nearly 73 percent of organized labor.
        The Ministry of Labor reportedly manipulated membership figures to
    prevent unions from acquiring bargaining rights or to rescind such
    rights. The ICFTU reports that, as a result of the law, workers in many
    sectors of economic activity are not covered by a collective agreement.
        The ILO has called on the Government to rescind this 10 percent
    rule, stating that it violates ILO Convention 98. However, both Turk-Is
    and the Turkish employers' organization favor retention of the 10
    percent rule, since each confederation has an established membership
    area and does not want the status quo upset. In 1994 the Government
    informed the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards that the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Security proposed to remove the 10 percent
    numerical restriction and that it had communicated its proposal to the
    social partners. The ILO took note of the Government's statement that
    it continued to study removal of this requirement despite objections
    from employer and worker organizations. However, since then the
    Government has taken no further action.
        The law on trade unions stipulates that an employer may not dismiss
    a labor union representative without rightful cause. The union member
    may appeal such a dismissal to the courts, and if the ruling is in the
    union member's favor, the employer must reinstate him and pay all back
    benefits and salary. These laws generally are applied in practice.
        The ILO has urged the Government to take the necessary measures to
    ensure that workers have effective protection against antiunion
    discrimination. Some private sector employers continued to try to
    eliminate unions. A total of 414,000 workers in the public sector were
    dismissed within the last 2 years. As a result of the privatization of
    128 entities in 12 sectors, 10,746 workers were laid off.
        The continuing state of emergency in the southeast has resulted in
    restrictions on labor organizations in four provinces. A law enacted in
    1984 provides for the establishment of free trade zones, which are
    intended to attract domestic and especially foreign investment, and to
    promote international trade. There are nine such zones operating in
    Mersin, Antalya, the Aegean region, Trabzon, Istanbul (two), Eastern
    Anatolia, Mardin, and Rize. Union organizing and collective bargaining
    are permitted in the zones. However, the right to strike is suspended
    for the first 10 years of operation of a particular business in the
    zone. In the meantime, labor disputes that cannot be settled by the
    parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Workers inside the zones
    are paid in foreign exchange rather than in Turkish currency, giving
    them a hedge against inflation.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    statutes prohibit compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children, and the Government generally enforces these provisions in
    practice; however, trafficking in foreign women and girls for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution and labor laws forbid the full-time
    employment of children younger than age 15, with the exception that
    those 13 and 14 years of age may engage in light, part-time work if
    enrolled in school or vocational training. The Constitution also states
    that ``no one shall be required to perform work unsuited to his/her
    age, sex, and capacity.'' With this article and related laws, the
    Government undertakes to protect children from work unsuited to their
    age and capacity, such as underground mining and from working at night.
    According to Article 67 of the Labor Law, children who attend school
    can work no more than 7.5 hours a day, inclusive of school time. The
    Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these laws only in largescale
    industrial and service sector enterprises. Children working in
    agriculture, in household-based establishments, in establishments with
    three or fewer workers, in apprenticeship training centers, and those
    working as domestic servants are subject to the Code of Obligations,
    which fails to provide a minimum age of employment. However, according
    to Article 174 of the Code of Obligations, children between the ages of
    12 and 16 years may not work at night and may work for no more than 8
    hours a day.
        Child labor is widespread. According to a June United Nations
    Children's Fund report, 1.07 million children between the ages of 6 and
    14 and 2.4 million children between the ages of 15 and 17 are in the
    labor force. This represents about six percent of all children aged 6
    to 14, and 60 percent of those aged 15 to 17. According to an October
    1999 State Statistics Institute report, 961,000 children work in family
    businesses and do not receive wages, 257,000 are seasonal workers, and
    387,000 are wage earners. Some 1.1 million of the working children are
    boys. Child labor is used most often in small-sized enterprises.
    According to official data, 87 percent of working children are employed
    by small-sized enterprises having 1 to 9 workers, 7 percent work in
    medium-size enterprises (10 to 24 workers), and 6 percent are employed
    by large-scale enterprises (more than 25 workers).
        In practice many children work because families need the
    supplementary income. An informal system provides work for young boys
    at low wages, for example, in auto repair shops. Girls rarely are seen
    working in public, but many are kept out of school to work in
    handicrafts, especially in rural areas. The bulk of child labor occurs
    in rural areas and often is associated with traditional family economic
    activity, such as farming or animal husbandry. It is common for entire
    families to work together to bring in the harvest.
        The gradual elimination of child labor is a national priority. The
    seventh 5-year development plan, which ran through this year, committed
    the Government to enact legislation to restrict further child labor and
    to adopt legislation to conform to relevant international conventions.
    The Government recognizes the serious problem of child labor and works
    with the ILO to document its extent and to determine solutions.
        The Ministry of Labor, the ILO'S International Program on the
    Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) government partner, actively has been
    combating child labor since 1992, when it established a child labor
    unit and trained Ministry of Labor inspectors specifically in child
    labor issues. In 1996 the Government and the ILO signed an agreement to
    extend IPEC until December 2001. Currently some 70 of the 700 field
    inspectors are trained to handle child labor issues, while the total
    number of establishments falling within the jurisdiction of the
    Ministry is 4 million. Labor inspectors only cover areas that are
    defined in the labor laws. Many children are working in areas that are
    not covered by labor laws, such as agriculture or the informal economy
    and are therefore beyond the reach of the inspectorate.
        With the introduction in 1998 of the 8-year compulsory education
    program (previously, 5 years were compulsory), the Government expected
    the number of child workers to be reduced significantly, since children
    are required to attend school until age 14. As yet, no statistics are
    available concerning the impact of the mandatory 8-year education on
    child labor.
        Small enterprises prefer child labor because it is cheaper and
    provides practical training for the children, who subsequently are
    preferred for future employment in the same workplace. If children
    employed in these businesses are registered with a Ministry of National
    Education training center, they go to the center once a week for
    training, and the centers are obliged by law to inspect their
    workplaces. Currently there are 318 centers located in 80 cities. These
    centers provide apprenticeship training in 86 occupations. Only 22.8
    percent of working children take advantage of these schools.
        The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, including that
    performed by children, and the laws generally are enforced; however,
    trafficking in foreign girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is
    a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor is obliged
    legally to set minimum wages at least every 2 years through a minimum
    wage board, a tripartite government-industry-union body. In recent
    years, it has done so annually. However, during the year there were two
    adjustments: the nominal minimum wage was increased in January by 15
    percent and again in July by 10 percent, compared with an annual
    inflation rate of nearly 34 percent. Public workers who are part of
    collective labor agreements also received an inflationindexed increase
    and a 5 percent prosperity rate increase. The monthly gross minimum
    wage rates, which became effective in July, were approximately $180
    (118.8 million TL) for workers over age 16, and $110 (75 million TL)
    for workers under 16.
        The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. It would be difficult for a single worker, and
    impossible for a family, to live on the minimum wage without support
    from other sources. Most workers earn considerably more. According to
    the results of an August survey conducted by the Public Workers' Labor
    Union, a four-member family requires $834 (534 million TL) per month to
    live above the poverty line. Workers covered by the labor law, who
    constitute about one-third of the total labor force, also receive a hot
    meal or a daily food allowance and other fringe benefits that,
    according to the Turkish Employers' Association, make basic wages alone
    account for only about 37.3 percent of total compensation.
        The labor law sets a 45-hour workweek, although most unions have
    bargained for fewer hours. The law prescribes a weekly rest day and
    limits the number of overtime hours to 3 per day, for up to 90 days in
    a year. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor effectively
    enforces wage and hour provisions in the unionized industrial, service,
    and government sectors, which cover about 12 percent of workers.
        The law mandates occupational health and safety regulations, but in
    practice the Government does not carry out effective inspection and
    enforcement programs. Law 1475 allows for the shutdown of an operation
    if a five-person committee, which includes safety inspectors, employee,
    and employer representatives, determines that the operation endangers
    workers' lives. In practice financial constraints, limited safety
    awareness, carelessness, and fatalistic attitudes result in scant
    attention to occupational safety and health by workers and employers
    alike. The law sets out procedures under which workers may remove
    themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Government deals with the problem
    of trafficking in persons through laws relevant to prostitution and
    illegal immigration. The Ministries of Justice and the Interior are
    responsible for the problem, and the police, especially the immigration
    and organized crime authorities, enforce antitrafficking laws. Under
    the Penal Code, it is illegal to abduct and detain a woman or child.
    However, this law relates more to the old custom of kidnaping a bride,
    in which punishment is suspended if adbuctor and abductee get married.
    A further provision prohibits enticement to prostitution; however,
    penalties are light (up to 2 years' imprisonment). A further article of
    the Penal Code makes it a crime to send a prostitute from one place to
    another by force or fraud. These laws, and those dealing with illegal
    immigration, are most relevant to trafficking in persons.
        Turkey is a major destination and transit country for trafficking
    in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution. The
    International Organization for Migration (IOM) and domestic NGO's
    stated that most trafficked women in the country are from Albania,
    Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. Arrests (and in most cases,
    deportations) of nationals from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine rose from
    6,700 in 1998 to approximately 11,000 in 1999, according to IOM.
    According to the Turkish National Police, 232 Moldovan, 293 Romanian,
    and 175 Ukrainian women were extradited in 2000. African and Asian
    women use Turkey as a transit point to other countries in Europe.
        Organized crime groups appear to be the primary trafficking
    organizations. The Ministry of the Interior's organized crime
    department is responsible for combating trafficking. According to
    NGO's, victims of trafficking receive no governmental assistance and
    the trafficking cycle continues. Many women and girls come to the
    country believing that they have legitimate work as models,
    entertainers, governesses, or translators. In some cases, girls from
    Romanian orphanages have been kidnaped. Most of the activity occurs in
    Istanbul, Izmir, and Trabzon. Once in the country, the trafficked women
    and girls are in debt bondage to their traffickers, who are members of
    the mafia (mainly Russian). Women who attempt to escape often are
    beaten, gang-raped, or killed. The Government addresses this problem
    with laws relating to illegal migration and unregistered prostitution;
    registered prostitution is legal.
        Reportedly there is almost no trafficking in Turkish women or
    girls. There were no reports of trafficking in children for the purpose
    of forced labor; legislation in this area addresses the issue (see
    Section 6.d.).
        There is little formal interagency cooperation in dealing with the
    problem of trafficking. Representatives from the Ministries of
    Interior, Justice, and Health, among other ministries and NGO's, have
    met on this issue. The Alien's Department of the police is the most
    active governmental entity addressing this problem.
        The Government does not provide any formal protection, aid, or
    education to victims of trafficking. Since the women being trafficked
    are not usually from Turkey, preventive education is less applicable.
    Women's shelters are open to women regardless of citizenship.
                                   __________

                                  TURKMENISTAN

        Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by its president and his
    closest advisers, continues to exercise power in a Soviet-era
    authoritarian style despite Constitutional provisions nominally
    establishing a democratic system. The seriously flawed December 1999
    parliamentary elections and the passage of a law exempting President
    Saparmurat Niyazov from term limits were backward steps. Niyazov, head
    of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1985 (renamed the Democratic Party
    in 1992) and President of Turkmenistan since its independence in 1991,
    legally may remain in office until his death. Niyazov retained his
    monopoly on power, and the Democratic Party, the renamed Communist
    Party, remained the sole political party in the country. The Government
    registered no parties during the year and continued to repress all
    opposition political activities. Emphasizing stability and gradual
    reform, official nation-building efforts focused on fostering Turkmen
    nationalism and the glorification of President Niyazov. The 50-member
    unicameral Parliament (Mejlis) has no genuinely independent authority,
    and in practice the President controls the judicial system.
        The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the responsibilities
    formerly held by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB); namely,
    to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of
    society and repression of dissent. The KNB reportedly exercises wide
    discretion over issues such as exit visas and Internet access and works
    to limit personal freedoms. The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs
    the criminal police, which works closely with the KNB on matters of
    national security. Both forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        Turkmenistan is largely a desert with cattle and sheep raising,
    intensive agriculture in irrigated areas, and huge oil and gas
    reserves. Its economy remains dependent on central planning mechanisms
    and state control, although the Government has taken a number of small
    steps to make the transition to a market economy. Agriculture,
    particularly cotton cultivation, accounts for nearly half of total
    employment. Gas, oil and gas derivatives, and cotton account for almost
    all of the country's export revenues. Negotiations between the
    Government and an international gas consortium concerning the
    construction of a gas export pipeline across the Caspian Sea--the
    Trans-Caspian Pipeline--stalled in the latter half of the year. While
    the idea for the pipeline still exists, the Government is focusing
    instead on negotiating large gas deals with Russia and Ukraine. It is
    also considering projects for pipelines through Iran and Afghanistan,
    as well as a pipeline to China.
        The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. The
    Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses, and the
    authorities in particular severely restricted political and civil
    liberties. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government
    peacefully. In 1999 one political prisoner died in custody under
    suspicious circumstances. Security forces continued to beat and
    otherwise mistreat suspects and prisoners, and prison conditions
    remained poor and unsafe. Both the criminal police and the KNB operate
    with relative impunity and abused the rights of individuals as well as
    enforced the Government's policy of repressing political opposition.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, and
    unfair trials remained problems. Approximately 12,000 prisoners were
    amnestied and released during the year; 2 were political prisoners. An
    additional 2,000 received a reduction of sentence. Interference with
    citizens' privacy remained a problem. During the year, the Government
    demolished hundreds of private homes in and around Ashgabat with very
    little notice given to the owners in order to make room for large urban
    building projects such as luxury apartments, government buildings, and
    monuments; many displaced homeowners received little or no compensation
    for their loss.
        The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and does not
    permit freedom of the press. In May the Government withdrew the
    operating licenses of all private Internet providers, leaving only
    state-owned Turkmen Telecom as a service provider. The Government
    completely controls the media, censoring all newspapers and never
    permitting independent criticism of government policy. Criticism of
    officials is only permitted if it directed at those who have fallen out
    of favor with the President. The focus of the media on President
    Niyazov, around whom a personality cult has been built, intensified
    during the year. The President's father and mother have been
    incorporated more fully into the cult. Academic freedom has also
    declined. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and association.
    The Government imposes restrictions on nonregistered religious groups.
    The law on religion reaffirms a number of important religious freedoms
    but also tightens government control of religious groups. The
    requirement that religious organizations have at least 500 Turkmen
    citizens as members in a given locality to be registered legally has
    prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from
    legally establishing themselves. Repression of religious minorities
    continued during the year, although it abated somewhat during the
    summer following a government decree against unlawful searches that was
    issued in April. At least 10 non-governmental groups were registered
    during the year; 8 were affiliated with Sunni Muslim. Government
    restrictions on travelling abroad, including for educational and
    training purposes, tightened during the year. The Government has also
    increased restrictions on internal travel, limiting travel of both
    citizens and non-citizens to border cities and regions. Domestic
    violence against women is a problem, and women experience societal
    discrimination. The Government generally gave favored treatment to men
    over women and to ethnic Turkmen over minorities.
        In January 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe (OSCE) opened an office in Ashgabat.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In September 1999,
    political prisoner and Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev was found
    hanged in his cell in the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi.
    Following his death, the Government rejected requests in 1999 from the
    Russian Government and international human rights organizations for an
    investigation into the suspicious nature of Garayev's death (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The 1992 Constitution makes torture or other cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment illegal; however, there were widespread
    credible reports that security officials frequently beat criminal
    suspects and prisoners and often used force to obtain confessions.
    There were credible reports that political prisoners are singled out
    for cruel treatment. There were reports that prisoners needing medical
    treatment have been beaten on their way to and from the hospital.
    Security forces also used denial of medical treatment and food, verbal
    intimidation, and placement in unsanitary conditions to coerce
    confessions. In November four Protestants were tortured while in police
    custody and at least three of them subsequently had their homes and
    cars confiscated after being forced to sign a statement saying that
    they voluntarily had donated all they owned as a gift to the President
    (see Section 2.c.).
        Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are unsanitary,
    overcrowded, and unsafe. Disease, particularly tuberculosis, is
    rampant. Food is poor and prisoners depend on relatives to supplement
    inadequate food supplies. Those who do not receive food from relatives
    suffer greatly. Facilities for prisoner rehabilitation and recreation
    are extremely limited. Some prisoners have died due to overcrowding,
    untreated illnesses, and lack of adequate protection from the severe
    summer heat. In Turkmenbashy prison, inmates reportedly are housed 14
    to a cell and are permitted visits from relatives once every 3 months,
    who may bring food once every 2 months. In Kizlkaya prison, near
    Dashoguz, prisoners are forced to work in a kaolin mine under hazardous
    and unhealthy conditions (see Sections 2.b. and 6.c.). In September
    1999, a political prisoner was found hanged in his cell under
    suspicious circumstances (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
        The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
    conditions. The OSCE has repeatedly requested permission from the
    Government to visit prisons, but has received no response.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The Constitution states that citizens ``have
    the right to freedom of belief and the free expression thereof and also
    to obtain information unless it is a state, official, or commercial
    secret.'' However, in practice those expressing views critical of or
    different from those of the Government have been arrested on false
    charges of committing common crimes (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
        On January 5, the Government arrested Nurberdy Nurmamedov, the head
    of the Agzybirlik (Unity) National Movement. Nurmamedov was convicted
    of hooliganism and making death threats on a business associate; he was
    given a 5-year term in a labor camp, but was amnestied on December 22.
    Nurmamedov's son, Murat, was also convicted of hooliganism and
    sentenced to 2 years of hard labor, but was put under house arrest
    instead of going to prison. The arrests of Nurmamedov and his son
    followed shortly after Nurmamedov's statements criticizing the December
    12, 1999, Mejlis elections and the decision by the Mejlis to appoint
    Niyazov president for life (see Section 2.a.).
        In November 1999, the Government sentenced Parahat Yklimov, the
    brother of Sapar Yklimov--a former government official who lives
    outside the country--to 11 years' imprisonment for financial
    misconduct. Prior to his arrest, he reportedly had been warned that his
    brother should cease his political activities abroad. His family
    reportedly was told by internal security organizations that he would be
    released if his brother returned to the country.
        The precise number of political detainees held at year's end was
    unknown. By law a person accused of a crime can be held in pretrial
    detention for up to 10 months. According to the Government, out of a
    total of 22,000 prisoners countrywide, some 12,000 prisoners were
    amnestied and released by year's end (see Sections 1.e and 3). Among
    those amnestied were political prisoners Nurbedy Nurmamedov and Pirkuli
    Tanrikuliev. A further 2,000 prisoners were granted a reduction in
    sentence. In January 1999, the Government released dissident Gulgeldi
    Annaniyazov.
        In January there were reports that a Baptist pastor and his wife,
    who were residing legally in the country, were deported to Ukraine. In
    February the family of jailed Baptist Shageldi Atakov was exiled to a
    small village outside of Mary (see Section 2.c.). In March the
    authorities forcibly returned to Russia three Baptist preachers and
    their families who had been living in Ashgabat and Mary (see Section
    2.c.). Also in March, the Government arrested religious leader Hoja
    Ahmed Orazgylychev and tore down an unregistered mosque and religious
    school run by Orazgylychev and his followers; he subsequently was
    released and sentenced to internal exile in Tedjen (see Section 2.c).
    This occurred after he reportedly gave an interview to the Government
    that was critical of the President.
        In November 1999, President Niyazov announced plans to deport to
    remote areas any government officials who were found to have committed
    crimes. President Niyazov proposed that the officials, accompanied if
    they desired by their families, would work off their sentences in
    exile. Almost all prominent political opponents of the Government have
    chosen to move to either Russia, Sweden, Norway, or the Czech Republic
    for reasons of personal safety; none returned during year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
    judicial independence; however, in practice, the judiciary is not
    independent. The President's power to select and dismiss judges
    subordinates the judiciary to the Presidency. The President appoints
    all judges for a term of 5 years. The appointments are without
    legislative review, except for the Chairman (Chief Justice) of the
    Supreme Court, and the President has the sole authority to remove all
    appointees from the bench before the completion of their terms.
        The court system has not been reformed since the Soviet era. It
    consists of a Supreme Court, 6 provincial courts (including 1 for the
    city of Ashgabat only), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city
    courts. A Supreme Economic Court hears cases involving disputes between
    state-owned enterprises and ministries, and, increasingly, commercial
    disputes. The Government abolished all military courts in 1997.
    Criminal offenses committed by members of the armed forces are tried in
    civilian courts under the authority of the Office of the Prosecutor
    General.
        The law provides for the rights of due process for defendants,
    including a public trial, the right to a defense attorney, access to
    accusatory material, and the right to call witnesses to testify on
    behalf of the accused. In practice authorities often deny these rights,
    and there are no independent lawyers, with the exception of a few
    retired legal officials, available to represent defendants. When a
    person cannot afford the services of a lawyer, the court appoints one.
    A person may represent himself in court.
        Lower courts' decisions may be appealed, and the defendant may
    petition the President for clemency. The President released over 12,000
    inmates from prison in connection with general amnesties during the
    year (see Section 1.d. and 3). In practice adherence to due process is
    not uniform, particularly in the lower courts in rural areas. Even when
    due process rights are observed, the authority of the government
    prosecutor vis-a-vis the defense attorney is so great that it is very
    difficult for the defendant to receive a fair trial. The Government
    denied foreign diplomats access to several supposedly open court
    proceedings.
        At year's end, the Government held at least one political prisoner,
    Mukhametkuli Aimuradov. In January the Government released political
    prisoners Nurberdy Nurmamedov and Pirkuly Tanrikuliev as part of a
    general amnesty (see Section 1.d.). In September 1999, Russian citizen
    Khoshali Garayev, one of two persons convicted in secret before the
    Supreme Court in 1995 for antigovernment activities and planning
    terrorist actions against government officials, was discovered hanged
    in his cell at the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi. The
    Government rejected all requests for an investigation into the
    circumstances surrounding Garayev's death (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    In December 1998, he and Mukhamedkuli Aimuradov were sentenced to
    additional concurrent terms of 18 years for allegedly attempting to
    escape from this prison.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of protection
    from arbitrary interference by the State in a citizen's personal life;
    however, government authorities violated this right. There are no legal
    means to regulate the conduct of surveillance by the state security
    apparatus, which regularly monitors the activities of opponents and
    critics of the Government. Security officials use physical
    surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and the
    recruitment of informers. Critics of the Government, and many other
    people, report credibly that their mail is intercepted before delivery.
        In the past, the authorities have dismissed children from school
    and removed adults from their jobs because of the political activities
    of relatives. Internal security organizations reportedly pressured
    relatives of a former government official who left the country to
    convince him to return (see Section 1.d.). The relatives of a democracy
    activist convicted on charges of embezzlement lost a government job and
    access to the state-run university (see Section 2.b.). The authorities
    also threaten supporters of opposition political movements with loss of
    employment and homes (see Section 2.b.). In October President Niyazov
    called for background checks that would span three generations in order
    to determine the ``moral character'' of university students prior to
    entry (see Section 2.a.).
        During the year, the Government demolished hundreds of private
    homes in and around Ashgabat at very short notice in order to make way
    for large government building projects such as a new sports stadium,
    public monuments, and luxury apartments. Those who built their homes
    without the appropriate approval from the Government were not offered
    alternate accommodations despite their length of occupancy or degree of
    hardship. Some of these families continue to live outdoors, near their
    destroyed homes, for lack of any alternative. Others who had the proper
    building permission have been offered apartments or plots of land in
    compensation, but such compensation is often not at fair market value
    (i.e. desert plots with no amenities) or inadequate for large families.
        In April the President ordered the implementation of new procedures
    restricting searches of private homes (see Section 2.c.). The measures
    were formally approved by the legislature on June 15 and became
    effective immediately.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to hold personal convictions and to express them freely; however,
    in practice, the Government severely restricts freedom of speech and
    does not permit freedom of the press. Criticism of the Government can
    lead to personal hardship, including loss of opportunities for
    advancement and employment.
        The Government completely controls radio and television. It funds
    almost all print media. The Government censors newspapers and uses
    Turkmen language newspapers to attack its critics abroad; the Committee
    for the Protection of State Secrets must approve prepublication
    galleys. Russian-language newspapers from abroad are available by
    subscription only and are dated. Some Russian and other foreign
    newspapers are also available in several Ashgabat hotels. Owners of
    satellite dishes have access to foreign television programming. Use of
    satellite dishes in Ashgabat appears widespread, but the dishes are too
    expensive for poorer residents outside of urban areas.
        While Internet access is available, there is now only one provider
    for the whole country. On May 29, the Government withdrew the licenses
    of all private Internet providers, leaving state-owned Turkmen Telecom
    as the sole Internet provider for the whole country. There are credible
    reports that the Government took this measure in order to monitor
    Internet activity, especially electronic mail. Internet access is
    prohibitively expensive for most citizens. For normal usage, monthly
    fees average $20 (400,000 manat at the street rate), which is the
    amount of the minimum monthly wage.
        In June 1999, the tri-language daily Ashgabat dropped its English
    and Russian sections and now is printed in Turkmen only. There are no
    Russian-language radio broadcasts and only one short Russian-language
    news program on television each day. In order to regulate printing and
    copying activities, the Government ordered in February 1998 that all
    publishing houses and printing and copying establishments obtain a
    license and register their equipment.
        The Government prohibits the media from reporting the views of
    opposition political leaders and critics, and it never allows even the
    mildest form of criticism of the President in print. The focus of the
    media on President Niyazov, to the exclusion of objective news
    reporting, intensified during the year and amplified the cult of
    personality centered around the President. Public criticism of
    government officials is done almost exclusively by the President
    himself. The Government has subjected those responsible for critical
    foreign press items to threats and harassment.
        In January the Government arrested and sentenced Nurberdy
    Nurmamedov, the head of the Agzybirlik (Unity) National Movement, for
    hooliganism and making death threats; his son Murat was sentenced for
    hooliganism, as well (see Section 1.d.). The arrests followed shortly
    after Nurmamedov's statements criticizing the December 12, 1999, Mejlis
    elections and the decision by the Mejlis to appoint Niyazov president
    for life.
        All foreign correspondents who had applied for accreditation,
    except the Reuters correspondent, had received it by year's end.
        In January 1999 the Government arrested human rights and democracy
    advocate Vyacheslav Mamedov for remarks on a Russian radio broadcast
    attributed to him that were critical of the Government's treatment of
    ethnic Russians. Mamedov was soon released but remained under
    investigation, and his nongovernmental organization (NGO) remained
    unregistered at year's end.
        Intellectuals have reported that the security organs have
    instructed them to praise the President in their art and have warned
    them not to participate in receptions hosted by foreign diplomatic
    missions. The Minister of Culture attends rehearsals of all theater
    productions to ensure that they do not contain antigovernment or
    antipresidential content. The Ministry of Culture must approve plays
    before they open to the public.
        The Government also significantly restricts academic freedom. It
    does not tolerate criticism of government policy or the President in
    academic circles, and it discourages research into areas it considers
    politically sensitive, such as comparative law, history, or ethnic
    relations. All publishing companies are state-owned and works by
    authors of fiction who write about particular periods of history or
    other topics that are out-of-favor with the Government are not
    published. The government-controlled Union of Writers has in the past
    expelled members who have criticized government policy; libraries have
    removed their works. The Government abolished the Academy of Sciences
    in 1998. No masters' degrees or doctorates have been granted in the
    country since that time.
        The Government increased restrictions on academic freedom during
    the year. Following remarks by President Niyazov on September 27, in
    which he criticized an elementary school history textbook for its
    portrayal of Turkmen history, all copies of the book were recalled from
    schools and most have been destroyed. Scholars are very reluctant to
    begin textbook projects. During the year, exit visas for study and
    training abroad, particularly for non-ethnic Turkmen, became more
    difficult to obtain (see Section 2.d.).
        President Niyazov called for background checks that would span
    three generations in order to determine the ``moral character'' of
    university students prior to entry (see Section 1.f.). The President
    also decreed that foreign languages would only be taught in special
    language centers located in specific schools.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    allows for peaceful assembly; however, the Government restricts this
    right in practice. Permits are required for public meetings and
    demonstrations. In the past, there were reports of spontaneous
    demonstrations; for example, over bread prices. According to Human
    Rights Watch, in August approximately 200 village women who aimed to
    bring their grievances before the President were prevented from
    entering Ashgabat by police forces. In September a group of
    approximately 30 students who had been accepted to study in Turkey but
    who had been denied exit visas demonstrated along with their parents in
    front of the cabinet of ministers building.
        The Constitution allows for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice. Unregistered organizations
    with political agendas are not allowed to hold demonstrations or
    meetings. No political groups critical of government policy have been
    able to meet the requirements for registration. The Government uses
    laws on the registration of political parties to prevent the emergence
    of potential opposition groups. At present the only registered
    political party is the Democratic Party, the former Turkmen Communist
    Party.
        Social and cultural organizations without political aims are
    allowed to function, but have found it difficult to register as legal
    entities. However, during the year, the Government reportedly
    registered at least 10 NGO's: 8 groups affiliated with Sunni Islam (see
    Section 2.c.), 1 union of entrepreneurs and inventors, and 1
    educational support group. Two registered NGO's that had experienced
    legal difficulties and were in danger of being closed down by the
    Government earlier in the year had resolved their legal disputes by
    year's end. One of the NGO's was in the process of re-registration and
    the other, which had not previously been registered, was not registered
    but was operating normally.
        Theoretically citizens have the freedom to associate with whomever
    they please; however, the authorities have fired or threatened to fire
    supporters of opposition movements from their jobs, removed them from
    professional societies, and even threatened them with the loss of their
    homes. In addition some citizens with links to foreigners are subject
    to official intimidation. In July 1999, the Government arrested former
    parliamentarian and democracy advocate Pirkuli Tanrikuliev on charges
    of embezzlement after he discussed forming a new political party with
    Western diplomats. Thereafter the Government convicted him, sentenced
    him to 8 years in prison, and stripped him of his medical credentials.
    Shortly before his arrest, his daughter lost her government job and his
    youngest son was removed from the list of those accepted into the
    state-run university. He was released under the presidential amnesty in
    December.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion and does not establish a state religion; however, the
    Government imposes restrictions on most religious groups. Citizens are
    overwhelmingly Muslim, but Islam does not play a dominant role in
    society, in part due to 70 years of Soviet rule. The Government pays
    the salaries of Muslim clerics.
        There is no state religion, but a modest revival of Islam has
    occurred since independence. The Government has incorporated some
    aspects of Muslim tradition into its efforts to define a Turkmen
    identity. Publication of the President's philosophical and spiritual
    guidelines on what it means to be Turkmen, known as ``rukhname,'' has
    been delayed several times. There is widespread concern over what
    rukhname might mean for individual freedom. The state-supported Council
    on Religious Affairs (CRA) is part of the government bureaucracy rather
    than an organ for promoting interfaith dialog. The Russian Orthodox
    council member wears presidential medals on his clerical vestments.
    According to a Keston News Service report, the Council appears to
    exercise direct control over the hiring, promotion, and firing of both
    Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox clergy, despite the fact that this
    role is not listed among the CRA's duties in the Law on Religion.
    During the year, the Government registered 10 new NGO's, 8 of which
    were affiliated with Sunni Islam (see Section 2.b.).
        While it affirms a number of important religious freedoms, the Law
    on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which was amended
    in 1995 and again in 1996, also provides for significant government
    control of religion. Religious congregations are required to register
    with the Government and must have at least 500 Turkmen citizens over
    the age of 18 as adherents to be registered. This requirement has
    prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from
    setting up legal religious organizations. Moreover the Government
    applies this 500-member standard on a local basis. A religious group
    must have at least 500 adherents in each city in which they wish to be
    registered.
        This restriction also has caused problems for a number of minority
    religions, including the Baha'i Faith, which was registered by the
    Government in 1994 only to be deregistered in 1997 when the threshold
    was raised to 500 adherents. Members of the Baha'i Faith have been
    prevented from conducting services since 1997 and, in 1997 and 1998,
    were questioned by internal security representatives for holding
    private prayer meetings in their homes. Although the local Baha'i
    community in Ashgabat was able to open its center for 1 day in March
    1999 to celebrate the Faith's Nowruz (spring) holiday, this year the
    community believed that they would not be permitted to open for Nowruz
    and therefore did not request permission to open. However, the local
    Baha'i community in Ashgabat was able to conduct a memorial service at
    a local restaurant in January. In January 1999, the Armenian community
    in Turkmenbashi applied to local authorities to use a church
    appropriated during the Soviet era as a cultural center pending
    registration as a religious organization; however, at year's end, it
    had not yet received a response from the Government. The Halk Maslahaty
    (People's Council) had not yet reduced the 500 person threshold by
    year's end.
        Although the law protects freedom of religion, the Government
    states officially that proselytizing by unregistered religions--i.e.,
    everything other than Sunni Islam and Orthodox Christianity--is
    illegal. Government permission is required for any mass meetings or
    demonstrations for religious purposes. The Government also restricts
    the travel of clergy or members of religious groups to the country.
    Islamic religious literature is distributed through the mosques.
    Orthodox churches are permitted to offer religious literature.
    Unregistered religious groups face government harassment if they
    attempt to meet or distribute religious literature. In March border
    officials confiscated religious materials being brought into the
    country in bulk by a visiting group affiliated with an evangelical
    Christian organization.
        In August 1999, Shageldi Atakov, a prominent member of the Baptist
    faith, was sentenced to 4 years in prison and fined $12,000 (686
    million manats)--an astronomical sum considering average wages in the
    country amount to $30 (approximately 156,000 manats) a month--for an
    alleged illegal transfer of automobiles in 1994 that Atakov denied. On
    February 3, the local Committee of National Security (KNB) chief
    reportedly expelled Atakov's wife and children from Mary to Kaakha,
    where they were told not to leave the town (see Section 1.d.). In March
    the Government arrested Atakov's brother Chariyar on unknown charges
    and imprisoned him for 15 days. Credible press reports indicate that a
    series of efforts to intimidate Baptist congregations throughout the
    country took place at the beginning and end of the year, including
    raids of homes and confiscation of religious materials. In March the
    authorities forcibly returned to Russia three Baptist preachers and
    their families who had been living in Ashgabat and Mary (see Section
    1.d). At year's end, there were many reports of Baptist churches in
    several cities having been harassed by the Government.
        The Government also harassed Pentecostals. On February 4, law
    enforcement authorities reportedly beat the Pastor and confiscated
    religious materials at a Pentecostal facility in Tejen. On February 6,
    agents from the KNB broke up a service at a Pentecostal house of
    worship in Ashgabat and recorded the names of all those present.
        Muslims were also the target of mistreatment. In March the
    Government arrested religious leader Hoja Ahmed Orazgylychev and tore
    down an unregistered mosque and religious school run by him and his
    followers. President Niyazov ordered that all copies of Orazgylychev's
    Turkmen translation of the Koran be burned. Orazgylychev subsequently
    was released and sentenced to internal exile (see Section 1.d.). He
    earlier had criticized President Niyazov for directing that Turkmen
    children dance around a Christmas tree during New Year's celebrations
    (see Sections 1.d.).
        In April President Niyazov ordered that Muslim madrassahs and other
    religious schools be closed and that only two such schools, functioning
    under the auspices of the government-controlled Muftiyat, be allowed.
        The President ordered the implementation of new procedures
    restricting searches of private homes in April, which the legislature
    approved in June (see Section 1.f.). The period following these
    measures reportedly saw a significant reduction of police harassment of
    some religious believers in their private homes and a reduction in the
    confiscation of religious property during the summer. However, there
    was an increase in such activity during the last 4 months of the year.
        In October KNB officials detained Seventh Day Adventist pastor
    Pavel Fedotov at a Bible reading in Turkmenabad and charged him with
    holding an unsanctioned meeting and confiscating videotapes; he was
    released several days thereafter. In November four Protestants were
    reportedly tortured by police because of their religious affiliations,
    and at least three of them had their homes and cars confiscated after
    being forced to sign a statement saying that they had voluntarily
    donated all they owned as a gift to the President (see Section 1.c.).
    Police continued to detain and harass the Protestants after the initial
    incident.
        The Seventh Day Adventist congregation in Ashgabat, whose church
    was demolished on short notice in November 1999 as part of a Government
    urban clearing project, has received neither compensation nor
    alternative premises for worship.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes restrictions both
    on freedom of movement within the country and on travel abroad. The
    Government has tightened restrictions on travel to border cities and
    regions, having declared large parts of the country closed. Throughout
    the year, the President repeatedly told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    to maintain control over foreigners in the country. Citizens still
    carry internal passports. These documents are used primarily as a form
    of identification, rather than as a means of controlling movement.
    Residence permits are not required, although the place of residence is
    registered and noted in passports.
        The Government uses its power to issue passports and exit visas as
    a means of restricting international travel. Any citizen who wishes to
    visit a foreign country must obtain an exit visa, which can take up to
    5 weeks to process. Although not new, this policy became more onerous
    in June 1999 when the country withdrew from the visa agreement of the
    Commonwealth of Independent States. The official reason given by the
    Government for this action was to secure the country's borders against
    foreign criminal elements. Most citizens are permitted to emigrate
    without undue restriction. During the year, exit visas for study and
    training abroad, particularly for non-ethnic Turkmen, became more
    difficult to obtain (see Section 2.a.).
        The government-funded Council of World Turkmen provides assistance
    to ethnic Turkmen abroad who wish to return to the country and apply
    for citizenship; however, the Government discourages immigration by
    ethnic Turkmen living in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries.
    Immigration of non-Turkmen from other areas of the former Soviet Union
    is discouraged by the unofficial policy of favoring employment of
    ethnic Turkmen.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1997 Law
    on Refugees establishes the procedures and conditions for recognizing
    refugee status and sets the legal, economic, and social rights of
    refugees. The country currently provides first asylum if the person is
    recognized under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR). The Government has granted refugee or asylee status to some
    ethnic Turkmen from Afghanistan and has allowed some Tajik refugees and
    migrants to reside in the country. The Government cooperates with the
    UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations that assist refugees. There
    were no confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of those having a
    valid claim to refugee status. There have been unconfirmed reports of
    small numbers of refugees being forcibly returned by individual border
    guards; however, according to the UNHCR, there is no clear pattern of
    abuse or forced expulsion of refugees, with the exception of such low-
    level harassment.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have no real ability to effect peaceful change in the
    Government and have little influence on government policy or
    decisionmaking. The 1992 Constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a
    secular democracy in the form of a presidential republic. It calls for
    the separation of powers between the various branches of government,
    but vests a disproportionate share of power in the Presidency. In
    practice President Niyazov's power is absolute, and the country remains
    a one-man state. Despite the appearance of decisionmaking by consensus,
    most decisions are made at the presidential level. In his address to
    the Halk Maslahaty in July 1998, President Niyazov called for local
    councils and village leaders to have greater power and authority to
    deal with local issues; however, in reality even local leaders are
    selected and dismissed by the President. In December 1999, the Halk
    Maslahaty proposed, and the newly elected Mejlis (Parliament) approved,
    a law making an exception to the constitutionally mandated maximum of
    two 5-year terms for the President, but only for Niyazov, as the
    country's first president, conferring on him a lifetime term in office.
        In November 1998, the President announced that any Turkmen citizen
    who would like to write to him with a complaint could do so directly.
    Special mailboxes were set up throughout the country and, in the first
    year, some 140,000 letters were received by the President. Citizens
    still apparently write to the President because these letters are often
    cited in the local media, but the numbers received during the year were
    not reported.
        In the 1992 presidential election, the sole candidate was
    Saparmurat Niyazov, the incumbent and nominee of the Democratic Party.
    The Government announced the election barely a month before voting day,
    giving opposition groups insufficient time to organize and qualify to
    submit a candidate. A 1994 national referendum extended the President's
    term to 2002, obviating the need for the scheduled presidential
    election in 1997. According to the official results, 99.9 percent of
    those voting cast their ballots to extend his term. The policy of the
    Democratic Party, according to its leadership, is to implement the
    policy of the President. In August 1999, the Government changed the
    national oath to require that citizens swear personal allegiance to
    President Niyazov in particular, rather than just to the presidency as
    a general institution.
        The 50-member Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees and
    has no real independence. In the 1994 Mejlis elections, no opposition
    participation was permitted. The Government claimed that 99.8 percent
    of all eligible voters participated. President Niyazov promised in 1998
    that the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1999 for a
    reconstituted Mejlis would be ``free and fair'' and conducted on a
    ``wide democratic basis''; however, the elections were seriously
    flawed. Although there were at least two candidates for each Mejlis
    seat, every candidate was selected by the Government, and there was no
    open discussion of the issues. The Office for Democratic Institutions
    and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE declined to send an observation or
    limited assessment mission for the elections. In its public
    explanation, ODIHR cited serious concerns that the broad electoral
    framework in the country fell short of its OSCE commitments. The
    Government claimed that 98.9 percent of eligible voters participated.
    Diplomatic observers noted many empty polling stations, extensive use
    of mobile ballot boxes, and numerous instances of family voting.
        There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women or
    minorities in the political process; however, women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. Thirteen members of the
    50-member Mejlis are female, although women constitute over 50 percent
    of the population. Women serve in the following positions: Minister of
    Textiles, Prosecutor General, Chief of Presidential Protocol, Deputy
    Minister of Health, Deputy Minister of Social Welfare, Deputy Minister
    of Education, Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance, and Deputy
    Chairman for Textiles and Foreign Trade. No women serve as provincial
    governors. Minorities are represented in the Government, although
    preference is given to ethnic Turkmen. The Mejlis consists of 48 ethnic
    Turkmen, 1 ethnic Russian, and 1 ethnic Uzbek.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no local human rights monitoring groups, and government
    restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association would
    preclude any effort to investigate and criticize publicly the
    Government's human rights policies. Several independent journalists
    based in Russia report on these issues in the Russian press and have
    contact with international human rights organizations. On numerous
    occasions in the past, the Government has warned its critics against
    speaking with visiting journalists or other foreigners wishing to
    discuss human rights issues.
        In January 1999, President Niyazov signed a decree establishing a
    human rights commission that he heads. The commission oversees the work
    of law enforcement agencies, the military, and the judiciary, but it
    appears to have little real authority. The commission is subordinate to
    the National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights under the
    President, which has been in operation since 1997. Its mandate is to
    support the democratization of the government and society and to
    monitor the protection of human rights. The Institute maintains four
    full-time staff members to receive and resolve citizen complaints of
    arbitrary action. Of the 2,590 complaints received during the year,
    some 35 percent concerned appeals, pardons, and abuses by law
    enforcement officials; 10 percent dealt with social and economic
    problems; and 24 percent concerned housing. The remainder were in the
    miscellaneous category. In general the Institute conducts a study of
    the complaint and returns its findings to the individual and the
    organizations involved. However, the Institute is not an independent
    body, and its ability to obtain redress is limited by government
    interests.
        In January 1999, the OSCE opened an office in Ashgabat. There was
    no further progress on negotiations on a memorandum of understanding
    between the Government and the OSCE.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights and freedoms for all,
    independent of one's nationality, origin, language, and religion. It
    further specifies equal rights before the law for both men and women.
    There is no legal basis for discrimination against women or religious
    or ethnic minorities. However, cultural traditions and the Government's
    policy of promoting Turkmen nationalism limit the employment and
    educational opportunities of women and nonethnic Turkmen.
        Women.--Anecdotal reports indicate that domestic violence against
    women is common, but no statistics are available. The subject is not
    discussed in society. There are no court cases available and no
    references to domestic violence in the media. One unofficial group to
    support battered women operates in Ashgabat.
        Women are underrepresented in the upper levels of state-owned
    economic enterprises and are concentrated in the health care and
    education professions and in service industries. Women are restricted
    from working in some dangerous and environmentally unsafe jobs. Under
    the law, women enjoy the same inheritance and marriage rights as men.
    However, in traditional Turkmen society, the woman's primary role is as
    homemaker and mother, and family pressures often limit opportunities
    for women wanting to enter careers outside the home and advance their
    education. Religious authorities, when proffering advice to practicing
    Muslims on matters concerning inheritance and property rights, often
    favor men over women.
        There is only one officially registered women's group, which is
    headed by the Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis and dedicated in honor
    of the President's mother. The Government has no program specifically
    aimed at rectifying the disadvantaged position of women in society, as
    it does not acknowledge that women suffer discrimination.
        Children.--The Government's social umbrella covers the welfare
    needs of children. The Government has not taken effective steps to
    address the environmental and health problems that have resulted in a
    high rate of infant and maternal mortality. In September 1999, the
    Government cut the number of years of basic education from 10 to 9
    years; however, children now in their eighth, ninth, or tenth year of
    education will be unaffected. There is little difference in the
    education provided to girls and boys. Education is free and compulsory.
        Class sizes in the country are increasing rapidly, facilities are
    deteriorating, and funds for textbooks and supplies are decreasing. In
    September the President called for a reduction in the number of
    teachers by 10,000 before the end of the year. Educators are concerned
    that this will further exacerbate crowded classrooms, overwork
    teachers, and further reduce the quality of education in the country.
    The ostensible reason for the reduction is to increase salaries for the
    remaining teachers. However, past similar promises have been
    unfulfilled, and teachers are routinely paid 2 to 3 months late. In
    1998 the Ministry of Education (MED) increased the number of students
    per class from 30 to 45. Wages for teachers and administrators are in
    arrears in many districts; this, added to the fact that salaries are
    low, has caused some teachers to leave the field and seek jobs in the
    private sector, leaving classrooms overcrowded.
        Bribery has become a main component of the admission process at
    prestigious departments in universities. Although officially free,
    admission to many faculties at Turkmen State University in Ashgabat
    reportedly costs between $2,000 and $4,000. Paying bribes for good
    grades is also a common practice. Furthermore, the MED has discouraged
    schools from having contacts with NGO's and international
    organizations.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. However,
    during the annual cotton harvest, some schools in agricultural areas
    are closed and children as young as 10 years of age work in the cotton
    fields for up to 2 months (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--Government subsidies and pensions are
    provided for those with disabilities, although the pensions are
    inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living. Those capable of
    working generally are provided with jobs under still valid
    preindependence policies that virtually guarantee employment to all.
    According to existing legislation, facilities to allow access by the
    disabled must be included in new construction projects. However,
    compliance is inconsistent and most older buildings are not so
    equipped. Care for the mentally retarded and mentally ill is provided
    on the local level. Mentally retarded and mentally ill children are
    placed in boarding schools, with educational and future employment
    opportunities if their condition is mild. The psychological hospital in
    Bekrova and the psychological clinic in Gok Tepe were closed over the
    past year. To compensate a psychiatric hospital was opened in Dashoguz
    for those in need of in-patient care. There is also a hospital for the
    criminally insane in Lebap Velayat. Out-patient facilities exist in
    Ashgabat, Yoloten, and Tedjen. In theory patients receive food,
    clothing, and medical care at in-patient facilities but in practice,
    supplies are inadequate and services are poor.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for
    equal rights and freedoms for all citizens. Turkmen comprise
    approximately 77 percent of the population of about 5.2 million;
    Uzbeks, 9 percent; and Russians, 7 percent. There are smaller numbers
    of Kazakhs, Armenians, Azeris, and many other ethnic groups. Since
    independence the country has not experienced ethnic turmoil.
        As part of its nation-building efforts, the Government has
    attempted to foster Turkmen national pride, in part through its
    language policy. The Constitution designates Turkmen as the official
    language, and it is a mandatory subject in school, although it is not
    necessarily the language of instruction.
        The Constitution also provides for the rights of speakers of other
    languages to use them. While Russian remains in common usage in
    commerce and in everyday life, the Government has intensified its
    campaign over the past year for official business to be conducted
    solely in Turkmen. Some high-ranking government officials have been
    publicly criticized by the President for their failure to speak
    Turkmen. In accordance with his wishes, Russian language usage in
    newspapers has been cut back sharply during the past few years (see
    Section 2.a.). In June 1999, the Government switched one of the Russian
    language daily newspapers to Turkmen and reduced daily Russian news
    broadcasts on state-run television to 30 minutes. In October 1999, the
    state radio ceased entirely its daily 15-minute Russian language news
    broadcast. During the year, there were no Russian language radio
    broadcasts and only 15 minutes of news in Russian on television each
    day. Nonethnic Turkmen employees at government ministries reportedly
    were given until December 1999 to learn Turkmen, and there have been
    reports that some government employees, such as doctors and teachers,
    have been dismissed from their positions because they failed to learn
    the language. The most prominent example was the rector of the
    Polytechnical Institute in Ashgabat, who was dismissed from his
    position in 1999 for his inability to speak Turkmen.
        Non-Turkmen fear that the designation of Turkmen as the official
    language places their children at a disadvantage educationally and
    economically. They complain that some avenues for promotion and job
    advancement are no longer open to them. Only a handful of non-Turkmen
    occupy high-echelon jobs in the ministries, and there are reports that
    managerial positions were closed to non-Turkmen. As a result of these
    restrictions, more and more ethnic Russians view their situation in the
    country as deteriorating and are seeking Russian citizenship.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Turkmenistan inherited the Soviet
    system of government-controlled trade unions. There are no legal
    guarantees entitling workers to form or join unions. The Colleagues
    Union is the only legal central trade union federation permitted, and
    it claims a membership of 1.3 million; its member unions are divided
    along both sectoral and regional lines. Unions may not form or join
    other federations.
        While no law specifically prohibits the establishment of
    independent unions, there are no such unions, and no attempts were made
    to register an independent trade union during the year.
        The law neither prohibits nor permits strikes and does not address
    the issue of retaliation against strikers. Strikes are extremely rare
    and no strikes were known to have occurred during the year.
        There is no information available on union affiliation with
    international unions. The country joined the International Labor
    Organization in 1993.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does
    not protect the right to collective bargaining. In practice in the
    state-dominated economy, the close association of both the trade union
    and the state-owned enterprise with the Government seriously limits
    workers' ability to bargain, and workers often go months without pay or
    receive their paychecks late.
        The Ministry of Economics and Finance prepares general guidelines
    for wages and sets wages in health care, culture, and some other areas.
    In other sectors, it allows for some leeway at the enterprise level,
    taking into account local factors. The Government determines specific
    wage and benefit packages for each factory or enterprise.
        The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers
    against union members and organizers, and there are no mechanisms for
    resolving such complaints.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor; however, there were unconfirmed, anectodal
    reports of trafficking in women (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) and reports
    of prisoners being forced to work in a kaolin mine in Kizlkaya prison,
    near Dashoguz, under hazardous and unhealthy conditions (see Section
    1.c. and 2.b.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the
    exception of children who work in cotton harvesting in rural areas (see
    Section 5 and 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 16 years; in
    a few heavy industries, it is 18 years. The law prohibits children
    between the ages of 16 and 18 years from working more than 6 hours per
    day (the normal workday is 8 hours).
        A 15-year-old child may work 4 to 6 hours per day but only with the
    permission of the trade union and parents. This permission rarely is
    granted. Violations of child labor laws occur in rural areas during the
    cotton harvesting season, when teenagers work in the fields and
    children as young as 10 years of age sometimes help with the harvest.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
    generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the exception of
    cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 5 and 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. In
    December 1999, the Government raised the average wage in the state
    sector to approximately $77 (400,000 manats) per month at the official
    rate. While the Government subsidizes the prices of many necessities
    and provides others free of charge, this wage falls short of the amount
    required to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and his or
    her family. Most households are multigenerational, with several members
    receiving salaries, stipends, or pensions. Even so, many people lack
    the resources to maintain an adequate diet, and meat is a luxury for
    most citizens.
        The standard legal workweek is 40 hours with 2 days off.
    Individuals who work fewer hours during the week or are in certain
    high-level positions may also work on Saturdays.
        The country inherited from the Soviet era an economic system with
    substandard working conditions--one in which production took precedence
    over the health and safety of workers. Industrial workers often labor
    in unsafe environments and are not provided proper protective
    equipment. Some agricultural workers are subjected to environmental
    health hazards. The Government recognizes that these problems exist and
    has taken some steps to address them, but it has not set comprehensive
    standards for occupational health and safety. Workers do not always
    have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
    their health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are unconfirmed, anecdotal
    reports of women from Turkmenistan traveling to Turkey and the United
    Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and working as prostitutes, especially before
    the U.A.E. tightened its entry visa requirements for young women over
    the past few years. The Government does not have programs in place to
    combat trafficking in persons, but cooperates in educational efforts on
    this topic. In November 1999, the Government and the International
    Organization on Migration hosted a 1-day seminar on illegal migration
    during which trafficking in women was discussed in detail.
                                   __________

                                    UKRAINE

        Ukraine is governed by a directly elected president and a
    unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), which is
    elected partially according to proportional representation and
    partially by direct constituency mandate. Incumbent President Leonid
    Kuchma was reelected after two rounds of voting on October 31 and
    November 14, 1999. There were some irregularities during the election
    campaign and during the balloting, including those cited in the March 7
    final report of the Office for Security and Cooperation of Europe/
    Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) which
    stated that the presidential elections of October and November 1999
    ``failed to meet a significant number of the OSCE election related
    commitments.'' However, almost all observers agreed that the election
    results reflected the will of the electorate. Despite numerous flaws
    and irregularities, previous national elections in 1998 and 1994 also
    generally reflected the will of the electorate. The President appoints
    the Cabinet and controls government operations. In an April referendum,
    which observers described as flawed in several respects but probably
    reflected the will of the people, voters approved several changes to
    the Constitution which would expand presidential powers and increase
    executive branch influence over Parliament. The Constitutional Court
    later struck down two of the six proposed amendments; however,
    constitutional changes had not been implemented by year's end. The
    Constitution mandates an independent judiciary; however, the courts are
    funded through the Ministry of Justice, are subject to political
    interference and corruption, and are inefficient.
        The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Ministry of Internal
    Affairs (which controls the various police forces), and the Ministry of
    Defense have equal responsibility for internal security and report to
    the President through the Cabinet. The State Tax Administration also
    has law enforcement powers, which it exercises through the tax police.
    The armed forces largely have remained outside of politics. While
    civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the
    security forces, institutional government corruption sometimes can lead
    to their improper use. The SBU and other government agencies have
    interfered indirectly in the political process through criminal and tax
    investigations of politicians, journalists, and influential
    businessmen. Members of the security forces committed human rights
    abuses.
        Ukraine is making a difficult transition from a centrally planned
    to a market-based economy. The private sector has continued to grow and
    now represents a substantial portion of the economy. For the first time
    since independence, the country experienced economic growth (5
    percent). Nevertheless, the country remains in a serious economic
    crisis. While the Government made some progress in key areas such as
    privatization, energy, and the state budget, the country lacks many of
    reforms needed to generate sustainable economic growth. Industrial
    output has suffered years of sharp decline. A 1999 presidential decree
    on agricultural reform led to a break-up of the Soviet-era state farm
    system. Legislation enabling the granting of land titles was passed;
    however, the property rights of former collective farm workers are weak
    and poorly defined. Production in key areas such as wheat was
    unreliable. The summer grain harvest was the worst since 1945, but the
    winter crop was the best in years. According to official statistics,
    about half of the work force is employed formally in manufacturing,
    with the balance divided between services and agriculture; however, in
    reality many industrial enterprises have reduced or stopped production.
    Exports are diversified and include metals, chemicals, sugar, and
    semifinished goods. The annual per capita gross domestic product for
    the year was approximately $669. However, millions of employees go
    months without being paid, and most individuals derive a significant
    proportion of their income from the shadow economy. Inflation was 19
    percent during the first half of the year, but averaged less than 0.5
    percent per month since June. Investment remains at low levels, with
    many potential investors discouraged by rampant corruption, onerous
    taxation, and arbitrary licensing practices. Unemployment has affected
    women disproportionately; 56 percent of those officially registered as
    unemployed are women. Wealth is concentrated in the political elite and
    among directors of state-dominated sectors such as metals, oil, and
    gas.
        The Government's human rights record was poor in some areas;
    however, the Government continued to respect the rights of its citizens
    in other areas. In previous years, police and military committed
    extrajudicial killings; however, there were no reports of such
    incidents during the year. A prominent journalist disappeared in
    September. In November a decapitated body believed to be his was found.
    Later that month, a prominent political opponent accused the President
    of complicity in the disappearance. Those charges have not been proved
    or disproved. The Government asserted that it is investigating the
    journalist's disappearance and conducting tests to determine the
    identity of the corpse; however, the case remains unsolved at year's
    end, and the authorities' poor handling of the investigation proved a
    source of great concern. Police and prison officials regularly tortured
    and beat detainees and prisoners, sometimes resulting in death. The
    beating of conscripts in the army by fellow soldiers was common and
    sometimes resulted in death. Prison conditions are harsh and life-
    threatening. There were instances of arbitrary arrest and detention.
    Lengthy pretrial detention in very poor conditions was common, and
    detainees often spent months in pretrial detention for violations that
    involved little or no prison time if convicted. Long delays in trials
    are a problem. The Government rarely punishes officials who commit
    abuses. The SBU, police, and Prosecutor's Office have drawn domestic
    and international criticism for their failure to take adequate action
    to curb institutional corruption and abuse in the Government. Many
    high-profile corruption cases have been dropped, ostensibly because of
    lack of evidence. Anticorruption legislation has been enforced
    selectively, mostly against government opponents and low-level
    officials. Political interference and corruption affect the judicial
    process. The judiciary is overburdened, inefficient, and lacks
    sufficient funding and staff. These factors undermine citizens' right
    to a fair trial. The criminal justice system has been slow to reform,
    due to both lack of government effort and strained economic resources.
    The Government continued to intrude in citizens' lives and infringe on
    their privacy rights. The Government interfered with the news media and
    restricted freedom of the press; however, a wide range of opinion is
    available in newspapers and periodicals. Government interference was
    particularly severe during the period preceding the April referendum on
    amendments to the Constitution that would expand presidential powers by
    limiting the power of the Parliament and in response to coverage of the
    scandal surrounding the disappearance of an opposition journalist.
    Self-censorship remained a significant problem. During the 1999
    presidential election campaign, government authorities interfered in
    the election process and stepped up pressure on the media through tax
    inspections and other measures. The national broadcast media came under
    particular pressure. There were some limits on freedom of assembly, and
    there were some instances of restrictions on freedom of association.
    Limitations on nonnative religious organizations constrained freedom of
    religion. The Government took steps to return to religious groups
    properties expropriated during the Soviet era. It returned two churches
    that were rebuilt with government funds. Some limits on freedom of
    movement, most notably the registration or ``propiska'' system,
    remained. The Government took steps to support the return and
    resettlement of exiled Tatars in Crimea. As many as 10 elected mayors
    from several regions reported government harassment stemming from their
    lack of support for President Kuchma during the 1999 presidential
    campaign. The SBU monitored the activities of nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) during the year. Violence and discrimination
    against women; violence against children; societal anti-Semitism; and
    discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities are
    problems. The Government discourages some workers from organizing
    unions, and forced labor in the form of trafficking in women and girls
    for sexual exploitation is a significant problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government agents. In previous years,
    members of the police and military committed extrajudicial killings;
    however, there were no reports of such incidents during the year.
        There were reports in previous years that police beat persons at
    alcohol corrective treatment centers and sometimes killed them (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Members of the armed forces killed soldiers during violent hazing
    incidents in previous years (see Section 1.c.). According to a
    government official, in 1998 10 to 12 military personnel were beaten to
    death, and a total of 20 to 30 died as an indirect result of injuries
    sustained from hazing.
        Abuse of prisoners and detainees, and harsh prison conditions,
    sometimes led to death (see Section 1.c.). Statistics on prison deaths
    for this year were unavailable. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in
    prison and detention facilities, many due to harsh conditions.
        The pervasiveness of corruption, connections between government
    officials and organized crime, and the political activities of
    organized crime figures often blurred the distinction between political
    and criminal acts. Politicians, politically connected businessmen, and
    journalists have been the victims of possibly politically-motivated--
    and sometimes fatal--attacks. There were allegations of government
    involvement in the disappearance and presumed death of opposition
    journalist Heorhiy Gongadze; however, those charges have not been
    proven (see Section 1.b.).
        No official statistics for contract killings during the year were
    available.
        The Government made no known progress in resolving a number of the
    high profile killings of past years. No progress was made in solving
    the 1999 murder of the security chief of the independent television
    station STB or the 1999 killings of the chairman of the regional
    arbitration court Borys Vihrov and the director of local television
    station Igor Bondar in Odessa. The Government also made no known
    progress in resolving the 1998 murders of former director of the
    national bank Vadym Hetman, deputy head of the Crimean government
    Aleksandr Safontsev, the mayor of Shakhtersk, or the campaign manager
    of a Kiev mayoral candidate. Nor was there any progress in resolving
    the 1997 murders of the governor of the Razoolnensky district, the
    Crimean deputy minister for tourism and resorts, the murder of
    prominent businessman Arkadiy Tabachnyk, or the bombing of the
    intensive care unit in Simferopol. In May police arrested a suspect in
    the 1995 killing of Member of Parliament Yevhen Shcherban.
        b. Disappearance.--On September 16, prominent journalist Heorhiy
    Gongadze disappeared. Gongadze was the editor of the on-line news
    journal Ukrainska Pravda and was a frequent critic of both the
    Government and leading business figures. In a July open letter
    addressed to the Prosecutor General, he complained of government
    harassment, including being followed and questioned by security forces.
    In early November, police found a decapitated body outside of Kiev,
    which Gongadze's friends and family believed was that of the missing
    journalist. The Government asserted that it is conducting a full-scale
    investigation of his disappearance. The body was sent to forensic
    experts for examination, yet no positive identification was made by
    year's end--authorities did not begin the process of conducting a DNA
    test until mid-December. On November 28, the leader of the Socialist
    Party, Oleksandr Moroz, accused the President and other senior
    government officials of complicity in the disappearance of Gongadze. He
    also released audio tapes purporting to be conversations between the
    President, his Administration Chief Volodymyr Lytvyn, and Minister of
    Internal Affairs Yuri Kravchenko discussing the desirability of
    Gongadze's abduction. The tapes, provided by a former Presidential
    security guard, were not authenticated officially by year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police and
    prison officials regularly tortured and beat detainees and prisoners,
    and there were numerous reports of such abuse. Amnesty International
    (AI) and other human rights groups continued to receive regular reports
    that Berkut (special militia units or riot police) troops tortured and
    beat inmates as part of regular training exercises. The media reported
    that police subjected detainees to the ``swallow,'' in which the
    detainee is placed on his stomach and his feet are tied to his hands
    behind him, forcing his back to arch. Another abuse is the ``baby
    elephant,'' in which a gas mask is placed on the prisoner's head and
    the flow of oxygen slowly reduced. Detainees also were subjected to a
    method called the ``monument,'' in which a prisoner is suspended by his
    hands on a rope and beaten. Requesting an attorney often leads to a
    worse beating, and detainees may be beaten until they waive their right
    to an attorney. There is no effective mechanism for registering
    complaints about mistreatment or for obtaining redress for such
    actions. Prisoners may address complaints to the Ombudsman, and that
    office has received widespread reports of torture in pretrial
    detention. However, the Ombudsman has no enforcement authority, and the
    Government made little effort during the year to end such practices or
    to punish officials who committed or abetted such abuses. According to
    the Office of the Ombudsman, most of the complaints that it received
    centered on human rights violations by law enforcement personnel. In
    1999 the Ombudsman was criticized for failing to investigate whether
    special police units beat prisoners during regular exercises in jail.
    During the year, the Ombudsman made the treatment of prisoners a
    priority and investigated conditions in at least two prisons. On
    December 1, 1999, the Parliament passed an amendment to the Criminal
    Code that prescribes up to 15 years' imprisonment for torture. However,
    human rights monitors reported little difference in the treatment of
    prisoners since adoption of this law.
        Police also abused Roma, particularly in the Transcarpathian
    region, and harassed and abused dark-skinned persons (see Section 5).
    Police also harassed journalists and refugees (see Sections 2.a. and
    2.d.). Police corruption also remained a serious problem.
        Reports continued of harsh conditions and violence against
    conscripts in the armed forces. Senior officers reportedly required
    malnourished recruits to beg for food or money. Senior conscripts often
    beat recruits, sometimes to death (see Section 1.a.). Punishment
    administered for committing or condoning such activities did not serve
    as an effective deterrent to the further practice of such abuses.
    Between 1991 and 1998, 450 soldiers were convicted of violent
    harassment of their colleagues; approximately 200 military personnel
    were prosecuted in 1998 for violent hazing (10 to 12 conscripts were
    beaten to death, and 20 to 30 died from injuries related to hazing).
        Some politically active individuals were wounded in violent
    attacks. In February unknown assailants beat parliamentarian Oleksandr
    Yeliashkevych near a hotel where several Members of Parliament live.
    Five suspects were charged in the October 1999 bombing in which
    presidential candidate Natalia Vitrenko was wounded slightly, and more
    than 30 others were injured. No progress was reported in resolving the
    April 1999 wounding by gunshot of Kiev municipal government official
    Mykola Pidmogylny or the November 1999 shooting of Vinnytsia Mayor
    Dmytro Dvorkis.
        Members of the press were hurt in violent incidents throughout the
    year. In July Anatoliy Zhuchynsky, a reporter for the Vinnytsia
    newspaper 33 Channel, was assaulted outside his home. He linked the
    attack to his political reporting. In August two men assaulted
    Valentyna Vasylchenko, a reporter for the Cherkassy newspaper Antenna,
    in the stairway outside her apartment. She attributed the attack to her
    coverage of criminal groups. In September Nikolay Severin, an editor of
    an independent paper in Luhansk, was attacked by brick-wielding
    assailants outside his home. He blamed the assault on his critical
    reporting.
        No progress was made in resolving the 1999 firebombing of the
    office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis in Simferopol or the 1999 bombing
    of the office of the Communist Party leader Leonid Hrach in Simferopol.
    Accusations by opposition presidential candidate Marchuk linking the
    presidential administration to a false bomb threat that disrupted a
    1999 meeting between Marchuk and local residents were never proven.
        In 1998 the Government created a penal department to oversee reform
    of the penal system and to serve as the administrative center of the
    penal system. The new department originally was placed under the
    oversight of the Ministry of Interior, but it was given the status of
    an independent government agency by presidential decree in 1999.
    However, human rights groups report that this change in status has not
    affected its practices. The Government failed to punish prison and
    police officials who committed or condoned violence against prisoners.
        There was no improvement during the year in prison conditions,
    which are harsh, life-threatening, and do not meet minimum
    international standards. Prison officials intimidated and mistreated
    inmates. Due in part to the severe economic crisis, prisons and
    detention centers were severely overcrowded and lacked adequate
    sanitation and medical facilities. According to official statistics,
    funding for prisons decreased by almost 14 percent over the last 3
    years. During the year, the Government announced a general amnesty for
    34,800 inmates intended to relieve overcrowding. Because the country
    lacks a well-developed system of suspended sentences, and the law does
    not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, at least one-third
    of inmates were convicted of only minor violations.
        Conditions in pretrial detention facilities routinely failed to
    meet minimum international standards. Inmates sometimes were held in
    investigative isolation for extended periods and subjected to
    intimidation and mistreatment by jail guards and other inmates.
    Overcrowding is common in these centers. For example, the pretrial
    detention center in Kiev, houses 3,500; it was constructed to hold
    2,850 persons.
        According to official sources, information on the physical state of
    prison walls and fences as well as pretrial detention blocks is
    considered to be a government secret. However, the press reported
    freely about harsh prison conditions. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths
    in prisons and detention facilities, which was more than 3 times the
    death rate of the general population. Poor sanitary conditions result
    in deaths from diseases such as tuberculosis and dysentery. There are
    frequent incidents of murder by fellow inmates and suicide.
        Conditions in the Interior Ministry's Corrective Labor and
    Treatment Centers for Alcoholics (LTP's), where violent alcoholics are
    confined forcibly by court decision, differ little from those in
    prisons. Virtually no treatment is available. According to statistics
    from March, 12 LTP's with some 3,000 inmates continued to operate.
    Although some centers were transferred to the Health Ministry during
    the year, the Government had not lived up to its earlier commitment to
    transfer all of the LTP's to the ministry. Police have the right to
    take forcibly any person appearing drunk in public to special sobering
    centers. Human rights groups reported cases of police mistreatment,
    robbing, or beating of detainees at such centers (see Section 1.a.). In
    August 1999, the Government issued a decree directing the closure of
    such centers by the end of this year; however, some centers remained
    open at year's end.
        The Government continued to allow prison visits from human rights
    monitors; however, these monitors reported that it can be difficult to
    obtain access to prisons. Cases were reported in which prisoners were
    not permitted correspondence and family visits were allowed only once
    per year. Prisoners may complain to the Ombudsman about the conditions
    of detention, but human rights groups reported that inmates were
    punished for initiating complaints.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain problems. The law provides that authorities may detain
    a suspect for 3 days without a warrant, after which an arrest order
    must be issued. The Constitution stipulates that only courts may issue
    arrest warrants, but under its transitional provisions, the
    Prosecutor's office retains the right to issue search and arrest
    warrants until 2001. The maximum period of detention after charges have
    been filed is 18 months, but the law does not limit the aggregate time
    of detention before and during a trial. The law permits citizens to
    contest an arrest in court or appeal to the prosecutor. The
    Constitution requires immediate notification of family members
    concerning an arrest, but this action often is not taken in practice.
        By law a trial must begin no later than 3 weeks after indictment,
    but this requirement rarely is met by the overburdened court system.
    Months may pass before a defendant finally is brought to trial, and the
    situation did not improve during the year. Complicated cases can take
    years to go to trial. Although the 1996 amendment to the Criminal
    Procedures Code provides for bail, it is used rarely. Restrictions on
    travel outside a given area sometimes are employed. Accused persons
    usually are held without bail in pretrial detention for several months.
    As of October, there were 228,000 prisoners, 48,000 of whom were
    persons held in pretrial detention. The Constitution provides
    compensation for unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention, or
    conviction, but there are no known cases in which this provision was
    invoked. Reports indicated that this inaction is a result of lack of
    faith in the judiciary rather than the absence of unlawful or arbitrary
    detentions.
        The law stipulates that a defense attorney be provided without
    charge to the indigent from the moment of detention or the filing of
    charges, whichever comes first. There are insufficient numbers of
    defense attorneys to protect suspects from unlawful, lengthy
    imprisonment under extremely poor conditions. Although the concept of
    providing attorneys from the state system exists in principle, public
    attorneys often refuse to defend indigents for the low government fee.
    While in custody, a suspect or a prisoner is allowed by law to talk
    with a lawyer in private; however, human rights groups reported that
    the client-attorney privilege occasionally was denied by prison or
    investigative officials. To protect the defendant, each investigative
    file must contain a document signed by the defendant attesting that the
    charges against him, his right to an attorney, and his right not to
    give evidence against himself or his relatives have been explained to
    him. An appeals court may dismiss a conviction or order a new trial if
    this document is missing. As defendants increasingly became aware of
    their rights, they insisted on observance of these procedures. However,
    many persons remained unaware of these safeguards.
        The Government occasionally charges persons who are openly critical
    of the Government (usually opposition politicians or editors and
    journalists from the opposition press) with criminal libel or tax
    evasion charges (see Section 2.a.). In August Oleksandr Tymoshenko, the
    husband of then-Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and a business
    associate were arrested on charges of embezzlement of state funds.
    Tymoshenko's efforts to reform the energy sector had drawn strong
    opposition, most notably from powerful businesspersons closely tied to
    the Government. Although the investigation of the men reportedly was
    underway for some time, some observers believed that timing of the
    arrests was intended to pressure Tymoshenko.
        In May 1999, police officers in Mukachevo detained some 70 persons,
    primarily Roma, in a local market for illegal trading. The detainees
    were held without charges for 2 days and forced to perform manual labor
    for police officers. In July 1999, three Romani women were detained for
    failing to produce identification. They were ordered to clean the
    police station but they were released when a leader of a Romani NGO
    intervened on their behalf. There were no reports of incidents
    targeting Roma during the year.
        Police also arbitrarily detained persons for extensive document
    checks and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
        Official corruption is widespread. The Government apparently
    enforced anticorruption statutes selectively for political ends. While
    anticorruption statutes were applied increasingly against lower-level
    officials, such enforcement reportedly is lacking against high-level
    officials. In 1999 Vasylkiv Mayor Valeriy Popovych was detained briefly
    on corruption charges after complaining of government harassment due to
    his support for opposition candidate Moroz during the October 1999
    presidential election. Charges against Popovych were dropped in
    January; however, in February he resigned his post under pressure from
    regional authorities. In 1999 a number of persons arraigned on criminal
    and corruption charges claimed that they were victimized because of
    their support for the former Prime Minister, who is currently on trial
    abroad for money laundering, and government opponent Pavlo Lazarenko.
    Former government officials Petro Shkudun, Mykola Syvulsky, and Vasyl
    Koval claimed that their cases were motivated politically due to their
    links to Lazarenko. In December 1999, Koval was sentenced to serve five
    years in prison on corruption charges. In June Syvulsky again was
    arrested on corruption charges while serving as an aide to former
    Deputy Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who had been associated with
    Lazarenko.
        The Government does not employ forced exhile.
        e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary is subject
    to considerable political interference from the executive branch and
    also suffers from corruption and inefficiency. The courts are funded
    through the Ministry of Justice, which allows the Government to
    influence the judicial process. The presidential administration also
    reportedly continues the old Soviet tradition of weighing in by
    telephoning justices directly.
        The establishment of an independent judicial system provided for in
    the Constitution still awaits the passage of implementing legislation.
    As a result, the judiciary continues to operate according to Soviet
    principles. Most judges and prosecutors were appointed during the
    Soviet era, and court officials are attuned closely to the Government's
    interests. The High Judicial Council, which approves the appointment of
    and disciplines judges, consists primarily of senior executive branch
    representatives, including the Prosecutor General and the Chairman of
    the State Security Service. Human rights lawyers claimed that the
    judiciary was not free from government influence, particularly at the
    regional and local levels. For example, court chairmen are appointed
    directly by the executive and wield considerable influence over the
    outcome of a case through case assignments, the control of staff and
    promotions, and the control of social benefits available to judges.
    Court chairmen reportedly deliberately overburden independent-minded
    judges with too many cases and then instigate disciplinary actions
    against them for not completing their casework. There are credible
    reports that court chairmen regularly followed executive instructions.
    The Ministry of Justice and court chairmen also controlled judges'
    housing. Judges whose rulings were not in accord with the executive
    branch were provided with apartments far from city centers or are
    ignored altogether when new apartments became available.
        The judiciary lacks sufficient staff and funds, which engenders
    inefficiency and corruption. The court system receives all its funding
    from the Ministry of Justice. Budgetary funds allocated by the
    Government in 1999 covered only half of the judiciary's requirements
    for the year; funding levels for the year were said to be similarly
    inadequate. In 1999 the Supreme Court challenged in the Constitutional
    Court the legality of the Government's practice of arbitrarily limiting
    the judiciary's budget. In its petition, the Supreme Court complained
    that the district courts received only 51 percent of required funding,
    military courts 33 percent, and oblast courts 62 percent. In 1999 the
    Constitutional Court ruled that the Government's practice of limiting
    the judiciary's budget was unconstitutional. This attempt by the
    Government to cut the judiciary's budget, and similar attempts in
    recent years, demonstrated clearly the dependence of the court system
    on the executive and the Government's willingness to make use of that
    dependence.
        The authority and independence of the judicial system also are
    undermined by the poor record of compliance with court decisions in
    civil cases. Provisions calling for criminal punishment for
    noncompliance with court decisions rarely are used. Compliance is
    particularly poor if the decision clashes with government interests.
    The Prosecutor General, the head of the Supreme Court, the chairmen of
    regional courts, and the chairmen of the Kiev municipal court (or the
    deputies of these officials) can suspend court decisions, which leads
    to interference, manipulation, and corruption.
        Many local observers regard the Constitutional Court as the
    country's most independent judicial body. Human rights groups state
    that overall the Constitutional Court has maintained a balance of
    fairness. However, in March the Court ruled that the President's
    proposed referendum on expanding presidential authority was
    constitutional, although it threw out two of the six original
    questions. Observers believed that this decision indicated a
    propresidential bias.
        There has been little progress in implementing the provisions of
    the 1996 Constitution that provide for a thorough restructuring of the
    court system, to be accomplished by June 2001, including the
    introduction of appellate courts. In an effort to meet the June 2001
    deadline, the President established a council on judicial reform in
    August; however, the council has had little impact and at year's end,
    Parliament had not passed a new law on the judiciary. Pending the
    passage of the required enabling legislation, the court system still is
    organized along Soviet lines, with the exception of the Constitutional
    Court.
        The court system consists of the Constitutional Court, general
    jurisdiction courts, and arbitration and commercial courts. General
    jurisdiction courts and arbitration courts are organized on three
    levels: district courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court and
    Supreme Arbitration Court. General jurisdiction courts are divided into
    criminal and civil sections. Military courts only hear cases involving
    military personnel.
        The Constitutional Court consists of 18 members, appointed for 9-
    year terms in equal numbers by the President, the Parliament, and the
    Congress of Judges. The Consitutional Court is the ultimate interpreter
    of legislation and the Constitution, and it determines the
    constitutionality of legislation, presidential edicts, cabinet acts,
    and acts of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. The President, at least 45
    Members of Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, and the
    Crimean legislature can request the Constitutional Court to hear a
    case. Citizens may apply to the Constitutional Court through the
    Ombudsman, although in practice the Ombudsman has yet to exercise this
    right. In some limited cases, the Constitutional Court can interpret
    law for individual citizens, when the applying citizen provides
    compelling proof that a constitutional provision is violated, or that
    it is interpreted differently by different government bodies. However,
    of some 8,000 such petitions only 4 were accepted for review as of
    early 1999.
        Under the current court system, cases are decided by judges who sit
    singly, occasionally with two public assessors (``lay judges'' or
    professional jurors with some legal training), or in groups of three
    for more serious cases. The Constitution provides for public,
    adversarial trials, including a judge, public assessors, state
    prosecutor, defense, and jury (when required by law). With some
    qualifications, these requirements are upheld in practice. However,
    implementing criminal procedure legislation establishing juries has not
    been adopted. Complicated cases can take years to go to trial. In the
    interim, defendants usually wait in pretrial detention. The 1996
    amendment to the Soviet-era Criminal Procedures Code provides for bail,
    but to date it has been used rarely (see Section 1.d.).
        Organized crime widely is alleged to influence court decisions. The
    Justice Ministry reported that in 1997 135 judges were disciplined, 22
    dismissed, and 5 prosecuted for bribery. No higher court judge has been
    disciplined to date. Criminal elements routinely use intimidation to
    induce victims and witnesses to withdraw or change their testimony. The
    law requires that a special police unit protect judges, witnesses,
    defendants, and their relatives. However, the unit has not yet been
    formed, and trial participants are vulnerable to pressure. There is a
    witness protection law, but it is in abeyance because of lack of
    funding. Under a law adopted in March, the names and addresses of
    victims and witnesses can be kept confidential, if they request
    protection due to fear for their lives.
        Prosecutors, like the courts, also are organized into offices at
    the rayon, oblast, and republic levels. They are responsible ultimately
    to the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the President and
    confirmed by the Parliament for a 5-year term. Regional and district
    prosecutors are appointed by the Prosecutor General.
        Although by law prosecutors and defense attorneys have equal
    status, in practice prosecutors are much more influential. The
    procuracy, in its pretrial investigative function, acts in effect as a
    grand jury. A prosecutor may initiate investigation through his own
    office or conduct investigations initiated by the Ministry of Internal
    Affairs or the SBU. Prosecutors also have the right to issue warrants
    without court approval and to suspend court decisions, thus effectively
    placing the procuracy above the courts in the legal hierarchy. In
    several cases, the procuracy has used its judicial review powers to
    annul court decisions unfavorable to the presidential administration's
    economic or political interests and ordered the case reexamined by a
    different court. The Office of the Prosecutor General practices
    selective prosecution and initiates investigations against the
    political or economic opponents of the President and his allies. The
    Prosecutor General ignores parliamentary and court requests for
    investigations into high-ranking persons if the accused is a
    presidential ally.
        The Constitution considerably curtails the prosecutor's authority,
    limiting it to prosecution, representing the public interest in court,
    oversight of investigations, and implementation of court decisions.
    However, in the absence of new criminal and criminal procedure codes to
    implement constitutional restrictions, the transitional provisions of
    the Constitution permit the prosecutor's office to conduct
    investigations and oversee general observance of the law. In November
    1997, the Constitutional Court interpreted the Procuracy Law, ruling
    that citizens can dispute prosecutors' decisions in court.
        The Constitution includes procedural provisions to ensure a fair
    trial, including the right of a suspect or witness to refuse to testify
    against himself or his relatives. However, pending passage of
    legislation to implement these constitutional provisions, a largely
    Soviet-era criminal justice system remains in place. While the
    defendant is presumed innocent, conviction rates have changed little
    since the Soviet era. Nearly all completed cases result in convictions.
        According to official statistics, in the first half of 1999, there
    were 114,600 convictions, between 36 and 39 percent of which resulted
    in prison sentences. A total of 494 defendants were acquitted, which is
    an increas of 11 percent from the corresponding period in 1998. In the
    first half of the year, there were 113,902 convictions and 375
    acquittals. However, as judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in
    conviction back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation''
    (which usually leads to the dropping of the case), these statistics are
    somewhat misleading. Additionally evidence indicates that suspects
    often bribe court officials to drop charges before cases go to trial,
    to lessen sentences, or to commute them.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    Although the Constitution requires that courts issue search warrants,
    this provision has not yet been implemented, and prosecutors continue
    to issue search warrants. The SBU may conduct intrusive surveillance
    and searches without a warrant, with the consent of the Prosecutor
    General, who nominally oversees this function of the SBU. However, the
    extent to which the Prosecutor General utilizes his authority to
    monitor SBU activities and to curb excesses by security officials is
    unknown. The Constitution provides citizens with the right to examine
    any dossier on them in possession of the SBU and to sue for physical
    and emotional damages incurred by an investigation. However, this right
    does not exist in practice, because the necessary implementing
    legislation has not been passed.
        Some remnants of Soviet control mechanisms persist. There are no
    probable cause statutes, and police officials and militia personnel
    have the right to stop persons and vehicles arbitrarily to initiate
    extensive document checks and vehicle inspections. In February the
    Ministry of Interior ordered traffic police to end the practice of
    stopping vehicles without reason; however, the order had little effect
    in practice. Police may detain a person arbitrarily for up to 3 hours
    to verify identity. There have been reports that police sometimes
    abused this right.
        Journalists whose news reports are critical of the Government or
    who covered opposition politicians reported that frequently they were
    followed by SBU agents and that their telephones were wiretapped (see
    Section 2.a.).
        Under the current ``propiska'' registration system, all internal
    passports contain a stamp indicating residence and matrimonial status
    (see Section 2.d.). The Government has indicated its intent to
    eliminate the propiska system, but little progress has been made to
    date.
        The Law on Public Organizations prohibits members of the police,
    SBU, and armed forces from joining political parties. Prior to the 1998
    parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--enrollment of public
    sector and government employees augmented the ranks of progovernment
    parties, particularly the People's Democratic Party (see Section 2.b).
        There were no reported cases of the political abuse of psychiatry;
    however, the press and human rights groups have reported several cases
    of abuse of psychiatry for economic reasons. Persons involved in
    property, inheritance, or divorce disputes were diagnosed wrongfully
    with schizophrenia and confined to psychiatric institutions. The
    disputes often entail the corruption of psychiatric experts and court
    officials. In February Parliament adopted a new Law on Psychiatry which
    bans abuse of psychiatry for political and nonmedical reasons and
    provides safeguards against such abuse. However, human rights monitors
    report that the law was not implemented by year's end, and the old
    Soviet system of classifying mental illness is still in use. Persons
    diagnosed with mental illness may be confined and treated forcibly,
    declared not responsible for their actions, and stripped of their civil
    rights without being present at the hearings or notified of the ruling.
    In the meantime, the 1988 old Soviet psychiatric regulation remains in
    force. There are some 1.2 million registered psychiatric patients in
    the country. Within 3 days after forcible confinement to a hospital, a
    patient must be examined by three doctors. Patients (including
    convicted prisoners) subsequently must be examined by the senior
    regional psychiatric commission within half a year. According to the
    Ukrainian Psychiatric Association, the Health Care Ministry has not
    always cooperated with human rights groups attempting to monitor abuse
    of psychiatry.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1991 law
    provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice
    the Government interfered with the news media and restricted these
    rights through the widespread use of tax inspections, libel cases,
    subsidization of friendly media, and intimidation of journalists. In
    addition journalists reported feeling more subtle forms of pressure, in
    particular to provide positive coverage of the President, which
    resulted in more self-censorship. The Government owns or controls most
    of the national radio and television channels, which is the primary
    source of information for most citizens. However, there is a wide
    variety of newspapers and periodicals available, which espouse
    different political points of view, and individuals can and frequently
    do criticize the Government without reprisal. Though limited in
    readership, internet publications, in particular Ukrainska Pravda,
    played a key role in covering the disappearance of Heorhiy Gongadze and
    the scandal surrounding allegations of Presidential involvement in the
    case (see Section 1.b.). Government attempts to control the press were
    reported by the media.
        The print media, both independent and government-owned,
    demonstrated a tendency toward self-censorship on matters that the
    Government and in particular the President deemed sensitive. Private
    newspapers have been established and are free to function on a purely
    commercial basis, although very few are profitable. However, they are
    subject to various pressures, such as control of access to affordable
    state-subsidized newsprint; dependence on political patrons who may
    facilitate financial support from the State Press Support Fund; close
    scrutiny from government officials, especially at the local level; and
    politically motivated visits by tax inspectors. In 1997 the President
    issued a decree on support of the press that requires the Cabinet to
    draw up a list of publications needing government support, including
    those published by central and local governments, public organizations,
    associations, unions, educational institutions, and newspaper
    employees. The journalistic community believed that this decree was
    intended to control the press by supporting loyal members. In December
    the President issued a decree defending freedom of the press; however,
    observers report it has had little impact. The dependence of much of
    the press on government patronage has inhibited criticism, particularly
    at the local level. The State Committee for Information Policy has
    warned some periodicals against fomenting ethnic tensions and
    conducting antistate propaganda and has applied to the Prosecutor's
    Office to open investigations into those newspapers. In December a
    court in Kharkiv fined the local chapter of PROSVITA, an organization
    that promotes Ukrainian language and culture, and ordered it to cease
    publication of its newspaper on the grounds that it had published an
    anti-Semitic article. The case presented the first time a court has
    punished a publication for anti-Semitic writings.
        The Committee on Protection of State Secrets enjoys broadly defined
    powers over all media. In 1997 the Cabinet adopted a regulation that
    further defined state secrets to include information on executions, the
    state of prisons, pretrial detention blocks, and centers for the
    forcible treatment of alcoholics. (The ``state of prisons'' refers to
    the physical state of the prison walls and fences, not prison
    conditions.) The press is able to report about harsh prison conditions
    without any inhibition. Journalists report that, in general, the
    committee has not interfered with their activities (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government pressured media outlets to support an April
    referendum on amending the Constitution to increase presidential
    powers. In March the Tax Administration temporarily froze the accounts
    of the newspaper Silski Visti, (which opposed the referendum and
    supported Socialist candidate Oleksandr Moroz during the presidential
    election), and confiscated its paper stock. In September the Tax
    Administration fined Silski Visti more than $178,000 (1 million
    hryvnia) for tax evasion. In October Silski Visti temporarily suspended
    publication due to heavy financial pressures. The paper resumed
    publication, but continued to experience financial problems.
        In April the newly founded newspaper Itogi was subjected to
    eviction, disconnection of its phone lines, and tax inspections of its
    main investor after publishing an article critical of a senior
    government official. The newspaper went out of business after
    publishing only five issues.
        The Government, both central and local, regularly targeted
    opposition newspapers with unannounced tax inspections or fire and
    building code inspections. Prior to the 1999 presidential election, the
    Government forced at least one opposition newspaper, Polytyka, to
    close. Government officials initiated more than 20 criminal and civil
    libel cases against Polytyka's editor, Oleg Lyashko, asking more than
    $40 million (220 million hryvnia) in damages. Lyashko was acquitted in
    one of two criminal libel cases that charged him with slandering the
    President and his staff, but that acquittal was overturned in December
    1999. At a December hearing, Lyashko's trial was tentatively set for
    January 2001. In January the State Committee for Information Policy
    refused to register Lyashko's new publication Svoboda. In February the
    Committee reversed its decision, and Svoboda began publication.
    However, government officials subsequently pressured Lyashko to change
    the tone of coverage in Svoboda, and the newspaper has experienced
    financial difficulties that prevented its regular basis publication. In
    March Lyashko was assaulted in the entryway to his home after
    publishing an article critical of an Odesa businessman. Although he
    initially blamed the Government, Lyashko later accused the businessman
    of orchestrating the attack. There has been no further investigation
    into the case, and no one has been charged with the assault.
        The newspaper Den, which supported presidential candidate and
    former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk during the 1999 presidential
    campaign, was subjected to 25 tax inspections between January and July
    1999. After Marchuk joined the Government as Secretary of the National
    Security and Defense Council during the year, Den became less critical
    of the Government and the repeated tax inspections ceased.
        In 1999 the Parliament adopted a resolution on the media that
    called for investigations into all complaints of harassment of nonstate
    media outlets by the Tax Inspectorate, the Prosecutor General's Office,
    or the presidential administration. Journalists reported that the
    resolution had little impact.
        Government officials also frequently use criminal libel cases or
    civil suits based on alleged damage to a ``person's honor and
    integrity'' to punish critics. Article 7 of the Civil Code allows
    anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated
    information is untrue or insults a person's honor or dignity. Article
    125 of the Criminal Code prescribes imprisonment of up to 3 years for
    libel. There is no distinction between private individuals and public
    officials (except for the President), nor is there a limit to the
    amount of damages that may be awarded. Consequently, any journalist who
    publishes an article critical of a public official risks being sued for
    damages.
        The Prosecutor General can file criminal libel charges. According
    to Ministry of Justice statistics, 123 persons were convicted in 1998
    for criminal libel. Of these seven cases resulted in prison sentences.
    According to the Union of Journalists of Ukraine, journalists lose two
    of every three cases against them in the courts. In 1999 approximately
    2,250 libel cases were filed. Exact figures for this year are not
    available; however, media analysts expect a similar number of cases for
    the year. Journalists complain that because the law does not limit
    damages, it can be used to drive opposition newspapers out of business.
        On occasion fines were so large that accounts were frozen and
    equipment confiscated by the Tax Inspectorate to enforce payment. It is
    clear that a large number of libel and personal dignity suits are
    motivated politically. Moreover, even when the actions of the Tax
    Inspectorate are overturned by subsequent court decisions, the damage
    to the newspapers' finances can be irreparable. Their accounts remain
    frozen until all appeals are completed. Independent newspapers face
    further financial pressure as they try to compete with propresidential
    newspapers, which are sold at a price significantly below cost.
    Newspapers aligned with the presidential administration reportedly
    often are financed by wealthy presidential allies. The threat of
    multiple lawsuits for large amounts of money also was used to pressure
    owners of opposition newspapers to sell their shares to their political
    opponents.
        In March the Lviv newspaper Express, which had been critical of the
    local government, was fined $26,785 (150,000 hryvnia) for libel.
    Journalists and students protested the decision, and in April the
    regional court overturned the lower court's decision. Journalists
    sometimes were subjected to physical attacks related to their
    professional activities. Some journalists reported threats of arrest or
    assaults when investigating crime and official corruption (see Section
    1.c.). The intermeshing of organized crime and many public officials
    makes it difficult to assess whether these attacks and threats were
    motivated politically.
        Despite government pressure and media self-censorship, the variety
    of newspapers and periodicals on the market, each espousing the view of
    its respective sponsor, provides a variety of opinion. Foreign
    newspapers and periodicals circulate freely.
        The broadcast media, the primary source of news and information for
    most citizens, are either state-owned or, in the case of private
    stations, subject to pressure from the Government, which took steps
    during the year to strengthen its control over this sector. In 1998 the
    Government transferred over state-owned broadcasting and transmission
    facilities from the Derzhteleradio (State Committee for Television and
    Radio) directly to the Information Ministry (later reorganized as the
    State Committee for Information Policy). The President and the
    Parliament each appoint half of the members of the National Council for
    Television and Radio Broadcasting, which issues licenses and allocates
    broadcasting time. President Kuchma did not name his half of the eight-
    member board until June, after the Parliament replaced its original
    four members in May. In the absence of a functioning council, the
    Government had virtually unchallenged control over media licensing
    prior to the 1999 presidential election and in the lead-up to the April
    referendum.
        Other state agencies took advantage of the lack of a working
    council to harass opposition stations. For example, the frequency of
    arbitrary tax inspections increased considerably without a working
    council. The State Electro-Communications Inspectorate increased the
    fees for broadcast frequencies tenfold in 1999 without the prior
    approval of the council. Fee increases disproportionately affected
    independent stations, since state channels were permitted to ignore
    payment of their frequency fees. The law entitles private and foreign
    companies to obtain a license to establish and operate their own
    transmission facilities.
        Prior to the 1999 presidential election, the Government increased
    pressure on the broadcast media, using tax inspections and other
    measures, and forced at least five local television stations (four in
    the Crimea and one in Dnipropetrovsk) to close. Numerous sources
    charged that the administration continued to use government agencies,
    particularly the Tax Inspectorate, to pressure the opposition media and
    businesses supporting its political opponents. Prior to the 1999
    presidential election, the independent television station STB, one of
    the more balanced and independent media outlets, faced increasing
    harassment by government entities. It was threatened with closure and
    the arrest of its owners if it did not cede financial and editorial
    control to presidential supporters. Its staff suffered physical
    assaults, threatening phone calls, robbery, and lawsuits. In August
    1999, the State Tax Administration froze STB's bank accounts for
    failure to pay sufficient taxes. By October 1999, the station was sold
    and had changed its news programming to take a more pro-Kuchma
    approach. During the 1999 presidential election campaign, several
    regional television outlets were taken off the air by government
    authorities, allegedly to prevent coverage of opposition presidential
    candidates. The presidential campaign saw a marked imbalance in the
    coverage of candidates on national television and radio channels, with
    opposition candidates receiving very limited and often negative
    coverage at the national level. Opposition candidates had more success
    in obtaining access to smaller local and regional television channels.
        In the period leading up to the April referendum on constitutional
    amendments that would expand presidential powers, television coverage
    was overwhelmingly propresidential and proreferendum.
        There is no known government censorship of books, film, or theater.
        While major universities are state owned, they operate for the most
    part under full autonomy. However, academic freedom is an
    underdeveloped and poorly understood concept. Nepotism and bribery
    reportedly are common during entrance exams and also influence the
    granting of degrees. Administrators of universities and academic and
    research institute directors possess the power to silence colleagues by
    denying them the ability to publish, withholding pay and housing
    benefits, or directly terminating them. This atmosphere tends to limit
    the spirit of free inquiry. Restrictions by the Communications Ministry
    on the mailing of scientific documents also have caused concern.
        The State Secrets Committee maintains offices for the protection of
    state secrets in state scientific and research institutes, including
    those not conducting any classified research. An April 1998
    presidential edict allows only government-designated contractors to
    provide Internet access at state institutions that have such censorship
    offices. Human rights groups feared that this edit may limit the
    freedom of information for universities and scientific research
    institutes. A July presidential decree identified the development of
    the Internet as a priority of national information policy and
    instructed the Government to design a state program to develop the
    Internet network. A 1999 presidential decree sought to require that all
    communication companies and Internet providers be licensed and their
    equipment be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security
    services). However, the decree was blocked by Parliament in 1999.
        All private and religiously affiliated universities operated
    without any reported state interference or harassment.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice; however, there were some instances in
    which this right was restricted. The 1988 law on public assembly
    circumscribes freedom of assembly by stipulating that organizations
    must apply for permission to their respective local administration at
    least 10 days before a planned event or demonstration. The Criminal
    Code prescribes up to 6 months in prison, 1 year of corrective labor,
    or a fine for repeatedly staging unauthorized demonstrations. The 1996
    Constitution requires that demonstrators merely inform the authorities
    of a planned demonstration in advance; however, authorities insist that
    all demonstrations meet the restrictive requirements of the 1988 law.
    Under the 1988 law, demonstrators are prohibited from inciting violence
    or ethnic conflict and from calling for the violent overthrow of the
    constitutional order. In practice unlicensed demonstrations are common,
    and most but not all occur without police interference, fines, or
    detention. There were no reports of cases of interference during the
    year.
        Communist groups complain that the authorities failed to punish
    Ukrainian nationalist groups who harassed them during their
    demonstrations. Ukrainian nationalist groups in turn complained that
    the authorities do not protect them from harassment by Communist
    groups. On December 22, a local court ordered antipresidential
    protestors occupying a large square in central Kiev to vacate the area
    because of impending holiday celebrations. Demonstrations by the group
    outside of Parliament and other Government buildings also were banned.
    On the same day the court decision was reached, the demonstrators
    announced that they would dismantle all but one of the protest tents
    erected on the square, and would resume demonstrations after the
    holidays if warranted. The demonstrations ended peacefully December 23.
        The Constitution, law, and government regulations restrict freedom
    of association to varying degrees. These restrictions generally apply
    to organizations that are considered dangerous, such as those which
    advocate violence or racial and religious hatred, or which threaten the
    public order or health.
        A government requirement that a political party have
    representatives in at least half of the country's regions in order to
    register officially has limited the ability of Russian, Crimean, Tatar,
    and Romanian groups to organize (see Section 3).
        The Ministry of Justice, with the Prosecutor General's consent, has
    the authority to warn, fine, or suspend operations of political parties
    for illegal operations. Suspension can be for up to 3 months and can be
    extended for 6 months upon the Ministry's request.
        In 1998 the Constitutional Court invalidated the 1993 Crimean law
    on citizens' associations, thus outlawing regional Crimean parties. A
    1992 law on public organizations prohibits the Government from
    financing or materially supporting political parties. According to this
    law, political parties may not receive funds from abroad or maintain
    accounts in foreign banks. The law prohibits police authorities,
    members of the SBU, and armed forces personnel from joining political
    parties.
        Prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections, the mass--perhaps
    coerced--enrollment of public sector and government employees augmented
    the ranks of progovernment parties, particularly the People's
    Democratic Party (see Section 1.f.).
        Freedom of association also is restricted through a strict
    registration requirement that lends itself to political manipulation
    and corruption; however, in practice such regulations seldom are
    employed to restrict this freedom. Groups must register with the
    Government to pursue almost any purpose. The Ministries of Internal
    Affairs, Justice, Economy, and Foreign Economic Relations, as well as
    the State Committees on Religion and Broadcasting and other government
    bodies have registration functions and used this power to limit freedom
    of association (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        For example, after almost a year of attempting to register as a
    national organization, a Luhansk-based group for the protection of gay
    rights, the Nash Mir Gay and Lesbian Center, succeeded in registering
    in November 1999. According to group representatives, local officials
    indicated that the group was not registered because it was a gay rights
    group. The group reported this year that it is functioning without
    problems.
        Groups must be registered with the Government to engage in almost
    any activity, whether commercial, political, religious, or
    philanthropic. Unregistered groups are prohibited from opening bank
    accounts, acquiring property, or entered into contracts.
        The registration law gives the Government the right to inspect the
    activities of all registered groups. This law requires that a party
    specify all its activities in its charter, but the party is not
    required to notify authorities of all its meetings. A change in the
    group's charter necessitates reregistration.
        A registered group may not duplicate any function or service that
    the Government is expected to provide. For example, human rights
    lawyers who wished to represent prisoners were prohibited from
    establishing an association because the Government is required by the
    Constitution to provide lawyers for the accused. However, this
    requirement is not always enforced. In the
        mid-1990's, AI was refused registration under the pretext that
    human rights protection is the function of the State. It continued to
    apply and eventually was registered.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on
    Freedom of Conscience and Religion provide for separation of church and
    state and the right to practice the religion of one's choice and the
    Government generally respects these rights in practice, with the
    exception of some nonnative religions, which experienced difficulties
    registering, buying, or leasing property. The Government generally
    permits religious organizations to establish places of worship and to
    train clergy. The Government has continued to expedite allotment of
    land plots for construction of new houses of worship and to return
    religious buildings and sites to their former owners.
        Although in past years the Government's protection of religious
    freedom had deteriorated for nonnative religious organizations (defined
    as all organizations other than Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Jewish),
    nonnative religions reported less difficulty in obtaining visas and
    registering. The Government did not discriminate against individual
    believers of nonnative religions; however, their organizations faced
    ongoing difficulty in carrying out their activities during the year.
    Through burdensome licensing requirements and informal means, local
    authorities restricted nonnative religions as well as Christian
    denominations other than Greek Catholic and Orthodox. The Government
    took steps to return properties expropriated during the Soviet era to
    religious groups.
        A 1993 amendment to the 1991 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and
    Religion restricts the activities of nonnative, foreign-based,
    religious organizations. The amendment narrowly defines the permissible
    activities of members of the clergy, preachers, teachers, and other
    foreign citizen representatives of foreign-based religious
    organizations. They may preach, minister religious ordinances, or
    practice other canonical activities ``only in those religious
    organizations which invited them to Ukraine and with official approval
    of the governmental body that registered the statutes and the articles
    of the pertinent religious organization.'' Although the Church of Jesus
    Christ of Latter-Day Saints had complained in 1998 that this
    restriction prevented the transfer of its missionaries between cities,
    church leaders subsequently have not reported any difficulties in
    transferring missionaries between cities.
        All religious organizations are required by the 1991 Religion Law
    to register with the State Committee on Religious Affairs. If a group
    chooses to register as a national organization, it must register with
    the central office of the State Committee for Religious Affairs, and
    each of its local groups must register with the local office of the
    State Committee in the region where it is located. Those groups that
    choose to register as local organizations must register only with the
    regional office of the State Committee. This status is necessary to own
    property or carry out many economic activities, such as publishing
    religious materials or opening bank accounts. This process is supposed
    to take not more than 1 month (or 3 months in cases in which either the
    central or regional committee decides that an expert opinion is
    necessary to determine the legitimacy of a group applying for
    registration). However, in practice this process generally exceeds 1
    month. The regional offices also supervise the compliance of religious
    organizations with the provisions of the law. Some nonnative religious
    organizations credibly reported that, especially at the local or
    regional levels, officials of the state committee refused to register
    their organizations for protracted periods, thus effectively delaying
    their activities and limiting freedom of association (see Section
    2.b.). However, there were fewer reports than in prior years of
    nonnative religious groups experiencing such registration problems.
        Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church in
    the central, southern, and eastern regions of the country and the Greek
    Catholic Church in the west, exerted significant political influence at
    the local and regional levels and pressured local officials not to
    register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent or
    purchase property. Each of the two dominant denominations, within their
    respective spheres of influence, also reportedly pressured local
    officials to restrict the activities of the other.
        The ongoing dispute among competing Orthodox Christian
    administrative bodies claiming to be ``the Ukrainian Orthodox Church''
    remained deadlocked. The Government has been unable to stop
    disagreements between the Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics in the
    western part of the country where the two communities were contentious
    and often engage in bitter disputes over church buildings and property
    in over 600 localities. The Kiev Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church
    complained of harassment by local authorities in the predominantly
    Russian-speaking eastern region of the country, while the Moscow
    Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church complained that local governments
    ignored the appropriation of its churches in the Ukrainian-speaking
    western region. In 1999 Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox
    Church of Kiev Patriarchate and his followers were assaulted by
    supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol (see Section 5).
        According to the State Committee for Religious Affairs, the
    transfer of most places of worship to their original owners according
    to a 1992 decree on restitution was nearing completion. In 1996 and
    1997, 105 buildings were returned; in 1998, 92 were returned; and in
    1999 103 were returned. About 40 buildings were returned during the
    first half of the year. There still were about 340 former houses of
    worship that were used for nonreligious purposes, but 275 of them were
    not claimed by religious groups. In the fourth quarter of 1999, local
    authorities in the oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia,
    Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi, as
    well as in Sevastopol, returned 42 former houses of worship to
    religious groups. In August the local Government returned a former
    Mosque to the Muslim community in Crimea.
        Numerous Jewish congregations have negotiated successfully with
    local authorities for worship space. In 1996 a Kiev arbitration court
    decided in favor of transferring the title of the former Kiev Central
    Synagogue, which in Soviet times was used as a puppet theater, to a
    Chabad Hasidic congregation. By December 1997, the puppet theater had
    vacated the building, and in the spring of 1998, the building reopened
    again as a synagogue. The synagogue was rededicated this year after
    extensive renovation. The decision set an important precedent for the
    judiciary's role in religious property restitution. According to Jewish
    community representatives, progress on restitution is generally
    satisfactory, although more could be done. In the first quarter of the
    year, two synagogues were returned to the Jewish community.
        The pace of restitution of Christian churches has slowed in recent
    years, since the buildings that remain in state possession tend to be
    prime properties currently being used as museums, concert halls, or
    city halls. All religions have enjoyed equal opportunity to regain
    control over former community property. Problems in obtaining
    restitution resulted from inadequate legislation, bureaucratic inertia,
    and the difficulty of locating alternative quarters for current
    occupants. In February 1999, a presidential order instructed all local
    governments to complete the handover of former religious property
    whenever possible by the end of 1999 and banned privatization of
    religious communities' property. However, restitution is not complete.
    The committee attributed delays in returning other properties to lack
    of funds and the difficulties involved in finding alternative space for
    current users.
        In July a dispute arose over efforts by a Jewish organization to
    build a memorial park at an ancient Jewish cemetery and holocaust
    massacre site in Sambor, a town in Lviv Oblast. City authorities
    deferred the project after local nationalist groups demanded that the
    site also commemorate non-Jewish victims of the Nazis buried on the
    site. Efforts to reach a compromise stalled when the Nationalists
    demanded that no Jewish symbols appear at the site, that no Hebrew be
    used on inscriptions, and that Christian crosses be displayed.
    Nationalist groups later installed make-shift crosses at the site. At
    year's end, work on the memorial had stopped, and the crosses remained.
        A number of religious properties were returned to Christian
    churches during the year. In the first quarter of the year, the
    Ukrainian Orthodox Church received 17 buildings. In May the Kiev
    Patriarchate received the newly rebuilt, historic St. Michael's
    Cathedral in central Kiev for its exclusive use. The Cathedral, which
    had been destroyed by Stalin in 1936, was rebuilt with significant
    local government funding. In September the Moscow Patriarchate received
    for its use the newly rebuilt Uspensky Cathedral of the Lavra
    Monastery, which also was restored using government funds.
        In June four foreign public school teachers with religious
    affiliations were deported from Sevastopol after being accused of
    illegal religious activity incompatible with their work visa status.
    Although the central Government in Kiev offered to assist them with an
    appeal of this decision, the teachers decided voluntarily to depart the
    country.
        During the year, the Government made significant efforts to ensure
    that pilgrims of the Bratslav Hasidic sect were able to visit the tomb
    of their founding rabbi in the city of Uman on the occasion of the
    Jewish New Year.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
    however, there are some limits. In particular the Government has not
    yet fulfilled its pledge to abolish mandatory registration--the
    propiska system--and replace it with an informational residence
    register (see Section 1.f.). Regulations impose a nationwide
    requirement to register at the workplace and place of residence in
    order to be eligible for social benefits, thereby complicating freedom
    of movement by limiting access to certain social benefits to the place
    where one is registered. For example, persons who move to other regions
    for work in the private sector may be denied formal access to free
    medical care and other services provided by the Government. Residence
    without registration carries a fine under the administrative code, but
    this provision rarely is enforced. Human rights groups reported cases
    of persons being stripped of their residence registration, evicted from
    their homes, and made homeless through criminal fraud or court error.
    Police also arbitrarily detained persons for extensive document checks
    and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
        Citizens who wished to travel abroad were able to do so freely.
    Exit visas are required for citizens who intend to take up permanent
    residence in another country. There were no known cases of exit visas
    being denied to citizens during the year. The Government may deny
    passports to individuals in possession of state secrets, but denials
    may be appealed. A lapse in an Israeli-Ukrainian student exchange
    agreement in 1999 led to concerns about the ability of several hundred
    students to travel overseas for study in Israel. While negotiations
    continued between the Ukrainian and Israeli Governments over the
    renewal of the lapsed exchange agreement, the Ukrainian Government took
    steps to ensure that the students in question could travel to Israel.
    The exchange agreement was renewed in April.
        Citizenship law provides the right to citizenship for all
    individuals who were born or lived in the country before independence
    and to their descendants who lived outside the country as of November
    13, 1991. In order to be eligible, persons must not be citizens of
    other countries and must submit their application by year's end. An
    amendment to the law in April extended the application deadline to 2005
    for Ukrainians returning from the far north and east in Russia and for
    former military officers. Dual citizenship is not recognized. A 1997
    amendment to the Citizenship Law also provides the right to citizenship
    for deported victims of political oppression, such as the Crimean
    Tatars. Refugees can acquire citizenship if they have lived legally in
    the country for 5 years and can communicate in the Ukrainian language.
    Since independence over 1.5 million Ukrainians have returned to the
    country, while over 1 million persons, mostly ethnic Russians, have
    left the country.
        The Government has not supported a foreign-funded program to
    facilitate the travel to the country of some emigrants who qualify for
    resettlement as refugees. More than 260,000 Crimean Tatars have
    returned from exile to Crimea, mainly from Central Asia. According to
    government officials, as of September between 220,000 and 230,000
    Tatars had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. Crimean Tatar leaders have
    complained that their community has not received adequate assistance in
    resettling and that an onerous process of acquiring citizenship has
    excluded many of them from participating in elections and from the
    right to take part in the privatization of land and state assets.
    However, the 1997 amendment to the Citizenship Law waives some of the
    usual residence and language requirements for returning deportees and
    expedites the acquisition of citizenship. The amendment facilitates the
    acquisition of citizenship by Crimean Tatars who were deported victims
    of political oppression. It allows deported persons, including Crimean
    Tatars, to acquire citizenship without a mandatory 5-year term of
    residence in the country and without Ukrainian language proficiency. In
    1999 the Rada further amended the Citizenship Law to allow deported
    persons or their descendents living in the country for 5 years to
    acquire citizenship automatically without having to renounce any
    foreign citizenship that they may possess. Previously Crimean Tatars
    had difficulty obtaining documents from Uzbekistan to confirm that they
    had relinquished their Uzbek citizenship.
        The 1993 Law on Refugees governs the treatment of refugees and
    entitles refugees to all of the benefits accorded to citizens. The
    Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR), and refugee status initially is given for a 3month term and is
    subject to further extension. According to government statistics, 2,898
    persons (more than half of whom are Afghans) were granted refugee
    status between January and October. A commitment was made to award
    refugee status to all Afghans who arrived in the country before 1995.
    Under the new Citizenship Law, legally registered refugees can apply
    for citizenship after 5 years of permanent residence. Under the Refugee
    Law, refugees are entitled to material assistance. The Cabinet decided
    to start allocating funds in the 1999 national budget for payment of
    refugee pensions and small allowances for indigent refugees, plus
    transportation fare to a refugee center. In cooperation with the UNHCR
    in 1997, the Government established a refugee receiving center for 200
    persons in Vinnytsya. The Government planned to open four other centers
    elsewhere; however, no additional center had been opened by year's end.
        Instances of police harassment of certain categories of refugees
    apparently diminished during the year.
        According to the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration,
    the Government has a first asylum policy. This means that persons who
    travel directly from their home country to Ukraine as refugees are
    assured refugee status. However, there were some problematic cases in
    1999.
        There were no reports during the year that persons were forced to
    return to a country where they feared persecution. In 1999, four
    Uzbeks, including two exiled Uzbek oppositionists, reportedly were
    arrested without a warrant, denied counsel, and deported forcibly to
    Uzbekistan without a hearing, despite protests by human rights groups.
    The four claimed to have been tortured and forced to give false
    testimony; nonetheless, they were sentenced later that year by an Uzbek
    court to between 8 and 15 years in prison.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right and the ability to change the government
    peacefully. The Constitution provides universal suffrage for citizens
    at least 18 years of age and for periodic elections every 4 years for
    the Parliament and every 5 years for the President. A presidential
    election was held on October 31 and November 14, 1999. Parliamentary
    elections took place in 1994 and in 1998.
        Power is divided between the executive, legislative, and judicial
    branches. Although nominally independent, the judicial branch in
    practice is influenced heavily by the executive (see Section 1.e.). The
    President appoints the Prime Minister, who appoints the remainder of
    the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, as well as certain other appointments,
    such as the Prosecutor General, is subject to parliamentary approval.
    The Constitution grants the President limited power to pass binding
    decrees and directives that have the power of law.
        The voting process in connection with the April referendum on
    amendments to the Constitution that would increase presidential powers
    was conducted in a generally free and fair manner; however, there were
    some serious problems. While most observers agreed that there were few
    procedural irregularities on voting day, the period leading to the
    referendum was marked by unbalanced media coverage and inappropriate
    involvement of government officials in turning out the vote and
    influencing voters on behalf of President Kuchma. Voter turnout was
    reported to be higher than during the October 1999 presidential
    election, raising suspicions of manipulation on the part of the
    presidential administration. For example, an unusually high number of
    voters were allowed to vote before election day. Pollsters reported
    that exit poll results on turnout were notably lower than results
    reported by the Government. However, it is believed that the outcome of
    the referendum generally reflected the will of the people.
        In June by-elections were held to fill 10 vacant parliament seats.
    Opposition candidates complained of voting irregularities, a lack of
    access to the media, and government pressure on behalf of
    propresidential candidates. However, observers believed that it was
    unlikely that these problems significantly altered the outcome of the
    election.
        As many as 10 elected mayors reported continued harassment by the
    Tax Administration and law enforcement bodies, allegedly at the
    direction of presidentially appointed regional governors. The mayors
    attributed this pressure to their lack of support for President Kuchma
    during the 1999 presidential election. In February Vasylkiv Mayor
    Valeriy Popovych resigned under pressure after being detained and
    released on corruption charges. In September Myrhorod mayor Vasyl
    Tretetsky was removed from office by the city council. The press
    reported that the regional governor threatened council members with the
    loss of family members' jobs if they did not oust Tretetsky. In
    September Romny mayor Viktor Strelchenko resigned, reportedly after
    being told that the city would not receive heating fuel from regional
    authorities if he remained in office. Cherkasy mayor Volodymyr Olinyk,
    who ran for president in 1999 but dropped out in favor of another
    opposition candidate, was under criminal investigation and complained
    of SBU monitoring of his activities.
        International observers noted violations of election day procedures
    in the 1999 presidential elections, with more numerous and serious
    violations occurring in the second round of voting. However, the
    violations reportedly were not widespread nor systematic. The most
    serious problems were unbalanced media coverage and the coordinated and
    inappropriate involvement of government officials in both rounds of the
    election on behalf of President Kuchma. The OSCE also was concerned
    over pressure exerted on voters in prisons, hospitals, and educational
    institutions on behalf of President Kuchma. A representative of the
    Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that the
    elections were ``far from fair and democratic.'' OSCE observers noted
    that unauthorized persons, including SBU officers, present in polling
    stations, especially during the runoff election and had reports of
    militia involvement in campaigning. After the first round of voting,
    three regional administrators were dismissed, allegedly for failing to
    produce sufficient votes for President Kuchma in their districts. After
    the second round of voting, President Kuchma dismissed two oblast
    governors and six rayon (regional) heads in those regions were Kuchma
    received fewer votes than Communist Party rival Symonenko. Very high
    voter turnouts, particularly in western districts, aroused suspicion of
    ballot stuffing on President Kuchma's behalf in the second round of
    voting. However, observers concluded that it was unlikely that these
    problems significantly altered the final outcome of the election, in
    view of President Kuchma's 18-point margin of victory.
        In the 1999 preelection period, various forms of government
    pressure on the media served to limit the independence of the press
    (see Section 2.a.). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
    found that state media coverage of the presidential campaign was biased
    strongly in favor of President Kuchma. The Government allegedly used
    official agencies, especially the Tax Inspectorate, to disrupt or
    eliminate the businesses of political opponents prior to the elections.
    Presidential candidate Yevhen Marchuk reported that police ordered a
    meeting with voters evacuated in Luhansk in August 1999, citing an
    anonymous bomb threat (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Political
    candidates also reported difficulty in renting meeting halls, closure
    of their local campaign offices by government officials, confiscation
    of campaign vehicles, and pressure on employees from directors of
    state-owned enterprises. Many opposition presidential candidates
    complained that the SBU overstepped its mandate and interfered in the
    campaign to the benefit of President Kuchma. These reports appear
    credible. There are confirmed reports that the SBU monitored NGO's
    engaged in nonpartisan political activity (see Sections 1.f. and 4).
    Presidential candidates complained about the presidential
    administration's dominance over the media and the illegal involvement
    of state officials in Kuchma's campaign. The Supreme Court declared in
    November 1999 that it did not have the right to question the decision
    of the Central Election Committee or to declare an election null and
    void but that it could only order recounts in specific polling
    stations.
        Women are active in government and politics, but are
    underrepresented and they hold a disproportionately small percentage of
    offices. Women hold 37 of the 450 seats in the Rada. Only two women
    hold ministerial posts. The 18-member Constitutional Court has two
    female members.
        Jews are well represented among the political elite and hold
    several parliamentary seats. Many Crimean Tatars are unable to
    participate fully in the political process, primarily due to
    citizenship problems (see Section 2.d.). The Government's requirement
    that a political party have representatives in at least half of the
    country's regions in order to register officially has limited the
    ability of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Romanian minority groups to
    organize (see Section 2.b.).
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
    operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing
    their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally
    are cooperative and responsive to their views. However, human rights
    groups reported more difficulties in investigating penal conditions,
    which are a significant human rights concern. There are confirmed
    reports that the SBU monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political
    activity during the 1999 presidential election campaign (see Section
    3).
        A 1998 law created the Parliamentary Commissioner on Human Rights,
    which is a constitutionally mandated independent human rights
    ombudsman. Parliament elected the first Ombudsman in April 1998. The
    Ombudsman serves a 5-year term and, in principle, is invested by law
    with very broad powers. In November the Ombudsman delivered her first
    human rights report to Parliament. The report noted that despite
    legislative guarantees, the country lacks effective mechanisms for
    protection of human rights. The Ombudsman's office reported that it had
    received more than 100,000 letters since its inception; however, many
    of those letters were requests for information rather than complaints
    of human rights violations. The office's staff grew by 30 percent
    during the year to approximately 60 full- and part-time workers.
    However, the office was underfunded, and employees sometimes were
    unpaid.
        The law provides the Ombudsman with unrestricted and unannounced
    access to any public official, including the President; unrestricted
    access to any government installation; and the oversight of
    implementation of human rights treaties and agreements to which the
    country is a party. However, the law provides no penalties for those
    who obstruct the Ombudsman's investigations, nor does it create
    sufficient enforcement authority for the Ombudsman. The law required
    the Government to submit amendments to existing laws to provide the
    legal framework for the operation of the Ombudsman's office. The
    Ombudsman's office itself drafted some 70 amendments to this effect,
    but those amendments had not been enacted at year's end. All citizens
    and current residents can address their concerns to the Ombudsman. The
    Ombudsman also serves as the intermediary between citizens and the
    Constitutional Court, since citizens cannot address the Court directly.
    The Ombudsman made combating of trafficking in persons (see Section
    6.f.) and improving prison conditions a priority during the year.
        Citizens have the right to file appeals with the European Court of
    Human Rights in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations.
    According to one human rights expert, some 13,000 appeals were made to
    the court in 1998 and some 200 cases were accepted by the court for
    review.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    sex, and other grounds; however, due in part to the absence of an
    effective judicial system, the Government does not enforce these
    provisions effectively. The Government has not prosecuted anti-Semitic
    acts, under the law forbidding the sowing of interethnic hatred.
        Women.--Violence against women is reportedly pervasive. While
    statistics compiled by the U.N. Development Program show that the
    number of reported rapes and attempted rapes decreased in recent years,
    surveys indicated that the majority of rapes and other cases of
    physical abuse went unreported. Past surveys by women's groups
    indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of women had been raped, and
    over 25 percent physically abused, in their lifetimes.
        The Criminal Code outlaws rape and ``forced sex with a materially
    dependent person,'' which may allow prosecution for spousal rape.
    Spousal abuse also is illegal, but authorities often pressure women not
    to press charges against their husbands. Separate statistics on
    prosecutions for wife beating or on average sentences are not
    available. In 1997, the last year for which statistics are available,
    1,510 criminal cases were opened for rape, 822 for sexual abuse, and 3
    for sexual compulsion. Information on convictions was not available.
        Violence against women does not receive extensive media coverage,
    despite the efforts of human rights groups to highlight the problem.
    Hot lines, shelters, and other practical support for victims of abuse
    are practically nonexistent, although there are some shelters run by
    private organizations. In 1998 Kiev municipal authorities opened the
    country's first state-funded women's center. In 1998 the Government
    announced plans to establish a network of shelters throughout the
    country, but by year's end, it had not yet begun to implement these
    plans.
        Ukraine is a significant source country for girls and women
    trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the Middle East for sexual
    exploitation (see Section 6.f.). A 1998 amendment to the Criminal Code
    imposes harsh penalties for--among other offenses--trafficking in human
    beings, including for sexual exploitation and pornography; however, the
    effectiveness of this step has not yet been established. The
    authorities rarely prosecute men for engaging women in the rapidly
    growing sector of sexually exploitative work.
        Women's groups reported that there was widespread sexual harassment
    in the workplace, including coerced sex. Apart from the law that
    prohibits forced sex with a ``materially dependent person,'' which
    applies to employees, legal safeguards against harassment are
    inadequate. In the only known case of prosecution for sexual harassment
    in the workplace, Pravda Ukrayiny editor Oleksandr Horobets was
    convicted in 1999 of sexual harassment of a subordinate and sentenced
    to 7 months in prison. However, the fact that Horobets was the editor
    of an opposition newspaper calls into question the motives of the
    procuracy in prosecuting the case.
        Labor laws establish the legal equality of men and women, including
    equal pay for equal work, a principle that generally is observed.
    However, the economic crisis has harmed women disproportionately. Women
    are much more likely to be laid off than men. Women constitute
    approximately 56 percent of the unemployed population, and as much as
    90 percent of newly unemployed persons. Industries that are dominated
    by female workers are also those with the lowest relative wages and the
    ones that are most likely to be affected by wage arrears problems.
        The Constitution and the Law on Protection of Motherhood and
    Childhood prohibit the employment of women in jobs that are hazardous
    to their health, such as those that involved heavy lifting. However,
    despite implementation of a government program to combat dangerous
    labor, these laws remain poorly enforced. The Ministry of Labor
    estimated that 15 percent of working women are employed in hazardous
    jobs. Furthermore human rights groups maintained that management
    selectively observed the law only as necessary to lay off or fire
    female workers. Many women's rights advocates feared that the law may
    be used to bar women from the best paying blue-collar jobs. By law
    pregnant women and mothers with small children enjoy paid maternity
    leave until their children reach the age of three years. However, this
    benefit is a disincentive for employers to hire women for responsible
    or career track jobs.
        Few women attain top managerial positions in state and private
    industry. A March business survey found that half of private sector
    employees are women. According to the survey, women run 30 percent of
    private small businesses and 13 percent each of large and medium
    businesses. According to government statistics, 69.2 percent of the
    country's 213,000 state administration jobs were held by women,
    including 45.2 per cent of the managerial positions. However, of the
    highest ``first'' and ``second'' category offices, only 5.6 percent in
    central or local governments are filled by women. (These numbers do not
    include the ``power ministries"--the Ministries of Defense, Internal
    Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and the SBU, which have substantially more
    male employees at all levels.)
        Educational opportunities for women generally have been, and
    continue to be, equal to those enjoyed by men. However, the Government
    limited the number of women who can receive military officer training
    to only 20 percent of the total number of students accepted. The
    military limited the role of women to certain functions. This limited
    their chances for promotion and training opportunities and they were
    left with low-paying routine positions in the military.
        Children.--The Government is committed publicly to the defense of
    children's rights, but the deep economic crisis severely limited its
    ability to ensure these rights. The low priority that both the public
    and the Government attached to children's rights is reflected in the
    absence of groups that aggressively promote children's rights. For
    example, the widely acknowledged problem of growing violence and crime
    in and outside schools, especially the notoriously violent vocational
    schools, largely is ignored by the public and the Government.
        Education is free, universal, and compulsory until the age of 15.
    However, the public education system has deteriorated as a result of
    government financial disarray. Teachers often went unpaid for months.
    Increasing numbers of children from poor families dropped out of
    school, and illiteracy, which was previously very rare, has become a
    problem. Health care is provided equally to girls and boys, but
    economic problems have worsened the overall quality of the health care
    system.
        There were higher numbers of homeless children, who usually fled
    poor orphanage or poor domestic conditions. According to government
    statistics, 100,000 children are registered as homeless; of those, 14
    percent are under age 7. Although statistics were unavailable, drug use
    and child prostitution are widespread and received substantial media
    attention during the year. Several charity groups were formed to assist
    these children, but they have not been able to reduce the problem. In
    January President Kuchma issued a decree aimed at reducing homelessness
    among children; however, the effect of that decree is unknown. In 1997
    the All-Ukrainian Committee for Protection of Children released survey
    results that revealed that every fifth or sixth child of both sexes
    under age 18 suffered from sexual harassment (including every third
    girl), and that every 10th girl is raped.
        Deteriorating conditions in the state orphanages led the Government
    to encourage families to provide foster homes for orphans and to
    facilitate the establishment of private, government-supervised
    orphanages. There are 75 such orphanages with some 800 children. To
    curb illegal adoption, an April 1998 amendment to the Criminal Code
    prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment for trafficking in children and
    illegal adoption (see Section 6.f.). However, there had been no known
    successful cases of its application as of year's end.
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
    the disabled, but the Government has done little to support programs
    targeted at increasing opportunities for the disabled. The law mandates
    access to buildings and other public facilities for the disabled, but
    it is enforced poorly.
        Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitism exists on an individual and
    societal basis. However, the central Government generally discouraged
    it. Some ultranationalist groups and newspapers continued to publish
    and distribute anti-Semitic tracts regularly. Anti-Semitic publications
    also are imported from Russia and distributed without the necessary
    state license. During the year, President Kuchma and Prime Minister
    Yushscenko repeatedly and publicly spoke about the need for the
    peaceful coexistence of ethnic and religious groups. Authorities opened
    criminal cases against publications for fomenting interethnic hatred.
    Moreover, the Procuracy warned certain publications against publishing
    anti-Semitic material. In 1999 the Shimon Dubnov Ukrainian Academy of
    Jewish History and Culture filed suit against the nationalist newspaper
    Vechirniy Kiev for publishing anti-Semitic criticism of the Academy's
    collection of scholarly articles, ``Judeophobia Against Ukraine,''
    which was published in 1998. The case still was pending at year's end.
        Anti-Semitic incidents continue to occur but, according to local
    Jewish organizations, have declined in number over recent years and
    they were concentrated in western regions of the country.
        In October large crosses were erected on prominent elevations near
    Sevastopol. In November the crosses were cut down. Although Orthodox
    religious leaders accused Tatars of dismantling the crosses, the Tatars
    denied involvement, and no one was held formally responsible for the
    act.
        During the year, there were no arrests made in the 1997 firebombing
    of the Kharkiv Israeli cultural center, nor have there been any
    prosecutions for the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in 1997.
        There were occasional statements by Ukrainian Orthodox Church
    officials (both Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates) denouncing the spread of
    nonnative religions and sharply criticizing their missionary
    activities. Evangelical Christian missionaries reported some instances
    of societal discrimination against members of their churches, such as
    salary cuts, layoffs, and public criticism for betraying ``native
    religions.''
        Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church and
    the Greek Catholic Church, pressured local and regional officials not
    to register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent
    or purchase property. Both these denominations also reportedly
    pressured officials to restrict the activities of the other.
        Tension also persists between the different branches of the
    Orthodox Church. In April 1999, a violent scuffle took place in the
    southeastern city of Mariupol between supporters of the Ukrainian
    Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage of Patriarch
    Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate). Filaret
    had come to Mariupol to consecrate a cross erected on the future site
    of a Kiev Patriarchate church. A scuffle broke out when opponents tried
    to pull down the cross. Filaret received minor injuries, and several of
    his followers were treated at a local hospital for concussions and
    minor injuries.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The frequent harassment of
    racial minorities is an increasing problem. The police routinely detain
    dark-skinned persons for arbitrary document checks (see Section 1.c.).
    In addition there were increased reports of racially motivated violence
    against persons of African and Asian heritage. Representatives of these
    groups claimed that police officials routinely ignored, and sometimes
    abetted, violence against them.
        Roma face considerable societal discrimination. Opinion polls have
    shown that among all ethnic groups, the level of intolerance is highest
    toward Roma. In the Transcarpathian region in particular, Roma continue
    to be subject to violence and abuse by police (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for the ``free development, use, and
    protection of the Russian language and other minority languages in
    Ukraine.'' This compromise builds on a 1991 law on national minorities,
    which played an instrumental role in preventing ethnic strife by
    allowing individual citizens to use their respective national languages
    in conducting personal business and by allowing minority groups to
    establish their own schools. Nonetheless, some pro-Russian
    organizations in the eastern part of the country complained about the
    increased use of Ukrainian in schools and in the media. They claimed
    that their children are disadvantaged when taking academic entrance
    examinations, since all applicants are required to take a Ukrainian
    language test. According to official statistics, there are 16,352
    Ukrainian schools, 2,399 Russian schools, 98 Romanian schools, 67
    Hungarian schools, 11 Moldovan schools, 9 Crimean-Tatar schools, and 3
    Polish schools in the country.
        In May a popular folk singer was killed at a cafe in Lviv,
    allegedly by Russian-speakers who objected to his singing Ukrainian
    songs. The murder sparked protests and prompted a national debate over
    the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages. In July the city council
    issued a decree banning the broadcast of ``amoral songs'' in public
    places, which some observers interpreted as a prohibition against
    Russian language music. However, the decree never was enforced and in
    August the local procuracy declared the decree unlawful. Ukrainian and
    Crimean Tatar minorities credibly complain of discrimination by the
    Russian majority in Crimea and demand that the Ukrainian and Tatar
    languages be given equal treatment to Russian. According to Tatar
    leaders, unemployment is as high as 50 percent in their community. In
    January 1999, the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis (the unofficial
    Tatar parliament) was firebombed in Simferopol. As of October, no one
    had been charged in the crime, though Tatars blamed Russian
    chauvinists. In May 1999, on the anniversary of Stalin's deportation of
    the Tatars to central Asia, 35,000 Tatars demonstrated for official
    recognition of the Mejlis, Tatar representation in the Crimean
    parliament, and for official status for the Tatar language. In response
    President Kuchma created a presidential Tatar advisory committee that
    included all members of the Mejlis. Tatar leaders reported that during
    the year the committee helped promote Tatar interests at the national
    level. Also in May 1999 Tatar protesters erected a tent camp in front
    of the Crimean government building. The camp was dismantled after the
    Crimean Prime Minister Serhiy Kunitsyn agreed to the protesters'
    demands for the creation of a council to represent Tatar interests in
    the Crimean government, for the right of Tatars returning from central
    Asia to own land, and for the creation of Tatar schools. A
    demonstration held on the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean
    Tatars in May was much smaller and less politicized.
        The Crimean Government, pleading insufficient funds, did not assent
    to requests from the Crimean Tatar community for assistance in
    reestablishing its cultural heritage through Tatar language
    publications and educational institutions. However, the central
    Government is working with the UNHCR, OSCE, and the International
    Organization for Migration on support for the Crimean Tatar community.
        The majority of the more than 260,000 Crimean Tatars who have
    returned to the country from exile in central Asia have received
    citizenship. According to Tatar leaders, approximately 30,000 to 40,000
    of them still lack citizenship, a decrease from 67,000 in 1999. Crimean
    Tatar leaders have complained that their community has not received
    adequate assistance in resettling, and that the onerous process of
    acquiring citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in
    elections and from the right to take part in the privatization of land
    and state assets (see Section 2.d.).
        Romanians called for university-level instruction in Romanian or
    the establishment of a Romanian technical college. There are 86
    Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi oblast.
        Rusyns (Ruthenians) called for status as an official ethnic group
    in the country. At a congress held in Uzhhorod in 1999, representatives
    of the Rusyn community called for Rusyn-language schools, a Rusyn-
    language department at Uzhhorod University, and for Rusyn to be
    included as one of the country's ethnic groups in the 2001 census.
    According to Rusyn leaders, more than 700,000 Rusyns live in the
    country.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to join trade unions to defend ``professional, social and
    economic interests.'' Under the Constitution, all trade unions have
    equal status, and no government permission is required to establish a
    trade union. The 1992 Law on Citizens' Organizations (which includes
    trade unions) stipulates noninterference by public authorities in the
    activities of these organizations, which have the right to establish
    and join federations on a voluntary basis. In principle all workers and
    civil servants (including members of the armed forces) are free to form
    unions. In practice the Government discourages certain categories of
    workers, for example, nuclear power plant employees, from doing so. A
    new trade union law designed to replace Soviet-era legislation was
    adopted by Parliament and signed into law by the President in 1999. In
    January independent unions challenged the law. The grounds that it was
    as unconstitutional, and in late October, the Constitutional Court
    ruled that some provisions of the 1999 Labor Union Law were
    unconstitutional. The court rejected the requirement that unions must
    register with the Ministry of Justice and the condition that unions
    have a certain level of membership and regional representation in order
    to qualify for national status. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO) has stated that the law violated ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
    Association.
        The successor to the Soviet trade unions, known as the Federation
    of Trade Unions (FPU), has begun to work independently of the
    Government and has been vocal in advocating workers' right to strike.
    The FPU has supported the protests of miners and other professions over
    unpaid wages. However, as during the Soviet era, most FPU affiliates
    work closely with management. Following President Kuchma's 1998
    appointment of the head of the FPU-affiliated coal miners' union to be
    director of the national coal monopoly, the FPU ended support for
    striking miners. Enterprise managers are free to join the FPU. In 1997
    the FPU leadership created a political party, the All-Ukrainian Party
    of Workers, which is virtually indistinguishable from the FPU.
        Independent unions now provide an alternative to the official
    unions in many sectors of the economy. The Independent Miners' Union of
    Ukraine (NPGU), unions representing pilots, civil air traffic
    controllers, locomotive engineers, aviation ground crews, and other
    unions operate either independently or within one of three national
    confederations. While exact membership is unknown, estimates for
    independent union membership ranged from 100,000 to 300,000, while
    estimates for FPU-affiliated unions ranged from 17 to 23 million
    members. Independent unions have claimed unsuccessfully a share of the
    former Soviet trade unions' huge property and funds, especially the
    social insurance benefits fund, a Soviet-era legacy traditionally
    controlled by the official unions.
        Independent unions claimed that the new trade union law is more
    restrictive than the old Soviet legislation. To acquire national
    status, a union must have representation in more than half of the 14
    regions of the country, or in onethird of the enterprises in a
    regionally based sector, or have a majority of union members in the
    sector. National status and registration confer the right to acquire
    space, property, to maintain bank accounts, and to enter legally
    binding agreements. These new requirements are likely to make it
    difficult for miners and sailors to organize. Another contentious
    requirement is mandatory registration by the Justice Ministry. All
    unions were required to reregister with the Justice Ministry by April.
    As of October, nearly all FPU-affiliated unions and 14 independent
    unions were registered. The largest independent union, the Independent
    Miners Union, was not registered because it lacks the geographic
    presence necessary for national status. As of October, the Justice
    Ministry had not applied the administrative sanctions against
    unregistered unions that were foreseen in the new law. Registration
    determines participation of a union in the national collective
    bargaining agreement with the Government, as well as membership on the
    Social Insurance Fund Board (see Section 6.b.). Independent unions
    stated that the Justice Ministry denied registration to unions not
    loyal to the Government. They also reported that management in many
    enterprises cited the new law in refusing to deal with independent
    unions. Additionally management no longer is obligated to provide free
    accommodation and telephone lines to unions. However, the law gives
    unions a say in labor safety and division of newly built housing.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike ``to defend one's
    economic and social interests.'' The Constitution states that strikes
    must not jeopardize national security, public health, or the rights and
    liberties of others. The law does not extend the right to strike to
    members of the procuracy, judiciary, armed forces, security services,
    law enforcement agencies, and public servants. However, a 1998 Law on
    Labor Disputes Resolution extends the right to strike to employees of
    ``continuing process plants,'' for example, metallurgical factories,
    provided that they give 15 days' advance notice of their intent to
    strike. The law prohibits strikes that jeopardize life or health, the
    environment, or that can hinder disaster, accident, or epidemic-related
    operations. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade
    Unions (ICFTU) 1999 report, the law does not allow strikes in the
    transport sector. Workers who strike in prohibited sectors can receive
    up to three years imprisonment.
        The law does not prohibit specifically strikes based on political
    demands. The law prohibits strikes based on demands to change the
    constitutional order, state borders, or the administrative division of
    the country, as well as on demands that infringe on human rights. The
    Government has relied on the prosecutors and the courts to deal with
    strikes that it considered illegal. The law does not extend the
    immunity from discipline or dismissal to strikers who take part in
    strikes that later are declared illegal by the courts. A union that
    organizes an illegal strike is liable for strike-inflicted losses.
        According to official statistics, there were 15 strikes in the
    first quarter of the year. There are no official restrictions on the
    right of unions to affiliate with international trade union bodies. The
    NPGU is a member of the Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and
    General Workers' Union.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Law on
    Enterprises states that joint worker-management commissions should
    resolve issues concerning wages, working conditions, and the rights and
    duties of management at the enterprise level. Overlapping spheres of
    responsibility frequently impeded the collective bargaining process.
    The Government, in agreement with trade unions, established wages in
    each industrial sector and invited all unions to participate in the
    negotiations. The 1998 Law on Labor Disputes Resolution provides for
    the establishment of an arbitration service and a National Mediation
    and Reconciliation Service to mediate labor disputes. During the first
    4 months of the year, the service mediated 414 labor disputes.
    According to official statistics, in 1999 the service mediated 421
    labor disputes.
        The manner in which the collective bargaining law is applied
    prejudices the bargaining process against independent unions and favors
    the official unions (affiliates of the FPU). Most workers never are
    informed that they are not obligated to join the official union.
    Renouncing membership in the official union and joining an independent
    union can be bureaucratically onerous and typically is discouraged by
    management. The collective bargaining law prohibits antiunion
    discrimination. Under the law, disputes should be resolved by the
    courts. There have been cases in which such disputes have not been
    settled in a fair and equitable manner.
        Under the new trade union law, an independent union also can be
    removed easily from the collective bargaining process at the enterprise
    level. Under the old law, if several unions at an enterprise failed to
    agree on joint representation, the larger union, that is the FPU
    represented labor in the bargaining process. The new law failed to
    address this problem.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the Labor Code prohibit forced and compulsory labor, and it generally
    is not known to occur; however, the country is a major source of girls
    and women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, there were no reports of such practices, apart from
    victims of traffickers.
        Human rights groups described as compulsory labor the common use of
    army conscripts and youths in the alternative service for refurbishing
    and building private houses for army and government officials. In 1998
    student groups protested against a presidential decree obliging college
    and university graduates, whose studies have been paid for by the
    Government, to work in the public sector at government-designated jobs
    for 3 years or to repay fully the cost of their education. Students
    described the decree as an anticonstitutional attempt to introduce
    compulsory labor, as the Constitution provides for free choice of job
    and one's agreement to work. The Government stated that the decree
    would cover only students who entered higher education institutions in
    1997 and thereafter. The extent of enforcement of the decree is
    unknown. In the past, human rights groups reported complaints from
    medical and law students that they had been forced to accept
    government-assigned jobs for 3 years to repay the cost of their
    education or not receive their diplomas. However, no recent complaints
    have been reported.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum employment age is 17; however, in certain
    nonhazardous industries enterprises may negotiate with the Government
    to hire employees between 14 and 17 years of age, with the consent of
    one parent. The Constitution provides for general secondary education.
    School attendance is compulsory until the age of 15, a regulation
    vigorously enforced by the Ministry of Education. However, since the
    Soviet era, the number of dropouts has increased significantly, mostly
    because of rising poverty. The Criminal Code prescribes up to 5 years
    in prison for involving children in criminal activities, drinking,
    begging, prostitution, gambling, or other exploitation. The Government
    does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but
    there were no reports that it occurred, apart from victims of
    traffickers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of
    Child Labor in October.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage is
    $21.70 (118 hryvnia), and the minimum monthly pension is $4.70 (24.9
    hryvnia). The average monthly salary is $41.60 (228.8 hryvnia), which
    does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Moreover millions of persons go unpaid for many months because of
    shrinking budget revenue. In July Parliament declared the official
    subsistence level to be about $50 (270.1 hryvnia) per month. Although
    the practice of underreporting sources of income is widespread, it is
    estimated that in fact some 50 percent of the population effectively
    lives in poverty.
        The Labor Code provides for a maximum 40-hour workweek, a 24hour
    period of rest per week, and at least 24 days of paid vacation per
    year. Stagnation in some industries, for example, defense,
    significantly reduced the workweek for some categories of workers.
        The law contains occupational safety and health standards; however,
    these frequently are ignored in practice. Lax safety standards and
    aging equipment caused many serious accidents, resulting in
    approximately 47,000 work-related injuries in 1999. According to
    official statistics, these were 85 serious industrial accidents in
    which 141 workers were killed and 332 were injured occurred during the
    first half of the year. Mining accidents killed 212 miners during the
    first half of the year. In the coal mining sector, it is estimated
    there are 5.2 deaths for every million tons of coal extracted.
        In theory workers have a legal right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without jeopardizing continued employment;
    however, in reality, independent trade unionists reported that
    asserting this right would result in retaliation or perhaps dismissal
    by management.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls is a
    significant problem. The country is a major source and transit country
    of women and girls trafficked to Central and Western Europe, the United
    States, and the Middle East for sexual exploitation, and reports of
    trafficked women and girls from Ukraine also have come from Australia,
    Japan, and South Africa. The International Organization for Migration
    estimated in 1998 that 100,000 citizens had been trafficked abroad for
    this purpose since 1991. Between 1991 and 1997 Israeli authorities
    deported 1,500 Russian and Ukrainian women who had been trafficked
    there; and Italian officials estimated in 1999 that at least 30,000
    Ukrainian women were employed in Italy in exploitative situations. In
    Israel where many Ukrainian women are trafficked, the Government fails
    to protect the victims and routinely jails the Ukrainian women on
    charges of prostitution prior to their deportation.
        The Parliament passed an amendment to the criminal code in 1998
    that imposes harsh penalties for, among other offenses, trafficking in
    human beings, including for sexual exploitation and pornography. In
    1999 the Government established special police units to investigate
    trafficking crimes; however, the effectiveness of these units and of
    the amended Criminal Code has not yet been established. In 1999 the
    Human Rights Ombudsman established a National Coordinating Council for
    the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings; however, the
    organization has yet to demonstrate its effectiveness. Trafficking is
    becoming a higher priority for law enforcement agencies, but these
    agencies often lack the financial and personnel resources to combat
    well-established criminal organizations that run trafficking
    operations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1999 established
    special antitrafficking units at the national and oblast levels. These
    units became operational this year; however, they have had limited
    impact. NGO's claimed that the local militia received bribes in return
    for ignoring this problem. Moreover, some reports allege that local
    public officials abeted or assisted organized criminal groups in
    trafficking women abroad.
        The authorities do not prosecute men routinely for engaging women
    in the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work. In the
    past three years, 37 criminal cases have been brought against alleged
    traffickers, most of which ended in acquittals. Sentences for those
    convicted of trafficking generally were not severe and usually consist
    of fines. In November a Greek man and two Ukrainian women were
    convicted of trafficking in human beings and sentenced to seven years
    and five years in prison, respectively. This case marked the first time
    convicted traffickers received jail sentences. In 1999 two women who
    were sentenced to 5-year suspended sentences and fined $150 (680
    hryvnia) for trafficking. In August 1999, authorities in the
    Netherlands arrested a Ukrainian national and three Dutch nationals for
    trafficking women to sex clubs in the southern Netherlands from
    Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania. No update on the results of
    these arrests were available at year's end. Also in 1999, a man was
    given a suspended sentence and fined for trafficking women to brothels
    in the former Yugoslovia and engaging them in prostitution, and three
    persons were arrested on suspicion of selling 200 young women and girls
    to be used as forced labor in night clubs or as prostitutes in Turkey,
    Greece, and Cyprus.
        Women who are trafficked out of the country often are recruited by
    firms operating abroad and subsequently are taken out of the country
    with legal documentation. They are solicited with promises of work as
    waitresses, dancers, or housemaids, or are invited by marriage agencies
    allegedly to make the acquaintance of a potential bridegroom. Once
    abroad the women find the work to be very different from what was
    represented to them initially.
        The Government, primarily due to lack of funds, is unable to assist
    victims effectively. Some NGO's, such as the domestic NGO La Strada,
    began offering some support services for victims of trafficking, but
    these groups also suffered from a shortage of funds. For example, La
    Strada described a case in February in which seven Ukrainian mothers
    contacted the NGO to request help for their daughters who were
    trafficked into prostitution in Montenegro. The NGO became frustrated
    with the lack of assistance from the Government because there was no
    central point of contact to address the situation or provide
    assistance. With foreign assistance, four regional trafficking
    prevention centers were opened in addition to the three already in
    existence. Centers now operate in Donetsk, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk,
    Chernyvtsy, Kherson, Rivne, and Zhytomyr. The centers offered job-skill
    training, have telephone hot lines, and serve as referral centers for
    health, legal, and psychological counseling. In addition to the three
    cities with trafficking prevention centers, hot lines operate in
    Luhansk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Ternopil, and Sevastopol. In the first half of
    the year, La Strada hot lines received 1,040 calls, 684 of which were
    from callers classified as potential victims. Winrock, an NGO also
    involved in antitrafficking efforts, reported more than 2,600 calls to
    its hot lines in the first quarter of the year.
        In September 1999, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national
    program for the prevention of trafficking in women and children,
    involving 20 ministries, local governments, international
    organizations, donors, and domestic and international NGO's. The
    program was to combat trafficking as well as to assist victims;
    however, severe budget constraints limited the ability of the
    Government to implement the program effectively. The Ombudsman made
    public statements that the issue of trafficking was a priority (see
    Section 4). The Ministry of Education introduced a curriculum on
    trafficking prevention and awareness in high schools. NGO's conducted
    general awareness programs.
                                   __________

                                 UNITED KINGDOM

        The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a
    longstanding constitutional monarchy with a democratic, parliamentary
    government. Some central government powers have been devolved to
    locally elected bodies in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The
    judiciary is independent, but Parliament may supercede its decisions
    through legislation.
        Throughout the country, police forces are under the effective
    control of civilian officials. The intelligence agency MI-5 has the
    authority to act in support of other law enforcement agencies in the
    prevention and detection of serious domestic crime, but information
    collected by that agency generally is not admissible as evidence in
    trials. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland has a
    complex and controversial role, due to the special and difficult
    circumstances in the region with respect to law and order. In some
    areas of Northern Ireland, because of the continuing threat of
    violence, army units operate to reinforce the RUC. Individual members
    of UK police forces committed human rights abuses in some instances.
        A highly developed, diversified, market-based economy with
    extensive social welfare services provides most residents with a high
    standard of living. Higher than average unemployment rates prevail
    among certain demographic groups, including youth and racial
    minorities, and in Northern Ireland, among Catholics.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. Individual members of the police
    occasionally abused detainees. Prison conditions, including
    overcrowding and the number of prison suicides, also remained problems.
    There are some limits on freedom of assembly and association related to
    the security situation in Northern Ireland. The Government continued to
    take steps to combat violence against women. Societal discrimination
    against women, nonwhite minorities, and the Traveller (nomadic)
    community are problems, as are child abuse and occasional societal
    violence against minorities. Trafficking in women is an acknowledged
    problem. In October the Human Rights Act came into effect, allowing for
    the enforcement of provisions of the European Convention on Human
    Rights in UK courts.
        In Northern Ireland, power was devolved in December 1999 under the
    terms of the Good Friday Agreement, which established local government
    institutions, including a legislative assembly and a power-sharing
    executive. In February 2000, due to the lack of progress on weapons
    decommissioning by republican paramilitary groups, the Ulster Unionist
    Party (UUP) threatened to withdraw from the executive in protest. The
    Secretary of State for Northern Ireland suspended the institutions in
    February in order to prevent UUP withdrawal. In May, after the
    Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) pledged to put its weapons
    completely and verifiably beyond use, the Government lifted the
    suspension, allowing devolution to resume. In October Executive First
    Minister David Trimble of the UUP refused to allow executive ministers
    of the republican Sinn Fein Party to participate in meetings of the
    North-South Ministerial Council, because there had been no progress on
    the weapons issue. At year's end, Sinn Fein ministers were challenging
    Trimble's move in court.
        The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (HRC) initiated a
    comprehensive consultation process on a bill of rights specific to
    Northern Ireland, as mandated by the Good Friday Agreement. The
    commission also provides legal advice and assistance to citizens. The
    HRC Chief Commissioner urged the Government to grant the commission
    additional funding and enhanced powers. Under the terms of its creation
    in 1999, the HRC can make the case for such changes in a report to the
    Government in 2001.
        The police force in Northern Ireland has had a complex and
    controversial role and under some circumstances continues to rely on
    support from British Army units. Approximately 13,000 British troops
    were stationed in Northern Ireland, the lowest number since the early
    1970's. The Good Friday Agreement mandated wide-ranging reforms in
    policing and criminal justice with the aim of developing fair,
    effective, and representative law-enforcement institutions that have
    the confidence of all parts of the community. In November Parliament
    passed a Northern Ireland Police Bill based on the recommendations of
    the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (commonly
    known as the Patten Commission). In March the criminal justice review
    mandated by the Good Friday Agreement publicly proposed as part of its
    findings reforms in the Northern Ireland prosecution system and in the
    procedures for making judicial appointments; its recommendations are
    expected to be implemented beginning in 2001.
        In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the Government in
    September completed the staged release of 433 prisoners affiliated with
    paramilitary organizations that maintain a complete and unequivocal
    cease-fire--although ``punishment'' attacks continued in areas under
    the influence of these groups. Several paramilitary dissident groups in
    Northern Ireland committed acts of violence aimed at disrupting the
    peace process. During the year, over 250 violent sectarian attacks took
    place in Northern Ireland. Loyalists carried out 86 punishment
    shootings and 72 punishment beatings, while republicans carried out 50
    punishment shootings and 54 beatings.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the Government.
        The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), an independent watchdog
    organization, concluded its inquiry into the police investigation of
    the death of Roger Sylvester, a black man who died in 1999 after being
    restrained by police officers. The PCA certified that the circumstances
    had been investigated to its satisfaction and forwarded an
    investigation report to the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS). In
    November the CPS ruled that there was insufficient evidence to file
    criminal charges against the police officers involved in Sylvester's
    case. Sylvester's family called for an independent inquiry.
        In December the CPS also ruled out filing criminal charges against
    police officers involved in the 1999 shooting death of Henry Stanley.
    Amnesty International expressed concern over the CPS decisions not to
    prosecute in the Sylvester and Stanley cases, which the organization
    considers ``strong prima facie evidence'' cases.
        In May a London court set a February 2001 trial date for a police
    officer charged in the murder of James Ashley, who was shot and killed
    during a police raid on his home in 1998. In connection with the case,
    four other police officers face trial.
        According to the PCA's Annual Report, deaths in police custody fell
    to 47 during the 12 months ending in March 2000, compared with 65
    during the same period the previous year. The report states that 11 of
    the deaths occurred because of natural causes, 9 were due to alcohol or
    drugs, and 12 were suicides. The PCA supports the abolition of the
    offense of ``being drunk and incapable'' and recommends that drunks be
    dealt with by nurses and paramedics rather than by the police.
    According to the Home Office, the provisional number of deaths in
    police custody in England and Wales during the calendar year was 47; in
    Scotland it was 3.
        There also were a number of deaths in custody in prison due to
    suicide and natural causes (see Section 1.c.).
        The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is assisting the
    family of Jim McDonnell in the formal inquest into his death in 1996 in
    Northern Ireland's Maghaberry Prison. Fellow prisoners charged that
    prison staff beat him.
        In April the European Court of Human Rights declared admissible 4
    cases brought by the families of 12 individuals killed by the security
    forces (or with alleged security force collusion) in Northern Ireland
    in the 1980's and 1990's. The families contend that the Government
    violated, inter alia, Article 2 (the right to life) of the European
    Convention on Human Rights and charge that the deceased were killed
    unjustifiably by the State or its agents through excessive use of force
    and that the State failed to comply with its procedural obligations by
    not effectively investigating the deaths. One of the cases had earlier
    been included in an inquiry into the use of lethal force (including
    allegations that the authorities sanctioned a shoot-to-kill policy)
    conducted in 1984-87 by John Stalker.
        In 1998 the Government opened a new judicial inquiry, presided over
    by a panel of three prominent judges from the UK and other Commonwealth
    countries, to establish the facts of the events of January 30, 1972, in
    Northern Ireland--"Bloody Sunday"--when 13 unarmed civil rights
    demonstrators in Londonderry were killed by British soldiers, but for
    which no member of the security forces was ever held accountable. The
    inquiry spent 2 years gathering testimony and evidence from other
    victims, journalists, and government officials. Formal hearings began
    in March in Londonderry. Following the August resignation from the
    panel of Sir Edward Somers due to personal reasons, the Government
    appointed John Toohey, a former judge on the Australian High Court. The
    disruption resulted in a 2-month delay in the proceedings, which
    resumed in November. The inquiry is expected to hear testimony from
    approximately 800 to 1,000 witnesses and continue for another 2 to 3
    years.
        David Copeland was convicted in June of a series of bombings in
    London in 1999 and sentenced to six life sentences. The bombings,
    motivated by racism and homophobia, killed three people.
        Under the criteria of the 1998 Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act,
    the Government determined that the main republican and loyalist
    paramilitary groups were abiding by a cease-fire. Despite the fact that
    the groups are considered to be maintaining a cease-fire, killing and
    wounding by both republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland
    continued. The groups that the Government determined were not
    maintaining a total and unequivocal cease-fire are the Real IRA (RIRA),
    the Continuity IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Red
    Hand Defenders, and the Orange Volunteers.
        The PIRA was blamed widely for three May killings, including the
    killing of a dissident republican activist. While the PIRA did not
    comment or deny involvement, media reports attributed these crimes to
    the group.
        More than 10 deaths in Northern Ireland during the year were
    attributed to feuding among the principal loyalist paramilitary groups.
    Victims included reputed members of key loyalist paramilitaries,
    including Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) leader Richard Jameson.
        In August the feud between the UFF/UDA and the UVF intensified when
    a display of strength by the UFF/UDA on the Shankill Road in Belfast
    led to gunfire and attacks on houses. During the following week, Bobby
    Mahood and Jackie Coulter (the latter connected with the UFF) were shot
    and killed, as was Sam Rocket, a UVF supporter. In August the
    Government revoked the release of Johnny Adair, a leader of the
    loyalist UFF who had benefited from early release in October 1999, for
    his role in the violent feuding. Subject to the approval of the
    Sentencing Board, the Government is recommending that Adair serve the
    duration of his original prison term. In December the factions
    announced a ``truce.''
        Although a number of suspects were questioned, no one was charged
    with the murder of lawyer Rosemary Nelson, who died in a car bomb
    attack in 1999. The Red Hand Defenders, a loyalist splinter group,
    claimed responsibility, and human rights groups continued to express
    concern about alleged police collusion in the murder. Nelson, known for
    taking on high-profile civil rights cases, claimed as early as 1997
    that RUC officers made death threats against her.
        In December 1999, a coalition of six human rights organizations
    stated that Nelson's death constituted a failure by the Government to
    meet its international obligations to ensure that lawyers are able to
    perform their jobs without fear for their safety. These organizations
    called for a full public inquiry into all the circumstances of Nelson's
    murder. In his April 2000 report to the U.N. Commission on Human
    Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
    Lawyers expressed concern over the extent and thoroughness of the
    official investigation into Nelson's complaints of RUC threats.
        Cognizant of the controversy surrounding Nelson's case, in 1999 the
    RUC appointed Deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk Colin Port to take over
    the investigation of the murder. Port's 80-member investigative team
    interviewed 7,000 potential witnesses. In March police made the first
    arrest of the case, questioning a man who was a member of the Royal
    Irish Regiment at the time of the murder; he was charged with an
    unrelated offense. In May the Independent Commission for Police
    Complaints (ICPC) ruled that there was ``insufficient evidence'' to
    discipline the RUC officers accused of threatening Nelson. In August
    Port appeared on the television program ``Britain's Most Wanted'' to
    appeal for individuals with information relating to the murder to come
    forward.
        No one has been charged in the UK for the 1998 bombing in Omagh
    that killed 29 persons. The RIRA claimed responsibility for the
    bombing. While authorities have collected information that identifies
    individuals alleged to be responsible for the bombing, much of it
    cannot be used as evidence. In October news organizations identified
    the alleged perpetrators, which prompted complaints from victims'
    families that a future trial could be jeopardized. Witnesses who could
    make prosecution possible have been reluctant to come forward. Family
    members of victims have criticized Sinn Fein for refusing to assist in
    the police investigation. While over 20 suspects were detained, only 1,
    Colm Murphy, was charged (for aiding and abetting the crime) and faces
    trial in the Republic of Ireland.
        In September a Belfast coroner conducted a public inquest into the
    Omagh bombing. Unlike inquests in England and Wales, coroner's courts
    in Northern Ireland do not reach verdicts apportioning blame, but
    instead make ``findings'' confined solely to the facts surrounding
    violent, sudden, or unexplained death. Human rights groups have argued
    in other inquests that this narrow definition shields wrongdoers,
    including soldiers and police officers, and unnecessarily keeps family
    members from learning the truth of the circumstances regarding their
    relative's death.
        Human rights groups continued to call for an independent inquiry
    into the December 1997 killing of Billy ``King Rat'' Wright, leader of
    the Loyalist Volunteer Force, in the high security Maze Prison by
    members of INLA. The facts of the killing call into question the
    prison's security standards: The watchtower in the courtyard where the
    killing took place allegedly was unmanned at the time, the perpetrators
    had weapons smuggled to them, and they apparently had knowledge of
    Wright's whereabouts. The jury at the coroner's inquest in February
    1999 stated that ``person or persons unknown and undetected'' were
    involved. In July the Government refused ``on security grounds'' to
    answer a parliamentary question about the identity the official in
    charge of the prison on the day of Wright's murder.
        In June a Belfast coroner abandoned plans for an inquest into the
    1997 death of Robert Hamill. Hamill's case received widespread
    attention because four RUC officers in a nearby vehicle allegedly did
    not act while Hamill was beaten to death by a mob. The coroner said
    that he feared that key witnesses would be in danger if they were
    called to give evidence. In 1999 one of the six suspects was acquitted
    of the killing but found guilty of a minor offense. The trial judge
    expressed concerns about the inaction of the police. Human rights
    groups argue that the RUC had intervened successfully in similar
    circumstances in the past. Moreover, they charge that the RUC's failure
    to intervene made the identification and prosecution of the murderers
    more difficult. The police ombudsman was directing the police
    investigation at year's end. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern called
    for an independent public inquiry. The family provided the Government
    with evidence that it says makes a definitive case for such an inquiry.
        The investigation into the 1989 murder of defense attorney Patrick
    Finucane continued. Finucane was killed in front of his family by
    members of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). Human rights
    organizations have alleged security force collusion in the murder. In
    July two RUC officers were arrested and questioned about the murder,
    which was being reviewed in a third round of independent investigations
    by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir John Stevens. In
    August the inquiry seized documents related to the case from the
    British Army. William Stobie was arrested in 1999 and charged with the
    murder, although in August the charges were reduced to aiding and
    abetting murder. Stobie has claimed he was an RUC informer at the time
    of Finucane's murder and said he warned police of a ``hit'' by the UDA,
    although it was unclear whether he knew Finucane was the target. Human
    rights organizations, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence
    of Judges and Lawyers, and Finucane's family continued to press the
    Government for an independent public inquiry into the killing. They
    cited the possible existence of new evidence that would support charges
    of collusion between government officials and loyalist paramilitary
    groups in Finucane's murder.
        While British Army regulations normally bar from service those
    guilty of ``serious crimes,'' Scots Guards Jim Fisher and Mark Wright
    continued to serve in their regiment, to which they were reinstated in
    1998 after being convicted of and serving time in prison for the 1992
    murder of Peter McBride. In 1999 McBride's family won a judicial review
    against the British Army Board that sanctioned the soldiers'
    reinstatement. In November the board reaffirmed its decision, allowing
    the pair to remain in the service.
        Former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet left the UK on March 2
    after Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that he would not extradite
    Pinochet to Spain for alleged human rights abuses because he was too
    ill to stand trial.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        The Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains was established
    jointly by the British and Irish Governments in 1999 to facilitate the
    location of the remains of nine victims of IRA paramilitary violence
    from the 1970's. The commission succeeded in locating the remains of
    three persons in 1999, but suspended its work in May, pending the
    receipt of additional information from the IRA. Work had not resumed by
    year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
    degrading treatment; however, individual members of the police
    occasionally abused detainees. Human rights organizations maintain that
    such abuse, while not widespread, is a matter of serious concern (see
    Sections 1.a. and 5). Detainees who claim physical mistreatment have
    the right to an immediate medical examination. A trial judge must
    examine such a claim. Confessions obtained by abusive treatment are not
    admissible in court, and judges can exclude even voluntary confessions.
        Reports by official bodies and nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's) have suggested that the public lacks confidence in existing
    procedures for making complaints against the police. According to a
    February 2000 Council of Europe committee report, more complainants
    have been taking their cases to the civil courts rather than filing
    complaints. The report states that even where complaints are filed and
    point to likely police culpability, criminal or disciplinary action
    against police officers has been rare, and convictions or disciplinary
    action even rarer; in many cases, police officers under investigation
    took medical retirement. According to the report, of 36,731 complaints
    recorded in the 1996-97 period studied by the committee, only 141
    resulted in legal or disciplinary action (latest statistics available).
    While accepting the need for reform of the complaint procedures, the
    Government disputed some of the conclusions reached in the report,
    pointing out that it omitted to mention over 1,000 disciplinary actions
    taken and the informal resolution of 32 percent of cases to the
    satisfaction of the complainants.
        Following these reports, the Government has engaged in an ongoing
    process to reform the police complaints system. In 1999 the Government
    phased in new complaint procedures. Among other things, the new
    procedures instituted a formal written warning procedure in serious
    cases and lowered the burden of proof in civil misconduct proceedings.
    In May 2000, the Home Office published a consultation document based on
    two separate studies conducted by a management consulting firm and a
    human rights group. The paper recommended that complaints against the
    police be handled by a new body, whose name would better reflect its
    independent nature than the current Police Complaints Authority. It
    also recommended that the new body have the ability to independently
    investigate the most serious complaints, including deaths in custody.
    The Home Office, after receiving and incorporating feedback on its May
    paper, issued a further report in December on its proposed framework
    for a new police complaints system, much of it based on the two groups'
    recommendations.
        Two RUC officers, Michael Magowan and Darren James Neill, were
    convicted and imprisoned in May for the 1998 assault on 18-year-old
    Bernard Patrick Griffin. Griffin, a Catholic, was arrested, beaten,
    verbally abused, and threatened. Griffin was then charged with assault.
    The truth emerged when a third officer present, Andrew Lea, confessed
    to his superiors; Lea was fined $1,600 (1,000 pounds). Magowan and
    Neill received 1- and 2-year sentences, respectively, and face RUC
    disciplinary charges of criminal conduct, which could result in
    dismissal.
        The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland began operation in
    November. The ombudsman has extensive powers to investigate complaints
    in Northern Ireland filed against the police or referred by the RUC
    Chief Constable, the Police Authority of Northern Ireland, or the
    Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The ombudsman is to supervise
    automatically cases involving death or serious injury and may
    investigate other cases. The ombudsman can recommend to the Director of
    Public Prosecutions (DPP) that charges be brought against officers,
    although the final decision rests with the DPP. The ombudsman can
    direct the Chief Constable to take disciplinary action against police
    officers. Unlike the ICPC, which must rely on the complaints and
    discipline branch of the RUC to provide investigators, the ombudsman
    has an independent investigative staff.
        Prior to being replaced by the ombudsman in November, the ICPC
    received 2,036 complaints; in November and December the ombudsman
    received about 540 complaints. In addition 2,396 cases were passed on
    from the ICPC to the ombudsman. Of the 2,390 cases completed by both
    organizations during the year, 7 led to informal disciplinary action
    and 9 led to formal criminal charges.
        Legislation implementing the 1999 Patten Report on Policing in
    Northern Ireland was enacted in November. The law changes the
    operational name of the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland
    (PSNI), imposes hiring quotas to increase Catholic representation in
    the service (now only 8 percent of the total), and introduces new human
    rights standards and wider use of community policing practices. The law
    establishes a new policing board comprised of 9 public members and 10
    political party representatives from the Assembly. The reform remains
    controversial. Chris Patten, author of the original recommendations,
    has endorsed the bill and urged full participation in the new
    institutions. However, the nationalist parties object to the bill for
    not strictly following all recommendations of the Patten Commission,
    while unionist critics argue that reforms will undermine the
    effectiveness of the police. By year's end, the impasse over
    implementation had not been resolved.
        The Independent Assessor of Military Complaints continued to
    coordinate investigations into complaints of abuses committed by the
    Army in Northern Ireland. During the year, some 20 formal and 550
    informal complaints were received; most involved allegations of verbal
    abuse or excessive helicopter flights adjacent to residential areas.
        The police and military in Northern Ireland continued to use
    plastic bullets to quell civil disturbances. The Patten Commission
    recommended the use of plastic bullets ``only as a last resort, short
    of the use of firearms'' and recommended that the Government conduct
    research to find ``an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal
    alternative'' to plastic bullets. The Government accepted these
    recommendations. New guidelines mandate that plastic bullets only be
    used to avert the risk of loss of life or serious injury; formerly,
    their use was sanctioned to protect property or to preserve the peace.
    During disturbances in July, the police relied on water cannons to
    repel a disorderly crowd.
        In total the security forces fired 25 plastic bullets during the
    year, compared with 111 in 1999. According to RUC rules, plastic
    bullets should be aimed below the rib cage; nevertheless, the use of
    plastic bullets in prior years resulted in 17 deaths and numerous head
    and upper body injuries. Plastic bullet use in Northern Ireland is
    criticized severely by human rights monitors, although the European
    Court of Human Rights ruled in 1984 that using them to quell serious
    riots did not contravene the European Convention on Human Rights. The
    U.N. Committee Against Torture, the European Parliament, and human
    rights NGO's have called for a ban on their use.
        The Patten Commission recommended the closure ``forthwith'' of
    Northern Ireland's three holding centers used to detain and interrogate
    individuals suspected of terrorist offences. Human rights organizations
    have long called for their closure because of repeated complaints of
    police mistreatment during interrogations. One facility, at
    Castlereagh, was closed in 1999, and a second, Strand Road, was closed
    in September; the RUC contends that it cannot quickly close the third
    center, Gough, because it lacks the capacity in existing police
    stations to cope with the demands of questioning hundreds of terrorist
    suspects per year. Audio and video recordings are now made of all
    interrogations in the holding centers, and the number of complaints
    against the police by persons arrested under emergency legislation has
    diminished significantly.
        The independent commissioner for holding centers in Northern
    Ireland made unannounced visits to holding centers in order to observe
    interrogations and interview detainees. The number of complaints,
    generally for verbal harassment or ``technical assault,'' dropped
    substantially.
        David Adams was assaulted during his arrest and initial
    incarceration at the Castlereagh interrogation center in 1994. In 1998
    a Belfast court awarded Adams $48,000 (30,000 pounds) for exemplary
    damages. Adams later was sentenced to 25 years for conspiracy to
    murder. Following the court decision on damages, an independent inquiry
    into Adams's treatment was initiated by the assistant chief constable
    of Strathclyde. On the basis of his report, the DPP declined to pursue
    charges against any of the officers involved. An application by Adams
    for judicial review of the DPP's decision was denied in June.
        Police occasionally harassed Travellers and members of other
    minorities. Separate 1999 and 2000 reports pointed out that minorities
    are more likely to be stopped and searched than whites. In 1999 the
    Home Secretary ordered the police to recruit 8,000 officers from ethnic
    minorities within 10 years. In response the London Metropolitan Police
    increased recruitment of minority officers and hired additional
    recruits in 1999, which brought the total number of minority officers
    to less than 4 percent of the force. However, one-third of UK police
    forces have recruited no additional minorities.
        The armed forces have a procedure to handle complaints of
    harassment, racial and otherwise. Service personnel also have the right
    to submit complaints to employment tribunals. In 1998 the services
    entered into a 5-year partnership agreement with the Commission on
    Racial Equality (CRE) to promote racial equality practices. During the
    year, the armed forces registered 77 internal harassment complaints,
    including 28 for sexual harassment, 9 for racial harassment, and 31 for
    bullying or other harassment.
        Both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups in Northern
    Ireland continued to intimidate or carry out ``punishment'' attacks on
    victims who live in areas under paramilitary influence. The attacks
    often are intended to maintain or extend the control of paramilitary
    groups in a given region. Targets include group members who have broken
    ranks or individuals accused of ``antisocial'' activities such as drug
    trafficking or carjacking. The attackers have used iron pipes, baseball
    bats, sledgehammers, and spiked clubs to beat their victims and shot
    them in the knees and legs. The authorities recorded over 200 such
    incidents during the year. Human rights groups say that available
    statistics underreport the true number of casualties because many of
    the victims are too intimidated to report paramilitary punishment
    attacks.
        A bomb damaged Hammersmith Bridge in London in June. In September
    terrorists fired a missile, believed to be a rocket propelled grenade,
    at the MI-6 building, headquarters of Britain's Secret Service. Neither
    attack resulted in injuries, and no one publicly claimed
    responsibility.
        Prison conditions generally met minimum international standards.
    The chief inspector of prisons' annual report expressed disappointment
    that prison management had failed to recognize and eliminate problems
    independently or to followup on negative reports in previous years. The
    inspector described the treatment of prisoners and the conditions in
    several prisons as unacceptable, but noted some improvements in other
    institutions. The Prison Service made attempts to correct the problems
    of overcrowding and poor facilities maintenance in its prisons, through
    an investment of some $1.72 million (1.1 million pounds) in maintenance
    projects during the 1999-2000 period and a reduction in the number of
    prisoners required to ``double up'' in cells through the addition of
    500 new places. In August the deputy governor at Feltham, a juvenile
    prison, resigned in protest over what he termed dangerous and
    antisocial conditions. An October Prison Service report criticized
    procedural failures at Felham in the case of Zahid Mubarek, an Asian
    man who was beaten to death by a fellow inmate, Robin Stewart. Stewart
    had been charged with racially motivated crimes and continued to write
    racist letters from prison, but nonetheless was housed in the same cell
    with Mubraek. In August four warders at the Portland Young Offenders
    Institute were suspended from their duties pending investigation of
    allegations of abuse over a 14 year period. The prison population in
    England and Wales as of December decreased by 2 percent over the same
    time the previous year from 65,279 inmates to 63,881.
        Prison suicides decreased during the last year. The Prison Service
    reported 139 deaths of prisoners in England and Wales during the year,
    compared with 148 such deaths in 1999. Of these deaths, 82 were self-
    inflicted (91 in 1999) and 54 were due to natural causes (57 in 1999).
    The Scottish prison service reported 19 deaths in custody in 2000: The
    causes of 13 were unresolved pending the results of routine inquests, 5
    were suicides, and 1 was due to natural causes.
        Human rights groups have been particularly critical of Special
    Security Units (SSU's), which are used to hold prisoners deemed to pose
    an exceptional risk of escape. Citing small group isolation, the lack
    of adequate exercise, work, educational opportunities, and natural
    daylight, as well as strict enforcement of noncontact visits through a
    glass barrier, human rights groups maintain that SSU imprisonment
    violates international standards. At year's end, 7 prisoners remained
    in SSU's; none was imprisoned for Northern Ireland terrorist-related
    crimes.
        Separate and distinct prison regimes exist for Northern Ireland and
    Scotland, administered through the Northern Ireland Office and the
    Scottish Office.
        The number of female prisoners continued to rise. According to a
    1999 Home Office report, women now commit 20 percent of all crime, and
    the number of women sent to prison doubled in the previous 6 years.
    Implementing the recommendations of a 1999 report by its women's policy
    group, the Prison Service adopted new procedures governing admission to
    mother and baby units and standards for their management.
        Faced with a large increase in the number of asylum seekers, the
    Government in December housed 1,195 immigration detainees in regular
    prisons, where normally they are held separately from convicted
    prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial. According to human rights
    groups, 28 regular prisons house some immigration detainees. The U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other groups cite a lack of
    specialized skills among regular prison officials in dealing with
    immigration detainees. The UNHCR, which regularly visits detention
    centers and has excellent relations with the Government and detention
    center officials, continues to criticize the Government's ``expectation
    of noncompliance'' by asylum seekers. In March the Government opened a
    new center to house asylum seekers for short periods while their cases
    are decided. The Home Office was also in the process of finalizing
    rules for the treatment of asylum seekers in detention centers, which
    has been called for by the chief inspector for prisons for England and
    Wales.
        The Prison Service stated that three prisoners were convicted in
    1999 of offenses related to the situation in Northern Ireland. The
    requests by all three for repatriation to the Republic of Ireland
    remained under consideration. Since the prisoners committed their
    offenses after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, they are not
    covered by its provisions for the early release of prisoners.
        The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons and
    immigration detention centers.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities can and
    often do make arrests or detain suspects without judicial warrants,
    especially in Northern Ireland, when they believe that they have
    reasonable cause to suspect wrongdoing. The 1994 Criminal Justice and
    Public Order Act allows police officers to stop and search vehicles and
    pedestrians if a police officer of at least superintendent rank (or a
    chief inspector if no superintendent is available) ``reasonably
    believes'' it is expedient to do so to prevent acts of violence. The
    authorization is limited to a 24-hour period but is renewable under
    certain circumstances.
        In July Parliament enacted the 2000 Terrorism Act, which is
    scheduled to come into force in February 2001. The law reforms
    mechanisms and powers used to deal with terrorism relating to Northern
    Ireland and extends them to all forms of domestic and foreign terrorism
    across the United Kingdom. It replaces the Prevention of Terrorism
    (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989, the Northern Ireland (Emergency
    Provisions) Act of 1996 (Amended in 1998), and sections of the Criminal
    Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998, incorporating many
    provisions of those acts into the new law. Certain other provisions of
    those laws, applicable only to Northern Ireland, are to be extended for
    a maximum of 5 years, based on the special security situation that
    continues to exist there.
        The new act widens the definition of terrorism to include actions
    or threats of action that are designed to influence the Government or
    intimidate the public to advance a political, religious, or ideological
    cause that involves serious violence against a person or serious damage
    to property, endangers a person's life, creates a serious risk to the
    health or safety of the public, or is designed to seriously interfere
    with an electronic system. It gives police the power to arrest and
    detain suspected terrorists for up to 48 hours without judicial review,
    or, under limited circumstances, legal representation. Under the law,
    the Government may ban organizations involved with any form of
    international or domestic terrorism and prosecute individuals who
    participate in or support such organizations. The law also enhances the
    Government's power to seize assets related to terrorist activities.
        The act also provides for special emergency powers applicable to
    Northern Ireland for a period of up to 5 years maximum--or less if the
    Secretary of State for Northern Ireland determines that the security
    situation allows it. These powers include special entry, arrest,
    search, and seizure authority without a warrant under certain
    circumstances, nonjury, single-judge ``Diplock Court'' trials for
    ``scheduled'' offenses, and a lower standard of admissibility of
    confessions than in ordinary courts.
        Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, have
    expressed objections over certain temporary and permanent provisions of
    the new act. These objections focus on the broad definition of
    terrorism employed in the law, the proscriptive powers of the state,
    and the powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation. They argue that
    the act effectively reverses the burden of proof in suspected terrorism
    cases and fails to provide adequate safeguards against abuse by law
    enforcement officials.
        Suspects arrested without warrants must be released within 24 hours
    (or 36 hours if a serious offense is involved) unless brought before a
    magistrates' court or arrested under Terrorism Act provisions. The
    court may authorize extension of detention by 36 hours and on further
    application by another 24 hours, versus the 48-hour scheme extant in
    Northern Ireland (see Section 1.e.).
        Defendants awaiting trial have a statutory right to bail unless
    there is a risk that they would flee, commit an offense, interfere with
    witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, or unless they
    were on bail when the alleged offense was committed. Defendants who are
    remanded in custody are protected by statutory custody time limits,
    which restrict the period for which they can be held while awaiting
    trial to a maximum of 182 days, unless the court grants an extension.
    According to data supplied by the Home Office, at year's end 6,791
    defendants were in custody awaiting trial. Of those in custody, 6,094
    had been awaiting trial for less than 24 weeks, while 196 had been
    waiting longer than 48 weeks. On balance the time spent awaiting trial
    decreased from 1999. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act includes measures
    to reduce delays in criminal proceedings by introducing procedural
    reforms and further limiting the time allowed for the prosecution of
    cases.
        The law gives administrative detention power to immigration
    officers. There is no time limit to such detention and no right to have
    it reviewed by a court. At year's end, approximately 1,500 asylum
    seekers were detained. They are detained either in immigration
    detention centers or in regular prisons (where they are normally held
    separately from convicted prisoners and those awaiting trial).
    Occasionally they are held in police cells, if for no more than 48
    hours and pending removal from the country or transfer to another
    accommodation (see Section 1.c.).
        Unlike those accused of criminal offenses, asylum seekers are given
    no written statement about why they were detained, although the
    practice is to provide them with updates on the status of their claims
    and the time required for their adjudication. Asylum seekers do not
    have an automatic right to apply for bail, and bail application, which
    can be made to immigration appellate authorities, requires a relatively
    high level of surety.
        The Government does not use exile (also see Section 2.d.).
        Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland also continued to
    threaten individuals and families to compel them to leave the province.
    Estimates of the number of people who fled into exile since the signing
    of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 range as high as 800.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
    provides citizens with a generally fair and efficient judicial process.
        There are several levels of courts. The vast majority of criminal
    cases are heard by magistrates' courts, which are managed by locally
    based committees. Their decisions may be appealed to the Crown Court,
    which also hears criminal cases requiring a jury trial, or to the High
    Court. Crown Court convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal,
    which may in turn refer cases involving points of law to the House of
    Lords. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (which consists of
    senior judges and is functionally distinct from the legislative arm) is
    the final court of appeal. The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC)
    operates as an additional appellate body to investigate suspected
    miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It
    considers cases after the judicial appeals process is exhausted and
    where there is significant new evidence that casts doubt on the
    conviction. In Scotland similar appeals may be made to the Scottish
    Office.
        The law provides for a fair trial, and the authorities respect and
    enforce the law in this regard. Defendants enjoy a presumption of
    innocence until proven guilty, the right to question witnesses against
    them, and the right to appeal to successively higher courts.
        The 1998 Human Rights Act took effect in October, bringing the
    European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (see Section 4).
    Under this law, all public bodies must act in a manner compatible with
    the convention. The law provides citizens with the right to take
    alleged violations of the convention by a public authority into British
    courts. The Government derogated from Article 5(3) of the convention,
    dealing with the prompt resolution of a case after arrest or detention
    and included this derogation in the Human Rights Act. NGO's criticize
    this derogation.
        In July Parliament passed the 2000 Terrorism Act, which replaced
    several other related laws (see Section 1.d.). Under the new law, the
    testimony of a senior police officer, corroborated by a suspect's
    silence under questioning, can be considered evidence of a suspect's
    membership in a terrorist organization. The act also criminalizes
    membership in a proscribed terrorist organization or the support of
    such an organization, including the provision of money or other
    property. The act allows for the seizure and forfeiture of assets
    belonging to a person convicted of fundraising or otherwise assisting
    or supplying property to be used for the purposes of terrorism. Human
    rights groups, including Liberty, have criticized the criminalization
    of membership in a terrorist organization as violating the right to
    freedom of expression and association.
        Under the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, judges have
    the power to instruct juries that they may draw an inference of guilt
    from a defendant's refusal to answer questions during interrogation or
    trial, although no conviction can be based solely on such an inference.
    Human rights groups and the U.N. Human Rights Committee sharply
    criticize this provision, which they consider an abrogation of the
    right against self-incrimination. A similar provision is in effect in
    Northern Ireland. Based on a 1996 European Court of Human Rights
    judgment, the 1999 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order codifies
    guidelines issued by the Attorney General that prohibited the drawing
    of inference from silence when a suspect is questioned before being
    permitted access to an attorney.
        Indigent defenders have the right to free counsel of their choice,
    with some exceptions. Criminal proceedings must be held in public
    except those in juvenile court and those involving public decency or
    security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may
    order the court closed, but sentencing must be public.
        In Northern Ireland, special ``emergency'' restrictions affect due
    process. The 2000 Terrorism Act extends the application of most
    provisions of the 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA)
    for a year, subject to another 12-month extension. Trials for certain
    terrorist-related offenses are conducted automatically in ``Diplock
    courts'' without a jury unless they specifically are ``scheduled out''
    to ordinary jury courts. Diplock courts were established to avoid cases
    being heard by juries that might make decisions along sectarian lines,
    as well as to protect jurors from intimidation. If judges decide to
    convict, they must justify the decision in a document that becomes part
    of the court record. An appellate court may overturn the decision on
    either factual or legal grounds. During the year, 89 persons were tried
    in Diplock courts, of whom 39 either pled or were found guilty. An
    internal review of the Diplock court system was completed in July. It
    concluded that, due to the risk of juror intimidation, the time was not
    yet right to achieve the Government's objective of resuming jury trials
    for all offenses. The Government accepted this conclusion. The Diplock
    courts, and the Government's latest decision to retain them, have been
    criticized widely by human rights groups.
        Provisions of the EPA extended under the Terrorism Act establish
    lower standards for the use of uncorroborated confessions in Northern
    Ireland than in normal cases, and such confessions have in the past
    been used as the sole basis for conviction. Additionally, these
    provisions permit the police to prevent any suspected terrorist from
    contacting legal counsel for up to 48 hours after arrest under certain
    circumstances, at the request of a police officer with the minimum rank
    of superintendent. After a detainee has asked to see a lawyer and has
    done so, this period is renewable in subsequent 48-hour increments
    until the detainee is charged or released. Human rights groups have
    criticized these provisions, arguing that a detainee is most likely to
    need counsel in the first few hours; lack of counsel during that time
    makes false or coerced confessions and the abuse of detainees more
    likely. According to the Northern Ireland office, 92 requests for
    access to lawyers were made through June, none of which were delayed.
        The 1996 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act reduced defense
    lawyers' access to potential evidence held by the prosecution,
    including information as to how the evidence was collected. According
    to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a local NGO, this
    practice may be contrary to U.N. guidelines on the role of prosecutors.
        In light of allegations of security force collusion in the killings
    of Patrick Finucane and Rosemary Nelson (see Section 1.a.), there is
    continuing concern about harassment of lawyers by members of the RUC.
    The Human Rights Commission and the Law Society (the solicitors'
    professional association) received complaints from attorneys during the
    year and were considering undertaking a study to assess the full extent
    of the problem, since there is evidence that the number of incidents is
    underreported. The RUC maintains that it has zero tolerance for
    misbehavior toward attorneys and specifically has addressed the issue
    in its new code of ethics.
        In March a nine-member panel of legal professionals, drawn from the
    civil service and private practice, issued the Northern Ireland
    Criminal Justice Review, which was mandated by the Good Friday
    Agreement. The review's 294 recommendations are intended to improve the
    criminal justice system so that it will enjoy the confidence of all
    parts of the community while delivering justice efficiently and
    effectively. The report recommends the creation of a single independent
    prosecuting authority called the Public Prosecution Service for
    Northern Ireland that would be responsible for all prosecutions,
    including minor offences that are now prosecuted by the police. The
    review also recommends creation of a nonpolitical Northern Ireland
    Attorney General to oversee the Prosecution Service. It calls for the
    establishment of a single minister-level Department of Justice once
    responsibility for justice is devolved to Northern Ireland. To ensure
    that judicial appointments faithfully reflect the composition of
    Northern Ireland society, the review recommends the establishment of a
    Judicial Appointments Commission, which would include input from the
    First Minister and Deputy First Minister, to introduce local political
    responsibility and accountability into the appointments process. The
    review also makes recommendations on restorative justice, juvenile
    justice, community safety, victims and witnesses, and sentencing and
    prisons.
        During a 6-month consultation period ending in September, the
    Government accepted comments on the review from human rights NGO's and
    political parties. In October the Government stated that it fully
    endorses the general approach taken in the report. Legislation is
    expected in 2001.
        In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the Government
    concluded the process of releasing prisoners affiliated with
    paramilitary organizations that maintained a cease-fire. By year's end,
    433 paramilitary prisoners, including 229 republicans and 193 loyalists
    (and 11 ``others'') had been released under the 1998 Northern Ireland
    (Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Warrants normally are required for a police search of
    private premises; however, under the 2000 Terrorism Act a police
    officer may enter and search ``any premises if he or she reasonably
    suspects a terrorist is to be found there.'' The Government compensates
    persons whose houses or property have been damaged during house
    searches.
        In July the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) became
    law. The RIPA allows the Government to monitor the content of private
    electronic communications after obtaining a warrant. In addition law
    enforcement agencies may require individuals and businesses to disclose
    encryption keys under certain circumstances. In October the Government
    enacted regulations under the RIPA allowing businesses to monitor the
    electronic communications of employees. The regulations are expected to
    be challenged under the Human Rights Act.
        In Northern Ireland, paramilitary attacks on the homes and families
    of police and politicians decreased significantly, but the security
    forces believe that such groups continue to conduct surveillance and
    retain the capability to target police and politicians.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Strongly held common-law
    tradition, an independent press, and a democratic political system
    combine to secure freedom of speech and of the press. Viewpoints
    critical of the Government are well represented.
        The print media are dominated by a handful of national daily
    newspapers, all privately owned and independent (although often
    generally aligned with a political party). About half of the electronic
    media are run by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which is
    funded by the Government but enjoys complete editorial independence.
    Corporations under renewable government license run the remainder.
        In May Barry Michael George was charged with the 1999 murder of
    Jill Dando, a leading television personality. George, whose trial was
    scheduled for February 2001, was believed to have been obsessed with
    Dando.
        Press organizations and human rights groups continued to criticize
    the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which allows courts to order a
    journalist to disclose a source if it is deemed to be in the interests
    of justice. The 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act also contains
    provisions that compel journalists to give evidence in cases where
    police can prove it is necessary to their investigation. The Official
    Secrets Act, another law cited by journalists as unduly restrictive,
    prohibits the defense that the information is already in the public
    domain or that its publication is in the public interest.
        In November Parliament passed the Freedom of Information Act (FIA).
    The FIA provides for public access to information held by the
    government. Certain information, including information related to the
    Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service, is subject to an
    absolute exemption from disclosure. In addition, the Government may
    refuse to disclose other ``exempt'' information, including information
    relating to national security and the operation of any ministerial
    private office, if the public interest in maintaining the exemption
    outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Critics, including the NGO
    Campaign for Freedom of Information, charge that the exemptions are
    overly broad.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for the right of peaceful assembly, but that right is limited routinely
    where it would impose a cost on public convenience. Police dispersed a
    May 1 anticapitalist demonstration in London after participants rioted,
    stoned police, and damaged cars and businesses. Several persons were
    injured, and a number of protesters arrested.
        In Northern Ireland the annual ``marching season'' posed
    significant problems for the Government since the right of assembly
    conflicted with the concerns of local residents in some communities who
    perceived the parades as the celebration of Protestant ``triumphs'' in
    historical battles. The 1998 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act
    transferred responsibility for ruling on disputed marches from the RUC
    to a Parades Commission. Of the 3,304 parades held during the year, 260
    were considered contentious. Of these the Parades Commission imposed
    restrictions on 188. The courts refused the Orange Order's bid for a
    judicial review of the act. The Orange Order claimed that the law's
    provisions violated the Human Rights Act's provisions for freedom of
    speech and assembly.
        In response to the Parades Commission's decisions in June and July
    not to allow the Orange Order parade down the nationalist Garvaghy Road
    in Portadown, the Orange Order called for widespread protests
    throughout Northern Ireland. Loyalist demonstrators blocked streets,
    and some hijacked and burned cars; the protests caused widespread
    disruption, and businesses were forced to close early. The two parades
    at Drumcree on July 2 and 9 took place relatively peacefully amid a
    massive security presence, but on several intervening evenings loyalist
    protesters on Drumcree Hill became violent and attacked police and army
    security forces. The Portadown Orange Lodge called for peaceful
    protests but did not condemn the violence. The Apprentice Boys' Siege
    of Derry parade on August 12 largely was peaceful.
        The law provides for freedom of association, but that right is
    sometimes limited. Under the 2000 Terrorism Act, it is an offense,
    punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, to belong to or profess to
    belong to an organization proscribed by the Home Secretary. Individuals
    are also subject to prosecution for supporting or inviting support for
    a proscribed organization, arranging or addressing meetings by
    proscribed organizations, or wearing clothing or carrying or displaying
    articles that would reasonably arouse suspicion of membership in a
    proscribed organization. Amnesty International has expressed concern
    that these powers may infringe on the rights to freedom of association
    and expression.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Government policy provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Members of all faiths and denominations enjoy freedom of worship. The
    Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.
    Those who believe that their freedom to worship has been abrogated have
    the right to appeal to the courts for relief. The Church of England
    (Anglican) and the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) have the status of
    state religions, although their status has come under increasing
    scrutiny. A January university report on religious discrimination
    commissioned by the Home Office claimed that the establishment of the
    Church of England causes ``religious disadvantage'' to other religious
    communities. The Home Office at year's end still was considering the
    report.
        The Church of Scientology asserts that it faces discrimination
    because the Government does not treat Scientology as a religion.
    Ministers of Scientology are not regarded as ministers of religion
    under prison regulations or for immigration purposes. In 1999 the
    independent Charity Commission rejected a Church of Scientology
    application for charitable tax status accorded to most religious
    groups, and concluded that it is not a religion for the purposes of
    charity law.
        The 1988 Education Reform Act requires that government schools hold
    a daily act of nondenominational Christian worship. A parental right of
    withdrawal exists for children who do not wish to participate, and
    safeguards exist for teachers who do not wish to participate in or
    conduct religious education. The act provides for alternative
    collective worship for other faiths. Teachers' organizations have
    called for government review of the act. Some ``voluntary schools''
    provided by religious groups enjoy state support. While the majority of
    these schools are Anglican or Catholic, there are a small number of
    Methodist and Jewish schools.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement
    within the country and in foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.
    In 1997 the Home Secretary revoked all exclusion orders preventing
    individuals linked to terrorism in Northern Ireland from traveling to
    Great Britain. When the Prevention of Terrorism Act was renewed in
    1998, it did not include provisions for exclusion orders. However, the
    Home Secretary has the power to activate other statutes implementing
    exclusion orders at any time.
        The Government cooperates closely with the UNHCR and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum is
    provided under a temporary protection process. Applicants are given 6
    months' ``leave to enter the country'' on arrival. They then can apply
    for an automatic 3-year extension of their stay and may apply for
    refugee status at any time. Asylum applications are considered in
    accordance with the criteria set out in the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Some asylum
    seekers are detained while the Government reviews their cases (see
    Section 1.d.); some are detained in regular prisons (see Section 1.c.).
        Faced with growing numbers of asylum applicants, the Government
    passed legislation in 1996 and 1999 designed to deter illegal entrants
    and the abuse of the asylum process, streamline the appeals process,
    and restrict benefits provided to asylum seekers. In December the
    Government issued guidelines for use by the courts in considering
    asylum claims by women. Judges were urged to consider forms of
    persecution more likely to be faced by female asylum applicants,
    including female genital mutilation and forced prostitution. The
    Government's policy, and the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act in
    particular, have been criticized by the UNHCR and NGO's for being
    detrimental to refugee rights. In particular Amnesty International in a
    September report claims that the Government's practice of dispersing
    asylum seekers throughout the county and issuing them vouchers for the
    purchase of food and other items stigmatizes asylum seekers and denies
    them access to community services.
        At year's end, 66,195 asylum applications were outstanding,
    compared with 101,475 outstanding a year earlier. The Government
    decided on 110,065 initial asylum applications, granting asylum in
    10,185. Under a special program to clear the asylum backlog, the
    Government also granted leave to remain in 10,330 cases. An additional
    11,365 cases were refused asylum, but were granted ``exceptional leave
    to remain.''
        There were no reports that persons were forced to return to
    countries where they feared persecution.
        Feuding among loyalist paramilitary groups resulted in the
    expulsion of over 200 families from their homes in the Shankill region
    of West Belfast as each group sought to expel from the neighborhood
    families allegedly sympathetic to their rivals. This scale of violent
    eviction had not been experienced in Northern Ireland since 1972.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government and freely
    exercise that right. The lower chamber of Parliament (the House of
    Commons, the center of legislative power) is elected in periodic,
    multiparty elections. The upper chamber (the House of Lords), with the
    power to revise and delay implementation of laws, is made up of
    hereditary and appointed life peers and senior clergy of the
    established Church of England. In the first stage of a government
    reform program, the House of Lords agreed in 1999 to remove all but 92
    of its over 900 hereditary peers who, with approximately 500 life peers
    and 26 clergy, make up the current House of Lords. Possible additional
    reforms are being debated, which would further reduce the size of the
    chamber, democratize selection of members, and add representatives of
    faiths other than Anglicanism as de jure members.
        The Government is formed on the basis of a majority of seats in the
    House of Commons, which are contested in elections held at least every
    5 years. Participation in the political process is open to all persons
    and parties. All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote. As in the
    rest of the country, Northern Ireland has city and district councils
    but with fewer powers. England and Wales also have County Councils. The
    Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament, and the Welsh
    Assembly have control over matters of regional importance, such as
    education, health, and some economic matters. Foreign affairs and
    defense continue to be the responsibility of the central government.
        Due to continuing problems with the decommissioning of paramilitary
    weapons, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive (established under
    the terms of the Good Friday Agreement) were suspended in February. The
    institutions were restored in May following intensive British-Irish
    talks with the parties and an initiative on weapons by the IRA.
        The small number of remaining UK overseas territories have an
    aggregate population of approximately 190,000. They enjoy varying
    degrees of self-government on the British model, with appointed
    governors.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    they and minorities face no legal constraints on voting or holding
    office. Women constitute 18 percent of the members of the House of
    Commons and approximately 16 percent of those in the House of Lords.
    Some 28 Members of Parliament have identified themselves as members of
    minority ethnic groups.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
    responsive to their views.
        A number of international nongovernmental human rights
    organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
    are based in the country. The Government cooperates fully with
    international inquiries into alleged violations of human rights.
        The 1998 Human Rights Act, which incorporated the provisions of the
    European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, took effect in
    October 2000 for the entire United Kingdom. Proceedings under the Human
    Rights Act can be brought only by victims of a breach of convention
    rights by a public authority. The Home Office has a human rights unit
    to carry out human rights policy and legislation. NGO's have criticized
    the Government for its failure to create a government-wide Human Rights
    Commission. In Northern Ireland the Human Rights Commission was
    established as an outcome of the peace process. While cases still may
    be taken to the European Court of Human Rights, all domestic remedies
    under the 1998 act must be exhausted first.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1976 Race Relations Act prohibits discrimination on the basis
    of race, color, nationality, or national or ethnic origin and outlaws
    incitement to racial hatred. These protections were extended to
    Northern Ireland in 1997. However, some groups continued to experience
    official and societal discrimination.
        The Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
    religion by public authorities. Employment discrimination on the
    grounds of religious or political opinion was outlawed specifically in
    Northern Ireland by the Fair Employment Act. The 1998 Fair Employment
    and Treatment Order extended the prohibition on discrimination to the
    provision of goods, facilities, services, and premises. The Government
    respects and enforces all antidiscrimination laws, which concentrate on
    employment and the supply of goods and services. The Northern Ireland
    Equality Commission began operation in August 2000 to oversee
    antidiscrimination policy.
        Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. In 1999 a
    government report, ``Living Without Fear,'' indicated that one in four
    women experience domestic violence at some stage in their lives, that
    reported incidents of rape more than tripled over the past 10 years,
    that two women per week are killed by their current or former partners,
    and that women fear personal attack more than any other crime.
    According to a February 2000 Home Office study, the 6,000 rapes and
    17,5000 indecent assaults recorded by the police yearly vastly
    underreport of the real scale of sexual violence against women. The
    study estimates the true number of rapes and assaults at between
    118,000 and 295,000. The research was released as part of a package of
    government grants and projects aimed at improving the conviction rate
    for rape and providing women with better protection against domestic
    violence. Reports of violence against women in Northern Ireland have
    increased.
        Criminal penalties for rape, including spousal rape, sexual
    assault, and domestic violence are substantial, and these laws are
    enforced strictly; however, conviction rates for rape tend to be lower
    than for other crimes. In the 12 months ending in September, 37,263
    sexual offences were recorded in England and Wales, a decrease of 0.4
    percent over the same period in 1999. The law provides for injunctive
    relief, personal protection orders, and protective exclusion orders
    (similar to restraining orders) for women who are victims of violence.
    The Government provides shelters, counseling, and other assistance for
    battery or rape and offers free legal aid to battered women who are
    economically reliant on their abusers.
        Criminal action for sexual harassment cases must be prosecuted
    under assault legislation since no law specifically prohibits sexual
    harassment. Women's groups have complained that civil suits concerning
    sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of gender sometimes
    take up to 3.5 years to appear before an industrial tribunal.
        The law provides for equal opportunity between the sexes, but women
    experience some discrimination in practice. The 1975 Sex Discrimination
    Act, as amended in 1986, prohibits both direct and indirect
    discrimination in training, housing, and the provision of goods and
    services, as well as in employment. Women have equal rights regarding
    property and divorce. According to the Government's Equal Opportunities
    Commission (which supports persons who bring discrimination cases
    before industrial tribunals and courts and produces guidelines on good
    practice for employers), significant progress has been made towards
    equal opportunity for women since the commission was established in
    1975. The introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 was an
    important change in the effort to equalize pay. However, a February
    report for the Government's Women's Unit found that women in full-time
    work earn on average 84 percent of the earnings of male full-time
    workers.
        Trafficking in women is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Women's issues within the Government are represented at the cabinet
    level by the Minister for Women, who heads up the Women's Unit, which
    engages in dialog with women and advises the Government but has no
    authority for direct action.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its systems of public education
    and medical care. The Government provides free, compulsory education to
    age 16 and further education to age 18 if the student so desires.
        While there is no societal pattern of abuse directed against
    children, indications are, despite a lack of reliable data, that child
    abuse is nevertheless a problem. Since the paramilitary cease-fires,
    reports of violence against children in Northern Ireland have
    increased.
        Concern and publicity surrounding pedophiles is growing. As part of
    a government drive to protect the young from child abusers, previously
    secret registers of pedophiles are available to any employer who runs
    an organization where persons under age 18 could be at risk (schools,
    children's homes, or voluntary organizations). In addition suspected
    child abusers and convicted pedophiles are banned from working with
    children. Childcare organizations must consult a list before offering
    anyone a job, paid or otherwise, and it is illegal for them to hire
    anyone named on it.
        Various laws covering England and Wales stipulate that children
    have the right to apply for court orders, to give or withhold consent
    for medical treatment (for those capable of making an informed
    decision), to make complaints to the relevant local authority, to have
    their ethnic, linguistic, and religious background considered in
    decisions affecting them, to have reasonable contact with their
    families (usually applied in a circumstance where there was abuse), and
    in general to be consulted regarding their desires.
        In February rules were introduced in England and Wales to reduce
    the intimidation that young suspects may feel when tried in an adult
    court. The rules include a ban on robes and wigs and uniformed security
    officers in the courtroom and affect all defendants under age 18 who
    face serious criminal charges in crown courts. The changes were in
    response to a 1999 European Court of Human Rights ruling that two young
    boys' rights were violated by the intimidating nature of their trial.
        Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the police can arrest and
    detain children as young as 10 years old for up to 7 days.
        In January the Government published a consultation document
    proposing that laws be amended to make it illegal for parents to hit
    their children with an implement or hit them on the head or face. It
    did not propose to outlaw completely spanking or hitting. The proposals
    are the result of a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 1998 that
    a 9-year-old boy's rights were violated by his stepfather's caning. The
    1998 School Standards and Framework Act extended the ban on corporal
    punishment in state schools to private schools and nursery schools.
    Child welfare groups have called for all corporal punishment of
    children to be outlawed.
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health and has been illegal in the United Kingdom since
    1985, is practiced by immigrant populations from countries in which the
    practice is common. The extent to which the procedure is carried out in
    the UK is unknown, but the Government continues to work to eradicate
    it.
        People with Disabilities.--The 1995 People With Disabilities
    Discrimination Act outlaws discrimination against disabled persons in
    the provision of access to public facilities by employers of more than
    15 workers, service providers (apart from those providing education or
    running transport vehicles), and anyone selling or renting property. In
    addition all businesses are required to accommodate disabled customers.
    Adaptations must be ``reasonable,'' bearing in mind the circumstances
    and size of the business. The 1993 Education Act requires local
    education authorities to make provision for the special educational
    needs of disabled children.
        In April the Disability Rights Commission (DRC) was launched. The
    DRC provides a hot line for disabled people and employers, legal advice
    and support for individuals, and policy advice to the Government. The
    DRC also has the power to conduct formal investigations, arrange
    conciliation, require persons to adopt action plans to ensure
    compliance with law, and apply for injunctions to prevent acts of
    unlawful discrimination.
        Government regulations require that all new buildings meet the
    access requirements of all persons with impaired mobility and that all
    taxis be wheelchair accessible. In 1992 the Government promulgated
    similar regulations for sensory-impaired persons. However, while
    generally improved, access to many buildings, especially older
    buildings, including transportation centers, remains inadequate.
        Religious Minorities.--According to the NGO the Board of Deputies
    of British Jews, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in Britain during
    the year was 398, compared with 270 in 1999 (adjusted figure). Public
    manifestations of anti-Semitism are confined largely to the political
    fringe, either far right or Islamist. In reaction to the October
    violence in the West Bank and Gaza, a number of synagogues were
    attacked by persons throwing bricks or other objects through the
    windows and anti-Semitic leaflets were posted in Manchester,
    Birmingham, and London. A Jewish man was stabbed in London in October
    in an apparent racist attack.
        Although there is some evidence that unemployment rates among
    Catholics remain higher than among Protestants in Northern Ireland,
    government programs and continued economic growth in the region have
    resulted in a decrease in the overall unemployment rate.
        The 1989 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, as amended, aims
    to end even unintentional or indirect discrimination in the workplace,
    and a public tribunal adjudicates complaints. All public sector
    employers and all private firms with over 10 workers must report
    annually to the Equality Commission on the religious composition of
    their work force and must review their employment practices at least
    once every 3 years. Noncompliance can bring criminal penalties and the
    loss of government contracts. Victims of employment discrimination may
    sue for damages. Although critics of the act assert that its targets
    and timetables are too imprecise, most leaders of the Catholic
    community regard it as a positive step.
        While the active recruitment of Catholics by the Northern Ireland
    Civil Service produced rough proportionality in overall numbers, the
    service acknowledges that Catholics remain significantly
    underrepresented in its senior grades. Government efforts to increase
    the recruitment of Catholics into the police (currently 92 percent
    Protestant) and related security jobs in Northern Ireland have been
    hampered by widespread antipathy in the Catholic community to the
    security forces as well as by intimidation by republican organizations
    opposed to any cooperation with the police or security forces. Despite
    past efforts, the percentage of Catholic officers in the force has not
    changed significantly. The new policing bill mandates that a 50:50
    religious balance be maintained in new recruitment until the religious
    composition of the police reflects the mix in society at large. Critics
    of this approach contend that it will violate the UK's international
    commitments.
        The fear of intercommunal violence has, over the years, led to a
    pattern of segregated communities in Northern Ireland. Protestant and
    Catholic families have moved away from mixed or border neighborhoods.
        According to the RUC, there were 28 arson/bomb attacks and 3 other
    acts of violence directed at both Protestant and Catholic churches in
    Northern Ireland during the year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Despite legal prohibitions
    against race discrimination, persons of African and Afro-Caribbean,
    South Asian, or Middle Eastern origin and Travellers face occasional
    acts of societal violence and some discrimination. According to an
    official report in October, 21,700 racially related offenses were
    recorded in the 1999-2000 period. Incitement to racial hatred is a
    criminal offense punishable by a maximum of 2 years' imprisonment. The
    Government strictly enforces the laws and regulations in this area.
        In June David Copeland was convicted of a series of racially
    motivated bombings in London that killed three people (see Section
    1.a.). In November Robert Stewart, an inmate at the Felham young
    offender institution, was convicted of the March murder of his Asian
    cellmate, Zahid Mubarek. Prior to the commission of the murder, Stewart
    had been charged with racially motivated offenses, and had written a
    number of racist letters while in prison (see Section 1.c.).
        The government-appointed but independent Commission for Racial
    Equality provides guidelines on good practice, supports persons taking
    court action under the 1976 Race Relations Act, and may initiate its
    own court actions. After investigating a complaint, the CRE may issue a
    notice requiring that the discrimination be stopped. The CRE then
    monitors the response to its notice for 5 years.
        According to a February announcement by Scotland Yard, the number
    of black and Asian officers in the metropolitan police increased by 20
    percent since the release of the Lawrence Report. However, minority
    officers still represent only about 4 percent of the metropolitan
    police force. More than one-third of police forces did not increase
    minority recruitment, the rate of which is substantially below the
    level required to meet targets set by the Home Office.
        A series of reports in 1999 and 2000, both independent and
    commissioned by police, show that minorities are more likely to be
    stopped and searched by police than whites (see Section 1.c.).
        In March the Police Complaints Authority announced that it would
    conduct a new inquiry into the police handling of the death of Ricky
    Reel, a young Asian found drowned in the Thames River in 1997. His
    family believes that Reel was the victim of a racial attack and claim
    that police failed to investigate the crime properly.
        Travellers, nomadic populations consisting of Roma, Irish, and
    ``new'' Travellers, estimated to number 100,000 persons, experience
    marginalization, educational discrimination, and police and societal
    harassment greater than that of the settled population, according to
    human rights groups. U.N. Committees on both the Rights of the Child
    and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have expressed similar
    concerns. In August 1997, the Government passed the Race Relations
    (Northern Ireland) Order, which for the first time gave specific legal
    protection to minority ethnic groups there, including the Traveller
    community. In January a study by Dundee University revealed
    institutionalized racism towards the Scottish Traveller community. In
    particular it showed that racist and intolerant attitudes among health
    professionals prevented Travellers from receiving proper medical care.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and
    join unions, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    1999 Employment Relations Act established the country's first
    procedures for statutory, as distinct from voluntary, union
    recognition. The Department of Trade and Industry began to promulgate
    implementing regulations during the summer of 2000. Additional
    regulations are being issued as they are completed. For example,
    beginning on September 4, 2000, workers are entitled to be accompanied
    at disciplinary and grievance hearings by a trade union
    representative--even if an employee's workplace is not unionized.
        Unions are free of government control. The Employment Relations Act
    affords significant new protection to union organizing efforts and, for
    the first time, confirms the statutory right to strike. The act sets
    minimum employment standards for the first time in labor law.
        Unions participate freely in international organizations. The
    general secretary of the International Confederation of Trade Unions
    (ICFTU), the general secretary of the Trade Union Advisory Committee to
    the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
    workers' representative on the governing body of the International
    Labor Organization (ILO) are all former British trade union leaders.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is longstanding and widespread, covering about 30 percent of
    the work force. Unionization is heaviest in the public sector. Under
    the Employment Relations Act, labor-management contracts are, for the
    first time, legally enforceable.
        Under the 1999 act, unions can file a request for recognition,
    identifying the proposed bargaining unit, to the Central Arbitration
    Committee (CAC). The act covers employers with more than 20 workers and
    encompasses an estimated two-thirds of all workplaces.
        Once the CAC determines the appropriate bargaining unit, it
    assesses whether a union is likely to have majority support. If union
    members already make up a majority of the bargaining unit, the CAC can
    issue a declaration that the union is recognized for collective
    bargaining without a ballot. In those instances where the CAC orders a
    ballot (typically, when the majority of bargaining unit employees are
    not already union members), the employer must cooperate by providing a
    list of names and giving the union access to the workplace to campaign.
    Unions win recognition when a majority of those voting agree, including
    at least 40 percent of those in the bargaining unit.
        Although the law encourages voluntary agreements between employers
    and unions, the CAC can, if necessary, impose a legally binding
    procedure for bargaining about pay, hours, and holidays. To date no
    union has filed a case before the CAC. This reflects the Trades Union
    Council's (TUC) explicit preference that its member unions should
    secure workplace agreements through negotiation rather than in the
    courts. The TUC acknowledged that the right to take a unionization
    dispute to the CAC has boosted its organizing efforts.
        Workers are protected against dismissal or other retaliation for
    campaigning or voting for or against recognition. Unions no longer are
    required to name members when initiating a strike ballot, to minimize
    opportunities for retaliation. The law also prohibits the compilation
    of lists of union members and labor activists for use by employers and
    employment agencies. This is aimed at ``blacklists,'' as operated in
    the past. Dismissed strikers are able to claim unfair dismissal if
    fired within 8 weeks of when they first undertook a legal strike.
        Union members are protected against ``being subject to any
    detriment'' due to union activity or membership. This protection goes
    further than the previous language of ``action short of dismissal taken
    against him as an individual.'' Heretofore, it was legal for employers
    to withhold fringe benefits otherwise available to nonunion employees.
        At the same time, the 1999 act retains key policies implemented by
    previous governments, notably ballots and notice before strikes,
    abolition of the closed shop, secondary boycotts, and prohibition
    against mass picketing.
        There are no export processing zones. The Employment Relations Act
    also extends its protection to contract and part-time workers in an
    attempt to close loopholes that previously allowed some employers to
    evade labor regulations. Foreign workers are protected to the full
    extent of the law.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited and is not
    practiced.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--School attendance until age 16 is compulsory. Children
    under age 16 are not permitted to work in an industrial enterprise
    except as part of an educational course. Forced and bonded child labor
    is prohibited, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition
    (see Section 6.c.). The UK ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor on March 23 and ILO Convention 138 on the minimum
    age for employment in June.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country's first minimum wage
    went into effect on April 1, 1999. As of October 1 the adult minimum
    wage was $5.50 (3.70). The youth wage was raised to $4.75
    (3.20) on June 1, 2000.
        When introduced in 1999, the new pay thresholds were expected to
    benefit some 1.5 million workers directly. However, according to
    government figures in October, nearly 300,000 workers still were paid
    less than the minimum wage a year after its introduction. Government
    departments aggressively are instructing employers that they must bring
    pay practices into compliance. The Board of Inland Revenue examined
    7,000 employers by October and had recovered $4 million (2.7 million
    pounds) on behalf of underpaid employees.
        Recognizing that the national minimum wage is a new institution,
    the Government asked the Low Pay Commission (incorporating academics,
    employers, and trade unions), created in 1998, to review the standard's
    implementation and make recommendations by July 2001.
        Currently the national minimum wage, by itself, does not provide a
    decent standard of living for most workers with families. But other
    elements of the welfare state fill the gap. Of nearly 28 million
    workers, some 6 million (21 percent) benefit from some social insurance
    scheme or another. This is in addition to free universal access to the
    National Health Service. The working families' tax credit and disabled
    person's tax credit--both implemented as of 1999--are designed to
    ensure a working family a weekly income of $320 (200 pounds), which
    constitutes a living wage.
        As of April, the Government also introduced a minimum income
    guarantee for low-income pensioners. This increases the basic state
    pension that all retired employees receive. And the Government also
    announced that, as of April 2001 the threshold of total personal assets
    will be raised to allow more low-income pensioners to avail themselves
    of this benefit.
        The Government introduced a working time directive in 1998 to bring
    domestic legislation into compliance with the European Union's 48-hour
    workweek. New 1999 legislation significantly raised the maximum
    compensation level for unfair dismissal claims from $19,200 to $80,000
    (12,000 to 50,000 pounds). Regulations from 1999 enhanced parental
    leave provisions for employees with more than a year's continuous
    service. The Human Rights Act, which came into force on October 2,
    2000, added additional rights in the workplace.
        The 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act stipulates that the health
    and safety of employees not be placed at risk. In practice the act is
    updated constantly. The Health and Safety Executive effectively
    enforces regulations on these matters and may initiate criminal
    proceedings in appropriate cases. Workers' representatives actively
    monitor enforcement of the act. Workers can remove themselves from
    hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws specifically criminalize
    trafficking in persons, which is a growing problem. A July Home Office
    report on reforming the law on sexual offences recommended the creation
    of a new crime of trafficking a person for the purpose of sexual
    exploitation. The police successfully prosecuted traffickers under
    other laws, such as those against procuring and living off of immoral
    earnings. Under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum act, persons found
    importing illegal immigrants can be fined $3,600 (2,000 pounds).
        A May Home Office report on trafficking in women estimated that up
    to 1,400 women were trafficked into the country in 1998. The report
    highlighted that police largely are unaware of the scale of the problem
    and do not treat it as a priority. The Government was considering the
    report's recommendations, which include the creation of a new crime
    category of ``sexual exploitation,'' allowing trafficked women to sue
    their exploiters, and a focus on prevention campaigns in host
    countries.
        On June 21, 58 ethnic Chinese suffocated in the back of a truck
    while attempting to enter the country illegally. Three persons were
    arrested and face trial in the UK in connection with the deaths.
                                   __________

                                   UZBEKISTAN

        Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. The
    Constitution provides for a presidential system with separation of
    powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In
    practice President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch
    that serves him dominate political life. First chosen president in a
    1991 election that most observers considered neither free nor fair,
    Karimov had his stay in office extended to 2000 by a 1995 plebiscite.
    Parliament subsequently voted to make the extension part of Karimov's
    first term, thus making him eligible to run again in 2000. He was
    elected to a second term in January against token opposition with 92.5
    percent of the vote under conditions that were neither free nor fair.
    The Oliy Majlis (Parliament) consists almost entirely of regional
    officials appointed by the President and members of parties that
    support the President. Despite constitutional provisions for an
    independent judiciary, the executive branch heavily influences the
    courts in both civil and criminal cases.
        There is effective civilian control over the military. The Ministry
    of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces
    are responsible for most normal police functions. The National Security
    Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national
    security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and
    narcotics. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human
    rights abuses.
        The Government has stated that it is committed to a gradual
    transition to a free market economy. However, continuing restrictions
    on currency convertibility and other government measures to control
    economic activity have constrained economic growth and led
    international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits.
    The economy is based primarily on agriculture and agricultural
    processing; the country is a major producer and exporter of cotton. It
    is also a major producer of gold and has substantial deposits of
    copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The Government has made some
    progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, but government
    statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There
    are no reliable statistics on unemployment, which is believed to be
    high and growing. The Government is taking some modest steps to reduce
    the host of formal and informal barriers that constrain the nascent
    private sector.
        The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the
    Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses. However, there
    were positive human rights developments in a few areas. Citizens cannot
    exercise their right to change their government peacefully. The
    Government has not permitted the existence of an opposition party since
    1993. Election and registration laws restrict the possibility that any
    real opposition parties form or mount a campaign. There were credible
    reports that security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of
    several citizens in custody. Police and NSS forces tortured, beat, and
    harassed persons. The security forces arbitrarily arrested or detained
    pious Muslims and other citizens on false charges, frequently planting
    narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on them. Prison conditions
    are poor, and detention can be prolonged. The judiciary does not always
    ensure due process and often defers to the wishes of the executive
    branch. Parliament passed a law on judicial reform that was awaiting
    presidential approval at year's end. The Government also demonstrated a
    commitment to permitting International Committee for the Red Cross
    (ICRC) access to detained persons and prisoners. Police and NSS forces
    infringed on citizens' privacy, including the use of illegal searches
    and wiretaps. Those responsible for documented abuses rarely are
    punished.
        The crackdown that followed the explosion of five terrorist bombs
    in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, continued during 2000. Among those
    arrested and tried were persons with close links to avowed Islamist
    Uzbeks abroad who, the Government believes, were responsible for the
    bombings. However, other victims of the crackdown included members of
    the secular opposition, human rights activists, and thousands of
    overtly pious Muslims and members of Islamist political groups. While
    it is not possible to estimate the number of those arrested, observers
    believe that the scale surpasses any previous such action. The Moscow-
    based human rights group Memorial has documented over 1,400 cases of
    persons imprisoned between January 1999 and April 2000. The
    organization credibly estimates that the total number arrested and
    tried in that time frame was between 4,000 and 5,000. By year's end,
    well over 5,000 persons were in prison as a result of the crackdown.
        The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and the press,
    and an atmosphere of repression stifles public criticism of the
    Government. Although the Constitution expressly prohibits it, press
    censorship continues, and the Government sharply restricts citizens'
    access to foreign media. A 1999 decree requires all Internet service
    providers to route their connections through a government server. The
    primary purpose of this measure, according to the Government, is to
    prevent access to information that the Government considers harmful.
    Despite the law, private Internet providers have proliferated during
    the year.
        The Government limits freedom of assembly and association. The
    Government continues to ban unauthorized public meetings and
    demonstrations. The Government has not yet implemented a 1999 law that
    improves the formal legal framework for the formation, registration,
    and operation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The Government
    continues to deny registration to opposition political parties as well
    as to other groups that might be critical of the Government. For
    example, the Ministry of Justice has denied repeated applications for
    registration of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and the
    Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), citing
    technical deficiencies in the applications. Unregistered opposition
    parties and movements may not operate freely or publish their views.
    The Government restricts freedom of religion. The Government harassed
    and arrested hundreds of Islamic leaders and believers on questionable
    grounds, citing the threat of extremism. The Government tolerates the
    existence of minority religions but places strict limits on religious
    activities. Although the Government had registered over 174 minority
    religious communities by year's end, several others were prevented from
    registering by local officials. Unlike in 1999, university authorities
    did not expel students for wearing Islamic dress during the year.
        The Government continues to voice rhetorical support for human
    rights, but does not ensure these rights in practice. Although the
    election, religion, and media laws contain elements that theoretically
    support human rights, in reality the Government does not respect such
    provisions. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which was formed
    in 1997, reports that it is assisting hundreds of citizens in
    redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve allegedly
    unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police. The
    Ombudsman's office issued reports identifying the most serious types of
    violations of human rights by government officials; however, most of
    the successfully resolved cases were relatively minor. The Government
    pardoned and released imprisoned human rights activist Mahbuba Kasimova
    at year's end.
        Domestic violence against women is a problem, and despite a
    constitutional prohibition, there continues to be significant
    traditional, societal discrimination against women. The Government
    undertook cooperation with women's NGO's. Trafficking in women and
    girls for the purposes of prostitution occurs. Workplace discrimination
    against some minorities persists. There are some limits on worker
    rights.
        Beginning in August, insurgents from the Islamic Movement of
    Uzbekistan (IMU) conducted significant armed incursions in Uzbekistan
    and neighboring states. Over two dozen members of the Uzbek police and
    armed forces were killed in the conflict as were at least 30
    insurgents. During the conflict, the Government ordered the evacuation
    of least five villages in the Surkhandarya region near the border with
    Tajikistan. After spending 2 months in a temporary camp, the villagers
    were transferred in November to a newly constructed settlement more
    than 200 kilometers away, where they complained to international
    observers of poor conditions and abusive treatment.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political killings; however, security forces
    committed killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths
    of several prisoners in custody. According to human rights activists
    and other observers, many of those killed in custody were interned at a
    new prison near Jaslik in Karakalpakstan, where conditions were thought
    to be extremely harsh. Nearly all the inmates of this facility, which
    opened in the spring of 1999, were accused of religious extremism.
    Although there is specific information available on only a handful of
    deaths due to mistreatment in custody, human rights observers and
    relatives of prisoners claim that the number of such cases throughout
    the country during the year reached several dozen. Law enforcement
    officials warned families not to talk about their relatives' deaths.
    Government officials acknowledge that some inmates of Jaslik died, but
    attribute the deaths to illness and the extremely hot climate rather
    than mistreatment.
        The country's regulations require that every death in custody be
    investigated by a medical examiner. In most cases, deaths apparently
    due to beating are ascribed to heart failure. However, in June Batirjon
    Karimov, a guard at a prison in Almalyk, was convicted and sentenced to
    6 years in prison for beating a prisoner to death. The court convicted
    Karimov of Articles 103 and 104 of the Criminal Code: Driving someone
    to suicide and intentionally causing severe bodily harm, respectively.
    The victim, Akmal Latipov, who had just been brought to the prison,
    allegedly slashed his wrist with a razor when Karimov began to beat
    him, in order to escape the beating. A forensic medical examination
    established the cause of Latipov's death to be blows to the head
    inflicted by Karimov.
        According to the World Organization Against Torture, Rustam
    Norbaev, a possible member of the political Islamic movement Hizb ut-
    Tahrir, was arrested on March 13 and died in pretrial detention in
    Yakkabaga on March 18, allegedly after being tortured. Officials
    claimed that Norbaev hanged himself.
        Negmat Karimov, who was sentenced in July 1999 to 20 years in
    prison for alleged involvement in the terrorist conspiracy behind the
    1999 Tashkent bombings, died in prison in Navoi on March 22. According
    to his parents, his body showed multiple signs of beating. Karimov also
    was convicted on charges related to religious extremism.
        In late December, Amanullah Nosirov, a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir
    convicted in 1999, died in prison in Navoi. According to acquaintances
    of the deceased, he died of injuries sustained while being beaten.
    Nosirov was the brother of Haffezullah Nosirov, an alleged leader of
    Hizb ut-Tahrir who was convicted in March (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
        Hazratkul Kodirov, a former resident of a village near the Tajik
    border that had been evacuated during clashes with the IMU, died near
    the end of December, allegedly from injuries sustained during police
    interrogation (see Section 2.d.). (According to other residents of the
    village, police used beatings to force up to 39 men to confess to
    collaborating with the IMU.) Kodirov's brother alleged that the body
    bore 50 small holes and that the genital area was ``destroyed.''
    Hazratkul had given an interview to the British Broadcasting
    Corporation (BBC) in November deploring conditions in the resettlement
    camp.
        Shukhrat Parpiev, who was sentenced in December 1998 to 15 years in
    prison, died in the Jaslik prison on May 5. According to an
    acquaintance, Parpiev was not religious, but had been arrested because
    he was seen with a known religious figure suspected of extremism.
    Parpiev's body allegedly was bruised badly, and had a broken clavicle,
    crushed skull, and broken ribs.
        In an open letter to the President, 33 Tashkent residents protested
    the military hazing death on June 13 of Dmitriy Popov, a recruit who
    suffered from heart problems. Popov was allegedly beaten by senior
    soldiers on June 7. The HRSU commented that such deaths were not
    uncommon in the military. At year's end, military prosecutors were
    planning on bringing a criminal case against five soldiers who
    allegedly participated in the beating.
        There were no reported politically motivated killings by the
    insurgent IMU, although there were casualties on both sides of the
    conflict. During and after the armed incursions of August and
    September, Uzbek military forces laid mines on the border with
    Tajikistan. Press reports indicate that such mines have killed at least
    13 Tajik civilians. The Ministry of Defense asserts that all minefields
    are clearly marked and that it has informed the Tajik Government of
    their locations in accordance with international norms.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no new reports of politically
    motivated disappearances.
        It is widely believed that Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, missing since
    March 1998, fled the country to avoid arrest and was not abducted by
    security forces. There were no reported developments in the 1995
    disappearance of Imam Abduvali Mirzaev or in the 1997 disappearance of
    his assistant, Nematjon Parpiev. Most independent observers believe
    that the two missing Islamic activists are either dead or in NSS
    custody.
        There was one report of a person who has disappeared after being
    taken into custody. Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at the
    Alliance Francaise, was apprehended by plainclothes officers in front
    of witnesses on July 17. Authorities have not yet acknowledged that he
    is being held (see Section 1.d.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Although the law prohibits these practices, both police
    and NSS routinely beat and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain
    confessions, which they then used to incriminate the detainees. Both
    the frequency of allegations of torture and the alleged severity of the
    treatment increased during the reporting period.
        In December Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a major report on
    torture in Uzbekistan that details dozens of allegations based on
    interviews with victims and their families. The report claimed that the
    number of allegations and the degree of brutality of torture were
    increasing. The most common torture techniques are beating, often with
    blunt weapons, and asphyxiation with a gas mask. There were numerous
    unverifiable reports of interrogators raping detainees with objects
    such as bottles, and of threatening to rape both detainees and their
    family members.
        Although it is routine for police to beat confessions out of
    detainees, anecdotal evidence suggests that those suspected (sometimes
    only because of their piety) of Islamist political sympathies are
    treated more harshly than criminals.
        According to his family, noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, who
    claimed that he and five other defendants were tortured during 5 months
    of detention prior to his August 1999 trial, continued to suffer
    mistreatment in prison. Family visits to him in Jaslik prison in May
    and June revealed that his fingernails had been pulled out and that he
    was in generally very poor health. On July 4, the Interior Ministry
    said that Makhmudov's health was satisfactory and that he did not
    request medical treatment. In December acquaintances reported that
    Makhmudov nonetheless had been transferred to a hospital prison.
        In a trial concluded in the Akmol Ikramov regional court in
    Tashkent on September 6, 15 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir all alleged that
    they had been tortured during pretrial detention. According to those
    attending the trial (international monitors were barred from the
    courtroom), the defendants alleged that guards and interrogators had
    used beatings and electricity, and had forced them to sign blank
    statements. Several alleged that guards had raped them. The defendants
    were sentenced to between 12 and 16 years each.
        Prison conditions are poor, and worse for male than for female
    prisoners. Males and females are housed in separate facilities. Prison
    overcrowding is a problem. Human rights activists reported that the
    incarceration of 10 to 15 persons in cells designed for 4 is common.
    Tuberculosis and hepatitis are endemic in the prisons, making even
    short periods of incarceration potentially deadly. Reportedly there are
    severe shortages of food and medicines, and prisoners often rely on
    visits by relatives to obtain both. Brutal treatment by guards and an
    especially harsh and polluted desert environment were said to make
    conditions at Jaslik prison the worst in the country. By year's end,
    however, human rights observers had learned from witnesses that
    conditions in Jaslik had improved substantially. According to the
    Committee for the Legal Assistance of Prisoners, there are between 500
    and 800 total inmates at Jaslik. Although the law allows all prisoners
    to have occasional family visitors, the remoteness of Jaslik makes such
    visits rare and difficult. Most of the prisoners transferred to Jaslik
    were convicted for their alleged participation in unauthorized Islamic
    groups. The Government operates labor camps, where conditions of
    incarceration have been reported to be less severe than in prisons.
        An amnesty signed by the President on the occasion of the September
    1 Independence Day, may affect up to 25,000 of the country's 63,000
    prisoners, according to government press releases. The amnesty does not
    apply to those convicted of political crimes. While there was no
    official report on the number of prisoners actually released, human
    rights activists estimate it to be around 10,000.
        The Government in December decided it would permit prison visits by
    human rights monitors such as the International Committee of the Red
    Cross (ICRC).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
    continued to arrest and detain individuals arbitrarily, without warrant
    or just cause. A Soviet-era detention law provides that police may hold
    a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 3 days. At the end
    of this period, the detained person must be declared officially a
    suspect, charged with a crime, or released. A person officially
    declared a suspect may be held for an additional 3 days before charges
    are filed. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests, but not for
    detentions, prior to the filing of charges. In practice these legal
    protections frequently are ignored. In some cases, police circumvent
    the rules by claiming that the detainee is being held as a potential
    witness and not as a suspect; there are no regulations concerning the
    length of time witnesses may be detained. A court date must be set
    within 15 days of arrest (or filing of charges) and the defendant may
    be detained during this period. A defendant may not have access to
    counsel while in detention but only after the first interview with an
    investigator. Once the trial date is set, detainees deemed not to be
    violent may be released on their own recognizance pending trial. No
    money need be posted as bond, but in such cases the accused usually
    must sign a pledge not to leave the city. In practice this procedure
    rarely is used. During the period between arrest and trial, defendants
    are almost always kept in pretrial detention, which has been known to
    last as long as 2 years.
        In the March trial in Guliston of Hizb ut-Tahrir activist
    Haffezullah Nosirov and 11 others, the defendants were tried on average
    6 months after arrest. Many claimed that authorities used the interim
    period to torture them into signing confessions. The trial marked the
    first time since June 1999 that international observers were permitted
    to attend a trial of accused religious extremists.
        In ordinary criminal cases, the police generally are capable of
    identifying and arresting only those reasonably suspected of the crime.
    However, both the police and NSS are far less discriminating in cases
    involving perceived risks to national security. Prosecutors have
    brought charges against at least 140 persons in connection with the
    bombings, including at least 12 in during this year. All those tried
    have been convicted. Twenty of these were sentenced to death, with most
    reportedly already executed. Hundreds of other defendants have also
    been convicted of terrorism, most allegedly linked to those convicted
    of the bombings or other actions attributed to the IMU.
        It is common government practice to violate the human rights of
    both immediate and extended family members of those the Government has
    targeted. For example, Bakhodir Khasanov, an instructor of French at
    the Alliance Francaise, was detained and held incommunicado in the
    basement of the Ministry of the Interior on July 17. This is the fourth
    time that authorities have detained Khasanov. The security services'
    interest in Khasanov apparently stems from the fact that many in the
    Khasanov family are pious Muslims, although Bakhodir himself has
    claimed that he is not especially religious. Bakhodir's father and
    brother are both currently imprisoned. His brother Ismail was convicted
    in August 1999 for alleged links to Islamic extremists and was retried
    on additional charges of being involved in events in Yangiabad,
    although those events took place while he was in prison. In November
    1999, police arrested Khasanov's 70-year-old father after planting Hizb
    ut-Tahrir leaflets on him. He signed a confession after police forced
    him to watch them beating his son Ismail, and is now serving 3 years in
    prison.
        Kamoletdin Sattarov of Andijon was convicted of anti-State activity
    in July after police allegedly planted two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets on
    him. His brother Muradjon was jailed in 1999 for membership in Hizb ut-
    Tahrir. Kamoletdin has admitted that Muradjon had gotten involved with
    the group but denied that he shared his brother's political or
    religious passions. Investigators in Kamoletdin's case found individual
    appeal forms of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in his home
    and used them as evidence against him (see Section 4).
        All male members of the family of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov
    remain in jail, and allegedly are beaten periodically by interrogators
    trying to learn Nazarov's whereabouts. Similarly, three brothers of
    exiled democratic opposition leader Mohammed Solikh are imprisoned
    because of their family ties (see Sections 1.c. and 3).
        Family members of missing Andijon Imam Abdu Kori Mirzaev reported
    that they were harassed and kept under constant surveillance.
        According to NGO reporting, Uzbek Imam Khadji Khudjaev was arrested
    by Russian police in August, apparently at the request of the Uzbek
    Government, and was extradited to Uzbekistan in November to face
    charges of involvement in the February 1999 Tashkent bombings.
        Police in Nukus allegedly planted drugs on a Baptist pastor in
    July, and held him without charge until his release in late September
    (see Section 2.b.).
        Police routinely planted small amounts of narcotics, weapons,
    ammunition, or Islamic literature on citizens either to justify arrest
    or to extort bribes. The most frequent victims of this illegal practice
    have been suspected members of nonofficial Islamic organizations such
    as Hizb ut-Tahrir. They usually were sentenced to between 15 and 20
    years in prison. The total number of those either tried and convicted
    or still in pretrial detention is unknown, but human rights activists
    contend that there are well over 1,000 and perhaps several thousand.
    Many of those in detention are political detainees.
        In December the Parliament passed judicial reform legislation,
    which, according to an international NGO that reviewed the laws,
    mandates notable, if incremental improvements. The reforms included
    modifications to the criminal justice system to make it adversarial and
    reduce the power of the procuracy, improvements in the appeals process
    to ensure greater access to the courts, and increases in the
    independence of the courts from the executive branch of government.
        In general, the Government does not hold political detainees
    indefinitely, but brings them to trial eventually. Because there is no
    free press or public record of arrests, it is not possible to determine
    the number of detainees awaiting trial. Estimates by human rights
    activists are usually in the range of several thousand.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judicial authority; however, the judicial branch takes its
    direction from the executive branch and has little independence in
    practice. Under the Constitution, the President appoints all judges for
    5-year terms. They may be removed for crimes or failure to fulfill
    their obligations. Power to remove judges rests with the President,
    except for Supreme Court judges, whose removal also must be confirmed
    by Parliament.
        The system of courts of general jurisdiction is divided into three
    tiers: District courts, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. In
    addition a Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing laws,
    decrees, and judicial decisions to ensure their compliance with the
    Constitution. Military courts handle all civil and criminal matters
    that occur within the military. There is a system of economic courts on
    the regional level that deals with economic cases between judicial and
    legal entities.
        Decisions of district and regional courts of general jurisdiction
    may be appealed to the next level within 10 days of ruling. The
    Criminal Code has reduced the list of crimes punishable by death to
    murder, espionage, and treason, eliminating the economic crimes that
    were punishable by death in the former Soviet code. Officially, most
    court cases are open to the public but may be closed in exceptional
    cases, such as those involving state secrets, rape, or young
    defendants. However, except for the first trial in June 1999, all
    trials of those suspected of involvement in the February 16 terrorist
    bombings were closed to international observers and the public on
    security grounds. In similar fashion, many trials of alleged Islamic
    extremists have been closed. International trial monitors or foreign
    diplomats only rarely are permitted to observe court proceedings.
        State prosecutors play a decisive role in the criminal justice
    system. They order arrests, direct investigations, prepare criminal
    cases, and recommend sentences. If a judge's sentence does not agree
    with the prosecutor's recommendation, the prosecutor has a right to
    appeal the sentence to a higher court. There is no protection against
    double jeopardy. Judges whose decisions have been overturned on more
    than one occasion may be removed from office. Consequently, judges
    rarely defy the recommendations of prosecutors. As a result, defendants
    usually are found guilty.
        The Government still uses the Soviet practice of trial by a panel
    of three judges: one professional judge and two lay assessors who serve
    5-year terms and are selected from workers' collectives. The judge
    presides and directs the proceedings. However, in practice, judges
    often defer to the Government and its prosecutors on legal and other
    matters. Defendants have the right to attend the proceedings, confront
    witnesses, and present evidence. The State provides legal counsel
    without charge, but by law the accused also has the right to hire an
    attorney. In practice the right to an attorney often is violated and
    there are numerous examples of denial of this right.
        In a March trial of 48 alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Termez,
    the judge allegedly appointed the police investigator who developed the
    prosecution's case as the defense attorney for six of the defendants.
    Police allegedly tortured detained Imam Abduvakhid Yuldashhev on at
    least two occasions in August and September, to force him to sign
    statements refusing the services of defense attorneys.
        The Government typically held unannounced trials of large groups of
    those alleged to be extremists, and rarely let international observers
    attend. Human rights observers contended that these groupings of
    defendants were arbitrary, since the prosecution only occasionally
    argued that those on trial actually were connected to one another.
    Defendants often claimed that the confessions on which the prosecution
    typically based its cases were extracted by torture. Judges ignored
    these claims and invariably convicted the accused, handing down severe
    sentences--usually from 15 to 20 years' imprisonment. Torture and
    mistreatment of detainees are explicitly outlawed. Lawyers may, and
    occasionally do, call on judges to reject confessions thus extracted
    and to investigate claims of such treatment. There has been no report
    of a judge opening an investigation into claims of torture.
        In one such trial that ended on April 14 in Tashkent, 12 defendants
    were convicted of anti-State activity, belonging to illegal groups, and
    other charges. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 20 years, and
    eight more to 17 years. One defendant, Abdulaziz Mavlianov, an employee
    of the Tashkent office of the ICRC, allegedly confessed only to having
    given about $15 (10,000 soum) and some publicly available information
    to the main defendant, alleged Islamist activist Toirjon Abdusamatov.
    At his trial, Mavlianov renounced that confession, which he had never
    signed. Despite the relatively innocuous nature of the alleged
    activities that led to his conviction, he was sentenced to 17 years in
    prison.
        In practice most defense lawyers are unskilled at defending their
    clients. Courts often do not allow all defense witnesses to be heard,
    and written documents are given more weight than courtroom witnesses.
    In the March trial of Haffezullah Nosirov and 10 other alleged members
    of Hizb ut-Tahrir, defendants were convicted in part on the basis of
    written testimony from Bakhrom Abdullaev, an alleged terrorist who
    reportedly had been executed in January. Furthermore, the judge in the
    case refused the defense's request to question the other (living)
    witnesses whose written statements formed the remainder of the
    prosecution's case. In his retrial, Sattarov was sentenced to 10 years
    in prison, which was 1 year more than his original sentence.
        In November the Government staged a trial of 12 alleged
    conspirators in the 1999 Tashkent bombings, 9 of whom were being tried
    in absentia. Since the court made no formal effort to notify the
    defendants directly of the charges against them, the proceedings
    violated the International Convention on Civil and Political rights.
    Although the State appointed lawyers for the missing defendants, they
    put up only a token defense, lasting less than 3 hours after a 2-week
    prosecution case. Several of the lawyers stated openly that they were
    unable to defend their clients because they had no opportunity to
    consult with them. Two of the absent defendants, IMU leaders Tohir
    Yuldashev and Jumaboy Khojiev (a.k.a. Juma Namangani), were sentenced
    to death. Other defendants received sentences of between 12 and 20
    years in prison.
        The Constitution provides a right of appeal to those convicted;
    however, such proceedings usually are formalistic exercises that
    confirm the original conviction. For example, the appeal of Imam
    Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov on August 8 lasted only 20 minutes, and the
    judge did not permit testimony. Abdurakhmanov, who had been sentenced
    to 17 years in prison and reportedly was subjected to torture prior to
    trial, was not allowed to be present at the appeal. However, a judge in
    the Andijon regional court, after hearing an appeal in August, ordered
    a retrial of Kamoletdin Sattarov, on the grounds that he was not
    represented properly at the original trial earlier that month.
        Authorities arrested and tried unfairly relatives of suspects and
    members of opposition groups (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
        In April the Moscow-based human rights organization Memorial
    published a list of over 1,400 individuals arrested and convicted for
    political and religious reasons from January 1999 to April 2000 (see
    Section 2.c.). The organization credibly estimates that, including
    those it can document, a total of between 4,000 and 5,000 such persons
    have been imprisoned. While most were convicted of conspiracy against
    the constitutional order, many were convicted of nonpolitical offenses
    such as tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, or illegal possession
    of narcotics or firearms. It is widely believed that in the latter
    cases, arresting officers planted the incriminating materials.
        On September 5, the Chairman of the Supreme Court claimed that
    there were 2,000 persons in jail for crimes against the State. At the
    same news conference and again the following day, the Minister of
    Justice explicitly rejected the notion that these or any other
    prisoners could be classified as ``political,'' on the grounds that all
    had been tried and convicted of crimes. However, the fact that nearly
    all convictions are based on forced confessions makes it impossible to
    determine what percentage of those convicted actually violated the law.
    Moreover, the alleged ``crimes,'' as interpreted by the courts,
    encompass criticism of the Government and possession of religious
    beliefs that the Government defines as extremist. Therefore, most of
    those convicted of crimes against the State are political prisoners.
        In December the Government proposed a draft agreement with the ICRC
    allowing the ICRC access to all prisoners. The draft agreement was
    modeled after the ICRC's own proposals and met all ICRC conditions for
    undertaking a program of prison visits.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Authorities infringe on these rights. By law only a
    prosecutor may issue a search warrant or authorize electronic
    surveillance. There is no provision for a judicial review of such
    warrants. Security agencies routinely monitor telephone calls and
    employ surveillance and wiretaps in the cases of persons involved in
    opposition political activities.
        A Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and
    other legislation (see Section 2.c.) prohibits private teaching of
    religion. Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for
    wearing religious dress were not allowed to reenroll in 2000 (see
    Section 2.c.). Unlike in 1999, students were not arrested for wearing
    religious dress during this year.
        Police arrested, detained, and beat family members of suspects that
    they were seeking (see Sections 1.c and 1.d.). Authorities also
    frequently forced relatives of alleged religious extremists to undergo
    public humiliation at neighborhood assemblies organized for that
    purpose. For example, the mother of IMU leader Juma Namangani was
    summoned to a school auditorium in late August where an assembly of
    neighbors confronted her. Relatives of soldiers killed in the
    insurgency insulted her and smeared her face with black paint. Local
    leaders shamed her for bringing Namangani into the world until she
    tearfully apologized and cursed her son.
        Both the wife and mother of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov were
    forced to undergo similar public humiliation in February and March.
        The Government does not allow general distribution of foreign
    newspapers and other publications. However, two or three Russian
    newspapers and a variety of Russian tabloids and lifestyle publications
    are available. A modest selection of other foreign periodicals is
    available in Tashkent's major hotels, and authorized groups can obtain
    foreign periodicals through subscription. The authorities do not permit
    rebroadcast of Russian programming that is critical of the Government
    (see Section 2.a.).
        In May postal authorities confiscated a package addressed to human
    rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov. The package contained documents from
    a Moscow human rights conference as well as copies of the Erk Party
    newspaper. In the notice sent to Ardzinov, authorities claimed that the
    material was confiscated on the basis of a statute prohibiting the
    mailing of items of artistic or cultural significance.
        In March police confiscated six copies of the Uzbekistan chapter of
    the 1999 HRW World Report from a HRW representative who was observing
    the trial of the 12 men on trial for membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir (see
    Section 1.d.). According to an international NGO, the presiding judge
    at the trial characterized the distribution of the report as the
    clandestine distribution of leaflets. In November customs authorities
    confiscated several copies of the journal of the unregistered Birlik
    Democratic Movement that had been mailed to a private citizen. Customs
    claimed that the material was illegal and anticonstitutional. In the
    same month, Customs opened mail sent from HRW's New York office to its
    Tashkent office and confiscated several copies of a published list of
    political and religious prisoners in Uzbekistan compiled by the Moscow-
    based human rights organization Memorial. In explaining the
    confiscation, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told
    HRW that it took issue with the content of the Memorial report.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    ``freedom of thought, speech, and convictions''; however the Government
    continues to restrict these rights severely.
        A 1991 law against ``offending the honor and dignity of the
    President'' limits the ability to criticize the President. Ordinary
    citizens remain afraid to express views critical of the President and
    the Government in public. The 1998 Mass Media law formally provides for
    freedom of expression, protects the rights of journalists, and
    reiterates the constitutional ban on censorship. Nonetheless, several
    articles of the law, and the lack of due process provided for in their
    implementation, allow the Government to use the law to silence critics.
    The law established an interdepartmental government commission which
    issues licenses to approved media outlets. In May a new law changed the
    term of validity of these licenses from 1 year to 5 years, a move
    welcomed by those in the media. The interdepartmental commission is
    empowered to revoke licenses and close media outlets without a court
    judgment.
        According to the Mass Media Law, journalists are responsible for
    the accuracy of the information contained in their news stories,
    potentially subjecting them to prosecution. The law prohibits stories
    that incite religious confrontation and ethnic discord or advocate
    subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order (see Section 2.b.).
        The Constitution prohibits censorship; however, it is widely
    practiced and the Government tolerates little, if any, criticism of its
    actions. The last opposition newspaper to be published was that of the
    Erk Democratic Party, which has been banned within the country since
    1993 but is published sporadically abroad.
        There are no private publishing houses, and government approval is
    required for all publications. Newspapers are generally printed by
    state-owned printing houses, which refuse to print any edition that
    does not bear the prior approval of the Committee for the Protection of
    State Secrets. In these circumstances, journalists who want to ensure
    that their work is published practice self-censorship.
        In April authorities closed an independent Urgench newspaper,
    Panorama (circulation 500). Panorama's publisher, Konstantin Aksianov,
    had purchased his own presses and thus was able to produce and
    distribute the newspaper without censorship by the Committee for the
    Protection of State Secrets. However, private printing presses require
    licenses and in April, the State Press Committee, without explanation,
    revoked Panorama's license to print and warned other printers not to
    print the newspaper.
        Information remains very tightly controlled. The Uzbekistan
    Information Agency cooperates closely with the presidential staff to
    prepare and distribute all officially sanctioned news and information.
    Nearly all newspapers are organs of government ministries. Private
    persons and journalist collectives may not establish newspapers unless
    they meet the media law's standards for establishment of a ``mass media
    organ,'' including founders acceptable to the Government. A handful of
    private newspapers containing advertising, horoscopes, and similar
    features, but no news or editorial content, are allowed to operate
    without censorship. Limited numbers of foreign periodicals are
    available (see Section 1.f.).
        Four state-run channels that fully support the Government and its
    policies dominate television broadcasting. A cable television joint
    venture between the state broadcasting company and a foreign company
    broadcasts the Hong Kong-based Star television channels, including the
    BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Cable News Network world news, to Tashkent and
    a few other locations. Access to cable television is beyond the
    financial means of most citizens.
        There are between 30 and 40 privately owned local television
    stations and 3 privately owned radio stations. Generally, broadcasters
    practice self-censorship and enjoy some leeway in reporting critically
    on local government.
        The interdepartmental commission closed two television stations in
    1999. One of them was allowed to reopen in 2000. Officials claimed that
    the stations did not meet technical requirements for relicensing and
    that there was no political element to the closings. Foreign observers
    noted that the two were among the most independent in the country and
    interpreted the closings as a warning to other broadcasters to be
    careful of their content. Shukhrat Babajanov, the owner of ALC, a
    station in Urgench that has been prohibited from reopening,
    unsuccessfully sued the Government in February for damages resulting
    from the station's closing. He appealed and lost again in March. ALC
    had also lost its registration temporarily in 1997, allegedly for
    technical violations of regulations. It was believed widely at the time
    that the real reason for the 1997 closure was that the owner had been a
    member of the Erk political party in the early 1990s. Babajanov and his
    former employees were subjected to harassment and veiled threats by
    police during the summer.
        As these cases illustrate, enforcement of the registration and
    licensing requirements can be strict, and the Government's
    implementation of the media law does not function smoothly. Because the
    registration committee meets irregularly and because the annual re-
    registration requirement has only recently been revised, up to one half
    of independent television stations have been forced to operate with
    expired licenses, making them vulnerable to a government shut down.
    During the 1999 election season, owners reportedly believed that the
    Government was intentionally delaying re-registration in order to
    ensure that the stations broadcast nothing unfavorable. However, in
    2000 most owners reported that tensions between them and the Government
    eased substantially.
        Private radio and television broadcasters formed an independent
    professional association in 1998. The association resisted both
    generous incentives and heavy pressure from the Government to elect the
    Government's candidate as chairman. Government officials openly
    threatened members of the group and the opposition candidate who was
    elected. Since that time, the Government has arbitrarily denied the
    group's registration application on seven occasions, three during the
    last year. In one unsuccessful effort to win registration, the
    association even changed its name from ANESMI to MEDIA. Ministry of
    Justice officials reportedly advised the group privately that it never
    would be registered. The lack of registration effectively restricts
    MEDIA's ability to attract international funding and operate legally.
        Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America are not
    permitted to broadcast from within the country, despite the
    Government's 1992 contractual agreement to allow this activity. The
    Government allows both organizations to have correspondents in the
    country. The BBC World Service was required to broadcast on a very low
    FM frequency that most radios would not be able to receive, and then
    only after the BBC had agreed on paper to restrictions amounting to
    self-censorship. (However, observes agree that there is no evidence
    that the BBC actually engages in self-censorship.) The World Service is
    permitted to broadcast only 2 hours per day: Two 30-minute broadcasts
    per day in Uzbek, and two 30-minute broadcasts per day in Russian, 7
    days a week.
        Since February 1999, all Internet service providers have been
    required to route their connections through a state-run server. The
    avowed main purpose of this directive was to prevent the transmission
    of what the State considers to be harmful information, including
    material advocating or facilitating terrorism, material deemed hostile
    to the constitutional order, and pornography. By year's end, the
    Government had re-routed all but one provider, but did not yet possess
    the equipment and expertise necessary to complete implementation of the
    decree. The Government has issued regulations and taken technical steps
    to filter access to content that it considers objectionable. Despite
    these restrictions, the availability of Internet access has expanded as
    the number of service providers and Internet cafes have grown.
        The Government has granted academic institutions a degree of
    autonomy, but freedom of expression still is limited.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, it also states
    that the authorities have the right to suspend or ban rallies,
    meetings, and demonstrations on security grounds, and in practice the
    Government restricted the right of peaceful assembly. The Government
    must approve demonstrations but does not grant permits to demonstrators
    routinely. In November 1999, a group of 30 to 40 veiled Muslim women
    gathered in front of the office of the Tashkent hokim (local governor)
    to protest the incarceration of their relatives. The police ordered
    them to disperse after refusing their request to meet with the hokim.
    Some members of the group report that they have been under intermittent
    surveillance since that time. In August shopkeepers at a Tashkent
    bazaar spontaneously took to the streets to protest a rise in rental
    fees set by the Government. Police responded to contain the crowd, but
    no violence was reported.
        The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of association;
    however the Government restricts the exercise of this right. The
    Government refuses to register opposition political parties and
    movements. The Constitution places broad limitations on the types of
    groups that may form and requires that all organizations be registered
    formally with the Government in accordance with procedures prescribed
    by law. A 1996 analysis by foreign legal observers concluded that,
    while the Law on Political Parties provides theoretical protections for
    minority parties and permits a wide range of fund raising, it also
    gives the Ministry of Justice broad powers to interfere with parties
    and to withhold financial and legal support to those opposed to the
    Government. There are no registered opposition parties (see Section 3).
        In the early 1990's, the Government repeatedly denied the attempts
    by the Birlik Movement and Erk Party to register. Harassment by
    security forces drove the leaders of these organizations into voluntary
    exile. These organizations made no attempt to register during the year,
    reportedly because their remaining adherents were afraid of government
    reprisals.
        The Constitution and a 1991 amendment to the law on political
    parties ban parties of an ethnic or religious nature. Authorities cited
    these statutes in denying registration to the Islamic Renaissance Party
    (IRP) in 1992. In the early 1990's, opposition activists announced the
    formation of the religious Adolat-True Path Party but never pursued
    formal registration, claiming that their members were afraid of
    government reprisals. Leaders and members of these parties, denied a
    voice in the political process and forced to flee repression, now form
    the core of the IMU, which launched an armed insurgency in Uzbekistan
    and neighboring countries during the year.
        The Law on Public Associations as well as the Law on Political
    Parties prohibits registration of organizations whose purpose includes
    subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order, as well as
    organizations whose names already are registered. In the past,
    officials have used the latter provision to block human rights NGO's
    and independent political parties from registering by creating another
    NGO or party with the identical name.
        The Government has refused to register the two principal
    independent human rights organizations. The Human Rights Society of
    Uzbekistan sought registration unsuccessfully four times between 1992
    and 1996. During the year, authorities refused to approve a visa to
    permit the HRSU's leader-in-exile to return to the country and to
    preside over a new founding convention, the required first step for a
    new registration application. In April authorities refused permission
    for the HRSU to host an international human rights conference in
    Tashkent (see Section 4).
        The Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU),
    headed by longtime human rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov, held its
    founding convention and filed registration papers in 1997, but the
    Government has not yet formally approved or denied the application. In
    both cases, the Government claims that the registration applications
    were not made properly and need to be resubmitted. Neither the HRSU nor
    the IHROU resubmitted applications during the year; there was no
    indication that they would be registered. The Government's repeated
    refusals to register these organizations appear politically motivated.
    The Government has approved the registration of only one human rights
    NGO, the Committee for Protection of Individual Rights, which was
    formed with government support in 1996.
        The process for government registration of NGO's and other public
    associations is also difficult and time-consuming, with many
    opportunities for obstruction. Although unregistered organizations
    often can disseminate literature, hold meetings, and use letterhead
    stationery without government interference, they do not exist as legal
    entities and have no real access to the media or government.
        A law on nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations passed in
    April 1999 provides a relatively benign legal framework for their
    registration and functioning. In particular the requirements for
    registration are simpler than they had been under previous legislation.
    However, the law contains several vaguely worded provisions that, in
    practice, may result in arbitrary enforcement of decisions harmful to
    NGO's. The real effect of the law depends on the implementing
    regulations, which had not yet been promulgated more than 1.5 years
    after passage of the law.
        Nonpolitical associations and social organizations usually may
    register, although complicated rules and a cumbersome government
    bureaucracy often make the process difficult. Some evangelical
    Christian churches (see Section 2.c.) found it difficult to obtain
    registration.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion and for the principle of separation of church and state;
    however, in practice the Government only partially respects these
    rights. The Government perceives unofficial Islamic activity as an
    extremist security threat and outlaws it. During the year, the
    Government arrested hundreds if not thousands of members of such groups
    and sentenced them to between 15 and 20 years in jail. The Government
    permits persons affiliated with mainstream religions, including
    approved Muslim groups, Jewish groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and
    various other denominations, such as Catholics and Lutherans, to
    worship freely and generally registers more recently arrived religions.
    However, the religion law forbids or severely restricts activities such
    as proselytizing and importing and disseminating religious literature.
        The Government is secular and there is no official state religion.
    Although the laws treat all religious confessions equally, the
    Government shows its support for the country's Muslim heritage by
    funding an Islamic university and subsidizing citizens' participation
    in the Hajj. The Government promotes a moderate version of Islam
    through the control and financing of the Spiritual Directorate for
    Muslims (the Muftiate), which in turn controls the Islamic hierarchy,
    the content of imams' sermons, and the volume and substance of
    published Islamic materials.
        In May 1998, the Parliament passed two laws that restrict religious
    activity. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations
    provides for freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution,
    separation of church and state, and the right to establish schools and
    train clergy. However, the law also severely limits religious activity.
    It restricts religious rights that are judged to be in conflict with
    national security, prohibits proselytizing, bans religious subjects in
    public schools, prohibits private teaching of religious principles,
    forbids the wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other
    than clerics, and requires religious groups to obtain a license to
    publish or distribute materials.
        The second legislative change enacted in May 1998 consisted of a
    series of revisions to the Criminal and Civil Codes that stiffened the
    penalties for violating the religion law and other statutes on
    religious activities. It provided for punishments for activities such
    as organizing a banned religious group, persuading others to join such
    a group, and drawing minors into a religious organization without the
    permission of their parents.
        The Criminal Code was amended again in May 1999 with two changes
    that affected religious freedom. The changes draw a distinction between
    ``illegal'' groups, which are those that are not registered properly,
    and ``prohibited'' groups, which are banned altogether. The first
    measure makes it a criminal offense punishable by up to 5 years in
    prison to organize an illegal religious group or to resume the
    activities of such a group (presumably after being denied registration
    or being ordered to disband). Furthermore, the measure punishes any
    participation in such a group by up to 3 years in prison. The second
    measure sets out penalties of up to 20 years in prison and confiscation
    of property for ``organizing or participating'' in the activities of
    religious extremist, fundamentalist, separatist, or other prohibited
    groups. In practice, the courts ignore the theoretical distinction and
    frequently convict members of disapproved Muslim groups under both
    statutes.
        The Religion Law requires all religious groups and congregations to
    register and provides strict and burdensome criteria for their
    registration. In particular it stipulates that each group present a
    list of at least 100 Uzbek citizen members (compared with the previous
    minimum of 10) to the local branches of the Ministry of Justice. This
    provision enables the Government to ban any group simply by denying its
    registration petition. Government officials designed the law to target
    Muslims who worship outside the system of state-organized mosques. A
    special commission created in August 1998 may grant exemptions to the
    religious law's strict requirements and register groups that have not
    been registered by local officials. The commission has granted
    exemptions to 51 such groups, including congregations with fewer than
    100 Uzbek members. However, no formal procedures or criteria have been
    established to bring a case before this commission.
        In a February 29 roundtable on religious freedom, Government
    officials (from the Committee on Religious Affairs, Parliament, and the
    National Center for Human Rights) called for clarifications that would
    bring religion law and practice into line with the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and on May 25 President Karimov
    suggested that the Parliament consider improvements to the religion
    law. However, no action was taken by year's end.
        In August an expert from the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
    Racial Discrimination noted the serious restrictions on freedom of
    religion in Uzbekistan, targeting primarily Muslims worshipping outside
    the state-organized mosques.
        Christian churches generally are tolerated as long as they do not
    attempt to win converts among ethnic Uzbeks. Christians who are ethnic
    Uzbeks are secretive about their faith and rarely attempt to register
    their organizations. Christian congregations that are of mixed ethnic
    background are reluctant to list their Uzbek members on registration
    lists due to fear of incurring official displeasure. Since the law
    prohibits participation in unregistered groups, some minority churches
    have not submitted registration applications because they know that
    they are unable to comply with the law's requirements and prefer not to
    identify themselves to the authorities. Although church leaders cite
    high registration fees and the 100-member rule as obstacles to
    registration, the most frequent problem is the lack of an approved
    legal address, which is required in order to submit an application.
    Some groups have been reluctant to invest in the purchase of a property
    without assurance that the registration would be approved. Others claim
    that local officials arbitrarily withhold approval of the addresses
    because they oppose the existence of Christian churches with ethnic
    Uzbek members.
        In August 1999, the central Government undertook to register
    minority religious groups whose applications had been blocked by local
    officials. Twenty churches received their registration immediately, and
    most new applications since that time have been approved; however,
    there have been exceptions. A Baptist congregation in Gazalkent
    attempted to register unsuccessfully throughout the year.
    Representatives of the group claimed that local officials were blocking
    its registration. The deputy mayor of Gazalkent allegedly told church
    leaders at one point that its application might be approved if it
    removed from its membership list all names of ethnic Uzbek origin.
    Another Baptist congregation in Guliston was denied registration in
    December ostensibly on the grounds that its proposed church was in a
    residential area. Although two Jehovah's Witness congregations are
    registered, eight others that have attempted to register during the
    last year were unsuccessful. Church officials believe that the fact
    that many members of these groups are Uzbek nationals is at the root of
    the bureaucratic obstructionism that they are facing. The Committee on
    Religious Affairs (CRA) denied the Greater Grace Christian Church of
    Samarkand permission to have a Finnish, rather than Uzbek, pastor. The
    church's application for registration was therefore blocked until this
    issue is resolved. The Tashkent International Protestant Church was
    denied registration because its members were not Uzbek citizens.
    However, the CRA gave permission for the church to meet and hold
    services. The church has appealed to the Presidential Commission on the
    Implementation of the Religion Law, which has authority to grant
    exceptions to the requirements of the law. By year's end, the
    Commission had not met.
        At year's end, the Government had registered 1,979 religious
    congregations and organizations, 1,805 of which were Muslim. The 174
    registered minority religious groups include 47 Korean Christian, 32
    Russian Orthodox, 30 Pentecostal (``full gospel''), 23 Baptist, 10
    Seventh-Day Adventist, 8 Jewish (1 Ashkenazy, 6 Bukharan, 1 mixed), 7
    Baha'i, 4 Lutheran, 3 Roman Catholic, 2 Jehovah's Witnesses, and 2
    Krishna Consciousness groups. Several of these congregations had fewer
    than the required 100 members but received exemptions from the
    requirement. An additional 335 applications had been denied, 323 of
    which were from Muslim groups. The number of mosques has increased
    significantly from the 80 or so permitted in the entire Soviet Union to
    1,800 registered currently, but has decreased from the 4,000 or more
    that opened after the country gained independence and before
    registration procedures were in place.
        Authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups, but often
    harass those that openly try to convert Muslims to Christianity. Police
    occasionally have broken up meetings of unregistered groups. Leaders of
    such groups have been assessed fines or even imprisoned. In August
    police allegedly detained a group of unregistered Baptists meeting in a
    private apartment in Chirchik for 2 days, during which police allegedly
    beat them. After a similar incident in October 1999 in Karshi, the
    Committee on Religious Affairs claimed that it took steps to ensure
    that police allow such Baptist congregations, which consider
    registration to be inconsistent with their religious beliefs, to meet
    undisturbed for worship.
        In July police in Nukus, Karakalpakstan, arrested Nikolai
    Rodzinski, pastor of a small unregistered Baptist group, after
    allegedly planting narcotics in his bicycle pack; he was released in
    late September. Rodzinski came to the attention of the police because
    members of his congregation participated in a summer youth camp
    sponsored by the registered Korean Christian church ``Mir.'' Karakalpak
    authorities closed the camp in July and in August ordered Pastor
    Vladimir Kim to close his church, on the grounds that the camp had
    taught religion to minors without parental consent, a violation of the
    religion law. Kim maintains that all parents had signed consent forms.
        The Nukus Full Gospel Church has not reopened since the August 1999
    presidential pardon of Pastor Rashid Turibayev, who had been imprisoned
    on religious and falsified narcotics charges. Nukus authorities have
    not returned the property confiscated in 1999 after Turibayev and two
    associates were convicted, and have not returned title to the church
    building to the Full Gospel Church headquarters in Tashkent. Local
    observers claim that after their release, the three were subjected to
    regular police harassment. Turibayev now lives in Kazakhstan where he
    is preaching to a Full Gospel congregation.
        Central government officials, as well as many Christian leaders,
    view these and other incidents of harassment as isolated cases of local
    officials misapplying the law.
        The Government's most serious abuses of the right to religious
    freedom were committed against Muslims. The Government's campaign
    against independent Muslim groups, begun in the early 1990's, resulted
    in numerous serious human rights abuses during the period covered by
    this report. The campaign has been directed at three types of Muslims:
    Alleged Wahhabists, including those educated at medrassas (schools)
    abroad and followers of missing imams Nazarov of Tashkent and Mirzaev
    of Andijon; those suspected of being involved in the 1999 Tashkent
    bombings or of being involved with the IMU, whose roots are in
    Namangan; and suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir throughout the
    country.
        The line between the so-called Wahhabists and those suspected of
    being involved in the 1999 bombings and the IMU insurgency in 2000 is
    not always apparent, even to an unbiased observer. Both Wahhabism and
    the IMU stem from the growth of independent Islam that the Government
    has sought to suppress since the early 1990's. Based on the court
    record, the distinction is that the Government considers the Wahhabists
    to be extremists and potential terrorists and those suspected of
    involvement in the bombings to be active terrorists. The Government
    does not consider repression of these groups to be a matter of
    religious freedom, but instead to be directed against those who oppose
    and even may take up arms against the political order. However,
    authorities are highly suspicious of those who are more pious than is
    the norm, including frequent mosque attendees, bearded men, and veiled
    women. In practice this approach results in abuses against many devout
    Muslims for their religious beliefs.
        On September 5, President Karimov signed a decree promising full
    amnesty to repentant Uzbek citizens who have joined ``terrorist groups
    under the influence of religious extremists'' abroad, but who have not
    participated in the insurgency.
        Following both the December 1997 murder of police officials in
    Namangan and the February 1999 terrorist bombings in Tashkent, police
    detained hundreds and perhaps thousands of suspected Wahhabists. The
    majority of those detained were released after questioning and
    detention that lasted as long as 2 months. The police routinely planted
    narcotics, ammunition, and, beginning in 1999, religious leaflets, on
    citizens to justify their arrest.
        To determine whom to arrest, the Government used the local mahalla
    (neighborhood) committees as a source of information. Shortly after the
    February 1999 Tashkent bombings, President Karimov directed that each
    committee assign a ``defender of the people,'' whose job it was to
    assure that young persons in the neighborhoods were not joining
    independent Islamic groups. The committees identified for police those
    residents who appeared suspicious. In an interview with the Associated
    Press in September, an official of the Committee on Religious Affairs
    said that the mahallas had identified 10,700 persons with extremist
    tendencies. Asked how mahalla officials know who is an extremist, the
    official replied ``you can see it in their eyes.'' Human rights
    observers noted that in practice the committees often perceived as
    suspicious those same individuals who already had been detained by the
    police in the wake of either the 1997 murders of officials in Namangan
    or the 1999 Tashkent bombings, and who subsequently had been released
    because there was no evidence against them. There were dozens of cases
    involving persons who previously had been detained and released who
    were rearrested and tried during the year.
        The absence of a free press and the rarity of public trials make it
    impossible to determine how many persons have been incarcerated.
    Nonetheless, the Moscow-based human rights organization, Memorial, has
    compiled a list of over 1,400 documented cases of persons allegedly
    imprisoned for political and religious reasons from January 1999 to
    April 2000 (see Section 1.e.). Memorial estimated that the total number
    of such prisoners was between 4,000 and 5,000. Human Rights observers
    estimate credibly that from 30 to 50 persons were convicted for alleged
    Islamic extremism each week during the reporting period. The number of
    those in pretrial detention is unknown but is probably several hundred.
    Nearly all those listed were accused of being Muslim extremists. By the
    end of June of this year, the Government had convicted 128 persons for
    direct involvement in the bombing plot. Of these, at least 18 received
    death sentences, most of which reportedly have been carried out.
        Pavlonazar Khodjaev was sentenced to death in May for allegedly
    having links to the IMU and helping plan a terrorist action near
    Yangiabad. Khodjaev's father had been imprisoned in 1999, according to
    human rights activists, because of his refusal to divulge to
    authorities the whereabouts of Pavlonazar and another of his sons. The
    elder Khodjaev was beaten to death in Jaslik prison in July 1999.
        Abdurakhim Abdurakhmanov, an independent Tashkent imam and follower
    of Imam Nazarov, was arrested on or about April 27. The Government held
    him in incommunicado and did not inform his family of his whereabouts.
    Abdurakhmanov had been fired from his job as leader of the Kokoldash
    Madrassa in 1996 and was arrested, severely beaten, and imprisoned
    briefly in 1998 after police claimed to have found narcotics and a
    false passport on him. After the recent arrest, officials questioned
    his wife and sister-in-law, accusing them of Wahhabism. He was
    convicted in July and sentenced to 17 years in prison. At his trial he
    claimed that he was tortured.
        A leading independent Muslim cleric, Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, has
    been missing since March 1998, when dozens of police and security
    agents raided and searched his home. Although his family claims that
    the security services abducted him, the Government and many observers
    believe that he fled to avoid arrest.
        There was one new development in the October 1999 release of
    leading Islamic figure Imam Abduvakhid Yuldashev, who was rearrested on
    July 23. Since his arrest he allegedly has been mistreated severely. He
    was held incommunicado for some 6 months and was twice beaten into
    signing documents refusing counsel. Another Islamic activist, Abdurauf
    Gafurov, remains free after his 1999 release.
        There were no reported developments in the 1995 disappearance of
    Imam Abduvali Kori Mirzaev or the 1997 disappearance of his assistant,
    Nematjon Parpiev; or the 1992 disappearance of Abdullah Utaev, leader
    of the outlawed Islamic Renaissance Party.
        Several persons arrested for religious reasons apparently died from
    mistreatment in custody (see section 1.a.).
        Students who in 1997 and 1998 were expelled from schools for
    wearing religious dress were not allowed to re-enroll in 2000 (see
    Section 1.f.).
        Synagogues function openly; Hebrew education (long banned under the
    Soviets), Jewish cultural events, and the publication of a community
    newspaper take place undisturbed.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for free
    movement within the country and across its borders, and the Government
    generally respected these rights; however, at times it limited this
    right. Citizens must have permission from local authorities in order to
    resettle in a new city. The Government rarely grants this permission to
    those who wish to move to Tashkent. The Government requires citizens to
    obtain exit visas for foreign travel or emigration, but grants these
    permits routinely. All citizens have a right to a passport, and the
    Government does not restrict this right. The new passports serve as
    both internal identity cards and, when properly certified, as external
    passports. Every citizen must carry such a document when traveling
    inside or outside the country. Police occasionally confiscate these
    documents, severely restricting a person's right to travel.
        Movement within the country of foreigners with valid visas
    generally is unrestricted. However, in mid-year, mountainous regions in
    the South and East of the country were closed to traffic because of the
    IMU insurgency. Visitors require special permission to travel to
    certain areas, such as Termez, on the Afghan border.
        Several Uzbek human rights activists were able to leave and reenter
    the country without encountering problems from the Government. The
    Government has not returned the passport of human rights activist
    Mikhail Ardzinov which police had confiscated in June of 1999. This
    restricted his freedom of movement within the country and prevented him
    from attending international conferences.
        The law on citizenship stipulates that citizens do not lose their
    citizenship if they reside overseas. However, since Uzbekistan does not
    provide for dual citizenship, those acquiring other citizenship lose
    Uzbek citizenship. In practice the burden is on returning individuals
    to prove to authorities that they have not acquired foreign citizenship
    while abroad. There were reports during the year that some ethnic
    Russians attempting to return after residing abroad were denied
    residence permits and new passports.
        There is no law concerning the rights of refugees and asylum
    seekers, and the Government does not recognize the right of first
    asylum. The Government does not adhere to the 1951 Convention Relating
    to the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
    considers asylum seekers from Tajikistan and Afghanistan to be economic
    migrants, and such individuals are subject to harassment and bribe
    demands when seeking to regularize their status. They may be deported
    if their residency documents are not in order. However, the Government
    agreed in August 1999 that it would not force those who have received
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate refugee status to
    leave the country. The UNHCR reports that the policy appears to be
    working, and that police rarely harass mandate refugees.
        The population includes ethnic Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, Germans,
    Greeks, and Crimean Tartars deported to Central Asia by Stalin during
    World War II. These groups enjoy the same rights as other citizens.
    Although they are free to return to their ancestral homelands,
    absorption problems in those countries have slowed that return.
    Although there are no official statistics, observers including the
    UNHCR estimate that there are 30,000 Tajik and 8,000 Afghan refugees in
    the country. As of December 31, there were 1,351 UNHCR mandate
    refugees, with roughly 450 cases pending decision. According to the
    UNHCR there were no cases of forced repatriation of persons to a
    country where they feared persecution.
        During the August conflict with the IMU, the Government ordered the
    evacuation of least five villages in the Surkhandarya region near the
    border with Tajikistan. After spending 2 months in a temporary camp,
    the villagers were transferred in November to a newly constructed
    settlement over 200 kilometers away. Conditions in the settlement are
    reportedly extremely poor and residents are suffering from a shortage
    of food. Several of the residents have told international observers
    that police have detained and beaten most of the men in an effort to
    find those who may have collaborated with the IMU. Estimates of the
    number in police detention at year's end ranged from 39 to over 120.
    One resident, Hazratkul Kodirov, died in late December, according to
    his brother, from injuries sustained during interrogation (see Section
    1.a.).
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        While the Constitution provides for this right, in reality citizens
    cannot change their government through peaceful and democratic means.
    The Government severely represses opposition groups and individuals and
    applies strict limits on freedom of expression. No opposition groups
    participated in government or were allowed to function legally.
        The Government is highly centralized and is ruled by a strong
    presidency. President Karimov, formerly the first secretary of the
    Communist Party in Uzbekistan under Soviet rule, was elected in a
    limited multicandidate election in 1991. A 1995 Sovietstyle referendum
    and subsequent parliamentary decision extended Karimov's first term
    until 2000. He was reelected in January to a second term with 92.5
    percent of the vote. Karimov's opponent, Abdulhafiz Jalalov ran a token
    campaign, and admitted on election day that he himself had voted for
    Karimov. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
    declined to monitor the presidential election on the grounds that the
    preconditions did not exist for it to be free and fair.
        President Karimov and the executive branch retain control through
    sweeping decree powers, primary authority for drafting legislation, and
    control of virtually all government appointments, most aspects of the
    economy, and the security forces.
        Most government officials are members of the People's Democratic
    Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), formerly the Communist Party and still the
    country's largest party. However, the party as such does not appear to
    play a significant role in the Government, and the President resigned
    his chairmanship of the party in 1996. There are four other parties;
    however, these were created with government assistance and are loyal to
    President Karimov. All five parties participated in the December 1999
    elections to the Oliy Majlis, during which 93 percent of the electorate
    reportedly cast their vote. However, parties that competed in the
    parliamentary elections, as well as the numerous independent
    candidates, were congenial to the Government and did not represent a
    real choice for voters.
        Because the voters lacked a choice, the OSCE and many international
    observers concluded that the December 1999 legislative elections fell
    short of adherence to accepted standards of free and fair elections.
    Local and regional hokims (governors)--who are appointed by the
    president--exerted a strong influence on the selection of candidates
    and the conduct of campaigns. Nearly half (110 out of 250) of those
    elected were not from party lists but were either hokims themselves or
    were nominated by the hokims' local assemblies. Only 16 of the 250
    winning candidates had been nominated by citizens' initiative groups.
    These candidates generally were allowed on the ballot only if the
    hokims approved them.
        The Oliy Majlis is constitutionally the highest government body. In
    practice, despite assistance efforts by international donors to upgrade
    its ability to draft laws independently, its main purpose is to confirm
    laws and other decisions drafted by the executive branch rather than to
    initiate legislation.
        New laws governing the conduct of parliamentary and presidential
    elections, as well as a law creating a Central Election Commission,
    came into effect in 1998. These laws, combined with the 1997 law on
    political parties, make it extremely difficult for opposition parties
    to come into being, to nominate candidates, and to campaign. The
    procedures to register a candidate are burdensome and the Central
    Election Commission has authority to deny registration. For example, a
    presidential candidate is prohibited from campaigning before being
    registered, but must present a list of 150,000 signatures in order to
    be registered. The Central Election Commission must deny registration
    of presidential candidates who are found to ``harm the health and
    morality of the people.'' The 1998 statutes deleted a previous
    provision allowing recourse to the Supreme Court to candidates whose
    parties are denied registration. The Ministry of Justice has the right
    to suspend parties for up to 6 months without a court order.
        Citizens initiative groups of 100 members or more may nominate
    candidates to the Parliament by submitting signatures of at least 8
    percent of the voters in the electoral district. Other interest groups
    are forbidden from participating in campaigns and candidates may meet
    with voters only in forums organized by precinct election commissions.
    The 1998 laws repeal the right of parties to fund their candidates'
    campaigns directly. Instead, parties must turn over all campaign money
    to the Central Election Commission, which then distributes the funds
    equally among the candidates. Only the Central Election Commission may
    prepare and release presidential campaign posters. In August 1999, the
    Parliament enacted minor modifications to the election laws, but these
    have had little practical effect.
        According to the Law on Political Parties, judges, public
    prosecutors, NSS officials, servicemen, foreign citizens, and stateless
    persons (among others) cannot join political parties. By law the
    Government prohibits formation of parties based on religion or
    nationality; those that oppose the sovereignty, integrity and security
    of the country and the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens;
    or those that promote war, or social, national, or religious hostility.
    Political organizations that seek to overthrow the Government, or sow
    national or racial hatred, are prohibited. Moreover, the Government has
    refused to register democratic political opposition organizations.
    Membership in unregistered political organizations is not forbidden
    officially, but membership in unregistered organizations with a
    prohibited goal or premise is forbidden.
        The Government continues to persecute members of unregistered,
    political opposition groups using such methods as arbitrary arrest,
    conviction on falsified charges, surveillance, and loss of employment.
    The leaders of the two largest unregistered opposition groups in the
    country--Mohammed Solikh of the Erk Democratic Party and Abdurakhim
    Polat of the Birlik Democratic Movement--were forced into exile in the
    early 1990's. After the February 1999 Tashkent bombings, persecution of
    members of these groups intensified. The Government repeatedly has
    accused Erk leader Solikh, who ran against Karimov for the presidency
    in 1992, of being a leader of the terrorist plot behind the bombings.
    Solikh was 1 of the 9 defendants-in-absentia in the November show trial
    of 12 alleged bombing conspirators. He was convicted and sentenced to
    15.5 years in prison. Two of Solikh's brothers (Rashid and Muhammed
    Bekhjanov) were imprisoned since soon after the bombings and were
    convicted on political charges in August 1999, along with noted poet
    and former Solikh associate Mamadali Makhmudov and another defendant
    affiliated with the Birlik party.
        Dozens of Erk and Birlik activists reported that after the bombings
    they were subjected to various forms of harassment: Frequent
    surveillance; restrictions on movement; searches of their homes;
    lengthy police interrogations; and, occasionally, detentions.
        Traditionally, women participate much less than men in government
    and politics, and are underrepresented in these areas. There are 17
    female deputies in the 250-member Parliament. There are 2 women (both
    with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister) among 28 members of the
    Cabinet; 1 is charged specifically with women's issues.
        There are nine ethnic Russians or Ukrainians, six Karakalpaks,
    three Kazakhs, one Korean, and one Armenian in the Parliament.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government restricts and harasses local NGO's working on human
    rights and refuses to register the country's two main human rights
    organizations. Both the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister
    of Justice accused publicly both local and international human rights
    organizations of giving support to the country's enemies.
        In the verdict in the case of Kamoletdin Sattarov in Andijon in
    July, the court ordered destroyed 17 individual appeal forms from the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights that police had found in
    Sattarov's home on February 3. Uzbek citizens exercising their right to
    free speech had filled out six of these forms; eleven were blank. The
    prosecution treated the forms, as well as two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets,
    as evidence of Sattarov's antistate activities. He was sentenced to 9
    years in prison. Upon appeal in August, the regional court voided the
    verdict of the Andijon court and ordered a new trial. In his retrial,
    Sattarov was sentenced to 10 years in prison, 1 year more than his
    original sentence. However, the judge ordered that the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Human Rights forms be returned to Sattarov's family.
    Sattarov's appeal of this verdict summarily reconfirmed the new
    sentence in December.
        Security forces continue to harass and abuse human rights
    activists. The chairman of the HRSU, Abdumannob Polat, lives in
    voluntary exile. Neither the IHROU nor the HRSU resubmitted
    applications to register during the year. However, HRSU's attempt to
    hold a congress of its members, required in order to submit a new
    registration application, was blocked by local officials on December 22
    (see Section 2.b.)
        On December 21, President Karimov pardoned and released Mahbuba
    Kasimova, an IHROU human rights activist and member of the Birlik
    Democratic Movement. Kasimova, who had been sentenced to 5 years in
    prison in a 3-hour trial in July 1999, had received international
    attention as a political prisoner. There were no developments in the
    case of Ismail Adilov, another IHROU activist who was imprisoned in
    1999 on charges widely believed to be fabricated.
        One international human rights group, HRW, has permission to
    operate in the country and has had an office in Tashkent since 1996.
    The group operates independently and has no affiliation with the
    Government.
        The Government registered one human rights NGO in 1996. The
    registered NGO, the Committee for Protection of the Rights of
    Individuals, was formed with the support of the Government but also has
    ties to opposition figures. Some sources affiliated with other groups
    have questioned its independence from the Government. The organization
    acts as the Uzbek affiliate of the International Society for Human
    Rights based in Germany.
        Since 1997 there has been a human rights Ombudsman's office
    affiliated with the Parliament. The Ombudsman may make recommendations
    to modify or uphold decisions of state agencies, but the
    recommendations are not binding. The Ombudsman is prohibited from
    investigating disputes within the purview of courts. The Ombudsman
    replaced the parliamentary human rights commissioner, who had
    insufficient trained staff to carry out in-depth investigations of
    human rights violations and did not vigorously pursue allegations
    against the police and security forces. The office of the Ombudsman
    increased its staff and received authorization to open regional offices
    throughout the country. The Ombudsman issues reports identifying the
    most serious types of violations of human rights by government
    officials. The office claims that it has assisted hundreds of citizens
    in redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve
    allegedly unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police
    and local officials. Most of the successfully resolved cases appear
    relatively minor. In February the current Ombudsman, Sayora Rashidova,
    sponsored a roundtable to discuss problems with the country's religion
    law. Non-state attendees included the mufti, the Russian Orthodox
    Church, academics, an international NGO, the OSCE, and various
    diplomatic missions.
        The National Human Rights Center of Uzbekistan, created by
    presidential decree in 1996, has as its purpose to educate the
    population and government officials about the principles of human
    rights and democracy. The center's chief activity is to hold seminars
    and training, and it is not involved in human rights advocacy. The
    center has worked closely with international organizations such as the
    UNDP and the OSCE.
        The Government is willing to discuss human rights matters with
    organizations such as the OSCE, as well as with foreign embassies. The
    UN has not sent human rights commission members or special rapporteurs
    to the country. The Government is generally willing to hold an open
    dialog with international human rights NGO's, and held several high-
    level discussions with representatives of HRW during 1999.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language or Social Status
        Both the Constitution and the 1992 law on citizenship prohibit
    discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, language, or social
    status; however, societal discrimination against women persists.
        Women.--Spousal abuse is common, but both local activists and the
    police say they have no statistics on the issue. At a September 1999
    seminar on domestic violence, representatives of NGO's with crisis
    centers reported that the number of women seeking assistance is growing
    rapidly. Wife beating is considered a personal family affair rather
    than a criminal act, and thus such cases usually are handled by family
    members or elders within the community (mahalla) and rarely come to
    court.
        In December a U.S.-based NGO, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights,
    released a major study on Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan. While the
    lack of reporting prevented the authors from determining the number of
    cases annually, the study concluded that domestic violence is
    widespread and that the Government has failed to combat or even
    acknowledge the problem. Another U.S.-based NGO, Winrock International,
    which helps develop women's organizations in Uzbekistan, agreed with
    the conclusions of the study but noted that public officials were
    willing to speak openly about the problem of domestic violence in
    Uzbekistan.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution occurs,
    particularly to the Persian Gulf, Turkey and South Korea (see Section
    6.f.). Prostitution within the country is a growing problem stemming
    from the worsening economic situation.
        Due to tradition, women, particularly in rural areas, usually marry
    before age 20, bear many children, and confine their activities to
    within the family. In rural areas, women often find themselves working
    in the cotton fields during the harvest season. However, women are not
    impeded formally from seeking a role in the workplace. The barriers to
    equality for women are cultural, not legal, and women who open
    businesses or seek careers are not hindered legally.
        Although the law prohibits discrimination against women,
    traditional cultural and religious practices limit their role in
    everyday society. For these reasons, women are underrepresented
    severely in high-level positions. In 1995 President Karimov issued a
    decree on measures to increase the role of women in society,
    particularly extending their participation in state and social
    administration and coordinating the activities of ministries and social
    organizations as they relate to women's issues. In this connection, a
    deputy prime minister position was created in 1995 charged with
    furthering the role of women in society. This cabinet level official is
    also head of the National Women's Committee. The edict also mandated
    the formation of regional women's committees throughout the country,
    headed by government-appointed officials. In September the National
    Women's Committee sponsored a meeting commemorating the fifth
    anniversary of the Beijing Conference. According to NGO participants at
    this meeting, the Government for the first time showed a willingness to
    work together with NGO's on a common plan of action.
        The President declared 1999 to be the ``year of the woman.'' In
    April 1999 the Government promulgated a law extending additional rights
    to women; it reduced the workweek to 35 hours for female employees of
    the State and reduced the optional retirement age for women to 54 years
    (after 20 years of employment). Government-sponsored activities also
    included a series of seminars, newspaper articles, public service
    announcements, and television programs that increased awareness of
    women's issues.
        Several dozen NGO's address the needs of women. For example, the
    Businesswomen's Association in Tashkent, in addition to providing
    resources and information about developing small enterprises, operates
    a store that sells clothing and crafts. A center in Tashkent conducts
    seminars on sexual harassment, domestic violence, and the legal rights
    of women. Another center in Samarkand operates a crisis hot line and
    provides educational services on alcoholism, sexually transmitted
    diseases, and family counseling.
        In parts of the country, some women and girls resort to suicide by
    self-immolation. There are no reliable statistics on the extent of this
    problem, since most cases go unreported. However, representatives of
    women's groups continue to observe an increase in self-immolation.
    After marriage many women or girls move into the husband's home, where
    they occupy the lowest rung on the family social ladder. A conflict
    with the husband or mother-in-law, who by tradition exercises complete
    control over the young bride, usually is the stimulus for suicide.
        A 1997 research study indicated that the number of women enrolling
    in higher education was diminishing; for example, women's enrollment in
    the finance and banking institute dropped from 65 percent in 1991 to
    about 25 percent in 1997. Cutbacks in government funding to
    universities and the need for families to fund a higher percentage of
    educational costs leaves many families in the position of being able to
    fund the education of only one child, either a son or a daughter. The
    report stated that university faculty ``steer'' women into occupations
    traditionally performed by females and suggested that administrators
    may practice a policy of deliberately barring entrance to women in some
    fields.
        Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, stating
    that parents are obliged to support and care for their children until
    they reach majority at age 18. Traditional Uzbek values reinforce the
    cohesion of families; in most cases, several generations of a family
    live together. In theory the State provides free universal primary
    education and health care; however, in practice shortages and budget
    difficulties mean that some services must be paid for privately. The
    State grants monetary allowances to families based on their number of
    children. The country has a very high birth rate; over one-half of the
    population is under the age of 18.
        Nine years of formal schooling are compulsory, and the average
    length of schooling is over 11 years. The U.N. Development Program
    reports that 100 percent of children complete secondary school.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Trafficking in
    girls for the purpose of prostitution occurs (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--One of the country's first laws, adopted
    only 2 months after independence in 1991, provided support for the
    disabled. This law was aimed at ensuring that the disabled have the
    same rights as other citizens. However, little effort is made to bring
    the disabled into the mainstream. The State cares for the mentally
    disabled in special homes. The Government has not mandated access to
    public places for the disabled.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Government statistics dating
    from 1992 show that the population of approximately 23 million is about
    71 percent Uzbek, 8 percent Russian, 5 percent Tajik, 4 percent Tatar,
    and 3 percent Kazakh, with many other ethnic groups represented. The
    statistics may underestimate the actual number of ethnic Tajiks. The
    figures treat ethnic Tajiks whose mother tongue was Uzbek as ethnic
    Uzbeks. Moreover, some Tajiks choose for a variety of reasons to
    declare themselves to be ethnic Uzbeks.
        Ethnic groups other than Uzbeks, particularly Russians, frequently
    complain that job opportunities are limited for them. Senior positions
    in the government bureaucracy and business generally are reserved for
    ethnic Uzbeks, although there are numerous exceptions to this rule.
        The 1992 citizenship law does not impose language requirements for
    citizenship. Nonetheless, the language issue remains very sensitive.
    Uzbek has been declared the state language, and the Constitution
    requires that the President speak Uzbek. However, the language law
    provides for Russian as ``the language of interethnic communication.''
    Russian is spoken widely in the main cities, and Tajik is spoken widely
    in Samarkand and Bukhara. The 1989 language law originally required
    that Uzbek would be the sole method of official communication by 1998,
    but subsequently was modified and now stipulates no specific date. The
    Government also is in the process of replacing the Cyrillic alphabet
    with the Latin alphabet. However, realizing the difficulties for Uzbeks
    and minorities alike, the Government has delayed the full transition to
    both the Uzbek language and the Latin alphabet to 2005.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 law on unions specifically
    provides that all workers have the right voluntarily to form and join
    unions of their choice, and that trade unions themselves voluntarily
    may associate territorially or sectorally. Membership in trade unions
    is optional. The law also declares all unions independent of the
    State's administrative and economic bodies (except where provided for
    by law), and states that trade unions should develop their own
    charters, structure, and executive bodies and organize their own work.
        However, in practice the overall structure of trade unions has not
    changed significantly since the Soviet era. Independence has eliminated
    subordination to Moscow but has not altered the centralized trade union
    hierarchy, which remains dependent on the Government. No alternative
    union structures exist.
        A few new professional associations and interest groups have been
    organized, such as a union of entrepreneurs, a union of renters, and an
    association of private physicians and pharmacists. Registered
    professional associations for judges and lawyers formed in 1997; both
    organizations are quasigovernmental. An association of broadcasters
    that formed in 1998 has failed to gain government registration (see
    Section 2.b.). The main activity of all registered associations is
    professional development. They do not license members and have no
    formal role in advocating the interests of members in relation to the
    Government.
        According to the law, the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions
    (CFTU) has a consultative voice in the preparation of all legislation
    affecting workers and is entitled to draft laws on labor and social
    issues. Trade unions are described legally as organizations that defend
    the right to work and to protect jobs. They have lost their previous
    role in state planning and in the management of enterprises. The
    emphasis now is on the unions' responsibility for ``social protection''
    and social justice--especially unemployment compensation, pensions, and
    worker retraining.
        The trade union law does not mention strikes or cite a right to
    strike. However, the law does give the unions oversight for both
    individual and collective labor disputes, which are defined as those
    involving alleged violations of labor laws, worker rights, or
    collective agreements.
        There were no reports of strikes. This circumstance likely reflects
    the absence of truly representative trade unions, as the standard of
    living fell and growing unemployment raised social tensions. The
    absence of labor activism also reflects the Communist legacy of
    docility in the face of authority. However, both union and government
    officials assert that the lack of strikes reflects general support for
    the Government's policies and common interest in social stability.
        The 1992 law on unions provides that unions may choose their own
    international affiliations; however, none have done so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions
    may conclude agreements with enterprises. Privatization is still in its
    very early phase. As a result, there is no experience with negotiations
    that could be described as adversarial between unions and private
    employers. The State is still the major employer, and the state-
    appointed union leaders do not view themselves as having conflicts of
    interest with the State.
        The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance in consultation
    with the CFTU, set the wages for various categories of state employees.
    In the small private sector, management establishes wages or negotiates
    them with those who contract for employment.
        The law forbids discrimination against union members and their
    officers.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    specifically prohibits forced labor, including by children, except as
    legal punishment or as may be specified by law; however, some abuses
    including trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
    prostitution occur (see Section 6.f.). No statute specifically
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and large-scale
    compulsory mobilization of youth and students (by closing schools) to
    help with the cotton harvest continues. Student labor is paid poorly,
    and students sometimes must pay for their food. Adults, including
    teachers and passersby in automobiles and busses, similarly are forced
    into the harvest effort.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years; 15-year-olds can
    receive state permission to work but have a shorter workday. In rural
    areas, younger children and the elderly often help to harvest cotton
    and other crops (see Section 6.c.). The Labor Ministry has an
    inspection service, which is responsible for enforcing compliance with
    these and other regulations governing employment conditions, and
    enforces them effectively.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by anyone, including
    children; however, trafficking in girls for forced prostitution and
    compulsory mobilization for the cotton harvest occur (see Section
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, in
    consultation with the CFTU, sets the minimum wage. As of September 1,
    it was less than $4 (2,450 soum) per month. The minimum wage is not
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family.
        The standard workweek is set at 41 hours and requires a 24-hour
    rest period. Some factories apparently have reduced work hours in order
    to avoid layoffs. Overtime pay exists in theory but is not always paid.
        Pay arrearages of 3 to 6 months are not uncommon for workers in
    state-owned industries. The problem appears to be growing.
        The Labor Ministry establishes occupational health and safety
    standards in consultation with the unions. There is a health and safety
    inspectorate in the Ministry. The local press occasionally published
    complaints about the failure of unions and government authorities to do
    enough to promote worker safety. Although written regulations may
    provide adequate safeguards, workers in hazardous jobs often lack
    protective clothing and equipment. Workers are permitted to leave jobs
    that are hazardous without jeopardizing their employability in other
    jobs; however, in practice, high rates of underemployment make such
    action difficult.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws relating specifically
    to trafficking in persons. Trafficking in women and girls for the
    purpose of forced prostitution occurs, particularly to the Persian
    Gulf, South Korea, and Turkey (see Section 5). However, there are no
    reliable statistics on this problem, and it does not seem to be carried
    out on a large scale. Uzbekistan is a source country, but not a
    destination or transit point, for trafficking in persons. The
    Government has not had occasion to assist with international
    investigations of trafficking or to extradite citizens accused of
    trafficking in other countries.
        Anecdotal reports from NGO's indicate that the number of young
    women from Uzbekistan who are forced into prostitution abroad is
    growing. The Government has not acknowledged the problem publicly, but
    has taken some measures to combat it. According to NGO representatives,
    the police force in Samarkand formed a special unit on trafficking in
    women in 1998, but the unit's effectiveness is hampered by a lack of
    resources. Border guards at airports were directed to give more
    scrutiny to unaccompanied young women traveling to Turkey, the United
    Arab Emirates, and South Korea; they are authorized to deny such women
    permission to leave the country. There is no government program to
    educate or assist potential victims; however, the State University for
    World Economy and Diplomacy sponsored a series of lectures on domestic
    violence and trafficking in women during the year.
                                   __________

                        FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

        The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia \1\ (Yugoslavia), a
    constitutional republic consisting of the Republic of Serbia and the
    Republic of Montenegro, has a president and a parliamentary system of
    government based on multiparty elections. The new federal Government,
    which was formed on November 4, dropped any claim to being the sole
    successor state of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
    (which dissolved in 1992), and was recognized by the international
    community. Vojislav Kostunica was elected President of the Federal
    Republic of Yugoslavia on September 24, and took office on October 7,
    after mass demonstrations by citizens protesting Slobodan Milosevic's
    attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and force a
    second election round led Milosevic to concede defeat. Prior to
    Kostunica's election, former Yugoslav President Milosevic had brought
    Serbia closer to open dictatorship than ever before. Immediately
    following the 1999 war in Kosovo, Milosevic moved to consolidate his
    weakened position in Serbia through a campaign of intimidation and
    violence against his political opponents, representatives of the
    independent media, student groups, civil society, and even, in certain
    cases, members of the regime. Prior to the September elections,
    Milosevic, who is also President of the Socialist Party of Serbia
    (SPS), continued to dominate all formal and informal governing
    institutions in the country. Although the SPS lacked majorities in both
    the Federal and Serbian Parliaments, it controlled key administrative
    positions. The SPS also controlled the governing coalition with the
    Yugoslav Left (JUL), controlled by Milosevic's wife, Mira Markovic, and
    the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), controlled by Vojislav Seselj, an
    extreme ultranationalist known for his radical politics during the wars
    in Croatia and Bosnia, who resigned from his government position in
    October. Milosevic also controlled the judiciary.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\  The report on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is discussed
    in three separate sections on Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro and
    addresses the human rights situations in each of these entities. Since
    federal authority was exercised effectively only over the Republic of
    Serbia throughout the year, the human rights situations in Kosovo and
    Montenegro are dealt with in separate sections following this report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic until
    his electoral defeat effectively controlled the Serbian police, a
    heavily armed force of some 80,000 officers that is responsible for
    internal security. Having been forced to withdraw from Kosovo in 1999,
    the police then repressed opponents of the regime in Serbia. In
    addition, Milosevic ignored the constitutional role of the Supreme
    Defense Council, essentially establishing himself as commander in chief
    of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which, along with the police, was employed
    in the brutal campaign against the citizens of Kosovo in 1999. Several
    times in the past, Milosevic had purged those officers in both the
    police and military who either failed to follow his orders or who
    directly challenged his policies in Kosovo, Serbia, or Montenegro. The
    security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
        Following the war in Kosovo, international economic sanctions
    remained in place much of the year. The international community began
    to remove those sanctions after Kostunica's election. The economy
    inherited by the new Government suffered from continued exclusion from
    international financial institutions and from the damage inflicted on
    infrastructure during 10 years of war. Economic performance is poor due
    to the general inefficiency in the economy, corruption, and continued
    resistance to reform and privatization. Unemployment and
    underemployment remain high, reaching at least 60 percent, as the
    Milosevic Government was unable or unwilling to introduce necessary
    restructuring measures. The Milosevic Government also failed to
    implement needed sweeping economic reforms to help the economy,
    including privatization, due to the influence of the regime's crony
    system.
        Under Milosevic the Government's human rights record remained
    extremely poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses.
    Milosevic attempted to prevent citizens from exercising their right to
    change their government. The police were responsible for numerous
    serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances,
    torture, brutal beatings, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Impunity
    for those who committed human rights abuses was a serious problem.
    Often, serious crimes such as murder remained uninvestigated and
    unsolved. The judicial system was not independent of the Government,
    suffered from corruption, and did not ensure fair trials. Under the
    Milosevic regime, there were many cases of political detainees and
    political prisoners. However, under Kostunica, the new Government
    released two prominent political prisoners--journalist Miroslav
    Filipovic in October and human rights activist Dr. Flora Brovina in
    November. In December Kostunica also pardoned opposition activist
    Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as ``Maki.'' Under the Milosevic regime,
    the authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Milosevic
    Government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press and
    used overbearing police intimidation and economic pressure to control
    tightly the independent press and media. Most journalists continued to
    practice self-censorship. The Milosevic Government restricted freedom
    of assembly and association. Police repressed citizens who opposed the
    Milosevic regime and severely beat scores of democratic opposition
    protesters throughout Serbia, sending many to hospitals. The Milosevic
    Government infringed on freedom of worship by minority religions and
    restricted freedom of movement. The regime enacted legislation to
    manipulate the electoral process, most recently in the summer, when
    Milosevic made changes to the Constitution that allowed him to be
    elected by popular vote to another term as President of Yugoslavia.
    Milosevic banned objective international observers from monitoring the
    September 24 elections for Yugoslav President and attempted to falsify
    election results. The Federal and Serbian Governments' record of
    cooperation with international human rights and monitoring
    organizations remained poor. The Milosevic Government routinely
    hindered the activities of local human rights groups.
        The Federal Government remained uncooperative with the
    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It
    again failed to meet its obligations under numerous U.N. Security
    Council Resolutions to comply fully with the Tribunal's orders, and
    failed to transfer or facilitate the surrender to the Tribunal of
    persons on its territory indicted for war crimes or other crimes
    against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (These persons
    include Milosevic and four of his top aides, who were indicted in 1999
    for their role in the Kosovo war). Violence and discrimination against
    women remained serious problems. Police repression and official and
    societal discrimination against Muslims in the Sandzak region, Roma,
    and other minorities persisted. The regime limited unions not
    affiliated with the Government in their attempts to advance worker
    rights. There was some child labor. Serbia is a source, transit, and
    destination country for trafficking in women and girls, and trafficking
    is a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
    extrajudicial killings. In November the Democratic Opposition of Serbia
    (DOS) Minister of the Interior, Bozo Prelevic, reported that he had
    received evidence suggesting that the head of the Republican State
    Security service, Rade Markovic, was involved in the April 1998 killing
    of Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of an independent Belgrade tabloid
    newspaper and weekly news magazine (see Section 2.a.).
        The number of political and extrajudicial killings increased, and
    there were many indications of complicity at the highest political
    levels. The targets of such attacks were not limited to opposition
    activists. Numerous deaths of persons close to the regime in the first
    half of the year suggested efforts on the part of the Government to
    consolidate its authority and remain in power. Typically no one was
    arrested for such killings.
        The most notable politically motivated killing was that of Zeljko
    Raznatovic, also known as ``Arkan"--a notorious paramilitary commander
    from the Croatian and Bosnian wars who was indicted by the ICTY.
    Raznatovic was killed inside Belgrade's Intercontinental Hotel in
    January. After his death, rumors began circulating of a falling out
    with the Milosevic regime. There was an official investigation into his
    death; however, it yielded no conclusive results.
        A number of other prominent political figures were killed during
    the year. In view of the high level of corruption among the political
    elite, the precise mix of criminal and political motives for these
    crimes was difficult to determine. Pavle Bulatovic, the former Yugoslav
    Minister of Defense and a close associate of the Milosevic family, was
    killed while dining in a restaurant in February. Another close
    Milosevic associate, Zika Petrovic, the head of Yugoslav Airlines, was
    shot and killed in April while walking his dog near Belgrade's central
    police station.
        Belgrade investigative judge Nebojsa Simeunovic was reported
    missing in early November. On December 3, police in Belgrade found his
    body washed up on the banks of the Sava River. Judge Simeunovic had
    refused to sign warrants for the arrest of DOS party leaders and
    striking miners during the October popular campaign to unseat
    Milosevic. He also was in charge of the investigation of several
    politically sensitive cases, including the 1997 killing of Radovan
    Stojicic-Bazda and the February killing of Pavle Bulatovic.
        Eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing Yugoslav forces
    and detained in prisons within Serbia died in detention during the year
    (see Section 1.c.).
        In March, criminals Branislav ``Dugi'' Lainovic and ``Bata''
    Vucurovic were killed in Belgrade and Vojvodina, respectively. Neither
    apparently was involved in politics when killed, but both played
    significant roles in paramilitary operations in Croatia in the early
    1990's and had links to former Serbian State Security leaders.
        On November 21, two Serbian police officers were killed and several
    were wounded in an attack by the so-called Liberation Army of Presevo,
    Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB), an offshoot of the disbanded Kosovo
    Liberation Army (KLA). On November 27, a 10-year-old boy was killed by
    an antitank mine planted by the Yugoslav army as his family fled the
    Presevo valley region for Kosovo. These incidents escalated tensions
    that had been building throughout the year in the region of
    southeastern Serbia that borders on Kosovo and encompasses the
    municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja. This region is
    populated by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. In November thousands of
    ethnic Albanians fled the region for neighboring Kosovo and Macedonia,
    due to fear of a buildup of Serbian police and military forces.
    Skirmishes between Serbian police and armed Albanian UCPMB members
    occurred throughout the year, resulting in the reported deaths of
    several Serbian police as well as some UCPMB members and a few
    civilians.
        b. Disappearance.--Police were responsible for disappearances.
        The most notable disappearance was that of former Serbian President
    Ivan Stambolic, who disappeared while on a daily jog in a park near his
    home in Belgrade in August. Many observers noted that the timing of
    Stambolic's disappearance (only a few weeks ahead of scheduled
    elections), and the fact that state-run media remained largely silent
    on the issue, suggested complicity by the Milosevic regime and the
    Serbian security service. The Serbian State Prosecutor's office began
    an investigation into the case in late November, but it had not yielded
    any results at year's end.
        In April Jan Svetlik, an opposition councilor from Zrenjanin, was
    abducted by two unknown assailants and kept outside of town for several
    hours during a session of the local parliament. The abduction allowed
    the ruling SPS to retain its parliamentary majority despite the fact
    that two of its own members earlier had defected to the opposition.
    Police failed to identify the assailants.
        Federal and Serbian government authorities have not cooperated
    fully with efforts to account for the thousands of disappearances of
    individuals from Kosovo during the first 6 months of 1999, nor have
    they allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or
    other international organizations access to many detention facilities.
    Some 5,500 persons are missing; some 700 are being detained in Serbian
    prisons (see Section 1.d.).
        c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Yugoslav and Serbian law prohibits torture and other cruel
    forms of punishment; however, security authorities regularly and
    systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of
    abuse against citizens and members of the political opposition. The
    majority of cases of torture occurred before detainees were charged
    with offenses or during the period between the filing of charges and
    the commencement of the trial. Freed prisoners reported being subject
    to beatings with rubber batons, metal batons, and wooden bats, as well
    as use of electroshock, starvation, withholding of medical care, and
    having their hands bound tightly with plastic bands.
        On May 17 and 18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and
    used excessive force to disperse street protests against the
    Government's closing of television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see
    Section 2.b.). In June police beat four persons at a police station in
    Zajecar after they put up opposition posters.
        In July Bojan Aleksov, a human rights monitor who worked with the
    Safe House Project for Conscientious Objectors from the Federal
    Republic of Yugoslavia and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Women
    in Black Against War, was arrested by police in Belgrade after being
    removed forcibly from his car. During his 23-hour detention, Aleksov
    repeatedly was threatened with death and interrogated about his human
    rights work and his connections with the international community. The
    police tortured Aleksov severely, including by forcing him to stand on
    his toes while they beat him with a truncheon all over his body.
    Despite running a fever, the police denied him water for up to 5 hours
    and kept him awake throughout the night. On the following morning,
    three police officers beat Aleksov on the soles of his feet, the palms
    of his hands, and other parts of his body, using a baton. Aleksov
    finally was forced to write a 12-page confession dictated to him by an
    officer, which outlined his human rights work and his contacts and
    visits with international organizations and officials. Under threat of
    death, Aleksov then was forced to agree to work for the State Security
    Service. Finally, the police forced Aleksov to repeat parts of the
    signed statement on video and made him repeat his ``confession'' three
    times in order to appear convincing enough. In response to this case,
    Amnesty International (AI) called for an investigation and the
    temporary suspension of the officers suspected of beating Aleksov
    pending final results of that investigation. No investigation was
    conducted by year's end.
        In early September police also beat an Otpor activist, a minor, and
    forced him to eat one of the movement's posters. A lawyer representing
    the activist was prevented from attending the interrogation and was not
    able to contact the activist.
        In August police interrogated and beat 19-year-old Rom Sasa
    Mustafic and threatened his wife, Demira Gezvira, in Belgrade. Mustafic
    was arrested by police, accused of theft, and allegedly beaten with a
    stick and punched in the stomach, ribs, back, and head. On September
    26, a traffic police officer reportedly beat and threatened Skender
    Gasi, a 27-year-old Rom from Kosovo, in Belgrade. According to local
    NGO reports, Gasi did not file a complaint against the officer because
    he feared reprisals.
        In November in Vojvodina police beat and threatened a Hungarian
    journalist (see Section 5).
        In September police detained seven Bulgarian election observers who
    entered Serbia despite not receiving official credentials. Police beat
    three of the observers, in one case causing a ruptured eardrum, and
    confiscated mobile telephones, money, and personal belongings.
        Police beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        There were numerous beatings of members of the political opposition
    by unidentified groups of men, apparently State Security agents or
    thugs employed by the Milosevic regime. On February 26, several men
    attacked and severely beat student Milos Dosen as he pasted up a poster
    in Belgrade that belonged to Otpor (``Resistance''), a student-led,
    nonviolent political movement that opposes the Milosevic regime.
    Despite videotape that showed the attackers and their vehicle's license
    plates in clear view, police did not investigate the incident.
        On April 11, in Novi Sad, two unidentified men beat Radoje Cvetkov,
    secretary for urbanism in the Novi Sad executive council, which is
    controlled by an opposition party.
        In June police beat a 19-year-old Otpor activist for 3 hours after
    they found the student movement's material in his car in Lapovo.
        According to Human Rights Watch, on September 2, police beat Mile
    Milic, a DOS candidate for the Lajkovac municipal assembly, after
    arresting him for hanging DOS posters. On September 3 in Indjija, SPS
    activists severely beat a minor who was hanging DOS posters. AI
    reported that on September 4, police beat Darko Pavlovic, an Otpor
    activist who was arrested in Sabac while hanging DOS posters. On
    September 8 in Vladicin Han, police detained and beat six Otpor
    activists. After reportedly tying up the six activists, the police used
    their fists and batons to beat them on the genitals, kidneys, and
    heads. One activist, Aleksandar Radic, had a rope placed around his
    neck. Only after several hundred persons gathered in front of the
    police station were the activists allowed to leave and seek medical
    treatment. On September 15, AI reported that police beat two Otpor
    activists who were spraying antigovernment graffiti in Belgrade and
    arrested them. They both were sentenced to 10 days' imprisonment for
    ``offenses against public peace and order.'' Lawyers representing the
    activists claimed that they were not granted access to their clients
    before the hearing, and were not permitted to be present while the
    arresting officer gave evidence.
        During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some
    demonstrators and used tear gas to control crowds (see Section 2.b.).
        Serbian Renewal Movement President Vuk Draskovic was wounded
    slightly after a bullet grazed his head in an attack in Montenegro in
    June by gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime (see Montenegro
    annex).
        In June a crowd that emerged from the offices of the ruling
    Socialist Party attacked activists distributing leaflets in Barajevo.
        In early March, unknown assailants damaged the car of Zarko Korac,
    leader of the Social Democratic Union.
        Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards.
    Torture and beatings were reported. There were reports that Albanians
    held in prisons included young children, the elderly, and persons who
    were blind and deaf (see Section 1.d.). Overcrowding and lack of food,
    medical care, and heating in winter all are problems.
        A total of eight Albanians taken from Kosovo by withdrawing
    Yugoslav forces and detained in prisons within Serbia died in
    detention; two were confirmed to have died in August, reportedly one of
    a heart attack and one of cancer.
        A series of prison riots occurred in November. The unrest began in
    Sremska Mitrovica and spread to prisons in Nis and Pozarevac, as well
    as Padinska Skela prison near Belgrade and the juvenile penitentiary in
    Valjevo. Prison inmates demanded an improvement in prison living
    conditions and an expansion of a proposed amnesty bill for Kosovar
    Albanian prisoners in Serbia to include other Serbian criminals.
    Several inmates alleged that they were victims of severe beatings in
    prison by guards. Prisoners also alleged that they were denied access
    to health care. Hundreds of ethnic Albanians were evacuated from the
    Pozarevac prison after they were threatened by Serbs for not joining
    the protests. One Serb prisoner died after falling off the roof of the
    Nis prison and several persons reportedly were injured during the
    riots. In response, the Government pledged emergency funds to improve
    prison conditions and on November 10, authorities released 14 Serbs and
    1 ethnic Albanian from the Pozarevac prison. In exchange, inmates
    agreed to put down their weapons and to allow guards back in the
    prison.
        On December 14, a military court in Nis sentenced nine Serbian
    military policemen and one lawyer to prison terms totaling 7 years for
    extorting money from Kosovar Albanian prisoners.
        Although the Milosevic regime generally permitted some prison
    visits by human rights monitors with sporadic access often subject to
    the whim of local officials, access generally was poor. On several
    occasions, outside monitors, including representatives of the ICRC,
    were denied access to individuals reportedly held by Serbian police,
    especially draft evaders and Kosovar Albanians whom retreating security
    forces transferred from Kosovo after hostilities ceased. However, the
    ICRC had no access to or information about persons detained in military
    detention facilities at year's end.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention was common in Serbia under Milosevic, with such abuses aimed
    at opponents of the regime apparently on a daily basis.
        Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive
    delays by Serbian authorities in filing formal charges and opening
    investigations. The ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal
    basis of their clients' detention often was hampered further by
    difficulties in gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of
    official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into custody.
    In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the
    court file. Investigative judges in Serbia often delegated their
    responsibility for carrying out investigations to the police or members
    of the State Security Service and rarely questioned their accounts of
    the investigation--even when it was obvious that confessions were
    coerced from the accused. Results of such sham investigations then were
    used in court to convict defendants on fabricated charges.
        According to the Humanitarian Law Center, at least 10 Kosovar
    Albanian minors were being held in the country's prisons in January.
    These children were among the approximately 2,000 civilians removed
    from Kosovo when the Yugoslav Army withdrew its forces in 1999. Serbian
    authorities reportedly sold dozens of these prisoners back to their
    families in Kosovo for prices as high as $25,000 (DM 50,000). Numerous
    human rights groups have documented an open-air market in northern
    Kosovo where lawyers purporting to represent these prisoners go to
    strike deals with families or friends of those imprisoned to secure
    their release. Despite the exchange of large sums of money, the lawyers
    often are never seen again. Human Rights groups also noted that in
    those cases where prisoners are released, the extorted ``fees'' were
    divided between the lawyers, judges, and police involved in individual
    cases and prisons. Human rights organizations believe that the
    Government still holds approximately 700 Kosovar Albanian political
    prisoners and detainees. The Government claims that some of these
    prisoners and detainees were convicted of common crimes.
        Visits to political detainees were rare and often were supervised
    by police. Local human rights NGO's attempted to visit prisoners, with
    mixed results. The ICRC was able to visit many, if not all, of the
    approximate 700 Kosovar Albanian political detainees inside Serbia.
    However, it is not clear that the ICRC has been able to arrange more
    than an occasional visit.
        Opposition politicians faced harassment by police under the
    Milosevic regime. On February 29, Belgrade police detained and
    interrogated Ivan Kovacevic, the Serbian Renewal Movement spokesman and
    a member of the Serbian Parliament. In March a total of 42 members of
    Vojvodina's League of Social Democrats were arrested in Novi Sad. They
    were handing out flyers asking for citizens to assemble in front of a
    construction site, where the regime was blocking the city's efforts to
    begin rebuilding a bridge destroyed during the NATO bombing campaign.
        In May three members of Otpor--Momcilo Veljkovic, Radojko Lukovic,
    and Dusan Ignjatovic--were arrested after friends of Marko Milosevic,
    the President's son, beat them severely outside a cafe in Pozarevac,
    Milosevic's hometown. The Otpor activists claim that they were beaten
    after they came to the defense of another activist, Dragan Milovanovic,
    who was being pressured by Marko Milosevic's associates to join the
    Socialist Party of Serbia.
        The beating set off a wave of protests, and the opposition
    scheduled demonstrations in Pozarevac a week later, which it ultimately
    was forced to cancel due to intimidation by the Milosevic regime. As a
    part of its effort to intimidate and prevent the demonstrations, police
    arrested Nenad Canak, the President of the Vojvodina League of Social
    Democrats, as he drove to Pozarevac. Police also arrested and
    interrogated dozens of others, including journalists, opposition
    politicians, and Otpor activists across Serbia in Nis, Novi Sad,
    Kragujevac and Pozarevac.
        Several days later, Veljkovic and Lukovic were released by the
    district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who did not find grounds to
    prosecute. Papovic in turn was dismissed from his post by the
    Government, and the activists were rearrested and served a total of 2
    months in prison. The judge appointed by the Milosevic regime claimed
    that releasing the students earlier would ``upset the public.''
        In June police in Leskovac arrested 10 persons, including Igor
    Olujic, a leading human rights lawyer with the Belgrade-based
    Humanitarian Law Center, Dobrosav Nesic, president of the Leskovac NGO
    Council for Human Rights, and several opposition party activists. Those
    detained were protesting peacefully the arrest a few days earlier of
    Otpor activist Vladimir Stojkovic. During the arrest, police used
    excessive force against several persons, including Bojana Ristic, a
    representative from the Serbian Renewal Movement who also serves in the
    Parliament.
        Also in June 20 members of Otpor were arrested in Smederevska
    Palanka. Police in Ivanjica detained an 11-year-old boy for waiving an
    Otpor flag in public. Police also questioned the boy's father about his
    support for Otpor. In September police arrested Otpor activist Branko
    Ilic in Arilje for the 10th time during the year. By the end of June,
    Otpor announced that since the winter, more than 1,000 of its activists
    had been arrested by the police.
        Opposition candidates in the Sandzak region of Serbia reported that
    tactics of the Milosevic regime greatly interfered with campaigning.
    Police arrested Coalition Sandzak activists for handing out leaflets
    and banned opposition rallies from taking place.
        As the regime intensified its crackdown, in July Yugoslav Army
    members arrested four Dutchmen, two British citizens, and two Canadians
    near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with
    espionage. The British citizens charged that they were beaten by the
    police and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Officials of the arrestees'
    countries had difficulty obtaining consular access to them after their
    transfer to federal prison facilities in Belgrade. Following
    Milosevic's ouster, all were released, and the charges against all
    eventually were dropped (see Montenegro annex).
        Federal statutes permit the police to detain criminal suspects
    without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without
    charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law
    separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. The police often
    combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period,
    police must turn over a suspect to an investigative judge, who may
    order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures,
    subsequent extensions of investigative detention of up to 6 months.
        Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reports of its
    use.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice, Federal and Serbian courts
    largely were controlled by the Milosevic regime and rarely challenged
    the will of the state security apparatus. Judicial corruption also is
    widespread. While judges are elected for fixed terms, they may be
    subjected to governmental pressure. Serbian authorities frequently deny
    a fair public trial to non-Serbs and persons whom they believe oppose
    the regime.
        Since 1998 republic-level judges no longer have mandates for life
    and are required to seek office periodically through election. This
    process involves obtaining Justice Ministry approval for each judge's
    candidacy. Local observers fear that the provision in effect makes
    judges functionaries of the Government, who easily may be removed if
    they do not cooperate.
        The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at
    the republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal
    Constitutional Court to which republic Supreme Court decisions,
    depending on the subject, may be appealed. There is also a military
    court system. According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal
    Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and
    regulations and relies on the constituent republic authorities to
    enforce its rulings.
        The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic
    of Yugoslavia remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for
    abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of
    Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992
    Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under federal law,
    defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to have an
    attorney represent them, at public expense if needed. The courts also
    must provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read
    into the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the
    prosecutor has the right to appeal the verdict.
        Defense lawyers, especially those representing minority clients,
    have filed numerous complaints about flagrant breaches of standard
    procedures, arguing that they undermine their clients' rights. Even
    when individual judges admitted that the lawyers were correct, the
    courts ignored or dismissed the complaints. For example, in Pozarevac,
    district prosecutor Bosko Papovic conceded that two Otpor activists
    were innocent of charges that they had conspired to kill associates of
    Marko Milosevic. Nevertheless, the two youth activists were imprisoned
    for 2 months, in May and June. Papovic, along with 15 other judges who
    defended his decision, subsequently was fired (see Section 1.d.).
        Many legal scholars have expressed concern over the 1998 Act on
    Lawyers, which they believe restricts the freedom of lawyers and
    interferes with the independence of lawyers in their dealings with
    clients. They believe that the law gives too much authority to the
    lawyers' chambers, both at the republic and federal levels, which the
    Helsinki Committee alleges would enable the Government to exercise
    stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian
    Constitutional Court judge, the law enabled the regime to interfere
    with the lawyer-client relationship, which even during the Communist
    era was upheld to a greater degree.
        In June the Government debated the passage of a law against
    terrorism in the Serbian Parliament. With its sweeping powers, the law
    would have allowed police essentially to arrest anyone, including NGO
    and media representatives, whom they deemed to be working for the
    removal of the Government. The law allowed for a minimum sentence of 3
    years' imprisonment in such cases. Finally, the law extended the period
    of detention during which police could conduct their investigation from
    3 to 30 days. Although the bill was not signed into law, the threat of
    its passage hampered many opposition activities against the Milosevic
    regime.
        Under Milosevic, the Government also violated norms of judicial
    fairness by pursuing cases previously brought against individuals and
    groups charged under the Yugoslav Criminal Code with jeopardizing the
    territorial integrity of the country and for conspiring or forming a
    group with intent to commit subversive activities (undermining the
    ``constitutional order''). Most of the cases involved alleged
    violations under Article 136 of the Federal Penal Code related to
    ``association to conduct enemy activity,'' or Article 125 concerning
    ``terrorism.'' There is no clear estimate as to how many persons remain
    imprisoned on these specific charges.
        Among the most prominent is the case of Dr. Flora Brovina who was
    transferred from Kosovo to a prison in Nis in July 1999. Dr. Brovina,
    who is known for her human rights work on behalf of women and children
    in Kosovo, was tried and convicted on terrorism charges and in December
    1999 sentenced to 12 years' incarceration. Dr. Brovina was freed on
    November 1 by a special pardon from President Kostunica.
        The Serbian court system convicted 143 ethnic Albanians in a mass
    trial in Nis in May. The men, who received sentences ranging from 7 to
    13 years' imprisonment, were convicted of being members of the KLA,
    terrorism, and attacking police. The trial was criticized widely by
    human rights groups because little effort was made to establish
    individual, as opposed to collective, guilt. In addition, defense
    witnesses were not allowed to testify, and the judge reportedly
    admitted that there could have been ``shortcomings'' in the
    prosecution's evidence.
        On July 6, six ethnic Albanians in Serbia accused of terrorism and
    supporting the KLA were sentenced to a total term of 46 years in
    prison. Human rights NGO's noted that the trial was unfair and that
    allegations of torture were widespread. The court failed to investigate
    the allegations of torture and accepted a filmed confession made while
    the men were in police custody, which already had been aired on Serbian
    State television. AI noted that this was in clear violation of the
    Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure.
        A spokesperson for the Serbian Judges Association stated that as of
    July, 50 of its members had been forced to resign due to pressure from
    the regime. This followed the dismissal by the Government of 16 judges
    for their alleged work with the political opposition, including Djordje
    Rankovic and district prosecutor Bosko Papovic, who spoke out against
    the case of the two Otpor activists who were beaten by associates of
    Marko Milosevic in Pozarevac (see Section 1.d.).
        Ukshin Hoti, leader of UNIKOMB, a political party that advocates
    Kosovo's unification with Albania, was in detention for the entire
    year. Hoti was in a Nis jail and was reportedly in poor health. His
    lawyers have been denied access to him since February 1998. Hoti was
    serving a 4-year sentence in a prison in Nis and was to be released on
    May 17, 1999. However, the Pristina-based Council for Human Rights was
    unable to locate Hoti as of July 1999 and there was no further
    information at year's end.
        In December, President Kostunica pardoned opposition activist
    Bogoljub Arsenijevic, known as ``Maki.''
        The Government continued to hold an estimated 700 ethnic Albanians
    as political prisoners. Visits to political prisoners are rare and are
    often supervised by police. Local human rights NGO's have attempted to
    visit prisoners, with mixed results. The ICRC has been able to visit
    many, if not all, of the Kosovar Albanian political prisoners inside
    Serbia.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Under the Milosevic Government, the authorities
    infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Federal law gives republic
    ministries of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor
    potential criminal activities, a power that is abused routinely. It is
    widely believed that the authorities monitor opposition and dissident
    activities, eavesdrop on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and
    wiretap telephones. Although illegal under provisions of federal and
    Serbian law, the federal post office registers all mail from abroad,
    ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
        The law includes restrictions on searches; however, officials often
    ignored them. Police raided the Belgrade and Mladenovac offices of
    Otpor in early September without a search warrant. The previous day,
    police raided Otpor's Novi Sad office. They confiscated computers,
    several thousand Tshirts, posters, buttons, and information about the
    movement's activists. Despite the law, the police did not leave any
    notification of the items they removed from Otpor's premises. The
    Serbian Helsinki Committee stated that the raids violated Article 21 of
    the Serbian Constitution, according to which police may enter a premise
    with a warrant or, if no warrant is obtained, in order to ``save people
    and property.'' Before the September 24 elections, as part of its
    crackdown on independent political activists, police also repeatedly
    raided the offices of CESID, a Serbian election monitoring NGO,
    confiscating files and computers.
        A government law requiring universal military service is enforced
    only sporadically; it was not enforced vigorously during the year. The
    informal practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic
    Albanians. However, in Montenegro VJ troops forcibly conscripted youths
    during the year. Of approximately 100,000 draft evaders living abroad
    at the start of the year to avoid punishment, 40 percent were estimated
    to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflects the large number of
    conscription-age men in Yugoslavia's Albanian community. Leaders of
    Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities maintained that when
    forced compliance of these groups with universal military service did
    occur, it was an attempt to induce young men to flee the country.
    According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, up to 12,000 young men for
    whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion already had started were
    granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into this category were told
    that if they returned to Yugoslavia their cases would be reviewed on a
    ``case-by-case'' basis, a policy that has not inspired confidence among
    offenders. A law passed in October 1998 stated that draft dodgers who
    did not report for military service would forfeit their right to
    inheritance. In many cases Yugoslav officials have refused to issue
    proper travel documents to children born to asylum seekers (see Section
    2.d.). A new amnesty bill was pending at year's end. The proposed law
    would grant amnesty to draft evaders, deserters, those who refused to
    bear arms, and to most political prisoners convicted under Article 136
    of the Penal Code (association to conduct enemy activity), but not to
    political prisoners convicted under Article 125 (terrorism). Many
    ethnic Albanian political prisoners were reportedly convicted under
    Article 125, but the exact number is unknown.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--Federal law provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Milosevic regime
    severely restricted these rights in practice. The October 1998 Law on
    Public Information, which was used to silence the independent media
    during the Kosovo war, continued to be applied to journalists and
    members of the political opposition. The regime arrested dozens of
    journalists and levied the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of
    dollars in fines in apparent efforts to silence the independent media.
    The regime took over independent television and radio stations and shut
    down others. State-controlled media coverage was biased severely in
    favor of Milosevic's coalition parties, the SPS and JUL, particularly
    in early September. State media carried minimal coverage of opposition
    parties, and what was covered was cast in a negative light. The regime
    also severely restricted international media coverage of the September
    elections by denying entry visas to many foreign journalists and by
    placing travel restrictions within Serbia on others. In addition,
    during the preelection period the regime forced international news
    organizations to broadcast through state-controlled facilities where
    reports could be censored or blocked.
        The Milosevic regime also cracked down on opposition politicians
    and politically active NGO's, particularly in the months preceding the
    September elections. Police arrested almost a dozen DOS candidates and
    raided several DOS offices. In the Sandzak region, police arrested
    opposition activists for handing out leaflets (see Section 1.d.). Many
    observers suggested that the disappearance of former Serbian President
    Ivan Stambolic in late August was meant to be a threatening message to
    SPS politicians not to stray from Milosevic's party (see Section 1.b.).
    Police also brought over a thousand members of the Otpor movement into
    police stations for questioning. Some of these interrogations resulted
    in beatings (see Section 1.c.).
        While the media climate greatly improved after Kostunica's election
    victory, media independence remained a problem. Observers noted that
    after the DOS took control of state-owned Radio-Television Serbia,
    coverage leading up to the December 23 parliamentary elections strongly
    favored DOS candidates. Other media outlets also lack professionalism.
        In March an indictment was filed against Dusan Mihajlovic, an
    opposition party leader; however, the case was not pursued. Mihajlovic
    was charged with ``spreading false information and disturbance of
    citizens'' because of remarks he made on a television news program
    criticizing a Milosevic speech.
        In May independent journalist Miroslav Filipovic, who also worked
    closely with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and as a
    correspondent for the Belgrade-based daily Danas, was arrested on
    charges of ``espionage'' and ``spreading false information'' following
    a series of articles investigating Yugoslav Army abuses in Kosovo.
    Formal charges were not brought against Filipovic until June. A closed
    trial held in July was protested by human rights NGO's, as was the 7-
    year sentence that Filipovic received. Both the prosecution and the
    defense appealed the sentence. The Filipovic case attracted significant
    attention from many international press and human rights groups. In
    addition over 300 journalists from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia
    signed a letter to Milosevic protesting the harsh sentence against
    Filipovic and demanding his release. On October 10, the Supreme
    Military Court in Belgrade overturned the guilty verdict against
    Filipovic on procedural grounds and sent the case back to court for a
    new trial. Kostunica pardoned Filipovic in October, and the charges
    against Filipovic were dropped.
        The Government fined the newspaper Glas Javnosti $5,000 (300,000
    dinars) under the Public Information Act, and Slavoljub Kacarevic,
    director and editor-in-chief of the newspaper, was fined $2,000
    (120,000 dinars) for an article published on June 14. Also in June, in
    Leskovac a car belonging to two independent journalists was vandalized
    outside the police station while the two were covering protests.
        In July independent publishers were forced to reduce the number of
    pages in their newspapers because the amount of paper supplied by the
    only domestic newsprint manufacturer was insufficient. The Federal
    Government turned down a request to import additional paper supplies
    even as leading Belgrade dailies Blic, Danas, and Glas Javnosti, and
    weeklies Vreme and NIN, used their last reserves of paper.
        According to the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM)
    network, more than 140 radio and television stations were banned inside
    Serbia under Milosevic, and, as of April, more than $625,000 (37.5
    million dinars) in fines were imposed on independent media under the
    Public Information Act. Despite this repression, ANEM reported that
    dozens of independent radio and television stations still were
    broadcasting.
        In mid-January, broadcasting equipment was stolen from the Belgrade
    television station Studio B. As a result, over 2 million viewers were
    unable to receive the station's signal. Although no one was ever
    charged with the crime, ANEM believed that the theft was in direct
    response to Studio B's broadcast of opposition-related programming.
        In a controversial news conference in February, former Serbian
    Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj threatened violence against
    independent journalists.
        In March the police attacked a technician and security guard at
    Studio B and confiscated transmission equipment from the premises. In
    addition eight print and electronic media outlets were fined for
    alleged violations of the Law on Public Information. Six additional
    independent radio and television stations were closed in March.
        Foreign journalists were expelled from Serbia and denied entry
    visas periodically throughout the year, especially during the period
    prior to the September elections.
        Following the beating of the three Otpor activists in Pozarevac in
    May, there was a wave of arrests as independent journalists publicized
    the assault. Studio B and the independent dailies Blic and Danas were
    fined for ``false reporting'' after they informed the public of the
    attack.
        On May 17, police moved against four of the largest independent
    media outlets--Studio B, B2-92, Radio Index, and Blic--and closed down
    the building from which they all operated. Radio Pancevo remained the
    only source of independent information in the Belgrade area until later
    that same night when its transmission also was blocked. On May 17 and
    18 in Belgrade, police beat peaceful protesters and used excessive
    force to disperse street protests against the Government's closing of
    television Studio B and Radio B2-92 (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        In June security guards beat Hanibal Kovac, a correspondent for
    Radio Free Europe, in Sabac in a recreation center controlled by a
    member of the Serbian Radical Party. The guards reportedly told Kovac
    that he was ``first on the list and that other reporters would get the
    same.'' Police also beat up a reporter in Novi Sad for wearing an Otpor
    T-shirt.
        On June 2, Dusika Radulovic, owner of a small independent newspaper
    Borske Novine was sentenced to 3 months in prison for publishing an
    article that allegedly libelled members of the local government. On
    June 9, satirist Boban Miletic was sentenced to 5 months in prison for
    ridiculing Milosevic during a public reading of his latest book.
        Also in June, a television crew from Radio Kraljevo was arrested
    along with Democratic Party officials and four Otpor activists in
    Kraljevo.
        In August journalist Zoran Lukovic was arrested and sent to prison
    to serve a 5-month sentence for ``spreading false information.''
    Lukovic was convicted in March 1999 with another journalist, Srdjan
    Jankovic, and with Slavko Curuvija, editor of the Belgrade daily
    tabloid Dnevni Telegraf. Curuvija was murdered in Belgrade in April
    1999, allegedly by members of Milosevic's secret service (see Section
    1.a.). Lukovic was pardoned and released at the end of the year.
        In August the NGO Reporters without Borders protested the
    Government's jamming of radio broadcasts by opposition station Radio
    Jasenica and the private station Radio Globus. A press release issued
    by the organization pointed to ``a policy of increasing repression
    against independent media'' prior to the September election. The
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also
    highlighted media repression in the period prior to the elections.
        In August five cable networks in Novi Sad stopped broadcasting news
    from television stations in Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hungary
    following a Yugoslav Information Ministry ban on broadcasting
    ``political propaganda programs.'' Critics charged that the ban was an
    attempt to prevent 200,000 viewers in the region from having access to
    independent media during the September election campaign.
        The Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) noted in
    August that ``repression of the authorities against the media in Serbia
    increased in the past few months.'' In addition the NUNS noted in its
    Dossier of Repression that the Information Act ``in the past few months
    has become an auxiliary means of carrying out repression.'' The NUNS
    confirmed ANEM's report that the independent media were charged the
    equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines by the regime.
        On November 27, two policemen beat Hungarian journalist Peter Aradi
    and threatened to kill him. Otpor reported that Aradi was taken to the
    police station in Senta, a town near the Hungarian border, where he was
    interrogated, beaten, and threatened before being released the
    following day (see Section 5). Also in November, three plainclothes
    police officers from the Serbian Interior Ministry detained Milos
    Antic, assistant editor of the Nedeljni Telegraf, and interrogated him
    for 2 hours at the police station in Belgrade. They pressured him to
    reveal his sources for an article he had written about Milosevic's
    alleged attempts to crack down on prodemocracy protesters during the
    October 5 demonstrations; the officers said they were acting under
    orders of a prosecutor preparing a case against Milosevic.
        In 1998 the Parliament passed the Universities Law. It severely
    curtails academic freedom by allowing the Government to appoint rectors
    and governing boards and hire and fire deans of faculties. Deans in
    turn can hire and fire professors--in effect taking away tenure and
    promoting regime loyalists inside the universities. The law also
    discourages political activism among students. After October 5, the new
    Government reinstated all previously dismissed professors.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Federal and
    republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly;
    however, under Milosevic, the Serbian and Federal Governments severely
    restricted this right.
        In Kragujevac in February, Otpor was prevented from collecting
    contributions to assist the independent newspaper Nezavisna Svetlost in
    paying a fine levied against it under the Public Information Law.
        On April 14, police stopped buses with opposition supporters
    traveling to rallies in Belgrade. On May 9, police stopped an
    opposition rally in Pozarevac by blocking opposition supporters' access
    to the town. On May 17 and 18, police used excessive force to disperse
    opposition street protests in Belgrade (see Section 1.c.). Police
    banned opposition rallies in the Sandzak region (see Section 1.d.).
        During the election demonstrations in October, police beat some
    demonstrators and used tear gas.
        Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of
    peaceful association; however, under Milosevic the Serbian and Federal
    Governments severely restricted this right. By the end of the summer
    virtually anyone wearing an Otpor T-shirt was subject to arrest or
    harassment by the police.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The laws at both the federal and Serbian
    republic level provide for freedom of religion; however, under
    Milosevic, there were incidents of government infringement on freedom
    of worship by minority groups, and the legal system provided little
    protection for the religious rights of minority groups.
        Although in the past the Milosevic regime was allied closely with
    and gave preferential treatment to the Serbian Orthodox Church, a split
    between the two widened considerably during the year. The split began
    with the onset of violence in Kosovo and widened with the regime's
    continued repression of the political opposition.
        The Government repressed Muslims in the Sandzak region along the
    border between Serbia and Montenegro. Reports of harassment in the
    Sandzak region indicated that it was carried out mostly by federal
    Yugoslav army troops.
        The Government made no progress in the restitution of property that
    belonged to the Jewish community, despite Milosevic's past promises to
    resolve the disputes. The Orthodox and Catholic Churches have had
    similar difficulties with the restitution of their property confiscated
    by the Communist regime.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement; however, under Milosevic, the Federal and Serbian governments
    restricted this right in practice. The federal government makes
    passports available to citizens; however, the authorities under the
    Milosevic Government restricted Yugoslav citizens from reentering the
    country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the right of
    Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians from southern Serbia to travel by
    holding up the issuance or renewal of passports for unusually long
    periods of time. It also reserved the option of prosecuting individuals
    charged previously with violating exit visa requirements. Throughout
    Milosevic's rule, opposition politicians and activists routinely were
    harassed and arrested as they traveled in Serbia. The Government placed
    travel restrictions on journalists. Freedom of movement was also
    restricted in travel between Serbia and Montenegro because of the trade
    blockade imposed by Serbian authorities.
        As Federal authorities had yet to repeal legislation targeting
    conscientious objectors and draft evaders from the war in Kosovo, many
    men could not travel freely throughout the country due to fear of
    arrest. Those conscientious objectors and draft evaders who fled Serbia
    could not return to the country for the same reason. Passports were
    denied as a matter of course to conscientious objectors and draft
    evaders. NGO representatives from 19 Serbian towns gathered in
    Montenegro in May and called for a general amnesty for conscientious
    objectors and draft evaders. AI and other NGO's noted that indictments
    continued to arrive at the homes of draft evaders and conscientious
    objectors. In several cases, trials against the men were conducted in
    absentia. After October 5, freedom of movement improved significantly.
    However, isolated incidents were reported late in the year of draft
    evaders from Montenegro stopped in Belgrade airport and sent back to
    Montenegro to face old charges in military courts. Draft evaders would
    be amnestied by a law being considered by the Federal Parliament at
    year's end.
        Following their exodus from Kosovo, there were reports that Serb
    refugees were prevented from traveling to Belgrade in 1999. Reports
    continue to indicate that their freedom of movement is restricted, with
    many of them being confined to Southern Serbia.
        Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional
    confiscation of passports. Sandzak Muslims and ethnic Albanians
    complained of harassment at borders when reentering the country.
        Yugoslav embassies overseas generally are considered to apply a
    double standard when issuing passports to their citizens; ethnic Serbs
    have a much easier time obtaining passports than members of ethnic
    minorities.
        Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts
    of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, have
    not been able to establish their citizenship in Yugoslavia, leaving
    them in a stateless limbo. The Government suspended the processing of
    citizenship applications during the NATO bombing. Government officials
    claimed that the country's citizenship application records were
    destroyed in the bombing, and did not resume processing applications.
        The conflicts that have occurred in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in
    recent years have led to widespread displacement of persons. Under
    Milosevic, the Government imposed numerous restrictions on free
    movement into and within Yugoslavia.
        Approximately half a million refugees from Bosnia and Croatia and
    some 220,000 more recent internally displaced persons from Kosovo,
    mainly Serbs and Roma, are living in the country. Unemployment among
    these groups is estimated at over 60 percent due to the country's poor
    economic climate. Up to 25 percent of the refugee population has moved
    more than three times since arrival in Serbia. Most Serb displaced
    persons from Kosovo are housed with host families; some 50,000 are in
    collective centers. A report by the U.S. Committee for Refugees
    describes collective centers for refugees as varying widely in quality
    and population density, ranging from ``decent'' to ``dismal, drafty,
    and crowded.''
        There are approximately 45,000 displaced Roma in Yugoslavia. Roma
    faced a difficult position during the Kosovo conflict. As neither Serb
    nor Albanian, the Roma in Kosovo tended to adapt to the ethnic group
    they perceived as dominant. As a result, many of Kosovo's Roma were
    perceived as Serb collaborators by returning ethnic Albanians, and many
    fled Kosovo for other areas of Yugoslavia (see Kosovo annex). Living
    conditions for Roma in Serbia are extremely poor. Local municipalities
    are often reluctant to accept Roma, hoping that if they refuse to
    provide shelter or assistance, the Roma may move on (see Section 5).
        The Yugoslav Government has been very slow to issue passports to
    refugees. This is a particular problem for parents who seek asylum. For
    example, Yugoslav officials in Germany refuse to issue passports to
    children born in Germany who have a German government document
    certifying their birth. When these asylum seekers who have been refused
    in Germany return to Yugoslavia with their children, the children
    travel on the basis of this document. Yugoslav authorities take the
    paper at the port of entry and issue a receipt for it. The children
    then have no documentation in a country where documentation is a basic
    requirement.
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted in 1997
    that the 1997 citizenship law would give the Ministry of Interior
    almost complete control over the granting of citizenship. The
    Government served notice that it plans to limit severely the granting
    of citizenship to refugees from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.
    The Government also plans to revise the eligibility status of a large
    number of persons; refugees who have been granted citizenship since
    1992 may stand to lose their Yugoslav citizenship if they have acquired
    the citizenship of a former Yugoslav republic.
        Observers in the Sandzak region also noted that Muslim residents
    who were forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not
    be permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they obtained Bosnian
    passports in the interim.
        The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR). There were no reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution during the year.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Federal and Serbian Constitutions provide for this right;
    however, in practice, under Milosevic, citizens in Serbia consistently
    were discouraged and often were prevented from exercising this right by
    the regime's domination of the mass media, control of the police, and
    manipulation of the electoral process. The regime persistently sought
    to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition leadership throughout
    Serbia through financial controls. In July Milosevic altered the
    Constitution to permit his candidacy in the September federal
    elections.
        Throughout the summer, the Milosevic regime continuously exerted
    undue pressure on persons and groups attempting to peacefully change
    their government (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 2.b.). In one such
    instance, police in August halted the distribution of humanitarian
    assistance by the Leskovac Human Rights Board, an organization that
    encouraged citizens to participate in September's elections.
        Kostunica came to power as President of Yugoslavia after mass
    demonstrations in early October by citizens protesting Slobodan
    Milosevic's attempts to manipulate the Federal Election Commission and
    Constitutional Court to force a second round of elections. Kostunica
    ran against Milosevic in the September 24 elections under the DOS
    Party, an 18-party alliance. Milosevic banned international observers
    from monitoring the elections; the opposition reported election fraud
    in some areas, particularly in southern Serbia and the voting in
    Kosovo. In Kosovo many polling stations were not opened on the
    September 24 election day. Although the DOS claimed victory for
    Kostunica, the Yugoslav Federal Election Commission claimed that
    neither candidate had won an outright majority and called for a second
    ballot. This sparked citizen protests in Belgrade and a general strike
    in favor of the opposition beginning on October 2, which culminated in
    a mass demonstration on October 5 by half a million citizens calling
    for Milosevic to give up power. Kostunica declared himself President of
    Yugoslavia that night and 2 days later Milosevic conceded electoral
    defeat. A federal government was formed by the DOS and the SNP
    (Socialist People's Party). At the Serb republic level, a three-way
    interim power sharing government was formed by the DOS, the SPS
    (Socialist Party of Serbia), and the Serbian Renewal Movement until the
    December 24 republic elections. Milan Milutinovic remained President of
    the Republic of Serbia.
        There are no legal restrictions that hinder women's participation
    in government and politics, and women are active in political
    organizations; however, they are underrepresented greatly in party and
    government offices, holding less than 10 percent of ministerial-level
    positions in the Serbian and Federal Governments. Until Milosevic's
    defeat, his wife Mira Markovic was an exception. She was the leading
    force in the neo-Communist Yugoslav Left Party, through which she
    exerted extraordinary and disproportionate influence on policy makers,
    including her husband. On November 27, female political activists
    announced that 10 DOS parties agreed to fill at least 30 percent of the
    places on the party list for the Serbian parliamentary elections with
    female candidates.
        There are no legal restrictions on the role of minorities in
    government and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic
    Serbs and, to a certain extent, Montenegrins dominate the country's
    political leadership. Montenegro boycotted the September 23 elections.
    Few members of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels of
    government or the state-run economy; however, Rasim Ljajic, a Sandzak
    Muslim leader, was appointed the Federal Minister for Minority Affairs
    in November. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo refused to take part in the
    electoral process at the Serbian republic and federal level, including
    most recently in federal presidential elections in September. Serbs in
    Kosovo participated in the September elections, but with low voter
    turnout.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Milosevic regime routinely hindered the activities of and
    regularly rejected the findings of human rights groups.
        A number of independent human rights organizations operate in the
    country, researching and gathering information on abuses, and
    publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and
    the Center for Antiwar Action research human rights abuses throughout
    the country and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The
    Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia publishes
    studies on human rights issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based
    Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In the
    Sandzak region, two committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim
    population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these
    organizations offer advice and help to victims of abuse.
        Throughout the summer, Serbian police cracked down on Belgrade's
    human rights NGO's, including the Helsinki Committee, the Center for
    Anti-War Action, and Women in Black Against War. Each organization
    reports that it was visited and harassed by police in an effort to
    intimidate the NGO's and document their sources of international
    support. In June police closed the offices of Women in Black Against
    War. In a related move, the premises of the Forum for Ethnic Relations
    also were shut and sealed.
        In August the Yugoslav Army announced that it would bring charges
    against Natasa Kandic, the head of the Humanitarian Law Center. The
    Yugoslav Army's Information Service alleged that Kandic breached the
    Law on Information when she published the article ``I Will Not Keep
    Quiet About Horrors'' in the independent newspaper Danas. Kandic
    published a defiant response to the army. The VJ did not initiate
    charges against Kandic, and threats and harassment against her stopped
    after October 5.
        Citing ``political activities,'' police in Leskovac removed the
    Human Rights Protection Committee from the register of social
    organizations and citizens' associations in the southern Serbian town
    in August. At the same time, criminal charges were filed against the
    director of the organization for the improper receipt of money.
        With some exceptions, the Milosevic Government's Federal Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs systematically denied visas to international
    nongovernmental human rights organizations.
        In 1999 as a result of their actions in Kosovo, the ICTY formally
    indicted as war criminals former President Milosevic and four other
    senior officials, including Serbian President Milan Milutinovic,
    Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff of the
    Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of Internal
    Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic. President Kostunica has made public
    statements that he opposes the extradition of any indictees to the
    ICTY.
        On December 11, a court in Uzice convicted and sentenced nine men
    for ``kidnaping'' indicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Stevan Todorovic
    and handing him over to NATO forces in Bosnia in September 1998. On
    December 13 in the Hague, Todorovic pled guilty to ethnic cleansing.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        While federal and republic-level laws provide for equal rights for
    all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social
    status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in practice the
    legal system provides little protection to such groups.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem and the traditionally
    high level of domestic violence persisted. The few official agencies
    dedicated to coping with family violence have inadequate resources and
    are limited in their activity by social pressure to keep families
    together at all costs. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file
    complaints with the authorities. There is no trained police unit to
    provide protection or assistance to female victims of sexual or other
    violence. The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offers a
    rape and spousal abuse hot line, as well as sponsors a number of self-
    help groups. The Center also offered help to refugee women (mostly
    Serb), many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the
    conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Criminal Code does not
    recognize spousal rape as a criminal offense; rape is defined as forced
    sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married.
        The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for
    trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women
    obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional
    patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be
    subservient to the male members of their family, long have subjected
    women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among
    minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the
    ability to exercise their right to control property and children. Women
    legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to
    the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average
    wage is 11 percent lower than the average wage of men. Women are
    granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months
    available. Women are active in political and human rights
    organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or
    no official acknowledgement.
        Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational
    needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory
    schooling. However, economic distress has affected children adversely
    in both the education and health care systems.
        Prior to the conflict in Kosovo, the division of Kosovo into
    unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems resulted
    in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being taught in
    separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in private
    shifts. Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private
    homes. The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict
    started, and the tension and division of society in general was
    replicated to the detriment of the children (see Kosovo annex).
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for
    trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities
    are inadequate and the Government did not make any efforts during the
    year to address the problem. The law prohibits discrimination against
    persons with disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision
    of other state services. The law mandates access to new official
    buildings, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
        Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely
    intertwined as to be inseparable. Incidents of discrimination against,
    and harassment of, religious minorities continued, especially in
    Serbian Sandzak.
        The Keston Institute reported that on September 26, a group of 13
    young men attacked 2 Romani women and one Romani man, all members of a
    Romani Pentecostal church in Leskovac, with sticks, bats, and chains.
    The attack took place 2 days after three young men interrupted the
    church's evening services and threatened the congregation, throwing
    firecrackers and shouting that they would force the Roma to leave town.
    The church reported the incidents to the local police, who advised them
    to file charges against the men. As of November 24, the attackers had
    not been found, but no further incidents had occurred.
        Societal violence against the Catholic minority in Vojvodina,
    largely consisting of ethnic Hungarians and Croats, was reported. In
    addition, Catholic churches frequented by the Croat minority were
    attacked, although there were few reports of this type of activity
    during the year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Albanian leaders in the
    cities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja in southeastern Serbia
    complained of discrimination by Serbian authorities. Very few ethnic
    Albanians are employed by municipal governments in the region. In part,
    the problem is due to the refusal of Serbian authorities to recognize
    the credentials of ethnic Albanians who completed their higher
    education in Kosovo under the post-1989 parallel system.
        There were incidents of official discrimination against the Romani
    population and skinheads and police occasionally violently attacked
    Roma (see Section 1.c.). The European Roma Rights Center reported that
    a group of skinheads attacked two 15-year-old Romani boys in Vranje on
    April 29. The boys were punched and beaten with baseball bats; one boy
    reported two broken ribs. In Nis a group of skinheads beat a 15-year-
    old Rom. Two of the attackers eventually were fined $10 (600 dinars).
    In May a 13-year-old Romani girl was attacked by a group of her fellow
    students and several skinheads with a knife. After the incident, police
    interrogated the girl and threatened to arrest her parents if she did
    not admit she was lying. In August several Romani families in Belgrade
    reported that skinheads repeatedly throw rocks at their houses, often
    breaking windows, shout racist insults, and threaten to set Romani
    houses on fire.
        Roma have the right to vote, and there are two small Romani parties
    in Serbia. One of the four deputy mayors In Kragujevac is a Rom.
    However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. For example, in Sabac,
    in western Serbia, Roma are barred from using a municipal swimming pool
    that is owned by the president of the local branch of the Serbian
    Radical Party. According to Human Rights Watch, on June 7, police
    leveled Roma homes in Belgrade, alleging that they were built in breach
    of zoning laws; police made racial insults and slapped and kicked some
    of the Roma who were forced out of their homes. Local authorities often
    ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.
        In Vojvodina in November police beat and threatened Hungarian
    journalist Peter Aradi. Otpor reported that police dragged Aradi from a
    table in a pizzeria where he was dining, threw him to the floor, and
    placed a gun barrel in his mouth. He then was taken to the police
    station and beaten. Before Aradi was released, the police reportedly
    forced him to kneel, hold a Bible, and ``say something in Serbian.''
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
    police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Unions
    are either official (government affiliated) or independent. The total
    labor force is approximately 2.3 million persons. The government-
    controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati,
    or SSS) claims 1.8 million members but probably numbers closer to 1
    million in reality. The largest independent union is the United Branch
    Independent Labor Unions (Nezavisnost), which has about 170,000
    members. The third largest union is the Association of Free and
    Independent Trade Unions (AFITU), which has about 50,000 members. Most
    other independent unions are sector specific, for example, the
    Independent Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor
    state of the economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term
    mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in production. The
    independent unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not
    yet reached the size needed to mount countrywide strikes. The
    independent unions also claim that the Milosevic regime prevented
    effective recruiting through a number of tactics, which included
    preventing the busing of workers to strikes, threatening the job
    security of members, and failing to grant visas to foreign visitors who
    support independent unions.
        The largely splintered approach of the independent unions has
    resulted in few achievements in terms of increased wages or improved
    working conditions. The Nezavisnost union gained new members as a
    result of its well-organized and tough bargaining positions during
    strikes of teachers and health workers in 1998 but has not led any
    strikes since then; it has focused instead on political action
    campaigns aimed at raising workers' political awareness. The official
    union lost credibility with some of its members because it ultimately
    accommodated the Milosevic regime's position on these strikes.
        The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' 2000 Annual
    Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights alleges that Serbia's labor
    laws still favor the official trade union and heavily restrict the
    right to strike. The report also alleges that the independent union
    Nezavisnost continued to face discrimination.
        The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains
    constrained.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this
    right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remains at a
    rudimentary level of development. Individual unions continue to be very
    narrow in their aims, unable to join with unions in other sectors to
    bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism in the
    country has centered not on bargaining for the collective needs of all
    workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of workers.
    Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric power
    industry employees have been ineffective in finding common denominators
    (e.g., job security protection, minimum safety standards, universal
    workers' benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall result is a
    highly fragmented labor structure composed of workers who relate to the
    needs of their individual union but rarely to those of other workers.
    Additionally, job security fears, which stem from the high rate of
    unemployment, limited workers' militancy.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
    including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
    generally is not known to occur; however, the country served as a
    source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women and
    girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in
    villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger
    children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be
    found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car
    windows or selling small items such as cigarettes, although this
    practice apparently is somewhat less widespread, since adults lacking
    other options for employment have taken many of these jobs. With an
    actual unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers
    who show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess
    of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal
    sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is
    prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls
    who are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises,
    including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies
    generally observe minimum wage standards. The monthly minimum wage is
    approximately $15 (900 dinars). However, this figure is roughly
    comparable to unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is
    paid to workers who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The
    actual minimum wage is at the low end of the range of average net
    salaries, $50 (3,000 dinars) per month. The minimum wage is
    insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. The cost of food and utilities alone for a family of four is
    estimated to be $120 (7,200 dinars) per month. According to one report,
    workers' salaries fell 34 percent during the year. Private enterprises
    use the minimum wage as a guide but tend to pay somewhat higher average
    wages.
        Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although
    some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor
    conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little
    meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
        Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
    enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
    focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the
    competition for employment and the high degree of government control
    over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work
    situations without risking the loss of their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons, and trafficking is a problem. There are laws
    that could be used to prosecute traffickers although the Milosevic
    regime showed little interest in addressing the problem. There
    continues to be little information available on trafficking, although
    Serbia is a source, transit, and destination country for women and
    girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced prostitution.
    There were no reports of individuals prosecuted for trafficking.
        Belgrade is a transit point, and to a lesser extent, a destination
    point, for trafficking in women and girls. Reportedly women from
    Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Romania are trafficked to and
    through the country. There were also reports that women were trafficked
    through the country to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they either stayed and
    were forced to work as prostitutes or were trafficked to other
    countries. Women are trafficked to Italy, Greece, Germany, the
    Netherlands, France, and other Western European countries. Women
    trafficked to Italy often are sent through Montenegro (see Montenegro
    annex).
        Women often are recruited to work abroad through advertisements for
    escort services, waitresses, and personal advertisements for marriage
    offers or lonely hearts columns, and then forced into prostitution.
    Federal legislation allows escort agencies to be registered and
    advertise; many of these agencies are involved in trafficking.
        There are no statistics available for children trafficked to other
    countries; however, the International Helsinki Federation for Human
    Rights reports that children, mostly Roma, are kidnaped and used for
    prostitution, begging, and stealing.
        There are no Government trafficking prevention programs or services
    for victims. A very small number of NGO's deal with trafficking issues.
    Awareness of human trafficking is low; however, the problem received
    some media attention.

                                     Kosovo

        Kosovo continued to be administered under the civil authority of
    the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),
    pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution
    recognized the continuing sovereignty of the Federal Republic of
    Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) over Kosovo but also called for ``substantial
    autonomy and meaningful self-administration.'' UNMIK began to establish
    a civil administration in June 1999, following the conclusion of the
    NATO military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav military,
    police, and paramilitary forces from the province. The chief
    administrator of UNMIK during the year was the Special Representative
    of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. Bernard Kouchner. Within UNMIK the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was made
    responsible for institution building, democratization, and human
    rights. To provide for greater Kosovar inclusion in civil
    administration and to circumvent the risk of quasigovernmental or
    ``shadow'' governmental entities, in February UNMIK established the
    Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). Under the direction of
    the SRSG and his designated representatives, international and local
    experts shared policy and advisory responsibility for providing social
    services and collecting revenues. On October 28, UNMIK conducted
    elections throughout Kosovo for members of municipal assemblies with
    wide participation by both political parties and voters other than
    Serbs. Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of
    movement, declined to register and boycotted the elections. Although
    there were some logistical problems and voting irregularities, the
    elections were held without significant violence or obstacles. Election
    observers concluded that they were carried out in accordance with
    international democratic standards and met the criteria for credible
    elections. The elected municipal assemblies were sworn in and took
    their seats in November; the SRSG appointed members of municipal
    assemblies in three Serb-majority municipalities where there was no
    election, and these took their seats in December. UNMIK Regulation
    1999/24 established that applicable law in Kosovo would include UNMIK
    regulations and those laws in effect in Kosovo as of March 22, 1989,
    the code in effect before the regime of Slobodan Milosevic abolished
    the political autonomy of Kosovo. This created a complex and in some
    cases incomplete set of codes. UNMIK issued a series of interim
    regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of
    governmental entities and private individuals. UNMIK regulations bound
    all public officials, including judges, to respect international human
    rights law. The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the
    legacy of ethnic conflict and Yugoslav oppression was an obstacle to
    judicial independence, and some judges and prosecutors reportedly were
    subject to outside pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic
    disputes.
        The U.N.-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (Kosovo
    Force, or KFOR), which included forces from all 19 NATO countries and
    over 20 non-NATO members, maintained internal security and defense
    against external threats. KFOR also assisted UNMIK's multinational
    civilian police corps (U.N. International Police, or CIVPOL) in its
    role as uniformed and criminal police. Of 4,718 regular, border, and
    special police positions authorized for Kosovo, contributing countries
    deployed about 4,000. The OSCE-run Kosovo Police Academy trained over
    3,000 local police officers for the newly established Kosovo Police
    Service (KPS). The KPS partnered with CIVPOL in field training. CIVPOL
    later began to transfer basic policing functions to KPS in some areas,
    while continuing to provide oversight. Several hundred additional KPS
    recruits continued training, and the OSCE was on schedule to have over
    4,000 KPS trained by the spring of 2001. The Kosovo Protection Corps
    (KPC), a civilian emergency preparedness service agency that
    incorporated disarmed former fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army
    (KLA), began training to respond to civil and medical emergencies. The
    International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated several
    dozen humanitarian projects for the KPC, often in collaboration with
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Some members of KFOR, CIVPOL,
    and the KPC occasionally committed abuses.
        A long history of mismanagement by Yugoslav Federal and Serbian
    authorities left the economy in poor condition even before armed
    conflict resulted in the massive destruction of property and economic
    enterprises. Key industries before the conflict were mining,
    metallurgy, and related manufacturing enterprise. The prewar economy
    also had a substantial agrarian sector. Unemployment among the
    predominantly ethnic Albanian population was estimated at 62 percent.
    Unemployment rates were much higher among Serb and other minority
    communities, although some Serbs continued to receive stipends or
    pensions from Yugoslavia. International organizations and donors
    continued their programs to improve the infrastructure and provide a
    regulatory climate conducive to enterprise and investment. About 70
    percent of small and medium-sized private enterprises restarted
    activities. However, the instability of the region, coupled with the
    destruction of property records and a still weak legal and regulatory
    framework, caused private capital investment to lag. The privatization
    of state enterprises stalled pending the resolution of significant
    property issues. Domestic energy generation capacity was about 50
    percent of demand, and energy import arrangements remained uncertain.
    Remittances from relatives abroad and foreign aid were important
    sources of national income. Significant criminal economic activity took
    place, especially in the fuel sector. International financial
    institutions estimated gross domestic product at less than $400 per
    capita.
        UNMIK generally adhered to international human rights standards in
    its administration of the province; however, serious problems remained,
    largely as a result of ongoing interethnic tensions. A few killings
    resulted from attacks that appeared to be politically motivated.
    Citizens continued to be killed by landmines planted by combatants
    during the 1999 conflict. Some kidnapings and disappearances continued.
    Approximately 3,600 persons also were missing and unaccounted for as a
    result of the armed conflict in 1999, including approximately 2,750
    Albanians, 500 Serbs, and 300 members of other ethnic groups. The
    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
    exhumed 3,620 remains in 1999 and 2000, of which about 1,260 remains
    were still unidentified. There were some reports of the excessive use
    of force by KFOR and CIVPOL during arrests. Early in the year some KPC
    members were accused of committing incidents of intimidation and
    extortion. In the course of carrying out their law and order
    enforcement functions, KFOR and CIVPOL at times used arbitrary arrest
    and detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. The
    judiciary was subject to bias and outside influence, particularly in
    interethnic cases, and did not always ensure due process. Some
    newspapers engaged in hate speech or printed articles providing
    personal details of alleged war criminals or collaborators. After some
    of those individuals were attacked, UNMIK issued a temporary regulation
    that prohibited articles that might encourage criminal activity or
    violence. Some observers in both the local and international media
    criticized this regulation as an infringement of freedom of the press.
    In order to prevent the potential for large, unruly gatherings, UNMIK
    occasionally limited freedom of assembly. There were some limits on
    freedom of movement. Over 150,000 Kosovar Albanians returned to the
    province during the year; only a few ethnic Serbs and other minorities
    returned. Rape, violence, and discrimination against women remained
    serious problems. Religious tension and violence continued. Ethnic
    Albanians destroyed approximately 20 Serbian Orthodox churches during
    the year, with a total of 100 destroyed since June 1999 in retaliation
    for Yugoslav troops' earlier destruction of mosques. Societal violence
    against ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other minorities was widespread, but
    decreased somewhat during the year. A total of 245 civilians were
    killed and 522 cases of arson were reported during the year. Most
    murders of minorities were rooted in ethnic retaliation; other killings
    more often were connected to criminal enterprise, political
    factionalism, and private feuds. Societal discrimination continued to
    target Roma, in retaliation for the group's alleged collusion with
    Serbs in the period before and during the NATO bombing campaign. The
    approximately 100,000 Serbs who remained in Kosovo live primarily in
    the north or in enclaves under the protection of KFOR. While a few
    Serbs and other minorities who left Kosovo in 1999 came back, security
    conditions did not permit large-scale organized returns. Worker rights
    are not developed fully, and child labor persists. Trafficking in women
    and girls to and through the province was a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--KFOR forces killed
    several individuals during operations. UNMIK and military authorities
    investigated these killings, but found no circumstances in which those
    responsible had acted improperly. On February 15, snipers wounded two
    KFOR soldiers. The soldiers responded by killing an Albanian and
    wounding at least four persons whom they said were firing at them from
    the rooftops. More than 35 other Albanians were detained on suspicion
    of involvement in the sniping. In August KFOR troops killed two
    Albanian males, claiming self-defense; some reports suggested that the
    two Albanians were shot in the back, and KFOR relieved at least one
    soldier of his duties pending investigation. On December 17, in
    Leposavic (Leposaviq), \2\ two Serbs were killed and one wounded after
    rioters protesting the arrest of a Serb man for the attempted murder of
    a KPS officer surrounded a U.N. police station guarded by KFOR soldiers
    and took seven KFOR soldiers hostage. One Serb was killed by gunfire; a
    KFOR commander reported that soldiers had fired warning shots that may
    have ricocheted and hit a protester. The other Serb died of a heart
    attack.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\  Throughout this report, dual town names are given: The Serb
    town name, followed by the Albanian name in parenthesis, except where
    towns universally are known by one name.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In January authorities accused a KFOR soldier, Sergeant Frank
    Ronghi, of raping and killing a 12-year old Albanian girl. A military
    tribunal subsequently convicted Ronghi and sentenced him to life in
    prison.
        In July 1999, KFOR arrested three members of a Kosovo Serb family
    for shooting and killing an Albanian man and wounding a second. In July
    the court trying the case heard credible evidence from KFOR that KFOR
    snipers were responsible for the shootings when called to the scene of
    an altercation (see Section 1.d.).
        Several killings appeared to be politically motivated. Some
    killings and attacks apparently were related to the October municipal
    elections. The majority of reported political intimidation attempts,
    which included drive-by shootings, kidnaping, and arson, were said to
    be aimed at representatives of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),
    led by Ibrahim Rugova, although other political parties subsequently
    reported nonlethal attacks as well. The LDK's rival, the Democratic
    Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaci, the former head of the KLA,
    often was cited as being behind the attacks, although nonpolitical
    motives including clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for
    economic resources also were suspected in some cases. UNMIK police
    rarely were able identify perpetrators. Human Rights Watch (HRW)
    reported that on June 15, two men wearing KLA badges killed senior LDK
    politician Alil Dreshaj. On August 4, the burned body of Shaban Manaj,
    an LDK politician and lawyer from Istok (Istog), was discovered
    following his disappearance 2 weeks earlier. On November 23, Xhemail
    Mustafa, cofounder of the LDK and President Rugova's press adviser was
    killed by unknown gunmen in the stairwell of his apartment building in
    Pristina. No arrests had been made by year's end. Attacks against LDK
    functionaries occurred in most other regions of the province as well.
        Unknown assailants killed two former KLA officers in April and May,
    respectively, shooting Besim Mala, also known as ``Commander Murrizi,''
    in the streets of Pristina, and Ekrem Rexha, also known as ``Drini,''
    in Prizren. UNMIK police attributed their killings to business
    disputes, rather than political motives. On July 12, a supporter of
    Ramush Haradinaj, a politician and former senior KLA commander, was
    murdered. On September 20, police found the body of Skender Gashi, a
    KPC officer and former KLA commander, in Orahovac (Rahovec); he had
    disappeared 2 days earlier. Local speculation included political,
    ethnic, and criminal motives for these killings, while the police
    attributed the murders to personal disputes.
        Unknown assailants killed one journalist, Shefki Popova, in
    September in Vucitrn (Vushtrri) (see Section 2.a.). Popova was listed
    as a Social Democratic Party candidate in Vucitrn (Vushtrri)'s
    municipal elections.
        The number of killings in the province decreased from the total
    recorded up to June 1999, when Yugoslav armed forces and Serbian police
    withdrew from the province, and also from the total recorded in the
    second half of 1999, about 400 killings. According to available
    figures, there were 245 murders during the year, including 146
    Albanians, 55 Serbs, 9 Bosniaks, 12 Roma, and 23 of unknown or
    ``other'' category, including 2 KFOR soldiers. U.N. police made arrests
    in only 2 to 3 percent of murder cases. Most murders of Serbs and other
    minorities were ethnically motivated (see Section 5), but the majority
    of murders of Albanians apparently were connected to family and
    economic rivalries and criminal activities.
        On February 29 in Srbica (Skenderaj), a Kosovar Albanian, Faton
    Hajrizi, killed a KFOR soldier. Hajrizi was arrested for the killing a
    number of times during the year and escaped from prison. He was
    rearrested in December and remained in custody at year's end. A second
    KFOR soldier was found dead, a presumed homicide, at the end of April;
    no perpetrator has been identified.
        Rexhep Luci, Pristina's director of urban planning, was killed in
    September. Kosovars and outside observers attributed the killing to
    Luci's role in heading up UNMIK's program to tear down illegal
    construction. Local commentators expressed grave concern that the
    killing would hinder efforts by Kosovar officials to establish civil
    order.
        On November 22, an explosion at the Pristina residence of Stanimir
    Vukicevic, the Yugoslav representative in Kosovo, killed one man and
    injured three others. The attack apparently was intended to protest the
    participation of Kosovo in the December Serbian parliamentary
    elections.
        In December 1999, an ethnic Albanian former judge was killed. He
    had worked in the Serbian judicial system.
        The International Crisis Group reported that in November 1999, five
    persons were abducted and killed by persons claiming either to be
    members of the Provisional KPC or the Policia Ushtarake, the KLA's
    military police, which was outlawed by UNMIK. Their bodies were found
    around the KLA compound in Lukare, north of Pristina. Four were
    identified; three as Roma, one as an Albanian woman. All four had been
    accused locally of having ``collaborated'' with Serb forces.
        Although there was credible evidence of Yugoslav agents and special
    forces teams in Kosovo, there were no confirmed reports of killings by
    Yugoslav or official Serbian forces inside the province.
        Some Kosovar Serbs continued efforts begun in 1999 to expel
    Albanians and other ethnic groups from the northern part of Mitrovica.
    In February, during an increase in violence in that city, groups of
    Serbs, reportedly including Serbian police, attacked ethnic Albanians
    on several occasions, killing eight civilians. The attacks were viewed
    as retaliation for a grenade attack on a U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) bus that killed two Serbs traveling from Mitrovica.
    During the month of February, over 1,500 Albanians, Muslim Slavs, and
    Turks fled their homes in the north side of the city, and Serbs
    withdrew from southern Mitrovica, where they were a minority (see
    Section 5).
        As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, certain rural areas of the
    province were filled with unexploded landmines and ordnance. Landmines
    and ordnance explosions killed 93 persons from June 1999 to April and
    injured more than 300. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC)
    in Pristina accredited 16 international demining organizations in
    Kosovo. Well over 1,000 persons were involved in the demining effort in
    the province, clearing 8,980 mines, 4,932 cluster bomb units, and 5,774
    other ordnance. KFOR and MACC cleared over 16,000 houses, 1,165
    schools, 1,056 miles of roads, and 124 miles of rail tracks.
    International organizations and NGO's undertook a widespread public
    education campaign on mines.
        Virtually no town or settlement escaped the effects of the
    Milosevic regime's campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999, with reports
    of dozens, sometimes hundreds, of civilians murdered in each town.
    Kosovo's still fragile investigative, judicial, and penal systems, in
    addition to ICTY, worked to ensure that perpetrators were identified
    and punished. Beginning in mid-1999, the ICTY began its program inside
    Kosovo, and carried out investigations in support of ongoing and future
    proceedings against presumed war criminals, including exhuming mass
    graves to permit the identification of victims of the war and ethnic
    cleansing. By year's end, the ICTY completed the exhumation of remains,
    begun in 1999, of some 529 graves, uncovering for identification the
    remains of 3,600 persons over the 2-season exhumation period. In May
    UNMIK issued a regulation establishing the Victim Recovery and
    Identification Commission (VRIC), primarily charged with identification
    of remains. Working with families on the basis of information they
    provided, details of the events, and the recovery of clothing and
    personal effects, the VRIC was able to positively identify victims. The
    remains of about 1,400 victims were unidentified at year's end.
        UNMIK suspended efforts to create a local Kosovo War and Ethnic
    Crimes Court due to lack of funding, concern over the scope of its
    mandate, and possible redundancy in view of the presence of
    international judges.
        Proceedings began in the Kosovo courts to adjudicate about 40 cases
    of alleged war crimes and genocide arising from the conflict, as well
    as murder cases dating from the period starting in June 1999. Of these,
    one war crimes case was decided on September 20, with the conviction in
    Gnjilane (Gjilan) of Kosovar Serb Milos Jokic for murder, attempted
    murder, and rape. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
        b. Disappearance.--Individual disappearances and kidnapings
    continued. In June an angry crowd of Serbs attacked UNMIK offices in
    Strpce (Shterpce) over the disappearance of a Serb shepherd. Marjan
    Melonasi, a journalist for Radio-Television Kosova who was half
    Serbian, disappeared in Pristina around September 9 (see Section 2.a.).
    Human rights organizations and police confirmed the kidnaping or
    disappearance of several young women each month. Most but not all of
    these victims reportedly eventually reappeared or were found, many
    after they were raped.
        As a result of the 1999 armed conflict, and despite the efforts of
    the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the ICTY, and
    other local and international organizations, the fate of over 3,600
    persons (2,750 Albanians presumed taken by Serbs, 500 Serbs presumed
    taken by Albanians, and 300 members of other ethnic groups) remained
    unknown at year's end. Withdrawing Yugoslav forces also took more than
    2,000 Albanian detainees with them into Serbia; Serbian authorities
    released over 1,300 by year's end, reputedly after payment to Serb
    middlemen by detainees' families in most cases.
        Both the ICTY and the VRIC, assisted by other international
    governmental and nongovernmental entities, continued their work to
    identify bodies exhumed from mass gravesites (see Section 1.a.). ICTY
    and other international experts did not expect to find many new mass
    graves. A clear gap continued between the 1,260 unidentified remains
    and the 3,600 persons reported to the ICRC as missing and unaccounted
    for at year's end. Efforts by governments, international organizations,
    and NGO's to determine the fate of these missing persons, including
    through pressure on Yugoslavia, did not lead to any results.
        In August the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights named a
    Special Envoy for Persons Deprived of Liberty in Connection with the
    Armed Conflict in Kosovo. In September the SRSG announced the
    establishment of an office in Pristina for detainees and missing
    persons.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
    punishment, and CIVPOL and KFOR largely respected the law in practice;
    however, there were sporadic reports of the use of excessive force
    during arrests and other abuses. Military authorities reported in
    September that nine members of a KFOR unit, including four officers,
    were disciplined following an investigation into allegations of
    excessive force, beating of suspects, and sexual assault on women at
    checkpoints and while on patrol. KFOR used tear gas to disperse a
    peaceful demonstration in Mitrovica (see Section 2.b.).
        Some reports suggested that KPC members were responsible for
    incidents of intimidation and extortion, and in several zones such
    misconduct may have been organized and condoned by the local KPC
    leadership. In response UNMIK and KFOR put into place a KPC
    disciplinary code and a compliance enforcement framework, which
    assigned responsibility for investigating and disciplining KPC
    compliance violations and criminal actions. At KFOR's insistence, all
    six KPC zone commanders were rotated in October. By the end of the
    year, documented instances of KPC non-compliance had decreased
    significantly.
        International organizations reported that in the first half of
    1999, Serb forces subjected ethnic Albanian women to illegal
    confinement, rape and other forms of torture. ICTY has ruled that the
    definition of war crimes includes the Serb use of rape and sexual
    assault against ethnic Albanians. Kidnapings and mass rapes occurred in
    Djakovica (Gjakova), Pec (Peja), and Drenica, using local hotels and
    army camps as mass rape sites, and gang rapes of women occurred in
    their homes or on the side of the road. Assailants killed male family
    members who tried to intervene and women who tried to escape. According
    to credible information, individual KLA soldiers and other Albanians
    raped Serb and Roma women in the months following Yugoslavia's
    withdrawal in 1999. Since then, police have registered over 95
    individual rape and attempted rape complaints, but there has been no
    strong ethnic pattern, nor evidence to suggest organized sexual abuse
    of minority women. However, rape is underreported significantly due to
    the cultural stigma attached to victims and their families (see Section
    5).
        Numerous attacks on political figures, particularly members of the
    LDK, were reported, both before and after the October municipal
    elections (see Section 3). In most cases, no suspects were found;
    however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the rival PDK
    party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including clan
    rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also were
    suspected in some cases.
        In early December, unknown assailants attempted to kill Hajvas
    Berisha, a former commander of the KLA and a KPS member, in Pristina.
    UNMIK arrested three of the alleged assailants; however, because the
    case involved a family blood feud, no charges were filed against the
    assailants because the case was settled out of court through
    traditional Albanian feud mediation methods.
        KFOR arrested a group of Serbs in Gracanica in September in
    possession of a large cache of explosives and arms. The Serbs
    reportedly were planning terrorist acts against UNMIK and other
    international entities. Two were reportedly officers of a special
    forces unit of the Yugoslav Army (VJ).
        There were some reports of attacks and intimidation of UNMIK and
    KFOR officials. In February, a KFOR soldier was shot by unknown
    assailants while escorting Serb children from school in Gnjilane
    (Gjilan), apparently in retribution for the killing of two Albanian
    males by KFOR soldiers earlier in the year. On September 12, Vjosa
    Dobruna, the Kosovar co-chair of the Department of Civil Society and
    Democratic Governance, reported that her car was broken into and moved
    from its parking place; nothing was missing or stolen. On December 7,
    Serbs beat a U.N. policeman during an inspection of suspected weapons
    caches in northern Mitrovica. On December 19, unknown persons attacked
    the UNMIK building in Zubin Potok with automatic gunfire and grenades.
        Prison conditions meet prisoners' basic needs of food, sanitation,
    and access to medical care; however, facilities are in need of further
    refurbishment and repair. Some facilities are overcrowded. UNMIK
    established the Kosovo Correction Service (KCS), and the OSCE provided
    training for over 400 of a planned force of 700-plus corrections
    officers. The KCS, which included international corrections experts as
    interim administrators, operated 3 prisons in Prizren (with a capacity
    100 inmates), Dubrava (with a capacity of 520), and Lipljan (Lipjan).
    The latter is to be restricted to women and juveniles and eventually
    after further renovation is to offer space for mentally disturbed
    prisoners and detainees after further renovation. CIVPOL and KFOR
    operated four additional detention centers in Pristina, Mitrovica, Pec
    (Peja), and Gnjilane (Gjilan). KFOR also held detainees accused of war
    crimes and serious ethnic offenses at Camp Bondsteel, but planned to
    turn over all detention responsibilities to the KCS by early 2001. In
    the absence of currently suitable detention facilities for mentally
    disturbed prisoners, police released a visibly disturbed female
    detainee from the Mitrovica detention center on August 22; she
    reportedly committed suicide 3 days later.
        Male and female prisoners are separated, and there is a separate
    facility in Lipljan (Lipjan) for females and juveniles, but there have
    been cases of older youths who have been held with the general adult
    population.
        Prisons and detention centers permitted the ICRC full access to
    prisoners and detainees. In the absence of a formal agreement but
    pursuant to OSCE's mandate for human rights monitoring under UNSCR
    1244, they also offered ad hoc access to the OSCE human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Under UNMIK regulation
    1999/24, issued in December 1999, which incorporated a local law in
    effect as of March 1989 and current practice, police may detain
    criminal suspects for up to 72 hours without charging them or granting
    them access to an attorney; however, in many cases, sources reported
    that CIVPOL used the 72-hour detention authority as a means of minor
    punishment with no intention of filing charges. The applicable rules of
    criminal procedure permit pretrial detention for up to 6 months, but
    UNMIK has decreed by regulation that this period may be extended by up
    to an additional 6 months in specific circumstances, in the case of
    crimes punishable by a sentence of over 5 years.
        In some instances, the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) intervened to
    continue the detention of persons ordered released by the courts but
    deemed an ongoing security threat. In July the prosecutor in Gnjilane
    (Gjilan) declined to press charges against Afrim Zeqiri, an ethnic
    Albanian accused of shooting three Serbs in May, including a child, and
    an international judge complied with the order to release him (see
    Section 5). Given the ethnic sensitivity of the case, UNMIK asked KFOR
    to hold the accused pending review by an international prosecutor. The
    case has since gone before another panel of ethnic Albanian judges, and
    was found without merit. Zeqiri has not been released. COMKFOR also
    held until July two ethnic Albanians accused of killing two Serbs in
    July 1999, despite the fact that the Pristina district court ordered
    their release in November 1999. Some accused persons were held for
    several months pending the five district courts' becoming operational
    in January and February. For example, in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district, 12
    defendants accused of serious crimes were awaiting trial when the court
    began hearing cases in February; most of these had been in detention
    for some time, some as long as 7 months. In May 41 Serb and Roma
    prisoners in Mitrovica went on a hunger strike for several weeks to
    protest the delay in holding their trials.
        Some observers argued that ethnic bias played a significant role in
    abuses of due process. In July 1999, authorities arrested three members
    of the Serb Momcilovic family accused of killing an Albanian and
    wounding another. The newly appointed prosecutor for Gnjilane (Gjilan)
    indicted the three in January; their trial took place in April,
    subsequently was adjourned, and did not reconvene until the end of
    July. Although at that point there was evidence exonerating the
    defendants of murder, the court ordered further gathering of evidence
    before convicting them on weapons charges in August and sentencing them
    to time served. In the meantime, the other 11 (ethnic Albanian)
    defendants awaiting a functioning court in Gnjilane (Gjilan) were tried
    in February. Observers also argued that the Momcilovics' detention was
    prolonged unnecessarily due to the court's refusal in April to admit a
    video that tended to exonerate them, and to KFOR's failure to perform a
    sufficiently detailed investigation into the initial incident and
    transmit the evidence in a timely manner.
        Some 300 persons remained in pretrial detention in CIVPOL and KCS
    prisons and detention facilities and 57 persons remained in KFOR
    detention.
        At the end of the year, the Yugoslav authorities continued to
    detain approximately 700 Kosovar Albanians in prison in Serbia, charged
    with alleged crimes arising from the Kosovo conflict. Federal and
    Serbian laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the
    Government, and terrorism are vague and were abused by the Milosevic
    regime. Yugoslav authorities released over 1,300 detainees, allegedly
    through the payment of bribes in some cases. The ICRC was able to gain
    permission for some family members to visit detainees in Serbia under
    restricted conditions.
        There were no reports of political detainees.
        Exile is not permitted legally, and there were no reported
    instances of its use. However, the continued fear of ethnic Serbs and
    other minorities of revenge against them by Kosovar Albanians led large
    numbers to leave Kosovo (about 150,000 Serbs left during and after
    Yugoslavia's withdrawal), sometimes more or less voluntarily and
    sometimes under harassment by Albanians. The departure of Serbs and
    other minorities continued throughout the year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Applicable law provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the legacy of ethnic conflict and years
    of Yugoslav oppression were an obstacle to judicial independence, and
    some judges and prosecutors reportedly were subject to outside
    pressure, particularly in cases involving ethnic disputes.
        Supported by an Advisory Judicial Commission, UNMIK re-established
    a court system in Kosovo that included the Supreme Court, 5 district
    courts, 18 municipal courts, the Commercial Court, 13 offices of the
    Public Prosecutor, and a number of courts for minor offenses. Of those
    officials appointed by the UNMIK SRSG, 324 judges and 52 prosecutors
    began work, as well as 377 lay judges to assess the facts of the case.
    The judicial corps is almost exclusively Albanian; 8 of 12 Serbian
    appointees refused to serve. UNMIK also appointed members of other
    minorities, who are serving.
        Approximately 15 UNMIK-appointed international judges and
    prosecutors work in the district courts alongside local judges in
    sensitive ethnic cases. UNMIK planned for at least two international
    judges and one international prosecutor in each of the five judicial
    districts. UNMIK appointed 405 judges and prosecutorial personnel and
    refurbished judicial facilities. Courts in all five districts began
    operations.
        The law provides for the right of defendants to be present at their
    trials and to have legal representation, at public expense if
    necessary; however, local judicial and legal personnel by and large had
    not worked in the legal system since 1989, and the full exercise of
    defendants' rights was not ensured.
        The defense bar was weak and disorganized as well as rooted in a
    more passive approach to defense due to years of practice under
    Socialist and authoritarian codes. A program was underway to improve
    the bar at year's end. Legal personnel were in the initial stages of
    learning and applying international human rights laws and conventions.
    Since UNMIK and the Kosovar legal community have not approved a new bar
    examination, recent law students and legal personnel may not practice.
        Serb lawyers and judges refused to participate in the judicial
    system established by UNMIK, reportedly encouraged by the Milosevic
    regime not to accept the Kosovo system by participating in it. This
    practice effectively denied adequate representation and due process to
    Serb defendants.
        When they began hearing cases in January and February, the courts
    faced a high backlog of criminal cases of all kinds. By June the courts
    had tried 695 criminal cases, the vast majority of them petty crimes
    and crimes against property; only 13 of them were murder cases, and
    most resulted in fines or prison sentences under 6 months. An update on
    the number of cases tried was unavailable at year's end.
        There was a perception by human rights observers that in cases with
    Serb defendants or victims, a fair trial was unlikely due to ethnic
    bias. In July two Kosovar Albanians allegedly shot and injured three
    Serb Orthodox clerics (see Sections 2.a. and 5). Police arrested the
    accused, who were charged with attempted murder. When confusion and
    miscommunication led the victims missing a court date, the Albanian
    judge and prosecutor ordered the release of the defendants from
    pretrial detention. The court president subsequently rescheduled the
    hearing, and UNMIK assigned an international prosecutor to the case.
        After the NATO campaign and Yugoslavia's withdrawal from Kosovo,
    Kosovar Albanian judges were unanimous in rejecting Yugoslav and
    Serbian law. On December 12, 1999, UNMIK issued Regulation 1999/24,
    which defined applicable law in Kosovo to include both UNMIK
    regulations and legal codes in effect as of March 1989, when Kosovo
    lost its autonomy. Local legal and judicial personnel were enjoined to
    apply the Kosovo code in effect in 1989 first, and to proceed to the
    Yugoslav and Serbian codes to the extent that the first was incomplete.
    UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 bound all public officials to respect
    international human rights laws and conventions; although they
    initially largely were unacquainted with these, international
    organizations and NGO's implemented programs to increase awareness and
    application.
        Kosovar and European legal experts reviewed the compilation of
    applicable criminal law to ensure compliance with generally accepted
    international standards. Legal experts then reviewed a criminal code
    for Kosovo based on the regulation's guidance, but have not yet issued
    the new codes.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Under UNMIK, authorities generally respected these
    rights; however, individuals occasionally accused KFOR and U.N. Police
    of using excessive force and improper behavior in executing weapons
    searches in private homes, including breaking down doors and destroying
    personal property.
        In Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to
    seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house
    occupations during the summer months. Albanians in the southern part of
    Mitrovica continued to refuse Serbs access to their property there as
    well. Civilians were also responsible for the destruction, often
    through arson, of private property (see Section 5). There were a
    growing number of credible reports of violence and intimidation being
    used to force Serbs to sell their homes to Albanians at attractive
    prices.
        Respect for private property rights has proved problematic.
    Withdrawing Yugoslav forces destroyed most existing property records
    and this, combined with the disruption of 10 years of Serbian
    authoritarianism and discrimination and the massive property
    destruction during the conflict, cast doubt over how current occupants
    of vacated properties could remain where they were living, how owners
    could reclaim rightfully their property, where returnees and internally
    displaced persons (IDP's) could live and build, and how potential
    investors could gain title to land before investing significant sums.
    UNMIK created by regulation the Housing and Property Directorate and
    the Housing and Property Claims Commission responsible for resolving
    property issues and adjudicating disputes including claims for
    restitution of property lost through discrimination, requests for
    registration of informal property transaction, and claims by refugees
    and IDP's who lost their property. However, the Directorate and only
    had offices in Pristina, although with mobile teams heard disputes
    elsewhere. The regulation setting up the Housing and Property Claims
    Commission removed court jurisdiction over private (as opposed to
    commercial) property disputes. As a result, most property disputes
    remained unresolved. There were locally administered ad hoc solutions,
    and unregulated construction proceeded even as solutions for those
    persons without accommodation still were lacking.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--UNMIK regulations provide a
    framework for recognition of these rights, prohibit hate speech, and
    regulate media conduct; however, local media and some international
    media organizations and attorneys criticized UNMIK regulations on
    speech and the press as undemocratic and an infringement on the freedom
    of speech and of the press.
        UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 requires that public officials respect
    international human rights laws and conventions, including the
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes freedom of
    speech and of the press. Through its regulation establishing the
    Department of Post and Telecommunications, UNMIK asserts control over
    broadcasting infrastructure; the OSCE oversees the Department of Media
    Affairs. In February UNMIK issued Regulation 2000/4, which prohibited
    hate speech and speech that incites ethnic violence.
        In June UNMIK issued Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37 on the conduct
    and organization of both broadcast and print media and established the
    office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) and the Media Appeals
    Board. The TMC is responsible for publishing a broadcast code of
    conduct and issuing licenses, for issuing temporary codes of conduct
    for print media, and for imposing sanctions, up to and including
    closing down offending media organs, in the event of violations of
    UNMIK regulations or published codes of conduct.
        Newspapers resumed publishing, and by year's end, there were seven
    daily newspapers and seven weeklies or monthlies. All newspapers
    published in Kosovo were printed in Albanian; journals in Serbo-
    Croatian were printed elsewhere and imported. The main dailies are
    aligned with different political parties. While flourishing, the print
    media often acted irresponsibly, publishing inflammatory articles that
    provided personal data including names and addresses of alleged war
    criminals or collaborators and inciting violence against political
    personalities. For example, the daily Dita published an article on
    Petar Topoljski, an UNMIK Serb employee who subsequently was murdered
    (see Section 5). In reaction UNMIK promulgated Regulations 2000/36 and
    2000/37, which prohibited the publication in both the print and
    broadcast media of personal information that would pose a threat to the
    life, property, or security of persons through vigilante justice or
    otherwise.
        In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The
    Orthodox Church denied that photographs published with the article
    depicted any known priests. Two ethnic Albanians subsequently attacked
    and injured a priest and two seminarians, (see Sections 1.e. and 5).
    The newly appointed TMC fined the newspaper $12,200 (DM 25,000). In its
    decision on Dita's appeal of the fine, the Media Appeals Board ruled
    that since the situation in Kosovo approximated a state of emergency,
    UNMIK's regulation did not violate international human rights laws and
    that Dita's article violated the UNMIK Regulation. However, the Board
    decided that the TMC did not apply proper procedures in fining Dita,
    and overturned the penalty.
        At year's end, there were over 50 radio and 9 television stations.
    While the television broadcasts were exclusively in Albanian, several
    radio stations broadcast in Serbo-Croatian for a Serbian audience, and
    others, notably Radio Kontact (which also broadcast in Albanian,
    Turkish, and English) aimed at a broader multiethnic audience.
        There were some attacks on journalists. Radio Kontakt was the
    target of a grenade attack on April 17. On June 20, Valentina Cukic, an
    editor of Serbian language programming for Radio Kontakt, was shot and
    wounded in Pristina while wearing her KFOR press identification. Radio
    Kontakt previously had sought protection from CIVPOL, KFOR, and the
    OSCE in response to threats and violence against the station, which
    promotes multiethnic programming. In response, CIVPOL provided
    protection details for Radio Kontakt personnel, as well as security at
    the station premises. A writer for the daily Bota Sot claimed that an
    unknown assailant threw an explosive device into his yard in Prizren in
    August. In September unknown assailants shot, stabbed, and killed
    Shefki Popova, a newspaper reporter, outside his apartment in Vucitrn
    (Vushtrri). A radio journalist, Marjan Melonasi, disappeared the same
    weekend (see Section 1.b.). In October Dita reported that LDK
    sympathizers on their way to a rally near Urosevac (Ferizaj) beat a
    radio reporter. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the intimidation of
    journalists, like other public figures, is underreported due to
    concerns for personal safety.
        The University of Pristina was in full operation beginning with the
    2000-01 academic year, with new and pre-1989 staff. The university
    terminated and expelled six professors who cooperated with Yugoslavia
    by teaching after 1989, when Kosovo lost its autonomy and a shadow
    education system was established. UNMIK respected academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--UNMIK generally
    respected freedom of assembly; however, occasionally it limited this
    right.
        On February 11, in Mitrovica Serbs in the northern part of the city
    violently forced Albanians out of their homes, killing eight in the
    process. Approximately 100,000 Albanian Kosovars marched in protest to
    Mitrovica from Pristina and other towns en route. Although the march
    itself was peaceful, KFOR prevented any attempt by the marchers to
    cross the bridge over the Ibar River into north Mitrovica and used tear
    gas to disperse those demonstrators who would not leave the bridge area
    at the end of the march.
        Several demonstrations protested against UNMIK and the
    international community for not doing enough to locate missing persons,
    including a May hunger strike by about 15 persons in Pristina. In
    September about 60 persons who had been released from detention in
    Serbia went on a hunger strike in Dubrava to protest the continued
    detention of ethnic Albanians by the Belgrade regime.
        In September local civil society representatives, joined by
    political parties and international representatives, organized a ``Day
    Against Violence'' as one element of reconciliation initiatives
    discussed at an overseas conference in July on reconciliation.
        In its regulations governing the definitions of and registration
    requirements for both political parties and NGO's, UNMIK stated
    specifically that such regulations did not affect the right to
    association and UNMIK generally respected this right.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--UNMIK respected the right to freedom of
    religion, and Regulation 1999/24 binds local officials to respect this
    right under international human rights laws and conventions.
        The effects of the Milosevic regime's oppression in Kosovo still
    are felt strongly. While the Milosevic regime and its local
    paramilitaries targeted persons and properties based largely on
    ethnicity, most Albanians are Muslims, and Yugoslav forces destroyed or
    damaged a number of mosques and other Islamic facilities prior to their
    withdrawal in June 1999. Given the strong association between Serbs and
    the Serbian Orthodox Church, ethnic Albanians attacked churches as
    symbols of the Serbian regime. Following Yugoslavia's withdrawal in
    1999, over 100 Serbian Orthodox churches were burned or destroyed in
    retaliation (see Section 5). In light of societal violence against
    properties owned by the Orthodox Church, UNMIK authorities took steps
    in the months following the conflict to ensure that members of all
    religious groups could worship safely, including deploying KFOR
    security contingents at Orthodox religious sites throughout the
    province. Because the security situation improved at the end of the
    year, KFOR began transferring responsibility for security at a very
    limited number of Orthodox churches to CIVPOL and the KPS.
        In July Dita accused Serbian Orthodox priests of war crimes. The
    Orthodox Church denied that photographs published with the article
    depicted any known priests. Two ethnic Albanians subsequently attacked
    and injured a priest and two seminarians, (see Sections 1.e., 2.a., and
    5).
        Kosovo's leading Orthodox cleric, Bishop Artemije, continued to
    reside in Gracanica, near Pristina, citing safety concerns, rather than
    in the diocesan seat in Prizren. Other leading Orthodox clerics also
    left their home parishes to reside in Gracanica.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Applicable law provides for freedom of
    movement; however, both the aftermath of war and practical obstacles
    restricted such movement in practice. Serbian and Yugoslav forces
    carried out a deliberate campaign of ``identity cleansing'' during the
    war, confiscating and destroying citizen identification documents and
    destroying the central and municipal archives and civil registers, with
    the result that many Kosovars had no documentation of identity. Some
    persons who retained Yugoslav passports found them invalid or
    unrecognized by neighboring countries due to the war. UNMIK published a
    regulation in March that authorized the Central Civil Registry to issue
    travel documents to any person registered as a habitual resident of
    Kosovo. The complexities of registering mass numbers of persons without
    any personal documentation drew out the process. In the interim, the
    SRSG issued individual travel letters in limited cases, but only a few
    countries recognized these documents. In September the U. N. submitted
    a sample travel document to member states for approval. However,
    because UNMIK was unable to issue identity cards until the end of the
    year, new travel documents were not issued.
        While precise figures are unavailable, substantial numbers of Serbs
    and Roma fled Kosovo following the conflict. Many displaced Serbs did
    not register with international agencies, but there are estimates of up
    to 150,000 Kosovar Serbs in Serbia, with an undetermined small
    additional number in Macedonia and approximately 30,000 displaced
    Kosovar Serbs, Roma, and other minorities in Montenegro. Numbers of
    displaced Roma are also difficult to estimate, although some sources
    report that as many as 25,000 Roma fled Kosovo in the aftermath of the
    conflict. Most did not return. Those who remained in Kosovo or who did
    return led lives restricted by the ethnic threats from some of their
    Albanian neighbors (see Section 5).
        After Milosevic withdrew Yugoslav troops in June 1999, the UNHCR
    oversaw the return of some 882,000 Kosovar refugees and IDP's from
    surrounding regions and other countries; about 150,000 have returned
    since the beginning of the year. While UNMIK and the international
    community were able to address many of the most pressing problems of
    the returnees, problems remained in obtaining sufficient housing,
    social services for the most vulnerable, property records, and
    education. Based on the establishment of a civil administration by
    UNMIK, several countries that had offered temporary refuge to ethnic
    Albanians forced by Milosevic to leave Kosovo ended their programs and
    began forcing the refugees to return to Kosovo, which tested the
    capacity of the province to absorb returnees. In October UNMIK asked
    countries to suspend returns until March of 2001.
        About 100,000 Serbs, 30,000 Roma, and 67,000 other minorities
    remained in Kosovo. Most of the 150,000 Serbs and about 30,000 Roma who
    fled when Yugoslav forces withdrew did not return, except in individual
    cases, due to fear of ethnic violence should they return without
    sufficient security safeguards and due to lack of economic opportunity,
    housing, and other basic services. UNMIK, the UNHCR, and the
    international community began a minority stabilization program to
    address some of these assistance needs. Although the high level of
    anti-Serb violence that characterized the period just after
    Yugoslavia's withdrawal decreased significantly, ethnically motivated
    violence and crime continued to be serious problems for minorities (see
    Section 5). Several villages that were once ethnically mixed have
    become almost entirely Albanian, with Serb residents moving to Serb
    villages elsewhere in Kosovo or leaving altogether. KFOR and UNMIK
    provided security to enclaves and minority settlements, and escorted
    minority members who left their residence areas to visit family, gather
    fuel, shop for food and other goods, attend school, and receive medical
    care. KFOR regularly escorted convoys of private vehicles, and the
    UNHCR provided buses to transport Serbs in larger numbers between
    enclaves and into Serbia. In February a rocket attack on a UNHCR bus
    killed two Serbs and wounded several more; as a result, the UNHCR
    suspended bus service for several weeks (see Section 5). Serbs
    throughout Kosovo and Roma in some areas reported that they were afraid
    to leave their enclaves due to fear of intimidation and attack by
    ethnic Albanians. On November 8, unknown assailants shot and killed
    four displaced Ashkali who had returned to their village of Dosevac
    (Dashevc) near Srbica (Skenderaj) to rebuild their houses, which were
    destroyed during the war (see Section 5). Most minorities--including
    Bosniaks, Egyptians, Ashkali, Gorani, and some Roma--lived alongside
    ethnic Albanians and reported that their security situation improved
    over the course of the year, although incidents of violence and
    harassment continued to occur and their freedom of movement is
    restricted in some areas of Kosovo. The Turkish community is more
    closely integrated with Albanians and is less threatened than other
    minorities. The remaining Roma in Kosovo largely were settled in
    enclaves and settlements and were dependent almost wholly on
    humanitarian aid.
        In April the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) endorsed a
    Declaration and Platform for Joint Action, under which key Albanian
    leaders visited those areas where local Albanians and Roma were trying
    to establish more cooperative interethnic relations, thus encouraging a
    climate conducive to the return of those who fled the province earlier.
    Roma still experienced difficulty in obtaining freedom of movement. The
    degree of harassment by neighboring Albanians varied, with a greater
    degree of difficulty for the Roma living in Kosovo Polje (Fushe
    Kosova), Obilic (Obiliq), Podujevo (Podujeva), Lipljan (Lipjan), and
    Gnjilane (Gjilan) (see Section 5). However, there were areas, notably
    around Urosevac (Ferizaj) and Djakovica (Gjakova) where Roma,
    Egyptians, and Albanians reportedly cohabited without major incidents.
    Both Roma and Serb families were reluctant to send their children to
    school, citing security concerns.
        In early May UNMIK established the Joint Committee on Returns with
    participation from KFOR, the UNHCR, and the Serb National Council to
    facilitate and coordinate returns of minorities to Kosovo.
        In Mitrovica there were restrictions on freedom of movement due to
    ethnically based harassment (see Section 5).
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution during the year.
        UNMIK and local authorities cooperated with the UNHCR to assist
    returning refugees.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        From 1989 until NATO's intervention, Kosovar Albanians expressed
    their frustration with the province's status within Serbia through a
    boycott of the political system and did not attempt to affect the
    Government through the electoral process. After the withdrawal of
    Yugoslav forces in 1999, UNMIK, the OSCE, and other international
    actors, including donors, began to prepare for municipal elections,
    with the aim of eventually organizing elections for a Kosovo-wide
    government. One of the most critical elements of the establishment of
    both a civil administration and an electoral process was the
    registration of Kosovo's legitimate residents, following Yugoslavia's
    ``identity cleansing'' (see Section 2.d.).
        At the conclusion of the electoral registration effort by the OSCE,
    about 901,000 of an estimated population of over 1 million persons
    successfully registered. UNMIK established a Central Election
    Commission, which was charged with establishing electoral rules and
    with organizing the operational details of the elections; there were
    also municipal election commissions in each of the 30 municipalities
    where elections were held. Pursuant to a registration process
    established in March, 22 political parties, 1 coalition of 6 parties, 3
    citizens' initiatives (grassroots organizations formed for political
    purposes), and 16 independent candidates registered to run for office.
    Serbs, citing security concerns and a lack of freedom of movement, did
    not participate in the registration process and boycotted the October
    municipal elections. Many Turks, due to a dispute with UNMIK over the
    use of the Turkish language in official documents and procedures also
    did not participate, although one Turkish political party did. Other
    minorities participated in registration and in the elections. Several
    fielded political parties and citizens' initiatives that won municipal
    seats in the vote or agreed to accept appointed seats after the
    elections.
        Campaigning for the municipal elections began officially on
    September 13. Earlier in the summer, there was an increase in violence
    that appeared to be related to the election. Political parties,
    especially the LDK but also the PDK and other parties, reported attacks
    on political figures, both before and after the October municipal
    elections (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In most cases, no suspects were
    found; however, local observers blamed many of these attacks on the
    rival PDK party and former KLA fighters. Nonpolitical motives including
    clan rivalry, criminality, and competition for economic resources also
    were suspected in some cases. For example, in June an LDK official was
    beaten in Urosevac (Ferizaj). On July 18 and 21, LDK officials were
    attacked in Lipljan (Lipjan). On August 2, Sejdi Koca, an LDK leader in
    Srbica (Skenderaj), was shot; during that week an LDK official also was
    shot in Podujevo (Podujeva). On August 18, a bomb attack damaged the
    office of the Party of Democratic Action, Kosovo's Bosniak party. It
    was not clear whether the attack was directed at the party office, the
    office of a Turkish political party nearby where an employee was
    slightly injured, or the office of the Serb Center for Peace and
    Tolerance. Supporters of rival political parties challenged LDK
    activists in Lipljan (Lipjan) several times, once disrupting a rally by
    hurling objects. The PDK reported that unknown arsonists burned down a
    neighborhood office in Pristina on September 22. A local newspaper
    reported that LDK supporters beat a radio journalist. In mid-November,
    an unknown assailant shot and badly wounded Shkelzen Hyseni, the newly
    elected LDK assemblyman in Pec (Peja). On November 30, LDK branch
    committee member Ejup Visoka was shot twice in a drive-by shooting in
    Podujevo (Podujeva); he was wounded in the arms and stomach. Also in
    November, unknown assailants attacked the wife of Elez Nikqi, Rugova's
    bodyguard, cutting her across the throat.
        After investigating several of these incidents, on October 3 the
    OSCE's Election Complaints and Appeals Sub-Commission (ECAC) imposed on
    political parties a series of penalties. These penalties included fines
    of up to $2,400 (DM 5,000) and, in one case, a candidate being stricken
    from the PDK list of candidates.
        Despite the violence in some areas prior to election day, the
    elections themselves were held on October 28 without significant
    violence. Voter turnout was high (about 75 percent). International and
    domestic observers reported some irregularities and logistical flaws.
    In Pristina a few underage persons were observed voting. Voters' lists
    were incomplete and cumbersome. Late polling station openings and a
    lack of crowd-flow systems at many stations resulted in long lines and
    occasional minor crowd unrest. Election officials were able to address
    most problems during the course of the day. The Council of Europe
    observer mission concluded that the elections were carried out in
    accordance with international democratic standards and met the criteria
    for credible elections. The LDK won 58 percent of the overall vote,
    compared with 27 percent for the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and
    less than 8 percent for the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). A
    number of small parties won the remaining votes. On November 27, newly
    elected municipal assemblies were sworn in. Members of the assemblies
    in three Serb-majority municipalities where elections were boycotted
    were selected and sworn in during December.
        Yugoslav authorities organized polling sites inside Kosovo for
    those who wished to vote in Yugoslavia's federal elections on September
    24. According to UNMIK, which did not itself support this electoral
    activity but which sent out several hundred ``witnesses,''
    approximately 45,000 of roughly 60,000 eligible Kosovar Serbs turned
    out, but only a handful of Kosovar Albanians voted. The Yugoslav
    elections were peaceful; however, the voting was conducted in a
    disorganized, illegitimate, and fraudulent manner. The Serbian
    opposition alleged fraud and vote tampering in the northern part of the
    province, including one stolen ballot box in Leposavic and opposition
    election observers being denied access to polling areas. On December
    23, Serbian parliamentary elections took place throughout Serbia,
    including Kosovo. Although KFOR and CIVPOL monitored the security
    climate, there was no international ``witnessing'' effort. No security
    incidents were reported.
        Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244, UNMIK established the Joint
    Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) for Kosovo, intended not only
    to provide a joint U.N.-Kosovar administration of services and revenue
    collection but also to supplant self-appointed administrators and
    officials throughout the province. The JIAS includes the SRSG, the
    Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), the IAC, and 20 administrative
    departments. The 36-member KTC is designed to reflect the pluralistic
    ethnic and political range of Kosovar society and is the highest level
    Kosovar advisory body. The eight-member IAC makes policy
    recommendations and serves as an executive board for the administrative
    departments and also includes minority representation. The departments,
    each with a Kosovar and an international co-head, provide social and
    administrative services, collect and manage revenues, and implement
    policies established by the other elements of the JIAS. The structure
    is mirrored on the municipal level, where municipal councils were
    elected on October 28.
        No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government
    and politics; however, they are underrepresented. According to women's
    groups, few women traditionally entered politics because of a lack of
    interest, money, education, and family support. Nonetheless, women held
    7 of the 36 KTC seats, women led at least 2 political parties, and the
    UNMIK electoral regulation required that party candidate lists for the
    municipal elections include a set quota of 30 percent women. However,
    the ``open list'' ballot apparently allowed voters to vote around
    female candidates, resulting in only 76 women elected to office in the
    October municipal elections, or 8.26 percent of total municipal
    assembly seats. In addition UNMIK appointed two women as co-heads of
    departments under the JIAS.
        No legal restrictions exist on participation by ethnic minorities
    in government and politics. The Kosovar co-head positions in JIAS
    departments are shared by minority groups, with two such positions
    reserved for Serbs and two for other minority members. A prominent Serb
    observer sits on the Interim Administrative Council; five Serbs hold
    positions and five other members of ethnic minorities hold positions on
    the KTC, as well as one Roman Catholic cleric. Although Kosovar Serbs
    boycotted the municipal elections, several ethnically based political
    parties registered candidates.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        UNMIK and the OSCE continued their encouragement of the development
    of civil society, including domestically based NGO's. A broad range of
    U.N. agencies and numerous international organizations and NGO's
    pursued operations in the province to assist with administration and to
    provide relief to all Kosovars as they faced the aftermath of war. This
    included assistance to hundreds of thousands of returning refugees,
    support for the search for the missing, and social services to
    ameliorate the effects of trauma. UNMIK issued a regulation in November
    1999 on NGO registration. Over 300 domestic NGO's are registered and
    active in the province.
        Human rights monitors including those of the OSCE, as well as some
    associated with domestically based NGO's, were active in documenting
    ethnically or politically motivated killings, disappearances, attacks,
    and incidents of intimidation. Monitors and observers also looked into
    reported abuses by members of the KPS, KPC, CIVPOL, and KFOR. The ICRC
    gained full access to prisons and detention centers throughout Kosovo
    in exercise of its humanitarian mandate (see Section 1.c.). UNSC
    Resolution 1244 gave the OSCE the mandate for human rights monitoring.
    Although UNMIK and the OSCE did not reach agreement on procedures, OSCE
    monitors generally were able to carry out their mandate on an ad hoc
    basis in most courts and gained limited access to prisons and detention
    centers.
        In June UNMIK established the office of Human Rights Ombudsperson
    to ensure Kosovars' rights under international human rights laws and to
    investigate allegations of abuses. Marek Nowicki of Poland was
    appointed to the position in August, and the Ombudsperson's office
    opened on November 21.
        UNMIK cooperated with the ICTY and ICTY investigators and field
    teams made numerous trips to the province to investigate alleged war
    crimes committed there and to gather data, particularly through the
    exhumation of victims, necessary to the prosecution of such crimes.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        UNMIK's regulation on applicable law specifically prohibits
    discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, or ethnic
    origin.
        Women.--Rape and a high level of domestic violence remained
    serious, persistent problems. There are no governmental agencies
    dedicated to coping with family violence. Applicable criminal law, as
    defined by UNMIK regulation, is incomplete in addressing both domestic
    violence and sexual crimes. Several domestic and international NGO's
    pursue activities to assist women, but they are constrained to some
    extent by a tradition of silence about domestic violence, sexual abuse,
    and rape. In Kosovo's traditionally male-dominated society, it is
    culturally acceptable for men to beat their wives; credible sources
    report that violence against women has increased in the post-conflict
    period. Few victims of spousal abuse ever file complaints with the
    authorities.
        Rape is underreported significantly due to the cultural stigma
    attached to victims and their families. Tradition prevents much
    discussion of the topic of rape among ethnic Albanians, since the act
    is seen as dishonoring the entire family. The prevalence of rape by
    Yugoslav and Serbian forces during the conflict has heightened the
    profile of rape as a form of war crime, but few individual women have
    come forward publicly. There has been a reluctance to file charges with
    the ICTY, for example. U.N. Police registered over 95 rapes and rape
    attempts in the province during the year. However, there is credible
    anecdotal evidence, supported by customary practice, that rape is
    underreported significantly.
        The province served increasingly as a transit point and destination
    for trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Women traditionally do not share status equal to men, and
    relatively few women obtain upper level management positions in
    commerce or government, although there is no legal restriction on their
    doing so. Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold
    that women should be subservient to the male members of their families,
    long have subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, women
    often are little more than serfs, without the ability to exercise a
    right to control property and children. Women widowed by the recent war
    risked losing custody of their children due to an Albanian custom
    requiring children to be given to the deceased father's family. While
    legally women and men equally are entitled to inherit property, it is
    customary that family property passes to men only. Particularly in
    rural areas, when a man dies, his widow often is returned to her birth
    family and his family assumes his land, leaving the widow without
    property.
        UNMIK's Office of Gender Affairs worked to coordinate gender issues
    throughout the programs of all UNMIK offices. It identified a network
    of gender focal points in all JIAS departments and in UNMIK's regional
    and municipal offices that were responsible for initiating and
    implementing gender policy in their respective areas and for
    facilitating consultation between UNMIK and women's organizations.
    UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 binds government officials to abide by the
    provisions of international human rights law and conventions, but that
    requirement has not yet benefited women's lives in rural areas.
        In population centers, the presence of UNMIK and an unprecedented
    number of international and nongovernmental organizations has opened a
    large number of previously unavailable jobs to women. UNMIK police and
    the OSCE launched an aggressive campaign to recruit women for the
    Kosovo Police Service (they make up 17 to 20 percent of the force).
    Women are increasingly active in political and human rights
    organizations. Women led two political parties, and several
    professional women worked as NGO and human rights activists.
        Children.--UNMIK established the JIAS Departments of Education and
    Science and of Health and Social Welfare, which address concerns about
    children's education and health. Following Kosovo's loss of autonomy in
    1989, Albanian parents refused to send their children to Serb-run
    public schools and developed a ``shadow'' education system. The quality
    of education was uneven and the divisions inherent in society were
    replicated in children's schooling. In 1999 conflict and the Serb
    ethnic cleansing campaign disrupted the spring term of the school year.
    Although many schools reopened for the 1999-2000 academic year,
    extensive damage to many school buildings, a lack of educational
    materials, and persistent electrical power outages hindered the full
    functioning of the education system. Serb and Roma parents were
    reluctant to send their children to the reopened schools despite the
    efforts of the authorities to provide security. As the school year
    progressed, international organizations rebuilt and equipped schools
    and the numbers of students enrolled increased.
        All schools opened on time for the 2000-2001 academic year. UNMIK
    issued a regulation on August 30 making enrollment in public school
    compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 15 (with only minor
    exceptions). The regulation made no provision for a waiver due to
    ethnic concerns. At least one school, in Pones (Ponesh), enrolled
    Serbian in addition to Albanian children, but most minority children
    continued to attend separate schools. In rural areas, lack of
    transportation made families reluctant to send girls to school since
    the prospect of future employment was slim.
        Economic problems and the aftermath of the conflict also affected
    the health care system, with adverse consequences for children. The
    health situation for children remained particularly poor. Humanitarian
    aid officials blamed the high rate of infant and childhood mortality,
    as well as increasing epidemics of preventable diseases, primarily on
    poverty that led to malnutrition, poor hygiene, and the deterioration
    of public sanitation. The high levels of air and water pollution, as
    well as the environmental effects of the uncontrolled release of toxic
    substances, including lead at the Trepca industrial complex, likely
    contributed to poor health conditions as well.
        The province served as a destination and transit point for
    trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.).
        There was no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--Although the law prohibits
    discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment,
    education, or in the provision of state services, inadequate facilities
    and the level of unemployment posed obstacles to the employment of the
    disabled. The law mandates access to new official buildings; however,
    it is not enforced in practice.
        Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are intertwined so
    closely that it is difficult to clearly identify discriminatory acts as
    primarily religious in origin rather than ethnic. Kosovar Serbs, in
    particular, identify themselves with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which
    defines not only their religious but also their cultural and historical
    perspectives. However, the views of all ethnic groups have been
    influenced strongly by religion, and some instances of ethnic
    discrimination or tension may have religious roots.
        Although UNMIK continued to take steps to ensure that members of
    all religious groups could worship safely, Bishop Artemije, the leading
    cleric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, remained at a
    monastery in Gracanica, near Pristina, rather than at his seat in
    Prizren (see Section 2.c.). Despite the KFOR presence, there were
    attacks on Orthodox churches. In April in Mitrovica a crowd of rock-
    throwing Albanians attacked Serbs and their KFOR escorts during a
    religious ceremony for Orthodox Easter. On April 28, unknown
    perpetrators rigged an antitank device that blew up the church in
    Grncar (Gerncar); since the Easter service was postponed, congregants
    were not harmed. After the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces in 1999,
    ethnic Albanians attacked Serbian Orthodox churches and burned or
    otherwise destroyed over 100 of them, including 20 during the year. On
    December 22, unknown assailants threw a hand grenade at the only
    functioning Serbian Orthodox church in Pristina, breaking windows and
    causing other damage. The daily newspaper Dita published a story in
    July that alleged that Orthodox priests committed war crimes (see
    Section 2.a.), and assailants subsequently shot and wounded a Serbian
    Orthodox priest and two seminary students in a drive-by shooting.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the high level of
    retaliatory anti-Serb violence that followed Yugoslavia's 1999
    withdrawal dropped significantly, ethnically motivated violence and
    crime continued to affect minorities. Serbs, Roma, and other minorities
    were victims of murder, kidnaping, assault, and property crimes,
    especially arson.
        On February 2, unknown assailants killed Josip Vasic, a prominent
    doctor and member of the Serb National Council in Gnjilane (Gjilan).
    Also on February 2, unknown assailants fired on a KFOR-escorted, UNHCR
    bus traveling to Mitrovica from the Serb village of Banja carrying 49
    Serbs, and killed 2 persons. In Novo Brdo (Novoberde) district, unknown
    assailants stabbed the last remaining Serb in one village, a woman, in
    February. On February 18, a Serb man was found dead in Podujevo
    (Podujeva) with gunshot wounds to the mouth and eye and his identity
    card pinned to his chest. On March 11, the body of a Serb man was found
    near Gracanica Lake; he had been shot and killed. On April 3, the body
    of a Serb man was found, bound and shot, in Pristina. On May 16, police
    found the remains of Petar Topoljski, a Serbian UNMIK employee,
    following publication by the Pristina-based newspaper Dita of an
    article identifying Topoljski as a member of a Serb paramilitary unit
    (See Section 2.a.). On August 27, an 80-year-old Serbian farmer was
    shot and killed in Crkvena Vodica. On September 14, a Serb woman was
    shot and killed in her home in Kamenica. On October 4, the body of a
    60-year-old Serb shepherd with gunshot wounds was found near Strpce
    (Shterpce) after he was reported missing. Assailants killed Serbs in
    incidents throughout the year in Gnjilane (Gjilan) district. In March
    and April alone, 60 Serb families there sold their property and
    departed for Serbia.
        Serb children also were targeted. On August 18, 10 children were
    wounded by a grenade thrown from a passing car onto a basketball court
    in the Serb village of Crkvena Vodica. On August 27, a Kosovar Albanian
    intentionally ran over four Serbian children in two different villages,
    causing the death of one child and the serious injury of several
    others. On May 28, an ethnic Albanian male opened fire on a group of
    Serb men in front of a shop in Gnjilane (Gjilan), killing three
    persons, including a 4-year-old child (see Section 1.d.).
        Serbs were also victims of beatings, grenade attacks, and arson. A
    total of 522 cases of arson were reported during the year.
        In June local Serbs in Srbica (Skenderaj) allegedly attacked
    members of the Albanian Behrami family, killing two. In the village of
    Cubrelj (Cubrel), a group of Serbs killed two Albanians on June 12, the
    first anniversary of the conclusion of the NATO military campaign.
        Other minorities were also victims of violence. In January unknown
    persons killed four members of a Bosniak family in Prizren. In April 15
    Albanian men beat a 70-year-old Bosniak woman in Pec (Peja).
        On April 3, unknown assailants kidnaped Metodije Halauska, an 86-
    year-old Czech man, from his home in Pristina, beat him, and shot him
    in the back of the head.
        On January 12, four members of a family of Torbesh (Muslim Slavs)
    were shot and killed in their home by an unknown assailant in Prizren.
        On May 24, an Albanian youth shot and wounded a Gorani woman in
    Pristina, reportedly because she did not speak Albanian. Minority
    communities in Prizren were subject to violent attacks, intimidation,
    and arson during the year.
        On November 8, unknown assailants shot and killed four displaced
    Ashkali who had returned to their village of Dosevac (Dashevc) near
    Srbica (Skenderaj) to rebuild their houses, which were destroyed during
    the war. Three members of an Ashkali family died in the Lipljan
    (Lipjan) area during the first week of August when a fire set off a
    grenade in their courtyard. It was not clear whether the grenade had
    been placed as a booby trap. In November in Urosevac (Ferizaj), unknown
    assailants murdered a 13-year-old Gorani boy and burned his body.
        There were reports of the ethnically motivated murder of Roma by
    unidentified Albanians. Roma were targeted because they are perceived
    as Serb collaborators by ethnic Albanians. On March 4, unknown persons
    shot and killed a 50-year-old Romani woman in Gusica and then set her
    house on fire. On March 27, a Rom was found strangled to death in Istok
    (Istog). On April 19, in Pec (Peja) two unidentified men shot and
    killed a Romani man. In April the European Roma Rights Center reported
    that two Romani boys and a Romani woman were killed by unknown
    assailants in Pec (Peja). In August three Roma were killed and one was
    injured by a mortar bomb tied to their fence in Mali Alas, near
    Pristina.
        Roma also were subject to beatings, harassment, and attacks on
    property. According to the European Roma Rights Center, on April 13,
    four armed men who represented themselves as members of the KLA,
    allegedly took a Romani man out of his house in Prizren, beat him, and
    threatened him. On May 17, an unidentified man beat a Rom in Trebovic.
    Numerous Roma were injured by hand grenades thrown at their houses.
    Unknown persons also burned Romani houses in Prizren, Gnjilane
    (Gjilan), Gorna Brnjica, Pec (Peja), Orahovac (Rahovec), and other
    cities.
        The remaining Roma in Kosovo largely were settled in enclaves and
    encampments and were almost wholly dependent on humanitarian aid to
    survive. In Kosovo Polje (Fushe Kosove), Podujevo (Podujeva), Lipljan
    (Lipjan), and Gnjilane (Gjilan), there was some degree of harassment by
    neighboring Albanians, especially in the latter two towns. The UNHCR
    reported discrimination by Albanian hospital workers against Roma.
        Civilians were responsible for the destruction, often through
    arson, of private property. There was a growing number of credible
    reports of violence and intimidation being used to force Serbs to sell
    their homes to Albanians at attractive prices. Of the approximately
    120,000 homes damaged by Yugoslav and Serbian forces and paramilitaries
    from 1998 on, 50,000 houses were beyond repair and, despite the efforts
    of international organizations another 38,000 houses were not habitable
    (see Section 1.f.).
        Serbs and Roma who did not leave when Yugoslav forces withdrew
    lived primarily in enclaves, except for the Serbs in the north of the
    province, where Serbs and Albanians effectively partitioned Mitrovica.
    Serbs lived largely in the northern Kosovo municipalities of Leposavic,
    Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, and in the northern part of Mitrovica, and in
    scattered enclaves under KFOR protection elsewhere. KFOR and UNMIK
    provided security to these enclaves, settlements, and camps, and
    escorted minority members who left their residence areas as well as
    convoys of private Serb vehicles. The UNHCR provided buses to transport
    Serbs in larger numbers between enclaves and into Serbia to take care
    of personal business.
        In Mitrovica Serb and Albanian Kosovars restricted each other's
    freedom of movement (see Section 2.d.). After Serbian forces withdrew
    in 1999, many ethnic Serbs from throughout Kosovo fled to Mitrovica and
    occupied homes, including those belonging to ethnic Albanians in the
    northern part of that town. Ethnic Albanians who sought to return to
    their homes in the north were subject to violence and intimidation by
    ethnic Serbs, and about 1,500 who live in the northern section of town
    reported repeated harassment. For example, in April a group of Serbs
    set fire to 3 Albanian homes and damaged over 20 U.N. vehicles in north
    Mitrovica. Ethnic Serbs stationed near the bridges monitored persons
    who crossed the Ibar River from southern Mitrovica into the northern
    part of the town. Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to
    seize Albanian property, resulting in over 60 reported illegal house
    occupations during the summer months. At the same time, ethnic Serbs,
    including some who owned property there, were unable to move freely in
    the southern part of the town without similar harassment from ethnic
    Albanians.
        Politically, both Serbs and Roma made some progress. The Serbs in
    particular, through the Gracanica-based Serb National Council (SNV),
    participated in the JIAS organs and negotiated with the international
    community for increased assistance and programs in addition to more
    effective security.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under Yugoslav law, workers had the
    right to join or form unions; however, in practice neither the official
    nor the independent unions were effective in protecting workers'
    rights. Applicable law, pending further agreed regulations and
    legislation, is that in effect in March 1989, when labor and employment
    law reflected socialist structures inappropriate to and unenforceable
    in existing conditions. In creating the JIAS Department of Labor and
    Employment, UNMIK included in its responsibilities policy
    recommendations on labor practices and the rights of workers and
    recognized labor as one element of an eventual tripartite commission
    but made no mention of a specific right of association.
        After the war, labor organizations, which had focused during the
    1990's on members' welfare, redirected their focus to traditional labor
    issues. The dominant group, the Confederation of Independent Trade
    Unions of Kosovo (BSKP), was founded in 1990 and its membership reached
    a high point of about 260,000 members in the mid-1990's. Its current
    president is a member of the KTC.
        With most Albanians unemployed during the period under Milosevic,
    the BSKP focused more on assisting its membership to survive than on
    collective bargaining. The organization is working with international
    entities, including the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), to rebuild
    its membership and its collective bargaining ability. Other trade union
    organizations include the Independent Trade Union of Miners and the
    Union of Education, Science, and Culture of Kosova, a rival educators'
    union to the one with membership in the BSKP. All three unions have
    expressed interest not only in participating in the drafting of labor
    legislation but also in the terms for privatization of state
    enterprises.
        The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains
    constrained in practice, although there are no legal impediments to
    their doing so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While draft
    labor legislation includes the right to organize and bargain
    collectively, no applicable law currently specifically addresses this
    right. Collective bargaining is at a rudimentary level of development.
    The history of trade unionism was centered not on bargaining for the
    collective needs of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a
    given group. Thus, workers in various sectors were ineffective in
    finding common denominators (e.g., job security protection, minimum
    safety standards, universal benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate.
    Given the poor state of the economy and the high unemployment rate,
    wages other than those paid by international and nongovernmental
    organizations rarely are paid on time, and there is little possibility
    for negotiation by labor organizations.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
    including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and is not
    generally known to occur; however, the province served as a
    destination, source and transit point for trafficking in women and
    girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Under labor law dating from before 1989, the minimum age
    for employment was 16, although in villages and farming communities it
    is not unusual to find younger children at work assisting their
    families. Moreover, children can be found in a variety of unofficial
    ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car windows or selling newspapers
    and small items such as cigarettes. With an unemployment rate in excess
    of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal
    sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is
    prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur; however, girls
    are trafficked to, from, and through the province for the purpose of
    forced prostitution (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--After the withdrawal of Yugoslav
    forces and authorities in June 1999, there was no effective minimum
    wage rate, as Kosovar Albanians refused to recognize the Yugoslav-
    Serbian legal code. The unemployment level exceeded 60 percent, and the
    average wage paid to those who had work was insufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. While many
    international agencies and NGO's paid wages adequate to support a
    worker and family, UNMIK determined that wages for any jobs that
    eventually would be part of the province's own governmental structure,
    even if funded by the international community at present, should be set
    at a level estimated to be supportable by the consolidated budget.
    Salaries under the Kosovo Consolidated Budget are barely enough to
    support a worker and a family.
        Reports of sweatshops operating in the province are rare, although
    some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor
    conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little
    meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
        Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
    enforcement of established occupational safety and health standards,
    and focused their efforts instead on economic survival.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking is a serious and growing
    problem. Throughout the year, nothing in the applicable law, as defined
    by UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, provided an effective legal framework
    under which to address trafficking. The province was mainly a
    destination point, but it was also a transit point for women and girls
    trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution.
        UNMIK police raided several brothels and nightclubs throughout the
    year in Pristina, Pec (Peja), and Prizren, and found more than 50 women
    of Ukrainian, Moldovan, Bulgarian, and Romanian origin working as
    prostitutes under slave-like conditions. There were also reports of
    trafficked women from Albania, Belarus, and African countries. Security
    authorities also reported that women and girls are being smuggled
    through Kosovo to Macedonia, Albania, and Italy. Evidence suggested
    that trafficking in women was an example of a coordinated effort
    between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, like other areas of organized
    crime. There were several kidnapings and disappearances of young women
    who subsequently were not located. Some local sources believed that
    these women were the victims of traffickers in some cases, although
    there is no clear evidence that this was the case. Pristina and Kosovo
    Polje (Fushe Kosova) are major centers for trafficking. In November
    UNMIK and KFOR arrested 7 Kosovar Serb men for kidnaping and operating
    houses of prostitution; 12 Moldovan women were found and brought to a
    local NGO.
        Women are recruited to work in cleaning jobs and are abducted and
    forced into prostitution. While some women were aware that they would
    enter the sex industry, they were not aware that they effectively would
    be imprisoned and unable to earn money. Trafficking victims have
    reported that they were subject to physical violence, rape, denial of
    access to health care, and confiscation of their passports.
        Because prostitution is punishable under provincial law, women are
    often afraid to report their traffickers due to fear of arrest. In
    Mitrovica one woman who was believed to be a trafficking victim was
    convicted of prostitution. However, UNMIK police have been active in
    investigating and intervening in incidents of trafficking.
        According to the IOM, the presence of a large international
    community that purchases sex services has contributed to the increase
    in the number of brothels that are involved in trafficking.
        Several international agencies and NGO's established programs to
    assist the victims of trafficking with material support in returning to
    their countries of origin or homes, if they so wished. The IOM launched
    an awareness campaign directed at UNMIK, KFOR, and local men who
    purchase the services of women who were most likely to be trafficking
    victims.

                                   Montenegro

        Montenegro, constitutionally a constituent republic (together with
    Serbia) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), made
    progress in its efforts to build a multiparty, multiethnic,
    parliamentary democracy; however, a deeply rooted patronage system and
    corruption continued to be dominant features of political life. During
    the year, the Government increasingly was excluded from federal
    functions by then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. The Government
    remains minimally subordinate to Yugoslavia in foreign affairs and
    defense matters. Units of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) are stationed in
    Montenegro. President Milo Djukanovic was elected in 1997 and until the
    end of December headed a reform coalition, which won power in 1998
    parliamentary elections that international election observers judged to
    be generally free and fair. Events during the year effectively steered
    the Government further away from the federal control of Milosevic's
    regime in Belgrade. Milosevic's attempts to deny Montenegro its
    constitutional voice in federal functions, in particular by closing
    Supreme Defense Council meetings to Djukanovic and by Milosevic's
    unilateral amendments of the Yugoslav Constitution on July 6, further
    undercut Montenegro's already weak role and authorities in the
    Federation. With Djukanovic's efforts to redefine Montenegro's
    relations with Serbia through political discussions rebuffed,
    Montenegro acquired a large degree of de facto independence,
    establishing its own currency, central bank, customs and diplomatic
    service, and an embryonic army. The Government respects the
    constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
        The republic police, under the authority of the Ministry of the
    Interior, has primary responsibility for internal security. However,
    the Yugoslav Second Army, which has federal jurisdiction in the
    republic and is under federal authority, not Montenegrin government
    control, made repeated attempts to usurp control over the civilian
    police. Some members of the security forces committed human rights
    abuses.
        The economic transition from a state-owned to a market-based system
    encountered delays and resistance. The industrial sector remains
    largely in the hands of the republic Government and is very
    inefficient. The economy suffered further as a result of NATO's air
    campaign against Serbia in 1999 and years of sanctions and isolation,
    although the Government reported that the economy grew during the year.
    Official unemployment remains significant, and rose to at least 42
    percent, but a large unofficial economy provides jobs for much of the
    officially unemployed. Economists estimate that actual unemployment
    averages 22 to 23 percent. At the same time, the Government's budgetary
    shortfall grew as it raised the minimum wage and strove to pay pensions
    on time to ensure social peace. The anticipated budget deficit during
    the year was expected to approximate the amount of assistance provided
    by foreign donors. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (including
    the unofficial economy) was forecast at $935 for the year.
        The republic Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. There
    were a number of political killings, including at least one allegedly
    linked to Milosevic and another linked to a VJ-supported paramilitary
    group. Police and VJ troops abused persons, and VJ troops harassed and
    intimidated citizens. VJ troops and Montenegrin police were responsible
    for numerous arbitrary arrests and detentions. Montenegrin police
    reportedly infringed on citizens privacy rights. Both republic and
    federal authorities restricted freedom of speech and of the press in
    some areas. Both VJ troops and Montenegrin police restricted freedom of
    movement. Violence and discrimination against women are problems.
    Discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities continued to be
    a problem. There were reports of harassment and intimidation of Muslims
    in the Montenegrin Sandzak region by paramilitary groups linked to the
    VJ. Trafficking of women and girls for the purposes of forced
    prostitution continued to be a problem; both federal and Montenegrin
    authorities allegedly are involved in such trafficking.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by agents of the
    republic Government; however, political killings occurred. On May 31,
    one of President Djukanovic's closest advisers, Goran Zugic, was shot
    and killed in front of his home in Podgorica by unknown assailants. No
    one claimed responsibility. The killing widely was considered to be the
    result of orders from of Milosevic; however, according to some
    accounts, Montenegrin criminal circles may have been responsible. There
    was no conviction in the case by year's end.
        Paramilitaries who served in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia and who
    were subordinated to the Yugoslav Army in Montenegro were a threat to
    the Djukanovic Government until Milosevic's downfall. There were
    widespread fears that Milosevic could order these forces to destabilize
    Montenegro at any moment. The paramilitaries, largely members of the
    Seventh Military Police Battalion, in one instance, killed a
    Montenegrin policeman outside a Podgorica bar on the eve of the
    September federal elections.
        In August Milenko Vujovic, a friend and business colleague of
    President Djukanovic's brother Alexsandar, was shot and killed in
    Herceg Novi. While the crime apparently was motivated by money, some
    accounts alleged that the killing was politically motivated.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
    punishment; however, Montenegrin police reportedly at times abused
    persons. A member of the radical Yugoslav Left (JUL) party (founded by
    Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic) claimed that he was beaten by the
    Montenegrin police after being arrested for allegedly defacing public
    buildings in Podgorica on the eve of the September 24 federal
    elections. Other members of JUL complained of being detained without
    explanation and abused up by the police in Herceg Novi for putting up
    pro-Milosevic posters during the federal election campaign. In October
    masked assailants beat a member of a pro-Serbian political party. The
    police never located the assailants, and the Minister of Interior
    declined to appear before Parliament to discuss this or the previous
    incident in Podgorica. In Niksic police arrested and beat members of a
    local gang. After the arrests, police imposed a near blockade of the
    city in an effort to catch other members of the gang.
        The VJ's Seventh Military Police Battalion--known for its fierce
    loyalty to Milosevic--intimidated citizens and created a climate of
    fear. VJ troops reportedly beat religious worshippers early in the year
    (see Section 2.c.). Members of that battalion also harassed and
    intimidated Muslims in the Sandzak region. In June batallion members
    entered Bijelo Polje (a town in northern Montenegro with a large Muslim
    population) in armored vehicles to ``inspect'' the town's center. At
    about the same time, members of this unit surrounded the police station
    in Berane (another multiethnic northern Montenegrin town) to underscore
    their demands for the release of a colleague who was arrested the night
    before in a drunken brawl. Members of this unit reportedly engaged in
    similar activities in October in the towns of Kolasin, Danilovgrad, and
    Mojkovac. In Plav, a northern town with a large ethnic Albanian
    population, members of the Seventh Military Police Battalion reportedly
    regularly engaged in live fire practice near the Albanian quarter.
        In August VJ troops opened fire on a truck that failed to stop at a
    checkpoint near Bar. The driver managed to escape without injury.
        The Yugoslav Army held major exercises in areas adjacent to the
    Montenegrin capital before and during the June 11 local elections and
    the September 24 federal elections. These maneuvers and aggressive VJ
    patrolling of major tourist areas during the height of the tourist
    season were intended to intimidate the Djukanovic regime and its
    supporters.
        On June 15, gunmen reportedly linked to Milosevic's regime
    attempted to kill Vuk Draskovic, the leader of one of the principal
    opposition parties in Serbia, when he was vacationing at his apartment
    in Budva on the Montenegrin coast. Draskovic had survived a car
    accident in October 1999 that many believe was staged by the Serbian
    Security Service. There was no conviction in the case by year's end.
        Prison conditions reportedly meet prisoners' minimum needs, but
    problems remain.
        The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights
    monitors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention; however, at times Montenegrin police
    arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, and the Yugoslav Army on
    occasion also arbitrarily detained and arrested individuals.
        For example, in early February VJ forces arrested and detained two
    Montenegrins accused of desertion and draft evasion. In July VJ
    personnel arrested four Dutch, two British, and two Canadian citizens
    near Montenegro's borders with Serbia and Kosovo. All were charged with
    espionage. The British citizens claimed they were beaten by the police
    and nearly lynched by VJ soldiers. Following Milosevic's removal, all
    were released, and the charges against all eventually were dropped by
    the federal authorities.
        The Montenegrin police harassed citizens by applying traffic laws
    selectively, based on the individual's political preferences. In at
    least one instance, police stopped a political opponent and known
    critic of Djukanovic, removed his license, and confiscated his vehicle
    for a minor traffic violation.
        Forced exile is prohibited and is apparently not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary and the Government generally respects this
    provision in practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair
    judicial process; however, a backlog of cases, a lack of resources, and
    corruption remain problems. Furthermore, the judges are poorly paid
    patronage appointees. However, the Minister of Justice promotes legal
    reform actively and has made some progress in reforming the Criminal
    Code. The court system consists of local, district, and supreme courts
    at the republic level. There is also a military court system under the
    control of federal authorities.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial and,
    according to most observers, the judiciary makes an effort to enforce
    this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices; however, police
    reportedly used surveillance and eavesdropping against members of the
    pro-Milosevic opposition Socialist People's Party, who charge that the
    Djukanovic Government both wiretaps their telephones and opens their
    mail. The intelligence service of the Yugoslav Army carries out
    electronic surveillance of key Djukanovic government telephones. The
    public dissemination of Yugoslav intelligence intercepts of cellular
    telephone conversations of Western diplomats in May made clear that the
    Yugoslav security service possesses and uses this capability.
        In November 1999, the Montenegrin assembly passed a law granting
    general amnesty to persons who evaded the draft from June 1998 to June
    1999. All persons reportedly received amnesty out of an expected
    14,000.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the republic Government
    and the federal authorities restricted this right in some areas. Media
    and information laws do not protect the press; to a large extent libel
    laws discourage a free press.
        The print media is not independent. Djukanovic effectively controls
    the print media, with the exception of the opposition daily, Dan, as
    well as the State public broadcasting station, Radio/TV Montenegro. A
    small, moderate, and pro-Yugoslav party that belongs to Djukanovic's
    coalition credibly charged that Djukanovic uses the media to promote
    independence sentiment while not permitting his coalition partner to
    make the case for remaining in a democratic Yugoslavia. However, during
    the year, the Government continued to take steps to encourage
    independent radio media by allocating more frequencies to independent
    radio stations and reducing the fees charged to them.
        Lack of professionally trained staff, low professional standards,
    and lack of funds all hinder the development of an independent media.
        Under Milosevic the Yugoslav federal authorities failed to respect
    the basic principles of freedom of the press in Montenegro. In early
    spring, the federal authorities, in conjunction with officials of the
    extreme left Yugoslav Left (JUL) party, set up transmitters on Yugoslav
    Army communications sites in Montenegro. They began broadcasting pro-
    Yugoslav, anti-Montenegrin propaganda (the so-called YU-INFO TV)
    despite a federal law that delegates to each republic the
    responsibility to allocate broadcast frequencies. YU-INFO TV still was
    broadcasting in Montenegro at the end of the year. Subsequently in
    August, the Milosevic regime established a studio in a Yugoslav Army
    facility in downtown Podgorica that used military transmitters to
    rebroadcast pro-Milosevic programs produced by Serbian TV (RTS). These
    actions were taken without consultation with the Montenegrin
    authorities.
        In late summer, the Federal authorities also disconnected
    Montenegrin TV from the Serbian cable network in Vojvodina's capital
    city, Novi Sad.
        Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints
    are available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications from
    abroad. However, the supply is limited due to the economic situation
    and the relatively small demand.
        Academic freedom generally is respected, although faculty and
    students at Podgorica University, who favored the Belgrade regime or
    the preservation of the Federation, were reluctant to discuss political
    matters as tensions grew between Montenegro and Serbia.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right. On the Serbian New Year in mid-January, the
    Government permitted a large opposition gathering to take place but had
    large numbers of police standing by. In February the police broke up a
    small opposition rally when the demonstrators appeared to be moving on
    the main government building. The opposition held rallies without
    problems during the June and September local and federal election
    campaigns, respectively.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government generally respected this right in practice.
        The Constitution specifically recognizes the existence of the
    Serbian Orthodox Church, but not other faiths. The Montenegrin Orthodox
    Church lost its independence after the First World War, becoming part
    of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and was only recently re-established.
    The re-established Montenegrin Orthodox Church is registered with the
    Government of Montenegro Ministry of Interior in Cetinje, the former
    capital, as a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The Government of
    Montenegro has been careful to remain neutral in the dispute between
    followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin Orthodox
    Church, but political parties have used this issue in pursuit of their
    own agendas. Pro-Serbian parties strongly support moves for the
    establishment of an official state religion, while proindependence
    parties have pushed for the official recognition of the Montenegrin
    Orthodox Church.
        Tensions between the unofficial Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the
    Serbian Orthodox Church worsened during the year. Violence allegedly
    broke out between members of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and of the
    Serbian Orthodox Church in late 1999 when on November 21, 1999, Father
    Dragan Stanisic of the Serbian Orthodox Church reportedly hit
    Montenegrin Orthodox Metropolitan Mihajlo in the face during a
    confrontation on a road near Cetinje. According to press reports,
    Father Stanisic's followers then attacked Mihajlo's car, although
    Stanisic denies that the incident ever occurred. Approximately 250
    persons demonstrated to protest the incident in Cetinje, and
    authorities summoned riot police and reinforcements to prevent further
    incidents.
        The rift between the churches was highlighted again in January when
    a Serbian Orthodox priest delayed the traditional Christmas celebration
    by calling on the audience to leave the hall because Montenegrin
    Orthodox Metropolitan Mihailo was present. Police reportedly had
    prevented a parallel Montenegrin Orthodox celebration from taking place
    in a separate location in the town on the same day. The Serbian
    Orthodox Church then publicly protested the Government's tolerance of
    the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.
        The Djukanovic Government sought to defuse tensions between the
    churches. However, there were reports that Yugoslav paramilitaries
    exacerbated such tensions. For example, in Niksic early in the year,
    several members of the Seventh Military Police Battalion reportedly
    intimidated a Montenegrin Orthodox priest in his church and beat
    several of his parishioners. On another occasion, Serbian nationalists
    near the former capital city of Cetinje beat up a Montenegrin Orthodox
    priest on his way to a church gathering, prompting retaliation from his
    supporters.
        The Montenegrin Orthodox Church has claimed holdings of the Serbian
    Orthodox Church in Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the
    dominant faith in Montenegro and has rejected the property claims.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The republic Constitution provides for
    freedom of movement, and the Government generally respects this right
    in practice; however, the establishment of numerous police checkpoints
    that carried out document checks restricted this right.
        The Yugoslav Army restricted this right even more seriously. Army
    checkpoints close to the borders with Albania and Bosnia limited
    movement by residents. In the Herceg Novi, Niksic, and Pljevlja areas,
    VJ restrictions on freedom of movement in border areas generated
    antimilitary demonstrations and intervention by the republic's
    political authorities. However, these restrictions were not eased until
    the defeat of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade.
        There was no official mechanism by which refugees or foreign
    nationals could establish residency. A new citizenship law was passed
    in 1999. The new law, while stringent in its requirements, provides a
    legal and equitable means for persons to acquire Montenegrin
    citizenship.
        The Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR reports that an estimated 60,000
    refugees and internally displaced persons live in the republic. The
    large influx of Albanian refugees from Kosovo largely has returned to
    Kosovo; however, a smaller but significant number of Serb and Roma
    refugees from Kosovo have replaced them. Conditions for refugees vary;
    those with relatives or property in the country have been able to find
    housing and in some cases employment. Roma refugees, on the other hand,
    live mostly in collective centers, with little or no access to health
    care or education.
        In September before the Yugoslav federal elections, Serbian
    Minister for Refugees Bratislava Morina promised financial aid for
    Serbs and Roma from Kosovo in what was perceived by observers to be an
    attempt to influence voters in favor of Milosevic.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution during the year.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Montenegrin Constitution provides citizens with the right to
    change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in
    practice with respect to republic institutions, but not with federal-
    level institutions. In 1998 President Djukanovic became the first
    president popularly elected in elections that foreign observers
    considered generally free and fair. The republic government invited the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to observe
    both the presidential elections in 1997 and the parliamentary elections
    in 1998, which also were judged to be free and fair. The OSCE sent
    observers to monitor the June 11 local elections in Herceg Novi and
    Podgorica, and reported that these were well conducted. In Herceg Novi,
    Djukanovic's coalition was defeated by the pro-Milosevic opposition
    party. For most of the year, the Government enjoyed the support of a
    multiethnic coalition in the republic assembly.
        President Milosevic dominated Yugoslavia's political system until
    he lost power in the September federal elections. He sought to
    consolidate his power at the federal level at the expense of
    Montenegro, and by manipulating power within the Federation, Milosevic
    effectively forced Montenegro out of the Federation's institutions
    while leaving it open to the Federal Government's charges that its
    actions violated Yugoslavia's Constitution. President Djukanovic did
    not participate in the September 23 federal elections and called for
    citizens to boycott them. The Montenegrin Parliament declared the July
    6 amendments to Yugoslavia's Constitution, including one that allowed
    Milosevic to run for another presidential term, unconstitutional, and
    Djukanovic used this declaration as a basis for his decision not to
    participate in the elections. The Government did not impede voting and
    some 600 polling stations were set up in private homes, Socialist
    People's Party (SNP) offices, Serbian firms, and VJ establishments.
    However, overall voter turnout was low.
        Despite the Montenegrin Government's legal rights under
    Yugoslavia's Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's
    control continued to refuse to recognize the 20 Montenegrin members
    delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the
    Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including
    the Speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results
    of 1998 Montenegrin parliamentary elections. Moreover, in violation of
    past practice, Milosevic installed Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime
    Minister, ignoring the Montenegrin Government's desire to have a voice
    in the selection of the federal Prime Minister. Milosevic's control
    over the federal courts was demonstrated when the Federal
    Constitutional Court ruled against the Montenegrin Government in 1999
    in disallowing the Montenegrin authorities' attempt to select all 20
    Montenegrin representatives to the Federal Assembly's Chamber of the
    Republics. The ruling was a reversal of a 1993 decision, which allowed
    Milosevic's ruling coalition in Serbia at the time to name all 20
    Serbian representatives to the upper chamber while he was the President
    of the Serbian republic.
        There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
    government and politics; however, they are underrepresented greatly in
    party and government offices. There are no female ministers in the
    Government, and there are only five deputy ministers and three Members
    of Parliament. However, a woman plays a key role in the presidency of
    Djukanovic's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists.
        No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government
    and politics; however, they are underrepresented and ethnic
    Montenegrins and Serbs dominate the republic's political leadership.
    Ethnic Albanians participate in the political process, and their
    parties, candidates, and voters participated in the 1997 and 1998
    elections. Ethnic Muslims also participate. Albanians and Muslims
    followed Djukanovic's call to boycott the September 24 federal
    elections. The area of the republic primarily inhabited by ethnic
    Albanians was established as a separate voting district in the 1998
    parliamentary elections and, in proportion to the region's population,
    five representatives were elected to the Parliament from the district.
    Ethnic Albanian parties captured two of the seats, with the multiethnic
    program of the pro-Djukanovic Coalition capturing the other three
    seats. Several ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in the
    coalition government are held by ethnic Albanians and Muslims.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
    without government restriction, and republic officials generally are
    cooperative and responsive to their views. Local NGO's include the
    Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, the Center for Democracy and Human
    Rights, and S.O.S., a support group for abused women and children. In
    addition the Montenegrin Government's pledge to cooperate with the ICTY
    continues. The Chief prosecutor visited the country in August.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        While federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all
    citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, or social status, and
    prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal system
    provides little protection to such groups.
        Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence
    persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family
    violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by
    social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of
    spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities.
        The country served as a transit point for trafficking in women for
    the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the republic, and few
    women hold upper level management positions in government or commerce.
    Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women
    should be subservient to the male members of their family, long have
    subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly
    among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without
    the ability to exercise their right to control property and children.
    However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and 12
    to 18 months of maternity leave. They are active in human rights and
    women's organizations.
        Children.--The Government attempts to meet the health and
    educational needs of children, but insufficient and inefficient
    resources impeded this goal. The educational system provides 8 years of
    mandatory schooling. When IDP's began arriving from Kosovo in 1998, the
    republic government initially refused to extend this educational
    benefit to Kosovar Albanians. However, after having consulted with and
    received promises of assistance from international organizations, the
    Government announced late in that year that displaced children soon
    also would be allowed to attend school. Although ethnic Albanian
    children have access to instruction in their native language, the
    Government came under criticism for not also developing a curriculum in
    which ethnic Albanians could learn about their own culture and history.
    This situation reportedly remains unchanged. Most Roma child refugees
    from Kosovo do not receive any education.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        The country served as a transit point for trafficking in girls for
    the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--Facilities for the disabled are
    inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against the disabled in
    employment, education, or in the provision of state services. The law
    mandates access to new official buildings, and the Government enforces
    these provisions in practice.
        Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely
    intertwined as to be inseparable.
        With the exception of tensions and incidents of violence (see
    Section 2.c.) between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin
    Orthodox Church, relations with and between religious minorities are
    generally peaceful. Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox communities coexist
    within the same communities and often use the same municipally owned
    properties to conduct worship services.
        Seventh-Day Adventists and members of Jehovah's Witnesses are
    officially registered religions in the republic. However, their
    followers report that their efforts to build and renovate church
    buildings have been impaired by persons they believe to be loyal to the
    local Serbian Orthodox Church.
        Ethnic Minorities.--In 1999 the Government began a pilot program in
    ethnic Albanian communities, which devolved extensive authority,
    including taxation, to locally elected officials. An Albanian
    Democratic Union member also was appointed to the post of Minister of
    Minorities to ensure that equal representation and opportunities would
    exist for all ethnic groups. Members of the ethnic Albanian and Bosniak
    (ethnic Muslim) minorities are represented in the cabinet. However,
    societal discrimination against minorities exists. Harassment and
    intimidation against Muslims in the Sandzak region by Serbian
    nationalists and VJ troops continued (see Section 1.c.).
        In the week prior to the September 24 federal elections, there were
    reports that several hundred Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians from
    Montenegro left the country for Kosovo or Bosnia. There were no direct
    reports of violence or intimidation, but several families reported that
    they left because of an increase in military conscription and an
    increased military presence. Most of the families were able to return
    home within 1 week.
        There is no official discrimination against the Romani population;
    however, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Local authorities often
    ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani community.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
    police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Most if
    not all of the workforce in the official economy is organized. Both
    official, government-affiliated unions and independent unions exist.
    Because the independent labor movement largely is fragmented and access
    to international labor organizations is limited, there have been few
    tangible results in the form of improved working conditions or higher
    wages.
        Unions may affiliate with international labor organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--This right is
    provided for under law, but collective bargaining remains at a
    rudimentary level of development. Instead of attempting to make
    progress on the collective needs of all workers, negotiations generally
    center on advancing the needs of a specific group of workers. Job
    security fears prevail, as a result of the high unemployment rate, and
    these fears limit the groups' militancy.
        One factor impeding the collective bargaining power of the workers
    was the weak economy, in which high unemployment gave employers the
    upper hand in setting wages and work conditions, as workers competed
    for whatever jobs existed.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
    including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
    generally is not known to occur; however, the republic served as a
    transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
    forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The official minimum age for employment is 16 years,
    although in farming communities, it is not unusual to find younger
    children assisting their families. Moreover, children can be found in a
    variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or
    selling small items such as cigarettes. The high unemployment rate
    ensures that there is little demand for child labor in the formal
    sector. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited by law and
    generally is not known to occur; however, girls are trafficked through
    the republic for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c.
    and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises,
    including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies
    generally observe the minimum wage standard, which is $47 (94 DM) per
    month. However, this figure is comparable to unemployment benefits or
    wages paid to those on mandatory leave. The gross average wage is
    approximately $175 (350 DM) per month, with a disposable average wage
    (after social contributions and payroll taxes) of approximately $90
    (180 DM) per month. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. Data for 1999 (latest
    available) suggests that households spent almost all of their resources
    on basic needs, such as food, clothing, and housing.
        The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little meaning in an
    economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
        Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
    enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
    focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In view of the
    competition for employment, and the high degree of government control
    over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work
    situations without risking the loss of their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically forbids
    trafficking in persons; however, in practice trafficking is a growing
    problem and traffickers rarely are prosecuted. However, traffickers
    arrested in the spring during police raids on a brothel were
    prosecuted. The country is a destination and transit country for
    trafficked women and children. Women are trafficked from Romania,
    Ukraine, Moldova, China, and Russia, often through Belgrade and on to
    Western European countries and Kosovo. Trafficking has increased since
    the 1999 war in Kosovo, and Italian police weekly intercepted illegal
    immigrants from Montenegro. Many of these immigrants reported being
    victims of a trafficking scheme, some of whom were charged as high as
    $1,500 (DM 3,000) to be transported. This included a large number of
    women and girls who were trafficked to other parts of Europe for
    prostitution.
        Trafficked women often respond to employment advertisements for
    jobs abroad as babysitters, hairdressers, maids, waitresses, models, or
    dancers. According to the International Helsinki Federation, although
    some women may be aware that they are going to work in the sex
    industry, they are unaware of the slavery-like conditions they may
    face. Many women are sold several times in different countries to
    nightclub owners. Their passports often are confiscated. Women have
    reported being beaten and raped by their traffickers.
        The International Helsinki Federation reports that police and local
    authorities do little to stop trafficking and are often clients of
    nightclubs that keep trafficked women as prostitutes. Women found
    during police raids of bars and nightclubs during the year often were
    prosecuted for prostitution and deported. In some cases club owners
    were arrested and prosecuted for enabling prosecution; however, their
    sentences are generally short. The Government as a rule repatriates
    victims, but does not provide any other services, and there are no
    victim protection programs.
        A small number of NGO's work on trafficking. There is at least one
    shelter for victims. Awareness of the problem is low.
                           NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                  ----------

                                    ALGERIA

        President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April 1999 to a 5-
    year term. Bouteflika had served as Foreign Minister in a previous
    government. The President is the constitutional head of state, appoints
    and dismisses the Prime Minister, and may dissolve the legislature.
    According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister appoints the cabinet
    ministers; however, in practice the President has taken a key role in
    designating the members of the Cabinet. The military establishment
    strongly influences defense and foreign policy. Bouteflika was regarded
    throughout the 1999 election campaign as the candidate most favored by
    the dominant security establishment and the most likely winner. At the
    end of the campaign, the other six candidates withdrew, credibly
    charging massive fraud by the military, and Bouteflika was elected
    easily, although with a turnout as low as 30 percent. The presidential
    election campaign was marked by increased openness; however,
    international observers and political parties pointed out numerous
    problems with the conduct of the elections. A September 16, 1999
    national referendum, which asked citizens whether they agreed with
    Bouteflika's peace plan (which includes an amnesty program for the
    extremists fighting to overthrow the Government), was free of charges
    of fraud, and Bouteflika's peace plan won a reported 98 percent
    majority, with a reported 85 percent turnout. Bouteflika is not
    affiliated formally with any political party, but he has the
    parliamentary support of a seven-party coalition. In June 1997, Algeria
    held its first parliamentary elections since January 1992 and elected
    the first multiparty parliament in the country's history. The
    cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front
    (FIS) was poised to win, suspended the democratization process and a
    transition to a pluralistic republic, and escalated fighting, which
    still continues, between the security forces and armed insurgent groups
    seeking to overthrow the Government and impose an Islamic state. The
    Government does not always respect the independence of the judiciary.
        The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air
    force, navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal
    guards, and local self-defense forces. All of these elements are
    involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and are
    under the control of the Government. The security forces committed
    serious human rights abuses, although allegations of such abuses
    continued to decline.
        The economy is slowly developing from a state-administered to a
    market-oriented system. The Government has implemented stabilization
    policies and structural reforms. However, privatization of state
    enterprises has made little progress, and there has been little
    progress on reform of the banking and housing construction sectors. The
    state-owned petroleum sector's output represented about a quarter of
    national income and more than 96 percent of export earnings during the
    year. Noncompetitive and unprofitable state enterprises constitute the
    bulk of the nonhydrocarbon industrial sector. The agricultural sector,
    which produces grains, fruit, cattle, fiber, vegetables, and poultry,
    makes up 10 to 12 percent of the economy. Algeria is a middle-income
    country; annual per capita income is approximately $1,600. Officially,
    about 30 percent of the working-age population is unemployed, and about
    70 percent of persons under the age of 30 cannot find adequate
    employment.
        Despite measurable improvements, particularly in addressing
    problems of torture and arbitrary detention, the human rights situation
    was generally poor and serious problems persisted, including
    significant government restrictions on citizens' political and
    association rights and failure to account for past disappearances; the
    massacre of civilians by armed terriorist groups also continued. There
    are significant limitations on citizens' right to change their
    government. The security forces committed extrajudicial killings,
    tortured, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested
    and detained, or held incommunicado, individuals suspected of
    involvement with armed Islamist groups; however, the incidence of such
    abuses by security forces continued to decline. Security force
    involvement in disappearances from previous years remains unresolved.
    Security forces sometimes reach the sites of massacres too late to
    prevent or halt civilian casualties; however, there were no reports
    that security forces were complicit in massacres that took place during
    the year. An international nongovernmental organization (NGO) noted
    during the year that the country's poor prison conditions improved
    during the year. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial delays
    are problems, although the practice of detention beyond the legal limit
    appears to be less frequent. Although the Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, executive branch decrees restrict some of the
    judiciary's authority. The authorities do not always respect
    defendants' rights to due process. Illegal searches and infringements
    on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems.
        There was no overt censorship of information; however, while the
    print media is relatively free, news media practiced self censorship.
    Newspapers reported frequently on terrorist violence and on surrenders
    under the amnesty program, about which there was a wide range of views
    expressed in the media. The independent press commented openly and
    regularly on political matters and other significant issues. In some
    cases, newspapers represented specific political and economic
    interests. Electronic media continued to express only government
    policy. The Government also continued to restrict freedom of speech,
    press, assembly, association, and movement, although to a lesser degree
    than in the previous year. The Government also places some restrictions
    on freedom of religion. During the April 1999 presidential election,
    the candidates who ultimately withdrew from the election credibly
    reported irregularities, such as government ballot-box stuffing through
    manipulation of military votes. During the 1997 legislative, municipal,
    and provincial elections, there were credible reports of
    irregularities, such as government harassment of oppositionparty
    observers and fraud in vote-tally procedures. Amnesty International,
    Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and the International
    Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) visited the country during
    the year at the invitation of the Government. Domestic violence against
    women, the Family Code's limits on women's civil rights, and societal
    discrimination against women remained serious problems. Child abuse is
    a problem. Amazigh (Berber) ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights
    continue to be an issue, although these concerns are represented by at
    least two political parties with seats in Parliament. Child labor is a
    problem.
        Armed groups committed numerous serious abuses and killed hundreds
    of civilians. There was an increase in violence compared with 1999.
    Armed terrorists continued their widespread campaign of insurgency,
    targeting government officials, families of security-force members, and
    civilians. Many of the killings appeared to be related to opposition to
    the amnesty program. According to the Government, more than 5,000
    insurgents have availed themselves of the amnesty program so far, and
    the armed groups have become smaller; however, a hard-core insurgent
    force remains.
        Armed groups killed numerous civilians, including infants, in
    massacres and with small bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets
    killed and maimed persons indiscriminately. Some killings also were
    attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. Press reports
    estimated that approximately 2,500 civilians, terrorists, and security
    force members died during the year in domestic turmoil. The violence
    now seems to take place primarily in the countryside, as the security
    forces largely have forced the insurgents out of the cities. There were
    numerous instances in which armed groups kidnaped women, raped them,
    and forced them into servitude.
        After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged that a
    more accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during the
    previous 8 years placed the total at about 100,000.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The security forces
    committed extrajudicial killings, mostly during clashes with armed
    terrorist groups, although the number of such killings continued to
    decrease during the year. For example, in early March, the army found
    and killed 12 suspected terrorists 280 miles southwest of Algiers. On
    June 20, troops backed by gunships and artillery attacked guerrillas,
    killing 16 persons. Security force killings of terrorists decreased by
    approximately 10 percent compared to 1999. The Government maintains
    that security forces resort to lethal force only in the context of
    armed clashes with terrorists. The Government also contends that, as a
    matter of policy, disciplinary action is taken against soldiers or
    policemen who are guilty of violating human rights, and such
    disciplinary action reportedly was taken during the year. Human Rights
    Watch and other groups claim that security forces failed to intervene
    in some past situations to prevent or halt massacres of civilians,
    although there were no claims that this occurred during the year.
        One person died from the injuries he sustained in June after police
    rounded up and beat 200 persons who had been attending a local mosque
    (see Section 1.c.).
        In December 1999, one person died of a heart attack the day after
    being beaten by police who had responded to a terrorist attack in the
    town of Dellys. The case received considerable print-media attention,
    and the government-funded National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH)
    investigated the incident. After the investigation and ensuing trials,
    21 members of the security forces were prosecuted and the local
    commanders of 2 different security services were investigated and
    suspended from their duties.
        There were reports that progovernment militia killed one or two
    civilians during the year. The Government handled the killings as
    common murder cases.
        On November 22, 1999, prominent FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani, who
    had spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and
    killed in Algiers. On December 13, 1999, authorities arrested a
    suspect, who had the murder weapon in his possession. The Government
    completed its investigation into the incident, but had not made public
    the results by year's end.
        Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians,
    and such killings increased by approximately 20 percent compared with
    1999. In many cases, terrorists randomly targeted civilians in an
    apparent attempt to create social disorder. Armed groups killed
    numerous civilians, including infants, in massacres and with small
    bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets killed and maimed persons
    indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.). Some killings also were attributed
    to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. The violence now seems to take
    place primarily in the countryside, as the security forces largely have
    forced the insurgents out of the cities. Increasingly the killing of
    civilians appeared to be a result of opposition to President
    Bouteflika's amnesty program and to facilitate the theft of goods
    needed by the armed groups. As well as the use of small bombs,
    terrorist tactics included creating false roadblocks outside the cities
    by using stolen police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Press reports
    estimated that approximately 2,500 civilians, terrorists, and security
    force members died during the year in domestic turmoil. For example, on
    March 18, terrorists killed 19 persons, including 7 children, during
    the Eid festival. On May 4, militants killed 19 persons and injured 26
    when they reportedly opened fire on a bus after the driver refused to
    stop at a false roadblock 45 miles south of Algiers. There was an
    increase in violence during the summer. More than 200 persons
    reportedly were killed during July alone. On July 11, militants shot
    and killed 11 men who were sleeping in their tents while camping in
    Tipaza. At least nine persons were killed on July 17 when an armed
    group stopped their bus and sprayed it with machine-gun fire. On July
    28, 270 miles west of Algiers, militants killed eight civilians and
    wounded six in an attack on a nomad family, cutting the throats of six
    children between the ages of 6 months and 4 years. On September 20, six
    persons, including three children, reportedly were shot and killed
    during an ambush by militants. On December 16, armed intruders killed
    16 students and a security guard, and injured 5 other students at a
    high school dormitory in the town of Medea. On December 17, terrorists
    opened fire on a bus near the town of Tenes, killing 14 travelers.
    After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged that a more
    accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during the previous
    8 years placed the total at about 100,000.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports during the year
    of disappearances in which the security forces were implicated.
    However, there have been credible reports of disappearances occurring
    over a period of several years, many of which involved the security
    forces. In September 1998, the Ministry of Interior established an
    office in each district to accept cases from resident families of those
    reported missing. In May the Ministry of Justice reported that it had
    received 3,019 complaints of disappearance and had clarified 1,146 of
    them. However, credible sources state that the offices have not
    provided any useful information to the families of those who
    disappeared. By year's end, the Ministry of Interior had agreed to
    investigate 4,700 cases. The Ministry reports that it has provided
    information to the families in 3,000 of those cases. In 1,600 of the
    cases, families have requested administrative action to obtain death
    certificates for their missing relatives. However, there were no
    prosecutions of security-force personnel that stemmed from these cases.
    Families of the missing persons, defense attorneys, and local human
    rights groups insist that the Government could do more to solve the
    outstanding cases. The Government asserts that the majority of reported
    cases of disappearances either were committed by terrorists disguised
    as security forces or involved former armed Islamist supporters who
    went underground to avoid terrorist reprisals.
        In September Amnesty International reported that more than 4,000
    persons had disappeared since 1994 after being detained by security
    forces. AI stated that some died in custody from torture or were
    executed, but that many others reportedly were alive. Local NGO sources
    state that a few of the persons who disappeared have been released from
    captivity by the security forces, but that there has been no public
    information about these cases, due to the fear of reprisal against
    those released. Human rights activists assert that a number of the
    persons who disappeared still are alive in the hands of the security
    forces, but offer no evidence to support this assertion.
        Terrorist groups continued to kidnap scores of civilians. In many
    instances the victims disappeared and the families were unable to
    obtain information about their fate. Armed groups kidnaped young women
    and held them captive for extended periods for the purpose of rape and
    servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation ban torture and
    other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to
    local human rights groups and defense lawyers, the police at times
    resort to torture when interrogating persons suspected of being
    involved with, or having sympathies for, armed insurgency groups. There
    were no reports of torture during the year at the Algiers police
    facility called Chateau Neuf, as had been the case in the past.
        There continued to be reports of police abuse of detainees during
    the year. After its October visit (see Section 4), Amnesty
    International stated that although there were ``substantially fewer''
    cases of torture ``in comparison to some years ago,'' such cases
    nevertheless ``continue to occur.'' Many victims of torture hesitate to
    make public such allegations due to fear of government retaliation.
    Accusations of torture were made by those accused of involvement in
    terrorist activities. The Interior Ministry and the ONDH have stated
    publicly that the Government would punish those persons who violated
    the law and practiced torture. Government officials reported in
    November that between 350 and 400 security officials had been punished
    for ``human rights abuses,'' although the Government provided no
    details regarding the abuses that such officials committed or the
    punishment that they received. There is no independent mechanism
    available to verify the Government's claims.
        In early August, the Government announced new policies concerning
    the Police Judiciaire (PJ), the officers who interrogate suspects when
    they first are arrested to determine whether there are grounds for
    prosecution. Local judges now are to grade the performance of PJ
    officers operating in their jurisdiction in an effort to ensure that
    the officers comply with the law in their treatment of suspects. In
    addition, any suspect held in preventative detention is to undergo a
    medical examination at the end of the detention, whether the suspect
    requests it or not.
        In March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the
    authorities beat and intimidated demonstrators who were attempting to
    draw attention to the problem of persons who had disappeared. The
    Government arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations that
    occurred about a week apart; however, those arrested were released
    after a short time (see Section 2.b.). In June following a bomb blast
    in Dellys, police rounded up a group of 200 persons who had been
    attending the local mosque. The group was taken to police headquarters
    and beaten. One person died from the injuries he sustained. Members of
    the group took legal action against the police and, as a result, the
    local chiefs of the police and the Gendarmerie were fired and two of
    the offending officers were arrested. In November police used force to
    disrupt a march by families of persons who had disappeared, which
    coincided with a visit to that city by Amnesty International (see
    Section 2.b.).
        In December 1999, a terrorist bomb killed and injured police in the
    town of Dellys. Within hours security forces rounded up and detained
    more than 100 persons of both sexes and a variety of ages. Police
    officers beat many of the detainees and threw them into the crater made
    by the terrorist bomb. One of the mistreated persons died of a heart
    attack the next day. A senior regional police commander ordered the
    police to stop these actions. In response to complaints from the
    mistreated persons, the authorities suspended the local commanders of 2
    different security services and prosecuted 21 members of the security
    forces (see Section 1.a.).
        Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as
    beheading, mutilating, and dismembering their victims, including
    infants, children, and pregnant women. These groups also used bombs
    that killed and injured persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    Terrorists also committed dozens of rapes of female victims, many of
    whom subsequently were murdered. There were also frequent reports of
    other young women being abducted, raped for weeks at a time by group
    leaders and other members, and forced into servitude (see Sections
    1.a., 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        Prison conditions remain generally poor, with significant
    overcrowding. However, an international NGO stated during the year that
    conditions had improved considerably. A decrease in prison population
    reduced overcrowding somewhat. Moreover, prisoners were found generally
    to be in good health and benefiting from adequate food and expanded
    visitation rights. The provision of adequate medical treatment to
    prisoners still is limited, but the Government reportedly is addressing
    the issue.
        In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of
    prisons or detention centers. However, in October 1999, March and again
    in May, the Government allowed International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC) to visit prisons. The ICRC in April decided no longer to seek
    access to military prisons because it lacked any credible evidence that
    these prisons held civilians. The ICRC did not visit FIS leaders in
    prison or under house arrest.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces
    continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain citizens. Human rights
    activists state that this practice continued to diminish during the
    year. The Constitution stipulates that incommunicado detention in
    criminal cases prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after
    which the suspect must be charged or released. According to the 1992
    antiterrorist law, the police may hold suspects in prearraignment
    detention for up to 12 days; they also must inform suspects of the
    charges against them. In practice the security forces generally adhered
    to this 12-day limit during the year.
        In March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the Government
    arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations occurring about
    a week apart; however, those arrested were released after a short time
    (see Section 2.b.). In November police used force to disrupt a march by
    families of the disappeared, and arrested five persons. Four
    subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and convicted of
    attacking a security officer (see Section 2.b.).
        FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from prison in 1997,
    remains under house arrest and is allowed to receive visits only from
    members of his family (see Section 2.d.), although he has made numerous
    press statements and conducted interviews while under house arrest.
    Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice president Ali Benhadj, who had been
    held incommunicado from 1992 until 1998, now is allowed contact with
    members of his family, who speak to the press on his behalf.
        The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the
    police obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the
    police made limited use of this law. However, according to defense
    attorneys, police who execute searches without a warrant routinely fail
    to identify themselves as police and abuse those who ask for
    identification (see Section 1.f.). Police and communal guards sometimes
    detain persons at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.). There are reports of
    police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists in order to
    force the suspects to surrender. According to Amnesty International, on
    April 4, police arrested 73-year-old El-Hadj M'lik in front of several
    witnesses. He had been questioned previously concerning his sons, one
    of whom is believed to be a member of a terrorist group. Security
    officials reassured the family, on two separate occasions, that M'lik
    would be returned to them. However, he had not been returned by year's
    end, and the Government provided no information regarding his
    whereabouts.
        Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Persons accused of
    crimes sometimes did not receive expeditious trials; however, long-term
    detention appeared to decrease somewhat during the past year (see
    Section 1.e.). Hundreds of state enterprise officials who were arrested
    on charges of corruption in 1996 remained in detention. Three or four
    of the higher ranking detainees were released during the year.
        Under the state of emergency, the Minister of Interior is
    authorized to detain suspects in special camps that are administered by
    the army. In 1995 the Government announced that it had closed the last
    camp and released the 641 prisoners there. Local human rights activists
    and NGO's state that no such camps now exist. They note that the
    Government continues to keep some former prisoners under surveillance
    and requires them to report periodically to police.
        Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and is not known to
    be practiced. However, there are numerous cases of selfimposed exile
    involving former FIS members or individuals who maintain that they have
    been accused falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing
    government policies.
        One such case was resolved in September when Ali Bensaad, a
    professor at the University of Constantine, who had been in exile in
    Germany, returned to the country. The former exile was issued a limited
    (6-month) passport, which allowed him to return. Bensaad is pursuing
    redress in the court system for the ``machinations'' he claims were
    perpetrated against him by former high-ranking officials.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the Government does not
    always respect the independence of the judicial system. In November
    1999, President Bouteflika named a commission to review the functioning
    of the judiciary and to recommend ways to improve it. In August after
    the commission submitted its report, the President announced a massive
    reorganization of the judiciary. He replaced 80 percent of the heads of
    the 187 lower courts and 99 percent of the presidents of the 37 higher-
    level courts. Most of the court heads were reassigned to new locations;
    however, a number were replaced outright. Whereas only a few courts
    previously were headed by women, 19 now have female heads.
        The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which try cases
    involving civilians, and the military courts, which have tried
    civilians for security and terrorism offenses. There is also a
    Constitutional Council, which reviews the constitutionality of
    treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of
    the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found
    unconstitutional.
        Regular criminal courts try those individuals accused of security-
    related offenses. Long-term detentions of suspects awaiting trial again
    appeared to decrease somewhat during the year.
        According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent
    until proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and
    may appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the
    right to legal counsel. However, the authorities do not always respect
    all legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to deny
    due process. Some lawyers do not accept cases of individuals accused of
    securityrelated offenses, due to fear of retribution from the security
    forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS have suffered
    harassment, death threats, and arrest.
        There are no credible estimates of the number of political
    prisoners; some estimate the number to be several thousand. An unknown
    number of persons who could be considered political prisoners are
    serving prison sentences because of their Islamist sympathies and
    membership in the FIS. There are credible estimates that the Government
    released 5,000 political prisoners after Bouteflika's 1999 election.
        International humanitarian organizations did not request visits
    with political prisoners during the year; therefore, it is unclear
    whether the Government would permit such organizations to visit
    political prisoners. In general the Government does not permit
    independent monitoring of prisons or detention centers; however, over
    the past 18 months, it has permitted the ICRC to monitor general prison
    conditions in civilian prisons (see Section 1.c.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--Authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy
    rights. The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home,
    but the state of emergency authorizes provincial governors to issue
    exceptional warrants at any time. Security forces also entered
    residences without warrants. According to defense attorneys, police who
    execute searches without a warrant routinely fail to identify
    themselves as police and abuse those who ask for identification.
    Security forces deployed an extensive network of secret informers
    against both terrorist targets and political opponents. The Government
    monitors the telephones of, and sometimes disconnects service to,
    political opponents and journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 3). There
    are reports of police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists
    in order to force the suspects to surrender (see Section 1.d.).
        Armed terrorists entered private homes either to kill or kidnap
    residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food. After massacres that
    took place in their villages, numerous civilians fled their homes.
    Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of violence to extort
    money from businesses and families across the country.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law.--
    Armed groups were responsible for numerous, indiscriminate,
    nonselective killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and
    other public places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of
    persons. In rural areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines,
    which often targeted security force personnel. For example, on
    September 29, a group of at least 100 armed men seized control of the
    roads leading into Bani Yassi, a small town 56 miles east of Algiers
    near Tizi Ouzou. The group then destroyed the barracks of the local
    communal police with an explosive device, entered the wreckage after
    the explosion, and killed those police officers who were not killed in
    the explosion. On November 4, one soldier was killed and two others
    were injured in a bomb blast at an electrical pylon in the mountainous
    region of Zaccar, about 40 miles southwest of Algiers. On December 5,
    three people were killed and 11 were injured in an explosion in Tiaret
    (200 miles west of Algiers).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech; however, the Government restricts this right in
    practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom of speech must respect
    ``individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the
    national defense.'' The state of emergency decree gives the Government
    broad authority to restrict these freedoms and to take legal action
    against what it considers to be threats to the state or public order.
    However, the Government did not enforce these regulations strictly, and
    the independent press reported regularly on security matters without
    penalty. Reporting by government-controlled press organs frequently
    included deflated numbers of civilians and government forces killed,
    and inflated terrorist casualty counts; however, there were no credible
    allegations of inflated terrorist surrenders under the amnesty program
    during the year, as had been the case in the past. Government
    discrepancies were noted frequently in independent newspapers.
        In March 1994, the Government issued an interministerial decree
    that independent newspapers could print security information only from
    official government bulletins carried by the government-controlled
    Algerian Press Service (APS). Independent newspapers openly ignored the
    directive, and the trend toward increased openness about security-force
    losses continued during the year. The Government continued to provide
    the press with more information than in the past about the security
    situation. Journalists deliberately did not report on current possible
    abuses by security forces to avoid difficulties with the Government,
    although there was significant coverage of NGO activity aimed at
    publicizing such abuses committed in the past. According to the
    Ministry of Health, it no longer forbids medical personnel from
    speaking to journalists, and such personnel spoke to the press during
    the year. The Government's definition of security information often
    extended beyond purely military matters to encompass broader political
    affairs. In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed from detention in
    1994 received direct orders from the Justice Ministry to make no
    further public statements. This ban remains in force. In general,
    journalists exercised self-censorship by not publishing criticism of
    specific senior military officials.
        For a second consecutive year, there were no reports that the
    Government put journalists under ``judicial control.'' In previous
    years, the Government used this practice to harass journalists who
    wrote offending articles by requiring the journalists to check in
    regularly with the local police and preventing them from leaving the
    country. According to a Europe-based NGO that specializes in press
    freedom, the Government continued to refrain from harassing journalists
    under criminal defamation statutes during the year, as had been its
    practice in the past.
        There were no newspapers allied with Islamist political parties in
    print, due to government pressure; however, legal Islamist political
    parties have access to the existing independent press, in which they
    may express their views without government interference.
        The Government maintains an effective monopoly over printing
    companies and newsprint imports. However, at least two newspapers were
    in the final stages of negotiations with private firms to print
    newspapers and import newsprint, which would circumvent such government
    control. There was no abuse of the Government's power to halt newspaper
    publications during the year.
        The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent
    press through the state-owned advertising company, which was created in
    1996. All state-owned companies that wish to place an advertisement in
    a newspaper must submit the item to the advertising company, which then
    decides in which newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state
    companies' output and government services still represent approximately
    two-thirds of national income, government-provided advertising
    constitutes a significant source of advertising revenue for the
    country's newspapers. Advertising companies tend to provide significant
    amounts of advertising to publications with a strong anti-Islamist
    editorial line and to withhold advertising from newspapers on political
    grounds, even if such newspapers have large readerships or offer cheap
    advertising rates.
        President Bouteflika stated in November 1999 that the media
    ultimately should be at the service of the State. Radio and television
    remained under government control, with coverage biased in favor of the
    Government's policies and the government-supported party, the National
    Democratic Rally (RND). Parliamentary debates are televised live.
    Satellite-dish antennas are widespread, and millions of citizens have
    access to European and Middle Eastern broadcasting. A five-member
    delegation from Reporters Without Borders visited the country in June.
    The group was allowed to meet freely with the interlocutors of their
    choice and concluded that the press enjoyed increasing freedom.
    However, the delegation also noted a number of continued barriers to
    full press freedom.
        Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the
    country after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some
    continued to return during the year. There was a growing number of
    academic seminars and colloquiums that occurred without governmental
    interference. The Government continues to interfere in seminars that
    were political or economic in content (see Section 2.b.). The only
    reported strike at a university during the year occurred in October at
    Bab Izzouar University, where a small number of professors went on
    strike to protest work conditions. After a week, the teachers returned
    to work (see Section 6.a.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992 emergency law and
    government practice sharply curtail this right. Citizens and
    organizations must obtain permits from the appointed local governor
    before holding public meetings. While the Government frequently grants
    licenses to political parties, NGO's, and other groups to hold indoor
    rallies, in most instances outdoor demonstrations are not permitted.
        Some unlicensed groups continue to be active, including groups
    dedicated to the cause of persons who have disappeared. Such groups
    continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government buildings.
    However, in March in the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the
    authorities beat and intimidated demonstrators attempting to draw
    attention to the cause of persons who disappeared. The Government
    arrested 40 persons during two separate demonstrations occurring about
    a week apart. However, those arrested were released after a short time.
    In November police again disrupted a march by families of persons who
    had disappeared. In this instance, which coincided with a visit to that
    city by Amnesty International, the police used force, and arrested five
    persons. Four subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and
    convicted of attacking a security officer.
        The Government refused to permit, in the name of public order, a
    proposed march in October to protest the Israeli Government's actions
    against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall.
    When a group of protesters attempted to hold a rally despite the ban,
    they were dispersed in a nonviolent manner.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
    the 1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restrict it.
    The Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they
    may be established (see Section 3). In January the Government refused
    to approve the Wafa Party because of its perceived ties to the FIS. In
    August 40 members of Parliament petitioned the Government, demanding an
    explanation of the Government's refusal to recognize the Party. In
    November the Minister of Justice responded, stating that the Wafa Party
    would not be recognized because it included large numbers of members
    who belonged to the outlawed FIS. The Government closed the Party's
    offices on November 13. The Front Democratique, which is headed by
    former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, applied for registration but
    received no response within the time period specified by law for
    governmental decision on such cases (see Section 3). The Interior
    Ministry licenses all nongovernmental associations and regards all
    associations as illegal unless they have licenses. It may deny a
    license to, or dissolve, any group regarded as a threat to the
    Government's authority, or to the security or public order of the
    State. After the Government suspended the parliamentary election in
    1992, it banned the FIS as a political party, and the social and
    charitable groups associated with it. Membership in the FIS remains
    illegal, although at least one former FIS leader announced publicly
    that he intended to form a cultural youth group.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares Islam to be the
    state religion but prohibits discrimination based on religious belief,
    and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however,
    there are some restrictions. Islam is the only legal religion, and the
    law limits the practice of other faiths; however, the Government
    follows a de facto policy of tolerance by not inquiring into the
    religious practices of individuals.
        The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a
    faith other than Islam. However, there are Roman Catholic churches in
    the country, including a cathedral in Algiers (the seat of the
    Archbishop), which conduct services without government interference. In
    1994 the size of the Jewish community diminished significantly, and its
    synagogue since has been abandoned. There are only a few smaller
    churches and other places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregate in
    private homes for religious services.
        Because Islam is the state religion, the country's education system
    is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens
    below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement in
    the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education
    and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Private primary and secondary
    schools are not permitted to operate.
        The Government appoints preachers to mosques and gives general
    guidance on sermons. The Government monitors activities in mosques for
    possible security-related offenses, and bars their use as public
    meeting places outside of regular prayer hours. The Ministry of
    religious affairs provides some financial support to mosques and has
    limited control over the training of imams.
        Conversions from Islam to other religions are rare. Because of
    safety concerns and potential legal and social problems, Muslim
    converts practice their new faith clandestinely. The Family Code, which
    is based on Shari'a (Islamic law), prohibits Muslim women from marrying
    non-Muslims, although this regulation is not always enforced. The code
    does not restrict Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.
        Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the Government restricts
    the importation of non-Islamic literature for widespread distribution.
    Personal copies of the major works of other religions, such as the
    Bible, may be brought into the country. Non-Islamic religious texts and
    music and video selections no longer are difficult to locate for
    purchase. The Government prohibits the dissemination of any literature
    that portrays violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.
        Under both Shari'a and the law, children born to a Muslim father
    are Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion. Islam does not allow
    conversion to other faiths at any age. In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group
    (GIA) declared its intention to eliminate Jews, Christians, and
    polytheists from Algeria. The GIA has not yet retracted that
    declaration and, as a result, the mainly foreign Christian community
    tends to curtail its public activities.
        The country's 9-year civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed
    radical Muslims against the general Islamic population. Approximately
    100,000 civilians, terrorists, and security forces have been killed
    during the past 9 years. Extremist selfproclaimed ``Islamists'' have
    issued public threats against all ``infidels'' in the country, both
    foreigners and citizens, and have killed both Muslims and non-Muslims,
    including missionaries. The majority of the country's terrorist groups
    do not, as a rule, differentiate between religious and political
    killings. During the year, terrorists continued attacks against the
    Government and civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic
    and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government at
    times restricts these rights. In the spring of 1999, the Government
    allowed travel abroad by representatives of organizations pursuing
    information on relatives who allegedly ``disappeared'' due to the
    actions of the security forces. These organizations, which were hosted
    by human rights NGO's, held public discussions on those who had
    disappeared.
        The Government does not allow foreign travel by senior officials
    from the banned FIS. FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from
    prison in 1997, remains under house arrest (see Section 1.d.). The
    Government also does not permit young men who are eligible for the
    draft and who have not yet completed their military service to leave
    the country if they do not have special authorization; such
    authorization may be granted to students and to those individuals with
    special family circumstances. The Family Code does not permit married
    females under 19 years of age to travel abroad without their husband's
    permission, although this provision generally is not followed in
    practice.
        Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the
    provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons
    regarded as threats to public order. The Government also restricts
    travel into four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon
    industry and many foreign workers are located, in order to enhance
    security in those areas.
        The police and the communal guards operate checkpoints throughout
    the country. They routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification
    papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes
    detain persons at these checkpoints.
        Armed groups intercept citizens at roadblocks, using stolen police
    uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their cash and
    vehicles. According to press reports, armed groups sometimes killed
    groups of civilian passengers at these roadblocks (see Section 1.a.).
        The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum, and
    the Government occasionally grants asylum. The Government cooperates
    with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. For example, it
    cooperates with the UNHCR on programs to help refugee Sahrawis, former
    residents of the Western Sahara who left that territory after Morocco
    took control of it in the 1970's. The Government also has worked with
    international organizations that help the Tuaregs, a nomadic people of
    southern Algeria and neighboring countries. There were no reports of
    the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government; however, there are significant limitations to this right in
    practice. The strong prerogatives of the executive branch, supported by
    the entrenched power of the military and the bureaucracy, prevent
    citizens from exercising this right. The withdrawal of six presidential
    candidates in 1999 amidst credible charges of fraud, and the election
    of President Bouteflika highlighted the continued dominance of the
    military elite in the process of selecting the country's political
    leadership.
        President Bouteflika was elected in an April 15, 1999 presidential
    election that was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day before of
    all other candidates, who charged that the military already had begun
    to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika victory. Until
    those allegations surfaced, the campaign had been conducted fairly,
    with all candidates widely covered in both state-owned and private
    media. The conduct of the campaign--although regulated as to the use of
    languages other than Arabic, and as to the timing, location and
    duration of meetings--was free, and all candidates traveled extensively
    throughout the country. One potential candidate was denied the ability
    to run because the electoral commission determined that he could not
    prove that he had participated in Algeria's war of independence against
    France, a legal requirement for candidates for President born before
    July 1942. With the withdrawal of the other candidates and the absence
    of foreign observers, it was impossible to make an accurate
    determination of turnout for the election, although it apparently was
    as low as 30 percent; the Government claimed a 60 percent turnout.
        Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by
    decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit
    to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament was
    not in session. The President did not exercise such authority during
    the year. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber, the
    National Popular Assembly (APN), and an upper chamber, the National
    Council, two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and
    provincial councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of
    the National Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of
    threequarters of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must
    originate in the lower chamber.
        In June 1997, Algeria held its first elections to the APN since
    elections were canceled in January 1992, and elected the first
    multiparty parliament in the country's history. Candidates representing
    39 political parties participated, along with several independent
    candidates. Under a system of proportional representation, the
    government-supported party, the National Democratic Rally, won a
    plurality of 154 seats out of a total of 371. In their final report,
    neutral observers stated that, of 1,258 (of the country's 35,000)
    voting stations that they assessed, 1,169 were satisfactory, 95 were
    problematic, and 11 were unsatisfactory. In November 1997, the
    provincial election commissions announced the results of their
    adjudication of the appeals filed by various political parties. The RND
    lost some seats but remained the overall victor in the Assembly
    elections.
        In 1997 the appointed previous legislature, the National Transition
    Council (CNT), changed the law that regulates political parties. Under
    the controversial law, potential parties require official approval from
    the Interior Ministry before they may be established. To obtain
    approval, a party must have 25 founders from across the country whose
    names must be registered with the Interior Ministry. A party headed by
    one of the six presidential candidates who withdrew from the April
    elections registered in September 1999. Two parties failed to receive
    registration. In January the Government refused to approve the Wafa
    party because of its perceived ties to the FIS (see Section 2.b.). The
    Front Democratique, which is headed by former Prime Minster Sid Ahmed
    Ghozali, applied for registration but received no response within the
    time period specified by law for governmental decision on such cases.
    No party may use religion, Amazigh heritage, or Arab heritage as a
    basis of organizing for political purposes. The law also bans political
    party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party financing
    and reporting requirements.
        The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide
    spectrum of viewpoints and engage in activities that range from holding
    rallies to printing newspapers. The Government continues to ban the FIS
    as a political party (see Section 2.b.). With the exception of the
    leading progovernment party, the RND, and the Front de Liberation
    National (FLN), political parties sometimes encounter difficulties when
    dealing with local officials, who hinder their organizational efforts.
    The Government monitors private telephone communications, and sometimes
    disconnects telephone service to political opponents for extended
    periods (see Section 1.f.). Opposition parties have very limited access
    to state-controlled television and radio, although the independent
    press publicizes their views.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. The new
    cabinet, named in August, has no female members. Eleven of the 380
    members of the lower house of Parliament are women. In September 1999,
    President Bouteflika appointed the first-ever female provincial
    governor. A woman heads a workers' party, and all the major political
    parties except one had women's divisions headed by women.
        The Amazighs, an ethnic minority centered in the Kabylie region,
    participate freely and actively in the political process. Two major
    opposition parties originated in the Amazigh-populated region of the
    country: The Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and
    Democracy. These two parties represent Amazigh political and cultural
    concerns in the Parliament and the media. The two Amazighbased parties
    were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the Electoral Law
    that stipulate that political parties must have 25 founders from across
    the country.
        The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, do not play an important
    role in politics, due to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of
    thousands, and their nomadic existence.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The most active independent human rights group is the Algerian
    League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent
    organization that has members throughout the country. The LADDH is not
    allowed access to the authorities or to prisons beyond the normal
    consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less-active
    Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an independent organization
    based in Constantine. The LADH has members throughout the country who
    follow individual cases. Human rights groups report occasional
    harassment by government authorities in the form of obvious
    surveillance and cutting off of telephone service.
        Unlike in previous years when such visits were banned, delegations
    from Amnesty International, the ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Freedom
    House, the FIDH, and Reporters Without Borders visited the country at
    the Government's invitation. Amnesty International visited in May and
    again in October, and, after its May visit, claimed that during the
    visit its delegation was ``able to move around the country freely and
    no restrictions were imposed'' on its activities. However, Amnesty
    International did not seek meetings with members of the FIS in prison
    or under house arrest. The organization stated that there had been ``a
    significant drop in the level of violence and killings, and the reports
    of arbitrary arrests, prolonged incommunicado detention, torture,
    disappearances, and unfair trials have also diminished significantly.''
    However, Amnesty International maintained that many serious concerns
    had not been addressed, including resolving past abuses such as
    disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, during its October
    visit, Amnesty International claimed that the Government was not
    cooperating adequately or providing the organization with quality
    information. The organization also claimed that the Government was
    staging demonstrations opposing the Amnesty International visit. In
    September and October, the ICRC conducted its third visit to the
    country to monitor general conditions in the civilian prisons. ICRC
    president Jakob Kellenberger commented during the visit on the
    constructive nature of the dialog between the ICRC and the Government.
    A delegation from Human Rights Watch met with government officials in
    May. The delegation stated that it was ``allowed to travel freely and
    meet with officials, lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, and
    victims and families of victims of abuses by the Government and armed
    groups.'' Freedom House visited July 3-10, and again in November, in
    order to assess the possibility of establishing programs involving
    support for the rule of law, including women's rights, freedom of the
    press, and judicial reform.
        The National Observatory for Human Rights was established by the
    Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the
    authorities. It prepares an annual report with recommendations to the
    Government.
        The Government has a national ombudsman, who receives individual
    complaints and presents an annual report to the President. Provincial
    representatives are designated to accept individual grievances and to
    make them known to the authorities. Most such complaints concerned
    bureaucratic unresponsiveness and lack of jobs and housing (see Section
    5).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race,
    sex, belief, or any other personal or social condition; however, women
    continue to face legal and social discrimination.
        Women.--Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse is
    common, but there are no reliable statistics regarding its extent.
    Spousal abuse is more frequent in rural than urban areas, especially
    among less-educated persons. There are no specific laws against spousal
    rape. Rape is illegal, and in principle a spouse could be charged under
    the law. However, there are strong societal pressures against a woman
    seeking legal redress against her spouse for rape, and there have been
    no reports of the law being applied in such cases. Battered women must
    obtain medical certification of the physical effects of an assault
    before they lodge a complaint with the police. However, because of
    societal pressures, women frequently are reluctant to endure this
    process. There are very few facilities offering safe haven for abused
    women, and many more are needed. Women's rights groups have experienced
    difficulty in drawing attention to spousal abuse as an important social
    problem, largely due to societal attitudes. There are several rape
    crisis centers run by women's groups, but they have few resources. In
    August 1998, the Government released figures indicating that the
    whereabouts of 319 women remain unknown, and that there were 24 reports
    by women of rape. Most human rights groups believe that the actual
    number is much higher. There is a rape crisis center that specializes
    in caring for women who are victims of rape by terrorists.
        Some aspects of the law and many traditional social practices
    discriminate against women. The 1984 Family Code, which is based in
    large part on Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal
    guardianship of a husband or male relative. For example, a woman must
    obtain a father's approval to marry. Divorce is difficult for a wife to
    obtain except in cases of abandonment or the husband's conviction for a
    serious crime. Husbands generally obtain the right to the family's home
    in the case of divorce. Custody of the children normally is awarded to
    the mother, but she may not enroll them in a particular school or take
    them out of the country without the father's authorization. Only males
    are able to confer citizenship on their children. Muslim women are
    prohibited from marrying nonMuslims; Muslim men may marry non-Muslim
    women (see Section 2.c.).
        The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man
    to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs in practice. A
    wife may sue for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his
    intent to marry another woman prior to the marriage.
        Women suffer from discrimination in inheritance claims; in
    accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an
    estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers.
    According to Shari'a, such a distinction is justified because other
    provisions require that the husband's income and assets are to be used
    to support the family, while the wife's remain, in principle, her own.
    However, in practice women do not always have exclusive control over
    assets that they bring to a marriage or income that they earn
    themselves. Females under 19 years of age may not travel abroad without
    their husbands' permission (see Section 2.d.). However, women may take
    out business loans and are the sole custodians of their dowries. In its
    2000 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
    Experts noted that the Government has stated that, despite
    incorporating equality between men and women into the legislative and
    regulatory texts governing the workplace, in practice women still are
    confronted with discriminations in employment resulting from
    stereotypes that exist regarding a woman's place in society.
        While social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a
    career exists throughout the country, it is much stronger in rural
    areas than in major urban areas. Women constitute only 10 percent of
    the work force. Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into
    contracts, and pursue opportunities in government, medicine, law,
    education, the media, and the armed forces. About 25 percent of judges
    are women, a percentage that has been growing in recent years.
    President Bouteflika's changes to the judiciary in August increased the
    number of courts headed by women (see Section 1.e).
        Although the 1990 Labor Law bans sexual discrimination in the
    workplace, the leaders of women's organizations report that violations
    are commonplace. Labor Ministry inspectors do little to enforce the
    law.
        There are numerous small women's rights groups. Their main goals
    are to foster women's economic welfare and to amend aspects of the
    Family Code.
        During the year, extremists sometimes specifically targeted women.
    There were numerous incidents of women being killed and mutilated in
    massacres. Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnaped young women and
    held them captive for extended periods for the purposes of rape and
    servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government is committed in principle to protecting
    children's human rights. It provides free education for children 6 to
    15 years of age, and free medical care for all citizens--albeit in
    often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has
    programs for children, but such programs face serious funding problems.
    Child abuse is a problem. Hospitals treat numerous child abuse cases
    every year, but many cases go unreported. Laws against child abuse have
    not led to notable numbers of prosecutions against offenders. Legal
    experts maintain that the Penal and Family Codes do not offer children
    sufficient protection. NGO's that specialize in care of children cite
    an increase in domestic violence aimed at children, which they
    attribute to the ``culture of violence'' developed during the years
    since 1992 and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural
    families to the cities to escape terrorist violence. Such NGO's have
    educational programs aimed at reducing the level of violence, but lack
    funding.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
    accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled.
    Public enterprises, in downsizing the work force, generally ignore a
    law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of their jobs for the
    disabled. Social security provides for payments for orthopedic
    equipment, and some nongovernmental organizations receive limited
    government financial support. The Government also attempts to finance
    specialized training, but this initiative remains rudimentary.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Amazighs are an ethnic
    minority centered in the Kabylie region. Amazigh nationalists have
    sought to maintain their own cultural and linguistic identity while the
    Government's Arabization program continues. The law requires that
    Arabic be the official language and requires, under penalty of fines,
    that all official government business be conducted in Arabic. The law
    also requires that Arabic be used for all broadcasts on national
    television and radios for dubbing or subtitling all non-Arabic films,
    for medical prescriptions (although the law is not followed in
    practice), and for communications equipment. As part of the national
    charter signed in 1996, the Government and several major political
    parties agreed that the Amazigh culture and language were major
    political components of the country's identity. In September 1999
    President Bouteflika stated that the Amazigh language would never be an
    official language.
        There are professorships in Amazigh culture at the University of
    Tizi Ouzou. The government-owned national television station broadcasts
    a brief nightly news program in the Amazigh language. Amazighs hold
    influential positions in government, the army, business, and
    journalism.
        The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, live an isolated, nomadic
    existence and are relatively few in number.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish
    trade unions of their choice. About two-thirds of the labor force
    belong to unions. There is an umbrella labor confederation, the General
    Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and its affiliated entities, which
    dates from the era of a single political party. The UGTA encompasses
    national syndicates that are specialized by sector. There are also some
    autonomous unions, such as syndicates for Air Algeria pilots (SPLA),
    airport technicians (SNTMA), and teachers (CNES).
        Workers are required to obtain government approval to establish a
    union. The 1990 law on labor unions requires the Labor Ministry to
    approve a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Syndicates
    Confederation (CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the
    autonomous syndicates, but without success. The application that the
    CSA filed with the Labor Ministry still was pending at year's end,
    although the CSA continues to function without official status. The law
    prohibits unions from associating with political parties and also
    prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The courts
    are empowered to dissolve unions that engage in illegal activities. The
    labor union organized by the banned FIS, the Islamic Syndicate of
    Workers (SIT), was dissolved in 1992 because it had no license.
        Under the state of emergency, the Government is empowered to
    require workers in both the public and private sectors to stay at their
    jobs in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to
    the 1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14
    days of mandatory conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. The law
    states that arbitration decisions are binding on both parties. If no
    agreement is reached in arbitration, the workers may strike legally
    after they vote by secret ballot to do so. A minimum level of public
    services must be maintained during public sector service strikes.
        In February the Agricultural Services Department went on strike for
    increased salaries. On March 28 and 29, The National Customs Union went
    on strike to demand the implementation of a previously negotiated
    agreement on salaries. On April 3, the air traffic controllers
    (Syndicat National des Personnels de la Circulation Aerienne) went on
    strike as a part of extended salary negotiations. In May steelworkers
    went on strike for assurances of job security. In that same month, the
    National Teacher's Union (Union National des Personnels de l'Education
    et de la Formation--UNPEF) went on strike for increased salaries and
    better housing. There also were various taxi strikes throughout the
    country during the year. The workers received varying numbers of
    concessions to their demands as a result of the strikes. In October a
    small number of professors at Bab Izzouar University went on strike to
    protest work conditions (see Section 2.a.).
        Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate
    with international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign
    labor groups. For example, the UGTA has contacts with French unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government
    permits this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination by
    employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms
    for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by
    employers. It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace.
        The Government has established an export processing zone in Jijel.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is incompatible with the Constitution's provisions on individual
    rights, and the Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including by
    children; however, while the Government generally enforces the ban
    effectively, armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnap young women and
    hold them captive for weeks at a time, during which group members rape
    them and force them into servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5,
    and 6.f.).
        In its 2000 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts noted that the
    law that requires persons who have completed a course of higher
    education or training to perform a period of service of between 2 and 4
    years in order to obtain employment or work in an occupation, is not
    compatible with relevant ILO conventions dealing with forced labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors
    from the Ministry of labor enforce the minimum employment age by making
    periodic or unannounced inspection visits to public sector enterprises.
    They do not enforce the law effectively in the agricultural or private
    sectors. Economic necessity compels many children to resort to informal
    employment, such as street vending. The Government prohibits forced and
    bonded labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall
    framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific
    agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the
    discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The Government
    fixes by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors; however, this
    is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
    and family. The minimum wage is approximately $105 (8,000 dinars) per
    month. Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for ensuring
    compliance with the minimum wage regulation; however, their enforcement
    is inconsistent.
        The standard workweek is 40 hours. There are well-developed
    occupation and health regulations codified in a 1991 decree, but
    government inspectors do not enforce these regulations effectively.
    There were no reports of workers being dismissed for removing
    themselves from hazardous working conditions. Because employment
    generally is based on very detailed contracts, workers rarely are
    subjected to conditions in the workplace that they were not informed of
    beforehand. If workers are subjected to such conditions, they first may
    attempt to renegotiate the employment contract and, that failing,
    resort to the courts.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons. Armed terrorist groups frequently kidnaped
    young women and held them captive for weeks at a time, during which
    group members raped them and forced them into servitude (see Sections
    1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.c.). There is a rape crisis center in
    Algiers that specializes in caring for women who are victims of rape by
    terrorists.
                                   __________

                                    BAHRAIN

        Bahrain is a hereditary emirate with few democratic institutions
    and no political parties. The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled
    Bahrain since the late 18th century and dominates all facets of its
    society and government. The Constitution confirms the Amir as
    hereditary ruler. The Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, governs
    the country with the assistance of his uncle as Prime Minister, his son
    as Crown Prince, and an appointed cabinet of ministers. In 1975 the
    Government suspended some provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
    including those articles relating to the National Assembly, which was
    disbanded and never reinstituted. Citizens belong to the Shi'a and
    Sunni sects of Islam, with the Shi'a constituting over two-thirds of
    the indigenous population. However, Sunnis predominate politically and
    economically because the ruling family is Sunni and is supported by the
    armed forces, the security services, and powerful Sunni and Shi'a
    merchant families. The political situation generally was calm during
    the year; there were a few incidents of low-level political unrest, but
    there has not been significant unrest since 1996. There are few
    judicial checks on the actions of the Amir and his Government, and the
    courts are subject to government pressure.
        The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It
    controls the public security force (police) and the extensive security
    service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The
    Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against
    external threats. It did not play a role in internal security during
    the year. Security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        Bahrain has a mixed economy with government domination of many
    basic industries, including the important oil and aluminum sectors.
    Possessing limited oil and gas reserves, the Government is working to
    diversify its economic base, concentrating on light manufacturing and
    the services sectors, particularly banking, financial services, and
    consulting. The Government has used its modest oil revenues to build a
    highly advanced transportation and telecommunications infrastructure.
    Economic growth is highly dependent on global oil prices, but the
    economy remains stable. The Government encouraged private national and
    international investment and moved to privatize some of its state-run
    industries. The country is a regional financial and business center.
    Tourism, particularly via the causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia,
    is also a significant source of income. Citizens enjoy a high standard
    of living.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
    some areas and improved in other areas; however, its record was poor in
    some areas, particularly workers' rights. The Government denies
    citizens the right to change their government; however, the political
    situation continued to improve due to the decrease in political and
    civil unrest compared to last year, and an effort by the Amir to
    develop relations with the Shi'a community. Security forces continued
    to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners. Impunity remains a
    problem; there were no known instances of any security forces personnel
    being punished for human rights abuses committed either during the year
    or in any previous year. The Government continued to use arbitrary
    arrest and detention, incommunicado and prolonged detention, and
    involuntary exile; however, in 1999 upon assuming power, one of the
    Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over 400 prisoners,
    detainees, and exiles. During the year, the Amir pardoned a combined
    total of approximately 500 prisoners and detainees, some of whom had
    been detained for political reasons. The judiciary remains subject to
    government pressure, and there are limits on the right to a fair public
    trial, especially in the Security Court. The Government continued to
    infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The Government imposed some
    restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press and restricted
    freedom of assembly and association. The Government also imposes some
    limits on freedom of religion and movement. Violence against women and
    discrimination based on sex, religion, and ethnicity remain problems.
    The Government restricts worker rights, and there were instances of
    forced labor.
        In December 1999, the Amir stated that all citizens are ``equal
    before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the BDF and the
    Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. These policies
    continued during the year.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        There were no investigations or prosecutions of any security force
    personnel for alleged extrajudicial killings committed in previous
    years.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
    or punishment are prohibited by law; however there are credible reports
    that prisoners often are beaten, both on the soles of their feet and
    about the face and head, burned with cigarettes, deprived of sleep for
    long periods of time, and in some cases subjected to electrical shocks.
    The Government has difficulty in rebutting allegations of torture and
    of other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices because it permits
    incommunicado detention and detention without trial. There were no
    known instances of officials being punished for human rights abuses
    committed either during the year or in any previous year, and there is
    an appearance of impunity.
        Opposition and human rights groups allege that the security forces
    sometimes threaten female detainees with rape and inflict other forms
    of sexual abuse and harassment on them while they are in custody. Such
    allegations are difficult to confirm or deny. Young prisoners are
    housed separately until the age of 15.
        Credible observers say that the prisons generally meet minimum
    international standards. Local defense attorneys report that their
    clients continued to receive improved care and treatment. In addition
    the release of hundreds of detainees from jail, perhaps as many as
    1,200 in 1999 and 2000 (see Section 1.d.), and the reduced number of
    arrests during the year, eased overcrowding. At the Government's
    invitation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    continued the series of visits to prisons that it started in late 1996.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are serious problems. The Constitution states that ``no
    person shall be arrested, detained, imprisoned, searched or compelled
    to reside in a specified place . . . except in accordance with the
    provisions of the law and under the supervision of the judicial
    authorities.'' However, in practice, in matters regarding arrest,
    detention, or exile, the 1974 State Security Act takes precedence.
    Under the State Security Act, persons may be detained for up to 3 years
    without trial for engaging in activities or making statements regarded
    as a threat to the broadly defined concepts of national harmony and
    security, and the Government continued to arrest and detain citizens
    arbitrarily. The scope of the State Security Act extends to any case
    involving arson, explosions, or attacks on persons at their place of
    employment or because of the nature of their work. Detainees have the
    right to appeal such detentions after a period of 3 months and, if the
    appeal is denied, every 16 months thereafter from the date of the
    original detention.
        Government security forces used the State Security Act during the
    year to detain persons deemed to be engaging in antigovernment
    activities, including persons who attempted to exercise their rights of
    free speech, assembly, and association, or other rights. Activities
    that also may lead to detention, questioning, warning, or arrest by the
    security forces include: Membership in illegal organizations or those
    deemed subversive; painting antigovernment slogans on walls; joining
    antigovernment demonstrations; possessing or circulating antigovernment
    writings; preaching sermons considered by the Government to have an
    antigovernment political tone; and harboring or associating with
    persons who committed such acts. However, there was greater tolerance
    of activities such as public demonstrations during the year, and the
    number of persons detained was less than in 1999.
        In addition to overseeing the security service and police, the
    Ministry of Interior also controls the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
    whose officers initially determine whether sufficient evidence exists
    to continue to hold a prisoner in investigative detention. The Ministry
    is responsible for all aspects of prison administration. In the early
    stages of detention, prisoners and their attorneys have no recourse to
    any authority outside the Ministry of Interior. The authorities rarely
    permit visits to inmates who are incarcerated for security-related
    offenses and such prisoners may be held incommunicado for months, or
    sometimes years. However, prisoners detained for criminal offenses
    generally may receive visits from family members, usually once a month.
        At the beginning of the year, security forces were estimated to be
    holding over 800 persons in detention for security-related offenses.
    During the year, some were arrested, released, and then arrested again.
    At year's end, the total number of persons detained was reduced;
    however, as many as 750 persons still remained in detention. During the
    year, the Government pardoned as many as 300 persons detained in
    connection with antigovernment activities. One of the Amir's first
    official acts was to pardon or release over 400 detainees, prisoners,
    and exiles. In January and April, the Amir pardoned an additional 223
    prisoners and detainees, some of whom had been detained for political
    reasons.
        Several Shi'a clerics were arrested in 1996 for signing a 1994
    petition to the Amir calling for the restoration of the National
    Assembly. Four of the clerics, Abdul Wahab Hussain, Hassan Mushaimaa,
    Hassan Sultan, and Haji Hassan Jarallah, remain in jail. The most
    prominent member of the group, Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, was pardoned in
    1999, although he is still subject to government restrictions (see
    Section 2.c.). On March 22, the Government rearrested Abdul Wahab
    Hussain only hours after a judge ordered his release (see Section
    2.c.).
        Abdul Jahil Abdula Khadim, a shop owner, remained in detention at
    year's end. He was detained in 1998 after a young man who worked in his
    store died from police mistreatment.
        While the authorities reserve the right to use exile and the
    revocation of citizenship to punish individuals convicted or suspected
    of antigovernment activity, there were no reports of exile orders
    issued during the year. In the past, the Government has revoked the
    citizenship of persons that it considered to be security threats. The
    Government considers such persons to have forfeited their nationality
    under the Citizenship Act of 1963 because they accepted foreign
    citizenship or passports, or engaged in antigovernment activities
    abroad. Bahraini emigre groups and their local contacts have challenged
    this practice, arguing that the Government's revocation of citizenship
    without due process violates the Constitution. The Amir pardoned 12
    exiles during the year. According to the emigre groups, as many as 450
    citizens continue to live in exile. This total includes both those
    prohibited from returning to Bahrain and their family members who live
    abroad with them voluntarily.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the courts are subject to government
    pressure regarding verdicts, sentencing, and appeals.
        The civil and criminal legal system consists of a complex mix of
    courts, based on diverse legal sources, including Sunni and Shi'a
    Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes and
    regulations. The 1974 State Security Act created a separate, closed
    security court system, which has jurisdiction in cases of alleged
    antigovernment activity.
        The Bahrain Defense Force maintains a separate court system for
    military personnel accused of offenses under the Military Code of
    Justice. Military courts do not review cases involving civilian,
    criminal, or security offenses.
        Defense attorneys are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and
    Islamic Affairs. Some attorneys and family members involved in
    politically sensitive criminal cases complain that the Government
    interferes with court proceedings to influence the outcome or to
    prevent judgments from being carried out. There are also occasional
    allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
        In past cases, the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other senior
    government officials have lost civil cases brought against them by
    private citizens; however, the court-ordered judgments are not always
    implemented expeditiously. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family are
    well represented in the judiciary and generally do not recuse
    themselves from cases involving the interests of the Government.
        A person who is arrested may be tried in an ordinary criminal court
    or, if recommended by the prosecution, in the Security Court. Ordinary
    civil or criminal trial procedures provide for an open trial, the right
    to counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the right to
    appeal. Criminal court proceedings generally do not appear to
    discriminate against women, children, or minority groups. However,
    there is credible evidence that persons accused of antigovernment
    crimes and tried in the criminal courts were denied fair trials. Those
    accused were not permitted to speak with an attorney until their
    appearance before the judge at the preliminary hearing. Trials in the
    criminal courts for antigovernment activities are held in secret.
        Security cases are tried in secret by judges on the Supreme Court
    of Appeals, sitting as the Security Court. Family members usually are
    not permitted in the court until the final verdict is rendered.
    Procedures in the Security Court do not provide for even the most basic
    safeguards. The Security Court is exempt from adhering to the
    procedural protections of the Penal Code. Defendants may be represented
    by counsel, but they seldom see their attorneys before the actual day
    of arraignment. Convictions may be based solely on confessions,
    including confessions that may have been elicited under torture, and
    police evidence or testimony that may be introduced in secret. The
    defense may not review the evidence against the defendant prior to
    trial proceedings. Defense lawyers complain that they rarely are given
    sufficient time to find witnesses. There is no right to judicial review
    of the legality of arrests. There is no judicial appeal of a Security
    Court verdict, but the defendant may request clemency from the Amir.
    The Security Court tried one individual, Abdul Wahab Hussain, during
    the year (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        The number of political prisoners is difficult to determine because
    the Government does not release data on security cases; however, the
    total is believed to be less than 100. Such cases are not tried in open
    court, and visits to prisoners convicted of security offenses are
    restricted strictly. The Government denies that there are any political
    prisoners and claims that all inmates incarcerated for committing
    security offenses were convicted properly of subversive acts such as
    espionage, espousing or committing violence, or belonging to terrorist
    organizations.
        In accordance with tradition, the Government releases and grants
    amnesty to some prisoners, including individuals imprisoned for
    political activities, on major holidays. The Government reported that
    the Amir pardoned over 288 prisoners and detainees during the year,
    although it was uncertain how many such persons were political
    prisoners rather than common criminals (see Section 1.d.). The
    prisoners were expected to be released in small groups over the course
    of several months.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--During the year the Government infringed on citizens'
    right to privacy, using illegal searches and arbitrary arrests as
    tactics to control political unrest, although reports of such
    violations of citizens' rights to privacy continued to decline. Under
    the State Security Law, the Ministry of Interior is empowered to
    authorize entry into private premises without specific judicial
    intervention. Telephone calls and personal correspondence are subject
    to monitoring. Police informer networks are extensive and
    sophisticated.
        There were reports that security forces entered private homes
    without warrants and took into custody residents who were suspected of
    either participating in, or having information regarding,
    antigovernment activities. While conducting these raids, security
    forces confiscated, damaged, or destroyed personal property for which
    owners were not compensated by the Government. Security forces also set
    up checkpoints at the entrances to villages, requiring vehicle searches
    and proof of identity from anyone seeking to enter or exit. Whenever
    possible the Government jams, either in whole or in part, foreign
    broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary (see
    Section 2.a.). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access to
    Internet sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic (see
    Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
    right ``to express and propagate'' opinions; however, citizens in
    practice are not free to express their public opposition to the
    Government in speech or writing. Press criticism of ruling family
    personalities and of government policy regarding certain sensitive
    subjects--such as sectarian unrest and the dispute with Qatar over the
    Hawar islands--is strictly prohibited. However, when the Amir assumed
    power in 1999, the Government allowed the press somewhat greater
    latitude. The Amir stated in his December 1999 National Day speech that
    the press and public have a duty to question the Government about
    developments in the country, and he repeated that sentiment on several
    occasions during the year in press interviews and in a meeting with the
    Bahrain Journalists Association (BJA) Board. Columnists and reporters
    wrote about several sensitive issues, criticizing the services offered
    by the Ministries of Interior and Defense and discussing the state
    budget, subjects that were off-limits in the past. However, later in
    the year, when some journalists tried to expand the scope of their
    criticisms to include political reform and reactivation of the
    Constitution, they were warned by the authorities to either support the
    government position or avoid the issues altogether.
        Local press coverage and commentary on international issues is
    open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also is
    relatively unrestricted. Many individuals express critical opinions
    openly on domestic political and social issues in private settings but
    do not do so to leading government officials or in public forums.
        The Information Ministry exercises extensive control over all local
    media. Newspapers are owned privately, but they routinely exercise
    self-censorship of stories on sensitive topics, and defer to
    Information Ministry demands. In some cases, editors of privately owned
    newspapers also hold government positions. The Government does not
    condone unfavorable coverage of its domestic policies by the
    international media and occasionally has revoked the press credentials
    of offending journalists. Because the Ministry controls foreign
    journalists' residence permits, unfavorable coverage in some cases has
    led to deportation. However, there were no reports that the Government
    revoked press credentials during the year. The Government generally
    afforded foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit
    their contacts.
        In late September, the newly formed BJA elected its first board of
    directors. Some journalists view the lack of competition for the
    chairmanship of the board, and the preponderance of government
    employees accepted as BJA members, as a signal that it will not be a
    truly independent organization.
        The State owns and operates all radio and television stations.
    Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from neighboring
    countries and Egypt may be received without interference. However,
    international news services, including the Associated Press, United
    Press International, and Agence France Presse, sometimes complain about
    press restrictions. The Cable News Network is available on a 24-hour
    basis by subscription, and the British Broadcasting Corporation World
    News Service is carried on a local channel 24 hours a day free of
    charge. However, the Government generally jams, wholly or partially,
    foreign broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary
    (see Section 1.f.).
        Most senior government officials, ruling family members, and major
    hotels, as well as affluent private citizens, use satellite dishes to
    receive international broadcasts. Prior government approval to access
    satellite dishes and for the importation or installation of dishes is
    no longer required (see Section 3). Bahrain Television's satellite
    subscription service does not offer access to the Qatar-based Al-Jazira
    channel, which otherwise broadcasts widely throughout the Middle East
    and North Africa. Government officials believe Al-Jazira's news and
    talk shows are biased against the country.
        Access to the Internet is provided through the National Telephone
    Company (BATELCO). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access
    to sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic. The software
    used is unreliable and often inhibits access to uncontroversial sites
    as well. E-mail access to information is unimpeded, although it may be
    subject to monitoring (see Section 1.f.).
        Although there are no formal regulations limiting academic freedom,
    in practice academics try to avoid contentious political issues.
    University hiring and admissions policies appear to favor Sunnis and
    others who are assumed to support the Government rather than focusing
    on professional experience and academic qualifications. However, there
    continued to be some improvement in the hiring of qualified individuals
    in a nondiscriminatory manner during the year, and a few Shi'a
    professors, including women, were hired.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Despite the
    Constitution's provision for the right of free assembly, the Government
    prohibits all public political demonstrations and meetings and controls
    religious gatherings that may take on political overtones. Permits are
    required for most other public gatherings, and permission is not
    granted routinely. Unauthorized public gatherings of more than five
    persons are prohibited by law. The Government monitors any gatherings
    that might take on a political tone and frequently disperses such
    meetings. During the year, the Government authorized two
    demonstrations, one in Manama on October 6 and one at the University on
    October 7, to protest Israeli government actions against Palestinians
    in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. Demonstrations were
    held on October 13 without government approval.
        The Constitution provides for the right of free association;
    however, the Government restricts this right. The Government prohibits
    political parties and organizations. Some professional societies and
    social and sports clubs traditionally have served as forums for
    discreet political discussion, but they are restricted by law from
    engaging in political activity. Only the Bahraini Bar Association is
    exempt from the regulations that require that the charters of all
    associations include a commitment to refrain from political activity.
    The Bar Association successfully had argued that a lawyer's
    professional duties may require certain political actions, such as
    interpreting legislation or participating in a politically sensitive
    trial. In January 1998, after the Bar Association sponsored a lecture
    in which prodemocracy speakers publicly attacked the Government, the
    Government told current board members that they would not be allowed to
    stand for reelection. Although the decision has not been reversed, the
    Bar Association continues to operate without hindrance. Other organized
    discussions and meetings by the Bar Association no longer are
    discouraged actively.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that Islam is the
    official religion and also provides for freedom of religion; however,
    the Government does not tolerate political dissent, including from
    religious groups or leaders. The Government subjects both Sunni and
    Shi'a Muslims to control and monitoring. Members of other religions who
    practice their faith privately do so without interference from the
    Government. The Government funds, monitors, and closely controls all
    official religious institutions. These include Shi'a and Sunni mosques,
    Shi'a Ma'tams (ceremonial centers), Shi'a and Sunni Waqfs (charitable
    foundations), and the religious courts, which represent both the
    Ja'afari (Shi'a) and Maliki (Sunni) schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
    While the Government rarely interferes with what it considers
    legitimate religious observations, it actively suppresses any activity
    deemed overtly political in nature. In the past, the Government
    occasionally has closed mosques and Ma'tams for allowing political
    demonstrations to take place on or near their premises and has detained
    religious leaders for delivering political sermons or for allowing such
    sermons to be delivered in their mosques. The Government also may
    appropriate or withhold funding in order to reward or punish particular
    individuals or places of worship. There were no reported closures of
    Ma'tams or mosques during the year.
        The High Council for Islamic Affairs is charged with the review and
    approval of all clerical appointments within both the Sunni and Shi'a
    communities, and it maintains program oversight for all citizens
    studying religion abroad. Public religious events, most notably the
    large annual commemorative marches by Shi'a, are permitted but are
    monitored closely by the police. There are no restrictions on the
    number of citizens permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi'a shrines and
    holy sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. However, stateless residents who
    do not possess Bahraini passports often have difficulties arranging
    travel to religious sites abroad. The Government monitors travel to
    Iran and scrutinizes carefully those who choose to pursue religious
    study there.
        Proselytizing by non-Muslims is discouraged, anti-Islamic writings
    are prohibited, and conversions from Islam to other religions, while
    not illegal, are not tolerated well by society. However, Bibles and
    other Christian publications are displayed and sold openly in local
    bookstores that also sell Islamic and other religious literature. Some
    small groups worship in their homes. Notable dignitaries from virtually
    every religion and denomination visit the country and frequently meet
    with the Government and civic leaders. Religious tracts of all branches
    of Islam, cassettes of sermons delivered by Muslim preachers from other
    countries, and publications of other religions are readily available.
        In early July 1999, the Amir pardoned prominent Shi'a cleric Abdul
    Amir Al-Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. Since his release,
    the Government has monitored Al-Jamri's movements. It also has denied
    him the right to issue marital status certificates, a lucrative source
    of income for many clerics. Several other clerics associated with Al-
    Jamri remain in jail. On March 22, the Government rearrested Shi'a
    cleric leader Abdul Wahab Hussain only hours after a judge released him
    following more than 4 years in detention without charge. The
    authorities neither brought charges against Hussain nor provided an
    explanation for his rearrest. Hussain remained incarcerated in a Manama
    jail at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on
    these rights. Citizens are free to move within the country and change
    their place of residence or work. However, passports may be denied on
    political grounds. Approximately 3 percent of the indigenous
    population, the bidoon, mostly stateless Shi'a of Persian-origin, do
    not have passports and are unable to obtain them readily, although they
    may be given travel documents as Bahraini residents (see Section 5).
    The Government occasionally grants citizenship to Sunni residents, most
    of whom are from the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.
        Citizens living abroad who are suspected of political or criminal
    offenses may face arrest and trial upon return to the country. Under
    the 1963 Citizenship Law, the Government may reject applications to
    obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the applicant has
    the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. The
    Government also has issued temporary passports, valid for one trip a
    year, to individuals whose travel it wishes to control or whose claim
    to citizenship is questionable. A noncitizen resident, including a
    bidoon of Iranian origin, also may obtain a laissez-passer (travel
    document), usually valid for 2 years and renewable at Bahraini
    embassies overseas. The holder of a laissez-passer also requires a visa
    to reenter the country.
        Although the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees, it has not formulated a formal policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum. The Government usually does not accept
    refugees due to the country's small size and limited resources.
    However, in practice refugees who arrive are not repatriated to
    countries from which they have fled. Many Iranian emigres who fled Iran
    after the Iranian revolution have been granted permission to remain in
    the country, but they have not been granted citizenship.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government or their
    political system peacefully, and the Government controls political
    activity. Since the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1975, there
    have been no formal democratic political institutions. The Prime
    Minister makes all appointments to the Cabinet. The relevant ministries
    fill all other government positions. About one-third of the cabinet
    ministers are Shi'a Muslim, although they do not hold security-related
    offices. The Government continues to view most substantive reform as a
    threat to stability and has taken only halting steps to expand
    political participation. The ordinary citizen may attempt to influence
    government decisions through submission of personal written petitions
    and informal contact with senior officials, including appeals to the
    Amir, the Prime Minister, and other officials at their regularly
    scheduled public audiences, called majlises.
        In 1992 the Amir established by decree a Consultative Council
    (Majlis Al-Shura). Its 40 members are divided mainly between Sunni and
    Shi'a (20 Sunni and 18 Shi'a) who are appointed by the Amir. Majlis
    members are selected to represent major constituent groups, including
    representatives from the business, labor, professional, and religious
    communities. There are no members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family or
    religious extremists in the Majlis. In addition to legislation
    submitted for its review by the Cabinet, the Majlis may initiate debate
    independently on nonpolitical issues. The Majlis also may summon
    cabinet ministers to answer questions; however, its recommendations are
    not binding on the Government. The Majlis held its eighth session from
    October 1999 to May, and began a new session on October 3.
        During the year, the Majlis debated a number of contentious social
    and economic issues, including unemployment, privatization, child care,
    and education reform, and drafted proposals on these and other subjects
    for government consideration. In 1999 a Majlis Human Rights Committee
    was formed. The Committee's deliberations and its first report, which
    was presented to the Amir in a well-publicized event, have been closely
    held. According to the Speaker of the Majlis, the Government responded
    favorably to all of the Majlis's recommendations by incorporating them
    into legislation or by taking other appropriate actions.
        Women are greatly underrepresented in government and politics;
    however, there are now four women in the Majlis, whereas there had been
    none before. There still are no women at the ministerial levels of
    Government. The majority of women who choose to work in government do
    so in a support capacity, and only a few have attained senior positions
    within their respective ministries or agencies.
        In September the Amir appointed the first Christian and Jewish
    members to the Consultative Council; an ethnic Iranian Bahraini also
    was appointed.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no local human rights organizations. Because of the
    restrictions on freedom of association and expression, any independent,
    domestically based investigation or public criticism of the
    Government's human rights policies faces major obstacles. Several
    political opposition groups in exile report on the human rights
    situation. Such groups include the Damascus-based Committee for the
    Defense of Human Rights in Bahrain, the London-based Bahrain Freedom
    Movement, the Beirut-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain,
    and the Copenhagen-based Bahrain Human Rights Organization. These
    groups are composed of small numbers of emigres living in self-imposed
    exile and reportedly receive funding from sources hostile to the
    Government.
        The Government maintains that it is not opposed to visits by bona
    fide human rights organizations. In recent years, the Government has
    allowed increased access by international human rights organizations.
    In June 1999, the Government received a delegation from Amnesty
    International, which issued a brief statement that noted that it was
    invited by the Government but was not allowed to meet with all persons
    to whom it requested access. Middle East Watch and Human Rights Watch
    representatives also visited the country in 1999. In 1996 the
    Government invited the ICRC to undertake visits to the country's
    prisons. The ICRC continued to visit the country's prisons throughout
    the year (see Section 1.c.).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the
    right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work
    for all citizens. However, in practice these rights are protected
    unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or
    sex.
        Women.--Violence against women occurs, but incidents usually are
    kept within the family. In general there is little public attention to,
    or discussion of, the problem. During the year, a few articles appeared
    in the local press discussing violence against women and the need for
    laws to defend women who are abused. No government policies explicitly
    address violence against women. Women's groups and health care
    professionals state that spouse abuse is common, particularly in poorer
    communities. There are very few known instances of women seeking legal
    redress for violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts are
    not receptive to such cases.
        It is not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers to
    be beaten or sexually abused (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.). Numerous
    cases have been reported to local embassies and the police. However,
    most victims are too intimidated to sue their employers. Courts
    reportedly have allowed victims who do appear to sue for damages,
    return home, or both.
        Shari'a governs the legal rights of women. Specific rights vary
    according to Shi'a or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, as
    determined by the individual's faith, or by the court in which various
    contracts, including marriage, have been made.
        While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a
    divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local
    religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases,
    occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances
    must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available
    in the country. Women of either branch may own and inherit property and
    may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the
    absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. In
    contrast, Sunni women--in the absence of a direct male heir--inherit
    only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among
    brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
        In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women
    custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under age 7, although
    custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach those
    ages. In all circumstances except mental incapacitation, the father,
    regardless of custody decisions, retains the right to make certain
    legal decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any property
    belonging to the child, until the child reaches legal age. A noncitizen
    woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their
    citizen father.
        Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the
    permission of the male head of the household. Women are free to work
    outside the home, to drive cars without escorts, and to wear the
    clothing of their choice. Women increasingly have taken jobs previously
    reserved for men. The Labor Law does not discriminate against women;
    however, in practice, there is discrimination in the workplace,
    including inequality of wages and denial of opportunity for
    advancement. Women constitute about 20 percent of the work force. The
    Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to
    promote female entry into the work force, and is a leading employer of
    women. The Labor Law does not recognize the concept of equal pay for
    equal work, and women frequently are paid less than men. Generally
    women work outside the home during the years between secondary school
    or university and marriage. Some women complain that admissions
    policies at the National University are aimed at increasing the number
    of male students at the expense of qualified female applicants,
    especially Shi'a women. Nevertheless, women make up the majority of
    students at the country's universities.
        There are women's organizations that seek to improve the status of
    women under both civil and Islamic law. Some women have expressed the
    view that, despite their participation in the work force, women's
    rights are not advancing significantly and that much of the lack of
    progress is due to the influence of Islamic religious traditionalists.
    However, other women desire a return to more traditional values and
    support calls for a return to traditional Islamic patterns of social
    behavior.
        Children.--The Government has stated often its commitment to the
    protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and
    religious framework of this traditional society. It generally honors
    this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and
    extensive social welfare network. Public education for citizen children
    below the age of 15 is free; it is not available for the children of
    foreign workers. While the Constitution provides for compulsory
    education at the primary levels (usually 12 or 13 years of age),
    authorities do not enforce attendance. Limited medical services for
    infants and preadolescents are provided free of charge.
        The social status of children is shaped by tradition and religion
    to a greater extent than by civil law. Child abuse is rare, as is
    public discussion of it; the preference of the authorities always has
    been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or
    religious groups. The authorities actively enforce the laws against
    prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping.
    Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned, or, if a
    noncitizen, deported. In the past, the authorities reportedly returned
    children arrested for prostitution and other nonpolitical crimes to
    their families rather than prosecute them, especially for first
    offenses. There were no reports of child prostitution during the year.
    Some legal experts have called on the Government to establish a
    separate juvenile court. However, other citizens insist that the
    protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and
    oppose greater government involvement. Independent and quasi-
    governmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the
    Protection of Children and the Mother and Child Welfare Society play an
    active part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal
    assistance, advice, and, in some cases, shelter and financial support
    to distressed children and families.
        In 1998 there were numerous arrests and detentions of juveniles in
    connection with the political unrest. These children generally were
    released without charges within several days of their arrests. However,
    those juveniles charged with security offenses received the same
    treatment as adult prisoners, that is, incommunicado detention and
    trial before a State Security Court. There were very few reports of
    arrests and detentions of juveniles during the year, and apparently
    those who were arrested were released.
        People with Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of the
    disabled and a variety of governmental, quasi-governmental, and
    religious institutions are mandated to support and protect disabled
    persons. The regional (Persian Gulf) Center for the Treatment of the
    Blind is headquartered in the country, and a similar Center for the
    Education of Deaf Children was established in 1994. Society tends to
    view the disabled as special cases in need of protection rather than as
    fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the Government is
    required by law to provide vocational training for disabled persons who
    wish to work and maintains a list of certified, trained disabled
    persons. The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer of over
    100 persons must engage at least 2 percent of its employees from the
    Government's list of disabled workers; however, the Government does not
    monitor compliance. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs works
    actively to place the disabled in public sector jobs, such as in the
    public telephone exchanges. The Government's housing regulations
    require that access be provided to disabled persons. Greater emphasis
    has been given in recent years to public building design that
    incorporates access for the disabled; however, the law does not mandate
    access to buildings for persons with disabilities.
        Religious Minorities.--Although there are notable exceptions, the
    Sunni Muslim minority enjoys a favored status. Sunnis receive
    preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the
    managerial ranks of the civil service. While the defense and internal
    security forces are predominantly Sunni, Shi'a citizens now are allowed
    to hold posts in these forces; however, they do not hold significant
    positions. In the private sector, Shi'a citizens tend to be employed in
    lower paid, less skilled jobs.
        Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shi'a
    neighborhoods, particularly in rural villages, are inferior to those
    found in Sunni urban communities. In an effort to remedy societal
    discrimination, the Government has built numerous subsidized housing
    complexes that are open to all citizens on the basis of financial need.
    In order to ease both the housing shortage and strains on the national
    budget, in 1997 the Government revised its policy in order to permit
    lending institutions to finance mortgages on apartment units.
        After demonstrations in support of Palestinians on October 13 (see
    Section 2.b.), several youths and men reportedly boarded a bus carrying
    Catholic parishioners and took Bibles from the parishioners throwing
    some of the Bibles out of bus windows.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A group of approximately 9,000
    to 15,000 persons, mostly Shi'a of Persian-origin but including some
    Christians, are stateless. Many are second- or third-generation
    residents whose ancestors emigrated from Iran. Although they no longer
    claim Iranian citizenship, most have not been granted Bahraini
    citizenship. Without citizenship, bidoon legally are unable to buy
    land, start a business, or obtain government loans, although in
    practice many do. The law does not address the citizenship rights of
    persons who were not registered with the authorities prior to 1959,
    which creates a legal problem for such persons and their descendants,
    and results in economic and other hardships. The Government maintains
    that many of those who claim to be bidoon actually are citizens of Iran
    or other Gulf states who have chosen voluntarily not to renew their
    foreign passports. Bidoon and citizens who speak Farsi rather than
    Arabic as their first language also face significant social and
    economic obstacles, including difficulty finding employment. There were
    unconfirmed reports that over 200 bidoon families received citizenship
    during the year.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The partially suspended 1973
    Constitution recognizes the right of workers to organize; however,
    independent trade unions do not exist. The Constitution provides for
    ``freedom to form associations and trade unions on national bases and
    for lawful objectives and by peaceful means,'' in accordance with the
    law, and states that ``no person shall be compelled to join or remain
    in any association or union.''
        Labor regulations permit the formation of elected workers'
    committees in larger companies. Worker representation is based on a
    system of Joint Labor-Management Committees (JLC's) that are
    established by ministerial decree. One JLC was established in November,
    bringing the total to 20.
        The JLC's are composed of equal numbers of appointed management
    representatives and worker representatives who are elected from and by
    company employees in elections organized by management. Each committee
    is chaired alternately by a management and worker representative. The
    selection of worker representatives appears to be fair. Under the law,
    the Ministry of Interior may exclude worker candidates with criminal
    records or those deemed a threat to national security, but the
    Government has not taken such action in recent years.
        The elected worker representatives of the JLC's select the 11
    members of the General Committee of Bahrain workers (GCBW), which was
    established by law in 1983, and which oversees and coordinates the work
    of the JLC's. The GCBW also hears complaints from Bahraini and foreign
    workers and assists them in bringing their complaints to the attention
    of the Ministry of Labor or the courts. In 1998 elections were held for
    3-year terms for representatives to the GCBW. Workers from a variety of
    occupations were elected to the body, including Sunni and Shi'a
    Muslims, foreign workers, and one woman. The elections, which were by
    secret ballot, appeared to be free and fair.
        Although the Government and company management are not represented
    on the GCBW, the Ministry of Labor closely monitors the body's
    activities and a Ministry representative attends and supervises GCBW
    general meetings. It approves the GCBW's rules and the distribution of
    the GCBW's funds. Some senior JLC and GCBW officials have been
    harassed. The JLC-GCBW system represents nearly 70 percent of the
    country's indigenous industrial workers. Both the Government and labor
    representatives readily admit that nonindustrial workers and foreign
    workers clearly are underrepresented in the system. The Ministry of
    Labor and Social Affairs supports the formation of JLC's in all public
    and private sector companies that employ more than 200 workers, and a
    JLC was established in the textile sector in 1999.
        Although foreign workers constitute 67 percent of the work force,
    they are underrepresented in the GCBW. Foreign workers participate in
    the JLC elections, and five foreign workers currently serve on JLC's.
    However, none sits on the board of the GCBW. It is a long-term goal of
    both the Government and the GCBW to replace foreign workers with
    citizens throughout all sectors of the economy and to create new jobs
    for citizens seeking employment.
        The Labor Law is silent on the right to strike, and there were no
    strikes during the year. Actions perceived to be detrimental to the
    ``existing relationship'' between employers and employees or to the
    economic health of the State are forbidden by the 1974 Security Act.
    There were no recent examples of major strikes, but walkouts and other
    job actions have been known to occur in the past without governmental
    intervention and with positive results for the workers.
        Internationally affiliated trade unions do not exist. The GCBW
    represents workers in the Arab Labor Organization, but does not belong
    to any international trade union organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--As in the case
    of strikes, the Labor Law neither grants nor denies workers the right
    to organize and bargain collectively outside the JLC system. While the
    JLC's are empowered to discuss labor disputes, organize workers'
    services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and productivity,
    workers have no independent, recognized vehicle for representing their
    interests on these or other labor-related issues. Minimum wage rates
    for public sector employees are established by Council of Ministers'
    decrees. Private businesses generally follow the Government's lead in
    establishing their wage rates.
        There are two export processing zones. Labor law and practice are
    the same in these zones as in the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is prohibited by law; however, in practice the labor laws apply
    for the most part only to citizens, and abuses occur, particularly in
    the cases of domestic workers and those working illegally. The law also
    prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces
    this prohibition effectively.
        Foreign workers, who make up at least 67 percent of the workforce,
    in many cases arrive in the country under the sponsorship of an
    employer and then switch jobs while continuing to pay a fee to their
    original sponsor. This practice makes it difficult to monitor and
    control the employment conditions of domestic and other workers; the
    Government took no substantive action during the year to stop the
    practice.
        Labor Law amendments passed in 1993 stiffened the penalties for job
    switching to include jail sentences of up to 6 months for the sponsor
    of every illegally sponsored worker; however, sponsors have not
    received jail sentences. In such cases, the workers involved usually
    are deported as illegal immigrants after the case is concluded. During
    the summer and fall of 1998, the Government conducted an amnesty
    program under which undocumented foreign workers were permitted either
    to legalize their status or leave the country without penalty. On
    October 1, the Government again gave illegal immigrants 3 months (until
    December 31) to legalize their status or leave the country.
        The sponsorship system leads to additional abuses. There are
    numerous credible reports that employers withhold salaries from their
    foreign workers for months, even years, at a time, and may refuse to
    grant them the necessary permission to leave the country. The
    Government and the courts generally work to rectify abuses brought to
    their attention, but they otherwise focus little attention on the
    problem, and the fear of deportation or employer retaliation prevents
    many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities (see
    Section 6.e.).
        Labor Laws do not apply to domestic servants. There are numerous
    credible reports that domestic servants, especially women, are forced
    to work 12- or 16-hour days, given little time off, and subjected to
    malnutrition, and verbal and physical abuse, including sexual
    molestation and rape. Between 30 to 40 percent of the suicide cases
    handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are foreign maids
    (see Section 6.e.).
        Foreign women employed as hotel and restaurant staff typically are
    locked in a communal house when not working and driven to work in a
    van. Many are involved in prostitution and reportedly trade sexual
    favors with hotel managers in exchange for time off from work (see
    Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years of age.
    Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in
    hazardous conditions or at night and may not work more than 6 hours per
    day or on a piecework basis. Child labor laws are enforced effectively
    by Ministry of Labor inspectors in the industrial sector; child labor
    outside that sector is monitored less effectively, but it is not
    believed to be significant outside family-operated businesses, and even
    in that sector it is not widespread. Some children work in the market
    areas as car washers and porters. While the Constitution calls for
    compulsory education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce
    attendance (see Section 5). The law prohibits forced and bonded child
    labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage scales, set by
    government decree, exist for public sector employees and generally
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The
    minimum wage for the public sector is $278.25 (105 dinars) a month.
    Wages in the private sector are determined on a contract basis. For
    foreign workers, employers consider benefits such as annual trips home,
    housing, and education bonuses as part of the salary.
        The Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social
    Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers,
    including adequate standards regarding hours of work (maximum 48 hours
    per week) and occupational safety and health.
        The Ministry enforces the law with periodic inspections and routine
    fines for violators. The press often performs an ombudsman function on
    labor problems, reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases
    brought before the courts. Once a worker has lodged a complaint, the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs opens an investigation and often
    takes remedial action. The Fourth High Court has jurisdiction over
    cases involving alleged violations of the Labor Law. Complaints brought
    before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that cannot be settled
    through arbitration by law must be referred to the Court within 15
    days. In practice most employers prefer to settle such disputes through
    arbitration, particularly since the court and labor law generally are
    considered to favor the employee.
        The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and
    Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing.
    Because employers include housing and other allowances in their salary
    scales, foreign workers legally can be paid lower regular wages than
    their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes receive the same or
    a greater total compensation package because of home leave and holiday
    allowances. Western foreign workers and citizen workers are paid
    comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly
    greater for the former. Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity
    leave and nursing periods during the day. However, women generally are
    paid less than men.
        In 1993 the Government strengthened the Labor Law by decree of the
    Amir, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be
    imposed upon private sector employers who fail to pay wages required by
    law. This law applies equally to employers of citizens and foreign
    workers and was intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers, who
    sometimes are denied the required salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law
    provides equal protection to citizen and foreign workers, but all
    foreign workers still require sponsorship by citizens or locally based
    institutions and companies. According to representatives of several
    embassies with large numbers of workers in the country, the Government
    generally is responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign
    worker complaints about unpaid wages and mistreatment. However, foreign
    workers, particularly those from developing countries, often are
    unwilling to report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and
    having to return to their native countries. Sponsors are able to cancel
    the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby
    block them for a year from obtaining entry or residence visas from
    another sponsor, although the sponsor may be subject to sanctions for
    wrongful dismissal. Foreign women who work as domestic workers often
    are beaten or sexually abused (see Section 5). Between 30 to 40 percent
    of suicide cases handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals are
    foreign maids (see Section 6.c.).
        Under the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves
    from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, many foreign workers become in essence indentured
    workers, and are unable to change employment or leave the country
    without their sponsors' consent (see Section 6.c.).
        Prostitution is pervasive among foreign women, especially among
    hotel and restaurant staff. Such women typically are locked in a
    communal house when not working and driven to work in a van. Many
    female hotel employees reportedly trade sexual favors with hotel
    managers in exchange for time off from work (see Section 6.c.).
                                   __________

                                     EGYPT

        According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which
    Islam is the state religion. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which
    has governed since its establishment in 1978, has used its entrenched
    position to dominate national politics and maintains an overriding
    majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially
    elected Shura (Consultative) Council. President Hosni Mubarak was
    reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum in
    September 1999. The Cabinet and the country's 26 governors are
    appointed by the President and may be dismissed by him at his
    discretion. The judiciary is independent; however, there is no
    appellate process for verdicts issued by the military or State Security
    Emergency courts.
        There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior,
    two of which are involved primarily in combating terrorism: The State
    Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which conducts investigations
    and interrogates detainees, and the Central Security Force (CSF), which
    enforces curfews and bans on public demonstrations, and conducts
    paramilitary operations against terrorists. The President is the
    commander in chief of the military; the military is a primary
    stabilizing factor within society but generally does not involve itself
    in internal issues. The security forces committed numerous serious
    human rights abuses; however, the use of force in the campaign against
    suspected terrorists appeared more limited than in previous years.
        Egypt is in transition from a Government-controlled economy to a
    free market system. The Government continued its privatization program,
    although some key sectors of the economy (such as banking, oil/gas,
    insurance, and textiles) still are dominated by State-owned
    enterprises. Agriculture remains the largest employer and is almost
    entirely in private hands. The tourism sector generates the largest
    amount of foreign currency. Petroleum exports, Suez Canal revenues, and
    remittances from approximately 2 million citizens working abroad are
    the other principal sources of foreign currency. These income sources
    are vulnerable to external shocks. Over the past decade, the Government
    has enacted significant economic reforms, which have reduced the budget
    deficit, stabilized the exchange rate, reduced inflation and interest
    rates significantly, and built up substantial reserves. However, low
    international oil prices, the 1997 Luxor terrorist attack, and the
    effects of the Southeast Asia economic crisis all negatively affected
    foreign exchange earnings in from 1997 through 1999, causing the trade
    and current account balance deficits to widen and negatively affecting
    the exchange rate. After initially attempting to stabilize the exchange
    rate by drawing down reserves, increasing interest rates, rationing
    foreign exchange, and implementing restrictive trade measures, the
    Government allowed the exchange rate to depreciate slowly in the second
    half of 2000. Continued progress in economic development depends
    primarily upon implementation of a wide range of structural reforms,
    the pace of which has slowed significantly over the past 1 to 2 years.
    The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,400 per year.
    Official statistics place 34.4 percent of wage earners in the
    agricultural sector, and knowledgeable observers estimate that perhaps
    3 to 5 percent of those engage in subsistence farming. The annual
    population increase is 1.9 percent.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in some areas, and its record improved somewhat over the previous year,
    primarily due to a decrease in terrorist activity by Islamic
    extremists; however, the Government's record was poor with respect to
    freedom of expression and its treatment of detainees, among other
    areas. The dominant role of the President and the entrenched NDP
    control the political scene to such an extent that citizens do not have
    a meaningful ability to change their Government. In parliamentary
    elections that were held between October 18 and November 15, the NDP
    won 172 seats, independent candidates won 255 seats, and opposition
    parties won 17 seats. However, many of the independents elected were
    former members of the NDP who rejoined the party after being elected,
    leaving the People's Assembly balance at 388 NDP members, 37
    independents, and 17 opposition party members out of 444 elected
    members, with two seats unresolved at year's end. Due to courtordered
    supervision by the judiciary of the voting and vote-counting, the
    process was fairer and more transparent than past parliamentary
    elections; however, there were significant problems, including the
    arrests of thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the months
    before the elections.
        The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 and was
    renewed for another 3 years in June, continues to restrict many basic
    rights. The security forces continued to arrest and detain suspected
    members of terrorist groups. In combating terrorism, the security
    forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest
    and detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and
    occasionally engage in mass arrests. In actions unrelated to the
    antiterrorist campaign, local police killed, tortured, and otherwise
    abused both criminal suspects and other persons. The Government took
    disciplinary action against police officers accused of abusing
    detainees, including prosecution of several offenders, but it did not
    pursue most cases or seek adequate punishments. The investigation that
    the Public Prosecutor reopened and expanded in 1999 regarding police
    brutality and torture during a 1998 police investigation of a double
    murder in the largely Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate,
    continued without resolution throughout the year.
        Prison conditions remain poor. The Ministry of Interior released
    more than 1,300 political detainees and prisoners, bringing the total
    number of detainees released since 1998 to more than 7,000. The use of
    military courts to try civilians continued to infringe on a defendant's
    right to a fair trial before an independent judiciary. During the year,
    the Government did not refer any new cases involving civilians to the
    military courts; however, the military court issued its verdict on
    November 19 in a trial involving 20 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood,
    who were referred to the court in October 1999 on charges of illegal
    political activity. Three of the defendants were sentenced to 5 years
    in prison, 12 were sentenced to 3 years, and five were acquitted. Most
    observers believe that the Government was seeking to undermine Muslim
    Brotherhood participation in the elections to professional syndicates
    and the People's Assembly.
        The Government used the Emergency Law to infringe on citizens'
    privacy rights. Although citizens generally express themselves freely,
    the Government partially restricts freedom of the press. The Government
    significantly restricts freedom of assembly and association. The
    Government places restrictions on freedom of religion. Despite
    difficulties due to an inadequate legal framework and periodic
    Government harassment, a number of local human rights groups are
    active. Although the Government does not recognize them legally, it
    allows these groups to operate openly.
        Domestic violence against women is a problem. Although the
    Government enforces the 1996 decree banning the practice of female
    genital mutilation (FGM), many families persist in subjecting their
    daughters to the traditional practice. Women and Christians face
    discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law. Adult
    literacy rates are 63 percent for males and 34 percent for females.
    There were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians during
    the year, but in incidents unrelated to terrorism 1 Christian was
    killed and 10 were wounded by Muslim extremists. New year's violence in
    Sohag governorate resulted in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1 Muslim.
    Child labor remains widespread, despite Government efforts to eradicate
    it. Exposure of workers to hazardous working conditions and other
    abuses of the law by employers continue, and the Government does not
    enforce the labor laws effectively. The Government limits workers'
    rights.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, police committed extrajudicial
    killings, and such killings also may have occurred in certain
    antiterrorist operations.
        Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in
    custody of the following eight persons during the year, all of whom
    allegedly were tortured while being detained by police under suspicion
    of criminal activity: Sami Hosni Ahmed, Ahmed Hassan Ahmed, Mohamed
    Tawfik Hassan Sayyed, Sayyed Kenawi Selim, Abdel Hamid Ramadan Abdel
    Hamid Zahran, Ahmed Mohamed Eissa, Haytham Mohamed Abdel Aziz, and
    Mohamed Islam Nasr Eddine (see Section 1.c.). In addition, several
    cases of death under police torture from previous years remain
    unresolved.
        Mohammed Mahmoud Hamouda died in prison during the year, reportedly
    due to diabetes and cardiac problems, during the Government's
    investigation of a case in which 16 persons were accused of heresy
    against Islam (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
        The London-based Islamic Observation Center announced on December
    22 that 37-year-old Mohammed Saad Osman Ahmad died in Tora prison in
    early December due to untreated leukemia. Ahmad allegedly had completed
    a 5-year prison sentence in 1998 but was not released.
        On June 6, the Banha Criminal Court (Daqahliyya governorate)
    sentenced police Captain Abdel Nasser Zeidan of the Shubra AlKheima
    investigations department to a 1-year suspended sentence for killing a
    suspected thief. The officer reportedly raided the home of 19-year-old
    Mosaad Ahmed Youssef in March without an arrest or search warrant and
    shot him three times in the back and head. On August 10, the Mansoura
    criminal court acquitted a police major and four other policemen in the
    April 9, 1998 death under torture of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad Abdallah
    (see Section 1.c.).
        As part of ongoing antiterrorist campaigns, on October 19, security
    forces killed two members of the ``Islamic Group of Egypt'' (IG) in
    Aswan, including Alaa Abdel Razek Atiyya, who reportedly was in charge
    of IG armed operations in Qena, Sohag, and Luxor. There were no reports
    of killings of relatives of suspected extremists by security forces in
    apparent vendettas.
        A trade dispute between a Christian clothing merchant and a Muslim
    customer on December 31, 1999, escalated into violent exchanges between
    Muslims and Christians in Sohag governorate, resulting in the deaths of
    21 Christians and 1 Muslim. One trial concluded in September and
    another was ongoing at year's end (see Section 5).
        On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced four members
    of a terrorist group from the upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout
    who were accused of murder and attempted murder of policemen and
    Christians in the early 1990's to 5 years' imprisonment at hard labor
    (see Sections 1.e. and 5.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of new cases of
    politically motivated disappearances.
        In November the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners
    reported on a total of 26 unresolved disappearances, including 3
    previously unreported cases of persons who disappeared in 1996 and
    1997. The Center learned that three persons previously reported missing
    are in prison, and that two disappearances did not involve police. The
    Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) continues to investigate
    30 previously reported disappearances. EOHR has provided these names to
    the U.N. Committee on Disappearances, but the Government reportedly has
    denied any involvement in these cases.
        On February 8, the Court of Cassation accepted an appeal by the
    Minister of Interior of a 1999 court decision ordering him to pay Bahaa
    Al-Amary, the wife of former Libyan Foreign Minister Mansur Kikhiya,
    $27,000 (100,000 Egyptian pounds). Kikhiya's family sued the Government
    following reports that he had been kidnaped from Cairo by Libyan
    agents, taken to Libya, and executed there in 1994. The court awarded
    the sum as compensation for the Ministry of Interior's inability to
    protect a foreign dignitary on Egyptian soil. The Court of Cassation
    ordered that the case be retried due to a technicality. The lower court
    had not tried the case by year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or
    moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however,
    torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and
    prison guards is common.
        Under the Penal Code, torture of a defendant or giving orders to
    torture are felonies punishable by hard labor or 3 to 10 years'
    imprisonment. If the defendant dies under torture, the crime is one of
    intentional murder punishable by a life sentence at hard labor. Arrest
    without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is
    punishable by temporary hard labor. Abuse of power to inflict cruelty
    against persons is punishable by imprisonment of no more than 1 year or
    a fine of no more than $33 (125 Egyptian pounds). In addition, victims
    may bring a criminal or civil action for compensation against the
    responsible Government agency. There is no statute of limitation in
    such cases.
        Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous credible
    reports that security forces tortured and mistreated citizens. Reports
    of torture and mistreatment at police stations remain frequent. While
    the Government has investigated torture complaints in criminal cases
    and punished some offending officers, the punishments do not conform to
    the seriousness of the offense.
        While the law requires security authorities to keep written records
    of detained citizens, human rights groups report that such records
    often are not available, not found, or that the police deny any
    knowledge of the detainee when inquiries are made about specific cases,
    effectively blocking the investigation of torture complaints.
        Human rights groups believe that the SSIS continues to employ
    torture. Torture takes place in SSIS offices, including its
    headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture
    victims usually are taken to an SSIS office, where they are handcuffed,
    blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious
    beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information,
    coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter
    others from similar activities.
        In January the EOHR released a report documenting in detail 13
    cases of torture that occurred in police stations during the latter
    half of 1999, 2 of which ended in death. Methods of torture employed by
    the police, as reported by victims, included: Being stripped and
    blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just
    touching the floor; beaten with fists, metal rods, or other objects;
    doused with hot or cold water; flogged on the back; burned with
    cigarettes; and subjected to electrical shocks. Some victims, including
    female detainees or family members of detainees, report that they have
    been forced to strip and threatened with rape.
        Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in
    custody of eight persons, reportedly under police torture, during the
    year (see Section 1.a.). All were being held on suspicion of criminal
    activity. The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners
    reported the death under torture of Ahmed Mohamed Eissa on February 10
    in New Valley Prison. Upon receiving a report of the death, the Public
    Prosecutor investigated the case and took testimony from inmates. The
    Public Prosecutor referred the Deputy Chief of Wadi Natroun Prison, a
    prison officer, and two policemen to the criminal court on charges of
    beating an inmate to death and forging a prison report stating that the
    death was from natural causes. The Shebeen El-Kom criminal court is
    reviewing the case, but no date for a court hearing had been set by
    year's end.
        The EOHR is investigating the following deaths in custody after
    receiving complaints from family members of the deceased, who believe
    they died under torture: Sami Hosni Ahmed, who died on February 9 at
    the Boulaq police station in Cairo, just hours after his arrest; Ahmed
    Hassan Ahmed, who died on March 2 at the Shubra Al-Kheima police
    station in Qalyubia, 4 days after his arrest; 17-year-old Mohamed
    Tawfik Hassan Sayyed, who died on March 5 in the Gamaliyya district of
    Cairo; Sayyed Kenawi Selim, who died on March 7 in the Imbaba district
    in Cairo, 10 days after his arrest on suspicion of theft; Abdel Hamid
    Ramadan Abdel Hamid Zahran, who died on March 11 at the Qalyub police
    station in Qalyubia, shortly after returning from interrogation in the
    Qalyub Security Directorate. An autopsy report in the Zahran case
    reportedly cited respiratory and cardiac failure as the cause of death
    and noted a blood clot in the brain, broken ribs, and bruises in the
    kidney area.
        In addition, the press reported the following deaths in custody,
    which reportedly were due to police torture or mistreatment: Haytham
    Mohamed Abdel Aziz, who reportedly died in Alexandria prison under
    suspicious circumstances (according to the press, a forensic postmortem
    showed several obvious bruises, as well as tuberculosis) and Mohamed
    Islam Nasr Eddine, a 49-year old Pakistani sentenced to life at hard
    labor for drug possession, who reportedly died in Qanatir prison from
    severe failure of the circulatory system. The latter incident was under
    police investigation at year's end.
        Regarding judicial action on previous cases of death under torture,
    on August 10, the Mansoura criminal court acquitted a police major and
    four other policemen in the April 9, 1998 death under torture of Waheed
    Al-Sayyid Ahmad Abdallah. According to a human rights organization, the
    accused police major paid Abdallah's family to change their testimony,
    which led to the acquittal. On November 16, the Aswan Criminal Court
    ruled on case in which Mohei Eddin Ahmed Mohamed, who was suspected of
    theft at a construction site, was tortured for 3 days in a police
    station, which led to his death in March 1999. A fellow worker who
    reportedly tried to intervene on the suspect's behalf, Haroun Ahmed
    Hamdallah, also was tortured and left paralyzed. The court dismissed an
    Aswan police officer from the force and sentenced him to 7 years in
    prison, and dismissed an assistant officer and sentenced him to 3 years
    in prison. The Government took no action during the year on several
    outstanding cases of death under torture, including the case of Gamel
    Mohammed Abdallah Mustafa (in 1998), the case of a businessman in the
    province of Qalyubia (1997), and the case of Mohammed Badr Al-Din Gomah
    (1996). The Government also took no action regarding the appeal of 1-
    year sentence given to a policeman convicted of engaging in torture in
    1994. No further government action appears likely in these cases.
        At year's end, the public prosecution continued to interview
    residents of the village of Al-Kush regarding a 1998 murder
    investigation, during which, according to local observers, dozens of
    suspects reportedly were tortured and mistreated. The public
    prosecution reopened and expanded the case in August 1999, 5 months
    after it had decided that medical evidence did not support allegations
    of police torture (see sections 2.c and 5.).
        Prison conditions remain poor. Government authorities reported the
    renovation or construction of 14 prisons during the past 6 years.
    Nonetheless, human rights groups report that overcrowding and unhealthy
    conditions continue. Cells are poorly ventilated, food is inadequate in
    quantity and nutritional value, drinking water often is polluted, and
    medical services are insufficient. Such conditions contribute to the
    spread of disease and epidemics. The use of torture and mistreatment in
    prisons continues to be common. In August 1999, the Public Prosecutor
    ordered his subordinates to visit prisons under their jurisdiction
    randomly at least once a month. He also instructed them to inspect
    prison records and to investigate complaints raised by prisoners.
    Inspections began after the announcement and continued during the year.
    Results of the inspections were unavailable.
        Relatives and lawyers often are unable to obtain access to prisons
    for visits. In January the Ministry of Interior opened to visits the
    Fayyoum prison, which had been closed since 1997. Prisons in Abu Zaabal
    and Tora remain closed to visits. During the year the Human Rights
    Center for the Assistance of Prisoners obtained 66 rulings by the
    Higher Administrative court to open the prisons for visits to
    individual prisoners; 30 other cases are pending before the courts.
    Human rights groups report that despite the rulings, visits continue to
    be refused at several prisons. At other prisons, restrictions have been
    placed on visits to prisoners who are incarcerated for political or
    terrorist crimes, limiting the number of visits allowed each prisoner
    and the total number of visitors allowed in the prison at any one time.
        In September the Ministry of Interior ordered that prisoners who
    have served their sentences be released directly rather than
    transferred to State Security Directorates for processing, which in the
    past resulted in delayed releases for some prisoners. The Human Rights
    Center for the Assistance of Prisoners reported that the policy had not
    been put into effect by year's end for political prisoners, who still
    were being transferred to State Security for processing after serving
    their sentences.
        In principle human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisoners
    in their capacity as legal counsel; however, in practice they often
    face considerable bureaucratic obstacles that prevent them from meeting
    with prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    does not have access to prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--As part of the
    Government's antiterrorist campaign, security forces conducted mass
    arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge. Police
    also at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Under the
    provisions of the Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981,
    the police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior
    upon showing that an individual poses a danger to security and public
    order. This procedure nullifies the constitutional requirement of
    showing that an individual likely has committed a specific crime to
    obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor.
        The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual
    without charge. After 30 days, a detainee has the right to demand a
    court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention order and may
    resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1month intervals thereafter. There
    is no maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge continues
    to uphold the legality of the detention order, or if the detainee fails
    to exercise his right to a hearing.
        In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the
    State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must
    bring charges within 48 hours or release the suspect. However, they may
    detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months, pending investigation.
    Arrests under the Penal Code occur openly and with warrants issued by a
    district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code
    contains several provisions to combat extremist violence. These
    provisions broadly define terrorism to include the acts of ``spreading
    panic'' and ``obstructing the work of authorities.''
        During the year, security forces arrested large numbers of persons
    allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Government
    has declared an illegal organization. Attorneys for those arrested say
    that during the year approximately 5,000 persons were arrested; a
    domestic human rights organization documented 694 arrests. Most of
    those arrested had been released by year's end. Public prosecution
    officials claim that none of the 5,000 was detained administratively
    and that those still in detention are being held pending investigation
    of specific charges. On November 19, a military court issued its
    verdict in a trial involving 20 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood
    referred to the court in October 1999 on charges of illegal political
    activity. Three were sentenced to 5 years in prison, 12 were sentenced
    to 3 years, and 5 were acquitted. Most observers believe that the
    Government was seeking to undermine Muslim Brotherhood participation in
    the elections to the People's Assembly and professional syndicates (see
    Sections 1.e., 2.b., and 3).
        Police also detained students participating in demonstrations
    several times during the year. Approximately 75 students were arrested
    in May when protests at Al-Azhar University against the novel ``A
    Banquet for Seaweed'' turned violent (see Section 2.a.). In October at
    Cairo University and Ayn Shams University, police arrested
    approximately 40 students protesting Israeli actions against
    Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. According
    to human rights organizations, all those arrested in the two incidents
    had been released by year's end, some on bail pending investigation of
    charges.
        In contrast to previous years, there were no confirmed reports
    during the year that converts to Christianity were subjected to
    harassment by the security services. Hassan Mohamed Ismail Mohamed, one
    of four converts previously prevented from traveling, was able to
    travel abroad in August (see Section 2.c.).
        Human rights groups reported that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
    persons detained under the Emergency Law have been incarcerated for
    several years without charge. The courts have ordered the release of
    several of these detainees, but prison officials reportedly have
    ignored the orders. The Ministry of Interior frequently reissues
    detention orders to return detainees to prison. During the year more
    than 1,300 political detainees and prisoners were released, bringing
    the total number of detainees released in the past 3 years to more than
    7,000. Following the releases, revised prison population estimates by
    local human rights organizations indicate that there are approximately
    15,000-16,000 political detainees; it is not clear how many among them
    are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving sentences, or
    detained without charge.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent;
    however, cases involving national security or terrorism may be handled
    by military or State Security Emergency courts, in which constitutional
    protections may not be observed. In addition, judicial orders sometimes
    are ignored by the authorities. The Constitution provides for the
    independence and immunity of judges and forbids interference by other
    authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. The President
    appoints all judges upon recommendation of the Higher Judicial Council,
    a constitutional body composed of senior judges and chaired by the
    president of the Court of Cassation. The Council regulates judicial
    promotions and transfers. In the last few years, the Government has
    added lectures on human rights and other social issues to its training
    courses for prosecutors and judges.
        In the civilian court system there are criminal courts, civil
    courts, administrative courts, and a Supreme Constitutional Court.
    There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts,
    appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final
    stage of criminal appeal.
        The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic tradition; hence,
    there are no juries. Misdemeanors that are punishable by imprisonment
    are heard at the first level by one judge and at the second level by
    three judges. Felonies that are punishable by imprisonment or execution
    are heard in criminal court by three judges. Criminal courts also have
    a State Security division to hear cases considered affecting state
    security; in these courts the defendant may appeal on procedural
    grounds only. The Court of Cassation hears appeals of criminal court
    rulings. Civil courts hear civil cases and administrative courts hear
    cases contesting government actions or procedures; both systems have
    upper-level courts to hear appeals. The Supreme Constitutional Court
    hears challenges to the constitutionality of laws or verdicts in any of
    the courts.
        A lawyer is appointed at the court's expense if the defendant does
    not have one. Appointed lawyers are drawn from a roster that is chosen
    by the Bar Association; however, expenses are incurred by the State.
    Any denial of this right is grounds for appeal of the ruling. However,
    detainees in certain high security prisons alleged that they were
    denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed until trial,
    thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate defense. A woman's
    testimony is equal to that of a man's in court. There is no legal
    prohibition against a woman serving as a judge, although in practice no
    women serve as judges (see Section 5).
        Defense lawyers generally agree that the regular judiciary respects
    the rights of the accused and exercises its independence. In the past,
    criminal court judges have dismissed cases in which confessions were
    obtained by coercion. However, while the judiciary generally is
    credited with conducting fair trials, under the Emergency Law, cases
    involving terrorism and national security may be tried in military or
    State Security Emergency courts, in which the accused do not receive
    all the constitutional protections of the civilian judicial system.
        In 1992 following a rise in extremist violence, the Government
    began trying cases of persons accused of terrorism and membership in
    terrorist groups before military tribunals. In 1993 the Supreme
    Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency
    Law to refer any crime to a military court. This use of military and
    State Security Emergency courts under the Emergency Law since 1993 has
    deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right
    to be tried by a civilian judge.
        The Government defends the use of military courts as necessary in
    terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts are
    protracted and that civilian judges and their families are vulnerable
    to terrorist threats. Some civilian judges have confirmed that they
    fear of trying high visibility terrorism cases because of possible
    reprisal. The Government claims that civilian defendants receive fair
    trials in the military courts and enjoy the same rights as defendants
    in civilian courts.
        However, the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due
    process before an independent tribunal. While military judges are
    lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by the Minister of
    Defense and subject to military discipline. They are neither as
    independent nor as qualified as civilian judges in applying the
    civilian Penal Code. There is no appellate process for verdicts issued
    by military courts; instead, verdicts are subject to a review by other
    military judges and confirmation by the President, who in practice
    usually delegates the review function to a senior military officer.
    Defense attorneys have complained that they have not been given
    sufficient time to prepare defenses and that judges tend to rush cases
    involving a large number of defendants.
        During the year, the Government did not refer any civilians to the
    military courts. However, on February 24, the Government executed two
    members of the ``Jihad Group in Egypt'' who had been sentenced by
    military courts to death in absentia in 1994 and 1997. On November 19,
    a military court issued its verdict in a case that the Government
    referred to it in October 1999 involving 20 professional leaders of the
    Muslim Brotherhood charged with belonging to an illegal group. Fifteen
    of the defendants were given sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years, and 5
    were acquitted. The arrests and trial before the military courts
    coincided with preparations for elections to the boards of professional
    syndicates and to the People's Assembly; verdicts and sentencing took
    place after delays, and after the Assembly elections were over (see
    Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
        The State Security Emergency courts share jurisdiction with
    military courts over crimes affecting national security. The President
    appoints judges to these courts from the civilian judiciary upon the
    recommendation of the Minister of Justice and, if he chooses to appoint
    military judges, the Minister of Defense. Sentences are subject to
    confirmation by the President but may not be appealed. The President
    may alter or annul a decision of a State Security Emergency court,
    including a decision to release a defendant.
        During the year, State Security Emergency courts issued verdicts in
    five cases. On April 13, a State Security Emergency Court, trying the
    case of 14 defendants alleged to be members of the Islamic Group,
    sentenced 1 defendant to death, 1 to life in prison, and the other 12
    to sentences ranging from between 3 and 10 years. On June 5, a State
    Security Emergency Court upheld an earlier ruling issued in absentia
    against Muhammad Mustafa Hassan, who allegedly was a member of the
    ``Returnees from Afghanistan'' group. Hassan was sentenced to 10 years
    at hard labor. On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced
    four members of a terrorist group from the upper (southern) city of
    Dairout who were accused of murder and attempted murder of policemen
    and Christians in the early 1990's to 5 years in prison. On September
    5, a State Security Emergency Court passed a verdict in the case of 16
    defendants led by Manal Wahid Mana'a who were accused of heresy against
    Islam (see Section 2.c.). The court sentenced Mana'a to 5 years' hard
    labor, three other defendants to 3 years' hard labor, seven defendants
    to 1 year hard labor, two defendants to 6 months in prison, and two
    defendants to a fine of $375 (1000 Egyptian pounds). One of the
    defendants died in prison, reportedly from ill health during the
    investigation. On September 15, a State Security Emergency Court ruled
    in the case of 10 defendants, 4 of them women, accused of propagating
    extremist ideas in Giza and Alexandria from 1990 to 1999. The court
    sentenced two of the defendants to 15 years' hard labor, one to 3
    years' hard labor, two to 3 years in prison, and five (including the
    four women) to 1 year in prison.
        On November 18, the State Security division of the South Cairo
    criminal court (in which the defendant may appeal on procedural grounds
    only) began hearing the government's case against Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
    Director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies (see
    Sections 2.a. and 4).
        According to local human rights organizations, there are
    approximately 15,000-16,000 political detainees. It is not clear how
    many among them are charged and awaiting trial, convicted and serving
    sentences, or detained without charge (see Section 1.d.).
        International humanitarian organizations do not have access to
    political prisoners (see Section 1.c.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy
    of homes, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of
    communication; however, the Emergency Law abridges the constitutional
    provisions regarding the right to privacy, and the Government used the
    Emergency Law to infringe on these rights. Police must obtain warrants
    before undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts have dismissed cases
    in which warrants were issued without sufficient cause. Police officers
    who conduct searches without proper warrants are subject to criminal
    penalties, although penalties seldom are imposed. The Emergency Law
    empowers the Government to place wiretaps, intercept mail, and search
    persons or places without warrants. Security agencies frequently place
    political activists, suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners,
    and writers under surveillance, screen their correspondence (especially
    international mail), search them and their homes, and confiscate
    personal property.
        The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues
    of foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the
    grounds of protecting public order; it exercises this authority
    sporadically (also see Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially
    restricts these rights. Citizens openly speak their views on a wide
    range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism of
    Government officials and policies, but generally avoid certain topics,
    such as direct criticism of the President.
        Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for
    Development Studies, was put on trial November 18 in a case that most
    observers believe will have broad implications for freedom of
    expression. Local observers believe that Ibrahim was prosecuted because
    of public remarks that he made regarding high-ranking officials that
    exceeded unwritten limits regarding freedom of expression. Ibrahim was
    charged with violating the Penal Code by disseminating abroad false
    information about Egypt, bribing public officials in order to obtain
    media coverage of Ibn Khaldoun Center activities, misappropriating
    funds obtained from the European Union (EU), and falsifying documents
    in order to obtain funds. He also was charged with violating a 1992
    military decree prohibiting any citizen or domestic organization from
    accepting foreign funds without Government permission (his organization
    accepted $246,226 (261,000 Euros) from the EU). Twenty-seven employees
    of the Center also were charged with aiding and abetting Ibrahim in the
    alleged activities. The Government arrested Ibrahim and closed the Ibn
    Khaldoun Center on June 30. Ibrahim and the other defendants were
    released on bail on August 10, and Ibrahim was charged formally on
    September 26. At the November 18 opening session of Ibrahim's trial
    before a Higher State Security Court, the three-judge panel granted a
    defense request for continuance and postponed the next hearing until
    mid-January 2001.
        Observers remain concerned about several aspects of the ongoing
    trial, especially regarding questions of due process: First, Ibrahim
    and many of the other defendants were not served formally with their
    indictments or court papers prior to the trial; second, Ibrahim's
    request for discovery of the documents that were confiscated from the
    Ibn Khaldoun Center, which his lawyers claimed were necessary to
    prepare his defense, had not been granted by the judicial authorities
    by year's end; and third, Ibrahim is being tried in a State Security
    Court, from which defendants may appeal once only on procedural
    grounds, but may not appeal the verdict itself (see Section 1.e.).
        In May the Public Prosecutor dropped the Government's case against
    EOHR secretary general Hafez Abu Se'da. Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney
    Mustafa Zidane had been charged in December 1998 with violating two
    articles of the Penal Code (dissemination of false information or
    inflammatory propaganda that harms public security or public interests
    and accepting foreign funds with the intent to harm national
    interests). The charges were dropped in February, and Abu Se'da instead
    was charged with violating a 1992 military decree prohibiting any
    Egyptian individual or organization from accepting foreign funds
    without Government permission, before the case ultimately was dropped
    altogether in May. The charges against Zidane also were dropped. The
    charges were based on an EOHR report that was critical of police
    conduct during a 1998 murder investigation in Sohag. The State Security
    Prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had accepted $25,000 from the British
    Embassy in Cairo to publish the critical report. In fact, the money was
    provided by the British Embassy to support a women's legal aid project
    begun in 1995 (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
        The Government owns stock in the three largest daily newspapers,
    and the President appoints their editors in chief. Although these
    newspapers generally follow the government line, they sometimes
    criticize government policies. The Government also holds a monopoly on
    the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the
    opposition parties. The Government used its monopolistic control of
    newsprint to limit the output of opposition publications.
        Opposition political parties publish their own newspapers but
    receive a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies
    from foreign interests as well. Most newspapers are weeklies, with the
    exception of the dailies Al-Wafd and AlAhrar, both of which have small
    circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently publish criticism of the
    Government. They also give greater prominence to human rights abuses
    than do state-run newspapers. All party newspapers are required by law
    to reflect the platform of their party. The Government suspended
    publication of the semiweekly newspaper Al-Shaab in May following a
    decision by the Political Parties Committee to withdraw recognition
    from the Islamist-oriented Socialist Labor Party (see Section 3).
        The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or
    private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There
    are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish
    their own newspapers, including a limit of 10 percent ownership by any
    individual. In January 1998, the People's Assembly approved a law that
    requires newspapers managed by joint stock companies to obtain the
    approval of the Prime Minister prior to publishing. Given government
    restrictions, a joint stock company is the only feasible incorporation
    option for publishers.
        The Government permitted the establishment of one new publication
    during the year and allowed two others to resume publication. The
    Ministry of Culture began publishing a new weekly newspaper, Al-Qahira,
    using the existing license of another publication. In May the Court of
    Ethics ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to review a
    government appeal of a January 1999 Supreme Constitutional Court ruling
    on a 1981 decree that abolished a monthly publication called Al-Mawqif
    Al-Arabi, thus allowing publication of the monthly to resume after
    nearly 20 years. In August the Higher Administrative Court overturned a
    1999 government decision to revoke the license of the newspaper Sawt
    Al-Umma for alleged violations by the publisher of joint stock company
    regulations. The newspaper later resumed publication.
        Several other publications failed to obtain licenses or lost
    related court cases, thereby losing the right to publish. In June the
    Higher Administrative Court overturned a lower court decision that
    would have allowed the newspaper Al-Karama to be published, after the
    publisher contested the Prime Minister's refusal to act on his request
    for approval of a joint stock company formed to publish the paper. In
    June the Higher Administrative Court upheld a lower court decision to
    stop publication of the Liberal Party publication Akhbar Al-Beheira,
    based on an article in the Political Parties Law providing that no
    party with fewer than 10 members in parliament may publish a newspaper.
        Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license in Egypt,
    several publishers of newspapers and magazines developed for the
    country's market have obtained a foreign license. Most of these
    publications are printed in the free trade zone. Newspapers and
    magazines published under a foreign license may be distributed with
    government permission. However, the Department of Censorship in the
    Ministry of Information has the authority also to censor or halt
    distribution of publications printed in the free trade zone under a
    foreign license. In April the Ministry confiscated one issue of the
    foreign-licensed newspaper AlTadamun, reportedly due to an article it
    contained that supported Iraq. The English-language weekly newspaper
    the Middle East Times reported no government censorship of its articles
    during the year. The newspaper closed its offices and moved to Cyprus
    in October for financial reasons. The Center for Human Rights and Legal
    Assistance in 1999 organized a legal challenge to the constitutionality
    of the Information Ministry's censorship of offshore publications. The
    Supreme Constitutional Court began hearing the case in December, but
    had not issued a decision by year's end.
        The Penal Code, Press Law, and Publications Law govern press
    issues. The Penal Code stipulates fines or imprisonment for criticism
    of the President, members of the Government, and foreign heads of
    state. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in 1998 to review the
    constitutionality of those articles of the Penal Code that specify
    imprisonment as a penalty for journalists convicted of libel. The case
    was scheduled to begin in January 2001. The Press and Publication Laws
    ostensibly provide protection against malicious and unsubstantiated
    reporting. Financial penalties for violations were increased
    substantially in 1996 when relevant provisions of the Penal Code were
    revised, but the judicial process remains long and costly, creating a
    bar to realistic legal recourse for those wrongly defamed. In recent
    years, opposition party newspapers have within limits published
    articles critical of the President and foreign heads of state without
    being charged or harassed. The Government continues to charge
    journalists with libel. In October 1999, the Public Prosecutor charged
    editor Mohamed Hassan Al-Banna and journalist Fouad Fawaz of the weekly
    newspaper Al-Khamis with insulting Libyan leader Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi.
    The case reportedly was settled out of court during the year.
        In 1996 the People's Assembly approved a revised Press Law
    following criticism of a more restrictive revision that had been
    approved in 1995. The People's Assembly also revised certain articles
    in the Penal Code pertaining to libel and slander. In addition in 1997
    the Supreme Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Article 195
    of the Penal Code under which an editor in chief could have been
    considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion of
    the newspaper. The Court ruled that the correct standard of
    responsibility should be ``negligence.'' The courts subsequently
    applied this lesser standard.
        Courts tried several prominent cases of slander during the year. In
    April the Court of Cassation upheld a 1999 criminal court conviction of
    four journalists from the opposition daily newspaper Al-Shaab of
    libeling Youssef Wally, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
    Agriculture. Editor in chief Magdy Hussein and reporter Salah Bedewi
    were sentenced to 2 years in prison, and each was fined about $5,300
    (20,000 Egyptian pounds). Cartoonist Essam Hanafi received the same
    fine and a 1-year sentence. A fourth AlShaab journalist, Adel Hussein,
    was convicted of libel and fined the same amount. In a separate case in
    May, five journalists from Al-Shaab (Magdy Hussein, Essam Hanafi,
    Talaat Rumeih, Adel Hussein, and Amer Soliman) were given sentences
    ranging from fines of about $2000 (7,500 Egyptian pounds) to 6 months
    in prison for slandering businessman Hussein Sabour. Hussein, Bedewi,
    and Hanafi all were released by year's end. In April the Court of
    Misdemeanors sentenced five journalists from the newspaper AlAhrar
    (Salah Qabadaya, Hossam Soliman Moussa, Mohamed Abdel Fahim Aboul Nour,
    Hisham Mohamed Mustafa, and Nabil Sadek Rizkallah) to 6 months in
    prison at hard labor and fines of about $2000 (7,500 Egyptian pounds)
    each for slander against Egypt Air President Fahim ElRayyan. During the
    year the courts also acquitted six journalists of slander and dismissed
    one case. Journalist Ashraf Ayoub's 1-year sentence for libel in 1999
    was dropped during the year, after the newspaper that he worked for,
    AlAhali, published a retraction and the businessman who had charged
    Ayoub withdrew his complaint.
        On occasion, and based on authority granted to him by law, the
    Public Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on the publication of news
    pertaining to cases involving national security in order to protect the
    confidentiality of the cases. The length of the ban is based on the
    length of time required for the prosecution to prepare its case. In
    contrast to 1999, the Public Prosecutor did not ban any news items
    during the year.
        The law provides penalties for individuals who disclose information
    about the State during emergencies, including war and natural
    disasters. The penalties include fines up to $1,700 (6,000 Egyptian
    pounds) and prison sentences up to 3 years. There were no reports in
    which the law was applied in practice during the year.
        In 1998 the People's Assembly approved a law that prohibits current
    or former members of the police from publishing workrelated information
    without prior permission from the Interior Minister.
        Various ministries legally are authorized to ban or confiscate
    books and other works of art upon obtaining a court order. The Islamic
    Research Center at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to censor,
    but not to confiscate, all publications dealing with the Koran and
    Islamic scriptural texts. In recent years the Center has passed
    judgment on the suitability of nonreligious books and artistic
    productions. In 1995 an administrative court ruled that the sole
    authority to prohibit publication or distribution of books and other
    works of art is vested in the Ministry of Culture. This decision
    invalidated a 1994 advisory opinion by a judiciary council that had
    expanded Al-Azhar's censorship authority to include visual and audio
    artistic works. The same year, President Mubarak stated that the
    Government would not allow confiscation of books from the market
    without a court order, a position supported by the then-Mufti of the
    Republic, who is now the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar.
        The Islamic Research Center at Al-Azhar University ruled during
    1999 in favor of distribution of the book ``My Father Adam: The Story
    of the Creation Between Legend and Reality,'' written by Abdel Sabour
    Shahine. An Islamist lawyer sued the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and several
    other senior Islamic figures in an effort to block publication of the
    book; a court rejected the suit on February 28. The plaintiff's appeal
    of the decision was pending at year's end.
        The Islamic Research Center also issued a statement on May 17
    denouncing the novel ``A Banquet for Seaweed,'' by Syrian author Haidar
    Haidar, for insulting religious values. The novel, originally published
    in 1983, was reissued by the Ministry of Culture as part of a series on
    Arabic literature. Al-Shaab newspaper (of the pro-Islamist Socialist
    Labor Party) declared the book blasphemous for ridiculing Islam, and
    initiated a campaign against the book and against the Minister of
    Culture for reprinting it. Student demonstrations against the book at
    Al-Azhar University on May 8 turned violent, leading to the arrest of
    75 students (see Sections 1.d. and 3). The Minister of Culture
    initially defended his decision and later relented and agreed to recall
    the book, but by then copies reportedly had sold out.
        There were no court-ordered confiscations of books during the year.
    During the year, one author was tried and convicted for his writings. A
    State Security misdemeanor court sentenced author Salaheddine Mohsen to
    a 6-month suspended sentence in July for ``insulting heavenly
    religions'' in his book ``The Shivering Light.'' At the time of his
    arrest, police confiscated approximately 100 copies of Mohsen's books,
    which he had published himself. On December 23, Mohsen was arrested at
    Cairo airport for attempting to leave the country. Upon the appeal of
    the State Security Prosecutor, who claimed that the sentence was too
    lenient, the Government ordered that Mohsen be retried. The retrial was
    pending at year's end. An appeal to the Court of Cassation by author
    Ala'a Hamed still was pending at year's end. Hamed previously was
    convicted in 1998 for the alleged pornographic content of his book
    ``The Bed.''
        The Ministry of Interior regularly confiscates leaflets and other
    works by Muslim fundamentalists and other critics of the State. During
    the year, hundreds of suspected members of the illegal Muslim
    Brotherhood were arrested (see Sections 1.d. and 3). In many cases the
    press reported that police confiscated written materials such as
    leaflets during the arrests. On November 19, 15 persons were convicted
    of offenses related to membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, including
    possession of leaflets and other written materials related to the
    organization, and were given sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years in
    prison.
        The Ministry of Interior also has the authority, which it exercises
    sporadically, to stop specific issues of foreignpublished newspapers
    from entering the country on the grounds of protecting public order
    (also see Section 1.f.). The Ministry of Defense may ban works about
    sensitive security issues. The Council of Ministers may order the
    banning of works that it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental
    to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace.
        The Ministry of Information owns and operates all domestic
    television and radio stations. The Government refuses to license
    private broadcast stations or to privatize the State's broadcast media.
    In addition to public television, the Government also offers several
    pay-for-view television channels. Government control and censorship of
    the broadcast media is significant.
        Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as
    scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and films that
    are highly critical of the Government and its policies are not
    censored. The Ministry of Culture also censors foreign films that are
    to be shown in theaters, but it is more lenient when the same films are
    released in videocassette format. Government censors ensure that
    foreign films made in Egypt portray the country in a favorable light.
    Censors review scripts before filming, are present during filming, and
    have the right to review the film before it is sent out of the country.
        An appeals court had not yet reviewed the case against the film
    ``Birds of Darkness'' by year's end. The plaintiffs charge that it is
    insulting to lawyers. Two related cases against the movie were dropped
    in 1997.
        Moderate Muslims and secularist writers still are subject to legal
    action by Islamic extremists. Cairo University professor Nasr Abu Zeid
    and his wife continue to live abroad following the 1996 Court of
    Cassation ruling that affirmed lower court judgments that Abu Zeid is
    an apostate because of his controversial interpretation of Koranic
    teachings. In August the Supreme Constitutional Court rejected Abu
    Zeid's contestation of the constitutionality of the 1996 ruling.
        The Government does not restrict directly academic freedom at
    universities. However, some university professors claim that the
    Government tightened its control over universities in 1994 through a
    law authorizing university presidents to appoint the deans of the
    various faculties. Under the previous law, faculty deans were elected
    by their peers. The Government has justified the measure as a means to
    combat Islamist influence on campus. The Government also occasionally
    bans books for use on campuses.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    significantly restricts freedom of assembly. Under a 1923 law, citizens
    must obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior before holding
    public meetings, rallies, and protest marches. The Interior Ministry
    selectively obstructs meetings scheduled to be held on private property
    and university campuses (also see Section 4). In January security
    officials prohibited the Group for Democratic Development from
    conducting a planned seminar on Islamic groups. In October the
    Government permitted the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies to
    hold a conference on the subject of human rights in the Arab world,
    which the Government had prohibited in 1999.
        The Government significantly restricts freedom of association. In
    June the Supreme Constitutional Court overturned on procedural grounds
    Law 153 pertaining to the formation, function, and funding of non-
    governmental organizations (NGO's) and private foundations, which had
    been passed by the People's Assembly in June 1999. The previous law
    governing NGO's, Law 32, was reinstated until a new law could be
    passed, which had not happened by year's end. Law 153 and the
    subsequent implementing regulations were controversial, and had drawn
    mixed reactions from local and international NGO's and activists, some
    of whom charged that the law and regulations placed unduly burdensome
    restrictions on NGO's. While many NGO's were registered under Law 153,
    its overturn and the reinstatement of Law 32 left a number of NGO's
    that had not yet registered under either Law 153 or Law 32 in an
    unsettled status regarding registration. (Those that succeeded in
    registering under Law 153 still were considered registered after the
    law was overturned.) Three human rights organizations were registered
    as NGO's during the year: The Center for Human Rights Legal Assistance,
    the Center for Human Rights Studies and Information, and the Arab
    Organization for Human Rights. The Arab Organization for Human Rights
    had sought licensing since 1985. Several other human rights
    organizations that applied for registration, including the Egyptian
    Organization for Human Rights, the Human Rights Center for the
    Assistance of Prisoners, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
    Studies, were not registered by year's end. The EOHR sued to force the
    Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs to register the organization,
    because the Ministry had not replied to EOHR's application within
    limits mandated under both Law 32 and Law 153. There was no decision on
    the case by year's end. In September the security services barred
    Mamdouh Nakhla, a Coptic Orthodox lawyer and human rights activist,
    from membership on the board of the Youssef El-Rami Charity Society,
    for ``security reasons.'' Nakhla filed a lawsuit against the Ministers
    of Interior and Social affairs; no court date had been set by year's
    end.
        Under 1993 legislation governing professional syndicates, at least
    50 percent of the general membership of an association must elect the
    governing board. Failing a quorum, a second election must be held in
    which at least 30 percent of the membership votes for the board. If
    such a quorum is unattainable, the judiciary may appoint a caretaker
    board until new elections can be set. The law was adopted to prevent
    wellorganized minorities, specifically Islamists, from capturing or
    retaining the leadership of professional syndicates. Members of these
    syndicates have reported that Islamists have used irregular electoral
    techniques such as physically blocking polling places and limiting or
    changing the location of polling sites.
        On June 28, the Government postponed nationwide elections for the
    Lawyers' Syndicate that had been scheduled for July 1 on the grounds
    that syndicate offices were inadequate to allow voting by the
    syndicate's more than 85,000 members. Local observers believe the
    elections were postponed to prevent victories by Islamists and other
    oppositionists, as had occurred in previous syndicate elections. In
    October 1999, the Court of Cassation upheld an earlier court decision
    to lift the Government sequestration of the Syndicate and to allow
    elections. Several Administrative Court rulings during the year
    supported the Syndicate's right to hold elections in its offices, but
    the elections had not taken place by year's end.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    belief and the practice of religious rites; however, the Government
    places restrictions on this right. Most Egyptians are Sunni Muslims.
    There is a small number of Shi'a Muslims. Approximately 10 percent of
    the population, or 6 million of 64 million, are Christians, the
    majority of whom belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. There are other
    small Christian denominations, as well as a Jewish community that
    numbers approximately 200 persons.
        Under the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion and
    primary source of legislation. Accordingly, religious practices that
    conflict with Shari'a (Islamic law) are prohibited. However, in Egypt
    the practice of Christianity or Judaism does not conflict with Shari'a
    and, for the most part, members of the non-Muslim minority worship
    without harassment and maintain links with coreligionists abroad.
        All mosques must be licensed, and the Government is engaged in an
    effort to control them legally. The Government appoints and pays the
    salaries of the imams who lead prayers in mosques, proposes themes for
    them, and monitors their sermons. In December the Minister of Awqaf
    announced that the Government now controls 52,000 mosques and 11,000
    mosques located in private buildings. (There are over 70,000 mosques in
    the country.) In an effort to combat extremists, the Government has
    announced its intention to bring all unauthorized mosques under its
    control by 2002.
        Neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes prohibit
    proselytizing or conversion. However, during the past 2 decades,
    several dozen Christians who were accused of proselytizing or who had
    converted from Islam to Christianity have been harassed by police or
    arrested on charges of violating Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which
    prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or
    inciting sectarian strife. No such incidents occurred during the year;
    however, in June Aziz Tawfik, a Christian who allegedly was engaged in
    proselytizing activities, was detained briefly by State Security
    forces. He reportedly was mistreated during his detention. He was
    released the same day and reportedly has not been harassed since.
        There are no restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslims to
    Islam. However, in cases involving conversion from Islam to
    Christianity, authorities have charged several converts with violating
    laws prohibiting the falsification of documents. In such instances,
    converts, who fear government harassment if they officially register
    the change from Islam to Christianity, have altered their
    identification cards and other official documents themselves to reflect
    their new religious affiliation. There were no reports of such arrests
    or harassment during the year.
        In 1997 human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit seeking
    removal of the religious affiliation category from government
    identification cards. Naklah challenged the constitutionality of a 1994
    decree by the Minister of Interior governing the issuance of new
    identification cards. The court referred the case to the State
    Commissioner's Office, which in May issued an opinion noting that the
    legal challenge had not been filed within 60 days of the decree's
    issuance, as required by law. However, the advisory opinions of the
    State Commissioner's Office are not binding. The court now is expected
    to try the case, although no date has been set.
        An 1856 Ottoman decree still in force requires non-Muslims to
    obtain what is now a presidential decree to build a place of worship.
    In addition, Interior Ministry regulations issued in 1934 specify a set
    of 10 conditions that the Government must consider prior to issuance of
    a presidential decree permitting construction of a church. These
    conditions include the location of the proposed site, the religious
    composition of the surrounding community, and the proximity of other
    churches. The Ottoman decree also requires the President to approve
    permits for the repair of church facilities.
        In response to strong criticism of the Ottoman decree, President
    Mubarak took several steps to facilitate church repairs. In December
    1999, President Mubarak issued a decree making the repair of all places
    of worship subject to a 1976 civil construction code. The decree is
    significant symbolically because it places churches and mosques on
    equal footing before the law. The practical impact of the decree has
    been to facilitate significantly church repairs. During the year, the
    Government issued 29 permits for church-related construction, including
    4 permits for the construction of new churches, 19 permits for churches
    previously constructed without authorization, and 6 permits for the
    demolition and reconstruction of existing churches. In addition, the
    Government reported that local authorities issued more than 350 permits
    for church-related repair during the year.
        However, the approval process for church construction is
    timeconsuming and insufficiently responsive to the wishes of the
    Christian community. Although President Mubarak reportedly has approved
    all requests for permits presented to him, Christians maintain that the
    Interior Ministry delays--in some instances indefinitely--submission to
    the President of their requests. They also maintain that security
    forces have blocked them from utilizing permits that have been issued.
    For example, a permit issued in 1993 to repair structural damage to a
    110-year-old church in a village next to Luxor remains unenforced due
    to ``security reasons.'' During the summer, newspapers published a May
    22 letter from the secretary general of Assiyut governorate to the head
    of the Assiyut counsel directing that all church repair requests be
    screened by security before approved.
        In January 1996, human rights activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit
    challenging the constitutionality of the Ottoman decree. In December
    1998, an administrative court referred Naklah's case to the State
    Commissioner's Office. In September the Office issued an opinion that
    the decree is unconstitutional, but that Naklah had no standing to file
    the suit. The opinion is not biding; the court had not ruled on the
    case by year's end.
        The Minister of Awqaf, Hamdy Zaqzouq, who is responsible for
    administering religious trusts, established in 1996 a committee to
    address a dispute with the Coptic Orthodox Church that originated in
    1952. At that time, the Government seized approximately 1,500 acres of
    land from the Church and transferred title to the Ministry of Awqaf.
    Based on the committee's recommendations, more than 800 acres have been
    returned to the Church. The committee continues to review claims to the
    remaining disputed property.
        The Constitution requires schools to offer religious instruction.
    Public and private schools provide religious instruction according to
    the faith of the student.
        The Government occasionally prosecutes members of religious groups
    whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs and whose
    activities are believed to jeopardize communal harmony. For example, on
    November 11, 1999, the State Security Prosecutor arrested 50 persons in
    Cairo suspected of heresy against Islam. On November 15, 1999, 30 of
    the detainees were released and the remaining 20 were charged with
    degrading Islam, inciting strife, and meeting illegally. The lead
    defendant, a woman named Manal Wahid Mana'a, was accused of attempting
    to establish a new Islamic offshoot. On September 5, a State Security
    Emergency Court in Boulaq sentenced 16 of the defendants, including
    Mana'a to 5 years' hard labor, 3 other defendants to 3 years' hard
    labor, 7 to 1 year of hard labor, 2 to 6 months in prison, and 2 to a
    fine of $375 (1000 Egyptian pounds). One of the defendants died in
    prison, reportedly from ill health, during the investigation (see
    Sections 1.e. and 1.a.).
        On September 15, a State Security Emergency Court handed down a
    ruling in the case of 10 defendants, 4 of whom were women, accused of
    propagating extremist ideas in Giza and Alexandria from 1990 to 1999.
    The court sentenced two defendants to 15 years' hard labor, one to 3
    years' hard labor, two to 3 years in prison, and five (including the
    four women) to 1 year in prison (see Section 1.e.).
        In August 1999, the public prosecutor reopened and expanded an
    investigation of police torture of mostly Christian detainees that took
    place during the police investigation in August and September 1998 of
    the murder of Samir Aweda Hakim and Karam Tamer Arsal in the largely
    Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate. By October
    approximately 300 of 1,000 residents involved in the incident had been
    reinterviewed. It remains unclear whether religion was a factor in the
    actions of the police officers. Some human rights groups outside Egypt
    believe that religion was a factor in the Al-Kush murder investigation,
    but most human rights and Christian activists in Egypt do not. Police
    abuse of detainees is a widespread practice that occurs regardless of a
    detainee's religious beliefs (see Section 1.c.).
        On June 5, a criminal court in Sohag city convicted Shayboub
    William Arsal of the murder of Hakim and Arsal. The court sentenced
    Shayboub to 15 years in prison at hard labor. An appeal was pending at
    year's end. The Christian community of Al-Kush believes that Shayboub,
    a Christian resident of Al-Kush, was accused and convicted of the crime
    because of his religion. The public prosecution in Sohag has taken no
    action on charges of witness tampering in Shayboub's trial that were
    raised in 1998 against Bishop Wisa and Arch-Priest Antonious.
        On July 16, the Dar Al-Salaam court sentenced a Christian, Suryal
    Gayed Ishak, to 3 years' hard labor for ``insulting Islam'' during a
    public dispute. Ishak's attorney appealed the conviction, claiming that
    Ishak was accused falsely of instigating the new year's violence in Al-
    Kush (see Section 5). The appeal was scheduled to be heard in January
    2001.
        Some Christians allege that the Government is lax in protecting
    Christian lives and property against extremists (see Section 5).
        In September the Maadi Community Church, an independent
    interdenominational Protestant church, obtained recognition from the
    Government, which allows the Church to buy property and hold services.
        In 1960 President Gamal Abdel Nasser issued a decree (Law 263 for
    1960) banning Baha'i institutions and community activities. All Baha'i
    community properties, including Baha'i centers, libraries, and
    cemeteries, were confiscated. This ban has not been rescinded.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and foreigners are free to
    travel within the country except in certain military areas. Males who
    have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or
    emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed.
    Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
    fathers to obtain passports and travel; married women require the same
    permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the
    right to return.
        The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum and/or refugee
    status in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no reports of the forced
    return of persons to a country where they feared persecution. Egypt
    grants first asylum for humanitarian reasons or in the event of
    internal turmoil in neighboring countries. The Government cooperates
    with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
    Asylum seekers generally are screened by UNHCR representatives, who
    issue a refugee identification card if the Ministries of Interior and
    Foreign Affairs approve. While recognized refugees are permitted to
    reside in Egypt legally, they may not acquire citizenship except in
    rare cases. During the year, approximately 6,400 recognized refugees
    resided in the country, including more than 2,500 Somalis and 2,400
    Sudanese. Although there is no pattern of abuse of refugees, during
    random security sweeps, the Government temporarily detained some
    refugees who were not carrying proper identification. Following
    intervention by the UNHCR, the refugees were released.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the 454-seat
    People's Assembly, the Shura Council, local governments, the mass
    media, labor, and the large public sector, and controls the licensing
    of new political parties, newspapers, and private organizations to such
    an extent that, as a practical matter, citizens do not have a
    meaningful ability to change their government.
        In September 1999 President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to
    a fourth six-year term in a national referendum. According to official
    results he received 94 percent of the vote. The referendum followed the
    constitutionally mandated nomination by the People's Assembly. Under
    the Constitution, the electorate is not presented with a choice among
    competing presidential candidates.
        During the year, Egypt held elections for the People's Assembly.
    Due to court-ordered supervision by the judiciary of the voting and
    counting, the process was significantly cleaner and more transparent
    than previous elections; however, there were a number of problems. The
    elections were held in stages between October 18 and November 15 in
    order to allow for supervision by a member of the judiciary at each
    polling place. Out of a total of 444 elected seats, the ruling NDP won
    172 seats, independent candidates won 255 seats, and opposition parties
    won 17 seats. Elections for two seats in Alexandria still had not been
    held by year's end due to a court-imposed delay because of procedural
    irregularities. Many of the independents elected were former members of
    the NDP who rejoined the party after being elected, thus leaving the
    People's Assembly actual balance at 388 NDP members, 37 independents
    (17 of them affiliated with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood), and 17
    opposition party members. Seven of those elected were women and three
    were Christians. President Mubarak also appointed 10 members to the
    Assembly, of whom 4 were women and 4 Christians.
        Despite the overall improvement in the electoral process, there
    still were problems affecting the elections' fairness, particularly in
    the period leading up to elections and outside some polling stations on
    election days. During the months preceding the elections, the
    Government arrested thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood on
    charges of belonging to an illegal organization. Most observers believe
    that the Government was seeking to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's
    participation in the People's Assembly and professional syndicate
    elections through intimidation. In addition previous convictions on
    such charges legally precluded many potential candidates from running.
        Violence among supporters of various candidates marred the
    elections at some polling places and resulted in the deaths of 9
    persons. At a few locations, the security presence was so heavy as to
    inhibit voters' access to the polls. There were also reports of voter
    harassment by security forces in jurisdictions in which the Muslim
    Brotherhood was expected to do well. The EOHR conducted a small-scale
    monitoring effort, but there was no systematic, large-scale independent
    monitoring of the elections.
        The People's Assembly debates Government proposals, and members
    exercise their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy.
    The executive initiates almost all legislation. Nevertheless, the
    Assembly maintains the authority to challenge or restrain the executive
    in the areas of economic and social policy, although it may not modify
    the budget except with the Government's approval. The Assembly
    exercises limited influence in the areas of security and foreign
    policy, and retains little oversight of the Interior Ministry's use of
    Emergency Law powers. Many executive branch initiatives and policies
    are carried out by regulation through ministerial decree without
    legislative oversight. The military budget is prepared by the executive
    and not debated publicly. Roll-call votes in the Assembly are rare.
    Votes generally are reported in aggregate terms of yeas and nays, and
    thus constituents have no independent method of checking a member's
    voting record.
        The Shura Council, the upper chamber of Parliament, has 264
    members. Two-thirds of the members are elected popularly and the
    President appoints one-third. One half of the Shura seats are up for
    reelection or reappointment every 3 years. In 1998 the NDP won all 88
    seats up for election. One Coptic Christian, from Alexandria, won a
    seat. The President made 47 appointments (including an additional three
    over the 44 open seats to replace deceased members). Those appointed
    included nine women, eight Coptic Christians, and two members of
    opposition parties.
        There are 13 recognized opposition parties. The law empowers the
    Government to bring felony charges against those who form a party
    without a license. New parties must be approved by the Political
    Parties Committee, a semiofficial body that includes a substantial
    majority of members from the ruling NDP and some members from among the
    independent and opposition parties. Decisions of the Parties Committee
    may be appealed to the civil courts. If a court overturns a denial, the
    party is not registered automatically. Both the Committee and the
    People's Assembly sometimes ignore court decisions. During the year the
    Committee approved one party (the Nasserist ``National Accord'' party)
    and rejected the applications of two others. These rejected parties
    filed an appeal of the Committee's decision. Six other appeals were
    pending before the Administrative Court at year's end.
        The Political Parties Committee also may withdraw recognition from
    existing political parties. On May 20, the Committee withdrew
    recognition from the Socialist Labor Party and suspended publication of
    the party newspaper Al-Shaab. The Committee justified its decision by
    citing the emergence of several splinter factions within the party.
    Members of the Socialist Labor Party charged that the emergence of such
    factions was a Government-backed conspiracy to punish the party and
    newspaper for having instigated student demonstrations that turned
    violent at Al-Azhar University in early May (see Section 2.a.).
        The Muslim Brotherhood remains an illegal organization and may not
    be recognized as a political party under current laws, which prohibit
    political parties based on religion. Muslim Brothers are known publicly
    and openly speak their views, although they do not explicitly identify
    themselves as members of the organization. They remain subject to
    government pressure (see Section 1.d.). Seventeen independent
    candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood were elected to the
    People's Assembly in the fall parliamentary elections.
        Women and minorities are underrepresented in Government and
    politics. The Constitution reserves 10 Assembly seats for presidential
    appointees, and during the year President Mubarak included four
    Christians and four women among his appointees. In addition to the
    appointments, seven women and three Copts were elected in the fall. The
    ruling NDP nominated three Coptic candidates in the parliamentary
    elections. Two women and 2 Copts serve among the 32 ministers in the
    Cabinet.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights organizations continue to face difficulties
    registering as legal organizations. In June the Supreme Constitutional
    Court overturned on procedural grounds Law 153 pertaining to the
    formation, function, and funding of non-governmental organizations
    (NGO's) and private foundations, which had been passed by the People's
    Assembly in June 1999. The previous law governing NGO's, Law 32, was
    reinstated until a new law could be passed, which had not happened by
    year's end. Law 153 and the subsequent implementing regulations, were
    considered controversial, and had drawn mixed reactions from local
    NGO's and international activists, some of whom charged that the law
    and regulations placed unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO
    operations.
        While many NGO's were registered under Law 153, its overturn and
    the reinstatement of Law 32 left a number of NGO's that had not yet
    registered under either Law 153 or Law 32 in an unsettled status
    regarding registration (see Section 2.b.). Three human rights
    organizations were registered as NGO's during the year: The Center for
    Human Rights Legal Assistance, the Center for Human Rights Studies and
    Information, and the Arab Organization for Human Rights. Several other
    human rights organizations that applied for registration, including the
    Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Human Rights Center for the
    Assistance of Prisoners, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
    Studies, were not registered by year's end (see Section 2.b.).
        Despite years of nonrecognition, the EOHR and other groups
    sometimes obtain the cooperation of Government officials. The
    Government allows EOHR field workers to visit prisons in their capacity
    as legal counsel, to call on some Government officials, and to receive
    funding from foreign human rights organizations. However, many local
    and international human rights activists have concluded that government
    restrictions on NGO activities, including limits on organizations'
    ability to accept funding, have inhibited significantly reporting on
    human rights abuses.
        In May the Public Prosecutor dropped the Government's case against
    EOHR secretary-general Hafez Abu Se'da. Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney
    Mustafa Zidane had been charged in December 1998 with dissemination of
    false information or inflammatory propaganda that harms public security
    or public interests and with accepting foreign funds with the intent to
    harm national interests. The charges against Abu Se'da were dropped in
    February, and he was instead charged with violating a 1992 military
    decree prohibiting any Egyptian individual or organization from
    accepting foreign funds without Government permission, before the case
    ultimately was dropped altogether in May. The charges against Zidane
    also was dropped. The charges were based on an EOHR report that was
    critical of police conduct during a 1998 murder investigation in Sohag
    (See sections 2.a. and 2.c.).
        The case of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center
    for Development Studies, who was put on trial beginning on November 18
    for charges that included disseminating abroad false information about
    the country and accepting foreign funds without government permission,
    also had a chilling effect on the work of human rights organizations,
    which exist largely on foreign funding (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.)
        In October the Government permitted the Cairo Institute for Human
    Rights to hold a conference on the subject of human rights in the Arab
    world, which the Government had prohibited in 1999. In January security
    officials prohibited the Group for Democratic Development from
    conducting planned seminar on Islamic groups.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal
    treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many
    traditional practices discriminate against women and Christians.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem
    and is reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. According to
    a national study conducted in 1995 as part of a comprehensive
    demographic and health survey, one of every three women who have ever
    been married has been beaten at least once during marriage. Among those
    who have been beaten, less than half have ever sought help. Smaller,
    independent studies confirm that wife beating is common. In general,
    neighbors and extended family members intervene to limit incidents of
    domestic violence. Due to the value attached to privacy in the
    country's traditional society, abuse within the family rarely is
    discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a divorce, but the law
    requires the plaintiff to produce eyewitnesses, a difficult condition
    to meet. Several NGO's offer counseling, legal aid, and other services
    to women who are victims of domestic violence. These activists believe
    that in general the police and the judiciary consider the ``integrity
    of the family'' more important than the well being of the woman. The
    Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs operates more than 150 family
    counseling bureaus nationwide, which provide legal and medical
    services.
        The Government prosecutes rapists, and punishment for rape ranges
    from 3 years in prison to life imprisonment at hard labor. If a rapist
    is convicted of abducting his victim, he is subject to execution;
    however, there were no reports of the execution of rapists. In 1999 the
    Government abolished an article of the Penal Code that permitted a
    rapist to be absolved of criminal charges if he married his victim.
    However, marital rape is not illegal. Although reliable statistics
    regarding rape are not available, activists believe that it is not
    uncommon, despite strong social disapproval. When ``honor killings'' (a
    man murdering a female for her perceived lack of chastity) occur,
    perpetrators generally receive lighter punishments than those convicted
    in other cases of murder. There are no reliable statistics regarding
    the extent of honor killings.
        Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal, but known to occur.
        The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the
    law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. By law,
    unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
    fathers to obtain passports and to travel; married women of any age
    require the same permission from their husbands (see Section 2.d.).
    Only males may confer citizenship. In rare cases, this means that
    children who are born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are
    themselves stateless. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's
    in the courts. There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as
    a judge, although in practice no women serve as judges. The Court of
    Cassation postponed to January 2001 the cases of two attorneys, Fatma
    Lashin and Amany Talaat, who are challenging the Government's refusal
    to appoint them as Public Prosecutors. (To become a judge, one must
    first serve as a Public Prosecutor.)
        Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to
    an individual's religion. In January the Parliament passed a new
    Personal Status Law that made it easier for a Muslim woman to obtain a
    divorce without her husband's consent, provided that she is willing to
    forego alimony and the return of her dowry. (The Coptic Orthodox Church
    does not permit divorce.) However, an earlier provision of the draft
    law that would have made it easier for a woman to travel without her
    husband's consent, was rejected.
        Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry
    Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim
    men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's
    inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance
    rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the
    balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits
    all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social
    pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance;
    however, this assistance is not always provided.
        Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law,
    academia, the arts, and business. Labor laws provide for equal rates of
    pay for equal work for men and women in the public sector. According to
    Government figures, women constitute 17 percent of private business
    owners and occupy 25 percent of the managerial positions in the four
    major national banks. Social pressure against women pursuing a career
    is strong, and women's rights advocates say that Islamist influence
    inhibits further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other
    discriminatory traditional or cultural attitudes and practices, such as
    female genital mutilation and the traditional male relative's role in
    enforcing chastity and chaste sexual conduct.
        A number of active women's rights groups work in diverse areas,
    including reforming family law, educating women on their legal rights,
    promoting literacy, and combating FGM.
        Children.--The Government remains committed to the protection of
    children's welfare and attempts to do so within the limits of its
    budgetary resources. Many of the resources for children's welfare are
    provided by international donors, especially in the field of child
    immunization. Child labor is widespread, despite the Government's
    commitment to eradicate it (see Section 6.d.). UNICEF has reported on
    the practice of poor rural families making arrangements for a daughter
    to be employed as a domestic servant in the home of wealthy citizens
    (see Sections 6.c.).
        The Government provides public education, which is compulsory for
    the first 9 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The
    Government treats boys and girls equally at all levels of education.
        The Government enacted a Child Law in 1996. The law provides for
    privileges, protection, and care for children in general. Six of the
    law's 144 articles set rules protective of working children (see
    Section 6.d.). Other provisions include: A requirement that employers
    set up or contract with a child care center if they employ more than
    100 women; the right of rehabilitation for disabled children; a
    prohibition on sentencing defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 to
    capital punishment, hard labor for life, or temporary hard labor; and a
    prohibition on placing defendants under the age of 15 in preventive
    custody (although the prosecution may order that they be lodged in an
    ``observation house'' and be summoned upon request).
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is common despite the Government's commitment to
    eradicating the practice and NGO efforts to combat it. Traditional and
    family pressures remain strong; a study conducted during the year
    estimates the percentage of women who have ever been married who have
    undergone FGM at 97 percent. The survey showed that attitudes may be
    changing slowly; over a 5-year period, the incidence of FGM among the
    daughters (from ages 11 to 19) of women surveyed fell from 83 to 78
    percent. FGM generally is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and
    12, with equal prevalence among Muslims and Christians.
        In 1997 the Court of Cassation upheld the legality of a 1996 decree
    banning FGM that was issued by the Minister of Health and Population
    Planning. In addition to attempting to enforce the decree, the
    Government supports a range of efforts to educate the public. A
    discussion of FGM and its dangers has been added to the curriculum of
    the school system. The Government broadcasts television programs
    criticizing the practice. Government ministers speak out against the
    practice, and senior religious leaders also support efforts to stop it.
    The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the most senior Islamic figure in the country,
    and the leader of the Coptic Orthodox community, Pope Shenouda, have
    stated repeatedly that FGM is not required by religious doctrine.
    However, illiteracy impedes some women from distinguishing between the
    deep-rooted tradition of FGM and religious practices. Moreover, many
    citizens believe that FGM is an important part of maintaining female
    chastity, which is a part of religious tradition, and the practice is
    supported by some Muslim religious authorities and Islamist political
    activists. A number of NGO's actively work to educate the public about
    the health hazards of the practice.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no laws specifically
    prohibiting discrimination against the disabled, but the Government
    makes serious efforts to address their rights. It works closely with
    U.N. agencies and other international aid donors to design job-training
    programs for the disabled. The Government also seeks to increase the
    public's awareness of the capabilities of the disabled in television
    programming, the print media, and in educational material in public
    schools. There are approximately 5.7 million disabled persons, of whom
    1.5 million are disabled severely.
        By law, all businesses must designate 5 percent of their jobs for
    the disabled, who are exempt from normal literacy requirements.
    Although there is no legislation mandating access to public
    accommodations and transportation, the disabled may ride Government-
    owned mass transit buses free of charge, are given priority in
    obtaining telephones, and receive reductions on customs duties for
    private vehicles. A number of NGO's are active in efforts to train and
    assist the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--The Constitution provides for equal public
    rights and duties without discrimination due to religion or creed. For
    the most part, the Government upholds these constitutional protections.
    However, discrimination against Christians exists. There are no
    Christians serving as governors, university presidents, and deans.
    There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services
    and armed forces. Although there was improvement in a few areas such as
    coverage of Christian subjects in the mass media, discriminatory
    government practices include: Suspected statistical underrepresentation
    of the size of the Christian population; bias against Christianity and
    Coptic history in the educational curricula; failure to admit
    Christians into public university training programs for Arabic language
    teachers (because the curriculum involves study of the Koran);
    discrimination against Christians in the public sector; and
    discrimination against Christians in staff appointments to public
    universities.
        The approximately 6 million Coptic Christians have been the objects
    of occasional violent assaults by the Islamic Group and other
    terrorists. Some Christians have alleged that the Government is lax in
    protecting Christian lives and property (see Section 2.c.). However,
    there were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians during
    the year. In incidents unrelated to terrorism, 1 Christian was killed
    and 10 were wounded in four assaults linked to Muslim extremists. Madgy
    Ayyad Mas'oud was killed on July 26 in a village in Giza by
    unidentified gunmen, reportedly because he built a church (with
    official approval) to which extremists objected. Two men were arrested
    on July 31 and charged with premeditated murder in connection with the
    case; the trial had not begun by year's end. On December 11, Father
    Hezkiyal Ghebriyal, a 75-year-old Coptic Orthodox priest, was stabbed
    and seriously wounded in the village of Bardis, near Sohag. Police
    arrested the suspected attacker, who remained in prison at year's end,
    pending an ongoing investigation. Several other Christians were wounded
    in sectarian disputes in other provinces.
        On April 15, the Tanta Criminal Court sentenced to 3 years in
    prison the assailant who stabbed a Christian priest in Mahalla in
    August 1999. On June 22, a State Security Emergency court sentenced to
    5 years' imprisonment with hard labor four members of a terrorist group
    from the upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout who were accused of
    murder and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early
    1990's. As of the end of the year, the Court of Cassation had not yet
    set a date to hear an appeal by the Public Prosecutor seeking a heavier
    sentence in the case of Ahmad and Ibrahim Nasir, who were sentenced to
    7 years in prison for the September 1999 murder of a monk in Assiut.
        A trade dispute between a Christian clothing merchant and a Muslim
    customer on December 31, 1999, in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag
    governorate, escalated into violent exchanges between Muslims and
    Christians in the area, resulting in the deaths of 21 Christians and 1
    Muslim on January 2, 2000. The violence also resulted in the injury of
    39 persons in Al-Kush and 5 persons in the neighboring municipality of
    Dar Al-Salaam. Approximately 200 businesses and homes in the area were
    damaged. Following the incident, President Mubarak sent the Minister of
    Local Administration to Al-Kush as his emissary. The Minister of
    Housing and the Public Prosecutor also visited Al-Kush to investigate.
    The Government subsequently provided $800 (3000 Egyptian pounds) to
    each of the families of those who were killed, and $130 (500 Egyptian
    pounds) to each person who was injured. The Government relocated and
    rebuilt 65 kiosks damaged in the riots; the placement of the kiosks had
    been a subject of longstanding dispute between Christian and Muslim
    merchants. The Christian community estimates that Christian residents
    and merchants lost $962,000 (3,609,400 Egyptian pounds) worth of
    merchandise and personal property during the looting. The Ministry of
    Social Affairs thus far has disbursed $14,000 (52,900 Egyptian pounds)
    in compensation. The Coptic Orthodox Church has provided $175,000
    (655,450 Egyptian pounds) in compensation. Several individuals and
    organizations have provided donations to the Christian community in Al-
    Kush.
        Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda stated publicly that negligence on
    the part of the police and local leaders led to an increase in the
    number of victims and an escalation of the violence. Although rumors
    reportedly played a significant role in exacerbating the violence, no
    incitement charges were brought. The Government did not investigate
    police conduct; however, the director of State Security for Sohag
    governorate, Sa'id Abu AlMa'aly, was removed from his position in
    March.
        On March 11, the Public Prosecutor announced the indictment of 135
    persons for involvement in the sectarian violence in Al-Kush and Dar
    Al-Salaam, on charges ranging from unlawful assembly to murder. Charges
    initially raised against a local priest were dropped. On September 5,
    the Sohag criminal court handed down the verdicts in the cases of 39
    persons charged with crimes (including arson and theft but not murder)
    committed in Dar AlSalaam. Among 21 persons convicted, 4 were sentenced
    to 10 years in prison, 4 to 2 years, 12 to 1 year, and 1 to 6 months;
    the remaining 19 defendants were acquitted. On June 4, the Sohag
    criminal court began hearing the case of 96 defendants charged with
    crimes (including murder) committed in Al-Kush. Observers criticized
    the decision by the trial judge on December 7 to release on personal
    recognizance for the Ramadan and Christmas holidays 89 defendants (51
    Muslims and 38 Christians), who faced charges from inciting violence to
    murder. The trial was ongoing at year's end.
        There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam.
    Reports of such cases are disputed and often include inflammatory
    allegations and categorical denials of kidnapping and rape. Observers,
    including human rights groups, find it extremely difficult to determine
    whether compulsion was used, as most cases involve a Coptic girl who
    converts to Islam when she marries a Muslim boy. According to the
    Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with her
    priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to
    convert. However, there are credible reports of Government harassment
    of Christian families that attempt to regain custody of their
    daughters, and of the failure of the authorities to uphold the law
    (which states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16 is
    prohibited, and between the ages of 16 and 21 is illegal, without the
    approval and presence of her guardian) in cases of marriage between an
    underage Christian girl and a Muslim boy.
        There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to
    convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim. However, if a Christian
    woman marries a Muslim man the Coptic Orthodox Church excommunicates
    her. Ignorance of the law and societal pressure, including the
    centrality of marriage to a woman's identity, often affect her
    decision. Family conflict and financial pressure also are cited as
    factors. In addition conversion is a means of circumventing the legal
    prohibition on marriage between the ages of 16 and 21 without the
    approval and presence of a girl's guardian. Most Christian families
    would object to a daughter's wish to marry a Muslim. If a Christian
    girl converts to Islam, her family loses guardianship, which transfers
    to a Muslim custodian, who is likely to grant approval. The law is
    silent on the matter of the acceptable age of conversion.
        Anti-Semitism is found in both the Government press and in the
    press of the opposition parties. The Government has criticized anti-
    Semitism and advised journalists and cartoonists to avoid anti-
    Semitism. There have been no violent anti-Semitic incidents in recent
    years directed at the tiny Jewish community.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join trade unions but are
    not required to do so. A union local, or workers' committee, may be
    formed if 50 employees express a desire to organize. Most union
    members, about 27 per cent of the labor force, are employed by
    stateowned enterprises. The law stipulates that ``high administrative''
    officials in Government and the public sector may not join unions.
        There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian
    Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor
    federation. The International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts
    repeatedly has emphasized that a law that requires all trade unions to
    belong to a single federation infringes on freedom of association. The
    Government has shown no sign that it intends to accept the
    establishment of more than one federation. The ETUF leadership asserts
    that it actively promotes worker interests and that there is no need
    for another federation. ETUF officials have close relations with the
    NDP, and some are members of the People's Assembly or the Shura
    Council. They speak vigorously on behalf of worker concerns, but public
    confrontations between the ETUF and the Government are rare. Disputes
    more often are resolved by consensus in private.
        The labor laws do not provide adequately for the rights to strike
    and to engage in collective bargaining. Strikers may face prison
    sentences of up to 2 years. Although the right to strike is not
    provided, strikes occur. The Government considers strikes a form of
    public disturbance and therefore illegal. According to a press report
    in March, the Minister of Military Production referred five striking
    workers from a Helwan arms factory to military prosecution.
        There were 17 strikes during the year. Strikes mainly were over
    issues of wage cuts, dismissals, and anticipated privatization. Most of
    the strikes took place in Alexandria, Cairo, and the Delta (northern
    Egypt), the country's industrial centers. Most of the strikes occurred
    in public sector companies and lasted for 1 day. Most strikes involved
    hundreds of workers, and in one instance more than a thousand workers
    were involved. Bonuses and incentives tied to the previous year's
    production typically are disbursed in January, and failure to disburse
    the bonuses often leads to a strike. ETUF or government officials
    successfully mediated most of the strikes.
        Some unions within the ETUF are affiliated with international trade
    union organizations. Others are in the process of becoming affiliated.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the law,
    unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector enterprises if
    the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions otherwise lack
    collective bargaining power in the state sector. The International
    Labor Organization (ILO) for years has claimed that the Labor Code
    undermines the principle of voluntary bargaining by providing that any
    clause of a collective agreement that is liable to impair the economic
    interest of the country is null and void. Under current circumstances,
    collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense because
    the Government sets wages, benefits, and job classifications by law.
        Firms in the private sector generally do not adhere to such
    Government-mandated standards. Although they are required to observe
    some Government practices, such as the minimum wage, social security
    insurance, and official holidays, firms often do not adhere to
    Government practice in nonbinding matters, including award of the
    annual Labor Day bonus. There are no legal obstacles to establishing
    private sector unions, although such unions are not common.
        Labor law and practice are the same in Egypt's six export
    processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor; however, the Criminal Code authorizes sentences
    of hard labor for some crimes. Although the law does not prohibit
    specifically forced and bonded labor by children, such practices are
    not known to occur (see Section 6.d.). Domestic and foreign workers
    generally are not subject to coerced or bonded labor, although UNICEF
    has reported on the practice of poor rural families making arrangements
    for a daughter to be employed as a domestic servant in the home of
    wealthy citizens (see Sections 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Under the 1996 Child Law (see Section 5), the minimum age
    for employment is 14 in nonagricultural work. The Labor Law of 1996 and
    associated ministerial decrees greatly limit the type and conditions of
    work that children below the age of 18 may perform legally. Provincial
    governors, with the approval of the Minister of Education, may
    authorize seasonal work for children between the ages of 12 and 14,
    provided that duties are not hazardous and do not interfere with
    schooling. Preemployment training for children under the age of 12 is
    prohibited. It is prohibited for children to work for more than 6 hours
    a day. One or more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be included.
    Children may not work overtime, during their weekly day off, between 8
    p.m. and 7 a.m., or for more than 4 hours continuously. Education is
    compulsory, free, and universal for the first 9 academic years
    (typically until the age of 15).
        The Government takes seriously the problem of child labor, and took
    steps to improve the situation. For example, Prime Minister Atef Ebeid
    and First Lady Suzanne Mubarak are involved personally with the
    problems of working children through their leadership positions on the
    National Council for Children and Motherhood. The Government worked
    closely during the year with international organizations--in particular
    UNICEF and the International Labor Organization (ILO)--as well as
    international and domestic NGO's and labor unions to implement programs
    designed to address child labor and its root causes. However, in
    general the Government does not devote adequate resources to implement
    its child labor policies. Statistical information on the number of
    working children is difficult to obtain and often out of date. A
    comprehensive study prepared by the Government's statistical agency in
    1988 indicated that 1,309,000 children between the ages of 6 and 14
    were employed. In November 1999, the Minister of Social Affairs
    reportedly stated that 1 million children participate in agricultural
    labor, and NGO's estimate that up to 1.5 million children work.
    Government studies also indicate that the concentration of working
    children is higher in rural than urban areas. Nearly 78 percent of
    working children are in the agricultural sector. However, children also
    work as domestic servants, as apprentices in auto repair and craft
    shops, in heavier industries such as construction, in brickmaking and
    textiles, and as workers in tanneries and carpet-making factories.
    While local trade unions report that the Ministry of Labor adequately
    enforces the labor laws in state-owned enterprises, enforcement in the
    private sector, especially in the informal sector, is lax. Many of
    these children are abused, overworked, and exposed to potentially
    hazardous conditions by their employers, and the restrictions in the
    Child Law have not improved conditions due to lax enforcement on the
    part of the Government. There were only two reported cases during the
    year in which the Government enforced child labor laws. In September
    Ministry of Interior officials raided 16 electrical workshops in
    various Cairo neighborhoods and found 30 children between the ages of 6
    and 12 working there. In another case, authorities found 4 children
    working in a Cairo restaurant that serves alcoholic beverages. Both
    cases were referred to the Prosecutor General's office. According to
    Article 74 of the Child Law of 1996, establishment owners are subject
    to fines of $27 to $133 (100 to 500 Egyptian pounds) for each illegal
    child worker; in the case of repeat offenders the fines are doubled.
    Investigations into the cases were ongoing at year's end.
        Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
    labor by children, UNICEF has reported on the practice of poor rural
    families making arrangements for a daughter to be employed as a
    domestic servant in the home of wealthy citizens (see Sections 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--For Government and public sector
    employees, the minimum wage is approximately $34 (about 128 Egyptian
    pounds) a month for a 6day, 36-hour workweek, as compared to the same
    wages for a 42hour workweek in 1999. The minimum wage, which is set by
    the Government and applied nationwide, is enforced effectively by the
    Ministry of Administrative Development. The minimum wage does not
    provide for a decent standard of living for a worker and family;
    however, base pay commonly is supplemented by a complex system of
    fringe benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's take-
    home pay. The minimum wage also is binding legally on the private
    sector, and larger private companies generally observe the requirement
    and pay bonuses as well. Smaller firms do not always pay the minimum
    wage or bonuses.
        The Ministry of Labor sets worker health and safety standards,
    which also apply in the export processing zones; however, enforcement
    and inspections are uneven.
        The law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working
    conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from
    hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits prostitution and sex
    tourism. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
    within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                      IRAN

        The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a
    populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution
    ratified after the revolution by popular referendum established a
    theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of
    institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The
    Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State,
    Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution
    and has direct control of the armed forces, internal security forces,
    and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a 4-year term as
    President in a popular vote in February 1997. A popularly elected 290-
    seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles, develops and
    passes legislation. All legislation passed by the Majles is reviewed
    for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles by a Council of
    Guardians, which consists of six clerical members, who are appointed by
    the Supreme Leader, and six lay jurists, who are appointed by the head
    of the judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Constitution provides
    the Council of Guardians with the power to screen and disqualify
    candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of
    requirements, including the candidates' ideological beliefs. The
    judiciary is subject to government and religious influence.
        Several agencies share responsibility for internal security,
    including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of
    Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was
    established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known
    as Basijis, and gangs of thugs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers
    of the Party of God), who often are aligned with specific members of
    the leadership, act as vigilantes, and are released into the streets to
    intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and
    individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities. Both regular
    and paramilitary security forces committed numerous, serious human
    rights abuses.
        Iran has a mixed economy that is heavily dependent on export
    earnings from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The
    Constitution mandates that all large-scale industry, including
    petroleum, minerals, banking, foreign exchange, insurance, power
    generation, communications, aviation, and road and rail transport, be
    owned publicly and administered by the state. Large charitable
    foundations called bonyads, most with strong connections to the
    Government, control the extensive properties and businesses
    expropriated from the Pahlavi family and individuals associated with
    the monarchy. The bonyads exercise considerable influence in the
    economy, but do not account publicly for revenue and pay no taxes.
    Basic foodstuffs and energy costs are subsidized heavily by the
    Government. Oil exports account for nearly 80 percent of foreign
    exchange earnings. Private property is respected. Although economic
    performance improved somewhat during the year due to the worldwide
    increase in oil prices, performance is affected adversely by government
    mismanagement and corruption. Unemployment was estimated to be at least
    25 percent, and inflation was an estimated 25 percent.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although
    efforts within society to make the Government accountable for its human
    rights policies continued, serious problems remain. The Government
    restricts citizens' right to change their government. Systematic abuses
    include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances;
    widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly
    including rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and
    detention; and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Judicial
    proceedings were instituted against some government officials for
    misconduct. However, perpetrators often committed such abuses with
    impunity. A group of 20 police officials was brought to trial in March
    for their actions in an attack on a Tehran University student dormitory
    in July 1999. All but two were cleared, including the senior official
    involved. In December 18 former officials of the Intelligence Ministry
    were tried before a military court for the killings of four dissidents
    in 1998. The proceedings were closed and the results of the trial were
    not made public by year's end.
        The judiciary suffers from government and religious influence, and
    does not ensure that citizens receive due process or fair trials. The
    Government uses the judiciary to stifle dissent and obstruct progress
    on human rights. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights,
    and restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association. The
    Government closed nearly all reform-oriented publications during the
    year and brought charges against prominent political figures and
    members of the clergy for expressing ideas viewed as contrary to the
    ruling orthodoxy. However, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance
    continued to issue licenses for the establishment of newspapers and
    magazines, some of which challenged government policies. The Government
    restricts freedom of religion. Religious minorities, particularly
    Baha'is, continued to suffer repression by conservative elements of the
    judiciary and security establishment. In July 10 Iranian Jews were
    tried and convicted on charges of illegal contacts with Israel, and
    sentenced to between 2 and 13 years in prison. Three others were
    acquitted. The trial procedures were unfair, and violated numerous
    internationally recognized standards of due process. The selection of
    candidates for elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
    Intense political struggle continued during the year between a broad
    popular movement that favored greater liberalization in government
    policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and certain hard-
    line elements in the government and society, which view such reforms as
    a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In many cases, this
    struggle is played out within the Government itself, with reformists
    and hardliners squaring off in divisive internal debates. Reformers and
    moderates won a landslide victory in the February Majles election, and
    now constitute a majority of that body; however, the Council of
    Guardians and other elements within the Government blocked much of the
    early reform legislation passed by the Majles.
        The Government restricts the work of human rights groups and
    continues to deny entry to the country to the U.N. Special
    Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Violence against women occurs,
    and women face legal and societal discrimination. The Government
    discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities and restricts
    important workers' rights, including freedom of association and the
    right to organize and bargain collectively. Child labor persists.
    Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of the
    Government, enforce their interpretation of appropriate social behavior
    through intimidation and violence.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government has
    been responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Human rights
    groups reported that security forces killed at least 20 persons while
    violently suppressing demonstrations by Kurds that occurred in the wake
    of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader
    Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 5). Human
    Rights Watch reported at least four student deaths in July 1999, when
    government-sanctioned agitators attacked a student dormitory during
    protests in Tehran (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the
    absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. In 1992 the domestic press
    stopped reporting most executions; however, executions continue in
    substantial numbers, according to U.N. and other reporting. The U.N.
    Special Representative cited an estimated 130 executions from January
    through July, most of which were reported in the media. The Government
    has not cooperated in providing the Special Representative with a
    precise number of executions carried out in Iran. Exiles and human
    rights monitors allege that many of those executed for criminal
    offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, actually are political
    dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political organizations, such as the
    Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, are believed to make up a large number
    of those executed each year. A November 1995 law criminalized dissent
    and applied the death penalty to offenses such as ``attempts against
    the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian
    officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against
    the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.'' U.N. representatives,
    including the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran, and
    independent human rights organizations, continue to note the absence of
    procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Harsh punishments are carried
    out, including stoning and flogging (see Section 1.c.). However, cases
    of stoning apparently are declining, and the U.N. Special
    Representative reports no cases over the past year in which such a
    sentence was carried out. The law also allows for the relatives of
    murder victims to take part in the execution of the killer.
        The Government's investigation into the murder of several prominent
    Iranian dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 continued throughout
    the year. The case involved the murders, over a 2-month period from
    October to December 1998, of prominent political activists Darioush and
    Parvaneh Forouhar and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouandeh.
    Political activist Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same time period
    and never has been found (see Section 1.b.). In February after several
    senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders
    on ``foreign hands,'' it was revealed that active-duty agents of the
    Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of
    Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior
    deputies resigned their posts following these revelations.
        Supervision for the case was placed in the hands of the Military
    Prosecutor's office. In June 1999, the Prosecutor's Office released an
    initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell within the
    Ministry of Intelligence led by four ``main agents'' as responsible for
    the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy
    Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the Government stated, had
    committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution
    several days prior to release of the Government's June report. The
    report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in connection
    with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation.
    In the early part of the year, the Government announced that 18 men
    would stand trial in connection with the killings. The trial began in
    late December in a military court. The proceedings were closed.
    However, news reports indicated that 15 defendants pled guilty during
    the opening stages of the trial. The identity of the defendants is
    still unknown, but former Minister of Intelligence Dori-Najafabadi has
    not been charged. Results of the trial had not been announced by year's
    end (see Section 1.e.).
        Frustration over the slow pace of the murder investigation and
    doubt about the government's willingness to follow the case to its
    conclusion were frequent topics of criticism of the Government
    throughout the year, particularly by those advocating greater adherence
    to the rule of law. Reform-oriented journalists and prominent cultural
    figures declared publicly their demands for a full accounting in the
    case and speculated that responsibility for ordering the murders lay at
    the highest level of the Government. Several citizens, including
    prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, were arrested in
    connection with statements they have made about the case (see Sections
    1.c. and 1.e.). In December, just before Ganji's case went to trial,
    the Military Court arrested a lawyer for the family of one of the
    victims for violating a public ban on comments regarding the case.
        One organization in 1999 reported eight deaths of evangelical
    Christians at the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years (see
    Section 2.c.). In 1999 an investigative reporter alleged that officials
    within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the murders of
    three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for which three
    female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization had been convicted
    (see Section 2.c.).
        Numerous Sunni clerics have been murdered in recent years, some
    allegedly by government agents (see Section 2.c.).
        The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no
    action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone
    associated with his work, ``The Satanic Verses,'' despite the issuance
    of a fatwa against Rushdie's life in 1989. The announcement came during
    discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of full
    diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a number of
    Majles deputies within Iran repudiated the Government's pledge and
    emphasized the ``irrevocability'' of the fatwa, or religious ruling, by
    Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder. The 15
    Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established for the
    murder of Rushdie.
        The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an
    Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murders of Zahra Rajabi and
    Ali Moradi, both of whom were associated with the National Council of
    Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for
    several terrorist attacks within Iran. The U.N. Special Representative
    reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities continued their
    investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad Hossein Naghdi,
    the NCR's representative in Italy.
        b. Disappearance.--No reliable information is available on the
    number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest,
    many detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and
    family members.
        Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998
    along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who
    later were found murdered, remains unaccounted for and is believed to
    have been killed for his political beliefs and activism (see Section
    1.a.).
        A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian
    Christians disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see
    Section 2.c.). Those who disappeared reportedly were Muslim converts to
    Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the authorities. The
    group that reported the figure believes that most or all of those who
    disappeared were killed.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
    there are numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison
    personnel continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison
    facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel
    and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents of the
    Government. Common methods include suspension for long periods in
    contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and,
    most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other
    instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also
    have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete
    deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete
    blindness. Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the Islamic
    Penal Code as appropriate punishment for adultery (see Section 1.a.).
        In November investigative journalist Akbar Ganji went on trial for
    statements he allegedly made during an April conference in Berlin on
    Iranian politics (see Sections 2.a. and 1.e.). He was arrested in April
    upon his return to Iran and held over the next 6 months for long
    periods in solitary confinement. Ganji told the court that he was
    beaten and tortured in prison. Ganji previously had written articles
    implicating former President Rafsanjani in a series of murders of
    dissidents and intellectuals apparently carried out by security forces.
        In March a gunman shot and severely wounded newspaper editor Saeed
    Hajarian, a senior political advisor to President Khatami. The methods
    used raised widespread suspicions that the security forces were
    involved in the attack. The gunman later was arrested and sentenced
    along with four other defendants to 15-year prison sentences.
        On July 8, 1999, the Government and individuals acting with the
    consent of the authorities, used excessive force in attacking a
    dormitory during student protests in Tehran, including reportedly
    throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were injured
    in the incident. The U.N. Special Representative has noted numerous
    credible reports that students arrested following the demonstration
    were tortured in prison (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.b.).
        In May 1999, Brigadier General Gholam-reza Naqdi, a senior Tehran
    police official, and several associates, who were accused of using
    torture to coerce confessions during the 1998 trial of former mayor of
    Tehran Gholam Hossein Kharbaschi, went on trial. It reportedly was the
    first prosecution of a government official for torture since the 1979
    revolution. The charges were based on the accusations of numerous
    Tehran municipality officials and district mayors that authorities had
    used torture to coerce admissions of guilt and statements that
    implicated the former mayor. The trial of Naqdi was conducted in closed
    session before a military court. Naqdi was cleared of most charges and
    resumed his duties with the Tehran police force.
        In August 1999, President Khatami was quoted in public remarks as
    criticizing the use of torture. He defended the rights of prisoners as
    a legitimate concern based on ``Islam and human conscience.''
        Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary
    confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force
    confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise
    tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidate family
    members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family
    members. The U.N. Special Representative reported receiving numerous
    reports of prisoner overcrowding and unrest. He cited a reported figure
    of only 8.2 square feet (2.5 square) of space available for each
    prisoner.
        The Government does not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by
    human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices
    remain common. There is reportedly no legal time limit for
    incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine the
    legality of detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or
    in local Revolutionary Guard offices. Although reliable statistics are
    not available, international observers believe that between scores and
    hundreds of citizens are detained for their political beliefs.
        The security forces often do not inform family members of a
    prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners also may be denied visits by
    family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed
    prisoners do not always receive notification of the prisoners' deaths.
    Those who do receive such information reportedly have been forced on
    occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
        Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the cultural rights of Azeris,
    was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups claim that Chehrangi was
    arrested to prevent his registration as a candidate in the February
    Majles elections (see Sections 3 and 5).
        In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested by security
    forces in the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were
    several prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a
    16-year-old boy. They were held for 14 months or more without formal
    charges until their trial began in May. The delay in clarification of
    charges appeared to violate Article 32 of the Constitution, which
    states in part that in cases of arrest ``charges with the reasons for
    accusation must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the
    accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be forwarded to the
    competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 24 hours so that the
    preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible.''
    Ten of the 13 eventually were convicted of charges relating to illegal
    contacts with Israel. Governments around the world criticized the
    detentions and trial as unfair and in violation of due process (see
    Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
        As many as 1,500 students were detained in the wake of student
    protests on July 8, 1999, and subsequent riots. Many of them remained
    in prison throughout the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
        Numerous publishers, editors and journalists either were detained,
    jailed, fined, or prohibited from publishing their writings during the
    year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a policy of
    intimidation toward members of the media that it considers to pose a
    threat to the current system of Islamic government.
        Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and
    detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a
    small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time. According to
    the U.N. Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least 10 Baha'is
    are in prisons, including 2 who were convicted of either apostasy or
    ``actions against God'' and sentenced to death. In March 1999, the four
    remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute of
    Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging
    from 3 to 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
        The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict
    the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious
    leaders whose views on political and governance issues are at variance
    with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures dispute the
    legitimacy and position of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
    Khamenei. The clerics include Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Tabataei-Qomi,
    who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than 15 years;
    Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who remains under house arrest in Qom; and
    Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house arrest in
    Qom since late 1996. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the former
    designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini,
    and an outspoken critic of the current Supreme Leader, remains under
    house arrest and heightened police surveillance (see Section 2.a.). The
    followers of these and other dissident clerics, many of them junior
    clerics and students, reportedly have been detained in recent years and
    tortured by government authorities.
        Throughout the year, Iran and Iraq exchanged prisoners of war
    (POW's) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
    war, adding to the large number of Iraqi POW's returned by Iran in
    1998. However, a final settlement of this issue between the two
    governments was not achieved, despite such predictions by Iranian
    government officials in late 1998. A June 1998 press report described
    joint Iran-Iraq search operations to identify the remains of those
    missing in action.
        The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents and
    ethnic and religious minorities leave the country due to a perception
    of threat from the Government.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The court system is not
    independent and is subject to government and religious influence. It
    serves as the principal vehicle of the State to restrict freedom and
    reform in the society.
        There are several different court systems. The two most active are
    the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses,
    and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter were established in
    1979 to try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic
    Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics
    crimes, economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and
    official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged
    transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court
    investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security
    duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A
    press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers
    in the media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
        The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible,
    to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic
    sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a
    cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned
    as the head of the judiciary in August 1999, and was replaced by
    Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and
    Prosecutor General also must be clerics.
        Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the
    civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a
    public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of
    appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury
    system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is not
    addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government
    advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and
    interpretation of Islamic law, rather than rely on statutes enacted
    during the Pahlavi monarchy.
        Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against
    national security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious
    for their disregard of international standards of fairness.
    Revolutionary Court judges act as both prosecutor and judge in the same
    case, and judges are chosen in part based on their ideological
    commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often is prolonged and
    defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments often lack clarity and
    include undefined offenses such as ``antirevolutionary behavior,''
    ``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with global arrogance.'' Defendants
    do not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary
    trials of 5 minutes duration occur. Others are show trials that are
    intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession. In 1992 the
    Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that ``the chronic abuses
    associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous and so
    entrenched as to be beyond reform.'' The Government has undertaken no
    major reform of the Revolutionary Court system since that report.
        In October a former member of a vigilante group, Amir Farshad
    Ibrahimi, was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment for defamation after
    he stated in a videotape that Ansar-e Hezbollah vigilantes had received
    payments from senior clerics and conservative political figures to
    organize and carry out attacks on their political opponents. Two
    prominent lawyers active in civil liberties cases, Shirin Ebadi and
    Mohsen Rahimi, were given suspended sentences and prohibited from
    practicing law for 5 years for their role in distributing the tape.
        In November a Revolutionary Court began the trials of 16 writers,
    intellectuals, and political figures who took part in an April
    conference in Berlin on the implications of the February Majles
    elections (see Section 3). The 16 defendants, who were arrested in Iran
    after the conference and charged with taking part in antigovernment and
    anti-Islamic activities, included investigative journalist Akbar Ganji,
    newspaper editor Mohammed Reza Jalaipour, Member of Parliament Jamileh
    Kadivar, women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahji,
    opposition politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, student leader Ali Afshari,
    and others, including a translator for the German Embassy in Tehran.
    The trial was ongoing at year's end.
        In late December, a military court began the trials of 18 persons
    in connection with the killings of several prominent dissidents and
    intellectuals in late 1998. The results of the trial had not been
    announced by year's end (see Section 1.a.).
        The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued
    to be a subject of wide debate throughout the year. The clerical
    courts, which were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and
    crimes committed by clerics, and which are overseen directly by the
    Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution, and operate
    outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics alleged
    that the clerical courts were used to prosecute certain clerics for
    expressing controversial ideas and for participating in activities
    outside the area of religion, including journalism.
        During the latter part of the year, a Special Clerical Court began
    the trial of Hojatoleslam Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a cleric who
    participated in the Berlin conference, on charges of apostasy and
    ``corruption on earth,'' which potentially carry the death penalty.
    Eshkevari has called for more liberal interpretations of Islamic law in
    certain areas. In November 1999, former Interior Minister and Vice
    President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-
    year prison term for allegedly publishing ``anti-Islamic articles,
    insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the
    United States,'' and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric
    Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper
    that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of
    his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the
    SCC (see Section 2.a.).
        In April 1999, a branch of the SCC convicted Hojatoleslam Mohsen
    Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in
    prison for ``dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion'' in a
    series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar
    advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and
    criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview
    published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain government
    officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes
    against the State. He also observed that such leaders ``mistake
    themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests
    of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from
    criticism.'' He also allegedly criticized former Supreme Leader
    Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric
    Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public.
        In July 1999, the SCC banned the daily newspaper Salaam and
    indicted its publisher, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeniha, on charges of
    ``violating Islamic principles,'' ``endangering national security,''
    and ``disturbing public opinion.'' Khoeniha, a cleric, later was
    sentenced to a 5-year jail term. The charges involved the publication
    by Salaam of documents related to the unsolved murders of dissident
    intellectuals in late 1998, which indicated a possible connection to
    senior officials in the plotting of the murders. The closure of the
    newspaper led to peaceful protests by students at Tehran University
    that later grew into widespread rioting after aggressive
    countermeasures were taken by security forces (see Section 2.b.).
        It is difficult for many women to obtain legal redress. A woman's
    testimony in court is worth only half that of a man's, making it
    difficult for a woman to prove a case against a male defendant.
        The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities
    with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, and
    conducts trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for
    threats to national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as
    head of the judiciary in August, stated in 1996 that Baha'i Faith was
    an espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this
    view (see Section 2.c.). The trial of 13 Iranian Jews on charges
    related to espionage for Israel was marked throughout by a lack of due
    process. The defendants were held for over 1 year without being charged
    formally or given access to lawyers. The trial was closed, and the
    defendants were not allowed to choose their own lawyers. Following the
    trial, defense lawyers told news reporters that they were threatened by
    judiciary officials and pressured to admit their clients' guilt (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        In December 1999, authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime
    Minister and longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an
    interview with him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam
    has spent much of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being
    arrested on charges of collaboration with the United States following
    the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in
    1979. In his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense counsel
    and access to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was gathered
    from the overtaken U.S. Embassy and used against him. Since then he has
    appealed for a fair and public trial, which has been denied him. He has
    been a frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured
    eardrum due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure resulting from
    denial of access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate
    condition. He reports having been taken on numerous occasions before a
    firing squad, told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live.
    Amir-Entezam remained in prison at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
        Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy
    Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in
    1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the
    law, was released from prison in early in 1999; however, the Government
    banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years. Human
    Rights groups outside Iran noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998 sentence
    also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased authoring a
    monthly column on legal issues, many focusing on the rights of women,
    since the time of his detention.
        In December Judiciary Chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi announced an
    initiative to reform the Iranian judicial system. He said that the
    country is ``still a long way off from having a reformed and developed
    judicial organization.'' He also announced that 40 judges, clerks, and
    ``middle-men'' had been arrested on corruption charges.
        No estimates are available on the number of political prisoners.
    However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and sentences persons
    on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when
    their actual ``offenses'' are political.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life,
    property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as
    ``provided by law;'' however, the Government infringes on these rights.
    Security forces monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes
    and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without
    court authorization.
        Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, an organization of
    hardline vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate
    revolutionary comportment upon the society, harass, beat, and
    intimidate those who demonstrate publicly for reform or who do not
    observe dress codes or other modes of correct revolutionary conduct.
    This includes women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of
    the body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup or nail
    polish. Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs also have been used to destroy
    newspaper offices and printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics,
    and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Ansar-e
    Hezbollah cells are organized throughout the country and linked to
    individual members of the country's leadership.
        Vigilante violence includes attacking young persons considered too
    ``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes,
    abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of
    popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally enter homes to remove
    television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings in which
    unmarried men and women socialize, or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or
    other forbidden activities are offered or take place. Enforcement
    appears to be arbitrary, varying widely with the political climate and
    the individuals involved. Authorities reportedly are vulnerable to
    bribes in some of these circumstances.
        In 1998 security forces conducted a nationwide raid of more than
    500 homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is suspected of having
    connections to the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning (see Section
    2.c.). During the raids, instructional materials, office equipment, and
    other items of personal property were confiscated. The effort
    apparently was designed to disrupt the operation of the Institute,
    which serves as the only alternative source of higher education for
    most Baha'is, who are denied entry to the state-controlled university
    system.
        Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section
    1.c.). Opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of their
    relatives in the country.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to
    Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights;'' however, the
    Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press in practice.
    After the election of President Khatami, the independent press,
    especially newspapers and magazines, played an increasingly important
    role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the
    society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression are
    lacking, and the independent press has been subjected to arbitrary
    enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably the
    judiciary, which see in such debates a threat to their own hold on
    power.
        Newspapers and magazines represent a wide variety of political and
    social perspectives, some allied with particular figures within the
    Government. Many subjects of discussion are tolerated, including
    criticism of certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press Law
    prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of
    subjects, including material ``insulting Islam and its sanctities'' or
    ``promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic
    Republic.'' Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding comment
    on the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the
    Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the current Supreme
    Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a
    supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic
    legal principles; sensitive or classified material affecting national
    security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics,
    including Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri; and advocating rights or
    autonomy for ethnic minorities.
        Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press
    law that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press Supervisory
    Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and
    Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a
    university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic
    Culture and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press
    licenses and for examining complaints filed against publications or
    individual journalists, editors, and publishers. In certain cases, the
    Press Supervisory Board may refer complaints to the courts for further
    action, including closure. The Press Court hears such complaints. Its
    hearings are conducted in public and feature the presence of a jury
    that is composed of clerics, government officials, and editors of
    government-controlled newspapers. The jury is empowered to recommend to
    the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants and the
    severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these recommendations
    are not binding legally. In at least two cases in 1999 (against the
    newspapers Jame-eh Salem and Adineh), recommendations made by Press
    Court juries for relatively lenient penalties were disregarded by the
    presiding judge in favor of harsher measures, including closure.
    Perhaps because the judgments of the Press Courts have not been viewed
    as sufficiently strict by some government officials, alleged violations
    of the Press Law increasingly were referred to the Revolutionary and
    Special Clerical Courts, in which defendants enjoy fewer legal
    safeguards (see Section 1.e.).
        In March the outgoing Parliament passed amendments to the Press Law
    that gave the Press Court increased procedural and jurisdictional
    power. The amendments allowed prosecution of individual journalists, in
    addition to their editors and publishers, for a broad range of ill-
    defined political offenses. The new Parliament (which was seated in
    May), introduced a bill in August to reverse the restrictive
    amendments. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei intervened with a letter
    to the Speaker demanding that the bill be dropped from consideration.
    Semiofficial vigilante groups appeared outside the Parliament, creating
    an atmosphere of intimidation. Despite some strongly worded objections
    from members, the bill was withdrawn.
        Public officials frequently levy complaints against journalists,
    editors, publishers, and even rival publications. The practice of
    complaining about the writings of journalists crosses ideological
    lines. Offending writers are subject to lawsuits and fines. Suspension
    from journalistic activities and imprisonment are common punishments
    for guilty verdicts for offenses ranging from ``fabrication'' to
    ``propaganda against the State'' to ``insulting the leadership of the
    Islamic Republic.'' Police raid newspaper offices, and Ansar-e
    Hezbollah mobs attack the offices of liberal publications and
    bookstores without interference from the police or prosecution by the
    courts.
        The country's record on freedom of expression worsened during the
    year. It remained a central issue in the struggle between hardliners
    and political reformers. The Government continued its policy of issuing
    licenses for new publications, some of which engaged in open criticism
    of certain government policies. However, the Government issued such
    licenses at a greatly reduced rate during the year. Beginning in late
    April, the Press Court closed virtually all remaining newspapers
    associated with the reform-oriented press. Over the course of a few
    days, the 14 most prominent reform newspapers were ordered closed,
    without hearings. By year's end, more than 30 independent newspapers
    and journals were closed. A few mildly proreform newspapers continue to
    publish; however, these have been restricted as well. ``Hamshahri,'' a
    daily newspaper published by the Tehran municipality, was ordered to
    restrict its circulation to the Tehran city limits. Others continue to
    publish, but only with heavy self-censorship.
        Dozens of individual editors and journalists were charged and tried
    by the Press Court, and several prominent journalists were jailed for
    long periods without trial. Others have been sentenced to prison terms
    or exorbitant fines. Among those imprisoned were Mashallah
    Shamsolvaezin, the editor of a number of now-banned newspapers; Latif
    Safari, Shamsolvaezin's publisher; and independent journalists, such as
    Akbar Ganji, Ahmed Zeidabadi, Massoud Behnoud, Ebrahim Nabavi, and
    Ezzatollah Sahabi. In November Ganji went on trial for statements that
    he made at a conference in Berlin on Iranian politics (see Sections
    1.c. and 1.e.).
        The Government monitors carefully the statements and views of
    Iran's senior religious leaders to prevent disruptive dissent within
    the clerical ranks. In November 1997, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,
    a cleric formerly designated as the successor to Iran's late Spiritual
    Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, called into question the authority of the
    current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing
    intervention in government policy. The comments sparked attacks by
    Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs on Montazeri's residence and a Koranic school in
    Qom run by Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were among the
    charges brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri at
    hearings of the Special Clerical Court in 1999 (see Sections 1.e.).
        The press reported throughout the year that several persons were
    jailed for expressing support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In October
    it was reported that Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the prayer
    leader at a Tehran mosque, was jailed by the Special Court for the
    Clergy for signing a petition that protested the continued detention of
    Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Support for Montazeri was also one of the
    charges included in the wide-ranging indictment of former Interior
    Minister Abdollah Nouri (see Sections 1.e.). In December one of
    Montazeri's sons was arrested for distributing his father's writings.
        The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers,
    which declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers
    to freedom of thought and expression, remain at risk. In July 1999, the
    Association of International Writers, known by its acronym PEN,
    released a statement noting that authorities had never solved the
    murders of signatories Ahmad Mirallai, Ghafar Hosseini, Ahmad Modhtari,
    Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, Ebrahim Zalzadeh, and Darioush and Parvaneh
    Forouhar, nor the disappearance in late 1998 of Pirouz Davani. PEN had
    reported in October 1998 that Declaration signatories Mohammad
    Pouyandeh, Mohammad Mokhtari, Houshang Golshiri, Kazem Kardevani, and
    Mansour Koushan were questioned by a Revolutionary Court in connection
    with their attempts to convene a meeting of the Iran Writer's
    Association. Mokhtari and Pouyandeh subsequently were murdered, while
    signatory Mansour Koushan reportedly fled to Norway.
        The Government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all
    television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflects the
    Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because newspapers
    and other print media have a limited circulation outside large cities,
    radio and television serve as the principal news source for many
    citizens. Satellite dishes that receive foreign television broadcasts
    are forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the wealthy, own
    them. In May 1999, the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated
    in public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the
    satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate
    determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting,
    quickly criticized any potential change as amounting to ``surrender''
    to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea.
        The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with
    screening books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain
    offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the
    Government are published without reprisal. The Ministry inspects
    foreign printed materials prior to their release on the market.
        Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was
    convicted by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the
    treatment of women under the law, was released from prison early in
    1999; however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical
    duties for 5 years and prohibited him from publishing (see Section
    1.e.).
        The Government effectively censors Iranian-made films, since it is
    the main source of funding for domestic film producers. Those producers
    must submit scripts and film proposals to government officials in
    advance of funding approval. However, such government restrictions
    appear to have eased since the election of President Khatami.
        President Khatami announced in September 1998 that the Government
    would take no action to threaten the life of British author Salman
    Rushdie, or anyone associated with his work ``The Satanic Verses.''
    However, his remarks were repudiated by other parties, including the 15
    Khordad Foundation, which claims to have financed a bounty for the
    murder of Rushdie (see Section 1.a.).
        Academic censorship persists. In his 1996 interim report, the U.N.
    Special Representative noted the existence of a campaign to bring about
    the ``Islamization of the universities,'' which appeared to be a
    movement to purge persons alleged to ``fight against the sanctities of
    the Islamic system.'' Government informers who monitor classroom
    material reportedly are common on university campuses. Admission to
    universities is politicized; all applicants must pass ``character
    tests'' in which officials screen out applicants critical of the
    Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors must cooperate with
    government authorities over a period of years. Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs
    disrupt lectures and appearances by academics whose views do not
    conform with their own. In October 1999, a newspaper announced that a
    post-graduate philosophy course taught by Professor Abdolkarim Soroush
    at Tehran University was canceled due to threats to set fire to the
    classroom by unidentified persons.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the
    principles of Islam''; however, in practice the Government restricts
    freedom of assembly and closely monitors gatherings to ensure that they
    do not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest. Such gatherings
    include public entertainment and lectures, student gatherings, labor
    protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. A
    significant factor for groups in deciding whether to hold a public
    gathering is whether it would be opposed by the semiofficial Ansar-e
    Hezbollah, which uses violence and intimidation to disperse such
    assemblies.
        In August two leading reform intellectuals, Mohsen Kadivar and
    Abdul Karim Soroush, were prevented by semiofficial club- and knife-
    wielding vigilantes from addressing a student convention in
    Khorramabad. Subsequent clashes between students and vigilantes
    resulted in the death of a police officer and injuries. The authorities
    arrested 150 persons.
        On July 8, 1999, students at Tehran University who were protesting
    proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press freedoms and
    the Government's closure of a prominent reformoriented newspaper, were
    attacked by elements of the security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah
    thugs. Police forces reportedly looked on and allowed repeated attacks
    against the students and their dormitory. Human Rights Watch reported
    that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were killed in the
    assault on the dormitory, 300 were wounded, and 400 were detained. The
    demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days to include many
    nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale rioting began and
    spread to cities outside Tehran. Student groups attempted to distance
    their organizations from these later acts, which they blamed on
    government-sanctioned agitators. The Government intervened to stop the
    rioting and announced a July 14 counter-demonstration of regime
    loyalists and off-duty government workers, many of whom were bussed in
    from other cities for the demonstration.
        In September 1999, the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court,
    Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted as saying that 1,500
    students were arrested during the riots, 500 were released immediately
    after questioning, 800 were released later, and formal investigations
    were undertaken against the remaining 200. He also announced that four
    student leaders were sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court for
    their role in the demonstrations. The death sentences reportedly were
    commuted to prison terms during the year. The Special Representative's
    report stated that about two-thirds of the students who initially were
    arrested subsequently were released, but noted that there has been no
    formal accounting of all the persons arrested in connection with the
    July 1999 demonstrations.
        The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in
    the aftermath of the July 1999 demonstrations. The party is a secular
    nationalist movement that predates the revolution and is viewed as a
    threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was accused of
    inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans against
    ``sacred values.'' Agents of the intelligence service in late 1998
    killed the former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush Forouhar,
    along with his wife (see Section 1.a.).
        In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action
    against members of the security forces for their violent assault on the
    student dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and
    political activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In
    August 1999, the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat
    Lotfian, was summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his
    officers in the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98
    officers were arrested for their actions. In February 20 police
    officers and officials were tried on charges of misconduct in
    connection with the demonstrations. The court found that misconduct had
    occurred, and ordered compensation for 34 injured students. However,
    the court released all but two of the accused officers.
        The Government forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in the
    wake of the February 1999 arrest of PKK leader Abudullah Ocalan in
    Turkey. Security forces reportedly killed 20 persons and made several
    hundred arrests (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        The Government limits freedom of association. The Constitution
    provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
    associations, Islamic religious groups, and recognized religious
    minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles of
    ``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity,'' or question Islam as the
    basis of the Islamic Republic. President Khatami repeatedly has
    declared as a major goal the development of civil society. A newspaper
    reported in June 1999 that the Article Ten Commission, a government
    body responsible for reviewing applications for the establishment of
    political parties, guilds, societies, and nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's), released figures indicating that as of April, ``85 political,
    115 specialized, and 26 religious minority organizations and
    associations'' were active in the country.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of
    religion. The Constitution declares that the ``official religion of
    Iran is Islam and the sect followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver)
    Shi'ism,'' and that this principle is ``eternally immutable.'' It also
    states that ``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full
    respect,'' and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews (Iran's
    pre-Islamic religions) as the only ``protected religious minorities.''
    Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not
    enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affects the
    nearly 350,000 followers of the Baha'i Faith, who effectively enjoy no
    legal rights.
        The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is
    rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including
    the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head of the
    Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
    (Parliament), is composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
        Religious activity is monitored closely by the Ministry of
    Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized religious
    minorities are not required to register individually with the
    Government, although their community, religious, and cultural
    organizations, as well as schools and public events are monitored
    closely. Baha'is are not recognized by the Government as a legitimate
    religious group; rather, they are considered an outlawed political
    organization. Registration of Baha'i adherents is a police function.
    Evangelical Christian groups are pressured by government authorities to
    compile and hand over membership lists for their congregations.
    Evangelicals have resisted this demand. Non-Muslim owners of grocery
    shops are required to indicate their religious affiliation on the front
    of their shops.
        The population is approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89
    percent are Shi'a and 10 percent are Sunni (mostly Turkomans, Arabs,
    Baluchs, and Kurds living in the southwest, southeast, and northwest).
    Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities compose less
    than 1 percent of the population. Sufi brotherhoods are popular, but
    there are no reliable figures available to judge their true size.
        Members of religious minorities are allowed to vote, but they may
    not run for President. All religious minorities suffer varying degrees
    of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of
    employment, education, and housing (see Section 5).
        The Government allows recognized religious minorities to conduct
    religious education of their adherents. This includes separate and
    privately funded Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian schools. These
    schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education, which imposes
    certain curriculum requirements. With few exceptions, the directors of
    these private schools must be Muslim. Attendance at these schools is
    not mandatory for recognized religious minorities. All textbooks used
    in course work must be approved for use by the Ministry of Education,
    including religious texts. Religious texts in non-Persian languages
    require approval by the authorities for use. This requirement imposes
    sometimes significant translation expenses on minority communities.
    Recognized religious minorities may provide religious instruction in
    non-Persian languages, but often come under pressure from the
    authorities when conducting such instruction in Persian. In particular,
    evangelical Christian and Jewish communities have suffered harassment
    and arrest by authorities for the printing of materials or delivery of
    sermons in Persian.
        Recognized religious minorities are allowed by the Government to
    establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports, or
    charitable associations that they finance themselves. This does not
    apply to the Baha'i community which, since 1983, has been denied the
    right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative
    institutions. Because the Baha'i Faith has no clergy, the denial of the
    right to form such institutions and elect officers has threatened its
    existence in the country.
        University applicants are required to pass an examination in
    Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction
    in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious
    minorities to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment
    similarly are screened for their knowledge of Islam.
        Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
    receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring
    heavier punishments than Muslims. Muslim men are free to marry non-
    Muslim women, but the opposite does not apply. Marriages between Muslim
    women and non-Muslim men are not recognized.
        The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytizing of Muslims
    by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against
    Baha'is and evangelical Christians. The Government regards the Baha'i
    community, whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam, as a
    ``misguided'' or ``wayward'' sect. The Government has fueled anti-
    Baha'i and anti-Jewish sentiment in the country for political purposes.
        The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or
    recant their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion from
    Islam, may be punishable by death.
        Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of
    the Constitution, some Sunni groups claim discrimination on the part of
    the Government. In particular, Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni mosque
    in Tehran and claim that authorities refuse to authorize construction
    of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Sunnis also have accused
    the state broadcasting company of airing programming insulting to
    Sunnis. Numerous Sunni clerics have been killed in recent years, some
    allegedly by agents of the Government. For example, Human Rights Watch
    reported in 1998 the killing of Sunni prayer leader Molavi Imam Bakhsh
    Narouie in the province of Sistan va-Baluchistan in the southeast. This
    led to protests from the local community, which believed that
    government authorities were involved in the killing.
        Majdhub Alishahi, an adherent of the Sufi tradition, reportedly was
    executed on charges of adultery and homosexuality after a coerced
    confession in 1996. Sufi organizations outside the country remain
    concerned about repression by the authorities of Sufi religious
    practices.
        The largest non-Muslim minority is the Baha'i Faith, estimated at
    nearly 350,000 adherents throughout the country. The Baha'i Faith
    originated in Iran during the 1840's as a reformist movement within
    Shi'a Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shi'a
    clergy. The political and religious authorities of that time joined to
    suppress the movement, and since then the hostility of the Shi'a clergy
    to the Baha'i Faith has remained intense. Baha'is are considered
    apostates because of their claim to a valid religious revelation
    subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i Faith is defined
    by the Government as a political ``sect'' historically linked to the
    Pahlavi monarchy and, therefore, as counterrevolutionary. Historically
    at risk, Baha'is often have suffered increased levels of mistreatment
    during times of political unrest.
        Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links
    with coreligionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world headquarters
    is situated in what is now the state of Israel (established by the
    founder of the Baha'i Faith in the 19th century in what was then
    Ottoman-controlled Palestine) exposes Baha'is to government charges of
    ``espionage on behalf of Zionism,'' in particular when Bahai's are
    caught communicating with or remitting monetary contributions to the
    Baha'i Faith headquarters.
        Broad restrictions on Baha'is appear to be geared to destroying
    them as a community. They repeatedly have been offered relief from
    abuse in exchange for recanting their faith. Baha'i cemeteries, holy
    places, historical sites, administrative centers, and other assets were
    seized shortly after the 1979 revolution. None of these properties have
    been returned and many have been destroyed. Baha'is are not allowed to
    bury and honor their dead in keeping with their religious tradition. In
    October 1998, three Baha'is were arrested in Damavand, a city north of
    Tehran, on the grounds that they had buried their dead without
    government authorization.
        In the past, Baha'i marriages were not recognized by the
    Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges of prostitution. As a
    result, children of Baha'i marriages were not recognized as legitimate
    and, therefore, were denied inheritance rights. However, in April the
    Government announced the elimination of the requirement that citizens
    indicate religious affiliation at the time of registration of marriage.
    This may allow Bahai's to register their marriages officially, and
    thereby mitigate some of the legal obstacles that they face.
        Manuchehr Khulusi was arrested in June 1999 while visiting fellow
    Baha'is in the town of Birjand, and was imprisoned until his release in
    May. During his imprisonment, Khulusi was interrogated, beaten, held in
    solitary confinement, and denied access to his lawyer. The charges
    brought against him still are unknown, but they were believed to be
    related to his faith. The Islamic Revolutionary Court in Mashhad held a
    2-day trial in September 1999 and then sentenced him to death in
    February. Despite Khulusi's release, it is unclear if the conviction
    and death sentence against him still stand.
        Ruhollah Rowhani, a Baha'i, was executed in July 1998 after having
    served 9 months in solitary confinement on a charge of apostasy, which
    arose from his allegedly having converted a Muslim woman to the Baha'i
    Faith. The woman claimed that her mother was a Baha'i and she herself
    had been raised a Baha'i. Rowhani was not accorded a public trial, and
    no sentence was announced prior to his execution.
        Two other Baha'is, Sirus Zabihi-Moghaddam and Hadayat Kashefi-
    Najafabadi, were tried alongside Rowhani and later sentenced to death
    by a revolutionary court in Mashad for practicing their faith. The
    sentences were reduced during the year to jail terms of 7 and 5 years,
    respectively.
        Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often take
    place in private homes and offices, are curtailed severely. Public and
    private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha'i students, a
    particularly demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has
    placed a high value on education. Denial of access to higher education
    appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha'i community.
        The property rights of Baha'is generally are disregarded. Since
    1979 large numbers of private and business properties belonging to
    Baha'is have been confiscated. In 1999 three Baha'i homes in Yazd and
    one in Arbakan were confiscated because their owners were members of
    the Baha'i community. In September and October 1998, government
    officers plundered more than 500 Baha'i homes throughout the country
    and seized personal household effects, such as furniture and
    appliances. Seizure of personal property, in addition to the denial of
    access to education and employment, is eroding the economic base of the
    Baha'i community.
        In 1999 authorities in Khurasan intensified their efforts to
    intimidate and undermine Baha'i education. Two teachers in Mashhad were
    arrested and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. Their students were
    given suspended sentences, to be reinstated if the students again
    participated in religious education classes. Three more Baha'is were
    arrested in Bujnurd in northern Khurasan for participating in religious
    education gatherings. After 6 days in prison, they were released with
    suspended sentences of 5 years. The use of suspended sentences appears
    to be a new government tactic to discourage Baha'is from taking part in
    monthly religious gatherings.
        In September 1998, authorities began a nationwide operation to
    disrupt the activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning. Also
    known as the ``Open University,'' the Institute was established by the
    Baha'i community shortly after the revolution to offer opportunities in
    higher education to Baha'i students who had been denied access to the
    country's high schools and universities. The Institute employed Baha'i
    faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed from teaching
    positions by the Government as a result of their faith, and conducted
    classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is. During the
    operation, which took place in at least 14 different cities, 36 faculty
    members were arrested, and a variety of personal property, including
    books, papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or confiscated.
    Government interrogators sought to force the detained faculty members
    to sign statements acknowledging that the Open University now was
    defunct and pledging not to collaborate with it in the future. Baha'is
    outside the country report that none of the 36 detainees would sign the
    document. All but 4 of the 36 persons detained during the September
    1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute had been released by November 1998.
        In March 1999, Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi,
    Habibullah Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four
    remaining detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under
    Article 498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging
    from 3 to 10 years. In the court verdict, the four were accused of
    having establishing a ``secret organization'' engaged in ``attracting
    youth, teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the
    Islamic Republic.'' According to Baha'i groups outside Iran, the four
    taught general science and Persian literature courses. In July 1999,
    Mirzapanah, who had been sentenced to 3 years in prison, became ill and
    was hospitalized. Prison authorities allowed him to return home upon
    his recovery on the understanding that they could find him whenever
    necessary. The other three were released in December 1999.
        The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small
    number of Baha'is in arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, at
    any given time. There were at least 10 Baha'is reported to be under
    arrest for practicing their faith at year's end, 2 under sentence of
    death.
        Baha'is regularly are denied compensation for injury or criminal
    victimization. Government authorities claim that only Muslim plaintiffs
    are eligible for compensation in these circumstances. In practice,
    Baha'is continue to be denied most forms of government employment (see
    Section 5).
        In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
    government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to the directive,
    the Supreme Revolutionary Council instructed government agencies to
    block the progress and development of the Baha'i community, expel
    Baha'i students from universities, cut Baha'i links with groups outside
    Iran, restrict employment of Baha'is, and deny Baha'is ``positions of
    influence,'' including those in education. The Government claims that
    the directive is a forgery. However, it appears to be an accurate
    reflection of current government practice.
        In his 1996 report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N.
    Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance recommended
    ``that the ban on the Baha'i organization should be lifted to enable it
    to organize itself freely through its administrative institutions,
    which are vital in the absence of a clergy, so that it can engage fully
    in its religious activities.'' In response to the Special Rapporteur's
    concerns with regard to the lack of official recognition of the Baha'i
    Faith, government officials stated that Baha'is ``are not a religious
    minority, but a political organization that was associated with the
    Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution, and engage in
    espionage activities.'' The Government asserted to the Special
    Rapporteur that, as individuals, all Baha'is were entitled to their
    beliefs and protected under other articles of the Constitution as
    citizens.
        The Christian community is estimated at approximately 117,000,
    according to government figures. Of these the majority are ethnic
    Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and
    evangelical churches also are active, although non-ethnically-based
    groups report a greater degree of restrictions on their activities.
        The authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years
    in curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytizing activities by
    evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian.
    Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered
    apostasy. Government officials have reacted to this perceived activity
    by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts. Members of
    evangelical congregations are required to carry membership cards,
    photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers
    are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside
    congregation centers. Meetings for evangelical services have been
    restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have
    been ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance
    before admitting new members to their congregations.
        As conversion by a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion may be
    considered apostasy under traditional Shari'a (Islamic law) practices
    enforced in the country, non-Muslims may not proselytize Muslims
    without putting their own lives at risk. Evangelical church leaders are
    subject to pressure from authorities to sign pledges committing them
    not to evangelize Muslims or to allow Muslims to attend church
    services.
        One organization reported in 1999 the deaths of 8 evangelical
    Christians at the hands of authorities in the past 11 years, and
    between 15 and 23 disappearances between November 1997 and November
    1998.
        Oppression of evangelical Christians continued during the year.
    Christian groups reported instances of government harassment of
    churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly
    of God congregation in the capital. Cited instances of harassment
    included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by
    Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering
    church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers of
    worshipers inside. Iranian Christians International (ICI) detailed the
    cases of Alireza and Mahboobeh Mahmoudian, converts to Christianity and
    lay leaders of the Saint Simon the Zealot Osgofi Church in Shiraz, who
    were forced to leave the country permanently in June 1998 after
    continued harassment by the authorities. The ICI reported that Alireza
    Mahmoudian had lost his job because of his conversion and had been
    beaten repeatedly by Basiji and Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs on the orders
    of government officials from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. His
    wife, Mahboobeh, also had been the subject of intimidation, principally
    through frequent and aggressive interrogation by government officials.
        Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community vary from
    25,000 to 30,000. These figures represent a substantial reduction from
    the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews who resided in the country prior to
    the 1979 revolution.
        While Jews are a recognized religious minority, allegations of
    official discrimination are frequent. The Government's antiIsrael
    policies, coupled with a perception among radicalized Muslim elements
    in Iran that Jewish citizens support Zionism and the State of Israel,
    create a threatening atmosphere for the small Jewish community. Jewish
    leaders reportedly are reluctant to draw attention to official
    mistreatment of their community due to fear of government reprisal.
        Some outside Jewish groups cite an increase in anti-Semitic
    propaganda in the official and semiofficial media as adding to the
    pressure felt by the Jewish community. One example cited is the
    periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious Protocols of
    the Elders of Zion, both by the Government and by periodicals
    associated with hard-line elements of the Government. In 1986 the
    Iranian Embassy in London was reported to have published and
    distributed the Protocols in English. The Protocols also were published
    in serial form in the country in 1994 and again in January 1999. On the
    latter occasion they were published in Sobh, a conservative monthly
    publication reportedly aligned with the security services.
        There appears to be little restriction or interference with
    religious practice or education; however, Jews were eased out of most
    government positions after 1979. Jews are permitted to obtain passports
    and to travel outside the country; however, with the exception of
    certain business travelers, they are required by the authorities to
    obtain government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip
    abroad. The Government appears concerned about the emigration of Jews
    and permission generally is not granted for all members of a Jewish
    family to travel outside the country at the same time (see Section
    2.d.).
        In February and March 1999, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of
    Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis,
    teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on alleged
    acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by death.
    The 13 were jailed for over 1 year, largely in solitary confinement,
    without official charges or access to lawyers. In April the defendants
    were appointed lawyers, and a closed trial commenced in a revolutionary
    court in Shiraz. Human rights groups and governments around the world
    criticized the lack of due process in the proceedings. The Special
    Representative characterized them as ``in no way fair.'' On July 1, 10
    of the 13, along with 2 Muslim defendants, were convicted on charges of
    illegal contact with Israel, conspiracy to form an illegal
    organization, and recruiting agents. They received prison sentences
    ranging from 4 to 13 years. Three were acquitted. Their lawyers filed
    an appeal and on September 21 an appeals court overturned the
    convictions for forming an illegal organization and recruiting agents,
    but upheld the convictions for illegal contacts with Israel. Their
    sentences were reduced to between 2 and 9 years' imprisonment.
        Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the March 1999 arrest of the
    13 Jewish individuals coincided with an increase in antiSemitic
    propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hardline elements
    of the Government. Since the beginning of the trial, Jewish businesses
    in Tehran and Shiraz have been targets of vandalism and boycotts, and
    Jews reportedly suffered personal harassment and intimidation.
        Human Rights Watch reported the death in May 1998 of Jewish
    businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, who was hanged in prison without a
    public charge or legal proceeding. Reports indicate that Kakhodah-Zadeh
    may have been killed for assisting Jews to emigrate. As an accountant,
    Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided powerof-attorney services for Jews departing
    the country.
        The Government restricts the movement of several senior religious
    leaders, some of whom have been under house arrest for years (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.d.), and often charges members of religious
    minorities with crimes such as drug offenses, ``confronting the
    regime,'' and apostasy (see Section 1.e.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some restrictions
    on these rights. Citizens may travel to any part of the country,
    although there have been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during
    times of occasional heavy fighting. Roadblocks and security checks are
    common on routes between major cities. Citizens may change their place
    of residence without obtaining official permission. The Government
    requires exit permits (a validation stamp placed in the traveler's
    passport) for draft-age males and citizens who are politically suspect.
    Some citizens, particularly those whose skills are in short supply and
    who were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit
    permits. The Government restricts the movement of certain religious
    minorities and of several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.c.).
        Citizens returning from abroad sometimes are subject to search and
    extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of
    antigovernment activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed material,
    personal correspondence, and photographs are subject to confiscation.
        The Government permits Jews to travel abroad, but often denies them
    the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other citizens. The
    Government normally does not permit all members of a Jewish family to
    travel abroad at the same time. Baha'is often experience difficulty in
    obtaining passports. Women must obtain the permission of their husband,
    father, or other living male relative in order to obtain a passport.
    Married women must receive written permission from their husbands
    before embarking on a trip outside the country.
        The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates
    with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Although the
    Government generally provides first asylum, the Government increased
    pressure on some refugees to return to their home countries,
    particularly as the economy has worsened.
        The country hosts a large refugee population, mostly Afghans who
    fled during the Soviet occupation. The Government and the UNHCR
    estimate that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees in
    the country. Most subsist on itinerant labor, often moving from place
    to place within the country. Between April and December, the government
    and the UNHCR operated a joint program intended to facilitate the
    repatriation of Afghans who did not have a well-founded fear of
    persecution. Approximately 133,000 Afghans returned voluntarily with
    UNHCR assistance, and another 50,000 returned with help from the
    Government. There were reports in late 1998 and early 1999 of a surge
    in the numbers of Afghans forcibly repatriated to their country by
    government officials and military personnel. Reasons cited were a
    worsening economic situation and anger over the murders in August 1998
    of nine Iranian diplomats and journalists stationed at the Iranian
    Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. There also were reports
    during this period of civilian mob attacks against groups of Afghan
    refugees, which resulted in numerous deaths.
        The UNHCR estimates that there were about 386,000 Iraqi Kurdish and
    Arab refugees in the country at year's end. Many of these Iraqi
    refugees originally were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-
    Iraq war because of their suspected Iranian origin. In numerous
    instances, both the Iraqi and Iranian Governments dispute their
    citizenship, rendering many of them, in effect, stateless. Other Iraqi
    refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
        Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of
    other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans,
    Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information
    about them or allowed the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The right of citizens to change their government is restricted. The
    Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is selected for a life
    term by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader may also be removed
    by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly itself is restricted to
    clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a
    list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and
    religion, and clerics dominate the Government. The Government represses
    any attempts to separate state and religion, or to alter the State's
    existing theocratic foundation. The selection of candidates for
    elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
        The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of
    six Islamic clergymen and six lay members who review all laws for
    consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also
    screens political candidates for ideological, political, and religious
    suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state;
    clerics who disagree with government policies also have been
    disqualified.
        Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members
    of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former
    Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by
    the Majles for ``liberalism'' and ``negligence,'' was elected President
    in May 1997. The Interior Ministry estimated that over 90 percent of
    the eligible population voted in that election. During the campaign,
    there was considerable government intervention and censorship. For
    example, the Council of Guardians reviewed 238 candidates, including a
    woman, but allowed only 4 individuals to run. Three were clerics; all
    were men. Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote, with his greatest
    support coming from the middle class, youth, minorities, and women. The
    election results were not disputed, and the Government did not appear
    to have engaged in fraud.
        Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly
    of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates,
    which led to criticism from many observers that the Government
    improperly predetermined the election results.
        In February 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held
    for the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures
    indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council
    seats across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous
    districts. The Councils do not appear to have been granted the autonomy
    or authority that would make them effective or meaningful local
    institutions; doing so could be viewed as a threat to the control of
    the central Government.
        Iran held elections for its 290 seat Majles in February. Of over
    6,000 candidates, 576 were disqualified before the elections by the
    Council of Guardians, which represented a substantial decrease from the
    44 percent who were disqualified before the 1996 elections. Most of
    those disqualified were outspoken advocates of political reform,
    including some of the most prominent supporters of President Khatami.
    In addition, an Azeri activist was arrested in December 1999,
    reportedly to prevent him from registering to run in the elections (see
    Sections 1.d. and 5). However, candidates with a wide range of views
    were permitted to run. The elections resulted in a landslide victory
    for moderate and reform candidates, who now constitute a large majority
    in the Majles. Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various
    issues. However, the Supreme Leader and other conservatives within the
    Government used constitutional provisions to block much of the early
    reform legislation passed by the Majles.
        Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 9 of 290 Majles
    seats. There are no female cabinet members. In 1997 President Khatami
    appointed the first female vice president (for environmental
    protection) since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh Ebtekar,
    following his inauguration. Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance
    Ataollah Mohajerani appointed a second woman to a senior post, Azam
    Nouri, when he chose her in 1997 as his Deputy Minister for Legal and
    Parliamentary Affairs. President Khatami appointed a woman to serve as
    Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
        Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially
    reserved Majles seats. However, the UN Special Representative noted in
    his September report frequent assertions that religious minorities are,
    by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative body
    (except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities), and from
    holding senior government or military positions. Religious minorities
    are allowed to vote, but they may not run for president.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights
    groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has
    stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a
    country's ``culture and beliefs.''
        Various professional groups representing writers, journalists,
    photographers, and others attempt to monitor government restrictions in
    their field and harassment and intimidation against individual members
    of their professions. However, their ability to meet, organize, and
    effect change is curtailed severely by the Government.
        International human rights NGO's such as Human Rights Watch and
    Amnesty International are not permitted to establish offices in or
    conduct regular investigative visits to the country. Human Rights Watch
    and members of a European judicial monitoring NGO were permitted to
    send representatives to Shiraz for the trial of 13 Iranian Jews on
    espionage charges (see Section 2.c.). However, they were not permitted
    to monitor the trial proceedings.
        The ICRC and the UNHCR both operate in the country. However, the
    Government did not allow the U.N. Special Representative for Human
    Rights in Iran to visit the country during the year. The Special
    Representative last was allowed entry into the country to gather
    information for his yearly report in 1996. However, the Special
    Representative corresponded with government officials during the year,
    and received several replies to his correspondence.
        The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995
    under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board
    as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights
    committee in the Majles. Most observers believe that these bodies lack
    independence. The U.N. Special Representative published statistics
    provided by the IHRC indicating that in the period from March 1998 to
    March 1999, 1,051 files were opened on the basis of complaints received
    by the organization. Of those the highest number of complaints were
    related to the judiciary. Of a total of about 3,000 currently active
    files, approximately 1,000 were related to women and women's issues.
        In April 1999, Mohammad Zia'i Far, secretary of the IHRC, stated in
    a press interview that illegal detention centers continue to exist in
    Iran. The press also reported that the IHRC sought permission from the
    Special Court for the Clergy to visit imprisoned cleric Mohsen Kadivar
    in Evin Prison in March 1999 (see Section 1.e.). The request reportedly
    was never answered. Kadivar was released during the summer. In 1998
    Ziaei-Far reportedly complained about the use by police of ``special
    detention centers'' to conduct coercive interrogations of detainees
    (see Section 1.c.) and acknowledged widespread human rights violations.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        In general the Government does not discriminate on the basis of
    race, disability, language, or social status. The Government does
    discriminate on the basis of religion and sex.
        Women.--Although reported cases of spousal abuse and violence
    against women occur, the statistics on such reports are not available
    publicly. Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom
    is discussed publicly. In May 1999, the President's Advisor on Women's
    Affairs was quoted in the press as stating that ``one cannot claim that
    violence against women does not take place in Iran.'' The Special
    Representative noted in his September report that media reporting on
    the situation of women has diminished, in part due to the closure of
    the reformoriented press (see Section 2.a.).
        Women have access to primary and advanced education; however,
    social and legal constraints limit their professional opportunities. In
    September the Majles approved a controversial bill to allow single
    women to travel abroad for graduate education. The legislation was
    under consideration by the Council of Guardians at year's end. Women
    are represented in many fields of the work force, and the Government
    has not prevented women from entering many traditionally male-dominated
    fields, including medicine, dentistry, journalism and agriculture.
    However, many women choose not to work outside the home. A 1985 law
    enacted by the Government instituted 3 months of paid maternity leave,
    and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing mothers to feed their
    babies. Pension benefits for women were established under the same law,
    which also decreed that companies hiring women should provide day-care
    facilities for young children of female employees.
        The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and
    prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to
    them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter
    public buildings, universities, and airports through separate
    entrances. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting events,
    although this restriction does not appear to be enforced universally.
    While the enforcement of a conservative Islamic dress codes has varied
    with the political climate since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in
    1989, what women wear in public is not entirely a matter of personal
    choice. Women are subject to harassment by the authorities if their
    dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and may be sentenced to
    flogging or imprisonment for such violations. The law prohibits the
    publication of pictures of uncovered women in the print media,
    including pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to
    observe Islamic dress codes at work (see Section 6.a.).
        Discrimination against women is reinforced by law through
    provisions of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those
    sections dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979
    revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a
    hallmark bill that was adopted in 1967, which gave women increased
    rights in the home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system
    based largely on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles passed
    legislation that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of
    medical care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by female
    physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about the
    quality of care that women could receive under such a regime,
    considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and
    licensed male and female physicians and specialists.
        In October the Parliament passed a bill to raise the legal age of
    marriage for women from 9 to 15. However, the Council of Guardians in
    November rejected the bill as contrary to Islamic law, although even
    under the current law, marriage at the minimum age is rare. All women,
    no matter the age, must have the permission of their father or a living
    male relative in order to marry. The law allows for the practice of
    Siqeh, or temporary marriage, a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl
    may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male after a simple
    and brief religious ceremony. The Siqeh marriage can last for a night
    or as little as 30 minutes. The bond is not recorded on identification
    documents, and, according to Islamic law, men may have as many Siqeh
    wives as they wish. Such wives are not granted rights associated with
    traditional marriage.
        The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of
    women and men convicted of adultery (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Under
    legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and
    regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on
    which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not required to
    cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Government issued a
    12-point ``contract'' to serve as a model for marriage and divorce,
    which limits the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional
    interpretations of Islamic law. The model contract also recognized a
    divorced woman's right to a share in the property that couples acquire
    during their marriage and to increased alimony rights. Women who
    remarry are forced to give up to the child's father custody of children
    from earlier marriages. In 1998 the Majles passed a law that granted
    custody of minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in
    which the father is proven unfit to care for the child (the measure was
    enacted because of the complaints of mothers who had lost custody of
    their children to former husbands with drug addictions and criminal
    records). Muslim women may not marry non-Muslim men. The testimony of a
    woman is worth only half that of a man in court (see Section 1.e.). A
    married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband before
    traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
        Children.--Most children have access to education through the 12th
    grade (it is compulsory to age 11), and to some form of health care.
    There is no known pattern of child abuse.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no available information
    regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated
    accessibility for the disabled. However, the Cable News Network
    reported in 1996 on the harsh conditions in an institution for retarded
    children who had been abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed
    children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and
    without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this
    represents the typical treatment of the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Members of all religious minorities suffer
    varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly
    in the areas of employment, education, and housing. Applicants for
    publicsector employment are screened for their adherence to Islam. The
    law stipulates penalties for government workers who do not observe
    ``Islam's principles and rules.'' Article 144 of the Constitution
    states that ``the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be an
    Islamic army,'' which is ``committed to an Islamic ideology,'' and must
    ``recruit into its service individuals who have faith in the objectives
    of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to the cause of achieving its
    goals.'' Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to another religion, is
    punishable by death.
        The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities suffer
    varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly
    in the areas of employment, education, and public accommodations (see
    Section 2.d.). For example, members of religious minorities generally
    are barred from becoming school principals. Muslims who convert to
    Christianity also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion from
    Islam to another religion, may be punishable by death.
        University applicants are required to pass an examination in
    Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction
    in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious
    minorities to higher education.
        Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
    receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits and incurring
    heavier punishments than Muslims.
        Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the arrest of 13 Jewish
    individuals in February and March 1999, as well as their subsequent
    trial during the year, coincided with an increase in anti-Semitic
    propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hard-line
    elements of the Government (see Section 2.c.). They also note that the
    Shirazi Jewish community, one of the oldest remaining Jewish
    communities outside Israel, had been under close surveillance by
    government authorities prior to the arrests and had been warned by the
    authorities against certain activities, such as the publication in
    Persian of scriptures and guidelines for the treatment of kosher foods.
        In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
    government policy directive to block the progress of Baha'is (see
    Section 2.c.).
        Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as
    places of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in
    the years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled.
    Baha'is are prevented from enrolling in universities. However, other
    Government restrictions have eased; Baha'is currently may obtain ration
    booklets and send their children to public elementary and secondary
    schools. Thousands of Baha'is who were dismissed from government jobs
    in the early 1980's receive no unemployment benefits and have been
    required to repay the Government for salaries or pensions received from
    the first day of employment. Those unable to do so face prison
    sentences (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds seek greater autonomy
    from the central Government and continue to suffer from government
    discrimination. The Kurds' status as Sunni Muslims is an aggravating
    factor in their relations with the Shi'a-dominated government. These
    tensions predate the revolution. Kurds often are suspected by
    government authorities of harboring separatist or foreign sympathies.
    These suspicions have led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting between
    government forces and Kurdish groups. Human Rights Watch reported in
    September 1997 that in the wake of the Gulf War and the creation of an
    autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, Iranian authorities increased
    their military presence in Kurdish areas of Iran, which often led to
    human rights abuses against Kurds. Abuses included destruction of
    villages, forced migrations, and widespread mining of Kurdish property.
    In 1994 government agents killed Dr. Abdul Rahman Gassemlou, a
    representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in Vienna.
        In the wake of the February 1999 arrest of Kurdish Workers Party
    leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, Iranian Kurds demonstrated in
    numerous cities in Iranian Kurdistan. In several instances, security
    forces suppressed the demonstrations by force. Human rights groups
    reported at least 20 deaths and several hundred arrests during the
    violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
        Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but
    complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government
    traditionally has viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly
    since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an
    independent Azerbaijan. Mohammed Chehrangi, an advocate for the
    cultural rights of Azeris, was arrested in December 1999. Azeri groups
    maintain that the arrest was made to prevent his registration as a
    candidate for the February parliamentary elections (see Sections 1.d.
    and 3).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code grants workers the
    right to establish unions; however, the Government does not allow
    independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the
    Worker's House, founded in 1982, is the sole authorized national labor
    organization. It serves primarily as a conduit for the Government to
    exert control over workers. The leadership of the Worker's House
    coordinates activities with Islamic labor councils, which are made up
    of representatives of the workers and one representative of management
    in industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35
    employees. These councils also function as instruments of government
    control, although they frequently have been able to block layoffs and
    dismissals.
        In 1991 the Government published a new Labor Code that allowed
    employers and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issue
    vocational licenses and help members find jobs.
        The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds
    with its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the Parliament passed a
    law that prohibits strikes by government workers. It also prohibits
    government workers from having contacts with foreigners and stipulates
    penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes and principles at
    work. Nevertheless, strikes occur, and apparently in increasing numbers
    as the economy has worsened. A European-based labor organization that
    follows Iranian labor issues reported 181 protests and strikes by
    workers in the period from March 1998 to March 1999. These reportedly
    included strikes and protests by oil, textile, electrical
    manufacturing, and metal workers, and by the unemployed.
        Newspapers in 1999 reported an ``unauthorized rally'' by thousands
    of workers over the Government's labor policies and the poor economy.
    Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly are
    common.
        There are no known affiliations with international labor
    organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not
    have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective
    bargaining agreements. No information is available on mechanisms used
    to set wages. It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in
    the export processing zones differ from the law and practice in the
    rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Penal Code
    provides that the Government may require any person who does not have
    work to take suitable employment; however, this does not appear to be
    enforced regularly. This provision has been criticized frequently by
    the International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO
    Convention 29 on forced labor. There is no information available on the
    Government's policy on forced and bonded labor by children.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors under 15
    years of age and places special restrictions on the employment of
    minors under age 18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law
    permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some
    small businesses. By law women and minors may not be employed in hard
    labor or, in general, night work. Information on the extent to which
    these regulations are enforced is not available. There is no
    information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded
    labor by children (see Section 6.c.). A 1985 law provides for 3 months
    of paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing
    mothers to feed their babies.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the
    Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each
    industrial sector and region. It is not known if the minimum wages are
    adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the
    minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a
    family and should take inflation into account. Under current poor
    economic conditions, many middle-class citizens must work two or even
    three jobs to support their families. The daily minimum wage was raised
    in March 1997 to $2.80 (8,500 rials). This wage apparently is not
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. Information on the percentage of the working population covered
    by minimum wage legislation is not available.
        The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum,
    with 1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid
    annual leave and several paid public holidays.
        According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by
    the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting
    workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly has issued 28
    safety directives, and oversees the activities of 3,000 safety
    committees established in enterprises employing more than 10 persons.
    Labor organizations outside the country allege that hazardous work
    environments are common in Iran, and result in thousands of worker
    deaths per year. It is not known how well the Ministry's inspectors
    enforce regulations. It is not known whether workers may remove
    themselves from hazardous situations without risking the loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                      IRAQ

        Political power in Iraq\1\ lies exclusively in a repressive
    oneparty apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein and members of his
    extended family. The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that
    the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary
    Command Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative
    authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also Prime Minister,
    Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional Command of
    the Ba'th Party, wields decisive power. Saddam Hussein and his regime
    continued to refer to an October 1995 nondemocratic ``referendum'' on
    his presidency, in which he received 99.96 percent of the vote. This
    ``referendum'' included neither secret ballots nor opposing candidates,
    and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible
    reprisal for a dissenting vote. Ethnically and linguistically the Iraqi
    population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians, Yazidis, and
    Armenians. The religious mix is likewise varied and consists of Shi'a
    and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including
    Chaldeans and Assyrians), Jews (most of whom have emigrated), and a
    small number of Mandaeans. Civil uprisings have occurred in recent
    years, especially in the north and the south. The Government has
    reacted with extreme repression against those who oppose or even
    question it. The judiciary is not independent, and the President may
    override any court decision.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
    Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government
    sources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to
    the President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The security
    forces play a central role in maintaining the environment of
    intimidation and fear on which government power rests. Security forces
    committed widespread, serious, and systematic human rights abuses.
        The Government owns all major industries and controls most of the
    highly centralized economy, which is based largely on oil production.
    The economy was damaged by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, and Iraq has
    been under U.N. sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Sanctions
    ban all exports, except oil sales, under U.N. Security Council
    Resolution 986 and subsequent resolutions (the ``oil-for-food''
    program). Under the program, Iraq also is permitted, under U.N.
    control, to import food, medicine, supplies for water, sanitation,
    electricity, agricultural, and educational projects, and spare parts
    for the oil sector.
        The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor.
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
    Government continued to execute summarily perceived political opponents
    and leaders in the Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that
    persons were executed merely because of their association with an
    opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison
    populations. The Government continued to be responsible for
    disappearances and to kill and torture persons suspected of--or related
    to persons suspected of--economic crimes, military desertion, and a
    variety of other activities. Security forces routinely tortured, beat,
    raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison conditions are extremely
    poor. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention,
    prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and continued to deny
    citizens the basic right to due process. The judiciary is not
    independent. The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy
    rights.
        The Government restricts severely freedom of speech, press,
    assembly, association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Commission on
    Human Rights and the U.N. General Assembly passed resolutions in April
    and November respectively criticizing the Government's suppression of
    these freedoms. Human rights abuses remain difficult to document
    because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts, including its
    prohibition on the establishment of independent human rights
    organizations, its persistent refusal to grant visits to human rights
    monitors, and its continued restrictions designed to prevent dissent.
    Denied entry to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur bases his reports on the
    Government's human rights abuses on interviews with recent emigres from
    Iraq, interviews with opposition groups and others that have contacts
    inside Iraq, and on published reports. Violence and discrimination
    against women occur. The Government has enacted laws affording a
    variety of protections to women; however, it is difficult to determine
    the practical effects of such protections. The Government neglects the
    health and nutritional needs of children, and discriminates against
    religious minorities and ethnic groups. The Government restricts
    severely trade union rights. Child labor persists, and there were
    instances of forced labor.
        The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
    Kurdistan (PUK) have controlled most areas in the three northern
    provinces of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniah since the Government
    withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from
    the area after the 1991 Kurdish uprising. The KDP and the PUK fought
    one another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to
    unify their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July
    1999. The ceasefire has held; however, reunification measures have not
    been implemented. The KDP, PUK, and opposition groups committed human
    rights abuses. The PUK held municipal elections in February, the first
    elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992. Foreign and
    local election observers reported that the elections generally were
    fair.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government
    committed numerous political and other extrajudicial killings. The
    Government has a long record of executing perceived opponents. The U.N.
    Special Rapporteur, the international media, and other groups all have
    reported a heightened number of summary executions in Iraq since 1997,
    assertions that are supported in detail by several sources in Iraq. The
    Special Rapporteur has stated that ``the country is run through
    extrajudicial measures.'' The list of offenses requiring a mandatory
    death penalty has grown substantially in recent years and now includes
    anything that could be characterized as ``sabotaging the national
    economy,'' including forgery, as well as smuggling cars, spare parts,
    material, heavy equipment, and machinery. The Special Rapporteur also
    noted that membership in certain political parties is punishable by
    death, that there is a pervasive fear of death for any act or
    expression of dissent, and that there are recurrent reports of the use
    of the death penalty for such offenses as ``insulting'' the President
    or the Ba'th Party. ``The mere suggestion that someone is not a
    supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death penalty,''
    the Special Rapporteur stated. Government killings occurred with total
    impunity and without due process.
        The regime periodically executed large numbers of political
    detainees en masse. During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued
    to receive reports referring to a ``prison cleansing'' execution
    campaign taking place in Abu Ghurayb, Radwaniyah, and other prisons.
    Opposition groups, including the Supreme Council for the Islamic
    Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the Iraqi
    National Congress (INC), and others with a network inside the country
    provided detailed accounts of summary executions, including the names
    of hundreds of persons killed.
        On three occasions in January and February, prison officials
    reportedly executed 91 prisoners at Abu Ghurayb; some of the prisoners
    were accused of theft, some were accused of trafficking in drugs, and
    some reportedly were affiliated with a political opposition group.
    According to opposition groups, prison officials reportedly executed 58
    prisoners who were held in solitary confinement at Abu Ghurayb; 14 were
    charged with political crimes and 44 were charged with common crimes.
    According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and
    the Center for Human Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the
    Government executed nearly 200 prisoners at Abu Ghurayb prison between
    October and December 1999. The prisoners were detained originally for
    their opposition activities against the Government.
        The Government's motive for such high numbers of summary
    executions--estimated at over 3,000 since 1997--may be linked to
    reported intimidation of the population and reduction of prison
    populations. As in previous years, there were numerous credible reports
    that the regime continued to execute persons thought to be involved in
    plotting against Saddam Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions
    included high-ranking civilian, military, and tribal leaders. For
    example, according to various opposition groups, government officials
    reportedly executed Republican Guard Brigadier General Abd al-Karim al-
    Dulaymi and between 25 and 38 other Republican Guard officers on
    suspicion of disloyalty during the year. According to Human Rights
    Watch, the Government executed four Special Security Forces officers,
    including staff Colonel Kadhim Jawad Ali and Ali Muhammad Salman. On
    December 28, 1999, the Government executed Captain Husayn Hashim Muhsin
    on suspicion of disclosing military information. On December 29, 1999,
    the Government executed by firing squad five members of the Republican
    Guard allegedly for participating in antigovernment activities.
        Government agents targeted for killing family members of defectors.
    For example, government agents reportedly killed Safiyah Hassan who
    allegedly criticized publicly the Government for killing her husband
    and two sons, Hussein and Saddam Kamal. Her husband and sons had been
    senior government officials; however, the brothers defected to Jordan
    in 1996. The Government offered the men immunity if they returned to
    the country; however, upon their return government agents killed them
    and their father.
        On June 3, the Government reportedly killed Jordanian citizen Dawud
    Sulayman al-Dalu and did not disclose information about the charges
    against him. According to the Iraqi National Party, government
    officials killed seven employees of the Central Computer Department in
    Baghdad because they allegedly purchased computer equipment from the
    UAE; the Government reportedly believed that the equipment would be
    used to send information abroad.
        In October security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women
    suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or
    covering up such activities (see Section 5). Security agents reportedly
    decapitated numerous women and men in front of their family members.
    According to Amnesty International (AI), the victim's heads were
    displayed in front of their homes for several days. Thirty of the
    victims' names reportedly were published, including three doctors and
    one medical assistant.
        During the year, a former officer from the Mukhabarat reported that
    he participated in a 1998 mass murder at Abu Ghurayb prison following a
    Revolutionary Command Council directive to ``clean out'' the country's
    prisons.
        In 1998 and 1999, the Government killed a number of leading Shi'a
    clerics, prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999 to express his
    concern to the Government that the killings might be part of a
    systematic attack by government officials on the independent leadership
    of the Shi'a Muslim community. The Government had not responded to the
    Special Rapporteur's letter by year's end.
        Observers attributed the August 1999 death of Iraq's chief
    architect Husam Bahnam Khuduri to poisoning. Although not widely used
    in recent years, the use of slow-acting poisons such as thallium (a
    radioactive substance that can be dissolved in drinking water) was a
    preferred method of political killings in the late 1980's and early
    1990's. Khuduri reportedly had extensive knowledge about the
    construction of Saddam Hussein's palaces, tunnels, and bunkers. While
    the official obituary did not state a cause of death, acquaintances
    reported that Khuduri showed signs of being under the effect of a slow-
    acting poison several days before he died. Several weeks before Khuduri
    died, he was interviewed for a satirical documentary about the regime
    by French filmmaker Joel Solar; according to Solar, Khuduri appeared
    healthy during the interviews.
        Reports of deaths due to poor prison conditions continued (see
    Section 1.c.). Many persons who were displaced forcibly still live in
    tent camps under harsh conditions, which also results in many deaths
    (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
        The Government reportedly does not investigate political or
    extrajudicial killings, and no investigations were made into the
    hundreds of killings committed by security forces in 1999, or in
    killings from previous years.
        As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread
    killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the ``Anfal''
    Campaign of 1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Both the Special
    Rapporteur and HRW have concluded that the Government's policies
    against the Kurds raise issues of crimes against humanity and
    violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
        Political killings and terrorist actions continued in the
    Kurdcontrolled north of the country. For example, unknown persons
    killed the leader of the Democratic Nationalist Union of Kurdistan,
    Sirbit Mahmud. In July unknown assailants killed parliamentary deputy
    Osman Hassan. In July PUK forces killed 4 members of the Iraqi
    Communist Workers Party and KDP forces killed several members of the
    Turkoman Front.
        In June 1999, the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA)
    reported that the partially decomposed body of Helena Aloun Sawa, an
    Assyrian woman who had been missing for a month, was discovered. AINA
    concluded that the murder ``resembles a well-established pattern'' of
    complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks against Assyrian
    Christians in the north. However, the KDP reported that there did not
    appear to be a ``political or racial'' motive. In June 1999, the KDP
    appointed a commission to further investigate the killing. No results
    of the investigation were reported by year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--The Special Rapporteur continued to receive
    reports of widespread disappearances. The whereabouts of journalist and
    Baghdad professor, Hashem Hasan, who was arrested as he attempted to
    leave the country in September 1999, remained unknown at year's end
    (see Section 2.c.). The status of six members of the Assyrian community
    of Baghdad, arrested in October 1996, is unknown. Hundreds still are
    missing in the aftermath of the brief Iraqi military occupation of
    Erbil in August 1996. Many of these persons may have been killed
    surreptitiously late in 1997 and throughout 1998, in the reported
    ``prison-cleansing'' campaign (see Section 1.a.). Thirty-three members
    of the Yazidi community of Mosul, who were arrested in July 1996, still
    are unaccounted for. Sources inside the country reported the existence
    of special prison wards that hold individuals whose whereabouts,
    status, and fate is not disclosed (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government continued to ignore the more than 16,000 cases
    conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the United Nations, as well as
    requests from the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the
    whereabouts of those missing from Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait,
    and from Iran on the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured
    in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The majority of the 16,496 cases known to
    the Special Rapporteur are persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared
    during the 1988 Anfal Campaign. The Special Rapporteur estimated that
    the total number of Kurds who disappeared during that period could
    reach several tens of thousands. HRW estimates the total at between
    70,000 and 150,000, and AI at more than 100,000. The second largest
    group of cases known to the Special Rapporteur consists of Shi'a
    Muslims who were reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and
    early 1980's as their families were expelled to Iran due to their
    alleged Persian ancestry.
        In 1997 and 1999, AI documented the repeated failure by the
    Government to respond to requests for information about persons who
    have disappeared. The report detailed unresolved cases dating from the
    early 1980's through the mid-1990's, particularly the disappearances of
    Aziz Al-Sayyid Jassem, Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad Ridha Al-Qazwini,
    Mazin Abd Al-Munim AlSamarra'i, the six Al-Hashimi brothers, the four
    Al-Sheibani brothers, and numerous persons of Iranian descent or of the
    Shi'a branch of Islam. The report concludes that few of these victims
    became targets of the regime for any crime; rather, they were arrested
    and held as hostages in order to force a relative, who may have escaped
    abroad, to surrender. Others were arrested due to their family's link
    to a political opponent or simply because of their ethnic origin (see
    Section 1.d.).
        The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to
    request that the Government provide information about the 1991 arrest
    of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei and 108 of his
    associates. The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf.
    Other individuals who were arrested with him have not been accounted
    for, and the Government refuses to respond to queries regarding their
    status. Similarly AI identified a number of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr's
    aides who were arrested in the weeks prior to his killing in February
    1999 (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Their whereabouts remain
    unknown. In its November 1999 report, AI identified eight aides of Al-
    Sadr who disappeared.
        The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number of
    Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained
    during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Government officials, including
    military leaders known to have been among the last to see the persons
    who disappeared during the occupation, have refused to respond to the
    hundreds of outstanding inquiries about the missing. Of 609 cases of
    missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the Tripartite Commission on
    Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved. The Government denies
    having any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records
    were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In a December report to the
    U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Secretary General criticized the
    Government's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations on the issue
    of the missing Kuwaiti citizens. Iran reports that 5,000 Iranian
    prisoners from the IranIraq War are unaccounted for by Iraq.
        In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances,
    human rights groups reported during the year that the Government
    continued to hold thousands of other Iraqis in incommunicado detention
    (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security
    services routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to
    former prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks
    administered to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of
    fingernails, burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from
    rotating ceiling fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of
    limbs, denial of food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark
    and extremely small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm
    family members and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was
    apparent when security forces returned the mutilated bodies of torture
    victims to their families. There are persistent reports that the
    families are made to pay for the cost of executions. Iraqi refugees who
    arrive in Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving
    governments, and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their
    claims. AI noted that Iraqi authorities have failed to investigate
    these reports.
        During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued to receive
    reports that arrested persons routinely are subjected to mistreatment,
    including prolonged interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings,
    and various deprivations. For some years, the Special Rapporteur has
    expressed concern about cruel and unusual punishments prescribed by the
    law, including amputations and brandings. During the year, authorities
    reportedly introduced tongue amputation as a punishment for persons who
    criticize Saddam Hussein or his family. In September government
    authorities reportedly amputated the tongue of a person who allegedly
    criticized Saddam Hussein. Following the amputation, authorities
    reportedly drove him around in an open truck and broadcast his alleged
    crime and punishment.
        Human rights organizations, and opposition groups continued to
    receive reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma
    after being raped while in custody. Security forces also reportedly
    assault sexually both regime officials and opposition members in order
    to blackmail them into compliance. Former Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-
    Janabi reported that a Mukhabarat unit, the Technical Operations
    Directorate, uses rape and sexual assault in a systematic and
    institutionalized manner for political purposes. The unit reportedly
    also videotaped the rape of female relatives of suspected
    oppositionists and used the videotapes for blackmail purposes and to
    ensure their future cooperation (see Section 1.f.).
        The security forces allegedly raped women who were captured during
    the Anfal Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait. The Government
    never has acknowledged these reports, conducted any investigation, nor
    taken action against those who committed the rapes.
        There were reports that Uday Hussein ordered security forces to
    torture members of the country's national soccer team during the year.
    For example, three soccer players who lost an October game in the Asian
    Cup quarter finals reportedly were whipped and detained for three days.
    A former Iraqi international soccer player stated in August 1999 that
    he and his teammates were tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not
    winning matches. These claims lend credence to previous similar
    reports.
        KDP forces reportedly entered Assyrian villages on different
    occasions and beat villagers (see Section 2.d.). Assyrian groups
    reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims against
    Christians in the north in recent years (see Section 5).
        Prison conditions are extremely poor. There reportedly are numerous
    official, semiofficial, and private prisons throughout the country.
    Overcrowding is a serious problem. In May 1998, Labor and Social
    Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah stated in an interview that
    ``the prisons are filled to five times their capacity and the situation
    is serious.'' Sabah was dismissed from his post after the interview,
    and the government-owned daily newspaper Babel reiterated the
    Government's longstanding claim that it holds virtually no prisoners.
    It is unclear to what extent the mass executions committed pursuant to
    the ``prison cleansing'' campaign have reduced overcrowding (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Certain prisons are infamous for routine mistreatment of prisoners.
    Abu Ghurayb, Baladiat, Makasib, Rashidiya, Radwaniyah, and other
    prisons reportedly have torture chambers. There are numerous mentally
    ill prisoners at Al-Shamma'iya prison in Baghdad, which reportedly is
    the site of torture and a number of disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah
    detention center is a former prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and
    reportedly the site of torture as well as mass executions (see Section
    1.a.). This prison was the principal detention center for persons
    arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991.
        During the year, the Special Rapporteur reported receiving
    information about two detention facilities in which prisoners are
    locked in metal boxes the size of coffins that reportedly are opened
    for only 30 minutes each day. There also were reports that in Sijn al-
    Tarbout prison and Quortiyya prison, prisoners are fed only liquids. A
    multistory underground detention and torture center reportedly was
    built under the general military hospital building close to the Al-
    Rashid military camp on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Center for Human
    Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party stated that the complex includes
    torture and execution chambers. A section reportedly is reserved for
    prisoners in a ``frozen'' state--that is, those whose status, fate, or
    whereabouts are not disclosed.
        Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian
    origin, who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the IranIraq
    war, reportedly are being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison.
    According to a report received by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, such
    persons have been detained without charge for close to 2 decades in
    extremely harsh conditions. The report states that many of the
    detainees were used as subjects in the country's outlawed experimental
    chemical and biological weapons programs.
        Reports of deaths due to poor conditions in prisons and detention
    facilities also continued during the year. The Iraqi Communist Party
    reported that 13 prisoners died at Makaseb detention center in December
    1999 and January as a result of torture and poor prison conditions. The
    13 prisoners reportedly were among the Shi'a detained in the aftermath
    of the protests following the February 1999 assassination of Sheik Al-
    Sadr (see Section 1.g.). In August the ICP reported that three
    political prisoners died from illnesses contracted in Abu Ghurayb
    prison. The prisoners reportedly were denied medical treatment.
        The Government does not permit visits by human rights monitors.
        Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported that prisons in the three
    northern provinces were open to the International Committee for the Red
    Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. According to the ICRC,
    regular and consistent improvement in conditions were observed on their
    weekly prison visits to declared prisons. However, both the PUK and the
    KDP reportedly maintain private, undeclared prisons, and both groups
    reportedly deny access to ICRC officials.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
    Legal Code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
    the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The Special
    Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary arrest
    and detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a
    lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November 1999, AI report
    entitled, ``Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression,'' many thousands of
    persons have been arrested arbitrarily in recent years because of
    suspected opposition activities or because they are related to persons
    sought by the authorities. Those arrested often are taken away by
    plainclothes security agents who offer no explanation and produce no
    warrant to the person or family members (see Section 1.f.). The
    authorities deny detainees legal representation and visits by family
    members. In most cases, family members do not know the whereabouts of
    detainees and do not make inquiries due to fear of reprisal. Many
    persons are taken away in front of family members who hear nothing
    further until days, months, or years later, when they are told to pick
    up the often-mutilated corpse of their relative. There also were
    reports of the widespread practice of holding family members and close
    associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see Section
    1.f.).
        In April security forces reportedly arrested a number of Republican
    Guard and Special Security Forces personnel following what the
    Government claimed was a coup attempt.
        Mass arbitrary arrests and detentions often occur in areas where
    antigovernment leaflets have been distributed. Other arrests have no
    apparent basis. For example, in July 1999, Ahlam Khadom Rammahi, a
    housewife who left Iraq in 1982, traveled from London using her British
    passport to visit her mother. Police arrested Rammahi on August 5,
    1999. No reason was stated for the arrest, and government officials did
    not inform her family of her whereabouts. AI reported that Rammahi was
    released on September 1999 as a result of international pressure. She
    subsequently was able to rejoin her family in the United Kingdom.
        According to international human rights groups, numerous foreigners
    arrested arbitrarily in previous years also remain in detention.
        The Government reportedly targets the Shi'a Muslim community for
    arbitrary arrest and other abuses. Security forces arrested hundreds of
    persons in al-Najaf, Karbala, and the Shi'a section of Baghdad
    following an anonymous distribution of antigovernment leaflets. In the
    weeks preceding the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr
    and two of his sons, many of Al-Sadr's aides were arrested, and their
    whereabouts still were unknown at year's end (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.g.). Hundreds more reportedly were arrested and the houses of many
    demolished in the weeks following the killing (see Section 1.g.).
        Although no statistics are available, observers estimate the number
    of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of whom
    have been held for decades.
        The Government announced in June 1999 a general amnesty for Iraqis
    who had left the country illegally or were exiled officially for a
    specified period of time but failed to return after the period of exile
    expired (see Section 2.d.). No citizens are known to have returned to
    the country based upon this amnesty. An estimated 1 to 2 million self-
    exiled citizens reportedly remain fearful of returning to the country.
        The PUK and the KDP reportedly hold approximately 500 political
    detainees in the north of the country. The KDP and PUK reached
    agreement for the mutual release of political prisoners in 1999. In
    March the KDP released 10 PUK prisoners and the PUK released 5 KDP
    prisoners (see Section 1.g.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent,
    and there is no check on the President's power to override any court
    decision. In 1999 the Special Rapporteur and international human rights
    groups observed that the repressive nature of the political and legal
    systems precludes application of the rule of law. Numerous laws lend
    themselves to continued repression, and the Government uses
    extrajudicial methods to extract confessions or coerce cooperation with
    the regime.
        There are two parallel judicial systems: The regular courts, which
    try common criminal offenses, and the special security courts, which
    generally try national security cases but also may try criminal cases.
    In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation,
    which is the highest court.
        Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving
    espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency
    exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special
    Rapporteur and other sources, military officers or civil servants with
    no legal training head these tribunals, which hear cases in secret.
    Authorities often hold defendants incommunicado and do not permit
    contact with lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by
    torture, which often serve as the basis for conviction. Many cases
    appear to end in summary execution, although defendants may appeal to
    the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency in any
    case that suits his political goals or personal predilection. There are
    no Shari'a (Islamic law) courts; however, regular courts are empowered
    to administer Islamic law in cases involving personal status, such as
    divorce and inheritance.
        Procedures in the regular courts theoretically provide for many
    protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security courts
    cases that, on their legal merits, would appear to fall under the
    jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are
    public, and defendants are entitled to counsel, at government expense
    in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the
    charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury
    system; panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to
    appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
        The Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged
    crimes. For example, a 1990 decree grants immunity to men who commit
    ``honor crimes,'' a violent assault with intent to commit murder
    against a female by a relative for her perceived immodest behavior or
    alleged sexual misconduct (see Section 5). A 1992 decree grants
    immunity from prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and security
    forces who kill anyone while in pursuit of army deserters. Unconfirmed
    but widespread reports indicate that this decree has been applied to
    prevent trials or punishment of government officials. The PUK declared
    during the year that ``honor crime'' immunity would not apply in the
    area under its control.
        It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners,
    because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or imprisonments,
    and families are afraid to talk about arrests. Many of the tens of
    thousands of persons who disappeared or were killed in recent years
    originally were held as political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government frequently infringed on citizens'
    constitutional right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly
    involving national security. The law defines security offenses so
    broadly that authorities effectively are exempt from the legal
    requirement to obtain search warrants, and searches without warrants
    are commonplace. The regime routinely ignored constitutional provisions
    designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic
    correspondence, and telephone conversations. The Government
    periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including
    those of opposition groups. The security services and the Ba'th Party
    maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity
    and instill fear in the public.
        In November 1999, the Government expelled more than 4,000 families
    that had sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War.
        In 1999 and previous years, the regime periodically sealed off
    entire districts in Kirkuk and conducted day-long, housetohouse
    searches, evidently as part of its ``Arabization'' campaign to harass
    and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomans from the region (see Sections 2.d.
    and 5). Government officials also take hostage members of minority
    groups to intimidate their families into leaving their home regions
    (see Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 5).
        The authorities continued systematically to hold family members and
    close associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.). For example, former General Najib
    Al-Salahi, who fled to Jordan in 1995, reported that some of his
    relatives had been arrested and harassed since he left the country and
    criticized publicly the Government. In June General Al-Salahi
    reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female
    family member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an
    intelligence agent who stated that another female relative was being
    held and warned him to stop speaking out against the Government. The
    Special Rapporteur reported that security forces killed the mother of a
    prominent opposition leader.
        In the past, the authorities demolished the houses and detained and
    executed family members of Shi'a who protested government actions (see
    Section 1.g.).
        The Special Rapporteur noted that guilt by association is
    facilitated by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of
    deserters or other perceived opponents of the regime. For example,
    relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for
    purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their
    residences, or face the arrest of other family members. The Supreme
    Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and
    December 1999 that authorities denied food ration cards to families
    that failed to send their young sons to the ``Lion Cubs of Saddam''
    compulsory weapons-training camps (see Section 5). Conscripts are
    required to secure a guarantor to sign a document stating that the
    named conscript would not desert military service and that the
    guarantor would accept personal responsibility if the conscript
    deserted.
        The Special Security Office reportedly continued efforts to
    intimidate the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of citizens
    outside the country who were suspected of sympathizing with the
    opposition were forced to call the suspected opposition members to warm
    them against participating in opposition conferences or activities
    during the year.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Following the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah
    Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr and his sons (see Section 1.a.), there were
    widespread reports of military assaults on protesters in areas of
    Baghdad heavily populated by Shi'a, and in cities with a Shi'a majority
    such as Karbala, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Basra, in which hundreds of
    persons were killed. While a funeral for Al-Sadr was prohibited,
    spontaneous gatherings of mourners took place in the days after his
    death. Government security forces used excessive force in breaking up
    these illegal gatherings, killing hundreds of persons. For example, in
    the Shi'a district of Al-Thawra in Baghdad, a crowd of tens of
    thousands was attacked by government security forces using automatic
    weapons and armored vehicles. The attack resulted in the deaths of
    approximately 25 mourners (although estimates range up to 400)
    including, according to one report, the imam of the Al-Thawra mosque.
    According to Shi'a sources, martial law was declared throughout the
    region in reaction to the Al-Sadr killing.
        Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr
    during the year. In February security officials reportedly executed 30
    religious school students who had been arrested after Al-Sadr's
    killing. In March numerous Shi'a who fled the country in 1999 and
    earlier in the year, told HRW that security forces interrogated,
    detained, and tortured them. In May six other students who were
    arrested following the killing were sentenced to death. It was unknown
    whether the death sentences had been carried out by year's end.
        As a reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's killing, the
    Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad and
    sent them to the south and west in 1999 and during the year.
        The Government continued to ``Arabize'' certain Kurdish areas, such
    as the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement
    of local residents from their homes and villages and their replacement
    by Arabs from outside the area (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
        Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before
    1991, continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid
    during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them before
    it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted
    haphazardly in civilian areas. Landmines also are a problem along the
    Iraq-Iran border throughout the central and southern areas in the
    country. There is no information on civilian casualties or the
    Government's efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields in areas under
    the central Government's control. According to reports by the U.N.
    Office of Project Services, the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian
    Peoples' Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed by landmines in the
    three northern governates since the 1991 uprising. The Special
    Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation
    under the Landmines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of
    mines. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued efforts
    to remove landmines from the area and increase awareness of the mine
    problem among local residents.
        In December 1998, the Government declared that mine-clearing
    activity was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such
    activity to leave the country. In April 1999, a New Zealander working
    for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was shot and killed at
    close range by an unknown assailant. The KDP arrested a person who
    claimed to have killed the U.N. worker on behalf of Saddam Hussein's
    Fedayeen.
        After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war
    crimes perpetrated by the regime, including deliberate killing,
    torture, rape, pillage, and hostage-taking as directly related to the
    Gulf War. HRW and other organizations have worked with various
    governments to bring a genocide case at the International Court of
    Justice against the Government for its conduct of the Anfal campaign
    against the Kurds in 1988.
        No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish
    parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK
    agreed in September 1998 to unify their administrations; however,
    little progress was made toward implementing the agreement. In October
    1999, senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of
    measures, including prisoner exchanges, the return of internally
    displaced persons (IDP's) to their homes, and arrangements for freedom
    of movement between their respective areas. Most of the measures were
    not implemented; however, the PUK and KDP conducted a small prisoner
    exchange in March (see Section 1.d.). In April the ICRC reported that
    IDP's on both sides still were living in tents or in open, unheated
    buildings (see Section 2.d.).
        Armed hostilities and resulting deaths were reported between the
    KDP and the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF), the PUK and the IWCP, the PUK
    and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the KDP and the PKK. There
    were a number of bomb attacks on civilian targets during the year in
    both the KDP- and PUK-controlled areas, which killed at least 12
    persons.
        KDP forces attacked the Erbil headquarters of the ITF in July,
    killing at least two persons and injuring several others. Tension
    between the KDP and the ITF had been building for months as the KDP
    leadership expressed frustration that the ITF failed to accept the KDP
    as the local authority. The ITF complained that the KDP interfered in
    its internal affairs.
        In July the PUK reportedly ordered all opposition groups to move
    their offices out of Sulaymaniah's city center following a number of
    bombings; the IWCP reportedly refused to move. PUK security forces
    subsequently killed at least six IWCP members and arrested several
    others at an IWCP office in Sulaymaniah. PUK forces also killed several
    IWCP members who were inside a car. In connection with this dispute,
    the PUK closed the IWCPaffiliated Independent Women's Organization and
    the Women's Protection Center in July and detained temporarily 12 women
    who had been staying at an abused women's shelter within the Center.
        There were repeated military incursions by Turkish security forces
    into northern Iraq during the year. In late 1999, the Turkish airforce
    targeted PKK positions in both KDP and PUK controlled areas. In April,
    May, and August, Turkish troops again were deployed to the region. In
    one incident, Turkish troops killed 38 Kurdish civilians. In July the
    PUK attempted to push the PKK out of its territory and fighting ensued.
    Both the PKK and the PUK suffered a number of casualties. In December
    hundreds of Turkish troops were deployed to the region, threatening to
    intervene on the PUK's behalf. Subsequently, the PUK and the PKK
    declared a cease-fire.
    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press ``in compliance with the
    revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;'' however, in practice
    the Government does not permit freedom of speech or of the press, and
    does not tolerate political dissent in areas under its control. In
    November the U.N. General Assembly criticized the Government's
    ``suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information,
    association, and assembly.'' The Special Rapporteur stated in October
    1999 that citizens lived ``in a climate of fear'' in which whatever
    they said or did, particularly in the area of politics, involved ``the
    risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or military
    intelligence.'' He noted that ``the mere suggestion that someone is not
    a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death
    penalty.''
        The Government and the Ba'th Party own all print and broadcast
    media, and operate them as propaganda outlets. They generally do not
    report opposing points of view that are expressed, either domestically
    or abroad. A 1999 Freedom House report rated Iraqi press freedom at 98
    out of a possible 100 points, with 0 being the most free and 100 being
    the most controlled. Several statutes and decrees suppress freedom of
    speech and of the press, including: Revolutionary Command Council
    Decree Number 840 of 1986, which penalizes free expression and
    stipulates the death penalty for anyone insulting the President or
    other high government officials; Section 214 of the Penal Code, which
    prohibits singing a song likely to cause civil strife; and the 1968
    Press Act, which prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific
    subjects, including those detrimental to the President, the
    Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ba'th Party.
        According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists are under
    continuous pressure to join the Ba'th party and must follow the
    mandates of the Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein.
    According to Iraqi sources, in 1999 Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of
    union members who had not praised Saddam Hussein and the regime
    sufficiently or often enough (see Section 6.a.). In September 1999,
    journalist and Baghdad University professor Hashem Hasan was arrested
    after declining an appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's
    publications. The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) sent a
    letter of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hassan's fate and
    whereabouts remain unknown (see Section 1.b.).
        The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically holds meetings
    at which they issue general guidelines for the press. Foreign
    journalists must work from offices located within the ministry building
    and are accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who
    reportedly restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to
    interact freely with citizens. Many Western news services are
    represented in Baghdad by bureaucrats who are based in the Ministry of
    Culture and Information.
        The Government regularly jams foreign news broadcasts (see Section
    1.f.). Satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines are banned although
    some restrictions reportedly were lifted in 1999. Security forces
    reportedly raided homes of persons suspected of using satellite dishes
    during the year. In October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified
    all diplomatic missions and international organizations that they would
    need to obtain government approval before bringing ``any technical
    apparatus'' into the country. During the year, the Government opened
    five Internet cafes where persons are permitted to view websites
    provided by the Ministry of Culture and Information.
        Books may be published only with the authorization of the Ministry
    of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sends
    textbooks with proregime propaganda to Kurdish regions; however, Kurds
    routinely remove propaganda items from such textbooks.
        The Government does not respect academic freedom and exercises
    strict control over academic publications. University staff are hired
    and fired depending on their support for the Government.
        In the north, many independent newspapers have appeared over the
    past 8 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts. The
    absence of central authority permits significant freedom of expression,
    including criticism of the regional Kurdish authorities; however, most
    journalists are influenced or controlled by various political
    organizations. Satellite services and related equipment for telephone,
    fax, Internet, and television services are available. Although the
    rival Kurdish parties in the north, the PUK and KDP, state that full
    press freedom is allowed in areas under their respective control, in
    practice neither effectively permits distribution of the opposing
    group's newspapers and other literature.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
    this right in practice. Except in Kurdishcontrolled northern areas,
    citizens legally may not assemble other than to express support for the
    regime. The Government regularly orchestrates crowds to demonstrate
    support for the regime and its policies through financial incentives
    for those who participate and threats of violence against those who do
    not. Widespread military and paramilitary attacks on persons who
    violated restrictions on peaceful assembly were reported throughout the
    year (see Section 1.g.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice. The Government controls
    the establishment of political parties, regulates their internal
    affairs, and monitors their activities. New political parties must be
    based in Baghdad and are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious
    character. The political magazine Alef-Be, which is published by the
    Ministry of Culture and Information, reported in December 1999 that two
    political groups would not be permitted to form parties because they
    had an insufficient number of members. The magazine reprinted the
    conditions necessary to establish political parties, which include the
    requirement that a political group must have at least 150 members over
    the age of 25. A 1999 law also stipulates that new parties must ``take
    pride'' in the 1958 and 1968 revolutions, which created the republic
    and brought the Ba'th party to power. Several parties are outlawed
    specifically, and membership in them is a capital offense (see Section
    3). A 1974 law prescribes the death penalty for anyone ``infiltrating''
    the Ba'th Party.
        In contrast, in the Kurdish-controlled north, numerous political
    parties and social and cultural organizations exist.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in
    practice. Islam is the official state religion.
        The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitors places of
    worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and repair of all
    places of worship, and approves the publication of all religious
    literature.
        Over 95 percent of the population are Muslim. The (predominantly
    Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni
    Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are
    Sunni Kurds, 13 to 16 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni
    Turkomans). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of Christians
    (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox),
    Yazidis, and a small number of Jews and Mandaeans.
        The Government does not recognize political organizations that have
    been formed by Shi'a Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups
    continued to attract support despite their illegal status. There are
    religious qualifications for government office; candidates for the
    National Assembly, for example, ``must believe in God'' (see Section
    3).
        Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs
    traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs
    are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life, including
    civil, political, military, and economic. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not
    distinct ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent country
    alongside Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'th
    Party, and Shi'a formed the core of the army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
    War.
        The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of
    murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the
    religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim
    population. Despite nominal legal protection of religious equality, the
    regime has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the
    Shi'a faith. Forces from the Mukhabarat, General Security (Amn Al-Amm),
    the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the
    Ba'th Party have killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques
    and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil
    uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a
    religious education, and prevented Shi'a adherents from performing
    their religious rites. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all
    the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and search, harass, and arbitrarily
    arrest worshipers.
        The following government restrictions on religious rights remained
    in effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal
    Friday prayer by Shi'a Muslims; restrictions on the loaning of books by
    Shi'a mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on
    government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of
    Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral
    processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on
    other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading;
    and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that
    commemorate Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured
    documents from the security services during the 1991 uprising, which
    listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Security forces
    reportedly still were encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf,
    one of Shi'a Islam's holiest sites, and at the former Shi'a theological
    school in Al-Najaf; security forces have been there since 1991.
        In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the
    Government instituted a new program in the predominantly Shi'a
    districts of Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where
    individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food
    program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are
    printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray
    at an unauthorized location. Shi'a sources outside the country who
    reported this policy believe that it is aimed not only at preventing
    unauthorized religious gatherings of Shi'a, but at stopping Shi'a
    adherents from attending Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, to which many
    pious Shi'a have turned since the closure of their own mosques.
        Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars
    being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in the past several
    years, particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic
    center of Najaf. This followed years of government manipulation of the
    Najaf theological schools. AI reported that the Government deported
    systematically tens of thousands of Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds) to
    Iran in the late 1970's and early 1980's, on the basis that they were
    of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, religious scholars and
    Shi'a merchants who supported the schools financially, were prime
    targets for deportation. In the 1980's, during the IranIraq war, it was
    reported widely that the Government expelled and denied visas to
    thousands of foreign scholars who wished to study at Najaf. After the
    1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some restrictions on
    Shi'a attending the schools, perhaps believing that this would reduce
    popular anger over the arrests and executions of religious leaders.
    However, the revival of the schools appears greatly to have exceeded
    the Government's expectations, and led to an increased government
    crackdown on the Shi'a religious establishment, including the
    requirement that speeches by imams in mosques be based upon government-
    provided material that attacked fundamentalist trends. A campaign of
    arrests in Mosul against fundamentalist trends was reported in
    September 1999.
        Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr
    during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Two months prior to the
    anniversary of Al-Sadr's killing, security forces were deployed around
    shrines, mosques, and other religious institutions, and mosques were
    closed except during prayer time. In February security officials
    reportedly executed 30 religious school students who had been arrested
    after Al-Sadr's killing. In May six other students who were arrested
    following Al-Sadr's killing were sentenced to death. It was unknown
    whether the death sentences had been carried out by year's end. As a
    reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's killing, the
    Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad and
    sent them to the south and west in 1999 and during the year.
        The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with
    religious pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the
    Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims
    who travel to holy sites in the country (see Section 2.d.).
        Approval procedures established by the U.N. Sanctions Committee
    require advance notification to regional air controllers and coalition
    military aircraft for flights undertaken for religious and humanitarian
    purposes that originate from and return to the country. In 1998 the
    U.N. Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and
    expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the Government rejected
    this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds
    to cover Hajjrelated expenses via a neutral third party. The Government
    again rejected the opportunity. In both years, the Government insisted
    that these funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to
    the central bank. As a result, in both 1998 and 1999, no Iraqi pilgrims
    were able to take advantage of the available funds. According to press
    reports, only 4,000 Iraqi pilgrims made the Hajj in 1999, despite the
    availability of 22,000 spaces.
        In 1999 the Government flew several airplanes full of elderly Hajj
    pilgrims unannounced to Saudi Arabia.
        Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram
    and 40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout
    the country and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala to
    commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The
    Government for several decades has interfered with these ``Ashura''
    commemorations by preventing processions on foot into the city. In 1998
    and 1999, violent incidents were reported between Iraqi pilgrims on one
    side and Ba'th party members and security forces enforcing the ban on
    the other. In May the Government prohibited persons from making the
    pilgrimage to Karbala. Security forces opened fire on persons who
    attempted to walk from Al-Najaf to Karbala (see Section 1.g.).
        The Government also has sought to undermine the identity of
    minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
        The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has
    engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and
    Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from
    northern areas and repression of political rights (see Section 2.d.).
    Most Assyrians live in the northern governates, and the Government
    often has accused them of collaborating with Iraqi Kurds. In the north,
    Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military
    forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal
    Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians. Both
    major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government
    occasionally targets Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkomans,
    in expulsions from Kirkuk in order to attempt to Arabize the city (see
    Section 2.d.).
        The Government imposes some repressive measures on Yazidis (see
    Section 5). For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul,
    arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for (see Section 1.b.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts movement within
    the country of citizens and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive
    border areas and numerous designated security zones are subject to
    arrest. Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways.
        The Government requires citizens to obtain specific government
    authorization and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may
    not make more than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad,
    citizens are required to post collateral, which is refundable only upon
    their return. There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may
    be taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside
    the country alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section 5).
    Prior to December 1999, every student who wished to travel abroad was
    required to provide a guarantor who would be liable if the student
    failed to return. In December 1999, authorities banned all travel for
    students (including those in grade school), cancelled spring and summer
    holidays, and enrolled students in compulsory military training and
    weapons-use courses.
        In what appeared to be an effort to lure citizens living abroad
    back to the country, government radio announced in June 1999 an amnesty
    for teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly
    thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty
    for all citizens who either had left the country illegally or who had
    failed to return after the period of exile had expired (see Section
    1.d.). The decree stated that ``charges of illegal departure, forging
    official documents towards this purpose, and disrupting public duties
    that were pressed before the issuance of this decree shall be dropped
    effective immediately.'' In October 1999, Justice Minster Shabib Al-
    Maliki announced that authorities may seize assets belonging to Iraqis
    living outside the country who did not return in response to the
    amnesty decree. A special ministerial committee was formed to track and
    monitor Iraqis inside the country who received money from relatives
    living abroad.
        A November 1999 law placed additional penalties on citizens who
    attempt to leave the country illegally. Under the law, a prison term of
    up to 10 years and ``confiscation of movable and immovable property''
    is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to leave illegally. Similar
    penalties face anyone found to encourage or assist persons banned from
    travel, including health care professionals, engineers, and university
    professors. In January the director of the Real Estate Registration
    Department stated that pursuant to the decree, the Government
    confiscated the property of a number of persons.
        The Government restricts foreign travel by journalists, authors,
    university professors, doctors, scientists, and all employees of the
    Ministry of Information. Security authorities interrogate all media
    employees, journalists, and writers upon their return from foreign
    travel. In December 1999, Captain Ammar Yasir Mahyush and retired Major
    Jasim Muhsin Ala reportedly were executed for their attempt to flee the
    country in February 1999.
        The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with
    religious pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the
    Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims
    to holy sites in Iraq (see Section 2.c.).
        Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in the country for 5
    years (1 year for spouses of government employees) are required to
    apply for naturalization as citizens. Many foreigners thus become
    subject to travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance
    include, but are not limited to, loss of the spouse's job, a
    substantial financial penalty, and repayment of any governmental
    educational expenses. The Government prevents many citizens who also
    hold citizenship in another country, especially the children of Iraqi
    fathers and foreign-born mothers, from visiting the country of their
    other nationality.
        The U.N. Secretary General estimates that there are more than half
    a million IDP's remaining in the three northern provinces (Erbil,
    Dohuk, and Sulaymaniah), most of whom fled government-controlled areas
    in early 1991 during the uprising that followed the Gulf War. As
    reported by the Special Rapporteur, the Government continued its
    ``Arabization'' policy by discriminating against and forcibly
    relocating the non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans, and
    Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, Tuz, Khoramatu,
    and other districts. Most observers view the policy as an attempt to
    decrease the proportion of non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk
    region, and thereby secure Arab demographic control of the area. For
    example, Kurdish grade school teachers and low-ranking civil servants
    are reassigned systematically outside of Kirkuk province, which has
    been renamed Al-Ta'mim (``Nationalization''). The Revolutionary Command
    Council has mandated that new housing and employment be created for
    Arab residents who have been resettled in Kirkuk, while new
    construction or renovation of Kurd-owned property reportedly is
    prohibited. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes, except to
    Arabs, nor register or inherit property. In contrast, in September the
    Ta'mim Voice newspaper reported that a significant sum of money would
    be made available to Arab citizens of Kirkuk to fund construction.
        As part of the Arabization process, the Government continued to
    deport Kurdish and Turkoman families. Regional Kurdish authorities
    report that between January and June, 155 families (a total of 875
    individuals) were expelled to the Kurdish-controlled north. The
    authorities estimate that since 1991, more than 94,000 persons have
    been displaced. Persons may avoid expulsion if they relinquish their
    Kurdish, Turkoman, or Assyrian identity and register as Arabs. Persons
    who refuse to relinquish their identity may have their assets
    expropriated and their ration cards withdrawn prior to being deported.
        According to numerous deportees in the north, the Government
    generally uses a systematic procedure to evict and deport non-Arab
    citizens. Frequently, a security force official demands that a family
    change its ethnicity from Kurdish or Turkoman to Arab. Subsequently,
    security officials frequently arrest the head of household and tell the
    other family members that the person will be imprisoned until they
    agree to settle elsewhere in the country. Such families frequently
    choose to move to the north; family members must sign a form that
    states that the departure is voluntary and they are not allowed to take
    any property or their food ration cards issued under the U.N. oil-for-
    food program. The Government frequently transfers the family's house to
    an Arab Ba'th Party member.
        Those expelled are not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur
    reported in 1999 that citizens who provide employment, food or shelter
    to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. In order to
    encourage departure and prevent displaced persons from returning, the
    Government reportedly has placed landmines in the area around Kirkuk,
    and has declared it a military and security zone. Roads into the area
    are fortified with military checkpoints. The Government denies that it
    expels non-Arab families.
        According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
    hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remain abroad. Apart from those
    suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the Government's
    suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others are Kurds who fled
    during the Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled
    following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly Kurds,
    have repatriated themselves to areas in the north, outside government
    control.
        The Government does not provide first asylum or respect the rights
    of refugees.
        Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in
    southeastern Turkey remain in northern areas controlled by the central
    Government. The UNHCR is treating such displaced persons as refugees
    until it reaches an official determination of their status.
        The KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998 agreement to begin
    returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons that
    each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the three
    northern provinces; however, little effort to implement the agreement
    took place during the year. In April the ICRC observed that the
    displaced persons in the north still were living in tents or in open,
    unheated public buildings (see Section 1.g.).
        In August 1999, the KDP reportedly imposed a blockade on eight
    Assyrian villages near Aqra. ICRC monitors reportedly intervened on the
    villages' behalf, and the blockade subsequently was lifted. However,
    KDP forces reportedly reentered one of the villages a couple of days
    later, rounded up the villagers, and publicly beat two of them. AINA
    reported that a similar raid occurred in another village. The KDP
    denied that the blockade or village raids occurred.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
    President wields power over all instruments of government. Almost all
    important officials either are members of Saddam Hussein's family or
    are family allies from his home town of Tikrit. Although the Government
    has taken steps to increase the perception of democracy, the political
    process still is controlled firmly by the State. The 1995 so-called
    referendum on Saddam Hussein's presidency was not free and was
    dismissed as a sham by most international observers. It included
    neither voter privacy nor opposing candidates, and many credible
    reports indicated that voters feared possible reprisal if they cast a
    dissenting vote. A total of 500 persons reportedly were arrested in
    Karbala, Baghdad, and Ramadi provinces for casting negative ballots,
    and a member of the intelligence services reportedly was executed for
    refusing to vote for the President.
        There are strict qualifications for parliamentary candidates; by
    law the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old
    and ``believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and
    socialism.'' Elections for the National Assembly were held in March;
    220 of the 250 parliamentary seats were contested and the 30 remaining
    seats were filled by presidential appointees. Out of the 250 seats, 165
    seats reportedly were won by members of the Ba'th Party, 55 by
    independents, and 30 were appointed by Saddam Hussein to represent the
    northern provinces. According to the Special Rapporteur, the Ba'th
    Party allegedly instructed a number of its members to run as nominally
    independent candidates.
        Full political participation at the national level is restricted to
    members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who are estimated to
    constitute about 8 percent of the population. The political system is
    dominated by the Party, which governs through the Revolutionary Command
    Council (RCC). The council is headed by President Saddam Hussein.
    However, the RCC exercises both executive and legislative authority.
    The RCC dominates the National Assembly, which is completely
    subordinate to it and the executive branch.
        Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely
    suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is punishable by
    death. In October security forces reportedly executed eight persons on
    charges of forming an opposition organization (see Sections 1.a. and
    2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law that theoretically authorized the
    creation of political parties other than the Ba'th Party. However, in
    practice the law is used to prohibit parties that do not support the
    President and the Government. New parties must be based in Baghdad and
    are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious character. In 1999
    various media published articles claiming that Saddam Hussein
    instructed officials in October 1999 to consider the formation of new
    political parties, a state council, and a new constitution. However, a
    Ministry of Culture and Information magazine later reported that the
    only two groups that attempted to form a party were refused for having
    an insufficient number of members.
        The Government does not recognize the various political groupings
    and parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims, Kurds, Assyrians,
    Turkomans, or other communities. These political groups continued to
    attract support despite their illegal status.
        Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and
    politics. The law provides for the election of women and minorities to
    the National Assembly; however, they have only token representation.
        In the north of the country, all central government functions have
    been performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the
    Government withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative
    personnel from the area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament
    and local government administrators were elected in 1992. This
    parliament last met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de
    facto control of northern Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one
    another from 1994 through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify
    their separate administrations and to hold new elections in July 1999.
    The ceasefire has held; however, reunification measures were not
    implemented. The PUK held municipal elections in February, which were
    the first elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992.
    Foreign and local election observers reported that the elections
    generally were fair.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not permit the establishment of independent
    human rights organizations. Citizens have established several human
    rights groups abroad and in northern areas not under government
    control. Monitors from most foreign and international human rights
    groups are not allowed in the country. However, the Government allows
    several international humanitarian and aid organizations to operate in
    the country.
        The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N.
    personnel throughout the country, maintained a threat to arrest or kill
    relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices
    in the capital (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.).
        As in previous years, the Government did not allow the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it respond to his requests for
    information.
        In April and again in November, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
    and the U.N. General Assembly criticized the ``systematic, widespread,
    and extremely grave violations of human rights'' by the Government,
    which resulted in ``all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained
    by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror.''
        For the eighth consecutive year, the Commission called on the U.N.
    Secretary General to send human rights monitors to ``help in the
    independent verification of reports on the human rights situation in
    Iraq.'' The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
    Protection of Minorities made a similar request. The Government
    continued to ignore these calls.
        The Special Rapporteur nonetheless was able to gather more
    evidence, in part due to interviews with current and past government
    officials that illustrated the systemic nature of human rights
    violations. He dispatched members of his staff to Kuwait, Jordan, and
    other locations to interview victims of government human rights abuses.
        The Government operates an official human rights group that
    routinely denies allegations of abuses.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for
    women, children, and minorities; however, in practice the Government
    systematically violates these rights.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women occurs but little is known
    about its extent. Such abuse customarily is addressed within the
    tightly knit family structure. There is no public discussion of the
    subject, and no statistics are published. Spousal violence constitutes
    grounds for divorce and criminal charges; however, suits brought on
    these charges reportedly are rare. Under a 1990 law, men who kill
    female family members for ``immoral deeds'' may receive immunity from
    prosecution for such honor crimes (see Section 1.e.).
        In October security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women
    suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or
    covering up such activities (see Section 1.a.).
        In April the PUK abolished in the Kurdish-controlled territories
    provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code that legitimized honor crimes.
        The Special Rapporteur has noted that there is an unusually high
    percentage of women in the Kurdish areas, reportedly as a result of the
    disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men during the Anfal
    Campaign. The Special Rapporteur reported that the widows, daughters,
    and mothers of the Anfal Campaign victims are dependent economically on
    their relatives or villages because they may not inherit the property
    or assets of their missing family members.
        Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign indicates that the
    Government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing
    squads and in chemical attacks.
        The Government states that it is committed to equality for women,
    who make up about 20 percent of the work force. It has enacted laws to
    protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual
    harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and
    police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land
    ownership, taxation, and suffrage. It is difficult to determine the
    extent to which these protections are afforded in practice. Women are
    not allowed to travel outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
        There are several women's organizations in the PUK-controlled
    regions in the north.
        Children.--The Government claims that it has enacted laws to make
    education for girls compulsory. No information is available on whether
    the Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare
    of children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights
    groups have collected a substantial body of evidence indicating the
    Government's continued disregard for the rights and welfare of
    children. The evidence allegedly includes government officials taking
    children from minority groups hostage in order to intimidate their
    families to leave cities and regions where the regime wishes to create
    a Sunni Arab majority (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
        The Government's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security
    Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions.
    There were widespread reports that food and medicine that could have
    been made available to the general public were stockpiled in warehouses
    rather than ordered, or diverted for the personal use of some
    officials. The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the
    oil-for-food program confirmed the insufficient placement of orders in
    a January letter to the Government, in which he expressed concern about
    the low rate of submission of applications in the health, education,
    water, sanitation, and oil sectors. He also stated that of the $570
    million worth of medicines and medical supplies that had arrived in
    Iraq through the oil-for-food program in 1998 and 1999, only 48 percent
    had been distributed to clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies.
        The Government's management of the oil-for-food program did not
    take into account the special requirements of children between the ages
    of 1 and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary General's specific injunction
    that the Government modify its implementation procedures to address the
    needs of this vulnerable group. In 1999 UNICEF issued the results of
    the first surveys of child and maternal mortality in Iraq that have
    been conducted since 1991. The surveys were conducted between February
    and May 1999, in cooperation with the Government in the southern and
    central regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish authorities
    in the north. The surveys revealed that in the south and center parts
    of the country, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5
    years old are dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade
    ago. In contrast mortality rates for children under 5 years old in the
    Kurdishcontrolled north dropped in the period from 1994 to 1999. The
    Special Rapporteur criticized the Government for ``letting innocent
    people suffer while [it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted.'' Had the
    Government not waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in
    1996, he stated in October 1999, ``millions of innocent people would
    have avoided serious and prolonged suffering.''
        For the seventh year, the Government held 3-week training courses
    in weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and
    infantry tactics for children between 10 and 15 years of age. Camps for
    these ``Saddam Cubs'' operated throughout the country. Senior military
    officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up
    under the ``physical and psychological strain'' of training that lasted
    for as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the Iraqi opposition
    report that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to
    fill all of the vacancies in the program. Families reportedly were
    threatened with the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to
    enroll their children in the grueling course. The Supreme Council for
    the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October 1999 that
    authorities were denying food ration cards to families that failed to
    send their young sons to Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps
    (see Section 1.f.). Similarly, authorities reportedly withheld school
    examination results to students unless they registered in the Fedayeen
    Saddam organization.
        People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the
    Government's policy towards the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--The country's cultural, religious, and
    linguistic diversity is not reflected in its political and economic
    structure. Various segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself
    constitutes a minority of the population, effectively have controlled
    the Government since independence in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, the religious
    majority of the population, have long been economically, politically,
    and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and
    religious groups in the north, the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been
    targeted for particular discrimination and abuse (see Section 2.c.).
        Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
    Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years.
        Although few Jews remain in the country, government officials
    frequently make anti-Semitic statements. For example, during the year,
    a Ba'th Party official stated that the ``lowly Jews . . . are
    descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshippers of the infidel
    tyrant.''
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Arabs are denied equal
    access to employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs are
    not permitted to sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or
    inherit property. The Government continued to relocate forcibly the
    non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians living
    in Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
        Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct
    ethnic group, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest
    Christian communities. These communities speak a different language
    (Syriac), preserve traditions of Christianity, and have a rich cultural
    and historical heritage that they trace back over 2,000 years. Although
    these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the Government, without
    any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such,
    evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated
    regime (see Section 2.c.).
        The Government does not permit education in languages other than
    Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was announced
    under a 1972 decree, never has been implemented. Thus, in areas under
    government control, Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted to
    attend classes in Syriac. In areas of the north under Kurdish control,
    classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising against
    the Government. By October 1998, the first groups of students were
    ready to begin secondary school in Syriac in the north; however, some
    Assyrian sources reported that regional Kurdish authorities refused to
    allow the classes to begin. Details of this practice (for example, the
    number of students prepared to start secondary courses in Syriac and
    the towns where they were located) were not available, and Kurdish
    regional authorities denied that they engaged in such a practice. In
    November 1999, the Kurdistan Observer reported that the central
    Government had warned the administration in the Kurdish region against
    allowing Turkoman, Assyrian, or Yazidi minority schools.
        Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
    Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years. Assyrians
    continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (KWP), a
    Turkish-based terrorist organization that operates against indigenous
    Kurds in northern Iraq. The Christians reported feeling caught in the
    middle of intraKurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers reported being
    pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign
    by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food
    supplies.
        Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Erbil in 1998
    and 1999. Although the bombings have not been linked to any particular
    faction or group, Assyrians believe that they are part of a terror
    campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving the north. The
    Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Patriotic Party, and other
    groups have criticized the investigation into these incidents conducted
    by the Kurdistan Regional Government. There were no reported arrests by
    year's end.
        In June 1999, the Assyrian National News Agency reported a ``well-
    established pattern'' of complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks
    against Assyrian Christians in the north (see Section 1.a.).
        The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many
    Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some
    would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct
    from Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical
    basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the
    Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to
    join in domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured
    government documents included in a 1998 HRW report describe special
    all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal
    campaign to ``pursue and attack'' Muslim Kurds. The Government imposes
    the same repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups (see Section
    2.c.).
        Citizens considered by the Government to be of Iranian origin must
    carry special identification and often are precluded from desirable
    employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of
    thousands of citizens of Iranian origin.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions independent of
    government control do not exist. The Trade Union Organization Law of
    1987 established the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU),
    a government-dominated trade union structure, as the sole legal trade
    federation. The IGFTU is linked to the Ba'th Party, which uses it to
    promote party principles and policies among union members.
        Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees
    or workers in state enterprises, have the right to join local union
    committees. The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions,
    which in turn belong to the IGFTU.
        In 1999 Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members of
    the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and the
    regime sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in 1999, Uday Hussein
    reportedly jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National Students
    Union for failing to carry out his orders to take action against
    students known for their criticism of the situation in the country.
        The 1987 Labor Law restricts the right to strike. No strike has
    been reported over the past 2 decades. According to the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions, severe restrictions on the right to
    strike include penal sanctions.
        The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of
    Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation
    of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries for public sector
    workers (the majority of employed persons) are set by the Government.
    Wages in the much smaller private sector are set by employers or
    negotiated individually with workers. Government workers frequently are
    shifted from one job and work location to another to prevent them from
    forming close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not
    protect workers from antiunion discrimination, a failure that has been
    criticized repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the International
    Labor Organization (ILO).
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor
    theoretically is prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates
    prison sentences, including compulsory labor, for civil servants and
    employees of state enterprises accused of breaches of labor
    ``discipline,'' including resigning from a job. According to the ILO,
    foreign workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating their
    employment to return to their native countries because of government-
    imposed penal sanctions on persons who do so. There is no information
    available on forced and bonded labor by children.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The employment of children under age 14 is prohibited,
    except in small-scale family enterprises. Children reportedly are
    encouraged increasingly to work in order to support their families
    because of the country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulates
    that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week
    than adults. Each year the Government enrolls children as young as 10
    years of age in a paramilitary training program (see Section 5). There
    is no information available on forced and bonded labor by children (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no information
    available on minimum wages.
        Theoretically, most workers in urban areas work a 6-day, 48-hour
    workweek. Hours for government employees are set by the head of each
    ministry. Working hours for agricultural workers vary according to
    individual employer-employee agreements. Occupational safety programs
    are in effect in state-run enterprises. Inspectors theoretically
    inspect private establishments, but enforcement varies widely. There is
    no information on workers' ability to remove themselves from work
    situations that endanger their health or safety, or on those who
    complain about such conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available on
    whether trafficking in persons is prohibited by law, or whether persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                      ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

        Israel \1\ is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system
    and free elections. There is no Constitution; a series of ``basic
    laws'' provide for fundamental rights. The legislature, or Knesset, has
    the power to dissolve the Government and limit the authority of the
    executive branch. Labor and One Israel party leader Ehud Barak was
    elected Prime Minister in May 1999 and took office in July 1999 at the
    head of a broad centrist coalition Government. On December 9, following
    the breakdown of his coalition, Barak resigned as Prime Minister; prime
    ministerial elections were scheduled to be held on February 6, 2001.
    The judiciary is independent.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The human rights situation in the occupied territories is
    discussed in the annex appended to this report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with
    most of its Arab neighbors. It concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in
    1979 and with Jordan in 1994, and a series of agreements with the
    Palestinians beginning in 1993. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel
    occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan
    Heights. The international community does not recognize Israel's
    sovereignty over any part of the occupied territories. Throughout its
    existence, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist attacks.
        An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and the
    Palestinians began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued
    with the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration
    of Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine
    Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West
    Bank and the Gaza Strip. In January 1997, the parties concluded the
    Hebron Protocol and in October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye
    River Memorandum. In September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO
    signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. The parties held intensive
    working-level talks between March and June and met at Camp David in
    July; however, the Government and the PLO did not reach an agreement.
    Internal security is the responsibility of the Israel Security Agency
    (the ISA--formerly the General Security Service, or GSS, and also known
    as Shin Bet, or Shabak), which is under the authority of the Prime
    Minister's office. The police are under the authority of the Minister
    of Internal Security. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are under the
    authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF includes a
    significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve
    status and plays a role in maintaining internal security. The Foreign
    Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviews the activities of
    the IDF and the ISA. Some members of the security forces committed
    serious human rights abuses.
        Israel has an advanced industrial economy, and citizens enjoy a
    relatively high standard of living, with a per capita income of over
    $17,000. Unemployment remained at about 9 percent during the year, but
    was substantially higher in the country's peripheral regions and among
    lower-skilled workers. The country's economic growth has been
    accompanied by an increase in income inequality. The longstanding gap
    in levels of income within the Jewish population and between Jewish and
    Arab citizens continues. The 14 towns with the highest unemployment
    rate in the country all are populated by Arab citizens. A heavy
    reliance on foreign workers, principally from Asia and Eastern Europe,
    is a source of social problems. Such workers generally are employed in
    agriculture and the construction industry and constitute about 6
    percent of the labor force. Since the implementation of an economic
    stabilization plan in 1985, the country has moved gradually to reduce
    state intervention in the economy through privatization of several
    state-owned companies and through deregulation. State-owned companies
    continue to dominate such fields as electricity generation and
    transmission, oil refining, shipping, and international air travel.
    However, individuals generally are free to invest in private interests
    and to own property. The Government owns and manages 77 percent of the
    country's land area, and as a matter of policy it does not sell land.
    The Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organization established in 1897 for
    the purchase and management of land for the Jewish people, owns 8
    percent of the country's land area, including a considerable amount
    transferred directly from the Government, and manages another 8 percent
    on behalf of the Government. Foreigners and citizens of all religions
    are allowed freely to purchase or lease the 7 percent of land not
    controlled by the Government or the JNF. In March the High Court of
    Justice ruled that the Government's use of the JNF to develop public
    land was discriminatory, since the JNF's statute prohibits the sale or
    lease of land to non-Jews.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
    however, its record worsened late in the year regarding its treatment
    of non-Jewish citizens. Historically, Israel's main human rights
    problems have arisen from its policies and practices in the occupied
    territories and from its fight against terrorism. However, in October
    police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations in the north of
    the country that coincided with the outbreak of violence in the
    occupied territories, killing 13 Arab citizens and injuring over 300
    (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g. of the annex for a discussion of
    casualties in the occupied territories). There also are credible
    reports that police failed to protect Arab lives and property in
    several incidents in which Jewish citizens attacked the homes of Arab
    citizens. A landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in September
    1999 prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including
    violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep
    deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to
    extreme temperatures. Since the September 1999 ruling, domestic and
    international NGO's have been unable to substantiate sporadic
    allegations that security forces tortured detainees. There were
    numerous credible allegations that police beat persons in detention.
    Detention and prison conditions, particularly for Palestinian security
    detainees held in Israel do not provide inmates with sufficient living
    space, food, and access to medical care. Following the IDF withdrawal
    from its self-declared ``security zone'' in southern Lebanon in May and
    the concurrent collapse of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), all of the
    prisoners from the Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon, where Lebanese
    guards routinely committed abuses, were released. The Government
    continued to detain without charge Palestinians, some of them for
    lengthy periods; the number of such detainees increased following the
    outbreak of violence in September. In April an Israeli High Court
    ruling declared illegal the holding of Lebanese detainees as
    ``bargaining chips'' in Israeli prisons. Subsequently, authorities
    released 13 Lebanese prisoners, all of whom had been held without
    charge, or had already completed their terms. At year's end, there were
    approximately 20 Lebanese prisoners in custody, two of whom--Sheikh al-
    Karim Obeid and Mustafa Dirani--were held without charge. Legislation
    that would enable Obeid and Dirani to be held as ``members of enemy
    forces not entitled to prisoner-of-war status'' passed a first reading
    during the year. Following the outbreak of violence in September, the
    Government detained without charge hundreds of persons in Israel, the
    West Bank, and Gaza, and imposed severe restrictions on the movement of
    persons and some restrictions on the movement of goods between Israel
    and the West Bank and Gaza and between cities in the West Bank and
    Gaza--i.e., closure, which has been in effect to varying extents since
    1993 (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
        The Government continued to fund shelters and crisis centers;
    however, violence and discrimination against women persists.
    Discrimination against the disabled persists. The Government made
    little headway in reducing institutionalized legal and societal
    discrimination against Israel's Christian, Muslim, and Druze citizens,
    who constitute just over 20 percent of the population, but do not share
    fully the rights provided to, and obligations imposed on, the country's
    Jewish citizens. Prior to October, the Government did not take tangible
    steps to improve the situation of the country's non-Jewish citizens,
    which was one of the main factors that contributed to large Israeli
    Arab demonstrations in October. The demonstrations and clashes between
    the police and Israeli Arabs brought renewed attention to the different
    treatment accorded to the Jewish and Arab sectors of the country. In
    October the Government approved a $975 million economic assistance plan
    for Arab citizens to be phased in over 4 years; however, some human
    rights groups criticized the plan as inadequate. The Knesset did not
    approve the plan by year's end. Trafficking in women for the purpose of
    forced prostitution is a continuing problem. In June the Government
    passed a law that prohibits the trafficking of persons for the purpose
    of prostitution.
        In early October, there were many instances of societal violence
    between Arab and Jewish citizens, which coincided with violent events
    in the country.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings during the year.
        In October police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations
    in the north of the country that coincided with the outbreak of
    violence in the occupied territories (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.
    of the annex), killing 13 Arab citizens and injuring 300 with a
    combination of live ammunition and rubber-coated steel bullets (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Demonstrators did not have firearms; however,
    some demonstrators reportedly threw rocks and firebombs. International
    and domestic human rights groups assert that police used rubber-coated
    metal bullets and live ammunition against demonstrators who posed no
    imminent danger of death or serious injury to security forces or
    others.
        On September 28, opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple
    Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 29, Palestinians
    held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of
    the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live
    ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and
    injuring about 200 (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the annex). In
    response to this violence, Palestinians held demonstrations throughout
    the occupied territories and Israel. On October 1, Israeli Arab leaders
    called a general strike, which received widespread support from Arab
    citizens, thousands of whom demonstrated throughout the country. On
    October 1, police used live ammunition and rubber-coated metal bullets
    to disperse demonstrations in Um-al-Fahem, killing two persons and
    injuring hundreds of others. On October 2, police killed six persons
    and injured numerous others during demonstrations in Jat, Nazareth,
    Arrabe, and Sakhnin. Police also used live ammunition and rubber
    bullets to disperse demonstrations in other towns and villages in the
    north of the country, injuring hundreds of demonstrators. On October 3,
    police killed three persons during demonstrations in Nazareth and Kfar
    Manda.
        In October and November, coinciding with violence in Israel and the
    occupied territories, there were numerous violent incidents along the
    Israel-Lebanese border. On October 7, IDF personnel reportedly killed 2
    persons and injured 25 during demonstrations along the border. On
    October 9, the IDF reportedly fired live ammunition on a group of about
    500 Palestinian demonstrators who were throwing rocks and Molotov
    cocktails, and trying to cross the border into Israel; IDF personnel
    reportedly killed 1 person and injured 10.
        On October 21, Prime Minister Barak proposed establishing a
    commission of examination to study the violence that occurred in early
    October. However, Israeli Arab leaders rejected Barak's offer and
    demanded that the Government establish a legal commission of inquiry,
    which would operate independently of the Government, have subpoena
    power, and automatically bestow immunity on anyone who testified before
    it. On November 8, in response to pressure from both Arab and Jewish
    citizens, Barak announced the establishment of the Legal Commission of
    Inquiry, which reportedly is to have considerable ability to collect
    information. The Commission is headed by a High Court justice, and its
    members include an Arab judge from a Nazareth court, and a professor
    from Tel Aviv University. In December the Legal Commission of Inquiry
    began its investigation; however, it did not reach any conclusions by
    year's end.
        There also are credible reports that police failed to protect Arab
    lives and property in several incidents in which Jewish citizens
    attacked Arab citizens. On October 7, a group of about 200 Israeli Jews
    attacked Arab homes in Nazareth Illit (Upper Nazareth), including the
    home of an Arab Member of the Knesset. On October 8, a group of about
    1,000 Israeli Jews attacked Arab homes in Nazareth. The attackers
    allegedly targeted Arab citizens due to their anger over the Hizballah
    kidnaping of three IDF soldiers and the attack on Joseph's Tomb in the
    West Bank in early October (see Sections 1.b. and 2.c. of the annex).
    Many of the Arabs exited their homes and attempted to defend themselves
    and their property (see Section 5). Police reportedly arrived at the
    scene late, did not take action beyond inserting themselves between the
    two groups, and fired live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas at
    the Arab citizens. Two Israeli Arabs were killed and approximately 50
    others were injured in these incidents. International and domestic
    human rights groups reported that the police were responsible for the
    deaths and injuries; however, some residents of Nazareth reported that
    some members of the Jewish crowd had firearms. Large crowds of Jews
    also attacked Arab homes, businesses, and two mosques in other areas of
    the country (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Arab protesters also attacked
    Jewish-owned businesses and at least one synagogue (see Sections 1.c.
    and 5).
        During the year, 22 Israelis died and 244 were injured in terrorist
    attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals in Israel and
    the occupied territories (also see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the
    annex). For example, on November 1, a car bomb in Jerusalem killed two
    Israelis and injured eleven others, including four children.
    Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. On
    November 22, a car bomb in Hadera killed three Israelis and injured 61.
    Palestinian Islamic Jihad also claimed responsibility for this attack.
        b. Disappearance.--On October 10, Hizballah guerrillas kidnaped
    three IDF soldiers. At year's end, the soldiers were believed to be
    held in Lebanon.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical
    abuse of detainees; however, security forces sometimes abused
    Palestinians suspected of security offenses. A landmark decision by the
    High Court of Justice in September 1999 prohibited the use of a variety
    of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in
    contorted positions (``Shabbeh''), sleep deprivation for extended
    periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. Since
    the September 1999 ruling, domestic and international NGO's have been
    unable to substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces
    tortured detainees.
        Prior to the High Court's 1999 decision, laws and administrative
    regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not
    enforced in security cases. The head of the ISA was empowered by
    government regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate
    physical and psychological pressure'' (which included violent shaking)
    while interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses.
    In November 1999, the Attorney General issued revised guidelines that
    denied blanket immunity from prosecution for interrogators; however, it
    remains theoretically possible that the State could decline to
    prosecute interrogators who used prohibited methods in cases of extreme
    urgency.
        In October police used live ammunition and rubber-coated metal
    bullets to disperse demonstrators in the north of the country, killing
    13 Arab citizens and injuring over 300 (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
    Demonstrators reportedly did not have firearms; however, in some cases
    they reportedly threw rocks and firebombs. On October 1, police beat
    severely a woman who screamed at a police officer during a
    demonstration. The incident was videotaped and broadcast on domestic
    and international television.
        There were numerous credible allegations from human rights groups
    that police beat persons in detention; reports of such beatings
    increased in October following demonstrations and the numerous
    subsequent police arrests of suspected or actual participants in the
    demonstrations (see Section 1.d.). For example, on October 26, police
    arrested an Arab citizen, Amneh Aqayleh, on suspicion of participating
    in demonstrations in Nazareth. Police brought Aqayleh to the Kishon
    detention center for interrogation where they reportedly beat him.
    Police also reportedly arrested and beat some Jewish demonstrators. For
    example, according to Amnesty International police arrested and beat
    Yoav Bar following a demonstration in Wadi Nisnas, breaking his hand,
    two of his ribs, and two of his teeth. According to Amnesty
    International, police also reportedly arrested and beat youths
    following demonstrations in the north of the country (see Section
    1.d.).
        According to local and international human rights NGO's, in some
    cases police reportedly delayed ambulances and medical personnel from
    entering Arab villages to treat persons who were injured during the
    clashes (see Section 2.d.). According to police officials, the streets
    often were too crowded and volatile for the ambulances to enter the
    villages safely. According to some observers, local leaders broadcast
    requests over mosque loudspeakers that demonstrators return home in
    order to clear the way for ambulances.
        In early October, police failed to protect Arab lives and property
    when a group of approximately 1,000 Jewish citizens attacked Arab
    Israeli homes in Nazareth. Police fired live ammunition, rubber
    bullets, and tear gas at Arab citizens. Two persons were killed and 50
    persons were injured (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        During the year, 244 Israelis were injured in terrorist attacks
    carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals in Israel and the
    occupied territories (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the annex).
        Conditions vary in incarceration facilities in Israel and the
    occupied territories, which are administered by the Israeli Prison
    Service (IPS), the IDF, or the national police. IPS prisons, which
    generally house Israeli citizens convicted of common crimes, usually
    provide inmates with sufficient living space, food, and access to
    medical care. In general, IPS inmates are not subject to physical abuse
    by guards, and prisoners receive basic necessities. Inmates receive
    mail, have television sets in their cells, and receive regular visits.
    Prisoners receive wages for prison work and benefits for good behavior.
    Many IPS prisons have drug treatment, educational, and recreational
    programs. The IPS established a national police unit to investigate
    allegations of offenses committed by guards, including complaints about
    the use of force against inmates.
        Since the closure in 1995 of the main IDF detention camps in the
    occupied territories, all security detainees (i.e., those detained and
    held without charge by security forces) from the occupied territories
    who are held for more than a few days are transferred to facilities
    within Israel. During the year, security detainees usually were held in
    the IDF's Megiddo prison, in IPS facilities, and in special sections of
    police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated for security
    reasons are subject to a different regimen, even in IPS facilities.
    They often are denied privileges given to prisoners convicted on
    criminal charges such as furloughs and some family visits. According to
    the Government, security detainees may receive financial assistance
    from the Palestinian Authority (PA), food from their families, and
    medical supplies from the ICRC and other aid organizations. Security
    detainees include some minors. Detention facilities administered by the
    IDF are limited to male Palestinian detainees and are guarded by armed
    soldiers. The total number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel,
    approximately 1,354 at the beginning of the year, reached 1,832 by
    year's end. The number of administrative detainees (held without charge
    or trial) was between 10 and 15 at year's end, including one Israeli
    Arab (see Section 1.d.). Under the terms of the Sharm el-Sheikh
    Memorandum, the Government released a total of 350 Palestinian security
    prisoners in 1999 (in addition to the 250 prisoners released in late
    1998 pursuant to the Wye River Accords). On May 1, Palestinian
    prisoners throughout the country began a hunger strike to protest
    prison conditions and their continued incarceration. Following
    negotiations with government and PA officials, the prisoners agreed to
    suspend the hunger strike on May 31. The Government agreed to remove
    prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow family members to
    visit inmates, and the prisoners agreed to refrain from planning
    terrorist attacks from prison.
        Conditions at the Russian Compound, which is run by police and
    houses a combination of security and common prisoners and detainees in
    Jerusalem, were criticized in 1997 as ``not fit to serve as lock-up''
    by High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak. Conditions in other
    IDF facilities have improved in some respects. For example, inmates are
    given more time for exercise outside their cells. Nevertheless,
    recreational facilities remain minimal, and there are strict
    limitations on family visits to detainees. Visits were prevented for
    long periods of time during closures.
        Conditions at some national police detention facilities are poor.
    Such facilities are intended to hold criminal detainees prior to trial
    but often become de facto prisons. Those held include some security
    detainees and some persons who have been convicted and sentenced.
    Inmates in the national police detention facilities often are not
    accorded the same rights as prisoners in the IPS system. Moreover,
    conditions are worse in the separate facilities for security detainees
    maintained both in police facilities and in IPS prisons.
        In 1996 the Government began a reform program for the country's
    detention facilities. To date, there have been some improvements,
    including the opening of a model detention center near Netanya;
    however, problems, including dilapidation and overcrowding persist. The
    1997 Arrest and Detention law provided for the right to live in
    conditions that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee,
    access to adequate health care, the right to a bed for each detainee,
    and access to exercise and fresh air on a daily basis. The Government
    has made significant strides towards implementing this legislation,
    though problems remain.
        Children's rights groups have expressed particular concern over the
    separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of
    children. Overcrowding, poor physical conditions, lack of social
    workers, and denial of visits by parents are among the key problems. In
    addition to some Israeli minors held in criminal cases, there are
    juveniles among Palestinian detainees. Children's rights activists had
    recommended the construction of a separate detention facility for
    children, and after a prolonged legal battle, separate prison
    facilities were built for Arab and Jewish children.
        All incarceration facilities are monitored regularly by various
    branches of the Government, by members of the Knesset, by the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and by human rights
    groups (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
        In September 1999, the Government acknowledged that it trained,
    debriefed, and paid the salaries of the Lebanese administrators and
    staff of the Al-Khiam prison in southern Lebanon, where prisoners
    allegedly were tortured routinely. Following the IDF withdrawal from
    its self-declared ``security zone'' and the concurrent collapse of the
    SLA, all of the prisoners in Al-Khiam were released.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest of citizens, and the Government generally observes
    this prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven
    guilty and have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other
    procedural safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits administrative, or
    preventive, detention (i.e., without charge or trial), which is used on
    occasion in security cases. In such cases, the Minister of Defense may
    issue a detention order for a maximum of 1 year, though such orders may
    be extended. Within 24 hours of issuance, detainees must appear before
    a district judge who may confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If
    the order is confirmed, an automatic review takes place after 3 months.
    Detention orders were confirmed in all cases during the year. Detainees
    have the right to be represented by counsel and to appeal detention
    orders to the High Court of Justice; however, the security forces may
    delay notification of counsel with the consent of a judge. According to
    human rights groups and legal experts, there were cases in which a
    judge denied the Government's request to delay notification of counsel.
    At detention hearings, the security forces may withhold evidence from
    defense lawyers on security grounds. The Government also may seek to
    renew administrative detention orders. However, the security services
    must ``show cause'' for continued detention, and, in some instances,
    individuals were released because the standard could not be met.
        In felony cases and in ordinary security cases, a district court
    judge may postpone for 48 hours the notification of arrest to the
    detainee's attorney. The postponement may be extended to 7 days by the
    Minister of Defense on national security grounds or by the police
    inspector general to conduct an investigation. Moreover, a judge may
    postpone notification for up to 15 days in national security cases.
        The 1997 Arrest and Detention Law more narrowly defined the grounds
    for pretrial detention in criminal and security cases and reduced to 24
    hours the length of time a person may be held without charge; however,
    this law does not extend to administrative detention cases. Human
    rights groups allege abuse of detention orders in cases in which they
    assert that the accused did not pose a clear danger to society.
    Children's rights activists have recommended separate legislation to
    define when and how a child may be arrested and how long children may
    be detained. According to media reports and children's rights groups,
    during and following the violence in the north, police sometimes beat
    youths while arresting them (see Sections 1.c.).
        Most of the protections afforded to Israelis are not extended to
    Palestinian detainees, who fall under the jurisdiction of military law
    even if they are detained in Israel. With IDF redeployment in the West
    Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result, all
    Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days are incarcerated
    in Israel (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
        Police arrested hundreds of persons mainly in the north of the
    country in connection with the demonstrations and disturbances that
    began in September; approximately two-thirds of the persons arrested
    were Arab citizens and about one-third were Jewish citizens. According
    to domestic and international human rights organizations, police
    continued to arrest Arab citizens whom they suspected of participating
    in the disturbances over a month after the demonstrations ended. On
    October 26, the Northern Police Commander announced to the press that
    his office compiled a list of hundreds of persons who participated in
    the demonstrations and that the police intended to arrest many of them.
    According to human rights organizations, police lacked any evidence
    against a significant number of Israeli Arabs that they arrested. There
    also were credible reports that police tricked some Israeli Arabs into
    confessing that they threw stones during demonstrations. Many of the
    persons arrested, including some minors, also reportedly were held
    without bail until the end of criminal proceedings against them.
    Several detainees brought appeals to the High Court of Justice;
    however, the Court upheld this practice on the grounds that calm had
    not yet returned to the country. According to Amnesty International, at
    least 10 Arab citizens detained in connection with the disturbances in
    October were denied access to counsel for up to 1 week.
        In December for the first time since 1994, the Government placed an
    Israeli Arab, Jhasan Athamnah, in administrative detention where he was
    being held on secret evidence at year's end.
        At year's end, the Government held 1,832 Palestinians in custody.
    Those held were a mixture of common prisoners, administrative
    detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny the
    ICRC access to one Lebanese citizen, Mustafa Dirani (held without
    charge since 1994). The Government granted the ICRC access to Sheikh
    Obeid (held without charge since 1989) for the first time in December
    1999, and allowed the ICRC four additional visits during the year.
    However, following the October kidnaping of IDF soldiers by Hizballah
    guerrillas (see Section 1.b.), the Government suspended ICRC access to
    Sheikh Obeid. In May 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that the
    Government was entitled to continue holding them for use in a possible
    exchange of hostages to obtain the return of an Israeli who still may
    be held by hostile forces. The High Court's ruling stressed that
    national security needs took precedence over the detainees' individual
    rights under Israeli and international law. However, in April the High
    Court declared illegal the detention of individuals to be used as
    ``bargaining chips;'' the Government subsequently released 13 Lebanese
    prisoners. However, Obeid, Dirani, and approximately 18 other Lebanese
    prisoners remained in custody at year's end; the former are
    administrative detainees, and the latter have been charged and
    convicted of crimes. The Government claims that Obeid and Dirani are
    security threats and attempted to pass legislation that would allow the
    continued detention without charge of ``members of enemy forces not
    entitled to prisoner-of-war status.'' The bill had passed a first
    reading by year's end. Two legal advisors to the Knesset criticized the
    bill, claiming that it contravened domestic and international laws.
        Six Iraqis, held since they attempted to enter the country
    illegally from Jordan, were deported to Holland, Sweden, and Finland,
    where they obtained refugee status.
        The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government
    respects this prohibition in practice.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
    However, in the past the judiciary routinely acquiesced to the
    Government's position in security cases. The September 1999 landmark
    High Court of Justice decision barring the use of torture (see Section
    1.c.) marked a major change in this practice, as did the April ruling
    prohibiting the holding of detainees for use as ``bargaining chips.''
    The judiciary generally provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        The judicial system is composed of civil, military, religious,
    labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court of
    Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court of Justice
    is both a court of first instance (in cases involving government
    action) and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme Court).
    Each of the cited courts, including the High Court of Justice, have
    appellate courts or jurisdictions.
        The law provides for the right to a hearing with representation by
    counsel, and authorities observe this right in practice. A regional and
    national system of public defenders operated by the Ministry of Justice
    was inaugurated in 1996 and now employs about 700 attorneys through 5
    regional offices. Under the system, economically disadvantaged persons
    who face sentences of 5 years or longer, and all persons who are
    accused of crimes with sentences of 10 years or longer receive
    mandatory legal representation. Judges also have discretionary power to
    appoint an attorney in all cases. Since the system was implemented,
    representation has increased to about 70 percent. All non-security
    trials are public except those in which the interests of the parties
    are deemed best served by privacy. Cases involving national security
    may be tried in either military or civil courts and may be partly or
    wholly closed to the public. The prosecution must justify closing the
    proceedings to the public in such cases, and the Attorney General
    determines the venue. Adult defendants have the right to be represented
    by counsel even in closed proceedings but may be denied access to some
    evidence on security grounds. Under the law, convictions may not be
    based on any evidence denied to the defense. In addition, convictions
    may not be based solely on a confession by the accused, although in
    practice security prisoners have been sentenced on the basis of the
    coerced confessions of both themselves and others.
        According to human rights organizations, the legal system often
    imposes far stiffer punishments on Christian, Muslim, and Druze
    citizens than on Jewish citizens. For example, human rights advocates
    claim that Israeli Arabs are more likely to be convicted of murder
    (which carries a mandatory life sentence) than Jewish Israelis. The
    courts reportedly also are more likely to detain Arab-Israelis until
    the conclusion of proceedings. The Government notes that the judicial
    system is independent and disputes the charge that the court system
    systematically discriminates against non-Jewish citizens. According to
    press reports, following the demonstrations that took place in
    September and October, 66 percent of those arrested were Arab Israelis,
    and 84 percent of those detained until the conclusion of proceedings as
    of late October were Arab Israelis (see Section 1.d.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Privacy of the individual and the home generally are
    protected by law; however, the Government uses laws that provide that
    authorities may interfere with mail and monitor telephone conversations
    in certain circumstances. In criminal cases, the law permits
    wiretapping under court order; in security cases, the order must be
    issued by the Ministry of Defense. Under emergency regulations,
    authorities may open and destroy mail on security grounds.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--In May Israeli forces withdrew from southern
    Lebanon in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. Prior to
    the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May, violence continued
    there and in northern Israel. An estimated 20 Hizballah guerrillas, and
    25 Lebanese civilians were killed in southern Lebanon prior to the
    Israeli withdrawal. Israeli forces and the SLA responded to Hizballah,
    Amal, and Palestinian guerrilla attacks as all sides engaged in
    recurring violence. For example, on February 8, in response to
    Hizballah attacks, Israel conducted air strikes on electrical power
    transformer stations and other targets, injuring over 1 dozen
    civilians. In retaliation for Hizballah attacks in May, Israel shelled
    military and civilian targets in the south, killing two persons.
    Israeli forces conducted air strikes and artillery barrages on
    Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets, including civilian
    infrastructure, inside Lebanon. During the May IDF withdrawal from
    southern Lebanon and the concurrent collapse of the SLA, at least four
    Lebanese civilians were killed by Israeli helicopter gunfire. In
    response to a Hizballah bombing in November, Israel launched airstrikes
    on Hizballah positions in the south, injuring one civilian.
        There were over 110 Lebanese civilian injuries prior to the IDF
    withdrawal, with most of the injuries involving minor wounds from
    shrapnel and broken glass. Civilians accounted for over 70 percent of
    the injured.
        Attacks by Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerillas resulted in
    numerous deaths and injuries. An estimated 9 Israeli soldiers were
    killed in southern Lebanon and northern Israel by roadside bombs,
    ambushes, and cross border attacks. Additionally 40 Israeli civilians
    were injured in shelling and cross border attacks.
        On October 7, Hizballah launched shells on IDF positions in the
    Sha'ba farms area in the Golan Heights; no injuries reportedly resulted
    from the shelling. The shelling reportedly served as cover for the
    kidnaping of three IDF soldiers in the north (see Section 1.b.). In May
    Hizballah attacks in the north of Israel killed 1 person and injured
    12. On October 20, IDF fire repulsed a cross border infiltration
    attempt by unidentified Lebanese insurgents; two were killed and the
    third was injured.
        On November 26, Hizballah guerillas bombed an Israeli patrol
    station in the Sha'ba farms area, killing 1 IDF soldier. In October
    Hizballah guerillas kidnaped 3 Israeli soldiers on patrol in the north
    of Israel, demanding that the Israeli government release all remaining
    Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons (see Section 1.b.). At year's
    end, the soldiers were believed to be held in Lebanon.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    the press, and the Government generally respects this right in
    practice. The law authorizes the Government to censor any material
    reported from Israel or the occupied territories regarded as sensitive
    on national security grounds. A censorship agreement signed in 1996
    between the Government and media representatives continued the trend of
    liberalization of the Government's censorship regime. The agreement,
    which now applies to all media organizations in the country, provides
    that military censorship is to be applied only in cases involving
    national security issues that have a near certainty of harming the
    country's defense interests. All media organizations can appeal the
    censor's decision to the High Court of Justice. Moreover, a clause
    prohibits the military censor from shutting down a newspaper for
    censorship violations and from appealing a court judgement against it.
    News printed or broadcast abroad may be reported without the censor's
    review, which permits the media to run previously censored stories that
    have appeared in foreign sources. Emergency regulations prohibit
    persons from expressing support for illegal organizations. On occasion
    in the past, the Government has prosecuted persons for speaking or
    writing on behalf of terrorist groups. No such cases were filed during
    the year. During the year, there were reports that the military censor
    intervened in several cases related to national defense.
        One Palestinian-owned newspaper is required to submit its entire
    contents, including advertising, to the military censor by 4:00 p.m.
    each day. The editor claims that this process caused his journalists to
    practice self-censorship. Journalists and professional journalist
    groups complained about limitations placed on their freedom of movement
    within the occupied territories, between the West Bank and Gaza, and
    between the occupied territories and Israel during the violent unrest
    in September (see Section 2.d.). One media organization reported that
    more than two dozen journalists were injured or harassed while covering
    events in the occupied territories in October and November (see Section
    2.a. of the annex). On October 5, during a demonstration in Jaffa,
    demonstrators acting outside of government control assaulted a foreign
    camera crew, injuring several journalists and breaking three cameras.
        Foreign journalists are required to sign an agreement to submit
    certain news stories and photographs for censorship; however, they
    rarely are challenged for not doing so.
        Individuals, groups, and the press freely address public issues and
    criticize government policies and officials without reprisal. Laws
    prohibit hate speech and incitement to violence. All newspapers are
    privately owned and managed. Newspaper licenses are valid only for
    Israel; separate licenses are required to distribute publications in
    areas in the occupied territories still under Israel's authority.
    Sixteen daily newspapers are published in Israel. There are about 90
    weekly local newspapers and more than 250 periodical publications.
        Directed by a government appointee, the quasi-independent Israel
    Broadcast Authority (IBA) controls television Channel 1 and Kol Israel
    (Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and information.
    The privately operated Channel 2, the country's first commercial
    television station, is operated by three franchise companies and
    supervised by the Second Television and Radio Authority, a public body
    that also supervises 14 private radio stations. There are five cable
    television companies that carry both domestic and international
    networks.
        The Government continued to attempt to close down the estimated 150
    pirate radio stations operating out of Israel and the West Bank.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for the right of assembly, and the Government generally respects this
    provision in practice.
        During the year, there were a number of peaceful demonstrations
    against withdrawal from the Golan Heights and for and against peace
    negotiations with the Palestinians.
        In early October, thousands of Arab citizens throughout the country
    participated in demonstrations. In some cases demonstrators threw
    stones and Molotov cocktails. The demonstrators were reacting to events
    in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as against government
    and police discrimination against Arab citizens (see Section 5). Police
    killed 13 Arab citizens and injured over 300 others during
    demonstrations in several towns and villages in the north (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.c.). Human rights groups noted that the only fatalities and
    serious injuries occurred in the north and criticized the Northern
    Police Commander for authorizing the use of excessive force.
        The law provides for the right of association, and the Government
    generally respects this provision in practice. After the Hebron
    massacre in 1994, the Cabinet invoked the 1948 ordinance for the
    prevention of terror to ban the ultranationalist Kach and Kahane Chai
    organizations, a ban that remains in effect. The decision provides for
    imprisonment for anyone belonging to, or expressing support for, either
    organization.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government generally respects this right. Approximately 80
    percent of citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and members
    of other religions make up the remaining 20 percent. Each recognized
    religious community has legal authority over its members in matters of
    marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of
    inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring cases to
    religious courts. Jewish and Druze families may ask for some family
    status matters, such as alimony and child custody in divorces, to be
    adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
    Christians only may ask that child custody and child support be
    adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
    Muslims have no recourse to civil courts in family-status matters.
    Legislation passed in 1996 allows the rabbinical courts to sanction
    either party who is not willing to grant a divorce.
        Many citizens object to the Orthodox Jewish religious authorities'
    exclusive control over Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial. These
    authorities do not recognize marriages or conversions to Judaism
    performed in Israel by Conservative or Reform rabbis. These issues have
    been a source of serious controversy within society, particularly in
    recent years, as thousands of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet
    Union have brought with them family members not recognized as Jewish by
    Orthodox authorities.
        Many Jews who wish to be married in secular or non-Orthodox
    religious ceremonies do so abroad. The Ministry of Interior recognizes
    such marriages.
        Under the Government's current interpretation and implementation of
    Jewish personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to initiate
    divorce proceedings without her husband's consent; consequently there
    are hundreds of so-called ``agunot'' in the country who cannot remarry
    or have legitimate children because their husbands either have
    disappeared or refused to grant a divorce.
        In August Prime Minister Barak announced his plans to ``separate
    religion from politics'' by promoting a ``civil-social revolution''
    consisting of a number of measures including: Drafting a constitution,
    folding the Ministry of Religious Affairs into the Ministry of Justice,
    lifting restrictions on transportation during the Sabbath, allowing for
    some form of civil marriages, eliminating the nationality clause from
    identification cards, and introducing a new core curriculum in all
    state-funded schools. These proposals triggered a national debate on
    religion and society. By year's end, none of these proposed reforms had
    been implemented.
        A January 1999 High Court ruling enabled Reform and Conservative
    rabbis to hold seats on the powerful municipal and religious councils.
    In 1998 the High Court ruled that draft exemptions for yeshiva students
    was illegal; however, it delayed implementation of the ruling several
    times and gave the Knesset until December 21 to pass legislation on the
    matter. On December 20, an 11-justice panel of the High Court rejected
    the Government's request for another extension; however, it stated that
    it would grant the IDF a ``reasonable period'' of time in which to
    implement the ruling.
        The Government provides proportionally greater financial support to
    institutions in the Jewish sector compared with those in the non-Jewish
    sector, i.e., Muslim, Christian, and Druze. For example, only 2.4
    percent of the Ministry of Religious Affairs budget for 1999 was
    allocated to the non-Jewish sector, although Muslims, Christians, and
    Druze constitute 20 percent of the population. In 1998 the High Court
    of Justice ruled that the budget allocation constituted ``prima facie
    discrimination'' but that the plaintiff's petition did not provide
    adequate information about the religious needs of the various
    communities. The court refused to intervene in the budgetary process on
    the grounds that such action would invade the proper sphere of the
    legislature. However, during the year, the court ordered the Government
    to allocate resources equitably to cemeteries of the Jewish and Arab
    communities.
        The status of a number of Christian organizations with
    representation in Israel heretofore has been defined by a collection of
    ad hoc arrangements with various government agencies. Several of these
    organizations seek to negotiate with the Government in an attempt to
    formalize their status.
        Missionaries are allowed to proselytize, although the Church of
    Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints voluntarily refrains from doing so
    under an agreement with the Government. A 1977 anti-proselytizing law
    prohibits anyone from offering or receiving material benefits as an
    inducement to conversion; however, there have been no reports of its
    enforcement. On December 6, a law prohibiting some missionary activity
    and the dissemination of some missionary material passed a first
    reading in the Knesset.
        Jehovah's Witnesses suffered verbal abuse, assaults, theft, and
    vandalism; however, they reported that the police response to their
    complaints improved significantly during the year.
        The Government has recognized only Jewish holy places under the
    1967 Protection of Holy Sites Law. The Government states that it also
    protects the holy sites of other faiths, and that it has provided funds
    for some holy sites of other faiths.
        A group of more than 100 Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform women
    continued a long legal battle to hold women's prayer services at the
    Western Wall during the year. In May the High Court ruled that women
    may read from the Torah and wear prayer shawls at the Western Wall.
    Both legislators and the state prosecutor's office sought to overturn
    the ruling; however, they were not successful as of year's end.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice for citizens, except with
    regard to military or security zones or in instances where citizens may
    be confined by administrative order to their neighborhoods or villages.
    However, following the outbreak of violence in late September, the
    Government imposed some restrictions on the movement of persons within
    the country as well as between Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and
    between cities inside the West Bank and Gaza (also see Section 2.d. of
    the annex). The Government continued to restrict the movements of two
    Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to
    extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative
    orders issued by the IDF central command (see Section 2.d. of the
    annex).
        Citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they
    have no outstanding military obligations and are not restricted by
    administrative order. During the year, the Government generally
    continued to permit Muslim citizens to make the Hajj. However for
    security reasons, the Government imposes some restrictions on its
    Muslim citizens who perform the Hajj, including requiring that they be
    over the age of 30. The Government does not allow persons to return if
    they leave the country without formal permission. The Government
    justifies these restrictions on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remains
    officially at war with Israel and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore
    is considered subject to security considerations.
        The Government states that non-Jewish female citizens who marry
    non-citizen men may retain their citizenship. The Government also
    asserts that the male spouses of non-Jewish citizens may acquire
    citizenship under the family reunification program, except in cases
    where the man has a criminal record or is suspected of posing a threat
    to security. However, Christian, Muslim, or Druze women who have
    married men from Arab states or the West Bank and Gaza have complained
    about losing their Israeli citizenship and right to reenter Israel.
        During the demonstrations and disturbances in late September,
    police reportedly closed roads and entrances to some Arab villages and
    cities around the country. According to human rights groups, police
    also sometimes delayed ambulances and medical personnel from entering
    Arab villages to treat persons who were injured during the clashes (see
    Section 1.c.). Journalists complained about limitations placed on their
    freedom of movement during the violence in Israel and the occupied
    territories (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government welcomes Jewish immigrants, their Jewish or non-
    Jewish family members, and Jewish refugees, on whom it confers
    automatic citizenship and residence rights under the Law of Return.
    This law does not apply to non-Jews or to persons of Jewish descent who
    have converted to another faith. Other than the Law of Return and the
    family reunification statutes there is no immigration law that provides
    for immigration to the country, or for political asylum or refugee
    status. The law does allow individuals to live in the country as
    permanent residents.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
    in assisting refugees. The Government does not provide asylum to
    refugees from states with which the country remains in a state of war.
    The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution. Six Iraqis who had been held in detention found asylum in
    Europe during the year (see Section 1.d.).
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens To
            Change Their Government
        The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
    peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
    periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage for adult citizens. The last national elections were held in
    May 1999. On December 9, Ehud Barak resigned as Prime Minister; the
    next prime ministerial elections were scheduled to be held on February
    6, 2001.
        Israel is a parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty
    system in which a wide range of political views are represented.
    Relatively small parties, including those whose primary support is
    among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset. Elections are
    by secret ballot.
        There are no legal impediments to the participation of women and
    minorities in government; however, they are underrepresented. Women
    hold 15 of 120 Knesset seats, compared with 9 female members in the
    previous Knesset. There are 11 Arabs and 2 Druze in the Knesset; most
    represent parties that derive their support largely or entirely from
    the Arab community. Of the Knesset's 12 committees, 2 (including the
    Committee on the Status of Women) are chaired by a woman. There are two
    women in the Cabinet, but no Arab ministers. However, there is an Arab
    Deputy Foreign Minister. Four women, but no Arab or Druze citizens,
    serve on the 14-member High Court of Justice. During the year, the
    Government appointed an Arab to a 6-month term on the High Court; the
    Government did not renew his appointment at the end of his term.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with
    investigations.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital
    status. The law also prohibits discrimination by both government and
    nongovernmental entities on the basis of race, religion, political
    beliefs, and age. Local human rights groups are concerned that these
    laws often are not enforced, either as a result of institutionalized
    discrimination, or because resources for implementing those laws, or
    mechanisms for their enforcement, sometimes are lacking.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. There continued to be
    action, both in and out of Government, to reduce violence against women
    in Jewish and Arab communities. Funding to combat such violence
    increased significantly in 1998 and has remained level since. In 1998
    the Government appointed a commission to address the subject of
    domestic violence; on the basis of the commission's recommendations,
    the Government allotted a supplementary budget allocation to combat
    domestic violence during the year. Groups that focus on domestic
    violence include a committee established by the Ministry of Labor and
    Social Affairs that includes Jewish and Arab NGO's as well as
    government representatives, and a coalition of human rights
    organizations; however, women's rights activists reported that most of
    the groups are funded privately. Twenty-three women were killed by
    their husbands or other male relatives during the year. According to
    one prominent women's group, between 150,000 and 200,000 women suffer
    from domestic violence each year, and some 7 percent of these are
    abused on a regular basis. According to women's organizations,
    approximately 2,800 women were assaulted sexually and approximately
    1,200 were victims of incest during the year; about 44 percent of the
    women were under age 18. Only a small percentage of the victims
    complained to the police.
        Arab human rights advocates also have formed a coalition to raise
    public awareness of so-called family ``honor killings,'' a term
    commonly used for the murder of a female by a male relative for alleged
    misconduct. At least 5 of the 23 women killed during the year by male
    relatives were killed in family ``honor'' cases; families often attempt
    to cover up the cause of such deaths.
        The Government provides partial funding for 12 shelters for
    battered women, including 1 exclusively for Arab women and 1 for ultra-
    Orthodox Jewish women. Women's rights advocates consider this number
    inadequate. The Government also provides funding for 13 rape crisis
    centers. There are 25 domestic violence prevention and treatment
    centers, which mainly are funded privately.
        According to the 1991 Domestic Violence Law, a district or
    magistrate court may prohibit access by violent family members to their
    property. Women's groups cooperate with legal and social service
    institutions to provide women's rights education. While sentences
    handed down to men convicted of rape have increased in recent years,
    women's rights activists argue that the penalties are not sufficiently
    harsh.
        Unlike in past years, there were no reports that Jewish religious
    extremists attacked physically women whom they considered to be dressed
    immodestly in public.
        Prostitution per se is not illegal; however, the operation of
    brothels and organized sex enterprises is outlawed.
        Trafficking in women has become a significant problem in recent
    years. According to recent studies, every year hundreds of women from
    the former Soviet Union are brought to Israel by well-organized
    criminal networks and forced to work illegally as prostitutes (see
    Section 6.f.).
        In 1998 Israel adopted a comprehensive sexual harassment prevention
    law; since that time several prominent cases have increased public
    awareness of the issue. For example, in July the Government lifted the
    immunity of then Transportation Minister Yitzhak Mordecai following
    complaints that he had sexually harassed three women. As of July, the
    Civil Service Commission had received 55 complaints of sexual
    harassment in the Ministry of Defense.
        Women's advocacy groups report that women routinely receive lower
    wages for comparable work, are promoted less often, and have fewer
    career opportunities than their male counterparts. Despite 1996
    legislation that provides for class action suits and requires employers
    to provide equal pay for equal work, including important side benefits
    and allowances, women's rights advocates charged that deep gaps
    remained. For example, the wage gap between men and women for year-
    round, full-time employment is about 30 percent, and only 2 percent of
    women serve in positions of senior management in large companies.
    According to recent reports, 51 percent of doctoral students are women,
    but women compose only 23 percent of the senior faculty members at
    universities and only 9.5 percent of full professors.
        Legislation in 1993, reinforced by a 1994 ruling of the High Court
    of Justice, has increased the percentage of women on the boards of
    government-owned companies. Women currently occupy 39 percent of
    director slots, up from 28.8 percent in 1997.
        The adjudication of personal status law in the areas of marriage
    and divorce is left to religious courts, where Jewish and Muslim women
    are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights (see Section
    2.c.). Under personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to
    initiate divorce proceedings without her husband's consent;
    consequently there are estimated to be thousands of so-called
    ``agunot'' who cannot remarry or have legitimate children because their
    husbands either have disappeared or have refused to grant a divorce.
        The 1995 Rabbinical Courts Law allows rabbinical tribunals to
    impose sanctions on husbands who refuse to divorce wives who have ample
    grounds for divorce, such as abuse. However, in some cases rabbinical
    courts have failed to invoke these sanctions. In addition, there have
    been cases in which a wife has failed to agree to a divorce, but a
    husband has been allowed to remarry; this permission is not given to
    wives. Such imbalances have been used by husbands to extort concessions
    from their wives in return for agreeing to a divorce. Rabbinical courts
    also may exercise jurisdiction over and issue sanctions against non-
    Israeli persons present in Israel.
        Religious law can be even more restrictive for Muslims: some
    Islamic law courts have held that Muslim women may not request a
    divorce, but that women may be forced to consent if a divorce is
    granted to a man.
        Jewish women are subject to the military draft; however, they have
    been barred from combat positions. In 1997 the Knesset passed
    legislation that opens all military professions, including combat
    positions, to women; however, the legislation was not implemented by
    year's end. In response to a High Court of Justice ruling, the Israeli
    Air Force (IAF) since 1996 has permitted women to enter pilot training.
    At year's end, three women were operating as navigators in F-4's and F-
    16's and one woman was nearing completion of pilot training. Recent IAF
    rulings allow female flight surgeons to participate in combat rescue
    missions and permit women to serve as flight mechanics for combat
    helicopter patrols.
        In March the Knesset passed the Equality of Women Law, which
    provides for equal rights for women in the workplace, the military,
    education, health, housing, and social welfare, and entitles women to
    protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, and
    trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of
    children. However, in practice resources sometimes are insufficient,
    particularly with respect to low-income families. Government spending
    is proportionally lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish
    areas, which adversely affects children in Arab villages and cities.
    Education is compulsory to age 15, or until the child reaches the 10th
    grade, whichever comes first. Government ministries, children's rights
    groups, and members of the legislature often cooperate on children's
    rights issues. The Government provides an extensive health care program
    for children. There is a broad network of mother and child clinics,
    which provide prenatal care as well as postnatal follow-up.
        The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and
    psychological abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive
    reporting requirements. Although there has been a sharp increase in
    reported cases of child abuse in recent years, activists believe that
    this is largely due to increased awareness of the issue rather than a
    growing pattern of abuse. There are five shelters for children at risk.
    The Ministry of Justice formed a committee with police and NGO
    representatives that is attempting to assess the scope of child
    prostitution. Children's rights activists estimate that there may be
    several hundred prostitutes among the nation's children, and they warn
    that the phenomenon is unlikely to be eradicated until the social
    problems that give rise to it--including child abuse and schools that
    give up too readily on dropouts--are addressed.
        NGO's in the field of children's welfare concentrate their efforts
    on public education, on promoting the concept of children's rights as
    citizens, on improving legal representation for minors, and on
    combating the problems of poverty, which are most notable for the
    Bedouin children of the south. There has been concern about the
    children of the country's growing population of foreign workers, many
    of whom reside in the country illegally. Children of such families,
    believed to number in the thousands, exist in a legal and social limbo,
    without access to schools or adequate health services.
        Privately funded children's rights information centers have been
    established in some communities, and the Government assists in funding
    additional centers in other cities.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government provides a range of
    benefits, including income maintenance, housing subsidies, and
    transportation support for disabled persons, who constitute about 10
    percent of the population. Existing antidiscrimination laws do not
    prohibit discrimination based on disability, and these citizens
    continue to encounter difficulties in areas such as employment and
    housing. A law requiring access for the disabled to public buildings is
    not widely enforced. There is no law providing for access to public
    transportation for the disabled. A 1996 law extended disability
    assistance for deaf children from the age of 14 to maturity. Extended
    protests by disabled organizations 1999 led to an increase in
    government spending in support of the disabled.
        During the year, the Government implemented a law seeking to
    rehabilitate and integrate the mentally disabled into the community;
    however, government discrimination against the mentally disabled
    remained a problem. According to the Ministry of Health, there are
    between 60,000 to 80,000 mentally disabled persons in the country;
    however, only 4 percent of the Ministry of Health's $5 billion (20
    billion NIS) budget is allocated for mental health services.
    Additionally, 80 percent of the mental health budget is allocated to
    psychiatric hospitals where less than 6,000 of the mentally disabled
    reside; the remaining tens of thousands of mentally disabled persons
    live on their own with little or no government support to help them
    integrate into the community.
        Religious Minorities.--Tensions between secular and religious
    elements of society continued to grow during the year. The non-Orthodox
    Jewish community in particular has complained of discrimination and
    intolerance (see Section 2.c.).
        Evangelical Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Reform and
    Conservative Jews complained of incidents of harassment, threats, and
    vandalism directed against their buildings, and other facilities, many
    of which were committed by two ultraorthodox groups Yad L'Achim and Lev
    L'Achim. In civic areas where religion is a determining criterion, such
    as the religious courts and centers of education, non-Jewish
    institutions routinely receive less state support than their Jewish
    counterparts.
        During the demonstrations and disturbances in October, there were
    several incidents involving attacks on synagogues and mosques. In
    October Arab protesters attacked a synagogue in Shafar'am. Jewish
    protesters attacked mosques in Acco and Tiberias.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government does not provide
    Israeli Arabs, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the
    population, with the same quality of education, housing, employment,
    and social services as Jews. In addition, government spending is
    proportionally far lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish
    areas; on a per capita basis, the Government spends two-thirds as much
    for Arabs than for Jews. According to the National Insurance Institute,
    42 percent of Israeli Arabs live below the poverty line, compared with
    20 percent of the total population. The Government also follows a
    disproportionately restrictive policy on issuing building permits to
    Arab citizens, resulting in the issuance of proportionately more
    building demolition orders against Arab-built structures. Ministers in
    the Barak Government publicly acknowledged the continuing disparities
    in government funding for Israel's non-Jewish citizens. Following the
    demonstrations and disturbances in September and October (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.c.), the Government approved a $975 million (4 billion NIS)
    economic assistance plan for the country's Arab citizens to be phased
    in over 4 years. Most of the money included in the plan is allocated
    for education and new infrastructure development. Israeli Arab leaders
    and human rights groups criticized the plan because it was not based on
    a comprehensive survey of the economic and development needs of the
    country's Arab population and was considered inadequate to meet that
    population's needs. Critics also pointed out that only half of the
    total sum represented newly allocated money. The Government did not
    implement the plan by year's end, and according to newspaper reports,
    the Government's 2001 budget proposal did not include details about
    funding for the plan.
        The Government appointed an Arab citizen to the board of the Israel
    land authority in November 1999. This marked the first representation
    of non-Jews on this body, half of whose members represent organizations
    forbidden by statute to transfer land to non-Jews. In March the High
    Court of Justice ruled on an October 1995 petition brought by an Arab
    couple that was barred from buying a home in Katzir, a Jewish
    municipality, which was built on state-owned land. The High Court ruled
    that the Government's use of the Jewish National Fund to develop public
    land was discriminatory, since the fund's by-laws prohibit the sale or
    lease of land to non-Jews. The High Court noted that its ruling in the
    case would not affect previous land allocations and that
    differentiating between Jews and non-Jews in land allocation might be
    acceptable under unspecified ``special circumstances.'' Following the
    High Court's decision, the Government established an interministerial
    committee to examine the issues involved in implementing the decision.
    The Israel Lands Administration had not implemented the ruling in this
    case by year's end and the Ka'adan family still was not allocated a
    plot of land in Katzir. Israeli Arab organizations have challenged the
    1996 ``Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,'' which listed as
    priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking
    the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds
    that it discriminates against Arab citizens; the Government continues
    to use this document for planning in the Galilee.
        Relative to their numbers, Israeli Arabs are underrepresented in
    the student bodies and faculties of most universities and in higher
    level professional and business ranks. Arabs constitute only 8.7
    percent of the students at major universities in the country. Well-
    educated Arabs often are unable to find jobs commensurate with their
    level of education. Arab citizens hold only 50 of the country's 5,000
    university faculty positions. The Government states that it is
    committed to granting equal and fair conditions to Israeli Arabs,
    particularly in the areas of education, housing, and employment. A
    small number of Israeli Arabs have risen to responsible positions in
    the civil service, generally in the Arab departments of government
    ministries. In 1994 a civil service commission began a 3-year
    affirmative action program to expand that number, but it has had only
    modest results. Arab citizens compose 6.2 percent of the civil service
    and less than 2 percent of the positions in the four senior-most civil
    service grades. In October the Knesset passed a bill that minorities
    and underrepresented populations must be granted ``appropriate
    representation'' in the civil service, and on the boards of government
    corporations.
        In practice, few Israeli Arabs serve in the military or work in
    companies with defense contracts or in security-related fields. The
    Israeli Druze and Circassian communities are subject to the military
    draft, and although some have refused to serve, the overwhelming
    majority accepts service willingly. Some Bedouin and other Arab
    citizens who are not subject to the draft serve voluntarily. Those who
    do not serve in the army have less access than other citizens to those
    social and economic benefits for which military service is a
    prerequisite or an advantage, such as housing, new-household subsidies,
    and government or security-related industrial employment. Under a 1994
    government policy decision, the social security child allowance for
    parents who did not serve in the military and did not attend a yeshiva
    (including Arabs) was increased to equal the allowance of those who had
    done so.
        Israeli Arab groups allege that many employers use the prerequisite
    of military service to avoid hiring non-Jews. For example, a September
    1999 survey revealed that 40 percent of employment ads in one weekend
    newspaper listed ``army service necessary.'' Jobs included ice cream
    sales, typist, bus driver, and customer service.
        There are approximately 130,000 Bedouin in the Negev; of this
    number about half live in 7 state planned communities and the other
    half live in 45 settlements that are not recognized by the Government.
    The recognized Bedouin villages receive basic services from the
    Government; however, they are among the poorest communities in the
    country. The unrecognized villages were declared illegal by the
    National Planning and Building Law of 1965 when the lands on which they
    sit were rezoned as nonresidential and the Government claimed
    ownership. According to the Government, recognizing these villages
    would conflict with its attempts to establish new villages in ``an
    orderly manner, and would leave disputes over the land unresolved.''
    Residents of the unrecognized villages pay taxes to the Government;
    however, they are not eligible for government services. Consequently,
    such villages have none of the infrastructure, such as electricity,
    water, and sewers, provided to recognized communities. The lack of
    basic services has caused difficulties for the villagers in regard to
    their education, health care, and employment opportunities. New
    building in the unrecognized villages is considered illegal and subject
    to demolition. Private efforts have supplied some unrecognized villages
    with water, and the courts have ordered the provision of limited health
    and education services. The Government has yet to fulfill its
    commitment to resolve the legal status of unrecognized Arab villages.
    Eight villages have been recognized officially since 1994, but nearly
    100 more, of varying size and with a total population of nearly 70,000
    persons, remain in limbo. Of the eight villages that have been
    recognized, the Government has yet to actually implement the decisions.
    In 1998 the High Court of Justice ordered the Ministry of Education to
    provide electricity to schools in several unrecognized villages in the
    Negev. In March 1999, the High Court ordered the Ministry of Health to
    provide within 2 months six permanent health clinics to serve the
    unrecognized villages; however, the clinics had not been built by
    year's end. In November the High Court ruled that the Government must
    build a school for the children in the unrecognized village of Beer
    Hadaj within 4 months. During the year, the Ministry of Interior and
    the Attorney General declared that residents of Husseinya, an
    unrecognized village, could list their village's name as their place of
    residence on their identification cards.
        Arab children make up about a quarter of the public school
    population, but Government resources for them are less than
    proportionate to those for Jewish children. Many schools in Arab
    communities are dilapidated and overcrowded, lack special education
    services and counselors, have poor libraries, and have no sports
    facilities. According to a report issued during the year, only 54
    percent of Arab students finish high school compared with 89 percent of
    Jewish students. According to 1998 statistics, 58 percent of the
    teachers in Jewish schools had university degrees compared with 39
    percent of the teachers in Arab schools. The disparity in government
    resources for education also affects Bedouin children from the
    unrecognized villages. Currently, preschool attendance for Bedouin
    children is the lowest in the country, and the dropout rate for Bedouin
    high school students is the highest. Arab groups also note that the
    public school curriculum stresses Israel's Jewish culture and heritage.
        Israeli Arab students also are not eligible to participate in a
    special education program to provide academic assistance to students
    from disadvantaged backgrounds. A petition was filed with the High
    Court of Justice in May 1997 charging that the Ministry of Education's
    refusal to provide this program to Israeli Arab students was
    discriminatory. The Attorney General's office agreed that the policy
    constituted impermissible discrimination but asked for 5 years to
    expand the program to Israeli Arab students. The petitioners rejected
    this proposal as being too slow. The court held hearings in the case
    twice in 1999; however, it still had not ruled on the proper
    implementation period by year's end.
        Unresolved problems of many years' standing also include claims by
    Arab groups that land expropriation for public use has affected the
    Arab community disproportionately; that Arabs have been allowed too
    little input in planning decisions that affect their schools and
    municipalities; that mosques and cemeteries belonging to the Islamic
    Waqf (religious endowment) have been neglected or expropriated unjustly
    for public use; and that successive governments have blocked the return
    to their homes of citizens displaced in the early years of the
    country's history. The Government has yet to agree with the pre-1948
    residents of the northern villages of Bir Am and Ikrit, and their
    descendants, regarding their long-term demand to be allowed to rebuild
    their houses. In 1997 a special interministerial panel recommended that
    the Government allow the villagers to return to Bir Am and Ikrit. The
    High Court has granted the Government several extensions for
    implementing the recommendation, including 2 extensions during the
    year. The Government stated that a special interministerial panel
    currently is examining economic aspects of the issue.
        In early October, there were many instances of societal violence
    between Arab and Jewish citizens which coincided with violent events in
    Israel and the occupied territories (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and the
    annex). For example, on October 3, an Israeli Arab shot and killed an
    Israeli Jew on a road in the north of the country. On October 7, a
    group of about 200 Israeli Jews attacked Arab Israeli homes in
    predominantly Jewish Upper Nazareth. On October 8, a group of about
    1,000 Israeli Jews attacked Arab Israeli homes in Nazareth. Two persons
    were killed and approximately 50 persons were injured in these attacks
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Jewish citizens also attacked Arab homes,
    businesses that employed Arabs, and two mosques in other areas of the
    country. During the October disturbances, Arab protesters also attacked
    Jewish-owned businesses throughout the country, and in at least one
    case Arab crowds attacked a synagogue.
        In 1991 the Government launched Operation Solomon, which airlifted
    14,000 Ethiopian immigrants to the country. There were occasional
    reports of societal discrimination during the year.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join and establish labor
    organizations freely. Most unions belong to Histadrut (the General
    Federation of Labor in Israel), or to a much smaller rival federation,
    the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of Labor). These
    organizations are independent of the Government. Histadrut members
    democratically elect national and local officers, and officials of its
    affiliated women's organization Na'amat, from political party lists of
    those already in the union. Plant or enterprise committee members are
    elected individually. About 650,000 workers are members of Histadrut,
    and much of the non-Histadrut work force is covered by Histadrut's
    collective bargaining agreements.
        The right to strike is exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15
    days' notice prior to a strike unless otherwise specified in the
    collective bargaining agreement. However, unauthorized strikes occur.
    Strike leaders--even those organizing illegal strikes--are protected by
    law. If essential public services are affected, the Government may
    appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the parties
    continue negotiations. There were a number of strikes in both the
    public and private sectors during the year by employees protesting the
    effects of privatization. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance
    arrangements often were the central issues of dispute.
        Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who worked in Israel
    were not able to join Israeli trade unions or organize their own unions
    in Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories are not
    permitted to conduct activities in Israel (see Section 6.a. of the
    annex). However, nonresident workers in the organized sector are
    entitled to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance
    procedures. They may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level
    workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments
    exceed a minimum threshold. Palestinian participation in such
    committees is minimal.
        Labor laws apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to the
    Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizen workers
    fully exercise their legal rights to organize and bargain collectively.
    While there is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion
    discrimination, the law against discrimination could be cited to
    contest discrimination based on union membership. No antiunion
    discrimination has been reported.
        Nonresident workers may not organize their own unions or engage in
    collective bargaining, but they are entitled to be represented by the
    bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements.
    They do not pay union membership fees, but are required to pay a 1
    percent agency fee, which entitles them to union protection by
    Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements. The Ministry of Labor may
    extend collective bargaining agreements to nonunionized workplaces in
    the same industrial sector. The Ministry of Labor also oversees
    personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the economy.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, specifically including child forced labor,
    and neither citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in Israel are
    generally subject to this practice; however, women are trafficked for
    the purpose of prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Civil rights groups
    charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal
    workers' lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to
    involuntary servitude (see Section 6.e.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Children who have attained the age of 15 years, and who
    are liable to compulsory education under the compulsory education law,
    may not be employed unless they work as apprentices under the
    Apprenticeship Law. Notwithstanding these provisions, children who are
    14 years old may be employed during official school holidays.
    Employment of those 16 to 18 years of age is restricted to ensure time
    for rest and education.
        There are no reliable data on illegal child workers. They are
    concentrated among the country's Arab population and its most recent
    Jewish immigrants. Illegal employment is found primarily in urban,
    light-industrial areas. Children's rights groups have called for more
    vigorous enforcement of child labor laws, combined with a parallel
    effort to deal with the causes of illegal child labor. The Government
    specifically prohibits forced child labor, and it generally does not
    occur.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation in 1987 established
    a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average wage, calculated
    periodically and adjusted for cost of living increases. At year's end,
    the minimum wage was about $700 (2,800 NIS) per month. The minimum wage
    often is supplemented by special allowances and generally is sufficient
    to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Union
    officials have expressed concern over enforcement of minimum wage
    regulations, particularly with respect to employers of illegal
    nonresident workers, who sometimes pay less than the minimum wage.
        By law the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours a
    week, 8 hours per day, and 7 hours on the day before the weekly rest,
    which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the Sabbath. By
    national collective agreements, the private sector established a
    maximum 45-hour workweek in 1988. The public sector moved to a 5-day,
    42-plus hour workweek in 1989, while the military adopted it in 1993.
        Employers must receive a government permit to hire nonresident
    workers from the occupied territories, certifying that no citizen is
    available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories
    are employed on a daily basis and, unless they are employed on shift
    work, are not authorized to spend the night in Israel. The Government
    has in the past considered, but not acted on, a change in this
    provision to allow Palestinian workers to remain overnight for a week
    at a time. Palestinians without valid work permits are subject to
    arrest. Due to security concerns, the Government stopped issuing
    permits for Palestinian workers following the outbreak of violence in
    October.
        Nonresident workers are paid through the employment service of the
    Ministry of Labor, which disburses wages and benefits collected from
    employers. The Ministry deducts a 1 percent union fee and the workers'
    required contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII), the
    agency that administers the Israeli social security system,
    unemployment benefits, and other benefits. Despite these deductions,
    Palestinian workers are not eligible for all NII benefits. They
    continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel and the
    bankruptcy of a worker's employer. They do not have access to
    unemployment insurance, general disability payments, low-income
    supplements, or child allotments. By contrast, Israeli settlers in the
    occupied territories who work in Israel have the same benefits as other
    Israeli workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long
    criticized this inequality in entitlements. Since 1993 the Government
    has agreed to transfer the NII fees collected from Palestinian workers
    to the Palestinian Authority, which is to assume responsibility for all
    the pensions and social benefits of Palestinians working in Israel.
        There was increased public debate over the role in the workplace
    and society of foreign workers, who are estimated to number at least
    180,000, perhaps half of them undocumented and employed illegally. The
    majority of such workers come from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia,
    and most are employed in the construction and agricultural sectors. The
    law does not allow such workers citizenship or permanent residence. As
    a result, they and their families live in a legal and social limbo.
    Government deportations of such workers take place without benefit of
    due process. In August press reports stated that the Government ordered
    an increase in deportations of undocumented foreign workers; however,
    the deportations were not carried out. Human rights groups argue that
    since foreign worker residency permits are tied to specific employment,
    workers have little leverage to influence their work conditions. In May
    the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that it had prevented labor
    organizations from distributing pamphlets on labor rights to foreign
    workers who arrived at the airport. Following the outbreak of violence
    in September, the Government implemented a closure policy, which
    prevented thousands of Palestinians from getting to their jobs in
    Israel (see Section 2.d.). On December 17, in response to pressure for
    additional workers from the construction and agricultural sectors, the
    Government announced that it would grant temporary permits to several
    thousand additional foreign workers.
        Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service
    enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although
    resource constraints affect overall enforcement. Legislation protects
    the employment rights of safety delegates elected or appointed by the
    workers. In cooperation with management, these delegates are
    responsible for safety and health in the workplace.
        Workers do not have the legal right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
    However, collective bargaining agreements provide some workers with
    recourse through the work site labor committee. Any worker may
    challenge unsafe work practices through government oversight and legal
    agencies.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women for the purpose of
    prostitution is a continuing problem. According to Amnesty
    International (AI), every year hundreds of women from the former Soviet
    Union are brought to Israel by well-organized criminal networks and
    forced through violence and threats to work illegally as prostitutes.
    According to some local NGO's, thousands of women are trafficked into
    the country annually.
        In June the Government enacted a law that prohibits the trafficking
    of persons for the purpose of prostitution. Prostitution per se is not
    illegal; however, the operation of brothels and organized sex
    enterprises is outlawed, as are many of the human rights abuses
    perpetrated by traffickers and pimps, such as assault, rape, abduction,
    and false imprisonment. Section 201 of the Penal Code stipulates that
    it is a criminal offense, punishable by between 5 and 7 years'
    imprisonment, to force or coerce a person to engage in prostitution.
    Section 202(b) of the Penal Code makes it a criminal offense to induce
    a woman to leave Israel with the intent to ``practice prostitution
    abroad.'' In March the Knesset passed the Equality of Women Law (see
    Section 5); Section 6(b) of the law stipulates that every woman is
    entitled to protection from violence, sexual harassment, sexual
    exploitation, and trafficking.
        Traffickers reportedly often lure women into coming to the country
    by offering them jobs in the service industry. In many cases,
    traffickers meet women at the airport and confiscate all of their
    official documents. Many trafficked women are forced to live and work
    under extremely harsh conditions and to give most of the money they
    earn to their bosses. The women reportedly often are raped and beaten,
    and often are afraid to report their situation to the police because
    they are in the country illegally.
        According to press reports, brothels are ubiquitous despite being
    illegal, and police officials estimate that there are 25,000 paid
    sexual transactions every day. Police often detain trafficked women
    following raids on brothels. The Minister of Interior has broad powers
    to deport illegal aliens and to hold them in detention pending
    deportation. The Ministry may issue deportation orders against any
    person who is in the country without a residence permit and may hold
    the deportee in detention following the issuance of a deportation
    order. The deportee can appeal the deportation order to the Ministry
    within 3 days of its issuance and also can challenge the order in the
    High Court. However, trafficked women often do not challenge a
    deportation order due to language barriers or a lack of information
    about the appeals procedure. Many trafficked women are detained for
    extended periods of time because of government orders that they stay in
    the country to testify in the criminal proceedings against their
    traffickers. Many women are reluctant or afraid to testify in trials
    due to threats and intimidation by their traffickers. According to AI,
    women refuse to testify in court in about 90 percent of all the cases
    that are prosecuted. Since 1997 police have arrested and deported
    approximately 1,200 women who were trafficked to the country for
    prostitution. According to AI, the Government does not attempt to
    determine whether or not a trafficked woman would be at risk for
    persecution if she is deported to her country of origin, even in cases
    in which the woman or girl has testified in criminal proceedings.

                           The Occupied Territitories

        (including areas subject to the jurisdiction of the palestinian
                                   authority)
        Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East
    Jerusalem during the 1967 War. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are now
    administered to varying extents by Israel and the Palestinian Authority
    (PA). Pursuant to the May 1994
        Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement,
    Israel transferred most responsibilities for civil government in the
    Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the PA while retaining
    responsibility for external security; foreign relations; the overall
    security of Israelis, including public order in the Israeli
    settlements; and certain other matters.
        An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and the
    Palestinians began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued
    with the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration
    of Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine
    Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West
    Bank and the Gaza Strip. In January 1997, the parties concluded the
    Hebron Agreement and in October 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye
    River Memorandum. In September 1999, the Israeli Government and the PLO
    signed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. The parties held intensive
    working-level talks between March and June and met at Camp David in
    July; however, the Israeli Government and the PLO did not reach an
    agreement. On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon
    visited the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September
    29, Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police
    in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal
    bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4
    persons and injuring approximately 200. Following this incident,
    Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers,
    settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied
    territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes--known to
    Palestinians and many Israelis as the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''--between
    Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily through the end of the
    year.
        Israel and the Palestinian Authority have varying degrees of
    control and jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel
    continues to control certain civil functions and is responsible for all
    security in portions of the occupied territories categorized as Area C,
    which includes the Israeli settlements and 4 percent of the total West
    Bank Palestinian population. In areas known as Area B, which includes
    41 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population, the PA has
    jurisdiction over civil affairs and shares security responsibilities
    with Israel. The PA has control over civil affairs and security in Area
    A, which includes 55 percent of the West Bank Palestinian population.
    The PA also has jurisdiction over some civil affairs in Area C, as
    specified in the Interim Agreement. Accordingly, this report discusses
    the policies and practices of both the Israeli Government and the PA in
    the areas in which they exercise jurisdiction and control.
        Israel continues to exercise civil authority in parts of the West
    Bank and Gaza through the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Office of
    Coordination and Liaison, known by the Hebrew acronym MATAK, which
    replaced the now defunct Civil Administration (CIVAD) in 1995. The
    approximately 175,000 Israeli settlers living in Area C of the West
    Bank and in the Gaza Strip are subject to Israeli law and, as citizens,
    receive preferential treatment from Israeli authorities in terms of
    protection of personal and property rights and of legal redress. The
    body of law governing Palestinians in the territories derives from
    Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and Israeli
    military orders. Certain laws and regulations promulgated by the PA
    also are in force. The international community considers Israel's
    authority in the occupied territories to be subject to the Hague
    Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the
    Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The Israeli Government
    considers the Hague Regulations applicable and states that it observes
    the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions.
        In January 1996, Palestinians chose their first popularly elected
    Government in democratic elections that generally were well-conducted;
    the 88-member Palestinian Council (PC) and the Chairman of the
    Executive Authority were elected. The PA also has a cabinet of 30
    ministers. Chairman Yasir Arafat continues to dominate the affairs of
    government and to make major decisions. Most senior government
    positions in the PA are held by individuals who are members of, or
    loyal to, Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. The Council meets
    regularly and discusses a range of issues significant to the
    Palestinian people; however, it does not have significant influence on
    policy or the behavior of the executive. In Gaza the legal code derives
    from British Mandate law, Egyptian law, and PA directives and laws. In
    the West Bank, pre-1967 Jordanian law and PA laws apply. The PA states
    that it is undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank legal
    codes; however, it has made little progress to date. The PA courts are
    perceived as inefficient and the PA executive and security services
    frequently ignore or fail to carry out court decisions.
        Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consist of
    the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); the Israel Security Agency (the ISA--
    formerly the General Security Service, or GSS, and also known as Shin
    Bet, or Shabak); the Israeli National Police (INP); and the
    paramilitary border police. Israeli military courts try Palestinians
    accused of committing security crimes in Israeli-controlled areas.
    Members of the Israeli security forces committed numerous serious human
    rights abuses, particularly following the outbreak of violence in late
    September.
        The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established in May 1994 and
    includes the Palestinian Public Security Force; the Palestinian Civil
    Police; the Preventive Security Force (PSF); the General Intelligence
    Service, or Mukhabarat; the Palestinian Presidential Security Force;
    and the Palestinian Coastal Police. Other quasi-military security
    organizations, such as the military intelligence organization, also
    exercise de facto law enforcement powers. Palestinian police are
    responsible for security and law enforcement for Palestinians and other
    non-Israelis in PA-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
    Israeli settlers in the occupied territories are not subject to PA
    security force jurisdiction. Members of the PA security forces
    committed numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year.
        The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, poorly
    developed, and highly dependent on Israel. The economy relies primarily
    on agriculture, services, and, to a lesser extent, light manufacturing.
    Especially during periods of tension, Israel restricts the movement of
    persons and products into Israel and Jerusalem from the West Bank and
    Gaza, which frequently affects the ability of Palestinians to reach
    their jobs in Israel. Since 1993 Israel has required Palestinians and
    their vehicles to have Israeli permits to cross from the West Bank or
    Gaza into Israel and Jerusalem. Approximately 125,000 West Bank and
    Gazan workers, representing roughly 20 percent of the Palestinian work
    force, normally are employed at day jobs in Israel, Israeli
    settlements, and Jerusalem, making their employment subject to
    disruption. Since 1993 Israel has applied ``closures,'' or enhanced
    restrictions, on the movement of persons and products, often for
    lengthy periods, in response to terrorist attacks or other changes in
    the security environment. During periods of violent protest in the West
    Bank or Gaza, or when it believes that there is an increased likelihood
    of such unrest or of terrorist attacks, Israel imposes a tightened
    version of closure. Comprehensive, tightened closures also are
    instituted regularly during major Israeli holidays. During such
    closures, Israel cancels all travel permits and prevents Palestinians--
    even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel or Jerusalem.
    Due to the ongoing unrest in the occupied territories, Israel imposed
    88 days of tightened, comprehensive closure during the year, compared
    with 15 days in 1999. In periods of extreme unrest in the West Bank and
    Gaza, the Israeli Government also prohibits most travel between towns
    and villages within the West Bank--an ``internal'' closure--impeding
    the flow of goods and persons. During such internal closures, the
    Government also bans travel on the safe passage route between the West
    Bank and Gaza. Israel imposed at least 81 days of internal closure
    during the year, compared with no days of internal closure in 1999. In
    the past, Israel rarely imposed internal closure within Gaza; however,
    during much of November and December the Israeli Government imposed
    internal closure in Gaza. The prolonged periods of closure had a
    significant negative impact on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza.
        Israel's overall human rights record in the occupied territories
    was poor; although the situation improved slightly during the first 9
    months of the year, it worsened in several areas late in the year,
    mainly due to the sustained violence that began in September. Israeli
    security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses during
    the year. Security forces killed 307 Palestinians and four foreign
    nationals and injured at least 11,300 Palestinians and other persons
    during the year. Israeli security forces targeted for killing a number
    of Palestinians whom the Israeli Government stated had attacked or were
    planning future attacks on Israeli settlements or military targets; a
    number of bystanders reportedly also were killed during these
    incidents. Since the violence began, Israeli security units often used
    excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators. Israeli security
    forces sometimes exceeded their rules of engagement, which provide that
    live fire is only to be used when the lives of soldiers, police, or
    civilians are in imminent danger. IDF forces also shelled PA
    institutions and Palestinian civilian areas in response to individual
    Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians or settlers; 7 Palestinians
    and 1 foreign national were killed, and 131 Palestinians were injured
    in these attacks. Israeli security forces abused Palestinians in
    detention suspected of security offenses. However, a September 1999
    landmark decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice prohibited the
    use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking,
    painful shackling in contorted positions, and prolonged exposure to
    extreme temperatures. Since the September 1999 ruling, domestic and
    international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have been unable to
    substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces tortured
    detainees. There were numerous credible allegations that police beat
    persons in detention. Three Palestinian prisoners died in Israeli
    custody under ambiguous circumstances during the year. Prison
    conditions are poor. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and
    infringements on privacy rights remained problems. Israeli security
    forces sometimes impeded the provision of medical assistance to
    Palestinian civilians. Israeli security forces destroyed Palestinian-
    owned agricultural land. Israeli authorities censored Palestinian
    publications, placed limits on freedom of assembly, and restricted
    freedom of movement for Palestinians.
        The PA's overall human rights record was poor, and it worsened in
    several areas during the year mainly due to the sustained violence that
    began in late September. Palestinian security forces reportedly killed
    several Israeli security force members during violent clashes with
    Israeli soldiers or settlers. Members of Palestinian security services
    and Fatah's Tanzim participated in violent attacks. Armed Palestinians,
    some of them members of Palestinian security forces, fired at Israeli
    civilians or soldiers from within or close to the homes of Palestinian
    civilians; residents of the homes consequently bore the brunt of IDF
    retaliation for these attacks. Palestinian security forces also failed
    to prevent armed Palestinians from opening fire on Israelis in places
    in which Palestinians were present. The extent to which senior PLO or
    PA officials authorized such incidents is not clear. Palestinian
    security forces in October reportedly impeded the provision of medical
    assistance to an injured Israeli border policeman, who later died.
        One Palestinian died in PA custody under ambiguous circumstances.
    PA prison conditions are very poor. PA security forces arbitrarily
    arrest and detain persons, and prolonged detention is a problem. Lack
    of due process also is a problem. The courts are perceived as
    inefficient, lack staff and resources, and do not ensure fair and
    expeditious trials. The PA executive and security services frequently
    ignore or fail to enforce court decisions. Lack of due process also is
    a serious problem in the PA's state security courts. PA security forces
    infringed on citizens' rights to privacy and restricted freedom of
    speech and of the press. The PA continued to harass, detain, and abuse
    journalists. PA harassment contributed to the practice of self-
    censorship by many Palestinian commentators, reporters, and critics.
    The PA placed some limits on freedom of assembly and association. In
    February the PA police announced a ban on unlicensed public gatherings,
    but this action was invalidated by the Palestinian High Court 2 months
    later. Violence against women and ``honor killings'' persist. Societal
    discrimination against women and the disabled is a problem. Child labor
    is a problem.
        Israeli civilians, especially settlers, harassed, attacked, and
    occasionally killed Palestinians in the occupied territories. There
    were credible reports that settlers killed at least 14 Palestinians
    during the year. In one case, an Israeli civilian killed a Palestinian
    who previously had attacked a settlement and killed an IDF soldier.
    Settlers also caused economic damage to Palestinians by attacking and
    damaging greenhouses and agricultural equipment, uprooting olive trees,
    and damaging other valuable crops. The settlers did not act under
    government orders in the attacks; however, the Israeli Government did
    not prosecute the settlers for their acts of violence. In general
    settlers rarely serve prison sentences if convicted of a crime against
    Palestinians.
        Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories harassed,
    attacked, and occasionally killed Israelis, especially settlers.
    Palestinians killed at least 18 Israeli civilians during the year. A
    number of extremist Palestinian groups and individuals, including the
    militant Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic
    Jihad (PIJ), continued to kill and injure Israelis. Five attacks and
    roadside bombings were carried out in Israel and the occupied
    territories. The PA made no arrests in any of these killings.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Israeli security
    forces killed numerous Palestinians in response to a sustained violent
    uprising late in the year. Most of the Palestinians were killed during
    demonstrations and other violent clashes, and others were targeted
    specifically by Israeli security forces.
        In May Israeli security forces killed six Palestinians and wounded
    up to 700 at demonstrations in which Palestinian demonstrators were
    protesting the continued incarceration of Palestinian prisoners in
    Israeli jails. Some protesters threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and
    some demonstrators shot at Israeli settlers (see Section 1.c.).
        Deaths due to political violence increased significantly during the
    year due to the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' At least 365 persons were killed
    between late September and the end of December in demonstrations,
    violent clashes, and military and civilian attacks, including 325
    Palestinians, 36 Israelis, 3 Jordanian citizens, and 1 German citizen.
    Additionally, at least 10,962 persons were injured during this period,
    including 10,600 Palestinians and 362 Israelis (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.g.). On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited
    the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem. On September 29,
    Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in
    the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal
    bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4
    persons and injuring approximately 200. Following this incident,
    Palestinians began violent demonstrations against IDF soldiers,
    settlers, and other Israeli civilians throughout the occupied
    territories; these demonstrations and ensuing clashes between
    Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily through the end of the
    year.
        Between late September and the end of the year, Israeli security
    forces killed 227 Palestinians and 4 foreign nationals, and injured
    over 10,600 Palestinians during violent demonstrations. Palestinian
    demonstrators frequently threw stones and Molotov cocktails at IDF
    soldiers. In some demonstrations, Palestinians also used firearms.
    According to the IDF, Palestinians used firearms in about 30 percent of
    the demonstrations between late September and mid-November. In
    response, Israeli security forces used a variety of means to disperse
    demonstrators, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, and
    live ammunition. In many instances, Israeli security forces used
    excessive force against demonstrators in contravention of their
    official rules of engagement (see Section 1.g.).
        Israeli Defense Force soldiers targeted for killing a number of
    Palestinians during the year. A senior Israeli official stated to the
    domestic press that the IDF deliberately targeted 10 Palestinians since
    the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' According to the IDF, the
    targeted persons were PA security officers or Fatah's Tanzim who
    previously had attacked or were planning future attacks on Israeli
    settlements or military targets. The Israeli Government stated that it
    only targeted persons against whom it had overwhelming evidence and
    only with the authorization of senior political leaders. PA officials
    and some human rights organizations claimed that a number of the
    targeted persons were not involved in the ongoing violence. IDF forces
    also killed 6 Palestinian bystanders and injured over a dozen others
    during these incidents (see Section 1.c.).
        On November 9, Israeli helicopters fired rockets at a car in Beit
    Sahour, killing Hussein Mohamed Salim Ubayyat, a Fatah official. Two
    Palestinian women walking on the road nearby were killed and seven
    other civilian bystanders were injured in the attack (see Section
    1.c.). An IDF spokesman later announced that Ubayyat had been targeted
    because of his prior involvement in a number of attacks against Israeli
    military and civilian targets.
        On December 31, IDF soldiers killed Dr. Thabet Ahmad Thabet, a
    high-ranking member of Fatah, while he was in his car near his home.
        There also were a number of instances in which is was unclear
    whether Israeli security forces targeted their victims. On November 17,
    IDF soldiers killed two Palestinian National Security Forces officers
    in Jericho. The IDF stated that the officers were part of a terrorist
    cell that previously had attacked IDF positions and some settlements.
    The PA stated that the two officers were killed while on duty and
    working to prevent Palestinian gunmen at a nearby refugee camp from
    shooting at Israeli positions.
        On November 22, IDF forces fired at 2 cars in Gaza, killing a
    senior Tanzim member, Jamal Abdel Raziq, and 3 other Tanzim members.
    The Israeli press reported that the 4 were terrorists who were
    attempting to infiltrate the Morag settlement and that security forces
    fired at the 2 cars after the drivers refused to stop at a road
    blockade. According to press reports, Israeli security sources later
    stated that the incident was an ``IDF-initiated operation'' against
    Raziq, who reportedly had been involved in attacks on Israelis in Gaza.
        On November 23, HAMAS member Ibrahim Abdel Karim Bani was killed
    when a bomb exploded in the borrowed car he was driving. Israeli
    security officials stated to the press that Bani Odeh was transporting
    explosives to carry out a terrorist attack that detonated prematurely.
    However, according to the PA and the Palestinian press, Bani Odeh was
    on a list of 10 Palestinians that the IDF planned to target for
    killing. PA security forces arrested Bani Odeh's cousin, who reportedly
    confessed to having provided information to the IDF about Odeh's
    whereabouts on the day he was killed.
        On November 26, IDF soldiers fired on nine Palestinian youths,
    killing five and injuring two. The Israeli press reported that the IDF
    refused an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) request to
    allow medical personnel access to the injured. Palestinian sources
    stated that the IDF subsequently fired on the injured persons with
    helicopter gunships. On November 27, Israeli radio, citing IDF sources,
    described the incident as a ``proactive'' IDF-initiated action that
    targeted known terrorists who had participated in previous attacks
    against Israeli civilian and military targets, including two attacks
    that took place earlier that day. The Israeli Government also stated
    that it had reason to believe that the Palestinian youths were planning
    an additional terrorist attack. Palestinian sources stated that the
    youths were on their way to visit friends when they were fired upon by
    the IDF.
        On December 10, IDF soldiers fired on two Palestinians who
    reportedly were planting a roadside bomb near Bethlehem, killing
    Mahmoud Mugrabi, a member of Fatah. According to press reports quoting
    a senior IDF official, Mugrabi's name was on a list of ten reputed
    terrorists that the IDF had targeted for killing.
        Israeli security force personnel killed several Palestinians in
    unclear circumstances. According to eyewitnesses and a credible
    Palestinian human rights organization, on October 6, an IDF soldier
    shot an unarmed 14-year-old boy on the porch of his home near Hebron;
    he later died. On December 11, Israeli security forces shot and killed
    Anwar Hmeiran, a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to
    Palestinian eyewitnesses, there were no clashes taking place at the
    time of the shooting. On December 16, Mohammad Fahed Maali was killed
    while reportedly walking past a clash between Israeli security forces
    and Palestinian demonstrators in Jenin; according to the Palestinian
    press, the Palestinian demonstrators did not use firearms in the
    demonstration. IDF soldiers killed Abbas Othman Ewaywi, a member of
    HAMAS. According to the IDF, Ewaywi was caught in crossfire between
    Israeli and Palestinian security forces. However, Palestinian media and
    eyewitnesses stated that there was no such exchange of gunfire when
    Ewaywi was shot. HAMAS issued a leaflet the same day vowing revenge for
    his death.
        On September 30, a journalist videotaped and broadcast
    internationally an exchange of fire between Israeli and Palestinian
    security forces at Netzarim junction that resulted in the killing of
    12-year-old Muhammad al-Dura. Many observers stated that the boy was
    killed by IDF fire; however, the IDF conducted an investigation and
    reported that it was not clear whether it was Israeli or Palestinian
    gunfire that killed al-Dura.
        The IDF generally did not investigate incidents in which security
    forces killed and injured Palestinians. The IDF stated that it did not
    investigate such incidents because of technical problems; because
    Israel does not have full control over the occupied territories, and
    the PA reportedly would not cooperate in investigations in Areas B and
    C, the IDF stated that it could not conduct such investigations.
    However, in certain high profile cases, such as the killing of Muhammad
    al-Dura and the injuring of a foreign journalist, the IDF agreed to
    investigate.
        In several incidents, following attacks on Israeli civilians,
    including settlers, IDF helicopters fired tank rounds and rockets from
    helicopters on towns and cities in the West Bank and Gaza, killing and
    injuring a number of persons and causing significant damage to
    buildings (see Section 1.g.).
        Prior to the outbreak of violence in late September, members of the
    Israeli security forces killed three Palestinians at military
    checkpoints and roadblocks inside the occupied territories. In these
    instances, Israeli authorities stated that the individuals were shot
    after failing to obey orders to halt. Palestinian eyewitnesses disputed
    these accounts and charged that Israeli soldiers used excessive and
    unnecessary force. On March 20, Israeli soldiers killed Halima al-Aloul
    at the Kharas checkpoint near Hebron; al-Aloul was riding with her
    husband, who allegedly failed to stop at the checkpoint. On March 30,
    Murad al-Zaro was shot and killed by Israeli police officers near the
    Shufat refugee camp in Jerusalem. Israeli police maintained that al-
    Zaro failed to stop when ordered to do so; however, Palestinian
    eyewitnesses claimed that police shot al-Zaro after he already had
    stopped the car. On July 8, IDF soldiers killed a Palestinian woman in
    Gaza while she was riding in a car. According to the IDF, the soldiers
    fired because they believed that they heard shots fired from the car.
        On August 16, IDF security forces mistakenly killed Mahmoud Assad
    Abdullah al-Bazar in Surda village. According to the IDF, security
    forces surrounded his house in the mistaken belief that a wanted HAMAS
    terrorist was inside. According to his family members, al-Bazar went to
    his roof to investigate noises and fired one shot in the air to
    frighten presumed thieves. The IDF soldiers reportedly heard the shot
    and opened fire on al-Bazar.
        According to credible human rights organizations, Israeli security
    forces sometimes impeded the provision of medical assistance to sick
    and injured Palestinians (see Section 2.d.); Palestinians claim that
    seven Palestinians died as a result. For example, on October 6, Israeli
    security forces delayed an ambulance from reaching a Palestinian who
    was wounded in a clash in Jerusalem; the Palestinian died later the
    same day. On October 14, IDF soldiers did not allow a father to bring
    his daughter into Nablus for medical treatment; she died the same day
    of a ruptured appendix. On October 16, IDF soldiers refused to allow a
    man into Nablus for kidney dialysis; he later died of kidney failure.
    According to the Israeli Government, Palestinian medical personnel
    sometimes used ambulances as shelter for Palestinians who had fired at
    Israeli civilians and soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
        In May Mohamad Abdel Jalil Fayez Saed from Askar refugee camp in
    Nablus died from wounds sustained in a 1991 confrontation with the IDF
    in which soldiers reportedly beat Saed for throwing stones at an IDF
    foot patrol, which left him paralyzed.
        Three Palestinian security detainees reportedly died in Israeli
    custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). On January 14, Lafi al-
    Rajabi died in a detention center near Nablus; his body reportedly bore
    cuts and bruises. On June 19, Sami As'ad reportedly hanged himself in
    Kishon prison; according to newspaper reports he previously had
    attempted suicide. On August 11, Ramez Fayez Mohammed Rashing Elrizi
    died in al-Nafha prison under ambiguous circumstances. The Israeli
    Government did not publish official autopsies in these deaths.
        Palestinian security forces reportedly killed several Israeli
    security force members during violent clashes with Israeli soldiers or
    settlers. Members of Palestinian security services and Fatah's Tanzim
    participated in violent attacks. Armed Palestinians, some of them
    members of Palestinian security forces, fired at Israeli civilians or
    soldiers from within or close to the homes of Palestinian civilians;
    residents of the homes consequently bore the brunt of IDF retaliation
    for these attacks. Palestinian security forces also failed to prevent
    armed Palestinians from opening fire on Israelis in places in which
    Palestinians were present. The extent to which senior PLO or PA
    officials authorized such incidents is not clear. Palestinian security
    forces reportedly impeded the provision of medical assistance to an
    injured Israeli border policeman, who later died.
        On September 29, a Palestinian policeman killed one Israeli border
    policeman and injured a second. The three police personnel were part of
    a joint patrol.
        On October 1, PA security forces shot a border policeman at
    Joseph's Tomb, and then delayed an ambulance from reaching him in a
    timely manner; the soldier bled to death.
        One Palestinian died in PA custody during the year. On June 6,
    Khalid Bahar was found dead in his prison cell; family members claim
    that the prisoner died after being tortured (see Section l.c.). The PA
    publicized the results of its autopsy report, which stated that the
    prisoner had choked to death.
        More than 35 Israelis and Palestinians died in politically related
    violence perpetrated by individuals and groups during the year. Israeli
    settlers harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed Palestinians in
    the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see Section 1.c.). There were credible
    reports that settlers killed at least 14 and injured a number of
    Palestinians during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' usually by stoning their
    vehicles, which caused fatal accidents, shooting them, or hitting them
    with moving vehicles. For example, on October 1, unidentified Israeli
    settlers opened fire on a car holding Palestinians, killing an 18-
    month-old baby. On October 17, two settlers from Itamar opened fire
    with machine guns on a group of Palestinians harvesting olives in a
    field near Nablus, killing one person and injuring four. The
    perpetrators of the attack were identified and taken into Israeli
    police custody, but subsequently were released because the police
    determined that the PA was not cooperating sufficiently with the
    investigation. The PA denied this charge. The settlers did not act
    under government orders in the attacks; however, the Israeli Government
    did not prosecute the settlers for their acts of violence. In general,
    settlers rarely serve prison sentences if convicted of a crime against
    Palestinians.
        Palestinian civilians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed
    Israelis, especially settlers. During the year, Palestinians killed 18
    Israeli civilians and injured numerous others (see Section 1.c.).
    Palestinians frequently threw stones and fired guns at Israeli
    civilians during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' On October 8, Palestinian
    civilians killed Israeli settler Hillel Lieberman from Elon Moreh.
    Lieberman had been missing since the morning of October 7, when he told
    a relative that he was going to ``pay a final visit'' to Joseph's Tomb
    in Nablus, after the IDF had announced that it would withdraw from the
    site. An unknown extremist group took responsibility for the killing.
        On October 12, a Palestinian mob killed two IDF reservists in a
    brutal attack in Ramallah. The mob attacked the soldiers' car until
    Palestinian police intervened and brought the soldiers to the civil
    police station. The mob followed, broke down the gate of the police
    station, and kicked, burned, and beat to death the two reservists.
    There were reports that Palestinian police personnel also participated
    in the beating.
        On October 30, unknown Palestinian gunmen killed one security guard
    and injured another at the National Insurance Office in Jerusalem. On
    November 9, Palestinian gunmen killed one woman and injured one man in
    their car. On November 13, Palestinian gunmen killed a settler and two
    IDF soldiers near Ramallah.
        Several Palestinian officials made public statements justifying
    Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians, and the PA made no arrests in
    any of these killings. Additionally, Tanzim leaders made public
    statements urging Palestinians to continue the violence. Following
    Chairman Arafat's announcement on November 17 to stop firing on Israeli
    civilians or security forces from Area A, there was a short-lived
    significant decrease in the number of such incidents. Israeli observers
    noted that Arafat's statement did not address attacks in Areas B and C.
        Seven Israeli civilians were killed in bomb attacks and roadside
    bombs for which several Palestinian extremist groups claimed
    responsibility. For example, a roadside bomb near Kfar Darom settlement
    in Gaza was detonated on November 20 as a settler schoolbus passed. A
    teacher and a school maintenance worker were killed, and nine
    passengers were wounded, including several children (see Section 1.c.).
    Two Palestinian extremist groups claimed responsibility for the attack.
    On November 23, two IDF soldiers were killed and three were injured in
    2 separate bomb attacks in Gaza.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances during the year.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit the
    physical abuse of detainees; however, security forces abused in
    detention Palestinians suspected of security offenses. A landmark
    decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice in September 1999
    prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent
    shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation
    for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme
    temperatures. Prior to the High Court's decision, Israeli laws and
    administrative regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees
    were not enforced in security cases (see Section 1.c. of the Israel
    report). The head of the then-GSS was empowered by government
    regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate physical
    and psychological pressure'' (which included violent shaking) while
    interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses. Since
    the September 1999 ruling, domestic and international NGO's have been
    unable to substantiate sporadic allegations that security forces
    tortured detainees.
        Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts are based
    on confessions. A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until
    after interrogation, a process that may last days or weeks. The
    Government does not allow ICRC representatives access to detainees
    until the 14th day of detention. This prolonged incommunicado detention
    contributes to the likelihood of abuse. Detainees sometimes claim in
    court that their confessions are coerced, but judges rarely exclude
    such confessions. According to Palestinian human rights groups, some
    Palestinian detainees fail to make complaints either due to fear of
    retribution or because they assume that such complaints would be
    ignored. During the year, there were no known cases in which a
    confession was thrown out because of improper means of investigation or
    interrogation.
        Israeli security forces injured at least 11,300 Palestinians during
    violent demonstrations during the year (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and
    1.g.). In May IDF soldiers and Israeli police injured up to 700
    Palestinians during protests in support of a hunger strike declared by
    Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. During the ``al-Aqsa
    Intifada,'' Israeli security forces injured about 10,600 Palestinian
    demonstrators.
        The IDF injured several bystanders at demonstrations, including
    journalists (see Section 2.a.). According to a November report by the
    Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 10 journalists were hit by
    IDF gunfire during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'', and 3 other journalists
    were hit by gunfire from an unknown source. In at least one case, a
    foreign photographer was hit by live ammunition during a demonstration
    in which no IDF personnel were under fire.
        Israeli authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an
    abusive manner at checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical
    harassment. According to press reports, on September 6, Israeli border
    policemen physically abused three Palestinian workers near the village
    of Abu Dis outside of Jerusalem. The officers took photos of themselves
    with their victims; their trial was ongoing by year's end.
        The PA does not prohibit by law the use of torture or force against
    detainees, and PA security forces reportedly were responsible for
    torture and widespread abuse of Palestinian detainees. Such abuse
    generally took place after arrest and during interrogation. In 1995 the
    Gaza civil police commander issued to police officers in the West Bank
    and Gaza a directive forbidding torture during interrogation, and
    directing the security forces to observe the rights of all detainees.
    However, the directive does not have the force of law; Palestinian
    security officers have not been issued formal guidelines on the proper
    conduct of interrogations. The PA lacks adequate equipment to collect
    and use evidence, and convictions are based largely on confessions. The
    importance of obtaining confessions heightens the possibility of abuse.
        PA security officials torture and abuse prisoners by threatening,
    hooding, beating, and tying detainees in painful positions, forcing
    them to stand for long periods of time, depriving them of sleep and
    food, and burning detainees with cigarettes and hot instruments.
    Palestinians also alleged that they had been shaken violently while in
    PA custody. International human rights monitoring groups have
    documented widespread arbitrary and abusive conduct by the PA. These
    organizations state that use of torture is widespread and not
    restricted to those persons detained on security charges. Human rights
    groups state that Palestinians who are suspected of belonging to
    radical Islamic groups are more likely to be treated poorly. In
    February and March, the General Intelligence Service arrested,
    detained, and physically abused dozens of Bir Zeit University students
    who were arrested on charges of throwing stones at a foreign head of
    state during a campus demonstration (see Section 2.b.). Several human
    rights groups claimed that the students were tortured during detention.
        During the year, one Palestinian died in PA custody. Family members
    claim that the prisoner died after being tortured (see Section l.a.).
    The PA publicized the results of its autopsy report, which stated that
    the prisoner had choked to death.
        Palestinian police and Tanzim members with firearms participated in
    violent demonstrations and attacks. Palestinian security forces
    sometimes fired at Israeli civilians or soldiers from within or close
    to the homes of Palestinian civilians; residents of the homes
    consequently bore the brunt of IDF retaliation for these attacks.
    Palestinian security forces also sometimes failed to prevent armed
    Palestinians from opening fire on Israeli civilians, soldiers, or
    military targets.
        In February Palestinian police failed to prevent an attack by a
    Palestinian crowd against PA judges and prosecutors in Bethlehem. A
    crowd of about 300 persons, mainly family members of one of the
    criminal suspects on trial, stormed the courthouse, locked the judge
    and prosecutors inside, threw stones, and demanded that the court
    revoke sentences against two defendants in a murder trial. Police
    officials were at the courthouse; however, they did not disperse the
    crowd or make any arrests.
        Israeli settlers harass, attack, and occasionally kill (see Section
    1.a.) Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were credible
    reports that settlers injured a number of Palestinians during the ``al-
    Aqsa Intifada,'' usually by stoning their vehicles, which at times
    caused fatal accidents, shooting them, or hitting them with moving
    vehicles. Human rights groups received several dozen reports during the
    year that Israeli settlers in the West Bank beat Palestinians and
    destroyed the property of Palestinians living or farming near Israeli
    settlements. For example, according to Palestinian eyewitnesses, a
    group of Israeli settlers beat a 75-year-old Palestinian woman in
    April. At least five settlers from Brakha near Nablus reportedly
    assaulted the woman, who was picking wild herbs near the settlement; a
    passerby reportedly intervened and took the woman to a hospital. During
    the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' there were numerous incidents in which
    Israeli settlers physically attacked Palestinians or threw stones at
    their homes and cars. Settlers also attacked and damaged crops, olive
    trees, greenhouses, and agricultural equipment, causing extensive
    economic damage to Palestinian-owned agricultural land. The settlers
    did not act under government orders in the attacks; however, the
    Israeli Government did not prosecute the settlers for their acts of
    violence. In general settlers rarely serve prison sentences if
    convicted of a crime against a Palestinian.
        According to human rights organizations, Israeli settlers sometimes
    attacked Palestinian ambulances and impeded the provision of medical
    services to injured Palestinians (see Section 2.d.).
        Palestinians harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed (see
    Section 1.a.) Israelis, especially settlers. During demonstrations in
    support of the Palestinian prisoner hunger strike in May, Palestinian
    demonstrators shot Israeli settlers in Beit El and Jenin in the West
    Bank. On May 21, an unknown Palestinian threw a Molotov cocktail at a
    car of Jewish settlers, critically injuring a child. Palestinians
    injured a number of Israeli settlers in attacks during the ``al-Aqsa
    Intifada.'' For example, on October 19, unidentified Palestinian gunmen
    shot at a large group of Israeli settlers who were hiking in an area
    near Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, where there had been fierce fighting the
    week before. One settler and one Palestinian were killed, and four
    Israelis and a dozen Palestinians were injured in an exchange of
    gunfire. Unidentified Palestinian gunmen fired on homes in Gilo, a
    Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem, for at least 13 nights between
    October and November, injuring seriously two persons. A number of
    Israeli civilians were injured in armed attacks or bombings, for which
    several Palestinian extremist groups claimed responsibility (also see
    Section 1.a.).
        Palestinian civilians attacked Israeli medical teams on several
    occasions. For example, on October 2, Palestinian civilians reportedly
    fired on an ambulance that was evacuating 4 IDF soldiers who had been
    injured in a violent clash; the ambulance reportedly was delayed for
    about 1 hour. Palestinian civilians also prevented the evacuation of
    injured Israelis in several incidents; in one such case, the injured
    person did not receive medical treatment and died from his wounds (see
    Section 1.a.). According to the Israeli Government, Palestinian medical
    personnel sometimes allowed ambulances and medical facilities to be
    used as shelter for Palestinians who had fired at Israeli civilians and
    soldiers (see Section 1.a.).
        Conditions for Palestinians in Israeli prisons are poor. Facilities
    are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate.
    Palestinian inmates held strikes and protests in support of a number of
    causes and to protest prison conditions throughout the year. On May 1,
    Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons began a hunger strike to
    protest prison conditions and their continued incarceration. Following
    negotiations with PA and Israeli government officials, the prisoners
    agreed to suspend the hunger strike on May 31. The Israeli Government
    agreed to remove prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow
    family members to visit inmates, and the prisoners agreed to refrain
    from planning terrorist attacks from prison. Three Palestinian
    prisoners died in Israeli custody under ambiguous circumstances during
    the year (see Section 1.a.).
        Israel permits independent monitoring of prison conditions,
    although human rights groups sometimes encounter difficulties gaining
    access to specific detainees.
        Prison conditions in PA facilities continue to be very poor. In
    many cases, facilities are overcrowded, old, dilapidated, and
    neglected. Food and clothing for prisoners are inadequate and must be
    supplemented by donations from families and humanitarian groups.
    Palestinian inmates held periodic strikes and protests throughout the
    year in support of a number of causes and to protest prison conditions
    and the practice of administrative detention. In some PA prisons, an
    effort is made to house religious prisoners together. Male and female
    inmates are housed separately. During the year, one Palestinian died in
    PA custody under ambiguous circumstances (see Section 1.a.).
        In August detainees held by the PSF in Ramallah staged a hunger
    strike demanding an improvement in detention conditions. The PSF agreed
    to meet the prisoners' demands. Prisoners in the PA-run Jneid Prison
    also staged a hunger strike to protest being held for an extended
    period of time without charge or trial (see Section 1.c.).
        The PA permits independent monitoring of its prisons, although
    human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and lawyers reported
    difficulties arranging visits or gaining access to specific detainees.
    Human rights organizations state that their ability to visit PA jails
    and detention centers varies depending on which security organization
    controls the facility. Human rights organizations state that the
    police, Preventive Security Force, and Mukhabarat generally were
    cooperative in allowing them to inspect facilities and visit prisoners
    and detainees. However, they said that the Military Intelligence
    Organization was less responsive to such requests. Human rights
    monitors state that prison authorities sometimes are capricious in
    permitting them access to PA detention facilities and they rarely are
    permitted to see inmates while they are under interrogation. Pursuant
    to an agreement signed in September 1996, the ICRC conducts prison
    visits but may be denied access to a detainee for 14 days. If abuses
    occur, they frequently happen during this 2-week period.
        Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence
    Organization in the West Bank and the police, have appointed officials
    to act as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers meet with
    human rights organizations and members of the diplomatic community to
    discuss human rights cases.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Israeli security
    personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person
    suspected of having committed a criminal or security offense in the
    occupied territories. Most of these arrests and detentions are for
    alleged security offenses. Persons arrested for common crimes usually
    are provided with a statement of charges and access to an attorney, and
    may apply for bail. However, these procedures sometimes are delayed.
        Israeli authorities intermittently issued special summonses for
    those suspected of involvement in or knowledge of security offenses.
    There were reports that some such summonses were issued immediately
    before and during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada.'' Israeli military order 1369
    stipulates a 7-year prison term for anyone who does not respond to a
    special summons delivered to a family member or posted in the MATAK
    office nearest the suspect's home address. There were no reports during
    the year that anyone was convicted of failing to respond to a summons.
    Bail rarely is available to those arrested for security offenses.
    Although Israeli law does not allow Israelis under the age of 16 to be
    tried as adults, Israeli courts treat Palestinians over the age of 12
    as adults. Defense for Children International (DCI) reported that over
    420 Palestinian minors (below the age of 18 years) were arrested and
    detained in Israeli prisons during the year, and that at year's end,
    there were 200 minors in Israeli prisons. The IDF stated that 44 minors
    were held in Israeli security facilities at year's end.
        Israeli authorities may hold persons in custody without a warrant
    for 96 hours; they must be released unless a warrant is issued.
    Prearraignment detention may last up to 11 days for Palestinians
    arrested in the occupied territories and up to 8 days for minors and
    those accused of less serious offenses. Authorities must obtain a court
    order for longer administrative detentions--up to 6 months from the
    date of arrest. At hearings to extend detention for interrogation
    purposes, detainees are entitled to be represented by counsel, although
    the defense attorney often is not allowed to see or hear the evidence
    against his client. Detainees either are released at the end of the
    court-ordered detention or sent to administrative detention if they are
    not indicted. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite
    detention until the end of the trial. Israeli regulations permit
    detainees to be held in isolation during interrogation. Detainees have
    the right to appeal continued detention.
        Although a detainee generally has the right to consult with a
    lawyer as soon as possible, in security cases authorities may delay
    access to counsel for up to 15 days. Higher-ranking officials or judges
    may extend this period. Access to counsel is denied routinely while a
    suspect is being interrogated, which sometimes can last several weeks.
    Authorities must inform detainees of their right to an attorney and
    whether there are any orders prohibiting such contact.
        A number of factors hamper contacts by Palestinians in Israeli
    prison and detention facilities with their lawyers, families, and human
    rights organizations. Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to
    post notification of arrest within 48 hours; however, Palestinian
    suspects often are kept incommunicado for longer than 48 hours. Even if
    an arrest becomes known, it is often difficult to obtain information on
    where a detainee is being held or whether the detainee has access to an
    attorney. Palestinians generally locate detained family members through
    their own efforts. Palestinians may check with a local ICRC office to
    determine whether it has information on the whereabouts of a family
    member. A senior officer may delay for up to 12 days notification of
    arrest to immediate family members and attorneys. A military commander
    may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an
    unlimited period of time.
        The Israeli Government routinely transfers Palestinians arrested in
    the occupied territories to facilities in Israel, especially the prison
    in Ashkelon and the military detention center in Megiddo. Israeli
    authorities have been known to schedule appointments between attorneys
    and their detained clients, only to move the clients to another prison
    prior to the meetings. Authorities reportedly use such tactics to delay
    lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90 days. Palestinian lawyers also
    have difficulty traveling to meet with their clients during Israeli-
    imposed closures. Israel requires Palestinian attorneys to acquire
    permits to enter Israel to see their clients held in prisons there.
    Human rights groups say that Palestinian lawyers from the Gaza Strip
    have a harder time obtaining these permits than their West Bank
    counterparts and that they are denied entry into Israel more frequently
    than West Bank lawyers.
        Male family members between 16 and 40 years of age, and any family
    members with security records, generally are barred from visiting
    relatives in facilities in Israel. Relatives of Palestinian prisoners
    also complain that sometimes they only learn that visitation rights
    have been canceled when they arrive at the prison following a trip of
    many hours from the occupied territories. Following the outbreak of
    violence in late September, the Israeli Government banned all family
    visits for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. In November there
    were negotiations between the Israeli Government, the ICRC, and the
    Palestinian Prisoners' Society to restore visitation rights to
    Palestinian prisoners. The Government of Israel offered to allow
    spouses, children under the age of 10, and parents to apply for one-day
    visitation passes; however, Palestinian prisoners rejected these
    conditions.
        Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions is secret
    and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney during the hearings;
    the detainee and defense lawyer are required to leave the courtroom
    when secret evidence is presented. Israeli authorities maintain that
    they are unable to present evidence in open court because doing so
    would compromise the method of acquiring the evidence. In July 1998,
    the High Court of Justice ruled that only judges, rather than military
    officials, may renew administrative detention orders beyond a 6-month
    period. Detainees may appeal detention orders, or the renewal of a
    detention order, before a military judge, but their chances for success
    are very limited. During the year, some succeeded in persuading the
    courts to shorten their detentions.
        The overall number of Palestinian prisoners and administrative
    detainees in Israeli jails declined for the fourth straight year until
    mid-October, when the number increased. Human rights organizations
    attributed the decrease to the absence of major terrorist attacks; in
    the past, Israeli officials arrested Palestinians suspected of
    terrorist connections after major terrorist attacks. The Israeli
    Government released 16 Palestinian prisoners in March as a goodwill
    gesture. According to the IDF, in mid-October there were 1,307
    Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli prisons, military detention
    centers, and holding centers, compared with 1,354 at the end of 1999.
    According to the IDF, there were 1,402 Palestinian security prisoners
    in Israeli prisons and detention centers as of mid-December. According
    to human rights groups, 10 Palestinians were in administrative
    detention at year's end, compared with 18 at the end of 1999. Several
    have been held for more than 1 year. Many Palestinians under
    administrative detention during the past 3 years have had their
    detention orders renewed repeatedly without meaningful opportunity to
    appeal.
        PA security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The
    PA does not have a uniform law on administrative detention, and
    security officials do not always adhere to the existing laws in the
    West Bank and Gaza Strip. Laws applicable in Gaza, which do not apply
    to the West Bank, stipulate that detainees held without charge be
    released within 48 hours. These laws allow the Attorney General to
    extend the detention period to a maximum of 90 days during
    investigations. Human rights organizations and the PA Ministry of
    Justice assert that PA security officials do not always adhere to this
    regulation. Prevailing law in the West Bank allows a suspect to be
    detained for 24 hours before being charged. The Attorney General may
    extend the detention period.
        The PA Chairman has not signed the Basic Law, which was designed to
    limit executive branch abuses and to delineate safeguards for citizens,
    since it was passed by the Palestinian Council (PC) in 1996. The lack
    of safeguards has contributed to the tendency of PA security forces to
    refuse to carry out High Court of Justice orders to release detainees.
    In some cases, the High Court ordered the release of prisoners detained
    for years without trial, and PA security forces released the prisoners
    several months or a year later. In November 1997, the High Court
    ordered the release of HAMAS activist Mahmud Muslah; Muslah remained in
    detention at year's end. In February 1999, the High Court ordered the
    release of Wa'el Farraj, who has been detained without charges since
    1996; Farraj remained in detention at year's end. According to the
    Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens Rights, the High Court
    ordered 9 detainees released during the year, compared with
    approximately 60 detainees in 1999. The PA released approximately 60
    security prisoners during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''; however, human
    rights groups estimate that the PA has held approximately 150 prisoners
    for more than a year without charge. The total number of Palestinians
    in PA jails reached between 500 and 900 prisoners by year's end,
    including approximately 50 political and security detainees.
        In past years, Palestinian security forces sometimes detained or
    placed under house arrest the relatives of alleged security criminals.
    In the past, lawyers and PA judicial officials acknowledged that, in
    contravention of the law, PA security services sometimes arrested and
    detained persons without informing judicial officials.
        PA authorities generally permit prisoners--except those held for
    security offenses--to receive visits from family members, attorneys,
    and human rights monitors. PA security officials do not always permit
    lawyers to see their clients. In principle detainees may notify their
    families of their arrest, but this is not always permitted.
        Human rights organizations reported in the past that lawyers
    sometimes were denied access to their clients.
        PA security services have overlapping or unclear mandates that
    often complicate the protection of human rights. Under existing law in
    the West Bank, only the PA's civil police force is authorized to make
    arrests. In practice all security forces are known to detain persons at
    various times. The operating procedures and regulations for the conduct
    of PA security personnel in the various services still are not well
    developed and have not yet been made fully available to the public.
        There are many detention facilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
    administered by the overlapping PA security services, a situation that
    complicates the ability of families, lawyers, and even the Ministry of
    Justice to track detainees' whereabouts and to determine their numbers.
    Security services, including Preventive Security, General Intelligence,
    Military Intelligence, and the Coast Guard have their own interrogation
    and detention facilities. In general these services do not, or only
    sporadically, inform families of a relative's arrest. Most PA security
    officers remain unaware of proper arrest, detention, and interrogation
    procedures, as well as basic human rights standards. Human rights
    groups have provided basic human rights training to a number of PA
    security services. During the year, at least 36 PA security officials
    participated in human rights courses, bringing the total number of
    security officials who have graduated from human rights courses to
    nearly 1,600 since the PA's establishment in 1994.
        PA security forces continued to harass and arbitrarily arrest and
    detain journalists, political activists, and human rights advocates who
    criticized the PA and its policies. A number of journalists were
    arrested and detained and television stations were shut down for
    expressing views or covering topics unacceptable to the Palestinian
    Authority (see Section 2.a.).
        In January PA security forces rearrested Abdel Sattar Qassem.
    Security forces had arrested Qassem and seven other signatories of a
    petition that accused the PA of corruption in November 1999. The PA
    released Qassem in July.
        On February 26, PA police arrested and detained for 1 week
    approximately 30 Bir Zeit University students who reportedly threw
    stones at a foreign head of state during a demonstration (see Section
    2.b.). In May PA security forces arrested 20 persons for participating
    in an anti-PA rally in Ramallah organized by the Popular Front for the
    Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) following the funeral of one of its
    members who died during clashes with the IDF near Ramallah (see Section
    2.b.).
        Neither the Israeli Government nor the PA forcibly deported anyone
    from the occupied territories during the year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Israeli law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
    Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in the occupied
    territories are tried in Israeli military courts. Security offenses are
    defined broadly and may include charges such as membership in outlawed
    organizations. Charges are brought by military prosecutors. Serious
    charges are tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses are tried
    before one judge. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal
    verdicts to the Court of Military Appeals, which may accept appeals
    based on the law applied in the case, the sentence, or both. The right
    of appeal does not apply in all cases and sometimes requires court
    permission. The Israeli military courts rarely acquit Palestinians of
    security offenses, but sentences sometimes are reduced on appeal.
        Trials sometimes are delayed for several reasons: Witnesses,
    including Israeli military or police officers, do not appear; the
    defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys fail to
    appear, sometimes because they have not been informed of the trial date
    or because of travel restrictions on Palestinian lawyers. These delays
    add pressure on defendants to plead guilty to minor offenses; if they
    do, an ``expedited'' trial may be held, in which a charge sheet is
    drawn up within 48 hours and a court hearing scheduled within days.
        By law most Israeli military trials are public, although access is
    limited. Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions.
    Evidence that is not available to the defendant or his attorney may be
    used in court to convict persons of security offenses. There frequently
    is no testimony provided by Palestinian witnesses either for or against
    Palestinians on trial. Israeli authorities maintain that this is due to
    the refusal of Palestinians to cooperate with the authorities. Physical
    and psychological pressures and reduced sentences for those who confess
    may induce security detainees to sign confessions. Confessions usually
    are given in Arabic but translated into Hebrew for the record because,
    authorities maintain, many Israeli court personnel speak Arabic but few
    read it. Palestinian detainees seldom read Hebrew and therefore often
    sign confessions that they are unable to read.
        Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client
    consultations in prisons hinder legal defense efforts. Appointments to
    see clients are difficult to arrange, and prison authorities often fail
    to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
        Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of
    security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried under Israeli law in
    the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges preside, and the
    standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are governed by
    the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers convicted in Israeli
    courts of crimes against Palestinians regularly receive lighter
    punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts of similar
    crimes against either Israelis or other Palestinians. In December the
    Jerusalem magistrates court ordered an Israeli settler to pay
    compensation of $17,500 to the family of a young Palestinian boy who
    reportedly was killed by the settler's negligence about a decade
    earlier.
        There were no reports that the Israeli Government held political
    prisoners.
        The PA courts are inefficient, lack staff and resources and, as a
    result, often do not ensure fair and expeditious trials, and the PA
    executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry out
    court decisions.
        The PA inherited a court system largely based on structures and
    legal codes predating the 1967 Israeli occupation. In the civil court
    system, cases initially are tried in courts of first instance. There
    are two appeals courts, one located in Gaza City and the other in
    Ramallah, which handle appeals from the lower courts. The appeals
    courts also function as the Palestinian High Court of Justice. The PA
    executive at times does not respect decisions of the High Court, and
    the Palestinian security agencies do not always enforce its rulings
    (see Section 1.d.). In 1995 the PA established state security courts in
    Gaza and the West Bank to try cases involving security issues. Three
    military judges preside over each court. A senior police official heads
    the state security court in Jericho, and three judges preside over it.
    There is no right of appeal, but the PA Chairman reviews the court's
    findings and he may confirm or reject the decision. The PA Ministry of
    Justice has no jurisdiction over the state security courts, which are
    subordinate only to the Chairman.
        The Gaza legal code derives from British Mandate law, Egyptian law,
    and PA directives and laws. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in the West
    Bank. Bodies of law in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have been modified
    substantially by Israeli military orders. According to the Declaration
    of Principles and the Interim Agreement, Israeli military decrees
    issued during the occupation theoretically remain valid in both areas
    and are subject to review pursuant to specific procedure. The PA has
    stated that it was undertaking efforts to unify the Gaza and West Bank
    legal codes, but it has made little progress. Human rights advocates
    claim that the PA's judiciary does not operate consistently.
        The court system in general is recovering from years of neglect;
    many of the problems predate PA jurisdiction. Judges and staff are
    underpaid and overworked and suffer from a lack of skills and training.
    Court procedures and record keeping are archaic and chaotic. The
    delivery of justice often is slow and uneven. The ability of the courts
    to enforce decisions is extremely weak, and there is administrative
    confusion in the appeals process. A heavy caseload exacerbates these
    systemic problems. The PA closed all civil courts in late September for
    several weeks.
        The PA Ministry of Justice appoints all civil judges for 10-year
    terms. The Attorney General, an appointed official, reports to the
    Minister of Justice and supervises judicial operations in both the Gaza
    Strip and the West Bank. In the past, the Chief Justice had the
    authority to appoint all judges in the West Bank. Human rights
    organizations and judicial officials criticized the decision, saying
    that it contravened existing law, which stipulated that a higher
    judicial council should be responsible for appointing judges. During
    the year, the Chairman authorized the establishment of the High
    Judicial Council in accordance with legislation passed by the Council
    in 1998. Human rights advocates and lawyers believe that this step may
    enhance the judicial system.
        The PA's state security courts often fail to afford defendants due
    process. The PA usually ignores the legal limits on the length of
    prearraignment detention of detainees suspected of security offenses.
    Defendants often are brought to court without knowledge of the charges
    against them or sufficient time to prepare a defense. They typically
    are represented by court-appointed lawyers, who often are not
    qualified. Court sessions often take place on short notice in the
    middle of the night, and without lawyers present. In some instances,
    security courts try cases, issue verdicts, and impose sentences in a
    single session lasting a few hours.
        During the year, the state security courts sentenced three persons
    to death for committing murder. In two of the cases, the trials
    reportedly were hasty, and the defendants did not have adequate
    representation. For example, a state security court sentenced Raji
    Saqir to death on July 3 after a 1-day trial, which occurred 1 day
    after Saqir allgedly committed murder. Although no executions were
    carried out during the year, in February 1999, a Palestinian colonel
    was executed after the PA's state security court convicted him of
    raping a young boy. Human rights groups criticized the decision; they
    complained that the trial lasted for less than 2 hours, the defendant
    did not have sufficient time to prepare his defense, there was no
    appeals process, and the charges were ill-defined.
        The state security courts adjudicated cases that fell far outside
    the scope of the courts' original mandate. In addition to ``security''
    cases, the courts have on occasion dealt with tax cases and economic
    crimes, such as smuggling. In February the Chairman decreed that
    ``serious'' crimes, including homicide, rape, and drug trafficking, be
    referred to state security courts. The decision prompted human rights
    organizations to issue statements requesting the abolition of state
    security courts and the referral of all cases to the regular civil
    courts.
        There were no reports during the year that persons were convicted
    for their political beliefs. A credible Palestinian human rights
    organization estimated that the PA held approximately 100 political
    prisoners before the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' in late
    September. In October the PA released most of the political prisoners.
    The PA stated that this action was in response to Israeli warnings that
    it would be bombing PA police facilities following the brutal killing
    of two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah (see Section 1.a.). A
    Palestinian human rights organization estimated that the PA held 10
    political prisoners at year's end.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Israeli military authorities in areas of the West Bank
    under their control may enter private Palestinian homes and
    institutions without a warrant on security grounds when authorized by
    an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. In conducting
    searches, the IDF has forced entry and sometimes has beaten occupants
    and destroyed property. Israeli authorities state that forced entry may
    occur lawfully only when incident to an arrest and when entry is
    resisted. Authorities state that beatings and arbitrary destruction of
    property during searches are punishable violations of military
    regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such cases. The
    Israeli Government states that it does not keep consolidated
    information on the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages
    resulting from IDF actions. In February IDF soldiers raided an elderly
    Palestinian woman's home, reportedly searching for stone throwers; the
    woman, who had been suffering from heart problems, died of a heart
    attack.
        Israeli security forces may demolish or seal the home (owned or
    rented) of a Palestinian suspected of terrorism without trial. The
    decision to seal or demolish a Palestinian's house is made by several
    high-level Israeli officials, including the coordinator of the MATAK
    and the Defense Minister. Residents of houses ordered demolished have
    48 hours to appeal to the area commander; a final appeal may be made to
    the Israeli High Court. A successful appeal generally results in the
    conversion of a demolition order to sealing. After a house is
    demolished military authorities prohibit the owner from rebuilding or
    removing the rubble. Israelis suspected of terrorism are subject to
    Israeli law and do not face the threat of home demolition. In August
    Israeli security forces demolished the home of Nidal Daghlas near
    Nablus, claiming that a HAMAS fugitive, Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, previously
    had hidden in Daghlas' home. Human rights groups stated that the home
    demolition was an arbitrary measure. On November 2, Israeli security
    forces demolished two homes in Gaza following a nearby explosion.
        In November 1999, the Israeli Government expelled 300 Bedouin
    farmers from their homes in caves near the Jewish settlement of Ma'on,
    stating that the area was a closed military zone. On March 29, the
    Israeli High Court of Justice ordered that the farmers be allowed to
    return to their homes. In April the IDF issued new deportation orders
    to returnees who were not party to the original legal suit.
        From late September through the end of the year, the IDF destroyed
    numerous citrus orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems
    on Palestinian-owned agricultural land in both the West Bank and Gaza.
    The IDF generally destroyed agricultural land following clashes at
    demonstrations, shootings aimed at settlers, or bombings. The IDF
    stated that it destroyed this land because Palestinian snipers
    reportedly were using it for purposes of concealment.
        The PA requires the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry
    and searches of private property; however, Palestinian security
    services frequently ignore these requirements. Police searched homes
    without the consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly
    entered premises and destroyed property.
        PA security forces sometimes detained or placed under house arrest
    the relatives of alleged security criminals (see Section 1.d.).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Between late September and the end of the year,
    Israeli security forces killed 227 Palestinians and 4 foreign
    nationals, and injured over 10,600 Palestinians during violent
    demonstrations. Palestinian demonstrators frequently threw stones and
    Molotov cocktails at the IDF. In some demonstrations, Palestinians also
    used firearms. According to the IDF, Palestinians used firearms in
    about 30 percent of the demonstrations between late September and mid-
    November. In response Israeli security forces used a variety of means
    to disperse demonstrators, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal
    bullets, and live ammunition. In many instances, Israeli security
    forces used excessive force against demonstrators in contravention of
    their official rules of engagement (see Section 1.a.). According to the
    IDF, it does not have a policy of indiscriminate or excessive use of
    force, and its rules of engagement establish a framework to deal with
    threats faced by Israeli civilians and armed forces.
        IDF regulations permit the use of both rubber-coated metal bullets
    and live ammunition only when a soldier's life is in immediate danger,
    to halt fleeing suspects, to disperse a violent demonstration, or to
    fire on an individual unlawfully carrying firearms. According to human
    rights organizations, a number of Palestinian deaths and injuries
    reportedly occurred during demonstrations at which protesters did not
    use live firearms.
        According to IDF policy, soldiers are to direct fire at the legs
    only, and may fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe that a
    serious felony has occurred and that they have exhausted other means to
    apprehend the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of
    children or women, even in cases of severe public disorder, unless
    there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's life.
    Palestinian medical relief organizations reported that 59.5 percent of
    the gunshot wounds inflicted by Israeli security forces during
    demonstrations were in the head or torso, and estimated that about one-
    sixth of the Palestinians wounded during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada''
    likely would be disabled permanently. According to human rights
    organizations, a total of 82 Palestinians under the age of 18 years
    were killed in the demonstrations. During some demonstrations,
    bystanders, including journalists, medical personnel, and Palestinian
    civilians were killed or injured by IDF fire (see Sections 1.a. and
    2.a.).
        The IDF fired tank rounds and rockets from helicopters on cities
    and towns in the West Bank and Gaza, killing and injuring a number of
    persons and causing significant property damage (see Section 1.a.). For
    example, on October 12, in retaliation for the brutal killing by a
    Palestinian mob of two IDF reservists (see Section 1.a.), IDF
    helicopters attacked over 10 PA targets in Ramallah and Gaza, injuring
    more than 20 bystanders and destroying buildings. On October 23, the
    IDF shelled a neighborhood in Hebron, killing 1 person, in retaliation
    for an earlier shooting incident in the Israeli-controlled area of
    Hebron.
        For at least 13 nights between October and December, Palestinian
    gunmen from Beit Jala shot at homes in Gilo, a Jewish neighborhood in
    East Jerusalem (see Section 1.c.). Two Israelis were injured seriously
    in these attacks. In retaliation for these attacks, the IDF launched a
    series of counterattacks on residential neighborhoods in Beit Jala,
    Beit Sahour, and Bethlehem. One foreign national was killed and 36
    Palestinians were injured in these counterattacks.
        On October 31, in retaliation for the Palestinian killing of two
    Israeli security guards, the IDF attacked with helicopters PA offices
    in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza. On November 15, the IDF responded with
    force to many incidents involving Palestinian gunfire directed at Gilo
    from Beit Jala, killing a foreigner and injuring a number of
    Palestinians. On October 19, in response to Palestinians shooting at a
    group of Israeli visitors at Joseph's Tomb, the IDF used helicopters to
    attack a nearby Palestinian refugee camp, killing 1 person and injuring
    several others. On November 20, IDF helicopters launched a series of
    retaliatory attacks in the Gaza Strip in response to a bomb attack in
    Gaza that killed 2 persons and injured 9; 50 persons reportedly were
    injured in the IDF attacks and significant damage was done to a number
    of PA buildings. On November 24, the IDF fired two tank rounds at the
    town of Kufr Qalil in retaliation for shots fired on a nearby IDF post
    by unidentified Palestinian gunmen; two Palestinians were killed by the
    tank rounds.
        The Israeli Government's imposition of external and internal
    closures during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' contributed to intermittent
    shortages of basic food, medical supplies, and gasoline in the West
    Bank and Gaza.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Israeli Government generally
    respects freedom of speech in the occupied territories; however, it
    maintains a low level of censorship and prohibits public expressions of
    support for Islamic extremist groups such as HAMAS and other groups
    dedicated to the destruction of Israel. In March during the Pope's
    visit to the region and in October during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' the
    Israeli Government reportedly selectively enforced its standing
    prohibition on the display of Palestinian political symbols, such as
    flags, national colors, and graffiti in Jerusalem for the first time
    since 1994. Such displays are punishable by fines or imprisonment, and
    Israeli security forces reportedly detained and temporarily barred from
    Jerusalem several Palestinian youths for waving the Palestinian flag.
    Overall, Israeli censorship of specific press articles continued at a
    low level; however, the Israeli Government did censor some articles
    during the year. Israeli authorities monitor Arabic newspapers based in
    East Jerusalem for security-related issues. Military censors review
    Arabic publications for material related to the public order and
    security of Israel. Reports by foreign journalists also are subject to
    review by Israeli military censors for security issues, and the
    satellite feed used by many foreign journalists is monitored. The
    Israeli Government often closes areas to journalists when it imposes a
    curfew or closure. Israeli authorities have denied entry permits to
    Palestinian journalists traveling to their place of employment in
    Jerusalem during closures of the territories; however, the journalists'
    Israeli-issued press credentials have not been revoked.
        The IDF requires a permit for publications sold in the occupied
    territories still under its control. Publications may be censored or
    banned for content deemed anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli. Possession of
    banned materials is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. During the
    year, the Israeli Government refused to allow publications, including
    newspapers, into the Gaza Strip on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur.
        At least 10 journalists reportedly were hit by IDF gunfire during
    the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' and 3 other journalists were hit by gunfire
    from an unknown source (see Section 1.c.). The IDF reportedly
    restricted the free movement of mainly Palestinian journalists (see
    Section 2.d.).
        On October 13, in retaliation for the mob lynching of two Israeli
    reserve soldiers (see Section 1.a.), the IDF launched rockets at the
    PA's Voice of Palestine radio transmitter in Ramallah. In November the
    IDF launched rockets against a PA-owned television transmitter in Gaza.
        The PA restricted freedom of speech and of the press. In a number
    of instances during the year, the PA took steps to limit free
    expression, particularly regarding human rights issues and allegations
    of corruption. Press freedom is subject to a 1995 press law that does
    not protect the press adequately. PA security services further stifle
    the independence of the press by closing down media outlets, banning
    publications or broadcasts, and periodically harassing or detaining
    members of the media (see Section l.d.). Palestinian commentators and
    human rights groups state that, as a result, the practice of self-
    censorship by journalists is widespread.
        On May 5, PA officials arrested one of the leaders of a teachers'
    strike and temporarily closed down the radio station that broadcast an
    interview in which the leader accused the PA of inefficiency. The PA
    continued to detain the strike leader at year's end. On May 21, the PA
    closed the Watan and al-Naser television stations and the al-Manara
    Radio station in Ramallah for nearly 4 days, after the stations
    broadcast live coverage of an anti-PA demonstration in al-Bireh. On May
    31, the PA arrested Samir Qumsiah, chairman of the Union of Private
    Radio and Television Stations because he had issued a statement
    criticizing the closing of the stations; the PA released Qumsiah 3 days
    later.
        On May 27, PA officials arrested Fathi Barqawi, a director general
    of the news department at the Public Broadcasting Corporation in
    Ramallah after he criticized Chairman Arafat publicly. Barqawi was
    released a week later following intervention by prominent PA officials.
        On June 20, Palestinian police arrested Abd al-Fattah Ghanem, a
    presidential advisor on refugees, after he criticized the PA for
    failing to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Police held Ghanem
    incommunicado for 7 days and denied him access to legal counsel for the
    3 weeks that he was in detention.
        During the year, the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) stripped 31
    lawyers of their membership in the association, their right to practice
    law, and their ability to run in PBA elections. The lawyers reportedly
    all were outspoken critics of the PA. In May the Palestinian High Court
    temporarily reversed the decision to strip the lawyers of their PBA
    membership and their right to practice law. However, on May 17 the PBA
    placed the director of a West Bank NGO and candidate in the PBA
    elections on the ``non-practicing'' register of lawyers, purportedly
    because he worked for an NGO and not a law office (see Section 4).
        In June PA police officials in Ramallah detained Maher Alami, a
    West Bank journalist, for approximately 1 week. The PA police
    reportedly warned Alami against writing articles critical of the PA.
        After the October 12 brutal killing of two IDF reserve soldiers at
    a Ramallah police station (see Section 1.a.), Palestinian police
    confiscated film from several journalists who were at the scene. On
    October 4, a foreign journalist filmed three members of the Palestinian
    security forces distributing Molotov cocktails to several children. The
    security forces detained the journalist and his crew for several hours
    and destroyed the roll of film.
        On November 21, PA security officials detained a Palestinian 2 days
    after he criticized the peace process. After 21 days of detention,
    security officials asked him to agree not to speak out against the PA;
    he did not agree, but was released the same day.
        Israeli-imposed closures disrupted the operations of West Bank and
    Gaza universities, colleges, and schools during the year. Students and
    staff had difficulty traveling to educational institutions in cities
    and towns that were closed or placed under curfew by Israeli
    authorities (see Sections 2.d. and 5). The November 1999 opening of the
    southern safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank afforded
    Gazan students greater ability to pursue their education at West Bank
    educational institutions. However, during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' the
    Israeli Government closed the safe passage route, which impeded the
    ability of Gaza students to attend West Bank universities.
        The PA generally has authority over all levels of education in the
    West Bank and Gaza Strip and it controls the budgets of all public
    colleges. The PA did not interfere with education in the West Bank and
    Gaza Strip during the year.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Israeli
    Government placed limits on freedom of assembly for Palestinians in the
    occupied territories, largely through the imposition of internal
    closures and curfews (See Section 2.d.). Israeli military orders ban
    public gatherings of 10 or more persons without a permit. Since the
    1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel has relaxed
    enforcement of this rule, except in cases of Palestinian demonstrations
    against land seizures or settlement expansions.
        Israeli security forces killed more than 225 Palestinian
    demonstrators and injured more than 11,000 during the year often in the
    context of violent demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        There were several large, peaceful demonstrations of Jewish
    settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem during the year.
        The PA imposes some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however,
    while it requires permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large
    cultural events, these permits rarely are denied. In Gaza police
    approval is required for ``political'' meetings at several specific
    large meeting halls. Written permission also is required for buses to
    transport passengers to attend political meetings. In West Bank cities,
    the PA requires permits for outdoor rallies and demonstrations and
    prohibits calls for violence, displays of arms, and racist slogans,
    although this is not always enforced.
        On February 29, students at Bir Zeit University staged a large
    protest against PA policies and practices at which several
    demonstrators threw stones at a foreign head of state. Following the
    protest, PA police arrested about 30 students (see Section 1.d.). The
    PA police commissioner also banned unlicensed public gatherings.
    Several human rights groups and political factions filed a petition
    with the Palestinian High Court protesting the action. On April 29, the
    Court suspended the police order and gave the police commissioner 8
    days to clarify the reasons for issuing the order. The police order had
    not been enforced by year's end. In March hundreds of Palestinians
    demonstrated in Ramallah to demand the release of the Bir Zeit
    university students.
        In May a number of persons participated in a PFLP rally in Ramallah
    following the funeral of one of its members who died in clashes with
    the IDF; Palestinian security forces arrested 20 demonstrators (see
    Section 1.d.).
        The Israeli Government generally respected freedom of association.
        The PA placed some limits on freedom of association. However, the
    PA permits Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
    help organizations to operate. There were periodic complaints during
    the year from Palestinian political parties, social and professional
    groups, and other NGO's that the PA attempted to limit their ability to
    act autonomously. On April 21, the Preventive Security Force ordered
    the closure of a democratization group office in Gaza because the
    organization's by-laws reportedly were not in compliance with the NGO
    law. The office remained closed at year's end (see Section 4).
        The armed wings of several Palestinian political groups, including
    Islamic opposition groups, were outlawed. While it is not illegal to
    belong to the nonmilitary components of such groups, during times of
    heightened security concern the PA has harassed and even detained
    members of the political wings of these organizations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Israeli law provides for freedom of
    worship, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    it does not ban any group on religious grounds. It permits all faiths
    to operate schools and institutions. Religious publications are subject
    to the Publications Laws. However, Israel's imposition of an internal
    closure on the West Bank and Gaza for 81 days during the ``al-Aqsa
    Intifada'' and total curfew on many Palestinian towns significantly
    impeded freedom of worship for Muslims and Christians. During periods
    of closure, Palestinians from the occupied territories were prevented
    from traveling to pray on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in
    Jerusalem, Islam's third holiest site. On several occasions the Israeli
    Government prevented worshippers under the age of 45 from attending
    Friday prayers on the Temple Mount; the Israeli Government stated that
    it did so due to security concerns.
        No PA law protects religious freedom; however, the PA generally
    respects freedom of religion. In past years, there were allegations
    that several converts from Islam to Christianity at times are subject
    to societal discrimination and harassment by PA officials. However,
    there was no pattern of PA discrimination and harassment against
    Christians (see Section 5).
        On October 7, following the IDF evacuation from the Jewish
    religious site of Joseph's Tomb, about 1,000 Palestinian protesters
    entered the religious site, burned it, and damaged the roof and an
    outer wall in an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the tomb (see Section
    5). Some Israeli Government officials criticized the PA for failing to
    prevent the attack. The PA began to refurbish the tomb the following
    day.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign
    Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Israeli Government
    restricted freedom of movement for Palestinians. Since March 1993,
    Israel has required that all West Bank and Gaza residents obtain
    permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However, Israel often denies
    applicants permits with no explanation, and does not allow effective
    means of appeal. In the past, Palestinian officials with VIP passes,
    including PA cabinet officials and members of the Palestinian Council,
    were subjected to long delays and searches at Israeli checkpoints in
    the West Bank, despite the fact that they were traveling on special
    passes issued by Israel. Prior to the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa
    Intifada'' in September, there was only one report that this occurred;
    however, in October and November Palestinian officials were delayed and
    searched frequently. In general Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
    Strip find it difficult to obtain permits to work, visit, study, or
    obtain medical care in Israel. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem
    sometimes are prohibited by Israeli officials from entering the West
    Bank, and they require written permits from Israel to travel to the
    Gaza Strip. Prior to the November 1999 opening of the safe passage
    route, residents of the Gaza Strip rarely were able to obtain
    permission to travel to the West Bank, or residents of the West Bank to
    enter the Gaza Strip; this was even true of residents of the West Bank
    and Gaza Strip who regularly received permission to enter Israel. The
    PA permits Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-
    help organizations to operate. Israeli authorities permit only a small
    number of Gazans to bring vehicles into Israel and sometimes do not
    permit West Bank vehicles to enter Jerusalem or Israel. Except for
    senior PA officials, and those using the safe passage to the West Bank,
    Palestinians of all ages crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel are
    not permitted to travel by car across the main checkpoint. Instead,
    they must travel along a narrow walkway almost a mile long. Israelis
    moving into and out of the Gaza Strip are permitted to use their cars.
        In November 1999, Israel and the PA implemented arrangements in the
    1995 Interim Agreement to establish a safe passage route across Israel
    between the Gaza Strip and the southern West Bank. A northern safe
    passage route, also called for by the Interim Agreement, never was
    established, despite several rounds of negotiations. The southern safe
    passage route facilitated the movement of Palestinians between the West
    Bank and the Gaza Strip to work, study, and visit, and alleviated some
    of the problems associated with freedom of movement for Palestinians.
    However, some Palestinian human rights groups criticized the safe
    passage agreement because it maintains significant limits on freedom of
    movement. The safe passage route was closed in October in response to
    the ongoing violence. As of the end of November, a total of 15,000
    Palestinians received approval to use the safe passage route and 2,900
    applicants were refused permits to use the route.
        Since March 1993, Israel also has applied varying levels of
    ``closure,'' or enhanced restrictions, on the movement of Palestinians
    and their goods, often for lengthy periods, in response to terrorist
    attacks and other changing security conditions. During periods of
    violent protest in the West Bank or Gaza, or when it believes that
    there is an increased likelihood of such unrest, the Israeli Government
    imposes a tightened version of closure, called ``comprehensive,
    external'' closure. Comprehensive closures also are instituted
    regularly during major Israeli holidays. During such closures, the
    Israel Government cancels travel permits and prevents Palestinians--
    even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel or Jerusalem.
    During comprehensive closures, the authorities restrict severely the
    movement of goods between Israel and the occupied territories and
    between the West Bank and Gaza. On October 8, in response to increased
    violence, Israel imposed a prolonged comprehensive closure on the
    occupied territories. Israel imposed 88 days of tightened,
    comprehensive closure during the year, compared with 15 days in 1999.
        During periods of extreme unrest in the West Bank and Gaza, the
    Israeli Government also prohibits most travel between towns and
    villages within the West Bank. These ``internal'' closures impede the
    flow of goods and persons. Israel imposed at least 81 days of total or
    near-total internal closure during the year, compared with no days of
    internal closure during 1999. In the past, Israel rarely imposed
    internal closure within Gaza; however, for much of November and
    December, the IDF closed major roads in central Gaza, which blocked
    transit from the north to the south and stranded thousands of workers
    and students. Beginning in October, the Israeli Government further
    constrained the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by
    imposing total closures on specific areas or villages, sometimes for
    weeks at a time, and by intermittently closing the Gaza Airport and the
    Allenby and Rafah crossing points to Jordan and Egypt. Israel also
    imposed a curfew in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron. During the
    curfews, Palestinians generally were confined to their homes for all
    but a few hours per week during which they were allowed to buy food and
    other provisions. The IDF did not impose a curfew on the Jewish
    settlers in Hebron. On December 10, the IDF further restricted freedom
    of movement by banning private Palestinian cars that contained only men
    (but no women) from traveling on main roads in Areas B and C. The
    prolonged closures and curfews imposed by Israel on Palestinian cities
    and towns during the year had a significant negative impact on every
    sector of the Palestinian economy. Israel's Ministry of Finance
    estimates that since the beginning of the ``al-Aqsa Intifada,'' there
    has been a 30 to 50 percent decline in economic output in the occupied
    territories. Unemployment of Palestinians nearly has quadrupled, the
    poverty rate has doubled, and income losses were estimated at over $500
    million.
        The prolonged closure also affected students' ability to attend
    school and university. In areas under curfew, all classes were
    cancelled (see Section 5). Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach
    their schools in different villages and towns, and university students
    were unable to travel between Gaza and the West Bank due to the closure
    of the safe passage route.
        Human rights groups reported that between late September and the
    end of the year, the IDF delayed or prohibited at least 94 ambulances
    from crossing checkpoints (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to
    the Israeli Government, Israeli ambulances and medical personnel
    reportedly facilitated the medical evacuation of over 180 Palestinians
    to Israel, Jordan, and other countries during the violent unrest.
        In 1998 the Israeli Government established a ``continuous
    employment program'' that allows selected Palestinian workers who have
    been approved by the Ministry of Defense and who are married, are over
    28 years old, and have worked in Israel for a long period of time, to
    enter Israel to work in the event of a tightened closure. The program
    was not implemented during the periods of tightened closure during the
    year.
        The Israeli Government continued to restrict the movements of
    several Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged
    to the extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of
    administrative orders issued by the IDF central command.
        The Israeli Government requires all Palestinian residents to obtain
    permits for foreign travel and has restricted the travel of some
    political activists. Bridge-crossing permits to Jordan may be obtained
    at post offices without a screening process. These restrictions on
    residence, reentry, and family reunification only apply to Palestinian
    residents of the occupied territories.
        Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, which Israel occupied
    during the 1967 War, generally do not accept Israeli citizenship.
    Therefore, they are issued a residence permit or Jerusalem
    identification card by the Israeli Government. Israel applies the 1952
    Law of Permanent Residency and its 1974 amendments to Jerusalem
    identification card holders. This law stipulates that a Jerusalem
    resident loses the right of residence if the resident leaves Israeli
    territory for more than 7 years, acquires the nationality of another
    country, or acquires permanent residence in another country. Such
    persons are permitted to return only as tourists and sometimes are
    denied entry. The Israeli Government does not apply these same
    restrictions to Israeli citizens. In the past, invoking the 1952 law as
    legal justification, the Israeli Interior Ministry stripped residency
    rights from hundreds of East Jerusalem Palestinians. In the late
    1990's, the pace of revocations increased as the Ministry applied
    restricted policies, including a ``center of life'' test, which
    required extensive documentation of continuous residence within
    Jerusalem for the previous 7 years, to determine whether Palestinians
    were eligible to retain their identification cards. The Ministry's
    policy was the subject of numerous lawsuits, including one considered
    by the High Court of Justice in 1999. In October 1999, then Minister of
    Interior, Natan Sharansky announced that the Ministry no longer would
    apply the ``center of life'' criteria used previously to revoke the
    residency rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians. During the year, there
    were 7 identity card revocations, compared with 394 revocations in
    1999. In February the Israeli Ministry of Interior also published new
    instructions regarding residency rights in Jerusalem. According to
    these instructions, residents of Israel, whose identity cards had been
    revoked since 1995 and who returned to live in Israel since 1998 and
    had ``maintained proper contact'' were entitled to restoration of their
    identity cards. During the year, 67 identity cards were restored.
        Israeli authorities also place restrictions on family
    reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or during the
    1967 War, or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons
    since then, are not permitted to reside permanently with their families
    in Jerusalem or the occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and
    children of Palestinian residents also experience difficulty in
    obtaining permission to reside with their family members. For example,
    a Palestinian with a West Bank identification card must apply to the
    Israeli Government for permission to live with his or her Jerusalem-
    resident spouse in Jerusalem. The Israeli Government occasionally
    issues limited-duration permits and also issues a limited number of
    Jerusalem identification cards as part of its family reunification
    program. Israeli security authorities single out young (often
    unmarried) Palestinian males for more stringent restrictions than other
    Palestinians, citing them as more likely to be security risks. They
    generally are prohibited from working in Israel.
        The PA issues passports and identification cards for Palestinians
    residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Bearers of Palestinian passports do
    not need special exit permits from the PA; however, when leaving Israel
    from Ben Gurion Airport they require permits in order to transit Israel
    to reach the airport.
        Palestinians who hold Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the
    Israeli Government, must obtain travel documents from the Israeli
    Government to travel abroad. Human rights groups report that
    Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem often do not apply for Israeli
    travel documents because they fear that the application might prompt a
    reexamination of their residency status and lead to the revocation of
    their identity cards. On request, the Jordanian Government also issues
    travel documents to Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
    Palestinians who wish to travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli
    identification documents with Israeli authorities at the Allenby
    Bridge. There also is a requirement that Palestinians from East
    Jerusalem obtain a special permit to cross the Allenby Bridge, which
    may be purchased from the Ministry of Interior for $40 (125 NIS).
    Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are
    not allowed to cross between Israel and Jordan at the Sheikh Hussein or
    Arava crossings.
        Palestinians who reside in the West Bank or Gaza are required by
    the Israeli Government to exit and enter with a Palestinian passport.
    When Israel tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
    during the year, the Government at times restricted the entry and
    departure of Palestinians, even those with passports from other
    countries.
        The PA generally does not restrict freedom of movement.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East
    Jerusalem chose their first popularly elected government in 1996. They
    elected an 88-member Palestinian Council and the Ra'iis (President or
    Chairman) of the Executive Authority of the Council. Yasir Arafat won
    almost 89 percent of the vote in a two-person race for Chairman. Some
    700 candidates ran for Council seats. Council members were elected in
    multimember electoral districts. As many as 35 of the elected members
    were independent candidates. International observers concluded that the
    election could reasonably be regarded as an accurate expression of the
    will of the voters, despite some irregularities. During the year, the
    Council debated numerous draft laws and resolutions. Some members of
    the Council complained of its relative lack of power in relation to the
    executive branch of government.
        The last municipal elections took place in 1986. Municipal
    elections were planned for June 1999; however, they did not take place.
    On August 22, the Fatah Central Committee (FCC) appointed a committee
    to devise a plan for holding local elections before year's end;
    however, the PLO Central Council did not ratify the plan.
        Most Palestinians in East Jerusalem do not recognize the
    jurisdiction of the municipality of Jerusalem. Only a very small
    percentage of Jerusalem's Palestinian population vote in the municipal
    council elections. No Palestinian resident of Jerusalem sits on the
    city council.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 5
    women in the 88-member Council, and 1 woman serves in a ministerial-
    level position.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGO's monitor the Israeli
    Government's human rights practices. The Israeli Government generally
    cooperates with human rights and humanitarian NGO's; officials normally
    agree to meet with human rights monitors. The Israeli Government
    permits human rights groups to publish and hold press conferences. On
    April 4, the Israeli Government refused to allow a Palestinian human
    rights activist to travel to Cairo, Egypt for a regional meeting on
    human rights; however, several months later the Government allowed the
    activist to attend a meeting outside of the country (see Section 2.d.).
        On October 17, pursuant to the meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh, a fact-
    finding committee was established to examine the causes of the violent
    events that began in late September, and to recommend ways to prevent
    their recurrence. The committee began its work in December.
        Local human rights groups, most of which are Palestinian, and
    several international organizations monitor the PA's human rights
    practices. The PA generally cooperates with these organizations, and PA
    officials usually meet with their representatives; however, there were
    instances in which it did not. Several Palestinian human rights
    organizations work privately with the PA to overcome abusive practices
    in certain areas. They also publish criticism if they believe that the
    PA is not responding adequately to private encouragement. Human rights
    groups state that the PA generally is cooperative when dealing with
    certain types of human rights issues. Human rights organizations
    reported that they sometimes were denied access to detainees in
    Palestinian prisons during the year (see Section 1.d.).
        The ICRC operates in the West Bank and Gaza under the terms of a
    memorandum of understanding signed in September 1996 between the ICRC
    and the PLO. The memorandum accords the ICRC access to all detainees
    held by the PA and allows regular inspections of prison conditions. In
    accordance with the agreement, the ICRC conducts routine visits of PA-
    run prison facilities and sees PA-held prisoners throughout the year.
    Other human rights groups, including the Palestinian Independent
    Commission for Citizens' Rights and the Mandela Institute, also visited
    PA prisons and detention centers on a regular basis. Some human rights
    and international humanitarian organizations reported that they
    occasionally were denied access to detainees in Palestinian prisons
    during the year (see Section 1.d.). PA officials reportedly are less
    responsive to queries regarding the PA's policies toward and treatment
    of members of Islamist opposition groups than to queries on other
    detainees.
        In 1999 Palestinian NGO's repeatedly called on the PA to ratify a
    law passed by the Council in December 1998, which would govern the
    activities of NGO's and their relations with the PA. Ratification of
    the law was delayed due to the PA's attempts to replace the Ministry of
    Justice with the Ministry of Interior as the agency responsible for the
    administration of NGO's. In January Chairman Arafat approved the NGO
    law. At least 150 NGO's had been issued with registration certificates
    by year's end.
        On April 21, PSF officials closed a democratization group office in
    Gaza because the NGO was not yet registered with the Ministry of
    Interior (see Section 2.b.). After repeated unsuccessful attempts to
    reopen the office, board members decided to close the office
    permanently.
        On May 17, the PBA placed the director of a West Bank NGO on the
    ``non-practicing'' register of lawyers reportedly because he worked for
    an NGO and not a law office.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Under the complex mixture of laws and regulations that apply to the
    occupied territories, Palestinians are disadvantaged under Israeli law
    and practices compared with the treatment received by Israeli settlers.
    This includes discrimination in residency and land use.
        Women.--The problems of rape, domestic violence, and violence
    related to ``family honor'' have gained greater attention in the
    Palestinian community as a result of a significant effort by
    Palestinian women's groups; however, public discussion generally
    remains muted. Victims often are encouraged by relatives to remain
    quiet and are punished themselves or blamed for the ``shame'' that has
    been brought upon them and their families. The brother of a 14-year-old
    girl who reportedly was raped and killed by her uncle and brother in
    1998 still was awaiting trial at year's end. Women's groups seek to
    educate women on these problems, but women's rights advocates claim
    that few resources are available to shelter the victims of violence
    because women's shelters are not accepted culturally in Palestinian
    society. They also maintain that society has not been receptive to
    providing counseling or outreach services to victims of violence, which
    these advocates see as more widespread than is acknowledged. According
    to women's groups, there are no reliable data on the incidence of
    violence against women. Spousal abuse, sexual abuse, and ``honor
    killings'' occur, but societal pressures prevent most incidents from
    being reported and most cases are handled within the families
    concerned, usually by male family members. In prior years, leaders of
    HAMAS threatened and tried to intimidate Palestinian women who were
    involved in programs aimed at empowering women and helping abused
    women; there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
        Palestinian women endure various forms of social prejudice and
    repression within their own society. Because of early marriage, girls
    frequently do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural
    restrictions sometimes prevent women from attending colleges and
    universities. While there is an active women's movement in the West
    Bank, serious attention has shifted only recently from nationalist
    aspirations to issues that greatly affect women, such as domestic
    violence, equal access to education and employment, and laws concerning
    marriage and inheritance. Women who marry outside of their faith,
    particularly Christian women who marry Muslim men, often are disowned
    by their families and sometimes are harassed and threatened with death
    by members of their community. Local officials sometimes attempt to
    convince such women to leave their communities in order to protect
    themselves.
        A growing number of Palestinian women work outside the home, where
    they tend to encounter discrimination. There are no special laws that
    provide for women's rights in the workplace. Women are underrepresented
    in most aspects of professional life. Despite the fact that there is a
    small group of women who are prominent in politics, medicine, law,
    teaching, and NGO's, women for the most part are seriously
    underrepresented in the decisionmaking positions in these fields.
        Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For
    Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a
    (Islamic law), and the varied ecclesiastical courts rule on personal
    status issues for Christians. In the West Bank and Gaza, Shari'a
    pertaining to women is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which
    includes inheritance and marriage laws. Under the law, women inherit
    less than male members of the family do. The marriage law allows men to
    take more than one wife, although few do so. Women are permitted to
    make ``stipulations'' in the marriage contract to protect them in the
    event of divorce and questions of child custody. However, only an
    estimated 1 percent of women take advantage of this section of the law,
    leaving most women at a disadvantage when it comes to divorce or child
    custody. Ecclesiastical courts also often favor men over women in
    divorce and child custody cases.
        Children.--The PA requires compulsory education up to 12 years of
    age. However, early marriage in certain sectors of society frequently
    prevents girls from completing the mandatory level of schooling.
    Currently British Mandate, Jordanian, and military laws, from which
    West Bank and Gaza law is derived, offer protection to children under
    the Labor and Penal Codes. Existing laws designed to protect children,
    such as a law that sets the minimum employment age, are not always
    enforced. While there is no juvenile court system, judges specializing
    in children's cases generally sit for juvenile offenders. In cases in
    which the child is the victim, judges have the discretion to remove the
    child from a situation deemed harmful. However, the system is not
    advanced in the protection it affords children.
        The sustained closure imposed by Israel affected students' ability
    to attend school during the year. In areas under curfew, all classes
    were cancelled. Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach their
    schools in different villages and towns (see Section 2.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no mandated accessibility to
    public facilities in the occupied territories under either Israeli or
    Palestinian authority. Approximately 130,000 Palestinians in the West
    Bank and Gaza are disabled. Additionally, medical relief organizations
    estimated that approximately one-sixth of the 10,600 Palestinians
    injured during the ``al-Aqsa Intifada'' would be disabled permanently.
    Some Palestinian institutions care for and train disabled persons;
    however, their efforts are chronically underfunded. Many Palestinians
    with disabilities are segregated and isolated from Palestinian society;
    they are discriminated against in most spheres, including education,
    employment, transportation, and access to public buildings and
    facilities.
        Religious Minorities.--In the past, there were reports that a small
    number of Muslim converts to Christianity in the Palestinian community
    sometimes were subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA
    officials. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination and
    harassment against Christians (see Section 2.c.).
        On October 7, following the IDF withdrawal from the Jewish
    religious site of Joseph's Tomb, about 1,000 Palestinian protesters
    entered the religious site, burned it, and damaged the roof and an
    outer wall in an unsuccessful attempt to demolish the tomb (see Section
    2.c.). On October 12, Palestinian civilians reportedly burned a
    synagogue in Jericho.
        On November 21, Israeli settlers set a mosque on fire in Huwara,
    reportedly in reaction to the killing of an Israeli settler by a
    settler earlier in the day.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Labor affairs in the West Bank came
    under Palestinian responsibility with the signing of the Interim
    Agreement in September 1995. Until a new law being drafted by PA
    authorities comes into effect, labor affairs in the West Bank are
    governed by Jordanian Law 21 of 1965, as amended by Israeli military
    orders, and in Gaza by PA decisions. The law permits workers to
    establish and join unions without government authorization. The
    previous Israeli requirement that all proposed West Bank unions apply
    for a permit no longer is enforced. Israeli authorities previously
    licensed about 35 of the estimated 185 union branches now in existence.
    Following a process to consolidate trade unions in the West Bank, there
    now are 12 trade unions there.
        Palestinian workers in Jerusalem are governed by Israeli labor law.
    They are free to establish their own unions. Although the Government
    restricts Jerusalem unions from joining West Bank trade union
    federations, this restriction has not been enforced. Palestinian
    workers in Jerusalem may belong simultaneously to unions affiliated
    with West Bank federations and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
        West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut
    Federation. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work in Israel
    or Jerusalem are not full members of Histadrut, but they are required
    to contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Negotiations
    between Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return half of this
    fee to the Palestinian Union Federation were completed in 1996, but
    funds have yet to be transferred.
        Palestinians who work in Israel are required to contribute to the
    National Insurance Institute (NII), which provides unemployment
    insurance and other benefits. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza
    are eligible for some, but not all, NII benefits. According to the
    Interim Agreement, Palestinians working in Israel and Jerusalem
    continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel, the bankruptcy
    of a worker's employer, and allowances for maternity leave.
        There are outstanding cases of Palestinian workers who have
    attempted to sue their Israeli employers for non-payment of wages but
    are unable to travel to the relevant courts because they are unable to
    receive the proper permits.
        The great majority of West Bank unions belong to the Palestinian
    General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). The PGFTU was involved in
    the completion of the negotiations with Histadrut regarding workers'
    fees. The reorganization of unions under the PGFTU is intended to
    enable the West Bank and Gaza unions to better represent the union
    members' interests; the reorganization had not been finalized by year's
    end.
        An estimated 92,000 workers in the West Bank are members of the
    PGFTU, the largest union bloc, which consists of 12 trade unions in the
    West Bank and 8 in Gaza. The organization has about 46,500 members in
    Gaza. The PGFTU estimates actual organized membership, i.e., dues-
    paying members, at about 30 percent of all Palestinian workers.
        No unions were dissolved by administrative or legislative action
    during the year. Palestinian unions that seek to strike must submit to
    arbitration by the PA Ministry of Labor. If the union disagrees with
    the final arbitration and strikes, a tribunal of senior judges
    appointed by the PA decides what, if any, disciplinary action is to be
    taken. There are no laws in the territories that specifically protect
    the rights of striking workers. In practice, such workers have little
    or no protection from an employer's retribution.
        For several months, teachers throughout the West Bank held a
    strike. On May 5, PA officials arrested one of the strike leaders and
    closed down the radio station that broadcast an interview in which the
    leader accused the PA of inefficiency (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). The
    teachers suspended their strike on May 17, despite the fact that none
    of their demands were met.
        The PGFTU has applied for membership in the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A majority of
    workers in the occupied territories are self-employed or unpaid family
    helpers in agriculture or commerce. Only 35 percent of employment in
    the territories consists of wage jobs, most with the U.N. Relief and
    Works Agency (UNRWA), the PA, or municipalities. Collective bargaining
    is protected. Labor disputes are adjudicated by committees of 3 to 5
    members in businesses employing more than 20 workers.
        Existing laws and regulations do not offer real protection against
    antiunion discrimination.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--PA law does not
    prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, including by
    children, but there were no reports of such practices during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza is 14
    years. Most observers agree that a significant number of Palestinian
    children under the age of 16 years work. Many children under the age of
    12 are engaged in some work activities. Most such employment is
    believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban
    street vendors. Some employment of children also is reported to occur
    in small manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories.
    The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor by
    children, but there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
        The PA's capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. It has only
    40 labor inspectors to inspect an estimated 65,000 enterprises. The
    International Labor Organization and UNICEF are working with the PA to
    study the nature and extent of the problem and to develop the capacity
    to enforce and update child labor laws.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There currently is no minimum
    wage in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The average wage for full-time
    workers appears to provide a worker and family with a decent standard
    of living.
        In the West Bank, the normal workweek is 48 hours in most areas; in
    Gaza the workweek is 45 hours for day laborers and 40 hours for
    salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum
    workweek laws.
        The PA Ministry of Labor is responsible for inspecting workplaces
    and enforcing safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The Ministry
    of Labor states that new factories and workplaces meet international
    health and safety standards but that older ones fail to meet minimum
    standards. There is no specific legal protection afforded workers that
    allows them to remove themselves from an unhealthy or unsafe work
    setting without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    in, to, through, or from the occupied territories.
                                   __________

                                     JORDAN

        The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled
    by King Abdullah II bin Hussein since the death of his father, King
    Hussein bin Talal, in February 1999. The Constitution concentrates a
    high degree of executive and legislative authority in the King, who
    determines domestic and foreign policy. In the King's absence, a
    regent, whose authority is outlined in the Constitution, assumes many
    of these responsibilities. The Prime Minister and other members of the
    Cabinet are appointed by the King and manage the daily affairs of
    government. The Parliament consists of the 40-member Senate, appointed
    by the King, and the 80-member Chamber of Deputies, which is elected
    every 4 years. The lower house asserts itself only intermittently on
    domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1997 parliamentary elections
    were marred by reports of registration irregularities, fraud, and
    restrictions on the press and on campaign materials. According to the
    Constitution, the judiciary is independent of other branches of
    government; however, in practice it is susceptible to political
    pressure and interference by the executive.
        General police functions are the responsibility of the Public
    Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD, the General Intelligence
    Directorate (GID), and the military share responsibility for
    maintaining internal security, and have authority to monitor the
    activities of persons believed to be security threats. Elements of the
    security forces continue to commit human rights abuses.
        Jordan has a mixed economy, with significant but declining
    government participation in industry, transportation, and
    communications. The country has few natural resources and relies
    heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from citizens working
    abroad. During the year, the Government took steps to increase
    privatization and to improve the country's investment climate during
    the year. For example, in April the country acceded to the World Trade
    Organization, which entailed extensive legislative and regulatory
    reform. However, the economy continues to suffer from chronically high
    unemployment, and GDP growth has remained between 1 and 2 percent since
    1996. Price controls remain on bread, pharmaceuticals, gasoline, and
    animal feed. Wages remain stagnant. International sanctions against
    Iraq, historically the country's largest trading partner, continue to
    inhibit export growth. Violence in the occupied territories late in the
    year adversely affected the tourist industry, and many foreign
    investment projects were frozen. Per capita gross domestic product in
    1999 was approximately $1,542 (1,086 dinars). Many families, especially
    those in rural areas, are unable to meet basic needs to subsist.
        There continued to be significant problems in the Government's
    human rights record. There are significant restrictions on citizens'
    right to change their Government. Citizens may participate in the
    political system through their elected representatives in Parliament;
    however, the King has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss
    the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to
    establish public policy. Other human rights problems include
    extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces, police abuse
    and mistreatment of detainees; allegations of torture; arbitrary arrest
    and detention; lack of transparent investigations and accountability
    within the security services; prolonged detention without charge; lack
    of due process of law and interference in the judicial process;
    infringements on citizens' privacy rights; harassment of members of
    opposition political parties and the press; and significant
    restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.
    The 1999 Press and Publications Law reduced somewhat the restrictions
    outlined in previous legislation on the ability of journalists and
    publications to function and report freely; however, significant
    restrictions continued to be in effect. The Government imposes some
    limits on freedom of religion, and there is official and societal
    discrimination against adherents of unrecognized religions. The
    evangelical Christian community reported fewer incidents of
    governmental harassment during the year. There are some restrictions on
    freedom of movement. Violence against women, restrictions on women's
    rights, and societal discrimination against women are problems. The law
    still allows for reduced punishments for violent ``honor crimes''
    against women for alleged immoral acts. Child abuse remains a problem,
    and discrimination against Palestinians persists. Abuse of foreign
    servants is a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government officials; however,
    security forces committed several extrajudicial killings.
        In January police reportedly beat Mar'i Khalil Al-Jahran in a South
    Shuna police station, where he bled to death.
        In March security forces fired at a group of villagers of the Bedul
    Tribe near Petra, killing a 21-year-old man and 2 teenagers. The
    villagers were protesting the demolition of a home by members of the
    Petra Regional Authorities; the home reportedly was built illegally on
    government-owned land. The Ministry of Interior stated that security
    forces acted in self-defense after villagers, armed with sticks,
    stones, and firearms attacked a group of officials from the Petra
    Regional Council who were attempting to carry out the demolition order.
    Following the incident, the Government stated that it would investigate
    and punish those responsible for the violence; however, by year's end,
    the Government had not taken legal action against any party. The
    Government did not launch an official investigation of the incident;
    however, King Abdullah offered the villagers an extensive compensation
    package, including economic assistance and increased land for housing.
        In May police reportedly beat Musa Shalback in Hai Nazal after
    pursuing him for allegedly stealing a car and hitting two pedestrians.
    According to eyewitnesses, police handcuffed Shalback, severely beat
    him, and subsequently took him at a local hospital. Shalback was in a
    coma when he arrived to the hospital where he died from his injuries 10
    days later. The Government stated that Shalback died as a result of
    injuries sustained in a car crash that followed the pursuit. By year's
    end, the Government had not responded to diplomatic inquiries about
    this case.
        On October 6, police used batons and tear gas to disperse
    protesters in Baqaa refugee camp; one person was killed and six others
    were injured during the protest. Protesters claim that police caused
    the death and injuries, while police personnel claim that the
    demonstrators caused the fatalities (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        On July 20, 16-year-old Amjad Salem Ahmad Smadi died at a police
    station in Ajloun 45 minutes after police officers placed him in
    custody for suspected robbery. Government officials initially reported
    that Smadi hanged himself; however, family members and other residents
    of Ajloun demanded an investigation into the death. In response the
    Government formed an ad-hoc parliamentary committee to look into the
    incident and transferred the police officers and the local prosecutor
    to another part of the country. An unpublished forensics report
    supported the original autopsy's conclusion that the death was a
    suicide; however, the report also stated that Smadi was beaten prior to
    his death. Human rights activists and family members believe that the
    boy died as a result of the beatings and subsequently was hanged to
    make it appear as if he had committed suicide. Neither diplomatic
    representatives nor human rights activists were able to uncover
    evidence to support either the family's claims or to refute the
    Government's position.
        The security services continue to be reluctant to conduct
    transparent investigations into allegations of wrongful deaths that
    occurred during police detention in previous years, thus promoting a
    climate of impunity.
        There were no developments in the investigation of the May 1999
    death of Mahmoud Rashid Qasem Mohammed Ishtayeh, who died in a hospital
    while in police custody. His family claimed that he died of injuries
    suffered during a beating; however, prison officials maintained that
    Ishtayeh died of natural causes.
        There were no developments in the investigation of the police
    officers who killed Maseed tribesmen in March 1998 or Mohammad Al-
    Khattub and Ismail Suleiman Ajarmeh in February 1998.
        Women continued to be victims of ``honor killings'' (see Section
    5).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearance.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law provides prisoners with the right to humane
    treatment; however, the police and security forces sometimes abuse
    detainees physically and verbally during detention and interrogation
    and allegedly also use torture. Allegations of torture are difficult to
    verify because security officials frequently deny detainees timely
    access to lawyers. The most frequently alleged methods of torture are
    sleep deprivation, beatings on the soles of the feet, prolonged
    suspension with ropes in contorted positions, and extended solitary
    confinement. Defendants in high-profile cases before the State Security
    Court claimed to have been subjected to physical and psychological
    abuse while in detention. Government officials deny allegations of
    torture and abuse.
        A number of cases of beatings while in police custody were reported
    to human rights activists during the year. Human rights activists
    believe that there were many more incidents that were not documented.
    Iraqi weightlifter Kazem Dashi claimed that he was beaten and
    intimidated during his April detention (see Section 1.d.). Musa
    Shalback died in a hospital in March 10 days after police reportedly
    beat him in Hai Nazal (see Section 1.a.). Periodic detentions of
    foreign workers continue and allegations of overcrowded cells and
    physical abuse by guards persist.
        Police on several occasions used force to disperse demonstrations
    during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). For example, in April
    newspapers reported that police used excessive force to disperse
    student demonstrations at Jordan University, injuring a number of
    protesters. The students were protesting the administration's recent
    changes to the university's student council law, which were designed to
    curb the influence of Islamists (see Section 2.c.).
        On several occasions in October, police used force to disperse
    large violent protests against the Israeli Government's actions in
    Israel and the occupied territories (see Section 2.b.). For example, on
    October 6, police used batons and tear gas to disperse protesters from
    Baqaa refugee camp; one person was killed and six were injured during
    the protest (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). Protesters claimed that
    police caused the death and injuries, while police personnel claimed
    that the demonstrators caused the fatalities. On October 8, police used
    batons against at least five persons at a demonstration at Jordan
    University. On October 24, police used tear gas and water cannons to
    disperse a demonstration of between 20,000 and 30,000 persons who were
    approaching a heavily mined border area. Police injured a number of
    persons, including a journalist covering the protest (see Section
    2.a.).
        On August 7, a small group of Palestinians attacked an Arab member
    of the Israeli Parliament at the Baqaa refugee camp. Police personnel
    immediately escorted him away from the area. On November 19, an unknown
    assailant shot and injured an Israeli diplomat. On December 5, unknown
    gunmen shot and injured a second Israeli diplomat. In December police
    officials arrested seven persons allegedly connected to these attacks.
        Prisons and local police detention facilities are Spartan, and on
    the whole are severely overcrowded and understaffed. Human rights
    groups and prisoners complained of poor food and water quality,
    inadequate medical facilities, and poor sanitation in certain
    facilities. During the year, the Government opened a new prison
    facility in an attempt to alleviate somewhat the problem of
    overcrowding.
        The Government holds some of the prisoners who are detained on
    national security grounds in separate detention facilities maintained
    by the GID. The Government holds other security detainees and prisoners
    in regular prisons. Conditions in GID detention facilities are
    significantly better than general police detention facilities. The
    security prisoners often are separated from common criminals; however,
    conditions for them do not differ significantly.
        With some exceptions, the International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC) is permitted unrestricted access to prisoners and prison
    facilities, including GID facilities. In 1999 the Government formally
    granted the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to
    prisoners. However, the Government did not inform the UNHCR of the
    presence of seven Libyan security detainees prior to their deportation
    from the country, which effectively denied the UNHCR access to the
    detainees (see Section 2.d.). Local human rights monitors are allowed
    to visit prisons, but complain that the authorities require them to
    undertake a lengthy and difficult procedure in order to obtain
    permission for such visits.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The security forces
    arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. Under the Constitution,
    citizens are subject to arrest, trial, and punishment for the
    defamation of heads of state, dissemination of ``false or exaggerated
    information outside the country that attacks state dignity,'' or
    defamation of public officials.
        The Criminal Code requires that police notify legal authorities
    within 48 hours of an arrest and that legal authorities file formal
    charges within 10 days of an arrest; however, the courts routinely
    grant requests from prosecutors for 15-day extensions as provided by
    law. This practice generally extends pretrial detention for protracted
    periods of time. In cases involving state security, the authorities
    frequently hold defendants in lengthy pretrial detention, do not
    provide defendants with the written charges against them, and do not
    allow defendants to meet with their lawyers until shortly before trial.
    Defendants before the State Security Court usually meet with their
    attorneys only 1 or 2 days before their trial.
        The Government detains persons, including journalists, for varying
    amounts of time for what appear to be political reasons (see Section
    2.a.). Human rights sources reported that more than 500 persons were
    detained for security reasons and subsequently released within a short
    period of time throughout the year. This number likely underestimates
    the total number of political detainees. Human rights groups report
    that there are a smaller number of long-term political detainees.
        Local governors have the authority to enact the 1954 Preventing
    Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under house arrest for
    up to a year without formally charging them (see Section 2.d.). House
    arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to a local police
    station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who violate the terms
    of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14 days.
        In April the GID arrested Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh and
    held him without charge, legal representation, or access to the
    government prosecutor for 20 days (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
        On April 13, the GID allegedly detained without charge Iraqi
    weightlifter Kazem Dashi at the Al-Ruwayshid border point; the GID
    released Dashi the same day. Dashi claimed that he was beaten and
    intimidated during his interrogation in GID custody (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government denied the allegations.
        In July the GID detained 12 persons from Salt without charge,
    allegedly for security reasons. The Government stated that some of the
    detainees were arrested because they were ``religious individuals'' and
    that some were members of political parties. In December the Government
    released all of the detainees; 4 of the 12 were charged after admitting
    that they had planned terrorist activities and were required to post
    bail.
        In October following widespread protests against the Israeli
    Government's actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, police
    detained hundreds of persons. Police did not charge most of the
    demonstrators and released them within 1 day.
        The Government uses the threat of detention to intimidate
    journalists into practicing self-censorship (see Section 2.a.). In past
    years, police typically detained for 5 to 10 days numerous journalists
    who criticized government officials or policies; some of the
    journalists experienced abuse. When the Government did file charges,
    convictions were rare; however, some proceedings lasted several years
    with defendants required to appear in court regularly. During the year,
    police arrested at least one journalist because of an article he wrote
    (see Section 2.a.).
        There was no further information on Basil Abu Ghoshe, who continued
    to be detained despite having completed his sentence in 1998,
    ostensibly for his own protection due to threats from a rival tribe.
        The security services detained approximately 50 persons, described
    in the press as ``Islamists,'' during the year. These detentions were
    related to allegations of involvement in terrorist or strictly
    political activities.
        The Constitution prohibits the expulsion of any citizen, and the
    Government does not routinely use forced exile; however, in 1999 the
    Government allegedly expelled four HAMAS leaders, who subsequently
    filed an appeal to reverse the expulsion. On June 25, the High Court
    rejected on technical grounds an appeal by the defendants' attorney to
    reverse the alleged order of expulsion. The case was considered closed
    at year's end.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    independence of the judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to
    pressure from the executive branch. A judge's appointment to,
    advancement within, and dismissal from the judiciary are determined by
    a committee whose members are appointed by the King. The Ministry of
    Justice has great influence over a judge's career and subverts the
    judicial system in favor of the executive branch. There have been
    numerous allegations that judges have been ``reassigned'' temporarily
    to another court or judicial district in order to remove them from a
    particular proceeding. Judges also complain of unlawful telephone
    surveillance.
        The judicial system consists of several types of courts. Most
    criminal cases are tried in civilian courts, which include the appeals
    courts, the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. Cases involving
    sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and
    offenses against the royal family are tried in the State Security
    Court. In 1997 the Parliament passed amendments to the law governing
    the State Security Court that effectively extended its mandate
    indefinitely. The amendments had been rejected earlier by the lower
    house's judicial committee as ``undemocratic'' and contrary to the
    principle of judicial independence.
        Shari'a (Islamic law) courts have jurisdiction over marriage and
    divorce among Muslims and inheritance cases involving both Muslims and
    non-Muslims. Christian courts have jurisdiction over marriage and
    divorce cases among Christians, but apply Shari'a law in inheritance
    cases (see Section 5).
        Most trials in the civilian courts are open. Defendants are
    entitled to legal counsel, may challenge witnesses, and have the right
    to appeal. Defendants facing the death penalty or life imprisonment
    must be represented by legal counsel. Public defenders are provided if
    the defendant in such cases financially is unable to hire legal
    counsel. Shari'a as applied in the country regards the testimony of a
    woman to be equal to half that of a man. This provision technically
    applies only in religious courts; however, in the past it has been
    imposed in civil courts as well, regardless of religion.
        The State Security Court consists of a panel of three judges who
    may be either civilians or military officers. Sessions frequently are
    closed to the public. Defendants tried in the State Security Court
    often are held in pretrial detention without access to lawyers,
    although they may be visited by representatives of the ICRC. In the
    State Security Court, judges have inquired into allegations that
    defendants were tortured and have allowed the testimony of physicians
    regarding such allegations. The Court of Cassation has ruled that the
    State Security Court may not issue a death sentence on the basis of a
    confession obtained as a result of torture. Defendants in the State
    Security Court have the right to appeal their sentences to the Court of
    Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both fact and law.
    Appeals are automatic for cases involving the death penalty.
        In the past, defense attorneys have challenged the appointment of
    military judges to the State Security Court to try civilian cases as
    contrary to the concept of an independent judiciary. Military judges
    appear to receive adequate training in civil law and procedure.
        In the past, the press routinely carried details of cases tried
    before the State Security Court, despite 1998 provisions in the Press
    and Publication Law that prohibited press coverage of any case that was
    under investigation, unless expressly permitted by the authorities. The
    1999 Press and Publications Law permits journalists to cover court
    proceedings ``unless the court rules otherwise'' (see Section 2.a.).
    There was press coverage of trials in the State Security Court during
    the year.
        On September 18, the Security Court convicted 22 suspected members
    of the ``Al-Qaeda'' terrorist network of planning attacks at tourist
    sites around the country during millenium celebrations. The court
    sentenced 6 of those convicted to death and 16 to prison sentences
    ranging from 7 years to life.
        In 1999 the Government expelled four HAMAS leaders (see Section
    1.d.); there were credible reports of executive branch influence with
    respect to the verdict. On June 25, the High Court rejected on
    technical grounds an appeal by the defendants' attorney to reverse the
    order of expulsion. The case was considered closed at year's end.
        In late 1999, lawyers refused to represent an Israeli citizen who
    was accused of forging official documents. The court convicted him and
    he was sentenced to 1 year in prison.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution requires that security forces obtain
    a warrant from the Prosecutor General or a judge before conducting
    searches or otherwise interfering with these rights, and the security
    services generally respect these constitutional restrictions; however,
    in security cases, the authorities sometimes--in violation of the law--
    obtain warrants retroactively or obtain preapproved warrants. Security
    officers monitor telephone conversations and Internet communication,
    read correspondence, and engage in surveillance of persons who are
    considered to pose a threat to the Government or national security. The
    law permits these practices if the Government obtains a court order.
    Judges complain of unlawful telephone surveillance (see Section 1.e.).
        In June the GID confiscated without a warrant a box of publications
    from Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh, detained him without charge
    for 20 days, then placed him under house arrest (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.d.).
        The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications (see
    Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government imposes
    some restrictions on these rights.
        The 1998 Press and Publications Law and the 1999 revisions to the
    law, combined with the 1998 Press Association Law, impose stringent
    restrictions on the operation of newspapers. The Government also
    intimidates journalists to encourage self-censorship. Private citizens
    may be prosecuted for slandering the royal family, the Government, or
    foreign leaders, and for ``sowing sedition.'' The Press and
    Publications Law and the law governing the Jordan Press Association
    (JPA) require membership in the JPA for persons to be considered
    ``legal'' journalists or editors, thus potentially excluding dozens of
    practicing journalists from the profession. The JPA uses its authority
    to enforce bans on journalists receiving funding from foreign sources
    or having Israeli contacts (see Section 4). In August 1999, then Prime
    Minister Abdul Raouf Rawabdeh issued an order directing government
    offices to cooperate only with JPA members. Citizens generally do not
    hesitate to criticize the Government openly, but are more circumspect
    in regard to the King and the royal family.
        The 1998 Press and Publications Law granted the Government wide
    discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order
    shutdowns, which enabled it to control the editorial content of
    newspapers. The law also prohibited reporting on criminal cases or
    crimes at any stage of the investigation without prior authorization
    from the public prosecutor. However, the 1999 amendments to the Press
    and Publications Law, limit somewhat the Government's discretion to
    issue fines, transfer the power to withdraw licenses to the judiciary,
    limit significantly the Government's power to order shutdowns, and
    allow journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court rules
    otherwise.'' The 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law also
    reduce the fine for violations at between $700 and $1,400 (500 to 1,000
    dinars), down from between $7,000 and $14,000 (5,000 and 10,000 dinars)
    under the 1998 Press and Publications Law (see Section 1.e.). It was
    illegal under the 1998 Press and Publications Law to publish news,
    opinion, information, reports, caricatures, or photos that disparage
    the King or the royal family, pertain to the armed forces or security
    services, harm national unity, disparage religion, offend an individual
    or harm his reputation, disparage the heads of friendly states, harm
    the country's relations with other nations, promote perversion or lead
    to moral corruption, shake confidence in the national currency, or
    feature false news or rumors. Although these restrictions were modified
    by the 1999 amendments to the Press and Publications Law, prohibitions
    on such activities still exist in the Penal Code and a number of other
    laws.
        According to the 1999 Press and Publications Law, all publications
    must be licensed by the Government. The law provides that those who
    seek to obtain a newspaper license must show proof of capital of
    $700,000 (500,000 dinars) for a daily newspaper, $70,000 (50,000
    dinars) for most other publications, and $7,000 (5,000 dinars) for
    specialized publications. The law also requires that the editor in
    chief of a newspaper be a citizen who permanently resides in the
    country and a member of the JPA for at least 4 years. This last
    provision reflects a reduction in the requirements from previous
    legislation but places the onus of regulation on the JPA.
        Persons accused of violating the Press and Publications Law are
    tried in a special court for press and copyright cases. Journalists
    also may be prosecuted for criminal and security violations in
    connection with their work. Although a substantial number of cases are
    dismissed before trial, many other cases linger in the courts for
    years. The Government routinely uses detention and prosecution or the
    threat of prosecution to intimidate journalists and thereby
    successfully encourages self-censorship (see Section 1.d.).
        The Penal Code authorizes the State to take action against any
    person who incites violence, defames heads of state, disseminates
    ``false or exaggerated information outside the country that attacks
    state dignity,'' or defames a public official.
        In January security forces arrested engineering student Asim Ogla
    Al-Maghayirah from the University of Science and Technology, accusing
    him of affiliation with a banned political party (Al-Tahrir) and
    distributing illegal pamphlets (see Section 2.b.).
        On May 25, police arrested Basil Talluzi, a freelance journalist
    and short-story writer for the independent weekly newspaper Al-Mir'ah
    (The Mirror), for writing a satirical article about leaders in the Arab
    world (see Section 1.d.). Talluzi was released the next day and
    reported that he was not mistreated while in detention. The JPA claimed
    credit for obtaining Talluzi's prompt release.
        In October police reportedly beat and confiscated the film of a
    reporter covering a demonstration against the Israeli Government's
    actions in Israel and the occupied territories. The police officer
    reportedly apologized and returned the film to the journalist the next
    day (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        In September the JPA voted to expel Nidal Mansour, its own vice
    president and the president of a nongovernmental organization (NGO),
    the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CFJ). Mansour
    allegedly received foreign funding for CFJ activities (see Section 4).
    As a result of his expulsion from the JPA, Mansour was not permitted to
    keep his position as editor in chief of Al-Hadath newspaper. The Jordan
    Times, an English language newspaper, published an article criticizing
    the JPA's expulsion of Mansour. The JPA threatened the editor in chief
    of the Jordan Times with disciplinary measures; she subsequently
    published an apology letter. In October Mansour filed a complaint to
    the High Court of Justice; the court suspended the expulsion order
    pending review of the case.
        In 1999 a columnist of Al-Arab Al-Yawm newspaper wrote an article
    that was critical of the JPA. The JPA subsequently suspended for 2
    years the newspaper's editor in chief, Azzam Yunis, along with three
    other journalists. June Yunis appealed the action; however, his request
    was denied.
        In March the Government banned a book of poems written by Musa
    Hawamdeh due to pressure from radical Islamists. In June the Shari'a
    court charged Hawamdeh with apostasy. The complainant requested that
    Hawamdeh publicly retract the controversial statements in his poem and
    requested that the Shari'a judge order that he divorce his wife and
    lose his rights to inherit property or manage his own wealth. The
    Shari'a court referred the case to a civil court. In July both the
    Shari'a and criminal courts acquitted Hawamdeh of all charges, without
    his retracting any portion of the poem (see Section 2.c.).
        According to local press reports, the Press and Publications
    Department also banned a book of poetry by Ziyad Al-Anani in April; the
    book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. The
    authorities did not bring charges against Al-Anani; the book was
    published and distributed in Beirut, Lebanon due to the Jordanian ban
    (see Section 2.c.).
        Some journalists complained about high taxes on the media industry
    and tariffs on paper, which they claim led them to reduce the size of
    their publications. They also criticized the Government for its policy
    of advertising predominantly in newspapers in which the Government owns
    shares.
        The Government did not block the entry of foreign publications. In
    January the Government passed a bill that grants foreign media
    operations ``absolute freedom of expression'' in the country. The bill
    reportedly was passed in order to encourage foreign investment. Some
    commentators criticized the Government for passing a bill that offers
    full autonomy for foreign journalists while maintaining laws that
    restrict freedom of expression for local journalists.
        Radio and television news broadcasts are more restricted than the
    print media. The Government is the sole broadcaster of radio and
    television programs. The Government has commercial agreements with the
    British Broadcasting Corporation, the London-based Middle East
    Broadcasting Center, and Radio Monte Carlo that allows it to simulcast
    regional programs using local radio transmitters. Jordan Television
    (JTV) reports only the Government's position on controversial matters.
    International satellite television and Israeli and Syrian television
    broadcasts are available and unrestricted.
        In December due to widespread criticism of local media coverage of
    events in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, King Abdullah took steps to
    reform the state media. For example, the King appointed new members to
    the board of the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (JRTVC) and
    reportedly instructed the new director to discontinue the traditional
    practice of placing items about the King first in the evening news
    lineup. The Minister of Information also announced a plan to create an
    independent regulatory commission.
        The GID actively investigates Internet reports of ``crimes against
    the king.''
        The Government limits academic freedom. No university professors
    were dismissed for their political views during the year; however, some
    academics claim that they receive frequent threats of dismissal. In
    March Jordan University granted the president of the university the
    authority to appoint half of the university's 80-member student
    council, including the chair (see Section 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    restricts freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain permits for public
    gatherings. Following a demonstration on October 6 in which one
    protester was killed and six were injured, the Government banned all
    demonstrations and public rallies. However, a number of demonstrations
    subsequently were held with government acquiescence despite the ban.
    Before the ban, the Government denied permits for public protests and
    rallies that it determined pose a threat to security.
        In February the Government twice refused requests by human rights
    activists to hold demonstrations to protest a parliamentary vote
    rejecting the repeal of Article 340, the so-called honor crimes law.
    However, on February 14, Prince Ali bin Hussein and Prince Ghazi bin
    Mohammed, led more than 5,000 persons in a march to Parliament to
    demand the cancellation of Article 340. The Ministry of Interior denied
    permits for an Islamic Action Front (IAF) counterdemonstration. Some
    commentators criticized the Government for organizing and controlling
    the demonstration instead of allowing human rights activists to
    organize their own demonstration.
        In March Jordan University's administration amended the Student
    Council election law, granting the University president the authority
    to appoint half of the University's 80-member student council,
    including the chair. The amendment was viewed widely as an effort to
    curb the influence of campus Islamists. Many students, including non-
    Islamists, objected to the University's decision, and staged several
    demonstrations throughout April to protest against the appointments.
    Police used physical force, water cannons, and tear gas to disperse
    demonstrations, injuring a number of students (see Section 1.c.).
        On July 1, the Higher Coordination Committee for Opposition Parties
    convened a rally to welcome home the three members of the Jordanian
    Professional Association who were shot by Israeli soldiers at a protest
    at the border between Israel and Lebanon.
        In August the Islamic Action Front organized several large
    demonstrations in support of Palestinian sovereignty over East
    Jerusalem. There was heavy police presence at these demonstrations;
    however, security forces did not prevent the demonstrations.
        In October there were numerous large demonstrations against the
    Israeli Government's actions in Israel and the occupied territories and
    in support of Palestinians. Police used force to disperse demonstrators
    during several violent demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        The Government restricts freedom of association. The Government
    requires, but routinely grants, approval for conferences, workshops,
    and seminars.
        The Government routinely licenses political parties and other
    associations. There currently are 25 licensed political parties.
    Membership in an unlicensed political party is illegal. The Government
    may deny licenses to parties that it decides do not meet a list of
    political and other criteria contained in the Political Parties Law.
    The High Court of Justice may dissolve a party if it violates the
    Constitution or the Political Parties Law.
        In January security forces arrested engineering student Asim Ogla
    Al-Maghayirah from the University of Science and Technology, reportedly
    due to his affiliation with a banned political party (Al-Tahrir) and
    because he allegedly distributed illegal pamphlets (see Section 2.a.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the
    safeguarding of ``all forms of worship and religious rites in
    accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is
    inconsistent with public order or morality;'' however, the Government
    imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion. Citizens may not
    always practice the religion of their choice. According to the
    Constitution, Islam is the state religion.
        Islamic institutions are managed by the Ministry of Religious
    Affairs and Trusts, which appoints imams and subsidizes certain
    activities sponsored by mosques. Religious institutions, such as
    churches that wish to receive official government recognition, must
    apply to the Prime Ministry for registration. The Protestant
    denominations registered as ``societies'' come under the jurisdiction
    of one of the recognized Protestant churches for purposes of family
    law, such as divorce and child custody. The Government does not
    recognize a number of religions.
        Over 90 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, and according
    to official government statistics, approximately 6 percent are
    Christian. Government and Christian officials privately estimate the
    true figure to be closer to between 2 and 4 percent. The Government
    does not recognize religious faiths other than the three main
    monotheistic religions: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism. In addition
    not all Christian denominations have been accorded official government
    recognition. Officially recognized denominations include the Greek
    Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox,
    Maronite Catholic, and the Assyrian, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-Day
    Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Other
    churches, including the Baptist Church, the Free Evangelical Church,
    the Church of the Nazarene, the Assembly of God, and the Christian
    Missionary Alliance, are registered with the Ministry of Justice as
    ``societies'' but not as churches. There also are small numbers of
    Shi'a and Druze, as well as adherents of the Baha'i Faith. The
    Government does not interfere with public worship by the country's
    Christian minority. However, although the majority of Christians are
    allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as proselytizing or
    encouraging conversion to the Christian faith--both considered
    incompatible legally with Islam--are prohibited. Christians are subject
    to aspects of Shari'a (Islamic law) that designate how inheritances are
    distributed.
        The Government does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church
    of Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but each
    of these denominations is allowed to conduct religious services and
    activities without interference.
        The Government does not recognize the Baha'i Faith as a religion
    but does not prohibit the practice of the faith. However, Baha'is, who
    number approximately 800 citizens, face both official and societal
    discrimination. The Government does not record the bearer's religion on
    national identity cards issued to Baha'is, nor does it register
    property belonging to the Baha'i community. Adherents of the Baha'i
    Faith are considered as Muslims for purposes of family and inheritance
    law. Unlike Christian denominations, the Baha'i community does not have
    its own court to adjudicate personal status and family matters. Baha'i
    personal status matters are heard in Shari'a courts.
        Non-Jordanian Christian missionaries operate in the country but are
    subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not proselytize
    Muslims. Since late 1998, foreign Christian mission groups in the
    country have complained of increased bureaucratic difficulties,
    including refusal by the Government to renew residence permits.
        The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian
    training school for pastors and missionaries, which requested
    registration from the Ministry of Education in 1998, was not registered
    by year's end. Pending such registration, in 1999 authorities suspended
    renewal of the residence permits of all of the seminary's 36 foreign
    students and 2 members of the faculty. In 1998 and 1999, some non-
    citizen Arab Muslim students were deported and asked to leave the
    country as a result of their association with JETS. To date the
    Ministry of Education's refusal to issue visas has affected 14 of 140
    students and 4 staff members of the school.
        In 1999 an employee of a small language school in Amman twice
    applied for a residence permit from the Ministry of Interior. His
    application was denied on both occasions, reportedly because government
    officials believed that he had been trying to convert Muslims to
    Christianity. He reapplied in April and was awaiting a response from
    the Government at year's end.
        In January GID officials contacted an official of Life Agape
    (formerly Campus Crusade for Christ)--an organization associated with
    the Baptist Church, which distributes Bibles and conducts Bible
    studies--and asked him to sign a letter stating that he would not
    ``deal with Muslims.'' The GID officers told the official that if he
    did not sign the letter his office would be closed. In February police
    brought the letter to the Life Agape office, and escorted the official
    to the police station, and then to meet with the Governor of the Amman
    municipality. The following day, the Governor closed the Life Agape
    office; no reason was specified on the Governor's order.
        The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Baha'is) on
    the national identity card and ``family book'' (a national registration
    record issued to the head of every family that serves as proof of
    citizenship) of all citizens.
        The Constitution provides that congregations have the right to
    establish schools for the education of their own members ``provided
    that they comply with the general provisions of the law and be subject
    to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and
    orientation.''
        In February criticism of a poem entitled ``Yusef,'' which was
    included in a book of poems published in May 1999 by Muslim poet Musa
    Hawamdeh, began to circulate in mosques in Amman. Radical Islamists
    escalated the criticism of the poem and the poet, calling for the poet
    to be killed if he refused to recant the poem and for him to be
    divorced forcibly from his Muslim wife. Criticism of the poem from the
    Ministers of Religious Affairs and Information followed, and by the end
    of March, the Government banned the book in which the offending poem
    was published. In June Hawamdeh was summoned to a Shari'a court to face
    allegations of apostasy; he was charged by the head of court clerks
    with denying Koranic facts and defaming a prophet. The complainant
    requested that Hawamdeh publicly retract the controversial statements
    in his poem and requested that the Shari'a judge order that he divorce
    his wife and lose his rights to inherit property or manage his own
    wealth. The Shari'a court referred the case to a civil court. In July
    both the Shari'a and criminal courts acquitted Hawamdeh of all charges,
    without requiring him to retract any portion of the poem (see Section
    2.a.).
        According to local press reports, the Press and Publications
    Department banned a second book of poetry, by Ziyad Al-Anani in April;
    the book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. The
    authorities did not bring charges against Al-Anani. The book was
    published and distributed in Beirut, Lebanon due to the Jordanian ban.
        In June due to a dispute stemming from an intrachurch rivalry
    between the Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Antioch Orthodox
    Patriachate, the Government closed an Arab Orthodox church in Amman
    that was aligned with the Antioch Patriarchate in Damascus, Syria. The
    Government closed the church following a request from local Orthodox
    hierarchy to enforce a 1958 law that grants the Jerusalem Patriarchate
    authority over all Orthodox churches in the country. On November 29,
    the Government gave permission to the church to open officially on
    December 14 despite the fact that the dispute over authority had not
    been resolved. The church opened as scheduled; however, the Government
    closed it down 1 week later, stating that the church was in violation
    of the 1958 law for associating itself with the Orthodox church. The
    Government reportedly stated that the church has permission to reopen
    under a different name.
        In December 1999, the municipality of Amman closed the Roy and Dora
    Whitman Academy--a nonprofit missionary school in Amman--on the basis
    that it was not registered with the Ministry of Education. In April the
    school received registration and reopened. In July the Ministry of
    Labor approved official work permits for the academy's staff.
        Shari'a in the country is applied in all matters relating to family
    law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father; all citizens,
    including non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions
    regarding inheritance. All minor children of a male citizen who
    converts to Islam are automatically considered to be Muslim. Adult
    children of a male Christian who has converted to Islam become
    ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not themselves
    convert to Islam. In cases where a Muslim converts to Christianity, the
    act is not recognized legally by the authorities, and the subject
    continues to be treated as a Muslim in matters of family and property
    law. The minor children of a male Muslim who converts to Christianity
    continue to be treated as Muslims under the law.
        The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims.
    Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians is allowed; however, a
    Muslim may not convert to another religion. Muslims who convert to
    other faiths complain of social and government discrimination. The
    Government does not recognize the legality of such conversions. Under
    Shari'a converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be denied
    their property and other rights. However, this principle is not
    applied. Converts from Islam do not fall under the jurisdiction of
    their new religion's laws in matters of personal status and still are
    considered Muslims under Shari'a, although the reverse is not true.
    Shari'a prescribes a punishment of death for conversion; however, there
    is no equivalent statute under civil law.
        The Political Parties Law prohibits houses of worship from being
    used for political party activity. The law was designed primarily to
    prevent Islamist parliamentarians from preaching in mosques.
        Religious instruction is mandatory for all Muslim students in
    public schools. Christian and Baha'i students are not required to
    attend courses in Islam.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for the right of
    citizens to travel freely abroad and within the country except in
    designated military areas; however, there are some restrictions on
    freedom of movement. The law requires that all women, including foreign
    women married to citizens, obtain written permission from a male
    guardian--usually their father or husband--to apply for a Jordanian
    passport. During the year, there were several cases in which mothers
    reportedly were prevented from departing with their children because
    authorities enforced requests from fathers to prevent their children
    from leaving the country.
        The GID sometimes withholds passports from citizens on security
    grounds. Local governors have the authority to enact the 1954
    Preventing Crimes Law, which allows them to place citizens under house
    arrest for up to a year without formally charging them (see Section
    1.d.). House arrest may involve requiring persons to report daily to
    local police station and the imposition of a curfew. Persons who
    violate the terms of their house arrest may be imprisoned for up to 14
    days.
        In April after the GID released Hassan Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Hanieh
    following 20 days of detention without charge (see Section 1.d.), the
    governor of Amman, required Abu Hanieh to report to a local police
    station twice daily and to return home by 6:30 p.m. every evening.
    Officials did not bring charges against Hanieh and rescinded the house
    arrest in August.
        Jordanians with full citizenship receive passports that are valid
    for 5 years. Most Palestinians living in Jordan are citizens and
    receive passports that are valid for 5 years. However, the Government
    estimates that there are 150,000 Palestinian residents who are refugees
    or children of refugees who arrived from Gaza after 1967 do not qualify
    for citizenship. They receive 2-year passports valid for travel only.
    In the period following the country's administrative and legal
    disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Palestinians residing in the
    West Bank received 2-year passports valid for travel only, instead of
    5-year Jordanian passports). In 1995 King Hussein announced that West
    Bank residents without other travel documentation again would be
    eligible to receive 5-year passports. However, the Government has
    emphasized that these passports are for travel only and do not connote
    citizenship, which only can be proven by presenting one's ``national
    number,'' a civil registration number accorded at birth or upon
    naturalization to persons holding citizenship. The national number is
    recorded on national identity cards and in family registration books,
    which are issued only to citizens.
        The Jordanian Society for Citizens' Rights (JSCR) reported a small
    number of cases in which Jordanian embassies overseas refused to issue
    new passports to Jordanians of Palestinian origin who were domiciled in
    foreign countries. Such Palestinians consequently were unable to return
    to Jordan.
        The Constitution specifically prohibits the deportation of
    citizens. However, in July the High Court rejected an appeal
    challenging the alleged expulsion of four HAMAS leaders, all four of
    whom are citizens (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.).
        There were credible reports that, due to a ban on his entering the
    country, government officials stopped former Minister of Parliament,
    Yaqoub Qarrash, at the border in January when he tried to return from
    Saudi Arabia.
        There is no law or statute that provides for the granting of
    refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government generally cooperates
    with the office of the UNHCR. The UNHCR must resettle refugees in other
    countries. However, in April 1998, the Ministry of Interior signed a
    memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR concerning the status and
    treatment of refugees. Under the agreement, the Government admits
    asylum seekers, including those who have entered the country
    clandestinely, and respects the UNHCR's eligibility determinations
    under the refugee definitions set forth in the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The agreement
    provides protection against the forcible return of refugees from the
    country, and recognizes the legal definition of a refugee as set forth
    in the U.N. Convention. Since 1996 the UNHCR has held regular seminars
    to train law enforcement officials in international refugee law,
    including specialized courses for policewomen. The Government provides
    first asylum. According to UNHCR figures, 55,626 persons have sought
    asylum through the UNHCR since October 1990, and in approximately 8,389
    cases (approximately 15 percent), applicants have been accorded refugee
    status.
        The Government estimates that over 200,000 Iraqis reside in the
    country. Since 1991 thousands of Iraqis have applied for refugee status
    and received legal and material assistance from the UNHCR. During the
    year, 6,806 Iraqis applied for, and 641 were accorded, refugee status.
    Additionally 1,753 out of the total 1,868 refugees accorded status
    during the year were Iraqi nationals, reflecting applications from
    previous years. The UNHCR also received applications for refugee status
    during the year from Sudanese, Russians of Chechen decent, Somali, and
    Eritrean asylum seekers.
        For the 1999-2000 school year, the Government reverted to its
    policy of denying Iraqi children admittance to school unless such
    children are legal residents of the country or recognized as refugees
    by the UNHCR.
        According to the Government, it deported eight Libyan nationals
    affiliated with ``international terrorist organizations'' in March. The
    Government did not inform the UNHCR of the presence of the Libyans
    prior to their deportation from the country. The Libyan Government
    reportedly executed three of the eight Libyans upon their return to
    Libya (see Section 1.c).
        Almost 1.6 million Palestinian refugees are registered in Jordan
    with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).
    The UNRWA counts another 800,000 Palestinians as either displaced
    persons from the 1967 war, arrivals following the 1967 war, or
    returnees from the Gulf between 1990 and 1991.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        There are significant restrictions on citizens' right to change
    their government. Citizens may participate in the political system
    through their elected representatives in Parliament; however, the King
    has discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister
    and Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to establish public policy.
    Appointments made by the King to high government posts do not require
    legislative approval. Executive power is vested in the King (or, in his
    absence, in the Regent), who exercises his power through his ministers
    in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
        In June King Abdullah dismissed then Prime Minister Abdul Raouf
    Rawabdeh and appointed Ali Abu Al-Ragheb as his successor. The King
    also appointed 19 new members to the 29-member Cabinet.
        The Parliament is composed of the 40-member Senate, appointed by
    the King, and the popularly elected 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The
    Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to initiate legislation,
    and it can approve, reject, and amend legislation proposed by the
    Cabinet. A group of 10 senators or deputies may submit draft bills for
    consideration; however, in practice legislation is initiated and
    drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers and submitted by the Government to
    the Parliament for its consideration. Opposition Members of Parliament
    have complained that attempts by members of the lower house to initiate
    legislation receive no response from the Government. The King proposes
    and dismisses extraordinary sessions of Parliament and may postpone
    regular sessions for up to 60 days. If the Government amends or enacts
    a law when Parliament is not in session, by law it must submit the law
    to Parliament for consideration during the next session; however, this
    does not always occur in practice.
        The Electoral Law and the distribution of parliamentary seats
    deliberately favor electorates in rural and southern Jordan, regions
    with populations known for their traditional, pro-Hashemite views.
        Over 500 candidates competed in the 1997 parliamentary elections,
    despite a boycott by Islamist and other parties. There were many
    reports of registration irregularities and fraud. Restrictions on the
    press and on campaign materials also had a negative effect on the
    campaign, which elicited much debate over the fairness of the Electoral
    Law and its implementation. Voter turnout was significantly lower in
    most urban areas than in rural areas. Centrist candidates with ties to
    major tribes dominate the Parliament.
        Municipal elections in July 1999 featured the participation of the
    parties that had boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections; however,
    low voter turnout necessitated a second day of balloting. The process
    generally was regarded as free and fair.
        The so-called one-man, one-vote amendment to the Electoral Law was
    ratified by Parliament in 1997, nearly 4 years after it was first
    enacted by royal decree. The amendment allows voters to choose only one
    candidate in multiple-seat districts. In the largely tribal society,
    citizens tend to cast their first vote for family members, and any
    additional votes in accordance with their political leanings. The
    amendment also limits representation in the largely Palestinian urban
    areas. As a result, the amendment in practice also has tended to limit
    the chances of other non-tribal candidates, including women, Islamists,
    and other opposition candidates to be elected.
        The next parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in 2001.
    The Islamic Action Front publicly declared that it would boycott the
    elections absent significant changes in the one-man, one-vote amendment
    to the Electoral Law.
        Women have the right to vote, and women's groups encourage women to
    vote and to be active in the political process; however, they are
    underrepresented at the national and local level. There is one female
    minister and two female senators, but no women hold seats in the
    Chamber of Deputies.
        Of the 80 seats in the lower house, 9 are reserved for Christians,
    6 for Bedouins, and 3 for the Circassian or Chechen ethnic minorities.
        The Palestinian community, estimated to account for more than half
    of the total population, is not represented proportionately in the
    Government and legislature. Nine of 28 ministers, 6 of 40 senators, and
    11 of 80 lower house deputies are of Palestinian origin. There also are
    no Palestinians in any of the 12 governorships throughout the country.
    The electoral system gives greater representation to areas that have a
    majority of inhabitants of non-Palestinian origin.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic and international human rights groups investigate
    allegations of human rights abuses and publish and disseminate findings
    critical of government policy. However, the Press and Publications Law
    has restricted the publication of information about the military and
    security services, which, in effect prevented the publication by
    domestic groups of reports alleging torture and other abuses committed
    by the security services. The 1999 amendments to the Press and
    Publications Law removed these specific restrictions, but restrictions
    still exist in the Penal Code and other legislation (see Section 2.a.).
        The local chapters of the Arab Organization for Human Rights
    (AOHR), the Jordanian Human Rights Organization (JHRO), and the JSCR
    are registered with the Government. The groups drew public attention to
    alleged human rights abuses and a range of other political issues. They
    also have pressed the Government either to bring formal charges against
    political detainees or to release them promptly. The AOHR and the JSCR
    assert that the Government responds to only about 10 and 20 percent
    respectively of the complaints that they submit on behalf of
    individuals who allegedly were subjected to human rights violations by
    the authorities. However, the JSCR reported that the Government
    generally supported public workshops that it held in which citizens
    discussed their viewpoints on sensitive social and political topics.
    Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are not permitted to
    receive funds from foreign sources, and some NGO workers reported that
    they feared they would be accused of accepting illegal funds from
    abroad. In June the Jordan Bar Association (JBA) accused Asma Khadar of
    the Mizan Group, a local NGO, of accepting foreign funds and threatened
    to close the organization and disbar her. The JBA did not file formal
    charges against Khadar or close the Mizan Group and the case was
    considered closed by year's end.
        The Government generally cooperates with international NGO's. The
    ICRC usually is permitted full and unrestricted access to detainees,
    including those held by the GID and the military intelligence
    directorate (see Section 1.c.).
        In March the Government formed the new Royal Commission for Human
    Rights, which is chaired by Queen Rania. The mandate of the Commission
    is to present recommendations on reforming current laws and practices
    to King Abdullah and to institutionalize human rights in the country.
    In November the Commission sponsored two human rights awareness
    seminars with police and judicial officials in Amman and Aqaba. Members
    of the Commission also intervened in a number of individual cases of
    alleged human rights violations throughout the year.
        The Government also established the National Team for Family
    Protection and the Child Protection Center during the year (see Section
    5). The Government controls the Parliamentary Public Freedoms
    Committee, the Ombudsman, and the Human Rights Office at the Prime
    Ministry.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of race;
    however, women, minorities, and others are treated differently under
    the law and face discrimination in employment, housing, and other
    areas.
        Women.--Violence against women is common. Reported incidents of
    violence against women do not reflect the full extent of the problem.
    Medical experts acknowledge that spousal abuse occurs frequently.
    However, cultural norms discourage victims from seeking medical or
    legal help thus making it difficult to assess the extent of such abuse.
        Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against
    their spouses for physical abuse but in practice familial and societal
    pressures discourage them from seeking legal remedies. Marital rape is
    not illegal. NGO's, such as the Jordanian Women's Union, which has a
    telephone hot line for victims of domestic violence, provide assistance
    in such matters. Wife battering technically is grounds for divorce, but
    the husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority from the
    Koran to correct an irreligious or disobedient wife by striking her.
        The Criminal Code allows leniency for a person found guilty of
    committing a so-called ``honor crime,'' a violent assault with intent
    to commit murder against a female by a relative for her perceived
    immodest behavior or alleged sexual misconduct. Law enforcement
    treatment of men accused of ``honor crimes'' reflects widespread
    unwillingness to recognize the abuse involved or to take action against
    the problem. Twenty-one such murders were reported during the year in
    which the victims were strangled, stabbed, or shot several times. Human
    rights monitors believe that many more such crimes were committed but
    not documented as honor crimes. Moreover, most crimes of honor are not
    reported by the press. The actual number of honor crimes is believed to
    be significantly higher. One forensic medical examiner estimated that
    25 percent of all murders committed in the country are honor crimes.
    The police regularly imprison women who are potential victims of honor
    crimes for their own protection. There were up to 40 women
    involuntarily detained in this form of ``protective custody'' during
    the year.
        According to Article 340 of the Penal Code, a ``crime of honor''
    defense may be invoked by a defendant accused of murder who ``surprises
    his wife or any close female relative'' in an act of adultery or
    fornication, in which case the perpetrator of the honor crime is judged
    not guilty of murder. Although few defendants are able to meet the
    stringent requirements for a crime of honor defense (the defendant
    personally must have witnessed the female victim engaging in sexual
    relations), most avoid trial for the crime of murder, and are tried
    instead on the charge of manslaughter; even those convicted of murder
    rarely spend more than 2 years in prison. (In contrast to honor crimes,
    the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death, and the maximum
    penalty for second-degree murder is 15 years.) Such defenses also
    commonly rely on the male relative having acted in the ``heat of
    passion'' upon hearing of a female relative's alleged transgression,
    usually without any investigation on the part of the assailant to
    determine the veracity of the allegation before committing the assault.
    Defenses in such cases fall under Article 98 of the Penal Code. Women
    may not invoke these defenses for murdering a male relative under the
    same circumstances, nor may they use them for killing men who attempt
    to rape, sexually harass, or otherwise threaten their honor.
        On January 11, a 29-year-old woman, who was being treated for self-
    inflicted burns at a local hospital, was shot several times and killed
    by her 28-year-old brother in an ``honor crime.'' An autopsy indicated
    that the woman was 6 months' pregnant at the time of her death. A
    criminal court originally sentenced the brother to death; however, the
    court subsequently commuted his sentence to 10 years in prison.
        After being released from protective custody on bail posted by her
    uncle in April, 40-year-old Fathieh Mohammad reportedly was shot and
    killed by her father, who subsequently turned himself in to the police,
    stating that he had killed his daughter to ``cleanse his honor.'' The
    police also apprehended one of Fathieh's brothers during the
    investigation and subsequently arrested both her father and brother for
    the crime. The case was pending at year's end.
        In December police arrested a man for beating to death his 19-year-
    old sister in November for ``reasons of honor.'' Police were
    investigating a second brother for his suspected involvement in the
    killing at year's end. Police exhumed the woman's body from a cemetery
    in which she was buried illegally. Medical tests proved that the victim
    had not engaged in sexual activity.
        In February a criminal court sentenced Bassam Mahmoud to 15 years
    in prison with temporary hard labor for killing his sister in 1999 to
    ``cleanse the honor.'' Mahmoud shot his 19-year-old sister Maysoon 21
    times after bringing her home from the police station where she had
    been charged with ``immoral'' behavior. Following his sentencing,
    Mahmoud's family dropped all charges against him, and the court
    subsequently reduced his 15-year sentence by half.
        Also in February, a tribunal of judges reduced the sentence against
    Samir Ayed, who in October 1999 had killed his sister in a ``fit of
    fury'' to ``cleanse his honor,'' to 6 months in prison. Most activists
    believe that even if Article 340 were repealed, honor crimes likely
    would persist with sentences continuing to be reduced under Article 98.
        In December 1999, the National Committee to Eliminate ``Crimes of
    Honor'' presented leaders of the upper and lower houses of the
    Parliament with a petition signed by 15,000 citizens demanding an end
    both to crimes of honor and the legislation that protects perpetrators
    of such crimes. In November 1999, the lower house rejected a
    government-supported amendment that would have eliminated Article 340;
    however, the upper house approved the same measure in December 1999.
    The amendment was returned to the lower house for reconsideration. In
    February the lower house again rejected the proposal to repeal Article
    340.
        In February the Government twice refused requests by human rights
    activists to hold demonstrations in protest of the lower house vote.
    However, on February 14, Prince Ali bin Hussein and Prince Ghazi bin
    Mohammed led more than 5,000 persons in a march on Parliament to demand
    the cancellation of Article 340. On the same day, the press reported
    that the Islamic Action Front (IAF) issued a fatwa stating that the
    cancellation of Article 340 would contradict Shari'a and would
    ``destroy our Islamic, social, and family values by stripping men of
    their humanity when they surprise their wives or female relatives
    committing adultery.'' The Ministry of Interior denied permits for an
    IAF counterdemonstration, which drew protests from both sides of the
    debate (see Section 2.b.).
        Women experience legal discrimination in matters of pension and
    social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the value of court
    testimony. A woman's testimony is worth only half that of a man (see
    Section 1.e.). The Government provides men with more generous social
    security benefits than women. The Government continues pension payments
    of deceased male civil servants to their heirs but discontinues
    payments of deceased female civil servants.
        Under Shari'a as applied in the country, female heirs receive half
    the amount of a male heir's inheritance, and the non-Muslim widows of
    Muslim spouses have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives
    half of her parents' estate; the balance goes to designated male
    relatives. A sole male heir inherits both of his parents' property.
    Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who
    need assistance. Men are able to divorce their spouses more easily than
    women. Marriage and divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by
    special courts for each denomination (see Section 2.c.). Married women
    are ineligible for work in the diplomatic service, and, until recently,
    most women in the diplomatic corps automatically were assigned to
    administrative positions. There are six female judges in the country.
        The law requires a married woman to obtain her husband's permission
    to obtain a passport (see Section 2.d.). Married women do not have the
    legal right to transmit citizenship to their children. Furthermore,
    women may not petition for citizenship for their non-Jordanian
    husbands. The husbands themselves must apply for citizenship after
    fulfilling a requirement of 15 years of continuous residence. Once the
    husbands have obtained citizenship, they may apply to transmit the
    citizenship to their children. However, in practice such an application
    may take years and, in many cases, citizenship ultimately still may be
    denied to the husband and children. Such children become stateless and
    lack the rights of citizen children, such as the right to attend school
    or seek other government services.
        Civil law grants women equal pay for equal work, but in practice
    this law often is ignored. Press and union leaders reported during the
    year that that some employers in the private sector reportedly paid
    their female employees well under the legal minimum wage, despite the
    fact that the women were under contract. In January the Jordanian Food
    Industry Factory reportedly fired a group of 28 women after they
    demanded to be paid the legal minimum wage. The women reportedly blamed
    their union and the Ministry of Labor for their inability to protect
    workers (see Section 6.e.).
        Social pressures discourage many women from pursuing professional
    careers. Nonetheless, women have employment opportunities in many
    professions, including engineering, medicine, education, the military,
    and law. Women constitute approximately 16.5 percent of the work force
    and 50 percent of university students. According to local NGO reports,
    while female employees hold approximately 52 and 39 percent of jobs in
    the education and health sectors respectively, they constitute only 7.5
    percent of managerial posts and 10 percent of all jobs in the private
    sector. Women's groups stress that the problem of discrimination is not
    only one of law, but also of women's lack of awareness of their rights
    or unwillingness to assert those rights. The U.N. Food and Agriculture
    Organization reported in 1995 that women who work in agriculture
    average 15-hour days and earn less than men. The Jordanian chapter of
    the Business and Professional Women's Club gives seminars on women's
    rights and assists women in establishing small businesses. The chapter
    also provided several programs for potential female voters and
    candidates for the upcoming 2001 parliamentary elections. The
    University of Jordan launched a new graduate degree program in women's
    studies during the year to promote ``objective awareness between the
    sexes.'' Members of the royal family work actively to improve the
    status of women.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
    welfare in the areas of education and health. However, government
    efforts in these areas are constrained by limited financial resources.
    Education is compulsory until the age of 16; however, no legislation
    exists to enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it, and
    children who do not attend school or attend infrequently are not
    considered truant. The law prohibits corporal punishment in schools;
    however, such punishment is known to occur. Since the beginning of the
    1999-2000 school year, the Government has denied Iraqi children
    admittance to school unless they are legal residents of the country or
    recognized as refugees by the UNHCR (see Section 2.d.).
        Educational development, quality, and the relevance of education to
    job market demand have been on the Government's agenda since 1985, with
    few concrete results to date. Because there are government-run primary
    schools in virtually every village, most students in the country have
    access to primary education. The Government also grants fee reductions
    and food and transportation supplements to families with many children
    or to very poor families in order to make education more affordable.
        In March Queen Rania established the National Team for Family
    Protection (NTFP) to consolidate all issues concerning family safety.
    On August 20, the Government opened ``Dar al Amman,'' the nation's
    first child protection center. The facility provides temporary shelter,
    medical care, and rehabilitation for children ages 6 to 12 years who
    have suffered abuse.
        The Government attempts to safeguard some children's rights,
    especially regarding child labor. However, although the law prohibits
    most children under the age of 16 from working, child vendors work on
    the streets of Amman. The Ministry of Social Development has a
    committee to address the problem and in some cases removes the children
    from the streets, returns them to their families or to juvenile
    centers, and may provide the families with a monthly stipend. However,
    the children often return to the streets. Declining economic conditions
    have caused the number of these children to increase steadily over the
    last 10 years. Selling newspapers, tissues, small food items, or gum,
    these street vendors, along with the other children who pick through
    trash dumpsters to find recyclable cans to sell, sometimes are the sole
    source of income for their families.
        Although the problem is difficult to quantify, social and health
    workers believe that there is a significant incidence of child abuse in
    families, and that the incidence of child sexual abuse is significantly
    higher than reported. The law specifies punishment for abuses against
    children. Rape or sodomy of a child under 15 years of age carries the
    death penalty.
        The Family Protection Unit of the Public Security Department (PSD)
    works with victims and perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence.
    The unit deals primarily with child and spousal abuse, providing
    multiple in-house services, including medical treatment for patients.
    The unit cooperates with police to apprehend perpetrators of domestic
    violence, facilitates participation in education and rehabilitation
    programs, and refers patients to other facilities.
        Illegitimate children are entitled to the same rights under the law
    as legitimate children. However, in practice they suffer severe
    discrimination in a society that does not tolerate adultery or
    premarital sex. Most illegitimate children become wards of the State or
    live a meager existence on the fringes of society. In either case,
    their prospects for marriage and gainful employment are limited.
    Furthermore, illegitimate children who are not acknowledged legally by
    their fathers are considered stateless and are not given passports or
    identity numbers.
        Students must obtain a good behavior certificate from the GID in
    order to qualify for admission under the university quota system.
    Activists reported that the GID sometimes withholds these certificates
    from deserving students reportedly due to a family member's allegedly
    problematic record.
        Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), a procedure widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, rarely is practiced. However, one southern tribe
    of Egyptian origin in the small village of Rahmah near Aqaba reportedly
    practices FGM. One local Mufti issued a fatwa stating that FGM
    ``safeguards women's chastity and protects them against malignant
    diseases by preventing fat excretions.'' However, the Mufti also stated
    that as FGM is not a requirement of Islam, women who do not undergo
    this procedure should not be embarrassed.
        People with Disabilities.--High unemployment in the general
    population restricts job opportunities for disabled persons, estimated
    by the Ministry of Social Development to number 250,000. Thirteen
    percent of disabled citizens receive monetary assistance from the
    Government. The Government passed legislation in 1993 requiring future
    public buildings to accommodate the needs of the disabled and to
    retrofit existing public buildings; however, implementation has been
    slow. During the year, the Greater Amman Municipality established a new
    Special Buildings Codes Department for Special Needs Citizens to
    enforce the implementation of the 1993 law. Since 1993 the Special
    Education Department of the Ministry of Social Development has enrolled
    approximately 11,000 mentally and physically disabled persons in public
    and private sector training courses. It has placed approximately 2,000
    disabled persons in public and private sector jobs. The law requires
    that 2 percent of the available jobs be reserved for the physically
    disabled. Private organizations and members of the royal family
    actively promote programs to protect and advance the interests of the
    disabled.
        Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, nomadic
    Bedouin and East Bank town dwellers, traditionally have been the
    backbone of popular support for the Hashemite monarchy. As a result,
    they generally have enjoyed considerable influence within the political
    system. They are represented disproportionately in senior military,
    security, and civil service jobs. Nevertheless, many Bedouin in rural
    areas are severely disadvantaged economically. Many persons of East
    Bank origin complain that the dynamic private sector largely is in the
    hands of the Palestinian majority.
        Religious Minorities.--In general Christians do not suffer
    discrimination; however, there were some instances of official and
    societal discrimination during the year (see Section 2.c.). Christians
    hold government positions and are represented in the media and academia
    approximately in proportion to their presence in the general
    population. Baha'is face some societal and official discrimination.
    Their faith is not recognized officially, and Baha'is are classified as
    Muslims on official documents, such as the national identity card.
    Christian and Baha'i children in public schools are not required to
    participate in Islamic religious instruction.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government granted
    citizenship to all Palestinians who fled to Jordan in the period after
    the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and to a large number of refugees and
    displaced persons who arrived as a result of the 1967 war. However,
    most refugees who fled Gaza after 1967 are not entitled to citizenship
    and are issued 2-year passports valid for travel only. In 1995 King
    Hussein announced that West Bank residents without other travel
    documentation would be eligible to receive 5-year Jordanian passports.
        However, the Government has emphasized that these passports are for
    travel only and do not connote citizenship (see Section 2.d.).
    Palestinians residing in Jordan, who make up more than half of the
    population, suffer discrimination in appointments to positions in the
    Government and the military, in admittance to public universities, and
    in the granting of university scholarships.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers in the private sector and in
    some state-owned companies have the right to establish and join unions.
    Unions must be registered to be considered legal. The law prohibits
    union membership for the country's approximately 1.5 million foreign
    workers. Over 30 percent of the work force are organized into 17
    unions. Although union membership in the General Federation of
    Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU), the sole trade federation, is not
    mandatory, all unions belong to it. The Government subsidizes and
    audits the GFJTU's salaries and activities. Union officials are elected
    by secret ballot to 4-year terms. Although the Government cosponsors
    and approves the timing of these elections and monitors them to ensure
    compliance with the law, it does not interfere in the choice of
    candidates.
        Labor laws mandate that workers must obtain permission from the
    Government in order to strike. Unions generally do not seek approval
    for a strike, but workers use the threat of a strike as a negotiating
    tactic. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under mediation or
    arbitration. If a settlement is not reached through mediation, the
    Ministry of Labor may refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal by
    agreement of both parties. The tribunal is an independent arbitration
    panel of judges appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The decisions of
    the panel are binding legally. If only one party agrees, the Ministry
    of Labor refers the dispute to the Council of Ministers and then to
    Parliament. Labor law prohibits employers from dismissing a worker
    during a labor dispute.
        In April the Government refused a request by some 200 workers at
    the Jordan Telecommunication Company (JTC) to form their own union to
    safeguard their rights under the company's new privatized leadership.
    The Ministry of Labor justified the refusal by saying that the workers
    already were represented by the General Union for Public Workers, which
    includes artists, barbers, restaurant and hotel industry employees, and
    workers in social services.
        In 1999 Pepsi-Cola Company fired 225 employees who staged an
    illegal strike. The Ministry of Labor intervened and the company
    reinstated 115 of the employees in 1999. Despite significant efforts by
    the Ministry of Labor and the Food Workers Union, the company rehired
    less than 10 percent of the remaining former employees during the year.
        In January the Jordan Cable and Wire Company reinstated 20 of 220
    workers that a labor court ruled were dismissed illegally in 1999.
    However, the company subsequently forced the employees to take a paid
    vacation and fired them again upon their return. No further action was
    taken during the year.
        The GFJTU belongs to the Arab Labor organization, the International
    Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have,
    and exercise, the right to bargain collectively. The Constitution
    prohibits antiunion discrimination, but the ICFTU claims that the
    Government does not protect adequately employees from antiunion
    discrimination and that the Government has dismissed public-sector
    employees for political reasons. Workers may lodge complaints of
    antiunion discrimination with the Ministry of Labor, which is
    authorized to order the reinstatement of employees discharged for union
    activities. There were no complaints of antiunion discrimination lodged
    with the Ministry of Labor during the year. The national labor laws
    apply in the free trade zones in Aqaba and Zarqa. Private sector
    employees in these zones belong to one national union that covers both
    zones and have the right to bargain collectively.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    forbids compulsory labor except in a state of emergency such as war or
    natural disaster, and it generally is not practiced; however, foreign
    domestic servants often are subject to coercion and abuse and in some
    cases work under conditions that amount to forced labor (see Section
    6.e.). The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory
    labor by children; however, such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Labor law forbids children under the age of 16 from being
    employed, except as apprentices, and prohibits children under the age
    of 17 from working in hazardous jobs, including at restaurants, night
    clubs, and jobs involving heavy machinery and toxic materials. Children
    under the age of 18 may not work for more than 6 hours continuously,
    may not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., and may not work
    during weekends, religious celebrations, or national holidays.
    Provisions in the labor laws do not extend to the informal sector,
    which consists of agriculture, domestic labor, and family businesses.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
    children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
    6.c.).
        In late 1999, the Ministry of Labor established a new division to
    deal with issues of child labor. The division was established to
    receive, investigate, and address child labor complaints and related
    issues; however, it was not staffed adequately by year's end. The
    Government also did not provide training for government officials who
    are responsible for enforcing child labor laws. All child labor
    enforcement responsibilities rest in the hands of 85 Ministry of Labor
    inspectors. According to the law, employers that hire a child under the
    age of 16 must pay a fine ranging from $140-$710 (100-500 dinars). The
    fine is doubled if the offense is repeated. However, the Government did
    not enforce laws regarding child labor during the year. Government
    officials claim that if children are barred from working in practice,
    they will lose important income on which their families depend, and may
    turn to more serious violations of law, such as drug trafficking and
    prostitution, for income.
        Basic education is free and compulsory for 10 scholastic years for
    citizens from the ages of 6 to 16. However, there are no provisions to
    enforce the law or punish guardians for violating it (see Section 5).
        The Government ratified International Labor Convention 182 on
    Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor; however, it has not
    provided adequate financial support to implement its provisions.
    Nonetheless, government policy has facilitated the work of NGO's in
    this area. The Ministry of Social Development has programs to improve
    conditions for indigent children and to rehabilitate children who have
    committed petty crimes, who constitute a segment of working children.
    There are no specific mechanisms for receiving, investigating, and
    addressing child labor complaints relating to allegations of the worst
    forms of child labor.
        The Ministry of Labor in conjunction with the National Task Force
    on Children and approximately 50 other local NGO's, developed a
    National Plan of Action (NPA) and adopted it in a national workshop
    held in 1998. The Ministry of Labor subsequently established a child
    labor unit in late 1999, which is responsible for conducting national
    research on child labor, adopting both preventative and remedial
    measures, developing a database on child laborers and their families,
    and training and monitoring Ministry of Labor inspectors about child
    labor issues. The Ministry began implementing some of the provisions of
    the NPA; however, the pace has been slow due to financial and
    logistical difficulties.
        Anecdotal evidence suggests that child labor, especially of child
    street vendors is more prevalent now than it was 10 years ago due to
    declining economic conditions (see Section 5).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national minimum wage is
    $114 (80 dinars) per month for all workers except domestic servants,
    those working in small family businesses, and those in the agricultural
    sector. Workers earning the minimum wage find it difficult to provide a
    decent standard of living for their families. The Government estimates
    that the poverty level is at a monthly wage of about $125 (89 dinars)
    per month for a family with 7.5 members. A study completed by the
    Ministry of Labor in July 1999 found that 18.7 percent of the
    population live at or below the poverty level; 1.5 percent live in
    ``abject'' poverty, defined by the Government as $58 (40.5 dinars) per
    month for a family with 7.5 members. The Government provides minimal
    assistance to at least 45,000 indigent families.
        The law prohibits most workers from working more than the customary
    48 hours per week. Hotel, restaurant, and cinema employees may work up
    to 54 hours per week; the law requires overtime payment for hours in
    excess of the standard workweek. Workers may not work more than 16
    hours in any continuous period or more than 60 hours of overtime per
    month. Employees are entitled to 1 day off per week.
        Labor law does not apply to the agricultural sector, small family
    businesses, or domestic servants. Domestic servants do not have a legal
    forum to address their labor grievances and have no standing to sue in
    court for nonpayment of wages. Abuse of domestic servants, most of whom
    are foreign, is widespread. Imprisonment of maids and illegal
    confiscation of travel documents by employers is common. Complaints of
    beatings, insufficient food, and rape generally are not reported to
    officials by victims, who fear losing their work permits and being
    returned to their country. Domestic servants generally are not given
    days off and frequently are called upon to work at any hour of the day
    or night.
        In February the Ministry of Labor announced that it would require
    Egyptian workers to obtain work permits approved by the Governments of
    both Egypt and Jordan, and that the Government would start applying
    ``more humane'' criteria when deciding whether to deport Egyptian
    workers.
        The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for
    workers, including the presence of bathrooms, drinking water, and first
    aid equipment at work sites. The Ministry of Labor is authorized to
    enforce health and safety standards. The law does not require employers
    to report industrial accidents or occupational diseases to the Ministry
    of Labor. Workers do not have a statutory right to remove themselves
    from hazardous conditions without risking the loss of their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in women; however, the practice is not known to occur. A
    1926 law specifically prohibits trafficking in children. There were no
    reports that persons were trafficked in, to, from, or within the
    country.
                                   __________

                                     KUWAIT

        Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary amirate ruled by princes
    (Amirs), drawn from the Al-Sabah family. The Al-Sabahs have governed
    the country in consultation with prominent commercial families and
    other community leaders for over 200 years. The 1962 Constitution
    provides for an elected national assembly and details the powers of the
    Government and the rights of citizens, although it also permits the
    Amir to suspend any or all of its provisions by decree. Although the
    Amir suspended constitutional provisions from 1976-81 and from 1986-92,
    since the 1992 elections when the National Assembly resumed
    functioning, he has not taken this step. In May 1999, the Amir
    dissolved a gridlocked Parliament. This was followed by
    constitutionally mandated elections, which took place in July 1999. The
    election campaign generally was considered to be free and fair;
    however, there were some problems. Moreover only 14.5 percent of
    citizens (males over the age of 21) have the right to vote. The
    Constitution and law provide for a degree of judicial independence;
    however, the Amir appoints all judges, and renewal of most judicial
    appointments is subject to government approval.
        The national police, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and
    Kuwait State Security (KSS) are responsible for internal security under
    the supervision of civilian authorities of the Ministry of Interior.
    Members of the security forces committed a number of human rights
    abuses.
        With large oil reserves the economy is highly dependent on its
    energy sector. The Government owns the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
    and, despite its stated emphasis on an open market, it dominates the
    local economy through direct expenditures and government-owned
    companies and equities. The Government has initiated a program of
    disposing of its stock holdings in private companies. According to
    government statistics, 93 percent of the indigenous work force is
    employed in the public sector, while foreigners constitute 98 percent
    of the private sector workforce. Citizens enjoy one of the highest
    standards of living in the world, and receive subsidized housing,
    childcare, food allowances, and free education. Foreign workers receive
    none of these benefits, and domestic servants and unskilled workers
    often live in poor conditions. During the October 1999 to 2000 fiscal
    year (FY), the country's estimated per capita gross domestic product
    was $13,176 (4,005 dinars), 14 percent more than FY 1999. The increase
    reflects the significant rise in oil revenues due to higher world oil
    prices. The estimated 1999-2000 budget deficit was $6.8 billion. For
    the current FY the budget surplus is estimated at $3 billion.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in many areas; however, its record was poor in some significant areas.
    Citizens cannot change the head of state. Although under the
    Constitution the National Assembly must approve the Amir's choice of
    Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir), this authority is limited; if
    the National Assembly rejects the Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits
    three names from which the assembly must choose the new Crown Prince.
    The Crown Prince appoints the members of the Government. However, the
    elected National Assembly has demonstrated significant ability to
    influence or overturn decisions of the Government and has on occasion
    removed ministers through votes of no confidence or by forcing
    ministers to resign. The Government bans formal political parties, and
    women do not have the right to vote or seek election to the National
    Assembly. A law promulgated in 1998 bans primaries previously conducted
    by religious sects and tribes. Some police and members of the security
    forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Prisons remain
    overcrowded; however, the Government continued its renovation of
    existing facilities and construction of a new maximum security prison.
    The judiciary is subject to government influence, and a pattern of bias
    against foreign residents exists. The Government infringes on citizens'
    privacy rights in some areas. Security forces occasionally monitor the
    activities of individuals and their communications. Men must obtain
    government approval to marry foreign-born women. The Government uses
    threats to induce informal censorship, and journalists practice self-
    censorship. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
    association. The Government places some limits on freedom of religion
    and movement. Deportation orders may be issued by administrative order,
    and over 250 potential deportees are estimated to be held in detention
    facilities, some for up to 3 to 6 months. Violence and discrimination
    against women are problems. Discrimination against noncitizens
    persists. The Government restricts some worker rights. The Labor Law
    does not protect domestic servants regardless of citizenship, and their
    situation worsened during the year. Unskilled foreign workers suffer
    from the lack of a minimum wage in the private sector, from failure to
    enforce the Labor Law, and at times physical abuse; some work under
    conditions that, in effect, constitute indentured servitude. The
    Government acknowledges that a serious problem exists in the case of
    the ``bidoon,'' Arabs who have residency ties to the country--some
    going back for generations, some for briefer periods--but who claim to
    have no documentation of their nationality. There are an estimated
    110,000 bidoon in the country, down from a pre-Gulf War level of
    220,000. In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring that
    bidoon register with the Government to begin a process in which some
    could be documented as citizens. Those who failed to register would be
    considered illegal residents. However, only 8,000 bidoon registered by
    the cutoff date (in addition to the 36,000 who registered during a 1965
    census). The Government maintains that many bidoon are concealing their
    true nationality. It reports that 12,000 were documented during the
    year as nationals of other states, primarily Syria and Saudi Arabia.
    The Government stated that it would take punitive action against those
    who did not rectify their stateless status by the deadline, and the
    number of bidoon purchasing fraudulent passports reportedly is on the
    rise.
        The country suffered under Iraqi occupation from August 1990 to
    February 1991, when an international coalition expelled Iraqi forces.
    Many human rights violations committed by the Iraqi army during this
    period remain unresolved, particularly the fate of 608 citizens and
    other residents taken by Iraq and still unaccounted for.
        Executive and legislative leaders continued to strengthen political
    institutions by resolving major disagreements within the framework of
    the Constitution and without recourse to extrajudicial measures.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        There were no developments in the investigations into the
    extrajudicial killings that occurred during the chaotic period after
    the country's liberation in February 1991.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
    Iraqi authorities have not accounted for 608 citizens and other
    residents of the country taken prisoner during Iraq's occupation. There
    has been no significant development since 1994 in these disappearance
    cases. The Government of Iraq has refused to comply with U.N. Security
    Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, which stipulates the release of
    detainees. In 1999 Iraq ceased its participation in ICRC-sponsored
    talks on their fate. It has refused to cooperate with the U.N.
    Secretary General's high-level representative, Yuli Vorontsov, who was
    appointed in February, under UNSCR 1284, to report on compliance by
    Iraq with its obligations regarding these cases.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there
    continue to be credible reports that some police and members of the
    security forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Reported abuses
    include blindfolding, verbal threats, stepping on toes, and slaps and
    blows. Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such
    abuse on noncitizens, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, than on
    citizens.
        The Government states that it investigates all allegations of abuse
    and that it has punished at least some of the offenders. However, the
    Government does not make public either the findings of its
    investigations or what, if any, punishments are imposed. This omission
    creates a climate of seeming impunity, which diminishes deterrence
    against abuse.
        Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they
    have been mistreated during interrogation. However, the courts
    frequently dismiss abuse complaints because defendants are unable to
    provide physical evidence of abuse. Members of the security forces
    routinely do not reveal their identity during interrogation, a practice
    that further complicates confirmation of abuse.
        Prison conditions, including conditions for those held for security
    offenses, meet minimum international standards in terms of food, access
    to basic health care, scheduled family visits, cleanliness, and
    opportunities for work and exercise. Continuing problems include
    overcrowding and the lack of specialized medical care. Approximately
    1,700 men and 250 women are serving sentences or awaiting trial in the
    central prison. In March the Talha deportation center formally was
    reconstituted as a minimum security prison and now holds approximately
    900 persons who have been convicted of financial or traffic crimes.
    Although Talha is no longer a deportation holding facility, deportees
    also are held there occasionally. Unlike in the past, there have been
    no reports of mistreatment of prisoners at Talha since its reopening.
    An estimated additional 250 prisoners were being held at the
    deportation facility in Shuwaikh; some of these detainees have been
    held for up to 3 to 6 months (see Section 1.d.).
        In March a new government directive was issued, which has improved
    prison conditions throughout the system. Following its provisions, the
    director of prisons increased prison staffing, ensured the steady
    progress of renovations at the central prison, and accelerated the
    construction of a new maximum-security prison. He also created a drug
    rehabilitation program for inmates. Drug-related offenders make up the
    majority of the prison population.
        The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee closely monitored
    prison conditions throughout the year, and the Government allowed the
    ICRC access to all detention facilities.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
    Government occasionally arrests and detains persons arbitrarily. There
    also were incidents of prolonged detention.
        In general police officers must obtain an arrest warrant from state
    prosecutors or a judge before making an arrest (see Section 1.f.),
    although in misdemeanor cases the arresting officer may issue them.
    Security forces occasionally detain persons at checkpoints in Kuwait
    City (see Section 2.d.).
        Under the Penal Code, a suspect may not be held for more than 4
    days without charge. Security officers sometimes prevent families from
    visiting detainees during this confinement. After 4 days, prosecutors
    must either release the suspect or file charges. If charges are filed,
    prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21
    days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention
    pending trial.
        During the 1999 election campaign, five parliamentary candidates
    were arrested and charged with slander against the Government. One of
    the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Sections 2.a.
    and 3); the sentence was not carried out and all charges were dropped.
        Of the estimated 2,200 persons serving sentences or being detained
    pending trial at the state security prison or state security detention
    facilities, approximately 60 are being held on security grounds, a 65
    percent reduction from last year. The other security prisoners and
    detainees were released during the year after completing their
    sentences, or after being acquitted or pardoned.
        Of the approximately 2,500 Egyptians arrested in the wake of the
    Kheitan riots in October 1999, all but 19 were released within a few
    days. The 19 were tried, with 18 of them being acquitted and 1
    sentenced to deportation.
        The Government may expel noncitizens (including bidoon, i.e.,
    stateless residents of Kuwait, some of whom are native born or long-
    term residents), if it considers them security risks. The Government
    also may expel foreigners if they are unable to obtain or renew work or
    residency permits. There are approximately 100 bidoon and foreigners
    held in detention facilities, some of them pending deportation. Some
    detainees have been held for up to 3 to 6 months. Many deportation
    orders are issued administratively, without the benefit of a trial.
    However, the Government does not return deportees to their countries of
    origin forcibly, allowing those who object to remain in detention. This
    practice leads to prolonged detention of deportees, particularly
    Iraqis, who do not wish to return to their own countries. It also plays
    a role in the complex problem faced by bidoon deportees, who
    essentially remain in detention because their stateless condition makes
    the execution of the deportation order impossible (see Sections 2.d.
    and 5).
        The Talha deportation center, which had been criticized in previous
    years by human rights groups, formally was reconstituted as a minimum
    security prison in March. There were no allegations of the prolonged
    detention of deportees in the facility during the year (see Section
    1.c.).
        The law protects citizens from exile, and there were no reports of
    this practice.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to a fair trial and states that ``judges shall not be subject to
    any authority;'' however, the Amir appoints all judges, and the renewal
    of judicial appointments is subject to government approval. Judges who
    are citizens have lifetime appointments; however, the majority of
    judges are noncitizens. These noncitizen judges work under 1- to 3-year
    renewable contracts, which undermines their independence. The Ministry
    of Justice may remove judges for cause, but rarely does so. Foreign
    residents involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently complain
    that the courts show a bias in favor of citizens.
        The secular court system tries both civil and criminal cases. The
    Court of Cassation is the highest level of judicial appeal. Sunni and
    Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective branches for
    family law cases. A Shi'a appellate court was established this year. In
    the secular courts no groups are barred from testifying; however, in
    all three court systems the testimony of one man is equal to the
    testimony of two women.
        Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and appeal
    verdicts. The Amir has the constitutional power to pardon or commute
    all sentences. Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be
    represented in court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in
    criminal cases. In misdemeanor cases, defendants have the right to
    waive the presence of legal counsel, and the court is not required to
    provide counsel to indigent defendants.
        Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal court verdicts to the
    High Court of Appeal, which may rule on whether the law was applied
    properly as well as on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
    Decisions of the High Court of Appeal may be presented to the Court of
    Cassation, which conducts a limited, formal review of cases to
    determine only whether the law was applied properly.
        In January Alaa Hussein, head of the Iraqi-installed
    ``provisional'' government during the occupation returned to the
    country of his own volition to stand trial. A military court had
    sentenced him to death in abstentia in 1993. In May a court upheld his
    conviction for treason, as well as his death sentence. Hussein's trial
    received extensive media attention and appears to have been conducted
    in a fair and open manner. If the verdict stands after the case
    completes the appeals process, the Amir must ratify the execution or
    chose to commute the sentence. The appeals process was still underway
    at year's end.
        In January a court found two authors guilty of writing obscene,
    blasphemous books in a case brought by anonymous citizens (see Section
    2.a.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners. The Government
    continues to incarcerate 27 residents (10 Iraqis, 12 bidoon, 2
    citizens, 2 Palestinians, and 1 Syrian) convicted of collaboration with
    Iraq during the 1990-1991 occupation. During the year, 19 Iraqis, 5
    bidoon, and 2 Palestinians who had been held on the same charge were
    released by Amiri pardon. By law such collaboration is considered a
    felony. Most of the persons convicted in the Martial Law Court in 1991,
    and the Special State Security Court, which was abolished in 1995, did
    not receive fair trials. Amnesty International faulted the trials in
    general, and particularly noted the absence of any right of appeal of
    the verdicts. In 1999 the Amir pardoned the remaining eight Jordanians
    convicted by the martial law and state security courts.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for individual privacy and
    sanctity of the home, and the Government generally respects these
    rights in practice; however, the law, which generally requires police
    to obtain a warrant to search both public and private property,
    provides for a warrantless search if alcohol or narcotics are suspected
    on the premises or if police are in hot pursuit of a suspect fleeing
    the scene of a crime. A warrant may be obtained from the State
    Prosecutor or, in the case of searches of private property, from a
    judge. The security forces occasionally monitor the activities of
    individuals and their communications.
        The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men
    and requires men to obtain government approval to marry foreign-born
    women. Although the Government may advise men against marriage to a
    foreign national, there are no known cases of the Government refusing
    permission for such marriages. The Government advises women against
    marrying foreign nationals (see Section 2.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press, printing, and publishing ``in accordance with the
    conditions and manner specified by law,'' and, with a few exceptions,
    citizens are free to criticize the Government at public meetings and in
    the media; however, journalists practice self-censorship. Several laws
    empower the Government to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and
    the press. The effect of these laws diminished during the year as court
    cases overruled punitive sentences that accompanied earlier
    convictions. The Government, through the Ministry of Information,
    practiced informal censorship by placing pressure on individual
    publishers and editors believed to have ``crossed the line'' in
    attacking government policies and discussing issues deemed offensive to
    Islam, tradition, or the interests of the State.
        Newspapers are privately owned and free to publish on many social,
    economic, and political issues and frequently criticize government
    policies and officials, including the Crown Prince/Prime Minister.
        The Government ended prepublication censorship in 1992, but
    journalists still censor themselves. The Press Law prohibits the
    publication of any direct criticism of the Amir, official government
    communications with other states, and material that serves to ``attack
    religions'' or ``incite people to commit crimes, creates hatred, or
    spreads dissension among the populace.''
        In order to begin publication of a newspaper, the publisher must
    obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information.
    Publishers may lose their license if their publications do not appear
    for 6 months. This 6-month rule prevents publishers from publishing
    sporadically--it is not used to suspend or shut down existing
    newspapers. Individuals also must obtain permission from the Ministry
    of Information before publishing any printed material, including
    brochures and wall posters. The Government does not censor foreign
    journalists and permits them open access to the country.
        In February the Government threatened to shut down two newspapers.
    Al-Siyassa and Al-Watan were charged with publishing false information
    in an article about the Amir's decision regarding salaries for security
    services personnel, which embarrassed the Amir. The managing editor of
    Al-Siyassa was detained for 1 week, although never formally charged.
    The Cabinet ordered the cancellation of both newspapers' licenses and
    suspension of publication for 2 years. After significant public
    criticism, particularly from the National Assembly, the Government
    decided not to shut down the papers or penalize them further. The
    crisis led to the resignations of the Cabinet (none were accepted) and
    to proposals by members of the National Assembly to amend the article
    of the Constitution that permits the Government to suspend publication
    without review by the Assembly or the courts. No action was taken to
    amend the article by year's end.
        The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion
    (see Section 2.c.). In contrast to prior years, there were no
    prosecutions of print or broadcast journalists. There were two
    prosecutions of individuals related to book publications. Under the
    law, any citizen may initiate a court case against an author if the
    citizen deems that the author has defamed Islam, the ruling family, or
    public morals. Often these court cases are brought for political
    reasons. In January in separate cases brought by anonymous citizens, a
    court found two female authors, Leila Al-Othman and Alia Shuaib guilty
    of writing ``obscene and blasphemous'' books. The books had been
    published years ago. Both authors were sentenced to 2 months in prison
    or a $160 (50 dinar) fine. An appeals court overturned Shuaib's
    conviction in March and changed Al-Othman's sentence to a $3,000 fine
    (912 dinars) and also fined her publisher $3,000 (912 dinars) (see
    Section 1.e.).
        During the 1999 election campaign, five parliamentary candidates
    were arrested and charged with slander against the Government. One of
    the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison, but the sentence
    was not carried out, and charges against all five were dropped (see
    Sections 1.d. and 3).
        The Government owns and controls the radio and television
    companies. Satellite dishes are widely available, and citizens with
    such devices are free to watch all available programming. In September
    state-owned Kuwait TV stopped telecasting certain women's Olympic
    sports, including synchronized swimming and gymnastics, after an
    Islamist National Assembly member criticized the station for showing
    ``immoral and pornographic'' sports and called on the Ministry of
    Information officially to censor the Olympics. The Olympics continued
    to be broadcast in their entirety on cable and satellite stations.
        The Ministry of Information censors all books, films, videotapes,
    periodicals, and other imported publications deemed morally offensive.
    While the Ministry announced plans to censor the Internet, the methods
    of enforcement and technical issues are still to be worked out.
    Internet providers and web sites practiced self-censorship. The
    Ministry has censored political topics as well and does not grant
    licenses to magazines with a political focus. The General Organization
    of Printing and Publishing controls the publication and distribution of
    informational materials.
        There is no government censorship of university teaching, research,
    or publication. However, academics are subject to the same restraints
    as the media with regard to criticism of the Amir or Islam.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    affirms the right to assembly; however, the Government restricts this
    right in practice. Public gatherings must receive prior government
    approval, as must private gatherings of more than five persons that
    result in the issuance of a public statement. Informal weekly, family-
    based, social gatherings of men, known as ``diwaniyas'' are protected
    by the Constitution. Practically every adult male, including the Amir,
    members of the Government, and members of the National Assembly hosts
    or attends diwaniyas, at which every possible topic is freely
    discussed. The diwaniya system contributes to the development of
    political consensus and official decisionmaking. Women are not
    precluded from holding diwaniyas; however, such diwaniyas are uncommon.
    By tradition women are barred from male diwanyas.
        The Constitution affirms the right of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice. The Government bans
    political parties. Several informal blocs, acting much like parties,
    exist and are active in the National Assembly. The Government has made
    no effort to constrain these groupings, which are organized on the
    basis of common ideological goals. Many may be categorized as
    ``opposition'' groups.
        All nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) must obtain a license
    from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Government uses its
    power to license as a means of political control. The Ministry has
    registered 52 NGO's, including professional groups, a bar association,
    and scientific bodies. These groups receive government subsidies for
    their operating expenses. Their members must obtain permission from the
    Ministry before attending international conferences. However, since
    1985, the Ministry has issued only three new licenses. The Ministry has
    disapproved other license requests on the grounds that previously
    established NGO's already provide services similar to those proposed by
    the petitioners (see Sections 2.d. and 4).
        In May 1999, in accordance with a 1993 decree that ordered
    unregistered NGO's to cease activities, the Government announced a
    crackdown on unlicensed branches of NGO's, whose activities it
    previously had overlooked, including unlicensed branches of Islamic
    charities, and required that they cease operations by mid-September
    1999. No further action was taken pursuant to the announced crackdown
    (see Sections 2.c. and 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion; although the
    Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government places
    some limits on this right. The Constitution also provides that the
    State protect the freedom to practice religion in accordance with
    established customs, ``provided that it does not conflict with public
    policy or morals.'' The Constitution states that Shari'a (Islamic law)
    is ``a main source of legislation.''
        The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups
    are unclear. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has official
    responsibility for overseeing religious groups. Nevertheless in reality
    officially recognized churches must deal with a variety of government
    entities, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (for visas
    and residence permits for pastors and other staff) and the Kuwaiti
    Municipality (for building permits). While there reportedly is no
    official government ``list'' of recognized churches, seven Christian
    churches have at least some sort of official recognition that enables
    them to operate openly. These seven churches have open ``files'' at the
    Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, allowing them to bring in the
    pastors and staff necessary to run their churches. Further by tradition
    three of the country's churches are widely recognized as enjoying
    ``full recognition'' by the Government and are allowed to operate
    compounds officially designated as churches: The Catholic Church (which
    includes two separate churches), the Anglican Church, and the National
    Evangelical Church of Kuwait (Protestant). The other four churches
    reportedly are allowed to operate openly, hire employees, invite
    religious speakers, etc., all without interference from the Government,
    but their compounds are, according to government records, registered
    only as private homes. The churches themselves appear uncertain about
    the guidelines or procedures for recognition. Some have argued that
    these procedures are purposely kept vague by the Government so as to
    maintain the status quo. All other churches and religions have no legal
    status but are allowed to operate in private homes.
        The procedures for the registration and licensing of religious
    groups also appear to be connected with government restrictions on
    NGO's, religious or otherwise. In 1993 all unlicensed organizations
    were ordered by the Council of Ministers to cease their activities.
    This order has never been enforced; however, since that time all but
    three applications by NGO's have been frozen. There were reports that
    in the last few years at least two groups have applied for permission
    to build their own churches, but the Government has not yet responded
    to their requests. The Government's 1999 crackdown on unlicensed NGO's,
    including unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, ceased early in the
    year (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
        Shi'a are free to conduct their traditional forms of worship
    without government interference; however, members of the Shi'a
    community have complained about the scarcity of Shi'a mosques due to
    the Government's slowness or failure to grant approval for the
    construction of new Shi'a mosques as well as the repair of existing
    mosques. The community was particularly critical in May when the
    municipality rejected a 9-year-old petition for construction of a Shi'a
    mosque in the Al-Qurain area. Although the municipality apparently
    relented due to direct government intervention, there are still
    complaints about the lack of sufficient Shi'a mosques. There are
    approximately 30 Shi'a mosques compared with the 1,300 Sunni mosques in
    the country. However, Shi'a have noted some improvement in recent years
    in that a small number of approvals have been granted for the
    construction of Shi'a mosques.
        Shi'a leaders also have complained that Shi'a who aspire to serve
    as imams are forced to seek appropriate training and education abroad
    due to the lack of Shi'a jurisprudence courses at Kuwait University's
    College of Islamic Law. They also have expressed concern that certain
    pending proposed legislation within the National Assembly does not take
    beliefs specific to the Shi'a into account.
        The Roman Catholic, Anglican, National Evangelical, Greek Orthodox,
    Armenian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, and Greek Catholic Churches are
    able to operate freely on their compounds, holding worship services
    without government interference. These churches state that the
    Government generally has been supportive of their presence, even
    providing police security and traffic direction as needed. Other
    Christian denominations (including Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists,
    Marthoma, and Indian Orthodox), while not recognized legally, are
    allowed to operate in private homes or in the facilities of recognized
    churches. Members of these congregations have reported that they are
    able to worship without government interference, provided that they do
    not disturb their neighbors and do not violate laws regarding assembly
    and proselytizing.
        Members of religions not sanctioned in the Koran, such as Hindus
    and Buddhists, may not build places of worship, but are allowed to
    worship privately in their homes without interference from the
    Government.
        The Government prohibits missionaries from proselytizing to
    Muslims; however, they may serve non-Muslim congregations. The law
    prohibits organized religious education for religions other than Islam,
    although this law is not enforced rigidly. Informal religious
    instruction occurs inside private homes and on church compounds without
    government interference. However, there were reports that government
    ``inspectors'' periodically visit public and private schools outside of
    church compounds to ensure that no religious teaching other than Islam
    takes place.
        The Government does not permit the establishment of non-Islamic
    publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. Nevertheless,
    several churches do publish religious materials for use solely by their
    congregations. Further, some churches, in the privacy of their
    compounds, provide informal instruction to individuals interested in
    joining the clergy.
        A private company, the Book House Company Ltd., is permitted to
    import significant amounts of Bibles and other Christian religious
    material--including, as of early in the year, videotapes and compact
    discs--for use solely among the congregations of the country's
    recognized churches. The Book House Company is the only bookstore that
    has an import license to bring in such materials, which also must be
    approved by government censors. There have been reports of private
    citizens having non-Islamic religious materials confiscated by customs
    officials upon arrival at the airport.
        Although there is a small community of Christian citizens, a law
    passed in 1980 prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims. However,
    citizens who were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families
    of such citizens since that date), are allowed to transmit their
    citizenship to their children.
        According to the law, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam when
    he marries a Muslim woman if the wedding is to be legal in Kuwait. The
    law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men (see
    Section 1.f.). A non-Muslim woman does not have to convert to Islam to
    marry a Muslim man, but it is to her advantage to do so. Failure to
    convert may mean that, should the couple later divorce, the Muslim
    father would be granted custody of any children.
        The law requires jail terms for journalists who ridicule religion
    (see Section 2.a.). During the year, Islamists used this law to
    threaten writers with prosecution for publishing opinions deemed
    insufficiently observant of Islamic norms. In January the Kuwaiti Court
    of Misdemeanors found two female Kuwaiti authors, Alia Shuaib and Leila
    Al-Othman, guilty of writing books that were blasphemous and obscene.
    Shuaib and Al-Othman were sentenced to 2 months in prison which could
    be suspended upon payment of a $160 (50 Kuwaiti dinars) fine. On March
    26, a Kuwaiti appeals court acquitted Shuaib of the charges of
    blasphemy and publishing works that ridicule religion. Al-Othman's
    conviction of using indecent language was upheld. The court's judgments
    represented the latest in a series of cases brought by Islamists
    against secular authors. The court did not provide explanations for its
    rulings (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.).
        Early in the year, a Vatican representative arrived in the country
    to establish a permanent mission. The mission, which currently is
    headed by a charge d'affaires who temporarily resides at the Roman
    Catholic Church, also is to represent Vatican interests in the smaller
    Persian Gulf States and Yemen. The Church views the Government's
    acquiescence to establishing relations with the Vatican as significant
    in terms of government tolerance of Christianity.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on
    freedom of movement. Citizens have the right to travel freely within
    the country and to change their work place as desired. Unmarried women
    21 years old and over are free to obtain a passport and travel abroad
    at any time. However, married women who apply for passports must obtain
    their husbands' signature on the application form. Once she has a
    passport, a married woman does not need her husband's permission to
    travel, but he may prevent her departure from the country by contacting
    the immigration authorities and placing a 24-hour travel ban on her.
    After this 24-hour period, a court order is required if the husband
    still wishes to prevent his wife from leaving the country. All minor
    children must have their father's permission to travel outside of the
    country. Citizens are free to emigrate and to return. Security forces
    in Kuwait City occasionally set up checkpoints where they may detain
    individuals. The checkpoints are mainly for immigration purposes and
    are used to apprehend undocumented aliens.
        The Government has the right to place a travel ban on any citizen
    or foreigner who has a legal case pending before the courts. The
    Government restricts the ability of members of NGO's to attend
    conferences abroad (see Sections 2.b. and 4). The Government severely
    restricts the ability of its bidoon population to travel abroad (see
    Section 5).
        There were no credible reports during the year that the Government
    enforced the policy of prior years limiting the presence of workers
    from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in the Gulf War.
        While the Government permits the ICRC to verify if deportees object
    to returning to their countries of origin, it detains those with
    objections until they either change their minds or make alternative
    arrangements to travel to a third country (see Section 1.d.).
        There is no legislation governing refugees, asylees, or first
    asylum, and no clear standard procedure for processing a person's claim
    to be a refugee. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of
    political refugees. The Government states that it does not deport
    anyone who claims a fear of persecution in their home country, but it
    often keeps such persons in detention rather than grant them permission
    to live and work in the country (see Section 1.d.). The U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains an office in the country
    and has access to refugees in detention. There were no reports of
    forced return of persons to counties where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens cannot change the head of state. Under the Constitution
    the National Assembly has a limited role in approving the Amir's choice
    of Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir). If the Assembly rejects the
    Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits three names from which the
    Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. Only about 14 percent of
    adult citizens have the right to vote. Women and citizens naturalized
    for less than 20 years may not vote or seek election to the National
    Assembly. Members of the armed forces, police, and other uniformed
    personnel of the Ministry of Interior are prohibited from voting or
    seeking election to the National Assembly.
        Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares
    legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister is
    appointed by the Amir and presides over a 16-member cabinet, which he
    chooses in consultation with the Amir. In accordance with the practice
    of the ruling family (but not specifically the Constitution), the Prime
    Minister always has been the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers
    the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. The Amir
    dissolved the National Assembly from 1976-81, and in 1986 the Amir
    effectively dissolved the Assembly by suspending the constitutional
    provisions on the Assembly's election. The Assembly remained dissolved
    until 1992, when elections were held. Since 1992 the constitutional
    provisions with respect to the Assembly have been observed. The
    Constitution provides that cabinet members sit in the National Assembly
    and may vote on legislation. There are 50 elected National Assembly
    members. Members serve 4-year terms, and National Assembly elections
    have been held on schedule. Since the Government prohibits political
    parties, Assembly candidates must nominate themselves. Nonetheless
    informal political groupings are active in the Assembly. The
    Constitution empowers the National Assembly to overturn any Amiri
    decrees made during the dissolution, and the Assembly has done so in
    some cases.
        In May 1999, the Amir dissolved the National Assembly in response
    to the political gridlock that emerged between Parliament and the
    Government. Elections were held 2 months later as specified in the
    Constitution.
        The 1999 election campaign generally was free and fair; however,
    there were some problems. Five parliamentary candidates were arrested
    and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. Four of those
    arrested received nominal fines, had their cases postponed, or were
    acquitted. While the candidates were not required to withdraw from the
    election, the fifth candidate withdrew, subsequently was convicted of
    the charges in July, and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. The
    sentence was not carried out (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        In December a by-election was held to fill the seat of a deceased
    Assembly member. The election campaign was considered generally free
    and fair; however, there were allegations of vote buying.
        In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation that bans
    primaries previously conducted by religious sects and tribes. The
    National Assembly's objective in passing this legislation was to
    eliminate the process by which candidates were withdrawn from elections
    and votes concentrated on the remaining candidates from these groups.
        Charges filed against several hundred citizens in the Government's
    attempt to enforce the ban on tribal primaries during the July 1999
    elections were never brought to trial. During its fall session, the
    National Assembly declined to lift the parliamentary immunity of the
    two newly elected members the Public Prosecutor had sought to charge
    with violating the ban on tribal primaries.
        Women are disenfranchised and have little opportunity to influence
    government. A May 1999 Amiri decree gave women the right to vote, to
    seek election to the National Assembly beginning with the parliamentary
    election scheduled for 2003, and to hold cabinet office. In November
    1999, the Parliament vetoed the Amir's May decree on constitutional
    grounds. Shortly thereafter members of the Assembly introduced
    identical legislation, but it also was defeated. No new legislation has
    been introduced by either the Government or by Assembly members. Women
    do hold some relatively senior nonpolitical positions within some
    ministries.
        Members of the Shi'a minority generally are underrepresented in
    high government positions. There is only one Shi'a member of the
    Cabinet, the Minister of Commerce. Of 50 National Assembly members, 6
    are Shi'a, as is the armed forces chief of staff.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government continued its practice of preventing the
    establishment of new local human rights groups by not approving their
    requests for licenses (see Section 2.b.). Since 1985 the Government has
    issued only three licenses. The Government has refused other license
    request on the grounds that previously established NGO's already
    provide services similar to those proposed by the petitions. It also
    continued to limit the ability of NGO members to attend conferences
    abroad (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.). Their members must obtain
    permission from the Government before attending international
    conferences.
        The Government's 1999 crackdown on unlicensed NGO's, including
    unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, ended early in the year (see
    Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
        The Government permits international human rights organizations to
    visit the country and to establish offices. Several organizations
    conduct fieldwork and report excellent communication with and
    reasonable cooperation from the Government. The Government has
    cooperated fully in the work of the U.N. Special Rapporteurs for Iran
    and Iraq and the high-level representative of the Secretary General on
    the issue of Kuwaitis missing in Iraq since the end of the Gulf War.
        The National Assembly has an active Human Rights Committee, which
    takes testimony from individuals about abuses, investigates prison
    conditions, and makes nonbinding recommendations for redress. Despite
    its designation as an advisory body, the Human Rights Committee has
    shown that, in practice, it is able to mobilize government agencies to
    address egregious human rights problems.
        In July the Government submitted its first periodic report on the
    implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
    Rights. After reviewing the presentation, a U.N. Human Rights Committee
    report on July 28 noted 23 principal subjects of concern. In
    particular, it cited discrimination against women in voting, marriage,
    and nationality; a range of abuses against bidoon; and restrictions of
    freedom of expression and association. The Committee urged immediate
    steps to ensure that law and practice meet the standards required by
    the covenant.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, national
    origin, language, or religion. However, laws and regulations
    discriminate in some cases against women and noncitizens, who face
    widespread social, economic, and legal discrimination.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to some
    local experts, domestic abuse of women occurs in an estimated 15
    percent of all marriages. Each of the country's 50 police stations
    reportedly receives on average 1 to 2 complaints of spousal abuse each
    week, although this may be understated. Of the complaints received,
    approximately 60 percent involve spousal abuse of noncitizen women. The
    police and the courts generally seek to resolve family disputes
    informally and may ask the offending spouse to sign a statement
    affirming that he agrees to end the abuse. The police refer serious
    cases to the Psychiatric Department at the Ministry of Health. The
    courts have found husbands guilty of spousal abuse. ``Honor'' crimes
    occur very infrequently; there is no provision in the Criminal Code
    that allows for leniency in such cases. Rape and sexual assault remain
    a serious problem, particularly for foreign domestic servants or
    unskilled workers. There are no legally mandated restrictions on dress
    for women.
        In April the Government arrested seven men for allegedly beating a
    19-year-old woman for not wearing a ``hijab'' (head scarf). The
    Government acted quickly in bringing the seven men to trial,
    criticizing the assault as a vigilante action by extremists. The case
    prompted a lively debate in society and the press. Most citizens
    expressed outrage, viewing the attack as a direct assault on their
    personal freedoms, while Islamists urged against making hasty
    judgments. Conflicting versions of what exactly occurred and the
    motives involved emerged during the trial, and the criminal court
    acquitted the seven accused men in June, finding that there was
    insufficient evidence to convict them. In November the Court of Appeals
    overturned the acquittal of five of the seven, and sentenced four to 1-
    year imprisonment and ordered them to pay $6,000 (2,000 dinars) each in
    compensatory damages. The fifth accused was ordered to pay $3,000
    (1,000 dinars) with no jail term.
        In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring the
    segregation of sexes at private universities. A 1996 law already
    requires the Government to segregate by sex the state-run university by
    2001.
        Some employers physically abuse foreign women working as domestic
    servants, and there are continuing reports of rape of these women by
    male employers and male coworkers. The local press gives the problem
    considerable attention, and both the police and the courts have taken
    action against employers when presented with evidence of serious abuse.
    Some rapes resulted in unwanted pregnancies. Reportedly 12 domestic
    servants killed children fathered by employers soon after birth.
    Foreign-born domestic employees have the right to sue their employers
    for abuse, but few do so fearing judicial bias and deportation. In July
    the Government reduced the operations of a specialized police facility
    designated to investigate complaints and provide some shelter for
    runaway maids, which resulted in a further deterioration of conditions
    for domestic employees (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
        In May a Sri Lankan maid was beaten severely with a plastic water
    pipe, strangled with a wire, and repeatedly tortured with a hot iron,
    allegedly by a Kuwaiti couple who employed her. She had worked for this
    family for over a year, during which time she reported that her
    employers did not feed her regularly and withheld her salary. The maid
    suffered permanent damage to her face, neck, ears, and arms. The case
    had not yet gone to trial by year's end. The woman accused of the
    assault was being held in jail; her husband, a policeman, remains free.
        In June five male citizens belonging to various state security
    organizations were arrested for the kidnap, rape, torture, and beating
    of four female domestic servants. The police seized videotapes of the
    crimes. The court hearing the case denied bail, and the five were
    awaiting trial at year's end.
        In August the criminal court postponed hearing the case of an
    Indonesian domestic worker who was beaten to death with a vacuum
    cleaner by her female employer. The entire family admitted to regularly
    beating her with hard objects for several months. The Kuwaiti woman was
    being held in prison without bail at year's end.
        The employers who beat to death their Sri Lankan maid in August
    1999 remained in jail awaiting trial at year's end. The case of the
    Kuwaiti women charged in 1999 in the beating death of her Indian maid
    had not gone to trial by year's end.
        Runaway servants, including many women alleging physical or sexual
    abuse, often seek shelter at their country's embassy for repatriation
    or a change in employers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
        Women continue to experience legal and social discrimination. Women
    are denied the right to vote (see Section 3). Their testimony is not
    given equal weight to that of males in the courts (see Section 1.e.).
    Married women require their husbands' permission to obtain a passport
    (see Section 2.d.). By law only men are able to confer citizenship;
    therefore, children born to citizen mothers and stateless fathers are
    themselves stateless. The Government forbids marriage between Muslim
    women and non-Muslim men (see Sections 1.f. and 2.c.). Inheritance is
    governed by Islamic law, which differs according to the branch of
    Islam. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit
    all property, while Sunni women inherit only a portion, with the
    balance divided among brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the
    deceased.
        In February women attempted to register for the 2003 elections.
    Invoking the Government's denial of their registration attempt as a
    basis, women's suffrage supporters filed four court cases, three of
    which were rejected for ``lacking seriousness.'' An administrative
    court referred the fourth case (filed by a male citizen) to the
    Constitutional Court, which refused it on procedural grounds for
    incorrectly framing the appeal. After the decision, First Deputy
    Premier and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah stated that he respected the
    court's verdict, but that the Government would still push for women's
    suffrage.
        Women traditionally are restrained from choosing certain roles in
    society, and the law restricts women from working in ``dangerous
    industries'' and trades ``harmful'' to health. However, almost all
    citizens work for the state in office jobs, and women are allowed into
    most areas of the bureaucracy, including even oil well firefighting
    units. Educated women maintain that the conservative nature of society
    limits career opportunities. Nonetheless an estimated 33 percent of
    women of working age are employed. The law provides for ``remuneration
    equal to that of a man provided she does the same work.'' This
    provision is respected in practice. Women work as doctors, engineers,
    lawyers, bankers, and professors. A few have been appointed to senior
    positions in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Planning, and
    the state-owned Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation. There is one female
    ambassador and two female undersecretaries; however, there are no
    female judges or prosecutors.
        In cases of divorce, the Government makes family entitlement
    payments to the divorced husband, who is expected by law and custom to
    provide for his children even though custody of minor children usually
    is given to the mother. The law discriminates against women married to
    foreign men. Such women are not entitled to government housing
    subsidies, which are available to male citizens. The law also requires
    women to pay residence fees for their husbands and does not recognize
    marriage as the basis for granting residency to foreign-born husbands.
    Instead the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By
    contrast male citizens married to foreign-born women do not have to pay
    residency fees for their spouses, and their spouses' right to residency
    derives from marriage.
        Polygyny is legal and is more common among tribal elements of the
    population. A husband is obliged to inform his first wife that he is
    taking a second wife. The husband is obligated to provide the first
    wife a separate household if that is her preference. A first wife who
    objects to a second marriage may request a divorce, but the court's
    determination of divorce and child custody would be made on grounds
    other than the fact of the second marriage itself.
        There are several women's organizations that follow women's issues,
    among the most active of which are the Women's Cultural and Social
    Society (WCSS) and the Women's Affairs Committee.
        Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
    Both boys and girls receive a free education, which extends through the
    university level, including advanced degrees. The Government provides
    free health care and a variety of other services to all children.
    Citizen parents also receive a monthly government allowance for each
    child.
        The marriage of girls under the age of 17 is uncommon among the
    urban population but remains a practice of the Bedouins in outlying
    areas.
        There were cases of male youths, some as young as 8 years old,
    raped by men or gangs of other male youths.
        There are reports of young boys, especially of South Asian origin,
    being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no institutionalized
    discrimination against disabled persons in employment, education, or in
    the provision of state services. Legislation passed by the National
    Assembly in 1996 mandates accessibility for the disabled to all public
    facilities, and provides an affirmative action employment program for
    the disabled. However, this law has not been implemented fully. The
    Government pays extensive stipends to disabled citizens, which cover
    transportation, housing, job training, and social welfare.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The plight of the 110,000
    bidoon remains a significant problem, and in June the Government
    instituted a new program to address the issue. The bidoon, a term
    meaning ``without,'' are Arabs who have residency ties to Kuwait--some
    going back for generations, some for briefer periods--but who have no
    documention of their nationality. The bidoon have been the objects of
    harsh government policy since the mid-1980's. Since 1985 the Government
    has eliminated the bidoon from the census rolls, discontinued their
    access to government jobs and free education, and sought to deport
    many. In 1993 the Government decreed that bidoon males no longer would
    be allowed to serve in the military. Those presently in the armed
    forces are being replaced gradually. The Government does not issue
    travel documents to bidoon routinely, and if bidoon travel abroad
    without documentation, they risk being barred from returning to the
    country unless they receive advance permission from the immigration
    authorities. Marriages pose special hardships because the offspring of
    male bidoon inherit the father's undetermined legal status.
        In June the National Assembly passed a law requiring that bidoon
    register with the Government by June 27 to begin a process in which
    they could be documented as citizens. Those who failed to register
    would be considered illegal residents and subject to deportation. The
    law provides that up to 2,000 bidoon may be naturalized each year, but
    registration will not lead to citizenship for those who are judged to
    have insufficient ties to the country. Only 8,000 bidoon registered by
    the June 27 cutoff date, in addition to 36,000 who registered (or who
    are descended from those who registered) during a 1965 census. The
    Ministry of the Interior created an ``Executive Committee in Charge of
    the Bidoon'' to resolve the issue. The Government has yet to state the
    likely fate of the large majority of bidoon, who will be unable to
    provide documentation proving Kuwaiti nationality. The Government
    stated in March that it would take punitive action against those who do
    not rectify their status by the deadline. It maintains that many bidoon
    are concealing their true nationalities in order to remain in the
    country, become citizens, and enjoy the generous benefits provided to
    citizens. The Government has denied many bidoon official documents such
    as birth certificates, marriage certificates, civil identification, and
    drivers' licenses, and has pressured employers not to hire bidoon.
    There were no reports during the year that the Government decided the
    nationality of any bidoon without a hearing.
        The Government grants legal status and issues a residency visa to
    any bidoon who presents a passport, regardless of the country of
    issuance. This led some bidoon to acquire passports from countries with
    which they have no affiliation, but which have liberal ``economic
    citizenship'' programs, although this practice has declined sharply
    since 1997. The Government stated that 12,000 bidoon were documented
    during the year as nationals of other states, primarily Syria and Saudi
    Arabia. Once documented, bidoon are able to obtain residency permits
    and other official papers. However, there also are credible reports of
    government authorities encouraging bidoon to purchase counterfeit
    passports in order to establish a claim to an alternate nationality.
    Purchasing a fraudulent passport allows bidoon to receive a residency
    permit and other civil documents, to marry, and to work. However, the
    bidoon have problems obtaining visas to travel abroad on these
    passports, as they are easily detected as fraudulent, and they may have
    difficulty renewing these passports when they expire.
        There were no credible reports during the year that the Government
    enforced the policy of prior years limiting the presence of workers
    from nations whose leaders had supported Iraq in the Gulf War. In prior
    years since the end of the Gulf War, government policy had targeted
    workers whose leaders supported Iraq, especially Palestinians,
    Jordanians, and Yemenis. The Government argued that during the Iraqi
    occupation, many of these workers' governments sided with the Iraqi
    forces. The Government delayed or denied the issuance of work and
    residency permits to persons in these groups, and in many cases
    hindered those workers who were permitted to reside in the country from
    sponsoring their families to join them. Many of these nationals
    resorted to the purchase of third country passports in order to gain
    entry to, or legalize their status in, the country. A government policy
    to route the residency visas of these nationals through the State
    Security Service led to a sharp increase in renewal denials in the
    period immediately after the war (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). In 1999
    diplomatic relations were restored with Yemen, Sudan, and Jordan; and
    subsequently these policies apparently were relaxed (see Section 2.d.).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to join
    unions. Nonetheless, the Government restricts the right of freedom of
    association by stipulating that there be only one union per
    occupational trade, and that unions may establish only one federation.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long criticized such
    restrictions.
        Approximately 50,000 persons, less than 5 percent of a total work
    force of 1,226,134, are organized into 14 unions, 12 of which are
    affiliated with the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF), the sole
    legal trade union federation. The Bank Workers Union and the Kuwait
    Airways Workers Union consisting of approximately 4,500 workers, are
    independent of the KTUF. The law stipulates that any new union must
    include at least 100 workers, of whom at least 15 are citizens. Both
    the ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
    (ICFTU) have criticized this requirement because it discourages unions
    in sectors that employ few citizens, such as the construction industry
    and the domestic servant sector. Despite past draft proposals and KTUF
    complaints, no new labor law was enacted during the year.
        The Government's pervasive oversight powers further erode union
    independence. The Government subsidizes as much as 90 percent of most
    union budgets, may inspect the financial records of any union, and
    prohibits any union from engaging in political or religious activities,
    which are vaguely defined. The law empowers the courts to dissolve any
    union for violating labor laws or for threatening ``public order and
    morals.'' Such a court decision may be appealed. The Amir also may
    dissolve a union by decree. By law the Ministry of Social Affairs and
    Labor is authorized to seize the assets of any dissolved union. The ILO
    has criticized this aspect of the law. Although no union has been
    dissolved, the law subordinates the legal existence of the unions to
    the power of the State.
        According to government statistics, 997,338 foreign workers are
    employed in the country. They constitute over 80 percent of the work
    force but only 10 percent of the unionized work force. The Labor Law
    discriminates against foreign workers by permitting them to join unions
    only after 5 years of residence, although the KTUF states that this
    requirement is not enforced and that foreigners may join unions
    regardless of their length of stay. In addition the law stipulates that
    foreigners may participate in unions only as nonvoting members. Unlike
    union members who are citizens, foreign workers do not have the right
    to elect their leadership. The law requires that union officials must
    be citizens. The ILO has criticized the 5-year residency requirement
    and the denial of voting rights for foreign workers. The KTUF
    administers an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to
    investigate complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free
    legal advice. Any foreign worker covered under the Labor Law may submit
    a grievance to the Labor Office regardless of union status. However,
    such services are not utilized widely.
        The law limits the right to strike. It requires that all labor
    disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor and
    management cannot reach a solution (see Section 6.b.). The law does not
    have any provision ensuring strikers freedom from any legal or
    administrative action taken against them by the State. However, the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has proved responsive to sit-ins
    or protests by workers who face obvious wrongdoing by their employers.
        Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The KTUF belongs to
    the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly
    Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
    the right to organize and bargain collectively, subject to certain
    restrictions (see Section 6.a.). These rights have been incorporated in
    the Labor Law and, according to all reports, have been respected in
    practice.
        The Labor Law provides for direct negotiations between employers
    and ``laborers or their representatives'' in the private sector. Most
    agreements are resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party may
    petition the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for mediation. If
    mediation fails, the dispute is referred to a labor arbitration board,
    which is composed of officials from the High Court of Appeals, the
    Attorney General's office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and
    Labor.
        The Civil Service Law makes no provision for collective bargaining
    between government workers and their employer. Technically, wages and
    conditions of employment for civil service workers are established by
    the Government, but in practice, the Government sets the benefit scales
    after conducting informal meetings with officials from the civil
    service unions. Union officials resolve most issues at the working
    level and have regular access to senior officials.
        The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. Any worker who
    alleges antiunion discrimination has the right to appeal to the
    judiciary. There were no reports of discrimination against employees
    based on their affiliation with a union. Employers found guilty of
    antiunion discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union
    activities.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor ``except in cases specified by law for national
    emergency and with just remuneration;'' however, some foreign workers
    are treated like indentured servants (see Section 6.e.). The Government
    does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but
    such practices are not known to occur.
        Foreign workers may not change their employment without permission
    from their original sponsors unless they have been in the country for
    over 2 years. Domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to abuses
    from this practice because they are not protected by the Labor Law. In
    many cases employers exercise control over their servants by holding
    their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and
    has acted to retrieve the passports of maids involved in disputes.
        Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled South
    Asian workers, live much like indentured servants. They frequently face
    poor working conditions and may encounter some physical abuse (see
    Sections 5 and 6.e.). Domestic servants who run away from their
    employers may be treated as criminals under the law. However, the
    authorities usually do not enforce this provision. In some reported
    cases, employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to
    cover the costs involved in bringing them to the country.
        There are also credible reports of widespread visa trading, a
    system by which sponsors agree to extend their sponsorship to workers
    outside of the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $1,800.
    Middlemen, generally foreigners, use the promise of Kuwaiti sponsorship
    to attract workers from economically depressed countries, taking a
    commission and remitting the rest to the nominal Kuwaiti sponsor. Once
    in the country, such workers are farmed out to the informal sector or
    find employment with parties that would otherwise be unable to sponsor
    them. Foreign workers who are recruited with these traded visas not
    only face possible prosecution for being engaged in illegal employment
    (i.e., working for an employer other than their sponsor), but also
    leave themselves extremely vulnerable to extortion by employers,
    sponsors, and middlemen. Government efforts to crack down on such
    abuses, such as by closing front companies for visa traders, have
    failed to realize significant progress. There are laws aimed at curbing
    visa trading, with penalties against both employers and visa traders,
    but the laws seldom are enforced. Visa trading has resulted in growing
    numbers of unemployed foreign workers who buy visas to enter the
    country and then cannot find work.
        For over 10 years, the ILO has criticized a 1979 legislative
    decree, which requires prior authorization for public meetings and
    gatherings, and provides for a penalty of imprisonment including an
    obligation to work. The ILO also is critical of a 1980 legislative
    decree respecting security, order, and discipline aboard ships,
    breaches of which also may be punished by imprisonment with an
    obligation to work.
        There are reports of young boys, especially of South Asian origin,
    being used as camel jockeys (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work,
    both full- and part-time. Employers may obtain permits from the
    Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to employ juveniles between the
    ages of 14 and 18 in certain trades. Education is compulsory for
    children between the ages of 6 and 15. The Government does not prohibit
    forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known
    to occur (see Section 6.c.). There are reports of young boys,
    especially of South Asian origin, being used as camel jockeys (see
    Sections 5 and 6.c.). There also have been confirmed reports that some
    South Asian and Southeast Asian domestic servants are under age 18.
    Such underage workers reportedly falsify their ages in order to enter
    the country. Some small businessmen employ their children on a part-
    time basis.
        Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours a day on the condition that
    they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a 1-hour rest
    period.
        In August Kuwait ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
    child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
    and Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. An informal two-
    tiered labor market ensures high wages for citizen employees, most of
    whom are in government white collar or executive positions, while
    foreign workers, even those in skilled positions, receive substantially
    lower wages. There is no legal minimum wage in the private sector. In
    the public sector, the monthly minimum wage is approximately $742 (226
    dinars) for citizens and approximately $296 (90 dinars) for
    noncitizens. The public sector minimum wage provides a decent standard
    of living for a worker and family. Wages of unskilled workers in the
    private sector do not always provide a decent standard of living. To be
    eligible to sponsor family members for residency, government workers
    must receive a minimum wage of $1,350 (450 dinars) a month, and private
    sector workers must make at least $2,135 (650 dinars) a month. The
    Council of Ministers approved a bill in August that would reduce this
    amount to $1,350 (450 dinars) for all workers.
        There are also credible reports of widespread visa trading, a
    system by which sponsors agree to extend their sponsorship to workers
    outside of the country in exchange for a fee of $1,500 to $1,800 (see
    Section 6.c.).
        The Labor Law establishes general conditions of work for both the
    public and the private sectors, with the oil industry treated
    separately. The Civil Service Law also prescribes additional conditions
    for the public sector. The Labor Law limits the standard work week to
    48 hours with 1 full day of rest per week, provides for a minimum of 14
    workdays of leave each year, and establishes a compensation schedule
    for industrial accidents. Domestic servants, who specifically are
    excluded from the private sector Labor Law, frequently work long hours,
    greatly in excess of 48 hours.
        The ILO has urged the Government to extend the weekly 24-
    consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period
    of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than
    five persons. The law pertaining to the oil industry provides for a 40-
    hour workweek, 30 days of annual leave, and sick leave. Laws
    establishing work conditions are not applied uniformly to foreign
    workers.
        Employers often exploit workers' willingness to accept substandard
    conditions. Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled
    South Asian workers, live much like indentured servants, are unaware of
    their legal rights, and generally lack the means to pursue a legal
    remedy. They frequently face contractual disputes and poor working
    conditions, and may face physical and sexual abuse (see Sections 5 and
    6.c.). Most are in debt to their employers before they arrive in the
    country and have little choice but to accept the employer's conditions,
    even if they contradict the contractual terms. It is not uncommon for
    wages to be withheld for a period of months, or to be decreased
    substantially. Many foreign workers are forced to live in ``housing
    camps,'' which generally are overcrowded and lack adequate cooking and
    bathroom facilities. Workers are housed 10 or more to a room in squalid
    conditions, many without access to adequate running water. The workers
    are only allowed off the camp compound on company transport or by
    permission of the employer. Foreign workers' ability to change their
    employment is limited, and, in some cases, employers' possession of
    foreign workers' passports allows them to exercise control over such
    employees (see Section 6.c). Many foreign workers go heavily into debt
    and cannot afford to return home.
        The Labor Law discriminates against foreign workers by limiting
    their ability to join unions (see Section 6.a.). The KTUF administers
    an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to investigate
    complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice.
    However, these services are not utilized widely. Any foreign worker may
    submit a grievance to the labor office regardless of union status.
        The Labor Law provides for employer-provided medical care and
    compensation to workers disabled by injury or disease due to job-
    related causes. The law also requires that employers provide periodic
    medical examinations to workers exposed to environmental hazards on the
    job, such as chemicals and asbestos. Foreigners must pay high fees for
    medical care, both yearly and each time medical care is provided. Many
    employers deduct the medical fees from employees' salaries. Adequate
    and affordable health care remains a problem for many foreign workers.
    No health insurance system exists.
        The Government has issued occupational health and safety standards;
    however, compliance and enforcement appear poor, especially with
    respect to unskilled foreign laborers. To decrease accident rates, the
    Government periodically inspects installations to raise awareness among
    workers and employers, and to ensure that they abide by the safety
    rules, control the pollution resulting from certain dangerous
    industries, train workers who use new machines in specialized
    institutes, and report violations. Workers have the right to remove
    themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their
    continued employment, and legal protection exists for workers who file
    complaints about such conditions.
        As noted domestic servants are not covered under the Labor Law.
    Those who flee their employers may be treated as criminals, although
    the authorities usually do not prosecute them. In some reported cases,
    employers illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the
    costs involved in bringing them to the country. It is also a common
    practice for employers illegally to withhold their passports. Maids pay
    the same amount or more than unskilled or semi-skilled workers for
    visas to work in the country.
        Runaway servants often seek shelter at their country's embassy for
    either repatriation or assistance in dealing with employers. The
    numbers in need of assistance increased substantially during the year
    as conditions for domestic employees worsened. Some embassies house
    runaway servants: The Sri Lankan Embassy has between 700-800 nationals
    in its care, the Indian Embassy 200, the Philippine Embassy 150, the
    Indonesian Embassy 100, and the Bangladeshi Embassy 60. The total of
    1,300 represents an increase of 1,000 in the past year. Although most
    of these workers sought shelter due to contractual or financial
    problems with their employers, some women also alleged physical and
    sexual abuse. The Sri Lankan, Indian, and Philippine Embassies all
    continue to report the steady occurrence of physical abuse and
    mistreatment involving domestic servants, including withheld salaries,
    overwork, and not being fed regularly or enough. Each government has
    attempted to register its nationals who arrive to work in the country
    as domestic employees and to regulate recruiting agents in their home
    countries, without much result. In July the reduction of services
    provided by the police facility designated to mediate between
    embassies, domestic workers, and employers made it very difficult for
    domestics to file complaints, receive withheld salary, and reach
    settlement in cases of mistreatment. Domestic servants must now deal
    with neighborhood police stations, whose personnel are untrained and
    inexperienced in handling their cases and often side with the employer
    (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        Some countries either have warned their female citizens about such
    work conditions or banned them from working in the country as domestic
    servants. The Government of India officially banned its nationals from
    working in Kuwait as domestic employees, but Indian nationals still buy
    visas and enter Kuwait as domestic workers. Bangladesh has banned
    female domestic servants from working in Kuwait since 1998. In August
    the Egyptian Foreign Minister warned women seeking employment in all
    Persian Gulf countries to ``exercise caution'' and to avoid being
    forced into illegal activities.
        The courts found in favor of the employee in an estimated 90
    percent of the labor disputes they heard, but this success did not
    result in improved conditions for foreign workers. Currently, no legal
    mechanism exists for foreign workers to enforce settlements. There is
    no compulsion for employers to obey court rulings, and workers often
    did not receive court-ordered compensation. Employers also reportedly
    use illegal methods to pressure foreign employees to drop cases against
    them, such as withholding their passports, police intimidation and
    brutality, and filing criminal charges against them for theft and other
    crimes.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    LEBANON

        Lebanon is a parliamentary republic in which, based on the
    unwritten ``National Pact of 1943'' the President is a Maronite
    Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the
    Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. President Emile Lahoud took office
    in 1998 after an election heavily influenced by Syria. The Parliament
    consists of 128 deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim
    representatives. In parliamentary elections in August and September,
    former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri defeated incumbent Salim Al-Hoss.
    President Lahoud named Hariri Prime Minister in October. According to
    international observers, the elections were flawed and the outcome was
    heavily influenced by the Syrian Government; however, there reportedly
    were fewer voting irregularities than in the 1996 parliamentary
    elections. The judiciary is independent in principle; however, it is
    subject to political pressure.
        Non-Lebanese military and paramilitary forces control much of the
    country. Approximately 25,000 Syrian troops are stationed in locations
    throughout the country, excluding the south. In addition, several armed
    Palestinian factions are located in refugee camps, although their
    freedom of movement is restricted significantly. The contingent of
    approximately 2,000 Israeli army regulars and 1,500 Israeli-supported
    militiamen that had controlled parts of the south withdrew from the
    region completely by May. All undermined the authority of the central
    Government and interfered with the application of law in the patchwork
    of areas not under the Government's control. In 1991 the Governments of
    Syria and Lebanon concluded a security agreement that provided a
    framework for security cooperation between their armed forces. However,
    an undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence personnel in the
    country continue to conduct their activities independently of the
    agreement.
        In 1989 the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi
    Arabia, to end the country's civil war. According to the Taif Accord,
    the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were to determine the redeployment
    of Syrian troops from their position in Lebanon's coastal population
    areas to specified areas of the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal
    contingent upon subsequent agreement by both Governments. The Syrian
    Government has not carried out this partial redeployment, and strong
    Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and decisionmakers makes
    officials unwilling to press for a complete withdrawal. Since the Taif
    Accord was signed, no government has requested formally the withdrawal
    of Syrian forces. The Government's relationship with Syria does not
    reflect the will of most of the country's citizens.
        Until May Israel exerted control in or near its self-proclaimed
    ``security zone'' in the south through direct military action and
    support for its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). With the tacit
    support of the Government, the Iranian-backed Shi'a Muslim faction
    Hizballah, and, to a much lesser extent, the Lebanese Shi'a group Amal
    and some Palestinian guerrillas were locked in a cycle of attack and
    counterattack with Israeli and SLA troops. In May after 22 years of
    occupation, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops withdrew from the south
    and West Biqa', and the SLA disbanded. Following the withdrawal, the
    Government deployed over 1,000 police and soldiers to the former
    security zone. After the withdrawal, Hizballah guerrillas maintained
    observation posts and conducted patrols along the border with Israel.
    The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) also increased
    its area of operations following the Israeli withdrawal. Palestinian
    groups operate autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country.
    The Government did not attempt to reassert state control over the
    Palestinian camps or to disarm Hizballah.
        The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
    which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the
    Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforces laws, conducts searches
    and arrests, and refers cases to the judiciary; and the State Security
    Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collect information on
    groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The Surete Generale
    is responsible for the issuance of passports and residency permits, the
    screening and censoring of foreign periodicals, plays, documentaries,
    television programs, and movies, and the censoring of those parts that
    address national security issues and ``morale.'' The security forces
    committed serious human rights abuses.
        Before the 1975-90 hostilities, the country was an important
    regional financial and commercial center. There is a market-based
    economy in which the majority of the private sector work force is
    employed in the services sector, such as banking and commerce. There is
    a small industrial sector, based largely on clothing manufacture and
    food processing. The annual gross national product is estimated to be
    approximately $5,000 per capita. A reconstruction effort begun in 1992
    is moving forward. Substantial remittances from abroad offset the trade
    deficit and resulted in a balance of payment surplus. The economy has
    been in recession since 1998. Almost all economic indicators pointed to
    decline. The budget deficit stood at 46 percent of expenditure,
    compared with 37 percent for the corresponding period in 1999, and
    foreign investments dropped by 13 percent. The per capita gross
    domestic product (GDP) is estimated at $4,700 and unemployment is
    estimated to be as high as 20 percent. The country has a substantial
    public debt of $22 billion (140 percent of the GDP).
        The Government's overall human rights record was poor, and serious
    problems remain, although there were some improvements in a few areas.
    The right of citizens to change their government remains significantly
    restricted by the lack of government control over parts of the country,
    shortcomings in the electoral system, and Syrian influence. The August
    and September parliamentary elections were flawed and suffered from
    Syrian government influence. Members of the security forces used
    excessive force and tortured and abused some detainees. Prison
    conditions remained poor. Government abuses also included the arbitrary
    arrest and detention of persons who opposed government policies.
    Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials are problems, and
    the courts are subject to political pressure. International observers
    reported that trials of former SLA personnel were not free and fair.
    The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, and continued
    surveillance of political activities during the year. The Government
    partially limited press freedom by continuing to restrict radio and
    television broadcasting in a discriminatory manner. Journalists
    practice self-censorship. The Government continued to restrict freedom
    of assembly, and imposes some limits on freedom of association. There
    are some restrictions on freedom of religion. The Government imposes
    some limits on freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against
    women; abuse of children; discrimination against Palestinians; forced
    labor, including by children; child labor; and the mistreatment of
    foreign servants are problems.
        Until the IDF withdrawal and the collapse of the SLA, artillery and
    aerial attacks by the various contending forces in southern Lebanon
    threatened life and property. These forces committed abuses, including
    killings, bombings, and abductions. The SLA maintained a separate and
    arbitrary system of justice in the zone formerly controlled by Israeli
    forces, which was independent of Lebanese central authority. Prior to
    the SLA collapse, its officials arbitrarily arrested, mistreated, and
    detained persons, and sometimes expelled local residents from their
    homes in the zone. Palestinian groups in refugee camps maintain a
    separate, often arbitrary, system of justice for other Palestinians.
    Palestinians sometimes may appeal for legal recourse to Lebanese
    authorities, often through their agents in the camps. In the past,
    there were reports that members of the various groups that control the
    camps detained their Palestinian rivals and, in some instances, killed
    them; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the
    year.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government authorities during the
    year.
        Four persons died in custody during the year. In January a Sudanese
    asylum seeker died of malaria in Zahle prison. Prison officials
    reportedly did not offer him medical treatment before his death. An
    elderly SLA member died in custody in June allegedly because prison
    officials refused to provide him with his medicine, which was
    manufactured in Israel. In November one SLA detainee died of cancer and
    another SLA detainee died from high blood pressure. The Military Court
    initiated an investigation into the two deaths to determine whether or
    not the detainees received proper medical treatment; however, it had
    not reached conclusions by year's end. The Government subsequently
    announced that it would review the medical records of all former SLA
    detainees (see Section 1.c.).
        In October 1999, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a
    Maronite church in Beirut (see Section 5).
        In December 1999, Sunni extremists killed four LAF soldiers in an
    ambush in the northern region of Dinniyeh after the soldiers attempted
    to arrest two Sunni Muslims allegedly involved in a series of church
    bombings. On December 31, 1999, the LAF retaliated by launching a
    massive military operation against Sunni insurgents in the north. Five
    civilians, 7 LAF soldiers, and 15 insurgents were killed in the
    operation (see Section 5).
        The judicial system continues to suffer from a backlog of hearings
    into cases of death in custody, some as old as 6 years. Such cases
    sometimes involve individuals connected to political groups or accused
    of criminal activity.
        There were no new developments in the case of the June 1999
    killings of four judicial officials at a courthouse in Sidon. The
    perpetrators reportedly are members of the outlawed Palestinian group
    ``Asbat al-Ansar''; however, government authorities did not arrest any
    of the suspected gunmen, who are believed to be hiding in the
    Palestinian refugee camp of Ain-Al Hilwah.
        A military tribunal in 1999 sentenced Captain Camille Yared to 10
    years in prison and 4 Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia
    for carrying out a 1996 bus bombing in Syria, which killed 11 persons.
    The court also sentenced 13 other Lebanese Forces members to 7 years in
    prison. An appeal in the case was scheduled to be held in January 2001.
        There were no developments in the 1996 beating death of Akram
    Arbeed, who allegedly was attacked while accompanying a candidate in
    the 1996 parliamentary election. The case is still pending.
        A court hearing in the 1998 appeal made by the prosecutor's office
    regarding the 1976 killing of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, Embassy
    officer Robert Waring, and their driver, Zohair Moghrabi, has not been
    scheduled following a court verdict declaring the suspect, Tawfiq
    Mohammad Farroukh, not guilty of murder for his role in the killings.
        The cycle of violence in and around the former Israeli controlled
    security zone decreased significantly following the IDF withdrawal in
    May. However, prior to the withdrawal, an estimated 20 Islamic
    resistance guerrillas, 8 Israeli soldiers, and 25 Lebanese civilians
    were killed in the south as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas
    on the one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged
    in recurring violence. For example, in May Hizballah attacks in the
    north of Israel killed 1 person and injured 12. In retaliation for
    these attacks, Israel shelled military and civilian targets in the
    south, killing two persons. Israeli forces conducted air strikes and
    artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets,
    including civilian infrastructure, inside Lebanon. For example, on
    February 8, in response to Hizballah attacks Israel conducted air
    strikes on electrical power transformer stations and other targets,
    injuring over one dozen civilians.
        There were over 110 civilian injuries prior to the May Israeli
    withdrawal, with most of the injuries involving minor wounds from
    shrapnel and broken glass. Civilians accounted for over 70 percent of
    the injured.
        During the May IDF withdrawal from the south and the concurrent
    collapse of the SLA, Israeli forces killed at least four Lebanese
    civilians.
        On October 7, IDF personnel killed 2 persons and injured 25 along
    the Israeli-Lebanese border during demonstrations against Israeli
    government actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (see Section
    2.b.). On October 7, Hizballah launched shells on IDF positions in the
    She'ba farms area in the Golan Heights; no injuries reportedly resulted
    from the shelling.
        On November 25, Hizballah guerrillas bombed an Israeli patrol
    station in the She'ba farms area, killing 1 IDF soldier. In response,
    Israel launched airstrikes on Hizballah positions in the south,
    injuring one person.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        The Government did not take any judicial action against groups
    known to be responsible for the kidnapings of thousands of persons
    during the 1975-1990 civil war.
        In 1999 the Government established a military commission to
    investigate the fate of all those who disappeared during the civil war.
    In September the commission concluded that all persons who disappeared
    at least 4 years before the end of the civil war were dead. The
    Government endorsed the commission report and then-Prime Minister Salim
    al-Hoss called on all families to accept reality despite its
    bitterness;'' however, many of the family members of persons who
    disappeared rejected the commission's findings and called for the
    creation of a new commission.
        In October during violent clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and
    Gaza, Hizballah guerillas kidnaped 3 Israeli soldiers on patrol in the
    north of Israel, demanding that the Israeli Government release all
    remaining Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons. At year's end,
    Hizballah continued to hold captive the soldiers.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Torture is not banned specifically by the Constitution,
    and there continued to be credible reports that security forces abused
    detainees and, in some instances, used torture. Human rights groups
    report that torture is a common practice. Violent abuse usually occurs
    during the preliminary investigations that are conducted at police
    stations or military installations, where suspects are interrogated in
    the absence of an attorney. Such abuse occurs despite laws that prevent
    judges from accepting any confession extracted under duress.
        The Government held incommunicado most of the 2,400 SLA personnel
    who surrendered to authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the
    south in May (see Section 1.d.). Some former SLA detainees reported
    that they were abused or tortured. Amnesty International (AI) and other
    human rights organizations reported that some detainees were beaten,
    handcuffed, blindfolded, and forced to lie face down on the ground.
        In 1999 police officials allegedly tortured in detention a number
    of Sunni youths who were suspected in involvement in a series of church
    bombings (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
        In March ISF personnel used excessive force to disperse a
    demonstration in front of the Prime Minister's residence protesting the
    Government's expulsion of four Japanese Red Army members to Jordan. The
    officers injured at least one demonstrator and a journalist (see
    Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The Government took no action against the
    officers. Ten demonstrators were arrested but were released shortly
    afterwards.
        On April 17, in Beirut security forces used excessive force to
    break up a demonstration calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces
    from the country; 13 persons were injured, and 8 persons were arrested
    and subsequently tried and sentenced by a military court (see Sections
    1.d. and 1.e.).
        On numerous occasions following the May IDF withdrawal from the
    south, civilians threw rocks, hot oil, and Molotov cocktails at IDF
    soldiers across the border, which resulted in some injuries. Hizballah
    reportedly supported these cross-border attacks, and the Government did
    little to halt them. On several occasions IDF troops returned fire and
    sometimes injured civilians.
        Abuses occurred in areas outside the State's authority, including
    the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that
    members of the various groups that control the camps detained their
    Palestinian rivals (see Section 1.d.).
        Prison conditions are poor and do not meet minimum international
    standards. The Ministry of Interior operates 18 prisons with a total
    capacity of 3,840 inmates. However, prisons are overcrowded, with a
    total population of about 8,375. Inmates lack heat, adequate toilet
    facilities, and proper medical care. The Government has not budgeted
    funds to overhaul the prison system. In September the Beirut Bar
    Association organized a conference composed of local and international
    participants to underscore the need for local penal reform. The head of
    the Association described the country's prison facilities as ``unfit
    for animals.'' The Government made an effort to carry out
    rehabilitation for some inmates. Inmates at Roumieh prison participated
    in vocational activities such as computer training courses in order to
    provide them with skills upon release. In September 36 inmates in
    Roumieh prison received certificates of accomplishment following
    completion of a computer training program.
        Three SLA detainees died of natural causes in custody during the
    year; however, one detainee died allegedly because prison officials
    refused to provide him with his medicine, which was manufactured in
    Israel. One Sudanese detainee died of malaria during the year after
    prison officials reportedly refused to offer him medical assistance
    (see Section 1.a.). The Surete Generale, which mans border posts,
    operates a detention facility. Hundreds of foreigners, mostly Egyptians
    and Sri Lankans, are detained there pending deportation. They
    reportedly are held in small, poorly ventilated cells.
        Former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four
    life sentences for the murder or attempted murder of various political
    figures during and after the civil war, is kept in solitary confinement
    in a prison in the basement of the Ministry of Defense. He is permitted
    minimal exercise and allowed only periodic visits from his family and
    lawyers. He is not allowed to read newspapers or listen to the radio.
    Government officials stated that his solitary confinement is necessary
    for his own protection.
        Local journalists and human rights organizations had access to
    certain prisons during the year. Access to prisons controlled by the
    Ministry of Defense was not permitted. Following the Israeli withdrawal
    from the south, the Government did not grant independent monitors
    access to former SLA soldiers in custody. In December government
    officials stated that International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    representatives would be allowed to visit all SLA detainees; however,
    the Government did not sign a memorandum of understanding by year's
    end.
        Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, Hizballah detained
    and reportedly mistreated SLA members and suspected agents at unknown
    locations. The SLA operated its own detention facility, Al-Khiam
    prison, and there were frequent allegations of torture and mistreatment
    of detainees (see Section 1.d.). Hizballah and the SLA occasionally
    released and exchanged prisoners.
        Hizballah did not permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
    Before its May dissolution, the SLA allowed representatives of the ICRC
    and family members of inmates to visit detainees at Al-Khiam prison.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government uses
    arbitrary arrest and detention. The law requires security forces to
    obtain warrants before making arrests; however, military prosecutors,
    who are responsible for cases involving the military as well as those
    involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion,
    make arrests without warrants. Arresting officers are required to refer
    a subject to a prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest, but frequently do
    not do so.
        The law requires the authorities to release suspects after 48 hours
    of arrest if no formal charges are brought against them. Some
    prosecutors flout this requirement and detain suspects for long periods
    in pretrial confinement without a court order. The law authorizes
    judges to remand suspects to incommunicado detention for 10 days with a
    possible extension for an additional 10 days. Bail is available only to
    those accused of petty crimes, not to those accused of felonies.
    Defendants have the right to legal counsel, but there is no state-
    funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operates an office
    for those who cannot afford a lawyer, and the court panel on many
    occasions has asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for
    defendants.
        Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest.
    Security forces detained and interrogated scores of citizens,
    predominately Christian supporters of exiled General Michel 'Awn, and
    of the jailed commander of the disbanded Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'.
    These detentions and searches of homes took place without warrants, and
    detainees claim that they were not given access to lawyers. Most
    detainees were released after they were forced to sign documents
    stating that they would abstain from politics.
        In 1999 police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number
    of Sunni youths for suspected involvement in church bombings; however,
    the youths later were released due to a lack of evidence (see Sections
    1.a. and 5).
        On April 13, authorities detained students from the National Free
    Current, a pro-Awnist group, for distributing antigovernment and anti-
    Syria leaflets (see Section 2.a.). In April ISF personnel arrested and
    subsequently released a number of demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and
    2.b.). In September authorities detained nine Lebanese Forces activists
    in connection with a rally protesting the Syrian presence in Lebanon
    (see Section 2.b.); authorities released these detainees after they
    paid a monetary fine.
        The Government held incommunicado most of the 2,400 SLA members who
    surrendered to the authorities following the IDF's withdrawal from the
    south in May (see Section 1.c.).
        The authorities often detain without charges for short periods of
    time political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Most
    of the former senior government officials who were detained in 1999 on
    charges of embezzlement or misuse of power were released on bail,
    including former Minister of Petroleum Shahe Baroumian. The former
    officials were detained without charge for prolonged periods of time in
    Roumieh prison, in violation of due process. Legal actions still are
    pending against them; however, they are free to travel abroad.
        Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and
    harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, various militias,
    and rival Palestinians.
        There were no allegations during the year of the transfer of
    citizens by government authorities to Syria. In December the Syrian
    Government transferred 46 Lebanese citizens, 7 Palestinian residents of
    Lebanon, and 1 Egyptian citizen from Syrian prisons to Lebanese
    custody. The Government announced that it will review each case;
    persons who have completed their sentences will be released, and
    persons with outstanding prison time will continue to serve out their
    sentences. Human rights activists believe that there are remaining
    Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons; however, the exact number is
    unknown. Amnesty International reported in 1999 that ``hundreds of
    Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested,
    some over 2 decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret
    detention in Syria.'' According to AI, Syrian forces operating in
    Lebanon carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of Lebanese
    nationals outside any legal framework.
        In August Syria released Shaykh Hashem Minqara, a radical Sunni
    member of the Islamic Unification Movement (``Tawheed''), who was
    arrested by Syrian forces in 1985 and transferred to Syria.
        Abuses occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including
    the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that
    members of the various groups that control the camps detained their
    Palestinian rivals.
        Local militias, including Hizballah, continued to conduct arbitrary
    arrests in areas outside central government control. There were
    credible reports that Hizballah detained scores of former SLA
    militiamen before handing them over to government authorities for
    trial.
        Prior to the Israeli withdrawal, the SLA operated its own detention
    facility, Al-Khiam prison. There were frequent reports of torture and
    mistreatment of detainees. Following the disbandment of the SLA in May,
    all of the prison's 140 inmates were released. A number of former
    inmates publicly recounted incidents of abuse by prison officials (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In April the Israeli Government released 13 Lebanese detainees who
    were held without charge in Israel for as long as 14 years; the former
    detainees returned to Lebanon under the auspices of the ICRC. Israel
    continues to hold 21 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh Abed Al-Karim
    Obaid and Mustafa Dirani.
        Exile as a form of punishment is not practiced regularly; however,
    in 1991 the Government pardoned former army commander General Michel
    'Awn and two of his aides on the condition that they depart the country
    and remain in exile for 5 years; 'Awn remained in France at year's end.
    'Awn was accused of usurping power. Former President Amine Gemayel, who
    lived in France in exile for the past 12 years, returned to the country
    in July.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent in
    principle; however, it is subject to political pressure. The
    Constitution provides for a constitutional council to supervise the
    constitutionality of laws and stipulates that judges shall be
    independent in the exercise of their duties; however, influential
    politicians as well as Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers
    sometimes intervene to protect their supporters from prosecution.
        The judicial system is composed of the regular civilian courts; the
    Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and
    military-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries national
    security cases; and the tribunals of the various religious
    affiliations, which adjudicate matters of personal status, including
    marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.
        The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges
    that adjudicates threats to national security. On the recommendation of
    the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case
    before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and
    may not be appealed.
        The Ministry of Justice appoints all other judges according to a
    formula based on the religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A
    shortage of judges has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged
    during years of internal conflicts. Trial delays are aggravated by the
    Government's inability to conduct investigations in areas outside of
    its control. Defendants have the right to examine evidence against
    them. The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man.
        In April the military court sentenced eight students to between 10
    days and 6 weeks in prison following their participation in
    demonstrations against the presence of Syrian troops in the country
    (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). All of the students had been
    released by year's end.
        In June the Military Court began trying the cases of the 3,033 SLA
    militiamen who surrendered to the Government following the Israeli
    withdrawal from the south. Some of the former SLA militiamen were
    charged under Article 273 of the Penal Code for taking up arms against
    the State, an offense punishable by death; others were charged under
    Article 285 of the Penal Code for trading with the enemy, an offense
    punishable by a minimum of 1 year in prison. Domestic human rights
    groups and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) reported
    that the trials were open to journalists and members of the public, but
    were not fair. Amnesty International reported that ``such summary
    trials,'' with barely 7 minutes spent on each individual neither allow
    the innocent to be acquitted nor ensure the discovery of those who may
    be guilty of war crimes. According to AI, the court tried between 23
    and 43 persons each day. SLA lawyers who requested an adjournment to
    study the files of detainees were granted additional time. However, in
    most cases, defense lawyers received the file shortly before trial and
    consequently were unable to argue the cases individually. The standard
    defense presented by lawyers for the militiamen was that the Government
    had been unable to defend citizens living under Israeli occupation for
    the last 22 years. Therefore the residents had no choice but to work
    with the occupiers.
        By year's end, 2,035 former SLA members received sentences ranging
    from 1 week to life imprisonment. About one-third of the former SLA
    members received 1-year prison sentences and about one-third received
    sentences of 3 to 4 weeks under Article 273 of the Penal Code, which
    criminalizes taking up arms against the State. Two persons who were
    implicated in the abuse and torture of prisoners at Al-Khiam prison
    were sentenced to life in prison. The Military Prosecutor recommended
    the death sentence for 37 former SLA militiamen for allegedly killing
    members of ``the resistance'' (i.e., Hizballah). Twenty-one of these
    militiamen were tried while in government custody; however, 16 were
    tried in absentia. The Military Court denied every recommendation for
    the death sentence and handed down lighter sentences in each case.
    Following attacks by angry crowds on two former SLA members in their
    villages, the court amended the sentences of some persons, barring them
    from returning to their villages for several years. According to the
    Government, these bans were issued to protect the former SLA members
    and were difficult to enforce. There were no additional reports that
    former SLA members who returned to their villages were subjected to
    harassment. The Government released most of the 220 SLA militiamen who
    were tried following the June 1999 SLA withdrawal from Jezzine in the
    south; however, 9 remained in prison at year's end.
        Hizballah applies Islamic laws in areas under its control.
    Palestinian groups in refugee camps operate an autonomous and arbitrary
    system of justice. The SLA also maintained a separate and arbitrary
    system of justice before its May disbandment.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--While the authorities generally show little interest
    in controlling the personal lives of citizens, they readily interfere
    with the privacy of persons regarded as foes of the Government. Laws
    require that prosecutors obtain warrants before entering houses except
    when the army is in hot pursuit of armed attackers; however, in
    practice the law is not respected.
        The Government and Syrian intelligence services use informer
    networks and monitor telephones to gather information on their
    adversaries. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and
    activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 2.b.). The
    Government concedes that telephone calls are monitored by security
    services, but claims that monitoring occurs only with prior
    authorization from competent judicial authorities. During September
    1999 parliamentary hearings, the Speaker of Parliament, the Minister of
    Interior, and the Surete Generale Director General publicly
    acknowledged that government officials frequently monitor citizens'
    private telephone conversations.
        Politicians and human rights advocates report increasing and more
    overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political
    meetings and political activities across the religious and political
    spectrum. In October 1999, the Parliament passed a law that authorized
    surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases, but banned
    its use against ministers and parliamentary deputies.
        Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of
    central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy
    rights. Various factions also use informer networks and the monitoring
    of telephones to obtain information on their adversaries.
        In August government officials raided the office of an Internet
    service provider (ISP) based on allegations that the ISP was
    distributing pornographic materials through the operation of a web site
    targeted for the homosexual community (see Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press; however, the Government partially limits this
    right in practice, particularly by intimidating journalists and
    broadcasters into practicing self-censorship. In 1998 the Government
    rescinded a total ban on satellite news; however, it continues to
    censor television broadcasts on a case-by-case basis.
        The country has a long history of freedom of opinion, speech, and
    the press. Although there were repeated attempts to restrict these
    freedoms during the year, daily criticism of government policies and
    leaders continued. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of periodicals are
    published throughout the country, financed by various local and foreign
    groups. While the press is independent, press content often reflects
    the opinions of these financial backers.
        The Government has several tools at its disposal to control freedom
    of expression. The Surete Generale is authorized to approve all foreign
    magazines and non-periodical works, including plays, books, and films,
    before they are distributed in the market. The law prohibits attacks on
    the dignity of the Head of State or foreign leaders. The Government may
    prosecute offending journalists and publications in the Publications
    Court, a special tribunal empowered to try such matters.
        Moreover, the 1991 security agreement between Lebanon and Syria
    contains a provision that effectively prohibits the publication of any
    information deemed harmful to the security of either state. In view of
    the risk of prosecution, journalists censor themselves on matters
    related to Syria.
        During the year, the Government did not bring charges against any
    newspaper. In 1999 President Lahoud announced that under his tenure no
    charges would be brought against any journalist because of his writings
    or opinions. However, in June the Surete Generale banned seven foreign
    publications for allegedly insulting the late Syrian President Hafez
    Al-Asad. The Surete Generale seized at the airport four newspapers and
    three magazines--The Herald Tribune, Le Monde, Liberation, the
    Financial Times, the Economist, Time, and Newsweek. The Surete stated
    that ``there were malicious attacks in some publications which were not
    about political thinking but only sought to defame Al-Asad and hurt the
    feelings of those upset by his death.'' In September the Government
    banned an edition of The Economist because it contained an article
    about Syria and the Middle East peace process, which was deemed
    insulting to the Syrian Government. In December the State Prosecutor's
    office questioned a journalist and two directors of An-Nahar newspaper
    about an article that was critical of both the Lebanese and Syrian
    security services. Following the interrogation, the State Prosecutor
    released all three persons.
        In April ISF personnel injured a journalist who was covering a
    protest (see Section 1.c.). On April 13, authorities detained persons
    for distributing antigovernment and anti-Syria leaflets. The Military
    Court subsequently sentenced eight students to varying lengths of time
    in prison. All of the students had been released by year's end (see
    Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
        In May Dr. Muhammad Mugraby criticized the country's judicial
    system at a press conference. The State Prosecutor's office requested
    that the Bar Association lift Dr. Mugraby's immunity in order to
    prosecute him for defaming the judiciary, and the Bar Association
    complied with this request. However, Mugraby challenged the decision of
    the Bar Association; the case was pending at year's end.
        In June the Government cancelled the passport of a correspondent
    for Al-Hayat newspaper, allegedly because she ``fraternized with the
    enemy'' when she appeared publicly with an Israeli official. The
    Government reissued the journalist's passport shortly after the
    incident.
        In June the Military Court sentenced a man to 1 year imprisonment
    for calling on the public to celebrate the death of the late Syrian
    president Al-Asad.
        In August government officials raided the office of an Internet
    service provider (ISP) based on allegations that the ISP was
    distributing pornographic materials through operation of a website
    aimed at the homosexual community. The Government also pressed charges
    against the owner of the ISP and a human rights activist on national
    security grounds (see Section 1.f.).
        A court hearing remains pending in the case of An-Nahar journalist
    Pierre Attallah, who was charged in absentia in June 1998 for defaming
    the judiciary and entering Israel.
        The country has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a
    flourishing private educational system (a result of inadequate public
    schools and a preference for religious community affiliation). Students
    exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government
    usually does not interfere with student groups.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
    this right. In 1998 the Government lifted its longstanding decree
    banning all demonstrations. Any group that wishes to organize a rally
    must obtain the prior approval of the Ministry of Interior, which does
    not render decisions consistently. Groups opposing government positions
    sometimes do not receive permits. Various political factions such as
    Amal, Hizballah, 'Awnists, and supporters of former Prime Minister
    Hariri held several rallies during the year; the 'Awnists demonstrated
    without a permit.
        In June police forces prevented some 200 supporters of exiled
    General Michel 'Awn from erecting two plaques at Nahr Al-Kalb, north of
    Beirut; one plaque commemorated the Israel withdrawal from Lebanon and
    the second plaque was left blank in anticipation of a withdrawal of
    Syrian troops.
        On several occasions during the year, military personnel used
    excessive force to disperse protesters, sometimes arresting protesters
    (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        In October thousands of Palestinian refugees and Lebanese citizens
    demonstrated peacefully on numerous occasions against Israeli
    government actions in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right and does not interfere with
    the establishment of private organizations; however, it imposes some
    limits on this right. The law requires organizations to obtain from the
    Ministry of Interior a receipt, which is essentially a permit, and may
    be withheld by the Ministry.
        The Ministry of Interior scrutinizes requests to establish
    political movements or parties and to some extent monitors their
    activities. The Army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and
    activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 1.f.).
        Syria does not allow groups that it considers openly hostile to
    operate in areas under its control.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, there are some restrictions. Discrimination based on religion
    is built into the system of government. There are no legal barriers to
    proselytizing; however, traditional attitudes and edicts of the
    clerical establishment discourage such activity.
        The State is required to ensure the free exercise of all religious
    rites provided that public order not be disturbed. The Constitution
    also provides that the personal status and religious interests of the
    population be respected. The Government permits recognized religions to
    exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status, such as
    marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There is no state religion;
    however, politics are based on the principle of religious
    representation, which has been applied to every conceivable aspect of
    public life.
        A group that seeks official recognition must submit its dogma and
    moral principles for government review to ensure that such principles
    do not contradict popular values and the Constitution. The group must
    ensure that the number of its adherents is sufficient to maintain its
    continuity. Alternatively, religious groups may apply to obtain
    recognition through existing religious groups. Official recognition
    conveys certain benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to
    apply the recognized religion's codes to personal status matters.
        The unwritten ``National Pact'' of 1943 stipulates that the
    President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament be a
    Maronite Christian, a Sunni Muslim, and a Shi'a Muslim, respectively.
    The Taif Accord, which ended the country's 15-year civil war in 1990,
    reaffirmed this arrangement but resulted in increased Muslim
    representation in Parliament and reduced the power of the Maronite
    President. The Accord called for the ultimate abolition of political
    sectarianism in favor of ``expertise and competence.'' However, little
    substantive progress has been made in this regard. A ``Committee for
    Abolishing Confessionalism,'' which was called for in the Taif Accord,
    has not yet been formed. Christians and Muslims are represented equally
    in the Parliament. Seats in the Parliament and Cabinet, and posts in
    the civil service, are distributed proportionally among the 18
    recognized groups (see Section 3).
        Each recognized religious group has its own courts for family law
    matters, such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
    State recognition is not a legal requirement for religious worship or
    practice. For example, although Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus are not
    recognized officially, they are allowed to practice their faith without
    government interference; however, their marriages, divorces, and
    inheritances in the country are not recognized under the law.
        The Government does not require citizens' religious affiliations to
    be indicated on their passports; however, the Government requires that
    religious affiliation be encoded on national identity cards.
        An individual may change his religion if the head of the religious
    group he wishes to join approves of this change. There are different
    personal status codes for each of the 18 officially recognized
    religious groups. Administered by representatives of the groups, these
    codes govern many areas of civil law, including marriage, divorce,
    inheritance, and child custody. Many families have relatives who belong
    to different religious communities, and intermarriage is not uncommon;
    however, intermarriage may be difficult to arrange in practice between
    members of some groups because there are no procedures for civil
    marriage. An attempt in 1998 by then-President Elias Hrawi to forward
    legislation permitting civil marriage failed in the face of opposition
    from the religious leadership of all confessions.
        Article 473 of the Penal Code stipulates that one who ``blasphemes
    God publicly'' faces imprisonment for up to a year.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel
    Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
    however, there were some limitations prior to the Israeli withdrawal
    from the south. Travel to Israel is prohibited by law. All males
    between 18 and 21 years of age are subject to compulsory military
    service and are required to register at a recruitment office and obtain
    a travel authorization document before leaving the country. Husbands
    may block travel by their wives and minor children (see Section 5).
        The LAF and Syrian troops maintain checkpoints throughout much of
    the country. Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the south, the
    Lebanese Army, the IDF, and the SLA maintained tight restrictions on
    the movement of persons and goods in and out of Israel's self-declared
    security zone. Following the Israeli withdrawal, dozens of customs and
    military intelligence officers were dispatched to the south. In August
    the Government deployed approximately 1,000 ISF and LAF officers to the
    south; however the officers were not deployed to the border by year's
    end. The ISF assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order in
    most of the region. Following the withdrawal, the Government announced
    that citizens no longer required permits to visit Jezzine. The U.N.
    Interim Forces in Lebanon also increased its area of operations in the
    country.
        There are no legal restrictions on the right of all citizens to
    return. However, many emigres are reluctant to return for a variety of
    political, economic, and social reasons. The Government encouraged the
    return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced during the
    civil war. In 1999 and continuing during the year, the Central Fund for
    the Displaced paid 13,500 squatter families approximately $65 million
    (97.5 billion Lebanese pounds) to move out of the homes they occupied
    and disbursed an additional $133 million (195 billion Lebanese pounds)
    for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of homes that were damaged
    during the civil war. Although some persons have begun to reclaim homes
    abandoned or damaged during the war, the vast majority of displaced
    persons have not attempted to reclaim and rebuild their property. The
    resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints,
    destroyed infrastructure, political feuds, the lack of schools and
    economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security still is
    incomplete in some parts of the country. During the year, the Ministry
    of Displaced sponsored several reconciliation meetings between
    Christian and Druze residents in eight villages throughout Chouf and
    Aley.
        Some 6,000 SLA militiamen and their families fled to Israel
    following the Israeli withdrawal and concurrent collapse of the SLA in
    May. Approximately 1,580 of these former SLA personnel returned to
    Lebanon, several hundred relocated elsewhere outside of Israel, and
    4,400 remained in Israel at year's end. The former SLA personnel who
    returned to Lebanon faced trial for taking up arms against the State or
    for trading with the enemy and most received prison sentences of
    varying lengths (see Section 1.e.). Those who remain in Israel
    reportedly wish to avoid facing trial or fear possible retribution. The
    Government publicly stated that the former SLA militamen are welcome to
    return to the country; however, they would face trial upon their
    return.
        Most non-Lebanese refugees are Palestinians. The U.N. Relief and
    Works Agency (UNRWA) reported in 1999 that the number of Palestinian
    refugees in the country registered with the UNRWA was about 370,000.
    This figure, which includes only the families of refugees who arrived
    in 1948, is presumed to include many thousands who reside outside the
    country. Most experts estimate the actual number now in the country to
    be fewer than 200,000. Most Palestinian refugees are unable to obtain
    citizenship and are subject to governmental and societal
    discrimination; however, Palestinian women who marry Lebanese men can
    obtain citizenship (see Section 5).
        The Government issues laissez-passers (travel documents) to
    Palestinian refugees to enable them to travel and work abroad. In
    January 1999, the Government eased the tight travel restrictions that
    it previously imposed on Palestinians resident in the country and
    entering from other countries by revoking a decision that had required
    all Palestinian refugees who hold Lebanese travel documents to obtain
    entry and exit visas when entering or leaving the country. However, in
    March 1999, the Government stopped issuing visitors' visas to Jordanian
    nationals who were born in Lebanon and are of Palestinian origin.
        There are no legal provisions for granting asylum or refugee status
    in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant first
    asylum. The Government grants admission and temporary (6 months) refuge
    to asylum seekers, but not permanent asylum. The Government generally
    cooperates with the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and UNRWA.
        There are nearly 3,600 non-Palestinian refugees (mostly Iraqi Shi'a
    and Kurds) residing in the country, according to the UNHCR. The Surete
    Generale periodically detains non-Palestinian refugees, primarily
    Iraqis and Sudanese, for illegal entry. Some of those detained are
    registered with the UNHCR and are eligible for resettlement outside the
    country. The Surete Generale denies UNHCR officials access to the
    detainees. There were credible reports that the Surete Generale
    detained Iraqi refugees and deported them back to Iraq.
        The Government granted political asylum to Japanese Red Army (JRA)
    member Kozo Okamoto, citing services rendered to the Arab cause and his
    physical incapacity; Okamoto led the massacre at Israel's Lod airport
    in 1972. The Government refused to grant asylum to four other JNA
    members and deported them to Japan.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution states that citizens have the right to change
    their government in periodic free and fair elections; however,
    effective lack of control over parts of the country, defects in the
    electoral process, and strong Syrian influence over politics and
    decisionmakers significantly restrict this right. There was some
    improvement in the parliamentary elections held in August and September
    in that there were fewer incidents of voter fraud and tampering with
    ballots than in the previous election; however, the electoral process
    was flawed by serious shortcomings.
        According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be
    held every 4 years. The Parliament, in turn, elects the President every
    6 years. The President and Parliament nominate the Prime Minister, who,
    with the President, chooses the Cabinet. According to the unwritten
    ``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite Christian, the
    Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker a Shi'a Muslim (see
    Section 2.c.). Since the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in
    Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989, which revised the 6 to 5 ratio of Christian
    to Muslim seats in Parliament, there has been a 50-50 balance between
    Christian and Muslim Members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also
    increased the number of seats in Parliament and transferred some powers
    from the Maronite President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the
    religiously mixed Cabinet.
        Parliamentary elections in August and September were flawed. The
    Syrian Government heavily influenced the electoral law governing the
    process and also pre-approved all of the candidates on alliance slates
    who ultimately won seats in the Cabinet. Security officials promoted
    relatives and political allies, and government officials supervised
    voting. The Government also used the official television station,
    Teleliban to promote progovernment candidates and to denigrate the
    leading opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
    Officials applied inconsistent voting regulations, often favoring
    progovernment candidates. Officials of various security services became
    personally involved in promoting candidates who were political allies
    or relatives. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Hoss lost his seat in a
    contested election as did many progovernment candidates. Following his
    overwhelming victory in the Beirut electoral districts, former Prime
    Minister Hariri was appointed Prime Minister on October 23. Following
    consultation between the Government and senior Syrian officials,
    President Lahoud and Prime Minister Hariri reached an agreement on the
    composition of the new Cabinet.
        In 1998 the Parliament elected a new President after amending the
    Constitution on a one-time basis to permit senior government officials
    to run for office. (The Constitution prohibits senior government
    officials from running for president unless they resign at least 2
    years before the election. The amendment provided for a one-time
    exception to this provision.) There was substantial criticism of the
    Syrian role in influencing political leaders in the selection of the
    presidential candidate; however, there was broad public support for the
    new President, Emile Lahoud, who took office in November 1998. In 1999
    municipal elections were held in 39 villages and towns. Local observers
    reported that the elections were generally free and fair; however, they
    were characterized by a number of irregularities, including the absence
    of names from voting lists, the closure of the registration department
    on voting day, and the presence of security personnel in polling
    stations. By-elections in the areas formerly occupied by Israel are
    scheduled to be held in 2001.
        Women have the right to vote and there are no legal barriers to
    their participation in politics; however, there are significant
    cultural barriers, and women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. No woman has ever held a cabinet position. In September 3
    women were elected to the 128-seat Parliament.
        Palestinian refugees have no political rights (see Section 5). An
    estimated 17 Palestinian factions operate in the country, generally
    organized around prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in
    refugee camps controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the
    refugees are not elected, but there are ``popular committees'' that
    meet regularly with the UNRWA and visitors.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several local human rights groups operate freely without overt
    government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human
    Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights-Lebanon, and
    the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled. Some of these
    groups have sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of
    Lebanese citizens and took credit in part for the release of a number
    of Lebanese from Syrian jails during 1998 (see Section 1.d.). The Bar
    Association and other private organizations regularly hold public
    events that include discussion of human rights issues. Some human
    rights groups reported harassment and intimidation by government,
    Syrian, Hizballah, and SLA forces.
        In July AI opened an office in the country.
        During the year, government officials discussed human rights
    problems with representatives of foreign governments and NGO's.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution calls for ``social justice and equality of duties
    and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism;''
    however, in practice aspects of the law and traditional beliefs
    discriminate against women. Religious discrimination is built into the
    political system. The law gives preferences to the disabled for
    employment in government positions. Discrimination based on race,
    language, or social status is illegal and is not widespread among
    citizens; however, foreign domestic servants often are mistreated.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The press reports
    cases of rape with increasing frequency, and cases reported are thought
    to be only a fraction of the actual number. There are no authoritative
    statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts agree that the
    problem affects a significant portion of the female population. In
    general battered or abused women do not talk about their suffering for
    fear of bringing shame upon their own families or accusations of
    misbehavior upon themselves. Some religious courts legally can compel a
    battered wife to return to the house in spite of physical abuse. Many
    women are compelled to remain in abusive marriages because of social
    and family pressures. Possible loss of custody of children and the
    absence of an independent source of income also prevent women from
    leaving their husbands. Doctors and social workers believe that most
    abused women do not seek medical help because of shame or inability to
    pay for treatment. The Government has no separate program to provide
    medical assistance to battered women; however, it provides legal
    assistance to victims of crimes who cannot afford it regardless of the
    gender of the victim. In most of the cases, the police ignore
    complaints submitted by battered or abused women. The Lebanese Council
    to Resist Violence Against Women, which was founded in 1997, has been
    active in working to reduce violence against women by offering
    counseling and legal aid, and raising awareness about domestic
    violence.
        Foreign domestic servants often are mistreated, abused, and in some
    cases, raped. Asian and African female workers have no legal recourse
    available to them because of their low status and isolation from
    society and because the labor laws do not protect them (see Section
    6.e.). Because of such abuse, the Government prohibits foreign women
    from working if they are from countries that do not have diplomatic
    representation in the country.
        The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of so-called
    ``honor crimes.'' According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife
    or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he
    demonstrates that he committed the crime in response to a socially
    unacceptable sexual relationship conducted by the victim. However, in
    1999 the law was amended to increase the severity of the sentence for
    perpetrators of ``honor crimes.'' Several instances of honor crimes are
    reported in the media every year.
        Women have varying employment opportunities in government,
    medicine, law, academia, the arts, and to a lesser degree, business.
    However, social pressure against women pursuing careers is strong in
    some parts of society. Men sometimes exercise considerable control over
    female relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or
    their contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but
    often cede control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons and
    because of family pressure. In 1994 the Parliament removed a legal
    stipulation that a woman must obtain her husband's approval to open a
    business or engage in a trade. Husbands may block foreign travel by
    their wives (see Section 2.d.). The testimony of a woman is equal to
    that of a man (see Section 1.e.). During the year, the Government
    amended some labor laws affecting women. For example, maternity leave
    was extended and women no longer are forbidden from working at night.
        Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children.
    Accordingly, children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers are
    not eligible for citizenship. Citizen widows may confer citizenship on
    their minor children.
        Religious groups administer their own family and personal status
    laws (see Section 2.c.). There are 18 recognized religious groups, each
    of which differs in its treatment of marriage, family, property rights,
    and inheritance. Many of these laws discriminate against women. For
    example, Sunni inheritance law provides a son twice the inheritance of
    a daughter. Although Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do
    so only with the concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that
    permits civil marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside the
    country are recognized by the State. Only religious authorities may
    perform marriages.
        Children.--The plight of children remains a serious concern;
    however, the Government has not allocated funds to protect them. Many
    children, particularly in rural areas, take jobs at a young age to help
    support their families. In lower income families, boys generally
    receive more education, while girls usually remain at home to perform
    housework. Illiteracy rates have reached 37.5 percent. In 1998 the
    Government enacted a law making education free and compulsory until the
    age of 12. However, public schools generally are inadequate, and the
    cost of private education is a significant problem for the middle and
    lower class. The Government also raised the age of child employment
    from 8 to 13.
        An undetermined number of children are neglected, abused,
    exploited, and even sold to adoption agents. The normal procedure for
    adoption is through religious homes or institutions authorized to
    arrange adoption; however, the demand to provide infants for adoption
    abroad results in illegal international adoptions. There are no
    statistics available concerning the prevalence of the illegal adoption
    of infants. Poor children often are compelled by their parents to seek
    employment, and often take jobs that jeopardize their safety, including
    in industry, car mechanic shops, and carpentry (see Section 6.d.).
    Because of their ages, wages earned by such children are not in
    conformity with labor regulations. The Government does not have
    specific child protection laws to remove children from abusive
    situations and does not grant NGO's adequate legislative standing to
    litigate on behalf of abused minor children.
        There are hundreds of abandoned children in the streets nationwide,
    some of whom survive by begging, others by working at low wages. In
    1999 the first Center for Street Children was opened to house and
    rehabilitate street children. The Center has been active in gathering
    children from various regions and providing a home for them. The Center
    places disabled children in institutions and refers children with
    police records to juvenile courts.
        Juvenile delinquency is on the rise; many delinquents wait in
    ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Although
    their number is small, there is no adequate place to hold delinquent
    girls; therefore, they are held in the women's prison in Ba'abda.
    Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build adequate
    facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. The Government operates a
    modern juvenile detention facility in Ba'asir, which opened in 1998.
        The Committee for Children's Rights, formed in 1993 by prominent
    politicians and some local NGO's, has been lobbying for legislation to
    improve the condition of children. The Ministry of Social Affairs
    oversees the Higher Council for Childhood and the National Committee
    for Literacy. The Higher Council for Childhood prepared legal studies
    and produced progress reports on national compliance with the
    Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Ministry of Health requires
    the establishment of health records for every child up to 18 years of
    age.
        People with Disabilities.--Over 100,000 persons became disabled
    during the civil war. Care of the disabled generally is performed by
    families. Most efforts to secure education, independence, health, and
    shelter for the disabled are made by some 100 private organizations.
    These organizations are relatively active, although poorly funded.
        The heavily damaged cities make few accommodations for the
    disabled. The Government does not mandate building code requirements
    for nongovernment buildings for ease of access by the disabled,
    although the Government in its rebuilding projects has constructed
    sidewalks in some parts of Beirut that allow access for the disabled.
    The private ``Solidere'' project for the reconstruction of downtown
    Beirut has self-imposed requirements for disabled access. This project
    is considered a model for future construction efforts around the
    country.
        During the year, the Parliament passed amendments to the law on
    disabled persons, which stipulates that at least 3 percent of all
    government and private sector positions should be filled by persons
    with disabilities, provided that such persons fulfill the
    qualifications of the position. The amendments provide the private
    sector with tax reduction benefits if the number of disabled that were
    hired exceeded the number specified in the law. The amendments also
    impose new building codes in all government buildings and require that
    public transportation be accessible for disabled persons.
        Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religion is built
    into the system of government (see Sections 2.c. and 3). The amended
    Constitution of 1990 embraces the principle of abolishing religious
    affiliation as a criterion for filling government positions, but few
    practical steps have been taken to accomplish this aim. One notable
    exception is the Lebanese Armed Forces, which, through universal
    conscription and an emphasis on professionalism, has reduced
    significantly the role of religious sectarianism in that organization.
    Each religious group has its own courts for family law matters, such as
    marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
        On October 3, 1999, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a
    Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb. There were no arrests made
    in this case during the year.
        Throughout the fall of 1999, approximately six random bombings were
    carried out against Orthodox churches and shops that sold liquor; the
    bombings took place in the northern city of Tripoli and in surrounding
    areas. The Government suspected that radical Sunni extremists carried
    out the bombings in retaliation for Russian military operations in
    Chechnya. Police officials detained and allegedly tortured a number of
    Sunni youths for suspected involvement in these bombings; however, the
    youths later were released due to a lack of evidence (see Section
    1.d.).
        In December 1999, Sunni extremists killed four LAF soldiers in an
    ambush in the northern region of Dinniyeh after the soldiers attempted
    to arrest two Sunni Muslims allegedly involved in a series of church
    bombings. On December 31, 1999, the LAF retaliated by launching a
    massive military operation against Sunni extremists in the north. Five
    civilians, 7 LAF soldiers, and 15 extremists were killed in this
    operation (see Section 1.a.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the United
    Nations, an estimated 370,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in
    the country (see Section 2.d.); however, it is believed that fewer
    actually reside there. Most Palestinian refugees live in overpopulated
    camps that have suffered repeated heavy damage as a result of fighting.
    The Government generally has prohibited the construction of permanent
    structures in the camps on the grounds that such construction
    encourages the notion of permanent refugee settlement in the country.
    Refugees fear that in the future the Government may reduce the size of
    the camps or eliminate them completely.
        The Government officially ended its practice of denying work
    permits to Palestinians in 1991. However, in practice, very few
    Palestinians receive work permits, and those who find work usually are
    directed into unskilled occupations. They and other foreigners may own
    a limited size plot of land but only after obtaining the approval of
    five different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but
    for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner
    disadvantageous to Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, to the 25,000
    Kurds in the country. The Government does not provide health services
    to Palestinian refugees, who rely on UNRWA and UNRWA-contracted
    hospitals.
        In recent years, Palestinian incomes have declined as the Palestine
    Liberation Organization (PLO) closed many of its offices in the
    country, which formerly employed as much as 50 percent of the
    Palestinian work force. Palestinian children reportedly have been
    forced to leave school at an early age because U.N. relief workers do
    not have sufficient funds for education programs. The U.N. estimates
    that 18 percent of street children are Palestinian. Drug addiction and
    crime reportedly are increasing in the camps, as is prostitution,
    although reliable statistics are not available. In August 1999, the
    Fatah faction of the PLO expanded its operations in the Ain al-Hilwah
    refugee camp by opening security offices and hiring personnel to
    maintain order in the camps.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except government
    employees, may establish and join unions and have a legal right to
    strike. Worker representatives must be chosen from those employed
    within the bargaining unit. About 900,000 persons form the active labor
    force, 42 percent of whom are members of 160 labor unions and
    associations. Twenty- two of the unions, with about 200,000 workers,
    are represented in the General Confederation of Labor (GCL).
        In general the Government does not control or restrict unions,
    although union leaders allege credibly that in the past, the Government
    has tried to interfere in elections for union officials.
        Palestinian refugees may organize their own unions; however,
    because of restrictions on their right to work, few Palestinians
    participate actively in trade unions.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international federations and
    confederations, and they maintain a variety of such affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
    workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and
    practice. Most worker groups engage in some form of collective
    bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtain
    significant gains for their members and on occasion have assisted
    nonunionized workers. There is no government mechanism to promote
    voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers have no protection
    against antiunion discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is not
    prohibited by law. In the absence of a prohibition against it, children
    (see Section 5), foreign domestic servants, and other foreign workers
    (see Section 6.e.) sometimes are forced to remain in situations
    amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1946 Labor Code stipulates that workers between the
    ages of 8 and 16 may not work more than 7 hours a day, with 1 hour of
    rest provided after 4 hours. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor amended this
    law to define workers under the age of 13 as child labor, in accordance
    with international obligations. Children are prohibited from working
    between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. The code also prohibits certain
    types of mechanical work for children between the ages of 8 and 13, and
    other types for those between the ages of 13 and 16. In 1999 the
    Government passed legislation that prohibits children under the age of
    16 from working in jobs that jeopardize their health, safety, or morals
    and requires that employers give children at least 20 hours of annual
    leave. In June the Parliament passed amendments to the Labor Code that
    prohibit children under age 18 from working more than 6-hour days, with
    1 hour of rest for days of more than 4 hours of work, and from working
    between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. The proposed amendments would
    also entitle children to 20 hours of annual paid leave. The Ministry of
    Labor is responsible for enforcing these requirements; however, it does
    not apply the law rigorously. Forced and bonded child labor is not
    prohibited and sometimes occurs (see Section 6.c.).
        Children between the ages of 10 and 14 constitute 0.6 percent of
    the labor force (5,936 children in total), according to 1996 figures.
    Most of these child laborers are Lebanese, but some are Syrian; they
    work predominantly in the industrial, craft, and metallurgical sectors.
    According to a 1995 UNICEF study, 60 percent of working children are
    below 13 years of age and 75 percent earn wages below two-thirds of the
    minimum wage. Nearly 40 percent of working children work 10 to 14 hours
    per day, and few receive social welfare benefits. In addition,
    approximately 52,000 children between the ages of 15 and 19 are in the
    active labor force; they are not eligible for the minimum wage until
    they reach the age of 21.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a legal
    minimum wage, currently about $200 (300,000 Lebanese pounds) per month.
    The law is not enforced effectively in the private sector. In theory
    the courts could be called upon to enforce it, but in practice they are
    not. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. Trade unions attempt to ensure the
    payment of minimum wages in both the public sector and the large-scale
    private sector.
        The Labor Law prescribes a standard 6-day workweek of 48 hours,
    with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the
    industrial sector work an average of 35 hours a week and workers in
    other sectors work an average of 30 hours a week. Foreign domestic
    servants, mostly of Asian and African origin, often are mistreated,
    abused, and raped. The employment contract for a foreign worker is
    signed by a recruitment agency and the employer; workers rarely are a
    party to the contract or, if they are a party, do not know what the
    contract stipulates because it is written in Arabic. The passports of
    foreign domestic workers are confiscated by the recruitment agency or
    their employer when the workers arrive at the airport. Foreign domestic
    servants are not protected by labor laws. Domestic servants often work
    18 hours per day and, in most cases, do not receive time off for
    vacations or holidays. There is no minimum wage for domestic servants;
    their average wage is about $100 (150,000 Lebanese pounds) per month.
    They have no entitlement to government financial assistance. Many
    foreign workers leave their jobs--which is not against the law--but
    their employers often report them as thieves to the police in order to
    locate them and force them to return.
        The law includes specific occupational health and safety
    regulations. Labor regulations require employers to take adequate
    precautions for employee safety. The Ministry of Labor is responsible
    for enforcing these regulations, and it does so unevenly. Labor
    organizers report that workers do not have the right to remove
    themselves from hazardous conditions without jeopardizing their
    continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that ``any
    person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other
    means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.'' If forced
    prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurs as a result
    of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be
    sentenced to at least 1 year in prison. There were no reports that
    persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                     LIBYA

        The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship
    that has been ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (the ``Brother
    Leader and Guide of the Revolution'') since 1969, when he led a
    military coup to overthrow King Idris I. Borrowing from Islamic and
    pan-Arab ideas, Qadhafi created a political system that rejects
    democracy and political parties and purports to establish a ``third
    way'' superior to capitalism and communism. Libya's governing
    principles are derived predominantly from Qadhafi's ``Green Book.'' In
    theory Libya is ruled by the citizenry through a series of popular
    congresses, as laid out in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 and
    the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People of
    1977, but in practice Qadhafi and his inner circle control political
    power. Qadhafi is aided by extragovernmental organizations--the
    Revolutionary Committees and the Comrades Organization--that exercise
    control over most aspects of citizens' lives. The judiciary is not
    independent of the Government.
        Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of
    several elite military units, including Qadhafi's personal bodyguards,
    local Revolutionary Committees, and People's Committees, as well as the
    ``Purification'' Committees, which were formed in 1996. The result is a
    multilayered, pervasive surveillance system that monitors and controls
    the activities of individuals. The various security forces committed
    numerous serious human rights abuses.
        The Government dominates the economy through complete control of
    the country's oil resources, which account for almost all export
    earnings and approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product.
    Oil revenues constitute the principal source of foreign exchange. Much
    of the country's income has been lost to waste, corruption, and
    attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire
    conventional weapons. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and
    encourage private sector participation, the economy continues to be
    constrained by a system of extensive controls and regulations covering
    prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange. The Government's
    mismanagement of the economy has caused high levels of inflation,
    increased import prices, and hampered economic expansion, which has
    resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of
    citizens in recent years. Significant increases in the world price of
    oil boosted petroleum revenues this year, masking the negative domestic
    impact of the country's economic policy.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
    continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the
    right to change their government. Qadhafi has used extrajudicial
    killing and intimidation to control the opposition abroad and summary
    judicial proceedings to suppress it at home. Security forces torture
    prisoners during interrogations and as punishment. Prison conditions
    are poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and
    many prisoners are held incommunicado. Many political detainees are
    held for years without charge. The Government controls the judiciary,
    and citizens do not have the right to a fair public trial or to be
    represented by legal counsel. The Government infringes on citizens'
    privacy rights, and citizens do not have the right to be secure in
    their homes or persons, or to own private property. The Government
    restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and
    religion. The Government imposes some limits on freedom of movement. In
    September the Government reportedly expelled hundreds of sub-Saharan
    workers following incidents of mob violence against the workers; the
    authorities also were accused of responding slowly to the violence. The
    Government prohibits the establishment of independent human rights
    organizations. Violence against women is a problem. Traditional
    attitudes and practices continue to discriminate against women, and
    female genital mutilation (FGM) still is practiced in remote areas of
    the country. The Government discriminates against and represses certain
    minorities and tribal groups. The Government continues to repress
    banned Islamic groups and exercises tight control over ethnic and
    tribal minorities, such as Amazighs (Berbers), Tuaregs, and Warfalla
    tribe members. The Government restricts basic worker rights, uses
    forced labor, and discriminates against foreign workers. There have
    been reports of slavery and trafficking in persons.
        Colonel Qadhafi publicly called for violence against opponents of
    his regime after violent clashes between Islamic activists and security
    forces in Benghazi in September 1995. Outbreaks of violence between
    government forces and Muslim militants continued in the eastern part of
    the country. The Government encouraged reconciliation with opposition
    groups during the year and invited dissidents living abroad to return,
    promising that they would be safe. An opposition figure was appointed
    Ambassador to the Arab League, but few other opposition figures
    returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and the
    likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear.
        In April 1999, the Government surrendered the two men suspected of
    the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before a Scottish court
    seated in the Netherlands. As a result, U.N. sanctions against Libya
    were suspended. The full lifting of the U.N. sanctions will require
    that Libya cooperate with the investigation, accept responsibility for
    the actions of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, and
    renounce terrorism.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Violent clashes
    between the security forces and militant Islamist opposition groups
    increased following a lull toward the end of 1999. In the past, the
    clashes were concentrated predominantly in the eastern region and
    resulted in an undetermined number of deaths. Since a 1996 prison
    mutiny in Benghazi and other attacks against the regime, the Government
    has maintained tightened security measures. In the years following the
    mutiny, the Government made hundreds of arrests, conducted military
    operations in the areas of insurrection, and killed a number of
    persons.
        The Government uses summary judicial proceedings to suppress
    domestic dissent and has used extrajudicial killings and intimidation
    to control the opposition abroad. Prior to 1994, there were reports
    that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living
    abroad (see Sections 1.b. and 2.d.).
        The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya following
    the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which killed
    259 persons on board and 11 persons on the ground, and the bombing of
    UTA flight 772 over Chad in 1989, which killed 171 persons. In April
    1999, the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the Pan Am
    bombing, which prompted the suspension of U.N. sanctions against Libya.
    The suspects are being tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court
    seated in the Netherlands. Following the conclusion of the UTA trial
    and the appearance in the Netherlands of the two Libyan suspects in the
    Pan Am 103 bombing, the full lifting of the now-U.S. and British
    investigations; accept responsibility for the actions of its officials;
    pay appropriate compensation; and renounce terrorism.
        In March 1999, a French court convicted in absentia the six
    defendants in the UTA bombing and sentenced them to life in prison. In
    July the Government paid the French Government $31 million (17 million
    dinars) to compensate the victims' families. Family members of the UTA
    772 victims now are seeking indictments of more senior officials,
    including Qadhafi.
        In late November 1999, the Government paid compensation to the
    British Government for the 1984 killing of British policewoman Yvonne
    Fletcher outside the Libyan Embassy in London.
        In September mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly beat
    hundreds of sub-Saharan expatriate workers, attacking and, in some
    cases, burning their places of residence and employment. Credible
    reports indicate that as many as 50 individuals were killed and
    hundreds of others injured. The mobs blamed the expatriate population
    for increased crime and the appearance of HIV in Libya. Libyan security
    forces were criticized by many African governments for their slow
    reaction to these events (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
        Prison conditions reportedly are poor and caused an unknown number
    of deaths in custody (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--The regime in the past has abducted and killed
    dissidents in the country and abroad. Dissident Mansour Kikhiya
    disappeared from Cairo, Egypt in 1993. There is credible information
    that, following his abduction, Kikhiya was executed in Libya in early
    1994. There have been no reports of such abductions or killings since
    1994.
        Prisoners routinely are held in incommunicado detention (see
    Section 1.d.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law provides for fines against any official using
    excessive force; however, there are no known cases of prosecution for
    torture or abuse. Security personnel reportedly routinely torture
    prisoners during interrogations or for punishment. Government agents
    reportedly periodically detain and torture foreign workers,
    particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. Reports of torture are
    difficult to corroborate because many prisoners are held incommunicado.
    In April 1999, the U.N. Committee against Torture reported that it
    continued to receive allegations of torture and recommended that the
    authorities send a clear message to all its law enforcement personnel
    that torture is not permitted under any circumstances.
        Methods of torture reportedly include: Chaining to a wall for
    hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying corkscrews to the
    back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing
    the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags,
    depriving of food and water, hanging by the wrists, suspending from a
    pole inserted between the knees and elbows, burning with cigarettes,
    attacking with dogs, and beating on the soles of the feet. In May three
    defendants, (two Bulgarians and one Palestinian) all health
    professionals in a much publicized case involving the HIV infection of
    nearly 400 Libyan children, claimed that their confessions had been
    obtained under duress (see Section 1.e.).
        Prison conditions reportedly are poor. According to Amnesty
    International (AI), political detainees reportedly were held in cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading conditions, and denied adequate medical care,
    which led to several deaths in custody. AI reported that Mohammad 'Ali
    al-Bakoush, detained since 1989 without charge or trial, died in Abu
    Salim prison in August 1999, reportedly as a result of poor conditions
    of detention. Inmates protesting poor conditions mutinied in July 1996
    at the Abu Salim prison. The prisoners went on a hunger strike and
    captured guards to protest the lack of medical care, overcrowding, and
    inadequate hygiene and diet provided at the facility. Security units
    were dispatched to suppress the uprising; as many as 100 persons were
    killed by security forces.
        The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
    arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. By law the Government may hold
    detainees incommunicado for unlimited periods. It holds many political
    detainees incommunicado in unofficial detention centers controlled by
    members of the Revolutionary Committees. Hundreds of political
    detainees, many associated with banned Islamic groups, reportedly are
    held in prisons throughout the country (but mainly in the Abu Salim
    prison in Tripoli); many are held for years without charge. Hundreds of
    other detainees may have been held for periods too brief (3 to 4
    months) to permit confirmation by outside observers (see Section 1.c.).
        In 1998 security forces arrested suspected members and sympathizers
    of banned Islamic groups and monitored activities at mosques following
    violent clashes in eastern Libya. In June 1998, at least 100
    professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities were arrested
    on suspicion of political opposition activities, specifically support
    of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an underground Islamic
    movement that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Some
    practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from
    security services. Qadhafi has criticized publicly Libyan
    ``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic activists who fought
    with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet forces) as threats
    to the regime (see Section 2.c.).
        The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption,
    black marketeering, drug trafficking, and atheism. It has been enforced
    by the ``Purification'' Committees since June 1996 (see Section 1.f.).
    Scores of businessmen, traders, and shop owners have been arrested
    arbitrarily on charges of corruption, dealing in foreign goods, and
    funding Islamic fundamentalist groups, and dozens of shops and firms
    have been closed. As part of the campaign to implement the Purge Law,
    the wealth of the middle class and affluent has been targeted as well.
        In March 1997, the Libyan General People's Congress approved a law
    that provides for the punishment of accomplices to crimes of
    ``obstructing the people's power, instigating and practicing tribal
    fanaticism, possessing, trading in or smuggling unlicensed weapons, and
    damaging public and private institutions and property.'' The new law
    provides that ``any group, whether large or small,'' including towns,
    villages, local assemblies, tribes, or families, be punished in their
    entirety if they are accused by the General People's Congress of
    sympathizing, financing, aiding in any way, harboring, protecting, or
    refraining from identifying perpetrators of such crimes. Punishment
    under the Collective Punishment Law ranges from the denial of access to
    utilities (water, electricity, telephone), fuels, food supplies,
    official documents, and participation in local assemblies, to the
    termination of new economic projects and state subsidies.
        In May 1997, Qadhafi declared that if any member of a family was
    found guilty of an offense, the individual's entire family was to be
    considered guilty.
        The Government does not impose exile as a form of punishment, and
    it continued to encourage Libyan dissidents abroad to return, promising
    to ensure their safety; however, with the exception of the recently
    appointed Ambassador to the Arab League, formerly an opponent of the
    regime, few returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and
    the likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear. Prior to 1994, there
    were reports that security forces hunted down and killed dissidents
    living abroad (see Section 1.a.). Students studying abroad have been
    interrogated upon their return (see Section 2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
    of the Government.
        There are four levels of courts: Summary courts, which try petty
    offenses; the courts of first instance, which try more serious crimes;
    the courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which is the final
    appellate level.
        Special revolutionary courts were established in 1980 to try
    political offenses. Such trials often are held in secret or even in the
    absence of the accused. In other cases, the security forces have the
    power to pass sentences without trial, especially in cases involving
    political opposition. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted in 1996 a lack
    of fairness in trials of capital cases. In the past, Qadhafi has
    incited local cadres to take extrajudicial action against suspected
    opponents. In May the attorney defending 16 health professionals who
    were charged with infecting 400 Libyan children with HIV (see Section
    1.c.) complained that he had been allowed to meet with his clients only
    twice since their incarceration. The defendants (nine Libyans, one
    Palestinian and six Bulgarians) were arrested in January 1999.
        A large number of offenses, including political offenses and
    ``economic crimes,'' are punishable by death. A 1972 law mandates the
    death penalty for any person associated with a group opposed to the
    principles of the revolution, as well as for other acts
        such as treason, attempting to change the form of government by
    violence, and premeditated murder. The ``Green Book'' of 1988 states
    that ``the goal of the Libyan society is to abolish capital
    punishment''; however, the Government has not acted to abolish the
    death penalty, and its scope has increased. In 1996 a law went into
    effect that applies the death penalty to those who speculate in foreign
    currency, food, clothing, or housing during a state of war or a
    blockade, and for crimes related to drugs and alcohol.
        In 1997 two civilians and six army officers were executed: The
    civilians by hanging and the army officers by firing squad. At least
    five others were given prison sentences, all convicted on charges of
    being American spies, committing treason, cooperating with opposition
    organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social
    goals. The eight executed men were arrested with dozens of others in
    connection with a coup attempt by army units composed of Warfalla tribe
    members in October 1993. The men were convicted by the Supreme Military
    Court and reportedly did not have lawyers for their trial. The
    convicted persons allegedly were kept in secret locations and tortured
    throughout their incarceration to obtain confessions of criminal
    activity.
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
    Executions noted in 1996 ``the apparent lack of respect for fair trial
    standards in trials leading to the imposition of capital punishment in
    Libya.''
        The private practice of law is illegal; all lawyers must be members
    of the Secretariat of Justice.
        The Government holds a large number of political prisoners. Amnesty
    International estimates that there are hundreds of persons imprisoned
    for political reasons.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government does not respect the right to privacy.
    Security agencies often disregard the legal requirement to obtain
    warrants before entering a private home. They also routinely monitor
    telephone calls.
        The security agencies and the Revolutionary Committees oversee an
    extensive network of informants; one credible foreign observer
    estimated that 10 to 20 percent of the population was engaged in
    surveillance for the regime. Libyan exiles have reported that family
    ties to suspected regime opponents may result in government harassment
    and detention. The Government may seize and destroy property belonging
    to ``enemies of the people'' or those who ``cooperate'' with foreign
    powers. In the past, citizens have reported that the Government warned
    members of the extended family of any regime opponent that they, too,
    risk the death penalty.
        The law passed by the General People's Congress in March 1997
    formally codified the Government's previous threats of punishment for
    families or communities that aid, abet, or do not inform the regime of
    criminals and oppositionists in their midst (see Section 1.d.).
        The 1994 Purge Law provides for the confiscation of private assets
    above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such
    undetermined amounts as ``the fruits of exploitation or corruption.''
    In 1996 the Government ordered the formation of hundreds of ``Purge''
    or ``Purification'' Committees composed of young military officers and
    students. The Purification Committees reportedly seized some
    ``excessive'' amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and
    affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to
    be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to
    strengthen the Government's power and control over the country. The
    activities of the Purification Committees continued during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The authorities tolerate some
    difference of opinion in People's Committee meetings and at the General
    People's Congress; however, in general they severely limit freedom of
    speech. This is especially true with regard to criticism of Qadhafi or
    his regime. The occasional criticism of political leaders and policies
    in the state-controlled media, which does occur is interpreted as a
    government attempt to test public opinion or weaken a government figure
    who may be a potential challenger to Qadhafi.
        The regime restricts freedom of speech in several ways: By
    prohibiting all political activities not officially approved, by
    enacting laws so vague that many forms of speech or expression may be
    interpreted as illegal, and by operating a pervasive system of
    informants (see Section 1.f.) that creates an atmosphere of mistrust at
    all levels of society.
        The State owns and controls the media. There is a state-run daily
    newspaper, Al-Shams, with a circulation of 40,000. Local Revolutionary
    Committees publish several smaller newspapers. The official news
    agency, JANA, is the designated conduit for official views. The regime
    does not permit the publication of opinions contrary to government
    policy. Such foreign publications as Newsweek, Time, the International
    Herald Tribune, L'Express, and Jeune Afrique are available, but
    authorities routinely censor them and may prohibit their entry into the
    market.
        Technology has made the Internet and satellite television widely
    available in Libya. According to numerous anecdotal reports, both are
    accessed easily in Tripoli.
        The Government restricts academic freedom. Professors and teachers
    who discuss politically sensitive topics face a risk of government
    reprisal.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Public assembly
    is permitted only with regime approval and in support of the regime's
    positions.
        Despite these restrictions, members of the Warfalla tribe staged
    several informal protests in 1995 against the regime's decision to
    carry out the death penalty against tribe members involved in the 1993
    coup attempt. The Government responded by arresting hundreds of tribe
    members and expelling others from the military and security forces. In
    January 1997, eight Warfalla tribe members arrested for involvement in
    the 1993 coup attempt were executed, and at least five others were
    given prison sentences for allegedly being American spies (see Section
    1.a.).
        The last display of public discontent and resentment towards the
    Government occurred when a riot broke out over a penalty called at a
    soccer match in Tripoli in 1996. The rare instance of public unrest
    began when a contentious goal was scored by the team that Qadhafi's
    sons supported, and the referee called the play in their favor. The
    spectators reportedly started chanting anti-Qadhafi slogans after the
    referee made the call, and Qadhafi's sons and their bodyguards opened
    fire in the air, then on the crowd. The spectators panicked and
    stampeded out of the stadium and into the streets, where they stoned
    cars and chanted more anti-Qadhafi slogans. The Government officially
    admitted that 8 persons died and 39 were injured as a result of the
    soccer riots, but there were reports of up to 50 deaths caused by the
    gunfire and the stampede of the crowd. There is speculation that this
    year's mob violence against sub-Saharan guest workers (see Sections
    1.a. and 5) reflects dissatisfaction with the Government's efforts to
    enhance ties to Africa, particularly the decisions to relax immigration
    controls on sub-Saharan workers and to funnel greater economic
    assistance to African nations.
        The Government limits the right of association; it grants such a
    right only to institutions affiliated with the regime. According to a
    1972 law, political activity found by the authorities to be treasonous
    is punishable by death. An offense may include any activity that is
    ``opposed to the principles of the Revolution.''
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of
    religion. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. In an apparent
    effort to eliminate all alternative power bases, the regime has banned
    the once powerful Sanusiyya Islamic sect. In its place, Qadhafi
    established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which is the outlet for
    state-approved religion, as well as a tool for exporting the revolution
    abroad. The ICS also is responsible for relations with other religions,
    including Christian churches in the country. In 1992 the Government
    announced that the ICS would be disbanded; however, its director still
    conducts activities, suggesting that the organization remains
    operational. Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices are at variance
    with the state-approved teaching of Islam are banned. Although most
    Islamic institutions are under state control, some mosques are endowed
    by prominent families; however, they generally follow the government-
    approved interpretation of Islam.
        According to recent reports, individuals rarely are harassed
    because of their religious practices, unless such practices are
    perceived as having a political motivation. In June 1998, at least 100
    professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities were arrested
    on suspicion of political opposition activities, specifically support
    of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an underground Islamic
    movement that is not known to have used or advocated violence. Some
    practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to avoid harassment from
    security services. Qadhafi has criticized publicly Libyan
    ``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic activists who fought
    with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet forces) as threats
    to the regime see Section 1.d.). Members of some minority religions are
    allowed to conduct services. Christian churches operate openly and are
    tolerated by the authorities. The authorities reportedly have failed to
    honor a promise made in 1970 to provide the Anglican Church with
    alternative facilities when they took the property used by the Church.
    Since 1988 Anglicans have shared a villa with other Protestant
    denominations. Christians are restricted by the lack of churches; there
    is a government limit of one church per denomination per city. There
    are two resident Catholic bishops, and a small number of priests. In
    March 1997, the Vatican established diplomatic relations with Libya,
    stating that Libya had taken steps to protect freedom of religion. The
    Vatican hoped to be able to address more adequately the needs of the
    estimated 50,000 Catholics in the country.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict
    the internal movement of citizens but has imposed blockades on those
    cities and regions (primarily in the east) where antigovernment attacks
    or movements originate. In 1996 after the escape of some 400
    prisoners--during which residents purportedly harbored escapees--the
    town of Dirnah was sealed off by government troops and also had its
    water and electricity cut off.
        The Government requires citizens to obtain exit permits for travel
    abroad and limits their access to hard currency. A woman must have her
    husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 5). Authorities
    routinely seize the passports of foreigners married to citizens upon
    their entry into the country.
        The right of return exists. The regime has called on students, many
    of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad, to
    return to Libya on little or no notice. Students studying abroad have
    been interrogated upon their return. Prior to 1994, there were reports
    that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living
    abroad (see Section 1.a.).
        The Government has expelled noncitizens arbitrarily (see Section
    6.e.). There were reports that in September the Government expelled
    hundreds of sub-Saharan workers following incidents of mob violence
    (see Section 1.a. and 5). Government authorities placed noncitizen,
    primarily sub-Saharan guest workers in hastily built camps pending
    their repatriation to their countries of origin. While there were no
    reports of mistreatment associated with these camps, sanitary
    conditions and access to health care reportedly were poor.
        In April 1998, the Government accused at least 10 Tunisians of
    suspected membership in, or support for, the Islamist group An-Nadha,
    which is banned in Tunisia for activities in opposition to the Tunisian
    Government, and forcibly returned them to Tunisia, where they
    reportedly were subjected to abuse. In 1995 the Government expelled
    approximately 1,000 Palestinian residents to indicate its displeasure
    with the signing of the Interim Agreement between Israel and the
    Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinians resorted to living
    in makeshift camps along the Egyptian border. The Government
    subsequently allowed them to return, but over 200 Palestinians elected
    to remain in the border camps, hoping to travel to the West Bank and
    Gaza or resettle in Egypt. The governments of Egypt and Israel refused
    to accept them, leaving them stranded in the deteriorating and squalid
    conditions of the once temporary border encampments. They were removed
    forcibly from their encampments to another location within the country
    by police and military authorities in April 1997.
        The Government expelled 132 Algerians in November 1997 (see Section
    6.e.).
        While the country has acceded to the 1969 Organization of African
    Unity Convention on refugees, the law does not include provisions for
    granting asylum, first asylum, or refugee status in accordance with the
    provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and the Government does not grant such
    status. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that
    by December, there were approximately 33,000 refugees in the country,
    including some 30,000 Palestinians, 3,000 Somalis, and 100 of other
    nationalities. During the year, UNHCR assisted approximately 1,000 of
    the most vulnerable refugees in the country and supported income-
    generating programs for refugee women. The Government provided housing
    for approximately 850 Somali refugees.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Major
    government decisions are controlled by Qadhafi, his close associates,
    and committees acting in his name. Political parties are banned.
    Qadhafi appoints military officers and official functionaries down to
    junior levels. Corruption and favoritism, partially based on tribal
    origin, are major problems that adversely affect government efficiency.
        In theory popular political participation is provided by the
    grassroots People's Committees, which are open to both men and women,
    and which send representatives annually to the national General
    People's Congress (GPC). In practice the GPC is a rubber stamp that
    approves all recommendations made by Qadhafi.
        Qadhafi established the Revolutionary Committees in 1977. These
    bodies consist primarily of youths who guard against political dissent.
    Some Committees have engaged in show trials of regime opponents; in
    other cases, they have been implicated in the killing of opponents
    abroad. The Committees approve all candidates in elections for the GPC.
        There is no reliable information on the representation of women and
    minorities in the Government.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government prohibits the establishment of independent human
    rights organizations. Instead it created the Libyan Arab Human Rights
    Committee in 1989. The Committee is not known to have published any
    reports.
        The regime has not responded substantively to appeals from Amnesty
    International on behalf of detainees. In 1994 the regime characterized
    Amnesty International as a tool of Western interests and dismissed its
    work as neocolonialist; its representatives last visited Libya in 1988.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors;
    however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions,
    particularly discrimination against women and tribal minorities.
        Women.--Although there is little detailed information on the extent
    of violence against women, it remains a problem. In general the
    intervention of neighbors and extended family members tends to limit
    the reporting of domestic violence. Abuse within the family rarely is
    discussed publicly, due to the value attached to privacy in society.
        The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equality.
    Despite this legal provision, traditional attitudes and practices
    prevail, and discrimination against women persists and keeps them from
    attaining the family or civil rights formally provided them. A woman
    must have her husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
        Although their status is still not equal to that of men, most
    observers agree that, with the advent of oil wealth in the 1970's, the
    opportunity for women to make notable social progress has increased.
    Oil wealth, urbanization, development plans, education programs, and
    even the impetus behind Qadhafi's revolutionary government all have
    contributed to the creation of new employment opportunities for women.
    In recent years, a growing sense of individualism in some segments of
    society, especially among the educated young, has been noted. For
    example, many educated young couples prefer to set up their own
    households, rather than move in with their parents, and view polygyny
    with scorn. Since the 1970's, educational differences between men and
    women have narrowed.
        In general the emancipation of women is a generational phenomenon:
    Urban women under the age of 35 tend to have more ``modern'' attitudes
    toward life and have discarded the traditional veil; at the same time,
    older urban women tend to be more reluctant to give up the veil or
    traditional attitudes towards family and employment. Moreover, a
    significant proportion of rural women still do not attend school and
    tend to instill in their children such traditional beliefs as women's
    subservient role in society.
        Employment gains by women also tend to be inhibited by lingering
    traditional restrictions that discourage women from playing an active
    role in the workplace and by the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist
    values. Some observers have noted that even educated women tend to lack
    self-confidence and social awareness and seek only a limited degree of
    occupational and social participation with men.
        Children.--The Government subsidizes education (which is compulsory
    to age 15) and medical care and has improved the welfare of children;
    however, declining revenues and general economic mismanagement have led
    to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Some nomadic tribes
    located in remote areas still practice female genital mutilation (FGM)
    on young girls, a procedure that is widely condemned by international
    health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
        People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the
    Government's efforts to assist the disabled.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Arabic-speaking Muslims of
    mixed Arab and Amazigh ancestry constitute 97 percent of the
    population. The principal minorities are Amazighs and blacks. There are
    frequent allegations of discrimination based on tribal status,
    particularly against Amazighs in the interior and Tuaregs in the south.
    The Government has manipulated the tribes to maintain a grip on power
    by rewarding some tribes with money and government positions and
    repressing and jailing members of various other tribes. The Government
    also has attempted to keep the tribes fractured by pitting one against
    another.
        Foreigners constitute a significant part of the workforce. Sub-
    Saharan Africans in particular have become targets of resentment, and
    in September mobs of citizens in several locations reportedly beat
    hundreds of sub-Saharan workers, attacking and, in some cases, burning
    their places of residence and employment. Credible reports indicate
    that as many as 50 individuals were killed, and hundreds of others
    injured. The mobs blamed the expatriate population for increased crime
    and the appearance of HIV in Libya. Libyan security forces were
    criticized by many African governments for their slow reaction to these
    events (see Section 5).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Independent trade unions and
    professional associations are prohibited, and workers do not have the
    right to form their own unions. The regime regards such structures as
    unacceptable ``intermediaries between the revolution and the working
    forces.'' However, workers may join the National Trade Unions'
    Federation, which was created in 1972 and is administered by the
    People's Committee system. The Government prohibits foreign workers
    from joining this organization.
        The law does not provide workers with the right to strike. In a
    1992 speech, Qadhafi affirmed that workers have the right to strike but
    added that strikes do not occur because the workers control their
    enterprises. There have been no reports of strikes for years.
        The official trade union organization plays an active role in the
    International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization
    of African Trade Union Unity. The Arab Maghreb Trade Union Federation
    suspended the membership of Libya's trade union organization in 1993.
    The suspension followed reports that Qadhafi had replaced all union
    leaders, in some cases with loyal followers without union experience.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense, because labor law
    requires that the Government must approve all agreements.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its report this
    year, the Committee of Experts of the International Labor
    Organization's (ILO) stated that in Libya ``persons expressing certain
    political views or views ideologically opposed to the established
    political, social, or economic system may be punished with penalties of
    imprisonment,'' including ``an obligation to perform labor.'' The ILO
    report also noted that public employees may be sentenced to compulsory
    labor ``as a punishment for breaches of labor discipline or for
    participation in strikes, even in services whose interruption would not
    endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of
    the population.''
        There have been credible reports that the Government arbitrarily
    has forced some foreign workers into involuntary military service or
    has coerced them into performing subversive activities against their
    own countries. Libyans, despite the Penal Code's prohibition on
    slavery, have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves,
    mainly southern Sudanese women and children, who were captured by
    Sudanese government troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see
    Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 18, although
    when Libya ratified ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age for Employment in
    1975, the minimum age specified was 15. Education is compulsory to age
    15. There is no information available on the prevalence of child labor,
    or on forced or bonded labor by children.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The labor force consists of
    approximately 1.2 million (1995 estimate) workers, including a
    significant, but unknown number of expatriate workers (in a population
    of 6 million). Wages, particularly in the public sector, frequently are
    in arrears. A public sector wage freeze imposed in 1981 remains in
    effect and has eroded real income significantly, particularly in the
    face of consistently high inflation. There is no information available
    regarding whether the average wage is sufficient to provide a worker
    and family with a decent standard of living.
        The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours. The Labor Law defines the
    rights and duties of workers, including matters of compensation,
    pension rights, minimum rest periods, and working hours.
        Although foreign workers constitute a significant percentage of the
    work force, the Labor Law does not accord equality of treatment to
    them. Foreign workers may reside in the country only for the duration
    of their work contracts and may not send more than half of their
    earnings to their families in their home countries. They are subject to
    arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and contracts, and
    have little option but to accept such changes or to depart the country.
    Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no protection.
        In 1997 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
    cited inadequate housing, threats of imprisonment to those accused of
    disobeying disciplinary rules, and accusations of causing a variety of
    societal problems as some of the problems in the Government's treatment
    of foreign laborers.
        The Government uses the threat of expulsion of foreign workers as
    leverage against countries whose foreign policies run counter to
    Libya's. The Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian
    residents in late 1995 to signal its displeasure with the agreement
    between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in 1996,
    the regime threatened to expel thousands of Palestinian workers for
    political and economic reasons (see Section 2.d.).
        Over 130 Algerians were expelled in 1997 (see Section 2.d.).
        Labor inspectors are assigned to inspect places of work for
    compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Certain
    industries, such as the petroleum sector, try to maintain standards set
    by foreign companies. There is no information on whether a worker can
    remove himself from an unhealthy or unsafe work situation without
    risking continued employment.
        In September mobs of citizens in several locations, reportedly beat
    hundreds of foreign workers from sub-Saharan African, attacking and in
    some cases burning their places of residence and employment. Many
    African governments criticized Libyan security forces for their slow
    reaction to these events (see Section 5).
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no information available
    regarding whether the law prohibits specifically trafficking in
    persons.
        There have been reports of trafficking in persons. Libyans have
    been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, mainly southern
    Sudanese women and children, who were captured by Sudanese government
    troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
                                   __________

                                    MOROCCO

        The Constitution provides for a monarchy with a Parliament and an
    independent judiciary; however, ultimate authority rests with the King,
    who presides over the Council of Ministers, appoints all members of the
    Government, and may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any
    minister, dissolve the Parliament, call for new elections, and rule by
    decree. The late King Hassan II, who ruled for 38 years, was succeeded
    by his son, King Mohammed VI, in July 1999. Since the constitutional
    reform of 1996, the bicameral legislature consists of a lower house,
    the Chamber of Representatives, which is elected through universal
    suffrage, and an upper house, the Chamber of Counselors, whose members
    are elected by various regional, local, and professional councils. The
    councils' members themselves are elected directly. The lower house of
    Parliament also may dissolve the Government through a vote of no
    confidence. In March 1998, King Hassan named a coalition government
    headed by opposition socialist leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi and
    composed largely of ministers drawn from opposition parties. Prime
    Minister Youssoufi's Government is the first government drawn primarily
    from opposition parties in decades, and also represents the first
    opportunity for a coalition of socialist, left-of-center, and
    nationalist parties to be included in the Government. The November 1997
    parliamentary elections were held amid widespread, credible reports of
    vote buying by political parties and the Government, and excessive
    government interference. The fraud and government pressure tactics led
    most independent observers to conclude that the results of the election
    were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the Government. After
    a long appeals process, some of the results were overturned by the
    Constitutional Council during the year and new by-elections were held.
    In September the Government reported that various political parties had
    engaged in vote-buying and fraud during indirect elections to replace
    one-third of the 270 seats in the Chamber of Counselors, Parliament's
    upper house. The Government criticized the electoral corruption,
    indicating that it would investigate and prosecute those concerned;
    however, few of the cases involving electoral fraud had been presented
    before the courts or prosecuted by year's end. The judiciary
    historically has been subject to bribery and government influence;
    however, the Youssoufi Government continued to implement a reform
    program to develop greater independence and impartiality.
        The security apparatus includes several overlapping police and
    paramilitary organizations. The Border Police and the National Security
    Police are departments of the Ministry of Interior, the Judicial Police
    falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and the Royal
    Gendarmerie reports to the Palace. Some members of the security forces
    continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
        The economy is based on large phosphate reserves, a diverse
    agricultural sector, fisheries, a sizable and growing tourist industry,
    a growing manufacturing sector (especially textiles), and a dynamic,
    deregulated telecommunications sector. There are considerable
    remittances from citizens working abroad. The illegal production and
    export of cannabis also is a significant economic activity,
    particularly in the north. Economic growth is highly dependent on
    agricultural output, which has been affected adversely by 2 consecutive
    years of worsening drought. According to the Government's statistics,
    the real gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by 0.7 percent in 1999. A
    similar outcome is estimated for 2000.
        The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
    most areas; however, the Government's record was generally poor in a
    few areas, and there were some notable setbacks. Citizens do not have
    the full right to change their government. While then-King Hassan II's
    appointment of a first-ever opposition coalition government in 1998
    marked a significant step toward democratization, officially recognized
    corruption and votebuying in the September Chamber of Counselors
    elections constituted a notable setback. There were reports of several
    suspicious deaths in police custody. Some members of the security
    forces occasionally tortured or otherwise abused detainees, and beat
    protesters on numerous occasions. Despite some progress by the
    Government, human rights groups continue to call for full disclosure of
    all available information concerning citizens abducted by the
    Government from the 1960's through the 1980's. Despite significant
    efforts by the Government, prison conditions remain harsh. Authorities
    sometimes arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. The judiciary
    historically has been subject to corruption and Interior Ministry
    influence; however, the Government continued to implement judicial
    reforms in order to increase the level of the judiciary's independence
    and impartiality. Nonetheless, human rights organizations and activists
    alleged a lack of due process in several high-profile court trials,
    including 2 controversial military court trials involving an air force
    captain who, after criticizing corruption in the military to a foreign
    news publication, ultimately was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for
    violating the Military Code; five Sahrawi youths who, after being
    arrested in Laayoune for throwing stones at police, were sentenced to 5
    to 10 years' imprisonment for forming a criminal association; and
    unemployed graduates who were detained during protests in Rabat in
    June. At times authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The
    Government's record on press freedom was inconsistent during the year.
    While the Government permitted extensive coverage of formerly taboo
    topics it systematically restricted press freedom on several specific
    topics that it considers sensitive, and on which journalists continue
    to practice self-censorship, including criticism of the Monarchy,
    Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam. It
    appeared that the Government also increased restrictions on both
    domestic and international media to prevent reporting on some topics
    with the potential to reflect negatively on the country's international
    image. The Government censored and banned at least 12 domestic and
    foreign publications during the year. On December 2, Prime Minister
    Youssoufi used the highly controversial and longcriticized Article 77
    of the Press Code to ban three investigative weekly newspapers. The
    Government limited freedom of assembly and association. In numerous
    incidents during the year, police beat and violently dispersed
    demonstrators. The Government limited freedom of religion. Although
    non-Muslim foreigners may practice their religions freely, missionaries
    who proselytize face expulsion, and converts from Islam to other
    religions continue to experience social ostracism. The Government
    monitors the activities of mosques. During the summer, the Government
    prevented members of an Islamist group, whose leader has questioned the
    legitimacy of the Monarchy, from gaining access to campgrounds and
    beaches for group prayer sessions, and arrested and jailed some of the
    group's members. The Government at times restricts freedom of movement
    and withholds the granting of passports for foreign travel. Domestic
    violence and discrimination against women are common. Teenage
    prostitution is a problem in urban centers. Berbers face cultural
    marginalization, and continue to press the Government to preserve their
    language and culture. Unions are subject to government interference,
    child labor also is a problem, and the Government has not acted to end
    the plight of young girls who are subjected to exploitative and abusive
    domestic servitude.
        However, there was further progress on some important human rights
    issues during the year. In February and August, the courts sentenced to
    prison terms five members of the security forces who were convicted for
    their involvement in the beating deaths of prisoners. In order to
    implement reforms enacted into law in 1999, the National Prison
    Administration initiated a series of activities to improve living
    conditions inside prisons, including the construction of family
    visitation centers, manual skills training facilities, and visits by
    various entertainers. In July the Royal Arbitration Commission that the
    King established in 1999 to indemnify former political prisoners and
    their families, released an initial grant of compensation totaling
    approximately $14 million (140 million dirhams), which benefited 68
    victims or their families; some of the grant money went to Sahrawis
    from the Western Sahara who were in need of urgent provisional
    financial and medical aid. The July compensation also supplemented an
    initial Government allotment to the commission of roughly $4 million
    (40 million dirhams) in April that went to meet the urgent medical
    needs of 39 former prisoners and their survivors. The Government
    continued to clear a backlog of unenforced legal judgments from
    previous years. In May the Government allowed Islamist dissident Sheik
    Abdessalam Yassine to leave his home after 11 years of house arrest for
    refusing to acknowledge the religious authority of then-King Hassan II.
    The Constitutional Council overturned a number of election results
    considered fraudulent from the 1997 legislative elections, as well as
    results from a by-election held in June. The King appointed the
    Monarchy's first female royal counselor in March and confirmed the
    appointment of the first female minister in September. In May the
    Government accorded ``public utility'' status, which confers
    organizations with financial benefits as recognition of their serving
    the public interest, to two of the country's leading human rights
    organizations, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and the
    Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH). In October the
    Government permitted an organization of former political detainees, as
    well as hundreds of human rights activists, to travel to and hold a
    remembrance ceremony at the notorious former secret detention center of
    Tazmamart, whose existence the authorities formerly denied. Throughout
    the year, the Human Rights Ministry held numerous human-rights-
    awareness training sessions with teachers and some police personnel,
    and the Government increased its efforts to introduce human rights as a
    core subject of the national school curriculum. In September the
    Government hosted a human rights training seminar for representatives
    of Arab governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in the
    Arab world. During her visit in April to attend an international
    conference on national human rights institutions and open a U.N.-
    sponsored human rights information center, U.N. High Commissioner for
    Human Rights Mary Robinson said that while there were still problems to
    resolve, the country had achieved ``significant progress'' in human
    rights over the past 2 years. In January the Human Rights Ministry
    announced an agreement with the Moroccan Barristers Association to open
    a network of legal support centers for victims of domestic violence.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings. According to a report in the February
    newsletter of the AMDH, Ali Akzkane died on January 4 under suspicious
    circumstances, while in police custody in the southern town of Tiznit,
    after being apprehended during an attempted robbery. In response to a
    January 13 newspaper article that called attention to the AMDH's report
    and its request for a government investigation, the Inspector General
    of the National Security Police in early March denied accusations of
    police malfeasance in the death. According to the Inspector General,
    Akzkane committed suicide in his jail cell 2 hours after being
    incarcerated, and authorities immediately notified the public
    prosecutor and regional doctor. An investigation ensued and, according
    to the Inspector General, discussions with Akzkane's family revealed
    that he had been suffering from depression. Results of the autopsy
    reportedly attributed Akzkane's death to suicide. According to the
    AMDH, it was contacted by the Government regarding the affair in
    September and told that the authorities were reviewing the case. There
    were no results in the investigation by year's end (see Section 1.c.).
        The AMDH's bureau in Taounate (outside of Fez) reported suspicious
    circumstances in the death of Mustapha Najiaji, after a Royal Armed
    Forces patrol took him and another citizen into custody at 2 a.m. on
    July 12; the press reported that security forces detained the two for
    public drunkenness and possession of illegal narcotics. According to
    the second citizen, the patrol took him and Najiaji to a ``bechouia''
    (an administrative center under the jurisdiction of the Interior
    Ministry that contains holding cells) and beat them until 3 a.m. The
    security forces subsequently freed the second citizen after Najiaji
    fell down, lost consciousness, and stopped breathing. According to the
    AMDH report, at 4 a.m. the security forces at the bechouia notified the
    public prosecutor that they had found Najiaji dead in his cell from a
    suicide by hanging. The second citizen reportedly alleged in his
    testimony to the public prosecutor that Najiaji died from beatings at
    the hands of the security forces. According to the AMDH, the prosecutor
    general of Fez orally transmitted the autopsy results to Najiaji's
    family, and the family's lawyer reportedly had access to the results;
    the results reportedly made reference to Najiaji having been the victim
    of violence before his death. The AMDH expressed concern over the slow
    handling of the case, which reportedly was pending with the general
    prosecutor at the military court in Rabat at year's end. The Royal
    Armed Forces patrol members involved in the case were not yet charged
    by year's end (see Section 1.c.).
        On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to
    break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern
    city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one
    worker and injuries to eight others. Conflicting reports attributed the
    death to either police abuse or ``natural causes'' (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.d., 2.b., and 6.a.).
        In their annual human rights report for 1999, which was released in
    late January, the AMDH called on the Government ``to resolve
    definitively and urgently the issue of deaths inside and outside police
    stations and posts of the Gendarmerie.''
        A police officer and two members of the Interior Ministry's
    auxiliary forces were arrested in connection with the beating death of
    Farah Mohammed near Oujda in August 1999. The public prosecutor at
    Oudja's court of appeal subsequently ordered an investigation. Farah
    Mohammed was stopped by police authorities for questioning in
    connection with contraband trafficking of fuel across the Moroccan
    border with Algeria. Eyewitnesses said that the police beat and kicked
    him into unconsciousness at the time he was detained. He died in police
    custody. Farah Mohammed's parents lodged an immediate complaint with
    gendarmerie authorities as soon as they learned of their son's death,
    which led to the immediate arrest of the police and military auxiliary
    officers allegedly involved in the beating. The trial in the case still
    reportedly was pending at year's end.
        In August an appeals court in Settat (south of Casablanca)
    convicted an auxiliary member of the security forces to 12 years'
    imprisonment and a fine of approximately $6,000 (60,000 dirhams) for
    the beating death of mint vendor Abdelaziz Warret in June 1999. Two
    other auxiliary members of the security forces involved in the beating
    death were sentenced to 4 months in prison. According to press reports
    in June 1999, police in Berrechid arrested Warret, confiscated his
    merchandise, and beat him until he fainted. He died later at a
    hospital. When his family went to claim the body and to obtain a death
    certificate, doctors refused to issue one. No explanation was given for
    his arrest. An autopsy subsequently performed during the investigation
    into Warret's death revealed that he died from internal hemorrhaging
    caused by the beating.
        In February a court in Tangiers convicted two police officers of
    manslaughter in the 1996 beating death of a citizen returning from
    Holland. According to reports of witnesses, port police stopped Mohamed
    El-Feddaoui in Tangiers as he disembarked from a car ferry in his
    automobile. The witnesses claim that El-Feddaoui subsequently was taken
    to the police station and tortured to death by two police officers. The
    two officers reportedly had been instructed by the port's police
    commissioner to detain and torture Feddaoui. Both of the police
    officers received 10 years' imprisonment for violence resulting in
    manslaughter. The court sentenced the port police commissioner to 8
    years' imprisonment for abusive detention and denial of his complicity
    in the crime. The court also ordered all three to pay approximately
    $35,000 (350,000 dirhams) each to Feddaoui's estate. According to press
    reports, the AMDH principally was responsible for furnishing testimony
    in the case (see Section 1.c.).
        In September the court of appeal in Safi (south of Casablanca)
    resumed a long-delayed case and summoned three police officers charged
    with manslaughter in the 1996 death of Hassan Mernissi. According to
    Mernissi's family, he was killed by the three police officers while in
    incommunicado (``garde-a-vue'') detention in Safi's central police
    station. Police reportedly had stopped Mernissi for drunkenness.
    According to a lawyer representing Mernissi's family, witnesses present
    in the police station at the time alleged that Mernissi was beaten to
    death while in detention. The police officers maintained that the
    allegedly drunk Mernissi knocked his head against the bars of his cell
    until he died. The autopsy indicated that Mernissi bled to death.
    Before the case was heard by court of appeal in Safi in early 1999, it
    remained in the pretrial investigation stage for over 2 years. In
    consideration of the Ramadan holiday, in December the trial was
    postponed again until March 2001.
        Human rights groups allege that poor medical care in prisons
    results in unnecessary deaths; however, the Justice Ministry in 1999
    assigned more doctors to prisons in an effort to improve prison health
    facilities. However, resource constraints continue to contribute to
    harsh conditions, including extreme overcrowding, malnutrition, and
    lack of hygiene. Throughout the year, the National Prison
    Administration continued to allow numerous site visits by members of
    Parliament, the press, human rights groups, and foreign diplomats (see
    Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no new cases of confirmed
    disappearance for the fifth consecutive year; however, the AMDH claimed
    during the year that the continued practice of incommunicado detention
    without informing the family members of those detained (see Section
    1.d.) was evidence of the continued practice of forced disappearance.
    While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the
    Government and its policies occurred over several decades, the
    Youssoufi Government, upon taking office, pledged that such policies
    would not recur, and that it would disclose as much information as
    possible on past cases. Many of those who disappeared were members of
    the military who were implicated in attempts to overthrow the
    Government in 1971 and 1972. Others were Sahrawis or Moroccans who
    challenged the Government's claim to the Western Sahara or other
    government policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret
    detention camps. While the Government in recent years quietly released
    several hundred persons who had disappeared, including a release of
    about 300 such detainees in June 1991, and although in October 1998 it
    issued an announcement on those who disappeared, to this day hundreds
    of Saharan and Moroccan families do not have any information about
    their missing relatives, many of whom disappeared over 20 years ago. No
    explanation for their incarceration has ever been provided. Local human
    rights monitors have concluded that many others died while at the
    notorious Tazmamart prison, which the Government since has closed. The
    Government has acknowledged 34 of these deaths and has provided death
    certificates to the families of all but 1 of the 34 who died.
        In October 1998, in response to a directive issued by then-King
    Hassan II that all human rights cases be resolved ``within 6 months,''
    the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) announced the
    release of information on 112 cases of disappearances. According to the
    Council, 56 of the 112 who disappeared were deceased; family members of
    33 of the deceased received death certificates from the Government. The
    Council added that eight persons believed to have disappeared were
    alive and living abroad, and that four were alive and in Morocco. Of
    the remaining 44, the Council stated that it had no further
    information. Human rights groups and families pointed out discrepancies
    between their lists and those of the Government, asked the Government
    for more data regarding these cases, and demanded full explanations of
    the causes and circumstances of these deaths and disclosure of the
    identities of those responsible. Some family groups claim that the
    Government is not divulging details on at least 50 more cases. In
    November 1998, the Council began meetings in various provinces with
    groups representing families of persons who had disappeared in order to
    collect data on their grievances and to conduct further research into
    the fate of those who remain missing. In April 1999, the Council
    announced that it would indemnify the 112 victims of politically
    motivated disappearances. Human rights NGO's disputed the Council's
    findings, claiming that they had compiled a list of over 600 potential
    cases of such disappearances from the 1960's through the 1980's. The
    NGO's called for the immediate release of all remaining political
    prisoners, disclosure of the fate of those whose cases the Council did
    not examine, delivery of the remains of the deceased to their families,
    compensation for victims and their families, and punishment for those
    responsible. On July 17, the Paris-based International Federation of
    Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) published a communique in which it
    estimated the number of persons who had disappeared in Morocco alone to
    be ``between nearly 600 and several thousand.'' The FIDH claimed that
    disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number up to
    1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented full confirmation
    of this figure. In October the Government for the first time permitted
    an organization of former political detainees, as well as hundreds of
    human rights activists, to travel to and hold a remembrance ceremony at
    the notorious former secret detention center at Tazmamart, whose
    existence the authorities formerly denied (see Section 2.a.).
        In August 1999, in one of his first official acts, King Mohammed VI
    established a new royal commission responsible for increasing the
    Government's efforts to resolve the issue of those who had disappeared
    and to reach an accommodation with former political prisoners and
    members of their families. The new commission met with some family
    members and local human rights organizations and began to draw up
    guidelines for the resolution of issues involving individuals who had
    disappeared.
        Following up on the CCDH's December 1999 announcement to distribute
    advance partial compensation to the neediest victims of forced
    disappearance and arbitrary detention, Prime Minister Youssoufi
    declared before Parliament in January that his government would
    compensate financially the most urgent cases first. Youssoufi's
    announcement came after the passing of the Government's January 1
    deadline for receipt of compensation claims from former detainees and
    their survivors by the Royal Arbitration Commission working under the
    auspices of the CCDH. The number of claims filed totaled approximately
    5,900. Human rights organizations contested the nature of the
    compensation process, particularly the composition of the Arbitration
    Commission, which they claimed lacked independence; the lack of
    transparency in the commission's decision-making processes; and the
    condition imposed by the commission that those filing claims must
    accept the commission's findings as final, without appeal. In April the
    CCDH announced the Government's allocation of a provisional
    compensation fund totaling approximately $4 million (40 million
    dirhams), as well as initial provisional compensation for 31 of the
    neediest former prisoners who had been held in the notorious Tazmamart
    prison, and 8 of the prisoners' surviving family members. Each prisoner
    or surviving family member received up to approximately $14,500
    (145,000 dirhams), a sum designed to cover urgent medical and financial
    expenses caused by extended imprisonment. In July the Royal Arbitration
    Commission announced final compensation settlements for 68 cases
    (benefiting 354 persons, including some of those provisionally
    compensated in April) that totaled approximately $14 million (140
    million dirhams). Former prisoners or their survivors were designated
    to receive between $25,000 and $350,000 (250,000 and 3,500,000
    dirhams). In July the Arbitration Commission began distributing
    preliminary compensation payments to some of the Sahrawis from the
    Western Sahara who had disappeared or been detained, and their family
    members. As with the April allotment, the Government stated that it
    intended these initial payments as provisional compensation to cover
    urgent medical and financial expenses for needy Sahrawis or their
    surviving family members who appealed for compensation from the
    Commission by December 31, 1999. The Government announced that
    additional compensation in the form of final settlements could be
    distributed pending the review by the Commission of petitions submitted
    by Sahrawi claimants. Critics of the arbitration process continued to
    criticize the Commission, claiming that its composition lacked
    independence and that the Commission's stipulation that all of its
    decisions were final was unfair. Numerous former prisoners and their
    survivors refused to file a claim. Others criticized the small number
    of cases settled, citing that over 5,800 cases remained. In the absence
    of disclosure by the Government explaining its role in past
    disappearances, the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice (FMVE--created
    by victims of forced disappearance and their surviving family members)
    continued to argue that the compensation process alone was inadequate
    to redress past government actions; it requested the Government to go
    beyond compensation to facilitate conciliation between citizens and the
    Government through publicized investigations into disappearances and
    arbitrary detentions. After the July compensation settlement was
    announced, the OMDH issued a communique calling for more transparency
    during the arbitration process. According to the OMDH, ``the fact of
    not communicating these measures at the opportune time, even though the
    measures were limited, helped sow ambiguity and misinformation, which
    the issue could have done without.'' In speeches given in July and
    December, King Mohammed VI addressed criticisms of the compensation
    process by announcing imminent reform of the CCDH. According to the
    King, the CCDH's composition, responsibilities, and work structure
    would be changed. None of the King's proposed changes had been
    implemented by year's end.
        There were no developments in the disappearance of Abdullah
    Sherrouq, a student who reportedly was detained by security services on
    June 22, 1981. After 19 years, his family has been unable to learn
    anything of his whereabouts or his fate, despite appeals by Amnesty
    International (AI). In 1998 the CCDH listed Sherrouq as 1 of the 112
    cases of disappearance acknowledged by the Government; according to the
    council, Sherrouq disappeared in undetermined circumstances; he was 1
    of the 44 for whom the Government said it possessed no further
    information.
        Associations that seek information on those who have disappeared,
    including the FMVE, an executive coordinating committee of former
    Sahrawi political prisoners, and a group specifically representing
    Tazmamart prison survivors, operate openly, and call upon the
    Government for full disclosure of events surrounding cases that date
    back to the 1960's. Several front-page articles in newspapers
    affiliated with parties in the governing coalition called at various
    times during the year for full disclosure on all outstanding cases of
    disappearance. The associations also call for compensation to families
    of those who have disappeared, death certificates and the return of the
    remains of those who died, and prosecution of responsible officials.
    The Government has indicated that it would be more open about providing
    information on these past cases, and met with the FMVE on a number of
    occasions during the year to discuss its concerns. Throughout the year,
    FMVE leaders also met with the CCDH and leaders of national political
    parties. However, according to press reports in August, the FMVE's
    leadership claimed that political parties were hesitant to help them
    address the problem of past disappearances. Associations in the Western
    Sahara that seek information on disappearances do not operate free from
    government interference; there were reports that some members of these
    associations were harassed and intimidated while seeking information on
    missing Sahrawis. Some also continue to be denied passports (see
    Section 2.d.).
        Until July the Government paid a monthly stipend of $500 (5,000
    dirhams) to 28 former prisoners who survived 18 to 20 years in solitary
    confinement under harsh conditions at Tazmamart prison in connection
    with the coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. After their release, the
    Government prohibited them from speaking out publicly about their
    detention. In exchange the Government gave the former prisoners
    assurances that it would help them find jobs and reintegrate them into
    society; however, none of them has obtained government assistance in
    this regard, and some complain of being denied voter cards and
    passports. After the final compensation settlement package from the
    Royal Arbitration Commission to the 31 former Tazmamart prisoners in
    July, the authorities ceased distributing the monthly stipends to the
    28 who had been kept in solitary confinement.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and the Government claims that
    the use of torture has been discontinued; however, some members of the
    security forces still torture or otherwise abuse detainees. The Penal
    Code requires capital punishment for perpetrators who commit acts of
    torture or ``acts of barbarity,'' provided that such acts occur during
    the commission of a crime. The Penal Code also stipulates sentences up
    to life imprisonment for public servants who ``use or oblige the use of
    violence'' against others in the exercise of their functions. By law,
    pretrial investigating judges must, if asked to do so or if they
    themselves notice physical marks that so warrant, refer the detained
    person to an expert doctor. However, according to legal experts, this
    obligation often is ignored in practice.
        In February the AMDH reported the death under suspicious
    circumstances of Ali Akzkane while he was in police custody in Tiznit
    on January 4 after being apprehended during an attempted robbery. In
    response to the AMDH's request for a government investigation, the
    National Security Police denied accusations of malfeasance in Akzkane's
    death, and attributed his death to suicide likely brought on by
    depression. Results of an autopsy reportedly attributed Akzkane's death
    to suicide. According to the AMDH, which was contacted by the
    Government regarding the affair in September, the authorities were
    reviewing the case at year's end (see Section 1.a).
        In April a Moroccan court in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune
    sentenced five Sahrawi youths to prison terms of between 5 and 10 years
    for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their alleged
    participation in a March 4 stone-throwing in the same city. One of the
    lawyers representing the five Sahrawis alleged that the judicial police
    who investigated the affair committed several illegal acts, including
    torturing the youths during their detention (see Sections 1.d., 1.e.,
    and 1.f.).
        After his release from prison on May 4 after a royal pardon, Sadok
    El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the Istiqlal party's
    General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), contacted the AMDH with
    accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, tortured,
    and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999 following his
    participation in a national truckers strike. El-Kihal alleged that
    security forces in the Gendarmerie of Taouriate (Oujda province)
    tortured him for almost 24 hours, suspending him by his arms for
    extended periods while beating his fingers and feet. El-Kihal also
    alleged to AMDH that members of the Gendarmerie tied his hands behind
    his back, bent him backward on his knees, and applied pressure to his
    stomach while somebody forced their fingers down his throat. El-Kihal
    alleged that two adjutants in the Gendarmerie participated in his
    torture. El-Kihal said that his jailers wrote a false police report,
    which they forced him to endorse with his thumbprint without first
    allowing him to read it. El-Kihal alleged that it was this police
    report that formed the basis of his conviction at the Oujda court of
    appeals, which sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. The Istiqlal
    party's Arabic-language daily, Al-Alam, published a UGTM communique on
    September 30, 1999, regarding El-Kihal's treatment. El-Kihal
    subsequently benefited from a royal pardon and was freed on May 4 (see
    Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 6.a.).
        In June a foreign diplomat met with a Sahrawi student, who claimed
    to have been tortured by the authorities for suspected participation in
    May 17 to 18 demonstrations near the Marrakech University campus. There
    were conflicting accounts regarding the origins of the large-scale
    demonstrations, during which mostly Sahrawi students clashed with
    dozens of Marrakech police in violent exchanges that involved the
    throwing of a Molotov cocktail by one student and the clubbing of
    students by security forces. During the detention, police allegedly
    attempted to force the student to inform on other Sahrawi students who
    had participated in the demonstrations. During the meeting, the student
    showed the foreign diplomat fresh burn marks that the police allegedly
    inflicted with cigarettes (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e).
        On May 17 in Rabat, police arrested 14 students at Mohammed V
    University and charged them with arson, violence against the police,
    erecting barricades, and impeding free movement. The students, 12 of
    whom were Sahrawis, participated earlier in the day in a solidarity
    protest with fellow Sahrawi students who were arrested the same morning
    in Marrakech. According to a lawyer representing 13 of the accused
    students, one of his clients claimed that police took him to an
    unidentified location after his arrest, beat him severely, and
    interrogated him regarding his activities and links with other Sahrawis
    and human rights activists. Indicating his client's difficulty in
    speaking in court, as well as his swollen face and eyes, the lawyer
    requested the pretrial investigating judge to conduct a medical
    examination of his client, which the judge refused. After a series of
    hearings and delays, on November 17, the Rabat court of appeals
    acquitted and freed all 14 students who were detained in mid-May.
    According to a lawyer for the defense, all of the detained students
    denied before the court any involvement in the demonstration. The
    prosecution reportedly failed to produce any witnesses who could
    confirm the students' participation in the May 17 incident (see Section
    1.e.).
        The AMDH's bureau in Taounate (outside of Fez) reported suspicious
    circumstances in the death of Mustapha Najiaji after a Royal Armed
    Forces patrol reportedly took him and another citizen into custody on
    July 12; press reports stated that security forces detained the two for
    public drunkenness and possession of illicit narcotics. According to
    the AMDH report, the second citizen claimed that the patrol beat
    Najiaji to death while the security forces claim that they found
    Najiaji dead in his cell from suicide by hanging. The AMDH reported
    that the prosecutor general of Fez orally transmitted the autopsy
    results to Najiaji's family and that the family's lawyer had access to
    the results; the results reportedly made reference to Najiaji having
    been the victim of violence before his death. The AMDH expressed
    concern over the slow handling of the case; it reportedly was pending
    with the general prosecutor at the military court in Rabat at year's
    end, and the Royal Armed Forces patrol members have yet to be charged
    (see Section 1.a.).
        In August the media reported a case of alleged torture by police in
    a Casablanca police station. Abderrahmane Jamali alleged that police
    officers in the Ain Sebaa-Hay Al-Hassani station tortured him for 3
    days while he was detained in early August, once in the presence of a
    citizen who had filed a complaint against him. Press reports alleged
    that the incident began in late July when the plaintiff twice filed a
    complaint against Jamali for abuse of confidence and theft. After the
    prosecutor dismissed the first complaint for lack of proof, the
    plaintiff requested a reopening and more thorough investigation of the
    case. Press reports alleged that Jamali subsequently was detained,
    tortured for 3 days, and then convicted and sentenced by a Casablanca
    court to 5 months' imprisonment several days later. Jamali reportedly
    fainted during the sentencing hearing. Jamali became ill within days of
    his incarceration and, after his family sent a letter to the prison
    director requesting the director's intervention, was sent to various
    medical facilities. At Averroes hospital, doctors on August 11 detected
    an infection allegedly transmitted by parasites found on rodents.
    According to the Party of Progress and Socialism's French-language
    daily newspaper Al-Bayane, doctors also found signs of ``physical
    cruelty'' on Jamali's body. The marks reportedly included contusions
    and bruises on his neck and knees, as well as a lesion on one of his
    lungs. A doctor at Averroes wrote a letter to Al-Bayane claiming that
    the infection Jamali contracted ``does not explain all of the signs
    that we observed during (his) clinical examination.'' Afterwards,
    Jamali filed complaints against three agents of the judicial police for
    torture; the Casablanca police department issued a communique on August
    18 stating that it had opened an investigation into the charges of
    torture. Some newspapers called for an investigation into the court of
    first instance's handling of the case because the judge and prosecutor
    allegedly failed to inquire into the detainee's fragile state of
    health, as required by law.
        In September the media reported on two cases of alleged torture by
    a deputy officer from the Royal Gendarmerie brigade in Zaio, in the
    northeastern part of the country. According to the reports, the officer
    tortured two persons in order to extort money from their family and
    friends. In one of the cases, a cafe owner alleged that in September
    the officer slapped him in front of his customers, used force to remove
    him from his establishment, and subjected him to various forms of
    torture at brigade headquarters. In the second case, an elderly woman
    brought suit against the same officer for torturing her son and
    extorting approximately $500 (5,000 dirhams) from her to stop the
    torture. After he was informed of the cases, Zaio's municipal president
    (who also is a Member of Parliament) reportedly referred the cases
    immediately to the national authorities. An investigation into the
    alleged torture was ongoing at year's end.
        At the October 27 trial of 10 students at the University of Hassan
    I in Settat, each of the students reportedly declared before the Settat
    court of first instance that they were forced under duress and torture
    to sign (by thumb prints) their police statements. According to a
    communique from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) political
    party, two of its members who were involved in the incident ``were
    victims of grave physical cruelty'' during their transfer to the police
    station and during their detention (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
        The OMDH filed a complaint on behalf of some of those who were
    detained and abused by the police at the end of September 1999,
    following several days of protests over a variety of social grievances
    in Laayoune in the Western Sahara (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and
    2.b.). There was photographic and other evidence to substantiate claims
    that the police systematically had beaten some of the persons they had
    detained in connection with the protests. An investigation was opened
    into the charges; however, after almost 15 months no police officials
    have been charged in connection with the force used to break up the
    protests, nor for the beatings inflicted on some of those detained by
    the police. (Some police officials allegedly responsible subsequently
    were transferred in 1999 and the chief of police in Laayoune was
    relieved of his duties there.)
        In its 2000 annual international human rights report released in
    June, Amnesty International acknowledged that security forces involved
    in several cases of torture had been arrested and prosecuted. However,
    the organization noted that ``in the majority of cases, investigations
    were either not opened into complaints and allegations of torture ...
    or were opened but dismissed without adequate investigation.''
        Frustrated by what it perceived to be the Interior Ministry's slow
    implementation of measures to ensure a more humane Government with
    greater transparency, which were urged by King Mohammed VI in 1999, the
    OMDH in February publicized a memorandum it sent to Interior Minister
    Ahmed Midaoui in January calling for a dialog between Midaoui's
    ministry and human rights organizations. The OMDH appealed to the
    Interior Minister to implement a series of proposed measures, including
    measures reinforcing individual protections against torture through the
    full implementation of the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
    Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, destroying police files
    on former political prisoners or exiles, and ending illegal punitive
    detention measures by local authorities.
        In 1999 the OMDH published a special newspaper in which it called
    on the Government to implement legislation that would criminalize the
    use of torture and would control the conditions under which detainees
    are kept in garde-a-vue detention and in prisons. The OMDH claimed that
    most cases of torture submitted to the justice system involved
    incidents that occurred in front of witnesses or in public areas.
    According to the OMDH, torture in detention largely continues to escape
    the notice of the judiciary. The OMDH noted that the implementation of
    judges' instructions on eliminating the use of torture has been
    ``exceedingly slow.'' While the OMDH admitted that the use of torture
    has diminished over the years, it claimed that it has not disappeared.
    The OMDH alleged in its report that those who commit such abuses ``do
    so with impunity in almost all cases.'' The NGO called on the
    Government to harmonize domestic law with its responsibilities under
    the U.N. Convention Against Torture, to ensure full independence for
    the judiciary, and to punish those who resort to torture.
        In February Human Rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar announced plans
    by the newly formed NGO Association for the Rehabilitation of Torture
    Victims (ARVT) to open a rehabilitation center in Casablanca designed
    to assist former torture victims in overcoming torture-related trauma.
    At an inaugural event, Prime Minister Youssoufi said that the center
    constituted a new milestone in the consolidation of the rule of law.
        Also in February, Mohammed Kholti, a retired secret police officer
    who tortured political dissidents during the 1970's and 1980's publicly
    asked for forgiveness in a letter sent to two national newspapers,
    which published his plea. Kholti's act marked the first time that a
    former member of the security forces had admitted to past use of
    torture.
        In April Reuter's news services reported the lifting of a 13year
    ban on a book that described harsh conditions in a high security
    prison. According to author Abdelkader Chaoui, his book, ``The
    Unachieved Past,'' had been banned since its publication in 1987. The
    book describes the harsh conditions in the Kenitra prison, in which the
    author was held for 15 years. Chaoui was jailed in 1974 because of his
    leftist political opinions and leadership role in a Marxist-Leninist
    organization. In November in Marrakesh, King Mohammed awarded Chaoui a
    literary prize for his most recent novel (see Section 2.a.).
        In May the Government permitted the local publication and sale of a
    comic book called ``They Even Starve Rats.'' Written and illustrated by
    Abdelaziz Mouride, a leftist student whom the authorities arbitrarily
    detained in 1974, sentenced to 22 years in prison, and then freed in
    1984, the comic book recounts in vivid detail the torture, injustice,
    and humiliation that the author and other political dissidents suffered
    at the hands of the authorities. Using the third person to narrate his
    experience, Mouride depicts the manner in which the authorities
    kidnaped dissidents, tortured them in secret detention centers, staged
    sham trials, and then incarcerated them in remote prisons, where some
    lost their sanity or died. Mouride secretly was able to send out
    drawings of his ordeals with visiting friends and relatives. Mouride
    said that human rights organizations played the principal role in
    securing his freedom in 1984 (see Section 2.a.).
        Also in May, a delegation from the International Center for the
    Rehabilitation of Torture Victims visited the country to discuss the
    Government's compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The
    delegation told Human Rights Minister Aujjar that it sought to hold its
    next world congress in Morocco.
        In an October 23 ``Open Letter to the Minister of Justice'' that it
    distributed to domestic as well as international media, the AMDH for
    the first time published a list containing 14 names of alleged former
    torturers and officials involved in disappearances and arbitrary
    detention. The first domestic newspaper to republish the list was Le
    Journal. Some of the listed names were high-ranking officials currently
    holding office, including the head of the Royal Gendarmerie and secret
    services. Former Interior Minister Driss Basri's name also was included
    in the list. In the letter, the AMDH called for ``the truth and pursuit
    of those responsible for disappearances.'' The AMDH also criticized the
    Justice Ministry for its alleged nonintervention in past cases of
    torture and disappearance (see Section 2.a.).
        In 1998 the Ministry of Justice and the prison administration
    implemented a law that makes autopsies routine for any death that
    occurs in detention, in order to allow allegations of torture to be
    evaluated. The autopsies take place at the request of the family, human
    rights NGO's, or the state prosecutor, and at the order of a judge.
    Autopsies were used to prove allegations of abuse in at least two cases
    during the year.
        In incidents throughout the year, police continued to use force to
    disperse several demonstrations by unemployed university graduates
    associated with the National Association of Unemployed Graduates (known
    by its French acronym, ANDC), an organization not recognized by the
    Government, and ``Group 314'' (a separate organization of unemployed
    state doctoral graduates of medicine and engineering), and other groups
    to a lesser extent. In numerous incidents throughout the country during
    the year, police beat demonstrators with batons in order to disperse
    them (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). On February 2, in the village
    of Tarmilet, security forces used force, including rubber bullets, tear
    gas, and water cannons, to remove striking workers who had blockaded a
    water-bottling factory to protest lay-offs (see Sections 1.d., 1.f.,
    2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.). On June 18 in Rabat, security forces again
    resorted to force, using batons and tear gas to disperse ANDC
    demonstrators and to remove Group 314 hunger strikers from the local
    headquarters of an independent national union (see Sections 1.d., 1.e.,
    and 2.b.). On July 26 and again on September 12, police violently
    dispersed disabled, unemployed university graduates who were protesting
    the denial of their right to employment (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and
    5). On October 8 in Casablanca, police dispersed with tear gas 2,000 to
    3,000 Islamists who were protesting the Israeli Government's actions
    against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall
    (see Section 2.b.). On October 23, security forces used violent means
    to break up a demonstration by students who were preparing to begin a
    march to protest transportation problems at Hassan I University in
    Settat (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). There were reports in the fall of
    violent clashes at university campuses around the county between
    security forces and JCO students engaged in student elections (see
    Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). On November 27, security forces reportedly
    used violent means to break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning
    factory in the southern city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted
    in the death of one worker and injuries to eight others (see Sections
    1.a., 1.d., 2.b., and 6.a.). During the weekend of December 9 to 11,
    security forces throughout the country used violent means to disperse
    human rights activists, members of the JCO, and unemployed graduates
    who separately gathered in Rabat and other large cities to demonstrate
    for different reasons (see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
        In February a Tangiers court convicted two police officers of
    manslaughter in the 1996 beating death of Mohamed El-Feddaoui at the
    port of Tangiers, when the El-Feddaoui was returning from Holland. Both
    police officers received 10-year jail terms for violence resulting in
    manslaughter. The port police commissioner was sentenced to 8 years'
    imprisonment for abusive detention and denial of complicity in the
    crime (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions remain harsh; however, they have improved in
    recent years, due in part to reforms undertaken at the suggestion of
    the CCDH and the Minister of Justice, and to more transparency in the
    functioning of the National Prison Administration. In August 1999, the
    Government enacted new legislation designed to reform the prison
    system. The new legislation replaced a royal decree that had governed
    the prison system since 1915. Among the reforms in the legislation were
    provisions mandating compensation for work performed by prisoners.
    Prisoners with ``good conduct'' records also were accorded the right to
    a furlough to visit family members during important holiday periods.
    The new legislation outlawed the use of handcuffs, manacles, or other
    devices used for physical restraint, except as required to restrain
    violent prisoners and then only after consultation with prison medical
    authorities. Procedures were established to allow the prisons to be
    inspected by the press and human rights organizations, and members of
    both the press and human rights organizations visited prisons after the
    procedures were established. Visitors must receive authorization from
    the Director of the Prison Administration to conduct prison visits.
    Special provisions also accorded women the right to keep their children
    with them in prison until the children reach the age of 2 or longer
    with special permission from the Ministry of Justice. The new law
    contained provisions that extended the function of the prison system
    beyond that of punishment and incarceration to include rehabilitation
    and preparation for a return to society.
        Nonetheless, credible reports indicate that harsh treatment and
    conditions continue, often as a result of chronic overcrowding. Despite
    being designed to hold 4,000 inmates, Oukacha Central Prison in
    Casablanca currently holds more than 7,000 prisoners. Human rights
    groups allege that poor medical care in prisons results in unnecessary
    deaths. To address this problem, the Government provided special funds
    in the 1998-99 budget for the renovation of prison facilities, and
    added doctors and health facilities to prisons. In addition to extreme
    overcrowding, malnutrition and lack of hygiene continue to aggravate
    the poor health conditions inside prisons (see Section 1.a.).
        Press reports during the year called attention to the extremely
    harsh conditions inside the detention center of Ain Atiq outside of
    Rabat. While Ain Atiq's status as a detention or social center is not
    defined clearly, it often receives homeless, vagrant, and mentally
    disabled persons, in addition to juvenile delinquents. Negligence at
    Ain Atiq reportedly has led to serious problems, such as hygienic and
    nutritional deficiencies, and harsh general living conditions. The
    center also is reportedly underequipped and understaffed to provide
    adequate medical care. The AMDH reportedly is planning a study of the
    center in the hopes of encouraging improvements. During the year, the
    authorities used Ain Atiq to detain various demonstrators picked up
    during protests. In June, July, and September security forces forcibly
    dispersed unemployed, disabled protesters in downtown Rabat and
    reportedly took them to Ain Atiq, where some allegedly remained for
    over a month (see Sections 2.b. and 5). In the past, human rights
    organizations have called for Ain Atiq's closure, as well as of other
    similar centers.
        Some press reports during the year also raised the problem of drug
    trafficking and sexual abuse in prisons among inmates. The presence of
    cannabis is widely recognized as a problem, as is sexual abuse of
    inmates. In May prisoners in the Touchka prison at Errachidia allegedly
    rioted to protest against, among other problems, sexual abuse among
    inmates. Press reports during the year also raised the issue of some
    prisoners being allowed to pay for the right to occupy their own cells.
        In the first visit of its kind, Members of Parliament visited Sale
    prison in February 1999 to investigate prison conditions and
    allegations of overcrowding. Their visit followed that of the 2M
    television station, which broadcast an exclusive report on prisons in
    January 1999.
        Although the Government generally did not permit prison visits by
    human rights monitors in the past, since the tenure of the Youssoufi
    Government began there has been close collaboration between the Justice
    Ministry, the National Prison Administration, and human rights groups
    on prison visits, which now are authorized explicitly by law.
    Throughout the year, the National Prison Administration continued to
    allow numerous site visits by Parliament, the press, human rights
    groups, and foreign diplomats. The National Observatory of Moroccan
    Prisons (ONPM) made over 15 visits during the year, taking extensive
    notes of the numerous problems facing the prison system and recounting
    these in the press. In addition to noting the harsh conditions caused
    by chronic overcrowding (some estimates place the current inmate
    population at as high as 52,000), the ONPM recommended that some of the
    existing deteriorated penitentiaries dating from the 1920's be replaced
    or renovated. According to Mohamed Lididi, the Administrator of the
    National Prison Administration, 20 smaller prisons currently are being
    built to supplement and replace some of the existing 43.
        In addition to permitting an increasing number of visits, the
    National Prison Administration initiated a series of activities to
    improve living conditions inside prisons, including the construction of
    family visitation centers, manualskills training facilities, and prison
    visits by various entertainers. Early in the year, the civilian prison
    in El-Jadida (near Casablanca) was expanded, with the addition of a
    professional training center and a family meeting area. The training
    center provides courses and vocational studies to inmates interested in
    preparing themselves for post-prison employment. The family area allows
    inmates to meet directly with their family members, and is equipped
    with chairs, tables, and a small cafe. Telephone booths also were
    installed for use by inmates. The improvements at El-Jadida were
    duplicated inside other prisons, with the Prison Administration
    devoting more resources to improving living conditions and inmate
    rehabilitation. The ONPM received permission to organize an evening
    music and dance program for female inmates in Oukacha prison in
    Casablanca. In Sale prison near Rabat, the British Embassy and the
    Prison Administration sponsored a musical performance by African
    students. Several similar performances and cultural seminars occurred
    at other prisons.
        In November at Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane, the Justice
    Ministry hosted, in coordination with the Rabat-based organization
    British Council and the London-based Penal Reform International, an
    international seminar on reforming the prison system. The seminar was
    attended by eminent international jurists and focused on identifying
    constructive alternatives to incarceration. The director of the
    penitentiary system participated in the seminar, speaking on the
    evolution of the country's penal system. The new NGO the Moroccan
    Prison Observatory participated as well.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Police continued to use
    arbitrary arrest and detention. Although legal provisions for due
    process have been revised extensively in recent years, reports indicate
    that authorities sometimes ignore them. Although police usually make
    arrests in public and during the day, they do not always identify
    themselves and do not always obtain warrants. Garde-a-vue detention is
    limited to 48 hours, with one 24-hour extension allowed at the
    prosecutor's discretion. In state security cases, the garde-a-vue
    period is 96 hours; this also may be extended by the prosecutor. It is
    during this initial period, when defendants are denied access to
    counsel, that the accused is interrogated and abuse or torture is most
    likely to occur. Some members of the security forces, long accustomed
    to indefinite precharge access to detainees, continue to resist the new
    rules.
        Under 1991 changes to the law, the police are obliged to notify a
    person's next of kin of an arrest as soon as possible. However, lawyers
    are not always informed promptly of the date of arrest, and thus are
    not always able to monitor compliance with the garde-a-vue detention
    limits. While the law provides for a limited system of bail, it rarely
    is granted. However, defendants sometimes are released on their own
    recognizance. The law does not provide for habeas corpus or its
    equivalent. Under a separate code of military justice, military
    authorities may detain members of the military without warrants or
    public trial.
        Although accused persons generally are brought to trial within an
    initial period of 2 months, prosecutors may request up to five
    additional 2-month extensions of pretrial detention. Thus, an accused
    person may be kept in detention for up to 1 year.
        During their February 2 operation to halt a strike at a
    waterbottling factory in the village of Tarmilet (48 miles from the
    capital), security forces reportedly arrested more than a dozen factory
    workers, as well as random passersby. According to sources in the
    Government, the workers and passersby later were released without
    charges. The Democratic Confederation of Workers trade union, which is
    aligned politically with the ruling USFP party, reported that security
    forces also detained two of its regional delegates 2 weeks following
    the February 2 incident. According to government sources, the two
    officials were freed by royal pardon on May 1 (Moroccan Labor Day)
    while an investigation into the incident was still underway (see
    Sections 1.c., 1.f., 2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.).
        In April a Moroccan court in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune
    sentenced five Sahrawi youths to prison terms of between 5 and 10 years
    for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their alleged
    participation in a March 4 stone-throwing incident in the city. One of
    the lawyers who represented the five Sahrawis alleged that the judicial
    police who investigated the affair committed several illegal acts,
    including unlawfully entering the homes of the youths and detaining
    them, torturing them during their detention, and forcing the youths to
    sign under duress police reports, which they were not allowed to read
    and which they claimed contained falsehoods. The decision was appealed
    to the court of appeals in Laayoune and was reportedly before the
    Supreme Court in Rabat at year's end (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and
    1.f.).
        On May 3, members of the ANDC and other unemployed persons in
    Meknes staged a sit-in before a local police station to protest the
    situation of the unemployed and alleged favoritism in local government
    hiring practices. According to press reports, city officials called in
    security forces, who used force to disperse the protesters. Twenty-
    eight protesters were arrested and sent before the court of first
    instance on May 4. The court, without explanation, adjourned a morning
    hearing and sent the 28 back to the police station; the protesters were
    summoned to the court again in the afternoon, then released without
    charge (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In a May 17 communique, the OMDH
    criticized the Government's use of violence against unemployed
    graduates in various cities throughout the country, including at the
    Meknes sit-in.
        On May 26, the court of first instance in Marrakech sentenced 13
    students to 3 years in prison for their alleged participation in
    demonstrations on May 17-18 near the Marrakech University campus. The
    13, 8 of whom were Sahrawis, were convicted on charges of armed
    gathering, assault with weapons, contempt of public servants exercising
    their duties, destruction of public goods, and impeding free movement.
    Two others were sentenced to 2 months in prison, and in June one more
    student was sentenced to 5 years in prison for setting fire to a public
    vehicle, damaging municipal property, and contempt of a civil servant
    exercising his duty. Thirty to 40 students reportedly were detained
    initially by police.
        Conflicting stories exist as to the origins of the large-scale
    demonstrations, in which large numbers of Marrakech police resorted to
    force to disperse dozens of mostly Sahrawi students, one of whom threw
    a Molotov cocktail that destroyed a police car. One of the detained
    students claimed to have been tortured by the authorities for suspected
    participation in the demonstrations, and displayed fresh cigarette
    burns to a foreign diplomat to support the allegations (see Sections
    1.c., 1.e., and 2.b.).
        On June 13, police arrested two regional leaders of the independent
    Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT) outside the UMT's Rabat headquarters.
    Police arrested the leaders on the UMT's premises following a
    demonstration downtown by thousands of unemployed graduates associated
    with the ANDC (a group unaffiliated with the UMT, although some of its
    members also belong to the UMT). After security forces violently
    dispersed the ANDC demonstration and arrested 28 of the protesters,
    many ANDC members returned to the UMT's headquarters to regroup.
    Security forces then arrived, encircled the building, and restricted
    access to it. When the two UMT leaders left their union's building to
    observe the situation, they were taken away by police and reportedly
    held overnight. Both of the leaders later were released without charge.
    All 28 ANDC protesters who were arrested downtown earlier in the day
    later were released without charge.
        On June 18 in Rabat, security forces resorted to force, using
    truncheons and tear gas to disperse ANDC demonstrators and Group 314
    hunger strikers from the UMT's Rabat headquarters. Security forces
    reportedly arrested up to 100 protesters. Dozens of protesters were
    reported injured, some seriously. Twenty-two of those arrested were
    charged with ``using violence against agents of authority''; 19
    received suspended sentences and 3 received 2 months' imprisonment.
    Prime Minister Youssoufi convened an interministerial meeting on June
    19 to address the violence and condition of the unemployed population.
    Justice Minister Azziman then met with some members of the ANDC, which
    still is unrecognized by the Government. On July 5, the Group 314
    hunger strikers ended their 28-day strike after a meeting with the
    Government, in which both sides pledged to engage in a substantive
    dialog (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
        In early October, over the period of several days, the Government
    accused of espionage, detained, and held under house arrest three
    French television journalists from France's FR3 television station, who
    were reporting on a human rights demonstration at the notorious former
    secret detention center of Tazmamart (see Section 2.a.).
        There were confirmed reports that police arrested 21 strikers
    involved in a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in Agadir on
    November 27. All but one of the strikers later was released. Security
    forces reportedly used violent means to break up the strike, which
    reportedly resulted in the death of one worker and injuries to eight
    others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.b., and 6.e.).
        From December 9 to 11, security forces violently attacked human
    rights activists, JCO members, and unemployed graduates, who had been
    demonstrating in Rabat and other large cities for different reasons,
    and detained hundreds of persons. Most demonstrators were released
    shortly thereafter (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
        Sadok El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the
    Istiqlal party's union, the UGTM, contacted the AMDH during the year
    with accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed,
    tortured, and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999, following
    his participation in a national truckers strike (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.e., and 6.a.).
        In December 1999, Moroccan security forces who reportedly were sent
    from Rabat, detained one Sahrawi in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune
    and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan and Agadir.
    Alleged to be spies for the Polisario, the three reportedly were held 8
    days before their appearance in an Agadir court and before their
    families were informed of their detention. Family members and the AMDH
    criticized the nature of the arrests, claiming them to be a violation
    of human rights and due process, and proof that forced disappearances
    still occur in the country. In a public trial abruptly convened on May
    30 after a lengthy and largely unpublicized police investigation, the
    three were convicted of threatening the internal security of the State
    and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison. In an appeals hearing on July
    5, all three were sentenced to 4 years in prison (see Section 1.e.). On
    September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained a fourth
    Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a flight. In
    August the Sahrawi was charged before the court of first instance in
    Agadir for spying for the Polisario Front and sentenced to 4 years in
    prison for threatening the internal security of the state (see Section
    1.e.).
        After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
    religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
    Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16.
    Yassine's release came after a May 10 statement by Interior Minister
    Midaoui before Parliament that Yassine ``leaves and returns to his
    residence as he likes.'' Minister Midaoui also stated that Yassine was
    free to take his case to court if he felt that his rights were being
    abused. In February four members of Yassine's Justice and Charity
    Organization were arrested for distributing a defiant memorandum from
    Yassine to King Mohammed VI. All four were charged with ``violating the
    sacred institution of the Monarchy''; however, authorities later
    dropped the charges and released all four (see sections 2.a., 2.c., and
    2.d.).
        There are no known instances of forced exile. After King Mohammed
    VI took the throne in July 1999, formerly exiled political dissident
    Abraham Serfaty was allowed to return to the country in September of
    that year. Serfaty, a member of the (now defunct) Communist Party and a
    supporter of Western Saharan independence, was expelled from the
    country in 1991 after having spent 17 years as a political prisoner. In
    September Serfaty, a mining engineer by profession, was appointed by
    King Mohammed VI as counselor to the newly established office
    responsible for developing recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves in
    the eastern part of the country.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; although the courts historically have been and
    remain to some extent subject to extrajudicial pressures, including
    bribery and government influence, the Government continued to implement
    reforms intended to increase judicial independence and impartiality
    during the year. Despite such efforts, the Government was criticized by
    the Denmark-based Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), the
    OMDH, and other groups for the slow pace of judicial reform. In January
    the Prime Minister announced plans to create an independent ombudsman
    that would investigate citizens' complaints and protect them from
    abuses involving the judiciary. The press reported in November, and the
    Ministry of Human Rights asserted, that the preparation of implementing
    legislation for the ombudsman post was nearing completion. According to
    press reports, in February Justice Minister Azziman reacted to
    accusations about the slow pace of reforms by calling upon the
    assistance of Supreme Court justices to increase and quicken the
    investigation of judges suspected of professional malfeasance. In March
    Azziman, through the High Council of the Magistrature, which often has
    been criticized by human rights organizations for the nontransparent
    nature of its deliberations, promoted a large number of judges whose
    records were considered exemplary, and disciplined a smaller number of
    judges. In November on public television Azziman reaffirmed the
    Government's commitment to reforming the judiciary. In 1998 Azziman had
    stated that judicial reform was his top priority, and addressed the
    issue of corruption by disbarring and disciplining a number of judges.
    With the encouragement of then-King Hassan II and the broad support of
    the business community, the Justice Minister in 1999 oversaw the
    creation of a system of commercial courts for business litigation to
    boost investor confidence. In the same year, the Ministry of Justice
    began to implement a 5-year reform plan that emphasized transparency,
    accountability, and professionalism as top priorities. During the past
    2 years, the administrative courts frequently have ruled against local
    governments that exceeded their authority.
        There are four levels in the common law court system: Communal and
    district courts, courts of first instance, the Appeals Court, and the
    Supreme Court. While in theory there is a single court system under the
    Ministry of Justice, other courts also operate, including: The Special
    Court of Justice, which handles cases of civil servants who are
    implicated in corruption; administrative courts, which deal with the
    decisions of the bureaucracy; commercial courts, which deal with
    business disputes; and the military tribunal, for cases involving
    military personnel and, on certain occasions, matters pertaining to
    state security (although state security cases also may fall within the
    jurisdiction of the regular court system).
        Although there is a single court system for most nonmilitary
    matters, family issues such as marriage, divorce, child support and
    custody, and inheritance are adjudicated by judges trained in Shari'a
    (Islamic law) as applied in the country. Judges considering criminal
    cases or cases in nonfamily areas of civil law generally are trained in
    the French legal tradition. All judges trained in recent years are
    graduates of the National Institute for Judicial Studies, where they
    undergo 3 years of study heavily focused on human rights and the rule
    of law. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to become a judge, and the
    majority of judges are not lawyers.
        In general detainees are arraigned before a court of first
    instance. If the infraction is minor and not contested, the judge may
    order the defendant released or impose a light sentence. If an
    investigation is required, the judge may release defendants on their
    own recognizance. According to reliable sources, cases often are
    adjudicated on the basis of confessions, some of which are obtained
    under duress.
        While appeal courts may in some cases be used as a second reference
    for courts of first instance, they primarily handle cases involving
    crimes punishable by 5 years or more in prison. In practice, defendants
    before appeals courts who are implicated in such crimes consequently
    have no method of appeal if a judgment goes against them. The Supreme
    Court does not review and rule on cases sent to it by courts of appeal;
    in its role as a court of cassation, the Supreme Court may overturn an
    appellate court's ruling on procedural grounds alone. The absence of
    appeals for defendants in such crimes therefore becomes more
    problematic given the fact that an investigation into the case by a
    ``juge d'instruction'' (pretrial investigating judge) is only mandatory
    in those crimes punishable by sentences of life imprisonment or death.
        Justice Minister Azziman has stated that he would attempt to end
    petty corruption in the judiciary by increasing judges' salaries and
    ensuring punishment for bribe-takers, as well as attempt to end all
    informal and inappropriate influences on judicial decision-making in
    the court system. Nonetheless, the court system remains subject to
    extrajudicial pressures. Despite recent increases, salaries for both
    judges and their staffs remain modest; as a result, some observers
    allege that petty bribery remains a routine cost of court business. In
    some courts, especially in minor criminal cases, some observers allege
    that defendants or their families must pay bribes to court officers and
    judges to secure a favorable disposition.
        However, throughout the year, the national media reported on a
    number of arrests, convictions, and sentences of judicial officials for
    their role in petty corruption. Reports also indicated that the Special
    Court of Justice, despite its resource constraints, increasingly
    prosecuted public servants for corruption. In October at the
    recommendation of the Justice Ministry, the King approved new internal
    statutory regulations for the High Council of the Magistrature.
    According to press reports, the new regulations were implemented to
    strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
        After his appointment in 1997 by then-King Hassan II, Justice
    Minister Azziman began to reduce the judiciary's relationship with the
    Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, judges continue to work closely
    with the Interior Ministry's local network of officials, or ``caids''
    (although as judicial police, caids technically fall under the
    jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry), who often legally are charged
    with the responsibility of questioning criminal defendants. Caids
    frequently prepare the written summary of an arrest and subsequent
    interrogation. The summary is admissible in court as an element of the
    evidentiary process and can carry great weight with the judge. After
    the new Justice Minister's appointment, the Ministry of Justice began
    to reassert its authority and control over judges.
        The law does not distinguish political and security cases from
    common criminal cases. In serious state security cases, communications
    between the Ministry of Interior and the court are more direct. At the
    Government's discretion, such cases may be brought before a specially
    constituted military tribunal, which is subservient to other branches
    of the Government, especially the military and the Ministry of
    Interior.
        Aside from external pressures, the court system also is subject to
    resource constraints. Consequently, criminal defendants charged with
    less-serious offenses often receive only a cursory hearing, with judges
    relying on police reports to render decisions. Although the Government
    provides an attorney at public expense for serious crimes (when the
    offense carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years), appointed
    attorneys often provide inadequate representation.
        In 1999 Minister Azziman announced that in the preceding 12 months
    the judicial system had enforced judgments in 60,000 out of 100,000
    cases of civil litigation, which represented significant progress
    toward eliminating a persistent backlog. The Justice Ministry continued
    to make progress clearing this backlog during the year.
        In 1998 the OMDH issued a report that assessed the status of the
    judiciary. According to the OMDH, the Youssoufi administration took a
    series of steps to improve the court system, including rooting out
    high-level corruption, naming a new Director for Judicial
    Administration at the Justice Ministry, reactivating a Justice Ministry
    disciplinary body, publishing that body's deliberations and decisions,
    and organizing free and fair elections to that body. Nevertheless, the
    OMDH called for additional reforms, including changing laws to reduce
    the Justice Minister's prerogative to suspend judges through the High
    Council of the Magsitrature, revamping the Criminal Code (which the
    OMDH stated offers insufficient protection for a fair trial),
    strengthening the law on civil liberties, and compelling judges to
    place their assets in a blind trust. The OMDH also called on the State
    to punish those officials guilty of human rights abuses. Finally, the
    OMDH noted the lack of resources necessary for documentation tracking
    and for court facilities. At its fourth annual congress held in March,
    during which it distributed its annual human rights report for 2000,
    the OMDH called for the elimination of ``courts of exception''
    (military tribunals, the Special Court of Justice, and the High Court),
    for the strengthening of judges' independence, and greater resources
    for the Justice Ministry.
        During the year, the courts handled an increasing number of cases
    that involved sensitive human rights issues, most of which were covered
    openly and extensively by national and international media. Trial
    subjects included freedom of the press, alleged Polisario Front
    espionage, and Sahrawi student demonstrations in the capital and
    Marrakech. Defense attorneys involved in these cases, most of whom were
    prominent human rights activists and members of the AMDH and OMDH,
    generally agreed that the majority of the judicial processes pertaining
    to the cases were marked by significant irregularities, and that these
    irregularities infringed on the rights to a fair trial for the accused.
        Mustapha Adib, a young air force captain, was incarcerated in
    December 1999 and tried before a military court for allegedly violating
    the Military Code and libeling the military. The authorities detained
    Adib after he spoke out against military corruption and harassment to a
    journalist from the French newspaper Le Monde. On February 17, a
    military court convicted Adib after 4 days of proceedings during which
    the judge rejected nearly every legal motion advanced by the defense.
    The court denied the defense's requests that the court make the trial
    public, allow the defense to summon more than a dozen defense witnesses
    and present documentary evidence, and recuse one of the military
    judges, who was a former superior of Adib's. The judge whom the defense
    asked to be recused allegedly was responsible for blocking Adib's
    promotions after Adib made the allegations of corruption in a 1998
    letter to then-Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed (now King Mohammed VI).
        The military tribunal sentenced Adib to the maximum prison term of
    5 years and expelled him from the air force. Human rights activists
    criticized the unfair nature of the trial; the OMDH issued a report on
    February 21 contending that closed trials unjustly influenced the
    results and accused the court of partiality in refusing to recuse
    Adib's former superior. After deciding on a ``silent defense'' to
    protest the military court's conduct of the case, the attorney
    representing Adib characterized the trial as a ``travesty of justice.''
    Following an appeal on procedural grounds lodged by Adib's attorney
    immediately following the end of the trial, and after Adib staged a 5-
    day hunger strike in early May, the Supreme Court in June announced
    that it would review the case. On June 14, the Supreme Court overruled
    the military court and announced that the case would be retried by a
    new military tribunal composed of different judges. Adib's defense team
    called the decision a ``historic judgment.''
        A newly constituted military court in Rabat retried Adib's case in
    early October. After 3 days of hearings, during which the court again
    refused to hear witnesses requested by the defense and rejected
    multiple other defense motions, the military court found Adib guilty of
    the charges initially brought against him. The court reduced Adib's
    sentence to 2.5 years in prison and upheld his expulsion from the
    military. Adib's lawyer criticized the verdict as ``neither just nor
    equitable,'' and said that he would appeal the new verdict. On
    September 28, before the retrial began, the international NGO
    Transparency International recognized Captain Adib with one of its
    Integrity Awards for his courage in fighting corruption, which Adib's
    lawyer accepted for him in Canada. In early November, Amnesty
    International identified Adib as a ``prisoner of conscience.''
        On April 5, a Moroccan civil court in the Western Sahara city of
    Laayoune sentenced five Sahrawi youth to prison terms of between 5 and
    10 years for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their
    alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing event in Laayoune,
    which reliable sources say was spontaneous, unorganized, and lasted for
    only 5 minutes. The demonstration followed similar protests by Sahrawi
    students in several southern Moroccan and Western Sahara cities at the
    end of February and early March that security forces dispersed
    violently (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.b.).
        Attendees at the trial, including human rights activists and an
    attorney for the five defendants criticized the handling of the trial,
    particularly the court's refusal to hear witnesses for the defense who
    allegedly could have testified that at least two of the five defendants
    had been elsewhere at the time of the incident. In addition to the
    police reports, the court allegedly based its judgment on the testimony
    of two witnesses, one of whom reportedly could not positively identify
    the accused, and another who was not present at the trial, but who
    claimed that he saw in his rear view mirror a youth throwing a bottle
    at his car. The prosecution reportedly did not present any physical
    evidence, nor did it present any witness who could testify that the
    five accused were the ones who had thrown the bottle. The authorities
    claimed that the youths threw rocks at several vehicles, including one
    belonging to peacekeepers from the U.N. MINURSO contingent based in
    Laayoune, and attempted to set fire to a truck. However, the youth were
    acquitted of the arson charge during the trial.
        A lawyer for the youths, who maintained the prosecution did not
    prove an incriminating act, said that ``the verdict had nothing to do
    with justice.'' The lawyer also alleged that the judicial police
    investigating the affair committed several illegal acts by unlawfully
    entering homes of the accused and detaining them, torturing the accused
    during their detention, and forcing the accused under duress to sign
    police reports, which they were not allowed to read and which they
    claimed contained falsehoods. The decision was appealed to the court of
    appeals in Laayoune and then reportedly to the Supreme Court in Rabat;
    no final ruling had been made by year's end. Families of the five
    Sahrawi youth also sent a letter to the Royal Palace in May requesting
    a royal pardon (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
        On May 26, the court of first instance in Marrakech sentenced 13
    students to 3 years in prison for their alleged participation in a riot
    on May 17 and 18 near their university campus. The 13 students, 8 of
    whom were Sahrawis, were convicted on charges of armed gathering,
    assault with weapons, contempt of public servants while exercising
    their duties, destruction of public goods, and impeding free movement.
    Two others were sentenced to 2 months, and in June one more student was
    sentenced to 5 years for setting fire to a public vehicle, damaging
    municipal property, and contempt of a civil servant exercising his
    duty. Thirty to 40 students reportedly were detained by police
    initially. According to one of the lawyers representing the students,
    judicial authorities showed little concern for the need to respect due
    process throughout the investigation of the events and the trial. There
    were no arrest warrants and no evidence was presented against any of
    those charged except the police statement of facts, which none of the
    defendants had signed (all had been forced to provide their thumbprint
    on the statement in lieu of a signature). The lawyers were not allowed
    to present evidence in court that could have exonerated their clients.
    For example, one of those convicted claimed that he had not been in
    Marrakech during the events. He was not allowed to present the
    testimony of friends in another city with whom he said he had been
    visiting.
        Students involved in the demonstrations and press reports claimed
    that after an initial encounter between students and police, both the
    police and students called in reinforcements to their respective sides.
    A sit-in of roughly 60 students (not all Sahrawis) in the public street
    in front of their residence then was held, which police reportedly
    broke up by force after negotiations failed. When another sit-in was
    organized, the police again forcibly dispersed students and arrested
    several dozen (not all Sahrawis). Lawyers for the 13 defendants
    appealed the court's conviction of their clients. According to Sahrawis
    and Sahrawi defense lawyers in Rabat, an appellate court in Marrakesh
    at the end of the summer upheld the original conviction. However, the
    court reduced all of the 3-year sentences by 1 year each. Among those
    detained by the police was a young Sahrawi student who claimed to have
    been tortured by two police officers in an isolated area near the
    university campus. The Sahrawi displayed fresh marks from cigarette
    burns to a foreign diplomat to support the allegations (see Sections
    1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
        During the late evening of May 17 in Rabat, police arrested 14
    students at Mohammed V University and charged them with arson, violence
    against the police, erecting barricades, and impeding free movement.
    The students, 12 of whom were Sahrawis, had participated earlier in the
    evening in a solidarity protest for fellow Sahrawi students who had
    been arrested that morning in Marrakech. The detained students
    reportedly admitted to staging two sit-ins in solidarity with their
    peers in Marrakech, but denied, as alleged by the authorities, any use
    of force or violence against the police who arrested them. The police
    contended that the students refused to disperse, then threw rocks at
    them and their vehicles. According to students, near midnight the same
    evening, police squads returned to the university, entered it, set up
    checkpoints, detained students without identity cards, and broke into
    dormitories in search of those who participated in the sit-ins earlier
    in the day.
        According to a lawyer who represented 13 of the accused students,
    one of his clients said that police took him to an unidentified
    location after his arrest, beat him severely, and interrogated him
    regarding his activities and links with other Sahrawi and human rights
    activists. Noting his client's difficulty in speaking in court and
    drawing attention to his swollen face and eyes, the lawyer requested
    the pretrial investigating judge to conduct a medical examination of
    his client, which the judge refused. According to the lawyer, after
    their arrest, the students were held incommunicado longer than the
    legal limit of 48 hours, and nobody was informed of their whereabouts
    during this time, as required by law. At preliminary legal proceedings
    on May 22 at the Rabat court of appeals, all 14 of the accused
    reportedly denied violent acts during the demonstration; however, in
    three of the police reports submitted to the court, three of the
    accused allegedly had admitted to violent acts. None of the depositions
    by the accused were signed; all were marked only by the defendants'
    thumbprints. After a series of hearings and delays, on November 17, the
    Rabat court of appeals acquitted and freed all 14 students who were
    detained in mid-May. According to a lawyer for the defense, all of the
    detained students denied before the court any involvement in the
    demonstration. The prosecution reportedly failed to produce any
    witnesses who could confirm the students' participation in the May 17
    incident (see Section 1.c.).
        On October 27, 10 students at the University of Hassan I in Settat
    were tried for their involvement in the October 23 demonstrations that
    police broke up violently (see Section 2.b.). Each of the 10 students
    reportedly declared before the court that they were forced under duress
    and torture to sign (by thumb prints) their police statements.
    According to a PPS political party communique, two of its members
    involved in the incident ``were victims of grave physical cruelty''
    during their transfer to the police station and during their detention.
    The defendants' lawyers unsuccessfully requested that the case be
    dropped on the grounds that the judicial police had not, as mandated by
    law, notified family members of the students' arrest. The court
    reportedly also refused the defense's request to have the students
    examined by a doctor, as is permissible by law if signs of physical
    distress are visible. At the end of the day-long trial, the Settat
    court of first instance found all 10 students guilty of the charges and
    sentenced them to from 3 to 5 months in prison (three were given
    suspended sentences). Following an appeal lodged by defense lawyers, on
    November 9, the Settat court of appeal reduced the sentences of the
    seven students sent to prison, reducing four of them from 5 to 3 months
    and three of them from 3 to 2 months.
        In an abruptly convened trial, 14 students who had been arrested
    during violent clashes between students and police at Mohammedia
    University on November 21 were convicted of disturbance of public order
    and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $50 to
    $150 (500 to 1,500 dirhams). The alleged victims of the students'
    vandalism did not appear at the trial to testify or be cross-examined
    (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        The Government pressed charges against 33 human rights activists
    who were involved in a protest before Parliament on December 9: the
    trial was scheduled for February 2001 (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a.,
    2.b., and 4).
        In December 1999, Moroccan security forces that reportedly were
    dispatched from Rabat detained one Sahrawi in the Western Sahara city
    of Laayoune and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan
    and Agadir. Alleged to be spies serving the Polisario Front, the three
    reportedly were held for 8 days before their appearance in an Agadir
    court and before their families were informed of their detention.
    Family members and the AMDH denounced the nature of the arrests,
    calling them a violation of human rights, due process, and proof that
    forced disappearances still occurred in Morocco. In a public trial
    convened on May 30 after a lengthy and largely unpublicized police
    investigation that was originally to be heard by a military tribunal,
    the three were convicted of threatening the internal security of the
    state and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison by Agadir's court of
    first instance. During an appellate hearing on July 5, at the request
    of the public prosecutor all three were given the same sentence of 4
    years. The abrupt convening of the public trial at the end of May also
    coincided with the decision of judicial authorities to change the
    jurisdiction of the case from the court of appeals to the court of
    first instance. (The court of first instance deals with lesser crimes
    punishable by sentences of 5 years and less; the court of appeals with
    serious crimes involving sentences of 5 years and more.) According to a
    lawyer representing the Sahrawis, during the trial the three accused
    denied any relations with the Polisario Front, contradicting
    confessions allegedly made during their detention (see Sections 1.b.
    and 1.d.). On September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained
    a fourth Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a
    flight to the Canary Islands. According to the Sahrawi's daughter, who
    witnessed the incident, two members of the security forces drove away
    with her father in a car with Casablanca license plates. Almost 10 days
    later, the Sahrawi reappeared in Agadir and also was charged before the
    court of first instance for spying for the Polisario Front. Two days
    later, the fourth Sahrawi was sentenced to 4 years in prison for
    threatening the internal security of the state.
        Sadok El-Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the
    Istiqlal party's union, the UGTM, contacted AMDH during the year with
    accusations that he had been arrested arbitrarily, jailed, tortured,
    and falsely convicted by authorities in June 1999 following his
    participation in a national truckers strike. Arrested and jailed on
    charges of forming a criminal gang and setting fire to a vehicle, El-
    Kihal alleged that security forces in the Gendarmerie of Taouriate
    (Oujda province) tortured him and wrote a false police report that they
    forced him to endorse with his thumbprint without allowing him to read
    it first. ElKihal contests that it was this police report that formed
    the basis of his conviction at the Oujda court of appeals, which
    sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. El-Kihal subsequently benefited
    from a royal pardon and was freed on May 4 (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
    and 6.a.).
        During the evening of June 18, up to 100 members of the security
    forces attacked the UMT headquarters in Rabat, where 12 Group 314
    members were in the 11th day of a hunger strike. Using tear gas and
    batons, security forces violently cleared all demonstrators from the
    area, arresting up to 100 protesters and evacuating the hunger
    strikers, who had been forced out by tear gas. Dozens of protesters
    were reported injured, some seriously. Twenty-two of those arrested,
    most of whom were ANDC members, were charged with ``using violence
    against agents of authority.'' During their trial in July, 30 lawyers
    representing the 22 defendants withdrew after the tribunal refused
    their--and allegedly the prosecution's--request to summon witnesses. In
    a press conference following their withdrawal, the lawyers said
    ``necessary conditions for a fair trial were absent.'' One lawyer
    defending the ANDC members said that there were multiple procedural
    errors in the conduct of the judicial investigation and the trial. The
    lawyer also claimed that all of the police statements regarding the
    defendants contained falsehoods, and that none of them had been signed.
    After the lawyers withdrew, the defendants refused to participate in
    the trial. The tribunal subsequently closed the proceedings to the
    public and proceeded to sentence all 22 defendants. Nineteen of the
    defendants received 2-month suspended sentences and $50 (500 dirhams)
    fines and three were sentenced to 2 months in prison and $50 (500
    dirhams) fines (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
        During and following public demonstrations in the Western Sahara
    city of Laayoune in September 1999, more than 150 persons were detained
    by police authorities. Most were released within a matter of days;
    however, 26 persons were tried on criminal charges for actions in
    connection with the protests and sentenced to imprisonment for periods
    ranging from 10 to 15 years. The OMDH claimed that the trial of these
    persons was unfair and insisted that the defendants were not provided
    adequate legal counsel for their defense. By year's end, none of the 26
    persons convicted in 1999 had their sentences reduced or overturned
    (see Sections 1.f. and 2.b.).
        The Government continued to hold a number of political prisoners.
    According to the AMDH and OMDH, seven political prisoners remained in
    detention at year's end. In January King Mohammed VI pardoned 2,000
    prisoners, 1 of whom was Arsalan Samouzi, a political prisoner who was
    sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for insulting the royal family
    during the reign of King Hassan II. The official Moroccan press agency,
    MAP, quoted the Justice Minister as saying in a July 23 television
    interview that there are no more political prisoners in detention. In
    the past, the Ministry of Interior claimed that there were 55 Islamists
    serving sentences for offenses that ranged from arms smuggling in the
    1980's to participating in a bomb attack on a hotel in Marrakech in
    1994. In the past, there also were claims that some of these Islamists
    were imprisoned solely for calling for an Islamic state during the
    1980's. The AMDH claims that 2 members of the ``Group of 26,'' an
    Islamist group involved in smuggling arms into the country from Algeria
    in the mid-1980's, remain in prison. The other 24 members completed
    their sentences or otherwise were released at various times between
    1994 and the end of the year. Various international human rights
    groups' estimates of the number of persons in prison for advocating
    independence for the Western Sahara vary from none to 700. Amnesty
    International lists dozens of persons whom it considers to be political
    prisoners. According to several human rights organizations, achieving
    consensus on a definitively accurate number of political prisoners is
    extremely difficult, mainly because conditions in the Western Sahara
    complicate attempts to confirm whether Sahrawis were imprisoned solely
    for their political affiliation or open advocacy of Western Saharan
    independence, or whether they were imprisoned for other actions in
    violation of the law. The AMDH claims that it knows of no persons
    imprisoned for having overtly advocating Western Saharan independence.
        Although the Government claims that it no longer holds political
    prisoners, it permits international humanitarian organizations to visit
    prisoners whom such organizations consider to be imprisoned for
    political reasons.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the home is inviolable
    and that no search or investigation may take place without a search
    warrant, and the law stipulates that a search warrant may be issued by
    a prosecutor on good cause; however, authorities sometimes ignore these
    provisions. Security forces allegedly entered homes in pursuit of
    persons associated with a strike at a water-bottling factory in
    February (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., 2.d., and 6.a.). One of the
    lawyers representing five Sahrawi youths who were sentenced to jail
    terms for their alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing
    incident in Laayoune, alleged that the judicial police who investigated
    the affair committed several illegal acts, including unlawfully
    entering homes of the youths (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
        During protests in Laayoune in the Western Sahara in September and
    October 1999, police reportedly encouraged local thugs to break into,
    loot, and destroy private shops. Following the protests in October
    1999, police unlawfully entered homes to arrest persons associated with
    the demonstrations. Human rights NGO's claimed that such police actions
    created a ``climate of fear'' in the city, forcing some families to
    flee the city or change residences nightly to avoid such police
    actions. There reportedly was no official investigation into such
    government actions by year's end (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and
    2.a.).
        Government security services monitor certain persons and
    organizations, both foreign and Moroccan, and government informers
    monitor activities on university campuses.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression; however, the Government systematically
    restricted press freedom regarding a few topics that the Government
    considers sensitive, and appeared to increase restrictions on some
    other topics with the potential to reflect negatively on the country's
    international image. Nonetheless, newspapers and weeklies from across
    the political spectrum, from Socialist to nationalist to Islamist,
    publish freely, and the Government permitted extensive coverage during
    the year of formerly taboo topics.
        The Government owns the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press
    (MAP), and the Arabic daily Al-Anbaa. The Government also supports two
    semiofficial dailies, the French-language Le Matin and the Arabic-
    language Assahra. In addition the Government provides subsidies to the
    rest of the press through price supports for newsprint and office
    space. A 1958 decree grants the Government the authority to register
    and license domestic newspapers and journals. Authorities may use the
    licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that they
    believe cross the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending
    publications may be declared a danger to state security and seized, the
    publisher's license suspended, and equipment destroyed. The Ministry of
    Interior may control foreign publications by collecting ``banned''
    publications after they have been distributed. There were multiple
    reports that authorities pressured domestic-based printers not to print
    several newspapers, including two belonging to the JCO. In addition,
    the administrators of the new weekly publication Demain alleged in
    April that the authorities attempted to block the printing of their
    publication because of its investigative editorial line. According to
    Demain's administrators, the alleged attempt to influence the
    magazine's editorial line led them to move the weekly's printing
    operations to Spain. The media continue to engage regularly in self-
    censorship to avoid the Government's attention and possible sanctions.
        The Press Code empowers the Minister of Interior to confiscate
    publications that are judged offensive by the Government. Under the
    code, the Prime Minister may order the indefinite suspension of a
    publication. The Press Code also empowers the Government to censor
    newspapers directly by ordering them not to report on specific items or
    events. In most past instances, government control of the media
    generally has been exercised through directives and ``guidance'' from
    the Ministry of Interior. However, during the year, the Government
    fined several journalists for articles that they had published, and
    sentenced one to prison. The King subsequently pardoned the journalist
    who was sentenced to prison, and the fines issued against the other
    journalists allegedly later were dropped. The Government generally
    tolerates satirical and often stinging editorials in the opposition
    parties' dailies. However, both law and tradition historically have
    prohibited criticism on three topics: The Monarchy, Morocco's claim to
    the Western Sahara, and the sanctity of Islam.
        There were approximately 2,000 domestic and foreign newspapers,
    magazines, and journals in circulation during the year.
        Prior to Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine's release after 11 years of
    house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the religious authority of
    then-King Hassan II, the Government on February 5 temporarily
    confiscated from newsstands in major cities several newspapers that
    contained a 19-page memorandum addressed by Yassine in late January to
    King Mohammed VI, in which Yassine asked the King to return to the
    populace the wealth that he alleged that the King's late father had
    stolen from the country. However, the Government permitted the three
    publications to be put back on the newsstands the same day. On February
    8 and 9, then-Communication Minister Larbi Messari declared that the
    memorandum was not banned, that it was available on the Internet, and
    that the concerned newspapers were back in circulation. Messari
    reportedly said that the confiscation was ``incidental,'' and that
    censorship was absurd and no longer practiced in the country. Four
    members of the JCO were arrested in February for distributing the
    memorandum in Tangiers and Ben Slimane (near Casablanca). All four were
    charged with ``violating the sacred institution of the Monarchy.''
    According to the AMDH, by February 7 the authorities had dropped the
    charges and released all four (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 2.d.).
        The Government banned the distribution of the February 15-21
    edition of the Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent weekly magazine. The weekly
    contained a letter by a Moroccan political scientist living abroad,
    which criticized the reign of King Hassan II and challenged King
    Mohammed VI to devote greater effort to much-needed reforms. According
    to press reports, civilian authorities from a Casablanca commisariat
    asked the national distributor of Jeune Afrique in Morocco not to
    distribute the issue. In the main editorial column in the subsequent
    edition of Jeune Afrique, the editors stated that they interpreted the
    commissariat's request as a ban and decided to withdraw its 8,000
    copies from Morocco rather than wait for its local distributor to
    receive the written prohibition order it had requested from the
    authorities; the distributor reportedly never received the order. On
    February 16, Communication Minister Messari sent a letter to the
    distributor demanding to know who in the Government had banned the
    issue, claiming that the Communication Ministry was not involved. The
    Government never established who gave the order to the local
    commissariat.
        The Government banned the distribution of the March 4 issue of the
    French daily newspaper Le Figaro. The issue contained an article about
    the fate of the late Mehdi Ben Barka, former National Union of Popular
    Forces (UNFP--later to become USFP) party founding member and secretary
    general who reportedly was killed in Paris in 1965 by French thugs,
    allegedly at the request of the Moroccan secret service. The source of
    the article reportedly at the time was a physician of thenKing Hassan
    II. Although the Government gave no formal statement explaining the
    ban, on May 5 then-Communication Minister Messari commented at a U.N.
    Education and Science Organization (UNESCO)sponsored seminar on human
    rights that ``I banned the Le Figaro issue ... because it contained
    defamation threatening to a cause of our national history.''
        On April 15, police at Marrakech airport seized and prevented the
    distribution of two related leading weekly investigative newspapers,
    the French-language Le Journal and its Arabiclanguage counterpart
    Assahifa, after their arrival from printers in France. The two domestic
    publications were banned at the orders of Prime Minister Youssoufi
    after Le Journal published an interview that its editor in chief held
    with Mohammed Abdelaziz, leader of the Polisario Front. The
    Government's ban of the publications coincided with the visit to the
    country of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. The
    Government explained the ban in a Communication Ministry communique the
    same day, characterizing Le Journal's interview with Abdelaziz ``an
    event organized by certain milieus hostile to our country (and) in
    homage to the separatist (Sahrawi) impudence.'' The communique also
    cited as explanation ``the extension of constant excesses in the
    editorial line of the two publications with regard to the handling of
    the question of our territorial integrity.''
        Aboubakr Jamai, editor in chief of Le Journal, criticized the
    government decision to censor the newspaper, claiming that other
    Moroccan publications recently had published similar articles
    containing material from interviews with the Polisario Front leader. At
    a press conference convened on April 17 by Le Journal's and Assahifa's
    parent corporation, Mediatrust, Jamai expressed concern that the ban
    likely had more to do with his paper's aggressive reporting on other
    topics. On April 17, the board of directors of the state-run television
    station 2M fired the station's top three officials for, according to
    Communication Minister Larbi Messari, having made a ``professional
    mistake'' during an April 14 broadcast. The professional mistake is
    widely believed to have been the station's televised reference in its
    evening newscast to Le Journal's controversial interview with Polisario
    Front leader Abdelaziz. On April 29, government spokesperson Khalid
    Alioua apologized for the ban of Assahifa, calling it an error. Unlike
    in Le Journal, Assahifa contained no reference to the interview with
    Abdelaziz. On April 19, the AMDH reacted to the bans of the two
    newspapers and the firing of 2M's leadership by issuing a communique
    criticizing decisions that ``gravely threaten the freedom of the
    press.''
        On April 26, a Casablanca court convicted Mustapha Alaoui, the
    editor of the Arabic-language daily Al-Ousbou, of libel and defamation
    of Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa, for a controversial article
    Alaoui published that alleged financial misfeasance in a real estate
    matter involving Benaissa while the latter served abroad as an
    ambassador. The court sentenced Alaoui to 3 months in prison, forbade
    him to practice journalism for 3 years and ordered him to pay
    approximately $100,000 (1,000,000 dirhams) in damages to Benaissa and a
    $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine. On April 27, Khalid Mechbal, the editor
    of the Tangiers-based weekly news publication Al-Shamal, also was
    convicted of libel and defamation in a case lodged by Benaissa for
    publishing a similar article. Mechbal received a 6-month suspended jail
    term, was forbidden from practicing journalism for 1 year, and was
    ordered to pay an approximately $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine. On May 3,
    another court convicted Alaoui of libel and defamation for an article
    he published concerning Fouad Filali, the estranged former brotherin-
    law of King Mohammed VI; Alaoui was sentenced a 3-month suspended jail
    term and ordered to pay approximately $10,000 (100,000 dirhams) in
    damages and a $500 (5,000 dirhams) fine.
        Journalists and human rights activists protested the court's
    decision to invoke statutes from the Criminal Code--rather than the
    Press Code--to punish the editors and ban them from exercising their
    profession. The Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM) stated in an April
    27 communique that ``the pronouncement of prison terms in issues of
    publishing and the press flagrantly contradicts the rule of law and the
    freedom of expression.'' On May 3, human rights activists and
    journalists demonstrated in front of the Communication Ministry to
    express their concerns about the convictions and other press censorship
    cases. Mustapha Alaoui stated that ``not even in the time of the French
    protectorate had a Moroccan journalist ever been forbidden from
    exercising his profession.''
        After immediately appealing the Casablanca court's decision, Alaoui
    and Mechbal learned in late May that the King had pardoned them, and
    allowed them to return to their professions without serving time in
    jail. However, they still were obligated to pay the damages and the
    fines. On July 6, while Alaoui awaited an appellate hearing to
    determine the issue of damages and fines, the authorities banned
    Alaoui's newspaper from publication, and forbade Casablanca printers
    from printing it. According to press reports, on July 31, the
    Casablanca court of appeal accepted reciprocal requests from lawyers
    representing Alaoui and Benaissa to withdraw Alaoui's appeal and
    Benaissa's civil litigation. The press reports indicated that the court
    of appeal also reduced Alaoui's $2,000 (20,000 dirhams) fine to $100
    (1,000 dirhams); however, independent sources alleged that Alaoui's
    fine was dropped altogether, as were the damages that he originally was
    ordered to pay to Benaissa in April.
        On May 15, the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (Reporters
    Sans Frontieres--RSF) criticized Morocco for banning seven local and
    foreign newspapers, and appealed to King Mohammed VI to ensure press
    freedom. The International Committee to Protect Journalists also raised
    the same concerns in a letter to Prime Minister Youssoufi in the
    spring.
        According to press reports in late May and early July, the
    authorities allegedly blocked the publication of two newspapers, Al-Adl
    Wal Ihsane and Rissalat Al-Futuwa, associated with Sheikh Yassine's
    Justice and Charity Organization. The authorities reportedly ordered
    printers of the two newspapers to suspend their distribution (see
    Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 2.d.). In September the directors of the two
    publications delivered to human right organizations and the press a
    letter that claimed that government authorities had issued
    administrative orders against the publication and sale of the two
    newspapers. The directors also stated that various printers had been
    threatened and pressured not to print the newspapers.
        In its June 23-29 issue, the independent weekly Le Journal reported
    that the secretary general of RSF had written a letter to Interior
    Minister Midaoui protesting the Government's ``heavy surveillance'' of
    a visiting French journalist, and its confiscation of the reporter's
    videocassette tapes as he was leaving Rabat airport. The secretary
    general asked Minister Midaoui to ``provide him with explanations'' of
    the Government's actions. The French journalist allegedly was writing
    an investigative article about Mehdi Ben Barka, a leftist political
    leader allegedly kidnapped and murdered in Paris in 1965 by French
    thugs at the request of the Moroccan secret service.
        During a protest by disabled unemployed university graduates on
    September 12, police reportedly attempted to remove the camera
    equipment of one photojournalist covering the demonstration, and
    jostled and threatened other news correspondents on the scene (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        In its September 23-29 edition, Le Journal reported that government
    authorities banned the distribution of a September issue of the London-
    based magazine The Economist, which contained a report on Morocco's
    August announcement of new oil finds in the eastern part of the
    country. The Economist report questioned the scale of the findings as
    announced by the Government. A local representative of The Economist
    confirmed the banning.
        On October 4, at a press briefing convened by the Government,
    Interior Minister Midaoui publicly threatened Aboubakr Jamai, the
    director of Le Journal, warning against publishing sensitive stories
    related to Mohammed Abdelaziz, the leader of the Polisario Front.
    Midaoui threatened to ban Le Journal again if the newspaper conducted
    and published more such interviews. RSF responded to the incident with
    a letter to Prime Minister Youssoufi, which related the NGO's concerns
    about the recent decline in press freedoms.
        In early October, over the period of several days, the Government
    accused of espionage, detained, and held under house arrest three
    French television journalists from France's FR3 television station, who
    were reporting on a government-authorized human rights demonstration at
    the notorious former secret detention center of Tazmamart. Despite
    their possession of two authorization papers from the Government to
    tape throughout the country, the journalists were stopped by security
    forces after they had taped the former detention center the morning
    before the October 7 demonstration. (Other domestic and international
    media later filmed the same footage without incident.) Local justice
    officials summoned the FR3 journalists to a nearby tribunal on October
    8, but the journalists refused the officials' request to hand over the
    material that had been taped at Tazmamart. The journalists then were
    placed under house arrest in the city of Er-Rachidia by security forces
    and kept under surveillance. During this time, the authorities
    confiscated the journalists' video material, passports, and personal
    belongings, and accused them of ``violating military secrets'' for
    videotaping Tazmamart (which became a military weapons depot after the
    secret detention center closed in 1991). After French officials
    intervened, the authorities released the three journalists on October
    9. Before leaving the country, the journalists signed a document
    agreeing to return to cooperate with the legal investigation of the
    affair. One of the FR3 journalists who was detained was Joseph Tual,
    the French journalist who had been monitored in June and whose video
    material then also was confiscated by security forces at Rabat airport.
        On November 4, the Government withdrew the accreditation and
    ordered the expulsion of Claude Juvenal, a Morocco-based French
    correspondent for Agence France Presse (AFP). According to MAP, a
    source from the Ministry of Culture and Communication stated that
    Juvenal had ``breached professional ethics by engaging in initiatives
    hostile to Morocco and its institutions.'' According to the
    semiofficial daily newspaper Le Matin du Sahara, Juvenal had ``for
    several years continually, and in sheer bad faith, cast doubt on,
    criticized and misrepresented every initiative and reform undertaken by
    Morocco.'' Juvenal's expulsion resulted in a strong negative reaction
    from domestic and international media. The SNPM issued a communique
    protesting the expulsion, stating that the authorities' justification
    for the expulsion ``remains ambiguous and hence unacceptable.'' The
    SNPM in its communiques and the RSF claimed that the expulsion
    illustrated growing intolerance by the authorities toward press
    freedom. A group of Morocco-based Spanish journalists wrote a letter to
    Minister of Culture and Communication Mohammed Achaari, in which they
    expressed their concerns that similar measures could be taken ``at any
    moment against other journalists'' and informed the Minister that they
    were seeking the protection of the Spanish Government and the European
    Union for themselves. Minister Achaari refused to explain the reasons
    for the expulsion when he was asked on national television.
        On December 2, Prime Minister Youssoufi banned indefinitely three
    independent weekly publications known for their politically sensitive
    investigative reports. The Prime Minister banned the French weekly
    publications Le Journal and Demain and the Arabic weekly Assahifa, a
    sister publication of Le Journal, after they published or commented on
    a 1974 letter alleging that Youssoufi had participated in coup plotting
    with other leftist leaders and the military against then-King Hassan II
    in 1972. In banning the three publications, Youssoufi used the highly
    controversial and long-criticized Article 77 of the Press Code, which
    allows both the Prime Minister and Interior Minister to ban any
    publication that ``threatens the kingdom's political and religious
    foundations.'' At their press conference on December 3, the three
    editors in chief of the banned publications criticized the banning as
    ``a manifestation of intellectual terrorism.'' The SNPM denounced the
    ban and the application of Article 77, urging the Government to
    reconsider its decision and to reform the entire Press Code. The AMDH
    also protested the ban, calling it a violation of the Constitution and
    international conventions on human rights. International NGO's
    criticized the banning as well. RSF called attention to the fact that
    Youssoufi had promised to defend press freedoms upon assuming office in
    1998, including revision of the entire Press Code. In mid-December, two
    of the three weeklies filed a lawsuit against the government at the
    administrative court of Rabat. In the meantime, Le Journal filed
    paperwork to establish a new publication; approval of the application
    was still pending at year's end.
        Also in mid-December, the Government confiscated and prevented
    distribution of the December 14-20 printed issue of the international
    publication Courier International. The publication contained four pages
    of articles written by the editors in chief of the three domestic
    weeklies banned indefinitely by Youssoufi on December 2. In their
    articles, the editors in chief attacked the Prime Minister's decision
    to shut down their publications. The electronic versions of the
    articles were available in the country on Courier International's
    Internet web site.
        Police reportedly confiscated journalists' photography equipment
    during their December 9 and 10 violent dispersions of human rights
    activists and JCO members in Rabat and other large cities (see Sections
    1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., and 4).
        In general press articles containing unflattering material that
    routinely had been prevented from circulation in past years, with the
    exception of those related to the topics the Government still considers
    sensitive, were permitted free circulation during the year. These
    included reports on corruption in the Government and military,
    financial scandals at public institutions, sensitive human rights-
    related court cases, torture, violence against women, the exploitation
    of child maids, prostitution, poverty, abandoned children, and harsh
    conditions inside prisons.
        In an October 23 ``Open Letter to the Minister of Justice'' that it
    distributed to domestic as well as international media, the AMDH for
    the first time published a list containing 14 names of alleged former
    torturers and officials involved in disappearances and arbitrary
    detention. The first domestic newspaper to republish the list was Le
    Journal. Agence France Presse then distributed the list of names abroad
    through its wire services. Some of the listed names were high-ranking
    officials currently holding office. In the letter, the AMDH called for
    ``the truth and pursuit of those responsible for disappearances.'' The
    AMDH also criticized the Justice Ministry for its alleged
    nonintervention in past cases of torture and disappearance (see Section
    1.c.).
        Also in October, the Government lifted its 17-year ban on the book
    ``For Bread Alone'' (``Le Pain Nu'') by the Moroccan writer Mohammed
    Choukri. The book had been banned during King Hassan II's reign
    reportedly for its sexually explicit overtones.
        Throughout the year, journalists, NGO's, and human rights activists
    increased their calls on the Government to enact a new public liberties
    law, which Prime Minister Youssoufi announced that he would enact when
    he assumed power in 1998. In January 1999, 42 NGO's addressed a
    memorandum to the Prime Minister proposing amendments to the law that
    governs the press, associations, and public gatherings. Their proposals
    were aimed at easing current restrictions and giving associations more
    freedom to organize and function. The present Public Liberties Law
    dates from 1958, and many legal observers agree that the sole amendment
    to the law, which was ratified in 1973, constituted a setback to civil
    liberties. The amendment apparently introduced restrictions that
    established firmer government control over the legal establishment of
    associations and the associations' scope of action once they are
    recognized legally and allowed to operate. In January before
    Parliament, Youssoufi announced his intention to open a debate on the
    law. However, unsatisfied with what it perceived to be the Government's
    slow handling of the issue, the NGO network Espace Associatif held a
    large roundtable conference in March in which it discussed reform of
    the law and urged the Government to act more quickly and transparently.
    In an April communique following the censorship of Le Journal and
    Assahifa, the AMDH demanded ``the immediate modification of the Public
    Liberties Law and abrogation of all constraints that hinder freedom of
    the press.'' At the same time, the OMDH issued a communique expressing
    frustration at the Government's slow progress with respect to the
    reforms that the OMDH had called for on numerous occasions. In May the
    Moroccan Barrister's Association also called for reform of the Public
    Liberties Law.
        In July and November, the King announced in two nationally
    televised speeches that the Government was preparing legislation for
    reforming the Public Liberties Law. Prime Minister Youssoufi's Cabinet
    discussed draft legislation and reviewed a draft in mid-December. The
    SNPM on December 19 rejected the draft Press Code contained in the
    three-part legislation on the grounds that the SNPM had not been
    consulted during the code's formulation. The SNPM claimed that the
    draft text still permitted the Government to seize, confiscate, and ban
    publications, and to punish those convicted of libel and defamation
    with jail sentences. Domestic media and human rights activists long
    have criticized these central provisions, which widely are perceived to
    repress and stifle the freedom of expression. No final decisions were
    made by year's end regarding the pubic liberties legislation. Before
    presenting the draft legislation to the Cabinet in December, Prime
    Minister Youssoufi presided over two interministerial discussions of
    the law in May and July.
        The Government controls Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM)
    broadcasts. Another major broadcaster is the French-backed Medi-1,
    which operates from Tangier and broadcasts throughout Morocco and other
    parts of North Africa. While nominally private and independent, Medi-1
    practices self-censorship, as do other media outlets. The Government
    owns the only television stations whose broadcasts may be received in
    most parts of the nation without decoders or satellite dish antennas.
    In 1996 the Government purchased a majority share in 2M, formerly the
    country's sole private station, which can be received in most urban
    areas. The ostensible reason for the Government's action was to save 2M
    from bankruptcy; the Government now owns 68 percent of 2M stock, and
    the Minister of Communication, by virtue of his position, has become
    the chairman of the board. A government-appointed committee monitors
    broadcasts. Privatization of these stations continued to be a major
    topic of political debate during the year, and the Government announced
    in 1998 that it was preparing a plan for 2M's resale to the private
    sector.
        In its October 28-November 3 issue, the independent magazine Demain
    reported that since July the Government had censored five broadcasts of
    a local news team that worked for the Qatari satellite television
    station Al-Jazira. According to Demain's and other press reports,
    spokesmen for the government-controlled television stations stated that
    the censored broadcasts (of domestic news items) were ``technical
    problems'' experienced during satellite transmissions. In late October,
    the SNPM criticized what it perceived to be a ban on the Qatari
    station, charging that the government-controlled television stations
    allowed other Arabic television stations to broadcast from the country.
    The Government had recalled its ambassador to Qatar in mid-July,
    allegedly in diplomatic retaliation for the Qatari Government's votes
    against Morocco's bid to host the 2006 World Cup and its bid for the
    presidency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The
    Government also allegedly was concerned over what it perceived to be
    several negative reports on Morocco that recently were produced by Al-
    Jazira.
        For the past 13 years, the popular humorist Ahmed Snoussi (also
    known as Bziz) has been prohibited from performing in the country due
    to his satire of those in power. While the authorities allowed Bziz to
    perform at the Mohammed V Theater in Rabat during the summer, he still
    is prohibited from performing live on television. He also faces
    restrictions on performing on university campuses. In November the
    authorities reportedly prevented him from accepting students'
    invitations to perform at universities in both Rabat and Tangiers.
        In April Reuters news services reported the lifting of a 13-year
    ban on a book that described harsh conditions in a high-security
    prison. According to the author, Abdelkader Chaoui, his book ``The
    Unachieved Past'' had been banned since its publication in 1987. The
    book described the harsh conditions of the Kenitra prison in which
    Chaoui was held for 15 years. Chaoui was jailed in 1974 because of his
    leftist political opinions (see Section 1.c.). In November in
    Marrakesh, the King awarded Chaoui a literary prize for his most recent
    novel.
        After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
    religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
    Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16.
    Yassine's release came after a May 10 statement by the Minister of
    Interior before Parliament that the Sheikh ``leaves and returns to his
    residence as he likes.'' The Minister also stated that Sheik Yassine
    was free to take his case to court if he felt his rights were being
    abused. Yassine's books, articles, and audio cassettes were sold only
    at some bookstores; however, editorials calling for his release prior
    to the Government's action were published without impediment (see
    Sections 1.d., 2.b., 2.c., and 2.d.).
        In May the wire service Agence France Presse and the French daily
    newspaper Le Monde reported that Government had banned the book
    ``Letter from Morocco,'' which was written by Christine Serfaty, the
    wife of former political dissident Abraham Serfaty (who was allowed to
    return to Morocco in September 1999 after 8 years of exile and 17 years
    of imprisonment). According to the two sources, the preface of
    Serfaty's book allegedly caused advisors at the Royal Palace to ban its
    distribution; the preface referred to Serfaty's collaboration with a
    French author on a controversial book, ``Notre Ami Le Roi,'' which has
    been banned in Morocco since it was published in 1990 for its criticism
    of the rule of then-King Hassan II. In an interview given by Abraham
    Serfaty to Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent in September, the former exile
    claimed that his wife's book had not been banned, but rather
    ``bookstores (in Morocco) that would like to import the book still
    cannot.'' In October Christine Serfaty claimed in an interview with
    Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent that she did not believe that a banning was
    in effect because she had received copies of her book from abroad
    through the postal system. However, she said that Moroccan bookstores
    that ordered her book still were waiting to receive it from the
    national distributor. The distributor reportedly sent the book to the
    government agency responsible for reviewing publications before their
    entry onto the market. The agency had yet to release the book to the
    distributor by year's end.
        Also in May, the Government permitted the local publication and
    sale of a comic book called ``They Even Starve Rats.'' Written and
    illustrated by Abdelaziz Mouride, a former leftist student whom the
    authorities arbitrarily detained in 1974, sentenced to 22 years in
    prison, and then freed in 1984, the comic book vividly recounts the
    torture, injustice, and humiliation that he and other political
    dissidents suffered at the hands of the authorities (see Section 1.c.).
        Dish antennas permit free access to a wide variety of foreign
    broadcasts and are available at low cost on the market. The antennas
    are in wide use throughout the country. Residents of the north are able
    to receive Spanish broadcasts with standard antennas. The Government
    does not impede the reception of foreign broadcasts or Internet access.
        The universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most areas, but
    are barred from open debate on the Monarchy, the Western Sahara, and
    Islam. Government informers monitor campus activities (see Section
    1.f.) and rectors are approved by the Ministry of Interior. Police and
    university students conducting elections clashed violently during the
    fall at university campuses throughout the country (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.e., and 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law also permits the
    Government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass
    gatherings, and at times police forcibly prevented and disrupted
    gatherings during the year. Most conferences and demonstrations require
    the prior authorization of the Ministry of Interior, ostensibly for
    security reasons.
        Throughout the year, many meetings and marches took place
    peacefully without government interference; however, numerous
    demonstrations involving unemployed demonstrators were disrupted by the
    Government. Security forces often resorted to violent means to disperse
    and prevent from marching unemployed demonstrators, including the ANDC,
    the Group 314, disabled unemployed protesters, and other affiliated
    groups. Security forces also used violent means to disperse human
    rights activists and members of Islamist organizations late in the
    year. In early October, the Denmark-based organization EMHRN noted that
    ``measures inspired by security police are still in existence; force is
    being used, outside the law, with protesters and, notably, with
    unemployed academics.''
        During their February 2 operation in the village of Tarmilet (48
    miles from the capital), security forces used force to remove striking
    workers who had blockaded a water-bottling factory. The operation,
    which involved a large-scale military presence and reportedly was led
    by senior military officers, took place after a court order in January
    had ruled in favor of the factory owners who charged the protesting
    workers with interruption of means of production and obstructing the
    freedom to work. Dozens of strikers and members of the security forces
    were injured during the operation (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., 2.d.,
    and 6.a.).
        On two consecutive days in February, security forces violently
    dispersed striking members of Group 314 (unemployed doctoral graduates
    of medicine and engineering). Members of Group 314 conducted a sit-in
    on February 10 at the Ministry of Employment and were dispersed by
    charging security forces, who beat the protesters with their hands,
    boots, and batons. Police arrested eight protesters, who later were
    released without charges. Seven protesters reportedly were injured. On
    February 11, approximately 300 members of Group 314 staged a sit-in
    before the Wilaya (regional office of the Interior Ministry) of Rabat
    to demand the release of the 8 members who were arrested the previous
    day. Approximately 200 members of the security forces intervened to
    disperse the demonstrators, again using violent methods. This time,
    police arrested four protesters, who also later were released without
    charges. Employment Minister Khalid Alioua denied during a February 10
    press briefing that abusive acts against the group had occurred (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On March 1, security forces in the Western Sahara city of Smara
    violently dispersed Sahrawi students and their families who were
    demonstrating in solidarity with Sahrawi students in the nearby
    Moroccan city of Agadir. Police had disrupted violently demonstrations
    by the Agadir students on February 28 and 29. The Agadir students were
    protesting the December 1999 incarceration of three Sahrawis accused of
    spying for the Polisario Front (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.). The
    Sahrawi students and families in Smara organized a march toward the
    police station, which security forces subsequently broke up forcefully.
    Dozens of persons allegedly were injured, as were a dozen police
    officers. According to reports, nobody was arrested during the protest.
        Security forces used force to break up a May 3 demonstration in
    Meknes by members of the ANDC and other unemployed protesters (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On May 11, police violently broke up a peaceful demonstration in
    front of the Tunisian Embassy, where approximately 50 human rights
    activists had gathered to protest the Tunisian Government's treatment
    of a Tunisian journalist (he was on a hunger strike) and his family.
    After issuing an order to cease the demonstrations, police used force
    to disperse the activists, pushing them, beating their legs with
    batons, tearing up their posters, and pursuing them down side streets.
    Police reportedly injured six protesters.
        On May 12, at the Ministry of Finance, police used excessive force
    to disperse approximately 500 engineers who were preparing to hold a
    sit-in to protest their terms of employment. Police used batons to
    disperse the protesters, clubbing a regional leader from the
    independent Moroccan Workers Union, who was knocked unconscious and
    required hospitalization. When the protesters regrouped nearby, the
    police again pursued them, and used batons to disperse them. Some
    police reportedly entered a ministry building and clubbed innocent
    bystanders whom they mistook for protesters. The International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels issued a communique that
    denounced police for using brutal methods against the protesters and
    asked the Government ``to work to put an end to brutal attacks against
    peaceful trade-union demonstrations.'' On May 17, the OMDH issued a
    communique that strongly criticized the brutal police actions on May 11
    and 12, and questioned the Government about ``the objective of using
    violence against civil society'' at a time when royal speeches on human
    rights urged a new and more humane relationship of authority between
    the Government and citizens.
        On May 17 and 18, police violently broke up student demonstrations
    in Marrakech, initially detaining 30 to 40 mostly Sahrawi participants.
    There were conflicting accounts regarding the origins of the large-
    scale demonstriations (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        Within a 1-week period in June, security forces in the capital used
    excessive force to break up both a march by unemployed graduates
    associated with the ANDC and to evict 12 Group 314 hunger strikers from
    UMT's Rabat headquarters. According to eyewitnesses, on June 13,
    hundreds of security force members violently stopped up to 4,000
    members of the ANDC from staging a protest march at the Parliament.
    Security forces used batons, chased protesters down streets, and
    violently dispersed large groups of marchers who had gathered before
    the Parliament. Thirty-three protesters reportedly were injured during
    the violent dispersal, 2 of them seriously. Over 20 persons were
    arrested, all of whom later were released without charges. On the
    evening of June 13, authorities detained two union leaders not involved
    in the demonstrations and released them the following day without
    charges (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        During the evening of June 18, up to 100 members of the security
    forces attacked UMT headquarters in Rabat, where 12 Group 314 members
    were in the 11th day of a hunger strike. The attack allegedly began
    after ANDC demonstrators outside the headquarters threw rocks at
    security forces. Security forces then reportedly threw the rocks back
    at the demonstrators, breaking windows in the process, and fired tear
    gas into the building. They subsequently used force to clear all
    demonstrators from the area, arresting up to 100 persons. Security
    forces them removed the hunger strikers, who had been forced out by the
    tear gas. Later in the evening, the authorities cut the water and
    electricity supply to the UMT's headquarters, which they restored the
    following morning. Dozens of protesters were injured, some seriously.
    Twenty-two of those arrested were charged with ``using violence against
    agents of authority;'' 19 received suspended sentences and 3 received 2
    months' imprisonment. Prime Minister Youssoufi convened an
    interministerial meeting on June 19 to address the violence and
    condition of the unemployed population. The Government stated that it
    ``affirms its choice of dialog and rejects all forms of pressure and
    tension.'' Justice Minister Azziman then met with some members of the
    ANDC. On July 5, the Group 314 hunger strikers ended their 28-day
    strike after a meeting with the Government, in which both sides pledged
    to engage in a substantive dialog (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
        On July 26 in downtown Rabat, police violently dispersed disabled
    unemployed university graduates, who were protesting the denial of
    their right to employment. The protesters arrived in Rabat from
    throughout the country to meet the Secretary of State in charge of the
    disabled, whom they accused of reneging on promises to assist them. The
    police reportedly removed the disabled protesters to the Ain Atiq
    detention center, outside the capital. On September 12, police again
    used force to break up a protest by approximately 40 disabled graduates
    before the Parliament. There were reports of injured protesters and,
    according to a communique issued by an association of unemployed
    handicapped university graduates, police again removed uninjured
    handicapped protesters to the Ain Atiq detention center. Police
    reportedly attempted to remove forcibly camera equipment of one
    photojournalist covering the demonstration, and jostled and threatened
    other news correspondents on the scene. The SNPM issued a communique
    criticizing the police treatment of the journalists, claiming that it
    was not the first time security forces exhibited such behavior toward
    them (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5).
        On October 9 in Casablanca, police dispersed with tear gas 2,000 to
    3,000 Islamists who were protesting the Israeli Government's use of
    force against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in
    September and October. Islamist leaders had asked for and were refused
    permission to hold the demonstration.
        On October 23, security forces used violent means to break up a
    demonstration by students preparing to begin a march to protest
    transportation problems at Hassan I University in Settat (southeast of
    Casablanca). Police intervened when the students were gathering on the
    edges of the university for a march toward the Wilaya of Settat. The
    police arrested 10 students, some of whom reportedly were not
    participating in the march, and accused them of disobedience, inciting
    disobedience, violence, and contempt of public servants while
    exercising their functions. Numerous students reportedly were injured
    in the violence, as well as two policemen. Press reports indicated that
    security forces intervened once students belonging to the Justice and
    Charity Organization inserted themselves into the march and began
    chanting anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans. Security forces
    reportedly clubbed students indiscriminately with truncheons, even
    entering neighborhood cafes and cafeterias to do so. After two of its
    youth members were detained in the incident, the political bureau of
    the PPS political party issued a communique on October 27, in which it
    claimed that security forces acted with ``unprecedented brutality'' in
    pursuing and attacking students indiscriminately within university
    grounds and in neighboring streets, and in conducting ``targeted
    arrests.'' At their trial on October 27, the 10 students were sentenced
    to between 3 and 5 months in prison (three were given suspended
    sentences); the students' sentences later were reduced on appeal (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
        On November 5, security forces reportedly used violent force to
    break up a sit-in by ANDC members in the southern city of TanTan. The
    local ANDC branch had called for a march to protest the lack of
    employment opportunities in the city, irregularities in the region's
    hiring practices, the lack of dialog with the authorities, and the
    local governor's abusive treatment of ANDC members. The police
    reportedly injured 25 demonstrators, 3 seriously, during the attack.
        On November 21, security forces violently clashed with JCO students
    at Mohammedia University (in the Casablanca suburbs) as the latter
    prepared for annual student elections. According to news reports, over
    100 students were injured and 14 arrested. Police claimed that they
    responded because the students illegally remained on campus overnight
    and committed acts of vandalism. The students were sentenced to 2
    years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $50 to $150 (500 to 1,500
    dirhams) (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Other reports indicated that
    similar although less violent clashes occurred between security forces
    and JCO students at other university campuses around the country
    engaged in student elections.
        On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to
    break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern
    city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one
    worker and injuries to eight others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and
    6.a.).
        During the weekend of December 9-11, security forces throughout the
    country used violent means to disperse human rights activists, members
    of the JCO, and unemployed graduates who gathered separately in Rabat
    and other large cities to demonstrate for different reasons. The three
    groups decided to gather despite a prior Interior Ministry statement
    that the gatherings were unauthorized and would be forbidden. On
    December 9, human rights activists from the AMDH and Forum for Truth
    and Justice (FMVE) gathered before the Parliament to demand trials for
    those responsible for past arbitrary detention, forced disappearance,
    and torture. Security forces violently attacked the demonstrators with
    truncheons and arrested about 40 persons. Security forces also
    reportedly confiscated journalists' photography equipment. After
    spending 1 night in jail, 39 of the detained protesters appeared before
    the court of first instance in Rabat the following day and were
    released that evening. The Government pressed charges against 33 of the
    demonstrators; the trial was scheduled for February 2001. The AMDH's
    president Abderrahmane Benameur, who was among those arrested and
    released, condemned the use of violence by security forces,
    characterizing such violence as ``a step backward in human rights.'' On
    December 17, the AMDH filed a lawsuit in Rabat's administrative court
    against the Government for banning its demonstration. On December 10,
    the FIDH issued a communique, in which it expressed its ``extreme
    concern'' regarding the Government's suppression of peaceful
    gatherings.
        Later during the weekend, in Rabat and other large cities, security
    forces again resorted to violent force to break up public gatherings by
    members of the JCO. The JCO had called for peaceful nationwide protests
    in large cities to demonstrate against the Government's banning of
    their newspapers and to demand the legalization of their organization.
    At the Rabat train station, security forces used truncheons to disperse
    violently assembled JCO members, and arrested dozens of persons. The
    authorities again confiscated photography equipment, including that of
    demonstrators and of a British Broadcasting Company journalist. The
    authorities charged 18 of those detained with holding an unauthorized
    demonstration. Their trial was scheduled to take place in January 2001.
    Security forces violently dispersed a similar demonstration in
    Casablanca on the same day, arresting hundreds of additional JCO
    demonstrators; all of the Casablanca demonstrators had been released by
    year's end. Of the released demonstrators, 22 were scheduled to be
    tried in early 2001.
        On December 11, security forces used force to arrest members of the
    ANDC who had gathered before the Parliament to protest against
    Government inactivity regarding their unemployment. Those arrested
    later were released.
        During the year, there were no new developments related to the
    police excesses in the Western Saharan city of Laayoune in September
    and October 1999, in which police used brutal force to break up
    demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and
    former Sahrawi political prisoners. Some who were detained during the
    police violence were subjected to systematic beatings and other forms
    of physical coercion. Most of those detained were released; however, 26
    persons were charged and sentenced to between 10 and 15 years in prison
    on charges of destruction of property during the protests. Despite
    appeals lodged by defense lawyers during the year, none of the
    sentences were reduced or overturned.
        In the aftermath of the September 1999 protests, King Mohammed VI
    immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved the local
    police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security forces to
    the city to help restore order. A new royal commission was dispatched
    quickly to the city by King Mohammed VI to explain to local residents
    proposed new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which
    would allow local residents more of a choice in their affairs, and to
    propose elections to choose members to a royal advisory council on the
    Western Sahara.
        Despite these actions taken to restore confidence and order and to
    lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out in late October 1999. There
    were credible reports that police provoked the violence and there were
    further credible reports that police authorities unlawfully entered
    homes to arrest persons associated with the demonstrations in September
    1999. Thirty-one persons reportedly were detained. Of these persons, 10
    reportedly were released within 24 hours and the remainder released
    within the following 2-week period.
        No investigation has been initiated into the excessive use of force
    by the police, nor have any charges against police been filed. There
    also was no progress during the year on local elections to choose
    members to the proposed royal advisory council on the Western Sahara.
        However, there also were numerous peaceful protests during the
    year. For example, on February 4, 60 Sahrawi students organized a sit-
    in protest in front of the Ministry of Human Rights to protest what
    they claimed to be the illegal detention of 3 Sahrawis who were
    detained in December 1999 and accused of espionage activities on behalf
    of the Polisario Front (see Sections 1.b. and 1.e.). The sit-in
    proceeded peacefully. On February 18 and 19, teachers who were members
    of two different trade unions protested without disruption for 2
    consecutive days the freezing of family allowances and teacher
    promotions. On March 4, hundreds of supporters and members of the NGO
    Forum for Truth and Justice, which was created by former political
    prisoners and their survivors, staged a sit-in before the notorious
    Derb Moulay Cherif police station to demand an accounting for and
    details regarding over 30 years of forced disappearance and arbitrary
    arrest. Police did not intervene. On March 12, two large rallies took
    place in Rabat and Casablanca that collectively involved over 200,000
    persons. The march in Rabat was called by civil society in observance
    of the international day for women. The march in Casablanca was a
    counterdemonstration organized by Morocco's two major Islamist groups.
    In spite of the large numbers of demonstrators and the political
    sensitivity of the marches, they both proceeded peacefully and without
    intervention by security forces (see Section 5). To protest government
    inaction on their behalf, 115 members of Group 314 staged a 48-hour
    hunger strike on March 17 and 18. The hunger strike proceeded
    peacefully, without any incidents or intervention by security forces.
    On May 3, journalists and human rights activists peacefully
    demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Communication against several
    cases of press censorship. On October 7, hundreds of former political
    prisoners, their families, and human rights activists peacefully
    demonstrated at Tazmamart, the notorious former secret detention
    center. On October 8, several tens of thousands persons peacefully
    participated in a march in Rabat led by the Prime Minister to
    demonstrate their solidarity with Palestinians.
        On November 5, 1999, Prime Minister Youssoufi revoked an order
    issued earlier in the year by former Interior Minister Driss Basri to
    ban all public meetings from government-owned facilities unless they
    otherwise were authorized by the Government. Basri's decision triggered
    protests by human rights activists who asserted that such tactics
    constituted a serious violation of freedom of expression. Amid the
    protests caused by Basri's order, government spokesman Khalid Alioua
    stated that the Interior Ministry's decision had been ``badly
    interpreted,'' and applied only to meetings in municipal council and
    administration buildings, not to the public halls that routinely are
    used by unions, parties, NGO's, and other groups.
        According to Youssoufi's November 5, 1999 revocation, only a
    declaration of a public meeting would be necessary for public meetings
    to proceed. However, on November 25, 1999, several weeks following the
    Prime Minister's revocation of Basri's order, government spokesperson
    Khalid Alioua announced that--in apparent contradiction to the Prime
    Minister's revocation--both a declaration and authorization must be
    issued before public-venue meetings could proceed. Alioua attributed
    the Government's decision to a series of illegal sit-ins and protests
    in public spaces that had followed the revocation. Human rights
    organizations reacted negatively to the announcement. The OMDH issued a
    communique that criticized the decision as illegal. The OMDH cited the
    1958 Public Liberties Code and Youssoufi's November directive in
    asserting that a declaration alone suffices to proceed with a public
    meeting, and that meetings may be prohibited only if deemed a threat to
    public order. Since the Government's November 25 announcement, local
    observers generally agree that the authorities indiscriminately apply
    the authorization rule, allowing those demonstrations to proceed that
    it considers inoffensive.
        After violent police suppression of demonstrations in Rabat in
    October 1998, Basri agreed in December 1998 to recognize officially the
    ANDC, whose request for recognition had been pending for 7 years. Basri
    also agreed to grant members of the group 5,000 taxi licenses. Members
    of the ANDC also were invited by then-King Hassan II to a national
    conference on unemployment in December 1998. In June 1999, the
    Ministers of Interior and Employment toured the regions to instruct
    walis (regional and city leaders appointed by the Interior Ministry)
    and governors on how to take steps to reduce unemployment, and to
    listen to the needs of the unemployed. However, despite repeated
    meetings with the Ministers of Interior and Employment, the ANDC has
    not obtained official recognition, and the promised taxi licenses have
    not been issued.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government limits this right in practice. Under a 1958 decree, which
    was amended substantially in 1973 to introduce restrictions on civil
    society organizations, persons who wish to create an organization must
    obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior before holding
    meetings. In practice the Ministry uses this requirement to prevent
    persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the Government from
    forming legal organizations. Historically, extreme Islamist and leftist
    groups have encountered the greatest difficulty in obtaining official
    approval. Although there are over 20 active Islamist groups, the
    Government has prohibited membership in 2, the JCO and Jama'a Islamia,
    due to their perceived anti-Monarchy rhetoric. Political parties also
    must be approved by the Ministry of Interior, which has used this power
    to control participation in the political process. However, individual
    Islamists are not barred from participating in recognized political
    parties. The last known instance in which a proposed political party
    failed to receive such approval was in 1996, when an Islamist group's
    application was not approved. The group instead was permitted to
    present candidates for the 1997 elections under the banner of an
    existing party. One Islamist party, the Party for Justice and
    Development (PJD--formerly the Popular Democratic Constitutional
    Movement), won nine seats in Parliament in the 1997 elections. In by-
    elections held in August, the PJD won two additional seats in
    Parliament.
        During the summer, the Government prevented members of the JCO from
    gaining access to campgrounds and beaches for group prayer sessions,
    and arrested and jailed some of the group's members (see Sections 1.d.,
    2.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are tolerated
    in practice. The Constitution provides that Islam is the official
    religion, and designates the King as ``Commander of the Faithful,''
    with the responsibility of ensuring ``respect for Islam.'' In 1996 a
    small foreign Hindu community received the right to perform cremations
    and to hold services, and other foreign communities enjoy similar
    religious privileges. However, Baha'is face restrictions on the
    practice of their faith. The Government monitors the activities of
    mosques.
        The Government does not license or approve religions or religious
    organizations. The Government provides tax benefits, land and building
    grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the
    observance of the major religions.
        Islamic law and tradition call for strict punishment for any Muslim
    who converts to another faith. Citizens who convert to Christianity and
    other religions sometimes face social ostracism, and in the past a
    small number have faced short periods of questioning by the
    authorities. Voluntary conversion is not a crime under the Criminal or
    Civil Codes; however, the authorities have jailed some converts on the
    basis of references to Koranic law. Any attempt to induce a Muslim to
    convert is illegal. Foreign missionaries either limit their
    proselytizing to non-Muslims or conduct their work quietly. The
    Government cited the Penal Code prohibition on conversion in most cases
    in which courts expelled foreign missionaries.
        The Ministry of Islamic Affairs monitors Friday mosque sermons and
    the Koranic schools to ensure the teaching of approved doctrine. The
    authorities sometimes suppress the activities of Islamists, but
    generally tolerate activities limited to the propagation of Islam,
    education, and charity. Security forces commonly close mosques to the
    public shortly after Friday services to prevent the use of the premises
    for unauthorized political activity. The Government strictly controls
    authorization to construct new mosques. Most mosques are constructed
    using private funds.
        After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
    religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
    Abdessalam Yassine was allowed to leave his Sale home on May 16. On May
    17, Sheikh Yassine then received at his home leading council members of
    his Justice and Charity Organization, attended a Sale mosque prayer
    service on May 19, and gave a May 20 press conference that was attended
    widely by domestic and foreign media representatives. In February prior
    to Sheikh Yassine's release, the Government temporarily confiscated
    several newspapers that printed a 19-page memorandum addressed by
    Yassine to King Mohammed VI asking for the King to return to Moroccans
    the wealth that Yassine alleged the King's late father had stolen from
    them. On February 8 and 9, then-Communication Minister Larbi Messari
    claimed that the memorandum was not banned, that it was available on
    the Internet, and that the concerned newspapers were back in
    circulation. Messari stated that the confiscation was ``incidental,''
    and that censorship was absurd and no longer practiced. Four members of
    the JCO were arrested in February for distributing the memorandum in
    Tangiers and Ben Slimane (near Casablanca). All four were charged with
    violating the ``sacred institution of the Monarchy.'' According to the
    AMDH, by February 7, the authorities had dropped the charges and
    released the four JCO members.
        According to press reports in late May and early July, the
    authorities allegedly blocked the publication of two newspapers--Al-Adl
    Wal Ihsane and Rissalat Al-Futuwa--that were associated with the JCO,
    ordering printers to suspend their distribution. Yassine's books,
    articles, and audio cassettes were sold only at some bookstores, and
    editorials that had called for his release were published without
    impediment. The JCO has an active presence on university campuses and
    occasionally had organized protests of Yassine's house arrest. However,
    prominent members of the JCO are subject to constant surveillance and
    sometimes are unable to obtain passports and other necessary documents.
    During the summer, the Government prevented members of the JCO from
    gaining access to campgrounds and beaches for group prayer sessions,
    and arrested and jailed some of the group's members. In August two JCO
    members were sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment for their
    proselytizing activities on a beach in El-Jadida. During the same
    month, Interior Minister Ahmed Midaoui declared before Parliament that
    ``we are one sole nation and nobody can impose upon others their own
    vision of Islam,'' and that ``people go to beaches for recreational
    purposes and we do not have Islamic beaches.'' He also added that ``we
    cannot tolerate the appearance of sectarianism in our society'' (see
    Sections 1.d., 2.a., 2.b., and 2.d.).
        The teaching of Islam in public schools benefits from discretionary
    funding in the Government's annual education budget, as do other
    curriculum subjects. The annual budget also provides funds for
    religious instruction to the parallel system of Jewish public schools.
    The Government has funded several efforts to study the cultural,
    artistic, literary, and scientific heritage of Moroccan Jews. In 1998,
    the Government created a chair for the study of comparative religions
    at the University of Rabat.
        Since the time of the French protectorate (1912-1956), a small
    foreign Christian community has opened churches, orphanages, hospitals,
    and schools without any restriction or licensing requirement being
    imposed. Missionaries who conduct themselves in accordance with
    societal expectations largely are left unhindered. However, those whose
    proselytizing activities become public face expulsion.
        The Government permits the display and sale of Bibles in French,
    English, and Spanish, but confiscates Arabic-language Bibles and
    refuses licenses for their importation and sale, despite the absence of
    any law banning such books. Nevertheless, Arabic Bibles reportedly have
    been sold in local bookstores. There were no known cases in which
    foreigners were denied entry into the country because they were
    carrying Christian materials, as occurred in the past.
        The small Baha'i community has been forbidden to meet or
    participate in communal activities since 1983; however, there were no
    reports during the year that the Government summoned members of the
    Baha'i Faith for questioning or denied them passports, as had occurred
    in previous years.
        There are two sets of laws and courts--one for Jews and one for
    Muslims--pertaining to marriage, inheritance, and family matters. The
    family law courts are run, depending on the law that applies, by
    rabbinical and Islamic authorities who are court officials. Parliament
    must authorize any changes to those laws. Non-Koranic sections of
    Muslim law on personal status are applied to non-Muslim and non-Jewish
    persons.
        The Government organizes events to encourage tolerance and respect
    among religions. In April and May, the Government hosted the first
    meeting of the ``Traveling Faculty of the Religions of the Book'' at
    Al-Akhawayn University in Ifrane.
        The Government annually organizes in May the ``Fez Festival of
    Sacred Music,'' which includes musicians from many religions. The
    Government has organized in the past numerous symposiums among local
    and international clergy, priests, rabbis, imams and other spiritual
    leaders to examine ways to reduce religious intolerance and to promote
    interfaith dialog. Each year during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan,
    the King hosts colloquiums of Islamic religious scholars to examine
    ways to promote tolerance and mutual respect within Islam and between
    Islam and other religions.
        In late August, the King declared in a nationally televised speech
    that 100 mosques throughout the country would be used as teaching
    centers to fight illiteracy. In the first (and pilot) year of the
    announced program, 10,000 citizens between the ages of 15 and 45 were
    to receive literacy courses on Islam, civic education, and hygiene. If
    successful, the program was expected to be expanded to include a larger
    part of the population in subsequent years. The King designated 200
    unemployed university graduates to administer the literacy courses
    during the program's pilot stage, which began in September.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement; however, the Government restricts this right in certain
    areas. The gendarmerie maintains checkpoints throughout the country, at
    which drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations are examined for
    validity. Although checkpoints have been maintained in the same places
    for years, the degree of inspections of motorists has relaxed, while
    the emphasis on inspecting trucks and buses continues. In addition
    while there are continuing allegations that gendarmes demand small
    bribes to clear vehicles, press reports indicate that gendarmes found
    guilty of such behavior are punished. In 1998 the Gendarmerie Royale
    began a campaign to combat such abuses within its ranks. In the
    Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, authorities restrict movement in
    areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
        The Ministry of Interior restricts freedom to travel outside the
    country in certain circumstances. In addition all civil servants and
    military personnel must obtain written permission from their ministries
    to leave the country. The OMDH and AMDH have compiled lists of
    individuals who reportedly have been denied passports or who have
    passports but are denied permission to travel. In February the AMDH
    reported in the French-language weekly Quotidien du Maroc on 33 past
    and previous cases in which the Interior Ministry has blocked the
    issuance of passports to former political prisoners. On February 26,
    the OMDH issued a communique protesting a lack of governmental action
    on outstanding passport cases. The OMDH contended that the Government,
    in resorting to arbitrary administrative delays, continues to harass
    former political prisoners who seek to resume normal lives. The OMDH
    also alleged that some citizens were forbidden by the Government to
    leave Moroccan territory during the year. The communique listed no
    names.
        In March the investigative French-language weekly Le Journal
    reported on two cases of former leftist political activists and
    political prisoners who were unable to renew their passports. Pardoned
    in 1992, Abdellah El-Harrif, the national secretary of a far-left
    political party unrecognized by the Government, discovered during a
    passport-renewal procedure that the authorities have sought his
    whereabouts since 1996. Despite numerous inquiries to the Government to
    determine the reason behind his particular status, El Harrif reportedly
    had not received a response by year's end. However, he remained free to
    continue his professional and political life without hindrance, and is
    free to travel within the country. El Harrif's deputy, Mostapha Brahma,
    reported similar difficulties. Brahma has been without a passport since
    1994, the year of his pardon, and has received no answer from the
    Interior Ministry, Human Rights Ministry, or the CCDH regarding the
    nonissuance of his passport. According to press reports in November, a
    former prisoner who was convicted in 1996 for ``threatening the sacred
    institution of the monarchy'' and freed 3 years later, still was
    waiting to receive his passport a year after submitting a passport
    request.
        According to press reports, before, during, and after their
    February 2 operation in the village of Tarmilet (48 miles from the
    capital) to remove striking workers from a water-bottling factory, a
    reported 1,000 security forces encircled and sealed off the village.
    Gendarmes erected blockades and strictly controlled access to the
    village. According to the AMDH, security forces maintained checkpoints
    near the village well after the February 2 confrontation with workers.
    The operation, which involved a large-scale military presence and
    reportedly was led by senior military officers, took place after a
    court order in January had ruled in favor of the factory owners, who
    had charged the protesting workers with interruption of means of
    production and obstructing the freedom to work. Dozens of strikers and
    members of the security forces were injured during the operation, in
    which security forces used rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons
    to remove strikers and their supporters from the factory and access
    areas (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.b.).
        After 11 years of house arrest for refusing to acknowledge the
    religious authority of then-King Hassan II, Islamist dissident Sheikh
    Abdessalam Yassine was permitted to leave his Sale home on May 16 (see
    Sections 1.d., 2.a, and 2.c.).
        Moroccans may not renounce their citizenship, but the King retains
    the power--rarely used--to revoke it. Tens of thousands of Moroccans
    hold more than one citizenship and travel on passports from two or more
    countries. While in Morocco, they are regarded as Moroccan citizens.
    Dual nationals sometimes complain of harassment by immigration
    inspectors.
        The Government welcomes voluntary repatriation of Jews who have
    emigrated. Moroccan Jewish emigres, including those with Israeli
    citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The Government also encourages the
    return of Sahrawis who have departed Morocco due to the conflict in the
    Western Sahara, provided that they recognize the Government's claim to
    the region. The Government does not permit Western Saharan nationalists
    who have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. While Morocco has from time to time provided political asylum
    to individuals, the issue of first asylum never has arisen. There were
    no reports of forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee
    status.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Constitutional provisions establishing periodic free elections
    notwithstanding, citizens do not have the full right to change their
    government. The King, as head of state, appoints the Prime Minister,
    who is the titular head of government. Constitutional changes in 1992,
    retained in the Constitution of 1996, authorize the Prime Minister to
    nominate all government ministers, but the King has the power to
    replace any minister at will. The Parliament has the theoretical
    ability to effect change in the system of government. However, the
    Constitution may not be changed without the King's approval. The
    Ministry of Interior appoints the provincial governors and local caids
    (district administrative officials). Municipal and regional councils
    are elected.
        The Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi is the
    first government formed from the political opposition since the late
    1950's, and his 1998 appointment by then-King Hassan II marked a
    significant step toward increased democratization. With the support of
    the Monarchy, Youssoufi, who was sentenced to death in absentia in the
    1970's but subsequently received a royal pardon in 1980, has declared
    his intention to modernize the administrative and judicial structures
    and to liberalize the economic and political system. Of the 41 cabinet-
    level posts in the Government that Youssoufi appointed in 1998, only 4
    posts (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Islamic Affairs) plus
    the Secretary General of the Government and the Minister-Delegate for
    Defense Administration were filled by holdovers from the former
    Government. In 1999 King Mohammed VI replaced one of the four
    holdovers, Interior Minister Driss Basri. In order to develop reforms,
    the King granted cabinet ministers a greater degree of responsibility
    for the management of their individual portfolios. In September Prime
    Minister Youssoufi consolidated his Cabinet to include fewer
    ministerial areas of responsibility. The Government now consists of 33
    cabinet-level posts, but still contains 6 ``sovereign'' ministerial
    posts directly appointed by the King (Interior, Foreign Affairs,
    Justice, Islamic Affairs, Defense Administration, and Secretary General
    of the Government).
        Morocco created a bicameral legislature in 1997. Fourteen parties
    have members in Parliament, and 7 are represented in the governing
    coalition. While opposition parties urged in 1996 and 1997 that all
    members of Parliament be elected directly by the citizenry, then-King
    Hassan II proposed in 1996 the creation of a bicameral legislature, in
    which all members of the lower house would be elected through universal
    suffrage and the upper house by various regional, local, and
    professional councils.
        In June 1997, Morocco held municipal council elections, followed by
    balloting for regional professional councils. In the wake of the June
    1997 elections, political parties accused each other of manipulation
    and vote-buying, and claimed government intervention on behalf of
    candidates. The Election Commission examined numerous petitions during
    the course of the electoral season in 1997 and recommended the reversal
    of over 60 municipal election results, including in Tangier, Khoribga,
    and Oujda, noted irregularities in four parliamentary races in
    Casablanca, Chefchaouen, and Fez, and called for the results to be set
    aside. The OMDH criticized the prominent role of the Interior Ministry
    in the June 1997 elections, as well as the numerous allegations of
    vote-buying, both by the Government and political parties, electoral
    list manipulation by the Government, and electoral card falsification.
        In August 1997, then-King Hassan II convoked a special session of
    Parliament to ratify two laws creating a bicameral assembly, and, in
    the same month, Parliament unanimously approved these laws, which
    created a 325-seat lower house, the Chamber of Representatives, to be
    filled by direct elections, and a 270seat upper house, the Chamber of
    Deputies, whose members would be elected by various directly elected
    professional and regional councils. There were widespread, credible
    allegations of votebuying and government manipulation in the November
    1997 legislative elections. The fraud and government pressure tactics
    led most independent observers to conclude that the election results
    were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the Government. All
    opposition parties criticized the Government, and some called for a
    boycott of Parliament. Two winners renounced their seats, alleging
    unsolicited government interference on their behalf. The Election
    Commission concurred that irregularities had occurred in two Casablanca
    cases and recommended that new elections be held in those districts.
    After a long appeals process initiated by the losers of the seats, new
    elections for the seats were held on August 31, as well as elections
    for four other seats throughout the country. The new elections followed
    the formal invalidation of the six 1997 election results throughout the
    year by the Constitutional Council. Press reports indicate that the
    August 31 by-elections overall proceeded more fairly than in 1997,
    despite allegations that two of the races involved some cases of vote-
    buying. Also in August, the Constitutional Council invalidated an
    additional by-election held in the Casablanca-Mechouar district in June
    that allegedly involved vote-buying. Despite the invalidations by the
    Constitutional Council throughout the year, the body continued to
    attract criticism for the alleged slow pace of its deliberations.
        On September 15, Morocco held indirect elections to replace, for
    the first time since the body's inception, one third of the 270 seats
    in the Chamber of Counselors. After the polls had closed, Interior
    Minister Midaoui reported in a nationally televised press conference
    that various political parties had engaged in votebuying and fraud.
    Criticizing the electoral corruption, Minister Midaoui claimed that his
    ministry had done everything it could to prevent fraudulent practices,
    including conducting investigations into 108 cases, at least 26 of
    which the Interior Ministry was certain involved fraud. The Interior
    Minister also reported that the Ministry had turned the cases over to
    the Justice Ministry for further action, and that the Government ``is
    going to do its duty.'' However, by year's end, few of the cases
    involving electoral fraud had been presented before the courts and
    prosecuted. According to press reports, the Constitutional Council also
    had received several hundred grievances relating to the election from
    throughout the country.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There is 1
    female minister delegate in the 33-member Cabinet. There are no women
    among the 325 members of the Chamber of Representatives, and only one
    woman in the 270-seat Chamber of Counselors. Women occupy only 84 out
    of 22,000 seats (or .34 percent) of local communal councils throughout
    the country.
        In March for the first time in the country's history, King Mohammed
    VI appointed a female royal counselor. In August the King also
    appointed a woman to head the National Office of Oil Research and
    Exploration, an office created as part of the Government's efforts to
    exploit newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the east. In September
    the King confirmed the first-ever female ministerial appointment; she
    is to be responsible for a newly reorganized ministry overseeing the
    status of women, the first time a ministry has been charged explicitly
    with the issue. In October the King appointed the first woman to head
    the National Office of Tourism.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are three nationally organized and officially recognized
    nongovernmental human rights groups: The Moroccan Organization for
    Human Rights, the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights
    (LMDDH), and the Moroccan Association for Human Rights. A fourth group,
    the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDDH), was formed in
    1992 by former AMDH members. There are also numerous regional human
    rights organizations. The Government maintains close and collaborative
    relations with all of these groups.
        Founded in the 1979 and 1988, respectively, the AMDH and OMDH have
    spent years struggling to end human rights abuses. During this time,
    they were subjected to harassment and restrictions by the Government.
    Some of their former leaders now occupy high posts in the Youssoufi
    Government, particularly in the human rights field. In May the
    Government accorded the two organizations ``public utility'' status,
    which confers organizations financial benefits as recognition of their
    serving the public interest.
        In October the OMDH hosted a regional congress on protecting human
    rights defenders and promoting democracy in the Arab world. The
    congress was attended by Arab jurists and the Human Rights Minister.
    The congress called for constitutional reforms throughout the Arab
    world that would protect democracy and ensure public freedoms.
        During the weekend of December 9-11, security forces throughout the
    country used violent means to disperse human rights activists, members
    of the JCO, and unemployed graduates who separately gathered in Rabat
    and other large cities to demonstrate for different reasons. On
    December 9, human rights activists from the AMDH and FMVE gathered
    before the Parliament to demand trials for those responsible for past
    arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, and torture. Security forces
    violently attacked the demonstrators with truncheons and arrested about
    40 persons. Security forces also reportedly confiscated journalists'
    photography equipment. After spending 1 night in jail, 39 of the
    detained protesters appeared before the court of first instance in
    Rabat the following day and were released that evening. The Government
    pressed charges against 33 of the demonstrators; the trial was
    scheduled for February 2001. The AMDH's president, Abderrahmane
    Benameur, who was among those arrested and released, condemned the use
    of violence by security forces, characterizing such violence as ``a
    step backward in human rights.'' On December 17, the AMDH filed a
    lawsuit in Rabat's administrative court against the Government for
    banning its demonstration. On December 10, the FIDH issued a communique
    in which it expressed its ``extreme concern'' regarding the
    Government's suppression of peaceful gatherings (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.d., 1.e., 2.a., and 2.b.).
        Two new prominent national human rights NGO's, the FMVE and the
    ONPM, were formed in 1999. Created by victims of forced disappearance
    and surviving family members, the FMVE's principal goal is to encourage
    the Government to address openly the issue of past forced
    disappearances and arbitrary detention. It also lobbies for reparations
    for former political prisoners that extend beyond financial
    compensation. Created by lawyers, doctors, journalists, former inmates,
    and entertainment personalities, the ONPM's main purpose is improving
    the treatment and living conditions of prisoners. ONPM also supports
    penal reform efforts. Both the FMVE and the ONPM maintained
    collaborative relations and fairly regular contact with government
    authorities throughout the year.
        In March the Moroccan Barrister's Association opened a human rights
    center in Rabat. The Human Rights Minister and other government
    officials attended its opening. The barrister's association plans to
    use the center to train lawyers in human rights laws and standards. The
    center is to undertake studies on reforming existing legal texts to
    ensure harmonization with international human rights conventions.
    Additionally, the center intends to track and monitor court cases and
    verdicts with human rights implications.
        On December 8, the Government signed an agreement with the
    Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM) to cooperate on gender
    equality programs.
        Amnesty International has local chapters in Rabat, Casablanca, and
    Marrakech. These chapters participate in AI international letter-
    writing campaigns involving issues outside Morocco. In September AI
    held a national youth forum outside the capital that focused on human
    rights awareness training and children's rights. The Government hosted
    a visit by AI secretary general Pierre Sane in June 1999, during which
    Sane met with senior government officials and announced that AI would
    consider Morocco as a site for a regional office and would hold its
    International Congress in Marrakech later that year. However, later in
    June 1999, articles in the French and domestic press reported that the
    Government had decided not to host the conference, allegedly because of
    fears that AI delegates would organize protests in Rabat concerning the
    human rights situation in the Western Sahara. The conference was not
    held. Amnesty International chose Lebanon as the site for its regional
    office, which opened in the fall.
        In the latter part of the year, the Government and Amnesty
    International discussed and signed two cooperation agreements on human
    rights education and public awareness. In September Human Rights
    Minister Aujjar received an Amnesty International delegation from
    Norway, which presented a draft 10-year program on cooperation for the
    country's new focus on human rights education. Amnesty International
    and the Government still were negotiating an official agreement on the
    draft program at year's end. The Government and the Moroccan chapter of
    Amnesty International signed a similar cooperation agreement on a human
    rights public awareness program on December 9, the 52nd anniversary of
    the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
        According to the MAP news agency, the Paris-based International
    Federation of Human Rights Leagues decided in March to hold its next
    world congress in Morocco, reportedly because of the country's progress
    in the area of human rights. FIDH officials visited the country in
    January to meet with Human Rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar, Prime
    Minister Youssoufi, and other government officials, and to discuss
    preparations for the congress, which was scheduled to take place in
    January 2001. The FIDH's world congress reportedly is the first to be
    held by an international human rights organization in the Arab world.
        In Cairo in March, the Arab League Council chose the Moroccan
    academic and jurist Khalid Naciri as the next president of the Arab
    Commission for Human Rights. Naciri is to occupy the post for 2 years,
    heading the commission's review of human rights questions in the Arab
    world. Naciri was a founding member of the OMDH and once served as its
    president.
        In October at its general assembly session held in Cairo, the Arab
    Human Rights Organization (OADH) elected two Moroccans to serve 3-year
    posts on the organization's Council of Secretaries. The two Moroccans
    also are active members of the OMDH. Also in October, the International
    Committee of the Red Cross, in collaboration with the Ministry of
    National Education and Boston University, conducted a pilot program to
    introduce the teaching of international humanitarian law to educators.
    The program is part of the Government's current efforts to reform the
    education system, including by integrating the teaching of human rights
    into the national curriculum.
        In April U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
    visited the country to attend an international conference on national
    human rights institutions and to open a U.N.-sponsored human rights
    information center. During her visit, her second in as many years,
    Robinson said that while there still were problems to resolve,
    particularly with respect to unemployment and the plight of women, the
    country had achieved ``significant progress'' in human rights during
    the past 2 years.
        At the end of her stay, Robinson inaugurated the opening of a
    center for human rights documentation, training, and information.
    Cosponsored by the Human Rights Ministry, the U.N. Commission on Human
    Rights, and the U.N. Development Program, the center is intended to
    operate as an independent entity and to provide a framework for dialog
    between governmental and nongovernmental bodies concerned with human
    rights. The center's work is to be directed toward persons involved in
    the application and implementation of laws related to human rights,
    including police officers, judges, lawyers, and representatives of
    human rights advocacy NGO's.
        Prime Minister Youssoufi chairs a human rights commission that
    reviews cases of past and present human rights issues. The commission
    is composed of members of the Government, including the Ministers of
    Justice, Human Rights, and Interior.
        The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights, a 10-year-old
    advisory body to the King, counsels the Palace on human rights issues,
    and was the organization charged by the King to resolve cases related
    to persons who had disappeared. The CCDH is composed of five working
    groups responsible for promoting the protection of human rights. They
    include groups on penal law; prison conditions; communications with
    human rights NGO's; inhuman conditions of refugees in Polisario-
    controlled camps in Tindouf, Algeria; and economic, social, and
    cultural rights. In his annual Throne Day speech on July 30 and again
    in a December 9 speech before the CCDH in commemoration of the 52nd
    anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, King Mohammed
    announced plans to reform the Council's structures, responsibilities,
    and working methods. Critics of the CCDH welcomed the King's
    announcements on the recomposition of the Council, which they have long
    maintained lacks true independence and the political will to address
    openly and fairly sensitive human rights issues. None of the announced
    reforms of the CCDH had been instituted by year's end.
        Throughout the year, the Human Rights Ministry held human rights
    awareness training sessions with educators and some police personnel.
    The sessions were directed at school inspectors at both the primary and
    secondary school levels. Up to 75 additional such training sessions are
    planned; the inspectors in turn are expected to transfer the training
    to teachers for integration into their teaching programs. Officials at
    the Human Rights Ministry state that some police officers and other
    enforcement officials also are being trained. The Government increased
    efforts to introduce human rights as a core subject of the national
    school curriculum during the year; in September Human Rights Minister
    Aujjar stated that the Government planned to establish an experimental
    phase-in program during the 2000-2001 school cycle, with plans for
    human rights to become a core component of the national curriculum
    within the next 2 years.
        In September the country cohosted a human rights training seminar
    for representatives of Arab governments and nongovernmental
    organizations in the Arab world. The seminar included discussions on
    education in human rights, education in democracy, and the rights of
    women in the Arab world.
        In January the Human Rights Ministry announced its intention to
    open, in collaboration with the Moroccan Barristers Association, a
    network of support centers charged with providing legal and
    psychological assistance to needy citizens. Targeted at children and
    women who have suffered physical or psychological violence, the centers
    are to be staffed by doctors, lawyers, psychologists, and teachers.
    Officials at the Human Rights Ministry say that the Ministry also
    intends to involve the participation of police officers at the centers.
    The primary mission of the centers is to provide quick, effective, and
    direct assistance to those in difficult situations, with an emphasis on
    clients' legal rights. The centers were scheduled to open in early
    2001.
        Also in January, Mohamed Said Saadi, then-Secretary of State for
    Social Protection, the Family, and Children, announced his department's
    plans, in collaboration with the European Union, to open a national
    center dealing with women's issues. The center would provide training,
    documentation, and information on women's issues. Saadi also announced
    the creation of bureaus within government ministries that would be
    responsible for overseeing the respect for equal employment and
    promotion opportunities for women.
        At the end of October, the Ministry of Human Rights hosted a
    conference in Rabat on ``Human Rights, Cultural Identities and Social
    Cohesion in the Mediterranean Region,'' which represented a follow-up
    to a dialog initiated in 1995. Attended by Morocco's human rights
    community and European leaders, such as former Portuguese President
    Mario Soares and former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, the 2-
    day conference focused on issues in the Mediterranean region such as
    human rights, migration, culture, and the impact of economic
    development on human rights.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Although the Constitution states that all citizens are equal, non-
    Muslims and women face discrimination in the law and traditional
    practice.
        Women.--Spousal violence is common. Although a battered wife has
    the right to file a complaint with the police, as a practical matter
    she would do so only if prepared to bring criminal charges. While
    physical abuse is a legal ground for divorce, a court only grants it if
    the woman is able to provide two witnesses to the abuse. Even medical
    certificates are not sufficient. If the court finds against the woman,
    she is returned to her husband's home. Consequently, few women report
    abuses to the authorities.
        The Criminal Code provides for severe punishment for men convicted
    of rape or sexually assaulting a woman or a girl. The defendants in
    such cases bear the burden of proving their innocence. However, sexual
    assaults often go unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss
    of virginity. While not provided for by law, victims' families may
    offer rapists the opportunity to marry their victims in order to
    preserve the honor of the family. The law is more lenient toward men
    with respect to crimes committed against their wives; for example, a
    light sentence may be accorded a man who murders his wife after
    catching her in the act of adultery. However, ``honor crimes,'' a
    euphemism that refers to violent assaults with intent to commit murder
    against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant behavior, are
    extremely rare.
        In February local police in the city of Azrou in the Middle Atlas
    region, initiated an operation against prostitution, which resulted in
    a series of arrests of prostitute, arraignments of brothel leaders, and
    closings of brothels that previously had been tolerated (see Section
    6.f.).
        Women suffer various forms of legal and cultural discrimination.
    The civil-law status of women is governed by the Code of Personal
    Status (sometimes referred to as the ``Moudouwana''), which is based on
    the Malikite school of Islamic law. Although the Code of Personal
    Status was reformed in 1993, women's groups still complain of unequal
    treatment, particularly under the laws governing marriage, divorce, and
    inheritance.
        In order to marry, a woman generally is required to obtain the
    permission of her ``tuteur,'' or legal guardian, usually her father.
    Only in rare circumstances may she act as her own ``tuteur.''
        It is far easier for a man to divorce his wife than for a woman to
    divorce her husband. Under Islamic law and tradition, rather than
    asking for a divorce, a man simply may repudiate his wife outside of
    court. Under the 1993 reforms to the Code of Personal Status, a woman's
    presence in court is required in order for her husband to divorce her,
    although women's groups report that this law frequently is ignored.
    However, human rights activists reported that in one NGO-sponsored test
    in the late 1990's, officials refused to order a divorce without the
    wife being present, despite offers of bribes. Nevertheless, women's
    groups complain that men resort to ruses to evade the new legal
    restrictions. The divorce may be finalized even over the woman's
    objections, although in such cases the court grants her unspecified
    allowance rights.
        A woman seeking a divorce has few practical alternatives. She may
    offer her husband money to agree to a divorce (known as a khol'a
    divorce). The husband must agree to the divorce and is allowed to
    specify the amount to be paid, without limit. According to women's
    groups, many men pressure their wives to pursue this kind of divorce. A
    woman also may file for a judicial divorce if her husband takes a
    second wife, if he abandons her, or if he physically abuses her.
    However, divorce procedures in these cases are lengthy and complicated.
    In November 1998, the Minister of Islamic Affairs proposed the
    institutionalization of additions to the basic marriage contract that
    would outline the rights and duties agreed upon between husband and
    wife and permit legal recourse for the enforcement of the contract.
        Under the Criminal Code, women generally are accorded the same
    treatment as men, but this is not the case for family and estate law,
    which is based on the Code of Personal Status. Under the Code of
    Personal Status, women inherit only half as much as male heirs.
    Moreover, even in cases in which the law provides for equal status,
    cultural norms often prevent a woman from exercising those rights. For
    example, when a woman inherits property, male relatives may pressure
    her to relinquish her interest.
        While many well-educated women pursue careers in law, medicine,
    education, and government service, few make it to the top echelons of
    their professions. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the
    work force, with the majority in the industrial, service, and teaching
    sectors. In 1998 the Government reported that the illiteracy rate for
    women was 67 percent (83 percent in rural areas), compared with 41
    percent for men (50 percent in rural areas). Women in rural areas
    suffer the most from inequality. Rural women perform difficult physical
    labor. Girls are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys,
    especially in rural areas, where the quality of schooling is inferior
    to urban areas and demands on girls' time for household chores often
    prevent school attendance. Some families also keep girls at home
    because of rural schools' lack of facilities. However, women who do
    earn secondary school diplomas have equal access to university
    education.
        The Government and the King continued to promote their proposal to
    reform the Personal Status Code in order to advance women's rights.
    Islamists and some other traditional segments of society firmly opposed
    the proposal, especially with respect to its more controversial
    elements, such as reform of women's legal status in marriage and family
    law issues. On March 12, an estimated 50,000 demonstrators marched
    peacefully in Rabat in observance of the International Day for Women
    and in support of political reform in the area of women's rights. On
    the same day, Islamist groups organized a peaceful counterdemonstration
    in Casablanca that drew an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons
    protesting such reform (see Section 2.b.). In October the Denmark-based
    Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network repeated concerns expressed by
    domestic civil society organizations late in the year about the future
    of the proposal to reform the Personal Status Code. According to the
    EMHRN, the plan to integrate women into the development process that
    the Government prepared in its discussions with civil society ``has
    been pushed to one side.''
        According to press reports and reliable sources, in early July, an
    unspecified number of imams of state-administered mosques sermonized
    against the social work of Aicha Ech-Chenna, president of the NGO
    Feminine Solidarity, and attacked her character; during prayer
    services, one of these imams allegedly threatened Ech-Chenna. Ech-
    Chenna's NGO primarily focuses on encouraging the social reintegration
    of marginalized and abandoned single mothers with illegitimate
    children. Some opposed to Ech-Chenna's work have characterized it as
    encouraging prostitution. After the reported attack on EchChenna's
    character and other threats, a group of domestic NGO's issued a
    communique in late July that criticized ``any attempt to use religion
    and mosques to subdue the voice of women.'' The communique also held
    the Government primarily ``responsible for anything that occurs within
    mosques.'' According to reliable sources, the Ministry of Islamic
    Affairs took disciplinary actions against the imam who had threatened
    Ech-Chenna, stripping him of his position and removing him from the
    mosque. In early November, at the beginning of the third annual
    ``Solidarity Campaign'' to help impoverished and needy citizens, the
    King decorated Ech-Chenna for her social work.
        In January Mohamed Said Saadi, then-Secretary of State for Social
    Protection, the Family, and Children, announced his department's plans,
    in collaboration with the European Union, to open a national center
    dealing with women's issues. The center would provide training,
    documentation, and information on women's issues. Saadi also announced
    the creation of bureaus within government ministries that would be
    responsible for overseeing the respect for equal employment and
    promotion opportunities (See Section 4). The national center was
    scheduled to open in Rabat in early 2001.
        According to a 1997 government survey, 76 NGO's work to advance
    women's rights and to promote women's issues. Among these are the
    Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action,
    and the Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, which advocate
    enhanced political and civil rights, as well as numerous NGO's that
    provide shelters for battered women, teach women basic hygiene, family
    planning, and child care, and educate illiterate women.
        Children.--The law provides for compulsory education for children
    between the ages of 7 and 13; however, not all children between these
    ages attend school due to family decisions and shortfalls in government
    resources, and the Government does not enforce the law. The Government
    conducts an annual campaign to vaccinate children against childhood
    diseases.
        The Government has had difficulty addressing the problem of child
    labor (see Section 6.d.). Young girls in particular are exploited as
    domestic servants. Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been
    estimated in the thousands by NGO activists (see Section 6.f.). The
    clientele consists of both foreign tourists and citizens. More young
    girls than boys are involved; however, young boys also work as
    prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). The practice of adoptive servitude, in
    which urban families employ young rural girls and use them as domestic
    servants in their homes, is prevalent. Credible reports of physical and
    psychological abuse in such circumstances are widespread. Some
    orphanages have been charged as knowing accomplices in the practice.
    More often parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters to
    wealthier urban families and collect the salaries for their work as
    maids. Adoptive servitude is accepted socially, is unregulated by the
    Government, and has only recently begun to attract public criticism.
    However, at the end of the year, the Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the
    National Observatory of Children's Rights (ONDE), presided by Princess
    Lalla Meryem, began a human rights awareness campaign regarding the
    plight of child maids. The campaign received widespread and extensive
    media exposure, including coverage in official publications.
        Another problem facing orphans of both sexes is their lack of civil
    status. Civil status is necessary to obtain a birth certificate,
    passport, or marriage license. In general men are registered at local
    government offices; their wives and unmarried children are included in
    this registration, which confers civil status. If a father does not
    register his child, the child is without civil status and the benefits
    of citizenship. It is possible for an individual to self-register;
    however, the process is long and cumbersome. While any child,
    regardless of parentage, may be registered within a month of birth, a
    court order is required if registration does not take place in that
    time. Abandoned children sometimes receive kafala (state-sponsored
    care).
        Several NGO's, including the Bayti Association and the Moroccan
    League for the Protection of Children, work to improve legal protection
    for children and to help at-risk children. In December the French
    Government awarded Najat Mjid, Bayti's president of 17 years, France's
    prestigious Human Rights Award in recognition of her activism on behalf
    of Moroccan children. Also in December, the United Nations nominated
    Mjid for the post of Special Rapporteur on the Traffic and Exploitation
    of Children. There are several shelters in the major cities that
    provide food and lodging for street children, while other NGO's work to
    reduce the exploitation of street children and to cure those street
    children with drug addictions.
        People with Disabilities.--A high incidence of disabling disease,
    especially polio, has resulted in a correspondingly high number of
    disabled persons. Current statistics from the Government estimate the
    number of disabled persons in Morocco at 2.2 million, or 7 percent of
    the population. While the Ministry of Social Affairs attempts to
    integrate the disabled into society, in practice this is left largely
    to private charities. The annual budget for the ministerial department
    in charge of disabled affairs is only .01 percent of the overall annual
    budget. Even nonprofit special-education programs are priced beyond the
    reach of most families. Typically, disabled persons are supported by
    their families; some survive by begging. The Government continued a
    pilot training program for the blind sponsored in part by a member of
    the royal family. In March the Government created a special commission
    for the integration of the disabled, presided over by Prime Minister
    Youssoufi. The commission is responsible for developing programs that
    facilitate societal integration of disabled persons. Also in March, the
    Government organized a ``National Day of the Disabled,'' which is aimed
    at increasing public awareness of issues affecting the disabled. On
    March 30, King Mohammed VI visited a center for disabled children in
    the Khemisset province and donated $720,000 (7,200,000 dirhams) to a
    project to expand the center's activities. There are no laws mandating
    physical changes to buildings to facilitate access by the disabled.
        On July 26 and again on September 12, police used force to break up
    protests by disabled, unemployed university graduates (see Sections
    1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution affirms, and
    the Government respects, the legal equality of all citizens. The
    official language is Arabic. Both French and Arabic are used in the
    news media and educational institutions. Science and technical courses
    are taught in French, thereby precluding the large, monolingualArabic-
    speaking population from participation in such programs. Educational
    reforms in the past decade have stressed the use of Arabic in secondary
    schools. Failure to transform the university system to a similar extent
    has led to the disqualification of many students from higher education
    in lucrative fields. This especially is true among the poor, for whom
    French training is not always affordable.
        About 60 percent of the population claim Berber heritage. Berber
    cultural groups contend that Berber traditions and the Berber language
    (which consists of three dialects) rapidly are being lost. Their
    repeated requests to King Hassan II to permit the teaching of Berber
    languages in the schools led to a 1995 royal speech authorizing the
    necessary curriculum changes; however, such changes have not been
    implemented. Official media broadcast in the Berber language for
    limited periods each day.
        In 1996 a number of Berber associations issued a communique
    petitioning the Government to recognize their language as an official
    language and to acknowledge their culture as a part of Moroccan
    society. These associations claimed that the Government refuses to
    register births for children with traditional Berber names, discourages
    the public display of the Berber alphabet, limits the activities of
    Berber associations, and continues to Arabize the names of towns,
    villages, and geographic landmarks. The Government thus far has made no
    response to the petition, although Prime Minister Youssoufi
    acknowledged Berber culture as an integral part of Moroccan identity in
    a speech before Parliament in 1998. A full page of a major national
    newspaper is devoted on a monthly basis to articles and poems on Berber
    culture, which are printed in the Berber language, although with Latin
    script.
        On March 14, the Government prevented a sit-in before the
    Parliament by two Berber NGO's, Tamaynout and the Moroccan Association
    for Research and Cultural Exchange(AMREC). The two NGO's filed a
    declaration for the sit-in on March 13; however, they received a letter
    later the same day from the Wali of Rabat banning the sit-in on the
    grounds that it threatened public order and security.
        In late 1999, Tamaynout published a report on violations of the
    cultural rights of Berber. As evidence the report cited the refusal of
    the authorities to recognize Berber names and to use the Berber
    language in commercial advertisements, and threats by the authorities
    of physical abuse if shop owners displayed such advertisements in their
    establishments. According to Tamaynout, Massinisa, a related NGO based
    in Tangiers, was contacted by government authorities and threatened on
    the evening before its congress. The report also stated that the
    government television channel 2M did not broadcast any Berber-language
    programs, despite the fact that Berbers pay taxes for the channel in
    the form of payments for other government-provided services. In its
    report, Tamaynout asked for government recognition of the Berber
    language and an end to harassment of Berber associations.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Although workers are free to
    establish and join trade unions, the unions themselves are not
    completely free from government interference. About half a million of
    the country's 9 million workers are unionized in 17 trade union
    federations. Three federations dominate the labor scene: The Union
    Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the Confederation Democratique du Travail
    (CDT), and the Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UCTM). The
    UMT has no political party affiliation. The CDT is affiliated with the
    ruling Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Prime Minister Youssoufi,
    and the UGTM with the Istiqlal party, the second partner in the ruling
    coalition. It is widely believed that the Ministry of Interior has
    informants within the unions who monitor union activities and the
    election of officers. Sometimes union officers are subject to
    government pressure. Union leadership does not always uphold the rights
    of members to select their own leaders. There has been no case of the
    rank and file voting out its current leadership and replacing it with
    another.
        Workers have the right to strike and do so. Work stoppages normally
    are intended to advertise grievances and last 24 to 72 hours or less.
    In May a report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted
    that there were allegations of violations of the right of association
    and threats to freedom of opinion and speech. The report cited arrests
    and jailings of union members as examples of violations of the right of
    association. The report also noted allegations that the Government
    hampered collective bargaining by its civil servants.
        In addition to numerous short-term strikes intended to highlight
    grievances, there were a number of narrowly focused work stoppages
    during the year. During a February 2 operation in the village of
    Tarmilet (48 miles from the capital), security forces used force,
    including rubber bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, to remove
    striking workers who had blockaded a water bottling factory to protest
    layoffs of temporary workers. The operation, which involved a large-
    scale military presence and reportedly was led by senior military
    officers, took place after a court order in January had ruled in favor
    of the factory owners, who charged the protesting workers with
    interruption of means of production and obstructing the freedom to
    work. Dozens of strikers and members of the security forces were
    injured during the operation. Security forces also reportedly arrested
    random passersby in addition to more than a dozen factory workers.
    According to sources in the Government, the workers and passersby later
    were released without charge. The Democratic Confederation of Workers
    trade union, which is aligned politically with the ruling USFP party,
    reported that security forces also detained two of its regional
    delegates 2 weeks after the February 2 incident. The two officials
    reportedly were freed by royal pardon on May 1 (Moroccan Labor Day)
    while an investigation into the incident was still ongoing. The owner
    of the factory and others involved in the incident reportedly claimed
    that security forces resorted to force only after the protesters
    initiated violence against unarmed police (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
    1.f., 2.b., and 2.d.).
        Arrested and jailed on charges of forming a criminal gang and
    setting a vehicle on fire during a national truckers strike in June
    1999, Sadok El Kihal, a trucker and regional bureau member of the UGTM,
    contacted the AMDH after his May 4 release with accusations that he had
    been arrested, jailed, tortured, and falsely convicted by authorities
    (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
        On November 27, security forces reportedly used violent means to
    break up a 5-day sit-in strike at a canning factory in the southern
    city of Agadir. The attack reportedly resulted in the death of one
    worker and injuries to eight others. Conflicting reports attributed the
    death to either police abuse or ``natural causes.'' There were
    confirmed reports that police arrested 21 of the strikers, 17 of whom
    were women, and ransacked the striking workers' dormitories inside the
    canning facility. All but one of the strikers later was released. The
    strikers were protesting their employer's alleged negligence in failing
    to pay its social security contributions. According to press reports,
    the striking personnel reportedly obeyed Labor Code regulations in
    filing an intent-to-strike notification 5 days before the November 22
    strike. Members of the striking workers' trade union and politicians
    affiliated with it called on the Prime Minister to initiate an
    immediate investigation into the incident and free those detained.
    According to the workers' trade union, within 1 week after the
    incident, the cannery already had hired 60 new workers to replace the
    strikers.
        In August during labor unrest near Casablanca, the nephew of a
    private transportation company owner drove a bus into a crowd of
    striking workers, killing 3 persons and wounding 12, in an attempt to
    end the occupation and obstruction of the company's bus depot. The
    workers were demonstrating to have their salaries increased to the
    level of the new national minimum wage and to compel the company to
    make its contributions to the national social security administration,
    as required by law. Government security forces arrested the nephew and
    son of the owner, the owner himself, and local thugs the company
    allegedly hired to intimidate the strikers. The owner's daughter also
    was charged in the case. An investigation into the affair was opened,
    and the Palace announced that it would offer $10,000 (100,000 dirhams)
    to the families of each of the victims. The AMDH and the OMDH issued a
    joint press release encouraging the Government to ensure due process
    and enforce the rule of law. Union leaders sent a letter to the King
    and the Cabinet criticizing the attack and seeking their intervention
    to salvage labor-management relations throughout the country. There
    were no further developments in the ongoing investigation by year's
    end.
        Unions may sue to have labor laws enforced, and employers may sue
    unions when they believe that unions have overstepped their authority.
        Unions belong to regional labor organizations and maintain ties
    with international trade union secretariats. The UMT is a member of the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    organize and bargain collectively is implied in the constitutional
    provisions on the right to strike and the right to join organizations.
    Trade union federations compete among themselves to organize workers.
    Any group of eight workers may organize a union and a worker may change
    union affiliation easily. A work site may contain several independent
    locals or locals affiliated with more than one labor federation.
        In general the Government ensures the observance of labor laws in
    larger companies and in the public sector. In the informal economy,
    such as in the family workshops-dominated handicrafts sector, employers
    routinely ignore labor laws and regulations, and government inspectors
    lack the resources to monitor violations effectively.
        The laws governing collective bargaining are inadequate. Collective
    bargaining has been a longstanding tradition in some parts of the
    economy, such as the industrial sector, and is becoming more prevalent
    in the service sector, including banking, health, and the civil
    service. The wages and conditions of employment of unionized workers
    generally are set in discussions between employer and worker
    representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of workers are
    set unilaterally by employers.
        Employers wishing to dismiss workers are required by law to notify
    the provincial governor through the labor inspector's office. In cases
    in which employers plan to replace dismissed workers, a government
    labor inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of workers
    who protest their dismissal. Any worker who is dismissed for committing
    a serious infraction of work rules is entitled by law to a court
    hearing.
        There is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination.
    Under the ostensible justification of ``separation for cause,''
    employers commonly dismiss workers for union activities that are
    regarded as threatening to employer interests. The courts have the
    authority to reinstate such workers, but are unable to enforce rulings
    that compel employers to pay damages and back pay. Ministry of Labor
    inspectors serve as investigators and conciliators in labor disputes,
    but they are few in number and do not have the resources to investigate
    all cases. Unions have resorted increasingly to litigation to resolve
    labor disputes.
        Labor law reform is such a controversial issue that a draft revised
    labor code has remained under discussion among the social partners and
    in parliamentary committee for more than 20 years.
        Labor law applies equally to the small Tangier export zone. The
    proportion of unionized workers in the export zone is about the same as
    in the rest of the economy, roughly 5 percent.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is prohibited by royal decree, and when authorities become aware
    of instances of forced labor, courts enforce the decree; however, in
    practice the Government lacks the resources to inspect all places of
    employment to ensure that forced labor is not being used, and forced
    labor persists in the practice of adoptive servitude.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but
    does not enforce this prohibition effectively. The practice of adoptive
    servitude, in which families employ young girls and use them as
    domestic servants, is socially accepted, and the Government does not
    regulate it. Credible reports of physical and psychological abuse in
    such cases are widespread (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.). Forced
    prostitution occurs, especially in cities with large numbers of
    tourists (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--In October the Government ratified ILO Convention 182,
    which prohibits the worst forms of child labor. Abuse of child labor
    laws is common, particularly in the informal sector. Education is
    compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 13, although not all
    children attend school. Special regulations pertain to the employment
    of children between the ages of 12 and 16. In practice children often
    are apprenticed before age 12, particularly in the informal handicraft
    industry. The use of minors is common in the small family-run workshops
    that produce rugs, ceramics, wood work, and leather goods. Children,
    particularly rural girls, also are employed informally as domestic
    servants and usually receive little or no wages. Safety and health
    conditions, as well as wages in businesses that employ children often
    are substandard. The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children;
    however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively (see
    Section 6.c.). The practice of adoptive servitude often is
    characterized by physical and psychological abuse (see Sections 5,
    6.c., and 6.f.). The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the
    Ministry of Health and with the support of UNICEF, is pursuing a
    strategy to ensure basic education and health services for child
    workers.
        Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing child
    labor regulations, which generally are well observed in the
    industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the
    inspectors are not authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic
    servants. The Government maintains that the informal handicrafts sector
    is difficult to monitor.
        The Government lacks the resources to enforce laws against child
    labor, and there is general acceptance of the presumption that, to
    properly learn traditional handicraft skills, it is necessary for
    children to start working at a young age. In addition many citizens
    claim that having children working to learn a craft is better than
    having them live on the streets, where they sometimes turn to juvenile
    delinquency, prostitution, and substance abuse.
        In September authorities in Fez announced plans to open four
    centers for the protection of children handicraft workers. Cosponsored
    by UNICEF, the centers are to provide children's rights education to
    child workers, their families, and employers. The centers are to take
    in street children and provide them with handicraft training and
    recreational opportunities. Health services for children also are
    planned for each center. One center opened in late September and three
    others were scheduled to open by the end of March 2001.
        In 1997 the Government announced a new voluntary labeling system
    for carpet exports to certify that no child labor was involved in
    production. The system is cosponsored by German rug importers. However,
    the Government does not monitor nonparticipating handicraft producers
    that violate child labor laws.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The threat of a general strike
    in April led to negotiations among the Government, the Employers
    Association, and the labor confederations over increasing the minimum
    wage and improving health and social benefits. All three parties agreed
    to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage effective July 1, raising
    it to approximately $180 (1,800 dirhams) per month in the
    industrialized sector and to approximately $9 (90 dirhams) per day for
    agricultural workers; however, not all private sector businesses had
    implemented the agreed-upon wage increase by year's end. Neither the
    minimum wage for the industrialized sector nor the wage for
    agricultural workers provides a decent standard of living for a worker
    and family, even with government subsidies for food, diesel fuel, and
    public transportation. Unions continue to appeal unsuccessfully for a
    minimum wage of approximately $200 (2,000 dirhams). In many cases,
    several family members combine their income to support the family. Most
    workers in the industrial sector earn more than the minimum wage. They
    generally are paid between 13 and 16 months' salary, including bonuses,
    each year.
        The minimum wage is not enforced effectively in the informal and
    handicraft sectors. However, as a result of the agreement reached in
    the April negotiations, the Government no longer pays less than the
    minimum wage to workers at the lowest civil service grades. To increase
    employment opportunities for recent graduates, the Government allows
    firms to hire them for a limited period through a subsidized internship
    program at less than the minimum wage.
        The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek with no more than
    10 hours worked in any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid
    public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and
    safety, including a prohibition on night work for women and minors. As
    with other labor regulations and laws, these are not observed
    universally.
        Occupational health and safety standards are rudimentary, except
    for a prohibition on the employment of women in certain dangerous
    occupations. Labor inspectors attempt to monitor working conditions and
    accidents, but lack sufficient resources. While workers in principle
    have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
    health and safety without jeopardizing their continued employment,
    there were no reports of any instances in which a worker attempted to
    exercise this right.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons; under the Penal Code, perpetrators are
    prosecuted either as scam artists, corrupters of minors, or persons who
    force others into prostitution.
        Prostitution is prevalent and forced prostitution occurs,
    particularly in cities with large numbers of tourists, as well as near
    towns with large military installations. In 1998 a case was reported in
    which a girl allegedly had been held against her will and forced to
    work for 5 years in a brothel in Hajeb until she escaped at age 19.
        According to the Party of Progress and Socialism's French-language
    daily newspaper Al-Bayane, in February local police in the city of
    Azrou in the Middle Atlas region, initiated a surprise operation
    against prostitution there. Coming after the nomination of a new
    director to lead the Interior Ministry's regional security force, the
    operation resulted in a series of arrests of prostitute, arraignments
    of brothel leaders, and closings of brothels that previously were
    tolerated. Al-Bayane claimed that Azrou is home to numerous brothels
    that lure vulnerable women in desperate situations (see Section 5.).
        Forced prostitution involving Moroccans also occurs abroad. In 1999
    a Moroccan woman who had been recruited to be a domestic servant in
    Saudi Arabia, escaped a prostitution ring there and informed police,
    which led to the arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended family
    group numbering about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans had been
    involved in organizing similar such activities throughout the Persian
    Gulf region.
        Voluntary teenage prostitution in urban centers has been estimated
    in the thousands by NGO activists. The clientele consists of both
    foreign tourists and citizens. More young girls than boys are involved;
    however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see Section 5).
        The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families employ young
    girls and use them as indentured servants, is prevalent and accepted
    socially, and the Government does not regulate it. Reports of physical
    and psychological abuse in such cases are widespread; reports of sexual
    abuse are less frequent. Some orphanages have been charged as knowing
    accomplices in providing these young child maids; however, more often,
    parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters as maids to
    wealthier urban families and collect their salaries (see Sections 5 and
    6.d.).
        Several domestic NGO's, as well as a branch of Terre Des Hommes, a
    Swiss-based international NGO, help victims of trafficking by assisting
    and rehabilitating street children, educating delinquents and runaways,
    assisting single mothers to become financially independent, educating
    youths and prostitutes about the dangers of unprotected sex, and
    advocating women's rights issues.
                                   __________

                                 WESTERN SAHARA

        The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a
    dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, an
    organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan
    Government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the
    Western Sahara after Spain withdrew from the area in 1975, and extended
    its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab after
    Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. The Moroccan Government has
    undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara
    as part of its long-term efforts to strengthen Moroccan claims to the
    territory.
        Since 1973 the Polisario Front has challenged the claims of Spain,
    Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces
    fought intermittently from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment
    to the area of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent, known by its French
    initials, MINURSO.
        In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory
    opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while
    some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, the ties
    were insufficient to establish ``any tie of territorial sovereignty''
    between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court added
    that it had not found ``legal ties'' that might affect the applicable
    U.N. General Assembly resolution regarding the decolonization of the
    territory, and, in particular, the principle of selfdetermination for
    its people. Most Sahrawis (as the majority of persons living in the
    territory are called) live in the area controlled by Morocco, but there
    is a sizable refugee population near the border with Morocco in
    Algeria, and, to a lesser extent, in Mauritania. The majority of the
    Sahrawi population lives within the area delineated by a Moroccan-
    constructed berm, which encloses most of the territory.
        Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the
    sovereignty question collapsed in 1984 when the OAU recognized the
    Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the civilian arm of the Polisario
    Front. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest.
        In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted the U.N. plan for
    a referendum that would allow the Sahrawis to decide between
    integration with Morocco or independence for the territory. The
    referendum was scheduled for January 1992, but was postponed because
    the parties were unable to agree on a common list of eligible voters--
    despite the previous acceptance by both parties of an updated version
    of the Spanish census of 1974 as the base for voter eligibility. A
    complicated formula for determining voter eligibility ultimately was
    devised and, in August 1994, MINURSO personnel began to hold
    identification sessions for voter applicants.
        The initial U.N voter identification effort ended in December 1995
    and, after several fruitless efforts to persuade the two parties to
    cooperate, the U.N. Security Council formally suspended the
    identification process in 1996. The United Nations and friendly
    governments continued to urge the two parties to seek a political
    solution to the conflict. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi
    Annan appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his
    personal envoy to examine possible approaches for a peaceful
    settlement. Baker visited the region, and negotiations between the
    Moroccan Government and the Polisario began in May 1997. In September
    1997, representatives of Morocco and the Polisario met in Houston in
    the United States and consented to a series of compromise agreements on
    the 1991 U.N. settlement plan to hold a referendum under U.N. auspices.
    According to the Houston Accords, the identification of potential
    voters, the referendum campaign, and the vote were to take place by
    December 1998; however, operational considerations again delayed the
    scheduled referendum, and Annan's latest reports to the Security
    Council during the year expressed doubt that the referendum could be
    held before 2002.
        In August 1998, MINURSO completed identification of voters in all
    uncontested tribal groupings. In November 1998, the U.N. Secretary
    General visited the region to examine ways to achieve compromise on
    several contested elements of the settlement plan in order to move the
    referendum process forward. After his consultations, the Secretary
    General proposed a series of measures in December 1998 to both parties.
    The measures proposed were aimed at establishing procedures among the
    parties to allow MINURSO to begin the identification process of three
    ``contested tribes.'' After agreement between the parties was reached
    on the contested tribes, MINURSO began the identification process of an
    additional 65,000 potential voters. The identification process of the
    three contested tribes was completed in December 1999. Only 4 percent
    of the applicants in this phase of the identification process were
    deemed eligible to vote in the referendum. Roughly 80,000 appeals also
    have been registered by those who were deemed ineligible to vote after
    the first round of the identification process. Approximately 50,000
    additional appeals were filed after the completion of the
    identification process for the 3 ``contested tribes,'' bringing the
    total number of appeals to nearly 130,000. MINURSO has not yet begun to
    adjudicate appeals from the identification process, due to continuing
    differences between the parties over who should be eligible to appeal,
    on what grounds, and by what process.
        As the end of MINURSO's mandate drew near in February, U.N.
    Secretary General Kofi Annan urged a review of the situation. Annan
    requested Baker to consult the parties to explore ways to achieve an
    ``early, durable and peaceful'' settlement to their dispute. Baker
    visited Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara in April to consult
    with all of the interested parties. Baker sought to reconcile
    differences over the U.N. Settlement Plan or find other approaches that
    might resolve the dispute. He returned without a consensus and
    described the process as being in the same position as in 1997 and
    1998. At the invitation of Annan, the Government of Morocco and the
    Polisario met in London in May and again in June in an attempt to
    resolve the parties' longstanding differences over the settlement plan,
    and to explore other avenues to resolve their dispute over the
    territory; however, little progress was made. In June Baker called on
    the parties to meet again, emphasizing that consideration should be
    given to finding a solution that reached a compromise between full
    independence for the territory and its full integration with Morocco. A
    technical meeting of the parties in Geneva in July to discuss the
    appeals process, confidence-building measures in the territory, and the
    fate of more than 1,600 Moroccan prisoner's of war (POW's) still held
    by the Polisario also failed to produce any breakthroughs. Annan made
    clear in three reports to the U.N. Security Council during the year
    that disputes between the parties over various issues in the Settlement
    Plan likely would delay the holding of the referendum for the
    foreseeable future.
        Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Layounne, Smara, and Boujdour
    have participated in local elections that are organized and controlled
    by the Moroccan Government. The southern province of Oued Ed-Dahab has
    participated in Moroccancontrolled elections since 1983. Sahrawis whose
    political views are aligned with the Moroccan Government fill all the
    seats allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament.
        The civilian population living in the Western Sahara under Moroccan
    administration is subject to Moroccan law. U.N. observers and foreign
    human rights groups maintain that Sahrawis have difficulty obtaining
    Moroccan passports, that the Government monitors the political views of
    Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan citizens, and that the
    police and paramilitary authorities react especially harshly against
    those suspected of supporting independence and the Polisario Front. The
    Moroccan Government limits access to the territory, and international
    human rights organizations and impartial journalists sometimes have
    experienced difficulty in securing admission.
        After years of denying that Sahrawis were imprisoned in Morocco for
    Polisario-related military or political activity, the Government of
    Morocco released more than 300 such prisoners in 1991. Entire families,
    and Sahrawis who had disappeared in the mid-1970's, were among those
    released. The Government of Morocco has failed to conduct a public
    inquiry or to explain how and why those released spent up to 16 years
    in incommunicado detention without charge or trial. The former Sahrawi
    detainees have formed an informal association whose principal objective
    is to seek redress and compensation from the Government of Morocco for
    their detention. A delegation of this association continued to meet
    with various government officials, human rights organizations, members
    of the press, and diplomatic representatives in both Rabat and in
    Layounne during the year. They reported that little progress has been
    made in gaining the Moroccan Government's recognition of their
    grievances. However, in July the Government, through the Arbitration
    Commission of the Royal Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH), began
    distributing preliminary compensation payments to Sahrawis who had
    disappeared or been detained in the past, and their family members. The
    Government announced that it intended such initial payments to be
    provisional funds for Sahrawis with urgent medical or financial needs
    who had appealed for compensation by December 31, 1999, and that more
    compensation could be distributed pending the results of the
    Commission's review of petitions by Sahrawi claimants. However, only a
    small number of those Sahrawis who formerly had disappeared or been
    detained have filed compensation claims because of their perceptions
    that the process is flawed administratively and one-sided in favor of
    the Government.
        In December 1999, Moroccan security forces that reportedly were
    dispatched from Rabat detained one Sahrawi in the Western Saharan city
    of Laayoune and two Sahrawis in the southern Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan
    and Agadir. The Government alleged that the three were spies for the
    Polisario Front. They reportedly were held for 8 days before their
    appearance in an Agadir court and before their families were informed
    of their detention. Family members and the Moroccan Association for
    Human Rights (AMDH) claimed that the arrests were a violation of human
    rights and due process, and proof that forced disappearances still
    occur in Morocco. A public trial was convened abruptly on May 30 after
    a lengthy and largely unpublicized police investigation that originally
    was to have culminated in a proceeding before a military tribunal.
    However, the case ultimately was tried in Agadir's court of first
    instance, and the three Sahrawis were convicted of threatening the
    internal security of the State and sentenced to 3 to 4 years in prison.
    According to a lawyer who represented the Sahrawis, during the trial
    the three defendants denied any relations with the Polisario Front,
    contradicting government allegations that the three confessed during
    their postarrest detention. During an appellate hearing on July 5, at
    the request of the public prosecutor all three were given 4-year
    sentences. On September 27, security forces in civilian dress detained
    a fourth Sahrawi at the Laayoune airport as he was about to board a
    flight to the Canary Islands. According to the Sahrawi's daughter, who
    witnessed the incident, two members of the security forces drove away
    with her father in a car with Casablanca license plates. Almost 10 days
    later, the Sahrawi reappeared in Agadir and was charged before the
    court of first instance for spying for the Polisario Front. Two days
    later, the fourth Sahrawi was sentenced to 4 years in prison for
    threatening the internal security of the State.
        On April 5, a Moroccan civil court in the Western Sahara city of
    Laayoune sentenced five Sahrawi youth to prison terms of between 5 and
    10 years for the ``formation of a criminal association'' after their
    alleged participation in a March 4 stone-throwing incident in Laayoune.
    Reliable sources said that the incident was spontaneous, unorganized,
    and lasted only 5 minutes.
        The stone-throwing demonstration followed similar protests by
    Sahrawi students in several southern Moroccan and Western Sahara cities
    at the end of February and in early March, which security forces
    brutally dispersed in violent clashes. The February and March
    demonstrations came in response to the December 1999 incarceration of
    three Sahrawis accused of spying for the Polisario Front. Attendees at
    the trial, human rights activists, and an attorney for the five
    defendants criticized the handling of the trial, particularly the
    court's refusal to hear witnesses for the defense who allegedly could
    corroborate claims by at least two of the defendants that they were not
    present at the demonstrations. The court allegedly based its judgment
    on police reports and the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom
    reportedly could not identify positively the accused; the other was not
    present at the trial, but claimed that he saw in his rear view mirror a
    youth throwing a bottle at his car. The prosecution reportedly did not
    present a bottle as evidence nor did it present a witness who could
    testify that any of the five accused had thrown the bottle. The
    authorities claimed that the youths threw rocks at several vehicles,
    including one belonging to peacekeepers from the MINURSO contingent
    based in Laayoune, and attempted to set fire to a truck. However, the
    youths were acquitted of the arson charge during the trial. An attorney
    for the youths, who maintained that the prosecution produced no
    evidence of an incriminating act, stated that ``the verdict had nothing
    to do with justice.'' The attorney also alleged that the judicial
    police investigating the affair committed several illegal acts by
    unlawfully entering homes of the accused and detaining them, torturing
    them during their detention, and forcing them under duress to sign
    police reports, which they were not allowed to read and which contained
    falsehoods. The decision was appealed before the court of appeals in
    Laayoune, which reportedly sent it to the Supreme Court in Rabat. A
    hearing on the case had not been held by year's end. Families of the
    five youths also sent a letter to the Moroccan royal palace in May
    requesting a royal pardon; however, the King took no action by year's
    end.
        In its annual human rights report released in June, Amnesty
    International noted that some members of the Moroccan security forces
    in Morocco and the Western Sahara who were involved in several cases of
    torture were arrested and prosecuted. However, the organization also
    noted that ``in the majority of cases, investigations were either not
    opened into complaints and allegations of torture . . . or were opened
    but dismissed without adequate investigation.''
        During the year, there were no new developments related to police
    abuses committed in the Western Sahara city of Laayoune in September
    and October 1999, when police authorities there used brutal force to
    break up demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates,
    miners, and former Sahrawi political prisoners who were protesting a
    variety of social grievances. Police detained roughly 150 persons
    during the protests in September 1999 and 31 in October 1999. Police
    subjected some of those who were detained during violence in September
    1999 to systematic beatings and other forms of physical coercion. Most
    of those detained were released; however, 26 persons were charged and
    sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison on charges of destruction of
    property during the protests. Despite appeals lodged by defense lawyers
    during the year, none of these sentences were reduced or overturned.
        In the aftermath of the September 1999 protests, King Mohammed VI
    immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved the local
    police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security forces to
    the city to help restore order. A new royal commission was dispatched
    quickly to Laayoune in early October 1999 to explain to local residents
    proposed new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which
    would allow local residents more choice in their affairs, and to
    announce a new election to choose members to a proposed new royal
    advisory council on the Western Sahara.
        Despite the actions taken to restore confidence and order and to
    lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out in late October 1999. There
    were credible reports that the police provoked the violence, and there
    were further credible reports that police authorities unlawfully
    entered homes to arrest persons associated with the demonstrations in
    September 1999. Police reportedly detained 31 persons. Of these
    individuals, 10 persons reportedly were released within 24 hours and
    the remainder released within the following 2-week period. There was no
    investigation during the year into the excessive use of force by the
    police during either September 1999 or October 1999. There was also no
    progress during the year on local elections to choose members to the
    proposed new royal advisory council on the Western Sahara that the King
    had announced in October 1999.
        A number of other Sahrawis remain imprisoned for peaceful protests
    supporting Saharan independence. Youths released in previous years
    report that the Moroccan police continue to monitor them closely.
        The Polisario Front claims that the Moroccan Government continues
    to hold several hundred Sahrawis as political prisoners and
    approximately 300 as POW's. However, the Government of Morocco formally
    denies that any Sahrawi former combatants remain in detention.
    Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    have stated that Morocco indeed has released all Polisario former
    combatants. A committee that represents former Sahrawi prisoners also
    believes that the Government of Morocco no longer holds any of those
    Sahrawis who were detained illegally during the 1970's and 1980's. The
    committee based this determination on interviews with family members of
    individuals who had been detained during that period.
        The Government of Morocco claims that 30,000 Sahrawi refugees are
    detained against their will by the Polisario in camps around Tindouf,
    Algeria. The Polisario denies this charge. According to credible
    reports, the number of refugees in Tindouf far exceeds 30,000, but the
    allegation that they wish to leave remains unsubstantiated.
        The ICRC reported that the Polisario now holds 1,481 Moroccan
    POW's. A group of 185 POW's was repatriated to Morocco in a
    humanitarian airlift conducted under ICRC auspices in November 1995. In
    April 1997, Polisario leaders offered to release 85 Moroccan POW's as a
    good will gesture during U.N. envoy Baker's first meetings in Tindouf,
    but Morocco and the Polisario could not agree on the conditions of
    their release. On February 25, the Polisario released 186 Moroccan
    POW's, many of whom had been in detention for more than 20 years.
    Another 201 were released to the ICRC and repatriated to Morocco on
    December 14. The U.N. settlement plan calls for the release of all
    POW's after the voter identification process is complete. Foreign
    diplomats and representatives of international organizations privately
    urged the Polisario throughout the year to release the remaining
    Moroccan POW's, and emphasized that their continued detention 9 years
    after the cessation of hostilities was a violation of their human
    rights. During visits to the POW camps outside Tindouf, Algeria in
    April and November, the ICRC determined that all the Moroccan POW's
    were in extremely bad health. There also are credible reports that the
    Polisario authority used the POW's in forced labor. The Polisario
    leadership has refused to comply with repeated requests that all of the
    POW's be released on humanitarian grounds, despite the fact that most
    of the POW's have been in detention for more than 20 years and that
    their health was deteriorating seriously due to the poor conditions
    under which they are held.
        There were no new cases of disappearance for the fourth consecutive
    year in that part of the Western Sahara under Moroccan administration.
    While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the
    Government of Morocco and its policies occurred over several decades,
    the Government in 1998 pledged to ensure that such policies do not
    recur, and to disclose as much information as possible on past cases.
    Many of those who disappeared were Sahrawis or Moroccans who challenged
    the Government's claim to the Western Sahara, or other government
    policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret detention
    camps. Although the Government released more than 300 such detainees in
    June 1991 and in October 1998 issued an announcement on those who had
    disappeared, hundreds of Sahrawi and Moroccan families still do not
    have any information about their missing relatives, many of whom
    disappeared over 20 years ago (see Section 2.b. of the Morocco report).
    On July 17, the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights
    Leagues (FIDH) published a communique in which it claimed that
    disappearances of Sahrawis in the Western Sahara could number up to
    1,500, although conditions in the territory prevented full confirmation
    of this figure.
        Freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and
    association remain very restricted in the Western Sahara. According to
    Amnesty International, Moroccan authorities continue to deny the
    registration of the independent newspaper Sawt Al-Janoub.
        Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara is limited in
    militarily sensitive areas, both within the area controlled by the
    Government of Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario. Both
    Moroccan and Polisario security forces sometimes subject travelers to
    arbitrary questioning. There were no reports of detention for prolonged
    periods during the year.
        During the year, Amnesty International and news articles in
    Morocco-based media highlighted the deteriorating situation in
    Polisario Front camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria, where
    freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association, and movement
    remain very restricted.
        There is little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara. The
    same labor laws that apply in Morocco are applied in the Moroccan-
    controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions are present in
    the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara but are not active. The 15
    percent of the territory outside Moroccan control does not have any
    major population centers or economic activity beyond nomadic herding.
    The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of Labor, is
    not active in the Western Sahara.
        A group of phosphate miners participated in the demonstrations in
    Layounne in September and October 1999. They claimed that the
    government-owned phosphate company, for which they work, has failed to
    respect a contract that had been negotiated between the miners and the
    company's former Spanish management when Spain withdrew from the
    territory and relinquished control of the mines to Morocco. The miners
    stated that they held a series of meetings in late 1999 with officials
    of the government-owned phosphate company after the demonstrations, but
    that no agreement was reached about enforcement of what they believed
    to be their contractually protected rights.
        There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining
    agreements during the year. Most union members are employees of the
    Moroccan Government or state-owned organizations. They are paid 85
    percent more than their counterparts outside the Western Sahara as an
    inducement to Moroccan citizens to live there. Workers in the Western
    Sahara were exempt from income and value-added taxes and received
    subsidies on such commodities as flour, oil, sugar, fuel, and
    utilities.
        Moroccan law prohibits forced labor, which does not appear to exist
    in the Western Sahara.
        Regulations on the minimum age of employment are the same as in
    Morocco. Child labor appears to be less common than in Morocco,
    primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ
    children, such as rug-knotting and other traditional handicrafts. A
    government work program for adults, the Promotion Nationale, provides
    families with enough income that children need not be hired out as
    domestic servants. Children in the few remaining nomadic groups
    presumably work as shepherds along with other group members.
        The minimum wage and maximum hours of work are the same as in
    Morocco. However, in practice workers in some fish processing plants
    may work as many as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the
    10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum stipulated in Moroccan law.
    Occupational health and safety standards are the same as those enforced
    in Morocco. They are rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the
    employment of women in dangerous occupations.
                                   __________

                                      OMAN

        The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al
    Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no
    political parties, but does have one representative institution, which
    is directly elected by voters selected by the Government. The current
    Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in 1970.
    Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important policy
    issues, he has brought tribal leaders--even those who took up arms
    against his family's rule--and other notables into the Government. In
    accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much decisionmaking is by
    consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan established a 59-seat
    Consultative Council, or Majlis Al-shura, which replaced an older
    advisory body. Beginning with the September elections, Council members
    are chosen directly by the vote of 175,000 government-selected
    electors. The Council was expanded to 83 seats for the September
    elections. The Council has no formal legislative powers but may
    question government ministers, even during unrehearsed televised
    hearings, and recommend changes to new laws on economic and social
    policy, which sometimes leads to amendments to proposed decrees. In
    December 1997, the Sultan appointed 41 persons as members of the new
    Council of State (Majlis Al-Dawla), which with the current Consultative
    Council forms the bicameral body known as the Majlis Oman (Council of
    Oman). In late 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the country's
    ``Basic Charter'' (also known as the Basic Law), which provides for
    citizens' basic rights in writing for the first time. The courts are
    subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence.
        The internal and external security apparatus falls under the
    authority of the Royal Office, which coordinates all intelligence and
    security policies. The Internal Security Service investigates all
    matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman Police, whose head
    also has cabinet status, performs regular police duties, provides
    security at airports, serves as the country's immigration agency, and
    maintains a small coast guard. In the past, there were credible reports
    that security forces occasionally abused detainees.
        Since 1970 Oman has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive
    economic progress and improve public access to health care, education,
    and social services. The economy is mixed, with significant government
    participation in industry, transportation, and communications. The
    Government seeks to diversify the economy and stimulate private
    investment.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
    some areas; however, its record was poor in other areas, particularly
    with respect to citizens' rights to change or criticize the Government.
    Human rights abuses have included mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary
    arrest, prolonged detention without charge, and the denial of due
    process; however, there were no reports of such abuses during the year.
    The Government restricted freedom of expression and association and did
    not ensure full rights for women and workers.
        The 1996 Basic Charter provides for many basic human rights, such
    as an independent judiciary, and freedoms of association, speech, and
    the press. The Basic Charter states that the Government was to strive
    to issue all enabling laws within 2 years of November 1996; however,
    this has not occurred. Only certain laws pertaining to the legal code
    for family and interpersonal relationships, to judicial reform, and to
    aspects of the Finance Ministry, had been enacted by year's end. There
    has been no public statement made by the Government noting the end of
    the 2-year period since issuance of the Basic Charter and proposing a
    new target date for implementation.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There have been allegations in the past that the security
    forces abused some detainees, particularly during interrogation. The
    abuse does not appear to have been systematic and often varied
    depending upon the social status of the victim, the official involved,
    and the location of the incident (for example, whether the abuse
    occurred in a rural or an urban area). The authorities have made
    efforts to prevent such abuse, and there were no confirmed incidents of
    such abuse in recent years. Unlike in previous years, there were no
    reports that detainees sometimes were left in isolation with promises
    of release or improved treatment as a means to elicit confessions or
    information. Judges have the right to order investigations of
    allegations of mistreatment. The 1996 Basic Charter, which has not yet
    been implemented in this area, specifically prohibits ``physical or
    moral torture'' and stipulates that all confessions obtained by such
    methods are to be considered null and void. There were no reports of
    torture during the year.
        On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical force
    to control demonstrations and some arrests were made.
        Prison conditions appear to meet minimum international standards.
    In the past, access to some prisoners was restricted severely.
        The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The police may obtain
    warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so.
    However, within 24 hours of arrest, the authorities must obtain court
    orders to hold suspects in pretrial detention, and the police are
    required to file charges or ask a magistrate judge to order continued
    detention. However, in practice the police do not always follow these
    procedures. Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow
    investigation and may grant extensions if necessary. There is a system
    of bail. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for certain legal and
    procedural rights for detainees; however, these provisions have yet to
    be implemented.
        Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado
    detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a
    detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker--the worker's
    sponsor--of the detention. Sometimes notification is made only just
    prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous
    week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the
    accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court
    building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and
    family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to
    ensure that security officials allow such visits.
        On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical force
    to control demonstrations and some arrests were made.
        The Government does not practice exile as a form of punishment. The
    1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning
    exile have yet to be implemented.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1996 Basic Charter affirms the
    independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts are
    subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence. The Sultan
    appoints all judges, acts as a court of final appeal, and intercedes in
    cases of particular interest, especially in national security cases.
    However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has
    overturned a decision of the magistrate courts or the commercial
    courts.
        The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate
    misdemeanors and criminal matters; the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts,
    which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance,
    and which are administered by the Ministry of Justice; the commercial
    courts; the Labor Welfare Board; and the Rent Dispute Committee, which
    hears tenant-landlord disputes.
        The magistrate court system was established by royal decree in 1984
    to take over all criminal cases from the Shari'a courts; it is
    independent and its president reports directly to the Sultan. Regional
    courts of first instance handle misdemeanor cases, which are heard by
    individual judges. All felonies are adjudicated at the Central
    Magistrate Court in Muscat by a panel made up of the President of the
    Magistrate Court and two judges. All rulings of the felony panel are
    final except for those in which the defendant is sentenced to death.
    Death sentences must be approved by the Sultan.
        The Criminal Appeals Panel also is presided over by the President
    of the Magistrate Court in Muscat, and includes the court's vice
    president and two judges. This panel hears appeals of rulings made by
    all courts of first instance. In the past, specially trained
    prosecutors from the Royal Oman Police (ROP), all of whom are trained
    as policemen as well as prosecutors carried out the role of public
    prosecutor in criminal cases; however, as a step toward implementing a
    November 1999 Royal decree affirming the independence of the judiciary,
    prosecutors were made independent of the ROP.
        The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There
    are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering
    cases into the criminal system, or any legal provision for a public
    trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and precedents
    in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide
    defendants with the written charges against them; defendants are
    presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and confront
    witnesses. The prosecution and the defense direct questions to
    witnesses through the judge, who is usually the only person to question
    witnesses in court. A detainee may hire an attorney but has no explicit
    right to be represented by counsel.
        The 1996 Basic Charter affirms both right to counsel and
    government-funded legal representation for indigents; however, these
    provisions have yet to be implemented, and the Government does not pay
    for the legal representation of indigents. Judges often pronounce the
    verdict and sentence within 1 day of the completion of a trial.
    Defendants may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines
    over the equivalent of $1,300 (480 rials) to a three-judge panel.
    Defendants accused of national security offenses and serious felonies
    do not have the right of appeal.
        A State Security Court tries cases involving national security and
    criminal cases that the Government decides require expeditious or
    especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided
    over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the
    Security Court are not permitted to have legal representation present.
    The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings are not
    disclosed publicly. The Court does not follow legal procedures as
    strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists
    form the panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of leniency,
    including in political cases.
        The Shari'a courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice, and
    apply Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic
    jurisprudence. Preliminary courts of first instance are located in each
    of the 59 ``wilayats,'' and are presided over by a single judge, or
    qadi. Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving
    prison sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $270 (100
    rials) must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of
    Appeals in Muscat. Panels of three judges hear appeals cases. Court of
    Appeal rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to
    the Supreme Committee for Complaints, which is composed of four
    members, including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the
    Sultanate.
        In 1997 the Government promulgated into law the provisions of the
    1996 Basic Charter pertaining to ``family law,'' i.e., law that falls
    under the purview of the Shari'a courts. The effect of this new law has
    been to regularize the nature of the cases and the range of
    corresponding judgments within the Shari'a court system.
        The Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD),
    better known as the commercial courts system, was established by royal
    decree in 1981 to decide all cases related to commercial matters.
    Subsequent decrees have empowered the commercial courts to decide labor
    disputes referred to it by government departments, commercial disputes
    to which the Government is a party, and arbitration cases involving
    private parties. The ASCD is financially and administratively
    independent of the Ministry of Justice and reports directly to the
    Minister of Commerce and Industry. The ASCD is made up of the Chairman,
    Deputy Chairman, a number of judges appointed by royal decree, and
    members of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cases are heard
    in regional courts for suits involving not more than $27,000 (10,000
    rials).
        In November 1999, the Sultan issued several royal decrees to
    establish a law on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of
    the judiciary as called for in the 1996 Basic Charter. The decrees
    formally established the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical
    system composed of a Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts
    (one located in each region), and, within the primary courts,
    divisional courts. Within each of the courts there are to be divisions
    to handle commercial, civil, penal, labor, taxation, general, and
    personal cases (the latter under Shari'a). The general prosecutor,
    which currently falls under the Royal Omani Police Chief Inspector, is
    to become an independent legal entity. Implementation of these decrees
    is expected to take place in early 2001.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The police are not required by law to obtain search
    warrants. There is a widespread belief that the Government eavesdrops
    on both oral and written communications, and citizens are guarded in
    both areas. Citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of
    Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation
    Council (GCC) countries. Such permission is not granted automatically.
    Delays or denial of permission have resulted in secret marriages within
    Oman. Marriages in foreign countries can lead to denial of entry into
    Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate child from claiming
    citizenship rights.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits criticism of the
    Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerate criticism of
    government officials and agencies, but such criticism rarely receives
    media coverage. The announced 1996 Basic Charter provides for freedom
    of opinion expressed in words, writing, or all other media within the
    limits of the law; however, these provisions have yet to be
    implemented.
        The 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to
    censor all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information
    censors may act against any material regarded as politically,
    culturally, or sexually offensive. Journalists and writers generally
    censor themselves to avoid government harassment. Editorials generally
    are consistent with the Government's views, although the authorities
    tolerate some criticism on foreign affairs issues. The Government
    discourages in-depth reporting on controversial domestic issues and
    seeks to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals by
    subsidizing their operating costs.
        In late 1997, the Government began to permit the entry onto the
    market of foreign newspapers and magazines containing reports or
    statements deemed critical of Oman, including articles critical of the
    Sultan. The lifting of the boycott against Israel in December 1994
    eliminated prohibitions on publications from or about Israel that
    otherwise meet censorship standards. However, in August 1999, the
    Ministry of Information stopped distribution of a London-based, Arabic-
    language magazine that contained an interview with a representative of
    the Israeli trade mission in Oman. Customs officials sometimes
    confiscate video cassette tapes and erase offensive material despite
    the fact that there are no published guidelines on what is viewed as
    ``offensive.'' The tapes may or may not be returned to their owners.
    Government censorship decisions are changed periodically without
    apparent reason. There is a general perception that the confiscation of
    books and tapes at the border from private individuals and restrictions
    on popular novels have eased somewhat; however, it reportedly has
    become more difficult to obtain permission to distribute in the local
    market books that censors decide have factual errors about Oman
    (including outdated maps).
        The Government controls the local radio and television companies.
    They do not air any politically controversial material. The Government
    does not allow the establishment of privately owned radio and
    television companies. However, the availability of satellite dishes has
    made foreign broadcast information accessible to the public. The
    Government, through its national telecommunications company, provides
    full, uncensored Internet access to citizens and foreign residents;
    however, as use of the Internet to express views not normally permitted
    in other media has grown, the Government has taken some steps to
    monitor and control its use. Warnings have appeared on web sites that
    criticism of the Sultan or personal criticism of government officials
    is likely to be censored; however, at least some of these sites have
    operated without apparent interference.
        The appropriate government authority, such as Sultan Qaboos
    University, the police, or the relevant ministry, must approve public
    cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars.
    Most organizations avoid controversial issues due to fear that the
    authorities may cancel their events.
        Academic freedom is restricted, particularly regarding
    controversial matters, including politics. Professors may be dismissed
    for going beyond acceptable boundaries.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law does not
    ensure freedom of assembly; all public gatherings require government
    sponsorship. The authorities do not always enforce this requirement,
    and gatherings sometimes take place without formal government approval.
    Over the course of 8 days in October, rare public demonstrations in
    support of the Palestinians and against Israeli and United States
    policies took place at Sultan Qaboos University and other venues. Most
    demonstrators were young men, and most demonstrations were peaceful.
    Some demonstrations included rock throwing and vandalism of private
    vehicles. On one or two occasions the police used tear gas and physical
    force to control demonstrations and some arrests were made. The
    Government, after 8 days of demonstrations, took quiet action to
    prohibit further demonstrations. Regulations implemented in 1994
    restricting most types of public gatherings remain in effect. The 1996
    Basic Charter provides for limited freedom of assembly, but these
    provisions have not yet been implemented.
        The law states that the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and
    Vocational Training must approve the establishment of all associations
    and their bylaws; however, some groups are allowed to function without
    formal registration. The Government uses the power to license
    associations to control the political environment. It does not license
    groups regarded as a threat to the predominant social or political
    views of the Sultanate. Formal registration of foreign associations is
    limited to a maximum of one association for any nationality. The 1996
    Basic Charter's provisions in this area--not yet in effect--regulate
    the formation of associations. In February a royal decree was
    promulgated that allowed for the formation of nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) in the area of services for women, children, and
    the elderly.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, which is
    affirmed by the 1996 Basic Charter. The 1996 Basic Charter provides
    that Shari'a is the basis for legislation and preserves the freedom to
    practice religious rites, in accordance with tradition, provided that
    such freedom does not breach public order. Discrimination against
    individuals on the basis of religion or sect is prohibited.
    Implementing decrees for the 1996 Basic Charter in this area have not
    yet been established. Non-Muslim religious organizations must be
    registered with the Government and the Government restricts some of
    their activities.
        Most citizens are Ibadhi or Sunni Muslims, but there is also a
    minority of Shi'a Muslims. Non-Muslims are free to worship at churches
    and temples built on land donated by the Sultan. There are many
    Christian denominations, which utilize two plots of donated land on
    which two Catholic and two Protestant churches have been built. Hindu
    temples also exist on government-provided land. Land has been made
    available to Catholic and Protestant missions in Sohar and Salalah.
        In June the departure from the country of a foreign Baha'i due to
    termination of his employment may have been hastened by the
    proselytizing activities of his wife. The authorities requested members
    of the Baha'i community to sign statements that they will not
    proselytize, in accordance with the country's law and custom.
        The Government prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing. It also
    prohibits non-Muslim groups from publishing religious material,
    although religious material printed abroad may be brought into the
    country. Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links
    with coreligionists abroad and undertake foreign travel for religious
    purposes.
        The police monitor mosque sermons to ensure that the preachers do
    not discuss political topics and stay within the state-approved
    orthodoxy of Islam. The Government expects all imams to preach sermons
    within the parameters of standardized texts distributed monthly by the
    Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
    by citizens within the country except to military areas. Foreigners
    other than diplomats must obtain a government pass to cross border
    points. To obtain a passport and depart the country, a woman must have
    authorization from her husband, father, or nearest male relative.
    However, a woman having an Omani identity card (which also must be
    authorized by a male relative) may travel to certain Gulf Cooperation
    Council countries without a passport.
        Until the promulgation of the Basic Charter, the Government did not
    have a policy on refugees or a tradition of harboring stateless or
    undocumented aliens. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits the extradition
    of political refugees; however, this provision has not yet been
    implemented. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
    during the year. Oman offered temporary refuge to several thousand
    Yemenis displaced by a civil war in 1994. They returned to Yemen after
    the war. Tight control over the entry of foreigners into the country
    effectively has screened out would-be refugees.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Oman is an autocracy in which the Sultan retains the ultimate
    authority on all important foreign and domestic issues. The country has
    no formal democratic political institutions, and its citizens do not
    have the ability peacefully to change their leaders or the political
    system.
        The Sultan promulgated the country's first defacto written
    constitution, known as the Basic Charter, in November 1996. Although it
    has immediate force of law, most laws and regulations to implement its
    provisions have not yet been enacted; it is expected that this process
    may take until 2001 or beyond to be completed. The law does not provide
    for political parties or direct elections. Citizens have indirect
    access to senior officials through the traditional practice of
    petitioning their patrons, usually the local governor, or wali, for
    redress of grievances. Successful redress depends on the effectiveness
    of the patron's access to appropriate decisionmakers. The Sultan
    appoints the governors. The Sultan makes an annual 3-week tour of the
    country, accompanied by his ministers. The tour allows the Sultan to
    listen directly to his subjects' concerns.
        In 1991 Sultan Qaboos established a Consultative Council, or Majlis
    Al-shura. In 1994 he expanded the number of Council seats to 80 from
    the original 59, which resulted in the allocation of 2 members for
    districts with a population of more than 30,000. Due to the population
    increase from 1994 to 2000, the number of seats was expanded further to
    82 for the 1997 elections and to 83 for the September elections. Unlike
    in 1999, when the Government selected the Council members from several
    nominees who were elected only by prominent persons in each district,
    the Government established a new system beginning with the September
    elections under which council members, male and female, are elected
    directly by receiving the most votes from eligible voters in their
    districts. In the October 1997 elections, 55,000 men and women, 3
    percent of the total population, were eligible to nominate Council
    members in all districts throughout the country. In the September
    elections, the Government selected more than 175,000 men and women to
    register to vote, of whom 114,000 registered and 100,000 voted. The
    number of eligible female voters increased from 5,000 to 52,000. In
    August a royal decree abolished the prior procedure under which voters
    (or electors) had volunteered as candidates for Council seats, had
    their police records checked by the Government, and relied on
    government approval of their decision to run. If the Sultan decided not
    to appoint them, the nominees with the most votes did not win
    appointment to the Council. Under the new procedures, candidates are
    not subject to government scrutiny, and the Sultan no longer ratifies
    winning candidates. At least two sitting members of the Council were
    excluded from standing for reelection in September because of their
    criticism of ministers during previous council sessions.
        The Council has no formal legislative powers, which remain
    concentrated in the Sultan's hands; however, it serves as a conduit of
    information between the people and the government ministries. No
    serving government official is eligible to be a Council member. The
    Council may question government ministers in public or in private,
    review all draft laws on social and economic policy, and recommend
    legislative changes to the Sultan, who makes the final decision. During
    the year, the membership of the Majlis Al-Dawla (Council of State),
    which was established in 1997, was increased from 41 to 48 members. The
    precise responsibilities of the Council of State and its relationship
    to the existing Consultative Council have yet to be clarified. The
    Council of State and the Consultative Council together form the Majlis
    Oman, or Council of Oman. A royal directive issued in April prohibited
    members of the Council of Oman from serving more than two 3-year terms.
        The Sultan publicly has advocated a greater role for women in both
    the public and private sectors; however, women remained
    underrepresented in government and politics. In the 1997 elections, the
    Government selected two women from among the nominees to serve on the
    Consultative Council. In December 1997, the Sultan appointed 4 women to
    the 41-member Majlis Al-Dawla; during the year he appointed 5 women to
    the now 48-member body. In 1999 the Sultan, for only the second time,
    appointed a woman to the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI)
    board.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government prohibits the establishment of human rights groups.
    The existing restrictions on the freedom of speech and association do
    not permit any activity or speech critical of the Government. There
    were no known requests by international human rights organizations to
    visit.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of
    sex, ethnic origin, race, religion, language, sect, place of residence,
    and social class; however, decrees to implement its provisions have not
    been promulgated. Institutional and cultural discrimination based on
    gender, race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
        Women.--There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse although
    observers say that allegations of such abuse in the Shari'a courts are
    not uncommon. Definitive information is scant and difficult to collect.
    Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse or
    child abuse cases to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint
    with the police but more often seek family intervention to protect them
    from violent domestic situations. Likewise, families seek to intervene
    to keep such problems out of public view. There have been reports that
    employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign women
    employed in such positions as domestic servants and hospital nurses.
    Foreign women employed as domestic servants and garment workers have
    complained that their employers have withheld their salaries and that
    government officials have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to
    investigative procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals
    known to be abusing domestic servants are not always brought to account
    for their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask
    their governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section
    6.e.).
        Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue
    to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women
    hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector
    of the economy, or even inform themselves of their rights. Government
    officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer
    to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative.
    Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country (see
    Section 2.b.).
        Some aspects of Islamic law and tradition as interpreted in the
    country also discriminate against women. Shari'a favors male heirs in
    adjudicating inheritance claims. Many women are reluctant to take an
    inheritance dispute to court for fear of alienating the family.
        Since 1970 conditions for women have improved dramatically in
    several areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the most
    recent figures available from the Ministry of Education report an
    enrollment rate nearing 90 percent for all girls eligible for
    elementary school. In the 1997-98 school year, female students
    constituted approximately 50 percent of the total number of students
    attending public schools. Women constitute roughly half of the 5,000
    students at Sultan Qaboos University. In November 574 women and 497 men
    received bachelor's degrees as members of the 11th graduating class,
    while 2 women and 9 men received master's degrees. The university has a
    quota system with the apparent goal of increasing the number of men
    studying certain specialties. Reportedly, women are being limited to 50
    percent of the seats in the medical department. Restrictions on women
    studying engineering and archeology were lifted in September 1998. The
    quota system is expected to allow women to constitute a majority in
    some other departments.
        Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women
    have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the
    media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants are women; of
    these, 59 percent are citizens. In both the public and private sectors,
    women are entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The
    government bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women,
    observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. Many
    educated women still face job discrimination because prospective
    employers fear that they might resign to marry or raise families. In
    the past, several female employees in the Government have complained
    that they have been denied promotion in favor of less capable men.
    Unlike the case in previous years, when government grants for study
    abroad were limited almost exclusively to males, such grants are now
    awarded based on merit, and in 1999 were divided evenly between men and
    women.
        Within the Government, women's affairs are the responsibility of
    the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training. The
    Ministry provides support for women's affairs through support for and
    funding of the Oman Women's Association (OWA) and local community
    development centers (LCDC's). The OWA consists of 25 chapters with an
    active membership of more than 3,000 women. Typical OWA activities
    include sponsoring health or sociological lectures, kindergarten
    services, and handicraft training programs. The OWA also provides an
    informal counseling and support role for women with divorce-related
    difficulties, girls forced to marry against their will, and women and
    girls suffering from domestic abuse. The main purpose of the 50 LCDC's
    located throughout the country is to encourage women to improve the
    quality of life for their families and to improve their contributions
    to the community. LCDC activities focus on health and sociology
    lectures, child care issues, and agricultural and traditional
    handicraft training programs.
        Children.--The Government has made the health, education, and
    general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school
    education is free and universal but not compulsory. Most children
    attend school through secondary school, to age 18. No significant
    sectors or groups within the population are prevented from receiving an
    education. The infant mortality rate continues to decline, and
    comprehensive immunization rates have risen. There is no pattern of
    familial or other child abuse. Government officials have publicly
    called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse.
        A few communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still
    practice female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health. Experts believe that the number of such cases is
    small and declining annually.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has mandated parking
    spaces and some ramps for wheelchair access in private and government
    office buildings and shopping centers. Compliance is voluntary, yet
    widely observed. Students in wheelchairs have easy access to Sultan
    Qaboos University. The Government has established several
    rehabilitation centers for disabled children. Disabled persons,
    including the blind, work in government offices. While the Government
    now charges a small fee to citizens seeking government health care, the
    disabled generally are not charged for physical therapy and prosthetics
    support.
        Religious Minorities.--Some members of the Shi'a Muslim minority
    claim that they face discrimination in employment and educational
    opportunities. However, some members of this same community occupy
    prominent positions in both the private and public sectors.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the past, citizens of east
    African origin complained that they frequently faced job discrimination
    in both the public and private sectors. Some public institutions
    reportedly favor hiring members of one or another regional, tribal, or
    religious group. However, no group is banned from employment.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The current law stipulates that ``it
    is absolutely forbidden to provoke a strike for any reason.'' The
    Government has not yet promulgated a new labor law that was first
    drafted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in 1994. In the
    last quarter of 1996, the Consultative Council recommended some changes
    to the draft, but the Government has not yet issued the new law.
    Government officials have stated that the new labor law is to be
    consistent with international labor standards.
        Labor unrest is rare. There have not been any known job actions
    within the last 7 years.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The current law
    does not provide for the right to collective bargaining; however, it
    requires that employers of more than 50 workers form a joint labor-
    management committee as a communication forum between the two groups.
    The implementation of this provision is uneven, and the effectiveness
    of these committees is questionable. In general the committees discuss
    such matters as the living conditions at company-provided housing. They
    are not authorized to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of
    employment. Such issues are specified in the work contracts signed
    individually by workers and employers and must be consistent with the
    guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
        The current law defines conditions of employment for some citizens
    and foreign workers. It covers domestic servants and construction
    workers but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that
    expire within 3 months. Foreign workers constitute at least 50 percent
    of the work force and as much as 80 percent of the modern-sector work
    force.
        Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
    Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or
    more workers. Similarly any employer with 50 or more workers must
    establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company,
    any employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the
    Labor Welfare Board. Sometimes worker representatives file collective
    grievances, but most grievances are filed by individual workers. Lower
    paid workers use the procedure regularly. Plaintiffs and defendants in
    such cases may be represented by legal counsel.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1973 Labor Law
    prohibits forced or bonded labor, and although the enabling laws have
    not yet been implemented, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms that forced or
    bonded labor for any person is prohibited; however, governmental
    investigative and enforcement mechanisms are lacking. Foreign workers
    sometimes find themselves in situations amounting to forced labor. In
    such cases, employers withhold letters of release (documents that
    release workers from employment contracts), which allow them to change
    employers. Without such a letter, a foreign worker must continue to
    work for his current employer or become technically unemployed, which
    is sufficient grounds for deportation. Many foreign workers are not
    aware of their right to take such disputes before the Labor Welfare
    Board. Others are reluctant to file complaints for fear of retribution
    from unscrupulous employers. In most cases, the Board releases the
    worker from service and awards compensation for time worked under
    compulsion. Employers face no other penalty than to reimburse the
    worker's back wages.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and instances
    of forced or bonded child labor are unknown.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1973 Labor Law prohibits children under the age of 13
    from working. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor enforces this
    prohibition; however, in practice the enforcement often does not extend
    to some small family businesses that employ underage children,
    particularly in the agricultural and fisheries sectors. Children
    between 13 and 16 years of age may be employed but must obtain the
    Ministry's permission to work overtime, at night, on weekends or
    holidays, or perform strenuous labor. Child labor does not exist in any
    industry.
        Although primary school education is not compulsory, most children
    attend school to age 18 (see Section 5).
        The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor by children
    and it is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
    and Labor issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of
    workers. In July 1998, the Government raised the minimum wage for most
    citizens to about $270 (100 rials) per month, plus $54 (20 rials) for
    transportation and housing. Minimum wage guidelines do not apply to a
    variety of occupational categories, including small businesses that
    employ fewer than five persons, the self-employed, domestic servants,
    dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories
    of manual labor. Many foreigners work in occupations that are exempt
    from the minimum wage law, and the Government is lax in enforcing
    minimum wage guidelines, where applicable, for foreign workers employed
    in menial jobs. However, highly skilled foreign workers frequently are
    paid more than their Omani counterparts.
        The minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual
    laborers and clerks is sufficient to cover living expenses and to
    permit savings to be sent home.
        The private sector workweek is 40 to 45 hours and includes a rest
    period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government workers have
    a 35-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days
    in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week
    and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 per week.
    Government regulations on hours of employment are not always enforced.
    Employees who have worked extra hours without compensation may file a
    complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Board's rulings are
    not binding.
        Every worker has the right to 15 days of annual leave during the
    first 3 years of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers
    provide many foreign nationals, including domestic servants, with
    annual or biannual round trip tickets to their countries of origin.
        All employers are required by law to provide first aid facilities.
    Work sites with over 100 employees must have a nurse. Employees covered
    under the Labor Law may recover compensation for injury or illness
    sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The
    health and safety standard codes are enforced by inspectors from the
    Department of Health and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As
    required by law, they make regular onsite inspections.
        There have been reports that employers or male coworkers have
    sexually harassed and abused foreign females employed in such positions
    as domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as
    domestic servants and garment workers have complained that their
    employers have withheld their salaries and that government officials
    have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to investigative
    procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals known to be
    abusing foreign domestic servants are not always held accountable for
    their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask their
    governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse (see Section 5).
        The law states that employers must not place their employees in
    situations involving dangerous work; however, the law does not
    specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous
    work without jeopardy to his continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                     QATAR

        Qatar, an Arab state on the Persian Gulf, is a monarchy with no
    constitution or political parties. Qatar is governed by the ruling Al-
    Thani family through its head, the Amir. The current Amir, Sheikh Hamad
    bin Khalifa Al-Thani, took power from his father in June 1995 with the
    support of leading branches of the Al-Thani family, and in consultation
    with other leading Qatari families. This transition of authority did
    not represent a change in the basic governing order. The Amir holds
    absolute power, the exercise of which is influenced by religious law,
    consultation with leading citizens, rule by consensus, and the right of
    any citizen to gain access to the Amir to appeal government decisions.
    The Amir generally legislates after consultation with leading citizens,
    an arrangement institutionalized in an appointed advisory council that
    assists the Amir in formulating policy. In 1999 the Amir convened a
    constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would
    provide for parliamentary elections. The committee has met regularly
    and is projected to complete its recommendations by 2002. In March
    1999, citizens were permitted to participate in the election of a
    national body, the Central Municipal Council, for the first time. The
    judiciary is nominally independent, but most judges hold their
    positions at the Government's pleasure.
        The country has efficient police and security services. The
    civilian security force, controlled by the Interior Ministry, comprises
    two sections: The police and the General Administration of Public
    Security and the investigatory police (Mubahathat), which is
    responsible for sedition and espionage cases. The Interior Ministry has
    a special state security investigative unit (Mubahith) that performs
    internal security investigations and gathers intelligence. In addition,
    there is an independent civilian intelligence service (Mukhabarat).
    There were one or two allegations that members of the security forces
    tortured civilians in detention.
        The State owns most basic industries and services, but the retail
    and construction industries are in private hands. Oil is the principal
    natural resource, but the country's extensive natural gas resources are
    playing an increasingly important role. Rapid development in the 1970's
    and 1980's created an economy in which foreign workers, mostly South
    Asian and Arab, outnumber citizens by a ratio of 4 or 5 to 1. The
    Government has embarked on a program of ``Qatarization,'' which is
    aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers. Many government jobs
    are offered only to citizens and private sector businesses are
    encouraged to recruit citizens as well.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
    many areas, and there were improvements in freedom of expression;
    however, its record was poor in areas, such as citizens' right to
    change the Government. Citizens do not have the right to change their
    government. There were one or two allegations that members of the
    security forces tortured civilians in detention during the year.
    Arbitrary detention in security cases, and restrictions on the freedoms
    of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and on workers'
    rights, continued to be problems. However, the Government continued to
    take some steps to ease restrictions on the practice of non-Muslim
    religions. Despite female suffrage, in practice women's rights are
    restricted by social customs. Domestic servants are mistreated and
    sometimes abused. Noncitizens, who make up the majority of the
    residents of the country, face discrimination in the workplace.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Government officially proscribes torture; however,
    there were one or two reports of alleged torture. There were
    unconfirmed allegations in previous years that some of the defendants
    in the trial of the 1996 coup plotters (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.) had
    been tortured while in police custody; government officials have denied
    the allegations. The Government administers most corporal punishment
    prescribed by Islamic law but does not allow amputation.
        Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
        The Government does not permit domestic human rights groups to
    exist, and no international human rights organization has asked to
    visit the country or its prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest; however, the police have the discretion to arrest
    persons based on a low level of suspicion, and arbitrary detention in
    security cases remains a problem. The authorities generally charge
    suspects within 48 hours. Suspects generally are presented to the
    Attorney General within 24 hours of arrest. The Attorney General
    decides whether to hold the suspect up to a maximum of 4 days, after
    which time the suspect is presented before a judge, who may order the
    suspect released or remanded to custody to await trial. The accused is
    entitled to legal representation throughout this process. Suspects who
    are detained in security cases generally are afforded access to
    counsel; however, they may be detained indefinitely while under
    investigation. There were no known cases of incommunicado detention
    during the year.
        In 1998 Ministry of Education official Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi
    distributed a letter criticizing the Amir's decision to allow women to
    vote and run for office in the Municipal Council elections as well as
    other purportedly anti-Islamic actions. The Amir ordered the arrest of
    Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi, and he remains in detention.
        In September 33 of the persons arrested and tried for involvement
    in a February 1996 coup attempt, including Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin
    Hamad Al-Thani, who was named as the prime suspect in the coup bid,
    were found guilty and sentence to life in prison; 85 were acquitted.
    The 33 found guilty have appealed. Prosecutors had called for the death
    penalty for all those accused.
        The Government has used forced exile on rare occasions. There were
    no reported cases this year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally
    independent; however, most judges are foreign nationals who hold
    residence permits granted by the civil authorities, and thus hold their
    positions at the Government's pleasure. The number of citizen judges is
    increasing.
        The judiciary deals with the bureaucracies of three ministries.
    Civil (or Adlea) courts are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, and
    Shari'a (Islamic law) courts fall under the Ministry of Endowments and
    Islamic Affairs. The prosecutors fall under the Ministry of Interior.
        There are two types of courts: The civil courts, which have
    jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, and the Shari'a courts,
    which have jurisdiction in family and criminal cases. There are no
    permanent state security courts; however, although there have been no
    cases before these courts since the Amir assumed power, they have not
    been abolished formally by law and remain an option. Defendants tried
    by all courts have the right to appeal. The original case and the
    appeal in Shari'a courts are no longer heard by the same judge, and
    procedural loopholes that permitted this practice in the past are to be
    closed as part of a pending judicial reform package.
        The legal system is biased in favor of citizens and the Government.
    A Muslim litigant may request the Shari'a courts to assume jurisdiction
    in commercial or civil cases. Non-Muslims are not allowed to bring
    suits as plaintiffs in the Shari'a courts; however, they may file suit
    in the civil courts. This practice prevents non-Muslim residents from
    obtaining full legal recourse. Trials in the civil courts are public,
    but in the Shari'a courts only the disputing parties, their relatives,
    associates, and witnesses are allowed in the courtroom. Lawyers do not
    play a formal role except to prepare litigants for their cases.
    Although non-Arabic speakers are provided with interpreters, foreigners
    are disadvantaged, especially in cases involving the performance of
    contracts. However, provided that the foreign defendant's sponsor or
    embassy agree, the defendant is entitled to legal representation
    throughout the trial and pretrial process.
        Defendants appear before a judge for a preliminary hearing within 7
    days of their arrest. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week
    at a time to allow the authorities to conduct investigations. Lengthy
    pretrial detention is not known to occur. Defendants in the civil
    courts have the right to be represented by defense attorneys but are
    not always permitted to be represented by counsel in the Shari'a
    courts.
        Shari'a trials usually are brief. Shari'a family law trials often
    are held without counsel. After both parties have stated their cases
    and examined witnesses, judges usually deliver a verdict after a short
    deliberation. Criminal cases normally are tried within 2 to 3 months
    after suspects are detained. Suspects are entitled to bail, except in
    some instances, such as in cases of violent crime. Bail may be provided
    by citizens or noncitizens. Foreigners who are charged with minor
    crimes may be released to a citizen sponsor. They are prohibited from
    departing the country until the case is resolved.
        After a public trial of persons arrested for involvement in the
    1996 coup attempt, trial judges sentenced 33 defendants to life
    imprisonment. Nine of them were tried in absentia. Another 85
    defendants were acquitted on all charges. A decision regarding the
    convicted defendants' appeal was pending at year's end. The trial was
    considered fair.
        There are no known political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Traditional attitudes of respect for the sanctity of
    the home and the privacy of women provide a great deal of protection
    against arbitrary intrusion for most citizens and residents. A warrant
    must be obtained before police may search a residence or business,
    except in cases involving national security or emergencies. Search
    warrants are issued by judicial authorities. There were no reports of
    unauthorized searches of homes during the year. The police and security
    forces are believed to monitor the telephone calls of suspected
    criminals, of those considered to be security risks, and of selected
    foreigners.
        With prior permission, which is usually granted, citizens may marry
    foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits or
    citizenship for their spouses.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Government reduced
    restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press in 1996 and
    permitted a noticeable expansion of press freedom, some restrictions
    still remain. The Government lifted formal censorship of the media in
    1995, and since then the press has been essentially free of government
    interference. However, journalists continue to practice self-
    censorship, due to real or perceived social and political pressures.
    Some journalists reportedly were subjected to pressure by the
    Government during the year after they published articles critical of
    the Government. Although explicit criticism of citizens' public or
    private affairs is not common, a number of such reports have been noted
    in local newspapers, especially Arabic-language newspapers. One Arabic-
    language newspaper even polled its readers to determine the most
    popular and least popular ministers. The Minister of Education was a
    frequent target of criticism; other criticism tended to be targeted at
    organizations rather than individuals.
        There were no reports of instances of political censorship of
    foreign news media or broadcasts of foreign programs on local
    television over the past year. The Censorship Office in the Ministry of
    Information was abolished (together with the Ministry) in 1996.
    Pornography and expressions deemed hostile to Islam still are subject
    to censorship, and censors still work at broadcast media under the
    overall supervision of the Ministry of Religious Endowments.
        Citizens enjoy broad freedom of speech but are restricted by the
    social and family restraints of a very traditional society. There is no
    apparent fear of government monitoring of private speech. However, the
    larger foreign population does not believe it enjoys the same freedoms
    and acts accordingly.
        Television and radio are state owned, but the privately owned
    satellite television channel Al-Jazeera operates freely. During the
    year, radio and television call-in programs and talk shows criticized
    the Amir for meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister at the U.N.
    Millennium Summit in September, and the Government was criticized for
    allowing the Israeli Trade Office to remain open prior to the November
    Islamic Summit. Various government ministers are regularly criticized
    on a popular radio talk show.
        A Ministry of Education official who wrote a letter in 1999
    critical of the Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for
    office in the Municipal Council elections remains in custody (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Customs officials screen imported print media, videocassettes, and
    other such items for pornography, but have stopped blocking the
    importation of non-Muslim religious items (see Section 2.c.).
        A growing number of citizens and residents have access to the
    Internet, which is provided through the state-owned telecommunications
    monopoly. Internet service is censored for pornographic content through
    a proxy server, which blocks those web sites containing certain key
    words and phrases. A user who believes that a site is censored
    mistakenly may submit the web address to the Internet service provider
    to have the site reviewed for suitability. The Government is responsive
    to such submissions.
        There is no legal provision for academic freedom. Most instructors
    at the University of Qatar exercise self-censorship.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    severely limits freedom of assembly. The Government generally does not
    allow political demonstrations; however, it permitted one peaceful
    demonstration of about 3,000 participants in October, under the aegis
    of the Central Municipal Council, that protested the Israeli
    Government's actions against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and
    Gaza.
        The Government severely limits freedom of association. The
    Government does not allow political parties or membership in
    international professional organizations critical of the Government or
    of any other Arab government. Private social, sports, trade,
    professional, and cultural societies must be registered with the
    Government. Security forces monitor the activities of such groups.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no constitutional protection for
    freedom of religion. The state religion is Islam, as interpreted by the
    conservative Wahhabi order of the Sunni branch. The Government
    officially prohibits public worship by non-Muslims; however, it
    tolerates and protects services conducted privately with prior
    notification to the authorities. The Government allows Shi'a Muslims to
    practice their faith freely; however, community leaders have agreed to
    refrain from certain public practices, such as self-flagellation.
        The Government and ruling family are inextricably linked to the
    practice of Islam. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs controls the
    construction of mosques, the administration of clerical affairs, and
    instruction in the Koran. The Minister of Islamic Affairs is a member
    of the Amir's cabinet and participates in policymaking at the highest
    level. The only official government holidays aside from the
    independence day are the Eid Al-Fitr, following the holy month of
    Ramadan, and the Eid Al-Adha, which commemorates the end of the Hajj.
    The Amir participates in widely publicized ``Eid prayers'' and each
    year personally finances the Hajj pilgrimages of many who cannot afford
    to travel to Mecca.
        During the year, the Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox churches in
    effect received de facto official recognition. However, formal
    recognition apparently has not yet been granted. There reportedly is a
    verbal commitment by the Government to allow the churches to operate
    openly in a manner that apparently reflects de facto government
    recognition. For example, priests of the three churches have been asked
    to wear their clerical garb and may apply to be sponsors for visitor
    visas for other church representatives. In addition, church
    representatives may import reasonable amounts of Bibles and other
    religious literature for use by their congregations. In February the
    Government identified a parcel of land on which it plans to allow the
    construction of three churches, one each for the Catholic, Anglican,
    and Orthodox communities. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture met with
    diplomats and representatives of the churches to discuss initial design
    plans. The Government recognizes and allows marriages between non-
    Muslims to be conducted by the Roman Catholic Church. Such progress for
    Christians is due, in large part, to their status as ``people of the
    book'' in that the Koran accords special status to Christians and Jews.
    The Government intends to permit Hindus and Buddhists neither to
    worship openly nor to establish temples because it claims that there is
    no Koranic justification for tolerance of polytheistic religions.
        Non-Muslims may not proselytize, and conversion from Islam is
    theoretically a capital offense. However, there is no record of an
    execution for such a conversion since independence in 1971.
        The Government formally prohibits the publication, importation, and
    distribution of Bibles and other non-Islamic religious literature.
    However, in practice individuals generally are not prevented from
    importing Bibles and other religious items for personal use. In
    previous years, there were sporadic reports of confiscation of such
    materials by customs officials. During the year, some Christian worship
    groups reported having no trouble importing instructional materials
    (i.e., Sunday school materials and devotionals) for use by the groups.
    Police provide traffic control for authorized Catholic masses, which
    may be attended by 1,000 or more persons at Easter and Christmas.
        There are no restrictions on non-Muslims providing religious
    instruction to their children; however, the public schools provide
    compulsory instruction in Islam. The public schools generally are
    closed to foreigners, most of whose children attend private schools.
        Practice of Islam confers advantage in civil life. For example,
    non-Muslims do not have the right to bring suit in the Shari'a (Islamic
    law) courts. These courts are utilized to settle the majority of civil
    claims; thus, non-Muslims are at a distinct disadvantage.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on internal
    travel, except around sensitive military and oil installations. In
    general, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel.
    However, men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by
    providing their names to immigration officers at ports of departure.
    Technically, women employed by the Government must obtain official
    permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known
    to what extent this regulation is enforced. Citizens critical of the
    Government face restrictions on their right to travel abroad.
        All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to
    immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local
    labor pool. Foreign workers must have the permission of their sponsor
    (usually their employer) to enter and depart the country, but their
    dependents may leave the country without restriction. Foreign women who
    are married to citizens are granted residence permits and may apply for
    citizenship; however, they are expected to relinquish their foreign
    citizenship.
        The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
    refugees, asylees, or first asylum. Those attempting to enter
    illegally, including persons seeking asylum from nearby countries, are
    refused entry. Asylum seekers who are able to obtain local sponsorship
    or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they are
    employed.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government or the
    political system peacefully. The political institutions combine the
    characteristics of a traditional Bedouin tribal state and a modern
    bureaucracy. Under the amended Provisional Constitution, the Amir must
    be chosen from and by the adult males of the Al-Thani family. There are
    no political parties or organized opposition groups. However, in 1999
    citizens had the opportunity for the first time to choose officials for
    the Central Municipal Council in free and fair elections.
        The Amir exercises most executive and legislative powers, including
    appointment of cabinet members. On March 8, 1999, citizens elected a
    29-member Central Municipal Council. For the first time, men and women
    age 18 and older were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates.
    The Council is a nonpartisan body that addresses issues such as street
    repair, green space, trash collection, and public works projects. Its
    role is to advise the Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture. The
    Council cannot change policy on its own.
        In November 1998, the Amir announced his intention to form a
    constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would
    provide for democratic parliamentary elections. The constitutional
    committee was inaugurated in July 1999 and includes a number of
    government officials, academics, and prominent business leaders. In
    addition to subcommittees on the legislature, executive, and judiciary,
    it includes a subcommittee on human rights. The committee has met
    regularly and is projected to complete its recommendations by 2002. The
    Amir reiterated in his remarks to the committee members that he expects
    their efforts to lead to the establishment of an elected parliamentary
    body.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Women have
    the right to vote and run as candidates for the Central Municipal
    Council; none were elected to the Council in the 1999 elections.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not permit local human rights organizations to
    exist. No international human rights organizations are known to have
    asked to investigate conditions in the country. However, Amnesty
    International and foreign embassies were invited to send observers to
    sessions of the public trial of those accused in the 1996 coup attempt.
    Foreign observers attended the trial sessions held during the year.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law proscribes discrimination in the workplace; however,
    institutional, cultural, and legal discrimination based on gender,
    race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
        Women.--According to the Family Development Center, the country's
    leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) on women's issues, violence
    against women is not widespread. Some foreign domestic servants,
    especially those from South Asia and the Philippines, have been
    mistreated by employers. In most cases, the mistreatment involves late
    or nonpayment of wages (see Section 6.c.), but also includes
    allegations of rape and physical abuse (see Section 6.e.). Foreign
    embassies provide shelter for maids who have left their employers as a
    result of abuse or disputes. According to Shari'a, all forms of
    physical abuse are illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The
    police actively investigate reports of violence against women. In the
    last few years, the Government demonstrated an increased willingness to
    arrest and punish offenders, whether citizens or foreigners. Offenders
    who are citizens usually receive lighter punishments than do
    foreigners. Abused domestic workers usually do not press charges for
    fear of losing their jobs.
        The legal system allows leniency for a man found guilty of
    committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent
    assault against a woman for perceived immodesty or defiant behavior;
    however, such honor killings are rare. In 1999 a former minister and
    Gulf War hero, Ali Saeed Al-Khayareen, was accused of killing his two
    half-sisters for their alleged sexual misconduct. Al-Khayareen was held
    for a few months at the Al-Rayyan detention center, but eventually the
    women's family decided to accept monetary compensation, and he was
    released late in 1999.
        The activities of women are restricted closely both by law and
    tradition. For example, a woman is prohibited from applying for a
    driver's license unless she has permission from a male guardian. This
    restriction does not apply to noncitizen women. The Government adheres
    to Shari'a as practiced in the country in matters of inheritance and
    child custody. Muslim wives have the right to inherit from their
    husbands. However, they inherit only one-half as much as male
    relatives. Non-Muslim wives inherit nothing, unless a special exception
    is arranged. In cases of divorce, Shari'a is followed; younger children
    remain with the mother and older children with the father. Both parents
    retain permanent rights of visitation. However, local authorities do
    not allow a noncitizen parent to take his or her child out of the
    country without permission of the citizen parent. Women may attend
    court proceedings but generally are represented by a male relative;
    however, women may represent themselves. According to Shari'a, the
    testimony of two women equals that of one man, but the courts routinely
    interpret this on a case-by-case basis.
        Women largely are relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker,
    but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the
    news media. Women appear to receive equal pay for equal work; however,
    they often do not receive equal allowances. These allowances generally
    cover transportation and housing costs. Increasingly, women receive
    government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities overseas. The
    Amir has entrusted his second wife, who is the mother of the Heir
    Apparent, with the high-profile task of establishing a university in
    Doha. In 1996 the Government appointed its first female undersecretary,
    in the Ministry of Education, and in March a woman was appointed vice
    president of Qatar University. Although women legally are able to
    travel abroad alone (see Section 2.d.), tradition and social pressures
    cause most to travel with male escorts. There also have been complaints
    that citizen husbands take their foreign spouses' passports and,
    without prior approval, turn them in for Qatari citizenship documents.
    The husbands then inform their wives that the wives have lost their
    former citizenship. In other cases, foreign wives report being
    forbidden by their husbands or in-laws to visit or to contact foreign
    embassies.
        There is no independent women's rights organization, nor has the
    Government permitted the establishment of one.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
    rights through a well-funded, free public education system (elementary
    through university) and a complete medical protection program for the
    children of citizens. However, children of most foreigners are denied
    free education and have only limited medical coverage.
        Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background,
    have been used as jockeys in camel races. Little information is
    available on wages and working conditions for these children (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted
    legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the
    disabled, who also face social discrimination. The Government maintains
    a hospital and schools that provide high-quality, free services to the
    mentally and physically disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Shi'a Muslims fill many positions in the
    bureaucracy and are prominent in business. However, they experience
    discrimination in employment in some sensitive areas, such as security.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government discriminates
    against some citizens of non-Qatari origin. In the private sector, many
    citizens of Iranian origin occupy some of the highest positions.
    However, they rarely are found in senior decisionmaking positions in
    government.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The right of association is limited
    strictly, and all workers, including foreigners, are prohibited from
    forming labor unions. Despite this restriction, almost all workers have
    the right to strike after their case has been presented to the Labor
    Conciliation Board and ruled upon. Employers may close a place of work
    or dismiss employees once the Conciliation Board has heard the case.
    The right to strike does not exist for government employees, domestic
    workers, or members of the employer's family. No worker in a public
    utility or health or security service may strike if such a strike would
    harm the public or lead to property damage. Strikes by expatriate
    workers are rare but do occur. The Conciliation Board is widely
    perceived to be objective, particularly with regard to the most common
    complaints of expatriate workers, the nonpayment of wages, and poor
    living conditions. The press reports work actions and grievances over
    these issues.
        The Labor Law provides for the establishment of joint consultative
    committees composed of representatives of the employer and workers. The
    committees do not discuss wages but may consider issues such as
    organization and productivity, conditions of employment, training of
    workers, and safety measures and their implementation.
        Since 1995 the country has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
    Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
    Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
    rights standards.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
    prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. In general wages are
    set unilaterally by employers without government involvement. Local
    courts handle disputes between workers and employers.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor. Three-quarters of the work force are
    foreign workers, who are dependent on a single employer for residency
    rights. This leaves them vulnerable to abuse. For instance, employers
    must give consent before exit permits are issued to any foreign
    employee seeking to leave the country. Some employers temporarily
    withhold this consent to force foreign employees to work for longer
    periods than they wish. Some unskilled workers and domestic servants
    are vulnerable to late payment of wages; it is government policy to
    assist laborers, usually through the Labor Board, under such
    circumstances. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively; however,
    some very young children work as jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5
    and 6.d., 6.e., and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed with
    the approval of their parents or guardians and some children may work
    in small, family-owned businesses. However, child labor is rare.
    Education is compulsory for citizens through the age of 15. Very young
    children, usually of African or South Asian background, are used as
    jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). Little
    information is available on wages and working conditions for these
    children. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children
    and generally enforces this prohibition effectively with respect to
    citizen children (see Section 6.c.).
        Minors may not work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a
    week. Employers must provide the Ministry of Labor with the names and
    occupations of their minor employees. The Ministry may prohibit the
    employment of minors in jobs that are judged dangerous to the health,
    safety, or morals of minors. Employers also must obtain permission from
    the Ministry of Education to hire a minor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage,
    although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The average
    wage provides a decent standard of living for workers and their
    families. The law prescribes a 48-hour workweek with a 24-hour rest
    period, although most government offices follow a 36-hours-per-week
    work schedule. Employees who work more than 48 hours per week, or 36
    hours per week during the Muslim month of Ramadan, are entitled to
    overtime pay. This law is adhered to in government offices and major
    private sector companies. It is not observed with respect to domestic
    and personal employees. Domestic servants frequently work 7 days per
    week, and more than 12 hours per day with few or no holidays, and have
    no effective way to redress grievances against their employers.
        The Government has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and
    health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of
    Energy and Industry, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees
    safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has
    its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964,
    as amended in 1984, lists partial and permanent disabilities for which
    compensation may be awarded, some connected with handling chemicals and
    petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not
    specifically set rates of payment and compensation. Laborers who suffer
    work-related sickness or injuries receive free medical treatment
    provided by the Government.
        Foreign workers may enter the country on a visitors visa and then
    convert this visa to a work visa once in the country. A sponsor is need
    to convert a visitor's visa to a work visa, and the worker must have
    their sponsor's permission to depart the country. Any worker may seek
    legal relief from onerous work conditions, but domestic servants
    generally accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. The
    Government also penalizes citizen employers who violate residence and
    sponsorship laws. Some foreign domestic servants have been mistreated
    by their employers. Such mistreatment normally involves the nonpayment
    or late payment of wages but also may involve rape and physical abuse
    (see Section 5). It is not known if workers have the right to remove
    themselves from hazardous work conditions without fear of dismissal.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons.
        On January 19, the Government arrested and repatriated several
    women from the former Soviet Union who were transported to the country
    to work as prostitutes.
        Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background,
    have been used as jockeys in camel races (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
                                   __________

                                  SAUDI ARABIA

        Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative
    institutions or political parties. It is ruled by King Fahd Bin Abd Al-
    Aziz Al Saud, a son of King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, who unified the
    country in the early 20th century. Since the death of King Abd Al-Aziz,
    the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his sons, who
    themselves have had preponderant influence in the choice. A 1992 royal
    decree reserves for the King exclusive power to name the Crown Prince.
    Crown Prince Abdullah has played an increasing role in governance since
    King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995. The Government has declared the
    Islamic holy book the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the Prophet
    Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government bases its
    legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of a rigorously
    conservative form of Islam. Neither the Government nor society in
    general accepts the concept of separation of religion and state. The
    Government prohibits the establishment of political parties and
    suppresses opposition views. In 1992 King Fahd appointed a Consultative
    Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, and similar provincial assemblies. The
    Majlis, a strictly advisory body, began holding sessions in 1993 and
    was expanded in 1997. The judiciary is generally independent but is
    subject to influence by the executive branch and members of the royal
    family.
        Police and border forces under the Ministry of Interior are
    responsible for internal security. The Mutawwa'in, or religious police,
    constitute the Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, a
    semiautonomous agency that enforces adherence to Islamic norms by
    monitoring public behavior. The Government maintains general control of
    the security forces. However, members of the security forces committed
    human rights abuses.
        The oil industry has fueled the transformation of Saudi Arabia from
    a pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society to a rapidly
    urbanizing one, characterized by large-scale infrastructure projects,
    an extensive social welfare system, and a labor market comprised
    largely of foreign workers. Oil revenues account for around 55 percent
    of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of government
    income. Agriculture accounts for only about 6 percent of GDP.
    Government spending, including spending on the national airline, power,
    water, telephone, education, and health services, accounts for 24
    percent of GDP. About 40 percent of the economy is nominally private,
    and the Government is promoting further privatization of the economy.
    In 1995 the Government began an aggressive campaign to increase the
    number of Saudi nationals represented in the public and private work
    forces. The campaign has restricted employment of some categories of
    foreign workers by limiting certain occupations to Saudis only,
    increasing fees for some types of work visas, and setting minimum wages
    for some job categories in order to increase the cost to employers of
    non-Saudi labor. In August 1998, the Government announced that citizens
    had to constitute at least 5 percent of the work force in private
    sector companies by October 1998, an amount that, according to a 1995
    ministerial decree, should be 15 percent. Despite a crackdown on
    illegal workers and the citizens who employ or house them, the program
    has continued to fall short of its goal of increasing the Saudi
    percentage of the work force by 5 percent each year.
        The Government's human rights record remained generally poor in a
    number of areas; however, its record showed limited improvement in some
    areas. Citizens have neither the right nor the legal means to change
    their government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and
    prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and facilitate
    incommunicado detention; in addition there were allegations that
    security forces committed torture. Prolonged detention without charge
    is a problem. Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction
    to the law, but with the acquiescence of the Government. Mutawwa'in
    (religious police, who constitute the Committee to Promote Virtue and
    Prevent Vice) continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and
    foreigners. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The
    Government prohibits or restricts freedom of speech, the press,
    assembly, association, religion, and movement. However, during the year
    the Government tolerated a wider range of debate and criticism in the
    press concerning domestic issues. Other continuing problems included
    discrimination and violence against women, discrimination against
    ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker
    rights. The Government views its interpretation of Islamic law as its
    sole source of guidance on human rights and disagrees with
    internationally accepted definitions of human rights. However, during
    the year, the Government initiated limited measures to participate in
    international human rights mechanisms. For example, it invited to the
    country the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
    Lawyers and acceded to (with reservations) the U.N. Convention on the
    Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

        Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
    Freedom From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political killings.
        In November 1998, several Mutawwa'in attacked and killed an elderly
    Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a
    traditional Shi'a practice). Attempts by Mutawwa'in to cover up the
    killing were unsuccessful. After investigating the incident, the
    Government stated that medical reports indicated that the man's death
    resulted from a drop in his blood pressure because of old age. The
    Government stated that the death was not a criminal incident.
        The investigation of the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing, which killed 19
    U.S. servicemen, continued. The Government has not yet issued a report
    of its findings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There were credible reports that the authorities abused
    detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials
    are responsible for most incidents of abuse, including beatings and
    sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of torture.
    Although the Government has ratified the Convention Against Torture and
    Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it has
    refused to recognize the authority of the Committee Against Torture to
    investigate alleged abuses. In 1998 the Government pledged to cooperate
    with U.N. human rights mechanisms, and it announced in April the
    establishment of a committee to investigate allegations of torture
    pursuant to its obligations under the convention (see Section 4).
    However, although the Government asks for details of reports of torture
    and other human rights abuses made by international human rights
    groups, it does not permit international observers to investigate such
    reports. The Government's general refusal to grant members of
    diplomatic missions access to the Ministry of Interior detention
    facilities, or allow members of international human rights groups into
    the country, hinders efforts to confirm or discount reports of abuses.
    The Government's past failure to criticize human rights abuses has
    contributed to the public perception that security forces may commit
    abuses with impunity.
        The Mutawwa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens
    and foreigners of both sexes (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.c.).
        The Government punishes criminals according to its interpretation
    of Shari'a (Islamic law). Punishments include flogging, amputation, and
    execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities
    acknowledged 120 executions during the year, an increase from 100 in
    1999. Executions included 62 persons convicted of murder, 21 convicted
    of narcotics-related offenses, 22 convicted of rape, and 10 convicted
    of armed robbery. The executions also included two women for murder and
    three for drug trafficking. The men were executed by beheading and the
    women were executed by firing squad. The government of Nigeria
    criticized Saudi Arabia for the execution of seven Nigerians convicted
    of bank robbery. In accordance with Shari'a, the authorities may punish
    repeated thievery by amputation of the right hand. There were 27
    reports of amputations, including 7 reports of multiple amputations
    (right hand, left leg) for the crime of highway robbery during the
    year. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol-
    related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person
    of the opposite sex, sometimes were punished by flogging with a cane.
        On April 16, the Associated Press reported that 5 persons had been
    sentenced to 2,600 lashes and 6 years in prison, and 4 persons to 2,400
    lashes and 5 years' imprisonment, for ``deviant sexual behavior.''
    Amnesty International reported in July that six men were executed on
    charges of deviant sexual behavior, some of which were related to their
    sexual orientation. Amnesty International was uncertain whether the six
    men who were executed were among the nine who were sentenced to
    flogging and imprisonment in April.
        During the year, a court ordered that the eye of an Egyptian man be
    removed as punishment for an attack 6 years ago in which he was
    convicted of throwing acid on another Egyptian man. The victim, who
    lost his eye in the attack and suffered other disfigurement, had urged
    the court to implement Al-Qisas, the Shari'a provision stipulating that
    the punishment be commensurate with the crime. Press accounts stated
    that the convicted man's eye was removed at a hospital in August.
        Prison and jail conditions vary throughout the Kingdom. Prisons
    generally meet internationally accepted standards and provide air-
    conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful
    patrolling by prison guards. However, some police station jails are
    overcrowded and unsanitary. Authorities generally allowed family
    members access to detainees.
        Boards of Investigation and Public Prosecution, organized on a
    regional basis, were established by King Fahd in 1993. The members of
    these boards have the right to inspect prisons, review prisoners'
    files, and hear their complaints. However, the Government does not
    permit human rights monitors to visit prisons or jails. The Government
    does not allow impartial observers of any type access to specialized
    Ministry of Interior prisons, where it detains persons accused of
    political subversion.
        Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) are present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses
    former Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the
    Gulf War. According to UNHCR officials, there was no systematic abuse
    of refugees by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse have
    surfaced in the past, the authorities have been responsive and willing
    to investigate allegations and reprimand offending guards. The camp
    receives a high level of material assistance and is generally
    comfortable and well-run. However, the Government generally confines
    refugees to the camp, except in the event of approved emigration.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest; however, some officers make arrests and detain
    persons without following explicit legal guidelines. There are few
    procedures to safeguard against abuse, although the Government claims
    that it punishes individual officers who violate regulations. There
    have been few publicized cases of citizens successfully obtaining
    judicial redress for abuse of the Government's power of arrest and
    detention.
        In accordance with a 1983 Ministry of Interior regulation,
    authorities usually detain suspects for no longer than 3 days before
    charging them. However, serious exceptions have been reported. The
    regulation also has provisions for bail for less serious crimes. Also,
    authorities sometimes release detainees on the recognizance of a patron
    or sponsoring employer without the payment of bail. If they are not
    released, authorities typically detain accused persons for an average
    of 2 months before sending the case to trial or, in the case of some
    foreigners, summarily deporting them. There is no established procedure
    providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest.
        The Mutawwa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more
    than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress
    and behavior. However, they sometimes exceeded this limit before
    delivering detainees to the police (see Section 1.f.). Current
    procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawwa'in at the
    time of an arrest. Mutawwa'in generally complied with this requirement.
    During the year, in the more conservative Riyadh district, the number
    of reports received of Mutawwa'in accosting, abusing, arresting, and
    detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards
    was comparable to 1999. The Jeddah district also received a similar
    number of reports as in the previous year.
        In January the Government arrested 16 Filipino Christians during a
    raid on a prayer service. Government officials maintained that the
    religious service was attended by such a large number of persons that
    it could not be considered private. All of the detainees subsequently
    were released and deported to the Philippines (see Section 2.c.).
    According to Amnesty International, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a Shi'a
    cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested in his
    home in April and reportedly has been held incommunicado since then
    (see Section 2.c.). In June the Government arrested an Indian Christian
    for possession of a videotape of a religious event. He was released
    after spending 2 months in jail and was deported to India (see Section
    2.c.). On November 30, the police detained five Christian worshipers
    for about an hour for questioning regarding their activities (see
    Section 2.c.). In December the authorities raided a worship service and
    arrested six Filipino citizens; three remained in custody at year's end
    (see Section 2.c.).
        Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of
    Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service,
    commonly are held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial
    phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GDI
    allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or
    lawyers.
        The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly
    criticize the Government or may charge them with attempting to
    destabilize the Government (see Sections 2.a. and 3). In January the
    Government announced that it had released, under its annual Ramadan
    amnesty, 4,637 prisoners and detainees, including 1,807 foreigners. It
    is unclear whether there were any political detainees or prisoners
    among those released.
        There is no reliable information about the total number of
    political detainees.
        Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of a U.S.
    military facility in Saudi Arabia, authorities have detained,
    interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a
    Muslims suspected of fundamentalist tendencies or Iranian sympathies.
    The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of
    Shi'a arrested in the aftermath of the bombing. Government security
    forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in
    custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation
    (see Section 2.c.).
        The Government did not use forced exile, and there were no reports
    that it revoked citizenship for political purposes during the year.
    However, it previously has revoked the citizenship of opponents of the
    Government who reside outside the country (see Section 3).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The independence of the judiciary
    is prescribed by law and usually is respected in practice; however,
    judges occasionally accede to the influence of the executive branch,
    particularly members of the royal family and their associates, who are
    not required to appear before the courts. Moreover, the Ministry of
    Justice exercises judicial, financial, and administrative control of
    the courts.
        The legal system is based on Shari'a. Shari'a courts exercise
    jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding
    marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base
    judgments largely on a code derived from the Koran and the Sunna,
    another Islamic text. Cases involving relatively small penalties are
    tried in Shari'a summary courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in
    Shari'a courts of common pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts are made to
    the courts of appeal.
        Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against
    the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before
    specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the
    Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.
        The Government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal
    tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community.
        The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed
    personnel and civil servants who are charged with violations of
    military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King
    review the decisions of courts-martial.
        The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse
    decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review
    lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for
    reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or
    remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council.
        The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of
    20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It
    establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in
    deciding cases.
        The law grants defendants the right to a lawyer and translator;
    however, defendants usually appear without an attorney before a judge,
    who determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards.
    The courts generally do not provide foreign defendants with
    translators. Defense lawyers may offer their clients advice before
    trial or may attend the trial as interpreters for those unfamiliar with
    Arabic. Public defenders are not provided. Individuals may choose any
    person to represent them by a power of attorney filed with the court
    and the Ministry of Justice. Most trials are closed.
        A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a
    man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two
    women. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case
    of adultery, confessions before a judge almost always are required for
    criminal conviction--a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting
    authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse.
    Female parties to court proceedings such as divorce and family law
    cases generally must deputize male relatives to speak on their behalf.
        Sentencing is not uniform. Laws and regulations state that
    defendants should be treated equally; however, foreign residents
    sometimes receive harsher penalties than citizens. Under Shari'a as
    interpreted and applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes against Muslims receive
    harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of
    wrongful death, the amount of indemnity or ``blood money'' awarded to
    relatives varies with the nationality, religion, age, and sex of the
    victim. A sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for
    punishments stipulated by the Koran.
        Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and
    reduce a judge's sentence. In general members of the royal family and
    other powerful families are not subject to the same rule of law as
    ordinary citizens (see Sections 1.a. and 3). For example, judges do not
    have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal
    family.
        The King and his advisors review cases involving capital
    punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and
    grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals.
    In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the
    murderer--usually in return for compensation from the family or the
    King.
        There is insufficient information to determine the number of
    political prisoners. The Government does not provide information on
    political prisoners or respond to inquiries about them. It does not
    allow access to political prisoners by international humanitarian
    organizations. Moreover, the Government conducts closed trials for
    persons who may be political prisoners and in other cases has detained
    persons incommunicado for long periods while they are under
    investigation. Amnesty International estimates the number of political
    prisoners to be between 100 and 200.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government infringes on these rights. The sanctity
    of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most
    fundamental of Islamic precepts. Royal decrees announced in 1992
    include provisions calling for the Government to defend the home from
    unlawful intrusions, while laws and regulations prohibit officials from
    intercepting mail and electronic communication except when necessary
    during criminal investigations. Nonetheless, there are few procedural
    safeguards against government interference with one's privacy, family,
    home, or correspondence.
        The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain
    permission from the provincial governor before searching a private
    home; however, warrants are not required.
        Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for
    contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim
    religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored materials
    considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious
    videotapes (see Section 2.c.). The authorities also open mail and use
    informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters.
    Security forces used wiretaps against foreigners suspected of alcohol-
    related offenses. Informants (know as ``mukhbir'') and ward bosses
    (known as ``umdas') report ``seditious ideas'' or antigovernment
    activity in their neighborhoods to the Ministry of the Interior.
        The Government enforces most social and Islamic religious norms,
    which are matters of law (see Section 5). Women may not marry
    noncitizens without government permission; men must obtain approval
    from the Ministry of Interior to marry women from countries outside the
    six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance with Shari'a,
    women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims; men may marry
    Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
        Mutawwa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in
    different regions of the country but were most numerous in the central
    Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawwa'in and religious
    vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested,
    and detained citizens and foreigners (see Section 1.d.). The Government
    requires the Mutawwa'in to follow established procedures and to offer
    instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawwa'in did not always
    comply with the requirements. The Government has not criticized
    publicly abuses by Mutawwa'in and religious vigilantes but has sought
    to curtail such abuses.
        Mutawwa'in enforcement of strict standards of social behavior
    included the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily
    prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of
    public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places.
    Mutawwa'in frequently reproached citizen and foreign women for failure
    to observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found
    together who were not married or closely related.
        Some professors believe that informers monitor comments made in
    university classrooms (see Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limits
    freedom of speech and the press. However, the authorities allow the
    press some freedom to criticize governmental bodies and social policies
    through editorial comments and cartoons.
        The authorities do not permit criticism of Islam or the royal
    family, and criticism of the Government is limited. However, during the
    year the authorities tolerated increasing criticism of governmental
    bodies and social policies in editorial comments and cartoons. For
    example, some newspapers published criticism of specific cabinet
    ministries and ministers for their handling of a disease outbreak,
    while another published a column criticizing the Minister of Finance
    for lack of transparency in the Government's spending of oil revenues.
    One newspaper published a column in support of allowing women to drive
    by disputing the arguments of a member of the Council of Senior Islamic
    Scholars who opposes such actions. The press also carried an extensive
    discussion on human rights following the publication of an Amnesty
    International report critical of government human rights practices.
    While nearly all media reports concurred with the Government's
    dismissive response to the Amnesty International report, one editorial
    that circulated widely called on regional governments to listen to
    criticism and review their human rights practices (see Section 4).
    Persons whose criticisms align them with an organized political
    opposition are subject to arrest and detention until they confess to a
    crime or sign a statement promising not to resume such criticisms,
    which is tantamount to a confession. Writer Zuheir Kutbi claims that he
    has been imprisoned six times for his writings. Due to his
    imprisonment, Kutbi has been deprived of employment and his passport,
    and lives under government surveillance.
        The print media are privately owned but publicly subsidized. A 1982
    media policy statement and a 1965 national security law prohibit the
    dissemination of criticism of the Government. The media policy
    statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote
    Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of the country. The
    Ministry of Information appoints, and may remove, the editors in chief.
    It also provides guidelines to newspapers on controversial issues. The
    Government owns the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expresses official
    government views.
        In November the Government approved a wide-ranging new press law
    that would permit the creation of professional journalism societies and
    permit the publication of foreign newspapers in the Kingdom. The new
    law states that local publications will be subject to censorship only
    in emergencies and pledges to protect free expression of opinion;
    however, the law obliges authorities to censor foreign publications
    that defame Islam and harm the interests of the state or the ``ethics
    of the people.'' It is not yet clear whether the implementation of the
    new law will change current practices regarding freedom of expression.
        Newspapers typically publish news on sensitive subjects, such as
    crime or terrorism, only after it has been released by the SPA or when
    it has been authorized by a senior government official. Two Saudi-
    owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, are
    widely distributed and read in the country. Both newspapers tend to
    practice self-censorship in order to comply with government
    restrictions on sensitive issues. The authorities continue to censor
    stories about the country in the foreign press. Censors may remove or
    blacken the offending articles, glue pages together, or prevent certain
    issues of foreign publications from entering the market. However, the
    Ministry of Information continued to relax its blackout policy
    regarding politically sensitive news concerning the country reported in
    the international media, although press restrictions on reporting of
    domestic news remain very stringent. The Government's policy in this
    regard appears to be motivated in part by pragmatic considerations:
    Saudi access to outside sources of information, such as Arabic and
    Western satellite television channels and the Internet, is increasingly
    widespread.
        In February Information Minister Fuad Al-Farsi imposed a ban of 1
    week on the daily sports newspaper Ar-Reyadi because of a column by a
    popular sports journalist, Prince Abdulrahman bin Saud, that attacked
    another sports journalist. The ban was lifted after 2 days.
        The editors of two Yemeni newspapers, Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-
    Arabi, claimed that actions taken against the newspapers by the Yemeni
    Ministry of Information, including filing a lawsuit, detaining a
    journalist, and suspending publication of one of the newspapers, were a
    direct result of pressure applied by the Saudi Government after the
    newspapers had published articles critical of Saudi Arabia.
        In December a newspaper reported that while one of its reporters
    was investigating a story about the illegal slaughtering of animals by
    a restaurant, local police arrested, fingerprinted, interrogated, and
    then released the reporter. In a front-page commentary, the newspaper
    stated that local police were protecting the restaurant's owners.
        The Government tightly restricts the entry of foreign journalists
    into the Kingdom.
        The Government owns and operates the country's television and radio
    companies. Government censors remove any reference to politics,
    religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign
    programs and songs. There are well over 1 million satellite receiving
    dishes in the country, which provide citizens with foreign broadcasts.
    The legal status of these devices is ambiguous. The Government ordered
    a halt to their importation in 1992 at the request of religious leaders
    who objected to foreign programming being made available on satellite
    channels. In 1994 the Government banned the sale, installation, and
    maintenance of dishes and supporting devices; however, the number of
    dishes continues to increase, and residents legally may subscribe to
    satellite decoding services that require a dish.
        In December the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars ruled that
    watching the popular Ramadan television series ``Tash Ma Tash'' was
    contrary to proper Islamic conduct. The program, which was broadcast on
    a government channel, mildly parodied bureaucratic delays and social
    problems. The Government did not publicize the Council's ruling nor did
    it stop airing the program.
        The Government bans all books, magazines, and other materials that
    it considers sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of
    Information compiles and updates a list of publications that are
    prohibited from being sold in the country.
        Access to the Internet is available legally only through Saudi
    servers, which are monitored heavily by the Government. Some citizens
    attempt to circumvent this control by accessing the Internet through
    servers in other countries. The Government attempts to block all web
    sites that it deems sexual, pornographic, politically offensive, or
    ``unIslamic.'' However, such web sites are accessible from within the
    country. According to Human Rights Watch, in April the Government
    closed a women-only Internet cafe in Mecca after a court complaint that
    the cafe was being used for ``immoral purposes.''
        The Government censors all forms of public artistic expression and
    prohibits cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, except
    those that are considered folkloric.
        Academic freedom is restricted. The authorities prohibit the study
    of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some
    professors believe that informers monitor their classroom comments and
    report to government and religious authorities.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    strictly limits freedom of assembly. It prohibits public demonstrations
    as a means of political expression. Public meetings are segregated by
    sex. Unless meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved
    by the appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold
    unsegregated meetings risk arrest and deportation. The authorities
    monitor any large gathering of persons, especially of women. The
    Mutawwa'in dispersed groups of women found in public places, such as
    restaurants. Government policy permits women to attend cultural and
    social events at diplomatic chanceries and residences only if they are
    accompanied by a father, brother, or husband. However, in practice
    police often implement the policy in an arbitrary manner. On many
    occasions during the year, authorities actively prohibited women from
    entering diplomatic chanceries or residences to attend cultural events
    and lectures. However, for several years authorities have allowed
    unescorted Saudi women to attend women-only cultural events hosted at a
    diplomatic mission.
        In October citizens took part in a number of illegal demonstrations
    protesting the Israeli Government's actions against Palestinians in
    Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in the fall. According to media
    accounts, the authorities did not interfere with two demonstrations
    conducted by women at universities and another outside a mosque;
    however, the authorities dispersed several other small, apparently
    spontaneous public demonstrations against Israel in Riyadh, AlJawf
    province, and elsewhere.
        The Government strictly limits freedom of association. It prohibits
    the establishment of political parties or any type of opposition group
    (see Section 3). By its power to license associations, the Government
    ensures that groups conform to public policy. The Government licenses a
    large number of humanitarian organizations and tribal and professional
    societies, such as the Saudi Chemists Society and the Saudi Pharmacists
    Society. The Government claims that such groups operate without
    government interference because they are not detrimental to public
    security.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion does not exist. Islam
    is the official religion and all citizens must be Muslims. The
    Government prohibits the public practice of other religions. Private
    worship by non-Muslims generally is permitted.
        Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy and the Government has declared
    the Islamic holy book, the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the
    Prophet Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government
    bases its legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of the
    rigorously conservative and strict interpretation of the Hanbali school
    of the Sunni branch of Islam and discriminates against other branches
    of Islam. Neither the Government nor society in general accepts the
    concepts of separation of religion and state, and such separation does
    not exist.
        Islamic practice generally is limited to that of the Wahabi order,
    which adheres to the Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam as
    interpreted by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab, an 18th century Arabian
    religious reformer. Practices contrary to this interpretation, such as
    visits to the tombs of renowned Muslims, are discouraged. The practice
    of other schools of Sunni Islam is discouraged, and there is
    institutionalized discrimination against adherents of the Shi'a branch
    of Islam. The Government supervises almost all mosques in the country
    and funds their construction, maintenance, and operations.
        The Ministry of Islamic affairs directly supervises, and is a major
    source of funds for, the construction and maintenance of almost all
    mosques in the country. The Ministry pays the salaries of imams (prayer
    leaders) and others who work in the mosques. A governmental committee
    is responsible for defining the qualifications of imams. The Mutawwa'in
    are government employees, and the president of the Mutawwa'in holds the
    rank of cabinet minister. The spreading of Muslim teachings not in
    conformance with the officially accepted interpretation of Islam is
    prohibited. Writers and other individuals who publicly criticize this
    interpretation, including both those who advocate a stricter
    interpretation and those who favor a more moderate interpretation than
    the Government's, reportedly have been imprisoned and faced other
    reprisals.
        The Shi'a Muslim minority (roughly 900,000 persons) lives mostly in
    the eastern province, in which Shi'a constitute about one-third of the
    population. Members of the Shi'a minority are the objects of officially
    sanctioned political and economic discrimination. Prior to 1990, the
    Government prohibited Shi'a public processions during the Islamic month
    of Muharram and restricted other processions and congregations to
    designated areas in the major Shi'a cities. Since 1990 the authorities
    have permitted the celebration of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura in the
    eastern province city of Qatif, provided that the celebrants do not
    undertake large, public marches or engage in self-flagellation (a
    traditional Shi'a practice). The celebrations are monitored heavily by
    the police. No other Ashura celebrations are permitted in the Kingdom,
    and many Shi'a travel to Qatif or to Bahrain to participate in Ashura
    celebrations.
        Early in the year, a Shi'a sheikh was taken into custody, and three
    other sheikhs were arrested for unknown reasons near the border with
    Jordan. Human Rights Watch reported that at least seven additional
    Shi'a religious leaders reportedly remained in detention for violating
    restrictions on Shi'a religious practices.
        According to Amnesty International, Hashim Al-Sayyid Al-Sada, a
    Shi'a cleric suspected of political or religious dissent, was arrested
    in his home in April and reportedly has been held incommunicado since
    then (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government seldom permits private construction of Shi'a
    mosques. Shi'a have declined government offers to build statesupported
    mosques because the Government would prohibit the incorporation and
    display of Shi'a motifs in any such mosques. The Government actively
    discourages Shi'a travel to Iran to visit pilgrimage sites, although
    Shi'a citizens are permitted to visit holy sites in Iraq.
        Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, authorities have detained,
    interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a
    suspected of subversion (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). The Government
    reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of Shi'a who were
    arrested in the aftermath of the Al-Khobar bombing. Government security
    forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in
    custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation
    (see Section 1.d.).
        In April in the city of Najran, in the southwest region bordering
    Yemen, rioting by members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a eventually led
    to an attack by an armed group of Shi'a on a hotel that contained an
    office of the regional governor. Security forces responded, leading to
    extended gun battles between the two sides. Some press reports
    indicated that the rioting followed the arrest of a Makarama Ismaili
    Shi'a imam and some of his followers on charges of ``sorcery.'' Various
    other reports attributed the unrest to the closure of two Ismaili Shi'a
    mosques and the provincial governor's refusal to permit Ismailis to
    hold public observances of the Shi'a holiday of Ashura. Still other
    reports attributed the unrest to a local crackdown on smuggling and
    resultant tribal discontent. Officials at the highest level of the
    Government stated that the unrest in Najran was not the result of
    Shi'a-Sunni tension or religious discrimination. After the unrest ended
    the Government stated that 5 members of the security forces were
    killed, and Ismaili leaders claimed that as many as 40 Ismaili
    tribesmen were killed. There was no independent confirmation of these
    claims.
        Magic is widely believed in and sometimes practiced, often in the
    form of fortune-telling and swindles. However, under Shari'a the
    practice of magic is regarded as the worst form of polytheism, an
    offense for which no repentance is accepted, and which is punishable by
    death. There are an unknown number of detainees held in prison on the
    charge of ``sorcery,'' or the practice of ``black magic'' or
    ``witchcraft.'' In a few cases, self-proclaimed ``miracle workers''
    have been executed for sorcery involving physical harm or apostasy. In
    1999 the Al-Bilad newspaper reported that the Interior Ministry ordered
    the execution of a Sudanese man convicted of practicing magic in Jeddah
    for 3+ years. The man claimed to be an herbal medicine expert and had
    treated a number of women with tonics and potions; he reportedly
    possessed 16 spell books and related paraphernalia. The man reportedly
    confessed to conspiring with Jinns (beings made of fire that coexist
    with humans) in ``efforts to separate wives from their husbands.''
        During the year, foreign imams were barred from leading worship
    during the most heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from
    delivering sermons during Friday congregational prayers. The Government
    claims that its actions were part of its ``Saudiization'' plan to
    replace foreign workers with citizens.
        Under Shari'a conversion by a Muslim to another religion is
    considered apostasy. Public apostasy is a crime punishable by death if
    the accused does not recant.
        The Government prohibits public non-Muslim religious activities.
    Non-Muslim worshippers risk arrest, lashing, and deportation for
    engaging in overt religious activity that attracts official attention.
        During the year, senior officials in the Government publicly
    reaffirmed the right of non-Muslims to engage in private religious
    worship. In an address to the 56th session of the U.N. Committee on
    Human Rights in April, Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud Al-Kabir,
    Director of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs, stated that ``non-Muslims enjoy full freedom to
    engage in their religious observances in private'' (see Section 4). The
    media widely disseminated Prince Turki's speech and the media
    increasingly acknowledges the right to private non-Muslim worship. Such
    private non-Muslim worship occurs on a wide scale throughout the
    country, including on the premises of several foreign embassies.
        Other high-level officials have confirmed that the Government does
    not sanction investigation or harassment of such private worship
    services. These officials ascribe any residual harassment of private
    worship services or seizure of personal religious materials such as
    Bibles or icons to individuals and organizations acting on their own
    authority and in contradiction of government policy. Representatives of
    Christian denominations present in the country report that the
    Government is not interfering with private worship services as long as
    those services remain discreet.
        However, in January the Government arrested 16 Filipino Christians
    during a raid on a prayer service. Government officials maintained that
    the religious service was attended by such a large number of persons
    that it could not be considered private. After 6 weeks of detention,
    all of the detainees were released and deported to the Philippines. On
    November 30, religious police broke up a worship service of about 60
    Christians. Police seized Bibles, musical instruments, and documents
    relating to other Christian activities. Police detained five of the
    worshipers for questioning, then released them after they signed a
    confession. None of the worshipers was arrested. In June the Government
    arrested an Indian Christian for possession of a videotape of a
    religious event. He was released in August after spending 2 months in
    jail and then deported to India (see Section 1.d.). On December 8 in
    Riyadh, the authorities raided a gathering of 12 Filipino Christians
    after a worship service. The authorities arrested six of the
    individuals; two were released the same day, one subsequently was
    released, and three remained in custody at year's end.
        Proselytizing by non-Muslims is illegal, although there were no
    reports during the year of arrests for proselytizing. Persons wearing
    religious symbols of any kind in public risk confrontation with the
    Mutawwa'in. This general prohibition against religious symbols also
    applies to Muslims. A Christian wearing a crucifix or a Muslim wearing
    a Koranic necklace in public would be admonished. In certain areas,
    both the Mutawwa'in and vigilantes acting on their own harassed,
    assaulted, battered, arrested, and detained citizens and foreigners
    (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
        Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for
    contraband, including material that is deemed pornographic, and non-
    Muslim religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored
    materials considered offensive, including Bibles and religious
    videotapes.
        Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools at all
    levels. All children receive religious instruction, which generally is
    limited to that of the Hanbali school of Islam.
        In accordance with Shari'a, Saudi women are prohibited from
    marrying non-Muslims, but Saudi men may marry Christians and Jews, as
    well as Muslims.
        The Government requires noncitizens to carry Iqamas, or legal
    resident identity cards, which contain a religious designation for
    ``Muslim'' or ``non-Muslim.''
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the travel of
    Saudi women, who must obtain written permission from their closest male
    relative before the authorities allow them to board domestic public
    transportation or to travel abroad (see Section 5). In 1999 the
    Ministry of Interior announced that preparations were underway to issue
    identity cards to women, which would have been a step toward allowing
    women to establish independent legal identities from men and to secure
    greater rights in many areas, including travel. However, the Ministry
    announced in August that the current identification document system for
    women would be maintained for another 3 years and thus identity cards
    would not be issued. Men may travel anywhere within the country or
    abroad.
        Foreigners typically are allowed to reside or work in the country
    only under the sponsorship of a citizen or domestic business. The
    Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It
    does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their
    employment or change their workplace without their sponsor's
    permission. Foreign residents who travel within the country may be
    asked by the authorities to show that they possess letters of
    permission from their employer or sponsor.
        Sponsors generally retain possession of foreign workers' passports.
    Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel
    abroad. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or labor dispute with
    foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the
    employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved.
    Some sponsors use this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in
    their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There were numerous
    reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees involved in
    labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute was
    resolved (see Section 5).
        The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and
    witnesses in criminal cases and suspends the issuance of exit visas to
    them until the case is tried or otherwise concluded. As a result, some
    foreign nationals are forced to remain in the country for lengthy
    periods against their will. The authorities sometimes confiscate the
    passports of suspected oppositionists and their families. The
    Government actively discourages Shi'a from traveling to Iran to visit
    pilgrimage sites. The Government still punishes Shi'a who travel to
    Iran without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, or those
    suspected of such travel, by confiscating passports for up to 2 years
    (see Section 5).
        Citizens may emigrate, but the law prohibits dual citizenship.
    Apart from marriage to a Saudi national, there are no provisions for
    foreign residents to acquire citizenship. However, foreigners are
    granted citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an
    influential patron.
        The 1992 Basic Law provides that ``the state will grant political
    asylum if the public interest mitigates'' in favor of it. The language
    does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general
    the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other
    foreign workers: They must have sponsors for employment or risk
    expulsion. Of the 33,000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war
    given refuge in the country at the end of the Gulf War, none has been
    granted permanent asylum; however, the Government has underwritten the
    entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi refugees and continues
    to provide excellent logistical and administrative support to the UNHCR
    and other resettlement agencies.
        Approximately 27,000 of the original 33,000 Iraqi refugees had been
    resettled in other countries or voluntarily repatriated to Iraq at
    year's end. Most of the approximately 5,400 remaining refugees, as well
    as 160 Afghan refugees, are restricted to the Rafha refugee camp. The
    UNHCR has monitored over 3,000 persons voluntarily returning to Iraq
    from Rafha since December 1991 and found no evidence of forcible
    repatriation (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government has allowed some foreigners to remain temporarily in
    the country in cases where their safety would be jeopardized if they
    were deported to their home countries.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There
    are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few citizens have a
    voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The
    King rules on civil and religious matters within certain limitations
    established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain
    consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders.
        The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as
    Deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in
    turn appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. In 1992
    the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-
    Shura. This strictly advisory body began to hold sessions in 1993. In
    1997 the King expanded the council to 90 members. There are two Shi'a
    on the Council. The Council engages in debates that, while closed to
    the general public, provide advice and views occasionally contrary to
    the Government's proposed policy or recommended course of action. The
    Government usually incorporates the Majlis' advice into its final
    policy announcements or tries to convince it that the Government's
    policy is correct.
        The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is another advisory body to
    the King and the Cabinet. It reviews the Government's public policies
    for compliance with Shari'a. The Government views the Council as an
    important source of religious legitimacy and takes the Council's
    opinions into account when promulgating legislation.
        In June the press reported on the first meeting of a newly
    established ``Royal Family Council,'' which is composed of the Crown
    Prince and representatives of major branches of the extended royal
    family. The Council's stated purpose is to consider ``major decisions
    regarding the family.'' Its role in government, if any, is not clear.
        Communication between citizens and the Government usually is
    expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups
    such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. In theory, any
    male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or air a
    grievance at a majlis, an open-door meeting held by the King, a prince,
    or an important national or local official. However, as governmental
    functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized,
    public access to senior officials has become more restricted. Since the
    assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Saudi kings have reduced the
    frequency of their personal contacts with the public. Ministers and
    district governors more readily grant audiences at a majlis.
        Typical topics raised in a majlis are complaints about bureaucratic
    delay or insensitivity, requests for personal redress or assistance,
    and criticism of particular acts of government affecting family
    welfare. Broader ``political'' concerns--social, economic, or foreign
    policy--rarely are raised. Complaints about royal abuses of power are
    not entertained. In general journalists, academics, and businessmen
    believe that institutionalized avenues of domestic criticism of the
    regime are closed. Feedback is filtered through private personal
    channels and has affected various policy issues, including the Middle
    East peace process, unemployment of young Saudi men, and the
    construction of new infrastructure.
        The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an
    opposition group, was established in 1993. The Government acted almost
    immediately to repress it. In 1994 one of its founding members,
    Mohammed Al-Masari, fled to the United Kingdom, where he sought
    political asylum and established an overseas branch of the CDLR. In
    1996 internal divisions within the CDLR led to the creation of the
    rival Islamic Reform Movement (IRM), headed by Sa'ad Al-Faqih. Al-
    Masari expressed the CDLR's ``understanding'' of two fatal terrorist
    bombings of U.S. military facilities in 1995 and 1996 and sympathy for
    the perpetrators. The IRM implicitly condoned the two terrorist attacks
    as well, arguing that they were a natural outgrowth of a political
    system that does not tolerate peaceful dissent. Both groups continue to
    criticize the Government, using computers and facsimile transmissions
    to send newsletters back to Saudi Arabia.
        Women play no formal role in government and politics and are
    actively discouraged from doing so. Participation by women in a majlis
    is restricted, although some women seek redress through female members
    of the royal family.
        Two of the 90 members of the Majlis Ash-Shura are Shi'a.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no publicly active human rights groups, and the
    Government has made it clear that none critical of government policies
    would be permitted. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
    reported that they have received no responses to their requests for
    access to the country. However, the press carried an extensive
    discussion on human rights following the publication in March of an
    Amnesty International report critical of the Government's human rights
    practices. While nearly all media reports concurred with the
    Government's dismissive response to the report, one editorial that
    circulated widely called on regional governments to listen to human
    rights criticism and review their human rights practices (see Section
    2.a.).
        The Government generally does not permit visits by international
    human rights groups or independent monitors. The Government disagrees
    with internationally accepted definitions of human rights and views its
    interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect
    human rights. The Government generally ignores or criticizes as attacks
    on Islam citations by international monitors or foreign governments of
    government human rights abuses.
        However, during the year the Government initiated limited measures
    to participate in international human rights mechanisms, such as
    inviting the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
    Lawyers to visit the country and acceding to the U.N. Convention on the
    Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with
    reservations regarding aspects of the convention that it considers
    contrary to Shari'a law (see Section 5). In an address to the 56th
    session of the committee in April, Prince Turki bin Muhammad bin Saud
    Al-Kabir, Director of the International Organizations Department of the
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Government welcomed the
    role of international human rights mechanisms. The media widely
    disseminated Prince Turki's speech.
        Although the Government has established a committee to investigate
    allegations of torture in the country pursuant to its obligations under
    the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
    Treatment or Punishment, it has refused to recognize the authority of
    the Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses (see
    Section 1.c.).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        There is legal and systemic discrimination based on sex and
    religion. The law forbids discrimination based on race, but not
    nationality. The Government and private organizations cooperate in
    providing services for the disabled. The Shi'a religious minority
    suffers social, legal, and sectarian discrimination.
        Women.--The Government does not keep statistics on spousal abuse or
    other forms of violence against women. However, based on the
    information available regarding physical spousal abuse and violence
    against women, such violence and abuse appear to be common problems.
    Hospital workers report that many women are admitted for treatment of
    injuries that apparently result from spousal violence. Some foreign
    women have suffered physical abuse from their Saudi husbands. A Saudi
    man may prevent his wife and any child or unmarried adult daughter from
    obtaining an exit visa to depart the country (see Section 2.d.).
    Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers
    abuse foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of
    countries with large domestic servant populations maintain safehouses
    to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that include
    forced confinement, withholding of food, beating and other physical
    abuse, and rape. Often the reported abuse is at the hands of female
    citizens. In general the Government considers such cases family matters
    and does not intervene unless charges of abuse are brought to its
    attention. It is almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress
    in the courts, due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and the
    women's own fears of reprisals. Few employers have been punished for
    such abuses. There are no private support groups or religious
    associations to assist such women.
        By religious law and social custom, women have the right to own
    property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or
    male relatives. However, women have few political or social rights and
    are not treated as equal members of society. There are no active
    women's rights groups. Women legally may not drive motor vehicles and
    are restricted in their use of public facilities when men are present.
    Women must enter city buses by separate rear entrances and sit in
    specially designated sections. Women risk arrest by the Mutawwa'in for
    riding in a vehicle driven by a male who is not an employee or a close
    male relative. Women are not admitted to a hospital for medical
    treatment without the consent of a male relative. By law and custom,
    women may not undertake domestic or foreign travel alone (see Section
    2.d.). In 1999 the Ministry of Interior announced that preparations
    were underway to issue identity cards to women, which would have been a
    step toward allowing women to establish independent legal identities
    from men. However, the Ministry announced in August that the current
    identification document system for women would be maintained for
    another 3 years, and that identity cards therefore would not be issued.
        In public a woman is expected to wear an abaya (a black garment
    that covers the entire body) and to cover her head and face. The
    Mutawwa'in generally expect women from Arab countries, Asia, and Africa
    to comply more fully with Saudi customs of dress than they do Western
    women; nonetheless, in recent years they have instructed Western women
    to wear the abaya and cover their hair as well. During the year,
    Mutawwa'in continued to admonish and harass women to wear their abayas
    and cover their hair.
        Some government officials and ministries still bar accredited
    female diplomats in the country from official meetings.
        Women also are subject to discrimination under Shari'a as
    interpreted in Saudi Arabia, which stipulates that daughters receive
    half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. In a Shari'a court, the
    testimony of one man equals that of two women (see Section 1.e.).
    Although Islamic law permits polygyny, with up to four wives, it is
    becoming less common due to demographic and economic changes. Islamic
    law enjoins a man to treat each wife equally. In practice such equality
    is left to the discretion of the husband. Some women participate in Al-
    Mesyar (or ``short daytime visit'') marriages, in which the women
    relinquish their legal rights to financial support and nighttime
    cohabitation. Additionally, the husband is not required to inform his
    other wives of the marriage, and any children resulting from such a
    marriage have no inheritance rights. The Government places greater
    restrictions on women than on men regarding marriage to non-Saudis and
    non-Muslims (see Section 1.f.). While Shari'a provides women with a
    basis to own and dispose of property independently, women often are
    constrained from asserting such rights because of various legal and
    societal barriers, especially regarding employment and freedom of
    movement.
        Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but
    men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men are required to
    pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the
    marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who
    demonstrate legal grounds for divorce still are entitled to this
    alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her
    children until they attain a specified age: 7 years for boys, 9 years
    for girls. Children over these ages are awarded to the divorced husband
    or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women
    continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their
    children after divorce.
        Women have access to free but segregated education through the
    university level. They constitute over 58 percent of all university
    students but are excluded from studying such subjects as engineering,
    journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas; women may do so
    only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative.
        Women make up approximately 5 percent of the formal work force and
    own about 4 percent of the businesses, although they must deputize a
    male relative to represent the business. Most employment opportunities
    for women are in education and health care, with lesser opportunity in
    business, philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Despite
    limited educational opportunities in many professional fields, some
    female citizens are able to study abroad and return to work in
    professions such as architecture and journalism. Many foreign women
    work as domestic servants and nurses. In 1997 the Government authorized
    women to work in a limited capacity in the hotel industry. Women who
    wish to enter nontraditional fields are subject to discrimination.
    Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if there are no adult male
    relatives present with whom they may reside and who agree to take
    responsibility for them. Most workplaces in which women are present are
    segregated by sex. Frequently, contact with male supervisors or clients
    is allowed only by telephone or fax machine. In 1995 the Ministry of
    Commerce announced that women no longer would be issued business
    licenses for work in fields that might require them to supervise
    foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a regular basis
    with government officials. However, in hospital settings and in the oil
    industry, women and men work together, and, in some instances, women
    supervise male employees.
        In September Crown Prince Abdullah signed the U.N. Convention on
    the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with
    reservations regarding aspects of the Convention that the Government
    considers contrary to Shari'a law.
        Children.--The Government provides all children with free education
    and medical care. Children are not subject to the strict social
    segregation faced by women, although they are segregated by sex in
    schools, beginning at the age of 7. In more general social situations,
    boys are segregated at the age of 12 and girls at the onset of puberty.
        It is difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the
    Government currently keeps no national statistics on such cases. One
    major hospital has begun a program to detect, report, and prevent child
    abuse. In general Saudi culture greatly prizes children, and initial
    studies show that severe abuse and neglect of children appear to be
    rare.
        Trafficking in children for forced begging persists (see Sections
    6.c., and 6.f.).
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced among some foreign workers from East
    Africa and the Nile Valley. It is not always clear whether the
    procedure occurred in Saudi Arabia or the workers' home countries.
    There is no law specifically prohibiting FGM.
        People with Disabilities.--The provision of government social
    services increasingly has brought the disabled into the public
    mainstream. In October Riyadh governor Prince Salman Bin Abd Al-Aziz
    announced that the Government was implementing new regulations designed
    to integrate disabled persons into the mainstream of society; the
    regulations had not been implemented by year's end. The media carry
    features lauding the accomplishments of disabled persons and sharply
    criticizing parents who neglect disabled children. The Government and
    private charitable organizations cooperate in education, employment,
    and other services for the disabled. The law provides hiring quotas for
    the disabled. There is no legislation that mandates public
    accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings often include such
    access.
        Foreign criminal rings reportedly bought and imported disabled
    children for the purpose of forced begging (see Sections 5, 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        Police generally transport mentally ill persons found wandering
    alone in public to their families or a hospital. However, there were
    reports that police pick up mentally ill persons for minor violations,
    detain them for a few weeks, and then release them, only to detain them
    again later for similar violations. Police officials recognize the
    problem but claim that according to Islam, family members should be
    taking care of such individuals.
        Religious Minorities.--Shi'a citizens are discriminated against in
    government and employment, especially in national security jobs.
    Several years ago the Government subjected Shi'a to employment
    restrictions in the oil industry and has not relaxed them. Since the
    1979 Iranian revolution, some Shi'a who are suspected of subversion
    have been subjected periodically to surveillance and limitations on
    travel abroad. Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of
    a U.S. military installation, authorities have detained, interrogated,
    and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a Muslims, including
    Shi'a returning to the country following their travel to Iran (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
        In April in the city of Najran, riots took place that led to
    members of the Makarama Ismaili Shi'a community engaging in gun battles
    with security forces that reportedly resulted in a number of deaths.
    Conflicting unconfirmed reports attributed the unrest to religious
    differences, smuggling, or land seizures (see Section 2.c.).
        Under Saudi law, children of Saudi fathers are considered Muslim,
    regardless of the country or the religious tradition in which they may
    have been raised. In some cases, children raised in other countries and
    in other religious traditions later taken by their Saudi fathers to
    Saudi Arabia reportedly were coerced to conform to their fathers'
    interpretation of Islamic norms and practices.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
    is illegal, there is substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or
    national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia are subject to
    various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most
    difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, pay
    scales for identical or similar labor or professional services are set
    by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced
    foreign nationals performing the same employment duties receive varied
    compensation based on their nationalities (see Section 6.b.).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Government decrees prohibit the
    establishment of labor unions, and strikes are prohibited; however,
    several work stoppages were staged in Jeddah during the year by foreign
    hospital, food processing, and construction workers who had not been
    paid.
        In 1995 Saudi Arabia was suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private
    Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
    Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
    rights standards.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is forbidden. Foreign workers comprise about two-thirds of
    the work force. There is no minimum wage; wages are set by employers
    and vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of
    the worker (see Section 5).
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor pursuant to a 1962 royal decree
    that abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor
    Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor,
    gives them the force of law. However, employers have significant
    control over the movements of foreign employees, which results in
    situations that sometimes involve forced labor, especially in remote
    areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work.
        Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas
    to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against
    their employers for unpaid salaries (see Section 2.d.). Some sponsors
    also pressure foreign workers by refusing to provide them with a
    ``letter of no objection'' that would allow them to be employed by
    another sponsor.
        The labor laws, including those designed to limit working hours and
    regulate working conditions, do not apply to foreign domestic servants,
    and such domestic servants may not seek the protection of the labor
    courts. There were credible reports that female domestic servants
    sometimes were forced to work 12 to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week.
    There were numerous confirmed reports of maids fleeing employers and
    seeking refuge in their embassies (see Section 5). The authorities
    often forced runaway maids to return to their places of employment.
        There have been many reports of workers whose employers refused to
    pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other
    promised benefits. Foreign workers with such grievances, except
    domestic servants, have the right to complain before the labor courts,
    but few do so because of fear of deportation. The labor system is
    conducive to the exploitation of foreign workers because enforcement of
    work contracts is difficult and generally favors employers. Labor
    courts, while generally fair, may take many months to reach a final
    appellate ruling, during which time an employer may prevent the foreign
    laborer from leaving the country. An employer also may delay a case
    until a worker's funds are exhausted and the worker is forced to return
    to his home country.
        The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
    children. Nonetheless, with the rare exception of criminal begging
    rings, and the possible exceptions of family businesses, forced or
    bonded child labor does not occur (see Section 6.d.). Children, mainly
    of South Asian and African origin, frequently are used for the purpose
    of organized begging, particularly in the vicinity of the Grand Mosque
    in Mecca during Islamic holidays (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 13 years, which may be
    waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of a juvenile's
    guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-
    oriented businesses or in other areas that are construed as extensions
    of the household, such as farming, herding, and domestic service. The
    law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children,
    but it is not a problem, with the rare exception of forced child
    begging rings, and possibly family businesses (see Section 6.c.).
        Children under the age of 18 and women may not be employed in
    hazardous or harmful industries such as mining or industries that use
    power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity
    responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children,
    the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in
    the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in
    general children play a minimal role in the work force.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legal minimum wage.
    Labor regulations limit the work week to 48 hours, including no more
    than 8 hours a day and no more than 5 hours without a break for rest,
    prayer, and food. The regulations allow employers to require up to 12
    additional hours of overtime per workweek at time-and-a-half pay. Labor
    law provides for a 24-hour rest period, normally on Fridays, although
    the employer may grant it on another day. The average wage generally
    provides a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
        The ILO has stated that the Government has not formulated
    legislation implementing the ILO Convention on Equal Pay, and that
    regulations that segregate work places by sex, or limit vocational
    programs for women, violate ILO Convention 111.
        Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have
    complained that after their arrival in Saudi Arabia they were presented
    with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than
    originally promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed
    contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less
    favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees report that at the end
    of their contract service, their employers refuse to grant permission
    to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes
    with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see
    Section 2.d.). A large number of female domestic servants often were
    subjected to abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        ``Saudiization'' is the Government's attempt to decrease the number
    of foreigners working in certain occupations and to replace them with
    Saudi workers. To accomplish this goal, the Government has taken
    several long-term steps, most notably limiting employment in certain
    fields to citizens, prohibiting renewal of existing contracts, and
    requiring that 5 percent of the work force in private sector companies
    be filled by citizen workers. The Government also requires firms to
    increase the proportion of citizen workers by 5 per cent each year.
    There is a limited number of persons, both influential and otherwise,
    who attempted to circumvent the requirements of the law. For example,
    employers have altered job descriptions or hired foreigners for
    nominally low-level positions but in fact had them fill positions
    reserved for citizens. In Jeddah fruit and vegetable vending jobs at a
    large open-air market were Saudiized in late 1999. However, by early in
    the year, the newly hired Saudi sellers had hired back many of the
    fired foreigners to run the stalls for them at lower wages than they
    had earned before the Saudiization occurred. Influential persons
    effectively may circumvent the law because the Ministry of Labor is
    reportedly unwilling to confront them.
        The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country
    has done little to Saudiize the economy because illegal immigrants
    largely work in low-income positions, which most Saudis consider
    unsuitable. In some cases, the campaign may have resulted in enhanced
    job security and wage stability for some legally employed immigrants in
    low-income positions. The Government is carrying out the campaign by
    widely publicizing its enforcement of existing laws against illegal
    immigrants and citizens who employ or sponsor illegal immigrants. In
    addition to deportation for illegal workers and jail terms and fines
    for citizens hiring illegal workers, the Government announced in 1998
    that houses rented to illegal aliens would be ordered closed. In 1997
    the Government offered an amnesty of several months' duration, which
    allowed illegal immigrants and their employers or sponsors to avoid the
    possibility of prosecution by voluntarily seeking expeditious
    repatriation. As of September 1999, as many as 1.1 million persons
    departed the country under terms of the amnesty or were deported for
    violating residence and labor laws. During this process, the Government
    yielded to domestic pressure and granted grace periods and exemptions
    to certain categories of illegal immigrants (such as domestic servants,
    drivers, and shepherds), thereby allowing many illegal immigrants to
    legalize their status without leaving the country. The Government
    announced in April that the grace period would expire in June and that
    anyone staying illegally could be subject to imprisonment, a fine, and
    questioning regarding who was assisting them. Illegal immigrants
    generally are willing to accept lower salaries and fewer benefits than
    legally employed immigrants. The departure or legalization of illegal
    workers reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby reduced
    the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and fewer
    benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants.
        Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from
    job-related hazards and disease. Foreign nationals report frequent
    failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers, herdsmen,
    domestic servants, and workers in family-operated businesses are not
    covered by these regulations. Workers risk losing employment if they
    remove themselves from hazardous work conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits slavery and the
    smuggling of persons into the country.
        Children, mainly of South Asian and African origin, frequently are
    used for the purpose of organized begging, particularly in the vicinity
    of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during Islamic holidays. There were
    reports that some of these children were smuggled into the country by
    organized rings.
        There were unconfirmed reports that women were trafficked into the
    country to work as prostitutes.
                                   __________

                                     SYRIA

        Despite the existence of some institutions of democratic
    government, the political system places virtually absolute authority in
    the hands of the President. Former President Hafiz Al-Asad died on June
    10 after 30 years in power. Immediately following Al-Asad's death, the
    Parliament amended the Constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age
    of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar
    Al-Asad to be legally eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'th
    party. On July 10, Bashar was elected by referendum in which he ran
    unopposed, and received 97.29 percent of the vote. Key decisions
    regarding foreign policy, national security, internal politics, and the
    economy are made by the President, with counsel from his ministers,
    high-ranking members of the ruling Ba'th Party, and a relatively small
    circle of security advisers. Although the Parliament is elected every 4
    years, the Ba'th Party is ensured a majority. The Parliament cannot
    initiate laws, but only assesses and sometimes modifies those proposed
    by the executive branch. The Constitution provides for an independent
    judiciary, but this is not the case in the exceptional (state of
    emergency) security courts, which are subject to political influence.
    The regular courts display independence, although political connections
    and bribery can influence verdicts. In general all three branches of
    government are influenced to varying degrees by leaders of the Ba'th
    Party, whose primacy in state institutions is mandated by the
    Constitution.
        The powerful role of the security services in government, which
    extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state
    of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1963. The
    Government justifies martial law because of the state of war with
    Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Syrian Military
    Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while
    General Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the
    purview of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security
    services operate independently of each other and outside the legal
    system. Their members commit serious human rights abuses.
        The economy is based on commerce, agriculture, oil production, and
    government services. There is a generally inefficient public sector, a
    private sector, and a mixed public/private sector. The still-dominant
    state role in the economy, a complex bureaucracy, overarching security
    concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, a lack of modern
    financial services and communications, and a weak legal system hamper
    economic growth. The Government has sought to promote the private
    sector through investment incentives, exchange rate consolidation, and
    deregulation, especially with regard to financial transactions
    governing imports and exports. However, in recent years, diminished
    foreign aid, drought, fluctuating prices for oil and agricultural
    commodities, and regional recession have hurt the economy. Uncertainty
    about the Middle East peace process and sporadic tension over Iraq has
    diminished investor confidence in the region. Consequently, Syria
    posted negative gross domestic product (GDP) rates of 4.4 percent in
    1997, 1.2 percent in 1998, and an estimated 2 percent in 1999. A high
    population growth rate of 3.3 percent continues to erode whatever
    economic gains are made. It is estimated that real per capita GDP again
    decreased in 1999. However, the Government has been very successful in
    controlling the money supply, with inflation remaining in the 2 percent
    range in 1998. Despite a 25 percent wage increase for public and
    private sector employees and a 20 percent increase for pensions, wage
    and benefits increases generally have not kept pace with cost of living
    increases. The gap between the rich and poor remained, with many public
    sector workers relying on second jobs to make ends meet.
        The human rights situation remained poor, and the Government
    continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there were
    improvements in some areas. The Ba'th Party dominates the political
    system, as provided for by the Constitution, and citizens do not have
    the right to change their government. The Government uses its vast
    powers so effectively that there is no organized political opposition,
    and there have been very few antiregime manifestations. Serious abuses
    include the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison
    conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without
    trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an
    inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at times,
    political influence; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; denial
    of freedom of speech and of the press, despite a slight loosening of
    censorship restrictions; denial of freedom of assembly and association;
    some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on freedom of movement.
        The Government does not officially allow independent domestic human
    rights groups to exist; however, there were reports that several
    domestic human rights organizations and civil society groups began
    meeting regularly during the year. Violence and societal discrimination
    against women are problems. The Government discriminates against the
    stateless Kurdish minority, suppresses worker rights, and child labor
    occurs. In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600
    political prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some
    nonpolitical prisoners and closed the Mazzah prison, which reportedly
    held numerous political prisoners and detainees. In December the
    Government transferred 54 Lebanese prisoners from Syrian to Lebanese
    custody.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings during the year.
        In November security forces killed 4 Bedouins during the
    Government's intervention in armed clashes between Bedouin shepherds
    and Druze residents of Suwayda Province (see Sections 1.c. and 5). In
    October 1999, government forces moved against a residential compound
    and boat dock owned by President Asad's brother, Rif'at Al-Asad. A
    number of Rif'at's supporters, including military guards, were
    sequestered in the compound, and the clash resulted in an unconfirmed
    number of deaths, including government forces. The Government
    reportedly claimed that the clash was the consequence of enforcing
    ``legal measures' that were taken against Rif'at and his supporters
    because of ``violations of civil and military laws.''
        There were reports in 1999 of corporal punishment of army recruits
    that led to injury or death (see Section 1.c.).
        In 1998 3 policemen were convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 10
    years of hard labor by the Aleppo criminal court for the torture and
    killing of a 50-year-old man accused of heroin dealing, marking the
    first time since 1994 that members of the security forces were held
    accountable for their actions.
        There were no reports of deaths in detention; however, such deaths
    have occurred in the past. Previous deaths in detention have not been
    investigated by the Government, and the number and identities of
    prisoners who died in prisons since the 1980's remain unknown.
        In 1998 Lebanon's military prosecutor charged 18 members of the
    Lebanese Forces, an outlawed rightwing Christian militia, with carrying
    out the December 1996 bombing of a bus in Damascus. Eleven of the 18
    persons charged were in custody. There were no further developments in
    the case during the year.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
    motivated disappearances. Despite inquiries by international human
    rights organizations and foreign governments, the Government offered
    little new information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who
    have been held incommunicado for years or about whom no more is known
    other than the approximate date of their detention, including
    Palestinians and Jordanian and Lebanese citizens who reportedly were
    abducted from Lebanon during and after Lebanon's civil war (see Section
    1.d.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Despite the existence of constitutional provisions and
    several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence
    that security forces continued to use torture. Former prisoners and
    detainees report that torture methods include administering electrical
    shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum;
    beating, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling;
    hyperextending the spine; and using a chair that bends backwards to
    asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim's spine. Although torture
    may occur in prisons, torture is most likely to occur while detainees
    are being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various
    security services throughout the country, and particularly while the
    authorities are trying to extract a confession or information about an
    alleged crime or alleged accomplices.
        The Government has denied the use of torture and claims that it
    would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or
    physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials
    who beat them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations of
    excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the
    plaintiff is required to initiate his own civil suit against the
    alleged abuser.
        Courts do not order medical examinations for defendants who claim
    that they were tortured (see Section 1.e). There were reports in 1999
    of the corporal punishment of army recruits that led to injury or death
    (see Section 1.a.).
        There were credible reports of torture during the year, including
    one prisoner who alleged he had been tortured while held in solitary
    confinement for 3 months. The Government reportedly tortured some of
    the Islamist prisoners who were detained during the large-scale arrests
    in late 1999 and early 2000 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        In October police used teargas and batons to disperse several large
    demonstrations directed against diplomatic missions and international
    agencies in reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force against
    Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; an indeterminate
    number of demonstrators and police personnel were injured (see Section
    2.b.).
        In November 200 persons were injured during clashes in Suwayda
    province involving Druze residents, Bedouin shepherds, and security
    forces (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        Prison conditions vary but generally are poor and do not meet
    minimum international standards for health and sanitation. Facilities
    for political or national security prisoners generally are worse than
    those for common criminals. The prison in Palmyra, where many political
    and national security prisoners have been kept, is widely considered to
    have the worst conditions. At some prisons, authorities allow
    visitation, but in other prisons, security officials demand bribes from
    family members who wish to visit incarcerated relatives. Overcrowding
    and the denial of sufficient nourishment occurs at several prisons.
    According to Human Rights Watch, prisoners and detainees are held
    without adequate medical care, and some prisoners with significant
    health problems reportedly are denied medical treatment. Some former
    detainees have reported that the Government prohibits reading
    materials, even the Koran, for political prisoners.
        The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison or
    detention center conditions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The Emergency Law, which authorizes the
    Government to conduct preventive arrests, overrides Penal Code
    provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, including the need
    to obtain warrants. Officials contend that the Emergency Law is applied
    only in narrowly defined cases. Nonetheless, in cases involving
    political or national security offenses, arrests generally are carried
    out in secret, and suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged
    periods without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial
    determination for the pretrial detention. Some of these practices are
    prohibited by the state of emergency, but the authorities are not held
    to these strictures.
        The Government has been known to detain relatives of detainees or
    of fugitives in order to obtain confessions or the fugitive's surrender
    (see Section 1.f.).
        Defendants in civil and criminal trials have the right to bail
    hearings and the possible release from detention on their own
    recognizance. There is no bail option for those accused of national
    security offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil
    cases, security detainees do not have access to lawyers prior to or
    during questioning.
        Detainees have no legal redress for false arrest. Security forces
    often do not provide detainees' families with information on their
    welfare or location while in detention. Consequently, many persons who
    have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term
    detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention. It
    appears that the number of new disappearances has declined in recent
    years, although this circumstance may be due to the Government's
    success in deterring opposition political activity rather than a
    loosening of the criteria for detention. Many detainees brought to
    trial have been held incommunicado for years, and their trials often
    have been unfair (see Section 1.e.). There were reliable reports that
    the Government did not notify foreign governments when their citizens
    were arrested or detained.
        Pretrial detention may be lengthy, even in cases not involving
    political or national security offenses. The criminal justice system is
    backlogged. Many criminal suspects are held in pretrial detention for
    months and may have their trials extended for additional months.
    Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court proceedings are caused
    by a shortage of available courts and the absence of legal provisions
    for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see also Section 1.e.).
        It is not known whether any Turkomen from among hundreds detained
    in 1996 remain in detention.
        There were reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and Palestinian
    Islamists between late December 1999 and February. Hundreds of persons
    allegedly were arrested in the cities of Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, and
    Homs. Most of those arrested reportedly were released after signing an
    agreement not to participate in political activities; however, some may
    remain in detention.
        There were reliable reports that security forces arrested several
    minors on unspecified political charges during the year. The minors
    reportedly were held in adult facilities for 6 months, had no access to
    legal counsel, and were not allowed visits from family members.
        There were unconfirmed reports that a large number of Jordanian
    prisoners were released between May and July. However, according to
    Amnesty International (AI), only three of the released Jordanians had
    been held for political reasons.
        In May there were media reports that Communist Action Party leaders
    Aslan 'Abd Al-Karim and Fateh Jamous and oppositionist Randa Ayoubi
    were released from prison; they reportedly were not required to agree
    to abstain from participating in political activities. In August Sheikh
    Hashim Minqara, a leader of the Islamic Tawheed Movement who was
    arrested in Lebanon in 1985 reportedly was released.
        In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600 political
    prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some nonpolitical
    prisoners, including some who were held under the Economic Penal Code.
    The amnesty was covered in the media and reportedly was the first time
    that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political
    reasons. There are credible reports that the 600 detainees, including
    members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Party, the
    Communist Action Party, and some Kurds, are being released
    incrementally. The Government also closed the Mazzah prison in
    November, which reportedly held numerous political prisoners and
    detainees.
        In December the Government transferred 54 Lebanese political
    prisoners and detainees from Syrian to Lebanese custody (see Section
    1.e.).
        A prisoner amnesty that was announced in July 1999 is believed to
    have benefited some political prisoners and detainees. While the total
    number of those released is unknown, AI identified six prisoners held
    for political reasons who were released. Unconfirmed reports suggest
    that as many as 600 prisoners may have been released. According to AI,
    hundreds of persons held for political reasons also were released in
    1998. Prior to the 1998-2000 releases, the last significant release of
    political detainees took place in late 1995, with approximately 2,200
    to 3,000 persons believed to have been released. Some former prisoners
    reportedly were required to sign loyalty oaths or admissions of guilt
    as a condition of their release. Most of those arrested in a mass
    crackdown in 1980 have been released; however, some may remain in
    prolonged detention without charge. Some union and professional
    association officials detained in 1980 may remain in detention (see
    Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). AI reported in 1998 that ``hundreds of
    Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested,
    some over two decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret
    detention.''
        The number of remaining political detainees is unknown. In June
    prior to the November prison amnesty, AI estimated that there were
    approximately 1,500 political detainees in the country; many of the
    detainees reportedly are suspected supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood
    and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th party. There also are Jordanian,
    Lebanese, and Palestinian political detainees. According to Amnesty
    International, security forces also detain family members of suspected
    oppositionists (see Section 1.f.). Estimates of detainees are difficult
    to confirm because the Government does not verify publicly the number
    of detentions without charge, the release of detainees or amnestied
    prisoners, or whether detainees subsequently are sentenced to prison
    (see Section 1.e.).
        In October 1998, the Jordanian Government requested that the Syrian
    Government account for 429 named Jordanian nationals, 239 of whom
    Jordan claims have been missing since they entered Syria, and 190 of
    whom Jordan claims are imprisoned in Syria. Families of missing
    Jordanians allege that there are more than 700 Jordanians in Syrian
    detention. According to press reports, government sources stated that
    the names provided by Jordan were being examined and that the
    Government would respond officially. To date there has been no
    published official response.
        Former prisoners are subject to a so-called ``rights ban,'' which
    begins from the day of sentencing and lasts until 10 years after the
    expiration of the sentence. Persons subject to this ban are not allowed
    to vote, run for office, or work in the public sector; they often also
    are denied passports.
        The Government has exiled citizens in the past, although the
    practice is prohibited by the Constitution. The Government refuses to
    reissue the passports of citizens who fled the country in the 1980's;
    such citizens consequently are unable to return to the country.
        There were no known instances of forced exile during the year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with
    alleged security cases are not independent of executive branch control.
    The regular court system displays considerable independence in civil
    cases, although political connections and bribery sometimes influence
    verdicts.
        The judicial system is composed of the civil and criminal courts,
    military courts, security courts, and religious courts, which
    adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and inheritance.
    The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal. The Supreme
    Constitutional Court is empowered to rule only on the constitutionality
    of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
        Civil and criminal courts are organized under the Ministry of
    Justice. Defendants before these courts are entitled to the legal
    representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for
    indigents. Defendants are presumed innocent; they are allowed to
    present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public,
    except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may
    appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to
    the Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult because the courts
    do not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries prepared
    by the presiding judges. There are no juries.
        Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as
    military personnel. The venue for a civilian defendant is decided by a
    military prosecutor. There were continuing reports that the Government
    operates military field courts in locations outside established
    courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observe fewer of the formal
    procedures of regular military courts.
        The two security courts are the Supreme State Security Court
    (SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the
    Economic Security Court (ESC), which tries cases involving financial
    crimes. Both courts operate under the state of emergency, not ordinary
    law, and do not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding
    defendants' rights.
        Charges against defendants in the SSSC often are vague. Many
    defendants appear to be tried for exercising normal political rights,
    such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the
    prosecution of anyone ``opposing the goals of the revolution,''
    ``shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,''
    or attempting to ``change the economic or social structure of the
    State.'' Nonetheless the Government contends that the SSSC tries only
    persons who have sought to use violence against the State.
        Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during the
    preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the
    prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually are closed to the public.
    Lawyers are not ensured access to their clients before the trial and
    are excluded from the court during their client's initial interrogation
    by the prosecutor. Lawyers submit written defense pleas rather than
    oral presentations. The State's case often is based on confessions, and
    defendants have not been allowed to argue in court that their
    confessions were coerced. There is no known instance in which the court
    ordered a medical examination for a defendant who claimed that he was
    tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some defendants, but the
    Government does not provide any statistics on the conviction rate.
    Defendants do not have the right to appeal verdicts, but sentences are
    reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter
    sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process.
        Accurate information on the number of cases heard by the SSSC is
    difficult to obtain, although hundreds of cases are believed to pass
    through the court annually. Many reportedly involved charges relating
    to membership in various banned political groups, including the Party
    of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th Party.
    Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in the past. The
    Government permitted delegates from AI to attend a session of the SSSC
    in 1997; however there have been no visits by human rights
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) since then (see Section 4).
        The Economic Security Court (ESC) tries persons for alleged
    violations of foreign exchange laws and other economic crimes. The
    prosecution of economic crimes is not applied uniformly, as some
    government officials or business persons with close connections to the
    Government likely have violated the country's strict economic laws
    without prosecution. Like the SSSC, the ESC does not ensure due process
    for defendants. Defendants may not have adequate access to lawyers to
    prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually is based on
    confessions. Verdicts may be influenced by high-ranking government
    officials. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not
    have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may
    appeal to the Court of Cassation. A significant prisoner amnesty for
    individuals convicted of economic crimes was announced in July 1999.
    Theoretically this amnesty may have benefited thousands of persons. In
    May late president Hafiz Al-Asad amended the Economic Penal Code to
    allow defendants in economic courts to be released on bail. The bail
    provision does not extend to those accused of forgery, counterfeiting,
    or auto theft; however, the amendment is intended to provide relief for
    those accused of other economic crimes, many of whom have been in
    pretrial detention for long periods of time. These amendments to the
    Economic Penal Code also limit the categories of cases that can be
    tried in the ESC. In November the Government approved a general pardon
    for nonpolitical prisoners and a reduction of sentences by one-third
    for persons convicted of economic crimes, with a provision to commute
    sentences entirely for persons who return embezzled funds to investors
    within 1 year of the law's effective date.
        Prisoner amnesties in July 1999 and November are believed to have
    benefited some political prisoners and detainees. The Government also
    transferred 54 Lebanese political prisoners and detainees from Syrian
    to Lebanese custody in December (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government has released virtually all of those arrested at the
    time President Asad took power in 1970. However, at least two persons
    arrested during that period may remain in prison, despite the
    expiration of one of the prisoners' sentences.
        The Government in the past denied that it held political prisoners,
    arguing that, although the aims of some prisoners may be political,
    their activities, including subversion, were criminal. The official
    media reported that the 600 beneficiaries of the November amnesty were
    political prisoners and detainees; this reportedly was the first time
    that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political
    reasons. Nonetheless, the Emergency Law and the Penal Code are so
    vague, and the Government's power so broad, that many persons were
    convicted and are in prison for the mere expression of political
    opposition to the Government.
        The exact number of political prisoners is unknown.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Although laws provide for freedom from arbitrary
    interference, the Emergency Law authorizes the security services to
    enter homes and conduct searches with warrants if security matters,
    very broadly defined, are involved. The security services selectively
    monitor telephone conversations and fax transmissions. The Government
    sometimes opens mail destined for both citizens and foreign residents.
    It also prevents the delivery of human rights materials. In August
    1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian
    newspapers (also see Section 2.a.).
        The Government continues its practice of threatening or detaining
    the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain
    confessions, minimize outside interference, or prompt the fugitive's
    surrender (see Section 1.d.). There have been reports that security
    personnel force prisoners to watch relatives being tortured in order to
    extract confessions. According to AI, security forces also detain
    family members of suspected oppositionists (see Section 1.d.).
        Security checkpoints continue to exist, although primarily in
    military and other restricted areas. There are few police checkpoints
    on main roads and in populated areas. Generally, the security services
    set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods, weapons, narcotics,
    and subversive literature. The searches take place without warrants. In
    the past, the Government and the Ba'th Party monitored and attempted to
    restrict some citizens' visits to foreign embassies and cultural
    centers.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing, but the
    Government restricts these rights significantly in practice. The
    Government strictly controls the dissemination of information and
    permits no written or oral criticism of the President, the President's
    family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or the legitimacy of the regime.
    The Government also does not permit sectarian issues to be raised.
    Detention and beatings for individual expressions of opinion that
    violate these unwritten rules sometimes occur, although not as
    frequently as in the past.
        The Emergency Law allows the Government broad discretion in
    determining what constitutes illegal expression. It prohibits the
    publishing of ``false information,'' which opposes ``the goals of the
    revolution `` (see Section 1.e.). In the past, the Government has
    imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press restrictions. In
    May 1999, a defamation case filed against a journalist was reported
    widely in the press. The case was believed to be the first in which a
    journalist was tried for what he had published; he was cleared of guilt
    by the court. State security services are known to threaten local
    journalists, including with the removal of credentials, for articles
    printed outside the country. There were reports that journalists
    temporarily lost their credentials during the year after they allegedly
    reported on issues deemed sensitive by the military. For example, in
    September authorities revoked temporarily the credentials of a local
    journalist who wrote an article that the Government deemed politically
    sensitive.
        The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and
    National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press. They usually
    prevent publication or distribution of any material deemed threatening
    or embarrassing by the security services to high levels of the
    Government. Censorship usually is stricter for materials in Arabic.
    Commonly censored subjects include: The Government's human rights
    record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official involvement in
    drug trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in Lebanon; graphic
    descriptions of sexual activity; material unfavorable to the Arab cause
    in the Middle East conflict; and material that is offensive to any of
    the country's religious groups. In addition most journalists and
    writers practice self-censorship to avoid provoking a negative
    government reaction.
        Recent trends toward a modest relaxation of censorship increased
    during the year. In his July inaugural speech, President Bashar Al-Asad
    emphasized the principle of media transparency. Since July both the
    print and electronic media at times have been critical of Ba'th Party
    and government performance and have reported openly on a range of
    social and economic issues. While this relaxation of censorship did not
    extend to domestic politics or foreign policy issues, it was a notable
    departure from past practice. Damascus-based correspondents for
    regional Arab media also were able to file reports on internal
    political issues, such as rumored governmental changes, new political
    discussion groups, and the possible introduction of new parties to the
    Ba'th Party-dominated National Progressive Front. In November the Ba'th
    Party Regional Command voted to amend the press law to allow
    constituent parties of the National Progressive Front to publish
    newspapers and to open party headquarters. In November the Prime
    Minister rescinded a 1986 ban on the printing of publications by public
    institutions without prior approval from the Prime Minister.
        A group of 99 Syrian intellectuals published a petition in a
    Lebanese newspaper in September calling for lifting martial law, ending
    the state of emergency in effect since 1963, releasing political
    prisoners, and expanding civil liberties in accordance with the
    provisions of the Constitution. The Government did not respond directly
    to the petition by year's end; however, the Government did take several
    of the steps called for in the petition (see Section 1.d.). The
    Government did not take action against any of the intellectuals who
    signed the petition by year's end. In December a local human rights
    organization published an open letter in a Lebanese newspaper calling
    for the closure of the notorious Tadmur prison.
        The media broadened somewhat their reporting on regional
    developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media
    covered some peace process events factually, but other events were
    reported selectively to buttress official views. The government-
    controlled press increased its coverage of official corruption and
    governmental inefficiency. There are no privately owned newspapers,
    although foreign-owned, foreign-published newspapers circulate
    relatively freely. In August 1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on
    entry of Jordanian newspapers (also see Section 1.f.).
        The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the radio and
    television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. The Ministry
    of Information closely monitors the radio and television news programs
    to ensure adherence to the government line. The Government does not
    interfere with broadcasts from abroad. Satellite dishes have
    proliferated throughout all regions and in neighborhoods of all social
    and economic categories, and in July the Government officially approved
    regulations permitting the importation of satellite receivers. Cellular
    telephone service was introduced early in the year, although
    prohibitive cost severely limits the number of subscribers. Internet
    access and access to e-mail is limited, although efforts are underway
    to provide greater Internet access, especially to universities and
    businesses. The Government blocks access to selected Internet sites
    that contain information deemed politically sensitive or pornographic
    in nature. The Government also blocks access to servers that provide
    free e-mail services. In 1999 and in September, telephone service to
    the offices and residences of several European embassies and the home
    of an American officer was disrupted, allegedly because the lines had
    been used to access Internet providers outside the country. Telephone
    service in 1999 was restored in response to diplomatic protest by the
    European embassies; however, diplomats and citizens continue to
    experience regular disruptions of telephone service. The Ministry of
    Culture and National Guidance censors fiction and nonfiction works,
    including films. It also determines which films may not be shown at the
    cultural centers operated by foreign embassies. The Government
    prohibits the publication of books and other materials in Kurdish;
    however, there are credible reports that Kurdish language materials are
    available in the country (see Section 5).
        The Government restricts academic freedom. Public school teachers
    are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy,
    although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at
    the university level.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
    assembly does not exist under the law. Citizens may not hold
    demonstrations unless they obtain permission from the Ministry of
    Interior. Most public demonstrations are organized by the Government or
    the Ba'th Party. The Government selectively applied the law during the
    year, permitting some demonstrations. The Government applies the
    restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian refugee camps, where
    controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
        In October there were numerous demonstrations, most of which were
    permitted or organized by the Government, and some of which were
    directed against diplomatic missions and international agencies in
    reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force against Palestinians
    in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. On October 4, police did not take
    adequate steps to protect diplomatic property during a violent
    demonstration. However, during a subsequent violent demonstration on
    October 6, police used tear gas, shields, batons, and threats of lethal
    force to disperse rock-throwing demonstrators and protect diplomatic
    property. Observers stated that the police acted with restraint. About
    50 police personnel and numerous demonstrators were injured in the
    demonstration (see Section 1.c.). The Government subsequently permitted
    additional demonstrations with a significant security force presence;
    such demonstrations remained peaceful.
        In November there were large demonstrations in Suwayda province
    following violent clashes between Bedouin shepherds and Druze residents
    of the province (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
        The Government restricts freedom of association. Private
    associations must be registered with the Government in order to be
    considered legal. Some groups have not been able to register,
    presumably because the Government views them as political, even though
    the groups presented themselves as cultural or professional
    associations. Unregistered groups generally may not hold meetings;
    however, there are credible reports that several domestic human rights
    organizations and civil society groups held regular meetings during the
    year. The Government usually grants registration to groups not engaged
    in political or other activities deemed sensitive. The authorities do
    not allow the establishment of independent political parties.
        In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted under its
    control, the executive boards of professional associations after some
    members staged a national strike and advocated an end to the state of
    emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time
    and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty
    members may serve on their executive boards. It is not known whether
    any persons detained in 1980 crackdowns on union and professional
    association officials remain in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, it imposes restrictions in some areas. The only advantage
    given to a particular religion by the Constitution is the requirement
    that the President be a Muslim. There is no official state religion;
    Sunni Muslims constitute the majority of the population.
        All religions and orders must register with the Government, which
    monitors fund raising and requires permits for all meetings by
    religious groups, except for worship. Recognized religious groups
    receive free utilities and are exempt from real estate taxes and taxes
    on official vehicles. There is a strict de facto separation of church
    and state. Religious groups tend to avoid any involvement in internal
    political affairs. The Government, in turn, generally refrains from
    becoming involved in strictly religious issues.
        The Government considers militant Islam a threat to the regime and
    follows closely the practice of its adherents. The Government has
    allowed many new mosques to be built; however, sermons are monitored
    and controlled, and mosques are closed between prayers.
        There were credible reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and
    Palestinian Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the
    Islamic Salvation Party in late 1999 and early 2000. Some of the
    Islamist prisoners reportedly were tortured in detention. A number of
    these prisoners reportedly were released during the year (see Sections
    1.c. and 1.d.).
        Although the law does not prohibit proselytizing, the Government
    discourages such activity in practice, particularly when it is deemed a
    threat to the generally good relations among religious groups. Foreign
    missionary groups are present but operate discreetly. The Government
    banned Jehovah's Witnesses as a politically-motivated Zionist
    organization in 1964.
        Officially all schools are government-run and nonsectarian,
    although some schools are run in practice by Christian, Druze, and
    Jewish minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools,
    with government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion courses are
    divided into separate classes for Muslim, Druze, and Christian
    students. Jews have a separate primary school, which offers religious
    instruction in Judaism, in addition to traditional subjects. Although
    Arabic is the official language in public schools, the Government
    permits the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and
    Chaldean in some schools on the basis that these are ``liturgical
    languages.''
        Religious groups are subject to their respective religious laws on
    marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance (see Section 5).
        Government policy officially disavows sectarianism of any kind.
    However, in the case of the Alawis, religion can be a contributing
    factor in determining career opportunities. For example, members of the
    President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security
    services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of
    the population, which is estimated to be 12 percent (see Section 3).
        For primarily political rather than religious reasons, Jews
    generally are barred from government employment and do not have
    military service obligations. Jews also are the only religious minority
    group whose passports and identity cards note their religion.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government limits freedom of
    movement. The Government restricts travel near the Golan Heights.
    Travel to Israel is illegal. In November 1999, the Government eased
    many of its travel restrictions, which made it easier for most citizens
    to travel abroad. In December the Government lifted the ban on travel
    to Iraq. Exit visas generally no longer are required for women, men
    over 50 years old, and citizens living abroad. In the past, individuals
    have been denied permission to travel abroad on political grounds,
    although government officials deny that this practice occurs. The
    authorities may prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate or
    travel abroad illegally, or who is suspected of having visited Israel.
    Women over the age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the
    permission of male relatives. However, a husband may file a request
    with the Ministry of Interior to prohibit his wife's departure from the
    country (see Section 5). The Government's use of police checkpoints has
    been reduced (see Section 1.f.).
        In July the Government announced that emigres who did not complete
    mandatory military service can pay a fee to avoid being conscripted
    while visiting the country.
        In November the Government temporarily sealed access to parts of
    Suwayda province for several weeks to nonresidents following violent
    clashes between resident Druze and Bedouin shepherds (see Section 5).
        As of June 383,199 Palestinian refugees were registered with the
    United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country. In
    general Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties
    travelling in and out of the country, as was the case in the past. The
    Government restricts entry by Palestinians who are not resident in the
    country. The Government does not allow Palestinian residents of Gaza to
    visit the country.
        Citizens of any Arab country may enter the country without a visa.
    However, citizens of Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia must demonstrate that
    they have an invitation from a business or individual citizen.
        There are no laws with provisions for dealing with refugees and
    asylees in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government
    cooperates on a case-by-case basis with the office of the United
    Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
    asylum but is selective about extending protection to refugees;
    approximately 2,455 persons sought asylum through the UNHCR during the
    first 9 months of the year. Although the Government denied any forced
    repatriation of those who may have had a valid claim to refugee status,
    in 1998 it apparently forcibly repatriated Iraqi, Somali, Algerian, and
    Libyan refugees. As of August 1999, there were an estimated 21,319 non-
    Palestinian refugees in the country, of whom about 3,962 were receiving
    assistance from the UNHCR, including 1,315 refugees of Iraqi origin.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and Members of
    Parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The
    late President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five
    times after taking power in 1970. His son, Bashar Al-Asad, also was
    confirmed by an unopposed referendum in July. Political opposition to
    the President is not tolerated. The President and his senior aides,
    particularly those in the military and security services, ultimately
    make most basic decisions in political and economic life, with a very
    limited degree of public accountability. Moreover, the Constitution
    mandates that the Ba'th Party is the ruling party and is ensured a
    majority in all government and popular associations, such as workers'
    and women's groups. Six smaller political parties also are permitted
    and, along with the Ba'th Party, make up the National Progressive Front
    (NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole framework of
    legal political party participation for citizens. While created
    ostensibly to give the appearance of a multiparty system, the NPF is
    dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not change the essentially one-
    party character of the political system. Non-Ba'th Party members of the
    NPF exist as political parties largely in name only and conform
    strictly to Ba'th Party and government policies. There were reports in
    the regional Arab media that the Government is considering legislation
    to expand the NPF to include new parties and several parties previously
    banned.
        The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known as the
    People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize policies and
    modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate control over
    the legislative process. Since 1990 the Government has allowed
    independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats
    in the 250-member People's Council. The current number of non-NPF
    deputies is 83, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th
    Party-dominated NPF. Elections for the 250 seats in the People's
    Council last took place in 1998.
        The Government is headed by a Cabinet, which the President has the
    discretion to change. In March former President Hafez Al-Asad accepted
    the resignations of all of the members of his Cabinet who resigned
    because the late President reportedly believed that the change would
    improve government and economic performance. On March 13, the late
    President appointed a new Cabinet consisting of 36 ministers; 26 Ba'th
    Party members, 6 NPF ministers, and 4 ``independents'' aligned with the
    Government.
        Persons who have been convicted by the State Security Court may be
    deprived of their political rights after they are released from prison.
    Such restrictions include a prohibition against engaging in political
    activity, the denial of passports, and a bar on accepting government
    jobs and some other forms of employment. The duration of such
    restrictions may last from 10 years to the remainder of the former
    prisoner's life. The Government contends that this practice is mandated
    by the Penal Code; it has been in effect since 1949.
        Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish population
    and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participate in the political
    system without restriction. Nonetheless, women are underrepresented in
    Government. There are 2 female cabinet ministers and 26 female Members
    of Parliament.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not allow the existence of local human rights
    groups. One or two human rights groups once operated legally but
    subsequently were banned by the Government. However, there are credible
    reports that several domestic human rights organizations and civil
    society groups met regularly during the year.
        Amnesty International (AI) visited Syria for 2 weeks in 1997, the
    second major visit by an international human rights organization (after
    a Human Rights Watch visit in 1995). These were the first such meetings
    held by government officials with an international human rights
    organization. There have been no such meetings since.
        As a matter of policy, the Government in its exchanges with
    international groups denies that it commits human rights abuses. It has
    not permitted representatives of international organizations to visit
    prisons. The Government states that it now responds in writing to all
    inquires from NGO's regarding human rights issues, including the cases
    of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency
    governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. Human
    Rights Watch reported in 1997 that the Government had not responded to
    its request to account publicly for the possibly thousands of citizens
    who were executed at Tadmur prison in the 1980's. The Government
    usually responds to queries from human rights organizations and foreign
    embassies on specific cases by claiming that the prisoner in question
    has violated national security laws.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal opportunity
    for all citizens. In practice membership in the Ba'th Party or close
    familial relations with a prominent party member or government official
    can be important for economic, social, or educational advancement.
    Party or government connections can pave the way for entrance into
    better elementary and secondary schools, access to lucrative
    employment, and greater power within the Government, the military, and
    the security services. Certain prominent positions, such as that of
    provincial governor, are reserved solely for Ba'th Party members. Apart
    from some discrimination against Kurds, there are no apparent patterns
    of systematic government discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
    disability, language, or social status. However, there are varying
    degrees of societal discrimination in each of these areas.
        Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable
    statistics regarding the prevalence of domestic violence or sexual
    assault. The vast majority of cases likely are unreported, and victims
    generally are reluctant to seek assistance outside the family. There
    are no laws against spousal rape. One preliminary academic study
    suggested that domestic violence is the largest single reason for
    divorces, and that such abuse is more prevalent among the less-educated
    and person who live in rural areas. Battered women have the legal right
    to seek redress in court, but few do so because of the social stigma
    attached to such action. The Syrian Women's Federation offers services
    to battered wives to remedy individual family problems. The Syrian
    Family Planning Association also attempts to deal with this problem.
    Some private groups, including the Family Planning Association, have
    organized seminars on violence against women, which were reported by
    the government press. There are no specifically designated shelters or
    safe havens for battered women who seek to flee their husbands.
        The Constitution provides for equality between men and women and
    equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the Government has sought to
    overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and
    encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet
    changed personal status, retirement, and social security laws that
    discriminate against women. Christians, Muslims, and other religious
    groups are subject to their respective religious laws on marriage,
    divorce, and inheritance (see Section 2.c.). In addition some secular
    laws discriminate against women. For example, under criminal law, the
    punishment for adultery is twice that as for the same crime committed
    by a man. ``Honor'' crimes (a euphemism that refers to violent assaults
    with intent to murder against a female by a male for alleged sexual
    misconduct) do occur.
        For Muslims personal status law on divorce is based on Shari'a
    (Islamic law), and some of its provisions discriminate against women.
    For example, husbands may claim adultery as grounds for divorce, but
    wives face more difficulty in presenting the same argument. If a woman
    requests a divorce from her husband, she may not be entitled to child
    support in some instances. In addition under the law a woman loses the
    right to custody of boys when they reach age 9 and girls at age 12.
        Inheritance for Muslims is based on Shari'a. Accordingly Muslim
    women usually are granted half of the inheritance share of male heirs.
    However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide financial support to
    the female relatives who inherit less. For example, a brother who
    inherits an unmarried sister's share from their parents' estate is
    obligated to provide for the sister's well-being. If the brother fails
    to do so, she has the right to sue.
        Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small minority of
    Muslim men.
        A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be prohibited
    (see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from travelling abroad
    with their children unless they are able to prove that the father has
    granted permission for the children to travel.
        Women participate actively in public life and are represented in
    most professions, including the military. Women are not impeded from
    owning or managing land or other real property. Women constitute
    approximately 7 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers, 57 percent of
    teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university
    professors.
        Children.--There is no legal discrimination between boys and girls
    in school or in health care. Education is compulsory for all children,
    male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12. According to the Syrian
    Women's Union, about 46 percent of the total number of students through
    the secondary level are female.
        Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and childbearing
    interferes with girls' educational progress, particularly in rural
    areas, where dropout rates for female students remain high.
        The law emphasizes the need to protect children, and the Government
    has organized seminars on the subject of child welfare. Although there
    are cases of child abuse, there is no societal pattern of abuse against
    children. The law provides for severe penalties for those found guilty
    of the most serious abuses against children.
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
    the disabled and seeks to integrate them into the public sector work
    force. However, implementation is spotty. Regulations reserving 2
    percent of government and public sector jobs for the disabled are not
    implemented rigorously. The disabled do not have recourse to the courts
    regarding discrimination. There are no laws that mandate access to
    public buildings for the disabled. The Minister of Social Affairs
    announced plans during the year to offer vocational training for
    disabled persons through local NGO's and to mandate that the Government
    hire 4 percent of its workforce from the disabled population.
        Religious Minorities.--Although there is significant religious
    tolerance, religion or ethnic affiliation can be a contributing factor
    in determining career opportunities. For example, members of the
    President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the security
    services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage of
    the population. Nevertheless, government policy officially disavows
    sectarianism.
        There generally is little societal discrimination or violence
    against religious minorities, including Jews. However, on October 12, a
    group of Palestinians threw bricks, stones, and Molotov cocktails at a
    synagogue in Damascus, apparently in reaction to the Israeli
    Government's use of force against Palestinians in the occupied
    territories. No one was injured in the attack; however, the synagogue
    was damaged slightly and was closed for approximately 1 month. The
    Government took immediate steps to ensure that the Jewish community
    would be protected from further attacks, including arresting the
    perpetrators and posting guards around synagogues and the Jewish
    quarter of Damascus.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
    permits national and ethnic minorities to conduct traditional,
    religious, and cultural activities. However, the Government's attitude
    toward the Kurdish minority is a significant exception to this policy.
    Although the Government contends that there is no discrimination
    against the Kurdish population, it has placed limits on the use and
    teaching of the Kurdish language. It also restricts the publication of
    books and other materials written in Kurdish (see Section 2.a.),
    Kurdish cultural expression, and, at times, the celebration of Kurdish
    festivals. The Government tacitly accepts the importation and
    distribution of Kurdish language materials, particularly in the
    northeast region in which most of the Kurds in the country reside. Some
    members of the Kurdish community have been tried by the Supreme State
    Security Court for expressing support for greater Kurdish autonomy or
    independence. Although the Asad Government stopped the previous
    practice of stripping Kurds in Syria of their Syrian nationality (some
    120,000 lost Syrian nationality under this program in the 1960's), it
    never restored their nationality. As a result, those who had lost their
    nationality and their children have been unable to obtain Syrian
    nationality and passports, or even identification cards and birth
    certificates. Without Syrian nationality, these stateless Kurds, who
    according to UNHCR estimates number about 200,000, are unable to own
    land, are not permitted to practice as doctors or engineers or be
    employed by the Government, are ineligible for admission to public
    hospitals, and have no right to vote, according to Human Rights Watch.
    They also encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in school.
    Stateless Kurdish men legally may not marry Syrian citizens.
        In November there were violent clashes in Suwayda province,
    reportedly stemming from a longstanding dispute between Bedouin
    shepherds and Druze residents over grazing and property rights. There
    were large demonstrations following the killings (see Section 2.b.).
    The Government deployed 5,000 army troops and sealed off the area with
    military checkpoints, temporarily preventing nonresidents from entering
    the Suwayda province (see Section 2.d.). A number of Druze, Bedouin,
    and security force personnel were killed and injured during the
    clashes.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides
    for this right, workers are not free to establish unions independent of
    the Government. All unions must belong to the General Federation of
    Trade Unions (GFTU), which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is in
    fact a part of the State's bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an
    information channel between political decisionmakers and workers. The
    GFTU transmits instructions downward to the unions and workers but also
    conveys information to decisionmakers about worker conditions and
    needs. The GFTU provides the Government with opinions on legislation,
    organizes workers, and formulates rules for various member unions. The
    GFTU president is a senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy
    may attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls
    nearly all aspects of union activity.
        The law does not prohibit strikes, except in the agricultural
    sector. Nevertheless, workers are inhibited from striking because of
    previous government crackdowns on strikers. In 1980 the security forces
    arrested many union and professional association officials who planned
    a national strike. Some of them are believed to remain in detention,
    either without trial or after being tried by the State Security Court
    (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
        The GFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab
    Trade Unions.
        In 1992 Syria's eligibility for tariff preferences under the U.S.
    Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the Government
    failed to take steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights
    to workers.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    organize and bargain collectively does not exist in any meaningful
    sense. Government representatives are part of the bargaining process in
    the public sector. In the public sector, unions do not normally bargain
    collectively on wage issues, but there is some evidence that union
    representatives participate with representatives of employers and the
    supervising ministry in establishing minimum wages, hours, and
    conditions of employment. Workers serve on the boards of directors of
    public enterprises, and union representatives always are included on
    these boards.
        The law provides for collective bargaining in the private sector,
    but any such agreement between labor and management must be ratified by
    the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who has effective veto power.
    The Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
    has long noted the Government's refusal to abolish the Minister's power
    over collective contracts.
        Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work contracts and
    other workers' interests with employers and may ask for binding
    arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives settle
    most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration.
    Management has the right to request arbitration, but this right seldom
    is exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a
    dispute over wages or severance pay.
        Since the unions are part of the Government's bureaucratic
    structure, they are protected by law from antiunion discrimination.
    There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
        There are no unions in the seven free trade zones. Firms in the
    zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing hiring and
    firing, although they must observe some provisions on health, safety,
    hours, and sick and annual leave.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There is no law
    prohibiting forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children. There were no reports of forced labor involving children or
    foreign or domestic workers. Forced labor has been imposed as a
    punishment for some convicted prisoners.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1959 Labor Law protects children from exploitation in
    the workplace. Independent information and audits on government
    enforcement are not available. Although it is not prohibited by law,
    there were no reports of coerced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.) due
    to the relative ease with which a work permit may be obtained. In
    December the Parliament approved legislation that raises the private
    sector minimum age for employment from 12 to 15 years for most types of
    nonagricultural labor, and from 16 to 18 years for heavy work. In all
    cases, parental permission is required for children under the age of
    16. The law prohibits children from working at night. However, all
    these laws apply only to children who work for a salary. Those who work
    in family businesses and are not technically paid a salary--a common
    phenomenon--do not fall under the law. The Government claims that the
    expansion of the private sector has led to more young children working.
    Education is compulsory for all children, male or female, between the
    ages of 6 and 12.
        The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors employment
    conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have enough
    inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry has the
    authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16 years
    of age may work. The majority of children under age 16 who are working
    do so for their parents in the agricultural sector without
    remuneration. The ILO report found that 10.5 percent of children under
    the age of 18 participate in the labor force, which amounts to 4.7
    percent of the total work force. Working hours for youths of legal age
    to work do not differ from those established for adults. Children under
    the age of 16 are prohibited by law from working in mines, at petroleum
    sites, or in other dangerous fields. Children are not allowed to lift,
    carry, or drag heavy objects. The exploitation of children for begging
    purposes also is prohibited. The Labor Inspection Department performs
    unannounced spot checks of employers on a daily basis to enforce these
    regulations; however, the scope of these checks is unknown.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minister of Labor and Social
    Affairs is responsible for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public
    and private sectors. In August the Government increased public sector
    minimum wages by 25 percent to $57 (2,664 Syrian pounds) per month,
    plus other compensation (for example, meals, uniforms, and
    transportation). In October the Government increased private sector
    minimum wages by 25 percent to $53 (2,425 Syrian pounds) per month in
    urban areas and $49 (2,237 Syrian pounds) in rural areas. These wages
    still do not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. As a result, many workers in both the public and private
    sectors take additional jobs or are supported by their extended
    families. In the past, a committee of labor, management, and government
    representatives submitted recommended changes in the minimum wage to
    the Minister, and private sector salary increases matched those in the
    public sector.
        The statutory workweek for administrative staff is 6 days of 6
    hours each, and laborers work 6 days a week of 8 hours each. In some
    cases a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate 1 24-hour rest
    day per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the ability of an
    employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a person is absent
    from work without notice for a long period, the employer must follow a
    lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify him,
    including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any
    action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right to
    appeal before a committee of representatives from the union,
    management, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the
    appropriate municipality. Such committees usually find in favor of the
    employee. Dismissed employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary
    benefits while the dispute is under consideration. No additional back
    wages are awarded should the employer be found at fault, nor are wage
    penalties imposed in cases where the employer is not found at fault.
    The law does not protect temporary workers who are not subject to
    regulations on minimum wages. Small private firms and businesses employ
    such workers to avoid the costs associated with hiring permanent
    employees.
        The law mandates safety in all sectors, and managers are expected
    to implement them fully. In practice there is little enforcement
    without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite government
    efforts to post notices on safety rights and regulations. Large
    companies, such as oil field contractors, employ safety engineers.
        The ILO noted in August 1998 that a provision in the Labor Code
    allowing employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many as 11
    hours a day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no reports of
    such abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and Labor inspect
    work sites for compliance with health and safety standards. Such
    inspections appear to be haphazard, apart from those conducted in
    hotels and other facilities that cater to foreigners. The enforcement
    of labor laws in rural areas also is more lax than it is in urban
    areas, where inspectors are concentrated. Workers may lodge complaints
    about health and safety conditions, with special committees established
    to adjudicate such cases. Workers have the right to remove themselves
    from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
    persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country. Standard labor
    laws would be applied in the event of allegations of trafficking.
                                   __________

                                    TUNISIA

        Tunisia is a republic dominated by a single political party.
    President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic
    Rally (RCD) party have controlled the Government, including the
    legislature, since 1987. This dominance was reaffirmed in an
    overwhelming RCD victory in the October 1999 legislative and
    presidential elections, although 1999 revisions to the Constitution
    allowed two opposition candidates to run against Ben Ali in
    presidential elections, the first multicandidate presidential race in
    the country's history. Approximately 20 percent of representation in
    the Chamber of Deputies is reserved for opposition parties (34 of 182
    seats), up from approximately 12 percent (19 of 163 seats) in the
    previous Chamber, which was elected in 1994. The President appoints the
    Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the 24 governors. The executive branch
    and the President strongly influence the judiciary, particularly in
    sensitive political cases.
        The police share responsibility for internal security with a
    paramilitary National Guard. The police operate in the capital and a
    few other cities. In outlying areas, their policing duties are shared
    with, or ceded to, the National Guard. Both forces are under the
    control of the Minister of Interior and the President. The security
    forces continued to be responsible for serious human rights abuses.
        Tunisia has made substantial progress toward establishing an
    export-oriented market economy based on manufactured exports, tourism,
    agriculture, and petroleum. The per capita gross national product for
    2000 was estimated to be $2,800, while real per capita income grew by
    an estimated 2.7 percent. Over 60 percent of citizens are in the middle
    class and enjoy a comfortable standard of living. The Government
    reported that only 6.2 percent of citizens fell below the poverty line,
    and that more than 80 percent of households owned their own homes. The
    country has a high level of literacy (91.1 percent of adults between
    the ages of 15 and 24 in 1999), low population growth rates (under 1.2
    percent in 1999), and wide distribution of basic health care. The
    Government devotes over 60 percent of the budget to social and
    development goals.
        The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
    some areas, particularly regarding the rights of women and children,
    and it also took modest steps to allow a greater diversity of views in
    the media; however, the Government's record remained poor in other
    areas, and significant problems remain. There are significant
    limitations on citizens' right to change their government. The ruling
    RCD Party is firmly intertwined with government institutions throughout
    the country, making it extremely difficult for opposition parties to
    compete on a level playing field. The October 1999 presidential and
    legislative elections marked a modest step toward democratic
    development, with opposition presidential candidates allowed to run for
    the first time, and opposition parties generally freer to campaign;
    however, while observers agree that the outcome of the elections
    generally reflected the will of the electorate, the campaign and
    election processes greatly favored the ruling party, and there was wide
    disregard for the secrecy of the vote, in which Ben Ali won 99.44
    percent of the ballots cast for President.
        There were reports of two extrajudicial killings by police. Members
    of the security forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and
    detainees. The Government asserts that police officials who commit
    abuses are disciplined, but there have been no documented cases in
    which security officials were disciplined for such abuse. Prison
    conditions range from Spartan to poor. Security forces arbitrarily
    arrest and detain persons. Lengthy pretrial detention and incommunicado
    detention are problems. Provisions enacted in 1999 to lower the maximum
    incommunicado detention period and require authorities to notify family
    members at the time of arrest are not enforced evenly. The judiciary is
    subject to executive branch control, lengthy delays in trials are a
    problem, and due process rights are not always observed; however, in
    July the Government set up a new court to oversee the proper
    administration of sentences. The Government infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights, including by intercepting mail and interfering with
    Internet communication. Security forces also monitored the activities
    of government critics and at times harassed them, their relatives, and
    associates.
        The Government continued to impose significant restrictions on
    freedom of speech and of the press, although there was limited easing
    of press restrictions during the year. Journalists practice
    selfcensorship. The Government demonstrated a pattern of intolerance of
    public criticism, using criminal investigations, judicial proceedings,
    and travel controls (including denial of passports) to discourage
    criticism and limit the activities of human rights activists. The
    Government continued to use the mandatory prescreening of publications
    and control of advertising revenue as a means to discourage newspapers
    and magazines from publishing material that it considered undesirable.
    The Government regularly seized editions of foreign newspapers
    containing articles that it considered objectionable. However, the
    Government eased its restrictions somewhat in a few areas; several
    foreign journals returned to newsstands during the year after being
    banned from sale following articles critical of the October 1999
    presidential and legislative elections. The Government also improved
    access to the Internet and continued to broadcast a monthly public
    affairs program that permitted citizens to debate issues with
    government officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
    association. The Government limits partially the religious freedom of
    members of the Baha'i faith. The Government does not permit
    proselytizing. The Government continued to restrict the freedom of
    movement of government critics and their family members. The Government
    subjected members of the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and other
    human rights activists to harassment, interrogation, property loss or
    damage, and denial of passports. The Government closed the headquarters
    of the LTDH on November 27 and replaced its board with a judicial
    administrator pending a scheduled January 2001 hearing. Four LTDH
    members filed a complaint that the LTDH's national congress elections
    that were held in October did not follow LTDH by-laws and were illegal.
    The Government barred meetings by LTDH board members in the interim.
    The Government continued to meet with the LTDH, but still refused to
    approve the registration of the National Council for Liberties (CNLT)
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) and continued to prosecute CNLT
    members. CNLT spokesman Moncef Marzouki was sentenced to a 1-year
    prison term for maintaining an illegal organization and distribution of
    false news for writing a paper for a human rights conference held in
    Morroco that criticized the Government's National Solidarity Fund
    charity for lack of transparency. The Government permitted observers
    from several international human rights groups to attend trials of
    human rights activists. Violence against women occurs. The Government
    continued to demonstrate its strong support for the rights of women and
    children; however, legal discrimination against women continued to
    exist in certain areas, such as property and inheritance law, which is
    governed by Shari'a (Islamic law), and societal discrimination exists
    in areas such as private sector employment. The Government took strong
    measures to reduce official discrimination, including equal opportunity
    for women as a standard part of its audits of all governmental entities
    and state-owned enterprises; however, such measures are not extended to
    the private sector. Child labor persists. Child labor continues to
    decline, due principally to government efforts to address the problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, there were reports of a few
    extrajudicial killings by members of the security forces.
        According to the LTDH, on August 9 motorcycle police officers
    kicked and beat Chaker Azouzi to death for failure to stop for police.
    The Government stated that the police officer implicated in Azouzi's
    death is being held pending a judicial investigation.
        According to an LTDH communique, Riadh Ben Mohamed J'day was beaten
    to death while he was held in police detention on September 17. The
    Government claimed that J'day committed suicide by hanging himself by
    his shirt from the bars in his cell, and that he died on the way to the
    hospital.
        The LTDH reported that El-Aid Ben Salah's cellmates beat him to
    death on June 10 and that, despite his cries, prison guards did nothing
    to save him. The Government stated that it has opened an investigation
    into Ben Salah's death.
        There was no progress in the investigation of the 1999 case of
    Tahar Jelassi, who reportedly died as a result of torture by prison
    guards for refusing to take off his clothes during a routine search at
    Grombalia prison.
        There were no developments during the year in the case of former
    Islamist Tijani Dridi, who allegedly died in police custody in 1998.
    The Government maintains that Dridi died on July 21 from injuries
    sustained the previous day in a motorcycle collision.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the use of torture and other
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, security
    forces routinely used various methods of torture to coerce confessions
    from detainees. The forms of torture included electric shock;
    submersion of the head in water; beatings with hands, sticks, and
    police batons; cigarette burns; and food and sleep deprivation. Police
    also reportedly utilized the ``rotisserie'' method: Stripping prisoners
    naked, manacling their wrists behind their ankles, and beating the
    prisoners while they were suspended from a rod. A 1999 CNLT report on
    prison conditions described other forms of torture, including the
    falaqa, which consists of suspending a prisoner by the feet and
    severely beating the soles of the feet; suspension of a prisoner from
    the metal door of his cell for hours on end until the prisoner loses
    consciousness; and confinement of the prisoner to the ``cachot,'' a
    tiny, unlit cell. LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, who was released
    from prison in 1999, and the CNLT both reported cases in which
    prisoners committed self-mutilation in prisons to protest conditions
    and then, as punishment, prison authorities sutured the prisoners'
    self-inflicted wounds without anesthesia and put them into isolation or
    into ``cachot.'' In the April 28 trial of Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, the
    brother of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik, presiding judges did not
    incorporate allegations of police brutality in their summary statements
    (which serve as the trial record), and refused to open an investigation
    into Zoghlami's claim that on April 26 police officers beat Zoghlami
    (breaking his nose), Sihem Bensedrine, Taieb Nooman, and Ali Ben Salem
    while holding them in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The four
    claimed that they were made to lay prostrate at a police station in the
    El-Manar suburb of Tunis while police stomped and kicked them, and that
    they subsequently filed a complaint of police brutality, which the
    judge refused to accept.
        According to Amnesty International (AI) and defense attorneys, the
    courts routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and
    mistreatment and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under
    torture. In the April trial of Ahmed Amari and 23 others for membership
    in the illegal Islamist organization An-Nahda, the presiding judges
    refused to investigate the claim by defendants that their confessions
    were extracted under torture, including a claim by Amari's attorney
    that he still bore physical signs of torture (see Sections 1.d. and
    1.e.).
        In a November 1998 report, the U.N. Committee Against Torture
    recommended that the Government reduce the prearraignment incommunicado
    detention period from 10 days to 48 hours, noting that most abuses
    occur during incommunicado detention. In August 1999, in order to
    address U.N. concerns, the Government enacted amendments to the Penal
    Code, which adopted the U.N. definition of torture, instructed police
    to inform detainees of their rights, including, notably, the right of a
    defendant to demand a medical examination while in detention, and
    increased the maximum penalty for those convicted of committing acts of
    torture from 5 to 8 years. In 1999 the Government also shortened the
    maximum allowable period of prearraignment incommunicado detention from
    10 to 6 days and added a requirement that the police notify suspects'
    families on the day of their arrest. However, credible sources claimed
    that the Government rarely enforces the new provisions. In its annual
    report for 2000, Human Rights Watch stated that despite the reduction
    of incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days, torture continued to be a
    problem, due to a climate of impunity ``fostered by a judiciary that
    ignored evidence of torture and routinely convicted defendants on the
    basis of coerced confessions.'' In its March 2000 report on torture,
    the CNLT stated that ``torture continues to be practiced on a large
    scale'' and affects not only political prisoners but common criminals
    as well.
        Human rights advocates maintain that charges of torture and
    mistreatment are difficult to substantiate because government
    authorities often deny medical examinations until evidence of abuse has
    disappeared. The Government maintained that it investigates all
    complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the prosecutor's
    office and claimed that alleged victims sometimes publicly accused
    authorities of acts of abuse without taking the steps required to
    initiate an investigation. However, the CNLT stated in its March report
    on torture that police often refuse to register complaints and judges
    dismiss complaints lodged by alleged victims of torture with little or
    no investigation. For example, Abdelmounim Belanas, who was convicted
    in 1999 of membership in the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT)
    and was released in June, claimed that he filed two complaints against
    the Government for torture that he was subjected to in 1995, 1997, and
    1999, but that both of his complaints were dismissed (see Sections
    1.e., 2.b. and 4). Absent a formal complaint, the Government may open
    an administrative investigation but is unlikely to release the results
    to the lawyers of affected prisoners. There have been no documented
    cases in which security officials were disciplined for such abuse.
        Eight alleged members of the Islamist organization Ansar were
    convicted on November 24 and received sentences ranging from 3 to 17
    years, largely on the basis of confessions that they claimed had been
    extracted under torture and on the testimony of a single government
    witness (see Section 1.d.).
        There were reports that security forces severely beat students
    during demonstrations in the south in February (see Section 2.b.).
    Credible sources reported that security forces beat university students
    during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the greater Tunis area in
    October (see Sections 2.b.).
        Credible sources reported that plainclothes policemen beat French,
    Algerian, and Moroccan journalists when they attempted to attend a
    press conference at the home of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April
    (see Section 2.a.). On April 25, police attacked human rights activists
    and attorneys as they left the Saint Augustin Clinic where Ben Brik was
    holding a hunger strike (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 4). Police beat
    LTDH vice presidents Fadhel Ghedamsi and Khemais Ksila, Ksila's wife
    Fatma, attorney Chawki Tabib, and CNLT member Omar Mestiri in the
    attack. Khemais Ksila suffered a fractured vertebra and his wife
    suffered bruises to her back as she attempted to stop police from
    beating her husband, who was knocked unconscious from blows to the top
    of his spinal column. Attorneys claimed that they filed a complaint but
    that the judge refused to accept it. PCOT member Mohamed Hedi Sassi
    claimed that security police attacked and beat him in July outside his
    home and again in August after stopping his car. CNLT members Omar
    Mestiri and Mohamed Bechir claimed that in December plainclothes
    policemen beat them in front of the Ministry of Health, where they
    attempted to lodge a formal protest of CNLT spokesman Moncef Marzouki's
    July dismissal. Mestiri claimed that policemen drove him 60 kilometers
    from Tunis and dropped him by the side of the road without money,
    papers, or his glasses, and left him to return on foot. Sources also
    claimed that Nejib Hosni and Raouf Ayadi had been hit and slapped by
    plainclothes police, who prevented them from entering the CNLT
    headquarters in December (see Sections 1.f. and 4).
        According to defense attorneys and former prisoners, prison
    conditions ranged from Spartan to poor and, in some cases, did not meet
    minimum international standards. Credible sources reported that
    overcrowding continued to be a serious problem, with 40 to 50 prisoners
    typically confined to a single 194-square-foot cell, and up to 140
    prisoners held in a 323-square-foot-cell. In a September 19 trial of 36
    defendants who were charged with belonging to the illegal Islamist
    organization An-Nahda, Zouer Yacoub stated that during his 3.5 year
    pretrial detention, he was confined with 270 inmates, who shared 1
    toilet and 1 sink, in a 323-square-foot cell (see Section 1.d.).
    Defense attorneys reported that prisoners in the 9th of April prison in
    Tunis were forced to share a single water and toilet facility with
    their cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems, and credible
    sources report that prison barbers use a single razor blade to shave
    every 10 prisoners.
        There were credible reports that conditions and prison rules were
    harsher for political prisoners than for the general prison population.
    One credible report alleged the existence of special cell blocks and
    prisons for political prisoners, in which they might be held in
    solitary confinement for months at a time. Another credible source
    reported that highranking leaders of the illegal An-Nahda Islamist
    movement have been held in solitary confinement since 1991. Other
    sources alleged that political prisoners regularly were moved among
    jails throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult for the
    prisoners' families to deliver food to the prisoners. One prisoner
    reported that he was moved 3 times while serving his 6-month sentence;
    another reported serving his sentence in 10 different jails in 3 years.
    The wife of Taoufik Chaieb (who was released following a presidential
    pardon in August after serving a 4-year prison term for membership in
    the illegal An-Nahda party) claimed that her husband was transferred to
    five prisons during his 4-year prison term. The CNLT report alleged
    that inmates are instructed to isolate newly arrived political
    prisoners and are punished severely for any contact with them. Fethi
    Chemki, the president of the Assembly for an Alternative to
    International Development (RAID), who was convicted in June of
    defamation for printing a CNLT report on prisons, claimed that he was
    confined to a bunk bed located besides the cell's lavatories and
    isolated by other prisoners, except those prisoners who were instructed
    to provoke fights (see Sections 1.e, 2.a. and 4). Other prisoners,
    including LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, alleged that the
    authorities limited the quantity and variety of food that families of
    political prisoners could bring to supplement prison fare.
        Former National High Commissioner for Human Rights Rachid Driss,
    whose former organization is government-funded, had conducted
    bimonthly, unannounced prison inspections since 1996. Although Driss
    has declared that prison conditions and prisoner hygiene were ``good
    and improving,'' details of his inspections were not made public. Driss
    was replaced in December by Zakaria Ben Mustapha, a former Minister of
    Cultural Affairs.
        The Government does not permit international organizations or the
    media to inspect or monitor prison conditions. The LTDH announced in a
    1999 communique that it had been granted permission to resume prison
    visits; however, it made no visits during the year, and the
    Government's willingness actually to allow such visits remained
    uncertain.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain problems. The law authorizes the police to make
    arrests without warrants in the cases of suspected felons or crimes in
    progress. A 1999 Penal Code amendment, provides for a maximum 3-day
    detention period, renewable once (for a maximum of 6 days) by the
    prosecutor, thus reducing from 10 days to 6 the time that the
    Government may hold a suspect incommunicado following arrest and prior
    to arraignment. The 1999 amendments also require arresting officers to
    inform detainees of their rights and detainees' families of the arrest
    at the time of arrest, and to make a complete record of the times and
    dates of such notifications. Credible sources stated that the new law
    rarely is enforced with respect to either common criminals or political
    detainees. Detainees have the right to be informed of the grounds for
    arrest before questioning and may request a medical examination.
    However, they do not have a right to legal representation during the 6-
    day incommunicado detention period. Attorneys, human rights monitors,
    and former detainees maintain that the authorities illegally extend the
    maximum limit of pre-arraignment detention by falsifying the date of
    arrest. Ahmed Amari and 23 other defendants who were extradited from
    Libya in July 1997 did not appear before a judge until April (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
        On April 8, police arrested RAID members Fethi Chemki and Mohamed
    Chouarbi, as well as Iheb El-Hani, the owner of a photocopy shop, and
    charged the three with defamation, distribution of false news,
    disturbing the public order, and belonging to an unrecognized
    association in connection with their photocopying of the CNLT's March
    report on torture. The Government reportedly detained hundreds of
    secondary-level students and other youths in connection with two
    demonstrations held in February and April (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
    On April 25, the police arrested CNLT members Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami,
    Sihem Bensedrine, Ali Ben Salem, and Taieb Nooman during an altercation
    between police and foreign journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    The Government subjected the family members of Islamist activists to
    arbitrary arrest (see Sections 1.f., 2.a., 2.d., 4, and 6.a.).
        Detainees have a right to be represented by counsel during
    arraignment. The Government provides legal representation for
    indigents. At arraignment the examining magistrate may decide to
    release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention. The law
    permits the release of accused persons on bail, which may be paid by a
    third party. In cases involving crimes for which the sentence exceeds 5
    years or that involve national security, preventive detention may last
    an initial period of 6 months and be extended by court order for two
    additional 4-month periods. For crimes in which the sentence may not
    exceed 5 years, the court may extend the initial 6-month pretrial
    detention by an additional 3 months only. During this period, the court
    conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and
    motions of both parties. In August 1999, the Government approved a law
    that gives persons indicted for criminal acts the right to appeal their
    indictment before the case comes to trial; previously, this right was
    granted in civil cases only.
        A case proceeds from investigation to a criminal court, which sets
    a trial date. There is no legal limit to the length of time the court
    may hold a case over for trial, nor is there a legal basis for a speedy
    hearing. Complaints of prolonged detention of persons awaiting trial
    were common, and President Ben Ali publicly has encouraged judges to
    make better use of release on bail and suspended sentences. In a
    September 19 trial, the attorney for Zouer Yacoub and 35 other
    defendants extradited from Libya in 1997 and charged with belonging to
    the illegal Islamist organization An-Nahda claimed that they had been
    held in pretrial detention for 3.5 years (see Section 1.c.). Detainees
    Abdelatif Bouhajila, Yassin Ben Zarti, Ridha Ben Ahmed, Fehra Fethi,
    Sofiane Ben Hamida, Yousef Mourru, and two others charged with
    conspiring with a foreign Islamist group (Ansar), held 3-month hunger
    strikes to protest their 26-month long pretrial detentions. All eight
    were convicted on November 24 and received sentences ranging from 3 to
    17 years, largely on the basis of confessions that they claimed had
    been extracted under torture and on the testimony of a single
    government witness (see Section 1.c.).
        Human rights activists reported that security forces arbitrarily
    imposed administrative controls on former prisoners following their
    release from prison. Although the Penal Code contains provisions for
    the imposition of administrative controls following completion of a
    prison sentence, only judges have the right to order a former prisoner
    to register at a police station, and the law limits registration
    requirements to 5 years. Human rights activists allege that these
    requirements often are unreasonable and prevent former prisoners from
    being able to hold a job. Numerous Islamists released from prison in
    recent years have been subjected to these types of requirements. Radhia
    Aouididi, who served a 3-year prison sentence for possession of a
    fraudulent passport (having been refused a passport in 1996 because of
    her fiance's membership in An-Nahda), was released from all
    administrative controls in August. She had been subject to a
    requirement to sign in daily at a police headquarters 9 miles from her
    village for a 5-year period following her 1999 release (see Section
    2.d.). Defense attorneys reported that some clients must sign in four
    or five times daily, at times that are determined only the previous
    evening. When the clients arrive at the police station, they may be
    forced to wait hours before signing in, making employment impossible
    and child care difficult. A new court, created by a 1999 law to oversee
    the proper administration of sentences, began functioning in September.
    The law allows judges to substitute community service for jail
    sentences in minor cases in which the sentence would be 6 months or
    less.
        There likely are a sizable number of political detainees, although
    there is no reliable estimate due to arbitrary government detention
    practices and the lack of publicly available records of arrests.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
    observes this prohibition. According to reliable sources, some
    political opponents in self-imposed exile have been prevented from
    obtaining or renewing their passports in order to return. However, a
    Government official stated in June that the Government had returned 200
    passports and would return another 600 of citizens living abroad, many
    of whom have been without a passport for years (see Section 2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the executive branch and the President
    strongly influence the judiciary. In practice the judicial branch is
    part of the Ministry of Justice and the executive branch appoints,
    assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers judges. In addition the
    President is head of the Supreme Council of Judges. This situation
    renders judges susceptible to pressure in politically sensitive cases.
        The court system comprises the regular civil and criminal courts,
    including the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal; and the
    Court of Cassation, the nation's highest court; as well as the military
    tribunals within the Defense Ministry.
        Military tribunals try cases involving military personnel and
    civilians accused of national security crimes. A military tribunal
    consists of a civilian judge from the Supreme Court and four military
    judges. Defendants may appeal the tribunal's verdict to the Court of
    Cassation.
        The Code of Procedure is patterned after the French legal system.
    By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, be represented
    by counsel, question witnesses, and appeal verdicts. However, in
    practice judges do not always observe these rights. The law permits
    trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused and the
    prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts. Defendants may
    request a different judge if they believe that a judge is not
    impartial; however, in practice judges do not always permit this. For
    example, lawyers for Nejib Hosni, who was convicted in December for
    violating a courtordered 5-year suspension from practicing law,
    requested that the trial judge recuse himself because, attorneys
    claimed, he no longer was impartial because he already had found Hosni
    in violation of the court order the week before. The judge refused the
    defense's request. The Court of Cassation, which considers arguments on
    points of law as opposed to the facts of a case, is the final arbiter.
        Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of
    appeals are open to the public. The presiding judge or panel of judges
    dominates a trial, and defense attorneys have little opportunity to
    participate substantively. Defense lawyers contend that the courts
    often fail to grant them adequate notice of trial dates or allow them
    time to prepare their cases. Some also reported that judges restricted
    access to evidence and court records, requiring in some cases, for
    example, that all attorneys of record examine the court record on one
    specified date in judges' chambers, without allowing attorneys to copy
    material documents. For example, in the case of RAID president Fethi
    Chemki and two others, defense attorneys said that they initially were
    not permitted access to documents that were the basis of the
    Government's charge of defamation, then later were permitted to view
    documents only in the judge's chambers (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and
    4). Defense lawyers also claimed that the judges sometimes refused to
    allow them to call witnesses on their clients' behalf, or to question
    key government witnesses. In the trials of both Jallel Ben Brik
    Zoghlami and Fethi Chemki, judges refused to permit defense attorneys
    to call witnesses or present evidence on their clients' behalf (see
    Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., and 4). Lengthy delays in trials also are a
    problem (see Section 1.d.).
        Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from
    Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Federation, and
    other international human rights organizations to monitor trials. The
    observers reported that the Government permitted them to conduct their
    work freely (see Section 4). According to credible sources, throughout
    the year the Government brought correspondents of foreign press
    services in for questioning for attending and reporting on political
    trials, and for writing articles critical of the Government in the
    foreign press (see Section 2.a.).
        Amnesty International and defense attorneys report that courts
    routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment,
    and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under torture (see
    Section 1.c.). In the April trial of Ahmed Amari and 23 others charged
    with membership in the illegal organization Islamist An-Nahda, the
    presiding judge refused to investigate allegations of torture, despite
    defendants' testimony that their confessions were extracted under
    torture (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Defense lawyers and human rights
    activists claim that the length of court sessions sometimes prevents
    reasoned deliberation.
        There is no definitive information on the number of political
    prisoners. Human Rights Watch reported that there might be hundreds of
    political prisoners convicted and imprisoned for membership in the
    Islamist group An-Nahda and the Communist Workers Party, for
    disseminating information produced by these banned organizations, and
    for aiding relatives of convicted members. Reliable sources estimate
    that between 600 and 1,400 political prisoners were held in the prisons
    at the beginning of the year. The Government releases prisoners on
    national holidays, such as Independence Day or the anniversary of
    President Ben Ali's accession to power. Several political prisoners
    were released during the year, including PCOT members Fahem Boukkadous
    and Abdelmounim Belanas (released on June 10), An-Nahda member Taoufik
    Chaieb (released on August 30), RAID president and members Fethi Chemki
    and Mohamed Chouarbi (released conditionally in May after serving 30
    days in detention), and Jallel Ben Brik Zoghlami, brother of journalist
    Taoufik Ben Brik (released in May after serving 19 days in detention)
    (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a., 2.b., and 4). However, the Government
    does not provide details on the numbers or types of prisoners released.
    President Ben Ali stated in a July 28 speech to members of the RCD
    ruling party that all prisoners are common criminals convicted of
    crimes in accordance with the law.
        The Government does not permit international humanitarian
    organizations to visit prisons. In his February report, U.N. Special
    Rapporteur Abid Hussein stated that the Government did not permit him
    to visit any prisoners in the 9th of April prison in Tunis but
    permitted him to visit former Social Democratic Movement (MDS)
    secretary general Mohammed Moaada, who at the time was under house
    arrest and police surveillance pending a government investigation of an
    alleged meeting between Moaada and An-Nahda leaders in Europe in 1997.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the person, the
    home, and for the privacy of correspondence, ``except in exceptional
    cases defined by law.'' The law requires that the police obtain
    warrants to conduct searches; however, police sometimes ignore the
    requirement if authorities consider that state security is at stake or
    that a crime is in progress. For example, human rights activist Mohamed
    Hedi Sassi claimed that his home was ransacked in January while he was
    held in police custody for failing to stop for an unmarked police car.
        Authorities may invoke state security interests to justify
    telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports of government
    interception of fax and computer-transmitted communications. The law
    does not authorize explicitly these activities, although the Government
    has stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure implicitly gives
    investigating magistrates such authority. Many political activists
    experience frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of residential
    and business telephone and fax services. Human rights activists accuse
    the Government of using the 1998 Postal Code, with its broad but
    undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the public order, to
    interfere with their mail and interrupt the delivery of foreign
    publications. Local phone, fax, and copy shops require persons to turn
    over their identification cards when requesting to send faxes. Lawyers
    and activists stated that the Government has increased its practice of
    cutting off telephone service to activists; telephone service to the
    offices, homes, and relatives of prominent human rights lawyers and
    other activists frequently was cut off, sometimes for long periods.
    Human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni claimed that his telephone service has
    been disrupted since 1994 and human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui
    claimed that her telephone service was disrupted numerous times
    throughout the year (see Section 4). However CNLT member Moncef
    Marzouki and journalist Taoufik Ben Brik, who were without telephone
    service for prolonged periods, reported that their service was
    reinstated in May.
        The security forces monitor the activities of political critics,
    and sometimes harass, follow, question, or otherwise intimidate their
    relatives and associates. Members of the CNLT claimed that in December
    plainclothes police prevented persons from entering the building in
    which their headquarters were located, including neighbors who lived
    there (see Sections 1.c. and 4). Police place journalists who write
    articles critical of the Government, or who are active in human rights
    organizations, under surveillance (see Section 2.a.).
        Human rights activists, lawyers, and other political activists also
    reported that they were under police surveillance. Lawyer Radhia
    Nasraoui complained that police frequently follow and intimidate her
    children. LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila reported that he continued
    to be subjected to government surveillance and harassment since his
    release in 1999. Although Ksila's telephone service was reconnected in
    May, he reported that his mail was monitored and only bills were
    delivered, and that he has been unable to work since 1996 (see Section
    4). On April 10, the Government closed CNLT member Sihem Bensedrine's
    publishing house, Aloes, and reopened it July 11. The Government stated
    that it closed the publishing house because it provided a venue for
    ``disruptive activities'' when Bensedrine held a meeting in which
    Taoufik Ben Brik announced his hunger strike to protest his indictment
    for defamation for articles critical of the Government that he had
    written and published in the foreign press (see Sections 2.a. and 4).
    Bensedrine's telephone service was reconnected in July, after being out
    of service for 15 months, but again was disrupted the week before the
    December 25 LTDH hearing (see Section 4). Bensedrine reported that her
    home and family still are under surveillance, but that her children had
    not recently been the target of government harassment, as had been the
    case in the past.
        Human rights activists alleged that the Government subjected the
    family members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest, reportedly
    utilizing charges of ``association with criminal elements'' to punish
    family members for crimes committed by the activists. For example, one
    female medical doctor claimed that she has been unemployed since 1997
    because police pressure hospitals not to hire her because her husband
    was convicted of membership in An-Nahda. One man claimed that for 8
    years, the Government refused to issue him a passport because his
    brother was prosecuted for membership in An-Nahda. Human rights
    activists also alleged that the relatives of Islamist activists who are
    in jail or living abroad were subjected to police surveillance and
    mandatory visits to police stations to report their contact with
    relatives. The Government maintained that the Islamists' relatives were
    members or associates of the outlawed An-Nahda movement and that they
    were correctly subjected to legitimate laws prohibiting membership in
    or association with that organization. The Government also reportedly
    refused to issue passports to the family members of some human rights
    activists, including the wife and children of human rights lawyer Nejib
    Hosni.
        Human rights activists allege that security forces arbitrarily
    imposed administrative controls on prisoners following their release
    from prison (see Section 1.d.) and confiscated national identity cards
    from numerous former prisoners. For example, one man claimed that his
    national identity card was confiscated when he left prison in June. A
    credible source claimed that the Government confiscated the national
    identity cards of as many as 10,000 persons who were either former
    prisoners convicted of membership in An-Nahda or relatives of An-Nahda
    members and their sympathizers.
        Police presence is heavy throughout the country and traffic
    officers routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine
    their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section
    2.d.). The Government regularly prohibited the distribution of some
    foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). The security forces often
    question citizens seen talking with foreign visitors or residents,
    particularly visiting international human rights monitors and
    journalists (see Section 2.a.). For example, police attempted to remove
    one man from a public trial for translating for a foreign observer.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression and of the press; however, in practice, the
    Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press. The Government
    relies upon direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and
    encourage a high degree of self-censorship. The Government also uses
    the Press Code, which contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion
    and defamation, to prosecute individuals who express dissenting
    opinions. In his February 2000 report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Abid
    Hussain stated that the Government ``still has a long way to go to take
    full advantage of its favorable economic context--and in particular the
    right to freedom of opinion and expression,'' and cited concern over
    the State's ``control of the national radio and television broadcasting
    system and the major dailies.'' The Government responded to the Special
    Rapporteur's report in a May/June Jeune Afrique article, stating that
    the Special Rapporteur's report ``infringes on the rules of ethics that
    are supposed to preside over missions executed within the framework of
    special procedures,'' and that ``the contents of the report confirm the
    clear impression, even the certainty, that the Special Rapporteur only
    reproduced allegations propagated by fringe political extremist and
    Islamic fundamentalist parties.'' In a speech before the RCD in July,
    President Ben Ali stated that although the Government must protect the
    right of citizens to hold dissenting opinions, those citizens who
    criticize the country in the international media were ``traitors'' who
    would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
        The Government convicted RAID president Fethi Chemki and member
    Mohamed Chouarbi of defamation under the Press Code for photocopying a
    report published by the CNLT (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 2.a., and 4).
    Mustapha Ben Jaafar, secretary general of the Democratic Forum, was
    investigated and detained for questioning in August on charges of
    defamation and belonging to an unrecognized organization for a
    communique that he distributed by e-mail, which criticized the
    Government (see Section 4). The criminal investigation of CNLT members
    Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, who were indicted in July 1999 for
    belonging to an illegal organization, remains pending (see Sections
    2.d. and 4). Charges brought against Marzouki in November and December
    1999 for defamation, belonging to an unrecognized organization, causing
    a public disturbance, and dissemination of false information, arising
    out of Marzouki's publishing and distributing two communiques on behalf
    of the CNLT, remained pending at year's end (see Section 4). In a
    separate case, Marzouki was sentenced to a 1-year prison term on
    December 30 for maintaining an illegal organization and distribution of
    false news for a paper that he wrote for a human rights conference in
    Morocco in September, which criticized the Government's National
    Solidarity Fund charity for lack of transparency (see Section 4). The
    criminal investigation of ousted MDS president Mohamed Moaada, which
    opened in 1997, is ongoing.
        The Government imposed a media blackout on coverage of student
    protests and related arrests in February and in April (see Section
    2.a.).
        Although several independent newspapers and magazines--including
    several opposition party journals--exist, the Government relies upon
    direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a
    high degree of self-censorship. Primary among these methods is ``depot
    legal,'' the requirement that printers and publishers provide copies of
    all publications to the Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Interior, and
    Ministry of Culture prior to distribution. The Government has not
    permitted the Tunisian Bar Association to publish its internal bulletin
    since July 1999. The Government delayed release from depot legal
    numerous editions of the biweekly magazine Jeune Afrique for periods of
    up to 9 days, and prohibited the sale of the October 24 issue, which
    contained an article by noted historian and Islamic scholar Mohamed
    Talbi in which Talbi described dissident journalist Taoufik Ben Brik as
    a ``national hero.''
        The Government since 1994 has refused to allow Amnesty
    International's Tunisia chapter to distribute textbooks on human rights
    written for high school students. However, the RSP party's sporadically
    published newspaper issued two editions with critical and extensive
    coverage of human rights issues. In a May statement in Jeune Afrique,
    the Government claimed that depot legal is a ``simple formality to
    preserve national cultural heritage'' and is not at all used to prevent
    all ``undesirable publications.''
        Similarly, distributors must deposit copies of publications printed
    abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and various ministries prior to their
    public release. While publishers need not wait for an authorization,
    they must obtain a receipt of deposit before distribution. On occasion
    such receipts reportedly are withheld, sometimes indefinitely. Without
    a receipt, publications may not be distributed legally. For example,
    publisher Sihem Bensedrine claimed that she deposited a request for
    publication of Kalima magazine in December 1999 and is still awaiting a
    receipt of filing. The Press Code contains broad provisions prohibiting
    subversion and defamation, neither of which is defined clearly. The
    code stipulates fines and confiscation for failure to comply with these
    provisions. The Government routinely utilized this method to prevent
    distribution of editions of foreign newspapers and magazines that
    contained articles critical of the country. For example, the Government
    prevented distribution of the French publications Figaro and
    L'Observateur, which were embargoed until February. Le Monde, Le Canard
    Enchaine, Le Point, and Liberation, which were banned in October 1999,
    once again were permitted to distribute copies in August. The
    Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung and the Financial Times have been
    banned periodically since the October 1999 elections. The Government
    also reportedly withheld depot legal to remove from circulation books
    that it deemed critical of the Government. In addition the Government
    provided official texts on major domestic and international events and
    reportedly reprimanded publishers and editors for failing to publish
    these statements.
        The Government also relies on indirect methods, such as newsprint
    subsidies and control of public advertising revenues, to encourage
    self-censorship in the media. There were credible reports that the
    Government withheld advertising orders, a vital source of revenues,
    from publications that published articles that the Government deemed
    offensive. According to credible sources, Le Temps and As-Sabbah were
    forced to cease publication for 2 weeks in August due to financial
    problems resulting from the Government's withholding advertising
    orders.
        The Government exerted further control over the media by
    threatening to impose restrictions on journalists, such as refusing
    permission to travel abroad, withholding press credentials, and
    imposing police surveillance on those who wrote articles critical of
    the Government. Members of the security forces also reportedly
    questioned journalists regarding the nature of press conferences and
    other public functions hosted by foreigners that the journalists
    attended. According to credible sources, the Government throughout the
    year brought correspondents of foreign press services in for
    questioning for attending and reporting on political trials, and for
    writing articles critical of the Government in the foreign press (see
    Section 1.e.). The Government indicted journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in
    April for defamation for publishing articles critical of the Government
    in the foreign press. Charges subsequently were dropped in May after
    Ben Brik held a 6-week hunger strike (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a.,
    and 4). Other journalists active in human rights organizations reported
    that they were under police surveillance for weeks at a time (see
    Section 1.f.). Two journalists reported that they were fired in July
    due to government pressure after they wrote articles that the
    Government deemed offensive.
        On May 23, Le Monde's Tunisia correspondent, Riadh Ben Fadhl, was
    shot twice in the shoulder at 6 a.m., the morning after he published an
    article in Le Monde that was critical of President Ben Ali. The
    official news agency, TAP, reported the shooting in all major
    newspapers in an article that emphasized discrepancies in Ben Fahdl's
    testimony, implying that the shooting was a failed suicide attempt. On
    May 30, President Ben Ali appeared in a front-page photo with Ben
    Fadhl, accompanied by an article in which Ben Fadhl asked the president
    to open an official investigation into the shooting. The Government had
    not announced the result of its investigation by year's end.
        Several journalists from Al-Fajr, the publication associated with
    the outlawed An-Nahda movement, remained in jail, serving sentences
    that were imposed in the early 1990's. The Government maintains that
    the arrests, indictments, and convictions were carried out in full
    accordance with the law.
        Visiting foreign journalists sometimes complain of being followed
    by security officials. The Government confiscated cassette tapes of
    interviews, notebooks, and the address book of French journalist Daniel
    Mermet in February as he was departing the country after a week of
    interviews with members of the human rights community. The Government
    claimed that Mermet had failed to register his materials upon entering
    the country. Reliable sources alleged that plainclothes policemen beat
    French, Algerian, and Moroccan journalists and confiscated cameras and
    film when the journalists attempted to attend a press conference at the
    home of journalist Taoufik Ben Brik in April (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
    1.e., and 1.f.).
        On May 3, for the third year in a row, the Committee to Protect
    Journalists named President Ben Ali as one of its ``10 worst enemies of
    the press.'' In its Report 2000, Reporters Sans Frontieres stated that
    ``journalists have adopted a habit of selfcensorship and those who
    venture to be independent pay a high price.'' Both reports focused on
    the presence of a restrictive atmosphere that leads to self-censorship
    and control exercised through advertising revenues. The Tunisian
    Newspaper Association remained expelled from the World Association of
    Newspapers (WAN). The WAN expelled the Association in 1997 for its
    failure to oppose repression of freedom of the press.
        The Government owns and operates the Tunisian Radio and Television
    Establishment (ERTT). The ERTT's coverage of government news is taken
    directly from the official news agency, TAP. The Government banned the
    broadcast of the April 8 funeral of former President Habib Bourguiba;
    television and radio stations broadcast foreign soccer games and shows
    about wildlife instead. In May 1998, the ERTT began broadcasting a live
    public debate program entitled ``Face to Face,'' which gave ordinary
    citizens the opportunity to debate public affairs issues with
    government officials. Human rights activists described the program as
    progress toward greater freedom of expression. There are several
    government-owned regional radio stations and one national television
    channel. Bilateral agreements with France and Italy permit citizens to
    receive the French television channel France 2 and the Italian Rai-Uno;
    however, the broadcast of France 2 has remained suspended since October
    1999 because of its critical coverage of the 1999 elections. The
    Government stated that the broadcast was terminated as part of a long-
    term plan to provide more broadcast time to Tunisian programming.
    Recent estimates place the number of satellite dishes (which have been
    legal since 1996) in the country at well over 100,000. The Government
    regulates their sale and installation.
        The Government encouraged greater use of the Internet and lowered
    Internet user fees and telephone connection fees again during the year.
    There are no customs duties on computers. By September 1, the
    Government reported that there were 35,000 subscribers (almost three
    times the number reported in 1999) and an estimated 250,000 users of
    the Internet. The Government used the Internet widely, with most
    government ministries and agencies posting information on readily
    accessible web sites. Some previously blocked sites, such as for the
    French journal Le Monde, became available during the year. However, web
    sites containing information critical of the Government posted by
    international NGO's and foreign governments frequently are blocked,
    including a report on Internet use in Tunisia by Human Rights Watch.
    The only two Internet service providers in the country remain under the
    control of the Tunisian Internet Agency, which was created in 1996 and
    which regularly must provide lists of subscribers to the Government.
    Human rights activists allege that the Agency regularly interferes with
    and intercepts their Internet communications. The Press Code, including
    the requirement that advance copies of publications be provided to the
    Government, applies to information shared on the Internet (see Section
    4).
        The Government limits academic freedom. Like journalists,
    university professors indicated that they sometimes practiced self-
    censorship by avoiding classroom criticism of the Government or
    statements supportive of the An-Nahda movement. Professors alleged that
    the Government utilized the threat of tax audits, control over
    university positions, and strict publishing rules to encourage self-
    censorship. The presence of police on campuses also discouraged
    dissent. A 1996 regulation requires professors to inform the Ministry
    of Higher Education in advance of any seminars, including the list of
    participants and subjects to be addressed. Copies of papers to be
    presented in university settings or seminars must be provided to the
    Ministry in advance. In February police arrested secondary school
    students and others demonstrating in the south, and in April 40 other
    secondary students were arrested in Tunis (see Section 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government imposes some
    restrictions on this right. Groups that wish to hold a public meeting,
    rally, or march must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior by
    applying no later than 3 days in advance of the proposed event and
    submitting a list of participants. The authorities routinely approve
    such permits for groups that support government positions, but often
    refuse permission for groups that express dissenting views. The
    Government permitted the Tunisia chapter of Amnesty International in
    May to hold a public conference in conjunction with the LTDH, the
    Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), and the Young Lawyers
    Association (AJA) in commemoration of International Freedom of the
    Press Day, to hold a public meeting in Sfax in June, and to hold its
    annual congress in July. However, on two separate occasions in March
    and April, police forcibly broke up a seminar that AI attempted to hold
    in its Tunis headquarters regarding human rights violations in Saudi
    Arabia, physically abusing AI members (see Section 4). The Government
    claimed that AI failed to submit the appropriate request. The
    Progressive Socialist Assembly (RSP) opposition party reported that on
    July 1, it was refused permission to hold a conference on Liberty and
    Democracy at a Tunis hotel; it held the conference at RSP headquarters
    instead. According to the LTDH, secondary students, joined by other
    youths, held strikes during the second week of February in the southern
    towns of Jbeniana, El-Amra, Zarzis, and El-Hamma. The strikes began in
    schools, developed into marches and demonstrations, and in some cases
    resulted in confrontations with security forces. The Government
    reportedly arrested as many as 400 students in connection with the
    demonstrations, including some minors who were placed in juvenile
    detention centers (see Section 1.d.). The LTDH claimed that numerous
    persons reported to the presiding magistrate that they were victims of
    police brutality during detention (see Section 1.c.). Students involved
    in the February demonstrations were charged with damaging property and
    taking part in hostile demonstrations, and received sentences ranging
    from 1 to 6 months. Some were acquitted, nine received presidential
    pardons, and the remaining students served out their sentences. All had
    been released by year's end. The protests and arrests never were
    reported by the press.
        Over a 3-day period in April, the Government arrested a reported 40
    additional secondary-level students, mostly in the greater Tunis area,
    for protesting a communique issued by the Government that announced a
    change in the final exam week schedule. The Government later denied
    that the communique had existed and restored the original exam
    schedule. The students were released several hours later without
    charge. During a March 28 to 29 hunger strike held by Sihem Bensedrine
    and Fatma Ksila at ATFD headquarters to protest the confiscation of
    passports, security officials posing as municipal workers closed off
    the street to traffic and pedestrians, claiming that the building was
    off limits due to a gas leak. The Government also cut off the phone and
    fax lines to ATFD headquarters. Credible sources reported that security
    forces beat university students during pro-Palestinian demonstrations
    in the greater Tunis area in October (see Section 1.c.).
        Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the
    Government restricts this right by barring membership in political
    parties organized by religion, race, or region. On these grounds, the
    Government prosecutes members of the Islamist movement An-Nahda. For
    example, in an April trial, and five September trials, the Government
    indicted an estimated 75 alleged An-Nahda members, most of whom were
    extradited from Libya in 1997 and had been held in pretrial detention
    for over 3 years. In a September 19 trial, the presiding judge indicted
    Ahmed Amari, Yousef Khirri, and Choukri Gargouri on multiple counts of
    the same charge of membership in An-Nahda. The trial ultimately was
    postponed until February 2001 to allow attorneys to interview their
    clients and to have access to the Government's case against the
    defendants. Human rights activists alleged that the Government extended
    its prosecution of Islamist activists to include family members who
    were not politically active (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). A
    criminal investigation against former MDS party leader Mohamed Moaada
    remained open, a result of his alleged 1997 meeting with An-Nahda
    leaders in Europe (see Section 1.e.).
        The Government bans organizations that threaten disruption of the
    public order and uses this proscription to prosecute members of the
    PCOT. In July 1999, the courts convicted 17 students, professors, and
    labor activists of membership in the PCOT. The Government released 16
    of the PCOT members in 1999. The remaining PCOT prisoner, Fahem
    Boukkadous, along with Abdelmounin Belanas, who was convicted of PCOT
    membership in a separate trial in 1999, were released on June 10 after
    holding a 4-week hunger strike. Three other PCOT members, Hamma
    Hammami, Abdeljabbar Madouri, and Samir Taamallah, who were convicted
    and given 9-year sentences in absentia, remain in hiding (see Section
    1.c.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion. The
    Constitution provides for the free exercise of other religions that do
    not disturb the public order, and the Government generally observes and
    enforces this right; however, it does not permit proselytizing and
    partially limits the religious freedom of Baha'is.
        The Government recognizes all Christian and Jewish religious
    organizations that were established before independence in 1956.
    Although the Government permits Christian churches to operate freely,
    only the Catholic Church has formal recognition from the post-
    independence Government. The other churches operate under land grants
    signed by the Bey of Tunis in the 18th and 19th centuries, which are
    respected by the post-independence Government.
        The Government controls and subsidizes mosques and pays the
    salaries of prayer leaders. The President appoints the Grand Mufti of
    the Republic. The 1988 Law on Mosques provides that only personnel
    appointed by the Government may lead activities in mosques, and
    stipulates that mosques must remain closed except during prayer times
    and other authorized religious ceremonies, such as marriages or
    funerals. New mosques may be built in accordance with national urban
    planning regulations but become the property of the State. According to
    human rights lawyers, the Government regularly questioned Muslims who
    were observed praying frequently in mosques.
        The Government allows the Jewish community freedom of worship and
    pays the salary of the Grand Rabbi. It also partially subsidizes
    restoration and maintenance costs for some synagogues. In October 1999,
    the provisional Jewish community elected a new board of directors, its
    first since independence in 1956, which is awaiting approval from the
    governor of Tunis. Once approval is obtained from the governor, which
    reportedly is only a formality, the committee is expected to receive
    permanent status. The governor of Tunis still had not granted the
    committee permanent status by year's end. The acting board has changed
    its name to the Jewish Committee of Tunisia. The Government permits the
    Jewish community to operate private religious schools and allows Jewish
    children on the island of Jerba to split their academic day between
    secular public schools and private religious schools. The Government
    also encourages Jewish emigres to return for the annual Jewish
    pilgrimage to the historic El-Ghriba Synagogue on the island of Jerba.
        The Government regards the Baha'i Faith as a heretical sect of
    Islam and permits its adherents to practice their faith only in
    private. Although the Government permits Baha'is to hold meetings of
    their National Council in private homes, it reportedly has prohibited
    them from organizing local councils. The Government reportedly
    pressures Baha'is to eschew organized religious activities. There are
    credible reports that prominent Baha'is periodically are called in by
    police for questioning. The Government unofficially denied Baha'i
    requests during the year for permission to elect local assemblies. The
    Government also does not permit Baha'is to accept a declaration of
    faith from persons who wish to convert to the Baha'i Faith. There were
    credible reports that four members of the Baha'i Faith were
    interrogated by Ministry of Interior officials in 1999 and pressured to
    sign a statement that they would not practice their religion and would
    not hold meetings in their homes.
        In general the Government does not permit Christian groups to
    establish new churches, and proselytizing is viewed as an act against
    the public order. Foreign missionary organizations and groups do not
    operate in the country. Authorities ask foreigners suspected of
    proselytizing to depart the country and do not permit them to return;
    however, there were no reported cases of official action against
    persons suspected of proselytizing during the year.
        Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools;
    however, the religious curriculum for secondary school students also
    includes the history of Judaism and Christianity. The Zeitouna Koranic
    School is part of the Government's national university system.
        Both religious and secular NGO's are governed by the same law and
    administrative regulations on association that impose some restrictions
    on freedom of assembly. For example, all NGO's are required to notify
    the Government of meetings to be held in public spaces at least 3 days
    in advance and to submit lists of all meeting participants to the
    Ministry of Interior. There were credible reports that two Christian
    religious organizations did not attempt to register because they
    believed that their applications would be rejected, although they were
    able to function freely under the auspices of their respective
    churches. Neither group believed that it was a victim of religious
    discrimination. A third group, composed of foreign Christians mostly
    from Sweden and the United Kingdom, is active in providing medical and
    social services in the city of Kasserine in the west. Despite its
    ambiguous legal status, this group (with 15 to 20 members) reports that
    it has been free to pursue its social and medical work without
    interference and states that it does not believe that it has been
    subject to religious discrimination.
        Religious groups are subjected to the same restrictions on freedom
    of speech and the press as secular groups. Primary among these
    restrictions is ``depot legal,'' the requirement that printers and
    publishers provide copies of all publications to the Chief Prosecutor,
    the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Culture prior to
    publication (see Section 2.a.). Similarly, distributors must deposit
    copies of publications printed abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and
    various ministries prior to their public release. Although Christian
    groups reported that they were able to distribute previously approved
    religious publications in European languages without difficulty, they
    claimed that the Government generally did not approve either
    publication or distribution of Arabic-language Christian material.
    Moreover, authorized distribution of religious publications was limited
    to existing religious communities, because the Government views public
    distribution of both religious and secular documents as a threat to the
    public order and hence an illegal act.
        There was a credible report of a Muslim couple in Bizerte who had
    converted to Christianity, and since 1998 have not been permitted to
    renew their passports as a result of their conversion. Muslim women are
    not permitted to marry outside their religion. Marriages of Muslim
    women to non-Muslim men abroad are considered common-law, which are
    prohibited and thus void when the couple returns to the country. Non-
    Muslim women who marry Muslim men are not permitted to inherit from
    their husbands, nor may the husbands and any children (who are
    considered to be Muslim) from the marriage inherit from the non-Muslim
    wife.
        Although civil law is codified, judges are known to override
    codified law with Shari'a (Islamic law) if codified law conflicts with
    Shari'a. For example, codified laws provide women with the legal right
    to custody over minor children; however, judges have refused to grant
    women permission to leave the country with minor children, holding that
    Shari'a appoints the father as the head of the family who must grant
    children permission to travel.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and persons are free to change their place of residence or work
    at will; however, in practice the Government restricts the freedom of
    movement and foreign travel of those critical of it.
        Amendments to the passport law in October 1998 transferred power
    for canceling passports from the Ministry of Interior to the courts;
    however, the amended law contains broad provisions that permit passport
    seizure on undefined national security grounds and deny citizens the
    right either to present their case against seizure or to appeal the
    judges' decision. The Ministry of Interior must submit requests to
    seize or withhold a citizen's passport through the Public Prosecutor to
    the courts.
        The Government arbitrarily withholds passports from citizens (see
    Section 1.f.); however, it issued passports to numerous persons during
    the year who had been denied them in the past. The Government returned
    passports to a number of citizens, including high-profile members of
    the human rights and Islamist communities, such as Sihem Bensedrine,
    Moncef Marzouki, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, Radhia Nasraoui, Khemais Ksila,
    Fatma Ksila, Mohamed Hedi Sassi, Iman Darwiche, Radhia Aouididi, Saida
    Charbati, and Rachida Ben Salem (see Sections 1.d. and 4). According to
    reliable sources, there are many others who still have not received
    passports, including human rights lawyer Nejib Hosni, PCOT student
    Nourredine Ben N'tiche, as well as many members of the Islamist
    community. According to credible sources, some political opponents in
    self-imposed exile have been prevented from obtaining or renewing their
    passports in order to return (see Section 1.d.). However, the
    Government stated that it had returned passports to approximately 200
    citizens living abroad (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government restricts internal travel during criminal
    investigations. The Government dropped travel injunctions against human
    rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui, who traveled abroad in June, CNLT member
    Moncef Marzouki, who traveled abroad in June and September, LTDH vice
    president Khemais Ksila, who traveled abroad in June, and CNLT member
    Sihem Bensedrine. In October the Government lifted a court-ordered
    travel injunction from a 1998 criminal indictment on CNLT secretary
    general Omar Mestiri, which had prevented him from traveling outside
    Tunis city limits. The investigation into the 1998 indictment remains
    ongoing. In October Mestiri traveled abroad without hindrance. However,
    Mestiri claimed that upon his return to Tunis in November, customs
    officers searched him and confiscated all the books and documents in
    his possession, including a recently released book on torture in
    Tunisia, published by the Paris-based organization, the Committee for
    the Respect of Human Rights and Freedom in Tunisia (CRDHLT) (see
    Sections 2.a. and 4).
        Police routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine
    their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section
    1.f.).
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting refugees. The Government
    acknowledged the UNHCR's determination of refugee status, which was
    accorded to 450 individuals during the year. Approximately 20 cases
    await determination by the UNHCR. The Government provides first asylum
    for refugees based on UNHCR recommendations. There is no pattern of
    abuse of refugees. Although a few refugees were deported during the
    year, none were forced to return to countries where they feared
    persecution. The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum and/or
    refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides that the citizenry shall elect the
    President and members of the legislature for 5-year terms; however,
    there still are some significant limitations on citizens' right to
    change their government. In October 1999, President Ben Ali was
    reelected for a third 5-year term in the country's first multiparty
    presidential elections, winning 99.44 percent of the vote. According to
    the Constitution, this is to be his last term in office. The ruling RCD
    party won all 148 directly elected seats in the legislative elections.
    Observers agree that the outcome of the presidential and legislative
    elections generally reflected the will of the electorate; however, the
    campaign and election processes greatly favored the ruling party and
    there was widespread disregard for the secrecy of the vote. The ruling
    RCD party so dominates all levels of political activity that credible
    electoral challenges have been extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the
    results also reflected the general satisfaction of the vast majority
    with President Ben Ali's rule, which derives in large part from his
    success in promoting economic and social well-being. Opposition
    presidential candidates were allowed to run for the first time and
    opposition parties were able to campaign freely within the limits
    dictated by the Government; however, given the overwhelming dominance
    of the RCD, the playing field for the elections was not level. A
    presidentially appointed independent election monitoring group
    presented a confidential report to the President on the election
    process, which reportedly uncovered numerous irregularities alleged by
    opposition parties. In response, the Government enacted a law in April,
    just before the May municipal elections, that requires voters to bring
    copies of all party ballots (not just the ballot with ruling-party
    candidates) into the voting booth, in order to help preserve the
    secrecy of the vote.
        The RCD party and its direct predecessor parties have controlled
    the political arena since independence in 1956. The RCD dominates the
    Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, and regional and local governments.
    The President appoints the Cabinet and the 24 governors. The Government
    and the party are integrated closely; the President of the Republic
    also is the president of the party, and the party's secretary general
    holds the rank of minister.
        The Government amended the Constitution and Electoral Code in July
    1999 to allow party presidents who have been in office for at least 5
    years and whose parties were represented in the 1994 to 1999 Chamber of
    Deputies (and who met other requirements such as those regarding age
    and nationality) to run in the October 1999 presidential elections.
    These criteria were a one-time alternative to the more restrictive
    standing requirement that candidates for president must receive the
    endorsement of 30 sitting deputies or municipal council presidents to
    be eligible to run, and paved the way for the first multiparty
    presidential elections, as Mohamed Belhaj Amor, secretary general of
    the Popular Unity Front (PUP), and Abderrahman Tlili, secretary general
    of the Union of Democratic Unionists party (UDU), entered the race.
    Both candidates acknowledged flaws in the Electoral Code and criticized
    the fact that the narrowly written criteria made only two persons
    eligible to run against Ben Ali. At the same time, they stated that
    they wanted to advance pluralism by seizing the opportunity to run.
    However, after the elections, there were opposition complaints that,
    despite some progress in liberalizing the electoral process, problems
    remained, especially with regard to protection of the secrecy of the
    ballot and the accuracy of the vote totals.
        The 182-seat Chamber of Deputies does not function as a
    counterweight to the executive branch; rather, it serves as an arena in
    which the executive's legislative proposals are debated prior to
    virtually automatic approval. Debate within the Chamber is often lively
    and government ministers are summoned to respond to deputies'
    questions, although heated exchanges critical of government policy are
    not reported fully in the press. Regardless of the debate, the Chamber
    has a history of approving all government proposals. The Chamber that
    emerged from the October 1999 parliamentary elections was more
    pluralistic than the Chamber in place from 1994 to 1999, as October
    1998 changes in the Electoral Code reserved 20 percent of the seats for
    the opposition parties, distributed on a proportional basis to those
    parties that did not win directly elected district seats. Five
    opposition parties currently hold 34 of 182 seats, or nearly 19
    percent, compared with 4 opposition parties with 19 of 163 seats, or 12
    percent, in the previous Parliament. The remaining 81 percent of the
    seats were contested in winner-take-all, multiseat district races, in
    which the ruling party won all 148 directly elected seats, up from 144
    in the previous Parliament. Opposition politicians recognized that the
    electoral changes ensured them more seats than they could have won in a
    popular election. However, they also argue that the winner-take-all,
    multi-seat district system permanently favors the RCD and essentially
    freezes the opposition at the 20 percent level.
        All six legally recognized opposition parties fielded parliamentary
    candidates in the October 1999 elections. The Government provided
    public financing to political parties, as called for in legislation
    adopted in 1997. Under the legislation, each party represented in the
    Chamber of Deputies received an annual public subsidy of approximately
    $54,000 (60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $4,500 (5,000
    dinars) per deputy. The Government also provided campaign financing
    that corresponded to the number of district lists that each party
    presented. Opposition politicians argued that the subsidy system
    reinforces the favored position of the ruling party because its
    dominance in the Parliament means that it receives the great majority
    of the government funding. Moreover, with funding based on the number
    of seats in Parliament, the opposition parties had no interest in
    forming coalitions against the RCD, but concentrated instead on
    competing with each other for the largest possible share of the 20
    percent of seats reserved for the opposition. During the elections,
    opposition parties found independent fundraising impossible, and those
    that published newspapers or magazines faced difficulties in obtaining
    paid advertisers.
        In the May municipal elections, the RCD won an overwhelming
    majority nationwide and retained the large majority of seats (and thus
    the mayoralty) in each of 257 municipal councils, although the number
    of opposition seats on the councils also increased significantly. The
    RCD won all seats in the 192 districts where it ran uncontested, and 94
    percent of the 4,128 seats nationwide. Opposition parties and
    independent lists won a total of 243 seats in 60 municipalities, up
    from a total of 10 seats nationwide in the 1996 elections. Opposition
    representation on the councils was enhanced by 1998 Electoral Code
    amendments, which provided that any party winning more than 3 percent
    of the vote in a district would win or share 20 percent of the seats on
    that council.
        Opposition parties noted improvements in the administration of the
    elections and conduct of the campaigns, although some opposition party
    members claimed that they did not receive voting cards from local
    authorities. The RCD campaign was far more restrained than in the
    October 1999 legislative elections, and press coverage of opposition
    parties was broader. The secrecy of the ballot generally was respected
    under a new law requiring voters to enter a voting booth, although some
    problems continued in that regard. While the Government's voter turnout
    estimates appeared to be inflated, the percentages won by opposition
    parties appeared credible, and opposition parties did well in a few
    areas, including traditional RCD party strongholds.
        Women participate in politics, but they are underrepresented in
    senior government positions. Twenty-one of the 182 Deputies elected in
    October 1999 were women, up from 13 of 163 deputies in the previous
    Chamber. There are four women in the Cabinet: Two full ministers (the
    Minister of Environment and Land Management and the Minister for Women
    and Family Affairs) and two junior ministers (the Secretary of State
    for Housing and the Secretary of State for Public Health).
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Tunisian Human Rights League is the most active independent
    advocacy organization, with 41 branches located throughout many parts
    of the country. The organization receives and researches complaints and
    protests individual and systemic abuses. The Government continued to
    maintain the regular contact with the LTDH that it established in 1999.
    Minister of Interior Abdullah Kallel met with LTDH president Taoufik
    Bouderbala and other representatives of the League to address issues
    such as the return of passports and the release of PCOT prisoners
    Abdelmounim Belanas and Fahem Boukkadous (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and
    2.b.). However, LTDH officials reported that the Government still has
    not provided any written responses to LTDH inquiries since 1994.
        Although the Government permitted the League to hold meetings in
    its offices, it continued to place significant obstacles in the way of
    the League's effective operation. LTDH members and other human rights
    activists reported government harassment, interrogation, property loss
    or damage, unauthorized home entry, and denial of passports. Several of
    the League's communiques appeared in independent newspapers during the
    year and its 2000 National Congress was discussed in a local weekly
    magazine, Realites, and independent daily journals. In January the LTDH
    hosted human rights training for secondary school teachers in
    conjunction with the Arab Institute for Human Rights. In May the LTDH
    attended a conference on freedom of the press with Amnesty
    International (see Section 2.b). However, in November a Tunis judge
    ordered closed the LTDH headquarters and replaced the newly elected
    board of directors with a judicial administrator pending the hearing of
    a complaint filed by four LTDH members, who claimed that the National
    Congress elections did not follow the League's by-laws and therefore
    were illegal. Since the closure of their headquarters, LTDH members
    claim that they have been under heavy police surveillance and that
    plainclothes police have prevented them from entering private homes,
    public restaurants, and buildings to meet. On December 25, the
    Government held a hearing and postponed the LTDH's civil trial until
    January 2001. On December 25, LTDH vice president Slahedine Jourchi was
    interrogated by the Public Prosecutor regarding a press release he
    published on December 11, but no charges had been filed against him by
    year's end.
        Although LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila was released in
    September 1999, he claims he still is harassed and under constant
    surveillance (see Section 1.f.). In a statement published in the May
    issue of the biweekly magazine Jeune Afrique, the Government claimed
    that it had completed its investigation of the February 1998 ransacking
    and burglary of the law office of human rights activist Radhia Nasraoui
    and had brought the perpetrators to justice. Human rights activists
    believe that security forces carried out the 1998 ransacking and
    burglary because some of the documents that the Government presented in
    the 1999 PCOT trial were among the documents stolen from Nasraoui's
    office. Although Nasraoui received a 6-month suspended sentence in the
    PCOT trial, she was prevented from leaving the country in May to attend
    an Amnesty International conference in Belgium. The Government claimed
    that she still was under a travel injunction from her 1999 suspended
    sentence. After verifying that Nasraoui's travel injunction had lapsed,
    the Government gave her permission to travel the following day,
    although Nasraoui ultimately decided not to travel because she already
    had missed the conference (see Section 2.d.). Nasraoui was permitted to
    travel out of the country in June.
        The Government continued to refuse to authorize the Tunisian
    National Council for Liberties to register as an NGO. The CNLT
    initially applied for authorization in 1998. The court has not yet
    acted on the March 1999 administrative appeal filed by the CNLT's
    founders. The Government stated that the case was submitted to a court
    of justice, and that the situation requires that the Government leave
    the matter to the judiciary. Although not recognized by the Government,
    the CNLT issued statements criticizing government human rights
    practices. The CNLT published a report in March describing a broad
    range of human rights abuses, and proclaimed 2000 as ``the year for the
    eradication of torture and the conquest of liberty.'' Government
    officials stated that, by publishing communiques in the name of an
    unregistered NGO, CNLT members violated the Publications Code (which
    requires that advance copies be provided to the Government), belonged
    to an illegal organization, and threatened public order. In June the
    Government convicted RAID president Fethi Chemki and member Mohamed
    Chouarbi of defamation for reproducing the CNLT's March report. Iheb
    El-Hani, a photocopy shop owner, who also was indicted in case, was
    acquitted of all charges (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., and 2.a.).
        There were no developments in the Government's 1999 criminal
    investigation of the leader of the Tunisian Association of Young
    Lawyers for meeting with CNLT members in his office. A court indicted
    both CNLT members Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki in July 1999, and
    Marzouki again in November and December 1999, on several charges,
    including belonging to an illegal organization, violating the
    Publications Code, and spreading false information. There were no
    results during the year in the Government's investigation into the
    charges, and a trial had not begun by year's end (see Section 2.a.). In
    a separate case based on a September indictment, Marzouki was sentenced
    on December 30 to a 1-year prison term for maintaining an illegal
    organization and distribution of false news for writing a paper used at
    a human rights conference held in Morocco that criticized the
    Government's National Solidarity Fund charity for lack of transparency.
    Marzouki had 10 days to file an appeal of the ruling and had not been
    imprisoned by year's end. Marzouki and CNLT member Mustapha Ben Jaafar,
    both doctors, allege that the Government prohibits them from treating
    patients in retaliation for their human rights activism. In July the
    Minister of Health fired Marzouki from his job as a doctor and
    professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Sousse University. The
    Government claimed that Marzouki submitted a fraudulent medical
    certificate to be excused for time off from his position when he
    traveled abroad in June. Marzouki claimed that he was fired because he
    made statements abroad that were critical of the Government. Marzouki's
    family also claims to have suffered from Marzouki's activism. Security
    police took CNLT member Mustapha Ben Jaafar briefly into custody in
    August for interrogation. The Government also interrogated other
    persons who entered the CNLT headquarters throughout the year. On the
    weekend of December 10, plainclothes police barred entry to CNLT
    headquarters. Omar Mestiri claimed that the police struck lawyers Nejib
    Hosni and Raouf Ayadi in front of the headquarters when they attempted
    to enter.
        The Government issued passports to CNLT members Sihem Bensedrine,
    Moncef Marzouki, and Mustapha Ben Jaafar; however, other CNLT members
    were unable to obtain passports (see Sections 1.f., 2.a., and 2.d.).
        The Arab Institute for Human Rights, headquartered in Tunis, was
    founded in 1989 by the LTDH, the Arab Organization for Human Rights,
    and the Union of Arab lawyers. It is an information, rather than an
    advocacy, organization, and the Government supports its activities.
        Amnesty International continued to maintain a Tunisian chapter. Its
    members complained that the Tunis office suffered repeated loss of
    telephone and fax service. Persons who were considering joining AI's
    Tunisia chapter report that security officials discouraged them from
    doing so. AI officials reported that they were under periodic police
    surveillance. The Government denied two requests, one in March and
    another in April, for AI to hold a seminar on human rights in Saudi
    Arabia. The Government stated that AI had not submitted the appropriate
    request. On July 11, the Government refused entry to AI researcher
    Donatella Rovera, FIDH president Patrick Baudouin, and France-section
    AI president Hassina Giraud upon their arrival at Tunis-Carthage
    Airport. Although the Government gave no official explanation why the
    three were refused entry, government officials have accused Amnesty
    International of exaggerating reports of human rights violations in
    Tunisia. However, the Government permitted AI to hold a public meeting
    in Tunis in May in celebration of International Freedom of the Press
    Day and a public meeting in Sfax in June, and to hold its annual
    meeting in July (see Section 2.b.). The Government permitted numerous
    foreign members of AI to enter the country and attend the July meeting.
        Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from AI,
    the International Human Rights Federation, and other international
    human rights organizations to monitor trials. The observers reported
    that the Government permitted them to conduct their work freely (see
    Section 1.e.). However, the Government reportedly blocked access to the
    Internet web sites produced by some of these organizations and those
    produced by the Committee to Protect Journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    Human rights activists and lawyers complain of frequently interrupted
    postal and telephone services (see Section 1.f.).
        Human rights offices in certain ministries and a governmental body,
    the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, address and
    sometimes resolve human rights complaints. The Higher Commission
    submits confidential reports directly to President Ben Ali. There is a
    Ministry of Human Rights, Communications, and Relations with the
    Chamber of Deputies, which is within the Prime Minister's office and is
    headed by Minister Afif Hendaoui. The first Minister for Human Rights,
    Daly Jazi, was dismissed on April 5 after less than 5 months in the
    position. The Government gave no reason for Jazi's dismissal. However,
    Jazi subsequently was appointed as an advisor to the President.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that all citizens shall have equal rights
    and responsibilities and be equal under the law, and the Government
    generally upholds these rights in practice. Legal or societal
    discrimination is not prevalent, apart from that experienced by women
    in certain areas, such as inheritance, which is governed by Shari'a.
    Shari'a provides that daughters receive only half the amount left to
    sons.
        Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no
    comprehensive statistics to measure its extent. According to one family
    court judge, women file 4,000 complaints of domestic violence each
    year, but later drop approximately half of those complaints. The
    Tunisian Democratic Women's Association operates the country's only
    counseling center for women who are victims of domestic violence. The
    center, located in Tunis, assists approximately 20 women per month.
    Instances of rape or assault by someone unknown to the victim are rare.
    Battered women first seek help from family members. Police intervention
    often is ineffective because police officers and the courts tend to
    regard domestic violence as a problem to be handled by the family.
    Nonetheless, there are stiff penalties for spouse abuse. Both the fine
    and imprisonment for battery or violence committed by a spouse or
    family member are double those for the same crimes committed by an
    individual not related to the victim. Although previously treated as a
    taboo subject by the media, the Government in April presented a
    televised panel discussion on domestic violence and in August President
    Ben Ali ordered an investigation into the extent of domestic violence.
    The Government had not released a report by year's end.
        Women enjoy substantial rights and the Government has made serious
    efforts to advance those rights, especially in the areas of property-
    ownership practices and support to divorced women. The 1956 Personal
    Status Code outlawed polygamy. A 1998 presidential decree created a
    national fund to protect the rights of divorced women, ensuring that
    the State would provide financial support to women whose former
    husbands refused to make child support and alimony payments. The
    Government has processed over 5,600 requests providing divorced women
    over $8 million (11 million dinars) since the fund's inception.
    Legislation requires civil authorities to advise couples on the merits
    of including provisions for joint property in marriage contracts.
    Nonetheless, most property acquired during marriage, including property
    acquired solely by the wife, still is held in the name of the husband.
    Inheritance law, based on Shari'a and tradition, discriminates against
    women, and women still face societal and economic discrimination in
    certain areas, such as private sector employment. The Government took
    strong measures to reduce official discrimination, including adding
    equal opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits of all
    governmental entities and state-owned enterprises; however, it did not
    extend such measures to the private sector.
        Women are entering the work force in increasing numbers, employed
    particularly in the textile, manufacturing, health, and agricultural
    sectors. According to 1999 government statistics, women constituted 29
    percent of the work force; there are an estimated 2,000 businesses
    headed by women. Women constitute 37.1 percent of the civil service,
    employed primarily in the fields of health, education, and social
    affairs, at the middle or lower levels. Women constitute 60 percent of
    all judges in the capital and 24 percent of the nation's total jurists.
    Approximately 50.4 percent of university students enrolled in the 1999-
    2000 academic year were women. The law explicitly requires equal pay
    for equal work. The Government includes equal opportunity for women as
    a standard part of its audits of all government ministries, agencies,
    and state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, while the rate of
    illiteracy has dropped markedly in both rural and urban areas, the rate
    of female illiteracy in all categories is at least double that of men.
    Among 10- to 14-year-old children, 5.5 percent of urban girls are
    illiterate, compared with 2.2 percent of urban boys, and 27 percent of
    rural girls compared with less than 7 percent of rural boys.
        Several active NGO's focus, in whole or in part, on women's
    advocacy, or research women's issues, and a cadre of attorneys
    represent women in domestic cases. Media attention focuses on women's
    economic and academic accomplishments, and usually omits reference to
    culturally sensitive issues. The Government funded several studies and
    projects designed to improve the role of women in the media. According
    to a government study, women represented 25.2 percent of professional
    journalists in 1998.
        There is a separate Ministry for Women and Family Affairs, with a
    relatively large budget to support its mission to ensure the legal
    rights and improve the socioeconomic status of women. The Government
    supports and provides funding to the National Women's Union, women's
    professional associations, and the Government's Women's Research
    Center.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
    public education, which is compulsory until age 16. Primary school
    enrollment for the 1999-2000 scholastic year was slightly less than the
    preceding year's, reflecting a decline in the birth rate; secondary
    school enrollment showed an increase of 8 percent. The Government
    reported that 99.1 percent of children attend primary school full-time.
    The Government offers a maternal and child health program, providing
    prenatal and postnatal services. It sponsors an immunization program
    targeting preschool age children, and reports that over 95 percent of
    children are vaccinated.
        In 1995 the Government promulgated laws as part of a code for the
    protection of children. The code proscribes child abuse, abandonment,
    and sexual or economic exploitation. Penalties for convictions for
    abandonment and assault on minors are severe. There is no societal
    pattern of abuse of children. There is a Ministry for Children and
    Youths and a Presidential Delegate to Safeguard the Rights and Welfare
    of Children.
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
    on disability and mandates that at least 1 percent of the public and
    private sector jobs be reserved for the disabled. All public buildings
    constructed since 1991 must be accessible to physically disabled
    persons. Many cities, including the capital, have begun to install
    wheelchair access ramps on city sidewalks. There is a general trend
    toward making public transportation more accessible to disabled
    persons. The Government issues special cards to the disabled for
    benefits such as unrestricted parking, priority medical services,
    preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts.
        Indigenous People.--The Government estimates that the small Amazigh
    (Berber) minority constitutes less than 3 percent of the population.
    Some older Amazighs have retained their native language, but the
    younger generation has been assimilated into Tunisian culture through
    schooling and marriage. Amazighs are free to participate in politics
    and to express themselves culturally.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    stipulate the right of workers to form unions. The Tunisian General
    Federation of Labor is the country's only labor federation. About 15
    percent of the work force, including civil servants and employees of
    state-owned enterprises, are members, and a considerably larger
    proportion of the work force is covered by union contracts. There is no
    legal prohibition against the establishment of other labor federations.
    A union may be dissolved only by court order.
        The UGTT and its member unions legally are independent of the
    Government and the ruling party, but operate under regulations that
    restrict their freedom of action. The UGTT's membership includes
    persons associated with all political tendencies, although Islamists
    have been removed from union offices. There are credible reports that
    the UGTT receives substantial government subsidies to supplement modest
    union dues and funding from the National Social Security Account. While
    regional and sector-specific unions operate with more independence, the
    central UGTT leadership follows a policy of cooperation with the
    Government on its economic reform program.
        Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right
    to strike, provided they give 10 days' advance notice to the UGTT and
    it approves of the strike. However, this advance approval rarely is
    sought in practice. There were numerous short-lived strikes over pay
    and conditions, and over efforts by employers to impede union
    activities. While the majority of these technically were illegal, the
    Government did not prosecute workers for illegal strike activity, and
    the strikes were covered objectively in the press. The International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions has characterized the requirement
    for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker rights. The
    law prohibits retribution against strikers, but there have been cases
    of employers punishing strikers nevertheless, which forces the strikers
    to pursue costly and time-consuming legal remedies to protect their
    rights.
        Labor disputes are settled through conciliation panels in which
    labor and management are represented equally. Tripartite regional
    arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation
    fails.
        Unions are free to associate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    organize and bargain collectively is protected by law and observed in
    practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial
    negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Forty-seven
    collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the
    private sector and cover 80 percent of the total private sector
    workforce. Each accord is negotiated by representatives of unions and
    employers in the area the accord encompasses. The Government's role in
    the private sector negotiations is minimal, consisting mainly of
    lending its good offices if talks appear to be stalled. However, the
    Government must approve (but may not modify) the agreements. When
    approved the agreements set standards for all employees, both union and
    nonunion, in the areas that they cover. The UGTT also negotiates wages
    and work conditions of civil servants and employees of state-owned
    enterprises. The Government is the partner for such negotiations. The
    1999 triennial negotiation ended in February 2000. The agreements
    signed provided for annual wage increases ranging from 4 to 6 percent.
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. However,
    the UGTT is concerned about antiunion activity among private sector
    employers, especially the firing of union activists and the use of
    temporary workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as
    textiles, hotels, and construction, temporary workers account for a
    large majority of the work force. The Labor Code protects temporary
    workers, but enforcement is more difficult than in the case of
    permanent workers. The 1999 discussions on this issue between the UGTT
    and the Government failed to achieve any results. A committee chaired
    by an officer from the Labor Inspectorate of the Office of the
    Inspector General of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and including a
    labor representative and an employers' association representative,
    approves all worker dismissals.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor by either adults or children, and it is not
    known to occur. The Government abolished forced and compulsory labor in
    1989.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. The minimum
    age for light work in the nonindustrial and agricultural sectors is 13
    years. The law also requires children to attend school until age 16.
    Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must have 12 hours of rest per
    day, which must include the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Children
    between the ages of 14 and 16 in nonagricultural sectors may work no
    more than 2 hours per day. The total time that they spend in school and
    work may not exceed 7 hours per day. The minimum age for hazardous work
    is 18. Inspectors of the Ministry of Social Affairs examine the records
    of employees to verify that employers comply with the minimum age law.
    Nonetheless, young children often perform agricultural work in rural
    areas and work as vendors in urban areas, primarily during the summer
    vacation from school.
        Observers have expressed concern that child labor continues to
    exist disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft
    industry, and in the cases of teenage girls whose families place them
    as household domestics in order to collect their wages. There are no
    reliable statistics on the extent of this phenomenon; however, an
    independent lawyer who conducted a study of the practice concluded that
    hiring of underage girls as household domestics has declined with
    increased government enforcement of school attendance and minimum work
    age laws. The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the
    Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a
    range of administratively determined minimum wages, which are set by a
    commission of representatives from the Ministries of Social Affairs,
    Planning, Finance, and National Economy, in consultation with the UGTT
    and the Employers' Association. The President approves the commission's
    recommendations. On May 1, the industrial minimum wage was raised by
    6.32 dinars to $138 (186.992 dinars) per month for a 48-hour workweek
    and $121 (163.798 dinars) per month for a 40-hour workweek. The
    agricultural minimum wage is $4.30 (5.809 dinars) per day. When
    supplemented by transportation and family allowances, the minimum wage
    provides for a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but
    nothing more, as it covers only essential costs. The Labor Code sets a
    standard 48-hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24-hour
    rest period per week. The few foreign workers have the same protections
    as citizen workers.
        Regional labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing standards.
    They inspect most firms about once every 2 years. However, the
    Government often encounters difficulty in enforcing the minimum wage
    law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy. Moreover,
    more than 240,000 workers are employed in the informal sector, which
    falls outside the purview of labor legislation.
        The Ministry of Social Affairs has responsibility for enforcing
    health and safety standards in the workplace. There are special
    government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as mining,
    petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions and
    standards tend to be better in firms that are export oriented than in
    those producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers are free
    to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing
    their employment, and they may take legal action against employers who
    retaliate against them for exercising this right.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, it prohibits slavery and bonded labor. There were
    no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through
    the country.
                                   __________

                              UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

        The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates
    established in 1971. None has any democratically elected institutions
    or political parties. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has
    been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty
    to the tribal leaders. Political leaders in the emirates are not
    elected, but citizens may express their concerns directly to their
    leaders via traditional mechanisms, such as the open majlis, or
    council. In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the seven emirate
    rulers constitute a Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative
    and executive body. The Council selects a President and Vice President
    from its membership; the President in turn appoints the Prime Minister
    and Cabinet. The Constitution requires the Council to meet annually,
    although individual leaders meet frequently in more traditional
    settings. The Cabinet manages the Federation on a day-to-day basis. A
    consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC), consisting of
    advisors appointed by the emirate rulers, has no legislative authority
    but questions government ministers in open sessions and makes policy
    recommendations to the Cabinet. Each emirate retains control over its
    own oil and mineral wealth, some aspects of internal security, and some
    regulation of internal and external commerce. The federal Government
    asserts primacy in matters of foreign and defense policy, some aspects
    of internal security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply
    of some government services. The judiciary generally is independent,
    but its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership.
        Each emirate maintains its own independent police force. While all
    emirate internal security organs theoretically are branches of one
    federal organization, in practice they operate with considerable
    independence.
        The UAE has a free market economy based on oil and gas production,
    trade, and light manufacturing. The Government owns the majority share
    of the petroleum production enterprise in the largest emirate, Abu
    Dhabi. The Emirate of Dubai is likewise an oil producer, as well as a
    growing financial and commercial center in the Gulf. The remaining five
    emirates have negligible petroleum or other resources and therefore
    depend in varying degrees on federal government subsidies, particularly
    for basic services such as health care, electricity, water, and
    education. The economy provides citizens with a high per capita income,
    but it is heavily dependent on foreign workers, who constitute at least
    80 percent of the general population.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some
    areas and continued to improve in other areas; however, its record was
    poor in other areas, particularly with respect to its denial of
    citizens' right to change their government and its placement of
    limitations on the labor rights of foreign workers. The Government
    denied citizens the right to change their government. The Government at
    times abused persons in custody, denied citizens the right to a speedy
    trial and legal counsel during police investigations, and restricted
    the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion. The
    press continued to avoid direct criticism of the Government and
    exercised self-censorship. Women continue to make progress in education
    and in the work force. In April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
    a directive allowing for the inclusion of women in the diplomatic
    corps. However, some discrimination against women persists, including
    informal restrictions on their ability to register businesses. The
    Government limits worker rights, and abuse of foreign domestic servants
    is a problem. There were reports of trafficking in persons.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment,
    and there were no confirmed reports of torture; however, there are
    consistent but unconfirmed reports from foreign prisoners of beatings
    and coerced confessions by police during initial detention. The
    Government conducted internal investigations of these reports, and
    maintained that they were groundless. According to unconfirmed sources,
    in March a Qatari journalist reportedly was subjected to sleep
    deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week detention after the
    authorities arrested him for publishing a series of satirical columns
    in the Dubai newspaper Gulf News (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        Shari'a (Islamic law) courts frequently impose flogging (except in
    Dubai) on Muslims found guilty of adultery, prostitution, and drug or
    alcohol abuse. In practice flogging is administered in accordance with
    Shari'a in order as to prevent major or permanent injuries. The
    individual administering the lashing swings the whip using the forearm
    only. According to press accounts, punishments for adultery and
    prostitution have ranged from 39 to 200 lashes. Individuals convicted
    of drunkenness have been sentenced to 80 lashes. The federal Supreme
    Court ruled in 1993 that convictions in the Shari'a courts do not
    necessarily require the imposition of Shari'a penalties on non-Muslims,
    but such sentences have been carried out in a few cases.
        In February an Indonesian woman convicted of adultery by the
    Shari'a court in the Emirate of Fujairah, was sentenced to death by
    stoning after she purportedly insisted on such punishment. The sentence
    was commuted on appeal to 1 year in prison, followed by deportation. In
    June 1998, the Shari'a court in Fujairah sentenced three Omani
    nationals convicted of robbery to have their right hands amputated. The
    Fujairah prosecutor's office instead commuted the sentence to a term of
    imprisonment.
        In central prisons that hold long-term inmates, prisoners are
    provided with food, medical care, and adequate sanitation facilities,
    but sleep on slabs built into cell walls or on the floor. Each prisoner
    is provided with four blankets. Only some blocks of the central prisons
    are air-conditioned during the intense heat and humidity of the summer.
    The Government gradually is phasing air conditioning into the prisons.
    Currently, prisoners with medical conditions are placed in
    airconditioned rooms during the summer months. Prisoners not under
    investigation and not involved in drug cases may receive visitors up to
    three times each week and may also make occasional local telephone
    calls. In Dubai Emirate, most prisoners are allowed family visits and a
    number of telephone calls.
        The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
    conditions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arrest, search, detention, or imprisonment, except in
    accordance with the law, and authorities generally respect these
    provisions in practice. The law prohibits arrest or search without
    probable cause.
        Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police must report arrests
    within 48 hours to the Attorney General, who must determine within the
    next 24 hours whether to charge, release, or order further detention
    pending an investigation. The Attorney General may order that detainees
    be held for up to 21 days without charge. After that time, the
    authorities must obtain a court order for further detention without
    charge.
        Although the code does not specify a right to a speedy trial,
    authorities bring detainees to trial in reasonable time with the
    exception of drug-related cases, for which the authorities must inform
    the Office of the President in the Abu Dhabi Emirate (also known as the
    Diwan) of the charges. Trials may last a substantial period of time,
    depending on the seriousness of the charges, number of witnesses, and
    availability of judges. There is no formal system of bail, but the
    authorities temporarily may release detainees who deposit money or an
    important document such as a passport. The law permits incommunicado
    detention, but there is no evidence that it is practiced. Defendants in
    cases involving loss of life, including involuntary manslaughter, may
    be denied release in accordance with the law. However, bail usually is
    permitted, after a payment of ``diya,'' a form of financial
    compensation for death or injury cases.
        Review of criminal cases by the office of the President in Abu
    Dhabi and bureaucratic delays in processing prisoners or releasing them
    sometimes result in detainees serving additional, unnecessary time in
    the central prisons (see Section 1.e.). Some bureaucratic delays have
    kept prisoners incarcerated for as long as several months beyond their
    court-mandated release dates.
        According to unconfirmed sources, in March a Qatari journalist was
    subjected to sleep deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week
    detention after the authorities arrested him for publishing a series of
    satirical columns in the Dubai newspaper Gulf News (see Sections 1.c.
    and 2.a.).
        The Crown Prince of Dubai in August granted an amnesty for 200
    citizen and 300 foreigner prisoners convicted of drug-related offenses.
    The foreign prisoners were deported upon release. To celebrate the
    success of the surgery performed in August on the President, the ruler
    of the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah ordered the release of 119 prisoners
    who had been convicted on charges relating to financial crimes. The
    release was followed by the issuance of amnesty orders by the ruler of
    Umm Al-Quwain, which allowed for the release of an unspecified number
    of prisoners, and by the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, ordering the release
    of 150 prisoners convicted of financial crimes.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    independence of the judiciary; however, its decisions are subject to
    review by the political leadership.
        There is a dual system of Shari'a and civil courts. The civil
    courts generally are part of the federal system and are answerable to
    the federal Supreme Court, located in Abu Dhabi, which has the power of
    judicial review as well as original jurisdiction in disputes between
    emirates or between the federal Government and individual emirates.
    Courts and other elements of the judicial system in the Emirate of
    Dubai tend to maintain independence from the federal system.
        The Shari'a courts are administered by each emirate but also must
    answer to the federal Supreme Court. In 1994 the President decreed that
    the Shari'a courts, and not the civil courts, would have the authority
    to try almost all types of criminal cases. The decree did not affect
    the emirates of Dubai and Ras AlKhaimah, which have lower courts
    independent of the federal system. Dubai has a special Shi'a council to
    act on matters pertaining to Shi'a family law (see Section 5).
        Legal counsel may represent defendants in both court systems. Under
    the new Criminal Procedures Code, the accused has a right to counsel in
    all cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment. Only
    the Emirate of Dubai has a public defender's office. If the defendant
    is indigent, the Government will provide counsel. However, in Dubai the
    Government provides indigents counsel only in felony cases. The Supreme
    Court ruled in 1993 that a defendant in an appeals case has a
    ``fundamental right'' to select his attorney and that this right
    supersedes a judge's power to appoint an attorney for the defendant.
        The right to legal counsel is interpreted to provide that the
    accused is entitled to an attorney only after the police have completed
    their investigation. Thus, the police may question accused persons--
    sometimes for days or weeks, as in narcotics cases--without the benefit
    of legal counsel.
        Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. There are no
    jury trials. The number of judges sitting for a case depends on the
    type of crime alleged; three judges normally sit for criminal cases.
    All trials are public, except national security cases and those deemed
    by the judge likely to harm public morality. Most judges are foreign
    nationals, primarily from other Arab countries; however, the number of
    citizens serving as public prosecutors and judges, particularly at the
    federal level, continued to grow.
        Each court system has an appeals process. Death sentences may be
    appealed to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed
    or to the President of the Federation. Non-Muslims who are tried for
    criminal offenses in Shari'a courts may receive civil penalties at the
    discretion of the judge. Shari'a penalties imposed on non-Muslims may
    be overturned or modified by a higher court.
        The Diwan, following the traditional prerogatives of a local ruler,
    maintains the practice of reviewing many types of criminal and civil
    offenses (such as alcohol use, drug-related cases, firearm use, cases
    involving personal injury, and cases affecting tribal harmony) before
    cases are referred to the prosecutor's office. However, this practice
    is not as prevalent as in past years, and such cases usually are
    referred directly to the prosecutor's office. The Diwan also reviews
    sentences passed by judges and reserves the right to return cases to
    the courts on appeal. The Diwan's involvement leads to long delays
    prior to and following the judicial process, causing prisoners to
    remain in prison after they have completed their sentence. Although
    there are reports of intervention by other emirates' rulers in specific
    cases of personal interest, intervention does not appear to be routine.
        The military has its own court system based on Western military
    judicial practice. Military tribunals try only military personnel.
    There is no separate national security court system. In Dubai convicted
    criminals are eligible for executive pardon, often based on
    humanitarian grounds, once they have served at least half of their
    sentence.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits entry into homes without
    the owner's permission, except in accordance with the law. Only police
    officers and public prosecutors carrying a warrant are permitted entry
    into homes. If the authorities enter a home without a warrant, their
    actions are considered illegal. In an August case in Dubai, a judge
    suppressed evidence that was obtained by police without a warrant.
    Officers' actions in searching premises are subject to review, and
    officers are subject to disciplinary action if they act irresponsibly.
    Local custom and practice place a high value on privacy, and entry into
    private homes without the owner's permission is rare. There is no known
    surveillance of private correspondence. However, foreigners have
    received sealed publications, such as magazines, through the
    international mail in which pictures of the naked human figure have
    been blackened over with a marking pen.
        Family law for Muslims is governed by Shari'a and the local Shari'a
    courts. As such, Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims. Such
    a marriage may result in both partners being arrested and tried.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech; however, the Government limits this right in
    practice. Most persons, especially foreign nationals, refrain from
    criticizing the Government in public.
        All published material is subject to Federal Law 15 of 1988, which
    stipulates that all publications, whether books or periodicals, should
    be licensed by the Ministry of Information. The law also governs
    content and contains a list of proscribed subjects. Mindful of these
    provisions, journalists censor themselves when reporting on government
    policy, the ruling families, national security, religion, and relations
    with neighboring states. However, following an October 1999 interview
    with the semiofficial daily newspaper Al-Ittihad, in which Deputy Prime
    Minister Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan stated that uncovering
    inefficiencies in government was one of the duties of the press,
    newspapers began publishing articles critical of alleged inefficiencies
    in the delivery of services by the Ministries of Health, Education, and
    Electricity and Water. In August the English-language daily newspaper
    Gulf News featured a two-part expose on life in the Dubai women's
    central prison. A rare look into a women's correctional facility, the
    series included interviews with citizen and foreign prisoners,
    describing in depth a typical day in the prison. In December a new
    Arabic-language newspaper, Akhbar Al-Arab, owned by a member of the Al-
    Nahyan ruling family, was established in Abu Dhabi.
        However, in March the Ministry of Information and Culture filed a
    lawsuit against the Dubai newspaper Gulf News in response to a series
    of sharply satirical columns that it published by Qatari journalist
    Abdul-Wahed Al-Mawlawi, which featured selfdeprecatory humor regarding
    stereotypes of alleged shortcomings of Gulf Arabs. The Government
    considered the articles to be offensive to Gulf citizens in general and
    to the country's citizens in particular. According to unconfirmed
    sources, the Government also arrested AlMawlawi about 1 week after the
    publication of the last of the columns, reportedly subjected him to
    sleep deprivation and physical abuse during his 2-week detention, then
    expelled him to Qatar (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The Ministry
    withdrew the lawsuit after the editor of the newspaper agreed to
    publish on the front page of the Gulf News a one-page apology for
    having caused any offense. In September the Government briefly banned
    10 prominent citizens, including 4 university professors, from
    publishing opinion pieces in the country's Arabic- and English-language
    press. The Ministry of Information imposed the ban after the writers
    took up the cause in the press of over 100 employees who had been laid
    off by the government-financed Emirates Media Corporation. No official
    justification was given for the ban, which was lifted against all 10
    citizens by late October.
        In September 1999, Emirates Media, which publishes Al-Ittihad and
    owns Abu Dhabi's radio and television stations, issued a directive
    forbidding all its employees, including journalists, from speaking with
    representatives of foreign diplomatic missions without prior approval.
    Also in 1999, Dubai Emirate announced plans to open a press club as
    part of its effort to promote Dubai as a major regional communications
    hub. The club provides facilities for the international press,
    including access to information, and serves as a site for open
    discussions between political figures and journalists. The country's
    three English-language newspapers are privately owned, as are three out
    of its six Arabic-language newspapers; however, privately owned
    newspapers receive government subsidies. Foreign publications routinely
    are subjected to censorship before distribution.
        All television and radio stations, with the exception of Ajman
    Emirate's local television station, are government owned and conform to
    government reporting guidelines. These unpublished guidelines are not
    always applied consistently. In July 1999, Emirates Media purchased
    Ajman Emirate's satellite television station. Satellite receiving
    dishes are widespread and provide access to international broadcasts
    without apparent censorship. Censors at the Ministry of Information and
    Culture review imported newspapers, periodicals, books, films, and
    videos and ban any material considered pornographic, violent,
    derogatory to Islam, supportive of certain Israeli positions, unduly
    critical of friendly countries, or critical of the Government or the
    ruling families. In June the state telephone and Internet monopoly
    substantially lowered Internet prices for the third time in 3 years and
    sought to encourage greater use of the Internet. The Internet monopoly
    uses a proxy server that appears aimed, in most instances, at blocking
    material regarded as pornographic or as promoting radical Islamic
    ideologies. In most cases, the proxy server does not appear to block
    news services or political expression unrelated to radical Islam, or
    material originating from specific countries. However, the Internet
    monopoly solicits suggestions from users regarding ``objectionable''
    sites and sometimes has responded by briefly blocking some politically
    oriented sites, which were, after an apparent review, later unblocked.
    In October following the increase in violence in Israel, the West Bank,
    and Gaza, Etislat established a web page depicting images of the dead
    and injured, and containing a discussion forum and bulletin boards, in
    which persons accessing the page could post their opinions.
        The unwritten but generally recognized ban on criticism of the
    Government also restricts academic freedom, although in recent years
    academics have been more open in their criticism. Academic materials
    destined for schools in the country are subject to censorship. At Zayid
    University, the female students are banned from reading texts in which
    the human body is pictured or sexuality is featured (see Section 5).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    tightly restricts the freedom of peaceful assembly. Organized public
    gatherings require a government permit. Each emirate determines its own
    practice on public gatherings. Some emirates are relatively tolerant of
    seminars and conferences on sensitive subjects. Citizens normally
    confine their political discussions to the numerous gatherings or
    majlis, which are held in private homes. There are no restrictions on
    such gatherings.
        In October the Government issued permits for demonstrations
    throughout the country to protest the Israeli Government's actions
    against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the
    fall. These public marches, in which both citizens and foreigners
    participated, were peaceful in nature. Demonstrations, many of which
    were organized by female students, also took place at universities.
        The Government tightly restricts freedom of association.
    Unauthorized political organizations are prohibited. All private
    associations, including children's clubs, charitable groups, and hobby
    associations, must be approved and licensed by local authorities;
    however, this requirement is enforced only loosely in some emirates.
    Private associations must follow the Government's censorship guidelines
    if they publish any material.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The federal Constitution designates Islam
    as the official religion, and Islam is also the official religion of
    all seven of the individual emirates of the federal union. The federal
    Constitution also provides for the freedom to exercise religious
    worship in accordance with established customs, provided that it does
    not conflict with public policy or violate public morals, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice; however, the
    Government controls all Sunni mosques and prohibits proselytizing.
        Virtually all Sunni mosques are government funded or subsidized;
    about 5 percent of Sunni mosques are entirely private, and several
    large mosques have large private endowments. The federal Ministry of
    Awqaf and Religious Affairs distributes weekly guidance to both Sunni
    and Shi'a sheikhs regarding religious sermons and ensures that clergy
    do not deviate frequently or significantly from approved topics in
    their sermons. All Sunni imams are employees of either the federal
    Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs or individual emirate
    ministries. In 1993 the Emirate of Dubai placed private mosques under
    the control of its Department of Islamic Affairs and Endowments. This
    change gave the Government control over the appointment of preachers
    and the conduct of their work.
        The Shi'a minority, which is concentrated in the northern emirates,
    is free to worship and maintain its own mosques. All Shi'a mosques are
    considered private and receive no funds from the Government. The
    Government does not appoint sheikhs for Shi'a mosques. Shi'a Muslims in
    Dubai may pursue Shi'a family law cases through a special Shi'a council
    rather than the Shari'a courts.
        In April the Ras Al-Khaimah Shari'a court ruled that anyone found
    guilty of employing a magician to cast a spell on others would be
    sentenced to death. The ruling followed the sentencing of a citizen to
    4 months' imprisonment for allegedly hiring a magician to cast a spell
    on her former husband and sister.
        The Government does not recognize all non-Muslim religions. In
    those emirates that officially recognize and thereby grant a legal
    identity to non-Muslim religious groups, only a limited number of
    Christian groups are granted this recognition. While recognizing the
    difference between Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant
    Christianity, the authorities make no legal distinction between
    Christian groups, particularly Protestants. Several often-unrelated
    Christian congregations are required to share common facilities because
    of official limitations on the number of Christian denominations that
    are recognized officially. Non-Muslim and non-Christian religions are
    not recognized legally in any of the emirates. Partly as a result of
    emirate policies regarding recognition of non-Muslim denominations,
    facilities for Christian congregations are far greater in number and
    size than those for non-Christian and non-Muslim groups, despite the
    fact that Christians are a small minority of non-Muslim foreigners.
        Major cities have Christian churches, some that were built on land
    donated by the ruling families of the emirates in which they are
    located. In Sharjah a new Catholic church was opened in 1997 and a new
    Armenian Orthodox church in 1998, both with public ceremonies. The
    Government of Dubai Emirate donated a parcel of land in Jebel Ali in
    1998 for the construction of a facility to be shared by four Protestant
    congregations and a Catholic congregation. Also in 1998, land was
    designated in Jebel Ali for the construction of a second Christian
    cemetery, and Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the expansion of
    existing Christian burial facilities. In 1999 land was designated in
    Ras Al-Khaimah Emirate for the construction of a new Catholic church.
        Dubai permits one Hindu temple and two Sikh temples to operate.
    There are no such temples elsewhere in the country. There are no
    Buddhist temples; however, Buddhists, along with Hindus and Sikhs in
    cities without temples, conduct religious ceremonies in private homes
    without interference. In 1998 Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the
    establishment of the country's first Baha'i cemetery. There are only
    two operating cremation facilities and associated cemeteries for the
    large Hindu community, one in Dubai and one in Sharjah. Official
    permission must be obtained for their use in every instance, posing a
    hardship for the large Hindu community, and neither accepts Hindus who
    have died in other parts of the country for cremation or burial. The
    remains of Hindus who die outside Dubai and Sharjah in all cases must
    be repatriated to their home country at considerable expense.
        Non-Muslims in the country are free to practice their religion but
    may not proselytize publicly or distribute religious literature. The
    Government follows a policy of tolerance towards non-Muslim religions
    and in practice interferes very little in the religious activities of
    non-Muslims. Apparent differences in the treatment of Muslim and non-
    Muslim groups often have their origin in the dichotomy between citizens
    and noncitizens rather than religious difference.
        The Government permits foreign clergy to minister to foreign
    populations, and non-Muslim religious groups are permitted to engage in
    private charitable activities and to send their children to private
    schools. Apart from donated land for the construction of churches and
    other religious facilities, including cemeteries, non-Muslim groups are
    not supported financially or subsidized by the Government. However,
    they are permitted to raise money from among their congregants and to
    receive financial support from abroad. Christian churches are permitted
    to advertise openly certain church functions, such as memorial
    services, in the press.
        The conversion of Muslims to other religions is regarded with
    extreme antipathy. While there is no law against missionary activities,
    authorities have threatened to revoke the residence permits of persons
    suspected of such activities, and customs authorities have questioned
    the entry of large quantities of religious materials (Bibles, hymnals,
    etc.) that they deemed in excess of the normal requirements of existing
    congregations, although in most instances the questions have been
    resolved and the items have been admitted.
        There have been reports that customs authorities are less likely to
    question the importation of Christian religious items than other non-
    Muslim religious items, although in virtually all instances importation
    of the material in question eventually has been permitted.
        Although emirate immigration authorities routinely ask foreigners
    to declare their religious affiliation, the Government does not collect
    or analyze this information, and religious affiliation is not a factor
    in the issuance or renewal of visas or residence permits.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no limitations on freedom of
    movement or relocation within the country, except for security areas
    such as defense and oil installations.
        Unrestricted foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male
    citizens, except those involved in financial disputes under
    adjudication. A husband may bar his wife and children from leaving the
    country. All citizens have the right to return. There is a small
    population of stateless residents, many of whom have lived in the
    country for more than one generation. Many stateless residents are
    originally from Iran and South Asia; other stateless residents include
    Bedouins or the descendants of Bedouins who are unable to prove that
    they are of UAE origin. There is no formal procedure for
    naturalization, although foreign women receive citizenship by marriage
    to a citizen, and anyone may receive a passport by presidential fiat.
    Because they are not of the original tribal groups, naturalized
    citizens may have their passports and citizenship status revoked for
    criminal or politically provocative actions. Such revocations are rare.
        Citizens are not restricted in seeking or changing employment.
    However, foreign nationals in specific occupations, primarily
    professional, may not change employers without first leaving the
    country for 6 months. During 1997 in an effort to liberalize employment
    regulations, the federal Government removed the 6month ban from some of
    these professions. Some foreign nationals involved in disputes with
    employers, particularly in cases in which the employee has signed a
    contract containing a clause not to compete, may be blacklisted by the
    employer with immigration authorities, effectively preventing their
    return for a specified period of time.
        The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
    refugees, asylees, or first asylum. It may detain persons seeking
    refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while they await resettlement
    in a third country.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        There are no democratically elected institutions, and citizens do
    not have the right to change their government or to form political
    parties. Although there are consultative councils at the federal and
    emirate levels, most executive and legislative power is in the hands of
    the Federal Supreme Council. The seven emirate rulers, their extended
    families, and those persons and families to whom they are allied by
    historical ties, marriage, or common interest wield most political
    power in their respective emirates. Decisions at the federal level are
    generally made by consensus among the sheikhs of the seven emirates and
    leading families.
        A federal consultative body, called the Federal National Council,
    consists of advisers appointed by the rulers of each emirate. The FNC
    has no legislative authority but may question ministers and make policy
    recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions usually are open to the
    public.
        The choice of appointing a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling
    family in consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By
    tradition rulers and ruling families are presumed to have the right to
    rule, but their incumbency ultimately depends on the quality of their
    leadership and their responsiveness to their subjects' needs. Emirate
    rulers are accessible, in varying degrees, to citizens who have a
    problem or a request.
        Tradition rather than the law limits the political role of women.
    Women are free to hold government positions, but there are few women in
    senior positions. There are no female members of the FNC. In December
    President Zayid's wife, Sheikha Fatima, who is chairwoman of the
    Women's Federation, renewed her call for women to participate in the
    country's political life. In 1998 Sheikha Fatima had announced the
    Government's intention to appoint a number of women as special
    observers at the FNC. These observers are to learn the procedures of
    the FNC, and it is expected that some later may be appointed as
    members. The observers have not been named yet. In a number of press
    interviews, Sheikha Fatima has stated that women participate in the
    preparation of legislation dealing with social issues through
    recommendations made by the Women's Federation, and that women are only
    ``steps away'' from full political participation. At the same time, she
    emphasized her view that the eventual appointment of women to the FNC
    and other government positions would be ``a responsibility rather than
    an honor,'' requiring careful prior preparation. Although the small
    Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success, few Shi'a Muslims have
    top positions in the federal Government.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no independent human rights groups. Government
    restrictions on freedom of the press and public association make it
    difficult for such groups to investigate and publicly criticize the
    Government's human rights restrictions. A human rights section exists
    within Dubai Emirate's police force to monitor allegations of human
    rights abuses. Informal public discussions of human rights, press
    reports of international human rights forums' activities, and media
    coverage of selected local human rights problems, such as foreign
    workers' conditions, are increasing public awareness of human rights.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality before the law with regard
    to race, nationality, religious beliefs, or social status. However,
    there is institutional and cultural discrimination based on sex,
    nationality, and religion.
        Women.--There are reported cases of spousal abuse. Police units are
    stationed at major public hospitals so that victims of abuse may file
    complaints, or attending physicians may call upon the police to
    interview suspected victims of abuse. However, women sometimes are
    reluctant to file formal charges for social, cultural, and economic
    reasons. When abuse is reported to the local police, authorities may
    take action to protect women. The laws protect women from verbal abuse
    or harassment from men, and violators are subject to criminal action.
    There continue to be credible reports of abuse of female domestic
    servants by some local and foreign employers (see Section 6.e.).
        Prostitution has become an increasingly open phenomenon in recent
    years, particularly in Dubai. Although no accurate statistics are
    available, substantial numbers of women appear to be arriving from the
    states of the former Soviet Union for temporary stays during which they
    engage in prostitution and possibly other activities connected with
    organized crime. Substantial numbers of prostitutes also appear to come
    from Africa and Central and South Asia. In 1999 Dubai police
    established special patrols in areas frequented by prostitutes in an
    effort to control the phenomenon. There were credible reports of
    trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
        Women play a subordinate role in this family-centered society
    because of early marriages and traditional attitudes about women's
    duties. There are no legal prohibitions against women owning property
    or businesses; however there are restrictions against female ownership.
    Women must inherit property or businesses from a father or husband, or,
    if unmarried, receive a grant of land from the ruling family in the
    emirate in which they reside. In the case of women who are married, the
    land must be granted to the husbands. Husbands may bar their wives and
    children from leaving the country (see Section 2.d.), and a married
    woman may not accept employment without her husband's written consent,
    although such permission usually is granted. Shari'a, according to the
    Maliki school of jurisprudence, is applied in cases of divorce. Women
    are granted custody of female children until they reach the age of
    maturity and are granted temporary custody of male children until they
    reach the age of 12. If the mother is deemed unfit, custody reverts to
    the next able female relative on the mother's side. A woman who
    remarries may forfeit her right to the custody of children from a
    previous marriage. Shari'a permits polygyny. In November the Government
    issued a new ruling granting a woman a divorce if it can be proved that
    her husband has deliberately stayed away from here for 3 months and has
    not paid for her upkeep, or for the maintenance of her children.
        There are no legal prohibitions against a woman owning her own
    business. Traditionally, professional women, including doctors,
    architects, and lawyers, have not faced restrictions in licensing
    businesses in their names. However, there are credible reports that
    women attempting to license businesses in the import-export sector,
    particularly in the Emirate of Dubai, encounter greater scrutiny than
    men. The Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce operates occasional programs to
    encourage small business entrepreneurship on the part of women. A
    woman's property is not commingled with that of her husband. Women who
    work outside the home do not receive equal benefits, such as housing,
    and may face discrimination in promotion. A draft 1998 law that would
    entitle women to maternity leave of up to 2 months, compared with the
    45 days granted under the current law, has yet to be approved by the
    Government. A number of women's groups have been pressing the
    Government to grant mothers 3 months of maternity leave at full pay and
    to provide day care facilities at the workplace.
        Opportunities for women have grown in government service,
    education, private business, and health services. Women constitute 15
    percent of the national workforce. The federal Government publicly has
    encouraged women to join the work force, ensuring public sector
    employment for all who apply. In April the Minister of State for
    Foreign Affairs mandated the employment of women in the diplomatic
    corps. According to the available statistics, women constitute 100
    percent of nursery school teachers, 55 percent of primary school
    teachers, 65 percent of intermediate and secondary school teachers,
    54.3 percent of health care workers, and 39.8 percent of all government
    employees. Women also constitute 4 percent of the military. Cultural
    barriers and the lack of economic necessity have limited female
    participation. A symposium promoting the rights of women in the labor
    force was held in 1996. Participants called for increasing the rights
    granted to women, including the elimination of the requirement that a
    husband give approval before his wife may work.
        Women continue to make rapid progress in education. They constitute
    over 75 percent of the student body at the National University in Al-
    Ain, largely because women, unlike men, rarely study abroad. In 1998
    the Government established Zayid University, a second state-run
    university, with campuses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, exclusively for
    women. However, academic materials are subject to censorship, and
    female students are banned from reading texts in which the human body
    is pictured or sexuality is featured (see Section 2.a.).
        Women officially are encouraged to continue their education, and
    government-sponsored women's centers provide adult education and
    technical training courses. The federal armed forces accept female
    volunteers, who may enroll in a special training course that was
    started after the Gulf War. The Dubai Police College recruits women,
    many of whom are deployed at airports, immigration offices, and women's
    prisons. Over 200 women have graduated from the College so far.
        The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government
    may imprison and deport noncitizen women if they bear children out of
    wedlock. In the event that the courts sentence women to prison for such
    an offense, local authorities, at the request of the prisoner, may hold
    the newborn children in a special areas within the confines of the
    prison or place them with a relative. In rare cases, children are held
    in other facilities until the mother's release. In Dubai Emirate,
    unmarried pregnant women must marry the father of the child; both
    parties are subject to arrest for fornication.
        Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
    Children who are citizens receive free health care and education, and
    are ensured housing. A family also may be eligible to receive aid from
    the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare for sons and daughters who are
    under the age of 18, unmarried, or disabled. There is no pattern of
    societal child abuse.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no federal legislation
    requiring accessibility for the disabled. However, the Ministry of
    Labor and Social Affairs sponsors centers that provide facilities and
    services to the disabled. Services range from monthly social aid funds,
    special education, and transportation assistance, to sending a team to
    the Special Olympics.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination based on
    national origin, while not legally sanctioned, is prevalent.
    Employment, immigration, and security policy, as well as cultural
    attitudes towards foreign workers, are conditioned by national origin.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--There are no unions and no strikes.
    The law does not grant workers the right to organize unions or to
    strike. Foreign workers, who make up the bulk of the work force, risk
    deportation if they attempt to organize unions or to strike.
        Since 1995 the UAE has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
    Private Investment Corporation insurance programs because of the
    Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
    rights standards.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does
    not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it
    is not practiced. However, some professional associations are granted
    greater freedom to raise work-related concerns, to lobby the Government
    for redress, or to file a grievance with the Government. Workers in the
    industrial and service sectors normally are employed under contracts
    that are subject to review by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
    The Ministry of Interior's Naturalization and Residency Administration
    is responsible for reviewing the contracts of domestic employees as
    part of residency permit processing. The purpose of the review is to
    ensure that the pay satisfies the employee's basic needs and secures a
    means of living. For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers
    must rely on conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor
    and Social Affairs or on special labor courts.
        Labor laws do not cover government employees, domestic servants,
    and agricultural workers. The latter two groups face considerable
    difficulty in obtaining assistance to resolve disputes with employers.
    While any worker may seek redress through the courts, this process puts
    a heavy financial burden on those in lower income brackets.
        In Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone, the same labor laws apply as in the
    rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is illegal. However, some unscrupulous employment agents bring
    foreign workers to the country under conditions approaching indenture.
    There are credible reports that some women from Central Europe and
    Central and South Asia, who are brought to the country for service
    sector employment, later are forced into prostitution (see Section
    6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
    generally enforces this prohibition effectively. However, the use of
    small children as camel jockeys is a problem. In September the Abu
    Dhabi police took into protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old
    Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in
    Pakistan and brought to the UAE to work as a jockey in camel races. In
    1999 authorities acting on information provided by the Pakistani
    Embassy, located and repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who
    allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. Police
    reportedly are investigating several such cases; however, to date no
    charges have been filed. There continue to be credible reports that
    hundreds of underage boys from South Asia, mainly between the ages of 4
    and 10, continue to be used as camel jockeys (See Sections 6.d. and
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Labor regulations prohibit employment of persons under the
    age of 15 and have special provisions for employing those 15 to 18
    years of age. The Department of Labor enforces the regulations. Other
    regulations permit employers to engage only adult foreign workers. In
    1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age of 15
    as camel jockeys and the use of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99
    pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these
    rules. However, credible sources report that almost all camel jockeys
    are children under the minimum employment age (see Section 6.f.).
    Relevant labor laws sometimes are enforced against criminal trafficking
    rings, but not against those who own racing camels and employ the
    children, because such owners come from powerful local families that
    are in effect above the law. According to credible sources, there were
    at least 20 cases during the year of underage camel jockeys who were
    repatriated to their countries of origin. In September the Abu Dhabi
    police took into protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old
    Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in
    Pakistan and brought to the country to work as a camel jockey. Reports
    of underage camel jockeys continued to surface in the local press
    during the year. In 1999 authorities, acting on information provided by
    the Pakistani Embassy, located and repatriated an 8year-old Pakistani
    boy who allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. Also in
    1999, a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh, who had been used as a camel
    jockey, was found wandering in the desert after being abandoned there
    by his handlers. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the hospitalization
    of a 5-year-old, 44-pound (20-kilogram) abandoned Bangladeshi child who
    had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been broken by a camel.
    Police reportedly are investigating several of these cases; however, no
    charges have ever been filed.
        Otherwise, child labor is not tolerated. The Government prohibits
    forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this prohibition
    effectively (see Section 6.c.). The Government does not issue visas for
    foreign workers under the age of 16 years. Education is compulsory
    through the intermediate levels (approximately 13 to 14 years' old).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or
    administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation.
    However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there
    is an unofficial, unwritten minimum wage rate that would afford a
    worker and family a minimal standard of living. The Labor and Social
    Affairs Ministry reviews labor contracts and does not approve any
    contract that stipulates a clearly unacceptable wage (see Section
    6.b.).
        The standard workday and workweek are 8 hours per day, 6 days per
    week; however, these standards are not enforced strictly. Certain types
    of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obliged to work longer
    than the mandated standard hours. The law also provides for a minimum
    of 24 days per year of annual leave plus 10 national and religious
    holidays. In addition manual workers are not required to do outdoor
    work when the temperature exceeds 112 degrees Fahrenheit.
        Most foreign workers receive either employer-provided housing or
    housing allowances, medical care, and homeward passage from their
    employers. Most foreign workers do not earn the minimum salary of
    $1,090 per month (or $817 per month, if a housing allowance is provided
    in addition to the salary) required to obtain residency permits for
    their families. Employers have the option to petition for a 6-month ban
    from the work force against any foreign employee who leaves his job
    without fulfilling the terms of his contract.
        The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
    municipalities, and civil defense units enforce health and safety
    standards. The Government requires every large industrial concern to
    employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is
    entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not observed
    uniformly in the housing camps that are provided for foreign workers.
    Workers' jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what
    they consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of
    Labor and Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers who
    were dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the
    right to lodge grievances with Ministry officials, who make an effort
    to investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed
    and underbudgeted; complaints and compensation claims are backlogged.
        Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and
    ultimately to the courts. However, many workers choose not to protest
    for fear of reprisals or deportation. The press periodically carries
    reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at
    the hands of some employers. Allegations have included excessive work
    hours, nonpayment of wages, and verbal and physical abuse.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons, and there were reports that it occurred;
    however, child smuggling, prostitution, and pornography are crimes.
        South Asian boys, generally from Pakistan and Bangladesh, are
    smuggled into the country by small, organized groups to be used as
    camel jockeys. Some of the smuggled children reportedly are kidnaped
    from their families in South Asia, but some apparently are sold to the
    smugglers by their parents. Hundreds of underage camel jockeys
    currently work in the country, many of them in the Abu Dhabi Emirate.
    The largest camel-racing tracks (and associated stables and training
    facilities) are in Al-Ain and Ghantoot in Abu Dhabi. The gangs provide
    the stables with the youths, who generally are between the ages of 4
    and 10. In May local authorities, working on information provided by
    the Pakistani Embassy, broke up a smuggling ring involved in illegally
    transporting underage Pakistani boys into the country to work as camel
    jockeys. Local authorities prosecuted the foreign smugglers in this
    case; however, the authorities did not investigate the citizens
    involved in the scheme. In September the Abu Dhabi police took into
    protective custody and repatriated a 10-year-old Pakistani boy who
    allegedly had been kidnaped from his village in Pakistan and brought to
    the country to work as a camel jockey. In November the Abu Dhabi police
    rescued two young Pakistani boys, aged 4 and 6, from an Al-Ain camel
    farm where they had been forced to work as camel jockeys. The boys
    allegedly were kidnapped from Pakistan earlier in the year and
    transported illegally to the country through Iran on forged passports.
    Upon arrival in the country they reportedly were sold to a Pakistani
    agent for $5,500. In 1999 authorities, acting on information provided
    by the Pakistani Embassy, located and repatriated an 8-year-old
    Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped to work as a camel
    jockey. Also in 1999, a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh who had been
    used as a camel jockey was found wandering in the desert after being
    abandoned there by his handlers. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the
    hospitalization of a 5-year-old, 44-pound, abandoned Bangladeshi child
    who had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been broken by a camel
    (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
        In 1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age
    of 15 as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99
    pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these
    rules. However, few jockeys meet these requirements and relevant labor
    laws, while sometimes enforced against the criminal trafficking rings,
    are not invoked against those who own racing camels and employ the
    children, because such owners come from powerful local families that
    are in effect above the law (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
        Although no accurate statistics are available, substantial numbers
    of women appear to be arriving from the states of the former Soviet
    Union for temporary stays, during which they engage in prostitution and
    possibly other activities connected with organized crime. Substantial
    numbers of prostitutes also appear to come from Africa and Central and
    South Asia. While the vast majority of these women are in the country
    voluntarily, there are credible reports that some women from Central
    Europe and Central and South Asia, who are brought to the country for
    service sector employment, later are forced into prostitution. It is
    unclear whether this activity is conducted with the full knowledge of
    the women's citizen sponsors, or whether the women's generally
    noncitizen agents are exploiting the sponsorship system to engage in
    illicit activity (see Section 5).
        In May three Central European women claimed that they were
    recruited to come work in the country in the hotel business. However,
    upon their arrival, their local sponsor seized their passports and
    locked them in a villa with iron gates on the windows. The women claim
    that they then were forced to work as prostitutes. The three women
    eventually escaped and obtained protection at their country's embassy
    in Abu Dhabi. They remained under their embassy's protection for
    approximately 1 month, after which their passports were returned and
    they were permitted to depart the country.
        The Kazakhstan Government reported in June that it broke up a
    trafficking ring that specialized in sending women to the UAE for
    prostitution. Five member of the ring were arrested while trying to
    board a woman and a 15-year-old girl on a flight to Dubai.
                                   __________

                                     YEMEN

        The Republic of Yemen, comprising the former (northern) Yemen Arab
    Republic (YAR) and (southern) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
    (PDRY), was proclaimed in 1990. Following a brief but bloody civil war
    in mid-1994, the country was reunified under the Sana'a-based
    government. President Ali Abdullah Saleh is the leader of the General
    People's Congress (GPC), which dominates the Government. He was elected
    by the legislature to a 5-year term in 1994, and was elected to another
    5-year term in the country's first nationwide direct presidential
    election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. The
    Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote
    from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election
    was generally free and fair; however, there were some problems,
    including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In addition
    the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate because
    the candidate selected by the leftist opposition did not receive the
    minimum number of votes required to run from the GPC-dominated
    Parliament (the other opposition party chose not to run its own
    candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole
    opponent was a member of the GPC. The first Parliament elected by
    universal adult suffrage was convened in 1993. Parliamentary elections
    were held again in 1997, with the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP),
    formerly the main party of the PDRY and a previous coalition partner of
    the GPC, leading an opposition boycott. The GPC won an absolute
    majority in the 1997 Parliament, with the opposition Islamist and
    tribal Yemeni Grouping for Reform (Islaah) as the only other major
    party represented. International observers judged the elections as
    reasonably free and fair, while noting some problems with the voting.
    The Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
    authority, although it increasingly demonstrates independence from the
    Government. Real political power rests with the executive branch,
    particularly the President. The judiciary is nominally independent, but
    is weak and severely hampered by corruption, executive branch
    interference, and the frequent failure of the authorities to enforce
    judgments.
        The primary state security apparatus is the Political Security
    Organization (PSO), an independent agency that reports directly to the
    President. The Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the police
    reports to the Ministry of Interior and conducts most criminal
    investigations and makes most arrests. The Central Security
    Organization (CSO), also a part of the Ministry of Interior, maintains
    a paramilitary force. The civilian authorities do not maintain
    effective control of the security forces. Members of the security
    forces, particularly the PSO, committed numerous, serious human rights
    abuses.
        Yemen is a very poor country; about 40 percent of the population
    live in poverty. Its embryonic market-based economy, despite a major
    economic reform program, remains impeded by excessive government
    interference and widespread corruption. Its annual per capita gross
    national product (GNP) fell from $377 in 1997 to $342 in 1998, but rose
    to $368 in 1999. Agriculture accounts for approximately 22 percent of
    GNP, industry for approximately 27 percent, and services for
    approximately 51 percent. Oil is the primary source of foreign
    exchange. Other exports include fish, livestock, coffee, and
    detergents. Remittances from citizens working abroad (primarily in
    Saudi Arabia and other Arab Persian Gulf states) also are important.
    However, remittances were reduced sharply after Saudi Arabia and other
    Gulf states expelled up to 850,000 Yemeni workers during the Gulf War
    because of the Government's lack of support for the U.N. coalition. The
    Gulf states also suspended most assistance programs, and much Western
    aid was reduced. Foreign aid has begun to reemerge as an important
    source of income. The unemployment rate is estimated at 35 percent, and
    is highest in the southern governorates, where, prior to unity, most
    adults were employed by the PDRY Government.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
    some areas and continued to improve its human rights performance;
    however, its record was poor in several other areas, and serious
    problems remain. There are significant limitations on citizens' ability
    to change their government. Security forces committed a number of
    extrajudicial killings. Members of the security forces tortured and
    otherwise abused persons, and continued to arrest and detain citizens
    arbitrarily, especially oppositionists in the south and other persons
    regarded as ``secessionists.'' However, during the year, the Government
    issued directives intended to align the country's arrest,
    interrogation, and detention procedures more closely with
    internationally accepted standards, and such directives generally were
    implemented in practice. Prison conditions are poor, and some detainees
    were held in private prisons not authorized by the Government. However,
    during the year, with the cooperation of the Government, the
    International Committee of the Red Cross conducted a comprehensive
    inspection of the country's prisons. PSO officers have broad discretion
    over perceived national security issues. Despite constitutional
    constraints, security officers routinely monitor citizens' activities,
    search their homes, detain citizens for questioning, and mistreat
    detainees. The Government fails to hold members of the security forces
    accountable for abuses, and there were no convictions of security
    officials for abuses during the year. Prolonged pretrial detention is a
    serious problem, and judicial corruption, inefficiency, and executive
    interference undermine due process. The Government continued to
    implement a comprehensive long-term program for judicial reform. The
    law limits freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government
    frequently harassed, intimidated, and detained journalists. However,
    harassment of journalists lessened during the year. Nonetheless,
    journalists practice self-censorship. The Government at times limits
    freedom of assembly. The Government imposes some restrictions on
    freedom of religion, and places some limits on freedom of movement. The
    Government adopted measures to decentralize government authority by
    establishing locally elected governorate and district councils. In
    February the Government hosted a major symposium of the U.N. Commission
    on Human Rights (UNCHR), chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary
    Robinson, on the human rights aspects of international development. The
    Government displayed official receptiveness to and support for donor-
    funded democracy and human rights programs. Violence and discrimination
    against women are problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is
    practiced on a limited scale, primarily along the coastal areas of the
    Red Sea. Although the practice is discouraged publicly, the authorities
    do not prohibit it. There is some discrimination against the disabled.
    Discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities is a
    problem. The Government influences labor unions. Child labor is a
    problem.
        There was a significant decrease in the number of kidnapings of
    foreigners, which was at least in part the result of the Government's
    establishment of a special court to try kidnapers and other violent
    offenders. The campaign of bombings--the devices sometimes were little
    more than noise bombs--that had continued for several years,
    particularly in the southern governorates, appears to have abated,
    although there were a few explosions during the year. Observers
    attribute these bombings to tribal disputes, religious extremists, and
    antigovernment political groups based in the country and abroad.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed a number of extrajudicial killings. There were some reports
    during the year that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured
    persons whom they believed were engaging in criminal activity and
    resisting arrest.
        In May security forces killed Ghassan Qasim Mani, a student in Al-
    Dalah governorate, during a violent confrontation between security
    forces and armed citizens. Another student and four police officers
    were injured in the confrontation, which occurred while security
    officials were conducting a weapons search in the vicinity of Al-
    Jalilah.
        In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being detained in
    a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her family
    claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession of
    adultery. The director of Ibb security ordered that an autopsy be
    performed and called in the head of AlUdain's security office for
    questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she
    was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police
    custody. She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of
    complications during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The
    investigation concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section
    1.c.).
        One police officer was killed and eight others wounded after
    intervening to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in
    Aden governorate; several villagers were wounded, but none were
    reported killed. The circumstances of the police officer's death were
    unclear (see Section 1.f.).
        No security officials were tried or convicted for abuses during the
    year.
        In July 1999, a court in Tawila in Al-Mahweet governorate convicted
    the town's security chief and two police officers of first-degree
    murder for torturing to death a teenager taken into their custody on
    theft charges in March 1999. All three officials were fired. The
    security chief was sentenced to 10 years in jail and ordered to pay
    $19,000 (3,116,000 riyals) in compensation to the victim's family. The
    two police officers each were sentenced to 5 years in jail.
        There was credible evidence that security forces killed a prisoner
    in detention in late 1997 or early 1998. Wadia Al-Shaibani, a 22-year-
    old who was arrested in connection with the July 1997 bombings in Aden,
    apparently died after suffering a beating at the Soleyban police
    facility in Aden. Government authorities declined to investigate; they
    claimed that AlShaibani committed suicide. The Human Rights Committee
    of the Consultative Council (an advisory board to the President) in
    1998 investigated Al-Shaibani's death; however, it was unable to
    persuade the authorities to investigate the death or to bring charges
    against security officials.
        On October 12, terrorists in a small bomb-laden boat attacked the
    USS Cole, a U.S. naval ship, as it refueled in Aden harbor. The
    explosion killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 others. The investigation
    into the attack was ongoing, and 6 suspects were in custody at year's
    end.
        Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses,
    and the Government's ability to control tribal elements remained
    limited. In addition, tensions between the Government and various
    tribes periodically escalated into violent confrontations (see Section
    5).
        Persons continued to be killed and injured in unexplained bombings
    and shootings that occurred during the year. In most cases, it was
    impossible to determine who was responsible for such acts or why they
    occurred, and there were no claims of responsibility. The Government
    accused southern oppositionists of perpetrating some incidents, but the
    opposition denied any involvement. Some cases appeared to have
    criminal, religious, or political motives; others appeared to be cases
    of tribal revenge or land disputes. In June 1998, the President
    established a committee to study the phenomenon of revenge killings and
    to make recommendations on how to combat the problem. There was no news
    on the committee's work or its findings at year's end.
        In December 1998, a group of 16 Western tourists was kidnaped by
    terrorists in Abyan governorate near Mudiyah. The next day, government
    forces surrounded the area and attempted a rescue operation. Four of
    the hostages and three of the terrorists were killed. There were
    varying reports as to whether the government forces inadvertently
    killed any of the hostages in the crossfire. However, at least two
    apparently were shot deliberately by the kidnapers. The Government has
    stated that its decision to intervene was based on its belief that the
    hostages' lives were in immediate danger. The trial of the four
    surviving terrorists, including Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) leader
    Zein Al-Abidine Al-Mihdar (also known as Abu Hassan), began in January
    1999, and in May 1999 they all were found guilty. Abu Hassan, who
    during his trial publicly and repeatedly admitted to all charges
    against him, a second Yemeni, Abdallah Al-Jundaydi, and a Tunisian,
    were sentenced to death; the remaining defendant was sentenced to 20
    years' imprisonment. The Tunisian's sentence was commuted to 20 years'
    at the first appellate review, and the Supreme Court in October 1999
    commuted Al-Jundaydi's sentence to 20 years as well. Abu Hassan's death
    sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in October 1999 and approved
    by President Saleh. He was executed by firing squad on October 17,
    1999. There were no allegations of lack of due process in Abu Hassan's
    trial or during the subsequent appeal process. The trial of seven
    additional AAIA members on terrorism charges began in October 1999 and
    ended in June; the group's leader and a second defendant were convicted
    and received jail sentences of 7 and 3 years; the remaining five
    defendants were acquitted (see Section 1.e.).
        b. Disappearance.--Members of the security forces continue to
    arrest and detain citizens for varying periods of time without charge
    or notification to their families. Many detainees are associated with
    the YSP or other opposition parties and are accused of being
    ``secessionists.'' Such detentions are temporary; detainees typically
    are released within weeks or, at most, months. Those who are not
    released eventually are charged.
        In 1998 at the invitation of authorities, delegations from the
    UNHRC and Amnesty International visited the country to investigate the
    whereabouts of persons who have ``disappeared'' in custody since
    unification. In 1997 the Government had promised AI that it would look
    into 27 cases of persons who died after they reportedly ``disappeared''
    while in government custody during the violence associated with the
    civil war in 1994. In its follow-up report issued in July 1999, AI
    criticized the Government for not keeping this promise. The Government
    claims that it responded to AI and passed the results of its
    investigations to the UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was
    inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive action. Both the
    U.N. Committee on Disappearances and AI also continue to allege that
    there are hundreds of unresolved disappearances dating from the
    preunity period in the former PDRY, particularly from its 1986 civil
    war. The Government asserts that it cannot be held responsible for
    cases that took place within the former PDRY prior to unity; however,
    it has set up a computer database in the Ministry of Foreign Relations
    to track disappearances, including those dating from the preunity
    period. The Government states that the scarcity of records resulting
    from the country's lack of an effective national registry hindered its
    attempts during the year to create database files, especially for
    persons who disappeared in the PDRY in the 1970's. AI has received no
    credible reports of new disappearances in the last 6 years.
        Some tribes seek to bring their political and economic concerns to
    the attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding hostages.
    Foreign businessmen, diplomats, and tourists are the principal targets.
    During the year, eight foreigners were kidnaped (six men, one woman,
    and one child), as well as a much higher number of citizens. A total of
    159 foreigners have been kidnaped since 1992. The legal magazine Al-
    Qistas, in a 1998 study, found that Sana'a, Marib, and Shabwa are the
    areas in which a foreigner is most likely to be kidnaped. Kidnaping
    victims rarely are injured, and the authorities generally have been
    successful in obtaining the negotiated release of foreign hostages.
    However, in June a Norwegian diplomat on vacation was killed near
    Sana'a during an exchange of fire between checkpoint police and his
    abductors.
        There has been a marked decline in tribal kidnapings of foreigners,
    from 13 cases involving 41 persons in 1997 to 10 cases involving 27
    persons in 1998 to 9 cases involving 21 persons in 1999 to 6 cases
    involving 8 persons during the year. Kidnapings had been a persistent
    problem in the past, due to the judiciary's frequent failure to impose
    sentences against accused kidnapers because some persons linked to
    kidnapings were members of prominent tribes or had links with such
    tribes. In most cases, the kidnapings were settled out of court, with
    no suspects facing trial; however, this practice has changed. In August
    1998, the Government issued by presidential decree a law that
    stipulated severe punishments up to and including capital punishment
    for persons involved in kidnaping, ``carjacking,'' attacking oil
    pipelines, and other acts of banditry and sabotage. In October 1999,
    the Government announced the establishment of a special court in Sana'a
    to implement this law and created a special prosecutor to investigate
    and try those charged under its provisions. In May the court sentenced
    an individual who had kidnaped three German tourists in November 1999
    to 12 years in jail. In June the kidnaper of an American in 1997, and
    later a group of European tourists, received a 20-year sentence; in
    July two additional kidnapers received 15-year jail sentences. The
    arrests, trials, and convictions continue. The Government's prosecution
    of persons charged with kidnaping appears to have had a deterrent
    effect. There were no reports of tribal opposition or interference in
    the arrests or the judicial process connected with these cases.
        c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of cruel
    or inhuman punishment; however, members of the security forces tortured
    and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting authorities are
    known to use force during interrogations, especially against those
    arrested for violent crimes. Detainees sometimes are confined in leg-
    irons and shackles, despite the passage of a law in 1998 outlawing this
    practice.
        The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture takes place
    but has claimed that the use of torture is not government policy.
    Nevertheless, the Government has not taken effective steps to end the
    practice or to punish those who commit such abuses. A government
    prosecutor has cited illiteracy and lack of training among police and
    security officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of undue
    force in prisons; a human rights activist has suggested that corruption
    and pressure from superiors to produce convictions also plays a role.
    The immunity of all public employees from prosecution for crimes
    allegedly committed while on duty also hinders accountability;
    prosecutors must obtain permission from the Attorney General to
    investigate members of the security forces, and the head of the Appeals
    Court formally must lift their immunity before they are tried. Low
    salaries for police officers, about $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals)
    per month, also contribute to corruption and police abuse.
        In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being detained in
    a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her family
    claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession of
    adultery. The director of Ibb security directed that an autopsy be
    performed and called in the head of Al-Udain's security office for
    questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she
    was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police
    custody. She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of
    complications during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The
    investigation concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section
    1.a.).
        In July 1999, a court convicted three security force officials of
    murder for torturing a teenager to death (see Section 1.a.); however,
    there were no reported convictions of security officers for abuses
    during the year. In February Major Hisham Al-Ghazali, the most senior
    of three CID officials convicted of torture in 1998, was reassigned to
    investigative duties. Abdullah Al-Qaradi, the prosecutor for
    investigation and security for Sana'a governorate, objected to the
    reassignment, but he was overruled by the CID's Director General,
    Hussein Ali Haitham.
        In April 1999, Sana'a municipality police arrested Naji Saleh Al-
    Khowlani for his alleged involvement in a car theft ring. Al-Khowlani
    was held for 2 months, during which time prison officials reportedly
    tortured him during regular nightly interrogation sessions in which
    officials would attempt to elicit a confession and extract information
    by burning him with a cigarette lighter. A medical report documented
    burn marks and other injuries on Al-Khowlani's body. No action was
    taken during the year to investigate this case.
        The trial of seven alleged members of the AAIA on terrorism
    charges, which began in October 1999, ended in June. The group's
    leader, Saleh Haidara Al-Atwi, and another defendant, Haidara Nasser
    Al-Mashraqi, were sentenced to 7 and 3 years in prison, respectively.
    The remaining five defendants were acquitted. Two of the defendants
    were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the prosecution coerced and
    tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions
    (see Section 1.e.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the
    publication of details about the trial.
        The eight Britons and two Algerians convicted in Aden in August
    1999 of possession of illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to
    commit terrorist acts in Aden claimed during their trial during the
    year that they had been tortured; two claimed that they had been abused
    sexually (see Section 1.e.).
        In 1998 several individuals on trial in Aden in connection with a
    series of bombings in 1997 testified publicly that they had been
    tortured. One defendant claimed that he had been raped while in
    custody. There is credible evidence that one other person arrested in
    connection with the same bombings died as a result of beatings
    inflicted by security officials. According to eyewitnesses who also
    claimed to have been tortured, Wadia Al-Shaibani was beaten first in a
    criminal security office in Aden, then transferred to the Soleyban
    police facility, where he was tortured to death (see Section 1.a.). No
    charges have been filed against security officials.
        In a related case in 1998 in which 31 persons were accused of
    conspiracy in Mahra governorate in 1997, several of the suspects
    claimed that they had confessed only because they had been tortured.
    Defense attorneys asserted the existence of films that would prove
    their clients' allegations that they had been beaten, and asked the
    judge to view the films. The judge denied this request. In late October
    1998, the court sentenced three of the defendants to death, found one
    innocent, and sentenced the others to jail for periods ranging from 6
    to 10 years.
        The Constitution may be interpreted as permitting amputations in
    accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). There have been no reports of
    amputations since 1991. However, a small number of persons who have
    been found guilty of theft and sentenced to amputation remain in jail
    awaiting the implementation of their sentences. The Shari'a-based law
    permits physical punishment such as flogging for some crimes. For
    example, in July two individuals convicted of kidnaping were sentenced
    to 80 lashes (the penalty for the consumption of alcohol) in addition
    to a period of imprisonment because they had been intoxicated during
    the commission of their crime. In Ibb governorate in January, Mohamed
    Tahbit Al-Su'mi, after being tried and convicted, was stoned to death
    for the 1992 rape and murder of his 12-year-old daughter. Capital
    punishment usually is carried out by firing squad; stoning is almost
    unheard of, but was approved in this case due to the unusual brutality
    of the crime. In rare cases involving particularly egregious crimes,
    such as the rape and murder of children, the law permits the ritual
    display in public of the bodies of executed criminals. The ostensible
    purpose of this practice is to demonstrate to the families of victims
    that justice has been served and to prevent blood feuds between tribes.
        Police used excessive force in September when they intervened to
    settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
        Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, causing
    numerous deaths and injuries (see Section 5).
        Prison conditions are poor and do not meet internationally
    recognized minimum standards. Prisons are overcrowded, sanitary
    conditions are poor, and food and health care are inadequate. Inmates
    depend on relatives for food and medicine. Many inmates lack mattresses
    or bedding. Prison authorities often exact money from prisoners and
    refuse to release prisoners until family members pay a bribe. Tribal
    leaders misuse the prison system by placing ``problem'' tribesmen in
    jail, either to punish them for noncriminal indiscretions or to protect
    them from retaliation or violence motivated by revenge. Refugees,
    persons with mental problems, and illegal immigrants sometimes are
    arrested without charge and placed in prisons with common criminals.
        Conditions are equally poor in women's prisons, in which children
    likely are to be incarcerated along with their mothers. By custom and
    preference, babies born in prison generally remain in prison with their
    mothers. Female prisoners sometimes are subjected to sexual harassment
    and violent interrogation by male police and prison officials. The law
    requires male members of the families of female prisoners to arrange
    their release; however, female prisoners regularly are held in jail
    past the expiration of their sentences because their male relatives
    refuse to authorize their release due to the shame associated with
    their alleged behavior. The Government's Supreme National Committee for
    Human Rights, working with the National Women's Committee, has
    developed a plan to establish a shelter in Sana'a that would house 50
    of these abandoned women and provide them with vocational education.
    The committee is seeking donor assistance and hopes to establish
    additional shelters in other governorates.
        Unauthorized ``private'' prisons are a problem. Most such prisons
    are in rural areas controlled by tribes, and many are simply a room in
    a tribal sheikh's house. Persons detained in such prisons often are
    held for strictly personal or tribal reasons and without trial or
    sentencing. There are credible reports of the existence of private
    prisons in government installations, although these prisons are not
    sanctioned by senior officials. In July Mohamed Naji Alao, a
    parliamentarian and founder of the human rights NGO the Organization
    for the Defense of Human Rights, discovered that several private
    prisons were being operated at government facilities in Sana'a. He
    reported them to the President, who immediately ordered the unlawful
    prisons closed, and the offenders arrested. In April 1999, the chairman
    of the Sana'a governorate prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba,
    inspected several illegal prisons operated by the Sana'a governor's
    office and sent his findings to the Attorney General. According to Al-
    Shaiba's findings, 19 individuals had been imprisoned beyond their
    legal sentence; several prisoners were being detained in handcuffs
    illegally; numerous individuals were being detained illegally in
    connection with civil or commercial cases or because they had disobeyed
    a tribal sheikh; and 43 persons from one region (Shibam Al-Gharas) were
    being detained on the same charge (shooting at a truck). Al-Shaiba
    informed the Attorney General that he had requested then-Sana'a
    governor Naji Al-Sufi to release the illegally imprisoned individuals,
    but that the governor had taken no action. Later that year, Al-Shaiba
    reported being harassed by then-governor Al-Sufi. The Attorney General
    took no action on the findings of the inspection report. Al-Shaiba took
    a voluntary leave of absence from his post, and eventually left the
    country. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post in October 1999, but
    was never charged with a crime (see Section 1.e.).
        During the year, the Government issued directives intended to align
    the country's arrest, interrogation, and detention procedures more
    closely with internationally accepted standards. For example, the
    Ministry of Interior created new detention/interrogation centers in
    each governorate (including four in Sana'a), to prevent suspects from
    being detained with convicted criminals. The Government also formally
    instructed police and prison officials that detainees be provided
    adequate food, that prisoners be released upon completion of their
    sentences, and that juveniles (with the exception of those convicted of
    murder) be incarcerated in facilities separated from adults. In
    addition, the Government created a female police force and developed
    regulatory guidance for their activities to better respond to the needs
    of female prisoners and female victims of crimes. The Government's
    directives generally were implemented in practice.
        In January the Government's Supreme National Committee for Human
    Rights led a government initiative to establish and finance, along with
    private sector contributions, a special ``charity fund'' to be used to
    enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal or Islamic
    law, were being held in prison pending payment of restitution to their
    victims, despite having completed their sentences. The President
    celebrated the Islamic holy month of Ramadan by appointing a high-level
    interministerial committee, chaired by the Minister of Interior, to
    inspect all major prisons in the country, both to identify prisoners
    whom the fund could help and to investigate conditions. The inspection
    committee immediately released persons being held illegally, developed
    recommendations for reform, and arranged for the eventual release of
    over 1,000 prisoners who had been held beyond their sentences (in
    violation of the law) until they could pay restitution. The Human
    Rights Committee of the Consultative Council continued to conduct spot
    checks of prisons and to arrange for the expeditious release of persons
    held improperly.
        The Government tightly controls access to detention facilities by
    NGO's, although it sometimes permits local and international human
    rights monitors access to persons accused of crimes. During the year,
    the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the
    Government's full cooperation, conducted a comprehensive inspection of
    the country's major prisons. While serious problems remain, the ICRC
    acknowledged the Government's commitment to penal reform and noted that
    the Government had made significant improvements since the last ICRC
    inspection (in 1995), especially with regard to the incarceration of
    mentally ill persons.
        The PSO does not permit access to its detention centers.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides due
    process safeguards; however, security forces arbitrarily arrest and
    detain persons. Enforcement of the law is irregular and in some cases
    nonexistent, particularly in cases involving security offenses.
    According to the law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of
    arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney must inform
    the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide whether detention is
    required. In no case may a detainee be held longer than 7 days without
    a court order. Despite these constitutional and other legal provisions,
    arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge are common
    practices. In April Parliament passed a new Police Law, which
    established the mandate, duties, and procedures for police. Draft
    provisions would have permitted police to conduct searches without a
    warrant and to open fire on gatherings of five or more persons if
    police suspected imminent violence or criminal activity. Following a
    campaign by human rights organizations, opposition political parties,
    and the press, Parliament amended the law to remove the provisions.
        In September forces from the CSO used excessive force in attacking
    the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate, reportedly arresting 30
    persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.)
        During the year, journalists continued to be detained briefly for
    questioning concerning articles that they wrote that were critical of
    the Government or that the Government considered sensitive (see Section
    2.a.). However, there was a significant decrease in the number of such
    incidents from the previous year.
        The law provides detainees with the right to inform their families
    of their arrests and to decline to answer questions without an attorney
    present. There are provisions for bail. In practice many authorities
    abide by these provisions only if bribed.
        Defense lawyers claimed that the eight Britons and two Algerians
    arrested in December 1998 for possessing illegal weapons and explosives
    and conspiring to commit terrorist acts in Aden (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.e.) were denied their right to legal counsel. They also contended
    that defense doctors were not permitted to examine their clients in
    order to investigate allegations of torture and sexual abuse. Several
    months after the defense's request, the Government arranged for an
    independent physician to examine those arrested; however, it did not
    allow the defense to observe the examination and did not provide a
    report. The trial concluded in August 1999, although according to the
    law, the violation of the right to counsel should have suspended the
    case. The court sentenced the main suspects to jail terms of 7 and 3
    years, respectively. Five other defendants received jail terms ranging
    from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict. Two of
    the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released for
    time served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered released
    for time served. The three returned to the United Kingdom in October
    1999.
        Citizens regularly complained that security officials did not
    observe due process procedures when arresting and detaining suspects,
    particularly those accused of involvement in political violence. There
    also were complaints that private individuals hired lower-level
    security officials to intervene on their behalf and harass their
    business rivals. Security forces sometimes detained demonstrators (see
    Section 2.b.). In August 1999, then-governor of Sana'a Naji Al-Sufi
    reportedly ordered the arrest of Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing
    the opposing party in a case involving one of the governor's friends.
    In September 1999, he illegally detained judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a
    member of the Sana'a appeals court, for 2 days (see Section 1.e.). The
    governor was relieved of his post in October 1999.
        In cases where a criminal suspect is at large, security forces
    sometimes detain a relative while the suspect is being sought. The
    detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate
    compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the
    court system, commonly is used to settle cases.
        The Government has failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners
    are incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. The Ministry
    of Interior and the PSO operate extrajudicial detention facilities. A
    large percentage of the total prison population consists of pretrial
    detainees. There have been allegations that a large number of persons
    have been imprisoned for years without documentation concerning charges
    against them, their trials, or their sentences.
        Aziz Mohamed Musaid, who was arrested in Taiz in September 1998 and
    charged with intent to commit adultery, has not yet been brought to
    trial and remains in prison because the presiding judge, Abdul Jabar
    Taha Al-Kharasani, has refused to adjudicate the case. The charges did
    not appear to be supported by solid evidence, and the local press has
    characterized Al-Kharasani as corrupt. In October 1999, Al-Kharasani
    was ordered by the Minister of Interior to turn over his cases,
    including Musaid's, to another judge, but he has refused to do so.
        While some cases of those being held without charge have been
    redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups and
    government inspection missions (and some illegally detained prisoners
    released), the authorities have not investigated or resolved these
    cases adequately.
        Unauthorized, private prisons also exist in tribal areas in which
    the Government does not exercise authority effectively. Persons
    detained in these prisons often are held for strictly personal reasons
    and without trial or sentencing (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
        The Government does not use forced exile. However, at the end of
    the 1994 civil war, the Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior
    leaders of the armed, secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY)
    who fled abroad. Although they were not forced into exile, they are
    subject to arrest if they return. The trial of the so-called ``16''
    concluded in March 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    ``autonomous'' judiciary and independent judges; however, the judiciary
    is not fully independent, and is weak and severely hampered by
    corruption, executive branch interference, and the frequent failure of
    the authorities to enforce judgments. Judges are appointed by the
    executive branch, and some have been harassed, reassigned, or removed
    from office following rulings against the Government. For example,
    there were credible reports that in 1999 thengovernor of Sana'a Naji
    Al-Sufi repeatedly interfered with and attempted to intimidate members
    of the judiciary, including by assaulting a defense lawyer, detaining
    at least two judges, and harassing the chairman of Sana'a governorate's
    prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, after Al-Shaiba reported to
    the Attorney General that the governor's office was running illegal
    prisons (see Section 1.c.). Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post
    in October 1999, but no legal action was taken against him. Al-Shaiba
    has left the country. Many litigants maintain, and the Government
    acknowledges, that a judge's social ties and susceptibility to bribery
    sometimes have greater influence on the verdict than the law or the
    facts of the case. Many judges are poorly trained, and some closely
    associated with the Government often render decisions favorable to it.
    The judiciary is hampered further by the Government's frequent
    reluctance to enforce judgments. Tribal elements sometimes threaten and
    harass members of the judiciary. For example, in August members of the
    Bani Dhubian tribe kidnaped judge Abdu Rahman Abu Taleb, who was
    presiding over a land dispute case involving the tribe.
        There are five types of courts: Criminal; civil and personal status
    (for example, divorce and inheritance); kidnaping/terrorism;
    commercial; and court martial.
        All laws are codified from Shari'a, under which there are no jury
    trials. Criminal cases are adjudicated by a judge, who plays an active
    role in questioning witnesses and the accused. Under the Constitution
    and by law, the Government must provide attorneys for indigent
    defendants; however, in practice this never occurs. Despite a
    stipulation that the Government provide (and fund) legal aid to
    indigent defendants, the law does not explicitly prohibit trying
    criminal defendants without a lawyer, and the judicial budget currently
    does not allow for defense attorneys. Judges sometimes ``appoint''
    attorneys present in their courtrooms to represent indigent defendants;
    however, such attorneys are not required legally to take the case,
    although most accept in order to avoid displeasing judges before whom
    they must appear later.
        By law prosecutors are a part of the judiciary and independent of
    the Government; however, in practice prosecutors look upon themselves
    as an extension of the police. They do not receive the normal judicial
    training that judges do, nor do they practice their legal obligation to
    prosecute police who delay reporting arrests and detentions.
        Defense attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients, address the
    court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those in commercial
    courts, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials are public;
    however, all courts may conduct closed sessions ``for reasons of public
    security or morals.'' Foreign litigants in commercial disputes have
    complained of biased rulings. However, some foreign companies have won
    cases against local defendants, and some such decisions have been
    enforced.
        In addition to regular courts, the law permits a system of tribal
    adjudication for noncriminal issues, although in practice tribal
    ``judges'' often adjudicate criminal cases as well. The results of such
    mediation carry the same if not greater weight as court judgments.
    Persons jailed under the tribal system usually are not charged formally
    with a crime but stand publicly accused of their transgression.
        Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges working in
    southern Yemen were women. However, after the 1994 civil war,
    conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female
    judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although several female
    judges continue to practice in Aden, there are no female judges in
    northern courts.
        The Government continued the program it began in late 1997 to
    reform the judiciary. This comprehensive, long-term reform program is
    intended to improve the operational efficiency and statutory
    independence of the judiciary by placing reform-minded personnel into
    the courts; forming an inter-ministerial council to oversee the reform
    project; publishing a judicial code of ethics; and making the Supreme
    Court smaller, more efficient, and less corrupt. Foreign donors have
    offered to provide assistance in implementing judicial reform, which
    the Government has accepted. While the program has not yet been
    completed, some attorneys cite improvements, including a reduction in
    the number of Supreme Court justices from 90 to 40, an increase in
    judges' salaries in order to deter corruption, an increase in the
    Ministry of Justice's budget, and participation by judges in workshops
    and study tours conducted by foreign judicial officials. However, the
    reform program's effect is not yet clear. In October 1999, the
    Government established a special court to try persons charged with
    kidnaping, ``carjacking,'' attacking oil pipelines and other acts of
    banditry and sabotage (see Section 1.b.). Several persons tried in this
    special court have received lengthy jail sentences, which appears to
    have had a deterrent effect on tribal kidnapings.
        In February 1999, a U.N. Development Program (UNDP) team visited
    the country to conduct an assessment that would serve as the basis of a
    second judicial reform program, which was scheduled to begin in January
    and end in 2002. In March 1999, the team noted the Government's
    willingness to address long-standing issues of accountability and
    transparency, and to implement laws more effectively. The program's
    goals are to modernize Ministry of Justice equipment, improve the
    country's legal libraries, provide special training for the Attorney
    General's office, enhance public awareness of the rule of law, and
    secure a building for the Supreme Court. The UNDP continues to seek
    donor funding for the program.
        Another judicial reform program, financed by international
    assistance, was initiated in January and is to last through March 2002.
    The program focuses on the Ministries of Justice and of Legal and
    Parliamentary Affairs and is to provide training in business and
    commercial law for judges; a diagnostic study of judicial education
    curriculum; training on drafting of legislation; and a review of the
    country's commercial laws to identify and fix gaps or inconsistencies.
    The program is ongoing.
        The security services continued to arrest and prosecutors charge
    and try persons alleged to be linked to various shootings, explosions,
    bombings, and other acts of violence. Citizens and human rights groups
    alleged that the judiciary did not observe due process standards in
    these cases.
        Eight Britons and two Algerians who were arrested in December 1998
    were tried from February to August 1999 in Aden on charges of
    possessing illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit
    terrorist acts. The 6-month trial did not meet minimum international
    standards for due process. Defense lawyers claimed that the prosecution
    lacked adequate evidence, and that the defendants were tortured,
    sexually abused, and denied access to their lawyers (see Section 1.c.).
    In August 1999, the court sentenced the main suspects, the 18-year-old
    stepson and 17-year-old son of Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri, to
    jail terms of 7 and 3 years, respectively. The Government has accused
    Al-Masri, head of the London-based organization Supporters of Shari'a,
    of involvement with the AAIA, which has carried out at least one fatal
    terrorist act in Yemen. Five other defendants received jail terms
    ranging from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict.
    Two of the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released
    for time served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered
    released for time served in early summer 1999. Their release was
    delayed because both the defense and the prosecution appealed the
    verdicts. The Appeals Court upheld the verdicts, and the three were
    released. They returned to the United Kingdom in October 1999.
        The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges,
    which began in October 1999, ended in June. Two were found guilty and
    given jail sentences; the remaining five were acquitted. Two of the
    defendants were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the prosecution
    coerced and tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and
    confessions (see Section 1.c.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting
    the publication of details about the trial.
        The Government claims that it does not hold political prisoners.
    Local opposition politicians and human rights activists generally
    accept this claim; however, some international human rights groups and
    members of the opposition-in-exile dispute the claim.
        At the end of the 1994 civil war, the President pardoned nearly all
    who had fought against the central Government, including military
    personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. The Government
    denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the DRY (one of whom
    now is presumed dead), who fled abroad. The DRY leaders are subject to
    arrest if they return. In 1997 and 1998, the so-called ``16'' were
    tried in absentia on various charges, including forming a secessionist
    government, conspiracy, and forming a separate military. All but two
    were found guilty, and in March 1998, a judge sentenced five of the
    defendants to death and 3 to 10 years in jail. Six persons received
    suspended sentences, and two were acquitted. Many opposition figures
    have urged the President to issue an amnesty for those who received
    sentences, in the interest of promoting reconciliation between the
    north and south. The President has stated that it is up to the judicial
    system to pass judgment. Defense attorneys have appealed to a higher
    court, but no judgment has yet been rendered.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--Despite constitutional provisions against government
    interference with privacy, security forces routinely search homes and
    private offices, monitor telephones, read personal mail, and otherwise
    intrude into personal matters for alleged security reasons. Such
    activities are conducted without legally issued warrants or judicial
    supervision. Security forces regularly monitor telephone conversations
    and interfere with the telephone service of government critics and
    opponents. Security forces sometimes detain relatives of suspects (see
    Section 1.d.). Government informers monitor meetings and assemblies
    (see Section 2.b.).
        The law prohibits arrests or the serving of a subpoena between the
    hours of sundown and dawn. However, persons suspected of crimes
    sometimes are taken from their homes in the middle of the night,
    without search warrants.
        In September forces from the CSO used excessive force when they
    intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in the
    Buraiqah district of Aden governorate. The dispute was between a
    businessman, who claimed to have purchased land in the adjacent
    mountains where he had built a quarry, and armed villagers, who claimed
    that they, not the Government, owned the land and were due
    compensation. During an initial confrontation, one police officer was
    killed and eight others wounded; several villagers were wounded, but
    none were reported killed. The circumstances of the police officer's
    death were unclear. In response, CSU forces charged the village,
    reportedly arresting 30 persons, mistreating citizens, looting and
    destroying houses, and leaving 200 families homeless.
        Jews traditionally face social (but not legal) restrictions on
    their residence and their employment (see Section 5).
        According to a 1995 Ministry of Interior regulation, no citizen may
    marry a foreigner without Interior Ministry permission (see Section 5).
    This regulation does not carry the force of law, and appears to be
    enforced irregularly. However, some human rights groups have raised
    concerns about the regulation.
        An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371 persons
    subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on
    Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
    costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the
    Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
    provider. According to Teleyemen (see Section 2.a.), the Government
    blocks sexually explicit web sites; however, with the exception of
    mowj.com, which is the web site of the Yemeni National Opposition Front
    (MOWJ), it does not block politically oriented web sites. For example,
    Abu Hamza's web page (see Section 1.e.) is not blocked. The Government
    claims that it does not monitor Internet usage, but some persons
    suspect their e-mail messages are read by security authorities. There
    have been no reports that the Government has taken action against
    Internet users.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution restricts freedom
    of speech and of the press ``within the limits of the law,'' and the
    Government influences the media and limits press freedom. Some security
    officials attempt to influence press coverage by threatening,
    harassing, and detaining journalists. Although most citizens are
    uninhibited in their private discussions of domestic and foreign
    policies, some are cautious in public, fearing harassment for criticism
    of the Government. The Penal Code criminalizes, with fines and up to 5
    years in jail, ``the humiliation of the State, the Cabinet, or
    parliamentary institutions,'' the publication of ``false information''
    that ``threatens public order or the public interest,'' and ``false
    stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their
    relations with Yemen.''
        The relative freedom of the press permitted between unification
    (1990) and the civil war (1994) has not been reestablished. An
    atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party
    journals continues at a higher level than before the civil war. The
    international human rights group the Committee to Protect Journalists
    continued to criticize the Government for restrictions, harassment, and
    arbitrary detention directed at journalists.
        The Ministry of Information influences the media by its control of
    most printing presses, by subsidies to certain newspapers, and by its
    ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets. Only one
    newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owns its own
    press. The Government selects the items to be covered in news
    broadcasts, and often does not permit broadcast reporting critical of
    the Government. However, during the 1999 presidential election
    campaign, the media extensively covered both candidates and reported in
    full the many critical comments made by the President's opponent. The
    Government televises parliamentary debates but may edit them
    selectively to remove criticism.
        In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the 1990 Press
    Law. The new regulations specify that newspapers must apply annually to
    the Government for licensing renewal, and that they must show
    continuing evidence of about $4,375 (700,000 riyals) in operating
    capital. Some journalists welcomed the new regulations, saying that
    they were long overdue. Others claimed that they were designed to drive
    some opposition newspapers out of business.
        Although newspapers ostensibly are permitted to criticize the
    Government, journalists sometimes censor themselves, especially when
    writing on such sensitive issues as government policies toward the
    southern governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other foreign
    governments, and official corruption. The penalties for exceeding these
    self-imposed limits can be arrest for libel, dismissal from employment,
    or extrajudicial harassment. Editors-in-chief legally are responsible
    for everything printed in their newspapers, regardless of authorship.
    Some journalists reported being threatened by security officials to
    change the tone and substance of their reporting. Journalists must have
    a permit to travel abroad, although there were no reports that this
    restriction was enforced during the year (see Section 2.d.).
        During the year, journalists continued to be detained for
    questioning for short periods of time for writing articles that were
    critical of the Government or that the Government considered sensitive
    subjects, primarily issues involving Saudi Arabia. However, there was a
    decline in the number of such incidents from the previous year, and
    most individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate agree
    that extralegal governmental harassment is less of a problem now than
    it was in the recent past. Some journalists claim that most harassment
    now comes from the police, in particular the CID, and no longer the
    PSO. Cases and ongoing trials involving journalists often are not
    resolved formally, but rather are settled through unofficial agreements
    between the Government and the journalists.
        Two cases during the year involved articles that criticized the
    Government of Saudi Arabia. In February the Ministry of Information
    filed a lawsuit against Dr. Qasim Sallam, the secretary general of the
    opposition Arab Socialist Baath Party, and the party's newspaper, Al-
    Ihya Al-Arabi, for an article Sallam wrote entitled ``The Danger-dom of
    Saudi Arabia,'' which alleged that there were supporters of Israel in
    the Saudi leadership. The case was pending at year's end. In August
    1999, Jamal Ahmed Amer, a journalist for Al-Wahdawi newspaper and
    member of the opposition Nasserist Party, was detained and held
    incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article critical of Yemeni-
    Saudi relations. Al-Wahdawi's editor, Abdelaziz Sultan, also was called
    in for questioning. In February Amer was tried and found guilty of
    ``harming national interests'' and ``publishing an article not based on
    accurate documents.'' The judge suspended publication of Al-Wahdawi for
    1 month, banned Amer from practicing journalism for 1 year, and fined
    Amer $31 (5,000 riyals). The editors of Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-Arabi
    claimed that the actions taken against them by the Ministry of
    Information were a direct result of pressure by the Government of Saudi
    Arabia. Amer's lawyer appealed the case, which was pending at year's
    end. Amer continued to write for another newspaper, Al-Usbu'. He has
    filed a suit against the Minister of Interior; this suit also was
    pending at year's end.
        In March Ali Al-Sarari, editor-in-chief of the YSP newspaper
    AlThawri, received a suspended 3-month prison sentence for publishing a
    story alleging that two soldiers were being held in the Mukallah
    prosecutors office on attempted rape charges. The Government claimed
    that the story was published to inflame north-south tensions.
        Also in March, a Sana'a court dismissed the cases brought against
    the Ministry of Information by the opposition Islaah, YSP, and
    Nasserist parties. The parties had claimed that the official media had
    neglected to broadcast the final communiques issued at the conclusion
    of their party meetings and conferences in violation of the
    Constitution's provision of equal media time for all political parties.
    The official media provides extensive coverage of the GPC.
        In May a CID officer destroyed journalist Khaled Al-Hammadi's
    camera as he attempted to photograph a student demonstration at Sana'a
    University, despite the fact that he had received permission to cover
    the event.
        Also in May, Hisham Ba Sharahil, the editor of Al-Ayyam, was
    charged with ``instigating the use of force and terrorism'' and
    ``publishing false information'' for publishing an interview with
    Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri (see Section 1.e.) in August 1999.
    He also was charged with ``insulting public institutions'' for
    publishing an article critical of the Director of Aden Security. The
    trial was suspended to allow Ba Sharahil to undergo medical treatment.
    In February Ba Sharahil also was called in for questioning in
    connection with an article published in Al-Ayyam criticizing the Aden
    municipal government's allowing the destruction of a building that once
    had been a synagogue. He again was called in for question in April
    following publication in Al-Ayyam of a letter of support for Ba
    Sharahil in his dispute with the Director of Aden Security from the
    secessionist Movement of Self-Determination for South Arabia (HATAM).
        In June Al-Tajammu newspaper and its editor in chief, Abdulrahman
    Abdullah, were tried for an article published in November 1999, which
    accused the Supreme Court of corruption. Abdullah received a 6-month
    suspended sentence, and the newspaper was fined.
        In July security officials detained a journalist for Al-Balagh
    newspaper for 6 days for reporting that an Iraqi teacher had raped six
    female students in Amran governorate's College of Education. The story
    turned out to be false, and the newspaper later apologized for
    circulating it. Also in July, security officials harassed the
    correspondents of the London-based Arabic Sayyidaty and the United Arab
    Emirates-based Sahrat Al-Khalij magazines when they tried to report on
    alleged serial killings at Sana'a University's medical school (see
    Section 5).
        In August Saif Al-Hadhri, the editor in chief of Al-Shumu
    newspaper, was convicted of libel in connection with a series of
    articles reporting high-level corruption in the Ministries of
    Electricity, Agriculture, Education and Finance. The judge fined Al-
    Hadhri $437 (70,000 riyals) and suspended him for 7 months. Al-Hadhri
    also was ordered to pay the Minister and Deputy Minister of Education's
    legal fees and $12,500 (2 million riyals) in compensation. Al-Hadhri
    appealed the judgment, and the case was pending at year's end. In July
    Al-Hadhri was abducted from his office for 1 day by 30 armed men, whom
    he claimed were security officials.
        In February 1999, the Ministry of Information closed Al-Shoura, the
    newspaper of the Islamist opposition party Union of Popular Forces
    (UPF), as well as a new, competing version of the same newspaper. The
    second version of Al-Shoura appeared following an ideological split in
    the UPF. Under the Press Law, it is illegal for more than one newspaper
    to use the same name. Some journalists allege that the Government
    financed the second Al-Shoura in order to create a pretext to shut down
    the outspokenly critical original Al-Shoura. A court allowed the
    original Al-Shoura to resume publication and upheld the suspension of
    the second Al-Shoura, but an appeals court later ordered the original
    newspaper to cease publication pending the Supreme Court's decision as
    to which faction had the right to Al-Shoura's name. The original Al-
    Shoura resumed publication in August.
        In August 1999, journalist and lawyer Nabil Al-Amoudi was brought
    before the Abyan preliminary court for writing an article critical of
    the Government and the human rights situation in the country. The case
    still was pending at year's end.
        In August 1999, security officials detained Jamil Al-Samit, a
    journalist for the Taiz-based official newspaper Al-Jumhurriyah, for
    writing an article about the use of excessive force by the military in
    putting down a civilian protest in the village of Quradah. He was
    detained in prison for several weeks.
        The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the press and
    publicizes human rights concerns. For example in September it sponsored
    a symposium on the media and human rights. Critics claim that the
    Syndicate is ineffective because it has too many nonjournalist members
    who support government policy. In 1999 several independent and
    opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the Committee for
    the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of Hisham Ba Sharahil,
    the publisher of Al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more vigorously
    journalists harassed by the Government.
        Customs officials confiscate foreign publications regarded as
    pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political
    content. In April PSO officials in Taiz detained Faysal Said Fara'a,
    the director of a private cultural center, for a day of questioning
    following his alleged receipt of banned books dealing with the
    opposition. There were no reports during the year that the Ministry of
    Information delayed the distribution of international Arabic-language
    dailies in an effort to decrease their sales in the country, as had
    occurred in previous years. However, authorities monitor foreign
    publications, banning those that they deem harmful to national
    interests. For example in April the owner of a Sana'a bookstore was
    arrested by the PSO for selling banned copies of an edition of the
    London-based Arabic magazine Al-Magalah, which featured a cover story
    on President Saleh's son Ahmed, the Commander of the Republican Guard.
        An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture to
    publish a book. Most books are approved, but the process is time-
    consuming for the author. The author must submit copies of the book to
    the Ministry. Officials at the National Library must read and endorse
    the text. It is then submitted to a special committee for final
    approval. If a book is not deemed appropriate for publication, the
    Ministry simply does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do not
    deal with an author who has not yet obtained a permit.
        An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371 persons
    subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on
    Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
    costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the
    Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
    provider. With the exception of mowj.com, the web site of the Yemeni
    National Opposition Front, the Government does not block politically
    oriented web sites (see Section 1.f.).
        Academic freedom is restricted somewhat because of the extreme
    politicization of university campuses. A majority of professors and
    students align themselves with either the ruling GPC party or the
    opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitors the activities of
    the other. Top administrative positions usually are awarded to
    political allies of these two major parties. There were several clashes
    between GPC- and Islaah-affiliated students during the year, but no
    serious violence.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are no
    constitutional restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully;
    however, the Government limited this right in practice. The Government
    claims that it bans and disrupts some demonstrations to prevent them
    from degenerating into riots and violence. The Government requires a
    permit for demonstrations, but it issues them routinely. In August
    police in Aden briefly detained five members of the YSP who convened a
    political meeting without a permit. Government informers monitor
    meetings and assemblies. In September 1998, following violent
    demonstrations earlier that year, the Government sent a draft law to
    Parliament that would impose significant limitations on the right to
    assemble and to demonstrate. The draft law was criticized by many
    lawyers, human rights activists, and members of Parliament. The
    Parliament continues to withhold action on this proposed law. Draft
    provisions of a new Police Law would have permitted police to open fire
    on gatherings of five or more persons if police suspected imminent
    violence or criminal activity; however, the provisions were removed
    after a campaign by human rights organizations, opposition political
    parties, and the press (see Section 1.d.).
        Although it banned a similar demonstration in 1999, in April the
    Government allowed the opposition to organize a rally in Mukallah in
    Hadramaut governorate to commemorate the deaths of the two persons who
    were killed by police during violent demonstrations there in April
    1998. Five thousand persons reportedly attended the rally. Also in
    April, the Government detained 19 opposition activists in Abyan
    governorate for questioning for several days; the opposition claims
    this was done to prevent them from holding a similar rally. In May
    hundreds of persons in Al-Dalah governorate peacefully marched to
    protest Government security policies and to demand an investigation
    into the death of a student during a violent confrontation between
    security forces and armed citizens earlier in the month (see Section
    1.a.). During the year, the opposition organized mass demonstrations in
    Al-Dalah and Lahaj governorates and a number of smaller marches
    throughout the country. In May thousands of students at Sana'a
    University organized a peaceful march to protest the university
    administration's delay in investigating alleged serial killings at the
    medical school (see Section 5). In September 300 women demonstrated in
    Al-Ghaida in Al-Mahra governorate to protest the preface to a book of
    statistics on the governorate written by the governor, which they
    believed contained derogatory comments about residents of the
    governorate. In November an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 citizens, mostly
    women and children, peacefully demonstrated in Sana'a to protest
    Israeli actions against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza
    during the fall.
        There are no constitutional restrictions on the freedom of
    association, and the Government generally respects this right in
    practice. Associations must obtain an operating license from the
    Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of Culture, which usually is
    a routine matter.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares that Islam is
    the state religion and also provides for freedom of religion, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice; however, there
    were some restrictions. Followers of other religions are free to
    worship according to their beliefs and to wear religiously distinctive
    ornaments or dress; however, the Government forbids conversions,
    requires permission for the construction of new places of worship, and
    prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing. The Constitution states that
    Shari'a is the source of all legislation.
        Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is
    considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There were no reports
    of cases in which the crime was charged or prosecuted by government
    authorities. In January the director of the Aden office of the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received a report that a Somali
    refugee, Mohammed Haji, who allegedly had converted from Islam to
    Christianity after his arrival in the country, had been arrested for
    apostasy. The UNHCR's investigation found that the refugee had been
    detained previously by police in Aden and at the UNHCR's Al-Jahin camp.
    The refugee was registered with the UNHCR under a Christian name but
    maintained an address in Sana'a under a Muslim name. He is married to a
    Muslim woman and has an Islamic marriage certificate. The UNHCR
    believed that authorities detained the refugee on criminal rather than
    religious grounds. In August Haji's case was dismissed, and he was
    remanded to immigration detention. Later that month, UNHCR resettled
    Haji and his family to New Zealand.
        Official government policy does not prohibit or provide punishment
    for the possession of non-Islamic religious literature. However, there
    are unconfirmed reports that foreigners, on occasion, have been
    harassed by police for possessing such literature. In addition, some
    members of the security forces occasionally censor the mail of
    Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community, ostensibly to
    prevent proselytizing.
        There are unconfirmed reports that some police, without the
    authorization or knowledge of their superiors, on occasion have
    harassed and detained persons suspected of apostasy in order to compel
    them to renounce their conversions.
        The Government does not allow the building of new non-Muslim public
    places of worship without permission; however, in 1998 the country
    established diplomatic relations with the Vatican and agreed to the
    construction and operation of a ``Christian center'' in Sana'a. The
    Papal Nuncio, resident in Kuwait, presented his credentials to the
    Yemeni Government in March. Yemen's ambassador to Italy was accredited
    to the Vatican in July 1999. President Saleh paid an official visit to
    the Vatican at the time of his state visit to Italy in April.
        Public schools provide instruction in Islam but not in other
    religions. However, almost all non-Muslims are foreigners who attend
    private schools.
        In February the Government revised its travel regulations to allow
    Yemeni-origin Jews on third-country passports to travel to Yemen, as
    well as Yemeni-origin Israelis with laissez-passer travel documents.
    The first such visitors arrived in March.
        The Government has taken steps to prevent the politicization of
    mosques in an attempt to curb extremism. Private Islamic organizations
    may maintain ties to pan-Islamic organizations and operate schools, but
    the Government monitors their activities.
        Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, owners of
    property previously expropriated by the Communist government of the
    former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including religious
    organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their property.
    However, implementation of the process, including for religious
    institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few properties have
    been returned to any previous owner.
        Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish population has
    emigrated. There are no legal restrictions on the few hundred Jews who
    remain, although there are traditional restrictions on places of
    residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on
    freedom of movement. In general the Government does not obstruct
    domestic travel, although the army and security forces maintain
    checkpoints on major roads. There were a few reports during the year
    that security forces at checkpoints killed or injured persons whom they
    believed were engaging in criminal activity and resisting arrest (see
    Section 1.a.).
        In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally man checkpoints
    alongside military or security officials, and subject travelers to
    physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
        The Government does not obstruct routinely foreign travel or the
    right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must have a permit
    to travel abroad. There were no reports that the restriction on
    journalists was enforced during the year (see Section 2.a.). Women must
    obtain permission from a male relative before applying for a passport
    or departing the country.
        Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often are
    required by security officials at government checkpoints to show that
    they possess resident status or refugee identification cards.
        The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the
    Government continues to grant refugee status on a group basis to
    Somalis who have arrived in Yemen after 1991.
        In 1999 the Government offered asylum to 9,311 Somalis, who fled
    the fighting in that country. This brought the total number of
    registered Somali refugees in the country to 55,186. The Government
    also cooperated with the UNHCR in assisting refugees from Eritrea
    (2,500 persons), Ethiopia (2,403 persons) and various other countries
    (362 persons). The Government permitted the UNHCR to monitor the
    situation of 2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
        Approximately 32,862 Somali refugees have been integrated into
    society and are no longer receiving food or financial assistance from
    the UNHCR. However, they still are eligible for medical treatment at
    UNHCR facilities in Aden and Sana'a. In addition, the UNHCR provides
    small loans to refugee women who wish to initiate income-generating
    activities. Somali-language education is provided in urban areas of
    Aden.
        The UNHCR provides food and medical assistance for up to 12,408
    Somalis and Ethiopians in a refugee camp at Al-Jahin in Abyan
    governorate. Children receive schooling in the camp, and adults are
    eligible for vocational training. The Government in 1998 approved a new
    UNHCR facility to be built at a site in Lahaj governorate; the facility
    still was under construction at year's end. The UNHCR, in coordination
    with the Government, issues identification cards to Somali refugees and
    recognized refugees of other nationalities. The Government has
    developed plans to establish a national refugee commission composed of
    the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the Immigration
    Authority.
        The UNHCR reports that the Government consults with it prior to
    returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin in order to
    avoid the involuntary repatriation of refugees with a credible fear of
    persecution. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
    country where they feared persecution. The UNHCR facilitated the
    voluntary repatriation of some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, as well
    as the voluntary return of 1,856 Somali refugees to areas of Somalia
    that are considered safe. Additionally, the UNHCR in Yemen, in
    collaboration with several Western governments, resettles vulnerable
    refugees.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizen to Change
            Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government; however, there are significant limitations in practice. The
    Government by law is accountable to the Parliament; however, the
    Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
    authority. Decisionmaking and real political power still rest in the
    hands of the executive branch, particularly the President. In addition,
    the Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are
    contrary to Islam, oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or
    violate the country's international commitments.
        The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the
    Government. The Cabinet consists of 24 ministers. Parliament is elected
    by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in 1993.
    International observers judged the most recent parliamentary elections
    (held in 1997) as ``reasonably free and fair,'' despite some problems
    associated with the voting.
        Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC, was
    elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct
    presidential election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the
    vote. The Constitution provides that the President be elected by
    popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and
    the election was generally free and fair; however, there were some
    problems, including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In
    addition the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate
    because the candidate selected by the leftist opposition coalition did
    not receive from the GPC-dominated Parliament the minimum number of
    votes required to run (the other opposition party chose not to run its
    own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole
    opponent was a member of the GPC. There was no significant violence
    associated with the election.
        The President has the authority to introduce legislation and
    promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session. Decrees
    must be approved by Parliament 30 days after reconvening. In theory if
    a decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, a decree
    remains in effect unless it is later affirmatively rejected by
    Parliament. Although the Constitution also permits Parliament to
    initiate legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament generally
    is relegated to debating policies that the Government already has
    submitted, although it sometimes successfully revises or blocks draft
    legislation submitted by the Government. Despite the fact that the
    President's party enjoys an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected
    or delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government,
    and on occasion it has forced significant modification. The Parliament
    also has criticized strongly the Government for some actions, including
    the lifting of subsidies that led to widespread violence in June 1998.
    Ministers frequently are called to Parliament to defend actions,
    policies, or proposed legislation, although they may and sometimes do
    refuse to appear. Parliamentarians at times are sharply critical during
    these sessions. Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff attended
    foreign NGO-sponsored training workshops designed to increase their
    independence and effectiveness.
        The President is advised by the 59-member Consultative Council, a
    board of appointed notables chaired by a former prime minister. The
    Council advises the President on a range of issues but has no
    constitutional powers.
        Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a; many
    citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about the inability of
    local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions.
    Responding to these concerns, in January the Parliament passed the
    government-submitted Local Authority Law. The new law, considered by
    the Government as an important part of its ongoing democratization
    program, is intended to decentralize authority by establishing locally
    elected district and governorate councils. The councils would be headed
    by government-appointed governors. The first elections for the councils
    were scheduled for February 2001.
        On November 19, Parliament approved several amendments to the
    Constitution, including amendments that would extend the terms of
    Members of Parliament from 4 to 6 years and the President from 5 to 7
    years, allow the President to dissolve Parliament without a referendum
    in rare instances, abolish the President's ability to issue
    parliamentary recess decrees, and transform the Consultative Council
    into a presidentially appointed Shura Council with limited legislative
    and candidate approval powers. The amendments were to be approved in a
    national referendum scheduled for February 2001.
        In some governorates, tribal leaders exercise considerable
    discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central
    government authority in these areas often is weak.
        The multiparty system remains weak. The GPC dominates the
    Parliament, and Islaah is the only other party of significance. All
    parties must be registered in accordance with the Political Parties Law
    of 1991, which stipulates that each party must have at least 75
    founders and 2,500 members. Some oppositionists contend that they are
    unable to organize new parties because of the prohibitively high legal
    requirements on the minimum number of members and leaders. Twelve
    parties participated in the 1997 elections, compared with 16 in 1993.
    The YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the 1997 elections,
    leading to lower voter turnout in the south. These same parties also
    boycotted the country's first nationwide direct presidential election
    in September 1999. There was no significant violence associated with
    this election. Two new parties were established in 1999: The Yemeni
    Green Party and the Union of Democratic Forces.
        The Government provides financial support to political parties,
    including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers. However, the
    YSP claims that the Government has yet to return the assets it seized
    from the party during the 1994 civil war.
        Although women vote and hold office, these rights often are limited
    by cultural norms and religious customs, and women are underrepresented
    in Government and politics. Two women were elected to the Parliament in
    1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an increasing number hold senior
    leadership positions in the Government or in the GPC. Voter
    registration of women is less than half that of men. Many Akhdam, a
    small ethnic minority that may be descendants of African slaves, are
    not permitted to participate in the political process, mainly due to
    their inability to obtain citizenship. There no longer are any credible
    reports that citizen members of religious minorities are not permitted
    to participate in the political process.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The concept of local nongovernmental human rights organizations is
    relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the years since
    unification. Several groups held workshops and other activities during
    the year without government interference and often with government
    support.
        The Government cooperates with NGO's, although NGO's complain that
    there is a lack of response to their requests from government
    officials. The Government's ability to be responsive is limited in part
    by a lack of material and human resources. In 1998 the Government
    introduced a new draft law for regulating the formation and activities
    of NGO's. While more liberal than the law it is designed to replace,
    the proposal still contains significant limitations on such
    organizations. The Parliament again refused to take any action on the
    proposed new law during the year.
        The Taiz-based Human Rights Information and Training Center
    (HRITC), perhaps the country's most respected domestic human rights
    NGO, places particular emphasis on education and NGO training. During
    the year, the HRITC sponsored numerous public lectures, training
    workshops, and conferences, and participated in several meetings of the
    international human rights community. The HRITC publishes the quarterly
    human rights journal Our Rights and regularly prints and distributes a
    brochure entitled Know Your Rights. During the year, the HRITC also
    published several works, including a translation of international human
    rights documents and laws, a book on violence against women, and a
    study on the role of women in local NGO's. Several donors have
    supported the HRITC. The HRITC, in cooperation with a foreign embassy,
    coordinated the series of events conducted by Penal Reform
    International from September 1998 to February 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
    The HRITC did not conduct any investigations into alleged human rights
    abuses during the year.
        The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, a lawyers' group
    formed in 1999 by attorney and parliamentarian Mohamed Naji Alao,
    discovered that several illegal private prisons were being operated at
    government facilities in Sana'a. He reported them to the President, who
    immediately ordered the unlawful prisons closed and offenders arrested
    (see Section 1.c.).
        The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human
    Rights is based in Aden. Although the organization continued to suffer
    from a lack of funds, it actively publicized human rights abuses,
    particularly in the south, and provided support to new human rights
    NGO's.
        The activities of Al-Nushataa, or The Activists, a group formed in
    1999 by former members of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization (YHRO),
    were limited to organizing a children's parliament, which familiarized
    secondary school children with the country's legislature. The
    activities of the National Center for Human Rights and Democratic
    Development (NCHRDD) were limited to an inspection tour of several
    Sana'a police stations.
        In 1998 and 1999, Penal Reform International (PRI), a London-based
    NGO, conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen and, with the support of
    a foreign embassy and the HRITC, organized prison management training
    workshops for prison and security officials. PRI identified several
    issues of concern, including the mistreatment of prisoners, lack of
    education and resources for prison officials, and unsanitary and
    overcrowded conditions.
        Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Parliament of the
    European Union, and the Committee to Protect Journalists observe the
    country closely. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    maintains a resident representative. The Government has given these
    groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee camps,
    and prisons. The Government had acknowledged some abuses that were
    alleged in a 1997 Amnesty International report and rejected other
    allegations. Amnesty International's follow-up report, issued in July
    1999, criticized the Government for not keeping its promise to
    investigate some of these abuses. The Government claims that it
    responded to Amnesty International and passed the results of its
    investigations to the UNCHR, but that the information the organization
    provided was inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive
    action.
        In February the Government hosted a major symposium of the UNCHR,
    chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary Robinson, on the human rights
    aspects of international development. Robinson signed a Memorandum of
    Intent for a technical assistance grant of $300,000, half of which
    would be used to fund a resident UNCHR consultant who, working under
    the umbrella of the UNDP, would serve as an advisor to the Supreme
    National Committee on Human Rights and oversee UNCHR programs in the
    country.
        The YHRO is a local human rights group headquartered in Sana'a,
    with branches in seven other cities. It was founded by the Government.
    Oppositionists as well as some human rights experts have viewed its
    findings as unobjective. The head of the YHRO, a member of the
    judiciary, was transferred from his post as head of the Sana'a Court of
    Appeals to the Dhamar Court of Appeals in 1998. This was seen by some
    observers as a demotion or an attempt by the Government to marginalize
    the judge, who was seen as too independent on human rights questions.
        The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, which was formed
    in 1997 and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign
    Affairs, is responsible for ensuring that the country meets its
    obligations with respect to implementing international human rights
    conventions and investigating specific instances of abuse. The
    Committee views using education as a means to effect cultural change as
    its highest priority. To this end, it continued during the year to seek
    donor support for a project to incorporate human rights education into
    secondary school curricula and to provide 1-day human rights workshops
    for police officers, which it began in 1999. The committee has been
    less active in investigating specific cases of abuse. Many persons
    alleged that it has not followed up on its stated commitment to
    investigate allegations of human rights violations. For example, the
    committee has not investigated the alleged torture of Naji Saleh Al-
    Khowlani during detention by police in Sana'a in 1999 (see Section
    1.c.), and it declined to investigate the case of Wadia Al-Shaibani,
    who reportedly died in late 1997 while in the custody of security
    forces in Aden (see Section 1.a.). In the latter case, it accepted the
    official coroner's report of death by suicide. The committee conducted
    no investigations of alleged human rights violations during the year,
    claiming that it had received no such reports. The committee continues
    to be hampered by a lack of human and material resources.
        However, the committee has been active on prison reform. In January
    it led a government initiative to establish and, with the help of
    private sector contributions, to finance a special ``charity fund'' to
    be used to enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal
    or Islamic law, were being held in prison pending payment of
    restitution to their victims, despite having completed their sentences.
    The committee participated in the subsequent inspections conducted to
    identify prisoners whom the fund could help and to assess prison
    conditions (see Section 1.c.). Working with the National Women's
    Committee, the committee during the year developed a plan to establish
    a shelter in Sana'a that would house and provide vocational education
    for 50 abandoned women. The committee is seeking donor assistance and
    hopes to establish additional shelters in other governorates. In 1999
    following an inspection of Sana'a central prison, the committee
    arranged for minors who were incarcerated with adults to be
    incarcerated separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to
    18 years old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an
    orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend
    school and participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
    The committee also initiated a project, with the support of local
    businessman, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still
    is seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory
    (see Section 5).
        In October the Human Rights Committee of the President's
    Consultative Council, in cooperation with the NCHRDD, inspected several
    police stations in Sana'a to determine whether police were following
    proper procedures and to develop recommendations for the Minister of
    Interior on training for police officers. The Committee has had limited
    success in investigating human rights abuses and conducted no other
    investigations during the year.
        The Parliament's human rights committee in the past has
    investigated some reports of human rights abuses, but its activities
    during the year were limited to participating in various prison
    inspections. The committee's chairman claims that he would like to
    increase the activities of the committee, especially in the area of
    press freedoms, but cites lack of official and financial support as
    constraints. The committee has no authority except to issue reports.
        The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior
    parliamentarians and party leaders, including some opposition members,
    but apparently was inactive during the year.
        The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated with the
    Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices,
    providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little
    follow-up to the report.
        Two delegations from the UNHRC visited in late 1998. One delegation
    looked into what progress the Government had made on cases of
    ``disappearances'' (see Section 1.b.). The other conducted an
    assessment of the Government's need for technical assistance,
    particularly for the Supreme National Committee on Human Rights.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal in general
    rights and duties,'' and that society ``is based on social solidarity,
    which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the
    law;'' however, discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and, to
    a lesser extent, religion, exists. Entrenched cultural attitudes often
    prevent women from enjoying equal rights.
        Women.--Although spousal abuse reportedly is common, it generally
    is undocumented. Violence against women and children is considered a
    family affair and usually is not reported to the police. In the
    country's traditional society, an abused woman would be expected to
    take her complaint to a male relative (rather than the authorities),
    who should intercede on her behalf or provide her sanctuary if
    required. One survey conducted by Sana'a University and the Dutch
    Ministry of Justice found that nearly 50 percent of the 120 women
    interviewed stated that they had been beaten; 1 in 5 claimed to have
    been threatened with death. Despite the high incidence rates reported,
    only 3 percent of women had ever sought help from an outsider or the
    police. The laws pertaining to violence against women rarely are
    enforced. The only institutionalized aid for victimized women is a
    small battered-women's shelter in Aden. The press and women's rights
    activists only recently have begun to investigate or report on
    violations of women's rights. Violence against women was the subject of
    a women's conference held in Aden in July and of two conferences held
    in 1999, and the issue became a topic of heated public debate following
    rumors of serial killings of female students at Sana'a University's
    medical school. Rumors that 16 women were murdered now appear to be
    unfounded; police believe the Sudanese morgue attendant now on trial
    for the murder of two female students fabricated accounts of having
    killed more. However, the press' extensive coverage highlighted
    authorities' dismissive treatment of the female students' concerns and
    a lack of interest in their security. In May 5,000 students marched to
    protest the university administration's handling of the case (see
    Section 2.b.).
        The Penal Code allows for leniency for persons guilty of committing
    a ``crime against honor,'' a euphemism for violent assaults or killings
    committed against a female for her perceived immodest or defiant
    behavior. Legal provisions regarding violence against women state that
    an accused man should be put to death for murdering a woman. However, a
    husband who murders his wife and her lover may be fined or imprisoned
    for a term not to exceed 1 year. Despite the apparent sanctioning of
    honor killings, most citizens, including women's activists, believe the
    phenomenon is not widespread. Some Western NGO's claim that the
    practice is more prevalent, but admit to a lack of evidence to support
    such claims.
        Women face significant restrictions on their role in society. The
    law, social custom, and Shari'a discriminate against women. Men are
    permitted to take as many as four wives, although very few do so. By
    law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However, the law largely is not
    enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12. In 1998 some
    conservative Members of Parliament attempted to eliminate the ``minimum
    age'' requirement on the grounds that parents should decide when their
    daughters are old enough to marry. Their draft law failed by a large
    majority. A 1998 draft law to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18
    also failed by a large majority. The law stipulates that the wife's
    ``consent'' to the marriage is required; ``consent'' is defined as
    ``silence'' for previously unwed women and ``pronouncement of consent''
    for divorced women. The husband and the wife's ``guardian'' (usually
    her father) sign the marriage contract; in Aden and some outlying
    governorates, the wife also signs. The practice of bride-price payments
    is widespread, despite efforts to limit the size of such payments.
        The law provides that the wife must obey the husband. She must live
    with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the
    marriage, and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may
    divorce wives without justifying their action in court. A woman has the
    legal right to divorce; however, she must provide a justification, such
    as her husband's nonsupport, impotence, or taking of a second wife
    without her consent. However, the expense of hiring a lawyer is a
    significant deterrent, as is the necessity for rural women to travel to
    a city to present their case. A woman seeking a divorce also must repay
    the mahr (a portion of her bride price), which creates an additional
    hardship. As the mahr usually is in the hands of her family, the
    refusal by a family to pay the mahr effectively can prevent a divorce.
    The family's refusal to accept the woman back into the home also may
    deter divorce, as few other options are available to women. When a
    divorce occurs, the family home and older children often are awarded to
    the husband. The divorced woman usually returns to her father's home or
    to the home of another male relative. Her former husband must continue
    to support her for another 3 months, since she may not remarry until
    she proves that she is not pregnant.
        Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission from their
    husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel. They also are
    expected to be accompanied by male relatives. However, enforcement of
    this requirement is irregular.
        Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or
    Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Yemeni
    women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born
    spouses; however, they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen
    of foreign-born fathers.
        According to a 1995 Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who
    wishes to marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry.
    A Yemeni woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her
    parents' approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who wishes
    to marry a Yemeni man must prove to the Ministry that she is ``of good
    conduct and behavior,'' and ``is free from contagious disease.'' There
    are no corresponding requirements for men to demonstrate parental
    approval, good conduct, or freedom from contagious diseases. Although
    the regulation does not have the force of law and is applied
    irregularly, some human rights groups have raised concerns about it.
        The Government consistently supports women's rights and the
    expansion of the public role of women. The President frequently speaks
    publicly about the importance of women's political participation and
    economic development. In 1999 the Prime Minister mandated that all
    ministries must promote at least one woman to the director general
    level; at year's end, only the Interior Ministry had failed to do so,
    although it had initiated an aggressive campaign to recruit, train, and
    deploy female police officers. Several ministries have a number of
    female directors general. In March the Prime Minister established the
    Supreme Council for Women, an independent governmental body charged
    with promoting women's issues in the Government. With the Government's
    active support, bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated long-
    term (1994-2004) projects worth $31 million (4.96 billion riyals) aimed
    at advancing vocational education and reproductive health for women and
    girls.
        According to the most recent Government statistics (1998), 64.15
    percent of women are illiterate, compared with approximately 31.25
    percent of men. The fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman. Most
    women have little access to basic health care. Only approximately 22
    percent of births are attended by trained health-care personnel. In
    some cases, where clinics are available, women do not use them because
    they are unable to afford them or reach them from their remote
    villages, have little confidence in them, or their male relatives or
    they themselves refuse to allow a male doctor to examine them. Donor-
    funded maternal and child health programs attempt to address these
    issues through programs designed to train midwives who serve rural
    populations.
        In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, are better
    educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than
    their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 civil war, the
    number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due not
    only to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural pressure
    from the north.
        The National Women's Committee (NWC), a government-sponsored semi-
    independent women's association, promotes female education and civic
    responsibility through seminars and workshops and by coordinating
    donors' programs. The committee's chairwoman sits on the Prime
    Ministerial Supreme Council for Women. There are a number of recently
    formed NGO's working for women's advancement, including the Social
    Association for Productive Families, which promotes vocational
    development for women; the Women and Children's Department of the
    Center for Future Studies, which organizes seminars and publishes
    studies on women and children; the Woman and Child Development
    Association, which focuses on health education and illiteracy; and the
    Yemeni Council for Motherhood and Childhood, which provides microcredit
    and vocational training to women.
        Children.--While the Government has asserted its commitment to
    protect children's rights, it lacks the resources necessary to ensure
    adequate health care, education, and welfare services for children. The
    UNDP estimates that 30 percent of children are malnourished. The infant
    mortality rate in 1999 was 75 deaths per 1,000 births, down from 105
    per 1,000 in 1998. Male children receive preferential treatment over
    female children; after the age of 1, male children have a 12 percent
    greater chance of survival than females, a result of the comparative
    neglect of female children.
        The law provides for universal free education for 9 years, which is
    compulsory, but this provision is not enforced. Many children,
    especially girls, do not attend primary school. Education for females
    is not encouraged in some tribal areas, where girls often are kept home
    to help their mothers with child care, housework, and farm work.
    According to UNICEF's ``Report on Children and Women in Yemen: 1998,''
    an estimated 45 percent of primary-school-age children (ages 6 to 15)
    do not attend school. Some rural areas have no schools for their
    school-age population. In 1998 to encourage girls' attendance at
    school, the Government passed a law that eliminated school fees and the
    requirement of uniforms for girls. According to the UNICEF report,
    enrollment of girls in school increased by 4 percent in 1998.
    Enrollment of boys declined 10 percent because increasing numbers of
    older boys from poor families left school to work.
        In 1999 following an inspection of Sana'a central prison, the
    Supreme National Committee for Human Rights arranged for minors who
    previously had been incarcerated with adults to be incarcerated
    separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years
    old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an orphanage
    run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend school and
    participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4). The
    Committee also initiated a project, with the support of local
    businessmen, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still
    is seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory
    (see Section 4).
        Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although the law requires
    that a girl be 15 to marry, the law is not enforced, and marriages of
    girls as young as age 12 occur.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced by some citizens. According to a
    1997 demographic survey conducted by the Government, nearly one-fourth
    (23 percent) of women who have ever been married have been subjected to
    FGM. However, the prevalence of the practice varies substantially by
    region. Citizens of African origin or those living in communities with
    heavy African influence are more likely to practice FGM. For example,
    according to the survey, approximately 69 percent of women living in
    coastal areas were subjected to FGM, compared with 15 percent in
    mountainous regions, and 5 percent in the plateau and desert regions.
    The procedure is confined mainly to excision, with infibulation being
    practiced only among East African immigrants and refugees. FGM rarely
    is reported among Shaf'ai Sunnis, and the Zaydi Shi'a reputedly do not
    practice it at all. The Government's publication of the data on FGM was
    an important first step in addressing this problem; however, while some
    government health workers and officials actively and publicly
    discouraged the practice, the Government has not proposed legislation
    to outlaw it nor have local women's groups adopted the problem as a
    major concern.
        In January the Prime Minister established the Higher Council of
    Motherhood and Childhood (HCMC), a semi-autonomous inter-ministerial
    entity responsible for formulating policy and programs to improve the
    status of children. The HCMC participates in the World Bank's Child
    Development Program and the Arab Council for Childhood and
    Development's program for street children.
        People with Disabilities.--Persons with mental and physical
    disabilities face distinct social prejudices, as well as discrimination
    in education and employment. In 1998 the Government mandated acceptance
    of disabled students in schools, exempted them from paying tuition, and
    required that schools be made more accessible to disabled students;
    however, it is unclear to what extent these laws have been implemented.
    There is no national law mandating the accessibility of buildings for
    the disabled. Some disabled persons are reduced to begging to support
    themselves. During the year, donors financed the establishment of three
    new schools for the disabled in Taiz governorate. Mentally ill
    patients, particularly those who commit crimes, are imprisoned and even
    shackled when there is no one to care for them. Persons with mental
    problems sometimes are arrested without charge and placed in prisons
    alongside criminals (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC, in cooperation with
    the Yemeni Red Crescent Society, built and now staffs separate
    detention facilities for mentally disabled prisoners. These facilities
    are located in Sana'a, Ibb, and Taiz, and collectively are able to care
    for a population of 300 persons.
        The Handicapped Society, the country's largest NGO involved in
    assisting the disabled, was founded in 1988 and has branches in 13
    governorates. Funded by international donors (primarily the Swedish
    organization Radda Barnen) and a modest annual grant from the
    Government, the Handicapped Society provides rehabilitation assistance
    and vocational training, and sponsors cultural and sports activities
    for disabled persons. The Ministry of Education has assigned three
    teachers to teach students at the disabled-accessible classrooms at the
    Society's Sana'a branch. Believing that the needs of disabled women
    were not being addressed adequately by the Handicapped Society,
    activists in 1998 established with government support the Challenge
    Society. The Challenge Society provides 85 disabled females between the
    ages of 6 and 30 with medical care, support services, and vocational
    training. In March three disabled teenagers toured the country on
    specially adapted bicycles and, supported by the Ministry of Youth and
    Sports and private sector contributions, took their bike tour to
    several Arab countries.
        Religious Minorities.--Apart from a small but undetermined number
    of Christians and Hindus of South Asian origin in Aden, Jews are the
    only indigenous religious minority. Their numbers have diminished
    significantly--from several tens of thousands to a few hundreddue to
    voluntary emigration over the past 50 years. Although the law makes no
    distinction, Jews traditionally are restricted to living in one section
    of a city or village and often are confined to a limited choice of
    employment, usually farming or handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own real
    property.
        Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community are employed
    in teaching, social services, and health care. Occasionally the
    security authorities harass such clergy by censoring their mail,
    ostensibly to prevent proselytizing (see Section 2.c.).
        In July 1998, a gunman killed three nuns belonging to the Sisters
    of Charity order in Hodeidah. The Government took swift action and
    immediately arrested the individual. The Government determined that he
    was deranged and committed him to a psychiatric institution.
        A hospital in Jibla operated by the Baptist Church has experienced
    occasional harassment from local Islamic extremists who feared that the
    hospital might be used to spread Christianity. There have been no
    reports of threats of violence by extremists in several years.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens with a noncitizen
    parent, called ``muwalladin,'' sometimes face discrimination in
    employment and in other areas. Persons who seek employment at Sana'a
    University or admission to the military academy by law must demonstrate
    that they have two Yemeni parents. Nonetheless, many senior government
    officials, including members of Parliament and ministers, have only one
    Yemeni parent. In some cases, naturalization of the non-Yemeni parent
    is sufficient to overcome the ``two-Yemeni-parent'' requirement.
        A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants of ancient
    Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen who later were enslaved, are considered
    the lowest social class. Known as the ``Akhdam'' (servants), they live
    in squalor and endure persistent social discrimination. Beginning in
    September 1999, the Government's Social Fund for Development (SFD)
    initiated a program for ``special needs groups,'' which focused
    particularly on the Akhdam. During the year, the SFD conducted an
    education project for Akhdam children in Hodeidah governorate, provided
    support to an NGO conducting field research on Akhdam needs in Sana'a
    governorate, and improved the quality of the water supply and built two
    classrooms for the Akhdam community in Taiz governorate.
        There have been reports by human rights groups that some immigrants
    of African origin have difficulty in securing Interior Ministry
    permission to marry Yemeni citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation
    requires that marriages of citizens and foreigners be approved in
    advance by the Ministry (see also Section 1.f.).
        Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, and the
    Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible for
    kidnapings, shootings, and other acts of violence remained limited. In
    January 22 persons were killed and 35 injured in tribal disputes in
    Shabwa and Al-Baida governorates. In one incident, 10 persons were
    killed and 3 injured when a fight at school between 2 children from
    different tribes escalated into violence. In another incident, a member
    of the Ba Haider tribe killed a fellow tribesman in retaliation for the
    killing of his father 20 years ago. The Nehm and Al-Haymah tribes also
    are involved in an ongoing violent feud in which several persons have
    been killed. In February tribesmen from the Nehm blocked the Sana'a
    Highway, opening fire on and killing three of the police officers
    dispatched to dismantle the roadblock. Up to 16 persons reportedly were
    killed in the ensuing fighting. The Deputy Governor of Sana'a was shot
    to death in August in what police believe was a tribally related
    revenge killing. Tensions, which periodically escalate into violent
    confrontations, continue between the Government and the Khowlan and
    other tribes in Marib governorate.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that
    citizens have the right to form unions; however, this right is
    restricted in practice. The Government seeks to place its own personnel
    in positions of influence inside unions and trade union federations.
    The 1995 Labor Law (amended in 1997) provides both for the right to
    form unions and for the right to strike.
        The Yemeni Confederation of Labor Unions (YCLU) remains the sole
    national umbrella organization. The YCLU claims 350,000 members in 15
    unions and denies any association with the Government, although it
    works closely with the Government to resolve labor disputes through
    negotiation. Observers suggest that the Government likely would not
    tolerate the establishment of an alternative labor federation unless it
    believed such an establishment to be in its best interest.
        By law civil servants and public sector workers, and some
    categories of farm workers, may not join unions. Only the General
    Assembly of the YCLU may dissolve unions. The law provides equal labor
    rights for women, and it confirms the freedom of workers to associate.
    The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum membership for unions, nor
    does it limit them to a specific enterprise or firm. Thus, citizens may
    associate by profession or trade.
        Strikes are not permitted unless a dispute between workers and
    employers is ``final'' and ``incontestable'' (a prior attempt must have
    been made to settle through negotiation or arbitration). The proposal
    to strike must be submitted to at least 60 percent of all concerned
    workers, of whom 25 percent must vote in favor of the proposal.
    Permission to strike also must be obtained from the YCLU. Strikes for
    explicit ``political purposes'' are prohibited. In practice the law
    tends to discourage strikes.
        There were several small strikes during the year. In February a
    group of school teachers in Taiz governorate struck for a day because
    they had not received their January salaries. Also in February, Sana'a
    municipality garbage collectors struck for a day, demanding payment of
    overdue wages and a salary increase. In June the staff of Sana'a
    University struck for a week to demand an increase in their salaries
    and overdue bonus payments. In August the staff of Al-Thawra public
    hospital in Sana'a struck for 10 days for higher wages. In September
    workers at the Yemen Hunt Oil Company in Marib governorate struck for a
    wage increase. There were no reports of violence in connection with
    these strikes.
        The YCLU is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions
    and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1995 Labor
    Law provides workers with the right to organize and bargain
    collectively. The Government permits these activities; however, it
    seeks to influence them by placing its own personnel inside groups and
    organizations. All collective bargaining agreements must be deposited
    with and reviewed by the Ministry of Labor, a practice criticized by
    the International Labor Organization (ILO). Agreements may be
    invalidated if they are ``likely to cause a breach of security or to
    damage the economic interests of the country.'' Despite these
    restrictions, several such agreements exist in fact. Unions may
    negotiate wage settlements for their members and may resort to strikes
    or other actions to achieve their demands. Public sector employees must
    take their grievances to court.
        The law protects employees from antiunion discrimination. Employers
    do not have the right to dismiss an employee for union activities.
    Employees may appeal any disputes, including cases of antiunion
    discrimination, to the Ministry of Labor. Employees also may take a
    case to the Labor Arbitration Committee, which is chaired by the
    Ministry of Labor and also consists of an employer representative and a
    YCLU representative. Such cases often are disposed favorably toward
    workers, especially if the employer is a foreign company.
        There are no export processing zones in operation; an EPZ is
    planned for Aden.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of its
    practice. The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children
    specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Child labor is common, especially in rural areas. Many
    children are required to work in subsistence farming because of the
    poverty of their families. Even in urban areas, children work in stores
    and workshops, sell goods on the streets, and beg. The law does not
    prohibit forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such
    practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        The established minimum age for employment is 15 in the private
    sector and 18 in the public sector. By special permit, children between
    the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government rarely enforces these
    provisions, especially in rural and remote areas. The Government also
    does not enforce laws requiring 9 years of compulsory education for
    children, and many school-aged children work instead of attending
    school, particularly in areas where schools are not easily accessible.
        The results of the 1994 national census showed that 231,655
    children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, or 6.5 percent of all
    children in that age group, were working. Experts believe that the
    number has increased since 1994.
        After the Government ratified the ILO's Convention 182 on the Worst
    Forms of Child Labor in July, the Consultative Council adopted the
    ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent child labor problems.
    A special council, under the leadership of the Minister of Labor, uses
    the strategy as a government-wide guideline for enforcing existing
    child labor laws and formulating and implementing new laws.
        In June the Ministry of Labor signed a $1.3 million agreement with
    the ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor
    (IPEC). Under the program, the Ministry will establish a child labor
    department, train teachers to make school curricula more relevant to
    rural children, mobilize media to discuss child labor, establish a
    microenterprise program to help families establish businesses that will
    allow their children to stay in school, and seek the support of civil
    society to remove children from hazardous jobs. In addition the
    Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs has developed a plan to
    establish six centers for street children over the next 5 years.
        The Ministry of Labor occasionally inspects factories in the major
    population areas. Ministry officials state that they lack the resources
    to enforce child labor laws more effectively. However, since a great
    percentage of the country's underage work force is in the agricultural
    sector in remote rural areas, it is difficult for the Government to
    protect most child workers.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no established minimum
    wage for any type of employment. The Labor Law states that ``it shall
    not be permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker
    should be less than the minimal wages of government civil servants.''
    According to the Ministry of Labor, the average minimum wage of civil
    servants is approximately $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals) per month.
    Private sector workers, especially skilled technicians, earn a far
    higher wage. The average wage does not provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. A combination of inflation and the loss
    of government-provided subsidies continued to erode wages.
        The law specifies a maximum 48-hour workweek with a maximum 8hour
    workday, but many workshops and stores operate 10- to 12hour shifts
    without penalty. The workweek for government employees is 35 hours: 7
    hours per day Saturday through Wednesday.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for regulating workplace
    health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for regulating
    occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but enforcement is
    weak to nonexistent. Many workers regularly are exposed to toxic
    industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses. Some foreign-
    owned companies as well as major Yemeni manufacturers implement higher
    health, safety, and environmental standards than the Government
    requires. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous
    work situations and may challenge dismissals in court.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   SOUTH ASIA

                                  ----------

                                  AFGHANISTAN

        Afghanistan \1\ continued to experience civil war and political
    instability for the 21st consecutive year. There was no functioning
    central government. The Pashtun-dominated ultra-conservative Islamic
    movement known as the Taliban controlled approximately 90 percent of
    the country, including the capital of Kabul, and all of the largest
    urban areas, except Faizabad. A Taliban edict in 1997 renamed the
    country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Taliban leader Mullah
    Omar as Head of State and Commander of the Faithful. There is a six-
    member ruling council in Kabul, but ultimate authority for Taliban rule
    rested in Mullah Omar, head of the inner Shura (Council), located in
    the southern city of Kandahar. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani
    claimed to be the head of the Government, controlled most of the
    country's embassies abroad, and retained Afghanistan's United Nations
    seat after the U.N. General Assembly again deferred a decision on
    Afghanistan's credentials during the September General Assembly
    session. Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood, both
    Tajiks, also maintained control of some largely ethnic Tajik territory
    in the country's northeast. Masood's forces were within rocket range of
    Taliban-held Kabul until late July 1999, but since then the Taliban has
    pushed them back, capturing large areas. In 1999 the Taliban summer
    offensive pushed Masood's forces out of the Shomali plain, north of
    Kabul. Towards the middle of June, the Taliban resumed its offensive,
    and captured the northeastern city of Taloqan. Commander Masood and
    commanders under the United Front for Afghanistan (UFA), also known as
    the Northern Alliance, continue to hold the Panjshir valley and
    Faizabad. The U.N. Secretary General's Personal Representative to
    Afghanistan Fransesc Vendrell engaged in extensive discussions with
    various Afghan parties and interested nations throughout the year, but
    there has been little visible progress in ending the conflict. A group
    of representatives from the six nations bordering Afghanistan plus the
    United States and Russia met several times during the year to explore
    ways to end the conflict. During the year, a process to convene a Loya
    Jirga, or Grand Assembly of traditional leaders, which was focused
    around former King Zahir Shah and based in Rome, slowly began to gather
    support. Other initiatives, such as the Bonn process and the Cyprus
    process, began to cooperate with the Rome-based initiative. A number of
    provincial administrations maintained limited functions, but civil
    institutions were rudimentary. There is no countrywide recognized
    constitution, rule of law, or independent judiciary. In 1999 the
    Taliban claimed that it was drafting a new constitution based on
    Islamic law, but during the year there were no further announcements
    regarding a constitution.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ *The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has been closed for security reasons
    since January 1989. Information on the human rights situation is
    therefore limited. This report focuses on the over 90 percent of the
    country under Taliban control.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Taliban remained the country's primary military force. Taliban
    and members of other warring Afghan factions committed numerous serious
    human rights abuses in areas they occupied.
        Agriculture, including high levels of opium poppy cultivation, was
    the mainstay of the economy. For the second year in a row, the country
    was the largest opium producer in the world. The agriculture sector
    suffered a major setback due to the country's worst drought in 30
    years. Experts estimate that the drought may affect more than half of
    the population, with 3-4 million severely affected. The drought has
    affected all areas of the country, causing an increase in internal
    displacement, loss of livestock, and loss of livelihood. The crop loss
    in some areas was estimated to be 50 percent. Approximately 80 percent
    of the livestock of the Kuchi nomads reportedly has perished, and the
    Argun reservoir which supplied water to 500,000 farmers and to Kandahar
    has run dry, as have 8 rivers in the region. In addition to the
    drought, the agricultural sector continues to languish because of a
    lack of resources and the prolonged civil war, which have impeded
    reconstruction of irrigation systems, repair of market roads, and
    replanting of orchards in some areas. The presence of millions of
    landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout the country has restricted
    areas for cultivation and slowed the return of refugees who are needed
    to rebuild the economy. Trade was mainly in opium, fruits, minerals,
    and gems, as well as goods smuggled to Pakistan. There were rival
    currencies, both very inflated. Formal economic activity remained
    minimal in most of the country, especially rural areas, and was
    inhibited by recurrent fighting and by local commanders' roadblocks in
    non-Taliban controlled areas. The country also is dependent on
    international assistance. Per capita income, based on World Bank
    figures, is about $280 per year. Reconstruction was continuing in
    Herat, Kandahar, and Ghazni, areas that are under firm Taliban control.
    Areas outside of Taliban control suffered from brigandage.
        The overall human rights situation remained extremely poor, and the
    Taliban continued to commit numerous serious and systemic abuses.
    Citizens were unable to change their government or choose their leaders
    peacefully. The Taliban carried out summary justice in the areas they
    controlled, and reportedly were responsible for political and other
    extrajudicial killings, including targeted killings, summary
    executions, and deaths in custody. There were allegations that Taliban
    forces were responsible for disappearances. The Taliban imposed strict
    and oppressive order by means of stiff punishments for crimes in the
    areas that they controlled. The Taliban's Islamic courts and religious
    police, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of
    Vice (PVSV), enforced their ultra-conservative interpretation of
    Islamic law. The PVSV has carried out punishments such as stoning to
    death, flogging, public executions for adultery, murder, and homosexual
    activity, and amputations of limbs for theft. For lesser infractions,
    Taliban militiamen often judged accused offenders and meted out
    punishments, such as beatings, on the spot. Prison conditions were
    poor. The Taliban arbitrarily arrested and detained persons and
    infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Taliban's military offensive
    and capture of Taloqan forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee
    their homes. Taliban forces were responsible for indiscriminate
    bombardment of civilian areas. Civil war conditions and the unfettered
    actions of competing factions effectively limited the freedoms of
    speech, press, assembly, and association. Freedom of religion is
    restricted severely and Taliban members vigorously enforced their
    interpretation of Islamic law. Freedom of movement is also limited.
    Years of conflict have left approximately 258,600 citizens internally
    displaced, while more than 2.8 million of the country's population of
    approximately 25.8 million live outside the country as refugees.
    Although the continued fighting has discouraged many refugees from
    returning to their country, 133,600 refugees voluntarily returned from
    Iran during the year under a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees-Iran
    agreement on voluntary repatriation. An additional 50,000 are estimated
    to have returned outside the framework of this agreement. All factions
    have harassed domestic and international NGO's.
        The human rights situation for women was extremely poor. Violence
    against women remained a problem throughout the country. Women and
    girls were subjected to rape, kidnaping, and forced marriage. Taliban
    restrictions against women and girls remained widespread,
    institutionally sanctioned, and systematic. The Taliban imposed strict
    dress codes and prohibited women from working outside the home except
    in limited circumstances in the health care field and in some
    humanitarian assistance projects. Despite these formal restrictions,
    the treatment of women and girls in Taliban-controlled areas improved
    slightly for the second year in a row, mainly due to lack of
    enforcement. Although girls were prohibited formally from attending
    school, several organizations were able to run elementary schools and
    home schools with girls in attendance despite the formal prohibition.
    Nonetheless, there was widespread and widely accepted societal
    discrimination against women and girls throughout the country. The
    Taliban detained persons because of their ethnic origins. Worker rights
    were not defined. Child labor persists.
        The human rights situation in areas outside of Taliban control also
    remained extremely poor, and Masood's forces and the Northern Alliance
    members committed numerous, serious abuses. Masood's forces continued
    sporadic rocket attacks against Kabul. Anti-Taliban forces bombarded
    civilians indiscriminately. Various factions infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. Armed units of the Northern Alliance, local commanders,
    and rogue individuals were responsible for political killings,
    abductions, kidnapings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detention,
    and looting.
        During the year, a degree of ``enforcement fatigue'' seems to have
    led to an informal easing of various restrictions. Reports suggest that
    activities such as nonformal education for girls and women working in
    self-employed sectors increasingly are tolerated if engaged in quietly.
    Many households in urban areas own television sets. Significantly, the
    Taliban forces did not engage in the scorched earth policy of previous
    campaigns when they burned homes, killed livestock, uprooted orchards,
    and destroyed irrigation systems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Taliban forces
    committed a large number of political and other extrajudicial killings,
    both within the country and in the refugee community in Pakistan during
    the year. In June Amnesty International (AI), reported that over the
    previous 2 years more than a dozen prominent citizens advocating an end
    to the war and establishment of a government representing all ethnic
    groups have been arrested and killed by the Taliban.
        Much of the political and extrajudicial killing in Afghanistan
    during the year occurred during the renewed conflict between the
    Taliban and the Northern Alliance during the summer, which was
    characterized by sporadic indiscriminate shelling and bombing. On
    February 14, indiscriminate bombing by the Taliban in the Panjshir
    valley killed eight civilians. In mid-June, the Taliban began
    offensives in the Shomali and Kunduz areas, using aircraft to support
    ground troops. On July 1, the Taliban launched large-scale attacks near
    the towns of Baghram and Charikar, approximately 30 miles north of
    Kabul. Civilians continued to be the primary victims of the fighting.
    On July 1-2, the Taliban carried out air raids on the towns of Charikar
    and Jabal-as Saraf, reportedly claiming civilian lives. In mid-July,
    there were reports--denied by the Taliban--of summary executions of
    prisoners by the Taliban forces in the conflict areas. On July 23,
    Taliban aircraft bombed several towns and villages in northern
    Afghanistan, reportedly killing three and wounding seven civilians. On
    July 30, the Taliban used heavy artillery and aircraft to bomb the town
    of Nahreen before capturing it.
        From August 9 through September 5, when the Taliban captured it,
    there was intense fighting around and in the town of Taloqan. During
    the offensive to capture Taloqan, Taliban aircraft bombed the city many
    times. No statistics are available on civilian casualties in Taloqan,
    but 60,000 to 75,000 persons left their homes in Taloqan and other
    areas in the northern part of the country to flee the fighting. AI
    reported in July that during the fighting in Taloqan the Taliban
    bombarded a village, burned all of the houses there, and killed some of
    the villagers. It was also reported that the Taliban cut the throat of
    one man in front of his relatives.
        In previous years, the Taliban used swift summary trials and
    implemented strict punishments in accordance with Islamic law. Public
    executions, which sometimes took place before crowds of up to 30,000
    persons at Kabul Stadium, are not known to have occurred during the
    year. Similarly, death by stoning for adultery, and by toppling walls
    on offenders for homosexual transgressions are not known to have
    occurred.
        Political killings and harassment of moderate Afghan leaders and
    Afghan intellectuals residing in Pakistan continued during the year;
    many believed that these killings and harassment occured at the
    direction of the Taliban. AI notes that over the last 2 years dozens of
    Afghans living in Pakistan have received death threats, and several of
    them have been killed. In 1999 a number of moderate activists relocated
    out of Pakistan to other countries, in part as a reaction to killings
    in Pakistan in 1998 and 1999. On June 1, a hooded gunman shot and
    wounded Mohammad Enam Wak, an Afghan author, at his home in Peshawar.
    By year's end, no action had been taken in the case. The shooting may
    have been in response to a book Wak just had published examining the
    idea of an Afghan federation on the basis of ethnic groups.
        Many Taliban soldiers reportedly were killed and injured by
    landmines laid by the Northern Alliance as they advanced in the Shomali
    plains.
        Opposition forces fired rockets into Kabul on a number of
    occasions. In many of these attacks, civilians were killed or injured.
        In other areas, combatants sought to kill rival commanders and
    their sympathizers. The perpetrators of these killings and their
    motives often were difficult to identify, as political motives often
    are entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade,
    and personal vendettas. A long-running feud among Northern Alliance
    members led to a number of killings of prominent commanders, including
    Bahadur in November 1999 and Abdul Chesik in December 1999. On December
    4, United Front Commander Abdullah Jan Wahidi reportedly was killed in
    an ambush.
        On August 5, seven deminers working for the U.N.-funded
    Organization for Mine Clearance and Rehabilitation were ambushed,
    killed, and burned in Badghis Province; one of the deminers may have
    been alive at the time he was burned. It is not clear who was
    responsible, but the group that waylaid the deminers was reportedly
    large, well-organized, and well-armed.
        When the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in 1999, there were reports
    that Taliban forces carried out summary executions upon entering the
    city. AI reported that hundreds of men, and in a few instances women
    and children, were separated from their families, taken away, and
    killed (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). There has been no investigation by
    the Taliban of these widely publicized allegations.
        The Taliban also has taken no action and conducted no investigation
    into allegations by AI that dozens of noncombatants were systematically
    killed by Taliban forces when they captured most of the Shomali valley
    in late July 1999.
        The Taliban has used excessive force against demonstrators. In
    December 1998, two students at Nangarhar medical college reportedly
    were killed by members of the Taliban when they fired upon a crowd of
    students who were protesting their dean's misappropriation of hostel
    funds. Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered an investigation of the
    incident, but it is not known whether an investigation took place or
    what the results of any investigation may have been.
        In 1998 the Taliban reportedly executed as many as 189 prisoners it
    captured during fighting near Mazar-i-Sharif in order to avoid
    exchanging them with the Northern Alliance. The Taliban denied these
    allegations; by year's end, there had been no investigation into these
    alleged killings.
        In 1998 the U.N. found several mass graves connected with the
    massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, which
    contained evidence consistent with mass executions. Independent
    investigations of these mass and other killings, including killings by
    the Taliban, were hindered by the continuing warfare and the
    unwillingness of local commanders to allow investigators to visit the
    areas in question. The Taliban leadership has indicated in several of
    these cases that investigations were under way or that investigations
    would be permitted. However, according to neutral observers, no real
    progress was made by the Taliban in facilitating investigations; mass
    and other killings from 1997 and 1998 have not been investigated fully.
        There has been no investigation into the 1998 killing of Lieutenant
    Colonel Carmine Calo, an Italian serving with the U.N. Special Mission.
        b. Disappearance.--The strict security enforced by the Taliban in
    areas under its control has resulted in a decrease in abductions,
    kidnapings, and hostages taken for ransom. However, there have been
    allegations that the Taliban maintains private prisons to settle
    personal vendettas and that the Taliban was responsible for
    disappearances in areas under its control. AI reported that hundreds of
    persons were separated from their families in the Taloqan area during
    the Taliban summer offensive, and that these persons were taken away
    and believed to have been killed (see Section 1.a.). There were
    unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to be
    foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Taloqan area
    during fighting from June through October. There also were reports of
    the abduction of women by the Taliban in August 1999 when the Taliban
    retook the Shomali plains; women reportedly were taken in trucks from
    the area of fighting and were trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab
    Gulf states. In 1998 there were credible reports that the Taliban
    detained hundreds of persons, mostly ethnic Hazaras, after the takeover
    of Mazar-i-Sharif; the whereabouts of many such persons remained
    unknown at year's end. There were unconfirmed reports that some Taliban
    soldiers abducted girls and women from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-
    Sharif in 1998; the whereabouts of some of these women also were
    unknown at year's end (see Section 5). Since 1998 persons who have
    disappeared include: General Abdul Rahman; General Farooq; Moulvi
    Shabuddin; Waliullah Dagarwal; General Syed Agha Rayees; Engineer Nabi
    Shah; and Wolaswal Ismail.
        There have been credible reports of some instances where Taliban
    soldiers have arrested Hazara men to extract ransoms. Abductions,
    kidnapings, and hostage taking for ransom or for political reasons also
    occurred in non-Taliban areas, but specific information was lacking. In
    northern areas, women were at risk of being raped and kidnaped,
    according to the U.N. There have been unconfirmed reports that local
    commanders were kidnaping young women. Some of the women reportedly
    then were forced to marry their kidnapers. Others simply remained
    missing. To avoid this danger, some families reportedly sent their
    daughters to Pakistan or to Iran (see Section 5).
        Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers formerly serving
    in Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war (POW's). Most
    were thought to be dead or to have assimilated voluntarily into Afghan
    society, though some are alleged to be held against their will. A
    number of persons from the former Soviet Union missing since the period
    of the Soviet occupation are presumed dead.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Taliban is believed to have used torture against
    opponents and POW's. Torture does not appear to be a routine practice
    in all cases. The Taliban reportedly beats some persons detained for
    political reasons. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in
    Afghanistan met in Iran with a former governor of Herat, General Ismail
    Khan, and two of his colleagues. The three stated that they were
    detained in a Kandahar prison on political grounds for 3 years prior to
    their escape on March 26. They were kept in windowless cells, shackled
    the entire time (see Section 1.d.). The General's colleagues reported
    that they were tortured by the prison authorities, and all three
    reported the torture of other prisoners; including being hung upside
    down by the legs while being beaten with cables.
        The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that it controlled,
    establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems, based on its
    understanding of Islamic justice. Taliban courts imposed their extreme
    interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary
    trials. Murderers were subjected to public executions, a punishment
    that at times was inflicted by the victims' families. Thieves were
    subjected to public amputations of either one hand, one foot, or both.
    Adulterers were stoned to death or publicly given 100 lashes. On
    September 26, a man convicted of adultery was publicly stoned in
    Maymana in Fariab province. The woman with whom he was convicted of
    engaging in adultery was sentenced to 100 lashes, but the sentence was
    postponed because she was pregnant. A second woman, who was convicted
    of arranging this adultery, was sentenced to 39 lashes. The punishment
    for those found guilty of homosexual acts is to have walls toppled over
    them. Although there were no known instances of such punishment during
    the year, this punishment was carried out on at least one occasion in
    1999, and seven times in 1998 (resulting in five deaths).
        In the past, there have been credible reports that Taliban forces
    threatened and beat women for what they considered immodest dress. They
    threatened and beat men for immodest dress and for incorrect beard
    length. There were no such credible reports this year.
        During the year, there were credible reports that the Taliban
    detained and tortured persons who they believed were being helpful to
    Western journalists. In July a Western journalist observed his Afghan
    associate being severely beaten. The associate was subsequently
    detained and beaten routinely until he was able to escape from prison
    (see Section 2.a.).
        All Afghan factions are believed to have used torture against
    opponents and POW's, though specific information generally is lacking.
    Torture does not appear to be a routine practice in all cases. Some of
    Masood's commanders in the north reportedly used torture routinely to
    extract information from and break the will of prisoners and political
    opponents. At least one of the alleged killers of Commander Abdullah
    Jan Wahidi (see Section 1.a.) reportedly was tortured prior to being
    executed.
        Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners held by some factions are not
    given food, as normally this is the responsibility of prisoners'
    relatives, who are allowed to visit to provide them with food once or
    twice a week. Those who have no relatives have to petition the local
    council or rely on other inmates. Prisoners live in overcrowded,
    unsanitary conditions in collective cells.
        In the past, there have been credible reports that torture occurred
    in prisons under the control of both the Taliban and the Northern
    Alliance. Local authorities maintain prisons in territories under their
    control and reportedly established torture cells in some of them. The
    Taliban operates prisons in Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-
    Sharif, Pul-i-Khumri, Shibarghan, Qala-e-Zaini, and Maimana. The
    Northern Alliance maintains prisons in Panjshir and Faizabad. According
    to one credible report, prison authorities routinely used rubber and
    plastic bound cables in beatings in Badakhshan province. According to
    AI, there have been reports that the Taliban forced prisoners to work
    on the construction of a new story on the Kandahar prison and that some
    Taliban prisoners held by Masood were forced to labor in life-
    threatening conditions, such as digging trenches in mined areas.
        There were reports that an Afghan human rights organization visited
    a Taliban prison in Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1999. Intensified
    fighting and poor security for foreign personnel limited the
    International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) ability to monitor
    prison conditions, especially in and around Mazar-i-Sharif after that
    city fell to the Taliban. However, the ICRC's access improved toward
    the end of 1999. The ICRC visited 5,621 detainees, including 49 women
    and 414 minors in 51 different places of detention during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the absence of formal
    legal and law enforcement institutions, justice was not administered
    according to formal legal codes, and persons were subject to arbitrary
    detention. There are credible reports that both Taliban and Northern
    Alliance militia extorted bribes from civilians in return for their
    release from prison or to avoid arrest. Judicial and police procedures
    varied from locality to locality. Little is known about the procedures
    for taking persons into custody and bringing them to justice. In both
    Taliban and non-Taliban areas, the practices varied depending on the
    locality, the local commanders, and other authorities. Some areas have
    a more formal judicial structure than others.
        On July 9, the Taliban's PVSV jailed for several days a foreign aid
    worker, who had lived and worked in Afghanistan for over 30 years, and
    a number of her Afghan associates. The aid worker and her associates
    promoted home-based work for women and home schools for girls. She was
    expelled from the country shortly after her release on July 12. She
    returned to Kabul in late September after receiving a visa in Pakistan
    but within days was ordered to leave the country; she departed on
    October 6. No reason was given by the Taliban for her arrest and
    deportation.
        On July 23, in Kabul, the Taliban arrested 40 members of a local
    group advocating a peaceful settlement of the conflict on charges of
    trying to destabilize the country. There were reports that another
    member of this group was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Peshawar,
    Pakistan.
        AI reported that the Taliban has taken children hostage in an
    effort to compel their fathers to surrender; the fathers of such
    children generally are reported to be political opponents of the
    Taliban. The families of these children have been told that the
    children would be released when their fathers surrender to the Taliban.
        A respected physician, Dr. Ayub, who headed the Shuhada Hospital in
    Jaghoray, was taken into custody during the Bamiyan military action in
    1999 and remains in Taliban custody without charges.
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan met in
    July in Iran with a former governor of Herat, General Ismail Khan, and
    two of his colleagues. The three said that they were detained in a
    Kandahar prison on political grounds for three years prior to their
    escape on March 26. They were kept in windowless cells and shackled for
    the entire time. The General's colleagues reported their own torture by
    the prison authorities, and all three reported the torture of other
    prisoners, including being hung upside down by the legs while being
    beaten with cables (see Section 1.c.).
        A number of persons arrested by the Taliban in 1998 for political
    reasons were believed still to be in detention at year's end.
        All factions probably hold political detainees, but no firm numbers
    are available. Both the Taliban and Masood hold thousands of POW's.
    Masood reportedly holds a number of Pakistanis, along with several
    hundred Taliban soldiers, as POW's. In June the Taliban and the
    Northern Alliance sent delegations to inspect each other's prisoners in
    advance of an exchange of prisoners. Lists were reportedly prepared
    amid allegations that the Taliban had executed as many as 189 prisoners
    captured in 1998 during the fighting around Mazar-i-Sharif in order to
    avoid exchanging them (see Section 1.a.). The Taliban has denied this,
    and there has been no investigation. The prisoner exchange initiative
    ended as fighting resumed in June.
        There was no information available on forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--With no functioning nationwide
    judicial system, many municipal and provincial authorities relied on
    some interpretation of Islamic law and traditional tribal codes of
    justice. There is no independent judiciary.
        The Taliban has Islamic courts in areas under their control to
    judge criminal cases and resolve disputes. According to the U.N., the
    Taliban asserts that there is a lower court and a higher court in every
    province, and a Supreme Court in Kabul. In 1999 Mullah Omar promulgated
    a decree ordering the Supreme Court and military courts not to
    interfere with one another, according to press reports. The courts
    meted out punishments including execution and amputation and reportedly
    heard cases in sessions that lasted only a few minutes. The courts
    reportedly dealt with all complaints relying on the Taliban's extreme
    interpretation of Islamic law and punishments, as well as on
    traditional tribal customs (see Section 1.c.). In cases involving
    murder and rape, convicted prisoners generally were ordered executed,
    although relatives of the victim could instead choose to accept other
    restitution. Decisions of the courts were reportedly final. According
    to AI, some judges in these courts were untrained in law and at times
    based their judgments on a mixture of their personal understanding of
    Islamic law and a tribal code of honor prevalent in Pashtun areas.
        Defendants do not have the right to an attorney.
        Little is known about the administration of justice in the areas
    controlled by the Northern Alliance. The administration and
    implementation of justice varied from area to area and depended on the
    whims of local commanders or other authorities, who summarily execute,
    torture, and mete out punishments without reference to any other
    authority.
        All factions probably hold political prisoners, but no reliable
    estimates of numbers are available.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Interfactional fighting often resulted in the homes
    and businesses of civilians being invaded and looted by the opposing
    forces--whether victor or loser. Some armed gunmen reportedly acted
    with impunity given the absence of any legal protection or a responsive
    police force. It was unclear what authority controlled the actions of
    the Taliban militiamen who patrolled the streets of cities and towns. A
    number of incidents were reported in which Taliban soldiers, persons
    masquerading as Taliban, or foreign sympathizers fighting alongside the
    Taliban, entered private homes without prior notification or informed
    consent. In Kabul the soldiers allegedly searched homes for evidence of
    cooperation with the former authorities or for violations of Taliban
    religion-based decrees, including the ban on the possession of
    depictions of living things (including photographs, stuffed animals,
    dolls, etc.). At various times, the Taliban also has banned certain
    traditional recreational activities, such as kite flying and playing
    chess (see Section 2.c.). Members of the PVSV, the Taliban's religious
    police, beat individuals on the streets for infractions of Taliban
    rules concerning dress, hair length, and facial hair, as well as for
    the violation of the prohibition on women being in the company of men
    who were unrelated to them. The Taliban required women to wear a burqa,
    a tent-like outer garment that covers a woman from head to toe, when in
    public (see Section 5). Men are required to have beards of a certain
    length or longer, not to trim their beards, and to wear head coverings.
    Men whose beards did not conform to the guidelines on beard length set
    out by the Taliban were subject to imprisonment for 10 days and
    mandatory Islamic instruction. According to AI, the Taliban have taken
    children hostage in an effort to compel their fathers to surrender (see
    Section 1.d.). The Taliban reportedly also has required parents to give
    their children ``Islamic'' names.
        In 1998 the Taliban prohibited television sets, satellite dishes,
    videocassette recorders, videocassettes, and audio cassettes as part of
    an effort to ban music, television, and movies (see Section 2.a.). The
    ban continues, although televisions reportedly are widely sold, and
    their use generally is ignored unless reported by a neighbor (see
    Section 2.a.).
        During the late summer offensive to retake Taloqan, the Taliban
    reportedly burned a village and killed several villagers (see Section
    1.a.). On October 19, the Northern Alliance alleged that the Taliban
    forced the residents of Humber Koh and Hazrab villages near Taloqan to
    leave their homes before burning the dwellings. There were reports
    during 1999 and during the year that the Taliban forcibly expelled
    ethnic Hazara and Tajiks from areas controlled by the Taliban, and that
    the Taliban harassed these minorities (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
        There were reports that some prisoners of the Taliban, including
    the sons of families that had opposed Taliban social restrictions, had
    been drafted forcibly and sent to the front. There were also reports
    that the Taliban forcibly conscripted or attempted to forcibly
    conscript persons in 1997 and 1998; some of these reports were
    unconfirmed.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--The Taliban continued to pose serious obstacles to
    the efforts of international aid organizations to deliver food aid and
    other humanitarian assistance. U.N.-led negotiations to obtain Taliban
    permission for delivery of food and nonfood aid across the front lines
    into the Panjshir Valley and the Dara-i-Suf area remained at an impasse
    at year's end. The Taliban permitted limited deliveries to Panjshir in
    December 1999 to reach the large community of displaced persons, which
    had fled the Shomali plains during the summer 1999 offensive. Limited
    supplies have reached Dara-i-Suf (where the U.N. has received reports
    of starvation), but only at great expense aboard donkey caravans. The
    French NGO Solidarite has sent similar donkey caravans into nearby
    Balkhab District.
        The continuing internal conflict resulted in many instances of the
    use of excessive force. When fighting resumed in June, the Taliban
    bombed cities held by the Northern Alliance, such as Taloqan, Charikar,
    Nahreen, and Jabal-as Saraf. The Taliban's aerial bombing of civilian
    areas has resulting in the deaths of civilians, property damage, and
    the displacement of residents.
        The conflict leading up to the fall of Taloqan in September
    displaced 60,000 to 75,000 people. Taloqan itself was evacuated, but
    families quickly returned once it became clear that the Taliban was not
    following the scorched earth policy it had pursued in previous years.
        In May 1999, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan. There were reports of
    systematic killings and summary executions by Taliban forces, as well
    as reports of hundreds of persons being taken away in Taliban trucks.
    Taliban forces reportedly also took hundreds of persons after the
    capture of Yakaolang the same month. In the late summer of 1999,
    refugees from the Taliban offensive in the Shomali plain reported
    summary executions of noncombatants. The number of those killed or
    detained in fighting by the Taliban in 1999 is unknown. In August 1998,
    the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif. There were reports that as many as
    5,000 persons, mostly ethnic Hazara civilians, were massacred by the
    Taliban after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif. In September 1998, the
    Taliban captured Bamiyan; during the fighting an estimated 200
    civilians were killed. There were also credible reports of a massacre
    of 45 civilians in a village near Bamiyan by Taliban commanders in
    September 1998. AI reported that the Taliban massacred 70 Hazara
    civilians, including children, in Qezelabad, near Mazar-i-Sharif in
    1997. There were also reports that Taliban forces in Faryab province
    killed some 600 civilians in late 1997.
        In general independent investigations of alleged killings were
    hindered by continuing warfare and the unwillingness of local
    commanders to allow investigators to visit the areas in question (see
    Section 1.a.). The Taliban denied charges that its forces massacred or
    committed atrocities against civilians and claimed that civilian
    deaths, if any, resulted from combat.
        Prior to its summer offensive, the Taliban claimed that the
    Northern Alliance bombed Shekhar Darra and Gol Darra, killing an
    unspecified number of civilians.
        The discovery of mass graves near Shibarghan in the northern part
    of the country in 1997 was widely reported. The graves allegedly
    contained 2,000 corpses, reportedly those of Taliban forces captured
    near Mazar-i-Sharif in mid-1997 and executed by Northern Alliance
    forces (see Section 1.a.).
        There were reports in 1999 that Masood's commanders in the
    northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan
    from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and
    otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid (see Section 4).
    There were no reports of such behavior during the year, and, on the
    contrary, the Masood forces appeared welcoming to NGO's.
        Continued warfare also resulted in massive forced displacement of
    civilians. Over the course of the year, it is estimated that up to
    75,000 persons may have fled the fighting, although a majority of them
    reportedly have returned to their homes. An estimated 500,000-750,000
    Afghans remain internally displaced following years of conflict. More
    than 2.4 million Afghans are living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. A
    much larger number over the past 21 years has sought refuge abroad.
    Women and children constituted the majority of those in need of
    humanitarian assistance.
        Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world,
    according to U.N. mine-clearing experts. The U.N. estimates that there
    are 5 to 7 million landmines and over 750,000 pieces of unexploded
    ordnance throughout the country, sown mainly during the Soviet
    occupation. However, some NGO's estimate that there may be less than 1
    million mines. There have been claims that 162 of 356 districts are
    mine-affected. The most heavily mined areas are the provinces bordering
    Iran and Pakistan. The landmines and unexploded ordnance cause deaths
    and injuries, restrict areas available for cultivation, and slow the
    return of refugees. At the end of 1999, according to the NGO Halo
    Trust, mines covered more than an estimated 420 square miles, including
    over 285 square miles of grazing land; over 100 square miles of
    agricultural land; almost 25 square miles of roads; 7.5 square miles of
    residential area; and over 2 square miles of irrigation systems and
    canals. From 1995-97, new mines are believed to have been laid over 90
    square miles of land, reportedly mainly by the Northern Alliance in the
    western provinces of Badghis and Faryab. Additional newly mined areas
    were reported but not confirmed during the year in the conflict areas
    north of Kabul. The Northern Alliance reportedly laid these in response
    to the Taliban's summer offensive. Taliban leader Mullah Omar
    reportedly banned the use, production, trade, and stockpiling of mines
    in 1998. Despite the general prohibition on the depiction of living
    things, the Taliban allowed the visual depiction of persons in demining
    educational materials.
        An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by
    landmines. Currently casualties caused by landmines and unexploded
    ordnance are estimated at 10 to 12 per day. In some parts of the
    country, including in Herat and Kandahar, almost 90 percent of
    households are affected by the presence of landmines. An estimated 96
    percent of civilian mine and unexploded ordnance casualties are male.
    Approximately 53 percent of mine and unexploded ordnance casualties
    occur in the 18 to 40 age group, while 34 percent of the casualties
    involve children, according to the U.N. Mine Action Center. Landmines
    and unexploded ordnance resulted in death in approximately 30 percent
    of cases and in serious injuries and disability, including amputation
    and blindness, in approximately 20 percent of cases.
        With funding from international donors, the U.N. has organized and
    trained mine detection and clearance teams, which operate throughout
    the country. Nearly all areas that have been cleared are in productive
    use, and approximately 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced
    persons have returned to areas cleared of mines and unexploded
    ordnance. Nevertheless the mines are expected to pose a threat for many
    years. In 1997 the 4,000 mine clearers suffered from an accident rate
    of 1 per week. However, clearance rates and safety have increased for
    clearance teams assisted by dogs. U.N. agencies and NGO's have
    instituted a number of mine awareness campaigns and educational
    programs for women and children in various parts of the country, but
    many were curtailed as a result of Taliban restrictions on women and
    girls.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--There are no laws that effectively
    provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and senior officials of
    various warring factions allegedly attempted to intimidate journalists
    and influence their reporting. There are fewer than 10 regular
    publications in the country. All other newspapers are published only
    sporadically. Newspapers for the most part are affiliated with
    different factions. Various factions maintain their own communications
    facilities. The Taliban selectively bans the entry of foreign
    newspapers into their territory. Many foreign books are prohibited. The
    Taliban radio station, the Voice of Shariat, broadcasts religious
    programming and Taliban pronouncements.
        The Taliban has arrested more than 25 journalists since it took
    control of Kabul in September 1996. In July a Western journalist, while
    being detained, observed his Afghan associate being severely beaten.
    The journalist subsequently was expelled from the country, and his
    associate was detained and beaten routinely, until he escaped from
    prison (see Section 1.c.). On August 11, three foreign journalists were
    arrested by the PVSV and accused of taking pictures of a soccer match
    in Kabul. The journalists were interrogated for 2 hours, after which
    their film was confiscated. The PVSV officials confirmed that it is
    forbidden to take pictures of living things.
        All factions have attempted to pressure foreign journalists who
    report on the conflict. The Taliban initially cooperated with members
    of the international press who arrived in Kabul but later imposed
    restrictions upon them. Foreign journalists were forbidden to film or
    photograph persons or animals, were not allowed to interview women, and
    were required to be accompanied at all times by a Taliban escort to
    ensure that these restrictions were enforced. In 1998 foreign
    journalists were not permitted into Mazar-i-Sharif after the Taliban
    took the city and reportedly massacred as many as 5,000 persons (see
    Section 1.g.).
        In August the Taliban introduced strict regulations governing the
    work of foreign journalists in the country. A list of 21 points ``to be
    respected'' is given to foreign journalists upon arrival. The list
    includes an item asking journalists ``not to offend the people's
    feelings.'' Journalists are required to tell the Taliban authorities
    when they travel outside of Kabul and to stay out of prohibited areas
    outside of Kabul. Journalists may work only with approved interpreters
    and local assistants, must renew their work permits every year, and
    must register all of their professional equipment. The Taliban also
    require most journalists to stay at the Intercontinental Hotel in
    Kabul, allegedly for security and economic reasons.
        In August 1998, Iranian journalist Mahmoud Saremi was killed after
    being abducted by Taliban soldiers in Mazar-i-Sharif, along with eight
    Iranian diplomats. Saremi was the Afghanistan bureau chief for the
    official Iranian news agency, IRNA. Taliban officials stated that those
    responsible for Saremi's killing were not acting under official orders
    and would be punished; however, no action was known to have been taken
    regarding the case by year's end.
        There have been numerous threats to Afghan journalists working in
    exile in Pakistan; the UNHCR has assisted approximately 10 Afghan
    journalists in relocating to Western countries from Pakistan. Many
    believe these threats are directed by the Taliban authorities in
    response to unfavorable columns by the journalists. On July 4, Inayat-
    ul-Haq Yasinin, a journalist in Peshawar, received death threats for
    publishing the results of an opinion poll on Afghan refugees living in
    Peshawar. In 1998 in Peshawar, two men fired at Abdul Hafiz Hamis
    Afizi, an ethnic Tajik Afghan journalist writing for two Peshawar
    Afghan daily newspapers. Also in 1998, Mohammad Hashim Paktianai, a
    journalist related to former president Najibullah was killed at his
    home in Hayatabad.
        The Taliban continue to prohibit music, movies, and television on
    religious grounds. In August 1998, television sets, videocassette
    recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite dishes were
    outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However, televisions
    reportedly are sold widely, and their use generally is ignored unless
    reported by a neighbor.
        The Taliban severely restricts academic freedom, particularly
    education for girls (see Section 5).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Civil war,
    tenuous security, and likely opposition from local authorities
    seriously inhibited freedom of assembly and association.
        It is unknown whether laws exist that govern the formation of
    associations. Many domestic NGO's continue to operate in the country,
    and many international NGO's also continue to operate (see Section 4).
    There were reports that the Taliban required NGO's to go through
    burdensome registration procedures in order to be allowed to operate
    and attempted to exert control over NGO staffing and office locations,
    especially in Kabul. All factions continue to harass and interfere with
    the operations of domestic and international NGO's, including aid
    organizations (see Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
    severely. Due to the absence of a constitution and the ongoing civil
    war, religious freedom is determined primarily by the unofficial,
    unwritten, and evolving policies of the warring factions. In most parts
    of the country, the Pashtun-dominated, ultraconservative Islamic
    movement known as the Taliban vigorously enforced its extreme
    interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban claimed in mid-1999 that it
    was drafting a new constitution, based upon the sources of Islamic
    religious law (Shari'a): the Koran, the Sunna, and Hanafi
    jurisprudence. A Taliban spokesman stated that the new constitution
    would ensure the rights of all Muslims and of religious minorities.
    However, custom and law require affiliation with some religion, and
    atheism is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. The small
    number of non-Muslim residents who remain in the country may practice
    their faith but may not proselytize.
        The country's official name, according to the Taliban, is the
    Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; according to the umbrella organization
    of various smaller, anti-Taliban groups, the Northern Alliance, it is
    the Islamic State of Afghanistan. These names reflect the desire of
    both factions to promote Islam as the state religion. Taliban leader
    Mullah Omar carries the title of Commander of the Faithful.
    Traditionally Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence has
    been the dominant religion. The Taliban also adheres to the Hanafi
    school of Sunni Islam, making it the current dominant religion in the
    country.
        The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that it controlled,
    establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems. The Taliban
    established Islamic courts in areas under its control to judge criminal
    cases and resolve disputes. Taliban courts imposed their extreme
    interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary
    trials (see Section 1.e.).
        The Taliban seeks to impose its extreme interpretation of Islamic
    observance in areas that it controlled and has declared that all
    Muslims in areas under Taliban control must abide by the Taliban's
    interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban announces its proclamations
    and edicts through broadcasts on the Taliban's ``Radio Shariat'' and
    relies on a religious police force under the control of the PVSV to
    enforce rules regarding appearance, dress, employment, access to
    medical care, behavior, religious practice, and freedom of expression.
    Members of the PVSV, which was raised to the status of a Ministry in
    May 1998, regularly check persons on the street in order to ascertain
    that individuals are conforming to such Taliban edicts. Persons found
    to be in violation of the edicts are subject to punishment meted out on
    the spot, which may include beatings and detention. In practice the
    rigid policies adopted both by the Taliban and by certain opposition
    groups have a chilling effect on adherents of other forms of Islam and
    on those who practice other faiths. Enforcement of Taliban social
    strictures is much stricter in the cities, especially in Kabul, and
    looser in rural areas, where more is left to local custom.
        Reliable data on the country's population is not available.
    However, informed sources estimate that 85 percent of the population
    are Sunni Muslim; most of the remaining 15 percent are Shi'a. The
    Hazara ethnic group is predominantly Shi'a; Shi'a are among the most
    economically disadvantaged persons in the country. The Shi'a minority
    want a national government that would give them equal rights as
    citizens. There are also small numbers of Ismailis living in the
    central and northern parts of the country. Ismailis are Shi'a but
    consider the Aga Khan their spiritual leader. In the past, small
    communities of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Christians lived in the
    country, but most members of these communities have left. Almost all
    members of the country's small Hindu and Sikh population, which once
    numbered about 50,000 persons, have emigrated or taken refuge abroad.
        Licensing and registration of religious groups do not appear to be
    required by the authorities in any part of the country.
        According to Human Rights Watch, in September 1999, the Taliban
    issued decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship
    but allowed them to worship at existing holy sites, forbade non-Muslims
    from criticizing Muslims, ordered non-Muslims to identify their houses
    by placing a yellow cloth on their rooftops, forbade non-Muslims from
    living in the same residence as Muslims, and required that non-Muslim
    women wear a yellow dress with a special mark so that Muslims could
    keep their distance. These decrees followed earlier reports that Hindus
    were required to wear a piece of yellow cloth attached to their
    clothing to identify their religious identity and that Sikhs were
    required to wear some form of identification as well. This system of
    identification allegedly was imposed to spare non-Muslims from the
    enforcement of rules that are mandatory for Muslims and from harassment
    by agents of the PVSV, but the identification system reportedly no
    longer is enforced.
        There also are unconfirmed reports that the Taliban has occupied
    and ``cleaned'' Shi'a mosques for the use of Sunnis, including a Shi'a
    mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998. The sections of the country's
    educational system that have survived over 20 years of war put
    considerable emphasis on religion.
        In Taliban controlled areas, the Taliban has decreed that all
    Muslims must take part in five daily prayers. Those who are observed
    not praying at appointed times or who are late attending prayer are
    subject to punishment, including severe beatings. There were reports in
    1998 that PVSV members in Kabul stopped persons on the street and
    quizzed them to determine if they knew how to recite various Koranic
    prayers.
        Publishing and distribution of literature of any kind, including
    religious material, is rare.
        Proselytizing by non-Muslims is prohibited. A small number of
    foreign Christian groups are present in the country, but they focus on
    relief work since they are forbidden to proselytize. Conversion from
    Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. There was no
    information available about converts or about restrictions on the
    training of clergy.
        Since taking control of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban reportedly has
    committed numerous human rights violations, particularly against the
    Hazaras. In September 1997, the Taliban reportedly massacred 70 ethnic
    Hazara civilians in Qezelabad. There were reports of mass arrests by
    the Taliban in Hazara neighborhoods of Kabul in January 1998. There
    also were credible reports of the massacre of thousands of civilians
    and prisoners by the Taliban during and after the capture of Mazar-i-
    Sharif in August 1998; this massacre reportedly was aimed at ethnic
    Hazaras. In September 1998, approximately 500 persons were killed as
    the Taliban gained control of the city of Bamiyan. The Hazaras regained
    control of Bamiyan in April 1999 following prolonged guerrilla-style
    warfare; however, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in May 1999 and
    reportedly killed a number of Shi'a residents. There were reports
    during 1999 and 2000 that there were forced expulsions of ethnic
    Hazaras and Tajiks from areas controlled or conquered by the Taliban,
    as well as harassment of these minorities throughout Taliban controlled
    areas.
        The Ismaili community fought for the Northern Alliance against the
    Taliban and suffered when the Taliban occupied territories once held by
    Ismaili forces. There were reports of mistreatment of Ismailis at the
    hands of the Taliban.
        The Taliban, following its extreme interpretation of Shari'a
    (Islamic law), required women to don a head-to-toe garment known as the
    burqa, which has only a mesh screen for vision, when in public. While
    in some rural areas this was the normal garment for women, the
    requirement to wear the burqa represented a significant change in
    practice when imposed in urban areas. According to a decree announced
    by the religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were
    not covered properly would be punished severely, along with their
    family elders. In Kabul and elsewhere, women found in public who were
    not wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles
    properly, were beaten by Taliban militiamen. According to Taliban
    regulations, men's beards must protrude farther than would a fist
    clamped at the base of the chin. Men also must wear head coverings and
    must not have long hair. A man who has shaved or cut his beard may be
    imprisoned for 10 days and be required to undergo Islamic instruction.
    Several civil service employees reportedly were fired in 1997 for
    cutting their beards. All students at Kabul University reportedly are
    required to have beards in order to study there (no female students are
    allowed). There also are credible reports that Taliban members gave
    forced haircuts to males in Kabul. At various times, the Taliban has
    banned certain traditional recreational activities, such as kite flying
    and playing chess. Dolls, stuffed animals, and photographs are
    prohibited under the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions
    against representations of living beings; in search of these objects,
    Taliban soldiers or persons masquerading as Taliban members reportedly
    have entered private homes without prior notification or informed
    consent. The Taliban reportedly has required parents to give their
    children Islamic names (see Section 1.f.).
        The Taliban continues to prohibit music, movies, and television on
    religious grounds in Taliban-controlled areas. In 1998 television sets,
    videocassette recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite
    dishes were outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However,
    subsequent reports indicate that many persons in urban areas around the
    country own such electronic devices despite the ban (see Section 1.f.
    and 2.a.).
        In November 1998, Taliban officials accepted responsibility for the
    defacing of one of two historic statues of Buddha near Bamiyan during
    their takeover of that city earlier in the year. The Taliban claimed
    that the vandalism was the result of an unauthorized act by one of
    their soldiers and that the statutes were being protected by the
    Taliban from further harm. While some Taliban leaders have claimed
    tolerance of religious minorities, there reportedly have been
    restrictions imposed upon Shi'a Muslims in Taliban-controlled
    territory, although not necessarily on a uniform basis. However, the
    Taliban allegedly has ordered Shi'a to confine their Ashura
    commemorations during the month of Muharram to their mosques and to
    avoid the public processions that are an integral part of Ashura in
    other countries with Shi'a populations.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although in principle citizens have the
    right to travel freely both inside and outside the country, their
    ability to travel within the country was hampered by warfare,
    brigandage, landmines, a road network in a state of disrepair, and
    limited domestic air service, complicated by factional threats to air
    traffic. Some Afghans reported difficulty in receiving necessary
    permits to leave the country for tourism or business purposes, while
    others reported no such difficulty. The Taliban's restrictions on women
    further curtail freedom of movement (see Sections 2.c. and 5). Despite
    these obstacles, many persons continued to travel relatively freely,
    with buses plying routes in most parts of the country. However, due to
    intermittent fighting in various areas, international aid agencies
    often found that their ability to travel, work, and distribute
    assistance was hampered severely. International travel continued to be
    difficult as both the Taliban and Masood threatened to shoot down any
    planes that flew without their permission over areas of the country
    that they controlled.
        Commercial trade was impeded in certain non-Taliban areas, as local
    commanders and criminals continued to demonstrate their control over
    the roads by demanding road tolls and sometimes closing roads. There
    were reports in 1998 that some Taliban commanders, who previously
    gained popularity by sweeping away the checkpoints that local warlords
    used to shake down travelers, were setting up checkpoints themselves
    and demanding tolls for passage, but there were no such reports during
    the year.
        There also have been instances in the past of the forcible
    expulsion of individuals on ethnic grounds, but there were no known
    instances of this during the year.
        Afghans continued to form one of the world's largest refugee
    populations. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
    approximately 2.8 million Afghans remain outside the country as
    registered refugees: 1.4 million in Iran, 1.4 million in Pakistan, and
    some in Russia, India, and the central Asian republics. Women and
    children constitute 75 percent of the refugee population. In addition
    there are 500,000 to 750,000 Afghans who are internally displaced
    following years of fighting. A total of 4,069,000 Afghan refugees have
    been repatriated since 1988, with over 1.5 million returning to the
    country in the peak year of 1992. During the year, 133,600 refugees
    were voluntarily repatriated from Iran under an UNHCR-Iran program, and
    another 50,00 are estimated to have returned outside the program.
    Refugees in Pakistan are known to cross the border back and forth
    routinely.
        There was no available information on policies regarding refugees,
    asylum, provision of first asylum, or the forced return of refugees.
        On June 21, Pakistan deported Professor Mohammad Rahim Elham, a
    prominent Afghan scholar, back to Afghanistan. Professor Rahim had
    called for a stop to Pakistani interference in the internal affairs of
    Afghanistan. There is concern that he may face detention, torture, or
    extrajudicial execution in Afghanistan. According to an AI report,
    Professor Rahim was granted asylum in another country late in the year.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        There was no functioning central government in the country. The
    continuing struggle for political power among the major armed groups
    prevented citizens from changing their government or choosing their
    leaders peacefully. Most political changes came about through shifting
    military fortunes. No faction held elections or respected citizens'
    right to change their government peacefully.
        The Taliban movement's authority emanates from its leader, Mullah
    Omar, who carries the title Commander of the Faithful, and from the
    Taliban's military occupation of most of the country. Governmental
    functions are exercised through the key Taliban governing body, the
    Inner Shura (Council) based in Kandahar, and by ministries based in
    Kabul.
        The Northern Alliance, headed by nominal President Rabbani, holds
    power with de facto Defense Minister Masood as Rabbani's primary
    military backer. Rabbani received nominal support from General Dostam
    and a faction of the Shi'a Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat. Another faction of the
    Hezb-i-Wahdat nominally allied with the Taliban early in 1999. Rabbani
    and Masood control the northeastern, largely Tajik, portion of the
    country, including the strategic Panjshir valley north of Kabul.
        Discontent with the Taliban's strictures and rural village values
    was strong in large, non-Pashtun cities such as Herat, Kabul, and other
    northern cities. The Taliban's military successes did not encourage the
    group's leaders to engage in meaningful political dialog with
    opponents. Efforts in 1998 to convene a national body of Muslim
    scholars (ulema) to discuss the future of the country broke down when
    both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance disagreed over the possible
    membership and sequence of the talks. Peace talks convened in April
    1998 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, but broke down quickly. Moderate and
    neutral Afghans, mostly living outside of the country, continue their
    efforts to organize a traditional Grand National Assembly (Loya Jirga)
    and held meetings in Rome in July and November 1999. The former King
    supports this process. Other moderate groups exist in Bonn, Cyprus, and
    Teheran.
        The U.N. and the international community continued their efforts to
    help Afghans reach a political settlement. The U.N. Secretary General's
    Personal Representative for Afghanistan Fransesc Vendrell has continued
    to explore ideas for a peace process with the warring factions. A group
    of six nations bordering the country, the U.S., and Russia met several
    times during the year to explore ways to resolve the conflict
    peacefully.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are many NGO's, both domestic and international, in the
    country. Some are based in neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan, with
    branches inside the country; others are based in Afghan cities and
    rural areas. The focus of their activities is primarily humanitarian
    assistance, rehabilitation, health, education, and agriculture.
        The Afghan League of Human Rights operates both in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan; it produces an annual report. The Cooperation Center for
    Afghanistan (CCA) is an Afghan NGO that operates in both Pakistan and
    Afghanistan. The CCA maintains an office in Peshawar, where it produces
    a monthly newsletter on the Afghan human rights situation. It also
    monitors and documents the human rights situation from several offices
    in both Taliban-controlled and Northern Alliance-controlled cities. The
    National Commission on Human Rights in Afghanistan began operations
    during 1998 in Pakistan, conducting seminars on human rights issues,
    issuing press statements criticizing specific instances of human rights
    abuses, and placing articles in Pashtu and Dari newspapers. The
    Afghanistan Commission for Human Rights, founded in 1997 after
    discussions with Taliban authorities on Islamic aspects of human
    rights, also started activities in Pakistan in 1998, focused on the
    plight of Afghan prisoners in Pakistani prisons and on children's
    rights. However, the civil war and lack of security continued to make
    it difficult for human rights organizations to monitor adequately the
    situation inside the country.
        On July 6, the Taliban issued an edict banning women's employment
    (except in the health care sector) by U.N. agencies and NGO's.
    Implementation remains erratic, but the U.N. and NGO's kept their
    female staff at home to avoid open confrontation with the Taliban. On
    August 16, the Taliban issued an order closing down the World Food
    Program's (WFP) 25 widows' bakeries, which provide food to the neediest
    citizens, including many war widows and other female-headed households.
    On August 17, the Taliban reversed the previous day's decision to close
    the widows' bakeries, apparently accepting the WFP's explanation that
    the female staff of the bakeries were not direct hire WFP employees and
    therefore not subject to the July 6 edict. The arrest in July of a
    foreign aid worker long resident in the country (see Section 1.d.) and
    the sudden closure of the widows' bakeries, served as reminders to the
    international relief community that their programs are at constant risk
    of closure by the Taliban.
        In September the Taliban refused a visa to the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan.
        During the year, the Taliban continued to pose serious obstacles to
    the international aid community's efforts to deliver food aid and other
    humanitarian assistance to citizens (see Section 1.g.).
        The Taliban continued to harass domestic and international NGO's.
    The Taliban has interfered consistently with the operation of the U.N.
    and NGO's. Tactics used have included threatening to impound the
    vehicles of NGO's that do not work on projects preferred by the
    Taliban, threatening to close projects that do not include Taliban
    supervisors or workers, and, in the case of one local NGO, the
    detention of its director and the impounding of all of its equipment in
    an effort to increase Taliban control of the organization. The Taliban
    announced in March 1998 that foreign Muslim women, including U.N.
    workers, would be allowed to perform their jobs only if accompanied by
    a male relative, a move that continued to hamper NGO and relief
    operations. The U.N. withdrew its personnel from southern Afghanistan
    in late March 1998 to protest the assault on a U.N. worker by the
    Taliban governor of Kandahar Province and the interference with its
    work by the Taliban. After reaching agreements with local officials,
    the U.N. returned to Kandahar in May 1999. In April 1998, Taliban
    authorities rejected the participation of a U.N. official on the U.N.
    team selected to negotiate with the Taliban on the travel restrictions
    for foreign Muslim women and other issues, because he was perceived to
    be ``anti-Taliban.'' In June 1998, the Taliban required all NGO's in
    Kabul to relocate to a single location in a bomb-damaged former school;
    those who refused were threatened with expulsion from the country.
    However, the order was not enforced. In November 1998, the U.N. World
    Food Program accused the Taliban of looting 1,364 tons of food,
    stealing trucks from the WFP's compound in Bamiyan, and occupying WFP
    offices in Bamiyan and Yakaolang.
        On June 15, 1999, staff members of an international NGO were
    detained and beaten by members of the Taliban in Bamiyan Province.
    After the June 1999 incident, Mullah Omar issued an edict stating that
    any person causing annoyance to a foreign worker could face punishment
    of up to 5 years in prison. However, in November 1999 U.N. properties
    were targeted in organized demonstrations in several cities when U.N.
    sanctions related to terrorism were imposed on the country. Certain key
    issues, including the mobility of international female Muslim staff and
    access by Afghan women and girls to programs, remain largely
    unresolved.
        There were reports in 1999 that Masood's commanders in the
    northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan
    from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and
    otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid. There were no
    such reports during the year (see Section 1.g.).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        There is no functioning constitution, and therefore there are no
    constitutional provisions that prohibit or protect against
    discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or
    social status. It is not known whether specific laws prohibit
    discrimination; local custom and practices generally prevail.
    Discrimination against women is prevalent throughout the country. Its
    severity varies from area to area, depending on the local leadership's
    attitude towards education for girls and employment for women and on
    local attitudes. Historically the minority Shi'a faced discrimination
    from the majority Sunni population. There has been greater acceptance
    of the disabled as the number of persons maimed by landmines increased,
    and the presence of the disabled became more widespread. In 1998 and
    1999, the Taliban on several occasions sought to execute homosexuals by
    toppling walls on them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.); however, this is
    not known to have occurred during the year.
        Women.--As lawlessness and interfactional fighting continued in
    some areas, violence against women occurred frequently, including
    beatings, rapes, forced marriages, disappearances, kidnapings, and
    killings. Such incidents generally went unreported, and most
    information was anecdotal. It was difficult to document rapes, in
    particular, in view of the social stigma that surrounds the problem.
    Although the stability brought by the Taliban to most of the country
    acted in general to reduce violence against women, particularly rapes
    and kidnapings, Taliban members continued to threaten or beat women to
    enforce the Taliban's dress code for women. There were unconfirmed
    reports that the Taliban or foreign ``volunteers'' fighting alongside
    the Taliban abducted women during the military offensive on Taloqan.
    There were also unconfirmed reports that Taliban soldiers or foreign
    volunteers abducted women in the offensive in the Shomali plains in
    1999 and that they raped and abducted women from Hazara neighborhoods
    in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998. The whereabouts of some of these
    women were unknown at year's end. The enforced seclusion of women
    within the home greatly limited the information available on domestic
    violence and marital rape. In a climate of secrecy and impunity, it is
    likely that domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
        Women accused of adultery also are subjected to violence. Adultery
    is punishable by death through stoning. At least one accused adulteress
    was sentenced to 100 lashes during the year; a female accomplice was
    sentenced to 30 lashes.
        Overall, the situation of women and girls remained mostly
    unchanged, as the Taliban generally continued the application of its
    ultra-conservative interpretation of Islamic law.
        In 1992 a new government was installed and the previous trend
    towards increasing numbers of women working outside of the home was
    reversed. Since the advent of the Taliban in 1994, the trend towards
    excluding women from employment has intensified.
        The treatment of women under Taliban rule has been particularly
    harsh, although there was marginal improvement in some areas during the
    year. In the areas where it took control, the Taliban initially
    excluded women from all employment outside the home, apart from the
    traditional work of women in agriculture; women were forbidden to leave
    the home except in the company of a male relative. In urban areas, and
    particularly after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forced
    almost all women to quit their jobs as professionals and clerical
    workers, including teachers, doctors, nurses, bank tellers, and aid
    workers. In a few cases, the Taliban relented and allowed women to work
    in health care occupations under restricted circumstances. The
    prohibition on women working outside of the home has been especially
    difficult for the large numbers of widows left by 20 years of civil
    war; there are an estimated 30,000 widows in Kabul alone. In August the
    Taliban issued an order closing down the World Food Program's 25
    widows' bakeries but reversed the decision on the following day (see
    Section 4). Many women reportedly have been reduced to selling all of
    their possessions and to begging to feed their families.
        However, during 1999, restrictions on women's employment reportedly
    eased somewhat. The Taliban allowed women to work in the medical sector
    as doctors and nurses, treating only other women. Medicins Sans
    Frontieres and other international NGO's reported that they were able
    to recruit both male and female health care staff without
    administrative obstacles and that the main difficulty faced in
    recruitment of medical staff was the lack of qualified female
    personnel. In 1999 there were reports that the Taliban reopened schools
    for doctors and nurses and that women were allowed to attend women-only
    institutions. A limited number of women were allowed to work for
    international agencies and NGO's, but they were not allowed to work in
    the offices of their employers; they were required to go directly from
    their homes to the project sites on which they worked. A Taliban edict
    issued in 1999 allowed needy widows with no other means of support to
    seek employment; but many widows reportedly were unaware of the change,
    and there was little work available. Women reportedly were allowed to
    claim international assistance directly rather than through their close
    male relatives, as a 1997 edict stipulated. However, male relatives
    still were required to obtain the permission of the PVSV for female
    home-based employment.
        Girls formally were prohibited from attending school. Formal
    restrictions against the education of girls remain, apart from
    instruction provided in mosques, which is mainly religious in content.
    However, there are a growing number of girls educated by international
    NGO's in formal schools, community-based schools, and home schools.
        Most citizens lack any access to adequate medical facilities, and
    the provision of health care under Taliban rule remains poor. Life
    expectancy rates are estimated at 44 years for women and 43 years for
    men. In most regions, there is less than 1 physician per 10,000
    persons. Health services reach only 29 percent of the population and
    only 17 percent of the rural population. Clean water reaches only about
    12 percent of the population. Health care for both men and women was
    hampered by the Taliban's ban on images of humans, which caused the
    destruction of public education posters and made the provision and
    dissemination of health information in a society with high levels of
    illiteracy more difficult. Tuberculosis rates for women and maternal
    mortality rates are extremely high. The Taliban significantly reduced
    women's access to health care, although it has since loosened
    restrictions somewhat. In 1997 the Taliban announced a policy of
    segregating men and women in hospitals; this policy reportedly
    continued at year's end. In 1997 in an attempt to centralize medical
    care for women, the Taliban also directed most hospitals in Kabul to
    cease services to women and to discharge female staff. Services for
    women were to be provided by a single hospital still partially under
    construction, which resulted in a drastic reduction in access to, and
    the quality of, health care for women. Later, women were permitted to
    seek treatment from female medical personnel working in designated
    women's wards or clinics; since June 1998 they have been permitted to
    seek treatment from male doctors only if accompanied by a male
    relative. In practice women were excluded from treatment by male
    physicians in most hospitals. These rules, while not enforced
    universally, made obtaining treatment extremely difficult for most
    women, and especially for Kabul's widows, many of whom have lost all
    such male family members. Further, even when a woman was allowed to be
    treated by a male doctor, he was prohibited from examining her except
    if she were fully clothed in Taliban-approved garb and from touching
    her, thus limiting the possibility of any meaningful treatment. The
    participants in a 1998 survey of 160 Afghan women reported little or no
    access to health care in Kabul. Most of the participants also reported
    a decline in their mental health. However, there were credible reports
    that the restrictions on women's health care were not applied in
    practice and that there were some improvements in access to health care
    for women during the last 2 years. By the end of 1999, all Kabul
    hospitals apart from the military hospital reportedly treated women.
    Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul provided a full range of health
    services to women, but there was only one maternity hospital in the
    country.
        The Taliban decreed what women could wear in public. Women in
    public spaces were required to wear a burqa, a loose, head-to-toe
    garment that has a small cloth screen for vision. While in many,
    particularly rural, areas of the country, the burqa was the customary
    women's outer garment, the requirement for all women to wear the burqa
    represented a significant change in practice for many women,
    particularly in urban areas. According to a decree announced by the
    religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were not
    covered properly would be punished severely along with their family
    elders. In Kabul and elsewhere women found in public who were not
    wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles properly,
    reportedly have been beaten by Taliban militiamen. Some women cannot
    afford the cost of a burqa, and thus are forced to remain at home or
    risk beatings if they go out without one.
        During 1999 there were reports of differences in the enforcement of
    the requirement for women to wear the burqa. Enforcement reportedly was
    relatively lax in rural and non-Pashtun areas, and there were reports
    that some women in Herat and in rural areas cover their heads with
    large scarves that leave the face uncovered and have not faced
    reprisals. The Taliban's dress code for women apparently is not
    enforced strictly upon the nomad population of several hundred thousand
    or upon the few female foreigners, who nonetheless must cover their
    hair, arms, and legs. Women in their homes must not be visible from the
    street; the Taliban require that homes with female occupants have their
    windows painted over.
        Women were expected to leave their homes only while escorted by a
    male relative, further curtailing the appearance and movement of women
    in public even when wearing approved clothing. Women appearing in
    public without a male relative ran the risk of beatings by the Taliban.
    Some observers reported seeing fewer and fewer women on the streets in
    Taliban-controlled areas. Women are not allowed to drive, and taxi
    drivers reportedly are beaten if they take unescorted women as
    passengers. On October 19, taxi drivers were warned by the PVSV not to
    pick up unaccompanied female passengers or risk a ban on their driving
    privileges. Women only may ride on buses designated as women's buses;
    there are reportedly not enough such buses to meet the demand, and the
    wait for women's buses can be long. In December 1998, the Taliban
    ordered that bus drivers who take female passengers must encase the bus
    in curtains and put up a curtain so that the female passengers cannot
    see or be seen by the driver. Bus drivers also were told that they must
    employ boys under the age of 15 to collect fares from female passengers
    and that neither the drivers nor the fare collectors were to mingle
    with the passengers.
        AI has reported that the Taliban have ordered the closure of
    women's public baths.
        Women are also forbidden to enter mosques or other places of
    worship unless the mosque has separate sections for men and women. Most
    women pray at home alone or with other family members. Women also
    reportedly have been prohibited from appearing on the streets for
    certain periods during the month of Ramadan.
        The Taliban's restrictions regarding the social behavior of men and
    women were communicated by edicts and enforced mainly by the PVSV. The
    U.N. and numerous other interlocutors noted that the edicts are
    enforced with varying degrees of rigor throughout the country. The
    restrictions were enforced most strictly in urban areas, where women
    had enjoyed wider access to educational and employment opportunities
    before the Taliban gained control.
        After her 1999 visit, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence
    Against Women noted some improvements in the status of women, including
    the existence of home schools as well as limited primary educational
    institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in Kabul;
    increased access of women to health care; and the permission for widows
    to work. The Special Rapporteur also noted continuing violations of the
    physical security of women and the practice of lashings and public
    beatings, violations of the rights to education, health, employment,
    freedom of movement, and freedom of association, and of family rights,
    including the existence of polygyny and forced marriage. She also noted
    that minority women sometimes were subject to forced displacement and
    that there were some cases of trafficking in women and children (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Children.--Local administrative bodies and international assistance
    organizations undertook to ensure children's welfare to the extent
    possible; however, the situation of children is very poor. Infant
    mortality is 250 out of 1,000 births; Medicins Sans Frontieres reports
    that 250,000 children per year die of malnutrition. One fourth of
    children die before the age of 5. Approximately 45 percent of the
    population is made up of children age 14 or under. The Taliban's
    restrictions on male-female medical treatment have had a detrimental
    effect on children. Physicians for Human Rights reported that children
    sometimes are denied medical care when the authorities do not let male
    doctors visit children's wards, which may be located within the women's
    ward of a hospital, or do not allow male doctors to see children
    accompanied only by their mothers. A UNICEF study also reported that
    the majority of children are highly traumatized and expect to die
    before reaching adulthood. According to the study, some 90 percent have
    nightmares and suffer from acute anxiety, while 70 percent have seen
    acts of violence, including the killing of parents or relatives.
        Taliban restrictions on the movement of women and girls in areas
    that they controlled hampered the ability of U.N. agencies and NGO's to
    implement effectively health and education programs targeted to both
    boys and girls.
        The educational sector currently is characterized by limited human
    and financial resources; the absence of a national educational policy
    and curriculum; the unpreparedness of the authorities to rehabilitate
    destroyed facilities; and discriminatory policies banning the access of
    females to all levels of education, according to a report by the Gender
    Advisor to the U.N. System in Afghanistan. Female literacy is
    approximately 4 percent, compared with an overall literacy rate of 30
    percent. There have been reports that the ban on women working outside
    of the home has hampered the education of boys, since a large
    percentage of the country's teachers were women prior the advent of
    Taliban rule.
        The Taliban have eliminated most of the formal opportunities for
    girls' education that existed in areas that they have taken over;
    however, some girls' schools still operate in rural areas and some
    towns. Some girls also are receiving an education in informal home
    schools, which are tolerated to varying degrees by the Taliban around
    the country. During the year, there were reports that the number of
    children that these home schools reach was increasing and that there
    was an increase in the attendance of girls in various educational
    settings, including formal schools. However, in June 1998, more than
    100 NGO-funded girls' schools and home-based women's vocational
    projects were closed by the Taliban in Kabul. In 1998 the Taliban also
    stated that schools would not be allowed to teach girls over the age of
    8, that schools teaching girls would be required to be licensed, and
    that such schools would be required to limit their curriculums to the
    Koran. However, the Taliban's implementation of educational policy is
    inconsistent and varies from region to region, as well as over time.
        In September 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
    Women noted the existence of home schools and also of limited primary
    educational institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in
    Kabul. The Taliban told the Special Rapporteur in 1999 that primary
    education is available to girls between the ages of 6 and 10 and that
    this was dispensed in mosque schools under the Ministry of Religious
    Affairs. About three-fourths of the curricula in the Ministry of
    Religious Affairs schools reportedly deals with religious and moral
    subjects. Taliban-sponsored public schools, at both the elementary and
    secondary levels, provide education only to boys and also emphasize
    religious studies. However, schools run by NGO's and international
    donors mostly are open to both boys and girls.
        Despite the limitations on education and the Taliban's restrictions
    on female education, approximately 25 to 30 percent of boys were
    estimated to be enrolled in school and up to 10 percent of girls were
    estimated to attend school, whether NGO-run, mosque schools, or home
    schools, according to UNICEF. This represents a modest increase in both
    boys' and girls' school enrollment over the last 5 years. Prior to the
    Taliban takeover in 1996, more than 100,000 girls reportedly attended
    public school in Kabul in grades kindergarten to 12, according to a
    U.N. survey. During 1999 approximately 300,000 to 350,000 school-age
    children attended schools run or funded by various assistance agencies
    and NGO's. In 1999 the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) reported
    that it served 175,000 students in 567 schools; most of these were
    formal schools, but 39 were home schools. In a few areas, over 50
    percent of students reportedly were girls. The SCA reported that 20
    percent of the students in its formal schools, mostly located in rural
    areas, were girls. Many boys also were being educated in home schools,
    because of administrative problems in the Taliban-run schools,
    including problems in the payment of teachers' salaries. A high
    proportion of the students in Northern Alliance-controlled territory
    reportedly were girls. In 1999 in areas newly captured by the Taliban,
    some communities successfully petitioned Taliban representatives to
    reopen the schools. In Herat, which was captured by the Taliban in
    1995, girls' schools have remained closed except in the refugee camps
    maintained by international NGO's. Nonetheless, approximately 5 percent
    of girls were enrolled in school in Kandahar; approximately 20 percent
    of girls were enrolled in Herat. Some families have sent girls abroad
    for education in order to evade the Taliban's prohibitions on females
    attending school.
        There have been unconfirmed reports that the Taliban uses child
    soldiers. In the past, there have been some cases of trafficking in
    children (see Section 6.f.).
        The Taliban have banned certain recreational activities, such as
    kite flying and playing chess. In October the Taliban banned youths
    from playing soccer in Kabul on Fridays. Dolls and stuffed animals are
    prohibited due to the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions
    against representations of living beings.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no measures to protect the
    rights of the mentally and physically disabled or to mandate
    accessibility for them. Victims of landmines continued to be a major
    focus of international humanitarian relief organizations, which devoted
    resources to providing prostheses, medical treatment, and
    rehabilitation therapy to amputees. It is believed that there was more
    public acceptance of the disabled because of the increasing prevalence
    of the disabled due to landmines or other war-related injuries. There
    are reports that disabled women, who need a prosthesis or other aid to
    walk, are virtually homebound because they cannot wear the burqa over
    the prosthesis or other aid.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--During the year, there were
    reports of harassment, extortion, and forced expulsion from their homes
    of ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks by Taliban soldiers. The Taliban is
    Pashtun-dominated and has show little tolerance for accommodation with
    ethnic minorities.
        It is estimated that the Taliban may have killed thousands of
    members of the ethnic Hazara minority in 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
        In the past, there were reliable reports that individuals were
    detained by both the Taliban and Northern Alliance because of their
    ethnic origins and suspected sympathy with opponents. Ethnic Hazara,
    who are overwhelmingly Shi'a, reportedly have been targeted for
    ethnically-motivated attacks, in particular by the overwhelmingly Sunni
    and ethnic Pashtun Taliban forces.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Little is known about labor laws and
    practices. There were no reports of labor rallies or strikes. Labor
    rights are not defined, and in the context of the breakdown of
    governmental authority there is no effective central authority to
    enforce them. Many of Kabul's industrial workers are unemployed due to
    the destruction or abandonment of the city's minuscule manufacturing
    base. An insignificant fraction of the work force ever has labored in
    an industrial setting. The only large employers in Kabul are the
    governmental structure of minimally functioning ministries and local
    and international NGO's.
        Workers in government ministries reportedly have been fired because
    they received part of their education abroad or because of contacts
    with the previous regimes, although certain officials in previous
    administrations still are employed under the Taliban. Others reportedly
    have been fired for violating Taliban regulations concerning beard
    length.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The country
    lacks a tradition of genuine labor-management bargaining. There are no
    known labor courts or other mechanisms for resolving labor disputes.
    Wages are determined by market forces, or, in the case of government
    workers, dictate.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Little information
    is available on forced or compulsory labor, including child labor.
    There have been reports that the Taliban has forced prisoners to do
    construction work at Kandahar prison and that the Taliban used forced
    labor after its takeover of the Shomali plains area in the summer of
    1999. There have been credible reports that Masood forced Taliban
    prisoners to work on road and airstrip construction projects under
    life-threatening conditions (such as requiring them to dig in mined
    areas). There were some cases of trafficking in women and children (see
    Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--There is no evidence that authorities in any part of the
    country enforce labor laws, if they exist, relating to the employment
    of children. Children from the age of 6 often work to help support
    their families by herding animals in rural areas and by collecting
    paper and firewood, shining shoes, begging, or collecting scrap metal
    among street debris in the cities. Some of these practices expose
    children to the danger of landmines.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no available
    information regarding a statutory minimum wage or the enforcement of
    safe labor practices. Many workers apparently are allotted time off
    regularly for prayers and observance of religious holidays. Most work
    in the informal sector.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no available information
    regarding legislation prohibiting trafficking in persons. The U.N.
    Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women reported that there were
    some cases of trafficking in women and children (see Section 5). There
    were reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to be
    foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Shomali
    plains during fighting in August 1999. Women taken in trucks from the
    area of fighting in the Shomali plains reportedly were trafficked to
    Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf states.
                                   __________

                                   BANGLADESH

        Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers
    exercised by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the
    leader of the Awami League, which came to power in 1996 in national
    elections deemed to be free and fair by international observers. There
    is an active political opposition. Violence is a pervasive feature of
    politics, including political campaigns, and elections frequently are
    marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and rigging. The major
    opposition political parties have abstained from Parliament since July
    1999, diminishing Parliament's effectiveness. The opposition parties
    accuse the Awami League Government of abusing its parliamentary
    majority to prevent real debate on legislation and national issues. The
    higher levels of the judiciary display a significant degree of
    independence and often rule against the Government; however, lower
    judicial officers fall under the executive, and are reluctant to
    challenge government decisions.
        The Home Affairs Ministry controls the police and paramilitary
    forces, which bear primary responsibility for maintaining internal
    security. The Government frequently uses the police for political
    purposes. There is widespread police corruption and lack of discipline.
    Police officers committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
        Bangladesh is a very poor country. Annual per capita income among
    the population of about 130 million is approximately $350. Slightly
    more than half of all children are chronically malnourished. Seventy
    percent of the work force is involved in agriculture, which accounts
    for one-fourth of the gross domestic product. The economy is market-
    based, but the Government still plays a significant role. The
    industrial sector is growing, albeit slowly, based largely on the
    manufacture of garments and textiles by privately owned companies. A
    small, wealthy elite controls much of the private economy, but there is
    an emerging middle class. Foreign investment has increased
    significantly in the gas sector and in electrical power generation
    facilities. Foreign aid still is significant, but has diminished
    somewhat in relative importance vis-a-vis increased earnings from
    exports and remittances from workers overseas. Efforts to improve
    governance and economic growth through reform have been unsuccessful,
    and were blocked by bureaucratic intransigence, vested economic
    interests, endemic corruption, and political polarization. The
    Government's commitment to economic reform is weak. Periodic natural
    disasters, including a severe flood in 1998, also hamper development;
    nevertheless, the economic growth rate during the last fiscal year was
    about 5.5 percent.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in some areas; however, its record remained poor in many other
    significant areas, and it continued to commit serious abuses. Police
    committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and some persons died in
    police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police routinely used
    torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while interrogating
    suspects. Police frequently beat demonstrators. The Government rarely
    convicts and punishes those persons responsible for torture or unlawful
    deaths. Prison conditions are extremely poor for the majority of the
    prison population. Rape of female detainees in prison or other official
    custody has been a problem; however, there were no reports of this
    during the year. The Government continued to arrest and detain persons
    arbitrarily, and to use the Special Powers Act (SPA) and Section 54 of
    the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow for arbitrary arrest and
    preventive detention, to harass political opponents and other citizens
    by detaining them without formal charges. The Government encourages
    violence by urging retaliation against opposition members who attack
    government supporters. The Government filed numerous criminal cases
    against opposition leaders and activists; in at least some of these
    cases, the charges likely were false. The newly-enacted Public Safety
    Act (PSA) gives the police even greater opportunity to abuse their
    powers. Much of the judiciary is subject to executive influence and
    suffers from corruption. A large case backlog slowed the judicial
    process, and lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Police searched
    homes without warrants, and the Government forcibly relocated slum
    dwellers. Virtually all journalists practiced some self-censorship.
    Attacks on journalists and efforts to intimidate them by government
    officials, political party activists, and others increased. The
    Government limited freedom of assembly, particularly for political
    opponents, and on occasion limited freedom of movement. The Government
    generally permitted a wide variety of human rights groups to conduct
    their activities, but it continued to refuse to register a local
    chapter of Amnesty International. Abuse of children and child
    prostitution are problems. Violence and discrimination against women
    remained serious problems. Discrimination against the disabled,
    indigenous people, and religious minorities was a problem. There was
    occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya religious minority.
    The Government continued to limit worker rights, especially in the
    Export Processing Zones (EPZ's), and, in general, is ineffective in
    enforcing workers' rights. Some domestic servants, including many
    children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and many suffer
    abuse. Child labor and abuse of child workers remained widespread and
    serious problems. However, a 1995 agreement between the Bangladesh
    Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and
    the International Labor Organization (ILO) that has eliminated about 95
    percent of child labor in the export garment sector, the main export
    industry, was extended in June. Trafficking in women and children for
    the purpose of forced prostitution and at times for forced labor
    remained serious problems. Both ruling and opposition political parties
    and their activists often employed violence, causing deaths and
    numerous injuries; however, the number of deaths has declined, likely
    due to fewer general strikes during the year. Vigilante justice
    resulted in numerous killings, according to press reports.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--Police committed a
    number of extrajudicial killings.
        Security forces sometimes used unwarranted lethal force. On
    February 9, police officers shot and killed Mohammad Ahmed Hossain
    Sumon, while trying to arrest him. Police officers also shot and
    wounded Sumon's brother and 12-year-old niece. Family members began to
    drive the victims to the hospital in a van, at which time the police
    again shot at them, breaking the van's windshield. No action was taken
    against the policemen involved in the killing. On May 3, police
    officers shot and killed two workers in the Savar EPZ, as police
    stormed a factory that disgruntled workers had taken over; another two
    persons later died from stab wounds sustained during the seizure (see
    Sections 1.c. and 6.b.). On September 18, police officers brandished
    weapons at persons attempting to rescue Mahbub Hasan Khan Oli, who was
    drowning in a Dhaka pond into which he had jumped to evade police
    capture. Oli drowned. In March 1999, police officers in Dhaka drowned
    college student Mujibur Rahman, and in July 1999, three policemen in
    Dhaka allegedly severely beat Mohammed Shahjada Tuku, then threw him
    into a canal where he drowned; as of year's end, none of the officers
    involved had been held accountable.
        According to government figures, 134 persons died in prison and
    police custody during the year (see Section 1.c.). According to an
    independent human rights organization, 70 persons died in police,
    prison, court custody, and army camps during the year.
        Most police abuses go unpunished, and the resulting climate of
    impunity remains a serious obstacle to ending police abuse and
    extrajudicial killings. However, in some instances where there was
    evidence of police culpability for extrajudicial killings, the
    authorities took action. In March 1999, four police officers were
    charged with manslaughter after a body was found in the rooftop water
    tank of the Detective Branch in Dhaka. The case is ongoing. The case
    against a police sergeant for killing a rickshaw puller in July 1999 in
    Agargaon remained pending at year's end.
        Court proceedings continued against 14 persons, including 13 police
    officers, arrested and charged after a college student in police
    custody was beaten to death in July 1998. At year's end, nine of the
    accused persons were in custody, and proceedings in the case were
    continuing (see Section 1.c.).
        In 1995 the Government charged former President Hossain Mohammad
    Ershad with ordering the 1981 murder of the alleged assassin of
    President Ziaur Rahman. Ershad, leader of the Jatiya party, was granted
    bail in 1997. In late 1998, immediately after Ershad took a stronger
    stance against the Government, the Prime Minister made remarks implying
    that the Government might accelerate the case. Subsequently Ershad
    entered into an alliance with other opposition parties to pressure the
    Government to step down by calling hartals and boycotting Parliament.
    On August 24, in a case concerning alleged misuse of power and
    corruption during Ershad's tenure as President, a High Court panel
    sentenced Ershad to 5 years in prison and a fine of $1 million (about
    55 million Taka) (see Section 1.e.). After Ershad's surrender to the
    court and subsequent incarceration on November 20, an appellate panel
    of the Supreme Court ruled that Ershad could be released from prison
    after payment of the fine, or after serving 6 months if the fine is
    unpaid. As of year's end, Ershad remained in jail. Ershad may be barred
    from politics for 5 years.
        In 1998 a judge convicted and sentenced to death 15 persons for the
    1975 murder of then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current
    Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina) and 21 of his family members (see Section
    1.e.). On June 28, the High Court began hearing an appeal of the
    verdicts and a review of the sentences. On December 14, a 2-judge High
    Court panel confirmed 10 of the convictions and death sentences. On the
    remaining five convictions, the two judges released split opinions, and
    those cases were pending further High Court review at year's end (see
    Section 1.e.).
        The Government continued to imprison eight persons accused of
    perpetrating the November 1975 murders of four senior Awami League
    leaders who then were in jail (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). On October
    12, charges were filed against these individuals and 13 others who are
    not in custody. At year's end, the court was scheduled to begin hearing
    testimony in the case on January 24, 2001.
        Vigilante violence against criminals by private citizens occurs.
    The Government reported that, by year's end, vigilantes killed 1
    person, compared to 20 persons during the first 9 months of 1999.
    Authorities rarely arrest and punish those responsible for vigilante
    violence.
        Press reports of vigilante killings by mobs are common. Tallying
    these reports, a newspaper estimated that mobs had beaten to death at
    least 14 persons in May and had killed at least 10 persons in June.
    Press editorials and commentaries opinioned that the increasing mob
    violence reflected a breakdown of law and order and a popular
    perception that the criminal justice system does not function. Human
    rights groups and press reports indicate that vigilante violence
    against women who are accused of having committed moral offenses is
    common, particularly in rural areas, and that religious leaders
    sometimes lead it (see Section 5).
        Mob violence also occurs. On August 18, Alfred Soren, a leader of
    the Santal tribe in the northern part of the country was killed and
    dozens of others were injured, in a mob attack, reportedly carried out
    by Bengalis who were angry with the tribals over a land dispute (see
    Section 5).
        Violence, often resulting in killings, is a pervasive element in
    the country's politics (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Supporters of
    different political parties, and often supporters of different factions
    within one party, frequently clash with each other and with police
    during rallies and demonstrations. According to government figures, 15
    persons were killed and 56 others were injured in politically motivated
    violence during the year. Awami Leaque supporters, often with the
    connivance and support of the police, violently disrupted rallies and
    demonstrations of the opposition parties (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
    Opposition parties also used armed violence and intimidation to enforce
    general strikes. During the year, four persons died in violence related
    to general strikes (hartals); five others were killed when run over by
    recklessly-driven vehicles that were violating the hartal.
        One person was killed in an explosion at opposition BNP
    headquarters just hours before the beginning of a hartal on February 2.
    The Government accused the opposition of manufacturing bombs; the
    opposition alleged that the explosion was a government plot designed to
    discredit the opposition. During the February 2 hartal, another person
    was killed by a bomb in Dhaka. During the February 16 hartal, a
    businessman was killed in the old section of Dhaka. On August 30, a BNP
    youth front leader was killed during a hartal by unidentified persons
    in the old section of Dhaka.
        During an opposition-called hartal in 1999, eyewitnesses saw Maqbul
    Hossain, an Awami League Member of Parliament (M.P.) for the Dhanmondi
    area of Dhaka, order the killing of two young BNP activists who had
    been seized by Hossain's armed followers. Members of Hossain's
    entourage then shot at point-blank range one of the men, BNP activist
    Sajal Chowdhury, who subsequently died; the other person was beaten.
    About a dozen police officers who were standing nearby in riot gear
    made no effort to intervene or to apprehend the gunmen, nor did the
    Government later take action against those persons responsible.
    However, police summoned for repeated interrogations the family of
    Chowdhury, which had filed a murder complaint against M.P. Hossain and
    the armed men. One Chowdhury family member was arrested on criminal
    charges, then detained under the SPA after a judge granted him bail
    (see Section 1.d.). In December 1999, police submitted their final
    report on the case to the court, stating that the evidence did not
    support the murder charge. Subsequently, the court accepted the police
    report and dismissed the case against Hossain. Hossain then served
    legal notice on the victim's family, demanding that they explain why
    they should not be charged with criminal defamation.
        Political killings continued during non-hartal periods as well. On
    July 16, Shamsur Rahman, a well-respected journalist who wrote articles
    on smuggling and terrorism in the southwestern region, was killed in
    Jessore. The Home Minister blamed the opposition for the killings;
    others blamed members of the ruling party who are connected with the
    smugglers. Numerous other journalists were killed or attacked by
    government or societal forces throughout the year (see Section 2.a.).
    On August 11, S.M.A. Rab, a prominent Awami League leader in Khulna,
    was killed. A Maoist group claimed responsibility. However, Rab's son
    blamed the killing on his father's rivals inside the ruling party who
    were upset by the Prime Minister's announcement that Rab would be the
    party's nominee for the Khulna mayoral post. On August 16, rival
    political party activists in the old section of Dhaka killed Awami
    League leader Kamal Hossain. On August 20, a pro-BNP attorney, Habibur
    Rahman Mandal, was shot and killed in the old section of Dhaka while on
    his way to court. The same morning a pro-Awami League attorney, Kalidas
    Boral, was shot and killed in Bagerhat (near Kulna), allegedly by
    rivals within his own party. A mourning procession for the two slain
    attorneys was fired upon, resulting in injuries (see Section 1.c.).
        On July 21, a large bomb was unearthed near the site of a public
    meeting at which the Prime Minister was to speak the following day. On
    July 23, a second bomb was discovered near a helicopter pad that she
    had used the previous day (see Section 1.c.).
        In March 1999, two persons were killed while making bombs at ruling
    party M.P. Mohammed Mohibur Rahman Manik's residence in the Sylhet
    region. Newspaper speculations that the bombs were to have been used if
    local intraparty conflicts were contested. Police arrested Manik in May
    1999 for involvement in bomb making. The court charged the M.P. on
    February 29; at year's end, Manik remained free on bail. On August 16,
    Manik was injured, along with approximately 50 others, in a gun battle
    between 2 factions of the Awami League in Sunamganj, Sylhet Division.
    On March 7, 1999, 2 bombs exploded in Jessore, killing 10 persons who
    were attending a performance of the leftaffiliated cultural group
    Udichi Shilpa Gosthi. On July 19, 24 individuals were charged in
    connection with the bombing(s), including former minister and BNP
    leader Tariqul Islam. As of year's end, Islam and 2 others accused in
    the case were free on bail, 18 individuals were in jail, and 3 are not
    in custody. While awaiting trial, Islam and the two others on bail
    appealed to have the charges dismissed, saying that they were not
    involved in the case. The High Court stayed the order until February
    14, 2001. On February 16, 1999, masked gunmen shot and killed Jatiya
    Samajtantrik Dal leader Kazi Aref Ahmed and four others as they were
    addressing a public rally in a village near Khushtia. On July 11, 29
    individuals were charged in connection with the incident; 25 of them
    are in custody. As of year's end, the case was continuing.
        Violence also is endemic between the student political wings of the
    major national parties, and between rival factions within the parties.
    In an escalation of political violence, on July 12, gunmen fired
    automatic guns at a van in Chittagong, killing eight persons, including
    six members of the ruling party's student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra
    League (BCL). The Govenment accused the student wing of the opposition
    JamaateIslami Party of being responsible for the attack. The Prime
    Minister challenged her supporters and the police to retaliate for the
    murders of her student supporters, declaring that there should be 10
    opposition bodies for each one from the ruling party. An anti-Jamaat
    campaign following the July 12 killings resulted in the deaths of at
    least 2 Jamaat activists, the injury of many others, and the arrests of
    hundreds more (see Section 1.d.). The opposition asserts that the
    attack on the van was a continuation of a shoot-out the previous day
    between rival factions of the BCL that left three BCL activists dead.
    Published photographs of an August 20 clash between two factions of the
    BCL at Kabi Nazrul College in the old section of Dhaka showed a BCL
    activist wielding a pistol in the presence of a policeman. The ruling
    Awami League temporarily suspended the operations of its youth front
    wing in Dhaka. On December 15, many major newspapers published a photo
    of a man pointing a gun during the riot that ensued after the court
    issued a split verdict in the murder case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and
    his family (see Section 1.e.). The man was identified as Hemayetuddin,
    a well-known BCL leader. No police action was taken against him. The
    main opposition BNP suspended activities of the central unit of its
    student wing, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, following the killing of two
    persons in a factional dispute at Dhaka University on July 2.
        Extortion from businesses and individuals by persons with political
    backing was common, and businessmen on several occasions went on
    strikes to protest the extortion. On May 25, several young men shot and
    killed Iftekhar Ahmed Shipu, owner of a cellular telephone shop in
    Dhaka, after Shipu refused to give them a free telephone. A ruling
    party parliamentarian's son and several others were charged with the
    killing in a case filed by Shipu's relatives. According to press
    accounts and a subsequent investigation by a human rights organization,
    a gang led by Sumon, son of an influential local Awami League leader,
    abducted two young men on September 15 and demanded a ransom of about
    $1,000 (50,000 Taka), which the parents did not pay. The dismembered
    bodies of the two victims were found in a drain the following day. The
    human rights organization report asserts that the police did not
    intervene to rescue the two young men, but rather shared drinks and
    cigarettes with the gang members as they were holding the two victims.
    Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the local police station was
    transferred, and the police arrested several members of the gang.
        b. Disappearance.--During the night of September 18, Nurul Islam,
    the BNP Organizing Secretary for Laxmipur district, was abducted from
    his home. According to reports from neighbors and from BNP sources, the
    General Secretary of the local chapter of the Awami League was behind
    this abduction and suspected killing. Police subsequently searched the
    General Secretary's residence for evidence relating to the abduction. A
    case was filed against the General Secretary, 2 of his sons, and 12
    others, but neither the General Secretary nor his sons were arrested.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or
    degrading punishment; however, police routinely employ physical and
    psychological torture and other abuse during arrests and
    interrogations. Torture may consist of threats, beatings and,
    occasionally, the use of electric shock. The Government rarely convicts
    or punishes those responsible for torture, and a climate of impunity
    allows such police abuses to continue. After several Dhaka policemen
    were arrested in 1998 for allegedly beating to death a college student
    in police custody (see Section 1.a.), the deputy commissioner of the
    Dhaka police detective branch publicly defended the use of physical
    coercion against suspects, saying that the practice was necessary in
    order to obtain information.
        Nasir Uddin Pintu, a leader of the opposition student group
    Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD), alleged that he was tortured in police
    custody with beatings, sleep deprivation, and dousing with water. He
    also reported that he was denied proper food and water while in custody
    from December 1999 to January. One human rights organization reported
    that, after conducting a field investigation, it had confirmed that on
    June 13, police officers in Jhenidaha arrested a 12-year-old boy named
    Belal, hung him nude from a tree, tied a brick to his genitals, and
    beat him with sticks, allegedly for teasing a beggar. The human rights
    organization reported that the family was too intimidated to file a
    criminal report on this incident. Subsequently, one police officer from
    the nearby Betai Police Camp was suspended temporarily; other policemen
    from the Camp were transferred.
        Rape of female detainees in police or other official custody has
    been a problem, as the Chief Justice of the Bangladesh Supreme Court
    acknowledged in a March speech when he observed that rapes and killings
    in police custody frequently occurred (see Section 1.a.). Some well-
    publicized reports of rape in police custody in prior years resulted in
    a widespread public outcry. While there were no reports of such rapes
    during the year, it is unclear whether the situation has improved after
    public condemnation, or whether rapes continue and simply are not being
    reported.
        According to human rights groups and media reports, police engaged
    in violence and looting during the July 1999 raid of the Tanbazar and
    Nimtali brothel districts, allegedly attacking residents as well as
    over 40 female human rights activists who were protesting the eviction
    (see Section 1.f.). The evicted sex workers were detained in vagrant
    centers, where guards and fellow inmates subjected them to sexual
    assault and harassment. According to two human rights organizations,
    fewer than a dozen prostitutes remained in the vagrant homes at year's
    end.
        Police sometimes rape women who are not in custody. The Government
    reported that in May a police constable raped a woman who was not in
    police custody. After an investigation, the constable was charged with
    rape and placed under suspension. The case was pending at year's end.
    During the first 9 months of the year, one human rights organization
    documented nine cases of police raping women who were not in custody.
    In addition after women report that they are raped (or are involved in
    family disputes), they frequently are detained in ``safe custody,''
    where they endure poor conditions, and sometimes are abused or, as has
    been reported in prior years, are raped (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
    Citing statistics from prison officials, one human rights organization
    asserted that as of September, 307 females (including adults and
    minors) and 114 male children were in ``safe custody.'' Government
    figures showed that 353 persons, including 139 women, were in safe
    custody at year's end.
        The police often employ excessive, sometimes lethal, force in
    dealing with opposition demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3).
    Before a scheduled rally of former Awami League M.P. Kader Siddiqui in
    May, police stopped Siddiqui in front of his house, fired gunshots into
    the sky to scare his followers, and beat him so severely that he
    required hospitalization. Four of his party activists were detained
    under the PSA. On August 6, police broke up a rally of the four-party
    opposition alliance using tear gas, rubber bullets and batons. At least
    25 persons were injured seriously. On October 5, security personnel
    blocked a road in the southwestern part of the country to prevent
    opposition leader Begum Khaleda Zia from visiting floodaffected areas
    and addressing a scheduled rally. Awami League student activists,
    assisted by the police, dismantled the dais that had been erected for
    Zia's rally. Government leaders said Zia's scheduled rally was at the
    same venue as a rally the Prime Minister was slated to address. A
    formal clarification from the Government stated that this ``unfortunate
    situation'' would not have occurred had the opposition scheduled its
    program before or after the Prime Minister's. The opposition protested
    that its rally had been announced before the Prime Minister's program,
    and that it had assured the authorities that its program would be
    finished well ahead of the Prime Minister's arrival. In November
    approximately 100 persons were injured in Chittagong after police tried
    to break up a 500-person march of Jamaat-e-Islami party members. Police
    fired tear gas and blank shots to disperse the marchers, who retaliated
    with homemade bombs and bricks. Police arrested more than 100
    protestors; 40 still were in custody at year's end. In a separate
    incident, no action was taken against police in the 1999 beating of
    Shafiul Alam Prodhan, president of the Jatiya Gonotantrik Party.
        On May 3, police officers injured numerous persons in the Savar
    EPZ, as police stormed a garment factory that disgruntled workers had
    taken over. Four persons died and more than 20 persons were injured in
    the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 6.b.).
        According to a May Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, Rohingya
    refugees living in camps continue to suffer abuses, including beatings
    and other forms of physical abuse, and in the past have been coerced by
    camp administrators trying to secure their return to Burma (see Section
    2.d.).
        The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged
    violations of others (see Section 1.f.).
        Police corruption remains a problem and there were credible reports
    that police facilitated or were involved in trafficking in women and
    children (see Section 6.f.).
        Both opposition and ruling parties routinely use actual or
    threatened violence to achieve political ends. Violence is a common
    feature during rallies, demonstrations, and general strikes. In an
    incident witnessed by a member of the foreign diplomatic community, on
    February 13, a joint procession of the four-party opposition alliance
    came under attack in Dhaka from unknown assailants. In retaliation some
    individuals from the procession damaged dozens of vehicles parked on
    the street. On August 7, members of an Awami League student wing
    procession fired upon a BNP torch procession in Narayanganj. The BNP
    demonstrators threw their torches at the Awami League student activists
    and stoned the police. As the police chased the BNP demonstrators, the
    Awami League activists ransacked the local BNP office. On August 16, 2
    ruling party factions fought a gun battle in Sylhet Division, injuring
    some 50 persons. Also in August, a mourning procession for two slain
    attorneys was fired upon by unidentified assailants, injuring four
    persons, including two policemen (see Section 1.a.).
        In the past, some opposition political activities, especially
    hartals, allegedly were staged with the intent of provoking violent
    clashes, in order to embarrass the Government and galvanize public
    opinion. However, the overall incidence and severity of hartals
    decreased significantly during the year.
        On December 22, after the BNP announced a new central committee for
    its youth wing, the Jatiyabadi Chhatra Dal, JCD activists opposed to
    the new leaders attacked the houses of two BNP leaders, damaged
    vehicles, and ransacked properties to protest the new committee,
    alleging that the new leaders were well-known terrorists, not students
    (see Section 1.a.).
        Members of the Ahmadiya religious minority were attacked at several
    places in the country (see Section 5).
        In rural areas, human rights groups and press reports indicate that
    vigilantism against women for perceived moral transgressions occurs,
    and may include humiliating, painful punishments such as whipping (see
    Sections 1.a. and 5). Rejected suitors, angry husbands, or those
    seeking revenge sometimes throw acid in a woman's face (see Section 5).
        On July 21, in Kotalipara village, Gopalganj district, a large bomb
    was found near the rostrum where Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was
    supposed to make an appearance the following day. On July 23, a second
    bomb of similar size was found buried near the helipad prepared for the
    Prime Minister's use at the same site. No one was hurt. The Government
    accused the opposition of plotting to kill the Prime Minister, and
    several dozen persons, including members of Jamaat-e-Islami and other
    proIslamic groups, were arrested or picked up for interrogation. On
    September 13, 20 persons were accused of being involved in the
    assassination attempt. Of those, 11 later were charged. At year's end,
    four were in custody; several others remained unapprehended (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions are extremely poor for most prisoners. The
    Supreme Court Chief Justice told a seminar on August 10 that prisoners
    live a ``subhuman'' life. Official figures indicated that 134 persons
    died in prison and police custody during the year (see Section 1.a.).
    According to credible sources, poor conditions were at least a
    contributing factor in many of these deaths. Most prisons are
    overcrowded and lack adequate facilities. According to government
    figures, the current prison population of 63,489 roughly is 265 percent
    of the official prison capacity. Of those, 16,393 were convicted and
    47,096 were awaiting trial or under trial. In some cases, cells are so
    crowded that prisoners sleep in shifts. The Dhaka Central Jail
    reportedly houses over 8,000 prisoners in a facility designed for fewer
    than 3,000 persons. A 1998 judicial report noted the poor physical
    condition of jails and unhygienic food preparation. Drugs are abused
    widely inside the prisons. The treatment of prisoners in the jails is
    not equal. There are three classes of cells: A, B, and C. Common
    criminals and lowlevel political workers generally are held in C cells,
    which often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality food.
    The use of restraining devices on prisoners in these cells is common.
    Conditions in A and B cells are markedly better; A cells are reserved
    for prominent prisoners. The Government has begun construction of
    additions to jail facilities in an effort to alleviate overcrowding.
        In general the Government does not permit prison visits by
    independent human rights monitors (see Section 4). Government-appointed
    committees of prominent private citizens in each prison locality
    monitor prisons monthly, but do not release their findings. District
    judges occasionally also visit prisons, but rarely disclose their
    findings.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
    to arrest and to detain persons arbitrarily, as well as to use national
    security legislation (the SPA or PSA) to detain citizens without formal
    charges or specific complaints being filed against them. The
    Constitution states that each person arrested shall be informed of the
    grounds for detention, provided access to a lawyer of his choice,
    brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, and freed unless the
    magistrate authorizes continued detention. However, the Constitution
    specifically allows preventive detention, with specified safeguards,
    outside these requirements. In practice authorities frequently violate
    these constitutional provisions, even in non-preventive detention
    cases. In an April 1999 ruling, a two-judge High Court panel criticized
    the police force for rampant abuse of detention laws and powers.
        Under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals may
    be detained for suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a
    magistrate or a warrant. Some persons initially detained under Section
    54 subsequently are charged with a crime, while others are released
    without any charge. According to the Government, 10,582 persons were
    arrested under Section 54 during the year. Of those, 3,915 subsequently
    were charged with criminal offenses. In 1998 the Home Minister
    acknowledged that police abuse Section 54. The Government sometimes
    uses Section 54 to harass and to intimidate members of the political
    opposition and their families. In a Government crackdown on the Jamaat-
    e-Islami after the July 12 killings of Awami League student supporters
    in Chittagong (see Section 1.a), the police arrested 38 Jamaat students
    at Rajshahi University on July 15 under Section 54. After an August 6
    clash between student activists of the ruling Awami League and the
    Jamaat-e-Islami at the Islamic University in Kushtia, the police
    detained 30 Jamaat-e-Islami supporters under Section 54. In addition
    police commonly detain opposition activists prior to and during general
    strikes without citing any legal authority, holding them until the
    event is over. Newspapers sometimes report instances of police
    detaining persons to extract money or for personal vengeance.
        Under the SPA the Government or a district magistrate may order
    anyone detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act likely
    ``to prejudice the security of the country.'' Other offenses subject to
    the SPA include smuggling, black market activity, or hoarding. The
    Government (or magistrate) must inform the detainee of the grounds for
    detention within 15 days, and the Government must approve the grounds
    for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. In practice
    detainees sometimes are held for longer periods without the Government
    stating the grounds for the detention or formally approving it.
    Detainees may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant
    early release.
        An advisory board composed of two persons who have been, or are
    qualified to be, high court judges and one civil servant are supposed
    to examine the cases of SPA detainees after 4 months. If the Government
    adequately defends its detention order, the detainee remains
    imprisoned; if not, the detainee is released. Appellate courts
    sometimes order authorities to release SPA detainees after finding that
    the Government is unable to justify the detention. If the defendant in
    an SPA case is able to present his case before the High Court in Dhaka,
    the High Court generally rules in favor of the defendant. However, many
    defendants are either too poor or, because of strict detention, are
    unable to obtain legal counsel and thereby move the case beyond the
    magistrate level. Magistrates are subject to the administrative
    controls of the Establishment Ministry and are less likely to dismiss a
    case (see Section 1.e.). Detainees are allowed to consult with lawyers,
    although usually not until a charge is filed. They are not entitled to
    be represented by a lawyer before an advisory board. Detainees may
    receive visitors. While in the past the Government has held
    incommunicado some prominent prisoners, there were no known cases of
    incommunicado detention during the year.
        According to a study carried out by a parliamentary subcommittee
    and released on September 7, successive governments have detained
    69,010 persons since the SPA was enacted in 1974, and have released
    68,195 persons, following orders from the High Court. The study
    asserted that the SPA cases generally are so weak and vague that the
    court had no alternative but to grant bail.
        The Government cites a significant reduction in the number of
    persons held under the SPA as evidence that it is minimizing its use of
    the act; some observers assert that use of the recentlyenacted Public
    Safety Act (PSA) explains the reduction of persons held under the SPA.
    According to the Government, 801 persons were under SPA detention at
    year's end: 416 for terrorism, 301 for smuggling, and 84 for anti-
    social activities. This was 180 fewer than the 981 persons under
    detention as of January 1, and a substantial decrease from the
    approximately 2,000 persons under SPA detention in mid-1997. According
    to the Government, authorities detained 1,331 persons under the SPA and
    released 1,511 SPA detainees during the year.
        In response to a deteriorating law and order situation, Parliament
    passed the restrictive new PSA in January; the law became effective in
    February. The law established special tribunals to hear cases under the
    act, and made such offenses non-bailable. Opposition leaders expressed
    fears that the law would be used to arrest political opponents of the
    ruling party, as the law, like the SPA, allows police to circumvent
    normal procedures designed to prevent arbitrary arrest, and precludes
    detainees from being released on bail, which often is the result of
    arrests based on little or no concrete evidence (see Section 2.b.).
    According to the Government, 1,350 persons were arrested under the PSA
    during the year: 445 for interfering with tenders and 905 for damaging
    vehicles or obstructing traffic. Of those, 450 persons were released,
    140 within 1 month, 301 within 3 months, and 9 within 6 months of
    detention. According to a human rights organization, 3,763 persons were
    accused under the PSA from February through August 10. Of these
    persons, 1,285 eventually were arrested. Another human rights
    organization reports that from June 1 to September 15, 1,166 persons
    were accused under the PSA, of whom 90 belonged to the BNP, 29 to the
    Awami League, and 32 to the the Jamaat-e-Islami.
        Opposition leaders claim that the Government used the new PSA to
    intimidate them. There are credible reports from human rights monitors
    and political activists that the Awami League Government uses both the
    SPA and the new PSA as tools to harass and intimidate political
    opponents and others. In November police searched the residence of
    Bahauddin, editor of an opposition newspaper, to arrest him on charges
    of sedition for publishing a parody of the national anthem that mocked
    the Prime Minister (see Section 2.a.). When police could not find
    Bahauddin, they arrested his brother, Mainuddin, instead, under the
    Special Powers Act (see Section 1.f.). Mainuddin spent 16 days in jail
    and then was released under court order.
        On December 26, BNP Member of Parliament Morshed Khan went to a
    shop to inquire about the identity of some youths who had attacked his
    son over a minor traffic incident. According to Khan, a mob of several
    dozen youths with weapons and sticks gathered around the shop to attack
    him. He quickly left. After the incident, a PSA case was filed against
    Khan and his son for allegedly stealing cash from the shop. In contrast
    no PSA case was filed against any member of the Awami League student
    front, the BCL, when they incited a riot on December 14 after
    announcement of the split verdict in the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman murder
    case (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). BCL activists had taken to the
    streets, smashing and burning hundreds of vehicles, and one auto-
    rickshaw driver was shot and killed. No PSA charges were filed against
    BCL leader Humayetuddin, whose photo appeared in numerous newspapers,
    wielding a gun during the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.), nor
    against others identified as participants in this violence.
        There is a system of bail for criminal offenses. Bail is granted
    commonly for both violent and nonviolent crimes. However, some
    provisions of the law preclude the granting of bail. The Women and
    Children Repression Prevention Act provides special procedures for
    persons accused of violence against women and children. Persons
    arrested under this act cannot be granted bail during an initial
    investigation period of up to 90 days. Some human rights groups express
    concern that a large number of allegations made under the act are
    false, since the non-bailable period of detention is an effective tool
    for exacting personal vengeance. According to government figures, 7,565
    persons were detained under this act during the year. At year's end,
    there were 2,139 persons detained under this law. A total of 201
    persons were convicted under this law during the year. In January
    Parliament passed The Women and Children Repression Prevention Act,
    which amended and superseded the old law of the same name. The new law
    calls for harsher penalties, provides for compensation to victims, and
    requires action against investigating officers for negligence or
    willful failure in duty (see Section 5). In a radio interview on July
    26, the Prime Minister called the courts ``safe havens'' for criminals,
    and criticized the courts for being too liberal in granting bail, even
    to known criminals. The Prime Minister's remarks led to protests from
    lawyers and the filing of three contempt of court petitions against
    her. If bail is not granted, the law does not specify a time limit on
    pretrial detention.
        Prisons often are used to provide ``safe custody'' for women who
    are victims of rapes or domestic violence (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
    One study conducted by the Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers
    Association (BNWLA) found that nearly half of the women in Dhaka's
    Central Jail were crime victims being held in safe custody, not
    criminals (see Sections 1.c. and 5). While women initially may consent
    to this arrangement, it often is difficult for them later to obtain
    their release, or to gain access to family or lawyers. While there have
    been reports in prior years of police raping women in safe custody,
    there were no reports that this occurred during the year (see Section
    1.c.).
        A major problem with the court system is the overwhelming backlog
    of cases, which produces long pretrial delays. The Chief Justice of the
    Supreme Court on May 19 told a gathering organized by the Law Ministry
    that about 1 million cases were pending in criminal, civil, and
    appellate courts. More than 47,000 persons, or about 75 percent of the
    country's prison population, were awaiting trial or under trial.
    According to research by one human rights organization, most prison
    inmates never have been convicted and are awaiting trial. The
    Government explains that many convicted persons who are appealing their
    cases sometimes mistakenly are counted as ``pretrial detainees.''
    Government sources report that the period between detention and trial
    averages 6 months, but press and human rights groups report instances
    of pretrial detention lasting several years. One human rights
    organization asserted that the average time in detention before either
    conviction or acquittal is in the range of 4 to 7 years. Reportedly
    some prisoners awaiting trail have been in prison longer than the
    maximum sentence they would receive if convicted. In one case reported
    by a human rights group, a suspended bank officer in Chittagong was
    arrrested in 1985 on corruption charges. Bail was granted in 41 of the
    45 cases filed against him. The bail petitions in the remaining four
    cases have yet to be heard, and trials on the merits of any of the
    charges have not begun. If convicted of the charges against him, his
    maximum sentence would be no more than 10 years, yet he already has
    served 15 years in pretrial detention. In another case, the BNP
    government in 1993 arrested a 10-year-old boy in connection with an
    Awami League demonstration. He remained in jail without a hearing until
    this year, when a prominent Dhaka attorney took up his case and won his
    release on bail. Trials often are characterized by lengthy
    adjournments, which considerably prolong the incarceration of accused
    persons who do not receive bail.
        Citizens who are not political opponents sometimes also are
    detained arbitrarily. Newspapers and human rights activists report
    numerous cases in which a person is arrested in order to force family
    members to pay for his or her release. In a 1999 judgment criticizing
    the police for abuse of detention powers, the High Court commented that
    the police had become a law breaking agency. Most persons detained
    under the SPA ultimately are released without charges being brought to
    trial (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.).
        The Government sometimes uses serial detentions to prevent the
    release of political activists. A former Jamaat-e-Islami M.P. was
    released on bail on October 3 and immediately redetained under the SPA.
    National Socialist Party member Mahmud Hasan Shachchu, an elected
    leader of a local government unit in Kushtia, was jailed in June 1999.
    After the High Court declared his detention illegal in April, the local
    magistrate detained Shachchu again under the SPA.
        Numerous court cases have been filed against opposition M.P.'s and
    activists, on charges ranging from corruption to murder. In June 1999,
    the Prime Minister told Parliament that more than 70 current BNP M.P.'s
    were under investigation for alleged corruption during the previous
    administration. Most of these corruption cases still were under
    investigation and a few had been completed by year's end. Obaidur
    Rahman, a BNP M.P., remained in prison. Rahman and two other political
    figures were arrested in October 1998 for alleged complicity in the
    1975 ``jail killings'' of four senior Awami League leaders. The
    Government continued to hold eight persons accused of perpetrating
    these murders. On October 12, the court filed charges against these
    persons. The deposition of witnesses in the jail killing case was
    scheduled to begin on January 24, 2001.
        Some opposition activists were detained or charged in questionable
    cases. On July 21, a Jamaat-e-Islami leader in Chittagong was arrested
    and accused in five cases; he subsequently was detained under the SPA.
    On September 11, the High Court found his detention invalid and ordered
    his release.
        In a case that appears to be politically-motivated, a senior leader
    of the opposition Islami Oikkyo Jote was detained from September 5 to
    November 7 under the SPA on the basis of his alleged involvement in
    undefined ``anti-State activities.''
        It is difficult to estimate the total number of detentions for
    political reasons. In some instances criminal charges may apply to the
    actions of activists, and many criminals claim political affiliations.
    Because of crowded court dockets and magistrates who are reluctant to
    challenge the Government, the judicial system does not deal effectively
    with criminal cases that may be political in origin. There is no
    independent body with the authority and ability to monitor detentions,
    or to prevent, detect, or publicize cases of political harassment. Most
    such detentions appear to be for short periods, such as several days or
    weeks. Defendants in most cases receive bail, but dismissal of wrongful
    charges or acquittal may take years.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, under a longstanding ``temporary''
    provision of the Constitution, some subordinate courts remain part of
    the executive and are subject to its influence. The higher levels of
    the judiciary display a significant degree of independence and often
    rule against the Government in criminal, civil, and even politically
    controversial cases; however, lower level courts are more susceptible
    to pressure from the executive branch. There also is corruption within
    the legal process, especially at lower levels.
        In a case concerning alleged misuse of power and corruption during
    President Hossain Mohammad Ershad 's tenure as President, a High Court
    panel on August 24 sentenced Ershad to 5 years in prison and a fine
    equivalent to about $1 million (approximately 55 million Taka). Ershad,
    who leads the Jatiya party, was sent to prison after he surrendered to
    the court on November 20. Meanwhile the appellate panel of the Supreme
    Court reduced his sentence to either payment of the fine or 6 months in
    jail. However, Ershad may be banned from Parliament for 5 years. In
    another case in 1995, the Government charged Ershad with ordering the
    1981 murder of the alleged assassin of President Ziaur Rahman (see
    Section 1.a.).
        There continued to be tension between the executive and the
    judiciary during the year. In 1999 the Government charged that the High
    Court granted bail to criminals indiscriminately, crippling efforts to
    combat crime. In January Parliament hastily passed the Public Safety
    Act, citing the ready availability of bail for criminal offenses as one
    of its motivations (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In October the court
    dismissed a case of contempt of court against Prime Minister Sheikh
    Hasina for her criticism of the court, but cautioned her against making
    statements not based on fact.
        On December 14, the High Court issued a split verdict in the murder
    case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, founder of the country and father of the
    Prime Minister, along with 21 members of his family. The senior judge
    in the case upheld the convictions and death sentences of 10 of the 15
    previously convicted persons, while the junior judge upheld the
    convictions and death sentences of all 15 of the convicted. The Prime
    Minister expressed her disappointment that both judges did not uphold
    the death sentences for all 15, and ruling party Chhatra League
    activists rioted in the streets, smashing and burning hundreds of cars
    in protest of the split verdict (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
        The court system has two levels: The lower courts and the Supreme
    Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consist of
    magistrates, who are part of the administrative branch of government,
    and session and district judges, who belong to the judicial branch. The
    Supreme Court is divided into two sections, the High Court and the
    Appellate Court. The High Court hears original cases and reviews cases
    from the lower courts. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear
    appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High Court.
    Rulings of the Appellate Court are binding on all other courts.
        Trials are public. The law provides the accused with the right to
    be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call
    witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. State-funded defense attorneys
    rarely are provided, and there are few legal aid programs to offer
    financial assistance. In rural areas, individuals often do not receive
    legal representation. In urban areas, legal counsel generally is
    available if individuals can afford the expense. However, sometimes
    detainees and suspects on police remand are denied access to legal
    counsel. Trials conducted under the SPA, the PSA, and the Women and
    Children Repression Prevention Act, are similar to normal trials, but
    are tried without the lengthy adjournments typical in other cases.
    Under the provisions of the PSA and the Women and Children Repression
    Prevention Act, special tribunals hear cases and issue verdicts. Cases
    under these laws must be investigated and tried within specific time
    limits, although the law is unclear as to the disposition of the case
    if it is not finished before the time limit elapses.
        Persons may be tried in absentia, although this rarely is done. In
    November 1998, 15 of the 19 defendants tried for the 1975 killing of
    then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 21 of his family members were
    convicted and sentenced to death, and 4 persons were acquitted.
    Fourteen of the defendants were tried in absentia, and 12 of them were
    convicted. In April when the High Court began its automatic review of
    the death sentences, the first two judges assigned to the case recused
    themselves, declaring that they were unable to hear the cases
    impartially, prompting heavy criticism from the Government. After the
    second recusal, government supporters marched to the High Court
    Building wielding sticks and clubs, and called for the execution of the
    sentences issued at the trial. Some members of the Cabinet, including
    the Home Minister, participated in a rally that threatened action
    against the judges for their failure to take on the case. The Prime
    Minister expressed sympathy with those persons protesting against the
    judiciary. Many observers believe that the High Court judges recused
    themselves because government interest in and pressure regarding the
    case were not conducive to a neutral judicial review of the trial;
    however, the judges have not explained their decisions, and there is no
    direct evidence to substantiate such allegations. The High Court is to
    rule simultaneously on appeals filed by four defendants present in the
    country. There is no automatic right to a retrial if a person convicted
    in absentia later returns. Absent defendants may be represented by
    state-appointed counsel (as was done in the Sheikh Mujib case), but may
    not choose their own attorneys, and, if convicted, may not file appeals
    until they return to the country.
        A major problem of the court system is the overwhelming backlog of
    cases, and trials under way typically are marked by extended
    continuances while many accused persons remain in prison (see Section
    1.d.). These conditions, and the corruption encountered in the judicial
    process, effectively prevent many persons from obtaining a fair trial
    or justice. According to one independent sample survey conducted by
    Transparency International Bangladesh, over 60 percent of the persons
    involved in court cases paid bribes to court officials. Because of the
    difficulty in accessing the courts and because litigation is time
    consuming, alternative dispute resolution by traditional village
    leaders, which is regarded by some persons to be more transparent and
    swift, is popular in rural communities. However, these mechanisms also
    can be subject to abuse.
        The Government states that it holds no political prisoners, but the
    BNP and human rights monitors claim that many opposition activists have
    been arrested and convicted under criminal charges as a pretext for
    their political activities. It is not clear how many such prisoners
    actually are being held (see Section 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires authorities to obtain a judicial
    warrant before entering a home; however, according to human rights
    monitors, police rarely obtain warrants, and officers violating the
    procedure are not punished. In addition the SPA permits searches
    without a warrant.
        The Government sometimes forcibly resettles persons against their
    will. In 1999 police forcibly removed 267 sex workers from a large
    brothel district in Tanbazar and Nimtoli, Narayanganj. Authorities
    claimed that the women wished to be rehabilitated, but credible
    eyewitnesses said that the women refused the offer. The 267 women were
    confined in a center for vagrants, where some alleged that they were
    abused. By December fewer than a dozen remained in the vagrant homes
    (see Section 1.c.).
        In 1999 police and paramilitary troops forced more than 50,000
    persons from their homes in 6 Dhaka slum areas. The Government
    continued its slum clearances during the year. On April 15, the
    Government demolished 700 homes in the Segunbagicha slum area. On April
    30, police officials demolished the Paribagh slums, leaving 1,100
    persons without shelter. After police announced the destruction of the
    railway slum in Kawran Bazar, residents protested the 1-day notice.
    Police used rubber bullets and batons to subdue the protesters,
    injuring 30 persons. Police and hired laborers set fire to 20 huts, but
    were unable to dislodge the slum dwellers (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged
    crimes of others (see Section 1.c.). According to one human rights
    organization and a published account by one of the victims, on the
    evening of June 17, police raided a house in the Khilgaon section of
    Dhaka, and after failing to locate their intended target, arrested his
    parents and beat his sisters. In November when police could not find
    Bahauddin, editor of an opposition paper, to arrest him under charges
    of sedition, they arrested his brother, Mainuddin, instead. Mainuddin
    was not connected with the sedition charge; however, police arrested
    him under the SPA (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        The Special Branch division of the police, National Security
    Intelligence, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI)
    employ informers to report on citizens perceived to be political
    opponents of the Government and to conduct surveillance of them.
    Political leaders, human rights activists, foreign NGO's, and
    journalists report occasional harassment by these security
    organizations. For example, representatives from one human rights
    organization report that police harassed their representatives in
    Comilla and Chittagong.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech, expression, and the press, subject to ``reasonable
    restrictions'' in the interest of security, friendly relations with
    foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit
    defamation or incitement to an offense; however, there were numerous
    examples of the Government limiting these rights in practice. Some
    government leaders encouraged violence against journalists by ruling
    party members.
        The press, numbering hundreds of daily and weekly publications, is
    a forum for a wide range of views. While most publications support the
    overall policies of the Government, several newspapers report
    critically on government policies and activities, including those of
    the Prime Minister. In addition to an official government-owned wire
    service, there is one privately-owned wire service affiliated with a
    major international company.
        Newspaper ownership and content are not subject to direct
    government restriction. However, if the Government chooses, it can
    influence journalists through financial means. Government-sponsored
    advertising and allocations of newsprint imported at a favorable tariff
    rate are central to many newspapers' financial viability. Government-
    sponsored advertising is the largest source of revenue for many
    newspapers. In allocating advertising through the Department of Films
    and Publications, the Government states that it considers circulation
    of the newspapers, wage board implementation, objectivity in reporting,
    coverage of development activities, and ``attitude towards the spirit
    of Bangladesh's War of Liberation.'' Commercial organizations often are
    reluctant to advertise in newspapers critical of the Government due to
    fear of unspecified governmental or bureaucratic retaliation.
        Attacks on journalists and newspapers, and efforts to intimidate
    them by government leaders, political party activists, and others
    frequently occurred. Such attacks by political activists are common
    during times of political street violence, and some journalists also
    were injured in police actions (see Section 1.c.).
        On January 4, two unidentified persons threw a bomb at the building
    that houses the Bangla-language daily Dainik Azadi, causing no major
    damage; however, a few minutes later, another bomb blast damaged the
    managing editor's car. On January 5, the leader of the local Jatiyabadi
    Chhatra Dal (the student wing of the BNP in Munshiganj), attacked Zakir
    Hossain Sumon-Srinagar, a correspondent for the ``Ajker Kagoj,''
    reportedly because he published a news item criticizing the student
    group. When Sumon was attacked, a senior journalist, Shafi Uddin Ahmed,
    tried to rescue him and also was attacked by the student group. No one
    was held accountable in either incident.
        On January 15, three unidentified persons shot and killed
    journalist Mir Illais Hossain in Jhenaidah. The journalist, also the
    leader of a leftist party, allegedly had received death threats a few
    weeks before the killing and had requested police protection. Four
    persons were arrested for their suspected involvement in the murder. By
    year's end, charges had not been filed. On February 27, a court in
    Narayanganj issued an arrest warrant for the editor and other officers
    of the opposition daily Dinkal on the basis of a complaint lodged by a
    ruling party M.P., who accused the newspaper of publishing false,
    malicious and inaccurate reports about him. On March 8, police officers
    raided the newspaper's office, threatening journalists and damaging
    furniture. The police withdrew after about 1 hour. On May 20, activists
    from the ruling party student front, the BCL, assaulted two Dhaka
    University correspondents and threatened to kill one of them.
        On July 16, two men entered the Jessore office of the Bangla-
    language daily Janakantha and shot and killed reporter Shamsur Rahman
    (see Section 1.a.). Rahman had been reporting on the activities of
    criminal gangs in the southwest part of the country, and the
    relationship of those gangs to the national political parties. By
    September 15, 12 persons had been arrested in connection with the
    murder. By year's end, charges had not been filed.
        According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, on October 20, a
    group of Jubo League activists, the youth wing of the ruling party,
    threatened Sohrab Hossain, a reporter with the regional ``Loksamaj,''
    after he wrote an article about problems with the Government's relief
    efforts in the flood-ravaged district of Satkhira. On October 25, State
    Minister for Social Welfare Mozammel Hossain (the person in charge of
    overseeing relief operations in Sathkira district) reportedly actively
    encouraged ruling party members to attack physically the press by
    saying ``Wherever you will find journalists, break their bones.'' On
    October 26, a group led by local Awami League leader Nurul Islam
    ransacked the office of the local daily ``Satkhirar Chitro'' and
    assaulted Anisur Rahim, the newspaper's editor, with knives and a
    revolver, hospitalizing him. The attack followed the newspaper's report
    on the alleged misappropriation of disaster relief funds (see Section
    1.c.). One person was arrested for his involvement in the attack on the
    editor following the state minister's remarks, but by year's end, no
    charges had been filed.
        According to the International Freedom of Expression Exchange, on
    October 27, Monwar Islam, senior journalist and secretary-general of
    the Dhaka Reporters Unity (an organization for reporters working in
    Dhaka) narrowly escaped an abduction attempt, allegedly because of his
    reporting. By year's end, no investigation had been conducted, and
    Islam had fled the country.
        Virtually all print journalists practice self-censorship to some
    degree, and are reluctant to criticize politically influential
    personalities in both the Government and the opposition; however, some
    journalists do make such criticism. Many journalists cite fear of
    possible harassment, retaliation, or physical harm as a reason to avoid
    sensitive stories. For example, in March the Laxmipur correspondent of
    a leading Bangla-language newspaper was arrested under the PSA,
    following a report he published on police involvement in mass cheating
    during high school examinations. The journalist was released in
    November as the Government failed to prove the charge against him in
    the PSA Tribunal. On May 28, Aminur Rahman Taj, a reporter from ``Ajker
    Kagoj,'' a leading Bangla-language newspaper, was arrested without a
    warrant and later was accused of defamation of character. Earlier his
    paper had published an article asserting that the wives of a prominent
    minister and a senior police official were involved in corrupt
    practices. After the reporter's arrest, fellow journalists strongly
    protested, and the police threatened to file PSA cases against the
    journalists. The protesting journalists went to the High Court for
    protection, and no PSA charges were filed against them.
        In June a leading English-language newspaper ran a story about
    three sons of M.P.'s who were allowed to leave the country after being
    implicated in criminal cases. When the story was quoted in foreign
    newspapers, an official from the Prime Minister's Office pressured the
    newspaper's management to fire the author of the story. The author
    resigned under pressure a few days later. On August 6, a daily
    newspaper in Chittagong issued a notice retracting a story it had run
    the previous day, implying that a ruling party faction was involved in
    the July 12 murders of eight persons in a van (see Section 1.a.). The
    reporter who authored the original story was fired. According to press
    reports, the General Secretary of a local Awami League chapter declared
    at a public rally in Laxmipur on October 4, that he would ``chop off
    the hands and legs'' of journalists who continue to write about him
    (see Section 2.a.). He threatened to ``throw opposition activists into
    the river'' if they came out against him, and to take action against
    the police if they tried to arrest him. An Awami League Presidium
    member and government minister was ``chief guest'' at this Laxmipur
    rally. Two days later, armed men in Laxmipur injured a newspaper
    reporter in an attack.
        Journalists and others potentially are subject to incarceration as
    a result of criminal libel proceedings filed by private parties. Ruling
    party M.P.'s filed separate criminal libel suits against several
    newspapers after articles were published that the politicians viewed as
    false and defamatory. The journalists in all cases received
    anticipatory bail from the courts, and none of the cases moved to
    trial. Sedition charges filed against a Bangla-language newspaper in
    February 1998 remained pending, and those persons accused remained on
    bail. In November a new sedition charge was filed against the same
    editor, Bahauddin, for publishing a parody of the national anthem
    mocking the Prime Minister. When the police arrived at Bahauddin's
    residence to arrest him, he was not there, so they arrested his brother
    Mainuddin instead (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). Mainuddin was arrested
    under the PSA, and therefore was not eligible for bail. Mainuddin was
    not charged; after 16 days he was released. Charges against editor
    Bahauddin remain pending in both sedition cases.
        Feminist author Taslima Nasreen, whose writings and statements
    provoked death threats from some Islamic groups in 1993 and 1994, left
    the country for Europe in 1994. Nasreen returned to the country in
    September 1998, and then departed again in January 1999. She remains
    abroad in self-imposed exile, and both criminal and civil cases against
    her for insulting religious beliefs remain pending. However, a private
    citizen filed similar charges in 1994, and a judge issued an arrest
    warrant in that case after Nasreen's September 1998 return. The warrant
    never was executed, and Nasreen later requested and received
    anticipatory bail from the High Court. In August 1999, the Government
    banned the import, sale, and distribution of Nasreen's latest book,
    citing the likelihood that the book would inflame passions and offend
    the religious sentiments in the Muslim community (see Section 5).
        On June 29, the Government banned a book written by Matiur Rahman
    Rentu, a former aide to Awami League president and current Prime
    Minister Sheikh Hasina, on the grounds that it contained materials that
    could provoke hatred and malice toward the Government. The author was
    shot and injured by unidentified assailants in Dhaka after his book
    first was released.
        The Government owns and controls radio and television stations. The
    activities of the Prime Minister occupy the bulk of prime time news
    bulletins on both television and radio, followed by the activities of
    members of the Cabinet. Opposition party news gets little coverage. In
    its 1996 election manifesto, the Awami League called for autonomy for
    the state-controlled electronic media. A government committee
    subsequently recommended measures for authorizing autonomy for radio
    and television broadcasts, but the Government has yet to implement this
    recommendation. However, the Prime Minister on September 20 reiterated
    her earlier commitment to grant autonomy whereby the responsibility for
    funding still would come from the Government but the stations would be
    run by independent bodies without government interference. The Ministry
    of Information has authorized one private radio station and one private
    television station. That private television station, named Ekushey
    Television (ETV), went on the air in early March and began full
    commercial broadcasts on April 14. ETV broadcasts to 70 percent of the
    country via land transmission and to the entire country via satellite.
    On November 6, programming duration was extended from 10 to 12 hours
    per day. ETV broadcasts two Bangla-language news bulletins of its own
    and rebroadcasts the state-owned and run, BTV, English-language news
    bulletin. ETV news bulletins cover opposition events without any
    apparent interference from the Government. Moreover, the station also
    carries a feature program that addresses various social problems and
    calls for government action to redress these issues. ETV's proprietor
    owns the private radio station. As a condition of operation, both
    private stations are required to broadcast for free some government
    news programs and speeches by the Prime Minister and President.
        Foreign publications are subject to review and censorship.
    Censorship most often is used in cases of immodest or obscene
    photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and
    objectionable comments about national leaders. The September 18 issue
    of the international news magazine ``Newsweek,'' published in
    Singapore, was banned in the country because it featured a photograph
    of Koranic verses on the sole of a human foot.
        A government Film Censor Board reviews local and foreign films, and
    may censor or ban them on the grounds of state security, law and order,
    religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or
    plagiarism. During the year, the Film Censor Board banned 14 English-
    language films on the grounds of obscenity and 13 Bangla-language
    films, although after 2 months the ban on the Bangla-language films was
    lifted. The Government also banned the screening of any English-
    language films in approximately 10 movie theaters that regularly do not
    comply with the Censor Board. Cable operators generally function
    without government interference, but on August 15 (the anniversary of
    the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the nation's founder and
    father of the current Prime Minister), the Government asked them to
    suspend their operations for the day, and the operators complied. Video
    rental libraries provide a wide variety of films to their borrowers,
    and government efforts to enforce censorship on these rental films are
    sporadic and ineffectual. The Government does not limit citizens'
    access to the Internet.
        The Government generally respects academic freedom. Although
    teachers and students at all levels largely are free to pursue academic
    assignments, research on extremely sensitive religious and political
    topics is forbidden.
        The situation on public university campuses remains volatile,
    seriously inhibiting the ability of students to receive a university
    education and of teachers to teach. Armed clashes between student
    groups of different parties or of different factions within a
    particular party resulted in temporary closures of colleges and
    universities in Chittagong, Sylhet, and other localities. A woman on
    the Dhaka University campus was partially stripped during New Year's
    Eve celebrations on December 31, 1999. After a week of heavy criticism
    by the press, three members of the student wing of the ruling party
    were arrested but later freed on bail. A ruling party M.P. made a
    statement in Parliament that demanded the punishment of the victim for
    violating Muslim social values by being on the streets to celebrate New
    Year's Eve (see Sections 2.c., 2.d., and 5). Campus violence has little
    to do with ideological differences, and more to do with extortion
    rackets run by nonstudent party activists, including those based on
    physical control of dormitories. As a result of widespread violence and
    campus closures, it takes nearly 6 years to earn a 4-year degree.
    However, several private universities that were established during the
    1990's are not affected by student political violence.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, subject to restrictions in the
    interest of public order and public health; however, the Government
    frequently limits this right. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure
    Code allows the Government to ban assemblies of more than four persons.
    According to one human rights organization, the Government imposed
    Section 144 bans 33 times during the first 9 months of the year. The
    Government sometimes uses Section 144 to prohibit rallies for security
    reasons, but many independent observers believe that such explanations
    usually are a pretext. Supporters of the ruling party frequently will
    schedule their own rallies for the same venue and time as scheduled
    opposition rallies and meetings, thus providing the Government a basis
    for imposing Section 144 for security reasons. The Krishak Sramik
    Janata League of former Awami League stalwart and present opposition
    figure Kader Siddiqi had to cancel a scheduled rally at Karimganj on
    May 14, because the ruling party's student wing announced a rally at
    the same time and place, prompting the local administration to impose
    Section 144. The BNP youth front could not hold its planned rally at
    Muladi in Barisal on June 29, because the local administration imposed
    Section 144 following a simultaneous rally by a ruling party
    organization at the same location.
        Authorities also permit ruling party activists to blockade roads
    and take other steps to disrupt opposition events. During nationwide
    general strikes called by the opposition, ruling party activists
    routinely intimidate opposition supporters and seek to coerce
    shopkeepers and drivers to ignore the strike.
        Ruling party supporters, often with the connivance and support of
    the police, violently disrupted rallies and demonstrations of the
    opposition parties. On August 6, at least 22 persons were injured
    during a gunbattle on the Islamic University Campus between activists
    of the ruling party student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, and
    the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of the Jamaat-e-
    Islami. According to one human rights organization that cites campus
    sources, the shooting began when a procession of ruling party
    supporters opened fire on an ICS procession. On August 6, police
    officers attacked a joint opposition rally led by the BNP that was held
    to protest the Government's failure to eradicate the mosquitoes that
    carry dengue fever. Using teargas, rubber bullets, and lathis (heavy
    sticks), the police broke up the rally and procession. More than 100
    persons were injured during the incident (see Section 2.a.).
        Thirteen full or part days of opposition-called hartals (general
    strikes) took place during the year at the national or local levels. In
    addition there were a number of local hartals to demand the
    Government's resignation, and to protest the enactment of the PSA (see
    Sections 1.d. and 1.e.), attacks on opposition rallies and processions,
    rising fuel prices, and the killing of a pro-BNP lawyer (see Section
    1.a.). Localized hartals were frequent occurrences in some parts of the
    country.
        Four persons died in violence during the hartals, and many were
    injured, including opposition activists, police, and many ordinary
    citizens (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3).
        Local ruling party groups sometimes also call local general
    strikes. Party activists enforce these strikes through threatened or
    actual violence against strikebreakers. Those persons who are opposed
    to or neutral toward the strike are coerced into observing prohibitions
    against vehicular transport and normal operation of businesses. Both
    opposition and ruling party activists mount processions during general
    strikes. Police rarely interfere with ruling party processions on such
    occasions; police and ruling party activists often work in tandem to
    disrupt and to discourage opposition processions.
        The Constitution provides for the right of every citizen to form
    associations, subject to ``reasonable restrictions'' in the interest of
    morality or public order, and in general the Government respects this
    right. Individuals are free to join private groups.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the
    state religion but also stipulates the right--subject to law, public
    order, and morality--to practice the religion of one's choice, and the
    Government respects this provision in practice. However, although the
    Government is secular, religion exerts a powerful influence on
    politics, and the Government is sensitive to the Muslim consciousness
    of the majority of its citizens. Approximately 88 percent of the
    population is Muslim. Some members of the Hindu, Christian, and
    Buddhist minorities continue to perceive and experience discrimination
    toward them from the Muslim majority (see Section 5).
        Religious organizations are not required to register with the
    Government; however, all nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
    including religious organizations, are required to register with the
    NGO Affairs Bureau if they receive foreign money for social development
    projects. The Government has the legal ability to cancel the
    registration of an NGO or to take other action against it; such powers
    rarely are used and have not affected NGO's with religious
    affiliations.
        Religion is taught in schools, and children have the right to be
    taught their own religion.
        The law permits citizens to proselytize. However, strong social
    resistance to conversion from Islam means that most missionary efforts
    by Christian groups are aimed at serving communities that have been
    Christian for several generations or longer. The Government allows
    various religions to establish places of worship, to train clergy, to
    travel for religious purposes, and to maintain links with co-
    religionists abroad. Foreign missionaries may work in the country, but
    their right to proselytize is not protected by the Constitution. Some
    missionaries face problems in obtaining visas.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move
    freely within the country and to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
    repatriate; however, there were instances in which the Government
    restricted these rights. In August 1999, immigration authorities seized
    the passport of Jatiya Party Secretary General Naziur Rahman Monzur. A
    High Court ruling ordered the passport to be returned to Monzur, and
    the Supreme Court rejected government appeals against the ruling.
    However, the passport had not been returned by year's end. Then-leader
    of the opposition Jamaat-e-Islami, Ghulam Azam, in December 1999
    submitted his passport to immigration authorities for renewal, but it
    was not renewed. Azam filed a writ petition with the High Court on
    March 13, challenging the Government's refusal to renew his passport.
    On June 8, the Court ordered the Home Secretary to renew the passport
    within 15 days and return it to Azam. The Government filed a delayed
    appeal with the Supreme Court. The case was pending at year's end. In
    late 1999 immigration authorities seized the passport of Jatiya Party
    chairman and former president H.M. Ershad and subsequently returned it
    under court orders. However, on June 5, the Government barred Ershad
    from going to London for medical treatment, and immigration authorities
    at the airport in Dhaka seized his passport again. A High Court bench
    dismissed Ershad's writ petition, challenging the restriction on his
    travel and the seizure of his passport. However, the appellate panel of
    the Supreme Court on August 17 ordered the Government to return the
    passport to Ershad. The Government has yet to comply with this order;
    Ershad also had not yet received a certified copy of the court's order
    to return the passport by year's end. Bangladeshi passports are invalid
    for travel to Israel.
        The law does not include provisions for granting refugee and asylum
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
    Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commission for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. The law does not provide for first asylum or resettlement of
    asylum seekers. However, in practice the Government grants temporary
    asylum to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR has interviewed and
    recognized as refugees on a case-by-case basis. At the UNHCR's request,
    the Government allowed about 125 refugees and asylum seekers, including
    non-Rohingya Burmese, Somalis, Iranians, and Sri Lankans, to remain in
    the country pending durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation
    and resettlement to other countries.
        Approximately 300,000 Bihari Muslims live in various camps
    throughout the country; they have been in the country since 1971
    awaiting settlement in Pakistan. Biharis are non-Bengali Muslims who
    emigrated to what formerly was East Pakistan during the 1947 partition
    of British India. Most supported Pakistan during Bangladesh's 1971 War
    of Independence. They later declined to accept Bangladesh citizenship
    and asked to be repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan
    historically has been reluctant to accept the Biharis.
        Approximately 251,000 Rohingya refugees (Muslims from the northern
    Burmese state of Arakan) crossed into southeastern Bangladesh in late
    1991 and 1992, fleeing repression. Since 1992 approximately 232,000
    Rohingyas have been repatriated voluntarily to Burma, nearly 22,700
    have left the camps and are living among the local Bangladeshis, more
    than 32,200 children have been born to the refugees, 7,700 have died,
    and more than 20,800 refugees remain in 2 camps administered by the
    Government in cooperation with the UNHCR. After blocking further
    repatriation in August 1997, Burma allowed repatriation to resume in
    November 1998, but at such a slow rate that births in the camps
    outnumbered repatriations. In April 1999, the UNHCR urged the
    Government to allow any refugees who could not return to Burma to be
    allowed to work in the country, benefit from local medical programs,
    and send their children to local schools. The Government refused these
    requests, insisting that all Rohingya refugees must remain in the camps
    until their return to Burma. According to HRW, there are reports of
    violence by refugee camp officials against Rohingyas (see Section
    1.c.). Despite senior level interaction with the Burmese Government,
    the Bangladesh Government remains unable to win Burmese agreement to
    accelerate the rate of repatriation.
        According to media reports, several thousand more Rohingyas arrived
    during the year, but recent arrivals avoided the camps and attempted to
    settle in the southeastern areas of the country. HRW reports that more
    than 100,000 Rohingyas who have entered the country since 1991 live in
    precarious circumstances in the country outside the camps with no
    formal documentation. The Government effectively denied first asylum to
    the new arrivals it encountered by categorizing them as illegal
    economic migrants and turned back as many persons as possible at the
    border. According to UNHCR, which has interviewed some of these
    migrants, at least some of them are fleeing persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Bangladesh is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which
    elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage.
    M.P.'s are elected at least every 5 years. The Parliament has 300
    elected members, with 30 additional seats for women, who are chosen by
    Parliament. Under a 1996 constitutional amendment, general
    parliamentary elections are presided over by a caretaker government,
    led by the most recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or,
    if he is unfit or unwilling, another senior retired justice or other
    neutral figure. Domestic and international observers deemed the last
    general election, held in June 1996, to be generally free and fair. The
    high voter turnout of 75 percent set a new record.
        Due to continuing opposition from the opposition parties, the
    Election Commission did not schedule upazila (subdistrict) elections.
    In July Parliament passed the zila (district) council law, which
    provides for indirect election of the district council chairman by an
    electoral college of elected lower level representatives. The law
    empowers the Government to appoint these chairmen until the indirect
    elections can be held. The Government has not made such appointments.
    The Chittagong City Corporation election was held on January 3;
    however, the opposition parties boycotted it, and the Awami League
    incumbent mayor was reelected unopposed. On the national level, the
    opposition parties continued to demand the immediate resignation of the
    Government and elections under a caretaker regime.
        Elections often are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and
    vote rigging. The Government and activists of major political parties
    frequently use violence and harassment against political opponents,
    practices that intensify in the period prior to elections. On July 31,
    Food Minister and Awami League Presidium member Amir Hossain Amu won a
    by-election, which was boycotted by the opposition. International and
    domestic observers as well as the media witnessed widespread
    intimidation of voters and abuse of authority in support of the winning
    candidate. The dispute over the November 15, 1999, byelection in
    Tangail remained unresolved and the ruling party candidate, although
    declared the victor, could not take his oath of office.
        Political activists also reportedly engage in extortion from
    businesses and individuals (see Section 1.a.).
        Under constitutional amendments enacted in 1991, the country
    changed from a presidential system to a parliament-led system. The
    changes stipulated that an M.P. who resigns from his party or votes
    against it in Parliament automatically loses his seat. BNP member Major
    (retired) Akhtaruzzaman lost his seat in Parliament as he joined the
    parliamentary session in violations of his party's decision to abstain.
    In practice this provision solidifies the control of Parliament by the
    Government and the Prime Minister. The lack of democracy within the
    political parties that have formed governments since 1991 has resulted
    in a concentration of political power in the office of the Prime
    Minister, regardless of which party is in power. In practice the Prime
    Minister usually decides on major governmental policies, with little or
    no involvement by Parliament. Parliament's effectiveness as a
    deliberative body is undermined further by the country's narrow,
    partisan politics. Since July 1999, the major opposition parties have
    abstained from parliamentary sessions. However, members of the
    opposition continue to participate in parliamentary standing committees
    on government ministries, which were formed in 1998. These committees
    are headed by M.P.'s rather than the ministers concerned, increasing
    the committees' effectiveness in overseeing government work.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Thirty
    parliamentary seats are reserved for women chosen by majority vote in
    Parliament; critics charge that these seats act far less to empower
    women than to enhance the ruling party's majority. The constitutional
    provision that provides for these 30 reserved seats expires in April
    2001, unless a new parliament sits before that date. A Government-
    sponsored bill to extend this provision cannot be passed unless the
    opposition ends its ongoing boycott of Parliament and supports the
    bill. In addition to these seats, women are free to contest any seat in
    Parliament. Seven current women M.P.'s were elected in their own right.
        Seats are not specifically reserved for other minority groups, such
    as tribal people. Of the 300 elected M.P.'s, 3 are Tribal Buddhists
    from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and 5 are Hindus. The rest are Bengali
    Muslims. The Jamaat-i-Islami, the country's largest Islamic political
    party, had 18 seats in Parliament after the 1991 elections, but only 3
    after the 1996 elections.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government generally permits human rights groups to conduct
    their activities. A wide variety of groups publish reports, hold press
    conferences, and issue appeals to the Government with regard to
    specific cases. While human rights groups often are sharply critical of
    the Government, irrespective of the ruling party, they frequently
    practice self-censorship, particularly on some politically sensitive
    cases and subjects. In the past, the Government has consulted with
    human rights groups on some draft legislation and taken their views
    into account. In January after discussions between the Government and
    some women's rights groups and NGO's, Parliament passed the Women and
    Children Repression Prevention Act. However, the Government continues
    to refuse to register the Bangladesh Section of Amnesty International,
    which since 1990 has applied several times for registration under the
    Societies Registration Act. Without this registration, a voluntary
    organization cannot receive funding from abroad.
        The Government is defensive about international criticism regarding
    human rights issues. However, the Government has been open to dialog
    with international organizations and foreign diplomatic missions
    regarding issues such as trafficking in women and children. Legislation
    to establish a National Human Rights Commission remained in abeyance
    for yet another year. Earlier the Government formed a cabinet
    subcommittee to review the draft legislation.
        In the past, the Government has put pressure on individual human
    rights advocates, including by filing charges that are known to be
    false. Such pressure also has included long delays in issuing re-entry
    visas for international human rights activists. Missionaries who
    advocate human rights have faced similar problems.
        In the past, human rights organizations have reported that the
    Government has put pressure on them usually in the form of harassment
    by the intelligence agencies and threats from activists of the ruling
    party.
        During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal before the
    law and are entitled to equal protection by the law.'' However, in
    practice the Government does not enforce strongly laws aimed at
    eliminating discrimination. In this context, women, children, minority
    groups, and the disabled often confront social and economic
    disadvantages.
        Women.--Violence against women is difficult to quantify because of
    unreliable statistics, but recent reports indicated that domestic
    violence is widespread. A report released by the U.N. Population Fund
    in September asserted that 47 percent of adult women report physical
    abuse by their male partner. The Government, the media, and women's
    rights organizations have fostered a growing awareness of the problem
    of violence against women.
        Much of the violence against women is related to disputes over
    dowries. According to a human rights group, there were 81 dowry-related
    killings during the year. Human rights groups and press reports
    indicate that incidents of vigilantism against women--sometimes led by
    religious leaders--at times occur, particularly in rural areas. These
    include humiliating, painful punishments, such as the whipping of women
    accused of moral offenses. Assailants who fling acid in their faces
    disfigured numerous women. One human rights organization reported that
    181 women suffered acid attacks during the year. The most common
    motivation for acidthrowing attacks against women is revenge by a
    rejected suitor; land disputes are another leading cause of the acid
    attacks. Few perpetrators of the acid attacks are prosecuted. Often the
    perpetrator flings the acid in through an open window during the night,
    making cases difficult to prove. Some arrests have been made, and one
    person has been given the death sentence.
        The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but it makes no
    specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. A total of 3,516 rapes
    and 3,523 incidents of spousal abuses were officially reported during
    the year. Of the spousal abuse cases, 2,814 were related to disputes
    over dowry. Of the 2,130 alleged rapists that were prosecuted, 63
    persons were convicted. The Government reports that other rape cases
    are under trial. During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N.
    Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
    Discrimination Against Women. The Government also has enacted laws
    specifically prohibiting certain forms of discrimination against women,
    including the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the Cruelty to Women
    Law of 1983, and the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act of
    1995, which was replaced by the Women and Children Repression
    Prevention Act of 2000 (see Section 1.d.). However, enforcement of
    these laws is weak, especially in rural areas, and the Government
    seldom prosecutes those cases that are filed. According to a human
    rights organization, there are 7 government-run and 13 privately-run
    large shelter homes available for use by women who are victims of
    violence. Some smaller homes also are available for victims of
    violence. However, these are insufficient to meet victims' shelter
    needs. As a result, the Government often holds women who file rape
    complaints in safe custody, usually in prison. Safe custody frequently
    results in further abuses against victims, discouraging the filing of
    complaints by other women, and often continues for extended periods
    during which women often are unable to gain release (see Sections 1.c.
    and 1.d.).
        There is extensive trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
    prostitution within the country and to other countries in Asia (see
    Section 6.f.).
        For the most part, women remain in a subordinate position in
    society, and the Government has not acted effectively to protect their
    basic freedoms. Literacy rates are approximately 26 percent for women,
    compared with 49 percent for men. In recent years, female school
    enrollment has improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and
    secondary school students are female. Women often are ignorant of their
    rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal
    educational opportunities, and strong social stigmas and lack of
    economic means to obtain legal assistance frequently keep women from
    seeking redress in the courts. Many NGO's operate programs to raise
    women's awareness of their rights, and to encourage and assist them in
    exercising those rights.
        Under the 1961 Muslim Family Ordinance, female heirs inherit less
    than male relatives do, and wives have fewer divorce rights than
    husbands. Men are permitted to have up to four wives, although this
    right rarely is exercised. Laws provide some protection for women
    against arbitrary divorce and the taking of additional wives by
    husbands without the first wife's consent, but the protections
    generally apply only to registered marriages. Marriages in rural areas
    often are not registered because of ignorance of the law. Under the
    law, a Muslim husband is required to pay his ex-wife alimony for only 3
    months, but this rarely is enforced.
        Employment opportunities have been stronger for women than for men
    in the last decade, which largely is due to the growth of the export
    garment industry in Dhaka and Chittagong. Eighty percent of the 1.4
    million garment sector workers are women. Programs extending micro-
    credit to large numbers of rural women also have contributed to greater
    economic power for them. However, women still fill only a small
    fraction of other wageearning jobs. According to a report by the Public
    Administration Reforms Commission publicized in October, women hold
    only 12 percent of government jobs, and only 2 percent of senior
    positions. The Government's policy to include more women in government
    jobs only has had limited effect. In recent years, about 15 percent of
    all recruits into government service have been women.
        The garment and shrimp processing industries are the highest
    employers of female laborers. Forty-three percent of women work in the
    agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors, but 70 percent of them
    are unpaid family laborers. Many women work as manual laborers on
    construction projects as well, and constitute nearly 25 percent of all
    manufacturing workers. Women also are found in the electronics, food
    processing, beverage, and handicraft industries.
        Children.--The Government undertakes programs in the areas of
    primary education, health, and nutrition. Many of these efforts are
    supplemented by local and foreign NGO's. While much remains to be done,
    these joint efforts have allowed the country to make significant
    progress in improving health, nutrition, and education; however,
    slightly more than half of all children are chronically malnourished.
    For example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the
    country's largest NGO, provides primary education to more than 1.2
    million children. In cooperation with the NonFormal Education
    Directorate of the Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF is
    implementing a program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily
    working) children in urban slum areas around the country. In addition
    the ILO has undertaken education/social welfare programs for more than
    50,000 children (see Section 6.d.). The Government made universal
    primary education between the ages of 6 and 10 years mandatory in 1991,
    but stated that it lacked the resources to implement the law fully.
    According to Education Ministry figures, approximately 81 percent of
    children between the ages of 6 and 10 years are enrolled in school,
    including 83 percent of girls. Attendance rates drop steadily with age;
    according to the Government, about 70 percent of all children complete
    grade 5. To reach the maximum number of children with limited
    facilities, most schools have two shifts. As a result, most children in
    grades one and two spend 2.5 hours a day in school; children in grades
    3 to 5 are in school for 4 hours. The Government provides incentives
    for rural female children between the ages of 12 and 16 years to remain
    in school. These incentives have been effective in increasing the
    number of girls in school.
        Because of widespread poverty, many children are compelled to work
    at a very young age. This frequently results in abuse of children,
    mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service
    (children who work in domestic service may work in conditions that
    resemble servitude) and prostitution (see Section 6.c.); this labor-
    related child abuse occurs commonly at all levels of society and
    throughout the country (see Section 6.d.). Reports from human rights
    monitors indicate that child abandonment, kidnaping, and trafficking
    for prostitution continue to be serious and widespread problems. There
    is extensive trafficking of children, primarily to India, Pakistan, and
    destinations within the country, largely for the purpose of forced
    prostitution (see Section 6.f.). UNICEF has estimated that there are
    about 10,000 child prostitutes in the country. Other estimates have
    been as high as 29,000. Prostitution is legal, but only for those over
    18 years of age and with government certification. However, this
    minimum age requirement commonly is ignored by authorities, and is
    circumvented easily by false statements of age. Procurers of minors
    rarely are prosecuted, and large numbers of child prostitutes work in
    brothels. There were credible reports that police facilitated or were
    involved in trafficking in of women and children (see Sections 1.c.,
    6.c., and 6.f.). The law stipulates a maximum sentence of life
    imprisonment for persons found guilty of forcing a child into
    prostitution.
        During the year, the Government acceded to the U.N. Optional
    Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
    Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and to the U.N.
    Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
    Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.
        People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal treatment and
    freedom from discrimination for the disabled; however, in practice, the
    disabled face social and economic discrimination. The Government has
    not enacted specific legislation or otherwise mandated accessibility
    for the disabled. Facilities for treating the mentally ill or the
    retarded are inadequate. Unless a family has money to pay for private
    service, a mentally ill person can find little treatment in the
    country.
        Indigenous People.--Tribal people have had a marginal ability to
    influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. The 1997
    Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord has been in effect for 3
    years, and has ended 25 years of insurgency in the CHT, although law
    and order problems continue. Former insurgent leader Jotirindrio
    Bodhipriya Larma, alias Shantu Larma, has publicly questioned whether
    the Peace Accord has been implemented properly, and has urged prompt
    government action to implement all provisions of the Accord. Confusion
    continues over the overlapping responsibilities of the various central
    and local government bodies involved in the Hill Tracts. The Land
    Commission that is to deal with land disputes between tribals and
    Bengali settlers does not yet function effectively in addressing
    critical land disputes. Tribal leaders also have expressed
    disappointment at the lack of progress in providing assistance to
    tribals that left the area during the insurgency.
        Until 1985 the Government regularly allotted land in the CHT to
    Bengali settlers, including land that was claimed by indigenous people
    under traditional concepts of land ownership. This led to the
    displacement of many tribal groups, such as the Chakmas and Marmas.
    Bengali inhabitants in the CHT increased from 3 percent of the region's
    population in 1947 to approximately 50 percent of the area's population
    of 1 million persons in 1997. The Shanti-Bahini, a tribal group, had
    waged a low-level conflict in the CHT from the early 1970's until the
    signing of the peace agreement with the Government in December 1997.
    During the periods of violence, all those involved--indigenous tribes,
    settlers, and security forces--accused each other of human rights
    violations. The terms of the 1997 pact provided for a strong local
    government, consisting of mostly tribal representatives, including the
    chairperson; reduction of the military presence in the CHT region; and
    a substantial compensation package for displaced tribal families.
        Alfred Soren, a leader of the Santal tribe in the northern part of
    the country, was killed and dozens of others were injured in an August
    18 attack. According to one human rights organization, the perpetrators
    of the attack were Bengalis who were angry with the tribals over a land
    dispute. Ninety persons were charged for involvement in the attack, but
    only four were arrested by year's end. Court proceedings were scheduled
    to begin at the end of January 2001.
        Tribal people in other areas also have reported problems of loss of
    land to Bengali Muslims through questionable legal practices and other
    means. The Garos of the Modhupur forest region in the north-central
    part of the country continue to face problems in maintaining their
    cultural traditions and livelihoods in the face of deforestation and
    encroachment by surrounding Bengali communities. The pressure on the
    Garo community has resulted in greater migration to urban areas and to
    the Indian state of Meghalaya, threatening the existence of an already
    small community estimated at only 16,000 persons. The Government had
    indicated in 1995 that it would establish a national park of 400 acres
    in the Mymensingh district. Part of the land would be taken from the
    Garo tribals. Action still is pending on that proposal. The Government
    has not ruled out moving the tribals from the land.
        Religious Minorities.--Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists constitute
    about 12 percent of the population.
        Local thugs and gang leaders sometimes attack religious minorities,
    perceiving them to be weak and vulnerable. The Government sometimes has
    failed to criticize, investigate, and prosecute the perpetrators of
    these attacks. The Ahmadiyas, whom many mainstream Muslims consider
    heretical, have been the target of continued attacks and harassment. In
    March neighboring Muslims attacked and damaged 40 houses belonging to
    Ahamdiyas at Krora and Nasirabad (Brahmanbaria district); they also
    captured a local Ahmadiya mosque. The mosque was returned to the
    Ahmadiyas after a month-long negotiation. In 1999 in Kushtia mainstream
    Muslims captured another Ahmadiya mosque, which remains under police
    control, preventing Ahmadiyas from worshipping. In November 1999, Sunni
    Muslims ransacked an Ahmadiya mosque in the western part of the
    country. In October 1999, a bomb killed 6 Ahmadiyas and injured more
    than 40 others who were attending Friday prayers at their mosque in
    Khulna; the case remained unresolved at year's end.
        Religious minorities are disadvantaged in practice in such areas as
    access to government jobs and political office. Selection boards in the
    government services often lack minority group representation.
        Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because
    of discrimination in the application of the law, especially the Vested
    Property Act. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a
    contentious issue since partition in 1947, when many Hindus fled, and
    again in 1971 when Bangladesh achieved independence, and many Hindus
    lost land holdings because of anti-Hindu discrimination in the
    application of the law. Prior to its 1996 election victory, the Awami
    League promised to repeal the Vested Property Act, the law used to
    deprive Hindus of their property. On September 4, the Cabinet decided
    in principle to return vested property to its original owners and
    formed a subcommittee to draft a law to this effect. At year's end, the
    draft was awaiting cabinet approval. In past years, there have been
    cases of violence directed against religious minority communities that
    also have resulted in the loss of property. The last such major
    incidents occurred in 1992, although there also were some minor
    incidents of this type during the period surrounding the 1996
    elections. Such intercommunal violence reportedly has caused some
    religious minority members to depart the country.
        Feminist author Taslima Nasreen left the country in January 1999,
    due to concerns about her personal security. She lives abroad in self-
    imposed exile (see Section 2.a.). The Government banned her latest book
    in 1999 for fear of offending the country's Muslim community.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to join unions and--with government approval--the right to form a
    union. Approximately 1.8 million of the country's 5 million workers in
    the formal sector belong to unions, most of which are affiliated with
    the various political parties. (The total work force is approximately
    58 million persons.) There is a large unreported informal sector, for
    which no reliable labor statistics exist.
        For a union to obtain and maintain its registration, 30 percent
    workplace participation is required. Moreover, would-be unionists
    technically are forbidden to engage in many activities prior to
    registration, and legally are not protected from employer retaliation
    during this period. Labor activists have protested that this
    requirement severely restricts workers' freedom to organize, and the
    ILO has requested the Government to amend the 30 percent provision on
    the same grounds. The ILO also has requested the Government to amend
    legislative provisions that bar registration of a union that is
    composed of workers from different workplaces owned by different
    employers. About 15 percent of the approximately 5,450 labor unions are
    affiliated with 25 officially registered National Trade Union (NTU)
    centers. There also are several unregistered NTU's.
        With the exception of workers in the railway, postal, telegraph,
    and telephone departments, civil servants, police, and military
    personnel are forbidden to join unions in large part because of the
    highly political nature of those unions. Many civil servants who are
    forbidden to join unions, such as teachers and nurses, have formed
    associations that perform functions similar to labor unions, that is,
    providing for members' welfare, offering legal services, and airing
    grievances. However, collective bargaining is prohibited. Some workers
    have formed unregistered unions, particularly university employees and
    workers in the construction and transport (both public and private)
    industries. The Government banned trade union activity in the
    Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, in early 1998. The ban
    followed an incident in which some labor unionists affiliated with the
    ruling party's trade union assaulted a senior bank official, after
    which there were clashes between members of rival unions. In September
    numerous associations of private school teachers went on strike,
    demanding that the Government, which pays private school teachers 80
    percent of their basic salary, pay 100 percent of it. The strikes ended
    after several weeks when the Government agreed to raise its part of the
    payment to 90 percent. In 1999 the ILO Committee of Experts stated that
    the Government's rejections of several applications for registration by
    trade unions in the textile, metal, and garment sectors were on
    unjustified grounds. The Ministry of Labor contends that these cases
    lacked the necessary documentation.
        The right to strike is not recognized specifically in the law, but
    strikes are a common form of workers' protest. In addition political
    opposition parties use general strikes to pressure the Government to
    meet political demands (see Section 2.b.). Workers at Chittagong port,
    the country's major harbor, conducted several work stoppages to protest
    a proposed new private container port. Some employees organized in
    professional associations or unregistered unions also went on strike
    during the year. Wildcat strikes are illegal but frequently occur, with
    varying government responses. Wildcat strikes in the transportation
    sector are particularly common.
        The Essential Services Ordinance permits the Government to bar
    strikes for 3 months in any sector that it declares essential. During
    the year, the Government applied this ban against employees of the
    Power Development Board. In the past, the Government has applied this
    ban to national airline pilots, water supply workers, shipping
    employees, and electricity supply workers. The ban may be renewed for
    3-month-periods. The Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or
    lockout at any time before or after the strike or lockout begins and to
    refer the dispute to the Labor Court. Mechanisms for conciliation,
    arbitration, and labor court dispute resolution were established under
    the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. Workers have the right to
    strike in the event of a failure to settle. If a strike lasts 30 days
    or longer, the Government may prohibit the strike and refer the dispute
    to the Labor Court for adjudication. This has not happened since 1993.
    The ILO has criticized the provisions of the Industrial Relations
    Ordinance that require three-quarters of a worker's organization to
    consent to a strike and that grant the Government authority to prohibit
    a strike at any time if it is considered prejudicial to the national
    interest or if it involves a public utility service.
        There are no legal restrictions on political activities by labor
    unions, although the calling of nationwide general strikes (hartals) or
    transportation blockades by unions is considered a criminal rather than
    a political act and thus is forbidden.
        While unions are not part of the government structure, they are
    highly politicized, and are strongest in state-owned enterprises and in
    institutions like the government-run port in Chittagong. Virtually all
    the NTU centers are affiliated with political parties, including the
    ruling party and the major opposition parties. Some unions are militant
    and engage in intimidation and vandalism. Illegal blockades of public
    transportation routes by strikers frequently occurred during the year.
    Pitched battles between members of rival labor unions regularly
    occurred. Fighting often is over the control of rackets or extortion
    payoffs and typically involves knives, guns, and homemade bombs.
        Workers are eligible for membership on their union's executive
    staff, the size of which is set by law in proportion to the number of
    union members. The Registrar of Trade Unions may cancel registration of
    a union with the concurrence of the Labor Court, but no such actions
    were known to have been taken during the year.
        There are provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the
    immunity of registered unions or union officers from civil liability.
    Enforcement of these provisions is uneven. In past illegal work
    actions, such as transportation blockades, police officers have
    arrested union members under the SPA or regular criminal codes.
        There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
    organizations, and unions and federations maintain a variety of such
    links. Trade unionists are required to obtain government clearance to
    travel to ILO meetings, but there were no reports that clearances were
    denied during the year. In addition in April 1999, immigration
    officials at the airport in Dhaka prevented 11 members of the
    Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union Federation (BIGUF) from
    departing the country to participate in an AFL-CIO-organized study tour
    in the Philippines, citing a requirement for government clearance. In
    October the Ministry of Labor issued the clearance, but it was too late
    for the BIGUF representatives to participate in the study tour.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining by workers is legal on the condition that they be
    represented by unions legally registered as collective bargaining
    agents by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Labor unions are affiliated
    with the various political parties; therefore, each industry generally
    has more than one labor union (one or more for each political party).
    To engage in collective bargaining, each union must nominate
    representatives to a Collective Bargaining Authority (CBA) committee,
    which the Registrar of Trade Unions must approve after reviewing the
    selection process. Collective bargaining occurs on occasion in large
    private enterprises such as pharmaceuticals, jute, or textiles but,
    because of high unemployment, workers may forgo collective bargaining
    due to concerns over job security. Collective bargaining in small
    private enterprises generally does not occur. The International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has criticized the country
    for what it views as legal impediments which hamper such bargaining.
        Public sector workers' pay levels and other benefits are set by the
    National Pay and Wages Commission, whose recommendations are binding
    and may not be disputed except on the issue of implementation.
        The Registrar of Trade Unions has wide powers to interfere in
    internal union affairs. He has the authority to enter union premises
    and inspect documents; however, there were no reports during the year
    that the Registrar of Trade Unions had abused these powers.
        Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, there is considerable
    leeway for discrimination against union members and organizers by
    employers. For example, the ordinance allows the arbitrary transfer of
    workers suspected of union activities or termination with payment of
    mandatory severance benefits (2 weeks' salary). In practice private
    sector employers usually discourage any union activity, sometimes
    working in collaboration with local police. The Registrar of Trade
    Unions rules on discrimination complaints. In a number of cases, the
    Labor Court has ordered the reinstatement of workers fired for union
    activities. However, the Labor Court's overall effectiveness is
    hampered by a serious case backlog, and in the past there have been
    allegations that employers have corrupted some of its deliberations.
        In 1998 Zafrul Hassan, the General Secretary of the Bangladesh
    Jatiyatabadi Sramik Dal (BJSD), filed a complaint that 76 persons, most
    of whom were active union leaders, were discriminated against through
    transfers and harassment by the Bangladesh Water Board. This case had
    not been resolved by year's end.
        In June 1999, the ILO received a complaint from the Bangladesh
    Agricultural Farm Labor Federation that the Government had not
    introduced legislation that would extend the protections of the
    Industrial Relations Ordinance to a greater number of agricultural
    workers. In July the ILO sponsored a seminar where this issue was
    raised to create awareness about agricultural laborers. Officials from
    various ministries, including the Ministry of Labor, attended. Farm
    laborers, such as those employed in the aquaculture sector (shrimp
    hatchery, harvesting and processing) are covered by the labor law and
    can form trade unions. However, most agricultural laborers are migrant
    workers, and thus are not employed by any particular individual or
    group. The Government had not taken steps to extend labor laws to cover
    these migrant workers.
        The country's two EPZ's are exempted from the application of the
    Employment of Labor (Standing Orders) Act of 1965, the Industrial
    Relations Ordinance of 1969, and the Factories Act of 1965. Among other
    provisions, these laws establish the freedom of association and the
    right to bargain collectively, and set forth wage and hour and
    occupational safety and health standards. While substitutes for some of
    the provisions of these laws have been implemented through EPZ
    regulations, which the Bangladesh EPZ Authority is charged with
    enforcing, professional and industry-based unions are prohibited in the
    zones. A small number of workers in the EPZ's have skirted prohibitions
    on forming unions by setting up associations. The Government has not
    implemented its 1992 commitment to end restrictions on freedom of
    association and formation of unions by 1997, and to apply all sections
    of labor law in the EPZ's by 2000. No collective bargaining occurs in
    the EPZ's. However, on December 12, the Government agreed to allow full
    freedom of association in the EPZ's by January 2004. Approximately
    93,000 persons are employed in EPZ's, primarily in the textile and
    apparel, electronics component, and leather industries. During the
    year, the EPZ's experienced several strikes, some of which turned
    violent. In one case, four workers were killed when the police stormed
    a factory that had been taken over by the disgruntled workers. During
    the incident, police shot and killed two persons; two others later died
    from stab wounds sustained in the violence. The workers were angered by
    a 15 percent cut in piece rates and the subsequent firing of 33 workers
    who had joined in protests against the pay-cut (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.).
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children; however, the Government does not enforce this prohibition
    effectively. The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act, both
    passed in 1965, established inspection mechanisms to enforce laws
    against forced labor; however, these laws are not enforced rigorously,
    partly because resources for enforcement are scarce. There is no large-
    scale bonded or forced labor; however, numerous domestic servants,
    including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and
    many suffer physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. In the past,
    the Government has brought criminal charges against employers who abuse
    domestic servants. There is extensive trafficking in both women and
    children, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution, although in some
    instances for labor servitude outside of the country (see Section
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--There is no law that uniformly prohibits the employment of
    children, and child labor is a serious problem. Some laws prohibit
    labor by children in certain sectors. The Factories Act of 1965 bars
    children under the age of 14 from working in factories. This law also
    stipulates that children and adolescents are allowed to work only a
    maximum 5-hour day and only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The
    Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 prohibits the employment of
    children younger than the age of 12 in commercial workplaces. The
    Employment of Children Act of 1938 prohibits the employment of children
    under the age of 15 in the railways or in goods handling within ports.
        Coverage and enforcement of these rules is inadequate. Because of
    widespread poverty, many children begin to work at a very young age.
    According to a 1996 labor force survey by the Government, the country
    has 6.3 million working children between the ages of 5 and 14 years who
    work for compensation and are not enrolled in school. Also, children
    often work alongside other family members in small-scale and
    subsistence agriculture. Previous UNICEF and ILO surveys indicate that,
    of children 6 to 17 years of age, 21 percent of boys and 4 percent of
    girls work in paid employment. Hours usually are long, the pay usually
    is low, and the conditions sometimes are hazardous. Children drive
    rickshaws, break bricks at construction sites, carry fruit, vegetables,
    and dry goods for shoppers at markets, work at tea stalls, and work as
    beachcombers in the shrimp industry. Many children work in the beedi
    (hand-rolled cigarette) industry, and children under 18 years old
    sometimes work in hazardous circumstances in the leather industry.
    Children routinely perform domestic work. Cases of children being
    abused physically and occasionally killed by the head of the household
    where they work are reported in the press. In the past, the Government
    has brought criminal charges against employers who abuse domestic
    servants. Some children are trafficked domestically or overseas, often
    for prostitution, and child prostitution is a serious problem (see
    Sections 5 and 6.f.). Under the law, every child must attend school
    through the fifth grade, or the age of 10 years. However, the
    Government continues to maintain that it does not yet have the
    resources to implement this law effectively.
        Protracted negotiations led to the July 1995 signing of a
    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Bangladesh Garment
    Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and the ILO to
    eliminate child labor in the garment sector. Under the MOU, the garment
    sector was to become child labor free by October 1996, with former
    child laborers enrolled in UNICEFsponsored schools and follow-up
    inspections of factories by ILO-managed inspection teams. Under the
    program, former child employees received a small monthly stipend while
    attending school to help replace their lost income. On June 16, the MOU
    was renewed for 1 year. Violations of the ban on child labor in the
    garment export sector dropped slightly from 5 percent as the year
    progressed to 4.7 percent of the factories inspected. According to ILO
    inspectors, 90 percent of the factories where violations were found had
    one to three child laborers, and the remaining ten percent had more.
    However, a BGMEA arbitration committee, which is tasked with imposing
    fines on violating factories, functions slowly. The number of children
    working in nonexport, or nonfactory garment production, is unknown.
        The Government did not grant the Ministry of Labor additional
    resources to enforce its commitment as a member of the South Asian
    Association for Regional Cooperation to eliminate hazardous child labor
    by 2000, and to eliminate all child labor by 2010; the existing small
    corps of labor inspectors continues to be ineffective against all labor
    problems because of inefficiency and corruption.
        In cooperation with the Non-Formal Education Directorate of the
    Government and some NGO partners, UNICEF is implementing a ``hard-to-
    reach'' program to provide education to 350,000 (primarily working)
    children in urban slum areas around the country. Working with the
    Government, NGO's, and some trade unions, ILO/IPEC has 20 action
    programs, targeting about 6,000 children in hazardous conditions,
    designed to ensure that children receive an education, rather than
    removing children from work. In addition ILO has undertaken education/
    social welfare programs for more than 50,000 children.
        The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including
    that performed by children; however, the Government does not enforce
    this prohibition effectively, and some children work as domestic
    servants in conditions that resemble labor servitude or are trafficked
    for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    There were credible reports that police facilitated or were involved in
    trafficking of women and children.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage. Instead the Wage Commission, which convenes every several years,
    sets wages and benefits industry by industry. In most cases, private
    sector employers ignore this wage structure. For example, in the
    garment industry, legal minimum wages are not paid by many factories,
    and it is common for workers of smaller factories to experience delays
    in receiving their pay, or to receive ``trainee'' wages well past the
    maximum 3 months. The declared minimum monthly wage for a skilled
    industrial worker is approximately $63 (3,400 Taka) for a worker in an
    EPZ and approximately $49 (2,650 Taka) for a worker outside an EPZ, and
    is sufficient to provide an individual with a minimal standard of
    living, but is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
    for a worker and family.
        The law sets a standard 48-hour workweek with 1 day off mandated. A
    60-hour workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, is
    allowed. The law is enforced poorly in industries such as hosiery and
    ready-made garments.
        The Factories Act of 1965 nominally sets occupational health and
    safety standards. The law is comprehensive but largely is ignored by
    employers. For example, there are many fire safety violations in the
    garment industry. Many factories are located in structures that were
    not designed adequately for industrial use, nor for the easy evacuation
    of large work forces. Twelve garment factory workers died on August 27
    when they were unable to escape from a factory fire due to locked
    exits. A Civil Defense Department report cited lack of adequate safety
    measures as the cause of the fatalities. In addition numerous factories
    have insufficient toilet facilities (for example, 1 toilet for 300
    employees). Workers may resort to legal action for enforcement of the
    law's provisions, but few cases actually are prosecuted. Enforcement by
    the Labor Ministry's industrial inspectors is weak, due both to the low
    number of labor inspectors (100 for about 300,000 covered
    establishments), and to endemic corruption and inefficiency among
    inspectors. Due to a high unemployment rate and inadequate enforcement
    of the laws, workers demanding correction of dangerous working
    conditions or refusing to participate in perceived dangerous activities
    risk losing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons and trafficking is a serious problem. There is extensive
    trafficking in both women and children, primarily to India, Pakistan,
    and destinations within the country, mainly for the purpose of forced
    prostitution, although in some instances for labor servitude. Some
    children also are trafficked to the Middle East to be used as camel
    jockeys.
        Trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution carries a 10 to
    20 year sentence or the death penalty. Trafficking in children for
    immoral or illegal purposes carries the death penalty or life
    imprisonment. However, few perpetrators are punished. Human rights
    monitors also credibly report that police and local government
    officials often ignore trafficking in women and children for
    prostitution, and easily are bribed to look the other way (see Sections
    1.c., 5, and 6.c.). According to one antitrafficking organization,
    during the year four new trafficking cases were filed, and the trials
    of two cases filed earlier were concluded. In one case, a trafficker
    was sentenced to death in absentia; in the second, two individuals were
    sentenced to life in prison. Exact numbers of those persons arrested
    for trafficking are difficult to obtain as charges against traffickers
    usually are for lesser crimes, such as crossing borders without proper
    documents.
        The exact number of women and children trafficked for purposes of
    forced prostitution is unknown; however, human rights monitors estimate
    that more than 20,000 women and children are trafficked from the
    country for such purposes annually. Most trafficked persons are lured
    by promises of good jobs or marriage, and some are forced into
    involuntary servitude outside of the country. Seeing no alternative for
    breaking the cycle of poverty, parents often willingly send their
    children away. Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside of the normal
    family support system also are susceptible. Traffickers living abroad
    often arrive in a village and ``marry'' a woman, only to dispose of her
    upon arrival in the destination country, where women are sold by their
    new ``friends'' or ``husbands'' into bonded labor, menial jobs, or
    prostitution. Criminal gangs conduct much of the trafficking in and
    smuggling of persons. The border between Bangladesh and India is
    loosely controlled, especially around Jessore and Benapole, making
    illegal border crossings easy.
        The number of child prostitutes is difficult to determine.
    Prostitution is legal, but only for those persons over 18 years of age
    with government certification; however, this minimum age requirement
    commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false
    statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large
    numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels.
        Children, usually young boys, also are trafficked into the Middle
    East and the Persian Gulf States to work as camel jockeys. It is
    estimated that there are anywhere from 100 to over 1,000 underage South
    Asian camel jockeys currently working in the United Arab Emirates
    alone; while many come from India and Pakistan, a growing number come
    from Bangladesh. Criminal gangs procure most of the youths. The
    majority of such children work with the knowledge of their parents, who
    receive as much as $200 (10,000 Taka) for their child's labor, although
    a significant minority simply are kidnaped. The gangs bringing the
    jockeys earn approximately $150 (7,500 Taka) a month from the labor of
    each child. The usual procedure used for bringing these children into
    the Middle East is to have their names added to the passport of a
    Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa for the Middle East;
    the children fraudulently are claimed to be her children. During the
    year, police made arrests in several incidents for trafficking in young
    boys to the Middle East.
        The Government has developed a set of policies and plans regarding
    the trafficking issue. The Government has been involved in ongoing
    efforts to engage the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
    (SAARC) on the issue. The Government also frequently sends
    representatives to conferences, seminars, and workshops on the
    trafficking problem. In addition the Government has initiated a program
    across a number of ministries to address the problem. However,
    government capacity to address with this issue remains limited.
        In June the Government signed a 3-year, $2 million (108 million
    Taka) project with the Norwegian government aid organization, NORAD, to
    develop an intraministerial infrastructure for addressing the
    trafficking problem. This project, based in the Department of Women and
    Children's Affairs, plans to be the focal point for addressing the
    prosecution, protection, and prevention activities carried out by the
    Government. A goal of the project is for the Government to become more
    involved in arresting and prosecuting traffickers. However, because the
    Government does not keep records of births and marriages at the village
    level, it is very difficult for authorities to detect false claims of
    marriage or family ties.
        The Government has expressed concern about the problem and has
    worked with NGO's, donor countries, and international organizations
    against trafficking. Some of these projects include conducting
    awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and rehabilitation
    programs. While the Government provides support for returning
    trafficking victims, governmentrun shelters generally are inadequate
    and poorly run. Increasing shelter capacity and rehabilitation programs
    is one of the features of the NORAD project.
        Throughout the country, a variety of NGO's and community-based
    organizations are working on the trafficking problem through prevention
    efforts, research, data collection, documentation, advocacy, awareness
    creation and networking, cross-border collaboration, legal enforcement,
    rescue, rehabilitation, reintegration, income generation and low-
    interest loan programs, vocational training, and legislative reform.
    Among the NGO's that have been active in addressing the problem, the
    Association for Community Development conducted a study on trafficking
    issues and conducted workshops and outreach programs aimed at reaching
    potential victims of trafficking before they are trafficked. The
    Bangladesh National Women Lawyer's Association (BNWLA) conducts
    awareness programs aimed at alerting poor persons to the dangers of
    trafficking through leaflets, stickers, and posters. The BNWLA also
    provides legal assistance to trafficking victims, and initiates legal
    action against traffickers. The BNWLA runs a shelter home for
    trafficked women and children that provides health care, counseling,
    and training. The Center for Women and Children (CWCS) has networks to
    monitor trafficking across the country, conducts awareness meetings,
    and has a pilot project to make police aware of the rights of women and
    children. Awareness of trafficking is increasing, and the topic
    receives frequent press coverage. Two umbrella organizations of anti-
    trafficking NGO's exist, and are seeking to improve coordination and
    planning of efforts against the problem.
                                   __________

                                     BHUTAN

        Bhutan is ruled by a hereditary monarch, King Jigme Singye
    Wangchuk, who governs with the support of a National Assembly and a
    Council of Ministers; there is no written constitution to protect
    fundamental political and human rights. Since ascending to the throne
    in 1972, the King has continued efforts toward social and political
    modernization begun by his father. In the last few years, Bhutan has
    improved rapidly services in education, health care, sanitation, and
    communications, with parallel but slower developments of the role of
    representatives in governance and decision making. In recent years,
    Bhutan has adopted some measures to transfer power from the King to the
    National Assembly. The judiciary is not independent of the King.
        Approximately two-thirds of the government-declared population of
    600,000 persons is composed of Buddhists with cultural traditions akin
    to those of Tibet. The Buddhist majority consists of two principal
    ethnic and linguistic groups: the Ngalongs of the western part of the
    country and the Sharchops of the eastern part of the country. The
    remaining third of the population, ethnic Nepalis, most of whom are
    Hindus, live in the country's southern districts. Bhutanese dissident
    groups claim that the actual population is between 650,000 and 700,000
    persons and that the Government underreports the number of ethnic
    Nepalese in the country. The rapid growth of this ethnic Nepalese
    segment of the population led some in the Buddhist majority to fear for
    the survival of their culture. Government efforts to institute policies
    designed to preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic
    group, to change citizenship requirements, and to control illegal
    immigration resulted in political protests and led to ethnic conflict
    and repression of ethnic Nepalese in southern districts during the late
    1980's and early 1990's. Tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese left the
    country in 1991-92, many of whom were expelled forcibly. According to
    U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), there were 98,269 ethnic
    Nepalese in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal as of late June; upwards
    of 15,000 reside outside of the camps in the Indian states of Assam and
    West Bengal. The Government maintains that some of those in the camps
    never were citizens, and therefore have no right to return. In 1998 the
    Government began resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of
    the country on land in southern districts vacated by the ethnic
    Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal, which some claim will
    complicate any future return of the ethnic Nepalese. A National
    Assembly resolution adopted in 1997 prohibits still-resident immediate
    family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding jobs with the
    Government or the armed forces. In early 1998 the Government
    implemented the resolution, and already had dismissed 429 civil
    servants by November 1998, when implementation of the resolution was
    discontinued.
        The Royal Bhutan Police (RBP), assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army,
    including those assigned to the Royal Body Guard, and a national
    militia, maintain internal security. Some members of these forces
    committed human rights abuses against ethnic Nepalese.
        The economy is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the
    main livelihood for 90 percent of the population and account for about
    half of the gross domestic product (GDP). Agriculture largely consists
    of subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Cardamon, citrus fruit,
    and spices are the leading agricultural exports. Cement and electricity
    are the other important exports. Strong trade and monetary ties link
    the economy closely to that of India. Hydroelectric power production
    potential and tourism are key resources, although the Government limits
    foreign tourist arrivals because of inadequate tourist infrastructure
    and environmental concerns. Tourist arrivals also are limited by means
    of pricing policies. Bhutan is a poor country. The gross national
    product per capita is estimated to be $470.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and problems
    remain in several areas. The King exercises strong, active, and direct
    power over the Government. Citizens do not have the right to change
    their government. The Government discourages political parties, and
    none operate legally. There were reports that security forces beat
    ethnic Nepalese refugees who entered the country to demonstrate.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems, and reports of torture
    and abuse of persons in detention continue. Impunity for those who
    commit abuses also is a problem. Judges serve at the King's pleasure,
    and the Government limits significantly the right to a fair trial.
    Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under a
    legal code established in the 17 century and revised and modernized in
    1958 and 1965. In late 1998 the Government formed a special committee
    of jurists and government officials to review the country's basic law
    and propose changes. In April the Government established a Department
    of Legal Affairs, which is projected to be functioning fully by mid-
    2001; it is a result of the review of the Basic Law. Programs to build
    a body of written law and to train lawyers are progressing. For
    example, the Government sends many lawyers to India and other countries
    for legal training. The Government limits significantly citizens' right
    to privacy. The Government restricts freedom of speech, the press,
    assembly, and association. The Government launched the country's first
    indigenous television service in June 1999, modifying a ban on private
    television reception that had been in place since 1989. Citizens face
    significant limitations on freedom of religion. In July 1998, the
    Government initiated steps to renew negotiations with the Government of
    Nepal on procedures for the screening and repatriation of ethnic
    Nepalese in the refugee camps, and the two governments held a series of
    meetings during the second half of that year. After a 3-year hiatus,
    ministerial-level bilateral talks resumed in September 1999. The
    Government restricts worker rights.
        The Government claims that it has prosecuted government personnel
    for unspecified abuses committed in the early 1990's; however, public
    indications are that it has done little to investigate and prosecute
    security force officials responsible for torture, rape, and other
    abuses committed against ethnic Nepalese residents.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during
    the year. Human rights groups allege that in 1998 a government official
    shot and killed Gomchen Karma, a Buddhist monk arrested in October 1997
    during a peaceful demonstration in the eastern part of the country. The
    Government stated that the shooting was accidental, that the official
    responsible has been suspended from duty and charged in connection with
    the incident, and that his case was being heard as of September.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and abuse; however, human rights
    advocates state that in practice security forces ignore these
    provisions. No one was prosecuted in connection with violating
    prohibitions against torture during the year. There were reports that
    security forces captured numerous ethnic Nepalese refugees attempting
    to return to the country, beat them, and sent them back across the
    border. Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan report
    that in 1998 and 1999, the police assaulted them, injuring several
    demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all of the marchers to
    Nepal (see Section 5). In the past, there have been reports that ethnic
    Nepalese refugees who attempted to return to the country were tortured.
    Refugee newspapers published in Nepal allege that Nima Gyaltsen, a
    prisoner detained since 1997 without charge or trial in Zilnon
    Namgyeling jail in Thimphu, died in 1999 after being subjected to
    torture during his incarceration.
        Refugee groups credibly claim that persons detained as suspected
    dissidents in the early 1990's were tortured by security forces, who
    also committed acts of rape. During those years, the Government's
    ethnic policies and the crackdown on ethnic Nepalese political
    agitation created a climate of impunity in which the Government tacitly
    condoned the physical abuse of ethnic Nepalese. The Government denies
    that these abuses occurred but also claims that it has investigated and
    prosecuted three government officials for unspecified abuses of
    authority during that period. Details of these cases have not been made
    public, and there is little indication that the Government has
    investigated adequately or punished any security force officials
    involved in the widespread abuses of 1989-92.
        Prison conditions reportedly are adequate, if austere. In 1993 the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a program of
    visits to prisons in the capital, Thimphu. In 1994 a new prison in
    Chemgang was opened. Together, these events contributed to a
    substantial improvement in conditions of detention over those that
    existed previously. However, Bhutanese human rights groups active
    outside the country maintain that prison conditions outside of Thimphu
    remain oppressive.
        The Government and the ICRC signed a new Memorandum of
    Understanding in September 1998, extending the ICRC prison visits
    program for another 5 years. The ICRC conducted two prison visits
    during the year, as it has done for each of the past 6 years, and
    received unhindered access to prisons during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain problems. Under the Police Act of 1979, police may not
    arrest a person without a warrant and must produce an arrested person
    before a court within 24 hours of arrest, exclusive of travel time from
    place of arrest. However, legal protections are incomplete, due to the
    lack of a fully elaborated criminal procedure code and to deficiencies
    in police training and practice. Incommunicado detention is known to
    occur. Incommunicado detention of suspected militants was a serious
    problem in 1991 and 1992, but the initiation of ICRC prison visits and
    the establishment of an ICRC mail service between detainees and family
    members has helped to allay this problem. Of those detained in
    connection with political dissidence and violence in southern areas in
    1991-92, 1,685 persons were ultimately amnestied, 58 are serving
    sentences after conviction by the High Court, 9 were acquitted by the
    High Court, and 71 were released after serving prison sentences.
        Human rights groups allege that in July and August 1997, the Royal
    Bhutan Police in and around Samdrup Jongkar town in the east arrested
    some 50 suspected supporters of a Bhutanese dissident group active
    outside the country. The Government states that only 16 persons were
    arrested during this period and that they have been charged with
    involvement in seditious activities and are awaiting trial. Many were
    said to be supporters of one-time Druk National Congress (DNC) and
    United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD) leader Rongthong Kunley
    Dorji, who was arrested in India in April 1997, following the issuance
    of an extradition request by Bhutanese authorities. Dorji faces
    extradition proceedings in India and possible return to Bhutan to face
    charges of fraud, nonpayment of loans, and incitement to violence. The
    original Bhutanese extradition request included a third charge,
    ``antinational activities,'' but this later was dropped when it became
    clear that Indian law would preclude his extradition to face political
    charges. Human rights groups contend that the charges brought against
    Dorji are politically motivated and constitute an attempt by the
    Government to suppress his prodemocracy activities. In June 1998, an
    Indian court granted Dorji bail, but placed restrictions on his
    movements. Dorji's extradition case still is pending in the Indian
    courts. According to an Amnesty International report released in 1999,
    30 persons were detained in 1998, most of them on suspicion of being
    members or supporters of the DNC.
        Amnesty International has reported that some of those arrested are
    feared to be at risk of torture (see Section 1.c.). Bhutanese human
    rights groups outside the country claim that the arrests, including
    those of several Buddhist monks, are aimed at imposing Ngalong norms on
    the eastern, Sharchop community, which has a distinct ethnic and
    religious identity. The Government denies that it has such a policy;
    many government officials, including both the former Head of
    Government, Foreign Minister Jigme Thinley, and the Chief Justice of
    the High Court Sonam Tobgye, are Sharchops.
        Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan charge that
    in 1999, the police assaulted them, injuring several demonstrators, and
    then arrested and deported all of the marchers to Nepal (see Section
    5). By one estimate, approximately 100 marchers were arrested and
    deported in 1999. The Government acknowledged that 58 persons whom it
    described as terrorists were serving sentences at the end of 1998 for
    crimes including rape, murder, and robbery. It stated that a total of
    134 persons were arrested in connection with the October 1997
    disturbances in the east; of that number, more than one-half either had
    been tried and acquitted or had been released after serving short
    sentences.
        Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for
    offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by
    ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section
    1.e.).
        Although the Government does not use formally exile as a form of
    punishment, many accused political dissidents freed under Government
    amnesties say that they were released on the condition that they depart
    the country. Many of them subsequently registered at refugee camps in
    Nepal. The Government denies this.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no written constitution,
    and the judiciary is not independent of the King.
        The judicial system consists of district courts and a High Court in
    Thimphu. Judges are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the
    Chief Justice and may be removed by the King. Village headmen
    adjudicate minor offenses and administrative matters.
        The Department of Legal Affairs, which was established in April, is
    projected to be fully functional by mid-2001. At a future date, the
    Government expects to create a Ministry of Law and Justice and an
    Attorney General's office within the Department of Legal Affairs. At
    present, the Department is composed of a Legal Services Division (which
    eventually is to become the Ministry of Law and Justice) with domestic,
    international, and human rights sections; and a Prosecution Division
    (which eventually is to become the Attorney General's office), with a
    criminal section and a civil section.
        Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under
    a legal code established in the 17 century and revised in 1958 and
    1965. For offenses against the State, state-appointed prosecutors file
    charges and prosecute cases. In other cases, the relevant organizations
    and departments of government file charges and conduct the prosecution.
    Defendants are supposed to be presented with written charges in
    languages that they understand and given time to prepare their own
    defense. However, this practice is not always followed, according to
    some political dissidents. In cases where defendants cannot write their
    own defense, courts assign judicial officers to assist defendants.
    There were reports that defendants receive legal representation at
    trial, and that they may choose from a list of 150 governmentlicensed
    and employed advocates to assist with their defense; however, it is not
    known how many defendants actually receive such assistance. A legal
    education program gradually is building a body of persons who have
    received formal training in the law abroad. Village headmen, who have
    the power to arbitrate disputes, make up the bottom rung of the
    judicial system. Magistrates, each with responsibility for a block of
    villages, can review their decisions. Magistrates' decisions can be
    appealed to district judges, of which there is 1 for each of the
    country's 20 districts. The High Court in Thimphu is the country's
    supreme court. Its decisions can be appealed to the King.
        Defendants have the right to appeal to the High Court and may make
    a final appeal to the King, who traditionally delegates the decision to
    the Royal Advisory Council. Trials are to be conducted in open
    hearings; however, there are allegations that this is not always the
    case in practice.
        Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and adoption,
    traditionally are resolved according to a citizen's religion: Buddhist
    tradition for the majority of the population and Hindu tradition for
    the ethnic Nepalese; however, the Government states that there is one
    formal law that governs these matters.
        Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for
    offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by
    ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners (see Section
    1.d.).
        On December 17, 1999, the King pardoned 200 prisoners to mark
    National Day; all reportedly were released. Among them were 40 persons
    convicted of ``antinational'' offenses, including prominent ethnic
    Nepalese dissident and internationally recognized political prisoner
    Tek Nath Rizal. Tek Nath Rizal was arrested in 1988 in Nepal and
    extradited to Bhutan, where he was held in solitary confinement in
    Wangdiphodrang military prison until his 1992 conviction for
    antinational crimes, including writing and distributing political
    pamphlets and attending political meetings. He was convicted under the
    1993 National Security Act, although at the time of his conviction the
    act had not yet been passed. However, a U.N. Human Rights Commission
    Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that visited the country in 1994
    at the Government's invitation determined that Rizal had received a
    fair trial and declared his detention ``not to be arbitrary.'' During
    the latter part of the year, Rizal was granted permission to leave
    Bhutan to receive medical treatment in Calcutta, India. He had not left
    Bhutan by year's end.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--There are no laws providing for these rights. The
    Government requires all citizens, including minorities, to wear the
    traditional dress of the Buddhist majority when visiting Buddhist
    religious buildings, monasteries, or government offices, and in schools
    and when attending official functions and public ceremonies. According
    to human rights groups, police regularly conduct house-to-house
    searches for suspected dissidents without explanation or legal
    justification.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government restricts freedom
    of speech and of the press.
        The country's only regular publication is Kuensel, a governmentrun
    weekly newspaper with a circulation of 10,000. Human rights groups
    state that government ministries regularly review editorial material
    and have the power to suppress or change content, which they regularly
    do. They allege that the board of directors nominally responsible for
    editorial policy is appointed by and can be removed by the Government.
    Kuensel, which publishes simultaneous editions in the English,
    Dzongkha, and Nepali languages, supports the Government but does
    occasionally report criticism of the King and Government policies in
    the National Assembly. Nepalese, Indian, and other foreign newspapers
    are available, but they sometimes can be withheld from circulation if
    they carry news that the Government deems critical of the country.
        In 1989 the Government banned all private television reception and
    ordered that television antennas and satellite dishes be dismantled.
    Many homes in Paro and Thimphu nonetheless have satellite dishes and
    receive signals from international broadcasters. In June 1999, the
    Government introduced locally produced television service with the
    inauguration of the Bhutan Broadcasting Service. The service broadcasts
    4 hours of programming daily: 2 hours of locally produced programming
    in Dzongkha, and 2 hours of English-language programming produced
    outside of the country (such as from the British Broadcasting
    Corporation (BBC) and the Cable News Network (CNN)). In late 1999 the
    Government began licensing cable operators to provide service in
    Thimphu and Paro, and cable television is available. The Government
    radio station broadcasts each day in the four major languages
    (Dzongkha, Nepali, English, and Sharchop). The Government inaugurated
    the country's first Internet service provider, Druknet, in June 1999.
        English is the medium of instruction in schools and the national
    language, Dzongkha, is taught as a second language. The teaching of
    Nepali as a second language was discontinued in 1990.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    restricts freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may engage in
    peaceful assembly and association only for purposes approved by the
    Government. Although the Government allows civic and business
    organizations, there are no legally recognized political parties. The
    Government regards parties organized by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the
    Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and the Bhutan National Democratic Party
    (BNDP)--as well as the Druk National Congress--as ``terrorist and
    antinational'' organizations and has declared them illegal. These
    parties do not conduct activities inside the country. They seek the
    repatriation of refugees and democratic reform.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government limits freedom of religion.
    The Drukpa branch of the Kagyupa School of Mahayana Buddhism is the
    state religion. About two-thirds of the population practice either
    Drukpa Kagyupa or Ningmapa Buddhism. The Drukpa branch is practiced
    predominantly in the western and central parts of the country, which
    are inhabited mainly by ethnic Ngalongs (descendants of Tibetan
    immigrants who predominate in government and the civil service, and
    whose cultural norms have been declared to be the standard for all
    citizens). The Ningmapa school is practiced predominantly in the
    eastern part of the country, although there are adherents in other
    areas, including the royal family. Most of those living in the east are
    ethnic Sharchops--the descendants of those thought to be the country's
    original inhabitants. The Government subsidizes monasteries and shrines
    of the Drukpa sect and provides aid to about one-third of the Kingdom's
    12,000 monks. The Government also provides financial assistance for the
    construction of Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples and
    shrines. In the early 1990's, the Government provided funds for the
    construction of new Hindu temples and centers of Sanskrit and Hindu
    learning and for the renovation of existing temples and places of Hindu
    learning. The Drukpa branch enjoys statutory representation in the
    National Assembly (Drukpa monks occupy 10 seats in the 150 member
    National Assembly) and in the Royal Advisory Council (Drukpa monks hold
    2 of the 11 seats on the Council), and the Drukpa branch is an
    influential voice on public policy. Citizens of other faiths, mostly
    Hindus, enjoy freedom of worship but may not proselytize. Under the
    law, conversions are illegal.
        The King has declared major Hindu festivals to be national
    holidays, and the royal family participates in them. Foreign
    missionaries are not permitted to proselytize, but international
    Christian relief organizations and Jesuit priests are active in
    education and humanitarian activities. According to dissidents living
    outside of the country, the Government restricts the import into the
    country of printed religious matter; only Buddhist religious texts are
    allowed to enter. These dissidents also state that Buddhist religious
    teaching, of both the Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa sects, is permitted
    in schools; the teaching of other religious faiths is not. The
    passports of members of minority religions cite the holder's religion,
    and applicants for government services sometimes are asked their
    religion before services are rendered.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens traveling in border regions are
    required to show their citizenship identity cards at immigration check
    points, which in some cases are located at a considerable distance from
    what is in effect an open border with India. By treaty, citizens may
    reside and work in India.
        Bhutan is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (See Section 5 regarding
    the ethnic Nepalese refugee situation).
        The Government states that it recognizes the right to asylum in
    accordance with international refugee law; however, it has no official
    policy regarding refugees, asylum, first asylum, or the return of
    refugees to countries in which they fear persecution. According to one
    credible human rights source, until recent years the Government
    systematically used to arrest and imprison Tibetan refugees crossing
    the country's border from Tibet. This policy was followed in deference
    to China's wishes. So invariable was this policy that Tibetan leaders
    advise refugees not to use routes of escape through Bhutan. Tibetan
    refugees have not done so for several years. This virtually is the only
    refugee population seeking first asylum in Bhutan, thus, the issue of
    first asylum did not arise during the year.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Bhutan
    is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the King. In June 1998,
    the King introduced term limits for his Council of Ministers and
    proposed measures to increase the role of the National Assembly in the
    formation of his Government. The National Assembly elected a new
    Council of Ministers and Government in July 1998 to a 5-year term.
    There are elected or partially elected assemblies at the local,
    district, and national levels, and the Government claims to encourage
    decentralization and citizen participation. These elections are
    conducted in much the same way as National Assembly elections. Since
    1969 the National Assembly has had the power to remove ministers who
    the King appoints, but it never has done so. Political authority
    ultimately resides in the King and decisionmaking involves only a small
    number of officials. Officials subject to questioning by the National
    Assembly routinely make major decisions, but the National Assembly is
    not known to have overturned any decisions reached by the King and
    government officials.
        Political parties do not exist legally, and the Government
    discourages their formation as unnecessarily divisive. The Government
    prohibits parties established abroad by ethnic Nepalese (see Section
    2.b.).
        The National Assembly, established in 1953, has 150 members. Of
    these, 105 are elected indirectly by heads of household, 10 are
    selected by a part of the Buddhist clergy, and the remaining 35 are
    appointed by the King to represent the Government. The National
    Assembly, which meets irregularly, has little independent authority.
    However, there are efforts underway to have the National Assembly meet
    on a more regular basis, and in recent years the King and the Council
    of Ministers have been more responsive to the National Assembly's
    concerns.
        The procedures for the nomination and election of National Assembly
    members are set out in an amendment to the country's Basic Law proposed
    by the King and adopted by the 73 session of the National Assembly in
    1995. It provides that in order to be eligible for nomination as a
    candidate for election to the National Assembly, a person must be a
    citizen of Bhutan, be at least 25 years of age, not be married to a
    foreign national, not have been terminated or compulsorily retired for
    misconduct from government service, not have committed any act of
    treason against the King, the populace, and country, have no criminal
    record or any criminal case pending against him, have respect for the
    nation's laws, and be able to read and write in Dzongkha (the language,
    having different dialects in the eastern and western areas of the
    country, spoken by Bhutanese Buddhists).
        Each National Assembly constituency consists of a number of
    villages. Each village is permitted to nominate one candidate but must
    do so by consensus. There is no provision for selfnomination and the
    law states that no person...may campaign for the candidacy or canvass
    through other means. If more than one village within a constituency
    puts forward a candidate, an election is conducted by the district
    development committee, and the candidate obtaining a simple majority of
    votes cast is declared the winner. Individuals do not have the right to
    vote; every family in a village is entitled to one vote in elections.
    The law does not make clear how a candidate is selected if none
    achieves a simple majority. However, it does state that in case of a
    tie among the candidates in the election, a selection shall be made
    through the drawing of lots. The candidate whose name is drawn shall be
    deemed to be elected.
        Human rights activists claim that the only time individual citizens
    have any involvement in choosing a National Assembly representative is
    when they are asked for consensus approval of a village candidate by
    the village headman. The name put to villagers for consensus approval
    by the headman is suggested to him by district officials, who in turn
    take their direction from the central Government. Consensus approval
    takes place at a public gathering. Human rights activists state that
    there is no secret ballot.
        The Assembly enacts laws, approves senior government appointments,
    and advises the King on matters of national importance. Voting is by
    secret ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a measure. The
    King may not formally veto legislation, but may return bills for
    further consideration. The Assembly occasionally rejects the King's
    recommendations or delays implementing them, but in general, the King
    has enough influence to persuade the Assembly to approve legislation
    that he considers essential or to withdraw proposals he opposes. The
    Assembly may question government officials and force them to resign by
    a two-thirds vote of no confidence; however, the National Assembly
    never has compelled any government official to resign. The Royal Civil
    Service Commission is responsible for disciplining subministerial level
    government officials and has removed several following their
    convictions for crimes including embezzlement.
        In June 1998, the King issued a decree setting out several measures
    intended to increase the role of the National Assembly in the formation
    and dissolution of his Government. The decree, later adopted by the 76
    session of the National Assembly, provided that all cabinet ministers
    are to be elected by the National Assembly and that the roles and
    responsibilities of the cabinet ministries were to be spelled out. Each
    cabinet minister is to be elected by simple majority in a secret ballot
    in the National Assembly from among candidates nominated by the King.
    The King is to select nominees for cabinet office from among senior
    government officials holding the rank of secretary or above. The King
    is to determine the portfolios of his ministers, whose terms will be
    limited to 5 years, after which they must pass a vote of confidence in
    the National Assembly in order to remain in office. Finally, the decree
    provided that the National Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of no
    confidence, can require the King to abdicate and to be replaced by the
    next in the line of succession. After adopting the decree, the National
    Assembly elected a new cabinet of ministers consistent with the decree.
    Human rights groups maintain that since only the King may nominate
    candidates for cabinet office, their election by the National Assembly
    is not a significant democratic reform. The King also removed himself
    as Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1998; Foreign Minister Jigme
    Thinley was elected to that position by the National Assembly for 1
    year, and was replaced by Minister for Health and Education Sangay
    Ngedup in July 1999.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    they have made small but visible gains. Three women hold seats in the
    National Assembly.
        All major ethnic groups, including ethnic Nepalese, are represented
    in the National Assembly. There are 16 ``southern Bhutanese'' (also
    known as Lhotshampas) in the National Assembly.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no legal human rights nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's) in the country. The Government regards human rights groups
    established by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the Human Rights Organization of
    Bhutan, the People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan, and the
    Association of Human Rights Activists--Bhutan--as political
    organizations and does not permit them to operate in the country.
    Amnesty International visited Bhutan in 1992 to investigate and to
    report on the alleged abuse of ethnic Nepalese. In late November 1998,
    Amnesty International again sent a delegation to the country and later
    released a report.
        ICRC representatives continue twice yearly prison visits, and the
    Government has allowed them unhindered access to detention facilities,
    including those in southern districts inhabited by ethnic Nepalese. The
    chairman and members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group
    on Arbitrary Detention made a second visit to the country in May 1996
    as a follow-up to an October 1994 visit. In addition to meetings with
    government officials, members of the working group visited prisons and
    interviewed prisoners in Thimphu, Phuntsoling, and Samtse.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Ongoing government efforts to cultivate a national identity rooted
    in the language, religion, and culture of the Ngalong ethnic group
    restrict cultural expression by other ethnic groups. In the late 1980's
    and early 1990's, the Government instituted polices designed to
    preserve the cultural dominance of the Ngalong ethnic group. It also
    committed many abuses against the ethnic Nepalese, which led to the
    departure of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese from the country;
    many ethnic Nepalese were expelled forcibly, and almost 100,000 of them
    remain in refugee camps in Nepal. At the time, the Government claimed
    that it was concerned about the rapid population growth of and
    political agitation by the ethnic Nepalese. The Government claims that
    ethnic and gender discrimination in employment is not a problem. It
    claims that ethnic Nepalese fill 22 percent of government jobs, which
    is slightly less than their proportion of the total population.
    Bhutanese human rights groups active outside the country claim that
    ethnic Nepalese actually make up about 35 percent of the country's
    population and that the Government underreports their number. Women are
    accorded respect in the traditions of most ethnic groups; however,
    persistence of traditional gender roles apparently accounts for the low
    proportion of women in government employment. Exile groups claim that
    ethnic and gender discrimination is a problem.
        Women.--There is no evidence that rape or spousal abuse are
    extensive problems. However, there are credible reports by refugees and
    human rights groups that security forces raped large numbers of ethnic
    Nepalese women in the southern area of the country in 1991 and 1992.
    According to Amnesty International, some women reportedly have died as
    a result. In one independent survey of 1,779 refugee families, 26
    percent of the respondents cited rape, fear of rape, or threat of rape
    as a prime reason for their departure from the country. The Government
    has denied these reports.
        Rape was made a criminal offense in 1953, but that law had weak
    penalties and was enforced poorly. In 1993 the National Assembly
    adopted a revised rape act with clear definitions of criminal sexual
    assault and stronger penalties. In cases of rape involving minors,
    sentences range from 5 to 17 years. In extreme cases, a rapist may be
    imprisoned for life.
        Women constitute 48 percent of the population and participate
    freely in the social and economic life of the country. Approximately 43
    percent of enrollment in school is female, and 16 percent of civil
    service employees are women. Inheritance law provides for equal
    inheritance among all sons and daughters, but traditional inheritance
    practices, which vary among ethnic groups, may be observed if the heirs
    choose to forego legal challenges. Dowry is not practiced, even among
    ethnic Nepalese Hindus. Among some groups, inheritance practices
    favoring daughters reportedly account for the large numbers of women
    among owners of shops and businesses and for an accompanying tendency
    of women to drop out of higher education to go into business. However,
    female school enrollment has been growing in response to government
    policies. Women increasingly are found among senior officials and
    private sector entrepreneurs, especially in the tourism industry. Women
    in unskilled jobs generally are paid slightly less than men.
        Polygamy is sanctioned provided the first wife gives her
    permission. Marriages may be arranged by the marriage partners
    themselves as well as by their parents. Divorce is common. Recent
    legislation requires that all marriages must be registered; it also
    favors women in matters of alimony.
        Children.--The Government has demonstrated its commitment to child
    welfare by its rapid expansion of primary schools, health-care
    facilities, and immunization programs. The mortality rates for both
    infants and children under 5 years have dropped significantly since
    1989. The Government provides free and compulsory primary school
    education, and primary school enrollment has increased at 9 percent per
    year since 1991, with enrollment of girls increasing at an even higher
    rate. In 1995 the participation rate for children in primary schools
    was estimated at 72 percent, with the rate of completion of 7 years of
    schooling at 60 percent for girls and at 59 percent for boys. There is
    no law barring ethnic Nepalese children from attending school. However,
    most of the 75 primary schools in southern areas heavily populated by
    ethnic Nepalese that were closed in 1990 remain closed today. The
    closure of the schools acts as an effective barrier to the ability of
    the ethnic Nepalese in southern areas to obtain a primary education.
    Children enjoy a privileged position in society and benefit from
    international development programs focused on maternal and child
    welfare. Amnesty International reported that at least 23 students,
    between 7 and 21 years of age, whose relatives had been arrested for
    supporting the prodemocracy movement, were expelled from school in
    eastern Bhutan in 1998. Amnesty International also reported that 19-
    year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled from school in March 1998 and was
    tortured by members of the Royal Bhutanese police after his arrest in
    Thimphu in July 1998.
        A study by UNICEF found that boys and girls receive equal treatment
    regarding nutrition and health care and that there is little difference
    in child mortality rates between the sexes. Government policies aimed
    at increasing enrollment of girls have increased the proportion of
    girls in primary schools from 39 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 1995.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of official
    discrimination toward disabled persons but the Government has not
    passed legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled. Societal
    discrimination against the disabled is a problem.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Nepalese have lived in
    the southern part of the country for centuries, and the early phases of
    economic development at the turn of the century brought a large influx
    of additional ethnic Nepalese. In the late 1980's, concern over the
    increase in the population of and political agitation among ethnic
    Nepalese prompted aggressive government efforts to assert a national
    culture, to tighten control over southern regions, to control illegal
    immigration, to expel ethnic Nepalese, and to promote national
    integration. Early efforts at national integration focused on
    assimilation, including financial incentives for intermarriage,
    education for some students in regions other than their own, and an
    increase in development funds in the south.
        Beginning in 1989, more discriminatory measures were introduced,
    aimed at shaping a new national identity, known as Drukpa. Drukpa is
    based on the customs of the non-ethnic Nepalese Ngalong ethnic group
    predominant in the western part of the country. Measures included a
    requirement that national dress be worn for official occasions and as a
    school uniform, the teaching of Dzongkha as a second language in all
    schools, and an end to instruction in Nepali as a second language
    (English is the language of instruction in all schools). Also,
    beginning in 1988, the Government refused to renew the contracts of
    tens of thousands of Nepalese guest workers. Many of these workers had
    resided in the country for years, in some cases with their families.
        During the mid- and late 1980's, citizenship became a highly
    contentious issue. Requirements for citizenship first were formalized
    in the Citizenship Law of 1958, which granted citizenship to all adults
    who owned land and had lived in the country for at least 10 years.
    However, in 1985 a new citizenship law significantly tightened
    requirements for citizenship and resulted in the denaturalization of
    many ethnic Nepalese. While citizenship previously was conferred upon
    children whose father was a citizen under the 1958 law, the 1985 law
    required that both parents be citizens in order to confer citizenship
    on a child, and that persons seeking to prove citizenship through their
    own or their parents' residency in 1958 be able to prove residency in
    the country at that time. In many cases, persons were unable to produce
    the documentation necessary, such as land tax receipts from 1958, to
    show residency nearly 30 years before. The law permits residents who
    lost citizenship under the 1985 law to apply for naturalization if they
    can prove residence during the 15 years prior to that time. The
    Government declared all residents who could not meet the new
    citizenship requirements to be illegal immigrants.
        The 1985 Citizenship Act also provides for the revocation of the
    citizenship of any naturalized citizen who ``has shown by act or speech
    to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and
    people of Bhutan.'' The Home Ministry, in a circular notification in
    1990, advised that ``any Bhutanese nationals leaving the country to
    assist and help the antinationals shall no longer be considered as
    Bhutanese citizens . . . such people's family members living in the
    same household will also be held fully responsible and forfeit their
    citizenship.'' Human rights groups allege that these provisions were
    used widely to revoke the citizenship of ethnic Nepalese who
    subsequently were expelled or otherwise departed from the country.
    Beginning in 1988, the Government expelled large numbers of ethnic
    Nepalese through enforcement of the new citizenship laws.
        Outraged by what they saw as a campaign of repression, ethnic
    Nepalese mounted a series of demonstrations, sometimes violent, in
    September 1990. The protests were spearheaded by the newly formed
    Bhutan People's Party, which demanded full citizenship rights for
    ethnic Nepalese, the reintroduction of Nepali as a medium of education
    in the south, and democratic reforms. Characterizing the BPP as a
    ``terrorist'' movement backed by Indian sympathizers, the authorities
    cracked down on its activities and ordered the closure of local
    Nepalese schools, clinics, and development programs after several were
    raided or bombed by dissidents. Many ethnic Nepalese schools reportedly
    were turned into Army barracks. There were credible reports that many
    ethnic Nepalese activists were beaten and tortured while in custody,
    and that security forces committed acts of rape. There also were
    credible reports that militants, including BPP members, attacked and
    killed census officers and other officials, and engaged in bombings.
    Local officials took advantage of the climate of repression to coerce
    ethnic Nepalese to sell their land below its fair value and to
    emigrate.
        Beginning in 1991, ethnic Nepalese began to leave southern areas of
    the country in large numbers and take refuge in Nepal. Many were
    expelled forcibly. According to Amnesty International, entire villages
    sometimes were evicted en masse in retaliation for an attack on a local
    government official. Many ethnic Nepalese were forced to sign
    ``voluntary migration forms'' wherein they agreed to leave the country,
    after local officials threatened to fine or imprison them for failing
    to comply. By August 1991, according to NGO reports, 2,500 refugees
    already were camped illegally in Nepal, with a steady stream still
    coming from Bhutan. The UNHCR began providing food and shelter in
    September of that year, and by year's end, there were 6,000 refugees in
    Nepal. The number of registered refugees grew to approximately 62,000
    by August 1992, and to approximately 80,000 by June 1993, when the
    UNHCR began individual screening of refugees. The flow slowed
    considerably thereafter; there were no new refugee arrivals from Bhutan
    to the camps during the year. According to UNHCR, there were 98,269
    ethnic Nepalese refugees in 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal, as of
    June 30. Much of this increase since 1993 is the result of births to
    residents of the camps. An additional 15,000 refugees, according to
    UNHCR estimates, are living outside the camps in Nepal and India.
        Ethnic Nepalese political groups in exile complain that the
    revision of the country's citizenship laws in 1985 denaturalized tens
    of thousands of former residents of Bhutan. They also complain that the
    new laws have been applied selectively and make unfair demands for
    documentation on a largely illiterate group in a country that only
    recently has adopted basic administrative procedures. They claim that
    many ethnic Nepalese whose families have been in the country for
    generations were expelled in the early 1990's because they were unable
    to document their claims to residence. The Government denies this and
    asserts that a threemember village committee--typically ethnic Nepalese
    in southern districts--certifies in writing that a resident is a
    Bhutanese citizen in cases where documents cannot be produced.
        The Government maintains that many of those who departed the
    country in 1991-92 were Nepalese or Indian citizens who came to the
    country after the enactment of the 1958 Citizenship law but were not
    detected until a census in 1988. The Government also claims that many
    persons registered in the camps as refugees may never have resided in
    the country. A royal decree in 1991 made forcible expulsion of a
    citizen a criminal offense. In a January 1992 edict, the King noted
    reports that officials had been forcing Bhutanese nationals to leave
    the country but stressed that this was a serious and punishable
    violation of law. Nevertheless, only three officials ever were punished
    for abusing their authority during this period (see Section 1.c.).
    According to the UNHCR, the overwhelming majority of refugees who have
    entered the camps since screening began in June 1993 have documentary
    proof of Bhutanese nationality. Random checks and surveys of camp
    residents--including both pre- and post-June 1993 arrivals--bear this
    out. The Government contends that some ethnic Nepalese left the country
    voluntarily, thus renouncing their Bhutanese citizenship. However,
    human rights organizations credibly dispute this claim.
        A Nepal-Bhutan ministerial committee met seven times between 1994
    and 1996, and a secretarial-level committee met twice in 1997 in
    efforts to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem. In 1998 Foreign
    Minister Jigme Thinley took office with a mandate to resolve the
    refugee issue, and several meetings were held with representatives of
    the Nepalese Government, the UNHCR, and NGO's. However, the dialog lost
    momentum in 1998 and was suspended by the Bhutanese Government pending
    the formation of a new government in Nepal in 1999. After a 3-year
    hiatus, the foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan met in September 1999
    in Kathmandu to resume discussions on the refugee issue. Bilateral and
    multilateral discussions have continued, including a ninth round of
    ministerial level talks held in May. During the year, U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata visited the country, as did at
    least one high-ranking foreign official. In late December, Bhutan and
    Nepal agreed upon a system to verify the nationality of Bhutanese
    refugees in Nepal in preparation for their for return to Bhutan.
    Refugee verifications were scheduled to begin in January 2001. At
    year's end, approximately 98,000 Bhutanese refugees remained in Nepal.
    The resettlement of persons onto the land once occupied by refugees
    continues to represent an obstacle to a negotiated resolution of the
    refugee problem.
        In March 1996, refugees began a series of ``peace marches'' from
    Nepal to Bhutan to assert their right to return to Bhutan. Bhutanese
    police immediately detained and deported the marchers who crossed into
    Bhutan in August, November, and December 1996. In the December 1996
    incident, police reportedly used force against the marchers. Such
    marches also were held in 1998 and 1999; the marchers charge that the
    police assaulted them during each march, injuring several
    demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all marchers. A
    resolution adopted by the National Assembly in July 1997 prohibits the
    still-resident family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding
    jobs with the Government or in the armed forces. Under the resolution,
    those holding such jobs were to be retired involuntarily. The
    Government made clear that for the purposes of this resolution, a
    family member would be defined as a parent, a child, a sibling, or a
    member of the same household. The Government states that 429 civil
    servants, many of them ethnic Nepalese, were retired compulsorily in
    accordance with the July 1997 National Assembly resolution, and that
    the program was terminated in November. The Government states that
    those forced to retire were accorded retirement benefits in proportion
    to their years of government service. The Government also began a
    program of resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of the
    country on land in the southern part of the country vacated by the
    ethnic Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal. Human rights
    groups maintain that this action prejudices any eventual outcome of
    negotiations over the return of the refugees to the country. The
    Government maintains that this is not its first resettlement program
    and that Bhutanese citizens who are ethnic Nepalese from the south
    sometimes are resettled on more fertile land in other parts of the
    country. The failure of the Government to permit the return of ethnic
    Nepalese refugees has tended to reinforce societal prejudices against
    this group, as has the Government's policy on forced retirement of
    refugee family members in government service and the resettlement of
    Buddhists on land vacated by expelled ethnic Nepalese in the south.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are not permitted, and
    there are no labor unions. Workers do not have the right to strike, and
    the Government is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
    collective bargaining in industry. Industry accounts for about 25
    percent of the GDP, but employs only a minute fraction of the total
    work force. The Government affects wages in the manufacturing sector
    through its control over wages in state-owned industries.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
    abolished its system of compulsory labor taxes in December 1995.
    Laborers in rural development schemes previously paid through this
    system now are paid regular wages. There is no evidence to suggest that
    domestic workers are subjected to coerced or bonded labor. The law does
    not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
    practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years
    for citizens and 20 years for noncitizens. A UNICEF study suggested
    that children as young as 11 years sometimes are employed with road-
    building teams. The Government provides free and compulsory primary
    school education, and 72 percent of the school-aged population is
    enrolled (see Section 5). Children often do agricultural work and
    chores on family farms. There is no law barring ethnic Nepalese
    children from attending school. However, most of the 75 primary schools
    in southern areas heavily populated by ethnic Nepalese that were closed
    in 1990 remain closed today. The closure of the schools acts as an
    effective barrier to the ability of the ethnic Nepalese in southern
    areas to obtain a primary education. In the early 1990's, children who
    failed their school examinations were compelled to join the armed
    forces (despite the fact that the minimum age of recruitment is age
    18). This practice of conscription has ended. The law does not
    specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
    practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A circular effective in February
    1994 established wage rates, rules and regulations for labor recruiting
    agencies, and regulations for payment of workmen's compensation. Wage
    rates are revised periodically, and range upward from a minimum of
    roughly $1.50 (50 ngultrums) per day for unskilled and skilled
    laborers, with various allowances paid in cash or kind in addition.
    This minimum wage provides a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family in the local context. The workday is defined as 8 hours with a
    1-hour lunch break. Work in excess of this must be paid at one and one-
    half times normal rates. Workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled
    to 1 day's paid leave for 6 days of work and 15 days of leave annually.
    The largest salaried work force is the government service, which has an
    administered wage structure last revised in 1988 but supplemented by
    special allowances and increases since then, including a 25 percent
    increase in July 1997. Only about 30 industrial plants employ more than
    50 workers. Smaller industrial units include 69 plants of medium size,
    197 small units, 692 ``mini'' units, and 651 cottage industry units.
    The Government favors a family-owned farm policy; this, along with the
    country's rugged geography, and land laws that prohibit a farmer from
    selling his last 5 acres and that require the sale of holdings in
    excess of 25 acres, result in a predominantly self-employed
    agricultural work force. Workers are entitled to free medical care
    within the country. They are eligible for compensation for partial or
    total disability, and in the event of death, their families are
    entitled to compensation. Existing labor regulations do not grant
    workers the right to remove themselves from work situations that
    endanger health and safety without jeopardizing their continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                     INDIA

        India is a longstanding parliamentary democracy with a bicameral
    parliament. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose Bharatiya Janata
    Party (BJP) led a 17-party coalition, took office in October 1999 and
    heads the Government. President K.R. Narayanan, who was elected by an
    electoral college consisting of Members of Parliament and members of
    state assemblies, is Head of State and also has special emergency
    powers. The judiciary is independent.
        Although the 28 state governments have primary responsibility for
    maintaining law and order, the central Government provides guidance and
    support through the use of paramilitary forces throughout the country.
    The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls most of the paramilitary
    forces, the internal intelligence bureaus, and the nationwide police
    service; it provides training for senior police officers for the
    stateorganized police forces. The armed forces are under civilian
    control. Security forces committed numerous significant human rights
    abuses, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern
    states.
        The country is in transition from a government-controlled economy
    to one that largely is market oriented. The private sector is
    predominant in agriculture, most nonfinancial services, consumer goods
    manufacturing, and some heavy industry. Economic liberalization and
    structural reforms begun in 1991 continue, although momentum has
    slowed. The country's economic problems are compounded by population
    growth of 1.7 percent annually with a current population of more than 1
    billion. Income distribution remained very unequal, with the top 20
    percent of the population receiving 39.3 percent of national income and
    the bottom 20 percent receiving 9.2 percent. Twenty percent of the
    urban population and 30 percent of the rural population live below the
    poverty level.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in some areas; however, numerous serious problems remain, despite
    extensive constitutional and statutory safeguards. Significant human
    rights abuses included: Extrajudicial killings, including faked
    encounter killings, deaths of suspects in police custody throughout the
    country, and excessive use of force by security forces combating active
    insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and several northeastern states;
    torture and rape by police and other agents of the Government; poor
    prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention in
    Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast; continued detention throughout the
    country of thousands arrested under special security legislation;
    lengthy pretrial detention; prolonged detention while undergoing trial;
    occasional limits on freedom of the press and freedom of movement;
    harassment and arrest of human rights monitors; extensive societal
    violence against women; legal and societal discrimination against
    women; female bondage and forced prostitution; child prostitution and
    infanticide; discrimination against the disabled; serious
    discrimination and violence against indigenous people and scheduled
    castes and tribes; widespread intercaste and communal violence;
    societal violence against Christians and Muslims; widespread
    exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor; and trafficking in
    women and children.
        Many of these abuses are generated by a traditionally hierarchical
    social structure, deeply rooted tensions among the country's many
    ethnic and religious communities, violent secessionist movements and
    the authorities' attempts to repress them, and deficient police methods
    and training. These problems are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where
    judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed counterinsurgency
    tactics, the refusal of security forces to obey court orders, and
    terrorist threats have disrupted the judicial system. The number of
    insurgencyrelated killings in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast by
    regular security forces increased from the previous year. In the
    northeast there was no clear decrease in the number of killings,
    despite negotiated ceasefires between the Government and some insurgent
    forces, and between some tribal groups.
        The concerted campaign of execution-style killings of civilians by
    Kashmiri militant groups, begun in 1998, continued, and included
    several killings of political leaders and party workers. Separatist
    militants were responsible for numerous, serious abuses, including
    killing of armed forces personnel, police, government officials, and
    civilians; torture; rape; and brutality. Separatist militants also were
    responsible for kidnaping and extortion in Jammu and Kashmir and the
    northeastern states.
        In July one of the largest Kashmiri militant groups announced a
    unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir and offered to open a dialog
    with the Government. The Government responded by instructing its
    military forces to reciprocate the ceasefire, accepting the offer of
    dialog, and beginning talks. The ceasefire and talks ended abruptly in
    August when the militants demanded the start of tripartite talks
    between themselves, the Government of India, and the Government of
    Pakistan. During the same period, Pakistan-backed militants opposed to
    the ceasefire attacked and killed more than 100 civilians, many of them
    Hindu religious pilgrims, at several locations in Jammu and Kashmir. On
    November 26, the Government instituted its own unilateral suspension of
    offensive action for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in Jammu and
    Kashmir and offered to initiate dialog with militant groups that wished
    to come forward for talks. The Government extended the ceasefire on
    December 20, and it remained in force at year's end. The Government
    also continued to pursue a dialog with Kashmiri militant groups, but no
    formal talks had begun by year's end.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--Extrajudicial
    killings by government forces (including deaths in custody and faked
    encounter killings) continued to occur frequently in the state of Jammu
    and Kashmir and several northeastern states, where separatist
    insurgencies continued. Security forces offered bounties for wanted
    militants brought in dead or alive.
        Official government figures indicate that security forces killed
    1,520 militants in encounters in Jammu and Kashmir as of September,
    compared with 1,082 militants killed by about the same time in 1999
    (Kashmir has been at the center of a territorial dispute between India
    and Pakistan since the two nations gained their independence in 1947;
    both claim Kashmir). Kashmiri separatist groups maintain that many such
    ``encounters'' are faked and that suspected militants offering no
    resistance are executed summarily by security forces. Statements by
    senior police and army officials confirm that the security forces are
    under instructions to kill foreign militants, rather than attempt to
    capture them alive. Human rights groups allege that this particularly
    is true in the case of security force encounters with non-Kashmiri
    militants who cross into Jammu and Kashmir illegally. According to
    press reports and anecdotal accounts, those persons killed typically
    were detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple
    bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or
    otherwise were discovered shortly afterwards. For example, on the night
    of April 29, police took into custody Said Hafeez Mehraj, an alleged
    militant, at a public telephone booth in Srinagar; the police delivered
    Mehraj's body to his family the following day. Family members allege
    that the police killed Mehraj while in police custody. However, the
    police claim that they took Mehraj to Rajouri Kedar in downtown
    Srinagar so that he could help them uncover an arms cache, and that
    militants fired on the police party, killing Mehraj. On August 16,
    authorities reported that security forces killed two members of the
    Hizbul Mujahideen militant group during a raid on a ``safe house'' used
    by the group in Walurhama-Magam, Kupwara district. Authorities claim
    that the two men, Nazir Ahmad Wani and Muhammad Sadiq Mir, began
    shooting at the forces and that troops killed them while firing back.
    However, the Hizbul Mujahideen claims that the two men surrendered, and
    alleges that the security forces later killed them while in custody.
        Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) active in Jammu and Kashmir
    claimed that in January, Mohammad Tahir Shah of Kapipora was killed
    soon after being taken into custody by security forces, which earlier
    had killed Shah's two sons, alleging that they were members of a
    militant organization. Shah was buried in Tral town. His relatives were
    not permitted to recover the body for burial in Kapipora, according to
    an NGO. Another NGO reported that on March 29, security forces killed
    Gulab Muhammad Chechi in an encounter in Beerwah. Authorities claim
    that he was a foreign militant and that security forces killed him
    during a gunfight. However, his relatives say that Chechi was a beggar
    native to Beerwah. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a
    government-appointed and financed investigative body (see Section 4),
    directed that all alleged encounter deaths be investigated immediately
    by an independent agency; however, members of the security forces
    rarely are held accountable for these killings. The NHRC itself may
    inquire into alleged security force abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, but
    does not have the statutory power to investigate such allegations if it
    is not satisfied with the responses to its inquiries. Authorities
    generally have not reported encounter deaths that occur in Jammu and
    Kashmir to the NHRC. Human rights groups allege that during the year
    security forces killed a number of captured non-Kashmiri militants in
    Jammu and Kashmir. During conflicts with armed militants, security
    forces allegedly respond indiscriminately to gunfire.
        According to official figures, in Jammu and Kashmir security forces
    killed 1,520 militants during the year; 762 civilians and 397 members
    of the security forces were killed during the same period. According to
    the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 1999 in Jammu and Kashmir security
    forces killed 1,082 militants, captured 744, and 109 surrendered to
    authorities. During the same period, 821 civilians and 356 security
    force members were killed in insurgency-related incidents in the state,
    according to the Home Ministry. Home Ministry figures state that in
    1999, 584 civilians, 439 militants, and 205 security force members were
    killed in insurgencies in the northeastern states. The Home Ministry
    reported that in 1998, 881 civilians, 374 militants, and 182 security
    force members were killed in the northeastern states.
        The security forces also killed civilians during military
    counterinsurgency operations. For example, on March 25, security forces
    shot and killed 5 men in Pathribal village, south of Srinagar, alleging
    that these men were responsible for the March 20 massacre of 35 Sikh
    civilians in Chattisinghpura village (see Section 5); however, the
    victims' family members claim that all of the men were innocent
    civilians whom the police killed, burned, and buried. A Home Ministry
    spokesman, announcing an investigation into the killings of the five
    men, later admitted that Jammu and Kashmir police may have
    ``overreacted'' in shooting the civilians. On April 3, the Special
    Operations Group (SOG) of the Kashmir police and the Central Reserve
    police force fired into a group of several hundred unarmed Muslim
    protesters in Brakpora, Anantnag district, killing 8 persons and
    injuring at least 15 others. The demonstrators were protesting the
    March 25 Pathribal village killings. On April 18, the Jammu and Kashmir
    government opened a judicial inquiry, under the leadership of retired
    Supreme Court Justice S.R. Pandian, to investigate the Anantnag
    incident. On October 31, Jammu and Kashmir's Chief Minister reported
    that the Home Ministry's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the
    SOG of the Jammu and Kashmir police force were guilty of using
    excessive force during the April 3 Brakpora incident. While some
    members of the police special task force were indicted in connection
    with the Brakpora killings, trials had not begun by year's end.
        Human rights activists in Jammu and Kashmir allege that members of
    the Border Security Force shot and killed Ashraf Bazaz and his wife in
    Srinagar. Security forces allegedly killed the couple, who was
    traveling in a taxi through Malka Chowk in the capital of Kashmir,
    after stopping them for questioning. The authorities maintain that the
    couple was killed in crossfire between the Border Security Force and a
    group of militants. On August 9, security forces reportedly opened fire
    on a group of protesters in the town of Rajori near the Jammu border
    with Pakistan, killing 1 person and injuring 15 others; allegedly, the
    shooting occurred because the protesters tried to stop an army convoy.
        Accountability remains a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir.
    Security forces have committed thousands of serious human rights
    violations over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial
    killings, disappearances, and torture (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    Despite this record of abuse, between January 1990 and September 1998,
    only 295 security force members were prosecuted and punished for any of
    these crimes, and no compensation was paid to the victims or their
    families, according to the Union Home Ministry. During the same period,
    113 security force members were punished for human rights abuses in the
    northeastern states. Punishments ranged from reduction in rank to
    imprisonment for up to 10 years. According to Amnesty International,
    the army stated in January that it had investigated 822 of the 955
    complaints of human rights violations that it received in 1999 and
    found that only 24 were of substance.
        In the past, scrutiny by the NHRC and international human rights
    organizations, when permitted (see Section 4), and the persistence of
    individual magistrates, resulted in somewhat greater accountability for
    abuses committed by security force members in Jammu and Kashmir;
    however, in July 1998, the Government rejected the NHRC's
    recommendations to bring the army and paramilitary forces under closer
    scrutiny by allowing the NHRC to investigate complaints of their
    excesses. The majority of complaints during the year involved
    individual cases; while there have been complaints of individual houses
    being destroyed, there were no reports of entire villages being burned
    by armed forces or of mass killings, as in past years. The NHRC
    continues to receive complaints alleging human rights violations by the
    security forces, especially from Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern
    states.
        There were many allegations that military and paramilitary forces
    in the northeast engage in abduction, torture, rape, arbitrary
    detention, and the extrajudicial execution of militants (see Sections
    1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.g.). The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of
    1958 and the Disturbed Areas Act of 1976 remained in effect in several
    states in which active secessionist movements exist, namely, in Jammu
    and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and parts of Tripura. The
    Disturbed Areas Act gives police extraordinary powers of arrest and
    detention, which, according to human rights groups, allow security
    forces to operate with virtual impunity in areas under the act. The
    Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 provides search and arrest
    powers without warrants (see Section 1.d.).
        Human rights monitors allege that, as in Jammu and Kashmir,
    government reports of deaths during ``encounters'' between insurgent
    groups and security forces in northeastern states actually are staged,
    and that those insurgents who were reported dead were killed after
    being detained by security forces. More than 30 encounters occurred
    between security forces and militant groups in Tripura alone during the
    first 9 months of the year. In March Assam chief minister Prafulla
    Kumar Mahanta told the press that 1,439 persons had been killed during
    the state's conflict; of these, 430 were security force members. There
    were at least 60 insurgency-related killings in Assam between January
    and June, according to an informal estimate from press reports. For
    example, on April 7, army personnel killed six suspected United
    Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) militants in an encounter in the
    Manasdiga Forest, Bongaigaon district. The People's Union for Civil
    Liberties (PUCL) credibly reported that army troops killed 12 members
    of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN(I-M))
    in an encounter on July 11 along the Assam-Manipur border close to the
    Jiri River at Bolapunj in Assam's northern Cachar district. There were
    no army casualties in the encounter. The district administration in
    Meghalaya ordered an investigation of an August 24 police shooting in
    which two Khasi student union leaders were killed. The two students
    allegedly were members of the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
    (HNLC) and were suspected of having killed three nontribal laborers in
    Meghalaya in 1999. The South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center
    (SAHRDC) credibly reported that on September 10, members of the 17th
    Battalion of the Assam Rifles, led by Major Rawal, took Khundrakpam
    Tomcha, Surjit Chongthamcha, Ito Tongbram, and Robin Thokchom into
    custody in the home of Naorem Dwijamani at Chingamthak, Thokchom
    Leikai, Imphal, Manipur; authorities detained Dwijamani later the same
    day. It is believed that the Assam Rifles took the five persons to
    their headquarters in Kangla. On September 12, police found a bullet-
    riddled body, which subsequently was identified as that of Khundrakpam
    Tomcha, on a bank of the Imphal River near Singjamei, Thokchom Leikai,
    Imphal. On September 12, the Assam Rifles stated that security forces
    had killed Khundrakpam Tomcha in crossfire between security forces and
    insurgents during an operation against insurgents on September 11.
    However, witnesses allege that the body also bore marks of torture. On
    September 13, the 17th Battalion Assam Rifles released to police Naorem
    Dwijamani and Robin Thokchom into police custody. According to press
    reports, Thokchom had been tortured (see Section 1.c.). Dwijamani
    subsequently was released on bail, but as of November, Thokchom
    remained in the central Imphal jail, facing charges under the National
    Security Act (NSA).
        Since 1980 clashes between police members and Naxalite Maoist
    Revolutionaries of the Peoples' War Group (PWG) have occurred in
    northwestern Andhra Pradesh. During the late 1990's, hundreds of
    policemen and suspected Naxalites were killed, according to press
    reports and human rights organizations. According to police, 101 PWG
    Naxalites were killed in armed ``encounters'' during the first 8 months
    of the year. Twenty years of guerrilla-style conflict have led to
    serious human rights abuses committed by both sides. Human rights
    groups allege that ``encounters'' often are faked by the police to
    cover up the torture and subsequent killing of Naxalite suspects,
    sympathizers, or informers. According to police, the PWG killed 31
    police officers and 80 civilians, including the former home minister of
    the state, from January 1 to December 14. In PWG-dominated areas,
    villagers complain of regular harassment and arbitrary detention by
    police (see Section 1.d.). Police officials rarely, if ever, are held
    accountable for human rights abuses.
        The state government offers a financial package to surrendered PWG
    militants, a program that has prompted hundreds of Naxalites to leave
    the movement in recent years. According to human rights activists and
    journalists, a few surrendered militants have been allowed to retain
    their weapons and now are working for the police as anti-PWG hitmen,
    residing in police camps and barracks. On November 23, four assailants
    killed human rights lawyer and former PWG militant Purusuotham in
    Hyderabad. Police arrested four suspects a few days later, two of whom
    were identified as ex-PWG militants. The two persons confessed to the
    killing at a press conference that was quickly organized by the police.
    Police attributed the killing to feuds dating back to the victim's time
    spent in the PWG.
        An ``encounter'' death occurred in Tamil Nadu on January 10, when
    police shot and killed a Naxalite, Ravindran, in Dharmapuri district.
    Police claimed that they opened fire after Ravindran and three other
    Naxalites ambushed a police patrol. A factfinding team of human rights
    NGO's, citing inconsistencies in the police reports and the testimony
    of another Naxalite who was taken into custody during the same
    incident, alleged that Ravindran was arrested on January 7, tortured,
    and later executed (see Section 1.c.). On July 20, Andhra Pradesh
    police killed seven Naxalites in Karimnagar district. According to
    police, the Naxalites began firing at police officers who were
    surrounding a safehouse used by the extremists, and the seven were
    killed in the ensuing return of fire by police. However, human rights
    NGO's allege that police deliberately set fire to the house before the
    outbreak of gunfire and then fired bullets into the structure for
    several hours, killing the Naxalites. On October 30, police surprised
    an armed group of seven female Naxalites in Gadampalli, Andhra Pradesh.
    Police opened fire while the women were bathing in a stream, killing
    all seven. No policemen were injured or killed in the encounter. On
    November 2, police officers killed Jadhav Subash, a former Naxalite, in
    Dantepalli village, Andhra Pradesh. According to human rights lawyers
    who interviewed village eyewitnesses, a squad of policemen dragged
    Subash from a village tea shop and then shot and killed him.
        As evidence that ``encounters'' often are faked by police, human
    rights groups cite the refusal of police officials to turn over the
    bodies of suspects killed in ``encounters.'' The bodies often are
    cremated before families can view them. The NHRC is investigating about
    285 reported cases of socalled ``fake encounter deaths'' allegedly
    committed by the Andhra Pradesh police in connection with anti-Naxalite
    operations. In its 1996-97 report, the NHRC stated that the evidence on
    record did not reveal any prior police attempt to arrest the persons
    before they were killed. The report observed that in none of these
    encounters did police personnel receive any injury. The Commission
    further observed that ``no attempt whatsoever'' was made to ascertain
    the identity of the police officers who fired the weapons, and that no
    attempt was made to investigate the circumstances under which the
    police opened fire. ``As this appeared to be the pattern of the
    procedure followed by the police,'' the report concluded, ``the
    Commission felt it necessary to conclude that the procedure followed by
    them was opposed to law.'' According to the Andhra Pradesh Civil
    Liberties Committee, the NHRC has evidence of police culpability in
    several cases of ``encounter deaths'' involving suspected Naxalites.
    However, such cases have not been adjudicated in the courts or
    otherwise have not been acted on by the state government. For example,
    of six cases referred by the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee
    to the NHRC in 1994, evidence of police culpability was found in five.
    In 1994 the NHRC directed the state government to investigate the
    cases; however, the state never has taken any action. The state
    government's failure to act expeditiously in these cases has
    discouraged local human rights groups from filing additional
    ``encounter death'' cases with the NHRC.
        The Disturbed Areas Act has been in force in a number of districts
    in Andhra Pradesh for over 3 years. Human rights groups allege that
    security forces have been able to operate with virtual impunity in
    parts of Andhra Pradesh under the act. They further allege that Andhra
    Pradesh police officers train and provide weapons to an armed vigilante
    group known as the ``Green Tigers,'' whose mission is to combat
    Naxalite groups in the state. Little is known about the size,
    composition, or activities of this group.
        Police also used excessive force indiscriminately against
    demonstrators, killing many citizens. For example, according to Amnesty
    International, on January 31, police killed two ``Dalit'' (formerly
    ``untouchable'') men in Jethuke village, Bhatinda district, Punjab,
    when they opened fire on hundreds of persons demonstrating over high
    bus fares and the detention of four leaders of the Bharatiya Kisan
    Union (Indian Farmers Union), who were representing villagers in
    negotiations with the district administration regarding the issue (see
    Section 2.b.). On May 8, in Dibrugarh, Assam, police killed two persons
    when they opened fire on the funeral procession of a businessman and
    his son--who allegedly were killed by surrendered ULFA militants
    working at police behest. On May 10, police fired 23 rounds of bullets
    into a mob of Karbi People's Front (KPF) supporters in Jalpaiguri, West
    Bengal, killing 1 person and injuring 5 others. During the year, a
    government commission completed its investigation of the drowning
    deaths of 17 persons in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. The deaths occurred in
    July 1999, when thousands of demonstrators ran into a river to escape
    police beatings. The demonstrators were demanding government
    intervention in a labor dispute at a local coffee estate and the
    release of 652 estate workers imprisoned after a previous
    demonstration. Human rights groups in Tamil Nadu criticized the
    commission's findings, claiming that the commission exonerated senior
    police officials, and implied that the demonstrators themselves were
    responsible for the drownings. No charges in connection with the
    drownings had been brought against any police official by year's end.
        On April 4, police in Mau district, Uttar Pradesh, confronted a
    group of 20 to 25 women staging a sitdown strike to demand the removal
    of a liquor-vending stall from their village, according to PUCL. After
    failing to persuade the women to disperse, police charged the group
    with bamboo poles. When this failed to move the women, the police
    opened fire on the unarmed protesters, killing one of them. On December
    18, police in Keshori village, Gondia district, Maharashtra, fired on a
    crowd of persons, killing 5 persons and injuring 31 others. The
    villagers asserted that the police firing followed an altercation that
    arose when villagers objected to some drunken policemen sexually
    harrassing a village woman. Police initially claimed that they had
    fired in self-defense. The entire police contingent later was
    transferred to another district. On December 31, police in Rayagada
    district, Orissa, fired on villagers protesting the attempt of a
    multinational company to set up an aluminum plant in the predominantly
    tribal area; three persons were killed.
        Throughout the country, numerous accused criminals continue to be
    killed in encounters with police. For example, the Institute of
    Objective Study in its ``Human Rights Today'' bulletin of winter 1999-
    2000 reported that on January 14, police in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, shot
    and killed 20-year-old Meerut College student Smita Bhaduri. Three
    police officers--Inspector A.K. Kaushik, Constables Surendra, and
    Bhagwan Sahay of Daurala police station--were told that ``gangsters
    were prowling'' Sewaya village on the outskirts of Meerut. After
    arriving at the village, the three officers shot at an automobile,
    believing it to be the gangsters' vehicle, killing Bhaduri. The
    officers allegedly reported that Bhaduri was killed by ``crossfire''
    during an ``encounter'' with gang members.
        According to the Government, 542 civilians and 96 police officers
    died in gunfire exchanges involving police in 1998.
        Security forces also held persons in incommunicado detention; on
    occasion, as in the 1996 case of human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi,
    such missing persons later were found dead (see Sections 1.b. and 4).
    As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death
    still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and
    Kashmir (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
        While extrajudicial killings continued in areas affected by
    separatist insurgencies, the press and judiciary also continued to give
    attention to deaths in police custody. According to the NHRC, 1,114
    persons died in prisons between April 1998 and March 1999, many from
    natural causes that in some cases aggravated by poor prison conditions
    (see Section 1.c.). Human rights groups allege that many deaths in
    prisons are due to torture. There were numerous examples of prison
    deaths due to torture throughout the year (see Section 1.c.).
        The NHRC has focused on torture and deaths in custody by directing
    district magistrates to report all deaths in police and judicial
    custody and stating that failure to do so would be interpreted as an
    attempted coverup. Magistrates appear to be complying with this
    directive. However, the NHRC has no authority to investigate directly
    abuses by the security forces, and security forces therefore are not
    required to--and do notreport custodial deaths in Jammu and Kashmir or
    the northeastern states. In August the NHRC ordered an investigation
    into the death in police custody of Rajan Singh in September 1995 in
    Agra district jail. Police stated that Singh, who was being transported
    to court for trial in a police truck, died of injuries sustained when
    he jumped from the vehicle in an effort to escape. The autopsy revealed
    that Singh had undergone shock and hemorrhaging prior to his death. The
    NHRC found that the postmortem results were inconsistent with the
    police explanation of the death and believed that the claim of Singh's
    attempted escape from custody was fabricated and that a more likely
    explanation was that Singh ``could have been subjected to severe
    beating in the police vehicle.'' The NHRC ordered Uttar Pradesh state
    to pay $10,990 (500,000 rupees) in compensation to Singh's next of kin
    and recommended disciplinary action against the police officers
    involved in the incident. Also in August, the NHRC directed the
    Karnataka government to pay compensation of $4,395 (200,000 rupees) to
    the family of Thimmaiah, who died in the Mulbagal police station, Kolar
    district, Karnataka. The police maintain that Thimmaiah hanged himself
    in his cell; however, the postmortem and inquest reports forwarded by
    the Karnataka government do not substantiate this claim. The Commission
    concluded that the death ``had been caused by police,'' and ordered the
    government of Karnataka to bring charges against the police officers
    involved in the incident.
        According to the PUCL, on February 17, Nathan died in police
    custody in Chennai. Police assert that they arrested Nathan on February
    16 on suspicion of theft and that he confessed to that crime in court
    the same day. They further maintain that Nathan complained of diarrhea
    and vomiting the following morning; he later was taken to a nearby
    hospital and declared dead. However, the PUCL alleges that Nathan
    actually was arrested on February 10, 6 days before the recorded
    arrest, and that police tortured him to death in an effort to recover
    stolen money. The Tamil Nadu government initiated an official inquiry
    into the death and suspended six police personnel, including an
    inspector, after the incident. Amnesty International and Human Rights
    Watch (HRW) reported that on April 20, police in Gujarat beat to death
    Colonel Pratap Save, an activist with the Kinara Bachao Samiti (Save
    the Coast Committee), which was protesting the construction of a port
    in Gujarat. Members of the State Reserve Police allegedly arrested 46
    demonstrators, including Save, following the protest, and beat 6 of
    them at a local police station (see Section 1.c.). Save suffered a
    brain hemorrhage and died at a hospital in Mumbai. All of the other
    protesters were released on bail within 48 hours. The Karnataka branch
    of the PUCL alleged that police in Moodabidri town, Mangalore district,
    Karnataka, were responsible for the custodial death of Sudath Kumar
    Jain, a 40year-old local film projectionist. The human rights group
    alleges that police took Jain from his home for questioning shortly
    after midnight on May 30. Two hours later, his relatives were informed
    that he had been admitted to a hospital; his relatives found Jain
    unconscious and bleeding from his mouth. Jain was transferred to a
    second hospital late that morning where he died 3 hours later. The PUCL
    concluded that police had tortured Jain to death (see Section 1.c.).
    After the investigation results, the superintendent of police, South
    Kanara district, filed a criminal case against the arresting officer.
        Human rights groups allege that police in Adilabad district, Andhra
    Pradesh tortured and then hanged Chandraiah, an unarmed suspected
    Naxalite, on June 10. Angry villagers forced one of the police
    officials to confess to the hanging. Based on his confession, human
    rights activists filed a formal complaint with the NHRC. The NHRC has
    directed the Andhra Pradesh government to investigate. The PUCL
    reported that Krishna Pada Seal, his wife, and his son were imprisoned
    in Sakchi Jail, Jamshedpur, Bihar on July 25. According to the PUCL,
    prison officials tortured them, allegedly because they intended to
    extort money from the family (see Section 1.c.). Seal and his family
    were granted bail on August 4, following the intercession of the PUCL.
    On his release, Seal could not walk, and died as he was being carried
    to a waiting car. According to credible reports, on August 3,
    Lalrinchana, a 25-year-old Chin refugee, died from torture in the
    Mizoram Aizawl central prison. Reportedly, village defense persons
    first arrested and tortured Lalrinchana, and then turned him over to
    the Mizoram police (see Section 2.d.). In August the Karnataka High
    Court convicted eight police officers who served in Nanjangud Police
    Station in Karnataka in 1996 for fabricating official records following
    a custodial death. The Karnataka police oversaw the entire
    investigation and presentation of evidence.
        In its 2000 annual report, Amnesty International expressed concern
    about the torture death of 21-year-old Devinder Singh. On September 18,
    1999, police beat Devinder Singh, Sapinder Singh, and Karnail Singh
    (three Sikh brothers), in a police courtyard in Punjab, apparently to
    exact a confession from them that they possessed an assault rifle.
    Allegedly, police pulled their legs open 180 degrees, applied gasoline
    to their genitals, and beat them badly. Devinder Singh died as result
    of his injuries. A police subinspector subsequently was charged with
    Devinder Singh's murder.
        An army major was arrested in 1998 for the 1996 killing of human
    rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. The case still was being heard at year's
    end, but human rights workers alleged that the central Government and
    Jammu and Kashmir state both were attempting to subvert the judicial
    process by withholding evidence, and that there were no court actions
    during the year. There were no developments in the 1996 killing of
    human rights monitor Parag Kumar Das, who allegedly was killed by a
    militant who previously had surrendered and was supported by the
    Government (see Section 4).
        Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by
    progovernment countermilitants continued to be a significant problem in
    Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who
    have surrendered to government forces, but who have retained their
    weapons and paramilitary organization. Government agencies fund,
    exchange intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants
    as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to
    search persons at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) and guard extensive
    areas of the Kashmir Valley from attacks by militants. The Government,
    through its sponsoring and condoning of extrajudicial countermilitant
    activities, is responsible for killings, abductions, and other abuses
    committed by these militant groups. Perhaps as many as 3,000
    individuals continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in
    the countryside, outside major towns. The Hizbul Mujahideen, a Kashmiri
    militant group, stated in June 1998 that progovernment countermilitants
    had killed 350 of its members. According to Pakistani newspaper
    accounts, Indian security forces had killed 438 Pakistani members of
    insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir during 1999. Of this number, 200
    were members of the LashkareTayyaba, 123 were members of the Al-Badr
    Mujahideen, 69 were members of the Harkat-Ul-Mujahideenand, and 46 were
    members of the Hizbul Mujahideen. However, these numbers have not been
    confirmed, and only include the four largest militant groups in the
    state. The Government stated that security forces had killed 1,520
    militants in the state during the year, compared with 1,082 in 1999.
    The Government recruited countermilitants into the Special Operations
    Group of the Jammu and Kashmir police and into the Border Security
    Force.
        Militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir increasingly targeted members
    of the security forces and civilians during the year. In January
    militants allegedly killed two soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir; the
    soldiers retaliated with arson. On February 28, militants killed five
    Hindu truck drivers on the SrinagarJammu Highway (see Section 5).
    According to HRW, in February militants allegedly shot and killed three
    police officers in the busy market area of Lal Chowk, Srinagar;
    security forces retaliated by beating nearby civilians with sticks and
    rifle butts and by burning cars in Srinagar (see Section 1.c.). On
    March 20, militants massacred 35 Sikh inhabitants of Chatisinghpura
    town, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir, in what appeared to be a
    well-planned attack. The militants, dressed in military uniforms,
    separated unarmed male members of the Sikh families from women and
    children, gathered the men in a school complex a short distance from
    their homes, and summarily executed them. It was the first known attack
    on the Sikh minority in Jammu and Kashmir by militants, and it appeared
    intended to drive other members of that community from the Muslim-
    majority state (see Section 5).
        On March 24, militants invaded a Muslim family's home and killed
    five family members in Kot Budhan village, Udhampur district. The
    militants stormed into the house in the early morning, beat family
    members, and then shot them at point-blank range; three other family
    members, including a child, were wounded in the attack. According to
    HRW, on April 17, gunmen entered the homes of several Hindu families in
    Kot Dara village, near Rajouri. They fired on the unarmed civilians,
    killing six persons and injuring six others (see Section 5). On August
    1 and 2, militants launched 8 separate and coordinated attacks in Jammu
    and Kashmir, killing approximately 99 persons. In one of the attacks,
    at Pahalgam, armed militants descended on a camp of Hindu religious
    pilgrims making the annual pilgrimage to Amarnat, in the northern part
    of the state. The militants fired automatic weapons at the pilgrims'
    tents, the unarmed civilians in the camp, their local porters and
    guides, and nearby army personnel, killing 32 persons, primarily
    unarmed civilians. Similar attacks throughout the night of August 1 to
    2 appeared to have been intended to halt the nascent effort of the
    Hizbul Mujahideen militant group and the Government to observe a
    ceasefire and initiate a dialog. An army-headed commission investigated
    the August 1 Phalagam massacre and reported on October 31, that the
    Home Ministry's Central Reserve Police Force and the SOG of the Jammu
    and Kashmir police force used excessive force; however, there were no
    charges brought in connection with this use of excessive force. On
    August 17, militants from Harkat-ul-Jehade Islami reportedly killed six
    Hindu villagers and seriously wounded seven in the Rajouri district in
    Jammu (see Section 5). According to HRW, on August 18, militants killed
    three elderly men and a teenage boy, and wounded two other persons when
    they fired automatic weapons at civilians in Ind village, Udhampur (see
    Section 5). On September 12, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
    militants wearing army uniforms entered an army camp at Beerwa, Budgam
    district, and fired automatic weapons at the sleeping soldiers; 11
    soldiers were killed. Two of the attackers were killed in the ensuing
    gun battle. In early December, militants killed two members of a
    policeman's family and wounded two others when they barged into a house
    in the border district of Poonch and opened fire. Militants also
    carried out attacks on security forces that killed numerous persons
    (see Section 1.g.). On December 22, six militants with concealed
    weapons entered Delhi's Red Fort, an historic monument that also houses
    an army unit, during a regularly scheduled sound and light show for the
    public. The militants opened fire on the crowd, killing a soldier and
    two civilians. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant group later claimed
    responsibility for the attack. On December 26, city police raided a
    Delhi apartment and shot and killed Abu Shamal, whom they claimed to be
    Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant involved in the Red Fort attack.
        Killings of security force members by militants in Jammu and
    Kashmir increased for the third year in a row. According to official
    statistics, 397 security force personnel were killed in the state
    during the year. The Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 356
    security force members were killed in the state in 1999 and that 232
    members died in Jammu and Kashmir in 1998.
        Insurgency and increased ethnic violence took a heavy toll in the
    northeastern states. Extensive, complex patterns of violence continued
    in many of the seven northeastern states. The main insurgent groups in
    the northeast include two factions of the National Socialist Council of
    Nagaland (NSCN) in Nagaland; Meitei extremists in Manipur; the ULFA and
    the Bodo security force in Assam; and the All Tripura Tiger Force
    (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in Tripura.
    The proclaimed objective of many of these groups is to secede from the
    country, creating new, independent nations. Their stated grievances
    against the Government range from charges of neglect and indifference
    to the widespread poverty of the region, to allegations of active
    discrimination against the tribal and nontribal people of the region by
    the central Government (see Section 5). The oldest of these conflicts,
    involving the Nagas, dates back to the country's independence in 1947.
    On August 1, 1997, a ceasefire between the Government and the Isak-
    Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM) entered into effect. The ceasefire
    was extended in January until July 31, 2001. In April another Naga
    insurgent group, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
    (NSCN-K), announced a formal ceasefire. Security forces were not
    operating against either of the two NSCN factions and both generally
    were observing the ceasefire with security forces. However, in April
    week-long fighting between the 2 NSCN factions left over 45 persons
    dead, and 4,500 persons were forced to flee 15 villages in Mon district
    (see Section 2.d.). Negotiations to widen the area of application of
    the ceasefire were handicapped when NSCN(I-M) leader Thuingaleng Muivah
    was arrested in Thailand on January 19 for travelling on a forged South
    Korean passport. On August 25, a joint group of Thai and Indian
    citizens appealed to the central Government to secure the release of
    the NSCN(IM) leader in the interest of Naga peace talks. He was
    released on bail in September.
        Elsewhere in the northeast, Bodo-Santhal ethnic clashes, which
    began in April 1998, continued throughout the year. More than 87,000
    persons live under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's
    Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of the
    ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals. The killings of ULFA
    leaders' family members during the year renewed concerns about the
    situation in Assam.
        Militant groups in Manipur, Tripura, and Assam continued to attack
    civilians.
        In Tripura on January 3, the NLFT killed three persons, including
    Ravi Kumar Devbarma, a Communist Party of India (Marxist)CPI(M)-leader,
    in Kashichandrapara. Prior to the April 30 to May 3 elections for the
    Tripura tribal autonomous district council, ultras (militants)
    threatened to harm seriously persons who voted in favor of any
    candidate not belonging to the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura
    (IPFT). During the period before the election, more than 1,500
    nontribal families from 3 villages were left homeless as tribals backed
    by militants intensified their offensive to cleanse autonomous district
    council areas of Bengalis. On April 14, the NLFT killed four nontribal
    villagers in Ramdulapara, north Tripura. Reportedly, the NLFT was
    retaliating for a United Bengali Liberation Force (UBLF) attack nearby
    on March 8 in which a villager was killed and six tribals were injured
    seriously. On April 15, the NLFT killed at least 12 villagers in Khas
    Kalyanpur, West Tripura. On May 4, NLFT militants shot three family
    members of Kishore Debbarma, an NLFT deserter. On May 15, NLFT
    militants killed four persons and abducted three others in west and
    south Tripura (see Section 1.b.). CPM sources allege that all of the
    victims were CPM supporters and that the NLFT was punishing them for
    voting for the CPM in the council polls. On May 19, NLFT insurgents
    killed seven nontribals--including CPM workers' family members--and set
    fire to several houses in south and west Tripura. On May 20, at least 8
    persons were killed and more than 20 others were injured in Kalyanpur,
    west Tripura. On May 21, 15 persons were killed in Teliamura and
    Kalyanpur in attacks on tribals by non-tribals. NLFT insurgents killed
    40 villagers in west Tripura on May 21, including 19 nontribals who
    were massacred at a relief camp in Kalyanpur. On May 22, NLFT
    insurgents killed three nontribals in Gandachhara. On May 25, NLFT
    members raided the house of a CPM leader in west Tripura, and burned
    alive his 8-year-old son. On May 26, ATTF rebels killed a tribal person
    and kidnaped four others (see Section 1.b.). On May 28, the NLFT shot
    and killed two farmers in Raiabari. On June 6, ATTF ultra's hacked a
    person to death in Warengtubari. On June 13, two persons, including a
    paramilitary officer, were killed in an ethnic clash in Telaimura, in
    which a Bengali mob, angered at a killing by tribals, turned violent.
    On June 23, NLFT militants kidnaped and killed a person in Anandapur
    village. On June 26, four persons were injured in ethnic clashes
    between tribals and Bengalis in Teliamura. On July 9, NLFT militants
    shot and killed Dhirendra Roy, a CPM leader at Salema. On July 14,
    tribals set fire to more than 150 houses, injured 3 persons, and
    kidnaped another in Teliamura. On July 22, rebels of the Bru National
    Liberation Front (BNLF), a group of Reang tribals, shot 12 NLFT
    activists at Saikarbari. On July 25, tribal rebels killed Roman
    Catholic priest Victor Crasta near Bongsul village. The same day UBLF
    activists set 25 houses on fire in west Tripura. On August 17,
    militants killed a villager at Panisagar and abducted three persons
    from Manu (see Section 1.b.). On August 26, NLFT insurgents killed one
    tribal youth in Sidhai, a fisherman at Jarulbachai, and a plantation
    worker in Narendrapur Tea Estate. On August 27, Bengalis in Tripura
    State Rifles uniforms hacked to death three tribal women in Durga
    Charan Para village. NLFT ultra's killed a priest as he was exiting a
    Kali temple in Jirania on August 27 (see Section 5). On November 19,
    NLFT members killed six Bengali settlers, including two children, in
    the remote Barahaldi area of Tripura; a few hours later, Bengali
    settlers killed seven tribals in retaliation.
        In Assam, on April 9, United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
    militants lined up 11 non-Karbi laborers in the Dhansari Reserve Forest
    in Karbi Anglong district, and shot at them. (The UPDS is a Karbi
    radical group fighting for greater autonomy for the Karbis, and Karbis
    are tribal peoples native to KarbiAnglong district.) On April 19, UPDS
    militants killed 11 Nepalis at East and West Umplapher villages. On
    April 24, UPDS militants killed six Bihari laborers in Akhoiputua as
    part of their ethnic cleansing drive in Karbi Anglong district. In
    April alone, the Karbis killed 29 persons. In an ambush near Haflong,
    Dima Halam Daoga (DHD), militants killed an executive magistrate and
    five others on May 18. On June 3, ULFA militants at Srijangram in
    Bongaigaon killed two Assam policemen. On June 20, two CRPF personnel
    and a top People's United Liberation Front (PULF) leader were killed in
    an encounter at Motinagar. On June 25, surrendered ULFA leader Tarun
    Phukan was found dead; it is believed that ULFA activists killed him at
    Sivsagar. On July 16, UPDS activists in Karbi Anglong district shot 10
    nontribals, mostly women and children. On July 18, migrant Biharis
    killed six Karbi villagers in Karbi Anglong. On July 26, DHD militants
    opened fire in a marketplace at Herangajao, killing two traders and
    injuring six others. On August 20, suspected National Democratic Front
    of Bodoland (NDFB) militants killed Bodo Sahitya Sabha President
    Bineswar Brahma in Guwahati. On August 21, at Bijni, NDFB rebels killed
    eight persons including a Peoples Democratic Front Legislator, Mohini
    Basumatary. On August 22, Bodo militants killed a former All Assam
    Students Union Leader. On August 27, a man affiliated with the People's
    United Liberation Front (PULF) killed a 7yearold Muslim boy in Cachar
    for unknown reasons, generating protests from Muslim organizations such
    as Nadwadoot Tamir and the Cachar Koumi Madrassa Students' Association.
    On December 7, in Sadiya, Assam, more than 20 ULFA militants killed 28
    persons after intercepting 3 trucks carrying non-Assamese, mainly
    Nepali settlers, from a nearby market.
        On June 10, unidentified militants killed noted playwright and
    social worker Arambam Somorendra at Khurai Salanthong. On June 28,
    unknown assailants killed 10 passengers in a car on the Imphal-Jiri
    stretch of National Highway 53. On July 30, unidentified militants
    killed four security personnel and injured many others in an ambush
    near Mao, bordering Nagaland. In mid-November suspected militants of
    the People's Liberation Army of Manipur shot and killed five army
    personnel in the Mutukhong area of east Imphal district.
        Many members of the Hmar Revolutionary Force (HRF) in Mizoram
    accepted the state government's offer of amnesty in return for
    surrendering their arms. On June 6, 16 HRF members relinquished arms
    before state Home Minister Tawnluia. They received $215 (10,000 rupees)
    each for rehabilitation. In Assam more than 2,000 extremists
    surrendered their arms during the year. A new Assam government package
    for insurgents attempted to rehabilitate rural and urban ultras
    separately, through various economic development and training programs.
    On February 6, ``organizing secretaries'' of the ULFA Khairul Hussain
    and Phukan Ali and ``medical-in-charge'' Tajuddin Ahmed surrendered to
    the army in lower Assam. On March 21, 22 ULFA members surrendered
    before Sonitpur district administration in Tezpur. On April 4, 532
    Assam militants (436 ULFA members, 77 Karbi National Volunteers, and 19
    National Democratic Front of Bodoland) surrendered at Rang Ghar. On
    April 18, 48 ULFA and NDFB militants surrendered before village elders
    in lower Assam's Darrang district. On May 2, 75 militants (54 ULFA, 12
    Rabha National Security Force, 8 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of
    Assam, and 1 Koch Rajbangshi) surrendered in Goalpara before the
    district administration. On May 30, 25 ULFA militants relinquished arms
    before the army at Bongaigaon.
        The kidnaping of NGO environmental monitor Sanjay Ghosh in 1997 and
    his death at the hands of his ULFA captors continued to attract wide
    public criticism. In August 1997, ULFA confirmed that Ghosh died in
    captivity after being ``arrested and tried.'' ULFA still has not
    produced Ghosh's body. In June 1999, the CBI filed murder charges in
    connection with the case against ULFA leader Paresh Arua and 10 other
    ULFA members. During the year, surrendered ULFA militant Lohit Deuri
    told the police that ULFA has kept one of the killers of development
    worker Sanjoy Ghosh in ``solitary confinement'' since 1999. The alleged
    killer, Khirod Gohain, is serving a ``sentence'' for indiscipline.
        Naxalite Maoist revolutionaries of the PWG killed dozens of
    persons, declaring them ``class enemies'' or police informers. On
    September 3, three PWG members shot and killed a former Naxalite,
    Krishnan, in Nizamabad district, Andhra Pradesh. Krishnan had
    surrendered to police earlier. The militants left a note accusing him
    of being a police informant. On May 30, PWG Naxalites shot one person
    and blew up a government guesthouse in a village in Andhra Pradesh. In
    areas under their control, Naxalites dispense summary justice in
    ``People's Courts,'' which in some cases condemn to death suspected
    police informers, village headmen, and others deemed to be ``class
    enemies'' or ``caste oppressors'' (landlords); the Naxalites also
    extort money from these groups, as well as businesses. Naxalite
    violence has plagued Andhra Pradesh since the early 1980's, and has
    claimed more than 500 civilian and police victims since 1996 alone (see
    Sections 1.g. and 5).
        In November 1997, an independent commission of inquiry established
    by Parliament in 1991 to investigate the May 21, 1991 assassination of
    former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tabled an interim report of its
    findings in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament). The report
    blamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as clearly
    responsible for the assassination but was inconclusive on the question
    of whether the LTTE had received assistance in carrying out the murder.
    It criticized the then-government for its alleged failure to provide
    comprehensive security for the former Prime Minister. On January 28,
    1998, a designated lower court in Chennai sentenced to death all 26
    persons accused in the assassination. The CBI originally charged 41
    persons in the case; 12 since have died, and 3 have evaded capture
    (including LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan). Many of those
    sentenced, who include both Indian and Sri Lankan nationals, allegedly
    were involved only peripherally in the assassination plot, but the
    court upheld the CBI contention that all of them were aware that they
    were conspiring in a common cause. Having heard an appeal of the
    convictions, the Supreme Court in May 1999, acquitted 19 of the 26
    accused persons and upheld the convictions of 7 persons (see Section
    1.e.). It sustained the death sentence in the case of four of the
    convicted persons and changed the sentence of three others to life
    imprisonment.
        Nearly 50 persons were killed in election-related violence
    throughout the country in September and October (see Sections 1.g. and
    4).
        Religiously and ethnically motivated violence caused numerous
    deaths (see Section 5).
        Mob lynchings of tribal people occur in many states (see Section
    5).
        b. Disappearance.--According to human rights groups,
    unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of suspected militants
    continued in Jammu and Kashmir; however, the Government has not
    released any recent figures.
        The Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 744 suspected militants
    were arrested in 1999 and 109 persons surrendered. In comparison,
    according to the Jammu and Kashmir police, 1,228 suspected militants
    were arrested in 1998 and 187 persons surrendered. Human rights
    organizations allege that the decline in the number of militants
    arrested from 1998 to 1999 is consistent with reports that security
    forces are killing many militants captured in ``encounters'' (see
    Section 1.a.); that pattern continued during the year. Of those
    arrested and who surrendered in 1998, 529 persons were released after
    preliminary questioning, 457 persons were charged under special
    security laws, and the remaining persons were released at a later stage
    of judicial review. In addition the Jammu and Kashmir police stated
    that in 1998 it held 514 persons under the Public Safety Act (PSA).
    According to an Amnesty International report that was released during
    the year, there are between 700 and 800 unsolved disappearances in
    Kashmir since 1990. The Home Ministry reported that security forces in
    the northeastern states arrested 1,413 suspected militants in 1999; an
    additional 1,080 militants surrendered during that year. In comparison
    1,485 suspected militants were arrested and 267 persons surrendered in
    1998. The Government was unable to provide complete statistics for the
    number of persons held under special security laws in the northeastern
    states, but acknowledged that 43 persons were in detention under the
    National Security Act as of December 31, 1998. Although the Government
    allowed the Terrorist and Disruptive Practices (Prevention) Act (TADA)
    to lapse in 1995, human rights organization credibly reported that more
    than 1,000 persons remained in detention awaiting prosecution under the
    law. Several thousand others are held in short-term (1 day to 6 months
    duration) confinement in transit and interrogation centers.
        Human rights groups maintain that several hundred more persons are
    held by the military and paramilitary forces in long-term
    unacknowledged detention in interrogation centers and transit camps in
    Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern states that nominally are
    intended for only short-term confinement. Human rights groups fear that
    many of these unacknowledged prisoners are subject to torture and
    extrajudicial killing (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to one
    NGO, there were 1,300 writs of habeas corpus pending in the Jammu and
    Kashmir High Court in 1999. In August Amnesty International reported
    that the fates of up to 1,000 persons reported missing in Jammu and
    Kashmir since 1990 remain unexplained by authorities. The U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on Torture reported in 1997 that more than 15,000 habeas
    corpus petitions have been filed in the country since 1990, ``but that
    in the vast majority of these cases the authorities had not responded
    to the petitions.'' In 1999 the Working Group on Enforced or
    Involuntary Disappearances of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
    (UNCHR) transmitted 33 newly reported cases of disappearance to the
    Government, 14 of which reportedly occurred in 1998. The Government
    submitted information on eight cases of disappearance to the working
    group in 1999.
        HRW reported that M. Akbar Tantray, an imam of a mosque in
    Rafiabad, Jammu and Kashmir, was reported missing on February 8.
    Shortly after his January 30 arrest by an army unit, unit officials
    told family members that Tantray was not in their custody. In February
    the NHRC issued a notice to the Union Defense Secretary requiring him
    to report on the whereabouts of Abdul Rasheed Wani of Bemina, Jammu and
    Kashmir. According to family members, an army patrol arrested Wani near
    the Srinagar fruit market on July 7, 1997 and he has not been seen
    since. In August Amnesty International appealed to the Government to
    investigate the growing number of disappearances in Jammu and Kashmir.
    The organization estimated that as many as 1,000 persons had
    ``disappeared'' in the state since 1990. In September the NHRC issued a
    notice to the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police in Jammu
    and Kashmir and the Secretaries of the Union Home and Defense
    Minisitries requiring them to report on missing persons in the state
    within 8 weeks; however, there was no public information regarding the
    authorities complied with the directive.
        In one prominent case in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government
    responded to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
    Arbitrary Executions in 1997, states that human rights monitor Jalil
    Andrabi was not arrested by security forces, as alleged by human rights
    groups, but was abducted by ``unidentified armed persons.'' Andrabi
    last was seen alive in the presence of countermilitants and members of
    the security forces on March 8, 1996, in Srinagar. Despite the
    Government's statement, the army in February 1996 identified to a
    Srinagar court a major with a temporary commission as the individual
    primarily responsible for Andrabi's death. Security forces allegedly
    dumped Andrabi's body into the Jhelum River. His case also is the
    subject of an inquiry by the NHRC. In 1998 an army major was arrested
    for the killing of Andrabi. There was no progress in the case by year's
    end, and the accused major no longer is in detention (see Sections 1.a.
    and 4). In April 1998, the Government stated that it would investigate
    the fate of eight persons who reportedly disappeared in Jammu and
    Kashmir during 1997: Fayaz Ahmad Beigh, Fayaz Ahmad Khan, Abdula Rashid
    Wahid, Mohammed Ashraf Dar, Mohammed Afzal Shah, Nisar Ahmad Wani,
    Manzoor Ahmad Dar, and Bilal Ahmad Sheikh. In September 1998, the
    Government accounted for only one of the eight persons, claiming that
    Fayaz Ahmad Beigh had escaped from police custody on September 9, 1997,
    and was believed to have crossed the line of control into Pakistan. By
    year's end, no new information was available on any of these cases. As
    of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death still
    were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and
    Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        The Government maintains that screening committees administered by
    the state governments provide information about detainees to their
    families. However, other sources indicate that families are able to
    confirm the detention of their relatives only by bribing prison guards.
    For example, in May the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)
    published an appeal by Sunita Majumdar, the mother of Partha Majumdar,
    who was taken from his home by police in District 24 Parganas, West
    Bengal, in September 1997, and has not been seen since. Police have
    provided no information in the case despite a request from the State
    Human Rights Commission. Partha Majumdar was a witness to an alleged
    police shooting that left one person dead. In May the State Human
    Rights Commission recommended that a criminal investigation be
    initiated against police involved in the incident; however, it is not
    known whether the requested criminal investigation was initiated. A
    program of prison visits by the International Committee of the Red
    Cross (ICRC), which began in October 1995, is designed in part to help
    assure communications between detainees and their families. During the
    year, the ICRC visited approximately 1,000 detainees in about 20 places
    of detention. All acknowledged detention centers in Jammu and Kashmir
    and Kashmiri detainees elsewhere in the country were visited. However,
    the ICRC is not authorized to visit interrogation centers or transit
    centers, nor does it have access to regular detention centers in the
    northeastern states (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
        In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early
    1990's appears to have ended. Hundreds of police and security officials
    were not held accountable for serious human rights abuses committed
    during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps were taken
    against a few such violators. The CBI claims to be pursuing actively
    charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the ``mass
    cremations'' case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly disposed
    of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been abducted and
    extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the knowledge or
    consent of their families. The CBI in its report to the Supreme Court
    in December 1996 stated that Punjab police secretly had cremated over
    2,000 bodies in Tarn Taran; of these, 585 bodies had been identified
    fully, 274 had been identified partially, and 1,238 were unidentified.
    Most reportedly were killed by Border Security Force personnel while
    they were attempting to enter the country from Pakistan, were
    unidentified victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes
    between militant factions. However, 424 persons apparently were
    militants killed in the interior of the district, 291 of whom
    subsequently were identified. These numbers demonstrate the extent of
    the violence during those years and, given the pattern of police abuses
    prevalent during the period, credibly include many persons killed in
    extrajudicial executions. The NHRC is seeking to obtain compensation
    for the families of those victims whose remains were identified, but
    the Government has challenged the NHRC's jurisdiction in the cases. In
    September 1998, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the NHRC to
    investigate the cases. In August 1998, the Committee for the
    Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab (CCDP) member and former
    Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh presented the Chief Minister of
    Punjab with a list of approximately 3,000 persons who either were
    missing or had died in encounters with security forces during the
    period of unrest in Punjub. Former Justice Singh also announced that
    the CCDP would form a threemember commission to investigate the mass
    cremations. The Commission received little cooperation from state
    government authorities and made little progress during the year (see
    Section 4).
        Amnesty International in its April report on human rights defenders
    in the country expressed concern that Punjab police officials continued
    to obstruct the judicial inquiry into the death of human rights monitor
    Jaswant Singh Khalra, hindering efforts to probe the Tarn Taran
    cremations. Khalra was investigating the cremation of unidentified
    bodies by Tarn Taran police. Several witnesses observed Punjab police
    officials arrest Khalra outside his Amritsar home in September 1995.
    Police officials subsequently denied that they had arrested Khalra, and
    he has not been seen since. In July 1996, following its investigation,
    the CBI identified nine Punjab police officials as responsible for
    Khalra's abduction and recommended their prosecution. One of the
    suspects subsequently died, reportedly by suicide; none of the others
    were charged by year's end. One human rights organization credibly
    alleged that police intimidated a witness in the case in August,
    threatening to kill him if he testified against them. These events
    prompted extended public debate over the accountability of Punjab
    police for abuses committed while suppressing a violent insurgency.
    According to human rights monitors in Punjab, approximately 100 police
    officials either were facing charges, were prosecuted, or were under
    investigation for human rights abuses at year's end.
        There are credible reports that police throughout the country often
    do not file required arrest reports. As a result, there are hundreds of
    unsolved disappearances in which relatives claim that an individual was
    taken into police custody and never heard from again. Police usually
    deny these claims, countering that there are no records of arrest. In
    Manipur 14-year-old Yumlembam Sanamacha of Thoubal district has been
    missing since soldiers arrested him in February 1998. The army
    reportedly detained him because of his alleged links with insurgent
    groups. The All-Manipur Students' Union petitioned the Guwahati High
    Court for Sanamacha's release. The Court ordered the army to produce
    the boy, but it failed to do so and his whereabouts remain unknown. On
    May 5, 1999, police in Siliguri, West Bengal, arrested 14-year-old
    Pinter Yadav and his 9yearold cousin. According to local human rights
    monitors, the boys were beaten and, when Pinter began to vomit blood,
    he was taken to a local police station. He has not been seen since, and
    efforts by family members to petition police for information were
    unsuccessful.
        Militants in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states
    continued to use kidnapings to terrorize the population, seek the
    release of detained comrades, and extort funds. Sometimes kidnaped
    persons later were killed (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). According to
    government figures, there were 634 kidnapings in the northeastern
    states during 1999. There were no significant new developments in the
    case of the 1995 kidnapings of American, British, German, and Norwegian
    nationals, despite police cooperation with foreign diplomats.
        On April 15, the BNLF abducted two officials of the Mizoram Public
    Health Engineering Department. The rebels released the captives on May
    16, after the intervention of three local church leaders. On April 19,
    members of the Reang ethnic minority abducted a teacher in Aizawl,
    Mizoram. On May 13, NLFT guerillas abducted two tea garden staff from
    Kailashahar. On May 14, NLFT militants injured three persons and
    abducted three others in Udaypur (see Section 1.c.). Also on May 14,
    tribal guerillas abducted three persons and set a number of houses on
    fire in Radhakishorpur and Kanchanpur, Tripura. On May 15, NLFT
    militants killed four persons and abducted three others in west and
    south Tripura (see Section 1.a.). CPM sources allege that all of the
    victims were CPM supporters, and that the NLFT was punishing them for
    voting for the CPM in the council elections. On May 17, the NLFT shot
    two villagers whom they had kidnaped from Manu on February 28. On May
    23, NSCN(K) supporters abducted seven persons in Borduria village,
    Tirap district, Arunachal Pradesh. On May 26, ATTF killed a tribal
    person and kidnaped four other persons (see Section 1.a.). On May 31,
    an NLFT militant abducted CPM worker Ajit Debbarma from Jampuijala,
    West Tripura. On June 6, in the Andaman Islands, Tamil immigrants from
    Sri Lanka abducted and took hostage Manoranjan Bhakta, a former
    Congress Party Member of Parliament, for more than 24 hours on Katchal
    Island. On June 14, the Manipur based Hmar People's Conference (HPC)
    released the two engineers and four technicians of the Northeastern
    Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) who were abducted on March 31 from
    Mizoram. On June 22, NLFT rebels kidnaped a tribal family in Khowai. On
    June 29, tribal militants abducted seven nontribals in Melaghar,
    Gandacherra and Brahmacherra. On July 3, North Tripura tribal
    guerrillas kidnaped a nontribal youth; in retaliation a mob killed an
    elderly tribal woman and burned down a number of houses. Also on July
    3, NLFT militants abducted the manager of Golakpur Tea estate in north
    Tripura. On July 4, tribal militants in Dhalai, Tripura, kidnaped a
    health department official. On July 14, tribals set fire to more than
    150 houses, injured 3 persons, and kidnaped another in Teliamura. On
    July 23, NLFT militants kidnaped four tribals from a Garo colony in
    South Tripura. On August 16, nine Tripura villagers were kidnaped in
    Brahmachhara Udaypur subdivision. On August 17, militants abducted
    three persons from Manu and killed a villager at Panisagar (see Section
    1.a.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and confessions extracted by
    force generally are inadmissible in court; however, torture is common
    throughout the country, and authorities often use torture during
    interrogations. In other instances, they torture detainees to extort
    money and sometimes as summary punishment.
        In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that the
    security forces systematically torture persons in Jammu and Kashmir in
    order to coerce them to confess to militant activity, to reveal
    information about suspected militants, or to inflict punishment for
    suspected support or sympathy with militants. Information is not made
    public regarding instances of action taken against security force
    personnel in Jammu and Kashmir for acts of torture.
        In May the NHRC ordered the government of Jammu and Kashmir to pay
    $4,395 (200,000 rupees) to the family of Ghulam Rasool, following its
    investigation into Rasool's 1996 death while in police custody in
    Kathua, Jammu and Kashmir. Police arrested Rasool in Kathua on October
    31, 1996. He was found dead in his cell the following day. The autopsy
    showed that the cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest arising
    from the dislocation of the spine. It also showed that Rasool had
    suffered injuries to his scalp, face, back, left eye, and both arms and
    legs. The NHRC concluded that police had tortured Rasool to death. It
    further directed the Jammu and Kashmir government to initiate legal
    proceedings against the police officials responsible. Human rights
    monitors maintain that there is a similar pattern of security force
    abuses in the northeastern states. On July 28, members of the Assam
    Rifles arrested Khuraijam Pranam of Bishenpur, Manipur and allegedly
    tortured him for 2 days before turning him over to local police. Pranam
    survived and underwent treatment in Imphal Hospital. On August 18, the
    Guwahati High Court directed the Manipur government to ensure that
    Pranam was not harmed in the hospital, and to allow family members to
    visit him. Police abuses against indigenous people include torture (see
    Section 5).
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted in 1997 that methods
    of torture included beating, rape, crushing the leg muscles with a
    wooden roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shocks.
    Because many alleged torture victims die in custody, and others are
    afraid to speak out, there are few firsthand accounts, although marks
    of torture often have been found on the bodies of deceased detainees.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings
    renewed their requests to visit the country during the year, but the
    Government did not permit them to do so (see Section 4).
        The prevalence of torture by police in detention facilities
    throughout the country is supported by the number of cases of deaths in
    police custody (see Section 1.a.). Delhi's Tihar jail is notorious for
    the mistreatment of prisoners, with 1 of every 11 custodial deaths
    occurring there. Police and jailers typically assault new prisoners for
    money and personal articles. In addition police commonly torture
    detainees during custodial interrogation. Although police officers are
    subject to prosecution for such offenses under Section 302 of the Penal
    Code, the Government often fails to hold them accountable. On April 20,
    police in Gujarat allegedly beat to death Colonel Pratap Save in a
    local police station (see Section 1.a.). The PUCL reported that police
    tortured to death Sudath Kumar in Moodabidri police station, Karnataka,
    on May 30 to 31 (see Section 1.a.). Human rights groups allege that
    police in Andhra Pradesh tortured and then hanged an unarmed suspected
    Naxalite, Chandraiah, on June 10 (see Section 1.a.). On August 4,
    Krishna Pada Seal died, just after he and his family were released from
    prison; according to the PUCL, prison officials tortured them during
    detention (see Section 1.a.). The PUCL alleged that police in Mangalore
    district, Karnataka, were responsible for the August 29 custodial death
    of Sudath Kumar Jain, a 40yearold local film projectionist who died in
    a hospital after sustaining injuries (see Section 1.a.). During the
    year, Amnesty International expressed concern about the September 1999
    torture death of 21-year-old Devinder Singh (see Section 1.a.).
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture stated in 1997 that, in
    Jammu and Kashmir, torture victims or their relatives reportedly have
    had difficulty in filing complaints because local police were issued
    instructions not to open a case without permission from higher
    authorities. In addition the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
    Powers Act provides that unless approval is obtained from the central
    Government, no ``prosecution, suit, or other legal proceeding shall be
    instituted . . . against any person in respect of anything done or
    purported to be done in exercise of the powers of the act.'' This
    provision allows the security forces to act with virtual impunity.
        There also were incidents in which police beat journalists (see
    Section 2.a.), demonstrators (see Section 2.b.), and Muslim students
    (see Section 2.c.). Police also committed abuses against tribal people
    (see Section 5).
        The rape of persons in custody is part of the broader pattern of
    custodial abuse. Limits placed on the arrest, search, and police
    custody of women appear effectively to limit the frequency of rape in
    custody, although it does occur on occasion. According to HRW, in
    February in Tamil Nadu, 12 women were detained illegally, tortured, and
    repeatedly sexually assaulted in custody, because of their ties to a
    suspected robber who had himself died in police custody. In addition to
    the 12 women, police detained and beat the young sons of suspected
    robbers, according to a local human rights organization. The same
    organization reported that the victims declined to press charges
    against the police. On September 3, Captain Ravinder Singh Twatir of
    the 12th Battalion, Rashtriya Rifles, was sentenced to 7 years of
    rigorous imprisonment and dismissed from the army for raping a girl in
    Naugam village, Doda district, Jammu and Kashmir on February 14. As of
    September no action had been taken against an alleged accomplice in the
    rape, special police officer Bharat Bhusan. The NHRC received a report
    of only one case of custodial rape between April 1997 and March 1998.
    The 24-hour reporting requirement applies to custodial rape as well as
    custodial death. However, the requirement does not apply to rape by
    policemen outside police stations. NGO's claim that rape by police,
    including custodial rape, is more common than NHRC figures indicate.
    Although evidence is lacking, a higher incidence of abuse appears
    credible, given other evidence of abusive behavior by police and the
    likelihood that many rapes go unreported due to a sense of shame and a
    fear of retribution among victims.
        Human rights monitors allege that on July 19, central reserve
    police force personnel raped a tribal housewife in Lamdam village,
    Manipur. They allege that the rape was committed in retaliation for an
    attack carried out on a CRPF patrol by People's Liberation Army
    militants the previous day (see Section 1.g.).
        There is a pattern of rape by paramilitary personnel in Jammu and
    Kashmir and the northeast as a means of instilling fear among
    noncombatants in insurgency-affected areas (see Section 1.g.), but it
    is not included in NHRC statistics because it involves military forces.
        From April 1998 to March 1999, the NHRC received 1,297 complaints
    of custodial death (1,114 in judicial custody and 183 in police
    custody), no cases of custodial rape, and 2,252 complaints of other
    police abuses. By year's end, the NHRC had not released the statistics
    of its actions against police during this time period. However, from
    April 1997 to March 1998, the NHRC received 1,012 complaints of
    custodial death (819 in judicial custody and 193 in police custody), 1
    case of custodial rape, and 1,413 complaints of other police excesses.
    As a result of NHRC action during this earlier period, criminal
    prosecutions were brought against 43 persons; departmental action was
    taken against 60 officers, 51 of whom were placed under suspension; and
    monetary compensation in amounts ranging from $1,100 (50,000 rupees) to
    $2,100 (100,000 rupees) were recommended for payment in 20 cases.
        According to press reports, prison officials used prisoners as
    domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels (see Sections
    5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        Police corruption undermines efforts to combat trafficking in women
    and children (see Section 6.f.).
        Security forces killed and injured numerous militant group members,
    many in so-called encounter deaths, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir
    and the northeastern states (see Section 1.a.).
        Militant groups sometimes used automatic weapons, hand grenades,
    bombs, landmines, and other weapons in political violence in Jammu and
    Kashmir and the northeastern states; numerous security forces and
    civilians were killed and injured.
        Religiously motivated violence led to a number of deaths and
    injuries as well as damage to property (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and
    5).
        Some militant groups in the northeast have used rape as a tactic to
    terrorize the populace; however, no cases are known to have been
    reported during the year.
        Prison conditions are very poor. Prisons are severely overcrowded,
    and the provision of food and medical care frequently is inadequate.
        Prisons operate above capacity because of thousands of prisoners
    awaiting hearings (see Section 1.d.). For example, in Bihar 80 percent
    of prisoners are unconvicted remand prisoners awaiting completion of
    their trials. Delhi's Tihar jail, with a designed capacity of 3,300
    persons, houses 9,000 prisoners. Birsa Munda jail in Ranchi, Bihar,
    designed to hold 364 persons, houses more than 1,800 male and female
    prisoners. In May the PUCL visited Sakchi jail, Jamshedpur, Bihar,
    following complaints of abuse of prisoners. The human rights activists
    found that the prison, designed to hold 200 prisoners, housed 786
    persons, of whom only 55 had been convicted; the rest were at various
    stages of the judicial process. Amnesty International reported that
    overcrowding in Arthur jail, Mumbai, led to rioting on June 19.
    Designed to hold 50 prisoners, Arthur jail has 180 inmates. Prison
    guards reportedly attacked inmates with razors and wooden poles to
    quell rioting that erupted following a fight between two prisoners.
    Forty inmates were injured in the incident. An August 3 report from
    Aizawl, Mizoram, stated that its central jail, designed to house 500
    prisoners, had 846 inmates. The NHRC reported in February on its
    November 1999 visits to jails in Guwahati and Shillong. In Guwahati the
    commission found 780 inmates in a district jail designed to hold 507
    (see Section 1.d.). In Shillong the commission found 374 inmates in the
    central jail, which was designed to hold 150 persons. One of the
    inmates was a 10- or 11-year-old girl awaiting trial. The Government
    prepared a national prison manual during the year to facilitate reform.
    It also continued to provide financial aid to the states. However, the
    Prison Act of 1894 remains unamended. According to the SAHRDC, in the
    poorest states, such as Bihar, where 265 police stations have no lock-
    up facilities, the lack of prisons led police to shackle prisoners to
    trees. An NHRC investigatory team visiting Meerut jail in Uttar Pradesh
    in 1998 found about 3,000 inmates in a facility designed to hold 650
    persons. As a result of this and other jail visits, the NHRC hired a
    consultant to draft the prison reform bill to be submitted to the
    Government. The draft bill, meant to be enacted by the national
    Parliament, encountered opposition from state governments asserting
    that prison management is the responsibility of the states. No new
    initiatives were taken on the bill during the year. The 1,114 deaths in
    judicial custody in 1998-99, occurring in a prison population of
    approximately 246,000 persons, many of whom are held for years, include
    a large proportion of deaths from natural causes that, in some cases
    were aggravated by poor prison conditions (see Section 1.a.). A study
    conducted by the NHRC in 1997-98 found that tuberculosis was the cause
    of death in 76 percent of deaths in judicial custody. Deaths in police
    custody, which typically occur within hours or days of initial
    detention, more clearly imply violent abuse and torture. The NHRC has
    no authority to investigate abuses by security forces directly, and
    security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states are
    not required to report custodial deaths to the Commission.
        With the exception of an agreement with the ICRC for visits to
    detention facilities in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government does not
    allow NGO's to monitor prison conditions (see Section 4). However, 15
    states and union territories have authorized the NHRC to conduct
    surprise check-ups on jails. Although custodial abuse is deeply rooted
    in police practices, increased press reporting and parliamentary
    questioning provide evidence of growing public awareness of the
    problem. The NHRC has identified torture and deaths in detention as one
    of its priority concerns. In 1998 it created a ``Special Rapporteur and
    Chief Coordinator of Custodial Justice'' to help implement its
    directive to state prison authorities to ensure that medical check-ups
    are performed on all inmates. In June the country's first women's
    correctional facility was opened in the Tihar complex in New Delhi.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--During the early 1980's,
    the Government implemented a variety of special security laws intended
    to help law enforcement authorities fight separatist insurgencies, and
    there were credible reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and
    detention under these laws during the year.
        Although the law that had been subject to the most extensive abuse,
    the TADA, lapsed in May 1995, 1,502 persons previously arrested under
    the act continued to be held as of January 1, 1997, in a number of
    states, according to the NHRC's 1996-97 report. Human rights sources
    estimate that about 1,000 persons remained in custody under TADA or
    related charges at year's end. A small number of arrests under the TADA
    continued for crimes allegedly committed before the law lapsed. In 1997
    the Government asserted that every TADA case would be reviewed.
    However, few persons have been released as a result of the review.
    Criminal cases are proceeding against most of those persons still held
    under the TADA, with more than 3,000 charged under other laws in
    addition to the TADA. In 1996 the Supreme Court eased bail guidelines
    for persons accused under TADA, taking into account the large backlog
    of cases in special TADA courts. In March 1999, the state minister for
    home affairs told the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly that 16,620
    persons had been detained under the TADA in the state since 1990; of
    these, 1,640 were brought to trial and 10 were convicted. TADA courts
    use abridged procedures. For example, defense counsel is not permitted
    to see witnesses for the prosecution, who are kept behind screens while
    testifying in court. Also, confessions extracted under duress are
    admissible as evidence. The special task force established by the state
    police forces of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to capture a bandit hiding in
    forests in the border area between the 2 states had arrested some 121
    persons under the TADA prior to the law's lapse; 51 of these persons
    were in custody at year's end.
        During the year, the Government sent a draft Prevention of
    Terrorism Bill, 2000 to the Law Commission of India for review and
    possible introduction in Parliament. The bill is similar to the TADA,
    in that it would permit summary trials and the hearing of testimony
    exacted under duress. It also would allow witnesses to testify in
    camera, without having to disclose their identities to the defense at
    any stage of the proceedings. In addition it would compel journalists
    to disclose to authorities any information regarding terrorist groups
    or actions, or face charges of terrorism against them. Finally, the
    bill would require the law to be reviewed every 5 years, instead of
    every 2, which was the case with TADA. In August the NHRC issued an
    opinion stating that the new Prevention of Terrorism Bill was not
    necessary. Commenting on these and other provisions of the bill, the
    NHRC wrote: ``These provisions would seriously affect human rights
    guaranteed under the Constitution and violate basic principles of
    criminal jurisprudence as internationally understood.'' Similar bills
    are pending in the Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies.
    If enacted they would provide for special courts to try offenses, place
    the burden of proof at the bail stage on the accused, make confessions
    to a police officer of the rank of superintendent of police admissible
    as evidence, extend the period of remand from 15 to 60 days, and set
    mandatory sentences for terrorism-related offenses. The Maharashtra
    state assembly enacted TADA-like legislation in November 1999. On
    September 6, the Mumbai Sessions Court issued the first conviction
    under the act, the Organized Crime (Control) Act. The court sentenced
    three alleged gang members to death on charges of conspiracy to murder
    former Mumbai mayor Milind Vaidya. The three persons have appealed
    their convictions to the Mumbai High Court. As of year's end, their
    case had not been heard.
        The Constitution permits preventive detention laws in the event of
    threats to public order and national security. Under Article 22 of the
    Constitution, an individual may be detained--without charge or trial--
    for up to 3 months, and detainees are denied their rights or
    compensation for unlawful arrest or detention. In addition to providing
    for limits on the length of detention, the preventive detention laws
    provide for judicial review. Several laws of this type remain in
    effect.
        The National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 permits the detention of
    persons considered to be security risks; police anywhere in the country
    (except Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions.
    Under these provisions the authorities may detain a suspect without
    charge or trial for as long as a year on loosely defined security
    grounds. The state government must confirm the detention order, which
    is reviewed by an advisory board of three High Court judges within 7
    weeks of the arrest. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family
    members and lawyers, and must be informed of the grounds for their
    detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in exceptional circumstances).
    According to the Government, 1,163 persons were being held under the
    NSA at the end of 1997. The NSA does not define ``security risk.''
    Human rights groups allege that preventive detention may be ordered and
    extended under the act purely on the opinion of the detaining authority
    and after advisory board review. Any court may not overturn such a
    decision.
        The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 covers
    corresponding procedures for that state. Over half of the detainees in
    Jammu and Kashmir are held under the PSA. Jammu and Kashmir police
    reported that 514 persons were being held under the PSA as of December
    1998. In September and November 1999 alone, the Jammu and Kashmir
    police arrested 25 members of the Kashmiri separatist All Parties
    Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The arrests followed a series of terrorist
    attacks in the state for which members of this group allegedly were
    responsible (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 4). On April 4, the
    Government released 3 of the 25 persons; in May it released 11 more of
    the APHC detainees and attempted to initiate a dialog with the APHC. By
    year's end, all of the remaining APHC detainees were released; no
    charges were brought against any of them. In December 1999, Shabir
    Shah, president of the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, was
    released. At the time of Shah's release, Amnesty International
    expressed concern about the 25 arrested leaders of the APHC and
    explicitly suggested that the charges were politically motivated.
        The Constitution provides that detainees have the right to be
    informed of the grounds for their arrest, to be represented by counsel,
    and, unless held under a preventive detention law, to appear before a
    magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. At this initial appearance, the
    accused either must be remanded for further investigation or released.
    The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions. The accused must be
    informed of their right to bail at the time of arrest and may, unless
    held on a nonbailable offense, apply for bail at any time. The police
    must file charges within 60 to 90 days of arrest; if they fail to do
    so, court approval of a bail application becomes mandatory.
        In November 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
    validity of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958. In a
    representation made to the NHRC, the SAHRDC asserted that the act's
    powers were ``too vast and sweeping and pose a grave threat to the
    fundamental rights and liberties of the citizenry of the (disturbed)
    areas covered by the act.'' The SAHRDC asserted that the powers granted
    to authorities under Section 3 of the act to declare any area to be a
    ``disturbed area,'' and thus subject to the other provisions of the
    act, were too broad. Moreover, the SAHRDC noted that Section 4(a) of
    the act empowers any commissioned officer, warrant officer,
    noncommissioned officer, or any other person of equivalent rank in the
    armed forces to fire upon and otherwise use force, even to the point of
    death, if he believes that it is necessary for the maintenance of law
    and order. Further, Section 6 of the act states that ``no prosecution,
    suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted, except with the
    previous sanction of the central Government against any person in
    respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of
    powers'' conferred by the act.
        The court system is extremely overloaded, resulting in the
    detention of numerous persons awaiting trial for periods longer than
    they would receive if convicted. Prisoners may be held for months or
    even years before obtaining a trial date. According to a reply to a
    parliamentary question in July 1994, more than 111,000 criminal cases
    were pending in the Allahabad High Court, the most serious case backlog
    in the country, of which nearly 29,000 cases had been pending for 5 to
    8 years. A statement to Parliament in July 1996 indicated that criminal
    and civil cases pending before the country's high courts numbered
    nearly 2.9 million in 1995, roughly the same as in 1994, but an
    increase from 2.65 million in 1993. According to the Union Home
    Ministry, the total number of civil and criminal cases pending for 3 or
    more years in all courts throughout the country was 5,116,895 on
    December 31, 1998. In its most recent report, the NHRC reported that
    nearly 80 percent of all prisoners held between April 1996 and March
    1997, were so-called ``undertrials,'' i.e., unconvicted remand
    prisoners awaiting the start or conclusion of their trials. In its
    1997-98 report, the NHRC stated that it ``remains deeply disturbed by
    the presence of a large number of under trial prisoners in different
    jails in the country.'' In March 1999, the chairman of the NHRC said
    that 60 percent of all police arrests were ``unnecessary and
    unjustifiable,'' and that the incarceration of those wrongly arrested
    accounted for 43 percent of the total annual expenditure on prisons.
    The NHRC reported in February on its November 1999 visits to jails in
    Guwahati (see Section 1.c.). The Commission found that 90 percent of
    the 780 inmates were unconvicted prisoners awaiting completion of
    trial. On February 27, the NHRC directed the Orissa government to pay
    $1,000 (50,000 rupees) as interim relief to a 16-year-old boy who was
    victim of illegal detention and torture by police at Kandhamal. Accused
    of theft, the boy was sent to a regular prison to await trial, rather
    than a juvenile home. In March the NHRC reported that it had directed
    the West Bengal government to pay $1,000 (50,000 rupees) in
    compensation to the court guardian of a 12year-old girl who was in the
    custody of the West Bengal police for nearly a decade because she was
    the sole witness to her parents' murder. On July 9, Bihar police
    registered a case against then-Bihar Minister of State for Cooperatives
    Lalit Yadav, his cousin, and four others for alleged illegal detention
    and torture of a truck driver and cleaner at the minister's residence.
    The complaint alleges that Yadav kept the two men in wrongful
    confinement for a month, beat them, and tortured them. The two men's
    toenails allegedly were pulled out and they were forced to drink urine.
    Yadav was dismissed from his state government post and from his
    political party membership.
        On November 28, the Government announced that it was allocating
    $108.15 million (5.03 billion rupees) to state governments for the
    creation of 1,734 additional courts during 2000-2005, in order to hear
    more cases and reduce the number of remand prisoners.
        In June 1997, Rongthong Kunley Dorji, a Bhutanese dissident, was
    placed in judicial custody pending review of an extradition request
    from the Government of Bhutan on charges that included political
    offenses as well as financial malfeasance. On June 12, 1998, Dorji was
    released on bail following the New Delhi High Court's decision to deny
    a government appeal and let stand a lower court's order to grant bail
    in the case. Dorji still awaits conclusion of his extradition hearing.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is an independent judiciary
    with strong constitutional safeguards. Under a Supreme Court ruling,
    the Chief Justice, in consultation with his colleagues, has a decisive
    voice in selecting judicial candidates. The President appoints judges,
    and they may serve up to the age of 62 on the state high courts and up
    to the age of 65 on the Supreme Court.
        Courts of first resort exist at the subdistrict and district
    levels. More serious cases and appeals are heard in state-level high
    courts and by the national-level Supreme Court, which also rules on
    constitutional questions. State governments appoint subdistrict and
    district judicial magistrates. High court judges are appointed on the
    recommendation of the federal law ministry, with the advice of the
    Supreme Court, the High Court Chief Justice, and the chief minister of
    the State, usually from among district judges or lawyers practicing
    before the same courts. Supreme Court judges are appointed similarly
    from among High Court judges. The Chief Justice is selected on the
    basis of seniority.
        When legal procedures function normally, they generally assure a
    fair trial, but the process often is drawn out and inaccessible to poor
    persons. Defendants have the right to choose counsel from attorneys who
    are fully independent of the Government. There are effective channels
    for appeal at most levels of the judicial system, and the State
    provides free legal counsel to the indigent.
        The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in most
    cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official
    secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the
    state might be made, or under provisions of special security
    legislation. Sentences must be announced in public.
        Muslim personal status law governs many noncriminal matters
    involving Muslims, including family law, inheritance, and divorce. The
    Government does not interfere in the personal status laws of the
    minority communities, with the result that personal status laws that
    discriminate against women are upheld.
        In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely functions due to
    threats by militants against judges, witnesses, and their family
    members; because of judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed
    antimilitant actions; and because of the frequent refusal by security
    forces to obey court orders. Courts in Jammu and Kashmir are reluctant
    to hear cases involving terrorist crimes, and fail to act expeditiously
    on habeas corpus cases, if they act at all. There were a few
    convictions of alleged terrorists in the Jammu High Court during the
    year. Many more accused militants have been in pretrial detention for
    years. On April 1, the Jammu and Kashmir Home Minister submitted a
    written statement to the state assembly acknowledging that 115 foreign
    militants (primarily from Pakistan, but reportedly also from
    Afghanistan and Tajikistan) jailed in the state and elsewhere had not
    been tried, despite the fact that many of them had been imprisoned for
    10 years (see Section 1.d.).
        Criminal gangs in all four southern states have been known to
    attack rivals and scare off complainants and witnesses from court
    premises, denying free access to justice. In some cases, accused
    persons have been attacked while being escorted by police to the
    courts.
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary
    requested to visit the country during the year, but the Government did
    not grant the Rapporteur permission to do so.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The police must obtain warrants for searches and
    seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches
    without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the
    searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over
    the offense. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam
    have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant.
        The government Enforcement Directorate (ED), which is mandated to
    investigate foreign exchange and currency violations, searches,
    interrogates, and arrests thousands of business and management
    professionals annually, often without search warrants. However, the ED
    ultimately convicts very few persons. In 1997 only 28 persons out of
    thousands arrested were convicted, according to the Times of India.
        The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of
    communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and
    intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or ``in the
    interest of the public safety or tranquillity.'' Every state government
    has used these powers, as has the central Government.
        In early January, soldiers set fire to 47 shops in an open market
    in Pattan Town, northern Kashmir Valley, in retaliation for a nearby
    ambush in which militants killed 2 soldiers. The army used gasoline to
    spread the blaze and shot at fire trucks that arrived on the scene.
    Human rights activists were unaware of any effort to hold security
    force members accountable for the rampage in Pattan Town; government
    information on action against suspects was unavailable.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Government forces continue to commit numerous
    serious violations of humanitarian law in the disputed state of Jammu
    and Kashmir. Between 350,000 and 450,000 army and paramilitary forces
    are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority population in
    the Kashmir valley suffers from the repressive tactics of the security
    forces. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed
    Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, both passed in July
    1990, security force personnel have extraordinary powers, including
    authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those persons disturbing
    the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of harboring militants
    or arms.
        The Union Home Ministry was unable to estimate how many civilians
    were killed in crossfire by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir during
    the year. It reported that 84 such deaths occurred in Jammu and Kashmir
    in 1996-1997. The security forces continue to abduct and kill suspected
    militants; the security forces have not accepted accountability for
    these abuses. Many commanders' inclination to distance their units from
    such practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer
    of some of these abuses to government-supported countermilitants.
        According to credible reports, in addition to harassment during
    searches and arbitrary arrests (see Section 1.d.) security forces
    abduct and sometimes use civilians as human shields in night patrolling
    and searching for landmines; the abuses so far have occurred mostly in
    the Kupwara and Doda districts. Because of Doda's inaccessibility, the
    abuses there allegedly have been underreported greatly.
        The spring and summer 1999 incursion of Pakistan-backed armed
    forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control new
    Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir resulted in an increased
    counterinsurgency campaign, accompanied by repressive offensive
    measures. According to a credible government source, as of early
    December 1999 over 450 militants had been killed since the Kargil
    conflict began. That trend continued, with official sources reporting
    that security forces had killed 1,062 militants during the first 9
    months of the year. In September 1999, then-chief of army staff Gen.
    Ved Malik said that security forces were killing 150 to 160 militants
    every month in Jammu and Kashmir.
        Kashmiri militant groups also committed serious abuses.
        Militants carried out several execution-style mass murders of Hindu
    (Pandit), Sikh, and Buddhist villagers in Jammu and Kashmir (see
    Sections 1.a. and 5). On March 20, suspected militants killed 35 Sikhs
    in Chatisinghpura village, Anantnag district (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    On April 26, militants invaded a home in Golgam village and killed four
    members of a Hindu family. On July 30, militants hurled a hand grenade
    into a jeep carrying Hindu religious pilgrims near Gulmarg, killing one
    person and injuring five others (see Section 5).
        In addition to political killings, kidnapings, and rapes of
    politicians and civilians (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.),
    insurgents engaged in extortion and carried out acts of random terror
    that killed hundreds of Kashmiris. Many of the militants are not
    citizens but Afghani, Pakistani, and other nationals. Since the 1990's,
    the militants have made liberal use of timedelayed explosives,
    landmines, hand grenades, and snipers. Militants previously had
    restricted landmine use to army convoys traveling outside of major
    cities, but during the year they began using command detonated
    landmines in Srinagar city. There was a significant upsurge in militant
    violence against security forces, and a tendency to use heavy weapons
    such as hand grenades and rockets. Militants killed and injured
    numerous security personnel and destroyed a great deal of security
    force property; many civilians also were killed. On January 3, a bomb
    explosion in a Srinagar market killed 16 persons, including 3 security
    force members. On February 10, militants planted a bomb on a Calcutta-
    bound train. The bomb exploded near Vijaypur, Jammu district, killing
    two persons and injuring four others. On March 27, militants hurled
    hand grenades at a police patrol in Bandipora town, killing 3 civilians
    and injuring 11 others. On April 12, militants exploded a powerful car
    bomb in Rawalpora on the outskirts of Srinagar as an army convoy was
    passing by; one civilian was injured in the blast. On April 19, a 15-
    year-old boy recruited by militants died in an explosion when he
    attempted to drive an explosivesladen car into army headquarters,
    Badamibagh Cantonment, Srinagar; four soldiers and three civilians were
    injured in the attack. Also on April 19, in Baramulla, 2 students, aged
    17 and 11, were killed and 20 passersby were injured when militants
    hurled a hand grenade at a security force vehicle convoy and missed;
    the hand grenade exploded in a market in Sopore town. On April 22, a
    group of militants attacked an army post in Punch district, killing two
    soldiers. On April 26, militants detonated a homemade bomb in
    Gharanarial, Jammu, killing five Border Security Force members. On
    April 29, an 18-year-old student was killed and four police personnel
    were injured when militants detonated an explosive device in Sher Bagh,
    Anantnag district. On May 10, four soldiers were killed when their
    vehicle hit a landmine planted by militants at Nihalpura village,
    Baramula district. On May 15, Ghulam Hasan Bhatt, Minister of Power,
    Jammu and Kashmir state, his driver, two body guards and radioman were
    killed when militants detonated a landmine under their passing vehicle.
    On May 16, one soldier was killed and two others were injured when
    militants fired rockets at an army camp in Sudru village, Banihal.
    Sixteen persons were killed, including 11 militants, 3 civilians, and a
    soldier, when militants armed with rockets and hand grenades attacked
    an army camp at Khundroo, Anantnag on June 1. On August 10, in
    Srinagar, a car bomb explosion set by militants killed 10 persons and
    injured approximately 30 others. The car bomb explosion occurred just
    minutes after police and journalists had rushed to, and civilians had
    vacated, the site of a hand grenade attack. On August 21, a landmine
    blast in Kupwara district killed three security force personnel,
    including a senior-level brigadier. On August 24, a landmine injured
    five security force personnel when a vehicle drove over it in Puthkhai,
    northern Kashmir. On September 23, two bomb explosions killed seven
    civilians in Sangalsan village, Udhampur. On October 8, three Border
    Security Force members were injured when their bus struck a landmine
    planted by militants near Khooni Nala village. On October 20, two
    soldiers were killed in Udhampur district when militants detonated an
    improvised explosive device that they had strapped to a mule and sent
    into the army camp. On November 28, shortly after the beginning of the
    Government's unilateral ceasefire for the holy month of Ramadan, a
    landmine blew up an army truck, killing 3 soldiers and wounding 12
    others; Hizbul Mujaheddin claimed responsibility. On December 5, a
    landmine explosion in the Adipora area of Baramulla district injured
    three soldiers.
        Extremist and terrorist activities in the northeast claimed many
    lives. In addition to ambushes, terrorists increasingly resorted to
    destroying bridges, and the laying time bombs on roads, on railway
    tracks, and in trains. On February 27, Assam Minister for Public Works
    and Forests Nagen Sharma and four others were killed when suspected
    ULFA militants detonated an explosive device as the minister's vehicle
    passed a near NijBahjani, Nalbari district. On March 5, suspected ULFA
    militants attempted to kill a second Assam minister, Hiranya Konwar.
    They detonated an improvised explosive device as the minister's car
    neared Rongali Doegarh, Sivasagar district; no persons were injured in
    the attack. On May 20, 5 persons were killed and 11 others were injured
    when militants threw a hand grenade into a passing jeep at
    Manikerbasti, west Tripura. Also on May 20, UBLF militants lobbed bombs
    at a passenger jeep from north Maharanipur in Khowai, killing 5 tribals
    and injuring 11 others. On May 21, 15 persons were killed when
    suspected NLFT militants threw hand grenades at Bengali villagers in
    Baghber village, Tripura. The militants then attacked villagers with
    machetes and set fire to 60 homes in the village. On October 23,
    suspected ULFA militants killed 15 persons and wounded 8 others in 2
    separate attacks. The first occurred in the Kakogam Market, Tinsukia
    district, where militants fired automatic guns at civilians, killing 11
    persons. The second attack occured at Naoholia, Dibrugarh district
    where militants indiscriminately fired at civilians, killing four
    persons and injured five others.
        On February 12, a Naxalite mine blast killed 21 persons in Bihar
    (see Section 5). On March 7, Naxalites killed Andhra Pradesh minister
    for local government A. Madhava Reddy in a landmine explosion near
    Hyderabad. Reddy was returning from a political rally. As home minister
    in the state from 1994-95, Reddy had overseen anti-Naxalite operations.
    In a letter to the PUCL, G.N. Saibaba, general secretary of the All
    India People's Resistance Forum; Varavara Rao, executive member of the
    Revolutionary Writers Association; and Gadar, general secretary of the
    All India League for Revolutionary Culture alleged that police had
    summarily executed three unarmed members of CPI(M) on February 1. The
    three writers alleged that police detained the three victims--Kumar,
    Sujanta and Venkanna--in the Musmi village, Warangal district. The PUCL
    alleges that police killed five women in an April 27 encounter in the
    Chandragiri Hills, Warangal district, Andhra Pradesh. According to the
    human rights organization, police surrounded the women and lobbed hand
    grenades at them, killing them.
        During the year, police arrested numerous persons suspected of
    involvement in previous terrorist attacks and brought charges against
    some suspects. Charges also were brought against persons accused of
    involvement with human suicide bomb attacks to advance Sikh separatism,
    as well as against dozens of captured separatist insurgents in Jammu
    and Kashmir for bombings, killings, and acts of sabotage.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice; however, there are some limitations.
    A vigorous and growing press reflects a wide variety of political,
    social, and economic beliefs. Newspapers and magazines regularly
    publish investigative reports and allegations of government wrongdoing,
    and the press generally promotes human rights and criticizes perceived
    government lapses.
        Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government may restrict
    publication of sensitive stories; however, while the Government at
    times interprets this power broadly to suppress criticism of its
    policies, the Government nonetheless introduced a right to information
    bill in the 2000 Monsoon Session of Parliament. However, during the
    year the bill lapsed; it must be reintroduced if Parliament is to take
    any further action on it.
        The 1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act remains in effect
    in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the act, a district magistrate may prohibit
    the press from publishing material resulting in incitement to murder or
    any act of violence. As punishment the act stipulates that the
    authorities may seize newspapers and printing presses. Despite these
    restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir,
    report in detail on alleged human rights abuses by the Government, and
    regularly publish press releases of militant Kashmiri groups. The
    authorities generally allowed foreign journalists to travel freely in
    Jammu and Kashmir, where they regularly spoke with militant leaders and
    filed reports on government abuses.
        In Assam the state government has attempted to impede criticism by
    filing a number of criminal defamation charges against journalists.
        In October 1998, the Manipur government announced curbs on the
    publication of insurgency-related news. The publication of insurgents'
    press releases, public invitations to slain militants' funerals, and
    calls to boycott Republic Day and Independence Day functions were
    prohibited. Penalties for violating the prohibition included arrest and
    criminal prosecution of newspaper owners and editors, and cancellation
    of newspapers' registration. These restrictions continued during the
    year.
        The Press Council of India is a statutory body of journalists,
    publishers, academics, and politicians, with a chairman appointed by
    the Government. Designed to be a self-regulating mechanism for the
    press, it investigates complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets
    a code of conduct for publishers. This code includes a commitment not
    to publish articles or details that might incite caste or communal
    violence. The Council publicly criticizes newspapers or journalists it
    believes have broken the code of conduct, but its findings, while noted
    by the press community, carry no legal weight.
        At the state level, regional political parties have the ability to
    control regional media. In some instances, allegations of violence
    against journalists have been made against state governments. According
    to Reporters Without Borders, on July 6, a magistrate in Sibsagar town,
    Assam, beat Parag Saikia, a journalist of the daily newspaper Aji. The
    magistrate reportedly had summoned the journalist for publishing a July
    1 article about the local authorities' alleged involvement in
    corruption. The journalist later was admitted to the hospital with
    various injuries. Between July and August, in the state of Andhra
    Pradesh, state police obstructed or attacked journalists and
    photographers in at least 10 different cities as they attempted to
    report on civil disturbances resulting from protests over power tariff
    hikes. The Andhra Pradesh Journalists' Union claims that the state
    chief minister of Andhra Pradesh played a role in the dismissal of the
    editor of the Telugu daily newspaper Andhra Prabha. The editor
    reportedly was fired for publishing stories critical of the state
    government's power policy.
        Nonviolent pressure on journalists comes from official sources as
    well: the editor of the vernacular daily newspaper Naharolgi Thoudang
    was arrested on charges of indulging in anti-national activities. He
    was released after a court ruled that the allegation was baseless. In
    Assam a similar incident occured as police intercepted the editor of
    the largest circulating Assamese daily in April, accusing him of having
    participated in a function organized by a militant organization. In
    April the Assam Human Rights Commission requested the police to report
    on the detention of Asomiya Pratidin editor Haider Hussain for visiting
    an ULFA camp in Bhutan; police detained Hussain in the first week of
    March. The Commission cited the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
    expression; Hussain was released several days later. Some newspapers
    receive more than $1.29 million (60 million rupees) annually in
    advertising revenue from the state government. The threat of losing
    this revenue contributes to self-censorship by smaller media outlets,
    which heavily rely on government advertising.
        In Calcutta the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) often
    threatens journalists; however, as the power of the party diminishes,
    journalists find it easier to criticize the government. At least nine
    journalists were injured while attempting to give a deputation to the
    director of information. The alleged assailants were state information
    officers, government employees owing allegiance to the Marxist
    government. In July alleged members of the CPI(M) severely beat a team
    of three reporters and a cameraman of ETV, a new vernacular cable
    television channel. Another reporter was injured severely in state
    finance minister Asim Dasgupta's constituency during municipal
    elections (see Section 3). On numerous occasions, CPI(M) supporters
    beat reporters of another Bengali cable channel, Khas Khobor. Earlier
    in the year, CPI(M) officially requested its supporters to boycott the
    channel. The matter was resolved when a former CPI(M) activist replaced
    the editor.
        In the northeast part of the country, violence against journalists
    has become a problem and results in significant self-censorship. On
    August 20, two unknown assailants shot and killed Thounaojam Brajamani
    Singh, the editor of the Manipur News, a daily newspaper published in
    Manipur. According to Reporters Without Borders, two men on a
    motorcycle followed Singh after he left the newspaper office. They
    overtook Singh and shot him in the head at point-blank range; Singh was
    the only employee whom they targeted. Singh had received anonymous
    death threats on August 15. No one had claimed responsibility for the
    murder, and police investigations were ongoing by year's end. On August
    26, militants bombed a newspaper office owned by an NGO at Konung
    Lampak, Manipur. Altogether, at least seven journalists have been
    killed in Assam over the past decade. There was no further information
    on the 1996 killing of journalist and human rights activist Parag Das
    in Assam (see Sections 1.a. and 4).
        On July 31, V. Selvaraj, a journalist with the biweekly Nakkeeran,
    was shot and killed in Perambalur, Tamil Nadu. Thirteen persons were
    charged in connection with Selvaraj's killing. A motive for the killing
    has not been established; however, local police maintain that there was
    personal enmity between Selvaraj and his 13 assailants. The trial had
    not begun by year's end.
        Intimidation by militant groups also causes significant
    selfcensorship. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in
    January English-language newspapers throughout Gujarat received written
    notice from the Bajrang Dal, a radical Hindu nationalist group,
    threatening them with dire consequences if they continued to publish
    exaggerated reports of antiChristian violence (see Sections 2.c. and
    5). In 1999 Kashmiri militant groups threatened journalists and editors
    and even imposed temporary bans on some publications that were critical
    of their activities.
        The Government maintains a list of banned books that may not be
    imported or sold in the country; some--like Salman Rushdie's ``Satanic
    Verses'' because they contain material government censors have deemed
    inflammatory.
        On February 16, customs agents at the Calcutta airport blocked the
    distribution of 3,000 issues of Time magazine because they contained a
    1-page interview with the brother of Mohandas Gandhi's assassin, which
    they deemed would be defamatory and derogatory to national prestige.
        Television no longer is a government monopoly, but this is due more
    to technological changes than to government policy. Private satellite
    television is distributed widely by cable or dish in middle-class
    neighborhoods throughout the country. These channels have been
    providing substantial competition for Doordarshan (DDTV), the national
    broadcaster, in both presentation and credibility because DDTV
    frequently is accused of manipulating the news for the benefit of the
    Government; however, cable operators are not free of criticism. In some
    parts of the country, to varying degrees, satellite channel owners use
    their medium to promote the platforms of the political parties that
    they support.
        In late summer the Government proposed measures to control
    objectionable content on satellite channels--specifically, tobacco and
    alcohol advertisements--that would hold cable distributors liable under
    civil law. As a result, cable operators in New Delhi and some other
    areas held a 3-day blackout during the Olympic Games to demonstrate the
    gravity of their concern. The Government since has clarified its
    position, stating that the (often foreign) satellite broadcasters,
    rather than the domestic cable operators, fall within the scope of the
    regulation.
        AM radio broadcasting remains a government monopoly. Private FM
    radio station ownership was legalized during the year, but licenses
    only authorize entertainment and educational content. Licenses do not
    permit independent news broadcasting.
        A government censorship board reviews films before licensing them
    for distribution. The board censors material deemed offensive to public
    morals or communal sentiment. During the year, Hindu fundamentalist
    groups resorted to violence and disrupted the shooting of ``Water,'' a
    film involving the exploitation of widows, as they claimed it offended
    Hindu sentiments. A 1999 film by the same producer/director and cast,
    ``Fire,'' which dealt with lesbianism and which had been cleared by the
    censor board, was not allowed to be screened in most states; only
    Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal took proactive steps to allow the film
    to be shown. At times offended Hindu mobs, led by members of the Shiv
    Sena, a Hindu fundamentalist political party, provoked violence at
    movie theaters that were able to show the film. The fact that the lead
    actress of both films was a Muslim exacerbated tensions. Producers of
    video newsmagazines that appear on national television are required to
    submit their programs to Doordarshan, the government television
    channel, which occasionally has censored stories that portrayed the
    Government in an unfavorable light. This has led to self-censorship
    among producers so that DDTV rarely has to exercise its power of
    censorship.
        The Government does not limit access to the Internet.
        Arundhati Roy's book ``The Greater Common Good,'' which discusses
    the socio-environmental costs of the Sardar Sarovar dam, was serialized
    in magazines in the country during the year. In 1999 political parties
    in favor of the Narmada project burned copies of the book and
    successfully threatened bookstores in Gujarat to remove it from their
    shelves.
        Citizens enjoy academic freedom, and students and faculty espouse a
    wide range of views. In addition to about 10 national universities and
    256 state universities, states are empowered to accredit locally run
    private institutions.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    generally respected this right in practice. The authorities sometimes
    require permits and notification prior to holding parades or
    demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respect the right to
    protest peacefully, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where separatist
    parties routinely are denied permits for public gatherings. During
    periods of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or
    impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code.
        Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir occasionally came
    under curfew, but more often were affected by strikes called by
    militants.
        On March 27, Calcutta police beat primary school teachers
    participating in a peaceful procession to the legislative assembly,
    after holding a meeting on demands they had made of the state
    government. On August 13 and 14, police killed 2 persons and injured 3
    others after they fired on a crowd of 1,500 Muslims in Agra. The crowd
    had gathered to protest efforts by majority Hindus to prevent them from
    using a plot of land close to a Hindu temple. The minority community
    wanted to use the land, which was under the supervision of Muslim
    religious authorities, as a graveyard. Police allege that the
    protesters turned violent, throwing bombs and bottles filled with acid
    at police. The police maintain that they fired at the crowd with live
    ammunition only after efforts to quell the disturbance with tear gas
    and rubber bullets had failed. Some of the protesters told reporters
    that the police actions were unprovoked (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
        According to Amnesty International, in August the Gujarat
    government detained approximately 600 persons who were planning to
    attend a hearing on the Narmada dam (see Section 2.d.). The police
    charged the protestors with disturbing the peace and released them
    shortly after their arrests.
        The Constitution provides for the right to form associations, and
    the Government generally respected this right in practice.
        In 1999 the Government introduced and enforced a new requirement
    that NGO's secure the prior approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs
    before organizing international conferences. Human rights groups
    contend that the new requirement provides the Government with
    substantial political control of the work of NGO's, abridging of their
    freedom of assembly and association.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice; however,
    it sometimes does not act effectively to counter societal attacks
    against religious minorities and attempts by state and local
    governments to limit that freedom. India is a secular state in which
    all faiths generally enjoy freedom of worship; government policy does
    not favor any religious group. However, tension between Muslims and
    Hindus, and to an increasing extent between Hindus and Christians,
    continues to pose a challenge to the secular foundation of the State
    (see Section 5). In addition governments at state and local levels only
    partially respect religious freedom.
        Although the law provides for religious freedom, enforcement of the
    law has been poor, particularly at the state and local levels, where
    the failure to deal adequately with intragroup and intergroup conflict
    and with local disturbances has abridged the right to religious
    freedom. In particular, some Hindu extremist groups continued to attack
    Christians during the year. In many cases, the Government response was
    inadequate, consisting largely of statements criticizing the violence
    against Christians, with few efforts to hold accountable those persons
    responsible or to prevent such incidents from occurring (see Section
    5). Throughout the year, the Government generally described the
    violence and attacks as a series of isolated local phenomena, in some
    states calling for a national debate on conversions, which Hindus had
    advocated being banned.
        The Government is led by a coalition called the National Democratic
    Alliance, which has pledged to respect India's traditions of secular
    government and religious tolerance. However, the leading party in the
    coalition is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist
    political party with links to Hindu extremist groups that have been
    implicated in violent acts against Christians and Muslims. The BJP also
    leads state governments in Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar
    Pradesh. Many BJP leaders and party workers are members of the
    Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and share some of its ideology.
    However, the BJP is an independent political party and the degree of
    RSS influence over its policy making is not clear. The RSS espouses a
    return to Hindu values and cultural norms. Members of the BJP, the RSS,
    and other affiliated organizations were implicated in incidents of
    violence and discrimination against Christians and Muslims. The BJP and
    RSS officially express respect and tolerance for other religions;
    however, the RSS in particular opposes conversions from Hinduism and
    believes that all citizens should adhere to Hindu cultural values. The
    BJP officially agrees that the caste system should be eliminated, but
    many of its members are ambivalent about this. Most BJP leaders also
    are RSS members. The BJP's traditional cultural agenda includes calls
    for construction of a new Hindu temple to replace an ancient Hindu
    temple that was believed to have stood on the site of a mosque in
    Ayodhya that a Hindu mob destroyed in 1992; for the repeal of Article
    370 of the Constitution, which grants special rights to the state of
    Jammu and Kashmir, the country's only Muslim majority state; and for
    the enactment of a uniform civil code that would apply to members of
    all religions. In mid-October, the RSS held a 3-day rally in Agra,
    which more than 75,000 Hindus reportedly attended. Speaking at the
    rally, RSS chief K.S. Sudarshan sparked controversy when he called for
    banning foreign churches and creating a national Christian Church based
    on the Chinese model. Sudarshan reportedly also encouraged Christian
    citizens to free themselves from the strong influence of foreign
    countries by setting up Indian nationalistic churches. Of particular
    concern for minority groups was Home Minister L.K. Advani's highly
    publicized participation at the Agra rally and vocal support of the RSS
    on his return to New Delhi. All of these proposals are opposed strongly
    by some minority religious groups. The BJP-led national Government took
    no steps to implement these controversial measures and has promised
    that it would not do so during its tenure.
        Human rights groups and others have suggested that the response by
    authorities in these states to acts of violence against religious
    minorities by Hindu extremist groups has been ineffective, at least in
    part because of the links between these groups and the BJP, and have
    noted that the ineffective investigation and prosecution of such
    incidents may encourage violent actions by extremist groups. Some
    Chrisian groups also claim that BJP officials at state and local levels
    have become increasingly uncooperative. The Government also has been
    criticized for not attempting to restrain the country's radical Hindu
    groups.
        The degree to which the BJP's nationalist Hindu agenda is felt
    throughout the country with respect to religious minorities varies
    depending on the region. In some states, governments took pains to
    reaffirm their commitment to secularism. In others, mainly in the
    south, religious groups allege that since the BJP's rise to power in
    the national Government, some government bureaucrats have begun to
    enforce laws selectively to the detriment of religious minorities. The
    situation in the east varied. For example, the Orissa government in
    November 1999 notified churches that religious conversions could not
    occur without notification of the local police and district magistrate.
    The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act of 1967 contains a provision
    requiring a monthly government report on the number of conversions, but
    this provision previously had not been enforced. After a conversion has
    been reported to the District Magistrate, the report is forwarded to
    the authorities and a local police officer conducts an inquiry. The
    police officer may recommend in favor of or against such intended
    conversion, often as the sole arbitrator on the individual's right to
    freedom of religion; if conversion is judged to have occurred without
    permission or with coercion, the authorities may take penal action. In
    Tripura there were reports of attacks on non-Christians by Christians.
        No registration is required for religions. Legally mandated
    benefits are assigned to certain groups, including some groups defined
    by their religion.
        There are many religions and a large variety of denominations,
    groups, and subgroups in the country, but Hinduism is the dominant
    religion. According to 1999 statistics (based on the 1991 census),
    Hindus constitute 82.4 percent of the population, Muslims 12.7 percent,
    Christians 2.3 percent, Sikhs 2.0 percent, Buddhists 0.7 percent, Jains
    0.4 percent, and others, including Parsis, Jews, and Baha'is, 0.4
    percent.
        The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act makes it a
    criminal offense to use any religious site for political purposes or to
    use temples for harboring persons accused or convicted of crimes. While
    specifically designed to deal with Sikh places of worship in Punjab,
    the law applies to all religious sites. The state of Uttar Pradesh
    passed the Religious Buildings and Places Act during the state assembly
    budget session of March-May. The act requires a state government-
    endorsed permit before construction of any religious building may
    commence in the state. During the year, West Bengal's government
    implemented 15year-old legislation that requires any person desiring to
    construct a place of worship to seek permission from the district
    magistrate; any person intending to convert a personal place of worship
    to one for the community must obtain the district magistrate's
    permission.
        The current legal system accommodates minority religions' personal
    status laws; there are different personal laws for different religious
    communities. Religion-specific laws pertain in matters of marriage,
    divorce, adoption, and inheritance. For example, Muslim personal status
    law governs many noncriminal matters involving Muslims, including
    family law, inheritance, and divorce. The personal status laws of the
    religious communities sometimes discriminate against women. Under
    Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and
    unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also
    allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry. Under
    the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman may demand divorce
    only in cases of spousal abuse and certain categories of adultery; for
    a Christian man, adultery alone is sufficient. In May 1997, the Mumbai
    High Court recognized abuse alone as sufficient grounds for a Christian
    woman to obtain a divorce.
        The Government was reviewing the legislation on marriage and
    drafted the ``Christian Marriage Bill'' during the year. The bill would
    replace the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, which is widely criticized as
    biased against women. If enacted it would place limitations on
    interfaith marriages and specify penalties, such as 10 years'
    imprisonment, for clergymen who contravene its provisions. The current
    form of the bill states that no marriage in which one party is a non-
    Christian may be celebrated in a church. The bill was not introduced
    during the most recent Parliament session in March-May due to the
    strong objections and reservations of the Christian community.
        There is no national law that bars proselytizing by Christian
    citizens. Foreign missionaries generally may renew their visas, but
    since the mid-1960's the Government has refused to admit new resident
    foreign missionaries. New arrivals currently enter as tourists on
    short-term visas. During the year, as in the past, state officials
    refused to issue permits for foreign Christian missionaries, as well as
    other persons, to enter some northeastern states, on the grounds of
    political instability in the region. This restriction is not levied
    specifically against Christians. Many foreigners, including diplomats,
    are refused permits to the country's northeastern states on the grounds
    of political instability in the region. Missionaries and religious
    organizations must comply with the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
    Act (FCRA), which restricts funding from abroad and, therefore, the
    ability of certain groups to finance their activities. The Government
    is empowered to ban a religious organization if it has violated the
    FCRA, has provoked intercommunity friction, or has been involved in
    terrorism or sedition. There is no ban on professing or proselytizing
    religious beliefs; however, speaking publicly against other beliefs is
    considered dangerous to public order, and is prohibited.
        A January decision by the Gujarat state government to revoke the
    ban on the participation of government employees in Rashtriya
    Swayamsewak Sangh activities was criticized widely by those who felt
    that this would lead to the spread of RSS influence within the
    government services, as was the well-publicized participation of the
    state's chief minister at an RSS rally that month. In March the
    government of Gujarat convinced a BJP legislator to withdraw a bill
    that sought to regulate Christian missionary activity within the state;
    the bill was written to prohibit ``forced'' or ``induced'' conversionsa
    crime that would have been punishable by a fine and up to 3 years in
    prison. In May the Gujarat government withdrew permission for state
    government workers to engage in RSS activities. Despite these steps by
    the state and national governments to address communal concerns, many
    in the minority communities continued to express unease about BJP rule.
        In August 1999, a bill was introduced in Gujarat that would allow
    harsh punishment for anyone in the state found guilty of converting
    someone to another religion through the use of force, provision of
    material benefits, or fraud. Human rights groups feared that if passed
    the bill--called the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Bill, 1999--could be
    used to restrict the fundamental right to choose one's religion.
    However, the Gujarat state assembly took no action on the Freedom of
    Religion Bill, allowing it to lapse. It must be reintroduced to be
    further considered.
        Violent attacks against Christians by Hindus, which began in late
    1998, continued during the year. Attacks on religious minorities no
    longer appear to be confined to Gujarat and Orissa. There were several
    attacks by Hindu groups against Christian institutions in Uttar Pradesh
    in April (see Section 5). These incidents were the first signs of
    Hindu-Christian violence in Uttar Pradesh in over 6 years. The
    Government dispatched the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) to
    investigate the attacks in the north, but the NCM's findings that the
    attacks were not ``communal in nature'' sparked widespread criticism in
    the minority community (see Section 5). There is strong evidence that
    the NCM report misrepresented the victims in its claim that the victims
    themselves are satisfied entirely that there was no religious
    motivation behind the violence. Victims of the incidents claim that the
    local police were not responsive either before or during the attacks.
    The BJP government in Uttar Pradesh initiated an investigation by
    intelligence agencies into the June 21 custodial killing of a witness,
    Vijay Ekka (see Sections 1.a. and 5); the government also announced
    plans to set up a judicial inquiry by a sitting judge from the state
    High Court. The Mathura superintendent of police was transferred
    because of the Ekka killing; however, no further information was
    uncovered and no other persons were held accountable by year's end.
        On June 26, the National Human Rights Commission ordered states
    affected by Hindu-Christian violence to provide written reports
    detailing the violence against Christians and the actions taken by
    state governments. No reports were made public by year's end, and
    according to human rights activists, states had not submitted them.
        On occasion, Hindu-Muslim violence led to killings and a cycle of
    retaliation. In some instances, local police and government officials
    abetted the violence, and at times security forces were responsible for
    abuses. Police sometimes assisted the Hindu fundamentalists in
    perpetrating violent acts (see Section 5). Following riots in
    Ahmedabad, Gujarat from August 5 to 7, some police officers allegedly
    forced some Muslim residents to sing the Sanskrit anthem to prove that
    they were not ``anti-national'' (see Section 5). Government officials
    allegedly also subjected Christian-affiliated foreign relief
    organizations to arbitrary roadblocks; many of these organizations are
    not engaged in religious activities (see Section 4). In a few
    instances, state governments investigated and sometimes arrested
    suspects in cases of anti-Christian violence. For example, after an
    Australian missionary was murdered in Orissa (see Section 5), several
    suspects were arrested. In another instance, the governments of
    Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh investigated a series of 6 church bombings
    in June and July (see Section 5); the investigations led to the arrest
    of 45 persons and concluded that members of the Deendar Anjuman, a
    Muslim group, carried out the bombings. In general government response
    has been poor with respect to such incidents.
        On July 14, the Maharashtra government announced its intention to
    prosecute Bal Thackeray, leader of the rightwing Hindu organization
    Shiv Sena, for his role in inciting the Mumbai 1992-1993 riots in which
    over 700 persons, the vast majority of whom were Muslim, were killed
    (see Section 5). On July 25, amid rioting by Shiv Sena supporters,
    Thackeray was arrested; a few hours later a judge ruled that the
    statute of limitations relating to the incitement charges had expired,
    and Thackeray was released.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement
    within the country except in certain border areas where, for security
    reasons, special permits are required. Under the Passports Act of 1967,
    the Government may deny a passport to any applicant who ``may or is
    likely to engage outside India in activities prejudicial to the
    sovereignty and integrity of India.'' The Government uses this
    provision to prohibit the foreign travel of some government critics,
    especially those advocating Sikh independence and members of the
    violent separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. On April 9, the
    Government prevented four members of a Kashmir human rights
    organization from traveling to the 56th U.N. Commission on Human Rights
    (UNCHR) meeting in Geneva (see Section 4). Abdul Majid Banday, Mohammad
    Tufail, Mohannad Amin Bhat and Abdul Rashid Lone, had valid passports
    and letters of accreditation as members of a U.N.-recognized NGO, but
    authorities prevented them from boarding their flight.
        Vehicle checkpoints, at which Border Security Forces routinely
    search and question occupants, are a common feature throughout most of
    Jammu and Kashmir. It also is common for police to block entry and exit
    points in preparation for gathering young males for police lineups.
    These searches tend to focus on troubled areas, as opposed to the mass
    searches that were common in the past. According to a credible source,
    such search operations seldom yield any results.
        In September the PUCL reported that Bangalore police arrested 30
    persons peacefully demanding access to public information on
    construction of the Bangalore-Mysore information corridor. The
    Karnataka government has proposed acquiring more than 20,000 acres of
    land in 168 villages. Those arrested were concerned about the status of
    farmland and homes in the village resutling form the continued planned
    government construction of an expressway between the two cities.
        On October 18, the Supreme Court ruled that construction of the
    Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in Gujarat could begin
    immediately, reaching a height of 90 meters, and could proceed in
    stages thereafter up to a finished height of 138 meters. The ruling
    stipulated that those displaced by the dam would be compensated.
    However, many human rights advocates and NGO's continued to allege that
    the construction of the dam would displace 40,000 families without
    adequately compensating those who are resettled (see Section 2.b.).
    (Opposition to the Narmada project was greatest during the early
    1990's, resulting in prolonged financial and legal delays.)
        Citizens may emigrate without restriction.
        Since 1990 more than 235,000 Bangladeshis have been deported, many
    from Maharashtra and West Bengal. The occasional deportation of
    Bangladeshis judged to have entered the country illegally continued
    during the year, but there was no repetition of the systematic roundup
    of Bangladeshis for mass deportation that was conducted by the
    Maharashtra government in 1998. The Government estimates that there are
    10 million Bangladeshis living illegally in the country. On August 28,
    the Supreme Court gave the central Government until January 2001 to
    repeal the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal (IMDT) Act of
    1985. The court ruled that the law, which is largely aimed at illegal
    Bangladeshi immigrants, is being applied only in Assam, and therefore
    is discriminatory. Bodo-Santhal ethnic clashes, which began in April
    1998, continued throughout the year. More than 87,000 persons live
    under poor conditions in relief camps in Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon,
    and adjoining districts as a result of the ongoing violence between
    Bodos and Santhals.
        The spring and summer 1999 incursion of Pakistan-backed armed
    forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around
    Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military
    campaign to repel the intrusion forced as many 50,000 residents of
    Jammu and Kashmir from their homes, a number of whom took refuge on the
    Paskistani side of the line of control. Many had their homes destroyed.
    Since that conflict, artillery shelling of the region by Pakistan has
    kept many of the internally displaced persons from returning and driven
    others from their homes. On October 12, Jammu and Kashmir home minister
    Mustaq Ahmad Lone told the State Assembly that 43,510 persons remained
    displaced (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.).
        In a number of northern states, most notably Orissa, Bihar, and
    West Bengal, hundreds of thousands of persons were displaced
    temporarily due to severe flooding and cyclonic storms during the
    monsoon season.
        The law does not contain provisions for processing refugees or
    asylum seekers in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, nor is there a clear
    national policy for the treatment of refugees. The Office of the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has no formal status, but the
    Government permits the UNHCR to assist certain groups of refugees
    (notably Afghans, Iranians, Somalis, Burmese, and Sudanese). The U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, visited the country in
    May (see Section 4).
        The Government has not permitted the UNHCR to assist other refugee
    groups, including Sri Lankan Tamils, to whose camps in Tamil Nadu the
    Government continued to bar access by the UNHCR and NGO's (see Section
    4). The Government provides first asylum to some refugees, most notably
    in recent years to Tibetan and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. However, this
    policy is applied inconsistently. For example, the insistence of some
    border authorities on the presentation of passport and visas by those
    claiming refugee status occasionally has resulted in individuals or
    groups being refused admittance. This has occurred in recent years in
    cases involving Chin and Rakhine refugees from Burma, and Afghans who
    entered the country through Pakistan. Refugees are not required to make
    claims in other countries. Cramped and unhygienic conditions reportedly
    exist in some of the camps for Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu.
        The Government recognizes certain groups, including Chakmas from
    Bangladesh, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and Tibetans as refugees and
    provides them with assistance in refugee camps or in resettlement
    areas. According to UNHCR and government statistics, there were
    approximately 98,000 Tibetans, approximately 64,989 Sri Lankan Tamils
    in 131 camps, and perhaps as many as 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils outside
    of the camps living in the country at year's end. The refugees in the
    camps are permitted to work, and the state and central governments pay
    to educate refugee children and provide limited welfare benefits. Many
    Chakmas from Bangladesh have been repatriated voluntarily, including
    all of the estimated 56,000 persons who had been residing in Tripura.
    Some 80,000 Chakma permanent residents remain in Arunachal Pradesh and
    Mizoram; the Supreme Court has upheld their right to citizenship.
    However, the Supreme Court's order to extend citizenship to this group
    still had not been enforced by year's end. The UNHCR reported that
    13,390 Afghans, 747 Burmese, 139 Iranians, 105 Somalis, 50 Sudanese,
    and 56 others, including Iraqis and Ethiopians, were receiving
    assistance from the UNHCR in the country as of August 31. Although the
    Government formally does not recognize these persons as refugees, it
    does not deport them. Instead, they received renewable residence
    permits or their status was ignored. Increasingly during the year, some
    of these groupsAfghans, Iraqis, and Iranians in particular--were not
    granted renewal of their residence permits by the authorities on the
    grounds that they were not in possession of valid national passports.
    Due to financial and other reasons, many refugees were unable or
    unwilling to obtain or renew their national passports, and therefore
    were unable to regularize their status in the country.
        The Tamil Nadu government provides educational facilities to Sri
    Lankan Tamil refugee children, and the central Government provides some
    assistance and channels assistance from NGO and church groups. The
    central Government generally has denied NGO's and the UNHCR direct
    access to the camps. NGO's report refugee complaints about deteriorated
    housing, poor sanitation, delayed dole payments, and inadequate medical
    care in the Tamil refugee camps. The NHRC has intervened to uphold the
    right of several Sri Lankan Tamils detained in so-called ``special
    camps'' to remain in the country. The Government uses these camps to
    hold suspected members of the LTTE terrorist organization. Human rights
    groups allege that inmates of the special camps sometimes are subjected
    to physical abuse and that their confinement to the camps amounts to
    imprisonment without trial. They allege that several of those acquitted
    by the Supreme Court in May 1999 of involvement in the assassination of
    former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (see Section 1.a.) remain confined
    in these special camps. Some 1,399 new refugees arrived from Sri Lanka
    during the first 9 months of the year. Human rights groups allege that
    the Government did not permit 30 to 40 families, whom alien smugglers
    left stranded on sand bars in the shallow Palk Strait, to enter the
    country; however, during the year some 180 persons similarly marooned
    were permitted to enter.
        Ethnic Chins are among the nonrecognized refugees in the
    northeastern states, particularly Mizoram. Chins and Chakma refugees
    have been targeted by student-led demonstrations protesting their
    presence in Mizoram. During the year, tensions between security forces
    and Chin National Force (CNF) insurgents operating in Burma allegedly
    resulted in the detention, interrogation, and expulsion of some persons
    associated with the CNF to Burma, where they credibly feared
    persecution. Human rights monitors allege that about 1,000 Chin
    refugees had been arrested in Mizoram and some 200 had been repatriated
    forcibly to Burma between July and September. According to one NGO, on
    August 3, a 25-year-old Chin refugee died in the Aizawl central police
    station, Mizoram (see Section 1.a.). An estimated 40,000 to 50,000
    Chins live and work illegally in Mizoram.
        Mizoram human rights groups estimate that some 41,000 Reangs, a
    tribal group from Mizoram that has been displaced due to a sectarian
    conflict, presently are being sheltered in 6 camps in North Tripura;
    conditions in such camps are poor and the Tripura government has asked
    the central Government to allot funds for their care. Reang leaders in
    the camps say that their community would return to Mizoram if they were
    granted an autonomous district council, allotted a set number of seats
    in the Mizoram Assembly, and granted financial assistance for
    resettlement. The Mizoram government rejected these demands and
    maintained that only 16,000 of the refugees had a valid claim to reside
    in the state. On August 7, following his meeting with Tripura chief
    minister Manik Sarkar, Union Home Minister L.K. Advani announced that
    an initial group of Reang refugees would be resettled in Tripura by
    October 31, and that repatriation of the entire group would be
    completed by year's end. However, while an NHRC staff member also
    visited Tripura to inquire into the situation of the Reangs, by year's
    end nothing had been done to repatriate them.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right Of Citizens To
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The country has a democratic, parliamentary system
    of government with representatives elected in multiparty elections. A
    Parliament sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier for new elections,
    except under constitutionally defined emergency situations. State
    governments are elected at regular intervals except in states under
    President's Rule.
        On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may proclaim a
    state of emergency in any part of the national territory in the event
    of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Similarly, President's
    Rule may be declared in the event of a collapse of a state's
    constitutional machinery. The Supreme Court in May 1995 upheld the
    Government's authority to suspend fundamental rights during an
    emergency.
        Some 50 persons were killed in election-related violence in state
    assembly polling in Gujarat, Bihar, and Manipur (see Section 1.a.), and
    there were localized allegations of voter fraud.
        During the February 12 Bihar State Assembly election, extremists of
    the Maoist Coordination Center (MCC) and the PWG killed 21 persons,
    including 12 members of the security forces and 2 election officials.
    The extremist groups had warned voters to remain at home during the
    polls, or face attack. Seventeen more persons were killed in the second
    phase of voting in the state on February 22. On September 17 in
    Ahmedabad, Gujarat, police killed 6 persons and injured 15 others when
    they fired on a crowd of about 2,000 persons (see Section 1.a.). The
    crowd had rampaged through a Muslim-minority section of the city after
    reports that ballot boxes had been tampered with in the city's
    municipal corporation elections. In West Bengal, clashes between
    supporters of the Trinamul Congress Party and the CPI(M) left 71
    persons dead in the first 9 months of the year (see Section 1.g.).
    Voting irregularities in the West Bengal election--such as fraud,
    delaying tactics, and intimidation--were reported widely.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no
    legal impediments hinder their participation in the political process.
    A large proportion of women participates in voting throughout the
    country (with turnout rates slightly lower than those of men), and
    numerous women are represented in all major parties in the national and
    state legislatures. There are 66 women among the 790 Members of
    Parliament, including the Deputy Speaker of the upper house, and there
    are 8 women in the 74-member Cabinet. The 1993 passage of the
    ``Panchayati Raj'' constitutional amendments reserved 30 percent of
    seats in elected village councils (Panchayats) for women, which has
    brought more than 1 million women into the political life at the
    grassroots level. In September debate over the Women's Reservation
    Bill, which was designed to reserve one-third of parliamentary seats
    for women, subsided when the Government failed to introduce the bill
    during the monsoon session of Parliament. The bill was introduced but
    not debated in the winter session of Parliament. The Women's
    Reservation Bill first was introduced in late 1998.
        The Constitution reserves seats in Parliament and state
    legislatures for ``scheduled tribes'' and ``scheduled castes'' in
    proportion to their population (see Section 5). Indigenous people
    actively participate in national and local politics, but their impact
    depends on their numerical strength. In the northeastern states,
    indigenous people are a large proportion of the population and
    consequently exercise a dominant influence in the political process. In
    comparison, in Maharashtra and Gujarat, tribal people are a small
    minority and have been unsuccessful in blocking projects that they
    oppose.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Independent human rights organizations operate throughout most of
    the country, investigating abuses and publishing their findings;
    however, in some states and in a few circumstances, human rights groups
    face some restrictions. Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir have
    been unable to move around the state to document human rights
    violations due to fear of retribution by security forces and
    countermilitants. Since 1992 several individuals closely involved in
    the documentation of violations in Jammu and Kashmir, including lawyers
    and journalists, have been attacked and in some cases killed.
    International human rights monitors have had difficulty in obtaining
    visas to visit the country for investigation purposes. For example,
    during the year the authorities continued to deny HRW and Amnesty
    International permission to visit Jammu and Kashmir; however, some
    foreign diplomats gained improved access to some prisons in Jammu and
    Kashmir. The Government also continued to deny the U.N. Special
    Rapporteurs on Torture and Extrajudicial Killings permission to visit
    the country, despite their repeated requests. Moreover, the police and
    security forces have arrested and harassed human rights monitors. In
    May U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata was allowed to
    visit the country (see Section 2.d.).
        In September 1999, the Ministry of Home Affairs sent a notice to
    several prominent NGO's asking them to justify their status as
    nonpolitical organizations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
    Act. According to HRW, the notice effectively was a threat to cut off
    foreign funding. The NGO's, many of which worked on women's rights,
    communal violence, and Dalit and tribal issues, publicly had criticized
    the policies of the BJP-led government and the antisecular activities
    of the Sangh Parivar, a collective of rightwing Hindu organizations of
    which the BJP is a member.
        On May 24, an agent of the intelligence bureau visited and
    questioned the director of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation
    Center (SAHRDC) about his travel earlier in the month to Geneva to
    participate in the meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. In 1998
    the Andhra Pradesh government issued a directive to faculty members of
    state universities not to associate with the Andhra Pradesh Civil
    Liberties Union (APCLC), a well-respected human rights organization.
    Following protests by faculty organizations, the directive was
    rescinded.
        On April 9, the Government prevented four members of a Kashmir
    human rights organization from traveling to the 56th annual meeting of
    the UNCHR in Geneva (see Section 2.d.).
        According to HRW, on April 20, a mob of local residents and
    politicians raided the Almora and Jageswar offices of an NGO working
    primarily on women's health and empowerment in Uttar Pradesh. The
    attack allegedly was in response to a pamphlet that the NGO had
    published in 1999 on HIV transmission, which contained purportedly
    sexually offensive material. Police and protestors assaulted staff and
    trainees, and a number of persons were detained for a short period.
        According to Amnesty, the chief judicial magistrate in Srinagar
    released on bail Ghulam Mohiuddin Najar, a political activist and
    teacher; however, immediately upon release, members of the Special
    Operations Group, a unit of the state police, shot and killed him at
    the court gate. According to Amnesty International, in February
    security forces in Jammu and Kashmir pointed guns at journalists who
    were attempting to investigate the killing of Najar.
        Amnesty International reported the November killing of human rights
    defender T. Puroshottam in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. A group of
    unidentified men wielding knives attacked Puroshottam, the Joint
    Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, in a local
    shop. Puroshottam was involved in numerous investigations of alleged
    human rights violations by the police including torture and
    extrajudicial executions, had been attacked previously, and had
    received persistent threatening telephone calls. There has been no
    independent investigation into Puroshottam's killing.
        There was no definitive resolution in the case of abducted and
    murdered Kashmir human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. Human rights
    workers allege that the state is attempting to subvert the judicial
    process by withholding evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). In Assam
    the investigation into the 1996 murder of human rights monitor and
    journalist Parag Das has yielded no definitive information on the
    identity of his killer. The assailant allegedly was a militant who
    previously had surrendered and was supported by the Government (see
    Sections 1.a. and 2.a.).
        Several Christian-affiliated (in many cases, non-evangelical)
    international relief agencies stated that, during the year, their work
    in delivering services to the poor became considerably more difficult
    due to threats, increased bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases,
    physical attacks on their field workers by Hindu extremists (see
    Sections 2.c. and 5).
        The Government appointed a National Human Rights Commission in 1993
    with powers to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment,
    and compensation in cases of police abuse. In addition the NHRC is
    directed to contribute to the establishment, growth, and functioning of
    human rights NGO's. The Government appoints the members and finances
    the operations of the NHRC. The NHRC is seriously understaffed and
    prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of abuse
    involving army and paramilitary forces.
        From April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999 (the most recent reporting
    year), the NHRC received 40,724 new complaints of human rights
    violations. The Commission had 13,512 cases awaiting consideration at
    the beginning of the reporting period. Of the 54,236 cases before it in
    the 1998-99 year, the Commission reviewed 53,711, leaving 525 awaiting
    review at the end of the year. Of the 53,711 cases considered during
    the year, 32,172 were dismissed; 10,718 were transmitted to other
    governmental authorities for disposition; 3,395 were concluded, and
    7,426 were pending. In the previous 12-month period (April 1997 to
    March 1998), the Commission received 36,791 complaints. The increased
    number of complaints in the most recent reporting year is believed to
    be the result of the Commission's increased visibility.
        The NHRC has sought to encourage a culture respective of human
    rights by fostering human rights education in schools and universities,
    by offering assistance and encouragement to human rights NGO's, by
    supporting training programs for the police, military forces, and
    paramilitary forces, and by making recommendations to the central and
    state governments. During the year, the NHRC carried out, with the
    assistance of NGO's, a human rights training program for state police
    that included stress counseling. The NHRC also has influenced the
    legislative process, particularly by issuing a formal opinion that a
    new Prevention of Terrorism Act is not needed, and by proposing Prison
    Reform Legislation. State Human Rights Commissions exist in Assam,
    Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu,
    Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and Rajasthan; Uttar Pradesh took
    legal steps to establish a commission but has yet to appoint members.
    In addition special courts to hear human rights cases have been
    established in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. The
    courts in Uttar Pradesh are not functioning, despite a September 1999
    court order that they be reactivated. The NHRC also encouraged the
    establishment of human rights cells in police headquarters in the
    states.
        The NHRC also was involved in programs to eliminate child labor
    (see Section 6.c.).
        The state human rights commission established in Jammu and Kashmir
    by an act of the state legislature, in 1997, has no power to
    investigate independently alleged human rights violations committed by
    security force members. Credible human rights monitors say that the
    Jammu and Kashmir Commission has not yet demonstrated effective,
    independent protection of human rights in the state.
        A People's Commission that was established in 1998 by retired
    Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh to highlight the fate of more than
    2,000 persons who ``disappeared'' during the period of political unrest
    in Punjab (see Section 1.b.) continued to receive little cooperation
    from state government authorities.
        The prison visits program in Jammu and Kashmir by the ICRC,
    initiated in October 1995, continued during the year (see Section
    1.c.). ICRC representatives also continued training police and Border
    Security Force personnel in international humanitarian law.
        The Government continued to refuse repeated UNHCR requests for
    access to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camps in Tamil Nadu (see Section
    2.d.).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social status
        The traditional caste system as well as differences of ethnicity,
    religion, and language deeply divide society. Despite laws designed to
    prevent discrimination, other legislation as well as social and
    cultural practices have a profound discriminatory impact. According to
    the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
    caste clashes are frequent in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu.
        Women.--Domestic violence is common and a serious problem.
    According to a 1996 survey in Uttar Pradesh, 30 percent of married men
    acknowledged physically abusing their wives. In a survey of 10,000
    women released during the year, more than half of the women said that
    violence was a normal part of married life. The Health Ministry
    released a different survey during the year that indicated that, of
    90,000 women surveyed, more than half acknowledge being battered. Dowry
    disputes also are a serious problem. In the typical dowry dispute, a
    groom's family members harass a new wife whom they believe has not
    provided a sufficient dowry. This harassment sometimes ends in the
    woman's death, which family members often try to portray as a suicide
    or kitchen accident; recent research suggests that a significant
    percentage of kerosene attacks also are due to domestic violence.
    Although most ``dowry deaths'' involve lower and middle-class families,
    the phenomenon crosses both caste and religious lines. According to
    National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics, 6,917 dowry deaths
    occurred in the country in 1998, including 2,229 dowry deaths in Uttar
    Pradesh, 1,039 in Bihar, 598 in Madhya Pradesh, 500 in Andhra Pradesh,
    420 in Maharashtra, 200 in Karnataka, 176 in Tamil Nadu, and 21 in
    Kerala.
        Under a 1986 amendment to the Penal Code, the court must presume
    that the husband or the wife's in-laws are responsible for every
    unnatural death of a woman in the first 7 years of marriage--provided
    that harassment is proven. In such cases, police procedures require
    that an officer of deputy superintendent rank or above conduct the
    investigation and that a team of two or more doctors perform the
    postmortem procedures. According to human rights monitors, in practice
    police do not follow these procedures consistently.
        The issue of rape has received greater political and social
    attention than in earlier years. In July the NHRC directed the Andhra
    Pradesh government to pay $1,100 (50,000 rupees) in compensation to
    each of four Dalit women who were raped in Godavari district. The NHRC
    overturned a state ruling that had denied the women monetary
    compensation because the victims and their attackers were members of
    low caste and tribal communities. The press consistently reports that
    such violence against women is increasing, although local women's
    organizations claim that there simply has been increased reporting.
    Only 10 percent of rape cases are fully adjudicated by the courts, and
    police typically fail to arrest rapists, thus fostering a climate of
    impunity. In May the Central Bureau of Investigation initiated an
    inquiry into the alleged gang rape of three women by police officials
    in Pilibhit district, Uttar Pradesh in August 1998. According to a
    complaint filed by a witness, three officers of the Madho Tanda police
    station in Pilibhit district entered the victims' home late on the
    night of August 16-17 and raped the three women. On May 30, a court in
    Jalpaiguri, West Bengal sentenced Kashinath Tripathy and Bhuson Barua
    to life imprisonment for the 1982 rape of a girl in Jalpaiguri.
        In September in Kulkul village, Orissa, a group of villagers hacked
    to death a 60-year-old tribal woman, Namsi Ho, allegedly for practicing
    witchraft. Police arrested four persons in connection with the killing.
    On October 16 and November 19, in Ganjam district, Orissa, villagers
    accused Kumari Behera, of sorcery, and tortured and branded her with
    hot iron rods. Five persons were arrested in connection with the
    assaults.
        According to NCRB statistics, in 1998 there were 15,031 reported
    rapes, 16,381 abductions of women, 6,917 dowry deaths, 41,318 reported
    cases of torture of women, 31,046 cases of molestation, and 8,123 cases
    of sexual harassment. The NCRB recorded 131,338 crimes against women in
    1998, compared with 121,265 in 1997. In 1997, 678 cases of gang rape
    were recorded. Gang rapes often are committed as punishment for alleged
    adultery or as a means of coercion or revenge in rural property
    disputes and feuds. On February 1, the Committee on the Elimination of
    Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of the U.N. Commission on Human
    Rights (UNCHR) expressed concern that ``there is a high incidence of
    gender-based violence against women, which takes even more extreme
    forms because of customary practices such as dowry, sati (the burning
    alive of widows on their husbands' funeral pyre) and the Devadasi
    system (the practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent
    girls to a Hindu deity or temple as servants of God. Devadasis, who
    generally are Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families
    and are required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste
    Hindus. Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels'' (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The committee further stated that
    ``discrimination against women who belong to particular castes or
    ethnic or religious groups also is manifest in extreme forms of
    physical and sexual violence and harassment.''
        Higher female mortality at all age levels, including female
    infanticide and sex selective termination of pregnancies, accounts for
    an increase in the ratio of males to females to 107.9 males per 100
    females in 1991, from 104.7 males per 100 females in 1981, and from
    102.9 males per 100 females at the turn of the century. In some
    districts of Tamil Nadu, female infanticide occurs despite government
    and NGO programs intended to counter the practice. In July the district
    collector of Dharmapuri, Tamil Nadu, formed a team to investigate the
    murder of a girl in Pararrapatti village. The team exhumed the buried
    body and arrested the girl's father and another accomplice. In August
    the maimed body of a newborn girl was found under a bridge in
    Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. Police believe that the child's mother
    abandoned her in the public place hoping that someone would take her
    in. On February 1, CEDAW expressed concern that ``India has not yet
    established a comprehensive and compulsory system of registration of
    births and marriages. The Committee notes that inability to prove those
    important events by documentation prevents effective implementation of
    laws that protect girls from sexual exploitation and trafficking, child
    labor and forced or early marriage.''
        Numerous laws exist to protect women's rights, including the Equal
    Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, the Sati
    (Widow Burning) Prevention Act, and the Dowry Prohibition Act. However,
    the Government often is unable to enforce these laws, especially in
    rural areas in which traditions are deeply rooted. According to press
    reports, the rate of acquittal in dowry death cases is high, and
    because of court backlogs it takes 6 to 7 years on average to rule on
    such cases. On February 1, CEDAW noted that ``there is an urgent need
    to introduce comprehensive [legislative] reform to promote equality and
    the human rights of women.''
        Prostitution is widespread, with an estimated 2.3 million
    prostitutes in the country, some 575,000 of whom are children. Many
    indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation (see
    Section 6.c.). In Assam's Chars River islands, some women work as
    prostitutes in exchange for as little as $0.23 (10 rupees). In 1998
    prostitutes began to demand legal rights, licenses, and reemployment
    training, especially in Mumbai and New Delhi.
        In 1997 Karnataka's government made sexual harassment a criminal
    offense.
        The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination
    for many thousands of trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
        Literacy rates for women are significantly lower than rates for
    men; the 2000 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) Report for India found
    that 38 percent of women were literate, compared with 66 percent of
    men.
        The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but enforcement
    is inadequate. In both rural and urban areas, women get lower wages
    than men for doing the same job. Women experience economic
    discrimination in access to employment and credit. This acts as an
    impediment to women owning a business, and the promotion of women to
    managerial positions within businesses often is slower than that of
    males. State governments have supported micro-credit programs for women
    that have begun to have an impact in many rural districts.
        The personal status laws of the religious communities discriminate
    against women. Under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman
    may demand divorce only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of
    certain categories of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is
    sufficient. In 1997 the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as
    sufficient grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce. Under
    Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and
    unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also
    allows polygyny (under which a man may have up to four wives) but
    prohibits polyandry (under which a woman may have muliple husbands). On
    February 1, CEDAW noted that ``steps have not been taken to reform the
    personal laws of different religious and ethnic groups, in consultation
    with them, so as to conform with the Convention. The Committee is
    concerned that the Government's policy of non-intervention perpetuates
    sexual stereotypes, son preference and discrimination against women.''
        The Hindu Succession Act provides equal inheritance rights for
    Hindu women, but married daughters seldom are given a share in parental
    property. Islamic law recognizes a woman's right of inheritance but
    specifies that a daughter's share only should be one-half that of a
    son.
        Under many tribal land systems, notably in Bihar, tribal women do
    not have the right to own land. Other laws relating to the ownership of
    assets and land accord women little control over land use, retention,
    or sale. However, several exceptions exist, as in Ladakh and Meghalaya,
    where women may have several husbands and control the family
    inheritance.
        Thousands of grassroots organizations work for social justice and
    the economic advancement of women, in addition to the National
    Commission for Women. The Government usually supports these efforts,
    despite strong resistance from traditionally privileged groups.
        Children.--The Government does not provide compulsory, free, and
    universal primary education, and only approximately 59 percent of
    children between the ages of 5 and 14 attend school. Of a primary
    school-age population of approximately 203 million, about 120 million
    children attend school. No significant sectors or groups actively are
    excluded, but the economic reality is that children of wealthier
    families are more likely to attend school than those of poor families.
    According to a UNDP study conducted in 1993, the dropout rate from
    primary school was 34 percent. A significant gender gap exists in
    school attendance, particularly at the secondary level. According to
    UNICEF, 59 percent of boys and 38 percent of girls were enrolled in
    secondary school.
        The central Government spends approximately 5.9 percent of its
    overall budget on education. The state governments also spend part of
    their budgets on education, but no comprehensive figure of combined
    federalstate expenditure is available. A 1993 study commissioned by the
    UNDP estimated that about 3.7 percent of the country's gross national
    product is devoted to education. On February 23, the Committee on the
    Rights of the Child of the UNHRC expressed concern ``at the prevailing
    poor situation in the state party with respect to education, which is
    characterized by a general lack of infrastructure, facilities and
    equipment, insufficient numbers of qualified teachers and a drastic
    shortage of text books and other relevant learning materials. There is
    serious concern regarding the striking disparities in terms of access
    to education, attendance at primary and secondary levels and drop-out
    rates between: different states, rural and urban areas, boys and girls,
    the affluent and the poor, and children belonging to scheduled castes
    and tribes.''
        Child welfare organizations estimate that there are 500,000 street
    children nationwide living in abject poverty.
        A coalition of about 50 NGO's conducted a detailed survey in the
    Calcutta municipal area and identified 145,000 children who were not
    attending school. Not all of them were street children. The NGO's
    received UNICEF assistance in training teachers to conduct transitional
    education for a target group of 45,000 5 to 9year-old children. The
    course work is intended to allow these children to enter mainstream
    schooling. UNICEF has contributed $94,000 (4.4 million rupees) for this
    activity; the West Bengal government has provided technical advice; the
    central Government contributed nothing to the project. By year's end,
    300 teachers had received training and 235 centers are functioning.
    About 5,875 children are attending transitional education sessions at
    these centers.
        Child prostitution occurs in the cities, and there are an estimated
    575,00 child prostitutes nationwide. Trafficking in children for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.). On February 23, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child of
    the UNCHR expressed concern ``about the sexual abuse and exploitation
    of children, especially those belonging to the lower castes and from
    poor urban and rural areas, in the contexts of: Religious and
    traditional culture; child domestic workers; children living and/or
    working on the streets; communal violence and ethnic conflict; abuse by
    security forces in areas of conflict, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the
    northeastern states; and trafficking and commercial exploitation,
    especially girls form neighboring countries, particularly Nepal. It is
    also concerned about the lack of adequate measures to combat this
    phenomenon and the lack of adequate rehabilitation measures.''
        According to an International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate, 15
    percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are
    children.
        A working group on child prostitution set up by the NHRC includes
    representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
    of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
    throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
    prohibitions.
        Runaway children, especially in larger cities, are at high risk for
    sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. They often work 18- to 20-hour
    days, frequently in hazardous conditions (see Section 6.c.), and suffer
    sexual and mental abuse. In addition schoolteachers often beat
    children.
        The Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has set up a
    24-hour ``child help line'' phone-in service for children in distress
    in nine cities. Run by NGO's with government funding, the child help
    line assists street children, orphans, destitutes, runaway children,
    and children suffering abuse and exploitation. During one 6-month
    period, the help lines received 25,000 calls, including 2,190 seeking
    medical assistance for children, 1,056 seeking shelter, 138 reporting
    missing children, and 125 reporting physical or sexual abuse of
    children.
        As part of its ongoing effort, the NHRC seeks to examine conditions
    in juvenile homes and recommend improvements. In 1999 the Commission
    issued directions to all state governments to report within 24 hours
    any instance of death or rape in such institutions. The Commission
    reported that it had undertaken this initiative following receipt of
    reports of a young boy's death in such a home in Delhi in 1996. In
    March 1999, NHRC member Justice V.S. Malimath said that cases of abuse
    and torture of children confined to juvenile homes had been reported.
    In some cases, the Commission had acted to transfer oversight of homes
    to private voluntary organizations ``after the (state) government
    failed to provide a healthy environment to children in these homes.''
    In its February 23 concluding observations regarding the country, the
    U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child of the UNCHR expressed
    concern about ``numerous reports of routine ill-treatment, corporal
    punishment, torture and sexual abuse of children in detention
    facilities, and alleged instances of killings of children living and/or
    working on the streets by law enforcement officials.'' The Committee
    also expressed concern ``at the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions
    of detention of children, including detention with adults; lack of
    application and enforcement of existing juvenile justice legislation;
    lack of training for professionals, including the judiciary, lawyers
    and law enforcement officers, in relation to the Convention (On the
    Rights of the Child), other existing international standards and the
    1986 Juvenile Justice Act; and the lack of measures and enforcement
    thereof to prosecute officials who violate these provisions.''
        The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act of 1929, as amended in
    1978, prohibits child marriage, a traditional practice in the northern
    part of the country. The act raised the age requirement for marriage
    for girls to 15 from 18 years, but the Government does not enforce it.
    According to one report, 50 percent of girls in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar
    Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are married by age 16. NCRB statistics show
    that only 56 cases were registered under the Child Marriage Restraint
    (Amendment) Act during 1998. The NHRC, in consultation with the
    National Commission for Women and the Department of Women and Child
    Development, recommended in 1997 that a new draft ``Marriage Bill'' be
    enacted to strengthen the prohibitions of the 1929 act; however, the
    bill had not yet been introduced in Parliament by year's end. The NHRC
    in its 1996-1997 report, criticized the Government for rejecting this
    suggestion, a response that the Commission concluded amounted,
    ``essentially, to a total disinclination to strengthen or alter the
    law, in any respect, or indeed to see to its better implementation in
    any manner.''
        The traditional preference for male children continues. Although a
    law passed in 1994 prohibits the use of amniocentesis and sonogram
    tests for sex determination, the Government does not enforce the law.
    The tests are misused widely for sex determination, and termination of
    a disproportionate number of pregnancies with female fetuses occurs. In
    the 12 years since the southern state of Maharashtra passed a law
    banning the use of such tests for sex determination, the state
    government only filed charges against one doctor, who he was acquitted.
    Human rights groups estimate that at least 10,000 cases of female
    infanticide occur yearly, primarily in poor rural areas. Parts of Tamil
    Nadu (Dharmapuri, Salem, and Madurai districts) still have high rates
    of female infanticide. According to statistics compiled by the
    Dharmapuri office of the Directorate of Health Services, 1,260 female
    infants were killed in the district in 1997. Police have not
    investigated these cases. In 1998 the Tamil Nadu Human Rights
    Commission suggested that a separate mandatory police investigation
    into the death of every female infant become mandatory, but there is no
    legislation that requires such action and none has been taken. In
    addition parents often give priority in health care and nutrition to
    male infants. Women's rights groups point out that the burden of
    providing girls with an adequate dowry is one factor that makes
    daughters less desirable. Although abetting or taking dowry
    theoretically is illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it
    still is practiced widely.
        Bonded and unbonded child labor continues to be a serious problem
    throughout the country (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--According to regional NGO's, there are
    over 90 million disabled persons in the country. Neither law or
    regulations require accessibility for the disabled. With the adoption
    of the Persons with Disability (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
    Rights and Full Participation) Act in 1995, a nascent disabled rights
    movement slowly is raising public awareness of the rights of the
    disabled. Although the act provides equal rights to all persons with
    disabilities, most disabled-related organizations admit that its
    practical effects so far have been minimal, in part due to a clause
    that makes the implementation of programs dependent on the ``economic
    capacity'' of the Government. To a large degree, physical impediments
    still limit mobility, legislation prevents equality, and societal
    discrimination maintains the status quo of the disabled.
        The Disabled Division of the Ministry of Welfare had a budget
    provision of more than $38 million (1.65 billion rupees) for the 1998-
    99 fiscal year for a number of organizations and committees at the
    national, regional, and local levels. The Ministry delivers
    rehabilitation services to the rural population through 16 district
    centers. A national rehabilitation plan commits the Government to
    putting a rehabilitation center in each of more than 400 districts, but
    services still are concentrated in urban areas. Moreover, the impact of
    government programs has been limited. Significant funding is provided
    to a few government organizations such as the Artificial Limbs
    Manufacturing Corporation of India, the National Handicapped Finance
    and Development Corporation, and the Rehabilitation Council of India.
    Each entity provides specific services or training, including producing
    aids and prosthetics, promoting disabled-oriented economic development
    activities, offering training to health-care professionals and
    vocational instructors concerning disabled-related issues, and
    providing comprehensive rehabilitation services to the rural disabled.
        Additional mini-grants are offered to NGO's that coordinate
    programs for the disabled to facilitate their physical, social, and
    psychological rehabilitation and integration into mainstream society.
    During 1998-99, $3 million (130.5 million rupees) was available.
    However, only half of this amount was allocated due to funding
    restrictions placed on each providing organization and the small number
    of them that exist.
        Two significant programs to benefit the disabled are the National
    Project to Integrate Mentally Retarded in Family and Community and the
    National Institute for the Multiple Disabilities. The first project,
    launched in six states in 1998, primarily focuses on children from the
    economically weaker sectors and promotes awareness concerning the
    mentally disabled, their problems, and their rights. The second is the
    Ministry of Welfare, which provides rehabilitation services to the
    disabled and is fostering greater awareness among communities
    throughout the country. As a result of the passage of the Persons with
    Disabilities Act, there now is a Disabilities Commissioner who oversees
    implementation of the act and its protections for the disabled.
        According to the Persons with Disability Act, 3 percent of
    positions in official offices and state-owned enterprises must be
    reserved for persons with visual, hearing, or orthopedic disabilities.
    The Government provides special railway fares, education allowances,
    scholarships, customs exemptions, budgetary funds from the Ministry of
    Rural Development, and rehabilitation training to assist the disabled.
    However, implementation of these entitlements is not comprehensive.
    Although the Government has taken significant steps toward improving
    the plight of the disabled, its involvement has been insufficient. The
    majority of responsibility for caring for disabled persons still lies
    with family members and voluntary groups.
        The NHRC continues to receive complaints relating to harassment,
    intolerance, and discrimination against the disabled. It currently is
    gathering information on these cases and forwarding assessments to
    concerned NGO's and government entities. However, this process is slow,
    and its effects so far have been minimal.
        The NHRC continued its efforts to improve conditions in mental
    hospitals and enhance awareness of the rights of those with mental
    disabilities during the year. In 1997 it commissioned an assessment of
    conditions at mental hospitals throughout the country, to be conducted
    by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuroscience. The
    assessment, whose results the NHRC released in July 1999, found that
    conditions in mental institutions were unsatisfactory and in need of
    reform. The rights of the mentally ill and mentally disabled are
    provided for in the Constitution and the Mental Health Act of 1987.
    However, the NHRC noted that despite these protections, conditions in
    many mental hospitals are unsatisfactory. They continue to embody old
    concepts of mental health care and essentially function as custodial
    rather than therapeutic institutions. Overcrowded and serving as
    ``dumping grounds'' for desperate relatives, some mental hospitals lack
    even basic amenities and have poor medical facilities. In August 1999,
    the NHRC reported that it had assumed the management of mental
    hospitals in Ranchi, Bihar, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and Gwalior, Madhya
    Pradesh, at the direction of the Supreme Court. In February NHRC
    Chairman Justice J.S. Verma asked chief ministers of all the states and
    administrators of all the union territories ``to issue clear directions
    to the inspector generals of prisons to ensure that mentally ill
    persons are not kept in jail under any circumstances.'' However, there
    was little follow-up to the NHRC direction.
        Indigenous People.--The Innerline Regulations enacted by the
    British in 1873 still provide the basis for safeguarding tribal rights
    in most of the northeastern border states. They are in effect in
    Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, but not in Tripura,
    in which the tribal population has been reduced to 30 percent of the
    total population due to increased Bengali migration since partition.
    These regulations prohibit any person, including citizens from other
    states, from going beyond an inner boundary without a valid permit. No
    rubber, wax, ivory, or other forest products may be removed from the
    protected areas without prior authorization. No outsiders are allowed
    to own land in the tribal areas without approval from tribal
    authorities.
        The 1991 census, the last conducted, showed that 8.08 percent of
    citizens belonged to scheduled tribes. According to the Indian
    Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal People (ICITP), 80 percent of
    the tribal population live below the poverty level. In May 1998, the
    NHRC established a panel to investigate the condition of the country's
    20 million denotified tribal people, who in 1871 the British colonial
    government labeled as belonging to ``criminal tribes''). During the
    year, the panel prepared a report for the NHRC on their condition and
    advised the NHRC in other ways. Denotifed tribal peoples are tribal
    people The colonial act listing these tribes was repealed in 1951, but
    the stigma remains and many of these tribal people still are
    discriminated against actively. On February 15, the NHRC recommended
    that the ``Habitual Offenders Act,'' aimed at the denotified and
    nomadic tribes, be repealed. According to the ICITP, more than 40,000
    tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar, have been forced into
    situations of economic and sexual exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.); many come from tribes that were driven off the land by national
    park schemes. Special courts to hear complaints of atrocities committed
    against tribal people were to have been established under the
    protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, but this never was
    accomplished.
        Despite constitutional safeguards, the rights of indigenous groups
    in the eastern parts of the country often are ignored. Indigenous
    people suffer discrimination and harassment, have been deprived wrongly
    of their land, and have been subject to torture and to arbitrary
    arrest. There has been encroachment on tribal land in almost every
    eastern state, including by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and by
    businesses that illegally have removed forest and mineral products.
    Moreover, persons from other backgrounds often usurp places reserved
    for members of tribes and lower castes in national education
    institutions. Mob lynchings, arson, and police atrocities against
    tribal people occur in many states (see Section 1.c.). For example, on
    January 31, local landowners attacked the tribal village of Ghutewadi,
    Ahmednagar district, Maharashtra, killing a 60-year-old tribal woman
    and injuring 10 other women and a child. On July 4, a mob killed a 90-
    year-old tribal woman and set 16 houses on fire following the abduction
    of a nontribal youth from Futotip village in North Tripura. On August
    17, a mob attacked Jatindra Kumr Jamatya, a tribal activist and member
    of the ruling CPI(M)in Nagrai, South Tripura.
        In the Andaman Islands in 1999, the local government implemented a
    policy of permitting development of the Jawara tribal area, which
    threatens the indigenous group's way of life. The construction of a
    road through the forest that is inhabited by this group and the
    encroachment of Indian settlers have impacted negatively this
    indigenous group's cultural vitality, economic self-sufficiency, and
    physical and mental health. These integrative policies have been
    motivated partly by humanitarian concerns, although interest in
    commercial exploitation of virgin forests that we inhabited by tribal
    people is another strong factor behind these policies. A manifestation
    of this negative trend was a destructive outbreak of measles that
    affected about 30 persons among the Jawara tribal people, which was
    reported in the press in September 1999.
        Such violations led to numerous tribal movements demanding the
    protection of land and property rights. The Jharkhand Movement in Bihar
    and Orissa, and the Bodo Movement in Assam, reflect deep economic and
    social grievances among indigenous people. In the Jharkhand area,
    tribal people complain that they have been relegated to unskilled
    mining jobs, have lost their forests to industrial construction, and
    have been displaced by development projects. During the year, the
    Government introduced and Parliament passed legislation creating new,
    largely tribal-populated states from the Jharkand area of Bihar and the
    Chhatisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh. The Chhatisgarh State came into
    existence on November 1 and the Jharkhand State came into existence on
    November 15.
        There also is some local autonomy in the northeast. In Meghalaya
    tribal chiefs still wield influence in certain villages. The Nagaland
    government controls the rights to certain mineral resources, and
    autonomous district councils in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya control
    matters such as education, rural development, and forestry in
    cooperation with the state governors.
        Religious Minorities.--The potential for renewed Hindu-Muslim
    violence remains considerable and both sides committed human rights
    abuses during the year. Hindus and Muslims continue to feud over the
    construction of mosques several centuries ago on three sites where
    Hindus believe that temples stood previously. In 1998 the Sri Krishna
    Commission, established by the Government to inquire into the cause of
    Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai in December 1992 and January 1993,
    released its report (see Section 2.c.). The riots, which followed the
    destruction of an historic mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, left
    more than 1,000 persons, mostly Muslims, dead. Maharashtra's BJP-Shiv
    Sena ruling coalition rejected the report, which laid responsibility
    for much of the violence on leaders from both parties. That government
    fell and was replaced by a Congress Partyled government, which
    submitted an affidavit to the Supreme Court in August promising to
    implement the Commission's recommendations. The same government
    established a special task force to implement the recommendations of
    the Sri Krishna Commission report. The recommendations included
    prosecuting the 31 police officials and several Shiv Sena, BJP, and
    Congress Party politicians found to have abetted the anti-Muslim
    rioting in Mumbai in 1993.
        On January 30, Muslim and Hindu crowds in Bangalore clashed and
    threw stones at each other after an idol was desecrated in a Hindu
    temple. Two persons were injured in Hindu-Muslim clashes in Ahmedabad,
    Gujarat, from August 5 to 7. Human rights groups allege that following
    the riots, the state reserve police officers forced some Muslim
    residents of the city to sing the Sanskrit anthem ``Vande Mataram'' to
    prove that they were not ``anti-national'' (see Section 2.c.). On
    August 31, several hundred angry Hindus pelted Muslim houses with
    stones and tried to set fire to several homes after a Muslim eloped
    with a Hindu in a town in Vadodara district, Gujarat. On September 12,
    Muslim-Hindu violence in Nanded, a city 300 miles southeast of Mumbai,
    left approximately 60 persons injured. The attacks occured during the
    annual Ganesh festival when a procession of Hindus passed by a mosque.
    According to some reports, Muslims in the mosque threw stones at Hindu
    worshippers whom they claim offended the mosque by making too much
    noise. The Maharasthra government ordered a judicial inquiry. On
    October 16, a gang entered Tahira village, Siwan district, Bihar, and
    murdered five members of a Muslim family. Police suspect unknown
    persons in nearby Mohajirpur village committed the killings in
    retaliation for the killings of Hindu villagers a few days earlier. On
    December 3, a group of men in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, attacked and
    killed a Muslim preacher with crude bombs and sickles. No one was
    convicted in connection with the August 26, 1999 mob mutilation and
    burning to death of a Muslim cattle trader in Padiabeda village,
    Orissa; about 400 persons witnessed the killing.
        Attacks by Muslim militants seeking to end Indian rule in Jammu and
    Kashmir, and contining political violence, has driven almost 95 percent
    of Hindus in the Kashmir valley (Pandits) to seek refuge in camps in
    Jammu, with relatives in New Delhi, or elsewhere, during the last few
    years. Throughout the year, militants carried out several execution-
    style mass killings of Hindu villagers and violently targeted Pandits,
    and in one instance the Sikh minority, in Jammu and Kashmir (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). On February 28, militants killed five truck
    drivers on the Srinagar-Jammu highway. The militants systematically
    halted commercial trucks traveling along the route and questioned the
    unarmed drivers and cleaners on board. Those persons identified as
    Hindus were taken out of the trucks and shot. On March 20, 17
    unidentified gunmen in army uniforms killed 35 Sikh men in Chati
    Singhpura (near Anantang in south Kashmir). The incident was the
    largest single massacre of civilians during the past 11 years of
    militancy, and at year's end, the only mass killing in Kashmir to have
    involved the Sikh community. According to various reports, militants
    separated unarmed male members of the Sikh families from women and
    children, gathered the men a short distance from their homes, and
    killed them with automatic weapon fire. It was the first known attack
    on the Sikh minority in Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.). On March
    25, security forces shot and killed five men, alleging that they had
    been responsible for the March 20 massacre. According to HRW, on April
    17, gunmen entered the homes of several Hindu families in Kot Dara
    village, near Rajouri. They fired on unarmed civilians, killing six
    persons and injuring six others. On July 13, militants killed three
    Buddhist monks in Rangdum, Kargil district. On July 30, militants
    hurled a grenade into a jeep carrying Hindu religious pilgrims near
    Gulmarg, killing one person and injuring five others. On August 1 to 2,
    militants entered a camp of Hindus making the annual pilgrimage to
    Amarnath in the northern part of the state and fired automatic weapons
    at tents, the unarmed civilians in the camp, the pilgrims' local
    porters and guides, and army personnel nearby. A total of 32 persons
    were killed in the attack, all of them unarmed civilians. Similar
    attacks occurred throughout the night of August 1 to 2, killing some
    100 persons in various places in Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 1.a.).
    On August 17, militants reportedly killed six Hindu villagers and
    seriously wounded seven others in Jammu (see Section 1.a.). On August
    18, militants entered a Hindu village in the Koteswara area near
    Rajauri and indiscriminately fired at villagers, killing four persons
    and injuring six others. On August 18, militants killed three elderly
    men and a teenage boy, and wounded two other persons when they fired
    automatic guns at civilians in Ind village, Udhampur. On August 20, a
    person shot and injured a Hindu telephone kiosk operator in Qazi Gund,
    near Anantnag. Also on August 20, militants entered the Hindu village
    of Indeh, Udampur district and killed four members of a Hindu family
    (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
        According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, about 51,000 Pandit
    families fled their homes in Jammu and Kashmir due to the violence. Of
    these, 4,674 families are living in refugee camps in Jammu, 235
    families are in camps in Delhi, and 18 families are in Chandigarh. The
    rest still are displaced, but are living on the economy in Jammu and
    Delhi. The Pandit community criticizes bleak physical, educational, and
    economic conditions in the camps and fears that a negotiated solution
    giving greater autonomy to the Muslim majority might threaten its own
    survival in Jammu and Kashmir as a culturally and historically
    distinctive group. On August 18, the Jammu and Kashmir government
    adopted a proposal designed to facilitate the return of Pandits to the
    Kashmir valley and rehabilitation of the Pandits. However, various
    Pandit groups criticized the proposal for failing to address the
    political aspirations of Pandits, failing to provide economic
    guarantees, failing to provide adequate security for returning Pandits,
    and creating special economic zones that would aggravate communal
    tensions. The proposal abandoned during the year. The NHRC released a
    39-page report in June 1999, in response to a petition from Hindu
    Pandits alleging that genocide had been committed against them. The
    NHRC found that the crimes against the Pandits ``fall short of the
    ultimate crime: Genocide,'' but stated that compensation to the
    community had been inadequate. As a result, the Government's monthly
    subsistence payment to Pandit families was increased.
        There were numerous attacks against Christian communities and
    Christian missionaries during the year. In August the SAHRDC stated
    that there had been 57 such attacks during the first 7 months of the
    year. The SAHRDC stated the attacks had taken three forms: Attacks on
    priests and nuns; attacks on evangelists and disruption of prayer
    meetings; and attacks on churches, hospitals, and other charitable
    institutions. Attacks occurred in Tamil Nadu, Goa, Punjab, Karnataka,
    Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar,
    Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. There were a series of
    incidents in Uttar Pradesh in April. On April 6, an angry mob,
    demanding a decrease in school fees and an increase in the number of
    passing students, harassed the principal of Sacred Heart school in
    Mathura. The principal disputed an allegation that the harassment was
    because of school fees, saying that she was harassed and chased by a
    group of young men (not parents of students) who also asked her
    questions about the religious texts read at the school. On April 10,
    Father Joseph Dabre, principal of St. Dominic's school in Mathura, was
    beaten by six young men who went to the school on the pretext of
    inquiring about admissions. On April 11, in Kosi Kalan near Mathura, 8
    to 10 assailants attacked Father K.K. Thomas at St. Theresa's school
    when he rushed to the assistance of a servant girl and 3 nuns whom the
    assailants were attacking. Thomas was injured seriously; his attackers
    had not been found by year's end.
        Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee asked Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Ram
    Prakash Gupta for a detailed report on the incidents in the Mathura
    area. State officials also ordered police to monitor closely churches,
    missionary centers, and other places of worship after the attacks near
    Mathura. On April 26, the NCM visited the sites of the attacks at
    Sacred Heart school, St. Dominic's school, and St. Theresa's school,
    and issued a report on April 27. The report, which claimed that the
    Sacred Heart case had ``no communal tinge,'' and that the Kosi Kalan
    case was a ``case of robbery and nothing else,'' was criticized widely
    by the minority community. Several members of the Lok Sabha openly
    questioned the report's validity, and there is strong evidence that the
    NCM report misrepresented the victims in its claims that they
    themselves are entirely satisfied that there was no religious
    motivation behind the violence. Victims of the incidents claim that the
    local police were not responsive either before or during the attacks.
    These attacks on Christians in Uttar Pradesh were the first in the
    state in 6 years.
        Following the violence in April in the vicinity of Mathura, on May
    5, six missionaries who were distributing Bibles and other literature
    in Vivekanandnagar, Ahmedabad, were injured severely. Some evangelists
    and some Bajrang Dal activists attacked each other in this
    Vivekanandnagar when the Bajrang Dal activists forbade distribution of
    Christian literature. Both groups filed police complaints alleging that
    the other group attacked them. A Hindu bystander who attempted to
    intervene had his finger cut off, according to newspaper reports. On
    May 22, 30 persons were injured when a powerful bomb exploded during a
    Christian meeting at Machlipatnam in the southern state of Andhra
    Pradesh. The central Government and the state governments of Andhra
    Pradesh and Karnataka maintain that the bombing were carried out by a
    Muslim extremist organization, Deendar Anjuman. Following investigation
    by the Central Bureau of Investigation, on October 21, police in
    Karnataka arrested 31 persons in connection with the bombings in that
    state, including 4 persons who reportedly were Pakistani nationals (see
    Section 2.a.). The governments later made more arrests, and by year's
    end, they had filed charges of conspiracy, violating the Explosives
    Act, and fomenting religious hatred against approxiamately 45 suspects
    in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. On June 7, a Catholic priest, Brother
    George Kuzhikandum, was killed on the campus of Brother Polus Memorial
    School near Mathura. On June 21, Vijay Ekka, the prime witness to the
    June 17 killing of Brother George, died in police custody (see Sections
    1.a. and 2.c.). In June in northern Punjab state, the Rev. Ashish
    Prabash Masih, age 23, reportedly was murdered and his body burned.
    Although police ruled out any communal undertones, the Punjab Christian
    Association stated that the murder was part of a concerted campaign
    against its community by Hindu nationalists. In April three nuns said
    that they were run down deliberately by a motor scooter in the northern
    state of Haryana on their way to a midnight Easter Mass. One of the
    nuns was injured seriously. The Christian Forum stated that the attack
    was the fifth on nuns and priests in Haryana in the year, but both the
    NCM and the Catholic Bishop's conference stated that the incident could
    have been an accident. On May 9 in Maharashtra, approximately 150
    suspected activists of the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
    (World Hindu Council, or VHP) attacked the 45th Annual Convention of
    the Evangelical Alliance Christian Church and the Nashik District
    Church Council, set fire to three vehicles, and ransacked a bus
    carrying religious literature. Four persons were hospitalized. Rural
    police said that they arrested 33 persons, all of whom belonged to
    Bajrang Dal or VHP. Although political leaders from Maharashtra's
    ruling party criticized the attack, the Minister of State for Dairy
    Development joined a group of BJP, RSS, and VHP activists who traveled
    to meet and congratulate the accused when they were released from
    prison on bail. On May 12, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, assailants threw
    stones and attempted to set fire to one church, while vandalizing two
    other churches.
        On January 23, 1999, Australian missionary Graham Staines and his
    two young sons were killed. The three were asleep in their car in
    Manoharpur, Keonjhar district, Orissa, when a mob shouting Hindu
    slogans set fire to their car. Police arrested 51 suspects in
    connection with the crime and sought others. Dara Singh was arrested on
    January 31 and charged with the murders of Staines and his two young
    sons (see Section 2.c.); he also was charged with the murders of
    another Christian and a Muslim. Singh remained in custody and the
    charges against him and 14 others still were pending at year's end. On
    September 30, a special court in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, convicted a 13-
    year-old boy of complicity in the killing of Staines and his two sons.
    He was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. The Wadhwa Commission
    established to investigate the Staines murder presented its findings in
    August 1999. The report concluded that Dara Singh masterminded the
    killing and effectively exonerated the Hindu organizations and
    political parties that had been accused of complicity. The National
    Commission for Minorities, other human rights groups, and some
    Christian groups criticized the Commission's findings as a coverup. The
    National Commission for Minorities, separate inquiry found evidence
    suggesting that the Bajrang Dal was involved in the Staines murders. On
    June 2, a Hindu priest reportedly ``reconverted'' 72 tribal Christians
    in the same village in which Graham Staines and his sons were killed.
        The burning of churches continued during the year. For example, on
    May 12, a hut used as a prayer cottage by Christians in Katiguda
    village was burned by what the local police referred to as ``anti-
    socials.'' Also on May 12, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, assailants threw
    stones, attempted to set fire to one church, and vandalized two other
    churches. On May 16, a cottage in Dharakote village that was used as a
    place of congregation for local Christians was set on fire. Armed
    police officers were deployed to the area, but by year's end no arrests
    had been made. On June 8, bombs exploded in four churches in Andhra
    Pradesh, Karnataka, and Goa. The blasts occurred in a Baptist Church in
    Ongole, Andhra Pradesh; a Catholic church in Tadepalligudem, Andhra
    Pradesh; a Catholic church in Wadi, Karnataka; and a church in Vasco,
    Goa. The bombs reportedly blew out windows and damaged pews; three
    persons in Ongole and two in Wadi received minor injuries. During the
    last week of June, a mosque in Gunter, Andhra Pradesh was bombed. None
    of the localities had a history of serious communal tensions before the
    blasts. In Karnataka police patrols reportedly were increased at all
    places of worship, and a special investigative unit was formed to
    investigate the bombings. By June 20, nine persons reportedly were
    arrested in connection with the blasts in Andhra Pradesh, including a
    leading member of a Shi'a Muslim organization (see Section 2.c.). A
    bomb exploded in the early hours of July 7 at a Lutheran church in
    Hubli, northern Karnataka, causing minor damage. On the evening of July
    8, across town, a bomb exploded at Saint Peter and Paul Church,
    breaking windows; there were no injuries.
        Since 1998 there has been increased harassment of Christian aid
    workers. Many report having been hampered in their work through
    threats, bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, physical attacks
    on their workers. Several Christian relief organizations have reported
    difficulty in obtaining visa renewal for foreign relief workers (see
    Sections 2.d. and 4).
        The NHRC expressed its concern at the upsurge of violence against
    Christians in the first 6 months of the year, demanding that the
    Government announce the steps that it was taking to protect the
    Christian community. Speaking in Parliament August 18 on the series of
    church bombings, Home Minister L.K. Advani said that ``the Center, in
    consultation with the affected states, will take stern action against
    those found guilty of instigating attacks against Christians.''
        Members of militant Hindu organizations (including members of the
    Hindu Jagran Manch, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the Bajrang Dal)
    reportedly are concerned about Christian efforts to convert Hindus.
    They claim that missionaries are forcing or inducing Hindus to convert
    to Christianity, including economically disadvantaged Dalits and
    tribals. In some cases, Hindus allegedly have reconverted, at times by
    force, tribals and Dalits belonging to other religions. However, many
    tribals follow traditional religious practices, and many Christian
    tribals were not Hindu prior to becoming Christian, although they often
    are considered Hindu by the Government and others. In September 1999,
    Vishw a Hindu Parishad working president Ashok Singhal called for
    enactment of a law banning forced conversions. Missionaries have been
    operating schools and medical clinics for many years in tribal areas,
    including the Dangs district in Gujarat. Tribals, such as those
    attacked in the Dangs district in 1998, and Dalits are outside of the
    caste system and occupy the very lowest position in the social
    hierarchy. However, they have made socioeconomic gains as a result of
    the missionary schools and other institutions, which have increased
    literacy among the lowest castes, among other achievements.
        Other incidents affecting religious minorities during the year
    occurred in Tripura, at which Christian militants imposed bans on Hindu
    and Muslim festivals, and in Assam, in which Hindu concern over the
    continued influx of illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh has grown
    over the past year (see Section 2.d.). On April 17, the secretary of
    the Noapara Baptist Church in Tripura was arrested with explosives in
    his possession. He allegedly was intending to take them to the NLFT.
        The practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent girls to
    a Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of God'' (also known as
    Devadasis), is reported by HRW to continue in several southern states,
    including Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Devadasis, who generally are
    Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families and are
    required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste Hindus
    (see Section 6.c.). Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban
    brothels. In 1992 the Karnataka state passed the Karnataka Devadasi
    (Prohibition) Act and called for the rehabilitation of Devadasis, but
    this law suffers from a lack of enforcement and criminalizes the
    actions of Devadasis. Since Devadasis are by custom required to be
    sexually available to higher caste men, it reportedly is difficult for
    them to obtain justice from the legal system if they are raped.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's caste system has
    strong historic ties to Hinduism. It delineates clear social strata,
    assigning highly structured religious, cultural, and social roles to
    each caste and subcaste. Members of each caste--and frequently each
    subcasteare expected to fulfill a specific set of duties (known as
    dharma) in order to secure elevation to a higher caste through rebirth.
    Dalits (formerly called untouchables) are viewed by many Hindus as
    separate from or ``below'' the caste system; nonetheless, they too are
    expected to follow their dharma if they hope to achieve caste in a
    future life. Despite longstanding efforts to eliminate the
    discriminatory aspects of caste, the practice remains widespread.
        The practice of untouchability (``untouchables''--now called
    Dalits--along with tribals occupy the lowest strata of the caste
    system) was outlawed in theory by the Constitution and the 1955 Civil
    Rights Act, but it remains an important aspect of life.
    ``Untouchability'' refers to the social restrictions imposed on persons
    because of their birth into certain Hindu castes. Dalits are considered
    unclean by higher caste Hindus and thus traditionally are relegated to
    separate villages or neighborhoods and to low paying and often
    undesirable occupations (such as scavenging, street sweeping, and
    removing human waste and dead animals). Many rural Dalits work as
    agricultural laborers for higher caste landowners. By custom Dalits may
    be required to perform tasks for upper caste Hindus without
    remuneration. The majority of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section
    6.c.). Dalits are among the poorest of citizens, generally do not own
    land, and often are illiterate. They face significant discrimination
    despite the laws that exist to protect them, and often are prohibited
    from using the same wells and from attending the same temples as higher
    caste Hindus, and from marrying persons from higher castes. In addition
    they face segregation in housing, in land ownership, on roads, and on
    buses. Dalits tend to be malnourished, lack access to health care, work
    in poor conditions (see Section 6.e.), and face continuing and severe
    social ostracism. In contrast the highest caste, the Brahmin, with 3.5
    percent of the population, holds 78 percent of the judicial positions
    and about 50 percent of parliamentary seats. NGO's report that crimes
    committed by higher caste Hindus against Dalits often go unpunished,
    either because the authorities do not prosecute vigorously such cases
    or because the crimes are unreported by the victims, who fear
    retaliation. In recent years, groupsincluding some that use violence--
    have organized to protect Dalit rights.
        The Constitution gives the President the authority to identify
    historically disadvantaged castes, Dalits, and ``tribals'' (members of
    indigenous groups historically outside the caste system). These
    ``scheduled'' castes, Dalits, and tribes are entitled to affirmative
    action and hiring quotas in employment, benefits from special
    development funds, and special training programs. The impact of
    reservations and quotas on society and on the groups they are designed
    to benefit is a subject of active debate. According to the 1991 census,
    scheduled castes, including Dalits, made up 16 percent and scheduled
    tribes 8 percent of the country's 1991 population of 846 million.
    Christians historically have rejected the concept of caste. However,
    because many Christians descended from low caste Hindu families, many
    continue to suffer the same social and economic limitations that low
    caste Hindus do, particularly in rural areas. Low caste Hindus who
    convert to Christianity lose their eligibility for affirmative action
    programs. Those who become Buddhists or Sikhs do not. In some states,
    government jobs are reserved for Muslims of low caste descent.
        The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
    Atrocities) Act of 1989 lists new offenses against disadvantaged
    persons and provides stiffer penalties for offenders. However, this act
    has had only a modest effect in curbing abuse. The NCRB reported that
    25,638 crimes against scheduled castes and 4,276 crimes against
    scheduled tribes were recorded in 1998. This compares with 27,944
    crimes against scheduled castes and 4,644 crimes against scheduled
    tribes recorded by the NCRB in 1997. However, human rights NGO's allege
    that caste violence actually is on the increase.
        Intercaste violence claims hundreds of lives annually; it was
    especially pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya
    Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. According to HRW, on April 25,
    upper caste Rajputs shot and killed four Dalits and seriously injured
    three others in Rohtas district, Bihar. Subsequently, Rajputs burned
    down the entire Dalit village, leaving all 25 families homeless,
    reportedly in retaliation for an earlier attack. On March 12, a mob of
    upper caste men entered Kambalapalli village, Karnataka, where they
    reportedly believed that the killer of an upper caste person had taken
    refuge. The mob surrounded and set fire to one of the homes in the
    predominantly Dalit village; seven members of a Dalit family were
    killed in the blaze. On May 12, a group of men entered Lakhisarai
    village, Bihar, and indiscriminately shot at villagers, killing 11
    persons, including 10 low-caste laborers. Police suspected that a
    criminal gang was responsible for the killings. On May 17, upper caste
    youths stripped two lower caste women and paraded them naked through
    their village of Rasoolabad, Kanpur district, Uttar Pradesh. The
    women's allged crime was to have allowed an upper caste woman to spend
    one night in their home. On June 3, approximately 50 armed men
    suspected of belonging to an upper caste private army, the Ranvir Sena,
    killed 5 low-caste persons, including a woman and a child, in Rajebigha
    village, Bihar. The killings reportedly were perpetrated because the
    assailants suspected that the villagers had voted against a candidate
    favored by the upper caste community in February state assembly
    elections in Bihar (see Section 3). Police occasionally have arrested
    Ranvir Sena members after similar incidents in Bihar. However,
    generally members of the Ranvir Sena who are arrested were released on
    bail shortly thereafter, and none were convicted during the year in
    connection with attacks on low-caste villagers. According to HRW,
    police make little effort to prevent such killings, despite the fact
    that the Ranvir Sena often publicly announces its intentions days
    before each attack; allegedly, police also fail to provide protection
    for villagers in the aftermath of such attacks. On October 22, the NHRC
    directed the Tamil Nadu government to pay about $10,990 (500,000
    rupees) to 36 Dalit women and children. The Commission found police
    wrongly attacked and beat the women and children after entering their
    Ogalur village, Perambalur district, on November 30, 1998. The NHRC
    further found that police illegally detained the victims for 18 days.
    In issuing the order, NHRC chairman justice J.S. Verma wrote, ``the
    present case is an instance of lawlessness on the part of the police
    even in discharging their duties.''
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of association. Workers may establish and join unions of their
    own choosing without prior authorization. More than 400 million persons
    make up the country's active work force. Some 30 million of these
    workers are employed in the formal sector. The rest are overwhelmingly
    are agricultural workers and, to a lesser extent, urban nonindustrial
    laborers. While some trade unions represent agricultural workers and
    informal sector workers, most of the country's estimated 13 to 15
    million union members are part of the 30 million member formal sector.
    Of these 13 to 15 million unionized workers, some 80 percent are
    members of unions affiliated with one of the 5 major trade union
    centrals. All major trade union centrals are affiliated to a greater or
    lesser extent with particular political parties. Central unions have
    stressed their independence and in some cases are attempting to sever
    previously tight party control.
        Trade unions often exercise the right to strike, but public sector
    unions are required to give at least 14 days notice prior to striking.
    Some states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic sector
    industries to give notice of a planned strike.
        The Essential Services Maintenance Act allows the Government to ban
    strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified
    ``essential'' industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging the
    assertion that a given dispute falls within the scope of this act.
    However, the essential services never have been defined in law. The act
    thus is subject to varying interpretations from state to state. The
    Maharashtra government passed a law in February 1999 banning strikes in
    essential services, including transport services, milk supply services,
    the electricity department, and hospitals. The Industrial Disputes Act
    prohibits retribution by employers against employees involved in legal
    strike actions. This prohibition is observed in practice.
        The Kerala High Court declared in July 1997 that all general
    strikes (bandhs) were illegal and all organizers of protests would be
    liable for losses caused by shutdowns. Later in the year, the Supreme
    Court upheld the verdict drawing attention to the difference between a
    complete closedown of all activities (bandh), and a general strike
    (hartal). While it is likely that the ruling was introduced in relation
    to political strikes, unions stated that it remained a potential threat
    to their activities. Other court rulings during 1997 also declared
    strikes illegal and made striking workers pay damages because consumers
    and the public suffered during strikes.
        According to Ministry of Labor statistics, as of June there had
    been 127 strikes and lockouts throughout the country during the year,
    involving 39,265 workers. In all, 63,000 ``person-days'' were lost due
    to strikes and 900,000 ``person-days'' were lost due to lockouts during
    this period. For example, in February over 100,000 workers of a
    colliery in Andhra Pradesh went on a 13-day strike demanding better
    wages and other benefits. The company later agreed to some of the
    workers' demands. In addition, during the year approximately 80,000
    workers went on strike for about 2 weeks in Uttar Pradesh to protest
    the government's plans to reorganize the state electricity board along
    corporate lines. The government succeeded in reorganizing the
    electicity board along corporate lines despite the workers' protest.
        When abuses, such as intimidation or suppression of legitimate
    trade union activities, are perpetrated against nationally organized or
    other large-scale unions or unionized workers, the authorities
    generally respond by prosecuting and punishing those persons
    responsible. Unaffiliated unions are not able, in all instances, to
    secure for themselves the protections and rights provided by law.
        In June the Government announced its intention to modify the Trade
    Union Act. The Government convened the Indian Labor Conference, which
    brought together government and trade union representatives to discuss
    modification of the Trade Union Act, but the conference took no
    substantive action on the act and it remained unchanged at year's end.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international trade union
    organizations. The Indian National Trade Union Congress and the Hind
    Mazdoor Sabha are affiliated with the International Confederation of
    Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), while the All India Trade Union Congress is
    affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
    bargain collectively has existed for decades. The Trade Union Act
    prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers, and
    employers are penalized if they discriminate against employees engaged
    in union activities.
        Collective bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and
    settling disputes in unionized plants in the organized industrial
    sector. Trade unions vigorously defend worker interests in this
    process. Although a system of specialized labor courts adjudicates
    labor disputes, there are long delays and a backlog of unresolved
    cases. When the parties are unable to agree on equitable wages, the
    Government may establish boards of union, management, and government
    representatives to determine them.
        In practice legal protections of worker rights are effective only
    for the 30 million workers in the organized industrial sector, out of a
    total work force of more than 400 million persons. Outside the modern
    industrial sector, laws are difficult to enforce. Union membership is
    rare in the informal sector, and collective bargaining does not exist.
        There are seven Export Processing Zones (EPZ's). Entry into the
    EPZ's ordinarily is limited to employees. Such entry restrictions apply
    to union organizers. All companies bus their workers directly to and
    from the factory. While workers in the EPZ's have the right to organize
    and to bargain collectively, union activity is rare. In addition unions
    have not pursued vigorously efforts to organize private-sector
    employees anywhere in the years since EPZ's were established. There
    have been efforts to organize workers in the EPZ's and unions have
    complained that such attempts were suppressed in Kerala and Gujarat.
    The fact that organizers are barred from EPZ's and workers are bused to
    EPZ's helps prevent unions from forming. Women constitute the majority
    of the work force in the EPZ's. The ICFTU reports that overtime is
    compulsory in the EPZ's, that workers often are employed on temporary
    contracts with fictitious contractors rather than directly by the
    company, and that workers fear that complaints about substandard
    working conditions would result in their being fired. In March 1999,
    the Union Ministry of Commerce announced its intention to convert all
    EPZ's into free trade zones and eliminate government interference in
    their functioning. Because of trade unions' and the Union Ministry of
    Labor's opposition to this change, the Government did not implement the
    plan. In June the Government announced its intention to establish
    special economic zones patterned on the Chinese model, and on November
    1, four out of seven existing EPZ's were converted without significant
    oppostion. These zones are not exempt from labor legislation.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the
    Constitution and specific statutes prohibit forced or compulsory labor,
    and bonded labor, as a form of compulsory labor, also is prohibited by
    statute; however, such practices are widespread. The Bonded Labor
    System (Abolition) Act of 1976 prohibits all bonded labor, by adults
    and children. Offenders may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison,
    but prosecutions are rare. Enforcement of this statute, which is the
    responsibility of state and local governments, varies from state to
    state and generally has not been effective, due to inadequate resources
    and to societal acceptance of bonded or forced labor. Labor inspectors
    at the state and local level have overwhelming case loads, and in many
    cases, do not receive adequate support or protection to challenge
    employers, who often have direct access to government officials. On the
    occasions when inspectors refer violations for prosecution, long court
    backlogs and inadequate funding for legal counsel frequently result in
    acquittals. NGO's estimate that there are 5 to 40 million bonded
    laborers in the country, including a large number of children (see
    Section 6.d.). According to HRW, the majority of bonded laborers are
    Dalits (see Section 5), and bondage is passed from one generation to
    the next.
        A Supreme Court decision defined forced labor as work at less than
    the minimum wage, which usually is set by the state governments. Under
    this definition, which differs from that of the ILO, forced labor is
    widespread, especially in rural areas.
        Bonded labor, the result of a private contractual relationship
    whereby a worker incurs or inherits debts to a contractor and then must
    work off the debt plus interest, is illegal but widespread. The
    Government estimates that between enactment of the Bonded Labor
    (Abolition) Act in 1976 and March 1999, 280,340 bonded workers were
    released from their obligations. Other sources maintain that those
    released constituted only one-twentieth of the total number of bonded
    laborers. State governments provide a sum of money to workers freed
    from bondage for their rehabilitation. In response to the 1997 Supreme
    Court decision requesting the NHRC to oversee implementation of the
    Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act, the NHRC formed a high-level
    ``Central Action Group,'' which reviews compliance routinely. The NHRC
    also appointed a special rapporteur to work in Andhra Pradesh,
    Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and report on compliance. In addition
    the NHRC briefed state governments on their responsibilities and
    instituted a system for receiving regular reports from the states. The
    NHRC also assessed the bonded labor problem, identifying districts in
    which it especially is acute. It identified and evaluated NGO's working
    in these areas, and conducted training in bonded labor law enforcement
    for district officials in the acutely affected areas. In November 1996,
    the Supreme Court directed each state to undertake a survey of bonded
    laborers. The surveys were carried out and identified 28,916 bonded
    laborers throughout the country. In Feburary 1997, the Supreme Court
    required state governments to file detailed affidavits on the status of
    bonded laborers. Some press reports indicate that Tamil Nadu alone has
    an estimated 25,800 bonded laborers, in response to which the state
    government began implementing and continues to work on rehabilitation
    plans. In 1999 alone, it allocated $1.25 million (54.4 million rupees)
    for these plans. According to Union Ministry of Labor Statistics, from
    1976 to March 31, the Tamil Nadu government identified and released
    63,894 bonded laborers. Government officials worked to release other
    bonded laborers in many of the country's states. In West Bengal,
    organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi immigrants is a source of
    bonded labor (see Section 6.f.).
        The working conditions of domestic servants and children in the
    workplace often amount to bonded labor. Children sent from their homes
    to work because their parents cannot afford to feed them, or in order
    to pay off a debt incurred by a parent or relative, have no choice in
    the matter. There are no universally accepted figures for the number of
    bonded child laborers. However, in the carpet industry alone, human
    rights organizations estimate that there may be as many as 300,000
    children working, many of them under conditions that amount to bonded
    labor. Officials claim that they are unable to stop this practice
    because the children are working with their parents' consent. In
    addition there is a reasonable basis to believe that products were
    produced using forced or indentured child labor in the following
    industries: Brassware; hand-knotted wool carpets; explosive fireworks;
    footwear; hand-blown glass bangles; hand-made locks; hand-dipped
    matches; hand-broken quarried stones; hand-spun silk thread and hand-
    loomed silk cloth; hand-made bricks; and beedis (hand-rolled
    cigarettes). A number of these industries expose children to
    particularly hazardous work conditions (see Section 6.d.). In its first
    attempt to address the issue of domestic child labor, during the year
    the Government issued a notification prohibiting government employees
    from hiring children as domestic help. Those employers who failed to
    abide by the law would be subject to penalities provided by the Bonded
    Labor System (Abolition) Act (such as fines and imprisonment), but also
    to disciplinary action at the place of work.
        In 1998 an HRW team headed by the Karnataka state labor
    commissioner conducted surprise inspections on silk twining factories
    in and around the town of Magadi. The team found 53 child workers under
    the age of 14 years working in the plants, forbidden to talk to each
    other, and beaten for slow work. The labor commissioner estimated that
    there were 3,000 bonded child laborers in the Magadi silk twining
    factories. In response UNICEF has started a non-formal education
    program for the estimated 3,000 bonded child laborers working in the
    industry. By year's end, about 260 children had been enrolled. In
    addition UNICEF began a micro-credit program for the parents of these
    children to create income-generating opportunities as an alternative to
    child labor.
        Female bondage, forced prostitution, and trafficking in women and
    children for the purpose of forced prostitution are widespread problems
    (see Section 6.f.). According to press reports, prison officials have
    used prisoners as domestic servants and sold female prisoners to
    brothels (see Section 1.c.). Devadasis, prepubescent girls given to a
    Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of God,'' are taken from their
    families and required to provide sexual services to priests and high
    caste Hindus. Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels
    (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        In Punjab persons routinely are sold in an organized trade in
    weekend bazaars for the purposes of forced domestic labor and forced
    sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in connection with this
    human trade. He later was released on bail.
        In December 1999, domestic media reported that child laborers were
    being sold in an organized ring at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in
    Bihar. According to these reports, children of impoverished families in
    surrounding districts are brought to the fair and sold. One reporter
    talked to a buyer, a shopkeeper, who paid $21 (900 rupees) for a 12-
    year-old child. Persons sometimes are sold into virtual slavery (see
    Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        NGO's such as the Bonded Labor Liberation Front worked to release
    bonded laborers throughout the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Article 24 of the Constitution and the Child Labor
    (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 are the principal protections
    against the exploitation of children in the workplace. Provisions for
    the protection of children in the workplace also are made in the Beedi
    and Cigar Workers (Condition of Employment) Act of 1966, the Factories
    Act of 1948, the Mines Act of 1952, the Motor Transport Workers Act of
    1961, the Plantations Labor Act of 1951, and the Minimum Wages Act of
    1948. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but
    does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        The enforcement of child labor laws is the responsibility of the
    state governments. Enforcement is inadequate, especially in the
    informal sector in which most children who work are employed. The
    continuing prevalence of child labor is attributed to social acceptance
    of the practice, to the failure of the state and federal governments to
    make primary school education compulsory, and ineffective state and
    federal government enforcement of existing laws.
        Work by children under 14 years of age is barred completely in
    ``hazardous industries,'' which include passenger, goods, and mail
    transport by railway; carpet weaving; cinder picking; cleaning of ash
    pits; cement manufacturing; building and construction; cloth printing;
    dyeing and weaving; manufacturing of matches, explosives, and
    fireworks; catering within railway premises or port limits; beedi
    (cigarette) making; mica cutting and splitting; abattoirs; wool
    cleaning; printing; cashew and cashew nut descaling and processing; and
    soldering processes in electronics industries. In January 1999, the
    Government added 6 occupations and 33 processes to the list of
    occupations and processes in which children are barred from working by
    the 1986 Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act. The additions
    brought the totals to 13 occupations and 51 processes in which children
    are prohibited from working under the act.
        In addition to industries that utilize forced or indentured child
    labor (see Section 6.c.), there is evidence that child labor is used in
    the following industries: Hand-knotted carpets; gemstone polishing;
    leather goods; and sporting goods.
        In occupations and processes in which child labor is permitted,
    work by children is permissible only for 6 hours between 8 a.m. and 7
    p.m., with 1 day's rest weekly.
        The BJP-led coalition Government continued its predecessors' plan
    to eliminate child labor from hazardous industries and eventually from
    all industries, but it did not repeat the previous government's pledge
    to accomplish the former by 2000 and the second by 2010. This program,
    for which approximately $56.69 million (2.64 billion rupees) has been
    budgeted since 1992, includes the enhanced enforcement of child labor
    laws, income supplements for families, subsidized school lunches in
    areas which child labor is concentrated, and a public awareness
    campaign. The Government continued efforts initiated in 1987 to enhance
    enforcement of the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986
    and other laws prohibiting and regulating child labor. In 1988 the
    Government started the National Child Labor Project (NCLP) to release
    children from hazardous work places and provide them with transitional
    schooling leading to mainstreaming in regular schools, and other forms
    of assistance. In addition government programs assist working children
    in rural development, women and child development, health, and adult
    job-creation programs. The NCLP targeted 12 districts in which child
    labor was prevalent at its inception in 1988. The NCLP has grown to
    cover 91 districts in 10 states. From April 1999 To January 31, 145,725
    children participated in the NCLP. Since its inception, the program is
    estimated to have helped more than 500,000 children leave work and
    start school. During their participation in the NCLP, the children's
    families are given a small stipend--usually $2.15 to $4.30 (100 to 200
    rupees) per month. Nevertheless, government efforts to eliminate child
    labor have affected only a small fraction of children in the workplace.
    A 1996 Supreme Court decision raised penalties for employers of
    children in hazardous industries to $430 (20,000 rupees) and
    established a welfare fund for formerly employed children. According to
    the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS), authorities are
    pursuing some 6,000 cases against employers. The Supreme Court ruling
    also has helped make local government officials more aware of the
    prohibitions against child labor in hazardous industries. This in some
    cases, has helped improve cooperation between local offcials and NGO's
    like SACCS that are removing children from hazardous workplaces. One
    recent example of such cooperation occurred on December 29, in Bhadohi
    district, Uttar Pradesh, in which SACCS and local law enforcement
    officials released 11 child laborers from work on looms for the
    production of hand-knotted carpets and initiated legal proceedings
    against the employer. During the year, SACCS helped release about 135
    child laborers in Bhadohi district alone. According to the Tamil Nadu
    Labor Department, 155 child laborers were freed from illegal workplaces
    between April and October 1999, out of the 10,118 child laborers
    identified in 2 surveys carried out in the state in 1997. State labor
    officials acknowledged that many more child laborers exist in the
    state.
        Estimates of the number of child laborers range widely. The
    Government census of 1991 puts the number of child workers at 11.28
    million. The ILO estimates the number at 44 million, while NGO's state
    that the figure is 55 million. Interpolation of census figures by the
    National Labor Institute indicates that of a total of 203 million
    children between the ages of 5 and 14, 116 million are in school, 12.6
    million are in full-time employment, and the status of 74 million is
    unknown. Most, if not all, of the 87 million children not in school do
    housework, work on family farms, work alongside their parents as paid
    agricultural laborers, work as domestic servants, or otherwise are
    employed. A Supreme Court-ordered survey of child labor throughout the
    country was completed during 1997 and documented the existence of some
    126,665 wage-earning child laborers. When this figure was challenged as
    patently low, the states conducted a second survey, in which an
    additional 428,305 child laborers in hazardous industries were found.
    However, even the combined total of the two surveys understates the
    true dimension of the problem.
        According to the ILO, labor inspectors conducted 13,257 inspections
    in 1997-98, finding 958 violations of the Child Labor Prohibition Act,
    prosecuting 676 of these cases, and obtaining 29 convictions. Those
    convicted of violating the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act
    are fined $460 (20,000 rupees) for each child employed. The Government
    is required to find employment for an adult member of the child's
    family or pay $108 (5,000 rupees) to the family instead. According to
    the Government, in 1996-97, labor inspectors conducted 35,886
    inspections, over twice as many as the following year. Between 1993 and
    the end of 1997, the Government released about 8,000 children from
    illegal workplaces and brought charges against approximately 4,000
    employers. In the hand-knotted carpet producing area of Uttar Pradesh,
    the NHRC and NGO's have worked with the state government to establish a
    task force for the elimination of child labor. SACCS reported freeing
    some 135 child laborers in the hand-knotted carpet industry during the
    year from Bhadohi district in Uttar Pradesh alone.
        Employers in some industries also have taken steps to combat child
    labor. The Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), a quasi-governmental
    organization that receives funding from the Ministry of Textiles, has a
    membership of 2,500 exporters who have subscribed to a code of conduct
    barring them from purchasing hand-knotted carpets known to have been
    produced with child labor. The CEPC conducts inspections to insure
    compliance, and allows members to use voluntarily a government-
    originated label to signify adherence to the code of conduct. Rugmark,
    which is a private initiative, operates a similar voluntary label
    scheme. Rugmark has 228 exporter members who buy carpets from the
    28,118 looms registered with Rugmark. However, the CEPC states that
    even with the program it is impossible to ensure that a carpet has been
    produced without child labor, given the difficulties of monitoring a
    decentralized and geographically dispersed industry. A privatesector
    research and consulting firm conducts the inspections, which cover only
    10 percent of registered looms. The inspectors have difficulty locating
    unregistered looms. The Government also cooperates with UNICEF, UNESCO,
    the UNDP, and the ILO in its efforts to eliminate child labor. Since
    1992 it has participated in the ILO's International Program on the
    Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). Approximately 90,000 children were
    removed from work and received education and stipends through IPEC
    programs since the start of its program in 1992.
        NGO's also have helped to free children from the work force. For
    example, since 1999 SACCS has freed over 34,000 children from the work
    force; it also operates an education and training center for children
    in New Delhi. From 1999 through year's end, SACCS freed 541 child
    laborers throughout the country through raids with law enforcement
    authorities on illegal workplaces. SACCS's intervention with parents
    resulted in the release of an additional 2,758 children, and its
    referral of cases to law enforcement agencies resulted in the release
    of 3,994 more child laborers over the same period. In many cases,
    charges were brought against the employers under the 1986 Child Labor
    (Prohibition and Regulation) Act.
        The NHRC, continuing its own child labor agenda, organized NGO
    programs to provide special schooling, rehabilitation, and family
    income supplements for children in the glass industry in Firozabad. The
    NHRC also intervened in individual cases.
        Primary school education is not compulsory, free, and universal
    (see Section 5).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The directive principles of the
    Constitution declare that ``the State shall endeavor to secure . . . to
    all workers . . . a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent
    standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural
    opportunities.'' Laws set minimum wages, hours of work, and safety and
    health standards. Laws governing minimum wages and hours of work
    generally are observed in industries subject to the Factories Act but
    largely are unenforced elsewhere and do not ensure acceptable
    conditions of work for the 90 percent of the work force not subject to
    the Factories Act.
        Minimum wages vary according to the state and to the sector of
    industry. Such wages provide only a minimal standard of living for a
    worker and are inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. Most workers employed in units subject to the
    Factories Act receive much more than the minimum wage, including
    mandated bonuses and other benefits. The state governments set a
    separate minimum wage for agricultural workers but do not enforce it
    effectively. Some industries, such as the apparel and footwear
    industries, do not have a prescribed minimum wage in any of the states
    in which such industries operate.
        The Factories Act establishes an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour
    workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These standards
    generally are enforced and accepted in the modern industrial sector,
    but tend not to be observed in older and less economically robust
    industries. State governments are responsible for enforcement of the
    Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered by a
    small number of factory inspectors and the inspectors' limited training
    and susceptibility to bribery result in lax enforcement.
        The enforcement of safety and health standards also is poor.
    Although occupational safety and health measures vary widely, in
    general state and central government resources for inspection and
    enforcement of standards are adequate. However, as awareness grows, the
    courts have begun to take work-related illnesses more seriously.
        Industrial accidents continued to occur frequently due to improper
    enforcement. Chemical industries are the most prone to accidents.
    According to the Director General of Mines' safety rules, mining
    companies must seal the entrances to abandoned underground mines and
    opencast mines are to be bulldozed and reforested. These rules are
    obeyed seldom, if ever. According to the Coal Ministry, between 1995 to
    1999, 1,201 persons were killed in registered mines and oil fields, 822
    (68 percent) of whom died in coal mines, mostly underground;
    approximately 3,000 persons were injured in mining accidents. Illegal
    mining is rampant. For example, Oswal Fertilizer Ltd.'s (OFL) new
    Diamonium Phosphate fertilizer plant at Paradip, Orissa, began
    operations in May. Eleven workers died during the plant's construction;
    an additional 6 persons were killed and 51 others were injured in a
    series of accidents at the plant from May to September. None of the
    workers was using safety equipment. Seven criminal cases have been
    brought against OFL in connection with the accidents.
        Safety conditions tend to be better in the EPZ's.
        The law does not provide workers with the right to remove
    themselves from work situations that endanger health and safety without
    jeopardizing their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a significant source,
    transit point, and destination for numerous trafficked persons,
    primarily for the purpose of forced prostitution and forced labor.
        The country's legal code generally is technically adequate for
    dealing with the problems of trafficking, violence against women, and
    prostitution. The Prevention of Immoral Trafficking Act (PITA) of 1986
    superseded and strengthened the All-India Suppression of Immoral
    Traffic Act (SITA). The PITA sought to toughen penalties for
    trafficking in children, particularly by focusing on traffickers,
    pimps, landlords, and brothel operators, while protecting underage
    girls as victims. The PITA requires police to use only female police
    officers to interrogate girls rescued from brothels. The PITA also
    requires the State to provide protection and rehabilitation for these
    rescued girls. In addition the PITA grants a form of quasi-toleration
    of prostitution, as prostitution, per se, is not a crime under the
    PITA, which criminalizes only solicitation or practice in or near a
    public place. Some NGO's note that this ambiguity, which is intended to
    protect trafficking victims, has been exploited to protect the sex
    industry. Due to the selective implementation of the PITA, the
    ``rescue'' of sex workers from brothels often leads to their
    revictimization. On June 25, 14 underage rescued sex workers fled the
    government shelter in Mumbai, citing poor conditions and ``inhuman
    treatment.'' On August 31, the Mumbai High Court instructed the
    Maharashtra government to improve conditions in its rescue homes.
        The country's prostitution and trafficking laws fail to impose on
    the clients and organizers of the sex trade the same penalties imposed
    on prostitutes found soliciting or practicing their trade in or near
    (200 meters) public places. Using the PITA's provisions against
    soliciting or practicing, police regularly may arrest sex workers,
    extort money from them, evict them, and take their children from them.
    The client by comparison largely is immune from any law enforcement
    threat, as he has committed a crime only if he is engaged in sex with a
    sex worker in a public place or is having sex with a girl under the age
    of 16 years (statutory rape). Similarly, although the intention of the
    1986 PITA was to focus enforcement efforts against the traffickers,
    pimps, and border operators, the opposite currently is the reality; a
    Calcutta NGO reports that an average of about 80 to 90 percent of the
    arrests made under the PITA in West Bengal state in the 1990's are of
    female sex workers. Police implementation of the PITA similarly is
    inadequate throughout the country; only a small fraction of arrests
    made under the PITA involve the trafficker. Implementation of the
    PITA's provisions for protection and rehabilitation of women and
    children who are rescued from the sex trade is extremely poor. NGO's
    familiar with the legal history of prostitution and trafficking laws
    regard the failure of the judiciary to recognize this inequity in the
    law's practice as a continuing ``blind spot.'' Over the last several
    years, arrests and prosecutions under the PITA have remained relatively
    static, while all indicators suggest a growing level of trafficking
    into and within the country.
        NGO's allege that ignorance of trafficking, a lack of political
    resolve to tackle it, and corruption at the enforcement level
    perpetuate the problem. Although the police are charged with enforcing
    the country's laws on prostitution and trafficking in women and
    children, NGO's, observers, and sex workers uniformly view police
    actions as part of the problem. Sex workers in Mumbai and Calcutta
    claim that harassment, extortion, and occasional arrests on soliciting
    charges usually characterize police intervention. The police seldom are
    seen as a positive force that addresses the violence of pimps and
    traffickers while protecting underage girls from bonded sex labor. A
    commonly held view among sex workers and NGO's is that local police and
    politicians responsible for the red light areas receive bribes from
    organized crime networks to protect the lucrative sex trade.
        Over 1 million girls and women are believed to be forced into the
    sex industry within the country at any given time. Women's rights
    organizations and NGO's estimate that more than 12,000 and perhaps as
    many as 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the country
    annually from neighboring states for the sex trade. According to an ILO
    estimate, 15 percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes
    are children. The traffic is controlled largely by organized crime.
        There is a growing pattern of trafficking in child prostitutes from
    Nepal. According to one estimate, 5,000 to 7,000 children, mostly
    between the ages of 10 and 18, are drawn or forced into this traffic
    annually. Girls as young as 7 years of age are trafficked from
    economically depressed neighborhoods in Nepal, Bangladesh, and rural
    areas of India to the major prostitution centers of Mumbai, Calcutta,
    and Delhi. Currently there are about 100,000 to 200,000 women and girls
    working in brothels in Mumbai and 40,000 to 100,000 in Calcutta. In
    Mumbai an estimated 90 percent of sex workers began when they were
    under 18 years of age; half are from Nepal. A similar profile is
    believed to exist among female sex workers in Calcutta, although the
    vast majority of women who are trafficked there come from Bangladesh,
    as opposed to Nepal. NGO's in the region estimate that about 6,000 to
    10,000 girls are trafficked annually from Nepal to Indian brothels, and
    that a similar number are trafficked from Bangladesh.
        Within the country, women from economically depressed areas often
    move into the cities seeking greater economic opportunities, and once
    there are victimized by traffickers who force or coerce them into the
    sex trade. However, in some cases family members sell young girls into
    the sex trade. For example, according to a local NGO researcher, in one
    village in Uttar Pradesh, girls 1 to 2 years of age are purchased from
    their parents and adopted by persons who train them for the sex trade
    through the use of pornographic materials, and sell them into the sex
    trade when they are 7 to 12 years old.
        Many indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation.
    According to the Indian Center for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
    (ICITP), more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar,
    were forced into economic and sexual exploitation; many come from
    tribes that were driven off their land by national park schemes. In
    Punjab persons of both sexes are sold in an organized trade in weekend
    bazaars, ostensibly as farm labor; many instead are purchased for the
    purposes of forced sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in
    connection with the trade. He was released later on bail.
        The number of women being trafficked out of the country to other
    countries is comparatively low. In July authorities cooperated with
    U.S. investigators seeking evidence in the prosecution of Lakreddy Bali
    Reddy, a U.S. citizen of Indian birth, who was indicted for trafficking
    minor girls for sexual exploitation from a rural area of Andhra Pradesh
    to the U.S. Reddy allegedly paid the airfares and expenses of 350 to
    400 young men and women aged approximately 13 to 18 years, mostly from
    low castes, and obtained their passports and visas--ostensibly to work
    as specialty cooks or laborers in his restaurants or apartment
    business. However, upon arrival in the U.S., the girls reportedly were
    put to work in a prostitution ring. Some of the girls claimed that
    Reddy had sex with them in India after their parents sold them; at
    least one victim was 12 years old.
        In a study published in 1996, the National Commission for Women
    reported that organized crime plays a significant role in the country's
    sex trafficking trade, and that women and children who are trafficked
    frequently are subjected to extortion, beatings, and rape. How women
    are trafficked varies widely: some are abducted forcibly or drugged,
    while others are made false offers of marriage, employment, or shelter.
    Poverty, illiteracy, and lack of employment opportunities contribute to
    the trafficking problem, although organized crime is a common element
    in all trafficking incidents, as is police corruption and collusion.
        Trafficking of persons within and into the country for forced labor
    also is a significant problem. In December 1999, the media reported
    that an organized ring was selling children from surrounding areas for
    labor at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar. There was a report
    that a 12-year-old child was purchased for $21 (900 rupees). In July a
    Mangalore, Karnatakabased NGO reported that tribal children were being
    auctioned in the Dakshina-Kanara district of the state primarily for
    use as domestic servants. The Karnataka Department of Social Welfare
    initiated an investigation, which it completed during the year (see
    Sections 5 and 6.c.). It found that the children were not being
    auctioned, but that better-off families in the district were employing
    many of them as domestic servants. The Department of Social Welfare
    suggested that more efficient implementation of ongoing development
    programs for tribal people in the district offered the best remedy for
    the child labor problem.
        In West Bengal, the organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi
    immigrants is a source of bonded labor. In June police in Krishnagar,
    West Bengal detained 8 Bangladeshi women and 14 children transiting the
    distict by bus. Agents allegedly smuggled the group from Jessore,
    Bangladesh across the border at Bongaon by offering them employment in
    Mumbai. Calcutta is a convenient transit point for traffickers who send
    Bangladeshis to New Delhi, Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh, and West Asia.
    Persons sometimes are sold into virtual slavery.
        Many boys, some of whom are as young as age 4, are trafficked to
    West Asia or the Persian Gulf States (especially the United Arab
    Emirates), and end up as riders in camel races. Some such boys end up
    as beggars in Saudi Arabia during the hajj. It is estimated that there
    are anywhere from 100 to over 1,000 underage South Asian camel jockeys
    (from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) currently working in the United
    Arab Emirates alone. Criminal gangs procure most of the youths. The
    majority of such children work with the knowledge of their parents, who
    receive as much as $200 (9,300 rupees) for their child's labor,
    although a significant minority simply are kidnaped. The gangs bringing
    the jockeys earn approximately $150 (6,975 rupees) per month from the
    labor of each child. The usual procedure used for bringing the children
    to the Gulf States is to have their names added to the passport of a
    Bangladeshi or Indian woman who already has a visa for the Gulf; the
    children fraudulently are claimed to be her children. Girls and women
    trafficked to the Persian Gulf States end up either as domestic workers
    or sex workers.
        NGO's and others allege that when police take action against
    brothels suspected of enslaving minors, the resulting police raids
    often are planned poorly and seldom are coordinated with NGO's or
    government social agencies. Therefore, the police action often worsens
    the situation of the girls and women indebted to traffickers and
    brothel owners. Girls rescued from brothels are treated as criminals
    and often are abused sexually by their police rescuers or by the staff
    of government remand centers, where they are housed temporarily before
    being brought back to the brothels as a result of the bribes paid by
    brothel operators, or legally released into the custody of traffickers
    and madams posing as relatives. In these cases, the debt owned by the
    girls to the brothel operators and traffickers further increases as the
    costs of bribing or legally obtaining release of the girls is added to
    their labor debt. NGO's invariably indicate the 1996 police roundup of
    476 sex workers in Mumbai as an illustration of the consequences of
    forced sweep rescues. Police in Mumbai carried out no such sweeps
    during the year.
        As was the case in the 1996 raids, NGO's claim that they seldom are
    given advance notice of police raids on brothels and therefore are not
    able to lend valuable assistance in identifying and interviewing
    underage victims. Moreover police do not seek advice or assistance from
    NGO's in planning law enforcement action to protect the victims during
    raids. Although over 400 girls and women were arrested in the 1996
    raids, few pimps or brothel managers were arrested, and none were
    prosecuted to conviction. The NGO's found themselves caught off guard
    by the large-scale police action and were illprepared to cope with a
    sudden huge demand for shelter for the rescued sex workers. As a
    result, many of the girls were sent to government centers known for
    their harsh conditions and considered by many to be in a worse state
    than the brothels. Ultimately, some of the girls died in state
    detention and many returned to the sex trade voluntarily, given their
    lack of options. Success stories from the 1996 raids were rare.
        Some NGO's know about trafficking conditions in the brothel areas
    such as Kamathipura, including identification of traffickers and
    locations of girls being held captive by brothel owners. However,
    because of the lingering effects of the 1996 raids, most of these NGO's
    are reluctant to trust the police with this information. Cooperation
    among NGO's in sharing information and assessing out the magnitude and
    scope of the trafficking problem in Mumbai has not been significant to
    date, although it continues to improve. Some Mumbai NGO's have worked
    aggressively to sensitize, train, and create awareness of trafficking
    among local authorities. The case of the NGO Prerana, which has been
    working closely with government officials, is a good example. During
    the year, a Prerana pilot program trained employees of a large
    Maharashtra government enterprise to identify and assist trafficking
    victims during their daily bus commute; Prerana also has enlisted the
    assistance of state police, who help train the workers. Conversely,
    other NGO's working to rescue women and girls from forced sexual work
    report that complaint-based police rescues are quite effective. Unlike
    the sweep type rescues such as the one carried out in Kamathipura in
    1996, these are focused attempts to rescue a small number of women and
    girls using specific information about the victim's location, names and
    appearance, often supplied by NGO's; police responses in such cases
    frequently have resulted in the rescue of the women and girls involved.
        Similar efforts to improve NGO coordination are being made in
    Calcutta, where some 10 NGO's meet monthly as part of the ``Action
    Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children'' forum. Every
    3 months the group attempts to meet withits Bangladeshi and Nepalese
    counterparts. Calcutta NGO's such as Sanlaap also are seeking to build
    stronger working relationships with local police. As a result of this
    coordination, Sanlaap has built stronger working relationships with
    police and other law enforcement officials in Calcutta. It has
    organized and sponsored meetings between representatives of the sex
    workers and police to discuss such issues as violence against women and
    trafficking. The seminars have helped sensitize police to the fact that
    many of the sex workers are the victims of organized traffickers.
    Sanlaap invariably is the first organization Calcutta police turn to
    when they have rescued a trafficked sex worker. The NGO has been
    allowed to place a counselor at the West Bengal Remand Home for Women,
    where rescued trafficking victims are housed. It also has been
    permitted to place counselors in police stations within Calcutta's red
    light district and has convinced the courts to release young
    trafficking victims into its custody, instead of sending them to the
    remand home.
        There are roughly 80 NGO's in 10 states around the country working
    for the emancipation and rehabilitation of women and children
    trafficked into the sex trade.
        A group on child prostitution established by the NHRC includes
    representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
    of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
    throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
    prohibitions.
                                   __________

                                    MALDIVES

        The Republic of Maldives, which comprises 1,190 islands (less than
    200 of which are inhabited), with a population of approximately
    270,000, has a parliamentary form of government with a very strong
    executive. The President appoints the Cabinet, members of the
    judiciary, and one-sixth of the Parliament. The President derives
    additional influence from his constitutional role as the ``supreme
    authority to propagate the tenets'' of Islam. Political parties are
    officially discouraged, and candidates for the unicameral legislature,
    the People's Majlis, run as individuals. The Majlis selects a single
    presidential nominee who is approved or rejected in a national
    referendum. President Gayoom was approved for a fifth 5-year term in
    October 1998. The Majlis must approve all legislation and is empowered
    to enact legislation without presidential approval. Civil law is
    subordinate to Islamic law, but civil law generally is applied in
    criminal and civil cases. The judiciary is subject to executive
    influence.
        The National Security Service (NSS) performs its duties under
    effective civilian control. The NSS includes the armed forces and
    police, and its members serve in both police and military capacities
    during their careers. The police division investigates crimes, collects
    intelligence, makes arrests, and enforces house arrest.
        Fishing, small-scale agriculture, and tourism provide employment
    for over one-half of the work force. Tourism accounts for over one-
    quarter of government revenues and roughly 40 percent of foreign
    exchange receipts. Manufacturing accounts for 6 percent of gross
    domestic product.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in a number of areas; however, its record was poor in some other areas,
    particularly with regard to political and religious freedoms. The
    President's power to appoint a significant portion of the Parliament
    constrains citizens' ability to change their government. The Government
    limits freedom of assembly and association. There are significant
    restrictions on the freedom of religion; in the past, the Government
    has detained arbitrarily and expelled foreigners for proselytizing and
    detained citizens who converted. Although the Government has undertaken
    a number of programs addressing women's issues, women face a variety of
    legal and social disadvantages. Some of these disadvantages are linked
    to the Government's observance of Shari'a (Islamic law) and other
    Islamic customs. The Government also restricts worker rights.
    Nonetheless, in recent years there has been some progress in certain
    areas. The Majlis has assumed a more active political role in recent
    years, and its members routinely differ with government policy on many
    issues. The courts were reorganized in 1997, and a new Constitution,
    which provides for the protection of certain fundamental rights, went
    into effect at the beginning of 1998. In addition procedural rules
    limiting indefinite police detention were instituted in 1998, and the
    presidential nominating process involved competition among candidates
    for the first time in 1998. A continued easing of government
    restrictions and the Press Council's balanced handling of issues
    related to journalistic standards allowed a greater diversity of views
    in the media, although most media outlets are controlled by persons
    friendly to the Government or by the Government itself.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There were no reports of beatings or other mistreatment of
    persons in police custody during the year; however, convicted criminals
    may be flogged under judicial supervision when this punishment is
    prescribed by Islamic law as interpreted in the country (i.e., only
    when the criminal confesses to the crime and only for the offenses of
    marital infidelity and alcohol abuse). There were no public floggings
    during the year. In 1998 there were two private floggings (carried out
    without public spectators) due to the confession of an extramarital
    affair. The man was subsequently banished, and the woman was placed
    under house arrest for 12 months. Punishments usually are confined to
    fines, compensatory payment, house arrest, imprisonment, or banishment
    to a remote atoll. The Government generally permits those who are
    banished to receive visits by family members.
        The country's prison was destroyed by fire in 1999. Following the
    fire, the Government transferred prisoners to a temporary facility on
    Maafushi, which houses a fluctuating population of approximately 300
    inmates (including 20 women who are housed in a separate compound).
    Children also are housed in separate center for juveniles. Prison
    conditions at the current facility, including food and housing,
    generally are adequate. Prisoners are allowed to work in prison and
    given the opportunity for regular exercise and recreation. Spouses are
    allowed privacy during visits with incarcerated partners. However,
    Amnesty International (AI) reported that in 1998, in the since-
    destroyed prison, prisoners were mistreated. The Government is
    surveying prison facilities in other countries to incorporate
    international standards and improvements in the reconstruction of the
    prison, and it has requested training for prison guards.
        The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats.
    The issue of visits by human rights groups is not known to have arisen.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1997 Constitution
    states that no person shall be arrested or detained for more than 24
    hours without being informed of the grounds for arrest or detention;
    however, in 1998 authorities arbitrarily detained foreign Christians
    for allegedly proselytizing and detained citizens who supposedly
    converted (see Section 2.c.). Police initiate investigations based on
    suspicion of criminal activity or in response to written complaints
    from citizens, police officers, or government officials. They are not
    required to obtain warrants for arrests. Based on the results of police
    investigations, the Attorney General refers cases to the appropriate
    court. The authorities generally keep the details of a case
    confidential until they are confident that the charges are likely to be
    upheld. In the past, persons have been held for long periods without
    charge.
        Depending upon the charges, a suspect may remain free, be detained
    in prison, or placed under house arrest for 15 days during
    investigations. The President may extend pretrial detention for an
    additional 30 days, but in most cases the suspect is released if not
    brought to trial within 15 days. Those who are released pending trial
    may not leave a specific atoll. The law providing for the indefinite
    detention of individuals under investigation was revised substantially
    in 1998. Within 24 hours of an arrest, an individual must be told of
    the grounds for the arrest. An individual can then be held for 7 days.
    If no legal proceedings have been initiated within 7 days, the case is
    referred to an anonymous three-member civilian commission appointed by
    the President that can authorize an additional 15 days' detention.
    After that time, if legal proceedings still have not been initiated, a
    judge must sanction the continued detention on a monthly basis. There
    is no right to legal counsel during police interrogation. There is no
    provision for bail.
        The Government may prohibit access to a telephone and nonfamily
    visits to those under house arrest. While there have been no reported
    cases of incommunicado detention in recent years, the law does not
    provide safeguards against this abuse.
        There were no reports of the external exile of citizens, although
    24 foreigners suspected of proselytization were banished for life in
    1998 (see Section 2.c.). The Government sometimes banishes convicted
    criminals to inhabited atolls away from their home communities; a man
    who confessed to an extramarital affair in April 1998 was banished for
    1 year. AI reported that in 1999, 10 persons from Faafu Magoodhoo were
    banished, reportedly without trial, for trying to organize a
    demonstration against the local atoll chief.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution does not
    provide for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary is subject to
    executive influence. In addition to his authority to review High Court
    decisions, the President influences the judiciary through his power to
    appoint and dismiss judges, all of whom serve at his pleasure and are
    not subject to confirmation by the Majlis. The President nevertheless
    has removed only two judges since 1987. Both dismissals followed the
    recommendation of the Justice Ministry that found the judges'
    professional qualifications to be below standard. The President may
    also grant pardons and amnesties.
        In September 1997, the court system, under the Ministry of Justice,
    was reorganized and court administration has improved. There are three
    courts: One for civil matters; one for criminal cases; and one for
    family and juvenile issues. On the recommendation of the Ministry of
    Justice, the President appoints a principal judge for each court. There
    is also a High Court on Male, which is independent of the Justice
    Ministry and which handles a wide range of cases, including politically
    sensitive ones. The High Court also acts as court of appeals. Under a
    1995 presidential decree, High Court rulings can be reviewed by a five-
    member advisory council appointed by the President. The President also
    has authority to affirm judgments of the High Court, to order a second
    hearing, or to overturn the Court's decision. In addition to the Male
    courts, there are 204 general courts on the islands.
        There are no jury trials. Most trials are public and are conducted
    by judges and magistrates trained in Islamic, civil, and criminal law.
    Magistrates usually adjudicate cases on outer islands, but when more
    complex legal questions are involved, the Justice Ministry will send
    more experienced judges to handle the case.
        The Constitution provides that an accused person be presumed
    innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person has the right
    to defend himself ``in accordance with Shari'a'' (Islamic law). During
    a trial, the accused also may call witnesses, and be assisted by a
    lawyer. Courts do not provide lawyers to indigent defendants. Judges
    question the concerned parties and attempt to establish the facts of a
    case.
        Civil law is subordinate to Shari'a, which is applied in situations
    not covered by civil law as well as in certain acts such as divorce and
    adultery. Courts adjudicating matrimonial and criminal cases generally
    do not allow legal counsel in court because, according to a local
    interpretation of Shari'a, all answers and submissions should come
    directly from the parties involved. However, the High Court allows
    legal counsel in all cases, including those in which the right to
    counsel was denied in the lower court. Under the country's Islamic
    practice, the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one
    man in matters involving Shari'a, such as adultery, finance, and
    inheritance. In other cases, the testimony of men and women are equal.
        There were no confirmed reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The 1997 Constitution prohibits security officials
    from opening or reading letters, telegrams, and wireless messages or
    monitoring telephone conversations, ``except as expressly provided by
    law.'' The NSS may open the mail of private citizens and monitor
    telephone conversations if authorized in the course of a criminal
    investigation.
        Although the 1997 Constitution provides residential premises and
    dwellings should be inviolable, there is no legal requirement for
    search or arrest warrants. The Attorney General or a commanding officer
    of the police must approve the search of private residences.
        The Government is attempting to concentrate the population on the
    larger islands by providing government services and concentrating job
    creation efforts there. The smaller islands are to be provided with
    only ``basic services.'' However, no one is being coerced to move to
    the larger islands under this program.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits public
    statements that are contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or
    are libelous.
        The Penal Code prohibits inciting citizens against the Government.
    However, a 1990 amendment to the Penal Code decriminalized ``any true
    account of any act of commission or omission past or present by the
    Government in a lawfully registered newspaper or magazine, so as to
    reveal dissatisfaction or to effect its reform.''
        Regulations that make publishers responsible for the content of the
    material they published remain in effect but did not result in any
    legal actions during the year.
        Most major media outlets are owned either by the Government or its
    sympathizers. Nonetheless these sympathetic outlets do on occasion
    strongly criticize the Government.
        The Press Council is composed of lawyers, private and government
    media representatives, and other government officials. The Council
    reviews charges of journalist misconduct (advising the Ministry of
    Information, Arts, and Culture on measures to be taken against
    reporters, when appropriate) and promotes professional standards within
    the media (recommending reforms and making suggestions for
    improvement). Private journalists have said that they are satisfied
    with the Council's objectivity and performance. The Government agreed
    that private journalists, rather than the Government, should take
    responsibility for preparation of a journalistic code of ethics.
    Individual newspapers and journals established their own ethical
    guidelines in many cases.
        There were no reports of government censorship of the electronic
    media, nor were there closures of any publications or reports of
    intimidation of journalists. Television news and public affairs
    programming routinely discussed topics of current concern and freely
    criticized government performance. Regular press conferences with
    government ministers instituted in 1995 continued. Journalists are more
    self-confident than in the past; self-censorship appears to have
    diminished, although it remains a problem. Since it is not clear when
    criticism violates the law prohibiting public statements that are
    contrary to Islam, threaten the public order, or are libelous,
    journalists and publishers continue to watch what they say,
    particularly on political topics, to avoid entanglement with the
    Government.
        Pornography and material otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic
    values may be banned. In 1999 the Government banned the animated movie
    ``The Prince of Egypt,'' on the grounds that it was offensive to Islam
    (see Section 2.c.).
        In 1997 the Government banned a book written by an elderly close
    relative of the President for its derogatory comments about a deceased
    previous president, after the relatives of the latter complained.
        Although 88 newspapers and periodicals are registered with the
    Government, only about 60 regularly publish. Aafathis, a morning daily,
    is often critical of government policy. Another daily, Miadhu, began
    publishing in 1996, and Haveeru is the evening daily. Both Miadhu's and
    Haveeru's publishers are progovernment.
        The Government owns and operates the only television and radio
    station. It does not interfere with foreign broadcasts or with the sale
    of satellite receivers. Reports drawn from foreign newscasts are aired
    on the Government television station.
        Cable News Network (CNN) is shown, uncensored, daily on local
    television. In 1996 a company began providing Internet service. The
    Government enacted no regulations governing Internet access but blocks
    distribution of pornographic material via the Internet.
        There are no legal prohibitions on the import of foreign
    publications except for those containing pornography or material
    otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic values. No seizures of
    foreign publications were reported during the year.
        There are no reported restrictions on academic freedom. Some
    teachers reportedly are vocal in their criticism of the Government.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997
    Constitution provides for freedom of assembly ``peaceably and in a
    manner that does not contravene the law;'' however, the Government
    imposes limits on this right in practice. The Home Ministry permits
    public political meetings during electoral campaigns but limits them to
    small gatherings on private premises.
        The Government registers clubs and other private associations if
    they do not contravene Islamic or civil law; however, the Government
    imposes some limits on freedom of association. While not forbidden by
    law, the President officially discourages political parties on the
    grounds that they are inappropriate to the homogeneous nature of
    society. However, many Majlis members were active and outspoken critics
    of the Government and have stimulated closer parliamentary examination
    of government policy.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
    significantly. The 1997 Constitution designates Islam as the official
    state religion, and the Government interprets this provision to impose
    a requirement that citizens be Muslims. The practice of any religion
    other than Islam is prohibited by law. However, foreign residents are
    allowed to practice their religion if they do so privately. On July 4,
    the commemoration of the day the country embraced Islam, President
    Gayoom stated that no other religion should be allowed in the country,
    and the Home Affairs Ministry announced special programs to safeguard
    and strengthen religious unity. The President, the members of the
    People's Majlis, and cabinet members must be Muslims.
        There are no places of worship for adherents of other religions.
    The Government prohibits the importation of icons and religious
    statues, but it generally permits the importation of individual
    religious literature, such as Bibles, for personal use. It also
    prohibits non-Muslim clergy and missionaries from proselytizing and
    conducting public worship services. Conversion of a Muslim to another
    faith is a violation of Shari'a and may result in a loss of the
    convert's citizenship.
        Islamic instruction is a mandatory part of the school curriculum,
    and the Government funds the salaries of religious instructors. The
    Government has established a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs to
    provide guidance on religious matters. The Government also has set
    standards for individuals who conduct Friday services at mosques to
    ensure adequate theological qualifications.
        In January 1999, the Government banned the animated movie ``The
    Prince of Egypt'' on the ground that ``its portrayal of the Prophet
    Moses was offensive to Islam, because all prophets and messengers of
    God are not to be animated or portrayed in any way'' (see Section
    2.a.). During June 1998, the authorities detained 24 foreigners
    (including children) for alleged Christian proselytization without
    explaining the charges against them and then expelled them from the
    country for life. Following the expulsion of the foreigners, police
    took two female citizens into custody for allegedly converting to
    Christianity. As many as a dozen other citizens were questioned. The
    women were detained from mid-June to late September 1998, during which
    time they received extensive counseling. No formal charges were ever
    brought against them, and they were released to their families. In
    April 1998, the Government asked the Seychelles Government to stop the
    radio broadcast of Christian programming in the local language,
    Dhivehi, to the country. However, the broadcasts continued throughout
    the year.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel at home and
    abroad, to emigrate, and to return. Because of overcrowding, the
    Government discourages migration into the capital island of Male or its
    surrounding atoll. Foreign workers are often kept at their worksites.
    Their ability to travel freely is restricted, and they are not allowed
    to mingle with the local population on the islands. The Government has
    not formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
    The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise during the
    year. There were no reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid
    claim to refugee status.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens' ability to change their government is constrained, and
    the strong executive exerts significant influence over both the
    legislature and the judiciary. Under the 1997 Constitution, the Majlis
    chooses a single presidential nominee, who must be a Sunni Muslim male,
    from a list of self-announced candidates for the nomination. Would-be
    nominees for President are not permitted to campaign for the
    nomination. The nominee is then confirmed or rejected by secret ballot
    in a nationwide referendum. From a field of five candidates, President
    Gayoom was nominated by the Majlis and was confirmed for a fifth 5-year
    term in October 1998. Observers from the South Asian Association for
    Regional Cooperation found the referendum to be free and fair.
        The elected members of the Majlis, who must be Muslims, serve 5-
    year terms. All citizens over 21 years of age may vote. Of the body's
    50 members, 42 are elected--2 from each of the 20 inhabited atolls and
    2 from Male--and the President appoints 8 members. Individuals or
    groups are free to approach members of the Majlis with grievances or
    opinions on proposed legislation, and any member may introduce
    legislation. There are no political parties, which are officially
    discouraged.
        The Office of the President is the most powerful political
    institution. The 1997 Constitution gives Islamic law preeminence over
    civil law and designates the President as the ``supreme authority to
    propagate the tenets'' of Islam. The President's authority to appoint
    one-sixth of the Majlis members, which is one-third of the total needed
    for nominating the President, provides the President with a power base
    and strong political leverage. The President currently also is
    commander in chief of the armed forces, the Minister of Defense and
    National Security, the Minister of Finance and Treasury, and the
    Governor of the Maldivian Monetary Authority.
        Relations between the Government and the Majlis have been
    constructive. The Government may introduce legislation but may not
    enact a bill into law without the Majlis' approval. However, the Majlis
    may enact legislation into law without presidential assent if the
    President fails to act on the proposal within 30 days or if a bill is
    repassed with a two-thirds majority. In recent years, the Majlis has
    become increasingly independent, challenging government policies and
    rejecting government-proposed legislation.
        In 1993 the Majlis introduced a question period during which
    members may question government ministers about public policy. Debate
    on the floor has since become increasingly sharp and more open.
    Elections to the People's Majlis were held in November 1999. According
    to observers from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
    (SAARC), the elections were generally free and fair. Several losing
    candidates entered court challenges, but the courts upheld the election
    results.
        Women are not eligible to become president but may hold other
    government posts. For reasons of tradition and culture, few women seek
    or are selected for public office, and women are underrepresented in
    government and politics. In order to increase participation by women in
    the political process, the Government continued a political awareness
    campaign in the atolls. In the November 1999 elections, six women ran
    for seats and two were elected. During the 1999 elections, observers
    from the SAARC noted that women participated equally in the electoral
    process. Following the elections, President Gayoom appointed an
    additional three women to the Majlis.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Although not prohibited, there are no active local human rights
    groups. The Government has been responsive to at least one foreign
    government's interest in examining human rights issues. The Government
    also facilitated visits of teams of SAARC election observers in 1994,
    1998, and 1999.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1997 Constitution declares all citizens equal before the law,
    but there is no specific provision to prohibit discrimination based on
    these factors. Women have traditionally been disadvantaged,
    particularly in terms of education and the application of Islamic law
    to matters such as divorce, inheritance, and testimony in legal
    proceedings.
        Women.--Women's rights advocates agree that wife beating and other
    forms of violence are not widespread. There are no firm data on the
    extent of violence against women because of the value attached to
    privacy in this conservative society. In 1997 the Government
    commissioned a study by a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) on
    domestic violence, but it was never completed. Police officials report
    that they receive few complaints of assaults against women. Rape and
    other violent crimes against women are extremely rare. None were
    reported or prosecuted during the year. Under Shari'a the penalty would
    be flogging, banishment, or imprisonment for up to 5 years.
        Women traditionally have played a subordinate role in society,
    although they now participate in public life in growing numbers and
    gradually are participating at higher levels. Women constitute 38
    percent of government employees, and about 10 percent of uniformed NSS
    personnel. Well-educated women maintain that cultural norms, not the
    law, inhibit women's education and career choices. In many instances,
    education for girls is curtailed after the seventh grade, largely
    because parents do not allow girls to leave their home island for an
    island having a secondary school. Nonetheless, women enjoy a higher
    literacy rate (98 percent) than men (96 percent). Due largely to
    orthodox Islamic training, there is a strong strain of conservative
    sentiment--especially among small businessmen and residents of the
    outer islands--that opposes an active role for women outside the home.
    However, the Government continued legal literacy programs to make women
    aware of their legal rights and workshops on gender and political
    awareness in the outer atolls. The Government also has built 10 of 15
    planned women's centers in the atolls, which are facilities where
    family health workers can provide medical services. The centers also
    provide libraries and space for meetings and other activities with a
    focus of the development of women.
        Under Islamic practice, husbands may divorce their wives more
    easily than vice versa, absent any mutual agreement to divorce. Islamic
    law also governs intestate inheritance, granting male heirs twice the
    share of female heirs. A woman's testimony is equal to only one-half of
    that of a man in matters involving adultery, finance, and inheritance
    (see Section 1.e.). Women who work for wages receive pay equal to that
    of men in the same positions.
        In October the Cabinet replaced the National Women's Council with a
    Gender Equality Council to serve as an advisory body to the Government
    to help strengthen the role of women in society and to help ensure
    equal participation by women in the country's development. Also during
    the year, the Government, with the assistance of the European Union and
    the U.N. Population Fund, expanded a program of small loans to women
    for development projects to additional islands.
        Children.--The Government does not have a program of compulsory
    education, but it provides universal access to free primary education.
    The percentage of school-age children actually in school was as
    follows: (grades 1 to 5) 99.26 percent, (grades 6 to 7) 96.2 percent,
    and grades (8 to 10) 51.09 percent. Of the students enrolled, 49
    percent are female and 51 percent are male. The Government is committed
    to the protection of children's rights and welfare. The Government is
    working with UNICEF to implement the rights provided for in the U.N.
    Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Government established a
    National Council for the Protection of the Rights of the Child in 1992.
    Government policy provides for equal access to educational and health
    programs for both male and female children. Laws protecting children's
    rights apply with equal force to children of either sex.
        Children's rights are incorporated into law, which specifically
    protects them from both physical and psychological abuse, including
    abuse at the hands of teachers or parents. The Ministry of Women's
    Affairs and Social Welfare has the authority to enforce this law, takes
    its responsibility seriously, and has received strong popular support
    for its efforts. The Ministry noted an increase in reports of child
    abuse during the first part of the year with 138 reports involving 317
    children, including 10 reports of sexual abuse. Penalties could be
    banishment or imprisonment for up to 3 years. It is not known if there
    were any prosecutions during the year. The Government is reviewing the
    law to see if improvements and additional protections are necessary.
    There is no reported societal pattern of abuse directed against
    children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no law that specifically
    addresses the rights of the physically or mentally disabled. In 1999
    the Government initiated a survey and identified 30,000 persons in the
    country as disabled (primarily hearing and sight impaired). The
    Government has established programs and provided services for the
    disabled.
        Persons with disabilities usually are cared for by their families.
    When such care is unavailable, persons with disabilities are kept in
    the Institute for Needy People, which also assists elderly persons. The
    Government provides free medication for all mentally ill persons in the
    islands, and mobile teams regularly visit mentally ill patients. In
    1999 the Government enacted a new building code, which mandated that
    all new government buildings and jetties must be accessible to disabled
    persons. The CARE Society, an NGO that assists the disabled, with
    funding from UNICEF and the Australian Government, began programs to
    train disabled persons in life and work skills.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--While the Government does not
    expressly prohibit unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them
    nor the right to strike. There were no reports of efforts to form
    unions or of strikes during the year. However, small groups of
    similarly employed workers with mutual interests have formed
    associations, which include employers as well as employees. These
    associations may address a variety of issues, including workers'
    rights.
        The work force consists of between 70,000 and 75,000 persons,
    including expatriate labor and seasonal and part-time workers. About 20
    percent of the workforce are employed in fishing. The approximately
    27,000 foreigners who work in the country makeup almost half of the
    workers in the formal sector; most are employed in tourist hotels, the
    retail and wholesale trade, factories, or on construction projects. The
    Government employs approximately 22,000 persons, both permanent and
    temporary. It estimates that the manufacturing sector employs about 15
    percent of the labor force and tourism another 10 percent.
        Although workers can affiliate with international labor
    federations, this generally has not been the case. However, it is
    believed some seamen have joined such federations.
        In 1995 the U.S. Government suspended Maldives' eligibility for
    tariff preferences under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
    because the Government failed to take steps to afford internationally
    recognized worker rights to Maldivian workers.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law neither
    prohibits nor protects workers' rights to organize and bargain
    collectively. Wages in the private sector are set by contract between
    employers and employees and are usually based on the rates for similar
    work in the public sector. There are no laws specifically prohibiting
    antiunion discrimination by employers against union members or
    organizers. The Government has exerted pressure in the past to
    discourage seamen from joining foreign seamen's unions as a means to
    secure higher wages. There have been no reported complaints alleging
    such discrimination or claiming government interference with workers'
    attempts to join unions in the past 5 years.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is not prohibited by law. However, there were no reports that it
    occurred. The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and
    bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--There is no compulsory education law, but more than 98
    percent of school-age children to grade 7 are enrolled in school. A
    1992 law bars children under 14 years of age from ``places of waged
    work and from work that is not suitable for that child's age, health,
    or physical ability or that might obstruct the education or adversely
    affect the mentality or behavior of the child.'' An earlier law
    prohibits government employment of children under the age of 16. There
    are no reports of children being employed in the small industrial
    sector, although children work in family fishing, agricultural, and
    commercial activities. The hours of work of young workers are not
    limited specifically by statute. The Government does not prohibit
    specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices
    are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). A Unit for Children's Rights
    in the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare is responsible
    for monitoring compliance with the child labor regulations. It relies
    upon complaints filed with it rather than initiating its own
    inspections to ensure compliance. As a result, oversight is incomplete.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1994 the Government
    promulgated its first set of regulations for employer-employee
    relations. The regulations specify the terms that must be incorporated
    into employment contracts and address such issues as training, work
    hours, safety, remuneration, leave, fines, termination, etc. There is
    no national minimum wage for the private sector, although the
    Government has established wage floors for certain kinds of work. Given
    the severe shortage of labor, employers must offer competitive pay and
    conditions to attract skilled workers.
        There are no statutory provisions for hours of work, but the
    regulations require that a work contract specify the normal work and
    overtime hours on a weekly or monthly basis. In the public sector, a 7-
    hour day and a 5-day work-week have been established through
    administrative circulars from the President's office. Overtime pay in
    the public sector was instituted in 1990. Employees are authorized 20
    days of annual leave, 30 days of medical leave, maternity leave of 60
    days, and special annual leave of 10 days for extraordinary
    circumstances. There are no laws governing health and safety
    conditions. However, there are regulatory requirements that employers
    provide a safe working environment and ensure the observance of safety
    measures. It is unclear whether workers can remove themselves from
    unsafe working conditions without risking the loss of their jobs. The
    Ministry of Trade, Industries, and Labour set up a Labour Dispute
    Settlement Unit in 1998 to resolve wage and labor disputes and to visit
    worksites and enforce labor regulations.
        In 1997 the Government for the first time worked closely with the
    International Labor Organization to address a number of labor issues.
    Although two draft labor laws were prepared in 1998: One to address
    issues such as the right of association, the right to organize, and
    acceptable work conditions related to health, environment, employer-
    employee relations, leave, and termination, and the other to deal with
    social security, pensions, and provident funds, these laws have not
    been enabled.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not address the problem of
    trafficking in persons; however, the Attorney General's Office believes
    that should a case arise it could be addressed under Shari'a. There
    were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or
    through the country.
                                   __________

                                     NEPAL

        Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of
    government. In 1990 the King, formerly an absolute monarch, legalized
    political parties, after which an interim government promulgated a new
    Constitution. The King retains important residual powers, but has
    dissociated himself from direct day-to-day government activities. The
    democratically elected Parliament consists of the House of
    Representatives (lower house) and the National Council (upper house).
    In May 1999, the country's third national parliamentary elections were
    held, which international observers considered to be generally free and
    fair. In February 1996, the leaders of the Maoist United People's Front
    (``Maoists'') launched a ``People's War'' that has led to violence in
    more than 50 of the country's 75 districts. The insurrection has been
    waged through torture, killings, and bombings involving civilians and
    public officials. The Constitution provides for an independent
    judiciary; however, the courts generally are inefficient and
    susceptible to political pressure and corruption.
        The National Police Force maintains internal security and is
    subject to civilian control, but local officials have wide discretion
    in maintaining law and order. Police reaction to the ``People's War''
    insurgency led to incidents of unwarranted force against prisoners and
    noncombatants. The army, which traditionally is loyal to the King, has
    sought to limit its domestic-security role in responding to the Maoist
    insurgency. The police committed numerous human rights abuses.
        The country is extremely poor, with an annual per capita gross
    domestic product of approximately $242. Over 80 percent of its 23
    million persons support themselves through subsistence agriculture.
    Principal crops include rice, wheat, maize, jute, and potatoes. Tourism
    and the export of carpets and garments are the major sources of foreign
    exchange. Foreign aid accounts for more than half of the development
    budget. The economy is mixed, with approximately 50 public sector
    firms. Many former government firms have been privatized since 1992.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The police at
    times used unwarranted lethal force and continue to abuse detainees,
    using torture as punishment or to extract confessions. The Government
    rarely investigates allegations of police brutality or punishes police
    officers who commit abuses. The disappearance of persons in custody is
    a problem. Prison conditions remain poor. The authorities use arbitrary
    arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention, judicial
    susceptibility to political pressure and corruption, and long delays
    before trial remain problems. The Government generally respects freedom
    of expression; however, at times it imposes some restrictions. The
    Government generally allows for freedom of assembly; some restrictions
    occur but are rare. The Government generally respects freedom of
    religion, although the Constitution imposes restrictions on
    proselytizing to spread religion. Women, the disabled, and lower castes
    suffer from widespread discrimination. Violence against women,
    trafficking in women and girls for prostitution, forced labor, and
    child labor also remain serious problems. There have been instances of
    forced child labor in the past, and there was one reported instance
    during the year.
        The Government established a national human rights commission in
    May. In July the Government outlawed the feudal ``Kamaiya'' system,
    releasing some 200,000 bonded laborers and family members from their
    debts to their landlords.
        During the year, the Maoists increased the scope of their campaign,
    frequently committing torture, killings, bombings, and other abuses.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--The police
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Most extrajudicial killings
    by police involved the Maoist insurgents, but police at times used
    unjustifiable lethal force in other situations as well.
        On October 27 in Dolakha district, police clashed with a group of
    24 Tibetans who had crossed into the country. After the Tibetans began
    throwing stones, police opened fire, killing one person and injuring
    five others. Police officers shot and killed six Nepalese citizens
    during countrywide civil unrest from December 26 to 31. Scores of
    police and hundreds of civilians were injured during the protests
    sparked by alleged anti-Nepali remarks from an Indian film star. On
    December 26 in Kathmandu, police who reportedly were protecting a
    crowded movie theater were surrounded by a group of persons who were
    throwing rocks and threatening to burn down the theater. After overhead
    shots failed to disperse the group, the police fired shots into the
    crowd, killing two persons. Another death occurred as police attempted
    to control rioters in Thamel, another area of Kathmandu. On December 27
    in Kathmandu, police gunfire against disruptive civilians killed two
    more persons including an uninvolved adolescent in a neighboring
    building. On December 31 in Rajbiraj, police shot and killed a 40-year-
    old male while attempting to control a mob of persons. The Government
    announced that it would financially compensate the families of those
    killed and make arrangements for medical treatment for those injured in
    the December clashes. At year's end, a government commission was
    investigating the incidents.
        On June 18, Ravi Upreti died of injuries reportedly sustained from
    beatings while in police custody in Jhapa in the eastern part of the
    country. On July 26, Sudish Rimal died shortly after being taken into
    police custody in the Sarlahi district. Family members alleged that he
    was tortured but declined to allow an autopsy, making confirmation of
    these charges impossible.
        Both police and insurgents continued to be killed in the
    increasingly violent ``People's War.'' Launched in February 1996 by
    leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the ``People's War''
    is a self-declared Maoist insurgency. The Government continued to
    commit human rights abuses in its efforts to combat the insurgency. The
    police have killed nearly 1,000 Maoists since 1996. Some of the deaths
    are believed to have been extrajudicial killings. On January 14, police
    opened fire on a Maoist ``cultural program'' at a school in Accham
    district, killing nine persons and wounding numerous others (see
    Section 1.c.). Police later admitted that seven of the persons killed
    were innocent bystanders. Police killed at least 18 Maoists during a
    ``search operation'' in Rukum in February. An ensuing fire destroyed
    hundreds of homes in the area, though there are conflicting claims as
    to who started the blaze. On December 9, police fired on a meeting of
    the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Women's Association in Bharatpur,
    killing one woman and injuring nine others, according to local media
    reports. Police claim that they fired on the crowd only after persons
    threw stones at and charged the police. At year's end, the 20 to 30
    police officers charged with abuses against the public in connection
    with police sweeps in 1998 had not been brought to trial.
        The Maoists were responsible for numerous abuses, and clashes
    between Maoist rebels and police led to a number of deaths during the
    year. On January 3, Maoists killed nine police officers during a 3-hour
    gun battle in Jumla. Six police officers were killed and five others
    were injured seriously in a Maoist ambush in Jajarkot on January 22. On
    February 19, Maoists killed 15 police officers and injured 20 others in
    an attack on a police post in Rolpa. A constable died instantly on May
    25 when he stepped on a landmine planted by Maoists in Tanahu district.
    Three other police officers were wounded. A total of 25 persons were
    killed, including 12 police officers, in a June 8 Maoist attack on a
    police checkpoint in Jajarkot. On June 14, a group of more than 50
    rebels attacked the police post at Junbesi. Three police officers died
    in the ensuing 2hour firefight, after which the rebels bombed the post
    and seized weapons stored there. On July 15, a group of some 300
    Maoists ambushed a police post in Thokarpa, killing 4 police officers
    and injuring 9 others. On September 25, Maoist insurgents attacked the
    district police headquarters of Dolpa, killing at least 14 persons and
    wounding 40 others (see Section 1.c.). On November 30, Maoists attacked
    a police post in Kalikot district, killing 11 police officers.
    Reportedly, some of the police deaths were executions based on a list
    that the Maoists consulted at the time.
        Although their activities are focused on the police, the Maoists
    continued to kill, injure, and kidnap civilians as well. On February
    14, Maoists pulled two men out of a political procession in Rukum and
    beheaded them in front of hundreds of onlookers. It is believed that
    the victims were targeted because they were carrying Nepali Congress
    Party flags. A bomb planted by Maoists behind a police post in Dolpa
    killed an 11-year-old boy on February 15. Two other persons were
    injured in the blast. On February 24 in Sindhupalchowk, a group of
    rebels attacked a local official, tied him to a tree and hacked him to
    death with khukuri, large machete-like knives. On February 26, in
    Okhaldhunga in the eastern part of the country, a group of
    approximately 15 Maoists hacked to death another local official. On May
    3, Maoists kidnaped Chitra Bahadur Thapa, a rival political worker,
    from his home in Bhotechaur. He was found dead 7 days later. On the
    night of July 13, Maoists severed the hands and legs of a resident of
    Gulmi. He died immediately. According to local press reports, on
    November 5, Maoists killed a policeman and injured seven other persons
    in an attack on a police post at a village in Ramechap district.
        According to mid-November government figures, since 1996, the
    insurgency has resulted in the deaths of 1,483 persons, including 234
    police officers, 258 civilians, and 991 insurgents. These figures
    indicate that 98 police, 69 civilians, and 128 insurgents were killed
    through mid-November. The press has reported higher figures, and
    reports have claimed that more police than Maoists were killed during
    the year, pointing to a marked increase in the firepower and
    aggressiveness of the insurgency.
        b. Disappearance.--The disappearance of persons in police custody
    is a problem. According to the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC),
    a local human rights organization, 10 persons disappeared from police
    custody during the first 9 months of the year; 218 persons have
    disappeared since 1996. Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a secondary school
    teacher, lawyer, and member of a human rights organization, who
    disappeared after an arrest in Kathmandu in September 1999, was
    released on July 6 without ever having been charged. There are reports
    that Shrestha was held incommunicado and tortured during his
    incarceration (see Sections 1.c. and 4). According to Amnesty
    International (AI), on September 6, police detained opposition
    politician Ishwari Dahal; at year's end, he remained missing.
        In December 1999, Suresh Ale Magar and Pawan Shrestha were released
    from jail in Kathmandu under a Supreme Court order, but immediately
    were re-arrested. At the time, police denied having them in custody,
    but Magar and Shrestha were released again in February (see Section
    2.a.). On November 3, authorities released Maoist leaders Dinesh Sharma
    and Diananath Gautam, whom police had held in custody for more than 11
    months. At a police-arranged press conference, Sharma initially said
    that he had been treated well; however, after his release he
    disappeared again. A statement later issued in his name alleges that
    police tortured him during his captivity.
        AI reported that on January 8, 1999, lawyer and human rights
    defender Rajendra Dhakal disappeared after his arrest in Jamdi in
    Tanahun district. He reportedly was arrested because of his alleged
    involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, along with two teachers
    arrested at the same time, was taken to the Bel Chantan police post.
    The teachers later were released. Dhakal remains missing, and police
    now deny ever having arrested him (see Section 1.e.). On January 21,
    1999, police arrested freelance journalist Milan Nepali. Nepali, who
    was associated with the left-leaning publication ``Janadesh'', later
    disappeared from police custody; as of year's end, Nepali's whereabouts
    were unknown (see Section 2.a.).
        According to AI, Maoists abducted as least 30 children in Jajarkot
    district in July and August.
        AI also expressed concern about other individuals currently held
    captive. According to AI, Dirgha Bahadur Dashoudi and Narayan Sharma,
    two teachers and members of the Tarun Dal from Dailekh district were
    abducted in early May, and the Chief Education Officer of Rolpa
    district, Rajendra Prasad Yadav was taken from a bus on which he was
    travelling on June 10. Yadav was released on September 16; the others
    remain missing.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law prohibit torture;
    however, the police at times use torture and beatings to punish
    suspects or to extract confessions. According to AI, torture methods
    include boxing of the ears, beating of the feet, and the rolling of
    weights over the thighs. AI noted that torture apparently was used to
    intimidate or punish detainees and to extract information and/or
    confessions, and that torture often occurred while detainees were held
    incommunicado and unable to contact family members, doctors, or lawyers
    (see Section 1.d.). The Government has failed to conduct thorough and
    independent investigations of reports of police brutality and has
    refused to take significant disciplinary action against officers
    involved. Police often are unwilling to investigate and to discipline
    fellow officers, and persons are afraid to bring cases against police
    for fear of reprisals. The Constitution and the Torture Compensation
    Act, which was passed by Parliament in 1996, provide for compensation
    for victims of torture. According to the Center for Victims of Torture
    (CVICT), 10 persons claimed compensation under the act during the year,
    all of the cases that were in the courts as of year's end. Another 20
    persons made claims during 1999. According to the CVICT, during the
    year one of the claims made in 1999 resulted in a payment of $70 (5,000
    rupees) to the claimant; none of the cases filed during the year were
    resolved by year's end. The Government has begun human rights education
    for the police force. According to an August 1999 government newspaper
    report, the Government suspended seven police personnel and appointed a
    high-level commission to probe the death of trucker Ale Tamang
    following alleged police torture while in police custody (see Section
    1.a.).
        Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, who disappeared after an arrest in Kathmandu
    in September 1999, was released on July 6 without ever having been
    charged (see Sections 1.b. and 4). Shrestha reportedly was tortured
    early in his incarceration and allegedly was held in solitary
    confinement throughout most of his stay.
        On January 14, police opened fire on a Maoist ``cultural program''
    at a school in Accham district; according to INSEC, police killed nine
    persons and wounded seven others during the incident (see Section
    1.a.). In February police officers allegedly set fire to ``Maoist
    sympathizing'' villages in Rukum in retaliation for the killing of 14
    police officers in a single Maoist attack (see Section 1.a.).
        Human rights groups have reported instances of torture in areas
    affected by the ``People's War.'' Dozens of male detainees reported
    having torture inflicted on them by the police; women in these areas
    have reported instances of rape and sexual abuse by the police. AI,
    which visited the country in 1998, reported that it found evidence of
    ``the systematic use of severe torture'' by the police, and raised
    concerns over the relative impunity of the police for such actions;
    however, in contrast to previous years, there only were two reports of
    torture during the year. AI did not find systematic use of severe
    torture when it visited the country during the year.
        On March 10, in Kathmandu, police charged a group of Tibetans with
    clubs and sticks, reportedly injuring several persons, including a 12-
    year-old monk. The Tibetans were chanting antiChinese slogans after a
    ceremony to mark the anniversary of the 1959 antiChinese uprising in
    Tibet. In 1999 in Pokhara police used tear gas and batons to break up a
    similar demonstration (see Section 2.b.).
        Local and international human rights groups also have documented
    Maoist violence in areas affected by the ``People's War,'' including
    the severing of limbs. The Maoists most often have targeted political
    leaders, local elites, and suspected informers. These targets included
    not only members of the majority Nepali Congress Party (NCP), but also
    members of the opposition Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist/
    Leninist (CPN-UML). Throughout the year, Maoists looted banks and
    bombed or set fire to government offices and homes of local political
    leaders. International nongovernmental organization (NGO) offices also
    were attacked on several occasions, as were foreign companies. There
    also were cases of intimidation, torture, or other degrading treatment.
    On February 17, Maoists set fire to the home of Rukum resident Bal
    Bahadur K.C., a district executive member of the CPN-UML party. The
    house was destroyed completely. On April 23, Maoists assaulted two
    teachers of a primary school in Rukum, beating them and smearing black
    paint on their faces. On April 26, 12 Maoists set fire to the Surhket
    home of NCP regional chairman Yagya Bahadur B.C. On May 6, Maoists
    kidnaped school headmaster Dharma Chandra Sharma from his home in
    Jumla. Sharma was released 2 days later after his captors shaved his
    head and paraded him around his village with shoes tied around his
    neck. Maoists were responsible for at least 17 violent incidents
    involving bombings, arson, and looting, on August 23. On September 25,
    Maoist insurgents attacked the district police headquarters of Dolpa,
    in the town of Dunai, killing at least 14 persons and wounding 40
    others (see Section 1.a.). On October 23, approximately 30 members of
    the student wing of the Maoists attacked the Padma Kanya School's
    principle.
        Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is common in prisons, and
    authorities sometimes handcuff or fetter detainees. Women normally are
    incarcerated separately from men, but in similar conditions. The
    Government still has not implemented a provision in the 1992 Children's
    Act calling for the establishment of a juvenile home and juvenile
    court. Consequently children sometimes are incarcerated with
    adultseither with an incarcerated parent, or, as one local NGO reports,
    as criminal offenders. The Department of Prisons states that there are
    approximately 10 children in jail or custody for offenses that they
    have committed and approximately 100 noncriminal dependent children
    housed along with their parents (see Section 5). In April the
    Government established separate juvenile benches in district courts
    where youth are tried. As a result, trials of persons under the age of
    18 now occur in a separate room in the courthouse, though there are no
    separate juvenile courts as such. Likewise, there is no provision for
    separate juvenile detention facilities.
        The authorities are more likely to transfer sick prisoners to
    hospitals than they were in the past. However, due to the inadequacy of
    appropriate facilities, the authorities sometimes place the mentally
    ill in jails under inhumane conditions.
        The Government permits local human rights groups and the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    stipulates that the authorities must arraign or release a suspect
    within 24 hours of arrest, but the police at times violate this
    provision. Under the Public Offenses Act of 1970, the police must
    obtain warrants for an arrest unless a person is caught in the act of
    committing a crime. For many offenses, the case must be filed in court
    within 7 days of arrest. If the court upholds the detention, the law
    authorizes the police to hold the suspect for 25 days to complete their
    investigation, with a possible extension of 7 days. However, the police
    occasionally hold prisoners longer, though the Supreme Court has, in
    some cases, ordered the release of detainees held longer than 24 hours
    without a court appearance.
        Detainees do have the legal right to receive visits by family
    members, and they are permitted access to lawyers only after
    authorities file charges. In practice the police grant access to
    prisoners on a basis that varies from prison to prison. There is a
    system of bail, but bonds are too expensive for most citizens.
    According to the Department of Prisons, about half of the 6,000 persons
    imprisoned are awaiting trial. Due to court backlogs, a slow appeals
    process, and poor access to legal representation, pretrial detention
    often exceeds the period to which persons subsequently are sentenced
    after a trial and conviction.
        Under the Public Security Act, the authorities may detain persons
    who allegedly threaten domestic security and tranquillity, amicable
    relations with other states, and relations between citizens of
    different classes or religions. Persons whom the Government detains
    under the act are considered to be in preventive detention and can be
    held for up to 6 months without being charged with a crime. Human
    rights groups allege that the police have used arbitrary arrest and
    detention during the ``People's War'' to intimidate communities
    considered sympathetic to the Maoists (see Section 1.b.). Since the
    insurgents began their terrorist campaigns, police have arrested 5,866
    suspected Maoists. Of those persons arrested, 1,654 had been tried and
    4,182 had been released.
        The 1991 amendments to the Public Security Act allow the
    authorities to extend periods of detention after submitting written
    notices to the Home Ministry. The police must notify the district court
    of the detention within 24 hours, and it may order an additional 6
    months of detention before authorities file official charges.
        Other laws, including the Public Offenses Act, permit arbitrary
    detention. This act and its many amendments cover crimes such as
    disturbing the peace, vandalism, rioting, and fighting. Human rights
    monitors express concern that the act vests too much discretionary
    power in the Chief District Officer (CDO), the highest-ranking civil
    servant in each of the country's 75 districts. The act authorizes the
    CDO to order detentions, to issue search warrants, and to specify fines
    and other punishments for misdemeanors without judicial review. Few
    recent instances of the use of the Public Offenses Act have come to
    light, since it has become more common, particularly with the Maoists,
    to arrest persons under the Public Security Act. In January local
    authorities in Biratnagar arrested Laxmi Mudbari, the central member of
    the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary),
    under the act; Mudbari remained incarcerated at year's end. Human
    rights commission officials reported several other cases of arrests or
    detentions under the act, but were unable to provide details of the
    cases.
        Authorities detained journalists and their advocates on occasion,
    on suspicion of having ties to or sympathy for the Maoists (see Section
    2.a.).
        The police have arrested or illegally detained some suspected
    Maoist insurgents and held them incommunicado. There are no other
    political detainees.
        The Constitution prohibits exile; it is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary and the Supreme Court has demonstrated
    independence; however, lower level courts remain vulnerable to
    political pressure and bribery of judges and court staff is endemic.
    The Supreme Court has the right to review the constitutionality of
    legislation passed by Parliament. In the past it has ruled that
    provisions in the 1992 Labor Act and in the 1991 Nepal Citizenship Act
    are unconstitutional. In 1995 the Court also decided that the
    dissolution of the Parliament at the request of a former Prime Minister
    was unconstitutional, and ordered the body restored.
        Appellate and district courts have become increasingly independent,
    although sometimes they bend to political pressure as well. In Rolpa,
    one of the districts most affected by the ``People's War,'' human
    rights groups have accused the district courts of acting in complicity
    with CDO's in violating detainees' rights. These groups allege that
    arrest without a warrant, prolonged detention without trial, and police
    torture occurs in these areas.
        The judicial system consists of three levels: District courts,
    appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The King appoints judges on
    the recommendation of the Judicial Council, a constitutional body
    chaired by the Chief Justice. The Council also is responsible for the
    assignment of judges, disciplinary action, and other administrative
    matters. Judges decide cases; there is no jury system.
        Delays in the administration of justice are a severe problem.
    According to the latest statistics, approximately 150,000 cases are
    active throughout the country. The Supreme Court has a backlog of
    approximately 15,000 cases. At the Court's current rate, it never will
    clear this backlog.
        The Constitution provides for the right to counsel, equal
    protection under the law, protection from double jeopardy, protection
    from retroactive application of the law, and for public trials, except
    in some security and customs cases. All lower court decisions,
    including acquittals, are subject to appeal. The Supreme Court is the
    court of last appeal, but the King may grant pardons. The King also can
    suspend, commute, or remit any sentence. On the recommendation of the
    Government, the King often pardons up to 12 prisoners--if they have
    served 75 percent of their sentence and shown good behavior--on
    national holidays.
        Although prisoners have a constitutional right to legal
    representation and a court appointed lawyer, government lawyers or
    access to private attorneys is provided only on request. Consequently,
    those persons unaware of their rights may be deprived of legal
    representation.
        There have been reports of cases in previous years in which
    authorities allegedly penalized attorneys involved in the defense of
    human rights. In January 1999, lawyer and human rights defender
    Rajendra Dhakal was arrested reportedly because of his alleged
    involvement in Maoist violence. He has not been seen since (see Section
    1.b). Kathmandu newspapers reported that in July 1999, four lawyers
    pleading for a group of three detained journalists were ordered
    detained themselves by a district judge as they tried to express their
    views on the judicial order to detain the journalists. After other
    attorneys came to protest the arrests, the attorneys were released (see
    Section 2.a.).
        Military courts adjudicate cases concerning military personnel, who
    are immune from prosecution in civilian courts. In 1992 the Supreme
    Court ruled that military courts could no longer try civilians for
    crimes involving the military services.
        The authorities may prosecute terrorism or treason cases under the
    Treason Act. Specially constituted tribunals hear these trials in
    closed sessions. No such trials have occurred during the past 5 years.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, Or
    Correspondence.--The Government generally respected the privacy of the
    home and family. Search warrants are required before searches and
    seizures may be carried out, except in cases involving suspected
    security and narcotics violations. As amended, the Police Act of 1955
    empowers the police to issue warrants for searches and seizures in
    criminal cases upon receipt of information about criminal activities.
    Within 24 hours of their issuance, warrants in misdemeanor cases must
    be approved by the CDO. Court judges must approve them in felony cases.
        Government provisions permit discrimination in employment on the
    basis of political opinion; however, such discrimination is not known
    to occur.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution specifies that
    all citizens shall have freedom of thought and expression and that the
    Government may not censor any news item or other reading material;
    however, the Government imposes some restrictions on these rights. The
    Constitution prohibits speech and writing that would threaten the
    sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom; disturb the harmonious
    relations among persons of different castes or communities; promote
    sedition, defamation, contempt of court, or crime; or contradict decent
    public behavior or morality.
        The Press and Publications Act provides for the licensing of
    publications and the granting of credentials to journalists. The Act
    also includes penalties for violating these requirements. In addition
    the Act prohibits publication of material that, among other things,
    promotes disrespect toward the King or the royal family; that
    undermines security, peace, order, the dignity of the King, or the
    integrity or sovereignty of the Kingdom; that creates animosity among
    persons of different castes and religions; or that adversely affects
    the good conduct or morality of the public. However, throughout August
    and September, the press and several private FM radio stations produced
    a number of stories calling for the prosecution of a nephew of the
    monarch who allegedly killed a popular local singer in a hit-and-run
    incident. This is the first time the local media has confronted a
    member of the royal family. The Press and Publications Act also
    provides a basis for banning foreign publications. However, foreign
    publications are widely available.
        There are hundreds of independent vernacular and Englishlanguage
    newspapers available, representing various political points of view.
    The Government owns ``Gorkhapatra,'' the second-largest circulating
    Nepali daily, and ``The Rising Nepal,'' the second-largest English
    daily. Editors and writers at the government newspapers practice self-
    censorship and generally reflect government policy. Ruling political
    parties have influenced the editorial policy of the government
    newspapers to their advantage. However, despite the sensitivity of the
    Government to the ``People's War,'' the press has not faced overt
    pressure to report on it in a particular way. Views of human rights
    groups, the statements of the police, and the press releases of Maoist
    leaders all have been reported in the local press.
        Nevertheless, journalists and their advocates have suffered human
    rights abuses. Shambhu Prasad Patel, vice president of the Rautahat
    Branch of the Nepal Press Union (NPU), was shot and killed by two
    unidentified gunmen on January 23 at his residence; as of year's end,
    no one had been held accountable. On February 13, police arrested and
    briefly detained Dev Kumar Yadav, a Maoist-leaning newspaper reporter
    for Janadesh and council member of the Federation of Nepalese
    Journalists, Siraha (FNJS), and Nagendra Kumar Paswan, a reporter for
    Mahima and vice chairman of the FNJS. No charges were filed. The 1999
    case against Krishna Sen, the editor of Janadesh who was arrested in
    connection with the publication of an interview with a Maoist leader,
    continued during the year. On February 18, Sen was charged under the
    Illegal Weapons Act and subsequently was sent to Rajbiraj jail in
    Saptari. Also in February police released Suresh Ale Magar, another
    columnist with Janadesh who had been held without a detention order
    (see Section 1.b.). On March 12, Jagdish Bhattarai, editor of the local
    weekly Nava Chetana and correspondent for Kantipur Daily in Palpa, was
    sentenced to 7 days in jail and fined approximately $7.20 (500 rupees)
    for contempt of court. Bhattarai was accused of writing a 1998
    editorial that denounced corruption and threatened to publish names of
    corrupt government officials. On May 8, the publication Gorkhapatra
    suspended associate editor Ram Prasad Acharya for publishing a Maoist
    press release. Freelance journalist Milan Nepali remains missing (see
    Section 1.b). In contrast to prior years, there were no reported
    incidents of seizure of either publications or equipment.
        In February the censor board of the Ministry of Information and
    Communications banned public screening of the film ``Aago'' (Fire),
    claiming that the film undermined public safety. The film contained
    references to the Maoist insurgency. In July the board allowed the film
    to be shown after the references had been deleted.
        The Broadcast Act of 1993 allows private television and FM radio
    broadcasts, but implementation of the Act has been slow. The Government
    owns the only television station, and controls one radio station that
    broadcasts both AM and FM signals. Radio, primarily short and medium
    waves, reaches the greatest number of persons and has the largest
    influence. Government-owned Radio Nepal broadcasts throughout the
    country through a series of repeater stations. With privatization of a
    number of radio bands, there was a marked increase in the range of
    programming options available. However, only government-owned Radio
    Nepal may originate its own local news broadcasts, and all stations
    must rebroadcast its news programs. The Government does not restrict
    access to foreign radio broadcasts, private cable networks, or to the
    purchase of television satellite dishes. Indian and Pakistani broadcast
    television also is readily available in many parts of the country.
        Since 1996 two private cable television networks have been
    operating in the Kathmandu valley. They mainly provide entertainment
    programming, but commentary critical of government policies
    occasionally occurs during publicly broadcast discussion programs.
    Throughout the country, local entrepreneurs also are receiving
    international stations via satellite for viewing in local bars, and are
    reselling the signal to local residents. Television time on the
    government-owned television station also is leased to private
    producers.
        There are four private radio stations and three community-owned
    radio stations that have their own transmitters, an increase of two and
    one, respectively, over 1999. During the year, a private company
    acquired a license to establish a 1,000-watt FM transmitter in the
    eastern part of the country, which will cover much of the eastern
    region and portions of India. Five private radio stations so far have
    been licensed to operate outside of the capital city, although none
    have begun their broadcasts. Although nongovernment radio stations are
    precluded legally from broadcasting locally developed news, private
    stations select which newspaper stories to read, permitting editorial
    perspective. Private stations also must broadcast the Government
    station's news program but are permitted to rebroadcast news from
    abroad. Private radio stations, like print media, practice self-
    censorship. In August 1999, one private radio station reported that a
    government official asked the station to stop a live call-in advice
    show dealing with the topics of HIV/AIDS and teenage problems. Other
    talk shows on sensitive topics continued without government comment.
        There have been many debates about liberalizing the media and
    privatizing government-owned media. This debate has put pressure, which
    successive governments so far have resisted, to open the airwaves and
    divest government-controlled printing operations. However, private FM
    radio and cable and satellite television have overtaken the
    Government's ability to regulate them.
        No government efforts to curtail academic freedom were reported
    during the year.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, although it may be restricted by law
    on vague grounds such as undermining the sovereignty and integrity of
    the State or disturbing law and order. These restrictions rarely were
    used during the year. Large public demonstrations are common, and
    police intervention is rare except in cases where crowds become violent
    or violate the terms of their parade permit. On March 10, the Tibetan
    community in Kathmandu held its annual ceremony to commemorate the
    anniversary of the 1959 anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet. Following the
    conclusion of the official ceremony, a large group of young persons
    left the event location and went onto a public street chanting anti-
    Chinese slogans. After attempting to restore order, police charged the
    crowd, reportedly injuring several persons in the process (see Section
    1.c.). In March 1999, police arrested 27 Tibetan demonstrators
    commemorating the same event in Pokhara; the police used tear gas and
    batons to break up the demonstration. All of the protesters were
    released soon after the incident.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion and permits the practice of all religions; however, although
    the Government generally has not interfered with the practice of
    religions, conversion and proselytizing are prohibited and punishable
    with fines or imprisonment, and members of minority religions
    occasionally complain of police harassment. Some Christian groups are
    concerned that the ban on proselytizing limits the expression of non-
    Hindu religious belief. The Constitution describes the country as a
    ``Hindu Kingdom,'' although it does not establish Hinduism as the state
    religion.
        The large majority of citizens are Hindu. There are smaller numbers
    of Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian citizens, as well.
        April public observances of Easter in a Kathmandu park and a
    Passover Seder in a major hotel in Kathmandu were uneventful. However,
    in 1999, Christian groups in Kathmandu were prevented from observing
    Good Friday in a public park when they failed to obtain the proper
    permit; 3 members of a group of 400 persons reportedly were injured
    when police attempted to disperse the group's subsequent protest at a
    local government office. Easter services that year, which did have the
    proper permit, took place in a public park without incident.
        A conviction for conversion or proselytizing can result in fines or
    imprisonment or, in the case of foreigners, expulsion from the country.
    Although arrests or detentions for proselytizing are rare, there have
    been few incidents of punishment or investigation in connection with
    conversion or proselytization during the last few years. However, the
    Government on occasion investigates reports of proselytizing. It
    investigated a 1997 accusation against the Adventist Development and
    Relief Agency (ADRA), and cleared ADRA in 1997. Nongovernmental groups
    or individuals are free to file charges of proselytizing against
    individuals or organizations. Such a case was filed with the Supreme
    Court against ADRA and the United Missions to Nepal, an umbrella
    Protestant group, on December 31, 1999. The case still was pending at
    year's end.
        For decades dozens of Christian missionary hospitals, welfare
    organizations, and schools have operated in the country. These
    organizations have not proselytized and have operated freely.
    Missionary schools are among the most respected institutions of
    secondary education in the country; most of the country's governing and
    business elite graduated from Jesuit high schools. Many foreign
    Christian organizations have direct ties to Nepali churches and sponsor
    Nepali priests for religious training abroad.
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of caste,
    except for traditional religious practices at Hindu temples, where, for
    example, members of the lowest caste are not permitted.
        The Press and Publications Act prohibits the publication of
    materials that create animosity among persons of different castes or
    religions.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement and residence, and the Government generally does not restrict
    travel abroad. However, for security reasons, the Government restricts
    travel by foreigners, including Tibetan residents in Nepal, to some
    areas near the Chinese border. The Government also has imposed
    restrictions on women's travel to the Gulf states to work as domestic
    servants, in response to cases of abuse of such women in the past.
    These restrictions do not apply to women who are traveling to the Gulf
    states for other reasons, nor do they apply for travel to other areas.
    Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory. The
    Government allows citizens abroad to return, and is not known to revoke
    citizenship for political reasons.
        The Government has no official refugee policy. However, it does
    provide asylum for refugees and has cooperated with the office of the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with other
    humanitarian organizations, in assisting refugees from Bhutan and Tibet
    (China). The UNHCR has maintained an office in Kathmandu since 1989.
    Since 1959 the Government has accepted as residents approximately
    20,000 Tibetan refugees, many of whom still reside in the country.
    Since 1991 it also has provided asylum to some 97,000 Bhutanese
    refugees, the great majority of whom are living in UNHCR administered
    camps in the eastern part of the country.
        China and the Government of Nepal tightened control of movement
    across their border in 1986, but both sides have enforced these
    restrictions haphazardly. Police and customs officials occasionally
    harass Tibetan asylum seekers who cross the border from China.
    According to the UNHCR, police conduct in this regard has improved in
    the last 2 years, although border police sometimes extort money from
    Tibetans in exchange for passage. There were no reports of forced
    expulsion of Tibetan asylum seekers during the year.
        There are approximately 98,000 ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan
    in UNHCR-administered camps in the southeastern region of the country.
    An additional 15,000 refugees reside outside the camps in either Nepal
    or India. The total represents approximately one-sixth of Bhutan's
    estimated pre-1991 population.
        The UNHCR monitors the condition of the Bhutanese refugees and
    provides for their basic needs. The Government accepts the refugee
    presence as temporary, on humanitarian grounds, but offers little more
    than a place to stay. The Government officially restricts refugee
    freedom of movement and work, but does not strictly enforce its
    policies. Visitors to the camps universally describe conditions as
    excellent. Violence sometimes has broken out between camp residents and
    the surrounding local population. The UNHCR and other donors and relief
    organizations have defused tensions through a refugee-affected areas
    assistance plan aimed at improving conditions in communities adjacent
    to the camps.
        In 1993 the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan formed a joint
    committee and began bilateral talks to resolve the refugee problem. No
    significant breakthroughs were made for several years. However, during
    the tenth round of bilateral talks December 24-27, Nepal and Bhutan
    agreed to prepare for verification at the camps in January 2001.
    Earlier lack of progress in the talks had left refugees frustrated, and
    both government leaders and international organization officials were
    concerned that the frustration could lead to unrest. Refugees continued
    to hold ``peace marches'' to protest their plight.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right Of Citizens To
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully.
    Citizens, through their elected representatives, also have the right to
    amend the Constitution with the exception of certain basic principles
    that they may not change--sovereignty vested in the people, the
    multiparty system, fundamental rights, and the constitutional monarchy.
        Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of
    government. Parliamentary elections are scheduled at least every 5
    years. Midterm elections may be called if the ruling party loses its
    majority, loses a vote of no confidence, or calls for elections. Under
    the Constitution all citizens aged 18 and over may vote.
        The House of Representatives, or lower house, may send legislation
    directly to the King by majority vote. The National Council, or upper
    house, may amend or reject lower house legislation, but the lower house
    can overrule its objections. The upper house also may introduce
    legislation and send it to the lower house for consideration.
        The King exercises certain powers with the advice and consent of
    the Council of Ministers. These include exclusive authority to enact,
    amend, and repeal laws relating to succession to the throne. The King's
    income and property are tax-exempt and inviolable, and no question may
    be raised in any court about any act performed by the King. The
    Constitution also permits the King to exercise emergency powers in the
    event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic
    depression. In such an emergency, the King may suspend without judicial
    review many basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and
    assembly, freedom from censorship, and freedom from preventive
    detention. However, he may not suspend habeas corpus or the right to
    form associations. The King's declaration of a state of emergency must
    be approved by a two-thirds majority of the lower house of the
    Parliament. If the lower house is not in session, the upper house
    exercises this power. A state of emergency may be maintained for up to
    3 months without legislative approval and for up to 6 months, renewable
    only once for an additional 6 months, if the legislature grants
    approval.
        The Constitution bars the registration and participation in
    elections of any political party that is based on ``religion,
    community, caste, tribe, or region,'' or that does not operate openly
    and democratically. During the most recent national elections in May
    1999, there were sporadic incidents of violence that mainly occurred
    between supporters of rival political parties. Maoist efforts to
    disrupt the elections by intimidating voters and candidates had little
    effect. The elections generally were held throughout the country
    according to schedule. International observers considered the elections
    to be generally free and fair.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no
    specific laws that restrict women, indigenous peoples, or minorities
    from participating in the Government or in political parties. Tradition
    limits the roles of women and some castes in the political process.
    However, the Constitution requires that women constitute 5 percent of
    each party's candidates for the House of Representatives. A 1999 royal
    ordinance, which Parliament has ratified, also requires that 20 percent
    of all village and municipal level seats be reserved for female
    candidates. The 1999 elections resulted in an increase from 7 to 12 in
    the number of women in the 205-seat lower house and from 5 to 9 in the
    60-seat upper house.
        No specific laws prevent minorities from voting or restrict them
    from participating in the Government and political parties on the same
    basis as other citizens. Hindus and members of certain castes
    traditionally have wielded more power than others, but members of other
    religious and social groups have in recent years gained increasing
    influence in government, including senior leadership positions. There
    are no special provisions to allocate a set number or percentage of
    political party positions or parliamentary seats for any minority
    group.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are approximately 10 human rights NGO's. These include the
    Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), the Informal Sector
    Services Center (INSEC), the International Institute for Human Rights,
    Environment, and Development (INHURED), and the Forum for the
    Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR). The Nepal Law Society also
    monitors human rights abuses and a number of NGO's focus on specific
    areas such as torture, child labor, women's rights, or ethnic
    minorities. Groups are free to publish reports on human rights abuses.
    The Government also has allowed groups to visit prisons and prisoners.
    The Government rarely arrests or detains persons reporting on human
    rights problems, but in June 1998, the police arrested Gopal Siwakoti
    Chintan, a human rights activist, for alleged collaboration with Maoist
    rebels. The police also confiscated audiotapes and videotapes of
    interviews with victims of human rights violations from Chintan's
    office. The police later released Chintan due to insufficient evidence
    that he had collaborated with the Maoists. There were reports that the
    Government and Maoists limited the activities of human rights
    activists.
        On July 6, police officers released Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, a
    secondary school teacher, lawyer, and member of a human rights
    organization; Shrestha never was charged (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
        The insurgency has caused a number of NGO's in the midwestern
    districts to reduce their activities substantially. Agricultural
    development projects and community health offices have been frequent
    targets. Maoists also have targeted aircraft attempting to make
    humanitarian deliveries of foodstuffs to midwestern districts.
        In May the Government formed the Human Rights Commission (HRC), a
    government-appointed commission with a mandate to investigate human
    rights violations. Since then the commission has received nearly 400
    complaints of human rights violations. Although some cases involve
    disappearance of detainees, illegal detention, and arrest of acquitted
    persons, many other cases are relatively trivial. The HRC notes that
    none of its cases have moved forward. Many do not merit prosecution;
    for those that do, the HRC lacks the legal resources to pursue them in
    the courts.
        The Government does not refuse visas to international NGO human
    rights monitors, or otherwise restrict their access when they are in
    the country. However, some areas along the country's border with China
    are restricted. An organization monitoring Tibetan refugee flows has
    been denied access to these border areas.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution specifies that the State shall not discriminate
    against citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, or ideology.
    However, there still is a caste system. Discrimination against lower
    castes, women, and the disabled remains common, especially in rural
    areas.
        Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem, but it
    receives limited public attention. In a 1996 study, 50 percent of the
    respondents said that they know someone who was the victim of domestic
    violence. In another 1996 survey, respondents listed the perpetrators
    of violence in 77 percent of incidents as family members, and 58
    percent reported that it is a daily occurrence. There currently is no
    law against domestic violence.
        Rape and incest also are problems, particularly in rural areas.
    Laws against rape provide for prison sentences of 6 to 10 years for the
    rape of a woman under 14 years of age and 3 to 5 years for the rape of
    a woman over the age of 14. The law prescribes imprisonment for 1 year
    or a fine for the rape of a prostitute. The law does not forbid spousal
    rape.
        The dowry tradition is strong, with greater prevalence in the Terai
    region. The killing of brides because of defaults on dowry payments is
    rare, but does occur. More common is the physical abuse of wives by the
    husband and the husband's family to obtain additional dowry or to force
    the woman to leave to enable the son to remarry.
        There is a general unwillingness among citizens, and particularly
    among government figures, to recognize violence against women as a
    problem. In a survey conducted by Saathi, a local NGO, 42 percent of
    the respondents said that in their experience medical practitioners
    were uncooperative or negligent in cases of violence against women and
    girls. This unwillingness to recognize violence against women and girls
    as unacceptable in daily life is seen not just in the medical
    profession, but among the police and politicians as well.
        The police department has a ``women's cell'' in five cities,
    including Kathmandu. These cells include female officers who receive
    special training in handling victims of domestic violence. The police
    also have sent out directives instructing all officers to treat
    domestic violence as a criminal offense that should be prosecuted.
    However, according to a police official, this type of directive is
    difficult to enforce because of entrenched discriminatory attitudes.
    Even though the police may make an arrest, further prosecution seldom
    is pursued by the victim or by the Government.
        At least six NGO's in Kathmandu work on the problem of violence
    against women and on women's issues in general. Saathi's assistance
    program includes a women's shelter and a suicide intervention center.
    The shelter provides housing, medical attention, counseling, and legal
    advocacy for the victims of violence.
        Trafficking in women remains a serious social problem in several of
    the country's poorest areas, and large numbers of women still are
    forced to work against their will as prostitutes in other countries
    (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Although the Constitution provides protections for women, including
    equal pay for equal work, the Government has not taken significant
    action to implement its provisions, even in many of its own industries.
    Women face systematic discrimination, particularly in rural areas,
    where religious and cultural tradition, lack of education, and
    ignorance of the law remain severe impediments to their exercise of
    basic rights such as the right to vote or to hold property in their own
    names.
        Women have benefited from some changes in marriage and inheritance
    laws. In 1994 the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the
    Citizenship Law that discriminated against foreign spouses of Nepalese
    women. However, many other discriminatory laws still remain. According
    to legal experts, there are over 20 laws that discriminate against
    women. For example, the law grants women the right to divorce, but on
    narrower grounds than those applicable to men. The law on property
    rights also favors men in its provisions for inheritance, land tenancy,
    and the division of family property. In 1995 the Supreme Court also
    ordered the Council of Ministers to enact legislation within 1 year
    giving women property rights in regard to inheritance and land tenancy
    that were equal to those of men. Alhough legislation to comply with
    this order has been introduced, it remains stalled in Parliament.
        According to the 1991 census, the female literacy rate is 26
    percent, compared with 57 percent for men. Human rights groups report
    that girls attend secondary schools at a rate half that of boys. There
    are many NGO's focused on integrating women into society and the
    economy. These NGO's work in the areas of literacy, small business,
    skills transfer, and prevention of trafficking in women and girls.
    There also are a growing number of women's advocacy groups.
        Most political parties have women's groups. Members of Parliament
    have begun working for the passage of tougher laws for crimes of sexual
    assault, but have had little success so far.
        Children.--Education is not compulsory. Government policy is to
    provide free primary education for all children between the ages of 6
    and 12 years, but the quality of education is sorely inadequate, many
    families cannot afford school supplies and clothing, and schools do not
    exist in all areas. Schools charge fees for higher education. Roughly
    60 percent of the children who work also attend school. However,
    approximately 70 to 75 percent of boys who work go to school, compared
    to only 50 to 60 percent of the girls who work. Free health care is
    provided through government clinics, but they are poorly equipped and
    too few in number to meet the demand. Community-based health programs
    assist in the prevention of childhood diseases and provide primary
    health care services. Due to poor or nonexistent sanitation in rural
    areas, many children are at risk from severe and fatal illnesses.
        Forced prostitution and trafficking in young girls remain serious
    problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Societal attitudes view a female child as a commodity, to be
    bartered off in marriage, or as a burden. Some persons, in fact,
    consider marrying a girl before menarche an honorable, sacred act that
    increases one's chances of a better afterlife. As a result, child
    brides are common. According to UNICEF's Regional Office for South
    Asia, 40 percent of all marriages involve a girl under 14 years of age.
    The age difference in marriage often is cited as one cause of domestic
    violence.
        A local NGO reports that approximately 100 children considered
    delinquents or accused of public offenses are incarcerated with adults
    because the Government has not established juvenile homes. Some of
    these delinquent children allegedly are as young as 9 years old, even
    though, under the law, children under 18 cannot be charged with crimes;
    the Government reports that about 10 persons under the age of 18 are
    incarcerated for crimes they have committed. The UNHCR believes that
    police sometimes have falsified the ages of young detainees in order to
    avoid challenge on this point. However, according to the press, almost
    100 children are in jails as noncriminal dependents of incarcerated
    adults (see Section 1.c.).
        People with Disabilities.--The disabled face widespread
    discrimination. Families often are stigmatized by and ashamed of
    disabled family members, who may be hidden away or neglected. Economic
    integration is further hampered by the general view that the disabled
    are unproductive. The mentally retarded are associated with the
    mentally ill. Sometimes, mentally ill and retarded persons are placed
    in prisons due to the lack of facilities or support.
        The Government has long been involved in providing for the
    disabled, but the level of government assistance has not met the needs
    of the disabled. The 1982 Disabled Persons Protection and Welfare Act
    and additional 1994 rules mandate accessibility to buildings, to
    transportation, to employment, to education, and to other state
    services. However, despite government funding for special education
    programs, the Government does not implement or enforce laws regarding
    the disabled. A number of NGO's working with the disabled receive
    significant funding from the Government, but persons who are physically
    or mentally disabled rely almost exclusively on family members to
    assist them.
        Religious Minorities.--The adherents of the country's many
    religions generally coexist peacefully and respect all places of
    worship. Most Hindus respect the many Buddhist shrines located
    throughout the country; Buddhists accord Hindu shrines the same
    respect. Buddha's birthplace is an important pilgrimage site, and
    Buddha's birthday is a national holiday. The country's Muslim minority
    is not well integrated with the Hindu and Buddhist communities.
        Some Christian groups report that Hindu extremism has increased in
    recent years. In January 1999, the India-based Hindu political party
    Shiv Sena, locally known as Pashupati Sena, opened an office in
    Kathmandu; a few Shiv Sena candidates unsuccessfully ran for office in
    the 1999 general elections. Government policy does not support Hindu
    extremism, although some political figures have made public statements
    critical of Christian missionary activities. Some citizens are wary of
    proselytizing and conversion by Christians and, therefore, view the
    growth of Christianity with alarm.
        Those who choose to convert to other religions--in particular Hindu
    citizens who convert to Islam or Christianity--sometimes are ostracized
    socially. Some reportedly have been forced to leave their villages.
    While this prejudice is not systematic, it can be vehement and
    occasionally violent. Hindus who convert to another religion may face
    isolated incidents of hostility or discrimination from Hindu extremist
    groups. Nevertheless, converts generally do not fear to admit in public
    their new religious affiliations.
        The caste system strongly influences society, even though it is
    prohibited by the Constitution. However, the Government allows caste
    discrimination at Hindu temples where, for example, members of the
    lowest caste are not permitted to enter. Otherwise, the Government
    makes an effort to protect the rights of the disadvantaged castes. In
    1998 the Government formed the ``Committee for the Upliftment of
    Depressed Communities,'' which runs income generation, public
    education, and scholarship programs for the disadvantaged castes.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country has over 75 ethnic
    groups that speak 50 different languages. The Constitution provides
    that each community ``shall have the right to preserve and promote its
    language, script, and culture.'' The Constitution further specifies
    that each community has the right to operate schools up to the primary
    level in its mother tongue.
        Discrimination against lower castes especially is common in the
    rural areas in the western part of the country. Although the Government
    has outlawed the public shunning of ``untouchables,'' an exception was
    retained for traditional practices at Hindu religious sites. Economic,
    social, and educational advancement tend to be a function of historical
    patterns, geographic location, and caste. Better education and higher
    levels of prosperity, especially in the Kathmandu valley, slowly are
    reducing caste distinctions and increasing opportunities for lower
    socioeconomic groups. Better educated urban-oriented castes (Brahmin,
    Chhetri, and certain elements of the Newar community traditionally
    dominant in the Kathmandu valley) continue to dominate politics and
    senior administrative and military positions, and to control a
    disproportionate share of natural resources in their territories.
        In remote areas, school lessons and national radio broadcasts often
    are conducted in the local language. However, in areas with nearby
    municipalities, education at the primary, secondary, and university
    levels is conducted almost exclusively in Nepali, which is
    constitutionally mandated as the official language of the State. Human
    rights groups report that the languages of the small Kusunda, Dura, and
    Meche communities nearly are extinct.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    freedom to establish and to join unions and associations. It permits
    restriction of unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or similar
    conditions. Despite the political transformation in 1990, trade unions
    still are developing their administrative structures to organize
    workers, to bargain collectively, and to conduct worker education
    programs.
        Union participation in the formal sector accounts for approximately
    10 to 12 percent of the formal work force. In 1992 Parliament passed
    the Labor Act and the Trade Union Act, and formulated enabling
    regulations. However, the Government has not yet fully implemented the
    laws. The Trade Union Act defines procedures for establishing trade
    unions, associations, and federations. It also protects unions and
    officials from lawsuits arising from actions taken in the discharge of
    union duties, including collective bargaining, and prohibits employers
    from discriminating against trade union members or organizers. There
    have been few reports of discrimination against union members.
        The law permits strikes, except by employees in essential services
    such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. The law
    empowers the Government to halt a strike or to suspend a union's
    activities if the union disturbs the peace or if it adversely affects
    the nation's economic interests. Under the Labor Act, 60 percent of a
    union's membership must vote in favor of a strike in a secret ballot
    for the strike to be legal. Workers at a jute mill in Biratnagar struck
    from June 29 to July 4 to demand tenure, medical benefits, and annual
    leave. Workers returned to their jobs after management acceded to most
    of their demands. In August thousands of employees of various
    government-owned corporations went on strike to protest perceived
    inequities in their pay scales. The employees later returned to work
    voluntarily after the Government appointed a committee tasked with
    reaching an agreement on the issue. Several days later, the Government
    issued notices in local media stating that in the future, it would
    enforce the Essential Services Act of 1957 which prohibits strikes by
    employees of government-owned enterprises.
        The Government does not restrict unions from joining international
    labor bodies. Several trade federations and union organizations
    maintain a variety of international affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Act
    provides for collective bargaining, although the organizational
    structures to implement the Act's provisions have not been established.
    Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 20 percent of wage
    earners in the organized sector. However, labor remains widely unable
    to use collective bargaining effectively due to inexperience and
    employer reluctance to bargain.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits slavery, serfdom, forced labor, or trafficking in human
    beings in any form; however, forced labor and trafficking in persons
    remain problems (see Section 6.f.). The Department of Labor enforces
    laws against forced labor in the small formal sector, but remains
    unable to enforce the law outside that sector.
        Large numbers of women still are forced to work against their will
    as prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). Bonded labor, especially in
    agricultural work, was a perennial problem. Bonded laborers usually
    were members of lower castes. Bonded labor reportedly occurred among
    certain ethnic groups in the western Terai region. However, the
    Government in July outlawed bonded labor and released the ``Kamaiya''
    bonded agricultural workers, from their debts. By year's end, the
    Government had not yet provided land to the Kamaiyas for resettlement
    nor had it begun programs to prepare the Kamaiyas for economic
    independence; however, it had announced plans to do so. The Government
    has set up temporary camps for the Kamaiyas and begun arrangements for
    distribution of food under a food-for-work program.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution stipulates that children shall not be
    employed in factories, mines, or similar hazardous work and limits
    children between the ages of 14 and 16 years to a 36-hour work-week.
    The law also mandates acceptable working conditions for children. The
    law establishes a minimum age for employment of minors at 16 years in
    industry and 14 years in agriculture and mandates acceptable working
    conditions for children.
        On July 21, the country passed its first comprehensive child labor
    law. The law, drafted with the assistance of the International Labor
    Organization (ILO), tightened earlier laws. It is the first national
    legislation to establish specific penalties for those who unlawfully
    employ children. It repeats the existing prohibition of the employment
    of children under the age of 14 years and renews the constitutional
    provision that children between the ages of 14 and 16 years may work,
    but no more than 6 hours a day and 6 days a week. The law prohibits
    child labor in tourism, cigarette or carpet factories, mines, or
    laboratories. Employers must maintain records of all 14- to 16-year-old
    laborers.
        These legal protections notwithstanding, resources devoted to their
    enforcement are limited, and children work in many sectors of the
    economy. According to a 1996 ILO study, up to 40 percent of all
    children work, mostly in agriculture. Others work in the carpet
    weaving, pottery, basket weaving, sewing, and ironsmithing industries.
    NGO's estimate that 2.6 million children are economically active, 1.7
    million of which work fulltime. According to a 1996 ILO study, most
    working children in the country are girls. Roughly 60 percent of the
    children who work also attend school. However, approximately 70 to 75
    percent of boys who work go to school, compared with 50 to 60 percent
    of girls who work. There also are reports that the Maoists use
    children, including girls, as soldiers, shields, runners, and
    messengers.
        The Ministry of Labor's enforcement record is improving. In
    February police rescued five children from a garment factory in
    Kathmandu. The children claimed that they were forced to work more than
    12 hours a day and that some were abused sexually. According to a
    February 1999 press report, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 years
    who were employed forcibly in a wool factory in Jorpati. The Government
    introduced a number of programs beginning in 1998 that are designed to
    reduce child labor. For example, the Ministry of Labor has set up three
    centers for children of carpet weavers, who might otherwise join their
    parents at the loom. The centers provide day care or education for the
    children, depending upon their ages. The Government also conducts
    public awareness programs to raise public sensitivity to the problem of
    child labor.
        The private sector has made its own efforts to eradicate child
    labor, especially in the carpet industry. Since 1996, the Rugmark
    Foundation has certified carpets made without child labor. Over half of
    all carpet factories now participate in this or a similar certification
    system. Partially as a result of this initiative, and of consumer
    pressure, children reportedly now constitute only 5 percent of the work
    force in the exportoriented carpet industry, and the carpet
    manufacturers association in August 1999 pledged publicly to end child
    labor in the industry by 2005. However, children's rights activists
    still say that, in the smaller factories, children remain a part of the
    work force. Rugmark, in its self-policing function, reports that it
    found 20 children working in carpet factories in Kathmandu in April and
    May.
        Trafficking in girls continues to be a serious problem (see Section
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In April the Government passed
    legislation that raised the minimum monthly wage for unskilled labor to
    $20 (1,450 rupees). The law also defined monthly minimum wages for
    semi-skilled labor at about $21 (1,500 rupees), skilled labor at $22
    (1,610 rupees), and highly skilled labor at $25 (1,800 rupees). The
    minimum wage for children ages 14 to 16 was set at $16 (1,144 rupees).
    Wages in the unorganized service sector and in agriculture often are as
    much as 50 percent lower. The Labor Act calls for a 48-hour work-week,
    with 1 day off per week, and limits overtime to 20 hours per week.
    Health and safety standards and other benefits such as a provident fund
    and maternity benefits also are established in the Act. Implementation
    of the new Labor Act has been slow, as the Government has not created
    the necessary regulatory or administrative structures to enforce its
    provisions. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations. Although the law authorizes labor officers
    to order employers to rectify unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety
    standards remains minimal.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking and
    prescribes imprisonment of up to 20 years for infractions; however,
    trafficking in women and girls remains a serious social problem in
    several of the country's poorest areas. Young women are by far the most
    common targets; trafficking of men and boys is not known to occur.
    While the vast majority of trafficking is of women and girls for the
    commercial sex industry, women and girls sometimes are trafficked for
    domestic service, manual or semi-skilled labor, or other purposes.
    Nepal is a primary sending country for the South Asia region; most
    women and girls trafficked from the country go to India. Local NGO's
    working against trafficking estimate that 5,000 to 7,000 Nepali girls
    between the ages of 10 and 18 are lured or abducted annually into India
    and subsequently forced into prostitution. In some cases, parents or
    relatives sell women and young girls into sexual slavery. Hundreds of
    girls and women return to the country annually after having worked as
    prostitutes in India. Most are destitute and, according to some
    estimates, 65 percent are HIV-positive when they return. There is
    legislation to protect women from coercive trafficking, including a ban
    on female domestic labor leaving the country to work in Saudi Arabia
    and other countries in the Gulf (see Section 2.d.); women's rights
    groups have protested the ban as discriminatory.
        Prostitution also is a problem in the Kathmandu valley. A
    children's human rights group states that 20 percent of prostitutes in
    the country are younger than 16 years old.
        Since 1996 active special police units have dealt with crimes
    against women and children.
        Despite recent attempts to increase the imposition of penalties on
    traffickers, enforcement of antitrafficking statutes remains sporadic.
    The fear of the spread of AIDS by returning prostitutes has discouraged
    the Government from promoting efforts to rehabilitate prostitutes.
    Government efforts focus more on preventing prostitution and
    trafficking in women. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare sponsors
    job and skill training programs in several poor districts known for
    sending prostitutes to India. In May 1999, the Ministry of Women and
    Social Welfare opened the Women's Self-Reliance and Rehabilitation
    Center (WOREC), a rehabilitation and skills training center for women
    returned from being trafficked and for women and girls at risk of being
    trafficked. With the Government's endorsement, many NGO's have public
    information and outreach campaigns in rural areas. These groups
    commonly use leaflets, comic books, films, speaker programs, and skits
    to convey antitrafficking messages and education.
        There are over 15 NGO's working against trafficking, several of
    which have rehabilitation and skills training programs for trafficking
    victims. WOREC and other organizations involved in the rehabilitation
    of trafficking victims state that their members have been threatened
    and that their offices have been vandalized because of their
    activities. According to press reports, on August 18, 1999, five
    convicted traffickers who had been given 20-year sentences but were
    released within 3 years attacked a 17-year-old living at a WOREC
    facility. The director of another prominent anti-trafficking group
    reported in July that traffickers regularly make threats against her
    organization.
        In October NGO's, the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and
    the Home Ministry together hosted a regional workshop with senior
    police officers to enhance cross border antitrafficking collaboration.
    NGO's and law enforcement officials discussed ways of improving
    bilateral and regional cooperation on investigating and prosecuting
    traffickers and ensuring better protection of victims.
        In June 1999, the police hosted a workshop in Kathmandu to provide
    recommendations for new legislation regarding trafficking and the
    sexual exploitation of children. A followup workshop was held in July
    1999. To date no new legislation has been passed on the subject. There
    are many social and legal obstacles to successful prosecution, and
    convictions are rare.
                                   __________

                                    PAKISTAN

        On October 12, 1999, the elected civilian Government of former
    Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a bloodless coup led
    by Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf. In consultation with
    senior military commanders, General Musharraf designated himself Chief
    Executive, and suspended the Constitution, the Parliament, and the
    provincial assemblies. The office of the President, which is mainly
    ceremonial, was retained. General Musharraf appointed an advisory
    National Security Council, which included both military and civilian
    advisers, and a civilian cabinet. The government bureaucracy continued
    to function; however, at all levels, the functioning of the Government
    after the coup was ``monitored'' by military commanders. In May the
    Supreme Court ruled that the Musharraf Government was constitutional
    and imposed a 3-year deadline--starting from October 12, 1999--to
    complete a transition to democratic, civilian rule. On December 31,
    local elections were held in 18 districts on a non-party basis; however
    the Government has not set a timetable for national elections.
    Corruption and inefficiency remained acute in all branches of
    government. The suspended Constitution provided for an independent
    judiciary; however, the judiciary was subject to executive branch and
    other outside influences, and suffers from inadequate resources,
    inefficiency, and corruption. The Supreme Court demonstrated a limited
    degree of independence; however, the overall credibility of the
    judiciary remained low, and General Musharraf took steps to control the
    judiciary and to remove his regime from judicial oversight.
        The police have primary internal security responsibilities,
    although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and the Frontier
    Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are
    acute, like Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments
    control the police and the paramilitary forces when they are assisting
    in law and order operations. In August the Government announced a
    devolution plan that included some increase in local political control
    of the police; however, the Government had not implemented this plan by
    year's end. During some religious holidays, the regular army is
    deployed in sensitive areas to help maintain public order. After the
    coup, the army played a role in enforcing exit control restrictions at
    airports and border crossings, reportedly as part of the Musharraf
    regime's anticorruption accountability campaign. Members of the
    security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
        Pakistan is a poor country with great extremes in the distribution
    of wealth. Education, especially for females is poor and only 33
    percent of the population are judged literate by a very low standard.
    Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are the
    principal exports. The economy includes both state-run and private
    industries and financial institutions. The suspended Constitution
    provided for the right of private businesses to operate freely in most
    sectors of the economy and there continued to be a strong private
    sector. The per capita annual income is $490 (PRs 29,400).
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and the Government
    committed numerous serious abuses; however, there were improvements in
    some areas, particularly with respect to freedom of the press. Citizens
    continued to be denied the right to choose or change their government
    peacefully. Police committed numerous extrajudicial killings; however,
    there were fewer such killings than in 1999. In Karachi there were
    fewer killings between rival political factions during the year;
    however, many of these killings reportedly were committed by or with
    the participation of the security forces. Police abused and raped
    citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses sometimes were
    transferred or suspended for their actions, no officer has been
    convicted and very few have been arrested. In Karachi there were signs
    of progress in redressing police excesses; however, in general police
    continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison conditions
    remained extremely poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained
    citizens. The Government used arbitrary and sometimes incommunicado
    detention against leaders of the Sharif Government and their families;
    several major political leaders remained in jail or in self-imposed
    exile abroad at year's end. Case backlogs led to long delays in trials,
    and lengthy pretrial detention is common. The judiciary is subject to
    executive and other outside influences, and corruption, inefficiency,
    and lack of resources remained problems. The Government took steps to
    control the judiciary and to remove itself from judicial oversight. On
    January 25, General Musharraf ordered all Supreme Court, Shariat court,
    and provincial High Court justices to swear to uphold the post-coup
    Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), which suspended the
    Constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior courts
    from making any decision against the Chief Executive ``or any person
    exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority.'' Six Supreme
    Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine other provincial
    court justices resigned in protest. The Government's anticorruption
    campaign violated due process. In October 1998, the National Assembly
    (NA) voted for a 15th constitutional amendment, which would have
    required the Government to enforce Shari'a (Islamic law) throughout the
    country. However, General Musharraf abandoned his predecessor's attempt
    to enact the amendment. In April the Sindh Court found Nawaz Sharif
    guilty of treason and other charges; however, the court imposed a life
    sentence instead of the death penalty sought by the Musharraf
    Government. The court acquitted Sharif's six codefendants. In October
    the Sindh High Court upheld Nawaz Sharif's conviction. However, on
    December 9, the Government commuted former Prime Minister Nawaz
    Sharif's prison sentence and exiled him and 18 of his family members to
    Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Government infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. The press was able to publish relatively freely;
    however, several journalists practiced self-censorship, especially on
    sensitive issues related to the military. There was not a systematic
    harassment campaign against newspapers or commentators critical of the
    Government during the year; however, the broadcast media remain a
    closely controlled government monopoly. The Government restricted
    freedom of assembly. During the year, the Government sporadically
    permitted several large antigovernment demonstrations; however, it
    prevented other protests and arrested organizers, reportedly for
    security reasons. In March the Government instituted a country-wide ban
    on strikes, processions, and outdoor political demonstrations. The
    Government maintained some limits on freedom of association. The
    Government imposed some limits on freedom of religion, particularly for
    Ahmadis. The Government also imposed limits on freedom of movement.
    General Musharraf spoke out against some of the human rights abuses of
    the previous regime and held a conference on human rights in April;
    however, the Government made minimal progress toward achieving the
    goals set at the conference.
        Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, abuse,
    rape, and other forms of degradation by spouses and members of society.
    The Government publicly criticized the practice of ``honor killings''
    but failed to take corrective steps, and such killings continued
    throughout the country. There was considerable discrimination against
    women, and traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a
    subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as
    child abuse, and prostitution, remained serious problems. Female
    children still lag far behind boys in education, health care, and other
    social indices. Governmental and societal discrimination against
    religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis and Christians remains a
    problem, and the Government failed to take effective measures to
    counter prevalent public prejudices against religious minorities.
    Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and
    civil disturbances. The Government and employers continued to restrict
    worker rights significantly. Debt slavery persists, and bonded labor by
    both adults and children remained a problem. The use of child labor
    remained widespread, although it generally is recognized as a serious
    problem, and industrial exporters have adopted a number of measures to
    eliminate child labor from specific sectors. Trafficking in women and
    children for the purpose of forced prostitution was a serious problem.
    Mob violence and terrorist attacks remained problems; however, the
    number of incidents declined slightly during the year.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
    extrajudicial killings. The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects,
    often in the form of deaths in police custody or of staged encounters
    in which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Police
    officials generally insist that these deaths occur during attempts to
    escape or to resist arrest; family members and the press insist that
    many of these deaths are staged. Police personnel have been known to
    kill suspected criminals to prevent them from implicating police in
    crimes during court proceedings. After an attempt was made on then
    Prime Minister Sharif's life in January 1999, as many as 40 Sunni
    Muslims associated with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the putative instigator,
    may have been killed in police encounters. The Human Rights Commission
    of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that there were fewer reports of
    extrajudicial killings during the year than there were in the previous
    year. In September a journalist reported that 19 persons died in police
    encounters or as victims of torture in the first 9 months of the year.
    Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least 100 persons die from
    police torture each year (see Section 1.c.). The HRCP estimated that 23
    persons were killed in police custody or police encounters during the
    year. Police officials insist that these deaths occurred during
    attempts to escape or resist arrest. For example, in October police
    killed a suspect who reportedly attempted to resist arrest; there were
    no investigations of the incident during the year. In addition to
    killing suspects to prevent them from implicating the police in court,
    police reportedly killed suspected criminals to circumvent or overcome
    insufficient evidence, witness intimidation, judicial corruption, and
    sometimes political pressure. Police professionalism is low. The police
    view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate given the lack of
    effective action by the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary on
    the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not
    stand up in court.
        According to a press report, Shaheen Akhtar, a 15-year-old rape
    victim charged with adultery was kept fettered in a hospital despite
    being diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis; Akhtar died in May (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended
    for involvement in extrajudicial killings. However, court-ordered
    inquiries into these killings have resulted in few trials and no
    convictions. In February two police inspectors who were charged with
    killing a member of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in custody were
    denied bail after the Sindh High Court determined that they had
    falsified precinct records and appeared to have committed the crime.
    Punjabi police killed Tahir Prince in February 1999; after his mother
    filed a writ, the Lahore High Court ordered a case registered against
    two police officers, one of whom was dismissed mid-year on charges of
    corruption. Tahir Prince's family then accepted financial compensation
    and dropped the case against the two officers. In general police
    continued to commit such killings with impunity.
        The police and security forces were responsible for the deaths of a
    number of individuals associated with political or terrorist groups. A
    committee of inquiry was established to look into the death of Pakistan
    Muslim League youth wing leader Qasim Khan, who died while in the
    custody of the Peshawar police in July 1999. However, despite requests
    from human rights activists, the committee did not publish its
    findings, and the officer who allegedly was involved in the killing
    retained his position.
        The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an urban Sindh-based political
    party that in the past demonstrated a willingness to use violence to
    further its aims, claimed that the police specifically targeted its
    adherents for extrajudicial killings. Altaf Hussain established the MQM
    in 1984 to promote the rights of Mohajirs, the descendants of Urdu-
    speaking Muslims who migrated from India to Pakistan following
    partition in 1947. Elements of the group became involved in extortion
    and other forms of racketeering, and the party split into the
        MQM-Altaf--the original group headed by Altaf Hussain, a large
    breakaway group (MQM-Haqiqi), and a few smaller factions. The MQM-
    Altaf, in part because of its efficient organization and willingness to
    use violence, became the dominant political party in Karachi and
    Hyderabad, and sent several moderate and nonviolent leaders to the now
    suspended Parliament and the Sindh provincial assembly. Because of its
    past links, the MQM-Altaf has antagonized followers, suffered violent
    breakaways, and continually been at odds with successive governments.
    In a 1999 report, the MQM listed 10 persons, mostly MQM activists, that
    it alleged were killed extrajudicially by Karachi police between
    October 1998 and March 1999. Since the coup, reports of extrajudicial
    killings of MQM activists have dropped sharply. However, on September
    13, two MQM activists were killed, probably by government forces.
        Politically motivated and sectarian violence continued. After the
    coup, there was relative quiet until the traditionally tense Shi'a
    holiday of Muharram in April, when a number of violent incidents
    occurred between rival Sunni and Shi'a groups. One newspaper reported
    that an estimated 300 persons had died in sectarian attacks between
    late 1997 and 1999 (see Sections 2.c. and 5). Shi'a activists reported
    in April that approximately 40 Shi'as have been killed since the coup.
    According to government figures, 915 persons, 64 percent of them
    Shi'as, have died as a result of sectarian violence since 1994. On
    April 7, unknown gunmen in Karachi killed a Shi'a lawyer and the
    Secretary General of Tehrek-i-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP), his son, and his
    driver; the assailants may have been members of the extremist Sipah-e-
    Sahaba Pakistan (SSP--see Section 5). On April 12, in the worst
    incident of sectarian violence since the coup, unknown assailants
    attacked a Shi'a religious congregation in Rawalpindi with grenades and
    bullets, killing 19 persons and injuring 37 others. Police arrested
    several Sunni Muslims following the attack. In April an unknown gunman
    killed 15 Shi'a Muslims in the village of Mallow Wali. On May 11,
    unknown assailants killed a leader of the SSP, which marked the first
    killing of a known Sunni leader since 1998 (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
        Women were killed by family members in so-called ``honor
    killings.'' In March women's rights activists told a local newspaper
    that the frequency of honor killings is on the rise. For example, on
    June 1, a man from Yar Hussain in the northwest frontier province
    (NWFP) allegedly killed his 20-year-old daughter, Mumlikat Bibi, while
    she was sleeping. The father reportedly opposed his daughter's efforts
    to choose a spouse without parental consent (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
        There were at least two high profile killings during the year. In
    January unknown assailants killed the chief justice designate of the
    Baluchistan High Court; it is likely that Marri was killed as a result
    of a personal vendetta. On March 10, unknown assailants killed Iqbal
    Raad, one of the defense lawyers for former Prime Minister Sharif.
    However, many observers believe that Raad's involvement in the Sharif
    trial was not a factor in his death.
        There were numerous bomb attacks during the year. On January 17, a
    bomb in Karachi killed 12 persons and injured 22 persons. On January
    28, two separate explosions killed 6 persons and injured 40 persons. On
    February 5, a bomb exploded killing 7 persons and injuring 60 others.
    No one claimed responsibility for these attacks. In March during a high
    profile visit to the country by a foreign head of state, five
    explosions occurred in Hyderabad, Quetta, and Karachi; two persons were
    killed and four persons were injured in these explosions. On March 28,
    an explosion in Torkham along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border killed at
    least 7 persons and injured 27 others. In May a spate of bombings
    targeting Karachi police stations killed one person. On July 7, two
    explosions in the Punjab killed 3 persons and injured 11 others. On
    July 16, a bomb exploded on a train to Hyderabad, killing 10 persons
    and injuring 32 others. On September 3, a bomb exploded in Lahore's
    central bus station, killing 2 and injuring 12 others. On September 7,
    7 persons were killed and 35 injured in an explosion at the Dharampura
    Bazaar in Lahore. In late September, a large explosion at an Islamabad
    market killed at least 16 persons and injured 100 others. A local
    magazine reported that between January and October, there were more
    than 17 bomb explosions that killed dozens of persons in Quetta. No one
    claimed responsibility for these attacks (see Section 1.c.).
        Local newspapers reported that more than ten politically prominent
    Afghans were killed during the year (see Section 2.d.). For example, in
    April unknown assailants killed Arif Khan, the Taliban governor of
    Konduz province. Afghans attributed some of these killings to personal
    rather than political disputes. Police personnel did not arrest anyone
    in connection with these killings.
        There were reports that four prisoners died in a riot in a Peshawar
    jail in October; however, prison authorities denied these reports (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Tension along the line of control between Pakistan and Indian-held
    Kashmir was high during the year, and there was shelling in several
    sectors. A senior army official in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir
    estimated that approximately 143 civilians were killed on the Pakistani
    side of the line of control.
        b. Disappearance.--There were credible reports of politically
    motivated disappearances. For example, retired Major General Anwar Sher
    and an Afghan aide, Abdul Qaher Shariati, disappeared in July; they
    were active in organizing Afghans to pursue a peace process. There has
    been no police investigation into the disappearances. In the intra-
    Mohajir violence in Karachi, victims sometimes first are held and
    tortured by opposing groups (or, as the MQM-Altaf alleges, by security
    forces). Bodies of these victims, often mutilated, generally are dumped
    in the street soon after the victims are abducted; however, the
    incidence of such crimes decreased greatly during the year.
        In July a woman in Baluchistan was abducted by members of her tribe
    after a tribal jirga (council) forced the woman to annul her marriage
    (see Section 5).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The suspended Constitution and the Penal Code expressly
    forbid torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;
    however, police regularly torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons.
    Police routinely use force to elicit confessions; however, there were
    fewer such reports and greater police cooperation in investigating such
    reports during the year. Human rights observers suggest that, because
    of widespread torture by the police, suspects usually confess to crimes
    regardless of their actual culpability; the courts subsequently throw
    out many such confessions. AI estimates that at least 100 persons die
    from police torture each year (see Section 1.a.). According to a 1999
    Human Rights Watch report, children in detention also are subjected to
    torture and mistreatment (see Section 5).
        Common torture methods include: beating; burning with cigarettes;
    whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged isolation;
    electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced
    spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and public humiliation. Some
    magistrates help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports
    stating that the victims died of natural causes.
        Police personnel continued to torture persons in custody throughout
    the country. In June a local newspaper reported that prisoners waiting
    to appear in court routinely are held in fetters in police vans, even
    on extremely hot days. In 1999 70 prisoners awaiting or undergoing
    trial at Karachi prison, all MQM members, charged that they had been
    arrested illegally and tortured to induce confessions. According to MQM
    officials, police arrested over 700 MQM members during the past 2 years
    (see Section 1.d.); many of these persons reportedly were tortured in
    custody. In November 1999, Rana Sanaullah Khan, a PML member of the
    suspended Punjab provincial assembly, was arrested for criticizing the
    Musharraf Government; he reportedly was tortured in custody.
        In March a judge sentenced two prisoners convicted of murdering
    almost 100 children to be executed by having their bodies cut into 100
    and 98 pieces, respectively, and then having the pieces dissolved in
    acid. Legal experts criticized the judgment, and the case was under
    appeal at year's end.
        Despite some cases during the year in which police officers were
    investigated or charged in connection with abuse of detainees, the
    failure of successive governments to prosecute and to punish abusers
    effectively is the single greatest obstacle to ending or reducing the
    incidence of abuse by the police. The authorities sometimes
    transferred, suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom
    prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shield
    their colleagues. However, in February Deputy Inspector General Fayyaz
    Ahmed Leghari stated that in 1999 Sindh police penalized 28,000
    officers for malfeasance, and discharged or compulsorily retired 1,100
    out of a total provincial force of 85,000. In February two police
    inspectors charged with killing an MQM activist in custody in 1998 were
    denied bail after the Sindh High Court determined that they falsified
    precinct records and appeared to have committed the crime (see Section
    1.a.).
        The 1997 Anti-terrorist Act allowed confessions obtained in police
    custody to be used in new ``special courts.'' Human rights
    organizations and the press criticized this provision of the law
    because police torture of suspects is common. Police generally did not
    attempt to use confessions to secure convictions under this law and the
    Government agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court in 1998
    invalidated this and other sections of the Anti-terrorist Act. Due to
    greater scrutiny by NGO's and the media, including prison inspections
    in the Punjab and Sindh, the incidence of torture and abuse in prisons
    may be decreasing. In Karachi the Citizens Police Liaison Committee
    (CPLC) brought cases against police who make false arrests, practice
    torture, or take bribes. Cooperation between the CPLC and the police
    human rights complaint cell resulted in the dismissal of 216 policemen
    and the demotion or fines for 1,226 others between November 1998 and
    July 1999.
        Police corruption is widespread. Police and prison officials
    frequently use the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and
    their families. Police accept money for registering cases on false
    charges and may torture innocent citizens. Persons pay police to
    humiliate their opponents and to avenge their personal grievances.
    During the year, the Government took some steps to reduce police
    corruption and transferred several senior police officers to other
    provinces to circumvent their local ties. The Government also deployed
    army officers to police stations.
        In the past, successive governments recruited police officers in
    violation of considerations of merit and the department's regulations.
    In some instances, recruits had criminal records Police corruption is
    most serious at the level of the Station House Officer (SHO), the
    official who runs each precinct. In 1998 300 new SHO's recruited on
    merit began a long-delayed special training course; the new SHO's have
    been hired and observers believe that they might improve police
    performance greatly. Some SHO's widely are believed to operate arrest-
    for-ransom operations, and establish unsanctioned police stations to
    collect illicit revenue. An August news report listed seven such
    stations in Karachi. SHO's are powerful; some are believed to have
    killed superior officers who tried to inhibit their corruption. Senior
    government officials have confirmed that police stations, and
    assignments therein, are sold to interested parties who then proceed to
    recoup their investment though illicit activities.
        Actions taken to redress police abuses often have mixed results. In
    urban Sindh, the CPLC committees helped to curb some excesses, but
    complaints of large-scale police abuse persist.
        Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in
    response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women,
    including rape. These stations are staffed by female personnel, but
    receive even fewer material and human resources than regular police
    stations. For example, at the beginning of the year, the Karachi
    women's police station was housed in an unsafe building that had no
    bathing facilities and only one toilet for staff and inmates to share.
    Alerted to these conditions, Sindh Inspector General of Police Aftab
    Nabi moved the station to improved quarters and began a fundraising
    drive for a permanent facility. According to the government's own
    Commission of Inquiry for Women, the stations do not function
    independently or fulfill their purpose. Despite court orders and
    regulations that only female officers may interrogate female suspects,
    women continued to be detained overnight at regular police stations and
    abused by male officers. Based on Lahore newspaper reports from January
    to May 1999, the HRCP found 11 cases of violence, rape, or torture of
    women in police custody. In 1998 ``Nasreen'' accused the SHO of
    Lahore's Mozang police station of raping her after she visited the
    station to register a complaint against her in-laws. At the end of
    1998, the case was under internal investigation by Lahore police;
    however, during the year, ``Nasreen'' and her family withdrew the case
    without stating a reason. Instances of abuse of women in prisons are
    less frequent than in police stations. Sexual abuse of child detainees
    by police or guards reportedly also is a problem.
        The Hudood Ordinances, promulgated by the central martial law
    government in 1979, aimed to make the Penal Code more Islamic. These
    ordinances provide for harsh punishments for violations of Shari'a
    (Islamic law), including death by stoning for unlawful sexual relations
    and amputation for other crimes (see Section 1.c.). These so-called
    Hadd punishments require a high standard of evidence. In effect, four
    adult Muslim men of good character must witness an act for a Hadd
    punishment to apply. In 20 years, not a single Hadd punishment has been
    carried out. However, on the basis of lesser evidence, ordinary
    punishments such as jail terms or fines are imposed. From 1979 to 1995,
    over 1 million Hudood cases were filed, and 300,000 were heard by the
    courts. More recent statistics are unavailable. The laws are applied to
    Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
        Women frequently are charged under the Hudood laws for sexual
    misconduct, such as adultery. In 1998 about one-third of the women in
    jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan were awaiting trial for adultery;
    that percentage likely remains accurate. Most women tried under the
    ordinance are acquitted, but the stigma of an adultery charge alone is
    severe. A Hudood law meant to deter false accusations is enforced
    weakly, and one human rights monitor claimed that 80 percent of
    adultery-related Hudood cases are filed without supporting evidence.
    Men accused of rape sometimes are acquitted and released while their
    victims are held for adultery or fornication. The Commission of Inquiry
    for Women recommended that the Hudood laws be repealed as they are
    based on an erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 5).
        The Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR), which applies in the Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), permits the punishment of relatives,
    friends, and neighbors of suspects. Authorities are empowered to
    blockade villages or to detain tribal kinsmen to obtain the surrender
    of a fugitive (see Sections 1.e. and 1.f.).
        Police routinely use excessive force against demonstrators or
    strikers. On June 3, in Rawalpindi police that were armed with batons
    attacked 200 small business owners during a demonstration, injuring a
    number of persons. On June 9, police personnel used force to disperse a
    group of protesters, injuring 4 persons. Police accused the protesters
    of throwing stones and bricks at them, but some eyewitnesses alleged
    that the police fired without provocation. On June 29, police used
    batons and deployed tear gas during a rally of small and medium
    businessmen. In all three incidents, the protesters were challenging
    government plans to collect sales taxes (see Section 2.b.).
        Police at times also beat journalists (see Section 2.a.). For
    example, in August government agents allegedly beat journalist Mazhar
    Tufail.
        Police failed in some instances to protect members of religious
    minorities--particularly Ahmadis and Christians--from societal attacks
    (see Section 5).
        A number of bomb attacks killed and injured many persons during the
    year (see Section 1.a.). No one claimed responsibility for these
    attacks.
        Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding is widespread.
    According to the HRCP, there are 80,000 prisoners in jails that were
    built to hold a maximum of 35,833 persons. In 1999 a journalist for the
    Nation newspaper visited Adiala jail in Rawalpindi and reported that
    the prison holds 4,277 prisoners but was built for 2,000. According to
    a February press report, Sindh provincial officials claimed that the 16
    jails of Sindh province, with a total capacity of 7,759 prisoners,
    actually housed over 14,000. Karachi central prison is the most
    overcrowded, with a population of 4,087 prisoners in a space designed
    for only 991; only 2 toilets are available per every 100 prisoners and
    the daily food budget in the lowest class of cells equals about $.020
    per prisoner. The HRCP claimed that the Lahore district jail, built to
    house 1,045 prisoners, contains 3,200. In July 1999, the Punjab Home
    Department admitted before the Lahore High Court that over 50,000
    prisoners were held in Punjabi jails meant for 17,271. In the NWFP 21
    prisons with a total capacity of 7,397 prisoners house 10,194 persons,
    including 485 children. Some 80 percent of prisoners are awaiting
    trial, mostly for petty offenses.
        Prisoners routinely are shackled. The principal of the institute
    for jail staff training in Lahore stated in a July 1999 press interview
    that fettering is the most convenient way to administer an overcrowded
    jail. While the Pakistan Prison Act of 1894 permits fettering for a
    variety of offenses, the punishment usually is given for administrative
    convenience, or to extract bribes from prisoners. The shackles used are
    tight, heavy, and painful, and reportedly have led to gangrene and
    amputation in several cases. According to a press report, Shaheen
    Akhtar, a 15-year-old rape victim charged with adultery under the
    Hudood Ordinances, was kept fettered in a hospital despite being
    diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis; Akhtar died in May (see Section
    1.c.). Although the Sindh High Court ruled fettering illegal in 1993,
    the practice continues, and visitors to Sindhi jails regularly see
    fettered prisoners. On April 21, General Musharraf condemned fettering
    as a ``tool of indignity.'' Following a Lahore High Court ruling in
    June, prison wardens in Lahore were ordered to remove fetters; however
    police personnel and prison administrators have resisted (see Section
    4).
        There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class
    ``C'' cells generally hold common criminals and those in pretrial
    detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor
    food. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse,
    including beatings and forced kneeling for long periods of time. In
    1998 the Senate's Committee on Human Rights reported that at one
    facility in Hyderabad, 60 prisoners were confined to a space 100 feet
    by 30 feet with only 1 latrine. Such unsanitary conditions are common
    in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit colonial-era prisons.
    Inadequate food, often consisting of only a few pieces of bread, led to
    chronic malnutrition for those unable to supplement their diet with
    help from family or friends. Access to medical care is a problem.
    Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and are not
    segregated from the general prison population (see Section 5). Foreign
    prisoners, mostly citizens of African countries with minimal diplomatic
    representation, often remain in prison long after their sentences are
    completed because there is no one to pay for their deportation to their
    home country. Conditions in ``A'' and ``B'' cells are markedly better;
    prisoners in these cells are permitted to have servants, special food,
    and televisions. Authorities reserve ``A'' cells for prominent persons,
    including political leaders. Especially prominent individuals--
    including some political figures--sometimes are held under house arrest
    and permitted to receive visitors.
        In September prisoners in Hyderabad prison rioted to protest poor
    prison conditions. On September 25, police used force to quell a large
    prison riot; no casualty figures were reported. Prisoners also held
    riots over prison conditions in Peshawar in October and in Dera Islami
    Khan in December. There were reports that four prisoners died in the
    Peshawar jail riot; however, prison authorities denied the reports.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors (see
    Section 1.d.). Landlords in Sindh and political factions in Karachi
    operated private jails (see Section 1.d.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law regulates arrest
    and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply
    with the law and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The
    law permits the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order
    detention without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of
    threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in 30-
    day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report
    instances in which prisoners jailed under the Maintenance of Public
    Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months without charge. For
    other criminal offenses, police may hold a suspect for 24 hours without
    charge. After the prisoner appears before a magistrate, the court can
    grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period of 14
    days if the police provide material proof that this is necessary for an
    investigation. The Musharraf regime created the National Accountability
    Bureau (NAB) and special accountability courts to try corruption cases;
    the National Accountability Ordinance allows those suspected of corrupt
    practices to be detained for 90 days without charge (see Section 1.e.).
        Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident
    Report (FIR) filed by a complainant, and have been known to file FIR's
    without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently are used to harass or
    intimidate individuals. Charges against an individual also may be based
    on a ``blind'' FIR, which lists the perpetrators as ``person or persons
    unknown.'' If the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the inactive
    file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a magistrate by
    the police; the police then name a suspect and ask that the suspect be
    remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After 14 days, the
    case is dropped for lack of evidence, but then another FIR is activated
    and brought against the accused. In this manner, rolling charges can be
    used to hold a suspect in custody continuously.
        If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical
    remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation) is necessary
    for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14
    days. However, such proof may be little more than unsubstantiated
    assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not fully
    observe the limits on detention. Police are not required to notify
    anyone when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge
    until a court challenges them. The police sometimes detain individuals
    arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort payment for
    their release. In Karachi small squads of police stopped taxis and
    delivery trucks for bribes. Human rights monitors report that a number
    of police stations have secret detention cells in which individuals are
    kept while police bargain for their release. There also are reports
    that the police move prisoners from one police station to another if
    they suspect a surprise visit by higher authorities. Some women
    continued to be detained arbitrarily and sexually abused (see Sections
    1.c. and 5). Police also detained relatives of wanted criminals in
    order to compel suspects to surrender (see Section 1.f.). Police
    personnel also have been known to detain persons as a result of
    personal vendettas. Following an August house robbery in a Christian
    neighborhood in Islamabad, police reportedly arrested residents of the
    neighborhood and extorted bribes from them in exchange for their
    release.
        The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within
    30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do not start
    until 6 months after the filing of charges. In 1998 the HRCP estimated
    that there were almost as many individuals awaiting trial in jails as
    there were prisoners. According to the chief justice of the Lahore High
    Court, there were over 500,000 civil and criminal cases backlogged in
    the province's subordinate court system as of April 1999. In 1999 in 62
    Lahore city courts, 7,000 prisoners were awaiting trial in 6,000 cases;
    in 3,500 of these cases, the police have not even brought a
    ``challan,'' or indictment, to the court. Sindh Government officials
    reported in February that 11,945 of the 14,219 prisoners in Sindh jails
    are awaiting trial. In 1997 the Government justified the creation of
    Anti-terrorist courts by citing the large number of murder and other
    cases that are clogging the regular court system (see Section 1.e.).
    The anti-terrorist courts reportedly sentenced 32 persons to death and
    15 persons to life imprisonment during the year. Double jeopardy
    applies to those convicted of possessing narcotics because of a 1990
    federal Shariat court ruling that customs and narcotics cases be
    initiated separately. A February ruling by the Lahore High Court
    forbidding a second trial was ignored by an April sessions court
    decision in Lahore, which sent the accused back to prison for the
    second time on the same narcotics conviction.
        Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has
    waited for over 3 years for the start of his trial on charges of
    killing his brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto. Charges were first filed
    against Zardari in 1997 and transferred successively to two courts,
    where several judges refused to preside. By year's end, only 2 of 223
    witnesses have been heard. In April 1999, Zardari was tried and
    convicted separately on corruption charges.
        The Government permits visits by human rights monitors, family
    members, and lawyers (see Section 1.c.). However, in some cases,
    authorities refuse family visits and, in some police stations, persons
    are expected to pay bribes to see a prisoner. The Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a separate legal system, the
    Frontier Crimes Regulation, which recognizes the doctrine of collective
    responsibility. Authorities are empowered to detain fellow members of a
    fugitive's tribe, or to blockade the fugitive's village, pending his
    surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local
    tradition. The Government continued to exercise such authority during
    the year. In March two persons from Mullah Said village were arrested
    under the Frontier Crimes Regulation following a shooting incident in
    which some persons from this village fired on residents of the
    neighboring Badan village (see Section 1.f.).
        The Government sometimes uses mass arrests to quell protests or
    civil unrest. In 1999 police personnel arrested hundreds of persons,
    including two prominent members of the SSP, Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq
    and Maulana Mohammad Ahmad Ludhianvi, following a wave of sectarian
    violence in Punjab and Sindh. Tariq and Ludhianvi were released during
    the year; however, Ludhianvi was killed in May by unknown assailants
    and Azam Tariq has taken refuge in Afghanistan (see Sections 1.a. and
    5). Police arrested small businessmen during strikes in May and June;
    however, all of the demonstrators were released shortly after their
    arrests. On May 11, police arrested about 300 Muslim clerics and
    students in Lahore during protests against Musharraf's proposed changes
    to the blasphemy laws (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). In September Lahore
    police arrested more than 500 activists of the Pakistan People's Party
    (PPP) for shouting slogans against the Musharraf regime and the army.
    During the year, police arrested hundreds of opposition party members
    in order to prevent planned demonstrations from occurring (see Section
    2.b.).
        The Government detained several high-profile businessmen in
    connection with General Musharraf's anticorruption campaign. In March
    police detained a leading Afghan rug merchant; the merchant was
    released after 2 months. On May 8, armed gunmen seized Amin Lakhani, a
    leading Karachi businessman. Several days later, the NAB admitted that
    it authorized Lakhani's seizure. Lakhani was held without charge for
    several weeks and questioned about his financial affairs. His brother,
    Sultan Lakhani, also was seized on May 8 and remained in detention
    without charge at year's end.
        On a number of occasions, police arrested persons prior to
    demonstrations under the Criminal Procedures Code ban (see Section
    2.b.).
        Police personnel arrested about 150 journalists during a peaceful
    protest in April. In August police personnel arrested four journalists
    who reportedly criticized the police; the journalists were released
    after 4 days (see Section 2.a.).
        In past years, persons occasionally were detained arbitrarily
    because of disputes with powerful or well-connected persons; however,
    there were no reports that this occurred during the year.
        The Musharraf Government detained without warrants and without
    charges several dozen political figures, military officers, government
    administrators, and Sharif family members following the 1999 coup.
    Nawaz Sharif and members of his family, including Punjab chief minister
    Shahbaz Sharif; most of the Cabinet; several senior advisors to the
    Prime Minister or to the Government; and a number of military and
    police officials were arrested or placed under house arrest immediately
    following the coup. On several occasions during the year, police
    officials prevented Nawaz Sharif's wife, Kulsoom Nawaz, from speaking
    at public meetings. Many of the officials who were arrested following
    the coup were held incommunicado. Nawaz Sharif was held incommunicado
    from the time of his arrest until he was brought to court more than 1
    month later. Most others were released within a few days. In December
    the Government released from detention former Minister of Information
    Mushahid Hussain who had been held under house arrest since the October
    coup. As of year's end, approximately 30 politicians and their
    relatives remained in custody.
        Several key figures among those initially arrested without charge,
    including Nawaz Sharif, were held in connection with the ``hijacking''
    on October 12, 1999 of the civilian airliner carrying General Musharraf
    back from a conference in Sri Lanka; former Prime Minister Sharif
    reportedly denied permission for the plane to land in Karachi. Along
    with Sharif's summary replacement of General Musharraf with the
    Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, this
    event led to the 1999 coup. In the weeks following Sharif's arrest, he
    was detained without charge and denied access to counsel and family
    members (see Section 1.e.). A First Incident Report was filed on
    November 10, 1999, which charged Sharif with attempted murder,
    hijacking, and criminal conspiracy. Former Sharif advisor Ghous Ali
    Shah, former Pakistan International Airlines chairman Shahid Khaqan
    Abbasi, former Director of Civil Aviation Aminullah Chaudhary, and
    former Inspector General of Police Rana Maqbool were charged along with
    Sharif. The accused were to be tried before an Anti-terrorist court. On
    November 26, 1999, three other individuals--former Punjab chief
    minister Shahbaz Sharif, former senator Saifur Rehman, and former
    secretary to the Prime Minister Saeed Mehdi--were named codefendants in
    the case. Following changes in the Anti-terrorist Act, the formal
    filing of charges against Nawaz Sharif occurred on December 8, 1999.
    Sharif was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in April. His
    six codefendants were acquitted; however, they were still in custody at
    year's end on a maintenance of public order charge'' (see Section
    1.e.).
        Private jails exist in tribal and feudal areas.
        Hundreds of MQM activists and legislators (including former Sindh
    Minister of Labor Shoaib Bokhari) were arrested in 1998 and remained in
    custody at year's end; some of these activists are being held without
    charge. According to MQM officials, police arrested over 700 MQM
    officials during the past 2 years (see Section 1.c.).
        Many persons apprehended by the National Accountability Bureau (see
    Section 1.e.) remained in detention past the ordinance's stipulated 90
    days detention without charge (see Section 1.d.). Siddiq ul-Farooq, a
    former press secretary to Nawaz Sharif, was arrested under the NAB in
    October 1999 and held without charge until May; at year's end, he was
    in detention pending commencement of the proceedings in his case. On
    April 4, Mian Manzoor Watoo, the former Punjab Chief Minister and head
    of his own PML faction, became the first senior politician to receive a
    jail term in a corruption case. In late 1999, MQM leader and former
    mayor of Karachi Dr. Farooq Sattar was arrested by order of the NAB,
    removed from his domicile, and held in a cell without a bed, chair, or
    desk. On July 14, Sattar was convicted on a widely disputed corruption
    charge. In July Nawaz Sharif was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment
    and banned from holding political office for 21 years on the basis of a
    corruption conviction. Most observers reported that Sharif's trial was
    fair; however, they believe the Government's decision to pursue the
    corruption case was politically motivated.
        During the year, authorities released from prison thousands of
    persons convicted of petty crimes who were being held despite the fact
    that their prison terms had expired. For example, in January
    authorities released 12,000 prisoners who were convicted of petty
    crimes. In an October news report, a senior official in the Ministry of
    Interior stated that 47,000 persons who were jailed for minor offenses
    were released during the year. The Punjab Department of Jails
    reportedly released 15,000 prisoners who were convicted of petty crimes
    during the year.
        Human rights groups alleged that as many as 50 private jails,
    housing some 4,500 bonded laborers were being maintained by landlords
    in lower Sindh (see Section 6.c.). Some prisoners reportedly have been
    held for many years. In the five districts of upper Sindh, landlords
    have defied the courts and police by holding tribal jirgas, which
    settle feuds, award fines, and even sentence persons to the death
    penalty in defiance of provincial laws. In January a newspaper reported
    that 56 landless agricultural workers escaped from a private jail in
    Sanghar district, Sindh. The landlord reportedly had forced them to
    work without wages for several years. In February 42 bonded laborers
    escaped from a private jail in Umerkot district, Sindh. Under pressure
    from the landowner, seven of the laborers signed affidavits that they
    had not been confined against their will. On March 8, the Lahore High
    Court ordered the release of 24 brick kiln workers, including 10 women
    or children. According to press accounts, the laborers were kept in
    chains, not compensated for their work, and were beaten frequently.
        On December 9, the Government commuted former Prime Minister Nawaz
    Sharif's prison sentence and exiled him and 18 of his family members to
    Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Sharif family was forced to surrender a
    number of assets to the Government and had to agree to withdraw from
    politics while in exile. Some observers stated that the Government
    exiled Sharif in order to remove him from politics and to reduce the
    power and influence of the opposition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The suspended Constitution
    provided for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the
    judiciary remains subject to executive branch influence, and despite
    the Musharraf regime's pledge to respect the independence of the
    judicial system, it took steps to control the judiciary and to remove
    the regime from judicial oversight. Provisional Constitution Order
    Number 1, issued on October 14, 1999, provided that all courts
    functioning at the time of the change in government would continue to
    operate, but that no court would have the power to issue orders against
    General Musharraf or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under
    his authority. The decree effectively removed the actions of the
    Musharraf regime from judicial oversight. General Musharraf further
    undermined the independence of the judiciary when he ordered that all
    Supreme Court, Shar'ia Court, and Provincial High Court justices take
    an oath to uphold the PCO that brought the military into power. Low
    salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, and corruption
    contributed to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts.
        On January 25, 4 days before the Supreme Court was due to begin
    hearings on the legitimacy of the coup, General Musharraf ordered all
    Supreme Court, Shariat court, and provincial High Court justices to
    take an oath committing themselves to uphold the PCO, which suspended
    the Constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior
    courts from making any decision against the Chief Executive ``or any
    person exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority.'' Six
    Supreme Court justices, including the Chief Justice, and nine
    provincial High Court justices resigned in protest; however, 85 percent
    of the affected justices agreed to swear allegiance to the PCO. As a
    result of this decree, government directives and ordinances under the
    PCO are no longer subject to judicial review. Some government officials
    claimed that General Musharraf issued this decree due to concerns that
    judges were being bribed to rule against the Government in the court
    challenges to the military takeover. Many persons criticized this
    requirement, stating that it effectively ended the role of the
    judiciary as an independent body.
        The Supreme Court at times demonstrated a limited degree of
    independence. For example, on May 12, in a unanimous decision, the
    Supreme Court upheld the legality of the coup on the grounds of state
    necessity; however, the court ordered the current Government to hold
    national elections no later than 90 days after October 12, 2002. The
    decision also affirmed the Supreme Court's continued right of judicial
    rule, ruled that it was legal for the Musharraf Government to amend the
    Constitution as long as the amendments do not change the basic
    character of the Constitution, and reserved the right to review the
    military's performance and the continued necessity of the Emergency
    Proclamation and the PCO. Many observers criticized the Supreme Court
    decision as vague and contradictory.
        The judicial system involves several court systems with overlapping
    and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There are civil and criminal
    systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics, and anti-
    terrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat court for certain
    Hudood offenses. The appeals process in the civil system is: Civil
    court, district court, High Court, and the Supreme Court. In the
    criminal system, the progression is magistrate, sessions court, High
    Court, and the Supreme Court.
        The judiciary has argued that it has failed to try and convict
    terrorist suspects in a timely manner because of poor police casework,
    prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence. In
    response to this problem, the Sharif Government passed the Anti-
    terrorist Act in 1997; special anti-terrorist courts began operation in
    August 1997. The anti-terrorist courts, designed for the speedy
    punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures;
    however, due to the continued intimidation of witnesses, police, and
    judges, the courts produced only a handful of convictions in 1998.
    Under the act, terrorist killings are punishable by death and any act,
    including speech, intended to stir up religious hatred, is punishable
    by up to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Cases are to be decided within
    7 working days, but judges are free to extend the period of time as
    required. Trials in absentia were permitted, but then subsequently
    prohibited in October 1998. Appeals to an appellate tribunal also were
    required to take no more than 7 days, but appellate authority since has
    been restored to the High and Supreme Courts, under which these time
    limits do not apply. Under the Anti-terrorist Act, bail is not to be
    granted if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
    is guilty.
        Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press,
    and politicians from a number of parties expressed strong reservations
    about the anti-terrorist courts, charging that they constitute a
    parallel judicial system and could be used as tools of political
    repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent
    effect of the act's death penalty provisions contributed to the
    reduction in sectarian violence after its passage. The anti-terrorist
    courts also are empowered to try persons accused of particularly
    ``heinous'' crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several
    persons have been tried, convicted, and executed under these
    provisions. In 1997 cases filed under Section 295 (a) of the Penal Code
    (one of the so-called blasphemy laws--see Section 2.c.) were
    transferred to the anti-terrorist courts. Human rights advocates feared
    that if blasphemy cases were tried in the anti-terrorist courts,
    alleged blasphemers, who in the past normally were granted bail or
    released for lack of evidence were likely to be convicted, given the
    less stringent rules of evidence required under the Anti-terrorist Act.
        In November 1998, Nawaz Sharif announced the establishment of
    military courts in Karachi, which had been under Governor's Rule since
    October 1998. These courts were to try cases involving heinous acts and
    terrorism, which the Government stated were a serious challenge to
    public authority that the existing court system was inadequate to
    address. They were intended to bring swifter justice to the city, which
    had been plagued by terrorism, violence, and a general breakdown in law
    and order. Military courts began operation in December 1998. In January
    1999, the Supreme Court ruled in an interim decision that military
    trial courts could not impose the death penalty. On February 17, 1999,
    the Supreme Court ruled that the military courts were unconstitutional
    and ordered the establishment of additional anti-terrorist courts;
    however, it allowed sentences already handed down by the military
    courts to stand. The anti-terrorist courts were to operate under the
    supervision of two Supreme Court justices, and courts of first instance
    and appellate courts were to render decisions within 7 days; in
    practice, this did not occur. Consequently in April 1999, the Sharif
    Government promulgated an ordinance transferring cases from military
    trial courts to anti-terrorist courts and expanded the jurisdiction to
    cover the same types of offenses as the military courts, including
    murder, gang rape, and child molestation. An April 1999 ordinance made
    strikes and go-slows illegal as ``civil commotion'' offenses; both are
    punishable by incarceration and fines (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). In
    December 1999, the Musharraf Government again modified the Anti-
    terrorist Act by adding a number of additional offenses, including acts
    to outrage religious feelings; efforts to ``wage war against the
    state''; conspiracy; acts committed in abetting an offense; and
    kidnaping or abduction to confine a person. By ordinance the Musharraf
    regime created a special anti-terrorist court in Sindh presided over by
    a High Court justice rather than a lower level judge, as is usually the
    case. The amended provision permits the High Court justice to
    ``transfer . . . any case pending before any other special court . . .
    and try the case'' in his court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif maintained
    that these changes were designed to help the Musharraf regime prosecute
    Sharif.
        The trial of Nawaz Sharif and six codefendants on charges of
    hijacking was the most widely publicized case tried by an Anti-
    terrorist court during the year. On April 6, Sharif was found guilty of
    hijacking and terrorism and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment
    (to be served consecutively), an unspecified fine, 5 years' rigorous
    imprisonment in lieu of non-payment of the fine, forfeiture of all
    property, and a fine to compensate the 198 passengers and crew of the
    flight. Judge Jaffrey ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
    arraign Sharif on four offenses related to ``waging war against the
    state'' and criminal conspiracy; the charges were dropped. The six
    codefendants were found not guilty; however, they were still in custody
    at year's end on a ``maintenance of public order charge.''
        Diplomatic observers who attended the Sharif trial concluded that
    the trial generally was fair, open, and transparent. The defendants
    were given free choice of and ready access to counsel. Diplomats and
    the media were granted free daily trial access and newspapers
    frequently reported on defense attorneys' criticism of General
    Musharraf and the army. In February the prosecution asked the judge to
    restrict media coverage of court statements by the accused. Judge
    Jaffrey rejected the prosecution's petition; however, the court
    reserved the right to prevent publication of sensitive national
    security data. Nawaz Sharif and his defense counsel expressed ``full
    confidence'' in the court. The prosecution appealed the codefendants'
    acquittals and Sharif's life sentences, arguing for the death penalty,
    and the defense appealed Sharif's conviction in the Sindh High Court in
    a trial that courtroom observers considered free and fair. On October
    30, the appeals court upheld Nawaz Sharif's convictions for hijacking
    and terrorism but combined them into one offense. The court also denied
    the prosecution appeal to upgrade Nawaz's sentence to the death
    penalty, reduced the amount of property forfeiture, and affirmed the
    antiterrorism court's acquittals of the six codefendants.
        By ordinance, the Musharraf regime created the National
    Accountability Bureau and special accountability courts to try
    corruption cases. The NAB was created in part to deal with as much as
    $4 billion (approximately PRs 208 billion) that is estimated to be owed
    to the country's banks (all of which are state-owned) by debtors,
    mainly from among the wealthy elite. The Musharraf Government stated
    that it would not target genuine business failures or small defaulters
    and does not appear to have done so. The NAB was given broad powers to
    prosecute such cases, and the accountability courts were expected to
    try cases within 30 days. The ordinance prohibits courts from granting
    bail and gives the NAB chairman sole power to decide if and when to
    release detainees. The ordinance also allows those suspected by the
    State Bank of Pakistan of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt
    practices to be detained for 90 days without charge and, prior to being
    charged, does not allow access to counsel. During the year, many
    persons that were apprehended under the NAB ordinance remained in
    detention without charge for longer than 90 days (see Section 1.d.). In
    accountability cases, there is a presumption of guilt, and conviction
    under the ordinance can result in 14 years' imprisonment; fines; and
    confiscation of property. Those convicted also are disqualified from
    running for office or holding office for 21 years. On August 11, the
    Government announced that persons with a court conviction would be
    barred from holding party office.
        The Musharraf regime denied press reports that it had decided not
    to pursue accountability cases against active members of the military
    or the judiciary; however, no serving members of the military or the
    judiciary have been charged by the NAB. In June the Government
    announced that NAB had arrested 132 persons to date; 82 persons were in
    detention, 53 were held in judicial lockups, and 29 were in the
    bureau's custody. A published list of persons charged with corruption
    by the NAB included former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir
    Bhutto. On November 19, 1999, MQM leader and former mayor of Karachi
    Dr. Farooq Sattar was arrested on a corruption charge by the NAB. He
    was held for more than three months in prison without access to counsel
    and was transferred from Karachi to Attock Fort, a high-security army
    facility in NWFP in February. Sattar was convicted on July 14 and
    sentenced to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment, a $1 million (PRs 50
    million) fine, and 21 years of political disqualification. Sattar's
    lawyers complained about violations of due process and the remote venue
    of the trial.
        The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the
    presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal
    of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital
    cases. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited number of judges,
    the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases
    routinely take years, and defendants must make frequent court
    appearances. Cases start over when an attorney changes. Under both the
    Hudood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and nonbailable
    offenses. According to the Criminal Procedures Code, the accused in
    bailable offenses must be granted bail, and those charged with
    nonbailable offenses should be granted bail if the alleged crime
    carries a sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused, especially
    well-connected persons who are made aware of impending warrants against
    them, are able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and are thus spared arrest
    and incarceration.
        The federal Shariat court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme
    Court serve as appellate courts for certain convictions in criminal
    court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat court also may
    overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of
    Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the
    Supreme Court. In two areas of the NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a
    law was instituted in 1999 by regulation and by ordinance,
    respectively. On September 20, 1999, the NWFP assembly passed a bill
    that incorporated the Kohistan ordinance into law (see Section 2.c.).
    In May the governor of the NWFP reportedly affirmed to the media his
    plan to implement Shari'a law in Malakand division.
        The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic
    infighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the
    different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the
    application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled judgeships
    and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized
    appointment process holds up the promotion of many lower court judges
    to the High Courts. Although the higher level judiciary is considered
    competent and generally honest, there are widespread reports of
    corruption among lower level magistrates and minor court functionaries.
        Persons in jail awaiting trial sometimes are held for periods
    longer than the sentence that they would receive if convicted. Court
    officials report that each judge reviews between 70 and 80 cases per
    day, but that action is taken on only 3 or 4 each week. At the end of
    1997, 80,000 criminal cases were reportedly pending in Sindh, 67,800 of
    which were in Karachi. The Law Ministry, in reply to a question in the
    National Assembly in 1997, reported that there were over 150,000 cases
    pending with the superior judiciary, which includes the Supreme Court
    and the four provincial High Courts. During the year, there were
    approximately 125,000 cases pending. Clogged lower courts exacerbate
    the situation; the majority of cases in the High Courts consist of
    appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal reaches the High Court,
    there are further opportunities for delay because decisions of
    individual judges frequently are referred to panels composed of two or
    three judges. There continued to be charges that magistrates and
    police, under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade
    detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the consequences.
    Politically powerful persons also attempt to influence magistrates in
    their decision-making, sometimes threatening to transfer magistrates to
    other assignments.
        In July 1999, press reports noted that hundreds of prisoners
    remained in the Karachi central prison after the completion of their
    sentences. The Sindh Home Department stated that at least 10 percent of
    prisoners awaiting trial in Karachi central prison had no access to
    free legal aid or the possibility of bail, even if qualified. Reporters
    interviewing male prisoners in one block discovered that 16 percent of
    them were not represented by attorneys. As of March 1999, 6,000 cases
    awaited trial in 62 Lahore courts, with 7,000 prisoners awaiting a
    court date. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have not yet submitted
    a ``challan,'' or indictment.
        The Penal Code incorporates the doctrines of Qisas (roughly, an eye
    for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas is not known to have been
    invoked; however, Diyat occasionally is applied, particularly in the
    NWFP, in place of judicial punishment of the wrongdoer. Only the family
    of the victim, not the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood,
    Qisas, and Diyat ordinances apply to ordinary criminal courts and
    Shariat courts. According to Christian activists, if a Muslim kills a
    non-Muslim, he can redress the crime by paying Diyat to the victim's
    family; however, a non-Muslim who kills a Muslim does not have the
    option of paying and must serve a jail sentence or face the death
    penalty for his crime. Failure to pay Diyat in non-capital cases can
    result in indefinitely extended incarceration, under Section 331 of the
    Diyat ordinance. In 1998 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted
    that there were 58 persons in prison after the completion of their jail
    terms because they could not pay the Diyat.
        Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess
    of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the Shariat courts
    and are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using
    ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and
    must be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a
    Shariat court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There is a
    system of bail.
        The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex
    (including adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol,
    and property offenses. Offenses are distinguished according to
    punishment, with some offenses liable to Hadd, or Koranic, punishment
    (see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular punishment.
    Although both types of cases are tried in ordinary criminal courts,
    special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in Hadd cases; Hadd
    punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them.
    Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences are most severe for married
    Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim man confesses to rape or
    there are four adult male Muslim witnesses to the act, the accused must
    be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is not Muslim or married, if
    he confesses, or if the act is witnessed by four adult males (not all
    Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100 lashes with a whip, and
    such other punishment, including death, as the court may deem fit. The
    testimony of four female witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is
    insufficient to impose Hadd punishments. If the evidence falls short of
    Hadd criteria, then the accused may be sentenced to a lesser class of
    penalties (Tazir). Since it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence
    to support the Hadd punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir
    level, under which sentences may be imposed up to 25 years in prison
    and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in the more
    than 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir
    punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
    offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary requirement for financial or
    future obligations is for two male witnesses or one male and two female
    witnesses; in all other matters, the court may accept the testimony of
    one man or one woman (see Section 5).
        Administration of justice in the FATA is normally the
    responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may
    conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such
    proceedings, the accused have no right to legal representation, bail,
    or appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder.
    However, the Government's political agents, who are federal civil
    servants assigned to tribal agencies, oversee such proceedings and may
    impose prison terms of up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces under the
    direction of the political agents frequently conduct punitive actions
    during enforcement operations. For example, in raids on criminal
    activities, the authorities have damaged surrounding homes as
    extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby
    criminal activity (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
        In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of federal political
    agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned
    punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning.
        Another related form of rough justice operating in the NWFP,
    particularly in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali, or the
    Pakhtun Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under
    this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take
    revenge for wrongs--either real or perceived--to redeem their honor.
    More often than not, these disputes arise over women and land, and
    frequently result in violence (see Section 5).
        There are limited numbers of political prisoners. Sections of the
    Penal Code directly target members of the Ahmadi faith; according to
    Ahmadi sources, approximately 200 Ahmadis have been incarcerated under
    these provisions since their inception. Several minority religious
    groups argue that other sections of the Penal Code--particularly the
    related blasphemy laws--are used in a discriminatory fashion by local
    officials or private individuals to punish religious minorities. While
    precise numbers are unavailable, the Ahmadis estimate that 80 of their
    coreligionists were charged in criminal cases ``on a religious basis''
    in 1999 (see Sections 2.c. and 5). On April 12, the Government
    announced its intention to require that deputy commissioners review all
    blasphemy cases prior to the filing of a FIR; however, the Government
    reversed this decision on May 16 due to intense pressure from some
    Islamic groups (see Section 2.c.).
        Some political groups also argue that they are marked for arrest
    based on their political affiliation (see Section 1.d.). The Muttahida
    Quami Movement, in particular, has argued that the Government used
    Anti-terrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence its activists.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Anti-terrorist Act allowed police or military personnel acting as
    police to enter and to search homes and offices without search
    warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in an
    alleged terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision
    was never tested in the courts. While the Anti-terrorist Act was
    partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Anti-
    terrorist Ordinances in October 1998 and in April 1999. Under these new
    ordinances, many blasphemy cases are now tried by anti-terrorist
    courts. By law the police need a warrant to search a house, but not to
    search a person. Despite this law, police have entered homes without a
    warrant and sometimes stole valuables during searches. In the absence
    of a warrant, a policeman is subject to charges of criminal trespass.
    However, police seldom are punished for illegal entry.
        The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services
    that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists,
    and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicate
    that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and intercept and open
    mail. In 1997 the Supreme Court directed the Government to seek its
    permission before carrying out wiretapping or eavesdropping operations.
    The judiciary's directive has been widely ignored. A case in which it
    was alleged that 12 government agencies tapped and monitored citizens'
    telephone calls still was pending in the Supreme Court at year's end.
        Police sometimes arrest and detain relatives of wanted persons to
    compel them to surrender. In some cases, the authorities have detained
    entire families in order to force a relative who was the recipient of
    an arrest warrant to surrender (see Section 1.d.). While the Government
    generally does not interfere with the right to marry, the Government on
    occasion assists influential families to prevent marriages they oppose.
    For example, in July 1999, police in Mirpurkas District, Sindh raided
    the home of Javed Dal, who had eloped with his cousin, and arrested his
    family members as hostages. His wife's father, Somar Dal, used his
    influence as a member of the Sindh National Front Executive Committee
    to instigate the arrests, which were carried out without warrants (see
    Section 5). The authorities also fail to prosecute vigorously cases in
    which families punish members (generally women) for marrying or seeking
    a divorce against the wishes of other family members. In June Mumlikat
    Bibi was killed in her parents' home in the village of Yar Hussain in
    the NWFP. Her father, who reportedly opposed Bibi's efforts to choose a
    spouse without parental consent, was accused of being the culprit (see
    Section 5).
        Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
    remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
    Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
    under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see
    Section 2.c.).
        The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the
    FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the authorities
    to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or blockade an
    entire village (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The Government demolished
    the houses of several alleged criminals, as well as the homes of those
    who reportedly tolerated nearby criminal activity.
        On December 13, 1999, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-
    Tulaba, an extremist group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged
    accomplices to a killing, and burned down their homes as punishment. On
    December 29, 1999, there were riots in Karachi in response to the
    demolition by security forces of up to 300 homes in the low-income
    Gharibabad neighborhood, which is widely considered to be an MQM-Altaf
    stronghold. Authorities claimed that the homes were built without
    permits and that they sheltered terrorists and criminals. In March
    police personnel arrested two persons from Mullah Said village
    following an incident in which several persons from the village shot at
    residents of the neighboring Badan village (see Section 1.d.).
        Provincial governments sometimes forcibly moved landless laborers
    from their temporary camps. For example, in October local government
    officials forcibly moved 900 persons who recently had been freed from
    bonded labor from their temporary camps in Sikandarabad in Kotri
    district (see Section 6.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The suspended Constitution
    provided for freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens generally
    are free to discuss public issues; however, some journalists practice a
    degree of self-censorship. In contrast to the Sharif Government, the
    Musharraf Government did not attempt to exercise direct control over
    views expressed in the print media. Newspaper editorials and
    commentators are increasingly critical of the Government; however,
    direct criticism of the military is rare. Investigative journalism is
    rare; instead the press acts freely to publish charges and
    countercharges by named and unnamed parties and individuals
    representing competing political and social interests. Both
    governmental and nongovernmental entities sometimes pay for favorable
    media coverage.
        Prior to the 1999 coup, any person deemed to have damaged the
    Constitution, including the publication of statements against the
    spirit of the Constitution, could be prosecuted for treason. However,
    prosecutions under this provision were rare. The suspended Constitution
    also prohibited the ridicule of Islam, the armed forces, or the
    judiciary.
        The Penal Code mandates the death sentence for anyone defiling the
    name of the Prophet Mohammad, life imprisonment for desecrating the
    Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting another's religious
    beliefs with the intent to outrage religious feelings (see Section
    2.c.). The Anti-terrorist Act stipulates imprisonment with rigorous
    labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or insulting words, or
    possessing or distributing written or recorded material, with the
    intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant is required to seize
    such material. While the Anti-terrorist Act was partially suspended in
    1998, the Sharif Government promulgated new Anti-terrorist Ordinances
    in October 1998 and in April 1999.
        In March police in Hyderabad registered criminal cases against
    Kulsoom Nawaz and 15 other PML leaders for making ``provocative''
    speeches at a party convention held the previous day.
        The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom
    since the media often serve as a forum for political parties,
    commercial, religious, and various other interests to compete with and
    criticize each other publicly. Although the press does not criticize
    Islam as such, leaders of religious parties and movements are not
    exempt from public scrutiny and criticism. The press traditionally has
    avoided negative coverage of the armed forces, and the Office of Inter-
    Services Public Relations (ISPR) has served to hold press coverage of
    military matters under close restraint. Officially the ISPR closely
    controls and coordinates the release of military news and access to
    military sources. After the 1999 coup, journalists reported no attempts
    by the ISPR agencies to influence editorial content.
        Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is
    hampered severely since any published discussion, let alone criticism,
    of the defense budget is proscribed by law. However, in 1997 this code
    of silence was undermined when a National Assembly committee discussed
    defense appropriations and corruption in defense contracts in open
    session, thereby making possible (and legal) newspaper coverage of the
    same issues. Discussion of the defense budget continued during the
    year, especially in the English-language press. Personnel changes among
    senior army officers in September were widely discussed in the press
    and newspapers published calls for extending the accountability process
    to include former military officers.
        Government leaks are not uncommon, but are managed carefully, and
    often are made to underpaid journalists who are on the unofficial
    payrolls of competing interests. Reports of intimidation, heavy-handed
    surveillance, and legal action to quiet the unduly curious or
    nondeferential reporter were common in the past; however, these reports
    have declined significantly since the coup. The Government has had
    considerable leverage over the press through its substantial budget for
    advertising and public interest campaigns and its control over the
    supply of newsprint and its ability to enforce regulations. Human
    rights groups, journalists, and opposition figures accused the
    Government of attempting to silence journalists and public figures;
    however, there were fewer such complaints during the year. On July 1,
    the Government ended its monopoly of newsprint supply and did not
    initiate new efforts to collect back taxes from selected newspapers. On
    August 28, the Government announced a draft ordinance for freedom of
    information, which would require every government office to designate a
    freedom of information officer who would be responsible for providing
    replies to written applications within 21 days. However, the act
    excludes all classified documents and does not define what constitutes
    classified information. By year's end, this ordinance has not been
    enacted. On December 30, the Government declassified the Hamoodur
    Rahman Commission Report, which criticizes the conduct of political and
    military leaders during the 1971 war with India.
        On April 29, a newspaper reported that police attacked and arrested
    150 journalists from Islamabad and Rawalpindi during a peaceful protest
    (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In May journalists in Abbotabad accused
    the local army monitoring cell of harassing Shuja Ahmad, president of a
    local organization of journalists. On August 22, several unknown
    assailants attacked Mazhar Tufail, a journalist from the Awam newspaper
    (see Section 1.c.). The journalist claimed that his assailants were
    government agents who wanted information on his activities. On August
    30, police in Dadu, Sindh arrested and charged with theft four
    journalists who reportedly criticized the police; authorities released
    the journalists after 4 days (see Section 1.d.). On July 10, police
    personnel entered the Lahore Press Club during a press conference and
    arrested the leader of the All Pakistan Traders Alliance, Umer Sailya.
    During the press conference, Sailya had criticized Musharraf and the
    military. In October a team of army monitors demanded immediate access
    to the premises of the Dawn newspaper and threatened to cut off power
    if refused; this occurred after the editors of Dawn received an
    unsigned letter threatening retaliatory action for recent articles
    criticizing the Government. However, many reputable journalists stated
    that this incident was an electrical inspection and not a violation of
    freedom of press. On October 3, police officials prohibited more than a
    dozen journalists from covering a speech that General Musharraf
    delivered to a group of businessmen. On December 10, army personnel
    detained for several hours a journalist and four photographers who
    attempted to photograph the departure of Nawaz Sharif following his
    exile. The officers confiscated the film and subsequently released the
    journalist and photographers.
        The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; however, the
    Ministry of Information controls and manages the country's primary wire
    service, the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP). The APP is both the
    Government's own news agency and the official carrier of international
    news to the local media. The few small privately owned wire services
    usually are circumspect in their coverage of sensitive domestic news
    and tend to follow a government line.
        The Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance requiring the
    registration of printing presses and newspapers was allowed to lapse in
    1997 after several years of waning application. In practice,
    registering a new publication is a simple administrative act, and is
    not subject to political or government scrutiny.
        Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted.
    Books and magazines may be imported freely, but are likewise subject to
    censorship for objectionable sexual or religious content. English
    language publications were not affected by the direct proscription of
    books and magazines promulgated by the Chief Commissioner in Islamabad,
    who banned five Sindhi-language publications in 1997 for
    ``objectionable material against Pakistan,'' i.e., expressions of
    Sindhi nationalism.
        Privately owned newspapers freely discuss public policy and
    criticize the Government. They report remarks made by opposition
    politicians, and their editorials reflect a wide spectrum of views. The
    effort to ensure that newspapers carry their statements or press
    releases sometimes leads to undue pressure by local police, political
    parties, ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups, militant student
    organizations, and occasionally commercial interests. Such pressure is
    a common feature of journalism, and, when a group is extreme in its
    views, can include physical violence, the sacking of offices, the
    intimidation or beating of journalists, and interference with the
    distribution of newspapers. At times landlords and their agents, who
    have become accustomed to terrorizing the powerless on their lands in
    an atmosphere of impunity, retaliate against journalists who report on
    their crimes. Journalists working in remote areas can expect more
    difficulties from local authorities and influential individuals than
    their big city counterparts. However, violence against and intimidation
    of journalists is a nationwide problem.
        The broadcast media are mainly government monopolies directed by
    the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Pakistan Television (PTV).
    Domestic news coverage and public affairs programming on these media
    are controlled closely by the Government and traditionally reflect its
    views. One private radio station, one television broadcaster, and a
    semi-private cable television station are licensed under special
    contractual arrangements with the Government. The semi-private
    television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN), occasionally has
    been closed due to disputes with the Ministry of Information and to
    financial difficulties. None of these stations is permitted to produce
    news and public affairs programming; the private television station
    rebroadcasts or simulcasts the regular PTV evening news. The Shalimar
    Television Network also rebroadcasts PTV news, in addition to current
    affairs programming from foreign broadcasters, such as the British
    Broadcasting Corporation. While the STN routinely censors those
    segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely, if
    ever, are foreign news stories censored for content. In 1999 after STN
    aired news stories critical of the Sharif Government's handling of the
    Kargil crisis with India, PTV announced plans to turn the STN into an
    ``all-news'' channel, scheduled to start in October 1999; as of year's
    end, these plans have not been implemented. The Ministry of Information
    monitors advertising on all broadcast media, editing, or removing
    advertisements deemed morally objectionable.
        In 1999 the Secretary for Information was quoted in the press as
    stating that additional, private television and radio channels would
    soon be licensed, echoing a pledge made by General Musharraf. However,
    by year's end, no such licenses were granted. Satellite dishes are
    readily available on the local market and are priced within reach of
    almost everyone with a television set--well into the lower-middle
    classes. South Asian satellite channels (usually India-based) have
    become important sources of news and popular entertainment.
        Literary and creative works remain generally free of censorship.
    Dance performances, even classical performances, are subject to protest
    by certain religious groups. Obscene literature, a category broadly
    defined by the Government, is subject to seizure. Dramas and
    documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including corruption,
    social privilege, narcotics, violence against women, and female
    inequality, are broadcast on television; however, some sensitive series
    have been canceled before broadcast.
        The Government and universities generally respect academic freedom.
    The atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student
    organizations, typically tied to political parties, continued to
    threaten academic freedom, despite the fact that a 1992 Supreme Court
    ruling prohibits student political organizations on campuses. On some
    campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from radical
    religious organizations, clash with and intimidate other students,
    instructors, and administrators on matters of language, syllabus,
    examination policies, grades, doctrine, and dress. These groups
    facilitate cheating on examinations, interfere in the hiring of staff
    at the campuses, control new admissions, and sometimes control the
    funds of their institutions. At Punjab University, the largest
    university in the province, Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT--the student
    wing of the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami) imposes its
    self-defined code of conduct on teachers and other students.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The suspended
    Constitution provided for freedom ``to assemble peacefully and without
    arms subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the
    interest of public order;'' however, while the Government until March
    generally permitted peaceful assembly, it later imposed significant
    restrictions on this right. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited
    from holding any conferences or gatherings (see Section 2.c.).
    Throughout the year, the Government occasionally interfered with large
    rallies, which were held by all political parties. On March 15, the
    Musharraf regime enacted an ordinance banning all public political
    gatherings, processions, and strikes. Government officials claimed that
    the ban was enacted as a safety measure for the visit of an official
    head of state; however, the ban remained in place at year's end,
    although it has been enforced unevenly. Some groups circumvented the
    ban by meeting in private homes while using loudspeakers to carry the
    proceedings to supporters outdoors. The Government approved some public
    political gatherings, including a meeting of the Grand Democratic
    Alliance in September where parties debated which steps to take to
    return the country to democracy.
        District magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the
    Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four persons
    where demonstrations seemed likely to result in violence. During the
    year, police made preventive arrests of political party organizers
    prior to announced demonstrations. For example, in July police arrested
    a group of Sharif supporters on their way from Lahore to Peshawar for a
    demonstration. On August 11, police arrested 40 PML supporters ahead of
    a planned public meeting on the country's independence day. In
    September police in Lahore arrested more than 500 members of the PPP
    for shouting anti-Musharraf and anti-army slogans. In October police
    arrested approximately 300 opposition leaders prior to a planned
    demonstration commemorating the year anniversary of the coup.
        The MQM has been harassed in its regular political activities,
    especially by the Sindh police. On February 19, police arrested 35 MQM
    and Jiye Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM, a national Sindhi political party)
    members during a public protest against layoffs of Urdu and Sindhi
    speaking workers from Pakistan Steel (see Section 1.d.). On February
    19, police personnel arrested 40 members of JSQM who planned to
    participate in a strike (see Section 1.d.). Police frequently arrested
    PML leaders and supporters in order to prevent planned demonstrations
    during the year; the HRCP noted that all public PML demonstrations in
    Karachi were prevented, except for meetings at the party's headquarters
    (see Section 1.d.).
        In August 1999, the Sharif Government issued an ordinance related
    to the anti-terrorist courts (see Section 1.e.). One section of the
    ordinance made ``illegal strikes, go-slows, (or) lock outs'' punishable
    by up to 7 years' imprisonment and a fine. A wide spectrum of
    opposition groups opposed this measure, fearing that it would be used
    to silence legitimate dissent. The anti-terrorist courts did not invoke
    this ordinance during the year.
        Police also arrested about 300 Muslim clerics and students in
    Lahore in May and students in Lahore during protests against General
    Musharraf's proposed changes to the blasphemy laws (see Sections 1.c.
    and 2.c.).
        Police sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators. On
    April 29, a local newspaper reported that police attacked with batons
    and then arrested more than 150 journalists from Islamabad and
    Rawalpindi during a peaceful rally (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). On
    June 3, police attacked with batons a procession of 200 small business
    owners who were protesting a government campaign to collect sales
    taxes; police also arrested three demonstrators (see Section 1.c.). On
    June 9, police opened fire to disperse a protest in Peshawar; four
    persons were injured (see Section 1.c.). Police accused the protesters
    of throwing stones and bricks; however, eyewitnesses alleged that the
    police opened fire without provocation.
        The authorities sometimes prevented leaders of politico-religious
    parties from traveling to certain areas if they believed their presence
    would increase sectarian tensions or cause public violence (see Section
    2.d.).
        The suspended Constitution provided for freedom of association
    subject to restriction by government ordinance and law; however, the
    Government maintained some limits on this right. While these ordinances
    and laws apparently have not been used since the martial law period,
    the Sharif Government revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in
    Punjab. After the coup, the government of Punjab lifted the ban on the
    registration of new NGO's, but the old NGO's remained without licenses
    at year's end. Overall, NGO's reported improved relations with the
    Government during the year (see Section 4). There are no banned groups
    or parties.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The suspended Constitution provided for
    freedom of religion, and stated that adequate provisions shall be made
    for minorities to profess and practice their religions freely; however,
    the Government imposes a range of limits on freedom of religion.
    Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which approximately 95 percent of
    the population is Muslim. The majority of the population is Sunni
    Muslim, but an estimated 15 percent of the population is Shi'a. The
    suspended Constitution required that laws be consistent with Islam and
    imposed some elements of Koranic law on both Muslims and religious
    minorities. In July General Musharraf amended the PCO in order to
    incorporate the Islamic provisions of the suspended Constitution, which
    include the definition of ``Muslim'' and ``non-Muslim'' and procedures
    regarding Shariat courts. While there is no law establishing the
    Koranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert from Islam),
    social pressure against apostasy is so powerful that most such
    conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of reprisals
    against suspected converts are common. Members of religious minorities
    are subject to violence and harassment, and police at times refuse to
    prevent such actions or charge persons who commit them.
        In the Malakand division and the Kohistan district of the NWFP,
    ordinances require that ``all cases, suits, inquiries, matters, and
    proceedings in the courts shall be decided in accordance with
    Shari'a.'' These ordinances define Shari'a as the injunctions found in
    both the Koran and the Sunna. Islamic law judges with the assistance of
    the Ulema (Islamic scholars), under the general supervision of the
    Peshawar High Court, try all court cases in the Malakand Division and
    the Kohistan District. Elsewhere in the country, partial provisions of
    Shari'a apply. For example, police are authorized to arrest or fine
    Muslims who eat or smoke in public places during Ramadan. In 1998 then-
    Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, proposed an amendment to the Constitution
    (the 15th Amendment) that would have imposed Shari'a throughout the
    country; minority religious groups feared that the implementation of
    this amendment would have restricted further the freedom to practice
    religions other than Islam. However, the Musharraf Government did not
    enact the proposed 15th Amendment and reportedly has no plans to do so.
        Discriminatory religious legislation has added to an atmosphere of
    religious intolerance, which has led to acts of violence directed
    against minority Muslim sects, as well as against Christians, Hindus,
    and members of Muslim offshoot sects, such as Ahmadis and Zikris (see
    Section 5).
        The Ahmadis are subject to specific restrictions under law. A 1974
    constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority
    because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as
    the last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as
    Muslims and observe Islamic practices. In 1984 the Government inserted
    Section 298(c) into the Penal Code, prohibiting Ahmadis from calling
    themselves Muslim and banning them from using Islamic words, phrases,
    and greetings. The constitutionality of Section 298(c) was upheld in a
    split-decision Supreme Court case in 1996. The punishment for violation
    of this section is imprisonment for up to 3 years and a fine. The
    Government and anti-Ahmadi religious groups have used this provision
    extensively to harass Ahmadis. Ahmadis suffer from various restrictions
    of religious freedom and widespread societal discrimination, including
    violation of their places of worship, being barred from burial in
    Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith, speech, and assembly,
    and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi mosques remained
    closed. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited from holding
    conferences or gatherings (see Section 2.b.). Ahmadis are prohibited
    from taking part in the Hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca).
    Some popular newspapers publish anti-Ahmadi ``conspiracy'' stories,
    which contribute to anti-Ahmadi sentiments in society.
        Section 295(a), the blasphemy provision of the Penal Code,
    originally stipulated a maximum 2-year sentence for insulting the
    religion of any class of citizens. This sentence was increased to 10
    years in 1991. In 1982 Section 295(b) was added, which stipulated a
    sentence of life imprisonment for ``whoever willfully defiles, damages,
    or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran.'' In 1986 another amendment,
    Section 295(c), established the death penalty or life imprisonment for
    directly or indirectly defiling ``the sacred name of the holy Prophet
    Mohammed.'' In 1991 a court struck down the option of life
    imprisonment. These laws, especially Section 295(c), have been used by
    rivals and local authorities to threaten, punish, or intimidate
    Ahmadis, Christians, and even orthodox Muslims. No one has been
    executed by the State under any of these provisions, although religious
    extremists have killed some persons accused under them. Since 1996
    magistrates have been required to investigate allegations of blasphemy
    to see whether they are credible before filing formal charges. On April
    21, the Government announced its intention to require that deputy
    commissioners review all blasphemy cases prior to the filing of a FIR
    (see Section 1.c.); however, General Musharraf later reversed this
    decision due to strong pressure from some Muslim groups. On May 11,
    police arrested approximately 300 Muslim clerics and students in Lahore
    during protests against Musharraf's proposed changes to the blasphemy
    laws (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). According to Ahmadi sources,
    approximately 3 dozen Ahmadis have been charged under the blasphemy
    laws since the October 1999 coup. For example, in October police
    arrested Nasir Ahmad of Rajanpur district under Section 295(b) for
    allegedly defiling a copy of the Koran. Mushtaq Ahmad Saggon and Nasir
    Ahmad, were convicted in Muzaffargarh in July 1999 under Sections
    295(a) and 295(c) for preaching and distributing religious literature.
    Their case was transferred to an anti-terrorist court at Dera Ghazi
    Khan, and the Lahore High Court denied their request for bail.
        In May a lower court in Sialkot district, Punjab, sentenced two
    Christian brothers to 35 years' imprisonment each and fined them each
    $1,500 (PRs 75,000). The brothers were convicted of desecrating the
    Koran and blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed; both cases were registered
    by an ice cream vendor who allegedly fought with the brothers after he
    asked them to use their own dishes, stating that his were reserved for
    Muslim customers. Lawyers for the brothers filed an appeal in the
    Lahore High Court. On May 2, Augustine Ashiq Masih was charged with
    blaspheming the Prophet in Faisalabad. According to press reports,
    Masih converted to Islam, married a Muslim woman, and then converted
    back to Christianity, which angered local Muslims who brought the
    charges against him. Ayub Masih (detained since 1996) was convicted of
    blasphemy for making favorable comments about Salman Rushdie, the
    author of the controversial book, ``The Satanic Verses,'' and was
    sentenced to death in April 1998. Ayub's family and 13 other landless
    Christian families were forced from their village in 1996 following the
    charges, and he survived an attempt on his life in 1997, when he was
    shot at outside of the courtroom while in trial. The case was pending
    appeal before the Lahore High Court at year's end.
        Police also arrest Muslims under the blasphemy laws; government
    officials maintain that about two-thirds of the total blasphemy cases
    that have been brought to trial have affected Muslims. In February
    Muhammad Younis was sentenced to 13 months in jail in Multan for
    uttering derogatory remarks about the companions of the Prophet
    Mohammad. In March an anti-terrorist court in Sindh convicted Muslim
    author Gohar Shahi in absentia under the blasphemy laws. On August 5,
    Abdul Hasnain Muhammad Yusuf Aliwas was given a death sentence and 35
    years' imprisonment by a Lahore court after being convicted under
    Sections 295(a), 295(c), and 298 for defiling the name of the Prophet
    Muhammad. Some of Ali's supporters claim that he was being persecuted
    for his allegedly unorthodox Islamic beliefs. In August Abdul Hasnain
    Muhammad Yusuf Ali, a Sufi Muslim was convicted of blasphemy under
    Sections 295(a) and 295(c) for defiling the name of the Prophet
    Muhammad. A Lahore court sentenced Ali to death. On October 4, police
    arrested Yunis Shaikh on blasphemy charges after he allegedly made
    remarks offensive to Islam and to the Prophet Mohammad during a
    lecture. Police denied bail and he was awaiting trial at year's end. In
    1998 a Shi'a Muslim, Ghulam Akbar, was convicted of blasphemy for
    allegedly making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed in 1995.
    He was sentenced to death, the first time a Muslim had been sentenced
    to death for a violation of the blasphemy law. The case remained under
    appeal at year's end.
        When blasphemy and other religious cases are brought to court,
    extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the
    consequences of an acquittal. As a result, judges and magistrates often
    continue trials indefinitely, and the accused is burdened with further
    legal costs and court appearances. Many judges also try to pass such
    cases to other jurists.
        The Government distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims with
    regard to political rights. In national and local elections, Muslims
    vote for Muslim candidates by geographic locality while non-Muslims
    must vote for at-large non-Muslim candidates. Legal provisions for
    minority reserved seats do not include the Senate and the Federal
    Cabinet.
        Furthermore according to the suspended Constitution, the President
    and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The Prime Minister, federal
    ministers, and ministers of state, as well as elected members of the
    Senate and National Assembly (including non-Muslims) must take an oath
    to ``strive to preserve the Islamic ideology, which is the basis for
    the creation of Pakistan'' (see Section 3).
        In June a prominent Christian-affiliated NGO that is active in
    defending those accused of violating the blasphemy laws received a
    series of death threats.
        ``Islamiyyat'' (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim
    students in state-run schools. Students of other faiths are not
    required to study Islam but are not provided with parallel studies in
    their own religions. In practice many non-Muslim students are compelled
    by teachers to complete the Islamiyyat. An education policy announced
    by the Government in 1998 included provisions for increased mandatory
    Islamic instruction in public schools.
        Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
    remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
    Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
    under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
        The Government designates religion on passports, and to get a
    passport citizens must declare whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim.
    Muslims must also affirm that they accept the unqualified finality of
    the prophethood of Mohammed and declare that Ahmadis are non-Muslims.
        In September 1999, the Sharif Government removed colonial-era
    entries for ``sect'' from government job application forms to prevent
    discrimination in hiring. However, the faith of some, particularly
    Christians, often can be ascertained from their names. General
    Musharraf and members of his staff apparently consulted with religious
    minorities on some of his initial cabinet appointments.
        In December 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that interest is un-
    Islamic and directed the Government to implement an interest-free
    system by June 2001.
        Following the coup, the Musharraf Government affirmed its
    commitment to protectthe rights of religious minorities. According to
    minority community members, the Government made efforts to seek
    minority input into decision-making and offered some religious
    minorities cabinet positions.
        The predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center of Chenab Nagar
    (formerly known as Rabway) in Punjab often has been a site of violence
    against Ahmadis (see Section 5).
        In December 1999, several hundred persons looted and burned
    property in Haveli Lakha, Okara district, Punjab, which belonged to
    Mohammad Nawaz, a local Ahmadi leader accused of planning to build an
    Ahmadi house of worship (see Section 5). A neighbor reportedly incited
    the incident by accusing Nawaz of building the house of worship after
    the two were involved in a property dispute. Nawaz, a doctor,
    reportedly intended to build a free clinic next to his home. The mob
    destroyed the clinic and looted and burned Nawaz's home. According to
    Ahmadi sources, police personnel arrived at the scene, but did nothing
    to stop the crowd. At year's end, neither the neighbor nor anyone in
    the crowd had been arrested or questioned in connection with the
    incident, and police took no steps to find or return any of Nawaz's
    property. However, Nawaz and his two sons were arrested and charged
    with blasphemy. Several days later, they were released on bail;
    however, the blasphemy case against them was pending as of year's end.
    Three other Ahmadis in Haveli Lakha also were charged with blasphemy in
    connection with the incident, even though they were not in town at the
    time; however, the case against them was dismissed for lack of
    evidence.
        Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem
    throughout the country (see Section 5). More than 300 persons have died
    in incidents of sectarian violence in Punjab in the last 3 years,
    according to one credible newspaper report. Another newspaper reported
    that over 2,000 persons have died in sectarian violence since 1981 (see
    Section 1.a.). However, sectarian violence markedly decreased after the
    October 1999 coup.
        Anti-terrorist courts also handed down convictions against several
    individuals accused of sectarian violence. On April 22, an anti-
    terrorist court in Rawalpindi sentenced 23 persons to life imprisonment
    for their role in leading a procession of persons that burned a Shi'a
    mosque in 1996. On July 3, an anti-terrorist court in Gujranwala
    convicted 2 men for reportedly killing a Shi'a senior police officer;
    however, the men later were released.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement
    within the country and the freedom to travel abroad; however, the
    Government limits these rights. The authorities at times prevent
    political party leaders and religious leaders from traveling to certain
    parts of the country (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.). Travel to Israel is
    prohibited by law. Government employees and students must obtain ``no
    objection'' certificates before travelling abroad, although this
    requirement is rarely enforced against students.
        Citizens regularly exercise the right to emigrate. However, an Exit
    Control List (ECL), which is made public but is constantly revised, is
    used to prevent the departure of wanted criminals and individuals under
    investigation for defaulting on loans, corruption, or other offenses.
    At the end of 1999, the HRCP estimated that there were more than 5,000
    entries on the ECL, including 400 PML leaders, all 45 MQM legislators
    and their family members, 20 journalists, and as many as 3,000 alleged
    bank defaulters. The Musharraf Government increased the use of the ECL
    reportedly to prevent those suspected of loan defaults or corruption
    from leaving the country. The focus apparently was on potential loan
    defaulters as part of the Musharraf Government's emphasis on
    accountability. According to a press report, the Musharraf Government
    added approximately 3,000 names to the ECL. No judicial action is
    required to add a name to the ECL; however, those named have the right
    to appeal to the Secretary of Interior and, if refused, to the Advocate
    General of the senior judiciary. In practice courts have directed the
    Government to lift restrictions on some politicians on the ECL. For
    example, Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister and leader of the PPP,
    was placed on the ECL and was prevented from leaving the country in
    December 1998. Bhutto was allowed to leave later that month following a
    court order to lift the travel restrictions against her.
        Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
    of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol and has not adopted domestic
    legislation concerning the treatment of refugees. In December 1999, the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted a
    change from the practice of granting ``prima facie'' status to all
    Afghans in the country; under the new policy, all refugee
    determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis. However, means
    for screening Afghan refugees have not been established, and Pakistani
    law makes no provisions for asylum. The absence of legalized asylum,
    coupled with sharp economic competition, led to a more restrictive
    admissions policy and a deteriorating quality of life for some
    refugees.
        The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum has been provided to
    refugees from Afghanistan since 1979, when several million Afghans
    fleeing Soviet occupation poured across the border. There remain an
    estimated 1.2 million Afghan refugees in the country who have been
    granted first asylum. There also are an estimated 2 to 3 million
    unregistered Afghans in urban areas throughout the country.
        The Government has not granted permanent legal resettlement to
    Afghan refugees but allows them to live and work in the country. Many
    are self-supporting and live outside refugee camps, which has resulted
    in some hostility among local communities whose residents resent the
    economic competition and believe that the refugees contribute to high
    crime rates. The Government occasionally harasses refugees and
    threatens them with deportation. For example, authorities in Quetta
    detained a number of newly arrived Afghans, mostly non-Pashtun
    minorities, with plans to deport them. In December 1999, the UNHCR
    proposed that the Government establish a formal joint screening
    mechanism to determine whether or not the intended deportees are
    refugees according to internationally accepted standards. No such
    formal mechanism was established during the year, and the Government
    deported some persons without notifying UNHCR officials. However, the
    Government sometimes allowed the UNHCR to attempt to find solutions
    other than deportation for refugees, such as arranging for resettlement
    in a third country.
        Most refugee camps are well established, and living conditions
    resemble those in neighboring villages, even though most direct
    assistance to the camps ended in the early 1990's. Most recent arrivals
    have gone to urban areas like Peshawar or Quetta, but some have settled
    in the new Akora Khattak camp (since 1996) and the Shamshatoo camp
    (since 1999). Conditions for newly arrived Afghans generally are worse
    than conditions in the well-established camps. For example, sanitation,
    health care, shelter, and fresh water are ongoing problems in the new
    camps. Some of the most recent arrivals still reside in makeshift
    tents. In 1999 874 Afghan refugees from Nasir Bagh camp were relocated
    to make room for construction of a new highway and housing development.
    Some were taken to Akora Khattak camp; however, many reportedly
    returned to Afghanistan or moved to other locations in Pakistan.
    Relocations declined in late 1999 and did not occur during the year.
        According to Amnesty International, there was one report of the
    forced return of a person to a country where he feared persecution
    during the year. Professor Mohammad Rahim Elhan, a prominent Afghan
    scholar who had accused the Government of interfering in the internal
    affairs of Afghanistan, was deported against his will to Afghanistan on
    June 21. However, he was subsequently permitted to reenter Pakistan.
    The Government cooperated with the UNHCR to support voluntary
    repatriations to rural areas of Afghanistan considered to be safe. In
    1999 approximately 92,000 Afghans returned to their home country.
    Afghan refugees have limited access to legal protection and depend on
    the UNHCR and group leaders to resolve disputes among themselves and
    with Pakistanis. In the past, police sometimes attempted to prevent
    Afghan nationals from entering cities and there were reports that some
    have been forced back into refugee camps. During the year, there were
    reports that the Government closed some Afghan schools and cracked down
    on unlicensed medical practitioners that treat mostly Afghans.
        Most able-bodied male refugees have found at least intermittent
    employment; however, they are not covered by local labor laws. NGO's
    and private entities provided women and girls with better education and
    health care than is available in Afghanistan. However, Afghan women
    working for NGO's were targets for occasional harassment and violence
    by conservatives and Taliban sympathizers.
        Several prominent Afghans also reportedly have been the targets of
    harassment and violence from Taliban supporters and conservatives in
    the refugee community. According to newspaper reports, at least 10
    Afghans were killed during the year, reportedly for their political
    views (see Section 1.a.). On June 1, unknown gunmen injured Mohammad
    Enam Wak at his home in Peshawar (see Section 1.c.). Wak wrote a book
    calling for a federal system of government in Afghanistan. In July an
    Afghan leader, Haji Jan Mohammad, whose name reportedly appeared on a
    Taliban hit list, was killed by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.).
    Police investigations of these Afghan killings were perfunctory at
    best; there were no arrests or convictions in any case.
        The resettlement of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue.
    The Biharis are Urdu speakers from the Indian state of Bihar who went
    to East Pakistan--now Bangladesh--at the time of partition in 1947.
    When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, the Biharis sought
    resettlement in Pakistan. However, approximately 250,000 Biharis remain
    in refugee camps in Bangladesh. While the Mohajir community--
    descendants of Muslims who immigrated to Pakistan from India after
    partition--supports their resettlement, the Sindhi community opposes
    it. In 1993 the Government flew 342 Biharis to the country and placed
    them in temporary housing in central Punjab. No further resettlement
    has occurred.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens continued to be denied their right to choose or change
    their government peacefully. After the imposition of a military
    government in October 1999, the Constitution and representative bodies,
    including the National Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial
    assemblies, were suspended indefinitely. General Musharraf appointed
    new members to the Cabinet, as well as new governors to all four
    provinces.
        The Musharraf Government pledged to return the country to a
    democracy; however, General Musharraf stressed his priority to build
    first a strong economic and political foundation to avert another bout
    of ``sham'' democracy. General Musharraf pledged to abide by a May 12
    Supreme Court ruling that mandates that national elections be held no
    later than 90 days after October 12, 2002. The Government established
    the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) to develop political reforms
    and a framework for elections. It is unclear whether or not the NRB has
    the institutional capacity to meet its mandate within the established
    deadline.
        Citizens' right to change their government also was restricted by
    the executive's strong influence on the judiciary. On January 25,
    General Musharraf ordered all of the justices in the country to swear
    to uphold his PCO (see Section 1.e.).
        The Musharraf regime did not ban political parties, and the parties
    active prior to the coup, including the Pakistan Muslim League (which
    was led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) continued their
    activities. However, the Government arrested hundreds of persons in
    opposition political parties during the year (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.b.). On March 15, General Musharraf issued an ordinance banning all
    political gatherings held outdoors (see Section 2.b.). The National
    Accountability Ordinance prohibits those convicted of corruption under
    the NAB from holding political office for 21 years (see Section 1.d.).
    On August 11, the Government amended the Political Parties Act to
    automatically disqualify anyone with a court conviction from holding
    party office. Legal observers expressed concern over the concentration
    of power in the NAB, the fact that NAB chairmen have all been members
    of the military, and the presumption of guilt in accountability cases.
        National elections for national and provincial assemblies last were
    held in February 1997. Election observers concluded that the elections
    generally were free and fair. Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League won
    a majority of seats and formed a government.
        Elections for local government bodies were held in Punjab in May
    1998. Elections were held in Baluchistan in March 1999 and a chairman
    was named in August. Elections have not been held in the two other
    provinces, NWFP and Sindh, since 1993, when these bodies were dissolved
    by a caretaker government because of corruption charges. Local
    government elections were postponed indefinitely in the NWFP and Sindh.
    Sindh was under Governor's rule from November 1998 until the October
    1999 coup. In October 1999, Musharraf suspended the local and
    provincial governments; the provinces are ruled by governors appointed
    by General Musharraf. During the year, Musharraf focused on the
    perceived need to devolve power to the local level in order to reduce
    the power of the central Government. In March General Musharraf
    presented his plan for devolution and political restructuring at the
    local level. According to this plan, non-party based local elections
    were scheduled to be held from December through August 2001. On
    December 31, there were elections in 18 districts of the country.
    According to local and international election observers, the elections
    generally were free and fair. Religious minorities boycotted the polls.
    Directly elected union councilors are to select a chief mayor and
    members of district council. Critics of the plan claim that it is
    merely an attempt to dissipate pressure for a return to democracy at
    the national level. On June 7, the Government announced a number of
    measures designed to make the electoral commission independent of
    government control, including granting the commission full financial
    autonomy.
        Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the
    political status of the northern areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan--
    is not resolved. As a result, more than 1 million inhabitants of the
    northern areas were not covered under the suspended Constitution and
    have had no representation in the federal legislature. An appointed
    civil servant administers these areas; an elected Northern Areas
    Council serves only in an advisory capacity and has no authority to
    change laws or to raise and spend revenue. In May 1999, the Supreme
    Court directed the Government to act within 6 months to give the
    northern areas an elected government with an independent judiciary. In
    November 1999, the Musharraf regime permitted previously scheduled
    elections to take place in the northern areas; independents and
    candidates from the PML, the PPP, and the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan won
    seats.
        The right of citizens to change their government also has been
    hampered at the provincial level by the Government's failure to release
    the 1998 census figures and by the likely underestimation of the
    population of Sindh. Held after a delay of 7 years, the national census
    was postponed repeatedly due to pressure from ethnic groups and
    provincial officials who feared diminished representation and access to
    federal funds. The 9.26 million census figure for Karachi, revised to
    9.8 million in a February report, is estimated to be 3 to 5 million
    short of the actual figure.
        Although women participate in Government, and former prime minister
    Benazir Bhutto is a prominent opposition figure, women are
    underrepresented in political life at all levels. Six women held seats
    in the 217-member National Assembly, up from 4 seats in the previous
    Parliament. Thirty-five women, more than ever before, campaigned for
    seats in the 1997 national elections. The Parliamentary Commission on
    the Status of Women in Pakistan recommended reserving one-third of
    seats in all elected bodies for women. The Musharraf Government
    announced in August that one-third of the seats in the upcoming local
    council elections would be reserved for female candidates; some
    political activists doubt that there would be enough female candidates
    in certain remote areas of the country to fulfill this requirement.
    Women participate in large numbers in elections, although some are
    dissuaded from voting by family, religious, and social customs. In 1997
    only 37 out of 6,600 female registered voters actually cast ballots in
    Jamrud in the Khyber Agency due to pronouncements that voting by women
    was un-Islamic. General Musharraf appointed a woman to his National
    Security Council and three women to his Cabinet. Provincial governors
    appointed by General Musharraf also have named women to serve in
    provincial cabinets.
        Minorities are underrepresented in Government and politics. Under
    the electoral system, minorities vote for reserved at-large seats, not
    for nonminority candidates who represent actual constituencies. The
    Musharraf regime abandoned a plan to abolish the separate electorate
    system due to pressure by some Muslim political groups. With separate
    electorates, representatives have little incentive to promote their
    minority constituents' interests. Many Christian activists state that
    separate electorates are the greatest obstacle to the attainment of
    Christian religious and civil liberties. Ahmadi leaders encourage their
    followers not to register as ``non-Muslims,'' so most Ahmadis are
    completely unrepresented. In the National Assembly, Christians hold
    four reserved seats; Hindus and members of scheduled castes another
    four; Ahmadis one; and Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, and other non-Muslims
    one (see Section 2.c.). Each of the four categories is maintained on a
    separate electorate roll, and minorities cannot cast votes for the
    Muslim constituency seats. Under Article 106 of the suspended
    Constitution, minorities also had reserved seats in the provincial
    assemblies. The 1997 general election report states that each Christian
    National Assembly member represents 327,606 persons; each Hindu and
    scheduled castes member, 319,029; the Sikh, Buddhist, Parsi, and other
    non-Muslim member, 112,801; and the Ahmadi member 104,244. These
    figures significantly understate the population of most of the minority
    groups because they are based on 1981 census figures. By year's end,
    the 1998 census figures for religious minorities had not been
    published. According to a local magazine, there are approximately 3
    million Christians, 2.7 million Hindus, and several hundred thousand
    Ahmadis in the country.
        Tribal people are underrepresented in government and politics. The
    1997 elections for the eight National Assembly members from the FATA
    were, for the first time, conducted on the basis of universal adult
    franchise. Prior to 1997, in keeping with local traditions, tribal
    leaders, or maliks, appointed in the governor's name by the central
    Government's political agents in each agency, elected the FATA National
    Assembly members. In accordance with the Government's general ban on
    political party activities in the FATA, candidates were not allowed to
    register by political party and political party rallies were not
    allowed. However, several political parties did campaign covertly.
    Tribal people, including large numbers of women in some areas,
    registered to vote despite campaigns by some tribes against their
    participation. However, on election day, far fewer registered women
    than registered men actually voted.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new
    human rights and legal aid groups continue to form. These groups
    generally are free to operate without government restriction; however,
    they are required to be licensed. Human rights groups report that they
    generally have good access to police stations and prisons. The
    Government has provided protection to human rights lawyers defending
    accused blasphemers following threats and attacks on the lawyers by
    religious extremists. These threats became more explicit and public in
    1998, with signed graffiti calling for the killing of well-known human
    rights activist Asma Jahangir.
        The Musharraf Government made some attempts to ease some of the
    previous government's restrictions on NGO's; the Sharif Government
    revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in 1999. General Musharraf
    appointed several persons with prominent NGO backgrounds to his Cabinet
    and many NGO workers reported a smoother working relationship with the
    Government during the period covered by this report. The new government
    in Punjab under General Musharraf lifted the previous ban on NGO
    registration (see Section 2.b.).
        International human rights observers are permitted to visit the
    country and travel freely. Several international organizations, many
    focused on refugee relief, maintain permanent offices in the country,
    although some report difficulty in securing visas for their foreign
    staff.
        The Ministry of Human Rights, established in 1995, is now a
    department within the Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights, and
    Parliamentary Affairs. Some 125 employees staff the department, which
    is headquartered in Islamabad and has four regional offices. The
    department has set up a ``fund for women in distress and detention''
    and a ``relief and revolving fund'' for victims of human rights
    violations. Because of its limited budget, the department operates
    primarily on a case-by-case basis but seeks help from donor agencies
    for projects to build institutional capacity and human rights
    awareness. The department finalized and began limited implementation of
    a reform program for jails. However, the department is not viewed as
    effective by human rights observers. The Government has failed to take
    follow-up action on the 1997 report of the Commission of Inquiry for
    Women.
        In April the Government organized a conference on human rights and
    pledged to take ``small but meaningful steps'' including: an 8-month
    public relations campaign on human rights themes; requiring deputy
    commissioners to move female burn victims to hospitals (see Section 5);
    banning the use of fetters in prisons and jails (see Section 1.c.);
    ordering deputy commissioners to review all blasphemy cases prior to
    the filing of a FIR (see Section 1.d.); creating a commission for
    police reforms; releasing 20,000 prisoners from jail; calling for a
    Commission on the Status of Women; and changing the law so that women
    married to foreign husbands can claim citizenship for their children.
    The Government subsequently took no apparent steps to organize the
    public relations campaign and backtracked on having deputy
    commissioners review blasphemy cases (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.). The
    Government made limited progress in the following areas: the Lahore
    High Court ordered local jail authorities to remove all fetters (see
    Section 1.d.); the Government reportedly released 47,000 prisoners who
    were convicted of petty crimes and that already had served their prison
    terms; the Government inaugurated a National Commission on the Status
    of Women on September 1; and in late April President Tarar issued an
    amendment ordinance to the citizenship law to enable women married to
    foreigners to claim citizenship for their children (see Section 5).
        On July 23, several clergy in the NWFP shot at a female NGO
    worker's home and ransacked her NGO-sponsored medical camp.
    Section 5. Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status
        The suspended Constitution provided for equality before the law for
    all citizens and broadly prohibited discrimination based on race,
    religion, caste, residence, or place of birth; however, in practice
    there is significant discrimination based on these factors.
        Women.--Domestic violence is a widespread and serious problem.
    Human rights groups estimate that anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of
    women are victims of domestic violence at the hands of their husbands,
    in-laws, or other relatives. The Progressive Women's Organization
    reported in 1999 that every one of two women is the victim of mental or
    physical violence. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women
    reported that violence against women ``has been described as the most
    pervasive violation of human rights'' in the country, and it called for
    legislation clearly stating that domestic violence against women is a
    criminal offense. Husbands are known to kill their wives even for
    trivial offenses. In 1999 the Pakistan Peace Coalition surveyed 1,000
    women in 10 communities in rural Punjab; 82 percent of the respondents
    reported that they feared violence from their husbands over trivial
    matters. While abusers may be charged with assault, cases rarely are
    filed. Police usually return battered women to their abusive family
    members. Women are reluctant to file charges because of societal mores
    that stigmatize divorce and make women economically and psychologically
    dependent on their relatives. Relatives also are reluctant to report
    abuse to protect the reputation of the family. There are no specific
    laws pertaining to domestic violence, except for the Qisas and Diyat
    ordinances, which are rarely invoked and may privatize the crime.
    However, Qisas and Diyat cannot be invoked where the victim is a direct
    lineal descendant of the perpetrator. Police and judges tend to see
    domestic violence as a family problem, and are reluctant to take action
    in such cases. Thus, it is difficult for women to obtain relief from
    the justice system in cases of domestic violence.
        The Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center in Karachi published a
    report in 1999 that summarized reports in the English language press
    about violence against women between 1993 and 1998. Even though it
    limited itself to reports of violence by close male relatives, Shirkat
    Gah documented 535 women who were killed or who committed suicide
    during the period; 95 of these women were killed or committed suicide
    after they expressed interest in marrying a man of their own choice.
        During the year, the press reported on hundreds of incidents of
    violence against women, and drew attention to the killings of married
    women by relatives over dowry or other family-related disputes. Most of
    the victims were burned to death, allegedly in kitchen stove accidents;
    some women reportedly were burned with acid. During the year, 593 burn
    cases were recorded in Lahore newspapers; cases were registered in 74
    percent but suspects were arrested in only 10 percent. Human rights
    monitors assert that many cases are not reported by hospitals and that,
    even when they are, the police are reluctant to investigate or file
    charges. Furthermore, human rights monitors agree that most ``stove
    deaths'' are in fact killings based upon a suspicion of illicit sexual
    relationship or upon dowry demands. Increased media coverage of cases
    of wife burnings, spousal abuse, spousal killing, and rape has helped
    to raise awareness about violence against women. The Government has
    failed to take action in honor killing cases, particularly when
    influential families are involved. By year's end, there was no progress
    in the 1998 case of Shahnaz, who died after her husband poured gasoline
    on her and set her on fire. The police registered a case against her
    husband and three in-laws. The case remained pending.
        A crisis center for women in distress was opened in 1997 in
    Islamabad. The center, the first of its kind in the country, is an
    initiative of the Ministry of Women's Development with the assistance
    of local NGO's. The center offers legal and medical referrals from
    volunteer doctors and lawyers, counseling from trained psychologists,
    and a hotline for women in distress. During the year, the crisis center
    served 75 women. A second crisis center in Vehari, in southern Punjab,
    opened during the year.
        Rape is an extensive problem. The HRCP estimates that at least
    eight women, five of them minors, are raped every day, and more than
    two-thirds of those are gang-raped. In 1997 the National Assembly
    passed a law that provided for the death penalty for persons convicted
    of gang rape. No executions have been carried out under this law and
    conviction rates remain low because rape, and gang rape in particular,
    is commonly used by landlords and criminal bosses to humiliate and
    terrorize local residents. It is estimated that less than one-third of
    all rapes are reported to the police. Police rarely respond to and
    sometimes are implicated in these attacks (see Section 1.c.). According
    to a police official, in most rape cases the victims are pressured to
    drop charges because of the threat of Hudood adultery or fornication
    charges against them if they cannot prove the absence of consent. All
    consensual extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of
    the Hudood Ordinances, and carry Hadd (Koranic) or Tazir (secular)
    punishments (see Section 1.e.). Accordingly, if a woman cannot prove
    the absence of consent, there is a risk that she may be charged with a
    violation of the Hudood ordinances for fornication or adultery. The
    Hadd--or maximum punishment for this offense--is public flogging or
    stoning; however, for Hadd punishments to apply, especially stringent
    rules of evidence are followed. Hadd punishments are mandatory if
    evidentiary requirements are met; for sexual offenses, four adult male
    Muslims must witness the act or the alleged perpetrator must confess.
    For non-Muslims or in cases where all of the 4 male witnesses are not
    Muslim, the punishment is less severe. The testimony of four female
    witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd
    punishments, therefore, even if a man rapes a woman in the presence of
    several women, he cannot be subjected to the Hadd punishment. If Hadd
    punishment requirements are not met, the accused may be sentenced to a
    lesser class of penalties (Tazir); in practice most rape cases are
    tried at this level. Under Tazir, a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25
    years in prison and 30 lashes. No Hadd punishment has been applied in
    the 20 years the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir
    punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
    offenders.
        According to an HRCP lawyer, the Musharraf Government has brought
    fewer charges against women under the Hudood Ordinance than in the
    past, and the courts have shown greater leniency toward women in their
    sentences and in the granting of bail. However, even in cases where a
    woman wishes to bring rape charges, she may have trouble bringing her
    attacker to justice. According to Amnesty International, men accused of
    rape sometimes are acquitted and released, while their victims are held
    on adultery charges.
        According to Human Rights Watch, women face difficulty at every
    level of the judicial system in bringing rape cases. Police are
    reluctant to take the complaint and sometimes are abusive toward the
    victim; the courts do not have consistent standards of proof as to what
    constitutes rape and to what corroboration is required; and judges,
    police, and prosecutors are biased against female rape victims, tending
    towards a presumption of female consent and the belief that women lie
    about such things. Judges on the whole reportedly are reluctant to
    convict; however, if there is some evidence, judges have been known to
    convict the accused of the lesser offense of adultery or fornication
    (consensual sex). Human Rights Watch also reported that women face
    problems in the collection of evidence; that the doctors tasked to
    examine rape victims often believe that the victims are lying; that
    they are trained insufficiently and have inadequate facilities for the
    collection of forensic evidence pertaining to rape; that they do not
    testify very effectively in court; and that they tend to focus on the
    virginity status of the victim, and, due either to an inadequate
    understanding of the need for prompt medical evaluations or to
    inadequate resources, often delay the medical examinations for many
    days or even weeks, making any evidence that they collect of dubious
    utility. Medical examiners and police personnel sometimes are
    physically or verbally abusive during these exams, especially in cases
    where a woman is charged with adultery or fornication (for which an
    exam may be requested) and does not wish to be examined (such women,
    despite the fact that by law they should not be examined without their
    consent, have been examined, and even have been beaten for their
    refusal to be examined). Police and doctors often do not know that a
    woman must consent to this type of exam before it can be performed, and
    judges may not inform women of their right to decline. If they report
    rape to the police, women's cases often are delayed or mishandled, and
    women frequently are harassed by police or the alleged perpetrators to
    drop the case. Police sometimes accept bribes to get the complainant to
    drop a case, and sometimes request bribes to carry it forward. Police
    tend to investigate the cases poorly, and may not inform women of the
    need for a medical exam or may stall or block women's attempts to
    obtain one. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women
    criticized Hudood Ordinances relating to extramarital sex and
    recommended that they be repealed asserting that they are based on an
    erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 1.c.). The Commission
    charged that the laws on adultery and rape have been subject to
    widespread misuse, with 95 percent of the women accused of adultery
    being found innocent either in the court of first instance or on
    appeal. However, the Commission pointed out that, by that time, the
    woman may have spent months in jail, suffered sexual abuse at the hands
    of the police, and seen her reputation destroyed. The Commission found
    that the main victims of the Hudood Ordinances are poor women who are
    unable to defend themselves against slanderous charges. These
    ordinances also have been used by husbands and other male family
    members to punish their wives and female relatives for reasons having
    nothing to do with sexual propriety, according to the Commission. At
    year's end, 511 women were awaiting trial for adultery under the Hudood
    Ordinance in Lahore; 400 in Peshawar; and 300 in Mardan (see Section
    1.e.).
        Marital rape is not a crime. The 1979 Hudood Ordinances abolished
    punishment for raping one's wife. However, the Commission of Inquiry
    for women has recommended reinstating penalties for marital rape.
    Marriage registration (nikah) sometimes occurs years before a marriage
    is consummated (rukh sati). The nikah (unconsummated) marriage is
    regarded as a formal marital relationship, and thus a woman or girl
    cannot be raped by a man to whom her marriage is registered, even if
    the marriage has not yet been entered into formally.
        There are numerous reports of women killed or mutilated by male
    relatives who suspect them of adultery. Few such cases are investigated
    seriously and those who are arrested often are acquitted on the grounds
    that they were ``provoked,'' or for a lack of witnesses. While the
    tradition of killing those suspected of illicit sexual relations in so-
    called ``honor killings'', in order to restore tribal or family honor,
    applies equally to offending men and women, women are far more likely
    to be killed than men. The Progressive Women's Organization, a human
    rights NGO, estimated that as many as 300 women are killed each year by
    their husbands or family, mostly as a result of ``honor killings,''
    known as ``karo/kari'' in Sindh. The problem is believed to be even
    more extensive in rural Sindh. ``Karo/kari'' (or adulterer/adulteress)
    killings are common in rural Sindh and Baluchistan. The HRCP reported
    an average of 30 killings per month for the first half of the year.
    Tribal custom among the Baluch and the Pathans also sanctions such
    killings. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has rejected the concept
    of ``honor'' as a mitigating circumstance in a murder case and
    recommended that such killings be treated as simple murder. Women who
    are the victims of rape may become the victims of their families'
    vengeance against the victims' ``defilement.'' On June 1, Nazir Ahmad
    killed his wife, Yasmin, and a family friend, Nasir Farooq, on
    suspicion that the two were conducting an extramarital relationship. On
    December 12, Khalida was killed by her uncle and other relatives who
    accused her of having illicit relations with Momin Gorchani. Khalida's
    relatives also injured Momin's father and another one of his relatives.
    Police arrested one person in connection with the murder. AI also
    reported that if an accused adulteress is killed, and the adulterer
    manages to escape this fate, he may be required under the karo/kari
    tradition to compensate the family of the accused adulteress;
    sometimes, a woman from the adulterer's family is given compensation to
    repair the honor of the adulteress' family.
        Trafficking in women also is a significant problem (see Section
    6.f.).
        There are significant barriers to the advancement of women
    beginning at birth. In general female children are less valued and
    cared for than are male children. According to a UN study, girls
    receive less nourishment, health care, and education than do boys. In
    February Dr. Sher Shah Syed, of the Pakistan National Forum on Women's
    Health in Karachi, reported that the maternal mortality rate is 600 per
    100,000 pregnancies; this figure contradicts the Government's figure of
    300 per 100,000 pregnancies. At Karachi's civil hospital, the maternal
    mortality rate was 2,257 per 100,000 in 1999. According to a 1996
    report by the Islamabad-based human development center, only 16 women
    are economically active for every 100 men.
        Discrimination against women is particularly acute in rural areas.
    In some areas of rural Sindh and Baluchistan, female literacy rates are
    2 percent or less. A survey of rural females by the National Institute
    of Psychology found that 42 percent of parents cited ``no financial
    benefit'' as the reason they kept their daughters from attending
    school, and sent their sons instead. Similarly a study by the NWFP
    directorate of primary education concluded that most girls in rural
    areas do not go to school because they have to look after the household
    while their mothers help in the fields. In Karachi only 28 percent of
    girls completing matriculation (10th grade) exams in science during the
    year would be able to find places in government-run colleges, as
    opposed to 83 percent of boys passing the same tests. In Baluchistan
    conditions are much worse, with only 2 percent of the province's women
    having received any formal education. Education activists have noted
    that many parents would like to educate their daughters; however, many
    parents reportedly choose not to send their daughters to school due to
    the poor quality of instruction and the lack of facilities.
        Human rights monitors and women's groups believe that a narrow
    interpretation of Shari'a has had a harmful effect on the rights of
    women and minorities, as it reinforces popular attitudes and
    perceptions and contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory
    treatment of women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
        Both civil and religious laws theoretically protect women's rights
    in cases of divorce, but many women are unaware of them, and often the
    laws are not observed. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for
    Women has recommended that marriage registration (nikahnama) be
    obligatory and that women, as well as men, have the right to initiate
    divorce proceedings. It also has called for the punishment of those who
    coerce women or girls into forced marriages. A husband legally is bound
    to maintain his wife until 3 months after the divorce. A father is
    bound to maintain his children until they reach the age of 14 for
    males, or the age of 16 for females. However, the legal system is so
    complicated and lengthy that it can take years for the children to get
    maintenance.
        In inheritance cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed
    to surrender--the share of the inheritance they legally are due. In
    rural areas, the practice of a woman ``marrying the Koran'' still is
    widely accepted if the family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or
    wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman ``married to the
    Koran'' is forbidden to have any contact with males over 14 years of
    age, including her immediate family members. Press reports indicate
    that the practice of buying and selling brides still occurs in parts of
    the NWFP and the Punjab.
        A special three-member bench of the Lahore High Court upheld in
    1997 the federal Shariat Court's ruling that a Muslim woman can marry
    without the consent of her wali (guardian--usually her father).
    However, in practice social custom dictates that couples are to marry
    at the direction of family elders. When this custom is violated,
    especially across ethnic lines, violence against the couple may result,
    and the authorities generally fail to prosecute such cases vigorously.
        Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
    remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
    Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
    under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see
    Section 2.c.).
        The value of women's testimony is not equal to that of a man's in
    certain court cases (see Section 1.e.).
        In December speakers at a seminar stated that large numbers of
    working women face discrimination and sexual harassment. Women
    routinely are denied equal opportunities for promotion, pay, and
    benefits. Additionally women in some sectors are denied days off and
    overtime benefits.
        Although a small number of women study and teach in universities,
    postgraduate employment opportunities for women largely remain limited
    to teaching, medical services, and the law. Nevertheless, an increasing
    number of women are entering the commercial and public sectors.
        Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many
    concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights. Other
    groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who
    may not be able to afford an attorney.
        The Government took several positive steps to improve the status of
    women during the year. For example, in April President Tarar issued an
    amendment ordinance to the citizenship law, which enables women who are
    married to foreign husbands to claim citizenship for their children. In
    September the Government inaugurated a National Commission on the
    Status of Women (see Section 4). The Commission was established in
    order to advise the Government on policies directly affecting women;
    however, the Commission lacks the authority to ensure that its
    recommendations are implemented.
        Children.--The Government, through its laws and programs, does not
    demonstrate a strong commitment to children's rights and welfare. There
    is no federal law on compulsory education, and neither the federal nor
    provincial governments provide sufficient resources to assure universal
    education. The education system is in disarray, with studies showing
    that only 65 to 70 percent of children under the age of 12 are enrolled
    in school, less than half of whom actually complete primary school. In
    Sindh province, the number of students enrolled in primary education
    rose from 2.1 million to 2.6 million between 1992 and 1998, an increase
    of approximately 6 percent. During this period, an average population
    growth rate of 3 percent would have added 20 percent to the number of
    primary school age children. Even in relatively prosperous Karachi,
    enrollment figures are low. M.I. Memon, the late head of the Board of
    Intermediate and Secondary Education in Karachi, estimated in 1998 that
    only 1.1 million of Karachi's school-age children actually were
    attending school: 500,000 in the public schools; 500,000 in private
    schools; and 100,000 in madrassahs (Islamic religious schools). Since
    the lowest estimate of school-age children in Karachi--the wealthiest
    and most developed city in the country--is 4 million, it would appear
    that no more than 27.5 percent of school age children are attending
    school. Even those children who go to school are not assured of being
    able to read and write. According to UNICEF figures, a nationwide
    sample of children in grade five revealed that only 33 percent could
    read with comprehension, while a mere 17 percent were able to write a
    simple letter. Development experts point to a number of factors for the
    poor state of public education, including the low percentage of gross
    national product devoted to education and inefficient and corrupt
    federal and provincial bureaucracies. Those fortunate enough to pursue
    higher education often face inordinate delays in receiving the results
    of final exams. On March 30, candidates for civil engineering degrees
    received results of the 1996 annual examinations. In 1999 one member of
    the Prime Minister's education task force estimated that up to 50
    percent of the education budget is ``pilfered.''
        Information about progress in educating girls is contradictory. A
    recent survey found that the enrollment rate for girls under age 12 was
    65 percent, which was less than that of boys (75 percent), but was
    considerably higher than the 1990 figure of 50 percent. Since official
    government figures count at most 1.5 million school-age children in
    public and private schools and madrassahs in Karachi (of an estimated 4
    million or more between the ages of 5 and 14), enrollment figures of 65
    and 75 percent are difficult to account for. In all of Sindh province,
    a 14 percent jump in the number of girls in Sindh's primary schools in
    the 1992-1998 period placed female enrollment in 1998 at only 35
    percent. Similarly the female literacy rate has doubled during the past
    two decades, although, at roughly 27 percent, it is just over half that
    of males. However, an Oxfam report released in March 1999 stated that
    the proportion of girls enrolled in school fell by 10 percent in the
    first half of the 1990's and one doctor claimed in a February press
    report that the average time girls spend in school nationwide is 0.7
    years.
        The Government announced a new education policy in March 1998,
    which dealt mostly with the construction of new schools but that also
    included provisions for increased Islamic instruction in public
    schools. Education is a provincial responsibility. In 1998 the
    government of Punjab, the country's most populous province, began an
    ambitious program to improve the quality of its educational system. A
    comprehensive survey was performed to identify school buildings that
    were being misused as well as the large numbers of teachers and
    administrators who were not performing their duties or even showing up
    for work. Administrative action against these ``ghost schools'' began,
    and the Government was better placed to ensure that its education
    budget was not misused. The Punjab government also worked closely with
    both international and local NGO's to improve primary and secondary
    education. However, no legal action was taken against those found
    responsible for the misuse of government property.
        Health care services, like education, remained seriously inadequate
    for the nation's children. Children suffer a high rate of preventable
    childhood diseases. According to the National Institute of Child Health
    Care, over 70 percent of deaths between birth and the age of five are
    caused by easily preventable ailments such as diarrhea and
    malnutrition. Public health administration suffers from poor
    management, avoidance of responsibility, false data, and lack of
    cooperation among agencies. The problems associated with polio are
    illustrative. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 1997
    91 percent of confirmed polio cases in the eastern Mediterranean region
    were in Pakistan (1,147). The WHO and the Center for Disease Control
    reported in 1999 that the full (three-dose) course of oral polio
    vaccine has been given to only 57 percent of children in Punjab, 50
    percent in the NWFP, 42 percent in Sindh, and 22 percent in
    Baluchistan. However, even the high number of reported polio cases may
    be too low, and the reported protection rate may be too high. Public
    health professors at a Karachi medical school report that vaccines
    frequently are degraded by poor storage, and that vaccination rates are
    inflated. In 1999 the English-language newspaper Dawn reported that
    doctors in Sindh had persuaded the Sindh health department to order a
    halt to the reporting of polio cases. Doctors are required by law to
    vaccinate all children under 5 years old within a 1.2 mile range (3
    miles in rural areas); however, they reportedly have taken steps to
    avoid the responsibility. Although the Government has undertaken six
    national immunization days since 1994, a Center for Disease Control
    official who observed a 1999 polio immunization campaign in Quetta, the
    capital of Baluchistan, reported that vaccination teams had no maps,
    census data, or plans. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
    reports that 8 percent of children suffer from iron deficiency and 30
    to 40 percent of children in the country suffer from stunted growth.
    According to a family-planning NGO, up to 50 percent of children are
    born iodine-deficient, resulting in high rates of mental retardation.
    During the year, the Government conducted a well-publicized campaign to
    encourage polio vaccinations; however, there were no statistics
    available on the number of children who were vaccinated.
        Many children begin working at a very early age (see Section 6.d.).
    At the age of 5 or 6, many female children assume responsibility for
    younger siblings.
        Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for
    ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.d.). On September 11, an anti-terrorist court in Karachi convicted
    five men for kidnaping the 15-year-old son of a businessman in January;
    three of the five defendants were sentenced to death. In rural areas,
    it is a traditional practice for poor parents to give children to rich
    landlords in exchange for money or land, according to human rights
    advocates. These children frequently are abused by these landlords and
    held as bonded laborers for life. Landlords also have been known to pay
    impoverished parents for the ``virginity'' of their daughters, whom the
    landlords then rape. Incidents of rape and the s are common. A 1996
    survey conducted in Punjab showed that 40 percent of reported rape
    victims were minors, with the youngest victim in the study only 8 years
    old. A UNICEF-sponsored study of Punjab found that 15 percent of girls
    reported having been abused sexually. Sexual abuse of boys is more
    common in segments of society where women and girls traditionally
    remain within the home. An HRCP study in the NWFP found 723 cases of
    sexual abuse of boys and 635 of girls during the first half of 1998. A
    newspaper reported that there were 1,025 incidents of sexual abuse of
    children between January and September; in the majority of cases,
    children were abused by acquaintances. There were credible reports of
    boys being sexually abused in a jail located in Punjab province during
    the year. At a May conference in Karachi on trafficking in women,
    speakers claimed that over 15,000 child sex workers were operating in
    Lahore and other cities. Child prostitution involving boys and girls is
    widely known to exist but rarely is discussed. All forms of
    prostitution are illegal and a person who abducts a child under the age
    of 10 and commits sexual assault may be sentenced to the death penalty.
    The Shabab-i-Milli, the youth wing of the Jamaat Islami party, launched
    a campaign in May to combat child prostitution by raising public
    awareness of the problem. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has
    observed that child sexual abuse is a subject that ``has been virtually
    ignored,'' and called for a public education campaign on the subject,
    including introducing it into school curriculums and training nurses
    and doctors in how to handle such cases.
        In the aftermath of a September prison riot in Hyderabad (see
    Section 1.c.), military personnel discovered that adult prisoners
    abused sexually about 50 imprisoned minors. The Government did not take
    action against prison officials for permitting the abuse by year's end.
        Children's rights theoretically are protected by numerous laws that
    incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
    However, the Government frequently fails to enforce these laws. There
    are two facilities--one in Karachi and one in Bahawalpur--that serve as
    reform schools for juvenile offenders. There is only one jail in each
    province for convicted prisoners under 21 years of age, and children
    frequently are incarcerated along with the general prison population,
    sharing prison conditions that are extremely poor (see Section 1.c.).
    Many children in prison were born to female inmates who were sexually
    abused by prison guards. Although Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws
    mandating special judicial procedures for child offenders, in practice,
    children and adults essentially are treated equally. According to a
    local NGO, an estimated 4,200 children were held in the nation's
    prisons at year's end, some as young as 8 years old, compared with
    4,000 in 1999. Imprisoned children often spend long periods of time in
    prison awaiting trial or a hearing before a magistrate, often in
    violation of the law. One child spent 3 years and 4 months awaiting
    trial. Children are subject to the same delays and inefficiencies in
    the justice system as adults are (see Section 1.e.). Peshawar's jail in
    1998 contained 183 children, 40 percent of whom were Afghan refugees.
    These prisoners were separated from the adult prisoners. According to
    some estimates, there are 900 children in Karachi's central jail, in a
    space meant to house 300; these children are 18 and under. Human Rights
    Watch reports that children frequently are beaten and even tortured
    while in detention; usually this is done to extract confessions, but it
    is done also to punish or intimidate child detainees or to extort
    payment from their families for their release (see Section 1.c.).
    Sexual abuse of child detainees by police or guards is reportedly a
    problem as well (see Section 1.c.).
        Courts also may order that children be sent to reform schools or
    various types of residential facilities, many designed to provide
    vocational or other training. Juvenile offenders and, in some cases,
    homeless and destitute children, may be sent to these residential
    facilities, for terms not to exceed the amount of time until they reach
    majority. Conditions in these institutions reportedly are poor, similar
    to those found in jails. Abuse and torture of the children in such
    institutions is a problem; one study found that 17.4 percent of the
    inmates of the Youthful Offenders Industrial School in Karachi had been
    tortured or otherwise mistreated. Educational facilities in these
    institutions often are inadequate; however, during the year, an NGO in
    Karachi started a school for the approximately 1 dozen children forced
    to live in a Karachi women's prison. Extortion on the part of the staff
    at such institutions is reportedly widespread; parents of inmates often
    are required to pay lower level staff members to visit their children
    or bring them food. Drug trafficking by guards and other staff also is
    a problem; some children reportedly have developed drug habits while in
    these institutions, and are supplied by their guards.
        On July 1, the Government passed the Juvenile Justice System
    Ordinance. The ordinance abolished the death penalty for minors under
    18 years of age, guarantees that the Government will provide children
    with legal assistance, prohibits children from being tried for crimes
    with adults, and prohibits the proceedings of juvenile courts from
    being published.
        According to press reports, there are several madrassahs where
    children are confined illegally and kept in unhealthy conditions, and
    there were reports of the abuse of children studying at madrassahs
    during the year. Sexual abuse of boys is widely believed to occur at
    some madrassahs.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced by the Bohra Muslims. There are an
    estimated 100,000 Bohra Muslims in the country; the Bohra observe a
    form of Shi'a Islam that was practiced in medieval Cairo. There were no
    available statistics on the extent to which the Bohra practice FGM;
    however, the practice of FGM in the Bohra community reportedly has
    declined in the last few years.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no laws requiring equal
    accessibility to public buildings for disabled persons. The vast
    majority of physically and mentally disabled persons are cared for by
    their families. However, in some cases these individuals are forced
    into begging, while organized criminal ``beggarmasters'' skim off much
    of the proceeds. Parents reportedly have given children as offering to
    Baba Shah Dola, a shrine in Punjab where the children reportedly
    intentionally are deformed by clamping a metal form on the head that
    induces microcephalitis. Some human rights organizations asked local
    authorities to investigate this practice; however, there have been no
    investigations. There is a legal provision requiring public and private
    organizations to reserve at least 2 percent of their jobs for qualified
    disabled persons. Organizations that do not wish to hire disabled
    persons can instead give a certain amount of money to the government
    treasury, which goes into a fund for the disabled. This obligation
    rarely is enforced. The National Council for the Rehabilitation of the
    Disabled provides some job placement and loan facilities.
        Mentally ill prisoners normally lack adequate care and are not
    segregated from the general prison population (see Section 1.c.).
        Religious Minorities.--Government authorities afford religious
    minorities fewer protections than are afforded to Sunni Muslim
    citizens. Members of religious minorities are subject to violence and
    harassment, and police at times refuse to prevent such actions or to
    charge persons who commit them.
        Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims continued to be
    a serious problem throughout the country (see Section 2.c.). In Punjab
    in particular, a deadly pattern of Sunni-Shi'a violence in which
    extremists killed persons because of their membership in rival
    sectarian organizations, or simply for their religious identification,
    continued; however, there were fewer deaths during the year as compared
    to previous years. Anti-terrorist courts handed down convictions
    against several individuals accused of sectarian violence during the
    year; however, government authorities did not detain suspects in many
    other cases of sectarian violence. Several incidents of sectarian
    violence between rival Sunni and Shi'a groups occurred during Muharram
    in April, during which Shi'a Muslims mourn the deaths of the Prophet
    Mohammed's nephew Ali and his son Hussain. On April 7, a Shi'a lawyer
    and the secretary general of TJP, Syed Waqar Hussain, his son, and his
    driver were killed by unknown gunmen in Karachi; the assailants may
    have been members of the extremist SSP (see Section 1.a.). On April 12,
    in the worst incident of sectarian violence since the coup, unknown
    assailants attacked a Shi'a religious congregation in Mullowali,
    Rawalpindi, with grenades and bullets, killing 19 persons and injuring
    37 others (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Police personnel arrested
    several Sunni Muslims following the attack. On April 19, unknown gunmen
    killed TJP activist, Iqubal Hussain in Multan. On April 26, unknown
    assailants killed TJP activist, Syed Farrukh Birjis Haider and his
    personal aide in Khanewal. On April 28, unknown gunmen killed local
    Shi'a leader Hakeem Syed Shahbaz Hussain Sherazi in Chishtian. On May
    2, unidentified assailants killed a Shi'a doctor, his pharmaceutical
    dispenser, and a patient in the doctor's Karachi office. The next day,
    unknown assailants killed Shi'a lawyer, Malik Ibrar Hussain in Toba Tek
    Singh, Punjab. On May 15, unknown assailants killed Shi'a lawyer Syed
    Sardar Hussain Jafri. Unknown assailants also killed Qudratullah
    Cheema, the chief of the Ahmadi community of Khanpur. On May 19,
    unknown assailants killed eminent Sunni cleric Maulana Yousuf Ludhianvi
    and Abdur Rehman, a teacher at the Sunni Banuri town religious school
    in Karachi; following these murders, hundreds of Sunni Muslims rioted
    in Karachi and torched a newspaper office, a movie theater, and a bank
    (see Section 2.c.).
        Ahmadis often are targets of religious intolerance, much of which
    is instigated by organized religious extremists. Ahmadi leaders charge
    that militant Sunni mullahs and their followers sometimes stage marches
    through the streets of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and
    spiritual center in central Punjab. Backed by crowds of 100 to 200
    persons, the mullahs purportedly denounce Ahmadis and their founder, a
    situation that sometimes leads to violence. The Ahmadis claim that
    police generally are present during these marches but do not intervene
    to prevent trouble (see Section 2.c.).
        On October 30, 2 assailants opened fire on an Ahmadi mosque in
    Ghatialian in Sialkot district, killing 4 Ahmadis and 1 Sunni Muslim.
    Three suspects were arrested; however, no formal charges were filed by
    year's end. On November 10, a mob composed of the cleric's followers
    killed five Ahmadis in Takht Hazara, Sarghoda district following a
    scuffle between a group of Ahmadis and a Sunni Muslim cleric. Police
    detained 25 persons for questioning and imprisoned 13 others in
    connection with the killings; however, no charges were filed against
    any of the suspects by year's end (see Section 2.c.).
        On July 15, in response to pressure from some Muslim groups, the
    Government incorporated the Islamic provisions of the suspended
    Constitution into the Provisional Constitutional Order, including the
    clause declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Ahmadis suffer from
    harassment and discrimination and have limited chances for advancement
    into management levels in government service (see Section 2.c.). Even
    the rumor that someone may be an Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can
    stifle opportunities for employment or promotion. Ahmadi students in
    public schools are subject to abuse by their non-Ahmadi classmates, and
    the quality of teachers assigned to predominantly Ahmadi schools by the
    Government generally is poor. However, most Ahmadis are home-schooled
    or go to private Ahmadi-run schools. Young Ahmadis complain of their
    difficulty in gaining admittance to good colleges and consequently
    having to go abroad for higher education. Certain sections of the Penal
    Code discriminate against Ahmadis (see Section 2.c.), particularly the
    provision that forbids Ahmadis from ``directly or indirectly'' posing
    as Muslims. Armed with this vague wording, mullahs have brought charges
    against Ahmadis for using standard Muslim salutations and for naming
    their children Mohammed.
        Other religious minority groups also experience considerable
    discrimination in employment and education. In the country's early
    years, minorities were able to rise to the senior ranks of the military
    and civil service. Today many are unable to rise above mid-level ranks.
    Discrimination in employment reportedly is common. Christians in
    particular have difficulty finding jobs other than menial labor,
    although Christian activists say the employment situation has improved
    somewhat in the private sector. Christians are overrepresented in
    Pakistan's most oppressed social group--that of bonded laborers. Like
    Ahmadis many Christians complain about the difficulty that their
    children face in gaining admission to government schools and colleges,
    a problem they attribute to discrimination. Many Christians continue to
    express fear of forced marriages between Muslim males and Christian
    women, although the practice is relatively rare. Reprisals against
    suspected converts to Christianity occur, and a general atmosphere of
    religious intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious
    minorities (see Section 2.c.). According to the HRCP, in January
    intruders broke into a church in Sialkot and desecrated religious
    literature. On March 12, men broke into the Lourdes Convent and
    attacked Sister Christine, a 78-year-old nun; she died in a nearby
    hospital a few days later. According to the Christian Liberation Front
    (CLF), an NGO, the perpetrators of the attack were Muslims who
    previously had accused Sister Christine of proselytizing. Police
    officials did not arrest anyone in connection with this attack. In May
    five masked men stopped a factory bus in Ferozwala on which female
    factory employees were traveling and raped six to eight Christian girls
    who were passengers; the assailants reportedly spared the two Muslim
    passengers on the bus. Initially police officials urged the girls to
    report that they were robbed, not raped; however, when the CLF
    complained to government officials, the officials immediately
    registered the cases as rape cases, arrested three suspects, and
    promised to investigate police behavior. The suspects were charged
    under the Hudood Ordinances and were scheduled to stand trial in
    September. One of the suspects was released for lack of evidence;
    however the other two cases had not been tried by year's end.
        There are restrictions on certain testimony in court by non-Muslims
    (see Section 1.e.).
        Although there are few Jewish citizens, anti-Semitic sentiments
    appear to be widespread, and anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist press
    articles are common.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Industrial Relations Ordinance of
    1969 (IRO) permits industrial workers to form trade unions subject to
    major restrictions in some employment areas. The Essential Services
    Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESMA) covers the state administration,
    government services, and state enterprises like oil and gas production,
    electricity generation and transmission, the state-owned airline, and
    ports. Workers in these sectors are allowed to form unions. However,
    the ESMA sharply restricts normal union activities, usually
    prohibiting, for example, the right to strike in affected
    organizations. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed under the
    ESMA. For each industry subject to the ESMA, the Government must make a
    finding, renewable every six months, on the limits of union activity.
    There is no provision allowing agricultural workers or teachers to
    unionize as they are not defined as ``an industry.'' A presidential
    ordinance in 1998 banned all union activity in the water and power
    development authority (employing 130,000 workers) for 2 years.
    Following a 3-day conference on employment protection, human resource
    development, and industrial relations sponsored by the Musharraf
    Government and the ILO in May, the Government on July 17 passed an
    ordinance permitting water and power workers to engage in ``responsible
    trade unionism.''
        Other restrictions on union activities include the Anti-terrorist
    Ordinance of 1999 (ATO). The ATO codified the crime of a ``terrorist
    act,'' which includes ``an act of civil commotion.'' Such acts are
    punishable by imprisonment of 7 years to life, as well as fines.
    ``Civil commotion'' includes illegal strikes, go-slows, and lockouts.
    Under the original ordinance, those distributing, publishing, or
    pasting a handbill or making graffiti or wall-chalking ``intended to
    create unrest'' were subject to arrest. According to the ILO, this
    ordinance prevented leafleting, posters, or even word-of-mouth notices
    of public meetings. In late 1999, the ATO was amended to eliminate
    references to handbills, graffiti, or the intent to create civil
    commotion (see Sections 1.e and 2.b.). According to government
    estimates, union members make up about 10 percent of the industrial
    labor force and 3 percent of the total estimated work force. Unions
    claim that the number of union members is underestimated. Contract
    labor continues to flourish, undercutting the power of the unions and
    exploiting workers who are willing to work on temporary contracts with
    fewer benefits and no job security.
        Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods
    constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's authority to
    ban any strike that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or
    prejudice the national interest. The Government also may ban a strike
    that has continued for 30 days. Strikes are rare. When they occur, they
    usually are illegal and short. The Government regards as illegal any
    strike conducted by workers who are not members of a legally registered
    union. Police do not hesitate to crack down on worker demonstrations.
    The law prohibits employers from seeking retribution against leaders of
    a legal strike and stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The
    courts may imprison employers for violating this prohibition, but they
    are more likely to fine them. The law does not protect leaders of
    illegal strikes. In May and June, there were strikes by small and large
    businessmen throughout the country to protest the Government's efforts
    to collect taxes. In May there was a 3-day strike by religious leaders
    against General Musharraf's proposed modification of the blasphemy law
    (see Section 2.b.).
        Unions may belong to federations, and there are eight major
    federations. The Government permits trade unions across the political
    spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from politics, some are
    associated with political parties. Unions associated with opposition
    parties are allowed to carry on their activities freely.
        In 1997 the Cabinet passed an amendment to the IRO which states
    that: 1) only employees of the represented industry can hold office in
    a trade union; and 2) if trade unions form a federation, the federation
    cannot bargain with individual employers; each component union has to
    bargain for itself. The first provision disadvantages smaller unions,
    which may not have enough officers capable of bargaining. The second
    provision is an attempt to weaken the power of the federations. This
    amendment has been challenged by the trade unions and, as a result, has
    not yet come into force. Late in 1997, the Prime Minister announced the
    Government's new investment policy, under which, in order to improve
    working relations among employees and employers, trade union activity
    would be industry-based and not factory-based. The new policy also
    decrees that, in order to check the growth of trade unions, unions
    receiving less than 20 percent of the votes in a referendum are to be
    dissolved automatically and their registrations canceled. No action has
    been taken to implement these elements of the investment policy.
        The ILO has stated repeatedly that current law and practice violate
    the Government's commitments under ILO Convention 87. The ILO has urged
    the Government to lift prohibitions against union activity with respect
    to teachers, radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, banking,
    and other Government employees, as well as to rescind the existing ban
    on strikes. The ILO also expressed concern about the practice of
    artificial promotions that exclude workers from the purview of
    Convention 111. In response to a Government request, the ILO has
    provided technical assistance to help bring the country's labor laws
    into conformity with the ILO's conventions. However, no legislative
    remedies have been applied.
        In 1994 a government task force on labor recommended improvements
    on worker rights problems, which formed the basis for the development
    of a new government labor policy. The Government has not approved the
    new policy; however, it has implemented two components of the proposed
    policy: 1) improvements in the workers' welfare fund; and 2) increases
    in social security benefits for workers. Federations are free to
    affiliate with international federations and confederations. Pakistani
    trade unions belong to the ICFTU and to secretariats affiliated with
    the ICFTU.
        The United States revoked generalized system of preferences (GSP)
    trade benefits in 1996 for failure to make progress on worker rights
    issues.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
    industrial workers to organize and freely elect representatives to act
    as collective bargaining agents is established in law. The IRO
    prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Under the law, private
    employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
    However, in practice, such redress has not been available to workers,
    because workers usually do not pursue redress through the courts due to
    the fact that the legal system is normally slow, prohibitively
    expensive, and sometimes corrupt. In general, legal unions have the
    right to bargain collectively. However, the many restrictions on
    forming unions (see Section 6.a.) preclude collective bargaining by
    large sections of the labor force like agricultural workers who are not
    provided with the right to strike, bargain collectively, or make
    demands on employers. The National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union
    filed suit against the Government for implementing a banking companies
    ordinance that prohibited union activities in banks during working
    hours and allowed only current bank employees to serve as bank trade
    union officials. Labor unions report that workers are given artificial
    promotions (such as a new title with no salary increase) to make them
    ineligible for union membership. This practice is prevalent in the
    financial sector, particularly among foreign banks.
        The ESMA also restricts collective bargaining. For each industry
    subject to the ESMA (see Section 6.a.), the Government must make a
    finding, renewable every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. In
    cases in which the Government prohibits collective bargaining, special
    wage boards decide wage levels.
        The boards are established at the provincial level and are composed
    of representatives from industry, labor, and the provincial labor
    ministry, which provides the chairman. Despite the presence of labor
    representatives, unions generally are dissatisfied with the boards'
    findings. Disputes are adjudicated before the National Industrial
    Relations Commission. A worker's right to quit also may be curtailed
    under the ESMA. Dismissed workers have no recourse to the labor courts.
        The ESMA exempts export promotion zones (EPZ's) from the IRO's
    granting of workers the right to form trade unions. There is only one
    EPZ, in Karachi, with nearly 6,000 employees, according to government
    sources. In 1996 the Cabinet decided to withdraw these exemptions
    beginning in January 2000. However, the Government has stated that it
    will honor agreements with investors regarding the exemptions, making
    it unlikely that the EPZ's exemption will be lifted before 2001.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The suspended
    Constitution and the law prohibited forced labor, including forced
    labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce these
    prohibitions effectively. Critics argue that the ESMA's limitation on
    worker rights, especially the right to quit, constitutes a form of
    compulsory labor. The ILO has objected to this violation of Convention
    29. The Government has responded that the maintenance of essential
    services is required for the defense and security of the country, and
    that continued reviews have limited these services to a few core areas
    like electricity generation and distribution, and air and sea ports.
        There is a reasonable basis to believe that handmade bricks and
    hand-woven wool carpets are produced with forced or indentured child
    labor. Illegal bonded labor is widespread. It is common in the brick,
    glass, and fishing industries and is found among agricultural and
    construction workers in rural areas. A 1998 study by a trade federation
    reported that over 200,000 families work in debt slavery in the brick
    kiln industry and there are reports that this figure has grown with the
    arrival of Afghan refugees to the country. The Bonded Labor Liberation
    Front (BLLF) is an NGO that advocates for the rights of bonded laborers
    and provides a safe haven and educational and vocational training for
    those who have escaped their bondage. The BLLF states that it freed 820
    bonded brick kiln workers (including 351 children) in 1999. There is no
    evidence that bonded labor is used in the production of export items
    like sporting goods and surgical equipment. However, bonded labor
    reportedly is used in the production of carpets for export under the
    peshgi system, by which a worker is advanced money and raw materials
    for a carpet he promises to complete. Many workers do not realize the
    extent of their exploitation. The lack of education among bonded
    laborers deprives them of the ability to perform the necessary
    calculations to know when they have paid their debts to bondholders.
    Bonded laborers who escape often face retaliation from former
    employers. Although police do arrest violators of the law against
    bonded labor, many of these individuals bribe the police to release
    them. Conservative estimates put the number of bonded workers at
    several million. The Government disputes that peshgi workers are
    ``bonded'' or ``forced'' laborers and argues that they are ``contract
    laborers'' who negotiate a salary advance in a free and open market.
        Human rights groups report that as many as 50 private jails housing
    some 4,500 bonded laborers were maintained by landlords in rural Sindh
    (see Section 1.d.).
        The suspended Constitution and the law prohibited slavery. However,
    in remote areas of rural Sindh, bonded agricultural labor and debt
    slavery have a long history. Landlords have kept entire families in
    private prisons and sold families to other landlords.
        The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act of 1992 outlawed bonded
    labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits for the
    recovery of existing debts. The act makes bonded labor by children
    punishable by up to 5 years in prison and up to $900 (PRs 50,000) in
    fines. However, the provincial governments, which are responsible for
    enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement mechanisms.
    Furthermore the law is written in English and is frequently
    incomprehensible to persons it is intended to protect. Hence the law is
    ineffective. Lacking employment alternatives, many workers who have
    been freed end up returning to bonded labor. In April General Musharraf
    announced that approximately $1,700,000 (PRs 100,000,000) have been
    designated to fight bonded labor. However, these funds were not
    allocated by year's end.
        There are reports that children in juvenile detention facilities
    are required to work. Children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either
    are imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their
    parents, or were born in jail reportedly are involved in woodcrafts and
    television repairs (see Section 6.d.). Verifying these reports is
    difficult because of limited outside access to the jail.
        Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used for forced labor.
    According to 1996 ILO estimates, 3.3 million children between the ages
    of 5 and 14 years (about 8 percent of this population group) are
    ``economically active.'' Of these, about two-thirds work in
    agriculture. Seventy percent of the working children have the status of
    ``unpaid family helpers.'' Many observers believe that the ILO
    estimates understate the true dimensions of the problem. Observers also
    believe that the incidence of bonded labor among such children is
    significant, but there are no reliable figures available on this. Some
    boys, usually between the ages of 6 and 9, are taken to countries in
    the Persian Gulf to serve as camel jockeys (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Child labor is common and results from a combination of
    severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate enforcement of laws
    intended to control it. The suspended Constitution prohibited the
    employment of children aged 14 years and under in factories, mines, and
    other hazardous occupations. The Employment of Children Act of 1991,
    whose provisions were extended by the President in 1998 to the FATA,
    prohibits the employment of children under age 14 in certain
    occupations and regulates their conditions of work. Under this law, no
    child is allowed to work overtime or at night. Penalties for the
    violation of the act include fines of up to $335 (PRs 20,000) or 1 year
    in prison. The Government acknowledges that child labor is a problem.
    The Constitution prohibits forced labor, including forced labor
    performed by children; however, forced and bonded labor by children is
    common (see Section 6.c.).
        Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required
    to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are
    imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their
    parents, or were born in jail, reportedly are involved in woodcrafts
    and television repairs (see Section 6.c.).
        In 1996 the Government announced the results of its first
    comprehensive child labor survey conducted with the assistance of the
    ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-
    IPEC). According to the survey, 8.3 percent (or between 3.3 and 3.6
    million) of children between the ages of 5 and 14 worked. The child
    labor force was predominately male (73 percent) and rural (71 percent).
    About 60 percent of child labor in the country occurred in Punjab. Some
    45.8 percent of child laborers worked 35 hours or more per week and
    12.6 percent worked 56 hours or more. The majority (67 percent) of
    child laborers worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing
    industries; 11 percent in the manufacturing sector, 9 percent in
    wholesale and retail, and 8 percent in social and personal services. In
    occupational terms, craft and related trade work accounted for about 19
    percent of child laborers, while 71 percent worked in unskilled jobs.
    Only the Government and exporters regard the ILO survey as an accurate
    measurement of the incidence of child labor. Many observers believe
    that it understates the problem, and give higher estimates of as many
    as 20 million child laborers. A 1997 survey by the Pakistan Institute
    of Labor Education and Research indicated that in one-fourth of 187
    Karachi households, the eldest child worker (below the age of 14)
    provided more than 40 percent of household income. A recent ILO survey
    indicated that agriculture is the largest child labor industry;
    followed by the informal sector, which includes domestic work, street
    vending, illegal work, and family businesses; hazardous work, such as
    the leather, surgical instruments, and brick kiln industries rank
    third. The report also noted that when programs are developed to
    eliminate child labor in one industry, parents often shift their
    children to work in other industries. A survey conducted by the Human
    Rights Commission of Pakistan published in June 1999 noted that there
    are approximately 4,000 children working in auto workshops in the
    Mardan district of the NWFP. The report stated that most of the
    children were between the ages of 3 and 8. In a press conference in
    February, the president of the Punjab Laborers Front stated that
    100,000 children between the ages of 5 and 12 years were working in
    more than 4,500 brick kilns in Punjab. The ILO, the Ministry of Labor,
    and the Federal Bureau of Statistics was scheduled to conduct a new
    survey in 2001 in over 30,000 households; this survey will include the
    agricultural sector and rural areas where the worst forms of child
    labor often occur.
        Child labor, mostly female, is common in the carpet industry, much
    of which is family-run. Carpet manufacturers are working with ILO-IPEC
    to establish a program to eliminate child labor from the industry
    through monitoring and rehabilitation. Although surgical instrument
    manufacturers have acted to remove child laborers from their factories,
    child labor still occurs at rudimentary offsite filing and polishing
    centers run by subcontractors for low-end items. Almost all children
    working in the surgical instrument industry are male. According to the
    ILO and the Punjab Welfare Department, children constitute about 15
    percent of the work force in the surgical instrument industry in
    Sialkot; 7,500 of these children are estimated to be under age 14.
    According to a June 1999 report issued by Public Services
    International, the average age of children in the surgical instrument
    industry is 12. Children in the surgical instrument industry are prone
    to injuries from machinery and burns from hot metal, as well as
    respiratory illnesses from inhaling poisonous metal dust. The
    successful efforts to eliminate child labor in other industries have
    not been mirrored in the surgical instrument industry. Child labor is
    not regarded as a particular problem in the textile and apparel
    industries, but no specific studies of this sector have been performed.
    In October Fayyaz Ahmad, a child worker in a textile mill died as a
    result of injuries he sustained when his clothing became entangled in
    machinery.
        In 1997 soccer ball manufacturers, importers, the ILO, and UNICEF
    implemented an 18-month action plan (the Atlanta Agreement) to
    eliminate child labor from the soccer ball industry. This project,
    based in Sialkot, monitored the production of soccer balls at newly
    established stitching centers, and set up as many as 185 rehabilitation
    centers to educate former child laborers and their younger siblings. At
    year's end, there were 153 rehabilitation centers; however, an
    additional 70 centers are projected for the next 2 years. The project
    also sought to identify unemployed adults, particularly women, from the
    families of former child stitchers to take up stitching work and
    replace lost income. Women initially were reluctant to move from their
    homes to stitching centers, so the project began to establish small,
    home-based stitching centers in individual villages; by year's end,
    there were 358 home-based centers and 146 larger centers for female
    stitchers. The ILO currently monitors over 1,200 stitching centers.
    Saga Sports, which also manufactures soccer balls, has built modern
    community-based facilities in 10 villages with a high percentage of
    family stitching operations. The facilities contain work space for
    stitchers as well as dining areas, child care centers, recreation
    areas, and medical clinics. Each facility also has its own water
    system, waste disposal system, generator for electricity, and
    transportation system. Meals, child care, medical services, and use of
    the facilities are provided gratis to workers and their families; use
    of non-production areas is allowed to all community members. These
    centers reportedly have created approximately 6,000 jobs, 400 to 500 of
    which are held by women. During the year, Saga Sports became the first
    industry in Sialkot to permit freedom of association. By year's end,
    over 6,000 children have been removed from employment in the soccer
    ball industry.
        Under a memorandum of understanding with the Government, the
    International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO/IPEC)
    program in Pakistan is involved with other child labor projects.
    Projects in Sialkot include one in the surgical instruments industry
    and one in the non-formal (non-exporting) sectors. The ILO works with
    the Government, employers, workers, and NGO's to pursue the
    Government's policy and plan of action for child labor. The Government
    established 30 rehabilitation centers (50 are planned) for former child
    laborers through the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, the Government's social
    welfare fund. Each center educates 120 children. The ILO created a
    similar program in conjunction with the European Union, specifically
    targeting child bonded laborers. In 1998 the ILO and the Swiss Agency
    for Development and Cooperation (SDC) launched a large project to
    combat child labor and child abuse in the NWFP. This program, which
    targets children in the automobile repair sector, aims to provide
    children with vocational training and informal education. In May the
    Government, in conjunction with the ILO, issued a national policy and
    action plan to combat child labor. Its three principal goals are: To
    immediately eradicate the worst forms of child labor, to progressively
    eliminate all remaining forms of child labor, and to ensure at least a
    primary education and vocational training for the targeted children.
    According to the plan, funding will be provided by the federal and
    provincial governments and ``international donors;'' however, no funds
    were allocated to implement this plan by year's end.
        In response to international criticism, the Government has begun to
    push provincial authorities to enforce child labor laws. However,
    enforcement of these laws remains a problem. There are few child labor
    inspectors in most districts, and the inspectors often have little
    training and insufficient resources. They reportedly also are subject
    to corruption. By law inspectors also may not inspect facilities that
    employ less than 10 persons; most child labor occurs in facilities
    smaller than this. Hundreds of convictions are obtained each year for
    violations of child labor laws, but low fines levied by the courts--
    ranging from an average of $7 (PRs 364) in the NWFP to an average of
    $140 (PRs 7,280) in Baluchistan--are not a significant deterrent. The
    1991 Employment of Children Act allows for fines of up to $350 (PRs
    18,200). Penalties often are not imposed on those found to be violating
    child labor laws.
        The Child Care Foundation of Pakistan, a national NGO, was
    established in 1996 with support from the Ministry of Commerce. Other
    NGO's, such as the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, conduct programs to end child
    labor. Bait-ul-Mal, with funding from the Government and international
    organizations, operates 33 education centers for children known
    collectively as the National Center for the Rehabilitation of Child
    Labor. Parents of working children are offered compensation of $6 per
    month (PRs 300), plus a small daily stipend of about $0.10 (PRs 5) in
    exchange for sending their children to school. Children in the centers
    receive free schooling, uniforms, books, and meals. However, many
    children apparently do not remain there for more than 1 year; the
    schools often are in areas far from their clients, and some children
    reportedly are sent to the schools in order to qualify for the stipend.
    The Bunyad Literacy Community Council also runs schools focusing on
    children who work in the soccer ball and carpet industries; its
    programs aim to transition children out of working and into mainstream
    schooling. Other local NGO's, such as the Society for the Protection of
    the Rights of the Child, are working to eliminate child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Federal statutes applicable
    throughout the country govern labor regulations. The minimum wage for
    unskilled workers is $35 (Prs 1,976) per month, with only slightly
    higher minimum rates for skilled workers. It applies only to industrial
    and commercial establishments employing 50 or more workers and not to
    agricultural or other workers in the informal sectors. The minimum wage
    usually is inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family, since families tend to be large, including members
    of the extended family.
        Federal law provides for a maximum work-week of 48 hours (54 hours
    for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and paid
    annual holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural
    workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and
    contractors. Many workers are unaware of their rights because of their
    lack of education.
        Additional benefits required by the Federal Labor Code include
    official government holidays, overtime pay, annual and sick leave,
    health and safety standards in the workplace, health care, education
    for workers' children, social security, old age benefits, and a workers
    welfare fund. Employees earning more than $52 (PRs 3,120) per month are
    not considered workers for the purpose of these benefits.
        The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations
    because of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory
    structures. In general health and safety standards are poor. Although
    organized labor presses for improvements, the Government has done
    little and its efforts to enforce existing legal protection are weak.
    Workers cannot remove themselves from dangerous working conditions
    without risking loss of employment. There is a serious lack of
    adherence to mine safety and health protocols. For example, mines often
    have only one opening for entry, egress, and ventilation.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of
    women under age 21 into the country for sexual purposes, as well as
    kidnaping and slavery; however, trafficking in persons, especially in
    women, is a significant problem. Trafficking in women is protected by
    powerful criminal interests and operates relatively openly. The
    Government has done little to stem the flow of women trafficked into
    the country or to help victims of trafficking. For example, despite the
    large numbers involved, only 88 cases have been registered in Sindh
    between 1990 and 1999. Of the 260 men and 110 women arrested, only 87
    were charged and only 7 were sentenced.
        Pakistan is a receiving country for thousands of trafficked women
    every year, mainly from Bangladesh. Smaller numbers of Burmese, Sri
    Lankan, Indian, and Afghan women also are trafficked into the country
    and some Pakistani women were trafficked overseas. The Commission of
    Inquiry for Women drew attention to the problem of ``enforced
    prostitution and trafficking in women,'' noting that women are the
    victims of exploitation by police and pimps, and should be treated with
    compassion. Trafficking in women has occurred for decades; there are
    likely several hundred thousand trafficked women in the country. A
    Karachi-based NGO estimates that 100 to 150 women who are trafficked
    into the country each day from Bangladesh are sold for domestic labor
    throughout the country and for forced prostitution in Karachi. Press
    reports indicate that the buying and selling of brides persists in
    parts of the NWFP and Punjab. Trafficking victims usually are deceived
    with false prospects of marriage or offers of legitimate jobs in
    Pakistan. They generally do not have legal residency, and, if arrested,
    end up in jail for violation of immigration laws or the Hudood
    ordinance. Without money to pay for bail, they often are bailed out by
    their pimps, who force them to return to prostitution. Small numbers of
    escaped victims of trafficking end up in shelters, but most do not
    because there are few such shelters available. Many women who are not
    bailed out are not repatriated; since they arrive without
    documentation, the Bangladesh High Commission will not take
    responsibility for them, and they remain confined to women's shelters.
    Some have been repatriated at the expense of individuals who discover
    them and pay for their return home.
        Prices for trafficked women start at approximately $550 (PRs
    30,000) but can go as high as approximately $5,000 (PRs 260,000).
    Physical beauty and educational level are major factors in determining
    prices. Some women sold in shops in Karachi reportedly are sent to
    Persian Gulf countries, where they are slaves; women sent to rural
    Pakistan reportedly are de facto slaves. Buyers in such shops
    reportedly purchase women for purposes of labor or sex; some are
    married to their buyers.
        There are reports that Afghan and Bangladeshi girls are trafficked
    into the country for sexual purposes.
        Young boys are trafficked from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf to work
    as camel jockeys; reports estimate that there are between several
    hundred and a few thousand boys between the ages of 4 and 10 working as
    camel jockeys, mostly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The majority
    of these boys are sent to the Gulf countries by their parents, landless
    agricultural workers who receive a monthly sum of money for their
    child's labor. Parents occasionally also accompany their children to
    the Persian Gulf. However, a significant minority of these children are
    abducted by traffickers in the country and sent abroad without the
    knowledge of their parents. The conditions such children live under
    often are poor, and many children reportedly are injured or maimed
    while racing camels. The children reportedly do not receive proper
    medical care or schooling, and when they become too old to race, they
    are sent back to the country and left to fend for themselves. In
    February the district administration in Multan approached the Pakistan
    Ambassador to the UAE for the return of two children reportedly sold to
    a UAE citizen for approximately $400 (PRs 20,000) each, and the federal
    investigation agency filed charges against four residents of Multan who
    were involved in the deal. To date, there has been no report on the
    return of the boys. Within the country, children sometimes are kidnaped
    to be used as forced labor, for ransom, or to seek revenge against an
    enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). In rural areas, it is a traditional
    practice for poor parents to give children to rich landlords in
    exchange for money or land, according to human rights advocates. These
    children frequently are abused by these landlords and held as bonded
    laborers for life.
                                   __________

                                   SRI LANKA

        Sri Lanka is a longstanding democratic republic with an active
    multiparty system. Constitutional power is shared between the popularly
    elected President and the 225-member Parliament. Chandrika Kumaratunga,
    head of the governing People's Alliance (PA) coalition, won reelection
    in 1999 for a second 6-year presidential term in a process marked by
    voting irregularities and at least six election-related deaths.
    Violence and fraud marked the October parliamentary elections as well;
    at least seven persons were killed in campaign-related violence in the
    period prior to the October election, which resulted in a reduced
    majority for the PA for the next 6-year period. The Government respects
    constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary. Through its
    rulings, the judiciary continued to exhibit its independence and to
    uphold individual civil rights, although the Supreme Court Chief
    Justice, in an attempt to reduce the court's workload, limited the
    fundamental rights cases that the court examined, preventing some
    torture victims from obtaining redress.
        For the past 17 years, the Government has fought the Liberation
    Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an insurgent organization fighting for a
    separate ethnic Tamil state in the north and east of the country. The
    conflict has claimed over 62,000 lives. In 1999 government forces took
    LTTE-controlled areas north and west of Vavuniya, but counterattacks
    starting in November 1999 erased most government gains. In January the
    LTTE began a buildup on the Jaffna peninsula and in April captured the
    important Elephant Pass military base. The clashes left large numbers
    of civilians dead or wounded and displaced more than 150,000 persons.
    Although the military halted the LTTE advance toward Jaffna in June,
    continuing clashes between the security forces and the LTTE killed
    several hundred more persons on both sides.
        The Ministry of Defense controls all security forces (armed forces
    and police). The 60,000-member police force is responsible for internal
    security in most areas of the country, and it also has been used in
    military operations against the LTTE. The 120,000-member army (which
    includes the Army Volunteer Force), the 17,000-member navy, and the
    18,500-member air force bear principal responsibility for conducting
    operations against the LTTE insurgents. The police paramilitary Special
    Task Force (STF) also battles the LTTE. The more than 15,000-member
    Home Guards, an armed force drawn from local communities and
    responsible to the police, provides security for Muslim and Sinhalese
    village communities in or near the war zone. The Government also arms
    and appears to direct various anti-LTTE Tamil militias, although at
    times these groups seemed to act independently of government authority.
    During the year, some members of the security forces committed serious
    human rights abuses.
        Sri Lanka is a low-income country with a market economy based on
    the export of textiles, tea, rubber, coconuts, and gems. It also earns
    substantial foreign exchange from tourism and the repatriated earnings
    of citizens employed abroad. The gross domestic product (GDP) per
    capita is approximately $850. Real GDP growth was 4.3 percent in 1999;
    because of increased exports and a surge in remittances from citizens
    abroad, growth by year's end reached 6.1 percent. In 1997 the
    Government intensified efforts to promote economic reform and
    liberalization, including privatizing public sector enterprises and
    promoting foreign investment and trade. These steps continued during
    the year, although privatization slowed due to the unsettled situation
    in the country.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in areas not affected by the insurgency, but there are serious problems
    in some areas, and the ongoing war with the LTTE continued to be
    accompanied by serious human rights abuses by both sides of the
    conflict. Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. In
    the past, security forces almost certainly killed prisoners captured on
    the battlefield; however, there were no reports of this abuse during
    the year. The military and police reportedly tortured detainees, and
    one person died in police custody. In addition nine individuals
    reportedly disappeared from security force custody in Vavuniya and in
    the east. In the past, persons also have disappeared or have been
    killed after last being seen near the army's forward defense lines in
    the north, areas that civilians are ordered by the military to avoid.
    The circumstances of such disappearances and killings were unclear, and
    with the many military offensives and forward defense line changes
    throughout the years, the risk to civilians remained high. The military
    took some measures to limit civilian casualties during operations,
    although more than 100 civilians died, with hundreds more injured, as a
    result of military-LTTE clashes. Torture remained a serious problem,
    and prison conditions remained poor. Arbitrary arrests (including
    short-term mass arrests and detentions) continued, often accompanied by
    failure of the security forces to comply with legal protections. New
    Emergency Regulations (ER) published in May further eroded due process
    protections. Impunity for those responsible for human rights abuses
    also remained a serious problem. Little progress was made in resolving
    many cases of extrajudicial killing or disappearance. In most cases,
    there was no investigation or prosecution, giving the appearance of
    impunity for those responsible for human rights violations. The
    Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and restricted freedom
    of the press. The Government continued to engage in censorship of
    domestic newspaper reporting and some foreign television broadcasts on
    military and security operations during the year, implementing
    stringent censorship regulations and shutting down newspapers critical
    of the Government. On occasion in previous years, security forces
    harassed journalists; however, there were no reports of such harassment
    during the year. Serious restrictions remained on freedom of movement,
    especially from Vavuniya to Colombo and the southern part of the
    country generally. Violence and discrimination against women, child
    prostitution, child labor, and discrimination against the disabled
    continued to be problems. There is some discrimination and occasional
    violence against religious minorities, and there is institutionalized
    ethnic discrimination against Tamils. Trafficking in women and children
    for the purpose of forced labor occurs, and a significant number of
    male children are trafficked into prostitution for foreign pedophiles.
        In March the Government named five commissioners including a new
    chairman for the National Human Rights Commission (HRC), which has 11
    offices around the country; however, human rights observers believed
    the HRC was not pursuing its mandate aggressively due to poor
    leadership. Rights activists expressed some satisfaction with the new
    leadership. The Committee to Inquire into Undue Arrest and Harassment
    (CIUAH) continued to assist those alleging abuse at the hands of the
    military and police. Human rights groups state that the committee is
    somewhat effective; however, critics believe that the committee's
    services have not been advertised widely, and they question its
    continued viability. In November the Government established an
    Interministerial Permanent Standing Committee and an Interministerial
    Working Group on Human Rights Issues, chaired by senior officials, to
    investigate human rights abuses referred by the Supreme Court, U.N.
    organs, or international human rights organizations. The Government in
    November also established the Prosecution of Torture Perpetrators Unit,
    under the direct supervision of the Attorney General, to prosecute
    torture cases. In March authorities arrested five suspects and issued
    an arrest warrant for another, in connection with the mass graves in
    Chemmani exhumed in 1999. Several of those arrested received bail. The
    case has not yet come to trial, and it was still pending at year's end.
        The Government did not attempt, as in the past, to use the ER to
    cover up security force misdeeds; however, the Government arrested one
    person under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to stifle
    competition with the state telecommunications monopoly. The Government
    captured or accepted the surrender of at least two LTTE cadres
    throughout the year (it is widely believed that many LTTE cadres
    committed suicide to avoid capture). The Government also continued to
    provide relief to those displaced by the conflict although many were
    still in areas under LTTE control such as the Vanni. However,
    government restrictions on medical supplies and a significant reduction
    in food rations contributed to poor health conditions for civilians in
    the Vanni. The Attorney General's office continued to indict security
    force personnel (including paramilitary organizations) and
    antigovernment elements, primarily the leftist Janatha Vimukthi
    Peramuna (JVP), who were implicated in the 1997 reports of three
    regional commissions that documented the disappearance of more than
    16,000 persons from 1988 to 1994. These persons disappeared after being
    removed forcibly by security force personnel and others. The Attorney
    General referred 348 files for action by the courts, involving 583
    security force personnel and resulting in 4 convictions of 88 members
    of the police and military. A fourth commission, which was established
    in May 1998 to investigate the 10,000 cases of disappearance that the
    first 3 commissions could not investigate before their mandates
    expired, sent a report to the President on August 31 to assist in
    further investigations and possible indictments.
        There are several former Tamil insurgent organizations currently
    aligned with the Government. These progovernment Tamil militants, who
    are armed and at times appear to be directed by the security forces,
    sometimes committed extrajudicial killings and were responsible for
    disappearances, torture, detentions, extortion, and forced conscription
    in Vavuniya and the east. The military wing of the People's Liberation
    Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) committed many such abuses. Both
    PLOTE and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) supposedly
    were disarmed by the Government in Vavuniya after a May 1999 exchange
    of gunfire between the groups in Colombo.
        The LTTE continued to attack civilians. The LTTE continued to
    commit serious human rights abuses in the ongoing war with the
    Government. The LTTE regularly committed extrajudicial killings,
    including killing prisoners taken on the battlefield, and also was
    responsible for disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, detentions,
    and extortion. At least 170 noncombatants were killed from January
    through September in LTTE suicide bombings and other attacks outside of
    the northern conflict zone. Through a campaign of killing and
    intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the work of the local
    government bodies in Jaffna whose members were elected in free and fair
    elections in January 1998. In addition the LTTE warned Tamil
    politicians in the east to discontinue their political activities
    during part of the year; however, they later lifted their ban on such
    activity for some politicians.
        Although it released four prisoners in February and another in
    June, the LTTE refused to free remaining military personnel and
    civilians in its custody. The LTTE continued to control large sections
    of the north and east of the country through authoritarian military
    rule. It denied those under its authority the right to change their
    government, infringed on privacy rights, routinely violated civil
    liberties, operated an unfair court system, restricted freedom of
    movement, used child soldiers, and severely discriminated against
    ethnic and religious minorities.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police, Home Guards,
    and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings, including the
    killing of civilians in connection with the conflict with the LTTE. One
    person died in police custody at Kantale after being arrested for
    suspected terrorist activity in June (see Section 1.c.). The STF shot
    and killed two young Tamil civilians in March. Seven persons died in
    elections-related violence on September 29. On July 13, army soldiers
    allegedly killed a Tamil student in Jaffna, which led to more than a
    week of protest and boycotts by students. The exact number of
    extrajudicial killings was impossible to ascertain due to frequent
    censorship of news relating to military or police operations and to
    lack of regular access to the north and east where the war between the
    Government and the LTTE insurgents is being waged.
        On April 30, gunmen in police uniforms killed the chief suspect in
    the 1993 killing of prominent politician Lalith Athulathmudali.
        On October 27, while police allegedly looked on, 27 Tamil males
    between 14 and 23 years of age were hacked to death by local villagers
    armed with machetes and clubs; 15 others were injured. Police allegedly
    took part in the killings and did nothing to prevent the villagers from
    entering the detention camp. The victims were former child soldiers
    being detained at a government-run ``rehabilitation'' camp at
    Bindunuwewa near Bandarawela. President Kumaratunga sent two police
    teams to investigate. The HRC said the police were guilty of ``grave
    dereliction of duty,'' and it did not believe that the mobs could have
    overpowered the police present. By year's end, police had arrested 3
    employees of a local teacher's technical training college and detained
    13 policemen in connection with the incident. Violence after the
    killings at Bindunuwewa continued for almost a week in the country's
    central hill area, and at least 14 people died during the week before
    police could restore order.
        On December 19, nine Tamil civilians were reported missing in
    Mirusuvil after being arrested by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA). One person
    escaped, and after checking himself into the local hospital for torture
    wounds, reported the incident to police and the local magistrate. The
    magistrate, accompanied by police, took the person to the site where he
    and the other eight had been arrested and tortured. The escapee
    identified two SLA soldiers as the perpetrators, and the soldiers
    admitted to torturing nine civilians and murdering eight. The soldiers
    identified the place of burial, and the bodies were exhumed. On
    December 25, an additional SLA commissioned officer and six additional
    SLA soldiers were arrested for the torture and murders. The army
    commander is monitoring the matter and has ordered a separate inquiry
    into the incident (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
        In some cases, extrajudicial killings were reprisals against
    civilians for LTTE attacks in which members of the security forces or
    civilians were killed or injured. In most cases, the security forces
    claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE, but human rights
    monitors believe otherwise. In Thampalakamam, near Trincomalee, in
    February 1998, police and home guards allegedly massacred eight Tamil
    civilians, including three children, possibly in reprisal for the LTTE
    bombing of the Temple of the Tooth a week earlier. The Government
    arrested 31 police officers and 10 home guards, and charged 4 with
    murder and 17 with unlawful assembly. The other 20 were released after
    the Attorney General determined that there was insufficient evidence
    against them. The case remained active during the year.
        Impunity remains a serious problem. Since April 1995 at least
    several hundred persons have been killed extrajudicially by the
    security forces or have disappeared after being taken into security
    force custody; they are presumed dead. With the exception of the 6
    security force personnel convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi
    Kumaraswamy and the 4 convictions for abduction involving 88 security
    force personnel, no member of the security forces has been convicted
    for any of these crimes. In the vast majority of cases where military
    personnel may have committed human rights violations, the Government
    has not identified those responsible and brought them to justice. In
    August 1998, the Government reimposed a state of emergency nationwide.
    There was no evidence that the Government was using the ER, as in
    previous years, to conceal extrajudicial killings or disappearances.
    Nevertheless, crucial safeguards built into the ER and the legislation
    establishing the HRC often were ignored by the security forces--
    especially those provisions requiring receipts to be issued for arrests
    and ordering the security forces to notify the HRC of any arrest within
    48 hours. Although security force personnel can be fined or jailed for
    failure to comply with the ER, none were known to have been punished
    for this during the year.
        In 1998 the court sentenced 6 persons to death and acquitted 2
    others in the case of 16 police and army personnel prosecuted for the
    rape and murder of Tamil schoolgirl Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, the murder
    of 2 members of her family, and the rape and murder of another
    individual. At his sentencing, 1 of the convicted, former Lance
    Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse, claimed knowledge of mass graves at
    Chemmani in Jaffna containing the bodies of up to 400 persons killed by
    security forces in 1996. Five others convicted in the Kumaraswamy
    killings later also claimed knowledge of mass graves in the Chemmani
    area where they allegedly had buried between 120 and 140 bodies on the
    orders of their superiors. In 1998 the Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated
    that the police Criminal Investigation Department had been directed to
    examine the allegation, and forensic experts and detectives were to
    visit the site. Exhumations in 1999 in the presence of international
    observers and forensic experts yielded 15 skeletons. Two of the victims
    provisionally were identified as young men who had disappeared in 1996.
    In December 1999, the Government submitted its forensic report to a
    magistrate in Jaffna; the report stated that 10 of the remains,
    including a skeleton that was bound and blindfolded, showed signs of
    physical assault which led to their deaths. The cause of death was not
    determined for the remaining bodies; however, the report stated that
    physical assault leading to death could not be ruled out. By year's
    end, 13 of the bodies had not been identified. Family members
    provisionally identified the bodies. Rajapakse and others named a total
    of 20 security personnel, including former policemen, as responsible
    for the killings. On March 14, authorities arrested five suspects and
    issued an arrest order for another who fled. In June one suspect not
    charged with murder was released on bail. The case was pending at
    year's end, but fighting near Jaffna displaced key witnesses and
    delayed proceedings.
        Although in June the courts ordered five soldiers arrested for the
    July 1999 gang rape and murder of Ida Carmelita, a young Tamil girl
    (two additional suspects were already in remand), the case remained
    pending at year's end. During the year, investigations conducted into
    the case found that the weapons used in the killing belonged to army
    personnel. Various witnesses testified at hearings held during the
    year. The case is to continue in 2001.
        The 1997 death of Reverend Arulpalan was not investigated during
    the year.
        In December 1997, three Tamil prisoners were hacked to death in
    prison by Sinhalese prisoners at Kalutara prison. Prison staff and army
    personnel at the prison allegedly failed to take measures to protect
    the detainees even as the attack occurred. At year's end, no charges
    had been filed in connection with the case. On January 6 and 7, 2 Tamil
    detainees in Kalutara prison died and more than 40 suffered injuries in
    clashes with other prisoners and prison guards. Authorities
    subsequently moved many detainees to another facility, but by year's
    end, they had taken no action against those responsible for the
    killings.
        The case against 8 soldiers and 1 reserve police constable arrested
    in February 1996 in the massacre of 24 Tamil villagers in Kumarapuram
    came to trial in September 1997. In November 1998, six of the soldiers
    were charged with murder, and the case was scheduled for trial during
    that year; however, the case had not gone to trial by year's end. The
    other two accused security force agents were released due to lack of
    evidence.
        The case of the 22 STF members arrested on suspicion of murdering
    23 Tamil youths at Bolgoda Lake in 1995 went to trial in June. Since
    key witnesses did not appear, the prosecution asked for the case to be
    rescheduled to October, when another hearing was held. The next hearing
    was scheduled for March 8, 2001.
        The PA Government came to power in 1994 and promised to bring to
    justice the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings from previous years.
    In 1994 it began prosecutions in several extrajudicial killings
    allegedly committed by members of the security forces. The trial of 21
    soldiers accused of massacring 35 Tamil civilians in 1992 in the
    village of Mailanthani in Batticaloa district was transferred to the
    Colombo High Court in 1996. The court held hearings in June and
    October, but the case was postponed until January 2001. Many witnesses
    for the case live in refugee camps, and they cannot come to court to
    give evidence; observers believe that the case likely will be
    protracted.
        Former insurgent Tamil militant groups armed by and aligned with
    the Government committed extrajudicial killings in the eastern province
    and in the Vavuniya area in the north. The military wing of PLOTE and
    the Razeek group were responsible for killing a number of persons. The
    security forces arm and use these militias and a number of other Tamil
    militant organizations to provide information, to help identify LTTE
    insurgents, and, in some cases, to fight in military operations against
    the insurgents. The exact size of these militias is impossible to
    ascertain, but they probably total fewer than 2,000 persons. Although
    the army in some instances took steps to convert Tamil militia groups
    into regular army units, military oversight of these groups remained
    inadequate, and complaints about them continued, especially in Vavuniya
    and Batticaloa. These groups frequently operated beyond government
    control. Complaints about their activities continued, especially in
    transit camps for internally displaced persons (IDP's) in Vavuniya. The
    militias gain access to these camps through a variety of means,
    including bribery and threats. It was impossible to determine the
    number of victims because of the secrecy with which these groups
    operated. Persons killed by these militants probably included both LTTE
    operatives and civilians who failed to comply with extortion demands.
    Unknown assailants killed Jaffna media correspondent Mayilvaganam
    Nimalarajan in the early morning of October 20. Nimalarajan's outspoken
    criticism of paramilitary groups in Jaffna led many to believe that one
    of these groups killed him. In February two members of the Razeek group
    were killed in separate incidents; in March a member of PLOTE was
    killed in Batticaloa; in April two TELO members were killed. These
    deaths likely resulted from rivalry among the groups. In May 1999, the
    Government forbade these groups from carrying arms and from stockpiling
    weapons, but these prohibitions have generally not been effective.
        Violence marred the period prior to parliamentary elections in
    October. By September 29, at least seven persons had died in election-
    related violence, and local monitoring organizations reported over 500
    violent acts.
        On January 5, assailants shot and killed pro-LTTE Tamil politician
    Kumar Ponnambalam. Police detained four persons, two of whom alleged
    that a local businessman had hired them to commit the murder. The
    investigation continued at year's end.
        During the year, the Government ordered payment of compensation to
    victims of a 1999 air force bombing that killed 22 civilians at
    Puthukkudiyiruppu.
        The LTTE committed many extrajudicial killings, including many
    bombings (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). On January 23, the LTTE killed
    14 civilians in Kokkadicholai for alleged links to the security forces.
    On March 1, the LTTE killed a Jaffna municipal council member from the
    Eelam People's Democratic party (EPDP). On March 10, in an attack meant
    for government ministers scheduled to travel along a certain route near
    Parliament, the LTTE killed 30 civilians and injured 60 more with
    claymore mines, rocket propelled grenades, and automatic weapons during
    rush hour in a Colombo suburb. Other civilians died or suffered
    injuries in a fight between security forces and the LTTE that evening.
    On March 11, LTTE cadres who survived the first battle committed
    suicide or died at the hands of the security forces. In Batticola on
    November 7, two suspected gunmen killed newly-elected Tamil United
    Liberation Front (TULF) Member of Parliament Nimalan Saundranayagam and
    wounded his security guard.
        On January 27, an LTTE bomb exploded at the post office in Vavuniya
    where military personnel were collecting paychecks, killing 11 persons
    and injuring more than 70 others, mainly civilians. Several bombings in
    commuter buses in January and February attributed to the LTTE killed 4
    persons and injured more than 100 others. On May 17, an LTTE bombing
    near a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23
    persons, including children, and wounded dozens of others. Credible
    witnesses reported gunfire 10 minutes after the explosion; they
    described it as a retaliatory attack by police that allegedly killed 4
    persons (see Section 1.g.), but police and hospital records do not
    confirm this account. On May 30, an LTTE bomb in Nelunkulan near
    Vavuniya killed 2 persons and injured 40 others. On June 14, an LTTE
    bomb hit a bus transporting members of the air force, injuring more
    than a dozen soldiers and killing two civilians. On December 14, a bomb
    explosion linked to the LTTE killed two civilians and two police
    officers.
        On January 5, a suicide bomb blast in front of the Prime Minister's
    office killed 14 persons and injured dozens of others. On June 7, an
    LTTE suicide bomber killed 23 persons, including the Minister of
    Industrial Development C.V. Gooneratne and his wife, at a parade in a
    Colombo suburb. On June 26, an LTTE suicide boat rammed the M.V. Mercs
    Uhana, a civilian transport ship carrying food and other supplies to
    Jaffna. Five of the ship's crew remain missing, and they may have died
    in the attack or fallen prisoner to the LTTE. On September 15, an LTTE
    suicide bomber killed himself, 5 others, and wounded more than 20
    persons, in front of the National Eye Hospital in central Colombo. In a
    similar incident, on October 5, an LTTE suicide bomb killed 10 persons
    and injured 40 persons at a PA political rally at the north-central
    town of Medawachchiya.
        The LTTE also has targeted progovernment Tamil groups in the past.
        The LTTE also has committed a number of ``lamp post'' killings,
    although there were no reported lamp post killings during the year. At
    least 14 persons found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-described
    courts were killed in 1999 by the LTTE in public executions; their
    bodies were tied to lamp posts or otherwise left for public display.
    The LTTE has attacked government installations, killing and wounding
    civilians, and the LTTE reportedly sometimes also kills its own injured
    troops to avoid their capture (see Section 1.g.).
        On October 2, at least 20 civilians were killed when a suicide
    bomber killed Mohammed Lathif Baithullah, a candidate for the Sri Lanka
    Muslim Congress, and his bodyguards, during campaigning for the October
    10 parliamentary elections. All of the civilians were reportedly
    members of the Muslim community.
        On October 19, a suicide bomb attack near the town hall in central
    Colombo left 3 dead and injured 24 others, including 3 foreigners.
        No further investigation has been made into the November 1999
    killing by unknown assailants of Ramesh Nadarajah, a Tamil Member of
    Parliament for the EPDP and editor of a weekly Tamil-language
    newspaper.
        During the year, no investigation or arrests were made in
    connection with a grenade explosion in November 1999 that killed a
    person and injured 35 others at a political rally held by UNP.
        In March 1999, municipal workers uncovered a pit near the Durraipa
    Stadium in Jaffna that contained the skeletal remains of several
    persons. Forensic evidence suggested that these remains were about 10
    years old. This discovery potentially implicated the Indian
    Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which occupied Jaffna at the time. Critics
    contrasted the prompt investigation of the Durraipa stadium graves with
    the slow investigation of the Chemmani mass graves.
        b. Disappearance.--Disappearances at the hands of the security
    forces continued in the north and east. During the year, there were no
    reports of disappearances in Colombo, or Jaffna. The army, navy,
    police, and paramilitary groups caused as many as 11 disappearances in
    Vavuniya and Trincomalee through September 29. In January, bodies of
    three Tamils allegedly taken by the Home Guards near Trincomalee were
    found; two of them had been decapitated. In December eight Tamil
    civilians were reported missing in Mirusuvil after being arrested and
    tortured by the SLA. Two SLA soldiers were identified as perpetrators
    and admitted to murdering seven of the civilians. The bodies were
    exhumed. One SLA commissioned officer and six additional SLA soldiers
    were arrested later. At year's end, the army commander had ordered an
    inquiry into the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Human rights
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), including Amnesty International
    (AI), reported an increase in disappearances in Vavuniya during the
    second half of the year. As with extrajudicial killings, the exact
    number of disappearances was impossible to ascertain due to censorship
    of news about security force operations and infrequent access to the
    north and east. However, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or
    Involuntary Disappearances lists Sri Lanka as a country with an
    extremely large number of nonclarified disappearances. Those who
    disappeared during the year and in previous years are presumed dead.
    The commander of the army and the Inspector General of police both have
    criticized the disappearances and stated that the perpetrators would be
    called to account. Nonetheless there have been very few security force
    personnel prosecutions to date.
        Three regional commissions were set up in November 1994 to inquire
    into disappearances that occurred from 1988-94, most during the 1988-89
    period of the JVP uprising. The commissions found that 16,742 persons
    disappeared after having been removed involuntarily from their homes,
    in most cases by security forces. In other cases, antigovernment
    elements--in particular the leftist JVP--were determined to be
    responsible for the disappearances. After the reports were presented to
    the President in September 1997, the police created a Disappearances
    Investigations Unit (DIU) in November 1998 to examine 1,681 cases in
    which the commissions had evidence against specific individuals. In
    July 1999, the Attorney General created a Missing Persons Commissions
    Unit to consider institution of criminal proceedings based on results
    of DIU investigations. The Attorney General's office has opened over
    1,175 files and referred 262 indictments to the high courts and 86
    complaints to magistrates involving 583 members of the security forces
    on abduction and murder charges. Hearings and trials in at least 250 of
    these cases had begun by year's end. Of these the Attorney General's
    office successfully prosecuted 4 cases of abduction, involving 88
    security force personnel.
        In May 1998, a fourth commission was established to look into
    approximately 10,000 cases of disappearance that the initial 3
    commissions had been unable to investigate before their mandates
    expired. The commission is not to investigate cases of disappearance
    that occurred after 1994, but is to focus only on cases that were not
    completed by the first three commissions. Human rights observers have
    criticized the Government for not extending the mandate of this
    commission to include cases of disappearance that occurred since the
    Kumaratunga government took office in 1994. The commission is charged
    with facilitating payment of monetary compensation to the families of
    persons who disappeared, as well as forwarding cases to the Attorney
    General for possible prosecution. The commission submitted an interim
    report to President Kumaratunga in December 1999 and a final report on
    August 31 (which by year's end still had not been made public) to
    assist in further investigations and prosecutions.
        During the year, there were no developments in the Vantharamulle
    case, in which army troops allegedly abducted 158 Tamils from a refugee
    camp in the Batticaloa district in 1990. Observers maintain that there
    is credible evidence identifying the alleged perpetrators. Proceedings
    began in 1999 against an army major (who died before the court case
    began) and a former subinspector of police in the case of 31 youths who
    allegedly disappeared following their arrests in Divulapitiya in 1989.
    The case continued during the year.
        In October 1999, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
    Disappearances made its third visit to the country. Its report,
    released in December 1999, cited the PTA and ER as important factors
    contributing to disappearances and recommended the abolition or
    modification of these laws to bring them into conformity with
    internationally accepted human rights standards. The working group
    criticized the country's slow progress in resolving disappearances and
    noted the lack of implementation of its recommendations from visits in
    1991 and 1992, including the creation of a central register of
    detainees. The report encouraged the establishment of an independent
    body to investigate disappearances that occurred after the Kumaratunga
    Government took office in 1994.
        Progovernment Tamil militias also were responsible for
    disappearances. These militias detained persons at various locations
    that serve, in effect, as undeclared detention centers. Human rights
    observers believed that the PLOTE was a major offender in the case of
    disappearances. However, the HRC has no mandate or authority to enforce
    respect for human rights among these militia groups. When the HRC
    office director for Vavuniya complained about PLOTE activity, he
    received death threats. He eventually departed the country in 1999. It
    was impossible to determine the exact number of victims because of the
    secrecy with which these groups operated. The Government has taken no
    clear steps to stop these militants' actions, although tighter
    restrictions on these groups' right to bear arms were implemented
    following a May 1999 shootout between PLOTE and TELO supporters near a
    popular shopping center in downtown Colombo.
        The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined number of civilian
    disappearances in the north and east during the year. Although the LTTE
    has denied taking any prisoners from its battles, at year's end it was
    known to be holding 11 civilian crew members of vessels that it has
    hijacked since 1995, along with 11 security force personnel. In
    February the LTTE released four security force members after a hunger
    strike; in April the LTTE released one civilian prisoner. The LTTE has
    not notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of any
    new security forces prisoners since 1994.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Despite legal prohibitions, the security forces and police
    continue to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and prisons,
    particularly Tamils suspected of supporting the LTTE. Suspected
    criminals also apparently were tortured. Several children reportedly
    have been tortured in detention during the last few years. The 1994
    Convention Against Torture Act (CATA) made torture a punishable
    offense. Under the CATA, torture is defined as a specific crime, the
    High Court has jurisdiction over violations, and criminal conviction
    carries a 7-year minimum sentence. However, according to a 1999 AI
    report, the CATA does not implement several provisions of the U.N.
    Convention; this results in torture being prohibited under specific
    circumstances and allowed under others. Consequently torture continues
    with relative impunity. In addition, the PTA makes confessions obtained
    under any circumstance, including by torture, admissible in court. The
    Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other human
    rights organizations cited the PTA as a major factor contributing to
    torture of prisoners.
        The Government is developing regulations to prosecute and punish
    military and police personnel responsible for torture. The
    Interparliamentary Permanent Standing Committee and its
    Interministerial Working Group on Human Rights Issues have begun
    tracking criminal investigations of torture. By year's end, there were
    146 cases under investigation. In addition the Government also ceased
    paying fines incurred by security force personnel found guilty in
    proceedings of the offense. Security force personnel have been fined
    under civil statutes for engaging in torture. According to the Attorney
    General's office, by year's end, 8 members of the security forces and
    police had been prosecuted under criminal statutes, but none of the
    cases had come to conclusion. Members of the security forces continued
    to torture and mistreat detainees and other prisoners, particularly
    during interrogation.
        Methods of torture included electric shock, beatings (especially on
    the soles of the feet), suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted
    positions, burning, slamming testicles in desk drawers, and near
    drownings. In other cases, victims must remain in unnatural positions
    for extended periods, or they have bags laced with insecticide, chili
    powder, or gasoline placed over their heads. Detainees have reported
    broken bones and other serious injuries as a result of their
    mistreatment. There were no reports of rape in detention during the
    year.
        Medical examination determined that officers of the Counter-
    Subversive Unit of the Vavuniya police beat and burned with cigarettes
    a Tamil man arrested in March. Police at Kantale, near Trincomalee,
    arrested and tortured five young Tamils in June; one died as a result
    (see Section 1.a.). In December the bodies of seven Tamils who had been
    tortured and killed by the army in Mirusuvil were exhumed after one
    person escaped and notified authorities. A commissioned officer and
    eight soldiers were arrested, and at year's end, an inquiry continued
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). Torture appeared more prevalent in rural
    areas than in Colombo.
        Under fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution, torture
    victims may file civil suit for compensation in the High Courts or
    Supreme Court. Courts have granted awards ranging from approximately
    $175 (14,200 rupees) to $2,280 (182,500 rupees). In February the
    Colombo high court ordered compensation of $625 (50,000 rupees) to a
    young man beaten in police custody in Vavuniya and Colombo in 1999. In
    August the Supreme Court ordered $1,250 (100,000 rupees) in
    compensation for a Tamil man tortured in December 1999 at an army camp
    near Batticaloa. However, most cases take 2 years or more to move
    through the courts, and NGO's who represent torture victims complained
    that the new Supreme Court Chief Justice appointed in September 1999
    grants hearings in only the most egregious cases.
        At the invitation of the Government, the United Nations Committee
    on Torture sent a five-person mission to Colombo in late August to
    determine whether a systematic pattern of torture exists in the country
    and, if so, to make recommendations for eliminating the practice. By
    year's end, the mission had not submitted its confidential report to
    President Kumaratunga.
        Progovernment Tamil militants, directly responsible to the security
    forces, also engaged in torture. The PLOTE in Vavuniya has drawn the
    most criticism for routinely torturing its opponents, and during the
    year, its members reportedly burned with cigarettes those who refused
    to pay protection money. Security forces have done little to stop this
    practice.
        The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Security force
    prisoners released by the LTTE stated that they had been subjected to
    torture, including being hung upside down and beaten, having pins
    inserted under their fingernails, and being burned by hot rods.
        The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the
    year, which killed and injured dozens of civilians (see Sections 1.a.
    and 1.g.).
        Prison conditions generally are poor and do not meet minimum
    international standards because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary
    facilities. An increase in detentions associated with the war with the
    LTTE caused a significant deterioration in already poor conditions in
    short-term detention centers and in undeclared detention centers run by
    progovernment Tamil groups (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government permitted representatives from the ICRC to visit
    approximately 160 places of detention. The HRC also visited over 2,000
    police stations and over 500 detention facilities by year's end (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Conditions also are poor in LTTE-run detention facilities. Some
    former prisoners reported being handcuffed and shackled during much of
    their captivity.
        The LTTE permits the ICRC to visit detainees in the Vanni regularly
    (see Section 1.d.). The ICRC provided medical attention and helped
    negotiate the release of four servicemen held in Mallavi following a
    hunger strike in February (see Section 1.b.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. Under the law, authorities must inform an
    arrested person of the reason for arrest and bring that person before a
    magistrate within 24 hours. In practice persons detained generally
    appear before a magistrate within a few days of arrest. The magistrate
    may authorize bail or order continued pretrial detention for up to 3
    months or longer. However, under the ER and the PTA, security forces
    may detain suspects for extended periods of time without court
    approval. The ER, in force periodically since 1979 and in force island-
    wide since August 1998, allows pretrial detention for a maximum of four
    consecutive 3-month periods. The ER gives security forces broad powers
    for arrest and detention without charge or the right to judicial
    review. New ER provisions published in May lengthen to a year the
    period for which authorities may order individuals to remain at home or
    otherwise have their freedom of association and movement limited. The
    new ER provisions also permit police to hold individuals for up to 90
    days to investigate suspected offenses, although the police must
    present detainees to a court within 30 days to record the detention.
    The court can order a further 6 months detention. The ER states that
    detention orders ``shall not be called in question in any court on any
    ground whatsoever,'' which may contradict an individual's
    constitutional right to petition the Supreme Court to redress
    fundamental rights violations.
        As required under the ER, the army generally turned over those that
    it arrested to the police within 24 hours, although the police and the
    army did not always issue arrest receipts or notify the HRC within 48
    hours. The HRC has a legal mandate to visit those arrested, and police
    generally respected this in areas outside of the conflict. Due to
    censorship and infrequent access, observers could not determine the
    state of affairs in the north and the east.
        Despite Government announcements that it would close all secret
    detention centers, there were continued credible reports that the
    military held persons for short amounts of time in smaller camps for
    interrogation before transferring them to declared places of detention.
    This procedure, which allegedly occurred on the Jaffna peninsula, in
    Vavuniya, and in the east (see Section 1.c.), did not comply with
    requirements to notify the HRC of arrests and to issue arrest receipts.
    The military maintained the detainees were ``in transit,'' and claimed
    they did not violate the detainees' rights.
        Large-scale arrests of Tamils continued during the year; these
    arrests were particularly prevalent after LTTE bombings, when many
    young Tamils were detained or arrested on suspicion of being LTTE
    cadres or sympathizers. The Government detained more than 2,819 persons
    under the ER and PTA from January to August 31, a higher number than
    that for all of 1999. Many detentions occurred during operations
    against the LTTE. Most detentions lasted several days to several
    months. The number of prisoners held at any given moment under the ER
    and the PTA consistently remained close to 2,000. Hundreds of Tamils
    indicted under the PTA remained without bail awaiting trial, some for
    more than 2 years. The high courts held hearings on 1,000 cases under
    the PTA or ER during the year. Many such cases drag on for years. On
    January 7 and 15, security forces detained several thousand Tamils in
    Colombo and the surrounding suburbs in ``cordon and search'' operations
    meant to find LTTE cadres after suicide bomb attacks (see Section
    1.a.). Although authorities eventually arrested fewer than 100 persons,
    many of those rounded up for questioning spent hours in detention,
    often without access to sanitary facilities. On March 18, police at a
    Colombo checkpoint detained and publicly strip-searched one woman, who
    turned out to be Sinhalese, on suspicion of being an LTTE suicide
    bomber. On May 30, police detained hundreds of Tamils in downtown
    Colombo for almost 5 hours of questioning. Approximately 50 of the
    detainees were taken for photographing and further questioning. In
    addition those arrested, most of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing,
    sometimes were detained in prisons with convicted criminals. Many
    lesser incidents of this sort occurred during the year. Tamils
    complained that they were abused verbally and held for extended periods
    at the security checkpoints that have been set up throughout Colombo
    (see Section 1.d.). The Government justified the detentions and arrests
    on security grounds, but many Tamils claimed that the detentions and
    arrests were a form of harrassment. Tamils often suffered arbitrary
    searches in their homes.
        In February the Government ordered the arrest of an engineer
    employed by a local Internet provider under the provisions of the PTA
    as part of its attempt to stifle competition with the state-owned
    telecommunications monopoly. The Government alleged that the company
    involved in a fundraising scheme to benefit the LTTE. Under
    international pressure, the Government dropped the charges against the
    engineer and released him in August; however, investigations of the
    company continued at year's end.
        In July 1998, the President established the Committee to Inquire
    into Undue Arrest and Harassment (CIUAH). The committee, which includes
    senior opposition party and Tamil representatives, examines complaints
    of arrest and harassment by security forces and takes remedial action
    as needed. The committee received more than 200 complaints between
    January and August 31. Opinions on the effectiveness of the CIUAH are
    mixed. Some human rights observers believe that the work of the
    committee acted as a deterrent to random arrests and helped to
    alleviate some of the problems encountered by detainees and their
    families. However, some critics claim that, following initial
    publicity, the committee's services have not been advertised widely.
    For example, the fax number for the committee is not in the Colombo
    telephone directory. Those wishing to contact the CIUAH usually are
    referred through human rights lawyers or find it by word of mouth. Many
    Tamils believe that the CIUAH does little to deter police agents from
    stopping them more frequently at security force checkpoints in the
    capital.
        The HRC continued to investigate the legality of detention in cases
    referred to it by the Supreme Court and private citizens. Although the
    HRC legally is mandated to exercise oversight over arrests and
    detentions by the security forces and to undertake visits to prisons,
    members of the security forces sometimes violated the regulations and
    failed to cooperate with the HRC.
        The Government continued to give the ICRC unhindered access to
    approximately 160 detention centers, police stations, and army camps
    throughout the country that were recognized officially as places of
    detention. Such visits played an important role in enabling the ICRC to
    monitor the human rights practices of the security forces. The HRC,
    through its 11 offices, also visited places of detention; however,
    human rights observers believed that due to inadequate leadership and a
    failure of the HRC to give long term contracts to many of its workers,
    the organization was not pursuing its mandate (see Section 4).
        The PLOTE continued to run places of illegal detention in Vavuniya.
    The EPDP also detained members for short periods in Jaffna as
    punishment for breaking party discipline.
        The LTTE continued to detain civilians, often holding them for
    ransom. For example, in September 1999 the LTTE held three businessmen
    for a ransom of $550,000 (40 million rupees). The businessmen were
    freed after making partial payment and promising to pay the balance.
    Unconfirmed reports indicated the LTTE was holding in custody more than
    2,000 civilians in the northern part of the island. Those held included
    11 civilian crew members of 3 vessels hijacked by the LTTE since 1995.
    In February the LTTE released 4 of the 15 servicemen that it held. In
    June it also released 1 of its 12 declared civilians prisoners. The
    LTTE did not permit the ICRC or any other humanitarian organization to
    visit its detainees, aside from these crew members and security force
    personnel.
        The Government does not practice forced exile. There are no legal
    provisions allowing or prohibiting its use.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects these provisions in
    practice.
        The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court, the courts of
    appeal, and the high courts. A judicial service commission, composed of
    the Chief Justice and two Supreme Court judges, appoints, transfers,
    and dismisses lower court judges. Judges serve until the mandatory
    retirement age of 65 for the Supreme Court and 62 for other courts.
    Judges can be removed for reasons of misbehavior or physical or mental
    incapacity, but only after a legal investigation and followed by joint
    action of the President and the Parliament.
        In criminal cases, defendants are tried in public by juries. They
    are informed of the charges and evidence against them, may be
    represented by the counsel of their choice, and have the right to
    appeal. The Government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on
    criminal charges in the high courts and the courts of appeal, but it
    does not provide counsel in other cases. Private legal aid
    organizations assist some defendants. In addition the Ministry of
    Justice operates 11 community legal aid centers to assist those who
    cannot afford representation and to serve as educational resources for
    local communities. There are no jury trials in cases brought under the
    PTA. Confessions, obtained by various means, including torture, are
    inadmissible in criminal proceedings, but are allowed in PTA cases;
    most convictions under the PTA rely heavily on them. Defendants bear
    the burden of proof to demonstrate that their confessions were obtained
    by coercion. Defendants in PTA cases have the right to appeal. Subject
    to judicial review in certain cases, defendants can spend up to 18
    months being held in prison on adminstrative order waiting for their
    case to be heard. Once their case comes to trial, decisions are made
    relatively quickly. Courts held hearings on some 1,000 PTA and ER cases
    during the year.
        Most court proceedings in Colombo and the south are conducted in
    English or Sinhala, which, due to a shortage of court-appointed
    interpreters, has restricted the ability of Tamil-speaking defendants
    to get a fair hearing. Trials and hearings in the north and east are in
    Tamil and English, but many serious cases, including those having to do
    with terrorism, are tried in Colombo. While Tamil-speaking judges exist
    at the magistrate level, only four high court judges, an appeals court
    judge, and a Supreme Court justice speak fluent Tamil. Few legal
    textbooks and no law reports exist in Tamil, and the Government has
    complied only slowly with legislation requiring publishing all laws in
    English, Sinhala, and Tamil.
        In Jaffna LTTE threats against court officials disrupted normal
    court operations. Although magistrate and district level courts
    functioned during the year, the high court suspended activities due to
    security concerns.
        The LTTE has its own self-described court system, composed of
    judges with little or no legal training. The courts operate without
    codified or defined legal authority and essentially operate as agents
    of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary. The courts
    reportedly impose severe punishments, including execution.
        The Government claims that all persons held under the ER and the
    PTA are suspected members of the LTTE and, therefore, legitimate
    security threats. Insufficient information exists to verify this claim
    and to determine whether these detainees or members of the now legal
    JVP, detained in similar fashion in past years, are political
    prisoners. Between 200 and 300 of those previously detained--mostly JVP
    members--were convicted under criminal law; some remain incarcerated.
    In many cases, human rights monitors question the legitimacy of the
    criminal charges brought against these persons.
        The LTTE also holds a number of political prisoners. The number is
    impossible to determine because of the secretive nature of the
    organization. The LTTE refuses to allow the ICRC access to these
    prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy,
    and the Government generally respects these provisions in practice;
    however, it infringes on citizen's privacy rights in some areas. The
    police obtain proper warrants for arrests and searches conducted under
    ordinary law; however, the security forces are not required to obtain
    warrants for searches conducted under either the ER or the PTA. The
    Secretary of the Ministry of Defense is responsible for providing
    oversight for such searches. No judicial review or other means of
    redress exist for alleged illegal searches under the ER. Some Tamils
    complained that their homes were searched as a means of general
    harassment by the security forces (see Section 1.d.). The Government is
    believed to monitor telephone conversations and correspondence on a
    selective basis. The security forces routinely open mail destined for
    the LTTE-controlled areas and seize contraband. The Government censors
    news reports that cover military operations. Television stations
    practice self-censorship and some international news broadcasts which
    deal with the country specifically are blurred over. This censorship
    tightened after the publication of the new ER on May 3 (see Section
    2.a.), although some restrictions had eased by year's end. For example,
    although blocks marked ``censored'' were inserted over missing text in
    newspapers in past years, there was no occurrence of this action in the
    last 6 months of the year.
        Progovernment Tamil militant groups, nominally operating under
    government control, used forced conscription in the past, although it
    appears this practice abated after a 1999 order from the Government. In
    previous years, there have been credible reports that Tamil youth (in
    the east in particular) have been forced to join these groups under
    threats to themselves and their families; however, there were no
    reports that this practice occured during the year.
        The LTTE routinely invades the privacy of citizens, maintaining an
    effective network of informants. There are credible reports the LTTE
    has warned 66,000 displaced Muslims living in the Puttalam area not to
    return to their homes in Mannar and Jaffna until the conflict is over.
    The LTTE also recruits children (see Section 6.c.).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Hostilities between the Government and the LTTE
    continued throughout the year. After establishing positions on the
    Jaffna peninsula in January, the LTTE in March began a sustained
    campaign to recapture Jaffna. On April 22, the LTTE captured a large
    base at Elephant Pass, and in the following weeks, forced the armed
    forces to retreat to Jaffna. By late May, the front lines had
    stabilized just east of Jaffna in the Chavacachcheri area. From June
    through August, there were minor skirmishes, with the armed forces
    carrying out counterattacks from September through year's end that
    resulted in high casualties on both sides. More than 2,000 combatants
    and more than 100 civilians died during the year in incidents related
    to the conflict.
        At year's end, approximately 490,000 persons were displaced by the
    conflict. Over 340,000 persons, principally in the Vanni region, remain
    displaced by the past several years of fighting; during the year the
    battles near Jaffna displaced an additional 150,000.
        The Government in the past often publicized aspects of its planned
    operations to allow civilians time to vacate the probable areas to be
    affected. However, the armed forces were more secretive during the
    year, and it did not give public warnings before the commencement of
    its advances. Despite the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to assess
    targets before attacks, bombings and artillery fire against LTTE
    installations have killed civilians working at those installations or
    living nearby. More than 100 civilians were killed in the LTTE's
    advance on Jaffna in April and May, including 6 who died at Pallaikudu
    in May when the armed forces conducted an aerial bombing of an LTTE
    boat dock. More than a dozen persons were killed by the air force in
    bombings against Mullaitivu during the year. On April 19, artillery
    shells killed 15 and wounded 24 at a home for the elderly in Kaithady
    during a clash between the LTTE and the army. It was not clear which
    side was responsible. On November 23, 2 shells thought to be fired by
    the LTTE landed near a school in Muttur, near Trincomalee, killing 2
    students and wounding 10 more. During the year, dozens of civilians
    were wounded in contested areas of the north and east in clashes
    between the armed forces and the LTTE.
        On May 17, 23 people were killed and dozens were injured when a
    bomb exploded at a Buddhist temple in Batticaloa in the east, where
    people were gathered to celebrate the Buddhist festival of Vesak (see
    Section 1.a.). The bomb, concealed in a freezer box on a bicycle,
    exploded after the cyclist was stopped by two policemen and a soldier;
    the cyclist ran away. After the bomb exploded, security forces opened
    fire, killing four children and injuring eight more. Although the
    Government has blamed the LTTE publicly for this bombing, no one
    officially claimed responsibility, and at year's end, no investigation
    had been conducted. Furthermore the Government has not commented on the
    additional deaths and injuries caused by the security forces opening
    fire.
        The security forces use aerial observation for selecting targets
    for shelling and bombing. They also attempt to locate the source of
    incoming mortar fire before responding; however, inaccurate mortar and
    artillery fire killed civilians. In September 1999, the air force
    dropped 3 bombs on a village near Puthukudiyiruppu in the Vanni,
    killing 22 persons (see Section 1.a.). Human rights observers,
    including the ICRC and AI, alleged that those killed were civilians.
    Government officials acknowledged that 22 men, women, and children were
    killed by the air force bomb; however, they alleged that the air force
    targeted an LTTE training camp, and at first they did not admit the
    possibility that civilians were killed in error. The Government later
    acknowledged quietly that the attack was an accident. During the year,
    the Government held an investigation and authorized compensation for
    the victim's families, admitting that the site had been bombed ``in
    error.'' However, the Government did not admit formally to having
    killed civilians.
        The security forces continued to receive instruction in
    international humanitarian law as part of their training courses (see
    Section 4). According to the military, the army also established human
    rights cells in each division, and it established a human rights office
    in each brigade and battalion. The armed forces operate under written
    rules of engagement that severely restrict the shelling, bombardment,
    or other use of firepower against civilian-occupied areas such as
    villages.
        The Government continued to provide food relief, through the
    Commissioner General for Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-
    Purpose Cooperative Societies (MCPS), to displaced and other needy
    citizens, including those in areas controlled by the LTTE. Food rations
    were delivered by the Government to the Vanni area through a checkpoint
    that is controlled on one side by the security forces and on the other
    by the LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the LTTE (an
    ``uncleared area'' in Government parlance) was not closed during the
    year.
        The Government maintained a long list of prohibited ``war-related''
    medical items, such as sutures, plaster of paris, intravenous liquid
    supplies, bandages, and some drugs. NGO's and other groups that sought
    to take these items to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region needed
    permission from local officials as well as from the Ministry of
    Defense. Delays were common and approval sometimes was denied, due to
    fear that supplies would fall into the hands of the LTTE. As a result,
    many medical items in the Vanni region were in short supply. This
    shortfall contributed to an already serious deterioration in the
    quality and quantity of medical care furnished to the civilian
    population. During the first half of the year, the Government proved
    particularly reluctant to allow medical supplies into LTTE-controlled
    areas. During this period, civilians injured in the conflict relied
    heavily on aid provided by international NGO's who faced severe
    restrictions on moving medical supplies into the area. Government
    restrictions on the transport of items such as cement, batteries, and
    currency into the LTTE-controlled areas also had a negative impact on
    the relief work of NGO's in those areas.
        The Ministry of Defense reported capturing several LTTE insurgents
    on the battlefield during the year. It sent these, and other cadres who
    surrendered or whom security forces arrested to rehabilitation centers.
    The ICRC continued to visit approximately 100 former LTTE members now
    in government rehabilitation camps, although the October massacre of
    more than 20 such detainees at a government-run detention facility at
    Bindunuwewa, near Bandarawella, led observers to question the continued
    security of residents of these facilities (see Section 1.a.).
        In view of the scale of hostilities and the large number of LTTE
    casualties, some observers found the number of prisoners taken under
    battlefield conditions to be low and concluded that many LTTE fighters
    apparently were killed rather than taken prisoner. Some observers
    believed that, on the government side, an unwritten ``take-no-
    prisoners'' policy generally remained in effect. The military denied
    this claim, stating that other factors limited the number of prisoners
    taken, such as the LTTE's efforts to remove wounded fighters from the
    battlefield, the proclivity of its fighters to choose suicide over
    capture, and the LTTE's occasional practice of killing its own badly
    wounded fighters (see Section 1.a.). There were no reported instances
    of security forces personnel executing LTTE cadres this year, and no
    army or other security forces personnel were prosecuted or disciplined
    for allegedly executing prisoners from previous years.
        The Government refused to permit relief organizations to provide
    medical attention to wounded LTTE fighters, although it has offered to
    treat any LTTE wounded entrusted to government care. Credible reports
    told of wounded LTTE cadres surrendering to the Government and
    receiving appropriate medical care.
        The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than
    take them prisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has
    executed wounded soldiers on the battlefield. At the end of September,
    the LTTE admitted to holding only 11 security forces prisoners, all
    captured in 1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believed to have killed most of
    the police officers and security force personnel that it has captured
    in recent years. However, the LTTE released two army deserters who
    surrendered to it in 1998, and in November 1999, it transferred over 11
    SLA members who were captured during the year to the ICRC. In February
    the LTTE released four servicemen, and in June it released one
    civilian.
        The LTTE uses excessive force in the war. During the course of the
    year, the LTTE killed a government minister (see Section 1.a.) and more
    than 200 other noncombatants. The LTTE has engaged in hostage taking,
    hijackings, and bombing of civilian targets.
        In the past, the LTTE has used church and temple compounds, where
    civilians are instructed by the Government to congregate in the event
    of hostilities, as shields for the storage of munitions; however, there
    were no reports that this occurred during the year.
        The LTTE uses child soldiers. The armed forces captured a 14-year-
    old female LTTE cadre in fighting in September, and during the year
    credible sources reported LTTE efforts to recruit children to replenish
    battlefield losses. According to some reports the LTTE shows war movies
    and gives political speeches to children in schools. In September 1998,
    25 young LTTE fighters surrendered as a group; at least one of those
    who surrendered was 13 years old. Most of the others were aged between
    15 and 17 years. In 1998 the LTTE promised the U.N. Secretary General's
    Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that it would not
    recruit children under 17 and would not use children under 18 in
    battle. It disregarded those promises.
        The LTTE expropriates food, fuel, and other items meant for IDP's,
    thus exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE-controlled areas.
    Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled and other parts of
    the Vanni region, with nutrition levels falling below the national
    average. Experts have reported an increase in anemia and a lower birth
    rate, both of which indicate lower levels of nutrition. There were
    confirmed cases of malnutrition, including hundreds of cases of
    malnourished children. Malnutrition resulted from several factors,
    including food shortages, poverty, and conflict-related dislocations.
    However, a survey completed by Medecins Sans Frontieres in 1999 found
    malnutrition levels in the war-affected areas at about the same level
    as in the war-free south of the country. Medical sources distinguish
    between ``undernourished'' children (of which there are many throughout
    the country) and ``malnourished'' children.
        Landmines were a problem in Jaffna and the Vanni and to some extent
    in the east. Landmines, booby traps, and unexploded ordnance pose a
    problem to resettlement of displaced persons and rebuilding. A U.N.
    landmine team tasked with locating and mapping LTTE and army mines in
    the Jaffna peninsula suspended its mission in April, stating that it
    was impossible to continue as long as hostilities continued. According
    to the Landmine Monitor Report for 2000, both the LTTE and the military
    abandoned promises given in 1999 not to place new mines in areas
    designated for civilian resettlement. Sources reported 16 civilians
    were killed or wounded from January to give end of August in incidents
    involving mines or unexploded ordnance. On November 28, a landmine
    blast attributed to the LTTE killed 7 persons and injured 24 passengers
    on a bus in Anuradhapura district. In contrast 20 such accidents
    occurred in 1999. Sources have confirmed that the SLA is making great
    efforts to clear all explosives from areas that it has recaptured.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and expression; however, the Government restricts
    these rights in practice, often using national security grounds
    permitted by law. During the year, the Government limited the access of
    domestic and foreign media to information and continued to censor news
    relating to the military and security situation. In June 1998, the
    Government imposed direct censorship on all domestic and foreign media
    reports relating to ongoing or possible future military and other
    security operations. The Government reissued its censorship order in
    November 1999 after the military suffered setbacks in the field. Even
    when no specific government censorship is exercised, private television
    stations impose their own, informal censorship on international
    television news rebroadcast in the country. In May the Government
    passed new ER to tighten censorship rules, to give the Government power
    to impound printing presses, and to close newspapers or broadcast
    stations it perceived as threats to national security. Subsequently a
    local NGO filed a fundamental rights case in the Supreme Court opposing
    censorship as a human rights violation. The court refused to consider
    the case. On November 1, International Press Institute (IPI) placed the
    country on its ``watch list'' of countries which ``appear to be moving
    towards suppressing or restricting press freedom.'' IPI cited the new
    Emergency Regulations as an impediment to free media expression.
        Despite earlier campaign promises to divest itself of its media
    holdings, the Government controls the country's largest newspaper
    chain, two major television stations, and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting
    Corporation (SLBC, a radio station). There are a variety of
    independent, privately owned newspapers, journals and radio and
    television stations, most of which freely criticize the Government and
    its policies. However, some journalists practiced self-censorship due
    to fear of intimidation. There is also a privately owned newspaper
    published in Jaffna. The Government imposes no political restrictions
    on the establishment of new media enterprises.
        The Government has failed to reform the press law and privatize
    government-owned media as promised during the 1994 election campaign.
    In 1997 there was an attempt to pass a broadcast reform bill that was
    ultimately unsuccessful and further revisions subsequently proposed by
    a blue-ribbon panel have yet to be implemented.
        In a January speech, the President attacked the press and singled
    out individuals and media organizations for criticism by name. After
    passing the new ER in May, the Government created a special media
    information center to approve print and broadcast material produced in
    the country, including that of foreign journalists. Later that month,
    the SLBC defied an order by the censor and continued to broadcast the
    BBC's Sinhala-language news program. After a period of controversy, the
    Media Minister allowed the broadcasts to continue. The President
    officially eased censorship restrictions on foreign journalists in a
    circular published on June 5, although material for publication or
    broadcast within the country, regardless of author, remained subject to
    government approval. As a result of the Government's actions,
    journalists practiced self-censorship.
        In late May, the Government used its power under the new ER to
    close two publications in Colombo and the independent newspaper in
    Jaffna, citing security concerns. The Supreme Court in late June
    declared the censorship regulations to be invalid, and it ordered the
    Government to allow the newspapers to reopen. The Government complied
    with the ruling, but it reissued the regulations in a manner consistent
    with the Supreme Court ruling.
        On September 19, police arrested a young man for criticizing the
    President on a radio call-in show. Police traced the call to discover
    the caller's address. The young man's parents alleged that he had a
    mental illness and could not be held responsible for his comments.
    Regardless at year's end, the young man remained in prison pending a
    hearing of the case.
        On January 2, unknown attackers set fire to the home of an actress
    who supported the opposition party candidate during the 1999
    presidential election campaign. On January 26, presumed government
    supporters attacked a husband and wife singing duo, who also had
    supported the opposition presidential candidate. On April 6, the local
    BBC correspondent was assaulted while covering a rally that protested
    Norway's involvement in the country's peace process. Other journalists
    reported threats for expressing opinions critical of the Government.
    Several fled the country.
        During the year, police detained two persons for questioning in
    connection with the 1999 murder of Rohana Kumara, editor of a Sinhala-
    language newspaper which had been critical of leading figures in the
    ruling coalition. By year's end, no one had been charged in connection
    with the case. Similarly authorities made no progress in the 1999
    murder of Ramesh Nadarajah, a Tamil Member of Parliament and the editor
    of a Tamil-language weekly.
        In March 1999, an army brigadier allegedly abducted and assaulted a
    journalist working for an independent Sinhala-language newspaper.
    Police arrested the brigadier, after which courts granted him bail. The
    case did not come to trial during the year.
        In February 1998, armed men attacked a journalist who regularly
    reported on defense matters, including corruption in military
    procurements. The Government criticized the attack; it subsequently
    arrested and indicted two air force personnel in the case, including
    the bodyguard of a former commander of the air force. A formal
    indictment was handed down in 1999. Courts postponed the hearings
    several times during the year; the case was scheduled to reconvene in
    February 2001.
        The editor of a leading national newspaper who was found guilty of
    defaming the President in 1997 appealed the verdict that year. On
    December 5, an appellate court upheld the lower court's ruling. The
    editor appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Another defamation
    case filed by the President in 1995 led to the September 5 conviction
    of an editor of another important English-language weekly. The editor
    received a 2-year jail sentence, later suspended; he appealed. Other
    defamation cases filed by the President against editors of major
    newspapers critical of the Government or supportive of the opposition
    remained pending. Journalists viewed these cases as frivolous and
    intended only to intimidate and harass the media.
        The Sri Lanka Tamil Media Alliance was formed in 1999 to protect
    the interests of Tamil journalists, who allege that they are subject to
    harassment and intimidation by Tamil paramilitary groups and Sri Lankan
    security forces. Regional Tamil correspondents working in the war zones
    have complained of arbitrary arrest and detention and difficulty in
    obtaining press accreditation. In August 1999, the Sri Lanka Tamil
    Media Alliance filed the first-ever fundamental rights case on behalf
    of an ethnic Tamil reporter on the staff of the government-owned and-
    controlled Tamil language daily. Security forces arrested the reporter
    on August 21, 1999, on suspicion of affiliation with the LTTE and later
    released him. The court ruled that the security forces had acted within
    their rights in detaining the reporter and refused to award
    compensation.
        Travel by foreign and national journalists to the conflict areas
    was restricted, but in September the Government began approving some
    requests for journalists (both local and foreign) to travel north and
    they organized transport for selected journalists to visit Jaffna;
    however, the Government did not announce a formal policy change. Both
    local and foreign journalists still were required to obtain advance
    permission from the Ministry of Defense for travel to conflict areas.
    The Foreign Ministry also had to approve visits to conflict areas by
    foreign journalists. Bureaucratic delays in processing requests have
    been reduced, but they still prevail. The Government occasionally
    arranges for groups of journalists to visit Jaffna and the vicinity of
    the front lines on tightly organized briefing tours. The Government
    remains the only source of most news about security and defense matters
    that can be disseminated to the public legally.
        The LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly
    restricts the print and broadcast media in areas under its control. The
    LTTE has killed those reporting and publishing on human rights.
        The Government generally respects academic freedom.
        The LTTE does not respect academic freedom, and it has repressed
    and killed intellectuals who criticize it, most notably the moderate
    and widely-respected Tamil politician and academic, Dr. Neelan
    Tiruchelvam, who was killed by a suicide bomber in July 1999. The LTTE
    severely repressed members of a human rights organization, the
    University Teachers for Human Rights, which formerly was based on the
    Jaffna peninsula; most former members of this group have been killed.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects this
    right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this freedom, the
    Government did not use the act for that purpose during the year. The
    right of assembly is also restricted under the emergency regulations,
    and the Government ordered the cancellation of two political rallies
    under the new emergency regulations in May. However, the Government
    generally granted permits for demonstrations, including those by
    opposition parties and minority groups. Nonetheless, both the main
    opposition UNP and the PA Government continued to accuse each other of
    political thuggery and hooliganism, complaining that supporters of the
    opposing party disrupted rallies and other political events.
        New ER enacted in May restricted the right to organize rallies,
    including political demonstrations and discouraged public celebrations.
    Under the new emergency regulations, police ordered the cancellation of
    a JVP protest organized for May 9 and cancelled the UNP's first pre-
    election rally, scheduled for May 12. Nonetheless many political
    parties and factions continued to hold impromptu, short demonstrations
    without reprisals from the Government. A June presidential order lifted
    the restrictions on rallies.
        Violence at political rallies sometimes occurs. A JVP supporter
    died on September 27 from injuries sustained when the police broke up a
    JVP rally held in Matale on September 25, which the Government claimed
    was illegal because participants had not applied for permits or
    requested permission to use loudspeakers.
        The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this
    right, the Government did not use the act for that purpose during the
    year.
        The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas that it
    controls. On the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE occasionally has posted in
    public places the names of Tamil civilians accused of associating with
    security forces and other Government entities. The LTTE has killed
    Tamil civilians who have cooperated with the security forces in
    establishing a civil administration in Jaffna under a political
    leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution gives Buddhism a foremost
    position, but it also provides for the right of members of other faiths
    to practice their religions freely, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Despite the special status afforded by the
    Constitution to Buddhism, major religious festivals of all faiths are
    celebrated as public holidays.
        Foreign clergy may work in the country, but for the last 30 years,
    the Government has sought to limit the number of foreign religious
    workers given temporary work permits. Permission usually is restricted
    to denominations registered with the Government. The Government has
    prohibited the entry of new foreign clergy. It permitted those already
    in the country to remain; however, as foreign clergy have retired, Sri
    Lankans would replace them. For example, in 1962 the Government reached
    an agreement with the Catholic Church that new Jesuit clergy would not
    be permitted to enter the country on a permanent basis. However, the
    Jesuits want their clergy to be replaced by foreign members of their
    order as they retire. The local Catholic Church hierarchy does not
    support the Jesuits in the dispute, and it is not lobbying the
    Government to change the agreement. Most religious workers in the
    country, including most Christian clergy, are Sri Lankan in origin.
        Some evangelical Christians, who constitute less than 1 percent of
    the population, have expressed concern that their efforts at
    proselytizing often meet with hostility and harassment from the local
    Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work (see Section 5). They
    sometimes complain that the Government tacitly condones such
    harassment; however, there is no evidence to support this claim. In
    1997 the Assemblies of God Church filed a fundamental rights case with
    the Supreme Court after the local village council in Gampaha had tried
    to block the construction of a church on the grounds that it would
    interfere with Buddhism. The Supreme Court ruled that the construction
    of the church could proceed. However, in May 1999 two bombs exploded in
    the hall of the church; no one was injured, but the structure was
    damaged slightly. The denomination complained that it continues to face
    opposition at the local level in many places but stated that legal
    action or the threat of legal action generally has resulted in the
    Church being allowed to construct facilities for its congregations and
    conduct worship services.
        The LTTE has discriminated against Muslims. In 1990 it evicted some
    46,000 Muslims from areas under its control in the north. The LTTE also
    has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses, and threatened
    Muslims with death if they attempted to return to their homes before
    the conflict ends (see Section 5).
        The LTTE attacked Buddhist sites, most notably the historic Dalada
    Maligawa or ``Temple of the Tooth,'' the holiest Buddhist shrine in the
    country, in the town of Kandy in January 1998. In May an LTTE bombing
    near a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival in Batticaloa killed 23
    persons and wounded dozens of others (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants every citizen
    ``freedom of movement and of choosing his residence'' and ``freedom to
    return to Sri Lanka,'' and the Government generally respects the right
    to domestic and foreign travel; however, the war with the LTTE prompted
    the Government to impose more stringent checks on travelers from the
    north and the east and on movement in Colombo, particularly after dark.
    Tamils must obtain police passes in order to move freely in the north
    and east, and frequently they are harassed at checkpoints around the
    country (see Section 1.c.). These security measures have the effect of
    restricting the movement of Tamils.
        The movement of persons in Jaffna is regulated strictly by military
    checkpoints throughout the city. For Tamils travel from Jaffna to other
    parts of the country remained extremely difficult, due to security
    restrictions imposed by the security forces and the limited
    availability of transportation. The ICRC in September replaced its
    relief and supply ship with a new vessel capable of carrying up to 75
    persons. The ship evacuated civilians from Jaffna who needed medical
    treatment, but it also carried civilian passengers between Trincomalee
    and Jaffna on an as-needed basis. In addition the Government hired a
    passenger vessel with room for 400 persons that operated between
    Trincomalee and Jaffna and transported medical supplies; in July the
    ICRC began providing escort for the ship under the ICRC flag, at the
    request of the Government and with the agreement of the LTTE.
        The armed forces initially prevented more than 1,000 civilians from
    vacating conflict areas on the Jaffna peninsula during fighting in
    April and May and imposed a curfew, prompting accusations that the
    security forces were using the population as ``human shields.'' The
    military quickly decided to permit civilians to evacuate the area after
    intense pressure by human rights groups. During the April and May
    campaign, almost the entire population of the Thenmarachchi district,
    east of Jaffna, was trapped between the military and the LTTE. By early
    June, the situation had calmed sufficiently that many persons were able
    to leave. The LTTE and the military did not allow international NGO's
    to have access to the area until mid-June. Observers believe that many
    persons, including the elderly and invalids, may not have been able to
    leave the area during the heaviest fighting in May, and may have died
    as a result. The area still was contested at year's end. The U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and ICRC were unable to gain access
    to the region until fighting abated in June.
        In November 1999, most residents of Vavuniya fled when the LTTE
    threatened to shell the town as part of its counterattack. Security
    forces kept nearly 5,000 residents of nearby welfare centers or transit
    camps where they were. Human rights groups accused security forces of
    endangering the lives of camp residents. One week later the LTTE
    withdrew its threat, and most residents returned.
        Fighting between Government and LTTE has displaced hundreds of
    thousands of persons, with many displaced multiple times as front lines
    shift. Fighting in Jaffna from April to June this year displaced an
    estimated 150,000 more, most of whom sought shelter with friends or
    relatives. Another 340,000 displaced reportedly live in the Vanni.
    Since September 172,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) have been
    living in welfare centers ranging from camps, where conditions vary
    considerably, to settlements with government social services and food
    aid. By year's end, 500,000 displaced persons, including those in the
    Vanni, had registered for government food aid and were receiving
    medicine and other essential supplies from the Government.
        The Government has sought to resettle the displaced where possible
    and has arranged for a number of those from Jaffna to return to their
    homes. Some attempts at resettlement proved successful. Over the years,
    the Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR, built permanent housing
    for 18,000 Muslims in the Puttalam area. However, many of the resettled
    were displaced again by further fighting, including those who in 1999
    returned to their homes north and east of Vavuniya, but they were
    forced to flee again when the LTTE retook the area starting in November
    1999.
        From October 1996 until the end of 1999, over 150,000 persons are
    estimated to have moved out of LTTE-controlled regions through Vavuniya
    and other transit points in government-controlled regions. Of these
    over 100,000 persons reached Jaffna and other Tamil-majority areas.
    Many had left the Vanni region with the intention of proceeding south;
    they opted for other destinations only after learning that they would
    have to remain in transit camps until security clearances for southward
    travel were obtained. Obtaining a clearance can take between 2 and 4
    months in some cases, and some human rights groups alleged that the
    procedures were arbitrary and unreasonably strict. Clearance procedures
    were applied to everyone, including the elderly and the very young.
    Those wishing to travel must be sponsored by a registered Vavuniya
    resident, and only one person may be sponsored at a time. This has
    created a lucrative black market in sponsorships. During the year,
    persons crossed illegally from LTTE-controlled to government-controlled
    areas. These individuals encountered strenuous security checks in
    Vavuniya that often took months, further contributing to crowding in
    the transit camps. While the Government had a legitimate interest in
    identifying LTTE infiltrators, it also appeared reluctant to allow
    displaced Tamils to travel to Colombo where they might contribute to
    unemployment and other social problems. At year's end, about 42,000
    displaced persons continued to live in substandard conditions with
    relatives or in camps in Vavuniya and Mannar. Some displaced persons
    wish to return to their homes.
        Prior to 1996, the LTTE severely restricted the movement of Tamils
    under its control, often levying a large ``exit tax'' on persons who
    sought to travel to areas under government control and requiring
    travelers to leave all their property in escrow. In addition it usually
    would allow only one family member to travel at a time. Following the
    Government's capture of Jaffna, the LTTE began to allow persons to move
    more freely into, government-controlled areas, although it still
    extracts a small fee for ``travel passes'' to leave the Vanni, and it
    rarely allows entire families to leave at once. The LTTE occasionally
    disrupts the flow of persons exiting the Vanni region through the one
    established and legal checkpoint. The LTTE also disrupted the movement
    of IDP's from Trincomalee to Jaffna by hijacking or attacking civilian
    shipping. On June 26, an LTTE suicide boat rammed the M.V. Mercs Uhana,
    a civilian transport ship carrying food and other supplies to Jaffna
    (see Section 1.a.). On November 2, the LTTE temporarily hijacked the
    Russian vessel M.V. Utyous after the Sri Lankan navy destroyed three
    LTTE craft in a sea battle. After successfully evading the navy and
    escaping to shore, the LTTE released the Russian ship and its crew. In
    addition the LTTE also disrupted civilian air traffic to Jaffna; in
    August 1998, it began warning civilians and humanitarian workers not to
    use civilian flights serving the peninsula.
        Humanitarian groups estimate that there are more than 200,000 IDP's
    in LTTE-controlled areas (see Section 1.g.).
        Several thousand Tamils fled LTTE-controlled areas to Tamil Nadu in
    southern India in 1998. An estimated 65,000 Tamil refugees lived in
    camps there, having left the country at various times throughout the
    period of the conflict. Indian authorities reported 1,400 new refugees
    from between January and August 31; about 100,000 refugees may have
    integrated into Tamil society in India over the years.
        The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of
    first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government does not
    permit the entry of refugees into the country or grant first asylum,
    nor does it aid those who manage to enter to seek permanent residence
    elsewhere. Howver, the UNHCR granted refugee status to four persons
    during the year who asked for that status after arriving in the
    country. The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or
    asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. There were no instances
    of forcible repatriation of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
    through periodic multiparty elections based on universal adult
    suffrage. The country is a longstanding democratic republic with an
    active multiparty system. Power is shared between the popularly elected
    President and the 225-member Parliament. The right to change the
    government was exercised in December 1999 when Chandrika Kumaratunga
    was elected to a second 6-year term as President and again during
    parliamentary elections in October. Both elections were marked by
    violence. As of September 29, the Center for Monitoring Election
    Violence (CMEV) recorded more than 500 acts of violence, including 7
    killings, in the period leading up to parliamentary elections. Another
    local monitoring organization counted 2,036 acts of violence during the
    campaign period from close of nominations in September to election day
    on October 10; it noted violence ranging from defacement of campaign
    posters to assault and 73 killings. Violence also plagued the 1999
    presidential elections; several persons died and many more were
    injured, including the President and the Justice Minister, in an LTTE
    suicide bomb attack.
        By year's end, local observers had not issued reports on the
    elections; however, they expressed concern about whether the vote was
    free and fair. A European Union monitoring mission, in its final
    report, expressed concern about violence and irregularities in the
    voting, but it concluded that the election ``did to a reasonable degree
    reflect the will of the electorate.''
        The incidence of electoral fraud has increased in recent elections.
    Elections Commission officers reported misuse of postal votes in the
    1999 Northwest (``Wayamba'') Province elections. In response to sharp
    criticism about the way that the vote was conducted, the President
    appointed a commission staffed by two retired judges to evaluate
    allegations of electoral fraud. Although they agreed that the poll was
    flawed, no new election was called. In February 1999, the President
    also created a bipartisan monitoring committee (which she chaired) to
    ensure that the remaining provincial council elections were ``free and
    fair.'' Two local election monitoring organizations found that the 1999
    presidential vote was flawed in more than 10 percent of polling
    stations. A group of 26 international observers invited by the
    Government to observe the elections stated that they saw no evidence of
    fraud in the 1999 presidential elections, but they admitted the
    possibility of irregularities and suggested ways for improving the
    voting system to prevent cheating. The EU sent a delegation of more
    than 70 monitors to observe the parliamentary elections in October. The
    Elections Commissioner granted the EU representatives access to polling
    and counting stations. Local monitoring groups also observed the polls.
        The Commissioner of Elections recognized 46 parties at the time of
    general elections in October; however, only 13 parties actually held
    seats in the 225-member Parliament elected during the year. The two
    most influential parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (the principal
    component party of the governing PA coalition) and the UNP, generally
    draw their support from the majority Sinhalese community. Historically,
    these two parties have alternated in power.
        Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of
    women in politics or government, the social mores in some communities
    limit women's activities outside the home, and they are
    underrepresented in government and politics. Nonetheless, in August
    1994, voters elected a Parliament that chose a female Prime Minister
    for the third time in the country's history. In November 1994, a woman
    was elected President for the first time; she was reelected in December
    1999 for a second term. Eleven women held seats in the Parliament that
    completed its term in August. In addition to the Prime Minister, the
    Minister for Women's Affairs, and the Minister of Social Services, a
    number of women held posts as deputy ministers in the last parliament.
    Of the 5,000 candidates for the October parliamentary elections, 116
    were women and 7 of them won seats in the October elections. The
    President appointed three of these women, including the wife of the
    deceased leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, to ministerial
    posts.
        The Parliament elected in October has 23 Tamil and 22 Muslim
    members.
        The LTTE refuses to allow elections in areas under its control,
    although it did not oppose campaigning in the east during the October
    parliamentary elections. Through a campaign of killing and
    intimidation, it effectively undermined the functioning of local
    government bodies in Jaffna, whose members were elected in January
    1998. This campaign included the killing of 2 of Jaffna's mayors and
    death threats against members of the 17 local councils. Throughout the
    period of the conflict, the LTTE has killed popularly elected
    politicians, including those elected by Tamils in areas the LTTE claims
    as part of a Tamil homeland.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are several domestic NGO human rights groups, including the
    Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), the University
    Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR-J), the Civil Rights Movement
    (CRM), and the Law and Society Trust (LST), that monitor civil and
    political liberties. There are no adverse regulations governing the
    activities of local and foreign NGO's, although in February 1999, the
    Government began requiring NGO's to include action plans and detailed
    descriptions of funding sources as part of its official registration
    process. Some NGO workers saw this as an attempt by the Government to
    exert greater control over the NGO sector after human rights groups
    criticized the Government's handling of the Wayamba elections in
    January 1999 (see Section 3). However, few NGO's complied with these
    new reporting requirements. The Government generally cooperated with
    NGO's, with members of Parliament, and with other officials frequently
    participating in seminars and other events concerning human rights and
    humanitarian affairs.
        The Government continued to allow the ICRC unrestricted access to
    detention facilities (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In the past, the
    ICRC provided international humanitarian law training materials and
    training to the security forces on an ad hoc basis. The UNHCR, the
    ICRC, and a variety of international NGO's assisted in the delivery of
    medical and other essential supplies to the Vanni area, even with the
    many restrictions on such supplies (see Section 1.g).
        By year's end, the HRC conducted more than 2,000 visits to police
    stations and 500 visits to detention facilities. The HRC has over 4,000
    cases of alleged human rights abuse pending. The Commission's
    investigation into the allegations by former Lance Corporal Rajapakse
    about mass graves at Chemmani in Jaffna resulted in exhumations in 1999
    that provided the basis for the ongoing case (see Section l.a.).
    Nonetheless, human rights observers believed that the work of the HRC
    was hampered severely by a lack of strong leadership within the
    organization. For example, after almost 4 years of operation, the HRC
    had failed to hire permanent staff. The organization also responded
    inadequately to requests from its field officers for protection when
    inquiries placed them in danger. The HRC also has been criticized for
    micromanaging the activities of the field offices, which are equipped
    poorly. The establishment of the CIUAH in 1998 strengthened claims of
    the HRC's ineffectiveness, since the responsibilities of the CIUAH
    clearly fell within the HRC's mandate (see Section l.d.). New
    commissioners were appointed in March after the tenure of the previous
    commissioners expired. Activists have expressed some satisfaction with
    the new leadership, especially for its prompt investigation into the
    Bindunuwewu massacre.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights under the law for all
    citizens, and the Government generally respects these rights. The
    Supreme Court regularly upholds court rulings in cases in which
    individuals file suit over the abridgment of their fundamental civil
    rights. The HRC and the CIUAH are other mechanisms that the Government
    has established to ensure enforcement of constitutional provisions in
    addition to access to the courts (see Section l.d.).
        Women.--Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse (often associated
    with alcohol abuse) continue to be serious and pervasive problems.
    Amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 1995 specifically addressed
    sexual abuse and exploitation and modified rape laws to create a more
    equitable burden of proof and to make punishments more stringent.
    Marital rape is considered an offense in cases of spouses living under
    judicial separation, and laws govern sexual molestation and sexual
    harassment in the workplace. While the Penal Code may ease some of the
    problems faced by victims of sexual assault, many women's organizations
    believe that greater sensitization of police and judicial officials is
    required. The Government set up the Bureau for the Protection of
    Children and Women within the police in 1994 to respond to calls for
    greater awareness and attention. Police statistics indicated that there
    were 26,660 crimes against women during the period from January to July
    1999, compared with 26,565 crimes between January and June of 1998.
    Although laws against procuring and trafficking were strengthened in
    1995, facilitating the prosecution of brothel owners, trafficking in
    women for the purpose of forced labor occurs (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        The Constitution provides for equal employment opportunities in the
    public sector. However, women have no legal protection against
    discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes are paid
    less than men for equal work, often experience difficulty in rising to
    supervisory positions, and face sexual harassment. Women constitute
    approximately one-half of the formal work force.
        Women have equal rights under national, civil, and criminal law.
    However, issues related to family law, including divorce, child
    custody, and inheritance, are adjudicated by the customary law of each
    ethnic or religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women is 18
    years, except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their
    customary marriage practices. The application of different legal
    practices based on membership in a religious or ethnic group often
    results in discrimination against women.
        Children.--The Government is committed to protecting the welfare
    and rights of children, but is constrained by a lack of resources. The
    Government demonstrates a strong commitment to children's rights and
    welfare through its extensive systems of public education and medical
    care. The 1997 Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act, implemented in
    January 1998, requires children between the ages of 5 and 14 to attend
    school (see Section 6.d.). Approximately 85 percent of children under
    the age of 16 attend school. Education is free through the university
    level. Health care, including immunization, also is free.
        In the period January 1 to August 31, the police recorded 767 cases
    of crimes against children, compared with 1,491 in 1999. Many NGO's
    attribute the problem of exploitation of children to the lack of law
    enforcement rather than adequate legislation. Many law enforcement
    resources are diverted to the conflict with the LTTE, although the
    Bureau for the Protection of Children and Women of the police conducts
    investigations into crimes against these two groups.
        There is a serious problem of child prostitution in certain coastal
    resort areas. The Government estimates that there are more than 2,000
    active child prostitutes in the country, but private groups claim that
    the number is much higher (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). A 1998 U.N.
    International Labor Office study placed the total at 30,000, a number
    which has not been confirmed and has been criticized by activists in
    the field as highly speculative. The bulk of child sexual abuse in the
    form of child prostitution is committed by citizens; however, some
    child prostitutes are boys who cater to foreign tourists. Some of these
    children are forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The
    Government has pushed for greater international cooperation to bring
    those guilty of pedophilia to justice. Several foreign pedophiles were
    brought before courts during the year. The penalty for conviction is
    usually a fine and deportation. Four cases of pedophilia were brought
    to court this year, one involving a foreigner.
        In 1995 the Ministry of Media, Tourism, and Aviation created a task
    force specifically to study the problem of sex tourism and related
    offenses. It was abolished at the end of 1997 and superseded by a
    presidential task force on child protection. Following the
    recommendation of the task force, the Government created the National
    Child Protection Authority (NCPA) in 1998. The law establishing the
    NCPA consolidated existing legislation and defined a child as anyone
    under age 18. Under the law, the definition of child abuse includes all
    acts of sexual violence against, trafficking in, and cruelty to
    children. The law also prohibits the use of children in exploitative
    labor or illegal activities or in any act contrary to compulsory
    education regulations. The legislation further widened the definition
    of child abuse to include the involvement of children in war. The NCPA
    is composed of senior law enforcement officers as well as
    representatives from the education, medical, and legal professions; it
    reports directly to the President. By year's end, the NCPA had
    recruited permanent staff and moved into an office space that it shares
    with the Bureau for the Protection of Women and Children of the police
    force.
        The LTTE uses child soldiers and recruits children for use in
    battlefield support functions and in combat. In September the military
    captured a 14-year-old girl who fought near Jaffna. Other LTTE
    recruits, some as young as 13, have surrendered to the military, and
    credible reports indicate the LTTE has stepped up recruiting efforts
    (see Section 1.g.). In May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the
    Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Children in
    Armed Combat that it would not recruit children under the age of 17;
    however, the LTTE has not honored this pledge.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
    to buildings or government services for the disabled. The World Health
    Organization estimates that 7 percent of the population is disabled.
    Most disabled persons who are unable to work are cared for by their
    families. The Department of Social Services operates eight vocational
    training schools for the physically and mentally disabled and sponsors
    a program of job training and placement for graduates. Some private
    companies, at the urging of the Government, have provided training and
    jobs to disabled veterans. The Government also provides some financial
    support to NGO's that assist the disabled, subsidizes prosthetic
    devices and other medical aids for the disabled, makes some purchases
    from disabled suppliers, and has registered 74 schools and training
    institutions for the disabled run by NGO's. The Social Services
    Ministry has selected job placement officers to help the estimated
    200,000 work-eligible disabled persons to find jobs. In spite of these
    efforts, the disabled still face difficulties because of negative
    attitudes and discrimination. In 1996 Parliament passed legislation
    forbidding discrimination against any person on the grounds of
    disability. No cases are known to have been filed under this law.
        Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, known as
    Veddas, number fewer than l,000. Some prefer to maintain their isolated
    traditional way of life, and they are protected by the Constitution.
    There are no legal restrictions on their participation in the political
    or economic life of the nation. In August 1998, the Government
    fulfilled a long-standing Vedda demand when the President issued an
    order granting Veddas the right to hunt and gather in specific
    protected forest areas. The executive order granted the Veddas the
    freedom to protect their culture and to carry on their traditional way
    of life without hindrance. Under a pilot program, Veddas received
    special identity cards to enable their use of these forest areas.
    However, some Veddas still complain that they are being pushed off of
    their land. Although many Veddas continue to pursue a traditional way
    of life, visits by tourists have become an important source of income
    for the community.
        Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religious
    differences seems much less common than discrimination based on ethnic
    group or caste. In general the members of the various faiths tend to be
    tolerant of each other's religious beliefs. However, on occasion
    evangelical Christians have been harassed by Buddhist monks for their
    attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity (see Section 2.c.). In
    1988 the leader of an Assemblies of God congregation in the southern
    town of Tissamaharama was killed by unknown assailants. In April 1999,
    two bombs exploded in the church hall of this congregation, now run by
    the pastor's widow. No one was injured; however, the building sustained
    some structural damage (see Section 2.c.).
        In the northern part of the island, LTTE insurgents expelled some
    46,000 Muslim inhabitants from their homes in 1990--virtually the
    entire Muslim population. Most of these persons remain displaced. In
    the past, the LTTE expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses and
    threatened Muslim families with death if they attempt to return (see
    Section 2.c.).
        The LTTE also has attacked notable Buddhist sites. In May 23
    persons were killed and dozens wounded when an LTTE bomb exploded near
    a temple at the Buddhist Vesak festival (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 1
    million Tamils of comparatively recent Indian origin, the so-called
    ``hill'' Tamils or ``Indian'' Tamils, whose ancestors originally were
    brought to the country in the 19th century to work on plantations.
    Approximately 75,000 of these persons do not qualify for either Indian
    or Sri Lankan citizenship and face discrimination, especially in the
    allocation of government funds for education. Without national identity
    cards, they also are vulnerable to arrest by the security forces.
    However, the Government has stated that none of these persons would be
    forced to depart the country. During 1999 the Government introduced a
    program to begin registering these individuals; 4,500 ``Indian'' Tamils
    received identity cards between January and September 22. Critics
    charged that the program did not progress fast enough.
        Both Sri Lankan and ``Indian'' Tamils maintain that they have long
    suffered systematic discrimination in university education, government
    employment and in other matters controlled by the Government. In 1996
    the Government established a parliamentary select committee to consider
    a package of constitutional reforms designed to devolve wide-ranging
    powers to local governments, thereby providing ethnic minorities
    greater autonomy in governing their local affairs. While the two main
    political groupings, the PA and UNP, reached consensus on many aspects
    of the devolution proposals, when the Government introduced the draft
    Constitution to Parliament in August in hopes of passing the measures,
    it had to suspend debate on the new Constitution due to political
    opposition. The LTTE rejected the devolution proposals.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Government respects the
    constitutional right of workers to establish unions. Any seven workers
    may form a union, adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize their
    views. Over 70 percent of the plantation work force, which is
    overwhelmingly ``hill'' Tamil, is unionized. In total there are over
    800,000 union members, 650,000 of whom are women. Approximately 20
    percent of the nonagricultural work force in the private sector is
    unionized. Unions represent most workers in large private firms, but
    those in small scale agriculture and small businesses usually do not
    belong to unions. Public sector employees are unionized at very high
    rates.
        Most large unions are affiliated with political parties and play a
    prominent role in the political process, though major unions in the
    public sector are politically independent. More than 30 labor unions
    have political affiliations, but there are also a small number of
    unaffiliated unions, some of which have active leaders and a relatively
    large membership. In 1999, the most recent year for which data are
    available, the Department of Labor registered 69 new unions and
    canceled the registration of 71 others, bringing the total number of
    functioning unions to 1,676. The Department of Labor is authorized by
    law to cancel the registration of any union that does not submit an
    annual report. This requirement is the only legal grounds for
    cancellation of registration.
        All workers, other than civil servants and workers in ``essential''
    services, have the right to strike. By law workers also may lodge
    complaints with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal or the
    Supreme Court to protect their rights. However, in May the Government
    issued new emergency regulations in response to military events in the
    north, which prohibited strikes as part of placing the country on a
    ``war footing.'' Nonetheless, plantation workers and railway workers
    participated in strikes. The Government has periodically controlled
    strikes by declaring some industries essential under the ER. Despite
    this restriction, the Government in 1998 permitted a 5-week postal
    strike and a strike by plantation workers. The President retains the
    power to designate any industry as an essential service. The President
    attempted to break a doctors' strike in June 1999 by declaring their
    services essential. The doctors defied the order, and after a standoff
    which lasted a week, the Government agreed to consider their
    grievances. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has pointed out
    to the Government that essential services should be limited to services
    where an interruption would endanger the life, personal safety, or
    health of the population.
        Civil servants collectively may submit labor grievances to the
    Public Service Commission but have no legal grounds to strike.
    Nonetheless, government workers in the transportation, medical,
    educational, power generation, financial, and port sectors have staged
    brief strikes and other work actions in recent years. There were over
    100 public sector strikes during the year.
        The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential
    sectors. Employers may dismiss workers only for disciplinary reasons,
    mainly misconduct. Incompetence or low productivity are not grounds for
    dismissal. Dismissed employees have a right to appeal their termination
    before a labor tribunal.
        Unions may affiliate with international bodies, and some have done
    so. The Ceylon Workers Congress, composed exclusively of Tamil
    plantation workers, is the only trade union affiliated with the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), although a
    new trade union in the Biyagama export processing zone is affiliated
    with the Youth Forum of the ICFTU. No national trade union center
    exists to centralize or facilitate contact with international groups.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right to collective bargaining, and it is practiced
    widely. Large firms may have employees in as many as 60 different
    unions. In enterprises without unions, including those in the export
    processing zones (EPZ's), worker councils--composed of employees,
    employers and often a public sector representative--generally provide
    the forums for labor and management negotiation. The councils do not
    have the power to negotiate binding contracts, and they have been
    criticized as ineffective by labor advocates.
        In December 1999, Parliament passed an amendment to the Industrial
    Disputes Act to require employers to recognize trade unions and the
    right to collective bargaining. The law prohibits antiunion
    discrimination. Employers found guilty of such discrimination must
    reinstate workers fired for union activities but may transfer them to
    different locations.
        There are approximately 110,000 workers employed in the export
    processing zones (EPZ's), a large percentage of them women. Under the
    law, workers in the EPZ's have the same rights to join unions as other
    workers. However, few unions have formed in the EPZ's, largely because
    of severe restrictions on access by union organizers to the zones.
    While the unionization rate in the rest of the country is approximately
    25 percent, the rate within the EPZ's is only 10 percent. Labor
    representatives allege that the Government's Board of Investment (BOI),
    which manages the EPZ's, including setting wages and working conditions
    in the EPZ's, has discouraged union activity. Work councils in the
    EPZ's are chaired by the BOI and only have the power to make
    recommendations. Labor representatives also allege that the Labor
    Commissioner, under BOI pressure, has failed to prosecute employers who
    refuse to recognize or enter into collective bargaining with trade
    unions. While employers in the EPZ's offer higher wages and better
    working conditions generally than employers elsewhere, workers face
    other concerns, such as security, expensive but low quality boarding
    houses, and sexual harassment. In most instances, wage boards establish
    minimum wages and conditions of employment, except in the EPZ's, where
    wages and work conditions are set by the BOI.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is prohibited by provisions of the 1844 Abolition of Slavery Act;
    however, there were reports of its use. There are reports of women
    being trafficked to the country for the purpose of prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.). The act does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by
    children specifically, but government officials interpret it as
    applying to persons of all ages. In the past there were credible
    reports that some rural children were employed in debt bondage as
    domestic servants in urban households; some of these children
    reportedly had been abused (see Section 5); however, no cases were
    reported during the year. Some children were trafficked and forced into
    prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        There are credible reports that some soldiers attached to an army
    camp north of Batticaloa forced local villagers to build a wall around
    the camp during the year, and they beat individuals who refused to
    comply. The military apparently transferred the officer responsible for
    the forced labor when notified of the abuse. Some members of the STF in
    the Batticaloa area forced villagers to work without compensation,
    clearing jungle areas and in other manual labor in and near STF camps
    during 1999; the villagers were threatened directly or indirectly with
    physical abuse if they did not perform the work.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--In 1998 Parliament passed the National Child Protection
    Authority Act (NCPA) to combat the problem of child abuse, including
    unlawful child labor. The act consolidated existing legislation that
    clearly established what types of employment are restricted for
    children, which age groups are affected, and what the minimum age for
    child labor is for particular jobs. The minimum age for employment is
    14, although the law to permits the employment of younger children by
    their parents or guardians in limited agricultural work. In January
    Parliament repealed a regulation that permitted domestic employment for
    children as young as age 12. About 85 percent of children under the age
    of 16 attend school, and the law permits the employment of such persons
    for not more than 1 hour on any day before school. The 1997 Compulsory
    Attendance at Schools Act, which requires children between the ages of
    5 and 14 to attend school, has been in effect since January 1998,
    although it still is being implemented. The ultimate effect that this
    act may have on the child labor problem remains unclear.
        Persons under age 16 may not be employed in any public enterprise
    in which life or limb is endangered. There are no reports that children
    are employed in the EPZ's, the garment industry, or any other export
    industry, although children sometimes are employed during harvest
    periods in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture. A
    1995 labor survey of the plantations indicated that half of all
    children in plantations drop out of school after the fourth grade,
    leaving a large pool of children between the ages of 10 and 15
    available to pursue employment.
        Despite legislation child labor still exists. A child activity
    survey carried out in 1998-1999 by the Department of Census and
    Statistics found almost 11,000 children working full time and another
    15,000 engaged in both economic activity and housekeeping. The survey
    found 450,000 children employed by their families in seasonal
    agricultural work.
        A recent study reported that child domestic servants are employed
    in 8.6 percent of homes in the Southern Province. The same study
    reported that child laborers in the domestic service sector often are
    deprived of an education. The law also permits employment in any school
    or institution for training purposes.
        Regular employment of children also occurs mainly in the informal
    sector and in family enterprises such as family farms, crafts, small
    trade establishments, eating houses, and repair shops. Children also
    are involved in the manufacture of coconut fiber products, bricks,
    fishing, wrapping tobacco, street trading, and farming. Government
    inspections have been unable to eliminate these forms of child labor
    (see Section 5), although an awareness campaign coupled with the
    establishment of hot lines for reporting child labor led to nearly 500
    complaints from January through August. According to the Ministry of
    Labor, there were 10 prosecutions for child labor (below the age of 14)
    during the year. Under legislation dating from 1956, the maximum
    penalty for employing minors is about $12 (1,000 rupees), with a
    maximum jail term of 6 months.
        Additional thousands of children are believed to be employed in
    domestic service, although this situation is not regulated or
    documented. Many child domestics are subjected to physical, sexual, and
    emotional abuse.
        Children work as prostitutes as well; internal trafficking in male
    children is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Estimates of the
    number of child prostitutes range from 2,000 to 30,000; however, there
    are no reliable statistics. Although forced or bonded labor by persons
    of any age is prohibited by law, some rural children reportedly have
    served in debt bondage, although there were no reports of this during
    the year (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        The LTTE continued to use high-school-age children for work as
    cooks, messengers, and clerks. In some cases, the children reportedly
    help build fortifications. In the past, children as young as age 10
    were said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special
    schools that provided them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal
    education. The LTTE uses children as young as 13 years of age in
    battle, and children sometimes are recruited forcibly into the LTTE
    (see Section 5). In May 1999, the LTTE began a program of compulsory
    physical training, including mock military drills, for most of the
    population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and
    the aged. According to LTTE spokesmen, this work is meant to keep the
    population fit; however, it is believed widely that the training was
    established in order to gain tighter control over the population and to
    provide a base for recruiting fighters.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Department of Labor
    effectively enforces the minimum wage law for large companies through
    routine inspections; however, staffing shortages prevent the department
    from effectively monitoring the informal sector. While there is no
    universal national minimum wage, approximately 40 wage boards set
    minimum wages and working conditions by sector and industry. According
    to the statistics division of the Department of Labor, the Government
    in September mandated a $5 (400 rupees) increase in the minimum wage
    for private sector workers, and government workers received an increase
    equal to 10 percent of their salary, with a minimum raise of $12.50
    (1000 rupees) per month. Minimum wage rates average approximately
    $33.52 (2,682 rupees) per month in industry, commerce, and the service
    sector; and approximately $1.42 (114 rupees) per day in agriculture.
    The minimum wage in the garment industry is $39 (3,225 rupees) per
    month. These minimum wages are insufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and the standard family of five, but
    the vast majority of families have more than one breadwinner. Most
    permanent full-time workers are covered by laws that prohibit them from
    working regularly more than 45 hours per week (a 5-1/2 day work-week).
    Such workers also receive 14 days of annual leave, 14 to 21 days of
    medical leave, and approximately 20 local holidays each year.
        Maternity leave is available for permanent and casual female
    workers. Employers must contribute 12 percent of a worker's wage to an
    employee's provident fund and 3 percent to an employee's trust fund.
    Employers who fail to comply may be fined, although the effectiveness
    of government enforcement of this provision is unknown.
        Several laws protect the safety and health of industrial workers.
    However, the Ministry of Labor's small staff of inspectors is
    inadequate to enforce compliance with the laws. Workers have the
    statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger
    their health, but many workers are unaware of, or indifferent to,
    health risks, and fear that they would lose their jobs if they removed
    themselves. Health and safety regulations do not meet international
    standards.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Penal Code amendments enacted in 1995
    made trafficking in persons illegal; however, there are credible
    reports that trafficking in women and children occurs. Penalties for
    trafficking in women include imprisonment for between 2 and 20 years,
    plus a fine. For trafficking in children, the law allows imprisonment
    of between 5 and 20 years, plus a fine. According to police reports,
    there is a floating pool of approximately 200 foreign female sex
    workers in the country who were trafficked from the former Soviet
    Union, Thailand, and China.
        Internal trafficking in male children also is a problem, especially
    from areas bordering the northern and eastern provinces. Protecting
    Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE), a domestic NGO, estimates
    that there are at least 5,000 male children between the ages of 8 and
    15 who are engaged as sex workers both at beach and mountain resorts.
    Some of these children are forced into prostitution by their parents or
    by organized crime (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). PEACE also reports an
    additional 7,000 young men aged 15 to 18 who are self-employed
    prostitutes. The country reportedly has a growing reputation as a
    destination for foreign pedophiles; however, officials believe that
    approximately 30 percent of the clients are tourists and 70 percent are
    locals. The Government occasionally prosecuted foreign pedophiles. As
    of September, a case against one foreign pedophile was pending in
    magistrate court. In 1999 a foreign pedophile was sentenced to 14 years
    in prison (the defendant has filed an appeal); another convicted
    pedophile was deported.
                               WESTERN HEMISPHERE

                                  ----------

                              ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

        Antigua and Barbuda is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a
    member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and
    a bicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A Governor
    General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
    state, with largely ceremonial powers. Prime Minister Lester B. Bird's
    Antigua Labour Party (ALP) has controlled the Government and Parliament
    since 1976. In the March 1999 elections, the ALP retained power by
    winning 12 of 17 parliamentary seats, 2 more than it won in the
    previous elections in 1994. The Governor General appoints the 15
    senators in proportion to the parties' representation in Parliament and
    with the advice of the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.
    The judiciary is independent.
        Security forces consist of a police force and the small Antigua and
    Barbuda Defence Force. The police are organized, trained, and
    supervised according to British law enforcement practices. There were
    reports of occasional instances of excessive use of force by the police
    and prison guards.
        The country has a mixed economy with a strong private sector.
    Tourism is the most important source of foreign exchange earnings. The
    country is burdened by a large and growing external debt, which remains
    a serious economic problem. Per capita gross domestic product was about
    $7,500 in 1998.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, problems remained in several areas. Prison
    conditions are poor, and there were allegations of abuse of prison
    inmates. Opposition parties complained that they received limited
    coverage or opportunity to express their views on the government-
    controlled electronic media. Societal discrimination and violence
    against women also continued to be problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
    authorities generally respected these prohibitions; however, there were
    allegations of abuse by prison guards.
        There have been occasional reports of police brutality and
    threatening behavior. In August the families of two young men arrested
    by the police charged that police beat the young men leaving them with
    bruises and cuts on their arms, cursed them, and waved guns at family
    members in a threatening manner. Police authorities acknowledged the
    arrest but denied the alleged behavior by the policemen named by the
    families.
        Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the lone, 18th-century
    prison considerably worsened when a fire destroyed most of the facility
    in January 1999. Prisoners allegedly started the fire to protest random
    searches by prison guards. Following earlier prison riots and serious
    security breaches in 1997, the Government had decided to privatize the
    prison and hired a foreign security company, which replaced all prison
    officials, with the exception of a small administrative staff and
    women's prison officials, with its own employees.
        Conditions at the prison have remained unsettled since the fire.
        All prisoners are back in the compound, but repairs and renovations
    were not yet completed at year's end. In August the private firm's
    contract ended and was not renewed. A local management team was hired,
    with an acting superintendent on temporary duty from a neighboring
    island, and was charged with restoring order in keeping with the June
    1999 recommendations of a Royal Commission of Inquiry that investigated
    charges of abuse and other problems. A resident superintendent was
    trained to take over from the acting official, and the new team
    continued to train new hires and returning guards who had been
    discharged when the private firm ran the facility. The Commission
    recommended hiring more guards and using a rehabilitative approach. A
    psychologist was hired to oversee a newly established Rehabilitation
    Center, while some 30 new guard officer positions were filled to bring
    the staff to 94, including 16 female officers.
        The prison remained overcrowded, with over 170 prisoners. In
    September inmates sent letters of complaint to the media, asking that
    the letters be forwarded to regional human rights organizations. They
    claimed that prisoners were chained naked to the floor in the maximum
    security section of the yet-to-be renovated prison. The authorities
    established a local review board to hear prisoner complaints and to
    monitor progress at the prison, but government officials and concerned
    private individuals agreed that problems are likely to continue until
    funds can be found to build a new prison outside the city precincts.
        The women's prison facility is separate and has not experienced the
    problems encountered in the men's prison. There is no separate facility
    for juveniles, who are housed with adult inmates.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
    these provisions in practice. Criminal defendants have the right to a
    judicial determination of the legality of their detention. The police
    must bring detainees before a court within 48 hours of arrest or
    detention.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The judicial system is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system
    and reflects historical ties to the United Kingdom. The Constitution
    designates the Privy Council in London as the final court of appeal,
    which always is employed in the case of death sentences. There are no
    military or political courts.
        The Constitution provides that criminal defendants should receive a
    fair, open, and public trial. In capital cases only, the Government
    provides legal assistance at public expense to persons without the
    means to retain a private attorney. Courts can reach verdicts quickly,
    with some cases coming to conclusion in a matter of days.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech, of the press, and other forms of communication.
    Although the authorities generally respect these provisions in
    practice, the Government has restricted opposition parties' access to
    electronic media, effectively denying them equal coverage. The
    Government owns one of the two general interest radio stations and the
    single television station. A religious station broadcasts without
    impediment. One of the Prime Minister's brothers owns the second radio
    station, and another brother is the principal owner of the sole cable
    television company. The government-controlled media report regularly on
    the activities of the Government and the ruling party but limit their
    coverage of and access by opposition parties.
        These restrictions led opposition leader Baldwin Spencer to
    initiate a constitutional challenge in 1993. In 1997 the High Court
    determined that the Government had denied Spencer his constitutional
    right to freedom of expression and called on the Government to provide
    the opposition with greater media access in the future. However, this
    ruling has had limited impact in practice. The Government continues to
    restrict opposition access to the media, and there continue to be
    allegations of censorship as the result of subtle coercive pressure by
    influential persons. The March 1999 report of the Commonwealth observer
    group that monitored the general elections noted that the governing ALP
    party received the greatest share of political coverage by the
    government-controlled electronic media. The report also indicated that
    fair and equal access to publicly owned electronic media did not appear
    to be available to opposition party figures.
        However, print media, including daily and weekly newspapers, are
    active and offer a range of opinion, often publishing vigorous
    criticism of the Government. Nevertheless, efforts by print media to
    expand into electronic media have been restricted. In 1996 a daily
    newspaper attempted to start a radio station but has been unable to
    secure a license to operate. The authorities charged the owners with
    operating a radio station without a license. The case went to trial,
    and the judge found in favor of the Government, charging the newspaper
    owners with criminal conduct and finding them liable for damages. The
    owners sued the State in December 1996 for illegal search and seizure
    and claimed that their constitutional right to broadcast had been
    violated. In December 1997, the judge ruled that constitutional rights
    had not been violated, even though the owners could rightly claim
    significant delay; the judge found that the Government had not been
    inconsistent in this case, since it had not granted other licenses. In
    1998 the owners appealed the case to the Privy Council in London,
    pointing out that a progovernment station had been granted a license.
    On November 14, the Privy Council ruled in favor of the appellants,
    after finding that the Government had submitted fraudulent licenses and
    deceptive evidence to the court. (The Government had presented licenses
    supposedly issued to the Bird family for 25 years, but the signature on
    the licenses was that of an official who had retired prior to the date
    of issuance, and the law permitted licenses to have a validity of 1
    year only.) The Privy Council ordered the Government to assign the
    appellants a broadcast frequency within 14 days. On November 15, the
    Government said that it would take steps to introduce new regulations
    to govern broadcasting, and on November 27, the police returned the
    impounded radio station equipment to the owners, who planned to begin
    broadcasting as soon as possible.
        The police still have not issued an official report of their
    investigations in three possible arson attacks in November 1998. An
    arsonist destroyed an opposition newspaper; a fire of suspicious origin
    badly damaged the Ministry of Information; and the opposition United
    Progressive Party's outdoor convention site mysteriously was set on
    fire.
        In March 1999, a newspaper dismissed two journalists due to a
    controversy surrounding a news story critical of the Government. The
    foreign-born newspaper publisher dismissed the reporters for making
    public their opposition to the publisher's decision not to publish the
    article critical of the Government just prior to the general elections.
    The Caribbean Association of Media Workers criticized the dismissals as
    undermining the newspaper's editorial independence and as a threat to
    press freedoms.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The police normally issue
    the required permits for public meetings but sometimes deny them in
    order to avert violent confrontations. While the authorities placed
    some restrictions on demonstrations in the past, the opposition held
    numerous rallies and public meetings to promote its platform without
    any interference.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
    enforcement officials unfairly target them. However, it is not clear
    whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of
    religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of the laws
    against marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious
    practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government assesses all claims by refugees under the provisions
    of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
    1967 Protocol. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for a multiparty political system
    accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All citizens 18
    years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. The
    Constitution requires general elections at least every 5 years; the
    last general elections were held in March 1999. The law obligates the
    Government to hold voter registration during a fixed period (of only 5
    days) each year, and parties conduct their own registration drives free
    of government interference.
        Except for a period in opposition from 1971 to 1976, the Antigua
    Labour Party has held power continuously since 1951. The opposition has
    charged that the ALP's longstanding monopoly on patronage and its
    influence over access to economic opportunities make it extremely
    difficult for opposition parties to attract membership and financial
    support. In 1992 public concern over corruption in government led to
    the merger of three opposition political parties into the United
    Progressive Party.
        The Commonwealth observer group that monitored the 1999 elections
    issued a report that noted irregularities in the electoral process and
    assessed the elections as free but not fair. The report indicated that
    the voters' register stood at 52,348 voters, of a total population of
    approximately 69,000 persons. Since 40 percent of the population were
    estimated to be below voting age, the voting rolls appeared to be
    inflated. According to the observer group, the voter registration
    period, which is limited to only a week every July, appeared too
    restrictive and potentially disfranchises citizens, such as persons who
    would reach the voting age of 18 after July but before the elections.
    The observer group recommended the establishment of an independent
    electoral commission to improve the voter registration process. By
    year's end, the Government had not acted on these recommendations.
        There are no impediments to participation by women in government
    and politics, but they are underrepresented. No women have been elected
    or currently serve in the House of Representatives. Two women are
    senators, which are appointed positions. Eight of the 14 permanent
    secretaries (the top civil servant position in ministries) are women.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
    groups have been formed. There were no requests, other than the letters
    from prisoners (see Section 1.c.), for human rights investigations or
    inquiries from individuals or international human rights groups during
    the year. In 1995 the Government created the post of Ombudsman. In 1999
    the Ombudsman reviewed 220 cases, twice that of the previous year. The
    office of the Ombudsman generally is well regarded. The Ombudsman makes
    recommendations to the Government based on investigations into
    citizens' complaints; however, his recommendations often are not
    implemented to the satisfaction of alleged victims of government abuse
    and injustice.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, creed,
    language, or social status, and the Government generally observed its
    provisions.
        Women.--Violence against women is a recognized social problem. It
    is treated as a matter of public conscience, and there are
    nongovernmental social welfare groups focused on the problem. Women in
    many cases are reluctant to testify against their abusers. However,
    Parliament approved domestic violence legislation in January 1999,
    which supplements the 1995 Sexual Offenses Act. The latter provides
    penalties for rape and other sexual offenses. Organizations such as the
    Government's Directorate of Women's Affairs seek to increase women's
    awareness of their rights under the law. Police generally refrain from
    intervening in cases of domestic violence, and some women have charged
    credibly that the courts are lenient in such cases.
        While the role of women in society is not restricted legally,
    economic conditions tend to limit women to home and family,
    particularly in rural areas, although some women work as domestics, in
    agriculture, or in the large tourism sector. Although the Government
    pledged to provide better family planning services, educational
    opportunities, and job training, it has been slow to implement new
    programs. The Directorate of Women's Affairs exists to help women
    advance in government and the professions, but there has been little
    progress.
        Children.--The Government provides education for children through
    the age of 16; it is free, universal, and compulsory. Children have
    access to health care and other public services.
        Child abuse remains a problem. While the Government has repeatedly
    expressed its commitment to children's rights, it has done little to
    protect those rights in practice. The Government still plans to
    establish a committee on children's rights and indicated it intends to
    strengthen monitoring and implementation of the U.N. Convention on the
    Rights of the Child. UNICEF helped support a study of the needs of
    children and families, and its recommendations are being used to
    develop a National Plan of Action on Child Survival, Development, and
    Protection.
        People with Disabilities.--No specific laws mandate accessibility
    for the disabled, but constitutional provisions prohibit discrimination
    against the physically disabled in employment and education. There is
    no evidence of widespread discrimination against physically disabled
    individuals, although the Government does not enforce the
    constitutional antidiscrimination provisions.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate
    freely and to form labor unions, and the authorities generally respect
    these rights in practice. Approximately 75 percent of workers belong to
    a union, and the hotel industry is heavily unionized. There are two
    major trade unions: The Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) and the
    Antigua Workers' Union (AWU). The ATLU is associated with the ruling
    ALP, while the larger and more active AWU is allied rather loosely with
    the opposition.
        The Labor Code recognizes the right to strike, but the Industrial
    Relations Court may limit this right in a given dispute. Workers who
    provide essential services (including bus, telephone, port, and
    petroleum workers, in addition to health and safety workers) must give
    21 days' notice of intent to strike. Once either party to a dispute
    requests that the court mediate, there can be no strike. Because of the
    delays associated with this process, unions often resolve labor
    disputes before a strike is called.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international labor organizations
    and do so in practice.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor
    organizations are free to organize and bargain collectively. The law
    prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were no reports that it
    occurred. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are not
    required to rehire employees fired for union activities but must pay
    full severance pay and full wages lost by the employee from the time of
    firing until the determination of employer fault. There are no areas of
    the country where union organization or collective bargaining is
    discouraged or impeded.
        There are no export processing zones, but there are free trade
    zones which facilitate services such as international banking and
    gambling. The Labor Code applies fully to workers in these zones as
    elsewhere in the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    forbids slavery and forced labor, including that by children, and they
    do not exist in practice.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law stipulates a minimum working age of 16 years,
    which corresponds with the provisions of the Education Act. The
    Ministry of Labor, which is required by law to conduct periodic
    inspections of workplaces, effectively enforces this law. There have
    been no reports of minimum age employment violations. The law prohibits
    forced or bonded child labor, and it is enforced effectively (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates, which were
    established by law for various work categories in 1981, have never been
    revised and generally are viewed as irrelevant to current economic
    conditions. The Ministry of Labor periodically surveys average wages
    paid in various sectors and issues these as guidelines to prevailing
    market wages. The guidelines are not compulsory. The Ministry provides
    them to reflect increasing wage expectations, and to offset not having
    yet updated the 1981 minimum wage rates. In 1999 the guidelines
    indicated that employers pay an average salary of $92.60 (EC$250) per
    week, although the range of actual salaries varies widely, depending on
    skill level and experience. The existing published minimum wages for a
    variety of jobs would not provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family, and in practice the great majority of workers earn
    substantially more than the minimum wage.
        The law provides that workers are not required to work more than a
    48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in practice the standard workweek is 40
    hours in 5 days. The law stipulates that workers receive a minimum of
    12 days of annual leave. The law requires employers to provide
    maternity leave with 40 percent of wages for 6 weeks of leave, while
    social service programs provide the remaining 60 percent of wages. The
    employer's obligation ends after the first 6 weeks, but social services
    will continue to pay 60 percent of wages for an additional 7 weeks,
    covering a total of 13 weeks.
        The Government has not yet developed occupational health and safety
    laws or regulations, but a section of the Labor Code includes some
    provisions regarding occupational safety and health. Plans to
    incorporate comprehensive legislation on safety, health, and the
    welfare of workers into the existing Labor Code have not been
    implemented. Although not specifically provided for by law, workers may
    leave a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy to continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons. There were no recent reports that
    persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                   ARGENTINA

        Argentina is a federal constitutional democracy with an executive
    branch headed by an elected president, a bicameral legislature, and a
    separate judiciary. In October 1999, voters elected President Fernando
    de la Rua; in December 1999, he replaced Carlos Menem of the
    Justicialist Party. The elections were considered free and fair. The
    judiciary is generally independent but is inefficient and subject at
    times to political influence.
        The President is the constitutional commander-in-chief, and a
    civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. Several agencies
    share responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Federal Police
    (PFA) report to the Interior Minister, as do the Border Police
    (``gendarmeria'') and Coast Guard. The PFA also has jurisdiction in the
    federal capital. Provincial police are subordinate to the respective
    governor. Members of the federal and provincial police forces and the
    federal prison guards continued to commit human rights abuses.
        Argentina has a mixed agricultural, industrial, and service
    economy. Following several years of economic growth during an economic
    reform and structural adjustment program, which included privatization
    and trade and financial sector liberalization, the economy slowed in
    1998 and in 1999 entered a recession. There was no real economic growth
    during the year. Unemployment rose to 13.8 percent in 1999 and in
    October it had reached 14.7 percent. Income disparities remain a
    serious problem; the wealthiest 10 percent of the population received
    36 percent of total personal income, while the poorest 10 percent
    received 1.5 percent of total personal income during the year.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Police officers
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Police torture and
    brutality are serious problems. In some cases the authorities
    investigated and sanctioned officers responsible for abuses. Prison
    conditions are poor. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens,
    and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The judicial system is
    inefficient and is subject at times to political influence and to
    inordinate delays in trials. There were many reports of harassment,
    threats, and criticisms of the press by public officials. Police used
    violence against demonstrators on a number of occasions during the
    year, with one person killed as a result. Violence and discrimination
    against women also are problems. Child abuse and child prostitution
    continued to be serious problems. AntiSemitism is a problem; however
    the Government took steps to combat it. Discrimination against
    indigenous people persist. Child labor is a problem. There were reports
    that women, and unconfirmed reports that children, were trafficked into
    the country.
        The legacy of the human rights abuses of the 1976-83 military
    regime continued to be a subject of intense national debate,
    particularly the arrest of former junta leaders on charges of taking or
    seizing babies born to dissidents in detention and giving them to
    supporters for adoption. Efforts by judges in Cordoba and Bahia Blanca
    to institute ``truth trials'' in an effort to force the military to
    provide information on the fate of those who disappeared during the
    military regime met with resistance on the part of those called to
    testify.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings; however, police officers
    were responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings. The
    authorities investigated and in some cases detained, tried, and
    convicted the officers involved.
        According to reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
    the police committed between 20 and 30 extrajudicial killings during
    the year. In July Amnesty International (AI) reported that 59 persons
    had died under suspicious circumstances in police stations throughout
    the country in the last 5 years. According to the report, of the 81
    police officers implicated in the deaths, 36 were sentenced, 43 have
    been indicted, and 2 were cleared of charges.
        On March 2, police in Buenos Aires killed two men who had taken
    hostages during an attempted robbery. After government negotiators
    failed to get the men to surrender, they entered a family home where
    they took three persons hostage and threatened to kill them. Government
    snipers then shot and killed both the hostage-takers.
        AI reported that on February 16, transvestite Vanesa Lorena
    Ledesma, also known as Miguel Angel Ledesma, died while in police
    custody; the body showed signs of torture (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
    However, later the court denied police involvement and claimed that the
    victim died of a drug overdose.
        On March 25, 28-year-old Jose Segundo Zambrano and 25-year-old
    Pablo Marcelo Rodriguez disappeared in Mendoza province. Their
    bloodstained car was found several days later, but their bodies were
    not discovered until July 3. The two men reportedly were police
    informants who had provided information about police officers who were
    involved in illegal activities. The victims' relatives and human rights
    organizations claimed that the killings were related to a police
    ``mafia.'' By the end of July, the authorities had detained 21
    officers, 4 of whom faced trial at year's end. Three were active-duty
    police and one was a former police officer.
        In April police detained Juan Marcelo Carunchio, a 19-year-old man
    living in Cordoba province, on his way to a concert. A witness reported
    that she saw the police beat Carunchio and take him away. Following his
    detention, he was hospitalized in a coma and died a few days later. The
    authorities suspended five police officers suspected of involvement in
    the incident. On April 20, the authorities detained Francisco Eladio
    Bravo, head of the special forces unit, but further information was not
    available by year's end.
        On July 2, two armed police intercepted a truck in Jujuy province,
    forced Manuel Fernandez to get out, and shot him from behind in the
    head. They allegedly planted cocaine and a weapon on the man and
    claimed that an armed encounter had taken place. On July 4, a judge
    ordered 10 police detained on suspicion of involvement in this case. As
    of November, they were still being detained, but no one had yet been
    charged.
        In July in Corrientes province, police arrested 26-year-old Jorge
    Marcelo Gonzalez, whom they mistook for a car theft suspect and took
    him to police headquarters. They then tortured him and fatally shot him
    in the back of the neck. The police then attempted to convince the
    owner of the car to report it as stolen. On July 4, the authorities
    detained four police officers in connection with Marcelo's death. In
    July the authorities accused personnel of the Federal Penitentiary
    Service of ordering the murder of Gaston Maximiliano Noguera, an inmate
    at the Caseros prison. Noguera was one of a group of prisoners allowed
    to leave prison to commit crimes, apparently with the consent of the
    Federal Penitentiary Service officials in this prison. According to the
    Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, on the night of January 3, when
    he was supposed to have been in the Caseros prison, Noguera robbed a
    restaurant and killed a police officer. On January 4, he was found
    hanged in his cell. Carlos Sandez Tejada, a fellow inmate, claims to
    have killed Noguera as part of a deal made with prison officials.
    Noguera's prior cellmate, Miguel Angel Arribas, was going to provide
    testimony to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights about the system
    of release for robbery but penitentiary guards shot him in December
    1999 while transferring him to another prison. At year's end, the judge
    investigating the case was under 24-hour protection after having
    received threatening phone calls and a small wooden coffin sent to his
    home.
        On November 10, in Salta province, provincial police efforts to
    breakup roadblocks mounted by unemployed workers resulted in the death
    of one protester. Incited by the violence, demonstrators later burned
    several buildings and looted stores in the towns of General Mosconi and
    Tartagal. Ultimate responsibility for the protester's death is still
    unresolved, with both other picketers and the provincial police
    potentially suspected.
        The authorities have charged 10 persons, including 3 police
    officers, for the killing of 2 hostages trapped in a car during a bank
    robbery on September 17, 1999, in Villa Ramallo. One police officer,
    Aldo Cabral, provided the transmitter the robbers used during the bank
    robbery; the two others, Ramon Leiva and Oscar Parodi, reportedly were
    the officers who fired the shots that killed the hostages. Trial is
    scheduled for April 2001.
        An investigation continued in the December 1999 deaths of two
    persons several blocks from a protest in which police fired tear gas
    and rubber bullets into a crowd of persons protesting the Federal
    Government takeover of the provincial government in Corrientes
    province; at least 40 persons were injured.
        In April 1999, a court convicted a former chief of police of Rio
    Negro province and sentenced him to 26 months in prison for obstructing
    justice in the investigation of the November 1997 deaths of three young
    women in the town of Cipolletti. The authorities also charged two army
    officers, Claudio Kielmasz and Guillermo Gonzalez, with killing the
    women; their trial is scheduled for March 2001. The victims' families
    remain disappointed as they suspect that more than two persons were
    involved in the crime, and that details were covered up during the
    investigation.
        In February in Buenos Aires province, a court convicted eight
    defendants, including a former police officer, of killing news
    photographer Jose Luis Cabezas in 1997 (see Section 2.a.).
        In August in Mendoza the trial began of seven policemen and two
    civilians under indictment in the 1997 death of 18-year-old Sebastian
    Bordon. Several of these officers were among the 134 officials
    dismissed by Mendoza authorities on charges of misconduct in January
    1999. In December a court found the officers guilty; however, it set
    them free because they had already served sufficient time in prison to
    be released. The court awarded the Bordon family compensation of
    $70,000 (70,000 pesos); half to be paid by the provincial government
    and the other half by the four officers.
        Several army officers were among 11 suspects in the investigation
    of an alleged coverup of the March 1994 death of army recruit Omar
    Carrasco. In 1996 the Federal Court of Neuquen sentenced Ignacio
    Canevaro to 15 years in prison, and Cristian Suarez and Victor Salazar
    to 10 years each, for the killing. They appealed the verdicts, and in
    1996, the Supreme Court decided to uphold the lower court's decision.
    In April lawyers appealed the case again, this time claiming that there
    was substantial new evidence; however, in October, the Federal Court of
    Neuquen upheld its original sentence. On November 23, the authorities
    released both Suarez and Salazar based on a law that allows 1 year of
    good behavior in prison to count for 2 years of a sentence. They both
    served over 6 years of their 10-year sentence; Canevaro remained in
    prison at year's end.
        Investigations continued into the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires
    Jewish community center (AMIA), in which 86 persons were killed, and
    the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Fifteen former
    police officers have been linked to a stolen vehicle ring, which
    furnished the van used in the AMIA bombing, and face various criminal
    charges (see Section 5). The defendants' trial is scheduled for April
    2001.
        No new information was available in the following cases from
    previous years: the investigation of police officers Nestor Trotta and
    Roberto Martini for the killing of a youth in 1999; the investigation
    into the death of Carlos Andres Sutara in 1998, in which 14 police
    officers were implicated; the investigation of a police officer in
    connection with the killing of Walter Repetto in 1998; and the
    investigation of four police officers in the death of Juan Carlos
    Cardozo in 1999.
        On February 9, 1998, the authorities detained five police officers
    from Rio Negro, including two chiefs of police, for the December 1989
    murders of Sergio Sorbellini and Raquel Laguna. A court reportedly
    indicted the officers later that year, but all five police were later
    released without charges. At year's end, the investigation was still
    pending.
        In October 1999, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon charged 186 persons
    with various crimes committed during the ``dirty war'' that the 1976-83
    military regime conducted against alleged extremists. In November 1999,
    Garzon indicted the leaders of the military junta, including former
    military leaders General Leopoldo Galtieri, General Jorge Videla,
    Admiral Emilio Massera, and 95 other officers, including 1 active
    federal judge, on charges of torture, terrorism, and genocide. The
    courts had sentenced Videla, Massera, and Galtieri to life in prison in
    1985, but former President Menem pardoned them in 1990. The 1986-87
    ``full stop'' and ``due obedience'' laws put an end to further trials
    stemming from dirty war offenses. Judge Garzon continued efforts to
    extradite a number of Argentine citizens during the year, but the
    Government did not act on the requests on the basis that those charged
    already had been tried, convicted, and pardoned under Argentine law.
        Two retired military officers were arrested overseas on the basis
    of international arrest warrants for abuses allegedly committed during
    the military regime. On August 7, on the basis of a warrant issued by
    France, Italian authorities arrested retired Major Jorge Olivera in
    Rome, charged with participation in the kidnaping of a French citizen
    in San Juan province in 1976. Following an extradition request
    presented by France in early September, the Penal Court of Appeals of
    Italy released him on September 19 after ruling that under Italian law,
    the statute of limitations for the crimes of kidnaping and torture had
    lapsed. Olivera returned to Argentina, but later in the month, the
    authorities confirmed accusations made by human rights groups that the
    document that had allowed his release was a false death certificate.
    The Italian Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the General
    Prosecutor started to investigate the proceedings of the case, and at
    the same time French judicial authorities requested that Olivera be
    arrested if he should try to leave the country.
        On August 24, on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Judge
    Garzon in 1998 related to charges of genocide, terrorism, and torture
    during the military regime, Mexican officials arrested retired
    Lieutenant Commander Miguel Angel Cavallo in Cancun. Cavallo had been
    working for several years as a businessman in Mexico. At year's end,
    Cavallo's extradition to Spain was pending in the Mexican Justice
    Ministry, a decision that must be finally approved by the Mexican
    Foreign Minister. Argentine judicial authorities rejected Cavallo's
    request for extradition to Argentina.
        These incidents demonstrated that while many of those accused of
    dirty war offenses are safe from prosecution in Argentina due to
    immunity laws, they run the risk of arrest if they travel abroad. In
    October Judge Juan Galeano filed a request with the Chilean Government
    for the arrest and extradition of General Pinochet for his involvement
    in the killing of Chilean General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires in a
    car-bomb attack in 1974. The Prats killing has been under pretrial
    investigation for several years. At year's end, a Chilean response to
    the extradition request was pending and had been the subject of
    judicial proceedings in that country.
        In March a federal court gave former naval officer Alfredo Astiz a
    3-month suspended jail due to statements he made during a January 1998
    interview with a news magazine in which he claimed that he was a
    trained killer of political and media targets. The navy stripped Astiz
    of his rank and retirement pay following the interview. Astiz is
    subject to an Interpol arrest warrant for human rights violations
    committed during the 1976-83 dirty war period. This warrant is based on
    his 1990 sentence to life imprisonment in France (where he was tried in
    absentia) for his role in the disappearance of the French nuns Alice
    Domon and Leonie Duquet. He has also been linked to the disappearance
    of a Swedish teenager, Dagmar Hagelin.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        The provincial police in Mendoza province compensated the families
    of Adolfo Garrido and Raul Bigorria, who disappeared in 1990 and are
    believed to have died in police custody, with a total of $220,000
    (220,000 pesos) as recommended in 1998 by the Inter-American Court for
    Human Rights.
        Most reliable estimates place the number of those who disappeared
    during the dirty war at between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. In 1984 the
    National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) issued a report
    listing 8,961 names of such persons, based on public testimony from
    friends, relatives, and witnesses. Since then the Ministry of Justice
    and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human Rights, which inherited
    the CONADEP files, has added over 700 new names, also based on
    voluntary reporting. At the same time, other names have been removed
    from the original list, either through confirmation of the death or
    survival of the person who disappeared, or through the identification
    of duplicate entries. The absence of documentary records of those who
    disappeared means that the Government must rely on public testimony,
    either voluntary or court-ordered. As CONADEP noted in its report, ``It
    has been possible to determine that an important quantity of
    documentation existed which has been destroyed or which is being
    concealed by those responsible for the repression.''
        The Under Secretariat for Human Rights accepted claims for
    financial compensation from families of persons who died or disappeared
    during the dictatorship under a law that permitted filing of
    applications until May. It had received nearly 9,000 claims by the
    deadline; at year's end the Senate had approved a bill extending the
    deadline for 3 more years. A law granting former prisoners of the
    military regime the right to apply for compensation from the Government
    expired in September 1998. The Under Secretariat, which administered
    the law, received over 12,000 applications, and by year's end had
    approved over 7,000 of them. While some human rights groups routinely
    claim that the number of disappeared was as many as 30,000, the fact
    that less than half that number of applications for compensation has
    been received suggests the lower figure of between 10,000 and 15,000
    may be more accurate.
        Despite military immunity laws and pardons, investigators continued
    efforts to hold members of the former military regime responsible for
    the kidnaping and illegal adoptions of children born to detained
    dissidents during the dirty war. At the urging of the human rights
    organization Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, judicial authorities
    continued to investigate such kidnaping and illegal adoption cases,
    thought to number approximately 250-300.
        In December 1999, the authorities arrested retired General
    Guillermo Saurez Mason in connection with a child kidnaping case. In
    March they put 73-year-old retired General Juan Bautista Sasiain under
    house arrest, charged with participating in the kidnaping and
    concealment of 11 children of women prisoners during the military
    regime. Retired General Santiago Omar Riveros was arrested in August,
    bringing to at least nine the number of former general officers
    arrested in connection with baby kidnaping cases. As in the case of
    most of the other retired general officers, Riveros was released to
    house arrest due to his age. Former Army General Jorge Rafael Videla,
    the de facto president from 1979 to 1981, remains under house arrest,
    following his initial arrest in June 1998. The kidnaping cases are
    being investigated by three federal judges, Judges Bagnasco, Servini de
    Cubria, and Marquevich. By year's end, Judge Bagnasco was concluding
    his investigations and was prepared to turn his investigator reports
    over to an oral court for trials. Investigations by the two other
    judges continued at year's end.
        In November Federal Judge Gabriel Cavallo ordered the preventive
    arrest of former police agents Julio Simon, known as ``Julian, the
    Turkey'', and Juan Antonio del Cerro, known as ``Colors'', and charged
    them with kidnaping 8-month-old Claudia Poblete in 1978. Poblete was
    the daughter of Gertrudis Hlaczik and Jose Poblete, who were detained
    in 1978 and are among those persons who disappeared.
        In December 1999, Congress voted to block former General Antonio
    Bussi, who is charged with human rights abuses including torture and
    deprivation of liberty during the period of the dirty war, from taking
    his seat in the legislature. In May the lower house of Congress in an
    all-but-unanimous vote confirmed the earlier denial of Bussi's right to
    occupy a seat in that body.
        In August the Supreme Court ruled against the Supreme Council of
    the Armed Forces, which had attempted to assert jurisdiction over the
    baby theft case. The Supreme Court decided that the case should
    continue under the jurisdiction of the civilian courts.
        AI reported in May that Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and
    her judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi received death threats,
    apparently related to the investigations that the two were involved in
    regarding the kidnaping of children during the dirty war and other
    human rights abuses carried out during that period (see Section 1.e.).
        In 1999 the Government created a reparation fund to be used by the
    Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo in carrying out activities to find
    and return children stolen from their parents during the 1976-83
    military regime. The fund authorized $600,000 (600,000 pesos) over 2
    years, starting in January 1999, with the money coming directly from
    the national congressional budget. While full disbursement of this
    money has been delayed because of funding shortfalls, the fund has
    allowed the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo to carry out a nationwide
    advertising campaign that resulted in more than 70 individuals coming
    forward to ask the organization's assistance in confirming their true
    identities.
        In September a 23-year-old woman who had been ordered by a court to
    provide a blood sample for DNA analysis to determine whether she was
    one of the kidnaped babies was arrested and held overnight for refusing
    to comply. Her attorney succeeded in obtaining her release after citing
    her threat to commit suicide if the authorities proceeded with the
    forcible blood extraction.
        In the disappearance case involving survivors of the Tarnopolsky
    family, Admiral Massera, who was ordered by the Supreme Court in
    September 1999 to pay $120,000 (120,000 pesos) to a Tarnopolsky family
    member, refused to follow the court's directive. In November a lower
    court ordered Massera's ``forced bankruptcy'' in a further effort to
    oblige the former admiral to obey the earlier court order.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Criminal Code
    provides penalties for torture that are similar to those for homicide;
    however, police torture and brutality remain serious problems. Human
    rights organizations described widespread police brutality, the use of
    torture on suspects, and corruption within the police forces. In June
    1997, the U.N. Committee against Torture criticized the Government for
    tolerating continued brutality and the use of torture in police
    stations and prisons. In December 1998, the Government responded to the
    U.N. Committee's criticism but did not make its reply public.
        The body of a transvestite who died in police custody on February
    16 reportedly showed signs of torture (see Sections 1.a. and 5.).
        In March a group of police officers who were looking for the
    killers of a colleague in Carlos Paz (Cordoba province) fired between
    15 and 20 shots at a van and beat up the 2 men in the van, a dentist,
    Humberto Gorritti, and businessman Raul Calvo. The police admitted
    later that they had made a mistake. This case remains under
    investigation.
        In April relatives of 23-year-old Cristian Omar Lopez accused
    police officers of Diamante district (Entre Rios province) of beating
    him seriously after he and a group of friends were forced by the police
    for no apparent reason to leave a dancing place. At year's end, Judge
    Hugo Perotti was carrying out an investigation.
        In July in Corrientes province, police tortured a man before
    killing him (see Section 1.a.).
        In July Mason Aldo Bravo accused a group of officials from the
    Investigation Bureau of the Provincial Police of Santiago del Estero of
    kidnaping him for 3 days and torturing him. According to his report,
    the policemen broke into his house at night and attacked him. Judge
    Mario Castillo Sola was investigating the case.
        In September police arrested 25-year-old Ariel Simonini in Tres de
    Febrero (Buenos Aires province) and charged him with stealing a weapon.
    According to Simonini, no evidence was found but before releasing him,
    a policewoman allowed three former police officers and a former
    intelligence official, who themselves were under arrest, to torture
    Simonini. Simonini reported that they kicked and beat him in the
    stomach, head, legs and ribs. The authorities charged the policewoman
    as the instigator of the torture and the four men involved as
    participants.
        Police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters on
    numerous occasions, resulting in injuries (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
    In one incident in Salta province, one protester was killed under
    circumstances that could have been the result of excessive use of force
    (see Section 1.a.).
        During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April,
    federal police used force to suppress a group of protesters and injured
    over 30 demonstrators with blows and by firing rubber bullets. One
    demonstrator received a bullet wound from unknown sources. The
    Government disciplined 12 police officers for excessive use of force
    (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
        Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons and jails are overcrowded,
    and some facilities are old and dilapidated. According to the Federal
    Penitentiary Service and by the different provincial jurisdictions, in
    1999 the prison system held 43,126 inmates in facilities designed to
    hold 23,523 persons, indicating a serious overcrowding problem.
        Reliable information on medical care and food available to
    prisoners is unavailable, but the general impression is that such
    services are minimal and of low quality. The Buenos Aires provincial
    government has considered various solutions, including renting
    temporary warehouse quarters, and was considering building 18 new
    prisons in various police districts, but had taken no action to do so
    by year's end.
        Pretrial prisoners cannot be held together with convicted
    prisoners, but reliable reports indicate that this form of prisoner
    separation often is not respected. Separate facilities for men and
    women and for adults and minors are provided for under the law and are
    available in practice. Facilities for women and for minors are not
    subject to the same serious overcrowding as prison facilities for men.
        Security is a problem at some prisons and detention facilities, at
    times resulting in jailbreaks. In 1999 there were 60 reported cases of
    prison riots in facilities around the country.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code limits
    the arrest and investigatory power of the police and the judiciary;
    however, provincial police sometimes ignored these restrictions and
    arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. Human rights groups find it
    difficult to document such incidents and state that victims are
    reluctant to file complaints because they fear police retaliation or do
    not believe that their complaints would result in any action.
        Police may detain suspects for up to 10 hours without an arrest
    warrant if the authorities have a well-founded belief that suspects
    have committed, or are about to commit, a crime, or if they are unable
    to determine the identity of a suspect. However, human rights groups
    argue that this provision of law is abused widely, that police often
    ignore the requirement that suspects must be unable to identify
    themselves, and often detain suspects who in fact do have
    identification.
        Police occasionally detain teenagers and young adults, sometimes
    overnight, sometimes for an entire weekend, without formal charges.
    They do not always provide such detainees with the opportunity to call
    their families or an attorney. These detainees are released only upon a
    complaint from relatives or legal counsel.
        In March 1999, the Federal Government promulgated Decree 150, which
    instructs police to prevent conduct that ``without constituting
    misdemeanors nor infractions in the code of misdemeanors, should be
    avoided.'' This decree is interpreted to allow the police to detain
    persons for carrying suspicious objects or potential weapons. Critics
    complained that the decree revived the old police edicts that had been
    in effect until the Buenos Aires City Council passed its Code of
    Misdemeanors in March 1998. Human rights groups long had argued that
    these edicts were used as an excuse for arbitrary detentions,
    particularly of young persons, immigrants, prostitutes, and
    transvestites.
        The law allows pretrial detention for up to 2 years, and the slow
    pace of the justice system often results in lengthy pretrial
    detentions. If convicted, a prisoner usually receives credit for time
    already served. Three-fourths of the inmates in the federal prisons of
    the greater Buenos Aires area were reportedly in pretrial detention. In
    the prison system of the province of Buenos Aires, this figure was
    reported to be as high as 90 percent. The law provides for the right to
    bail, and it is utilized in practice.
        The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is nominally
    independent and impartial, its processes are inefficient, and at times
    subject to political influence. The system is hampered by inordinate
    delays, procedural logjams, changes of judges, inadequate
    administrative support, and incompetence. Allegations of corruption are
    reported widely, especially in civil cases.
        The judicial system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
    each headed by a Supreme Court with chambers of appeal and section
    courts below it.
        The Council of Magistrates has responsibility for submitting to the
    President for his decision a slate of three qualified candidates for
    each federal judicial vacancy. The council is also responsible for
    conducting impeachment hearings on judges implicated in wrongdoings and
    for general administration of the federal court system. It began the
    process of selecting candidates for judicial vacancies in several parts
    of the country in September 1999. Nonetheless, it still does not
    function fully; the number of judicial vacancies has increased
    significantly, and a number of impeachment cases against judges remain
    to be resolved. The council made its first recommendations to the
    executive on the appointments of new judges in July. Of the candidate
    lists advanced to him by the Council of Magistrates, President de la
    Rua nominated two judges during the year. However, the Senate confirmed
    neither judge, as is required by law. At year's end, there were federal
    judicial vacancies for more than 113 positions nationwide. A number of
    prominent cases to discipline judges were initiated during the year,
    but were moving extremely slowly through the investigation process.
        Trials are public, and defendants have the right to legal counsel
    and to call defense witnesses. A panel of judges decides guilt or
    innocence. The law does not mandate a trial by jury. Federal and
    provincial courts continued the transition to oral trials in criminal
    cases, instead of the old system of written submissions. However,
    substantial elements of the old system remain. For example, before the
    oral part of a trial begins, judges receive written documentation
    regarding the case, which, according to prominent legal experts, can
    bias a judge before oral testimony is heard. Lengthy delays in trials
    are a problem.
        AI reported in May that Judge Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria and
    her judicial secretary Ricardo Parodi received death threats,
    apparently related to the investigations that the two were involved in
    regarding the kidnaping of children during the dirty war and other
    human rights abuses carried out during that period (see Section 1.b.).
    AI called on the Government to protect the work of Judge Servini and
    Parodi.
        In June 1998, the Government allowed Father Juan Antonio Puigjane
    to leave prison and serve the remainder of his term under house arrest.
    Puigjane, a Capuchin monk, was a leader of the leftist ``All for the
    Fatherland'' movement, which in 1989 assaulted the La Tablada army
    barracks. Although he did not take part in the assault and denied any
    foreknowledge of it, the court sentenced him to 20 years in prison.
    Members of the movement who were involved in the 1989 attack are
    recognized by some international human rights groups as having been
    jailed for political reasons, but the Government maintains that those
    involved were tried and convicted properly of involvement in a violent
    rebellion against a democratically elected government.
        The release of Puigjane followed the publication of a 1997 report
    by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) on La Tablada,
    in which the IACHR absolved the Government of the use of excessive
    force in repelling the assault but concluded that the Government
    committed human rights violations after the attackers had surrendered.
    The IACHR also found that the Defense of Democracy Act, under which the
    La Tablada defendants were tried and convicted, effectively denied them
    the right of appeal.
        In September the La Tablada prisoners launched a hunger strike to
    bring further pressure on the Government to act on their demand for an
    appeal. Efforts since 1998 to pass legislation that would have allowed
    the defendants a chance to appeal their earlier convictions ended in
    December when the legislation failed to gain the necessary support in
    both chambers of Congress. Following that, the Supreme Court rejected
    by a vote of 5-4 a request by the defendants for an appeal. With the
    legislative and judicial routes thereby closed, on December 29, the
    President, still under strong international pressure from the IACHR and
    a wide range of human rights groups, signed a decree commuting the
    sentences of 11 of the 13 defendants. With these commutations, 9 of the
    13 defendants will be eligible for a parole hearing in 2002, one in
    2003, and one in 2005. The two leaders of the assault, Enrique
    Gorriaran and his wife, Ana Maria Sivori, were convicted for their
    roles at La Tablada only in 1997. Since they were not tried under the
    Defense of Democracy Act, they were allowed an appeal, which confirmed
    their earlier life sentences. For this reason, they were not included
    in the December 29 presidential decree. As a result of the presidential
    decree, the La Tablada defendants ended their hunger strike after 116
    days.
        There were no other reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
    Government generally respects these prohibitions. Violations are
    subject to legal sanction. In practice, local police stop and search
    individuals without probable cause.
        Several highly publicized cases of unauthorized telephone wiretaps
    in recent years raised public concern, and the Government introduced a
    bill in Congress in 1998 to prevent such activities, including the
    unauthorized recording of telephone conversations, the unauthorized
    photographing or filming of private acts, and the dissemination of such
    unauthorized records. Various draft laws have been proposed on the
    control of wiretapping, but none became law during the year. The use of
    wiretaps approved by a federal judge continued to be governed by a
    decree issued by then-President Menem in the early 1990's.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice; however, there were several reports
    that public officials harassed, threatened, and criticized the press.
        A number of independent newspapers and magazines publish freely,
    and all print media are owned privately. Privately owned radio and
    television stations broadcast freely. The Federal Government owns the
    Telam wire service, a television station, and a radio network. A few
    provincial governments also own broadcast media.
        During the year there were several reports of harassment and
    threats against journalists, and criticisms of the press by public
    officials. In its annual report released in September, the Argentine
    Association of Journalistic Entities (ADEPA), a media observer
    organization, reviewed several incidents and noted that they occurred
    principally in the provinces.
        In July ADEPA expressed its concern to the provincial government in
    Santiago del Estero with respect to an incident in which the telephones
    of El Liberal, a local daily newspaper, were wiretapped. The incident
    occurred after El Liberal published a story on an alleged intelligence
    gathering network sponsored by the provincial government. The Inter-
    American Press Association (IAPA) criticized anonymous threats against
    three of El Liberal's journalists and the distribution of pamphlets
    with defamatory information about El Liberal. IAPA representatives met
    with Interior Minister Storani and expressed their concern over the
    situation in Santiago del Estero. In November the IAPA sent a
    delegation to Santiago del Estero to investigate the charges.
        In July the Cordoba daily newspaper La Voz del Interior reported
    the harassment of one of its distributors. An attacker ambushed and
    threatened the driver of a distribution van with a revolver. The IAPA
    reported that the attackers informed the driver that the governor was
    uncomfortable with the content of paper. This incident occurred after
    La Voz published a series of articles on the questionable practices of
    provincial government officials of Santiago del Estero, which included
    accusations of wiretapping and having blueprints of reporters' homes.
        In February an appeals court ordered television talk show host
    Bernardo Neustadt and Zidanelia Pacheco de Maroneses, whom Neustadt
    interviewed on his program New Times, to pay punitive damages to Judge
    Elisa Diaz de Vivar in the amount of $80,000 (80,000 pesos) for
    allegedly defamatory comments de Maroneses made in 1993 about the judge
    during the program. The IAPA stated that the award was a setback for
    the freedom of the press because it would force journalists to censor
    those they interview, and because it provides special privileges to
    public officials, who should be open to public scrutiny.
        In view of these incidents, many key media sources criticized the
    apparent lack of commitment on the part of some legislators to
    implement measures that would protect the role of the media as a
    ``bridge'' between politics and civil society, and cited the failure of
    some public officials to recognize openly the role of an independent
    media in a democratic society. ADEPA stated that these incidents
    violated freedom of the press and have recurred in recent years in a
    systematic fashion.
        In February the District Court of Dolores (Buenos Aires province)
    sentenced to jail terms the eight persons charged with and found guilty
    of the highly publicized 1997 murder of photo-journalist Jose Luis
    Cabezas of the weekly magazine Noticias. The court sentenced some to
    life sentences without parole, and gave the others life sentences with
    parole. Although never confirmed, many believe Cabezas was murdered by
    operatives of the late businessman Alfredo Yabran for photos and
    stories that he produced regarding Yabran's alleged illicit activities.
    ADEPA expressed satisfaction with the sentencing of those charged with
    Cabezas' murder. The IAPA stated that the verdict was a step in the
    fight against impunity for those who violate freedom of the press.
    Cabezas' family, however, believes that the intellectual authors of
    Cabezas' murder remain free, and that the incarceration of the eight
    persons who were found guilty does not put an end to the case.
        No new information was available regarding the death of newspaper
    editor Ricardo Gangeme, who was killed in May 1999 in Chubut province.
        In November the Supreme Court upheld Eduardo Kimel's 1999 sentence
    to 1 year in prison (suspended) and a fine of $20,000 (20,000 pesos)
    for comments made in a book he wrote. In December the IACHR announced
    that the case will be investigated as a possible violation of the right
    to free speech.
        The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects
    this in practice.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    and the law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. However, provincial police clashed
    with public sector protesters on a number of occasions during the year,
    using rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse protests that turned
    violent. In some incidents the police used deadly force against
    demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, labor
    groups led a march on the Congress. Clashes between protesters and the
    federal police resulted in injuries to over 30 demonstrators, including
    injuries from rubber bullets fired by police (see Sections 1.c. and
    6.a.). In May several protesters and police officers were injured after
    the authorities used rubber bullets and tear gas to break up the
    protest (see Section 6.a.).
        An investigation continued into the December 1999 deaths of 2
    persons near an area in which the police injured over 40 protesters who
    were demonstrating against the Federal Government's takeover of the
    provincial government of Corrientes (see Section 1.a.).
        The Constitution and the law provide for freedom of association,
    and the Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that the Federal
    Government ``sustains the apostolic Roman Catholic faith;'' however,
    other religious faiths are practiced freely. The Government provides
    the Catholic Church with a variety of subsidies totaling $8 million (8
    million pesos), administered through the Secretariat of Worship in the
    Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship. The
    Secretariat was transferred from the office of the presidency following
    the inauguration of President Fernando de la Rua in December 1999. The
    Secretariat is responsible for conducting the Government's relations
    with the Catholic Church, non-Catholic Christian churches, and other
    religious organizations in the country. Religious organizations that
    wish to hold public worship services and to obtain tax exempt status
    must register with the Secretariat, and must report periodically to the
    Secretariat in order to maintain their status.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
    these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        A committee composed of representatives of the Ministries of
    Justice, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior determines grants of refugee
    status, using the criteria of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A representative of the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees may participate in committee hearings,
    but may not vote. The Government has granted refugee status to numerous
    persons and accepted refugees for resettlement. The issue of the
    provision of first asylum did not arise during the year.
        In March 1999, the Government granted asylum to former Paraguayan
    General and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, who fled that country after the
    assassination of Paraguayan Vice President Luis Maria Argana, in which
    Oviedo allegedly was implicated. Oviedo was granted asylum under the
    condition that he would not participate in political activities. In
    September 1999, the authorities determined that he had been politically
    active from his base in Buenos Aires and ordered him moved to Tierra
    del Fuego province in Patagonia. Oviedo remained there until he fled
    the country in December 1999; in June he was captured in Brazil.
        In September two Paraguayans, Luis Alberto Rojas and Fidencio Vega
    Barrios, wanted for extradition to Paraguay for their alleged
    involvement in the 1999 assassination of the Paraguayan Vice President,
    escaped from the National Police Headquarters in Buenos Aires where
    they were being held. The authorities had detained them since February;
    police collusion in the escapes was suspected. At year's end, the two
    men had not been found and were thought to have fled the country.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage. In October 1999, voters elected Fernando de la Rua, leader of
    an alliance of opposition parties, as president; he succeeded President
    Carlos Saul Menem of the Justicialist party on December 10, 1999.
        In December 1999, President de la Rua requested and received
    congressional permission to suspend all three branches of the
    Corrientes provincial government and take direct federal control of the
    province. Public workers, including teachers, court workers, and public
    hospitals had been on strike or limiting services for much of the year,
    due to the provincial government's inability to pay salaries. The
    situation remained tense in the province during the year; in December,
    Congress passed legislation that extended the suspension of the
    Corrientes provisional government for 1 additional year.
        There are no legal impediments to participation by women and
    minorities in politics and government; however, they remain
    underrepresented. The Constitution stipulates that the internal
    regulations of political parties and party nominations for elections be
    subject to requirements to increase women's representation in elective
    offices. A 1991 law mandates the use of gender quotas by all political
    parties in national elections. A 1993 decree requires that a minimum of
    30 percent of all political party lists of candidates be female. As a
    result, the presence of women in Congress increased. About one-fourth
    of the 257 members of the lower house are women. Gender quotas have not
    applied in the Senate, where there are only 2 female members in the 72-
    person body. However, a December presidential decree mandates that for
    future elections in the Senate (with the full chamber being competed in
    2001 in first-ever direct elections), at least one-third of all
    Senators elected must be women. There are two female cabinet-level
    officials, the Minister of Social Development and Environment and the
    Minister of Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Training. There are
    no women justices on the Supreme Court.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
    operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
    their findings on human rights cases. The Government is generally
    cooperative, although not always responsive to their views.
        Some of the best-known human rights organizations include the
    Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, the Center of Legal and Social Studies, the
    Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, Service for Peace and Justice, and
    New Rights of Man. Within the federal government, the Ministry of
    Justice and Human Rights' Secretariat for Human Rights addresses human
    rights concerns at a domestic level. Human rights issues at the
    international level are handled by the Office of the Special
    Representative for International Human Rights of the Ministry of
    Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship.
        In July the new chief of the army appointed by President de la Rua
    proposed to establish a dialog among the Government, military, and
    human rights groups that would attempt to shed light on past abuses
    committed during the military regime. The proposal largely was rebuffed
    by human rights organizations, many of which oppose any contact with
    those officials whom they believe to be guilty of human rights abuses
    committed by the security forces during the dirty war period.
        In November Congress passed a law calling for the human rights
    commissions of both chambers to write an annual report on human rights
    in the country, commencing in 2001.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and law provide for equal treatment for all
    citizens, and the law provides for prison terms of up to 3 years for
    discrimination based on race, religion, nationality, ideology,
    political opinion, sex, economic position, social class, or physical
    characteristics.
        The National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
    Racism (INADI), an agency of the Ministry of Interior, has as its
    mandate identifying and combating all forms of intolerance in the
    country. INADI investigates violations of the antidiscrimination law
    and carries out educational programs to promote social and cultural
    pluralism and combat discriminatory attitudes. However, early in the
    year, INADI began a process of reorganization and leadership change,
    during which its effectiveness was impaired seriously. With new
    leadership, the institute was active again by year's end.
        In April an AI report expressed concern over reports that police
    targeted, tortured, and harassed gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The
    report included information regarding the February death in police
    custody of a transvestite whose body showed signs of torture (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.c). AI noted that police bylaws and provincial
    codes of misdemeanors allow police to detain or sanction members of
    sexual minorities for actions that do not constitute a criminal
    offence. The Association Against Homosexual Discrimination filed a
    complaint to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Cordoba
    regarding such treatment.
        Women.--Domestic violence and sexual harassment against women are
    widely recognized as serious social problems. However, few official
    statistics on these crimes are available, so any accurate measure of
    the problems is difficult. The Government, through the National Council
    of Women, recently implemented a new database system, with the help of
    UNICEF, to standardize statistics on domestic violence, permit a more
    accurate evaluation of the scope of the problem, and promote better
    public policy. During the year, as part of a pilot project, two
    workshops provided training on the use of the software for this
    purpose.
        Any person suffering physical or psychological domestic violence by
    a family member can file a formal complaint before a judge, with the
    level of injury inflicted determining the punishment under the civil
    and criminal codes. In addition, the Law on Protection Against Family
    Violence gives a judge the right to prevent the perpetrator of a
    violent act from entering the home or place of work of the victim, and
    temporarily to decide issues of family support, child custody, and
    arrangements for communication with children.
        No statistics on domestic violence were available on a national
    level. However, as an indicator of the magnitude of the problem, in
    1999 the city of Buenos Aires received 25,630 telephone calls regarding
    family violence. Courts in the city of Buenos Aires received 1,289
    formal complaints through August, compared with 2,160 in all of 1999.
        Rape is a problem, but reliable statistics as to its extent were
    not available. The crime of rape falls under the Law of Crimes Against
    Sexual Integrity, the name of which was changed in 1999 from the former
    Law of Crimes Against Honesty. This name change, sought by various
    women's rights groups, recognized that the nature of the crime is not a
    violation of female purity and chastity, but of the personal integrity
    of the victim. Marital rape and acquaintance rape are recognized by
    law, if force is involved, but the need for proof, either in the form
    of clear physical injury or the testimony of a witness, often presents
    a problem. The 1999 law expanded the definition of punishable sexual
    violations beyond forcible intercourse and increased the severity of
    punishments; in addition, it is no longer possible for an accused
    rapist to be excused from prosecution by offering to marry the victim.
    The penalties for rape vary from 6 months to 20 years and depend on the
    nature of the relationship between the rapist and victim and the
    physical and mental harm inflicted.
        Public and private institutions offer prevention programs and
    provide support and treatment for women who have been abused, but
    transitory housing is almost nonexistent. The Buenos Aires municipal
    government operates a small shelter for battered women and a 24-hour
    hot line offering support and guidance to victims of violence, but few
    other shelters exist. NGO's working in the area of women's rights
    stress that women too often do not have a full understanding of their
    rights. Women lack information about what constitutes sexual
    harassment, what can be considered rape, or when physical and emotional
    abuse is considered a punishable crime.
        During the year, Paraguayan authorities uncovered a trafficking
    ring that sent women and young girls to Buenos Aires, under the guise
    of working as domestic servants, and then forced them into prostitution
    (see Sections 6.c and 6.f.).
        Despite legal prohibitions, women encounter economic discrimination
    and occupy a disproportionate number of lower paying jobs. Often they
    are paid less than men for equivalent work, even though this is
    prohibited explicitly by law. Working women also are represented
    disproportionately in the informal sector, where effectively they are
    denied work-related economic and social benefits enjoyed by registered
    workers. According to government statistics, in 1999 the
    underemployment rate for women was twice as high as that of men, and
    women in general earned 30 percent less than men. The wage differences
    were more pronounced at higher levels of education; for example, women
    with a college degree earned 46 percent less than men.
        In 1992 the Government created the National Council of Women, an
    interagency organization under the authority of the President's Cabinet
    Chief, that carries out programs to promote opportunity for women in
    the social, political, and economic arenas. The new administration
    named Dr. Carmen Storani as the Council's President. The Council
    operates a web site that provides information on the organization and
    on issues relevant to the organization's goals.
        Children.--While the Government voices strong commitment to issues
    of children's rights and welfare, including education and health,
    increasingly tight federal and provincial budgets mean that programs
    relevant to these areas continue to receive insufficient funding. The
    Ministry of Justice and Human Rights' Under Secretariat for Human and
    Social Rights works with UNICEF and other international agencies to
    promote children's rights. Education is compulsory, free, and universal
    for children up to the age of 15; however, adequate schooling is
    unavailable in some rural areas. There are numerous health care
    programs for children, although not all children have access to them.
        NGO's and church sources indicate that child abuse and prostitution
    are increasing, although no statistics were available. The National
    Council for Minors and Family, a government organization reporting to
    the Ministry of Social Development and Environment, has developed an
    Action Plan, together with the Attorney General, the Ministry of
    Justice and Human Rights, the National Council of Women, and UNICEF, on
    the elimination of child prostitution. The most recent census (in 1991)
    noted that 4.5 million children under age 14 lived in impoverished
    conditions. There are street children in some large cities, although
    there are no reliable statistics on their numbers. There were
    unconfirmed press reports that Bolivian children sometimes were sold to
    sweatshops in Argentina (see Section 6.f.).
        A May UNICEF report stated that sexual exploitation of children is
    widespread due to police inefficiency and lack of judicial
    intervention. The report indicated that the problem is substantial, but
    statistics on this crime were not available. The children involved
    usually work in the same institutions as adults. There were reports of
    children being trafficked from rural areas to urban areas of the
    country, and vice versa. Women and girls also are trafficked from other
    countries, although this reportedly involves very few underage girls
    (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law intended to eliminate
    barriers for disabled persons mandates standards regarding access to
    public buildings, parks, plazas, stairs, and pedestrian areas. Street
    curbs, commuter train stations, and some buildings in Buenos Aires have
    been modified to accommodate wheelchairs, but many public buildings and
    lavatories are still inaccessible to the disabled. The Buenos Aires
    subway system installed a small number of elevators and escalators to
    facilitate use of the subway system by the disabled, and the subway
    administration pledged to increase the overall number of escalators in
    the system.
        The law prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in
    employment, education, and the provision of other state services, and
    mandates access to buildings for the disabled. There has been some
    progress in these areas. The National Advisory Commission on the
    Integration of People with Disabilities--a governmental office--and
    numerous nongovernmental groups actively defend the rights of the
    disabled and help them to find employment.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution recognizes the ethnic and
    cultural identities of indigenous people and states that Congress shall
    protect their right to bilingual education, recognize their communities
    and the communal ownership of their ancestral lands, and allow for
    their participation in the management of their natural resources.
    However, in practice, indigenous people do not participate in the
    management of their lands or natural resources. The National Institute
    of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) is the government agency responsible for
    implementing these provisions.
        The principal indigenous groups--the Kollas in Salta and Jujuy, the
    Mapuches in the Patagonian provinces, and the Wichis and Tobas in the
    northern provinces--represent less than 5 percent of the national
    population. The INAI estimates that there are approximately 700,000
    indigenous people, most of whom reside in rural areas. However, the
    nongovernmental Indigenous Association of the Argentine Republic
    estimates the indigenous population at 1.5 million persons. Other
    demographers in recent years have provided estimates of at most 450,000
    persons. To clarify the discrepancy, the national census scheduled to
    take place during the year was to have collected information about
    indigenous identity for the first time; however, at mid-year, funding
    shortfalls required the Federal Government to postpone the census until
    the year 2001.
        Existing census data show that poverty rates are higher than
    average in areas with large indigenous populations. Indigenous persons
    have higher rates of illiteracy, chronic disease, and unemployment.
    Government efforts to offer bilingual education opportunities to
    indigenous people continued to be hampered by a lack of trained
    teachers.
        Since 1994 the Government restored approximately 2.5 million acres
    of land to indigenous communities. Nonetheless, some communities were
    involved in land disputes with provincial governments and private
    companies.
        Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitism is a problem; however the
    Government took significant steps to initiate a public dialog intended
    to highlight past discrimination, and to improve religious tolerance.
    Combating this and other forms of intolerance is a priority for the
    INADI. There were a number of reports of anti-Semitic acts, of anti-
    Semitic violence, and of threats against Jewish organizations and
    individuals during the year. During the year, however, no one was
    convicted for any anti-Semitic acts.
        In February a Jewish country club in San Miguel received bomb
    threats. Following an evacuation of the building, it was established
    that the threats were spurious. Since it reopened in 1999, there have
    been several telephoned bomb threats made against the new AMIA Jewish
    community center building (which replaced the one destroyed by the
    bombing in 1994). No one has taken responsibility for the bomb threats,
    nothing was found in the building on these occasions, and no formal
    investigations were undertaken into the bomb threats.
        In April several adolescents allegedly vandalized several tombs in
    the Jewish cemetery at Posadas, in Misiones province. Local police
    subsequently arrested seven adolescents between the ages of 12 and 17
    in connection with the crime, but the police maintained that the acts
    of vandalism had no religious connotations.
        Most published reports of antireligious acts were anti-Semitic in
    nature. However, in June statues of Jesus Christ and Saint Augustine
    were vandalized at a Catholic Church in Buenos Aires. No arrests were
    reported at year's end.
        In January President de la Rua committed the Government to
    implementing a Holocaust Education Project to be carried out under the
    auspices of the International Holocaust Education Task Force. During
    the year, the Government appointed a special representative to the task
    force, began a number of projects including a Holocaust monument in
    Buenos Aires, and donated a building for a Museum of the Shoah. The
    Ministry of Education is working to include Holocaust education in
    primary and secondary schools, and the schools now commemorate a
    national day of tolerance on April 19. In June the Government renewed
    the charter of the National Commission for Clarification of Nazi
    Activities (CEANA), in order to enable CEANA to continue its
    investigations into past pro-Nazi actions on the part of Argentina. In
    June President de la Rua made a formal apology for Argentina's
    acceptance of Nazi war criminals as immigrants after World War II.
        The authorities continued to investigate the 1992 bombing of the
    Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish
    community center, in which 86 persons died.
        In May 1999, the Supreme Court (which is responsible for leading
    the investigation into the embassy bombing) released a report that
    concluded that the embassy bombing was the result of a car bomb. The
    court also formally determined that Islamic Jihad was responsible for
    the bombing, based on claims made by the group following the attack and
    on similarities with other bombings claimed by the group. In September
    1999, the court issued an international arrest warrant for Islamic
    Jihad leader Imad Mughniyhah. In December 1999, the court released a
    more extensive finding on the bombing, which encompassed the May
    report.
        In late 1999, the Government sought the arrest and extradition of
    Mohammad Abbas Malik for questioning about the bombing. When he was
    arrested overseas on other charges, the authorities interviewed him in
    September, and he denied any connection with the Israeli Embassy
    bombing. Following the interview, the Government indicated that it had
    no further interest in Malik with in connection to the 1992 bombing.
        In the AMIA case, the investigating judge determined in February
    1999 that there was insufficient evidence to charge Iranian Nasrim
    Mokhtari, long suspected of complicity in the bombing. In July 1999,
    the Supreme Court ruled that she could leave the country. Wilson dos
    Santos, who reportedly had linked Mokhtari to the bombing, recanted his
    testimony in 1999 from earlier that year; the press reported in July
    1999 that he had offered to return and testify in exchange for money.
    An investigator interviewed him in Brazil in 1999, evaluated the
    proposed testimony, and rejected his offer. However, subsequently the
    authorities decided to issue charges against Wilson dos Santos, and he
    was arrested in Switzerland and extradited to Argentina in December. He
    was charged with having given false testimony in the AMIA case, and the
    authorities still hope that he will be able to shed light on the events
    leading up to the 1994 attack.
        In July 1999, the authorities brought formal charges against all
    the suspects being held in connection with the attack, including a
    number of former Buenos Aires provincial police officers. Fifteen
    former police officers have been linked to a stolen vehicle ring, which
    furnished the van used in the bombing, and face various criminal
    charges (see Section 1.a.). The provincial police officers and others
    held in the AMIA case are suspected accessories to the crime and not
    those who are thought to have planned or executed the actual attack. In
    late February, the investigating judge formally presented for trial the
    report on his investigation regarding these suspected accessories. The
    defendants face charges of various acts of police corruption related to
    the vehicle used in the bombing. At year's end, Judge Galeano's
    investigation aimed at finding the actual perpetrators of the bombing
    continued.
        In April President de la Rua created a new task force of four
    independent prosecutors to investigate certain areas relating to the
    AMIA case. On the sixth anniversary of the AMIA bombing, President de
    la Rua and much of his Cabinet attended a solemn ceremony commemorating
    the victims at the now-rebuilt cultural center.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to form ``free and democratic labor unions, recognized by simple
    inscription in a special register,'' and this right is observed in
    practice. With the exception of military personnel, all workers are
    free to form unions. An estimated 35 percent of the work force is
    organized. Trade unions are independent of the Government and political
    parties, although many union leaders traditionally have supported the
    Justicialist Party. Most unions are affiliated with the General
    Confederation of Labor (CGT). A smaller federation, the Argentine
    Workers' Central, also is recognized legally. In the early part of the
    year, the CGT split into two factions, an ``official'' faction and a
    ``dissident'' faction, the latter of which conducted numerous marches
    and demonstrations--some of which became violent--in an effort to
    pressure the Government to take a more prolabor stance.
        The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts
    has criticized the law, which allows only one union per industrial
    sector to negotiate salary, collect dues, and call a strike. The law
    makes it virtually impossible for new unions to challenge existing
    unions, thus giving the established unions a monopoly on these
    fundamental powers of representation. On November 21, the Labor
    Minister formed a tripartite commission to analyze the ILO
    observations, including this issue.
        During congressional debate over a labor reform law in April, labor
    groups led a march on the Congress that was suppressed by the federal
    police, who injured over 30 demonstrators with blows and by firing
    rubber bullets. Ten police officers were injured in the altercation.
    One demonstrator received a bullet wound from unknown sources. The
    Government disciplined 12 police officers for excessive use of force
    (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and this right
    is observed in practice. Two national general strikes took place during
    the year. The first in June effectively shut down most public
    transportation, government offices, and schools throughout the country
    as millions of workers representing the three major labor federations
    protested the May reduction in government salaries, tax hikes, and
    other expenditure reductions as part of the Government's austerity
    plan. The second national general strike took place November 23-24,
    again with the support of all three major labor federations. This
    strike, in protest of labor reforms and further economic austerity
    measures, was more successful than the June strike in shutting down not
    only most public transportation, government offices and schools, but
    also many stores and businesses. While the November strike was
    generally peaceful, some prestrike acts of intimidation allegedly by
    union activists against bus and taxi companies left a number of busses
    and taxis damaged or burned in Buenos Aires and in other cities around
    the country. The police arrested no strikers or activists as a result
    of any of these incidents. In Cordoba, police made 10 arrests and there
    were at least 9 injuries in an effort to break up a demonstration by
    municipal workers. During the year, there also were scattered local
    work stoppage, and several unions, including transport workers,
    farmers, and teachers initiated numerous local and nationwide strikes
    to protest various issues including government labor policies, as well
    as nonpayment and late payment of wages by private companies.
        Groups of unemployed and underemployed workers around the country
    frequently used roadblocks as acts of protest. Hundreds of small
    incidents took place, with groups of activists blocking roads and
    highways. Some of these roadblocks were spontaneous actions by groups
    demanding continuation of federal and provincial unemployment payments
    and job subsidy programs that were expiring. Others were organized by
    radical labor and social groups such as the Classicist Combative
    Movement. While most roadblocks were resolved by negotiated
    settlements, usually including promises of extended unemployment
    programs, a number ended in confrontations between the police and
    strikers. In May the provincial and border police in Salta province
    used force to disperse truckers at roadblocks, who were protesting the
    withdrawal of government funds from a job subsidy program. Several
    protesters and police officers were injured after the authorities used
    rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the protesters. Protesters
    allegedly looted shops and set a townhall on fire. On November 10,
    again in Salta province, provincial police efforts to break up
    roadblocks resulted in the death of one protester (see Section 2.b.).
    Incited by the violence, demonstrators burned several buildings and
    looted stores in the cities of General Mosconi and Tartagal. The
    Federal Government criticized the provincial government's use of force
    but resisted calls for federal intervention.
        Unions are free to join international confederations without
    government restrictions; many unions also are active in international
    trade secretariats.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides unions with the right to negotiate collective
    bargaining agreements and to have recourse to conciliation and
    arbitration, and these rights are observed in practice. The Ministry of
    Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Formation ratifies collective
    bargaining agreements, which cover roughly three-fourths of the work
    force. According to the ILO, the ratification process impedes free
    collective bargaining as the Ministry not only considers whether a
    collective labor agreement contains clauses violating public order
    standards, but also considers whether the agreement complies with
    productivity, investment, technology and vocational training criteria.
    In recent practice, however, the Government has not refused to approve
    any collective agreements under the above criteria.
        The Labor Reform Law, which went into effect in May, allows
    collective bargaining on a regional, provincial, or company basis
    depending on what the local union and company decide. Prior law only
    permitted negotiations by the heads of the national union on behalf of
    all the unions in the sector.
        The new law also established a mediation service, which was being
    organized at year's end. Foreign experts, as part of an Organization of
    America States project, conducted a 1-week training in mediation for
    labor professionals, particularly government officials.
        The new Labor Reform Law lengthened the probationary period for new
    workers from 30 days to between 90 and 120 days for large companies and
    to between 6 months and 1 year for small businesses. The new law also
    ended the practice known as ``ultra-activity,'' which allows existing
    labor contracts to be renewed if the parties cannot come to terms on a
    new agreement.
        Some labor unions strongly opposed the reform legislation. In
    August their opposition was strengthened when a bribery scandal emerged
    over alleged payments to key Senators to encourage votes in favor of
    the legislation. Most significantly, implementing regulations for the
    new labor reform law were still in the process of being developed at
    year's end, with no clear indication of when they would be approved.
    This fact, and an inconclusive closing in December of the judicial
    investigation into the alleged bribes, left the final impact of the new
    legislation unclear.
        The law prohibits antiunion practices, and the Government enforces
    this prohibition.
        There are three functioning export processing zones (EPZ's) with
    many others legally registered but not active. The primary commercial
    advantages of these zones are related to customs and duty exemptions.
    The same labor laws apply within these zones as in all other parts of
    the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports that it was used;
    however, there were reports that women were trafficked to the country
    (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The law also prohibits forced and bonded
    labor by children; however, there were unconfirmed reports that
    children were trafficked to the country to work in sweatshops (see
    Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits employment of children under 15 years of
    age, except in rare cases where the Ministry of Education may authorize
    a child to work as part of a family unit; however, child labor does
    occur in practice and may be increasing. Children between the ages of
    15 and 16 may work in a limited number of job categories, but not more
    than 6 hours a day or 35 hours a week. The penalty for employing
    underage workers ranges from $1,000 to $5,000 (1,000 to 5,000 pesos)
    for each child employed. On August 25, the President decreed the formal
    establishment of a National Commission for the Eradication of Child
    Labor, which is to work with the Government, organized labor, the
    business community, religious groups, UNICEF, and NGO's. Labor Minister
    Patricia Bullrich appointed Leandro Haleprin to head the commission.
        A 1993 law requires that all children receive a minimum of 9 years
    of schooling, beginning at age 6. Government census figures indicate
    that about 5 percent of children between the ages of 6 and 14 are
    employed, most with older family members. Local NGO's note that the
    figure is imprecise and could be as high as 10 percent. In 1999 in the
    greater Buenos Aires area, 12,500 children age 14 and below were in the
    work force. In a 1997 report, UNICEF stated that 252,000 children
    between the ages of 6 and 14 were employed--183,500 in urban areas and
    68,500 in the country--principally harvesting tea and tobacco. An
    August UNICEF report on adolescents found that, for children between
    ages 13 and 17, 3 percent were in school and also economically active;
    7 percent were not in school but were economically active; 84 percent
    were only in school; and 6 percent were neither in school nor working.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and there
    were no confirmed reports of its use; however, there were unconfirmed
    press reports that children were trafficked to the country to work in
    sweat shops (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
    wage is $200 (200 pesos), which is not sufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. It is determined by a
    tripartite committee and has not been changed for at least 5 years.
        Federal labor law sets standards in the areas of health, safety,
    and hours. The maximum workday is 8 hours, and the maximum workweek is
    48 hours. Overtime payment is required for hours worked in excess of
    these limits. The law also sets minimums for periods of rest and paid
    vacation. However, enforcement of laws governing acceptable conditions
    of work is not carried out universally, particularly for workers in the
    informal sector who constitute about 40 percent of the work force.
        Employers are required by law to insure their employees against
    accidents at the workplace, and when traveling to and from work. In
    December a presidential decree increased the maximum cash payments and
    maximum total payments for workers' compensation in an effort to
    strengthen worker protections. Workers have the right to remove
    themselves from dangerous or unhealthful work situations, after having
    gone through a claim procedure, without jeopardy to continued
    employment. Nonetheless, workers who leave the workplace before it has
    been proven unsafe risk being fired; in such cases, the worker has the
    right to judicial appeal, but the process can be very lengthy.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws specifically
    addressing trafficking in persons, laws against child abuse provide
    penalties for trafficking children for purposes of prostitution, and
    other laws prohibit alien smuggling, indentured servitude, and similar
    abuses. During the year, Paraguayan authorities uncovered a trafficking
    ring that sent women and young girls to Buenos Aires, under the guise
    of working as domestic servants, and then forced them into
    prostitution. In one prominent case, two girls escaped from an
    Argentine brothel in April and returned to their homes. The Paraguayan
    authorities charged a number of Paraguayans with involvement in the
    case; however, at year's end, none had been convicted. An Argentine
    television station also conducted an investigation of prostitutes
    working in greater Buenos Aires and reported a number of undocumented
    Paraguayan women and girls working in slave-like conditions, offering
    their services as prostitutes in exchange for their clothing, room, and
    board.
        In 1999 police in Spain apprehended two Argentine citizens whom
    they charged with trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution.
        There were unconfirmed press reports that Bolivian children
    sometimes were sold to sweatshops in Argentina.
                                   __________

                                    BAHAMAS

        The Commonwealth of the Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary
    democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth
    II, the nominal head of state, is represented by an appointed Governor
    General. Prime Minister Hubert A. Ingraham's Free National Movement
    (FNM) has controlled the Government and Parliament since August 1992.
    The judiciary is independent.
        The national police force maintains internal security, and the
    small Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) is responsible for external security
    and some minor domestic security functions such as guarding foreign
    embassies and ambassadors; both answer to civilian authority. There
    continue to be reports that the police occasionally committed human
    rights abuses.
        The economy depends primarily on tourism, which accounts for nearly
    two-thirds of the gross domestic product. Financial services,
    particularly offshore banking and trust management, are also major
    sources of revenue. While some citizens enjoy relatively high income
    levels, there is considerable underemployment and poverty. The
    unemployment rate remained at 7 percent during the year.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
    however, problems remain in several areas. There were reports that
    police occasionally beat and abused detainees, and prison conditions
    remain harsh. The police occasionally use arbitrary arrest and
    detention. Lengthy pretrial detention and delays in trials are
    problems. Violence and discrimination against women and violence
    against children also are problems. Discrimination against the disabled
    and persons of Haitian descent persists.

                           RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings. Three prisoners
    died while in custody at the prison (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel and
    degrading treatment or punishment; however, the police occasionally
    beat and otherwise abused suspects. Many of the charges of abuse
    involved beatings to extract confessions. Human rights monitors and
    members of the public continued to express concern over such instances
    of police abuse against criminal suspects. Police officials continued
    to deny that there have been violations of defendants' rights.
    According to officials, these rights are protected by the trial judge,
    who determines the admissibility of the defendant's statement as
    evidence at trial.
        The Police Complaints and Discipline Unit, which reports directly
    to senior police officials, is responsible for investigating
    allegations of police brutality. This unit determines if enough
    evidence of abuse or misconduct exists in a particular case to warrant
    discipline within the police system or, in some instances, criminal
    prosecution by the Attorney General. Local human rights observers doubt
    the police force's ability to investigate itself impartially in cases
    of alleged abuse and misconduct and believe that many incidents of
    improper police behavior go unreported. Police officials insist that
    their investigations are fair and thorough. There were 197 complaints
    against the police during the year. In 14 cases, the complainant
    dropped the charges. A total of 26 complaints were dropped because the
    police were found to be not at fault. The authorities sent 31 cases to
    the Police Tribunal, and 126 cases were under investigation at year's
    end. Police officials believe that a continuing turnover in personnel
    is a contributing factor in disciplinary cases. There are approximately
    2,200 officers to police a total population (excluding tourists) of
    293,000.
        Corporal punishment is permitted by law with some restrictions. For
    example, caning is permitted at police stations but only if performed
    by a sergeant or higher ranking official. Cat-o-nine-tails are allowed
    at prisons but used rarely.
        Conditions at Fox Hill, the only prison, continued to improve but
    remain harsh and overcrowded. The men's maximum-security block,
    originally built in 1953 to house 400 to 600 inmates, holds nearly 800
    of the prison's total of over 1,400 inmates. The remaining prisoners
    are housed in medium- and minimum-security units which are currently
    at, or above, maximum capacity. The prison's female population is
    around 40 inmates, considerably less than the female unit's full
    capacity of 200. Male prisoners are crowded into poorly ventilated
    cells that generally lack regular running water. There are no separate
    facilities for inmates being held on ``remand'' (detention pending
    trial or further court action), although some eventually are segregated
    in a medium security wing after processing through maximum security.
    All inmates are screened for infectious diseases, and prison officials
    estimate that about 7 percent of the incoming prison population is
    infected with the HIV virus. Most prisoners lack beds. Many of them
    sleep on concrete floors and are locked in their cells 23 hours per
    day. Facilities for women are less severe and do have running water.
    Organizations providing aid, counseling services, and religious
    instruction have regular access to inmates. In August and September,
    three prisoners died while in custody at the prison. Prison officials
    were investigating the cases at year's end.
        The Government has provided funds for improvements in prison
    facilities and prisoner rehabilitation programs. Prison officials have
    instituted some technical and vocational programs, and correctional
    officers are undergoing instruction to become certified trainers.
    Modern training facilities are equipped with new computers, and the
    prison also offers some educational and literacy programs for
    prisoners. In December an 80-cell minimum security cellblock opened,
    and the prison is constructing a new 80-cell maximum-security building,
    scheduled to open in 2001. This building, which is to have larger cells
    and more extensive plumbing, should relieve some of the overcrowding in
    the existing block. Prison officials plan to renovate the current
    maximum-security unit once the new building is in service.
        Domestic and international human rights groups were able to visit
    the prison during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, police occasionally
    arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. In general the authorities
    conduct arrests openly and, when required, obtain judicially issued
    warrants. The Government respects the right to a judicial determination
    of the legality of arrests.
        Serious cases, including those of suspected narcotics or firearms
    offenses, do not require warrants where probable cause exists. Arrested
    persons appear before a magistrate within 48 hours (or by the next
    business day for cases arising on weekends and holidays) to hear the
    charges against them. They may hire an attorney of their choice, but
    the Government does not provide legal representation except to
    destitute suspects charged with capital crimes. Some local legal
    professionals and human rights observers believe that this lack of
    representation risks hasty convictions on the basis of unchallenged
    evidence, particularly in the case of poor or illiterate defendants.
    However, there is no statistical evidence to indicate that this is more
    than an occasional problem.
        The Bail Act prohibits bail for repeat offenders and those accused
    of certain violent crimes. Judges tend not to grant bail to foreign
    suspects, particularly on more serious offenses, since the authorities
    consider foreign offenders more likely to flee if released on bail.
    Judges sometimes authorize cash bail for foreigners arrested on minor
    charges, but in practice, foreign suspects generally prefer to plead
    guilty and pay a fine rather than pursue their right to defend
    themselves, given possible delays in court cases and harsh conditions
    in the prison. Attorneys and other prisoner advocates continue to
    complain of excessive pretrial detention.
        The authorities detain illegal immigrants, primarily Haitians and
    Cubans, at the detention center located off Carmichael Road until
    arrangements can be made for them to leave the country, or they obtain
    legal status. The detention center, which had been closed for repairs
    since suffering extensive damage from Hurricane Floyd in September
    1999, reopened in December. Detainees had been housed in the women's
    prison at Fox Hill where conditions are austere. Female and child
    detainees were housed together with the general population and were
    afforded little privacy. Incidents of antagonism between detainees and
    guards were frequent. Most of these incidents involved the Cuban
    detainees, a few of whom had been in custody for over a year. There
    were numerous escapes from Fox Hill prison, particularly by Cuban
    detainees. In the newly reopened detention center, which can hold up to
    600 detainees, women and men are housed separately. Haitians usually
    are repatriated within 2 weeks. Many detainees are provided with food
    and other items by relatives and friends on a regular basis, and those
    who can arrange and finance their repatriation generally are deported
    much more quickly. Illegal immigrants convicted of crimes other than
    immigration violations are held at Fox Hill prison where they may
    remain for weeks or months after serving their sentences, pending
    deportation.
        Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
        Magistrate's courts are the lowest level courts and only handle
    crimes with a maximum sentence of 5 years. Trial by jury is available
    only in the Supreme Court, which is the trial court that handles most
    major cases. Its decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal; the
    Privy Council in London is the final court of appeal. The Governor
    General appoints judges on the advice, in most cases, of the
    independent Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
        The justice system derives from English common law. Trials are fair
    and public. Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right
    to appeal. Defendants can confront and question witnesses against them
    and present evidence on their own behalf. However, the judicial system
    is plagued by a large backlog of cases, and delays reportedly can last
    as long as 2 years. To reduce the backlog, the Government continued the
    process of streamlining appeals, computerizing court records, and
    hiring new judges, magistrates, and court reporters. The Supreme Court
    established a task force to recommend further reforms in the court
    system and published a report in October 1999 proposing modifications
    in the system to facilitate case flow management including the
    disposition of cases within 16 months of initial filing.
        Despite these measures to improve efficiency, complaints persist of
    excessive pretrial detention, outdated record keeping, delayed justice
    for victims, and a failure to update new laws in the books. Some judges
    have been brought in from abroad; while familiar with English common
    law, they lack experience regarding Bahamian law and procedures. There
    were isolated complaints of deviations from normal, fair court
    proceedings--particularly in civil matters--but there were no
    indications that this was a widespread problem.
        The final appeals court recently ruled that death-row inmates
    appealing their sentences must be given the chance to be heard by
    bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
    American Commission on Human Rights.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
    seizure, and the Government generally respects these prohibitions in
    practice. The law usually requires a court order for entry into or
    search of a private residence, but a police inspector or more senior
    police official may authorize a search without a court order where
    probable cause to suspect a weapons violation exists. Such an official
    also may authorize the search of a person (that extends to the vehicle
    in which the person is traveling) without a court order, should
    probable cause exist to suspect drug possession.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects the
    constitutional provision for the right of free expression, and the
    political opposition criticizes the Government freely and frequently.
        Three daily and several weekly newspapers, all privately owned,
    express a variety of views on issues of public interest, including
    varying degrees of criticism of the Government and its policies.
    Foreign newspapers and magazines are readily available.
        There is a government-run radio station and four privately owned
    radio broadcasters. The country's sole television station, the state-
    owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas, presents a variety of
    views, although opposition politicians claim, with some justification,
    that their views do not receive as extensive coverage as those of the
    Government.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Groups must obtain permits to hold public
    demonstrations, and the authorities generally grant such permits.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. The law permits private
    associations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
    in assisting refugees.
        There is no legislation governing the processing of asylum seekers,
    and applications for political asylum are supposed to be adjudicated on
    a case-by-case basis at the cabinet level. Trained immigration
    officials screen asylum applicants, and the UNHCR reviews the interview
    records and offers advice on certain cases. Local and international
    human rights observers have criticized the Government for failing to
    screen potential asylum applicants adequately. These organizations have
    claimed that some Cubans and Haitians with a legitimate fear of
    persecution were repatriated without first having the opportunity to
    make a claim for asylum. Although the repatriation agreement between
    the Bahamas and Haiti expired at the end of 1995, the Government
    continued to repatriate illegal Haitian immigrants based on the terms
    of that agreement. The Government signed a repatriation agreement with
    Cuba in 1998.
        At year's end, a total of 5,801 persons, including 4,897 Haitians,
    374 Jamaicans, and 284 Cubans had been repatriated. Two Nigerian
    nationals requested asylum during the year. The Government granted one
    request and denied the other. A total of 39 Cubans requested asylum.
    All were denied.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        The Bahamas is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy with two
    major political parties and general elections at least every 5 years.
    An elected Prime Minister and Parliament govern. The political process
    is open to all elements of society, and citizens 18 years of age and
    older are eligible to register and vote. Voting is by secret ballot.
    The two principal political parties are the ruling Free National
    Movement and the opposition Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). The PLP
    led the country for 6 years of internal self-government from 1967 to
    1973 and held power from independence in 1973 until 1992. The FNM won
    general elections in 1992 and 1997. It holds 35 of 40 seats in the
    House of Assembly, and the PLP holds 4. The Coalition for Democratic
    Reform (a splinter party from the PLP) holds one seat. Both the ruling
    party and the opposition name members to the upper house, the Senate,
    in compliance with constitutional guidelines. Although it does pass
    legislation, the Senate is primarily a deliberative body that serves as
    a public forum to discuss national problems and policies.
        There are no legal impediments to participation by women in
    government and politics; however, women are underrepresented. The 40-
    seat House of Assembly has 6 elected female members, including the
    Speaker of the House, and 6 appointed female Senators, including the
    government leader in the Senate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janet
    Bostwick, also directs the Bahamian Bureau of Women's Affairs. Women
    also head the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce,
    Agriculture, and Industry. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is a
    woman.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Individual human rights monitors and several local human rights
    groups, as well as representatives of international human rights
    organizations, operate freely, expressing their opinions and reporting
    their findings on alleged human rights violations without government
    restriction. The Government allows them broad access to institutions
    and individuals.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Government generally respects in practice the constitutional
    provisions for individual rights and freedoms regardless of race, place
    of origin, political opinion, creed, or sex. However, the Constitution
    and the law contain certain provisions that discriminate against women.
        Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious,
    widespread problem. Government crime statistics do not separate
    domestic violence from other incidents of violence. The Government
    operates a nationwide toll-free hot line, with two trained volunteers
    on each of the inhabited islands who are on call to respond in the
    event of a crisis. Government and private women's organizations conduct
    public awareness campaigns highlighting the problems of abuse and
    domestic violence. On November 16, the Department of Social Services in
    partnership with a private company established, for the first time, two
    safe houses to assist battered women. The Domestic Court, which deals
    exclusively with family issues such as spousal abuse, maintenance
    payments, and legal separation, continued to receive a high volume of
    cases. The court can and does impose various legal constraints to
    protect women from abusive spouses or companions. However, advocates
    for women's rights see a need to improve the effectiveness of
    enforcement of the court's orders. They cite a general reluctance on
    the part of law enforcement authorities to intervene in domestic
    disputes and a lack of police training and sensitivity in dealing with
    domestic violence. While police training includes some presentations on
    domestic violence, law enforcement authorities admit that the problem
    has not been a top priority in training or resource allocation.
        The Constitution discriminates against women by not providing them
    with the same right as men to transmit citizenship to their foreign-
    born spouses. Additionally the law makes it easier for men with foreign
    spouses to confer citizenship on their children than for women with
    foreign spouses. Some inheritance laws also favor men over women. For
    example, when a person dies without a will, the estate passes to the
    oldest legitimate son, or in cases where there is no son, the closest
    legitimate male relative. Prominent women of all political persuasions
    continue to push for an amendment to the Constitution and related laws
    to redress this situation.
        Women participate fully in society and are well represented in the
    business and professional sectors.
        Children.--The Government places a priority on maintaining adequate
    expenditures for child welfare and education. Public education is
    compulsory for children through the age of 16.
        Awareness of parenting and responsibility for children has
    increased. However, child abuse and neglect remain serious problems.
    There were a total of 147 cases of child abuse during the year: 33
    cases of physical abuse, 94 cases of sexual abuse, 9 cases of neglect,
    4 cases of emotional abuse, and 7 cases of abandonment.
        The law requires that all persons who have contact with a child
    they believe to be abused sexually report their suspicions to the
    police. However, the same reporting requirement does not apply to cases
    of physical abuse, which health care professionals believe occurs quite
    frequently. The police refer reported cases of sexual and physical
    abuse to the Department of Social Services, which investigates them and
    can bring criminal charges against perpetrators. The Department may
    remove children from abusive situations if the court deems it
    necessary.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has constructed
    additional housing units in Nassau designed specifically for the
    disabled, but very few buildings and public facilities are accessible
    to the disabled. Although the 1973 National Building Code mandates
    certain accommodations for the physically disabled in new public
    buildings, the authorities rarely enforce this requirement. The code
    also fails to mandate accommodations in new private buildings, which
    often lack accessibility as well. Advocates for the disabled complain
    of widespread job discrimination and general apathy on the part of
    private employers and political leaders toward their need for training
    and equal opportunity. They note that there is no overarching
    legislation to implement and enforce equal opportunity policies in the
    workplace, educational institutions, or elsewhere.
        The Disability Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Social Development
    and National Insurance works with the Bahamas Council for Disability,
    an umbrella organization of nongovernmental organizations that offer
    services for the disabled, to provide a coordinated public and private
    sector approach to the needs of the disabled. A mix of government and
    private residential and nonresidential institutions provides a range of
    education, training, counseling, and job placement services for both
    physically and mentally disabled adults and children. There is still no
    disability act; a governmentsponsored task force drafted proposed
    legislation; however, it had not been introduced in Parliament at
    year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Unofficial estimates suggest
    that between 20 and 25 percent of the country's roughly 290,000
    inhabitants are Haitians or citizens of Haitian descent, making them
    the largest and most visible ethnic minority in the islands. While
    30,000 to 40,000 Haitian citizens reside in the Bahamas legally, some
    observers believe that similarly large numbers are in the country
    illegally.
        Although Haitians and Bahamians of Haitian descent generally are
    well integrated into society, interethnic tensions and inequities
    persist. Recent crime statistics show Haitians as targets for petty
    theft crimes. Some members of the Haitian community complain of
    discrimination in the job market, and resentment of continued Haitian
    immigration is widespread. However, reports of ethnic violence or
    blatant discrimination against legally resident Haitians are scarce.
    Leaders of the Haitian community approve of the Government's humane
    approach to the repatriation of illegal migrants and point to the high
    number of ethnic Haitians in the public service.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides labor
    unions with the right of free assembly and association. Private sector
    and most public sector workers may form or join unions without prior
    approval. Members of the police force, defense force, fire brigade, and
    prison guards may not organize or join unions. Workers exercise the
    right of association extensively, with almost one-quarter of the work
    force (and one-half of the workers in the important hotel industry)
    belonging to unions.
        Three major umbrella labor organizations--the National Workers
    Council of Trade Unions and Associations, the Trade Union Congress
    (TUC), and the National Congress of Trade Unions--along with individual
    labor unions, all function independently of government or political
    party control.
        The Industrial Relations Act requires that, before a strike begins,
    a simple majority of a union's membership must vote in favor of a
    motion to strike. The Department of Labor must supervise the vote.
    Unions threatened several work stoppages against both public and
    private employers during the year. In order to resolve trade disputes
    more quickly, in 1996 Parliament amended the Industrial Relations Act
    to establish an industrial tribunal. According to the act, labor
    disputes first are filed with the Ministry of Labor and then, if not
    resolved, are turned over to the tribunal. The tribunal follows normal
    court procedures for the admission of evidence, direct examination, and
    crossexamination. The tribunal's decision is final and can only be
    appealed in court on a strict question of law. Some employers complain
    that the industrial tribunal is biased unfairly in favor of employees.
    All labor unions have the right to maintain affiliations with
    international trade union organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers freely
    exercise their right to organize and participate in collective
    bargaining, which the law protects. Unions and employers negotiate wage
    rates without government interference.
        The Constitution and the Industrial Relations Act prohibit anti-
    union discrimination by employers. The act requires employers to
    recognize trade unions, and it requires the reinstatement of workers
    fired for union activities. Employers may dismiss workers in accordance
    with applicable contracts, which generally require some severance pay.
    The Government enforces labor laws and regulations uniformly throughout
    the country.
        Freeport is a specially designated free trade zone. Labor law and
    practice in this zone do not differ from those in the rest of the
    country. However, human rights advocates assert that the Port Authority
    has allowed the Hong Kong-based company Hutchinson-Whampoa, which now
    owns the harbor, airport, and many major hotels in Freeport, to
    discourage unions.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor by all persons, including
    children, and such labor does not exist in practice.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
    of 14 for industrial work or work during school hours. Children under
    the age of 16 may not work at night. There is no legal minimum age for
    employment in other sectors, and some children work part time in light
    industry and service jobs. The constitutional prohibition of forced and
    compulsory labor, including that by children, is respected in practice
    (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fair Labor Standards Act
    permits the creation of a Wages Council to recommend the setting of a
    minimum wage, but the Government never has established such a council
    or a general minimum wage. However, in July the Government established
    a specific minimum wage of $4.66 (B$4.66) per hour for all hourly and
    temporary workers throughout the public sector. In view of the high
    cost of living, this wage alone would not provide more than a
    subsistence living for a worker and family. The act limits the regular
    workweek to 48 hours, provides for one 24-hour rest period, and
    requires overtime payment (time and a half) for hours beyond the
    standard.
        The Ministry of Labor, responsible for enforcing labor laws, has a
    team of inspectors who conduct on-site visits to enforce occupational
    health and safety standards and investigate employee concerns and
    complaints, but inspections occur infrequently. The Ministry normally
    announces inspection visits in advance, and employers generally
    cooperate with inspectors to implement safety standards.
        The national insurance program compensates workers for work-related
    injuries. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to find
    suitable alternative employment for employees injured on the job but
    still able to work. The law does not provide a right for workers to
    absent themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
    continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons; however, the Penal code bans
    prostitution and prohibits the detention of persons against their will
    and for immoral purposes. There were no reports that persons were
    trafficked to, from, within or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    BARBADOS

        Barbados is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty,
    parliamentary form of government and is a member of the Commonwealth of
    Nations. The Queen is head of state and is represented by an appointed
    Governor General. Prime Minister Owen Arthur is the head of government
    and governs with an appointed cabinet. The judiciary is independent.
        The Royal Barbados Police Force is charged with maintaining public
    order. The small volunteer Barbados Defence Force (BDF) is responsible
    for national security and can be employed to maintain public order in
    times of crisis, emergency, or other specific need. Police committed
    some human rights abuses.
        The economy is based on tourism, services, light manufacturing, and
    agriculture, which makes it vulnerable to external economic
    developments. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was about $9,323
    in 1999. The country has registered 7 successive years of sustained
    economic growth. For the first quarter of the year, GDP grew at 4.6
    percent.
        The Government generally respects constitutional provisions
    regarding human rights; however, there were problems in a few areas.
    There were three extrajudicial killings by police. Other principal
    human rights problems continued to be occasional instances of excessive
    use of force by police and societal violence against women and
    children. There was an upsurge in spousal abuse during the year.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings. However, police committed three
    extrajudicial killings. In all cases, the police conducted
    investigations that found no wrongdoing on the part of the police
    officers.
        On February 6, police shot and killed a suspect, Curtis Maynard,
    who they said was armed and attempted to flee. However, local residents
    mounted a demonstration and asserted that Maynard was never known to
    carry weapons and that, since he was surrounded by police, they should
    have captured him without gunfire.
        On February 21, police shot and killed Kerwin Wilkinson when they
    responded to a report of a domestic dispute. The police said he
    resisted and brandished a machete; his girlfriend claimed that he was
    not holding the machete when police shot him.
        On March 3, police shot and killed Tony Greenidge, an emotionally
    disturbed worker, who had slashed to death an elderly person. Greenidge
    then attacked a responding police officer, and another police officer
    shot and killed him.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, credible
    reports continued that law enforcement officials sometimes used force
    during detention to extract confessions from detainees.
        In February a defendant accused and later convicted of child
    molestation alleged that the police slapped him, choked him, and denied
    him access to legal representation, and that due to this treatment, he
    signed a written confession. Also in February, another defendant
    alleged that his statement made in a deposition had been altered after
    the fact by police.
        In September the Police Commissioner promised to investigate the
    alleged beating of a prisoner being held by police on a marijuana
    charge after his mother stated on a radio program that the police had
    mistreated her son brutally.
        In December 1998, the police took two foreign citizens into custody
    for questioning in connection with a bank burglary. According to
    eyewitnesses, both individuals were in good health when the police
    apprehended them. However, 2 days later, the police took both men to
    the local hospital following complaints of abdominal pain. One man had
    to undergo extensive emergency surgery for life-threatening internal
    bleeding; doctors treated the second man for injuries to the abdomen
    and groin. Both men asserted that they were restrained physically and
    beaten by five or six men while in police custody. The police force's
    Criminal Investigation Department conducted an investigation and
    presented a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions in February
    1999. The authorities filed charges against five police officers and
    started trial proceedings; however, at year's end, the case was
    unresolved and remained before the courts.
        The majority of complaints against the police fall into the
    categories of unprofessional conduct and beating or assault. While the
    police force has a complaints and discipline department headed by a
    superintendent to deal with matters of inappropriate police conduct,
    there is no independent body to review complaints against the police.
    However, in December 1998, the Attorney General instituted a working
    group to make recommendations regarding the establishment of an
    independent complaints authority. In February the group presented its
    report to the Cabinet, and its recommendations were expected to be
    submitted to Parliament for further consideration.
        Police procedures provide that the police may question suspects,
    and other persons they hold, only at a police station, except when
    expressly permitted by a senior divisional officer. An officer must
    visit detainees at least once every 3 hours to inquire about the
    detainees' condition. After 24 hours, the detaining authority must
    submit a written report to the Deputy Commissioner. The authorities
    must approve and record all movements of detainees between stations.
    The authorities generally adhere to these basic principles, although
    officials occasionally used excessive force.
        The authorities issued firearms to special foot patrols in
    highcrime areas in response to public concern over violent incidents
    that had led to recent public concern. Aside from this exception, the
    police force mainly still is unarmed, in keeping with its British
    traditions. In February the police established a special task force
    unit to address illegal weapons and crimes involving firearms. They
    also announced creation of a joint unit with the BDF to target high-
    profile crimes.
        The only prison is antiquated and overcrowded, with over 625
    inmates in a structure built for 350 inmates. The Caribbean Human
    Rights Network has called for reform of the penal system and advocates
    the development of alternatives to imprisonment such as community
    service to alleviate the problem of severe overcrowding. During the
    year, government officials took steps to introduce alternative,
    noncustodial sentencing.
        The Government allows private groups to visit prisons to ascertain
    conditions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and requires detainees to
    be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time, and the
    Government generally respects these provisions in practice. Criminal
    defendants have the right to counsel, and attorneys have ready access
    to their clients.
        The authorities do not use forced exile as a punishment or means of
    political control.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is free of intervention by other branches
    of government.
        The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, which consists of the
    high court and court of appeal. The Governor General, on recommendation
    of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the leader of the
    opposition, appoints the Chief Justice and other judges. Judges serve
    until the age of 65.
        The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal
    offenses be given a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an
    independent and impartial court, and the Government respects this right
    in practice. The judicial system provides for the right of due process
    at each level. The law presumes defendants innocent until proven
    guilty.
        In February Parliament approved a package of new legislation
    intended to strengthen the powers of law enforcement officials. One of
    the new laws allows the Director of Public Prosecutions to appeal
    sentences in criminal cases that he considers too lenient.
        The Government provides free legal aid to the indigent with the
    exception of a limit of about $2,150 (1,300 pounds sterling) on
    expenses incurred for appeals by death row prisoners to the Privy
    Council in London. Two inmates have challenged this limit and are suing
    the Government on the grounds that it effectively deprives them of
    their right to due process.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search, or
    seizure, and the law requires warrants to be issued before privately
    owned property may be entered and searched.
        The Government does not interfere routinely in the private lives of
    its citizens; however, the police sometimes resorted to searches of
    homes without warrants. The Government does not censor mail. However,
    the Government restricts the receipt of foreign publications deemed to
    be pornographic. Other foreign publications of a nonprurient nature are
    allowed without restriction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities respect these
    rights in practice. There are two independent daily newspapers, both of
    which present opposition political views. The Government regularly
    comes under criticism in the newspapers and on daily call-in radio
    programs. There are six radio stations, two of which are owned by the
    Government. The Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television
    service (the only television source, excluding direct satellite
    reception) is government owned. Although CBC is a state enterprise, it
    regularly reported views opposing government policies. Critics allege
    that the Government sometimes uses its influence to discourage media
    reporting on sensitive issues, but the press remained vigorously
    critical of the Government on a broad span of issues. The Government
    prohibits the production of pornographic materials.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. Political parties, trade unions, and
    private organizations function and hold meetings and rallies generally
    without hindrance. The Public Order Act of 1970 requires police
    approval for public assemblies, and previously it had been enforced
    rarely. However, in February the authorities dispersed a protest march
    about the Maynard killing by police (see Section 1.c.) because no
    permit had been obtained. Permission later was granted for a
    demonstration held a few days afterwards.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and legal residents move freely
    within the country and leave and enter it without restriction.
        The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
    did not arise. There were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone
    having a valid claim to refugee status. However, government practice
    remains undefined.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have this right in law and exercise it in practice.
    Political parties compete in free and fair elections by secret ballot
    at least every 5 years. In the 1999 elections, the Barbados Labour
    Party won a decisive victory, gaining a 26-to-2 majority over the
    Democratic Labour Party. There are no impediments to participation in
    the political process, and all citizens over age 18 may vote. The Prime
    Minister exercises executive power along with the Cabinet of Ministers
    that he appoints, balanced by the bicameral Parliament and the judicial
    system.
        Although underrepresented overall, women participate in all levels
    of government and politics. There are three female members of
    Parliament; the Deputy Prime Minister, who also serves concurrently as
    Foreign Minister, is a woman, as is the Minister of Education.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Local groups involved with human rights operate freely and without
    government hindrance. The Caribbean Human Rights Network, a Caribbean-
    wide human rights organization which has its headquarters and a small
    staff in Barbados, investigates and reports on allegations of human
    rights violations throughout the region.
        The Ombudsman's office, established in 1987, hears complaints
    against government offices for alleged injuries or injustices resulting
    from administrative conduct. The office is prohibited from involvement
    in issues involving foreign affairs, immigration questions, and certain
    other matters. Because it focuses only on administrative conduct, it
    does not deal with complaints of police abuse; a separate department
    within the police force deals with matters of inappropriate police
    conduct.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law,
    regardless of race, religion, or sex. The Government respects these
    rights in practice.
        Women.--Violence and abuse against women continued to be
    significant social problems. Women's rights groups reported that
    victims of sexual assaults, domestic violence, incest, and rape are
    often reluctant to report such incidents. There are public and private
    counseling services for victims of domestic violence, rape, and child
    abuse. There was an upsurge in spousal abuse during the year.
        The 1992 Domestic Violence Law specifies the appropriate police
    response to domestic violence, which is intended to protect all members
    of the family, including men and children. It applies equally to
    marriages and to common law relationships. Criminal penalties for
    violent crimes are the same, regardless of the sex of the offender or
    the victim. The courts heard a number of cases of domestic violence
    against women involving assault or wounding. Victims may request
    restraining orders, which the courts often issue. The courts can
    sentence an offender to jail for breaching such an order. Human rights
    monitors criticized an inconsistency in sentencing for rape, incest,
    and statutory rape. They noted that the lack of sentencing guidelines
    resulted in longer sentences for persons convicted of petty theft than
    for incest; and lesser sentences for incest than for rape or sexual
    assault of nonfamily members.
        Women actively participate in all aspects of national life and are
    well-represented at all levels of both the public and private sectors.
    They form a large percentage of heads of household and are not
    discriminated against in public housing or other social welfare
    programs.
        The National Organization of Women (NOW) is an affiliate of a
    regional women's organization called the Caribbean Women's Association.
    The Business and Professional Women's club, an affiliate of the NOW,
    runs a crisis center staffed by 30 trained counselors and provides
    legal and medical referral services. The center also has a hot line for
    clients who wish to maintain their anonymity. The Government
    established a battered women's shelter, which opened in September 1999.
        In August Minister of Labor Greenidge told a labor meeting that he
    supported strong legislation aimed at preventing sexual harassment in
    the workplace.
        Children born overseas and out of wedlock to Barbadian men are
    considered citizens. However, Barbadian women married to nonBarbadian
    men were unable to confer citizenship on the child, until an act of
    Parliament took effect on August 16. Now a child born to a male or a
    female citizen has immediate citizenship.
        Children.--The Government provides for compulsory education to the
    age of 16. The national health insurance program provides children with
    free medical and dental services for most medical conditions. The
    Government is committed to children's human rights and welfare,
    although violence and abuse against children remain serious problems.
    The Child Care Board is responsible for monitoring and responding to
    the critical welfare needs, interests, and rights of children.
    Statistics from the Child Care Board show that approximately 1,000
    children suffered abuse in 1998-99.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not prohibit discrimination
    against the physically disabled in employment, education, or the
    provision of other state services. However, in 1997 the Ministry of
    Labor established the Disabilities Unit to address the concerns of the
    disabled, and in early 1998 it created an advisory committee on
    disabilities. The Labor Department, a unit within the Ministry that
    finds jobs for the disabled, long has advocated the introduction of
    legislation prohibiting discrimination. In May the Government, labor
    leaders, and the private sector jointly announced an agreement to
    promote a code of practice on the employment of persons with
    disabilities, as part of these groups' continuing social partnership.
    They also agreed to establish targets and time frames for the
    employment of disabled persons in the private and public sectors.
        While there is no legislation mandating provision of accessibility
    to public thoroughfares or public or private buildings, the Town and
    Country Planning Department sets provisions for all public buildings to
    include accessibility to persons with disabilities. As a result, the
    majority of new buildings have ramps, reserved parking, and special
    sanitary facilities for the disabled.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers freely exercise their right
    to form and belong to trade unions and to strike. Approximately 30
    percent of the labor force belongs to trade unions. Overall union
    membership appears to have declined slightly in recent years as some
    workers moved to better-paying positions in higher-technology sectors.
    There are two major unions and several smaller ones, representing
    various sectors. The public service union, the National Union of Public
    Workers, is independent of any political party or the Government. Some
    officers of the largest union, the Barbados Workers' Union, are
    associated personally with the Democratic Labour Party. Most unions
    belong to the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations, which
    was founded in 1995.
        The law accords full protection to trade unionists' personal and
    property rights. All private and public sector employees are permitted
    to strike, but essential workers may strike only under certain
    circumstances and after following prescribed procedures.
        In July the nonunion Barbados Police Association supported the
    police in a labor action over unfulfilled promises of increased wages
    and increased allowances. This action followed an October 1999 ``sick-
    out'' over the same issues. The police took action because they did not
    receive promised wage increases and increased allowances. For several
    years, the Government has been reviewing wage and pay scales of all
    public service employees, including the police. Police said that they
    are entitled to special consideration since they are not allowed to be
    represented by a trade union because of their domestic security
    function. The police labor action took place in July during the height
    of the local Carnival period. As the action proceeded, members of the
    BDF were called in to supplement those police who reported for work. As
    of year's end, the issues had not been resolved and were still under
    consideration.
        Trade unions are free to form federations and are affiliated with a
    variety of regional and international labor organizations. The
    Caribbean Congress of Labor has its headquarters in Barbados.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the
    authorities respect it in practice. Normally, wages and working
    conditions are negotiated through the collective bargaining process,
    but a 1993 tripartite prices and incomes policy accord established a 2-
    year wage freeze. A revised (second) protocol contained provisions for
    negotiated increases in basic wages and increases based on
    productivity, which covered 1995-97. In May 1998, the tripartite
    partners signed a third protocol covering 1998-2000, broadened to
    address the needs of disabled workers and to express support for
    international efforts against child labor.
        Employers have no legal obligation to recognize unions under the
    Trade Union Act of 1964, but most do so when a significant percentage
    of their employees express a desire to be represented by a registered
    union. Several foreign-owned international data-processing companies
    challenged union claims in 1997-98 to represent their workforces,
    highlighting the country's need for legislation outlining the union
    recognition process. While there is no specific law that prohibits
    discrimination against union activity, the courts provide a method of
    redress for employees who allege wrongful dismissal. The courts
    commonly award monetary compensation but rarely order reemployment. New
    legislation that would address the union recognition process had been
    pending for about 2 years at year's end.
        There are no manufacturing or special areas where collective
    bargaining rights are legally or administratively impaired. There are
    no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced, compulsory, or bonded labor, including that by
    children, and there were no reports of its use.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum working age of 16 is observed broadly.
    Compulsory primary and secondary education policies, which require
    school attendance until age 16, reinforce minimum age requirements. The
    Labor Department has a small cadre of labor inspectors who conduct spot
    investigations of enterprises and check records to verify compliance
    with the law. These inspectors may take legal action against an
    employer who is found to have underage workers. The law prohibits
    forced or bonded labor by children, and the authorities effectively
    enforce it (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets and the authorities
    establish minimum wages for specified categories of workers. Only two
    categories of workers have a formally regulated minimum wage--household
    domestics and shop assistants (entry level commercial workers).
    Household domestics are entitled to a minimum wage of about $0.75
    (bds$1.50) per hour, although in actual labor market conditions, the
    prevailing wage is triple that amount. There are two agerelated minimum
    wage categories for shop assistants. The adult minimum wage for shop
    assistants was raised by 13 percent in June 1997, to $2.13 (bds$4.25)
    per hour; the juvenile minimum wage for shop assistants became $1.62
    (bds$3.25) per hour. The minimum wage for shop assistants is marginally
    sufficient to enable a worker and family to meet minimum living
    standards; most employees earn more.
        The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and the law
    requires overtime payment for hours worked in excess. The Government
    accepts International Labor Organization conventions, standards, and
    other sectoral conventions regarding maximum hours of work. However,
    there is no general legislation that covers all occupations. Employers
    must provide workers a minimum of 3 weeks' annual leave. Unemployment
    benefits and national insurance (social security) cover all workers. A
    comprehensive, government-sponsored health program offers subsidized
    treatment and medication.
        The Factories Act of 1983 sets out the officially recognized
    occupational safety and health standards. The Labor Department enforces
    health and safety standards and follows up to ensure that problems
    cited are corrected by management. The Factories Act also requires that
    in certain sectors firms employing more than 50 workers create a safety
    committee. This committee can challenge the decisions of management
    concerning the occupational safety and health environment. Trade union
    monitors identify safety problems for government factory inspectors to
    ensure the enforcement of safety and health regulations and effective
    correction by management. Government-operated corporations in
    particular were accused of doing a ``poor job'' in health and safety.
    The Government has promised to undertake inspections of government-
    operated corporations and manufacturing plants as a priority. Workers
    have a limited right to remove themselves from dangerous or hazardous
    job situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
    addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                     BELIZE

        Belize is a parliamentary democracy with a constitution enacted in
    1981 upon independence from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, a
    cabinet of ministers, and a legislative assembly govern the country.
    The Governor General represents Queen Elizabeth II in the largely
    ceremonial role of head of state. Prime Minister Said Musa's People's
    United Party (PUP) holds 26 of the 29 seats in the House of
    Representatives. The Government generally respects the constitutional
    provisions for an independent judiciary; however, at times the
    judiciary is subject to political influence.
        The Police Department has primary responsibility for law
    enforcement and maintenance of order. The Belize Defense Force (BDF) is
    responsible for external security but, when deemed appropriate by
    civilian authorities, may be tasked to assist the police department.
    Both the police and the BDF report to the Minister of National Security
    and are responsible to and controlled by civilian authorities. There
    were reports of abuse by the police.
        The economy is primarily agricultural, although tourism has become
    the principal source of foreign exchange earnings. The agricultural
    sector is heavily dependent upon preferential access to export markets
    for sugar and for bananas. The Government favors free enterprise and
    generally encourages investment, although domestic investors are given
    preferential treatment over foreign investors in a number of key
    economic sectors. Preliminary estimates of annual gross domestic
    product growth placed it at 6.2 percent in real terms. Annual per
    capita income was $2,771.
        The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human
    rights; however, there were problems in several areas. Principal human
    rights abuses include several extrajudicial killings, occasional
    brutality and use of excessive force by the police when making arrests,
    poor prison conditions, allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention,
    lengthy pretrial detention, political influence on the judiciary, and
    judicial limits on freedom of the press. Violence and discrimination
    against women, abuse of children, and employer mistreatment of
    undocumented foreign workers also were problems. There were instances
    of trafficking in persons.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    political killings by the security forces; however, there were three
    instances of extrajudicial killing.
        On January 24, six BDF soldiers shot and killed Samuel Ramirez, a
    Guatemalan farmer, near the border between the two countries. A public
    Commission of Inquiry ruled that Ramirez had attacked the soldiers and
    that the killing was justifiable.
        On February 24, an off-duty police officer with a machete chased
    Kelvin ``Brambles'' Barrow into the sea, where Barrow drowned. The
    Ombudsman presented a report to the National Assembly, and the case was
    before the Department of the Public Prosecutor (DPP) at year's end.
        On March 17, Hattieville prison inmates rioted. During the riot, a
    guard shot and killed one inmate. The Ombudsman's investigation
    revealed that the officer was delinquent, and the matter was before the
    DPP at year's end.
        In September 1999, 38-year-old Daniel Tillett died while in police
    custody, after being arrested for fighting in public. On February 14,
    the Director of Public Prosecutions issued instructions to the Police
    Commission to proceed to indictment of the officer-in-charge, Jesus
    Cantun. At year's end, he was in jail awaiting trial.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or other inhuman
    punishment; however, the police occasionally used excessive force when
    making arrests. The Government's Ombudsman stated that the second and
    third most common complaints that his office receives involve police
    misconduct and brutality and misconduct on the part of Department of
    Corrections personnel. The Ombudsman estimated that at year's end, his
    office would have approximately 10 pending cases of this type.
        The Police Department's internal affairs and discipline section,
    the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Ombudsman's office, and on
    occasion, special independent commissions appointed by the Prime
    Minister, investigate allegations of abuse by officials. When the
    Internal Affairs Division was established in 1995, it received 50
    complaints against police officers; in 1999, the number had increased
    to 299. The increase may reflect an increase in abuse by officials as
    well as an increase in the public's willingness to report such abuses.
        On February 14, a police officer shot and wounded a BDF soldier in
    Orange Walk Town. Witnesses claimed that the two men were involved in a
    verbal altercation. When the soldier pulled his machete, the police
    officer drew his firearm and shot the soldier in the abdomen. The
    exiting bullet struck an innocent bystander. Both victims recovered
    from their wounds. The officer was arrested and suspended from the
    force; at year's end, the Ombudsman was investigating the incident.
        On April 4, police shot escaped prisoner Darrel ``Bagga'' Jones.
    All investigations determined this to be a justified use of force.
        On May 20, while on duty at the national agriculture and trade
    show, a police officer shot and wounded a man. Immediately prior to the
    shooting, the sergeant in charge ordered the officer not to shoot. The
    victim had been brandishing a piece of cardboard that had a dead snake
    glued to it. The authorities suspended the officer from duty, and the
    Ombudsman was conducting an investigation at year's end.
        On August 27, two national team soccer players claimed that police
    beat them while they were handcuffed in Orange Walk Town. Police
    Commissioner Hughington Williams suspended the chief inspector for the
    district, James Magdaleno, and assistant inspector Eli Salazar, pending
    the outcome of the investigation. Williams also took disciplinary
    action against constables Roger Briceno, Mateo Carrillo, and A. Coc.
    The matter still was before the police internal affairs division at
    year's end.
        In April 1999, two Guatemalan men, Hector Balcarcel and Ricardo
    Guzman, were detained at the Guatemala-Belize border. They were taken
    into police custody, allegedly detained for 5 days, and Balcarcel
    allegedly was tortured. Balcarcel's report to the Human Rights
    Commission and the Guatemalan embassy claimed that he was stripped,
    handcuffed, burned with a lighter and habanero peppers on his genitals,
    beaten with a stick, and forced to drink his own urine. After an
    internal investigation, the police determined that these allegations
    were false. An internal review of this investigation still was underway
    at year's end.
        In June 1999, the authorities arrested a police constable and
    charged him with extortion and corruptly soliciting a reward. They
    relieved him of duty and put him on trial in the Supreme Court; the
    court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine.
        On March 16, two inmates at the Hattieville prison, Nehru Smith and
    Bert Elijios, were sentenced to receive corporal punishment in
    accordance with prison rules for assaulting and nearly killing another
    inmate. Smith and Elijios received 12 and 6 tamarind lashes
    respectively. The Minister of Prisons gave official support and
    approval for the floggings. On March 31, the newly reappointed prison
    governor stated that the floggings were necessary, but that while he
    was in charge, no other prisoners would be punished in that fashion.
        On March 17, between 300 and 400 prisoners at Hattieville reacted
    to the floggings by rioting. During the riot, one prisoner was killed,
    and three were hospitalized with gunshot wounds (see Section 1.a.). The
    matter still was before the DPP at year's end.
        On August 28, an inmate at the Hattieville correctional facility
    was given 12 lashes for stabbing a fellow inmate in the neck during an
    altercation over $2 (bz$4). A visiting judge sentenced the prisoner to
    the lashings following a hearing. The punishment was administered in
    accordance with prison rules, despite the new prison governor's earlier
    vow that floggings would not occur.
        Prison conditions are poor. Conditions at the Hattieville
    Department of Corrections--the country's only prison--have deteriorated
    continually since it opened in 1993. Although designed to house 500
    inmates, it houses 745 male inmates and 20 female inmates, resulting in
    approximately 6 inmates in each 6-by-9 foot cell. The majority of
    prison accommodations do not have showers or toilets. Instead, inmates
    are provided with 5-gallon buckets. The prison psychiatrist provides
    mental health services for inmates. There is no separate facility for
    inmates with mental illnesses. First-time offenders are housed in the
    same building as those who commit capital crimes. Noncitizens
    constitute approximately 15 to 20 percent of the prison population.
    There are rare reports of human rights abuses in the form of physical
    brutality by prison wardens. Incidents of gang- and drug-related
    violence in the prison are on the rise. Frequent prison breaks,
    confiscation of weapons, and reports of beatings have occurred
    throughout the prison's history. Prison authorities estimated that they
    confiscated more than 1,500 deadly weapons by year's end. The
    authorities reported that there were 53 prison escapes during the year;
    all but 3 escapees were captured by year's end.
        The prison includes a separate facility for women.
        The Government took steps to curb recidivism and focus on
    rehabilitation. The Youth Enhancement Agency (YEA) houses over 60
    youths between the ages of 13 and 25, who participate in rehabilitation
    and job training programs. Prison authorities provided training for
    inmates in basic skilled trades such as carpentry. Increasingly,
    youthful offenders are transferred from the main prison to the YEA
    facilities. A job-training program at a citrus farm employs 44 inmates.
    There is a timeoff program for good behavior.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government observes
    these provisions to a degree; however, there were occasional
    accusations of arbitrary arrest and detention.
        The law requires the police to inform a detainee of the cause of
    detention within 48 hours of arrest and to bring the person before a
    court to be charged formally within 72 hours. In practice the
    authorities normally inform detainees immediately of the charges
    against them. Bail is granted in all but the most serious cases. In
    cases involving narcotics, the police cannot grant bail, but a
    magistrate's court may do so after a full hearing. There are persistent
    allegations that security forces hold detainees for 72 hours and
    release them, but upon release, arrest them again. In May the newly
    appointed Supreme Court Chief Justice published and promulgated ``The
    Judges' Rules,'' which outline a code of conduct to which police
    officers must adhere when dealing with arrested persons. Many detainees
    cannot afford bail, and backlogs in the docket often cause considerable
    delays and postponement of hearings, resulting in an overcrowded
    prison, and at times prolonged incarceration before trial.
        The Constitution forbids exile, and it does not occur in practice.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
    provision in practice; however, at times the judiciary is subject to
    political influence. The appearance of judicial independence from the
    executive branch is compromised because some foreign judges and the
    Director of Public Prosecutions must negotiate renewal of their
    contracts with the Government and thus may be vulnerable to political
    interference. In February the Government appointed a new Supreme Court
    Chief Justice, Abdullai Conteh, a jurist from Sierra Leone.
        The judiciary consists of the magistrate's courts, the Supreme
    Court, the Court of Appeals, and a family court that handles cases of
    child abuse, domestic violence, and child support. Those convicted by
    either a magistrate's court or the Supreme Court may appeal to the
    Court of Appeals. In exceptional cases, including those resulting in a
    capital sentence, the convicted party may make a final appeal to the
    Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
        Persons accused of civil or criminal offenses have constitutional
    rights to presumption of innocence, protection against self-
    incrimination, defense by counsel, a public trial, and appeal. Legal
    counsel for indigent defendants is provided by the State only for
    capital crimes. In April 1999, the Government appointed an attorney to
    the Legal Aid Center to improve and strengthen legal aid services to
    the public. The judicial system is constrained by a severe lack of
    trained personnel, and police officers often act as prosecutors in the
    magistrate's courts.
        Trial by jury is mandatory in capital cases.
        A Political Reform Commission recommended that the family court be
    placed at the same level as the magistrate's courts, a recommendation
    that the Government adopted. However, trials in cases that come before
    the family court generally are private. The convicted party in family
    court may appeal to the Supreme Court. Defendants have the right to be
    present at their trial unless the opposing party fears for his or her
    safety. In such a case, the court grants interim provisions under which
    both parties are addressed individually during a 5day period.
        There are lengthy trial backlogs in the judicial system. One factor
    commonly cited is the low pay offered to judges, resulting in high
    turnover rates. In addition an inordinate number of significant
    narcotics-related cases are taking years to resolve. In these cases,
    defendants often are released on minimal bail payments. In April 1999,
    two retired judges were named to the Supreme Court in a temporary
    capacity to help reduce backlogs. At year's end, only three justices
    served on the Supreme Court, instead of the full complement of five.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violators are
    subject to legal action. However, there were several cases in which the
    previous government exercised its power under the right of eminent
    domain in an arbitrary manner. Such cases take years to resolve in the
    courts.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press but also permits the authorities to
    make ``reasonable provisions'' in the interests of defense, public
    safety, public order, public morality, or public health. These
    provisions include forbidding any citizen to question the validity of
    the financial disclosure statements submitted by public officials.
    Anyone who questions these statements orally or in writing outside a
    rigidly prescribed procedure is subject to a fine of up to $2,500
    (bz$5,000), or imprisonment of up to 3 years, or both.
        A wide range of viewpoints is presented publicly, usually without
    government interference, in seven privately owned weekly newspapers,
    three of which are affiliated directly with major political parties.
    There is no daily press. All newspapers are subject to the constraints
    of libel laws.
        There are a range of privately owned commercial radio stations. In
    addition to these local stations, there are two British military
    stations that broadcast news directly from London. Popular radio call-
    in programs are lively and feature open criticism of and comments on
    government and political matters.
        There are eight privately owned television broadcasting stations,
    including several cable networks in Belize City and the major towns.
    The Government's Belize Information Service issues press releases and
    maintains an Internet web site. Two independent television stations
    produce local news and feature programs. The Belize Broadcasting
    Authority regulates broadcasting and asserts its right to preview
    certain broadcasts, such as those with political content, and to delete
    any defamatory or personally libelous material from political
    broadcasts.
        The law provides for academic freedom, and the Government respects
    it in practice.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects it in
    practice. Political parties and other groups with political objectives
    freely hold rallies and mass meetings. The organizers of public
    meetings must obtain a permit 36 hours in advance of the meetings; such
    permits are not denied for political reasons and are granted routinely
    in practice.
        The Constitution permits citizens to form and join associations of
    their choosing, both political and nonpolitical, and the Government
    respects these provisions in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The law provides for granting of asylum or refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
    organizations. The Government's Refugee Department officially closed on
    December 31, 1999. Since then, the UNHCR has relied upon a local
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) to monitor the status of asylees and
    to represent its interests. There were 12 refugees receiving UNHCR
    assistance and awaiting the opportunity to apply for asylum in the
    country. Most are African, originating from Nigeria or Sierra Leone.
        The previous administration appointed members to an eligibility
    committee to review applications for asylum. The committee, which
    included a UNHCR representative, met on a weekly basis. In 1998 the
    Government turned down 30 requests for asylum. The Government has not
    established an eligibility committee since the change of administration
    in 1998. The Government has not accepted applications and no mechanism
    exists to adjudicate asylum requests. There is no legislation that
    formalizes the asylum process. The Government last honored the
    principle of first asylum in the case of four persons in 1995.
        In the wake of the civil conflicts in Central America in the
    1980's, over 40,000 predominantly Hispanic migrants came to Belize,
    many of them entering illegally and living without documentation. In
    May 1999, the Government instituted a 6-week amnesty initiative whereby
    undocumented migrants were eligible to obtain legal residency,
    provided: They had lived in Belize continuously for 4 years, married a
    Belizean citizen or had a stable common-law association, had Belizean
    children, or, if female, were at least 4 months pregnant. The amnesty
    is expected to benefit about 5,000 UNHCR-registered asylees, as well as
    13,000 others. Officials continued processing amnesty applications
    during the year.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Belize is a democracy governed by a national assembly with
    executive direction from a cabinet of ministers headed by Prime
    Minister Said Musa. The law requires national elections every 5 years.
    The Government changed hands in August 1998 when the PUP won 26 of 29
    seats in the House of Representatives in free and fair elections.
        All elections are held by secret ballot, and suffrage is universal
    for citizens 18 years of age and older. National political parties
    include the People's United Party, the United Democratic Party (UDP),
    and the National Alliance for Belizean Rights (NABR). The country's
    ethnic diversity is reflected in each party's membership.
        No laws impede participation of women in politics; however, they
    are somewhat underrepresented in electoral politics due to both
    tradition and socioeconomic factors. Voters elected 2 women to the 29-
    seat House of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House and the
    President of the Senate, both appointed, are women. Women also hold a
    number of other appointive offices, including four of nine senate
    seats, one cabinet position, and three are permanent secretaries in
    ministries. The Chief Elections Officer is also a woman.
        There are no laws impeding participation by indigenous people or
    minority groups in politics. There are Mestizo, Creole, Maya, and
    Garifuna representatives in Parliament.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Human Rights Commission of Belize (HRCB), an NGO affiliated
    with regional human rights organizations and partly funded by the
    UNHCR, operates without government restriction on a wide range of
    issues, including migrant and agricultural workers' rights and cases of
    alleged police abuse. The HRCB publishes human rights complaints and
    urges police and other governmental bodies to act upon them. The HRCB
    gained prominence through media reports about its workshops and
    seminars that educate citizens about human rights.
        International human rights groups operate freely as well.
    Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
    activities.
        The Government's Ombudsman, a position created in 1999, stated that
    his office receives an average of two to three complaints of human
    rights violations per week. The second and third most common complaints
    his office receives involve police misconduct and brutality and
    misconduct on the part of Department of Corrections' personnel. The
    Ombudsman estimated that at year's end, his office would have
    approximately 10 pending cases of this type.
        In his first annual report, the Ombudsman highlighted three primary
    concerns: unprofessional police behavior; lack of response by public
    officials to the Ombudsman's formal inquiries; and public officials'
    lack of knowledge regarding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The report
    stated that the office had received 213 formal complaints (about all
    types of perceived abuse by government agencies) in its first 7 months
    of existence; of which the 3-person office had resolved 134 cases.
        On May 9, the Office of the Ombudsman and the HRCB signed a
    memorandum of understanding coordinating efforts to curb human rights
    abuses.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The country is multiracial and multiethnic, and the Government
    actively promotes tolerance and cross-cultural understanding.
    Discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds is illegal and rare,
    although ethnic tension, particularly resentment of recently arrived
    Central American and Asian immigrants, continued to be a problem. The
    Government continues to reserve certain professions for citizens,
    granting permits and licenses to noncitizens only in specific cases.
    These occupations include fishing, souvenir manufacturing, sightseeing
    tours, accounting, insurance, real estate, and legal services.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Based on reported
    cases, the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society
    estimated that there were about 1,000 domestic violence cases during
    the year. A shelter for battered women offers short-term housing. The
    Belize Organization for Women and Development, an NGO, advises women on
    their rights and provides counseling. Laws prohibit rape and sexual
    harassment, but few offenders are charged and convicted. In October
    1999, an expanded criminal code outlawed marital rape. Shortly
    thereafter, the Police Department created a police family violence unit
    in order to combat spousal abuse.
        Despite constitutional provisions for equality, women face social
    and economic prejudice. Women find it more difficult than men to obtain
    business and agricultural financing and other resources. Most employed
    women are concentrated in female-dominated occupations with
    traditionally low status and wages. The Women's Bureau in the Ministry
    of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society is charged with
    developing programs to improve the status of women. That Ministry
    estimated that women would receive 35 percent of all small business
    loans during the year. A number of officially registered women's groups
    work closely with various government ministries in promoting social
    awareness programs. Women have access to education and are active in
    all spheres of national life, but relatively few hold top managerial
    positions. However, women head the Belize Business Bureau, Belize
    Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Belize Citrus Growers Association,
    several prominent environmental NGO's, and the Belize Rotary Club. The
    law mandates equal pay for equal work, but female workers often earn
    less than men in similar jobs. There are no legal impediments to women
    owning or managing land or other real property.
        There were reports that women have been trafficked for purposes of
    prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Children.--Education is compulsory for children between the ages of
    5 and 15. After children finish their primary education, they may enter
    a secondary school, the government-run apprenticeship program, or a
    vocational institution. However, these programs have room for only
    about one-half of the children finishing primary school; competition
    for spaces in secondary school is intense. Education is nominally free,
    but various school, book, and uniform fees place education out of reach
    for many poor children.
        The Family Services Division in the Ministry of Human Development,
    Women, and Civil Society is devoted primarily to children's issues. The
    division coordinates programs for children who are victims of domestic
    violence, advocates remedies in specific cases before the family court,
    conducts public education campaigns, investigates cases of trafficking
    in children (see Section 6.f.), and works with NGO's and UNICEF to
    promote children's welfare. The National Committee for Families and
    Children includes a representative from the Ministry of Human
    Development, Women, and Civil Society.
        Child abuse is not considered to be widespread or a societal
    problem. In 1998 Parliament passed the Families and Children Act, and
    in 1999 the National Organization for the Prevention of Child Abuse
    (NOPCA) published a handbook for the public that outlined in plain
    language provisions of the law. The law allows authorities to remove a
    child legally from an abusive home environment, removes the limit
    placed on child support that a parent must pay, and allows men to file
    for support, as well as women. It requires parents to maintain and
    support a child until he or she reaches the age of 18, compared with
    the previous law's mandate of support up to the age of 16. The law also
    accepts DNA testing as legal proof of paternity and maternity. It
    requires that all adoptions be reported to the Human Development
    Department of the Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil
    Society, and that prospective parents be screened before they may adopt
    a child. The NOPCA instituted a nationwide telephone help line to
    encourage discourse and reduce abuse.
        There were some reports that children were trafficked for the
    purpose of forced prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically
    for accessibility for disabled persons or prohibit job discrimination
    against them. The Government's Disability Services Unit, as well as a
    number of NGO's, such as the Belize Association of and for Persons with
    Disabilities and the Belize Center for the Visually Impaired, provide
    assistance to physically disabled persons. Disabled children have
    access to government special education facilities, although the
    requirements to enter such programs are strict.
        Indigenous People.--Among the country's indigenous people, the
    Mopan and Ke'kchi are grouped under the general term Maya, although
    their leaders say that they should be identified as the Masenal,
    meaning ``common people.'' The Maya have sought official recognition of
    their communal claims to land, but the Government has been reluctant to
    single out one ethnic group for special consideration. The Government
    has designated 77,000 acres as 9 separate Mayan reserves; however,
    Mayan leaders claim that the Maya have an ancestral claim to a total of
    500,000 acres. The Maya have formed cultural councils and other groups
    to advance their interests, sometimes with the collaboration of NGO's
    concerned with environmental and indigenous issues. Several Mayan
    organizations have filed suit to force the Government to recognize the
    Maya's ancestral land rights and to prevent further granting of logging
    concessions on the disputed land.
        On October 12, the Government and the Mayan People of Southern
    Belize signed a collective agreement to address the grievances set
    forth in a petition by Mayan community leaders in the summer of 1998.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--By law and in practice, workers
    generally are free to establish and join trade unions. Eleven
    independent unions, whose members constitute approximately 11 percent
    of the labor force, represent a cross-section of white-collar, blue-
    collar, and professional workers, including most civil service
    employees. However, several of these unions are inactive. The Ministry
    of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor recognizes unions
    after they file with the Registrar's Office. The law empowers members
    to draft the bylaws and the constitutions of their unions, and they are
    free to elect officers from among the membership at large. Unions that
    choose not to hold elections may act as representatives for their
    membership, but the national Trade Union Congress permits only unions
    that hold free and annual elections of officers to join its ranks. Both
    law and precedent effectively protect unions against dissolution or
    suspension by administrative authority.
        The law permits unions to strike and does not require them to give
    notice before going on strike.
        Although no unions are affiliated officially with political
    parties, several are sympathetic to one or the other of the two main
    parties (the PUP and the UDP).
        Unions freely exercise the right to form federations and
    confederations and affiliate with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for collective bargaining and unions practice it freely
    throughout the country. Employers and unions set wages in free
    negotiations, or, more commonly, employers simply establish them. The
    Labor Commissioner or his representative acts as a mediator in
    deadlocked collective bargaining negotiations between labor and
    management, offering nonbinding counsel to both sides. Historically the
    Commissioner's guidance has been accepted voluntarily. However, should
    either union or management choose not to accept the Commissioner's
    decision, both are entitled to a legal hearing of the case, provided
    that it is linked to some provision of civil or criminal law.
        The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination both before and
    after a union is registered. Unions may organize freely, but the law
    does not require employers to recognize a union as a bargaining agent.
    For example, although the registered Banana Workers Union actively
    advocated worker rights, it was not recognized by the banana industry's
    growers association due to low membership. Some employers have been
    known to block union organization by terminating the employment of key
    union sympathizers, usually on grounds purportedly unrelated to union
    activities. Effective redress is extremely difficult to obtain in such
    situations. Technically, a worker can file a complaint with the Labor
    Department, but in practice it is virtually impossible to prove that a
    termination was due to union activity.
        The Labor Code applies in the country's export processing zones
    (EPZ's). There are no unions in the EPZ's, reflecting the general
    weakness of organized labor in the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    laws forbid forced, compulsory or bonded labor, including that
    performed by children, and generally it is not known to occur; however,
    there were reports that women were trafficked and infrequent reports
    that children also were trafficked for the purpose of forced
    prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Act prohibits all employment of children under
    age 12, and prohibits employment of children between the ages of 12 and
    14, before the end of school hours on official school days. The minimum
    age for employment is 17 years for work near hazardous machinery.
    Inspectors from the Departments of Labor and Education enforce this
    regulation. During the year, truancy officers, who historically have
    borne the brunt of the enforcement burden, were more active. The law
    requires children between the ages of 5 and 15 to attend school, but
    there are many truants and dropouts. According to the Central
    Statistics Office, in the 1990's, 46 percent of children did not
    complete primary school, and 10 percent of those children never
    enrolled in school at all. On March 21, the Government ratified
    International Labor Organization Convention No. 182 on the worst forms
    of child labor.
        Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and in general
    the Government effectively enforces this prohibition; however, there
    were infrequent reports of trafficking in children for purposes of
    prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $1.12
    (bz$2.25), except in export industries, where it is $1.00 (bz$2.00) per
    hour. For domestic workers in private households and shop assistants in
    stores where liquor is not consumed, the rate is $0.87 (bz$1.75) per
    hour. The minimum wage law does not cover workers paid on a piecework
    basis. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Public Services, and Labor
    is charged with enforcing the legal minimum wage, which generally is
    respected in practice. The minimum wage as sole source of income does
    not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
    salaried workers receive more than the minimum wage.
        The law sets the normal workweek at no more than 6 days or 45
    hours. It requires payment for overtime work, 13 public holidays, an
    annual vacation of 2 weeks, and sick leave for up to 16 days. An
    employee is eligible for severance pay provided that he was employed
    continuously for at least 5 years.
        The exploitation of undocumented Guatemalan, Honduran, and
    Salvadoran workers, particularly young service workers and possibly
    some agricultural workers, continued to be a problem. Banana farm
    owners slowly are moving the housing they provide for their workers
    away from the fields where poisonous pesticides are sprayed. Health
    clinics in the region report that the most frequently treated ailments
    are pesticide-related skin conditions. Company-provided housing often
    lacks electricity and water. The Government, the HRCB, and other
    concerned citizens all focus on this problem; however, since turnover
    rates of banana workers are so high, organizing this segment of the
    work force is difficult.
        A patchwork of health and safety regulations covers numerous
    industries, and the Labor Department in the Ministry of Industry,
    Commerce, Public Services, and Labor enforces these regulations to
    varying degrees. Enforcement is not universal, and the ministries
    commit their limited inspection and investigative resources principally
    to urban and more accessible rural areas where labor, health, and
    safety complaints have been registered. Workers have the legal right to
    remove themselves from a dangerous workplace situation without jeopardy
    to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, it does proscribe procurement for the
    purpose of prostitution. Nonetheless, one dance hall owner reportedly
    recruited women from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to work as
    prostitutes by promising them jobs as dancers, waitresses, or
    domestics. Upon arrival, the employer allegedly takes their passports,
    forces them to engage in prostitution, and holds their wages. The
    police have investigated, but had not made any arrests by year's end,
    nor had the Government taken any other steps to address this practice.
        The Ministry of Human Development, Women, and Civil Society, the
    police department, and--in cases involving migrant children--the
    Ministry of National Security and Immigration investigate and attempt
    to remedy cases that involve trafficking in children (see Section 5).
    According to a spokesperson from the Human Development Department,
    there were infrequent reports of trafficking in children for the
    purpose of prostitution; most involved migrant children.
                                   __________

                                    BOLIVIA

        A constitutional, multiparty democracy with an elected president
    and bicameral legislature, Bolivia has separate executive, legislative,
    and judicial branches of government, with an attorney general
    independent of all three. President Hugo Banzer Suarez of the
    Nationalist Democratic Action party took office in August 1997. The
    government coalition controls the Senate but only has a plurality of 57
    out of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the coalition
    holds the leadership positions in both chambers. The executive and
    legislative branches suffer from corruption and inefficiency to some
    extent. The judiciary, while independent, also is corrupt and
    inefficient.
        The National Police have primary responsibility for internal
    security, but military forces can be called upon for help in critical
    situations, and this occurred during the year. The police provided
    security for coca eradication work crews in the Chapare region. A
    special counternarcotics force (FELCN), including the Mobile Rural
    Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), is dedicated to antinarcotics enforcement.
    Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over the
    security forces; however, some members of these forces committed human
    rights abuses.
        Bolivia has extensive poverty, and many citizens lack access to
    such basic services as potable water, sewage, electricity, and primary
    health care. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is about $1,087.
    According to the World Bank, between 1993 and 1999, approximately 67
    percent of the population lived below the national poverty line. The
    country is rich in minerals and hydrocarbons, and extensive investments
    in petroleum deposits in the eastern and southern parts of the country
    are expected to form a basis for strong GDP growth in the future.
    However, most workers engage in traditional agriculture, and many
    citizens remain barely linked to the cash economy.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, problems remain in certain areas. Legal and
    institutional deficiencies prevented the full protection of citizens'
    rights. In April violent demonstrations and road blockages broke out in
    Cochabamba over a controversial municipal water project, and unrelated
    protests occurred across the country, leading to the deaths of
    protesters as well as members of the security forces; commerce was
    brought to a virtual halt. On April 8, President Banzer declared a
    state of siege, which Congress approved on April 13. The stage of siege
    ended on April 20. Nongovernmental human rights organizations
    criticized the state of siege and the killings, injuries, and
    preventive detentions that took place during it. Violent demonstrations
    and other confrontations due to an unrelated list of grievances against
    the Government also took place in September and October, and resulted
    in the deaths of up to 10 civilians, 4 security officials, and the
    spouse of 1 of the security officials. There were a number of
    allegations of torture. There were credible reports of abuses by
    police, including use of excessive force, petty theft, extortion, and
    improper arrests. Investigations of alleged official abuses were slow.
    Prison conditions are harsh and at times police arbitrarily arrested
    and detained persons. The most pervasive human rights abuse continued
    to be prolonged incarceration of detainees due to antiquated procedures
    and inefficiency and corruption in the judicial system. Other problems
    include infringements on citizens' privacy rights, government attempts
    to intimidate some news media, violence and discrimination against
    women, abuse of children, discrimination against and abuse of
    indigenous people, discrimination against Afro-Bolivians, child labor,
    inhuman working conditions in the mining industry, and trafficking in
    women.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings. However, security forces
    killed some protesters during violent demonstrations in April and
    September.
        In April violent demonstrations and road blockages broke out in
    Cochabamba over a controversial municipal water project. These
    demonstrations, combined with unrelated protests across the country,
    brought commerce to a virtual halt. On April 8, President Banzer
    declared a state of siege. Under a state of siege, the President has
    the authority to forbid demonstrations that threaten the public order
    and detain persons who are suspected of plotting against the public
    order (see Section 1.d.). In the days that followed, there were violent
    clashes between security forces and demonstrators. It appears likely
    that at least three out of the four civilians killed during the April
    demonstration were killed by security forces. In addition, 1 army
    officer was killed, and over 50 persons were injured. The state of
    siege ended on April 20.
        On October 10, the civilian justice system ordered 17 military
    officers and soldiers to testify or face arrest on charges in the death
    of a protester on April 8 in Cochabamba. The military officials did not
    testify and sought to have the case transferred to the military justice
    system at year's end. The Government agreed to pay all medical costs,
    as well as compensation up to $1,575 (10,000 bolivianos), to those
    injured in the violent disturbances in April, September, and October,
    depending on the severity of the injury. In addition, the Government
    awarded up to $2,362 (15,000 bolivianos) in compensation to the
    families of those killed in April and up to $3,937 (25,000 bolivianos)
    to the families of those killed in September. At year's end, the
    Government was paying the medical costs and had compensated the
    families of those persons killed in April but had not yet compensated
    those injured in April, September, and October, nor paid compensation
    to the families of those killed in September.
        The military justice case against alleged sharpshooter Captain
    Robinson Iriarte Lafuente, who was videotaped by television news
    organizations in civilian clothes kneeling alongside troops and firing
    a rifle during the disturbances in Cochabamba, was pending at year's
    end. On April 27, Captain Iriarte testified before the congressional
    Human Rights Committee that he fired shots in three different locations
    at walls and buildings to intimidate civilians who were rioting nearby.
    Iriarte claimed that each time he received permission from a superior
    officer at the scene. Armed Forces Commander Admiral Jorge Zabala
    earlier told the Congressional Human Rights Committee that, during the
    state of siege, soldiers only were authorized to fire live ammunition
    by order of their commander, and the 7th Division Commander, Brigadier
    General Jose Antonio Gil, testified that he gave no such order.
        The Constitution provides for declaration of a state of siege,
    which the Congress must approve, and many administrations have utilized
    it. In August the Constitutional Tribunal affirmed the
    constitutionality of the state of siege. However, human rights
    organizations criticized the state of siege and the resulting deaths,
    injuries, and detentions (see Section 1.d.).
        Violent demonstrations and other confrontations, due to an
    unrelated list of grievances against the Government, also took place in
    September and October. Protesting groups ranged from illegal coca
    growers in the Chapare, indigenous farmers in the highlands, to urban
    and rural teachers' unions, to groups protesting a controversial
    municipal water project in Cochabamba. These demonstrations resulted in
    the deaths of up to 10 civilians, and approximately 180 civilians were
    injured. At least three of these deaths were not plausibly attributable
    to the security forces. The Government enjoined the security forces to
    act with restraint and to avoid head-to-head conflict with
    demonstrators, and their performances generally were in keeping with
    these orders, despite violent provocations (see Section 2.b.). In
    addition, four security officials and the spouse of one of them
    disappeared in the Chapare during the disturbances and later were found
    tortured and murdered. Another security official was missing and
    presumed dead at year's end.
        The case of the November 1999 death of Miguel Angel continued to
    move slowly through the judicial system. Rivero Siles, a 17-year-old
    prisoner accused of murder, died due to severe burns suffered while he
    was held in a solitary confinement cell at San Sebastian prison in
    Cochabamba. Investigations into actions by police at the prison
    continued during the year. The authorities removed the prison governor,
    closed the solitary confinement cells, and replaced them with a regular
    jail cell that is used to punish prisoners for poor behavior by
    isolating them from the rest of the prison (see Section 1.c.).
        The case of 18-year-old Marcelo Botelho, who police arrested in
    October 1999 in Santa Cruz and who died the next day in a hospital, was
    closed. Although there were allegations that the police had beaten
    Botelho, there were no eyewitness reports, and the Government did not
    pursue a case against the police.
        On May 20, 1999, police arrested Peruvian businessman Carlos Freddy
    Cano Lopez, after he refused to pay a disputed taxi fare. Cano suffered
    third degree burns over 50 percent of his body when his cell
    mysteriously caught fire. The authorities transferred Cano to a
    hospital in Lima, Peru, where he died in June 1999. The authorities
    suspended the policemen in question and their judicial case was pending
    at year's end.
        On January 13, the Government completed investigations and issued
    reports concerning the five unresolved cases of civilian deaths during
    the fatal confrontations between security forces and illegal coca
    growers in the Chapare in the spring of 1998. The reports were
    forwarded to the Cochabamba district attorney who recommended on
    February 1 that all five cases (plus two others) be closed. However, a
    judge in Villa Tunari decided to continue proceedings on three cases
    and following his decision allegedly received threats, which later
    apparently ceased. The three cases in question subsequently were
    transferred to a Superior Court in Cochabamba, which ruled that two of
    the cases should be closed and that one case, the death of Alberto Coca
    Cayo, should be sent back to the judge in Villa Tunari to continue
    proceedings. Military officers charged in the case petitioned for the
    case to be transferred to the military justice system. The case was
    transferred back to the superior court in Cochabamba, where the
    decision as to which jurisdiction would consider the case was pending
    at year's end.
        After 2-1years, the Government completed its investigations into
    the December 1996 events at Amayapampa and Capasirca that left nine
    civilians and one policeman dead in clashes between miners and security
    forces. The findings held five military officers responsible but
    absolved then-President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and his ministers of
    any responsibility. The cases against the accused officers were pending
    in the military justice system at year's end; five officers were
    reassigned to nonoperational units pending the outcome of their legal
    cases. An attempt in Congress to censure Sanchez de Lozada and his
    ministers also was pending at year's end. The Government's delay in
    completing effective investigations and identifying and punishing those
    responsible for either civilian or security force deaths results in an
    atmosphere of impunity.
        There was violence during the year against government security
    forces and coca eradication crews. On January 20, an unknown assailant
    shot and killed Joint Eradication Task Force (JTF) conscript Raul
    Almendras; police later arrested a coca grower as a suspect in the
    murder. On May 14, a government helicopter flying in support of
    eradication efforts was fired upon; one JTF soldier was wounded. The
    JTF in the Chapare was fired upon on August 2, and the Ecological
    Police, who provide security for the JTF, returned fire and wounded one
    of the assailants, who subsequently was arrested along with a
    companion. On August 18, there were two serious explosive incidents
    that injured a policeman and another government employee. One suspect
    subsequently was arrested. In separate booby trap blasts on October 11,
    a coca eradication soldier and a civilian were injured. On October 21,
    as the JTF near Puerto Zudanez was returning to base camp, it was fired
    upon. Two members of the JTF were killed and four were wounded. On
    November 13, the JTF column was ambushed while proceeding to eradicate
    coca in the Ismael Montes sector. One policeman, Abad Espinoza, was
    killed.
        There were several reported cases of alleged criminals lynched or
    burned by civilians, sometimes resulting in death, for their alleged
    crimes.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        The case of Jose Carlos Trujillo Oroza drew renewed attention as
    the most prominent of the cases of those who disappeared during the
    1971-78 de facto regime of President Hugo Banzer Suarez. Trujillo's
    mother presented the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
    in June 1999. The security forces had detained Trujillo, a 21-year-old
    university student, in December 1971, and he never was seen again after
    February 2, 1972. Trujillo's mother first presented his case to the
    Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in September 1992. In 1996
    President Sanchez de Lozada's Government accepted responsibility for
    Trujillo's arrest and disappearance and named those responsible, but
    did not hold them accountable. On January 25, the Banzer Government
    accepted responsibility for Trujillo's arrest and disappearance before
    the Court. The Government offered to begin negotiations with Trujillo's
    mother, who is seeking the return of her son's remains and punishment
    for those responsible, with the goal of an amicable settlement. These
    negotiations still were unsuccessful at year's end. The Government was
    pursuing cases against some persons accused of torture and deprivation
    of freedom, but not murder, in the Trujillo case. At year's end, the
    family was appealing the decision of the judicial system not to pursue
    murder charges.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government
    generally respects this provision; however, there were a number of
    significant allegations of torture, beatings, and abuse by members of
    the security forces. There were no independently confirmed reports of
    abuse or beatings by security forces of civilians during the year.
        During the April state of siege (see Section 1.a.), there were
    allegations that the military took residents of Achacachi into custody
    in the middle of the night and beat them in an attempt to learn the
    names of those responsible for the death of an army captain. The army
    captain was an officer in a unit thought by demonstrators to be
    responsible for the earlier death of a civilian in Achacachi. A mob
    beat the captain, and after he was taken to a hospital, dragged him
    from the hospital and beat him to death. There also were allegations
    that arrestees from Patacamaya during the state of siege were beaten by
    the military prior to being transferred to the custody of the PTJ.
        There were allegations that security officials beat protesters who
    they detained in the Chapare during the September-October disturbances,
    as well as allegations that they beat civilians to try to learn the
    location of missing security officials and the names of those
    responsible for their deaths.
        There also were credible allegations that military officers and
    sergeants beat and otherwise mistreated military conscripts. The
    military justice case against superiors accused of allegedly beating
    conscript Roger Candia Vallejos in September and November 1999
    continued at year's end.
        Several police officers were fired and charged for off-duty crimes,
    and a number were dismissed for corruption. However, in general the
    police were not disposed to investigate their own colleagues, and
    prosecutors were reluctant to prosecute security officials for alleged
    offenses committed while on duty.
        Neither the technical and judicial police nor prosecutors normally
    receive human rights training. Over 6,000 FELCN members, PTJ members,
    lawyers, prosecutors, and judges received training on bail provisions
    of the new Code of Criminal Procedures. In July foreign consultants
    conducted a 1-week human rights course for 33 FELCN investigators. The
    basic FELCN and UMOPAR training includes a human rights module.
        In September 1999, the military signed a cooperation agreement with
    the Ombudsman's office and, in November 1999, the military concluded an
    agreement for cooperation and coordination for human rights training
    with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, which took place during
    the year.
        Indigenous communities in areas with little or no central
    government presence impose punishment reliably reported to include the
    death penalty on members who violate traditional laws or rules,
    although the Constitution prohibits such punishment.
        Prison conditions are harsh. Prisons are overcrowded, and
    conditions can be life threatening for inmates without money. According
    to the Director General of the Penal System in the Ministry of
    Government, as of July there were approximately 8,500 prisoners in
    facilities designed to hold 4,400 prisoners. The majority of all
    prisoners were held for narcotics crimes. The Pardon and Extraordinary
    Freedom Jubilee 2000 Law, an amended version of which took effect on
    December 8, is expected to reduce this overcrowding. The law pardons
    prisoners under the age of 21 or over the age of 60; reduces felony
    sentences by onethird for all prisoners sentenced prior to August 30;
    and pardons prisoners who are parents of minor children and have
    completed at least 50 percent of their sentences. (Reductions in felony
    sentences are not extended to prisoners convicted of murder, parricide,
    or treason, nor to most prisoners convicted of terrorism, rape, or
    narcotics trafficking. In addition, prisoners who were convicted for
    murder, rape, kidnaping, terrorism, or narcotics crimes and sentenced
    to more than 10 years in jail are not eligible for the benefits given
    to prisoners under age 21 or over age 60, or to parents of minor
    children.) The one-third reduction in sentences is expected to be that
    many prisoners would then have served over 50 percent of their
    sentences and thus be eligible for parole much sooner than expected.
    The law is expected to lead to the release of between 1,500 and 2,000
    prisoners over the course of 2001.
        Ability to pay can determine a prisoner's cell size, visiting
    privileges, day-pass eligibility, and place or even length of
    confinement. Cell prices range from $20 to $5,000 (125 to 30,000
    bolivianos), paid to prior occupants or to prisoners who control cell
    blocks. For example, in the poorest parts of San Pedro prison in La
    Paz, inmates occupy tiny cells (3 by 4 by 6 feet) with no ventilation,
    lighting, or beds. Crowding in some ``low-rent'' sections obliges
    inmates to sleep sitting up. Although only children up to 6 years old
    are supposed to live with an incarcerated parent, children as old as
    age 12 live with their fathers in San Pedro prison. According to the
    Director General, as of July there were 900 children living with a
    parent in prison. If such children have nowhere else to go, the
    Government considers it more humane to support them in prison than to
    leave them homeless in the streets. The standard prison diet, according
    to a 1995 study, can cause anemia; the diet has not been improved since
    then. The Government budgets only $0.32 (2 bolivianos) per prisoner per
    day for food. Prisoners who can afford to use their own money to
    supplement the standard prison diet by buying food do so. There is no
    adequate health care within the prisons, and it is very difficult for
    prisoners to get permission for outside medical treatment. However,
    affluent prisoners can obtain transfers to preferred prisons or even to
    outside private institutional care for ``medical'' reasons. Drugs and
    alcohol are readily available for those inmates who can pay.
        There are separate prisons for women; conditions for female inmates
    are similar to those for men.
        Convicted juvenile prisoners are not segregated from adult
    prisoners in jails. Rehabilitation programs for juveniles or other
    prisoners are scarce to nonexistent. The Government has acknowledged
    these problems but does not have sufficient resources to correct them
    quickly.
        On June 28, Brazilian prisoner Mustafa Samir was found hanged and
    on June 29, Peruvians Omar Casis and Renaldo Montesinos were shot and
    killed at the maximum security San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison located
    near La Paz. Investigations into these deaths were pending at year's
    end. The prison houses the country's most violent prisoners and
    terrorists.
        Unlike 1999 there were no instances of prisoners dying from fires
    in their cells during the year. In November 1999, prisoner Miguel Angel
    Rivero Siles died as the result of a fire in his prison cell; in May
    1999 Carlos Freddy Cano Lopez was arrested and suffered severe burns
    after his cell mysteriously caught fire. He died in a hospital that
    June (see Section 1.a.). These were the second and third times since
    1998 that prisoners had been burned in their cells. In 1999 the
    authorities discharged the two policemen arrested for attempting to
    burn a drunken man in September 1998, but their judicial case still was
    pending at year's end. On November 29, 1999, the Ombudsman and the
    Ministry of Government signed an agreement that led to the closing of
    several prisons determined to have inhuman conditions, including the
    detention cell in La Paz where Cano Lopez was burned. The agreement
    also called for repair of other substandard prisons, including San
    Sebastian prison in Cochabamba where Rivero Siles was burned. The San
    Sebastian solitary confinement cells subsequently were removed and
    replaced by a regular jail cell (see Section 1.a.).
        In October 1999, Marcelo Botelho died in a Santa Cruz hospital and
    human rights organizations alleged that police had beaten the victim.
    However, there were no eyewitness reports, and the Government did not
    pursue a case against the police (see Section 1.a.).
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
    news media representatives.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were some
    instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests are carried out
    openly. The law requires a valid warrant, which a court must confirm
    within 48 hours. However, there were credible reports that these legal
    safeguards were violated in some cases.
        On April 8, President Banzer declared a state of siege (see Section
    1.a.), which under the Constitution provides for the detention of
    persons who are suspected of plotting against the public order. Those
    detained must be brought before a judge within 48 hours. The
    authorities detained 22 persons seen as instigators of the protests.
    Those detained included Felipe Quispe Huanca, executive secretary of
    the Sole Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
    (CSUTCB), and several other trade unionists, peasant leaders, and
    university students. Quispe, the leader of indigenous farmers who
    manned roadblocks outside La Paz, is a former terrorist in the Tupaj
    Katari Guerrilla Army who was imprisoned during 1992-97 and then
    granted conditional release. Another approximately 50 persons were
    arrested for violating the state of siege and later released. The
    Ombudsman and human rights organizations challenged the detentions as
    illegal, since the authorities detained the 22 persons on April 7,
    prior to the April 8 supreme decree that enacted the state of siege.
    All 22 detainees were released by April 14, and the state of siege
    ended on April 20. The La Paz superior court and the Constitutional
    Tribunal both ruled in favor of the habeas corpus petitions after the
    detainees already had been released. The Ombudsman's office noted that
    this state of siege was the first in which habeas corpus was used as a
    legal tactic to attempt to force the Government to release detainees.
    There were allegations that the military beat residents of Achacachi
    and arrestees from Patacamaya during the state of siege (see Section
    1.c.).
        Denial of justice through prolonged detention remains the most
    pervasive human rights problem. Judicial corruption, a shortage of
    public defenders, inadequate case-tracking mechanisms, and complex
    criminal justice procedures keep persons incarcerated for months, or
    even years, before trial. The Constitution provides for judicial
    determination of the legality of detention. Prisoners are released if a
    judge rules detention illegal, but the process can take months.
    Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately 70 percent cannot afford
    legal counsel, and public defenders are overburdened (see Section
    1.e.).
        According to a 1998 study, approximately 60 percent of those jailed
    still were waiting for the processing of their cases to be finished,
    and of those, 30 percent already had served what would have been the
    maximum sentence for the crime they were accused of committing.
        The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice
    by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the
    judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as
    they come to light. In May provisions of the new Code of Criminal
    Procedures replaced the release provisions of the Personal Recognizance
    Law, promulgated in 1996, which were never utilized effectively. Most
    prisoners still await either trial or sentencing, but under the new
    Code of Criminal Procedures the courts are beginning to provide release
    on bail for some prisoners. Judges still have the authority to order
    preventive detention for suspects under arrest deemed to be a flight
    risk or for obstruction of justice. If a suspect is not detained, a
    judge still can order significant restrictions on a suspect's travel.
        The expanding public defender program provides concise information
    about human rights to citizens and seeks to involve public defenders in
    arrest cases at the earliest possible juncture to ensure that human
    rights and due process are honored. A program of mobile public
    defenders who can reach the more remote parts of the country has proven
    effective.
        Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in
    children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their
    protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no
    judicial review.
        The 1997 abduction case of Waldo Albarracin, President of the
    Bolivian Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), continued to move
    slowly through the judicial system. The authorities had yet to take any
    action regarding the four police officials accused of abducting
    Albarracin, although legal cases against two policemen were pending at
    year's end.
        The Government does not use forced exile as a punishment.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent;
    however, corruption and intimidation in the judicial system remain
    major problems. Poor pay and working conditions help make judges and
    prosecutors susceptible to bribes.
        The judicial system has four levels of trial: Investigative, trial,
    superior court, and Supreme Court or Constitutional Court appellate
    review. Since the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1998,
    the Supreme Court hears only appeals of substantive laws, not
    constitutional issues. The system is essentially a closed, written
    system. With rare exceptions, a judge does not interview witnesses, nor
    does an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses before the
    judge exist. The highly formal and corrupt judicial system makes it
    difficult for poor, illiterate persons to have effective access to
    courts and legal redress.
        In cases not involving the narcotics law, a judge of instruction is
    in charge of the first stage. The judge instructs the police about what
    witness statements he wishes to take. A prosecutor, who is an overseer
    of correct procedure, may intervene, if the judge deems it necessary,
    to give an advisory opinion. Often this opinion is provided in advance
    and contains the statements of all witnesses interviewed by the police
    or the prosecutor. If the judge finds that the evidence is conclusive
    of guilt, the judge submits the case to a sentencing judge for review.
    This second stage of trial involves an analysis of this evidence by the
    trial judge, who allows the defense to present additional evidence. The
    trial judge is not required to seek additional evidence, although the
    judge may add additional witnesses to be interviewed if deemed
    necessary.
        In narcotics (Law 1008) cases, the FELCN handles the investigative
    stage, and there is no judicial review of cases to determine whether a
    case should move to the trial stage. This is expected to change when
    the new Code of Criminal Procedures takes full effect in 2001, and
    narcotics cases are expected to be handled the same as non-narcotics
    cases in the first two stages. The third stage of Superior Court review
    is essentially a review of all evidence, and the court may reopen the
    case for additional witnesses. The Supreme Court review, which is
    virtually automatic if sought in non-narcotics cases and is required in
    all narcotics cases, is a fourth iteration of that process. During the
    superior court and Supreme Court reviews, the courts may confirm,
    lower, raise, or annul sentences, or provide alternatives not
    contemplated in lower courts. The repetitive nature of this four-stage
    procedure requires a great deal of time before a final result is
    reached in an individual case.
        Defendants have constitutional rights to a presumption of
    innocence, to remain silent, to an attorney, to confront witnesses, to
    present evidence on their own behalf, to essential due process, and to
    appeal judicial decisions. However, in practice almost none of these
    rights systematically exist. The full implementation of the new Code of
    Criminal Procedures on May 31, 2001, is expected to alleviate some of
    these problems. The new code is expected to facilitate more efficient
    investigations, transparent oral trials, and credible verdicts.
    Although the law provides for a defense attorney at public expense if
    needed, one is not always promptly available. The Government has hired
    49 additional staff members to bolster rural public defense, achieving
    a total of 167 public defenders, legal assistants, and social workers.
        In October 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Judicial
    Council, established in 1998 to oversee the judicial process and to
    provide an impartial body to review the actions of judges, did not have
    the power to dismiss a Superior Court or higher level judge due to an
    administrative finding of malfeasance alone. The Court ruled that the
    removal of such a judge from office requires a final judgment and
    sentence of conviction in a criminal case tried before the Supreme
    Court. The Council retains its power to suspend without pay, for up to
    13 months, judges against whom a criminal charge has been filed or
    against whom a disciplinary process has been initiated.
        In early 1999, the Council had investigated numerous reports of
    judicial corruption, which led to the resignation or dismissal of more
    than 20 judges in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz. One of the
    dismissed judges, who allegedly accepted bribes from narcotics
    traffickers, protested his dismissal to the Constitutional Court, which
    ruled that only a court finding of malfeasance, rather than a finding
    by an administrative body such as the Council, was cause for dismissal.
    The Court's decision dealt a serious blow to the Judicial Council and
    weakened its role as a disciplinary body. At year's end, legislation
    was pending that would increase the Council's suspension powers to 3
    years or would reinstate the Council's power to dismiss judges found
    guilty of malfeasance by the Council.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of the home
    and the privacy of citizens; however, while the authorities generally
    respect these provisions, there were credible allegations of UMOPAR
    abuses involving thefts of property. Residents in the cocagrowing areas
    generally are reluctant to file and pursue formal complaints. On May
    17, the Government reopened a human rights office of the Ministry of
    Justice and Human Rights in Chimore in the Chapare region (see Section
    4).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
    fundamental right to express ideas and opinions freely by any means of
    dissemination; however, there are some limitations on freedom of
    speech, and the Government attempted to intimidate some news media. The
    Penal Code provides that persons found guilty of insulting, defaming,
    or slandering public officials for carrying out their duties may be
    jailed from 1 month to 2 years. If the insults are directed against the
    President, Vice President, or a minister, the sentence may be increased
    by one-half.
        Press organizations alleged that the Government intentionally cut
    off electricity for 2 hours on April 8 in Cochabamba during the state
    of siege in order to silence radio and television stations (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). There has been no investigation of these
    allegations, by either press organizations or the Government.
        The 40-person La Paz Press Tribunal is authorized to evaluate
    journalists' practices that are alleged to violate either the
    Constitution or citizens' rights.
        Newspapers are privately owned, and most adopt antigovernment
    positions. State-owned and private radio and television stations
    operate freely. There were credible reports of government attempts to
    intimidate some news media to provide more favorable coverage.
        The Government prohibits the importation of pornographic books,
    magazines, and artwork.
        The Government respects academic freedom, and the law grants public
    universities autonomous status.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities generally
    respect this right in practice; however, under the state of siege the
    Government imposed some limits on this right. The Government routinely
    grants permits for marches and rallies. There were numerous
    demonstrations throughout the year; in some cases protesters blocked
    roads. The Governor of La Paz temporarily instituted a ban on public
    gatherings of more than three persons during the state of siege.
        As a rule, the authorities try to avoid confronting demonstrators.
    However, security forces clashed with union and other demonstrators on
    many occasions during the year, resulting in some deaths and hundreds
    of injuries (see Section 1.a.). The authorities intervened only when
    rallies became dangerously violent or interfered substantially with
    normal civic activity. The authorities regularly use tear gas and other
    forms of crowd control. In early February, violent protests over
    increases in municipal water prices left 130 persons injured (including
    30 police) and led to the arrest of 180 persons.
        The law provides for freedom of association, and the authorities
    generally respect this right in practice. The Government requires
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to register with the appropriate
    departmental government. There were complaints in 1999 against the
    departmental government of La Paz for the revocation of civil
    registrations for three NGO's established by the Unification Church
    (see Section 2.c.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Roman
    Catholicism predominates, and the Constitution recognizes it as the
    official religion. Non-Catholic religious organizations, including
    missionary groups, must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    and Worship and receive authorization for legal religious
    representation. There were 268 registered religious groups, which were
    mostly Protestant; at year's end, approximately 130 applications were
    pending. The only minority religions in the country that have
    encountered problems are Hari Krishna and the Unification Church. Hari
    Krishna had registered as an educational organization instead of as a
    religious organization. The Government sought to expel Hari Krishna
    from the country in the mid-1980's; however, the attempt failed when
    the Supreme Court declared it illegal. According to the Government, in
    1999 it denied for lack of documentation a Hari Krishna application for
    registration as a religious organization. In August 1999, the
    Unification Church complained of ongoing harassment by the Government,
    specifically citing the August 1998 revocation by the La Paz
    departmental government of three civil registrations for church-
    affiliated NGO's. However, the Unification Church still is registered
    legally with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship as a religious
    organization.
        On July 21, President Banzer signed a Supreme Decree governing the
    relationships between religious organizations and the Government. The
    decree updates a similar decree dating from 1985, which had been the
    subject of criticism by Catholic and non-Catholic religious groups. The
    new decree reflects input from religious groups and, according to the
    Government, is designed to increase transparency and dialog in church-
    state relations.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on travel.
    However, on numerous occasions during the year protestors blocked roads
    and highways. The law permits emigration and provides for the right to
    return. The Government does not revoke citizenship for political
    reasons.
        The law provides for the grant of asylum or refugee status in
    accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Government has accepted persons for
    resettlement; it received 2 refugees during the year, over 40 refugees
    in 1999, and 5 refugees in 1998. The issue of the provision of first
    asylum did not arise. After the 1996 takeover of the Japanese
    Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru by Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
    Movement (MRTA) terrorists, the authorities found that some MRTA
    activists had used Bolivia as a safehaven and announced a more
    restrictive policy on accepting Peruvian political asylees.
    Nonetheless, members of the MRTA and other terrorists continued to use
    the country as a safehaven and a place to plan activities.
        There were no reports of persons forced to return to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. Political parties ranging from far left to moderate
    right function openly. Implementing regulations for the 1994
    constitutional revisions provide for half of the congressional deputies
    to be elected individually and directly, rather than from party lists.
    The first national election under these regulations was held in June
    1997, with attendance by international observers. Only one instance of
    tampering with ballots was detected. Elections for national offices are
    held every 5 years; the next national election is scheduled for 2002.
    In August 1997, President Hugo Banzer Suarez of the Nationalist
    Democratic Action Party took office. His coalition controls the Senate
    but has a plurality of only 57 out of 130 seats in the Chamber of
    Deputies. However, the government coalition holds leadership positions
    in both chambers.
        There are no legal impediments to women or indigenous people
    voting, holding political office, or rising to political leadership;
    however, women and indigenous people are underrepresented in government
    and politics. Political parties acceded to demands from women that they
    be allocated a fair share of the candidacies in the 1997 national
    elections, approving a law that every third candidate on party lists
    must be female. In addition every other candidate on municipal election
    ballots, beginning with the second candidate, must be a woman--a
    development that has significantly augmented female representation to
    approximately 30 percent of municipal council positions. However, there
    have been reports that in some municipalities party leaders have
    pressured councilwomen to resign in favor of their male substitute, and
    women in three separate municipalities have allegedly been threatened
    with death if they do not resign their positions. There are 20 women
    among the 157 deputies and senators; there are no female ministers in
    the Cabinet and only 4 women among the 45 vice ministers.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
    responsive to their views. However, NGO's and the Ombudsman have
    complained that government security forces and government ministries
    have refused to cooperate when NGO's or the Ombudsman are conducting
    investigations. The Government criticizes human rights advocates for
    paying attention exclusively to the negative aspects of the
    Government's performance.
        APDH President Albarracin and his family have received anonymous
    threats in relation to the legal case against his alleged police
    abductors (see Section 1.d.). The APDH's branch office in Santa Cruz
    also received anonymous threats related to its investigations involving
    the security forces; in 1999 unknown parties broke into its office and
    destroyed its computer.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman conducted numerous investigations and in
    August presented a comprehensive report to Congress that was critical
    of the Government, and particularly cited the fact that the greatest
    number of alleged violations were attributed to the police. The Chamber
    of Deputies Human Rights Committee, led by an opposition party
    congressman, also presented its annual report in August, which
    criticized the Government.
        On May 17, the Government reopened a human rights office of the
    Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in Chimore in the Chapare region
    with assistance from an international donor. All of the human rights
    offices in the Chapare region had closed in June 1999. These offices
    accept and pursue complaints of human rights abuses committed by
    anyone, including police, narcotics traffickers, and illegal coca
    growers.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    language, religion, political or other opinion, origin, or economic or
    social condition; however, there was significant discrimination against
    women, indigenous people, and the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
        Women.--Violence against women is pervasive, but no system exists
    to register such incidents systematically. According to the National
    Police's Department of Statistics and Planning, in 1998 approximately
    57 percent of reported assaults were perpetrated against women.
    According to a 1997-98 study conducted by the Pan American Health
    Organization and the Ministry of Health among women in three
    municipalities representative of the country's three major cultural and
    geographic zones, 62 percent of women reported experiencing some kind
    of domestic violence or abuse at least once in their lifetime.
    Approximately 21 percent had suffered psychological abuse, 28 percent
    had suffered non-life-threatening physical violence, and 13 percent had
    suffered life-threatening violence. Rape is also a serious problem that
    is highly underreported. It is estimated that only one out of every
    five incidents of violence against women is reported.
        The 1995 Law on Domestic and Family Violence makes the rape of an
    adult victim a public crime; however, the victim must press charges.
    The law also broadens the definition of family member abuse. The 1999
    Law against Sexual Violation created the new crime of statutory rape of
    a person from 14 to 18 years of age and established new penalties of 10
    to 20 years' imprisonment for the rape of a child under the age of 14,
    2 to 6 years' imprisonment for statutory rape, and 5 to 20 year's
    imprisonment for the rape of an adult. The new Code of Criminal
    Procedures provides that crimes against adults included in previous
    laws on sex crimes can be made public crimes; however, the victim must
    press charges. Sexual crimes against minors automatically are
    considered public crimes. Public agencies state that reported incidents
    of abuse have increased markedly as a result of the recent laws, as
    citizens become more aware of the problem and of the availability of
    help. There was no further action on proposed legislation to provide
    benefits and protection for domestic workers, including specific
    protection from physical, psychological, and sexual aggression.
        In October 1999, President Banzer signed the Law to Protect Victims
    of Crimes Against Sexual Freedom, first proposed in 1997 as a draft law
    against sexual harassment. The new Code of Criminal Procedures (see
    Section 1.e.) for the first time considers sexual harassment a civil
    crime, also resulting in greater protection under the law. There are no
    statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment, but the problem
    generally is acknowledged to exist widely in the male-oriented society.
        Prostitution is legal for adults age 18 and older, and there were
    reports of trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Legal services offices devoted to family and women's rights operate
    throughout the country. Family protection police units, staffed by
    specially trained officers, including women, also are active.
        The Maternal and Infant Health Insurance Program, which began in
    1996 and was expanded to the Basic Health Insurance Program in 1999,
    provides 75 types of health services, focused on maternal and infant
    health, to women of reproductive age and to children under the age of
    5.
        Women generally do not enjoy a social status equal to that of men.
    Many women do not know their legal rights. Traditional prejudices and
    social conditions remain obstacles to advancement. Women generally earn
    less than men for equal work; however, the minimum wage law treats men
    and women equally.
        Most women in urban areas work in the informal economy and the
    services and trade sectors, including domestic service and micro-
    business, whereas in rural areas the vast majority of economically
    active women work in agriculture. Young girls often leave school early
    to work at home or in the economy. According to a 1997 study by the
    Ministry of Education, four out of five illiterate citizens are female.
    Girls have lower rates of school participation and higher dropout rates
    than boys. Although not effectively enforced, the national labor law
    limits women to a workday 1 hour shorter than that of men and prohibits
    them from working at night.
        Children.--The Government is aware of the precarious situation of
    children and the need to provide legal and institutional infrastructure
    for their protection. Seven Defender of Children and Adolescents
    offices were opened in 1997 in La Paz to help protect children's rights
    and interests. However, the Government has not given the poor situation
    of children sufficient political priority to ensure that it can be
    improved quickly and effectively. In December the Government's Inter-
    Institutional Commission for the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor
    released a new national plan to address the problem of child labor,
    which includes programs to address financial, health, education, and
    other needs of children (see Section 6.d.).
        In October 1999, President Banzer signed into law a new Code for
    Boys, Girls, and Adolescents, which codifies many obligations the
    country assumed by ratifying the U.N. Convention on Rights of the
    Child. It also regulates adoptions and tightens protection against
    exploitative child labor and violence against children. However,
    resource constraints are expected to impede full implementation of this
    law.
        Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in
    children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their own
    protection, simply on the orders of a social worker (see Section 1.d.).
    Corporal punishment and verbal abuse are common in school, and physical
    and psychological abuse in the home also are serious problems.
        Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years
    of primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in
    rural areas. The Ministry of Education and the World Bank calculated in
    1997 that 26 percent of children graduated from high school. Prolonged
    teachers' strikes often result in lengthy school closures, limiting
    children's access to education.
        The National Institute of Statistics calculated in 1998 that
    approximately 24 percent of children under 3 years old were chronically
    undernourished. A December 1999 UNICEF report on infant mortality
    indicated that 85 of every 1,000 children die before they reach 5 years
    of age.
        Many children, particularly from rural areas, lack the birth
    certificates and identity documents they need to secure social benefits
    and protection.
        Although laws provide safeguards against children working, they are
    not enforced effectively. According to a May 1999 study commissioned by
    the International Labor Organization (ILO), approximately 369,385
    children between the ages of 7 and 14 work (23 percent of that age
    group), usually to help provide for family subsistence, in uncontrolled
    and sometimes unhealthy conditions (see Section 6.d.).
        Child prostitution is a problem, particularly in urban areas and in
    the Chapare region. At least two NGO's, Fundacion La Paz and Q'Haruru,
    have active programs to fight child prostitution. The Government's plan
    to combat child labor includes a campaign against child prostitution
    (see Section 6.d.).
        The old practice of ``criadito'' service still persists in some
    parts of the country. Criaditos are indigenous children of both sexes,
    usually 10 to 12 years old, whom their parents indenture to middle- and
    upper-class families to perform household work in exchange for
    education, clothing, room, and board. There are no controls over the
    benefits to, or treatment of, such children, who may become virtual
    slaves for the years of their indenture.
        There were unconfirmed reports that children sometimes were sold to
    work in sweatshops in Argentina (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--In 1997 the Government promulgated
    regulations to implement the 1995 Law on Disabilities. The regulations
    require wheelchair access to all public and private buildings; duty
    free import of orthopedic devices; a 50 percent reduction in public
    transportation fares; and expanded teaching of sign language and
    Braille. A National Committee for Incapacitated Persons was established
    to oversee the law's enforcement, conduct studies, and channel and
    supervise programs and donations for the disabled. The electoral law
    makes arrangements for blind voters. However, in general there are no
    special services or infrastructure to accommodate disabled persons. A
    lack of adequate resources impedes full implementation of the law.
    Social attitudes keep many disabled persons at home from an early age,
    limiting their integration into society.
        Indigenous People.--Discrimination against, and abuse of,
    indigenous people continued. The indigenous majority generally remains
    at the low end of the socioeconomic scale, facing severe disadvantages
    in health, life expectancy, education, income, literacy, and
    employment. More than one-half of all citizens speak indigenous
    dialects as their first language, and many speak no Spanish at all,
    which essentially excludes them from most of the formal economy. Lack
    of education, inefficient farming and mining methods, indigenous
    cultural practices, and societal biases keep the indigenous people
    poor. They continued to be exploited in the workplace. Some rural
    indigenous workers are kept in a state of virtual slavery by employers
    who charge them more for room and board than they earn. Although the
    1996 Agrarian Reform Law extended the protection of the national labor
    law to all paid agricultural workers, including indigenous workers, the
    problem persists due to lack of effective enforcement.
        The Agrarian Reform Law provides for indigenous communities to have
    legal title to their communal lands and for individual farmers to have
    title to the land they work. The Government and indigenous leaders
    jointly developed provisions of this law. However, the issue of land,
    specifically the Agrarian Reform Law, has been a constant source of
    complaints and protests by indigenous people.
        Indigenous people complain that their territories are not legally
    defined and protected, and that outsiders exploit their resources.
    Specific offenders allegedly are illegal coca growers and timber
    pirates. Indigenous groups have taken advantage of the Popular
    Participation Law to form municipalities that offer them greater
    opportunities for selfdetermination.
        Clashes between Laime and Qaqachaca indigenous groups in the border
    of the Oruro and Potosi departments left dozens dead and injured over
    the course of the year. These groups have a decades-long history of
    tension over disputed land.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is ongoing societal
    discrimination against the small Afro-Bolivian minority.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers may form and join
    organizations of their choosing; however, labor leaders consistently
    state that a section of the 1985 Economic Liberalization Decree, which
    addresses the free contracting of labor, undermines any protections
    against dismissal without cause. Labor leaders allege that employers
    use or threaten to use this article to limit unionization. The Labor
    Code requires prior government authorization to establish a union,
    permits only one union per enterprise, and allows the Government to
    dissolve unions by administrative fiat; however, the Government has not
    enforced these provisions in recent years. The law requires the
    Government to confirm the legitimately elected officers of unions, a
    difficult role that it is not known to abuse. While the code denies
    civil servants the right to organize and bans strikes in public
    services, including banks and public markets, nearly all civilian
    government workers are unionized. Workers generally are not penalized
    for union activities; during the April state of siege some union
    leaders and activists were detained, not for union activities, but for
    their alleged roles in fomenting disturbances (see Section 1.d.). In
    theory the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) represents virtually the
    entire work force; however, only about one-half of workers in the
    formal economy actually belong to labor unions. Some members of the
    informal economy also participate in labor or trade organizations. The
    CSUTCB, led by Felipe Quispe, is not a trade union in the traditional
    sense, since there is no counterpart employer with which to bargain.
    The CSUTCB is designed to maximize the power of indigenous farmers with
    respect to the Government and traditional trade unions.
        On December 6, the Government announced that for the remainder of
    the President's term of office, it would not introduce legislation to
    modernize the antiquated Labor Code and patchwork of labor laws and to
    make them conform with ILO conventions that the country already has
    ratified.
        Workers in the public sector frequently exercise the right to
    strike. Solidarity strikes are illegal, but the Government has neither
    prosecuted those responsible nor imposed penalties. Significant strikes
    centered around annual negotiations over salaries and benefits for
    public employees. However, their real targets were the Government's
    economic and social reform programs. During the April disturbances (see
    Section 1.a.), riot police struck for more pay. Most strikes were
    conducted and led by the self-described Trotskyite element of the Urban
    Teachers Union, which protested the Government's education reform plan,
    including reform of teacher training institutions, a merit-based salary
    system, and decentralization designed to give municipalities greater
    control over education. Teachers' strikes shut down public schools for
    several weeks in late September.
        Unions are not free from influence by political parties. The COB
    itself is a political organization directed by Marxist ideologues. Its
    stated aim is to end the Government's neoliberal economic program, and
    it gives little attention to serious collective bargaining. Most
    parties have labor committees that attempt to influence union activity
    and also have party activists inside the unions.
        The law allows unions to join international labor organizations.
    The COB became an affiliate of the Communist, formerly Sovietdominated,
    World Federation of Trade Unions in 1988.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers may
    organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining, or voluntary
    direct negotiations between employers and workers without the
    participation of the Government, is limited but growing. The Labor Code
    was written in a period in which the COB, which purports to represent
    all worker groups and interests, had quasi-governmental status and the
    exclusive authority to negotiate with state-owned enterprises. The
    practice was for the COB and the Government to negotiate a global
    agreement on salaries, minimum wages, and other work conditions each
    year. With the privatization of most of these enterprises, the COB's
    relevancy has diminished markedly, and the practice of direct employee-
    management negotiations in individual enterprises is expanding.
        The law prohibits discrimination against union members and
    organizers. Complaints go to the National Labor Court, which can take a
    year or more to rule due to a massive backlog of cases. The court has
    ruled in favor of discharged workers in some cases and successfully
    required their reinstatement. However, union leaders say that problems
    are often moot by the time the court rules.
        Labor law and practice in the seven special duty-free zones are the
    same as in the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, the practices of child apprenticeship and
    agricultural servitude by indigenous workers (see Section 5) constitute
    violations, as do some individual cases of household workers
    effectively held captive by their employers. In addition, women were
    trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits all work for payment by children under
    the age of 14; however, this prohibition generally is not enforced.
    Child labor is a serious and increasing problem. The Labor Code is
    ambiguous on conditions of employment for minors from 14 to 17 years of
    age and permits apprenticeship for those 12 to 14 years old. The ILO
    has criticized this practice, which is sometimes tantamount to bondage
    (see Section 6.c). The law also prohibits the employment of persons
    under 18 years of age in dangerous, unhealthy, or immoral work.
        Approximately one in every four children between the ages of 7 and
    14 is employed in some way. A May 1999 study by the ILO estimated that
    approximately 70,000 children between the ages of 7 and 14 were working
    in cities, and that approximately 300,000 children in the same age
    group were working in rural areas. The extreme poverty of many families
    dictates the involuntary employment of their children for motives of
    survival. After an ILO-sponsored conference in May 1999 on the
    country's child labor problems, an Inter-Institutional Commission for
    the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor was formed. The Government
    also signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO, pledging more
    attention to child labor, a 5-year plan to combat it, and adoption of
    policies against its most dangerous forms. In November President Banzer
    announced a plan to give small annual payments to families with
    children between the ages of 6 and 14 who were attending school. In
    December the Government's Inter-Institutional Commission released its
    new national plan to address the problem of child labor. The plan,
    which has not yet been funded, includes programs to give families
    alternatives to having children work, and to address financial, health,
    education, and other needs.
        The Labor Ministry is responsible for enforcing child labor
    provisions but generally does not enforce them throughout the country.
    Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years of
    primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in
    rural areas. Urban children sell goods, shine shoes, and assist
    transport operators. Rural children often work with parents from an
    early age, generally in subsistence agriculture. Children generally are
    not employed in factories or formal businesses but, when employed,
    often work the same hours as adults. Children also work in the mines
    and other dangerous occupations in the informal sector. Child
    prostitution is a growing problem, particularly among girls between the
    ages of 14 and 18. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, the practices of child apprenticeship (criadito) and
    agricultural servitude by indigenous workers constitute violations, as
    do some individual cases of household workers effectively held captive
    by their employers (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In conformity with the law, the
    minimum wage is subject to annual renegotiation and was increased in
    January by 7 percent to approximately $56 (355 bolivianos) per month,
    plus bonuses and fringe benefits. The minimum wage does not provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family, and most workers
    earn more. Although the minimum wage falls below prevailing wages in
    most jobs, certain benefit calculations are pegged to it. The minimum
    wage does not cover members of the informal sector, who constitute the
    majority of the urban work force, nor does it cover farmers, who
    account for some 30 percent of the working population.
        Only one-half of the urban labor force enjoys an 8-hour workday and
    a workweek of 5 or 5-1/2 days, because the maximum workweek of 44 hours
    is not enforced. The Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational Safety has
    responsibility for protection of workers' health and safety, but
    relevant standards are enforced poorly. Many workers have died due to
    unsafe conditions. However, the Government has requested technical
    assistance in the occupational safety area from an international donor.
    The Labor Ministry maintains a hot line for worker inquiries,
    complaints, and reports of unfair labor practices and unsafe working
    conditions.
        Working conditions in the mining sector are particularly bad.
    Although the State Mining Corporation has an office responsible for
    safety, many mines, often old and using antiquated equipment, are
    dangerous and unhealthy. In some mines operated as cooperatives, miners
    earn approximately $3 (20 bolivianos) per 12-hour day. They work
    without respirators in mines where toxic gases and cancer-causing dusts
    abound; they buy their own supplies, including dynamite, have no
    scheduled rest periods, and many work underground for up to 24 hours
    continuously. There are no special provisions in the law defining when
    workers may remove themselves from dangerous situations. Unless the
    work contract covers this area, any worker who refuses to work based on
    the individual's judgment of excessively dangerous conditions may face
    dismissal.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons, although aspects of the problem are
    covered in other laws and in the Constitution. There were reports of
    domestic trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. A union
    leader asserted that employment agencies lure rural indigenous women to
    cities with promises of employment as domestic servants but then force
    them to work without salaries to repay transport and other fees and
    sometimes turn them over to houses of prostitution. There were also
    unconfirmed press reports that children sometimes were sold to
    sweatshops in Argentina.
                                   __________

                                     BRAZIL

        Brazil is a constitutional federal republic composed of 26 states
    and the Federal District. The federal legislative branch exercises
    authority independent of the executive branch. In 1998 voters elected
    President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of the Brazilian Social Democratic
    Party (PSDB), to a second 4-year term. The 1998 elections marked the
    third time since the end of military rule in 1985 that citizens freely
    chose their president and elected the legislative bodies in accordance
    with the 1988 Constitution. All parties are able to compete on the
    basis of fair and equal procedures. The judiciary generally is
    independent; however, it is inefficient and subject to political and
    economic influence.
        The military forces handled national defense and are subject to
    effective civilian control, both in law and in practice. Police forces
    fall primarily under the control of the states. State police are
    divided into two forces. The civil police have an investigative role,
    and the uniformed police, known officially as the ``military police,''
    are responsible for maintaining public order. Although the individual
    state governments control the uniformed police, the Constitution
    provides that they can be called into active military service in the
    event of an emergency, and they maintain some military characteristics
    and privileges, including a separate judicial system. The federal
    police force is very small and primarily investigative. It plays little
    role in routine law enforcement. The state police forces committed
    numerous serious human rights abuses.
        Brazil has a market-based, diversified economy. The Government,
    which traditionally played a dominant role in shaping economic
    development, is encouraging greater private sector participation in the
    economy through privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and
    removal of some impediments to competition, trade, and investment.
    Industrial production, including mining operations and a large and
    diversified capital goods sector, accounts for approximately 35 percent
    of gross domestic product (GDP); agriculture contributes about 8
    percent. Exports consist of both manufactured and primary goods. Among
    the principal exports are iron ore, coffee, airplanes, soybeans, and
    footwear. Per capita GDP was about $3,400, and the economy grew by 4
    percent. Income distribution remained highly skewed: the poorest half
    of the population received only 10 percent of national income while the
    richest tenth received 48 percent.
        The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there continued to be numerous serious abuses. State
    police forces (both civil and uniformed) committed many extrajudicial
    killings, tortured and beat suspects under interrogation, and
    arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Police also were implicated
    in criminal activity of all kinds, including killings for hire, death
    squad executions, and kidnapings for ransom. Prison officials often
    tortured and beat inmates. The state governments concerned did not
    punish most perpetrators of these abuses effectively. Police tribunals
    (special courts for the uniformed police) remained overloaded, rarely
    investigated cases thoroughly, and seldom convicted abusers. The
    separate system of uniformed police tribunals contributes to a climate
    of impunity for police officers involved in extrajudicial killings or
    abuse of prisoners. Prison conditions range from poor to extremely
    harsh. The judiciary has a large case backlog and often is unable to
    ensure the right to a fair and speedy trial. Justice is slow and often
    unreliable, especially in areas where powerful economic interests
    influence the local judiciary. Human rights monitors on occasion face
    threats and harassment. Violence and discrimination against women are
    problems. Child prostitution and abuse are problems. Despite
    constitutional provisions safeguarding the rights of indigenous people,
    government authorities often fail to protect them adequately from
    outsiders who encroach on their lands, and fail to provide them with
    adequate health care and other basic services in many areas.
    Discrimination against Afro-Brazilians is a problem. Violence against
    homosexuals is a problem. Forced labor continued to be a serious
    problem. Child labor is a serious problem. There continued to be
    occasional reports of forced child labor. The Government continued its
    interministerial campaign against child labor. Trafficking in women and
    children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious problem.
        The National Secretariat of Human Rights oversees the
    implementation of the Government's action plan to address human rights
    abuses. A new secretary was installed in May. In May U.N. High
    Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited, and U.N. Special
    Rapporteur for Torture Nigel Rodley visited in August and September.
    Robinson commented on the Government's recognition of its human rights
    problems and stated that President Cardoso was on the right track in
    trying to reduce and eliminate abuses. Rodley noted the poor conditions
    in prisons and said that in many cases law enforcement authorities who
    torture prisoners and suspects do so with impunity. The Government
    undertook several programs to promote the protection of human rights.
    In 1996 a nongovernmental organization (NGO) established a witness
    protection program; the Government adopted it in 1999 in an attempt to
    combat widespread impunity. The Government's inter-ministerial
    Committee for the Defense of the Human Being (CDDPH), chaired by the
    National Human Rights Secretary, continued to be an effective
    instrument to highlight human rights abuses and allocate federal
    resources to bolster the efforts of the states. However, because of
    jurisdictional and resource limitations, the efforts of the Federal
    Government had an uneven and limited impact in many of the states where
    human rights violations are most common.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
    numerous extrajudicial killings, which continued to be a serious
    problem throughout the country. The uniformed police summarily executed
    suspected criminals rather than apprehend them, and then filed false
    reports that the suspects were resisting arrest. Preliminary estimates
    from the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo alone indicated that
    the police killed at least 1,000 persons during the year while
    operating in their ``official'' capacity. In addition many other
    killings occurred as the result of death squads and other criminal
    groups, many of which included police as members. The failure to
    investigate, prosecute, and punish police who commit such acts creates
    a climate of impunity that continues to encourage human rights abuses.
    Harsh conditions in prisons and rioting led to the death of inmates
    (see Section 1.c.).
        The lack of accountability and the inefficient criminal justice
    system allow impunity to continue. All crimes less serious than murder
    committed by uniformed police officers against civilians remain in the
    military justice system. In 1999 an investigation into Sao Paulo's
    special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing'' and
    ``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes against
    civilians that include murder and torture. In 1999 a newspaper that had
    access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among
    them, some delayed for up to 12 years. Equally long delays allowed many
    cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of
    limitations. This probe was the closest scrutiny ever of the special
    police courts and resulted in the authorities bringing criminal charges
    against two court officials.
        Human rights activists believe that the 1996 ``Bicudo'' law, which
    gives civil courts jurisdiction over intentional homicide committed by
    uniformed police officers, has had limited success. In 1995--the last
    year before the implementation of the new law--police courts convicted
    23 percent (48 of 205) of officers tried for homicide. In 1998 civilian
    courts convicted 48 percent (31 of 64) of officers charged with
    homicide. The comparable rate for civilians tried for murder in Sao
    Paulo was 50 percent. The law allows for civil prosecutors to review
    the most egregious cases, while less prominent cases are reviewed by
    the police force itself. Almost without exception, the police
    investigators conclude that suspects were resisting arrest.
        Police often were members of vigilante groups and death squads
    responsible for killings. In addition uniformed and civil police
    involvement in criminal activity is widespread. Throughout the country,
    police were implicated in crimes ranging from killing for hire and
    kidnaping to drug trafficking and extortion.
        Reputable NGO's reported hundreds of extrajudicial killings and
    other abuses of force by police throughout the country during the year.
        A Sao Paulo press report indicated that on November 8, a local
    police officer was arrested near Boa Vista, Roraima, on the accusation
    that he had participated in the killing of seven adolescents whose
    noisy party had bothered him.
        Two Sao Paulo police officers were arrested on or about December 11
    and accused of having killed four persons in a bakery in Sao Bernardo
    do Campo 5 days earlier. Three other persons were injured in the
    attack.
        In May police shot and killed a member of the Landless Movement
    (MST) during a confrontation between protesters and uniformed police in
    the state of Parana (see Section 2.b.). The authorities did not charge
    or arrest any officer by year's end.
        The use of torture by police sometimes led to the death of the
    victims (see Section 1.c.). The authorities opened an investigation
    into the death of Nilson Saldinia, who died in February in the 50th
    district jail in Sao Paulo's Itaim Paulista neighborhood. At year's
    end, the investigation continued, but no one had been accused.
        Police killings of street children continued (see Section 5).
        Harsh or dangerous prison conditions, official negligence, poor
    sanitary conditions, abuse by guards, and a lack of medical care led to
    a number of deaths in prisons. Inmates in prisons and at juvenile
    detention facilities rioted repeatedly during the year (see Section
    1.c.). Many riots resulted in a number of deaths, but no estimates were
    available for the number of prisoners killed nationwide during prison
    riots.
        The office of the police ombudswoman in Rio de Janeiro state
    received 2,894 complaints from April 1999 through December 15, during
    its first 20 months of operation. Complaints against the uniformed
    police accounted for 60 percent of that total. There were 312
    officially reported police homicides in the first 9 months of the year,
    compared to 289 in all of 1999. These statistics seriously understate
    the number of killings by police, as they do not include the deaths of
    perpetrators allegedly caught in the act of committing a crime.
    Previous research by the Institute for Religious Studies (ISER)
    suggests that, to estimate the true number of police homicides, the
    official figures should be doubled. The ISER report also stated that
    Rio de Janeiro police killed half of their victims with 4 or more
    bullets and shot the majority of victims in either the shoulder or the
    head; 40 cases clearly demonstrated execution-style deaths, where
    police first immobilized the victims and then shot them at point-blank
    range. In 64 percent of the cases examined, the victims were shot in
    the back.
        According to the Sao Paulo state government, the uniformed and
    civil police killed 635 civilians in the first 9 months of the year, an
    increase of 30 percent over the same period in 1999. A Sao Paulo police
    ombudsman's report released in July showed that of the 664 persons
    killed by police officers in 1999, 31 percent were committing crimes at
    the time they were shot, 56 percent had no previous criminal record,
    and 51 percent of the victims were shot in the back. Many human rights
    observers believe that the report reflects excessive use of force by
    the Sao Paulo police.
        In a nationally televised bus hijacking in Rio de Janeiro in June,
    police wounded a hostage while attempting to shoot the hijacker. The
    hijacker then killed the hostage. The hijacker was apprehended unhurt,
    but arrived dead at the hospital after police riding in the ambulance
    allegedly strangled him. At year's end, one police officer had been
    acquitted and four awaited trial.
        Four uniformed police officers were sent to prison to await trial
    in a civil court for the highly publicized killing of three persons,
    including two juveniles (aged 14, 17, and 21) in Sao Paulo in February
    1999. The officers arrested the victims for fighting, beat them, then
    were seen leading them into a forested area near where the bodies were
    found 2 weeks later. Each victim was shot once in the head. The police
    officers initially denied having any contact with the victims. They
    later confessed to the killings after 19 witnesses came forward to
    testify against them and a DNA test identified blood inside the police
    car as that of one of the victims. The perpetrators were charged with
    aggravated triple homicide, abuse of power, and hiding bodies.
        The five uniformed police officers arrested in the March 1999
    shooting deaths of two persons, one of whom was mentally disabled, in
    Sao Paulo's Jardin Elba slum, were jailed in September, pending trial.
    The officers, who allegedly shot the two outside of their police car,
    dragged the bodies inside, and then simulated an exchange of gunfire,
    were charged with homicide. At year's end, no trial date had been set.
        Police sources reported that the investigation continues into the
    April 1999 death of 20-year-old Ricardo Galvao, who was shot, stabbed,
    and beaten. Galvao was last seen in a police vehicle after being caught
    trying to steal a car. On August 11, the police involved in the
    apprehension were expelled from the police force. The authorities
    charged two civilians with Galvao's death.
        Four uniformed policemen are still in custody awaiting trial in the
    August 1999 double homicide that took place in Sao Bernardo do Campo,
    Sao Paulo. The accused suspected the victims of stealing a police
    motorcycle, questioned them, and returned to the neighborhood the
    following day, when they allegedly killed the two youths by shooting
    them in the head and leaving another youth for dead. The third victim
    survived by feigning death and was placed in the witness protection
    program.
        In December 1999, police in the Federal District shot and killed
    one person and blinded another during a peaceful demonstration. The
    governor removed certain officials as a result. At year's end, the case
    against the police officers awaited trial.
        There was no information available about an investigation into the
    February 1999 killing of Antonio Lopes in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte,
    or in the October 1999 killing of Robelio dos Santos, in Salvador,
    Bahia.
        Amnesty International reported that police death squads still were
    active in Mato Grosso do Sul. There was no information available about
    the status of the cases against various police officers accused of
    participating in death squads in the states of Alagoas and Mato Grosso
    do Sul in 1997 and 1998.
        In April a court retried and convicted former military policeman
    Otavio Lourenco Gambra, also known as ``Rambo,'' for the murder of
    Mario Jose Josino in a highly publicized March 1997 extortion and
    killing incident in Sao Paulo's Favela Naval neighborhood. Gambra's
    1998 conviction had been overturned due to lack of evidence. Eight
    other police officers were convicted of bodily harm and professional
    negligence. All were serving time in Sao Paulo prisons at year's end.
        In April the State Court of Para annulled an August 1999 trial in
    the city of Belem that acquitted 3 uniformed police officers in command
    of the unit responsible for the 1996 massacre of 19 landless workers at
    Eldorado de Carajas in the Amazonian state of Para. Human rights
    activists considered this decision a major blow against police
    impunity. A new trial was scheduled for March 2001.
        In September the State Court of Rondonia convicted 3 of 12
    uniformed policemen and 2 squatters of homicide in the August 1995
    killings of 11 squatters and 2 policemen in Corumbiara. The three
    officers received sentences of 16, 18, and 19 years. The two squatters
    who were tried were not convicted of murder but of inciting the
    killings and received 6 and 8 years respectively. Activists criticized
    the fact that the courts had acquitted 9 of the 12 police officers
    involved and that the court had not indicted the landowner who was
    involved directly in the conflict, despite the fact that there was a
    videotape of the landowner in which he told the police to attack the
    squatters, whom he called enemy guerrillas.
        Of 31 police officers charged with participation in the 1993
    massacre of 21 residents of the Vigario Geral neighborhood in Rio de
    Janeiro, the courts acquitted 19 and convicted 6 officers. At year's
    end, four officers awaited trial; two died before going to trial.
        The trial of retired police Colonel Ubiratan Guimaraes again was
    delayed. Guimaraes is accused of homicide in the deaths of 111 inmates
    during an October 1992 riot in Sao Paulo's Carandiru prison. The
    charges he faces carry a penalty of 1,350 years of imprisonment,
    although his jail term would be limited to 30 years by the
    Constitution. Guimaraes would be the first policeman of the rank of
    colonel to face a civilian jury under the Bicudo law. The other 85
    officers who are accused of involvement also await trial. The statute
    of limitations expired for the charges of torture and beatings, but the
    officers can be tried for murder. All of the officers, including
    Guimaraes, were released to await trial.
        Death squads in which the police are involved contribute
    significantly to the level of violence and lawlessness, according to
    public security officials. Human rights groups reported the existence
    of organized death squads linked to the police forces that target
    suspected criminals and persons considered ``undesirable'' (such as
    street children) in almost every state. A report on death squads issued
    by the committee for human rights of the Federal Chamber of Deputies in
    1999 highlighted death squad activity with police involvement in the
    states of Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso,
    Amazonas, Para, Paraiba, Ceara, Espirito Santo, and Acre. The report
    stated that death squads ``arise because of the loss of credibility in
    the justice and public security institutions and the certainty of
    impunity as the result of the incapacity of the institutions that have
    jurisdiction in resolving the problem.'' The report indicated that
    death squad activity appeared to be declining except in Bahia.
        In August 1999, the Governor of Espirito Santo (the state with the
    highest rate of homicide), stated that death squad activity involving
    the police contributed significantly to the level of violence in the
    state. A state police investigation and a state parliamentary committee
    of inquiry reported that an informal organization, the ``Squad le
    Cocq'' involving police, judicial, and elected authorities including
    Jose Carlos Gratz, president of the state assembly, was responsible for
    the vast majority of organized crime in the state.
        An investigation instigated by the former president of the supreme
    court of Acre state and carried out under the auspices of the CDDPH
    amassed evidence that former Acre military police chief and former
    state and federal deputy Hildebrando Pascoal headed a crime ring and
    death squad in that Amazonian state linked to at least 30 murder and
    torture cases previously suspended by state authorities for lack of
    evidence. Charges against Pascoal include the kidnaping--with the
    collusion of military police officers from Piaui--and murder of the
    suspected killer of Pascoal's brother, and the kidnaping of the
    victim's wife and children in an attempt to locate the victim. A
    congressional committee of inquiry also established Pascoal's control
    of narcotics trafficking within the state. A witness who testified
    before that committee identified the site of a mass grave in Acre that
    federal authorities believe Pascoal's organization used to dispose of
    at least eight murder victims. Pascoal's election to the federal
    Chamber of Deputies in October 1998 conferred on him parliamentary
    immunity from all prosecution. However, in October 1999, the Chamber
    voted to remove Pascoal's immunity and the police subsequently arrested
    him. In June a federal judge ruled that Pascoal would face a jury trial
    on account of the capital offense, but no trial date was set. At year's
    end, he was in prison and awaited trial on charges of murder;
    additional charges of narcotics trafficking and electoral violations
    were pending.
        The authorities also failed to conclude the investigation of the
    May 1996 death squad killings in the Franco da Rocha neighborhood of
    Sao Paulo, and no charges have been filed in connection with the case.
    Witnesses identified five uniformed police officers as having arrested
    four men who were found dead a few hours later. Franco da Rocha is one
    of Sao Paulo state's poorest communities and the location of a
    clandestine dumping site for the victims of death squads. Since 1993 at
    least 212 bodies have been found there, including 50 victims shot in
    the head. Progress in the investigation has been hampered by difficulty
    in identifying bodies whose heads or hands were amputated.
        Several persons were killed in conflicts involving the settlement
    of disputes of land ownership and usage. The MST increased its campaign
    of legal occupation of lands identified as unproductive, and illegal
    occupation of land not yet so designated. In addition as a new policy,
    the MST began occupying public buildings in an effort to embarrass the
    Government and gain publicity for its cause. MST activists destroyed
    private property during some occupations. The Catholic Church's
    Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), the country's foremost entity
    monitoring human rights in rural areas, released in October its report
    covering rural violence in 1998. The report presents a mixed picture of
    the overall human rights climate relating to the country's land
    conflicts. Killings of landless activists increased to 47 in 1998,
    compared with 30 in 1997, while attempted murders rose from 37 to 46.
    Cases of torture rose from 5 to 35, but less serious indicators of
    aggression fell sharply. The report notes that increased actions by the
    Government to remove activists from illegal settlements resulted in
    increased confrontations and destruction of property and homes but also
    noted that the pace of agrarian reform outstripped new MST occupations,
    contributing to a less violent climate overall.
        In the investigation into the March 1999 killing of the brother of
    an MST leader in Parana, the police arrested a suspected gunman but
    later released him. There was no information available about the
    investigation into the April 1998 death of MST leader Sadi Padillo in
    Santa Catarina.
        The CPT's report concludes that the climate of impunity enjoyed by
    landed interests as a result of the ``fragile'' justice system and the
    collusion of local political interests continues to encourage serious
    human rights abuses of landless activists, including murder and
    torture. However, the report also notes that the tactics of the land
    reform movement have led to a self- perpetuating cycle in recent years,
    whereby increased confrontation and tension have led to increased
    government attention, encouraging in turn more land occupations. In
    1999 statistics showed a decrease in violence.
        Manuel Souza Neto, a leader of the MST, was killed in October and
    his body was found in his home. He had been shot, and reports indicate
    that his neck was slit. Members of the MST reported that landowners had
    sent death threats to the victim, and suspect one landlord in his
    death. However, others note that the victim also was active in politics
    and that his killer could have been motivated by political goals.
        On July 25, a wave of MST actions throughout the country left three
    dead. In Recife, a police officer shot and killed one protestor. The
    protester was part of a group of about 300 activists attempting to
    occupy a regional bank headquarters. Near Fortaleza ranchers killed
    another MST member during an occupation attempt. In Para state, an
    unknown gunman killed an MST activist; six other persons had died in
    land-related violence in that area since May.
        On November 21, MST leader Sebastiao da Maia, also known as
    Tiaozinho, was killed during the occupation of a ranch in Parana. The
    authorities claimed that Maia was killed in a shootout during the
    occupation, but the MST claimed that he died in an ambush by hired
    gunmen. The authorities did not charge anyone with murder in the case
    but arrested five security guards on firearms charges. According to the
    Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission, Maia's killing was the
    tenth killing of a rural activist during the year.
        Also on November 21, a gunman killed Jose Dutra da Costa, a rural
    activist in the state of Para. Police arrested the gunman the same day
    and suggested that Costa may have been killed on the orders of large
    landowners in the region. According to one source, for 2 years Costa
    had been on a death list of 18 activists.
        On December 19, federal police seized a large cache of arms at a
    ranch in Pontal do Paranapanema, east of Sao Paulo, in the home of a
    member of a landowner's group. In 1997 the ranch had been the scene of
    an armed conflict between the landowner and the MST, in which eight MST
    members were shot. The landowner was acquitted of charges of homicide
    in that case, but faced arms charges after the arms seizure.
        In June in the state of Para, Jeronimo Alves de Amorim was
    convicted of ordering the 1991 murder of the head of a local workers'
    union, Expedito Ribiero de Souza. Human rights activists noted that
    this conviction is the first time that a landowner has been held liable
    for such a crime. The court sentenced Alves de Amorim to 19 years in a
    maximum security prison (see Section 6.a.).
        In an April retrial, a jury acquitted MST leader Jose Rainha for
    the 1989 killings of landowner Jose Machado Neto and police officer
    Sergio Narciso da Silva. In 1997 a jury in the small, rural town of
    Pedro Canario, Espirito Santo, sentenced Rainha to 26 years for the
    killing. The jury convicted Rainha even though the prosecution
    presented no material evidence and witnesses testified to Rainha's
    presence 1,500 miles away from the scene of the crime. Since Rainha's
    sentence exceeded 20 years, he automatically was entitled to a retrial.
    Police investigator Celso Jose da Cruz, who appealed his 1997
    conviction (and sentence of 516 years' imprisonment) for involvement in
    these killings, was convicted in a retrial. There was no information
    available regarding the trials of the 29 policemen charged as
    codefendants in the killings.
        According to human rights activists monitoring the case,
    proceedings remain stalled against the former mayor of Rio Maria, in
    the state of Para, who was charged with the 1985 murder of Joao Canuto,
    the first president of the rural workers' union in Rio Maria. Canuto's
    daughter, Luzia Canuto, received death threats as a result of the case.
    In 1998 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
    criticized the Federal Government for failing to prosecute the crime.
        The four suspects charged with manslaughter in the burning death of
    Pataxo indigenous leader Galdino Jesus dos Santos in Brasilia still
    awaited trial at year's end. In 1998 an appellate court upheld a 1997
    court decision to prosecute for manslaughter rather than murder. In
    1999 a superior court ruled that a jury would try the defendants, and
    the defense appealed the decision. The appeal was denied in April, but
    a new appeal was filed, delaying the trial again. The accused remain in
    prison. Dos Santos died in April 1997 after the suspects set him on
    fire while he was asleep on a public bench.
        Vigilante groups and death squads, which often included police
    officials, also were responsible for killings.
        The National Secretariat for Human Rights sponsors training
    programs in human rights, carried out in cooperation with federal and
    state entities and national and international organizations, in most
    states. The Secretariat administers a human rights training program for
    policemen in cooperation with Amnesty International (AI) in 10 states.
    Human rights groups maintain that the effect of these programs has been
    limited, at best. However, human rights activists in many states
    reported willingness of police authorities to address their concerns
    and to deal with problems brought to their attention.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        In 1995 Congress passed legislation that recognized and assigned
    government responsibility for the deaths of political activists who
    ``disappeared'' during the military regime while in the custody of
    public officials, and obligated the Government to pay indemnities of
    between $100,000 and $150,000 (200,000 to 300,000 reais) to each of the
    families. In 1997 President Cardoso signed a decree awarding
    reparations to the families of 43 such persons. As of March 1999, 265
    persons had received indemnities out of 366 requests. A commission
    created by the law continued to evaluate requests for, and authorize
    payment of, indemnities.
        No further progress was made during the year in investigating the
    mass grave found in the Perus Cemetery in Sao Paulo on September 4,
    1990. Over the last 10 years, the authorities were able to identify the
    bodies of 6 persons from the 1,500 bones found. Human rights groups
    state that these persons were opponents of the military regime.
    However, attempts to identify additional bodies have stopped, and no
    efforts were made to find those responsible for the deaths.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and a 1997 law prohibit torture and
    provide severe legal penalties for its use; however, there are frequent
    credible reports that police torture and beat criminal suspects to
    extract information, confessions, or money. Victims generally are poor,
    uneducated about their rights, and afraid to come forward due to fear
    of reprisals. Prison officials often tortured and beat inmates.
        As in the cases of extrajudicial killings, the police benefit from
    a high level of impunity. A 1999 investigation by prosecutors into Sao
    Paulo's special courts for uniformed police uncovered 1,107 ``missing''
    and ``delayed'' cases against uniformed police charged with crimes
    against civilians that include murder and torture. A newspaper that had
    access to 300 cases under investigation found 100 murder charges among
    them, some dating back up to 12 years. Equally long delays have allowed
    many cases of torture and lesser charges to expire due to statutes of
    limitations. Although some policemen are expected face criminal charges
    as a result of this investigation, human rights officials called the
    findings ``horrifying.''
        The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 481 complaints
    through the first 9 months of the year alleging torture, abuse,
    mistreatment, or neglect (negligence accounts for 132 of these
    complaints). This represented a slight increase from the same period in
    1999, when the ombudsman received 467 such complaints. The ombudsman's
    office believes that many cases are not reported.
        U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture Rodley visited the country for
    23 days in August and September. While his final report had not been
    issued before year's end, Rodley described conditions in some prisons
    as grotesque and stated that the Congress promotes impunity of police
    agents by failing to provide proper oversight and by giving them
    excessive powers. Rodley told the Federal Chamber of Deputies
    Commission on Human Rights that the authorities routinely subject
    suspects and prisoners to illegal detention, subhuman conditions and
    torture, and rarely are punished for the abuses. He described instances
    during his visit in which prisoners were beaten after talking with him,
    where torture implements were discovered in a prison, and where he had
    to take one prisoner to the hospital to recover from a beating. He also
    told the Commission that officials in one prison promised to discipline
    one corrections officer, but did not do so. He called the situation
    worse than he had imagined and presumed that his experience represented
    only a fraction of the problem.
        In 1999 the Globo newspaper in Rio de Janeiro published the results
    of an investigation into the allegations of torture by state police.
    The police opened a total of 53 investigations regarding complaints of
    torture against police authorities between 1997, when the torture law
    came into effect, and 1999. Only one of the inquiries, which had been
    suspended, officially had been concluded. The report identified several
    patterns, including the use of electric shock, beatings with iron bars,
    and sexual abuse including sodomy with foreign objects. The report
    noted that police classified such incidents as abuse of authority and
    physical assault, offenses that are far less serious than torture. As a
    result of the report, the state government ordered an independent
    review of the 53 cases, and the Federal Government established a task
    force to review Rio de Janeiro state police practices.
        In 1999 Sao Paulo officials investigated allegations that
    investigative police of the 26th state police district humiliated and
    beat prisoners after inmates secretly audiotaped 20 police officers
    beating them and threatening to kill them. The authorities responded by
    creating a special service to receive complaints of torture committed
    by investigative and uniformed police. Persons wishing to make a
    grievance about police activity or offer suggestions contacted the
    police ombudsman over 8,000 times during the first 9 months of the
    year.
        On October 18, Amnesty International released a special report on
    torture that included five cases in the country. One was that of
    ``Jose'' (not his real name), a juvenile in the state of Para who was
    beaten so severely by police that he has needed psychiatric treatment
    ever since. Jose's mother complained about the beating to the local
    public prosecutor, who referred the case to the police chief at the
    same station where the beating occurred. Other cases were cited in
    Paraiba, Sao Paulo, and Pernambuco.
        On October 19, the authorities arrested two civil guards in Sao
    Paulo and accused them of the sexually assault of three teenage girls
    caught trespassing in a cemetery. Police authorities began an internal
    investigation into the matter.
        On October 24, Federal Highway Police arrested a Rio state
    policeman and accused him of having been a member of a gang that
    specialized in robbing trucks at gunpoint along the highways. Police
    were investigating the possible involvement of other officials in the
    activities of the gang.
        In late November, several former prisoners who had been held in an
    Air Force prison in Rio de Janeiro made public their allegations of
    having been tortured during their time in prison. The allegations
    included accusations of beatings and electric shocks. The Federal
    Police announced that it would begin an investigation into the reports.
    The allegations were also investigated in early December by the Human
    Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.
        On December 14, two policemen severely beat a shoe shiner, Rangel
    Bezerra de Lima, in Ceilandia, Federal District. The reason given by
    the police during the attack was that they had experienced a ``bad
    day.'' The case got the attention of the Human Rights Division of the
    Ministry of Foreign Relations, which assisted Rangel in filing a
    complaint against the perpetrators, accusing the police of torture.
        The case of Otavio dos Santos Filho, who allegedly died as a result
    of torture at Sao Paulo's Depatri jail in 1999, was archived without
    any resolution. No explanation for closing the case was been made
    public by year's end.
        Police authorities took no action regarding 107 cases of torture
    and beating that took place in the Depatri jail in February 1998 and
    were confirmed by the Police Medical Institute. Prosecutors and human
    rights groups continued to push for a trial of the guards who are
    accused in the case.
        In 1997 civil policemen in Belem, Para state, under the command of
    Captain Clovis Martins de Miranda Filho, accosted Hildebrando Silva de
    Freitas, who apparently had failed to pay a bribe for a liquor license
    for his bar. At Captain de Miranda's direction, as many as 10 police
    officers severely beat and sexually abused de Freitas. In 1998 an
    internal police investigation concluded that de Freitas had suffered
    severe physical injury and did not contest the testimony of the
    witnesses who corroborated his account, but declared there was no
    connection between his injuries and the officers who had confronted
    him. At year's end, the case was under review by the Para state
    prosecutors' office. De Miranda has brought a defamation suit against
    the state ombudsman for public security in Para for statements that she
    allegedly made to the press regarding the case. The state has declined
    to bear the costs of the ombudsman's defense.
        Police violence against homosexuals continued (see Section 5).
        There continue to be numerous credible reports of state police
    officials' involvement in crime, including revenge killings and
    intimidation and killing of witnesses involved in testifying against
    police officials.
        The Sao Paulo state police ombudsman received 218 complaints in the
    first 9 months of the year alleging corruption, illicit enrichment,
    swindling, embezzlement, or participation in drug trafficking on the
    part of policemen.
        The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued its
    human rights training courses for high-ranking state military police
    officers at the Federal Police Academy in Brasilia. A total of 860
    military police have been trained in basic techniques, including the
    apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects without recourse to
    excessive or unnecessary force. The program was funded through
    December, and the ICRC office expected authorization to proceed for 2
    to 3 more years. The Center for the Study of Violence at the University
    of Sao Paulo is expected to review the results. The military police in
    the states of Amapa, Paraiba, Rondonia, and Sao Paulo already have
    incorporated the ICRC program into their general police training
    program.
        Over one-fifth of Sao Paulo's uniformed police officers have
    received some kind of community police training under the state's
    community policing initiative. Begun in December 1997, the program is
    expected to take 10 years to implement fully. Under the program, high-
    ranking police officials meet with citizens' consultative groups
    weekly. The uniformed police also instituted a policy of ``recycling''
    policemen involved in shootings, removing them from patrols for 6
    months and offering them counseling.
        Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Severe
    overcrowding was prevalent, especially in larger cities. According to
    Ministry of Justice figures for 1998, about 85 percent of the prison
    population was kept in substandard conditions. The situation was most
    critical in the states with the largest prison populations, including
    Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco.
    Most penal authorities in these states do not have the resources to
    separate minor offenders from adults and petty offenders from violent
    criminals. Prison riots were frequent occurrences. Discipline is
    difficult to maintain under such conditions, and prison officials often
    resort to inhuman treatment, including torture.
        AI stated that the prison system was ``in crisis'' in a
    comprehensive report on prisons released in June 1999. The report was
    based on 33 visits to prisons in 10 states. In December 1998, Human
    Rights Watch (HRW) also issued a comprehensive report entitled ``Behind
    Bars in Brazil,'' based on an intensive review of prison conditions in
    eight states. Both reports meticulously detail inhuman conditions and
    systematic and wide ranging abuses of human rights throughout the
    prison system. Among the most serious charges are the commonplace
    undocumented and uninvestigated deaths of inmates at the hands of
    authorities or other prisoners, and the routine use of torture against
    inmates by both guards and police officers.
        Poor working conditions for prison guards aggravate substandard
    prison conditions and encourage corruption. The director of Sao Paulo's
    Carandiru prison (the largest in the country) told representatives from
    AI that many cases of torture and use of excessive force result in part
    from employees' working conditions. An investigation of the more than
    1,100 employees of Sao Paulo's prison at the end of 1998 showed that
    241 had criminal records themselves. The majority of the charges
    against them were for crimes committed while working at the prison and
    ranged from drug trafficking and threats to assisting in escapes. The
    state secretary of penitentiary administration was aware of the guards'
    criminal pasts and allowed them to continue working. At year's end,
    prison officials stated that investigations were continuing and that
    they had discharged some employees.
        In September the director of the maximum security prison Bangu 1 in
    Rio de Janeiro, who had attempted to clean up corruption and violence
    at the institution, was murdered--probably on orders from incarcerated
    drug traffickers, corrupt prison guards, or police officers, according
    to state security officials.
        Prisons do not provide adequate protection against violence
    inflicted by inmates on each other.
        On October 10, news media reported a riot in a Parana state prison
    in Piraquara, where prisoners armed with pistols and a grenade took
    seven guards hostage. According to news sources, this was the second
    riot there in 4 months. Another riot occurred on October 10 in
    Contagem, a district of Belo Horizonte, in which one policeman and one
    prisoner were injured. Press reports stated that it was the third riot
    there during the year, and that the cause was overcrowding.
        On October 22, prisoners took 66 persons hostage during a riot in
    Penitenciaria Nelson Hungria, near Belo Horizonte. The prisoners were
    armed with pistols and knives. The riot ended with a promise by the
    authorities to transfer some of the inmates to other facilities.
        On October 23, a riot broke out in Penitenciaria 2 de Itapetininga,
    in Sao Paulo State. At least 500 prisoners were involved; they took 14
    guards as hostages. The riot lasted only 9 hours, but three prisoners
    died from fires set during the incident. On October 24, a gang fight
    inside Carandiru Prison in Sao Paulo killed two prisoners and injured
    another five. According to the authorities, the gangs were fighting
    over control of the prison. Prison authorities responded by
    transferring prisoners identified as most dangerous gang members to
    other facilities.
        On or about November 5, a riot broke out in the Casa de Detencao
    Jose Mario Alves da Silva, in Porto Velho, Rondonia. Three prisoners
    were killed (apparently by other prisoners) and another 17 were
    injured. A guard also was injured. The revolt lasted 79 hours.
        Armed with knives, razor blades, and pistols, prisoners in Sao
    Paulo's high-security Taubate penitentiary rioted December 17 and 18,
    resulting in the deaths of nine inmates. The riot was sparked by
    prisoner demands for transfer to lower-security facilities and was
    followed by an unsuccessful escape attempt. After the riot was quelled,
    the authorities transferred 25 prisoners to other facilities.
        Prisoners also are subject to extremely poor health conditions.
    Scabies and tuberculosis, diseases not common in the general
    population, are widespread in Sao Paulo prisons. The Ministry of
    Justice estimates that 10 to 20 percent of the national prison
    population is HIV positive. Denial of first aid and other medical care
    sometimes is used as a form of punishment. According to the Sao Paulo
    state secretary of prison administration, 1,923 prisoners in Sao
    Paulo's prisons are infected with tuberculosis, 178 have leprosy, 122
    are infected with hepatitis, 457 are infected with HIV, and over 3,800
    suffer from full-blown AIDS. AI reports that, while underused, the Sao
    Paulo state hospital for prisoners with AIDS is cleaner and better
    organized than most prison hospitals.
        Overcrowding in Sao Paulo's prisons and police detention centers,
    which hold about 43 percent of the country's prison population, is a
    critical human rights problem. Although state prison capacity has risen
    by 50 percent with the opening of 21 new prisons since 1998, rising
    crime and inflexible sentencing has meant that facilities remain
    overcrowded. The prison population increased by 7,000 persons in the
    first 8 months of the year.
        The state of Sao Paulo has approximately 92,000 prisoners. Only
    about 59,000 these prisoners are in the state penitentiary system. Due
    to lack of space, more than 32,000 prisoners, most of whom already have
    been convicted and should be in state penitentiaries, remain in
    temporary holding facilities in police stations. The state penitentiary
    system has an over-capacity rate of about 18 percent.
        Sao Paulo prison authorities openly admit that overcrowding has led
    to abysmal conditions and violent riots in Sao Paulo prisons. There
    were 25 riots during the year in Sao Paulo prisons, which resulted in
    the deaths of 23 prisoners. A riot in Parana state on June 3-6 left one
    prisoner dead and three injured. Another riot occurred on July 12,
    although no one was hurt in that incident. Among the prisoners'
    complaints were overcrowding, the slow parole process, and lack of
    conjugal visits.
        Overcrowding and lack of adequate security also lead to a number of
    escapes and carefully planned jail and prison breaks. On September 19,
    in Sao Paulo state, armed men broke into 2 prisons and 1 jail and freed
    206 prisoners. At another break at Sumare prison, also in Sao Paulo
    state, 7 men stormed the complex and freed 92 of the 100 prisoners.
    Numerous breaks such as these occurred throughout the year, and very
    few prisoners were recaptured. In at least one case seven guards were
    held hostage during the escape.
        Torture and mistreatment of prisoners by prison officials is also a
    serious concern. Investigations began in the torture and beatings of 20
    prisoners in Sao Paulo's Sorocaba prison. The prisoners and their
    relatives charge that on July 28, the prisoners were forced to walk
    through two rows of police officers (armed with truncheons and sticks)
    who beat the prisoners as they walked. The prisoners were then divided
    into groups of five and each group locked into a solitary confinement
    cell designed to hold one person. In October a public prosecutor
    charged 20 policemen and 5 penitentiary guards with participating in
    the torture of inmates.
        The authorities opened an investigation in the death of Nilson
    Saldinia, who died in February in the 50th district jail in Sao Paulo's
    Itaim Paulista neighborhood. Human rights groups claim that he died as
    a result of torture after police beat him and other prisoners with bars
    and metal rods and applied electric shocks to them (see Section 1.a.).
        An investigation also has been opened into the allegation of a June
    3 torture incident involving over 100 prisoners in Sao Paulo state's
    prison facility in the city of Americana. According to Justica Global,
    a local human rights group, prisoners were forced to pass through a
    ``corridor'' formed by military policemen from the Special Operations
    Unit while the policemen beat the prisoners with iron bars, truncheons,
    and whips. According to the organization, one prisoner's left arm was
    broken and another prisoner, Wilson Pereira da Silva, was beaten
    severely and then police threw a mixture of vinegar, water, and salt on
    his wounds. The director of the facility was fired shortly after the
    accusations surfaced.
        Sao Paulo prison officials have taken steps to improve the quality
    of the prison guard force. Since 1998 new hires are required to have a
    high school diploma and to take human rights courses. Sao Paulo prison
    authorities also are attempting to improve conditions by building more
    prisons (six small ones were built during the year), by improving
    training of prison personnel, and by creating committees of community
    leaders to monitor prison conditions. However, they emphasize that the
    most serious problem--overcrowding--can not be resolved in the short
    term as it is simply impossible to build as fast as the prison
    population is growing.
        The states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo provide separate prison
    facilities for women, but generally only in houses of detention or
    actual prisons, where female inmates are separated from men. However,
    in Rio de Janeiro state there are only two police districts in which
    women in lockup are held in exclusive short-term jail facilities.
    Women's facilities in Sao Paulo's penitentiary system are even more
    overcrowded than those for men. Facilities built to accommodate 600
    female inmates hold 1,055. The state's prison expansion program did not
    include provisions for additional space for women. There are no
    facilities that are exclusively female--including inmates, guards, and
    warden. With male officers in women's prisons, opportunities for abuse
    and extortion of sexual favors are abundant.
        Sao Paulo's juvenile detention centers (FEBEM) continue to be
    plagued by overcrowding, poor conditions, riots, and accusations of
    torture. The authorities completed an investigation into the 1999 riots
    at the FEBEM facility at Franco da Rocha and fired the director as a
    result. Human rights NGO's expressed regret that this was the only
    management-level employee discharged by year's end.
        Since the extremely violent Tatuape complex riot in October 1999,
    human rights groups estimate that FEBEM employees have tortured or
    beaten at least 700 FEBEM inmates. The two most common forms of torture
    cited by these groups are ``repique'' and ``recepcao.'' Repique is used
    after attempted escapes or rebellions, when the employees gather the
    inmates and beat them with iron bars and sticks. Recepcao occurs when
    adolescents are transferred to different facilities and are greeted by
    two rows of FEBEM guards who kick, beat, and scream at the prisoners as
    they pass between them to teach them the rules of discipline.
        The Public Ministry was investigating 87 cases of torture and
    mistreatment in FEBEM facilities. Officials were considering for
    investigation another 52 complaints of mistreatment. The majority of
    the investigations and complaints involve the Tatuape complex.
        Three cases of torture occurred in FEBEM facilities in June and
    July, involving the so-called ninjas, a group of FEBEM guards who roam
    FEBEM complexes at night, beating inmates at random. Actions by this
    group were registered at the Cadeiao de Pinheiros, Tatuape, and Franco
    da Rocha facilities.
        Human rights organizations also accuse the Sao Paulo state
    government of holding 900 of the 4000 FEBEM inmates in an ``irregular''
    state (in violation of a federal statute) by putting them in adult
    prison facilities, in violation of the International Convention on the
    Rights of the Child, to which the Government is a signatory. The
    transfer of youth to adult prison facilities began in August 1999 and
    intensified after the riots in November of that year. Injunctions that
    would force FEBEM officials to move the youth to juvenile facilities
    consistently have been reversed by the Sao Paulo supreme court, citing
    the fact that there is no other place to put the inmates.
        Government action has proved ineffective in improving the
    conditions in FEBEM. After the November 1999 riots, Sao Paulo Governor
    Mario Covas promised to build 20 new facilities and fire all FEBEM
    employees responsible for torture. To date 4 of the 20 facilities have
    been built, but they have failed to resolve overcrowding. Moreover, two
    of these new facilities were sites of later riots, leading employees to
    complain that the inmates had been transferred before the facilities
    were ready and able to provide basic care or recreational or
    educational activities. Some employees accused of mistreatment have
    been fired, but human rights groups claim that only a small portion of
    those responsible have been dismissed.
        There is no evidence that conditions have improved in the 14 months
    since riots began. A report put together by several human rights groups
    also notes that FEBEM officials demand 5 days' notice for visits by
    human rights groups, inhibiting the independent analysis of conditions
    within the FEBEM complexes.
        In August local human rights NGO's delivered a report to Nigel
    Rodley, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture about the situation in
    FEBEM. Rodley toured the facilities and reported finding instruments of
    torture.
        In November 1998, President Cardoso approved a law authorizing
    alternative sentencing for nonviolent offenders aimed, in part, at
    easing prison overcrowding. In its 1999 prison report, AI noted that
    the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Mato Grosso do Sul have imposed
    noncustodial sentences effectively, but points out that in states such
    as Rio de Janeiro alternative sentencing has not been implemented
    effectively. There was minimal improvement during the year on the issue
    of alternative sentencing. In May the Government approved legislation
    that provided new funds for prisons and options for alternative
    sentencing. In September Justice Minister Jose Gregori inaugurated a
    National Center of Support and Accompaniment for Alternative Sentences
    to educate the judiciary to apply alternatives such as community
    service to convicts sentenced to less than 4 years' incarceration to
    reduce prison overcrowding.
        It is government policy to permit prison visits by independent
    human rights monitors, and state prison authorities generally observe
    this policy in practice. Federal officials in the Ministry of Justice
    responsible for penal matters offered full cooperation to AI, which
    reported no significant problems in gaining access to state-run prison
    facilities. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rodley was given full access during
    his 3-week fact-finding mission in August and September. By contrast,
    HRW noted in preparing its prison report in 1998 that gaining access to
    prisons was ``surprisingly difficult,'' and that barriers ranged from
    outright denial of access to the use of procedural delays. Only three
    states of the eight investigated--Amazonas, the Federal District, and
    Rio Grande do Norte--had made their prisons completely accessible to
    Human Rights Watch.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observes
    this prohibition; however, police continued at times to arrest and
    detain persons arbitrarily. The Constitution limits arrests to those
    caught in the act of committing a crime or those arrested by order of a
    judicial authority. The authorities generally respect the
    constitutional provision for a judicial determination of the legality
    of detention, although many convicted inmates are detained beyond their
    sentences due to poor record keeping. The law permits provisional
    detention for up to 5 days under specified conditions during a police
    investigation, but a judge may extend this period. However, groups that
    work with street children claim that the police sometimes detain street
    youths illegally without a judicial order or hold them incommunicado.
        Human rights monitors allege that civil and uniformed police
    regularly detain persons illegally to extort money or other favors,
    citing the Favela Naval incident of 1997 as the most notorious example
    (see Section 1.a.).
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture made an inquiry into the
    death of Anderson Carlos Crispiniano, who alleged himself to be the
    victim of police torture in Rio de Janeiro. In June Crispiniano was
    asleep at his home when a group of armed men identifying themselves as
    policemen forced their way in and arrested him without a warrant. They
    removed Crispiniano from his home and later telephoned to say that he
    was being held hostage for ransom. He later was released, badly beaten
    and partly paralyzed, and died after 15 days in the hospital.
        HRW noted that police in the state of Parana arrested 173 persons,
    mostly without probable cause, during forced evictions carried out
    during the year.
        According to an AI press release, police detained 141 persons in an
    attempt to prevent protesters from disrupting the 500th anniversary
    celebration in Porto Seguro on April 22. Human rights activists
    protested the police action, calling the detentions unjustified and out
    of proportion to any perceived threat (see Sections 2.b. and 5). The
    authorities later released the temporarily detained demonstrators
    without filing charges.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is an independent
    branch of government; however, it is inefficient, subject to political
    and economic influence, and plagued by problems relating to lack of
    resources and training of officials. In many instances, lower-income,
    less educated citizens make limited use of the appeals process that
    otherwise might ensure the right to fair trial.
        The judicial system, with the Federal Supreme Court at its apex,
    includes courts of first instance and appeals courts. States organize
    their own judicial systems but must adhere to the basic principles in
    the Constitution. Specialized courts deal with police, labor,
    elections, juveniles, and family matters.
        Defendants in criminal cases arrested in the act of committing a
    crime must be charged within 30 days of their arrest, depending on the
    crime. Other defendants must be charged within 45 days, although this
    period can be extended. Defendants for all but the most serious crimes
    have the right to a bail hearing. Based on the police investigation
    leading to the formal charges, prosecutors prepare an indictment for
    the review of a judge, who determines if the indictment meets the legal
    requirements to bring the accused to trial. A judge and jury try
    persons accused of capital crimes, attempted homicide, or more serious
    charges. A judge tries lesser crimes. Defendants have the right to
    appeal all convictions to state superior courts. They further have the
    right to appeal state court decisions to both the Federal Supreme Court
    on constitutional grounds and to the Federal superior court to contest
    whether a decision was inconsistent with the decision of a court in
    another state or infringes on federal law. All defendants sentenced to
    20 years in prison or more have the automatic right to a retrial in the
    same court.
        Special police courts have jurisdiction over state uniformed police
    (except when charged with intentional homicide); the record of these
    courts shows that conviction is the exception rather than the rule.
    These courts (which are separate from the courts-martial of the armed
    forces, except for the final appeals court) are composed of four
    ranking state uniformed police officials and one civilian judge. With
    too few judges for the caseload, there are backlogs, and human rights
    groups note a lack of willingness by police to investigate fellow
    officers.
        A 1996 law gives ordinary courts jurisdiction over cases in which
    uniformed police officers are accused of intentional homicide against
    civilians. However, except for the most egregious cases, the internal
    police investigation determines if the homicide was intentional, and
    the police tribunal decides whether to forward a case to a civil court
    for trial. As a result, few cases are referred to the civil courts. It
    takes 8 years to reach a definitive decision in the average case. At
    the appellate court level, a large backlog of cases hinders the court's
    ability to ensure fair and expeditious trials.
        Defendants are entitled to counsel and must be made aware fully of
    the charges against them. According to the Ministry of Justice,
    approximately 85 percent of prisoners cannot afford an attorney. In
    such cases, the court must provide one at public expense; courts are
    supposed to appoint private attorneys to represent poor defendants when
    public defenders are unavailable, but often no effective defense is
    provided. Juries decide only cases of willful crimes against life,
    including crimes by police; judges try all others.
        The right to a fair public trial as provided by law generally is
    respected in practice, although in some areas, particularly rural
    areas, the judiciary generally is less capable and more subject to
    influence. Similarly local police often are less dutiful in
    investigating, prosecutors are reluctant to initiate proceedings, and
    judges find reasons to delay when cases involve gunmen contracted by
    landowners to eliminate squatters or rural union activists.
        Low pay, combined with exacting competitive examinations that in
    some years eliminate 90 percent of the applicants, make it difficult to
    fill vacancies on the bench. The system requires that a trial be held
    within a set period of time from the date of the crime. However, due to
    the backlog, old cases frequently are dismissed. According to a former
    judge, this practice encourages corrupt judges to delay certain cases
    purposely, so that they can be dismissed. Lawyers often drag out cases
    as long as possible in the hope that an appeals court might render a
    favorable opinion and because they are paid according to the amount of
    time that they spend on a case.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary
    intrusion into the home. Wiretaps authorized by judicial authority are
    permitted. The law regulating the conditions under which wiretaps may
    be used appears to strike a fair balance between giving the police an
    effective law enforcement tool and protecting the civil liberties of
    citizens. The inviolability of private correspondence is respected.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution prohibits all
    forms of censorship and provides for freedom of speech and a free
    press, and the authorities respect these rights in practice.
        Newspaper, magazines, and a growing number of on-line electronic
    publications, which are privately owned, vigorously report and comment
    on government performance. Both the print and broadcast media routinely
    discuss controversial social and political issues and engage in
    investigative reporting. Most radio and television stations are
    privately owned; however, the Government has licensing authority, and
    politicians frequently obtain licenses. Current or former congressional
    representatives, some of whom are or were members of the committee that
    oversees communications, own many television and radio stations, as
    well as local newspapers. It is difficult to determine how many media
    outlets are controlled indirectly by politicians, since concessions
    often are registered in the names of family members or friends linked
    to them. In addition the Government regularly approves transfers of
    concessions already granted to other individuals with little oversight.
        The penalty for libel under the 1967 Press Law is a prison term. It
    is considered extreme by judges and rarely is imposed. The National
    Newspaper Association (ANJ) continued to press for an updated press
    law, noting that the current law dates from time of the military
    regime. Newspaper owners throughout the country have complained about
    judges who have imposed huge fines and jail terms against newspapers
    for ``moral damage'' that appear aimed at crippling news organizations.
    According to the ANJ annual report issued in September, if the new law
    does not establish criteria for calculating maximum fines for libel,
    there is a risk of restrictions to freedom of the press.
        In December 1999, the Lower House of the Congress approved a press
    gag law (Lei Mordaca) that would penalize prosecutors, judges and
    government attorneys for revealing information about ongoing cases to
    the press. The ANJ, together with the Inter-American Press Association,
    mounted a public campaign against the law and Congress effectively
    stalled the legislation. The journalists argued that such a gag law
    would represent a prior restraint on freedom of speech, in violation of
    the Constitution.
        Complex electoral campaign laws regulate the broadcast media and
    prescribe complicated arrangements to apportion the free use of
    commercial radio and television broadcast time granted to political
    parties during an election campaign. The short periods for rulings and
    non-appeal provisions of the regulations are designed to enforce
    discipline and ensure that remedies are applied in a timely manner.
    Media and free speech advocates generally accept the manner in which
    the campaign laws are enforced.
        Foreign publications are distributed widely; prior review of films,
    plays, and radio and television programming is used only to determine a
    suitable viewing age.
        The National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ) and the ANJ have
    documented a number of violent attacks, including killings and threats
    against journalists. The September ANJ report, which covered the period
    August 1999 through July, listed 8 cases of physical aggression against
    12 journalists, including a murder attempt upon a newspaper reporter in
    Bauru, Sao Paulo. It also described five death threats against
    journalists. Although no new murder cases were reported during the
    year, the ANJ report noted that seven journalists have been murdered
    since 1995 and none of the crimes have been solved. The police said
    that charges have been brought in four of the cases, and that they
    could not gather sufficient evidence in the other three. The ANJ
    further stated that impunity for crimes committed against journalists
    and inappropriate and inconsistent application of the Press Law are
    impediments to the functioning of the free press.
        The ANJ alleged that on February 17, two uniformed police officers
    attacked Juarez Rodrigues, from the newspaper Estado de Minas. The
    officers also confiscated Rodrigues' working equipment, his cellular
    phone, and demanded the roll of film in which Rodrigues had recorded a
    police action. Police Commander Augusto Severo later visited the
    newspaper's director to apologize for the actions against the reporter
    and to promise to pay for any material damage to the equipment. Severo
    also stated that a military inquiry had been initiated to punish the
    officers responsible.
        The ANJ also alleged that, on February 22, two journalists and a
    driver from the newspaper O Povo de Fortaleza were beaten and tortured
    on the orders of the mayor of a small town, Hidrolandia, in which they
    were investigating a story. Although criticized and forced to leave his
    political party, the mayor remained in office.
        According to the Inter-American Press Association (SIP), on March
    3, journalist Ricardo Noblat, managing editor of the newspaper Correio
    Braziliense of Bras!lia, alleged that two of his sons had been attacked
    and that he had been receiving anonymous telephone threats since 1998.
    He stated that these actions were political persecution because of his
    professional activity. On June 27, the CDDPH gave the Justice Minister
    a preliminary report about the attacks on Noblat's sons. Although it
    was only preliminary, the report by the Justice Ministry concluded that
    the attacks were political.
        Also according to the SIP, on March 8, a group of masked, armed men
    kidnaped journalist Klester Cavalcanti, correspondent of the magazine
    Veja in Belem, capital of Para state. The men pushed the journalist
    into a car, drove him to a forest with his head inside a black plastic
    bag, tied him to a tree in an isolated spot, pointed a revolver at him,
    and threatened him with death if he published a report on an illegal
    land sale.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. Permits are not required for outdoor
    political or labor meetings, and such meetings occur frequently.
        Police used force to disperse demonstrators on several occasions
    during the year, resulting in serious injuries and at least one death
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In May MST protesters heading to Parana
    state's capital of Curitiba were stopped by police 20 kilometers
    outside the city. They said that they were planning to protest
    peacefully in front of government buildings. However, the same week,
    MST groups had invaded government buildings in several other capital
    cities. Parana state police say that they acted to prevent the same
    occurrence in their state. The confrontation between police and
    protesters which took place when the bus was stopped resulted in one
    death (see Section 1.a.). Human Rights Watch reported that police
    killed another demonstrator--Jose Marlucio da Silva--in Recife on July
    25 during a similar protest, but no further information was available
    about this case.
        Between May and October, MST protests increased, culminating in
    promises of about $2 billion (4 billion reais) in federal government
    money for agrarian reform. Protests in the capital, Brasilia, united
    large numbers of protesters. In August joint protests by the MST and
    Contag (Confederacao Nacional de Trabalhadores na Agricultura) drew
    over 12,000 participants. Demonstrations in Brasilia were usually
    concurrent with smaller, local protests and invasions, of anywhere
    between 200 and 5,000 landless activists. Many protests occurred
    without incident, with notable exceptions. The MST's new method of
    forcibly invading public buildings is an example of increasing
    aggressiveness on the part of the movement. The movement also invaded
    President Cardoso's family farm.
        However, the number of land invasions decreased sharply during the
    year. According to INCRA (the government agency charged with
    implementing land reform), there were only 226 invasions by landless
    militants through November, compared with 438 in 1999 and 427 in 1998,
    indicating that the large amount of land that has been distributed by
    the Federal Government may have had some effect in decreasing landless
    movement activity. The CPT noted that the number of conflicts between
    landless movement members, landowners, and police increased over the
    last 3 years, but that the number of resulting deaths declined from 47
    in 1998 to 24 in 1999. The total number of MST activists killed during
    the year was not yet available.
        In April a group of indigenous leaders organized a march in protest
    of the ceremonies to mark the 500-year anniversary of Portuguese
    arrival; however, police using riot gear prevented the protesters from
    entering the main square, and fired rubber bullets into the crowd.
    Human rights observers criticized the police for injuring over 30
    persons, arresting over 100 others, and limiting free assembly and
    lawful protests. The then-president of FUNAI, Carlos Frederico Mares,
    resigned in protest over this incident.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
    no favored or state religion. All faiths are free to establish places
    of worship, train clergy, and proselytize, although the Government
    controls entry into indigenous lands.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on movement,
    except entry into protected indigenous areas, nor are there any
    restrictions on emigration or return. However, a parent is not allowed
    to leave the country with children under the age of 18 without the
    permission of the other parent, whether or not the marriage still is in
    effect.
        In 1997 the Government passed legislation with provisions for
    asylum and refugee status intended to conform to the principles of the
    1951 U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the
    U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. There were 2,632 refugees in the
    country, mostly from Angola and other African countries, but also
    including persons from Iran, Bosnia, and Kosovo. During the year, a
    total of 445 persons were granted refugee status, out of a total of 590
    requests.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate
    citizens aged 18 to 70, except for military conscripts who may not
    vote. It is voluntary for minors from 16 to 18 years of age, for the
    illiterate, and for those age 70 and over.
        Women have full political rights under the Constitution and are
    increasingly active in politics and government; however, they are
    underrepresented in both fields. Cultural, institutional, and financial
    barriers continue to limit women's participation in political life. The
    number of female candidates for office in the 1998 national elections
    roughly doubled, compared with the number in 1994, according to
    statistics released by the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE). Women
    constituted approximately 12 percent of the total candidates. However,
    their representation in the national Congress decreased from 7.6
    percent to 6.1 percent after the 1998 elections; 29 women were elected
    to the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies, and 5 to the 81seat Senate. In
    August the TSE reported that for the first time, a majority of
    registered voters were female (50.45 percent). The TSE also reported
    that there were over 70,000 female candidates for the nationwide
    municipal elections. At 18.3 percent of the total number of candidates,
    this was a 40 percent increase from the last municipal elections in
    1996. There were no female members of Cabinet. In December the first
    woman assumed her seat on the country's highest court, the Supreme
    Federal Tribunal.
        Diverse ethnic and racial groups, including indigenous persons,
    while free to participate politically, are not represented in
    government and politics in proportion to their numbers in the general
    population.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of local and national human rights groups operate without
    government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights cases. Federal officials generally are cooperative and
    responsive to their views. Federal and state officials, due to
    insufficient resources, in many instances actively solicit the aid and
    cooperation of NGO's in addressing human rights problems. However, on
    occasion human rights monitors are threatened and harassed due to their
    efforts to identify and take action against human rights abusers,
    especially members of the state police forces (see Section 1.a.).
        AI reported in February that its office in Sao Paulo received a
    bomb threat from an extreme right group (see Section 5). The police
    investigated the threats and no bomb was found. AI noted that gay
    rights groups had received similar threats, that a member of their
    staff was attacked during the year, and that police had not acted to
    protect their staff or other human rights activists from violent
    attacks. The head of the AI office continued to receive threats by mail
    and phone. As a result, AI closed their Sao Paulo office and moved to
    Porto Alegre. At year's end, the Sao Paulo State Civil police still
    were investigating. The AI office in Porto Alegre also continued to
    receive threats, which the Rio Grande do Sul police were investigating.
        Henri des Roziers, a Dominican monk, attorney, and human rights
    activist in Xinguara, Para, received several death threats during the
    year for his assistance to victims of violence in the region and his
    direct involvement in criticizing cases of torture, police abuse, and
    forced labor. Des Roziers, along with the Ministry of Labor's Office to
    Combat Forced Labor, was instrumental in freeing 462 rural workers from
    forced labor in 1999. In May Pastoral Land Commission President Dom
    Tomas Balduino announced that des Roziers' name appeared on a ``hit
    list'' of 10 names of activists who were to be murdered, drawn up by
    large landowners. In July Des Roziers and the CPT criticized the use of
    torture in the Xinguara city police station. Para state civil police
    chief Joao Moraes responded with a personal attack on des Roziers and
    accused him of involvement in the murder of a landowner.
        Established in April 1997, the Justice Ministry's National
    Secretariat of Human Rights oversees implementation of a 1996 action
    plan to address human rights abuses. The Secretariat also administers
    or sponsors programs to reduce violence among the poor, to train police
    officials in human rights practices, and to combat discrimination
    against blacks, women, children, indigenous people, the elderly, and
    the disabled. In May the Government appointed Gilbert Saboia, former
    ambassador to Sweden, as the new Secretary for Human Rights.
        In May U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
    visited the country and met with a full range of NGO's as well
    government officials. Robinson commended the Government for allowing
    her to investigate and for its recognition of its human rights problems
    and commitment to seek a solution. Robinson declared that impunity from
    prosecution is the greatest human rights problem, linking it to
    killings, torture, racial and sexual discrimination, and the
    exploitation of children. She also stated that the U.N. might open an
    investigation into the repression of indigenous rights during an April
    commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the European arrival to the
    country (see Sections 2.b and 5).
        In December the Government released the second National Report on
    Human Rights, independently prepared by the Center for the Study of
    Violence at the University of Sao Paulo. The National Secretariat for
    Human Rights, the University of Sao Paulo, and the U.N. Development
    Program co-sponsored the preparation of the report. A comprehensive
    account of the human rights situation in each state, it provides
    information on health, education, public security, and labor conditions
    and a list of human rights monitors and advocates in each state.
        In 1999 two attorneys working for a human rights group in
    Aracatuba, Sao Paulo state, received death threats after successfully
    prosecuting three police officers who were convicted of torture and
    homicide. The attorneys asked for police protection and refused to
    leave the city. Police investigations into the threats produced no
    results; the attorneys continued their work but without police
    protection.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race,
    religion, or nationality; however, discrimination against women,
    blacks, and indigenous people continued to be a problem. The
    International Labor Organization (ILO) notes that important differences
    in wages affect women and blacks, particularly in rural areas. A 1997
    law provides prison penalties and fines for racist acts, including
    promulgation of pejorative terms for ethnic or racial groups, use of
    the swastika, or acts of discrimination based on sex, religion, age, or
    ethnic origin. Several persons have been charged with racism since the
    law's enactment, mostly for the use of racial slurs.
        There continued to be reports of violence against homosexuals,
    although it was not always clear that the victim's sexual orientation
    was the reason for the attack. The Gay Group of Bahia (GGB), the
    country's best known homosexual rights organization, and AI have in the
    past 7 years documented the existence of skinhead, neo-Nazi, and
    ``machista'' gangs that attacked suspected homosexuals in cities
    including Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, and
    Brasilia. In some cases, these gangs included police officers.
        In September Jose Eduardo do Bernardes da Silva, a member of AI,
    and Roberto de Jesus, president of the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Pride
    Association, both received bombs in the mail with swastikas and the
    word revenge printed on the package (see Section 4).
        Homosexual activist groups reported that 130 gay, lesbian, and
    transgender persons were murdered during the year, compared to 169 in
    1999 and 116 in 1998. However, data compiled by activist organizations
    and claims that violence against homosexuals is increasing cannot be
    confirmed, because the motives for the crimes are not always clear.
    Information from the GGB and other homosexual rights groups clearly
    indicates that transvestite prostitutes, the most visible homosexual
    group, are at a greater risk of violence than other homosexuals. Police
    routinely extort money from transvestites and often beat or kill those
    who fail to cooperate. Gay rights activists in the city of Recife
    compiled substantial evidence of extortion and the unlawful use of
    violence against transvestite prostitutes. In past years, flagrant
    abuses by the police in the states of Alagoas and Bahia have been
    reported.
        The Secretariat of State Security of Rio de Janeiro state, in
    partnership with NGO's, continued to operate a hot line to receive
    complaints of violence or other crimes against homosexuals. The
    Secretariat also continued to operate a hot line for complaints of
    prejudice, discrimination, or other crimes based on race, ethnicity,
    color, religion, or national origin. The offices in police headquarters
    where both hot lines are located also offered professional counseling
    to victims of such offenses. Respect for human rights and sensitivity
    to the problems of minorities and the poor are included in police
    training in Rio de Janeiro. In April a new Institute for Public
    Security was created to reform police organization, recruitment, and
    training; it also aims to improve police performance on human rights.
        Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
    sexual and domestic violence, which are both widespread and vastly
    underreported. There is a high incidence of physical abuse of women.
    Most major cities and towns have established special police offices to
    deal with crimes of domestic or sexual violence against women; there
    are over 250 such offices. However, reporting crimes and receiving help
    continue to be a problem for women living in remote areas who must
    sometimes travel great distances to the nearest special precinct. For
    example, the large but sparsely populated states of Acre and Roraima
    each have only one such precinct. Though the numbers of reported cases
    of the most common crimes rose through much of the 1990's, they
    generally have leveled since 1998. For example, in the state of Sao
    Paulo, there were 1,731 reported cases of rape in the first 11 months
    of the year, compared with 1,833 for all of 1999. In the Federal
    District, the number of reported cases of rape declined slightly to 371
    during the year, compared with 416 cases in 1999. The annual number of
    cases of harmful physical assault against women reported to the police
    in the state of Rio de Janeiro nearly doubled from 1991 to 1999, to
    34,831, and the number of rapes reported increased from 952 to 1,455.
    Both state authorities and women's rights activists agree that a large
    number of rapes go unreported. According to a 1998 study of two middle-
    class neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, only 10 percent of women who had
    suffered violent attacks reported them to the police. The Sao Paulo
    Center for Assistance to Female Victims of Sexual Violence reported
    that 400 women sought the center's intervention in rape cases after
    receiving no help from the police in 1998. In Bahia there were 7,751
    complaints about violence to women filed with the police Delegate for
    the Protection of Women during the first 7 months of the year, an
    increase of 40 percent over the same period in 1999.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is also
    a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Each state Secretariat for Public Security runs ``women's
    stations'' (delegacia da mulher). However, the quality and availability
    of services provided varies widely, especially in isolated areas. These
    offices are intended to provide the following services for victims of
    domestic violence: psychological counseling; a ``shelter home'' for
    victims of extremely serious abuses who have no place to go; hospital
    treatment for rape victims, including abortion (up to 12 weeks of
    pregnancy) and treatment for HIV and other sexually transmitted
    diseases; and initiation of criminal cases by investigating and
    forwarding evidence to the courts.
        The penalties for rape vary from 8 to 10 years in prison.
        A domestic violence offender in a case that does not involve a
    serious offense and carries penalties of less than 1 year's
    imprisonment may receive alternative sentencing with no jail term,
    according to the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense
    of Women's Rights.
        Men who commit crimes against women, including sexual assault and
    murder, are unlikely to be brought to trial and courts still are
    reluctant to prosecute and convict men who claim that they attacked
    their wives for infidelity. A 1999 study by an academic at the Catholic
    Pontifical University of Sao Paulo indicates that 70 percent of
    criminal complaints regarding domestic violence against women are
    suspended without a conclusion. Only 2 percent of criminal complaints
    of violence against women lead to convictions. In 1998 the National
    Movement for Human Rights reported that female murder victims were 30
    times more likely to be killed by current or former husbands or lovers
    than by others.
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex in
    employment or pay and provides for 120 days of paid maternity leave.
    However, the provision against wage discrimination rarely is enforced.
    According to statistics released in 1998 by the International
    Confederation of Independent Unions, women are paid, on average, 44
    percent less than men. According to government statistics released in
    1998, women with a high-school education or less earn, on average, 63
    percent of the salaries earned by men with the same level of education.
    Black women earned on average 26 percent of a white male's salary. A
    1998 study by a sociologist showed that women who started working in
    positions in which they earned twice the minimum wage advanced in pay
    after 10 years to a wage of seven times the minimum wage. Men starting
    in the same positions earned 2.6 times the minimum wage and advanced to
    a wage of 10.9 times the minimum wage after 10 years. A Ministry of
    Labor survey reported that the average starting salary for high-school-
    educated women in Sao Paulo was one-third less than the average
    starting salary for high school educated men. According to the Ministry
    of Labor and Employment (MLE), Centers for the Prevention of Workplace
    Discrimination have been established in 16 states. These centers, which
    are housed in regional bureaus of the Ministry, promote programs to end
    discrimination in the workplace and cultivate partnerships with other
    organizations that combat discrimination. The centers also serve as
    clearinghouses for allegations of discrimination.
        In response to the Maternity Leave Law, some employers seek
    sterilization certificates from female job applicants or try to avoid
    hiring women of childbearing age. A 1995 law prohibits employers from
    requiring applicants or employees to take pregnancy tests or present
    sterilization certificates. Employers who violate the law are subject
    to a jail term ranging from 1 to 2 years, while the company must pay a
    fine equal to 10 times the salary of its highest-paid employee.
        Children.--Millions of children continue to suffer from the poverty
    afflicting their families, must work to survive, and fail to get an
    education. Schooling is free and compulsory until the age of 14 and is
    available in all parts of the country. The education system does not
    exclude any groups; however, 1.1 million children between 7 and 14
    years of age did not attend school in 1999.
        In September UNICEF reported that nearly 100,000 children die each
    year before their first birthday, almost half during the peri-natal
    period. While the national infant mortality rate declined from 50.8 in
    1989 to 36.1 per 1,000 live births in 1998, in some states, such as
    Alagoas, it reached 72 per 1,000. Some municipalities have a rate of
    110 per 1,000.
        According to a UNICEF report, over 20 million children and
    adolescents, or almost 35 percent, live in poverty. About 2.9 million
    children under the age of 15, including over 375,000 between 5 and 9
    years old, continue to work (see Section 6.c.). Many work together with
    their parents, most often in agriculture. Many other children beg on
    city streets. According to the most recent government figures released
    in November 1999 and confirmed by UNICEF, the number of children
    working has decreased steadily since 1993, while the number of children
    attending school has increased. However, the overall level of child
    labor remained roughly the same between 1998 and 1999, because progress
    in reducing it was hampered by a rise in agricultural production that
    year. The Federal Government administers a total of 33 programs under 5
    separate ministries aimed at combating child labor. The Ministry of
    Social Security and Assistance's program for the eradication of child
    labor provided supplemental income or ``school scholarships'' to the
    families of 390,000 children in rural and urban areas who, in return,
    must attend school. The federal scholarship program is supplemented by
    a number of similar programs administered by municipalities and NGO's.
    Some of the largest such programs are in Campinas (Sao Paulo state),
    Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), and Olinda (Pernambuco).
        There are no reliable figures on the number of street children.
    Some are homeless, but the majority return home at night. Disparities
    in the numbers of children living on the street reported by children's
    rights activists indicate the difficulty of arriving at accurate
    estimates. The Center for the Defense of Children and Adolescents
    (CEDECA) in Belem, in the state of Para, reported that in 1998 a total
    of 2,328 youths under the age of 18, or 0.5 percent of the youth
    population, spent their days in the streets. CEDECA estimated that 97
    of those youths lived permanently in the streets.
        NGO's in Rio de Janeiro have made 28 shelters available for
    homeless children, but some children prefer the freedom and drugs that
    street life offers. Drug use, particularly glue sniffing and crack, is
    increasingly prevalent among street children. NGO's report that extreme
    poverty at home or sexual abuse by fathers and stepfathers are the
    principal reasons that many children choose to live in the streets. A
    national study of rape cases carried out by a group of Sao Paulo
    academics indicated that family members committed roughly 70 percent of
    rapes within their own homes. A study by the Brazilian Geography and
    Statistics Institute (IBGE) reported that 47 percent of Sao Paulo
    street children come from families that earn less than $200 (350 reais)
    per month. Nationwide, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates
    that some 30 million children live below the poverty line and
    increasingly come from households headed by women.
        In the October 1999 case of a child prostitution ring in Maranhao
    that involved police, judicial authorities, and elected officials,
    charges were brought against the owner of a bar, a local judge, a high-
    ranking police official, and two attorneys. At year's end, trials had
    not yet taken place.
        Youth are both victims and perpetrators of violence. Of all deaths
    of 15- to 19-year-olds, 72 percent are due to causes such as homicide,
    suicide, and traffic accidents, which reduces by at least 3 years the
    average life expectancy of men. During the first half of the year, 50
    young people died as a result of manslaughter in the state of Sao Paulo
    alone. Approximately 85 percent were victims of commercial sexual
    exploitation and ranged from 12 to 17 years of age. Homicide is the
    leading cause of death for children aged 10 to 14, and only 1.9 percent
    of murderers are serving prison sentences.
        A 1999 study by the Information Network for Violence, Exploitation,
    and Sexual Abuse of Children and Adolescents (CECRIA), an entity within
    the National Human Rights Secretariat, states that government efforts
    to combat sexual exploitation of children need to be better tailored
    and coordinated. It cites 40 separate programs operated by national and
    international NGO's, some in partnership with Government entities, but
    notes that most of the programs face shortfalls in resources and
    personnel. In association with the Ministry of Justice, the NGO ABRAPIA
    has since 1997 operated a telephone hot line to register complaints of
    sexual abuse against children and adolescents. ABRAPIA also administers
    the ``SOS-child'' program in Rio de Janeiro state that registers
    complaints of domestic abuse against children and provides medical and
    social assistance.
        Sexual exploitation of children and child prostitution remained a
    significant problem throughout the country. The CECRIA report indicated
    that patterns of sexual exploitation of children correspond to the
    distinct economic and social profile of the country's region. In the
    northern Amazonian region, sexual exploitation of children centers
    around brothels that cater to mining settlements. In the large urban
    centers, children, principally girls, who leave home because of abuse
    or sexual exploitation often prostitute themselves on the streets in
    order to survive. In the cities along the northeast coast, sexual
    tourism exploiting children is prevalent, and involves networks of
    travel agents, hotel workers, taxi drivers, and others who actively
    recruit children and even traffic them outside the country. Child
    prostitution also is developed in the areas served by the country's
    navigable rivers, particularly in ports and at international borders.
    In port cities, crews from cargo vessels are a primary clientele. The
    report notes that although trafficking develops in part to meet the
    demands of foreigners, and that the local population sustains it.
        Trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution contains several
    provisions for the disabled, stipulating a minimum wage, educational
    opportunities, and access to public buildings and public
    transportation. However, groups that work with the disabled report that
    state governments failed to meet the legally mandated targets for
    educational opportunities and work placement. A 1991 law stipulates
    that all businesses with over 200 employees must reserve 2 percent of
    their vacancies for the disabled. In 1999 labor officials in the
    Federal District launched an information campaign to encourage firms to
    comply with the law and warned that noncomplying firms could be fined.
        The National Human Rights Secretariat sponsored a ``City for
    Everyone'' program in cooperation with municipal governments and
    national and international NGO's that focused on providing better
    access for the disabled to public areas and public transport. However,
    little progress in the elimination of architectural barriers to the
    disabled has been made. In 1999 Rio de Janeiro state mandated that bus
    companies must make a specific number of buses on certain routes
    accessible to wheelchair users within 3 months. By September only 14
    public buses--of thousands in the city--had been adapted for wheelchair
    use. No intercity or interstate buses had been modified. The city of
    Niteroi put in service 10 vans specifically for the use of disabled
    persons, but the supply of this service lagged behind the rising
    demand.
        In June the Chamber of Deputies' Human Rights Commission released
    the report of its investigation into the conditions of mental hospitals
    and asylums. The report cited many examples of understaffed and poorly
    administered hospitals, substandard living conditions for many
    patients, and severely overcrowded and unclean facilities.
        According to the Federal Ministry of Education, in 1997 only 5
    percent of the estimated 6 million school-age children with
    disabilities had access to specialized instruction. Throughout the
    country, 43 percent of school districts offer special instruction for
    disabled children. In the nine states in the northeast part of the
    country, only 24 percent of school districts offer special instruction.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution grants the indigenous
    population of approximately 330,000 broad rights, including the
    protection of their cultural patrimony and the exclusive use of their
    traditional lands; however, the Government has fallen short of securing
    these rights for indigenous people in practice. The Government
    estimates that over half live in poverty in communities whose
    traditional ways of life are threatened on a variety of fronts. The
    number of indigenous citizens receiving food assistance in the southern
    states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul exceeded the total indigenous
    population at the time of the 1995 census in those states. The greatest
    number of beneficiaries reside in Mato Grosso do Sul state, where
    42,000 persons of a total indigenous population of 45,300 receive food
    assistance.
        Indigenous leaders and activists complain that indigenous people
    have only limited participation in decisions taken by the Government
    affecting their land, cultures, traditions, and allocation of national
    resources. They also criticized the Government for devoting
    insufficient resources to health care, other basic services, and
    protection of indigenous reserves from outsiders. Illegal mining,
    logging, and ranching are serious problems on indigenous land.
        The National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is responsible for the
    coordination and implementation of indigenous policies. The President
    appoints the head of FUNAI; it is organized into 52 regions with
    directors appointed directly by the FUNAI president.
        The 1988 Constitution charged the Federal Government with
    demarcating indigenous areas within 5 years. By January the Government
    had completed demarcation of roughly 79 percent of the total area of
    identified indigenous territory. During the year, the Government
    demarcated 4 more areas totaling about 360 square miles. Of the 563
    identified indigenous areas, 313 have reached the final registration
    stage, and 250 remain to be demarcated legally. Identified indigenous
    territory comprises 11 percent of the national territory.
        In December 1998, the Federal Government issued a decree
    recognizing the original boundaries of the Raposa Serra do Sol
    indigenous area in the Amazonian state of Roraima, overturning a
    controversial decision made in 1996 by the Justice Minister to limit
    and alter the shape of the reserve. In 1999 a state court suspended the
    demarcation process after local landowners and economic interests filed
    a suit requesting that action. In 1999 Roraima Senator Mozarildo
    Cavalcanti presented a bill canceling the 1998 decree. In September the
    bill was given an unfavorable report in committee. Indigenous activists
    claim that the Government's failure to allocate resources and complete
    the demarcation was a political concession to local economic and
    political interests who then were able to influence the state court.
    The demarcation of Raposa Serra do Sol has been pending since 1992.
        The Constitution provides indigenous people with the exclusive use
    of the soil, waters, and minerals on indigenous lands, subject to
    congressional authorization. In granting such authorization, the
    Constitution stipulates that the views of the affected communities must
    be considered and that the communities also must ``participate'' in the
    benefits gained from such use. However, legislation regulating mining
    on indigenous lands has been pending before the Congress since 1995.
    The Catholic Church-affiliated Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI)
    criticized the regulations within the legislation that would provide
    for indigenous groups' approval of mining concessions and their
    participation in the profits from mining, on the grounds that they do
    not address sufficiently the constitutional rights of indigenous
    people.
        In 1999 landowners brought a civil action to the Supreme Court
    against a lower court ruling in Bahia that restored demarcated land of
    the Caramuru-Catarina Paraguacu reserve to the Pataxo Ha-Ha-Hae tribe.
    At year's end, no trial date had been set. Other attempts were made to
    negotiate between the tribe and landowners.
        The Government estimates that 208 of the 563 identified indigenous
    lands are used illegally by nonindigenous persons for mining, logging,
    and agriculture. Nonindigenous invaders destroy the environment and
    wildlife, spread disease, and provoke violent confrontations. FUNAI
    admits that it does not have the necessary resources to protect
    indigenous lands from encroachment.
        Due partly to the Government's failure to provide adequate medical
    care as required by law, indigenous people have suffered epidemics of
    malaria, measles, and tuberculosis. According to the chief of FUNAI's
    medical department, 60 percent of the indigenous population suffer from
    a chronic disease such as tuberculosis, malaria, or hepatitis. In
    certain areas of the Amazon region, up to 80 percent of the population
    are affected. Illegal mining in the Amazon has led to the doubling of
    the incidence of malaria in the 1994-98 period. FUNAI estimates that 75
    percent of the affected population is indigenous. The infant mortality
    rate among the Yanomami in 1997 was 13 percent, while infant mortality
    among nonindigenous residents in the area was only 1.5 percent.
    According to health workers' unions, poor working conditions and lack
    of resources from the Government make it very difficult for health
    workers to travel into indigenous areas to provide sufficient medical
    care.
        FUNAI also has been unable to provide mandated health care and
    other basic services. Hoping to improve the level of health care
    provided to indigenous people, in 1999 the Government transferred that
    responsibility from FUNAI to the Ministry of Health.
        According to the Pro-Yanomami Committee, in 1999 FUNASA, the
    Government's health agency, issued a report showing that in 1998, 279
    indigenous persons died in Roraima, 180 of them Yanomami. Most of the
    deaths were caused by acute respiratory infection, malaria, and
    diarrhea. Almost half died without having received medical assistance.
        In September after Federal prosecutors complained about the
    slowness of the police investigation, the National Council for Human
    Rights formed a committee to oversee the investigation of the May 1998
    killing of Xucuru Chief Francisco ``Xicao'' de Assis Araujo. Araujo
    defended the land claims of his tribe, whose lands are being encroached
    upon by ranchers in his home state of Pernambuco.
        No progress was made in the case of mass sterilizations promoted
    among women of the Pataxo tribe of Bahia by Federal Deputy Dr. Roland
    Lavigne in exchange for votes during his 1994 electoral campaign. Women
    were reluctant to have children due to the general level of poverty in
    the community, and campaign workers allegedly convinced them that
    sterilization was the only effective form of birth control. Pataxo
    leaders claim that the sterilizations were a deliberate program of
    genocide intended to eliminate their tribe and free their land for
    farmers who illegally occupy the Pataxo reserve.
        In April during the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the
    arrival of the Portuguese in Porto Seguro (Bahia), police used rubber
    bullets and tear gas, in violently blocking 2,000 indigenous marchers
    from entering the city. Indigenous leaders were seeking damages in
    civil court at year's end. In May U.N. High Commissioner for Human
    Rights Mary Robinson raised the police's actions with President
    Cardoso. The President denied any use of excessive force, and in July a
    Federal Police investigation reached the same conclusion. However, the
    Federal Public Prosecutor has challenged these findings. FUNAI
    president Mares resigned in protest over the treatment of indigenous
    people during the event.
        In May an Acre state judge sentenced former Acre governor Orleir
    Cameli, his family's firm, and his partner Abraao Candido da Silva, to
    pay about $5 million (10 million reais) to the Ashaninka-Kampa
    indigenous group for material and moral damage caused by the extraction
    of mahogany and cedar from 1981 to 1987. The firm extracted 2,478 cubic
    meters of wood from the area. Cameli announced he would appeal the
    decision.
        In September CIMI reported that FUNAI was going to press charges
    against Jordao, Acre city councilman Auton Farias, and two others for
    the murder of an indigenous person in Tarauaca, Acre.
        Religious Minorities.--Leaders in the Jewish community expressed
    concern over the continued appearance of anti-Semitic material on
    Internet websites compiled by neo-Nazi groups.
        Amnesty International reported that Eduardo Bernardes da Silva, a
    worker with the NGO's office in Sao Paulo, received a suspicious
    package at his home on September 5. He opened it partially and found a
    device covered in swastikas, thought to have been sent by a neo-Nazi
    group. Police confirmed that it was a bomb and destroyed it in a
    controlled explosion.
        The next day a similar bomb was sent to the offices of the
    Associacao da Parada GLBT, an association which organizes an annual Gay
    Pride March, reportedly by the same group.
        In September a neo-Nazi group sent letters to two prominent Sao
    Paulo human rights commission members, Renato Simoes and Italo Cardoso,
    threatening to ``exterminate'' gays, Jews, black people and nordestinos
    (people from the impoverished northeast of the country), as well as
    those seeking to protect their rights. The letter said that the group
    intended to target a number of human rights organizations on or around
    the country's September 7 Independence Day, including Tortura Nunca
    Mais (No More Torture), Action by Christians against Torture, AI, and
    gay and lesbian groups.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
    has been illegal since 1951, darker-skinned citizens say that they
    frequently encounter discrimination. Legislation in force since 1989
    specifically prohibits, among other practices, denial of public or
    private facilities, employment, or housing to anyone based on race. A
    1997 amendment to this law added prohibitions against, and jail terms
    for, the incitement of racial discrimination or prejudice and the
    dissemination of racially offensive symbols and epithets. The media
    reported arrests of several persons charged with using racial slurs
    during the year. Several examples of such cases include that of a
    seamstress pressing charges against her employer, a stagehand bringing
    charges against a theatrical director, and a customer pressing charges
    against an employee of a video rental store. All instances involved use
    of racial slurs when insults were uttered; at year's end, none had
    completed the trial process.
        In Sao Paulo human rights activists continued to express concern
    because of discrimination against blacks and poor persons from the
    northeast by neo-Nazi groups in the south. Many of these groups
    maintain Web sites that espouse violence. The Sao Paulo State Assembly
    Human Rights Committee criticized several hate groups who maintain such
    Web sites and asked the Public Ministry for an investigation. One man,
    who maintained a Web site that called for the eviction from Sao Paulo
    of all emigrants from northeastern part of the country, was accused of
    crimes under the Racism Law. Instead of going to trial, he chose to
    accept guilt for the crime and did community service as punishment. At
    year's end, other similar cases still were being investigated.
        ISER research noted a disproportionately higher rate of police
    killings of Afro-Brazilians. Persons of color are five times more
    likely to be shot or killed in the course of a law enforcement action
    than are persons who are perceived to be white.
        In September two members of the Sao Paulo State Assembly's Human
    Rights Committee received threatening letters stating that the group
    which identifies itself as ``raca pura'' (pure race) is ``fighting for
    an end to homosexuals, blacks, and northeasterners.'' Sao Paulo's State
    Secretary of Security ordered an investigation into both incidents. The
    investigations were ongoing at year's end.
        In addition to these violent threats against minorities, research
    conducted this year at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
    reconfirmed that Afro-Brazilians experience lower standards of living
    than whites. Cross-checking data from the IBGE, the national statistics
    office, and the U.N. Human Development Index showed that Afro-
    Brazilians have lower salaries, life expectancies (62 years instead of
    69 years), and educational standards (79 percent literacy rates,
    compared with 92 percent) than whites. Afro-Brazilians and mulattos
    still are clearly disadvantaged economically and socially throughout
    the country. In Sao Paulo, for example, the rate of unemployment among
    blacks is 22.7 percent, while the rate among nonblacks is 16.1 percent.
    Nonblacks in Sao Paulo have an average monthly income of about $523
    (1,005 reais), while blacks average only $267 (512 reais) a month.
        According to research carried out by the Inter-Union Department of
    Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies in 1998, Afro-Brazilians had
    higher rates of unemployment, earned less, and enjoyed less job
    stability than white Brazilians in each of the five largest
    metropolitan regions where data were gathered. In and around Salvador,
    Bahia, which has the highest percentage of Afro-Brazilians of any
    metropolitan region, unemployment among Afro-Brazilians was 45 percent
    higher than among whites (the difference among heads of household was
    75 percent). In Sao Paulo, Afro-Brazilian unemployment was 41 percent
    higher than among whites and 64 percent higher among heads of
    households. Afro-Brazilian men earned on average between 62 percent and
    70 percent of the average salary earned by white men in the five
    regions surveyed. Afro-Brazilian women earned on average between 33.5
    and 47 percent of the average salary of a white man. Illiteracy also is
    a problem: 32 percent of blacks are illiterate, compared with 14
    percent of whites. Blacks are less likely than whites to be enrolled in
    institutes of higher education.
        A much higher percentage of blacks are convicted by courts than
    whites, according to professor Sergio Adorno of the University of Sao
    Paulo's Nucleus for the Study of Violence. Adorno analyzed 500 criminal
    cases judged in Sao Paulo courts in 1990 and found that 60 percent of
    whites able to afford their own lawyers were acquitted, while only 27
    percent of blacks who hired lawyers were found not guilty. Ignacio
    Cano, a researcher at the Sociological Institute of Religious Studies
    in Rio de Janeiro, found strong evidence of racial bias by the police
    in the use of lethal force against residents of color in Rio de Janiero
    from 1993 to 1996 and in Sao Paulo from 1996 to 1999. According to
    Cano, Afro-Brazilians were three times as likely as whites to suffer
    death or injury from police gunfire.
        In 1997 the Federal Government's Interministerial Working Group for
    the Valorization of the Black Population issued 29 recommendations,
    including the creation of affirmative action programs for university
    admissions and government hiring. The group is charged with proposing
    public policies to increase the participation and access of Afro-
    Brazilians in society. The National Secretariat for Human Rights
    adopted some of the group's recommendations in the national human
    rights program, which now contains, as a specific goal, the development
    of affirmative actions programs to increase access for Afro-Brazilians
    to professional schools and universities.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    provides for representation of all workers (except members of the
    military, the uniformed police, and firemen) but imposes a
    hierarchical, unitary system funded by a mandatory union tax on workers
    and employers. New unions must register with the Ministry of Labor and
    Employment (MLE), which accepts the registration if no objections are
    filed. Registration can be contested with the MLE by other unions which
    represent workers in the same geographical area and professional
    category. In the case of such an objection, the MLE's Secretariat for
    Labor Relations has 15 days to consider the validity of the objection.
    If the objection is found to be valid, the MLE will not register the
    union and it remains for union organizers to challenge the decision in
    the labor courts.
        The 1988 Constitution freed workers to organize new unions out of
    old ones without prior authorization of the Government; however, it
    retained many other provisions of the old labor code. One such
    provision is a restriction known as ``unicidade'' (``one-per-city''),
    which limits freedom of association by prohibiting multiple, competing
    unions of the same professional category in a given geographical area.
    Most elements of the labor movement, as well as the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), criticize the retention of
    unicidade. The Cardoso administration submitted a constitutional
    amendment to Congress that would end unicidade, but at year's end, it
    still had not come to a vote due to disagreement over the proposal.
        In practice a number of competing unions have been allowed to exist
    among the thousands of local unions. However, these do not represent
    the norm, and the MLE and the courts actively enforce the principle of
    unicidade in decisions regarding the registration of new unions.
        Approximately 16 percent of the work force voluntarily pays union
    dues, but nearly twice that percentage is charged a mandatory union tax
    and also is represented in collective bargaining. The Ministry of Labor
    estimates that there are over 16,000 unions. Local unions are able to
    associate with state federations and national confederations in their
    professional category. Unions are obliged by law to represent all
    workers in a professional category and geographical area, regardless of
    membership status.
        Although the law makes no provision for central labor organizations
    that include multiple categories of workers, four major groups have
    emerged: the Workers' Unitary Central (CUT), the Forca Sindical (FS),
    the Workers' General Confederation (CGT), and the Social Democratic
    Union (SDS). Labor centrals are not provided for in the Labor Code, and
    centrals do not have legal standing to represent professional
    categories of workers in collective bargaining.
        Unions and their leadership are independent of the Government and
    of the political parties. The leadership of major unions is distinct
    and independent from that of the political parties. The major union
    centrals tend to share links to various left-of-center political
    parties. In some instances, unions and centrals form alliances with
    political parties and social movements to advocate or carry out protest
    acts regarding specific issues. One of the largest such acts in recent
    years was the ``March of 100,000,'' which brought 75,000
    representatives of the CUT, the National Confederation of Agricultural
    Workers, the MST, and 30 other organizations to Brasilia in 1999 to
    protest government policies.
        The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike (except
    for the military, police, and firemen). Enabling legislation passed in
    1989 stipulates that essential services must remain in operation during
    a strike and that workers must notify employers at least 48 hours
    before beginning a walkout. Congress has yet to pass the complementary
    legislation establishing legal protection for strikes in the public
    sector; however, in practice the Government has not interfered with the
    right of public workers to strike. The Constitution prohibits
    government interference in labor unions, but provides that ``abuse'' of
    the right to strike (such as not maintaining essential services, or
    failure to end a strike after a labor court decision) is punishable by
    law. Employers are prohibited from firing workers or hiring substitute
    workers during a strike, with certain exceptions, provided that the
    strike is not ruled abusive. If a union follows the laws regarding
    strikes, which were eased in the 1988 Constitution, the labor courts
    generally do not rule that the strikes are abusive.
        The number of strikes has diminished in recent years. According to
    the Inter-union Department of Socioeconomic Studies and Statistics
    (DIEESE), there were approximately 550 strikes in 1999, compared with
    1,250 strikes recorded in 1996. In the city of Sao Paulo and the
    surrounding region, which covers the country's industrial center, data
    from the regional labor court showed that there were 84 strikes during
    the year, the lowest number in a decade. Public sector strikes received
    the most attention in the media during the year. Public sector unions
    that struck during the year include municipal transit workers, customs
    agents, public teachers, state university workers, and various
    categories of federal employees. In addition major strikes in the
    private sector included the metalworkers of Sao Paulo, bank workers,
    truck drivers, and longshoremen in the port of Santos.
        On May 18 in Sao Paulo, military police fired tear gas and rubber
    bullets into a crowd of striking workers from a coalition of 25 unions
    linked to the CUT. More than 20 strikers were injured. Strikers reacted
    by throwing rocks and cans at police, injuring five policemen (see
    Section 1.c.). The ICFTU reported that police fired on striking workers
    at a government-run company in Brasilia in December 1999, killing
    public sector worker Jose Ferreira da Silva and injuring 20 others.
    Although police said that they used only tear gas and rubber bullets,
    live ammunition was found in Ferreira's body.
        According to leaders of the National Confederation of Agricultural
    Workers, an organized campaign exists in the state of Para to
    assassinate rural labor leaders. In November labor organizer Jose Dutra
    da Costa was shot and killed in Rondon do Para. Costa served as
    director for land reform policy of the local union, which was involved
    in taking over disputed land for the settlement of rural workers. In
    June in the state of Para, Jeronimo Alves de Amorim was convicted of
    ordering the 1991 murder of the head of a local workers' union,
    Expedito Ribiero de Souza (see Section 1.a.).
        Unions and centrals freely affiliate with international trade union
    organizations; the CUT, FS, and CGT are affiliated with the ICFTU.
        The ICFTU reports that intimidation and killings of rural labor
    union organizers and their agents also continues to be a problem.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right to organize. Businesses and unions
    are working to expand and improve mechanisms of collective bargaining.
    However, due to the highly detailed labor code, the scope of issues
    legally subject to collective bargaining is narrow. The labor court
    system exercises normative power with regard to the settlement of labor
    disputes, discouraging direct negotiation. The Cardoso administration
    made expansion of collective bargaining one of its major objectives in
    the labor sector. However, the Labor Ministry has yet to introduce
    legislation on the issue due to fierce resistance by labor unions,
    which view such government efforts as an attempt to make negotiable
    collective bargaining rights provided for by the Constitution.
        Collective bargaining is widespread in the formal sector. More than
    16,700 negotiated contracts were registered with the Labor Ministry in
    1999, a significant increase from the 10,000 contracts registered 2
    years earlier. To be binding, all collective bargaining agreements must
    be reported to the Labor Ministry within 8 days of their conclusion. In
    spite of the prevalence of collective bargaining, unicidade and the
    inability of new unions to compete with existing unions limit the
    effectiveness of negotiations and the bargaining power of unions. As a
    result, DIEESE reports that only half of the collective bargaining
    agreements it tracked in 1999 contained wage increases that kept pace
    with inflation.
        In 1995 the Cardoso administration promulgated a provisional
    measure that simultaneously ended inflation indexing of wages, allowed
    for mediation of wage settlements if the parties involved so desired,
    and provided greater latitude for collective bargaining. Previously the
    labor court and the Labor Ministry had responsibility for mediation in
    the preliminary stages of dispute settlement. Although labor court
    decisions still set wages in many disputes, parties now may choose
    mediation as an alternative. Free mediation services are provided by
    the Ministry of Labor and the Public Ministry of Labor, and unions and
    employers also may choose a private mediator from a registry kept by
    the Labor Ministry.
        The Constitution incorporates a provision from the old labor code
    that prohibits the dismissal of employees who are candidates for or
    holders of union leadership positions. Nonetheless, dismissals take
    place, with those dismissed required to resort to a usually lengthy
    court process for relief. In general the authorities do not effectively
    enforce laws protecting union members from discrimination. Labor courts
    charged with resolving these and other disputes involving unfair
    dismissal, working conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances
    are slow and cumbersome. At year's end, over 2.5 million complaints
    were languishing in the labor court system, where they may remain
    unresolved for 5 to 10 years. According to the Supreme Labor Court,
    over 2 million complaints have been registered in labor courts each
    year during the past 5 years.
        The Government is attempting to reduce this backlog and increase
    the efficiency of the courts. Legislation approved in January enables
    cases with relatively low monetary claims to be adjudicated in one
    meeting with a judge within 30 days of the filing. Another recent law
    promotes the formation of employee/employer conciliation commissions
    designed to resolve grievances before they reach the labor courts. In
    the past, according to union officials, as many as 95 percent of cases
    in courts took between 5 to 10 years to resolve.
        Labor law applies equally in the free trade zones. The unions in
    the Manaus free trade zone, like rural unions and many unions in
    smaller cities, are weaker vis-a-vis employers than unions in the major
    industrial centers.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor; however, there continue to be credible reports
    of compulsory labor in many parts of the country. The 2000 ICFTU report
    states that forced laborers number in the hundreds of thousands, but
    there are no government sources to confirm such estimates. Forced labor
    is most common in agricultural activities in the rural north and
    center-west of the country, in logging, charcoal production, herding,
    and agriculture. The majority of cases occur when employers recruit
    laborers from population centers and transport them long distances to
    remote areas where escape is difficult. Laborers often are forced to
    work in inhuman conditions, many times under the watch of armed guards,
    to pay off debt that they incurred on the trip or at the worksite. In
    many cases, overseers or owners of farms withhold pay from migrant
    laborers and use force to retain and intimidate them.
        According to the Penal Code, violators of forced or compulsory
    labor laws may be sentenced up to 8 years in prison. Legislation passed
    in December 1988 better defined penalties for those who recruit workers
    under fraudulent claims, withhold documents or salaries, or force
    workers to labor against their will to repay debt.
        Government officials and labor activists say that widespread
    poverty, low levels of education, and lack of awareness of workers'
    rights greatly complicate efforts to combat forced labor. Enforcement
    also has been hampered by the remoteness of the areas in which forced
    labor is practiced and the difficulty of arriving in these areas
    without alerting those using illegal labor. Additionally, freed workers
    often are afraid to testify against those who recruited and supervised
    them and are unable to remain in the region in order to testify. Thus
    the authorities often have found it difficult to identify and prosecute
    the owners of farms or businesses that exploit forced labor. In its
    March report, the ILO Committee of Experts noted that when convictions
    do occur, usually only the third party recruiters are punished and the
    owners of the large estates who employ illegal labor are not
    sanctioned. Beginning in 1996, the Government may expropriate and use
    in land reform programs land on which slave labor is found. However,
    land owners must be compensated for these lands. In one case, the
    Government paid the owner of the Flor da Mata ranch in the Para state
    for lands expropriated for use in land reform in 1998. The Pastoral
    Land Commission objected to the amount paid to the ranch owner, stating
    that it was well above what the owner paid for the land, thereby
    contributing to a sense of impunity and rewarding those who allow their
    lands to be used for forced labor. There is proposed legislation in
    Congress that would allow land to be confiscated with no payment to
    land owners.
        Federal Government efforts to eliminate forced labor are
    coordinated by the Executive Group to Combat Forced Labor (GERTRAF),
    which was established in 1995. The Ministry of Labor coordinates
    GERTRAF, which includes representatives from seven different
    ministries. The enforcement arm of GERTRAF is the Special Group for
    Mobile Inspection (SETIF), which works in conjunction with Federal
    Police. During 1995-98, the teams carried out more than 500 raids. They
    reached over 140,000 persons working under varying conditions
    approximating forced labor. Over this period, SETIF freed nearly 800
    workers from slave-like conditions and helped in the prosecution and
    incarceration of 13 persons. SETIF conducted 123 raids and freed 639
    workers from forced labor in 1999--more than in any previous year.
    Through the first 6 months of the year, the group freed 418 workers
    from 45 ranches and levied over $200,000 (370,000 reais) in fines.
    Although 33 minors under 16 years of age were found working on ranches
    during raids by SETIF during the year, none of them were laboring in
    conditions of forced or compulsory labor.
        In its largest single operation to date, SETIF and the Federal
    Police freed 135 workers from slave-like conditions on a cotton ranch
    in the state of Mato Grosso in April. The team responded to a complaint
    made by 15 workers who had escaped from the ranch in February and
    reported working 7 days a week among rats and snakes, sleeping on the
    ground, and paying high prices for spoiled food. Workers had been
    recruited from cities in the region with promises of good housing,
    food, and salaries; instead, they were forced to work at gunpoint in
    inhuman conditions. The authorities are investigating at least eight
    other ranches in the region for suspected use of forced labor.
        GERTRAF receives allegations of forced labor from labor unions and
    other organizations. The CUT initiated a 24-hour hot line with a toll-
    free number for reporting instances of forced labor in 1997. However,
    the most important supplier of information to GERTRAF is the Catholic
    Church's Pastoral Land Commission, which tracks instances of forced
    labor and carries out campaigns to educate workers about the risks of
    forced labor. The CPT reported 16 instances of forced labor involving
    1,099 workers in 10 states in 1999. Over one-half of these forced
    laborers were found in the state of Para. The 1999 figures represented
    a reversal of a 3-year trend of declining instances of forced labor.
    The CPT reported that, due to the hidden and complex nature of forced
    labor, these figures significantly understate the actual number of
    workers trapped in conditions of forced and compulsory labor in the
    country.
        The law also bars forced and bonded labor by children. Although the
    MLE found no children working as forced laborers during the year, in
    1999 the Pastoral Land Commission reported 25 children under the age of
    16 found working in conditions of forced labor. In March the ILO
    reported that observers have cited over 3,000 girls who were subject to
    debt servitude and forced into prostitution in the state of Rondonia.
        Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
    prostitution also is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law restricts work that may be performed by children;
    however, child labor is a serious problem. The Government amended the
    Constitution in December 1998 to raise the minimum working age from 14
    to 16 years and the age at which apprenticeships may begin from 12 to
    14 years. The law bars all minors under age 18 from work that
    constitutes a physical strain or from employment in nocturnal,
    unhealthful, dangerous, or morally harmful conditions. However, the
    authorities rarely enforce additional legal restrictions intended to
    protect working minors under age 18, and the problem is widespread.
        The law requires permission of the parents for minors to work as
    apprentices, and working minors must attend school through the primary
    grades. Schooling is universal, free, and compulsory until the age of
    15.
        The rate of school enrollment of children aged 7 to 14 increased
    from 89.1 percent in 1994 to 95.5 percent in 1999. Rates of repetition
    have dropped from 30.2 percent in 1995 to 23.4 percent in 1997. Despite
    these promising numbers, repetition rates and the poor quality of
    public schools continued to be problems. Fully 40 percent of first-
    graders repeat the year, and in a number of states first-graders are
    more likely to fail than to pass. Even with increased enrollment, there
    still were 1.1 million children between the ages of 7 and 14 who are
    not attending school.
        Although still a serious problem, the incidence of child labor has
    dropped significantly in recent years. According to government figures,
    the number of working children fell by nearly 24 percent between 1995
    and 1999. Over the same period, the rate of participation in the work
    force of children from the ages of 5 to 14 dropped from 11 to 9
    percent. Nevertheless, more than 2.9 million children under the age of
    15 continued to work in 1999. Frequent accidents, unhealthy working
    conditions, and squalor are common.
        A 1999 Labor Ministry report indicates that children work in about
    100 rural and urban activities. Common rural activities include
    fishing, mining, producing charcoal, and harvesting sugarcane, sisal,
    tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, and a variety of other crops. In urban
    areas, children are found in shoe shining, trash picking, street
    peddling, prostitution, and drug trafficking. According to the
    Government's Institute for Applied Economic Research, there are around
    400,000 children between the ages of 10 to 16 working as domestic
    servants.
        The Ministry of Labor and Employment is responsible for inspecting
    worksites to enforce child labor laws. These efforts are guided
    regionally by special Nuclei for the Eradication of Child Labor, which
    gather data and develop plans for child labor inspection. Nearly all
    inspections of children in the workplace are driven by allegations and
    tips from workers, teachers, unions, NGO's, and the media.
    Approximately 3,200 inspectors investigated 52,000 establishments in
    1999. Inspectors lack authority to investigate allegations of child
    labor in informal sector establishments, where most child labor is
    found. In all cases but the worst forms, inspectors attempt to reach an
    alternative solution before applying fines of around $225 (400 reais)
    per violation. Inspectors also may refer cases to prosecutors from the
    Public Ministry of Labor, who are able to levy fines upwards of $1,670
    (3,000 reais) and investigate cases in the informal sector.
        Fighting child labor is a priority of the Cardoso administration.
    The Ministry of Social Security and Assistance's Program for the
    Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) provides cash stipends to low-income
    families who keep their children in school and out of work activities.
    Because the public school day lasts only 4 hours, PETI also offers
    complementary cultural and instructional activities to children during
    nonschool hours to keep them from situations in which they could be put
    to work. PETI has grown from assisting about 3,700 children in 2 states
    in 1996 to over 390,000 in nearly all 26 states by the end of the year.
    The program started with children involved in hazardous activities in
    rural areas, such as charcoal production and sisal, sugar cane, and
    citrus harvesting. Other rural activities recently included in the
    program are work in cotton and tobacco fields, flour mills, salt mines,
    horticulture, weaving, fishing, wood mills, brick production, ceramics,
    and mining. The PETI program also is growing rapidly in urban
    activities such as trash picking, shoe shining, and street peddling.
        Social programs to end child labor have been matched by investments
    in programs to support greater access to education. The Ministry of
    Education's (MEC) Program for the Guarantee of a Minimum Income (PGRM)
    provides low-income families with modest monthly stipends--typically
    ranging from $6-8 (10-15 reais) per child--provided that all children
    aged 7-14 in the household are attending school. The poorest 20 percent
    of municipalities in each state are eligible to enroll in the program
    and receive funds from the Federal Government. MEC estimates that the
    PGRM has benefited 1 million children in more than 500,000 families.
    The Government supplements this program with a decentralized school
    lunch program that serves 37 million children across the country.
        In December 1999, the Government ratified ILO Convention 138
    dealing with the minimum age for work and Convention 182 on the
    eradication of the worst forms of child labor. At year's end,
    Convention 138 had not taken effect due to technical issues concerning
    the minimum working age that the Government submitted to the ILO. In
    March the Ministry of Labor established a tripartite commission to
    produce a list of worst forms of child labor to be eradicated in the
    country. At year's end, the commission produced a list of over 80 such
    activities, which includes 27 new activities that are to be banned for
    all workers under 18 years of age. These new activities include cutting
    sugar cane, applying pesticides, and driving tractors.
        Civil organizations have played a fundamental role in reducing the
    number of children working. One of the organizations coordinating the
    diverse efforts has been the National Forum for the Prevention and
    Eradication of Child Labor. The Forum was established in 1994 with
    funding from the ILO and UNICEF, and has chapters in every state and
    over 40 institutional members from government, unions, employers, and
    NGO's. The ILO's Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC)
    sponsors programs in footwear, charcoal, citrus, sisal, and domestic
    service. IPEC programs have focused on capacity building, awareness
    raising, research promotion, and the incorporation of income generating
    schemes and monitoring systems into child labor prevention programs.
    UNICEF supports various NGO's, and began a campaign in to remove child
    laborers from working in trash dumps.
        The ABRINQ Foundation for Children's Rights has negotiated
    agreements and garnered commitments from producers in footwear, citrus,
    automobile production, charcoal, and other industries to investigate
    and eradicate instances of child labor. ABRINQ also awards mayors who
    invest in prochild policies with its Child-Friendly Mayor award.
    Through a labeling program and awareness-raising activities, the
    footwear industry's Pro-Child Institute has helped to reduce
    significantly instances of child labor in footwear production in the
    state of Sao Paulo. Other important NGO's include Projeto POMMAR, which
    works most closely with children at risk of becoming prostitutes in the
    Northeast, and Missao Crianca (Mission Child), a new NGO that seeks to
    disseminate its methodology for minimum income programs to end child
    labor. All major union centrals have made firm commitments to eradicate
    child labor by reporting violations and implementing programs to
    educate union members about the hazards of child labor. The News Agency
    for Children's Rights closely tracks stories in the media, publishes
    studies, and gives awards to media outlets that effectively cover
    children's rights.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is
    approximately $77 (151 reais) a month, which is not sufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for workers and their families. A
    1999 study by DIEESE concluded that the minimum wage was only about
    one-seventh of the salary necessary to support a family of four in the
    Sao Paulo metropolitan area. Many workers outside the regulated
    economy, particularly in the rural northeast, earn less than the
    minimum wage. At year's end, Congress was considering legislation that
    would increase the minimum wage.
        The Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours and specifies a
    weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on Sundays. The
    Constitution provides for pay and fringe benefits and establishes
    protections for agricultural and domestic workers, although not all
    provisions are enforced. All workers in the formal sector receive
    overtime pay for work beyond 44 hours, and there are prohibitions
    against excessive use of overtime.
        Unsafe working conditions are prevalent throughout the country.
    Fundacentro, part of the Ministry of Labor, sets occupational, health,
    and safety standards, which are consistent with internationally
    recognized norms. However, the Ministry has insufficient resources for
    adequate inspection and enforcement of these standards. If a worker has
    a problem in the workplace and has trouble getting relief directly from
    an employer, the worker or union can file a claim with the regional
    labor court, although in practice this frequently is a cumbersome,
    protracted process.
        The law requires employers to establish internal committees for
    accident prevention in workplaces. It also protects employee members of
    these committees from being fired for their committee activities.
    However, such firings do occur, and legal recourse usually requires
    years for resolution. Individual workers do not have the legal right to
    remove themselves from the workplace when faced with hazardous working
    conditions; however, workers may express such concerns to the internal
    committee, which would conduct an immediate investigation.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits the transport of
    persons for illicit reasons within and outside the country; however,
    trafficking in persons, including women and children, in, to, and from
    the country is a problem. Penalties for trafficking in persons include
    fines and prison sentences ranging from 1 to 12 years, depending on the
    severity of the abuse and whether violence, threats, or fraud were
    employed.
        Trafficking within the country often takes the form of rural
    workers being transported long distances to work on remote ranches in
    slave-like conditions (see Section 6.c.).
        Trafficking of women and children for purposes of prostitution,
    both within the country and to other countries is also a problem.
        Laws on trafficking are enforced by the Federal Police. Officials
    reported that it is very difficult to capture and incarcerate
    traffickers because they must be caught in the act of traveling with
    the victims. Further, most women who leave the country with traffickers
    do so willingly, and only upon arrival do they realize the severe
    conditions under which they are forced to work and live. Officials also
    report that fear of reprisals keeps a number of victims from seeking
    police intervention or from testifying against those who persecuted
    them.
        The U.N. reported that over 75,000 Brazilian women work as
    prostitutes in Europe. According to the report, most of the women come
    from the states of Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. During the
    year, the Federal Police arrested several suspects in the capital of
    Brasilia, Goias, Rio de Janeiro, and Ceara involved in recruiting women
    to work as prostitutes abroad, mainly in Spain, but also in Portugal,
    Japan, and Israel. Police officials stated that in most cases women who
    are recruited by trafficking organizations understand that they are to
    work as prostitutes, but that they are lied to about working conditions
    and their prospective earnings. In other cases women were told that
    they would work as nannies or as household servants. Upon arrival
    victims of trafficking often have their passports confiscated and are
    forced to prostitute themselves and live in virtual confinement. As in
    other types of trafficking, perpetrators use debt and isolation to
    control the victims.
        In March the federal police arrested one person who was connected
    to a trafficking ring that brought women from the state of Goias to
    Spain. The person allegedly received $130 (234 reais) in return for
    each woman transported from the bus station to the airport. Four women
    were with the suspect at the time of arrest.
        In June the Federal Police uncovered a travel agency in Goias which
    had recruited and sent at least 20 women to work as prostitutes in
    Spain. At year's end, the two agency owners were in prison awaiting
    trial; the recruiters were still at large.
        The Government took a number of steps over the year to combat child
    prostitution. To call attention to the problem and foster initiatives
    to fight it, May 18 was declared the first National Day against the
    Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents. Legislation enacted in
    June lengthened the maximum sentence to 10 years in prison for those
    who manage brothels that exploit child prostitutes. In July the
    Government announced the first national pilot program to combat child
    prostitution. The program has a budget of a $556,000 (1 million reais)
    but was geared to begin its outreach operations at the end of the year.
                                   __________

                                     CANADA

        Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal parliamentary
    form of government. Citizens periodically choose their representatives
    in free and fair multiparty elections. On November 27, voters elected a
    majority of 172 Liberal Party members to the 301-seat Parliament, and
    Jean Chretien began his third term as prime minister. The judiciary is
    independent.
        Elected civilian officials control the federal, provincial, and
    municipal police forces. The armed forces have no role in domestic law
    enforcement except in national emergencies. Laws requiring the security
    forces to respect human rights are observed strictly, and the courts
    punish violators.
        Canada has a highly developed, market-based economy. Laws
    extensively protect the well-being of workers and provide for workers'
    freedom of association.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means for dealing
    with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in
    some areas. Problems include discrimination against aboriginals, the
    disabled, and women. There was an increase in anti-Semitic harassment.
    The Government continued to take serious steps to address private acts
    of violence against women. Trafficking of persons into the country,
    including trafficking for purposes of prostitution is a growing
    problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        Four Toronto policemen were charged with manslaughter for the death
    of a suspect whom they beat while taking him into custody outside a
    convenience store in August. Accounts of the incident vary as to what
    actually transpired at the time.
        The Government made concerted efforts to resolve issues stemming
    from two controversial shooting deaths in previous years. In May an
    Alberta provincial court judge issued a fatality inquiry report on the
    causes of a 1998 incident in which a Royal Canadian Mounted Police
    (RCMP) officer shot a woman and her child on the Tsuu T'ina
    reservation. The report's 18 key recommendations focused on the needs
    of indigenous people and improvements in police and family services
    procedures, and other measures to prevent similar situations from
    occurring. A court upheld the 1999 conviction for criminal negligence
    of a police officer in the 1995 shooting death of an aboriginal
    activist at Ipperwash, Ontario.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions in practice; however, there were isolated
    incidents of police mistreating suspects. In February the RCMP began an
    inquiry into the deaths of four native men, two of whom were found
    frozen on the outskirts of Saskatoon and two of whom were found dead in
    or near their homes. Another native man filed charges against two
    Saskatoon police officers who allegedly picked him up in a police
    cruiser, drove him to the same spot outside the city where the two
    other men were found dead, and left him in sub-zero temperatures. At
    year's end, the two officers were awaiting trial in this case. In
    October Saskatchewan's Justice Minister ordered a public inquest into
    the events that led to the death of one of the men who had been found
    dead in his home, due to a drug overdose, shortly after being released
    from police custody. The provincial public prosecutions office already
    had decided that there was no basis for pressing criminal charges in
    relation to this case.
        The military continued to receive complaints from women serving in
    the armed forces who charge that they are subject to sexual abuse,
    harassment, and discrimination. A new armed forces grievance board that
    is independent of the military chain of command began operations in
    June. In addition, other mechanisms established by the Government to
    address such complaints, including the Advisory Board on Canadian
    Forces Gender Integration and Employment Equity and an Ombudsman in the
    Department of National Defense, continue to operate. During the year,
    the Ombudsman received 14 discrimination complaints, 128 harassment
    complaints, and 2 sexual assault complaints.
        In 1999 Toronto police continued a review of procedures following
    public complaints about the use of strip searches and body cavity
    searches in several routine arrests. The review determined that there
    were isolated incidents of unnecessary searches. Toronto police
    authorities determined that the policy still was appropriate and during
    the year provided further guidance to officers about when such searches
    are appropriate.
        In June the RCMP Public Complaints Commission completed its
    hearings on the controversy surrounding the use of pepper spray to
    break up demonstrations at the November 1997 Asia Pacific Economic
    Cooperation (APEC) conference in Vancouver (see Section 2.b.). The
    Commission had not issued a report by year's end.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors. However, the
    Ombudsman Ontario remains concerned about ``recurring evidence''
    presented in three separate investigations concluded during the year
    that there is a ``systemic problem in the lack of consistent
    application of official policy and standing order across correctional
    facilities in the province's prison system.'' The Ombudsman
    investigated a variety of problems during the year, including
    segregation procedures, use of force, and lost property. The Ombudsman
    also made recommendations concerning standards of hygiene, health care,
    and fair and reasonable treatment to the Ministry of Correctional
    Services; the Ombudsman reports that the Ministry has begun to make
    improvements in these areas.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
    these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process and vigorously enforces the right to a fair trial.
        The court system is divided into federal and provincial courts,
    which handle both civil and criminal matters. The highest federal court
    is the Supreme Court, which exercises general appellate jurisdiction
    and advises on constitutional matters.
        The judicial system is based on English common law at the federal
    level as well as in most provinces; in the province of Quebec, it is
    derived from the Napoleonic Code. Throughout the country, judges are
    appointed. In criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of
    innocence and the right to a public trial, to counsel (which is free
    for indigents), and to appeal. The prosecution also can appeal in
    certain limited circumstances.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law generally prohibits such practices, government
    authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice; however, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Government may
    limit free speech in the name of goals such as ending discrimination,
    ensuring social harmony, or promoting gender equality. The Court ruled
    that the benefits of limiting hate speech and promoting equality are
    sufficient to outweigh the freedom of speech clause in the Charter of
    Rights and Freedoms.
        Journalists occasionally are banned from reporting some specific
    details of court cases until a trial is concluded, and these
    restrictions, adopted to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial,
    enjoy wide popular support. Some restrictions on the media are imposed
    by provincial-level film censorship, broadcasters' voluntary codes
    curbing graphic violence, and laws against hate literature and
    pornography. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for free
    speech and free press, but both the Criminal Code and human rights
    legislation have established limits. Inciting hatred (in certain cases)
    or genocide is a criminal offense. The Supreme Court has set a high
    threshold for such cases by specifying that these acts must be proven
    willful and public. The Broadcasting Act, which prohibits programming
    containing any abusive comment that would expose individuals or groups
    to hatred or contempt, has not yet been challenged in the courts.
        The Human Rights Act also prohibits repeated communications by
    telephone that expose a person or group to hatred or contempt. Human
    rights groups are exploring the possibility of extending this
    prohibition to the Internet, arguing that the Internet should be
    considered ``telephonic communications'' and therefore covered under
    the Human Rights Act. Between October and December, the Human Rights
    Tribunal heard two complaints that the Ernst Zundel web site, known for
    its Holocaust-denial material, incites hatred against Jews. The case
    was ongoing at year's end.
        On September 13, an unidentified gunman shot and wounded Michel
    Auger, the organized crime reporter for Le Journal de Montreal. The
    previous day, Auger had published an article regarding activities of
    motorcycle gangs. Police linked the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang to
    the shooting and their investigation continued at year's end. They
    arrested two men in connection with the attack, including one man for
    making and supplying the gun. The Auger shooting led to a debate
    between those who advocated additional powers for law enforcement to go
    after gangs (up to and including suspension of the Charter of Rights
    and Freedoms) and those who argued that preserving civil liberties
    outweighed the risk of isolated incidents of gang violence. The
    question divided the journalistic community, which relies heavily upon
    civil liberty provisions. After the Auger shooting, approximately
    20,000 persons (mostly journalists) demonstrated on the streets of
    Montreal, to urge police to do a better job in combating gang violence.
    Following Auger's recovery and return to work, the numbers of those
    calling for additional police powers dwindled.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government generally respects them
    in practice.
        In June the RCMP Complaints Commission completed hearings begun in
    1998 investigating the use of pepper spray by RCMP officers to break up
    small crowds of protesters at the APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver in
    November 1997. The issues covered by the Commission included whether
    actions taken by police were justified by the security risk and whether
    political considerations such as direct influence from senior political
    leaders played a role in determining the level of RCMP response to
    protesters' actions. The Commission had not issued a report at year's
    end.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The province of Saskatchewan permits prayer and bible readings in
    school as provided for in the Saskatchewan Act, which forms part of the
    provincial constitution. However, in July 1999, a one-person Board of
    Inquiry ruled that it was discriminatory to require recitation of the
    Lord's Prayer in Saskatoon public schools. As a result of the ruling,
    the Lord's Prayer is not recited in Saskatoon public schools. At year's
    end, the Saskatoon School Board and complainants continued to search
    for a compromise.
        Public funding for Roman Catholic schools--or separate schoolsis
    constitutionally protected in the country's original four provinces,
    but the policy has been challenged in recent years. In 1999 the U.N.
    Human Rights Committee found that the province of Ontario had failed to
    provide equal and effective protection against discrimination.
        In March 1999, the government-mandated Proulx task force submitted
    a report on religion in schools to the Quebec National Assembly. Its 14
    recommendations included abolishing Catholic and Protestant status for
    public schools and creating secular public schools within which
    religion would be studied from a cultural perspective. Publicly funded
    support services would be provided for students of all faiths. School
    boards' responses are due to the Quebec government by July 1, 2001.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
    accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees and extends first asylum. Canada is
    a resettlement country, and the Government projected approving between
    36,600 and 40,800 claims for refugee status during the year.
        During the summer of 1999, 599 Chinese arrived illegally by boat
    off the coast of British Columbia and sought refugee status. Because
    the majority of the early refugee claimants who were released failed to
    appear for their hearings, a much larger percentage of refugee
    claimants from subsequent boats were remanded into custody pending
    their refugee hearings. A total of 586 persons made refugee claims. The
    Government has granted refugee status to 25 migrants and has denied 458
    claims. Of these, 330 have been returned to China. Other claims were
    abandoned or withdrawn. A total of 43 adults remained in custody at
    year's end. A total of 115 children were placed in the care of the
    Ministry of Children and Families.
        There was no information publicly available on the results of a
    formal inquiry into a Chinese refugee's claims that prison officers had
    beaten him in December 1999.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons to a
    country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        On November 27, national parliamentary elections were held, in
    which the Liberal Party won a majority with 172 of 301 seats. The
    Canadian Alliance (conservative) won 66 seats, the Bloc Quebecois
    (separatist) won 38 seats, the New Democratic Party (liberal) won 13
    seats, and the Progressive Conservative Party (conservative) won 12
    seats. Jean Chretien of the Liberal Party entered his third term as
    Prime Minister.
        A significant body of opinion in the Province of Quebec
    (represented by the party that currently governs the province)
    continues to maintain that Quebec has the right to withdraw from the
    Confederation if that decision proves to be the democratically
    expressed will of the people of Quebec. However, in June the Federal
    Government enacted legislation to clarify its role in a possible
    secession attempt by a province. The new law is in response to a 1998
    Supreme Court reference (an answer to a question referred to the Court
    by the federal government), which stipulated that the Federal
    Government would be obliged to negotiate Quebec's separation in good
    faith if a clear majority of Quebeckers voted to separate on the basis
    of a clearly phrased question. The new legislation stipulates that the
    House of Commons must determine whether any future secession referendum
    question proposed by a province is clear, and whether any subsequent
    majority vote is large enough to obligate the Government to negotiate
    secession. The legislation was controversial with Quebec's provincial
    government, which then drafted and, on May 30, passed Bill 99 to
    underline the right of the Quebecois to self-determination and to
    decide the political regime and legal status of Quebec.
        There are no laws limiting the participation of women in political
    life; however, they are underrepresented in government and politics.
    Following the November elections, in the Parliament, 62 of 301 members
    in the House of Commons are women, and 33 of 105 senators are women.
    Women hold 10 seats in the 36person Cabinet. In November 1999, a woman
    was appointed for the first time as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
    to their views.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for equal benefits and
    protection of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic origin,
    color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. These
    rights generally are respected in practice; however, there were some
    complaints of discrimination in this multicultural society.
        Women.--The law prohibits violence against women, including spousal
    abuse; however, it remained a problem. The number of sexual assault
    crimes have declined over the past 5 years; however, in 1999 a total of
    23,872 cases of sexual assault were reported. The courts consider such
    cases seriously and those convicted of sexual assault face up to 10
    years in prison. Cases involving weapons, threats, wounding, or
    endangerment of life carry longer sentences, up to life imprisonment.
        The Government's publication on family violence statistics
    indicates that an estimated 8 percent of women (and 7 percent of men)
    who were married or living in a common-law relationship during the
    previous 5-year period experienced some type of violence committed by
    their partner on at least one occasion. The economic costs of violence
    against women are estimated to be $2.7 billion (Can $4.2 billion).
    Services available to abused women have increased significantly over
    the past 2 decades. For example, the number of shelters for abused
    women across the country increased from 75 in 1979 to 470 in 1998.
        The Criminal Code prohibits criminal harassment (stalking) and
    makes it punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. The law
    prohibits sexual harassment, and the Government enforces this
    provision. Women continued to complain of harassment in the armed
    forces, and the Government has set up mechanisms to try to resolve
    complaints (see Section 1.c.).
        Women are well represented in the labor force, including business
    and the professions. Employment equity laws and regulations cover
    federal employees in all but the security and defense services. In
    October 1999, the Federal Government agreed to a settlement following
    an unsuccessful appeal of a 1998 Human Rights Tribunal ruling that the
    Government must pay back wages to workers in underpaid positions
    (predominantly female) under the concept of equal pay for work of equal
    value. Payment was made and finalized this year.
        Women have marriage and property rights equal to those of men.
    Women head over 85 percent of single-parent households.
        Prostitution is legal, but pimping and operating, being found in,
    or working in a brothel are not. Living (wholly or partially) on the
    earnings of prostitution is illegal. Communicating in public for the
    purpose of prostitution (solicitation) is also illegal, but is
    considered a lesser offense than the other offenses related to
    prostitution.
        Women were trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual
    exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. Education is free through grade
        13 and is compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16, depending on
    the province. Federal and provincial regulations protect children from
    abuse, overwork, and discrimination and penalize perpetrators of such
    offenses.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Changes to the
    law in 1997 strengthened tools to combat child prostitution and
    prohibited female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health.
        A group of 1,500 citizens, who as orphans were diagnosed falsely as
    retarded and psychotic, and illegally interned in mental institutions
    during the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, continued to seek compensation
    from the provincial and Federal governments. They charge that the
    Government is responsible for the abuse that they received in the
    Catholic Church-run institutions, including beatings, electric shock
    treatment, and sexual abuse. In 1999 they formed a committee to seek
    restitution for the abuse suffered. In May the Catholic Church
    announced that it would participate in a ``compassion fund,'' but would
    not issue a formal apology or admit fault in the cases. Quebec Premier
    Bouchard reiterated his government's compensation offer of
    approximately $650 (C$1,000) each to the victims, but the committee
    representing the orphans rejected the offer as insufficient.
        Children were trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual
    exploitation (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services. Nevertheless, the Government continued to receive
    numerous complaints regarding societal discrimination against disabled
    persons and has instituted programs to discourage such discrimination.
    Disabled persons are underrepresented in the work force; they make up
    2.7 percent of the federally regulated private sector work force, while
    those capable of working total 6.5 percent of the population. The law
    mandates access to buildings for persons with disabilities, and for the
    most part the Government enforces these provisions.
        In 1999 the province of Alberta announced that it would compensate
    the nearly 500 surviving persons who were sterilized without their
    consent under a policy aimed at residents of mental institutions. More
    than 2,000 Albertans were sterilized between 1928 and 1972 under the
    Alberta Sterilization Act, which was repealed in June 1972. By the end
    of the year, the Alberta Government had settled all outstanding
    sterilization claims.
        The law provides a variety of protections and rights for the
    disabled and specifically prohibits discrimination against disabled
    persons in employment, education, or in the provision of public
    services. Sexual exploitation of persons with disabilities in
    situations of dependency is a criminal offense. The law requires
    employers and service providers to accommodate special needs of
    disabled persons, unless it constitutes an undue hardship, and mandates
    access to buildings for the disabled. The Government has instituted
    programs to help the disabled join the work force, but they continued
    to experience more difficulties in getting and retaining employment
    than those without disabilities.
        Indigenous People.--The treatment of aboriginal people continued to
    be one of the most important human rights problems facing the country.
    Disputes over land claims, self-government, treaty rights, taxation,
    duty-free imports, fishing and hunting rights, and alleged harassment
    by police continued to be sources of tension on reserves. Aboriginal
    people remain underrepresented in the work force, overrepresented on
    welfare rolls and in prison populations, and more susceptible to
    suicide and poverty than other population groups.
        The Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects aboriginal
    rights, including those established by historical land claims
    settlements; aboriginal rights also are recognized in the Constitution
    and by the courts. Historical treaties with native groups in eastern
    Canada form the basis for the Federal Government's policies there, but
    the antiquated language and uncertain intent have resulted in extensive
    legal challenges to the Government's interpretation of treaty rights.
    Native groups in the west that never signed historical treaties
    continue to claim land and resources, and many continue to seek legal
    resolution of outstanding issues. As a result, the evolution of the
    Federal Government's policy toward aboriginal rights, particularly land
    claims, has been linked closely to legal challenges, including 45
    Supreme Court decisions.
        In 1998 the Government established the Aboriginal Action Plan, a
    ``long-term, broad-based'' policy approach to promote the quality of
    life of aboriginal people and promote self-sufficiency. According to
    the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, the Government spent
    $4.7 billion (Can $7 billion) on aboriginal programs during the year,
    which included the Aboriginal Action Plan and spending from 12
    different departments. Since 1999
        16 specific claims have been settled, and 70 comprehensive land
    claims have been negotiated across the country. After years of
    negotiations, the Federal and provincial governments concluded a modern
    day treaty with the Nisga'a people of British Columbia, who received
    claim to tribal lands, fishing and timber rights, limited self-
    government, and other economic benefits. The Federal Government
    continued to be involved in self-government negotiations with over 350
    First Nations, and 6 agreements were in final or advanced stages of
    negotiations at year's end. Professional development and fiscal
    accountability projects further support aboriginal self-governance.
        In response to court decisions over the past few years, the
    Government continues to work at resolving a variety of issues,
    including fishing rights in Atlantic Canada. Disputes over native
    fishing rights in Atlantic Canada continued after a 1999 Supreme Court
    ruling on the Marshall case which interpreted centuries-old treaties to
    allow First Nations to earn a moderate livelihood from natural
    resources, in compliance with government regulations that promote
    conservation and protect others who depend on the same resource. The
    Federal Government negotiated interim fishing agreements with 29 of the
    34 native communities in Atlantic Canada, but the Burnt Church First
    Nation in New Brunswick and 4 other native communities in Nova Scotia
    have refused to sign the interim agreements and have been accused of
    contravening federal regulations by fishing for lobster out-of-season.
    Other test cases that involve aboriginals being tried on charges of
    illegally harvesting timber on Crown land continued in the court
    systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Court cases also continue in
    Quebec over timber resources.
        During the year, the Federal and British Columbia governments
    concluded a treaty with the Nisga'a people who live in northwestern
    British Columbia. The treaty gave the Nisga'a control over 765 square
    miles of tribal lands, a cash settlement, fishing and timber-cutting
    rights, and certain rights of self-government. The treaty ended a range
    of special tax breaks and other benefits available under previous
    arrangements. The treaty was ratified by the Nisga'a people in November
    1998 and by the provincial legislature in the spring of 1999. It was
    debated and passed by Parliament in December 1999. Although the British
    Columbia legislature ratified the treaty, two groups expressed their
    intention to challenge the treaty in court. These legal challenges
    include one from a political party that contends that the treaty should
    have been submitted to a referendum and one from the Gitanyow, an
    aboriginal band located near the Nisga'a, who contend that the treaty
    awarded more than 85 percent of their traditional tribal lands to the
    Nisga'a. At year's end, neither case had made legal progress.
        The Stoney reserve west of Calgary gave up control of its finances
    to federal Indian Affairs officials in 1997, following widespread
    allegations of political corruption, financial mismanagement, sexual
    assaults, and abuses connected with social service agencies. After a 2-
    year probe, the RCMP concluded that no criminal charges would be made,
    and that instead, the problem with reserve finances was managerial in
    nature. Stoney Reserve corrected the situation and put its finances
    back in order. Of the 611 First Nations, 25 have their finances managed
    by a private accounting firm.
        Quebec's Indian people remain overwhelmingly opposed to separation
    from Canada and deeply distrust the separatist government of the
    province. Despite the Quebec Prime Minister's recent overtures to the
    leaders of the Cree and Inuit nations, surveys indicate that most of
    Quebec's 60,000 Indians would favor partition of the province in the
    event of Quebec's separation from Canada. Indian leaders maintain that
    a sovereign Quebec would treat Indians as another ethnic minority
    instead of as sovereign nations within the territory of the province.
    To address these sentiments and respond to a pending lawsuit, in 1998
    the Quebec government agreed with the Cree and Mohawk tribes to
    initiate negotiations regarding longstanding grievances over timber
    resources, public rights of way on tribal lands, and management of
    development in the James Bay region. In March 1999, Quebec gave the
    Mohawks increased fiscal rights and powers. In June 1999, the first
    summit in 11 years between Quebec's First Nations and the provincial
    government was held to establish a permanent policy forum to resolve
    ongoing issues. During 1999 the Government focused on negotiations over
    a commission to set up a political entity (Nunavik) for Quebec's Inuit.
    The commission, in accordance with an agreement signed in November
    1999, has Inuit, Quebec, and federal representatives. In September the
    James Bay Crees challenged the authority of the Nunavik Commission on
    the basis of overlapping land claims. In December the Commission
    postponed delivering its final report to the federal and provincial
    governments, stating that it needed more time and formally requested an
    extension of its mandate to the end of March 2001.
        In May 1999, representatives of the Government of Newfoundland and
    Labrador, the Federal Government, and the Labrador Inuit Association
    initialed a land claims agreement for the Inuit. The plan provides for
    land, water rights, self-government, and an economic development plan
    that includes sharing revenues from subsurface developments. The
    Federal Government negotiated interim fishing agreements with 29 of the
    34 native communities in Atlantic Canada, but the Burnt Church First
    Nation in New Brunswick and 4 other native communities in Nova Scotia
    have refused to sign. As a result, they have been accused of
    contravening federal regulations by fishing for lobster out-of-season.
        In September 1999, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of
    Nova Scotia aboriginal Donald Marshall for catching and selling fish
    eels out of season and without a license. In doing so, the court ruled
    that the 18th century treaties between the aboriginals and the British
    Crown gave the First Nations rights not accommodated by modern fishery
    regulations. The Court ruled that the Federal Government must give
    treaty beneficiaries access to the fisheries sufficient to enable them
    to earn a moderate livelihood. The Court also found that this right is
    subject to regulation and subsequently reemphasized this point in a
    separate explanation of its decision. There was some violence against
    aboriginals by nonaboriginals, following aboriginal efforts to exercise
    their new rights by trapping lobsters in October prior to the normal
    season. The Supreme Court's decision to interpret the 18th century
    treaties liberally has encouraged aboriginals involved in a number of
    court cases seeking access to economic benefits from natural resources
    such as logging, mining, and energy.
        The Supreme Court's clarification of the Marshall case ruled out
    the possibility of aboriginals using the case to gain commercial rights
    in the forestry sector. However, test cases now are progressing through
    the court systems in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia that involve
    aboriginals being tried on charges of illegally harvesting timber on
    Crown land.
        Religious Minorities.--The League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith
    in Canada reported that there were 267 incidents of anti-Semitism in
    1999--an 11 percent increase from 1998. An increase in acts of
    vandalism contributed to the rise in incidents, in contrast to a steady
    decrease in previous years. The League continues to express concern
    over the growth of anti-Semitic activity on the Internet. In October
    the Human Rights Tribunal examined the activities of one such web site
    (see Section 2.a.).
        In October and November, Jews were subjected to a wave of attacks
    that community leaders said was unprecedented. During a 6 week period
    beginning on October 1, about 45 anti-Jewish incidents--arson,
    assaults, verbal abuse and death threats--were recorded. Many Jewish
    leaders complained about what they described as a lukewarm response
    from government officials at all levels.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The narrow defeat of the 1995
    Quebec sovereignty referendum left unresolved the concerns of French-
    speaking Quebeckers about their minority status in Canada, while
    sharpening the concerns of English-speaking Quebeckers about their
    minority status. The separatist Parti Quebecois provincial government
    of Quebec stated that it would hold another sovereignty referendum only
    under winning conditions. The Supreme Court ruled in August 1998 that a
    unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal, but that the
    Federal Government and other provinces would be obligated to negotiate
    Quebec's separation if a clear majority of Quebeckers voted to change
    their relationship with Canada on the basis of a clearly phrased
    referendum question (see Section 3).
        Some English-speaking and native groups in Quebec assert the right
    to keep parts of Quebec in Canada in the event that Quebec declares
    independence. Despite personal meetings and other overtures by Quebec's
    Prime Minister to aboriginals and the English-speaking community, both
    groups remain distrustful of the separatist government of Quebec. Many
    members of these communities fear that their rights would be infringed
    by a sovereign Quebec.
        The Constitution protects the linguistic and cultural rights of
    minorities. Despite Canada's federal policy of bilingualism, English
    speakers in Quebec and French speakers in other parts of Canada
    generally must live and work in the language of the majority.
        In January the Supreme Court upheld an appeal by francophones who
    had been denied a French-language school in their community and forced
    to bus their children 57 minutes to another school. The Court ruled
    that the percentage of French language students in the community who
    potentially could attend a French language school (rather than the
    actual number of students who desired to attend one) met the
    requirements to establish such a school, and therefore the community
    was obligated constitutionally to provide one. In making its ruling,
    the Supreme Court stated that the Appeals Court erred (among other
    reasons) by not considering which services would best encourage the
    flourishing and preservation of the French language minority.
        Quebec's language law restricts access to publicly funded, English
    language schools through grade 11 to children whose parents were
    educated in English in Canada and to short-term residents. The Quebec
    courts heard two cases challenging this law. In June the Montreal
    Superior Court heard a suit brought against the Quebec government by 10
    francophone families for the right to send their children to anglophone
    schools. Another case was brought by a group whose native tongue is
    neither French nor English, who alleged that the law restricting
    English-language schools to children whose parents were educated in
    English in Canada is discriminatory. At year's end, both cases were
    pending.
        In October three coffeehouses with English names were firebombed,
    allegedly in an attempt to force them to change their names to French.
    A man associated with a group that aims to eliminate the use of English
    in Quebec was arrested for the bombings and was denied bail prior to
    his trial.
        The English-speaking minority of Quebec, representing 9 percent of
    the population of the province and 16 percent of the population of the
    city of Montreal, continues to protest restrictions placed on English-
    language use. In 1997 the Quebec provincial government reestablished a
    French-language inspection office that had been abolished in 1993.
    Quebec's language law also stipulates that French is the working
    language of most businesses and must predominate in bilingual
    commercial signage. However, in October 1999, a Quebec court judge
    struck down a key section of the province's language law that requires
    French lettering to be twice as large as English lettering on
    commercial signs, stating that French is no longer in jeopardy in
    Quebec. In April the Quebec Superior Court overturned the lower court
    decision, ruling that the lower court erred by finding that the Quebec
    government had the burden of proving that French is still in jeopardy
    in Quebec. The Superior Court stated that the lower court should have
    found that the defendant had the burden of proving that French is no
    longer in jeopardy in Quebec. The defendant has appealed the Superior
    Court ruling. English speakers also expressed concern over the
    increasing scarceness of health services and public schooling in their
    language.
        Provinces other than Quebec often lack adequate French-language
    schooling and health services, which is of concern to local
    francophones, although French-language schools and French immersion
    programs are reported to be thriving in all three prairie provinces.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Except for members of the armed
    forces, workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
    to associate freely. The Labor Code protects these rights for all
    employees under federal jurisdiction, while provincial legislation
    protects all other organized workers.
        Trade unions are independent of the Government. Of the civilian
    labor force, approximately 29.5 percent is unionized.
        All workers have the right to strike, except for those in the
    public sector who provide essential services. The law prohibits
    employer retribution against strikers and union leaders, and the
    Government enforces this provision.
        Labor action, including strikes, occurred throughout the country
    during the year. Notable strikes included: Inside Workers strike by
    clerical staff, social-work staff, tax collectors, health inspectors,
    and public nurses in the city of Toronto, nurse and federal prison
    guard strikes in Alberta, and forestry and hotel worker strikes in
    British Columbia.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers in both
    the public (except for some police) and the private sectors have the
    right to organize and bargain collectively. While the law protects
    collective bargaining, there are limitations, which vary from province
    to province, for some public sector workers providing essential
    services.
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination and requires employers
    to reinstate workers fired for union activities. There are effective
    mechanisms for resolving complaints and obtaining redress.
        All labor unions have full access to mediation, arbitration, and
    the judicial system.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
    including that performed by children, is illegal, and it generally does
    not occur; however, women and children were trafficked for the purposes
    of commercial sexual exploitation (see Sections 5, 6.d, and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Child labor legislation varies from province to province.
    The Federal Government does not employ youths under 17 years of age
    while school is in session. Most provinces prohibit children under age
    15 or 16 from working without parental consent, at night, or in any
    hazardous employment. These prohibitions are enforced effectively
    through inspections conducted by the federal and provincial labor
    ministries. Education is compulsory nationwide through age 15 or 16,
    depending upon the province.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
    generally enforces this prohibition effectively; however, children were
    trafficked for purposes of commercial sexual exploitation (see Sections
    5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Standard work hours vary from
    province to province, but in all provinces the limit is 40 or 48 a
    week, with at least 24 hours of rest.
        Minimum wage rates are set in each province and territory, and
    range from $3.65 to $4.77 (Can $5.50 to Can $7.20) per hour. Ontario
    and Alberta have a minimum wage rate for youths lower than their
    respective minimums for adult workers. The minimum wage does not
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. A family
    whose only employed member earns the minimum wage would be considered
    below the poverty line.
        Federal law provides safety and health standards for employees
    under federal jurisdiction, while provincial and territorial
    legislation provides for all other employees. Federal and provincial
    labor departments monitor and enforce these standards. Federal,
    provincial, and territorial laws protect the right of workers with
    ``reasonable cause'' to refuse dangerous work and to remove themselves
    from hazardous work conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, the Government prosecutes such offenses as
    violations of immigration policies. The Government is conducting a
    legislative review of the Immigration Act and introduced legislation
    that specifically makes trafficking an offense punishable by fine or
    imprisonment, but the Senate had not passed it by year's end. The
    country is primarily a transit and destination point for trafficking in
    persons. There have been several widely reported cases of smuggling and
    trafficking, including hundreds of Chinese who arrived illegally by
    ship in British Columbia during the summer of 1999 (see Section 2.d.).
        Press reports indicate that over the past 10 years almost 15,000
    Chinese have entered Canada illegally. Many of these illegal immigrants
    have paid large sums to be smuggled to Canada and are indentured to
    their traffickers upon arrival. Almost all work at lower than minimum
    wage and use most of their salaries to pay down their debt at usurious
    interest rates. The traffickers (snakeheads) use violence to ensure
    that their clients pay and that they do not inform the police.
        Asian women and girls who are smuggled into Canada often are forced
    into the sex trade. Traffickers use intimidation and violence, as well
    as the illegal immigrants' inability to speak English, to keep these
    victims from running away or informing the police.
        Vancouver and Toronto serve as hubs for organized crime groups that
    deal in trafficking in persons, including trafficking for prostitution.
    East Asian crime groups have targeted Canada, and Vancouver in
    particular, because of lax immigration laws, benefits available to
    immigrants, and the proximity to the U.S. border.
        Canadian and Honduran officials are investigating the ongoing
    problem of Honduran youths being smuggled into Canada who are being
    used by Honduran drug traffickers to sell drugs. In January Canadian
    authorities arrested dozens of small-time Central American drug dealers
    including many Honduran minors. In February the press reported that
    Honduran authorities were working to repatriate those minors.
                                   __________

                                     CHILE

        Chile is a multiparty democracy with a constitution that provides
    for a strong executive, a bicameral legislature, and a separate
    judiciary. Approved by referendum in 1980 and amended in 1989, the
    Constitution was written under the former military government and
    establishes institutional limits on popular rule. President Ricardo
    Lagos, of the Socialist Party, won a close runoff election on January
    16 against center-right candidate Joaquin Lavin of the Alliance for
    Chile coalition. Lagos took office on March 11, succeeding Christian
    Democrat Eduardo Frei. International and domestic observers found both
    the 1999 election and the subsequent runoff to be free and fair. Both
    the current and former presidents are members of the ``Concertacion''
    coalition of political parties. The National Congress consists of 120
    deputies and 49 senators; this includes nine designated senators plus
    two former presidents who are senators-for-life. The government
    coalition of four major parties controls the lower house and, following
    the suspension of two conservative senators including former president
    Augusto Pinochet, counts a slim majority in the Senate. Continued
    turnover in the court system has reduced the number and influence of
    military-era appointees over the constitutionally independent judicial
    branch to the point that there was very little influence in the
    administration of justice.
        The armed forces are constitutionally subordinate to the President
    through an appointed civilian Minister of Defense but enjoy a large
    degree of legal autonomy. Most notably, the President must have the
    concurrence of the National Security Council, which comprises military
    and civilian officials, to remove service chiefs. The Carabineros (the
    uniformed national police) have primary responsibility for public
    order, safety and border security. The civilian Investigations Police
    are responsible for criminal investigations and immigration control.
    Both organizations--although formally under the jurisdiction of the
    Ministry of Defense, which prepares their budgets--are under
    operational control of the Ministry of Interior. Some members of the
    police committed human rights abuses.
        The export-led free-market economy experienced its first recession
    after 15 consecutive years of expansion in 1999, when the economy
    experienced a decline of 1.1 percent in real terms with inflation at
    2.3 percent. Economic growth for the year was 5.4 percent with
    inflation of 4.75 percent. Copper remained the most important export;
    salmon, forest products, fresh fruit, fishmeal, other minerals, and
    manufactured goods also were significant sources of foreign exchange.
    Unemployment stood at 8.3 percent at the end of the year. From 1987 to
    1998, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line
    decreased from 45 to 21.7 percent. Annual per capita gross domestic
    product was approximately $4,700.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights;
    however, problems remained in some areas. The most serious involved a
    death in police custody, police mistreatment, use of excessive force,
    and physical abuse in jails and prisons. The due process rights of
    detainees were not always respected. Discrimination and violence
    against women and children continue to be problems. Indigenous people
    remain marginalized. Despite ongoing attempts to change the labor code,
    limitations on fundamental worker rights persisted. Child labor is a
    problem in the informal economy.
        During the year, the Government, primarily the judiciary, took
    significant steps to allow for the investigation of human rights abuses
    committed during the former military government, and to bring those
    accountable in certain cases to justice. The bulk of the human rights
    abuses under the military regime occurred between 1973 and 1978,
    although a number took place after this period. In its August 1999
    ruling to uphold the removal of former President Augusto Pinochet's
    congressional immunity, the Supreme Court ruled that Chile's Amnesty
    Law could only be applied after a crime had been investigated and
    prosecuted. At year's end, the Defense Ministry-sponsored Human Rights
    Roundtable Dialog, comprising members of the armed services, religious
    groups, human rights groups, and NGO's, was preparing to make public
    information on the fate of some of the persons who were killed or who
    disappeared while in official custody during the Pinochet regime;
    however, military authorities continued during the year to resist a
    full accounting of the fate of those who were killed and disappeared.
    Unlike in previous years, the judiciary appeared not to interfere in or
    stifle cases against alleged human rights abusers.
        In October 1998, the United Kingdom detained Pinochet pending
    resolution of a Spanish extradition request on charges of genocide and
    murder. On March 2, after considerable legal action and a series of
    court rulings, Home Secretary Jack Straw denied Spain's request on the
    basis of medical exams indicating that Pinochet was unfit mentally and
    physically to defend himself against the charges. On March 3, the
    British authorities freed Pinochet and he returned to Chile. He faces
    charges in over 200 cases, including charges of aggravated homicide, in
    Chilean courts. The investigation of the most prominent of these cases,
    known as the ``Caravan of Death'' case, led to the petition to remove
    Pinochet's immunity and the subsequent effort to indict him.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings or other extrajudicial killings during
    the year; however, one person died under yet to be explained
    circumstances while in police custody.
        On January 5, Carlos Antonio Millaman Munoz was detained on charges
    of aggravated robbery. According to the Corporation for the Promotion
    and Defense of Human Rights (CODEPU), on January 6, the authorities
    permitted family members and a friend a visit at the headquarters of
    the Investigative Police in the Santiago suburb of La Florida. Millaman
    was reportedly in bad physical condition and feared for his life. The
    same day he was transferred to the El Salvador hospital where he died
    later in the day. At the end of the year, the case was still being
    investigated.
        A number of cases from previous years in which the police were
    accused of extrajudicial killings due to excessive use of force or
    mistreatment of prisoners while in custody remained under investigation
    or pending resolution of appeals. These include the case of University
    of Tarapaca student Daniel Menco Prieto, who police shot and killed
    during a May 1999 student demonstration.
        No information was available regarding the case of Jonathan Moya
    Jara, whose partially clothed body was found with its head buried in
    the sand in August 1999. In September 1999 the authorities arrested two
    Carabineros who had allegedly detained the victim.
        No information was available in the case of Raul Palma Salgado, who
    died in police custody in 1998 after police allegedly tortured him. In
    1999 a court sentenced four police officers to 10 years in prison for
    his death, and their appeal was pending at the end of 1999.
        The case of Claudia Alejandra Lopez, who was shot under unclear
    circumstances during a 1998 demonstration in Santiago, also was
    inactive. No new information was available on the case of the September
    1989 murder of leftist leader Jecar Nehgme, which was reopened in
    November 1998 when new evidence was discovered.
        While former President Pinochet was in the United Kingdom, family
    members of victims filed numerous charges in Chile against him for
    deaths and disappearances during the period of military rule. Of these,
    one concerned the 1973 disappearance of 19 persons in a case known as
    the Caravan of Death. On August 8, the Supreme Court confirmed a Court
    of Appeals ruling lifting Pinochet's parliamentary immunity in this
    case. The Supreme Court's decision stated that ``the true purpose of an
    immunity proceeding is to decide whether there is probable cause
    against a congressman charged with a crime'' and, according to the Code
    of Criminal Procedure ``there is probable cause when evidence is
    discovered against a congressman that would warrant his arrest.''
    Subsequently, the prosecuting judge ordered psychiatric exams as
    required by law for defendants over age 70. Pinochet's lawyers appealed
    the decision, arguing that general physical exams also should be
    required. At year's end, the prosecuting judge had ordered psychiatric
    and neurological exams and set a date to take Pinochet's deposition,
    both steps required by law, which would ultimately pave the way for an
    indictment and arrest order. At year's end, over 200 cases concerning
    human rights violations had been filed in the courts against Pinochet.
        The Supreme Court decision on Pinochet also contained guidelines
    calling for full investigation of cases of deaths and disappearances
    that are likely to fall under provisions of the Amnesty Law or that
    potentially are subject to the statute of limitations. The Court stated
    that amnesty is not applied to crimes in the abstract, but rather to
    individuals found guilty of a crime. Likewise, the statute of
    limitations should be applied only after the guilty party has been
    identified and the courts determine that no impeding factors, such as
    subsequent crimes by the accused are relevant. Previously,
    investigations into human rights abuses during the 1973-78 period had
    been impeded because the cases were thought to fall automatically under
    the Amnesty Law and the statute of limitations. By 1989 this
    interpretation already had begun to erode in the courts. The new
    guidelines make it possible to open investigations into all types of
    crimes committed during the 1973-78 period. Following these guidelines,
    the judge investigating the Caravan of Death case expanded the charges
    against Pinochet to include aggravated homicide.
        In January a military tribunal changed the charges in the case of
    Operation Albania--the June 1987 killings of 12 Manuel Rodriguez
    Patriotic Front (FPMR) members--against former National Intelligence
    Center (CNI) Director Hugo Salas Wenzel from being an author of the
    crime to concealing it. The military court dropped indictments against
    former CNI Sub-directors retired General Humberto Leiva Gutierrez and
    Brigadier Marcos Derpich Miranda, Air Force Captain Hernan Miguel
    Carmona, and Inspector Jose Morales Morales of the Investigations
    Police and changed the charges against the 15 other individuals accused
    in the case from kidnaping to illegal detention. The court ratified the
    thesis of the investigating judge that the crime under investigation is
    homicide, thereby affirming that there was never an armed confrontation
    as the CNI had alleged. At year's end, the investigation and legal
    proceedings continued.
        Acting on a petition by the Council for the Defense of the State
    (the official entity charged with the defense of the State's legal
    interests), the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court on June 1
    transferred the Operation Albania case from the military tribunal to
    the Court of Appeals. Investigating Judge Milton Juica, who had been
    handling the case under the military tribunal, was reappointed as
    investigating judge.
        No new information was available regarding the trial of eight CNI
    agents who authorities charged in November 1999 in the case of
    journalist Jose Carrasco, who died in 1986. Several of the officers
    charged in 1999 were also under investigation regarding Operation
    Albania.
        There was little progress in the investigation of Operation Condor,
    an undercover operation in which several military governments in Latin
    America cooperated to kill leftist opponents. In 1999 Spanish Judge
    Baltazar Garzon and a colleague collected evidence and took testimony
    regarding human rights violations in Chile and Argentina during the
    military dictatorships. The Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches
    (FASIC) reported that on July 2, Argentine judge Maria Servini de
    Cubria (the same judge in charge of the Prats case) handed over
    ``extrajudicially'' numerous antecedents regarding Operation Condor to
    Chilean Judge Juan Guzman in connection with the 126 (at that time)
    cases against Pinochet pending before Guzman's court.
        In 1999 an appeals court reopened the case of the 1982 killing of
    labor leader Tucapel Jimenez. In 1998 investigating judge Sergio
    Valenzuela Pinto had closed the case, ruling that there was
    insufficient evidence to bring anyone to trial. Acting on a petition by
    the Council for the Defense of the State, in April 1999 the Supreme
    Court replaced Valenzuela Pinto, who had been criticized for his
    handling of the case, with judge Sergio Munoz Gajardo.
        Judge Munoz led the Appeals Court to order the detention of 12
    persons for the crimes, including retired army general and former head
    of Army Intelligence (DINE) Ramses Arturo Alvarez Scoglia. Munoz
    subsequently charged several others, including retired army general and
    former DINE director Hernan Ramirez Rurange, who is accused of helping
    one of the suspects flee the country. He also indicted former Auditor
    General of the Army, retired General Genera Gernando Torres Silva.
    Another prominent official among the accused, former CNI director and
    retired general Humberto Gordon died of a heart attack in June. Munoz
    dropped charges against several other suspects. In November an
    investigative judge indicted active duty Brigadier General Hernan
    Ramirez Hald in the Tucapel Jimenez case; the indictment was the first
    ever of an active duty general. At year's end, of the 17 persons
    charged, the authorities had released 2 on bail, detained 14, and were
    still seeking 1 person.
        The family of Carmelo Soria, a Spanish citizen working for the
    United Nations killed in Santiago on July 14, 1976, continues to seek
    compensation from the Government in the amount of approximately $50
    million (2.7 billion pesos) and has asked the Audencia Nacional de
    Madrid to issue an arrest warrant for Pinochet, retired General Manuel
    Contreras, and others.
        In November an Argentine court found Chilean intelligence agent
    Enrique Arancibia Clavel guilty and sentenced him to life in prison for
    his role in the 1974 car bombing in Buenos Aires that killed former
    Chilean army chief Carlos Prats and his wife Sofia Cuthbert. Arancibia
    Clavel had filed an appeal, which was pending at year's end. The case
    had been reopened in 1992 as a result of a petition filed by the Prats
    family. An Argentine appeals court had ruled in October that the Prats
    killing was a ``crime against humanity'' and, as such, was not subject
    to the statute of limitations. The judge also requested the extradition
    of Pinochet and other former military officers and one civilian in
    connection with the Prats case. At year's end, the Chilean Supreme
    Court was considering the extradition request.
        On December 7, the family of Charles Horman, whom security forces
    killed in Santiago in 1973, filed a criminal complaint requesting that
    Judge Juan Guzman open a criminal investigation into his death. The
    family also filed a petition requesting that the Supreme Court appoint
    a special prosecutor to hear the case. At year's end, the Supreme Court
    had not ruled on the petition and the case remained before Judge
    Guzman.
        On July 20, the Seventh Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Santiago
    sentence two former CNI officials and a DINE official to life
    imprisonment in the related Juan Alegria Mundaca case. The Supreme
    Court upheld that decision on appeal.
        Families of persons who suffered, died, or disappeared while in
    government custody continue to file new claims for compensation. In
    June the Group of Former Political Prisoners of the Region of
    Valparaiso filed a claim with the regional appeals court seeking
    damages for illegal detention and deprivation of liberty. In April a
    Santiago court decreed that the Government should pay about $222,000
    (125 million pesos) to two children of Doctor Enrique Paris for damages
    resulting from the 1973 death and disappearance of their father.
    Another Santiago court ordered the Government to pay approximately
    $180,000 (100 million pesos) to the family of Arsenio Poupin Ossiel. A
    court also ordered a payment of approximately $430,000 (240 million
    pesos) to the family of Eduardo Paredes. All three disappeared after
    being taken into custody by the military following the September 11,
    1973, assault on the presidential palace. In August the courts awarded
    approximately $500,000 (300 million pesos) to the widow and three
    children of Luis Anibal Manriquez, detained and killed in November of
    1973. In October the courts awarded $400 million (225 million pesos) to
    Carmen Gloria Quintana, who received burns on her body after being
    detained by a military patrol in 1986. The Council for the Defense of
    the State was considering whether to appeal some of these awards at
    year's end.
        In October 1999, Italy requested the extradition of retired General
    Manuel Contreras and another DINA (the army intelligence branch during
    the military regime) official to serve prison sentences for their role
    in the attempted murder of Christian Democrat Party leader Bernardo
    Leighton, which occurred in Italy in 1975. Chile has no extradition
    treaty with Italy. In October Supreme Court President Hernan Alvarez
    rejected the recommendation of the investigating judge that the
    Government either extradite the two former officials or try them in
    country for the crime. At the end of the year, the Supreme Court denied
    the extradition request principally on the grounds of insufficient
    evidence and lack of due process because the two persons had been tried
    and convicted in Italy in absentia.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        On June 13, a ``Dialog Table'' of military officers and human
    rights attorneys signed an agreement that established a mechanism for
    gathering new information on persons who had disappeared during the
    military regime. Under a law approved in June, specific military
    officers and community leaders were designated to receive information
    on the whereabouts of those who ``disappeared'' during the military
    regime. Information was received in the strictest confidence during a
    6-month period. At year's end the armed forces and the Carabineros were
    preparing to turn over information on the fate of 200 persons executed
    during the Pinochet regime. The courts have taken steps to try to
    locate bodies identified by the Dialog Table process and are deciding
    what legal actions should be taken next. The FASIC, the CODEPU, and
    other human rights organizations have several denial-of-justice cases
    pending before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
    regarding previously closed disappearance and execution cases (see
    Section 1.a.). Denial of justice cases based on application of the
    amnesty law also have been filed with the U.N. Commission on Human
    Rights (UNCHR).
        Investigations of military-era detentions and disappearances of
    persons at Colonia Dignidad (now called ``Villa Bavaria''), a secretive
    German-speaking settlement 240 miles south of Santiago, intensified
    during the year. Paul Schaefer, who immigrated from Germany in 1961
    with 300 followers, founded the 34,000-acre enclave. In April 1999,
    investigating judge Juan Guzman issued a detention order against the
    79-year-old Schaefer for the kidnaping and disappearance in 1974 of
    Alvaro Vallejos in the vicinity of Colonia Dignidad. Schaefer, also
    wanted by the authorities on other charges, remained a fugitive at
    year's end. During the year the enclave was searched several times. In
    October the authorities confiscated files and arrested Schaefer's
    deputy Gerhard Muecke in connection with Vallejos' disappearance. The
    Government issued an order to expel Muecke and two other German
    citizens whose residency permits expired. Muecke would stand trial
    before being expelled.
        In January 1985, Boris Weisfeiler disappeared near the Colonia
    Dignidad under circumstances that have yet to be fully clarified. The
    case was reopened at the beginning of the year and is among those being
    investigated by Judge Guzman.
        On August 16, the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that the
    Fourth Criminal Court of Santiago had jurisdiction over the case of the
    disappearance of Jose Manual Ramirez Rosales, arrested by agents of the
    DINA in 1974. In May 1999, the authorities indicted former Army Sargent
    Major and DINA agent Basclay Humberto Zapata Reyes (``El Troglo'') in
    this case.
        Of the 1,156 persons who disappeared under the military regime, the
    remains of 985 have yet to be found. The government agency in charge of
    the compensation program for the families of those executed or
    disappeared under the military regime recognizes 3,197 victims of the
    Pinochet era. These include 2,095 victims in which circumstances of
    death have been established and 1,102 cases in which the persons
    disappeared. During the year, monthly pension benefits, distributed to
    an average 3,441 eligible survivors (spouse, mother or father, and
    children), were approximately $11.3 million (6.3 billion pesos). Since
    1992, the program has distributed well over $100 million (57.8 billion
    pesos). Survivors receive pensions, educational benefits and other
    assistance.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of illegal pressure on
    detainees; however, the CODEPU has received reports of abuse and
    mistreatment by both the National Police and the Investigations Police.
    When requested by other human rights organizations or family members,
    CODEPU lawyers visit detainees during the interrogation (see Section
    1.d.) and represent some suspected terrorists in court. The CODEPU
    continues to investigate alleged use of excessive force against
    detainees. The Minister of Interior asks the courts to conduct
    independent investigations of credible complaints of police abuse, but
    such investigations often do not result in arrests, due in part to the
    reluctance of judges to pursue the issue vigorously.
        The Human Rights Office of the Metropolitan Legal Aid Office, an
    arm of the Justice Ministry, released a report in March 1999 noting it
    had assisted 815 persons in 1998, twice the number as in the previous
    year. The report further stated the Legal Aid Office presented 70 cases
    to civilian or military courts in 1998; 42 cases were filed in 1997. Of
    the more recent cases, 48 were lodged against national police officers,
    while 7 cases involved the Investigations Police and 6, military
    personnel; the remainder involved various civilian government
    authorities and private security guards.
        In 1998 a law entered into effect that clarified the illegality of
    any use of force against persons detained by the police. The law
    provides that if a member of the police force uses ``torture or
    unlawful coercion,'' either physical or mental, or orders them to be
    applied, or commits them against a person under arrest or detention,
    the officer would be sentenced to imprisonment. Officers who know about
    the abuse and have the ``necessary power and authority'' to prevent or
    stop it also would be considered accessories to the crime if they fail
    to do so. The CODEPU has found that this law had an important impact on
    the conduct of the Judicial Police, but little impact so far on
    Carabineros. Beginning in 2001, courses in human rights are expected to
    be part of the core curriculum in the Carabinero police academies for
    both rank and file as well as officers.
        Human rights groups continue to claim that military recruits
    sometimes are mistreated. The Commission on Juvenile Rights (CODEJU), a
    nongovernmental organization (NGO), claimed in November 1999 that it
    had received 380 complaints of recruit mistreatment in the previous 5
    years. This statement followed claims of mistreatment by recruits,
    lawsuits, and an investigation by the army that affirmed recruits'
    claims of mistreatment. There were three suicides among recent recruits
    in 1999 and one in 1998.
        No new information is available regarding the case of 14 military
    conscripts who military officers reportedly beat during a military
    exercise in 1998. As of 1999, one corporal was awaiting trial in the
    case.
        At year's end, the court of appeals had not yet ruled on the August
    1997 filing by attorneys for Carmen Gloria Quintana that appealed
    efforts by the Government to set aside an award of approximately
    $600,000 in compensation that the IACHR had recommended for Quintana in
    1988. Army Captain Pedro Fernandez Dittus set fire to Quintana and her
    companion Rodrigo Rojas Denegri while they participated in a protest
    against the military regime in 1986. Rojas died 4 days later, while
    Quintana survived with severe and disfiguring injuries.
        During the year, there were instances of violent confrontations
    between radical Mapuche groups and local landowners and representatives
    of logging companies in the southern part of the country (see Section
    5). Most of the protests involved rockthrowing.
        A Marxist-Leninist group claimed responsibility for a bomb that
    exploded on November 26 in front of the Colombian embassy in Santiago.
    The bombing resulted in damage to property, but no injuries.
        Prisons are often overcrowded and antiquated. A fight among prison
    gangs that led to a fire and the death of seven prisoners caused a
    national debate on the overcrowding of prisons, which are unable to
    cope with a rapidly growing inmate population. At year's end, the
    number of prisoners averaged 163 percent of designed capacity.
    According to press reports, there were over 30,000 prisoners housed in
    104 locations. Food meets minimal nutritional needs, and prisoners may
    supplement the diet by buying food. Those with sufficient funds often
    can rent space in a better wing of the prison. Although most reports
    state that the guards generally behave responsibly and do not mistreat
    prisoners, prisoners have complained to CODEPU about beatings.
        Pretrial detainees are not generally held with convicted prisoners.
        In 1999 a Santiago appeals court ruled that prison guards had used
    excessive force when moving maximum security prisoners in February of
    that year. Prison authorities appealed the finding, and the courts
    absolved the guards, ruling that the force used was not excessive.
        Prison guards have been accused of using excessive force to stop
    attempted prison breaks. Although most reports state that the guards
    generally behave responsibly and do not mistreat prisoners, the CODEPU
    reported several instances of alleged mistreatment of prisoners and
    believes that many others go unreported. CODEPU is particularly
    concerned about the treatment of prisoners in maximum security prisons
    and prisoners with HIV/AIDS and mental deficiencies who often do not
    receive adequate medical attention. The Government announced plans to
    build 5 new prisons in 2001 capable of housing 8,000 prisoners.
        Women are generally housed in separate facilities, which tend to be
    less crowded and with somewhat better conditions than men's prisons.
        By law, juvenile offenders (those under the age of 18) are
    segregated from adult prisoners. According to the latest available
    figures, there were 6,630 minors in adult prisons in 1992 and 346 by
    the end of 1997 although this number increased to 422 by the end of
    1998. The Government announced plans to build three juvenile detention
    centers in 2001.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities
    generally respect constitutional provisions for arrest and detention;
    however, detainees are not always advised promptly of charges against
    them nor granted a timely hearing before a judge. The Constitution
    allows civilian and military courts to order detention for up to 5 days
    without arraignment and to extend the detention of alleged terrorists
    for up to 10 days. The law affords detainees 30 minutes of immediate
    and subsequent daily access to a lawyer (in the presence of a prison
    guard) and to a doctor to verify their physical condition. The law does
    not permit a judge to deny such access; police authorities generally
    observe these requirements.
        In practice, many detainees are not promptly advised of charges
    against them, and they are not granted a timely hearing before a judge.
    At the end of 1999, 8 percent of the general prison population of
    24,791 was under investigation but not charged with a crime; 45 percent
    were charged with an offense and were awaiting trial or had been
    convicted and were awaiting sentencing; and 48 percent were serving
    sentences.
        A 1998 law requires police to inform those detained of their
    rights, to expedite notification of the detention to family members,
    and eliminated the ability of police to demand identification from or
    stop persons bases solely on suspicion. The law also deals with
    physical abuse by police against detained persons.
        The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel, but this
    is a reality only for those who can afford to pay. The Constitution
    allows judges to set bail.
        There were no cases of forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
    judicial system independent of the other branches of government;
    continued turnover in the court system has reduced the number of
    military-era appointees over the constitutionally independent judicial
    branch to the point that there they had very little influence over the
    administration of justice.
        Cases decided in the lower courts can be referred to appeals courts
    and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Criminal court judges are
    appointed for life. In 1997 constitutional reforms set 75 as the age
    limit for Supreme Court justices, gave the Senate the right to approve
    or disapprove presidential nominations to the Court, and increased
    court membership from 17 to 21. Of the 21 justices on the Supreme
    Court, 3 were appointed under the military regime. The Supreme Court
    prepares lists of nominees for the Supreme Court and appeals courts,
    from which the President makes nominations. The Supreme Court continues
    to work with the other branches of government on broad judicial reform.
        If formal charges are filed in civilian courts against a member of
    the military, including the National Police, the military prosecutor
    asks for jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has sometimes granted,
    although less often than in previous years. This is of particular
    consequence in the human rights cases from the period covered by the
    1978 Amnesty Law. In addition, military courts have the authority to
    charge and try civilians for terrorist acts, defamation of military
    personnel, and sedition. Rulings by military tribunals can be appealed
    to the Supreme Court. Persons accused of terrorist acts and students
    arrested during demonstrations for damaging property or assaulting a
    police officer, are brought before military tribunals. On July 19 the
    Inter-American Court of Human Rights received a submission on behalf of
    32 civilians convicted in military tribunals for violations of the Law
    on Terrorist Actions, Arms Control, and State Security. The plaintiffs
    argued that applying military criminal law to civilians violates the
    American Convention on Human Rights.
        A 1997 judicial reform law created the post of Attorney General,
    with a 10-year term, and a related office that is expected to be in
    full operation by 2002. Congress passed enabling legislation for the
    Ministry in September 1999. The judicial reform law, which applies to
    criminal cases, provides that national and regional prosecutors
    investigate crimes and formulate charges, leaving judges and
    magistrates the narrower function of judging the merits of evidence
    presented to them. Training and administrative setup began in 1999, and
    implementation began in December with oral trials in 2 of the 13
    political regions.
        Based on the Napoleonic Code, the criminal justice system does not
    provide for trial by jury, nor does it presume innocence until proven
    otherwise. However, recent changes to the trial system, including the
    gradual adoption of oral trials, have moved the system away from its
    Napoleonic roots. Criminal proceedings are inquisitorial rather than
    adversarial. The Constitution provides for the right to legal counsel,
    but indigent defendants do not always receive effective legal
    representation. Indigent defendants, who account for the majority of
    cases, may be represented by law students doing practical training, on
    occasion by a court-appointed lawyer, or by a lawyer from the
    Government's legal assistance corporation.
        There were no reports of political prisoners, although inmates in
    Santiago's maximum-security prison who have been convicted of terrorist
    acts routinely claim to be political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanctions. A 1995 privacy law bars obtaining
    information by undisclosed taping, telephone intercepts, and other
    surreptitious means, as well as the dissemination of such information,
    except by judicial order in narcotics-related cases.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respect these rights in practice. However, human rights groups have
    criticized the existence and application of laws that allow government
    officials to prosecute journalists who insult or criticize them.
        The press maintains its independence, criticizes the Government,
    and covers issues sensitive to the military, including human rights
    cases. Investigative journalism is infrequently practiced for both
    financial and political reasons, but recently on-line dailies are
    including such stories more frequently.
        Two major media groups control most of the print media, which are
    largely independent of the Government. The State is majority owner of
    La Nacion newspaper, but it is not under direct government control.
    Electronic newspapers are emerging with distribution over the Internet.
        The broadcast media also are largely independent of government
    control. The Television Nacional network is state-owned but not under
    direct government control. It receives no government subsidy and is
    self-financing through commercial advertising. It is editorially
    independent and is governed by a board of directors appointed by the
    President and approved by the Senate. Members reflect various political
    viewpoints, and the board encourages the expression of varied opinions
    over the network.
        Under the State Security Law of 1958, it is a criminal offense to
    besmirch the honor of state institutions and their members and symbols,
    such as the Congress, the Supreme Court, the military services, the
    flag, and the President. Military courts have the authority to charge
    and try civilians for defamation of military personnel and for
    sedition, but their rulings can be appealed to the Supreme Court. Human
    Rights Watch (HRW) and the Inter-American Press Association have
    criticized these restrictions on freedom of expression and information,
    as has the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur for
    Freedom of Expression, who visited the country in June 1999 and called
    for changes in the law.
        Several cases have been brought against journalists under
    provisions of the State Security Law. In February the Supreme Court
    sentenced Jose Ale Aravena to a suspended prison sentence under the law
    for insulting former Chief Justice Servando Jordan in an article in La
    Tercera newspaper. HRW noted that the judge who issued the sentence
    also insulted and threatened Ale in public before releasing the
    verdict. In July President Lagos pardoned Ale.
        In April 1999, ``The Black Book of Chilean Justice'' by journalist
    Alejandra Matus, went on sale in Santiago. Former Supreme Court
    President Jordan, who was mentioned negatively in the book, immediately
    filed charges against Matus under the State Security Law, and an
    appeals court judge ordered all copies of the book seized from the
    publisher and book stores. The newspaper La Tercera and the Editorial
    Planeta publishing house subsequently placed the prohibited text on the
    Internet, using foreign servers, and the book was published in
    Argentina. It remains banned.
        After becoming aware of the Jordan lawsuit, Matus left the country
    and sought and obtained political asylum abroad. The charges against
    her and seizure of the book were widely repudiated, including by the
    President and members of Congress. The IACHR adopted a resolution in
    October declaring that, if the alleged facts of the case are certain,
    they would constitute a violation of the freedom of expression.
    Nevertheless, the State Security Law has yet to be modified and,
    without a conviction, the President is unable to grant Matus a pardon,
    as he did in the case involving the journalist Jose Ale.
        HRW reported that authorities charged journalist Paula Afani Saud
    with breaching the secrecy of a criminal investigation when she wrote
    articles in 1998 about an investigation by authorities into narcotics
    trafficking and money laundering. HRW noted that Afani refused to
    identify her sources for information contained in the articles and
    claimed that the subsequent charges brought against her violated the
    public's right of access to information and counteracted a Government
    initiative to protect the confidentiality of journalist's sources.
        A 1996 privacy law set penalties for those who infringe on the
    private and public life of individuals and their families. At the time
    of the law's passage, journalists argued vigorously that applying it to
    media reporting would have a chilling effect on freedom of the press.
    To date, this privacy law has not been applied to the media.
        The 1980 Constitution established a Film Classification Council
    (CCC) with the power of prior censorship. The Council has banned over
    50 films and approximately 700 videos, mostly for violence and
    pornography. Local and foreign film distributors regard the CCC's
    screening process as insufficiently transparent. The Constitution
    permits the State to censure films. The Lawyers Association for Public
    Liberties petitioned the IACHR to object to the Supreme Court's banning
    of the film ``The Last Temptation of Christ;'' the case was before the
    InterAmerican Court at year's end.
        The National Television Council (CNT), created by legislation in
    1989 and supported with government funding, is charged with assuring
    that television programming ``respects the moral and cultural values of
    the nation.'' The CNT's principal role is to regulate violence and
    sexual explicitness in both broadcast and cable television programming
    content. Films and other programs judged by the CNT to be excessively
    violent or to have obscene language or sexually explicit scenes can be
    shown only after 10 p.m. when ``family viewing hours'' end. In
    practice, the ever-increasing volume of programming makes the CNT's job
    all but impossible. The CNT issues occasional warnings to networks and
    cable providers and sometimes obliges them to postpone the showing of
    certain films until after 10 p.m. It also occasionally levies fines.
    Debate continues over the CNT's role.
        The courts can prohibit media coverage of legal cases in progress
    but do so rarely. The press has begun using foreign Internet web sites
    to publish articles when gag orders are issued.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to assemble peacefully, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. However, early in the year an
    international group of neo-Nazis were prohibited from holding a
    meeting. The Government enacted legislation to prevent the meeting from
    being held and specifically used immigration laws to prohibit foreign
    citizens from entering the country to attend the meeting.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Church
    and state are officially separate; however, the Roman Catholic Church
    continues to receive some preferential treatment. All denominations
    practice their faiths without restriction.
        A 1999 law on religion, designed to bring other religious entities
    closer to the legal status enjoyed by the Catholic Church, went into
    effect in March. The new law bestows the same legal status that the
    Catholic Church previously enjoyed upon all other faiths. However,
    their status still can be challenged in court. Reflecting its
    historical position, the legal status of the Catholic Church cannot be
    challenged at all. The new religion law removed the ability of the
    State to dissolve religious entities by decree. Instead, this only can
    occur after a judicial review begun by a complaint filed by the
    semiautonomous council for the Defense of the State.
        Many of the approximately two million Protestants, who represent
    about 12 percent of the population, assert the Government has
    discriminated against them. They cite the absence of Protestant armed
    forces chaplains, difficulties for pastors to visit military hospitals,
    and the predominantly Catholic religious education in public schools.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. For
    minor children to leave the country, either alone or with only one of
    their parents, they must have notarized permission from nonaccompanying
    parent(s).
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
    in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
    cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue
    of the provision of first asylum has not arisen.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    government through periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for
    citizens 18 years of age and over. Free and fair presidential elections
    were held in December 1999, with a runoff in January. In the second
    round of elections, Ricardo Lagos narrowly defeated Joaquin Lavin with
    52 percent of the vote to Lavin's 48 percent. Lagos led the center-left
    Concertacion coalition that included his Socialist Party, the Christian
    Democratic Party, the Party for Democracy, and the Radical Social
    Democrat Party. Lavin was supported by the center-right Alliance for
    Chile coalition consisting of the Independent Democratic Union and the
    National Renewal party. The legislative branch, with the exception of
    11 nonelected senators among its 49 members, is elected freely and is
    independent from the executive branch.
        The Government still operates under some political restraints that
    the military regime imposed. Under the 1980 Constitution, various
    national institutions--including the President, the Supreme Court, and
    the National Security Council (the latter acting on nominations by the
    armed forces)--appoint an additional nine Senators (beyond those
    elected) to 8-year terms. In addition, former presidents Pinochet and
    Frei exercised their option to become senators-for-life.
        The former military government wrote the 1980 Constitution, and
    amended it slightly in 1989 after losing a referendum on whether
    General Pinochet should stay in office as president. The Constitution
    provides for a strong presidency and a legislative branch with limited
    powers. It includes provisions designed to protect the interests of the
    military and the minority political opposition (currently the center-
    right coalition). These provisions include limitations on the
    President's right to remove the commanders in chief of the three armed
    services and the national police; an electoral system that gives the
    second-place party (or coalition) in each district disproportionate
    representation in Congress; and the provision for non-elected senators.
    In January the IACHR issued a resolution criticizing the existence of
    designated senators and senators-for-life and urged the Government to
    end the practice. In October a Senate Commission (including two
    designated Senators) unanimously approved a proposal that would abolish
    these positions starting in 2006, but at year's end Congress had not
    passed legislation codifying this proposal.
        Women have the right to vote and are active in all levels of
    political life, including grassroots movements. Women are a majority of
    registered voters and of those who actually cast ballots; however, they
    are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 13 women
    among the 120 deputies, 2 women in the 49-seat Senate, and 5 women
    among the 16 cabinet ministers. No women currently serve as Supreme
    Court justices.
        The approximately 1.2 million indigenous people have the legal
    right to participate freely in the political process, although
    relatively few are active politically. One member of Congress is of
    indigenous descent.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several human rights NGO's are active. The Chilean Human Rights
    Commission, an NGO, is affiliated with the International League of
    Human Rights. The FASIC is active on the full range of human rights
    issues. The CODEPU provides legal counsel to those accused of
    politically related crimes and to victims of human rights abuses. The
    Government cooperates with domestic NGO's efforts to investigate
    current accusations of human rights violations. Many international
    NGO's also follow human rights issues closely.
        There were no confirmed reports of threats made against human
    rights activists during the year. An investigation into the burglary of
    the CODEPU offices in 1999 was inconclusive. No information was
    available regarding unconfirmed threats reportedly made against Rafael
    Castillo, who had been involved in investigations of human rights
    abuses associated with Operation Albania and other killings.
        In May 1998, then-President Frei advocated the creation of a
    ``national defender of citizens,'' a state body that would receive
    complaints about abuse of authority by government officials and
    agencies. The Lagos administration forwarded legislation to Congress in
    October to create this entity, but Congress had not passed the
    legislation by year's end.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality before the law and the
    Government generally respects these provisions. In 1999 Congress
    amended the Constitution to emphasize the principle of equality between
    men and women and now states that ``persons are born free and equal in
    their dignity and rights.'' There are no laws that specifically
    prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or social status.
        Women.--The most serious violations of women's rights involved
    sexual and domestic violence. The public is becoming increasingly aware
    of the extent of physical abuse of women. The National Women's Service
    (SERNAM), created in 1991 to combat discrimination against women,
    conducted courses on the legal, medical, and psychological aspects of
    domestic violence for police officers and judicial and municipal
    authorities. In a 1996 study conducted by SERNAM, the most recent that
    it has conducted, results showed that of 12,000 reports of domestic
    violence since the Law of Intrafamily Violence went into effect, only 1
    in 5 accusations resulted in judicial action. The study also found that
    in nearly three-quarters of those cases, the accusation led to a
    positive change in the domestic situation regardless of the judicial
    outcome.
        The courts may order counseling for those involved in intrafamily
    violence. In 1997 there were approximately 61,000 reports of domestic
    violence. The Citizens' Peace Foundation indicated that there were
    1,052 cases of rape reported to the police in 1998, and 993 in 1997.
    Experts believe that a majority of rape cases go unreported. In July
    1999, a new law took effect increasing the penalties for sexual abuse.
    The legislation includes clauses to facilitate proof of the crime and
    to protect the privacy and safety of the person making the charge. The
    new law also overturned 100-year-old legislation that permitted a man
    charged with rape to be released if he asked the victim to marry him
    and she accepted.
        Legal distinctions between the sexes still exist. The law permits
    legal separation but not divorce, so those who wish to remarry must
    seek annulments. Since annulment implies that a marriage never existed
    under the law, former spouses are left with little recourse for
    financial support. A 1994 law created conjugal property as an option in
    a marriage, but some women saw this as a disadvantage, since the law on
    separate property (which still exists) gives women the right to one-
    half their husbands' assets but gives husbands no rights to assets of
    the wife. In the face of heavy opposition from the Catholic Church, the
    Chamber of Deputies approved a divorce bill in September 1997; the bill
    faces Senate opposition but was still on the legislative agenda at
    year's end.
        A SERNAM study in 1997 found that the average earnings of female
    heads of household are 71 percent of those of male heads of household.
    Women with no schooling averaged a salary that was 87 percent of their
    male counterparts. The minimum wage for domestic helpers (who are
    thought to number 300,000 in what is probably the largest single
    category of working women) is only 75 percent of the standard minimum
    wage. Female heads of household with university training averaged 57
    percent as much as their male counterparts. The Labor Code provides
    specific benefits for pregnant workers and recent mothers. Employers do
    not have the right to ask women to take pregnancy tests prior to hiring
    them. Legislation extending these benefits to domestic employees took
    effect in November 1998.
        Children.--The Government provides free education through high
    school; education is compulsory from first through eighth grade.
        Violence against children is a problem, albeit a declining one. A
    survey of eighth grade students by UNICEF comparing the incidence of
    mistreatment in the years 1994 and 2000 showed that in 1994, 34 percent
    of children had been subject to some form of serious physical violence.
    That number had declined to 25 percent this year. During the same
    period, those having suffered some sort of serious physical violence
    from their parents had fallen from 21.3 percent to 11.9 percent.
    Violence by the mother (21.3 percent) was almost twice as frequent as
    violence by the father (11.9 percent), and violence in low-income
    households (31 percent) almost double that in high-income households
    (16.3 percent).
        A 1999 report by the National Minors Service (SENAME) noted that it
    had handled the cases of 5,453 maltreated children for the first 6
    months of that year; 583 of these cases were judged severe enough to be
    presented to legal authorities. The SENAME reported that cases of abuse
    brought to its attention totaled 9,723 in 1998 and 7,676 in 1997. From
    the middle of 1998 to December of 1999, the SENAME brought to the
    courts 713 cases for child abuse, 314 for rape, 292 for sexual abuse,
    79 for grave harm done to children, and 28 cases of homicide. Of the
    cases, 70 percent came to trial, of which 80 percent resulted in
    convictions. Beginning in 1997, the SENAME lawyers began receiving
    specialized training in child abuse cases, leading to a higher
    conviction rate of offenders according to the Director of the
    organization. A report from the La Morada Corporation for Women
    released in May 1999 estimated that there are 20,000 cases of sexual
    abuse of children every year.
        A 1996 UNICEF report stated that 34 percent of children under 12
    years of age experience serious physical violence, although only 3.2
    percent of the victims of intrafamily violence reported to the National
    Police family affairs unit were below the age of 18. A 1994 law on
    intrafamily violence was designed in part to deal with this problem.
    According to UNICEF, some form of corporal punishment is used by one or
    both parents in 62 percent of households. UNICEF estimated that
    approximately 107,000 children between the ages of 12 and 19 are in the
    work force. A study by the Catholic Church estimated that some 50,000
    children under age 15 are working (see Section 6.d.).
        UNICEF estimated in June 1999 that there were roughly 10,000 child
    prostitutes between the ages of 6 and 18, up from 4,200 in 1995.
        People with Disabilities.--A 1994 law promotes the integration of
    the disabled into society; the Government's National Fund for the
    Handicapped has a small budget to encourage such integration. The 1992
    census found that 288,000 citizens said that they had some form of
    disability. The disabled still suffer some forms of legal
    discrimination; for example, blind persons cannot become teachers or
    tutors. Although a 1994 law requires that new public buildings provide
    access for the disabled, the public transportation system does not make
    provision for wheelchair access, and subway lines in the Santiago
    metropolitan area provide facilitated access for the disabled only in
    some areas.
        Indigenous People.--Approximately 1.2 million persons identify
    themselves as indigenous. The Mapuches, from the south, constitute
    about two-thirds of the indigenous population, but there are small
    Aymara, Atacameno, Huilliche, Rapa Nui, and Kawaskhar populations in
    other parts of the country. A committee composed of representatives of
    indigenous groups participated in drafting the 1993 law that recognizes
    the ethnic diversity of the indigenous population and gives indigenous
    people a voice in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and
    traditions. It provides for eventual bilingual education in schools
    with indigenous populations, replacing a statute that emphasized
    assimilation of indigenous people. Of the population that identifies
    itself as indigenous, about one-half remain separated from the rest of
    society, largely because of historical, cultural, educational, and
    geographical factors. In practice, the ability of indigenous people to
    participate in governmental decisions affecting their lands, cultures,
    traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is marginal.
    Indigenous people also experience some societal discrimination.
        The National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI) was
    created in 1994, and indigenous people directly elected representatives
    to this body in 1995 and 1999. It advises and directs government
    programs that assist the economic development of indigenous people. In
    May a commission appointed by the Lagos administration proposed a 16-
    point program aimed at addressing indigenous concerns. As part of the
    program, a permanent national commission was created to facilitate the
    participation of Mapuche and other indigenous populations in the
    formulation of national policies affecting them.
        In October the Chamber of Deputies allowed to lapse a proposed
    constitutional reform, pending since 1991, that would have recognized
    explicitly the existence of indigenous persons and the state's
    responsibility for encouraging development of indigenous culture. Also
    in October, a group of 200 Mapuches marched from Santiago to the
    National Congress in Valparaiso demanding land, more political rights,
    and ratification of International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
    No. 169. That convention supports ``the aspirations of indigenous
    people to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life
    and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities,
    languages and religions, with the framework of the States in which they
    live.'' The marchers declared themselves satisfied with the response
    they received from the legislators.
        In the first decision of its kind, a Temuco appeals court ruled in
    September 1999 that an indigenous employee fired from a municipal job
    had been discriminated against by her immediate superior. The court
    based its ruling on the Indigenous Law, which outlaws discrimination on
    the basis of ``origin and culture.''
        Several Mapuche families continued to object to exchanging
    traditional lands for other property as part of the Ralco hydroelectric
    project. The eight families involved continued to object to ENDESA's
    effort to have them resettled. Land occupations and other violence by
    isolated Mapuche Indian groups against private forestry companies
    occurred through much of the year (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government had not responded to suggestion from the U.N.
    Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made in August
    1999. The Committee suggested that the Government apologize to and
    compensate indigenous people for their historical treatment, and
    explicitly outlaw racial and ethnic discrimination.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Country assimilated a major
    European migration in the 19th century and major Middle Eastern and
    Croatian migrations in the early part of the 20th century. Smaller
    racial and ethnic minority groups such as those of Asian descent and
    African-Chileans also can be found and experience some societal
    intolerance.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions
    without prior authorization and to join existing unions. The work force
    is estimated at 5.7 million persons, of whom 3.7 million are salaried.
    Union membership is approximately 655,000, or roughly 12 percent of the
    work force. Government-employee associations are provided with the same
    rights as trade unions; however, the law denies government employees
    the possibility of uniting with other workers or to benefit from joint
    actions, thus constituting an interference to their freedom of
    association. Police and military personnel and employees of state-owned
    companies attached to the Ministry of Defense may not organize
    collectively. Members of unions are free to withdraw from union
    membership.
        The 1992 Labor Code permits nationwide labor centrals, and the
    Unified Workers Central (CUT), the largest and most representative of
    these, legalized its status in April 1992. Labor unions are effectively
    independent of the Government, but union leaders usually are elected
    from lists based on party affiliation and sometimes receive direction
    from party headquarters. Political activities or affiliations of unions
    or union officials are not restricted. Registering a union is a simple
    process.
        Employees in the private sector have the right to strike; however,
    the Government regulates this right, and there are some restrictions on
    the right to strike. Public employees do not enjoy the right to strike,
    although government teachers, municipal, and health workers have struck
    in the past. The law proscribes employees of some 30 companies--largely
    providers of essential services (e.g., water and electricity)--from
    striking; it stipulates compulsory arbitration to resolve disputes in
    these companies. There is no provision for compulsory arbitration in
    the public sector. Striker replacements are permitted under certain
    circumstances.
        Employers must pay severance benefits to striking workers and must
    show cause to dismiss workers. Employees who believe they have been
    dismissed unfairly or dismissed because of their trade union activities
    file complaints with the Ministry of Labor. However, even if such a
    claim is found to have merit, the employee does not enjoy the right to
    reinstatement. In such cases the employer is only required to make
    additional compensatory payments. The burden of proof rests with the
    employer in cases in which employees allege illegal antiunion activity.
        In October protesting truck owners disrupted movement along parts
    of the highway system for over two days. The truckers asked for lower
    diesel fuel prices and a limit on the number of truckers allowed to
    work in the country. Labor unions did not support the truck owners.
        The CUT and many other labor confederations and federations
    maintain ties to international labor organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Despite legal
    provisions for collective bargaining, the Labor Code includes
    provisions that make it difficult for trade unions to organize in many
    sectors. As a result, the majority of workers work under individual
    contracts. Employers say that this is due to the workers' preference,
    distrust of union leaders, and loyalty to companies. Union leaders
    counter that the Labor Code--which does not allow union shops--prevents
    successful organization in many sectors. Unions cite the widespread
    practices of subcontracting and temporary employment as a ways that
    employers resist unionization.
        The Ministry of Labor arbitrates about half of the complaints it
    receives. Workers may take cases to the courts if they have not been
    arbitrated. If complainants succeed in proving that they were fired
    unjustly, the employer must pay discharged employees twice their normal
    severance payment. There are no statistics available concerning the
    disposition of complaints of antiunion behavior. There were allegations
    that employers dismiss workers for union activity and attempt to avoid
    a complaint by immediately paying them some multiple of the normal
    severance pay.
        Temporary workers--defined in the Labor Code as those in
    agriculture and construction, as well as port workers and
    entertainers--may form unions, but their right to collective bargaining
    is limited, as it is dependent on employers agreeing to negotiate with
    unions of temporary workers. Likewise, intercompany unions are
    permitted to bargain collectively only if the employer agrees to
    negotiate with such a union. Labor Code sanctions against unfair
    bargaining practices protect workers from dismissal only during the
    bargaining process. Labor leaders complain that companies invoke the
    law's needs-of-the-company clause to fire workers after a union has
    signed a new contract, particularly when negotiations result in a
    prolonged strike.
        Labor laws apply in the duty free zones; there are no export
    processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known
    to occur. While the Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced
    and bonded labor by children, there were no reports of such practices.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law allows children between the ages of 16 and 18 to
    work with the express permission of their parents or guardians. The law
    allows 15-year-olds to work under certain conditions; their parents
    must consent they must have finished compulsory schooling, and they may
    only perform light work not requiring hard physical labor, or
    constituting a threat to health and childhood development. In July
    Congress passed a law that raised the minimum legal age for some types
    of work from 14 to 15 years of age. Additional provisions in the law
    protect workers under 18 years of age by restricting the types of work
    open to them (for example, they may not work in nightclubs), and by
    establishing special conditions of work (they may not work more than 8
    hours in 1 day). Labor inspectors enforce these regulations, and
    compliance is good in the formal economy; however, many children are
    employed in the informal economy. In August 1999, Congress passed a law
    that raised the minimum age to work in an underground mine from 18 to
    21 years; special regulations govern the ability of 18- to 21-year-olds
    to work at such sites.
        UNICEF estimated that approximately 107,000 children between the
    ages of 12 and 19 work. A government study in 1996 estimated that
    15,000 children between the ages of 6 and 11 and 35,000 children
    between the ages of 12 and 14 are in the work force. A 1998 Catholic
    Church study estimated that 50,000 children under the age of 15 worked.
    The majority of these were males from single-parent households headed
    by women; among these were children who worked more than 40 hours per
    week and did not attend school. The Ministry of Labor convenes regular
    meetings of a tripartite group (business-labor-government) to monitor
    progress in eradicating child labor. The Labor Code does not
    specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
    practices were not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages, and
    the minimum wage is adjusted annually. This wage is designed to serve
    as the starting wage for an unskilled single worker entering the labor
    force and does not provide a worker and family with a decent standard
    of living. Approximately 400,000 workers (about 11 percent of the work
    force) earn the minimum wage. According to the Government, of the
    workers who earn the minimum wage, approximately 43 percent are between
    the ages of 15 and 19. A tripartite committee comprising government,
    employer, and labor representatives normally suggests a minimum wage
    based on projected inflation and increases in productivity. In May
    1998, Congress approved the Government's proposal setting an escalating
    minimum monthly wage through the year 2000; the minimum wage as of
    December 31 was approximately $175 (100,000 pesos).
        The law sets hours of work and occupational safety and health
    standards. The legal workweek is 48 hours, which can be worked in
    either 5 or 6 days. The maximum workday length is 10 hours, but
    positions such as caretakers and domestic servants are exempted. All
    workers enjoy at least one 24-hour rest period during the workweek,
    except for workers at high altitudes who voluntarily exchange a work-
    free day each week for several consecutive work-free days every 2
    weeks.
        Occupational health and safety are protected under the law and
    administered by both the Ministries of Health and of Labor. The
    Government has increased resources for inspections by over 60 percent
    since 1990 and targeted industries guilty of the worst abuses. As a
    result, enforcement is improving, and voluntary compliance is fairly
    good. A 1996 law increased the number of annual occupational health and
    safety inspections and provided that they be carried out by an expanded
    labor inspection service in the Ministry of Labor. Insurance mutual
    funds provide workers' compensation and occupational safety training
    for the private and public sectors. There was a 24-percent decline in
    reported occupational injuries in 1997, the last available figures,
    compared with the previous 5 years, although 11 percent of the work
    force still submitted claims. Workers who remove themselves from
    situations that endanger their health and safety have their employment
    protected if a real danger to their health or safety exists.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, although it may be prosecuted under
    other laws.
        There were occasional reports that persons were trafficked through
    the country.
        If cases of trafficking in persons were to arise, the police,
    Justice and Interior Ministries, SERNAM (if the cases involved women),
    or SENAME (if the cases involved children) would respond.
                                   __________

                                    COLOMBIA

        Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy in which the
    Liberal and Conservative parties have long dominated politics. Citizens
    elected President Andres Pastrana of the Conservative Party and a
    bicameral legislature controlled by the Liberal Party in generally
    free, fair, and transparent elections in 1998, despite attempts at
    intimidation and fraud by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and
    narcotics traffickers. Similar attempts at intimidation by illegal
    armed actors, including killings and kidnapings, threatened to impair
    local elections scheduled for October; however, the elections were
    generally peaceful. The civilian judiciary is largely independent of
    government influence; however, the suborning or intimidation of judges,
    witnesses, and prosecutors is common.
        The Government continued to face serious challenges to its control
    over the national territory, as longstanding and widespread internal
    armed conflict and rampant violence--both political and criminal--
    persisted. The principal participants in the conflict were government
    security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics
    traffickers. The number of victims of paramilitary attacks during the
    year increased. In some areas government forces were engaged in combat
    with guerrillas or narcotics traffickers, while in others paramilitary
    groups fought guerrillas, and in still others guerrillas attacked
    demobilized members of rival guerrilla factions. The 2 major guerrilla
    groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
    National Liberation Army (ELN), consist of an estimated 11,000 to
    17,000 full-time combatants organized into more than 100 semiautonomous
    groups. The FARC and the ELN, along with other smaller groups,
    exercised a significant degree of territorial influence and initiated
    armed action in nearly 1,000 of the country's 1,085 municipalities
    during the year, which was approximately the same level as in 1999.
    Their popular support nationwide remained low, according to polls and
    numerous other reports. The major guerrilla organizations received a
    significant part of their revenues (in the hundreds of millions of
    dollars) from fees levied on narcotics production and trafficking, as
    well as kidnaping and extortion. Guerrillas and paramilitary groups
    supplanted absent state institutions in many sparsely populated areas.
    Peace talks initiated in 1999 between the Government and the FARC
    continued in a demilitarized zone (``despeje'') consisting of 5
    southern municipalities, with a total population of approximately
    100,000 persons. In the absence of both a state presence and
    international verification, FARC human rights abuses inside the zone,
    as well as outside of it, continued. Peace talks were complicated by
    the September 8 hijacking of a commercial plane by a FARC guerrilla who
    obtained refuge in the demilitarized zone. On November 14, the FARC
    unilaterally suspended negotiations and demanded concrete government
    action against the paramilitary groups. On December 6, President
    Pastrana extended the term of the demilitarized zone until January 31,
    2001, as intense public debate continued over the value of the existing
    peace process. The killing of congressional peace commission chairman
    Diego Turbay Cote on December 29 cast further doubt on the future of
    peace negotiations, although government and FARC negotiators remained
    in contact.
        In April the Government and the ELN agreed in principle on
    verification within a proposed ``encounter zone'' in southern Bolivar
    and northeastern Antioquia departments, in which the ELN's national
    convention could take place. However, progress stalled when local
    residents of the proposed zone protested its creation. Two groups--
    Asocipaz and the ``No to the Despeje'' Committee--demanded active
    consultation with the Government on the creation of an encounter zone
    and on occasion blocked access to the area. Paramilitary groups have
    attempted to influence these organizations. The Governments of Spain,
    France, Switzerland, Norway, and Cuba took a progressively more active
    role in the peace process during the year and committed to provide
    development assistance when the zone is implemented. However, the
    September 17 mass kidnaping of over 50 Cali residents by the ELN again
    slowed the peace process. After negotiation coupled with military
    pressure, the last of the hostages were released on November 3. ELN
    leaders participated in a mid-October conference in San Jose, Costa
    Rica, jointly sponsored by the Government and a group of
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), to explore solutions to the
    conflict. (The FARC, although invited, did not participate in the
    conference.) On December 15, five hired killers wounded public
    employees' union president Wilson Borja, a key member of the civil
    society facilitating commission in the Government-ELN peace process.
    Carlos Castano, the head of the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia
    (AUC) paramilitary umbrella organization, admitted a role in the
    attack. The Christmas release of 42 police and military hostages by the
    ELN paved the way for continued negotiations on the encounter zone at
    year's end.
        In open opposition to the Government, in November the AUC
    paramilitary group kidnaped seven members of Congress and demanded that
    the Government grant the AUC a role in the peace negotiations with the
    FARC. Interior Minister Humberto de la Calle negotiated the hostages'
    release with Castano, an action that angered the FARC. The Government
    refused to accord illegal self-defense (paramilitary) groups any
    political status.
        The civilian-led Ministry of Defense is responsible for internal
    security and oversees both the armed forces (including the army, air
    force, navy, marines, and coast guard) and the National Police. In the
    past, civilian management of the armed forces has been limited;
    however, over the past few years, the professionalism of the armed
    forces has improved, and respect for civilian authority on the part of
    the military has increased. In addition to the armed forces and the
    National Police, the public security forces include armed state law
    enforcement and investigative authorities, including the Administrative
    Department of Security (DAS) and the Prosecutor General's Technical
    Corps of Investigators (CTI). The DAS, which has broad intelligence
    gathering, law enforcement, and investigative authority, reports
    directly to the President but is directed by a law enforcement
    professional. The police are charged formally with maintaining internal
    order and security, but in practice law enforcement responsibilities
    often were shared with the army in both rural and urban areas. Many
    observers maintain that government action to combat paramilitarism has
    been inadequate, and in the past security forces regularly failed to
    confront paramilitary groups; however, the security forces improved
    their efforts to confront and detain members of paramilitary groups
    during the year. Nevertheless, members of the security forces sometimes
    illegally collaborated with paramilitary forces. The armed forces and
    the police committed serious violations of human rights throughout the
    year.
        Despite years of drug- and politically related violence, the
    economy is diverse and relatively advanced. Crude oil, coal, coffee,
    and cut flowers are the principal legal exports. In 1999 the country
    suffered its first recession in over 60 years, with a decrease in gross
    domestic product (GDP) of 4.5 percent and record unemployment of over
    20 percent. Although the economy recovered with 3 percent growth during
    the year, the level of unemployment remained unchanged and was at 19.7
    percent by year's end. The inflation rate at year's end was 8.75
    percent. Since September 1999, the Government has adopted fiscally
    austere budgets and floated the peso. High levels of violence greatly
    inhibit business confidence. Narcotics traffickers continued to control
    large tracts of land and other assets and exerted influence throughout
    society, the economy, and political life. Income distribution is highly
    skewed; much of the population lives in poverty. Per capita GDP was
    approximately $2,100.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; there were some
    improvements in the legal framework and in institutional mechanisms,
    but implementation lagged, and serious problems remain in many areas.
    Government security forces continued to commit serious abuses,
    including extrajudicial killings. Despite some prosecutions and
    convictions, the authorities rarely brought higher-ranking officers of
    the security forces and the police charged with human rights offenses
    to justice, and impunity remains a problem. Members of the security
    forces collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in
    some instances allowing such groups to pass through roadblocks, sharing
    information, or providing them with supplies or ammunition. Despite
    increased government efforts to combat and capture members of
    paramilitary groups, often security forces failed to take action to
    prevent paramilitary attacks. Paramilitary forces find a ready support
    base within the military and police, as well as among local civilian
    elites in many areas.
        On August 12, the revised Military Penal Code went into effect,
    which provides for an independent military judicial corps and for legal
    protection for troops if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to
    commit human rights abuses; the code also precludes unit commanders
    from judging subordinates. A series of military reform decrees signed
    by the President on September 14 provided greater facility for the
    military to remove human rights abusers or paramilitary collaborators
    from its ranks and provided for the further professionalization of the
    public security forces. The military judiciary continued to demonstrate
    an increased willingness to turn cases involving security force
    officers accused of serious human rights violations over to the
    civilian judiciary, as required by a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling
    and the new Military Penal Code; in August a presidential directive
    reinforced these legal norms.
        Police, prison guards, and military forces tortured and mistreated
    detainees. Conditions in the overcrowded and underfunded prisons are
    harsh; however, some inmates use bribes or intimidation to obtain more
    favorable treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as
    prolonged pretrial detention, are fundamental problems. The civilian
    judiciary is inefficient, severely overburdened by a large case
    backlog, and undermined by intimidation and the prevailing climate of
    impunity. This situation remains at the core of the country's human
    rights problems. The Superior Judicial Council (CSJ) estimated, based
    on a 1997 survey, that 63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40
    percent of all reported crimes go unpunished. On April 6, the
    Constitutional Court overturned much of the 1999 law that had created
    the specialized jurisdiction (which had replaced the anonymous regional
    courts system on July 1, 1999).
        The authorities sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    Journalists typically work in an atmosphere of threats and
    intimidation, primarily from paramilitary groups and guerrillas, which
    appeared to worsen during the year; journalists practice selfcensorship
    to avoid reprisals. There were some restrictions on freedom of
    movement, generally because of security concerns. Violence and
    instability in rural areas displaced between 125,000 and 317,000
    civilians from their homes during the year. Almost one-fourth of these
    movements occurred in massive displacements. (Exact numbers of
    displaced persons are difficult to obtain because some persons were
    displaced more than once, and many displaced persons do not register
    with the Government or other entities.) The total number of internally
    displaced citizens during the last 5 years may exceed 1 million. There
    were reports that security force members harassed or threatened human
    rights groups. Violence and extensive societal discrimination against
    women, abuse of children, and child prostitution are serious problems.
    Extensive societal discrimination against the indigenous and minorities
    continued. Child labor is a widespread problem. Trafficking in women
    and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. ``Social
    cleansing'' killings of street children, prostitutes, homosexuals, and
    others deemed socially undesirable by paramilitary groups, guerrillas,
    and vigilante groups continued to be serious problems.
        Paramilitary groups and guerrillas were responsible for the vast
    majority of political and other killings during the year. Throughout
    the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened
    civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an orchestrated
    campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby depriving
    guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to
    challenge the FARC and the ELN for control of narcotics cultivations
    and strategically important territories. Paramilitary forces were
    responsible for an increasing number of massacres and other politically
    motivated killings. They also fought guerrillas for control of some
    lucrative coca-growing regions and engaged directly in narcotics
    production and trafficking. The AUC paramilitary umbrella organization,
    whose membership totaled approximately 8,150 armed combatants,
    exercised increasing influence during the year and fought to extend its
    presence through violence and intimidation into areas previously under
    guerrilla control while conducting selective killings of civilians it
    alleged collaborated with guerrillas. The AUC increasingly tried to
    depict itself as an autonomous organization with a political agenda,
    although in practice it remained a mercenary vigilante force, financed
    by criminal activities and sectors of society that are targeted by
    guerrillas. Although some paramilitary groups reflect rural residents'
    desire to organize solely for selfdefense, most are vigilante
    organizations, and still others are actually the paid private armies of
    narcotics traffickers or large landowners. Popular support for these
    organizations grew as guerrilla violence increased in the face of a
    slowly evolving peace process. The Government continued to insist that
    paramilitary groups, like guerrillas, were an illegal force and
    increased efforts to apprehend paramilitary members; however, the
    public security forces' record in dealing with paramilitary groups
    remained mixed. In some locations the public security forces
    increasingly attacked and captured members of such groups; in others
    elements of these entities tolerated or even collaborated with
    paramilitary groups.
        The FARC and the ELN regularly attacked civilian populations,
    committed massacres and summary executions, and killed medical and
    religious personnel. The FARC continued its practice of using gas
    canisters as mortars to destroy small towns, indiscriminately wounding
    government officials and civilians in the process. Guerrillas were
    responsible for the majority of cases of forcible recruitment of
    indigenous people and of hundreds of children; they also were
    responsible for the majority of kidnapings. Guerrillas held more than
    1,000 kidnaped civilians, with ransom payments serving as an important
    source of revenue. Other kidnap victims were killed. At year's end, the
    FARC and ELN reportedly held 527 soldiers and police. In many places,
    guerrillas collected ``war taxes,'' forced members of the citizenry
    into their ranks, forced small farmers to grow illicit crops, and
    regulated travel, commerce, and other activities. In March the FARC
    announced ``Law 002,'' which demanded that anyone with assets of $1
    million pay taxes to the FARC or risk kidnaping. The FARC routinely
    committed abuses against citizens who resided in the despeje zone.
    Numerous credible sources reported cases of murder, rape, extortion,
    kidnaping, robbery, threats, detention, and the forced recruitment of
    adults and children, as well as impediments to free speech and fair
    trial and interference with religious practices.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political and
    extrajudicial killings continued to be a serious problem. An estimated
    4,000 citizens died in such acts, committed principally by nonstate
    agents. Members of the security forces continued to commit
    extrajudicial killings.
        An analysis of data from the Center for Investigations and Popular
    Research (CINEP), published by the Colombian Commission of Jurists (an
    NGO), indicated that there were 20 reports of extrajudicial killings
    attributable to state forces in the period from October 1999 to March,
    including deaths that resulted from police abuse of authority. However,
    the military claimed that six of the deaths resulted from
    confrontations with guerrillas; four alleged deaths (of which only one
    was confirmed) resulted from a panic when the army tear-gassed an
    indigenous protest (see Sections 2.b. and 5); and five were attributed
    by other groups to paramilitary forces. CINEP calculated 37 similar
    cases in 1999, which also included deaths that resulted from police
    abuse of authority. Most of the incidents cited by the Commission were
    under investigation by military and civilian authorities at year's end.
    The number of cases of military personnel accused of human rights
    violations who were tried in civilian courts increased. There were some
    reports that police and former security force members committed social
    cleansing killings.
        According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, there were 235
    massacres (defined as the simultaneous or nearly simultaneous killing
    of 3 or more persons outside of combat at a single location or at
    several nearby locations) during the first 6 months of the year. An
    estimated 1,073 persons were killed in these massacres; the Ministry of
    Defense attributed none of these deaths during this period to public
    security forces. The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police
    reported 1,286 persons killed in 216 massacres (defined as 4 or more
    persons killed in the same incident) during the year and attributed
    none of these massacres to security forces. The Ombudsman's office
    recorded 509 massacres in 1999, in which 2,262 persons were killed, and
    attributed 20 killings to public security forces.
        On August 15, an army unit mistakenly killed 6 children; the
    Prosecutor General's office determined that the act was unintentional
    harm caused in the course of duty and referred the case to the military
    justice system (see Section 1.g.).
        The human rights delegate of the Attorney General's office, which
    oversees the performance of all public sector employees, received 201
    complaints and cases during the first 6 months of the year and
    concluded 26 disciplinary investigations. Among the complaints were 20
    complaints of massacres. The Attorney General's office received 78
    complaints related to massacres and forced disappearances during the
    year. Approximately 75 percent of these complaints involved the army
    (particularly in Putumayo, Antioquia, and southern Bolivar
    departments); the other 25 percent implicated police or DAS officials.
    During the year, the Attorney General's office concluded 13
    investigations of massacres and forced disappearances attributed to
    state agents and sanctioned 50 members of the security forces
    (including 10 members of the National Police, 35 members of the army,
    and 5 members of the DAS). The office exonerated 20 accused persons.
    Contrary to previous years, the office referred all cases involving
    human rights violations to the Prosecutor General for criminal
    investigation. Five generals were under investigation by the Attorney
    General during the year for failure to prevent paramilitary massacres
    in 1998 and 1999.
        At year's end, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
    office reported that it had approximately 918 open investigations of
    human rights violations, in which 1,379 individuals are under
    investigation. This number includes 286 members of the military and
    police, 573 presumed members of paramilitary groups, 353 presumed
    guerrillas, and 187 other civilians. The unit arrested 302 persons
    during the first 6 months of the year, and other state entities
    arrested a further 70 persons against whom the unit had cases. As of
    November, another 676 arrest warrants for persons against whom the unit
    had cases remained outstanding, of which 37 are for military personnel,
    20 are for police, and 3 are for members of the DAS. The authorities
    detained 38 members of the army, 41 police, 5 members of the DAS, and 5
    members of the CTI during the year.
        The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police announced that
    25,660 murders occurred during the year, compared with 24,358 murders
    in 1999. The press reported that on average one person was killed every
    20 minutes. The police and the Prosecutor General's office have
    insufficient resources to investigate most killings adequately. The
    Superior Judicial Council estimated based on a 1997 survey that 63
    percent of crimes go unreported and that 40 percent of all reported
    crimes go unpunished.
        According to a March report by the Ministry of Defense, during the
    first half of the year, the military judiciary convicted and sentenced
    206 members of the National Police, army, and navy for serious offenses
    that the Ministry identified as violations of human rights: homicide,
    bodily injuries, rape, attempted murder, illegal detention, and abuse
    of authority. Of the total of 206 convictions, 66 were for homicide and
    113 were for bodily injuries. The average sentences issued in 1998 were
    58 months' imprisonment for homicide and 15 months' imprisonment for
    bodily injuries, although sentences ranged from 2 years to 64 years for
    homicide, and 2 months to 2 years for bodily injuries. The military
    judiciary convicted and sentenced 206 persons for serious crimes in
    1999. The civilian Criminal Procedure Code authorizes restriction to a
    military base as an acceptable substitute for imprisonment when
    military jails or prisons are unavailable.
        In August 1997, the Constitutional Court more narrowly defined the
    constitutional provision that crimes by state agents unrelated to
    ``acts of service'' must be tried in civilian courts (see Section
    1.e.). Since then the military judiciary has turned 1,307 cases, of
    which an estimated 41 percent are for possible human rights violations,
    over to the civilian judiciary for investigation and possible
    prosecution, including cases involving high-ranking officers. During
    the year, the military judiciary turned 496 cases over to the civilian
    judiciary, compared with 79 cases in 1999 and 266 cases in 1998. The
    new Military Penal Code reiterates that the crimes of forced
    disappearance, torture, and genocide must be tried in civilian courts.
    President Pastrana reaffirmed these new legal norms in an August
    directive sent to the military high command and the commander of the
    National Police (see Section 1.e.).
        Prosecution continued in civilian courts against army Major David
    Hernandez, Captain Diego Fino Rodriguez, Sergeant Edgardo Varon, and
    Privates Carlos Escudero, Ferney Cardona, and Raul Gallego, members of
    the Fourth counter-guerrilla battalion (Fourth Brigade), for the March
    1999 murder of Antioquia peace commissioner (and former Vice Minister
    for Youth) Alex Lopera and two other persons. However, in March Captain
    Fino escaped military detention; four soldiers are under investigation
    for complicity in his escape. Major Hernandez had escaped in June 1999
    and was still at large at year's end. Following Fino's escape, the
    military announced that all military detainees would be transferred to
    the military stockade at Tolemaida to prevent further escapes; however,
    it was not clear that this was implemented in all cases.
        On April 1, the Attorney General's office publicly stated that it
    had found insufficient evidence to bring charges against retired army
    Colonel Jorge Plazas Acevedo, former chief of intelligence of the
    army's 13th Brigade, for the October 1998 kidnaping and later murder of
    Jewish business leader Benjamin Khoudari. The Attorney General's office
    announced that it was dropping its administrative investigation and
    publicly asked the Prosecutor General's office to drop its criminal
    investigation. However, the Prosecutor General's office continued its
    prosecution of Colonel Plazas and civilians Jhon Alexis Olarte Briceno
    and Guillermo Lozano Guerrero, who were on trial at year's end. The
    Prosecutor General's office has 11 other arrest warrants pending in the
    case; 1 lieutenant was ruled out as a suspect.
        During the year, the Attorney General sanctioned eight service
    members in connection with the May 1998 Barrancabermeja massacre, of
    which three--army Captain Oswaldo Prada Escobar, Lieutenant Enrique
    Daza and Second Lieutenant Hector Guzman Santos--were discharged. A
    police lieutenant colonel, captain, and lieutenant, as well as two DAS
    agents were suspended. On July 12, Elizabeth Canas Cano, a key
    eyewitness to the massacre, was killed by two unidentified gunmen. In
    May the Prosecutor General's office ordered the preventive detention of
    four paramilitary suspects in the case; the investigation was still in
    progress at year's end. The Attorney General's office also was
    conducting an inquiry into the death of Canas.
        In December the Attorney General's office charged 17 police and 9
    army officials with collusion with paramilitary groups in approximately
    160 social cleansing murders by members of paramilitary groups in
    northeastern Antioquia (near the communities of La Ceja, Guarne, and El
    Penon) during 199598. The Attorney General also charged two municipal
    officials with omission. The Prosecutor General's office pressed
    criminal charges against 3 of the 26 officials charged by the Attorney
    General; police Captain Luis Alfredo Castillo Suarez Juan Carlos
    Valencia Arbalaez and Carlos Mario Tejada Gallego were on trial in
    Medellin at year's end. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Maria Clavijo
    Clavijo, Staff Sergeant Javier Gomez Herran, and soldier Carlos Mario
    Escudero are under investigation in the killings. Clavijo was arrested,
    suspended from duty, and placed in military detention on March 17.
    Although the army challenged jurisdiction, arguing Clavijo's actions
    were related to acts of service, the CSJ ruled that the case should be
    tried in civilian court.
        On March 3, the ongoing civilian prosecution of retired Colonel
    Bernardo Ruiz Silva, former commander of the army's now disbanded 20th
    Brigade (military intelligence), for allegedly organizing the November
    1995 Bogota killing of Conservative Party opposition leader Alvaro
    Gomez Hurtado suffered a major setback when key witness Luis Eduardo
    Rodriguez Cuadrado retracted his previous testimony before a Bogota
    judge. However, the testimony of another key witness helped the
    prosecution. The trial continued at year's end. Also on trial are army
    intelligence agents Henry Berrio Loaiza and Carlos Gaona Ovalle,
    retired army warrant officers Omar Berrio Loaiza and Franklin Gaona
    Ovalle, and civilian accused killers Hector Paul Florez Martinez,
    Manuel Mariano Montero Perez, Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo Giraldo, and
    Hermes Ortiz Duran.
        In 1999 the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
    formally indicted marine Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla, then-
    commander of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion, as well as marine
    Corporals Javier Fernando Guerra, Eduardo Aristides Alvarez, and Jose
    Milton Caicedo for the 1995 social cleansing killings of alleged
    thieves Sifredy and Fredy Arboleda. On May 25, the Prosecutor General
    ordered the detention of marine Sergeant Francisco Duarte Zuniga, who
    was still at large at year's end. A disciplinary investigation by the
    Attorney General was still underway at year's end.
        In October 1998, the Attorney General's office severely reprimanded
    marine Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo Alfonso Quinones, along with 4
    others, for colluding with paramilitary groups in the murders of at
    least 50 persons in Barrancabermeja, Santander department, in 1992-94,
    although he was exonerated by a military tribunal in 1994. Quinones
    appealed the reprimand, but Attorney General Jaime Bernal recused
    himself from the case, and Congress never appointed anyone else to
    adjudicate the matter. The statute of limitations on the case expired
    during the year, leaving the reprimand standing. During the year,
    Quinones was promoted to brigadier general.
        In July 1999, the Prosecutor General's office indicted paramilitary
    Nicolas Antonio Gomez Zapata for participation in the January 1994 ``La
    Chinita'' massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 35 persons. Among
    the 50 service members sanctioned by the Attorney General during the
    year were persons accused of involvement in this massacre. No progress
    has been reported in the Prosecutor General's case.
        At year's end, three army noncommissioned officers sought in
    connection with the April 1991 massacre of bus passengers at Los Uvos
    remained at large.
        In August a civilian court absolved retired army Colonel Hernando
    Navas of involvement in the November 1988 Nuevo Segovia massacre in
    which over 100 persons were killed or wounded. The authorities have
    charged 8 military officials, 1 police officer, and 10 civilians in the
    case. Among these, Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Londono Tamayo and
    Lieutenant Colonel Marco Baez Garzon continued to appeal civilian court
    convictions related to the massacre. Londono remained in detention, but
    was still on active duty, although he has been deprived of command
    responsibilities. Baez Garzon also was deprived of command
    responsibility and remained in military custody in Bogota.
        On June 29, the Constitutional Court instructed the CSJ to
    reconsider its 1996 decision referring the case of the 1987 forced
    disappearance, torture, and death of a member of the M-19 guerrilla
    group, Nydia Bautista, by accused retired General Alvaro Velandia
    Hurtado to military courts. Upon the stipulated review, the CSJ
    reversed itself and assigned jurisdiction to the civilian courts at the
    end of July, pointing out that the acts were not related directly to
    military service. The Prosecutor General's office continued its
    investigation.
        There was no information available regarding the pending trial of
    Lieutenant Colonel Jose Vincente Perez Berrocal for the 1987 killing of
    a Liberal mayor.
        No motives or suspects have been identified in the September 1998
    killing of Congressman Jorge Humberto Gonzalez. The investigation
    remained open at year's end.
        Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups,
    including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by
    members of the public security forces, in particular the army,
    continued. Evidence suggests that there were tacit arrangements between
    local military commanders and paramilitary groups in some regions, and
    paramilitary forces operated freely in some areas that were under
    military control or despite a significant military presence. Individual
    members of the security forces actively collaborated with members of
    paramilitary groups--passing them through roadblocks, sharing
    intelligence, providing them with ammunition, and allegedly even
    joining their ranks while off-duty.
        The military high command, under the leadership of Defense Minister
    Luis Fernando Ramirez and General Fernando Tapias, stated repeatedly
    that it would not tolerate collaboration between military personnel and
    paramilitary groups and that the army would combat paramilitary groups;
    however, security force actions in the field were not always consistent
    with the leadership's positions. Credible reports persisted of
    paramilitary installations and roadblocks near military bases; of
    contacts between paramilitary and military members; of paramilitary
    roadblocks unchallenged by military forces; and of military failure to
    respond to warnings of impending paramilitary massacres or selective
    killings. Military entities often cited lack of information or
    resources to explain this situation. Impunity for military personnel
    who collaborated with members of paramilitary groups remained common.
        In September the President signed military decrees that allowed for
    the dismissal of members of the public security forces who were
    complicit in paramilitary or other illegal activities; government
    agencies actively investigated allegations of collaboration or
    complicity with paramilitary groups by members of the security forces.
    A total of 388 members of the military were dismissed in October;
    however, it was not known how many of these were dismissed for
    collaborating with paramilitary groups in such abuses (see Section
    1.e.).
        Both the Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU),
    the largest of the seven major paramilitary organizations of the AUC
    umbrella group, and the army's Fourth Brigade claimed responsibility,
    but in different circumstances, for the January 23 killings of two
    long-demobilized guerrillas. The ACCU claimed that it killed Uberney
    Giraldo and Jose Evelio Gallo, both leaders of the Socialist Renewal
    Current (CRS), and two others after abducting them from the village of
    San Antonio, Antioquia department. On January 24, the army's Fourth
    Brigade announced that it had killed two ``ELN guerrillas'' in combat,
    but civilian autopsies identified them as the two missing CRS leaders.
    On January 26, gunmen stole the bodies from the morgue but left the
    autopsy reports behind. At year's end, investigations by the Attorney
    General's office and the Prosecutor General's office were underway.
        On February 19-20, a large group of AUC paramilitary attackers
    killed an estimated 37 persons whom they suspected of being guerrillas
    or guerrilla sympathizers at El Salado, Bolivar department. The navy
    reportedly set up a roadblock shortly after the killings began, which
    prevented human rights and relief groups from entering; some groups
    accepted the navy's explanation that access was not possible due to
    fighting in the area. The Ministry of Defense denied charges that the
    navy blocked NGO's from entering or colluded with paramilitary forces,
    and an investigation by the Prosecutor General was underway at year's
    end. A military investigation did not find any substantiation for these
    charges.
        The paramilitary group reportedly had been in the town since
    February 16, and had a list of names of persons they suspected of being
    guerrilla supporters. The victims included a 6-year-old girl and an
    elderly woman, and some victims were tortured or raped. The attackers
    also burned several homes. On February 19, the paramilitary group flew
    in a helicopter to rescue an injured member. According to Human Rights
    Watch, 30 minutes after the paramilitary forces withdrew, government
    forces entered the town.
        On February 22, members of the 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion
    captured 11 members of the paramilitary group suspected of
    participating in the El Salado massacre, killed 2 of them, and downed a
    paramilitary helicopter. According to NGO's and press reports, the
    massacre at El Salado and a February 15-16 paramilitary massacre at
    nearby Las Ovejas, Sucre department, displaced approximately 3,000
    persons. By year's end, 16 paramilitary suspects were under arrest, and
    the Prosecutor General's investigation into the paramilitary group's
    responsibility for the massacre was concluded.
        Members of the San Jose de Apartado ``peace community'' in Uraba
    region, Antioquia department, as well as NGO's, accused the 17th
    Brigade of involvement in 2 paramilitary massacres in February and July
    in which 11 persons were killed. On February 19, unidentified
    perpetrators widely believed to be members of the ACCU paramilitary
    group attacked San Jose de Apartado. They selectively killed five
    persons, and wounded three others. There were reports that the men wore
    the insignia of the 17th Brigade on their uniforms and that army troops
    were seen on the outskirts of the city several hours before the
    massacre. On July 8, approximately 20 paramilitary assailants murdered
    6 peasants in La Union, part of San Jose de Apartado. The attackers
    reportedly gave the citizens 20 days to leave the town. NGO's alleged
    that the 17th Brigade was complicit in both attacks and that army
    members were near La Union prior to the July 8 attack. There were
    allegations that a military helicopter hovered over La Union during the
    massacre; however, these allegations were never confirmed. The military
    investigation rebutted the charges. The Prosecutor General was
    investigating both incidents at year's end. There were at least two
    visits during the year by joint commissions of inquiry including
    representatives from the Prosecutor General's office, the Human Rights
    Ombudsman's office, and international NGO's. Human rights NGO's and
    members of the peace community of San Jose de Apartado reported 11
    additional deaths in separate incidents during the year, half of which
    they attributed to paramilitary forces. They also reported frequent
    paramilitary roadblocks, intimidation, theft, and the restriction of
    incoming food supplies.
        In February Human Rights Watch issued a report that stated that the
    army maintains close operational ties to paramilitary groups. The
    report highlighted incidents of collaboration by officers of the army's
    Third, Fourth, and 13th Brigades. It stated that according to evidence
    from government investigators, the army's Third Brigade based in Cali
    provided weapons and intelligence to the paramilitary ``Calima Front.''
    The report also detailed ties between the army's Fourth Brigade and
    paramilitary groups and ties between the 13th Brigade (intelligence)
    and paramilitary groups. The report also detailed threats received by
    various government agents while they investigated these ties.
        Vice President Gustavo Bell responded to the Human Rights Watch
    report and said that while the Government has never denied residual
    ties between individual members of the public security forces and
    paramilitary groups, it has moved to break those ties and punish those
    responsible. Bell said that the suggestion that there was a
    ``deliberate, institutional will to help and support'' paramilitary
    groups was untrue. Bell noted that much of the information in the
    report came from the Prosecutor General's office, demonstrating that
    the Government was investigating military crimes.
        In March the Attorney General's office ordered that Vice First
    Sergeant Jose Maria Cifuentes Tovar, of the 45th Battalion, be removed
    from the army for having failed to obey orders to install a roadblock
    to prevent the escape of members of paramilitary groups from
    Barrancabermeja following a February 1999 massacre that left nine
    persons dead. On March 18, 1999, police arrested paramilitary leader
    Mario James Mejia (``el Panadero'') for killing a taxi driver; he then
    was charged in Bogota with leading the February 1999 Barrancabermeja
    massacre and was still under investigation at year's end. Pedro Mateo
    Hurtado Moreno and three other paramilitary suspects in the massacre
    remained at large at year's end. Politically motivated killings and
    related unrest continued in Barrancabermeja at a very high rate
    throughout the year.
        In March the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
    ordered the detention of army Captain Luis Fernando Campusano Vasquez
    and sought the capture of 15 other civilians, including Carlos Castano,
    who remained at large. They are suspected of being affiliated with area
    units that collaborated with a 300person paramilitary group based at
    Vetas, Norte de Santander department, which committed 15 massacres in
    and around the towns of La Gabarra and Tibu between May 29 and
    September 1, 1999. More than 145 persons whom the attackers claimed
    were guerrillas or guerrilla supporters were killed. Nearby elements of
    the army's 46th counterguerrilla battalion (Tibu) and Fifth mechanized
    group (Cucuta), as well as police, did not intervene.
        In July the Attorney General announced an investigation into
    retired army Brigadier General Alberto Bravo Silva, Colonel Roque
    Sanchez, and three other army officers for failing to prevent a
    paramilitary massacre of 27 persons in August 1999 in La Gabarra. The
    investigation was still in progress at year's end. Bravo retired in
    August 1999 on the orders of President Pastrana. Two of the three army
    officers are still members of the public security forces. Colonel
    Sanchez, the regional police commander at the time of the killings, was
    on trial at year's end. In October the Attorney General's office also
    charged Colonel Sanchez. On May 3, the Prosecutor General's office
    formally charged AUC paramilitary chief Carlos Castano with
    masterminding the May 29 and August 21 La Gabarra massacres in 1999.
        In March the Prosecutor General issued formal indictments against
    eight security force members, including Tibu military base Commander
    Mauricio Llorente Chavez, for complicity in a paramilitary massacre
    that took place in Tibu in July 1999. Five members of the police were
    charged in May and subsequently were arrested. On June 20, the
    Prosecutor General's office arrested six members of the National
    Police--Arturo Velandia, Luis Toloza, Miguel Hernandez, Alfonso Ortiz,
    Gustavo Lobo, and Jose Ordonez.
        In April 1999, President Pastrana formally retired from service
    Brigadier Generals Fernando Millan Perez and Rito Alejo del Rio; both
    had links to paramilitary groups. The Government stated only that it
    ``was no longer convenient'' for them to continue their military
    service. The military judiciary announced no new developments during
    the year in its ongoing investigation of General Millan regarding
    allegations that he armed and equipped a paramilitary group in Lebrija,
    Santander department, in 1997. The group was believed responsible for
    at least 11 killings. In October 1998, the Superior Judicial Council
    had determined that Millan's alleged actions constituted an act of
    service and turned the case over to the military judiciary for
    prosecution, effectively cutting off the prosecutor's investigation.
    Millan had denied the charges. In June 1999, the Attorney General's
    office opened a disciplinary investigation of Millan, which still was
    in progress at year's end.
        At year's end, General del Rio, former commander of the 13th
    Brigade, remained under preliminary investigation by the human rights
    unit of the Prosecutor General's office for allegedly establishing
    illegal paramilitary groups in Medellin in 1987, and in Uraba in 1996.
    General Del Rio is also under preliminary investigation by the Attorney
    General's office.
        On July 27, the Attorney General's office formally charged five
    army officers, including four generals, for failing to protect the
    residents of Puerto Alvira, Meta department, when paramilitary forces
    killed 19 persons in May 1998, despite repeated requests by the Human
    Rights Ombudsman. The five charged are former commanders of the army's
    Fourth Division, retired General Augustin Ardila Uribe and General
    Jaime Humberto Cortes Parada (the army's Inspector General); former
    commander of the 7th Brigade, retired Brigadier General Jaime Humberto
    Uscategui; commander of the 2nd Brigade, General Fredy Padilla de Leon
    (former head of the Seventh Brigade); and commander of the ``Joaquin
    Paris'' battalion, Colonel Gustavo Sanchez Gutierrez. Those involved
    denied the charges. The Attorney General's investigation was still in
    progress at year's end. In June a first instance military court
    recommended closing the investigation of the case; the Superior
    Military Tribunal was considering this recommendation at year's end. At
    year's end, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
    had detained three members of paramilitary groups and had outstanding
    arrest warrants for five more, including brothers Carlos and Fidel
    Castano.
        In August air force Commander Hector Fabio Velasco called for the
    renewed detention and a first instance hearing of Brigadier General
    Jaime Uscategui and Lieutenant Colonel Hernan Orozco in connection with
    the July 1997 AUC paramilitary massacre of dozens of persons at
    Mapiripan, Meta department. Army Commander General Jorge Mora had
    recused himself from Uscategui's case due to personal ties and was
    replaced by Velasco. A military tribunal was still considering the
    issue at year's end. In May 1999, Uscategui was arrested on civilian
    charges connected with the case, but in August 1999, the CSJ had ruled
    that the case should be tried in the military courts. Uscategui was
    released after 180 days when the military investigation produced no
    action, although the investigation continued. Early in 1999, Uscategui
    sought to retire from the military effective in January; however, his
    effort was thwarted by the Attorney General, who ordered Uscategui
    dismissed from the military in November 1999 for dereliction of duty in
    the October 1997 judicial convoy massacre in San Juan de Arama, Meta
    department. A military trial of Brigadier General Uscategui and
    Lieutenant Colonel Orozco still was in progress at year's end.
        In August 1999, the CSJ had sent the cases of all other defendants
    in the Mapiripan case to the civilian courts for action, including
    charges against Lieutenant Colonel Lino Hernando Sanchez Prada for
    facilitating the massacre, which was determined not to be an act of
    service. As of February 29, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit
    had completed its investigations of Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez and the
    five other defendants (two noncommissioned officers and three
    commercial pilots) in the civilian judiciary. In November the
    Prosecutor General indicted in a separate process Lieutenant Colonel
    Sanchez, two army sergeants, and eight members of paramilitary groups
    (including two civilian pilots). All the cases were on trial by year's
    end. In addition to Sanchez, and the five other defendants, two more
    presumed paramilitary group members (who also were still in detention)
    were indicted in December.
        In May the Attorney General's office, which in 1999 formally had
    accused five officers, three noncommissioned officers, and five
    civilian officials of possible complicity or participation in the July
    1997 Mapiripan massacre, dropped the charges against and closed the
    investigation of Lieutenant Colonel Lino Sanchez Prada. The other cases
    remained under investigation at mid-year.
        The case of retired army Colonel Jose Ancizar Hincapie Betancurt
    for collaboration in 1993-94 with a paramilitary group that killed 10
    persons remained pending before civilian courts at year's end.
        In July Ivan Cepeda, the son of murdered Senator Manuel Cepeda
    Vargas, was forced to flee the country due to death threats that he
    suspected were a reaction to his activism in pursuing justice for his
    father's 1994 death. In testimony before the Senate, the Attorney
    General had stated that the Senator had been killed as the result of a
    joint operation between some senior army officers and members of
    paramilitary groups. In 1999 the Attorney General's office severely
    reprimanded army First Sergeant Justo Gil Zuniga Labrador and Vice
    First Sergeant Hernando Medina Camacho, then members of the army's 20th
    Brigade, for the killing of Senator Cepeda, who was the leader of the
    Patriotic Union (UP) party. The army discharged both men from service,
    and in December 1999 they each were sentenced to 43 years' imprisonment
    for their roles in Cepeda's murder.
        Paramilitary groups committed numerous extrajudicial killings,
    primarily in areas where they competed with guerrilla forces for
    control, and often in the absence of a strong government security force
    presence. The frequency of paramilitary massacres continued to increase
    significantly. Several major paramilitary campaigns during the year
    involved a series of orchestrated massacres in Uraba, Norte de
    Santander, and Barrancabermeja. At mid-year the Human Rights Ombudsman
    attributed 93 massacres, which claimed 512 victims, to paramilitary
    groups. In 1999 the office received 1,467 complaints against members of
    paramilitary groups. The Ministry of Defense attributed 52 percent of
    the estimated 1,073 deaths that occurred in the 235 massacres reported
    by the Human Rights Ombudsman's office during the first 6 months of the
    year. In December the Ministry of Defense reported that paramilitary
    forces killed 983 civilians in massacres during the year. The Colombian
    Commission of Jurists attributed 657 killings and 118 social cleansing
    killings to paramilitary groups in the period from October 1999 through
    March. Paramilitary activities also included kidnaping, intimidation,
    and the forced displacement of persons not directly involved in
    hostilities (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Paramilitary groups targeted
    teachers (see Section 2.a.), human rights activists (see Section 4),
    labor leaders (see Section 6.a.), community activists, national and
    local politicians (including President Pastrana), peasants, and other
    persons whom they accused of supporting or failing to confront
    guerrillas. Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups
    (see Section 5).
        AUC paramilitary groups were suspected of hundreds of selective
    killings throughout the country, especially in Choco, Santander, Valle
    del Cauca, and Antioquia departments. The FARC, the ELN, or both, had a
    strong presence in these areas as paramilitary forces vied with them
    for control of territory or resources, including coca cultivation.
    Paramilitary groups continued to kill political leaders and peace
    activists, including peace community leader Freddy Gallego, former
    Aguachica mayor and peace activist Luis Fernando Rincon, and former
    Cucuta mayor (and current mayoral candidate at the time of his death)
    Pauselino Camarga. Fourteen members of the CTI were killed during the
    year in various parts of the country. Both paramilitary forces and
    guerrillas were suspected of responsibility in these killings.
        Paramilitary massacres at Las Ovejas, Sucre department, and El
    Salado, Bolivar department, were part of an ongoing paramilitary effort
    to wrest control of the Montes de Maria region from guerrillas. On
    February 15-16, approximately 150 ACCU members staged attacks in 5
    neighborhoods of Las Ovejas. They killed at least 20 persons whom they
    suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers, burned dozens
    of homes, and displaced a large number of persons.
        On April 6, approximately 50 paramilitary attackers massacred 21
    men whom they suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla collaborators
    at Tibu, Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander department, in a
    continuation of a series of 15 massacres in the region in 1999.
        On May 11, a paramilitary group that identified itself as the
    ``Calima Front'' claimed responsibility for the killings of 12
    civilians in the village of Sabaletas, just outside Buenaventura, Valle
    del Cauca department. The group also claimed to have killed 14 other
    persons it suspected of being guerrillas in the same area. According to
    Human Rights Watch, the army's Third Brigade created and supports the
    Calima Front, which Human Rights Watch believes is responsible for at
    least 200 killings between July 1999 and July 2000, as well as the
    displacement of over 10,000 persons.
        In August the AUC paramilitary movement claimed that it had killed
    the leader and six members of the ``la Terraza'' gang of hired killers
    based in Medellin. The AUC was known to have contracted the gang to
    conduct killings.
        In a series of attacks on the night of November 22, paramilitary
    forces killed 15 fishermen in Nueva Venecia, in the region of La
    Cienaga de Santa Marta, Magdalena department, and kidnaped another 22
    persons whose bodies later were discovered. Human Rights Ombudsman
    Eduardo Cifuentes issued a December 14 resolution that reported that 45
    persons were killed and that 25 had disappeared, criticized slow
    government action to assist those displaced as a result of the
    incident, and called for immediate investigation of reports of a
    paramilitary base in the area. The Prosecutor General's office was
    investigating the 37 confirmed deaths at year's end.
        Other examples of paramilitary massacres included the killing of 7
    persons in Estados Unidos in January, the November killings of 15
    persons in Granada in the western part of the country, and the killing
    in November of 7 persons in Barrancabermeja.
        Investigations of past killings and massacres proceeded slowly. In
    many cases there was no progress in ongoing investigations. Progress
    during the year included the issuance of warrants of arrest for five
    suspects involved in murder and extortion as members of the El Corral
    Convivir (self-defense group) in 1991 in Arauca department. Other
    members of paramilitary groups investigated and indicted included Luis
    Arnulfo Tuberquias, who was linked to kidnaping and theft on behalf of
    such groups; among those captured were Jose Luis Hernandez and Ruben
    Isaza, nephew and son respectively of paramilitary leader Ramon Isaza,
    and Dario Zapata Hernandez, allegedly the second in command of the AUC
    in the Puerto Boyaca area, Caldas department.
        On May 3, the Prosecutor General's office formally charged AUC
    paramilitary leader Carlos Castano with the August 1999 killing of
    renowned journalist, political comedian, and peace and human rights
    activist Jaime Garzon Forero in Bogota. On January 13, members of the
    CTI captured La Terraza gang member Juan Pablo Ortiz Agudelo in
    Medellin on suspicion of having been the gunman in the attack against
    Garzon. Ortiz remained in detention in Bogota at year's end. In
    December a group of men claiming to represent the ``La Terraza''
    criminal organization said publicly that they were hired by Castano to
    kill Jaime Garzon and human rights activists Elsa Alvarado, Mario
    Calderon, Jesus Maria Valle, and Eduardo Umana Mendoza. They offered to
    turn themselves in and provide proof of Castano's involvement in return
    for security guarantees from the Government. There was no public
    response from the authorities by year's end.
        In December 1999, Spain complied with a government request and
    extradited paramilitary Lubin de Jesus Morales Orozco, who was arrested
    in Madrid in June 1999 on unrelated charges, for the April 1998 killing
    of Eduardo Umana Mendoza, perhaps the country's best-known and most
    controversial human rights lawyer. Five persons, including Morales,
    remained in detention and were on trial in a civilian court at year's
    end.
        On June 14, the trial of 10 persons suspected of the February 1998
    killing of human rights activist Jesus Maria Valle began in Medellin.
    Valle was the president of the Antioquia Permanent Committee for the
    Defense of Human Rights. Charges were brought against suspected killers
    Jorge Eliecer Rodriguez Guzman, Alvaro Goez Meza, Gilma Patricia
    Gaviria Palacios, Elkin Dario Granada Lopez, Alexander Vallejo
    Echeverry, and Carlos Alberto Bedoya Marulanda for direct participation
    in the crime. In August 1999, the Prosecutor General's office issued
    arrest warrants for AUC paramilitary leader Carlos Castano and Juan
    Carlos Gonzalez Jaramillo for planning the crime. Castano was indicted
    in September 1998 for the killing. According to press reports, the
    first police agent on the case was killed soon afterward; the
    prosecutor fled the country; and another investigator was killed in
    September 1999.
        On November 22, a Bogota judge convicted paramilitary Juan Carlos
    Gonzalez Jaramillo (alias ``El Colorado'') and Walter Jose Alvarez
    Rivera in the May 1997 murders of two CINEP workers, Mario Calderon and
    Elsa Alvarado, as well as Alvarado's father, Carlos Alvarado. Jaramillo
    was sentenced to 60 years in prison, and Alvarez Rivera was sentenced
    to 45 years. The judge determined that soccer magnate Gustavo Adolfo
    Upegui Lopez was not implicated in the murders but ordered a review of
    evidence presented during the CINEP trial that connected Upegui with
    paramilitary groups. Upegui remained under arrest in Medellin on
    separate charges at year's end. The judge also convicted two other men
    connected to the case for the illegal use of telecommunications
    equipment and exonerated two other men accused of organizing the
    murders. An arrest warrant for paramilitary leader Carlos Castano in
    connection with this case remains outstanding.
        Accused paramilitary Ivan Urdinola Grajales remained detained in
    connection with the 1989-90 ``Trujillo I'' massacres in Valle
    department, and also is implicated in the 1994 ``Trujillo II''
    massacre. Prosecutors also have an outstanding warrant for the
    detention of one other paramilitary member in the Trujillo I case. In
    May a court upheld charges against paramilitary Norberto Morales
    Ledesma for involvement in the Trujillo II massacre. Paramilitary
    member Reynel Gomez Correa, detained in 1999 in connection with
    Trujillo II, was murdered in prison in December, before he could be
    brought to trial. Two other members of paramilitary groups implicated
    in both Trujillo I and Trujillo II remain at large. One such person has
    been detained, and another is being sought in the Trujillo I massacre.
    One paramilitary member has been convicted and another detained for the
    1994 Trujillo II massacre. Investigations continue in both cases.
        In July the superior court of Cundinamarca department exonerated
    Jose Tellez and his wife Nancy Lozano, who were accused of
    participating in the 1989 killing of Liberal presidential candidate
    Luis Carlos Galan. Another suspect, Alberto Hubiz Hazbun, who was
    accused of planning the crime, was absolved in 1993. The only person to
    have been convicted of the crime is John Jairo Velazquez Vasquez, who
    was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 1997.
        No suspects have been identified in the September 1999 killing of
    academic and peace activist Jesus Bejarano.
        There was no information available on the investigation into the
    May 1998 killing of former Defense Minister General Fernando Landazabal
    Reyes.
        While an estimated 507 members of paramilitary groups were believed
    to be in jail at year's end, known paramilitary leaders largely
    remained beyond the reach of the law. Government figures indicated that
    from 1997 through October 2000, 934 members of paramilitary groups have
    been captured, and 150 members have been killed. The Ministry of
    Defense reported that during the year the security forces killed 89
    members of paramilitary groups and captured 315 members. In 1999 the
    army reported that it killed 26 members of paramilitary groups and
    captured 102 during that year.
        Paramilitary forces killed members of indigenous groups (see
    Section 5) and members of trade unions (see Section 6.a.).
        The guerrillas of the FARC, the ELN, and the People's Liberation
    Army (EPL) continued to commit killings, often targeting noncombatants
    in a manner similar to that of paramilitary groups. The Colombian
    Commission of Jurists reported that guerrillas were responsible for 236
    political killings in the period of October 1999 through March. The
    Ministry of Defense attributed 880 civilian deaths in massacres to
    guerrillas during the year. The Human Rights Ombudsman attributed 22
    massacres to the FARC during the first 6 months of the year and 9
    massacres to the ELN. The Ombudsman also attributed 89 killings to the
    FARC and 31 killings to the ELN during the first 6 months of the year.
    Local elected officials and candidates for public office, teachers,
    civic leaders, business owners, and peasants opposed to their political
    or military activities were common targets. The Federation of Colombian
    Municipalities reported that 17 mayors were killed during the year;
    guerrillas were the principal suspects (see Section 3). For example, in
    November unknown gunmen killed Carlos Julio Rosas, mayor of Orito,
    Putumayo department. In addition, in the run-up to the October
    municipal elections, 19 mayoral candidates were killed. Police and
    military personnel were targeted for selective and combat killings (see
    Section 1.g.). Guerrilla groups also killed religious leaders (see
    Section 2.c.), members of indigenous groups (see Section 5), and labor
    leaders (see Section 6.a.). Some communities controlled by guerrillas
    also experienced social cleansing killings of criminal or other
    ``undesirable'' elements. Guerrilla campaigns around the demilitarized
    area, in the Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and southern departments
    often involved significant civilian casualties and prompted significant
    displacements (see Section 1.g.).
        According to military statistics, FARC and ELN guerrillas killed as
    many as 200 children during the year (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
        The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office reported
    in November that it is conducting ongoing investigations into the
    detention, disappearance, and deaths of 92 off-duty army personnel.
    Police suspected 22nd FARC front commander ``Geovanni'' of ordering the
    February 27 killing of retired army General Crispiniano Quinones (a
    former commander of the 13th Brigade) by unidentified gunmen at La
    Vega, Cundinamarca department. According to the press, Geovanni and two
    other FARC members were killed shortly thereafter in a confrontation
    with police.
        On March 25 and 26, at least 21 police officers and 8 civilians
    (including the mayor of Vigia del Fuerte and 2 children) were killed
    when the FARC overran the twin towns of Vigia del Fuerte, Antioquia
    department, and Bellavista, Choco department. The FARC held captive at
    least seven more police officers. The FARC tortured many of the
    policemen before killing them outside of combat. In April the
    authorities issued an arrest warrant for FARC member Luis Fernando
    Zapata Hinestroza.
        In May six men who participated in roadblocks protesting a possible
    demilitarized zone for the ELN in southern Bolivar and Antioquia
    departments were killed in the Magdalena Medio region. The ELN was
    suspected of the killings.
        On May 7, FARC guerrillas attacked a public bus in Gigante, Huila
    department, with an explosive device; the driver lost control and hit a
    tree. FARC members shot at the occupants of the bus and burned the
    vehicle; four occupants were still inside when the bus was set on fire
    and are presumed dead.
        In June the FARC massacred at least 11 civilians at Nutibara,
    Antioquia department, and injured 15 other persons. The army's 14th
    Brigade responded to this and other FARC attacks, reportedly killing 14
    guerrillas.
        On July 10, in Huila department, two unidentified gunmen killed
    General Saulo Gil Ramirez, former Director of the National Police from
    1958-65. The press speculated that guerrillas were responsible for the
    killing.
        On July 1, 1 person was killed and approximately 40 were wounded
    when several explosive devices exploded at the El Valle police command
    in Cali. Authorities attributed the explosion to subversive groups. On
    the same day, ELN guerrillas attacked the police's Simon Bolivar
    Carabineer Academy in southwestern Cali.
        On July 14, the FARC entered the town of Roncesvalles in Tolima
    department and killed 13 policemen (see Section 1.g.).
        An August offensive by the FARC resulted in the deaths of more than
    20 civilians and military personnel.
        In August FARC guerrillas killed secretary general of Rio Blanco
    Milciades Luis Garabito after accusing him of paramilitary ties.
        According to press reports, also in August an ELN guerrilla squad
    tortured and killed eight residents of Sardinita, including one child
    and one teacher.
        In early October, the FARC attacked the remote village of Ortega
    and killed eight persons, including two women and two children. The
    guerrillas also burned 20 homes, a school, and a church.
        On October 18, guerrillas attacked Bagado and Dabeiba in the Choco
    department, killing 1 police officer; 17 were missing. Much of Bagado
    was destroyed.
        On November 23, suspected guerrillas killed 12 persons in Santander
    de Quilichao, Cauca department. At least some of the victims reportedly
    were linked to paramilitary groups. Two women were injured. Also on
    November 23, FARC guerrillas killed nine peasants suspected of
    collaborating with paramilitary groups in Antioquia department.
        Investigations into reported killings by FARC members within and on
    the periphery of the demilitarized zone continued. On December 29,
    congressional peace commission chairman Diego Turbay Cote, his mother
    councilwoman Ines Cote, and five other persons were killed in Caqueta
    department (near the FARC demilitarized zone). The killings placed the
    future of the peace process in doubt as the Prosecutor General, army,
    and police alleged that the FARC were responsible. There was no
    reported progress in the Prosecutor General's investigation into the
    May 1999 killings in Vereda Perlas Altas, Puerto Rico, Caqueta
    department. According to press reports, the FARC have executed
    approximately 20 residents in the despeje zone.
        Guerrillas killed citizens using bombs and artillery and continued
    their practice of using gas canisters to attack small towns, thereby
    killing civilians indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.).
        On May 1, FARC spokesman Raul Reyes said that a FARC
    ``revolutionary tribunal'' exonerated FARC eastern bloc commander
    German Briceno Suarez (``Grannobles'') of involvement in the March 1999
    killings of kidnaped American citizen indigenous activists Terence
    Freitas, Lahe'ena'e Gay, and Ingrid Washinawatok near Saravena, Arauca
    department. In July 1999, the Prosecutor General's office ordered the
    arrest of Briceno; army efforts to apprehend him and other FARC members
    accused of the crime had not been successful at year's end. Reyes said
    that investigations of other FARC members suspected of the killings
    would continue. In September the Prosecutor General's office sought to
    question Nelson Vargas Ruedas, a FARC guerrilla imprisoned in Bogota,
    for information about the crime. U'wa tribe member Gustavo Bocota
    Aguablanca, who also was indicted for the crime in December 1999, was
    still at large at year's end. The investigation of the case continued
    at year's end.
        In December a Medellin court ruled that Wilson Eusebio Garcia
    Ramirez, commander of the ELN's ``Carlos Alirio Buitrago'' front,
    should be tried in absentia for the September 1998 killings of CTI
    members Edilbrando Roa Lopez and John Morales Patino at Mesopotamia,
    Antioquia. The two had been investigating a 1998 massacre of nine
    persons at the nearby town of Sonson.
        At year's end, the authorities had not yet captured two members of
    the FARC's 32nd Front, including Arley Leal and Milton de Jesus Tonal
    Redondo (``Joaquin Gomez'' or ``Usurriaga''), head of the FARC's
    southern bloc, in connection with the September 1998 murder of Father
    Alcides Jimenez in Putumayo.
        The Ministry of Defense reported that security forces killed 970
    guerrillas and captured 1,556 guerrillas during the year. The
    Prosecutor General's office reported that at year's end, it had open
    investigations of 353 guerrillas, had 53 guerrillas in custody, and had
    252 warrants for the arrest of guerrilla leaders.
        Approximately 80 cases regarding Colombia were before the
    InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) at year's end. The
    great majority involved violations of the right to life. At year's end,
    the IACHR was expected to make a decision about whether to move a case
    involving paramilitary and military involvement in the 1996 killing of
    19 merchants to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
        The IACHR continued the process of trying to reach an amicable
    settlement of the Patriotic Union's 1996 complaint charging the
    Government with ``action or omission'' in what the UP termed
    ``political genocide'' of the UP and the Communist Party. As part of
    the process, since June the Government has provided protection through
    the Interior Ministry to surviving UP and Communist Party members.
    Despite these efforts, at least two UP members reportedly were killed
    during the year.
        There continued to be incidents of social cleansing--including
    attacks and killings--directed against individuals deemed socially
    undesirable, such as drug addicts, prostitutes, transvestites,
    homosexuals, beggars, and street children. The Colombian Commission of
    Jurists did not attribute any social cleansing killings to security
    forces during the period from October 1999 through March; it attributed
    118 social cleansing killings to paramilitary groups and 2 such
    killings during this period to the guerrillas.
        b. Disappearance.--The 1991 Constitution and the law explicitly
    prohibit ``forced disappearance;'' however, it continued to be a
    problem. On May 30, Congress codified forced disappearance, genocide,
    torture, and forced displacement as crimes, permitting such cases to be
    tried in the civilian judiciary. On July 6, President Pastrana signed
    the law, and it entered into effect immediately. Human rights activists
    noted that the final law did not include a draft article stipulating
    that the four crimes, as serious human rights violations, must be tried
    in the civilian, rather than the military judiciary, when military
    defendants are involved, according to a 1997 Constitutional Court
    decision. However, advocates of the bill noted that the reformed
    Military Penal Code, which entered into effect August 12, did include
    such a stipulation. More than 3,000 cases of forced disappearance have
    been reported formally to the authorities since 1977; very few have
    ever been resolved. Many of the victims disappeared in the course of
    various confrontations between armed groups or with the State. The
    great majority of victims of forced disappearance were never seen or
    heard from again.
        The Attorney General's office, which oversees the performance of
    all public sector employees, received 78 complaints related to
    massacres and forced disappearances during the year; approximately 75
    percent of these complaints involved the army (particularly in
    Putumayo, Antioquia and southern Bolivar departments); the other 25
    percent implicated police or DAS officials. A report of three persons
    who allegedly disappeared due to actions by the army has not been
    confirmed.
        There were no reported results from the trial in a civilian court
    of police Major Manuel de Jesus Lozada Plazas, the former deputy
    commander of the Government's elite antikidnaping squads known as the
    GAULA, at year's end. The authorities had suspended him from duty and
    placed him on half-pay following his arrest in March 1997. There also
    have been no results reported in the investigation into cooperation
    between these squads and illegal paramilitary groups.
        In May the Prosecutor General indicted retired Colonel Gonzalo Gil
    Rojas, former commander of the 20th Brigade, for responsibility in the
    1989 kidnaping of Amparo Tordecillo Trujillo, a former EPL member; in
    December the charges were dismissed. The Prosecutor General also
    indicted in absentia former 20th Brigade members retired Captain Mario
    Raul Rodriguez Reynoso and three noncommissioned officers; they
    remained at large at year's end.
        The law prohibits kidnaping; however, it remained an extremely
    serious problem. Reforms to the Penal Code enacted in June increased
    the minimum sentence for simple kidnaping from 6 to 8 years; the
    maximum is 20 years. Police figures for the year, corroborated by Free
    Country Foundation (Fundacion Pais Libre), registered 3,706 kidnapings
    during the year, compared with 3,201 in 1999. Paramilitary groups
    kidnaped 280 persons, while criminals kidnaped 371 persons and another
    944 persons were kidnaped by unknown persons or groups. Guerrilla
    groups were responsible for 2,104 cases. An estimated 164 minors were
    in captivity at year's end. GAULA members and other units of the
    security forces freed 507 persons during the year (including at least
    48 children); 285 of the rescued victims were held by the ELN, 82 by
    the FARC, 44 by the EPL (Popular Liberation Army), and the remaining 96
    by either paramilitary groups or common criminals. The GAULA reported
    that 173 people died in captivity during the year, a 33 percent
    increase over 1999. Arrests or prosecutions in any kidnaping cases were
    rare.
        The Colombian Commission of Jurists attributed 145 forced
    disappearances to paramilitaries in the period from October 1999
    through March. In many instances persons kidnaped by paramilitary
    groups later were found dead.
        On March 9, a paramilitary group led by Jhon Jairo Esquivel
    Cuadrado kidnaped seven members of the CTI at Minguillo, Cesar
    department. Esquivel was captured in July and remained detained pending
    formal charges at year's end. There were no indications that the
    abducted investigators were still alive.
        In May paramilitary forces kidnaped and raped journalist Jineth
    Bedoya (see Section 2.a.).
        On June 19, Carlos Castano's AUC paramilitary group kidnaped
    Antioquia Deputy Guillermo Leon Valencia Cossio, brother of the
    Government's negotiator in the peace process with the FARC, Fabio
    Valencia Cossio, but released him on June 23.
        In October the AUC paramilitary group kidnaped seven members of
    Congress, including former Senate President Miguel Pineda and Zulema
    Jattin, a member of a congressional peace commission, and demanded that
    the AUC be consulted in the peace process. The Government refused to
    open discussions with the AUC, but Interior Minister Humberto de la
    Calle negotiated the hostages' release with Castano.
        Kidnaping continued to be an unambiguous, standing policy and major
    source of revenue for both the FARC and ELN. In April the FARC
    announced ``Law 002,'' which required persons with more than $1 million
    in assets to volunteer payment to the FARC or risk detention. According
    to Pais Libre, politicians, cattlemen, children, and businessmen were
    guerrillas' preferred victims. The FARC often purchased victims
    kidnaped by common criminals; the FARC then negotiated ransom payments
    with the family.
        On March 22, the FARC kidnaped 9-year-old Clara Oliva Pantoja and
    did not release her until December 19. On April 7, the FARC kidnaped 3-
    year-old Andres Felipe Navas; he had not been released by year's end.
    Both children reportedly were held in the FARC demilitarized zone.
    Several released kidnaped victims claim that the FARC is holding more
    than 200 persons in the despeje zone.
        In March the ELN kidnaped 25 electrical company workers at Guatape,
    Antioquia. The kidnapings were part of the ELN's campaign against the
    country's civilian electrical infrastructure.
        On September 17, the ELN kidnaped over 50 patrons of Cali
    restaurants. Roughly a dozen were released within a few days. After
    combined negotiation and military pressure, the remaining survivors
    were released by November, although three had died while in captivity
    due to illness after lengthy forced marches while the kidnapers
    attempted to evade the army. Over the objections of the army commander
    in charge of rescue, the Government allowed the captors to remain free
    in return for release of the remaining hostages. Brigadier General
    Jaime Canal Alban, commander of the 3rd Brigade, resigned to express
    his disagreement with the Government's decision.
        On November 28, unknown assailants kidnaped 18-year-old Juliana
    Villegas, daughter of the head of the National Association of
    Industrialists, a strong supporter of the peace process; guerrillas
    were suspected.
        Guerrillas continued to kidnap political leaders. For example, in
    October the FARC kidnaped a gubernatorial candidate in northern Choco
    department, Senator Juan Mesa, and Antioquia assemblyman Alvaro
    Velasquez. The Federation of Colombian Municipalities reported that at
    least 20 mayors were kidnaped during the year, nearly all by guerrilla
    groups. Many more unreported kidnapings of short duration may have been
    carried out. In response to this situation, some rural mayors fled to
    major cities, where they continued to conduct municipal business via
    telephone and facsimile. Guerrillas also kidnaped journalists (see
    Section 2.a.).
        The FARC, the ELN, and other guerrilla groups regularly kidnaped
    foreign citizens throughout the year; some were released after weeks or
    months of captivity. For example, in July a representative of Doctors
    without Borders was kidnaped by a fringe guerrilla group and had not
    been heard from at year's end. In August the ELN captured and held 26
    university professors and students, including several foreigners, for
    several days before releasing the group.
        On April 8, the DAS captured ELN leader Ovidio Antonio Parra
    Cortes, who had been sought for his role in directing the May 1999
    kidnaping of 174 persons from Cali's La Maria Catholic Church. The
    army's Third Brigade also arrested seven men believed to have helped
    carry out the La Maria hostage-taking.
        By year's end, all of the 41 occupants of an airplane hijacked by
    the ELN in April 1999 had been released; 1 died in captivity in 1999
    due to a lack of needed medications.
        Despite government search efforts and continued pressure by the
    Government on the FARC to account for three American missionaries
    kidnaped by FARC guerrillas in January 1993, their whereabouts and
    condition remained unknown.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law explicitly prohibit
    torture, as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
    punishment; however, police and military torture and mistreatment of
    detainees continued. On May 30, Congress codified torture as a crime
    (see Section 1.b.), and the reformed Military Penal Code directed that
    cases of torture involving military and police defendants be tried in
    the civilian, rather than the military, courts. The Attorney General's
    office, which only can sanction administratively or refer to the
    Prosecutor General's office those it finds guilty, did not sanction any
    security force members for torture during the year. Contrary to
    previous years, the Attorney General's office, which received 119
    complaints of torture in 1998, did not receive any complaints of
    torture by state agents during the year. The Colombian Commission of
    Jurists reported one case in the period from October 1999 to March.
    During the first 9 months of the year, CINEP reported that 79 persons
    were injured by state forces. During the year, the Military High Court
    convicted 52 service members for causing injuries.
        The Colombian Commission of Jurists reported that from October 1999
    through March, 136 corpses of persons presumed killed by paramilitary
    forces showed signs of torture; there were 14 similar cases attributed
    to guerrillas; one case attributed to an unidentified unarmed group;
    and none by the State. Of victims who survived torture, the Commission
    attributed one case to public security forces and four cases to
    paramilitary groups. In March the Ministry of Defense reported that the
    Superior Military Tribunal convicted 53 service members for inflicting
    bodily injuries.
        On March 10, a Bogota prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for four
    policemen for allegedly beating detainees Jorge Amilkar Murcia, Juan
    Antonio Rodriguez Ochoa, and a third unnamed victim, taking them to a
    bridge, and forcing them to jump. Rodriguez survived and reported the
    crime to the authorities; Murcia's body was never found.
        According to Human Rights Watch, on June 18, troops from the Rebeiz
    Pizarro Battalion fired upon a car carrying six adults and two
    children; all occupants were wounded.
        In December the Prosecutor General's human rights office indicted
    Colonel Jose Ancizar Molano Padilla (then-commander of the 2nd Marine
    infantry battalion), Captain Alvaro Hernando Moreno, Captain Rafael
    Garcia, Lieutenant Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, and four noncommissioned
    officers for torturing 12 marines with asphyxiation and electric shocks
    in December 1995. The victims were tortured to determine the
    whereabouts of two lost assault rifles. Colonel Molano and his accused
    subordinates remained in detention and are expected to be tried in a
    civilian court. In December the Attorney General's office concluded its
    investigation of the same incident and ordered a 3-month suspension
    from duty for Colonel Molano. It also suspended Captain Moreno,
    Lieutenant Jaramillo, seven noncommissioned officers, and one private.
        Four Venezuelans arrested in May 1999 in the course of a military
    antiguerrilla operation who subsequently claimed that the 3rd army
    Special Forces Battalion tortured and inflicted other cruel, inhuman,
    and degrading punishment against them were remanded to the custody of
    the Venezuelan Embassy and finally allowed to return to Venezuela. The
    Venezuelan Government also asked for an investigation in relation to
    five other persons who were with these four men at the time of their
    capture. The bodies of two of these five persons subsequently were
    found in a river; the other three allegedly disappeared following the
    operation.
        Paramilitary groups increasingly used threats both to intimidate
    opponents and to raise money. Letters demanding payment of a war tax
    and a threat to mark victims as a military target if they failed to pay
    were typical. In 1999 CINEP reported that nearly half of those
    threatened were public school teachers and that approximately half of
    all threat recipients were residents of Antioquia department.
        Guerrilla groups also tortured and abused persons. The bodies of
    many persons detained and subsequently killed by guerrillas showed
    signs of torture and disfigurement. For example, one soldier captured
    by the FARC was subjected to several machete blows to the head until
    the entire left side of his head was destroyed. While he was still
    alive, his genitalia were cut off and acid was poured on his face. The
    military reported that another soldier and his brother were captured by
    the FARC while on a bus, subsequently were tortured and decapitated,
    and their heads were sent to their father inside a box. The Colombian
    Commission of Jurists reported 17 cases of torture by guerrillas during
    the period from October 1999 to March.
        Guerrillas also routinely used threats, both to intimidate
    opponents and to raise money, and--like the paramilitary groups--sent
    letters demanding payments of a war tax, along with threats to make
    persons military targets. Guerrillas also killed, kidnaped, and
    threatened mayoral candidates (see Section 3).
        According to press reports, in July explosive devices damaged three
    businesses in downtown Barrancabermeja, Santander department. The
    authorities stated that the ELN demanded that local businessmen attend
    a mandatory meeting and that the bombs were punishment against those
    who failed to attend. In April the FARC announced ``Law 002,'' which
    required persons with more than $1 million in assets to volunteer
    payment to the FARC or risk detention. In August the FARC bombed as
    many as 13 businesses in Medellin in retaliation for nonpayment of a
    FARC-imposed ``war tax.''
        Prison conditions are harsh, especially for those prisoners without
    significant outside support. Severe overcrowding and dangerous sanitary
    and health conditions remained serious problems. In December 1997, a
    visiting IACHR mission declared that the living conditions in Bogota's
    La Picota prison constituted ``cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
    of the inmates,'' and these problems continue. Prison guards from the
    INPEC report to the Ministry of Justice. There are approximately 7,000
    prison guards. Guards and prison staff frequently are untrained or
    corrupt. In response to what was called a ``disciplinary emergency,''
    INPEC's disciplinary office reported in September that it had removed
    159 prison guards and was investigating 651 INPEC officials for
    irregularities in performing their duties. Prisoners are suspected of
    killing or ordering the killing of 22 guards in 1999.
        According to the Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners,
    a majority of prisoners' food was provided by outside, private sources.
    In 1999 INPEC reported that the daily food allowance for each prisoner
    was $1.44 (2,700 pesos). According to INPEC, the country's prisons and
    jails held approximately 50,702 inmates at year's end, significantly
    more than their capacity of 31,000 persons. The addition of a new
    prison in Valledupar, Cesar department, and the renovation of other
    facilities added 3,000 spaces over the past 3 years but was offset by
    an increase of approximately 10,000 prisoners over the same period.
    According to the Ministry of Defense, 20 percent of the country's
    inmates are in the 10 most crowded prisons, which have an average
    occupancy rate of 200 percent. In a number of the largest prisons,
    overcrowding was severe. Medellin's Bellavista prison, the country's
    largest, was built to house 1,800 inmates; at year's end, it housed
    6,575 inmates. Bogota's La Modelo prison had a 169 percent occupancy
    rate, and the Palmira prison outside Cali held 192 percent above its
    planned capacity.
        In February the Justice Ministry announced a plan to renovate
    prisons and build 11 other new prisons over the next 3 years, expanding
    prison capacity by 18,000 persons. In July Congress approved the
    financing of the remaining announced facilities. Only 8,000 prisoner
    accommodations met international standards. A total of 17.8 percent of
    the country's prisons were between 40 and 80 years old, 3.5 percent
    were between 80 and 201 years old, and 2.4 percent were more than 201
    years old.
        In November approximately 12,000 women and children, who were
    visitors to the prisons, protested prison conditions by spending 72
    hours inside 7 prisons, including Bogota's La Modelo. The Government
    negotiated with inmate representatives and human rights NGO's to ensure
    the peaceful exit of the protesters by agreeing to convoke the National
    Roundtable on Penitentiary Work, an intersectoral commission that
    includes inmate representatives, in December.
        An estimated 42 percent of all prison inmates are pretrial
    detainees. The remaining 58 percent are split roughly between those
    appealing their convictions and those who have exhausted their appeals
    and are serving out their terms. There are no separate facilities for
    pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. According to the Ministry
    of Defense, 4,145 persons (8 percent of inmates) are in pretrial
    detention in police stations. Despite an August 1999 Constitutional
    Court ruling which obligated the transfer of detainees from overcrowded
    police station holding cells to prisons, Bogota's 21 police stations
    still hold 1,657 prisoners awaiting transfer to prisons.
        Local or regional military and jail commanders did not always
    prepare mandatory detention registers or follow notification
    procedures; as a result, precise accounting for every detainee was not
    always possible.
        There are separate prison facilities for women, and in some parts
    of the country, separate women's prisons exist. Conditions at women's
    prisons are similar to those at men's prisons but are far less violent.
    According to the Criminal Procedures Code, no one under the age of 18
    may be held in a prison. Juveniles are held in separate facilities
    operated by the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF).
        The reformed Penal Code requires sentences of 3 to 6 years for
    prison escapes. Escapes from prison continued to be a problem. There
    were six major riots in prisons. On February 3, six prisoners were
    killed and two were wounded during a confrontation between members of
    paramilitary groups and guerrillas at Bogota's La Picota Prison.
        In April members of paramilitary groups and guerrillas engaged in a
    12-hour battle inside Bogota's La Modelo prison, ending a 2-month
    truce, and employed a wide variety of firearms and other weapons.
    Thirty-two inmates were killed, and 35 were wounded. In response, 1,200
    members of the National Police entered La Modelo prison to retake
    control. Among prohibited items found were cellular telephones,
    handguns, shotguns, assault rifles, hand grenades, explosives, dogs
    trained to attack, illicit drugs, and alcohol. Police found a sauna and
    gym in a FARC commander's cell and also discovered a working brothel.
    Authorities brought a variety of charges, including homicide and rape,
    against 20 prisoners. In July Jorge Ospina Trujillo, reportedly a
    member of a paramilitary group, escaped from the Bellavista prison in
    Medellin, Antioquia department. According to the authorities, Ospina
    was one of the prisoners responsible for the April massacre in La
    Modelo prison in Bogota.
        Guerrillas launched several attacks against prisons holding
    guerrilla prisoners, facilitating numerous escapes. For example, during
    its April 2-3 offensive, the ELN attacked a prison at Cucuta, Norte de
    Santander department, initiating the attack with a car bomb. Some 75
    prisoners, including approximately 50 ELN and FARC guerrillas, escaped.
    Four prisoners were killed and four prisoners were wounded in the
    fighting.
        Key narcotics traffickers and some guerrilla leaders obtain cells
    with many comforts, some of which--such as access to twoway radios,
    cellular telephones, and computers--allowed them to continue their
    illegal activities from inside jail. In July the authorities dismantled
    a sophisticated telecommunications center in the district and Picalena
    prisons in Ibague, Tolima, department. Fortysix prisoners between the 2
    prisons used cellular telephones to extort money or negotiate ransom.
    To prevent this type of activity, on July 27, President Pastrana
    announced that he would issue a resolution making it mandatory for
    telephone companies to provide caller identification service to all
    customers.
        The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to
    have routine access to most prisons and police and military detention
    centers.
        The ICRC continues to have ad hoc access to civilians held by
    paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. However, it has not been
    granted access to members of the police or military who are held by
    guerrilla groups.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    includes several provisions designed to prevent illegal detention;
    however, there continued to be instances in which the authorities
    arrested or detained citizens arbitrarily.
        The law prohibits incommunicado detention. Anyone held in
    preventive detention must be brought before a prosecutor within 36
    hours to determine the legality of the detention. The prosecutor must
    then act upon that petition within 36 hours of its submission. Despite
    these legal protections, instances of arbitrary detention continued.
        Conditional pretrial release is available under certain
    circumstances, for example, in connection with minor offenses or after
    unduly lengthy amounts of time in preventive detention. It is not
    available in cases of serious crimes, such as homicide or terrorism.
        Guerrillas, particularly the FARC, pressed the Government and
    Congress to adopt a permanent prisoner exchange law. Initiating regular
    prisoner exchanges remained a top guerrilla priority and featured
    prominently in the FARC's negotiating points at the peace talks.
    Neither the Congress nor the Government attempted to pass such
    legislation, and there was minimal popular support for it during much
    of the year. On September 27, the Attorney General proposed the
    implementation of an existing law that allows for the exchange of
    prisoners during armed conflict. In October the public debate on
    prisoner exchange revived when photographs emerged of 261 police and
    military hostages being held in outdoor fenced enclosures. The U.N.
    High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) expressed deep concern for
    the well-being of the hostages and called on the FARC to permit ICRC
    access. At year's end, 527 soldiers and police are presumed held by the
    FARC and ELN, and the ICRC had not been permitted access to them.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and forced exile is not practiced
    by the State. However, there were repeated instances of individuals
    pressured into self-exile for their personal safety. Such cases
    included persons from all walks of life, including politicians, human
    rights workers, slum-dwellers, business executives, farmers, and
    others. The threats came from various quarters: some individual members
    of the security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups,
    narcotics traffickers, other criminal elements, or combinations of the
    above.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judicial system,
    reorganized under the 1991 Constitution, is independent of the
    executive and legislative branches both in theory and in practice;
    however, the suborning or intimidation of judges, witnesses, and
    prosecutors by those indicted or involved is common. The Human Rights
    Ombudsman's office reported receipt of 773 complaints of denial of the
    right to due legal process during 1999, the most recent year for which
    statistics were available. The office received 1,353 complaints in
    1998.
        The judiciary includes the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of
    Justice, and the Council of State, the Superior Judicial Council, and
    lower courts. The Prosecutor General's office is an independent
    prosecutorial body that brings criminal cases before the courts.
    Article 234 of the new Military Penal Code states that the Supreme
    Court (not the Superior Military Tribunal) has first instance
    jurisdiction in cases involving criminal acts by generals, admirals,
    major generals, vice-admirals, brigadier generals, rear admirals, and
    magistrates and prosecutors of the Superior Military Tribunal. Cases
    that already were in their trial phase by August 12, 1999, must
    continue under the old military penal code; however, this article
    applies to all cases brought to trial after that date, regardless of
    when the crime was committed. Article 234 also states the Supreme Court
    is the court of second instance review of rulings by the Superior
    Military Tribunal, effectively asserting the authority of the Supreme
    Court--a body composed entirely of civilian magistratesover the
    military judiciary. The Council of State is the appellate court for
    civil cases. The Constitutional Court adjudicates cases of
    constitutionality, reviews all decisions regarding writs of protection
    of fundamental rights (``tutelas''), and reviews all decisions
    regarding motions for cessation of judicial proceedings. Jurisdictional
    clashes among the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Justice, the
    Council of State, and the Superior Judicial Council were common, due to
    the lack of a single supreme judicial authority capable of deciding
    issues of jurisdiction or constitutional interpretation.
        The CSJ, which oversees the administration of the judiciary, also
    has the responsibility of determining whether individual cases
    involving members of the security forces are to be tried in civilian or
    military courts. On August 17, President Pastrana issued a directive to
    the armed forces and the police that stated that the new Military Penal
    Code ``excludes from military criminal jurisdiction the crimes of
    genocide, torture, and forced disappearance'' and that ``acts against
    humanity do not fall under the jurisdiction of the military courts.''
    The directive also ``raises to the category of law'' a 1997
    Constitutional Court decision that serious human rights violations and
    other crimes not directly related to acts of service must be tried by
    civilian courts.
        On April 6, the Constitutional Court overturned much of the 1999
    law that had created the specialized jurisdiction (which had replaced
    the anonymous (``faceless'') regional courts system on July 1, 1999).
    The Constitutional Court found that defendants have the right to know
    the identity of their accusers and that elements of the law that
    permitted some prosecutors and witnesses to remain anonymous under
    exceptionally dangerous circumstances were unconstitutional. The Court
    ruled that specialized jurisdiction judges and prosecutors no longer
    could transfer cases to other colleagues when they believed their own
    security to be at risk. The Court also ruled that persons detained for
    any of the crimes designated in the legislation may request to be
    confined in their homes and may request special permission to go to
    work, as is the case in the regular civilian judiciary. The Court
    permanently closed the appeals court for the specialized jurisdiction.
    The remaining first instance specialized jurisdiction courts continued
    to have responsibility for trying certain crimes, including crimes of
    kidnaping, hijacking, paramilitarism, narcotics trafficking, money
    laundering, and human rights abuses. Specialized jurisdiction
    prosecutors still are permitted 12 months to investigate and develop
    cases, rather than the 6 months afforded to regular civilian judiciary
    prosecutors.
        As part of the Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary falls
    under the executive branch, rather than under the judicial branch. The
    armed forces commander is also the president of the military judiciary.
    The workings of the military judiciary lack transparency and
    accountability, contributing to a generalized lack of confidence in the
    system's ability to bring human rights abusers to justice. On August
    12, a new Military Penal Code replaced the outdated one, which predated
    the 1991 Constitution and did not contemplate some contemporary crimes.
    (President Pastrana signed it into law in August 1999.) The
    Constitutional Court ruled that no implementing legislation was needed
    and instructed the Ministry of Defense to implement the new Military
    Penal Code. Provisions of the new code include the following: unit
    commanders no longer may judge their subordinates; an independent
    military judicial corps is to be created; and service members are to be
    protected legally if they refuse to carry out illegal orders to commit
    human rights abuses. The reformed code states that torture, genocide,
    and forced disappearance could never be related to ``acts of service,''
    which is the constitutional standard for trying crimes in the military
    judiciary, and stipulates that these crimes therefore always must be
    tried in the civilian judiciary (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). The
    reformed Military Penal Code also gives representatives of the civilian
    judiciary the right to be present at military trials of military
    personnel.
        The new military justice system is composed of magistrates of the
    Military Court of Appeals, lower military court judges, investigating
    judges, prosecutors, and judge advocates (auditor de guerra) at the
    General Inspector, division, and brigade levels. Brigadier General
    Jairo Pineda was appointed to head the Executive Directorate of the
    military penal justice system and is to report directly to the Minister
    of Defense, a civilian. Military prosecutors report to Brigadier
    General Pineda, not to unit commanders as under the previous system.
        According to press reports, on August 16, the Military Penal
    Tribunal appointed its first three prosecutors as part of the new
    Military Penal Code. New prosecutors also were appointed for the
    military forces as a whole and one for each branch of the military and
    the police. On August 17, the prosecutors began to analyze and rule in
    military proceedings.
        A 1997 Constitutional Court decision directed the military judicial
    system to relinquish to the civilian judiciary the investigation and
    prosecution of serious human rights violations and other alleged crimes
    not directly related to acts of service-the 1991 constitutional
    standard for determining whether a case should be tried by the military
    or civilian judiciary. The CSJ assigned most cases involving high-level
    military personnel to the military courts, where convictions in human
    rights-related cases were the rare exception. According to the 1991
    Constitution, general-rank officers are to be tried by the Supreme
    Court; however, that provision was ignored in practice. No definitive
    court ruling has resolved various judicial interpretations of the
    provision; however, a majority of decisions appear to suggest that this
    provision applies only to full generals. The Court ruled that military
    justice was the exception to the general rule and that, in the case of
    doubt, jurisdiction should be assigned to the civilian system. In
    determining which alleged crimes were to be tried by military
    tribunals, the CSJ sometimes employed a broad definition of acts of
    service, thus ensuring that uniformed defendants of high rank,
    particularly the most senior, were tried in military tribunals. During
    the year, the CSJ assigned two key cases to civilian jurisdiction: the
    case against Major Clavijo and the Nydia Bautista case (see Section
    1.a.). In addition, CSJ figures quoted by the Ministry of Defense
    indicated that, where conflicts of jurisdiction arose, the total number
    of cases assigned to military courts dropped from 50 percent in 1992 to
    approximately 15 percent in 2000, while cases assigned to civilian
    jurisdiction rose from 40 percent in 1992 to 60 percent over the same
    period.
        According to figures released by the Ministry of Defense in
    December, since the 1997 Constitutional Court decision, the military
    judiciary has transferred 1,136 cases to the civilian judicial system;
    there was no information available as to how many of these cases dealt
    specifically with human rights abuses or violations of international
    humanitarian law, nor how many cases remained in the military judicial
    system. However, a March report by the Ministry of Defense reports that
    41 percent of the cases transferred involved serious crimes such as
    homicide, torture, illegal detentions, and infliction of bodily
    injuries; the rest were common crimes. Out of the total of 1,307 police
    and military cases transferred, 496 cases were transferred during the
    year, 79 in 1999, 266 in 1998, 295 in 1997, and 171 cases were
    transferred on an unknown date. According to year-end report of the
    Ministry of Defense, the military judiciary during the year found 122
    members guilty of violating ``human or fundamental rights.'' The
    average prison sentence was 58 months for homicide and 15 months for
    inflicting bodily injury.
        The military judiciary demonstrated an increased willingness during
    the year to turn cases of military officers who were accused of human
    rights violations or criminal activities over to the civilian
    judiciary; however, such officers generally were of lower rank. A July
    CSJ ruling suggested that it considered itself bound by the
    Constitutional Court's 1997 decision that certain human rights
    violations could not be considered acts of service and therefore must
    be tried in civilian courts. Between January and November, 80 cases
    were transferred.
        In October 1998, the CSJ had determined that Brigadier General
    Fernando Millan Perez's alleged organization of a paramilitary group
    constituted an act of service and therefore had turned General Millan's
    case over to the military judiciary for prosecution (see Section 1.a.).
    In reaching its decision, the CSJ had determined that it was not bound
    by the Constitutional Court's narrow 1997 interpretation of the 1991
    constitutional standard of relation to acts of service. The CSJ's
    decision effectively ended the Prosecutor General's investigation into
    whether General Millan had provided weapons and intelligence to
    paramilitary groups in Santander department.
        On September 14, President Pastrana signed 12 decrees to reform and
    strengthen the military. One decree provides for the separation from
    service of all uniformed members of the military regardless of their
    time in service, at the discretion of the top military commanders.
    Previously, the Minister of Defense could at his discretion separate
    from service only those who had served at least 15 years in the
    military. Other decrees establish three levels of misconduct and the
    crimes classified at each level. A total of 27 crimes are punishable
    with immediate dismissal; these include: Torture, forced disappearance,
    genocide, facilitating by any means the knowledge of protected
    information or access to classified documents without authorization,
    failure to enter into combat or to pursue the enemy having the capacity
    to do so, and retreating before the enemy or abandoning post without
    having used elements of defense that might be available. A higher-
    ranking officer such as a unit commander is granted initial authority
    to issue disciplinary sanctions. Those under investigation may be
    suspended for up to 90 days with half pay; those suspended may perform
    administrative duties. The decrees also state that in the event that
    another authority should be informed of crimes, the military must
    inform that authority and provide all relevant information to it.
    Another decree states that, with limited exceptions, any officer
    sentenced to prison by the military or the civilian justice system is
    to be separated from service.
        On October 16, the military dismissed 388 members of the armed
    forces, including 89 officers. According to press reports, these
    included 2 lieutenant colonels and 15 majors. No information was
    available from the Ministry of Defense regarding the specific reasons
    for any of the dismissals, nor were their names announced; it was not
    known how many were dismissed due to allegations that they were
    responsible for human rights abuses or for collaborating with
    paramilitary groups in such abuses.
        In cases in which military officers were tried, convicted, and
    sentenced for human rights violations, they generally did not serve
    prison terms but were confined to their bases or military police
    detention centers, as permitted by law. Military prisoners remain on
    active duty (and reduced pay) while in detention but are relieved from
    command responsibilities. In other cases members of the military can be
    suspended pending investigation, as occurred in the August Pueblo Rico
    killings (see Section 1.g.). Some perform administrative functions
    while in detention. Armed Forces Commander General Tapias cited a lack
    of adequate military prison facilities as a primary cause for escapes
    from military detention areas. For example, on March 14, suspected
    Casanare department paramilitary leader Humberto Caicedo Grosso escaped
    from military confinement at the 14th Brigade's headquarters. The
    authorities detained five brigade members for failing to stop Caicedo's
    escape.
        The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil
    jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community
    laws (see Section 5).
        Judges have long been subject to threats and intimidation,
    particularly when dealing with cases involving members of the public
    security forces or of paramilitary, narcotics, and guerrilla
    organizations. Violent attacks against prosecutors and judges
    continued, and prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys continued to
    be subjected to threats and acts of violence. On April 3, specialized
    jurisdiction prosecutor Margarita Maria Pulgarin Trujillo was killed in
    Medellin; AUC members were the prime suspects in her killing.
    Prosecutors reported that potential witnesses in major cases often
    lacked faith in the Government's ability to protect their anonymity and
    were thus unwilling to testify, ruining chances for successful
    prosecutions. In June Congress approved Penal Code and Penal Procedural
    Code reforms that created a number of new crimes such as genocide (see
    Section 1.b.), but reduced the sentences for a number of serious
    crimes, including kidnaping and extortion, and the amount of time
    served necessary for parole. The new Penal Code and Procedural Code are
    scheduled to go into effect in 2001. It still was difficult for defense
    attorneys to impeach or cross-examine anonymous witnesses, and often
    the defense attorneys did not have unimpeded access to the State's
    evidence.
        The Attorney General's office investigates misconduct by public
    officials, including members of the military and police. The Attorney
    General's office can draw upon a nationwide network of hundreds of
    government human rights investigators covering the country's 1,085
    municipalities. The office received 78 complaints related to massacres
    and forced disappearances during the year. Approximately 75 percent of
    these complaints involved the army (particularly in Putumayo, Antioquia
    and southern Bolivar departments); the other 25 percent implicated
    police or DAS officials. Its constitutional mandate only provides for
    the imposition of administrative sanctions; it has no authority to
    bring criminal prosecutions or impose criminal sanctions but can refer
    all cases to the Prosecutor General's office for investigation.
    Contrary to previous years, the Attorney General's office referred all
    cases of human rights violations received during the year to the
    Prosecutor General for investigation. The Attorney General's office
    reported that the majority of these cases are investigated by the
    Prosecutor General's office.
        In August a judge convicted of ``corrupt practice'' for her 1999
    exoneration of billionaire emerald magnate Victor Carranza on charges
    of paramilitarism was released after serving less than half of her 46-
    month term. Carranza remained in prison due to his prior convictions
    for homicide and kidnaping.
        The Supreme Court elects the Prosecutor General for a 4-year term,
    which does not coincide with that of the president, from a list of
    three candidates chosen by the President. The Prosecutor General is
    tasked with investigating criminal offenses and presenting evidence
    against the accused before the various judges and tribunals. However,
    this office retains significant judicial functions and, like other
    elements of the civilian judiciary, it is struggling to make the
    transition from a Napoleonic legal system to a mixed one that
    incorporates an adversarial aspect.
        In an attempt to deal with impunity, the Prosecutor General in 1995
    created a special human rights unit as part of the regional courts
    system. The unit has achieved significant results; as of November, its
    group of 30 anonymous prosecutors had handled 918 cases involving
    massacres, extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, and terrorism during the
    year. These prosecutors have issued arrest warrants against members of
    the security forces and of paramilitary, guerrilla, and drug
    trafficking organizations. The unit arrested 192 suspects during the
    year.
        During the year, the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's
    office investigated, indicted, or prosecuted 286 security force
    members, including at least 11 officers, on a variety of charges
    including homicide, torture, kidnaping, and sponsorship of paramilitary
    groups. The Attorney General's office and the security forces
    demonstrated a greater willingness to follow up with instructions that
    those ordered arrested be removed from their duties, denied the right
    to wear a uniform, or turned over to civilian judicial authorities.
    However, impunity continued to be very widespread.
        The Constitution specifically provides for the right to due
    process. Judges determine the outcome of all trials; there are no jury
    trials. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and has
    the right to representation by counsel, although representation for the
    indigenous and the indigent historically has been inadequate. In mid-
    1999, the CSJ's administrative chamber reported that the civilian
    judiciary suffered from a backlog of approximately 3,069,000 cases
    (including approximately 604,000 penal cases) and that there were
    approximately 338,000 outstanding arrest warrants. Approximately
    223,000 writs for protection of fundamental rights (``tutelas'') were
    before the Constitutional Court for its legally mandated review.
        Defendants in trials conducted by the regular courts have the right
    to be present and the right to timely consultation with an attorney.
    Regular court defendants and their attorneys have the right to
    question, contradict, and confront witnesses against them, to present
    witnesses on their own behalf, and to have access to government
    evidence relevant to the case. The country's judiciaries, including
    regular civilian, specialized jurisdiction, and military, continue to
    be overwhelmingly Napoleonic in character; everything is processed in
    writing. Public trials are still rare, and there are no juries;
    however, cross-examination of witnesses does occur. Defendants also
    have the right to appeal a conviction to a higher court.
        In addition to providing public defense attorneys in criminal
    cases, the Human Rights Ombudsman's 34 departmental and regional
    offices throughout the country provide a legal channel for thousands of
    complaints and allegations of human rights violations. However, in
    practice, the Ombudsman's operations are underfunded and understaffed,
    slowing its development of a credible public defender system.
        Within the FARC-controlled despeje zone, local FARC leaders
    effectively supplanted judicial authorities and declared the
    establishment of an alternative, FARC-run ``justice system.'' Residents
    of the zone regularly were denied the right to a fair trial. In the
    face of FARC intimidation, all elements of the civilian judiciary fled
    the zone. In 1999 Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez publicly said
    that they would return only ``when accompanied by the security
    forces.'' In September the FARC gave haven to a FARC guerrilla who had
    hijacked an airplane and refused to release him to government
    authorities. Continuing concern about arbitrary FARC justice in the
    zone led the authorities to stress that governmental justice must be
    present.
        The Government states that it does not hold political prisoners.
    The ICRC reported that it monitored approximately 3,900 cases of
    imprisoned citizens accused of terrorism, rebellion, or aiding and
    abetting the insurgency, which are crimes punishable under law.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law provides for the protection of these rights;
    however, at times the authorities infringed upon them. The law
    generally requires a judicial order signed by a prosecutor for the
    authorities to enter a private home, except in cases of hot pursuit.
    The Ministry of Defense continued training public security forces in
    legal search procedures that comply with constitutional and human
    rights. Due to intimidation, corruption, or the absence of evidentiary
    proof collected directly by prosecutors, guerrilla suspects captured by
    the security forces in or out of combat and turned over to the judicial
    authorities routinely were set free.
        A judicial order or the approval of a prosecuting attorney is
    required to authorize the interception of mail or the monitoring of
    either landline or cellular telephones. This protection extends to
    prisoners held in jails. However, various state authorities sometimes
    monitored telephones without obtaining prior authorization. There were
    unconfirmed reports by some human rights groups that members of the
    security forces subjected them to surveillance, harassment, or threats.
        A preliminary investigation begun by the Prosecutor General's
    anticorruption unit in December 1999 determined that elements of the
    Administrative Department of Security had engaged in illegal
    wiretapping in Bogota over the course of several years. As of April,
    eight DAS officers were in custody, and another officer was sought.
    Having found sufficient evidence, on June 20, the Prosecutor General
    opened a formal investigation. This was the first instance in which the
    Prosecutor General pressed charges against a state entity for
    interference with privacy. The investigation continued at year's end.
        Guerrillas also used wiretaps and accessed bank accounts of
    citizens at roadblocks in order to select kidnap victims.
        There are some child soldiers among the paramilitary groups, who
    were recruited forcibly (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
        Guerrillas regularly forcibly recruited children and indigenous
    people to serve as soldiers (see Sections 1.g and 5).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--The internal armed conflict and narcotics
    trafficking are the central causes of violations of human rights and
    international humanitarian law. Government security forces at times
    violated international humanitarian law and continued to commit serious
    human rights abuses, although the great majority of serious abuses were
    committed by paramilitary groups and guerrillas.
        In October the ICRC suspended evacuations of wounded combatants
    after the murder of a wounded guerrilla by paramilitary forces near
    Apartado, Uraba region, Antioquia department, and of a wounded member
    of a paramilitary group by guerrillas in Putumayo. In both cases the
    victims forcibly were taken from ICRC vehicles. The ICRC resumed
    medical evacuations of combatants in December.
        On February 24, the Government announced the creation of an
    interagency intelligence committee, chaired by the Minister of Defense
    and including members of the police, the Prosecutor General's office,
    the Attorney General's office, and the DAS, to improve the State's
    ability to track down and engage or capture members of paramilitary
    groups. However, at year's end there was little tangible evidence that
    the committee was functioning.
        The ICRC reported that the Government, including military
    authorities, followed an open-door policy toward the ICRC and readily
    incorporated Red Cross curriculums on international humanitarian law in
    standard military training. However, impunity remains a problem.
    According to military sources, local commanders typically preferred to
    transfer or discharge soldiers accused of serious human rights
    violations, rather than initiate legal proceedings. On May 30, Congress
    passed legislation that codified forced displacement as a crime and
    provided for sentences of between 15 and 40 years' imprisonment; the
    legislation also codified genocide and forced disappearance as crimes
    (see Section 1.b). Departing from the historical, internationally
    accepted definition of genocide, and in response to the killings of
    thousands of members of the Patriotic Union leftist coalition (see
    Section 1.a.), the law codified ``political genocide'' as a crime.
    However, it stipulated that political genocide could be committed only
    against members of legally constituted (i.e., nonguerrilla) groups.
        On August 15, an army unit of 30 soldiers operating near Pueblo
    Rico, Antioquia, mistook a party of schoolchildren for a guerrilla unit
    and opened fire, killing 6 children between the ages of 6 and 10, and
    wounding 6 others. According to press interviews, the soldiers did not
    realize at the time that the persons that they were shooting were
    children. On September 28, a military justice panel provisionally
    disassociated 14 of the soldiers and allowed them to return to duty.
    The remaining 16 soldiers, including patrol commander Sergeant Jorge
    Enrique Mina Gonzalez, remained under investigation at year's end. On
    December 22, the Attorney General charged Sergeant Mina, and corporals
    Avilio Pena Tovar and Ancizar Lopez, stating that the three confused a
    15-year-old girl in the group with a guerrilla but that they willfully
    used indiscriminate force. The Attorney General's office exonerated the
    other 27 soldiers involved in the incident. The Prosecutor General's
    office determined that the act was unintentional harm caused in the
    course of duty and referred the case to the military justice system,
    where it remained at year's end.
        In May the human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office
    recommended that the air force reopen its investigation into the
    December 1998 Santo Domingo, Arauca department, incident in which an
    air force helicopter was accused of bombing civilians in the course of
    combat with the FARC. A total of 19 civilians were killed, and 25
    others were wounded. The Prosecutor General's office based its
    recommendation on new evidence after the office subpoenaed three
    helicopter crew members and obtained an analysis of metal shards. An
    air force commander reportedly charged the FARC with planting shards at
    the scene. In December the air force revisited the zone prior to making
    a decision on whether to open formally an investigation. In November
    the Attorney General's office charged air force lieutenants Johan
    Jimenez Valencia and Cesar Romero Pradilla (the pilot and copilot of
    the helicopter) and flight technician Hector Mario Hernandez Acosta
    with indiscriminate use of force.
        According to the Independent Advisory Committee for Human Rights
    and Displacements (CODHES), 317,340 displacements of civilians from
    their homes occurred during the year; government sources estimate that
    125,000 persons were displaced. (Exact numbers of displaced persons are
    difficult to obtain because some persons were displaced more than once,
    and many displaced persons do not register with the Government or other
    entities.) According to CODHES, approximately 288,000 displacements
    occurred during 1999. As many as 1 million citizens may have been
    displaced since 1996. The ICRC provided emergency assistance to 135,000
    displaced persons during the year. An alliance of human rights,
    religious, and aid organizations stated that an estimated 2 million
    persons had been displaced by political violence since 1985. CODHES
    states that some persons have been displaced for as long as 10 years,
    but it is unable to identify a typical timeframe for displacement. Some
    persons return to their homes within days or weeks, others within
    months, and some never return. Some displaced persons move several
    times after fleeing their original home, making tracking difficult. The
    Government does not consider persons to be displaced after 2 years.
    CODHES estimated that perhaps 65 percent of displacements became
    permanent. In an attempt to determine the true scope of the problem,
    the Government, in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR), developed a computerized system for collecting data
    on the displaced and estimating total numbers.
        The vast majority of displaced persons are peasants who have been
    displaced to cities, which have had difficulty integrating large
    numbers of persons into their infrastructure. According to CODHES, in
    1999 approximately 53 percent of displaced persons were women and
    girls, 32 percent of displaced households were headed by women, and 70
    percent of the displaced population were children. The Human Rights
    Ombudsman's office reported that only 15 percent of displaced children
    have access to schools. Many displaced persons settle on the outskirts
    of Bogota, Medellin, and Cartagena, where conditions are overcrowded
    and unsanitary, and smaller municipalities have been overwhelmed by the
    need for services. Malnutrition among displaced children is a problem.
    Many displaced persons lost access to health care, employment, and
    education (see Section 5). CODHES estimates that only 34 percent of
    displaced households have access to health services. According to the
    UNHCR, approximately one-third of displaced persons are indigenous
    people or blacks; these groups represent only 11 percent of the
    population. In 1999 the office of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
    received reports of threats and attacks against displaced communities
    and their leaders; threats against individuals and groups working with
    the displaced increased in 1999, especially in the regions of Magdalena
    Medio and Uraba.
        Both paramilitary groups and guerrillas used forced displacements
    to gain control over disputed territories and to weaken their
    opponents' base of support. In some cases, entire towns were abandoned
    after paramilitary or guerrilla attacks. The authorities sometimes
    encouraged civilian populations to move back to their homes before
    security situations had normalized.
        The Government's response to the needs of the displaced population
    continued to be inadequate. The Government has no systematic program or
    budget to make adequate provisions for humanitarian assistance to the
    displaced, although it is required by law and court decisions to do so.
    Conditions at the Government's two camps for displaced persons in
    Uraba, at Pavarando and Turbo, were poor and unhygienic; health care
    remained poor, and there were few educational or employment
    opportunities. However, conditions at a temporary government shelter
    for displaced persons at the stadium at Cucuta, Norte de Santander
    department, were much better. The Government provides assistance
    through the Solidarity Network, the ICBF, the Health Ministry, and
    other state entities. The Solidarity Network was neither designed nor
    prepared for emergency humanitarian assistance work, and it usually
    provided such assistance only to refugees returning to the country. In
    March 1999, the Government estimated that the ICRC provided 70 percent
    of humanitarian assistance received by displaced persons. Private
    estimates were higher. Most displaced citizens receiving ICRC emergency
    humanitarian assistance received it for only 90 days. The Government
    also tries to limit assistance to 90 days; however, some displaced
    persons in the camps at Turbo and Pavarando, and in a stadium in
    Cucuta, received aid for a longer period. During the year, ICRC
    provided emergency assistance to 130,000 internally displaced persons.
        Hundreds of displaced persons also fled to Panama, Ecuador, and
    Venezuela, where they often were denied refugee status, treated as
    illegal immigrants, and denied protection or assistance, and often were
    returned to Colombia. The UNHCR has an office in Bogota to address the
    problem and opened field offices in Barrancabermeja in 1999 and in San
    Jose de Apartado, Uraba and in Puerto Asis, Putumayo during the year.
        On January 4, a group of internally displaced persons violently
    took over the ICRC's Bogota offices; they injured 3 local ICRC
    employees and detained 37 ICRC workers for 13 hours, then allowed most
    staff to leave the building. On February 22, such a group again
    forcibly detained members of the ICRC staff, a representative from the
    Attorney General's office, and two journalists for 9 hours. Also on
    that day, members of the same group tried to occupy the Bogota
    headquarters of the Social Solidarity Network; the police arrested
    them. In April the ICRC abandoned offices in Bogota that had been
    occupied by approximately 60 internally displaced persons since
    December 1999. Despite a December Constitutional Court ruling that the
    Government should assist the group, at year's end, the group still
    occupied the old ICRC premises.
        According to the Vice President's office, there are more than
    70,000 antipersonnel landmines in the country, located throughout 135
    municipalities in 23 departments. Some 20,000 mines are maintained by
    the military to defend static positions. According to the International
    Campaign Against Mines, 63 persons were killed by mines in 1999. The
    Ministry of Defense reported that 10 military personnel were killed or
    wounded by antipersonnel mines during the first 7 months of the year.
    There is no generalized mine clearance program. However, in January the
    army deactivated 20 guerrilla landmines in southern Bolivar. Four
    civilians had been injured recently by landmines in the area. In August
    the military cleared two mine fields in Cundinamarca department. From
    1998 to mid-2000, the Ministry of Defense reported that the military
    had cleared 120 FARC minefields and 39 ELN minefields.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported continued violence
    against women, especially in war zones. It noted that most female
    victims in zones of conflict chose not to report the abuses they had
    suffered, in part due to a lack of confidence in the efficacy of
    governmental institutions to address their problems. The Ombudsman
    noted that female leaders of political and peasant organizations in the
    Uraba-Antioquia region were increasingly the targets of persecution,
    threats, torture, and executions. According to the Ombudsman's 1999-
    2000 report, intrafamilial violence, sexual assault, and murder of
    women remained serious problems throughout the country (see Section 5).
    More than 30 percent of FARC members are female.
        Contrary to previous years, there were no reports during the year
    that the Government militarized public hospitals in conflict areas,
    which increased the risk that the hospitals would become targets of
    guerrilla attack. In March the Constitutional Court ruled that state
    security forces could not maintain installations (such as police
    stations) next to schools, so as to not endanger the lives of students
    in case of guerrilla attack. The Ministry of Defense later announced a
    proposal to relocate police stations outside of city centers; however,
    this had not been implemented by year's end. In contrast to the
    previous year, there were no reports that the State refused medical
    treatment to guerrillas.
        The many paramilitary groups are diverse in their motivations,
    structure, leadership, and ideology. The 1997 establishment of the
    United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia as a national umbrella
    organization was designed both to provide a national structure and to
    develop a more coherent political culture for the country's local and
    regional paramilitary groups. The AUC paramilitary umbrella group
    comprises an estimated 8,000 combatants, who are members of 7 major
    organizations. The largest of these organizations is the ACCU, which is
    based in Cordoba department and the Uraba region of Antioquia
    department. The AUC also has as many as 4,000 of its own combatants.
    Carlos Castano heads both the AUC and the ACCU. Although illegal, some
    paramilitary groups reflected rural citizens' legitimate desire to
    defend themselves from the guerrilla threat. Other groups were actually
    the paid, private armies of drug traffickers or large landowners. Many
    members of paramilitary groups are former security force members or
    former guerrillas. Some local army and police commanders tacitly
    tolerated--and sometimes aided and abetted--the activities of
    paramilitary groups, despite the public pronouncements of the
    Government and the public security forces high command that they
    intended to combat paramilitary violence. Elements of political and
    economic elites in these areas also supported paramilitary groups. The
    President, other government officials, the UNHCHR, and various NGO's
    noted increased popular support for paramilitary groups during the
    year. AUC leader Carlos Castano admitted publicly that his group
    receives funding from both legitimate businesses and from narcotics
    trafficking, and that the group is financed by ``dominant businesses''
    in the regions in which it operates.
        Paramilitary groups used selective killings and systemic massacres
    to force displacements and punish civilians for perceived ties to the
    guerrillas (see Section 1.a.). Paramilitary groups also launched
    several offensive campaigns characterized by a series of massacres
    linked by time or location.
        The Fifth Brigade reported that in March troops of its 13th and
    56th Battalions captured 25 suspected AUC members at San Rafael de
    Lebrija, Santander department. During the operation, the troops
    captured a significant amount of war material. Also in March, elements
    of the army's 46th Battalion, based at Tibu, Norte de Santander
    department, captured another three suspected members of paramilitary
    groups and killed one. One soldier was killed in the action. In
    February the National Police and the DAS captured north coast
    paramilitary chief Adan Rojas Ospino in Barranquilla, Atlantico
    department. Rojas, a key aid to AUC paramilitary chief Carlos Castano,
    was sought in connection with a series of massacres dating back to the
    1980's, as well as to the 1994 killing of a congressman. On February
    24, the DAS also announced the capture of Arnoldo Segundo Meza de la
    Rosa, the alleged chief of intelligence and finance operations for the
    paramilitary fronts operating in Sucre and Bolivar departments.
    Additionally, the DAS announced the capture in Monteria, Cordoba
    department, of an ACCU paramilitary leader.
        Paramilitary groups on occasion used landmines and sometimes forced
    underage combatants into their ranks. Paramilitary forces failed to
    respect the injured and medical personnel. For example, in November
    members of a paramilitary group reportedly killed a patient on an
    ambulance driving from Tibu to Cucuta, Norte de Santander department,
    and declared the Tibu hospital a ``military objective,'' causing
    several support staff to flee. In late October, presumed members of a
    paramilitary group kidnaped the same hospital's director, who later was
    found dead. In late September, paramilitary forces in the Uraba region
    dragged a wounded FARC member from a Red Cross ambulance and shot and
    killed her. In early October, the FARC stopped a Red Cross ambulance
    carrying a wounded paramilitary member and killed him. In response, on
    October 4, the ICRC suspended all assistance to wounded combatants. The
    ICRC resumed evacuation of wounded combatants in late December.
        Guerrilla organizations continued to pursue strategies that
    routinely led them to commit abuses against citizens. Their tactics
    consistently included killings, kidnaping, torture, targeting of
    civilian populations and installations, including medical facilities,
    and the forced recruitment of children as young as 10 years old. In
    response to President Pastrana's August 1999 call to all armed groups
    to obey international humanitarian law (the rules of war), the FARC
    responded that it would not abide by, and was not bound by,
    international humanitarian law.
        Two main guerrilla armies, the FARC and the ELN, as well as the
    much smaller EPL and other groups, commanded an estimated total of
    between 11,000 and 17,000 full-time guerrillas operating in more than
    100 semiautonomous groups throughout the country. These groups
    undertook armed actions in nearly 1,000 of the 1,085 municipalities.
    Both the FARC and the ELN systematically attacked noncombatants and
    violated citizens' rights through the use of tactics such as killings,
    forced disappearances, the mutilation of bodies, attacks on churches,
    attacks on hospitals, attacks on ambulances, and executions of patients
    in hospitals. Guerrilla groups also were responsible for multiple
    abuses of religious and medical personnel with protected status and of
    the wounded. Indiscriminate attacks on police stations resulted in high
    numbers of civilian casualties. Guerrillas also killed religious
    leaders (see Section 2.c.) and indigenous people (see Section 5).
        Guerrillas used landmines both to defend static positions (such as
    base camps, cocaine laboratories, and sites at which kidnap victims
    were held) and as indiscriminate weapons of terror. According to the
    Vice President's office, the FARC and ELN have laid indiscriminately
    50,000 mines in rural areas. Landmines planted by guerrillas or
    disguised as everyday items such as soccer balls or paint cans often
    resulted in the killing or maiming of civilian noncombatants; thousands
    of displaced persons were unable to return to their homes due to the
    presence of antipersonnel mines. According to press reports, guerrilla
    bases in the despeje zone are surrounded by landmines. The FARC used
    sulfuric acid in the gas canisters that it employed as artillery, and
    continued its practice of using these canisters to attack small towns.
    Scores of soldiers, police, and civilians were burned indiscriminately
    as a result. For example, on August 19, two girls aged 13 and 14 years
    old, were killed when FARC guerrillas threw an explosive device into a
    hardware store in El Carmen de Bolivar, Bolivar department. In mid-
    December, a 9-year-old girl died buried in rubble when a gas canister
    destroyed her home in San Alfonso, Huila department, during a FARC
    attack. A 15-year-old female guerrilla also was killed in combat during
    the same attack.
        Although the ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children under the
    terms of the June 1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement, both it and
    the larger FARC regularly forced children into their ranks (see Section
    5). Once recruited, child guerrillas are virtual prisoners of their
    commanders and subject to various forms of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls
    is a particular problem, and former child guerrillas have testified to
    this in the press. According to one press report, the Roman Catholic
    Church documented one case of a 13-year-old girl who was recruited by
    the guerrillas and used for sex before a nun persuaded them to release
    her. Child soldiers, including girls, were seen in guerrilla ranks in
    the despeje, and reports from various sources indicate that the
    guerrillas recruited at least 120 minors in the despeje. In addition,
    many families reportedly left the despeje (or have been displaced from
    other regions) to escape forcible recruitment of their children.
    According to press reports, in April FARC military commander Jorge
    Briceno Suarez (``Mono Jojoy'') admitted that the FARC often had
    committed serious abuses against civilians and that the FARC made
    regular use of child combatants.
        Guerrilla-paramilitary violence left a string of civilian
    casualties in the wake of ongoing targeted or massive killings by both
    sides. For example, in Barrancabermeja paramilitary and guerrilla
    elements killed 160 persons during the first 6 months of the year, the
    highest total in 5 years for this area. On December 11, the army's
    Human Rights Office posted on placards in Bogota's central square the
    names of 3,289 civilians, of whom 11,596 persons were killed by
    paramilitary groups, and 693 persons by guerrillas. The names of more
    than 200 children were listed.
        The FARC staged many attacks against municipalities outside of the
    despeje, possibly in a de facto effort to expand the demilitarized
    zone. According to the Ministry of Defense, between January and
    October, 74 guerrilla attacks on towns left 3,515 civilians dead. On
    July 12, the FARC attacked four towns in Huila and Tolima departments,
    destroying police stations, churches, schools, businesses, and homes.
    Four FARC groups attacked Alpujarra in southern Tolima department, and
    Colombia, Timana, and Vegalarga in Huila department. The attacks left 4
    civilians dead and more than 15 persons wounded. The FARC attacked
    Vegalarga again 8 days later. As a result, more than 2,000 persons from
    Vegalarga, Colombia, Algeciras, and other towns fled to Neiva, capital
    of Huila department. On July 14, the FARC entered the town of
    Roncesvalles, Tolima department, and killed 13 policemen. According to
    press reports, the FARC attacked the mayor's office, various commercial
    buildings, a dozen homes, and the police station. After the police ran
    out of ammunition defending the station, they were killed upon
    surrendering.
        Ending its unilaterally declared Christmas truce, on January 12,
    the FARC attacked four towns in Narino department. The attackers
    destroyed police stations, town halls, and a water plant. The FARC
    killed three policemen and one civilian and kidnaped three other
    civilians. During the course of the attacks, FARC members also stole an
    ambulance and bombed the Trans-Andean oil pipeline near Ipiales,
    causing an oil spill. On January 15, approximately 500 guerrillas
    attacked four different points along the Bogota-Villavicencio highway.
    In confrontations among the army, the National Police, and the FARC, at
    least five civilians and five security force members were killed. The
    army reported that it killed 44 FARC combatants in action. Also on
    January 15, four National Police stations in southern Bogota were
    destroyed; one 11-year-old girl was killed by a grenade, and seven
    other civilians were reported wounded. The National Police suspected
    that the FARC was responsible for the attacks. According to press
    reports, in January the ELN kidnaped 15 persons southwest of Cartagena
    and then reportedly used 8 of its victims as human shields in
    confrontations with the police and the marines. One 19-year-old woman
    was killed in the crossfire.
        During a January attack on the town of El Castillo, Meta
    department, indiscriminate FARC use of homemade artillery resulted in
    the destruction of the town church, hospital, school, town hall, and at
    least 20 homes. Eight FARC guerrillas, all estimated to be between the
    ages of 13 and 15, were killed during the attack. Nine civilians were
    killed, and four civilians were wounded.
        On February 4, a car bomb in Puerto Asis, Putumayo department,
    killed 2 persons and wounded 10 other persons. On March 3, the FARC
    detonated a car bomb in the town square at Cachipay, Cundinamarca
    department; 3 civilians were killed and 19 were wounded. On March 30,
    the FARC detonated another bomb in front of the mayor's office in
    Cachipay, which killed 3 persons and wounded 20 others. On March 26,
    the FARC detonated another car bomb in the town square at Girardot,
    Cundinamarca department, killing 1 policeman and wounding 10 civilians.
    Many believed that the Girardot bombing was a FARC admonishment to
    local merchants who were late in making extortion payments. Other FARC
    car bombings in Cundinamarca department at Soacha (a southern
    neighborhood of Bogota) on February 24 and at Anapoima on January 16
    caused property damage but did not result in any deaths.
        During a March FARC artillery attack on the Medellin base of the
    army's Fourth Brigade, 2 civilians were killed and 18 injured when the
    FARC's gas cylinder-bombs exploded prematurely in a civilian
    neighborhood. A total of 45 homes and 2 civilian buildings were
    destroyed.
        On July 29, approximately 400 members of the FARC guerrilla group
    attacked the town of Arboleda, Caldas department, killing 12 policemen
    and 4 civilians. The attack lasted for 2 days. Guerrillas detonated
    explosives in front of town buildings, including the police station and
    a church. Most of the village was damaged or destroyed.
        On August 2, the FARC 14th front killed five hostages with shots to
    the head and left a sixth person for dead. The survivor, a farmer named
    Fernando Jimenez Hurtado, had been kidnaped in June in Caqueta
    department, south of the FARC demilitarized zone, and had been chained
    for 2 months to another hostage. He was forced to drag the victim's
    body almost 1 kilometer to the nearest police station. Jimenez Hurtado
    reported being held with 50 other kidnaped persons under poor
    conditions.
        Antioquia police reported that, on November 18, the FARC killed 6
    farmers who were former EPL guerrillas, burned 20 houses, and displaced
    30 persons in a rural area of Frontino, west of Medellin. Unconfirmed
    reports indicated that another five persons may have disappeared.
        From late September to early December, the FARC banned all road
    traffic in the southern department of Putumayo, following an offensive
    by paramilitary forces in the area of La Hormuga. The guerrillas' ban
    on road traffic, which was criticized by NGO's and local officials, led
    to severe shortages in food and medicine despite government efforts to
    fly in supplies and to secure key roads. The FARC also reportedly
    restricted the movement of ambulances.
        According to the Federation of Colombian Municipalities,
    paramilitary and guerrilla attacks damaged or destroyed the
    installations of 64 municipal governments during the year, and
    paramilitary groups and guerrillas kidnaped 20 mayors and 18 mayoral
    candidates (see Sections 1.b. and 3).
        The FARC committed numerous abuses against civilians in the despeje
    zone. The FARC was responsible for killings, alleged cases of forced
    disappearance, rape, arbitrary detention, infringement of the rights to
    free speech, freedom of religion (see Section 2.c.), and fair trial
    (see Section 1.e.), forced political indoctrination, and the forced
    recruitment of hundreds of children. According to press reports, the
    FARC has stated publicly that all persons between the ages of 13 and 60
    in the despeje zone are liable for military service with the
    guerrillas; families fleeing the zone reported that they were asked to
    surrender children to the FARC as of their 14th birthday.
        Guerrillas, usually the ELN, destroyed 434 electrical pylons in the
    period from January 1999 to September 2000, causing massive damage to
    the country's power industry and increases in electricity rates for
    consumers. Guerrilla attacks on oil pipelines caused considerable
    environmental damage.
        According to press reports in September, the ELN had held an
    internal trial of participants in the 1998 Machuca fireball incident in
    which over 80 persons were killed and 17 were injured as a result of an
    ELN pipeline bombing. According to the reports, the ELN claimed to have
    expelled guerrillas from its ranks for involvement in the crime.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press; and the Government generally respected this right
    in practice; however, journalists regularly practiced selfcensorship to
    avoid retaliation and harassment by various groups. The privately owned
    print media published a wide spectrum of political viewpoints and often
    voiced harsh antigovernment opinions without fear of reprisals. A ban
    on the publication of evidence pertaining to criminal investigations,
    based on the secrecy provisions of the Penal Code and an anticorruption
    statute, remained in effect. Journalists typically work in an
    atmosphere of threats and intimidation, primarily from paramilitary
    groups and guerrillas, which appeared to worsen during the year.
    Fearing for their safety, journalists often refrain from publishing or
    broadcasting stories counter to the interest of paramilitary groups,
    guerrillas, or narcotics traffickers.
        In October 1999, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special
    Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression stated that the ``press freedom
    situation in Colombia is a serious source of concern'' and that, in
    addition to the killings of journalists, ``Colombian journalists endure
    constant threats and intimidation.''
        The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's office reported
    in November that it had 32 open cases involving murders, kidnapings,
    and threats against journalists. Twelve journalists were killed during
    the year, although not all of the killings could be attributed directly
    to the journalists' work.
        On September 9, members of a paramilitary group murdered Carlos
    Jose Restrepo Rocha, the publisher of TanGente newspaper in Tolima, a
    municipal council candidate, and a former member of the now-inactive M-
    19 terrorist group. Ten men who identified themselves as members of a
    paramilitary group seized Restrepo during a community meeting in San
    Luis de Ibague, Tolima department, and Restrepo was found dead hours
    later, with paramilitary pamphlets placed on his body.
        On November 15, unidentified assailants shot and killed local radio
    reporter Gustavo Rafael Ruiz Cantillo in the Pivijay municipality
    marketplace, Magdalena department. Many observers believe that he was
    killed by paramilitary forces, who reportedly have a strong presence in
    Pivijay; however, the FARC also are known to operate in the region. An
    investigation continued at year's end.
        On November 30, unidentified assailants killed reporter Guillermo
    Leon Agudelo in his home in Florencia, Caqueta department. On December
    13, two persons on a motorcycle shot and killed Alfredo Abad Lopez,
    director of the Voice of the Jungle radio station, a Caracol affiliate,
    as he left his home in Florencia, Caqueta department. The authorities
    formed a special investigative unit to establish whether the two
    murders are connected, and the Florencia mayor's office offered a
    $10,000 reward for information leading to arrests in these cases.
        In May 1999, the Prosecutor General's office created a new
    subdivision to handle investigations of crimes that targeted
    journalists. On May 3, investigations also produced arrest warrants
    against AUC leader Carlos Castano and three other persons who allegedly
    killed journalists Alberto Sanchez and Luis Alberto Rincon.
        In July the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Unit indicted Rodolfo
    Nelson Rosado Hernandez (alias ``El Pichi'') and Jorge Eliecer Espinal
    Velasquez (``El Parce'') in the September 1999 murder of newspaper
    editor Guzman Quintero Torres in Valledupar, Cesar department. The two
    have been in police custody since September 1999 and are thought to be
    members of a group of killers working for area paramilitary forces.
    Quintero's editorials had criticized state forces in the area, and he
    reportedly had been threatened before his death.
        There was also progress in the investigation of murdered journalist
    Jaime Garzon (see Section 1.a.).
        Guerrillas, primarily the ELN, were responsible for the kidnaping
    of 15 journalists during the year. Guerrillas abducted many of them to
    bear witness to crimes committed by paramilitary forces or to deliver
    messages to local authorities. Eleven journalists reported death
    threats during the year.
        In January the FARC kidnaped journalist Guillermo ``la Chiva''
    Cortes; in August security forces rescued him, along with six other
    hostages.
        On May 25, Jineth Bedoya Lima, a reporter for the El Espectador
    newspaper, was kidnaped and raped over a period of 10 hours while on
    her way to interview a convicted paramilitary leader at the Modelo
    prison in Bogota. Two days prior to her kidnaping, El Espectador
    received threatening letters against her and other journalists. Carlos
    Castano, leader of the AUC paramilitary organization, denied that the
    AUC was involved in the kidnaping.
        On December 16, the ELN reportedly kidnaped Caracol television
    journalist Winston Viracacha in Tumaco, Narino department. Viracacha
    had traveled with his cameraman and an assistant to meet members of the
    ELN's ``Comuneros del Sur'' front, who retained Viracacha but released
    his companions.
        Thirteen journalists left the country during the year. In March
    Francisco ``Pancho'' Santos, editor of the family-run El Tiempo, the
    country's largest newspaper, and founder of the Pais Libre
    antikidnaping organization and the national ``No More'' antiviolence
    civic campaign, fled the country after announcing that he was the
    target of a FARC guerrilla group plot to kill him. Santos remained in
    exile at year's end. Also in March, television personality Fernando
    Gonzalez Pacheco fled the country after receiving threats from the
    FARC. In June Ignacio Gomez Gomez, a journalist for El Espectador, fled
    the country after receiving threats against his life.
        The InterAmerican Press Society opened a rapid action unit office
    in Bogota to help the Prosecutor General's office investigate crimes
    against journalists. On August 18, President Pastrana issued a decree
    establishing a program for the protection of journalists. In October
    the Minister of Interior announced the inauguration of the program,
    which is to provide armor for cars, escorts, and transportation. The
    Government consulted with journalism organizations to identify
    journalists at special risk but has not had the resources to provide
    protection. The Ministry of the Interior supported an alerts network
    organized for journalists by providing a small number of radios and an
    emergency telephone hot line.
        On December 20, a specialized court judge in Neiva, Huila
    department, absolved contractor Fernando Bermudez Ardila and two other
    defendants accused of the April 1998 murder of journalist Nelson
    Carvajal Carvajal; the judge cited weak evidence in the case. Bermudez
    had been accused of hiring the two other men to kill Carvajal, because
    Carvajal would not agree to stop negative reporting about a development
    project built by Bermudez's firm. Prosecutors appealed the decision,
    and the Supreme Court is expected to rule on the case.
        Media ownership remains highly concentrated. Wealthy families or
    groups associated with one of the two dominant political parties have
    consolidated their holdings of news media, and regional firms continued
    to purchase local news media outlets. As a result of the general
    economic downturn, large press conglomerates closed radio stations and
    newspaper offices in certain provinces and reduced staff. Although the
    press remained generally free, economic problems and the concentration
    of media ownership limited the media's resources, causing the media to
    rely heavily on a smaller pool of advertisers, including the
    Government, which the media often chose not to criticize.
        The National Television Commission continued to oversee television
    programming throughout the year.
        The FARC restricted the movement of journalists in the despeje
    through blockades and random identity checks and on at least three
    occasions stopped El Tiempo trucks and burned all of the newspapers
    that they carried.
        The Government generally respected academic freedom, and there was
    a wide spectrum of political activity throughout the country's
    universities. However, paramilitary groups and guerrillas maintain a
    presence on many university campuses, aimed at generating political
    support for their respective campaigns. They use both violent and
    nonviolent means towards political ends. Both paramilitary groups and
    guerrillas also regularly targeted public school teachers at the
    elementary and secondary levels for politically motivated killings.
        In August the National University was closed, and its premises were
    searched after a policeman was killed during a protest. Students held a
    referendum against violent groups operating on the university campus.
        In April schools in Chalan and Ovejas, in Sucre department, were
    suspended due to death threats against 50 teachers. More than 3,000
    students were affected. Threats also were made against teachers in
    Coloso, Morroa, Toluviejo, San Onofre, Los Palmitos, and San Antonio de
    Palmito in Sucre department. All of the major guerrilla organizations
    and the paramilitary groups maintain a presence in the region.
        On October 5, Universidad del Atlantico professors Luis Meza
    Almanza Alfredo Martin Castro Hayder were killed in Barranquilla on
    October 5 and August 26, respectively. Both were known for leftist
    views and had been under consideration for rector positions at the
    University. Castro was reportedly on a death threat list.
        Investigations continued into four 1999 attacks against prominent
    academics. Jesus Antonio Bejarano, a former government peace
    commissioner; Doctor Dario Betancur, head of the social sciences
    faculty of Bogota's Universidad Pedagogica; and Doctor Hernando Henao,
    an anthropologist who published on the subject of displaced persons,
    all were killed in 1999. In December 1999, Professor Eduardo Pizarro
    Leongomez, director of the political studies and international affairs
    institute at the National University, was shot twice by unknown
    attackers; he survived but fled the country. As a result of these
    incidents, academic leaders have chosen to assume a lower profile; many
    have taken up residence outside the country.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects
    this right in practice. The authorities normally do not interfere with
    public meetings and demonstrations and usually grant the required
    permission except when they determine that there is imminent danger to
    public order.
        There were large demonstrations on several occasions by citizens
    throughout the country; the authorities generally did not interfere.
        In February police sought to remove an U'wa road block by using
    tear gas to disperse the crowd; the U'wa claimed that four children
    were killed in the ensuing panic (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Press
    reports indicated that only one body was recovered. In April numerous
    indigenous groups blocked routes, freeways, and city streets throughout
    the country to demand respect for their life and territory and to
    support the Embera-Katio and U'wa tribes in their disputes against the
    Urra hydroelectric project and Occidental Petroleum respectively (see
    Section 5). On September 10, thousands of persons across the country,
    including business leaders, union activists, and ordinary citizens,
    marched in support of peace and respect for human rights.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Any legal organization is
    free to associate with international groups in its field. Membership in
    proscribed organizations, such as the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and the
    AUC, is a crime.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Roman Catholic religious instruction is no longer mandatory in public
    schools, and a 1994 Constitutional Court decision declared
    unconstitutional any official government reference to religious
    characterizations of the country. Although the Catholic Church was
    separated from the State by the 1991 Constitution, it retains a de
    facto privileged status. The law on the freedom of religion provides a
    mechanism for religions to obtain the status of recognized legal
    entities. Accession to the 1997 public law agreement between the State
    and non-Roman Catholic religious entities currently is required for any
    religion that wishes to minister to its adherents via any public
    institution. Local governments may exempt from taxes religiously
    affiliated organizations such as schools and libraries; however, in
    practice, local governments often exempt only organizations that are
    affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. The Government permits
    proselytizing among the indigenous population, provided that it is
    welcome and does not induce members of indigenous communities to adopt
    changes that endanger their survival on traditional lands.
        Paramilitary groups sometimes target representatives and members of
    the Roman Catholic Church and evangelical Christian churches, generally
    for political reasons.
        The FARC has placed religious restrictions on persons within the
    despeje zone. The FARC also levied ``war taxes'' on Roman Catholic and
    evangelical churches and schools in the despeje and elsewhere.
        The FARC and ELN guerrilla movements regularly target
    representatives and members of the Roman Catholic Church and
    evangelical Christian churches, generally for political reasons, and
    committed acts of murder, kidnaping, and extortion, as well as
    inhibited the right to free religious expression. For example,
    according to one evangelical movement, guerrillas regularly attacked
    rural evangelical Christians and their churches.
        According to the Christian Union Movement, the FARC murdered 46 of
    the movement's affiliated preachers between January 1999 and June 2000.
    As of June, the FARC had forced the closure of over 300 evangelical
    churches in Meta, Guajira, Tolima, Vaupes, Guainia, Guaviare, Vichada,
    Casanare, and Arauca departments. Additionally, the movement claimed
    that the FARC extorted and, in many cases, forced the closure of rural
    evangelical schools. Faced with threats by guerrillas or paramilitary
    forces, many evangelical preachers were forced to refrain from publicly
    addressing the country's internal conflict.
        Guerrillas were suspected of the April massacre of 2 evangelical
    preachers and 12 church members at Hato Nuevo, Carmen de Bolivar,
    Bolivar department.
        On March 27, unidentified perpetrators killed Roman Catholic priest
    Hugo Duque Hernandez at Supia, Caldas department.
        There were no new developments in the November 1999 killings of
    Roman Catholic priest Jorge Luis Maza and Spanish aid worker Inigu
    Egiluz in Choco department; security forces had arrested nine members
    of a paramilitary group in conjunction with the crime.
        The human rights unit of the Prosecutor General's Office reported
    in November that it had 34 open cases of killings of members of
    evangelical groups.
        The Bishops' Conference of the Roman Catholic Church reported that
    paramilitary forces, the ELN, and the FARC sometimes threatened rural
    priests with death for speaking out against them. It also reported that
    Roman Catholic churches in Huila, Tolima, Cauca, and Antioquia
    departments were destroyed during guerrilla attacks on towns and police
    stations.
        On April 11, at least three Mormon temples in Cali were bombed. No
    one was injured in the attacks, which damaged buildings. No one claimed
    responsibility for the attacks.
        Jewish community leaders estimated that as many as 20 percent of
    the country's Jewish community had fled the country as of July 1999.
    Among the principal causes was a string of kidnapings, assaults, and
    murders affecting Jewish business leaders.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
    the right to travel domestically and abroad, and the Government
    generally respects this right in practice, with some exceptions.
    Outsiders who wish to enter Indian tribes' reserves must be invited. In
    areas where counterinsurgency operations were underway, police or
    military officials occasionally required civilians to obtain safe-
    conduct passes; paramilitary forces and guerrillas often used similar
    means to restrict travel in areas under their control. At times the
    Government implemented curfews. Military counterinsurgency operations,
    forced conscription by paramilitary and guerrilla organizations, and
    guerrilla incursions often forced peasants to flee their homes and
    farms, and there was a very large population of internally displaced
    persons. According to CODHES, approximately 317,000 displacements of
    persons occurred during the year; the vast majority of displaced
    persons are peasants who have been displaced to cities (see Section
    1.g.).
        Throughout the year, frequent road blockades erected by
    paramilitary groups, the FARC, ELN, and peasant farmers inhibited
    transportation, communication, and commerce throughout the country.
    Social organizations also resorted to road blockages, some of them
    prolonged, to protest government actions or policies. Almost every
    major artery in the country was closed at some point during the year.
    From late September to early December, the FARC banned all road traffic
    in the southern state of Putumayo, following an offensive by
    paramilitary forces in the area of La Hormiga (see Section 1.g.).
        Press reports indicate that more than 300,000 citizens emigrated
    during the last 2 years, due principally to the deteriorating security
    situation and economic recession.
        The Constitution provides for the right to asylum, under terms
    established by law in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The country has had a
    tradition of providing asylum since the 1920's. At year's end, 239
    refugees had legal asylum status, and 12 applications for asylum were
    pending.
        The Government cooperates with the offices of the UNHCR and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and internally
    displaced persons. The Government reserves the right to determine
    eligibility for asylum, based upon its own assessment of the nature of
    the applicant's suffering. The issue of the provision of first asylum
    did not arise during the year. There were no reports of the forced
    return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    government, and citizens exercise this right in regularly scheduled
    elections by secret ballot. In 1998 voters elected Conservative Party
    candidate Andres Pastrana President in elections that were free, fair,
    and transparent, despite some threats to the electoral process by
    paramilitary groups, narcotics traffickers, and guerrillas. The Liberal
    Party controls the legislature.
        Presidential elections are held every 4 years, with the incumbent
    barred for life from reelection. The Liberal and Conservative parties
    long have dominated the formal political process with one or the other
    winning the presidency. Public employees are not permitted to
    participate in partisan campaigns. Officially, all political parties
    operate freely without government interference. Those that fail to
    garner 50,000 votes in a general election lose the right to present
    candidates and may not receive funds from the Government. However, they
    may reincorporate at any time by presenting 50,000 signatures to the
    National Electoral Board. Voting is voluntary and universal for
    citizens age 18 and older, except for activeduty members of the police
    and armed forces, who may not vote.
        Prior to local elections in October, both paramilitary and
    guerrilla organizations sought to dissuade some potential candidates
    from running for office or restrict their ability to campaign. The
    Colombian Federation of Municipalities reported to the press that armed
    groups threatened candidates in more than half of the country's 1,085
    municipalities. By year's end, the Federation reported that 19 mayoral
    candidates were killed, 20 were kidnaped, 12 reported threats, and as
    many as 53 candidates for mayoral and municipal council posts withdrew
    their candidacies. For example, on September 23, guerrillas kidnaped
    the mayor of Samaniego, a Liberal Party candidate for that office, and
    six other mayoral candidates from this southern town in Narino. On
    September 9, members of a paramilitary group forced Carlos Restrepo, a
    leftist activist and publisher who was planning to run for a local
    office, from a community meeting; his body later was found outside San
    Luis. However, the October 29 elections were generally peaceful.
        In April the FARC announced the formation of a political party--the
    Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia--before a gathering of thousands
    of persons. FARC leader Manuel Marulanda announced that the party would
    operate secretly.
        There are no legal restrictions, and few practical ones, on the
    participation of women or minorities in the political process; however,
    both are underrepresented in official and party positions. In March a
    quota law to increase the number of women in high-level public
    positions went into effect. The quota law requires that a minimum goal
    of 30 percent of nominated positions, including seats on the high
    courts and ministerial positions, be allotted to women. The quota law
    does not apply to publicly elected positions, such as seats in
    Congress. Before the end of each year, the Government must report to
    Congress the percentage of women in high-level governmental positions.
    Voters elected 14 women to the 102-seat Senate and 19 women to the
    161seat House of Representatives in March 1998. At year's end, there
    were 4 women in the 16-member cabinet--they serve as the Ministers of
    Health, Culture, Communications, and Foreign Trade. There were no women
    among the 23 Supreme Court justices, 1 woman among 9 Constitutional
    Court magistrates, and 3 women out of 13 magistrates of the Superior
    Judicial Council.
        Indigenous people are underrepresented in government and politics.
    Two Senate seats are reserved for indigenous representatives. In
    October voters in Cauca elected Floro Tunubala, the country's first
    indigenous governor. Blacks also are underrepresented in government and
    politics. In 1996 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a
    1993 law that set aside two house seats for citizens of African
    heritage, although the ruling nonetheless allowed the incumbents to
    complete their terms in office. There is one black senator, but there
    are no black members of the Chamber of Representatives.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A large and varied nongovernmental human rights community is
    active, and provides a wide range of views. Among the many groups are:
    The Colombian Catholic Bishops Conference; the Colombian Commission of
    Jurists; the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace; the
    Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights; the Center for
    Investigations and Popular Research; the Advisory Committee for Human
    Rights and Displacements; the Latin American Institute for Alternative
    Legal Services; the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners
    (dedicated to defending accused guerrillas); the Association of
    Families of Detained and Disappeared Persons; the Reinsertion
    Foundation (focused on demobilized guerrillas); the Pais Libre
    Foundation (focused on the rights of kidnap victims); and the Vida
    Foundation (focused on the rights of victims of guerrilla violence).
    Other international humanitarian and human rights organizations in the
    country that were active include the ICRC (with 16 offices across the
    country) and Peace Brigades International.
        Although the Government generally did not interfere directly with
    the work of human rights NGO's, many prominent human rights monitors
    worked under constant fear for their physical safety. There were
    unconfirmed reports that security forces harassed or threatened human
    rights groups. In August the Prosecutor General's office opened an
    investigation against retired Brigadier Generals Millan and Del Rio for
    bribing witnesses to testify falsely against a leading NGO organizer
    and a labor leader. Human rights groups were subjected to surveillance,
    harassing phone calls, graffiti campaigns, and threats by paramilitary,
    guerrilla, and other unidentified groups. At least four human rights
    activists had been killed as of October; there were three forced
    disappearances of human rights activists.
        In October Angel Quintero and Claudia Patricia Monsalve, members of
    ASFADDES (an association for relatives of the disappeared) were
    kidnaped in Medellin by persons claiming political motives. There has
    been no news of the victims since October, and no arrests have been
    made. The authorities continued their investigation at year's end.
        In August the Government launched an effort to improve its dialog
    with NGO's on human rights, the peace process, the Government's
    comprehensive strategy known as ``Plan Colombia,'' and other issues. In
    October the Government jointly hosted with an NGO umbrella group an
    international gathering on these issues which included the
    participation of the ELN.
        NGO's investigated and reported on human rights abuses committed by
    government forces, various paramilitary groups, and the guerrillas.
    Many NGO's expressed serious concern over the growing paramilitary and
    guerrilla violence and the Government's apparent inability to stop
    either group. In particular, a number of NGO's, as well as governmental
    human rights officials, were alarmed by the rapid growth of popular
    support for paramilitary groups, and their increasing political and
    military power.
        The human rights community remained under intense pressure during
    the year. Human rights monitors were subjected to a systematic campaign
    of intimidation, harassment, and violence. According to the Colombian
    Commission of Jurists, five human rights advocates were killed during
    the year; three human rights workers disappeared. A total of 49 human
    rights workers have been killed or have disappeared in the past 5
    years. On numerous occasions during the year, paramilitary groups in
    several municipalities circulated lists of the names of persons they
    considered ``military targets,'' which included the names of local
    human rights activists, labor organizers, and politicians.
        In addition, approximately 35 human rights workers left the
    country, either temporarily or permanently, for their own safety. For
    example, in July human rights activists Ivan Cepeda and his wife
    Claudia Giron left the country after receiving threats against their
    lives.
        The Government, through the Ministry of the Interior and the DAS,
    allocated approximately $4.3 million (8 billion pesos) to its 2-year-
    old program to protect human rights advocates and labor activists
    associated with 88 different human rights NGO's and unions. The funds
    were designated for security measures for individuals as well as for
    the headquarters of the NGO's, an emergency radio network, and funding
    for travel abroad for individuals who faced a particular threat;
    however, human rights groups stated that the protection programs are
    inadequate to address the crisis, and called for increased efforts to
    combat impunity.
        The new forced disappearance law provides for a maximum penalty of
    60 years for cases involving human rights activists (see Section 1.b.).
        Armed groups targeted regional ombudsmen. Fourteen regional
    ombudsmen have been killed since 1998. In July Jose Manuel Bello, the
    municipal human rights ombudsman in Vigia del Fuerte, Atrato, Antioquia
    department, reportedly was kidnaped, killed, and dragged into the
    Atrato River by members of the FARC guerrilla group. In July
    unidentified, armed men killed Yemil Fernando Hurtado Castano, the
    human rights ombudsman in Narino municipality, southeastern Antioquia
    department. The regional ombudsman of Lourdes municipality, Norte de
    Santander department, was kidnaped and held for 3 days by paramilitary
    forces. Garcia and two other municipal human rights officials were
    forced to leave Norte de Santander department due to continued
    paramilitary threats.
        The criminal organization La Terraza publicly admitted to killing
    at least five human rights advocates and stated that the killings had
    been ordered by Carlos Castano (see Section 1.a.).
        There was no reported progress in the investigation of the
    September 1999 killing of the Human Rights Ombudsman's representative
    for San Juan Nepomuceno, Carlos Arturo Pareja, and his assistant.
        A preliminary investigation by the Prosecutor's national human
    rights unit indicated common criminals were responsible for the January
    1999 killings of Everardo de Jesus Puerta and Julio Ernesto Gonzalez,
    both members of the Committee for Solidarity with Political Prisoners
    (CSPP). The case was referred to the Medellin prosecutor's office for
    further investigation.
        Prosecutors continued to investigate the November 1999 AUC killings
    of southern Bolivar department peasant leaders Edgar Quiroga and
    Gildardo Fuentes.
        On November 22, a Bogota judge convicted two members of a
    paramilitary group for the 1997 murders of two CINEP workers and one
    other person. Arrest warrants remained outstanding for Carlos Castano
    and four other members of paramilitary groups (see Section 1.a.).
        Suspected paramilitary leader Libardo Humberto Prada was linked by
    NGO's to the August 15 murder of peace activist and former mayor Luis
    Fernando Rincon Lopez in Aguachica, Cesar department. The case remained
    under investigation at year's end. In April 1999, the human rights unit
    of the Prosecutor General's office formally indicted Prada and
    paramilitary Cielo Lobo Ascano in the August 1998 killing in Valledupar
    of local Redepaz coordinator Amparo Leonor Jiminez.
        In February a lower civilian court convicted four Colombian human
    rights activists arrested by the army in 1997 for allegedly funneling
    international human rights assistance intended for displaced persons to
    the ELN guerrilla movement. The court sentenced them each to 5 years'
    imprisonment.
        The Ministry of Defense reported that in the past 5 years, 97,894
    security force members received human rights training during the year,
    including 1,994 human rights trainers. Such training is provided by the
    ICRC, the Colombian Red Cross, the Roman Catholic Church, elements of
    the Government and security forces, and foreign governments. Many
    observers credited these programs with having done much to foster a
    climate of increased respect for human rights and international
    humanitarian law within the military forces in recent years.
        The Government has an extensive human rights apparatus, which
    includes the office of the President's Adviser for Human Rights, headed
    by Vice President Gustavo Bell. Human rights expert Reinaldo Botero was
    named Director of the presidential program for human rights and
    international humanitarian law in September. The executive branch's
    efforts on human rights are supported by the Ministry of Interior, the
    human rights office of the Ministry of Defense, and dependent offices
    for each of the public security forces. The office of the national
    Human Rights Ombudsman, its regional representatives and corps of
    public defenders, the Attorney General's office and its delegate for
    human rights and regional representatives, and the Prosecutor General's
    office and its human rights unit are all independent institutions, not
    subject to executive branch direction.
        The House of Representatives elects the Public Ministry's National
    Ombudsman for Human Rights for a 4-year term, which does not coincide
    with that of the President. The office has the constitutional duty to
    ensure the promotion and exercise of human rights. The Ombudsman
    provides public defense attorneys and a channel for complaints of human
    rights violations (see Section 1.e.). However, the Ombudsman lacks
    sufficient funding and staff. In August the House of Representatives
    named former Constitutional Court Judge Eduardo Cifuentes Munoz as
    Human Rights Ombudsman.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman's office processed 13,951 complaints in
    1999 (the latest year for which figures were available); 8,562 cases
    (61 percent) were against government entities. Of the 7,272 cases
    concluded in 1999, the Ombudsman's office obtained favorable or
    partially favorable conclusions in 2,867, or forty percent. Another
    1,436 were referred to the competent authority. The office also
    provided 40,656 free legal consultations through its corps of more than
    1,000 public defenders, many of whom work only part-time.
        Early in the year, the Government established a high-level
    commission to coordinate policy on human rights and international
    humanitarian law, which is headed by Vice President Gustavo Bell.
        In August 1999, the Vice President enunciated the Government's
    human rights policy; however, some aspects of implementation have been
    slow to materialize. The Government's national human rights plan called
    for the respect, promotion, and assurance of human rights. It promised
    increased government attention to the consequences of human rights
    abuses and called on all armed factions to respect international
    humanitarian law. The plan asserted that security forces would combat
    both guerrilla and paramilitary forces. One of the plan's most
    important provisions permitted the armed forces commander to remove
    from service summarily any military member whose performance in
    combating paramilitary forces he deemed ``unsatisfactory or
    insufficient.'' In September President Pastrana signed 12 decrees to
    reform and strengthen the military; one decree provides for the
    separation from service of all uniformed members of the military
    regardless of their time in service, at the discretion of the top
    military commanders (see Section 1.e.).
        The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNHCR have
    offices in Bogota. In 1997 the UNHCHR opened a field office in Bogota
    to observe human rights practices and advise the Government; its
    mandate was extended through April 2002. The office is tasked with
    monitoring and analyzing the human rights situation throughout the
    country and with the provision of assistance to the Government, civil
    society, and NGO's in the field of human rights protection. It
    submitted reports to the Government and to the U.N. In March the UNHCR
    report, which covered 1999, noted that ``the continued existence of
    direct links between some members of the security forces and
    paramilitary groups, revealed by disciplinary and judicial
    investigations, is a cause of great concern.'' The report also noted
    that in 1999 ``in some regions of the country, these links were
    strengthened and the authorities responsible for penalizing them failed
    to take decisive action.'' In April UNHCHR Mary Robinson noted
    ``reports indicating that members of the military forces participate
    directly in organizing new paramilitary groups and in disseminating
    threats. The President, other government officials, the UNHCHR, and
    various NGO's noted increased popular support for paramilitary groups
    and a polarization of political opinion with concern.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination based on
    race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status; however,
    in practice, many of these provisions are not enforced. The killing of
    homosexuals as part of the practice of social cleansing continued.
        Women.--Rape and other acts of violence against women are pervasive
    in society, and like other crimes, seldom are prosecuted successfully.
    According to the Ombudsman's 1999-2000 report, intrafamilial violence,
    sexual assault, and murder of women were increasing problems. The
    governmental Institute for Family Welfare and the Presidential
    Adviser's Office for Youth, Women, and Family Affairs continued to
    report high-levels of spouse and partner abuse throughout the country.
    In 1999 the Institute for Forensic Medicine reported 62,123 cases of
    domestic violence, of which 41,528 were conjugal violence, 9,896 were
    child abuse, and 10,699 were cases of abuse by other family members.
    The ICBF conducted programs and provided refuge and counseling for
    victims of spousal abuse; however, the level and amount of these
    services were dwarfed by the magnitude of the problem. For example,
    ICBF's 530 family ombudsmen handle approximately 1,160 cases per year.
        The Institute estimated that 95 percent of all abuse cases are
    never reported to the authorities and reported 13,703 cases of probable
    rape during the year.
        The 1996 Law on Family Violence criminalizes violent acts committed
    within families, including spousal rape. The law also provides legal
    recourse for victims of family violence, immediate protection from
    physical or psychological abuse, and judicial authority to remove the
    abuser from the household. It allows a judge to oblige an abuser to
    seek therapy or reeducation. For acts of spousal sexual violence, the
    law mandates sentences of 6 months to 2 years and denies probation or
    bail to offenders who disobey restraining orders issued by the courts.
    A 1997 law also made additional, substantial modifications to the Penal
    Code and introduced sentences of between 4 and 40 years for crimes
    against sexual freedom or human dignity, including rape, sex with a
    minor, sexual abuse, induction into prostitution, and child
    pornography. The law also repealed an old law that fully exonerated a
    rapist if he subsequently offered to marry the victim and she accepted.
    However, there was little evidence that this legislation was enforced
    systematically. The reforms to the Penal Code approved in June reduced
    the maximum sentence for violent sexual assault from 20 to 15 years;
    the minimum sentence is 8 years. The National Institute for Forensic
    Medicine reported 19,859 cases of spousal abuse during the first half
    of 1999. The overwhelming majority of victims were women. First Lady
    Nohra Pullana de Pastrana is on the board of directors of the ICBF and
    works with the ``Make Peace'' program, which provides support to women
    and children who were victims of domestic violence.
        Sexual harassment is a problem.
        Women also faced an increased threat of torture and sexual assault
    due to the internal conflict (see Section 1.g.).
        The forced disappearance law provides for a maximum penalty of 60
    years for cases involving pregnant women (see Section 1.b.).
        Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        The Constitution prohibits any form of discrimination against women
    and specifically requires the authorities to ensure ``adequate and
    effective participation by women at decisionmaking levels of public
    administration.'' Even prior to implementation of the 1991
    Constitution, the law had provided women with extensive civil rights.
    However, despite these constitutional provisions, discrimination
    against women persists. A study by the University of Rosario released
    during the year concluded that women faced hiring discrimination and
    that women's salaries were generally incompatible with their education
    and experience. The salary gap between men and women widened in the
    last decade, reaching a high point in 1999 as the country's economy
    declined. The study also noted that women were affected
    disproportionately by unemployment. Government unemployment statistics
    for the year indicated that the unemployment rate for men was 16.9
    percent, while the rate for women was 24.5 percent. According to the
    March report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, women earn
    28 percent less than men. The National Statistics Institute reported
    that a higher percentage of women were employed in minimum wage jobs.
    According to U.N. statistics, women's earnings for formal sector,
    nonagricultural work correspond to approximately 85 percent of men's
    earnings for comparable work, and women must demonstrate higher
    qualifications than men when applying for jobs. Moreover, women
    constitute a disproportionately high percentage of the subsistence
    labor work force, especially in rural areas. Female rural workers are
    affected most by wage discrimination and unemployment.
        Despite an explicit constitutional provision promising additional
    resources for single mothers and government efforts to provide them
    with training in parenting skills, women's groups reported that the
    social and economic problems of single mothers remained great. In
    September 1997, the Constitutional Court ruled that pregnant women and
    mothers of newborn children under 3 months of age could not be fired
    from their jobs without ``just cause.'' The court ruled that bearing
    children was not just cause.
        On October 25, the Constitutional Court struck down a law that had
    prohibited pregnant women who are divorced or separated from their
    partners from remarrying before giving birth. The law also had imposed
    a 270-day ``waiting period'' for women who wanted to remarry.
        Children.--The Constitution formally provides for free public
    education, which is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15. An
    estimated 25 percent of children in this age group do not attend
    school, due to lax enforcement of truancy laws, inadequate classroom
    space, and economic pressures to provide income for the family. The
    Government provides for the cost of primary education, but many
    families face additional expenses related to education, such as
    matriculation fees, books, school items and transportation costs (which
    are significant in rural areas where children may live far from
    school). These costs can be prohibitive, especially for the rural poor.
        Despite significant constitutional and legislative commitments for
    the protection of children's rights, these were implemented only to a
    minimal degree. The Constitution imposes the obligation on family,
    society, and the State to assist and protect children, to foster their
    development, and to assure the full exercise of these rights. The
    Children's Code sets forth many of these rights and establishes
    services and programs designed to enforce the protection of minors.
    Children's advocates reported the need to educate citizens with regard
    to the code as well as the 1996 and 1997 laws on family violence, which
    had been drafted particularly to increase legal protection for women
    and children.
        Abuse of children is a problem. The National Institute for Forensic
    Medicine reported 9,896 cases of child abuse during the year; there
    were 9,713 reported cases in 1999. According to the March report of the
    U.N. Commission on Human Rights, sexual abuse is prevalent,
    particularly of children between the ages of 5 and 14 years of age. In
    70 to 80 percent of cases, children know their abusers.
        An estimated 25,000 boys and girls under age 18 work in the sex
    trade. In 1996 legislators passed a law prohibiting sex with minors or
    the employment of minors for prostitution, and they amended that law in
    1997 to provide that conviction for nonviolent sexual abuse of a child
    under age 14 carries a prison sentence of 4 to 10 years. Conviction for
    rape of anyone under the age of 12 carries a mandatory sentence of 20
    to 40 years in prison. Enforcement of such laws is lax. The ICBF
    oversees all government child protection and welfare programs and funds
    nongovernmental and church programs for children.
        Trafficking in girls is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Child labor is a significant problem (see Section 6.d.).
        In conflict zones, children often were caught in the crossfire
    between the public security forces, paramilitary groups, and guerrilla
    organizations. For example, on August 15, six children were killed and
    several others injured by members of the army's Fourth Brigade who
    mistook the children for a guerrilla unit (see Section 1.g.). Ministry
    of Defense figures indicated that approximately 200 children were
    killed due to the conflict during the year. At mid-year, UNICEF
    reported that 460 children had been killed over the past 4 years by
    various armed groups and that 789 had been kidnaped. Children suffered
    disproportionately from the internal conflict, often forfeiting
    opportunities to study as they were displaced by conflict and suffered
    psychological traumas. According to UNICEF, over 1 million children
    have been displaced from their homes over the past decade. The Human
    Rights Ombudsman's office estimated that only 15 percent of displaced
    children attend school. In July 1999, the Government announced that no
    one under the age of 18 could enter military service, even with the
    consent of a parent; previously, individuals over 16 years of age but
    below age 18 could volunteer to join the military with parental
    permission but were barred from serving in combat.
        Paramilitary groups sometimes impressed children into their ranks,
    and the use of child soldiers by guerrillas was common. According to
    press reports, in August members of the FARC killed a school rector in
    Meta department for criticizing the recruitment of his students. The
    Government estimates that approximately 6,000 children are engaged as
    combatants by both paramilitary groups and guerrillas. In May 1999, the
    FARC promised visiting Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary
    General on Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu that it would stop
    forcing children into its ranks; however, it continued the practice.
    The Roman Catholic Church reported that the FARC lured or forced
    hundreds of children from the despeje zone into its ranks. It engaged
    in similar practices in other areas under its control. For example,
    according to press reports, in June the FARC recruited at least 37
    youths, including minors, in the municipality of Puerto Rico in
    southern Meta department. According to one NGO, in Putumayo the FARC
    instigated compulsory service of males between the ages of 13 and 15
    and was recruiting in high schools. Once recruited, child guerrillas
    are virtual prisoners of their commanders and subject to various forms
    of abuse. Sexual abuse of girls is a particular problem. Although the
    ELN agreed to halt recruitment of children under the terms of the June
    1998 Mainz ``Heaven's Gate'' agreement, it also regularly impressed
    children into its ranks. Some 57 child guerrillas were captured or
    deserted during the year, and 27 children were killed during FARC-
    military clashes.
        According to press reports, families from the demilitarized zone,
    as well as from Arauca, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia departments have
    fled their homes because guerrilla groups have tried to recruit their
    children forcibly. On May 4, a woman from Norte de Santander
    department, with the help of the Colombian military, delivered her 12-
    year-old son to the ICBF to protect him from the FARC, which was trying
    to recruit him forcibly.
        Children were also among the preferred kidnaping targets of
    guerrillas (see Section 1.b.). Pais Libre reports that the number of
    children kidnaped annually has increased in recent years, from 131 in
    1998 to 206 in 1999, and as of November 12, 265 children had been
    kidnaped in 2000. According to one press report, more than 200 children
    were kidnaped during the year. For example, the FARC kidnaped 9-year-
    old Clara Oliva Pantoja on March 22 and 3-year-old Andres Felipe Navas
    on April 7 and held both in the despeje zone. Clara Olivia Pantoja was
    released in December (see Section 1.b.). In April three armed men
    kidnaped 9-year-old Dagberto Ospina Ospina from his school bus in
    southern Cali. No group has been identified or claimed responsibility.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution enumerates the
    fundamental social, economic, and cultural rights of the physically
    disabled; however, serious practical impediments exist that prevent the
    full participation of disabled persons in society. There is no
    legislation that specifically mandates access for the disabled.
    According to the Constitutional Court, physically disabled individuals
    must have access to, or if they so request, receive assistance at,
    voting stations. The Court also has ruled that the social security fund
    for public employees cannot refuse to provide services for the disabled
    children of its members, regardless of the cost involved.
        Indigenous People.--There are approximately 80 distinct ethnic
    groups among the country's more than 800,000 indigenous inhabitants.
    These groups are concentrated in the Andes mountains, Pacific Coast
    lowlands, the Guajira peninsula, and Amazonas department. According to
    the National Organization of Colombia's Indigenous (ONIC), 93 percent
    of indigenous people live in rural areas; 25 percent are on
    reservations, and approximately 115,000 indigenous people are without
    land.
        The Constitution gives special recognition to the fundamental
    rights of indigenous people. The Ministry of Interior, through the
    office of indigenous affairs, is responsible for protecting the
    territorial, cultural, and self-determination rights of Indians.
    Ministry representatives are located in all regions of the country with
    indigenous populations and work with other governmental human rights
    organizations, as well as with NGO human rights groups and civil rights
    organizations, to promote Indian interests and investigate violations
    of indigenous rights. Nonetheless, members of indigenous groups suffer
    discrimination in the sense that they traditionally have been relegated
    to the margins of society. Few opportunities exist for those who might
    wish to participate more fully in modern life. The March report of the
    U.N. Commission on Human Rights noted that an estimated 80 percent of
    the indigenous population live in conditions of extreme poverty, that
    74 percent receive wages below the legal minimum, and that their
    municipalities have the highest rates of poverty. In addition,
    indigenous communities suffer disproportionately from the internal
    armed conflict (see Section 1.g.). Members of indigenous communities
    often flee together in mass displacements, relocating to another
    indigenous community.
        According to the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA),
    68,245 indigenous families live on designated Indian reserves.
    Indigenous groups' rights to their ancestral lands are by law
    permanent. INCORA reports that approximately 80 percent of these lands
    have been demarcated. However, armed groups often violently contested
    indigenous land ownership. According to ONIC, roughly 95 percent of the
    country's resources are found on indigenous reservations and claimed
    territories. Traditional Indian authority boards operate some 519
    reserves; the boards handle national or local funds and are subject to
    fiscal oversight by the national Comptroller General. These boards
    administer their territories as municipal entities, with officials
    elected or otherwise chosen according to Indian tradition.
        Indigenous communities are free to educate their children in
    traditional dialects and in the observance of cultural and religious
    customs. Indigenous men are not subject to the national military draft.
        INCORA estimated that some 200 indigenous communities had no legal
    title to land that they claimed as their own. INCORA reported that at
    mid-year some 488 requests by indigenous communities to establish new
    reserves remained outstanding. According to INCORA, more than 75
    million acres have been recognized legally as Indian lands. It is
    buying back much of this land, which has been settled by mestizo
    peasants, and returning it to indigenous groups.
        The Constitution provides for a special criminal and civil
    jurisdiction within Indian territories based upon traditional community
    laws. However, some observers asserted that these special jurisdictions
    were subject to manipulation, and that punishments rendered by such
    community courts were often much more lenient than those imposed by
    regular civilian courts.
        Members of indigenous communities continued to be victims of all
    sides in the internal conflict, and a number of them were killed. The
    national Human Rights Ombudsman stated in its 1999-2000 annual report
    that among the indigenous communities most affected by extrajudicial
    killings, threats, and regional combat were the Corebaju in Caqueta,
    the Puinave in Guaviare, the Embera-Katio of Alto Sinu, the Embera-
    dobida of Choco, the Paez in Cauca, the Emaer-katio in Antioquia, the
    Guayabero on the Guaviare-Meta border, the Tule in Choco, and the U'wa
    in Boyaca and Casanare. The Human Rights Ombudsman's office reported 33
    killings in indigenous communities in 1999; 22 of these victims were
    community leaders.
        According to press reports, in June members of a paramilitary
    organization killed Joselito Bailarin, EmberaKatio governor of the
    community of Canaverales in Murri de Frontino in Antioquia department.
    On December 25, Embera leader Armando Achito reportedly was killed by
    paramilitary forces in Jurado municipality, Choco department.
        There were no new developments in the 1996 murder of Indians
    Dagoberto Santero Bacilio, Carlos Arturo Solano Bernal, and Sergio
    (Manue) in San Antonio de Palmito in Sucre department, allegedly by
    paramilitary groups.
        According to press reports, in early May, the FARC announced that
    it would execute seven Embera-Katio indigenous leaders in the town
    square at Frontino in Murri, Antioquia department, as retribution for
    the May 26 deaths of two indigenous brothers at the hands of
    paramilitary forces. The FARC believed that the indigenous leaders had
    laid a trap for the brothers by identifying them as guerrilla
    collaborators. The FARC stated that the indigenous leaders took too
    long (8 days) to report the crime. The Indigenous Organization of
    Antioquia (OIA) attributed the delay to difficulties in communicating
    from a rural zone to Medellin. The OIA called for a humanitarian
    commission to protect the leaders; however, on May 24, the FARC killed
    one of the leaders, a 30-year-old teacher named Hernando de Jesus
    Bailarin.
        Paramilitary and guerrilla groups have been known to force
    indigenous people, including children, into their ranks. Some guerrilla
    groups reportedly favored indigenous people as guides and
    communicators, due to their knowledge of the geography of their
    historical lands and knowledge of generally unfamiliar languages.
        On May 10, approximately 3,000 Kankuama tribe members from the
    Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta region in Magdalena department were
    pressured to leave their community by the AUC paramilitary
    organization. The AUC was fighting the FARC, ELN, and EPL guerrilla
    organizations in the region. On March 2, indigenous leader Jairo Bedoya
    Hoyos disappeared. The OIA held the AUC responsible. In an open letter,
    the AUC stated that it did not have Bedoya in its custody.
        U'wa protests against initial drilling by Occidental Petroleum in
    an area near but not on their reserve continued. The U'wa filed several
    court challenges to drilling, and succeeded in winning brief delays
    before appeal courts ruled in favor of the Government's arrangement
    with Occidental. U'wa repeatedly sought to block road access to the
    drilling site; in one instance in February, police sought to remove an
    U'wa road block by using tear gas to disperse the crowd; in an ensuing
    panic the U'wa claimed that four children were killed (see Sections
    1.a. and 2.b.). Press reports indicated that only one body was
    recovered. Indigenous Senator Jesus Pinacue announced a hunger strike
    to pressure Occidental Petroleum to leave U'wa land. Indigenous Senator
    Francisco Rojas Birri and Representatives Leonardo Caicedo and Jhonny
    Aparicio supported the hunger strike. A 1997 OAS joint study with a
    university recommended the immediate and unconditional suspension of
    oil exploration or exploitation activities; clarification of the status
    of U'wa territories and protected reserves; and the development of a
    formal process of consultation under the auspices of the Government.
    The U'wa also had threatened to commit collective suicide if their
    wishes were not respected. In August 1999, the Government increased the
    U'wa reserve, from 100,000 acres to 1.25 million acres. The area has
    estimated oil reserves of up to 1 billion barrels. In August a
    technical working group including the Ministries of Interior and
    Environment, as well as an advisor to the U'wa, reported that the
    Government and Occidental Petroleum are complying with all applicable
    regulations. The U'wa broke off talks in September, in response to a
    ruling by the Government's agrarian reform agency authorizing the state
    oil company to purchase lands to create a buffer zone around the
    drilling area. Talks remained suspended at the end of the year.
        Beginning in early January, 167 indigenous members of the
    EmberaKatio tribe occupied the grounds of the Ministry of the
    Environment in Bogota for 4 months to protest the flooding of their
    lands by the Urra hydroelectric project. In 1998 the Constitutional
    Court ruled that the human rights of the Embera had been violated by
    Urra because it had not consulted the Embera on the project.
        Religious Minorities.--There is little religious discrimination.
    The Roman Catholic Church and some evangelical churches reported that
    some indigenous leaders were intolerant of nontraditional forms of
    worship.
        Three Mormon temples were bombed in April, and members of the
    Jewish community were victims of abuse (see Section 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the Ministry of
    the Interior, citizens of African heritage live primarily in the
    Pacific departments of Choco (370,000), Valle del Cauca (1,720,257),
    Cauca (462,638), and Narino (261,180), as well as along the Caribbean
    coast. Although estimates vary widely, blacks represent approximately
    10 percent of the total population.
        Blacks are entitled to all constitutional rights and protections;
    however, they traditionally have suffered from discrimination. Blacks
    are underrepresented in the executive branch, judicial branch, and
    civil service positions, and in military hierarchies. Despite the
    passage of the African-Colombian law in 1993, little concrete progress
    was made in expanding public services and private investment in Choco
    department or other predominantly black regions. The same law also
    authorized black communities to receive collective titles to some
    Pacific coast lands. However, black leaders complained that the
    Government was slow to issue titles, and that their access to such
    lands often was inhibited by the presence of armed groups or
    individuals. Unemployment among African-Colombians ran as high as 76
    percent in some communities. The March report of the U.N. Commission on
    Human Rights noted that an estimated 80 percent of African-Colombians
    live in conditions of extreme poverty, that 74 percent receive wages
    below the legal minimum, and that their municipalities have the highest
    rates of poverty. Choco remains the department with the lowest per
    capita level of social investment and is last in terms of education,
    health, and infrastructure. It also has been the scene of some of the
    country's most enduring political violence, as paramilitary forces and
    guerrillas struggled for control of the Uraba region.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the
    rights of workers to organize unions and to strike, except for members
    of the armed forces, police, and those ``essential public services'' as
    defined by law. However, legislation that prohibits all public
    employees from striking is still in effect, although it often is
    overlooked. In practice violence towards trade unionists and antiunion
    discrimination are obstacles to joining and engaging in trade union
    activities. Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be
    targets of attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics
    traffickers, and their own union rivals. Union leaders contend that
    perpetrators of violence against workers, particularly members of
    paramilitary groups, operate with virtual impunity.
        The 1948 Labor Code (which has been amended repeatedly) provides
    for automatic recognition of unions that obtain at least 25 signatures
    from potential members and comply with a simple registration process at
    the Labor Ministry; however, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
    has received reports that this process was slow and sometimes took
    years. The law penalizes interference with freedom of association. It
    allows unions to determine internal rules freely, elect officials and
    manage activities, and forbids the dissolution of trade unions by
    administrative fiat. In 1999 President Pastrana approved Law 584, which
    limits government interference in a union's right to free association.
    The law reflects recommendations made by the ILO Direct Contacts
    Mission and corresponds to international labor legislation. Previous
    requirements that were repealed under this law include the requirement
    that in order for a trade union to be registered, the labor inspector
    must certify that there is no other union. The law also amends the
    requirement that labor authorities must be present at general
    assemblies convened to vote on calling a strike (the trade unions now
    have the choice of having labor authorities present or not). However,
    the law added the requirement that when there is a request for
    information from an interested party, Ministry of Labor officials can
    require trade union leaders or members to provide relevant information
    on their work, including books, registers, plans, and other documents.
    The ILO Committee of Experts considers that this amendment is not in
    conformity with the freedom of association convention since control by
    an administrative authority should be used only for carrying out
    investigations when there are reasonable grounds that an offense has
    been committed.
        According to estimates by the Ministry of Labor and various unions,
    6 to 7 percent of the work force is organized. According to the
    Colombian Commission of Jurists, 89 percent of those organized are
    public sector workers. There are approximately 2,500 registered unions,
    87 to 95 percent of which are organized in one of three confederations:
    The center-left United Workers' Central, with which 45 to 50 percent of
    unions are affiliated; the Maoist/Social Christian Colombian Democratic
    Workers' Confederation, with which approximately 30 percent of unions
    are affiliated; and the Liberal Party-affiliated Confederation of
    Colombian Workers (CTC), with which 12 to 15 percent of unions are
    affiliated. Unions and Ministry of Labor officials report that union
    membership has declined in recent years.
        Before staging a legal strike, unions must negotiate directly with
    management and, if no agreement results, accept mediation. By law,
    public employees must accept binding arbitration if mediation fails; in
    practice, public service unions decide by membership vote whether or
    not to seek arbitration. In early August leaders of some unions called
    for a 24-hour strike by an estimated 700,000 state workers, including
    the Sindicated Union of Workers (USO) oil workers, the main public
    sector employees' union, telecommunications workers, teachers, and
    health workers, to protest government austerity workers and high
    unemployment.
        Unions, indigenous groups, debtors, students, and others continued
    to both protest and negotiate with the Government over the latter's
    inability to confront the country's economic downturn, soaring
    unemployment, and a Labor Code reform bill which may eliminate several
    popular worker benefits. On August 3, a general strike organized by
    various unions, including the United Workers' Central (CUT) and the
    General Confederation of Democratic Workers (CGTD), protested economic
    policies, privatizations, unemployment, new taxes, and social security
    reforms in Bogota and other cities throughout the country. Union
    strikers were joined by bank employees and state workers, such as
    teachers and health employees.
        Labor leaders throughout the country continued to be targets of
    attacks by paramilitary groups, guerrillas, narcotics traffickers, and
    their own union rivals. Labor leaders and NGO's reported that 105 union
    members were killed during the year; U.N. officials reported 54 murders
    of labor leaders during the first 10 months of the year. According to
    the National Labor School (ENS), approximately 1,500 union members have
    been murdered since 1991, and unions face widespread societal hostility
    because they are seen by some observers as ``subversive.'' Trade union
    leaders allege that 90 percent of victims were killed by paramilitary
    groups. Other victims were targeted by the FARC for their membership
    in, or sympathy with, the National Syndicate of Agricultural Industry
    Workers (Sintrainagro), a union largely composed of demobilized EPL
    members. Many of the murdered Sintrainagro members had worked in the
    banana industry in the Uraba region. The ILO Direct Contact Mission
    preliminary report in March noted that ``cases where the instigators
    and perpetrators of the murders of trade union leaders are identified
    are practically nonexistent, as is the handing down of guilty
    verdicts.'' The ENS also reported that in the last 5 years, 47
    unionists have been the victims of forced disappearances, 60 unionists
    were kidnaped, and 1,573 unionists received death threats. The USO
    reported that at least 600 trade union leaders were displaced during
    the first 10 months of the year.
        In May 1998, the ILO expressed serious concern over allegations of
    murders, forced disappearances, death threats, and other acts of
    violence against trade union officials and members. The ILO documented
    more than 300 murders of trade union members during 1995-98. The ILO
    criticized the Government for failing, since November 1996, to provide
    it with information on a single case of detention, trial, and
    conviction of anyone responsible for the murder of union officials and
    members.
        In February an ILO Direct Contacts Mission, which had been approved
    by the ILO Governing Body and accepted by the Government in November
    1999, visited the country to examine alleged abuses of workers' rights
    to life, free association, and collective bargaining. In March the
    Direct Contacts Mission presented a preliminary report to the Governing
    Body's committee on freedom of association, which noted that the
    Government was ``making sincere efforts'' to address these problems.
    The report expressed concern over the number of killings, kidnapings,
    death threats, and other violent assaults on trade union leaders and
    unionized workers and stated that killings of trade union leaders and
    unionized workers were a ``regular'' occurrence.
        Government efforts to overcome impunity include the establishment
    of 25 special human rights investigative subunits, one of which is
    responsible for cases of human rights violations of trade unionists,
    and a 49 percent increase in the legal budget for judicial employees.
    To protect trade unionists from violence, in 1999 the Government
    developed the Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and
    Trade Union Leaders. As of November, the program provided protection
    for 41 trade union premises and protection for 116 leaders and
    activists. These individuals are provided with bulletproof vests,
    bodyguards, and in some cases vehicles. Trade unionists complain that
    these measures are insufficient to protect adequately the large number
    of trade unionists who are threatened, and continue to press for more
    efforts to break the impunity with which most of these acts are
    committed.
        The ILO's recommendations included an urgent and global inquiry
    into the participation of public officials in the creation of self-
    defense or paramilitary groups; an increase in government budgetary
    allocations to protect trade union officials; and an increase in
    efforts to combat impunity. After a contentious debate at the June
    International Labor Conference, the Government and worker delegations
    agreed to a compromise offered by the ILO Director General Juan
    Somovia: the establishment of an ILO office in Bogota to be headed by
    his personal representative. Rafael Alburquerque was appointed ILO
    Special Representative to Colombia and began work in October. In
    November Alburquerque reported to the ILO Governing Body that the
    situation continues to be grave; the Special Representative's next
    report is expected in March 2001.
        On May 4, Javier Suarez, the leader of a truck drivers' union, was
    shot and killed near his home in Buenaventura. Union leaders suspected
    that paramilitary groups were responsible.
        In early August, Carmen Emilio Sanchez Coronel, a trade unionist
    with the teacher's union in Norte de Santander department, was killed
    along with seven other trade unionists at a paramilitary roadblock. The
    CUT also blamed paramilitary forces for the August 2 death of Antioquia
    union worker Luis Rodrigo Restrepo. The CUT alleged that paramilitary
    groups were targeting its rank and file members as well as union
    leaders.
        On December 15, five men seriously wounded Wilson Borja, president
    of public employees' union FENALTRASE, when they fired on his car at a
    stoplight in an apparent attempt to kill him. The attackers killed a
    30-year-old female street vendor and wounded one of Borja's two
    bodyguards. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano publicly admitted
    ordering the attack and claimed that he meant to ``detain'' Borja. Most
    observers connected the attempt, which followed press reports of
    progress toward establishing an ELN ``encounter zone,'' with Borja's
    role in facilitating the ELN peace process. Police detained one
    suspected gunman and a possible paramilitary accomplice within days of
    the attack.
        Prosecutors have outstanding warrants for the arrest of
    paramilitary members Temilda Rosa Martinez and Eduardo Manrique Morales
    in the February 1999 killing of 72-year-old Julio Alfonso Poveda, a CUT
    founder.
        In December the Prosecutor General's office arraigned three hired
    killers alleged to have murdered CUT vice president Jorge Ortega in
    1998.
        There were no leads in the August 1999 bomb incidents at both the
    Sincelejo, Sucre department offices of the Association of Rural Land
    Users (which was destroyed by a bomb) and at the Medellin office of the
    USO, where a bomb was defused. According to the ENS, there have been 14
    bombing attempts against union offices in the last 3 years.
        The Government still has not addressed a number of ILO criticisms
    of the Labor Code. In 1993 the ILO had complained about the following
    provisions of the law: The requirement that government officials be
    present at assemblies convened to vote on a strike call; the legality
    of firing union organizers from jobs in their trades once 6 months have
    passed following a strike or dispute; the requirement that contenders
    for trade union office must belong to the occupation their union
    represents; the prohibition of strikes in a wide range of public
    services that are not necessarily essential; various restrictions on
    the right to strike; the power of the Minister of Labor and the
    President to intervene in disputes through compulsory arbitration when
    a strike is declared illegal; and the power to dismiss trade union
    officers involved in an unlawful strike.
        The expired 1995 collective work convention between Ecopetrol and
    the USO was replaced by a new agreement in May 1999. USO leadership
    remained in open conflict with the Government on many issues. USO
    leaders reported that its members in the oilproducing Magdalena Medio
    region continued to receive death threats from presumed paramilitary
    groups, who have accused USO officials of working with the ELN
    guerrillas waging a sabotage campaign against the country's oil
    pipelines.
        Unions are free to join international confederations without
    government restrictions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution protects the right of workers to organize and engage in
    collective bargaining. Workers in larger firms and public services have
    been most successful in organizing, but these unionized workers
    represent only a small portion of the economically active population.
    High unemployment, traditional antiunion attitudes, a large informal
    economic sector, and weak union organization and leadership limit
    workers' bargaining power in all sectors. The requirement that trade
    unions must cover the majority of workers in each company as a
    condition for representing them in sectoral agreements further weakens
    workers' bargaining power.
        The law forbids antiunion discrimination and the obstruction of
    free association; however, according to union leaders, both
    discrimination and obstruction of free association occurred frequently.
    Government labor inspectors theoretically enforce these provisions, but
    because there are 271 labor inspectors to cover 1,085 municipalities
    and more than 300,000 companies, the inspection apparatus is weak.
    Furthermore, labor inspectors often lacked basic equipment, such as
    vehicles. Guerrillas sometimes deterred labor inspectors from
    performing their duties by declaring them military targets.
        The Labor Code calls for fines to be levied for restricting freedom
    of association and prohibits the use of strike breakers.
        Collective pacts--agreements between individual workers and their
    employers--are not subject to collective bargaining and typically are
    used by employers to obstruct labor organization. Although employers
    must register collective pacts with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry
    does not exercise any oversight or control over them.
        The Labor Code also eliminates mandatory mediation in private
    labor-management disputes and extends the grace period before the
    Government can intervene in a conflict. Federations and confederations
    may assist affiliate unions in collective bargaining.
        Labor law applies to the country's 15 free trade zones (FTZ's), but
    its standards often were not enforced in the zones. Public employee
    unions have won collective bargaining agreements in the FTZ's of
    Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, and Santa Marta, but the garment
    manufacturing enterprises in Medellin and Risaralda, which have the
    largest number of employees, are not organized. Labor unions do not
    exist in any of the zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    forbids slavery and any form of forced or compulsory labor, and this
    prohibition generally is respected in practice in the formal sector;
    however, women were trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution
    (see Section 6.f.).
        Paramilitary forces and guerrilla groups forcibly conscripted
    indigenous people (see Section 5). There were some reports that the
    guerrillas used forced labor to build clandestine roads.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children; however, the
    Government does not have the resources to enforce this prohibition
    effectively (see Section 6.d.). Although there were no known instances
    of forced child labor in the formal economy, several thousand children
    were forced to serve as paramilitary or guerrilla combatants (see
    Section 1.g.), to work as prostitutes (see Section 5), or in some
    instances as coca pickers.
        Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
    under the age of 14 in most jobs, and the Labor Code prohibits the
    granting of work permits to youths under the age of 18; however, child
    labor is a significant problem, particularly in the informal sector. A
    1989 decree established the Minors' Code and prohibited the employment
    of children under age 12. It also stipulated exceptional conditions and
    the express authorization of Labor Ministry inspectors for the
    employment of children between the ages of 12 and 17 years. Children
    under age 14 are prohibited from working, with the exception that those
    between the ages of 12 and 14 may perform very light work with the
    permission of their parents and appropriate labor authorities. All
    child workers (anyone under the age of 18) must receive the national
    minimum wage for the hours they work. Children between the ages of 12
    and 14 can work a maximum of 4 hours a day; children between the ages
    of 14 and 16 can work a maximum of 6 hours a day; and children between
    the ages of 16 and 18 can work a maximum of 8 hours a day. All child
    workers are prohibited from working at night, or performing work in
    which there is a risk of bodily harm or exposure to excessive heat,
    cold, or noise. A number of specific occupations are prohibited for
    children as well, such as mining and construction. However, these
    requirements largely are ignored in practice, and only 5 percent of
    those children who work have filed for the required work permits. By
    allowing children between the ages of 12 and 13 to work, even under
    restricted conditions, the law contravenes international standards on
    child labor, which set the minimum legal age for employment in
    developing countries at 14 years.
        In the formal sector, child labor laws are enforced through
    periodic review by the Ministry of Labor and by the military, which
    ensures compliance with mandatory service requirements. However, in the
    informal labor sector and in rural areas, child labor continues to be a
    problem, particularly in agriculture and mining. Children as young as
    11 years of age work full-time in almost every aspect of the cut flower
    industry as a way to supplement family income. Even children enrolled
    in school or, in some cases, those too young for school, accompany
    their parents to work at flower plantations at night and on weekends.
    In the mining sector, coal mining presents the most difficult child
    labor problem. Many marginal, usually family-run, mining operations
    employ their young children as a way to boost production and income; it
    is estimated that between 1,200 and 2,000 children are involved. The
    work is dangerous and the hours are long. Younger children carry water
    and package coal, while those age 14 and up engage in more physically
    demanding labor such as carrying bags of coal. These informal mining
    operations are illegal. The Ministry of Labor reported that, by the end
    of 1999 an interagency governmental committee had removed approximately
    80 percent of child laborers from the informal mines and returned them
    to school. The law prohibits the employment of minors for prostitution;
    however, child prostitution is a problem. In August the Prosecutor
    General's Specialized Sex Crimes and Human Dignity Unit reported that
    from August 1999 to August 2000 it opened 41 cases in which a child
    under age 14 was induced or lured into prostitution.
        A Catholic Church study conducted in May 1999 reported that
    approximately 2.7 million children work, including approximately
    700,000 who worked as coca pickers. This represented a sharp increase
    from 1992, when according to a 1997 study by Los Andes University,
    approximately 1.6 million children (between the ages of 12 and 17)
    worked. One observer noted that the recent economic downturn might
    increase the number of children working, especially in rural areas.
    Child participation in agricultural work soared at harvest times.
    According to the Ministry of Labor, working children between the ages
    of 7 and 15 earned on average between 13 and 47 percent of the minimum
    wage. An estimated 26 percent of working children had regular access to
    health care; approximately 25 percent were employed in potentially
    dangerous activities. The ICBF estimated that paramilitary and
    guerrilla groups employed 6,000 children as combatants (see Section 5).
    School attendance by working children was significantly lower than for
    nonworking children, especially in rural areas. The health services of
    the social security system cover only 10 percent of child laborers. A
    1996 study by the national Human Rights Ombudsman of child labor in
    Putumayo department found that 22 percent of the children between the
    ages of 5 and 18 were full-time coca pickers. In the municipality of
    Orito, the figure reached 70 percent.
        The Labor Ministry has an inspector in each of the 33 departments
    responsible for certifying and conducting repeat inspections of
    workplaces that employ children; however, this system has few resources
    and covered only the 20 percent of the child work force employed in the
    formal sector of the economy. In 1995 the Government established a
    National Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor, made up of
    representatives from the Ministries of Labor, Health, Education, and
    Communications, as well as officials from various other government
    offices, unions, employer associations, and NGO's. Under the Action
    Plan, the Government distributed funds during the year to member
    organizations of the committee for child labor eradication projects.
    The Government also obtained commitments from the country's leading
    trade associations and unions to implement child labor eradication
    programs with the jointly ILO's IPEC program, these programs were in
    the preparatory stages at year's end. During the year, the Government
    formulated a 2000-02 Action Plan which gives priority to direct
    intervention on behalf of domestic child workers, child miners,
    sexually exploited children, children in trade activities and children
    in the agricultural sector. It has also designed a project, for which
    it is seeking funding, to collect more reliable national data on child
    labor.
        The Government is taking steps to incorporate into national law,
    ILO Convention 182 concerning the prohibition of and immediate action
    for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, it is unable to enforce this prohibition effectively, and
    trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution and the
    forced recruitment of child soldiers are problems (see Sections 1.f.,
    1.g., 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a uniform
    minimum wage for workers every January to serve as a benchmark for wage
    bargaining. The monthly minimum wage, set by tripartite negotiations
    among representatives of business, organized labor, and the Government
    was about $150 (322,500 pesos) throughout the year. The minimum wage
    does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Because the minimum wage is based on the Government's target inflation
    rate, the minimum wage has not kept up with real inflation in recent
    years. A total of 70 percent of all workers earn wages that are
    insufficient to cover the costs of the Government's estimated low-
    income family shopping basket. However, 77 percent of all workers earn
    no more than, and often much less than, twice the minimum wage.
        The law provides for a standard workday of 8 hours and a 48-hour
    workweek, but it does not require specifically a weekly rest period of
    at least 24 hours, a failing criticized by the ILO.
        Legislation provides comprehensive protection for workers'
    occupational safety and health; however, these standards are difficult
    to enforce, in part due to the small number of Labor Ministry
    inspectors. In general, a lack of public safety awareness, inadequate
    attention by unions, and lax enforcement by the Labor Ministry result
    in a high-level of industrial accidents and unhealthy working
    conditions. Over 80 percent of industrial companies lack safety plans.
    The Social Security Institute reported 53,408 work-related accidents
    during the year, which resulted in 417 deaths. There were 243 cases of
    work-related illness. The industries most prone to worker accidents
    were mining, construction, and transportation.
        According to the Labor Code, workers have the right to withdraw
    from a hazardous work situation without jeopardizing continued
    employment. However, unorganized workers in the informal sector fear
    the loss of their jobs if they exercise their right to criticize
    abuses, particularly in the agricultural sector.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons, and the country is a source for
    trafficking in women and girls to Europe, the United States, and Asia.
    In June Congress approved a new Criminal Code, which provides for a
    prison term of 6 to 8 years and a fine up to the equivalent of 100
    times the minimum legal monthly salary for any person who ``promotes,
    induces, compels, facilitates, collaborates, or in any other way
    participates in the entry or exit of people into or from the country
    without complying with all legal requisites.'' While intended to combat
    alien smuggling in general, the law could be used to prosecute
    traffickers as well. The law is scheduled to enter into effect in
    January 2001.
        A government committee composed of representatives of the Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs, Interpol, the DAS, the Ministry of Justice, the
    Attorney General's office, the Prosecutor General's office, and the
    presidency meets once every 2 months to discuss trafficking in persons.
    In November the Ministry of Justice, the Organization for International
    Migration, and NGO Hope Foundation held the first national conference
    on trafficking in persons.
        The DAS reported at that conference that Colombia is the third most
    common country of origin of trafficking victims, and that the majority
    of Colombian women trafficked for prostitution go to the Netherlands,
    Spain, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The Organization for Security
    and Cooperation in Europe issued a report on trafficking in persons in
    September 1999, which stated that women and girls from Colombia also
    are trafficked to North America. According to press reports, more than
    50 percent of women from Colombia who enter Japan are trafficking
    victims forced to work as prostitutes. According to the DAS, 126
    Colombian trafficking victims have been rescued abroad by Interpol
    during 1998-2000, and 115 victims were rescued by the National Police
    during 19992000. According to police, the majority of international
    trafficking operations are managed by Colombians and have ties to
    narcotics trafficking.
        First Lady Nohra Pastrana, in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs
    Ministry and Interpol, participated in a public relations campaign to
    alert citizens, in particular women, to the risks of immigrating
    illegally to other countries.
        On June 23, a Colombian woman trafficked to Denmark was granted
    asylum in Denmark after testifying against Colombian and Danish
    traffickers. In August police in Andalucia, Spain, detained 51 persons
    and broke up a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and
    Ecuador for purposes of prostitution.
                                   __________

                                   COSTA RICA

        Costa Rica is a longstanding, stable, constitutional democracy with
    a unicameral Legislative Assembly directly elected in free multiparty
    elections every 4 years. Miguel Angel Rodriguez of the Social Christian
    Unity Party (PUSC) won the presidency in the February 1998 elections,
    in which approximately 70 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. The
    judiciary is independent.
        The 1949 Constitution abolished the military forces. The Ministry
    of Public Security--which includes specialized units such as the
    antidrug police--and the Ministry of the Presidency share
    responsibility for law enforcement and national security. In 1996 the
    Government combined several police units within the Ministry of Public
    Security, including the Border Guard, the Rural Guard, and the Civil
    Guard, into a single ``public force.'' Public security forces generally
    observe procedural safeguards established by law and the Constitution;
    however, members of these forces occasionally committed human rights
    abuses.
        The market economy is based primarily on light industry, tourism,
    and agriculture. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was estimated
    at 1.4 percent, compared with 8 percent in 1999. The government deficit
    is estimated to have narrowed to 2.1 percent of GDP, compared with 2.3
    percent in 1999; however, the public sector deficit remained at 3.3
    percent of GDP, the same as in 1999. The Constitution protects the
    right to private property; however, domestic and foreign property
    owners encounter considerable difficulty gaining adequate, timely
    compensation for lands expropriated for national parks and other
    purposes. The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade
    uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse; however, there were problems in a
    few areas. There were some instances of physical abuse by police and
    prison guards, and reports of police abuse of authority or misconduct
    increased during the year. The judicial system processes criminal cases
    very slowly, resulting in lengthy pretrial detention for some persons
    charged with crimes. Domestic violence is a serious problem, and abuse
    of children also remains a problem. Traditional patterns of unequal
    opportunity for women remain, in spite of continuing government and
    media efforts to advocate change. Child labor persists, and child
    prostitution is a growing problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        The third judicial police officer accused of the 1994 murder of
    farmer Ciro Monge did not appear for his trial in April, and his
    whereabouts were unknown at year's end. The two officers convicted in
    1997 appealed the rulings and lost; one fled the country in 1998 but
    was captured and returned to serve his sentence in February.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment
    and holds invalid any statement obtained through violence, and the
    authorities generally abide by these prohibitions; however, members of
    the public forces were responsible for some physical abuse, and reports
    of police abuse of authority or misconduct increased during the year.
    An effective mechanism for lodging and recording complaints of police
    misconduct exists. The Ombudsman's office serves as a recourse to
    citizens that have complaints about violations of their civil and human
    rights and about deficiencies in public and private infrastructure. It
    investigates complaints and, where appropriate, initiates suits against
    officials.
        The Ombudsman's office received 52 reports of police abuse of
    authority or misconduct during the year, compared with 14 in 1999 and 4
    in 1998. The majority of the reports involved complaints about
    negligence or corruption, but part of the large increase was due to
    complaints of alleged police brutality during the Costa Rican
    Electricity Institute strike (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). Police
    intervention during strike-related protests in downtown San Jose
    included the use of tear gas and riot gear.
        A large percentage of police personnel owe their appointments to
    political patronage. The Rodriguez administration continued
    implementation of the 1994 Police Code designed to depoliticize and
    professionalize the police force. The Government's longterm plan is to
    establish permanent, professional cadres, eventually resulting in a
    nonpolitically appointed career force. The basic course for new police
    recruits includes training using a human rights manual developed by the
    Ministry of Public Security.
        Prisoners generally receive humane treatment. Prisoners are
    separated by sex and by level of security (minimum, medium, and
    maximum). There are separate juvenile detention centers. Illegal
    narcotics are readily available in the prisons, and drug use is common.
    As of August, the Ombudsman's office had received two complaints of
    physical abuse of prisoners by guards, and four complaints of
    psychological abuse; compared with six complaints of physical abuse and
    six complaints of psychological abuse in all of 1999. The Ombudsman's
    office investigates complaints and refers serious cases of abuse to the
    public prosecutor.
        Penitentiary overcrowding remains a problem, with the prison
    population estimated at 67 percent above planned capacity in 1999. A
    study by a U.N. agency found that the prison population grew by 155
    percent from 1992-99. The Government is expanding six prisons to
    address this problem. In March 1996, the Supreme Court's Constitutional
    Chamber issued an order to the San Sebastian prison in San Jose, giving
    the institution 1 year to achieve minimally acceptable conditions for
    the prisoners. As of September, occupancy in that prison was 139
    percent above intended capacity, an increase from 108 percent in 1999.
    In August the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber declared that no
    additional prisoners would be admitted to the San Sebastian prison
    until it met the U.N. minimum standards for the treatment of the
    imprisoned. The Ministry of Justice responded by calling on the
    Rodriguez administration to allocate more funds for prison enhancement.
    Five additional facilities have been opened and three have been
    undergoing renovation since 1999 as part of this plan. The Government
    also approved the budget for a series of detention facilities in
    outlying provinces, which are expected both to reduce overcrowding and
    to locate prisoners closer to their families.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and law
    prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
    respects these prohibitions.
        The law requires issuance of judicial warrants before making
    arrests. The Constitution entitles a detainee to a judicial
    determination of the legality of the detention during arraignment
    before a court officer within 24 hours of arrest. The authorities
    generally respect these rights.
        The law provides for the right to bail, and the authorities observe
    it in practice. Generally, the authorities do not hold detainees
    incommunicado. With judicial authorization, the authorities may hold
    suspects for 48 hours after arrest or, under special circumstances, for
    up to 10 days.
        The Constitution bars exile as punishment, and it is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
    for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this
    provision in practice. The Constitution provides for the right to a
    fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this
    right.
        The Supreme Court supervises the work of the lower courts, known as
    tribunals. The Legislative Assembly elects the 22 Supreme Court
    magistrates to 8-year terms, subject to automatic renewal unless the
    Assembly decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority. Accused persons
    may select attorneys to represent them, and the law provides for access
    to counsel at state expense for the indigent.
        Persons accused of serious offenses and held without bail sometimes
    remain in pretrial custody for long periods. Lengthy legal procedures,
    numerous appeals, and large numbers of detainees cause delays and case
    backlogs. As of February, there were 1,967 accused persons jailed while
    awaiting trial, representing 21 percent of the prison population.
        There were no reports of political prisoners. However, one
    individual was jailed for committing crimes against the State
    (politically motivated acts of violence) in the 1980's. The human
    rights group Families for the Defense of Political Prisoners and Human
    Rights considers this person to be a political prisoner.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions; and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction. The law requires judicial warrants
    to search private homes. Judges may approve the use of wiretaps in
    limited circumstances, primarily to combat narcotics trafficking.
        The law grants considerable rights to squatters who invade
    uncultivated land, regardless of who may hold title to the property.
    Landowners throughout the country have suffered frequent squatter
    invasions for years. President Rodriguez said he would give priority to
    reducing these conflicts, increasing public security, and regularizing
    land tenure. The Legislative Assembly is reexamining laws that allow
    occupants of land to gain title through adverse possession. The
    incidence of squatter invasions had increased in 1999 in anticipation
    of the land tenure regularization. However, during the year there was
    only one instance when squatter families were removed. In that case,
    the Government removed 230 families without reports of protests or
    violence.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, a generally effective
    judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system together
    ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
        There are 6 major privately owned newspapers, several periodicals,
    20 privately owned television stations, and over 80 privately owned
    radio stations, all of which pursue independent editorial policies.
    While the media generally criticized the Government freely, there were
    unconfirmed allegations that the Government withheld advertising from
    some publications in order to influence or limit reporting.
        A 1996 ``right of response'' law provides persons criticized in the
    media with an opportunity to reply with equal attention and at equal
    length. Print and electronic media continued to criticize public
    figures; however, media managers have found it difficult to comply with
    provisions of this law.
        The Penal Code outlines a series of ``insult laws'' that establish
    criminal penalties of up to 3 years in prison for those convicted of
    ``insulting the honor or decorum of a public official.'' The law also
    identifies defamation, libel, slander, and calumny as offenses against
    a person's honor that can carry criminal penalties. The Inter-American
    Press Association and the World Press Freedom Committee assert that
    such laws have the effect of restricting reporting by the media, and
    that they wrongly provide public officials with a shield from public
    scrutiny by citizens and the press.
        The Office of Control of Public Spectacles rates films and has the
    authority to restrict or prohibit their showing; it has similar powers
    over television programs and stage plays. Nonetheless, a wide range of
    foreign films are available to the public. A tribunal reviews appeals
    of the office's actions.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        In March police intervention to disband strike-related protests in
    San Jose resulted in complaints to the Ombudsman's office that such
    actions were abusive and constituted evidence of police brutality (see
    Sections 1.c. and 6.a.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. While the
    Constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion,
    members of all denominations freely practice their religion without
    government interference. Religious education teachers, including those
    in public schools, must be certified by the Roman Catholic Episcopal
    Conference. Foreign missionaries and clergy of all denominations work
    and proselytize freely.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no
    restrictions on travel within the country, on emigration, or on the
    right of return.
        There is a long tradition of providing refuge to persons from other
    Latin American countries.
        The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status in
    accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government has
    admitted approximately 5,000 persons as refugees under terms of the
    convention. The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Government makes a distinction between
    political asylum and refugee status. The issue of the provision of
    first asylum did not arise. The Constitution specifically prohibits
    repatriation of anyone subject to potential persecution, and there were
    no reports of the forced expulsion of persons to a country where they
    feared persecution.
        The authorities regularly repatriated undocumented Nicaraguans,
    most of whom entered the country primarily for economic reasons.
    However, following Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the Government announced a
    program of general amnesty for all Nicaraguans, Hondurans, and
    Salvadorans in the country prior to November 9, 1998. By June 156,000
    Central Americans, 95 percent of whom are Nicaraguans, qualified for
    and received legal resident status under this government amnesty
    program.
        Immigration officials reported that 4,000 Colombians were expected
    to emigrate to Costa Rica during the year; 2,831 emigrated in 1999. The
    majority immigrate legally. However, others seek temporary refugee
    status, and under the law, are expected to return to their country of
    origin once the period of conflict ends in their country.
        The Government has been reluctant in many cases to state publicly
    under what status it would grant legal residence. However, according to
    press reports, the authorities granted 16 Cuban athletes asylum in the
    period between January 1999 and June, under the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
        Allegations of abuse by the Border Guard periodically arise.
    Although instances of physical abuse appear to have declined, there
    were credible reports of extortion of migrants by border officials.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage
    and by secret ballot every 4 years. The independent Supreme Electoral
    Tribunal ensures the integrity of elections, and the authorities and
    citizens respect election results. The Constitution bars the President
    from seeking reelection, and Assembly members may seek reelection only
    after at least one term out of office. In September the Constitutional
    Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this
    provision in response to a petition filed by private citizens. The case
    is expected to be appealed to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
    for a determination of whether the ban on presidential reelection
    constitutes an infringement of citizens' rights to vote and run for
    office.
        In the 1998 elections, President Rodriguez's Social Christian Unity
    Party won a plurality in the Legislative Assembly, winning 27 of 57
    seats. The National Liberation Party (PLN) won 23 seats, the Democratic
    Force won 3 seats, and 4 minor parties--the Labor Action, National
    Integration, Costa Rican Renovation, and Libertarian Movement parties--
    each won 1 seat.
        Women encounter no legal impediments to their participation in
    politics; however, while they are underrepresented overall, women are
    represented increasingly in leadership positions in the Government and
    political parties. Both vice presidents (who are also cabinet members),
    the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Women's Affairs, and 11
    legislative assembly deputies are women. Sonia Picado, leader of the
    PLN, the principal opposition party, is also a woman. Former Assembly
    Deputy Sandra Piszk continues as Ombudsman, a key autonomous post
    created in 1993 to protect the rights and interests of citizens in
    their dealings with the Government, and Linette Saborio remained the
    Director General of the judicial investigative organization. The PUSC
    mandated that a minimum of 40 percent of posts in party councils be
    occupied by women and created the Ministry of Women's Affairs, headed
    by Dr. Gloria Valerin. In 1998 female legislators formed the Foundation
    of Women Parliamentarians of Costa Rica to commemorate the 45th
    anniversary of the first female members of the Assembly. The group's
    principal focus is to promote women's involvement in politics through
    informational meetings and public awareness campaigns, but it also
    works for a number of social objectives, including the decentralization
    of government.
        Indigenous people may participate freely in politics and
    government; however, in practice, they have not played significant
    roles in these areas, except on issues directly affecting their
    welfare, largely because of their relatively small numbers and physical
    isolation. They account for about 1 percent of the population, and
    their approximately 20,000 votes constitute an important swing vote in
    national elections. None of the 57 members of the National Assembly
    identifies himself as indigenous. There are two black members in the
    Assembly. The country's 100,000 blacks, who mostly reside on the
    Caribbean coast, enjoy full rights of citizenship, including the
    protection of laws against racial discrimination.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Various human rights groups operate without government restriction,
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
    Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views. The
    Costa Rican Commission for Human Rights, the Commission for the Defense
    of Human Rights in Central America, and the Family and Friends of
    Political Prisoners of Costa Rica monitor and report on human rights,
    as does the Ombudsman's office.
        The Legislative Assembly elects the Ombudsman for a 4-year,
    renewable term. The Ombudsman's office is part of the legislative
    branch, ensuring a high degree of independence from the executive
    branch. The law provides for the functional, administrative, and
    judgmental independence of the Ombudsman's office.
        Several international organizations concerned with human rights,
    including the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and the Inter-
    American Court of Human Rights, are located in San Jose.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that all persons are equal before the
    law, and the Government generally respects these provisions.
        Women.--The Government has identified domestic violence against
    women and children as a serious societal problem. The Costa Rican
    Women's Defense Office handled 5,188 cases of domestic violence in
    1999. The Law Against Domestic Violence classifies certain acts of
    domestic violence as crimes and mandates their prosecution. An old law
    permitted a judge to pardon a man accused of statutory rape if the
    perpetrator intends to marry the victim, she and her family acquiesce,
    and the National Institute for Children does not object; however, an
    August 1999 reform to the Penal Code rendered this article void. The
    authorities have incorporated training on handling domestic violence
    cases into the basic training course for new police personnel. The
    domestic violence law requires public hospitals to report cases of
    female victims of domestic violence. It also denies the perpetrator
    possession of the family home in favor of the victim. Television
    coverage of this issue has increased in news reporting, public service
    announcements, and feature programs. Reports of violence against women
    have increased, possibly reflecting a greater willingness of victims to
    report abuses rather than an actual increase in instances of violence
    against women. The public prosecutor, police, and the Ombudsman all
    have offices dedicated to this problem. The law against sexual
    harassment in the work place and educational institutions seeks to
    prevent and punish sexual harassment in those environments.
        Prostitution and sex tourism are both legal for persons over the
    age of 18. The prohibition against trafficking in women for the purpose
    of prostitution was strengthened by a statute that went into effect in
    August 1999, although there have been only infrequent and isolated
    cases reported in the past (see Section 6.f.).
        Women constitute 50.1 percent of the population. In 1998 President
    Rodriguez created the Ministry of Women's Affairs. The 1990 Law for the
    Promotion of the Social Equality of Women prohibits discrimination
    against women and obligates the Government to promote political,
    economic, social, and cultural equality. In March 1996, the
    Government's National Center for the Development of Women and the
    Family presented its 3-year National Plan for Equality of Opportunity
    between Women and Men. The plan is based on the Platform for Action
    adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. As
    part of the plan, the Government established an office for gender
    issues in the Ministry of Labor; similar offices are planned in two
    other ministries.
        According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1999
    Human Development Report, women represent 31 percent of the labor
    force. Most women work in the services sector, with others working in
    industry and agriculture. While laws require that women and men receive
    equal pay for equal work, average salaries for women remain somewhat
    below those of their male counterparts. According to 1997 UNDP data,
    women occupy 45 percent of executive, management, and technical
    positions.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
    welfare through well-funded systems of public education and medical
    care. The Government spends over 5 percent of GDP on medical care. In
    June 1998, the Legislative Assembly passed a constitutional amendment
    increasing spending on education from 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP.
    The country has a high rate of literacy (95 percent) and a low rate of
    infant mortality (14 persons per 1,000). The law requires 6 years of
    primary and 3 years of secondary education for all children. There is
    no difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or in
    health care services. The autonomous National Institute for Children
    (PANI) oversees implementation of the Government's programs for
    children. In December 1996, the Assembly passed a law strengthening the
    PANI's role in protecting and promoting the rights of children, in
    accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
    the Child.
        In recent years, the PANI has increased public awareness of abuse
    of children, which remains a problem. From January to June, the
    Institute intervened in 3,704 cases of abandonment, 1,013 cases of
    physical abuse, 536 cases of sexual abuse, and 885 cases of
    psychological abuse of children. The PANI attributed the increase in
    cases reported to better reporting capabilities and an increase in
    patterns of child abuse. There was also a continued increase in
    reported psychological abuse cases because the 1997 Code of Childhood
    and Adolescence redefined such abuse and increased awareness of it.
    Abuses appear to be more prevalent among poor, less-educated families.
    Traditional attitudes and the inclination to treat such crimes as
    misdemeanors sometimes hamper legal proceedings against those who
    commit crimes against children.
        In February 1996, the PANI announced a comprehensive plan to
    improve the conditions of the poorest children. According to Institute
    estimates, 19 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 are
    employed in domestic tasks, while 15 percent work outside the home. The
    Government, police sources, and UNICEF representatives acknowledge that
    child prostitution is a growing problem. Although no official
    statistics exist, the PANI has identified street children in the urban
    areas of San Jose, Limon, and Puntarenas as being at the greatest risk.
    Estimates of the number of children involved in prostitution vary
    widely. An International Labor Organization (ILO) study of four San
    Jose neighborhoods in 1998-99 identified at least 212 minor girls
    working as prostitutes, but other countrywide estimates are higher. A
    PANI study estimated that some 40 families in August supported
    themselves by ``renting'' their children to sex tourists. In July 1999,
    the Legislative Assembly passed the Law Against the Sexual Exploitation
    of Minors, which specifically penalizes persons who use children and
    adolescents for erotic purposes and made it a crime to engage in
    prostitution with minors. An adult who pays for sex with a minor can be
    sentenced to 2 to 10 years in prison. The Government took steps to
    enforce this law and has raided brothels and arrested clients. The law
    provides for prison sentences from 4 to 10 years for those managing or
    promoting child prostitution. The authorities brought charges against
    30 persons for violating the law and had convicted 4 persons by year's
    end.
        Casa Alianza operates a 24-hour telephone help line that received
    240 accusations of exploitation of minors. In March the organization
    made a presentation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
    (IACHR) about what it termed the growing commercial sexual exploitation
    of children in the country. Casa Alianza criticized the Government for
    not providing the PANI with 7 percent of national tax revenue, as
    stipulated by the law creating the Institute, and also criticized the
    Government for the relatively low number of persons actually charged,
    found guilty, and sentenced for child exploitation.
        People with Disabilities.--The 1996 Equal Opportunity for Persons
    with Disabilities Law prohibits discrimination, provides for health
    care services, and mandates provision of access to buildings for
    persons with disabilities. This law is not enforced widely, and many
    buildings remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities. In July a
    government study concluded that only 35 percent of the law's stated
    goals had been implemented. Nonetheless, a number of public and private
    institutions have made individual efforts to improve access. In 1999
    the PANI and the Ministry of Education published specific classroom
    guidelines for assisting children with hearing loss, motor
    difficulties, attention deficit disorder, and mental retardation. In
    October the Ministry reported that since 1998 there had been a 20
    percent increase in special education services offered throughout the
    country, and that 116 special education centers had been created.
        Indigenous People.--The population of about 3.5 million includes
    nearly 40,000 indigenous people among 8 ethnic groups. Most live in
    traditional communities on 22 reserves which, because of their remote
    location, often lack access to schools, health care, electricity, and
    potable water. The Government, through the National Indigenous
    Commission, completed distribution of identification cards to
    facilitate access to public medical facilities in 1999. The Government
    also built a medical clinic and several community health centers in
    indigenous areas. The Ombudsman has established an office to
    investigate violations of the rights of indigenous people. In January
    1999, a group of indigenous people from Puntarenas challenged the
    constitutionality of the 1978 Indigenous Law because of their inability
    to possess private property on the reservation. The Supreme Court's
    Constitutional Chamber rejected this challenge in January.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law specifies the right of
    workers to join unions of their choosing without prior authorization,
    although barriers exist in practice. About 15 percent of the work force
    is unionized, almost entirely in the public sector. Unions operate
    independently of government control.
        Some trade union leaders contend that ``solidarity'' associations,
        in which employers provide access to credit unions and savings
    plans in return for agreement to avoid strikes and other types of
    confrontation, infringe upon the right of association. After the ILO
    Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) ruled that solidarity
    associations and their involvement in trade union activities violated
    freedom of association, the Government amended the Labor Code in 1993.
    The following year, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) ruled that these
    and other planned changes fostered greater freedom of association. In
    1995 the COE encouraged the Government to approve legislation to allow
    unions to administer compensation funds for dismissed workers and to
    repeal labor code provisions restricting the right to strike in certain
    nonessential public, agricultural, and forestry sectors. The
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported that
    the Labor Ministry provided information about newly formed unions to
    employers who then encouraged formation of solidarity associations and
    blacklisted union members. The Labor Ministry denied the reports but
    acknowledged that solidarity association culture is deeply embedded.
    During 1999 and 2000, the Labor Ministry received 13 complaints
    (representing 7 incidents) charging explicit antiunion discrimination.
        In June 1998, the Rerum Novarum Workers Confederation complained
    about government noncompliance with commitments to protect worker
    rights but withdrew the complaint after the Rodriguez administration
    asked for a reasonable period to demonstrate its commitment to worker
    rights. Some labor unions did not support the complaint because they
    believed that it interfered with the administration's national
    reconciliation process. In August the Rerum Novarum confederation
    resubmitted the complaint against the Government; they had not received
    a response at year's end.
        The Constitution and Labor Code restrict the right of public sector
    workers to strike. However, in February 1998, the Supreme Court
    formally ruled that public sector workers, except those in essential
    positions, have the right to strike. Even before this ruling, the
    Government had removed penalties for union leaders participating in
    such strikes.
        In March the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber clarified the
    law forbidding public sector strikes. It ruled that public sector
    strikes may be allowed only if a judges approves them beforehand and
    finds that ``services necessary to the well-being of the public'' are
    not jeopardized. Public sector workers who decide to strike can no
    longer be penalized by a prison sentence but can face charges of breach
    of contract.
        In March Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) workers, employees
    from public hospitals, teachers, students, taxi drivers, and public
    transportation workers called a general strike that lasted several days
    to protest the passage of legislation which would partially open the
    ICE to private participation (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        There are no legal restrictions on the right of private sector
    workers to strike, but very few workers in this sector belong to
    unions. Private sector strikes rarely occur; however, their frequency
    increased during the year.
        Unions may form federations and confederations and affiliate
    internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution protects the right to organize. Specific provisions of the
    1993 Labor Code reforms provide protection from dismissal for union
    organizers and members during union formation. The revised provisions
    require employers who are found guilty of discrimination to reinstate
    workers fired for union activities. However, the ILO's CFA reported
    that harassment is still used to force workers to leave unions, and
    that other violations of labor legislation continue to occur. In one
    incident, a company in the banana industry refused to negotiate with a
    legitimate union for 3 years. The company eventually fired the union
    leader and established a solidarity association.
        Trade unions claim that the 1993 reforms have not led to
    significant improvements because the Government has not enforced the
    law effectively. However, the Labor Ministry hired an additional 10
    labor inspectors who are able to expedite such cases. The
    Constitutional Chamber ruled that the labor inspectorate must comply
    with the 2-month time limit for investigations. Most cases take up to 2
    months to resolve, but some may take longer if the judge decides that
    an unusual situation merits further investigation and requires
    witnesses. Delays in processing court rulings are common throughout the
    judicial branch.
        Public sector workers cannot engage in collective bargaining
    because the Public Administration Act of 1978 makes labor law
    inapplicable in relations between the Government and its employees.
    However, the Supreme Court has affirmed their right to strike (see
    Section 6.a.). In August 1999, the Government negotiated a wage
    increase following a 7-day strike by public sector workers. Private
    sector unions have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining.
        All labor regulations apply fully to the country's nine export
    processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Ministry oversees labor regulations
    within the EPZ's. It reported that after an effort to hire additional
    inspectors, it now has 1 inspector for every 9,000 workers, compared
    with 1 for every 30,000 in 1999.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no known instances
    of such practices. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children,
    and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code provide special
    employment protection for women and children and establish a minimum
    working age of 15 years. The Legislative Assembly adopted the Code on
    Childhood and Adolescence in December 1997, which includes provisions
    designed to implement the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
    Adolescents between the ages of 15 and 18 can work for a maximum of 6
    hours daily and 36 hours weekly, while children under age 15 cannot
    work legally. The PANI, in cooperation with the Labor Ministry,
    generally enforces these regulations in the formal sector. Due to
    limited government resources for enforcement, some children work on the
    fringes of the formal economy in violation of these limits. Youths
    under the age of 18 may not work in the banana industry. A 1999 study
    by the Census Bureau and Ministry of Labor estimated that 8.9 percent
    of the population between the ages of 5 and 14 are involved in the
    country's formal and informal workforce, and found that 70 percent of
    these children are boys. However, the study also indicated that the
    number of minor children in the workforce has dropped steadily over the
    past 10 years.
        With help from the ILO, the Labor Ministry is working to phase out
    child labor and has asked employers of children to notify the Ministry
    of such employment. The Government formed the National Directive
    Committee for the Progressive Eradication of Child Labor and Protection
    of Adolescent Laborers in 1990. Representatives from the PANI, the
    Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public
    Security, the Ombudsman's Office, UNICEF, the ILO, and area
    universities are part of the committee. In April 1999, the Committee
    conducted an aggressive public awareness campaign as part of its
    national plan. The campaign addressed child labor and explained
    existing legislation to audiences of different age groups. The Ministry
    of Labor maintains an Office for the Eradication of Child Labor, which
    cooperates with projects sponsored by the ILO, U.N. Development
    Program, and other entities. Nonetheless, child labor remains an
    integral part of the informal economy, particularly in small-scale
    agriculture and family-run microenterprises selling various items,
    which employ a significant proportion of the labor force. Child
    prostitution is a growing problem (see Section 5). The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
    prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        In October the International Relations Commission of the
    Legislative Assembly approved ILO Convention 182 on the eradication of
    the worst forms of child labor for debate on the Assembly floor, which
    was scheduled for the session beginning in December.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for a
    minimum wage. A National Wage Council, composed of three members each
    from government, business, and labor, sets minimum wage and salary
    levels for all sectors. Monthly minimum wages, last adjusted in July
    for the private sector, range from $137 (42,373 colones) for domestic
    employees to $662 (205,365 colones) for some professionals. Public
    sector negotiations, based on private sector minimum wages, normally
    follow the settlement of private sector negotiations. The Ministry of
    Labor effectively enforces minimum wages in the San Jose area, but does
    so less effectively in rural areas. Especially at the lower end of the
    wage scale, the minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and
    family with a decent standard of living.
        The Constitution sets workday hours, overtime remuneration, days of
    rest, and annual vacation rights. Although often circumvented in
    practice, it also requires compensation for discharge without due
    cause. Generally, workers may work a maximum of 8 hours during the day
    and 6 at night, up to weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours, respectively.
    Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime premium of 50 percent of
    regular wages for work in excess of the daily work shift. However,
    agricultural workers do not receive overtime pay if they voluntarily
    work beyond their normal hours. Little evidence exists that employers
    coerce employees to perform such overtime.
        A 1967 law on health and safety in the workplace requires
    industrial, agricultural, and commercial firms with 10 or more workers
    to establish a joint management-labor committee on workplace conditions
    and allows the Government to inspect workplaces and to fine employers
    for violations. Most firms subject to the law establish such committees
    but either do not use the committees or do not turn them into effective
    instruments for improving workplace conditions. Due partly to budgetary
    constraints, the Ministry has not fielded enough labor inspectors to
    ensure consistent maintenance of minimum conditions of safety and
    sanitation, especially outside San Jose. However, ministry programs to
    hire additional inspections and enhance inspector training programs
    have resulted in some progress. While workers have the right to leave
    work if conditions become dangerous, workers who do so may jeopardize
    their jobs unless they file written complaints with the Labor Ministry.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
    for the purpose of prostitution, and in August 1999, a statute went
    into effect that strengthens this prohibition. There have been only
    infrequent and isolated cases of trafficking in women in the past (see
    Section 5). However, in its March submission to the IACHR, Casa Alianza
    asserted that there was trafficking in women from Colombia, the
    Dominican Republic, and the Philippines to the country. Local
    authorities lack the resources necessary to address this problem; there
    is little in the way of government protection, aid, or educational
    campaigns for persons who have been trafficked to or from the country.
    The Ministry of Women's Issues began an awareness campaign in 1999 to
    educate women about the dangers of trafficking.
                                   __________

                                      CUBA

        Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by President Fidel Castro,
    who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the
    Communist Party, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. President
    Castro exercises control over all aspects of life through the Communist
    Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government
    bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. The Communist Party is
    the only legal political entity, and President Castro personally
    chooses the membership of the Politburo, the select group that heads
    the party. There are no contested elections for the 601-member National
    Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), which meets twice a year for a few
    days to rubber stamp decisions and policies already decided by the
    Government. The Party controls all government positions, including
    judicial offices. The judiciary is completely subordinate to the
    Government and to the Communist Party.
        The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security
    and totalitarian control. Officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
    (FAR), which are led by President Castro's brother, Raul, have been
    assigned to the majority of key positions in the Ministry of Interior
    in recent years. In addition to the routine law enforcement functions
    of regulating migration and controlling the Border Guard and the
    regular police forces, the Interior Ministry's Department of State
    Security investigates and actively suppresses opposition and dissent.
    It maintains a pervasive system of vigilance through undercover agents,
    informers, the rapid response brigades, and the Committees for the
    Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). The Government traditionally uses
    the CDR's to mobilize citizens against dissenters, impose ideological
    conformity, and root out ``counterrevolutionary'' behavior. During the
    early 1990's, economic problems reduced the Government's ability to
    reward participation in the CDR's and hence the willingness of citizens
    to participate in them, thereby lessening the CDR's effectiveness.
    Other mass organizations also inject government and Communist Party
    control into citizens' daily activities at home, work, and school.
    Members of the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        The Government continued to control all significant means of
    production and remained the predominant employer, despite permitting
    some carefully controlled foreign investment in joint ventures with it.
    Foreign companies are required to contract workers only through Cuban
    state agencies, which receive hard currency payments for the workers'
    labor but in turn pay the workers a fraction of this (usually 5
    percent) in local currency. In 1998 the Government retracted some of
    the changes that had led to the rise of legal nongovernmental business
    activity when it further tightened restrictions on the self-employed
    sector by reducing the number of categories allowed and by imposing
    relatively high taxes on self-employed persons. In September the
    Minister of Labor and Social Security publicly stated that more
    stringent laws should be promulgated to govern self-employment. He
    suggested that the Ministry of Interior, the National Tax Office, and
    the Ministry of Finance act in a coordinated fashion in order to reduce
    ``the illegal activities'' of the many self-employed. According to
    government officials, the number of self-employed persons as of
    September was 156,000, a decrease from the 166,000 reported in 1999.
        According to official figures, the economy grew 5.6 percent during
    the year. Despite this, overall economic output remains below the
    levels prior to the drop of at least 35 percent in gross domestic
    product that occurred in the early 1990's due to the inefficiencies of
    the centrally controlled economic system; the loss of billions of
    dollars of annual Soviet bloc trade and Soviet subsidies; the ongoing
    deterioration of plants, equipment, and the transportation system; and
    the continued poor performance of the important sugar sector. The 1999-
    2000 sugar harvest (just over 4 million tons) was marginally better
    than the 1998-99 harvest. The 1997-98 harvest was considered the worst
    in more than 50 years. For the tenth straight year, the Government
    continued its austerity measures known as the ``special period in
    peacetime.'' Agricultural markets, legalized in 1994, provide consumers
    wider access to meat and produce, although at prices beyond the reach
    of most citizens living on peso-only incomes or pensions. Given these
    conditions, the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances
    from the exile community significantly helps those who receive dollars
    to survive. Tourism remained a key source of revenue for the
    Government. The system of so-called tourist apartheid continued, with
    foreign visitors who pay in hard currency receiving preference over
    citizens for food, consumer products, and medical services. Most
    citizens remain barred from tourist hotels, beaches, and resorts.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor. It continued to
    violate systematically the fundamental civil and political rights of
    its citizens. Citizens do not have the right to change their government
    peacefully. There were unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings by
    the police, and reports that prisoners died in jail due to lack of
    medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials
    continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. The
    Government failed to prosecute or sanction adequately members of the
    security forces and prison guards who committed abuses. Prison
    conditions remained harsh. The authorities continued routinely to
    harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame
    human rights advocates and members of independent professional
    associations, including journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers,
    often with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country. The
    Government used internal and external exile against such persons, and
    it offered political prisoners the choice of exile or continued
    imprisonment. The Government denied political dissidents and human
    rights advocates due process and subjected them to unfair trials. The
    Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government denied
    citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It
    limited the distribution of foreign publications and news, reserving
    them for selected party faithful, and maintained strict censorship of
    news and information to the public. The Government restricts some
    religious activities but permits others. Before and after the January
    1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, the Government permitted some public
    processions on feast days, and reinstated Christmas as an official
    holiday; however, it has not responded to the papal appeal that the
    Church be allowed to play a greater role in society. During the year,
    the Government allowed two new priests to enter the country (as
    professors in a seminary) and another two to replace two priests whose
    visas were not renewed. However, the applications of many priests and
    religious workers remained pending, and some visas were issued for
    periods of only 3 to 6 months. The Government kept tight restrictions
    on freedom of movement, including foreign travel. The Government was
    sharply and publicly antagonistic to all criticism of its human rights
    practices and discouraged foreign contacts with human rights activists.
    Violence against women, especially domestic violence, and child
    prostitution are problems. Racial discrimination occurs. The Government
    severely restricted worker rights, including the right to form
    independent unions. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, it requires children to do farm work without
    compensation during their summer vacation.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings. There were unconfirmed
    reports of deaths due to the excessive use of force by the national
    police.
        On October 6, according to a report by the Agencia de Prensa Libre
    Oriental (APLO--an independent news agency), a policeman shot 41-year-
    old Leovigildo Oliva, from El Poblado, Dos Caminos de San Luis,
    Santiago province, as he was returning home in the early morning on
    horseback carrying a bag of animal feed. Oliva was taken to the
    hospital and died a few hours later. No explanation was given for the
    shooting.
        On December 28, 27-year-old Leonardo Horta Camacho was shot and
    killed. According to some reports, Horta apparently was shot while
    trying to steal a pig; a policeman reportedly told Horta's girlfriend
    that he was accidentally shot while struggling with a policeman.
    Another version was that police thought Horta was one of two escaped
    prisoners that they were searching for.
        Government sanctions against perpetrators were light or nonexistent
    in the cases of deaths due to excessive use of force that occurred in
    1998. There was no information available about the results of any
    investigations into the 1998 deaths of Wilfredo Martinez Perez, Yuset
    Ochoterena, and Reinery Marrera Toldedo.
        During the year, there were reports that prisoners died in jail due
    to lack of medical care (see Section 1.c.).
        In 1996 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
    issued its final report on the Government's July 1994 sinking of the
    13th of March tugboat, which killed 41 persons. The IACHR ordered the
    Government to indemnify the survivors and the relatives of the victims
    for the damages caused. At year's end, the Government still had not
    done so. The Government detained a number of human rights activists to
    prevent them from participating in a Mass in memory of the victims on
    the anniversary of the deaths (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detainees
    and prisoners; however, there were instances in which members of the
    security forces beat and otherwise abused human rights advocates,
    detainees, and prisoners. There were numerous reports of
    disproportionate police harassment of black youths (see Section 5).
        On January 22, Communist Party members attacked members of the
    Sigler Amaya family in their home in Pedro Betancourt, in the province
    of Matanzas, in the presence of police officers. The family was
    concluding a fast for the release of two of their family members, Guido
    Sigler Amaya and Ariel Sigler Amaya, who were detained on December 15,
    1999. After destroying a number of placards, the 10 party members
    attacked several persons in the family with sticks. Juan Francisco
    Sigler Amaya was knocked unconscious; Miguel Sigler Amaya suffered a
    broken rib; Gulliver and Ulises Sigler Gonzalez, the sons of Juan
    Francisco, received lesser injuries. Party members also beat Gloria
    Amaya Gonzalez, the grandmother. After the attack, police officers
    entered the house and arrested all the men in the house. The police did
    not arrest the attackers. On January 23, the authorities released Juan
    Rogelio ``Yeyo'' Gonzalez, Juan Francisco Martinez, and Miguel Sigler
    Amaya but fined them for disturbing the peace and causing public
    disorder. At year's end, the Government had not sanctioned any of the
    Communist Party members for this attack. Police released Guido Sigler
    Amaya on July 9, and Airel Sigler Amaya on August 5.
        On July 13, Ernesto La O Ramos of the ``Maximo Gomez National Civic
    Movement,'' reportedly planned to place flowers in a nearby river in
    commemoration of the death of 41 persons, who died in the sinking of
    the 13th of March tugboat in 1994. A policeman warned La O Ramos not to
    go to the river. When he refused, the policeman brought him to the
    police station. On the way to the police station, La O Ramos greeted a
    friend, and the policeman reportedly interpreted this as an indication
    that La O Ramos intended to run away. The officer hit La O Ramos in the
    face, fracturing his nose and breaking his eye glasses. La O Ramos was
    cited for disrespect and his trial on August 3 was postponed until
    further notice. However, on September 29, the judge dismissed the
    charges against La O Ramos.
        The Government continued to subject persons who disagree with it to
    acts of repudiation. At government instigation, members of state-
    controlled mass organizations, fellow workers, or neighbors of intended
    victims are obliged to stage public protests against those who dissent
    with the Government's policies, shouting obscenities and often causing
    damage to the homes and property of those targeted; physical attacks on
    the victims sometimes occur. Police and state security agents are often
    present but take no action to prevent or end the attacks. Those who
    refuse to participate in these actions face disciplinary action,
    including loss of employment.
        During the year, there were no massive acts of repudiation directed
    against the homes of individual human rights activists; however, there
    were smaller-scale acts of repudiation, known as ``reuniones
    relampagos,'' or rapid repudiations. These acts are conducted by a
    small number of persons, usually not from the person's neighborhood,
    and can last up to 30 minutes. These individuals shout epithets and
    throw stones or other objects at the target's house. For example, in
    the early morning on June 21, a small group of persons threw stones,
    tomatoes, and eggs for about 10 minutes at the home of Yvette Rodriguez
    Manzanares in Santiago de Cuba. Rodriguez is a member of Followers of
    Chibas Movement (MSC).
        On the night of August 12, unknown persons threw stones at the
    house of Nelson Parra Polanco, a member of the Democratic Solidarity
    Party in Manzanillo in the province of Granma. On September 27, just
    before midnight, an unknown number of persons entered the yard of the
    house of Isabel del Pino, president of the Association of Humanitarian
    Followers of Christ the King, and knocked loudly on her door. The crowd
    also shouted abusive language, such as ``Down with the Worm'' (``Abajo
    la gusanera''), ``Let the worms leave'' (``Que se vayan los gusanos''),
    etc.
        Prison conditions continued to be harsh and life threatening, and
    conditions in detention facilities also are harsh. The Government
    claims that prisoners have rights, such as family visitation, adequate
    nutrition, pay for work, the right to request parole, and the right to
    petition the prison director. However, police and prison officials
    often denied these rights in practice, and beat, neglected, isolated,
    and denied medical treatment to detainees and prisoners, including
    those convicted of political crimes or those who persisted in
    expressing their views. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in
    February 1999, the Government revised the Penal Code to provide that
    prisoners cannot be subjected to corporal punishment, nor is it
    permitted to employ any means against them to humiliate them or to
    lessen their dignity. However, the revised code failed to establish
    penalties for committing such acts.
        The Government regularly violated prisoners' rights by failing to
    provide adequate nutrition and medical attention. On June 1, APLO
    reported that Marcelo Diosdado Amelo Rodriguez, imprisoned in Boniato,
    was not receiving medicine for hypertension and circulatory problems.
    In June the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) called on the
    Government to provide medical treatment to two journalists serving
    prison sentences. The two journalists suffered from hepatitis and
    serious influenza, and the IAPA feared that one might contract
    tuberculosis. On July 27, an independent press agency reported the
    death of common prisoner Lucia Castelua Padron because prison
    authorities did not transfer her to a hospital to receive treatment for
    hepatitis. In 1997 the IACHR described the nutritional and hygienic
    situation in the prisons, together with the deficiencies in medical
    care, as ``alarming.'' Both the IACHR and the former U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on Cuba, as well as other human rights monitoring
    organizations, reported the widespread incidence in prisons of
    tuberculosis, scabies, hepatitis, parasitic infections, and
    malnutrition.
        On April 10, over 100 prisoners in Prison 1580, located in the
    Havana City municipality of San Miguel del Padron, protested the lack
    of medical attention and requested better prison conditions. On May 3,
    a number of prisoners reportedly rioted in Kilo 7, a prison in
    Camaguey, and requested better medical treatment, better food, and
    personal respect. Special police forces apparently attacked the
    prisoners and terminated the strike, an action that resulted in 20
    prisoners being hospitalized.
        Prison guards and state security officials also subjected human
    rights and prodemocracy activists to threats of physical violence; to
    systematic psychological intimidation; and to detention or imprisonment
    in cells with common and violent criminals, sexually aggressive
    inmates, or state security agents posing as prisoners.
        There are separate prison facilities for women and for minors.
        Prison officials regularly denied prisoners other rights, such as
    the right to correspondence, and continued to confiscate medications
    and food brought by family members for political prisoners. Prison
    authorities also routinely denied religious workers access to detainees
    and prisoners.
        Political prisoners are required to comply with the rules for
    common criminals and often are punished severely if they refuse. They
    often are placed in punishment cells and held in isolation. Detainees
    and prisoners often are subjected to repeated vigorous interrogations
    designed to coerce them into signing incriminating statements, to force
    collaboration with authorities, or to intimidate victims.
        Vladimiro Roca Antunez, a member of the Internal Dissidents Working
    Group, remains in prison, and was moved from solitary confinement in
    early July to a section of the prison for common prisoners. Prison
    officials denied Roca prison furloughs over weekends, which were
    granted to the three other members of the group before their release in
    May (see Section 1.e.).
        The authorities took Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet to a prison in Holguin,
    located about 450 miles from Havana where his family lives, immediately
    following his 1-day trial in February. On June 7, Biscet was placed in
    a ``punishment cell'' and could not receive visitors nor receive food,
    clothes, or publications. He was not allowed to take any reading
    materials to the punishment cell, not even the Bible. The authorities
    allegedly placed Biscet in a punishment cell because he started a 6-
    hour fast to commemorate the 40 days of fasting that he started on June
    7, 1999, in an apartment on Tamarindo 34 in the 10th of October
    municipality in Havana. On July 1, Biscet left the punishment cell;
    however, authorities sent him back to the punishment cell again when he
    announced his intention to fast on July 13 in honor of the Cubans who
    died when the 13th of March tugboat sank in 1994. Prison authorities
    reportedly told Biscet that such actions were disruptive of prison life
    and could lead to violence. Biscet served 42 days in solitary
    confinement. In November prison authorities punished Biscet again, this
    time for protesting inadequate medical attention for 10 common
    prisoners suffering from diarrhea. Guards allegedly denied him food
    that his family brought and refused to allow a scheduled family visit.
    Biscet still was imprisoned at year's end.
        From May 24 to June 1, political prisoners Jorge Garcia Perez
    (Antunez) conducted a hunger strike to protest the lack of medical
    attention, the arbitrary removal of books and literature, including the
    Bible, and suspension of family visits. He reportedly received improved
    treatment from prison officials following the hunger strike.
        On August 22, the parents of Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez reported
    that he was placed in a punishment cell in the provincial prison of
    Canaleta in Ciego de Avila. Prison officials did not allow him to have
    any literature, including the Bible.
        Although no longer in solitary confinement in a punishment cell,
    Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez, who was president of the National Council
    for Civil Rights in Cuba and who has been imprisoned since 1994 on
    charges of espionage and disrespect, refuses to see family members
    until prison officials guarantee that he can receive visits from his
    family members once a month, in accordance with prison regulations.
    Presently Chaviano and his wife exchange letters.
        The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
    conditions by international or national human rights monitoring groups.
    The Government has refused to allow prison visits by the International
    Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 1989 and continues to refuse
    requests to renew such visits.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention continued to be problems, and they remained the Government's
    most effective weapons for harassing opponents. The Law of Penal
    Procedures requires police to file formal charges and either release a
    detainee or bring the case before a prosecutor within 96 hours of
    arrest. It also requires the authorities to provide suspects with
    access to a lawyer within 7 days of arrest. However, the Constitution
    states that all legally recognized civil liberties can be denied to
    anyone who actively opposes the decision of the Cuban people to build
    socialism. The authorities routinely invoke this sweeping authority to
    deny due process to those detained on purported state security grounds.
        The authorities routinely engage in arbitrary arrest and detention
    of human rights advocates, subjecting them to interrogations, threats,
    and degrading treatment and unsanitary conditions for hours or days at
    a time. A survey by the illegal nongovernmental organization (NGO) the
    Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation reported
    that the Government sanctioned or processed 368 persons for political
    motives in 1999. Amnesty International (AI) further recognized the
    increase of arrests and harassment of dissidents at year's end,
    particularly around the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
    Human Rights, when the authorities arrested approximately 200 persons
    to prevent them from participating in a celebration of that
    anniversary. Human rights activists characterized this escalation as
    the worst in a decade. Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the
    Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation, said that
    he especially was disturbed about the new and unlawful methods that the
    security forces used to harass dissidents, including the use of force
    when arresting activists.
        For example, the police arrested Victor Rolando Arroyo Carmona, an
    independent journalist, and Pedro Pablo Hernandez Mijares during a
    birthday party celebration for Noel Ascanio Montero in Guines. The
    police beat Rolando Arroyo, confiscated his cassette recorder (he is an
    independent journalist) and $15. Police subsequently left the two men
    on the side of a road, far from Guines. The men returned to Guines and
    went to the local police station to lodge a formal complaint against
    the police, but instead were again driven away and left on the road
    more than 20 miles away. On returning to Guines in the early morning,
    Rolando Arroyo again went to the police station, but police intercepted
    him and took him to the next municipality of Guanajay.
        In December 1999, police detained Jose Aguilar Hernandez and Carlos
    Oquendo Rodriguez of the July 13 Movement, Diosdado Gonzalez Marrero of
    the Peace, Love, and Liberty Party, and Marcel Valenzuela Salt of the
    Brotherly Civic Organization when they attempted to demonstrate during
    the religious festivities in honor of St. Lazarus, near the small town
    of El Rincon, near Havana. On June 13, the authorities released the
    four men.
        In December 1999, the authorities arrested Maritza Lugo Fernandez,
    the vice president of the Democratic November 30 Party and released her
    only on June 2. Maritza Lugo had been released from jail in August
    1999, then was detained various times before her subsequent arrest in
    December 1999. When Maritza Lugo was released, state security officials
    told her to prepare the papers for the departure of her family,
    including her husband, Rafael Ibarra Roque, who still was in jail.
    However, in December the authorities again arrested Maritza Lugo and
    detained her until year's end without filing charges against her.
        The authorities continued to detain human rights activists and
    independent journalists for short periods, often to prevent them from
    attending or participating in events related to human rights issues.
    The authorities also placed such activists under house arrest for short
    periods for similar reasons.
        On January 13, security personnel impeded a number of human rights
    activists and independent journalists from attending the trial of
    independent journalist Victor Rolando Arroyo Carmona. Victor Rolando
    received a 6-month jail sentence for allegedly hoarding toys. He bought
    toys to distribute to poor children on January 6. The Government
    confined Juan Carlos Perez Arencibia, Feliciano Alvarez, and Cecilio
    Gonzalez to their homes so that they could not attend Arroyo's trial in
    Pinar del Rio. In 1996 Arroyo Carmona served a 1-year and 9 months'
    prison term for showing disrespect to authorities.
        On January 25, police detained Oswaldo Paya Sardinas, president of
    the Christian Liberation Movement and Hector Palacios Ruiz, director of
    the Center for Social Studies. According to Elizardo Sanchez Santa
    Cruz, the two were detained to prevent a meeting from taking place at
    Palacios' house regarding ``All United,'' a document that was issued
    just before the Ninth Ibero-American Summit in November 1999 in Havana.
    The police also detained a number of other dissidents, including Jose
    Orlando Gonzalez Bridon, Secretary General of the Confederation of the
    Democratic Workers Union of Cuba, and an independent journalist; all
    were released the same afternoon. Police had detained Bridon on January
    20 and questioned him about his journalistic activities.
        State Security officers detained human rights activists and
    independent journalists, including Alejandro Chang of the Movement of
    Fraternal Brothers for Dignity; Nelson Aquiar Ramirez of the Orthodox
    Party, Maria A. Garcia Delgado of the Movement of 24 February, Carlos
    Alberto Dominguez of the November 30 Democratic Party, Carlos Rios of
    Change 2000, Clara Morales Martinez of the July 13 Movement, Angel
    Polanco, Rafael Peraza, Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez Amaro, and Jose
    Antonio Fornaris Ramos to make sure they did not attend the 1-day
    public trial of Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Eduardo Diaz Fleitas, and
    Fermin Scull Zulueta, which took place on February 25 in Havana. In
    addition, the authorities told many dissidents and independent
    journalists not to attend. The authorities ordered prominent dissident
    Jesus Yanez Pelletier not to leave his house, and placed guards outside
    to ensure compliance. Others who were ordered to stay in their homes
    were Maria Esther Suarez Valdes of the Confederation of Democratic
    Workers Union of Cuba; Ileana Gonzalez of the Democratic Party November
    30; Ruben Camalleri of the Movement of February 24; Carlos Raul Jimenez
    Carrero of Nationalist Agenda; and Odilia Collazo Valdes of the Pro-
    Human Rights Party of Cuba. The authorities placed independent
    journalists Omar Rodriguez Saludes and Jorge Olivera Castillo under 1-
    day house arrest.
        On May 24, security police detained four human rights activists who
    were on their way to deliver a letter requesting better prison
    conditions for political prisoners to prison authorities in Vedado,
    Havana. The letter also protested Dr. Biscet's incarceration 450 miles
    away from his family. Police detained Armando Dominguez and Iosvani
    Aquilar Camejo of the Movement of Fraternal Brothers for Dignity, and
    Alejandro Chang Cantillo and Marlon Cabrera of the Brotherly Civic
    Movement. On October 23, the police released Marlon Cabrera Rivero and
    Alejandro Chang Cantillo; they released Armando Dominguez Gonzalez on
    October 20 and Iosvani Aquilar Camejo on October 30. The authorities
    also fined Aguilar Camejo about $30 (600 pesos) for disturbing the
    peace in the prison.
        On June 29, the police arrested Rafael Iturralde Bello, president
    of the Libertad independent agricultural cooperative in Santiago de
    Cuba, outside a bus station in Pinar del Rio. They arrested Iturralde
    before he could meet with other members of the National Association of
    Independent Farmers of Cuba in Pinar del Rio. They released Iturralde
    24 hours later and placed him on a bus to Santiago de Cuba.
        As in previous years, on July 13, police prevented activists from
    commemorating in any way the 1994 incident in which 41 persons drowned
    when the Border Guard sank the 13th of March tugboat (see Section
    1.a.). Beginning on July 12, police detained activists in a number of
    provinces, and ordered others to remain in their homes on July 13. The
    authorities told dissidents that if they did not obey they would be
    prosecuted for illegal assembly and distribution of enemy propaganda,
    or for incitement to rebellion. In Santiago de Cuba, more than 80 state
    security agents reportedly attacked about 30 dissidents who had thrown
    bouquets of flowers into the ocean in honor of those who died in 1994.
    State Security agents allegedly also beat women in the group. Security
    agents accused the dissidents of being thieves and delinquents (see
    Section 2.b.).
        On July 21, the authorities also prevented activists in Santiago de
    Cuba, including independent journalist Luis Alberto Rivera and Fidel
    Soria Torres and Ivette Rodriguez Manzanares of the MSC, from attending
    the trial of Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Eddy Alfredo Mena Gonzalez of
    the Movement of Cuban Youth for Democracy. The two men were charged
    with disrespect, causing damages, and causing public disorder. On
    August 15, the court gave Rodriguez a 6-year prison sentence and
    sentenced Mena to 5 years in prison (see Section 1.e.).
        On September 8, security police ordered a number of human rights
    activists not to attend the annual procession in honor of the Virgin of
    Charity (see Section 2.c.).
        The Penal Code includes the concept of ``dangerousness,'' defined
    as the ``special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated
    by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms.'' If the
    police decide that a person exhibits signs of dangerousness, they may
    bring the offender before a court or subject him to therapy or
    political reeducation. Government authorities regularly threaten
    prosecution under this article. Both the U.N. Commission on Human
    Rights (UNCHR) and the IACHR have criticized this concept for its
    subjectivity, the summary nature of the judicial proceedings employed,
    the lack of legal safeguards, and the political considerations behind
    its application. According to the IACHR, the so-called special
    inclination to commit crimes referred to in the Criminal Code amounts
    to a subjective criterion used by the Government to justify violations
    of the rights to individual freedom and due process of persons whose
    sole crime has been an inclination to hold a view different from the
    official view.
        On August 8, police summoned Manuel Lantigua Dominguez, a member of
    the dissident Council of Cuban Workers (CUTC) in the province of
    Guantanamo, to the local police office. After taking his photograph and
    fingerprints, the police told Lantigua that a case on charges of
    dangerousness would be opened against him.
        The Government also used exile as a tool for controlling and
    eliminating the internal opposition. AI has noted that the Government
    detains human rights activists repeatedly for short periods and
    threatens them with imprisonment unless they gave up their activities
    or left the country. The Government used these incremental aggressive
    tactics to compel Ruben Ruiz Armenteros, vice president of the Human
    Rights Party of Cuba, to leave the country on September 28. On October
    26, Orestes Rodriguez Horruitiner, president of the MSC, also left the
    country. Rodriguez had been imprisoned from July 1997 to April 7.
        The Government also has pressured imprisoned human rights activists
    and political prisoners to apply for emigration and regularly
    conditioned their release on acceptance of exile. HRW observed that the
    Government routinely invokes forced exile as a condition for prisoner
    releases and also pressures activists to leave the country to escape
    future prosecution.
        AI has expressed particular concern about the Government's practice
    of threatening to charge, try, and imprison human rights advocates and
    independent journalists prior to arrest or sentencing if they did not
    leave the country. According to AI, this practice ``effectively
    prevents those concerned from being able to act in public life in their
    own country.''
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
    independent courts; however, it explicitly subordinates the courts to
    the ANPP and the Council of State, which is headed by Fidel Castro. The
    ANPP and its lower level counterparts choose all judges. The
    subordination of the courts to the Communist Party, which the
    Constitution designates as the superior directive force of the society
    and the State further compromises the judiciary's independence. The
    courts undermine the right to a fair trial by restricting the right to
    a defense and often failed to observe the few due process rights
    available to defendants.
        Civil courts exist at municipal, provincial, and supreme court
    levels. Panels composed of a mix of professionally certified and lay
    judges preside over them. Military tribunals assume jurisdiction for
    certain counterrevolutionary cases.
        The law and trial practices do not meet international standards for
    fair public trials. Almost all cases are tried in less than a day;
    there are no jury trials. While most trials are public, trials are
    closed when there are alleged violations of state security. Prosecutors
    may introduce testimony from a CDR member about the revolutionary
    background of a defendant, which may contribute to either a longer or
    shorter sentence. The law recognizes the right of appeal in municipal
    courts but limits it in provincial courts to cases such as those
    involving maximum prison terms or the death penalty. Appeals in death
    penalty cases are automatic. The death penalty ultimately must be
    affirmed by the Council of State.
        Criteria for presenting evidence, especially in cases of human
    rights advocates, are arbitrary and discriminatory. Often the sole
    evidence provided, particularly in political cases, is the defendant's
    confession, usually obtained under duress and without the legal advice
    or knowledge of a defense lawyer. The authorities regularly deny
    defendants access to their lawyers until the day of the trial. Several
    dissidents who have served prison terms reported that they were tried
    and sentenced without counsel and were not allowed to speak on their
    own behalf. AI concluded in 1996 that ``trials in all cases fall far
    short of international standards for a fair trial.''
        The law provides the accused with the right to an attorney, but the
    control that the Government exerts over the livelihood of members of
    the state-controlled lawyers' collectives--especially when they defend
    persons accused of state security crimes--compromises their ability to
    represent clients. Attorneys have reported reluctance to defend those
    charged in political cases due to fear of jeopardizing their own
    careers.
        In January a Havana court reaffirmed the 4-year prison term for
    dangerousness imposed in 1998 on Lazaro Constantin Duran, leader of the
    Friends Club of an independent teachers' organization. On January 18, a
    court sentenced independent journalist Jesus Joel Diaz Hernandez to 4
    years imprisonment for dangerousness (see Section 2.a.).
        On February 25, diplomats and members of the international press
    attended the 1-day trial of Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, president of the
    Lawton Foundation for Human Rights. Biscet was convicted of disrespect,
    creating a public disturbance by hanging a Cuban flag upside down
    during a press conference in his home, and encouraging others to
    violate the law. In his opening statement, Biscet denied all charges
    against him, and insisted that he was a nonviolent activist for human
    rights. The three judge panel heard six witnesses and listened to the
    opening and closing arguments of both the prosecutor and defense
    attorney. The court sentenced Biscet to 3 years in prison (less than
    the 7 years the prosecution sought). The same court sentenced Fermin
    Scull Zulueta to 1 year in prison, and released Eduardo Diaz Fleitas.
    The latter two men were charged with insulting national symbols,
    creating a public disturbance, and instigating a crime. The authorities
    transferred Biscet to the Cuba Si prison in Holguin (see Section 1.c.).
    The authorities detained and prevented human rights activists and
    independent journalists from attending the trial (see Section 1.d.).
        On July 13, prison authorities accused Egberto Angel Escobedo
    Morales, serving a 24-year sentence for the crimes of espionage,
    propagating enemy propaganda, and theft of the additional crimes of
    disrespect and causing disturbances in a penitentiary. The prosecution
    requested an additional 20-year sentence.
        On July 21, in Santiago de Cuba, Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina and Eddy
    Alfredo Mena Gonzalez of the Movement of Cuban Youth for Democracy went
    on trial for disrespect, causing damages, and causing public disorder.
    On August 15, Rodriguez received a 6-year prison sentence, while Mena
    was sentenced to 5 years in prison.
        During the year, three of the four members of the Internal
    Dissident Working Group received conditional release from prison--Felix
    Antonio Bonne Carcasses, on May 12; Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello, on
    May 15; and Rene de Jesus Gomez Manzano, on May 23. Police arrested the
    four persons in July 1997 for expressing peacefully their disagreement
    with the Government. In September 1998, they were charged with acts
    against the security of the state in relation to the crime of sedition.
    Despite the prosecution's demand for sentences from 5 to 6 years, Felix
    Bonne and Rene Gomez received a 4-year jail sentence while Martha
    received a 3-1/2 year sentence. The fourth member of the group,
    Vladimiro Roca Antunez, received a 5-year sentence. In early July, Roca
    was moved from solitary confinement to a section of the prison for
    common prisoners; he remained in prison at year's end.
        Human rights monitoring groups inside the country estimate the
    number of political prisoners at between 300 and 400 persons. On July
    16, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation
    reported that 314 persons were in prison for political reasons. The
    authorities have imprisoned persons on charges such as disseminating
    enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt for the authorities
    (usually for criticizing Fidel Castro), clandestine printing, or the
    broad charge of rebellion, which is often brought against advocates of
    peaceful democratic change.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Although the Constitution provides for the
    inviolability of a citizen's home and correspondence, official
    surveillance of private and family affairs by government-controlled
    mass organizations, such as the CDR's, remains one of the most
    pervasive and repressive features of daily life. The State has assumed
    the right to interfere in the lives of citizens, even those who do not
    actively oppose the Government and its practices. The mass
    organizations' ostensible purpose is to improve the citizenry, but in
    fact their goal is to discover and discourage nonconformity. Citizen
    participation in these mass organizations has declined; the economic
    crisis both has reduced the Government's ability to provide material
    incentives for their participation and has forced many persons to
    engage in black market activities, which the mass organizations are
    supposed to report to the authorities.
        The authorities utilize a wide range of social controls.
        The Interior Ministry employs an intricate system of informants and
    block committees (the CDR's) to monitor and control public opinion.
    While less capable than in the past, CDR's continue to report on
    suspicious activity, including conspicuous consumption; unauthorized
    meetings, including those with foreigners; and defiant attitudes toward
    the Government and the revolution.
        The Government controls all access to the Internet, and all
    electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. The Department of
    State Security often reads international correspondence and monitors
    overseas telephone calls and conversations with foreigners. The
    Government also monitors domestic phone calls and correspondence.
        In January the authorities dismissed Teidy Betancourt Gonzalez from
    her job as an assistant teacher in a kindergarten because her husband,
    Ruben Perez Pons, a member of the Democratic Action group in Sancti
    Spiritus, is a dissident. On April 29, the authorities expelled from
    his workplace Jose Carlos Malina Gonzalez, conditionally released from
    jail, because he refused to participate in a government-sponsored
    public event for the return of Elian Gonzalez Brotons. The
    administrator of Molina's workplace threatened to inform the police so
    that he could be returned to prison.
        In August Romilio de Jesus Garcia Mauri, member of the Club of
    Prisoners and Former Political Prisoners, was convoked three times to
    appear at the local police station in Santiago de Cuba for possible
    drug trafficking. Every time Mauri arrived at the police station, he
    was asked to submit a writing test for examination. On August 10,
    police detained Yuri Tier Pineiro on the La Victoria beach in the
    province of Sancti Spiritus and interrogated him for 3 days about the
    political activities of his father, Marcelo Tier Perez, and his older
    brother Marcelo Tier Pineiro, members of the Democratic Solidarity
    Party. He himself is not a political activist.
        There were numerous credible reports of forced evictions of
    squatters and residents who lacked official permission to reside in
    Havana (see Section 5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government does not allow
    criticism of the revolution or its leaders. Laws against antigovernment
    propaganda, graffiti, and disrespect of officials carry penalties of
    between 3 months and 1 year in prison. If President Castro or members
    of the National Assembly or Council of State are the objects of
    criticism, the sentence can be extended to 3 years. Charges of
    disseminating enemy propaganda (which includes merely expressing
    opinions at odds with those of the Government) can bring sentences of
    up to 14 years. In the Government's view, such materials as the
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international reports of human
    rights violations, and mainstream foreign newspapers and magazines
    constitute enemy propaganda. Local CDR's inhibit freedom of speech by
    monitoring and reporting dissent or criticism. Police and state
    security officials regularly harassed, threatened, and otherwise abused
    human rights advocates in public and private as a means of intimidation
    and control.
        The Constitution states that print and electronic media are state
    property and cannot become in any case private property. The Communist
    Party controls all media--except a few small church-run publications.
    Even the church-run publications, denied access to mass printing
    equipment, are subject to governmental pressure. In particular, the
    Government publicly criticized the publisher of the magazine Vitral, a
    publication of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, twice during the year;
    President Castro had criticized publicly an article that the magazine
    printed in 1999. The Government reported extensively on Vitral articles
    and on the publisher's activities and contacts, which it labeled as
    counterrevolutionary. As of October, Vitral had not been shut down, but
    as of year's end, the Church was still being subjected to considerable
    pressure to avoid political topics.
        The Government controls all access to the Internet, and all
    electronic mail messages are subject to censorship. Citizens do not
    have the right to receive publications from abroad, although newsstands
    in hotels for foreigners and certain hard currency stores sell foreign
    newspapers and magazines. The Government continued to jam the
    transmission of Radio Marti and Television Marti. Radio Marti
    broadcasts generally overcame the jamming attempts on short-wave bands,
    but its medium-wave transmissions are blocked completely in Havana.
    Security agents subjected dissidents, foreign diplomats, and
    journalists to harassment and surveillance, including electronic
    surveillance.
        All media must operate under party guidelines and reflect
    government views. The Government attempts to shape media coverage to
    such a degree that it not only continued to exert pressure on domestic
    journalists but also kept up a steady barrage of pressure on groups
    normally outside the official realm of control, such as visiting
    international correspondents. Fidel Castro continued to criticize
    publicly the international press, often by name.
        Resident foreign correspondents reported that the very high-level
    of government pressure experienced in 1999, including official and
    informal complaints about articles, threatening phone calls, and lack
    of access to officials, continued throughout the year. The Government
    strengthened its ability to control the foreign press by ceasing to
    issue multiple entry visas to journalists from foreign press
    organizations who reside in Havana. Such journalists are now required
    to apply for a new visa each time they leave the country.
        In August Radio Moron, a small government-run radio station in the
    central part of the country, dismissed the host of one of its programs
    after he read on the air a poem by Raul Rivero (founder and director of
    the Cuba Press news agency).
        The 1999 Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy
    outlaws a broad range of activities as undermining state security, and
    toughens penalties for criminal activity. Under the law, anyone caught
    possessing or disseminating literature deemed subversive, or supplying
    information that could be used by U.S. authorities in the application
    of U.S. legislation, is subject to fines and to prison terms of 7 to 20
    years. While many activities between Cuban nationals and foreigners
    possibly could fall within the purview of this new law, it appears to
    be aimed primarily at independent journalists.
        This law increased the penalties and broadened the definitions of
    activities covered by the 1996 Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty Act, which
    already proscribed citizens from providing information to any
    representatives of the U.S. Government, or seeking any information from
    them, that might be used directly or indirectly in the application of
    U.S. legislation against the Government. This includes accepting or
    distributing Publications, documents or other material from any origin,
    which the authorities might interpret as facilitating implementation of
    such legislation.
        The Government continued to threaten independent journalists,
    either anonymously or openly, with arrest and conviction based on the
    new law. Some journalists have been threatened repeatedly since the law
    took effect. Independent journalists noted that the law's very
    existence had some effect on their activities and increased self
    censorship, and some noted that it is the Government's most effective
    tool to harass members of the independent press.
        In February 1999, National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon told
    foreign correspondents that under the new law, even reporters working
    for accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years in
    prison if the information they publish is deemed to serve U.S.
    interests.
        The Government continues to subject independent journalists to
    internal travel bans, arbitrary and periodic detentions (overnight or
    longer), harassment of family and friends, seizures of computers,
    office and photographic equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged
    imprisonment (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Independent
    journalists in Havana reported that threatening phone calls and
    harassment of family members continued during the year. More than 20
    independent journalists experienced varying degrees of harassment, and
    certain individuals appear to have been singled out. Since January
    dozens of reporters were repeatedly detained, some for several days.
    Authorities also placed journalists under house arrest to prevent them
    from reporting on conferences sponsored by human rights activists,
    human rights events, and court cases against activists.
        Family members have lost their jobs because they refuse to condemn
    or inform on these so-called counterrevolutionaries (see Section 1.f.).
    Acts of intimidation have been reported less frequently since 1999.
    However, police have tried more often to prevent independent
    journalists from covering so-called sensitive events.
        In January an unidentified assailant attacked Mary Miranda, of Cuba
    Press, and beat her unconscious.
        In February police briefly detained Edel Garcia, Director of the
    Centro Norte del Pais agency, as he left church after attending a
    memorial Mass for the Brothers to the Rescue pilots who were aboard
    planes that the air force shot down in 1996. Police frequently stop
    Garcia on fabricated traffic violations. Garcia's wife receives weekly
    death threats and his teenage daughters are harassed with increasing
    frequency. Garcia has a criminal trial pending, but the date and the
    charges are as yet not known. Charges that have been mentioned include:
    insulting the President, illicit association, collaboration with the
    enemy, spreading false news, and espionage.
        In February security officials ordered several journalists to
    remain home and not to attend the trial of a member of the opposition.
    Jose Antonio Fornaris, of Agencia Cuba Verdad, refused to stay home;
    the police detained him at the local jail for the entire day.
        In March the University of Havana expelled the daughter of Maria de
    los Angeles Gonzalez Amaro, Director of the Union de Periodistas y
    Escritores Cubanos Independientes, after a university dean warned her
    not to follow in her mother's footsteps. In September on two occasions,
    security officials intimidated Mrs. Gonzalez in her home.
        In April the Government's Juventud Rebelde newspaper accused Raul
    Rivero, Tania Quintero, Manuel David Orrio, Lucas Garve, and Vicente
    Escobal of being counterrevolutionary leaders.
        In May the authorities went to the home of Manuel Vasquez Portal,
    Director of Agencia Decoro, who was scheduled to speak that day on
    ``Globalization and Culture'' at the Centro de Estudios Sociales. Two
    officials from State Security threatened Vazquez with detention if he
    give his speech. State Security officials also visited 17 other persons
    and told them not to attend the speech.
        In July the authorities confiscated equipment (video cameras,
    camera, and cassette recorders) and all office supplies from the
    Agencia Yara in Bayamo.
        In August police detained Ricardo Arabi Jimenez, director of
    Agencia Yara, for attending a meeting about organizing the first
    congress of independent trade unions by the CUTC, scheduled to be held
    in October (see Section 6.a.).
        In September Dorca Cespedes, Havana Press reporter, was told by the
    director of her daughter's day care center, that the toddler could no
    longer attend. The authorities had instructed the director not to care
    for the child due to the mother's counterrevolutionary activities.
        In September the security police took octogenarian Nestor Baguer,
    independent journalist and founder of the original Independent Press
    Agency of Cuba, to a private home in Havana where he was questioned
    about his activities. The authorities also made calls to contacts of
    Baguer to invite them to a meeting at his home. The authorities then
    went to Baguer's home to inform him that they knew about the alleged
    meeting.
        In September individuals posing as vandals, but thought to be
    security officials, threw rocks at the home of Juan Tellez, Agencia
    Libertad.
        In September the authorities jailed Joaquin Cabeza de Leon in
    Camaguey because he helped to organize a literary award ceremony.
        In September police arrested brothers Jesus and Jadir Hernandez
    Hernandez, of Havana-Press, in Guines, and charged them with illegal
    trafficking in persons and collaboration with a foreign diplomatic
    mission. For several weeks, both men had been disseminating information
    about the unification of several dissident groups in Havana Province.
    In October authorities again threatened the brothers and their family
    members.
        In October a security official showed a photograph to Dr. Jose Luis
    Garcia, Agencia Libertad, in which Garcia was conversing with a man
    that he had just casually met. Garcia was told that the man was a
    member of state security and that the photograph would be shown to
    other members of the opposition to make it look like Garcia was
    actually collaborating with state security.
        In October the police detained Jesus Alvarez Castillo and Pedro
    Duque, Cuba Press correspondents from Ciego de Avila, in front of the
    office of Cuba Press and accused them of involvement in a murder. The
    authorities later dismissed the accusation as a case of mistaken
    identity.
        The authorities often confiscate equipment when arresting
    journalists, especially photographic and recording equipment. It is now
    possible to buy a fax machine or computer, payable in dollars; if a
    receipt can be produced, this equipment is usually not confiscated.
    Photocopiers and printers are impossible to find on the local market,
    which makes them a particularly valuable commodity for journalists. A
    fax machine that a friend brought from overseas for journalist Reinaldo
    Cosano Alen, arrived damaged and was not usable after 10 days in
    Customs. Equipment lost due to burglary also has been reported. In
    January unidentified persons entered the home of journalist Juan
    Gonzalez Febles and stole his tape recorder, recorded tapes, and
    several articles. In August a couple posing as employees of Cuba Press
    stole all the documents, books, and office materials collected by the
    agency after the owner of the premises had asked the agency to move due
    to pressure from the police.
        Outside the capital of Havana, independent journalists reported
    that detentions, threats, and harassment are more severe than in the
    capital.
        AI, HRW, the IAPA, Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), and the
    Committee to Protect Journalists repeatedly called international
    attention to the Government's continued practice of detaining
    independent journalists and others simply for exercising their right to
    free speech (see Section 1.d.).
        In June the IAPA called on the Government to provide medical
    treatment to two independent journalists serving prison sentences. Joel
    de Jesus Diaz, in prison in Ciego de Avila, was suffering from
    hepatitis and Manuel Antonio Gonzalez Castellanos in Holguin was
    suffering from severe influenza and possibly tuberculosis. The IAPA
    also called for the release of independent journalists Victor Rolando
    Arroyo and Bernardo Arevalo Pardon, both of whom are serving prison
    sentences (see Section 1.c.).
        In July police detained Ricardo Gonzalez, RSF correspondent, for 6
    hours as they tried to coerce him to collaborate with them. In August
    French journalist Martine Jacot, sent by RSF to the country, was in
    contact with a dozen independent journalists in Havana and Ciego de
    Avila. She also met with the families of two of the three journalists
    currently in prison. On August 17, just before she was to leave the
    country, security police arrested her, questioned her at the Havana
    airport, and seized a video camera, two videotapes, and documents. The
    police never returned this equipment to RSF.
        In August the authorities detained three Swedish journalists and
    later expelled them from the country. The journalists had met with
    independent journalists and had organized a seminar for two groups of
    independent journalists. The authorities said that the journalists,
    including Martine Jacot, violated immigration laws by traveling on
    tourist visas, instead of traveling on visas issued to journalists.
        Distribution of information continues to be controlled tightly.
    Importation of foreign literature is controlled, and the public has no
    access to foreign magazines or newspapers. Leading members of the
    Government have indicated that citizens do not read foreign newspapers
    and magazines to obtain news because they do not speak English and they
    have access to the daily televised round tables on issues with which
    they need to concern themselves. Access to computers is limited. E-mail
    use is growing slowly as the Government incrementally allows access to
    more users; however, the Government generally controls its use, and
    only very few persons or groups have access. The Government opened a
    national gateway to some journalists, artists, and municipal-level
    youth community centers, but the authorities still restrict the types
    and numbers of international sites that can be accessed.
        Independent journalist Reinaldo Cosano Alen received a letter from
    Customs informing him that two magazines were confiscated for being
    counterrevolutionary. Customs also confiscated several editions of the
    Cartas de Cuba magazine that were addressed to independent journalist
    Tania Quintero Antunez.
        The Government officially prohibits all diplomatic missions in
    Havana from printing or distributing publications, particularly
    newspapers and newspaper clippings, unless these publications deal
    exclusively with conditions in a mission's home country and prior
    Government approval is received. Many missions do not accept this
    requirement and send materials out liberally; however, the Government's
    threats to expel embassy officers who provide published materials had a
    chilling effect on some missions.
        The Government restricts literary and academic freedoms and
    continued to emphasize the importance of reinforcing revolutionary
    ideology and discipline over any freedom of expression. The educational
    system teaches that the State's interests have precedence over all
    other commitments. Academics and other government officials are
    prohibited from meeting with some diplomats without prior approval from
    the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Education requires
    teachers to evaluate students' and their parents' ideological
    character, and note such evaluations in school record that students
    carry throughout their schooling. These reports directly affect the
    students' educational and career prospects. As a matter of policy, the
    Government demands that teaching materials for courses such as
    mathematics or literature have an ideological content. Government
    efforts to undermine dissidents include denying them advanced education
    and professional opportunities. Fidel Castro has stated publicly that
    the universities are available only to those who share his
    revolutionary beliefs.
        Artistic expression is less restricted. The Government encourages
    the cultural community to attain the highest international standards in
    order to sell its work overseas for hard currency. However, the
    Government began implementing a program in the fall called ``Broadening
    of Culture'' that ties art, socialism, and modern ``revolutionary''
    ideology and legends into its own vision of culture. The Government
    uses the government media and the schools to impose this vision on the
    public, particularly the youth.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
    Constitution grants limited rights of assembly and association, these
    rights are subject to the requirement that they may not be ``exercised
    against the existence and objectives of the Socialist State.'' The law
    punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons,
    including those for private religious services in a private home, by up
    to 3 months in prison and a fine. The authorities selectively enforce
    this prohibition and often use it as a legal pretext to harass and
    imprison human rights advocates.
        The Government's policy of selectively authorizing the Catholic
    Church to hold outdoor processions at specific locations on important
    feast days continued during the year. For the third consecutive year,
    it permitted a procession in connection with Masses in celebration of
    the feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana on September 8. The
    Government also authorized other denominations to hold a few public
    events in late November. However, the Government continued routinely
    and arbitrarily to deny requests for other processions and events. Just
    before Holy Week, the Government informed Catholic Church officials
    that no processions would be allowed. When the Church made this
    information public, state officials changed their position and decided
    that churches that had requested permission for a procession could
    proceed.
        The authorities have never approved a public meeting by a human
    rights group. On February 22, state security officers detained
    prodemocracy activists in different parts of the country to prevent
    them from staging activities commemorating the February 24, 1996,
    shootdown of two civilian aircraft over international airspace by the
    air force. Security agents also warned many more activists against
    staging any public demonstrations on February 24, and warned
    independent journalists not to cover such incidents.
        In early August, security agents detained in Havana leaders of the
    Council of Cuban Workers from various provinces to ensure that members
    could not hold a preparatory meeting for the CUTC's first congress.
    Although scheduled to take place in October, it never was held. On
    October 13, state security arrested Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, the
    Secretary General of the CUTC, as he was about to conduct a press
    conference. At year's end, he remained in jail without being charged.
        On August 15, state security informed a number of activists not to
    gather in the cemetery in Havana in honor of Eduardo Chibas, a well-
    known politician of the 1940's and early 1950's.
        A march from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to the Church
    of La Merced and which was organized by dissidents for the release of
    political prisoners on September 17 did not take place because of
    police intimidation and detentions.
        On September 25, police again prevented a number of activists from
    marching from the Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to the Church of
    Mercedes. Police took the activists to a police station to review their
    identification documents.
        On November 2, the Day of the Dead, state security personnel
    prevented activists from entering the chapel in Havana's Colon Cemetery
    where a number of human rights activists are buried.
        On November 10, police in Santiago de Cuba prevented activists from
    marching from the Plaza de Marte in honor of the first anniversary of
    the attempt to demonstrate in Dolores Park in Havana.
        During the year the Government organized a number of marches and
    rallies in front of diplomatic missions. The Government mobilizes
    thousand of persons in these marches, including school children and
    workers. Anyone who does not attend the event can be easily identified
    since persons congregate at certain points from factories or schools.
    Sometimes small identification papers are given to participants; they
    must present these papers to their immediate supervisor or school
    officials the next day to demonstrate that they attended the rally.
        The Government generally denies citizens freedom of association.
    The Penal Code specifically outlaws illegal or unrecognized groups. The
    Minister of Justice, in consultation with the Interior Ministry,
    decides whether to give organizations legal recognition. The
    authorities have never approved the existence of a human rights group.
    However, there are a number of professional associations that operate
    as NGO's but without legal recognition. For example, some scientists
    formed the Zoological Society, and some teachers established an
    Association of Independent Teachers.
        Along with recognized churches, the Roman Catholic humanitarian
    organization Caritas, the Masonic Lodge, small human rights groups, and
    a number of nascent fraternal or professional organizations are the
    only associations outside the control or influence of the State, the
    Communist Party, and their mass organizations. With the exception of
    the Masons, who have been established in the country for more than a
    century, the authorities continue to ignore those groups' applications
    for legal recognition, thereby subjecting members to potential charges
    of illegal association. All other legally recognized nongovernmental
    groups are at least nominally affiliated with, or controlled by the
    Government.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution recognizes the right of
    citizens to profess and practice any religious belief, within the
    framework of respect for the law; however, in law and in practice, the
    Government continues to restrict freedom of religion.
        In 1991 the Government allowed religious adherents to join the
    Communist Party. In 1992 it amended the Constitution to prohibit
    religious discrimination and removed references to ``scientific
    materialism,'' i.e., atheism, as the basis for the State. Members of
    the armed forces do not attend religious services in their uniform,
    probably to avoid possible reprimand by superiors.
        The Government requires churches and other religious groups to
    register with the provincial registry of associations within the
    Ministry of the Interior to obtain official recognition. In practice,
    the Government refuses to recognize new denominations. The Government
    prohibits, with occasional exceptions, the construction of new
    churches, forcing many growing congregations to violate the law and
    meet in private homes. Government harassment of private houses of
    worship continued, with evangelical denominations reporting evictions
    from houses used for these purposes. According to the Cuban Council of
    Churches (CCC) officials, most of the private houses of worship that
    the Government closed were unregistered, making them technically
    illegal. In addition CCC Pentecostal members have complained about the
    preaching activities of foreign missionaries that led some of their
    members to establish new denominations without obtaining the required
    permits. Because of these complaints by the Pentecostals, the CCC has
    formally requested overseas member church organizations to assist them
    in dissuading foreign missionaries from establishing Pentecostal
    churches.
        The Government's main interaction with religious denominations is
    through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Communist Party. The
    Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor
    the country's religious institutions, including surveillance,
    infiltration, and harassment of religious professionals and laypersons.
        In 1998 following Pope John Paul II's January visit, the country's
    Roman Catholic bishops called on the Government to recognize the
    Church's role in civil society and the family, as well as in the
    temporal areas of work, the economy, the arts, and the scientific and
    technical worlds. The Government continued to limit the Church's access
    to the media and refused to allow the Church to have a legal
    independent printing capability. It maintained a prohibition against
    the establishment of religious-affiliated schools. Nonetheless, in
    September local government authorities, for the third time since 1961,
    allowed the Catholic Church to hold an outdoor procession to mark the
    feast day of Our Lady of Charity in Havana. Although visibly present,
    state security personnel did not harass any participants or observers,
    as they did in 1998. However, prior to the event, security police
    ordered a number of human rights activists not to attend the
    procession. On December 25, 1999, the Government permitted the Catholic
    Church to hold a Christmas procession in Havana. Catholic Church
    authorities received permission to conduct the closing ceremonies for
    the jubilee year celebration and the Cuba Eucharistic Congress (the
    last one took place in 1959) on December 9 and 10. On December 9, 1,500
    children from all over the country received their first communion in
    the square outside the San Carlos Seminary. On December 10 Cardinal
    Jaime Lucas Ortega Alamino, carrying the eucharist, led a procession of
    bishops, priests, and believers from the Church of Christ (Iglesia del
    Cristo del Buen Viaje) to the San Carlos Seminary. Unlike 1999, there
    was no broadcast of the Pope's annual Christmas Day message from the
    Vatican, but it was mentioned in the evening television news.
        In 1998 the Government announced in a Politburo declaration that
    henceforth citizens would be allowed to celebrate Christmas as an
    official holiday. (The holiday had been cancelled, ostensibly to spur
    the sugar harvest, in 1969, and restored in 1997 as part of the
    preparations for the Pope's 1998 visit.) However, despite the
    Government's decision to allow citizens to celebrate Christmas as a
    national holiday, it also maintained a December 1995 decree prohibiting
    nativity scenes in public buildings.
        The Government allowed two new foreign priests to enter the country
    during the year and two to replace two priests whose visas were not
    renewed during the year. Some visas were issued only for periods from 3
    to 6 months, and the applications of many other priests and religious
    workers remain pending.
        The Government continued to enforce a resolution that prevented any
    national or joint enterprise (except those with specific authorization)
    from selling computers, fax machines, photocopiers, or other equipment
    to any church at other than official--and exorbitant--retail prices.
        On July 9, dissidents attended the Jubilee Mass for prisoners
    celebrated by Cardinal Jaime Ortega Alamino at the Church of Our Lady
    of Charity. The Church distributed leaflets that invited worshippers to
    attend the Mass and to pray for prisoners and requested former
    prisoners and prisoners on conditional release to attend. Recently
    released members of the Internal Dissident Working Group, Martha
    Beatriz Roque Cabello, Rene de Jesus Gomez Manzano, and Felix Antonio
    Bonne Carcasses also attended. During the ceremony a white dove was
    released from its cage, and the congregation spontaneously started to
    clap and some persons shouted ``liberty, liberty.'' State security
    officials outside the church did not intervene. The Church normally
    uses lay members to provide security at events like these. Apart from
    ensuring that people remain in their places or in the procession line
    during the service, these church guards also prevent any activities
    from taking place that could lead to a response from state security
    officials such as occurred at the July 9 Mass.
        On August 30, the independent press agency Grupo Decoro reported
    that evangelical pastor Pablo Rodriguez Oropeza and his wife Enma
    Cabrera Cabrera were evicted from the house where they had lived for 6
    years. The press agency did not report the reason for the eviction.
    Santos Osmany Dominguez Borjas, a bishop of the United Pentecostal
    Church of Cuba (Apostolic), returned to Havana after he was expelled to
    Holguin on October 8, 1999. In recent years, the Government has relaxed
    restrictions on some religious denominations, including Seventh-Day
    Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses. The CCC continues to broadcast a
    monthly 15-minute program on a national classical music radio station,
    under the condition that the program not include material of a
    political character.
        State security officials visited some priests and pastors, prior to
    significant religious events, ostensibly to warn them about dissidents;
    however, some critics claim that these visits are done in an effort to
    foster mistrust between the churches and human rights or prodemocracy
    activists. State security officers also regularly harassed, including
    inside churches and during religious ceremonies, human rights advocates
    who sought to attend religious services commemorating special feast
    days or before significant national days.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government tightly restricted
    freedom of movement. The Government generally has not imposed legal
    restrictions on domestic travel, except for persons found to be HIV-
    positive, whom it initially restricts to sanatoriums for treatment and
    therapy before conditionally releasing them into the community.
    However, in recent years state security officials have forbidden human
    rights advocates and independent journalists from traveling outside
    their home provinces, and the Government also has sentenced others to
    internal exile. On December 12, a court sentenced Angel Moya Acosta to
    1 year in prison and banned him from traveling to Havana from his home
    province of Matanzas for 10 years after serving his prison term.
        In 1997 the Council of Ministers approved Decree 217, aimed at
    stemming the flow of migration from the provinces to the capital.
    Persons from other provinces may travel and visit Havana; however, they
    cannot move into the city, on the grounds that if internal migration is
    left unchecked, the city's problems regarding housing, public
    transport, water and electrical supplies will become worse. The
    Government recently noted that since the decree went into effect,
    17,000 fewer people have migrated to Havana. Police frequently check
    the identification of persons on the streets, and if someone is found
    from another province living in Havana illegally, they are fined $15
    (300 pesos) and sent back home. Fines are higher$50 (1,000 pesos) for
    those who are residing illegally in the neighborhoods of Old Havana and
    Cerro. Human rights observers noted that while the decree affected
    migration countrywide, it was targeted at individuals and families, who
    are predominantly of African descent, from the more impoverished
    eastern provinces.
        The Government imposed some restrictions on both emigration and
    temporary foreign travel. In June the Government denied an exit permit
    to Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos, secretary-general of the CUTC to attend a
    labor conference in the United States organized by the AFL-CIO. No
    explanation was given. Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the
    Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation also was
    not allowed to leave the country. Mexico's Partido Accion Nacional
    (PAN) had invited Sanchez to witness the Mexican presidential election
    on July 2. The PAN also invited members of the Moderate Reflection
    Group, but Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Democratic Liberal
    Party and a member of the Moderate Reflection Group, said that the
    group decided not to apply for an exit permit because of lack of funds
    to pay for the application fees for exit permits. PAN also issued an
    invitation to Elizardo Sanchez to attend the inauguration of the new
    President on December 1. According to Sanchez, even though PAN
    officials requested an exit visa for him directly from the Government,
    he never received it. Similarly, the authorities denied an exit visa to
    Osvaldo Alfonso Valdes, president of the Liberal Party, who was invited
    to attend the International Liberal Party's convention that took place
    in Canada in October.
        The Government did issue an exit permit to Manuel Costa Morua of
    the Socialist Movement to travel to Europe in April; Costa Morua also
    is a member of the Moderate Reflection Group.
        The Government allows the majority of persons who qualify for
    immigrant or refugee status in other countries to depart; however, in
    certain cases the authorities delay or deny exit permits, usually
    without explanation. Some denials involve professionals who have tried
    to emigrate and whom the Government subsequently banned from working in
    their occupational field. The Government refused permission to others
    because it considers their cases sensitive for political or state
    security reasons. In July 1999, the Ministry of Health issued an
    internal regulation, known as Resolution 54, that provides for the
    denial of exit permits to medical professionals, until they have
    performed 3 to 5 years of service in their profession after requesting
    permission to travel abroad. This regulation normally applied to recent
    graduates. This regulation was not published as part of the legal
    provisions, and may apply to other professionals as well.
        The Government also routinely denies exit permits to young men
    approaching the age of military service, and until they reach the age
    of 27, even when it has authorized the rest of the family to leave.
    However, in most of those cases approved for migration to the United
    States under the September 1, 1994, U.S.-Cuban migration agreement, the
    applicants eventually receive exemption from obligatory service and are
    granted exit permits.
        In September two independent journalists, Jesus Labrador, Cuba
    Press reporter, and Gustavo Cardero, (NotiCuba reporter) planned to
    leave the country as refugees until the authorities confiscated their
    exit permit.
        The Government has a policy of denying exit permission for several
    years to relatives of individuals who successfully migrated illegally
    (e.g., merchant seamen who have defected while overseas, and sports
    figures who have defected while on tour abroad).
        Migrants who travel to the United States must pay the Government a
    total of about $500 per adult and $400 per child, plus airfare. These
    government fees for medical exam, passport, and exit visa--which must
    be paid in dollars--are equivalent to about 5 years of a professional
    person's accumulated peso salary and represent a significant hardship,
    particularly for political refugees who usually are marginalized and
    have no income. In 1996 the Government agreed to allow 1,000 needy
    refugees to leave each year with reduced exit fees. However, after the
    first group of 1,000 in 1996, no further refugees have been accorded
    reduced fees. At year's end, 85 approved refugees remained in the
    country because they were unable to pay government exit fees for
    themselves and their families.
        The Penal Code provides for imprisonment from 1 to 3 years or a
    fine of $15 to $50 dollars (300 to 1,000 pesos) for unauthorized
    departures by boat or raft. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR) has stated that it regards any sentence of over 1
    year for simple illegal exit as harsh and excessive. Under the terms of
    the May 2, 1995, U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord, the Government agreed not
    to prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international
    or U.S. waters, or from the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, after
    attempting to emigrate illegally.
        In 1994 the Government eased restrictions on visits by, and
    repatriation of, Cuban emigrants. Citizens who establish residency
    abroad and who are in possession of government-issued permits to reside
    abroad may travel to the country without visas. The Government reduced
    the age of persons eligible to travel abroad from 20 to 18 years and
    extended the period for a temporary stay abroad from 6 to 11 months. In
    1995 the Government announced that emigrants who are considered not to
    have engaged in so-called hostile actions against the Government and
    who are not subject to criminal proceedings in their country of
    residence may apply at Cuban consulates for renewable, 2-year multiple-
    entry travel authorizations. However, in 1999 the Government announced
    that it would deny entry permits for emigrants who had left the country
    illegally after September 1994. It remains unclear whether the
    Government actually was implementing such a policy.
        The Constitution provides for the granting of asylum to individuals
    persecuted ``for their ideals or struggles for democratic rights
    against imperialism, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; against
    discrimination and racism; for national liberation; for the rights of
    workers, peasants, and students; for their progressive political,
    scientific, artistic, and literary activities; and for socialism and
    peace.'' However, the Government has no formal mechanism to process
    asylum for foreign nationals. Nonetheless, the Government honors the
    principle of first asylum and has provided it to a small number of
    persons. There was no information available on its use during the year.
    According to the UNHCR, since January the authorities received 75
    applications for refugee status within the country. Of the 75
    applicants, 24 persons were recognized as refugees. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Citizens do not have the legal right to change their Government or
    to advocate change, and the Government retaliates systematically
    against those who seek peaceful political change. The Constitution
    proscribes any political organization other than the Communist Party.
    While the Constitution provides for direct election of provincial,
    municipal, and National Assembly members, the candidates must be
    approved in advance by mass organizations controlled by the Government.
    In practice, a small group of leaders, under the direction of President
    Castro, selects the members of the highest policy-making bodies of the
    Communist Party--the Politburo and the Central Committee.
        The authorities tightly control the selection of candidates and all
    elections for government and party positions. The candidacy committees
    are composed of members of government-controlled mass organizations
    such as the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) and the CDR's and are
    responsible for selecting candidates, whose names are then sent to
    municipal assemblies that select a single candidate for each regional
    seat in the ANPP. An opposition or independent candidate has never been
    allowed to run for national office.
        In January 1998, the Government held national elections in which
    601 candidates were approved to compete for the 601 seats in the
    National Assembly. According to the official state media, the
    candidates were voted in by over 93 percent of the electorate. No
    candidates with views independent from or in opposition to the
    Government were allowed to run, and no views contrary to the Government
    or the Communist Party were expressed in the government-controlled
    national media. The Government saturated the media and used government
    ministries, Communist Party organs, and mass organizations to urge
    voters to cast a ``unified vote'' where marking one box automatically
    selected all candidates on the ballot form. In practice, the Communist
    Party approved candidates for all offices. A small minority of
    candidates did not belong formally to the Communist Party. The
    Communist Party was the only political party allowed to participate in
    the elections.
        On April 23, elections for local representatives to the municipal
    assembly were held. Government newspapers reported that 98 percent of
    voters participated in the election. Slightly more than 50 percent of
    those elected were the incumbents, 20 percent were women, and about 9
    percent of all candidates were between the ages of 16 and 30. The
    reports also claim that nationwide the number of blank ballots
    decreased from 3.2 percent to 2.8 percent, while the number of annulled
    votes also decreased to 3 percent from nearly 4 percent, compared with
    the last election. Municipal elections are held every 2-1/2 years to
    elect 14,686 local representatives to the municipal assemblies.
    Deputies to the National Assembly, delegates to the provincial
    assemblies, and members of the council of state are elected during
    general elections held every 5 years. The municipal assemblies
    constitute the lowest level of the Government's structure.
        Although not a formal requirement, Communist Party membership is in
    fact a prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional
    advancement.
        The Government rejects any change to the political system judged
    incompatible with the revolution and ignored and actively suppressed
    calls for democratic reform. Although President Castro signed the
    Declaration of Vina del Mar at the Sixth Ibero-American Summit in 1996,
    in which government leaders reaffirmed their commitment to democracy
    and political pluralism, the Government continued to oppose independent
    political activity on the ground that the national system provides a
    ``perfected'' form of democracy and that pluralism exists within the
    one-party structure.
        Government leadership positions continue to be dominated by men,
    and women remain underrepresented. There are very few women or
    minorities in policymaking positions in the Government or the Party.
    There are 2 women in the 24-member Politburo, 18 in the 150-member
    Central Committee, and 166 in the 601-seat ANPP. Although blacks and
    persons of African descent make up over half the population, they hold
    only six seats in the Politburo.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not recognize any domestic human rights groups,
    or permit them to function legally. The Government subjects domestic
    human rights advocates to intense intimidation, harassment, and
    repression. In violation of its own statutes, the Government refuses to
    consider applications for legal recognition submitted by human rights
    monitoring groups (see Section 2.b.).
        Dissidents generally believe that most human rights organizations
    have been infiltrated and are subjected to constant surveillance.
    Activists believe that some, perhaps many, of the dissidents are either
    state security or are persons attempting to qualify for refugee status
    to leave the country.
        In its 1997 report, the IACHR examined measures taken by the
    Government and found that they did not ``comprise the bedrock of a
    substantive reform in the present political system that would permit
    the ideological and partisan pluralism implicit in the wellspring from
    which a democratic system of government develops.'' The IACHR
    recommended that the Government provide reasonable safeguards to
    prevent violations of human rights, unconditionally release political
    prisoners and those jailed for trying to leave the country, abolish the
    concept of dangerousness in the Penal Code, eliminate other legal
    restriction on basic freedoms, cease harassing human rights groups, and
    establish a separation of powers so that the judiciary would no longer
    be subordinate to political power.
        The Government steadfastly has rejected international human rights
    monitoring. In 1992 the country's U.N. representative stated that Cuba
    would not recognize the mandate of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
    (UNCHR) on Cuba and would not cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on
    Cuba, despite being a UNCHR member. This policy remained unchanged and
    the Government refused even to acknowledge requests by the Special
    Rapporteur to visit the country. In April 1998, the UNCHR did not renew
    the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, following as yet unfulfilled
    assertions by the Government that it would improve human rights
    practices if it was not under formal sanction from the UNCHR. As in
    1999, the UNCHR again passed a resolution on April 18, introduced by
    the Czech Republic and Poland, which expressed concern about the human
    rights situation in the country. The Government responded by organizing
    a march of an estimated 200,000 persons past the Czech Embassy in
    Havana. On April 19, national television featured a round-table
    discussion on the UNCHR vote in which the Foreign Minister strongly
    criticized the UNCHR resolution and accused it of discriminating
    against third world countries.
        During this same UNCHR session, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
    Violence Against Women released her report, which was critical of the
    Government on issues of women's rights and on other human rights
    problems.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Cuba is a multiracial society with a black and mixed-race majority.
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex, or national
    origin, although evidence suggests that racial discrimination occurs
    frequently.
        Women.--Violent crime rarely is reported in the press, and there
    are no publicly available data regarding the incidence of domestic
    violence and rape; however, human rights advocates report that violence
    against women is a problem. The law establishes strict penalties for
    rape, and the Government appears to enforce the rape law; however,
    according to human rights advocates, the police do not act on cases of
    domestic violence.
        Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on violence
    against women, visited the country in 1999 and issued a report on her
    findings in February. The report states that she was surprised to find
    that most government officials did not see violence against women as a
    prevalent problem. However, she noted that activists at the grassroots
    level are very attuned to problems of violence affecting women.
    Coomaraswamy urged the Government to take comprehensive steps to
    enhance the legal protection against violence against women and
    specifically urged the adoption of legislation to address domestic
    violence and sexual harassment.
        Prostitution is legal (except for prostitution by children under 17
    years of age); however, pandering or otherwise benefiting from
    prostitution is a felony. Prostitution has increased greatly in the
    last few years; press reports indicate that tourists from various
    countries visit specifically to patronize inexpensive prostitutes. A
    government crackdown on prostitution that began in late 1998 initially
    had some effect, but prostitutes (known as ``jineteras'') were still
    visible in Havana and other major cities during the year. The early
    success was obtained by stationing police on nearly every major street
    corner where tourists are present. Some street police officers are
    suspected of providing protection to the jineteras. Most observers
    believe that the Government clamped down on prostitution to combat the
    perception that the Government promotes sex tourism. The Government set
    up centers to take prostitutes off the streets and reeducate them; the
    newest center reportedly opened in September in Valle Grande near
    Havana. In her February report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy
    recommended that the Government dismantle the centers and find ``other
    mechanisms that do not violate the rights of the prostitutes.''
        The Family Code states that women and men have equal rights and
    responsibilities regarding marriage, divorce, raising children,
    maintaining the home, and pursuing a career. Women are subject to the
    same restrictions on property ownership as men. The maternity law
    provides 18 weeks of maternity leave and grants working mothers
    preferential access to goods and services. About 40 percent of all
    women work, and they are well represented in many professions.
    According to the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC), women hold 33 percent
    of managerial positions. The FMC also asserted that 11,200 women have
    received land parcels to cultivate; that more than 561,000 women have
    begun working as agricultural workers, and that women devote 34 hours a
    week to domestic work, about the same number of hours they spend
    working outside the home.
        Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government protect
    family, maternity, and matrimony. It also states that children,
    legitimate or not, have the same rights under the law and notes the
    duties of parents to protect them. Education is free and compulsory to
    the ninth grade, but it is grounded in Marxist ideology. State
    organizations and schools are charged with the integral formation of
    children and youth. The national health care system covers all
    citizens. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. However,
    child prostitution is a problem, with young girls engaging in
    prostitution to help support themselves and their families. It is
    illegal for a child under 17 years of age to engage in prostitution.
    The police began to enforce this law more actively in late 1998 and
    continued to do so during the year, as part of their crackdown on
    prostitution in general. However, the phenomenon continues as more
    cabarets and discos open for the growing tourist industry which make it
    easier for tourists to come into contact with child prostitutes.
        Police officers who find children loitering in the streets or
    begging from tourists frequently will intervene and try to find the
    parents. If the child is found bothering tourists a second time, police
    frequently fine the child's parents.
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
    on disability, and there have been few complaints of such
    discrimination. However, a young married blind couple, members of the
    Fraternity of Independent Blind People of Cuba were told to leave a
    cafe in Moron where they sang for tips. There are no laws that mandate
    accessibility to buildings for the disabled. In practice buildings and
    transportation are rarely accessible to disabled people.
        On November 8, a special police operation dislodged a number of
    persons with disabilities from selling their products in Central
    Havana. Police arrested two persons; a court sentenced one of them to 1
    year in jail for selling stolen goods.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Many persons of African descent
    have benefited from access to basic education and medical care since
    the 1959 revolution, and much of the police force and army enlisted
    personnel is black. Nevertheless, racial discrimination often occurs,
    and is acknowledged publicly by high governmental officials, including
    Castro. There have been numerous reports of disproportionate police
    harassment of black youths. In 1997 there were numerous credible
    reports of forced evictions of squatters and residents lacking official
    permission to reside in Havana. The evictions, exacerbated by Decree
    217 (see Section 2.d.), primarily targeted individuals and families
    from the eastern provinces, which are traditionally areas of black or
    mixed-race populations.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution gives priority to
    state or collective needs over individual choices regarding free
    association or provision of employment. The demands of the economy and
    society take precedence over individual workers' preferences. The law
    prohibits strikes; none are known to have occurred. Established
    official labor organizations have a mobilization function and do not
    act as trade unions, promote worker rights, or protect the right to
    strike. Such organizations are under the control of the State and the
    Communist Party, which also manage the enterprises for which the
    laborers work.
        The Communist Party selects the leaders of the sole legal labor
    confederation, the Confederation of Cuban Workers, whose principal
    responsibility is to ensure that government production goals are met.
    Despite disclaimers in international forums, the Government explicitly
    prohibits independent unions and none are recognized. There has been no
    change in conditions since the 1992 International Labor Organization
    (ILO) finding that the Government violated ILO norms on freedom of
    association and the right to organize. Those who attempt to engage in
    unofficial union activities face government persecution.
        Workers can and have lost their jobs for their political beliefs,
    including their refusal to join the official union. Several small
    independent labor organizations have been created, but function without
    legal recognition and are unable to represent workers effectively or
    work on their behalf. The Government actively harasses these
    organizations. Police detained independent labor activist Jose Orlando
    Gonzalez Bridon of the CUTC for brief periods in January. Most
    political dissidents lose their jobs and remain unemployed; the only
    work they are offered is cleaning streets.
        The CTC is a member of the Communist, formerly Soviet-dominated
    World Federation of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining does not exist. The State Committee for Work and Social
    Security (CETSS) sets wages and salaries for the state sector, which is
    almost the only employer in the country. Since all legal unions are
    government entities, antiunion discrimination by definition does not
    exist.
        The 1995 Foreign Investment Law (Law 77) continued to deny workers
    the right to contract directly with foreign companies investing in the
    country without special government permission. Although a few firms
    have managed to negotiate exceptions, the Government requires foreign
    investors to contract workers through state employment agencies, which
    are paid in foreign currency and, in turn, pay workers very low wages
    in pesos. Workers subcontracted by state employment agencies must meet
    certain political qualifications. According to Minister of Basic
    Industry Marcos Portal, the state employment agencies consult with the
    Party, the CTC, and the Union of Communist Youth to ensure that the
    workers chosen deserve to work in a joint enterprise.
        There are no functioning export processing zones, although the law
    authorizes the establishment of free trade zones and industrial parks.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Neither the
    Constitution nor the Labor Code prohibits forced labor. The Government
    maintains correctional centers where it sends persons for crimes such
    as dangerousness. Prisoners held there are forced to work on farms or
    building sites. The authorities often imprison internees who do not
    cooperate.
        The Government employs special groups of workers, known as
    microbrigades, that are temporarily reassigned from their usual jobs,
    to work on special building projects. These microbrigades become
    increasingly important in the Government's efforts to complete tourist
    and other priority projects. Workers who refuse to volunteer for these
    jobs often risk discrimination or job loss. Microbrigade workers
    reportedly receive priority consideration for housing assignments. The
    military assigns some conscripts to the Youth Labor Army, where they
    serve their 2-year military service requirement working on farms that
    supply both the armed forces and the civilian population.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, the Government requires children to work without compensation.
    All students over age 11 are expected to devote 30 to 45 days of their
    summer vacation to farm work, laboring up to 8 hours per day. The
    Ministry of Agriculture uses ``voluntary labor'' by student work
    brigades extensively in the farming sector.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum working age is 17 years. However, the
    Labor Code permits the employment of 15- and 16-year-old children to
    obtain training or fill labor shortages. The law requires school
    attendance until the ninth grade, and this law generally is respected.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, it
    strongly encourages children to work without compensation (see Section
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage varies by
    occupation and is set by the CETSS. For example, the minimum monthly
    wage for a maid is $8.25 (165 pesos); for a bilingual office clerk,
    $9.50 (190 pesos); and for a gardener $10.75 (216 pesos). The
    Government supplements the minimum wage with free education and
    subsidized medical care (but reduces daily pay by 40 percent after the
    third day of being admitted to a hospital), housing, and some food
    (this subsidized food is enough for about 1 week per month). However,
    even with these subsidies, the minimum wage does not provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. Corruption and black market
    activities are pervasive. The Government rations most basic necessities
    such as food, medicine, clothing, and cooking gas, which are in very
    short supply.
        The Government requires foreign companies in joint ventures with
    state entities to hire and pay workers through the State. HRW noted
    that the required reliance on state-controlled employment agencies
    effectively leaves workers without any capacity directly to negotiate
    wages, benefits, the basis of promotions, and the length of the
    workers' trial period at the job with the employer. Reportedly these
    exploitative labor practices force foreign companies to pay the
    Government as much as $500 to $600 per month for workers, while the
    workers in turn receive only a small peso wage from the Government.
        The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workdays in
    hazardous occupations, such as mining. The Government reduced the
    workday in some government offices and state enterprises to save
    energy.
        Workplace environmental and safety controls are usually inadequate,
    and the Government lacks effective enforcement mechanisms. Industrial
    accidents apparently are frequent, but the Government suppresses such
    reports. The Labor Code establishes that a worker who considers his
    life in danger because of hazardous conditions has the right not to
    work in his position or not to engage in specific activities until such
    risks are eliminated. According to the Labor Code, the worker remains
    obligated to work temporarily in whatever other position may be
    assigned him at a salary provided for under the law.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--In February 1999, the National Assembly
    revised the Penal Code to prohibit trafficking in persons through or
    from the country and provided the following penalties for violations: a
    term of 7 to 15 years' imprisonment for organizing or cooperating in
    alien smuggling through the country; 10 to 20 years' imprisonment for
    entering the country to smuggle persons out of the country; and 20
    years to life in prison for using violence, causing harm or death, or
    putting lives in danger, in engaging in such smuggling. These
    provisions are directed primarily at persons engaging in organized
    smuggling of would-be emigrants. In addition, the revised code made it
    illegal to promote or organize the entrance of persons into or the exit
    of persons from the country for the purpose of prostitution; violators
    are subject to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment.
        There were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
    within, or through the country for the purpose of providing forced
    labor or services.
                                   __________

                                    DOMINICA

        Dominica is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member of
    the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime minister, a cabinet, and a
    unicameral legislative assembly compose the Government. A president,
    nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the leader of the
    opposition party, and elected for a 5-year term by the Parliament, is
    head of state. The Dominica Labour Party (DLP) prevailed in free and
    fair elections held on January 31, and Roosevelt P. Douglas became
    Prime Minister. Douglas died in office on October 1, and former
    Minister of Communication and Works Pierre Charles replaced him. The
    judiciary is independent.
        The Dominica Police is the only security force. It is controlled by
    and responsive to the democratically elected Government. There were
    occasional allegations of abuse by the police.
        The country's primarily agrarian economy depends on earnings from
    banana exports, which declined some 20 percent during the year. The
    Government's efforts to develop the tourist industry had mixed results,
    with a decline in tourist arrivals but an increase in cruise ship
    visitors during the year. The Government also is diversifying
    agricultural production and promoting the export of fresh fruits,
    vegetables, and coconut products, both within and outside the region.
    Per capita gross domestic product was about $3,426 in 1999.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. The principal
    human rights problems are occasional instances of use of excessive
    force by police, poor prison conditions, societal violence against
    women and children, instances of discrimination against indigenous
    Carib Indians, and societal discrimination against female Caribs in
    mixed marriages.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
    were some allegations of occasional use of excessive force by the
    police. During the first half of the year, the authorities reportedly
    received 13 complaints regarding excessive use of force by the police.
        In November 1997, the authorities forced the Commissioner and
    Deputy Commissioner of police to retire as a result of recommendations
    by a Commission of Inquiry that investigated allegations of
    mismanagement, corruption, and police brutality. Under new leadership,
    the police created an Internal Affairs Department in December 1997 to
    investigate public complaints against the police and to provide
    counseling to police. In July 1998, a consultant from the United
    Kingdom conducted a 3-month study to update antiquated police
    regulations and to establish new operational guidelines for the police.
    This report was submitted to the Government in 1998, but the
    recommendations have not yet been implemented.
        Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions
    continue to be problems in the sole prison facility. There are over 200
    prisoners. The prison provides work therapy, sports programs,
    educational opportunities, and counseling for inmates. There continued
    to be complaints by prisoners about the poor quality of prison food.
    Female prisoners are segregated from male prisoners; however, juveniles
    are housed with adult inmates.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    requires that the authorities charge persons with a crime within 24
    hours after arrest. If charges are brought, the police must bring the
    detainee to court within 72 hours. This requirement generally is
    honored in practice, although those arrested on Fridays often must
    remain in jail over the weekend and are not charged until the following
    Monday.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
        The judicial system is composed of a high court judge, 5
    magistrates, and 10 magistrate courts located in police stations around
    the country. Appeals can be made to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
    and to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
        The law provides for public trial before an independent, impartial
    court. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty,
    are allowed legal counsel, and have the right to appeal. Courts provide
    free legal counsel to the indigent only in capital cases.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of free expression, and the Government respects this in practice.
    The political opposition openly criticizes the Government.
        The print media consist of two private newspapers and political
    party journals; all publish without censorship or government
    interference. The principal radio station is state-owned and has a
    government-appointed board. There is also an independent radio station
    owned by the Catholic Church. Citizens also have access to independent
    news sources through cable television and radio reception from
    neighboring islands.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
    enforcement officials unfairly target them. However, it is not clear
    whether such complaints reflect discrimination on the basis of
    religious belief by the authorities or simply enforcement of laws
    against marijuana, which is used as part of Rastafarian religious
    practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice. The Government may revoke
    passports if subversion is suspected but has not done so in recent
    times.
        The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
    did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
    a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The Constitution calls for elections at least every
    5 years.
        On January 31, the Dominica Labour Party won 10 seats in free and
    fair elections, defeating the United Workers' Party (UWP) which had
    held power since 1995. DLP leader Roosevelt P. ``Rosie'' Douglas forged
    a majority coalition of 13 seats in the 21-member Parliament, with the
    Dominican Freedom Party, holder of 2 seats, and 1 former UWP
    parliamentarian who changed party affiliation to join the DLP
    Government. Douglas died in office on October 1, and the former
    Minister of Communication and Works, Pierre Charles, became the Prime
    Minister. Ian Douglas, nephew of Rosie Douglas and representing the
    DLP, won the December 11 by-election for the deceased Prime Minister's
    seat.
        There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation
    of women in leadership roles in government or political parties;
    however, they are underrepresented in practice. Voters elected two
    women to Parliament in the January elections.
        Carib Indians participate in national political life.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no government restrictions on the formation of local
    human rights organizations, although no such groups exist. Several
    advocacy groups, such as the Association of Disabled People and a
    women's and children's self-help organization, operate freely and
    without government interference. There were no requests for
    investigations of human rights abuses from international or regional
    human rights groups.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution includes provisions against racial, sexual, and
    religious discrimination, which the authorities respect in practice.
        Women.--Sexual harassment and domestic violence cases are common,
    and there is no family court to deal specifically with domestic
    violence issues. Women can bring charges against husbands for battery,
    and both the police and the courts prosecute cases of rape and sexual
    assault, but there are no specific spousal abuse laws. However, in
    April 1998, a new Sexual Offences Act went into effect to replace the
    previous act, which required medical evidence or witness corroboration
    for indictment. As a matter of policy, all rape cases are handled
    solely by female police officers. The Department of Labor recruited a
    permanent counselor and established a crisis response mechanism to
    assist women who are victims of domestic violence. The Welfare
    Department assists victims of abuse by finding temporary shelter,
    providing counseling to both parties, or recommending police action.
    The Welfare Department reports all cases of abuse to the police. The
    courts may issue protective orders, but the police do not enforce them
    consistently.
        Beyond the general protection of the Constitution, women do not
    benefit from any specific civil rights legislation. While there is
    little open discrimination against women, property ownership continues
    to be deeded to ``heads of households,'' who are usually males. When
    the male head of household dies without a will, the wife cannot inherit
    the property or sell it, although she can live in it and pass it to her
    children. In the civil service, the law establishes fixed pay rates for
    specific jobs, whatever the gender of the incumbent.
        The Dominica National Council of Women, a nongovernmental
    organization, has developed local adult education and small business
    training programs for women. According to the Labor Department, many
    women in rural areas find it difficult to meet basic needs, at least in
    part owing to the decline in the banana export industry.
        Children.--The law stipulates that the Government should protect
    the rights of children to education and health care. Education is
    compulsory through the age of 16, and primary health care is available
    throughout the island.
        Various laws enumerate children's rights, but their enforcement is
    hampered by lack of staffing in government agencies. According to the
    Welfare Department, reported cases of child abuse, including sexual
    abuse, have increased in the past few years. In 1999 there were 303
    reported cases of child abuse, which affected 71 boys and 232 girls. Of
    these cases, 124 involved sexual abuse. At year's end, there were nine
    staff members in the social welfare office that handles all welfare
    problems, including complaints of child abuse.
        Although the maximum sentence for sexual molestation (rape, incest)
    is life imprisonment, the normal sentence given is 15 years except in
    the case of murder. The age of consent for sexual relations is 16
    years.
        People with Disabilities.--Beyond the general protection of the
    Constitution, there is no specific legislation dealing with the
    disabled. However, the labor laws permit authorization of employment of
    a disabled person for less than the minimum wage, in order to increase
    opportunities for employment of the disabled (see Section 6.e.). There
    is no requirement mandating access for those with disabilities.
        Indigenous People.--There is a significant Carib Indian population,
    estimated at 3,400 persons, of a total population of 76,000. Most live
    on a 3,783-acre reservation created in 1903 and expanded in 1997.
    School, water, and health facilities available on the Carib reservation
    are rudimentary but similar to those available to other rural
    Dominicans. Most Carib Indians engage in farming, fishing, and
    handicraft. Unemployment is believed to be higher than in rest of the
    country, while the average income is below the national average. About
    65 percent of the Carib population is between the ages of 18 and 35.
        The reservation is governed by the 1978 Carib Constitution. Carib
    Indians over the age of 18 who reside there are eligible to vote for
    the Chief and eight members of the Council of Advisors. Elections are
    held every 5 years, and the latest election was held in July 1999.
    According to the Carib Constitution, the Council must meet once a
    month, determine the chief's itinerary, and publish council meeting
    agendas in the government Gazette.
        There are credible reports of discrimination against Carib women
    who are married to, or who live with, non-Carib men, making it
    difficult for such couples to obtain permits to build homes within the
    reservation. Building permits are obtained from the Carib Council.
    Until 1979 the Carib Constitution allowed Carib men married to non-
    Carib women to continue living on the Carib reserve but dictated that
    Carib women married to non-Carib men had to move off the reservation.
    Although the law has changed, practice is not yet in keeping with the
    law. In one case, a Carib woman in a common-law relationship with a
    non-Carib man who tried to build a house on land reserved for her
    family received threats that her house would be burned down. An
    estimated 25 percent of the Carib Indian population is believed to be
    in mixed marriages or relationships.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the legal right to
    organize, to choose their representatives, and to strike, but unions
    represent less than 10 percent of the work force. All unions are
    independent of the Government. While there are no direct ties, members
    of certain political parties dominate some unions. There is no
    restriction on forming labor federations, but there is no Trades Union
    Congress. Unions may affiliate with various international labor bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have
    legally defined rights to organize workers and to bargain with
    employers. Collective bargaining is widespread in the nonagricultural
    sectors of the economy, including in government service, and there is
    also recourse to mediation and arbitration by the Government. The law
    prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and judicial
    authorities enforce union rights. In addition, employers must reinstate
    workers fired for union activities. The law requires that employers
    recognize unions as bargaining agents once both parties have followed
    appropriate procedures. Department of Labor inspectors under the
    supervision of the Labor Commissioner enforce labor legislation, but
    the small Labor Inspection Office lacks sufficient personnel to carry
    out its duties.
        Labor regulations and practices governing the country's industrial
    areas and export firms do not differ from those prevailing in the rest
    of the economy. There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including that by children, and such labor
    is not known to exist.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum legal age for employment is 15 years.
    Employers generally observe this law without government enforcement.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded child labor, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages for
    various categories of workers, but these were last revised in 1989. The
    minimum wage rate for some categories of workers (e.g., household
    employees) is as low as $0.37 (EC$1.00) per hour if meals are included.
    However, minimum wages for most workers fall in a range between $0.74
    (EC$2.00) per hour for tourist industry workers to $1.11 (EC$3.00) per
    hour for occupations such as shopclerks. Minimum wages are not
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. However, most workers (including domestic employees) earn more
    than the legislated minimum wage for their category. The Minimum Wage
    Advisory Board met in 1998 and recommended increases in these wage
    levels, but the Government had not yet acted upon these recommendations
    at year's end.
        The labor standards laws state that no employer shall establish or
    maintain differences in wages between men and women performing the same
    or similar work with parallel responsibilities under similar
    conditions. The law further states that no employer may reduce the
    wages of an employee to comply with equal wage standards. The labor
    laws also provide that the Labor Commissioner may authorize the
    employment of a disabled person at a wage lower than the minimum rate
    in order to enable that person to be employed gainfully.
        The standard legal workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. The law provides
    for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid vacation per year. The Employment Safety
    Act provides occupational health and safety regulations that are
    consistent with international standards. The Advisory Committee on
    Safety and Health is an established body but has never met. The rarely
    used enforcement mechanism consists of inspections by the Department of
    Labor, which can and does prescribe specific compliance measures,
    impose fines, and prosecute offenders. Workers have the right to remove
    themselves from unsafe work environments without jeopardy to continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons.
        The country has an economic citizenship program that allows foreign
    investors to purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures
    requiring cash inflows ranging from $15,000 (EC$40,000) to $50,000
    (EC$135,000). This process reportedly has facilitated the illegal
    immigration of persons from China and other countries to North America
    where, in some instances, they may be forced by the criminal
    organizations that provided the funds to work under conditions similar
    to bonded labor to repay their debt.
                                   __________

                               DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

        The Constitution provides for a popularly elected president and a
    bicameral Congress. President Hipolito Mejia of the Dominican Reform
    Party (PRD) took office on August 16 after a free and fair election,
    replacing President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Liberation Party
    (PLD). The PRD also has control of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
    The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
    interference from outside forces remains a problem. The Government took
    some steps to improve the ability of the judiciary to resist such
    outside interference.
        The National Police (PN), the National Department of Investigations
    (DNI), the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD), and the military
    (army, air force, and navy) form the security forces. The PN is under
    the Secretary of the Interior and Police; the military is under the
    Secretary of the Armed Forces; and the DNI and the DNCD, which have
    personnel from both the police and the military, report directly to the
    President. Although the security forces generally are responsive to
    civilian authority, there were instances in which members of the
    security forces, principally the National Police, acted independently
    of government authority or control. Members of the National Police, and
    to a more limited extent the military, continued to commit serious
    human rights abuses.
        The economy, once heavily dependent on sugar and other agricultural
    exports, continues to diversify; tourism, telecommunications, and free
    trade zones (FTZ's) are major sources of income and employment.
    Remittances from abroad, estimated to exceed $1.5 billion, are
    equivalent to approximately 9 percent of the $2,100 per capita gross
    domestic product. The country's agricultural and tourism sectors and
    electrical power network largely have recovered from the effects of
    Hurricane Georges, which hit the island in 1998, while housing
    reconstruction and transportation infrastructure lag behind. The 1999
    transfer of sugar mills to private control contributed to increasing
    poverty and joblessness in the bateyes (sugar cane shantytowns). Income
    distribution in the country is highly skewed, and according to the U.N.
    Development Program, the richest 10 percent of the population receives
    over 37 percent of the income, over 18 times that received by the most
    impoverished 10 percent of the population.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems
    remain. Police committed extrajudicial killings. The police, and to a
    lesser degree the military, tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    detainees and prisoners. Police on several occasions used force to
    disperse demonstrators. There was a significant increase in allegations
    of physical abuse and torture of minors in police and military
    detention. Prison conditions ranged from poor to extremely harsh.
    Police arbitrarily arrested and detained suspects and suspects'
    relatives. The ability of prosecutors to limit police detentions and
    practices has eroded, as compared with 1999. While there have been some
    improvements in the efficiency of the judiciary, lengthy pretrial
    detention and long delays in trials remained problems. Police committed
    break-ins of private homes without judicial orders. The authorities
    rarely prosecute abusers, and at times members of the security forces
    commit abuses with the tacit acquiescence of the civil authorities,
    leading to a climate of impunity. Numerous allegations of corruption by
    government officials were raised following the change of
    administration. The authorities infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
    Members of the police harassed journalists. The Government at times
    pressured editors not to publish unfavorable items, and journalists
    practice self-censorship. The Government at times restricted freedom of
    assembly. The Government restricts the movement of and forcibly expels
    Haitian and Dominican-Haitian migrants. Violence and discrimination
    against women; prostitution, including child prostitution; abuse of
    children; discrimination against the disabled, discrimination against
    and abuse of Haitian migrants and their descendants, and child labor
    are serious problems. There continued to be reports of forced labor.
    Workers on the sugar plantations and mills continued to work in unsafe
    conditions. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government officials; however, police
    committed at least 250 extrajudicial killings. It is difficult for any
    outside observer to quantify the exact number of victims of
    extrajudicial killings each year; included in this number are civilians
    who were killed in alleged ``exchanges of gunfire'' with police. The
    police fail to cooperate with civilian authorities in many ways, which
    made quantifying the problem very difficult. For example, the police do
    not provide Public Ministry officials with reports on investigations of
    citizens killed in confrontations with police; police rarely documented
    citizen killings in accordance with minimum investigations or crime
    scene standards; police denied civilian authorities, including
    prosecutors requesting information, transcripts of police tribunal
    hearings that process these cases in secret; and the police have been
    known to publicly fire officials involved in these incidents, only to
    reinstate them quietly later.
        The Dominican Human Rights Committee and other observers state that
    the police may employ unwarranted deadly force against criminal
    suspects in a kind of uniformed vigilantism. In addition, some victims
    are involved in private disputes with police agents, while other
    victims later were found to be honest citizens erroneously caught up in
    the wave of antigang violence carried out by the police. The
    circumstances of the vast majority of these killings are questionable,
    but witnesses other than the police usually are lacking.
        Extrajudicial killings stem from the lack of basic education, poor
    training, and weak discipline of the members of the police force. These
    problems are aggravated by low pay and the fact that the Government's
    budgetary allocation for the police is too low to support the higher
    recruiting standards needed and to provide adequate training for
    police. For example, new recruits fire only one round of ammunition
    during training, and there is no coherent policy on the use of deadly
    force or rules of engagement by the police. Additionally, the lack of
    professional, transparent, and credible investigation of the
    circumstances in which police kill citizens in ``exchanges of gunfire''
    lead to the perception of impunity in these killings. Finally, there is
    a lack of specific training in human rights as applied to police work.
        In the majority of the 250 deaths at the hands of police, the
    police characterized the victims as delinquents. The rest were wives,
    girlfriends, or associates of the officers, other civilians, or fellow
    officers. In most cases, the police claimed that the deaths resulted
    from the exchange of gunfire in the course of an arrest. Amnesty
    International's August report noted the large number of deaths at the
    hands of police and the lack of transparency in the investigative
    process. In October 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
    (IACHR) issued a report that criticized the police for committing
    extrajudicial killings and neglecting to investigate and punish
    officers responsible for such abuses. Police assert that the deaths of
    so-called delinquents resulted from shoot-outs requiring the police to
    act in self-defense. However, a number of cases demonstrate that this
    often is not the case.
        For example, on April 18, police shot and killed Antonio Lora
    Fernandez allegedly during questioning at the Isabela police substation
    of Puerto Plata.
        In July in Manoguayabo, a suburb of Santo Domingo, police shot and
    killed Juan Expedito Garcia, a 49-year-old businessman who was
    traveling with his daughter-in-law, Katy Jimenez de Garcia. Garcia and
    Jimenez were victims of an attempted carjacking by a group of
    delinquents. The delinquents ultimately kidnaped the two and sped away,
    followed closely by the police. After being stopped by police, Garcia
    and Jimenez threw themselves to the ground, raised their hands, and
    told the police not to shoot because they themselves were victims.
    Jimenez, the only surviving witness, reported that the police shot
    Garcia four times in the head and three times in the body before
    shooting and killing one of the kidnapers. She overheard one officer
    giving the order to kill her as well, but was spared when she was able
    to explain the circumstances of their kidnaping. The police commission
    investigating the incident recommended that those responsible be tried
    in a military tribunal. At year's end, there was no public information
    about the investigation into this case.
        In July witnesses, including the victim's sister, reported that
    police shot and killed 20-year-old Juan Jose Urena in Santo Domingo.
    The police said that Urena was wanted by the Secret Service and the
    Department of Homicide and Crimes against Property. They reported that
    when they tried to detain Urena, he threatened them with a machete, and
    they were forced to shoot him. The victim's sister, who saw the
    incident, said that he did not resist arrest, but that he already was
    wounded and handcuffed when the agents fired the shots that killed him.
    Urena's death at the hands of police led to public protests, tire
    burnings, and the throwing of Molotov cocktails. Police responded with
    tear gas and guns. The police shot a bystander in the leg as they tried
    to calm the protests (see Section 2.b.). The police officers who
    participated in the shooting of Urena were arrested pending a police
    investigation.
        On July 18, in Guayabin, on the northern border with Haiti,
    military agents shot and killed 6 Haitians and 1 Dominican citizen and
    wounded 13 others after they crossed the border illegally in a truck
    (see Section 2.d.).
        On August 13, a 30-year-old Haitian died after soldiers took him
    into custody in La Canada, near Hondo Valle (see Section 2.d.).
        On September 25, police killed two persons in separate incidents,
    20-year-old Emilio Jose Matias Moronta and 23-year-old Lauri Mendez
    Sena, in Santo Domingo neighborhoods Villa Maria and Los Alcarrizos,
    respectively. The local press reported that the police said that
    Moronta resisted arrest and threatened officers with a gun; however, an
    unidentified businessman claimed the police version was false and that
    the victim did not carry a firearm and was first wounded by the police
    in the leg. In the same press report, the police claimed Sena resisted
    arrest with a machete. At year's end, there was no public information
    about an investigation.
        On November 15, police shot and killed Johnny Perdomo Santo, in the
    Santo Domingo neighborhood of Ozama. Police reported to the press that
    they followed Santo in a car, whose plates linked it to a history of
    crimes, and that Santo attempted to shoot at them. Santo reportedly
    died on the way to the hospital. Witnesses told the press there were a
    total of three victims, including a woman. They said two corpses were
    taken away in the police vehicle, and a third one was taken away in the
    victims' car. At year's end, there was no public information about an
    investigation into the facts of the case.
        Military personnel killed a number of Haitian migrants who were
    attempting to enter the country (see Section 2.d.).
        The administration of President Hipolito Mejia acknowledged the
    problems with the police apparatus and early in his administration
    agreed to the creation of a Police Reform Commission to be made up of
    the Chief of Police, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Armed
    Forces, the Legal Advisor to the President, representatives of human
    rights organizations, and legislators. However, President Mejia
    retained the services of Chief of Police Pedro de Jesus Candelier,
    under whose tenure the number of deaths at the hands of the police rose
    significantly over previous years. At year's end, the Commission had
    not made public any recommendations, but the Secretary of Interior and
    Police indicated in early December that he would make public and open
    to public debate any contemplated reforms. In October the Attorney
    General publicly agreed to more aggressive independent investigation of
    extrajudicial killings. On December 7, the Supreme Court president
    urged judges to apply the full weight of the law in cases of violations
    of human rights.
        Police courts may try police officers or may remand them to
    civilian court jurisdiction. Military courts try military personnel
    charged with extrajudicial killings or other crimes. Police Chief
    Candelier announced that every time an officer is involved in a
    questionable incident, the case goes to a commission of superior
    officers for investigation. He said that if it is determined that the
    police officer exceeded his authority, the case is sent to the police
    courts or to the civilian courts, depending on the severity of the
    offense. However, the police send very few--if any--cases to civilian
    courts, despite requests from the former Attorney General, District
    Attorney, and Justice Reform Commissioner. On September 4, six civil
    society groups submitted an ``Act of Unconstitutionality'' to the
    Supreme Court on the issue of the legality of Law 285, which
    encompasses the Code of Police Justice. Civil society groups argue that
    police courts violate the Constitution, and that they weaken the
    separation and independence of governmental functions, as well as the
    exclusivity of the judicial function in the administration of justice.
    The lawsuit asks the Court to rule on the constitutionality of these
    police tribunals; a decision was still pending at year's end.
        State agents in prisons also committed extrajudicial killings. In
    the Najayo Prison in San Cristobal, police custodians shot and killed
    inmates Francisco Alberto Jaquez Brito, Manuel Sanchez Fermin, and
    Rafael Taversal Alberto in August during an escape attempt. A
    commission that included the Attorney General, the Chief of Police, and
    the Director of Prisons concluded that police agents acted negligently
    and in excess of their duties, and that the escapees could have been
    subdued by other means. The prisoners had not yet breached the exterior
    gates of the prison campus when they were shot and killed. The
    commission recommended that the three police cadets be tried in a
    police tribunal, and that three police supervisors be sanctioned with
    days in prison and ``arrest without salary'' for failing to control
    their subordinates and for failing to take an adequate count of
    prisoners. Human rights groups called for civilian trials for those
    responsible for the deaths of the prisoners.
        There also were a number of deaths in prisons due to harsh
    conditions and official negligence (see Section 1.c.).
        In July 1999, the authorities arrested a general, a colonel, a
    legal consultant, and various police officers in connection with the
    deaths of three alleged delinquents in Moca. In a civilian video, the
    police were shown handcuffing the three young men and placing them,
    alive, in the back of a police pickup truck. When the truck arrived at
    police headquarters, the three men were dead. A lower police tribunal
    reportedly tried, convicted, and sentenced officers Cesar Ovando
    Michell and Virgilio Severo Rodriguez to 2 years in prison, but a
    Police Appeals Tribunal later absolved the officers. The first-instance
    police tribunal discharged three other officers. In early November, the
    Attorney General asked Police Chief Candelier for a detailed report on
    the tribunal's proceedings, and said that he would investigate the
    possibility of reopening the case on a procedural appeal to the Supreme
    Court. Candelier said that he would not prevent such action; however,
    as of year's end, the case had not yet been presented to the Supreme
    Court.
        In August a court sentenced Rafael Paredes de la Cruz, a former
    cadet in the National Police to 15 years in prison for the 1998 killing
    of Father Jose Antonio Tineo Nunez. The court found the other
    defendant, Juan Bautista Caminero Mendoza, not guilty.
        There was no progress reported in trials of police officers
    detained for killing law student Franklin Bortolo Fabian Mejia in July
    1998; for killing a suspected robber of a Santiago pharmacy, also in
    July 1998; or for the triple homicide in November 1998 of three young
    male victims who might have been killed because of their refusal to
    share the proceeds of a recent robbery with the police.
        In August a court in Santo Domingo released the verdict in the case
    of the 1975 murder of journalist Orlando Martinez Howley, a critic of
    the Balaguer administration. Retired General Joaquin Pou Castro, former
    air force officer Mariano Cabrera Duran, and Luis Emilio de la Rosa
    Beras admitted to the killing and a court sentenced each of them to the
    maximum penalty of 30 years in prison. The court also awarded an
    indemnity of $314,000 (5 million pesos) to Martinez's surviving
    brothers. Lawyers for the sentenced defendants say that they plan to
    appeal. Although several witnesses testified to the knowledge and
    complicity of former President Balaguer in the murder, he was not
    called to testify for health reasons.
        In April violence at political rallies during the election campaign
    resulted in two deaths and several injuries when PRD bodyguards fired
    into the crowd at a political rally in Moca (see Section 3.)
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        There was little progress in the investigation into the case of
    Narciso Gonzalez, a university professor and critic of the Balaguer
    government who disappeared in May 1994. According to the former
    District Attorney, there is not enough evidence to go to trial, and
    existing evidence is contradictory. There was no action during the year
    on the family's complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and other
    forms of physical abuse; however, security force personnel continue to
    torture, beat, and otherwise physically abuse detainees and prisoners.
    Lack of supervision, training, and accountability throughout the law
    enforcement and corrections systems exacerbate the problem of physical
    abuse. Human rights groups, the local press, and the President's
    Commission to Support the Reform and Modernization of Justice (Justice
    Reform Commission) reported regular and repeated occurrences of
    physical abuse of detainees while in custody. There was a significant
    increase in allegations of physical abuse and torture of minors in
    police and military detention.
        In June the Justice Reform Commission reported cases of torture and
    abuse of at least nine minors in the police stations in Villas
    Agricolas, Los Farallones, Villa Francisca, and Plan Piloto in the
    national district. It cited numerous instances of beatings, sexual
    abuse, asphyxiation with plastic bags to elicit confessions, and a
    torture method called ``roasting the chicken'' in which the victim is
    placed over hot coals and turned until confessing. After completing an
    internal investigation, the National Police claimed that there were no
    instances of torture or abuse, and that if force was used, it was
    necessary to obtain the ``obedience'' of the minor. The Justice Reform
    Commission criticized the police for failing to conduct an objective
    investigation and for covering up serious abuses. As of September, the
    district attorney for Santo Domingo had made two requests to the Chief
    of Police that three officers be turned over for interrogation. Both of
    these requests were denied. An investigative judge was appointed to the
    cases, which were still pending in the Eighth Penal Court in Santo
    Domingo at year's end.
        In August judges of the Appeals Court for Children and Adolescents
    in San Pedro de Macoris made public a set of allegations of similar
    abuses committed against 19 minors in police stations in Juan Dolio and
    Boca Chica, as well as in the General Pedro Santana public jail, which
    is controlled by the army. One of the adolescent victims reported that
    the police beat him to force him to say ``yes'' to their questions; in
    the interrogation sessions, they hit him with the butts of their guns;
    they made him kneel and two officers at once hit him in the ears and
    kicked him; they hit him with a baton, and put him in a dark room where
    they applied an electric current to his body. The child reported that
    due to the marks these incidents left on his body, the police held him
    for 8 days before transferring him to the judge. The law requires that
    minor detainees be transferred to a judge within 24 hours. There is no
    information available regarding any investigation into these alleged
    abuses by the police or the military.
        Homosexual and transvestite detainees report to gay rights
    advocates that during detention the police have held them in a darkened
    room and have given them the alternative of performing fellatio on
    guards or being placed in a locked cell with the most dangerous
    prisoners, where the detainees presumed that they would be raped,
    beaten, or both. Other informants confirmed that the police use the
    prospect of being locked in with the most dangerous prisoners as a
    threat.
        The National Coordinator for Human Rights cited the Department of
    Homicide and Robbery Investigations and the DNCD for the persistent use
    of torture to extract confessions from detainees. According to human
    rights organizations, the method most often used is beating. After
    several former detainees went to the press in 1999 with credible
    reports that police interrogators had beaten them repeatedly, the Chief
    of Police and Attorney General designated a commission to investigate.
    The beatings allegedly took place during periods of detention of up to
    15 days without arraignment before a judge (the Constitution permits
    only 48 hours). The informants reported that the police repeatedly
    awoke them during the night for questioning. Human rights advocates
    have described another form of abuse that guards reportedly use against
    prisoners in the Mexico section of San Pedro de Macoris Prison. Prison
    officials use a punishment called ``the toaster'', where prisoners are
    laid, shackled hand and foot, on a bed of hot asphalt for the entire
    day and are beaten with a club if they scream. The army administers San
    Pedro de Macoris prison.
        The National District Prosecutor's office continued to place
    lawyers in high-volume police stations and in several DNCD offices to
    monitor the investigative process and to assure that detainees' rights
    are respected (see Section 1.d.). Most of the affected PN and DNCD
    investigators responded positively to this oversight, although some
    DNCD personnel reportedly complained that their hands were being tied.
    This initiative remains largely limited to the Santo Domingo
    metropolitan area, with a lesser presence in Santiago. There is some
    evidence that these assistant prosecutors at times acquiesce in
    traditional police practices, rather than attempt to raise these
    practices to constitutional standards. Less qualified prosecutors
    assigned to the rest of the country have not assumed strong roles in
    managing criminal investigations and ensuring the rights of suspects.
    Human rights courses are offered in the training curriculums for
    military and DNCD enlisted personnel and officers; however, the courses
    are optional. In October the Armed Forces Secretary inaugurated the
    Military Institute of Human Rights, located in Santiago.
        Civilian prosecutors sometimes file charges against police and
    military officials alleging torture, physical abuse, and related
    crimes. A 1997 law provides penalties for torture and physical abuse,
    including sentences of from 10 to 15 years in prison. However, until
    recently these provisions were not known fully or applied by
    prosecutors and judges. There have been repeated calls by human rights
    groups as well as by the Justice Reform Commission for civilian trials
    of officials charged with abuse and torture; however, most cases, if
    tried at all, are sent to military or police tribunals.
        Out of a police force of about 23,000 members, Police Chief
    Candelier fired 84, disarmed 200, and sent 100 officers for retraining
    during the first 6 months of the year as part of an effort to increase
    respect for human rights and discipline within the police force. He
    reported that many of the 84 were fired for drug use, including cocaine
    and marijuana. However, some discharged officers later were rehired.
    Significant problems also remain because serious efforts have not been
    made to vet police recruits. Many persons with prior criminal records
    reportedly have been incorporated into police ranks, either using false
    names or identification or with recommendations from other state
    institutions, such as the army.
        The police at times forcibly dispersed demonstrators, using tear
    gas and weapons (see Sections 2.b. and 6.b.).
        Prison conditions range from poor to extremely harsh. Reports of
    torture and mistreatment in prisons are common. The prisons are
    seriously overcrowded, health and sanitary conditions are poor, and
    some prisons are out of the control of the authorities. The General
    Directorate of Prisons falls under the authority of the Public Ministry
    and is seriously underfunded. Budget allocations for necessities such
    as food, medicines, and transportation were lacking. Medical care in
    all prisons suffers from a lack of supplies and available physicians.
    Prisoners immobilized by and dying of AIDS are not transferred to a
    hospital, but some terminal-stage inmates were released early to spend
    their last days at home.
        In 32 prisons around the country with a total capacity of 9,000
    persons, the police and the military hold more than 15,000 prisoners
    and detainees. The military controls 22 prisons with a total of 6,000
    prisoners, and the National Police controls 10 prisons, with a total of
    9,000 inmates. A warden is responsible for running each prison and
    reports to the Attorney General through the Directorate of Prisons. A
    police or military colonel (or lieutenant colonel), who is appointed
    for 3 to 6 months only, reports to the warden and is responsible for
    providing security. However, in practice the colonel is in charge of
    the prison, and neither the Directorate of Prisons nor the individual
    wardens have much power. According to credible reports, some prisons
    are totally out of the control of the authorities. They are, in effect,
    operated by armed inmates, who decide whether an individual gets food,
    space to sleep, or medical care. Individual inmates only can secure a
    tolerable level of existence by paying for it. Only those with
    considerable personal or family resources can do so.
        Conditions at La Victoria prison, which is run by the National
    Police, pose a serious threat to life and health. In June this prison
    held over 3,500 prisoners in a facility built for 1,000. In March there
    was a serious fire at La Victoria in which 13 persons died, 44 suffered
    burns, and 20 others were injured. Inmates alleged that guards refused
    to open cell doors so that they could escape. At year's end, the
    Director of Prisons reported that an investigation had been conducted,
    and that those responsible were arrested and sent before a police
    tribunal. However, there was no public information on the trial's
    outcome.
        The Barahona Commission for the Defense of Human Rights has
    criticized the conditions in the Barahona prison, which has 22 beds,
    but currently holds 586 inmates. In one cellblock, which has space for
    32 persons, there are 145 inmates. The commission issued a report at
    mid-year, in which it described 52 Haitians imprisoned there as
    ``practically kidnaped,'' and said that they have not been taken to
    their hearings. The Commission reported that the bathroom facilities
    amount to cesspools and that the authorities are indifferent to the
    lack of hygiene; prisoners do not receive medicine or medical
    attention, and many have tuberculosis and other diseases. They
    allegedly receive only one meal on Saturdays and no meals on Sundays.
        A government food program for the general public is used to provide
    lunches at some prisons. The former Director of Prisons reported that
    his office had the budget to spend $0.50 (8 pesos) per inmate to
    provide three meals per day. Inmates surveyed said that the food
    provided was unacceptable, and most chose to eat whatever they could
    beg for or purchase from persons in the vicinity of the prison or from
    family members. Due to inefficiency and corruption within the prison
    system, visitors often have to bribe prison guards in order to visit
    prisoners.
        Female prisoners are separated from male inmates. In general,
    conditions in the female prison wings are superior to those found in
    male prison wings. There have been some reports of guards physically
    and sexually abusing female inmates. Female inmates, unlike their male
    counterparts, are prohibited from receiving conjugal visits. Those who
    deliver while incarcerated are permitted to keep their babies with them
    in prison until they reach 1 year of age.
        In May in Rafey Prison in Santiago, guards beat six inmates with
    aluminum and wooden bats as they bathed in the rain in a courtyard of
    the prison. Two officials allegedly responsible for the beatings were
    said to have been tried in a police tribunal; however, there was no
    public information available about any investigation or trial.
        The law requires that juveniles be detained separately from adults.
    However, recent press reports found a high incidence of juveniles who
    were detained with adult prisoners being forced into sexual servitude
    in return for protection at prisons around the country. Najayo prison
    has a new wing for juvenile offenders that holds 250 persons. Inmates
    are not separated by crime within the prison population; however, they
    may be put into solitary confinement for disturbances while
    incarcerated.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors and by the press.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The Constitution provides for the security of
    the individual against imprisonment without legal process, bars
    detention beyond 48 hours without the detainee being presented before
    judicial authorities, and prohibits custodial authorities from not
    presenting detainees when requested. It also provides for recourse to
    habeas corpus proceedings to request the release of those unlawfully
    held. However, the security forces continued to violate constitutional
    provisions by detaining suspects for investigation or interrogation
    beyond the prescribed 48-hour limit. The police traditionally detain
    all suspects and witnesses in a crime and use the investigative process
    to determine who are innocent and merit release, and who they should
    continue to hold. After the prosecutor's office placed its lawyers in
    several police stations in 1997, the police began to curtail the
    practice of arbitrary detention in those precincts. However, progress
    has been slow (see Section 1.c.), and this program has been limited for
    the most part to the Santo Domingo metropolitan area. During the year,
    no new prosecutors were placed in police stations, and the
    effectiveness against human rights abuses of those working in police
    stations cannot be discerned accurately.
        The prosecutor for the Court of Appeals in Santiago reported that
    the Department of Investigation of Homicide and Robbery of the National
    Police, Northern Command, routinely detained persons beyond the 48-hour
    limit. Detainees at police headquarters in Santo Domingo, known as
    ``the palace,'' reported that they were held for 15 to 21 days.
    Juveniles held at the Department for Minors at the Villa Juana Police
    Station commonly are held for 8 to 14 days, well beyond the 24-hour
    limit for minors. The official in charge of the Department for Minors
    attributes this to lack of swift action by the Juvenile Defender, the
    Public Ministry official in charge of interrogating minors and sending
    them before a Juvenile Court judge. By law juveniles may not be
    interrogated by the police or in the presence of police.
        The police continued the practice of making frequent sweeps or
    roundups in low-income, high-crime communities in which they arrest and
    detain individuals arbitrarily. The alleged objective of the roundups
    is to fight delinquency. Following the indiscriminate arrests, the
    police regularly detain individuals for up to 20 days or more, while
    they look for a reason to charge them with a crime. For example, on
    September 23-24, police arrested 900 persons around the country in 1
    weekend with the objective of ``preventing the commission of crimes''
    and ``maintaining order and peace.'' They also took possession of
    property including motorcycles, other vehicles, and weapons. Human
    rights organizations report that individuals detained in these roundups
    frequently are beaten. The police say that they rely upon unlawful
    detention without presentation to a court because some cases involve
    more complicated investigations. However, there is a clear pattern of
    the police arresting individuals before investigating a crime
    thoroughly, and relying on confessions to make their case. Without the
    education, training, or equipment to conduct modern forensic
    investigations, police rely instead on holding suspects incommunicado
    (see Section 1.e.), repeatedly questioning them, and sometimes beating
    them, until they confess. Prosecutors who are assigned to monitor the
    criminal investigation phase at police stations appear to be unable to
    control the practice (see Section 1.c.).
        A related problem is the police practice of arresting and detaining
    individuals solely because of their familial or marital relationship to
    a suspect. A suspect's parents, siblings, or spouse are all vulnerable
    to this practice, the goal of which is to compel an at-large suspect to
    give himself up or to coerce a confession from one already arrested. In
    1999 the PN chief had ordered that this practice be ended immediately;
    however, it continued. According to the Dominican Human Rights
    Committee, there were several reports of detentions of suspects'
    relatives during the year.
        Local human rights organizations have reported on and criticized
    police roundups of Haitian and Dominican-Haitian construction workers.
    Officials allegedly take groups of dark-skinned or ``Haitian-looking''
    individuals to empty buildings soon after they are paid, in order to
    extort money from them. One worker reported that he was beaten
    frequently, and that many of his paychecks were taken during these
    roundups. He said that the license plates are removed from the official
    police vehicles so that the perpetrators cannot be identified easily.
        Many suspects suffer long pretrial detention. In November over 83
    percent of the national prison population was awaiting trial, 11
    percent higher than in 1999; of these, about three-quarters were
    ``prisoners without sentences,'' and the remainder had convictions
    under appeal. However, while suspects nationwide still suffer long
    pretrial detention, judicial statistics show reduced delays for the
    last 3 years in the Santo Domingo National District (an area that
    accounts for approximately 45 percent of all criminal cases in the
    country). The average pretrial detention throughout the country is more
    than 6 months.
        Due to the historical inefficiency of the courts (see Section
    1.e.), the granting of bail serves as the de facto criminal justice
    system. As a rule, defendants awarded bail rarely face an actual trial.
    (Time already served counts toward a sentence.) This situation improved
    somewhat as a result of the steps taken by the former Santo Domingo
    District Attorney and the judiciary, in cooperation with the Director
    of Prisons, to introduce a prisoner registry system that focuses on
    providing timely trials for prisoners. The failure of prison
    authorities to produce the accused caused a significant percentage of
    trial postponements. Authorities held some prisoners even though there
    were no formal charges against them, and kept some prisoners jailed
    even after a court ordered their release. One prisoner held in Najayo
    Prison was charged with swindling over 4 years ago. The maximum penalty
    for this crime is 3 years; however, the prisoner was never tried or
    convicted. His case finally was dismissed in August. In October the
    Attorney General proposed a program to reduce prison crowding by
    releasing inmates who only were held pending payment of a fine. Large
    numbers of prisoners are generally pardoned at the end of the year. In
    early December, prison authorities paroled 80 elderly (75 years or
    older) persons, 90 terminally ill prisoners, and 150 inmates who have
    finished sentences, but cannot pay their fines.
        Notable advances also were made by the new Mejia administration to
    increase the availability of free legal services to the poor. Most
    detainees and prisoners cannot afford adequate defense services. There
    were 12 new public defenders added, bringing the total to 31 throughout
    the country. A bill to create a national public defender program was
    pending in Congress at year's end.
        Hoguisten Canji, a 33-year-old Haitian, spent 9 years in prison
    without an official charge and without ever being presented to a
    judicial officer. His case finally came to the attention of the Public
    Defender Program, which ultimately obtained his release on January 14
    on a writ of habeas corpus. His attorney noted that there was no
    official file on the case, no name of the person that he allegedly
    murdered in 1991, and no order for preventive detention. A Public
    Defender Program attorney also defended Hector Manuel Reyes, who spent
    17 years behind bars for a murder for which he had never been
    convicted. The authorities had lost his case file. Reyes was released
    on March 20. Officials acknowledge that there may be hundreds of such
    cases in the prison system.
        The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
    use. However, persons who credibly asserted that they were citizens
    sometimes were expelled to Haiti (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, attempts by public and private
    entities, including the executive branch, to undermine judicial
    independence still remain. The judiciary appears better equipped to
    resist such outside interference, due in part to training funded by
    foreign technical assistance. Court officials also began to implement
    new selection criteria for judges. The National Judiciary Council
    chooses members of the Supreme Court, with the goal of ensuring
    independence from the executive and legislative branches, and some
    progess has been made.
        The judiciary, based primarily on the Napoleonic Code, includes a
    16-member Supreme Court, appeals courts, courts of first instance, and
    justices of the peace. There are also specialized courts that handle
    administrative, labor, land, and juvenile matters.
        Military or police courts have jurisdiction over members of the
    security forces. However, civil society groups challenged this system
    in a Supreme Court case filed in August (see Section 1.a.). Public
    pressure exists for military or police boards to remand cases involving
    serious crimes to civilian courts for review; however, there is no
    information that any such cases were remanded during the year. In other
    cases, civil authorities have requested that the PN turn over their
    files so that cases of suspected extrajudicial killings might be
    evaluated independently for possible prosecution. There was little
    cooperation from the National Police or military in requested
    investigations during the year (see Section 1.c.).
        Judges, rather than juries, render all verdicts. Under the 1994
    constitutional amendments, which entered into force in August 1998, the
    Supreme Court is responsible for naming all lower-court judges in
    accordance with a judicial career law. The National Judiciary Council
    selects new justices of the Supreme Court. The Council consists of the
    President, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of
    Deputies, two at-large members designated by them (one Senator and one
    Deputy, from parties different than those of the presidents of the
    Senate and Chamber), the President of the Supreme Court, and one other
    justice designated by the Supreme Court.
        Following the commission of a crime, the criminal process begins
    with the arrest of possible suspects. During the investigative phase,
    suspects are questioned repeatedly and urged to confess. The
    Constitution provides for the right not to be arrested without judicial
    warrant except in cases where the suspect is caught in the act; the
    right not to be deprived of liberty without trial or legal formalities,
    or for reasons other than those provided by law; the right to be
    presented to a competent judicial authority within 48 hours of one's
    detention; the right not to be a witness against oneself; and the right
    to a defense in an impartial and public trial. These rights commonly
    are disregarded.
        The most serious and common violation of these rights occurs when
    police detain suspects, sometimes for many days, without giving them
    access to a telephone call to family while subjecting them to frequent
    questioning. Although accused persons are entitled to have an attorney
    present, they often are not permitted to call one or, if one arrives,
    the attorney is not permitted to be present during the questioning.
    (The police complain that the presence of attorneys interferes with
    their investigations.) Torture frequently is used as a method to
    extract a confession during questioning (see Section 1.c.). Under these
    circumstances, suspects may confess to acts that they did not commit
    merely to get relief from the intense questioning and the detention.
    The results of these interrogations frequently form the only evidence
    presented at the trial.
        The law provides for the remedy of ``Amparo,'' an action any
    citizen may bring for violation of a constitutional right, in
    accordance with the terms of the Inter-American Convention on Human
    Rights. This action includes violations by judicial officials. The
    process of dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, and
    arbitration, continues to be used as an alternative to trial and
    incarceration.
        There remains a large backlog of criminal cases in the National
    District and throughout the country. The Supreme Court's plan to unclog
    the court dockets has been frustrated by the Government's failure to
    allocate sufficient funds. Dockets are crowded with traffic infractions
    that should be heard in the traffic courts provided for by statute; due
    to a lack of funds, the traffic courts have not been set up. Other
    complications in clearing the backlog arise from the exhaustion of
    funds for transporting prisoners to court; many cases must be sent back
    when the accused does not appear. The Government has not yet
    established 25 additional courts provided for by law.
        Throughout the year, there were improvements in the administration
    of justice that resulted from cooperation between the judiciary and the
    Santo Domingo district attorney's office. New cases unnecessarily
    congesting the criminal system were reduced by more than 50 percent
    through use of community conciliation centers, and investigative judge
    rulings increased by 65 percent in the last 2 years. The courts'
    efforts to improve productivity of judges was notable: the number of
    definitive (final) sentences quadrupled over the past 3 years and time
    to trial was reduced from an average of 11.8 to 6.5 months. It is not
    yet clear how the change of 90 percent of Public Ministry officials in
    August will affect the changes introduced by the previous
    administration.
        The judicial training school trained 530 judges (out of a total of
    585) on drafting and structuring sentences in its first cycle. The
    school prepared a computer seminar on fundamental constitutional
    protections with four modules for judges on human rights. In October it
    held a seminar on domestic violence and a seminar on judicial ethics
    for 200 judges. A dialog among 500 judicial and civil society
    representatives created a judicial code of ethics.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions against arbitrary
    entrance of one's home; however, police sometimes break into private
    quarters without cause to search for suspects, and the authorities
    infringe on citizens' privacy rights in other ways as well. Although
    the Government denies arbitrary use of wiretapping or other
    surreptitious methods to interfere with the private lives of persons or
    families, it has not taken necessary steps to dismantle an active
    private wiretapping industry.
        The law permits the arrest of a suspect caught in the act of
    committing a crime, and police may enter a residence or business in
    pursuit of such suspects. Otherwise judges must authorize arrests and
    issue search warrants. However, the PN and occasionally the DNCD
    continued to violate these requirements. Some prosecutors confessed
    that out of ``tactical necessity to combat criminality'' and ``with
    great reluctance,'' they tolerated the illegal search practices. They
    justified their actions by arguing that the Government has not provided
    sufficient resources or attention to criminal investigation and that,
    given the cumbersome and antiquated criminal procedures, adhering to
    the letter of the law would make law enforcement nearly impossible.
        The Dominican Human Rights Committee reported that police carried
    out raids on private homes in the Santo Domingo neighborhoods of
    Caputillo, Villa Agricola, Los Alcarrizos, and Guachupita; police
    allegedly went into homes without search warrants to look for
    delinquents.
        The police continued to detain relatives and friends of suspects to
    try to compel suspects to surrender or to confess (see Section 1.d.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these
    freedoms, and the Government generally respected them in practice;
    however, there were some isolated exceptions. For example, there were
    isolated instances of government pressure on editors not to publish
    certain unfavorable items, such as negative poll results.
        Citizens of all political persuasions exercise freedom of speech.
    Newspapers and magazines freely present a diversity of opinion and
    criticism; there are eight daily and seven weekly newspapers, and three
    weekly magazines. However, journalists and editors practice self-
    censorship, particularly when coverage could adversely affect the
    economic or political interests of media owners.
        The National Press Union criticized police treatment of journalist
    and union secretary Paul Meguis Jose in April. Jose was following a
    story in Batey Central in Barahona when a police officer shoved him,
    threw his camera on the ground, and then confiscated it. A police
    tribunal found the official guilty of an infraction, and ordered that
    he serve 10 days in prison. In San Francisco de Macoris, police smashed
    the camera of La Nacion newspaper reporter Julio Benzant. DNI agents
    arrested and mistreated Jose Rivas, a reporter for the daily newspaper
    Hoy, during his coverage of the return of Mario Duran Cabrera, one of
    the defendants in the Orlando Martinez case (see Section 1.a.). The
    Dominican Human Rights Committee criticized the detention of journalist
    Robert Vargas, of the Spanish news agency (EFE), and the unlawful
    search of his residence carried out by police as an attempt to
    intimidate him for his reporting on human rights issues.
        Numerous privately owned radio and television stations broadcast
    all political points of view. The Government controls one television
    station.
        In September the National Press Union criticized the violation of
    freedom of expression by the director of the government-owned Dominican
    Radio and Television for canceling an FM radio program. The director of
    the station arrived with a group of military officers to interrupt the
    broadcast and said that the program served as a forum to criticize the
    Government of President Mejia. The union complained that this
    cancellation occurred only days after installation of the new
    Government and asserted that the station director should have discussed
    the program with its producers if he disagreed with its content.
        In November the National Press Union reported that PRD leaders,
    including one from the Secretariat of Youth and another from the
    National Lottery, beat a journalist in Hato Mayo, who broadcast a radio
    program critical of the PRD. In the same month, in Moca, a provincial
    official of the Secretariat of Education punched a correspondent of the
    daily newspaper El Nacional when he asked the official about problems
    with the national school lunch program. Also in November, a
    correspondent from the El Siglo newspaper was sued for slander and
    detained for 2 days after he denounced the cutting of trees ordered by
    the vice mayor of Constanza. The charges later were dropped.
        Public and private universities enjoy broad academic freedom. The
    main public university, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo,
    with approximately 100,000 mostly part-time students, has few
    restrictions on enrollment and maintains a policy of nonintervention
    (other than on curriculum development) in classroom affairs. The
    Government exerts no control over private universities, except for the
    preservation of standards, and teachers are free to espouse their own
    theories without government oversight.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice; however, there were some exceptions, and the
    Government at times restricted this right. Outdoor public marches and
    meetings require permits, which the Government usually grants; however,
    the police used force to break up demonstrations on several occasions
    throughout the year. The Government responded with force to disperse
    demonstrators calling for completion of public works projects, opposing
    evictions, or supporting a strike. During transportation strikes in the
    first 4 months of the year, police used force to disperse union
    members; others were arrested and detained without charges for several
    days.
        The police used force to disperse demonstrators. News reports and
    human rights organizations criticized the manner in which police used
    force to disperse demonstrators in Batey 5 in Barahona in mid-year.
    Protesters gathered to call for compliance with a promise to finish
    installation of electricity made 4 years ago by the governor of the
    province. There were reports that police indiscriminately launched tear
    gas into homes; several children had to be taken to hospitals due to
    the effects of the gas. According to the Dominican Human Rights
    Committee, the police on several other occasions used force to remove
    squatters from Punta Villa Mella, Valiente, La Toronja, and Vallo
    Lindo, state-owned lands near the national district (Santo Domingo and
    environs).
        In a December interview with the newspaper Hoy, the Secretary of
    Interior and Police admitted that the police committed abuses when
    responding to several public marches and demonstrations in late
    November. These protests were largely in response to the Government's
    package of economic proposals. On November 16, a police lieutenant and
    four others were wounded by bullets and rocks in the confrontation
    between high school students and police in the town of Licey. National
    news media reported that the police repelled the students with tear
    gas. Student leaders told reporters that the police came into the
    school and arrested and beat several students. The police have promised
    an investigation into the protests.
        On November 24, former President Leonel Fernandez and numerous
    other PLD leaders were involved in confrontations with the police when
    the PLD officials marched to the offices of the Public Ministry to
    protest the arrest of four high-level PLD members on corruption
    charges. The police used tear gas against the marchers and prevented
    Fernandez from entering the building. He and several others were
    overcome by the gas and taken to nearby hospitals.
        On November 29, the ``black helmet'' unit of the police interrupted
    a march to the National Palace by groups of student, chauffeur, and
    social organizations who were also protesting the economic reform
    package. Police repelled demonstrators with tear gas and rubber bullets
    and detained more than 170 demonstrators. Organizers of the
    demonstration, including Human Rights Committee president Virgilio
    Almanzar, claimed that the police denied their right to freedom of
    assembly.
        There were no reports of the use of the criminal charge
    ``association with criminal elements'' to stifle political dissent this
    year. Under former President Balaguer, the authorities traditionally
    used this charge against dissidents and those involved in street
    demonstrations against the Government.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. Political parties
    frequently affiliate with their foreign counterpart organizations.
    Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and others
    function freely and can maintain relationships with counterpart
    organizations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination
    on religious grounds, and many religions and denominations are active.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
    generally respects this right in practice.
        The Catholic Church, which signed a concordat with the Government
    in 1954, enjoys special privileges not extended to other religions.
    These include the use of public funds to underwrite some church
    expenses, such as rehabilitation of church facilities, and a complete
    waiver of customs duties when importing goods into the country. The
    attendance at Catholic Mass for members of the National Police is
    compulsory.
        In July then-President Fernandez signed a law making Bible reading
    in public schools obligatory. This new law added Bible reading to the
    weekly flag raising and singing of the national anthem in public
    schools. Private schools are not obliged to include Bible reading as
    part of their weekly activities.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    travel, except for limitations imposed under judicial sentence, or
    police regulations for immigration and health reasons, and the
    Government generally respects these provisions in practice; however,
    there were some exceptions. Citizens face no unusual legal restrictions
    on travel within or outside the country. Local and international human
    rights groups cited discrimination against Haitian migrants, whom they
    said were subject to arbitrary and unilateral action by the
    authorities.
        Haitians continue to migrate in great numbers to the Dominican
    Republic, some legally but most without legal documents, in search of
    economic opportunity. Some illegal migration is assisted or sanctioned
    indirectly by the authorities, especially by police and military in the
    border areas, who profit from the illegal traffic. Throughout the year,
    the security forces, particularly the army, repatriated undocumented
    Haitian nationals believed to be in the country illegally. In December
    the Directorate of Migration reported that 12,500 Haitians were
    repatriated during the year; however, a later report issued by the
    armed forces stated that they had deported 36,362 Haitians between
    August 16 and the end of the year.
        In many cases, the Government denied those deported the opportunity
    to demonstrate that they were legal residents in the country or to make
    arrangements for their families or property. Haitian Government
    officials complained that Haitians often were detained with little or
    no food and then deported without timely notice to the Haitian
    authorities. Human rights organizations and the media continued to
    report many instances of violent treatment of Haitian migrants by the
    authorities.
        On July 18, in Guayabin, on the northern border with Haiti,
    military agents shot and killed 6 Haitians and 1 Dominican citizen and
    wounded 13 others after they crossed the border illegally in a truck.
    The truck had sped through several military checkpoints, and members of
    the military pursued it until it crashed. Controversy exists as to
    whether the military personnel knew that the truck was filled with
    immigrants when they fired at it. A Commission with members from Haiti
    and the Dominican Republic was established to investigate the incident.
    The officers reportedly were tried in a military court, given letters
    of reprimand, and returned to military service.
        On August 13, a 30-year-old Haitian died after he was taken into
    custody by soldiers in La Canada, near Hondo Valle, a border town.
    According to newspaper reports, he entered the country illegally and
    was detained along with two other illegal migrants; soldiers allegedly
    beat him to death. The Commander of the Third Brigade of the army
    arrested the soldiers involved in the homicide and promised a quick
    investigation.
        On November 7, soldiers in the Department of Border Investigation
    Operations shot and killed a Haitian under questionable circumstances
    at the Elias Pina border crossing point. Investigations of killings of
    civilians at the hands of military, similar to killings at the hands of
    police, lack transparency. At year's end, there was no information
    about an investigation into this case.
        On March 6, the IACHR held a hearing in two 1997 cases of two
    Dominican-born children who have been denied birth registrations. The
    mothers of both children are Dominican citizens of Haitian descent. The
    law in question is Law 6-59 on Civil Records, and the legal issue in
    the case is the denial of the right to register a late declaration of
    birth. The cases were still pending at year's end.
        On August 8, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights heard a case
    presented by the Dominican Center for Justice and International Law
    (CEJIL), Dominicans 2000, Human Rights Watch, the International Human
    Rights Law Clinic, and other international human rights organizations,
    alleging that massive expulsions, repatriations, and deportations of
    Haitians and Dominican-Haitians by the Government violated
    international human rights law. The Inter-American Court considered
    general concerns about ``mass expulsions'' and ``forced repatriations''
    carried out by the Ministry of Interior and Police, as well as nine
    individual cases of persons who allegedly were expelled forcibly
    without opportunity for due process. The Court did not address the case
    of the six Haitians killed in Guayabin.
        On August 18, the Court rendered its decision, laying out
    ``provisional measures'' for the future treatment of Haitians, and
    specific relief and protection of the nine individuals. It did not
    require immediate broad-based accountability of the migration
    authorities for enforcement of border agreements reached with Haiti in
    December 1999. These agreements set out a systematized deportation
    procedure in which Haitian authorities would be advised of potential
    deportations, deportees would be given opportunities for legal hearings
    (to present proof of legal status in the country), as well as
    opportunities to advise family members and collect belongings. Rather,
    the Court requested that the Government provide more detailed
    information about the condition of individuals in the border
    ``bateyes'' (shantytowns) who potentially are subject to forced
    expulsions. It also asked for a government report every 2 months on
    provisional measures that are expected be adopted to comply with the
    Court's decision.
        The ongoing process of repatriating Haitian citizens did not
    diminish after the Court's decision in August. NGO representatives
    working in rural areas reported that decisions to deport often were
    made by lower ranking members of the security forces, sometimes based
    upon the racial characteristics of the deportees. The Director of
    Migration stated that the process of rounding up illegal Haitians is
    performed by the rank and file of the armed forces and migration
    officers. They approach persons who look like Haitians, including
    persons who have very dark complexions and fairly poor clothing. They
    engage them in conversation about their work and residence, mainly to
    check their use of Spanish and any accent they may have. If such
    persons speak Spanish poorly or with a noticeable accent, they
    generally are detained and deported.
        The Haitian Government protested the failure to give detainees an
    opportunity for a hearing on their claim of citizenship or right to
    residence, although it acknowledges the Government's right to deport
    those individuals who are illegal aliens. NGO's and Catholic priests
    familiar with the process also have protested that children born of one
    or two Haitian parents in the Dominican Republic, heretofore denied
    registration as Dominican citizens, frequently are among those deported
    as illegal Haitians.
        While the Government has a policy of strictly enforcing documentary
    requirements and repatriation for those found lacking, it appears to
    have an unofficial policy that is more tolerant, which is fueled by the
    reality of dependence on Haitian labor for certain agricultural and
    construction work. Thus, after being stopped as a suspected illegal
    Haitian migrant, an individual may be allowed to remain in the country
    despite his lack of documents if his story about work satisfies the
    official who stopped him. NGO's have reported corruption among the
    military and migration border officials, and noted that these officials
    sometimes cooperate with the transit of Haitian workers into the
    country. However, in December the Director of Migration reported that
    the need for Haitian labor is generally filled by Haitian migrants
    already in the country.
        According to a 1984 presidential decree, an applicant for refugee
    status must be referred to the Technical Subcommittee of the National
    Commission for Refugees by the National Office of Refugee Affairs. The
    Subcommittee, which makes a recommendation to the Commission, is made
    up of members from the Foreign Ministry, the DNI, and the Immigration
    Directorate. The Commission, which makes a final decision on the
    application, consists of the three members of the Subcommittee; the
    legal advisor to the President; and members of the PN, the Ministry of
    Labor, and the Attorney General's office. There is no functioning
    National Office of Refugee Affairs, and the National Commission for
    Refugees, an office of the Foreign Ministry, has not met since 1993.
    However, the Subcommittee makes recommendations, and the Immigration
    Directorate issues documentation to refugees certified as such by the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While these documents are
    accepted routinely by the police and immigration officials, the process
    by which they are issued does not comply with the decree. During the
    year, 43 refugee applications (30 of which were from Haitians) were
    submitted. Of those, the UNHCR recognized 14 and refused 5; 17 were
    pending and 5 were abandoned. There were no reports of repatriation or
    refoulement of persons claiming refugee status.
        The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
    asylum and resettlement. There were several cases in which the
    Government offered political asylum to refugees and their families
    fleeing war-torn countries.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully through periodic elections. Citizens exercised
    this right in free and fair presidential elections in May. Voters gave
    the PRD 49.87 percent of the vote, while the DLP received 24.94
    percent, and the Social Christian Reform Party (PRSC) received 24.6
    percent of the vote. The Constitution requires 50 percent plus one vote
    for a candidate to be elected to the presidency; however, if the
    second-place candidate concedes, as happened in May, the Central
    Electoral Board (JCE) may declare the first-place candidate the winner
    without a second round of elections.
        The President and all 179 members of the Senate and the Chamber of
    Deputies are elected freely every 4 years by secret ballot. There is
    universal adult suffrage; however, active duty police and military
    personnel may not vote. In practice, voting is limited to those persons
    who can show a national identity document, which requires that their
    births were registered properly by their parents.
        There was a significant controversy about the ability of the JCE to
    issue new national identity cards to the voting population prior to the
    May elections, and there were serious allegations by the PRD that the
    PLD intentionally was sabotaging its supporters' ability to vote.
    Ultimately, the Board was able to issue cards to most voters who
    applied for them. However, there were numerous reports, including
    allegations by supporters of the PRD, that identity cards were being
    taken or ``bought'' from dark-skinned individuals so that they would
    not exercise their right to vote.
        Election campaigning was relatively peaceful, although there were
    isolated instances of violence. On April 29, two PLD activists were
    killed in Moca during a PRD campaign rally. PLD members claimed that
    PRD supporters shot into a group of PLD flag wavers. In contrast, PRD
    supporters argued that PLD opposition members were trying to ``ambush''
    their presidential candidate's motorcade. There was also political
    violence in San Pedro de Macoris at the end of April in which a vice
    mayor and secretary general of the PRD were wounded by gunfire when
    their party was carrying out a medical mission in one of the
    neighborhoods. During the August 16 election, an argument between
    political rivals reportedly led to the fatal shooting of an
    unidentified man in San Juan de la Maguana.
        The nation has a functioning multiparty system. Opposition groups
    of the left, right, and center operate openly. The President often
    dominates public policy formulation and implementation. He can exercise
    his authority through the use of the veto, discretion to act by decree,
    and influence as the leader of his party. Traditionally, the President
    has predominant power in the Government, effectively making many
    important decisions by decree. Former President Fernandez reduced the
    reliance on rule by decree during his administration. The President
    appoints the governors of the 29 provinces.
        Congress provides an open forum for the free exchange of views and
    debate. The main opposition party is the PLD, which holds 4 of 30 seats
    in the upper house and 49 of 149 seats in the lower house. A third
    major party, the PRSC of former President Balaguer, contests all
    elections; various smaller parties are certified to contest provincial
    and national elections.
        The JCE conducts all elections. In April 1999, the leading
    political parties agreed that the Congress should approve legislation
    expanding the JCE from five to seven members until after the May
    presidential elections. The PLD and the PRSC each nominated one new
    member to join the board.
        There were no reports of disturbances surrounding the Dominican
    Municipal League (LMD). It functioned normally, albeit with diminished
    legitimacy, due to the exclusion of PRD candidates from the 1999
    election for LMD president.
        Women and minorities confront no serious legal impediments to
    political participation; however, they are underrepresented in
    government and politics. By law parties must reserve 33 percent of
    positions on voting lists for women; a proportion that is to increase
    to 40 percent in 2002. However, the parties often place women so low on
    the lists as to make their election difficult or impossible. With the
    election of former Senator Milagros Ortiz-Bosch to the vice-presidency,
    there is only 1 woman in the 30-member Senate; women hold 24 seats in
    the 149-member Chamber of Deputies. Women continue to be represented in
    appointed positions, albeit to a limited degree. The President of the
    Chamber of Deputies is a woman, as are two cabinet secretaries. Women
    fill 5 of the 15 seats on the Supreme Court.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Nongovernmental human rights organizations generally operate freely
    without government interference. In addition to the Dominican Human
    Rights Committee, the National Human Rights Commission, and the
    nongovernmental Truth Commission (dealing with the Narciso Gonzalez
    case), several Haitian, church, women's, and labor groups exist.
        The Government established the Reform Commissions for the police
    and armed forces in the latter part of the year, and allowed limited
    civil society or NGO representation. The most credible human rights and
    civil society organizations are not represented. At year's end, there
    was no public information available nor discussion in civil society
    about the objectives of the two reform commissions.
        There is no ombudsman's office. However, at year's end, legislation
    was pending in Congress to create a human rights ombudsman's office as
    well as a special prosecutor for human rights abuses.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination based on race and sex; however,
    such discrimination exists, the Government seldom acknowledges its
    existence or makes efforts to combat it.
        Women.--Domestic violence is widespread. Under the 1997 Law Against
    Domestic Violence, the State can prosecute for rape, incest, sexual
    aggression, and other forms of domestic violence. Penalties for these
    crimes range from one year to 30 years in prison, and have fines
    ranging from $30 to $6,000 (500 to 100,000 pesos). The State can
    prosecute a suspect for rape even if the victim does not file charges.
    This law also allows a rape victim to press charges against her husband
    without having her marriage annulled. The Secretariat of Women, as well
    as various NGO's, have outreach programs on domestic violence and legal
    rights. In 1998 the Government opened a center in Villa Juana (National
    District) for the legal support and forensic examination of abused
    women, which handled 35 to 50 cases per day in its first year. Since
    its opening, it has handled over 7,000 cases and now averages 60 to 90
    cases per day. Due to the success of this first center, the Government
    opened two additional centers during the year in San Francisco de
    Macoris and Santiago. The Ministry of Women has begun a project, in
    coordination with a local NGO, to open a fourth Services Center for
    Victims of Domestic Violence in San Cristobal. At year's end, there
    were still no shelters for battered women.
        Rape is a serious problem and is believed to be widely
    underreported. From January through October, the Santo Domingo district
    attorney's office received only 203 reports of rape in the National
    District. The penalties for committing rape are 10 to 15 years in
    prison and a fine of $6,097 to $12,195 (100,000 to 200,000 pesos).
    Victims often do not report cases of rape because of fear of social
    stigma, as well as the perception that the police and the judiciary
    would fail to provide redress. The police are reluctant to handle rape
    cases and often encourage victims to seek assistance from NGO's.
        Sexual harassment is widespread.
        Prostitution is illegal; however, the Government does not enforce
    vigorously prostitution laws, except in cases involving child
    prostitution and international trafficking in women and girls, which is
    a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Sex tourism is a
    growing industry throughout the country as the number of international
    visitors increases. NGO's have ongoing HIV/AIDS and sexually
    transmitted disease prevention programs for male and female
    prostitutes, as well as for hotel and industrial zone workers. The 1997
    Domestic Violence Law prohibits acting as an intermediary in a
    transaction of prostitution, and the Government has used the law to
    prosecute third parties that derive profit from prostitution.
        Divorce is easily obtainable by either spouse, and women can hold
    property in their own names apart from their husbands. Traditionally,
    women have not shared equal social and economic status or opportunity
    with men, and men hold the majority of leadership positions in all
    sectors. In many instances women are paid less than men in jobs of
    equal content and equal skill level. Some employers reportedly give
    pregnancy tests to women before hiring them, as part of a required
    medical examination. Union leaders and human rights advocates report
    that pregnant women often are not hired.
        Children.--Despite the existence of government institutions
    dedicated to child welfare, private social and religious organizations
    carry the principal burden. The Oversight Organization for the
    Protection of Children, created by the executive branch, is the primary
    government institution covering issues of child welfare. Private
    institutions receive 35 to 40 percent of the budget of the Oversight
    Organization. The Mejia administration created a new Ministry of Youth
    soon after the election.
        The 1994 Minor's Code requires 8 years of formal education. The
    Oversight Organization works with NGO's, law enforcement personnel, and
    the general public to publicize children's rights. In the National
    District, the Department of Family and Children, in the Office of the
    Prosecutor, administers the Minor's Code and arranges conciliation of
    family conflicts to execute court decisions with respect to child
    protection, and to interview children whose rights have been violated.
        Abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological, is the most
    serious human rights violation affecting children. The Department of
    Family and Children estimates that 50 percent of the children in the
    country are victims of some sort of abuse. No statistics were available
    from the National Police's Department of Sexual Abuse regarding rapes
    of children between 4 and 11 years of age, and few such cases reached
    the courts. In 50 percent of the cases, the accused is a person close
    to the child: a father, grandfather, uncle, brother, cousin, or close
    family friend. The criminal law provision on sexual abuse and
    intrafamily violence provides for a penalty of 10 to 20 years
    incarceration and a fine of $6,600 to $13,200 (108,000 to 216,000
    pesos) for persons found guilty of sexual abuse of a minor, and up to
    30 years if the victim is a family member of the abuser.
        Typical cases of child abuse include that of a 4-month-old child
    whose arm and rib were broken by his parents. The child was separated
    from his parents and sent to a shelter until the parents completed
    required counseling and psychological treatment. An 8-year-old child's
    father burned his child's hand after the child was caught stealing.
    There also have been reports of children being left tied up and without
    food in their homes while their parents go to work. The law prohibits
    the press from reporting on all cases of child abuse, which results in
    a diminished public perception of it.
        The Minor's Code contains provisions against child abuse, including
    physical and emotional mistreatment, sexual exploitation, and child
    labor. It also provides for removal of a mistreated child to a
    protective environment. According to local monitors, instances of child
    abuse were underreported because of traditional beliefs that family
    problems should be dealt with inside the family. However, child abuse
    is receiving increasing public attention.
        The Ministry of Health gave conservative estimates that, from
    January through October, there were 887 deliveries by female
    adolescents under age 15, and 15,491 deliveries by adolescents between
    the ages of 15 and 19. This information is preliminary and conservative
    in light of 1999 statistics, which estimated deliveries by adolescents
    below age 15 at 1,529, and by adolescents from 15 to 19 at 33,332 for
    that full year. Many of these pregnancies were reported to be the
    result of rape or incest and often are accompanied by sexually
    transmitted diseases.
        Some in the tourist industry have facilitated the sexual
    exploitation of children; particular areas of concern are Boca Chica
    and Puerto Plata. Tours are marketed by foreigners overseas with the
    understanding that boys and girls can be found as sex partners.
    According to an official in the District Attorney's Office, the
    Association of Hotels has asked to participate in government
    initiatives to combat the exploitation of children in the tourist
    industry. Journalists reported that the majority of prostitutes in
    brothels visited around the National District appeared to be between 16
    and 18 years of age. There are several church-run shelters that provide
    refuge to children who break free from the prostitution trade.
    Prostitution is the principal area of exploitation of underage girls in
    the informal economy. The Oversight Organization carried out community
    information campaigns on children's rights, including the prevention of
    child abuse, child labor, and family violence. It also provided
    training to persons and groups providing social services to children,
    judicial officials, and other children's advocates.
        Poor adolescent girls and boys sometimes are enticed into
    performing sexual acts by the promise of food or clothing; sometimes
    they are forced into unsafe relationships with strangers by the need
    for money. Once involved, they may be held against their will by
    individuals who sell their sexual favors to others. Some of these
    minors are lured from their parental homes; others are already on the
    street.
        Trafficking in girls is a serious problem (see Section 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        The judicial system sometimes fails to protect the status of minors
    in criminal cases. The authorities sometimes treated minors as adults--
    most often when physical forensic examinations indicated that the
    person claiming to be minors were probably adults--and incarcerated
    them in prison rather than juvenile detention centers. In 1997 the
    Government began implementing the 1994 Minor's Code, laying the
    groundwork for a juvenile court system. The Supreme Court inaugurated
    the first of 11 juvenile courts in August 1999 and chose judges for the
    other 10 courts, some of which were functioning by year's end. Although
    these juvenile courts are organized with a focus on rehabilitating
    offenders, very few social services are available for minors. In
    practice, juveniles are detained in excess of the time permitted by
    law, and then are sent to jail rather than referred for rehabilitative
    services. There are legal advocates especially for juveniles in Santo
    Domingo and La Vega to provide them with representation in delinquency
    cases.
        Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.). It is not uncommon for
    minors to be put on the street to fend for themselves as younger
    siblings claim the parent's meager resources. Homeless children called
    ``palomas'' (doves) are frequently at the mercy of adults who collect
    them and put them to work begging and selling fruit, flowers, and other
    goods on the street. In return for their work they are given basic
    housing. The ages at which these children work, the hours they put in,
    and their failure to comply with compulsory school attendance all
    violate the law, but the Government has not been able to combat this
    practice.
        People with Disabilities.--Disabled persons encounter
    discrimination in employment and in the provision of other services.
    Although the law provides for physical access for the disabled to all
    new public and private buildings, the authorities have not enforced
    this law uniformly. There is a Subsecretariat for Rehabilitation under
    the Ministry of Public Health, a recreation center for the disabled in
    Las Caobas, and a department in the Sports Ministry to facilitate
    athletic competition for the disabled. However, there is little
    consciousness of the need to make the daily lives of the disabled safer
    and more convenient. For example, new street construction makes few
    provisions for the disabled to cross the streets safely.
        The Dominican Rehabilitation Association (ADR) has grown from a 1-
    room operation to a large complex with 17 affiliates throughout the
    country. It provides services for 2,500 persons daily. The Government
    provides about 30 percent of the ADR's budget. The Government also
    distributed 25,000 wheelchairs donated by a foreign athletic team.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A strong prejudice against
    Haitians runs through society and disadvantages many Haitians and
    Dominicans of Haitian ancestry, as well as other foreigners of African
    descent. The Government has not acknowledged the existence of this
    discrimination nor made any efforts to combat it. Darker-skinned
    Dominicans also face informal barriers to social and economic
    advancement.
        Efforts to stem the influx of Haitian immigrants have made it more
    difficult for those Haitians already in the country to live peacefully.
    Police regulations threaten those offering transportation to illegal
    immigrants with confiscation of their vehicles, and have discouraged
    taxi and bus drivers from picking up dark-skinned persons. In roundups
    of illegal immigrants, authorities pick up and expel darker Dominicans
    as well as legal Haitian residents.
        Perhaps 500,000 Haitian immigrants--or 7 percent of the country's
    population--live in shantytowns or sugar cane work camps, in harsh
    conditions with limited or no electricity, running water, or schooling.
    There are estimates that as many as 1 million Haitians live in the
    country. Human rights groups regularly charge the Government with
    unlawful deportations of, and police brutality toward, these legal and
    illegal immigrants (see Sections 1.d and 2.d.).
        Credible sources also charge that the Government refuses to
    recognize and document as Dominican citizens many individuals of
    Haitian ancestry born in the country. Since many Haitian parents have
    never possessed documentation for their own birth, they are unable to
    demonstrate their own citizenship. As a result, they cannot declare
    their children's births at the civil registry and thereby establish
    Dominican citizenship for their offspring. Some civil registry offices
    do not accept late declarations of birth for children of Haitian
    immigrants, although they routinely accept late declarations for
    children of Dominican parents.
        Haitian parents encounter difficulties registering their children
    for school. Lack of documentation usually deprives children of Haitian
    descent of the opportunity to attend school where there is one
    available. Some parents fail to seek documentation due to fear of being
    deported. It falls to the discretion of public school principals
    whether children may attend, when immigrant parents have no identity
    cards or birth certificates to register children formally. Even when
    permitted to attend primary school, it is rare that the children of
    Haitian parents progress beyond sixth grade.
        Sometimes poor Haitian families arrange for Dominican families to
    ``adopt'' and employ their children. The adopting parents can simply
    register a child of any age as their own. In exchange, the parents
    receive monetary payment or a supply of clothes and food. They believe
    that this ensures their children a more promising future. In many
    cases, adoptive parents do not treat the adoptees as full family
    members and expect them to work in the households or family businesses
    rather than attend school. The effect is a kind of indentured
    servitude, at least until the young person reaches majority (see
    Section 6.c.). There were reports that Haitian girls between the ages
    of 10 and 14 were the most sought after, especially in border areas.
        The Government is doing little to improve the conditions of Haitian
    immigrants. Most social services in shantytowns are provided by NGO's
    and other relief organizations.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    freedom to organize labor unions and for the right of workers to strike
    (and for private sector employers to lock out workers), and workers in
    all sectors exercise this right. All workers, except the military and
    the police, are free to organize. Organized labor represents an
    estimated 10 percent of the work force and is divided among four major
    confederations and a number of independent unions. There are
    approximately 190 registered unions in the country. The 1992 Labor Code
    provides extensive protection for worker rights and specifies the steps
    legally required to establish a union, federation, or confederation.
    The Code calls for automatic recognition of a union if the Government
    has not acted on its application within 30 days. In practice, the
    Government readily facilitates recognition of labor organizations.
        Unions are independent of the Government and generally independent
    of political parties. The law against companies who fire union
    organizers or members is enforced selectively, and penalties are
    insufficient to deter employers from violating worker's rights. There
    were reports of widespread discreet intimidation by employers in an
    effort to prevent union activity. This is apparent particularly in the
    FTZ's where foreign companies have located in search of low labor costs
    and little interference in their operations. For example, unions in the
    FTZ's in San Pedro de Macoris report that their members hesitate to
    discuss union activity at work, even during break time, due to fear of
    losing their jobs.
        Requirements for calling a strike include the support of an
    absolute majority of all company workers whether unionized or not, a
    prior attempt to resolve the conflict through mediation, written
    notification to the Ministry of Labor, and a 10-day waiting period
    following notification before proceeding with the strike. The
    Government generally respects association rights and places no
    obstacles to union registration, affiliation, or the ability to engage
    in legal strikes. However, enforcement of labor laws is sometimes
    unreliable, inhibiting employees from freely exercising their rights.
        In May nurses belonging to the National Union of Nursing Services
    and the National Union of Dominican Nursing Services unions went on
    strike to protest noncompliance with terms that the Ministry of Health
    agreed to in 1997. Issues of contention included a pay raise and a
    demand for hospital equipment. Sugar workers struck in La Romana in
    August to protest the company's failure to make bonus payments.
    Transportation workers struck in the Puerto Plata in September to
    protest rising fuel costs.
        G & K Services, a company in San Isidro, fired 20 union members in
    April. No judicial action was taken because the company paid severance
    pay to the workers. A court judgment in April ordered Dennis Fashions,
    Inc., which had been closed since 1998, to provide severance pay to its
    352 unionized employees. The company failed to comply with the
    judgment. A total of 350 unionized workers of Euromodas in Cristo Rey
    filed a lawsuit to collect severance pay after the company closed in
    1998. In January the court ruled that Euromodas had to pay the workers;
    however, the company no longer exists. The owners of Euromodas opened a
    new company during the year, and in June former employees protested
    outside the new factory. Protesters were dispersed by the police, who
    arrested 35 of them and held them for 2 days without charges before
    releasing them.
        In November 1999, employees of the FTZ company D & P Handbag in
    Santiago formed a union and filed the register of union members with
    the Director of Labor. This register was rejected because the Director
    General of Labor claimed that it did not contain the requisite number
    of members. In January the Ministry of Labor reversed this decision;
    however, the company did not permit formation of a union. At year's
    end, the case was still pending before a labor court in Santiago.
        On December 29, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a judgment against
    Han Chang company. It upheld the decision of the lower court that the
    work contracts of five union leaders fired in 1995 were valid. The
    Court ordered that the workers be reinstated and paid back wages. The
    Bani company has failed to comply with the decision and the National
    Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers (FENATRAZONA) has asked for the
    cancellation of the company's export license. Legal authority to cancel
    export licenses lies with the National Council of Free Zones and is
    dependent on a request from the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of
    Labor reported that this case was being mediated.
        Labor unions can and do affiliate freely regionally and
    internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is legal and may take place in firms in which a union has
    gained the support of an absolute majority of the workers. Only a
    minority of companies have collective bargaining pacts, and the
    International Labor Organization considers the requirements for
    collective bargaining rights to be excessive and finds that in many
    cases they could impede collective bargaining. The Labor Code
    stipulates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade
    union membership or activities; however, in practice, workers sometimes
    are fired because of their union activities.
        The Labor Code establishes a system of labor courts for dealing
    with disputes. While cases do make their way through the labor courts,
    enforcement of judgments is sometimes unreliable.
        The Labor Code applies in the 40 established FTZ's, which employ
    approximately 200,000 workers, mostly women. Workplace regulations and
    their enforcement in the FTZ's do not differ from those in the country
    at large, although working conditions are sometimes better and the pay
    is higher. Some FTZ companies have been accused of discharging workers
    who attempt to organize unions, but there also have been reports of
    union organizers extorting money from business owners. In the FTZ's,
    while there may be as many as 10 collective bargaining agreements on
    paper, only 3 actually are functioning. The majority of the unions in
    the FTZ's are affiliated with the National Federation of Free Trade
    Zone Workers or the United Federation of Free Trade Zone Workers.
        Many of the major manufacturers in the FTZ's have voluntary ``codes
    of conduct,'' that provide for protection against forced labor, freedom
    of association, freedom from discrimination, and prohibit the use of
    child labor. They also call for a workplace that is safe and healthy.
    However, workers rarely have heard of such codes, or the principles
    they set out.
        Tortoni Manufacturing closed its doors in April after unionized
    employees told management they wanted a collective bargaining
    agreement. New investors reportedly took control of the company,
    renamed it Gramerci Dominicana (a subsidiary of Andover) in July, and
    committed to pay the employees their severance pay. As of December 8,
    through mediation by the Secretariat of Labor, the employees were
    reinstated and had received the first of two installments of severance
    pay.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    all forms of forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children; however, such practices still exist to a limited extent in
    the adult worker population and, to a limited extent, among children in
    the informal sector. Young children ``adopted'' by families work under
    a kind of indentured servitude and homeless children are made to beg by
    adults (see Section 5). Trafficking in women and girls for purposes of
    prostitution is also a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The
    FENATRAZONA noted that there were over 40 reports of coerced overtime
    in factories. Workers gave examples of their employers locking factory
    doors with chains so they could not leave, and taking incentive pay
    away from or firing those who refused to work overtime. Union officials
    state that newly hired workers are not informed that overtime is
    optional. The Association for the Development of Women and the
    Environment reported several instances of forced adult labor in the
    sugar industry in the shantytowns of La Jagua, Sabana Grande de Boya,
    and Los Jovillos. Field guards reportedly kept workers' clothes and
    documents to prevent them from leaving. In January a field guard in Los
    Jovillos broke a worker's arm when he tried to leave.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits employment of children under 14
    years of age and places restrictions on the employment of children
    under the age of 16. These restrictions include limiting the daily
    number of working hours to 6, prohibiting employment in dangerous
    occupations or in establishments serving alcohol, and limiting
    nighttime work. A company could face legal sanctions and fines if
    caught employing underage children. Children between the ages of 14 and
    16 may work in apprenticeship and artistic programs. The law requires 6
    years of formal education. Children who do not continue in school often
    seek illegal employment before reaching the minimum working age (see
    Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        In August FENATRAZONA criticized the Overseas Manufacturing
    Corporation, in the FTZ in San Pedro de Macoris, for employing underage
    workers in the production of computer components. The Ministry of Labor
    carried out two investigations and found no workers under age 16.
    (FENATRAZONA asserted that the inspectors were denied entry on their
    first visit and that when they returned, the children had been removed.
    The Secretariat of Labor denied this version and said that the
    inspectors were never denied entry.) At the end of August the company
    was operating with only 20 workers, rather than the normal force of 60
    to 80. According to the owner, the company was undergoing a work ``slow
    down'' due to lack of primary materials. At year's end, the company
    reportedly had closed.
        The high level of unemployment and lack of a social safety net
    create pressures on families to allow or encourage children to earn
    supplemental income. Tens of thousands of children begin working before
    the age of 14. Child labor takes place primarily in the informal
    economy, small businesses, clandestine factories, and prostitution.
    Conditions in clandestine factories are generally poor, unsanitary, and
    often dangerous. The Government largely has eliminated the use of
    children for cutting sugar cane; however, there are still reports that
    poor Haitian and Dominican children accompany their parents to work in
    the cane fields, with the tacit acceptance of sugar companies.
        Sexual exploitation of children is a problem (see Section 5).
        The Ministry of Labor, in collaboration with the International
    Labor Organization's Program on the Eradication of Child Labor, and
    other international labor rights organizations, has implemented
    programs to combat child labor. These include a national child labor
    survey; a program to remove children from dangerous agricultural work
    in San Jose de Ocoa, Constanza, and Azua; and an upcoming program in
    the area of child prostitution in Boca Chica and Puerto Plata. By
    November the Constanza program removed 500 children, twice as many as
    the targeted number, from work in hazardous agriculture, and placed
    them in schools.
        The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however,
    such practices persist in the informal sector (see Section 6.c.). There
    were no reports of forced child labor in the formal sector.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution empowers the
    executive branch to set minimum wage levels, and the Labor Code assigns
    this task to a national salary committee. Congress also may enact
    minimum wage legislation. The minimum monthly salary is $135 (2,222
    pesos) in the FTZ's and ranges from $107 (1,757 pesos) to $176 (2,895
    pesos) outside the FTZ's depending upon the size of the company and the
    nature of the business. The minimum wage does not provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. It only provides
    approximately one-third of the income necessary to sustain an average
    family. The national poverty level, which is based on a basket of goods
    and services consumed by a typical family, is $402 (6,607 pesos) per
    month for a family of five.
        The Labor Code establishes a standard work period of 8 hours per
    day and 44 hours per week. The code also stipulates that all workers
    are entitled to 36 hours of uninterrupted rest each week. In practice,
    a typical workweek is Monday through Friday plus a half day on
    Saturday, but longer hours are common. The code grants workers a 35
    percent differential for work totaling between 44 hours to 68 hours per
    week and double time for any hours above 68 hours per week.
        Conditions for agricultural workers are poor, especially in the
    sugar industry. Most sugar cane worker villages have high rates of
    disease and lack schools, medical facilities, running water, and sewage
    systems. On sugar plantations, cane cutters usually are paid by the
    weight of cane cut rather than the hours worked. Employers often do not
    provide trucks to transport the newly cut cane at the conclusion of the
    workday, causing workers to receive lower compensation because the cane
    dries and weighs less.
        When the cane is weighed, workers are given tickets indicating the
    weight of cane cut (often rounded in favor of the employer) and the
    amount of money due. These tickets, issued to a specific person but
    payable to the bearer, may be turned in to the employer and redeemed
    for cash every 2 weeks. Many cane cutters earn less than $4.00 (60
    pesos) per day. Because workers earn so little and sometimes cannot
    wait until payday to redeem their tickets, an informal barter system
    has evolved in which the tickets also are used to purchase items at
    private stores located on the plantations. These private stores make
    change by giving back a combination of tickets and cash. However, it is
    not unusual for these stores to retain 10 percent of the cash due a
    customer.
        The Dominican Human Rights Committee and batey residents report
    that conditions of work for cane workers have deteriorated since the
    industry was privatized in 1999. Workers reportedly are paid less, work
    longer hours, and have fewer benefits, according to the Committee. The
    Dominican Association of Sugar Technicians reported that before the
    October 1999 privatization of the industry, there were approximately
    32,000 sugar industry workers, compared to approximately 3,200 at
    year's end. While child labor in the sugar industry has decreased
    significantly, it still exists according to human rights advocates and
    labor federations (see Section 5).
        The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) sets workplace
    safety and health conditions. The existing social security system is
    seriously underfunded and applies to only about 9 percent of the
    population. Approximately 13,000 employees work in the IDSS bureaucracy
    to support fewer than 20,000 retirees.
        Both the IDSS and the Ministry of Labor have small corps of
    inspectors charged with enforcing standards. The Secretariat of Labor
    has 250 inspectors who seek to improve sanitation, health care, and
    safety for workers. Included in this number is a smaller, specialized
    corps (eight in the National District) of inspectors for the FTZ's.
    Inspector positions customarily are filled through political patronage,
    and bribes from businesses are common. In practice, workers cannot
    remove themselves from hazardous working situations without
    jeopardizing employment (see Section 6.b.).
        For example, an FTZ in Bonao, Bi Bong Apparel, fired several
    workers who, displeased with the safety of work conditions, cut wires
    to stadium lighting under which they were forced to work. In March the
    Labor Court held that the company should not have fired the workers and
    ordered an inspection. The Department of Hygiene and Safety carried out
    an inspection of the lighting, drinking water, bathrooms, and
    ventilation. According to the Ministry of Labor, inspectors found
    irregularities and made a series of recommendations. In November the
    workers returned to their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and a 1998 alien smuggling law increased the penalties for
    those found guilty of various phases of this crime; however,
    trafficking in women and children from, to and within the country
    remains a serious problem. The penalties for trafficking are 3 to 10
    years in prison, or, if there is a death, 10 to 20 years in prison,
    plus punitive damages.
        Laws dealing with domestic violence, as well as the Minor's Code,
    create protection under both civil and criminal law against particular
    situations that may be conducive to, or acts that may be a part of, the
    traffic in persons, whether female or male, minors or adults. The law
    also prohibits acting as an intermediary in a transaction of
    prostitution, and the Government has used this law to prosecute third
    parties that derive profit from prostitution.
        The Directorate of Migration estimates that there are approximately
    400 rings of alien-smugglers, traffickers, and purveyors of false
    documents operating within the country. These individuals profit by
    facilitating the trafficking of women to Europe and the Eastern
    Caribbean under false pretenses and for purposes of prostitution.
        In 1996 the Government created the Interinstitutional Committee for
    the Protection of Migrant Women (CIPROM); however, this organization
    ceased functioning due to lack of funding. One NGO, the Center for
    Integral Orientation and Investigation (COIN), counsels women planning
    to accept job offers in Europe and the eastern Caribbean about
    immigration, health, and other issues including the dangers of
    trafficking, forced prostitution, and domestic servitude. The program
    also provides services to returning women. COIN administers the Center
    for Health and Migration Information for Migrant Women that carries out
    community education campaigns in high risk areas on various issues,
    including citizenship, legal work requirements, dangers of trafficking,
    forced prostitution, and domestic servitude. It also provides a
    information hotline and offers psychological, legal, and health
    counseling to returning women.
        In January two journalists from the Spanish newspaper, El Mundo,
    made public a documentary that exposed a ring of traffickers of women
    to Europe. The ring included foreigners as well as local officials. The
    authorities arrested one military officer and deported one Dutch
    citizen. In July the Public Ministry dismantled a house of prostitution
    in which the majority of the prostitutes were from Europe and Russia.
    The leader of the operation, as well as the women themselves, fled the
    country before they could be prosecuted.
        From January through August, the authorities dismissed 42
    immigration employees for links with groups trafficking in persons. In
    addition authorities have charged at least 45 persons for allegedly
    organizing illegal trips under the 1998 antismuggling law. Of these, 30
    persons were tried and 15 were convicted. Their sentences range from 3
    to 5 years in prison. At year's end, 15 cases were pending.
        The Oversight Organization for the Protection of Children
    coordinates the approaches of various agencies involved in combating
    trafficking in children, whether for adoption, sexual exploitation, or
    other purposes. This organization works with the Attorney General's
    office, the Public Health Ministry, Migration, and other agencies. In
    the National District, the Department of Family and Children in the
    Office of Public Prosecutor focuses on identifying children who are
    victims of abuse and prosecutes offenders under heightened penalties
    contained in the domestic violence law.
        A primary concern of the Oversight Organization is preventing abuse
    of the child adoption process by those intending to sell or exploit
    children through prostitution or child pornography. The Department of
    Family and Children is very concerned about kidnapings, especially of
    infants, for sale to foreigners who deliberately have sidestepped legal
    formalities--including those of their own country. The Government seeks
    to protect children from victimization under the rubric of adoption.
    Many children leave the country as adoptees, but government officials
    have made such adoptions much more difficult and, they hope, have
    prevented would-be traffickers from abusing the system.
        Poor Haitian and Dominican parents sometimes arrange for more
    prosperous Dominican families to ``adopt'' their children, in exchange
    for money or goods. Such children often are not treated as full family
    members and are expected to work long hours in domestic service,
    agriculture, or industry under threat of corporal punishment and
    without compensation. Especially in the case of girls, these children
    often are abused sexually.
                                   __________

                                    ECUADOR

        Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a 123-member unicameral
    legislature that was chosen in free elections in May 1998. On January
    21, members of the military joined protesters, including indigenous
    dissidents, to force President Jamil Mahuad from office. After a brief
    period of confusion and the proclamation of a ``People's Parliament''
    by the coup leaders, on January 22, Vice President Gustavo Noboa
    assumed the presidency and restored order. At the end of May the
    Government extended a full amnesty to all those who participated in the
    overthrow of Mahuad. The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but
    in practice is inefficient and susceptible to outside pressure.
        The military enjoys substantial autonomy, reinforced by assured
    revenues from the country's oil exports, as well as from civil
    aviation, shipping, and other commercial sectors. The National Police
    are responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of
    internal order and fall under the civilian Ministry of Government and
    Police. In early January, then-President Mahuad declared a state of
    emergency, which gave him the power to use troops to monitor and react
    to public protests. The state of emergency lasted 1 month in most of
    the country, and until March in Guayas province. Throughout the year,
    the military continued to supplement the police on an ad hoc basis.
    Some military officers were forced to resign for their role during the
    events of January 21, despite the blanket amnesty. The police and, in
    some isolated cases, members of the military, continued to commit
    abuses.
        The economy is in a severe economic recession, although it began to
    improve slightly during the year. The economy is based on private
    enterprise, although there continued to be heavy government involvement
    in key sectors such as petroleum, utilities, and aviation. The
    principal exports are oil, bananas, shrimp, and cut flowers, which are
    the country's leading sources of foreign exchange. Most citizens are
    employed in the urban informal sector or as rural agricultural workers;
    rural poverty is extensive, and underemployment is high. According to a
    1999 study, approximately 62 percent of citizens live in poverty and 15
    percent are indigent, with an almost total lack of resources. By the
    end of 1999, the incomes of approximately 56 percent of households were
    below the poverty line. The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of
    $1,053 provided most of the population with a low standard of living
    during the year. Per capita GDP was $1,101 in 1999. In response to the
    recession, the Government announced in January that the country would
    adopt the U.S. dollar as its national currency and completed that
    process in September. Inflation for the year was 91 percent.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor in a number
    of areas, and serious problems remain. There were credible reports that
    police committed extrajudicial killings. Police tortured and otherwise
    mistreated prisoners and detainees, usually with impunity. Prison
    conditions remained poor. In August a law went into effect that is
    expected to either free or reduce the sentences of approximately 2,900
    prison inmates for humanitarian reasons. Persons often are subject to
    arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention is a problem. Once
    incarcerated, persons may wait years before being convicted or
    acquitted. More than one-half of the prisoners in jail have not been
    sentenced formally. The Government failed to prosecute and punish human
    rights abusers. The most fundamental human rights abuses stem from
    shortcomings in the politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt
    legal and judicial system. The Government infringed somewhat on press
    freedom and some self-censorship continues. The Government declared
    states of emergency during the year that limited freedom of assembly
    and movement. Violence and pervasive discrimination against women,
    indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians also remain problems. The
    Government continued to order participants in nationwide strikes back
    to work, and arrested striking members of the National Teachers' Union.
    Child labor is a problem. Mob violence and killings persist.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of politically motivated killings; however, there
    continued to be credible reports that police committed extrajudicial
    killings. Through December the Ecumenical Committee for Human Rights
    (CEDHU) reported a total of 15 extrajudicial killings by the police,
    security forces, or semiofficial entities such as neighborhood
    brigades. However, during the same period, the Permanent Committee for
    Human Rights (CDH) reported 20 cases of extrajudicial killings by the
    same groups in Guayas province alone. (Neighborhood brigades are civic
    defense groups organized by the National Police to provide an anticrime
    presence in neighborhoods. They are not authorized to carry firearms,
    but often do.) In many of these instances, there was insufficient
    evidence to reach a conclusion as to what occurred; however, the
    killings sometimes exhibited a suspicious pattern.
        On January 6, a crowd of residents from the evacuated town of Banos
    forced their way past a military roadblock in order to reoccupy their
    homes. (Banos had been evacuated due to the threat from a nearby active
    volcano.) A stray bullet fired by security forces struck and killed
    Edison Guato, and dozens of persons were injured during the melee (see
    Section 2.b.).
        On May 13, in a remote northeast section of the Amazon near the
    Peruvian border, government security forces clashed with a previously
    unknown armed group calling itself the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Ecuador--Defenders of the People (FARE-DP). Two of its members were
    killed and five others were wounded and/or captured, including their
    purported leader, ``Alex.'' The authorities later maintained that the
    FARE-DP was criminal in nature and linked the group to a series of
    kidnaping and murder cases.
        In Guayaquil on May 31, Guayas Transit Commission police reportedly
    shot 24-year-old civil engineer Cesar Matute nine times and killed him.
    Matute apparently failed to stop his truck at a police roadblock,
    thinking it was set up by robbers. The authorities suspended officers
    Alfonso Peasantes and William Jimenez. After an investigation by the
    fourth district police court, the two officers were exonerated and
    reinstated.
        On June 5, in Guayaquil Special Operations Group police confronted
    a group of criminals that they were pursuing and killed seven persons;
    eight others reportedly escaped. Police stated that the robbers were
    armed heavily and strongly resisted arrest.
        On August 28, in Portoviejo, police surprised 19 armed robbers
    attempting to hold up a local bank. Eleven of the gunmen were killed
    during the shootout and 8 escaped. Three policemen also were wounded.
    Police stated that all of the suspects refused to surrender. There was
    no investigation of the incident.
        Also on August 28, in Guasmos Sur, members of an army patrol shot
    and killed Sergeant Carlos Lemos as he allegedly fled from them.
    Officials reported that Lemos had escaped 12 days earlier from a jail
    at the 5th Army Engineers headquarters where he was being held pending
    an investigation into the theft of rifles from an armory in Esmeraldas.
    Lemos's lawyer and his family dispute the official version of events
    and claim that he was tortured and murdered. No official inquiry had
    been made by year's end.
        On December 4, 60-year-old Josefina Rios Murillos died after
    apparently being thrown from a police vehicle in Guayaquil. Her family
    said that the city's recent ``greater security campaign'' had increased
    police brutality, and it has charged that Rios was struck on the head
    before being thrown out of the patrol car. At year's end, the case was
    under investigation.
        On February 9, the bodies of two men were found in different parts
    of Guayaquil. One was identified as a security guard mysteriously
    killed at a business from which nothing was stolen; the other was an
    unidentified individual whose corpse was dumped along the highway that
    circles the city. There have been other unsolved murders along this
    highway; for example, in May the bodies of John Merchan and Jacobo
    Moreira were found there--both had long criminal histories. Other
    bodies found on the highway include: On June 21, Adolfo Perez; on June
    23, Francisco Pazmino; and on July 27, Angel Pacucar. Seven other
    bodies of suspected criminals also were found on the highway over a 4-
    day period in September. Some human rights groups suspect police
    involvement in these killings, but no investigation had been undertaken
    by year's end.
        In January a police court inquiry into the March 1999 killing of
    14-year-old Mickey Mendoza concluded; the court charged policeman
    Carlos Alberto Iturralde Salazar with unintentional homicide. The court
    ruled that he had failed to maintain proper control of the weapon,
    which apparently went off when Mendoza tried to grab the gun. Iturralde
    was confined to police barracks pending trial. On January 13, the
    Mendoza family filed a dissent with the court asking that the second
    policeman on the scene also be tried, and that five policemen whom they
    believe conspired to cover up the incident be charged as accomplices.
    The charges were increased and, on July 17, Iturralde was found guilty
    of simple homicide; however, he was transferred to Cuenca and returned
    to full duty status pending the court's issuance of a final decision.
    Late in the year, the authorities arrested Iturralde and jailed him
    pending the outcome of a sentencing hearing. Iturralde faces a sentence
    of up to 8 years' imprisonment; however, the Mendoza family believes
    that the killing was premeditated and is seeking additional charges
    that would carry a longer sentence.
        A court dismissed the case against Carlos Alulema, a policeman who
    shot and killed a cigarette vendor in July 1999 in Guayaquil, on the
    grounds that the policeman was drunk and not responsible when he
    committed the crime. No information was available about the
    investigation into the killing by two police officers of Richard
    Morales Cabrera in November 1999 in Guayaquil, a shooting that also
    wounded several other persons.
        The investigation continued into the February 1999 killing of Jaime
    Hurtado Gonzalez, an Afro-Ecuadorian member of Congress from the far-
    left Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) party; Pedro Tapia (Hurtado's
    alternate in the Congress); and Wellington Borja near the Supreme Court
    in Quito. The killings bore the hallmarks of a professional ``hit,''
    and the authorities have brought charges against several suspects,
    including police officers and a former police informant, in the
    killings. Several suspects were jailed and convicted, and their appeals
    were denied; at year's end, the investigation was still active.
        There has been no disposition of the November 1998 kidnaping and
    killing in Quito of Saul Filormo Canar Pauta, a leader of the
    Ecuadorian Confederation of United Working Class Organizations. In
    December 1998, a municipal worker found Canar's body in a trash dump.
    His hands and feet were tied and his body showed signs of torture. The
    authorities suspect that he may have been killed by private landowners
    in retaliation for his activities organizing land invasions by
    squatters.
        There also were instances in which citizens took the law into their
    own hands, inciting mob violence that resulted in lynchings and
    burnings of suspected criminals (see Section l.e.). Mobs killed at
    least 14 crime suspects in the first 11 months of the year; individual
    lynchings continued to occur in all parts of the country, especially in
    indigenous communities in remote areas of the highlands. For example,
    on August 13, in the indigenous community of Quilla Silla in Azuay
    province, local residents beat three men whom they accused of cattle
    rustling. As a result, 22-year-old Jorge Guanuci died, and two of his
    companions were injured seriously before firemen from a nearby town
    intervened.
        Government officials reported the killings of 20 persons in the
    town of Lago Agrio during November and December. Most were killed
    execution-style as the result of conflicts between rival Colombian
    groups who had entered the country. In addition, in December another
    five persons were killed while travelling on a public bus outside of
    Lago Agrio when unidentified criminals blew up a section of the oil
    pipeline.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        Criminal kidnaping for profit continued to be a problem. By mid-
    year the police antikidnaping unit reported 8 kidnaping cases and
    another 56 possible cases. On October 12, an unidentified armed group
    kidnaped a group of 10 oil workers near Pompeya, in Orellana province.
    The Government launched a major operation to find the victims and to
    investigate the perpetrators of this act. At year's end, eight oil
    workers still were being held.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and similar forms of
    intimidation and punishment; however, the police continued to torture
    and abuse suspects and prisoners, usually with impunity. Reports of
    abuse increased.
        The CEDHU published detailed reports on suspects who reported being
    tortured by specific policemen. By December the authorities had
    registered 33 complaints of some form of torture by security forces. In
    most cases, the police appeared to have abused such persons during
    investigations of ordinary street crime. The victims reported that the
    police beat them, burned them with cigarettes, applied electric shocks,
    or threatened them psychologically. By year's end, human rights
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) had received at least 135 reports
    of incidents involving physical mistreatment.
        For example, on January 29, near Milagros, an 18-year-old woman
    accepted a ride and a drink from policeman Freddy Veloz. She later
    awoke from a state of unconsciousness in a remote area after having
    been raped. The woman lodged a formal complaint in court, but there was
    no disposition in the case by year's end.
        On March 2, in Guayaquil, off-duty CTG Corporal Miguel Noriega, in
    an inebriated state, shot and wounded Anabel Villegas in the hand and
    leg. Noriega subsequently was arrested, and the case was pending at
    year's end.
        On August 24, in Guayaquil, police shot and wounded off-duty
    fireman Xavier Barriero, in a case of mistaken identity. Once police
    discovered their mistake, they then left the scene without providing
    any assistance to Barriero. Eventually, the police admitted their error
    and paid his medical bills.
        Police corruption is a problem throughout the country. During the
    year, the police in Guayaquil dismissed 20 police officers for various
    reasons that included corruption.
        Conditions in prisons and detention centers generally continued to
    be poor. Prisons in the tropical coastal areas tend to be worse than in
    the temperate highlands. For example, the Tomas Larrea prison in
    Portoviejo was built in 1930 to hold 150 inmates, but its current
    population exceeds 300. It has never been repaired or expanded and has
    many tunnels, which have contributed to some of the 30 successful
    escapes since 1970. Overcrowding also is a chronic problem elsewhere.
    There are no separate facilities for hard core or dangerous criminals,
    nor are there effective rehabilitation programs. New prisons have not
    been constructed due to lack of financial resources.
        The Constitution requires that prisoners charged with lesser
    offenses (those carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years or less) and who
    have been detained for more than 1 year without a sentence obtain their
    freedom immediately. In January the National Directorate for Social
    Rehabilitation (DNRS) reported that 553 inmates had been released since
    the provision entered into force. On August 18, a law went into effect
    that is expected eventually to free or reduce the sentences of 2,947
    prison inmates for humanitarian reasons.
        In September 1999, the DNRS published a report that indicated that
    there were a total of 8,520 inmates incarcerated in facilities
    originally designed to hold a population of 5,964 prisoners. In 1998 a
    total of 26 inmates died in prison. The report stated that traumatic
    injuries, reportedly inflicted by fellow inmates, caused 65 percent of
    those deaths. It attributed the others to illness and drug use. The
    prison authorities routinely investigate deaths in custody. During the
    year, a number of prisons experienced serious outbreaks of disease,
    including meningitis.
        In September 1999, women represented 9.5 percent of the total
    prison population. Women are held separately from men, and conditions
    are notably better in the women's prison in Quito than in other
    facilities. There also are separate facilities for juveniles.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
    Penal Code provide that no one may be deprived of liberty without a
    written order from a governmental authority; however, the authorities
    often violate these legal protections in practice, and arbitrary arrest
    and detention remain problems. For example, on January 28, in Azuay,
    the authorities arrested Maria Guatama, her daughter, and
    granddaughter; they spent a night in jail without any formal charges.
    The incident was traced to a disgruntled neighbor who apparently had
    friends on the police force. The family's release most likely was due
    to the fact that they could afford a lawyer.
        The law requires the authorities to issue specific written arrest
    orders within 24 hours of detention--even in cases in which a suspect
    is caught committing a crime--and the authorities must charge the
    suspect with a specific criminal offense within 48 hours of arrest. All
    detained persons may challenge the legality of their detention by
    petition within 48 hours of their arrest, but in practice few such
    petitions are brought forward. The senior elected official (usually the
    mayor) of the locality in which the suspect is held reviews any such
    petitions. Regardless of the legality of a detention, a prisoner may be
    released only by court order. In some cases, detainees who are unaware
    of this, or who do not have the funds to hire a lawyer, may remain in
    prison for an extended period of time before being released. Bail
    generally is not available, and the law prohibits it in narcotics and
    major offense cases. Families of detainees sometimes attempt to secure
    the prisoners' freedom through illegal means.
        Human rights organizations continued to report occasional cases of
    incommunicado detention, although the law prohibits this practice. Even
    when the police obtain a written arrest order, those charged with
    determining the validity of detention often allowed frivolous charges
    to be brought, either because they were overworked or because the
    accuser bribed them. The system frequently was used as a means of
    harassment in civil cases in which one party sought to have the other
    arrested on criminal charges. Preventive detention up to and including
    trial is legal if a judge determines that it is necessary and if
    evidence that a crime has been committed is presented.
        As in the previous year, the authorities in Guayas Province
    arrested scores of persons under a state of emergency that was imposed
    from January until May. The measure was imposed to stem a soaring crime
    rate (584 persons died in violent crimes in the city of Guayaquil in
    1999, and 104 kidnaping cases were registered.) The police often
    arrested persons on mere suspicion or for lack of proper
    identification; they released most of them a few days later.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
    not use it as a method of political control.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
    susceptible to outside pressure and corruption. Despite efforts begun
    in 1992 to depoliticize and modernize the court system, the judiciary
    continues to operate slowly and inconsistently. Judges reportedly
    rendered decisions more quickly or more slowly depending on political
    pressure, or in some instances, the payment of bribes. There are
    lengthy delays before most cases come to the courts.
        The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, superior circuit
    courts, other courts and tribunals that hear cases in accordance with
    the Constitution and other laws, and the Judicial Council. There also
    are military and police tribunals that have the same status as circuit
    courts, while criminal, provincial, and cantonal courts serve as courts
    of first-instance.
        The regular court system tries most nonmilitary defendants,
    although some indigenous groups try members independently for
    violations of tribal rules. The law permits police or military courts
    to try police officers and military defendants in closed sessions, in
    accordance with the respective military and police court martial
    manuals. Only the Supreme Court may try cases involving flag-rank
    officers. The police court does not announce verdicts or punishments,
    reinforcing the strong impression that the police are immune from
    prosecution. The 1998 Constitution placed both police and military
    justice under the control of the Supreme Court. However, the three
    systems have not yet been integrated.
        The Supreme Court that took office in 1997 publicly recognized the
    shortcomings of the judicial system and pledged to improve the quality
    and training of judges. In May 1998, the Supreme Court supervised the
    selection by open competition of all appellate judges. A Judicial
    Council, charged with administering the court system and disciplining
    judges, took office in the fall of 1998. In November 1999, the
    Council's disciplinary committee fired two judges and two court
    employees for their role in the release of suspected drug traffickers.
    All four faced criminal charges. During the year, the Judicial Council
    removed at least two judges and a number of minor officials from their
    jobs.
        The failures of the justice system contributed to a growing number
    of cases in which communities took the law into their own hands. There
    continued to be reports of lynchings and burnings of suspected
    criminals by outraged citizens (see Section 1.a.). These occurred
    particularly in indigenous communities and poor neighborhoods of major
    cities where there is little police presence.
        The law provides for internationally accepted due process rights
    for criminal defendants, but the authorities, including the Chief
    Prosecutor's office, often did not observe these rights in practice. By
    law, the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and
    defendants have the right to a public trial, defense attorneys, and
    appeal. They may present evidence, refuse to testify against
    themselves, and confront and cross-examine witnesses. Although a public
    defender system exists, in practice there are almost no attorneys
    available to defend the large number of indigent suspects.
        Trial is supposed to begin within 15 to 60 days of the initial
    arrest; however, in practice initiation of the trial phase can take
    years. Less than 40 percent of all those incarcerated have been
    convicted and sentenced. Accused narcotics traffickers and suspects in
    major crimes cannot obtain bail or be released on their own
    recognizance.
        In November 1999, Congress passed a new Criminal Procedures Code.
    Then-President Mahuad proposed changes in December 1999, which Congress
    accepted in January. The code is scheduled to take effect in July 2001,
    and is intended to change the criminal justice system from an
    inquisitorial to an accusatorial-style system. The Chief Prosecutor's
    office is to investigate and prosecute crimes, while the role of judges
    is to change to that of neutral arbiters presiding over oral trials.
    The new code is a step toward implementation of provisions in the 1998
    Constitution intended to strengthen the justice system by improving due
    process and enhancing the rights of the accused, through measures such
    as habeas corpus and limits on preventive detention.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanctions.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech, and the authorities generally respected this
    provision in practice; however, there were some notable exceptions.
    There are frequent charges of slander and libel brought by and against
    public figures, but few result in final decisions or judicial relief.
    On April 19, the President of Congress announced that press coverage of
    congressional proceedings would be restricted to an audio broadcast;
    following vigorous protest by the press, which formerly had enjoyed
    wide access to Congress, he announced that separate areas would be set
    aside for live coverage of sessions. Some self-censorship continues.
        There is a free and vigorous press. Ownership of the media is
    broadly based, and editorials represent a wide range of political views
    and often criticize the Government. However, some degree of self-
    censorship in the print media occurs, particularly with respect to
    politically sensitive issues or stories about the military and its
    related industries. In addition, most elements of the media were
    influenced by economic considerations and tend to reflect the narrow,
    regional interests of their owners.
        All of the major media organs--newspapers, radio, and television--
    are locally and privately owned, except for one governmentowned
    national radio station. The law limits foreign investment in broadcast
    media. Using a law promulgated by the last military regime that
    requires the media to give the Government free space or broadcast time,
    the Government can and does require television and radio to broadcast
    governmentproduced programs featuring the President and other top
    administration officials.
        On February 16, in Guayaquil, Rafael Cuesta, the news director of
    the Tele Centro television station was injured severely by a bomb
    contained inside a videocassette. Congresswoman Cinthya Viteri and
    indigenous leader Marco Murillo also received videocassette bombs in
    the mail; however, because of the Cuesta incident they were suspicious
    and alerted the police, who defused the devices. Police were unable to
    discover who sent the bombs.
        Near the end of the year, the mayor of Guayaquil banned a guidebook
    that contained negative comments about the city.
        The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government
    does not interfere in issues involving academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of free assembly for peaceful purposes, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice; however, there
    were some limits. In February President Noboa decreed a nationwide
    state of emergency that lasted until March and limited freedom of
    assembly. Public rallies require prior government permits, which
    generally are granted, although exceptions occur. In January protesters
    took over the congressional building and, joined by military leaders,
    forced the resignation of President Mahuad (see Section 3). Numerous
    other labor and student demonstrations took place without major
    incident in the capital and the outlying regions during the year.
    Protesters often blocked roads. On January 6, police in Quito and
    Guayaquil arrested 46 protesters, and in Quito 1 student was shot and
    injured; some protesters were armed, and the police denied
    responsibility. In general the security forces intervened in
    demonstrations only when there was violence against bystanders or
    destruction of property. Police in Quito used tear gas in January,
    March, and September to repel demonstrators who sought access to the
    city center (see Section 6.a.). Police also used tear gas against
    protesting members of the National Teachers' Union. On April 17,
    members of the Evangelical Indigenous Movement (FEINE) and the
    Federation of Indians, Campesinos, and Blacks (FENOCIN) occupied the
    Government's Indigenous Affairs Office.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Government does not require religious groups to be licensed or
    registered unless they form NGO's that engage in commercial activity.
    Approximately 90 percent of the population consider themselves to be
    Roman Catholic, although most citizens do not regularly practice the
    religion or follow a syncretistic version that combines indigenous
    beliefs with orthodox Catholic doctrine. The Government allows
    missionary activity and religious demonstrations by all religions. The
    Government does not permit religious instruction in public schools;
    private schools are permitted to teach religion, as are parents in the
    home. There are no restrictions on publishing religious materials in
    any language. In early 1998, police in Pinchincha suspended the
    meetings of a group known as ``Gnostico Cristiano Universal,''
    following the suicide of 29 members of the ``Heaven's Gate'' cult in
    California, while they investigated possible links between the two
    groups. The Government's investigation was inconclusive, and the groups
    have resumed their activities.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
    however, frequent military and police roadblocks often present problems
    for travelers using public transportation, especially at night. The
    Government requires all citizens to obtain exit visas when travelling
    abroad, which are granted routinely. Military and minor applicants must
    comply with special requirements.
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
    in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of provision of first
    asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
        According to the UNHCR, since September approximately 1,600
    Colombian refugees arrived in the country, most of whom fled due to
    fighting between guerrillas and paramilitary forces in the Colombian
    department of Putumayo. The Government and the UNHCR have developed a
    three-point contingency plan to cope with the refugee influx into
    Sucumbios province. In November nine persons occupied offices of a
    Catholic Church in Quito that worked with the UNHCR to screen and
    register refugees. The occupation ended peacefully after 48 hours.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage; however, on January 21, members of the military
    joined protesters, including indigenous dissidents, to force President
    Jamil Mahuad from office. After a brief period of confusion during
    which the leaders of the coup announced the dissolution of the three
    branches of government and the formation of a ``People's Parliament,''
    on January 22, Vice President Gustavo Noboa assumed the presidency and
    restored order.
        On January 19, approximately 6,000 persons including members of the
    Confederation of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities (CONAIE), students, and
    leftwing political protesters marched in Quito. On January 21,
    thousands of protesters, including members of CONAIE, students,
    teachers, and union members, occupied and took control of the
    congressional building in Quito. The police and military guarding the
    building did not oppose the occupation with force, and over 100
    soldiers joined the protesters. CONAIE leader Antonio Vargas announced
    on television from the floor of Congress that he would head the
    People's Parliament. He also said that retired army Colonel Lucio
    Gutierrez would join him in a new ``ruling junta'' as the executive,
    and that former Supreme Court President Carlos Solorzano would take
    over the role of Supreme Court President. The protesters called for
    President Mahuad to resign. (There also were protests in Guayaquil,
    where a group of students, unionists, and neighborhood associations
    seized the provincial government building.)
        President of Congress Juan Jose Pons described the small military
    group that joined the protests as ``seditious'' and called for support
    for the democratically elected Government. Mahuad then spoke on
    television and refused to resign. On the afternoon of January 21, the
    armed forces service chiefs and joint staff chief General Carlos
    Mendoza called for the President to resign. Mahuad resisted the call to
    resign but later fled the palace. The junta (also called the
    ``triumvirate'') originally was composed of Vargas, Solorzano, and
    Colonel Gutierrez. Later during the night of January 21, at the palace,
    General Mendoza briefly joined the junta, replacing Colonel Gutierrez.
    On January 22, President Mahuad appeared again on television and
    accepted Vice President Gustavo Noboa as president; on the same day,
    Congress ruled that Mahuad had deserted his post. With Noboa's
    assumption of office, order was restored.
        On January 22, Congress sanctioned two of its membersDemocratic
    Left representatives (and former army generals) Paco Moncayo and Rene
    Yandunfor their role in the coup and removed them from their seats in
    the Congress.
        On February 4, General Norton Narvaez, the head of the armed
    forces, announced that a military court had found 113 soldiers, 17 of
    whom were in jail, guilty of breach of discipline and breaking their
    oath for taking part in the coup. They were put on administrative leave
    and confined to barracks. General Mendoza resigned.
        On May 31, Congress approved an amnesty for army officers involved
    in the coup, and those held in prison were released. On June 5, the 17
    most senior imprisoned officials were placed on 48-hour administrative
    leave. Colonel Gutierrez served 4 days in jail for a ``breach of
    discipline,'' i.e., for his interviews with the press. On June 12, the
    military forced Colonel Gutierrez and 11 other officers to resign
    despite the blanket amnesty.
        On July 13, Supreme Court President Galo Pico issued arrest
    warrants for former President Mahuad and his former finance minister
    for crimes in connection with the freezing of bank assets in March
    1999.
        Voting is mandatory for literate citizens over 18 years of age and
    voluntary for illiterate citizens. The law does not permit active duty
    members of the military to vote. The Constitution bars members of the
    clergy and active duty military personnel from election to Congress,
    the presidency, or vice presidency. The Constitution provides that if a
    political party fails to garner a minimum of 5 percent of the votes in
    two open elections, the party must be eliminated from the electoral
    registry.
        In August a dispute arose over who had the right to be elected
    president of Congress. After a Constitutional Court ruling forced
    Susana Gonzalez from office following a challenge, Hugo Quevedo was
    elected. He later defeated a challenge to his own election and remained
    in office at year's end.
        No specific laws prevent women or minorities from attaining
    leadership positions; however, few women, indigenous people, or Afro-
    Ecuadorians occupy senior positions in government. Women are
    underrepresented in politics and government, although they have made
    gains in recent years. Women hold 17 of 123 seats in Congress, the
    largest proportion of seats held by women in the country's history.
    There is one female cabinet minister.
        The indigenous movement, which previously shunned traditional
    politics, formed an electoral movement called Pachakutik (which means
    ``cataclysmic change'' in Quichua) and ran candidates for national,
    provincial, and local office in the 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections. A
    Pachakutik Congresswoman, Nina Pacari, formerly the Second Vice
    President of Congress, is part of an eight-member congressional bloc
    whose cooperation with the majority in Congress on some issues has
    ensured it significant influence. The politically active Confederation
    of Ecuador's Indian Nationalities, headed by Antonio Vargas, was at the
    forefront of protests that overthrew then-President Mahuad. Indigenous
    members of the National Constituent Assembly and their supporters won
    important constitutional protections for indigenous rights in the 1998
    Constitution. There are 3 indigenous deputies serving in the 123-member
    Congress.
        One Afro-Ecuadorian serves as a member of Congress, but none are
    found in senior-level government jobs.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
    without restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights cases. Domestic human rights groups, such as the CEDHU and
    the regional Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), were
    outspoken in their criticism of the Government's record on specific
    cases. Nevertheless, the Government contracted with the ALDHU to
    provide human rights training to the military and the police.
        The office of the Ombudsman was created in 1998 to ensure ongoing
    attention to human rights problems; however, some observers have
    criticized its independence in practice. In May Congress removed the
    Ombudsman from office on charges of fraud for acts that he committed
    while he was acting Attorney General. As of year's end, Congress had
    not named a replacement, and Claudio Mueckay was acting Ombudsman at
    year's end.
        In 1998 the Government decreed an ambitious National Human Rights
    Plan with the goal of preventing, penalizing, and eradicating human
    rights violations in the country. The three branches of government, as
    well as the independent Ombudsmen's office and a number of NGO's,
    contributed to development of this plan. At the end of 1999, the U.N.
    had contributed $1.2 million to support the plan. The plan includes
    education for the Congress on human rights matters. The Government
    began to implement various aspects of its plan, including seminars,
    publishing documents, and a contingency plan for refugees.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
    sex, or social status. In addition, the constitutional reforms
    explicitly increased the rights of women, children, and minorities, and
    required Congress to pass legislation implementing these rights
    promptly. However, women, indigenous people, and Afro-Ecuadorians
    continue to face significant discrimination.
        Women.--Although the law prohibits violence against women,
    including within marriage, it is a widespread practice. The 1995 Law
    Against Violence Affecting Women and Children criminalized spousal
    abuse, including physical, sexual, and psychological abuse; created
    family courts; and reformed the Penal Code to give courts the power to
    separate an abusive spouse from the home. Although nationwide
    statistics were not available, according to an NGO in Guayaquil, that
    city registered more than 32,000 official complaints of domestic
    violence between May 1998 and May 1999, almost double the previous
    period's figure. The NGO's report also said that one out of three women
    suffered from some form of domestic violence. Women may file complaints
    against a rapist or an abusive spouse or companion only if they produce
    a witness. Many rapes also are not reported due to the victims'
    reluctance to confront the perpetrators. The penalty for rape is a jail
    sentence of up to 16 years. In cases of statutory rape involving
    ``amorous'' sex with a minor, if the rapist marries the victim the
    charges against him, or anyone else who took part in the rape, cannot
    be pursued unless the marriage subsequently is annulled. While some
    communities have established their own centers for counseling and legal
    support of abused women, the Government only began to address this
    problem seriously with the 1994 formation of the Women's Bureau.
    Although this office can accept complaints about abuse of women, it has
    no authority to act on the complaints. However, the Women's Bureau has
    doubled the number of its outreach offices and actively referred abuse
    cases to prosecutors.
        Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
        Adult prostitution is legal.
        Discrimination against women is pervasive in society, particularly
    with respect to educational and economic opportunities for those in the
    lower economic strata. The increasingly active women's movement alleges
    that culture and tradition inhibit achievement of full equality for
    women. There are fewer women than men in the professions and skilled
    trades, and pay discrimination against women is common.
        The Ecuadorian Women's Permanent National Forum, founded in 1994,
    includes more than 320 women's organizations and promotes social,
    economic, and cultural change through various methods, including
    increasing political participation by women. In addition the National
    Women's Council provides support for approximately 500 women's
    organizations, many of which promote social consciousness and greater
    participation by women in the political process. The Women's Political
    Coordinator, an NGO that operates in 17 provinces, promotes similar
    themes relating to women's rights, with an emphasis on political
    participation and human rights. It also focuses on young women and
    Afro-Ecuadorian women.
        Children.--According to the National Statistics Institute, in 1999
    approximately 47 percent of the population was under the age of 18. The
    Government has not taken effective steps to promote the welfare of
    children. The Constitution requires that children achieve ``a basic
    level of education,'' estimated at 9 years of school; however, the
    Government rarely enforces this requirement in practice (see Section
    6.d.). Education is free.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. Government
    resources to assist children traditionally have been limited, although
    the Government operates a program to care for the children of the
    working poor called ``Operation Child Rescue.'' The Inter-American
    Commission on Human Rights has concluded that this program reached only
    a small percentage of those affected. Approximately 45 percent of
    children under the age of 5 are malnourished. Government spending on
    education continued to decline, both in real terms and as a proportion
    of GDP. There are more than 20 NGO's that promote child welfare.
        Several private organizations are very active in programs to assist
    street children, and UNICEF also runs a program in conjunction with the
    Central Bank. The children of the poor often experience severe
    hardships, especially in urban areas. Children as young as 5 or 6 years
    of age often sell newspapers or candy on the street to support
    themselves or to augment family income. Also, there are reports of
    prostitution by girls and boys under 18 years of age in urban areas,
    and there have been reports of cases in which children were forced into
    prostitution. In rural areas, young children often must leave school at
    an early age to help out on the family's plot of land.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination
    against disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of
    other state services. However, there are no laws to ensure disabled
    persons access to public buildings or services, nor are they provided
    any other special government assistance. In June the city of Guayaquil
    began a modest program to give the disabled better access to public
    buildings.
        Indigenous People.--While at least 85 percent of all citizens claim
    some indigenous heritage, culturally indigenous people make up about 15
    to 20 percent of the total population. The vast majority live in rural
    areas, including the highlands and the Amazonian provinces, and most
    live in varying degrees of poverty. Land is scarce in the more heavily
    populated highland areas where high infant mortality, malnutrition, and
    epidemic disease are common. Electricity and potable water often are
    unavailable. Although the rural education system is seriously
    deficient, many indigenous groups participated actively with the
    Ministry of Education in the development of the bilingual education
    program used in rural public schools.
        The Constitution recognizes the rights of indigenous communities to
    hold property communally, to administer traditional community justice
    in certain cases, and to be consulted before natural resources are
    exploited in community territories. Indigenous people also have the
    same civil and political rights as other citizens. In the Amazon area,
    indigenous groups have lobbied the Government, enlisted the help of
    foreign and domestic NGO's, and mounted protests (including kidnaping
    oil workers and tourists), in their attempts to win a share of oil
    revenues and a voice in exploitation and development decisions. The
    Constitution expressly recognizes the indigenous communities' rights to
    be consulted on, but not to approve, oil exploration and development.
    Oil companies have increased their efforts to minimize the
    environmental and social impact of their oil projects in the Amazon but
    continue to face criticism from indigenous groups that environmental
    damage still is occurring.
        Despite their growing political influence and the efforts of
    grassroots community groups, which were increasingly successful in
    pressuring the central Government to assist them, Indians continue to
    suffer discrimination at many levels of society. With few exceptions,
    indigenous people are at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale. For
    example, by one UNICEF estimate in 1999, 83 percent of indigenous
    children worked at some kind of job (see Section 6.d.).
        CONAIE was at the forefront of protests that toppled President
    Mahuad (see Section 3). It also has arranged a popular referendum and
    public demonstrations to protest government economic austerity measures
    and to urge the repeal of economic modernization laws involving
    privatization of state-owned enterprises.
        Religious Minorities.--Although relations between religious
    communities generally have been amicable, in past years there have been
    a few incidents of interreligious or intrareligious tension or
    violence.
        A Baptist clinic in the town of Chachas is operating normally,
    following opposition to its establishment from local residents in April
    1999.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of the rural,
    northern coastal area includes large numbers of Afro-Ecuadorian
    citizens. They suffer widespread poverty and pervasive discrimination,
    particularly with regard to educational and economic opportunity. There
    are no special government efforts to address these problems.
        There are five major Afro-Ecuadorian organizations active in the
    country; the largest is the Confederacion Nacional Afroecuatoriana,
    with headquarters in Quito. It estimates that Afro-Ecuadorians account
    for more than 1 million persons, or about 10 percent of the total
    population. While the presence of Afro-Ecuadorians has grown in the
    fields of sports and culture, their educational opportunities continue
    to be limited.
        The press has focused on lingering racism among all strata of
    society. Afro-Ecuadorian organizations note that despite the absence of
    official discrimination, societal discrimination continues to affect
    them. For example, they assert that the police stop Afro-Ecuadorians
    for document checks with greater frequency than other citizens.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and Labor Code
    provide most workers with the right to form trade unions. Members of
    the police, the military, and public sector employees in nonrevenue
    producing entities are not free to form trade unions. The 1991 Labor
    Code reforms sets the number of workers required for an establishment
    to be unionized at 30, which the International Labor Organization's
    Committee on Freedom of Association considers too stringent a
    limitation at the plant workers' council level. Although the Congress
    debated additional labor reforms, labor law was in flux at year's end
    because the Constitutional Court ruled that some recent labor
    legislation was unconstitutional. The court's ruling nullified several
    articles that the Government stated provided flexibility to employers,
    but that some observers claimed undercut constitutional protections of
    worker rights.
        While employees of state-owned organizations enjoy rights similar
    to those in the private sector, the law technically prevents the
    majority of public sector employees from joining unions or exercising
    collective bargaining rights. However, most public employees maintain
    membership in some labor organization, and there are frequent
    ``illegal'' strikes. Despite official threats, the Government rarely
    takes action against striking public workers. However, in May the
    Government ordered striking teachers back to work and arrested and
    temporarily jailed National Teachers' Union (UNE) leaders. A November
    1997 law prohibits public sector strikes if they paralyze key services,
    including schools.
        Although the labor confederations are politically independent, the
    two largest single labor unions, the UNE and the Union of Social
    Security Workers, are allied with the Democratic Political Movement, a
    communist party. Approximately 12 percent of the work force is
    organized. There are four large labor centrals or confederations. None
    of the main labor centrals is connected firmly to any one political
    party, and there are no ties between the Government and any labor
    union.
        There are few restrictions on the right of workers to strike,
    although a 10-day cooling-off period is required before a strike can be
    declared. The Labor Code revisions limit solidarity strikes or boycotts
    to 3 days, provided that the Labor Ministry approves them. In a legal
    strike, workers may take possession of the factory or workplace, thus
    ending production at the site, and receive police protection during the
    takeover. The employer must pay all salaries and benefits during a
    legal strike; the Labor Code protects strikers and their leaders from
    retaliation.
        There were several significant strikes during the year, mainly in
    response to government austerity measures. They involved public sector
    employees such as teachers and social security and medical workers, as
    well as petroleum, electricity, and transportation workers; indigenous
    groups also protested during the strikes. Police in Quito used tear gas
    in January, March, and September to repel demonstrators who sought
    access to the city center (see Section 2.b.). In April public sector
    bureaucrats went on strike to demand higher wages. In May the Public
    Teachers Union (UNE) began a countrywide strike for higher wages, and a
    judge issued an arrest warrant for Arcelly Moreno, the president of the
    UNE. The strike lasted more than 2 months; some striking teachers were
    detained for as long as 10 days. In December health workers held a
    strike for 2 weeks.
        Unions may freely form and join federations or confederations, and
    three of the large labor centrals maintain international affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor
    market is highly segmented, with a minority of workers in skilled,
    usually unionized, positions in state-run enterprises or in medium to
    large industries. Most of the economically active population is
    employed in the agricultural sector or the urban informal sector; the
    vast majority of these workers are not organized. The Labor Code
    requires that all private employers with 30 or more workers belonging
    to a union must negotiate collectively when the union so requests.
    Collective bargaining agreements cover only onequarter of the
    approximately 12 percent of the work force that is organized. In March
    a new labor law allowed businesses to hire workers on ``individual
    contracts,'' but the practice did not become prevalent because Congress
    was reconsidering the law at year's end.
        The Labor Code streamlined the bargaining process in state
    enterprises by requiring workers to be represented by only one labor
    union. It prohibits discrimination against unions and requires that
    employers provide space for union activities upon the union's request.
    The law does not permit employers to dismiss a worker without the
    express permission of the Ministry of Labor, whose rulings are not
    subject to judicial review. If the Ministry of Labor rules that a
    dismissal is unjustified, it can require the employer to pay large
    indemnities or separation payments to the worker, although the reforms
    set a cap on such payments. A fired worker is eligible for
    reinstatement and in general would not be blacklisted at other
    companies. Workers generally are protected against antiunion
    discrimination only by pressure from the union. The Labor Code provides
    for resolution of labor conflicts through an arbitration and
    conciliation board which consists of one representative of the Ministry
    of Labor, two from the union, and two from management.
        The 1990 Maquila Law permits the hiring of temporary workers for
    the maquila (in-bond processing for export) industries only. While
    there is no express prohibition on association rights in the Maquila
    Law, in practice it is difficult to organize temporary employees on
    short-term contracts. Since temporary workers are not recognized by the
    Labor Code, they do not enjoy the same level of protection offered to
    other workers. The maquila system allows a company and its property to
    become an export-processing zone wherever it is located. Many such
    ``zones'' have been established; most are relatively small and are
    dedicated to textiles and fish processing.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the Labor Code prohibit compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
    it in general. There have been reports of children forced into
    prostitution (see Section 5), but there were no other reports of forced
    or bonded labor by children.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits boys younger than 12 years old and girls
    younger than age 14 from working, except in special circumstances such
    as apprenticeships. It requires children between the ages of 12 or 14
    and 18 years to have the permission of their parent or guardian to
    work. The law also prohibits children between the ages of 14 and 18
    years from working more than 7 hours per day or 35 hours per week, and
    it restricts children below the age of 14 years to a maximum of 6 hours
    per day and 30 hours per week. In practice the Ministry of Labor fails
    to enforce child labor laws, and child labor is prevalent. The problem
    has increased in recent years due to the prolonged economic crisis, and
    urban child labor has increased with the migration of the rural poor to
    the cities. A UNICEF report estimated that in 1997, 37 percent of the
    2.1 million children between the ages of 10 and 17 worked; in 1999
    almost 1 out of 2 children in this age bracket worked. A 1999 report
    based on a joint national and World Bank study found that 45 percent of
    children between the ages of 10 and 17 worked at least parttime. Among
    children aged 10 to 11, who cannot work legally, 28 percent worked at
    least part-time nationwide. More than 60 percent of all children live
    in rural areas and do unpaid agricultural work for their families.
        The Constitution provides that children must attend school until
    they attain a ``basic level of education'' estimated at 9 school years.
    However, due to the lack of schools in many rural communities, the
    Government's failure to provide adequate resources, and the need for
    children to work, this provision rarely is enforced. UNICEF reported in
    1999 that one out of three children did not remain in school long
    enough to complete the 6th grade. The Constitution provides that 30
    percent of the public budget must be devoted to education; however, in
    practice only half of that amount is spent. The Government has programs
    in 18 urban areas that provide families with educational subsidies as
    an incentive to keep children in school. In rural areas, many children
    attend school only sporadically after about 10 years of age in order to
    contribute to household income as farm laborers.
        In the city, many children under 12 years of age work in
    familyowned ``businesses'' in the informal sector, shining shoes,
    collecting and recycling garbage, or as street peddlers. Others are
    employed in commerce, messenger services, domestic service, and
    begging. Child prostitution is a problem, and there have been cases
    reported of children being forced into prostitution (see Section 5).
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no
    other reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
    periodically sets the minimum wage in consultation with the Commission
    on Salaries, but Congress also may adjust it. As of August, the minimum
    wage plus mandated bonuses provided a gross monthly compensation of
    approximately $110, or 50 cents per hour in the case of contract
    workers. The statutory minimum wage is not adequate to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. Most organized workers in
    state industries and formal sector private enterprises earned
    substantially more than the minimum wage and also received other
    significant benefits through collective bargaining agreements. However,
    the majority of workers work in the large informal and rural sector
    without recourse to the minimum wage or to legally mandated benefits.
        The Ministry of Labor has the principal role in enforcing labor
    laws and carries this out through a corps of labor inspectors who are
    active in all 22 provinces. The Labor Code provides for a 40-hour
    workweek, a 15-day annual vacation, a minimum wage, and other employer-
    provided benefits, such as uniforms and training opportunities. In
    March reforms to the labor law nominally gave greater flexibility to
    employers by hiring parttime workers, such as accountants, for only a
    few hours per week. However, this legislation was affected by a
    Constitutional Court decision (see Section 6.a.).
        The Labor Code also provides general protection for workers' health
    and safety on the job. However, a worker may not leave the workplace of
    his own volition, even if there is a hazardous situation. The worker is
    allowed to request that an inspector from the Ministry of Labor come to
    the workplace and confirm the hazard; that inspector then may close
    down the workplace. Response time for inspectors ranges from a few days
    in major cities to much longer in the countryside.
        The Government enforces health and safety standards and regulations
    through the Social Security Institute. In the formal sector,
    occupational health and safety is not a major problem. However, there
    are no specific regulations governing health and safety standards in
    the agricultural sector and in practice there is no enforcement of
    safety rules in the small mines that make up the vast majority of the
    mining sector. During the year, at least two fatalities were reported
    due to accidents in the mines.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is a misdemeanor law that
    addresses trafficking in persons; it provides for penalties from 6
    months to 3 years in prison, as well as fines. The Migration Law and
    the Penal Code provide for the imposition of sanctions on suppliers of
    false documents for purposes of travel or work. Other laws dealing with
    kidnaping, labor, occupational safety, and slavery apply to and provide
    sanctions for trafficking in persons. In June Congress amended the
    Criminal Code to strengthen sentences for furnishing or utilizing false
    documents and for alien smuggling. Alien smugglers or traffickers can
    receive sentences from 3 to 6 years' imprisonment; the penalties range
    from 6 to 9 years' if victims are injured, and a penalty of up to 12
    years may be imposed if a death occurs. The law specifically exempts
    victims from prosecution. There were no confirmed reports of persons
    being trafficked to, from, within, or through the country against their
    will; however, there were many reports of persons being smuggled
    illegally from the country to the United States through Central America
    in which trafficking sometimes was suspected. In 1999 police in Spain
    reported that they had arrested 50 Ecuadorian women working as
    prostitutes who were likely victims of trafficking.
                                   __________

                                  EL SALVADOR

        El Salvador is a constitutional, multiparty democracy with an
    executive branch headed by a president and a unicameral legislature.
    President Francisco Flores of the Nationalist Republican Alliance
    (ARENA) was elected in 1999 to a 5-year term. In free and fair
    elections in March, the former guerrilla organization Farabundo Marti
    National Liberation Front (FMLN) won a plurality of the seats in the
    Legislative Assembly. ARENA maintains a working majority in coalition
    with the conservative National Conciliation Party. Three other parties
    hold seats in the Assembly. The judiciary is constitutionally
    independent but suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
        The National Civilian Police (PNC) maintains internal security. The
    military is responsible for external security. The military provides
    support for some PNC patrols in rural areas, a measure begun in 1995 by
    presidential executive order in an effort to contain violence by well-
    armed, organized criminal bands. In March at the President's direction,
    the air force, navy, and selected army units formed Joint Task Groups
    with the police as part of an interagency antinarcotics program.
    Civilian authorities maintain effective control of the military and
    security forces. Some members of the police committed human rights
    abuses.
        The country has a free-market, mixed economy largely based on
    services, agriculture, and manufacturing. Although agriculture accounts
    for only 12 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), it is the
    largest source of employment, engaging 35 percent of the work force,
    estimated at 2.3 million persons. Coffee and sugar are the principal
    export crops and important sources of foreign exchange. The
    manufacturing sector, which contributes 21 percent of GDP, employs 9
    percent of the work force. The textile sector, especially the maquila
    (in-bond assembly or processing) plants in free trade zones, represents
    about 50 percent of manufacturing sector employment and is the main
    source of new jobs. The economy is open, and private property is
    respected. The rate of real economic growth was estimated to reach 2.5
    percent during the year. Inflation was 3.6 percent. Per capita GDP
    reached $2,080. The official unemployment rate averaged 7.7 percent
    during the year, 6.5 percent urban and 11 percent rural; however, the
    rate of underemployment (less than full-time work or total income below
    the minimum wage) was estimated at about 30 percent. Approximately 44
    percent of the population lives below the poverty level.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Police
    officers committed extrajudicial killings. The Supreme Court found the
    1993 Amnesty Law constitutional but noted that certain categories of
    crimes were not covered. Police kidnaped persons for profit. The police
    used excessive force and mistreated detainees; there were also
    allegations that police abused street children. Prison conditions
    remained poor. High crime rates, together with police officer
    involvement in prominent kidnapings, led to the creation of a
    presidential commission to discipline and dismiss corrupt and criminal
    police. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The judiciary
    remained inefficient and is hampered by widespread corruption. Impunity
    for the rich and powerful remained a problem. The authorities used
    force to disperse one demonstration; one person was injured. In
    February Human Rights Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco resigned over
    misconduct charges; the Legislative Assembly had not named a successor
    at year's end. Violence and discrimination against women continued, and
    discrimination against disabled persons also remained a problem. Abuse
    of children, child labor, and forced child prostitution were also
    problems. The Government did not adequately protect workers' rights to
    organize and bargain collectively. Trafficking in women and children is
    a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by agents of the Government; however, the
    police committed some extrajudicial killings.
        During the year, the Human Rights Ombudsman's office received for
    investigation 87 cases alleging killings by the PNC during the year and
    in prior years. As of November, the presidential commission
    investigating police misconduct identified at least 72 officers
    suspected of extrajudicial killings during the year and in prior years.
        On February 10, police shot at the tires and windshield of a
    vehicle that failed to obey their signal to stop on a major
    thoroughfare in San Salvador. When the vehicle halted, passenger
    Salvador Hernandez fled, and a police officer shot and killed him. The
    prosecutor charged Mario Orlando Franco Duran with aggravated homicide.
    He also charged Franco and three other officers with the attempted
    murder of Edwin Quintanilla Flores and Ricardo Trejo Stanley, the
    vehicle's driver and another passenger. On December 11, a judge
    determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the homicide
    charge for the trial of Franco to proceed to the next phase; however,
    the judge dismissed the attempted homicide charges against the
    defendants on grounds that it was impossible to determine which
    officers intended to shoot at the vehicle's windshield. The prosecutor
    appealed the latter verdict, and the appeal was pending at year's end.
        On April 7, police driver Mauricio Enrique Martinez shot and killed
    Luis Edgardo Garcia Vasquez after he failed to stop when signaled by
    police on the highway between Santa Ana and Ahuachapan. Two police
    officers and two police drivers pursued him and shot out his tires.
    When the vehicle stopped, Martinez opened the door and shot Garcia in
    the head. In December a court convicted Martinez of aggravated murder
    and sentenced him to 28 years in prison. The two officers were
    acquitted, and charges were dropped against the other driver, who
    became a witness in the case.
        In June PNC officer Luis Alonso Navarrete was on duty with a Joint
    Task Group (composed of soldiers and police) when he allegedly shot and
    killed six persons and wounded four others with an M-16. Five of the
    victims were soldiers who formed part of his Joint Task Group. Police
    arrested Navarrete the same day; he reportedly suffered from mental
    illness. The PNC disciplinary committee dismissed Navarrete from the
    police in September. He remained in custody awaiting trial on charges
    of aggravated homicide and attempted aggravated homicide at year's end.
        A total of 13 inmates died in prison due to violence and illness
    (see Section 1.c.).
        There was mixed progress in resolving cases of extrajudicial
    killings from previous years.
        In October a court sentenced police officer Jose Miguel Soriano
    Melgar to 12 years in prison for the November 1999 shooting of Carlos
    Lopez Regalo. The court acquitted police captain Erick Fuentes of the
    charge of aggravated homicide. That verdict was appealed in November;
    the appeal was pending at year's end.
        In July a police disciplinary tribunal removed from the force five
    officers charged with the November 1999 beating death of Manuel de
    Jesus Parada. In October a jury acquitted four of them of the crime; it
    issued no verdict for the fifth officer, who had fled prosecution and
    did not appear for the trial.
        In October a court found three PNC officers guilty of attempted
    homicide for torturing Juan Carlos Miranda before stabbing him and
    stealing his vehicle (see Section 1.c.).
        In November a court convicted police officer Jorge Alberto Canas
    Sanchez of aggravated homicide and sentenced him to 30 years in prison
    for the August 1999 murders of Fernando Hernandez and Manuel Aguilar.
    Two other officers charged with the crime remained fugitives at year's
    end. A judge provisionally acquitted another individual who had been
    charged with complicity. The prosecutor's appeal was pending at year's
    end.
        In February a court dismissed charges against a police officer in
    the August 1999 shooting of a protester near Sonsonate during a
    confrontation between police and several hundred members of the
    Association of Salvadoran Agricultural Producers. The prosecutor
    appealed, but the appeals court upheld the verdict.
        In October the trial of Jose Ernesto Cordova, charged with the July
    1999 murder of William Ernesto Rosales Bonilla, an employee of the
    newspaper El Diario de Hoy, began. The trial had not concluded at
    year's end. Prosecutors assert that there were other participants in
    the crime, including police officers. However, no evidence of police
    participation had been found by year's end.
        A public prosecutor charged police captain Mariano Rodriguez Zepeda
    with aggravated homicide for the 1998 shooting of Jose Antonio
    Villalta. The next phase of the trial was scheduled for January 2001.
        There were no further developments in the 1998 death of Carlos
    Ernesto Lovo who died of drowning after fleeing police custody.
        In February four members of the National Action Party (PAN) were
    killed in two separate incidents. Masked gunmen shot and killed
    Gilberto Cano Gonzalez near PAN headquarters in Metapan while he was
    distributing campaign materials to a party sympathizer, Samuel Martinez
    Flores. Martinez was killed by his own gun, which he dropped in his
    attempt to flee after the first shots were fired. In October a court
    found ARENA activist Jose David Murcia and Gilberto Torres not guilty
    of aggravated homicide. The prosecutor appealed, alleging procedural
    errors in the trial. The appeal was pending at year's end. In San
    Antonio de Monte a local resident (reportedly mentally disturbed)
    stoned two PAN members to death. The police detained the perpetrator,
    and there was no indication of any political connection.
        On March 26, Jose Maria Tojeira, rector of the Jose Simeon Canas
    Central American University, formally asked the Attorney General to
    reopen the case of the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests, their
    housekeeper, and her daughter and prosecute the crime's alleged
    instigators. He based his request in part on the December 1999 report
    by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) which found
    the State responsible for violating the right to life of the eight
    murdered persons and for failing to conduct an effective investigation.
    The report also criticized the 1993 General Amnesty Law, which led to
    the release from custody of two military officers found guilty of the
    murders in 1992, and called on the Government to reopen the case. In
    reply to the IACHR report, the President reviewed the steps taken by
    the justice system to investigate and punish the crime; however, he
    recommended against reopening the case because that would undermine the
    integrity of the post civil war amnesty, which he regarded as essential
    to the continuing process of national reconciliation. The Attorney
    General deferred action on Tojeira's petition until the Supreme Court
    (CSJ) issued its decision on the constitutionality of the 1993 General
    Amnesty Law. On September 26, the CSJ upheld the constitutionality of
    the 1993 General Amnesty Law. However, the Court also indicated that
    certain special cases were not eligible for amnesty and gave lower
    courts discretion to adjudicate these matters on a case-by-case basis.
    In December the Attorney General brought the matter before a lower
    court judge and recommended that the case be closed. The judge ruled
    that the accused were not covered under the amnesty law because they
    were public officials at the time of the killings. However, she closed
    the case because the 10-year statute of limitations had expired.
    Tojeira appealed the decision, as did the defense, who wanted the court
    to find the accused not guilty based on the facts rather than the
    statute of limitations. Both appeals were pending at year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed politically motivated
    disappearances.
        As of mid-November, the presidential commission investigating
    police misconduct identified at least 12 officers suspected of
    involvement in kidnapings in during the year and in prior years. Most
    disappearances were the result of kidnaping for profit, a common
    occurrence affecting all levels of society throughout the country.
        In May an organized crime group that included police officers
    kidnaped businessman Rodrigo Zablah in San Salvador and held him for
    more than 2 weeks. Three police officers allegedly stopped his vehicle
    and told him to accompany them to the police station because of a
    traffic accident that had occurred a day earlier. Once he was in the
    police car, they took him to another location. The Attorney General's
    office identified 18 persons involved in the crime, including at least
    3 police officers. A hearing was scheduled for June 2001. Eight of the
    accused remained at large at year's end.
        In June another organized crime group that included police officers
    kidnaped a couple in Sonsonate and demanded ransom. The PNC's
    antikidnaping unit rescued the victims the next day and captured five
    persons. The Attorney General's office charged eight persons with the
    crime, including PNC sergeant Tomasa Reyes Alvarado and former PNC
    sergeant Jose Azcunaga Segura. The latter had been charged with
    kidnaping in the past and had been removed from the police force. A
    hearing was scheduled for May 2001. Two of the accused remained at
    large at year's end.
        There were no new developments in the 1999 kidnapings of Margarita
    Posada, the director of a domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO),
    and Miguel Montenegro, president of the Human Rights Commission of El
    Salvador. Both victims were released within a day. The police did not
    find the perpetrators.
        The Association for the Search for Children who Disappeared as a
    Result of the Armed Conflict, a local NGO, advocated the creation of a
    national commission to clarify what happened to 383 children who
    disappeared during the war, and whose whereabouts remain unknown. The
    Legislative Assembly had taken no action on their request at the end of
    the year.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, some
    members of the PNC continued to use excessive force or otherwise
    mistreated detainees.
        In February four PNC officers allegedly tortured Juan Carlos
    Miranda before stabbing him and stealing his vehicle. The officers had
    stopped him as he was driving a minibus. After putting him in the back
    of the bus, they kicked, beat, and threatened him for 2 hours. Finally,
    they stabbed him and left him for dead. In October a court found three
    officers guilty of attempted homicide and sentenced them to 16 years in
    prison. The court absolved a fourth officer of all charges.
        During the year, the office of the Ombudsman for the Protection of
    Human Rights (PDDH) received 724 complaints of violation of the right
    of personal integrity by government authorities, a decrease from a
    total of 929 complaints in 1999. This category covers torture, inhuman
    or degrading treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force,
    and improper treatment of detainees. The majority of these complaints
    involved the PNC and alleged minor to serious violations of arrest
    procedures. The PDDH received a total of 1,198 complaints against the
    PNC for all categories of human rights violations during the year. The
    number of complaints against the PNC and the cases of violations of
    personal integrity by all authorities have declined for the past
    several years.
        At year's end, 128 police officers were in prison on criminal
    charges or serving prison sentences for crimes that included murder,
    rape, extortion, and kidnaping.
        In June President Flores named a commission to investigate alleged
    police misconduct. The commission proposed reforms to PNC regulations
    to expedite discipline and dismissals, including the establishment of
    special courts to review cases of alleged misconduct. In June the
    Legislative Assembly passed authorizing legislation to implement the
    measures recommended by the commission. This legislation strengthened
    the role of the PNC Inspector General's office, making it a quasi-
    independent body within the PNC, charged with investigating allegations
    of police misconduct and reporting directly to the chief. In August the
    Assembly approved a temporary measure that allowed the chief of police
    for 120 days to remove officers charged with crimes or inadequate
    performance following an internal PNC investigation by the office of
    the Inspector General. In December the Assembly extended the measure
    for an additional 45 days. By year's end, the police force had
    dismissed more than 1,500 persons under the special decree and
    preexisting disciplinary procedures, and the special police courts had
    acquitted more than 200 persons. Some assembly deputies and the press
    questioned the transparency of the process and the fairness of its
    application and charged that high ranking officers remained immune from
    scrutiny. The commission identified 14 persons suspected of having
    committed torture.
        Labor organizations and the Human Rights Ombudsman alleged that in
    March the Government used unwarranted force to disperse a demonstration
    by striking social security workers. The police used water cannons on
    demonstrators who had blocked a busy street for several hours and
    refused to move when urged to do so by police and other authorities,
    including the Human Rights Ombudsman. The police shot rubber bullets in
    the air, injuring one journalist. When the case was brought to court in
    March, the judge determined that the use of force by police was
    appropriate for the circumstances. The Government did not employ force
    during other demonstrations during the year.
        In the past there have been allegations from children's rights
    groups that street children suffer from police brutality; the PNC
    always have denied these charges (see Section 5).
        There were no further developments in the 1998 shooting of FMLN
    communications adviser Leonardo Mena Marroquin.
        Human rights awareness was a standard component of the police
    officers' basic training program.
        Prison conditions remained poor. From December 1997 to December
    1999, the prison population fell about 23 percent as a result of the
    implementation of new sentencing and penal codes, which limit
    preventive detention to serious crimes. However, it increased again
    during the year. The prison system has the capacity to hold 5,794
    prisoners in 18 penal facilities. There was still some overcrowding in
    individual facilities. At year's end, 7,383 men were held in 17 prison
    facilities with a combined capacity of 5,674; there are 371 women in
    the single women's prison, which has a capacity of 120; and there are
    61 men in 3 secure hospital wards with a combined capacity of 75
    persons. Because of a lack of holding cells, pretrial detainees often
    are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with
    violent criminals.
        Gang violence, especially in the country's three largest and oldest
    penitentiaries and its juvenile holding facilities, continued to plague
    the prison system, despite government efforts to separate different
    gangs. In January the media reported incidents of prisoners torturing
    other prisoners in La Esperanza in San Salvador in 1999 and earlier.
    Prison authorities reported that, during the year, there were 13 deaths
    in the prison system, 4 of which were from multiple wounds caused by
    violence between prisoners. The remaining deaths resulted from illness.
        There are separate facilities for female detainees and prisoners.
        The law requires that all juveniles be housed separately from
    adults both prior to trial and while serving a prison sentence, and the
    Government observes this requirement in practice. Most criminal cases
    involving juveniles are brought to trial or conciliation proceedings
    within 3 months.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors, NGO's, and the media.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest; however, at times the PNC arbitrarily
    arrested and detained persons. During the year, the PDDH received 181
    complaints for violations of personal liberty, a decrease from 225
    complaints in 1999. The number of complaints in this category has
    declined steadily since 1996. The courts generally enforced a ruling
    that interrogation without the presence of counsel is coerced and that
    any evidence obtained in such a manner is inadmissible. As a result,
    police authorities generally delayed questioning until a public
    defender arrived.
        The law permits the police to hold a person for 72 hours before
    delivering the suspect to court, after which the judge may order
    detention for an additional 72 hours to determine if an investigation
    is warranted. Because of a lack of holding cells, such detainees often
    are sent to regular prisons, where they may be placed together with
    violent criminals. The law allows 120 days to investigate serious
    crimes and 45 days for lesser offenses before a judge is required to
    bring the accused to trial or dismiss the case. However, many cases
    were not completed within the legally prescribed time frame. During the
    year, more than 2,000 inmates were in pretrial detention. From January
    through May, the justice of the peace courts, where most court cases
    originate, accepted a daily average of 166 cases. Of these, a daily
    average of nine cases were resolved through conciliation proceedings.
        The Penitentiary Code permits release on bail for detainees who are
    unlikely to flee or whose release would not impede the investigation of
    the case. Because it may take several years for a case to come to
    trial, some prisoners have been incarcerated longer than the maximum
    legal sentence for their crimes. In such circumstances, a detainee may
    request a review by the Supreme Court of his or her continued
    detention.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
    observes this prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. However, the judiciary suffers from inefficiency and
    corruption.
        The court structure has four levels: justices of the peace, trial
    courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
    selects justices of the peace, trial judges, and appellate judges from
    a list of nominees proposed by the National Judicial Council. The
    Council is an independent body provided for in the Constitution to
    nominate, train, and evaluate judges. All lower court judges serve
    until they voluntarily resign or are dismissed for cause. The
    Legislative Assembly elects, by a two-thirds majority, Supreme Court
    justices from a list provided by the National Judicial Council and the
    National Association of Lawyers. A justice serves for 9 years and may
    be reelected. There are separate court systems for family matters and
    juvenile offenders; they stress conciliation as an alternative to
    adjudication. The Criminal Sentencing Court has responsibility for
    executing and monitoring the sentences imposed by the trial courts.
    Through its Department of Judicial Investigation, the Supreme Court
    regularly receives and investigates public complaints about judicial
    performance. This department also reviews the findings and
    recommendations of the National Judicial Council, which evaluates
    justices on an ongoing basis. The Supreme Court imposes penalties when
    warranted.
        Judges, not juries, decide most cases. A jury verdict cannot be
    appealed. However, the defendant may appeal the sentence to the Supreme
    Court for reduction. A jury verdict may be overturned by a mistrial
    determination that there were serious problems with jury panel
    selection or errors in the trial procedure. A judge's verdict may be
    appealed.
        The Juvenile Legal Code requires that minors under the age of 18 be
    tried only in juvenile courts, limits sentences for minors to a maximum
    of 7 years, and includes alternatives to incarceration for minors.
        In 1999 the Legislative Assembly approved a number of additional
    changes to the Criminal Procedures and Penal and Penitentiary
    (Sentencing) Codes. These changes included the establishment of more
    severe penalties for some crimes (including increasing the maximum
    possible prison sentence from 30 to 35 years), the elimination of
    parole for some crimes, and the addition of new crimes to the code. One
    of these reforms strengthened the legal protection afforded to children
    and the disabled by prescribing 6-to-8-year prison sentences for
    persons convicted of sexual aggression against adults incapacitated by
    mental or physical conditions or against minors.
        The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence,
    protection from self-incrimination, legal counsel, freedom from
    coercion, and compensation for damages due to judicial error.
    Defendants also have the right to be present in court. These rights
    were not always respected fully in practice. The Constitution and law
    require the Government to provide legal counsel for the indigent;
    however, this requirement was not always implemented in practice.
        Impunity before the country's civil and criminal laws continued,
    especially for persons who were politically, economically, or
    institutionally well-connected. In August National Conciliation Party
    leader and Legislative Assembly Deputy Francisco Merino shot at police
    officers, injuring one officer. (Merino is also a former Vice
    President.) Merino settled out of court with the police department and
    the injured officer. The Assembly decided not to lift Merino's
    parliamentary immunity to allow criminal prosecution.
        In October a judge exonerated the individuals accused of the April
    1999 rape and murder of 9-year-old Katya Miranda. Investigators
    allegedly failed to collect important evidence at the crime scene, and
    the judge refused to interview several witnesses identified by
    prosecutors. In November a judge ruled that the ex-president and
    directors of the Salvadoran Soccer Federation could not be prosecuted
    for misuse of funds, document fraud, and other charges because the
    organization was not public. More than $4 million (36 million colones)
    was missing from the Federation. The Attorney General's office appealed
    the judge's decision, and a hearing was scheduled for January 2001.
        Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources and lack of
    sufficient personnel) and intimidation of victims and witnesses
    (especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest, and
    prosecute criminals, resulting in diminished public confidence in the
    justice system.
        Corruption in the judicial system and the Attorney General's office
    contributed to impunity. In November the Attorney General announced
    that he was investigating information that almost 450 prosecutors and
    judges might have falsified their credentials or obtained them
    illegitimately, and another 83 persons might have been involved in
    nepotism. He also was investigating suspicions that prominent defense
    attorneys had sources inside the prosecutors' office who provided leaks
    that impeded investigations and prevented successful prosecutions.
        The Government and the Legislature took steps to address these
    problems. At the Attorney General's urging, the Legislative Assembly
    passed a law on November 23 that created an expedited process for
    dismissing employees of the Attorney General's office. The measure,
    authorized for 120 days, was modeled after a law passed in August that
    permitted the expedited removal of undesirable persons from the police
    force.
        Some public officials called for the Supreme Court to begin a
    similar initiative to remove corrupt judges. The Court maintained that
    its Department of Judicial Investigation and the National Judicial
    Council already scrutinized judicial performance on an ongoing basis.
    In practice, the Court imposed few sanctions upon judges. During the
    year the Court received the Council's evaluations of the performance of
    322 justices of the peace, 46 trial court judges, 63 sentencing court
    judges, and 28 appeals court magistrates. The evaluations reviewed each
    judge's performance over several months in 1998 or 1999. The Council
    recommended the dismissal of 3 justices of the peace and 1 trial court
    judge, and suspensions ranging from 3 to 60 days for 156 justices of
    the peace, 23 trial court judges, 18 sentencing court judges, and 13
    appeals court magistrates. The Court exonerated two of the four
    officials recommended for dismissal; a third resigned, and the fourth
    case remained under review at the end of the year. By the end of the
    year, the Court had begun to review 11 cases of judges recommended for
    dismissal. It had taken no action in the remaining cases.
        The implementation of judicial reforms continued to create
    confusion and uncertainty among police, prosecutors, public defenders,
    and the courts. Inadequate police coverage (due to limited resources
    and lack of sufficient personnel) and intimidation of victims and
    witnesses (especially by gangs) made it difficult to identify, arrest,
    and prosecute criminals, thus diminishing public confidence in the
    justice system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for a right to privacy, and
    government authorities generally respected these rights in practice.
    The law requires the police to have a resident's consent, a warrant, or
    a reasonable belief that a crime is under way or is about to be
    committed, before entering a private dwelling.
        In June the Attorney General's office initiated investigations of
    reported illegal wiretapping activities conducted by the
    telecommunications company, TELECOM. The Legislative Assembly formed a
    special commission to conduct parallel investigations. The
    Superintendent of Telecommunications and Electricity produced a list of
    telephone numbers believed to have been tapped, including those of the
    offices of the Attorney General, politicians, journalists, and NGO's.
    Neither the commission nor the Attorney General had completed their
    investigations, and the purpose of the wiretapping had not been
    determined at year's end.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in
    practice. Print and broadcast journalists from all major media outlets
    regularly and freely criticize the Government and report opposition
    views. Opposition figures are interviewed routinely on television and
    radio, and in the press. According to major media associations, the
    Government did not use direct or indirect means to control the media.
    However, some television stations complained that advertising agencies
    responsible for placement of government-funded public service
    announcements were biased in favor of media companies that generally
    supported government policy.
        The Inter-American Press Association identified problems in several
    areas, including the absence of a law providing for journalists' right
    to maintain the confidentiality of sources. In September some news
    organizations criticized the Government for attempting to require all
    television and radio stations to broadcast the President's speech and
    related events celebrating Independence Day. Several organizations
    refused to broadcast events other than the President's speech; however,
    the Government took no action against them.
        There are 5 daily newspapers, with a combined circulation of more
    than 250,000 copies per day, and 12 television stations. Four
    independent VHF television stations reach most areas of the country,
    while the government-owned and operated VHF station has poor signal
    quality even in San Salvador. Seven independent UHF stations serve San
    Salvador, and several can be received as far as 30 miles from the
    capital. Two cable television systems cover much of the capital, and
    other cable companies operate in the major cities of San Miguel, Santa
    Ana, and Sonsonate. All carry major local stations and a wide range of
    international programming. There are approximately 20 small cable
    television companies across the country, serving limited local areas.
    While most of them appear to be authorized broadcasters, several are
    believed to be pirating signals. Approximately 150 licensed radio
    stations broadcast on the FM and AM bands.
        A provision in the 1999 Criminal Code allows judges to close court
    proceedings if public exposure could prejudice the case. The media and
    the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) have asserted that the
    provision abridges press freedom. In the past, legislative deputies
    have argued that misuse of the provision could lead to impunity and
    corruption by limiting the ``watchdog'' role of the press.
        There were no instances of censorship of books, other publications,
    films, or plays.
        The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and the Government
    respects this right in practice.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for peaceful assembly for any lawful purpose, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. There is no requirement for
    permits to hold public meetings, and public demonstrations are common
    and generally peaceful. A court determined that the Government's use of
    force to disperse a demonstration by striking social security workers
    in March was appropriate (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        The Supreme Court still had not decided a constitutional challenge
    to a 1996 law charging the Ministry of Interior with registering,
    regulating, and overseeing the finances of NGO's and non-Catholic
    religious groups, which a group of affected organizations filed in
    1998.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Constitution specifically recognizes the Roman Catholic Church and
    grants it legal status. In addition, the Constitution provides that
    other churches may register for such status in accordance with the law.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The law does not include specific provisions for granting refugee
    or asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
    however, the Government has procedures for handling such requests in
    accordance with these principles.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum has not
    arisen in recent years. There were no reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The President and Vice President are elected every
    5 years. The Constitution bars the President from election to
    consecutive terms. Voting is by secret ballot.
        Ten political parties, representing the full political spectrum,
    fielded 7 candidates in the March 1999 presidential elections. The
    Government did not restrict opposition participation, and there were no
    violent incidents during the campaign. Observers found that the vote
    was without major flaws and proceeded peacefully with fair access to
    the polls for all. Francisco Flores, the candidate of the ARENA party,
    won a clear majority in the first round of voting.
        In March the country held legislative elections that observers
    generally reported to be free and fair. The FMLN won a plurality of
    legislative seats.
        Four PAN members were killed in two separate incidents in February
    prior to the March elections (see Section 1.a.).
        There are no laws or overt practices that prevent women from voting
    or participating in the political and governmental systems; however,
    women are not accorded equal respect or stature in these areas and are
    under-represented in government and politics. Women head three
    ministries (Foreign Affairs, Education, and Environment) and the Social
    Security Institute, and hold a substantial number of vice- and sub-
    ministerial jobs. Women represented 49 percent of the registered voters
    in the March election. In March voters elected 8 women to the 84-seat
    legislature, a decrease from the previous Assembly's 14 women. One
    woman sits on the Assembly's 11-member governing board; there were 2
    women on the board in the previous legislature.
        Minorities, including indigenous people, are not barred from voting
    or participating in government and politics; however, they are
    underrepresented.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government generally demonstrated a willingness to discuss
    human rights issues and problems with international and domestic NGO's.
    However, it was sometimes reluctant to discuss worker rights issues
    with NGO's. Numerous domestic and various international NGO's operated
    freely. Domestic and international NGO's are required to register with
    the Government under the terms of the 1996 NGO registration law, and
    some reported difficulties.
        The principal human rights investigative and monitoring body is the
    Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH), elected by the
    Assembly for a 3-year term. The Peace Accords specifically created the
    PDDH, which was established formally by an amendment to the
    constitution that defined its role.
        Ombudsman Eduardo Penate Polanco resigned in February. The Attorney
    General had charged him with diverting funds from international donors
    while he worked in a previous job, and the Legislative Assembly was
    preparing to remove him from office for negligence. Following his
    resignation, the office continued its work under an acting Ombudsman
    while the Legislative Assembly considered other candidates. The
    office's investigative capacity remained limited due to resource
    constraints. The institution remained handicapped because the interim
    official lacked confirmation by the Assembly and therefore did not have
    the same authority as a permanent ombudsman.
        During the year, the PDDH accepted 2,572 complaints of human rights
    violations. The rights most frequently alleged to have been violated
    included personal integrity and due process of law; 566 complaints.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
    and prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, sex, or
    religion. In practice, discrimination against women, the disabled, and
    indigenous people occurs in salaries and hiring. There were some
    instances of violence against homosexuals.
        There were no new developments in the 1999 shooting of a man
    leaving the office of the domestic homosexual rights organization Entre
    Amigos, or in the telephonic death threats against the director of that
    organization. There were no new developments in the 1999 murders of
    transvestite prostitutes ``Doris'' and Nestor Adonai Marenco (known as
    ``Gloria'') nor in the murders of transvestite prostitutes in 1998.
        There was no new information in the 1999 case of PNC agents in
    Chalatenango department charged with hitting, insulting, and
    threatening six homosexuals.
        Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is a
    widespread and serious problem. The law prohibits domestic violence and
    provides for sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year in prison upon
    conviction. Convicted offenders are prohibited from using alcohol or
    drugs and from carrying guns. The law also allows the imposition of
    restraining orders against offenders. Once a taboo social subject,
    domestic violence increasingly is being recognized publicly and has
    become a topic for national debate. Government institutions, such as
    the PDDH, the Attorney General's office, the Supreme Court, and the
    PNC, coordinated efforts with NGO's and other organizations to combat
    violence against women through education, government efforts to
    increase enforcement of the law, and NGO support programs for victims.
    The National Secretariat for the Family maintains a hot line for
    victims to report domestic abuse. The Salvadoran Institute for the
    Development of Women (ISDEMU) received 4,017 cases of domestic violence
    through August, a number slightly down from the same period in 1999.
    Incidents of domestic violence and rape continued to be underreported
    for several reasons: societal and cultural pressures against the
    victim; a fear of reprisal; poor response to victims by the
    authorities; fear of publicity; and the belief that cases are unlikely
    to be resolved. The penalties for sexually aggressive rape are 6 to 10
    years in prison. The law does not specifically address spousal rape;
    however, it could be considered a crime if the actions meet the
    Criminal Code's definition of rape. The ISDEMU received 277 cases of
    sexual aggression through August, a slight increase above the same
    period in 1999.
        Prostitution is common. There were credible reports that some women
    and girls were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
        Women are trafficked to Mexico to work as prostitutes (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        The law prohibits sexual harassment. In May the authorities
    dismissed a deputy police commissioner for having sexually harassed a
    female subordinate.
        The Constitution grants women and men the same legal rights;
    however, women suffer discrimination.
        Women suffer from cultural and societal discrimination and have
    significantly reduced economic opportunities. Priority generally is
    given to male children for schooling, to men for available jobs and
    promotions, and to sons for inheritances. Women are not accorded equal
    respect or stature in traditional male-dominated areas such as
    agriculture and business. On June 15, the Legislature ratified
    International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention Number 100, on equal
    remuneration. However, while there is no definitive evidence available,
    it is widely believed that women often are paid less than men for equal
    work. The one sector in which there is an exception to this practice is
    in the export processing zones and in-bond assembly plants, the largest
    source of new jobs, where women made up 85 to 90 percent of the work
    force (see Section 6.b.). However, even in this sector, men hold the
    majority of management positions. Training for women generally was
    confined to low-wage occupational areas where women already hold most
    positions, such as teaching, nursing, home industries, and small
    businesses. The law prohibits pregnant women from working in strenuous
    occupations after the fourth month of pregnancy (see Section 6.e.).
        Several NGO's are engaged in promoting women's rights and have
    conducted several rights awareness campaigns.
        Children.--The Government concentrated more on reducing poverty and
    promoting family stability through economic growth than in direct
    expenditure on children's programs. The National Secretariat of the
    Family solicited public input on a new national policy of comprehensive
    attention for children and adolescents.
        Education is compulsory through the 9th grade (up to age 14).
    Public education is free through high school, and only a nominal fee is
    charged to attend the national public university. Rural areas fell
    short of providing a ninth grade education to all potential students,
    in part because of a lack of resources and in part because many rural
    parents withdraw their children from school by the sixth grade to work.
    UNICEF data from 1998 show that 14 percent of urban children (ages 7-
    17) and 29 percent of rural children were not attending classes.
        The Government worked through state institutions and with UNICEF to
    promote protection and general awareness of children's rights. However,
    children continued to be victimized by physical and sexual abuse,
    abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The Salvadoran Institute for
    the Protection of Children (ISPM), an autonomous entity, has
    responsibility for protecting and promoting children's rights. The ISPM
    estimated that an average of 2,600 children, some abandoned and others
    victims of mistreatment, stayed in its shelters. For the year, it
    reported 1,126 cases of physical mistreatment, 267 cases of negligence,
    and 374 cases of abandonment. All of these statistics were below those
    for the same period in 1999 when the ISPM reported approximately 1,500
    cases of mistreatment, 650 cases of negligence, and 700 cases of
    abandonment. Using different criteria, the ISDEMU recorded 3,071 cases
    of abuse during the year, significantly below the 1999 level of 10,070
    cases. The difference reflects a change in reporting criteria.
        Substance abuse (glue and paint sniffing) was a problem among urban
    street children. FUNDASALVA, an NGO, provides drug counseling and
    treatment to minors. In the past, there have been allegations from
    children's rights advocates that street children suffer from police
    brutality. The PNC denied these charges and incorporated PDDH human
    rights training into programs for police units that deal with
    juveniles.
        The ISPM reported 87 cases of sexual abuse, a slight increase from
    the 1999 figure of 72. A majority of the victims were female. According
    to the PDDH, over 85 percent of all abuse occurs in schools and at
    home, and only a small percentage of these cases were reported to the
    authorities.
        The PDDH estimated that 270,000 minors work, most as street vendors
    (see Section 6.d.). In addition to lost educational opportunities, some
    of these children fell victim to sexual abuse and were exploited and
    forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Between 10 and
    25 percent of ``visible'' prostitutes are minors, and an estimated 40
    percent of the ``hidden'' prostitutes who cater to upper-class clients
    are believed to be minors, according to a UNICEF study released during
    the year.
        Children, especially those living on the streets, are trafficked to
    other countries and then forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
        Children from Honduras have been used as beggars to support
    traffickers in San Salvador (see Section 6.f.).
        Infant malnutrition continued to be a problem. A National Family
    Health Poll, conducted in 1998 and released in December 1999, found
    that 1.1 percent of children under 5 years of age suffered from grave
    malnutrition, with an additional 21 percent experiencing less severe
    malnutrition. The Ministry of Health listed malnutrition as one of the
    10 principal causes of infant mortality in the country. The Government
    has a national plan for infants designed to increase access to potable
    water, iodized salt, and micronutrients, and to encourage breast
    feeding, but all of these remain problem areas, especially among the
    rural poor.
        People with Disabilities.--Government efforts to combat
    discrimination and increase opportunities for the disabled are growing
    but inadequate, with the exception of the war wounded, who have secured
    both government and international funding for rehabilitation and
    retraining programs. In May the Legislative Assembly passed a law
    mandating that new or renovated public buildings be accessible to the
    disabled. The law also required businesses to employ 1 person with a
    disability for every 25 employees, an increase from the preexisting
    requirement of 1 to 50. Although the Government had not enforced the
    previous law's employment quota, it brought together dozens of
    government agencies and nongovernmental organizations to discuss ways
    to implement the new law effectively. However, the Ministry of Labor
    has only two persons to handle all issues related to the disabled, and
    its records are kept on paper files in its regional branches.
    Therefore, there are no reliable data on the number of disabled
    persons, nor on how many are employed.
        Access by the disabled to basic education was limited due to lack
    of facilities and appropriate transportation. There was no provision of
    state services for the physically disabled. Only a few of the
    Government's community-based health promoters have been trained to
    treat the disabled, and they rarely provided such service. The Ministry
    of Health estimated that 10 percent of the population is afflicted by
    some form of disability. Many disabilities are directly attributable to
    the civil war. Other contributing factors included lack of prenatal
    care, misuse of pesticides in food production, malnutrition, auto
    accidents, and criminal violence.
        There were several organizations dedicated to protecting and
    promoting the rights of the disabled, but funding was insufficient.
    Foreign funds for badly needed rehabilitation services channeled
    through the Telethon Foundation ProRehabilitation, a local private
    voluntary organization, helped address numerous rehabilitation issues
    and provided alternatives for the education and rehabilitation of the
    disabled population. A semiautonomous institute, the Salvadoran
    Rehabilitation Institute for the Disabled, has 10 centers throughout
    the country and offers medical treatment, counseling, special education
    programs, and professional training courses to the disabled. The
    Government and national and international private and nongovernmental
    organizations provide its funding.
        Indigenous People.--The country is ethnically homogeneous, although
    a very small segment of the population still claims indigenous status.
        The Constitution states that native languages are part of the
    national heritage and should be preserved and respected. In reality,
    very few persons speak the indigenous language of Nahuatl. There are no
    national laws regarding indigenous rights.
        Early in the century, facing active repression, most indigenous
    people adopted local customs and successfully assimilated into the
    general population, from which they are generally indistinguishable.
    There are a few very small communities whose members still wear
    traditional dress and maintain traditional customs to a recognizable
    degree without repression or interference. There are no special rights
    for indigenous people; however, they are allowed to make decisions
    regarding their communal lands just as any other landowners under
    Article 105 of the Constitution. These small indigenous groups exist in
    the poorest parts of the rural countryside where employment
    opportunities are few and domestic violence is a problem.
        Indigenous people reportedly earned less than other agricultural
    laborers. Indigenous women in particular had little access to
    educational and work opportunities due to cultural practices, lack of
    resources, and rural underdevelopment. As with the poor rural sector in
    general, access to land was a growing problem confronting indigenous
    people. Few possessed titles to land, and bank loans and other forms of
    credit were extremely limited.
        There are some small, active indigenous associations. The largest
    and best known is the National Association of Indigenous Salvadorans.
        Religious Minorities.--There were no new developments in the
    investigation of the 1999 burglaries at offices of the Lutheran Church.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    rights of workers and employers to form unions or associations, and the
    Government generally respected these rights; however, there were some
    problems. There were repeated complaints by workers, in some cases
    supported by the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee on
    Freedom of Association (CFA), that the Government impeded workers from
    exercising their right of association.
        Union leaders asserted that the Government and judges continued to
    use excessive formalities to deny applications for legal standing to
    unions and federations. Among the requirements to obtain legal
    standing, unions must have a minimum of 35 members in the workplace,
    hold a convention, and elect officers. In March the Government denied
    an application from five food industry unions to form a federation,
    because they allegedly had made procedural errors in their application.
    In a complaint submitted to the ILO, the unions asserted that the
    Government had not given them an opportunity, as required by law, to
    correct the errors in their application. The CFA, in its November
    report, supported the workers' view, observing that it ``deeply
    regretted'' that the Government had not worked to overcome procedural
    problems that ``could easily have been rectified.'' It criticized the
    Government, observing that ``formalities should not be of such a nature
    as to impair the free establishment of organizations.'' In September
    the unions submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court that remained
    pending at year's end.
        In 1999 the CFA similarly cited the Government for its failure to
    provide protection or remedy for a number of labor leaders fired in
    1998 during the process of privatizing the state-owned telephone
    company. The finding concluded that the Labor Code imposed excessive
    formalities for the recognition of a trade union, and found that the
    application of the law repeatedly was used to refuse legal status to a
    trade union in the telephone company. The Committee called on the
    Government to complete the process for recognition of the
    telecommunications union, amend the Labor Code to remove the excessive
    formalities that the Committee concluded infringe on the right to form
    a union, seek to have the two union leaders who had not yet accepted
    severance pay reinstated, and ensure that future changes of company
    ownership did not threaten labor leaders or labor organizations.
        The Government asserted that the telephone company complied with
    the labor code by offering a severance payment to the fired workers.
        In September the Supreme Court determined that the Government had
    erred in denying legal standing to the telecommunications union and
    ordered the Government to grant it legal status. On October 23, the
    Government complied with the order and granted legal status to the
    union. However, TELECOM, the privatized successor to the state-owned
    telecommunications company, dismissed three union leaders in the next 5
    weeks. As part of a company restructuring process, it also asked dozens
    of employees, many of whom were union members, to submit resignations.
    Thirteen employees refused, and the company prohibited their entry to
    the workplace. Telecom petitioned the Ministry of Labor to decertify
    the union, asserting that the union had failed to follow correct
    procedures for obtaining legal recognition. In December the Ministry of
    Labor sought to mediate a mutually agreeable settlement between the
    parties, but was unsuccessful. The union filed a lawsuit against the
    company for violating the rights of the union members. At year's end,
    the suit had not gone to trial, and the Ministry of Labor had not ruled
    on the company's petition.
        There is a small organized labor sector with approximately 150
    active unions, public employee associations, and peasant organizations,
    representing over 300,000 citizens, approximately 20 percent of the
    total work force. Unions generally are independent of the Government,
    political parties, and other political forces. The Labor Code prohibits
    foreigners from holding leadership positions in unions.
        By law only private sector workers have the right to form unions
    and strike; some employees of autonomous public agencies may form
    unions if they do not provide essential services. Military personnel,
    police, and government workers may not form unions but are allowed to
    form professional and employee organizations. Some of the most powerful
    labor groups are public employee associations. They have the same
    responsibilities as unions, including calling technically illegal
    strikes and collective bargaining. The Government negotiated with
    public employee associations and generally treated their strikes as
    legitimate, although the Labor Code provides for mandatory arbitration
    of public sector disputes. The November CFA stated that ``denial of the
    right of association of public service employees to establish unions is
    an extremely serious violation.'' The Committee formally recommended
    that the Government amend national legislation to recognize the right
    of association of workers employed in the service of the State, with
    the possible exception of the armed forces and the police. There was
    one public sector strike during the year (see Section 1.c.).
        The law prohibits antiunion actions before a union is registered
    legally and prohibits the dismissal of workers whose names appear on a
    union application. The Constitution provides that union officials may
    not be fired, suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted
    except for legal cause from the time of their election until one year
    after the completion of their term of office. However, the Labor Code
    does not require the employers to reinstate them, but requires the
    employers to provide a severance payment. In practice, some employers
    dismissed workers who sought to form unions. The Government generally
    ensured that employers paid severance to these workers. However, the
    Government did not prevent their dismissal or require their
    reinstatement.
        The Committee on Freedom of Association cited one case in which a
    private firm blocked the formation of a union by coercing the union
    founders to resign 1 hour before the union was to be recognized
    officially (see Section 6.b.).
        Unions can only strike after the expiration of a collective
    bargaining agreement. Unions must first seek to resolve differences
    through direct negotiation, mediation, and arbitration before striking.
    To be considered legal, the strike must aim to obtain or modify a
    collective bargaining agreement and to defend the professional
    interests of workers. Union members must approve a decision to strike
    through secret ballot. The union must name a strike committee to serve
    as a negotiator and send the list of names to the Ministry of Labor,
    who notifies the employer. The union must wait 4 days from the time the
    Ministry notifies the employer before beginning the strike.
        In June the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Government's
    dismissal of striking Social Security Institute workers in 1999 was
    illegal. In accordance with that ruling, in August the Social Security
    Institute reinstated 187 of the 219 workers. The remaining workers
    requested a severance payment in lieu of reinstatement.
        The Labor Code prohibits partisan political activity by unions. The
    unions routinely ignored this prohibition, but the Government took no
    punitive action against them.
        Unions and other labor organizations freely affiliated with
    international labor organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution and the Labor Code provide for collective bargaining
    rights for employees in the private sector and for certain categories
    of workers in autonomous government agencies, such as utilities and the
    port authority. However, both private sector unions (by law) and public
    sector employee associations (in practice) used collective bargaining.
        The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of collective
    bargaining agreements and acts as a conciliator in labor disputes in
    the private sector and in autonomous government institutions. In
    practice, ministers and the heads of autonomous government institutions
    often negotiate with labor organizations directly, relying on the
    Ministry of Labor only for such functions as officially certifying
    unions. The Ministry often seeks to conciliate labor disputes through
    informal channels rather than attempt to enforce regulations strictly,
    which has led to charges that the Ministry is biased against labor.
    Labor leaders assert that the Government had an unfair advantage in
    arbitration of public sector labor disputes, because the Government
    holds two of three seats on arbitration panels. (The employer, the
    workers, and the Labor Ministry each name one representative to a
    panel.) The arbitration panel for the Social Security labor dispute in
    March included a representative of the Labor Ministry, although the
    Labor Minister sits on the governing council of the Social Security
    Institute. Corruption continued to affect labor inspectors and courts.
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination against unions. It
    provides that union officials at the time of their election, throughout
    their term, and for 1 year following their term may not be fired,
    suspended for disciplinary reasons, removed, or demoted except for
    legal cause. Workers and the ILO reported instances of employers using
    illegal pressure to discourage organizing, including the dismissal of
    labor activists and the maintenance of lists of workers who would not
    be hired because they had belonged to unions.
        In reviewing the February firing of 44 union members by the La
    Salud Dairy, the Ministry of Labor found that the cooperative had the
    legal right to dismiss the workers. It cited a provision of the Labor
    Code that allows enterprises to suspend labor contracts when economic
    conditions require them to reduce their activities; however, the
    dismissals occurred 1 day before a deadline for completing the
    renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, and in letters to
    the fired workers, the company cited the union's negotiating position
    as the reason for the dismissals. Labor representatives stated that,
    after dismissing the first set of workers, management successfully
    pressured the 43 remaining members to resign from the union.
        There are approximately 220 maquila (in-bond assembly or
    processing) plants, the majority of which are located in the country's
    8 export processing zones (EPZ's). The Labor Code applies in the EPZ's;
    there are no special EPZ labor regulations.
        Most EPZ companies and a large portion of the maquila plants had
    voluntary codes of conduct promoted by their parent corporations or
    foreign purchasers. In addition, two EPZ's have their own codes of
    conducts for all tenants. These codes include worker rights protection
    clauses. Some companies in the EPZ's provided salaries and on-site
    benefits (e.g. clinics, cafeterias) competitive with the best private
    sector enterprises (see Section 6.e.). However, there were credible
    reports that some factories dismissed union organizers, and there are
    no collective bargaining agreements with the 19 unions that exist in
    the maquila sector. The International Confederation of Trade Unions
    (ICFTU) contended in its annual report that some EPZ workers also
    suffered low pay, health and safety risks, 12- to 14-hour workdays, and
    minimal toilet breaks.
        In January the clothing assembly factory DOALL reemployed workers
    that unions alleged it had dismissed illegally when they tried to form
    a union in 1999. The reinstatements followed pressure from DOALL's
    major foreign customer and involvement by the Ministry of Labor. In
    September the Ministry of Labor approved an application for legal
    standing for a union formed by the rehired workers. The Ministry had
    denied the union's original application in 1999 based on documentation
    provided by DOALL showing that the workers had resigned 1 hour before
    they held the union's constituent assembly. Union officials asserted
    that company management had falsified the letters of resignation. The
    Committee on Freedom of Association noted that the Government had not
    responded to the Committee's queries on this incident which it said
    included ``antiunion acts of discrimination and interference on the
    part of the company.''
        In October the Ministry of Labor opened branch offices in EPZ's to
    make its services more accessible to its users. The Ministry provided
    the staff, and the EPZ's covered other costs.
        In the past, there have been credible accusations that some
    factories abused their workers, and that some women were not hired
    because they were pregnant. Workers have reported mistreatment,
    threats, abuse, and sexual harassment. Although the Ministry of Labor
    has improved its efforts to increase inspection and follow up on such
    complaints, it still has insufficient resources to cover all the EPZ's,
    much less the much larger national private sector.
        Although a 1996 law gives the Ministry of Economy the power to
    withdraw free zone privileges from companies that violate labor
    regulations, there have been no instances in which this has been used
    or even threatened publicly. The ICFTU has reported persistent problems
    facing female employees in EPZ's, including mandatory pregnancy tests
    and firing of workers who are pregnant (see Section 5).
        On October 23, the Government complied with a Supreme Court order
    to provide legal standing to the telecommunications union (see Section
    6.a.).
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in the case of calamity
    and other instances specified by law, and the Government generally
    enforces this provision; however, there were reports that women were
    forced into prostitution (see Section 5).
        Although not specifically prohibited by law, forced and bonded
    labor by children are covered by the general prohibition. There were no
    reports of their use in the formal sector; however, there was strong
    evidence that minors have been forced into prostitution (see Sections 5
    and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution prohibits the employment of children
    under the age of 14; however, child labor is a problem. Minors, age 14
    or older, may receive special Labor Ministry permission to work, but
    only where such employment is indispensable to the sustenance of the
    minor and his or her family. This is most often the case with children
    of peasant families who traditionally work during planting and
    harvesting seasons. The law prohibits those under the age of 18 from
    working in occupations considered hazardous. The law limits the workday
    to 6 hours for youths between 14 and 18 years of age and sets a maximum
    normal workweek for youths at 36 hours. The PDDH estimated that 270,000
    minors work, most as street vendors.
        Orphans and children from poor families frequently work for their
    own or family survival as street vendors and general laborers in small
    businesses, mostly in the informal sector (see Section 5.). Children in
    these circumstances often do not complete schooling through the 9th
    grade, as the law requires. There were no reports of child labor in the
    industrial sector. It does not exist in the EPZ's.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor laws
    and made an effort to do so; however, scarce resources and the
    difficulty of monitoring the large informal sector limited its
    effectiveness outside the urban formal sector. On June 15, the
    Legislative Assembly ratified ILO Convention 182 on the elimination of
    the worst forms of child labor. In September the ILO's International
    Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) opened an office to
    help develop and support this effort. The Government continued to
    collaborate with IPEC on projects initiated in 1999. In March IPEC
    began a project with local NGO's, police, municipal officials, and
    fireworks producers to take 1,000 children out of the fireworks
    industry and prevent another 1,000 children from entering. The project
    includes community awareness programs, increased educational and health
    care opportunities for children, creation of alternative economic
    opportunities for families, and increased labor enforcement capacities.
    Similar programs target children in the coffee and shellfish extraction
    industries.
        The Labor Code does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded
    labor by children, but they are covered by its general prohibition;
    however, there were reports that minors were forced into prostitution
    (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set by
    executive decree based on recommendations from a tripartite
    (government, labor, and business) committee. The minimum daily wage is
    $4.80 (42.00 colones) for commercial, industrial, and service
    employees; $3.57 (31.20 colones) plus food allowance for coffee
    plantation workers; $2.61 (22.80 colones) plus food allowance for sugar
    and cotton plantation workers; and $2.47 (21.60 colones) plus food
    allowance for all other agroindustrial workers. The minimum wage with
    benefits does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing minimum wage
    laws and generally does so effectively in the formal sector. However,
    some maquila plants underpaid workers and failed to compensate them in
    accordance with the law for mandatory overtime.
        The law sets a maximum normal workweek of 44 hours. It limits the
    workweek to no more than 6 days for all workers. It requires bonus pay
    for overtime. By law a full-time minimum wage employee is paid for an
    8-hour day of rest in addition to the 44-hour normal workweek and
    receives an average of 1 month's wage a year in required bonuses plus 2
    weeks of paid vacation. Many workers worked more hours than the legal
    maximum.
        The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers, including
    the Government, to take steps to ensure that employees are not placed
    at risk in their workplaces. These laws prohibit the employment of
    persons under 18 years of age in occupations considered hazardous or
    morally dangerous, such as bars and billiard halls; the prohibition
    also applied to hazardous occupations such as agricultural work with
    poisonous chemicals or factory work with dangerous equipment. The Labor
    Code prohibits pregnant women from engaging in strenuous physical
    exertion at the workplace after the fourth month of pregnancy. Health
    and safety regulations are outdated, and enforcement is inadequate. The
    Ministry of Labor attempts to enforce the applicable regulations but
    has restricted powers and limited resources to enforce compliance.
    Workers in some maquilas expressed concerns about unhealthy drinking
    water, unsanitary bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate
    ventilation (problems with dust and heat). Some of the largest plants
    have dust control, air conditioning, on-site medical facilities, and
    enforced safety regimes.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in persons; however, it stipulates that any crime involving
    ``commerce in women or children'' automatically carries a 30 percent
    increase in the prison sentence or fine that otherwise would be imposed
    for that crime. The Government enforces this provision.
        The country is a source of women and children for trafficking in
    prostitution to Mexico and other countries. There are credible reports
    that women and children are lured to Mexico by procurers only to be
    sold to owners of establishments there who then force the trafficked
    persons to work off the debt as sex workers. According to Guatemalan
    authorities, street children from El Salvador are lured to border areas
    with Guatemala where they are then forced into prostitution by
    organized rings.
        According to press reports, Honduran children were brought to San
    Salvador to beg for their sponsors. The Government investigated and
    took a number of children into custody. When their parents could not be
    found, they were turned over to the ISPM.
                                   __________

                                    GRENADA

        Grenada is a parliamentary democracy, with a Governor General as
    titular Head of State. In the January 1999 parliamentary elections,
    Prime Minister Keith Mitchell's New National Party (NNP) won all 15
    seats and formed a new government. Subsequently, one Member of
    Parliament left the NNP and became the sole opposition member. The
    elections were conducted openly and fairly and were free of violence.
    The judiciary is independent.
        The 755-member Royal Grenada Police Force is responsible for
    maintaining law and order. It is controlled by and responsive to
    civilian authorities. There were occasional allegations of abuse by the
    police.
        Grenada has a free market economy based on agriculture and tourism.
    The projected annual real economic growth rate was 5.3 percent,
    compared with about 8 percent in 1999. Per capita gross domestic
    product was approximately $3,205.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Violence against
    women is common. Child abuse is a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reported incidents of torture. Flogging, a legal form of punishment,
    is rare but has been used as punishment for sex crimes and theft cases.
        There were no media reports of police brutality during the year.
    Allegations of police brutality are investigated internally by the
    police. The Police Commissioner can discipline officers in valid cases
    of brutality with penalties that may include dismissal from the force.
    The Police Commissioner has spoken out strongly against police use of
    unlawful force.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides the
    police with the right to detain persons on suspicion without a warrant,
    but they must bring formal charges within 48 hours. The police adhere
    to this time limit in practice. If the police do not charge a detainee
    within 48 hours, they must release the person.
        The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of
    detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge. The police
    must formally arraign or release a detained person within 60 days, and
    the authorities generally followed these procedures. There is a
    functioning system of bail, although persons charged with capital
    offenses are not eligible. Persons charged with treason may be accorded
    bail only upon the recommendation of the Governor General.
        In January the Government announced establishment of a Truth and
    Reconciliation Commission with a broad mandate to examine events in the
    country from 1976 through 1991. The Commission's terms of reference
    specify the objective of recommending ``general amnesty to certain
    persons who in the opinion of the Commission have given truthful
    information during the hearing of evidence.'' The Commission is
    expected to review the convictions of former Deputy Prime Minister
    Bernard Coard and other leaders of the former People's Revolutionary
    Government for their roles in the 1983 assassination of former Prime
    Minister Maurice Bishop and his cabinet colleagues. In 1986 a court
    convicted Coard and 18 other revolutionary leaders of murder and
    sentenced them to death; subsequently, 2 were pardoned, and the
    sentences of the remaining 17 commuted to life in prison. Of these, one
    person was granted parole to undergo medical treatment overseas. At
    year's end, the Commission was preparing to begin its work.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, a part of the
    Eastern Caribbean legal system, is independent. Final appeal may be
    made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. Those arrested on
    criminal charges are brought before a judge to determine whether there
    is sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges; if there is, the
    judge remands the defendant for trial.
        The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the
    authorities observe it in practice. There is a presumption of
    innocence, and the law protects persons against self-incrimination and
    requires the police to explain a person's rights upon arrest. The
    accused has the right to remain silent and to seek the advice of legal
    counsel. A defense lawyer has the right to be present during
    interrogation and may advise the accused how to respond or not to
    respond to questions. The accused has the right to confront his
    accuser.
        The court appoints attorneys for indigents only in cases of murder
    or other capital crimes. In other criminal cases that reach the
    appellate stage, the court appoints a lawyer to represent the accused
    if the defendant was not previously represented or reappoint earlier
    counsel if the appellant no longer can afford that lawyer's services.
    Due to the backlog of cases caused by a shortage of judges and
    facilities, up to 6 months can pass before those charged with serious
    offenses face trial in the High Court. With the exception of persons
    charged with murder and foreign-born drug suspects, the courts grant
    most defendants bail while awaiting trial.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions. The law generally
    requires judicially issued warrants for searching homes, except in
    cases of hot pursuit. The Firearms Act of 1968 and the Drug Abuse
    Prevention Act Number 7 of 1992 contain other exceptions that give the
    police and security units legal authority to search persons and
    property without warrants in certain circumstances. In practice police
    obtain warrants in the majority of cases before conducting any search.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. There are three weekly newspapers, and several
    other newspapers publish irregularly. One of the weeklies is affiliated
    with an opposition political party, but the three most widely
    circulated newspapers are independent and often critical of the
    Government. The newspapers routinely carry press releases by the
    opposition parties, including regular weekly columns expressing the
    opposition parties' views.
        There are six radio stations. The main station is part of the
    Grenadian Broadcasting Network (GBN), a privately owned organization in
    which the Government holds a minority share. The principal television
    station is also part of the GBN. A privately owned television station
    began broadcasting in 1992. A cable television company operates in most
    areas of the country. All newspapers, radio, and television stations
    enjoy independence from the State and regularly report opposition
    views. The television news often carried reports on opposition
    activities, including coverage of political rallies held by various
    political parties and candidates, public forums featuring political
    leaders of each of the major parties, and other public service
    broadcasts.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right to assemble for any peaceful purpose, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Supporters of political
    parties meet frequently and hold public rallies; the authorities
    require permits for the use of a public address system but not for
    public meetings themselves.
        The Constitution provides for the right to association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement within the country, and all citizens have the right to enter
    and leave the country, except in special circumstances as outlined in
    and limited by the 1986 Act to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of
    Certain Persons. This law allows the Minister for National Security to
    restrict travel out of the country by any person whose aims,
    tendencies, or objectives include the overthrow of the democratic and
    parliamentary system of government; it has not been invoked in the past
    few years. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3 months to an
    independent and impartial tribunal. The Chief Justice appoints an
    accredited lawyer to preside over such a tribunal.
        No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
    exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There
    were no reports of forced return of persons to a country where they
    feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. General elections must be held every 5 years; in
    January 1999, Prime Minister Keith C. Mitchell's NNP was returned to
    office, securing all 15 seats in Parliament. Since then one Member of
    Parliament changed party affiliation to become the single elected
    opposition member, leaving the NNP with a majority of 14 seats.
        There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by
    women in government and politics. Four of the 15 elected Members of
    Parliament are women; there are no women among the 13 appointed
    Senators. Women account for 7 of the 13 permanent secretaries, the
    highest civil service position in each ministry; in addition, a woman
    is the Cabinet Secretary, the highest civil service position in the
    Government.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Local human rights groups operate without government restriction,
    and the Government cooperates with visits from international human
    rights organizations. In September Amnesty International established
    its regional office for the Eastern Caribbean in Grenada.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of
    origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex, and the Government
    generally adheres to these provisions.
        Women.--Women's rights monitors believe that violence against women
    remains a serious problem; however, they reported a decrease in such
    incidents during 1998, and more recent figures were not available. The
    police state that most cases of abuse are not reported, and others are
    settled out of court. The law stipulates a sentence of 15 years'
    imprisonment for a conviction of any nonconsensual form of sex.
    Sentences for assault against a spouse vary according to the severity
    of the incident. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was preparing a public
    relations campaign to increase awareness of the problem of domestic
    violence. In September 1999, a shelter for battered and abused women
    and their children opened in the northern part of the island, with
    medical and psychological counseling personnel on its staff. The home
    accommodates 20 persons.
        Sexual harassment in the workplace is a problem.
        There is no evidence of official discrimination in health care,
    employment, or education. Women frequently earn less than men
    performing the same work; such wage differences are less marked for the
    more highly paid jobs.
        Prostitution is illegal.
        Children.--The Social Welfare Division within the Ministry of Labor
    provides probationary and rehabilitative services to youths, day care
    services and social work programs to families, assistance to families
    wishing to adopt or foster children, and financial assistance to the
    six children's homes run by private organizations.
        Education is compulsory until the age of 16.
        Government social service agencies reported a further increase in
    the number of child abuse cases, including sexual abuse. Abused
    children are placed either in a government-run home or in private
    foster homes. The law provides for harsh penalties against those
    convicted of child abuse and disallows the victim's alleged ``consent''
    as a defense in cases of incest. Women's organizations and other
    nongovernmental organizations increased their public awareness efforts
    to recognize and combat sexual abuse of women and children.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not protect job seekers
    with disabilities from discrimination in employment, nor does it
    mandate provision of accessibility for public buildings or services.
    The National Council for the Disabled and the National Children's Home
    assist the Government in placing disabled students into community
    schools. The Council also seeks assistance from architects and builders
    in the construction of ramps at hotels and public buildings, and ramps
    have been installed at some hotels and government buildings.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--All workers are free to organize
    independent labor unions. Labor Ministry officials estimate that 35
    percent of the work force is unionized. Union leaders play a
    significant role in the political process, and one labor leader serves
    in the Senate on behalf of the Grenada Trades Union Council (GTUC).
        Workers in the private and public sectors are free to strike, once
    legal and procedural requirements are met. There were several incidents
    of industrial action, including brief strikes by teachers, port
    authority workers, and private sector workers. Workers at the water
    company and the telephone company briefly employed ``work-to-rule''
    tactics. However, all such actions were short-lived and settled with
    the intervention of the Labor Commission, the Minister of Labor, or the
    Industrial Court. All unions are technically free of government
    control, and none receive government financial support. However, all of
    the major unions belong to one umbrella labor federation, the GTUC,
    which is subsidized by the Government. The GTUC holds annual
    conventions and determines some policies for member unions.
        The GTUC and its unions freely affiliate with regional and
    international trade union groups.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
    free to organize and to participate in collective bargaining.
    Legislation requires employers to recognize a union that represents the
    majority of workers in a particular business. The law prohibits
    discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. If a
    complaint of discrimination arises, mechanisms exist to resolve it.
    After all avenues for resolving a complaint have been exhausted between
    union representatives and employers, both sides may agree to ask for
    the assistance of the Labor Commissioner. If the Labor Commissioner is
    unable to find a resolution to the impasse, the Minister of Labor
    intervenes and, if unable to reach an agreement, may appoint an
    arbitration tribunal if both parties agree to abide by its ruling. The
    law requires employers who are found guilty of antiunion discrimination
    to rehire dismissed employees, but in most cases the employee accepts
    the option of compensation. There were no cases of antiunion
    discrimination reported to the Ministry during the year.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that of
    children, and it is not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Child labor is illegal; however, children sometimes work
    in the agricultural sector. The statutory minimum age for employment of
    children is 16 years. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor enforce
    this provision in the formal sector by periodic checks. Enforcement
    efforts in the informal sector are lax. The Constitution prohibits
    forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
    occurred (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no minimum wage laws
    in force. Most workers, including nonunionized workers, receive
    packages of benefits from employers set by collective bargaining
    agreements between employers and labor unions. In many cases, overall
    wages and benefits are not sufficient to provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. Many agricultural workers earn only
    about $5.37 to $5.55 (EC$14.50 to EC$15.00) per day.
        The Constitution stipulates that the maximum number of hours per
    week workers may work is 40. The law does not prescribe a standard
    workweek, except for the public sector, which is expected to work a 40-
    hour week Monday through Friday. The normal workweek in the commercial
    sector includes Saturday morning work but does not exceed 40 hours.
        The Government sets health and safety standards, but the
    authorities enforce them unevenly. Workers can remove themselves from
    dangerous workplace situations without jeopardy to continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
    trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                   GUATEMALA

        Guatemala is a democratic republic with separation of powers and a
    centralized national administration. The 1985 Constitution provides for
    election by universal suffrage of a one-term president and a unicameral
    congress. On January 14, Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) candidate
    Alfonso Portillo replaced President Alvaro Arzu of the National
    Advancement Party (PAN), following a free and fair December 1999 runoff
    election. The FRG also holds a majority (63 seats) in the 113-member
    Congress. Despite significant pledges, the Portillo administration took
    only limited steps to implement the Peace Accords that the Government
    concluded with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
    guerrillas in 1996. The judiciary is independent; however, it suffers
    from inefficiency, intimidation, and corruption.
        The Minister of Interior oversees the National Civilian Police
    (PNC), created in January 1997 under the terms of the Peace Accords.
    The PNC has sole responsibility for internal security; however, during
    the year some members of the predecessor National Police (PN) remained
    on duty, and awaited mandated training to become PNC officers. There
    are no active members of the military in the police command structure,
    but for the past 3 years, the Government has ordered the army to
    support the police temporarily in response to an ongoing nationwide
    wave of violent crime. On March 21, Congress enacted a law that enabled
    the Government to continue this practice. Under the new law, military
    personnel were not subordinated clearly to police control during joint
    patrols or operations; however, in practice army units generally were
    subordinated to police control in situations such as PNC road
    checkpoints, security deployments around prisons, and deployments in
    response to reported lynchings. The Constitution requires the Minister
    of Defense to be either a colonel or a general in the military. On
    January 14, a bill was submitted that would enable the President to
    appoint a civilian as Minister of Defense; in June Congress asked the
    Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of the bill. On
    October 3, the Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for the
    President, as Commander in Chief, to name a civilian as the Minister of
    Defense, with the rank of assimilated general. The President has been
    slow to carry out his commitment to dissolve the Presidential Military
    Staff (EMP) and to have its functions taken over by a civilian agency.
    On October 13, Interior Minister Byron Barrientos announced the
    creation of a citizen security brigade in Santiago Sacatepequez as a
    pilot project that may be extended to other parts of the country. Some
    members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
        The mostly agricultural-based, private sector-dominated economy
    grew by approximately 3 percent during the year. Coffee, sugar, and
    bananas are the leading exports, but tourism, textiles, and apparel
    assembly are key nontraditional export industries. According to a study
    by the Ministry of Agriculture, 4 percent of producers control 80
    percent of the land. About 40 percent of the work force are engaged in
    some form of agriculture, and subsistence agriculture is common in
    rural areas. According to the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), between
    50 and 60 percent of the population depends on subsistence farming.
    Officially, inflation was about 5.5 percent during the year, although
    most observers acknowledge that the official price index does not
    measure accurately actual price movements. There is a marked disparity
    in income distribution, and poverty is pervasive, particularly in the
    large indigenous community. Approximately 83 percent of citizens live
    in poverty; this figure rises to 90 percent among the indigenous
    population. According to the UNDP, 59 percent of the population live in
    extreme poverty. Combined unemployment and underemployment was
    estimated at 46 percent. Per capita gross domestic product was
    approximately $1,600 during the year. Remittances from citizens living
    abroad continue to grow as a major source of foreign currency.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens
    in many areas; despite improvements in some areas, serious problems
    remain in others. Some police officers committed extrajudicial
    killings. The investigation of the 1998 murder of Catholic bishop and
    human rights activist Juan Gerardi Conedera neared conclusion, and five
    defendants, including an army captain, a retired army colonel, and a
    former EMP specialist, were scheduled to stand trial. In May a
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) acting as legal representative for
    10 communities whose inhabitants were massacred by government forces in
    the early 1980's filed a criminal suit against the high command of the
    regime of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia, alleging
    genocide and other crimes. There was one credible report of forced
    disappearance attributed to the police. There were credible reports
    that some police tortured, abused, and mistreated suspects and
    detainees. Despite greater numbers of police officers on duty
    throughout the country, and less public apprehension about filing
    complaints against the police, the total number of such complaints
    remained roughly the same as the previous year. Arrests and
    administrative sanctions against police officers remained high. In May
    the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis (SAE), the President's Peace-
    Accords-mandated civilian think tank, announced that it had discovered
    a database containing the names and other personal information of over
    650,000 persons given to the SAE by Military Intelligence; the database
    appeared to have been compiled several years earlier. In June an NGO
    released a two-volume publication about the army and its conduct,
    personnel, and organization during the internal conflict. Prison
    conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy
    pretrial detention continued to be problems. Judges and other law
    enforcement officials are subject to intimidation and corruption, and
    the inefficient judicial system frequently is unable to ensure fair
    trials and due process. Efforts to reform the judiciary continued;
    however, the climate of impunity is a serious problem. The Government
    achieved convictions in a few important cases involving past human
    rights violations; however, more often cases remained pending for
    lengthy periods in the courts as defense attorneys took advantage of
    the inefficient judicial system and filed numerous, baseless motions
    and appeals to delay trial. Threats to and intimidation of witnesses,
    victims, prosecutors, and judges continued to be a serious problem.
    Although the Government increased the security it provided for judicial
    personnel and witnesses in key cases, many observers believe that the
    level of protection still is insufficient. From April to June, the
    number of threats against judicial personnel, journalists, and human
    rights workers increased significantly, further contributing to the
    public's already heightened sense of insecurity. Allegations persisted
    that the EMP infringed on citizens' privacy rights by monitoring
    private communications.
        The U.N. Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to
    monitor peace implementation and human rights issues. On March 3 and
    August 9, the Government signed a series of agreements in which it
    accepted responsibility for a number of human rights cases pending
    before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). By
    December 5, the Government was negotiation with the IACHR on 79 of 140
    pending cases. The Government began to pay reparations in a number of
    key cases. Violence and discrimination against women persisted, as did
    societal abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled and
    the indigenous population. Workers' efforts to form unions and
    participate in union activities are hindered by an ineffective legal
    system. Child labor and trafficking in women and children also are
    problems. Lynchings and mob violence continued, but at a significantly
    reduced rate, due in part to increased action by the PNC to combat
    lynchings. The Government conducted anti-lynching campaigns, achieved a
    very few convictions in past lynching cases, and made numerous arrests;
    however, fewer than a third of the hundreds of past lynching cases have
    gone to trial, and at year's end only one person was serving a prison
    sentence for taking part in a lynching. There was limited progress in
    the criminal case against a group of armed civilians who held the
    leaders of the principal banana workers' union at gunpoint in October
    1999 and forced them to resign from both their jobs and union
    positions.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    allegations of politically motivated killings by government agents;
    however, members of the police committed some extrajudicial killings.
    The Government demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest and
    prosecute those responsible and achieved some convictions in high-
    profile cases; however, in many cases, the scarcity of law enforcement
    resources and a weak prosecutorial and judicial system prevented the
    Government from adequately investigating killings and other crimes or
    arresting and successfully prosecuting perpetrators.
        The number of reported extrajudicial killings continued to decline.
    The office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH), which generally
    compiles data based on personal interviews with victims and their
    families, reported 13 complaints of extrajudicial killings during the
    year, compared with 16 complaints in 1999 and 32 complaints in 1998.
    Based on 20 complaints alleging 21 extrajudicial killings in the 9-
    month period between October 1, 1999, and June 30, MINUGUA investigated
    15 cases and confirmed 13. It reported 27 such complaints in the first
    9 months of the year.
        MINUGUA's 11th Human Rights Report, released on August 31, noted a
    number of extrajudicial killings by members of the PNC. Many of these
    cases involved accidental discharges of weapons, drunken misbehavior by
    on- or off-duty officers, questionable crowd control techniques, or
    poor judgment by officers who lost control of unstable situations
    involving angry crowds or persons resisting arrest. Other cases
    presented signs of premeditation and malicious intent. In many of these
    cases, there was effective investigation by both the PNC's Office of
    Professional Responsibility (ORP) and the prosecutors of the Public
    Ministry; however, in some cases, there was credible evidence of a
    coverup by PNC officers, the ORP, or both.
        On February 5, PNC officers without a warrant conducted a sting
    operation against street vendors of pirated music recordings in an
    outdoor market in Guatemala City. When a confrontation ensued with
    angry vendors, a combined patrol of additional police and army units
    was called to provide backup. As the situation deteriorated, police
    forces fired their weapons into the air to regain control of the crowd
    that had gathered. During the confusion, street vendor Francisco Ixcoy
    Osorio was shot and killed; other persons present were injured. The
    authorities investigated the killing and arrested several suspects. On
    June 5, the Public Ministry accused six PNC officers and three army
    soldiers of homicide. The PNC officers claimed that colleague Alfredo
    Saso Perez killed Osorio and that two of their superiors--Commissar
    Virgilio Ramos and Chief of Operations Diones Arriaza Solis--used death
    threats and false testimony to organize a coverup to impede the Public
    Ministry's investigation. In June the judge released the accused on
    bail and provisionally closed the case due to lack of evidence. The
    Public Ministry appealed this decision, arguing that a case should be
    pursued against Ramos and Arriaza, and that Saso Perez should be
    arrested. The Fourth Appellate Court rejected the appeal; however, the
    Public Ministry continued its investigation, and hoped to reopen the
    case if new evidence is found.
        On March 6, in San Jose Acatempa, Jutiapa, Byron Florian Yanez and
    Jose Mendez Interiano, two police officers in a PNC patrol car, shot
    off-duty PNC officer Sergio Barahona Arana from behind and killed him.
    MINUGUA found that the local PNC falsified its report of the incident,
    in which it claimed that Barahona had a gun in his hand when he died
    and that there had been a shootout with the other police officers.
    There was credible evidence that police later conducted searches and
    fired weapons into the front of a school building to simulate a gun
    battle as part of their coverup. MINUGUA also cited evidence that the
    ORP participated in the coverup by altering its investigative report.
    Florian Yanez was a fugitive until he was found dead of a gunshot wound
    on May 31 in Jutiapa. On April 5, the authorities arrested Mendez
    Interiano; he was in jail awaiting trial at year's end, accused of
    participating in the coverup. In addition, the Police Commissioner of
    Jutiapa has not collaborated with the Public Ministry prosecutor in the
    case; he refused to turn over photographs of the crime scene and the
    weapons used in the crime.
        On April 19, in Coban, Alta Verapaz, Denis Fredy Cucul Tun argued
    with PNC officers about the fact that his car was parked in a street
    that was to be cleared for a religious procession. Officer Rolando
    Salvador Rubio Choc took Cucul to the opposite side of the street, held
    him against a wall at arm's length, and shot him in the chest at
    pointblank range, killing him. Hearing the shot, a crowd quickly
    gathered and sought to lynch Rubio, who fled to the nearby police
    station. An ORP investigation quickly established Rubio's
    responsibility for the killing, despite his argument that his weapon
    accidentally discharged, and he was jailed while the Public Ministry
    conducted its investigation and prepared to go to trial. MINUGUA
    confirmed in its 11th report that PNC officers had tried to cover up
    the facts of the case and impede the Public Ministry's investigation.
    MINUGUA also noted that Rubio had violated PNC protocols by carrying a
    weapon that was loaded and contained unauthorized expanding cartridges.
        In some cases, detainees or prisoners died while in the custody of
    PNC officers or Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) detectives,
    apparently due to torture or abuse (see Section 1.c.).
        On March 11, detainee Luis Armando Colindres was found dead in his
    cell at a PNC substation in Zone 12 of the capital, apparently the
    victim of strangulation. The PNC claimed that Colindres hanged himself,
    but the forensic report found injuries consistent with a struggle to
    resist being strangled. A judge ordered the detention of PNC officers
    Santos Medardo Recinos Moran, Elman Avigail Garcia Pineda, and Jeremias
    Santiago Godoy Ramos on charges of homicide. On June 7, the judge
    granted a defense motion to modify the charges to material document
    fraud (because PNC reports were altered) and abandonment of duty and
    released the defendants on bail. A Public Ministry appeal of these
    decisions was pending at year's end.
        Although most cases from past years remained unresolved, there were
    some convictions during the year for past extrajudicial killings by
    members of the security forces. In contrast to 1999, there were fewer
    judicial setbacks in human rights cases. At year's end, trials
    continued in several high profile cases. In many other cases of past
    extrajudicial killings, there was little or no progress, often due to
    the tactics of defense attorneys who frequently abused the legal system
    by filing dilatory motions to derail impending trials against their
    military clients.
        The investigation entered its final stages and pretrial
    preparations began against five defendants in the April 1998 murder of
    Bishop Juan Gerardi Conedera, the Coordinator of the Archbishop's
    Office on Human Rights (ODHAG). President Portillo promised in his
    inaugural address that all state institutions would cooperate fully in
    the investigation. Bishop Gerardi was killed just 2 days after his
    public delivery of the final report of the ``Recovery of Historical
    Memory'' project, which held the military and its paramilitary allies
    responsible for more than 90 percent of the human rights violations
    committed during the 36-year-long internal conflict. After 2 years
    under Public Ministry witness protection, on January 17, former
    indigent Ruben Chanax Sontay gave additional testimony before Judge
    Flor de Maria Garcia Villatoro in which he implicated several
    individuals in Gerardi's murder. Based largely on Chanax's new
    testimony, on January 21, Judge Garcia issued arrest warrants for five
    suspects: Retired army Colonel Byron Disrael Lima Estrada; his son,
    army Captain Byron Miguel Lima Oliva; former EMP Specialist Jose
    Obdulio Villanueva Arevalo; Father Mario Leonel Orantes Najera; and
    former parish house cook Margarita Lopez. (Lopez, who was charged with
    being an accessory after the fact, had been detained briefly in 1998
    and then released.) Lima Estrada, Lima Oliva, and Margarita Lopez were
    arrested on January 21, followed by Villanueva on January 22. On
    February 9, Father Orantes, who had been arrested and charged with the
    murder in October 1998, then released in February 1999, secretly
    returned to the country and immediately checked into a hospital,
    claiming that his health was too poor to be sent to jail. On February
    15, Judge Garcia granted Orantes permission to remain in the hospital,
    based on a court-ordered medical examination that confirmed his health
    problems.
        Shortly after Villanueva's arrest, his defense attorney presented
    evidence indicating that he was actually in prison in Antigua on the
    night of Gerardi's murder, completing the final days of his prison
    sentence for the 1996 killing of Pedro Sas Rompich. On February 25,
    Judge Garcia released Villanueva, based on this new information and a
    lack of Public Ministry evidence to the contrary. On March 15, lead
    prosecutor Leopoldo Zeissig released the results of a handwriting
    analysis that demonstrated that Villanueva had not signed personally
    for his EMP paychecks in prison for several months, including at the
    time of the Gerardi murder. (Villanueva had remained on the EMP payroll
    while serving his prison sentence.) In early April, Zeissig also
    produced a former cellmate of Villanueva's, Gilberto Gomez Limon, who
    testified that Villanueva frequently was allowed to leave prison,
    including on the night of the Gerardi murder. This new evidence
    convinced Judge Garcia to order Villanueva's rearrest, which occurred
    on April 7.
        On March 16, Judge Garcia ruled that prosecutors had presented
    sufficient evidence against Margarita Lopez to send her case to trial
    on charges of participating in a criminal coverup. Also on March 16,
    Zeissig filed charges against navy Captain Carlos Rene Alvarado
    Fernandez for falsifying Villanueva's signatures on his paycheck
    receipts and lying to conceal the fraud. On March 21, another court-
    ordered medical exam confirmed that Father Orantes should continue to
    spend his pretrial detention in the hospital. In April Judge Garcia
    ruled that Father Orantes must face trial on charges of murder, based
    largely on Chanax's testimony and contradictions in Orantes' own
    statements. On April 24, Chanax left the country under Public Ministry
    witness protection due to concerns for his safety.
        On April 26, the Catholic Church was granted status as a private
    plaintiff in the case. ODHAG, as the Church's legal representative,
    gained the right under the law to present witnesses and other evidence
    at trial and to prosecute the accused alongside the Public Ministry
    prosecutors. On May 9, the Fourth Court of Appeals agreed with defense
    attorneys representing Father Orantes and Margarita Lopez that ODHAG
    did not have sufficient ``juridical standing'' to act as private
    plaintiff in the case against them. However, the ruling did not apply
    to ODHAG's participation in the case against the three military
    suspects.
        On May 18, Judge Garcia charged the three military suspects, Lima
    Estrada, Lima Oliva, and Villanueva, with the extrajudicial execution
    of Bishop Gerardi. The charge of ``extrajudicial execution,'' unlike
    the charge of murder, generally is reserved for members of security
    forces on active duty, although Lima Estrada was not on active duty in
    1998. The judge's decision was based largely on the testimony of
    witness Ruben Chanax Sontay, which placed all three military defendants
    at or near the crime scene on the night of the murder. In late July,
    witness Juana del Carmen Sanabria, the former administrator of Bishop
    Gerardi's parish house, left the country due to death threats. A total
    of seven judges, prosecutors, and witnesses have left the country due
    to threats and intimidation in the case. On August 1, Lima Oliva was
    involved in a disturbance in prison and was injured slightly. He
    claimed that other inmates were trying to kill him, but the other
    inmates claimed that he started the fight and was trying to take
    control of the cellblock. During the scuffle, several items, including
    a planner/organizer, disappeared from Lima Oliva's cell and later were
    found in the possession of Public Ministry prosecutors, whom Lima Oliva
    accused of masterminding the disturbance for the purpose of
    ``stealing'' the documents. On August 7, Judge Garcia granted
    conditional freedom to Margarita Lopez, allowing her to await trial
    under house arrest rather than in prison. Another courtordered medical
    exam in August confirmed that Father Orantes' poor health required that
    he remain hospitalized.
        After one judge recused herself for a supposed friendship with Lima
    Estrada and another resigned after being challenged for bias by ODHAG,
    in July a three-judge panel to hear the case at trial was constituted,
    with Judge Eduardo Cojulun presiding, joined by Judges Jazmin Barrios
    and Carlos Chin. A number of appeals and motions filed by the defense
    attorneys in July and August delayed the trial against all five
    defendants from October until early 2001. Prosecutors acknowledged
    publicly that they are pursuing a political motive theory for the
    upcoming trial, arguing that Gerardi was killed by current or former
    members of the military with the assistance of Father Orantes and
    Margarita Lopez. MINUGUA confirmed multiple complaints by Judge Garcia
    and other judicial colleagues, prosecutors, witnesses, and ODHAG staff
    of numerous threats and acts of intimidation, including telephone
    threats, electronic surveillance, and observation by unknown
    individuals following them on foot or in vehicles (see Sections 1.e.
    and 4).
        Negotiations continued regarding indemnification for the family of
    Pedro Sas Rompich, who was killed in 1996 by Jose Obdulio Villanueva
    Arevalo, while Villanueva was acting as a bodyguard for then-President
    Arzu. Villanueva has since served a commuted prison sentence for the
    killing and spent most of the year in jail as one of five suspects in
    the murder of Bishop Gerardi. A court-ordered damages award to be paid
    by Villanueva to the victim's survivors remained pending.
        On April 28, the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) annulled an
    appellate court's December 1999 verdict in the Xaman massacre case, in
    which an army patrol entered a refugee-returnee community at Xaman,
    Alta Verapaz, in October 1995, killing 11 persons and injuring 30
    others. The Appellate Court had found 15 members of the patrol innocent
    and resentenced the remaining 10 members to 12-year prison sentences.
    The prosecutor had appealed the Appellate Court's decision, feeling
    that the sentences were too lenient. The CSJ decision remanded the case
    back to the trial court for a retrial. At year's end, the case
    continued to be delayed by appeals that must be resolved before the
    retrial can begin. The original trial was the longest in the country's
    history and was marked by numerous death threats and acts of
    intimidation against judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and family members
    of the victims.
        Two former police officers sentenced to death in 1996 in the so-
    called Patrol No. 603 case remained on death row pending the outcome of
    several appeals by their defense attorney. The case stems from a 1995
    murder and attempted murder in what appeared to be a ``social
    cleansing'' operation, in which persons deemed socially undesirable
    (e.g., gang members, local delinquents, or convicts released from
    prison) are found murdered in circumstances suggesting that the killing
    was planned and carried out by an organized group. Similarly, there was
    no progress in the related case before the IACHR.
        The August 1994 killing by police of four workers at La Exacta farm
    remained under investigation, and the criminal case remained suspended.
    The parties continued to seek a resolution through the IACHR's amicable
    settlement procedures. Negotiations continued regarding a settlement of
    the pending labor court charges, with intervention from the Labor
    Ministry and the Presidential Human Rights Commission (COPREDEH) to
    install a Conciliation Court to resolve the dispute. The Center for
    Legal Assistance in Human Rights (CALDH) continued to represent the
    families of the deceased, the injured, and those who lost their jobs
    and homes during the illegal eviction. On August 9, President Portillo
    signed an agreement with the IACHR in which the Government acknowledged
    its responsibility for failure to provide justice in the case and
    promised both to pay reparations and pursue renewed criminal
    investigations against those responsible for the violence.
        An appellate court ruling remained pending in the case of the 1994
    murder of Constitutional Court president Epaminondas Gonzalez Dubon.
    Both the prosecution and defense appealed aspects of the May 1998
    murder conviction of Marlon Salazar and Roberto Antonio Trabanino, who
    were serving 27-year prison sentences for the crime at year's end. A
    third suspect, Mario Rene Salazar, remained at large. On August 8,
    another suspect implicated in the Gonzalez Dubon murder, Elser Omar
    Aguilar, was found dead in the trunk of a car in Guatemala City. His
    body showed signs of torture. In February an appellate court reaffirmed
    the 14-year jail sentence for narcotics trafficking imposed in July
    1999 on former Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rene Ochoa Ruiz, widely
    suspected of being the intellectual author of the Gonzalez Dubon
    murder.
        Defense attorneys in the case of the murder of anthropologist Myrna
    Mack Chang continued to file appeals in order to delay the proceedings,
    and the courts continued to fail to resolve those appeals in a timely
    manner. In January 1999, Judge Henry Monroy ordered a trial of the
    three high-ranking military officers accused of ordering the 1990
    murder: Retired General Edgar Augusto Godoy Gaitan, Colonel Juan
    Valencia Osorio, and Colonel Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera. A trial
    originally scheduled for early in the year was delayed by appeals filed
    by defense attorneys. On March 27, Myrna Mack's sister, Helen Mack
    Chang, met with CSJ representatives to learn why there had been no
    decision regarding a defense appeal filed on November 4, 1999, nearly 5
    months earlier (the law sets a 30-day time limit for resolving such
    appeals). CSJ representatives had no answer at that March 27 meeting,
    but on March 29, they announced that they actually had issued a
    decision in the appeal on March 23. That decision denied the appeal and
    fined the defense attorney approximately $130 (1,000 quetzals) for
    filing a frivolous appeal. On March 31, the defense attorney filed
    another appeal, this time of the CSJ's March 23 decision. On May 8,
    that appeal was recognized by the Constitutional Court, which set a May
    11 date for a hearing on the merits. However, the Court still had not
    resolved the appeal at year's end. EMP member Noel de Jesus Beteta, who
    confessed to the killing, continued to serve a 30-year sentence. On
    March 3, the Government signed an agreement with the IACHR in which it
    accepted responsibility for Myrna Mack's murder as well as the denial
    of justice and proposed an amicable settlement, which was refused by
    Helen Mack. A commission composed of a Guatemalan jurist and an
    international expert was established under IACHR auspices to monitor
    due process in the case.
        In November the Government reached a settlement with the
    InterAmerican Court of Human Rights to pay reparations to the survivors
    of the 1990 killing of three street children--Julio Roberto Caal
    Sandoval, Jovito Josue Juarez Cifuentes, and Anstraun Villagran--and
    two indigent adults, Federico Clemente Figueroa Tunchez and Henry
    Giovanni Contreras, by police officers (see Sections 4 and 5). In
    December 1999, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence that
    police officers Samuel Rocael Valdes and Nestor Fonseca were
    responsible for the deaths. The Court also ruled that the Government
    failed to protect the rights of the victims and provide them with
    justice.
        On August 9, the Government signed an agreement before the IACHR in
    which it accepted responsibility for its failure to provide justice in
    the unresolved disappearances in 1989 of 10 university students, 5 of
    whom were later found dead, and pledged to negotiate an amicable
    settlement with the victims' survivors, including reparations and
    criminal prosecution of those responsible.
        On August 11 and 12, the Inter-American Court held hearings to set
    the amount of compensation owed to the families of the victims in the
    ``white van'' case; the Court's decision remained pending at year's
    end. Separately, the Government also offered to enter into settlement
    negotiations with the victims' survivors. In March 1998, the Court had
    found the Government liable in the case, in which members of the now-
    disbanded Treasury Police kidnaped and then either released or killed
    11 persons in 198788.
        In the case of the 1982 military massacre at Dos Erres, Peten,
    prosecutors secured relocation abroad for two key witnesses and their
    families in exchange for their testimony against their former army
    comrades. On March 17, former army Sergeants Favio Pinzon Jerez and
    Cesar Franco Ibanez testified before a judge about the massacre of more
    than 200 unarmed civilians on December 6-8, 1982, in the village of Dos
    Erres. In their testimony, they implicated several former comrades and
    gave detailed accounts of the massacre, before departing the country
    under witness protection from the Public Ministry. Based on their
    testimony, prosecutors obtained arrest warrants against 16 former
    members of the implicated army patrol. Defense attorneys eventually
    contested 10 of those arrest warrants, arguing that their clients
    should be protected from prosecution by the National Reconciliation
    Law, which grants limited amnesty for certain acts committed during the
    internal conflict. The Constitutional Court granted temporary
    injunctions against the arrest warrants so that the petitions could be
    decided on their merits. On July 7, an appellate court found the
    petitions to be without merit and denied them. The defense appealed
    that ruling to the Constitutional Court, where a decision remained
    pending at year's end. The PNC did not execute six of the arrest
    warrants, nor did they present the warrants to the military, even
    though many of the suspects still were on active duty at the time. On
    December 4, the prosecutor publicly urged the PNC to act on the
    warrants of four military suspects, including Vicente Alfonso Bulux,
    Santos Lopez Alonzo, and Fredy Antonio Samayoa Tobar.
        Army Sergeant Major Manuel Pop Sun, who was arrested in April and
    later released under a temporary injunction, remained the only
    individual to have been arrested in the Dos Erres case by year's end.
    On June 14, Pop Sun appeared at the MINUGUA offices claiming that the
    army had imprisoned him in a military hospital, kept him drugged with
    antipsychotic medications, and was trying to kill him because of his
    knowledge of the Dos Erres massacre. Pop Sun offered his testimony to
    prosecutors in exchange for witness protection, but later jumped from a
    secondstory window and fled from Public Ministry protection.
    Prosecutors stressed that Pop Sun was free to depart at any time, as
    his participation in the witness protection program was voluntary. His
    odd behavior raised speculation about the true intent of his offer to
    testify, and he remained a suspect in the case at year's end. In its
    11th Human Rights Report issued in August, MINUGUA noted the presence
    of Military Intelligence observers when it tried to interview Pop Sun
    at the Military Medical Center. MINUGUA also found that Pop Sun had
    been overmedicated while in the military hospital and concluded that
    his treatment there amounted to torture and abuse.
        On March 3, the Government signed an agreement before the IACHR in
    which it recognized its institutional responsibility for the Dos Erres
    massacre. Represented by COPREDEH, the Government pursued settlement
    negotiations with the victims' survivors, who were represented by two
    NGO's--Families of the Disappeared in Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) and the
    Center for Justice and International Law. In those negotiations, the
    Government agreed in principle to prosecute aggressively the material
    and intellectual authors of the massacre, pay for reparations and other
    community assistance for the survivors, create a historical document
    that recounts what happened at Dos Erres, and erect a memorial in honor
    of the victims. Those negotiations continued at year's end, with
    reparations as the central focus. On December 1, in accordance with
    recommendations of both the IACHR and the Inter-American Court, the
    Government created a Special Commission to Locate and Identify Families
    and Victims of the massacre at Dos Erres. On December 7, a monument to
    the victims of the Dos Erres massacre was erected at the cemetery of
    the Aldea Las Cruces.
        On February 1, an appeals court in Coban substituted 50-year prison
    sentences for the death penalties handed down by a trial court in
    October 1999 against three former Civilian Defense Patrol (PAC) members
    in the March 1982 massacres at Rio Negro and Agua Fria, two villages in
    Rabinal, Baja Verapaz. The Appeals Court gave the three defendants,
    Carlos Chen, Francisco Gonzalez Gomez, and Fermin Lajuj, 30 years in
    prison for each of the two murders proven at trial, for a total of 60
    years' imprisonment; however, the law sets the maximum prison sentence
    at 50 years. In June a survivor of the Rio Negro massacre, who was
    adopted and raised by a foreign family, returned for the first time.
    She was reunited with surviving members of her family and called on the
    Government to provide reparations for the impoverished survivors of the
    conflict-era massacres.
        On May 2, CALDH filed a lawsuit on behalf of 10 communities in
    Quiche and Chimaltenango whose citizens were massacred by government
    security forces between October 1981 and March 1982, resulting in over
    850 deaths. The suit alleges crimes, including genocide, committed by
    high command of the regime of former President Fernando Romeo Lucas
    Garcia. In addition to Fernando Lucas Garcia, the suit also names his
    brother (and former army Chief of Staff) Benedicto Lucas Garcia and
    former Defense Minister Luis Rene Mendoza as defendants. By the end of
    the year, prosecutors had made significant progress in their
    investigation. The suit is the first genocide case to be brought in a
    Guatemalan court and is a precursor to a similar suit that CALDH plans
    to file against the regime of former de facto President and current
    President of Congress Efrain Rios Montt.
        There was no apparent progress in recapturing 12 former PAC members
    convicted in 1999 for the 1993 killing of Juan Chanay Pablo in
    Colotenango, Huehuetenango, and then freed in April 1999 from a police
    station by a crowd armed with sticks, machetes, homemade explosives,
    and smoke bombs. Although arrest warrants were issued to recapture the
    escapees, they remained at large despite credible reports that they had
    returned to their home region of Colotenango and were being protected
    by former PAC comrades. There also was no progress in the investigation
    of Brigadier General Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo, the alleged
    intellectual author of the crime, who was elected to Congress in the
    November elections and therefore enjoys legislative immunity from
    prosecution. According to the Government, amicable settlement
    negotiations between the Government and the victim's survivors,
    mandated by the IACHR, neared completion by year's end. The Government
    continued to provide security for several human rights activists in
    Colotenango in accordance with a resolution of the Inter-American
    Court.
        The Supreme Court ordered the Public Ministry to conduct a new
    investigation into the 1993 murder of newspaper publisher and former
    presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle and three associates.
    Suspect Francisco Ixcoy Lopez, former PAC member, remained at large,
    despite the fact that the Carpio family had located him at one time and
    informed the authorities of his whereabouts. The criminal case remained
    open, but the Public Ministry made no efforts to advance the case and
    the victim's family withdrew the charges. The case before the IACHR for
    the Government's failure to provide justice remained pending at year's
    end, as did a motion to send the case forward to the Inter-American
    Court. The family of Jorge Carpio requested that the IACHR authorize
    that the case be taken up by the Court, since they believed that
    justice was not being served in the Guatemalan courts. The Commission's
    decision was pending at year's end.
        On January 31, a court convicted former PAC member Vicente
    Cifuentes Lopez of homicide in the 1985 murder of American journalist
    Nicholas Blake and sentenced him to 28 years' imprisonment. In May
    police and prosecutors located three other suspects in the case in the
    remote Cuchumatanes Mountains; however, the Government made no effort
    to recapture the suspects and they remained at large at year's end. On
    March 30, the Government paid restitution of $161,000 (1 million
    quetzals) to Blake's survivors as mandated by the Inter-American Court.
        On February 15, an appeals court upheld the November 1999 trial
    verdict in which former military commissioner Candido Noriega was found
    guilty of six murders and two cases of manslaughter and sentenced to
    220 years in prison. On August 24, the CSJ rejected a similar appeal
    and upheld both the guilty verdict and the 220-year sentence. (In 1996
    the Penal Code was modified to extend the maximum sentence for murder
    from 30 to 50 years' imprisonment. Because the case began prior to this
    change, the commuted death sentence for the two murder convictions is
    for 30 years.) There was no progress in the court-ordered investigation
    of Noriega's alleged accomplice, Juan Alesio Samayoa, or in the
    investigation of military officers who served at the so-called Base 20
    in Quiche in 1982, the suspected intellectual authors of some or all of
    Noriega's actions.
        On August 28, a court acquitted Lazaro Obispo Solorzano Lopez and
    Henry Orlando Hernandez Montepeque of the May 1999 kidnaping and murder
    of oil refinery businessman Edgar Ordonez Porta. Neither prosecutors
    nor the private plaintiff, the victim's brother Hugo Ordonez Porta,
    pursued a serious case against the accused during the trial; instead,
    Hugo Ordonez presented witnesses and evidence that asserted that
    members of Military Intelligence may have committed the murder. Ordonez
    also claimed that Military Intelligence conducted a parallel
    investigation that significantly interfered with the official
    investigation and may have led the Public Ministry and the PNC into
    conspiring in a coverup. Also on August 28, the trial court
    acknowledged the parallel investigation and interference, ordered a new
    investigation, and left the case open with respect to additional
    suspects, including several high-ranking military and police officials,
    as well as the former prosecutor in the case. The motive for the
    killing remained unclear. During the year, the Attorney General named
    Leopoldo Zeissig as prosecutor; he was reviewing testimony at year's
    end.
        There was no progress in the 1997 killing of congressional Deputy
    Joel Salomon Mendoza Pineda and his nephew. The court case against two
    former congressional deputies was dismissed, and there was no case
    pending against the former mayor of Escuintla, a suspected intellectual
    author. In August 1998, the court of appeals upheld the 50-year prison
    sentence for the four persons convicted of the murder. In October 1999,
    the CSJ upheld the immunity of Alfred Reyes and Gueillermo Deominguez
    and determined that the evidence against the legislators was
    insufficient to oblige them to go to trial.
        On June 1, the National Security Archive, an NGO, publicly released
    its two-volume publication entitled ``The Guatemalan Military: What the
    United States Files Reveal.'' Volume One is a database of Guatemalan
    military officers and the positions they held during the internal
    conflict. Volume Two is a compilation of over 50 key declassified
    documents said to be representative of the thousands of documents
    collected during the group's ``Guatemala Documentation Project,'' which
    was begun in 1994 to support the Historical Clarification Commission's
    efforts to catalog the devastation of the 36-year internal conflict.
    Human rights activists viewed the report largely as a tool to determine
    the responsibility of individual military officers for specific human
    rights abuses during the internal conflict.
        There was little progress in the investigations into the ``military
    diary,'' an apparently genuine military intelligence dossier that
    documented the abduction, torture, or killing of 183 persons by
    security forces during the 1983-85 period. The National Security
    Archive had released that document publicly in May 1999. The Government
    responded by appointing 35 prosecutors to handle the cases and a
    supervising prosecutor designated with overall coordination. Public
    Ministry investigators made slow progress during the year and learned
    that some of the victims named in the document still were alive and
    living either in the country or abroad. The unit that compiled the
    document has not yet been identified.
        Exhumations of clandestine cemeteries continued throughout the
    year. Most of the bodies recovered have been those of victims of
    military or paramilitary killings in the 1980's. Forensics groups use
    the information obtained from the exhumations to verify eyewitness
    reports of massacres, of which 669 were recorded by the Historical
    Clarification Commission, and to determine, at least in general, who
    might have been responsible. Forensic research and DNA testing have
    identified some of the remains. The forensic evidence has been used in
    some criminal cases. During the year, ODHAG's Forensic Anthropology
    Unit exhumed bodies from eight sites in Alta Verapaz, Quiche, Santa
    Rosa, Huehuetenango, and San Marcos. As of September, workers at these
    sites had found 419 skeletons and identified 28. By the end of August,
    the forensic team of the Office of Peace and Reconciliation of the
    Quiche Diocese conducted excavations of 44 sites in Quiche, where they
    exhumed a total of 95 human remains, of which 19 were infants and none
    were identified. Twelve of these sites (containing 28 remains) were
    found within the grounds of the Joyabaj Parochial Convent, which served
    as a military detachment headquarters during the 1980's. Threats and
    intimidation against persons working on exhumations continued, but at
    lower levels than in previous years. ODHAG reported attempts by
    landowners to prevent exhumations on their property and, in some cases,
    suspected clandestine cemetery sites had been disturbed just prior to
    their investigation. At the end of the year, ODHAG's forensic
    anthropology unit had ceased work while waiting for a change in
    funding. Through August the Forensic Team of the Office of Peace and
    Reconciliation of the Quiche Diocese conducted exhumations at 44
    different clandestine cemeteries throughout Quiche department.
        In October the prosecutor requested that the judge close the case
    of the clandestine cemetery alleged in 1999 to be on the grounds of a
    former Mobile Military Police (PMA) facility. An October 1999
    excavation failed to produce any human remains. There was little
    progress in the investigation into metal fragments found at the site
    that prosecutors believe were once license plates used during
    clandestine operations. The delays were due in part to the January
    resignation of prosecutor Fernando Mendizabal, who feared reprisals
    from the new FRG-led Government for his role in the investigation into
    the nationwide smuggling ring led by Alfredo Moreno.
        In December press reports suggested that the Guatemalan Forensic
    Anthropology Foundation (FAFG) recently unearthed the remains of 20
    persons in a clandestine cemetery located near San Martin Jilotepeque,
    Chimaltenango, in what was used as a military post from 1982 to 1986.
    FAFG staff reportedly believe that the cemetery is one of at least
    seven in the area.
        The criminal case filed in Spain in December 1999 by indigenous
    leader and 1992 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu Tum against
    eight former military and civilian leaders for human rights abuses
    committed during the 36-year internal conflict was not heard by the
    court. The suit alleged that the defendants, including former de facto
    President and current president of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, former
    President and retired General Fernando Lucas Garcia, former de facto
    President Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, and five other defendants were
    responsible for ``crimes against humanity,'' including genocide,
    torture, and terrorism. The suit cited 3 cases--the 1980 assault on the
    Spanish Embassy in which more than 30 persons died, the killing of
    Menchu's mother and 2 siblings, and the killing of 4 Spanish priests
    over the course of the conflict.
        On April 29, Spanish Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco denied the third
    motion in 4 months by Prosecutor Pedro Rubira to dismiss the Menchu
    suit. This motion was based on the argument that the cases presented by
    Menchu effectively were adjudicated by the signing of the Peace Accords
    in 1996, which ended the internal conflict. (The earlier motions had
    contested Spanish jurisdiction in the case.) During the year, Judge
    Ruiz Polanco called several witnesses to testify in Spain, including
    Congresswoman Nineth Montenegro, former Spanish Ambassador to Guatemala
    Maximo Cajal, former Historical Clarification Commission member Alfredo
    Balsells Tojo, and Jesuit author Ricardo Falla.
        Early in the year, several organizations and individuals attempted
    to join the Menchu suit, sometimes trying to add numerous additional
    crimes and defendants. For example, in April Human Rights Ombudsman
    Julio Arango attempted to join the suit with additional complaints
    against Lucas Garcia and Mejia Victores. Similarly, in April the human
    rights NGO the Mutual Support Group (GAM) added 8 additional defendants
    from the Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo regime to the Menchu suit, accusing
    former civilian and military leaders of the extrajudicial killings of
    53 university student leaders between 1984 and 1990. In May the family
    of one of the four Spanish priests whose murder constitutes part of the
    Menchu complaint joined the suit. On December 13, the Spanish court
    decided not to hear the case. The decision was based in part on the
    fact that it was not clear that justice in the case could not be
    achieved in Guatemala, since a genocide case had yet to be tried by the
    Guatemalan court system.
        Attorneys for Mejia Victores made little progress in their counter-
    charges against Menchu in Guatemalan criminal court, in which they
    accused her of treason, violating the Constitution, and failing to
    report a crime by filing charges in a Spanish court rather than a
    Guatemalan court. In early August, the Spanish court denied a request
    by prosecutor Candido Bremer for a copy of Menchu's complaint, which
    Bremer intended to use in his investigation of Mejia Victores'
    accusations against Menchu. In response, Menchu filed a brief with the
    Guatemalan court in which she defended her right to file the Spanish
    lawsuit, based on Guatemala's international treaty obligations that
    provide for the extraterritorial prosecution of crimes against humanity
    and genocide. The press reported in November that the counter-suit
    brought against Menchu in Guatemala by attorneys for Mejia Victores had
    been closed.
        Menchu and various staff members of her human rights NGO, the
    Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation, have been targeted with numerous death
    threats and other acts of intimidation since the lawsuit was filed in
    Spain. The number of death threats against Menchu increased sharply in
    April and May, as it did generally among the human rights community and
    journalists (see Sections 2.a. and 4.).
        Intimidation of witnesses continued to be a problem, although at
    less than 1999 levels; there were no reports of the killing of
    witnesses. For example, two witnesses in the Bishop Gerardi murder
    case, Ruben Chanax Sontay and Juana del Carmen Sanabria, left the
    country due to threats and intimidation. Several potential witnesses
    were intimidated in the case of murdered Zacapa Municipal Workers Union
    leaders Robinson Morales Canales and Angel Pineda. Several witnesses in
    the Ordonez Porta case also were threatened.
        There were some allegations of politically motivated killings by
    nonstate actors during the year, and the authorities demonstrated a
    willingness to investigate these murders. In some of these cases, there
    was insufficient evidence to conclude whether or not the killing was
    politically motivated.
        On June 22, Oswaldo Monzon Lima, Secretary General of the 90member
    Union of Gasoline Transport Drivers in Escuintla, was killed. His body,
    shot once in the back, was found on June 23 in a thicket across the
    highway from his abandoned tanker truck. Since 1998 Monzon Lima had
    been involved in an ongoing dispute with his employer at the time,
    president of the Association of Fuel Transporters Mario Ortiz Barranco.
    In 1998 Monzon Lima had filed a complaint with the police that Ortiz
    had threatened to have him killed, based on a suit in the labor courts
    alleging that Ortiz had fired illegally three union leaders within
    weeks of the union's formation. In addition, Monzon had presented the
    Ministry of Energy and Mines with a file that outlined irregularities
    in Ortiz's conduct of his gasoline transportation business, including
    his use of forged permits and licenses. On June 19, Monzon refused to
    accept a settlement offer from Ortiz in the suit over the illegal
    firings. He was murdered 3 days later. By September the Public
    Ministry's investigation was proceeding normally with Ortiz as the
    primary suspect.
        On February 29, Erwin Haroldo Ochoa Lopez and Julio Armando
    Vasquez, two environmentalists working for the National Council for
    Protected Areas (CONAP), a governmental environmental protection
    agency, were killed outside a restaurant in Puerto Barrios, Izabal.
    MINUGUA noted serious mishandling of the crime scene, including the
    fact that police would not allow firemen to administer first aid to the
    victims, who still were alive when firemen first arrived on the scene,
    but who died shortly thereafter. The Public Ministry's investigation
    eventually focused on retired army Colonel Sergio Otoniel Ponciano, who
    owned a private security firm and a ranch in a protected area. In
    August the authorities arrested Ponciano and charged him with murder.
    Separate investigations by SIC detectives and Public Ministry
    prosecutors underscored the lack of coordination between these two
    organizations on both the local and national levels.
        In October Maura Ofelia Paniagua Corzantes, civil law coordinator
    for the law clinic at San Carlos, was murdered. She was in charge of
    receiving criminal complaints, particularly complaints of violence
    against women, on behalf of the University, which is recognized under
    domestic violence law. The day before Paniagua was killed, someone came
    to the door to see her; her maid told the person that she was not
    available and the person went away. The following day the same person
    returned and shot her repeatedly. At year's end, the Public Ministry
    was investigating the case to determine a motive and suspect for the
    killing.
        On March 2, on a road near Coban, Alta Verapaz, four armed men
    attacked a group of attorneys, judicial personnel, representatives of
    the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, and farmers, leaving three persons
    dead and three wounded. The group was travelling to a meeting where it
    planned to mediate a dispute between ranchers and small farmers over
    the use of a new road. PNC officers later arrested rancher Hermelindo
    Caal Rossi and an unidentified minor for the killings. The case was
    under investigation by the Public Ministry at year's end.
        On May 4, Jose Anancio Mendoza Garcia was found dead in a well in
    Camotan, Chiquimula. His body showed signs of multiple injuries that
    indicated that he was murdered. Mendoza Garcia was a former New Nation
    Alliance (ANN) candidate for mayor in Camotan, as well as a local
    leader of the Council of Ethnic Communities Runujel Junam (CERJ), a
    prominent indigenous human rights organization. There was no clear
    motive for his killing, but Mendoza's CERJ and ANN colleagues concluded
    that his murder was politically motivated. There was little progress in
    identifying a motive or a suspect by year's end.
        There were some trials resulting in convictions for past cases of
    politically motivated killings, but many cases remained unresolved,
    including the 1999 murders of Zacapa Municipal Workers Union leaders
    Robinson Morales Canales and Angel Pineda.
        On July 27, a court convicted former Santa Cruz mayor Silverio
    Perez de Leon and former city council member Justo Lopez and sentenced
    them each to 50 years' imprisonment for their roles as intellectual
    authors of the May 1998 murder of acting mayor Luis Yat Zapeta. Former
    treasurer Cayetano Alvarez Velasquez was found innocent. Prosecutors
    convinced the court that the crime was committed in revenge for Yat's
    successful effort to remove Perez de Leon from office on charges of
    corruption. An appeal of the trial court's verdict was pending at
    year's end. Bernardino Zapeta Vicenta, Tomas Zapeta Ixcoy, and Manuel
    Pacajoj Mejia, the suspected material authors of the killing, were in
    jail for an unrelated robbery.
        In the case of murdered Retalhuleu Prosecutor Shilvia Jerez Romero
    de Herrera, on August 7, the 7th court of appeals upheld the death
    sentence handed down by a trial court in October 1999 against Agosto
    Negro gang member Tirso Roman Valenzuela Avila. In that decision, the
    appeals court modified the trial court's verdict with respect to Jorge
    Ever Lopez Monroy, to whom it also gave the death penalty, and Waldemar
    Hidalgo Marroquin and Jaime Raul Quezada Corzo, each of whom received
    50-year prison sentences for the May 1998 murder. They previously had
    been set free by the trial court. The CSJ upheld the death sentence for
    Valenzuela Avila and upheld the 50-year sentences for the other three
    defendants.
        Prosecutors determined that the January 1999 killing of alleged
    gang member Olman Alexis Viera Rodriguez, and the May 1999 murder of
    New Guatemalan Democratic Front (FDNG) leader Roberto Gonzalez Arias
    were not politically motivated.
        Prosecutors continued to investigate the 1999 murders of Zacapa
    Municipal Workers Union leaders Robinson Morales Canales and Angel
    Pineda, both of whom had protested labor rights violations and
    corruption in the Zacapa mayor's office. Prosecutors made no apparent
    effort to continue to investigate former Zacapa Mayor Carlos Vargas y
    Vargas, his driver, or his bodyguard, who were believed widely to be
    the intellectual and material authors of the murders. On February 3,
    police arrested Carlos Anibal Paz Gordon, a former employee of a
    company owned by persons close to Mayor Vargas, as the suspected
    material author of the crime. Paz Gordon's alleged accomplice, Carlos
    Ramiro Mende Aldana, remained at large at year's end. Paz Gordon's
    trial originally was scheduled to begin on February 15, but was delayed
    by a change in the prosecutor and a series of pretrial evidentiary
    motions and hearings. On October 5, the court convicted Paz Gordon and
    sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment. Several other Zacapa Municipal
    Workers Union members claimed to have received death threats, as did
    several key potential witnesses. MINUGUA reported in 1999 that the
    prosecutors in Zacapa seriously mishandled several aspects of the
    investigation against the material authors.
        Six months after the May 1999 abduction and killing of Tomas Tol
    Salvador, an FDNG leader in Quiche and human rights activist for the
    CERJ and for the Council of Ethnic Communities, an indigenous
    organization, the courts finally ordered the January 18 exhumation of
    an unidentified body. The body was confirmed to belong to Tol Salvador.
    No suspects were identified and no clear motive had been established by
    year's end; the case remained under investigation.
        In the May 1999 killing of former Judge Herberto Zapata Gudiel,
    prosecutors requested provisional closure of the case while they gather
    additional evidence against primary suspect Elmer Ezequiel Hernandez
    Salazar. In addition prosecutors ruled out the possibility that Zapata
    might have been involved in narcotics trafficking. The case still was
    pending at year's end. Two presumed suspects were identified, but the
    judge provisionally closed the case against them pending the discovery
    of further evidence.
        The investigation into the July 1999 murder of Mayan priest Raul
    Coc Choc remained provisionally closed for lack of evidence, although
    prosecutors continued their investigation. Coc Choc was a leader of the
    National Association of Mayan Priests; members of the board reported
    that he had received numerous death threats over the telephone prior to
    his murder. The Public Ministry has accused Julian Chonay Buc and
    Josefina Cristal Costop of the crime, but the judge provisionally
    closed the case for lack of evidence. The Public Ministry has requested
    a reconstruction of the crime scene in order to reopen the trial.
        There were no further developments in the investigation into the
    August 1999 murder of sociologist Maria Ramirez Sanchez. Because
    Ramirez was an employee for the same organization as anthropologist
    Myrna Mack when the latter was killed for political reasons in 1990,
    media and human rights groups speculated that Ramirez's murder also was
    politically motivated. However, by the end of the year, prosecutors
    still had not established a motive or identified the possible killers;
    the investigation continued.
        A heightened sense of public insecurity fueled by a deteriorating
    violent crime situation and a rash of threats against journalists,
    human rights workers, and judicial personnel, contributed to some
    allegations of social cleansing operations. During the first half of
    the year, a number of corpses were found in and around Guatemala City
    with signs of torture and violent death, including decapitation. Nearly
    all of the corpses were young males, many with gang-style tattoos,
    causing some human rights observers to suspect that the Government was
    conducting a social cleansing operation against gang members or other
    criminals. Others argued that the deaths were the product of an inter-
    gang turf war, possibly related to narcotics trafficking. In its 11th
    Human Rights Report, MINUGUA noted apparent social cleansing operations
    in Siquinala, Escuintla, in which armed groups kidnaped, tortured, or
    killed several individuals.
        Prison authorities reported that on May 8, convicts Gumercindo
    Lopez Salazar and Elvin Arnulfo Sosa Flores escaped from prison and
    killed a guard in the process. The next day, Lopez's dead body was
    found in a river with signs of torture and mutilation. A preliminary
    autopsy by a forensic doctor from the judiciary concluded that the
    victim had been murdered--a conclusion that was discarded by the Public
    Ministry in a follow-up autopsy by its own doctor. In addition it was
    unclear whether Lopez's death might have preceded the time at which he
    was alleged to have escaped from prison, thereby raising doubts as to
    whether the escape might have been faked to camouflage an extrajudicial
    killing. In its 11th Human Rights Report, MINUGUA concluded that the
    Public Ministry did not thoroughly pursue the investigation in its
    initial stages.
        In 1999 ODHAG and CALDH brought criminal charges against former
    leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) for the alleged
    killings of five former EGP guerrillas. The charges were initiated
    after relatives of EGP members who had disappeared in the early 1980's
    broke off negotiations with former EGP leaders aimed at determining the
    whereabouts of the remains. CALDH later halted the legal process after
    negotiations resumed. In August ODHAG reported that the case remained
    in the investigation phase, with an exhumation planned in Nicaragua to
    search for the bodies of the EGP members, based on information received
    from potential witnesses. According to ODHAG and CALDH, at year's end
    the case was suspended at the request of the victims' families.
        The number of attempted lynchings and resultant deaths decreased
    significantly during the year, and the PNC deterred a number of
    lynchings. However, popular frustration with the inability of the
    Government to control crime and of the courts to assure speedy justice,
    as well as a tradition of extrajudicial repression of crime during
    years of military rule, led to continued lynchings and mob violence.
    Since MINUGUA began tracking lynchings in 1996, it has recorded a total
    of 337 cases. Of these, 75 cases have gone to trial, and 17 sentences
    have been handed down. Of these sentences, 7 were acquittals and 10
    were guilty verdicts. By year's end, only one individual had actually
    begun to serve a prison sentence. MINUGUA reported 52 lynchings during
    the year (including 24 lynchings and 28 attempted lynchings), which
    resulted in 32 deaths and 83 persons injured. These figures are
    significantly lower than in 1999, when there were 105 lynchings (71
    lynchings and 34 attempts), resulting in 48 deaths and 188 persons
    injured. There were fewer lynchings during the first half of the year;
    this was attributed by many observers primarily to the elections and
    the new Administration's early period in office, and in part to
    increased PNC deployment in rural areas and greater intervention by the
    PNC and other authorities. While the police were successful in rescuing
    some victims of mob attacks, many observers agree that their efforts to
    deter or prevent lynchings would benefit greatly were the organization
    to establish more effective ties with indigenous communities (see
    Section 5). MINUGUA has noted that lynchings increasingly are planned
    and premeditated events. There continued to be some cases in which
    municipal officials or other local leaders were involved in lynching
    attempts. As in past years, mobs generally killed the victims for
    either property-related crimes or suspected membership in criminal
    gangs. The large majority of the attacks took place in rural areas in
    the mostly Mayan communities of the western and central highlands.
    Generally these were communities where, during the internal conflict,
    PAC's were accustomed to conducting populist summary hearings in the
    town square and then publicly executing alleged criminals or
    guerrillas.
        On April 29, approximately 500 residents of Todos Santos
    Cuchumatan, Huehuetenango, stoned to death a Japanese tourist and
    burned to death his Guatemalan tour-bus driver. The incident apparently
    resulted from local fears based on rumors that a satanic group intended
    to hold a conclave in the area at that time. Authorities reacted
    quickly, eventually arresting a total of 13 suspects. On August 13,
    three of the suspects were accused formally of murder and assault; the
    investigation continued at year's end, with no date set for the trial.
        On July 8, a crowd trapped eight men at a roadblock near
    Xalbaquiej, Chichicastenango, Quiche. The victims were pulled from
    their vehicles, doused with gasoline, and burned to death because they
    were suspected of running guns and drugs. Authorities quickly
    identified and issued arrest warrants for 12 suspected ringleaders of
    the mob. Representatives of 30 surrounding communities threatened
    unspecified retaliation against the Government should any arrests be
    made in the case; at year's end, the PNC had not executed the warrants.
        While the justice system has been slow to convict and imprison
    perpetrators of lynchings, the Government has demonstrated an increased
    willingness and ability to investigate and prosecute lynching
    offenders. There were numerous arrests and several convictions against
    lynch mob leaders during the year. On May 25, a court sentenced four
    men to 41 years and 8 months in prison each for a 1999 lynching of two
    victims in Chisec, Alta Verapaz. On May 10, three individuals received
    30-year prison sentences and on June 2, one vigilante was sentenced to
    50 years in prison and two others were given 33-year sentences for an
    October 1997 lynching in Comitancillo, San Marcos. On December 19, the
    Sentencing Tribunal of Solola condemned Diego Tzaj Cuc to 50 years in
    prison on two 25-year counts of murder for the January 1997 lynching in
    Nahuala of Cristobal Tambriz Ixtama and Diego Crisostomo Coti Gomez.
    The conviction came after the Solola district prosecutor appealed a
    June 14 decision which found Tzaj Cuc not guilty. The Ninth Appelate
    Court agreed with the prosecution and ordered a retrial at which Tzaj
    Cuc was convicted. Three other suspects in the case were awaiting trial
    at year's end: Francisco Boluz Lopez, Cruz Sojom Coti, Alonzo Tulul
    Guarchai and Francisco Traj Tay. At year's end, 10 men and 1 woman were
    scheduled to stand trial for the June 1997 lynching of 9 persons in
    Barreneche, Solola.
        With the assistance of MINUGUA, the Government inaugurated a new
    anti-lynching campaign targeting those specific areas where lynchings
    have occurred. During the year, about 50 workshops had been held in
    rural towns, and these towns had not seen a recurrence of lynchings at
    year's end. In conjunction with the program's inauguration, CSJ
    President Jose Quesada Fernandez strongly denounced lynchings in a
    public statement and pledged support and protection for judicial
    personnel who are threatened by the local populace when lynching
    perpetrators are brought before the courts. In addition the National
    Tourism Institute (INGUAT) promotes a campaign that includes
    educational workshops to prevent lynchings. The PNC developed an
    antilynching operational plan that outlines procedures for officers to
    follow when confronted with lynchings. There were some criticisms that
    the PNC has yet to meaningfully deploy its operational plan or take
    advantage of officers who speak indigenous languages to build
    relationships with the communities that they police. Some observers
    also have criticized national antilynching campaigns as lacking
    sufficient focus or coordination with rural communities.
        Despite improvements in the Government's response to deter
    lynchings and punish those responsible, growing public feelings of
    insecurity in the face of an ongoing wave of violent crime led many
    communities to form Local Security Councils--as provided for in the Law
    on the National Civilian Police--to protect themselves from criminal
    activity. These organizations were created primarily in Quiche
    department, with others believed to exist in Baja Verapaz, Solola,
    Huehuetenango, and San Marcos departments. At a November press
    conference, PNC director Rubio Lecsan Merida announced that the
    Councils would be implemented in 31 municipalities as a measure to
    extend the effectiveness of the police. In addition there were
    unconfirmed reports that armed groups not covered by the Council
    statute have organized in numerous other communities. There also were
    unconfirmed reports that these unregulated, uncontrolled groups were
    responsible for killings, torture, and social cleansing operations.
    There continued to be concerns that former PAC members sometimes are
    involved in lynchings.
        b. Disappearance.--There was one credible report of forced
    disappearance attributed to police forces.
        On May 7, plainclothes PNC and SIC agents detained Adelso Carrillo
    Leiva, Rigoberto Pineda Agustin, and Mynor Pineda Agustin in San
    Benito, Peten. During interrogation for suspected participation in a
    kidnaping, the suspects were blindfolded and driven to a remote
    location, then threatened, beaten, and tortured. They returned to San
    Benito without Mynor Pineda, and his whereabouts were unknown as of
    June 30, suggesting a forced disappearance. A MINUGUA investigation
    indicated that PNC and SIC members tried to frame the three suspects
    for the kidnaping by falsifying evidence and documents. In addition the
    police apparently drove the suspects to the scene of the crime in order
    to claim that they caught the suspects in the act. The Public Ministry
    made no serious attempt to investigate or solve the crime. A writ of
    habeas corpus submitted on May 10 was answered by the judge in the San
    Benito Criminal Court, but did not produce Mynor Pineda or any
    information regarding his whereabouts.
        There was no progress in the February 1998 disappearance of
    Francisco Gonzalez Vasquez, which was attributed to two Zacapa police
    officers. Despite an August 1998 arrest warrant for the arrest of
    Inspector Marvin Rolando Gomez Noguera on charges of ``abuse of
    authority and threats,'' he never has been arrested. The PNC
    transferred him to a position in Tecun Uman, San Marcos (on the other
    side of the country).
        The PDH's office reported 10 complaints of forced disappearance
    during the year, compared with 12 in 1999, and 18 in 1998. MINUGUA
    reported two complaints of forced disappearance during the year,
    compared with one in 1999 and one in 1998.
        There was one credible report of a politically motivated
    disappearance. On April 7, University of San Carlos (USAC) Professor
    Mayra Gutierrez Hernandez disappeared. The human rights community and
    Gutierrez's family and friends concluded that her disappearance was
    politically motivated, due to her social activism and political
    activities, which included social research into international
    adoptions, women's rights, and a range of human rights causes. They
    also accused prosecutors of sabotaging the investigation by pursuing
    inaccurate theories that Gutierrez was an active member of a guerrilla
    organization and either left voluntarily or was kidnaped by her
    guerrilla comrades. These theories were repeated publicly by high-level
    Government officials, including then-Interior Minister Guillermo Ruiz
    Wong, thereby adding fuel to suspicions of a rightwing conspiracy.
    During its own investigation, MINUGUA found evidence that persons
    associated with military intelligence were spreading rumors and other
    misinformation to divert the official investigation, while persons
    close to Gutierrez inexplicably altered or removed valuable evidence
    and gave false information to Public Ministry prosecutors.
    Nevertheless, there were strong indications that the Public Ministry's
    investigation was neither thorough nor objective. On November 28, the
    NGO Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo requested a special mandate from the CSJ to
    conduct an investigation into the case due to the lack of information
    that has been made available to date by the authorities. On December 7,
    the Supreme Court granted the PDH the status of special investigator in
    the case until February 2001.
        Disappearances in high-profile cases from recent years remained
    unresolved at year's end. For example, there was no progress in the
    investigation into the April 1999 disappearance of prominent indigenous
    leader and FDNG party member Carlos Coc Rax. Nor was there progress in
    the disappearance cases of Arnoldo Xi, an indigenous- and peasant-
    rights activist who reportedly was shot and abducted in March 1995;
    Lorenzo Quiej Pu, a human rights activist who disappeared in January
    1994; and Juan Jose Cabrera (``Mincho''), the guerrilla commander
    reportedly captured by the EMP in 1996 while taking part in a
    kidnaping.
        On August 10, ODHAG released its report on children missing since
    the armed conflict. The report stated that of the documented cases, 86
    percent were of ``forced disappearances'' and the remaining 14 percent
    were attributable to diverse causes associated with the conflict, such
    as communities fleeing attack. Of the documented cases of forced
    disappearances, the military was responsible for 92 percent of the
    cases; PAC's were responsible for 3 percent; guerrilla forces were
    responsible for 2 percent; and the remaining 3 percent could not be
    attributed to anyone. In 68 percent of the forced disappearances, boys
    and girls were taken directly to a military post of one kind or
    another. Approximately 93 percent of the victims were Mayan children,
    the majority of whom were between 1 and 4 years old.
        The fate of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who
    disappeared following a March 1992 clash between army and URNG forces,
    remains unknown. On December 5, the Inter-American Court ruled that the
    Government was guilty of violating Bamaca's personal liberty and
    integrity, and his rights to life, to juridical personality, and to
    legal protection. It further found that in the case, the Government
    violated international human rights conventions, specifically the
    Convention against Torture. The Court ordered the Government to
    investigate, publicly identify and try those responsible, and award
    damages for its violations.
        There was no apparent progress in the 1998 criminal case filed by
    Adriana Portillo Bartow for the 1981 abduction and disappearance of her
    two children and four other members of her family. The lawsuit named
    former Interior Minister Donald Alvarez Ruiz, former National Police
    Director German Chupina Barahona, and Pedro Garcia Arredondo, the
    former chief of Commando Seis (a plainclothes police urban
    counterinsurgency force) as defendants. Garcia Arredondo was reelected
    as mayor of Nueva Santa Rosa in the November 1999 elections and
    therefore has immunity from prosecution.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the integrity and security
    of the person and prohibits physical or psychological torture of
    prisoners; however, there were credible reports of torture, abuse, and
    other mistreatment by members of the PNC, although at decreased levels
    from the previous year. These complaints typically involved the use of
    excessive force during arrests, interrogations, or other police
    operations. SIC detectives continued to torture and beat detainees
    during interrogation to obtain forced confessions. The Government and
    the PNC showed increased willingness and ability to investigate,
    prosecute, or otherwise punish officers who committed abuses. The PNC
    transferred cases of alleged torture to the Public Ministry. There was
    a significant increase in the number of murder victims that
    demonstrated signs of torture or cruel treatment, in such diverse
    locations as the Peten, the border with Honduras, Escuintla, and
    Guatemala City, which led some observers to suspect social cleansing
    operations (see Section 1.a.).
        The PDH's office reported no complaints of torture during the year,
    compared with four in 1999 and two in 1998. In its 11th Report on Human
    Rights, MINUGUA investigated 13 complaints of torture, of which 12 were
    confirmed. The majority of these cases involved abuse or mistreatment
    of suspects and detainees by PNC officers or SIC detectives. The PNC
    sometimes punished the use of excessive or illegal force by officers,
    but more often offenders merely were transferred to a different
    location. In several cases, there was credible evidence that PNC
    officers and their superiors altered documentation, falsified evidence,
    bribed and intimidated victims and witnesses, or otherwise obstructed
    the investigation and prosecution of police misconduct. Some PNC
    officers accused of crimes evaded punishment by fleeing justice. On
    November 25, the PNC director said that the organization has ``zero
    tolerance for illegal acts or for human rights abuses on the part of
    police officers.'' Through the end of October, 215 PNC officers had
    been dismissed from duty, while another 537 officers were under
    investigation in the courts.
        On February 3, PNC officers in Nueva Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa,
    arrested Juan Carlos Zepeda Herrera for public drunkenness. Several
    neighbors witnessed the arrest, but when Zepeda's father went to the
    police station to inquire about his son, a senior officer denied
    knowledge of the arrest. The next day, Zepeda was found in the bottom
    of a 15-meter deep ravine with several broken bones and other serious
    injuries. The ORP and Public Ministry concluded that the arresting
    officers were responsible, but little progress had been made on the
    case against them by the end of the year.
        On February 9, Augusto Marroquin Carreto was taken from his cell in
    the Quetzaltenango detention center by SIC detectives and interrogated
    about his alleged involvement in the death of another prisoner. The
    detectives beat and tortured him until he confessed. Several high
    ranking PNC and SIC officers attended the interrogation. On February 5,
    SIC officers from Quetzaltenango tortured Pablo Albani Edelman
    Bethancourt and Alex Guillermo Reyes Monterroso into confessing their
    membership in a gang of car thieves by asphyxiating them with rubber
    hoods and beating them.
        On February 13, in Jocotenango, Sacatepequez, Carlos Samayoa Olayo
    was arrested inside his home and beaten severely by PNC officers who
    did not have an arrest warrant. He was taken to jail despite signs that
    his health was deteriorating quickly. Eventually, he was taken to a
    hospital, where part of his intestine was removed surgically due to
    injuries he sustained from blows to the stomach. PNC officers falsified
    his arrest documentation to justify their use of force and hide the
    fact that they had arrested him illegally. A judge freed Samayoa and
    the PNC initiated disciplinary proceedings against the responsible
    officers, but the Public Ministry's investigation failed to produce
    criminal charges by year's end.
        Casa Alianza reported that although the number of incidents of
    abuse of street children roughly was equal to 1999 levels, relatively
    few incidents were committed by members of the security forces. Most
    acts of violence against street children were committed by individuals,
    by private security guards, or in gang- and drug-related violence among
    street children. Casa Alianza reported only one case of abuse of street
    children by PNC officers, in which several officers were alleged to
    have threatened and intimidated five street children. Prosecutions and
    convictions for crimes against street children continued to be very
    rare.
        There were no reports that police used excessive force in evictions
    of landless peasants occupying farms in attempts to gain land during
    the year. Because of violent confrontations in the past, the Government
    continued its policy of securing an eviction order from a court,
    informing the occupiers of the coming eviction, and sending in a
    lightly armed police contingent to end the occupation by using dialog
    and verbal persuasion. The Ministry of Government carried out numerous
    evictions without incident during the year using this policy. Despite
    these improved tactics, on March 7, police and squatters clashed during
    an eviction near Villa Nueva, when police used tear gas to subdue rock-
    throwing squatters. In a similar operation, police also clashed with
    squatters in the Peten on December 11. Some 21 persons were injured as
    violence broke out during the eviction of about 300 squatter families.
    Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The public continued to
    experience difficulty in demonstrating or securing legal title to land,
    and some progress was made toward genuine land reform. On April 27, the
    parastatal Fontierras signed a $31 million loan agreement with the
    World Bank to provide property titles to landowners in the Peten
    department. Cooperation between the parastatals Fontierras and
    Contierra brought together the related functions of land purchases with
    that of resolving land conflicts, which are at the root of a great deal
    of rural violence and lynchings (see Section 1.a.). The alliance
    resolved 89 such conflicts during the year. The issuing of land titles
    by Fontierras has affected approximately 5,400 families; the estimated
    demand for these services is estimated at 55,000 families.
        Corruption continued to be a problem, and there were credible
    allegations of involvement by individual police officers in criminal
    activity; contrary to the previous year, there were no credible
    allegations of police involvement in kidnapings. The authorities
    arrested some police officers and continued to take action against
    officers found to have engaged in illegal activities, referring some
    violations to the criminal justice system rather than simply imposing
    administrative punishments. However, some observers claimed that rather
    than discipline its officers the PNC often just transferred them to a
    different part of the country. Transfers are a common practice and are
    used to avoid personal problems, corruption, and questions of
    mistreatment of detainees. Impunity for police who commit abuses
    remained a serious problem.
        All PNC members were required to meet minimum education
    requirements and pass an entrance examination. Former PN staff who
    wished to integrate into the PNC must complete successfully a 3-month
    retraining course. According to MINUGUA, there are 1,200 former PN
    employees who have yet to receive training. There also were screening
    procedures to detect suspected human rights violators and officers
    involved in criminal activities. New recruits had to complete a 6month
    training course before entering on duty. The training course, developed
    with the assistance of MINUGUA, foreign countries, and international
    organizations, includes extensive human rights components. However,
    some observers claimed that the retraining course was not sufficiently
    rigorous and that relatively few members of the PN were screened out
    during retraining, allowing the incorporation of some poorly qualified
    PN members into the ranks of the new PNC.
        Pursuant to the Peace Accords, former members of the military were
    eligible to apply for positions in the PNC but were required to apply
    like other civilians and complete the 6-month training course required
    of all civilian applicants. However, the Government incorporated some
    former members of the military and the former PMA into the ranks of the
    PNC upon the completion of only the shorter course intended for current
    members of the PN. A total number of 10,144 officers from prior
    security forces have taken the retraining course since its inception.
    The former PMA members were not subjected to a competitive selection
    process but were screened carefully before they were allowed to enter
    the program. Although government plans called for 20,000 PNC members to
    be on duty around the country by the end of 1999, resource constraints
    limited that number to about 16,700 by year's end. According to a June
    MINUGUA report, PNC officers covered 307 of 331 municipalities.
    Approximately 39 percent were new recruits, and 61 percent were
    inducted from existing organizations. Approximately 10 percent of the
    force is female. In August a class of 999 new recruits graduated from
    the Police Academy.
        The PNC's Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) handles
    internal investigations of misconduct by police officers. Despite
    greater numbers of police officers on duty throughout the country, and
    less public apprehension about filing complaints against the police,
    the total number of such complaints remained roughly the same as the
    previous year. There were signs that the ORP increased its
    independence, professionalism, and effectiveness, despite limited
    experience and resources. However, there were isolated cases in which
    ORP investigators appeared to participate in coverups of police
    misconduct. The ORP received a total of 1,581 complaints during the
    year, compared to 1,517 complaints for 1999. There were 222 complaints
    of abuse of authority, 104 of robbery, 43 of homicide, 141 of
    corruption, 108 of improper conduct, 107 of threats, and 72 of illegal
    detention. In cases where sufficient evidence suggested that criminal
    acts were committed, ORP investigators forwarded them to the Public
    Ministry for further investigation and prosecution. Between January and
    the end of October, the PNC fired 215 officers. By year's end, charges
    were brought against a total of 594 officers. At the end of the year,
    the ORP had closed 870 cases, compared to 153 cases in 1999. The
    investigations found 345 officers culpable and exonerated 525 officers.
    Most observers still considered the PNC to be a significant improvement
    over the PN.
        In 1998 the PNC accepted some 60 police candidates from indigenous
    communities in the Ixil region--approximately 30 of whom graduated on
    their first attempt--to ensure that PNC personnel in those communities
    would be proficient in the local language and able to operate
    effectively in those communities. According to MINUGUA, approximately 7
    percent of PNC officers speak an indigenous language. However, it
    appears that a very high percentage of officers that do speak
    indigenous languages work outside of the geographic area of their
    particular linguistic competency.
        No active members of the military serve in the police command
    structure, but on March 21, Congress enacted a law enabling the
    Government to employ the army to continue to support the police
    temporarily in response to an ongoing nationwide wave of violent crime.
    In 1998 and 1999, President Arzu had ordered the army to support the
    police temporarily. While these measures were popular politically,
    given the public's preoccupation with crime and security, they left
    open the possibility of renewed military involvement in internal
    security functions, a role prohibited by the Peace Accords. Under the
    new law, military personnel are not subordinated clearly to police
    control during joint patrols or operations.
        There has been only modest progress in the case of Sister Dianna
    Ortiz, who was kidnaped, tortured, and sexually abused by a group of
    armed men in November 1989. The prosecutor on the case, Braulio Guzman,
    renewed his efforts to finalize the investigative phase of the trial
    despite logistical constraints. The court is empowered to close the
    case for lack of evidence should nothing further be submitted.
        Prison conditions remained harsh but generally not life
    threatening. There was at least one death in the prison system that
    caused observers to suspect social cleansing by government agents (see
    Section 1.a.). The prison system continued to suffer from a serious
    lack of resources, particularly in the areas of prison security and
    medical facilities. In November the Government reported that prison
    capacity nationwide was 6,170 persons and that there were approximately
    6,700 inmates. The majority of the prisoners are not serving prison
    terms but are being held in pretrial detention. Pretrial detainees
    often are separated from convicted criminals. Many are released either
    on good behavior or because they never are sentenced. Some institutions
    were overcrowded; for example, in August the Preventive Detention
    Center for Men in Guatemala City was approximately 75 percent over its
    designed capacity. In February a project to improve prison
    infrastructure began, involving improvements to fences and walls to
    prevent further escapes and installation of better water, electricity,
    sanitation, and emergency systems. In the spring, a new maximum
    security facility opened. Prisoners continued to complain of inadequate
    food. Corruption-especially drug-related--was widespread. Prison
    officials reported frequent escape attempts and other manifestations of
    prisoner unrest. According to press reports, in December approximately
    1,100 prisoners temporarily took control of the interior of the main
    detention facility in Guatemala City, calling for better living
    conditions and access to visitors. The frequency of jailbreaks
    continued to be a matter of serious public concern, although the number
    of successful escapes appears to have declined. Several escaped
    convicts eventually were recaptured. The military continued to provide
    perimeter security for various prisons, as it has done since 1998.
        The 433 female prisoners in the penal system generally are held in
    facilities separate from men. Immigration detention facilities do not
    always keep female detainees separate from the male population. In
    August one woman claimed that she had been raped while in detention;
    however, she declined to cooperate with authorities willing to
    investigate. The Government permitted access to prisons by family
    members.
        Minor children are held in separate detention facilities. According
    to a December MINUGUA report, there are only five juvenile delinquent
    facilities in the country; approximately 39 percent of the children
    housed in these facilities have sought protection and have committed no
    offense.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention; however, there were frequent credible
    reports of arrests without judicial warrants, illegal detentions, and
    failure to adhere to prescribed time limits in legal proceedings. In
    practice, arresting officers frequently fail to satisfy legal
    requisites. The Constitution requires that a court-issued arrest
    warrant be presented to a suspect prior to arrest unless he is caught
    in the act of committing a crime. Police may not detain a suspect for
    over 6 hours without bringing the case before a judge. Once a suspect
    has been arraigned, the prosecutor generally has 3 months to complete
    his investigation and file the case in court. The law also provides for
    access to lawyers and bail.
        There are no comprehensive, reliable data on the number of
    arbitrary detentions, although most accounts agree that the security
    forces routinely ignored writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal
    detention. The PDH reported 46 complaints of illegal detention during
    the year, compared with 20 in 1999 and 18 in 1998. From October 1999
    through June, MINUGUA investigated some 31 cases of illegal or
    arbitrary detention, and confirmed 23. According to a December MINUGUA
    report, approximately 95 percent of arrested children were arrested by
    authorities without a warrant.
        Government figures indicated that approximately 61 percent of those
    incarcerated are awaiting trial. The law sets a limit of 3 months for
    pretrial detention; however, longer detentions still occurred
    routinely. Prisoners often were detained past their legal trial or
    release dates. Prisoners sometimes were not released in a timely
    fashion after completing their sentences due to the failure of judges
    to issue the necessary court order or other bureaucratic problems.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judicial system often fails to
    provide fair trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient
    personnel and funds, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and
    witnesses. The courts' response to human rights violations, as well as
    to general criminal activity, has been inadequate, although during the
    year the Government achieved convictions in a few important human
    rights cases from previous years. However, many high-profile human
    rights cases remained pending in the courts for long periods as defense
    attorneys abused the system by employing numerous dilatory appeals and
    motions, for which they rarely were sanctioned. Courts sometimes took
    months to resolve even patently frivolous appeals. There were numerous
    credible allegations of corruption, manipulation, and intimidation in
    the judiciary. There also were credible allegations of parallel
    investigations by military intelligence-in the Bishop Gerardi and
    Ordonez Porta murder cases--that interfered with the justice system's
    efforts to investigate or prosecute those responsible (see Section
    1.a.).
        Judges and prosecutors continued to receive threats aimed at
    influencing current decisions or as reprisals for past decisions. Death
    threats and intimidation of the judiciary were extremely common in most
    cases involving human rights violations, particularly where the
    defendants were current or former members of the military, military
    commissioners, or PAC's; witnesses often are too intimidated to
    testify. For example, the lead prosecutor and his staff in the Bishop
    Gerardi murder investigation continued to report wiretapping,
    surveillance, and frequent death threats. In addition at least two
    judges and a judicial staff member in the Gerardi case reported threats
    and intimidation, including surveillance (see Section 1.a.). With
    relatively few exceptions, plaintiffs, witnesses, prosecutors, and
    jurists involved in high-profile cases against members of the military
    reported threats, intimidation, and surveillance. A March report at the
    U.N. Human Rights Commission noted that many judges and prosecutors are
    denied health insurance because the threats and intimidation that they
    receive makes their jobs too dangerous. The Government allocated more
    resources to the judiciary's physical security, including providing
    protective details for the judge and at least some members of the
    prosecution team in the Gerardi case and witnesses in the SITRABI and
    Dos Erres cases (see Sections 1.a. and 6.a.). The Government also
    devoted more resources to providing for witness protection abroad for
    key witnesses in the Gerardi and Dos Erres cases (see Section 1.a.).
    According to a November press article, the Public Ministry spent
    approximately $800,000 (6 million quetzals) on its witness protection
    program, and was reviewing the criteria according to which witnesses
    are admitted into the program.
        The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ),
    appellate courts, trial courts, and courts of first instance (which
    function like grand juries). There also are courts of special
    jurisdiction such as labor courts and family courts; these also are
    under the jurisdiction of the CSJ. The Constitutional Court is
    independent of the rest of the judiciary. The Constitution requires
    that Congress elect all CSJ and appellate court magistrates every 5
    years from lists prepared by panels composed of active magistrates,
    representatives of the bar association, law school deans, and
    university rectors. In October 1999, new CSJ and appellate magistrates
    were chosen in a selection process that was more participatory and
    transparent than ever before, despite some accusations that political
    parties were attempting to fill the courts with their sympathizers
    prior to the November 1999 general elections. There are several
    community courts in indigenous rural areas (see Section 5). During the
    year, 18 judges whose 5-year contracts were not renewed collectively
    filed a petition before the Constitutional Court, which still was
    pending at year's end.
        The 1994 Criminal Procedures Code provides for the presumption of
    innocence, the right to be present at trial, the right to counsel, plea
    bargaining, and the possibility of release on bail. Trials are public,
    allowing victims, family members, and human rights groups to observe
    the process. Verdicts are rendered by three-judge panels. The Criminal
    Procedures Code introduced oral trials; however, only those attorneys
    who have graduated since that time have had real training in oral
    trials. The code also provides for language interpretation for those
    who require it; however, in practice this provision rarely is honored
    due to budgetary and other constraints (see Section 5). During the
    year, some new interpreters were hired, and the Public Defender's
    Office began hiring attorneys who speak indigenous languages and
    assigning them to areas where they can use their language skills to
    defend non-Spanish-speaking defendants. The Public Ministry, which is
    independent of the executive branch, may initiate criminal proceedings
    on its own or in response to a complaint. Private parties may
    participate in the prosecution of criminal cases as coplaintiffs.
    Lengthy investigations and frequent procedural motions by both defense
    and prosecution often lead to excessively long pretrial detention (see
    Section 1.d.). Courts showed little willingness to exercise discretion
    in dismissing frivolous or patently invalid motions. As a consequence,
    parties continued to use such motions as delaying tactics, frequently
    holding up trials for several months or even years.
        Inefficiency and corruption in the courts, Public Ministry, and
    police continued to impede the proper functioning of the judicial
    system and undermine the right to due process. The Supreme Court
    continued to seek the suspension of judges and to conduct criminal
    investigations for improprieties or irregularities in cases under its
    jurisdiction. According to government statistics, through August 1999
    (the last period for which figures were available), the Supreme Court
    imposed 1,215 sanctions against members of the judiciary for offenses
    ranging from simple impropriety to illegal conduct. Of those sanctions
    against judges, 1,159 were findings of impropriety, 66 were warnings, 9
    judges were fired, and 1 was suspended. Magistrates received 13
    findings of impropriety. The Public Ministry has been hampered in its
    efforts to investigate crimes and prosecute offenders by inadequate
    training and equipment, excessive caseloads, and insufficient numbers
    of investigators. Prosecutors remained susceptible to intimidation and
    corruption. In addition the Government's failure to clearly delineate
    responsibility for investigating crimes to either the PNC or the Public
    Ministry led to continued infighting and competition between these
    organizations, as well as the duplication of investigative resources.
    It was difficult to attract qualified personnel to the courts because
    of the low salaries offered, but a raise in the salaries of judges
    attracted greater numbers of higher caliber candidates.
        On December 2, 1999, the new law on legal careers took effect,
    fulfilling a major objective of the Peace Accords. That law establishes
    a system to regulate the income, terms of office, promotion, training,
    disciplinary measures, and other activities of judges and magistrates,
    as well as support their professionalism and independence. The new law
    was designed to speed up trials and reduce corruption by recognizing
    and protecting competent judges while creating mechanisms to remove
    incompetent or corrupt ones. A Judicial Career Advisory Committee and a
    Disciplinary Committee were established, as called for by the new law,
    and a permanent training staff was hired for what is now called the
    Institutional Training Unit of the Judicial Career Council. It provides
    a mandatory 6-month training course for all newly appointed judges. The
    Council is responsible for selecting judges as well as disciplining
    them in accordance with the law's criteria for sanctions. The 1999 law
    also provided for a Peer Review Council, which has been in operation
    since mid-year. The panel reviews accusations brought by the public,
    litigants, or other sources, investigates the complaints, and takes
    administrative action where appropriate. The panel had reviewed dozens
    of cases by year's end, resulting in sanctions ranging from letters of
    reprimand to firing.
        In cooperation with foreign donors, the Government continued its
    efforts to reform the judicial system, and there were some significant
    improvements throughout the year. For example, on July 18, a new Public
    Ministry Case Intake Unit was inaugurated in Guatemala City, which
    reduced the average waiting time for filing a complaint from several
    hours to approximately 10 minutes. A new Public Ministry Victim's Unit
    was inaugurated with doctors and nurses on call 24 hours a day to
    assist rape and other crime victims and to gather evidence for their
    cases.
        One of the most successful reform efforts has been the creation of
    ``justice centers,'' which bring together judges, public defenders,
    prosecutors, private law practitioners, police, municipal
    representatives, military officers, and civil society in a team
    approach to dispute resolution and problem solving. The centers have
    installed modernized docket and case filing systems in the courts,
    thereby increasing efficiency and public service while significantly
    decreasing corruption in the disappearance of case files. Centers are
    located in Zacapa, Quetzaltenango, Escuintla, Nebaj (Quiche), the
    Peten, Santa Eulalia (Huehuetenango), and Santa Cruz del Quiche (which
    opened in April). Additional centers in Huehuetenango, Coban,
    Chiquimula, Puerto Barrios, San Marcos, and Solola are scheduled to
    open by mid-2001. The Supreme Court extended the administrative model
    of the justice centers to include the criminal courts in the capital by
    creating a new Clerk of Court office, which has streamlined the
    processing of cases, increased transparency, and improved customer
    service. Under the old system, courthouses resembled marketplaces in
    which individuals could bribe a court official to ``lose'' their case
    file--a system that resulted in near-complete impunity for those with
    sufficient money. Individuals also could bribe the court to lose the
    file of a person in pretrial detention, thus assuring that that person
    would remain in jail indefinitely. With the implementation of the
    centralized, computerized case tracking system, the number of missing
    cases has dropped from approximately 1,000 per year to 3 cases since
    the new system was introduced. In all three of the misplaced cases, the
    individuals named in the complaints have been identified and are under
    investigation. Prospective judges and assistant judges attended special
    courses at the School of Judicial Studies, from which applicants were
    selected to fill vacancies in the judiciary. Since 1994 the Government
    has expanded the judiciary's presence throughout the country; at year's
    end, there were judges in more than 300 of the 331 municipalities
    around the country.
        Despite some progress, much remains to be done to reform the
    judiciary and establish effective rule of law, as mandated by the Peace
    Accords. Many of the structural and procedural weaknesses of the
    judiciary would have been addressed by the proposed constitutional
    reforms that were defeated in a national referendum in May 1999. The
    National Commission for the Strengthening of Justice, which was created
    following the Peace Accords, increasingly is active; in July it
    announced its strategic plan, and subsequently created a number of
    subcommittees to work on implementation. The Commission met weekly
    during the year to consider reforms to the penal code in order to
    assist justices of the peace in resolving local disputes.
        Beginning in August, residents of small towns in Quiche began
    holding customary law trials, allegedly based on Mayan indigenous law,
    in which community leaders meted out corporal punishment rather than
    lynch suspected wrongdoers (see Section 1.a.). For example, on August
    17, leaders of several small communities near Zacualpa, Quiche, rounded
    up a crowd of 350 residents and summoned representatives from the PNC,
    Public Ministry, and the Human Rights Ombudsman's office to serve as
    witnesses. They then held a customary law trial and sentenced 2
    brothers suspected of thievery to 25 lashes with a whip, shaved their
    heads, and made them promise never again to do anything to harm the
    community. The two men reportedly accepted responsibility for their
    crimes and their father was designated to administer the whippings.
    (One of the worst mass lynchings in 1999, in which five suspected gang
    members were killed by a mob that also took several PNC officers
    captive to prevent them from interfering in the lynching, also occurred
    in Zacualpa.) Government and law enforcement officials quickly
    criticized the common law trials as illegal and emphasized the need for
    all suspected criminals to be processed through the judicial system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of
    home, correspondence, and private documents; however, allegations
    persist that the authorities sometimes disregard these provisions.
    Elements of the security forces, specifically the EMP, reportedly
    continued to monitor private communications. The prosecutor and his
    staff in the Bishop Gerardi murder investigation continued to report
    wiretapping and surveillance, and other human rights organizations
    reported telephone anomalies that suggested wiretapping (see Section
    1.a.).
        On May 7, Edgar Gutierrez, head of the President's Secretariat for
    Strategic Analysis, announced the existence of a computer database
    containing names, personal information, and cryptic codes about more
    than 650,000 persons. The database appeared to have been compiled by
    military intelligence several years earlier and a copy remained on the
    SAE computer system. The SAE provided a copy to the Human Rights
    Ombudsman, who offered access to the database as a public service for
    those who wished to learn if their names appeared on the list.
        The military continued to honor the 1994 presidential order to
    suspend all conscription, including forced recruitment, as the armed
    forces found it relatively easy to recruit young male volunteers from
    impoverished areas using pay and education incentives.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression, and the Government generally respected this
    right in practice. There were numerous credible reports that members of
    the press were targets of anonymous threats and intimidation; and there
    were two credible allegations of government-connected censorship. There
    were no reports of self-censorship.
        In addition to regular and open criticism of government policies,
    the print media publicized communiques from human rights organizations,
    unions, and groups opposed to the Government or its policies. The press
    criticized the military and other powerful sectors. The press also
    regularly published stories on reputed drug traffickers, official
    corruption, and clandestine intelligence networks.
        The Government prepared public information programs, which the
    radio and television stations were required to broadcast. The
    Government owns the rights to seven national television channels but
    used none of them for broadcasts.
        All four of the country's national television stations are owned by
    a Mexican citizen, Angel Gonzalez, who plays a significant role in
    politics and provides free broadcast time to Guatemalan Republican
    Front politicians whom he supports. These channels are criticized
    strongly as being monopolistic, progovernment, and interested in
    broadcasting only uncontroversial news. In exchange for giving
    extensive free time to the Guatemalan Republican Front and denying
    access to then-ruling National Advancement Party, Gonzalez reportedly
    insisted that his brother-in-law, Luis Rabbe, be the FRG's candidate
    for mayor of Guatemala City. Despite the FRG's electoral sweep of most
    major offices, Rabbe was defeated. Portillo then named Rabbe as his
    Minister of Communications. By year's end, both Rabbe and the
    Communications Ministry were the subject of numerous corruption
    charges.
        In February journalist Jose Eduardo Zarco, host of the popular
    television political news show ``Evening Issues,'' claimed that his
    show had been forced off the air due to political pressure from the
    newly inaugurated Portillo Government. Specifically Zarco alleged that
    Communications Minister Rabbe pressured Angel Gonzalez to close the
    show because it was too critical of the Government. Gonzalez owns the
    television station that broadcast Zarco's show as well as several other
    stations, despite a law forbidding non-Guatemalans to own radio or
    television stations and laws to prevent monopoly control. Human Rights
    Ombudsman Julio Arango investigated and concluded that the Government
    wrongfully had forced the show off the air. Arango called for
    legislation to eliminate the media monopoly held by Gonzalez. The
    Government denied responsibility for the show's closure and invited
    Organization for American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on the
    Freedom of Expression Santiago Canton to conduct an investigation into
    the incident.
        On April 12, Canton arrived for a 3-day visit, after which he
    recommended a ``serious investigation of the possible existence of a
    real monopoly on television stations open to public access,'' in
    reference to the control by a single individual of all of the private
    stations in the country. He also recommended that the Government
    implement clear regulations to prevent conflicts of interest between
    government officials and the media; suspend the auctions on radio
    frequencies until the Peace Accord regarding the rights of indigenous
    people is implemented; change the regulations governing television and
    radio advertising to ensure equal access; include the recommendations
    of civil society in legislation on information access that President
    Portillo promised to propose; and launch a campaign to promote and
    provide training in freedom of expression, including the passage of a
    law to protect the freedom of information. Based in part on Canton's
    recommendations, as well as a similar recommendation from the
    Historical Clarification Commission, on August 16, the Government
    introduced legislation in Congress to create a Freedom of Information
    Law. The bill would establish an ombudsman's office to defend the right
    to freedom of information, including the ability to petition the
    Government for personal records and other information. The bill
    languished in the FRG-dominated Congress at year's end.
        In September popular radio talk show host Marielos Monzon was fired
    from Radio Sonora, allegedly for returning 3 days late from a trip.
    Monzon credibly alleged that she was fired because she earlier had
    rejected a demand from station management not to interview certain
    ``leftwing'' members of the Portillo Administration, nor opposition
    politicians.
        Despite its Peace Accords pledge to enact reforms to the Radio
    Communications Law to make radio frequencies available for indigenous
    communities, the Government instead passed a law that created a public
    auction system for radio frequencies. In August when eight local radio
    operators were unable to purchase the frequencies that they already
    were using due to the extremely high cost, the Superintendent of
    Telecommunications fined them $10,000 (about 78,000 quetzals) for
    broadcasting without a license. MINUGUA concluded that the high cost of
    the public auction system was an effective barrier to rural indigenous
    access to radio frequencies.
        On April 27, photojournalist Roberto Martinez of the newspaper
    Prensa Libre was killed while covering street demonstrations provoked
    by bus fare increases. Martinez allegedly was shot by private security
    guards, who opened fire on a group of demonstrators who were
    accompanied by a number of professional journalists carrying their
    photographic equipment. Two guards were remanded for trial, and
    remained in police custody at year's end (see Section 2.b.).
        In May and thereafter, there were significant increases in the
    number of threats and other acts of intimidation directed against
    journalists, which coincided with an increase in threats against
    judicial personnel and human rights workers. Various reporters,
    columnists, and editors from several daily newspapers complained of
    telephone threats and other acts of intimidation. Personnel from one
    newspaper, El Periodico, began receiving numerous threats the day
    before publishing a series of articles on an alleged clandestine
    intelligence network within the military. Some reporters claimed that
    they were followed by vehicles with tinted windows and no license
    plates. Others alleged that they were the victims of telephone
    surveillance. The sudden and significant increase in the number of
    threats in April and May led many observers to believe that there was
    an organized campaign to intimidate the press by conservative elements
    affiliated with the military.
        On September 30, 1999, the Chiquimula sentencing court found Jose
    Gabriel Lopez Leon and Neftaly Lopez Leon guilty of the 1997 murder of
    journalist Jorge Luis Marroquin Martinez; the court sentenced each of
    them to 30 years in prison. The same court found that the prosecutors
    in the case had presented inadmissible evidence against the suspected
    intellectual author of the crime, former Jocoton Mayor Manuel Ohajaca.
    The Public Ministry did not bring any new evidence against Ohajaca.
        The Constitution provides for academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. Peaceful demonstrations were common.
    The police acted with restraint, and the authorities sometimes
    negotiated the peaceful departure of the demonstrators. On April 24, a
    demonstration against an increase in public transportation rates turned
    violent, as rioters looted, burned buses, and destroyed property in
    downtown Guatemala City. On April 25, the police responded with tear
    gas and riot control measures, and arrested over 50 alleged
    participants. However, the violence continued on April 27. Many
    citizens criticized the police for not responding earlier and with more
    force to stop the violence. During the riot, private security guards
    killed three persons, including a journalist, and wounded several
    others (see Section 2.a.). On October 10, mass protests over land
    reform occurred, generally without incident. However, 1 demonstrator
    was killed by an unidentified assailant, and 10 protesters were injured
    in a clash with police in downtown Guatemala City.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. The Government did not
    interfere with political associations. However, organizations must
    obtain legal status, a formerly cumbersome and expensive procedure that
    was streamlined considerably in 1998. The URNG and several NGO's had
    alleged that this law particularly disadvantaged organizations
    representing marginalized social sectors, including indigenous groups.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    There is no state religion; however, the Constitution recognizes
    explicitly the separate legal personality of the Catholic Church.
    Members of a religion need not register simply in order to worship
    together. However, the Government requires religious congregations
    (other than the Catholic Church), as well as other nonreligious
    associations and NGO's, to register as legal entities in order to be
    able to transact business.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Director General of Immigration acknowledged publicly that
    extortion and mistreatment of persons attempting to cross illegally
    into the country are subject to extortion and mistreatment by
    government officials. Many observers believe that this mistreatment is
    underreported because illegal immigrants almost never have the capacity
    to lodge formal complaints, either with the authorities or against
    them; and there is little legal assistance available to such
    immigrants.
        The Government grants refugee status and asylum in accordance with
    the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees from other countries.
    The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared
    persecution.
        Voluntary repatriation of Guatemalan refugees who had migrated to
    Mexico during the internal conflict concluded in 1999, bringing the
    total to over 40,000 since 1993. Guatemalans who still remain in Mexico
    do so by choice. Forty former refugee families returned voluntarily to
    Mexico in August, claiming that the Government was not providing for
    their fundamental needs. The Government of Mexico reportedly accepted
    their return. Over 1,500 other individuals indicated their intention to
    return to Mexico if the Government would not resolve their land issues
    and improve living conditions.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government by peaceful and
    democratic means, through secret ballot and universal suffrage for
    those 18 years of age and older. Members of the armed forces and police
    may not vote. Since the return to democracy and civilian rule in 1985,
    there have been nine free elections. International observers concluded
    that both the November 1999 general elections and the December 1999
    runoff presidential election were free and fair. During and after the
    November round of elections, political parties lodged numerous
    complaints of fraud and misconduct against each other, the vast
    majority of which were unaccompanied by evidence and appeared to be
    partisan attempts to disqualify opponents or annul election results.
    Due largely to unexpectedly high voter turnout, the Supreme Electoral
    Tribunal (TSE) was slow to report the November vote count. Public
    uncertainty over the delayed count contributed to violence and
    disturbances in a number of municipalities with highly contested local
    races. Lack of transportation, onerous voter registration requirements,
    and elections scheduled during the harvest season prevent many poor,
    indigenous, and rural persons from voting.
        Voters elect the 113-member, unicameral Congress every 4 years
    using a system of proportional representation based on population, with
    deputies elected both from districts and from a nationwide list. The
    Congress had 91 deputies from districts and 22 from the national list.
    The 1999 elections involved 13 political parties, including two 2-party
    coalitions. Four parties and both coalitions won seats in the
    legislature, led by the FRG with a 63-seat majority, followed by the
    PAN with 21 seats, the Bancada Unionista with 16 seats, and the New
    Nation Alliance coalition, which includes the Guatemalan National
    Revolutionary Unity (URNG) party, with 9 seats. Other small parties
    hold a total of 4 seats. Voter participation in the 1999 elections was
    at a 13-year high. Congress can and does act independently of the
    executive, but fragmentation along party lines and a weak support and
    staff structure result in a legislature that is relatively ineffective.
    Nevertheless, Congress increased its relative power and independence
    under the leadership of president of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, a
    former de facto President and current leader of the ruling party, the
    FRG.
        The former Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity guerrillas met
    all legal requirements for qualification as a political party and
    competed in the 1999 general elections, winning nine seats in Congress
    as part of a coalition with a much smaller party.
        On December 26, 1999, voters elected FRG presidential candidate
    Alfonso Portillo in a runoff election that international observers
    characterized as free and fair. He took office on January 14.
        The new Government's efforts to implement the Peace Accords were
    limited as it struggled to organize itself and set policy priorities
    throughout the year. By year's end, the Portillo Administration
    established a new timetable for the implementation of the many elements
    of the Accords which had yet to be accomplished.
        In May 1999, in a national referendum, voters rejected the entire
    package of 50 constitutional reforms approved by Congress in 1998,
    dealing a significant blow to the peace process. Only 20 percent of the
    electorate voted. The defeated amendments included provisions to
    recognize, respect, and protect indigenous languages and traditional
    customs, professionalize the judicial service, give civilian courts
    jurisdiction over military personnel, and define the army as an
    apolitical organization. While ordinary laws could be enacted to
    accomplish many of the reforms, the constitutional reforms nonetheless
    held great symbolic value for the peace process.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
    and government, but women are underrepresented in politics. The major
    parties nominated and elected fewer female candidates for Congress in
    the 1999 elections; however, women's participation as voters was the
    highest ever, despite social traditions that inhibit voting by women.
    Nevertheless, women held some prominent political positions. Voters
    elected 8 women to Congress in November, and that number was increased
    to 13 as substitutes took the seats of members of Congress recruited to
    serve in the Executive Branch. One woman, Zury Rios de Lopez, is the
    Second Vice President of Congress. Women hold two seats on the Supreme
    Court and one on the Constitutional Court. There was one female
    minister in the Portillo Cabinet--the Minister for Culture and Sports.
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for indigenous people.
    Some attained high positions as judges and government officials,
    including 14 members of the new Congress (15 were elected, but Aura
    Marina Otzoy Colaj, an indigenous woman, later was appointed Ambassador
    to Norway). There were 6 indigenous members in the 80-member Congress
    before the 1999 elections. Indigenous people still are underrepresented
    significantly in politics due to limited educational opportunity and
    pervasive discrimination (see Section 5). There are two indigenous
    members in the Cabinet of the Portillo Government.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government permits local human rights groups to operate without
    restriction. Numerous domestic and international groups investigate and
    report freely on human rights issues. Senior government officials also
    met with numerous foreign government officials and international human
    rights monitors. While many international human rights organizations
    and their workers do not enjoy formal legal status, they continue to
    operate openly.
        During the year, most NGO's credibly reported receiving threats or
    being intimidated by unidentified persons. From April to June there was
    a very significant increase in the number of threats against human
    rights workers, as well as journalists and judicial personnel, in
    comparison to 1999 levels (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Most of these
    acts of intimidation involved anonymous telephonic threats,
    surveillance, and unknown individuals and cars following human rights
    workers or watching their workplaces or residences. In addition at
    least two murders and one disappearance allegedly were committed for
    political reasons, possibly related to the victims' human rights work.
    These cases included the killing of two government environmental
    workers in Izabal (see Section 1.a.), and the disappearance of
    Professor Mayra Gutierrez (see Section 1.b.). ODHAG personnel reported
    frequent and persistent death threats, surveillance, and other acts of
    intimidation, as did the prosecutors, two judges, and other judicial
    personnel working on the Bishop Gerardi murder case (see Section 1.a.).
    1992 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu and her staff reported
    numerous threats in connection with the genocide lawsuit that they
    filed in 1999 in a Spanish court against former de facto President
    Efrain Rios Montt and seven other former military or government
    officials. There were other incidents during the year of possible
    political intimidation of human rights workers; however, the reports
    could not be verified.
        In addition to the increased number of threats, there was a series
    of breakins or robberies in human rights NGO offices that some
    observers believed was part of an overall campaign to intimidate civil
    society. In March unknown persons broke into the offices of former
    presidential candidate and leftist leader Alvaro Colom, took files and
    computer information, and wrecked the office. They also defecated and
    urinated on tables and in hallways and scribbled political graffiti and
    insults on chalkboards. In May the National Coordinator of Widows of
    Guatemala, an NGO, reported what appeared to be an ordinary robbery of
    its daycare center in Santa Cruz del Quiche, which was followed a month
    later by a break-in at its Guatemala City office. On June 14, robbers
    stole three computers from a branch office of CALDH after drugging the
    night watchman. On September 4, four armed men entered the offices of
    FAMDEGUA around noon and demanded keys to vehicles and money. They
    stole a FAMDEGUA vehicle, four computers, two laptops, a television,
    and other electronic equipment. The computers contained sensitive
    information about human rights complaints, statistics, and information
    regarding specific human rights cases, such as the Dos Erres massacre
    (see Section 1.a.). On October 26, an armed group assaulted the
    employees and robbed the offices of a group called Women Let's Advance.
    The assailants raped one employee, and stole several computers and
    other office equipment as well as the money and jewelry of the
    employees. On December 22, 2 days after the press reported that ODHAG
    would be bringing a genocide suit against former de facto president and
    current president of Congress, Efrain Rios Montt, ODHAG's legal
    coordinator Mynor Melgar and his family were threatened, tied up, and
    robbed at gunpoint in their home. While the event contained elements of
    common crime, Melgar was threatened, and the perpetrators' actions
    showed premeditation in directing their actions to him specifically.
    While each of these incidents, if taken separately, could be explained
    as a common crime, the frequency of such incidents was a cause for
    significant concern.
        Every 5 years, Congress elects the Human Rights Ombudsman from
    three candidates chosen by the Congressional Committee on Human Rights;
    the next election is scheduled to occur in August 2002. The Ombudsman
    reports to Congress and monitors the rights provided for by the
    Constitution. The PDH's rulings do not have the force of law. The
    Ombudsman, Julio Arango Escobar, operates with a large degree of
    independence from other branches of the Government, often passing
    judgment on controversial issues not normally considered human rights
    topics, such as bus fares and electricity rates. During the year,
    Arango continued to complain that the Congress neither funded his
    office adequately nor implemented his recommendations on human rights.
    The PDH's lack of funding limited the possibility of developing
    adequate investigative capabilities. Relations between the Ombudsman's
    office and MINUGUA were strained and distant. Upon the expiration of
    MINUGUA's mandate at the end of the year, the PDH was to take over
    MINUGUA's human rights verification function, but there was no visible
    preparation for the transfer of that responsibility by either party.
    MINUGUA said that its attempts to engage the PDH in meaningful
    preparations were rejected. On November 22, the Secretary General
    recommended to the General Assembly that the MINUGUA mission be
    extended for another year; it is expected to continue working on a
    reduced staff and budget through 2003 in accordance with the
    rescheduled Peace Accord implementation timeline.
        COPREDEH continued to forge responsive and cooperative
    relationships with both domestic and international human rights
    monitors, often acting as a liaison between such groups and other
    government offices. Unlike in the previous year, COPREDEH took a more
    active approach in attempting to resolve cases before the IACHR. Due
    largely to the leadership of new COPREDEH president Victor Hugo Godoy,
    on March 3, the Government signed a series of precedent-setting
    agreements before the IACHR in which it accepted responsibility for
    several key human rights cases, including the Dos Erres massacre (see
    Section 1.a.); the murder of Myrna Mack Chang (see Section 1.a.); and
    the killing of street child Marcos Fidel Quisquinay by a live grenade
    placed in a bag of food. COPREDEH sought to negotiate amicable
    settlements with the victims or their survivors in these 3 cases and
    over 40 others pending before organs of the Inter-American human rights
    system. On March 29, the Government, represented COPREDEH, designated
    46 cases that had been submitted to the IACHR as priority cases for
    seeking settlements with victims or their survivors. Similarly, on
    August 9, President Portillo signed an agreement with the IACHR in
    which he acknowledged the Government's general responsibility to pay
    reparations to victims or their survivors of human rights abuses
    committed during the internal conflict in 10 cases. On November 30, the
    Government, in compliance with a decision by the Inter-American Court
    on Human Rights, agreed to compensate the families of the murdered
    street children (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Also on November 11,
    President Portillo accepted the Government's responsibility in several
    other human rights cases, including the La Exacta Farm case (see
    Section 1.a.). During the year, the Government signed agreements
    covering 52 cases before the IACHR, out of a total of approximately
    130, in which it pledged to indemnify victims or their survivors and
    investigate and prosecute those responsible. By December 5, the
    Government had entered into negotiations on a total of 79 cases before
    the IACHR. Human rights observers described this as a sign of a
    fundamental shift in Government policy regarding human rights.
        MINUGUA maintained a human rights verification staff of
    approximately 70 persons, with 13 regional or subregional offices to
    monitor implementation of the human rights provisions of the Peace
    Accords and strengthen democratic institutions. MINUGUA stated that the
    Government generally cooperated with its investigations but cited
    occasional isolated incidents in which government officials or
    institutions had obstructed its efforts.
        In April the Government hosted a visit by OAS Special Rapporteur on
    the Freedom of Expression Santiago Canton, whose visit focused on
    allegations of government censorship of a television news show and an
    alleged media monopoly by a Mexican businessman (see Section 2.a.).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language or Social Status
        The Constitution states that all persons are free and equal in
    dignity and rights, and that the State must protect the life, liberty,
    justice, security, peace, and development of all citizens. However, in
    practice the Government frequently is unable to enforce these
    provisions, due to inadequate resources, corruption, and a
    dysfunctional judicial system.
        Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence,
    remained common among all social classes. The 1996 Law on Domestic
    Violence provides that the Public Ministry, the national police, family
    courts, legal clinics, and the PDH can receive complaints of domestic
    violence. Domestic violence is defined as ``whatever action or omission
    by direct or indirect manner causes damage, or physical, sexual,
    psychological, or patrimonial suffering'' to a person within the family
    group. The law provides for the issuance of restraining orders against
    alleged aggressors and obligates the PNC to intervene in situations of
    domestic violence. Statistics vary significantly. The Procuracy General
    of the Nation registered 1,664 complaints in the first 10 months of the
    year, compared with 1,548 complaints in all of 1999. During the first
    half of the year, the PDH received 1,535 cases of abuse against women.
    In 1998 the PDH reported approximately 2,600 complaints of domestic
    violence nationwide. Of the total number of cases of domestic violence
    of all types (including child abuse), only 33 have gone to trial,
    resulting in 28 convictions. On July 28, an appeals court upheld a 2-
    year prison sentence for spousal abuse against Amado Morales. The
    decision is only the second such conviction in the country's history--
    the first reportedly took place 8 years ago.
        Complaints of spousal abuse continued to rise due, at least in
    part, to increased nationwide educational programs, which have
    encouraged women to seek assistance. Judges may issue an injunction
    against an abusive spouse or companion, and the police are charged with
    enforcing such injunctions. The Women's Rights Department of the PDH
    and various NGO's provided medical and legal assistance and information
    on family planning. The office of the Ombudsman for Indigenous Women,
    led by Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy, was established in 1999 and began to
    provide social services for victims of domestic or social violence, as
    well as mediation, conflict resolution, and legal services for
    indigenous women. It formed a coordinating committee and other advisory
    boards and representative assemblies from each of 24 linguistic groups.
    It opened its first branch offices and spent much of its first year
    resolving personnel, equipment, and organizational issues. On November
    28, the Government announced the formation of the National Coordinator
    for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women
    (CONAPREVI), which is to be chaired by the Secretary for Women's
    Affairs, and include public sector representatives from the Public
    Ministry, the judiciary, the National Statistics Institute, and three
    representatives from the private sector Network Against Violence
    Against Women.
        Victims rarely reported criminal sexual violence, although the
    number of complaints of such offenses continues to increase
    significantly. PNC statistics showed 323 rapes in 1999, (the latest
    year for which statistics were available), compared to 220 rapes in
    1998. Many observers believed that this increase did not reflect an
    increase in the number of rapes committed, but rather an increased
    willingness on the part of victims to come forward, greater public
    confidence in the PNC, and improved record keeping of crime statistics.
    Despite these advances, relatively few rape cases went to court, in
    large part because police have little training or investigative
    capacity for such crimes and because many rape victims were reluctant
    to report and prosecute such crimes. Unofficial statistics suggested
    that there were 80 convictions during the year for rape or related
    crimes in 1999, compared with 67 convictions in 1998. In July the
    Public Ministry created a Special Victim's unit, staffed 24 hours a day
    with doctors and nurses with rape test kits to assist rape victims in
    gathering evidence to use against their attackers. The law allows a
    rapist to be exonerated when the victim is at least 12 years old and
    agrees to marry him, but the Public Ministry must approve the marriage
    when the victim is below the age of 18.
        Sexual harassment in the workplace is common.
        On May 23, the Portillo Administration announced the creation of a
    Secretariat for Women's Affairs. The Secretariat operates under the
    direction of the President, advising him on the coordination of policy
    affecting women and their development.
        The Constitution asserts the principle of equality between the
    sexes. Nonetheless, in practice women face job discrimination, are less
    likely to win management positions, and on average receive
    significantly lower pay than men. Some women were subjected to
    preemployment pregnancy tests. Women are employed primarily in low-wage
    jobs in the textile industry, agriculture, retail businesses, and the
    public sector. More working women than men are employed in the informal
    sector of the economy, where pay and benefits generally are lower.
    Women may own, manage, and inherit property on an equal basis with men.
    In 1999 the Congress repealed a rarely enforced Civil Code article that
    enabled a husband to deny his wife the right to work outside the home
    and an article that placed the husband in charge of administering the
    family's property.
        The National Women's Forum, inaugurated in November 1997, continued
    to promote women's issues by participating in local and regional forums
    organized by political parties during the general election campaign. In
    May the Forum presented its 2-year plan for development and women's
    issues to the Government. The plan sets specific targets for
    development, including literacy, expanded primary school coverage,
    scholarship programs, and integrated women's health. In each of the 24
    linguistic communities, women's groups are responsible for implementing
    and monitoring the Forum's policies and programs.
        Children.--The Constitution charges the Government with protecting
    the physical and mental health, as well as the moral well-being, of
    minors. However, despite these provisions, the Government in the past
    has not devoted sufficient resources to ensure adequate educational and
    health services for children. Approximately 80 percent of children
    under the age of 18 live in poverty. The Government budgeted
    approximately $345 million (2.69 billion quetzals) for education and
    $178 million (1.39 billion quetzals) for health care; however, the
    percent of the country's GDP that was spent on education decreased from
    2.46 percent of GDP in 1999 to 2.3 percent during the year.
        A MINUGUA report, issued on December 11, found that 51 percent of
    the population is under 18 years old; of this group, 83 percent live in
    poverty; 46 percent of children under the age of 5 suffer chronic
    malnutrition and another 24 percent suffering periodic malnutrition.
    There are approximately 200,000 orphans throughout the country,
    approximately 10,000 children in gangs, and 6,000 children living on
    the streets. A total of 444 children have disappeared since 1996.
        The Constitution provides for compulsory education for all children
    up to the 6th grade. However, less than half the population actually
    receives a primary education, and only 3 of 10 students who begin
    primary school complete it. One-fourth of all children do not attend
    school. These are concentrated in rural areas, and a disproportionate
    number are indigenous. Only one of eight girls who begin school
    graduates from the 6th grade. According to a December MINUGUA report,
    the average Guatemalan child receives 2.3 years of education; however,
    when only indigenous children are considered, the average drops to 1.3
    years of education. Children in rural and indigenous areas are less
    likely to complete primary school.
        Approximately 2.1 million children between the ages of 5 and 12
    were enrolled in schools in 1999, according to the Ministry of
    Education. The Ministry also reported that 3,461 communities had access
    to educational services for the first time. The PDH reported in 1999
    that 38 percent of elementary school-age children and 79 percent of
    secondary school-age children do not attend school. There were special
    initiatives to promote the education of girls, and about 49,000 girls
    received incentive scholarships from PRONADE, a privately run program
    under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, during the year, in
    addition to approximately 12,000 scholarships from other government
    institutions and international organizations.
        Most estimates indicated that reports of child abuse continue to
    increase, although there are few statistics available to measure the
    problem. The Procuracy General reported 1,126 cases of child abuse as
    of December 5, compared to 1,478 cases in 1999 and 1,172 cases in 1998.
    A total of 70 cases reported during the year concerned physical abuse;
    the remainder involved sexual or psychological abuse. Out of a total of
    4,250 cases of domestic violence, the PDH investigated 126 complaints
    of child abuse during the year. The largest percentage of these
    complaints were for physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, as well as
    neglect. A Permanent Commission for Children and Youth investigates
    cases of mistreatment of children. The Social Secretariat for the
    Welfare of Children has oversight for the children's welfare program,
    treatment and training for children, and special education assistance
    for children. The Secretariat provides shelter and assistance to
    children who are victims of abuse; however, due to lack of resources,
    these children sometimes are placed with other youths who have
    committed crimes.
        Abuse of street children remained a serious problem in major cities
    (see Section 1.c.). Most credible estimates put the number of street
    children at approximately 6,000 nationwide, with about 3,500 of these
    youths concentrated in Guatemala City. The NGO Casa Alianza increased
    its estimates of the number of homeless persons to 25,000, of whom
    8,000 are children. Approximately 1 in every 1,000 children lives on
    the street. The majority of street children ran away from home after
    they were abused. Criminals--reported to include private security
    guards and corrupt police or military personnel--often recruited these
    children into thievery or prostitution rings. According to Casa
    Alianza, drugs, prostitution, and gangs posed the greatest danger to
    this vulnerable group during the year. Most violence against street
    children was committed by individuals, private security guards, and
    other street children, not by police or other government forces. There
    was only one report of abuse of street children by PNC officers, in
    which several officers allegedly threatened five street children. The
    Government and a number of NGO's operate youth centers, but the funds
    devoted to them are not sufficient to alleviate the problem. The
    Government maintains one shelter for girls and one shelter for boys in
    Guatemala City; these shelters provide housing for the homeless and
    incarceration for juvenile offenders. A new phenomenon developed as
    street children began giving birth to a second generation of street
    children, dubbed ``street babies.'' Casa Alianza reported three cases
    of kidnaping or forced disappearance of street babies by unknown
    individuals.
        On November 30, the Government, in compliance with a decision by
    the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, agreed to compensate the
    families of the street children who were killed between 1990 and 1995
    (see Section 1.a.). In addition to the modest $11,500 per victim
    compensation, the Government also promised to develop programs to
    prevent the abandonment of and violence against street children.
        In August ODHAG issued its report on children missing in the armed
    conflict (see Section 1.b.). A report by ODHAG issued in September
    found that children accounted for 20 percent of the victims of
    arbitrary extrajudicial executions during the armed conflict, and that
    27 percent of the victims of sexual abuse committed during the armed
    conflict were children.
        On February 29, Congress indefinitely suspended a proposed new
    Minors' Code due to strong political opposition from certain powerful
    sectors, reportedly led by the adoption attorneys who receive large
    financial gains from nonjudicial adoptions that would have been
    eliminated under the new code. Other opponents, including religious
    leaders, argued that the code derogated parental rights and threatened
    the integrity of the family. The bill was to have become law on March
    3. Debate on changes to the code continued during the year.
        COPREDEH continued weekly meetings of the Permanent Commission for
    Children, composed of representatives from Casa Alianza and from the
    judicial and executive branches, with the aim of addressing the
    problems of street children. The Government continued its program to
    train instructors to educate civil society groups and the public about
    children's rights.
        Sexual exploitation of children is a growing problem, including
    child prostitution and the trafficking of children for purposes of
    prostitution. The Ministry of Labor noted an increase in child
    prostitution in the towns along the borders with Mexico and El
    Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador, many child prostitutes
    were brought into the country from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras
    by organized rings, who force the children into prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.). The proposed Minor's Code would have mandated stricter
    punishments for parents who force their children into prostitution, and
    for adults who solicit child prostitutes.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that the State
    should protect disabled persons. Nonetheless, physically disabled
    persons are discriminated against in education and employment
    practices, and few resources are devoted to combat this problem or to
    assist the disabled. The PDH continued to draft proposed regulations to
    implement the provisions of the 1996 Law on Protection of the Elderly
    and the Law on Attention to Disabled Persons, which mandates equal
    access to public facilities, prohibits discrimination based on
    disability, and provides other legal protections. The law defines a
    disabled person as one whose physical, mental, or emotional
    deficiencies limit performance of normal activities. It stipulates
    equal opportunity for disabled persons in health, education, work,
    recreation, sports, and cultural activities. It also provides that all
    disabled persons receive the benefits of labor laws and social security
    and have the right to work. In addition the law establishes equal
    education opportunities, the requirement that buildings meet access
    codes, and the right to equal pay. While implementation of the new law
    has been slow, a National Council for the Disabled, composed of
    representatives of concerned government ministries and agencies, met
    regularly to formulate regulations needed to implement the legislation.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution states that the country is
    composed of diverse ethnic groups and obliges the Government to
    recognize, respect, and promote the lifestyles, customs, traditions,
    forms of social organization, and manner of dress of indigenous people.
    In 1999 the Arzu Government created the office of Ombudsman for
    Indigenous Women and appointed Juana Catinac Xom de Coyoy as its first
    Director.
        Indigenous people constitute over one-half the population but
    remain largely outside of the country's political, economic, social,
    and cultural mainstream. An October U.N. report stated that 73 percent
    of indigenous persons, and 72 percent of those living in rural areas,
    face an institutional lack of economic possibilities and limited access
    to basic services. The 1994 census, the most recent, stated that 42.8
    percent of the population is indigenous; however, most observers
    believe that this figure is low and that indigenous people constitute a
    majority of the population. There is no single indicator of indigenous
    status, and there are at least 22 separate Mayan ethnic groups, each
    with its own language. In addition to the indigenous Mayan groups,
    there is an indigenous Xinca community of some 6,000 persons. The
    Garifuna, descendents of Africans brought to the Caribbean region as
    laborers and who later migrated to South and Central America, are a
    separate minority group.
        Indigenous people were the most common victims of extrajudicial
    killings and other serious human rights abuses during the internal
    conflict. The commissions established to discuss the implementation of
    constitutional provisions relating to indigenous rights met during the
    year to formulate recommendations to the Government regarding
    protection of indigenous culture, languages, traditions, lands, and
    sacred sites. Indigenous people continued to organize themselves into
    interest groups to promote bilingual education, women's rights, and
    community development. Politically, the indigenous groups remained
    fragmented, and there was little agreement among the Mayan groups on
    common goals or strategies to increase their political representation
    and power. The Government devoted marginally increased resources to
    bilingual education. Contrary to previous years, there were no reports
    of schools denying children the right to wear traditional indigenous
    dress, a common complaint under the previous administration.
        Rural indigenous people have limited educational opportunities and
    thus have fewer employment opportunities. Many indigenous people are
    illiterate or do not speak Spanish. Linguistic barriers hinder
    interaction with the Government and limit access to public services,
    including the judiciary, since few officials speak any of the 24
    indigenous languages. In 1998 the Indigenous Languages Officialization
    Commission issued a report, in which it recommended that a variety of
    public services be provided in the four most widely spoken indigenous
    languages (K'iche', Q'eqchi', Mam, and Kaqchikel), with a lesser degree
    of services provided in less widely spoken indigenous languages.
        Indigenous people arrested for crimes often are at a disadvantage
    due to their limited comprehension of Spanish. The Criminal Procedures
    Code states that the courts must provide interpretation for anyone
    requiring such services during criminal proceedings. In 1999 there were
    67 interpreters at all levels of the legal system, from the police to
    the formal courts, to assure non-Spanish speakers the means to bring
    complaints, resolve conflicts, and provide testimony. Interpreters were
    concentrated in former conflict areas of the country; more interpreters
    were in training. The Public Defender's Office began hiring attorneys
    fluent in indigenous languages and assigning them to areas where they
    could serve as translators in addition to defending their clients. The
    Government also made efforts to recruit justices of the peace who are
    bilingual in Spanish and an indigenous language. In January 1998,
    several community courts were created in primarily indigenous, rural
    areas to decentralize justice and incorporate customary Mayan law for
    minor offenses. In August there were several incidents in which
    indigenous common law courts were convened to hand down sentences,
    including whippings and other forms of corporal punishment, against
    suspected criminals and other delinquents (see Section 1.e.). The
    University of San Carlos offers a postgraduate degree in indigenous
    customary law. Judges, prosecutors, public defenders, judicial
    translators, and others already have received the degree, which
    emphasizes criminal law and human rights.
        Contrary to the previous year, no indigenous leaders disappeared
    during the year. There was one credible report of an indigenous leader
    killed for political reasons, Jose Mendoza Garcia (see Section 1.a.).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    provide workers with freedom of association and the right to form and
    join trade unions. The Government does not control unions. Although
    internal intelligence services allegedly monitor the activities of
    politically active union leaders, there is no direct state interference
    in union activities. In June the Labor Ministry proposed a package of
    major reforms intended to strengthen the Labor Code's protection of
    worker rights. In December the Labor Ministry proposed a revised Code
    of Labor Procedure aimed at streamlining labor dispute litigation. The
    proposed Labor Code reforms would increase the fines for firing workers
    who organize unions and define the mission of the Labor Ministry as
    that of ``carrying out a national policy of defense and development''
    of worker rights. The reforms were pending at year's end. The most
    recent reforms to the Labor Code in 1992 mandated steps to improve
    worker rights by facilitating freedom of association, strengthening the
    rights of working women, increasing penalties for violations of labor
    laws, and enhancing the role of the Labor Ministry and labor courts in
    enforcing labor law. However, enforcement of the law is weak. Despite
    continuing credible efforts to enlarge it, the labor inspection system
    remains ineffective, inadequate, and corrupt. All workers have the
    right to form or join unions, including public sector employees, with
    the exception of members of the security forces. However, retaliation
    by employers--including firing, intimidation, and sometimes violence--
    against workers who try to exercise internationally recognized labor
    rights is common and usually goes unsanctioned. In its November report
    to the International Labor Organization (ILO) Governing Body, the ILO's
    Committee on Freedom of Association detailed five cases of dismissal of
    workers for unionizing activity in which courts ordered the workers
    reinstated but the employers never complied. In some of these cases,
    appeals and reappeals by employers of court decisions against them have
    continued the proceedings for years, revealing the inability of the
    courts to dismiss frivolous appeals and have their decisions enforced.
        The law provides for a system of labor and social welfare courts to
    rule on violations of the Labor Code. Employers often failed to comply
    with the decisions of the Labor Courts and suffered no effective
    sanctions for having done so. Throughout the economy, employees were
    reluctant to exercise their right of association for fear of reprisal
    by employers. Workers had little confidence that the responsible
    executive and judicial institutions would defend effectively their
    rights as employees when employers violated those rights. In addition
    the weakness of labor inspectors, the failures of the judicial system,
    poverty and lack of education, the legacy of violent repression of
    labor activists during the internal conflict, and the deepseated
    hostility of the business establishment towards independent and self-
    governing labor associations constrained the exercise of worker rights.
    In its 4th Report on the Peace Process, MINUGUA noted that ``genuine
    trade union freedom does not exist'' due to antiunion violence.
        According to the Labor Ministry, less than 2 percent of the work
    force (about 60,000 persons) belong to labor organizations. The
    approximately 1,300 registered unions and 400 company-sponsored
    ``solidarity organizations'' were independent of government and
    political party domination. However, the International Confederation of
    Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in a September 1999 report described the
    solidarity organizations as ``set up by employers to undermine trade
    unions.'' The administrative process for unions to obtain legal status
    has been simplified progressively over the past decade. In 1996 the
    Ministry of Labor reduced the number of steps within the Ministry for
    consideration of union applications and established strict timetables
    for approval or denial; the time for the procedure was reduced to 20
    days from 60. During the year, the Labor Ministry expanded its program
    to assist unions with their applications. During the year, the Ministry
    also simplified the process for forming federations and confederations.
    The Labor Ministry granted legal status to 42 unions during the year.
    In 1999 there were 1,389 registered unions, including 401 unions in the
    public sector and 988 unions in the private sector.
        On October 13, 1999, a group of men, many of them armed, took
    control of the union hall of the SITRABI banana workers union in the
    town of Morales, Izabal. There were credible reports that leaders of
    the vigilante group repeatedly threatened to kill some of the union
    leaders. During the incident, which lasted over 8 hours into the
    morning of October 14, about 20 rank-and-file union members reportedly
    were held captive for much of that time on the bus in which they had
    come to the union hall. There were several credible reports that armed
    men forcibly entered the home of one of the union leaders and made him
    go with them to the union hall. Various union leaders and rankand-file
    members were shoved and struck. Union leaders were forced to sign
    letters of resignation from their positions in the union and from their
    jobs. The Ministry of Labor immediately declared the coerced
    resignations to be invalid. MINUGUA's report on the incident called it
    ``one of the most serious violations of human rights since the signing
    of the Peace Accords.''
        Despite the availability of dozens of potential witnesses, and
    therefore little doubt as to the essential facts, the investigation and
    indictment process that followed was lengthy and slow to progress.
    According to MINUGUA, law enforcement failures attendant to this
    incident included police inaction as the incident took place, lapses in
    applying the Code of Criminal Procedures during the indictment phase,
    and a weakening of the charges finally placed against the accused. In
    June the first instance court rejected charges of abduction,
    intimidation, aggravated trespass, and aggravated illegal detention,
    which were sought by the prosecution. The first instance court
    arraignged 24 defendants on charges of trespass, illegal detention, and
    coercion. The trial date is scheduled for spring 2001.
        The ILO's Governing Body, sitting as the Committee on Freedom of
    Association, published a detailed account of these events in its report
    released in November. The report noted that ``the BANDEGUA enterprise
    denies any links with the acts of violence while the trade union
    accuses it of being responsible for them.'' (SITRABI is the union of
    BANDEGUA employees; BANDEGUA is the Guatemalan subsidiary of Del Monte
    Fresh Produce). In the background to this violence against these union
    leaders was the firing of 897 workers by BANDEGUA in September 1999, in
    violation of the contractual agreement ``in force between the
    enterprise and the trade union.'' In October the Ministry of Labor
    facilitated the completion of a collective bargaining agreement between
    the SITRABI union and the lease holding contractors of BANDEGUA who had
    taken up operating the plantations on which the 918 workers had worked
    as directhire BANDEGUA employees.
        Workers have the right to strike, but labor code procedures for
    having a strike recognized as legal are cumbersome. Labor organizers
    have criticized the law, which requires that twothirds of the work
    force must approve a vote to strike, prohibits strikes by agricultural
    workers at harvest time, and allows the Government to prohibit strikes
    that it considers seriously harmful to the national economy. Employers
    may suspend workers or fire them for absence without leave if the
    authorities have not recognized their strike as legal. The strike
    regulation law calls for binding arbitration if an impasse has been
    reached after 30 days of negotiation.
        In 1996 Congress approved a law that further restricted the right
    to strike for workers employed in a range of essential public services,
    including urban and interurban transport, mail, and telegraph. Unions
    had opposed the law strongly, and some members of Congress called the
    measure unconstitutional and contrary to obligations under ILO
    conventions. However, the Constitutional Court declared it
    constitutional in 1997. This essential services strike legislation
    gives the President the authority to intervene forcefully should
    strikes threaten the orderly functioning of society. The Labor Code
    reforms proposed in June would undo the provisions of this law that the
    ILO regards as incompatible with ILO standards with respect to the
    right to strike. The proposed reforms would reduce the number of
    workers required to call a legal strike to a simple majority. The
    proposed reforms would limit essential services to health,
    communications (including air traffic control), and public transport,
    and provide for legal strikes in those sectors so long as minimum
    services are maintained.
        There were no significant strikes during the year.
        The law protects workers from retribution for forming unions and
    for participating in trade union activities, but enforcement of these
    provisions is inconsistent. Many employers routinely seek to circumvent
    labor code provisions in order to resist unions, which they view as
    disruptive and as a challenge to their full control of the workplace.
    An ineffective legal system and inadequate penalties for violations
    have hindered enforcement of the right to form unions and participate
    in trade union activities. Although the Labor Code provides that
    workers illegally fired for union activity should be reinstated within
    24 hours, in practice employers often filed a series of appeals or
    simply defied judicial orders for reinstatement. Penalties for defying
    such orders were increased somewhat in the 1992 Labor Code reform and
    further in a decree that went into effect in June 1998. The Labor
    Ministry has worked to ``promote the restructuring of labor relations
    in enterprises by encouraging labor-management cooperation'' and bring
    about a ``culture of negotiation'' as called for by the Peace Accord on
    Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. However,
    productive, good-faith negotiations between employer and worker
    representatives have been the exception rather than the rule. The
    majority of unions that engaged in collective bargaining during the
    year reported that employers increasingly rejected the underlying
    premise of collective bargaining--that power in the workplace can be
    shared equitably according to a contract between the employees and
    company management.
        Impunity for acts of intimidation and violence against trade union
    members remains a problem. In its Fourth Report on the Peace Process,
    MINUGUA noted that ``genuine trade union freedom does not exist'' due
    to antiunion violence. In its November report, the ILO noted that 12
    murders, some of which date back to 1995, of union leaders and union
    members, have not yet been investigated credibly nor effectively
    prosecuted. In June Mixco city councilman Francisco Rodas left the
    country, alleging persistent, credible death threats following his
    campaign to have 400 fired municipal workers reinstated by Labor Court
    rulings. Mixco Mayor Elmer Morales fired the workers in the months
    after he assumed office in February and was the suspected source of the
    threats.
        An active ``solidarity'' movement claims to have approximately
    170,000 members in about 400 companies. Unions may operate legally in
    workplaces that have solidarity associations, and workers have the
    right to choose between the two or to belong to both. The Government
    views these associations as civic organizations that need not interfere
    with the functioning of trade unions. The Labor Code stipulates very
    clearly that trade unions have an exclusive right to bargain
    collectively on work conditions on behalf of workers. However, unions
    charge that management promotes solidarity associations to avoid the
    formation of trade unions or to compete with existing labor unions.
    There were credible reports that some of these associations did not
    always adhere to democratic principles in their formation and
    management and that workers were unable to participate fully and freely
    in decision-making. Similar credible charges were made against some
    trade unions.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman's office for economic and social issues
    receives complaints related to violations of internationally recognized
    worker rights. Union leaders and workers filed over 100 complaints with
    the PDH in 1999, and the Ombudsman has made public statements about
    labor conditions in various sectors of the economy. The PDH can
    investigate union complaints and issue a statement, but the office has
    no enforcement powers beyond attempting to resolve the situation
    through publicity and moral persuasion.
        Unions may and do form federations and confederations and affiliate
    with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
    the right to organize and bargain collectively; however, the practice
    of collective bargaining is constrained by legal restrictions,
    according to a report by the ILO Committee of Experts (COE). The COE
    called on the Government to remove the legal requirement that a
    collective bargaining agreement be submitted to the Government and that
    it have two-thirds support of union members. The COE report also lists
    seven other reforms necessary to provide for full exercise of the right
    to organize and bargain collectively. The practice of collective
    bargaining also is limited by the weakness of the labor movement; the
    requirement that 25 percent of the workers in a factory or business
    must be union members in order for collective bargaining to take place;
    the lack of experience with collective bargaining; and management's
    aversion to sharing power with worker associations. Both management and
    labor honored wellwritten collective contracts at some firms; however,
    in others management, and sometimes labor, chose to ignore the
    contractually binding collective bargaining agreements. Between 1995
    and 1999, 153 collective bargaining agreements were concluded between
    employers and employees and registered with the Labor Ministry. Nearly
    all of these agreements remained in force at the end of the year;
    although some had expired and were under renegotiation. Most workers,
    even those organized in trade unions, do not have collective contracts
    to cover their wages and working conditions nor do they have individual
    contracts as required by law. According to a study released in November
    by the Association for Research and Social Studies, only 10 percent of
    workers have a contract duly registered with the Labor Ministry as
    required by law.
        Employers legally cannot dismiss workers for helping to form a
    trade union; workers file complaints in this regard with the labor
    inspectors for resolution; however, the Government does not enforce
    this law effectively. The Labor Code provides for the right of
    employers to fire union workers for cause, permits workers to appeal
    their dismissal to the labor courts, and requires the reinstatement
    within 24 hours of any union worker fired without cause. The Labor Code
    prohibits employers from firing workers for union organizing and
    protects them for 60 days following the official publication of
    approval of the union. The Labor Code also prohibits employers from
    firing any member of the executive committee of a union and also
    protects them for 12 months after they are no longer on the executive
    committee. An employer may fire a member of the union's executive
    committee for cause only after a trial and issuance of a court
    resolution. However, the Government does not enforce these laws in
    practice.
        Despite governmental, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to
    restructure and modernize the labor court system, the system remained
    ineffective. There are 20 labor courts, including 7 in the capital and
    13 elsewhere around the country. An additional nine courts deal with
    labor issues as part of their jurisdiction. The weakness of the
    judicial system as a whole, the severe shortage of competent judges and
    staff, and a heavy backlog of undecided cases all contribute to the
    labor courts' lack of credibility and effectiveness. The small number
    of competent and motivated labor inspectors, and the lack of training
    and resources devoted to detecting and investigating Labor Code
    violations, compound the weakness of the labor courts. However,
    government efforts to improve the labor inspection system continued. At
    year's end, there were 80 full time, professional labor inspectors on
    the rolls of the Ministry of Labor. In September the Ministry hired
    another 70 inspectors under temporary contracts. The Ministry of Labor
    continued to increase its rate of inspections and fired some
    incompetent or corrupt inspectors. Ministry figures show that over
    2,000 investigations or inspections were conducted between January and
    August 1999. A portion of these inspections was a successful campaign
    to improve compliance with labor standards in the inbond processing for
    export or ``maquila'' sector. In addition some represented an effort to
    ensure compliance with minimum wage provisions. As a result of this
    revitalized labor inspection effort, the Labor Ministry filed 1,136
    complaints for uncorrected labor law violations during the year, which
    was a record number.
        The Ministry of Labor has reorganized its labor inspection system
    to permit some complaints to be heard at the Ministry of Labor rather
    than requiring that inspectors travel to each work site. The Ministry
    instituted a set of complaint assistance, small claims mediation, and
    informational initiatives designed to provide better services to
    workers. The Ministry continued its educational campaign on worker
    rights (especially the rights of minors and women), which included a
    campaign of radio announcements and the provision of some documents in
    indigenous languages. In an effort to improve enforcement of the Labor
    Code outside the capital, the Ministry of Labor continued to
    decentralize its operations. Seven of the Ministry's offices outside
    the capital have been accorded regional authority. These regional
    offices, in addition to labor inspectors, also include specialists in
    women and workplace issues, managementworker relations/conflict
    resolution, and minor workers/child labor issues. The Labor Ministry
    plans to give these regional offices supervisory authority over branch
    offices in the departmental capitals of each region.
        Labor laws and regulations apply throughout the country, including
    in the few export processing zones (EPZ's); however, they are enforced
    weakly. (Maquilas that make garments for export operate under an EPZ-
    like regime, although they are not located in distinctly set-apart
    areas.) The laws governing the EPZ's are not discriminatory on the
    subject of organizing trade unions or collective bargaining. Union
    leaders often blamed their inability to organize workers in these zones
    on employer pressures and unofficial restrictions on their access to
    the EPZ's. While labor standards in the EPZ's were no different from
    those found outside the zones, actual working conditions were often
    better.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    bars forced or compulsory labor, and the practice generally does not
    exist. The ILO COE urged the Government to ensure the rapidity of
    judicial processes and inquiries concerning compulsory labor and to
    ensure the imposition of penalties and the strict enforcement of laws.
    The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by
    children, but they are covered by the general constitutional provision.
    Forced or bonded labor by children generally did not occur; however,
    children were trafficked for the purpose of prostitution (see Sections
    5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age forEmployment.--
    The Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14 without
    written permission from the Ministry of Labor. However, children below
    this age regularly are employed in the informal and agricultural
    sectors, usually in small family enterprises. A MINUGUA report, issued
    on December 11, found that 34 percent of children between the ages of 7
    and 14 work. The law prohibits minors from night work and extra hours
    (the legal workday for minors under the age of 14 is 6 hours; for
    minors 14 to 17 years of age, it is 7 hours), from working in
    establishments where alcoholic beverages are served, and from working
    in unhealthy or dangerous conditions. However, between 3,000 and 5,000
    children were employed in the illegal cottagebased fireworks industry.
    The Labor Ministry estimated that approximately 10 percent of the
    children in this industry work illegally in factories, while younger
    children, under the age of 14, typically work at home on piecework
    taken in by their families. On July 12, an explosion in a family-run
    home fireworks workshop killed three siblings, including a 13-year-old;
    all three were working in their father's illegal fireworks factory in
    San Raymundo Sacatepequez. The accident was due to carelessness and
    inexperience handling explosives; and was typical of accidents that
    occur regularly in the informal cottage fireworks industry.
        Laws governing the employment of minors are not enforced
    effectively, due to the shortage of qualified labor inspectors and the
    weakness of the labor court system. The Association for Girls and Boys
    in Central America estimates that approximately 2 million children
    work. The majority of child laborers work in agriculture (family farms,
    coffee, and sugar cane harvesting), while others work in domestic
    service, construction, various family businesses, stone quarrying,
    rock-breaking, fireworks manufacturing, shining shoes, begging,
    performing in the streets, or other jobs. According to Labor Ministry
    statistics, between 1995 and 1999, 507 permits were issued authorizing
    the employment of minors. The Ministry of Labor's efforts to reduce the
    number of these permits issued had the unintended effect of increasing
    the number of minors applying for work with falsified age documents.
    Many children under the age of 14 work without legal permission and are
    open to exploitation. They generally receive no social benefits, social
    insurance, vacations, or severance pay, and earn below-minimum
    salaries.
        The Labor Ministry has a program to educate minors, their parents,
    and employers on the rights of minors in the labor market. In 1992 the
    Government formed the Child Worker Protection Unit within the Ministry
    of Labor. Late in the year, the Ministry of Labor, with the support of
    a group of NGO's, finalized a National Plan for the Prevention and
    Eradication of Child Labor and Protection of Adolescent Workers.
    Implementation of the 1997 Children's and Minor's Code has been
    suspended indefinitely because of political controversy over its
    provisions (see Section 5). Economic necessity forces most families to
    have their children seek some type of employment to supplement family
    income, especially in rural and indigenous communities. Children who
    work generally do so in family enterprises. Education is compulsory for
    all children up to the 6th grade. The law does not prohibit
    specifically bonded labor by children, but they are covered by a
    constitutional prohibition on forced or compulsory labor. Bonded labor
    by children generally did not occur; however, children were trafficked
    into prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages;
    however, noncompliance with minimum wage provision in the rural and
    informal sectors is widespread. The Ministry of Labor oversees a
    tripartite committee, which includes formal sector representatives of
    labor and management, and makes recommendations for increases in the
    minimum wage. In the event that agreement is not possible, the
    Government may decree such increases. The Executive Branch promulgated
    the most recent minimum wage increase by decree, after the tripartite
    commission was unable to reach a consensus, and it took effect on
    December 16. This decree raised the minimum daily wage for agricultural
    work by $0.45 (3.46 quetzals) to $3.24 (25.08 quetzals). It raised the
    minimum daily wage for service, industrial, and government sector work
    by $0.49 (quetzals 3.82) to $3.57 (27.67 quetzals). In March the
    National Legislature mandated by decree an incentive bonus that
    augments the minimum wage. This decree increased the minimum wage by
    ordering that an incentive bonus be paid for each hour worked--$0.09
    (0.6725 quetzals) per hour for agricultural workers and $0.08 (0.64375
    quetzals) per hour for industrial and other workers. This raises the
    legal minimum wage for a regular 8hour day to $3.93 (30.46 quetzals)
    for agricultural work and $4.32 (32.82 quetzals) for service,
    industrial, and government sector work. The minimum wage was not
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. According to the UNDP, at least 80 percent of the population
    live below the poverty line, including approximately 60 percent of
    those employed. In November MINUGUA reported that a minimum wage
    adequate for feeding a family of six would have to be nearly 80 percent
    higher than the current minimum wage. MINUGUA also reported that a
    minimum wage also adequate for clothing, sheltering, and educating a
    family of six would have to be nearly 225 percent higher than the
    current minimum wage.
        The legal workday is 8 hours and the workweek is 44 hours, but a
    tradition of longer hours remains in place due to economic conditions.
    The Labor Code requires a weekly paid rest period of at least 24 hours.
    Trade union leaders and human rights groups charge that workers
    sometimes were forced to work overtime, often without premium pay, in
    order to meet work requirements. Labor inspectors report uncovering
    numerous instances of such abuses, but the lack of stiff fines or
    strong regulatory sanctions, as well as inefficiencies in the labor
    court system, inhibit adequate enforcement of the law.
        Occupational health and safety standards are inadequate. Many of
    the provisions of the applicable law--which dates back to 1957--are
    archaic, making enforcement problematic. During the year, as part of
    its effort to address this situation, the Ministry of Labor
    participated in a number of international initiatives intended to
    sensitize employers and workers to health and safety risks in the
    workplace. Enforcement of occupational health and safety standards that
    do exist and could be applied reasonably is weak. When serious or fatal
    industrial accidents occur, the authorities often fail to investigate
    fully and to assign responsibility for negligence, if any. Employers
    rarely are sanctioned for having failed to provide a safe workplace,
    although the authorities did suspend one maquila operation for safety
    shortcomings, and threatened about a dozen others, in some cases
    repeatedly, with a suspension of operations if they failed to improve
    safety conditions. The Labor Ministry provides training courses for
    labor inspectors in health and safety standards, and has given such
    training a higher priority despite scarce resources. Legislation
    requiring companies with more than 50 employees to provide on-site
    medical facilities for their workers has not been well enforced;
    however, most large employers provided such facilities for their
    employees. Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from
    dangerous workplace situations, and the law provides them with
    protection for their continued employment. However, few workers are
    willing to jeopardize their jobs by complaining about unsafe working
    conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in persons unless that trafficking involves entry into or
    departure from the country for the purpose of prostitution. In addition
    an immigration law that came into effect in January 1999 made alien
    smuggling a crime punishable by imprisonment. The law mandates
    sentences of 5 to 8 years in prison for those found guilty of
    ``promoting or facilitating the illegal entry of persons.''
    Prostitution is not illegal; there are certain health code requirements
    for persons engaging in prostitution. Pimping and inducing a person
    into prostitution are crimes that can result in either fines or
    imprisonment, with heavier penalties if minors are involved.
    Trafficking in women and children, primarily for the purpose of
    prostitution, is a growing problem.
        The country is a significant transit country for alien smuggling,
    both from neighboring Latin American countries and from China, Taiwan,
    and south Asia; aliens often are smuggled to the United States.
    Traffickers use force, coercion, fraud, and deception. In one instance,
    Chinese male victims apparently agreed to debt bondage to pay off their
    transportation costs, while female victims, some of whom were under the
    age of 18, apparently were being taken to the United States to work as
    prostitutes. The victims were told that their families in China would
    suffer if they broke the debt bondage agreement.
        The Defense of Children's Rights unit in the PDH and the Minors'
    Section of the Public Ministry regularly investigate cases of
    trafficking. Officials in the Labor Ministry also raise the issue with
    the police and social welfare agencies as part of their efforts to
    combat child labor and child exploitation. There are no programs
    specifically designed to provide shelter or rehabilitation to victims
    of trafficking. NGO's that focus on women and children's rights often
    help victims of trafficking and work to educate the population about
    the dangers of trafficking; however, there are no NGO's that focus
    solely on trafficking.
        The Ministry of Labor, UNICEF, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
    the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, who
    visited the country in July 1999, have noted a marked increase in child
    prostitution over the past 2 years in the towns along the borders with
    Mexico and El Salvador. Along the border with El Salvador, many child
    prostitutes were brought into the country from El Salvador, Nicaragua,
    and Honduras by organized rings, who force the children into
    prostitution. In its annual report for 1999 on the state of children,
    ODHAG clearly identified the growing problem of child prostitution as
    linked inextricably to that of trafficking in persons. The report notes
    that no child prostitute ``got there alone'' without inducement and
    exploitation by adults.
                                   __________

                                     GUYANA

        The Co-operative Republic of Guyana is a small nation struggling
    with the problems of consolidating its democratic institutions. It has
    a multiparty political system based on proportional representation.
    Citizens elect an executive president and a 65-member unicameral
    parliament. The President appoints a prime minister and a cabinet. In
    December 1997, citizens voted in a free and fair national election to
    return the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and its Civic (C) partner
    to office. Social unrest and occasional violence marred the post-
    election period, with the main opposition party alleging that the
    election was fraudulent; charges that international observers
    considered unfounded. Nonetheless, as part of a Caribbean Community
    (CARICOM) brokered compromise between the two parties, the PPP/C
    alliance agreed to shorten its constitutionally mandated 5-year term to
    3 years, and a new election is scheduled for 2001. The judiciary,
    although constitutionally independent, is inefficient and often appears
    subject to government influence.
        The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and the Guyana Police Force (GPF)
    are under civilian control. The GPF has the authority to make arrests
    and maintains law and order throughout the country. The GDF is a
    professional military responsible for national defense, internal
    security, and emergency response. Some members of the police force
    committed human rights abuses.
        Guyana is a very poor country. The economy, which for years was
    centrally planned and controlled, is based on a mix of private and
    state enterprises. Rice, sugar, bauxite, and gold are the major
    exports. There are severe shortages of skilled labor and the economy is
    constrained by an inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure for
    transportation, power distribution, flood control, and communications.
    Real economic growth unofficially was estimated at 0.5 percent,
    compared with 3 percent in 1999. Per capita gross domestic product is
    estimated at $824, and over half the population lives in poverty.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas. The police
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings, and police abuse of
    suspects continued to be a problem. The authorities took some steps to
    investigate abuses, but in general, the police continued to commit
    abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remain poor, and lengthy
    pretrial detention remains a problem. The inefficient judicial system
    results in long delays in trials. Police infringed on citizens' privacy
    rights. Violence against women and children, societal discrimination
    against women and indigenous Amerindians, and incidents of
    discrimination stemming from the racial tensions between Indo-Guyanese
    and Afro-Guyanese are problems, as is child labor in the informal
    sector.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police continued
    to commit extrajudicial killings. The Guyana Human Rights Association
    (GHRA) reported that the police killed 13 civilians during the year,
    compared with 9 in 1999, 11 in 1998, and 27 in 1997. In most cases, the
    police shot the victims while attempting to arrest them or while a
    crime was being committed.
        The GHRA also expressed concern about the death in custody of Shawn
    ``Big Bird'' Nedd, who reportedly was shot and killed on February 7 by
    police after being arrested, while being held in a vehicle of the
    ``Quick Reaction Squad.'' Eusi Kwayana of the Working People's Alliance
    political party filed a private criminal charge against a police
    constable for Nedd's death. In July the Director of Public Prosecutions
    (DPP) dismissed the case.
        On February 9, police shot and killed criminal fugitive Linden
    ``Blackie'' London, a former army officer wanted for 4 murders and 14
    robberies. Television cameras recorded a police officer shooting London
    as he appeared to surrender to the GDF. The manner of London's death
    led to speculation that he was executed to prevent him from revealing
    details of criminal connections within the Government or the security
    services. Several thousand persons attended London's funeral on
    February 16, including former President Desmond Hoyte, who publicly
    condemned extrajudicial killings by police. Rhonda Forde, a female
    companion of London's, died when she was shot during the exchange of
    gunfire. On February 18, a government official announced that an
    independent board would not be established to investigate police
    actions during the standoff, but that police and defense forces would
    conduct a joint services investigation. However, no results of any
    investigation of London's killing have been made public.
        On March 18, a police squad shot and killed Hilton Rodrigues,
    wanted for murder and robbery; a police constable also was killed in
    the shootout. On June 23, a police officer shot and killed 26-year-old
    Ramdeo Rampersaud while attempting to arrest him on rape charges.
        On August 18, a policeman shot and killed 14-year-old Trevor
    Crossman in Ituni, along the Demarara River. The policeman mistook him
    for his older brother, with whom the policeman had argued. In order to
    express public sympathy for the family, the Police Commissioner
    attended Crossman's funeral. The authorities charged the policeman with
    manslaughter; on September 8, he was released on bail pending trial.
        On September 3, Mohammed Shafeek died in the Brickdam police
    lockup. An autopsy revealed that Shafeek was beaten all over his body;
    his skull and neck were fractured. The Home Affairs Minister initially
    announced that police reports indicated that Shafeek might have been
    beaten by other prisoners. However, the Police Commissioner
    subsequently announced on September 28 that an investigation revealed
    that Shafeek was beaten by the Venezuelan crew of a ship that had since
    left the country, and that the police had arrested him for disorderly
    conduct. The commissioner added that Shafeek should have been
    hospitalized instead of being placed in a prison cell, and that
    procedures would be instituted in the future to ensure that injured
    prisoners were hospitalized. On October 4, the police submitted a 20-
    page report to the DPP. The report noted that disciplinary action would
    be taken against police officers involved. At year's end, an inquest
    was scheduled for January 2001.
        On November 21, a presidential guard allegedly shot and killed
    fruit vendor Oscar Daniels in Georgetown. The guard reportedly was
    aiming at Daniels' cousin, with whom he had argued, and the guard took
    Daniels to a hospital, but he died on the way. Shortly thereafter, the
    guard returned to duty until media reports led to his removal. At
    year's end, an inquest was pending.
        Throughout the year, the Rise Organize and Rebuild (ROAR) political
    party complained about threats and harassment from the ruling PPP. ROAR
    portrayed the murder on November 12 of a man named Mohan, the father of
    ROAR's organizer in the Essequibo region, by a PPP supporter as a
    result of the PPP's campaign against it. However, the ROAR presented no
    evidence that connected the killing to the PPP.
        There were no new developments in most of the extrajudicial
    killings by police in previous years, including the police shootings of
    Fazal Narine and Colin McGregor in 1999. In April a jury found that no
    one could be held criminally responsible for the death of Victor
    ``Junior'' Bourne in 1998. Two police superintendants were charged with
    killing Bourne but defended themselves by asserting that they acted in
    self-defense. Human rights monitors questioned the jury's verdict by
    noting that the police version of the shooting was contradicted by
    eyewitness testimony, which stated that Bourne was in bed asleep when
    police shot him. Amnesty International issued a statement criticizing
    the verdict and expressing concern over the climate of police impunity
    in the country.
        On March 30, the U.N. Human Rights Committee made 22
    recommendations to the Government, including a call for prompt
    investigation by an impartial body of extrajudicial killings and
    excessive use of force. It also called for measures to be taken to
    ensure the prosecution of offenders and to provide effective remedies
    to victims. The Committee recommended that all law enforcement
    officials receive thorough training in international human rights
    standards.
        Many justice authorities and human rights activists say that
    because of rising crime and pressure from urban businesses, which are
    often the targets of criminals, the Government has taken a lax attitude
    toward investigation of alleged police abuses. In general police abuses
    are committed with impunity.
        The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), established in 1989, is
    composed of five members who investigate complaints against police
    officers. The statute provided for the independence of the PCA;
    however, most members are themselves members of the criminal justice
    system, and the PCA is not truly independent. The PCA received 69
    complaints during the year (compared with 45 in 1999), completed
    investigation of 27 of them, and sent them to the Police Commissioner
    for action. However, there is no information publicly available on the
    status of these investigations. The PCA has not submitted an annual
    report since 1995. Even when police officers do face charges, most of
    the cases are heard by lower magistrate courts, where other specially
    trained police officers serve as the prosecutors. As a result, human
    rights activists question officers' commitment to prosecuting their own
    colleagues.
        In response to the growing number of complaints against the police,
    the police established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
    in 1997. During the year, the OPR received 150 cases; it completed
    action on 97 of them and was awaiting instructions from the DPP on 27
    cases. Since its inception, the OPR has carried out investigations of
    complaints against police, and at least 99 cases have resulted in some
    type of disciplinary action being taken against police officers.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police
    continued to abuse suspects, although to a lesser degree than in the
    previous year. From 1995 to 1997, the GHRA received an average of 20
    complaints per year from victims who had been beaten by police while in
    custody. The GHRA still considers police mistreatment of prisoners a
    problem. Moreover, inmates, attorneys, and judicial authorities
    provided credible evidence that police and correctional officers
    frequently ignored the actions of other inmates who beat, robbed, or
    otherwise mistreated ``problematic'' prisoners.
        On September 3, Mohamed Shafeek died in the Brickdam police lockup,
    after being arrested the previous day (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison and jail conditions were poor, especially in police holding
    cells. Georgetown's Camp Street Prison, the country's largest, is
    extremely overcrowded. For most of the year, Camp Street held between
    900 and 1,100 prisoners in space initially designed to hold 350.
    Conditions in the country's four smaller prisons generally are
    adequate. In 1997 when the Director of Prisons reported that a prisoner
    had died in part due to overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison, the
    Government responded by assigning more full-time nurse practitioners
    and pharmacists to the prison system and by requiring that doctors
    visit prisons more regularly. Prison directors and inmates reported
    that, over the course of the year, medical coverage improved. The GHRA
    continues to advocate improved health care in the prison system. In
    addition to overcrowding and a lack of medical personnel, poor staff
    morale is a serious problem within the prison system. Prison staffers
    are poorly paid, and their salaries and benefits are insufficient to
    compensate for the on-the-job risks; however, they try to assist
    prisoners as much as possible. Prison officials lobbied the Government
    for increased funding to improve prison conditions; they also
    encouraged efforts by local and international nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) to improve physical and sanitary conditions.
        Although sanitary and medical conditions in police station
    temporary holding facilities vary, in almost all cases these conditions
    are worse than those in the prisons. Some such jails are bare,
    overcrowded, and damp. Few have beds, washbasins, furniture, or
    utensils. Meals are normally unavailable; friends and relatives must
    bring detainees food and water. Cells rarely have sanitary facilities,
    and inmates sometimes are escorted by staff members outside the cells
    to use holes in the floor for toilets. Inmates generally sleep on a
    thin pallet on the concrete floor. The Brickdam lockup in Georgetown
    has poor sanitation and dangerous conditions. One cell without plumbing
    or other facilities typically holds up to 30 detainees and is often the
    site of violence between inmates. Although precinct jails are intended
    to serve only as pretrial holding areas, some suspects have been
    detained there as long as 4 years, waiting for the overburdened
    judicial system to take action on their cases.
        In October the GHRA criticized prison authorities for the death of
    Michael Ramcharran at the hands of another inmate, which the GHRA said
    was the direct result of overcrowding at the Camp Street Prison. To
    reduce overcrowding, the GHRA called on the judiciary to consider
    alternate sentencing for minor offenses, rejuvenation of the Parole
    Board, and the release of ill prisoners who have completed almost all
    of their sentences. However, the Government did not adopt any of these
    recommendations. Since then, the Parole Board has become more active,
    but still is reluctant to release prisoners due to insufficient post-
    release resources, including a lack of probationary staff.
        The GHRA noted that protest actions on the roof of the central
    prison increased significantly during the year; at one point in October
    six inmates were on the roof to protest lengthy delays in trials (see
    Sections 1.d and 1.e.).
        Conditions were generally adequate in the only women's prison,
    which is at New Amsterdam, in a facility that holds men and women in
    separate dormitory-type buildings. There are a number of vocational and
    educational courses, and regular visits by a psychiatrist who provides
    counseling were started for female inmates. The GHRA has urged that
    female inmates' responsibility for children should be recognized in
    terms of length of sentence and facilities for family contact. The East
    La Penitence police jail, where female prisoners are held until
    sentencing, was upgraded during the year; sanitation improved, and
    there is piped water for the inmates. Construction has not begun yet on
    the new women's detention center at East La Penitence.
        Following widespread criticism caused by the detention in 1999 of
    two boys (ages 8 and 11) with adult prisoners who mistreated them,
    police have been careful to place juvenile offenders in a separate
    facility, in which conditions are adequate. In December 1999, police
    moved imprisoned juveniles from Brickdam to the Kitty police lockup,
    but conditions were so poor there that they were moved to the Ruimveldt
    police station. This station became the only facility holding
    juveniles, whose ages range between 14 and 17 years.
        Prison officials were receptive to local and international NGO
    requests to enter and inspect prison facilities. The GHRA participates
    as a member of the prisons' visiting committee, which investigates
    prisoner complaints, inspects diets, reviews primary medical care
    services, and provides recommendations to prison authorities.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides that no person may be deprived of personal liberty except as
    authorized by law and requires judicial determination of the legality
    of detention, a mandate that the authorities generally respected in
    practice.
        Arrest does not require a warrant issued by a court official.
    Police may arrest without a warrant when an officer witnesses a crime
    or at the officer's discretion in instances where there is good cause
    to suspect that a crime or a breach of the peace has been or will be
    committed. The law requires that a person arrested and held for more
    than 24 hours be brought before a court to be charged. Bail is
    generally available, except in capital offense cases. In narcotics
    cases, magistrates have limited discretion in granting bail before
    trial and must remand persons convicted of such crimes into custody,
    even if an appeal is pending.
        Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem. The GHRA has asserted
    that prisoners often are detained for 3 or 4 years while awaiting
    trial; however, the authorities denied that delays were this long.
    During the year, prisoners protested lengthy trial delays (see Section
    1.c.)
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, law enforcement officials and prominent
    lawyers questioned the independence of the judiciary and accused the
    Government of intervening in certain criminal and civil cases. There
    are no institutional checks on the President or the ruling party when
    they seek to influence judges. However, the Government generally
    respects the independence of the judiciary in human rights cases.
        The court system is composed of a high court (the Supreme Court of
    Judicature), an appeals court, and a system of magistrate courts.
    Magistrates are members of the civil service and are trained lawyers.
    The magistrate courts deal with both criminal and civil matters. The
    Ministry of Legal Affairs, headed by the Attorney General, is the
    principal legal advisor to the State. The Director of Public
    Prosecution is statutorily independent and can file legal charges
    against offenders. The Constitution provides that anyone charged with a
    criminal offense has the right to a hearing by a court of law. This
    right is respected in practice.
        Delays in judicial proceedings are caused by shortages of trained
    court personnel and magistrates, inadequate resources, postponements at
    the request of the defense or prosecution, occasional alleged acts of
    bribery, poor tracking of cases, and the slowness of police in
    preparing cases for trial. The inefficiency of the judicial system
    undermines due process. Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem
    (see Section 1.d.). In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee called on
    the Government to recruit competent part-time and temporary judges in
    order to deal with the backlog of cases. In September four additional
    judges were sworn in.
        Defendants are granted public trials, and appeals may be made to
    higher courts. Appeals of some murder cases may go on for several
    years. Trial postponements are granted routinely to both the defense
    and the prosecution. Programs designed to improve legal structures,
    reform judicial procedures, upgrade technical capabilities, and improve
    efficiency of the courts have had only a limited effect, and judicial
    staff still need further training in all areas. Although the law
    recognizes the right to legal counsel, in practice, with the exception
    of capital crimes, it has been limited to those who can afford to pay.
    There is no public defender system.
        The Georgetown Legal Aid Clinic, with public and private support,
    provides advice to persons who cannot afford a lawyer, with a special
    interest in cases of violence against women and criminal cases related
    to civil cases in such matters (for example, assault as part of a
    divorce case). Defendants in murder cases who need a lawyer are
    assigned an attorney by the court. The Guyana Association of Women
    Lawyers provides free legal services for civil cases only.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights; however,
    the authorities often infringed on citizens' privacy. Law enforcement
    officials must obtain warrants before searching private homes or
    properties. Although the authorities generally respected these
    requirements, there were numerous reports of police officers searching
    homes without warrants, particularly in neighborhoods where narcotics
    trafficking is a problem.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice. Citizens openly criticize the
    Government and its policies.
        The independent Stabroek News publishes daily, and a wide range of
    religious groups, political parties, and journalists publish a variety
    of privately owned weekly newspapers. The Government's daily newspaper,
    the Guyana Chronicle, covers a broad spectrum of political and
    nongovernmental groups. However, throughout the year the Chronicle
    typically displayed a clear antiopposition bias.
        While printed media flourished, a growing number of journalists
    charged the Government with failure to respect freedom of the
    electronic media. The Government owns and operates the country's sole
    radio station, which broadcasts on three frequencies. There are no
    private radio stations, and private interests continued to allege that
    the Government either denied or failed to respond to more than 20
    requests for radio frequency authorizations. The Government maintained
    that it was unable to grant frequencies to private stations because
    there was no legislation governing their allocation. However, despite a
    similar lack of legislation to govern television frequencies, there
    were 12 independent television stations in addition to the government
    station.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right. The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass
    political meetings. The Police Commissioner has the authority to refuse
    permission for a public meeting if he believes that it may provoke a
    breach of the peace. In cases of refusal, applicants can appeal to the
    Minister of Home Affairs, whose decision on the matter is final. After
    obtaining authorization, which generally is granted, political parties
    and other groups held public meetings and rallies throughout the
    country without hindrance.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement within the country, and the Government generally respects this
    right in practice. Travel to Amerindian areas requires government
    permission, the result of a law dating from colonial times designed to
    protect indigenous people from exploitation. However, in practice most
    persons travel throughout these areas without regard to the formality
    of a permit. Citizens are free to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
    return.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
    in assisting refugees. The Government does not have a formal policy on
    refugees or asylum and has not enacted model legislation prepared by
    the UNHCR. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Citizens enjoy this right and exercised it in free and fair
    elections held in December 1997. There is a multiparty political system
    based on proportional representation. Voters indirectly elect the
    President to a 5-year term of office. Any citizen 18 years or older can
    register to vote.
        The party that wins the most votes for parliament wins the
    presidency. A party's presidential candidate must be announced in
    advance of the election. The President appoints a cabinet and a prime
    minister who, with the President, exercise executive power. Citizens
    are free to join or support political parties of their choice. Since
    Parliament always is controlled by the party in power, the legislature
    typically provides only a limited check on the executive's power.
        In December 1997, citizens voted to return the PPP and its Civic
    partner to office and elected Janet Jagan, widow of former president
    Cheddi Jagan, as President, defeating the People's National Congress
    (PNC), which is the main opposition party. As a result of opposition
    charges of election fraud that international observers considered
    unfounded, the ruling party entered into an agreement brokered by
    officials from other CARICOM nations to hold new elections after 3
    years instead of 5 years as required by the Constitution. In October
    1998, a court began hearing testimony in a civil suit filed by the PNC
    in support of its allegation that the 1997 election was rigged;
    however, by year's end, no verdict was reached.
        In 1999 Finance Minister Bharrat Jagdeo succeeded to the presidency
    following the resignation of Janet Jagan due to health reasons. The
    CARICOM-brokered agreement also called for constitutional reform of the
    electoral process, and Parliament began to debate changes to the 1980
    Constitution, but reaching agreement on proposed revisions is a lengthy
    process. In December Parliament passed a Constitutional Amendment Act
    that imposes a 7-year residence requirement on candidates for the
    presidency and sets a limit of two terms. In addition the act removed a
    clause that made the President immune from prosecution, and it limits
    the number of nonelected ministers to four. Additional constitutional
    amendments are expected following the next general elections, which are
    scheduled to be held in March 2001.
        Guyana is a racially divided society in which the political party
    structure polarizes the main ethnic groups. Winner-take-all elections
    exacerbate these tensions. The two major parties (the PPP and the PNC)
    are formed largely by Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese, respectively.
        There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
    minorities in the political process, but women and minorities are
    underrepresented in decisionmaking, government, and politics. The 20-
    person Cabinet includes 2 women, and the country's second-highest judge
    is a woman. The 65-member Parliament includes 12 women and 10
    Amerindians, representing both major parties.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Guyana Human Rights Association, the most active local human
    rights group, functioned without government interference. The GHRA is
    an NGO formed in 1979 with the participation of trade unions,
    professional organizations, various ethnic groups, and churches. It
    issues periodic press releases and normally publishes an annual report
    on human rights. Members of the Government openly discussed human
    rights issues and made public statements in response to foreign and
    local human rights reports. The authorities did not interfere with the
    activities of human rights groups. The new draft constitution provides
    for the creation of a human rights commission to investigate abuses and
    to promote respect for human rights. An Amnesty International
    delegation visited in February and met with senior government
    officials.
        In 1999 the Government presented its first report since 1981 on the
    country's human rights situation to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, as
    required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
    (ICCPR), of which it is a signatory. However, the Government's report,
    which was due in 1987, only covered the human rights situation between
    1982 and 1987. In March the Government participated in 2 sessions with
    the committee, which then made 22 recommendations on a wide range of
    human rights issues (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). In 1999 the
    Government withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which had
    permitted death row prisoners to appeal their cases to the U.N. Human
    Rights Committee. The withdrawal was in response to the Committee's
    1996 ruling in favor of two convicted murderers who were to be hanged
    in 1997.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides fundamental rights for all persons
    regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin. However, the
    Government does not always enforce these provisions effectively.
        Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence, is
    widespread. Rape, particularly of girls and young women, is a serious
    problem but infrequently reported or prosecuted. Health professionals
    and NGO's reported a high incidence of incest. Lawyers say that while
    more victims are reporting these crimes to the authorities, there is
    still a social stigma applied to the victim for doing so. Despite
    efforts by NGO's and the Department of Public Prosecutions to sensitize
    police officers to domestic violence, the police are often hesitant to
    interfere in cases of domestic disputes. According to press reports,
    there were 17 deaths as a result of domestic violence between January
    and October 16; the actual number was likely to be higher.
        In 1996 Parliament passed the Domestic Violence Act. In addition to
    defining domestic violence and establishing it as a crime, the law
    gives women the right to seek prompt protection. Magistrates can issue
    interim protection orders when a victim of abuse, a police officer, or
    a social worker fills out an application for protection. A magistrate
    then evaluates the case and decides whether to replace interim orders
    with permanent orders. The Domestic Violence Act allows victims to seek
    protection, occupation, or tenancy orders. Protection orders prohibit
    abusers from being anywhere that the applicant lives, works, visits, or
    attends school. If protective orders are violated, the abuser can be
    fined up to $54 (G$10,000) and imprisoned for up to 12 months. However,
    this legislation frequently has not been enforced. Occupation orders
    allow the victim and any children to remain at a home previously shared
    with an abuser, while the abuser must leave. Similarly, tenancy orders
    require an abuser to leave a rented dwelling and continue to pay some
    or all of the rent. Although local NGO's that address the issue of
    domestic violence are relatively new, they work effectively together
    under tight budget constraints. While NGO's consider the Domestic
    Violence Act as a positive step, they claim that it has had little
    effect on the overall situation of domestic violence in society. NGO's
    report that domestic violence crosses racial and socioeconomic lines.
        In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee criticized the lack of
    information about the effect of the Domestic Violence Act in reducing
    the level of violence against women. The Committee called for training
    of police and other law enforcement personnel in the importance of
    ensuring that women who are victims of violence are accorded equal
    protection and that preventive and punitive measures are enforced. By
    year's end, the Government had not taken any action in response to the
    U.N. recommendations.
        Help and Shelter (H&S), the first local NGO dedicated to fighting
    domestic violence, focuses on societal reeducation in order to
    sensitize the public to domestic violence. By mid-1999, H&S had
    counseled 1,768 persons since it began offering counseling services in
    November 1995. H&S reported that 68 percent of its cases involved
    spousal abuse and 7 percent involved child abuse. Another 10 percent of
    cases reported to H&S were rape cases; the vast majority of these--78
    percent--were reported by victims age 16 and under.
        The 1997 Antidiscrimination Act builds upon the provisions of the
    1990 Equal Rights Act. The two laws provide a strengthened framework
    under which women and minorities may seek redress for discriminatory
    acts or practices. However, no case has ever been tried under the Equal
    Rights Act, and critics of the Antidiscrimination Act claim that it is
    unlikely to be effective since the act places enforcement
    responsibilities on the overburdened Chief Labor Officer.
        There is no legal protection against sexual harassment in the
    workplace. The law prohibits dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy, and
    dismissal on such grounds does not occur in practice. The Women's
    Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Labor monitors the legal rights of
    women. The Women's Leadership Institute was established by law in
    December 1997 and opened in February 1999. The center seeks, through
    education and training, to facilitate greater women's participation in
    government and the private sector. The center plans to train an average
    of 350 women annually on issues such as women's rights, status of
    women, violence against women, and leadership development.
        A 1990 law protects women's property rights in common-law marriages
    and entitles a woman who separates or divorces to onehalf the couple's
    property if she had been working and onethird of the property if she
    had been a housewife. Divorce by consent remains illegal. The courts
    may overturn a husband's will in the event that it does not provide for
    his wife, as long as she was dependent on him for financial support.
        The new draft constitution provides for a minimum number of women
    to be on party slates for parliamentary seats and creates a women and
    gender equality commission to promote the enhancement of the status of
    women, girls, and gender issues.
        Children.--At least half of the population lives in poverty, and
    children are affected more severely than any other group. One-third of
    the population is under 18 years of age and, although the Government
    provides free education through secondary school, the severe
    deterioration of the public education and health care systems has
    limited children's future prospects. The public health system is
    inadequate, and private health care is unaffordable for many children.
    Children often do not attend school because their families need them to
    contribute to the household by working or providing child care for
    siblings or younger relatives.
        Concern continues to rise over the effects of domestic violence on
    children. It is unclear how many deaths from child abuse take place,
    since law enforcement officials believe that the vast majority of
    criminal child abuse cases went unreported. The GHRA is concerned that
    there are no law enforcement investigative procedures in place to
    determine if abuse or parental incapacity were the true causes of death
    in some cases of the 400 children under the age of 5 who die each year,
    deaths that usually are ascribed to malnutrition or disease. Media
    reports of rape and incest further indicated that violence against
    children is a significant problem. According to UNICEF, a disturbing
    aspect is the concept of the ``girl child,'' in which teenage girls
    trade sexual favors for money, a practice condoned by their parents yet
    obscured by cultural norms. In a related practice, parents demand
    monetary compensation following the rape of a teenage daughter.
        The Domestic Violence Act allows police officers or social workers
    to file an application on behalf of an abused child. However, there is
    a lack of social services or trained experts to deal with children
    fleeing sexual, physical, or emotional abuse. Many children suffer from
    neglect or abandonment, particularly when 3 percent of the adult
    population emigrates each year, often leaving children behind.
        The new draft constitution provides for the creation of a
    commission on the rights of the child to promote the well-being of
    children. This commission would monitor compliance and make
    recommendations for compliance with the U.N. Convention on the Rights
    of the Child and other international instruments acceded to by the
    Government. It also would review legislation affecting children and
    investigate complaints relating to children's rights.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no law mandating provision of
    access for disabled persons, and the lack of appropriate infrastructure
    to provide access to both public and private facilities makes it very
    difficult to employ the disabled outside their homes. In 1997
    Parliament passed a law establishing a council for persons with
    disabilities; however, the council has yet to begin its activities.
    There are several special schools and training centers for the
    disabled, but they lack trained staff and are in disrepair.
        Indigenous People.--The Amerindian population, which consists of
    nine tribal groups, constitutes an estimated 8 percent of the
    population. Most live in reservations and villages in remote parts of
    the interior. Their standard of living is much lower than that of most
    citizens and their ability to participate in decisions affecting their
    lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources is
    limited.
        Amerindian life is regulated by the Amerindian Act, legislation
    dating from colonial times designed to protect indigenous people from
    exploitation. Under the act, the Government may determine who is an
    Amerindian and what is an Amerindian community, appoint Amerindian
    leaders, and annul decisions made by Amerindian councils. It also
    prohibits the sale of alcohol to Amerindians and requires government
    permission before any Amerindian can accept formal employment; however,
    these provisions are not enforced. Both Amerindian individuals and
    groups remain free to criticize the Government. In 1998 the Ministry of
    Amerindian Affairs admitted that the Amerindian Act was antiquated and
    expressed a commitment to update it, although it has taken no action to
    do so.
        The Government has long maintained that it is committed to
    demarcating lands that traditionally have been the home of Amerindians.
    However, the Government holds title to almost all the country's land
    and is free to act as it wishes without consultation. The Government
    identified a total of 75 villages, and reported that it successfully
    demarcated the lands of 11 Amerindian communities in 1998. The Ministry
    of Amerindian Affairs claimed that, in close consultation with
    Amerindian leaders, it would demarcate a total of 40 additional
    villages by the end of 1999; however, while a handful of village
    leaders have accepted these new titles, most leaders rejected the
    demarcations. Local Amerindian NGO's regarded government consultations
    as mere public relations exercises and demarcation as a means of
    confining Amerindian communities so that the rest of what Amerindians
    considered to be their land could be offered as concessions to miners
    and loggers. (Most of the titles to demarcated land were granted
    decades ago under the Amerindian Act and did not allow for the growth
    of Amerindian communities.) The Amerindian NGO's claimed that
    Amerindian leaders were not consulted properly and were pressured into
    uninformed decisions. The Government maintained that it would consider
    granting additional land rights to those communities that agreed to
    have their lands demarcated in 1999, but it has not yet taken action to
    do so.
        In March the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed regret that the
    Government had not yet amended the Amerindian Act and expressed concern
    that Amerindians did not enjoy fully the right to equality before the
    law. The Committee was especially concerned that the right of
    Amerindians to enjoy their own culture was threatened by logging,
    mining, and delays in the demarcation of their traditional lands, and
    that in some cases insufficient land is demarcated to enable them to
    pursue their traditional economic activities.
        The new draft constitution provides for the creation of a
    commission on indigenous people to promote and protect the rights of
    the Amerindian community. Among the duties of the commission is to make
    recommendations for the protection, preservation and promulgation of
    the cultural heritage and language of indigenous people. In addition
    the commission is to promote the empowerment of indigenous people
    through local government institutions including village councils and
    the Council of Toushaos (community elders).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Longstanding ethnic tensions,
    primarily between citizens of African descent and those of South Asian
    origin, continued to influence society and political life. Racial and
    ethnic grouping of social and political organizations has polarized
    society along ethnic lines, and discrimination and exclusion continue
    to occur. Members of both the largely Indo-Guyanese PPP and the largely
    Afro-Guyanese PNC engaged in rhetorical and propaganda attacks that
    fueled racial tensions. In August Parliament passed legislation
    creating an ethnic relations commission in an effort to reduce
    tensions, and in December it approved implementing legislation for the
    commission.
        The civil service and defense and police forces are overwhelmingly
    staffed by Afro-Guyanese. Recruitment efforts targeted at Indo-Guyanese
    candidates for the uniformed services generally have met with an
    unenthusiastic response, with most qualified Indo-Guyanese candidates
    opting for a business or professional career over military, police, or
    public service. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 election, the
    Government increased its efforts to recruit Indo-Guyanese for the
    security forces. The Government sponsored various forums for discussion
    of racial problems and to promote inclusion. It supported the work of
    NGO's that deal with these concerns.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of association and specifically enumerates workers' rights to
    form or belong to trade unions. The Trade Unions Recognition Law, which
    requires employers to recognize the union chosen by a majority of the
    workers, was passed in late 1997 and came into effect in 1999, but was
    not effective in practice. The Trade Unions Recognition Board did not
    grant recognition to any new unions; it issued recommendations to
    recertify existing unions that previously had represented workers, but
    the process was not completed by year's end.
        Approximately 34 percent of the work force is unionized. Most union
    members work in the public sector and in state-owned enterprises.
    Organized labor freely associates in one major national federation, the
    Guyana Trades Union Congress (TUC), which is composed of 22 unions.
    There is a tradition of close ties between the trade union movement and
    political parties. Historically, the two major political parties have
    wielded significant influence over the leadership of several unions,
    and trade union officials often served in dual roles as party
    officials. This arrangement occasionally led to overt politicization of
    labor issues. For example, the Public Service Union organized a strike
    of customs employees in November 1998, with explicit political support
    from the opposition PNC. In 1999 all opposition parliamentary parties
    supported the public service workers' strike.
        Workers have a generally recognized right to strike. Strikes can be
    declared illegal if the union leadership did not approve them, or they
    did not meet the requirements specified in collective bargaining
    agreements. Public employees providing essential services may strike if
    they provide the proper notice to the Ministry of Labor and leave a
    skeleton staff in place.
        In May workers at the Forestry Commission went on strike. They were
    attempting to obtain recognition of their union, but 10 union branch
    chiefs were dismissed and had not been paid the severance package due
    to them.
        In 1999 following a civil service strike, an arbitration panel
    awarded government workers an across-the-board 31 percent pay increase
    for 1999, an additional 26 percent increase in 2000, and step
    increases. While the Government has paid the annual increases, it has
    not yet agreed to implement step increases. There is no law prohibiting
    retaliation against strikers or antiunion discrimination by employers.
    However, this principle always is included in the terms of resumption
    after a strike. The Trade Unions Recognition Law defines and places
    limits on the retaliatory actions employers may take against strikers.
    Arbitration rulings, when agreed to by the contending parties, are
    enforceable legally.
        Unions and their federations freely maintain relations with
    recognized international trade union and professional groups. All three
    of the major international trade union federations have affiliates in
    the country.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Public and
    private sector employees possess and utilize the right to organize and
    to bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor certifies all collective
    bargaining agreements and has never refused to do so. However, until
    enactment of the 1997 recognition law, this right was not codified, and
    employers legally were not required to recognize unions or to bargain
    with them. Individual unions directly negotiate collective bargaining
    status, pursuant to the 1993 repeal of a regulation that required that
    all collective bargaining be negotiated through the GTUC. Unions are
    dissatisfied with a provision granting the Ministry of Finance veto
    power over wage contracts negotiated by other ministries. The Chief
    Labor Officer and the staff of the Ministry of Labor provide
    consultation, enforcement, and conciliation services.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there is no indication that
    it occurs. The Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children
    and enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Factories Act and the Employment of Young Persons and
    Children Act set out minimum age requirements for employment of
    children. Legally, no person under age 14 may be employed in any
    industrial undertaking and no person under age 16 may be employed at
    night, except under regulated circumstances. The law permits children
    under age 14 to be employed only in enterprises in which members of the
    same family are employed. However, it is common to see very young
    children engaged in street trading in the capital. While cognizant of
    the situation, the Ministry of Labor does not employ sufficient
    inspectors to enforce existing laws effectively. According to UNICEF,
    child labor in the informal sector is a problem, as is the practice of
    teenage girls trading sexual favors for money (see Section 5). The
    Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children and enforces
    this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Act and the Wages
    Councils Act allow the Labor Minister to set minimum wages for various
    categories of private employers. However, there is no legislated
    private sector minimum wage. As a result of the civil service
    arbitration ruling in 1999 (see Section 6.a.), the minimum public
    sector wage increased to $104 (G$19,000) per month. Although
    enforcement mechanisms exist, it is difficult to put them into
    practice, and unorganized workers, particularly women and children in
    the informal private sector, often are paid less than what is required
    legally. The legal minimum wage for the public sector is insufficient
    to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
        The Shops Act and the Factories Act set hours of employment, which
    vary by industry and sector. In general work in excess of an 8-hour day
    or a 44-hour week requires payment of an overtime rate. However, if the
    initial contract stipulates a 48-hour workweek, then the overtime rate
    applies only for hours worked in excess of 48 hours. The law does not
    require at least a 24-hour rest period each week.
        The Factories Act also establishes workplace safety and health
    standards. The Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry
    of Labor is charged with conducting factory inspections and
    investigating complaints of substandard workplace conditions. As with
    its other responsibilities, inadequate resources prevented the Ministry
    from effectively carrying out this function. Workers cannot remove
    themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing
    continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, and there were occasional reports of
    trafficking in persons of Chinese and South Asian origin, who would
    immigrate illegally to the United States under conditions amounting to
    debt bondage. Persons providing fraudulent documents for the purpose of
    facilitating illegal immigration can be charged with obtaining money
    under false pretenses, which carries a small fine and a 6-month prison
    sentence. Some fraud cases were prosecuted during the year.
                                   __________

                                     HAITI

        Haiti is a republic with an elected president and a bicameral
    legislature; although the 1987 Constitution remained in force, the
    failure to hold legislative elections left the country without a
    functioning legislature for over 3 years. The terms of office of the
    House of Deputies and most of the Senate expired on January 11, 1999;
    however, elections were not held until May 21, 2000. Parliament was not
    in session during that period. President Rene Preval, Prime Minister
    Jacques Edouard Alexis, and a cabinet governed during the year. The
    Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), formed in March 1999, delayed the
    local and parliamentary elections five times. After first-round
    elections were held in May, the CEP adopted a methodology that gave
    outright victory to candidates from the ruling Fanmi Lavalas (FL)
    party. Opposition parties and the international community objected to
    the CEP's method for tabulating votes and refused to recognize the new
    Parliament, which was sworn in on August 28. After CEP president Leon
    Manus refused to certify the results, he received death threats and
    subsequently fled the country. Two other CEP members also resigned in
    protest over the tabulation method. In a highly controversial move,
    President Preval replaced the three CEP members with FL loyalists on
    July 2. This now controversial CEP, whose mandate was expanded in
    August to include presidential elections, held presidential elections
    on November 26. Opposition parties refused to participate and the
    international community refused to support or certify the presidential
    elections because the controversy over the May 21 elections was not
    resolved. The opposition demanded the formation of a new CEP,
    resolution of the May 21 elections disputes, and security guarantees
    for future elections. On November 30, the CEP announced that Jean-
    Bertrand Aristide had won 91.5 percent of the vote in the November 26
    presidential elections and proclaimed him the winner. However,
    controversy continued over voter turnout claims. The CEP announced a
    nationwide voter turnout rate of 60.5 percent. Other observers,
    including the opposition and local and international media, estimated
    voter turnout between 5 percent and 20 percent. The judiciary is
    theoretically independent; however, it is not independent in practice
    and remained largely weak and corrupt, and there were allegations that
    the executive branch interfered in politically sensitive cases.
        In September 1994, a U.N.-sanctioned multinational force restored
    the country's democratically elected president. The Armed Forces of
    Haiti (FAd'H) subsequently were disbanded. At that time, the Government
    established the Haitian National Police (HNP). Despite substantive
    international assistance and some notable progress, the HNP remains a
    fledgling institution with inadequate resources. It still grapples with
    corruption; the presence of human rights abusers within its ranks and
    attrition are serious problems. Allegations of corruption,
    incompetence, and narcotics trafficking are leveled against members at
    all levels of the force, which now numbers between 3,000 and 3,500
    officers for a population well in excess of 8 million. The HNP has a
    variety of specialized units, including a crisis response unit (SWAT),
    a crowd control unit (CIMO) serving Port-au-Prince and the Western
    department, crowd control units (UDMO's) serving each of the remaining
    eight departments, a presidential and security unit, a small Coast
    Guard unit, and a Special Investigative Unit (SIU), formed to
    investigate high-profile political killings. The SIU is no longer ill-
    equipped and inexperienced; however, it lacks a mandate from the
    country's political leaders. It is making progress on some cases. Some
    members of local government councils (CASEC's) exercise arrest
    authority without legal sanction. Members of the HNP and other security
    forces continued to commit serious human rights abuses, although less
    so than in 1999.
        Both the mandates of the U.N. Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and
    of the U.N./Organization of American States (OAS) International
    Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) have expired. The International
    Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH) began operations in March
    with a limited mandate, largely dedicated to technical training. Its
    mandate is scheduled to expire on February 6, 2001. The departure of
    MICIVIH removed an objective monitor of the HNP, thereby making the
    compilation of human rights abuse statistics very difficult.
        Haiti is an extremely poor country, with a per capita income of
    around $400. This figure probably does not fully include significant
    remittances from the over 1 million Haitians living abroad, as well as
    income from informal sector activities that constitute an estimated 70
    percent of actual economic activity. The country has a market-based
    economy with state enterprises controlling utilities. Aside from the
    sale of two previously closed enterprises, the privatization of state-
    owned enterprises has come to a halt. A small elite controls much of
    the country's wealth. Accurate employment statistics are unavailable.
    About two-thirds of the population work in subsistence agriculture,
    earn less than the average income, and live in extreme poverty. A small
    part of the urban labor force (approximately 20,000 persons) works in
    the industrial and assembly sectors, with an equal number in government
    or service sector employment. Assembled goods, textiles, leather goods,
    handicrafts, and electronics are sources of limited export revenue and
    employment. Other important exports are mangoes and coffee. The country
    is heavily dependent on international assistance, especially
    remittances from expatriates. It imports basic foodstuffs, including
    rice and sugar. The economic situation worsened perceptibly during the
    year. Political instability, deficit financing, depreciation of the
    gourde, and the world fuel price increase contributed to the country's
    severe economic problems. Episodes of sharp gourde depreciation in
    September-October, combined with a fuel price increase, resulted in
    high costs for import-dependent business enterprises, prices for food
    and consumer goods remained high at year's end. The International
    Monetary Fund estimated the increase in inflation from 1999 in October
    at 18 percent.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor, and its
    overall effort to respect the human rights of its citizens was marred
    by serious abuses and shortcomings in oversight. Contrary to the
    previous year, there were no credible allegations of extrajudicial
    killing or disappearance. There were several politically motivated
    killings during the year. The HNP continued to beat, torture, and
    otherwise mistreat detainees. Methodical investigations by the HNP are
    rare, and impunity remains a problem. Very poor prison conditions,
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged pretrial detention
    continue to be problems. Many criminal deportees who already served
    full sentences overseas are put back in jail for indefinite periods of
    time. The judiciary remained understaffed and underfunded; judges are
    corrupt and untrained. Judicial dockets are clogged, and fair and
    expeditious trials are the exception rather than the rule. The
    judiciary is not independent in practice; however, the completion of
    the Carrefour-Feuilles and Raboteau trials were signs of improvement.
    Security forces carried out illegal warrantless searches. Popular
    organization militants and members of the HNP increased their
    harassment of political parties, especially the opposition, during and
    after the May legislative elections. Opposition candidates were
    arrested, beaten, shot, and sometimes killed. Some opposition party
    offices were burned or otherwise destroyed. Most media practice some
    form of self-censorship, although they are frequently critical of the
    Government. Violence and societal discrimination against women, and
    government neglect and abuse of children remain problems. Some
    government leaders directed their rhetoric against the mulatto segment
    of society. The practice of rural families sending young children to
    the larger cities to work as unpaid domestics (restaveks) is still a
    problem. Child labor persists. Vigilante activity, including killings,
    remained a common alternative to formal judicial processes.
        The Government made some progress in fighting police impunity and
    in addressing the legacy of human rights abuse from the 1991-94 period.
    On September 29, the trial of former soldiers involved in the 1994
    Raboteau massacre began. On November 10, the court found 16 of the 22
    defendants guilty and acquitted 6. The judge sentenced 12 to life
    imprisonment with hard labor and 4 others to between 4 and 9 years'
    imprisonment. On September 11, a jury found 4 police officers,
    including former police chief Jean Coles Rameau, guilty for their role
    in the murder of 11 civilians in the Carrefour-Feuilles section of
    Port-au-Prince on May 28, 1999. The judge sentenced the defendants to 3
    years' imprisonment each.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    credible reports of extrajudicial killings by members of the HNP;
    however, it is very difficult to obtain reliable statistics in this
    regard because the mandate of MICIVIH has expired. Its successor, the
    International Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti (MICAH), has a much
    more limited mission that does not include compiling statistics on
    human rights abuses. However, there were political killings during the
    year.
        On January 11, a crowd chased HNP and U.N. CIVPOL officers into the
    Fort Liberte Commissariat after police rescued one of two thieves
    caught by the local populace seeking to lynch them. The second thief
    was beheaded. One 14-year-old was shot and subsequently died. The
    source of the bullet is unknown.
        There were politically motivated killings during the year. On March
    27, unknown persons killed Popular Organization (OP) member Jean Samedi
    in the La Saline area of Port-au-Prince. Following discovery of his
    body, the crowd lynched one individual suspected of involvement in the
    killing; five others were wounded in the confrontation. Samedi's murder
    led to further street violence later in the week, during which two
    persons were killed and at least three others, including a police
    officer, were wounded. On March 28, Legitime Annis, a local opposition
    party coordinator, and his wife were murdered at their home in Petit-
    Goave. On March 29, Ferdinand Dorvil, campaign manager for an
    opposition Senate candidate from Grand Riviere du Nord, was dragged
    from his home, shot, and killed. On April 10, Merilus Deus, opposition
    candidate in Savanette, was murdered, and his daughter was injured. The
    HNP investigated these murders as politically motivated incidents.
        On April 3, unknown gunmen shot popular radio host and director
    general of Radio Inter Jean Leopold Dominique, known for his criticism
    of the Government and of former coup leaders (see Section 2.a.). For
    weeks before the attack, Radio Inter employees had received threatening
    phone calls. On April 8, following Dominique's funeral, a gang of
    approximately 25 persons burned the office of the KID party to the
    ground while police watched. The HNP is treating the case as a
    politically motivated killing. The investigation was still open at
    year's end. Two arrests were made in this case; one man was released
    while the other, a former policeman, was still in custody at year's
    end. In September Jean-Senat Fleury, a respected judge known for his
    impartiality, was removed by the Minister of Justice from investigating
    the case. The grounds for his removal were unclear. In November the
    Minister named a new prosecutor, Claduy Gassant, who began calling
    witnesses, including high ranking HNP officials and FL politicians.
        On May 12, Branor Simon, the campaign coordinator for a local
    opposition candidate in Grand'Anse department, was shot and killed. His
    murder credibly is believed to be politically motivated. On May 21, two
    election-related deaths were reported in Croix de Bouquets, a suburb of
    Port-au-Prince, where a candidate and policeman exchanged fire in an
    altercation away from a polling booth. Police were cooperating with the
    investigation at year's end.
        On September 6, men wearing police uniforms abducted, tortured and
    killed Amos Jeannot, an employee of a local nongovernmental
    organization (NGO) called Fonkoze (see Section 4).
        Two prominent killings in 1999 remain unresolved. No arrests have
    been made in the October 1999 killing of Jean Lamy, an unofficial
    advisor to the HNP and longtime political ally of President Jean-
    Bertrand Aristide or in the March 1999 killing of opposition Senator
    Yvon Toussaint.
        On September 11, a court found 4 of 6 police officers guilty for
    their role in the summary execution of 11 civilians in the Port-au-
    Prince suburb of Carrefour-Feuilles on May 28, 1999. The judge
    sentenced each to 3 years' imprisonment.
        On September 29, 22 former members of the military went on trial
    for taking part in the 1994 Raboteau massacre. On November 11, the jury
    found 16 of the defendants guilty. The judge sentenced 12 defendants to
    life imprisonment with hard labor and 4 others to between 4 and 9 years
    imprisonment.
        In 1995 Claudette Gourdet Saint Albin was convicted in absentia of
    the September 1993 murder of Antoine Izmery. When in April the SIU
    attempted to arrest her, the judicial police presented a 1998 document
    acquitting her. There has been no further movement on the Gourdet/
    Izmery case.
        The Government has focused its efforts on investigations into
    political killings that happened before the 1994 return of Jean-
    Bertrand Aristide, e.g. Raboteau, Cite Soleil. Little progress has been
    made in the investigations of political killings after 1994, with the
    exception of the Carrefour-Feuilles trial. Judges assigned to
    politically sensitive cases complained about interference by the
    executive branch of the Government.
        There was little movement on the investigation into the 1993
    massacre of residents of Cite Soleil, a Port-au-Prince slum, by members
    of the FAd'H and its allied paramilitary group, Revolutionary Front for
    the Advancement and Progress of Haiti. In November 1999, 23 arrest
    warrants were issued; however, soon afterwards, Minister of Justice
    LeBlanc terminated the employment of the judge on grounds of
    corruption, leaving the 4-year-old case without a judge with
    institutional knowledge of the case. By year's end, no arrests had been
    made; however, a new judge was appointed in the late summer.
        Extrajudicial killings often take the form of vigilante actions. In
    general, such incidents occurred without official complicity,
    especially in rural areas where there is little or no police presence,
    the populace routinely resorts to vigilante actions in the absence of
    reliable means of legal redress. In November the Prime Minister called
    for the reappearance of vigilante brigades, and several began to
    operate. Angry mobs often kill suspected thieves, bandits, murderers,
    rapists, and sorcerers, usually by assault with machetes, stoning,
    beating, or burning. The HNP tried to prevent instances of vigilante
    justice in at least two cases in Port-au-Prince.
        On March 30, a mob attacked and severely injured a murder suspect
    in Port-au-Prince who had just been arrested by the HNP. The suspect
    was in police custody when he was attacked. The HNP did not provide
    adequate security but instead drove the suspect through downtown Port-
    au-Prince in the back of a pick-up truck, despite a large crowd which
    had formed.
        In March Amnesty International (AI) released a public statement
    expressing concern about reports of politically motivated violent
    street demonstrations by individuals said to be calling for, among
    other demands, the resignation of the Provisional Electoral Council. On
    March 27 and 28, demonstrators, some of whom claimed ties to the Fanmi
    Lavalas party, set fire to tires at barricades around Port-au-Prince.
    The central market was burned. A police officer in civilian clothes was
    shot twice at close range. Local television broadcast a report that a
    9-year-old child had been shot and killed in the protests. Local police
    response was sporadic and limited; at least six persons were killed and
    many wounded. On March 29, Constitution Day, the violence continued in
    and around Port-au-Prince. FL supporters threatened Espace de
    Concertation party marchers. An opposition party organizer Legitime
    Adis and his wife were shot in their Petit Goave home.
        Prison administrators and international human rights observers
    report a high number of deaths in prison (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no credible reports of politically
    motivated disappearances.
        On April 27, Claudy Myrthil, the Espace de Concertation candidate
    for the post of Delegue de Ville in the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of
    Martissant was abducted from his home by unknown persons and held
    captive for 10 days. It is not clear whether his abduction was
    politically motivated.
        In June 1999, recent skeletal human remains were found at Titanyen
    (near Croix des Missions), an area that often had served as a dumping
    ground for bodies of victims of political killings during the Duvalier
    and military eras. The HNP's forensic unit removed the remains with the
    assistance of foreign experts. Preliminary findings link some of the
    remains with an April 1999 incident in which HNP officers allegedly
    arrested eight teenage associates of the gang leader, Hypolite Elysee,
    whom HNP agents killed in April. Despite the efforts of their families
    to find them at police stations, prisons, and the morgue the youths
    were not located. The HNP opened an investigation into the case in
    June; at year's end the investigation remained open.
        c. Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The 1987 Constitution prohibits the use of unnecessary
    force or restraint, psychological pressure, or brutality by the
    security forces; however, members of the security forces continue to
    violate these provisions. Police officers used excessive--and sometimes
    deadly--force in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and
    rarely were punished for such acts. Police frequently beat suspects.
    Torture and other forms of abuse are pervasive.
        On July 6, members of the HNP questioned, beat, and tortured a
    journalist and businesswoman at her home for 2 hours (see Section
    2.a.).
        According to an opposition political party leader, on July 12, a
    police commando unit led by Mayor-elect Willo Joseph and local HNP
    Commissioner M. Jose rounded up and beat seven Espace leaders in
    Maissade. They were taken to neighboring Hinche where police
    authorities imprisoned them. The authorities stated that they were
    arrested for ``setting houses on fire.'' One of the detained persons
    was dragged through the streets of Maissade by a rope attached to his
    neck.
        According to Marc-Antoine Destin, president of the Confederation of
    Haitian Workers (CTH), on February 22, HNP officers led by Joanna
    Lunday, a local judge, kicked and beat a group of about 20 CTH
    officials at their headquarters in Petionville. Four CTH officials were
    arrested (see Section 6.a.). They were not charged with any crime, and
    were later released. The officers and judge have not been disciplined.
        Police mistreatment of suspects at both the time of arrest and
    during detention remains pervasive in all parts of the country. Beating
    with fists, sticks, and belts is by far the most common form of abuse.
    However, international organizations documented other forms of
    mistreatment, such as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, and
    kalot marassa (severe boxing of the ears, which can result in eardrum
    damage). Those who reported such abuse often had visible injuries
    consistent with the alleged maltreatment. There were also isolated
    allegations of torture by electric shock. Mistreatment also takes the
    form of withholding medical treatment from injured jail inmates. Police
    almost never are prosecuted for the abuse of detainees.
        There were isolated credible allegations of excessive force on the
    part of the CIMO and UDMO crowd control forces.
        The Government's record of disciplining police officers implicated
    in these offenses is mixed. More often the HNP simply fires officers
    caught in flagrant abuses. The Government prosecuted six HNP officers
    during the year, and four received a sentence of 3 years in the
    Carrefour-Feuilles trial (see Section 1.a.). There are some HNP
    officers in prison for other offenses, although no exact figures were
    available at year's end. More than 800 officers have been removed since
    1996. The lack of an Inspector General's office within the HNP
    significantly contributes to a problem with discipline.
        There were sporadic instances of brutality on the part of local
    officials exercising unauthorized law enforcement functions. Especially
    in rural areas, brutality is perpetrated by members and agents of
    CASEC's (administrative councils of communal sections), who tend to
    assume illegally a law enforcement role in the absence of a regular
    police presence.
        A Committee to Judge Jean Claude Duvalier lobbied the French
    Government for his return to the country. Early in the year, they filed
    a complaint in a French court asking for his return, but the court
    dismissed their motion. The group was in the process of appealing this
    decision at year's end.
        Prison conditions remained very poor. The Penitentiary
    Administration Management (DAP), with the support of the International
    Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), struggled to improve conditions in
    the country's prisons. Prisoners and detainees, held in overcrowded and
    inadequate facilities, continued to suffer from a lack of basic
    hygiene, poor quality health care, and 24-hour confinement to cells in
    some facilities. Several prisons experienced water shortages. As of
    August, the country's 19 prisons held 4,219 prisoners, an increase of
    about 350 persons compared with 1999.
        The prison system continued to experience food shortages. Prison
    administrators and international human rights observers report a high
    number of deaths in prison. No official statistics are available;
    however, prison administrators report that in the month of November
    alone, at least 10 deaths were reported--5 attributable to
    malnutrition, 2 or 3 to AIDS, and the remainder to other causes.
    International human rights observers report that the number of deaths
    attributable to malnutrition rose significantly at year's end. Many
    prisons were only able to supply one (as opposed to the required two)
    meals a day to inmates. Most severely affected were inmates whose diet
    was not supplemented by food brought by family members. Even in those
    prisons where two meals were supplied, the food routinely lacked the
    minimum nutrients established by international standards; many
    prisoners were malnourished.
        The ICRC manages a number of humanitarian programs to improve
    living conditions within the prison system. It pays for prescriptions
    not available in the prison pharmacies. On a quarterly basis, the ICRC
    distributes basic hygiene supplies to the prisons, including soap,
    bleach, brooms, mops, paper towels, and disinfectants. The ICRC also
    provides funding on an as needed basis to clear the prison septic tanks
    and renovate prison bathrooms, showers, and water pumps. The ICRC also
    donates reading material, sewing machines, wood and other items to help
    prisoners pass the time.
        The DAP is plagued by budgetary and management problems. The prison
    system still operates on the same budget as in 1995. Even when the
    administration manages to purchase enough food for all the prisoners,
    they experience difficulties in delivering the food to the 19 prisons.
    The prison administration does not have a delivery system, so it is up
    to the individual prison inspectors to go to the main warehouse and
    carry out as much food as they can fit in a taxi or local bus. The
    central warehouse also lacks a control mechanism to ensure that each
    prison is getting its fair share.
        In the past, when the authorities received Haitian citizens
    deported from other countries for having committed crimes, they were
    processed in 1 week and then released. However, since March 24,
    criminal deportees who already have served sentences outside the
    country are kept in jail, with no timetable for their eventual release.
    Prosecutor August Brutus said that ``preventive measures'' are being
    taken to prevent the ``bandits'' from increasing the level of
    insecurity and crime in the country.
        Health care services offered to inmates is improving slowly.
    However, most of the nurses do not receive adequate training. All
    receive a minimal 3-month training course before beginning work;
    however, of the system's 60 nurses, at most 5 have completed the 3-year
    course of instruction necessary to obtain full certification as
    registered nurses. In October 1999, a new Chief Physician was
    appointed. He instituted monthly meetings of all the prison healthcare
    professionals. Every prison has a dispensary, none have hospitals. Only
    the National Penitentiary has a nurse on duty 24 hours a day. The
    common sicknesses after malnutrition are skin problems, tuberculosis,
    and AIDS. In the capital, doctors are available; however this is not
    always the case in the provinces. The nurses do not conduct daily
    checkups on the physical condition of the prisoners; the prisoners must
    first ask and then receive permission to visit the nurse. The
    dispensaries have a limited supply of medication. If the needed
    medication is not available through the dispensary, family members must
    provide it, or in cases when there are no relatives, the ICRC provides
    funding for the medication on a routine basis in the capital and on a
    quarterly basis in the provinces.
        Fort National prison in Port-au-Prince is the only prison facility
    expressly for women and juveniles. In other prison facilities, women
    are housed in cells separate from the men. However, overcrowding often
    prevents strict separation of juveniles from adults, convicts from
    those in pretrial detention, or violent from nonviolent prisoners. Many
    prisoners were held in police holding cells, particularly in the
    provinces. The National Penitentiary is the only prison originally
    constructed for use as a prison; all other prisons are former police
    holding cells.
        International human rights observers and prison officials admit
    that there are instances of abuse by prison personnel against
    prisoners; however, no statistics were available at year's end. Prison
    officials report that prisoners did not file any official complaints
    against prison personnel during the year. However, they also admitted
    that they are aware that abuse occurs because they have heard oral
    reports from prisoners. However, the prisoners are afraid to file an
    official complaint because they fear that the abuse may worsen as a
    result.
        The authorities freely permitted the ICRC, the Haitian Red Cross,
    MICAH, and other human rights groups to enter prisons and police
    stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners with medical care,
    food, and legal aid. The Director General of the HNP cooperated with
    MICAH and the ICRC.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces
    continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. The Constitution
    stipulates that a person may be arrested only if apprehended during the
    commission of a crime, or if a written order by a legally competent
    official such as a justice of the peace or magistrate has been issued.
    These orders cannot be executed between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., and
    the authorities must bring the detainee before a judge within 48 hours
    of arrest. In practice, the authorities frequently ignored these
    provisions. There were instances of arrests by security forces and
    local authorities lacking the authority to do so. In particular,
    arrests by mayors and members of local CASEC's occurred in underpoliced
    rural areas. Occasionally parents ask a judge to imprison a delinquent
    child.
        On July 12, police beat and arrested seven leaders of the Espace de
    Concertation party (see Section 1.c.).
        The requirement that a detainee be brought before a judge within 48
    hours of his arrest was disregarded routinely in certain police
    jurisdictions, according to NGO's. Although the 48-hour rule is
    violated in all parts of the country, it is most often and flagrantly
    ignored in Jeremie, Cap Haitien, Petionville, and the Delmas
    commissariat of Port-au-Prince. Moreover, arrests sometimes are made on
    charges (for example, sorcery or debt) that have no basis in law. The
    authorities also detained some persons on unspecified charges or
    ``pending investigation.''
        In 1999 the international community was increasingly troubled by
    the authorities' tendency to detain persons in defiance of valid orders
    for their release issued by judges. MICIVIH expressed ``extreme
    concern'' at these cases, and described the authorities' actions as
    ``completely arbitrary and illegal.'' Prisoners with histories of
    opposition to the Government or affiliation with the Duvalier or de
    facto regimes were affected disproportionately by this practice. By
    August about half of those prisoners identified in 1999 had been
    released. By October prisoners still held despite valid release orders
    included Leoncefils Ceance, Esteve Conserve, Calero Vivas Fabien, Jean-
    Robert Lherisson, Rilande Louis, Leonard Lucas, Georges Metayer,
    Alexandre Paul, Jean-Michel Richardson, and Jean Enel Samedi.
        As in previous years, the dysfunctional judicial system resulted in
    pervasive prolonged pretrial detentions, with an estimated 80 percent
    of the country's prisoners awaiting trial and a third of them for more
    than one year (see Section 1.e.). The problem is most extreme in Port-
    au-Prince. A February 1999 compilation of statistics on these cases by
    MICIVIH showed that of 3,090 prisoners awaiting trial, 1,172 have been
    held for more than 1 year. Of these, 775 had been held between 1 and 2
    years, 287 had been held between 2 and 3 years, and 110 had been held
    for more than 3 years. Sometimes the charges in these lengthy
    detentions are minor. Approximately 98 percent of the female and minors
    in prison are awaiting trial, indicating that the judicial system moves
    even more slowly for women and children (see Section 5).
        In late 1999, Minister of Justice Leblanc announced that resolving
    the problem of prolonged pretrial detention was a high priority; he
    reorganized the Port-au-Prince prosecutor's office and attempted to
    implement a more rigorous schedule for hearings for correctional and
    criminal affairs. The Government had made little progress at year's
    end, as resolution of the problem required thorough judicial reform at
    all levels of the penal process: police, justices of the peace,
    prosecutors, investigating magistrates, trial judges, and prisons (see
    Section 1.e.).
        In Cap-Haitien, the second largest city and largest city in the
    North, the judicial system has improved somewhat, although serious
    human rights violations occur on a routine basis. The Constitution
    prohibits police detention in excess of 48 hours; however, lengthy
    delays are routine. In some cases, detainees in police holding cells
    have been held for more than a month. Those accused of crimes and
    awaiting trial face lengthy delays in reaching trial. In many cases,
    pretrial detainees spend years awaiting trial. Human rights
    organizations note that the average wait before trial has increased
    from 3 to 4 years. Nevertheless, they report that beatings of prisoners
    have decreased in Cap-Haitien and active efforts are being made to
    decrease the lengths of pretrial confinement.
        Police in some instances attacked journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        The Constitution prohibits the involuntary exile of citizens, and
    there were no reports of its use.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice.
    Years of rampant corruption and governmental neglect have left the
    judicial system poorly organized and nearly moribund. The Constitution
    sets varying periods of tenure for judges above the level of justice of
    the peace. However, in practice the Ministry of Justice exercises
    appointment and administrative oversight of the judiciary, prosecutors,
    and court staff. The Ministry of Justice can remove justices of the
    peace and occasionally dismisses judges above this level as well.
        At the lowest level of the justice system, the justices of the
    peace issue warrants, adjudicate minor infractions, mediate cases, take
    depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or higher judicial
    officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors cooperate
    in the development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges
    of the first instance courts. Appeals court judges hear cases referred
    from the first instance courts, and the Supreme Court deals with
    questions of procedure and constitutionality.
        The judicial apparatus follows a civil law system based on the
    Napoleonic Code; the Criminal Code dates from 1832, although it has
    been amended in some instances. The Constitution provides for the right
    to a fair public trial; however, this right was abridged widely in
    practice. The Constitution also expressly denies police and judicial
    authorities the right to interrogate persons charged with a crime
    unless the suspect has legal counsel or a representative of his of her
    choice present or waives this right; however, this right was abridged
    in practice. While trials are public, most accused persons cannot
    afford legal counsel for interrogation or trial, and the law does not
    require that the Government provide legal representation. Despite the
    efforts of local human rights groups and the international community to
    provide legal aid, many interrogations without counsel occur. During
    actual trials, however, some defendants had access to counsel.
    Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to be present
    at trial, to confront witnesses against them, and to present witnesses
    and evidence in their own behalf, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice.
        A shortage of adequately trained and qualified justices of the
    peace, judges and prosecutors, as well as underfunding, among other
    systemic problems, created a huge backlog of criminal cases, with many
    detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial detention for a
    court date. Bail is available; however, it is entirely at the
    discretion of the investigative judge (juge d'instruction). Bail
    hearings are not automatic. The attorney for the defendant can make an
    application based upon a specific need, and the judge then decides if a
    conditional release is warranted. This usually is done only in minor
    cases when there is an overwhelming humanitarian reason, such as a need
    for medical attention. In some regions, there are not enough judges to
    hear cases, and judges lack basic resources (such as office space,
    legal reference texts, and supplies) to perform their duties.
    Professional competence is sometimes lacking as well; some judges are
    illiterate. If an accused person ultimately is tried and found
    innocent, there is no redress against the Government for excessive time
    served in detention.
        The Code of Criminal Procedure does not assign clear responsibility
    to investigate crimes and divides the authority for cases among police,
    justices of the peace, prosecutors, and investigative magistrates.
    Examining magistrates often receive files that are empty or are missing
    police reports. Autopsies are conducted only rarely, and autopsy
    reports are even more rare. The code provides for 2 criminal court
    sessions (assizes) per year in each of the 15 first-instance
    jurisdictions, each session generally lasting 2 weeks, to try all major
    crimes requiring a jury trial. During the year, the Port-au-Prince
    jurisdiction--by far the largest in terms of caseload--failed to adhere
    to this stipulation due to difficulties in assembling juries. The first
    criminal assizes since July 1998 occurred in Port-au-Prince in December
    1999. The second was held almost 1 year later in September.
        At least 3 classes of approximately 80 students have graduated from
    the Magistrates School. The school conducted seminars on human rights
    and judicial reform during the year.
        There were no official reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits interference with privacy,
    family, home, or correspondence; however, police and other security
    force elements conducted illegal warrantless searches. In the past
    there were reports that the police arrested family members of wanted
    persons when the suspects themselves could not be found.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government has in the past
    generally respected these rights; however, the Government's respect for
    the press deteriorated during the year. Print and electronic media from
    opposite ends of the political spectrum often criticize the Government.
    However, most media practice self-censorship, wary of offending
    sponsors or the politically influential. After the November 26
    presidential elections, death threats proliferated against media
    figures who questioned the electoral process or outcomes. Although the
    threats were anonymous, the Government did nothing to counter them.
    Three radio station were forced to stop temporarily news programming
    for brief periods in late November and December as a direct result of
    threats against the stations for their coverage of the elections.
        There are two French-language newspapers in the country, Le
    Nouvelliste and Le Matin, with a combined circulation of less than
    20,000 readers. Print media in Creole is limited due to regional
    variations and the lack of a consistent orthography; however, many
    newspapers include a page of news in Creole. Both daily newspapers are
    frequently critical of government policies.
        The written press is beyond the reach of many citizens, due to
    language differences, illiteracy, and cost. The literacy rate is only
    about 20 percent, and broadcast media, especially Creole-language
    radio, have a preeminent importance. Although most radio stations and
    other forms of telecommunications are nominally independent, they are
    subject to a 1997 law that names the State as the sole owner and
    proprietor of all telecommunications media. Members of the press
    believe that the Government refuses to sign the Chapultepec Convention
    (on freedom of expression) because the Convention prohibits government
    monopolies of the media, which would be in direct violation of the 1977
    law. The State leases the right to broadcast to private enterprises but
    maintains the right to repossess the airwaves as it sees fit.
        Over 200 private radio stations exist, including about 40 in the
    capital alone. Most stations carry a mix of music, news, and talk show
    programs, which many citizens regard as their only opportunity to speak
    out on a variety of political, social, and economic issues. Uncensored
    foreign satellite television is available; however, its impact is
    limited, as most persons cannot afford access to television. Broadcast
    media freely express a wide range of political viewpoints.
        Credible reports indicate that the Government's inability or
    unwillingness to provide adequate security to media outlets and
    prominent members of the press has contributed to an increased
    sentiment of vulnerability among those members of the press who
    criticize the Government or Fanmi Lavalas.
        According to employees of Radio Metropole, on February 11, Prime
    Minister Alexis publicly criticized the station for its coverage of
    rightwing leader Claude Raymond's death while in prison; however, none
    of the reported items were inaccurate.
        On April 3, unknown persons killed radio commentator Jean Leopold
    Dominique and a security guard (see Section 1.a.).
        On December 15 two youths killed sports broadcaster Geral Denoze;
    the motive remained unknown at year's end.
        Numerous anonymous death threats have been directed at journalists
    by name, including the entire news staff of Radio Vision 2000, which is
    known for its opposition to the Government. On April 5, Radio Vision
    2000 journalists sent a signed letter to Justice Minister Camille
    Leblanc, in which they described ``daily threats against their lives.''
    They asked the Minister to ensure security for the radio staff and
    building. Following Jean Leopold Dominique's funeral on April 8, a
    group of at least 100 persons massed outside the station, threatening
    to attack it. The CIMO dispersed the crowd. A few days after
    Dominique's murder, Daly Valet, a Radio Vision 2000 journalist, went
    into hiding after receiving frequent and credible death threats. He
    fled the country. In June heavily armed, hooded men painted slogans on
    the wall of the station and threatened newsroom employees. In face of
    threats, Radio Galaxie suspended its news service the day after the
    November 26 elections. That same day Radio Vision 2000 joined Radio
    Galaxie in suspending its service following the receipt of threats.
    Radio Caraibes shut down its news service on December 23, after
    receiving threats to the station and personnel.
        On April 4, hooded, armed men attacked the Radio Unite station in
    Artibonite province. They stole transmitters and destroyed much of the
    recording studios and electrical installations.
        According to employees of Radio Echo 2000 in Petit Goave, on April
    5, a group of armed men entered the station and threatened to burn the
    station down and kill the employees if they did not cease broadcasting.
    The police did not respond. In March a group of bandits beat one of the
    journalists, Elyse Sincere.
        On April 17, presidential staff employee and information officer
    Guy Delva organized a march ``to protest attacks against freedom of the
    press,'' coercing independent media to take part or else be stigmatized
    as antigovernment agitators. He also pressured news directors by
    telephone to cease broadcasting on April 17, lest they be branded as
    opponents of the event. Radio news sections sent representatives to the
    march in small numbers to avoid open defiance, but all refused to shut
    down their programming on April 17.
        In May unknown persons destroyed radio and television stations in
    Petit-Goave.
        In June a private radio station, Horizon PM, issued an open
    nationwide alert, noting that its editor and several of its employees
    had received anonymous verbal threats.
        In August unknown persons hurled a fragmentation grenade at the
    National Television Building in Port-au-Prince. No one was injured.
        On August 22, agents from TeleTimoun, the television station wholly
    owned by the FL, entered and offered the news staff quadrupled
    salaries, connected cell phones, and freedom from fear of future
    harassment to those Telemax employees who accepted the offer. All but
    one person accepted. The Telemax news service, previously the country's
    most objective and technically advanced, subsequently was staffed with
    Lavalas supporters and objective reporting ceased.
        Foreign journalists generally circulated without hindrance from the
    authorities; however, in July police questioned, beat, and tortured a
    dual national journalist in her home (see Section 1.c.). The journalist
    identified the officers from a police line-up. The police commissioner
    who orchestrated the event was fired on other charges not related to
    this incident. At year's end, the Government had not apprehended,
    charged, or disciplined the officers, even though the victim had
    identified them.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities generally respect
    this right in practice. In general, a variety of organizations were
    able to exercise this right without hindrance throughout the year. For
    example, on September 18, about 6,000 members of the Papaye Peasants'
    Movement marched from the central plateau town of Papaye to Hinche in
    an anti-Lavalas demonstration. According to observers, the police
    played a passive role, except at one point intervening to separate the
    demonstrators from pro-Lavalas supporters, and there was no
    confrontation.
        However, in several instances police inaction allowed organized
    political militants to violate the right of freedom of assembly in
    practice, and there were numerous violent political demonstrations (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Olivier Nadal, former president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce,
    reported to the press that he and his family had received death
    threats, and that they had fled the country. He also had been
    threatened with arrest. Nadal was the organizer of a May 1999 rally of
    entrepreneurs, which was broken up by a band of unknown persons while
    the police stood by and did not intervene.
        A peaceful, well-publicized demonstration scheduled for August 29
    in Cap Haitien by the opposition Convergence Group never took place.
    According to local press reports, the Convergence Group decided to
    avoid confrontation with members of the pro-Lavalas OP, who moved into
    the area of the Cap Haitien Cathedral chanting antiopposition slogans.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the right to
    practice all religions and faiths, provided that practice does not
    disturb law and order, and the Government respects this right is
    practice.
        In many respects, Roman Catholicism retains its traditional primacy
    among the country's religions although Protestant denominations
    (primarily Methodist and Baptist) have overtaken the Catholic Church in
    numbers of members. Voodoo, a traditional religion derived in part from
    West African beliefs, is practiced alongside Christianity by a large
    segment of the population. While there are associations of voodoo
    practitioners and priests, there is no organized hierarchy or
    established voodoo church. Accusations of sorcery, particularly in
    rural areas, have been known to lead to mob violence resulting in
    deaths. Given the prevalence of voodoo in these areas, it appears
    likely that voodoo practitioners are targeted in some cases.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government respects the right of
    freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
    repatriation.
        An unknown number of undocumented migrants put to sea during the
    year seeking better economic opportunities in other countries. The
    Government operated, with international support, the National Migration
    Office (ONM) to assist citizens involuntarily repatriated from other
    countries, including the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. That
    office stopped providing humanitarian services to involuntarily
    repatriated migrants in June, and in August it stopped meeting and
    processing the migrants. Although the ONM office still exists, it no
    longer provides any services to repatriated migrants but conducts
    training courses. According to the International Organization for
    Migration, the Dominican Republic deports approximately 500 Haitians
    each month across the Border. At the end of August, a mass repatriation
    of approximately 3,000 Haitian nationals took place. There were
    reliable reports of separation of families and maltreatment of Haitians
    by Dominican soldiers during this period, as had been the case in 1999.
        The Government has no policy regarding foreign nationals seeking
    refuge or asylum from third countries. The question of provision of
    first asylum did not arise. There were no reports of the forced return
    of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for regular elections for local and
    parliamentary offices and for the presidency. Rene Preval, who was
    elected in 1995 in an election regarded by the international community
    as free and fair, continued in office during the year. On May 21, a
    first round of long overdue senatorial, legislative, and municipal
    elections to fill vacant posts took place after repeated postponements.
    The CEP manipulated the results by its choice of a methodology for
    calculating the percentages in determining senate seats, by the faulty
    transmission of results, and by the arbitrary treatment of challenges
    which had an impact on the results of several races. A continuing
    standoff through the rest of the year between the Government and
    opposition parties led to an opposition boycott of a second round of
    legislative elections in July and of the November 26 elections for
    president and remaining Senate seats. Elections to replace President
    Preval took place as scheduled on November 26.
        The country's constitutional crisis continued through the first
    half of the year. The crisis began with the flawed local and
    parliamentary elections of April 1997 and Prime Minister Rosny Smarth's
    subsequent resignation. A stalemate between the President and
    Parliament continued through January 11, 1999, when the terms of office
    of the entire 85-seat House of Deputies and of all but 9 of the 27
    members of Senate expired. In March 1999, President Preval negotiated
    an agreement with a coalition of five small opposition parties to form
    a Provisional Electoral Council to organize the overdue local and
    parliamentary elections. After many delays, these were fixed for May
    21, with a second round on July 9.
        There were scattered acts of violence in the months leading up to
    the election, as well as several politically motivated killings during
    the year (see Section 1.a.). On March 11, supporters of the ruling
    Fanmi Lavalas' candidate for deputy in the Delmas region physically
    attacked Serge Auguste, an opposition candidate. On March 17, Marie
    Laurence Jocelyn Lassegue, an opposition candidate running for Senate,
    was shot and injured while campaigning. On March 20, two men shot and
    injured Marcel Fils, an opposition party coordinator, in downtown Port-
    au-Prince. On March 27, unknown persons killed progovernment Popular
    Organization (OP) member Jean Samedi in the La Saline area of Port-au-
    Prince. Samedi's murder led to further street violence later in the
    week, during which two persons were killed and at least three others,
    including a police officer, were wounded (see Section 1.a.). The HNP
    investigated their murders as politically motivated incidents.
        Opposition leaders reported that while they participated in a
    proconstitution march on March 29, seven hostile FL supporters attacked
    them, shouting ``Aristide or death,'' and other threats. The attackers
    brandished pistols and threw stones and one Molotov cocktail.
        AI reported that a group of armed men attacked members of an
    opposition party as they handed out pamphlets in Port-au-Prince on
    March 29. On April 3, noted journalist Jean Leopold Dominique and one
    of his guards were shot and killed (see Section 1.a.). On April 4,
    Merilus Deus, an opposition senatorial candidate in Savanette was
    murdered (see Section 1.a.); the deputy candidate went into hiding. On
    April 6, the Grand'Anse BED legal adviser reported that several
    individuals forced their way into his house, dragged out his personal
    property and burned it. There was no sign of the HNP during this
    incident. On April 8, a group of pro-FL militants attacked and burned
    the headquarters of an opposition party. The FL denied involvement
    despite several credible reports that its supporters were responsible
    for the attack. On April 9, two regional opposition offices in Achaie
    and Aquin were burned and destroyed. On April 19, an opposition
    candidate for local office in suburban Port-au-Prince allegedly was
    kidnaped, but reappeared unharmed on May 3.
        On May 21, about 60 percent of the country's 4 million registered
    voters went to the polls to select from some 29,000 candidates for
    11,000 local and national posts. International and domestic observers
    agreed that despite some scattered irregularities (polling booth
    intimidation, ballot stuffing, and publication of voting results before
    polling booths were closed), the elections were generally free and
    fair. Two election-related deaths were reported in a suburb of Port-au-
    Prince, where a candidate and policeman exchanged fire in an
    altercation away from a polling booth. On May 22, the HNP arrested and
    charged Paul Denis, an opposition party leader and former senator, for
    possession of illegal weapons. He later was released amidst allegations
    the arrest was motivated politically.
        While the initial voting was generally free and fair, serious
    irregularities in the counting of votes and the computation of winners
    in certain senate races compromised the election. A December report by
    the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded that the voting
    process began to deteriorate after the closing of the polls. For
    example, armed groups stole and burned ballot boxes in the departments
    of the Center, North, and Artibonite. The delivery of voting materials
    (ballots, ballot boxes, pens, ink, and voter registration lists) in
    Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien was chaotic and a substantial number of
    these materials may have been lost. The election controversy became
    serious with the publication of the results of the Senate races. Under
    the Constitution and electoral law, a candidate must receive an
    absolute majority of votes cast in order to be elected in the first
    round of voting. If no candidate receives a majority, a second-round
    runoff is required. The Senate results published by the CEP announced
    that the ruling Fanmi Lavalas party won 16 of the 17 Senate seats in
    the first round. These results were based on what opposition parties
    and independent observers termed a flawed interpretation of both the
    Constitution and the electoral law. Officials only counted votes cast
    for the top four contenders in each Senate race, yielding what both
    international and local observers said were false FL victories.
    Percentages of votes were calculated imprecisely, by using the total of
    votes received by the top four contenders rather than the total of
    votes for all candidates. There were 20 to 30 candidates for Senate in
    each department. CEP President Leon Manus and two other members (all
    representing opposition parties) refused to certify the irregular
    results and resigned their posts. A preliminary evaluation conducted by
    the OAS found that only 9 Senate seats should have been decided in the
    first round, while 10 should have gone to a second round. President
    Preval responded to the three CEP resignations by appointing
    replacement council members loyal to FL, who immediately certified the
    Senate results without addressing the controversial counting method.
        The international community, local civic groups, and opposition
    parties called on the Government to address the controversy. The CEP
    ignored these protests and on July 9, held second-round races for
    deputies. There were no senatorial second-round contests. With an
    almost unanimous boycott by opposition parties and candidates, voter
    turnout for this round was significantly lower than in May, at
    reportedly only 5 percent. All international and most domestic
    observers refused to participate in monitoring the second round.
        Domestic human rights and opposition parties continued to protest
    the election results. Following his resignation, CEP president Leon
    Manus fled the country after being threatened repeatedly. He then
    issued a statement that acknowledged that the methodology used in
    counting votes for the Senate was flawed. On June 15 and 16, bands of
    pro-FL militants shut down metropolitan Port-au-Prince with barricades
    and tire burnings to protest international refusal to certify the
    results. International missions led by the OAS unsuccessfully attempted
    to encourage resolution of the May 21 elections dispute.
        Despite local and international calls not to seat the Parliament
    before resolution of the election controversy, on August 28, Parliament
    was sworn in formally.
        Violence escalated, particularly in Port-au-Prince, during the days
    before the November 26 elections for President and for replacements for
    the remaining nine Senators whose terms would expire in January 2001.
    While some of the violence was attributable to the political situation,
    for which the FL accused the opposition of responsibility and vice-
    versa, common crime was undoubtedly the source of many episodes;
    however, the violence contributed to an overall climate of
    intimidation.
        On the evening of November 2, in Hinche heavily armed members of FL
    attacked a meeting being held by opposition political party leader
    Chavannes Jean Baptiste and injured seven persons. A few days later,
    the mayor of Port St. Louis fired shots into a seminar being conducted
    by a respected opposition politician.
        Shootings and robberies became an almost daily occurrence in Port-
    au-Prince. On November 3, unidentified persons opened fire on an
    evening rush hour crowd, killed at least five, and wounded several
    others. That same day three bodies were found in another location. On
    November 4 and 5, three more bodies were found in yet another site.
    Also on November 4, at least one person was killed and another gravely
    wounded during a confrontation between rival gangs at another street
    intersection. Ongoing confrontation between rival gangs in the Port-au-
    Prince slum of Cite Soleil during the month of November resulted in
    numerous injuries and property damage. In general, the HNP did not
    respond to the confrontations.
        On November 14, a group of approximately 500 pro-FL demonstrators
    rallied peacefully in front of a foreign Embassy to protest
    international pressure on former-President Aristide to bring about a
    negotiated solution to the political stalemate that had developed over
    the May 21 elections. The same day, a drive-by shooting killed one
    person in front of the Le Nouvelliste newspaper offices in downtown
    Port-au-Prince. That evening, residents panicked as unidentified
    persons in a pick up truck drove through several neighborhoods shooting
    at persons (injuring a number of them) and ordering persons off the
    streets.
        On November 15, a clearly marked U.N. vehicle was hit in a drive-by
    shooting in Gonaives. No one was injured.
        On November 22, nine separate explosions occurred in crowded areas
    of Port-au-Prince; the explosions killed two children and left many
    other persons injured. On November 25, marching FL members in Petit
    Goave staged citizen's arrests of several opposition members and
    detained several others. Also on November 25, an attempt was made
    during the evening to burn the communal electoral office (BEC) in
    Ganthiere. Police intervened and were able to save the electoral
    materials, although the building was partially destroyed.
        The international community and most opposition parties refused to
    help or take part in the November 26 presidential elections because of
    the unresolved controversy surrounding the May elections. Due to the
    lack of international observers, the local press monitored the election
    process. Several radio stations were forced to close their news
    operations because of threats (see Section 2.a.).
        The November 26 elections took place amidst heavy police security
    and were characterized by low turnout--accounts vary from the 5 percent
    to 20 percent. Aside from a pipe bomb that exploded in the Port-au-
    Prince suburb of Carrefour and the burning of ballots during the
    morning in the city of Anse d'Hainault, the elections generally passed
    without disturbance. With the opposition boycott, former President
    Jean-Bertrand Aristide faced only token opposition and was elected to a
    5-year term with a reported 91.5 percent of the votes cast.
        In the days following the November elections, pro and anti
    government violence occurred again in the department of Grand-Anse. In
    the cities of Anse d'Hainault, Cotetaux, and Petite Riviere de Nippes,
    protest and violence led to the deploying of HNP units from Port-au-
    Prince, and in the case of Nippes, the Coast Guard, to restore order.
    Throughout the rest of the country, calm generally prevailed.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in politics
    or government; however, they are underrepresented, and the low status
    of women limits their participation. The Election Law provides that the
    monetary deposit required of female candidates for political office is
    one-half that required of male candidates, if a recognized party
    sponsors them. Three of the 82 deputies are women, and there are 6
    women among the 27 senators.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic and international human rights groups generally operate
    without government restrictions; however, threats and intimidation from
    unknown sources continued to increase during the year. Justice Minister
    Leblanc continued to seek dialog with some groups and solicited their
    recommendations on human rights issues such as police impunity and
    prosecution of police and former military suspected of committing human
    rights abuses. The number of groups that monitor human rights has
    grown, as has the scope of those groups; however, most monitoring
    groups are hampered by a lack of resources. Human rights organizations
    increasingly turn to issues that they have not addressed before,
    including prison conditions, the widespread lack of health facilities,
    and impunity for criminals.
        Following the April 3 killing of Jean Leopold Dominique, members of
    the local human rights community, including the National Coalition for
    Haitian Rights (NCHR) and the Platform of Haitian Human Rights
    Organizations rallied in front of the Haiti Inter radio station. Self-
    described members of Fanmi Lavalas beat and shot at several
    participants. Riot police were on hand but did not protect the rally
    participants (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
        On September 6, men wearing police uniforms abducted, tortured, and
    killed Amos Jeannot, an employee of Fonkoze, a local NGO (see Section
    1.a.). AI and local human rights organizations appealed to the HNP for
    a swift and thorough investigation. The investigation continued, but no
    arrests had been made by year's end.
        There were no arrests or progress made in the investigation of the
    1999 attempted murder of Pierre Esperance, NCHR country director. The
    HNP's investigation remains open but apparently inactive.
        The difficult security climate remained unchanged. Organizations
    such as the NCHR, the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations,
    the Human Rights Fund, and the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights
    reported receiving repeated threats, most of them anonymous.
        The Office of the Protector of Citizens (OPC), an autonomous,
    ombudsman-like office provided for by the 1987 Constitution, was
    hampered by a cut in funds due to the Government's budget crisis. The
    OPC is one of the Government's four independent, autonomous
    institutions. Despite budgetary problems, the OPC conducted a number of
    seminars throughout the year, including over 20 seminars in schools,
    some in the Magistrates School, and others at the local and county
    levels of government. In February Dr. Louis Roy, the Director of the
    OPC, appointed Florence Elie to a 4-year term as Deputy Director. Dr.
    Roy was chosen as the Director by a commission of parliamentarians in
    conjunction with the President in 1995. However, his seven-year
    appointment only was ratified by Parliament in 1997.
        The recently seated Parliament created a Justice and Human Rights
    Committee. The chairman of the committee said that his primary goal
    would be the improvement and reform of the judicial system. It is not
    clear whether the committee would also conduct human rights monitoring.
        The mandate of MICIVIH expired on March 15. MICIVIH played a vital
    and successful role in monitoring the human rights situation and in
    promoting adherence to human rights norms by the authorities. The U. N.
    created a new entity, the International Civilian Mission for Support in
    Haiti (MICAH), after MICIVIH's mandate expired. MICAH's mandate began
    in March and is scheduled to expire on February 6, 2001. This new
    entity is much smaller in size and scope than MICIVIH. MICAH's mandate
    is limited to training in human rights and to conducting civic
    education courses. It does not conduct human rights monitoring.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1987 Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination
    on the grounds of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
    status. It does provide for equal working conditions regardless of sex,
    beliefs, or marital status. However, there is no effective governmental
    mechanism to administer or enforce these provisions.
        Women.--The law provides penalties for rape and domestic violence;
    however, the authorities do not enforce these provisions adequately.
    According to women's rights groups, rape and other abuse of women is
    common, both within and outside marriage. A 1998 study by the Haitian
    Center for Research and Action for the Promotion of Women documented
    widespread rape and violence against women. The report also found that
    many women do not report these forms of abuse out of fear, shame, or
    lack of confidence in judicial remedies. A 1999 survey by UNICEF of
    violence against women found that 37 percent of women reported being
    victims of sexual violence or reported knowing a woman who had been;
    another 33 percent reported being victims of other types of physical
    abuse. The law excuses a husband if he murders his wife or her lover
    upon catching them in the act of adultery in his home. A wife who kills
    her husband upon discovering him in the act of adultery is not excused.
    The National Commission of Truth and Justice, formed after the 1991-
    1994 period of military rule, recommended several improvements to
    existing laws concerning rape and abuse of women, but Parliament
    enacted none of the proposed changes. In January U.N. Special
    Rapporteur for Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy released a
    report based on her June 1999 visit to the country. She noted, among
    other problems, that most women prisoners share living quarters with
    male prisoners, exposing them to violence and sexual abuse (see Section
    1.c.). In 1998 a national coalition of women's organizations met with
    the Ministries of Health, Population, Social Affairs and Women's
    Issues. Three proposed changes to the law were submitted to Parliament;
    by year's end, Parliament had not voted on the proposals. There are no
    government-sponsored programs for victims of violence.
        Sexual harassment of female workers is a problem, especially in the
    assembly sector (see Section 6.b.).
        The Ministry of Women's Affairs is charged with promoting and
    defending the rights of women and ensuring that they attain an equal
    status in society, but it has few resources at its disposal and was
    able to accomplish little in this regard.
        The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law;
    however, women do not enjoy the same social and economic status as men.
    In some social strata, tradition limits women's roles. Peasant women,
    often the breadwinners for their families, remain largely in the
    traditional occupations of farming, marketing, and domestic labor. Very
    poor urban women, who head their families and serve as their economic
    support, also often find their employment opportunities limited to
    traditional roles in domestic labor and marketing. Laws governing child
    support recognize the widespread practice of multiple-father families
    but are rarely enforced. Female employees in private industry or
    service jobs, including government jobs, are seldom promoted to
    supervisory positions. However, welleducated women have occupied
    prominent positions in both the private and public sector in recent
    years. Women's rights groups are small, localized, and receive little
    publicity.
        Children.--The Government's programs do not promote or defend
    children's rights. Government health care and education programs for
    children are inadequate. Malnutrition is a problem. The Government has
    a school nutrition program administered through the Office of National
    Development, with food provided by foreign donors. The Constitution and
    the law provide that primary education be free and compulsory; however,
    in practice access to public schools is the primary obstacle to most
    rural families. Even in public schools there are nominal mandatory fees
    associated with sending a child to school (uniform, books, etc.), and
    these costs are beyond the means of many rural families. One study
    reported that schools are dilapidated and understaffed. An estimated 90
    percent of schools are private, and the costs of school fees, books,
    materials, and uniforms are prohibitive for most families. According to
    the Government, 40 percent of children never attend school, and less
    than 15 percent of those who do graduate from secondary school. Poorer
    families sometimes ration education money to pay school fees for male
    children only. Several international and local NGOs work on children's
    issues.
        Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent
    city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called
    ``restavek'' (which means ``lives with'' in Creole); families of these
    children frequently received financial compensation (see Sections 6.a.,
    6.d., and 6.f.). Most local human rights groups do not report on the
    plight of restavek children as an abuse nor seek to improve their
    situation. The Ministry of Social Affairs believes that it can do
    little to stop this practice, regarding it as economically motivated;
    the Ministry assigned five monitors to oversee the welfare of restavek
    children. Society holds such children in little regard, and the poor
    state of the economy worsened their situation.
        Port-au-Prince's large population of street children includes many
    restaveks who have been sent out of employers' homes or who are
    runaways. There is some anecdotal information indicating that children
    are involved in prostitution or being trafficked.
        The Ministry of Social Affairs is aware of the problem, provides
    some assistance to street children. In 1998-1999 (last available data),
    they assisted 887 children. The Haitian Coalition for the Defense of
    the Rights of the Child (COHADDE) promotes children's rights by
    conducting awareness raising activities. According to COHADDE, children
    work primarily in domesticity (restavek), but some are found working on
    the street, and some are involved in prostitution.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that disabled
    persons shall have the means to ensure their autonomy, education, and
    independence. However, there is no legislation to implement these
    constitutional provisions or to mandate provision of access to
    buildings for the disabled. Although they do not face overt
    mistreatment, given the severe poverty in which most citizens live,
    those with disabilities face a particularly harsh existence. Disabled
    beggars are a familiar sight on the streets of Port-au-Prince and other
    towns.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some 99 percent of Haitians are
    descendants, in whole or in part, of African slaves who won their war
    of independence from France in 1804. The remaining population is of
    European, Middle Eastern, North American, or Latin American origin. The
    law makes no distinction based on race. Longstanding social and
    political animosities often are tied to cultural identification, skin
    color, and overlapping issues of class in this starkly inegalitarian
    society. Some of these animosities date back to before the country's
    revolutionary period.
        Racial distinctions tend to parallel social and economic strata.
    Mulattos, generally belong to the wealthiest classes of society. During
    the year, various political figures, including the President, used
    rhetoric indirectly targeting the mulatto segment of society. Mulattos
    historically have been targets of sporadic attack in many cases because
    they are perceived to be wealthy.
        The Government recognizes two official languages: Creole, which is
    spoken by virtually all Haitians; and French, which is spoken by about
    20 percent of the population, including the economic elite. The
    inability to communicate in French long has limited the political and
    economic opportunities available to the majority of the population. The
    Government prepares most documents only in French, and judges conduct
    most legal proceedings exclusively in French. However, Creole is used
    in parliamentary debate in the Lower House of Parliament.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    provide for the right of association. An article of the 1987
    Constitution, which supersedes the labor code, gives legal recognition
    to public sector employees. The law protects union activities and
    prohibits a closed shop. The law also requires a union, which must have
    a minimum of 10 members, to register with the Social Affairs Ministry
    within 60 days of its formation in order to obtain legal recognition.
    The labor code does not require prior approval before any association
    is established. The Labor Code stipulates that ``no labor union can be
    formed with less than 10 individuals.'' Article 232 gives unions 60
    days after formation to register with the Office of Personnel
    Management of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
        Unions are independent of the Government and political parties.
    Nine principal labor federations represent about 5 percent of the total
    labor force of approximately 2,800,000 persons, including about 2 to 3
    percent of labor in the industrial sector.
        Teachers went on strike for several months in 1999 because they had
    been promised a 32 percent pay increase, later renounced by the
    Government. The Government denied that public school employees had a
    right to strike, suspended some teachers, and garnished the salaries of
    public school employees who participated in the strike. At year's end,
    19 teachers remained suspended. In October seven teachers, members of
    the CNEH, were reinstated. A total of 77 teachers were given financial
    penalties that amounted to the number of days they were on strike
    multiplied by 1/30 of their gross pay.
        The labor code forbids strikes by public utility service workers.
    Article 209 of the Labor Code defines public utility service employees
    as essential workers who ``cannot suspend their activities without
    causing serious harm to public health and security.'' Managers,
    administrators, and other heads of establishments are not allowed to
    join labor unions and strike.
        In August the Government issued rules governing the public school
    calendar for the 2000-01 academic year. The Ministry of National
    Education moved the opening date back about 3 weeks and reduced the
    number of holidays by 1 day, which added 1 month to the school year;
    teachers unions were not notified prior to the change nor given
    adequate opportunity to bargain prior to implementation. The unions
    criticized this unilateral change as an unfair labor practice and a
    violation of the contract they signed on June 28, 1999. In the wake of
    these confrontations, communication between the unions and the
    Government has been limited. Some unions hope to resurrect negotiations
    through mediators, while others expanded their lawsuit filed in 1999.
    While the school year started on schedule, less than 10 percent of
    students attended classes during the week of September 4. Approximately
    15 percent of students did not return at all.
        On May 15, about 300 technicians of the Government-owned telephone
    company (TELECO) went on a 1-day work stoppage to protest management's
    slow response in addressing employees' concerns regarding reductions of
    employee health insurance and pension benefits. TELECO management paid
    its arrears to the insurance fund, and promised to resume its
    contributions to the pension fund. However, it later dismissed four
    technicians in apparent retaliation.
        On August 7, armed temporary employees walked into the TELECO
    headquarters and demanded the so-called 14th month salary, which is a
    bonus normally paid to full-time employees to pay for school fees.
    Temporary employees are normally not eligible. TELECO's offices in the
    greater Port-au-Prince area remained closed for 2 days, and telephone
    service was reduced. The police took control of the TELECO building and
    its environs to restore order. The bonus was not paid. The protestors
    resumed normal activity after some were fired, and others threatened.
    Using this incident as a pretext, management suspended payment of the
    traditional 1-month bonus to full-time employees paid 1 month before
    the school opening date.
        In August workers at several factories in the Shodecosa Industrial
    Zone protested the minimum wage that they received. More than 40
    workers were fired, and the protest gradually ended.
        On September 11, public transport unions went on strike to protest
    the Government's decision to raise fuel prices. They ended their strike
    the following day. On October 3, public transport unions called for a
    general strike to protest the Government's failure to open a dialog on
    new fuel prices. The strike was not successful; drivers and owners of
    public transportation vehicles did not participate.
        On October 2, the union of the electric company workers conducted a
    one-day sit-in inside the Ministry of justice compound. The Ministry
    promised workers police protection from angry residents while they are
    on the job. The workers were satisfied and returned to work.
        Each of the principal labor federations maintained some fraternal
    relations with various international labor organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    protects trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for
    those who interfere with this right. No fines were issued during the
    year. Unions generally were free to pursue their goals, although the
    Government made little effort to enforce the law. Union leaders assert
    that some employers in the private industrial sector dismiss
    individuals who participate in union organizing activities. The
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions brought a complaint to
    the International Labor Organization (ILO) in September 1999, alleging
    that a utility company (Electricite d'Haiti) violated freedom of
    association in 1996 when it dismissed 30 leaders and more than 400
    members of the Federation of Electricity Workers of Haiti, closed trade
    union offices by armed persons, and banned any meetings by trade union
    members in the company. Additional allegations in this case include the
    attempted murder of two trade union officials, and the arrests and
    assaults of other trade union leaders. The ILO had not received a
    response from the Government on these allegations by year's end, and
    the case remained unresolved. According to the current union
    (FESTRED'H) leaders, the 1996 union leaders and workers were dismissed
    permanently. The Government orchestrated a reorganization of the union
    and allowed it to function under new leadership. The workers are not
    fighting actively for reinstatement. Some retired, some left the
    country, and the rest attempted to find employment in other sectors.
        Labor unions reported at least one killing, and several arrests
    during the year. On September 4, Elison Merzilus, a member of the
    Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH), was taken from his home
    by a group of 10 armed men. He lived in the 7th Section of the Gros-
    Morne Commune, in the Artibonite Department. His body was found 2 weeks
    later, in a ravine located in the 8th Section of the Gros-Morne
    Commune. Merzilus was instrumental in forming a women's organization
    affiliated with CATH several days before his disappearance. Around the
    same time, 10 other union members were informed that their names were
    blacklisted and spent several months in hiding.
        On December 19, the authorities arrested Wilson Duverson and Rigaud
    St.-Juste in the commune of Anse-a-Foleur, Northwest Department. They
    were subjected to severe beatings and other harsh treatment. The
    authorities released Duverson on January 8 and released St. Juste on
    January 18. Both are members of the Anse-a-Foleur Workers Organization
    for Recovery (OTRA).
        Several leaders of major Labor Confederation leaders were subjected
    to persistent telephone threats and were given ultimatums to rally
    behind the FL.
        Organized labor activity was concentrated in the Port-au-Prince
    area, in state enterprises, the civil service, and the assembly sector.
    The high unemployment rate and antiunion sentiment among some factory
    workers and most employers limited the success of union organizing
    efforts. The ILO has criticized the law for its failure to include a
    specific provision envisaging protection against antiunion
    discrimination at the time of hiring.
        Collective bargaining continued to be nonexistent, and employers
    set wages unilaterally. The Labor Code does not distinguish between
    industries producing for the local market and those producing for
    export. Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector enjoyed
    better-than-average wages and benefits. However, frequent verbal abuse
    and intimidation of workers and organizers is a problem in the assembly
    (maquiladora) sector. Female workers in the assembly sector report that
    some employers sexually harass female workers with impunity. Women also
    report that while the vast majority of assembly sector workers are
    female, virtually all the supervisors are men.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor for adults and minors; however,
    while such labor is not known to occur among adults, the Government
    failed to enforce this law for children, who continued to be subjected
    to forced domestic labor as restaveks in urban households under
    conditions that amount to slavery (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum employment age in all sectors is 15 years,
    with the exception of domestic service, where the minimum age is 12
    years of age. The Labor Code prohibits minors from working under
    dangerous conditions, and it prohibits minors under the age of 18 from
    working at night in industrial enterprises. There is also a legal
    provision for employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16 as
    ``apprentices.'' Fierce adult competition for jobs ensures that child
    labor is not a factor in the industrial sector; however, children under
    the age of 15 commonly worked at informal sector jobs to supplement
    family income. Children also commonly worked on small family farms
    alongside their parents, even though the high unemployment rate among
    adults keeps children from being employed on commercial farms in
    significant numbers. In these as in many other areas, government
    agencies lack the resources to enforce the relevant laws and
    regulations effectively. The Labor Code prohibits forced or compulsory
    labor, which applies equally to minors; however, some children are
    forced to work as domestic servants (see Sections 5, 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent
    city dwellers to serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called
    restavek; families of these children frequently received financial
    compensation (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). A 1991 U.N. study cited this
    practice as an example of slavery in the 20th century. UNICEF estimated
    that 250,000 to 300,000 children, 85 percent of them girls, may be
    victims of this practice. According to a 1998 UNICEF study, the average
    restavek is between 11 and 14 years of age; however, more than 20
    percent are between the ages 4 and 10, and more than 75 percent are
    girls. About 23 percent of these girls are raped by a host family
    member, and 15 percent of them become pregnant. About 77 percent of
    restaveks have never been to school. Among those who have, only 2
    percent reach secondary school. The Ministry of Social Affairs believes
    that many employers compel the children to work long hours, provide
    them with little nourishment, and frequently beat and abuse them. The
    law requires that restaveks 15 years of age and older be paid ``not
    less than one half the amount payable to hired servant'' to perform
    similar work, in addition to room and board. To avoid this obligation,
    employers send many if not most restaveks away from the home before the
    children reach the age of 15.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum daily wage,
    established in June 1995 by the Tripartite Commission of Salaried
    Workers, whose six members are appointed by the President of the
    Republic, (two representatives each of labor, employers, and
    Government), is about $1.52 (36 gourdes). Annually, a minimum wage
    worker would earn about $473, an income above the national average but
    not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. Some workers are paid on a piece-rate basis, and may earn more
    than the minimum wage. The majority of citizens work in subsistence
    agriculture, a sector where minimum wage legislation does not apply.
    Many women work as domestic employees, where minimum wage legislation
    also does not apply.
        The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the
    standard workday at 8 hours and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24 hours
    of rest on Sunday. However, the officers of the HNP work 12-hour shifts
    6 days per week, in apparent violation of the Labor Code. The code also
    establishes minimum health and safety regulations. The industrial and
    assembly sectors largely observed these guidelines. The assembly sector
    published a voluntary code of conduct in April 1999, committing
    signatories to a number of measures designed to raise industry
    standards, including payment of the minimum wage and the prohibition of
    child labor. Employers in the assembly sector generally pay the minimum
    wage or higher amount. However, the real value of the gourde has
    diminished, and workers are no longer satisfied with the minimum wage.
    Working conditions are also generally better in this sector. There are
    no reports of child labor in this sector. However, the Ministry of
    Social Affairs does not enforce work hours or health and safety
    regulations. There is no formal data, but unions allege that job-
    related injuries are prevalent in the construction industry and public
    works sectors. With more than 50 percent of the population unemployed,
    workers were not able to exercise the right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and internal trafficking of children is a problem. Rural
    families send young children to affluent city dwellers to serve as
    unpaid domestic labor; the families of such restaveks frequently
    receive monetary compensation (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). An estimated
    300,000 children, 75 percent of them girls, may be victims of this
    practice.
        There were no other reports of trafficking to, from, within, or
    through the country. However, there are anecdotal reports on the
    practice of families taking restaveks to Europe and the United States
    to continue using them as domestic servants.
                                   __________

                                    HONDURAS

        Honduras is a constitutional democracy, with a president and a
    unicameral congress elected for 4-year terms. President Carlos Roberto
    Flores Facusse of the Liberal party took office in January 1998. Since
    the country's return to democracy in 1982, the two major political
    parties, the Liberals and the Nationalists, both have held power after
    free elections. The judiciary is generally independent, but often
    ineffective and subject to outside influence.
        The Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) include the army, the air force,
    and the navy. The national Preventive Police (formerly a paramilitary
    force known as the FUSEP) were placed under civilian control in 1997.
    The police handle public security, counternarcotics, and border patrol
    duties. The Government created a Ministry of Security in 1998 to
    oversee police operations and counter a national crime wave. In
    November the Government authorized the use of joint armed forces and
    police patrols throughout the country to combat rising levels of crime.
    The Government has used the military to patrol the streets seven times
    in the last 6 years. In January 1999, the National Congress ratified a
    constitutional amendment that established direct civilian control over
    the armed forces--through a civilian Minister of Defense--for the first
    time since 1957. The amendment also replaced the position of the armed
    forces commander in chief with that of Chief of the Joint Staff. In
    July 1999, the President replaced the Chief of the Joint Staff, the
    Vice Chief of Staff, and other senior HOAF officers after they sought,
    without prior authorization from the civilian leadership at the Defense
    Ministry, to have the Congress amend a draft organic law to govern the
    HOAF; that action further cemented civilian control of the military. A
    number of versions of the draft law regulating responsibilities between
    the Defense Ministry and the HOAF were debated during the year; at
    year's end, Congress had not passed legislation. Members of the police
    continued to commit human rights abuses.
        The market-based economy is based primarily on agriculture and,
    increasingly, on the important maquiladora (in-bond processing for
    export) industry, which accounts for approximately 130,000 jobs, most
    of which are filled by young women. The HOAF play an indirect,
    diminishing role in the national economy through their pension fund,
    which controls some enterprises usually associated with the private
    sector, including a bank and several insurance companies. About 39
    percent of workers labor in agriculture, with most of the rest in
    industry and manufacturing, commerce, and services. The principal
    export crops are coffee and bananas; these, along with ``value added''
    income from the maquiladora industry, are the leading sources of
    foreign exchange. Nontraditional products, such as melons, pineapples,
    and shrimp, play a growing role in the economy. In 1998 Hurricane Mitch
    caused widespread flooding and landslides and over $3 billion in
    damage, and led to an economic recession during 1999. Most affected
    export sectors have recovered, and the economy experienced positive
    growth during the year. The Central Bank estimated growth for the year
    at between 5.3 and 5.5 percent. Annual per capita income is
    approximately $800; about two-thirds of the country's households live
    in poverty.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, serious problems remained. Members of the security
    forces committed some extrajudicial killings. Human rights groups
    accused the security forces and the business community of colluding to
    organize ``death squads'' to commit extrajudicial killings. Security
    force personnel committed acts of torture, and beat and otherwise
    abused detainees and other persons, including street children. Prison
    conditions remain harsh, lengthy pretrial detention is common, and
    detainees do not always receive due process. Considerable impunity for
    members of the economic and official elite, exacerbated by a weak,
    underfunded, and often corrupt judicial system, contributed to human
    rights problems. Although the civilian courts increasingly considered
    allegations of human rights violations or common crimes against armed
    forces personnel, and some cases went to trial, there were relatively
    few convictions. While no senior Government official, politician, or
    bureaucrat, or member of the business elite, was convicted of crimes,
    the Government removed more than 100 military officials, police
    officers, police agents and investigators, and judges from office on
    corruption and other charges. The judicial system continued to deny
    swift and impartial justice to prisoners awaiting trial. On occasion
    the authorities conducted illegal searches. Individual members of the
    news media suffered various forms of harassment, including attempted
    murder and physical assaults. Other human rights problems included
    violence and societal discrimination against women, child prostitution,
    abuse of street children, and discrimination against indigenous people.
    The Government does not enforce effectively all labor laws. Some
    workers are forced to work overtime. Child labor is a problem,
    particularly in rural areas and in the informal economy, but not in the
    exportprocessing sector.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government agents; however, the
    security forces were suspected of an estimated 200 extrajudicial
    killings, many involving persons under 18 years of age, during the
    year. Human rights groups alleged that individual members of the
    security forces worked with civilian (including vigilante) groups and
    used unwarranted lethal force against supposed habitual criminals or
    suspected gang members. Several groups pushed for investigations into
    specific incidents, while others claimed to have provided public
    prosecutors with evidence of collusion between police elements and
    business leaders with regard to these murders. The Government publicly
    denied accusations relating to the security forces as institutions but
    investigated allegations against members of neighborhood vigilante
    groups. During the year, the authorities sought or detained 11 police
    officials for their involvement in the killings of various individuals.
        In the spring, a suspected gang member who was arrested by police
    died while in the hospital, after the police reportedly ``worked with
    him'' at the crime scene to identify suspects who had fled. Another
    suspect was executed after the police left him alone in the back of a
    pickup truck while they chased his companions.
        Prison guards shot and killed one escaping prisoner (see Section
    1.c.).
        In July the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Covenant House
    reported that 302 homeless children and street youths were killed in
    ``social cleansing'' killings between January 1998 and May. The
    majority of the killings occurred in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.
    Covenant House attributed 36 percent of the killings to the police and
    members of the military; and private security officers committed other
    killings. In August the Public Ministry and the General Directorate of
    Criminal Investigation (DGIC) named a joint special commission to
    investigate the extrajudicial killing of minors. In October the DGIC
    reported that 312 minors were victims of extrajudicial killings between
    1998 and 2000. In October Covenant House filed a complaint with the
    Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) stating that 360
    street children were killed from 1998 through October 2000. In 1997
    Covenant House brought charges before the Public Ministry against
    unnamed members of the armed forces and the police for the alleged
    torture of 63 juveniles or minors, 35 of whom reportedly were murdered,
    since 1990. The Government took no action in this instance.
        The case of a prison guard who shot and killed a minor who refused
    to surrender after escaping from the central penitentiary in
    Tegucigalpa in May 1999 went to trial during the year; however, no
    further information was available.
        Human rights organizations continued to allege that individual
    members and former members of the security forces, acting in collusion
    with business leaders, committed extrajudicial killings of street
    criminals. They also charged neighborhood watch (``vigilante'') groups
    with the responsibility for many extrajudicial executions. On various
    occasions during the year, the Public (Justice) Ministry and the
    National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an autonomous government
    entity, publicly admitted that individual government employees might be
    taking part in such executions; however, the Government asserted that
    the individuals were acting without official authorization.
        There was no progress in the investigation of the March 1999 murder
    of Juan Ramon Alvarado, the late mayor of Cabanas in Copan department.
    Two suspects previously detained were released in 1999 due to lack of
    evidence.
        In September the Third Court of Appeals issued an arrest warrant
    for Jaime Raudales, a former member of the now-disbanded Army
    Intelligence Battalion 3-16, for the 1988 murders of social activists
    Miguel Angel Pavon and Moises Landaverde.
        Also in September, a government team exhumed the remains of four
    persons from a cemetery in Olancho department; these were the first
    official exhumations by the Government (see Section 1.b.).
        There were several developments in the investigation of the 1982
    murder of Nelson MacKay Echevarria. During the year, a court charged
    Colonel Wilfredo Leva Cabrera with the killing. Leva Cabrera, who is in
    prison on a drug trafficking conviction, requested protection under the
    Amnesty Law; however, during the year the Supreme Court overruled a
    lower court decision and rescinded amnesty protection for Leva Cabrera
    in this case. At year's end, the murder charge was being initiated in a
    criminal court. At year's end, former military official Alexander
    Hernandez Santos was being tried for the murder of MacKay, as well as
    other crimes related to human rights abuses.
        In March Major Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa, who for 5 years had been
    a fugitive from justice, surrendered voluntarily to the authorities,
    who remanded Trejo Rosa to a prison hospital. In May the court indicted
    him for the murder of MacKay; he also was indicted for the kidnaping
    and torture of Miguel Francisco Carias, as well as the 1982 kidnaping
    and torture of six university students (see Section 1.c.). In June the
    court released Trejo Rosa from the prison hospital but ordered him
    placed under house arrest due to his age and infirmity.
        In February the First Court of Appeals acquitted Captain Billy Joya
    Amendola of the 1982 murder of university student Hans Madisson. The
    Public Ministry appealed this decision to the Supreme Court in March.
    In October a court issued an arrest warrant for Joya Amendola in
    connection with the 1982 kidnaping and torture of six university
    students (see Section 1.c.).
        There was no information available regarding the Public Ministry's
    appeal of an October 1999 ruling by a lower court that found former
    army chief of staff Oscar Hernandez Chavez not guilty of the 1982
    murder of university student Hans Madisson.
        In July the Third Court of Appeals acquitted retired General Daniel
    Bali Castillo, retired Colonel Manuel Enrique Suarez Benavides, and
    retired police Major Marco Antonio Matute Lagos of the 1982 deaths of
    Adan Avilez Funez and Nicaraguan citizen Amado Espinoza Paz. The Public
    Ministry filed appeals of these decisions with the Supreme Court, which
    had yet to rule on the appeals at year's end. The Supreme Court is
    required to confirm the ruling of the Third Court of Appeals for a full
    acquittal; it had not done so by year's end. Other former military
    officials, including Alexander Hernandez Santos (who was in prison and
    being questioned about this incident at year's end), still face charges
    in this case.
        In September a court sentenced police officer Jose Raul Bonilla
    Velasquez to 15 years' imprisonment for the murder of Jose Alejandro
    Molina. The court acquitted police officer Jose Alfredo Leiva in the
    same case.
        In November a court sentenced Oscar Esmelin Rivera to 20 years in
    prison for the October 1998 killing of Pedro Garcia Villanueva, the
    director of Public Ministry attorneys in Santa Barbara department.
    Garcia had been investigating alleged human rights violations and other
    criminal activities in the region at the time of his death.
        In February the Public Ministry named a special prosecutor to
    continue its investigation of the 1998 murder of Carlos Antonio Luna
    Lopez, a town councilman in Catacamas, Olancho department. A suspect in
    the murder of Luna Lopez, Oscar Aurelio ``Machetillo'' Rodriguez
    Molina, subsequently was brought before a court, which in March
    conducted a ``reenactment'' of Luna Lopez's murder. Several other
    suspects remained at large at year's end.
        Homicides, armed robberies, and other violent assaults remained
    commonplace. Violent crime continued to fuel the growth of private--
    often unlicensed--guard services, and of volunteer groups that
    patrolled their neighborhoods or municipalities to deter crime. In
    February the Security Ministry authorized the creation of approximately
    500 neighborhood watch groups, known as Citizen Security Councils
    (CSC's), around the country to assist the police in combating rising
    crime. Human rights groups during the year criticized the CSC's, which
    they viewed as active participants in the increasing number of
    extrajudicial killings. However, in June National Human Rights
    Commissioner Leo Valladares stated publicly his belief that the CSC's
    were not acting as vigilantes or ``death squads.'' The continued
    proliferation of private security forces and CSC's nonetheless made it
    more difficult to differentiate among homicides that may have been
    perpetrated by government security personnel, private vigilantes, or
    common criminals. In October the Government ordered all private
    security firms to turn in assault rifles, even if acquired legally, in
    an effort to decrease the availability of weapons to criminals.
        Vigilante justice allegedly led to the killing of known and
    suspected criminals, as well as of street children (see Section 5). The
    Preventive Police claimed to have investigated 382 of 410 known
    killings since 1997, concluding that all police personnel accused of
    involvement in such incidents had been placed at the disposition of the
    courts, except for 1 fugitive.
        Several ``murders for hire'' occurred during the year, usually
    related to land disputes or criminal activities. In February the police
    arrested Johnny Orlando Funez Funez and Jose Antonio Galdamez for the
    murder of social activist Jairo Amilcar Ayala Nunez in Lanza, Colon
    department over a land expropriation case. Also in February, four
    unidentified gunmen killed community leader Ruben Elvir in El Camalote,
    Santa Barbara department. Also in February, unknown assailants killed
    Marciano Martinez Ramirez and Victor Manuel Almendares, the president
    and the treasurer, respectively, of a forestry cooperative in
    Lepaterique.
        In March four members of the Chorti indigenous group, Vicente
    Arias, Enecon Arias, Antonio Garcia, and Balbino Hernandez died during
    a gun battle in Copan. Ines Mejia and Wilfredo Bueso were arrested for
    the murders; a third assailant died during the gun battle. Indigenous
    activists claimed that the group was killed in a dispute over tribal
    lands; however, the police asserted that the killers and their victims
    were members of rival criminal gangs involved in the contraband trade
    (see Section 5).
        In April two gunmen killed Concepcion ``Chonillo'' Alvarez and
    three members of his family in Choluteca over a local land dispute; no
    one has been arrested in this case. Also in April, the authorities
    arrested Julio Cesar Espinoza Mejia for the murder of Copan mayor Hugo
    Alvarado over another land dispute.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        Various witnesses, survivors, and former HOAF personnel have
    charged that members of the now-disbanded army Intelligence Battalion
    3-16 kidnaped, tortured, and killed many of the 184 persons who
    disappeared during the 1980's. The Public Ministry and the National
    Human Rights Commission kept open their investigations of those
    disappearances.
        In February the Public Ministry filed an appeal of a December 1999
    decision by a lower court that freed former police intelligence
    director Carlos Roberto Velasquez Ilovares in the 1988 disappearance of
    leftist activist Roger Samuel Gonzalez Zelaya. The appeals court had
    not ruled on this petition at year's end.
        On June 26, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and
    execution committed by military officials were not covered by the 1987
    Amnesty law (see Section 1.e.). This ruling allows for the criminal
    prosecution of the military officers accused of the 1982 kidnaping and
    torture of six leftist university students (see Section 1.c.).
        In September a government team of forensic experts from the Public
    Ministry and local officials exhumed the remains of four persons from a
    cemetery at Dulce Nombre de Culmi in Olancho department. The four
    persons were believed to have been guerrillas who died during a
    firefight with HOAF personnel in 1983. Government forensic experts
    planned to conduct DNA testing on the remains of the four persons in an
    effort to verify their suspected identities; those efforts continued at
    year's end. Human rights activists noted that these were the first
    official exhumations by the Government.
        Following charges brought by human rights groups to the IACHR
    beginning in 1986, in November the Government made compensatory
    payments totaling approximately $1,580,000 (23,800,000 lempiras) to the
    families of 17 persons who disappeared between 1981 and 1989. The human
    rights groups then dropped their charges before the IACHR. The
    suspected perpetrators of those disappearances remain subject to
    criminal prosecution in the future, but these payments freed the
    Government of further civil liability in these 17 specific cases. Some
    human rights activists publicly criticized as inappropriate the
    presence among the group of 17 families receiving payments of the NGO
    Committee of Families of the Detained-Disappeared of Honduras (COFADEH)
    general coordinator Bertha Oliva de Nativi, and of Andres Pavon,
    president of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras
    (CODEH), since the relatives of the other 167 persons who disappeared
    during this time period have not received justice nor any financial
    recompense.
        The courts adjudicated several pending cases involving
    disappearances (see Section 1.a.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were
    isolated instances in which officials employed such practices. In
    addition, police beatings and other alleged abuses of detainees
    remained a problem. The police also engaged in violence, which included
    beatings, against street children (see Section 5). During the year, a
    court in San Pedro Sula ordered the imprisonment of four police
    officers accused of wounding a woman in a vehicle that they allegedly
    attempted to stop in late December 1999. On March 30, the authorities
    detained the officers.
        In February Special Prosecutor for Human Rights Wilfredo Flores
    charged publicly that police officers routinely protected torturers and
    other human rights abusers in their ranks. In March DGIC Director
    Wilfredo Alvarado denied that DGIC agents tortured or abused prisoners.
    In May Preventive Police Director Alvaro Flores Ponce made a similar
    declaration regarding the Preventive Police. In October the Preventive
    Police were singled out in Amnesty International's annual report for
    their use of ``torture and excessive force.''
        During the year, the Ministry of Security revised the procedures
    for internal review of police abuse and misconduct, partly as a result
    of public pressure from human rights groups and the Public Ministry,
    which in the past had reported that the Preventive Police's reviewing
    office was unresponsive to their requests for impartial investigations
    of police officers accused of abuse. The police force, which includes
    the Preventive Police and the DGIC, is subject to investigation by the
    Internal Affairs office regarding public complaints of police behavior;
    the Internal Affairs office reports to the Minister of Security. The
    Preventive Police and the DGIC each have an Office of Professional
    Responsibility (OPR), which conduct internal reviews of police
    misconduct such as offduty criminal conduct and ethics violations. An
    OPR ruling is reported to the Minister of Security, who can take
    disciplinary action or direct a supervisor to decide upon disciplinary
    action for minor infractions. Some human rights groups indicate that
    the new system has increased impartial judgments of police behavior.
        Both the DGIC and the Preventive Police suspended or dismissed
    numerous agents and officers for corruption and abuse of authority
    during the year. The Public Ministry reported that it received 697
    complaints of police abuse through August, compared with 421 complaints
    during 1999. The authorities dismissed more than 100 police officers
    and DGIC agents during the year, compared with nearly 400 officer and
    agents in 1999. The authorities accused 16 police and DGIC agents of
    torture and other abuses, and charged 4 persons with corruption and
    abuse of authority during the year. For example, in October the DGIC
    fired chief administrative officer Armando Espinal for alleged
    corruption, and a lower court issued an arrest warrant for former FUSEP
    Director Julio Cesar Chavez Aguilar for profiting from noncompetitive
    FUSEP purchases during his tenure as director.
        In February the HOAF announced that three army officers would be
    tried in courts-martial for having beaten and threatened eight recruits
    in January in an effort to recover a missing weapon. The Defense
    Minister, the HOAF chief of the joint staff, and other senior officers
    met with the president of CODEH, the country's leading human rights
    NGO, to review this incident, which also led the HOAF to create a
    Directorate of Humanitarian Law to investigate future human rights
    abuses within the HOAF. Also in February, the Defense Ministry
    appointed a civilian as its chief financial officer in an effort to
    counter a history of corruption among former HOAF paymasters and
    announced that it would cooperate with investigations by private human
    rights groups of alleged abuses of authority by HOAF personnel. In
    March the HOAF inaugurated mandatory human rights training for its
    majors and captains. In September the Defense Ministry signed an
    agreement with the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights to provide
    human rights training for the HOAF.
        In May Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa was indicted in the 1982
    kidnaping and torture of six leftist university students, as well as
    for the kidnaping of Miguel Francisco Carias and the murder of Nelson
    MacKay Echevarria (see Section 1.a.). Trejo Rosa surrendered to the
    authorities in March; he remained under house arrest at year's end.
        On June 26, the Supreme Court ruled that illegal detention and
    execution committed by military officials were not covered by the 1987
    Amnesty Law (see Section 1.e.). This ruling allows for the criminal
    prosecution of the military officers accused of the 1982 kidnaping and
    torture of the university students. Seventeen current and former
    military and police officials continued to face simultaneous criminal
    and civil charges in various courts. As a result of the Supreme Court's
    decision, amnesty laws are no longer applicable for: Alexander
    Hernandez, Juan Blas Salazar Meza, Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa, Juan
    Evangelista Lopez Grijalba, Captain Billy Hernando Joya Amendola,
    retired General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, Juan Ramon Pena Paz, Roberto
    Arnaldo Erazo Paz, Jorge Antonio Padilla Torres, and Julio Cesar Funez
    Alvarez (the current deputy director of the Preventive Police).
        In September the First Court of Appeals once again issued arrest
    warrants for Raymundo Alexander Hernandez Santos and for Julio Cesar
    Funez Alvarez. In September the Supreme Court ruled against a petition
    by the Public Ministry for the preventive detention of Joya Amendola
    for the 1982 kidnaping and attempted murder of the six university
    students. In October the First Court of Appeals issued additional
    arrest warrants in this case for Billy Joya Amendola, Amilcar Zelaya
    Rodriguez, and Manuel de Jesus Trejo Rosa. At year's end, Hernandez
    Santos, who turned himself in voluntarily, was detained for questioning
    regarding his involvement in the case.
        In 1998 the Supreme Court had ruled that the country's amnesty laws
    protected Juan Blas Salazar Meza from prosecution for the 1982
    kidnapings. The June Supreme Court decision overturned that decision.
    Salazar Meza is serving a 5-year prison sentence for narcotics
    trafficking. In September the First Court of Appeals reinstated an
    arrest warrant for Salazar Meza, sought by the Public Ministry in
    connection with the 1982 cases as a first step to bringing him to
    trial.
        In September a judge issued a warrant for the arrest of retired
    General Amilcar Zelaya Rodriguez, the owner of the property in the
    Amarateca Valley of Francisco Morazan department where the 1982
    incidents occurred. An appellate court upheld the arrest warrant for
    Zelaya in October.
        In August a separate court ruling absolved Captain Billy Joya
    Amendola of all charges in the 1982 torture of newsman Oscar Reyes Baca
    and his wife, Gloria de Reyes (see Section 2.a.).
        The police forces are underfunded and understaffed, and corruption
    is a problem. Widespread frustration at the inability of the security
    forces to prevent and control crime, and the well-founded perception
    that corrupt security personnel were complicit in the high crime rate,
    led to continued support among a segment of the general public for
    vigilante justice (see Section 1.a.).
        In August Security Minister Gautama Fonseca dismissed Preventive
    Police Deputy Director Wilfredo Urtecho Jeamborde and DGIC Deputy
    Director Saul Bueso Mazariegos from their posts. Human rights and civic
    groups noted the dismissals, since both Urtecho Jeamborde and Bueso
    Mazariegos have been suspected in the past of profiting from a variety
    of illegal enterprises. The Public Ministry reportedly was
    investigating both individuals at year's end for possible prosecution.
        Prison conditions remained harsh. Prisoners suffered from severe
    overcrowding, malnutrition, and a lack of adequate sanitation, and
    allegedly were subjected to various other abuses, including rape. The
    27 penal centers held over 11,500 prisoners, more than twice their
    maximum capacity; more than 90 percent of all prisoners were awaiting
    trial for an average of 22 months, with some waiting over 5 years (see
    Section 1.d.). Prison facilities are overcrowded, and pretrial
    detainees generally are not separated from convicted prisoners. Prison
    security was poor. Contrary to the previous year, the Government did
    not send the army in to any prisons to maintain order during the year.
    Retired military officers do work as guards in some areas, and some
    Preventive Police are used as guards. Prison disturbances, caused
    primarily by harsh conditions, occurred throughout the year, although
    at a lesser rate than in 1999, due to increased manpower and training
    of prison personnel. On March 27, a fight at the San Pedro Sula prison
    left one prisoner dead and five prisoners and guards wounded. Following
    the fight, the authorities transferred 181 prisoners to HOAF
    facilities. Prison escapes, through bribery or otherwise, remained a
    frequent occurrence. Prison guards shot and killed one escaping
    prisoner during the year; there were no other serious injuries to
    escaping prisoners.
        More often than not, for lack of alternative facilities, wardens
    housed the mentally ill and those with tuberculosis and other
    infectious diseases among the general prison population. Prisoners with
    money routinely bought private cells, decent food, and permission for
    conjugal visits, while prisoners without money often lacked basic
    necessities, as well as legal assistance. The prison system budgets
    about $0.40 (6 lempiras) per day for food and medicine for each
    prisoner. Prisoners were allowed visits and in many cases relied on
    outside help to survive, as the prison system could not provide
    adequate or sufficient food.
        In June 1999, the Public Ministry signed an agreement with the
    Center for the Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation of Victims of
    Torture and their Relatives to establish programs to protect the human
    rights of prisoners; to train police and prison personnel to avoid
    committing acts of torture; and to arrange for periodic inspections of
    prisons. These programs continued during the year. In February a
    Tegucigalpa court ordered the central prison in the capital to suspend
    disciplining prisoners because of widespread reports of abuse, and
    instructed prison authorities to develop a plan to stop the alleged
    abuses. In September the Security Ministry and CODEH agreed to
    collaborate on a national plan to provide human rights training to
    prison guards and to rehabilitate the prison population through formal
    education and vocational training.
        In July the Government announced that it would build a model prison
    farm in the Sula Valley at a cost of $15 million (225 million
    lempiras). The 1,500-bed penitentiary, scheduled to open in 2002, would
    be one of several to be built to relieve overcrowding and promote
    rehabilitation within the country's antiquated penal system.
        Women generally were incarcerated in separate facilities under
    conditions similar to those of male prisoners; however, female
    prisoners do not have conjugal visit privileges.
        The Government operates juvenile detention centers in Tamara, El
    Carmen, and El Hatillo; all are located in or near Tegucigalpa or San
    Pedro Sula. This lack of juvenile detention facilities contributed to
    the detention of minors in adult prisons and to vigilante violence
    against, and police abuse of, street children (see Sections 1.a. and
    5). In February Covenant House alleged that 800 juvenile criminals have
    been housed in adult prisons since 1995. Street children in detention
    sometimes were housed in adult prisons, where they were abused
    routinely. However, in May Covenant House made public its judgment that
    the Government no longer routinely houses juvenile offenders in adult
    prisons. In October the IACHR ordered the Government to make
    compensatory payments to 300 juvenile offenders who served time in
    adult prisons from 1995 to 1999. In April the Government announced
    plans to permit juvenile criminals to pursue an education while in
    prison.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
    protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
    authorities occasionally fail to observe these legal requirements. The
    law states that the police may arrest a person only with a court order,
    unless the arrest is made during the commission of a crime, and that
    they must clearly inform the person of the grounds for the arrest. By
    law the Preventive Police cannot investigate crimes; that force only
    detains suspects. The police must bring a detainee before a judge
    within 24 hours; the judge then must issue an initial, temporary
    holding order within 24 hours, make an initial decision within 6 days,
    and conduct a preliminary investigation to decide whether there is
    sufficient evidence to warrant further investigation.
        While bail is legally available, it is granted primarily for
    ostensibly medical reasons; however, procedures in such cases are
    confused and unclear. Poor defendants, even when represented by a
    public defender, seldom are able to take advantage of bail (see Section
    1.e.). Lengthy pretrial detention is a serious problem; in March an
    independent study estimated that 92 percent of prisoners were awaiting
    trial, some for over 5 years. The average length of detention was
    approximately 22 months, and over 90 percent of all prisoners had been
    neither tried nor sentenced (see Section 1.c.).
        The 1996 Unsentenced Prisoner Law mandates the release from prison
    of any detainee whose case has not come to trial and whose time under
    detention exceeds the maximum prison sentence for the crime of which he
    is accused. This law also authorizes the parole until trial of persons
    over the age of 60 accused of nonfelony crimes, women who are pregnant
    or lactating, and the mortally ill. In April the Government estimated
    that as many as 3,017 prisoners qualified for release under the
    Unsentenced Prisoner Law, that 3 officers were required to monitor each
    person, and that the annual cost of enforcing this law was
    approximately $6.7 million (100 million lempiras).
        However, despite this law, many prisoners remain in jail after
    being acquitted or completing their sentences, due to the failure of
    responsible officials to process their releases. A significant number
    of defendants served the maximum possible sentence for the crime of
    which they were accused before their trials were concluded, or even
    begun. For example, a man arrested in August 1997 was released without
    a trial in October 1999, while his two alleged accomplices, who also
    were arrested in August 1997, were released without trials in October
    2000. In September the authorities released a man who had been
    exonerated of all charges 6 days after his arrest in July 1998. Also in
    September, the authorities released another man who had been detained
    without a trial since April 1996. In October the authorities released
    one prisoner who was arrested in June 1991, and then ordered freed in
    March 1995.
        Neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code explicitly prohibits
    exile, but it is not used as a means of political control.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is poorly staffed and
    equipped, often ineffective, and subject to outside influence. While
    the Government respects constitutional provisions in principle,
    implementation has been weak and uneven in practice. A number of
    factors limit the effectiveness of the system. Both the judiciary and
    the Public Ministry suffer from inadequate funding; low wages and lack
    of internal controls make law enforcement officials susceptible to
    bribery; the civil law inquisitorial system is both inefficient and
    opaque; and powerful special interests still exercise influence and
    often prevail in the courts. Approximately 35 percent of the complaints
    received by the National Human Rights Commission concern the judicial
    system. Many leading politicians enjoy constitutional immunity.
        The court system is composed of a 9-member Supreme Court, 10
    appeals courts, 67 courts of first instance with general jurisdiction,
    and 325 justice of the peace courts with limited jurisdiction. Congress
    elects the nine Supreme Court justices and names the president of the
    court; the Supreme Court, in turn, names all lower court judges. The 4-
    year term for justices of the Supreme Court coincides with those of the
    Congress and the President.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial; however,
    the written, inquisitorial trial system is labor-intensive, slow,
    opaque, and does not protect the rights of defendants adequately. In
    December 1999, the Congress passed a law to modernize the Criminal
    Procedures Code; this new law, which is scheduled to take full effect
    in February 2002, substitutes an adversarial system for the
    inquisitorial system and mandates a speedier disposition of cases. The
    new law is designed to change the code into one based upon the
    presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and respect for
    the dignity and liberty of the accused. It also expressly prohibits
    incarceration without first receiving a clear sentence from a judge or
    tribunal.
        Judges legally are in charge of investigations, as well as of
    trials and sentencing. Under the 1984 Code of Criminal Procedures,
    judges, the police, public officials, and individual citizens can
    initiate criminal proceedings. As many as 80 percent of the cases
    reported to the police are never referred to the criminal justice
    system, but instead are settled administratively by the police or by
    municipal courts. A judge may jail an accused person for 6 days before
    a determination is made of probable cause to accept charges. If a judge
    sustains the criminal accusation, the accused remains in jail, or may
    be released on bail while awaiting trial (see Section 1.d.).
        An accused person has the right to an initial hearing by a judge,
    to bail, to an attorney provided by the State, if necessary, and to
    appeal. Although the Constitution recognizes the presumption of
    innocence, the criminal code in practice often is administered by
    poorly trained judges operating on a presumption that the accused is
    guilty; consequently, the rights of defendants often are not observed.
    All stages of the trial process are conducted in writing and, at the
    judge's discretion, may be declared secret and, thus, even less
    ``public'' than normal.
        Defendants and their attorneys are not always genuine participants
    in the process, despite rights accorded under law. Defendants may
    confront witnesses against them and present evidence on their own
    behalf, but only through the judge. By law defendants and their
    attorneys are entitled to review governmentheld evidence relevant to
    their cases, but this right is not always respected in practice.
        A public defender program provides assistance to those unable to
    afford an adequate defense. There are 137 public defenders providing
    free legal services nationally to 37 percent of the prison population;
    however, public defenders are hard pressed to meet the heavy demands of
    an unautomated, inadequately funded, and labor-intensive criminal
    justice system. The Supreme Court issued an instruction in 1998 that
    holds judges personally accountable for reducing the number of
    backlogged cases, and separates judges into pretrial investigative
    judges and trial and sentencing judges. The Court also created a
    program to monitor and enforce compliance with these measures. The
    Court's instruction was intended to ensure more effective protection
    for the rights of the accused to a timely and effective defense, but it
    has had little effect.
        Modest progress was made in previous years towards implementing a
    judicial career system to enhance the qualifications of sitting judges;
    depoliticize the appointment process; and break the subcultures of
    corruption, clientism, patronage, and influencepeddling within the
    judiciary. Nonetheless, many courts remain staffed by politically
    selected judges and by unqualified clerks who are inefficient and
    subject to influence from special interests. The reforms have not been
    implemented fully.
        On April 7, the National Human Rights Commissioner released a
    report that alleged political interference and corruption within the
    judiciary. The Supreme Court filed a lawsuit against Valladares, and
    charged him with engaging in ``corruption, extortion, and blackmail;''
    however, the Supreme Court later dropped its charges (see Section 4).
        On May 2, President Flores issued a decree that created a special
    commission to draft recommendations for improving the judicial system.
    On September 19, the commission presented recommendations to the
    President. The Government incorporated many of these recommendations
    into a constitutional amendment that was presented to Congress on
    October 3. Congress passed the amendment on December 20; it must
    approve it a second time in the 2001 session.
        On November 7, the Supreme Court announced that it is investigating
    500 civil, criminal, administrative, and labor judges in an
    anticorruption effort. According to press reports, at least 100 judges
    have been charged with corruption or fired for judicial indiscretions
    in the past 3 years.
        Elements of the armed forces withheld their cooperation from
    official efforts to track down military officers wanted in connection
    with alleged human rights abuses dating back to the 1980's. The Supreme
    Court considered throughout the past decade whether legal amnesties
    adopted in 1987, 1990, and 1991 for crimes committed during the 1980's
    covered the military, as political deliberations in the Congress had
    suggested. In 1998 the Court determined that while the amnesty laws
    were constitutional, amnesty appeals would have to be decided on their
    individual merits. On June 26, the Court ruled that laws providing
    amnesty protection to present and former military officials were
    inapplicable to common crimes, such as illegal detention and homicide,
    which some officials were alleged to have committed. At the request of
    the Public Ministry, on August 1, the Court clarified that its June
    ruling applied only to the specific case (the 1982 kidnaping and
    torture of six university students) under consideration (see Section
    1.c.), and that the amnesty laws would continue to apply to all
    military defendants until the prosecutor in a specific case established
    the grounds for the exclusion of amnesty for the accused in that case.
    Thus, military officials still may benefit from the amnesty laws, but
    the Public Ministry now has the right to challenge the applicability of
    those laws to specific investigations of past human rights abuses.
        Many leading politicians enjoy constitutional immunity from
    prosecution because of their membership in either the National Congress
    or the Central American Parliament. That immunity extends to acts
    committed before taking office. Only the National Congress can deprive
    a protected person of his immunity: such a person lacks the legal
    capacity voluntarily to surrender his immunity. In April the Congress
    passed a General Law of Immunities that reduced the number of
    government positions with immunity from an estimated 1,250 to less than
    200 positions. The new law continues to require a vote of Congress to
    deprive an individual protected under the law of his immunity, but it
    permits certain civil suits to be brought against such an individual
    without regard to his position in the Government. In March Attorney
    General Roy Medina declared that military amnesties and the political
    immunity of political leaders combined to make impossible the
    prosecution of such individuals for alleged past and present crimes.
        Over the past 6 years, the Public Ministry has taken steps to
    investigate and charge not only military officers for human rights
    violations, but also ranking officials of the two previous governments,
    for abuses of power, fraud, and diversion of public funds and
    resources. However, at year's end, very few of those accused had been
    tried or convicted.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution specifies that a person's home is
    inviolable, that persons in the employ of the State may enter only with
    the owner's consent or with the prior authorization of a competent
    legal authority, and that entry may take place only between 6 a.m. and
    6 p.m., or at any time in the event of an emergency or to prevent the
    commission of a crime. However, as in previous years, there were
    credible charges that police personnel failed at times to obtain the
    needed authorization before entering a private home. Coordination among
    the police, the courts, and the Public Ministry remained weak. The
    Government respects the privacy of correspondence.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities largely
    respected these rights in practice. However, journalists admitted to
    self-censorship when their reporting threatened the political or
    economic interests of media owners. A small number of powerful business
    magnates whose business interests, political loyalties, and family ties
    often intersect own many news media. Systemic national problems, such
    as corruption and conflicts of interest, also have limited the
    development of the news media. For example, three of the four national
    newspapers are run by presidential candidates or their close family
    members. Reporting of events, particularly those related to elections,
    is subject to editorializing.
        The Government has various means to influence news reporting of its
    activities, such as the granting or denial of access to government
    officials, which is crucial for news reporters, editors, and media
    owners alike. Other methods are more subtle, such as the coveted right
    to accompany the President on his official travels. Journalists who
    accompany the President on such occasions do so at the expense of the
    Government, which grants or withholds invitations for such travel at
    will.
        The comparatively little investigative journalism that took place
    focused on uncontroversial issues, such as illegal immigration. When
    the news media attempted to report in depth on national politicians or
    official corruption, they continued to run into obstacles, such as
    external pressures to desist from their investigations, artificially
    tight reporting deadlines, and a lack of access to Government
    information and independent sources.
        The news media also continued to suffer from internal corruption,
    politicization, and outside influences. Payments to journalists to
    investigate or suppress certain stories continued, although no
    individual journalist was accused publicly of engaging in the practice.
    News directors and editors acknowledged their inability to halt the
    practice, given their own workloads and the difficulty of discovering
    why a given reporter opted to emphasize one aspect of a story over
    another, or why a particular name was omitted from a list of suspects
    to be made public.
        The executive branch continued to make frequent use of the ``Cadena
    Nacional,'' a complete preemption of all television and radio
    broadcasting, including international channels seen only on cable
    television. Originally designed to transmit critical information during
    an emergency or crisis, such as Hurricane Mitch, the Cadena Nacional is
    used primarily to promote the supposed accomplishments of the
    Government, from the inauguration of infrastructure projects to the
    transmission of President Flores's audience with the Pope. The
    Government also has considerable influence on the print media through
    its ability to grant or withhold official advertisements funded with
    public monies.
        The leading newspaper in the capital of Tegucigalpa, La Tribuna,
    was founded by the late father of President Flores. La Tribuna is still
    run by his family, and it competes directly with rival publications for
    scarce revenues from advertising, much of which comes from the
    Government itself.
        In March El Nuevo Dia, the smallest of the five daily newspapers,
    ceased publication due to rising production costs and a protracted
    labor dispute with its production staff.
        One potentially abusive practice continued to be the granting of
    awards to individual reporters on ``Journalists' Day.'' In May all
    three branches of the Government and several private organizations,
    including chambers of commerce, bestowed numerous awards, some
    accompanied by substantial sums of cash, on the ``best'' journalists.
    Rather than being tied to a specific accomplishment--a particular
    article or series, or even a lifetime's body of work--most awards were
    granted without any published criteria to beat reporters assigned to
    the granting institution. Some of these awards appeared to be deserved;
    however, many observers viewed the awards as little more than
    acknowledgments by the granting institutions of perceived services
    rendered. One newspaper editor who regularly rotates news assignments
    precisely to avoid any conflict of interest acknowledged that employees
    objected to the rotations because the practice effectively eliminated
    them from award consideration each year.
        Individual members of the news media suffered various forms of
    harassment. In February Vica television reporter Allan Montenegro lost
    an eye during an altercation with police following an automobile
    accident. Montenegro, who is suing the Security Ministry over the
    incident, said that a police officer struck him in the face with the
    butt of a rifle after Montenegro identified himself as a reporter. In
    May Canal El Progreso television reporter Hernan Cubas Padilla filed a
    complaint with the National Human Rights Commission alleging that
    Deputy Johny Handal had threatened at various times to close Canal El
    Progreso and kill Cubas Padilla due to his reporting of alleged corrupt
    activities in Yoro department by Handal, deputies Jamil Hawit and Rene
    Ramon Robleda, and El Progreso town councilwoman Nelly Soliman. Also in
    May, deputy and former president of Congress Rodolfo Irias Navas struck
    La Prensa newspaper reporter Ramon Alberto Tejedo while Tejedo
    conducted a press interview with a third party.
        In April Radio Progreso news director Julio Cesar Pineda Alvarado
    survived a drive-by shooting but was injured when a bullet struck his
    head; Pineda Alvarado subsequently reported having received death
    threats and being followed prior to the attack.
        In April El Heraldo newspaper reporter Leonarda Andino filed a
    complaint with the National Human Rights Commission because she
    received a summons for publishing excerpts from a report on the
    judiciary by the National Human Rights Commissioner (see Section 1.e.).
    In July a court in San Pedro Sula ordered El Heraldo reporter Sogelia
    Alvarado to testify in a defamation suit filed by Supreme Court
    President Oscar Armando Avila Banegas against mayoral candidate Oscar
    Kilgore. In September a court acquitted La Prensa reporter Arnulfo
    Aguilar of credit card fraud, abetting the escape of a prisoner, and
    contempt of court; Aguilar had maintained during his trial that unnamed
    persons whom he was investigating for alleged corruption had generated
    false charges against him. In October Deputy Francisco Herrera
    Dominelli filed a lawsuit on behalf of his wife against La Prensa
    reporter Serapio Umanzor Diaz, whom Herrera Dominelli accused of
    defaming his wife in the course of reporting on her business
    activities; Umanzor Diaz avoided a prison sentence by paying a fine of
    $192 (2,880 lempiras).
        According to the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), during
    the year television journalist Rosanna Guevara lost her position as a
    manager in Vica Television's news department, allegedly because she
    criticized President Flores. In March she reported receiving death
    threats over her station's political coverage.
        Such attempts by government officials and unidentified assailants
    to intimidate journalists increasingly led both local and foreign
    observers to call into question the ability of the news media to report
    freely on sensitive topics. In May the annual report of the IAPA noted
    that 13 reporters had been subjected to various forms of harassment
    during the past decade. In October the NGO Freedom House expressed
    concern regarding local treatment of the news media. At its annual
    conference in October, the IAPA adopted a resolution that called
    attention to several of the harassment cases and called upon the
    Government to respect the freedom of the press.
        In August a court absolved former army captain Billy Joya Amendola
    of all charges in the 1982 torture of newsman Oscar Reyes Baca and his
    wife, Gloria de Reyes (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government respects academic freedom, and has not attempted to
    curtail political expression on university campuses.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    generally respects it in practice.
        In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic
    Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias (see Sections 4 and 5). Dozens
    of persons conducted a hunger strike in support of Sanchez for 9 days
    during August and September, and some 1,200 protesters seized the Mayan
    ruins at Copan, the country's leading tourist attraction, in September.
    On September 7, the police forcibly restored order to the site after 3
    days of protests, causing 15 injuries (including 5 police) in the
    process.
        Also in September, some 300 indigenous persons sought to march from
    Copan to Tegucigalpa in support of Sanchez; however, the Security
    Ministry arrested all of the marchers in order to prevent them from
    entering Tegucigalpa. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a writ of
    habeas corpus to compel the Security Ministry to release the marchers.
    The protests and the hunger strike ended in mid-September when the
    Public Ministry agreed to reinstate Sanchez on the condition that he
    immediately would resign his post, receiving the various severance
    payments provided for by the Labor Code. In November lawyers for the
    demonstrators filed a lawsuit against Security Minister Gautama
    Fonseca, which accused him of abusing his authority and violating their
    civil rights when he ordered their detention in September. If the
    courts accept the protesters' lawsuit, the Minister in theory could
    face criminal charges as well; the courts had not made a decision at
    year's end.
        On December 5-6, protesters clashed with police during a
    demonstration in support of opposition presidential candidate Ricardo
    Maduro (see Section 3). Protesters attacked police with sticks and
    rocks; at least 12 persons were injured, including 3 journalists.
    Police used tear gas to break up the demonstration and arrested 20
    persons.
        In March the Public Ministry announced that it had declined to
    prosecute several dozen alleged instigators of a riot in front of the
    presidential offices in October 1999. The Ministry also announced that
    it was considering pressing charges against senior police officials who
    directed the police response against the alleged rioters, 44 of whom
    sustained a variety of injuries at the time. In October the Government
    made compensatory payments averaging $1,500 (22,500 lempiras) each to
    the 44 persons injured during the 1999 protest, including a payment to
    the family of 1 individual who died of natural causes in May, and to
    the indigenous organization that organized the 1999 demonstration (see
    Section 5). The total amount of payment each victim received depended
    upon the type of injury suffered.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects it in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for all forms of
    religious expression, and the Government generally respects this right
    in practice.
        In September the Congress adopted a controversial measure requiring
    that, beginning in 2001, all school classes begin with 10 minutes of
    readings from the Bible. Parents who do not want their children to
    listen to the readings may notify school authorities in writing. The
    Education Ministry, in consultation with Christian churches, is to
    establish procedures to select readings, plan their implementation, and
    promote their distribution. However, the law does not stipulate which
    segments of the Bible would be used. After the vote, many legislators
    also questioned whether the wording of the legislation in fact made
    such readings mandatory. Evangelical Christians supported the law;
    however, lay constitutional scholars, the Roman Catholic Church, and
    other religious leaders opposed the measure as a violation of the
    constitutional separation of church and state. A legal challenge to the
    constitutionality of this law appeared likely at year's end.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enter and exit the country
    without arbitrary impediment, and the Government does not restrict
    travel within the country's borders.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees, the International Office of Migrations (IOM), and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
    provides first asylum and grants asylum or refugee status in accordance
    with the terms of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution. On several occasions during the year,
    small boats piloted by persons fleeing Cuba were discovered in Honduran
    waters or washed ashore. In each instance, the Government provided
    temporary refuge to those Cubans and collaborated with the IOM and
    local human rights groups to interview each person to determine whether
    the individual had a well-founded fear of persecution. In every
    instance, the Government assisted those persons who expressed a desire
    to return to Cuba to do so, facilitated voluntary transit by others to
    third countries, or granted temporary residence and work permits to
    those who wished to remain in the country.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens last exercised the right to change their government
    through democratic and peaceful elections in November 1997.
    International observers found the elections to be free and fair.
        Citizens choose a president, three vice presidents, and members of
    the National Congress by free, secret, direct, and obligatory balloting
    every 4 years. In 1997 voters for the first time were able to cast
    separate ballots for the president, deputies in the National Congress,
    and municipal leaders, making individual elected officials more
    representative and accountable. Voting was made easier for citizens by
    a change that allowed them to vote closer to their homes.
        Suffrage is universal; however, neither the clergy nor members of
    the military or civilian security forces are permitted to vote. Any
    citizen born in Honduras or abroad of Honduran parentage may hold
    office, except for members of the clergy, the armed forces, and the
    police. A new political party may gain legal status by obtaining 20,000
    signatures and establishing party organizations in at least half of the
    country's 18 departments.
        In June the Congress amended the Law on Elections and on Political
    Organizations to permit citizens residing abroad to vote in future
    presidential elections. The opposition National Party charged that the
    ruling Liberal Party had brought the bill to a vote without prior
    notice and when few Nationalists were present, and asserted that the
    amendment was illegal because it failed to include Congressional
    elections or to provide a role in overseas elections for the National
    Electoral Tribunal (TNE), as required by the existing law. When the
    Nationalists threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the
    amendment, the Liberals agreed to negotiate with the Nationalists over
    how overseas voting would be conducted; the status of this legislation
    and its implementation continued to be debated at year's end.
        The next national elections are scheduled for November 2001;
    presidential primaries for the Liberal and National parties took place
    in December. President of Congress Rafael Pineda Ponce won the Liberal
    primary; Luis Cosenza, a stand-in for the original candidate Ricardo
    Maduro, won the National Party's primary. A major political conflict
    began in October after the ruling Liberals petitioned the National
    Electoral Tribunal (TNE) not to allow National Party presidential
    contender Maduro to compete in his party's primary because the Liberals
    questioned whether he was ``Honduran by birth,'' a legal requirement
    for assuming the presidency. (Maduro was born in Panama of a Panamanian
    father and a Guatemalan mother, but Maduro and his mother both received
    official documentation of Honduran citizenship in the 1980's, through
    Maduro's Honduran maternal grandmother. Since that time, Maduro has
    served in several government positions that required ``Honduran by
    birth'' nationality.) Despite numerous accusations, an arbitration of
    international jurists, and presidential intervention, the TNE refused
    to register Maduro for the primary. At year's end, the National Party
    continued to express interest in reinstating Maduro as the presidential
    candidate, even though the question of Maduro's citizenship was not
    resolved.
        There are no legal impediments to the participation of women or
    minorities in government and politics; however, they are
    underrepresented. One of the country's three vice presidents is a
    woman, as are four cabinet ministers; approximately a dozen women also
    serve as vice ministers or head various government agencies. Women hold
    12 of 128 seats in the National Congress, and 2 of 20 Honduran seats in
    the Central American Parliament. The Government's Office of Women's
    Affairs has cabinet-level status, although the executive president of
    that office is not a member of the cabinet. There is one female justice
    on the Supreme Court.
        In April the Congress enacted a Law of Gender Equality that
    mandates that 30 percent of all candidates nominated for public office
    by recognized political parties be women. Female legislators and
    women's groups criticized this law for not requiring full gender parity
    in political party slates. They also complained that, in practice,
    electoral slates for general elections would not meet the 30 percent
    threshold established by the law because the country's few female
    politicians might be defeated during the internal nominating processes
    of the political parties. The law is expected to apply to the 2001
    elections.
        There are few indigenous people in leadership positions in
    government or politics. There are no members of Congress who state that
    they are indigenous, but there is one indigenous alternate deputy.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operates without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with these
    groups and are responsive to their views.
        Anonymous telephone callers continued to threaten human rights
    workers. The National Human Rights Commissioner and the leaders of the
    CODEH and of the COFADEH all reported receiving numerous death threats
    by telephone.
        In 1996 the Congress ratified a presidential decree expanding the
    functions of the NHRC and unanimously reelected Leo Valladares to a 6-
    year term that is scheduled to expire on March 5, 2002. Under this
    decree, and in fulfillment of his expanded functions, the NHRC has free
    access to all civilian and military institutions and detention centers,
    and is supposed to perform his functions with complete immunity and
    autonomy. However, in April the Supreme Court filed a lawsuit against
    Valladares, and charged him with engaging in ``corruption, extortion,
    and blackmail'' over a report issued by the NHRC in April that exposed
    corruption within the judicial branch (see Section 1.e.). However, the
    Supreme Court later dropped its charges.
        In June the NHRC announced that the Commission would close 7 of its
    12 regional offices for budgetary reasons. Human rights activists
    charged that the Government deliberately underfinanced the NHRC to
    hinder its operations. Valladares observed publicly that, while the
    NHRC required an annual budget of $1.8 million (27 million lempiras) to
    operate on a national scale, the actual NHRC budget for the year 2000
    was only $1,067,000 (16 million lempiras). Various aid grants from
    foreign governments to the NHRC expired earlier in the year. In
    December the Congress passed a budget that provides the NHRC with a
    budget of $1.6 million (24 million lempiras).
        In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic
    Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias, ostensibly as part of a
    reorganization of the Ministry. However, indigenous groups claimed that
    Sanchez had been fired for investigating reports of violations of
    indigenous rights too diligently (see Section 5).
        In March the CODEH publicly accused the INTERPOL unit in Honduras
    of conducting research into the CODEH's foreign information and funding
    networks, but did not make public any evidence to support those
    accusations. In July the CODEH announced that it would close four of
    its regional offices due to a shortfall in funding.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution bans discrimination based on race or sex. The
    Constitution also bans discrimination on the basis of class; however,
    in practice, the political, military, and social elites generally
    enjoyed impunity before the legal system. Members of these groups
    rarely were arrested or jailed; the President, cabinet ministers, and
    legislators all enjoy legal immunity (see Section 1.e.).
        Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. The Penal Code
    was amended in 1997 to classify domestic violence and sexual harassment
    as crimes, with penalties of 2 to 4 years' and 1 to 3 years'
    imprisonment, respectively. In February the Pan-American Health
    Organization reported that 60 percent of women have been victims of
    domestic violence. Most such violence took place within the family. The
    penalties for rape are relatively light, ranging from 3 to 9 years'
    imprisonment. All rapes are considered public crimes, so a rapist can
    be prosecuted even if he marries his victim.
        Under pressure from women's advocacy and reform groups, the
    Congress in 1997 enacted the Law Against Domestic Violence to
    strengthen the rights of women and increase the penalties for crimes of
    domestic violence. This law allows the Government to protect battered
    women through emergency measures, such as detaining an aggressor or
    separating him temporarily from the victim's home. It also imposes such
    penalties as a fine of $333 (5,000 lempiras) and 4 years' imprisonment
    per incident.
        In March the Public Ministry reported that it receives an average
    of 200 allegations of domestic violence each month, but that many cases
    remain pending because the Government has not yet created the special
    courts authorized by the Law Against Domestic Violence. In August the
    Public Ministry reported investigating 10,535 cases of spousal abuse
    during 1999; male spouses filed 1,267 of those cases. In September the
    U.N. Population Fund estimated that 8 of every 10 women suffer from
    domestic violence. In October the Public Ministry reported that it had
    received 3,000 complaints of domestic violence, averaging 35 per day,
    during the year.
        The Government attempted to remedy this situation by working with
    women's groups to provide specialized training to police officials on
    enforcing the Law Against Domestic Violence. There are few shelters
    specifically maintained for battered women. The Government operates 1
    shelter that can accommodate 10 women and their families. Six private
    centers for battered women offer legal, medical, and psychological
    assistance, but not physical shelter.
        Sexual harassment in the workplace also continued to be a problem.
        Women, who make up 51 percent of the work force, were represented
    in at least small numbers in most professions, but cultural attitudes
    limited their career opportunities. In theory, women have equal access
    to educational opportunities; however, family pressures often impede
    the ambitions of women intent on obtaining a higher education. The law
    requires employers to pay women equal wages for equivalent work, but
    employers often classify women's jobs as less demanding than those of
    men to justify paying them lower salaries. In July the Government
    created the Inter-Institutional Technical Committee on Gender to
    coordinate government assistance programs for women.
        Some organizations have begun to offer assistance to women,
    principally targeting those who live in rural areas and in marginal
    neighborhoods of cities. For example, the Honduran Federation of
    Women's Associations provided home construction and improvement loans,
    offered free legal assistance, and lobbied the Government on women's
    causes. The Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights
    continued to operate a program to make women aware of their legal
    rights. Programs that provide small loans to microentrepreneurs target
    female clients.
        Women have advanced significantly in some professions during the
    past several years. The HOAF and national police academies have
    accepted female recruits since 1998, and the first class of women to
    receive aeronautical training at the air force academy graduated in
    1999. In 1998 Reyna Dinora Aceituno was elected Secretary General of
    the Confederation of Honduran Workers (CTH), the country's second
    largest labor confederation. In May the capital city of Tegucigalpa
    hired its first female firefighter. In June and July, the Episcopal
    Church ordained its first three female religious ministers.
        In October tens of thousands of women commemorated World Food Day
    by conducting demonstrations against poverty and violence in the
    country's major cities. Also in October, the Government announced a new
    program to provide ``agricultural equality'' for women through such
    measures as recognizing female land ownership separately from male
    spouses or family members, increasing the number of government land
    titles granted to women, and facilitating access to financial
    assistance for female agricultural workers.
        Children.--Although the Government allocated 32 percent of its
    budget for the year to public education and health care, this was
    insufficient to address the needs of the country's youth. The
    Government provides free, universal, and compulsory education through
    the age of 10; however, the Government estimated that as many as
    175,000 children each year fail to receive schooling of any kind,
    either due to insufficient financial resources, or because parents rely
    on their children to assist in supporting the family by working. Girls
    attend primary school in the same proportion as boys. In October the
    Government announced its intention to increase its national school
    capacity by 5,000 children during 2001.
        Media reports indicated that up to 40 percent of children under the
    age of 5 years suffer from chronic malnutrition. The Government
    estimated that 7,000 children (40 of every 1,000) under the age of 5
    die each year because of inadequate health care; to combat these
    deaths, in March the Health Ministry announced a 2-year program to
    reduce infant mortality by 25 percent.
        The Government was unable to prevent the abuse of street children
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.) or child laborers (see Section 6.d.).
    During the year, the Government and children's rights organizations
    raised their estimates of the number of street children to 10,000, only
    half of whom have shelter on any given day. The number of street
    children has increased substantially since 1998, due to Hurricane
    Mitch. Many street children have been molested sexually, and about 40
    percent regularly engaged in prostitution.
        Approximately 30 percent of the street children in Tegucigalpa and
    San Pedro Sula, the two largest population centers, were reported to be
    HIV-positive. Over 75 percent of street children found their way to the
    streets because of severe family problems; 30 percent simply were
    abandoned. Abuse of street children is a serious problem. Both the
    police and members of the general population engaged in violence
    against street children (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In September
    police arrested the adult son of the Human Rights Commissioner for
    burning a child's eyelid with a cigarette. He was charged with a minor
    infraction. The Human Rights Commissioner publicly separated himself
    from his son's actions and emphasized that his son should be subject to
    appropriate legal action.
        In May the Public Ministry reported receiving an average of 20
    complaints of child abuse every week; in May UNICEF estimated that 17
    percent of children have suffered some form of child abuse. In March
    the Tegucigalpa city administration opened 12 temporary shelters for
    children, with a total capacity of 240 children. In November the
    Government announced that it plans to open a 24-hour Street Child
    Attention Center in Tegucigalpa, which had not opened at year's end.
    The Center, working with the municipal authorities and with children's
    rights organizations, would initiate contact on the streets with
    abandoned children, meet their basic needs, then offer counseling and
    formal or vocational training to help reincorporate them into society.
        Human rights groups implicated out-of-uniform security force
    personnel, vigilantes, and business leaders in many juvenile deaths
    (see Section 1.a.). In February Covenant House alleged that 21 children
    were killed and 879 children suffered various forms of mistreatment
    from 1994 to 1999.
        The 1996 Code of Childhood and Adolescence covers the rights,
    liberties, and protection of children, including in the area of child
    labor (see Section 6.d.). It established prison sentences of up to 3
    years for persons convicted of child abuse.
        In September the Government sponsored its eighth annual Children's
    Congress in Tegucigalpa, at which children from across the country
    discussed issues of national interest. For the first time, several
    departmental capitals hosted similar meetings of local children
    simultaneously.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no formal barriers to
    participation by an estimated 300,000 disabled adults in employment,
    education, or health care; however, there is no specific statutory or
    constitutional protection for them. There is no legislation that
    requires access by disabled persons to government buildings or
    commercial establishments. In April the Government reactivated the
    National Council for the Treatment of the Disabled Minor to coordinate
    assistance to an estimated 800,000 disabled youths and appropriated
    about $1.3 million (20 million lempiras) to fund its activities.
        Indigenous People.--Some 450,000 persons, constituting 11 percent
    of the general population, are members of various indigenous groups.
    These small communities of indigenous people have little or no ability
    to participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures,
    traditions, and the allocation of natural resources. Indigenous land
    rights are communal. While the law permits persons to claim individual
    freeholding titles, this is difficult to accomplish in practice. Tribal
    lands often are defined poorly in documents dating back to the mid-19th
    century and, in most cases, lack any legal title based on modern
    cadastral measurements. The Government makes all decisions regarding
    exploitation of timber resources on indigenous lands, often over
    strenuous tribal objections.
        The lack of clear title by indigenous groups to public lands that
    they occupy often leads to conflicts between such groups and various
    government entities. However, such disputes are equally common between
    the Government and nonindigenous groups, and the Government is working
    with various indigenous groups on management plans for public and
    tribal lands that they occupy. In the absence of clear land titles and
    unequal access to legal recourse, indigenous groups also are vulnerable
    to frequent usurpation of their property rights by nonindigenous
    farmers and cattle ranchers. Expanded coverage of the national
    cadastral registry, property titling, and government land registries is
    reducing this vulnerability.
        The courts commonly deny legal recourse to indigenous groups and
    often show bias in favor of nonindigenous parties of means and
    influence. Failure to obtain legal redress frequently causes indigenous
    groups to attempt to regain land through invasions of private property,
    which usually provokes the authorities into retaliating forcefully. The
    Government generally is responsive to indigenous land claims; however,
    numerous cases remained unresolved because of conflicting claims by
    influential nonindigenous groups.
        In 1997 after a month of nationwide protests by indigenous
    organizations that included a hunger strike, the Government signed a
    22-point agreement with representatives of various groups that made
    available 9 initial land grants of about 22,000 acres each to different
    tribes, granted some contested land titles outright to indigenous
    petitioners, and set aside about $13,000 (200,000 lempiras) in
    government funds for indigenous housing. The Congress also created a
    commission to study indigenous land claims, which often conflict with
    the claims of small farmers, but the commission was largely inactive.
    Since 1997 the Government has distributed tens of thousands of legal
    titles encompassing hundreds of thousands of acres of land to
    indigenous persons. In September the Congress appropriated about $1.7
    million (25 million lempiras) to purchase land for distribution to the
    indigenous Chorti community, plus an additional $1,267,000 (19 million
    lempiras) in October for its general land redistribution programs.
    Indigenous groups nonetheless charged that the Government had failed to
    fulfill its commitments under the 1997 agreement.
        Members of the Black Carib and Garifuna indigenous groups, backed
    by international supporters, objected strenuously to a proposed
    constitutional amendment that would permit foreigners to own and
    develop land for tourism within 25 miles of the country's coasts and
    land frontiers. The amendment was approved on its first reading in 1998
    but failed to obtain a constitutionally required second approval in
    1999, following an indigenous demonstration in October 1999, that led
    to a violent clash near the presidential offices (see Section 2.b.).
    The amendment appears unlikely to be considered again in the near
    future.
        In August the Public Ministry fired Special Prosecutor for Ethnic
    Rights Gilberto Antonio Sanchez Chandias, ostensibly as part of a
    reorganization of the Ministry; however, indigenous groups claimed that
    Sanchez had been fired for investigating reports of violations of
    indigenous rights too diligently (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
        Indigenous groups petitioned actively during the year for the
    Government to carry out more effective investigations into dozens of
    murders of indigenous leaders that date back to the 1970's, including
    the deaths in March of four Chorti men in Copan (see Section 1.a.).
        In August various indigenous groups convened a First Conference of
    National Solidarity in Tegucigalpa in preparation for the World
    Conference Against Racism, to be held in South Africa under U.N.
    auspices in 2001.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the legal right to form
    and join labor unions; unions are independent of the Government and of
    political parties. Most peasant organizations are affiliated directly
    with the labor movement. Unions frequently hold public demonstrations
    against government policies and make extensive use of the news media to
    advance their views. However, only about 14 percent of the work force
    is unionized, and the economic and political influence of organized
    labor has diminished in recent years.
        The International Labor Organization (ILO) notes that various
    provisions in the law restrict freedom of association, including the
    prohibition of more than one trade union in a single enterprise, the
    requirement of more than 30 workers to constitute a trade union, and
    the requirement that trade union organizations must include more than
    90 percent Honduran membership.
        The labor movement is composed of three national labor
    organizations: the General Council of Workers (CGT), the Confederation
    of Honduran Workers (CTH), and the Unitary Confederation of Honduran
    Workers (CUTH).
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, along with a
    wide range of other basic labor rights, which the authorities respect
    in practice. However, the civil service code denies the right to strike
    to all government workers, other than employees of state-owned
    enterprises. The ILO has reported that federations and confederations
    are prohibited from calling strikes and that a two-thirds majority of
    the votes of the total membership of the trade union organization is
    required to call a strike; the ILO asserts that these requirements
    restrict freedom of association. Public sector health care employees
    conducted illegal work stoppages during the year.
        A number of private firms have instituted ``solidarity''
    associations, essentially aimed at providing credit and other services
    to workers and managers who are members of the associations.
    Representatives of most organized labor groups criticize these
    associations, asserting that they do not permit strikes, have
    inadequate grievance procedures, and neutralize genuine, representative
    trade unions.
        In May dissident members of some 40 labor, peasant, and social
    organizations formed a Popular Bloc (``Bloque Popular'') whose
    immediate goals were to pressure the Government to implement social
    reforms and cease its efforts to privatize inefficient state-owned
    enterprises. During the second half of the year, the Bloc conducted a
    series of nationwide, 1-day work and traffic stoppages that brought the
    Government, the private sector, and organized labor to the bargaining
    table to negotiate a national wage increase outside the formal
    framework of the annual minimum wage talks, which normally are held
    each December (see Section 6.e.).
        The three national labor confederations maintain close ties with
    various international trade union organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    protects the rights to organize and to bargain collectively; collective
    bargaining agreements are the norm for companies in which workers are
    organized. The Labor Code prohibits retribution by employers for trade
    union activity; however, it is a common occurrence. Some employers have
    threatened to close down unionized companies and have harassed workers
    seeking to unionize, in some cases dismissing them outright. The labor
    courts routinely consider hundreds of appeals from workers seeking
    reinstatement and back wages from companies that fired them for
    engaging in union organizing activities. However, once a union is
    recognized, employers actually dismiss relatively few workers for union
    activity. Nonetheless, such cases serve to discourage workers elsewhere
    from attempting to organize.
        Workers in both unionized and nonunionized companies are protected
    by the Labor Code, which gives them the right to seek redress from the
    Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Labor took action in several cases,
    pressuring employers to observe the code. Labor or civil courts can
    require employers to rehire employees fired for union activity, but
    such rulings are uncommon. Agreements between management and unions
    generally contain a clause prohibiting retaliation against any worker
    who participates in a strike or other union activity.
        The Labor Code explicitly prohibits blacklisting; however, there
    was credible evidence that informal blacklisting occurred in the
    privately owned industrial parks, known as maquiladoras. When a union
    is formed, its organizers must submit a list of initial members to the
    Ministry of Labor as part of the process of obtaining official
    recognition. However, before official recognition is granted, the
    Ministry of Labor must inform the company of the impending union
    organization. The Ministry of Labor has not always been able to provide
    effective protection to labor organizers. There were credible reports,
    particularly in the export processing zone (EPZ) sector, that some
    inspectors had sold the names of employees involved in forming a union
    to companies that then dismissed union organizers before the Ministry
    of Labor could recognize the unions.
        The same labor regulations apply in the EPZ's as in the rest of
    private industry. Unions are active in the Government-owned Puerto
    Cortes free trade zone (7 of 11 maquiladoras there are unionized), but
    factory owners have resisted efforts to organize the privately owned
    industrial parks. The Honduran Association of Maquiladores (AHM)
    routinely sponsors seminars and other meetings between its members and
    major labor groups in order to reduce potential tensions within the
    industry. At year's end, 54 of the country's 434 maquiladoras were
    unionized, and 26 of those plants operated under collective bargaining
    agreements.
        In 1997 the AHM adopted a voluntary code of conduct governing
    salaries and working conditions in the industry and recognizing
    workers' right to organize. Although local unions were not consulted
    during the drafting process and have no formal role in its
    implementation, this code nonetheless represented a public commitment
    by apparel manufacturers to abide by local laws and regulations
    governing their industries. It provided a starting point for a dialog
    among the AHM, organized labor, and the Government, which formed a
    Tripartite Commission that meets on a monthly basis to discuss and
    facilitate solutions for labor problems. The AHM often serves as an
    informal arbiter of labor disputes between its member companies and
    their workforces. The attitude of the Government towards organized
    labor in the EPZ's is the same as in other industries.
        In a number of maquiladora plants, workers have shown little
    enthusiasm for unionizing, since they consider their treatment, salary,
    and working conditions to be as good as, or better than, those in
    unionized plants. In the absence of unions and collective bargaining,
    several EPZ plants have instituted solidarity associations that, to
    some extent, function as ``company unions'' for the purposes of setting
    wages and negotiating working conditions. Other EPZ plants use the
    minimum wage to set starting salaries, and adjust wage scales by
    negotiating with common groups of plant workers and other employees,
    based on seniority, skills, categories of work, and other criteria. In
    November Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), a private
    sector initiative to improve working conditions in maquiladoras around
    the world, granted its first overseas certifications of compliance with
    WRAP principles to two local companies, Cross Creek de Honduras and
    Kellwood de Honduras.
        Labor leaders accuse the Government of allowing private companies
    to act contrary to the Labor Code and expect the problem to continue
    until the Ministry of Labor is reorganized to make it more efficient.
    They criticize the Ministry of Labor for not enforcing the Labor Code,
    for taking too long to make decisions, and for being timid and
    indifferent to workers' needs. Industry leaders, in turn, contend that
    the obsolete and cumbersome Labor Code discourages foreign investment
    and requires significant amendment. The Ministry of Labor has sought to
    address these deficiencies by requesting increased funding from the
    Flores administration, by dismissing or transferring Ministry of Labor
    employees whose performance was unsatisfactory, by opening more
    regional offices to facilitate worker access to Ministry of Labor
    services, and by conducting a painstaking, ongoing review of the Labor
    Code within the Tripartite Commission.
        A 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ministry of
    Labor and the Office of the United States Trade Representative calling
    for greater enforcement of the Labor Code has resulted in some
    progress. However, labor unions charge that the Ministry of Labor has
    not made sufficient progress towards enforcing the Code, especially in
    training its labor inspectors and in conducting inspections of the
    maquiladora industry. The Government has acknowledged that it does not
    yet adhere completely to international labor standards. In 1997 the
    country, in conjunction with other Central American nations, agreed to
    fund a regional program to modernize the inspection and labor
    management functions of all regional labor ministries. In August and
    September, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to abide by the
    terms of the 1995 MOU and to take additional steps to strengthen
    enforcement of the Labor Code.
        Kimi de Honduras, a South Korean-owned maquiladora with a history
    of labor troubles, closed its doors in May and laid off over 600
    employees, most of whom were women. Former Kimi employees complained
    that severance payments made by the company did not meet requirements
    stipulated by the Labor Code, but a Ministry of Labor examination of
    the company's calculations found Kimi's severance payments to its
    former workforce in order.
        In July 1999, workers at Yoo Yang, another South Korean-owned
    maquiladora, sought to establish a union for all maquiladora workers.
    Both the Yoo Yang employees and the Ministry of Labor missed various
    deadlines stipulated in the Labor Code for the processing of the
    workers' petition, which the Ministry of Labor invalidated in April
    because the Labor Code precludes the creation of industrial unions once
    individual companies in a given industry become unionized. In July Yoo
    Yang employees submitted a new petition for recognition as a company
    union to the Ministry of Labor, which declined to rule definitively on
    the petition because of alleged irregularities contained in the
    workers' application for juridical recognition; in the process, the
    Ministry of Labor again missed several processing deadlines for labor
    petitions established by the Labor Code. The irregularities were
    addressed, and in December the Ministry of Labor granted union status
    to Yoo Yang employees.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, and this applies equally
    to children; however, there were credible allegations of compulsory
    overtime at EPZ plants, particularly for women, who make up an
    estimated 80 percent of the work force in the maquiladora sector. The
    legal prohibitions apply equally to children, and there were no
    official reports of such practices in the area of child labor (see
    Section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the
    employment of minors under the age of 16, except that a child who is 15
    years of age is permitted to work with parental and Ministry of Labor
    permission. The Children's Code prohibits a child of 14 years of age or
    younger from working, even with parental permission, and establishes
    prison sentences of 3 to 5 years for individuals who allow children to
    work illegally. An employer who legally hires a 15-year-old must
    certify that the child has finished, or is finishing, his compulsory
    schooling. The Ministry of Labor grants a limited number of work
    permits to 15-year-old children each year.
        The Ministry of Labor cannot enforce effectively child labor laws
    outside the maquiladora sector, and violations of the Labor Code occur
    frequently in rural areas and in small companies. According to the
    Ministry of Labor, human rights groups, and children's rights
    organizations, an estimated 350,000 children work illegally.
    Significant child labor problems exist in family farming, agricultural
    export (including the melon and coffee industries), and small scale
    services and commerce. Many children also work in the construction
    industry, on small family farms, as street vendors, or in small
    workshops to supplement the family income. Boys between the ages of 13
    and 18 work in the lobster and shrimp industries, where they provide
    support to divers from boats while they learn the trade. Hurricane
    Mitch exacerbated existing child labor problems in every sector of the
    economy.
        The employment of children under the legal working age in the
    maquiladora sector may occur, but not on a large scale. (Younger
    children sometimes obtain legitimate work permits by fraud or purchase
    forged permits.) The maquiladoras in recent years have raised their
    minimum employment age, and some hire only at age 18 or above, reducing
    the number of legal job opportunities available to persons under 18
    years of age.
        In September 1998, the Government created the National Commission
    for the Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor, which
    includes government ministries, official family welfare agencies, and
    local NGO's. In August the National Commission sponsored a public
    seminar on child labor in the country to assist the Commission in
    developing a national plan to combat this problem.
        Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited, including that performed
    by children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In the aftermath of Hurricane
    Mitch in December 1998, labor leaders agreed to forgo the customary
    January increase in the minimum wage in return for a pledge by business
    leaders to control price increases for basic goods and services. In
    June 1999, the Roman Catholic Church arbitrated a 25 percent increase
    in the minimum wage that the Government implemented in July 1999; an
    additional 8 percent increase took effect in January. The minimum wage
    in effect prior to July 1999 served as the basis for both increases.
    Daily pay rates vary by geographic zone and the sector of the economy
    affected; urban workers earn slightly more than workers in the
    countryside. The lowest minimum wage occurs in the nonexport
    agricultural sector, where it ranges from $2.33 to $2.96 (35.00 to
    44.50 lempiras) per day, depending on whether the employer has more
    than 15 employees. The highest minimum wage is $3.89 (58.30 lempiras)
    per day in the export sector. All workers are entitled to an additional
    month's salary in June and December of each year. The Constitution and
    the Labor Code stipulate that all labor must be paid fairly; however,
    the Ministry of Labor lacks the personnel and other resources for
    effective enforcement. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living (above the poverty line) for a worker and
    family.
        Under the threat of a nationwide work stoppage by the country's
    three labor confederations (see Section 6.a.), in October the private
    sector agreed to a monthly wage increase of $23.33 (350 lempiras) for
    workers earning up to $116.60 (1,749 lempiras) per month. A monthly
    increase of $10 (150 lempiras) would be retroactive to October 1, and
    an additional monthly increase of $13.33 (200 lempiras) is scheduled to
    take effect on February 1, 2001. This agreement excluded workers in the
    nonexport agricultural sector, who instead would receive a monthly wage
    increase of $10 (150 lempiras) as of February 1, 2001.
        Under this agreement, workers earning between $140 (2,100 lempiras)
    and $400 (6,000 lempiras) per month would receive an additional wage
    increase of $23.33 (350 lempiras) as of April 1, 2001. This wage
    increase excluded: Workers receiving a salary increase equivalent to,
    or greater than, $23.33 (350 lempiras) through either an individual
    contract or a collective bargaining agreement taking effect 3 months
    prior to April 1, 2001; those paid by piecework or based on
    productivity; microenterprises, agricultural firms, or ranches
    employing 15 or fewer workers; and workers in medicine or petroleum
    product sales whose utility margins are regulated by the Government.
        This agreement also incorporated various social commitments by the
    Government, including the establishment of an Economic and Social
    Council within which the Government, the private sector, and labor and
    social groups would debate wages and other labor issues, as well as
    national social policy. The Congress enacted legislation implementing
    this agreement in December, which obviated any need to hold the formal
    talks on increasing the minimum wage that had been planned for
    December. The CTH, which initially opposed the terms of this agreement,
    conducted a protest strike during the first week of October that only
    resulted in some success along the country's North Coast.
        The law prescribes a maximum 8-hour workday and a 44-hour workweek.
    There is a requirement of at least one 24-hour rest period every 8
    days. The Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10 workdays after
    1 year, and of 20 workdays after 4 years. However, employers frequently
    ignored these regulations due to the high level of unemployment and
    underemployment and the lack of effective enforcement by the Ministry
    of Labor. Foreign workers enjoy equal protection under the law,
    although the process for a foreigner to obtain a work permit from the
    Ministry of Labor is cumbersome.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing national health
    and safety laws, but does not do so consistently or effectively. There
    are 19 labor inspectors throughout the country. The informal sector is
    regulated and monitored poorly. For example, divers for shrimp and
    lobster work in hazardous conditions; the lack of medical facilities in
    the Mosquito Coast region adds to the problem. Worker safety standards
    are also difficult to enforce in the construction industry. Some
    complaints alleged that foreign factory managers failed to comply with
    the occupational health and safety aspects of Labor Code regulations in
    factories located in the EPZ's and in private industrial parks. There
    is no provision allowing a worker to leave a dangerous work situation
    without jeopardy to continued employment.
        In March workers at Chung Sing Textiles, a Taiwanese-owned
    maquiladora, alleged publicly that the company maintained a clandestine
    ``punishment cell'' for employees who violated factory regulations.
    Separate investigations by the Ministry of Labor and the AHM of those
    charges failed to develop any evidence of the existence of a punishment
    cell at Chung Sing. In July a seamstress at Sunny Industries, a Korean-
    owned maquiladora, lost the effective use of her left hand when it
    accidentally became entangled in a machine. In a lawsuit filed against
    Sunny Industries in August, the seamstress alleged that company
    management for several hours refused to free her hand from the machine
    for fear of damaging the equipment, then delayed referring her to a
    public hospital for medical treatment for 8 days because it did not
    wish to pay her medical expenses.
        In August the Government announced its participation in a regional
    program to improve occupational safety and health conditions throughout
    Central America. This program aims to strengthen regional labor codes
    and the enforcement capabilities of the Central American labor
    ministries in these fields.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Legal Code includes provisions that
    prohibit trafficking in persons; however, it is a problem. The
    Government and Justice Ministry, through its General Directorate for
    Population and Migration, is responsible for enforcing the country's
    immigration laws. However, weak police and court systems hinder law
    enforcement efforts.
        Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of aliens smuggled
    to the United States involving the use of force or sequestration
    (holding persons incommunicado against their will). The most common
    practice involves the sequestration of persons until a smuggling fee is
    paid. If the fee is not paid, the smugglers normally seek retribution
    by turning such persons in for deportation proceedings. Many times,
    fees are paid by relatives who fear that smugglers may employ violence
    against the smuggled persons. The most common practice involving debt
    bondage is the smuggling of indentured persons, through the country
    from China or South America, whose smuggling fee is paid by an employer
    in the United States in return for free or lowpaid labor. There were
    two such cases, involving a total of seven persons.
        In January Covenant House of Honduras asserted that some 250
    Honduran children in Canada had been coerced into prostitution or the
    transportation of illicit narcotics. An investigation of those charges
    was ongoing at year's end. In January Canadian authorities arrested
    dozens of small-time Central American drugdealers including many
    Honduran minors. In February the press reported that Honduran
    authorities were working to repatriate those minors.
        In February a judge in San Pedro Sula, Alexa Cubero, was arrested
    for allegedly kidnaping six minors with intent to sell them to persons
    unknown; this case had not come to trial at year's end. In July the
    Government announced that it was working with the Government of Mexico
    to repatriate over 200 Honduran minors working as prostitutes in
    southern Mexico. In September a local children's rights group charged
    that 498 children had been reported missing since 1986, including 22
    children during the year. The group asserted that local kidnapers
    receive an average of $133 (2,000 lempiras) per child, each of whom
    subsequently is sold abroad for $10,000 to $15,000.
        The Government does not provide economic aid to victims or
    potential victims of such crimes. However, in March the Government
    inaugurated two centers in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula to assist
    citizens deported from other countries to relocate in Honduras. With
    the assistance of several international organizations, the Government
    hoped to be able to reinsert up to 4,000 persons into society each
    year.
                                   __________

                                    JAMAICA

        Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy and a member of
    the Commonwealth of Nations. Two political parties have alternated in
    power since the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1944;
    a third major party was established in late 1995. Prime Minister P.J.
    Patterson's People's National Party (PNP) won 50 of the 60 seats in
    Parliament in national elections in December 1997 that were
    significantly less violent than previous general election campaigns.
    Intimidation of voters and party agents and restrictions on the free
    movement of voters was reported. The judiciary is independent but lacks
    adequate resources.
        The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has primary responsibility for
    internal security, assisted by the Island Special Constabulary Force.
    The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF--army, air wing, and coast guard) is
    charged with national defense, marine narcotics interdiction, and
    supporting the JCF. The JDF has no mandate to maintain law and order
    and no powers of arrest. The Ministry of National Security and Justice
    oversees the JCF and the JDF. Civilian authorities generally maintain
    effective control of the security forces; however, some members of the
    security forces committed human rights abuses.
        The economy is based on primary products (bauxite and alumina,
    sugar, bananas), services (tourism, finance), and light manufacturing
    (garment assembly). The Government promoted private investment to
    stimulate economic growth and modernization, pursuing in the process a
    sometimes painful program of structural adjustment. The trade-dependent
    economy contracted (by 0.5 percent) for the fourth consecutive year in
    1999. In 1999 annual per capita income was $2,531, but there is a large
    gap between the wealthy and the impoverished.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members
    of the security forces committed extrajudicial killings and beatings
    and carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions.
        Although the Government moved to punish many of those police
    involved, continued impunity for police who commit abuses remains a
    problem. Police investigations often were hampered by lack of
    witnesses, and bottlenecks in the judicial systems cause long delays in
    resolution of criminal cases. Prison and jail conditions remained poor;
    overcrowding, brutality against detainees, and poor sanitary conditions
    were problems. The judicial system was overburdened, and lengthy delays
    in trials were common. There were allegations that citizens' privacy
    rights were infringed upon. Violence and economic discrimination
    against women remained problems. There were cases of societal
    discrimination against disabled persons and members of the Rastafarian
    religion. Violence against suspected homosexuals occurred. Child labor
    is a problem. Mob violence against those suspected of breaking the law
    remains a problem.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings during the year.
        However, there were two killings involving politically connected
    victims that produced allegations of possible political motivation. On
    December 6, unknown assailants shot and killed an organizer for Sharon
    Hay-Webster, a PNP Member of Parliament, in front of Hay-Webster's
    constituency office in South Clarendon, after a party event. On
    December 12, a PNP area leader was found strangled in St. Andrew
    parish. One Member of Parliament said that the victim had been
    threatened and that he was ``sure she had been eliminated for political
    reasons,'' but another Member of Parliament contended that constituents
    had killed her in a dispute over jobs in a public works project.
    Although the last two national elections were relatively calm, there is
    a history of political violence and killings in the period leading up
    to elections (see Section 3).
        The police frequently employed lethal force in apprehending
    criminal suspects. During the year, there were 140 deaths, including
    those of 11 police officers, during police encounters with criminals.
    While allegations of ``police murder'' were frequent, the validity of
    many of the allegations was suspect. The country faces a crime
    situation with a homicide rate exceeding 30 per 100,000 persons. Well-
    armed gangs trafficking in narcotics and guns control many inner-city
    communities. The gangs are often better equipped than the police force
    and have conducted coordinated ambushes of joint security patrols.
    There have been targeted assaults against police officers and their
    families.
        In February police killed a 20-year-old man in Farm district,
    Clarendon parish. The police claimed that they encountered a group of
    men, were fired upon, and returned fire. At that point, the man was
    hit. However, residents said that the police came upon the group, began
    firing indiscriminately and hit the victim. The incident led to 2 days
    of violent protests in May Pen, Clarendon's capital, which subsided
    when the area's parliamentarian visited and appealed for calm. In May
    the police concluded their investigation and forwarded it to the Public
    Prosecutor's office for action. In September the authorities brought
    murder charges against a policewoman involved in the incident; at
    year's end she awaited trial.
        On April 25, television stations broadcast news footage taken by an
    independent cable operator that showed a group of armed police officers
    surrounding a house in pursuit of an alleged gang leader, who was shot
    and killed by a police superintendent a few moments later. The
    videotape did not show the shooting; however, the footage of a woman
    crying for help and a violent scuffle in a doorway stirred much
    controversy and led to a confrontation on April 27 between heavily
    armed gunmen and the police in a volatile area of Kingston. Two
    policemen were killed and several injured in a prolonged gun battle;
    one gunman was also killed. In a press conference immediately after the
    outbreak of violence, security force leaders criticized Jamaicans for
    Justice, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocating human rights,
    for politically motivated involvement in the controversy (see Section
    4). During the press conference, the Police Commissioner also
    criticized a journalist for questioning possible political motivation
    behind the violent events (see Section 2.a.).
        The JCF has undertaken an initiative of ``community policing'' in
    certain areas to address the problem of longstanding antipathy between
    the security forces and many poor inner-city neighborhoods. For
    example, designated policemen walk beats and interact with members of
    the community on a daily basis. The JCF conducted both administrative
    and criminal investigations into all incidents involving fatal
    shootings by the police. In July the Government established a special
    police body, the Bureau of Special Investigations, specifically to
    address police shootings. This group supplements the JCF Office of
    Professional Responsibility, which investigates police corruption and
    other misconduct, and the civilian Public Complaints Authority that
    oversees investigations of the other two bodies and can initiate its
    own investigations. In April a prominent human rights activist assumed
    the newly created position of human rights advisor to the Minister of
    National Security and Justice. She has been engaged in educating JCF
    trainees as well as junior officers to respect citizens' rights. The
    JCF policy statement on the use of force incorporates U.N.-approved
    language on basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law
    enforcement officials.
        Following a police investigation, in September 1999 the Public
    Prosecutor's office charged a police sergeant with murder for the April
    1999 killing of an off-duty JDF soldier during island-wide protests. A
    preliminary hearing found that there was sufficient evidence to proceed
    to trial; at year's end, the case was still before the courts.
        The authorities also brought murder charges against a police
    officer for the death of a taxi driver killed when police fired on a
    taxi carrying passengers in Kitson town in June 1999. The case was
    still in preliminary hearings at year's end.
        On August 21, 1999, nine soldiers and four policemen severely beat
    Michael Gayle, described as a paranoid schizophrenic, after he tried to
    pass through a roadblock near his home after curfew. Gayle died as the
    result of a ruptured abdomen; at the coroner's inquest, the jury
    returned a majority verdict that all police and military personnel on
    duty at the roadblock at that time should be charged with manslaughter.
    However, in March the Director of Public Prosecutions ruled that there
    was not sufficient evidence to bring charges against specific
    individuals for Gayle's death. The police opened a new investigation of
    this incident, completed it in April, and resubmitted the results to
    the Public Prosecutor's office. The police investigation did not
    uncover any new information and recommended that the case be closed.
        Vigilantism, involving spontaneous mob executions in response to
    crime, continued to be a problem. There were 8 known vigilante killings
    during the year, compared with 9 in 1999 and 16 in 1998. Official
    investigations into such killings generally do not uncover information,
    since the persons and the community involved usually band together to
    intimidate potential witnesses.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other abuse of prisoners and
    detainees; however, reports of physical abuse of prisoners by guards
    continued, despite efforts by the Government to remove abusive guards
    and improve procedures.
        In June police fired on a minibus carrying 16 passengers when the
    driver failed to stop at a roadblock. The police reported that they had
    received reports of gunmen on the bus. After the bus sped away, the
    police pursued and fired on it. One passenger took off his white shirt
    and waved it out a window, shouting that passengers were on the bus,
    but had to duck back inside when the police continued shooting. Six
    persons were injured, including two students. Two policemen involved in
    the incident were removed from front-line duty and more training was
    mandated for police in the proper use of firearms. The police concluded
    an investigation into the incident and sent it to the Public
    Prosecutor's office for action.
        In December 1998, the court of appeal announced that flogging could
    not be imposed as a punishment because the legislative authority for it
    had expired. This sentence was used rarely; prior to 1994, no sentence
    of flogging had been imposed for 25 years.
        There were reports that police sexually harassed women (see Section
    5).
        A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published in July 1999 detailed
    frequent and credible allegations of police abuse, specifically in
    lockups, including severe beatings, mock executions, and rape. The
    conditions in these lockups are harsh, with severe overcrowding,
    intermittent meals, and poor lighting, ventilation, and sanitation. HRW
    noted that the Government must undertake a systematic effort to curb
    police abuse effectively and bring sanctions against officers who
    commit abuses. The police have acknowledged the problem and have stated
    they are trying to address it by establishing a police code of conduct
    and by increasing human rights training. The police must call a legal
    aid attorney when they detain a person.
        Prison conditions remained poor; overcrowding, inadequate diet,
    poor sanitary conditions, and insufficient medical care are typical.
    During the year, the Government secured the services of a dentist for
    the prisons. The Government also outplaced food services for the
    prisons.
        In May a riot at the St. Catherine's district prison led to reports
    of beatings by guards and JDF soldiers of 300 inmates. The JDF soldiers
    had been in charge of prison security at St. Catherine's following a
    work stoppage by guards in January (see Section 6.a.). Guards and
    soldiers fired into cells, but caused no injuries. Prisoners alleged
    that they were upset with being given spoiled food, and that the guards
    and soldiers retaliated against them when they refused to eat it.
    Prison officials contended that the disturbance developed during a
    search of cells for weapons and contraband (including cellular
    telephones brought in with the acquiescence of certain guards). There
    were also reports that the prisoners were staging a riot in conjunction
    with another prison, coordinated by telephone, in order to facilitate a
    jailbreak. Many prisoners had to wait days for medical attention
    following these events.
        In June the Government convened a one-person Commission of Inquiry
    into the incident; the JDF initiated its own internal inquiry. A prison
    doctor testified that he saw 15 guards and soldiers repeatedly club and
    kick a handcuffed inmate, and that only his presence prevented the
    inmate from being killed. The doctor has since been reassigned. A
    sentry from a private security company also testified to witnessing
    beatings. There were also reports that inmates took a JDF soldier
    hostage, and the soldiers acted to recover him. In July the
    Commissioner concluded his work but had not reported his findings by
    year's end. The authorities did not bring criminal charges against any
    of the guards or soldiers.
        A separate prison for women--the Ft. Augusta Women's Prison--is
    housed in a 19th century fort. Poor sanitary conditions are the norm,
    although far less so than in the men's prisons because there is less
    overcrowding. Ft. Augusta is also safer and does not have the violence
    found in the men's prisons.
        The Constitution prohibits the incarceration of children in adult
    prisons; however, in practice some juveniles are held with adults. The
    July 1999 HRW report criticized the conditions in which juveniles are
    held. HRW noted that the Government responded quickly to remove some
    children from lockups. The report detailed many cases in which
    juveniles were detained improperly, not given access to legal
    representation, and held in adult lockups where they were victimized by
    adult prisoners.
        In July the court of appeals ruled that it was unconstitutional for
    juveniles to be held ``at the Governor General's pleasure.'' This
    referred to a section of the 1951 Juveniles Act that provides that
    persons under the age of 18 who commit a capital crime must have their
    death sentence commuted; however, they could be held for an
    indeterminate time at the Governor General's discretion and were
    subject to incarceration in an adult prison.
        In general the Government allowed private groups, voluntary
    organizations, international human rights organizations, and the media
    to visit prisons and monitor prison conditions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Jamaica Constabulary
    Force Act permits the arrest of persons ``reasonably suspected'' of
    having committed a crime, and the police continued to arrest and detain
    citizens arbitrarily. In 1997 the Jamaican Bar Association (JBA)
    protested that the police unlawfully were detaining and fingerprinting
    groups of citizens in poor, inner-city areas. At the time, the Police
    Commissioner disavowed the practice and ordered it discontinued;
    however, both the JBA and the Independent Jamaica Council for Human
    Rights state that the practice continues. In July 1999, police rounded
    up 52 men from the Grant's Pen area of Kingston after civil unrest
    erupted there. The men reportedly were fingerprinted, photographed, and
    then released without being charged. A class action civil suit was
    brought and was pending at year's end.
        In March a three-person Commission of Inquiry was convened to
    investigate the detention and forced transport in July 1999 of at least
    25 persons (many of whom were reportedly mentally ill), who were living
    on the streets in a Montego Bay business district. In October 1999, the
    authorities had charged three persons (including a police inspector and
    two public sector employees) with false imprisonment and assault, but
    later dropped the charges against the police inspector when he turned
    State's witness in the inquiry. In September the commission presented
    its recommendations, among them that the victims be granted $500
    (J$20,000) per month for life. The Government indicated that it
    intended to set up a trust for that purpose but had not yet done so by
    year's end. The police inspector said that he was under orders from his
    superiors, a claim the commission rejected as perjured. Although it was
    believed widely that the police were involved and acted at the behest
    of Montego Bay merchants and with the acquiescence of the local
    government, the commission exonerated the Montego Bay mayor and parish
    council. The commission named the police inspector and civil service
    truck driver as key conspirators and criticized the local head of
    public works for instituting a coverup. The two public sector employees
    were awaiting trial at year's end.
        The law requires police to present a detainee in court within 48
    hours of arrest, but the authorities continued to detain suspects,
    especially those from poor neighborhoods, without bringing them before
    a judge within the prescribed period. The Government attributed this
    circumstance to an overburdened court system that cannot accommodate
    large numbers of such presentations in a timely manner. Magistrates
    inquire at least once a week into the welfare of each person listed by
    the JCF as detained. There is a functioning bail system.
        Foreign prisoners must pay for their own deportation when they have
    completed their sentences. If they cannot afford to pay, they are
    jailed until relatives or consulates can arrange for transportation. In
    effect this constitutes an additional prison term for indigent
    foreigners.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and no instances of exile
    occurred.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, which exists in practice. However, the judicial
    system is overburdened and operates with inadequate resources.
        Three courts handle criminal matters at the trial level. Resident
    magistrates try lesser offenses (misdemeanors). A Supreme Court judge
    tries felonies, except for felonies involving firearms, which are tried
    before a judge of the Gun Court. Defendants have the right to appeal a
    conviction in any of the three trial courts to the Court of Appeal,
    which is the highest court. This appeal process results in frequent
    delays. The Constitution allows the Court of Appeal and the Parliament
    to refer cases to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the
    United Kingdom as a final court of appeal.
        The lack of sufficient staff and resources hinders due process.
    Trials in many cases are delayed for years, and other cases are
    dismissed because files cannot be located. The Government initiated a
    night court in 1995, which has had some success in reducing the backlog
    of cases. Donations of computers are also expected to assist the courts
    in this regard.
        The defendant's right to counsel is well established. In February
    the Government increased salaries for attorneys appointed by the State,
    and in April it created the position of Public Defender, to bring cases
    for individuals who have had their constitutional rights violated. The
    defender's office would contract private attorneys to represent
    clients. However, as of year's end, no cases had been brought as the
    defender's office was still securing funds.
        In May legal aid was expanded to include prisoners charged with any
    offenses, except those covered by certain provisions of the Money
    Laundering Act or possession or trafficking of narcotics under the
    Dangerous Drugs Act. Although the authorities assert that those who
    commit such offenses can afford counsel, the Jamaican Bar Association
    has criticized this as presuming guilt.
        During the Commission of Inquiry into the beatings of prisoners at
    St. Catherine's district prison in June (see Section 1.c.), the judge
    ruled that a human rights group could not take notes during the
    proceedings. A Supreme Court judge later overturned this ruling.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the
    State into the private life of an individual; however, there were
    allegations of unauthorized wiretapping by the police. The revised
    Jamaica Constabulary Force Act gives security personnel broad powers of
    search and seizure similar to those granted by the former Suppression
    of Crimes Act. The act allows search of a person on board or
    disembarking a ship or boat without a warrant if a police officer has
    good reason to be suspicious. In practice the police conducted searches
    without warrants.
        In October the media reported allegations that the police
    wiretapped the telephones of the Prime Minister, two Cabinet members,
    and other senior officials. Only the Prime Minister has the authority
    to order wiretaps, and on October 24, the Prime Minister stated that
    his last authorization for wiretapping had been in April, for 14 lines
    associated with 12 different individuals suspected of trafficking in
    firearms and narcotics. The head of the Special Intelligence Unit,
    which the press alleged had carried out the wiretaps, denied that his
    unit placed wiretaps on any telephones. At year's end, it was still
    unclear whether any wiretaps had been put in place. In December the
    Government introduced a draft Interception of Communications Act, which
    would place authorization for wiretapping in the hands of the
    judiciary.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice.
        The four largest newspapers, all privately owned, regularly report
    on human rights abuses, particularly those involving the JCF. Foreign
    publications are available widely. The Government privatized the
    Jamaica Broadcasting Company in 1997, and the television station and
    two radio stations it operated became privately owned. The Government's
    broadcasting commission has the right to regulate programming during
    emergencies. Foreign television transmissions are unregulated and
    available through satellite antennas.
        In an April 27 press conference, the Police Commissioner criticized
    a journalist who raised a question about political motivation behind a
    violent confrontation that occurred the previous day (see Section
    1.a.). On the following day, the same journalist was confronted by a
    police officer who pointed his gun inside the journalist's vehicle and
    asked him what he was doing.
        Near year's end, Parliament approved the Corruption Prevention Act,
    which the Government had reintroduced without clauses that journalists
    had charged would restrict their ability to report about corruption.
    The original draft had provided that journalists could be fined up to
    $25,000 (J$1 million) and receive 10 years' imprisonment for publishing
    information about an ongoing corruption investigation. The new act does
    not restrict the media from publication.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice.
        There were numerous community protests against police actions
    during the year, such as the 2 days of protests in May Pen over a
    killing by police (see Section 1.a.). A local human rights group
    organized various rallies, including reenactments of the August 1999
    beating of a man by security forces (see Section 1.a.) and the July
    1999 abduction of homeless persons (see Section 1.c.). Security
    personnel generally acted with restraint during public demonstrations.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
        Members of the Rastafarian community have complained that law
    enforcement officials unfairly target them. It is alleged that the
    police force Rastafarian detainees to cut their hair and
    surreptitiously give them food that they are forbidden to eat.
    Rastafarians have no right to prison visits by Rastafarian clergy.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government provides asylum or refugee status in accordance with
    the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum; it approved
    one application during the year. The Government established a committee
    and formal procedures to review claims to refugee status. This
    committee has denied all claims to refugee status by Cubans and
    Haitians who have arrived in the country since 1994.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in periodic
    elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. All citizens age 18
    and over have the right to vote by secret ballot. However, voters
    living in ``garrison communities'', in inner-city areas dominated by
    one of the two major political parties, face substantial influence and
    pressure from politically connected gangs and young men hired by
    political parties, which impede the free exercise of their right to
    vote.
        During the 1997 general election campaign, both international and
    local observer groups concluded that, although the process was
    significantly less violent than recent election campaigns, problems
    persisted in the garrison communities. These problems included
    intimidation of party agents and voters of nondominant parties and
    restrictions on the movement of voters and election workers. Some areas
    are so dominated by one party that the polls simply closed early and
    vote counts were taken that resulted in 100 percent (or nearly 100
    percent) of the votes being awarded to the dominant party. These
    problems persisted in the December 1997 election, despite the best
    efforts of the security forces, which were credited with controlling
    violence, such as the beating of voters, and reducing election
    malpractice, such as the theft of ballot boxes from polling places.
        There were two killings of politically connected persons late in
    the year that produced allegations of possible political motivation
    (see Section 1.a.), as well as other acts of alleged intimidation.
        There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
    politics; however, they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Women hold about 13 percent of all political offices and 30
    percent of the senior civil service positions. Two of the 16 cabinet
    members are women, as is the PNP General Secretary.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. The Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights is the
    country's only formal organization concerned with all aspects of human
    rights. Jamaicans for Justice is a human rights group created in August
    1999 in response to concerns about police impunity; the NGO focuses on
    the issues of extrajudicial killing and excessive use of force by the
    police. Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive
    to the views of human rights organizations.
        However, in an April press conference, senior police officials
    criticized Jamaicans for Justice on the occasion of an outbreak of
    severe violence (see Section 1.a.). The organization also reported that
    it received threatening telephone calls at its office following the
    killing of two policemen that month. The group noted that the police
    were cooperative in tracing and stopping threatening calls. In a
    newspaper article, the Minister of National Security and a member of
    the clergy questioned the sincerity of those defending human rights,
    claiming that they cared little for police officers killed in the line
    of duty. The Police Federation labeled the human rights NGO
    ``suspicious,'' and stated that it would monitor the group's actions
    closely. Jamaicans for Justice reported that undercover police
    regularly attend their meetings.
        In August Amnesty International (AI) issued a statement to the
    Government expressing concern for a human rights attorney's safety. The
    attorney figured prominently in the inquiry into the abduction of
    homeless persons from Montego Bay (see Section 1.d.) and represented
    prisoners at the inquiry into beatings at St. Catherine's district
    prison (see Section 1.c.). AI contended that the attorney fled the
    country fearing for her life and that she reported death threats,
    surveillance, and illegal wiretapping from agents of prison
    authorities. The Police Commissioner stated that the attorney had not
    notified police of any such threats. The attorney also is wanted by
    police in connection with charges of fraud brought by a former client.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
    of origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex. The Government
    largely enforces these prohibitions in practice, except for widespread
    discrimination on the basis of political opinion in the distribution of
    scarce governmental benefits, including employment, especially in the
    garrison communities (see Section 3). Individuals have committed acts
    of violence against suspected homosexuals; in April a mob cornered a
    25-year-old man in a Kingston church and killed him because they
    suspected that he was a homosexual.
        Women.--Social and cultural traditions perpetuate violence against
    women, including spousal abuse. Violence against women is widespread,
    but many women are reluctant to acknowledge or report abusive behavior,
    leading to wide variations in estimates of its extent. Reported
    incidents of rape and incest have been on the rise, with a 10 percent
    increase in rapes during the year. The JCF rape investigative and
    juvenile unit, which is headed by a female deputy superintendent,
    handles sex crimes.
        The Domestic Violence Act of 1995 provides remedies for domestic
    violence, including restraining orders and other noncustodial
    sentencing. Breaching a restraining order is punishable by a fine of up
    to $250 (J$10,000) and/or 6 months' imprisonment.
        There have been some reports of sexual harassment of women by the
    police.
        The Constitution and the 1975 Employment Act accord women full
    legal equality; however, in practice women suffer from sexual
    harassment and economic discrimination in the workplace. The Bureau of
    Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Labor oversees programs to ensure
    the legal rights of women. These programs have had limited effect but
    have raised the awareness of problems affecting women. In 1996 the
    Government established a steering committee, charged with creating a
    Commission on Gender and Social Equity. The committee forwarded its
    recommendations to Parliament in 1997, which accepted them; Parliament
    continued to discuss methods of implementation at year's end.
        A number of active women's rights groups exist. They are concerned
    with a wide range of issues, including violence against women,
    political representation, employment, and the image of women presented
    in the media. Their effectiveness is mixed, but the groups were
    successful in advocating enactment of the 1995 Domestic Violence Act.
        Children.--The Government is committed to improving children's
    welfare. The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture is responsible
    for implementation of the Government's programs for children.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. However, a
    number of reported cases of sexual abuse and incest may point to a
    growing trend. There were reports of child prostitution in some resort
    areas. Inducing prostitution on one's premises of a girl under 12 is a
    felony punishable by life imprisonment; of a girl between the ages of
    12 and 16 is a misdemeanor punishable by 5 years in prison. The
    encouraging of prostitution of a girl under age 16 by a legal guardian
    is a misdemeanor punishable by 3 years' imprisonment; procuring a girl
    under age 18 is also a misdemeanor punishable by 3 years' imprisonment.
    Child pornography is not prohibited by statute, but it is a common law
    offense that can be prosecuted as a form of indecency.
        The Juvenile Act of 1951 deals with several areas related to the
    protection of children, including the prevention of cruelty, a
    prohibition on causing or allowing juvenile begging, the power to bring
    juveniles in need of care or protection before a juvenile court, the
    treatment of juvenile offenders, the regulation and supervision of
    children's homes, and restrictions on employment of juveniles. However,
    resource constraints have resulted in juveniles ``in need of care or
    protection'' being incarcerated in police lockups with adults (see
    Section l.c.).
        People with Disabilities.--No laws mandate accessibility for the
    disabled, and disabled citizens have encountered discrimination in
    employment and denial of access to schools. Several government agencies
    and NGO's provide services and employment to various groups of disabled
    citizens. In 1998 the Prime Minister appointed the first blind member
    of the Senate, an action that despite expectations has not brought
    tangible benefits to disabled persons, although it helped to increase
    public awareness related to these issues. In July 1999, an incident in
    which police rounded up a number of persons (many of whom reportedly
    were mentally ill) triggered a national debate over police action (see
    Section 1.c.).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
    form or join a trade union, and unions function freely and
    independently of the Government. The Labor Relations and Industrial
    Disputes Act (LRIDA) defines worker rights. There is a spectrum of
    national unions, some of which are affiliated with political parties.
    Approximately 15 percent of the work force is unionized.
        The LRIDA neither authorizes nor prohibits the right to strike, but
    strikes do occur. Striking workers can interrupt work without criminal
    liability but cannot be assured of keeping their jobs. Other than in
    the case of prison guards, there is no evidence of any workers losing
    their job over a strike action. Workers in 10 broad categories of
    ``essential services'' are prohibited from striking, a provision the
    International Labor Organization (ILO) repeatedly condemned as overly
    inclusive.
        Beginning December 29, 1999, prison guards conducted an islandwide
    sick-out to protest the proposed reappointment of the Commissioner of
    Corrections. When 800 guards failed to comply with an order to return
    to work, the authorities put them on forced leave at one-fourth pay
    beginning in January. In March the Government brought disciplinary
    charges against the guards and declared the work stoppage illegal. In
    May court hearings began to examine the charges against the guards on a
    case-by-case basis; they still were under way at year's end.
        On March 30, members of the Junior Doctor Association (JDA) staged
    an industrial action in which they curtailed their hours in retaliation
    for nonsettlement of salary negotiations. The Government declared the
    action illegal and the Supreme Court ordered the doctors back to work.
    They did not comply but subsequently ended their protest on April 4.
    The Government brought charges against the doctors who then apologized
    for their actions. In April the court sentenced the JDA's executive
    members to 200 hours of community service. The JDA appealed the ruling;
    in June a higher court overturned the ruling on the grounds that the
    JDA is not a legal organization and could not be taken to court. In
    July in response to the ruling, the Government declared that it would
    no longer conduct negotiations with ``nonlegal entities.'' Unions that
    represent teachers and government workers feared that this could
    include them, since they are not officially registered with the
    Government as trade unions. In protest the three largest registered
    trade unions boycotted an unrelated meeting with employers and the
    Government in August. However, there have been no consequences for the
    unregistered unions following the Government's announcement, reflecting
    the fact that various other laws and regulations provide for their
    right to bargain.
        Unions maintain a wide variety of regional and international
    affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There were no
    reports of government interference with union organizing efforts during
    the year. Judicial and police authorities effectively enforce the LRIDA
    and other labor regulations. All parties are committed firmly to
    collective bargaining in contract negotiations, even in some nonunion
    settings. An independent Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) hears cases
    where management and labor fail to reach agreement. Any cases not
    resolved by the IDT pass to the civil courts. The IDT generally handles
    35 to 40 cases each year. Most are decided within 90 days, but some
    take longer to resolve due to the complexity of the dispute or delays
    requested by the parties. The LRIDA prohibits antiunion discrimination,
    and employees may not be fired solely for union membership. The
    authorities enforced this law effectively.
        Collective bargaining is denied in a bargaining unit if no single
    union represents at least 40 percent of the workers in the unit in
    question or when the union seeking recognition for collective
    bargaining purposes does not obtain 50 percent of the votes of the
    total number of workers (whether or not they are affiliated to the
    union). The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) considers that where there
    is no collective agreement and where a trade union does not obtain 50
    percent of the votes of the total number of workers, that union should
    be able to negotiate at least on behalf of its own members. The COE
    requested the Government to take necessary measures to amend this
    legislation.
        Domestic labor laws apply equally to the ``free zones'' (export
    processing zones). However, there are no unionized companies in any of
    the 3 zones, which employ 7,703 workers. Organizers attribute this
    circumstance to resistance by foreign owners in the zones to organizing
    efforts, but attempts to organize plants within the zones continue.
    Company-controlled ``workers' councils'' handle grievance resolution at
    most free zone companies, but they do not negotiate wages and
    conditions with management. Management determines wages and benefits
    within the free zones; these are generally as good as or better than
    those in similar industries outside the zones. The Ministry of Labor is
    required to perform comprehensive factory inspections in the free zones
    once each year, and in practice it performs them at 6- to 9-month
    intervals. There were no reports of substandard or unsafe conditions in
    the free zone factories.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    does not specifically address the matter of forced or compulsory labor
    for either adults or children, but there were no reports that this
    practice exists.
        The ILO COE noted that the Jamaica Shipping Act of 1998 did not
    remove the provision that disciplinary offences of seafarers such as
    desertion and absence without leave are punishable by imprisonment
    (involving an obligation to work). The ILO points out that this is
    incompatible with ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor
    and requested that the Government amend the legislation. However,
    amendments to the law that were enacted in November did not address
    this criticism.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of
    12 shall not be employed except by parents or guardians, and that such
    employment may be only in domestic, agricultural, or horticultural
    work. However, enforcement is uneven. Children under the age of 12 are
    seen peddling goods and services on city streets. There are also
    reports that underage children are employed illegally in fishing
    communities and in prostitution. The Educational Act stipulates that
    all children between 6 and 11 years of age must attend elementary
    school. However, due to economic circumstances, thousands of children
    are kept home to help with housework and avoid school fees. A 1994
    UNICEF report stated that 4.6 percent of children below the age of 16
    worked to help support their households. In December 1999, the Minister
    of Labor, Welfare, and Sport gave a speech in which she stated that
    23,000 children were engaged in child labor. The Government and UNICEF
    cooperated on a strategy designed to eliminate child labor, to increase
    school awareness through poverty alleviation, and on a public awareness
    campaign intended to combat public complacency. However, these efforts
    are hampered by economic conditions, lack of resources, and incomplete
    information on the full extent of the problem.
        In September the Government signed a memorandum of understanding
    with the ILO in preparation to ratify ILO Convention 182 on the
    prohibition and elimination of the ``worst forms'' of child labor. The
    memorandum provides funding and technical assistance to assess the
    country's child labor situation. While the Constitution does not
    prohibit forced or bonded labor by children, such practices were not
    known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, raised from
    $20 (J$800) to $30 (J$1,200) per week in August 1999, is considered
    widely to be inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. Most workers are paid more than the legal minimum,
    except in the tourism industry. Work over 40 hours per week or 8 hours
    per day must be compensated at overtime rates, a provision that is
    observed widely.
        The Labor Ministry's Industrial Safety Division sets and enforces
    industrial health and safety standards, which are considered adequate.
    Public service staff reductions in the Ministries of Labor, Finance,
    National Security, and the Public Service have contributed to the
    difficulties in enforcing workplace regulations.
        The law provides workers with the right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
    employment if they are trade union members or covered by the Factories
    Act. The law does not specifically protect other categories of workers
    in those circumstances. Industrial accident rates, particularly in the
    bauxite and alumina industry, remained low.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
    trafficking in persons; however, there are laws against assault and
    fraud, and other laws establish various immigration and customs
    regulations. There were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                     MEXICO

        Mexico is a federal republic composed of 31 states and a federal
    district, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. On
    July 2, voters elected Vicente Fox Quesada of the opposition Alliance
    for Change Coalition president in elections that domestic and
    international observers judged to be generally free and fair, and which
    ended the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) 71-year hold on the
    presidency. Observers described the election as a historic turning
    point of the most profound significance and made recommendations for
    further electoral reform. Fox began his 6-year term on December 1,
    replacing Ernesto Zedillo. Sporadic outbursts of politically motivated
    violence continued to occur in the southern states of Chiapas,
    Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The peace process in Chiapas between the
    Government and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) remained
    stalled throughout most of the year; however, some progress was made in
    December after President Fox ordered the dismantling of military
    checkpoints, submitted to Congress a bill to implement the peace
    accords, and closed two contentious military posts in Chiapas. In
    addition, during December the state government released 16 EZLN
    prisoners and the EZLN, through its spokesman, set 3 conditions for the
    resumption of dialog. The judiciary is generally independent; however,
    it occasionally has been influenced by the executive branch. In
    addition, judicial effectiveness is hampered by inefficiency, a high
    caseload, and limited resources at almost all levels.
        The police forces, which include federal and state judicial police,
    the Federal Preventive Police (PFP), municipal police, and the various
    police auxiliary forces, have primary responsibility for internal
    security. However, the military plays a large role in some law
    enforcement functions, primarily counternarcotics, and also exercises
    internal security responsibilities. Elected civilian officials control
    the police and the military; however, corruption is widespread within
    police ranks and also is a problem for the military. The military
    maintains a strong presence in the state of Chiapas and a lesser, but
    still significant, deployment in Guerrero. Military personnel and
    police officers continued to commit serious human rights abuses.
        The Government continued to deregulate and open the market-based,
    mixed economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 was $484
    billion and the inflation rate was 12.3 percent. Per capita GDP in 1999
    was about $4,974. The economy still is recovering from the 1994
    economic crisis, and real wages are less than before the crisis.
    Leading exports include petroleum, automobiles, and manufactured and
    assembled products, including electronics and consumer goods. One-
    fourth of the population resides in rural areas where subsistence
    agriculture is common. Income distribution remained skewed; the top 30
    percent of the population received about 67 percent of total income,
    while the bottom 30 percent earned less than 7.4 percent.
        The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
    citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas and in some
    states where a poor climate of respect for human rights presents
    special concern. Federal and state law enforcement officials were
    accused of committing political and extrajudicial killings. There
    continued to be credible reports of disappearances. The police
    regularly obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this
    evidence in courts, and the courts continue to admit as evidence
    confessions extracted under torture. The military also has been accused
    of using torture. Widespread police corruption and alleged police
    involvement in narcotics-related crime continued. Prison conditions are
    poor. The police continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily.
    Lengthy pretrial detention, lack of due process, and judicial
    inefficiency and corruption persisted. Threats and attacks on
    journalists--some reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
    hindered press freedom, and there were reports of some self-censorship.
    Drug-related killings and violence, particularly in the northern
    states, continued. Violence and discrimination against women,
    indigenous people, religious minorities, and homosexuals persisted.
    Child prostitution and abuse continued. There were credible reports of
    limits on freedom of association and worker rights. Extensive child
    labor in agriculture and the informal economy and trafficking in
    persons are problems. There were increased reports of vigilante
    killings.
        The Government's efforts to improve the human rights situation
    continued to meet with limited success. Although the Government has
    sanctioned some public officials, police officers, and members of the
    military, widespread impunity continues to be a serious problem among
    the security forces. The Zedillo Government continued to support the
    National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), and in April 1999, Congress
    amended the Constitution to grant it greater autonomy from the
    executive branch. However, the CNDH primarily investigates complaints
    against federal authorities and has no enforcement powers.
        Armed civilian groups operating in the state of Chiapas committed
    human rights abuses. There continued to be a high incidence of
    narcotics-related violence, particularly in the northern states, and
    human rights abuses, allegedly with the assistance of members of the
    security forces. Guerrilla attacks against government property and
    personnel continued, but at a lesser rate and intensity relative to
    previous years.
        On December 2, the day after his inauguration, President Fox and
    U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) Mary Robinson signed an
    agreement on technical assistance in human rights matters. Commissioner
    Robinson also announced the establishment of a human rights U.N.
    liaison office to work with human rights organizations to help
    implement the technical assistance program. Robinson stated that the
    accord was especially significant because the President himself had
    signed it on his second day in office in the state of Oaxaca, where
    there are notable human rights problems.
        Shortly before assuming office, President Fox announced the
    appointment of Mariclaire Acosta, former president of the Mexican
    Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, to the new
    position of Special Ambassador for Human Rights. Her mission is to
    ensure that the Government complies with its human rights commitments,
    and that it distributes its human rights resources effectively.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Federal and state
    law enforcement officials were accused of committing political and
    extrajudicial killings. In past years, the military also was accused of
    such killings; however, there were no reports implicating the military
    during the year.
        There were some apparently politically motivated killings by
    security force officials. On June 15, Artemio Arturo Perez, a
    Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) supporter arrested for causing a
    public disturbance during a PRI political rally in Mixistlan de La
    Reforma, Oaxaca, died in his jail cell. Perez and his family claimed
    that PRI party members forced persons to attend the rally, and that
    Perez was arrested for voicing his disapproval. The prison authorities
    declared suicide to be the official cause of death, but Perez's family
    and various human rights organizations claim that he died as a result
    of torture (see Section 1.c.). On June 21, two family members began a
    hunger strike to demand action against prison employees Alfredo Reyes,
    Wilfrido Hernandez Solano, and Luis Faustino Gonzalez for abuse of
    authority, illegal detention, and torture. The case is under
    investigation by the Oaxaca state attorney general's office and the
    state's Human Rights Commission.
        In March the president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission cited
    several cases of possible police involvement in the deaths of prisoners
    (see Section 1.c.).
        The Durango state Human Rights Commission is investigating the
    presumed suicide of Jose Manuel Urbina, who was found drowned in a
    state security facility in June. National Action Party (PAN) deputy
    Victor Hugo Castaneda Soto questioned the manner in which Urbina was
    arrested and noted that his body was found in a crouched position, a
    difficult position to maintain by someone attempting to drown himself.
        On July 19, five men with known drug connections were found hanged
    near El Quelite, Sinaloa. On July 16, according to witnesses, armed men
    in Federal Judicial Police uniforms kidnaped the five--Fausto Andres
    Arellano Vidales, Anacleto Valle Garcia, Gaston Horacio Lopez
    Amarillas, Guillermo Gurrola Gutierrez, and Carlos Lopez Torres--from a
    store in Mazatlan, Sinaloa. State authorities were investigating the
    case, including a drug trafficking connection, at year's end.
        There were numerous reports of executions carried out by rival drug
    gangs, whose members have included both active and former federal,
    state, and municipal security personnel. Throughout the country, but
    particularly in the northern border states, violence related to
    narcotics trafficking continued. For example, 27 murders with presumed
    or proven drug connections occurred in the Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua
    area from January 1 to August 31. The modus operandi of the killings
    has shifted from the kidnapings and disappearances of the mid-1990's to
    armed attacks in public areas throughout the city, in which intended
    targets and innocent bystanders are victims. The police and military
    were accused of committing serious human rights violations as they
    carried out the Government's efforts to combat drug cartels.
        Although narcotics-trafficking organizations committed many
    killings, human rights groups allege that security forces are
    responsible for some killings generally attributed to narcotics
    traffickers or other criminals, including some of those whose bodies
    were discovered in Chihuahua in December 1999 (see Section 1.b.). The
    Association of Families of Disappeared Persons has alleged that the
    security forces were behind many of the disappearances and has argued
    that the cases were not investigated properly for that reason.
        In October 1999, a group of men armed with assault weapons attacked
    Acapulco City councilor-elect Marco Antonio Lopez Garcia and his family
    while they were en route to a PRD election victory celebration. The
    councilor's son was killed, and the councilor seriously wounded. State
    authorities charged a PRD activist with the crime and alleged that he
    was affiliated with the Popular Revolutionary Insurgency Army (ERPI).
    The suspect later repudiated a confession that he alleged was coerced
    by torture and was released in November 1999. PRD officials rejected
    the results of the state investigation as false and called for federal
    intervention. Human rights observers charged that state and federal
    authorities used the investigation into electoral violence to repress
    opposition parties and peasant organizations by linking the political
    opposition to insurgent groups. The case is unresolved and still open.
        There were no new developments during the year in the Federal
    Attorney General's office's (PGR) investigation into the March 1999
    killing in Guerrero of Aurelio Penaloza Garcia, a former state attorney
    general and advisor to the PRD's unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate,
    by men dressed in Federal Judicial Police uniforms and armed with
    automatic weapons. In April 1999, the authorities had charged
    Bernardino Alvear Villa and Juan Valdovinos Rodriguez in connection
    with this murder. They have been arrested and were in jail awaiting
    trial at year's end. An arrest warrant has been issued for Eulogis
    Palacios.
        On April 29, the Morelos state supreme court upheld the state
    congress's decision to bar former governor Jorge Carillo Olea from
    holding state office for the next 12 years because of his
    administration's connection to a kidnaping ring in the state. In March
    1999, a court convicted the former Morelos state attorney general,
    Carlos Peredo Merlo, of allowing the cover-up of the kidnaping,
    torture, and murder of Jorge Nava Aviles in 1998. He eventually
    received a sentence of less than 2 years. The court also convicted
    Cuernavaca's former deputy prosecutor and the former director of the
    state judicial police on related charges in the same case and sentenced
    each of them to 3 years and 3 months. The remaining persons accused in
    this case still are awaiting trial.
        There were no new developments regarding the October 1999 death of
    Cosem Demian Sanchez Sastre, a member of the Zapatista National
    Liberation Front (FZLN), the political branch of the EZLN, who was
    found dead in his cell in a Tijuana detention facility. There also were
    no new developments regarding either the August 1999 case of the arrest
    of Tamaulipas PGR officials charged with the murder of fellow PGR
    official Jaime Rajid Gutierrez Arreola or the May 1999 killing of 1
    immigrant when federal fiscal police opened fire on a van containing 23
    persons.
        There were no new developments in the June 1999 case of Mauricio
    Martinez Hernandez, a municipal worker killed by a police officer in
    Naucalpan, in the state of Mexico. There were no new developments in
    the May 1999 attack on indigenous rights leader Herberto Pazos Ortiz.
        There were no new developments in the case of Gerardo Villarreal
    Rodriguez, who died in Nuevo Leon in 1998, after being tortured by four
    state police officers; or in the investigation of the 1998 killing of
    an alleged migrant smuggler, in which seven members of the Grupo Beta
    police unit were detained.
        On May 18, a Chiapas state court convicted the thendirector of the
    auxiliary police, former General Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz, and his two
    chief lieutenants, Roberto Garcia Rivas and Roberto Martin Mendez, of
    ``homicide by omission'' and sentenced them to 8 years in jail in
    connection with the 1997 Acteal massacre. The men were close enough to
    hear the shootings, but took no action and reported that all was quiet
    in their area when questioned by state officials. Of the 102 persons
    detained, 58 now have been convicted and sentenced, although 24 have
    had their sentences suspended. There are outstanding warrants for 27
    others.
        On May 10, 14 former police officers involved in the 1997 killing
    of 6 youths during a police operation in the Mexico City neighborhood
    of Buenos Aires were convicted in connection with 3 of those killings.
    The court sentenced 11 officers to the maximum penalty of 50 years in
    jail and 2 others to 18-1/2 years. However, in September a judge denied
    an arrest warrant for Moctezuma Ilhuicamina Zaepeda Rodriguez and Jose
    Lamberto Ponce Lara, the two former leaders of the police groups
    implicated in the murders. The same judge also either acquitted or
    denied arrest warrants for 15 other police officers in September.
    Investigations were still underway into the killings of the remaining
    three youths.
        The courts have arrested 44 public officials in connection with the
    1995 Aguas Blancas massacre of 17 indigenous farmers. Of the 44, 13
    former police officers have been convicted and sentenced to 18 years in
    prison, 9 other former government officials have been convicted and
    sentenced, and 3 of the accused are fugitives. Fifteen former police
    officers have been absolved and freed on appeal, as have 7 other former
    officials. Despite recommendations by the Inter-American Commission on
    Human Rights (IACHR), the U.N. Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions,
    and the Supreme Court, then-Governor Ruben Figueroa Alcocer has not
    been investigated or prosecuted for his alleged involvement in the
    massacre. The Guerrero state government has indemnified the debts of
    the victims' families, and both the federal and state governments
    consider the case resolved.
        On June 12, seven Chiapas state policemen were killed and one other
    policeman and a civilian were wounded in an ambush in Las Limas
    village, El Bosque municipality, Chiapas. On July 26, the Federal
    Attorney General's office announced the arrests of PRI supporter
    Alberto Patishtan Gomez and EZLN supporter Salvador Lopez Gonzalez in
    connection with the ambush on charges of murder, robbery, and
    possession of illegal weapons. The Federal Attorney General's office
    charged that Patishtan and Lopez were part of an armed 10-person group
    that carried out the attack. However, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas
    Human Rights Center maintains Lopez's innocence, claiming there is
    insufficient proof against him.
        On July 30, Juan Lopez and Gabriel Luis Hernandez Gomez were
    arrested in connection with the June 1999 murder of Jose Hidalgo Perez,
    a member of a politically active family in San Cristobal de Las Casas,
    Chiapas. They are awaiting trial.
        There were no new developments in the January 1999 killing of
    villagers in Tzacabel, Chiapas.
        On February 27, the authorities arrested two suspects for the
    January 1999 murder of Jorge Aguirre Meza, cofounder of the Sinaloa
    Human Rights Defense Commission and a mayoral candidate in the
    municipality of Navolato. The suspects, who reportedly have ties to
    narcotrafficking, are currently in jail and on trial in Culiacan, the
    state capital. Arrest warrants for two other suspects were also issued;
    however, these suspects are in a Mexicali jail on unrelated crimes.
        The number of reports of vigilante killings and violence increased
    during the year, as compared to 1999. For example, on July 30,
    approximately 2,000 residents of the community Nueva Palestina,
    Chiapas, put an indigenous man on trial for a robbery and murder and
    killed him. The state attorney general's office dispatched a team to
    investigate and to help resolve tensions in the community.
        b. Disappearance.--There continued to be credible reports of
    disappearances. The CNDH is working to establish a nationwide database
    to assist in the identification of unknown remains, some of which may
    be those of persons who disappeared. According to press reports, the
    CNDH during the year received 37 cases of presumed disappearances; 19
    of those reported missing later were found alive and well. In December
    1999, nine bodies were recovered from graves outside Ciudad Juarez,
    Chihuahua. Six of the nine bodies were identified positively and the
    remains released to their families in May. Three of the bodies were
    identified as persons not previously listed among the 224 persons
    reported missing in the state since 1994. All of the victims are
    believed to have had ties to drug trafficking in some way. Federal
    authorities confiscated the ranch where the bodies were found but the
    courts subsequently ordered it returned to its owner in July. The
    Chihuahua-based Committee for the Defense of Human Rights alleges that
    military and police forces are responsible for some of the
    disappearances. The Association of Families of the Disappeared Persons
    also has alleged that the security forces were behind many of the
    disappearances and has argued that the cases were not investigated
    properly for that reason.
        According to the national public security system, there were 607
    kidnapings in 1999, 734 in 1998, and 1,047 in 1997. However, kidnaping
    is an underreported crime. In Michoacan police have broken 89 kidnaping
    rings since 1996, resulting in 500 arrests, including 49 during the
    year. On August 18, Mexico City's Legislative Assembly passed a law to
    impose mandatory minimum sentences of 15 to 20 years for Mexico City
    public servants convicted of kidnaping. Although 6 kidnapings were
    reported in Chihuahua State from January to August, all have been
    resolved and 11 suspects were arrested and remain in custody. None of
    the suspects detained are public officials.
        According to the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Center for Human Rights
    (PRODH), on March 13, gunmen allegedly under the order of local bosses
    in Ajuchitlan del Progreso, Guerrero, kidnaped Maximino Marcial Jaimes.
    He has not been seen since. Marcial was a member of an environmentalist
    organization. According to PRODH, the press had reported that Marcial
    was in Almoloya prison, but the prison officially denied his presence
    there. His whereabouts were unknown at year's end.
        According to the January 1999 Human Rights Watch report, many
    disappearance cases were in fact cases of prolonged detention by
    security forces. The report detailed incidents that occurred in
    previous years, and numerous human rights groups credibly asserted that
    disappearances continued to occur.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, it continues
    to be a serious problem. The Constitution excludes as evidence
    confessions obtained in the absence of the accused person's defense
    attorney, and the law excludes coerced confessions, including those
    extracted under torture. However, the police regularly obtain
    information through torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts,
    and the courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted
    under torture. The military has also been accused of using torture.
    According to Amnesty International (AI), many victims do not report, or
    do not follow through on complaints against the police due to fear of
    reprisals, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators. To combat
    torture, the Congress passed laws to prevent and sanction torture in
    1991 (amended in 1994), adopted the Law of the Defense Office of Mexico
    City in 1998 and the Federal Public Defense Law in 1998.
        In her 1999 annual address, the then-president of the CNDH
    acknowledged that torture continued to be a serious human rights
    problem. She cited the PGR and the Defense Secretariat as the main
    organizations associated with the use of torture. In a report published
    in July 1999, the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that
    laws aimed to prevent torture were inadequate because of the absence of
    an independent body to investigate allegations of mistreatment. There
    are persistent reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) of the
    widespread use of torture by the police and the security forces. In a
    June 22 report, AI Mexico claimed to have received numerous complaints
    that indicate that torture is a habitual practice in many areas of the
    country especially to extract confessions and information in place of
    police investigations. In October the same organization reported that
    the legal system permits torture, that torture is practiced in the
    country, and that urgent action is needed to eliminate it. AI called
    for legislative and administrative reforms to enforce the laws against
    torture and eliminate the judicial prerogative that permits the
    introduction of confessions extracted under torture. Nigel Rodley, the
    U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported in January 1998 that
    torture continued to occur despite the fact that the country had in
    place an array of legal safeguards. In March Guadalupe Morfin Otero,
    president of the Jalisco Human Rights Commission (CEDHJ), attacked the
    state attorney general's office for continuing the use of torture when
    interrogating prisoners. She cited several cases of possible police
    involvement in the death of prisoners (see Section 1.a.).
        The authorities punish few officials for torture, which continues
    to occur in large part because confessions are the primary evidence in
    many criminal convictions. Poorly trained and inadequately equipped to
    investigate crimes, police officers often attempt to solve crimes by
    rounding up likely suspects and then extracting confessions from them
    by force.
        In August the police in Nueva Italia, Michoacan, arrested Ivan
    Ramirez and Israel Moline and allegedly tortured them into confessing
    to the murder of their friend. One of the youths charged that he
    confessed only after at least six state police officers had beaten him,
    semi-asphyxiated him using plastic bags, and damaged his testicles. The
    youths told the judge that they had been tortured; however, he admitted
    their confessions as evidence anyway and consigned them to jail. When
    the friend returned from an unannounced trip 3 months later, the youths
    were released. The Michoacan State Human Rights Commission charged
    state legal authorities with fabricating evidence in the case.
        On August 4, CNDH report 8/2000 charged that the military falsified
    evidence against two environmental activists, Rodolfo Montiel Flores
    and Teodoro Cabrera Garcia, tortured them, violated their rights to due
    process, and harassed residents in their home village, Pizotla,
    Guerrero. The military did not respond publicly to the CNDH report.
    Montiel and Cabrera had been arrested in May 1999 on charges of illegal
    drug cultivation and illegal possession of arms, and their colleague
    Salome Sanchez Ortiz was killed by the military. Montiel and Cabrera
    stated that military personnel tortured them to extract their
    confessions. The Government stated that on three separate occasions,
    Montiel and Cabrera confessed to illegal activities, and that tests had
    indicated that both men had fired a gun. However, the defense team
    stated that on each of those occasions Montiel and Cabrera were
    intimidated by the presence of military personnel. Initial medical
    examinations performed in 1999 by government and CNDH doctors did not
    find evidence of torture, but a medical examination by independent
    doctors on July 29 did find physical evidence consistent with torture.
    The CNDH recommended that the army conduct numerous internal
    investigations of its handling of the arrests and detentions. On August
    28, a judge sentenced Cabrera to 10 years' imprisonment for illegal
    possession of arms reserved for the exclusive use of the military.
    Montiel was sentenced to 6 years and 8 months on the same charge, as
    well as for possession of arms without a license, and illegal drug
    cultivation. Defense lawyers cited many irregularities in the judicial
    process and are appealing the verdict. On October 19, the press
    reported that the PGR requested that the sentences of Montiel and
    Cabrera be increased to the maximum of 20 years; however, on October
    27, the appeals judge upheld their original sentences.
        On April 1, the former president of the Guerrero state PRD, David
    Molina Francisco, alleged that he was freed after being held hostage
    for 40 hours by military personnel. Molina claims that he was tortured
    physically and psychologically, including being beaten and subjected to
    electric shocks, and interrogated on activities of insurgent groups.
    The PRD lodged a formal complaint with the Guerrero state human rights
    commission.
        On August 1, the Mexico City human rights commission recommended
    that the city's attorney general's office investigate the torture of
    Jose Luis Mendez Briano and Fernando Martinez Beltran, who were
    arrested by city police on June 24 while making their getaway from a
    robbery. One of the men was transferred to the hospital for treatment
    of various injuries.
        On July 30, in Ecatepec, Mexico state, auxiliary police discovered
    four Central American migrants hiding in a rail car. The police
    allegedly beat them, stripped them of their clothing, and kept them in
    a cell for several hours, before finally letting them go. The federal
    prosecutor's office in Ecatepec opened an inquiry into the alleged
    violations; the inquiry continued at year's end.
        State human rights commissions also received reports of torture
    allegedly committed by police. The CEDHJ charged in September 1999,
    that the Jalisco state attorney general, Felix Ledesma Martinez, and
    the mayor of Guadalajara, Francisco Ramirez Acuna, had impeded an
    investigation into an alleged case of torture to protect high-ranking
    members of the Guadalajara municipal police force. On January 13,
    Jalisco state police arrested former armored car guard Jesus Galvan
    Ortiz in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Galvan claimed that police took him to a
    house, tortured him, and demanded that he confess to robbing an armored
    car. Police released him several hours later and never charged him. The
    house where Galvan allegedly was taken and tortured was later found to
    belong to the wife of attorney general Ledesma. On February 8, Ledesma
    admitted to owning the property but denied any knowledge of the alleged
    torture. Nonetheless, on February 14, citing personal reasons, he
    resigned from office. The Jalisco CEDH was investigating Galvan's
    allegations at year's end.
        In September 1999, the president of the Mexico City Human Rights
    Commission (CDHDF), Luis de la Barreda, announced that during the
    CDHDF's 6 years of existence, the Mexico City attorney general's office
    (PDJDF) was the subject of the majority of its recommendations
    regarding torture. The commission made 14 recommendations involving 18
    alleged perpetrators; 7 against the PDJDF, 6 against the Director
    General of Prisons, 3 against the Secretary of Public Security, and 2
    against the Director General of Public Health. In its report, the CDHDF
    noted that it had investigated 44 security personnel for the use of
    torture. It had 17 of these cases still under investigation, dismissed
    5, and had found 22 public officials culpable. However, the authorities
    did not arrest 11 of those found culpable.
        During the year, the Zacatecas state Human Rights Commission issued
    several recommendations for punitive action against the state police
    for their habitual use of torture. On August 8, the Zacatecas state
    legislature requested that Governor Ricardo Monreal Avila order the
    state attorney general to designate a special prosecutor to investigate
    the local police for the alleged torture of four persons accused of
    stealing farm equipment in 1999. On September 20, state prosecutors
    issued arrest warrants for two state policemen on charges of torture,
    illegal arrest, and abuse of authority. The prosecutors also announced
    that they were investigating five other members of the state police,
    including the state police chief, for their presumed involvement in
    torture. However, despite the public urging of Governor Ricardo
    Monreal, neither arrest order had been executed by year's end.
        Members of the security forces were charged with committing rape.
    For example, on June 10, municipal police in Matias Romero, Oaxaca,
    arrested Rolando Jesus Vazquez Vargas, a sergeant in the 6th artillery
    regiment, for the rape and beating of Maria de Carmen Dominguez. Two
    other men are being sought in connection with the same assault. On July
    18, Chihuahua state judicial police arrested three soldiers, Ruben
    Villanueva Sanchez, Eleazar Jimenez Flores, and Rosendo Juarez Zenil,
    for raping and beating a tourist. A 1998 report by the IACHR described
    a definite pattern of rape and sexual assault against women committed
    by such officials. The Commission stated that some women had been
    assaulted sexually by law enforcement officials, particularly those in
    detention, or had been assaulted by others with the officials' consent.
        Official corruption and complicity in crime continues to be a
    source of human rights violations. For example, on May 25 and 26, the
    authorities arrested two Mexico City judicial police agents, Ahui Omar
    Castro Hernandez and Gerardo Bustamante Dominguez, and Rene Rodriguez
    Monroy, a former employee of the city's public security secretariat, on
    extortion charges. They allegedly demanded $16,000 (150,000 pesos) from
    narcotics trafficker Jose Rigoberto Caballero, in exchange for his
    freedom from city custody. Many citizens distrust the justice system,
    including law enforcement officials, and are reluctant to register
    official complaints.
        On July 23, workers at a hospital construction site in Ciudad
    Juarez rioted in protest over mistreatment by police and poor working
    conditions (see Section 6.e.). According to the workers, one of the
    underlying causes of the incident was persistent petty extortion by the
    police.
        On August 8, Juan Ramos Lopez, judicial director of the city's
    Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), lodged a complaint against the
    PGJDF with the Mexico City human rights commission. Ramos alleged that
    the PGJDF had been persecuting him since November 1999 when the SSP
    approached the PGJDF for information on the diversion of funds in the
    city's auxiliary police force. A PGJDF investigation into the diversion
    of funds continues, and 26 auxiliary police commanders have been
    suspended from duty for their involvement in the scandal.
        Police abuse and inefficiency hamper investigations. For example,
    in April a court overturned on appeal the 30-year sentence of Abdel
    Latif Sharif, convicted in connection with the string of murders of
    over 200 women since 1993 in Ciudad Juarez, based on lack of
    consistency in the autopsy reports. Sharif remains in custody and is to
    receive a new trial. Since his arrest, eight more young women have been
    kidnaped, raped, strangled, and their bodies dumped in the same areas
    of the desert where previous victims were found. Four bus drivers are
    still in detention for allegedly committing the murders while Sharif
    was incarcerated. The bus drivers claim that they were tortured into
    confessing, and their case remained under investigation at year's end
    (see Section 1.c.).
        Several human rights organizations and the U.N. Special Rapporteur
    on Extrajudicial Executions, Asma Jahangir, who visited the country in
    1999, believe that the Government has made only limited progress in
    solving these murders because most of the victims were poor, young
    women, few of whom had anyone to press the authorities for intensive
    investigation. However, police incompetence, prosecutorial ineptitude,
    and lack of investigative resources also hampered the investigation.
        To enhance the investigation into the murders in Ciudad Juarez, the
    Chihuahua attorney general's office appointed a special prosecutor for
    crimes against women in 1998. The special prosecutor's office has 65
    cases in process, related to 67 of the victims; the remains of 23 of
    the victims required extensive scientific examination to identify them.
    In August the court system in Ciudad Juarez had a total of 145 cases in
    process against 103 persons for murdering women, including for motives
    of domestic violence, crimes of passion, drug connections, and revenge.
        Some law enforcement personnel have been known to have drug
    trafficking connections. For example, in November 1999, 4 former
    Tamaulipas state police officers were among a group of 10 men,
    including narcotics trafficker Osiel Cardenas-Quillen, who confronted 2
    international law enforcement officers with automatic rifles on a busy
    street in Matamoros, Tamaulipas. Carlos-Guillen and his associates went
    into hiding and are being sought by the authorities.
        On June 21, the PGR arrested Jose Ricardo Rodriguez Torres, Ruben
    Cortes Flores, Miguel Angel Crespo Zoloeta, and Carlos Pineda Bernal,
    four Tijuana-based agents of the PGR's counternarcotics agency. They
    were charged with drug trafficking.
        On August 8, the newspaper La Jornada reported that the internal
    affairs department of the PGR sanctioned 3,060 public servants between
    December 1996 and March 2000 for involvement in illegal activities,
    especially drug trafficking.
        Narcotics-trafficking organizations also included corrupt public
    officials. The former governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva
    Madrid, is suspected of having aided narcoticstrafficking
    organizations. He fled shortly before his term of office expired in
    1999 and still was being sought by federal authorities at year's end.
    Villanueva Madrid claims that he is innocent and the victim of a
    political frame-up.
        Government officials have conceded the country's serious human
    rights shortcomings. UNHCHR Robinson, who visited the country in
    November 1999, said that President Zedillo's admission that serious
    human rights violations occur in Mexico was a positive sign. In an
    effort to fight corruption and provide better public security, the
    Government created the PFP in 1999. The 12,000-person force includes
    approximately 5,000 transferred military personnel and another 6,000
    from the former federal highway police. The inclusion of military
    personnel, who take a leave of absence from the armed forces while
    serving in the PFP, led to criticism from some human rights NGO's.
        Police extorted money from street children, at times abused
    homosexuals (see Section 5), and violated the rights of illegal
    immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
        Francisco Hernan Cortes, one of the presumed attackers in the May
    1999 attempt on the life of PRD Senator Hector Sanchez Lopez and two
    companions, remains in jail awaiting trial in Oaxaca.
        Prison conditions are poor. Many prisons are staffed by
    undertrained and corrupt guards, and some lack adequate facilities.
    Prisoners complain that they must purchase food, medicine, and other
    necessities from guards or bribe guards to allow the goods to be
    brought in from outside. The penal system comprises 444 facilities: 5
    federal penitentiaries, 8 federal district prisons, 329 state prisons,
    and 102 municipal and regional jails. Prison overcrowding continued to
    be a common problem, despite an early release program endorsed by the
    CNDH, legal reforms that reduced the number of crimes that carry
    mandatory prison sentences, and the construction of new prisons.
    Antonio Sanchez Galindo, technical director of the Council for Minors
    of the Secretariat of Government, estimated that the prison population
    is 50 percent over capacity. The prisons with the largest
    overpopulation are: Reclusorio Norte in Mexico City-Capacity 4,506,
    actual population 7,419; Reclusorio Oriente in Mexico City-Capacity
    4,295, actual population 7,441; Reclusorio Sur in Mexico City-Capacity
    2,914, actual population 4,485; La Mesa in Tijuana-Capacity 1,716,
    actual population 5,982; Ciudad Juarez-Capacity 1,310, actual
    population 2,740. In Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, the state prison
    increased its capacity by 400 beds to 1,240, but the facility still has
    2,720 inmates. The authorities in Chihuahua State have approved the
    construction of a second penitentiary in Ciudad Juarez to ease
    overcrowding and begun construction on a new juvenile detention
    facility, which is scheduled to be completed in 2001.
        In 1998 Federal District prison director Carlos Tornero Diaz
    admitted that guards supply 40 percent of the illegal drugs smuggled
    into the prisons, and that inmates lacked sufficient drinking water.
    While the authorities investigate some prison officials for abusing
    prisoners, they more commonly dismiss those who commit abuses or charge
    them with only minor offenses. Drug and alcohol abuse is a problem in
    prisons. A Baja California State official estimated that 80 percent of
    the state's prison population are addicted to drugs. Conflicts between
    rival prison groups involved in drug trafficking continue to occur. On
    September 5, Federal Judicial police stormed the Torreon prison to end
    what they claimed were 20 years of self-government by the prisoners. In
    the process, the police seized munitions, drugs including cocaine and
    marijuana, and alcohol. In May doctors at a prison in Nuevo Laredo
    resigned, citing unhealthy conditions such as inadequate food and water
    as the reason for their resignations. They stated that conditions such
    as mange, AIDS, and tuberculosis are known to the authorities, who fail
    to take any action to treat and segregate sick inmates.
        The Oaxaca Human Rights Networks reported that Eugenio Almaraz
    Garcia, a Zapotec man, died on February 29 from presumed neglect by the
    director of the Pochutla, Oaxaca prison. According to his family and
    the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights, Almaraz died of
    septic shock, multiple organ failure, and tuberculosis after being
    denied medical attention 6 days before his death. The Oaxaca state
    Human Rights Commission is investigating the case.
        In many prisons inmates exercise authority, displacing prison
    officials. Influence peddling, drug, and arms trafficking, coercion,
    violence, sexual abuse, and protection payoffs are the chief methods of
    control used by prisoners against their fellow inmates. Corruption and
    poor conditions led to riots and escapes. On September 30, about 60
    detainees at the Juarez Juvenile Detention Center were involved in a
    clash with authorities. The troubles began when repeat offenders being
    held in isolation allegedly exposed themselves to guards and refused to
    return to their cells. Ten ringleaders then incited others to join in
    the disturbance. Rioters broke lights and tore down power cables before
    being subdued by police reinforcements using tear gas.
        On May 17, the PFP intervened in the Penitentiary Number 1 in Nuevo
    Laredo, Tamaulipas to regain control of the prison, which had been
    exercised by a narcotics-trafficker prisoner, Guillermo Martines.
        On September 5, close to 1,000 PFP personnel intervened in the
    state penitentiary in Torreon, Coahuila, to break the control
    established by prisoner Martin Gallardo.
        In August the CNDH issued a recommendation to the governor of
    Tabasco and requested an immediate investigation into the
    administrators of the state penitentiary. Prison riots at the state
    penitentiary on October 22 and November 3, 1999, left 11 prisoners
    dead. The CNDH report criticized Tabasco prison administrators for
    their negligence in not caring for the prisoners during severe flooding
    and for failing to maintain order, impartiality, and the physical
    integrity of prisoners.
        Women are held separately from men and juveniles are held
    separately from adults.
        Although the Constitution calls for separation of convicted
    criminals from detainees held in custody, in practice these
    requirements were violated routinely as a result of overcrowding.
        There is no specific law or regulation to allow human rights
    organizations or other NGO's to visit prisons; however, in practice
    such visits are permitted in certain situations, especially by the
    CNDH. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    is able to visit prisoners in Chiapas due to a July 1998 agreement with
    the Government. For permission to visit prisoners in Oaxaca and
    Guerrero, the ICRC must apply to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the police continued
    to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. Arbitrary arrest and
    detention were among the most common human rights abuses. Legally, a
    prosecutor may hold a detainee no more than 48 hours before he must
    present the accused to a judge, except when the accused is caught in
    the act or within 72 hours of committing a crime. In 1999 Human Rights
    Watch reported that a great number of disappearances eventually are
    found to be cases of arbitrary detention (see Section 1.b.).
        Reports of arbitrary detention occur with greatest frequency in
    Tabasco, Guerrero, Chiapas, the Federal District, and Oaxaca. States'
    attorney general personnel, state police, and the army are the most
    frequent abusers of detention laws.
        The Constitution provides that the authorities must sentence an
    accused person within 4 months of detention if the alleged crime
    carries a sentence of less than 2 years, or within 1 year if the crime
    carries a longer sentence. These periods can be extended if the parties
    agree. In practice, judicial and police authorities frequently ignored
    these time limits. Criminal defendants often were held with convicted
    prisoners. Furthermore, many detainees reported that judicial officials
    often solicited bribes in exchange for not pressing charges. Those able
    to pay were released from custody. Corruption is rampant throughout the
    system. For example, in May two judicial police agents along with a
    former city government employee were arrested on extortion charges (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Judges often failed to sentence indigenous detainees within legally
    mandated periods. In 1996 the CNDH reviewed 8,661 files of indigenous
    persons who were detained and recommended the immediate release of
    1,727 persons. Of those states with the largest numbers of indigenous
    prisoners, the CNDH reviewed 2,222 cases in Oaxaca, and recommended 407
    releases, of which 296 had been accomplished by the end of 1998; 1,219
    cases in Veracruz, with 331 recommendations for release and 245
    releases; and 639 cases in Puebla, with 157 releases recommended, and
    61 releases. In November 1999 the CNDH signed an accord with
    Secretariat of Government, the PGR, the Federal Institute of the Public
    Defense office, and the National Indigenous Institute (INI), to develop
    a program for the anticipated liberty of indigenous prisoners in
    federal prisons. Since that time, the CNDH has developed a database of
    2,314 registered cases, and 381 persons were released during the year.
        Federal prosecutors continued to adhere to the recommendation by
    the INI that they drop charges against first-time offenders accused of
    drug cultivation, as drug traffickers often forced indigenous
    defendants, who were not made aware of the legal significance of their
    actions, to grow the crops. The INI also supports programs to provide
    translators for indigenous defendants and to assist them in obtaining
    bail bonds.
        Some human rights groups have claimed that activists arrested in
    connection with civil disobedience activities are in fact political
    detainees. The Government asserts that the system fairly prosecutes
    those charged in sometimes violent land invasions for common crimes,
    such as homicide and damage to property.
        The law does not permit forced exile, and it is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is generally
    independent; however, on occasion it has been influenced by the
    executive branch, particularly at the state level. Corruption,
    inefficiency, and disregard of the law are major problems. Corruption
    and impunity are serious problems and tend to benefit the wealthy and
    powerful. Lack of training also is a problem. Judicial reforms have
    begun to address some of these problems, but full resolution of these
    problems awaits more extensive and systemic judicial reform. In
    February and March 1999, the Congress and the states passed
    constitutional reforms designed to streamline the administration of
    justice and repeal archaic laws. Human rights groups criticized these
    reforms, claiming that they effectively allow prosecutors to disregard
    defendants' allegations of violation of due process during criminal
    proceedings. On August 11, the International Jurists Commission
    reported that judicial authority has been diminished severely by the
    procedural immunity enjoyed by officials of the State, particularly the
    military.
        The federal court system consists of a Supreme Court, 91 circuit
    courts of appeal, 49 courts of appeal, and 185 district courts.
        Efforts to implement the 1995 judicial reforms continued. During
    the year, the Federal Judicial Council strengthened administrative
    control over the judiciary, investigated cases of corruption, and
    removed some corrupt judges. In addition, in September the Institute
    for Professional Formation of the Mexico City Attorney General's office
    initiated new workshops and courses directed at officials who deal with
    prosecutions, including the prosecutor's office, official secretaries,
    judicial police, and police group leaders. The course material
    encompassed case management, scientific investigation techniques, legal
    framework, and evidence collection. However, in a report released in
    December, Human Rights Watch asserted that deficiencies in the
    administration of justice were still a major concern, and repeated its
    1999 statement that judicial reforms have done little to improve the
    problems that plague the justice system. The December report stated
    that prosecutors not only ignored abuses by police but also fabricated
    evidence. Judicial oversight was seriously inadequate as the courts
    accepted evidence obtained through human rights violations, and judges
    cited legal precedents that weakened human rights protections.
        Based on the Napoleonic Code, the trial system consists of a series
    of fact-gathering hearings at which the court receives documentary
    evidence or testimony. Court officials may add notarized documents
    (that are not authenticated) into the case file. A judge in chambers
    reviews the case file and then issues a final, written ruling. The
    record of the proceeding is not available to the general public; only
    the parties have access to the official file, although by special
    motion the victim may have access to it.
        The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to attend
    the hearings and challenge the evidence or testimony presented, and the
    Government respects these rights in practice. In general, court
    hearings are open to the public and it is common to find not only the
    accused, but also relatives of the accused and journalists in the
    courtroom.
        While there is a constitutional right to an attorney at all stages
    of criminal proceedings, in practice the authorities often do not
    assure adequate representation for many poor defendants. Moreover, the
    public defender system is not adequate to meet the demand, although
    improvements in salaries and benefits have ameliorated this situation.
    Attorneys are not always available during the questioning of
    defendants; in some instances a defense attorney may attempt to
    represent several clients simultaneously by entering different rooms to
    certify formally that he was present, although he did not actually
    attend the full proceedings. Prosecutor salaries and benefits vary by
    region and agency. Federal prosecutors are usually better paid than
    state ones.
        In the case of indigenous defendants, many of whom do not speak
    Spanish, the situation is often worse. The law calls for translation
    services to be available at all stages of the criminal process;
    however, the courts do not routinely furnish translators for indigenous
    defendants at all stages of criminal proceedings, and thus defendants
    may be unaware of the status of their cases. Provision of translators
    to non-Spanish speaking defendants, including indigenous ones, is
    provided for but poorly implemented, resulting in prisoners being
    convicted without fully understanding the documents they have been
    required to sign. The CNDH, through the Fourth Inspector General's
    office, has a program to assist incarcerated indigenous defendants. The
    INI also has judicial assistance programs for indigenous defendants and
    provides counsel on their behalf. The INI also distributes legal,
    educational, and informational material in indigenous languages.
        A particularly egregious abuse of due process is the prosecution's
    ability to use evidence gathered by means of torture. While torture
    itself is a criminal act, judges routinely allow statements coerced
    during torture to be used as evidence against the accused (see Section
    1.c.). For example, in August a court convicted two environmental
    activists in Guerrero although they allege that they had been tortured
    into signing confessions (see Section 1.c.).
        The law does not require civil trial of soldiers involved in civil
    crimes, and the military continues to handle such cases. The
    Constitution provides for military jurisdiction for crimes or offenses
    involving any violation of military discipline. In cases in which a
    member of the military commits a crime and is arrested by civil
    authorities, the military has the right to request transfer immediately
    of the case to military jurisdiction. Although the military retains
    jurisdiction over its personnel, it has begun cooperating with the PGR
    on investigations of counternarcotics cases involving soldiers and
    sailors. For example, in late August, Generals Quiroz and Acosta were
    arrested by military police on charges of narcotics trafficking and
    assisting the Ciudad Juarez-based Amado Carrillo drug cartel. General
    Acosta also was accused of complicity in the disappearance and torture
    of several persons in Guerrero during the 1960's and 1970's.
        In 1999 the Military Judicial Police had arrested five members of a
    military dissident group, the Patriotic Command for Raising People's
    Awareness (CPCP), a group composed of military personnel protesting
    what they had called an unjust military justice system. The authorities
    charged the five CPCP members with the crime of sedition and later
    arrested the leader of the group, Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez. According
    to the Foreign Ministry (SRE), on April 17, the CNDH concluded that
    allegations that the military had tortured or violated the human rights
    of Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez and the other incarcerated members of the
    CPCP were unfounded. At year's end, the authorities held Bacilio Gomez
    in jail but had not yet brought him to trial. In December, the 12th
    circuit court in Mazatlan, Sinaloa, granted injunctions that in essence
    dismissed the charges of insubordination, sedition, and conspiracy
    against Juan Francisco Bernal Vasquez, Gerardo Torres Benitez, and
    Ignacio Manzano Benitez. Although they still face charges of violating
    ``common military duties,'' they are eligible for release on bail. The
    appeal filed by Hildegardo Bacilio, leader of the December 1998
    protest, is still under consideration.
        At times lawyers in human rights cases faced harassment. For
    example, on January 27, two men physically harassed Juan de Dios
    Hernandez Monge and issued threats against Pilar Noriega Garcia. Both
    are attorneys for students at the Autonomous National University in
    Mexico City (UNAM) detained by the authorities. On March 29, unknown
    persons broke into the home of Leonel Guadalupe Rivero Rodriguez,
    another attorney for UNAM students. No valuables were taken but his
    computer files having to do with the UNAM cases were searched (see
    Section 2.a.).
        The only political prisoner is General Jose Francisco Gallardo who
    maintains that he was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment for speaking
    his mind on the advisability of having a military ombudsman (see
    Section 4). During the year, he received visits from Amnesty
    International.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
    privacy, family, home, and correspondence, and the law requires search
    warrants; however, in the past there have been credible reports that
    unlawful searches without warrants were common.
        The law allows for electronic surveillance with a judicial order.
    The law prohibits electronic surveillance for electoral, civil,
    commercial, labor, or administrative purposes.
        On September 20, the Mexico City daily newspaper El Universal
    reported that President-elect Fox, his transition team, and the
    National Executive Committee of Fox's party, PAN, were victims of
    eavesdropping on their telephone conversations. To substantiate its
    charge, the newspaper printed the transcript of a phone conversation
    between Fox and his spokesperson. Fox later verified the authenticity
    of the transcript. The persons or person responsible for the taping are
    unknown, but the press speculated that it only could have been the
    Government's civilian intelligence organization, the Center for
    Investigation and National Security (CISEN). However, no evidence was
    provided to support that charge, and CISEN denied responsibility. In
    December President Fox formed a committee, led by Secretary of
    Government Santiago Creel, Secretary of Public Security Alejandro Gertz
    Manero, Attorney General Rafael Macedo de la Concha, and security
    advisor Aguilar Zinser, to revise the practices and role of CISEN. The
    President gave the committee 100 days to evaluate CISEN and propose a
    plan for its reorganization and the enhancement of its transparency.
        On July 19, Jose Murat Casab, governor of Oaxaca, announced that a
    routine check of his office had turned up three listening devices.
    Murat blamed three officials of the Federal Secretariat of Government--
    Francisco Eduardo de la Vega y Avila, Jose Trinidad Rodriguez
    Ballesteros, and Olaf Ivan Corro Labrafor this act. The three officials
    then lodged a federal complaint against Murat for character defamation.
    Zacatecas governor Ricardo Monreal Avila instructed state attorney
    general Gonzalez Navarro to open an investigation into alleged
    electronic monitoring of state government officials by federal security
    agents. In addition, state police chief Miguel Angel Hernandez advised
    state representatives that they all were being monitored
    electronically, although the factual basis for this advice was unclear.
        On November 29, the PGR announced that it would not initiate legal
    action against Jorge Salomon Azar, former governor of Campeche, nor
    Antonio Gonzalez Kuir, current governor of Campeche, for their presumed
    involvement in the 1998 wiretapping of Layda Sansores, a former member
    of Congress. They later were released. However, on December 18,
    Sansores petitioned a court to order the PGR to reactivate the
    investigation against both men and to investigate Valente Quintana,
    coordinator of the state security and police system; Antonio Ayala;
    Dante Omana; and Manual Alfaro Isaac, former coordinator of advisors
    for then-Governor Salomon Azar.
        The Constitution states that all persons have the right to make
    free, responsible, and informed decisions on the number of children
    they choose to have. The 1984 General Health Law provides for criminal
    action against those who pressure a woman to undergo sterilization
    procedures or perform such procedures without a woman's consent. There
    were no reports of forced sterilization during the year. In 1995 the
    CNDH found that the largest number of complaints against health care
    institutions involved negligence or abuse during childbirth by medical
    personnel and charges of coerced sterilization. It said that the number
    of such complaints had grown, in large part due to women's increased
    awareness of their rights.
        Independent agencies believed that forced sterilization procedures
    exceeded by several times the number of known cases, but the overall
    scope of the problem was difficult to quantify. Women may not realize
    that procedures have been performed until after the fact, and many
    victims are reluctant to file complaints, although there are mechanisms
    for filing formal complaints with the National Medical Arbitration
    Commission and with the national and state human rights commissions.
    However, the CNDH office in Chiapas reported that in some indigenous
    communities women choose sterilization, but then due to fear of
    reprisal from their husbands report that it was forced upon them or
    that they simply did not understand the nature of the procedure. In
    1999 there were reports of possible violations of informed consent
    standards with contraceptive drug use in the state of Guerrero;
    however, these charges were not substantiated.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--There were numerous allegations of the use of
    excessive force and the violation of international humanitarian law.
    Incidents of conflict in Chiapas between the security forces and EZLN
    sympathizers and in Guerrero between the army, the Popular
    Revolutionary Army (EPR), and the Revolutionary Army of the People's
    Insurgency (ERPI) led to many of these accusations. However, the
    confused circumstances of these clashes made those allegations
    difficult to substantiate. UNHCHR Robinson suggested in November 1999
    that the Government consider creating a military human rights ombudsman
    to combat impunity in the armed forces. In an interview with the
    newspaper La Jornada published on July 27, CNDH president Jose Luis
    Soberanes responded that his agency was capable of dealing with
    complaints of violations by the military, and he also called for a
    restructuring of the military. The Secretariat of National Defense
    (SEDENA) has offices in Chiapas and Guerrero, to deal with citizen
    complaints of human rights violations. SEDENA, in coordination with the
    CNDH and state human rights commissions, provides its officers with
    human rights training; however, enlisted troops do not always receive
    instruction on human rights (see Section 4).
        During much of the year, the Government maintained around 20,000
    troops in selected areas of Chiapas to contain the EZLN-backed uprising
    that began in 1994, and about half that number in Guerrero to handle 2
    much smaller rebel groups there. The EPR and the EPRI maintain a
    presence in Guerrero; however, they were less active compared with the
    previous year.
        On December 1, his first day in office, President Fox ordered the
    dismantling of 53 military checkpoints in Chiapas and military camps in
    the conflict zone. In less than 10 days, the army withdrew from two
    contentious military positions. In addition, the Government lifted
    restrictions on previously expelled foreigners and eased visa
    requirements for members of human rights organizations. In a December 2
    press conference in La Realidad, Chiapas, the EZLN's Subcommander
    Marcos stated that President Fox's initial steps were encouraging and
    praised his choice of Luis H. Alvarez as his Chiapas Peace Coordinator.
    The rebel leader also laid down five conditions for a return to
    dialogue with the government: passage of the Congressional Chiapas
    Peace and Reconciliation Commission (COCOPA) bill, liberation of all
    EZLN prisoners, withdrawal of the army from EZLN territory and
    repositioning of the army to pre-1994 positions, closure of seven
    specific military posts in Chiapas, and no substitution of state police
    for army troops in the newly demilitarized areas. On December 5, Fox
    sent to Congress the COCOPA bill to implement the 1996 San Andres
    Accords between the EZLN and the Government. Governor Pablo Salazar
    Mendiguchia took office on December 8, and declared that he plans to
    review the cases of all state prisoners charged with links to the EZLN.
    On December 30, he had 16 Zapatista prisoners released from state
    custody with a promise that more would follow.
        At year's end, an amnesty by the Oaxaca state government led to the
    release of 32 persons accused of ties to the guerrillas from state
    detention. Of the 55 persons still in custody, 27 are subject to
    additional federal charges; and 20 were charged before 1996, the
    commencement date stipulated in the amnesty law.
        NGO's and others have alleged that in the process of dealing with
    rebels in Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca, the Government used excessive
    force. For example, on May 25, state police forces and the army entered
    San Isidro Miramar in San Agustin Loxicha, Oaxaca, to detain alleged
    EPR members. Community residents claimed police and military officers
    harassed, threatened, and beat them during the arrest of Octaviano
    Hernandez Pacheco and Andres Enrique Hernandez. Since 1996 more than 70
    residents of Loxicha have been arrested for alleged involvement with
    the EPR. As of July, 24 of these were still in prison. In July AI
    claimed that the prisoners had been subjected to torture and death
    threats and criticized the absence of due process in the handling of
    the cases. The NGO the Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture
    has criticized the use of torture against residents of Loxicha since
    1996. However, on December 2, President Fox announced his support for
    an amnesty for the EPR, the demilitarization of the Los Loxichas area
    of Oaxaca State, and a review of the arrests of alleged EPR members. On
    December 8, the Oaxaca State legislature passed an amnesty law for
    local indigenous persons (Loxichas) accused of having links to the EPR.
    As of December 16, eight persons had been released from detention as a
    result of the amnesty; 79 Loxichas were still in custody. Of these,
    another six persons were acquitted of homicide charges but not released
    because of other charges pending against them. Although 27 of these
    remaining prisoners are subject to federal charges, the Oaxaca State
    government has already petitioned the federal government for an amnesty
    on their behalf. Ultimately, up to 50 more prisoners could be released
    and 200 other persons still at liberty could have their arrest warrants
    cancelled, according to press reports.
        In December 1998, the Fray Bartolome de Las Casas center and the
    PGR published conflicting reports on the Acteal massacre. The Fray
    Bartolome report blamed the Government for sponsoring armed civilian
    groups in Chiapas and for failing to protect the victims. The NGO
    accused the Government of waging ``lowintensity warfare'' in Chiapas
    and stated that the Government was responsible for the massacre. The
    PGR attributed the massacre to a history of local confrontation, the
    presence of the EZLN, an absence of the rule of law, and the neglect of
    local enforcement officials. In May a court convicted former General
    Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz and his two chief lieutenants of ``homicide
    by omission'' and sentenced each to 8 years in prison (see Section
    1.a.). On October 15, the CNDH issued a report on the June 1998 battle
    in El Charco, Guerrero between the military and alleged elements of the
    ERPI that resulted in the killing of 12 persons. The Commission found
    that the army had violated the human rights of the inhabitants and that
    various articles of the Constitution, the Federal Criminal Procedure
    Code, and the Code of Military Justice had been violated. The CNDH
    recommended that the SEDENA investigate the actions of the military
    participants in the El Charco events, that the Judge Advocate's office
    investigate the official in the military prosecutor's office who first
    received evidence in the case, that the Judge Advocate's office
    determine if charges should be brought against military personnel, that
    SEDENA advise all military personnel regarding their role and
    responsibilities in upholding human rights and due process, and that
    Sedena issue general instructions limiting the role of military
    prosecutors in criminal investigations. SEDENA acknowledged receipt of
    the report, accepted its recommendations, and pledged to study how to
    implement them. At year's end, there was no information released
    regarding the results of any military investigations.
        The military continues to deny any responsibility for abuses
    committed during the early stages of the Chiapas rebellion in 1994. The
    military authorities who have jurisdiction failed to punish any
    military personnel or government officials for committing abuses,
    although the CNDH issued an interim report in May 1994 finding that
    there was reason to believe that the military had injured or killed
    civilians in aerial attacks and that there were summary executions,
    illegal detentions, and instances of torture.
        There were credible reports of violent incidents and murders
    committed by armed civilian groups and local political factions in
    Chiapas. The National Democratic Federation alleges that the group
    ``Peace and Justice'', which it described as a paramilitary group, was
    responsible for the murders of 53 Zapatista sympathizers since 1995.
    Another group that allegedly has committed human rights abuses in
    Chiapas is the Revolutionary Indigenous Movement against the
    Zapatistas. From January 1998 through August 1999, the army confiscated
    431 weapons from civilians in the Chiapas zone of conflict. The Chiapas
    state attorney general's office claimed to have disbanded 39 gangs and
    confiscated 132 firearms within the same time period. On August 3,
    between 30 and 300 members of the Peace and Justice armed civilian
    group fired their weapons in the air, set off fragmentation grenades,
    and burned at least 6 houses to evict 90 EZLN sympathizers from
    Paraiso, Yajalon Municipality, Chiapas. The eviction reportedly was the
    result of a 1997 land dispute. The 15 displaced families remain in the
    nearby village of Hidalgo Joshil, and 40 military personnel patrol the
    area to maintain peace.
        Armed civilian groups, controlled or sponsored by local political
    bosses loosely affiliated with the PRI, were alleged to have committed
    many human rights violations in Chiapas, including the 1997 Acteal
    massacre. NGO's such as the PRODH, The Fray Bartolome de las Casas
    Human Rights Center in Chiapas, and the Mexican Commission for the
    Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH) have identified at least
    15 such groups; they identified 9 such groups in 1999. Some NGO's and
    press accounts contended that these groups were not only the private
    armies of local bosses, but also army surrogates armed by the military
    and used to attack the EZLN. The Government denied these allegations
    and likewise rejected the existence of paramilitary groups. On April
    18, the Federal Attorney General's office opened a new special unit to
    investigate possible armed civilian groups in Chiapas. On October 27,
    the unit arrested 11 alleged members of Peace and Justice on charges of
    illegal weapons possession, organized crime, and terrorism. Among those
    arrested were three alleged leaders of the group: Samuel Sanchez, a
    former PRI state legislator; Marcos Albino Torres Lopez, a former army
    corporal; and Mario Cruz Perez, who reportedly was the link between the
    political and military wings of Peace and Justice.
        On May 7, four masked men killed three indigenous persons and
    wounded one more during their return home by truck to Tzanembolom,
    Chenalho Municipality, Chiapas. The survivor was a reported EZLN
    sympathizer, while the dead were all members of the same progovernment
    family. It is unknown whether the attack was politically motivated, the
    result of a family feud, or a random criminal act. The CNDH opened two
    investigations that were still in progress at year's end. To maintain
    public order, the Chiapas state government adopted preventive measures,
    including police patrols and 24-hour police presence to protect local
    residents.
        In June the municipal authorities of Chenalho, Chiapas, promised to
    facilitate the return to the area of almost 3,000 displaced members of
    ``the Bees,'' a pacifist organization that sympathizes with some of the
    goals of the EZLN. The Bees had been displaced from Chenalho since
    1997.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice. The mass media are not subject to
    formal censorship by the Government; however, there were reports of
    some self-censorship. In addition, threats and attacks on
    journalistssome reportedly by federal, state, or local authorities--
    hindered press freedom. Nonetheless, the freedom and independence of
    the media continued to expand. Many observers believe that drug
    trafficking organizations or corrupt security personnel in their pay
    carried out most of the attacks on the media.
        The traditional cozy relationship between the Government and the
    media that tilted coverage and editorial opinion in the Government's
    favor has diminished but not disappeared entirely. The Government no
    longer controls the import of newsprint but does retain control over
    broadcast licensing, which critics claim led some broadcast media to
    practice self-censorship. Accordingly old habits of accommodation
    lingered, and the editorial line of some key news organizations
    maintained a bias in favor of the Government. The persistence of
    official influence--and its greatest concentration--was most apparent
    in television. Instead of paying a 12.5 percent tax on advertising
    revenues, television broadcasters provided free broadcast time to the
    Government, which gave it convenient access to this powerful medium.
    Official advertising in the media continues, but disguising it as news
    coverage is more common at the state than at the national level. Cash
    and noncash payments to journalists persisted but were not as common as
    they once were; legislation to end this practice was enacted in 1998.
        The many attacks on journalists constituted the most serious
    problem for press freedom. The Committee for the Protection of
    Journalists and Media Communications reported that in 1999 there was a
    decline in the number of acts of intimidation, including physical
    attacks, threats, and detentions, against journalists; from 202 in 1998
    to 135 in 1999. A report issued by 4 NGO's in 1999 recorded 240 attacks
    of various types against journalists during 1998, compared with 187
    during 1997. These numbers include all aggressive acts against the
    media as reported in the media. According to the report, government
    institutions (including federal, state, or local police) or officials
    were responsible for 41 percent of the incidents. The Manuel Buendia
    Foundation, one of the NGO's, concluded that the vast majority of acts
    were intended to intimidate. During the first 7 months of 1999, the
    CNDH program on aggression against journalists investigated 22
    complaints of attacks on journalists; most were for assault or
    intimidation. One, from July in the state of Morelos, was for murder.
    The CNDH began an investigation of that case.
        There were no new developments in the 1999 harassment cases of
    Sergio Haro Cordero or Jesus Barraza Zavala. There was no information
    available about the Mexico City attorney general's office's (PGJDF)
    investigation of the February 1998 killing of Luis Mario Garcia
    Rodriguez, a reporter for the Mexico City daily newspaper La Tarde.
        On August 14, the CNDH recommended that the CISEN investigate and
    sanction agent Abraham Ponce Calvo for violating the privacy rights of
    Miguel Badillo Cruz, a columnist for the newspaper El Universal, and
    his wife. Badillo complained that on June 13 and 14, Ponce tracked his
    wife's movements from his car. Ponce denied the allegations, stating
    that from June 12 to 15 he was in a different location investigating
    organized crime.
        According to PRODH and the newspaper La Jornada, on May 14, members
    of the military harassed journalists at the Las Limas checkpoint in the
    state of Chiapas. The journalists were prevented from taking
    photographs and were filmed by the soldiers.
        On June 15, men dressed in police uniforms kidnaped Freddy
    Secundino Sanchez, a writer from the magazine Epoca, outside his home
    in Mexico City. The men drove him around in a taxi while they beat and
    threatened him at gunpoint before releasing him. On June 7, he received
    a death threat via telephone. On June 20, Secundino submitted a
    complaint to the Mexico City Human Rights Commission. The Commission in
    turn asked the Mexico City Attorney General's office to ensure that no
    agent under its command threatened or harmed Secundino, and that it
    provide Secundino and his family with protection and investigate
    Secundino's complaint. As a result, the Mexico City Attorney General's
    office assigned agents to protect Secundino and his family. The case
    was under investigation.
        On June 22, unknown men opened fire on Lily Tellez, a highprofile
    news anchor and reporter for the national network TV Azteca, while she
    was driving in Mexico City. Tellez was uninjured, but her chauffeur and
    two bodyguards were wounded. The motive for the attack is unknown, but
    speculation has focused on Tellez's investigative reporting on
    narcotics and the Francisco Stanley murder case. Francisco ``Paco''
    Stanley was a television talk show host who was murdered while exiting
    a Mexico City restaurant. In its 2001 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW)
    reported that in February that the Human Rights Commission of Mexico
    City alleged that the principal suspect had been framed by prosecutors.
        On April 28, the body of Jose Ramirez Puente, the host of a popular
    radio news program in Ciudad Juarez, was found in his car. He was
    stabbed to death. State judicial police claimed that they found 17.6
    pounds of marijuana in his car hours after the discovery of the body,
    although local media organizations disputed any connection to drug
    trafficking. Ramirez covered state and local politics and the police
    beat; it was not clear whether the killing was related to his work.
        On April 9, the body of Pablo Pineda, a reporter and photographer
    with the newspaper La Opinion in Matamoros was discovered in the United
    States. According to news reports, he had been shot in the back of the
    head. In December 1999, Pineda survived an attempt on his life near his
    home.
        In May Meliton Garcia, a reporter with the Monterrey-based
    newspaper El Norte was charged with fraudulently obtaining a voter's
    registration card. The charges against Garcia stem from a two-part
    series in which he reported on his efforts to obtain voting
    registration documents using a false birth certificate. In the article,
    he described how unofficial document expediters who congregate outside
    government offices sell false birth certificates.
        In September the former police commissioner in Ciudad Juarez filed
    a criminal defamation suit against Jesus Antonio Pinedo Cornejo and
    Luis Villagram, editor and reporter for the weekly Seminario. An
    article dated February 28 and entitled ``History of Police Officer and
    Drug Traffickers' linked the police commissioner with the drug trade.
    On October 2, the commissioner announced that he would drop the suit.
        Television news independence has been enhanced by greater political
    pluralism, generational change in media leadership, and growing
    competition for advertisers and viewers, which continued to separate
    government and media interests. Moreover, as much of the national media
    has developed higher journalistic standards and independence in recent
    years, government influence has declined. The media showed a high
    degree of editorial independence, particularly in the capital and other
    major urban centers. Direct criticism of the Government, especially in
    radio and the print media, was common.
        During the course of the year, prior to the July presidential
    elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the newspaper
    Reforma monitored media access for each of the candidates, especially
    broadcast media. The resulting published analysis demonstrated that the
    leading candidates enjoyed equal access to the media. National
    electronic media covered the candidates far more equitably than in past
    elections; however, there continued to be large discrepancies in
    coverage in local and state level electronic media. The overall effect
    was to give the PRI candidate Francisco Labastida more positive
    coverage. After the July 2 election, both the national and local media
    provided more balanced coverage overall.
        In the middle of the campaign, the Government attempted to change
    the procedures for the distribution of government publicity placed in
    the media, placing control of all government advertising in the hands
    of the Secretariat of Government, which would then funnel the
    advertising through the government-owned Notimex news service. Media
    outlets protested, voicing concern that spending decisions would be
    based on political considerations. The Government retracted its plan
    and reverted to the system in which each government entity was
    responsible for its own paid advertising.
        The Constitution recognizes academic freedom in higher education,
    and the Government respected this provision in practice.
        In April 1999, a student strike at the UNAM to protest a proposed
    tuition increase shut down the university. The strike began when the
    authorities announced an increase in tuition but quickly evolved from a
    protest by some students into a more generalized attack on the national
    political system. The university administration made the tuition hike
    voluntary but did not meet other striking students' demands. The
    students at time used violence and intimidation to keep the university
    closed, and attempts to negotiate an end to the campus occupation
    failed. On February 6, several thousand PFP, accompanied by CNDH
    monitors, stormed the main campus, breached barricades, and detained
    about 600 strikers. Strikers did not resist the police operation, and
    the CNDH reported no human rights violations. Most of those detained
    were released within 24 hours, and only 251 were actually arrested and
    charged with rioting, terrorism, and dispossession. On February 14,
    classes resumed; however, on March 6, classes were disrupted once again
    when strikers reoccupied the university administration building and
    demanded the release from prison of fellow strikers. On April 14, at
    the request of UNAM rector Juan Ramon De la Fuente, 3,000 PFP personnel
    armed with batons and riot shields positioned themselves in and around
    the UNAM campus to forestall a strikers' reoccupation of the
    university. The PFP later withdrew from the campus. On June 7, the PGR
    released on bail the last six jailed strike leaders.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. The only requirement for holding demonstrations is
    that groups that wish to meet in public areas must inform local police
    authorities in advance. Organized, peaceful demonstrations occur
    frequently throughout the country.
        The police showed restraint and avoided confrontation with UNAM
    student strikers, who conducted periodic marches through the streets of
    Mexico City (see Section 2.a.).
        According to the NGO General Office of Citizenship Participation
    and Social Conduct, in the first half of the year, on the national
    level there were 83 marches with 291,560 participants and 58 blockages
    with 54,552 participants. In Mexico City there were 43 marches with
    13,255 participants and 60 blockages with 10,990 participants.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Political parties,
    opposition, and independent associations functioned freely without
    government interference or restriction. The Federal Electoral Code
    recognizes national political parties as well as political
    associations. Political associations can participate in elections
    through an agreement with a political party but are not allowed to use
    their names or symbols during the election campaigns. Political parties
    do not have legal status until they receive their official designation
    from the IFE. The IFE currently recognizes 8 political parties and 31
    political groups. Three parties lost their registration as a result of
    the July election because they obtained less than 2 percent of the
    vote.
        Citizens are free to associate and may form private or charitable
    associations. However, in 1998 the Mexico City legislature passed a law
    that gave the city government more influence over private charities.
    According to the Foreign Ministry (SRE), there are as many as 7,500
    NGO's active in the country, which are an important and vocal part of
    civil society.
        The Government was accused of harassing NGO's, especially in the
    state of Chiapas (see Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, there are some restrictions. In November 1998, the Government
    and representatives of many religious denominations signed a religious
    code of conduct that reaffirms freedom of religion. The law bars the
    clergy from holding public office, advocating partisan political views,
    supporting political candidates, or opposing the laws or institutions
    of the State.
        Religious groups cannot operate legally without registering as
    religious associations with the Under Secretariat of Religious Affairs
    of the Federal Secretariat of Government. Although the Government does
    reject a few applications, usually due to incomplete documentation, the
    registration process is routine.
        The authorities in the past have used immigration law to restrict
    the activities of religious workers, particularly in the state of
    Chiapas. To visit the country for religious purposes, foreign religious
    workers must secure government permission. The Government limits the
    number of visas each religious group is allowed. Some religious groups
    claim that it is government policy to keep foreign religious
    practitioners out of Chiapas and Oaxaca, thus making it more difficult
    for religious workers going to those states to obtain visas. The
    Government maintains that it does not deny visas based on religion, and
    does not expel religious workers based on their religious activities.
    The Government argues that foreign religious workers have been expelled
    for inappropriate political behavior. There also have been incidents of
    violence between religious groups in Chiapas (see Section 5).
        The Government lifted almost all restrictions on religious groups
    in 1992. The Catholic Church and other religions maintain their own
    schools; however, the Catholic Church complains of government
    restrictions on the running of those schools and the raising and
    spending of school funds. Although religious associations cannot own or
    administer broadcast radio or television stations, the Catholic Church
    owns and operates a national cable television channel. Government
    permission is required to transmit religious programming on broadcast
    radio or television, and permission is granted routinely.
        Relations were difficult between the Catholic Diocese of San
    Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, and the Government during the tenure
    of Bishop Samuel Ruiz, which ended in April. The situation in Chiapas
    is a result of a complex mix of economic, ethnic, political, and
    religious tensions. The San Cristobal Diocese has complained that its
    foreign clergy are unable to get their visa status extended or
    rectified (many enter on tourist visas).
        The non-Catholic Christian population continued to grow in
    Campeche, Chiapas, Yucatan, and along the northern border. There is a
    long history of religious intolerance in, and expulsions from, certain
    indigenous communities whose residents follow syncretistic (Catholic/
    Mayan) religious practices and view other religious practices as a
    threat to indigenous culture (see Section 5).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    of free movement, and the Government does not restrict the movement of
    its citizens into, out of, or within the country, except in Chiapas
    where the Government attempts to keep persons away from EZLN areas.
        The army and federal immigration authorities maintain strict
    checkpoints in parts of Chiapas. The focus of the checkpoints is the
    verification of tourist activities by persons with tourist visas. They
    also serve to stem illegal immigration. Church and human rights
    activists claim that the Government is fostering an antiforeigner
    climate. In addition, church groups complain about legal requirements
    that foreign religious workers must secure government permission to
    visit the country for religious purposes, and that the Government
    limits the number of visas granted to each religious group.
        Corrupt police sometimes violated the rights of illegal immigrants.
    Illegal immigrants rarely file charges in cases of crimes committed
    against them, because the authorities generally deport immediately such
    persons who come to their attention; any pending case brought by an
    illegal immigrant is subject to dismissal because the person is no
    longer present. In May the CNDH criticized the mistreatment of Central
    American migrants by the authorities and society. Studies conducted by
    the College of Mexico indicate that human rights violations against
    Central American migrants were increasing. On May 2, the newspaper La
    Jornada reported that approximately 2,899 complaints of human rights
    violations had been filed by Central American migrants in 1999.
        There were incidents in which illegal immigrants either were
    harassed or injured. On April 11, members of the state auxiliary police
    and federal judicial police arrested seven indigenous residents of
    Oaxaca State in a bus terminal, mistaking them for illegal Guatemalan
    migrants. After being interrogated by federal and state authorities,
    they were released. On April 13, the CNDH opened an inquiry into the
    victims' claim of cultural discrimination.
        On July 30, in Ecatepec, Mexico state, auxiliary police allegedly
    beat four Central American migrants hiding in a rail car (see Section
    1.c.).
        There was no new information available about the alleged beating in
    March 1999 of four intending immigrants near Mexicali, Baja California,
    by federal fiscal police.
        There were also credible reports that police, immigration, and
    customs officials were involved in the trafficking of illegal migrants
    (see Section 6.f.).
        The law provides for the protection of foreigners who might face
    political persecution if they were to return to their countries of
    origin. The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and
    asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government accepts
    the principle of first asylum and reviews each claim on a case-by-case
    basis with the assistance of the office of the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR). In June 1999, UNHCR Sadako Ogata visited the
    country and signed agreements with the Government to strengthen
    protection for refugees.
        On October 3, immigration authorities arrested Pedro Anibal Riera
    Escalante, a Cuban national and deported him to Cuba the following day.
    The Foreign Relations Secretariat subsequently noted that Riera, a
    former Cuban consul general in Mexico City, had applied for asylum on
    September 8. There were no other reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully through periodic elections. As a result of
    electoral reforms approved and implemented in recent years, the
    political process and especially the electoral process have become more
    transparent. While elections are open and generally fair, some abuses
    continue to occur. Prior to the July 2 presidential election, the PRI
    had dominated politics, controlled the Federal Government, and won
    every presidential election since its founding in 1929. However, on
    July 2, voters elected Vicente Fox, a member of the National Action
    Party and presidential candidate of the Alliance for Change Coalition,
    president, with 43.3 percent of the vote. Observers, both international
    and domestic, judged the elections, which ended the PRI's 71-year hold
    on the presidency, to be generally free and fair. The observers
    described the election as a historic turning point of the most profound
    significance and made recommendations for further electoral reform.
        The legislature amended the Constitution to allow the eligible 9
    million citizens resident overseas to vote in national elections;
    however, the Senate failed to act on the necessary implementing
    legislation that would have made voting possible in the 2000 election,
    due to differences over the costs and requirements for voting.
        Presidents are elected every 6 years and cannot be reelected.
    President Ernesto Zedillo supported legislation making the IFE an
    independent agency and declined to handpick his party's candidate for
    the presidential election. Instead, the PRI held a multicandidate
    primary in 1999 and chose Francisco Labastida as its presidential
    candidate.
        The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), operating with full
    autonomy, arranged the July 2 federal elections, which international
    observers judged to be generally free and fair. They described the
    elections and the resultant overturning of 71 years of dominance by the
    PRI as a historic turning point of the most profound significance and
    made recommendations for further electoral reform. The IFE had
    implemented the extensive 1996 constitutional and legislative reforms
    to help prevent electoral fraud and to create more uniform conditions
    for political party participation by regulating campaign finance,
    advertising, and other areas. It standardized the voter registration
    list and recruited and trained thousands of civil society volunteers to
    serve as independent electoral workers at the voting booths. The IFE
    also has provided support to state electoral institutes in running
    state and local elections and was instrumental in overhauling electoral
    district boundaries to reflect demographic shifts.
        After the July election, in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI held
    211 seats; the PAN 207; the PRD 50; the Green Ecologist Party (PVEM)
    17; the Labor Party (PT) 7; Democracy Convergence (CD) 3; the
    Nationalist Society Party (PSN) 3; and the Social Alliance Party (PAS)
    2. The PRI holds 59 seats in the Senate; the PAN 45; the PRD 17; the PT
    1; the PVEM 1; and the CD 1. Legislators can and do change their party
    affiliation frequently.
        On the state level, the PRI governs 19 states, the PAN 8, the PRD
    1, PRD-PT coalitions 3, and PAN-PRD-led coalitions 2. On the municipal
    level, opposition strength is well established. The PRD governs the
    Federal District, and the PAN governs 13 of the 20 largest metropolitan
    areas.
        On August 20, Chiapas voters elected the opposition Alliance for
    Chiapas candidate Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia to serve as governor, in a
    decisive victory over the PRI's Sami David David. As during the federal
    elections, the army was confined to its barracks, and the police
    presence was restrained. Although there were reports of minor, isolated
    irregularities, voting generally went smoothly. In his victory speech,
    Salazar supported the demilitarization of Chiapas and the introduction
    in Congress of the COCOPA legislation based on the 1996 San Andres
    accords between the EZLN and the federal Government.
        On August 25, post-election violence in Chimalhuacan, Mexico state,
    between local PRI factions left at least 10 persons dead and many more
    injured. State police later arrested 62 persons, including the supposed
    ringleader, Guadalupe Buendia Torres.
        Despite the IFE's efforts, there were still controversies at the
    state level over elections. On December 29, in Tabasco, the ultimate
    court of appeal on election matters (TEPJF) annulled the results of the
    state's disputed October 15 gubernatorial election and directed the
    Tabasco state legislature to name an interim governor and prepare for a
    new election. In its decision, the TEPJF cited inequitable local media
    coverage, diversion of funds for the election for the PRI candidate,
    and the blocking or miscounting of opposition votes. The TEPJF was
    created in 1987 and had never before invalidated an election.
        Yucatan state opposition parties accused PRI Governor Victor
    Cervera Pacheco and the PRI-dominated state legislature of stacking the
    State Electoral Council to favor the PRI's candidates in the 2001
    elections. On December 29, the TEPJF rejected the Council nominated by
    the state legislature and named a new Council. PRI state legislators
    questioned the legitimacy of this TEPJF-appointed Council and vowed to
    fight the ``imposition'' in the courts.
        Although there are no legal impediments to their full
    participation, women are underrepresented in government and politics.
    Women hold approximately 16 percent of the seats in the Congress. No
    women serve as governors or justices on the Supreme Court. A woman,
    Rosario Robles, served as head of government of the Federal District
    from September 1999 to December. Under President Zedillo, 2 Cabinet
    Secretaries out of 20 were women. President Fox appointed 9 women to
    his 51-member Cabinet. A total of 9 of the 15 members of Mexico City
    Mayor Manual Lopez Obrador's cabinet are women, and 13 of the city's 23
    key city officials are women.
        The Electoral Code provides that no more than 70 percent of
    candidates can be of the same gender. All political parties are
    attempting to increase the number of women who run for elected office
    through formal and informal means. They have utilized quotas requiring
    that a certain percentage of candidates on a party list be female.
    However, in practice women more often are put forward as substitute
    candidates who have little chance of serving unless the titular
    candidate leaves office. The PRD leadership is 22 percent female, 24
    percent of its representatives and 13 percent of its senators are
    female, and it has a female party president. The PAN has utilized more
    informal methods to increase female registration. Nonetheless, 23
    percent of its leadership is female, and 11 percent of its senators and
    representatives are female. PRI party rules mandate that a certain
    number of its candidates be women. Twelve percent of the party
    leadership, including its president, is female. Fifteen percent of both
    its representatives and senators are female.
        Constitutional changes in 1996 expanded the rights of indigenous
    people to elect representatives to local office according to ``usages
    and customs,'' rather than standard electoral law. Only the states of
    Oaxaca and Quintana Roo have enacted the implementing legislation.
    These traditional customs vary from village to village. In some
    villages, women do not have the right to vote or to hold office. In
    others, they can vote but not hold office. Women were excluded
    systematically from the political process by ``usages and customs'' in
    Oaxaca state and expected to face the same phenomenon in the state of
    Quintana Roo.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate largely without
    government restriction, investigating allegations of human rights
    abuses and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government
    officials generally have become more cooperative and responsive to NGO
    views; however, the Government used vigorous enforcement of its
    constitutional prohibition on foreigners engaging in political
    activities to hinder the work of foreign human rights monitors, and it
    restricted the activities of many human rights observers and religious
    workers in the state of Chiapas.
        After the December 1997 Acteal massacre, foreign concern over
    Chiapas increased significantly, and many foreigners and members of
    human rights groups traveled to that area, often on tourist visas, to
    learn firsthand about conditions there, to observe the human rights
    situation, and donate supplies. However, when individual foreign
    activists in Chiapas acted in ways that the Government considered
    political and inconsistent with tourist status, the Government issued
    them a letter of departure that required them to leave the country upon
    expiration of their visas.
        On July 4, Deputy Secretary of Government Jose Angel Pescador Osuna
    annulled the 2-year expulsion of Tom Hansen, director of Mexico
    Solidarity Network, and agreed to reconsider the expulsions of 400
    other human rights activists, priests, and foreign development
    volunteers. On June 30, Hansen was granted a 15-day election observer
    visa.
        In 1998 the National Migration Institute (INM) began to require
    persons who wished to enter the country to monitor the human rights
    situation to go through a new application process, which required,
    among other things, that they apply 30 days in advance. The INM also
    placed a 10-day limit on visits, set a limit of 10 visitors per NGO,
    and required that visitors submit a detailed itinerary and agenda.
    Domestic and foreign NGO's objected to these new visa requirements, and
    asserted that they actually restrict human rights monitoring and give
    the Government the right to decide which human rights organizations are
    legitimate. While government officials promised that the process would
    improve access for human rights observers, the effect has been the
    opposite. Immigration officials have used this visa requirement in the
    past to remove from the country religious workers whom they judge to be
    engaging in human rights activities. They also used this procedure to
    restrict the activities of human rights monitors. Human rights
    observers reported that the process is difficult, complex, rarely
    results in visa issuance, and interferes significantly with their
    ability to monitor human rights violations. As of September 15, 155
    applications for human rights observer visas were made and 74 visas
    were issued. Of the 100 applications made in 1999, 95 were issued.
        NGO's reported that human rights workers in several states received
    death threats while working on cases that implicated government
    officials. On June 13, Arturo Solis, president of the Center of Border
    Studies and the Promotion of Human Rights, publicly accused federal
    immigration agents in Tamaulipas of involvement in illegal immigrant
    trafficking. He has since received numerous death threats. The case is
    under investigation by the Secretariat of Government, the National
    Human Rights Commission, the Tamaulipas State Human Rights commission,
    and a congressional commission.
        On August 3, in Oaxaca, Oaxaca, the home of Angelica Ayala Ortiz,
    vice president of the Mexican League for the Defense of Human Rights
    (LIMEDDH), was robbed. Missing were Ayala's computer, recording
    equipment, and the new television and videocassette recorder that
    replaced similar ones stolen from her home last year. Asserting that
    the robbery was an act of intimidation, Ayala, who works on indigenous
    rights issues, lodged a complaint with the state attorney general's
    office, which is investigating. On February 15, an arrest warrant was
    issued for Jesus Reynaldo Hernandez Bautista, a bank security guard,
    for the July 1999 robbery of the LIMEDDH office in Oaxaca. There had
    been no apparent progress in the investigation into the August 3
    robbery of Ayala's home by year's end.
        In August elements of the army allegedly began to harass Hilda
    Navarrete Gorjan, director of the human rights NGO the Voice of Those
    Without a Voice in Coyuca de Benitez, Guerrero. On August 18, military
    personnel were parked in vehicles outside Navarrete's office with
    weapons pointed in the direction of her building. On August 23, unknown
    persons broke into the office and stole computer and video equipment;
    however, there was no evidence to suggest that the military was
    responsible for the break in.
        There were no new developments in the investigation into the 1999
    threats, harassment, and attacks against the PRODH and human rights
    lawyer Digna Ochoa. The investigation was still open at year's end.
    Mexico City judicial police provide protection for Ochoa while she is
    within the city limits. On May 10, the Inter-American Court of Human
    Rights stated that the Government was providing the protection for
    Ochoa ordered by the court, and that it had received no information
    about new threats or evidence of violence against PRODH. However, Ochoa
    did receive telephone death threats in June.
        The PRODH has criticized the Government's actions to provide safety
    to human rights workers as inadequate. The PRODH advocates the adoption
    of measures to promote awareness of the importance of human rights work
    and to investigate cases of threats, intimidation, and attacks against
    human rights workers.
        The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), established by the
    Government in 1990, has improved its credibility steadily. The Senate,
    instead of the President, now appoints the commission's president,
    although some NGO's feared that this would make the CNDH more
    susceptible to political pressure. In November 1999, the Senate named
    legal scholar Jose Luis Soberanes to a 5-year term as CNDH president,
    replacing the sitting president prior to the expiration of her term.
    Although most NGO's have a favorable opinion of the CNDH, many are
    critical of its method of presenting information, especially the
    reporting of compliance with recommendations. NGO's also have
    criticized the CNDH's reliance on former government security or
    judicial personnel as investigators of human rights abuse allegations.
        General Jose Francisco Gallardo Rodriguez, who was arrested in 1993
    on a range of charges, including embezzlement and dishonoring the
    military, was moved in 1999 from a military to a civilian jail.
    Gallardo maintained that military authorities were persecuting him
    because he wrote an academic dissertation calling for the establishment
    of a human rights ombudsman's office in the military. Since 1996 the
    IACHR and AI had called for his release. On August 4, Gallardo's lawyer
    lodged a complaint with the Federal Attorney General's office to demand
    action against the military tribunal for negligence of administration
    of justice because it allegedly had issued its resolution against
    Gallardo 63 days after the legal time limit.
        In 1999 U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
    Arbitrary Executions Asma Jahangir visited the country at the
    Government's invitation. Her report stated that the ineffectiveness of
    the justice system had led to violations of human rights. In addition,
    civilian courts' lack of jurisdiction over members of the armed forces
    for violations of human rights committed against civilians erodes the
    independence of the courts. The IFE implemented Jahangir's suggestion
    to invite international observers for the presidential elections and
    accredited 860 persons.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that men and women are equal before the
    law, and that education should avoid ``privileges of race, religion,
    groups, sexes, or individual;'' however, these provisions are not
    enforced effectively, although the Government continues to make
    progress in efforts to do so.
        Amnesty International has reported that homosexual men and women
    are likely to be victims of abuse and violence. In its 1999 annual
    report, the Citizen's Commission Against Homophobic Crimes reported
    that on average three murders are committed because of sexual
    orientation per month, and that there have been 190 such killings in
    the last 5 years, mostly in Mexico City, Mexico State, and Veracruz.
    The consensus among gay rights groups is that the police fail to
    investigate these crimes seriously.
        Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involve
    domestic and sexual violence, which is both widespread and vastly
    underreported. A 1997 law on intrafamily violence criminalized
    intrafamily violence, established protective measures for victims, and
    provided public education on the domestic violence problem. The law
    provides for fines equal to 30 to 180 days worth of pay and the
    detention of violators for up to 36 hours. The law also expanded the
    definition of rape to include spousal rape, involving married or
    common-law couples. According to a 1999 survey by the National
    Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Computation, some form of
    domestic abuse occurs in one of every three homes. The victim seeks
    help in only one of every six homes suffering from domestic abuse. More
    than 65 percent of all women suffer some form of abuse, verbal or
    otherwise, but only 30 percent lodge formal complaints, according to
    the Mexican Association Against Violence Toward Women. In 86 percent of
    abuse cases, it is the father or husband who commits the abuse. The
    Center for Attention to Intrafamily Violence reports that it receives
    between 50 to 60 complaints nationwide every day. Women are reluctant
    to report abuse or file charges, and the police are reluctant to
    intervene in what society considers a private matter. Many police also
    are inexperienced in these areas and unfamiliar with appropriate
    investigative technologies, although some have received training on
    these issues.
        According to the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion
    of Human Rights (CMDPDH), over 1 million women each year seek emergency
    medical treatment for injuries sustained due to domestic violence,
    which is the fourth highest cause of death for women. Groups such as
    the NGO Center for Research and Care of Women, are attempting to
    counter the widespread view of domestic violence as private, normal
    behavior and to deter future violence. On June 1, Mexico City Mayor
    Rosario Robles publicized a handbook written by a coalition of feminist
    NGO's to reduce domestic violence and to help victims of gender
    discrimination.
        Under certain circumstances limited to the statutory rape of a
    minor between the ages of 12 and 18, the Criminal Code allows a judge
    to dismiss charges if the persons involved voluntarily marry. In
    practice this provision is invoked rarely.
        In the case of the approximately 200 women raped, murdered, and
    mutilated in the Ciudad Juarez area since 1993 (see Section 1.b.), the
    CNDH determined in 1998 that the Chihuahua state attorney general's
    office's inadequate response had violated the human rights of the
    victims and their families. The CNDH therefore recommended that the
    state attorney general and the mayor of Ciudad Juarez be investigated
    for negligence. In the same year, the authorities appointed a special
    prosecutor and hired foreign experts in serial killings to advise
    investigators. The murders and rapes continued during the year.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution occurs
    (see Section 6.f.).
        The Federal Criminal Code includes penalties for sexual harassment,
    but victims must press charges. Many female victims were reluctant to
    come forward, and cases were difficult to prove. Sexual harassment in
    the workplace is widespread.
        The CNDH's First Inspector General's office is devoted entirely to
    protecting the rights of women.
        Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
    neither the authorities nor society in general respect this in
    practice. The legal treatment of women's rights is uneven. Women have
    the right to own property in their own names and to file for separation
    and divorce. However, in some states a woman may not bring suit to
    establish paternity and thereby obtain child support, unless the child
    was a product of rape or cohabitation, the child resides with the
    father, or there is written proof of paternity.
        The Constitution and labor laws provide that women shall have the
    same rights and obligations as men, and that ``equal pay shall be given
    for equal work performed in equal jobs, hours of work, and conditions
    of efficiency.'' However, women in the work force generally are paid
    less than their male counterparts and are concentrated in lower-paying
    occupations. According to a 1998 academic study, even though girls and
    boys attend school at similar rates, a woman on average needs to have 4
    more years of education to earn the same salary as a man in a
    comparable position.
        Labor law includes extensive maternity protection, including 6
    weeks' leave before and after childbirth and time off for breast
    feeding in adequate and hygienic surroundings provided by the employer.
    Employers are required to provide a pregnant woman with her full pay,
    are prohibited from dismissing her, and must remove her from heavy or
    dangerous work or exposure to toxic substances. To avoid these
    expensive requirements, some employers, including some in the maquila
    industry, reportedly deliberately violate these provisions by requiring
    pregnancy tests in preemployment physicals, by regular examinations and
    inquiries into women's reproductive status (including additional
    pregnancy tests), by exposing pregnant women to difficult or hazardous
    conditions to make them quit, or by dismissing them. In its 2000 and
    2001 annual reports, Human Rights Watch indicated that the Government
    not only was aware of such practices and failed to prevent them or to
    punish the perpetrators, but also made public excuses for companies
    that violated the law. The U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO),
    under terms of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
    (NAALC), the labor side agreements to the North American Free Trade
    Agreement, accepted a challenge to these practices in the maquila
    industry and in January 1998 recommended ministerial consultations. As
    a result, the U.S. and Mexican Secretaries of Labor participated in a
    conference in Merida, Yucatan, in March 1999, on gender discrimination
    in employment. In addition, the U.S., and Mexican NAO's organized
    cross-border outreach sessions in August 1999 on the rights of women in
    the workplace in McAllen, Texas and Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The conference
    and the outreach sessions concluded that discrimination exists, that it
    is not sanctioned by law, and that the authorities have taken steps to
    inform female workers of their right to file complaints about such
    practices, by distributing brochures and opening government offices
    that work together with NGO's to publicize the problem and available
    remedies.
        To protect the labor rights of women, the Secretariat of Labor made
    9,593 safety and hygiene inspections in private factories and public
    institutions through August and estimated that it would complete 13,790
    by the end of the year. The Secretariat made 23,138 inspections in
    1996. However, while the Government increased the number of federal
    inspectors in 1997 and concluded agreements with more states to expand
    and better coordinate labor inspections, the number of maquila plants
    (approximately 3,500 operating) far exceeds what the less than 700
    (approximately 350 state and 341 federal) inspectors can monitor.
        In 1995 the CNDH found that the largest number of complaints
    against health care institutions involved negligence or abuse during
    childbirth by medical personnel and charges of forced sterilization
    (see Section 1.f.).
        The National Women's Program (PRONAM) monitored the situation of
    women, made recommendations to the Government regarding women's issues,
    and worked with government agencies, international organizations, and
    NGO's to support women's causes. PRONAM and the National Statistics
    Institute compiled gender-specific statistics to ascertain more
    accurately the status of women. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO), the Secretariats of Labor and Foreign Relations, and PRONAM also
    promoted the status of women in the workplace. In addition, PRONAM and
    UNICEF initiated in 1999 an ongoing advertising campaign attacking
    social stereotypes and discrimination against women.
        Children.--Children under the age of 15 make up 35 percent of the
    population, and the median age of the population is 21. The Government
    maintains several programs to promote child welfare that support
    maternal and infant health, provide stipends for educating poor
    children, subsidize food, and provide social workers; however, problems
    in children's health and education remain. The CNDH receives numerous
    complaints about the services provided by the Secretary of Health, the
    Secretary of Education (SEP), and the Institute of Social Security.
    Nine years of education are compulsory, and the legal minimum age for
    employment is 14; however, according to SEP and the Sierra Neighborhood
    Foundation, only 31 percent of youths between 15 and 20 years of age
    attend school.
        The problem of child labor is particularly pronounced among migrant
    farming families (see Section 6.d.). The Government has attempted to
    make schooling easier for the children of such families by making their
    educational credentials portable. The National Public Health
    Institute's 2000 National Nutrition Survey reported that 3 million
    children under the age of 5 suffer some form of malnutrition. UNICEF
    also reported that approximately 5 million children, 2 million of which
    are under 12 years of age, are working. In 1998 the director of the
    National Education Council reported that 1.7 million school-age
    children were not in school because their poverty obligates them to
    work. About 900,000 children work in agriculture, particularly in the
    northern states. UNICEF and the National Institute for Integral
    Development of the Family, in a 1999 study of working children in the
    100 largest cities, estimated that 150,000 children work in those
    cities. (NGO's maintain that the total is higher.) According to a 1999
    national nutrition survey, 30 percent of children under 5 years of age,
    or about 3 million, suffer anemia, while another 2 million children are
    chronically malnourished.
        On January 4, the Congress passed a constitutional amendment to
    protect the rights of children and teenagers and ensure respect for
    their dignity. The new law also increased penalties for the sexual
    abuse or exploitation of children. Child prostitution and pornography
    are felonies under the law. On May 31, the Congress passed the
    Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents Law. The law
    provides for the right to life, non-discrimination, healthy living
    conditions, protection against threats to liberty and physical abuse, a
    healthy family life, health services, equal treatment for the disabled,
    education, pursuit of happiness, and freedom of thought and expression.
    Penalties under the law include fines of 500 to 1,000 times Mexico
    City's minimum wage and possible administrative jail time.
        The CNDH attempted to protect children by educating them on their
    rights and reviewing legislation to ensure compliance with relevant
    international conventions. On August 30, the Public Education
    Secretariat (SEP) announced the publication of four new books geared to
    teach children about discrimination, violence in the home, and
    toleration of differing beliefs.
        The Mexican Association of Childhood and Youth reported that there
    is a large population, estimated at 42,000, of vulnerable street
    children in Mexico City. Street children often become involved with
    alcohol, drugs, prostitution, petty thievery, and increasingly, violent
    crimes. Corrupt police officials sometimes exploit these children by
    pressuring them to commit petty crimes and extorting money from them.
        A 1998 report by the NGO Center for Research and Advanced Study in
    Social Anthropology counted 5,000 minors, 90 percent of them female,
    working as prostitutes or subjects of pornography. In April the Mexico
    City attorney general's office and the Mexico City Human Rights
    Commission reported that nearly 12,000 children in Mexico City are
    victims of sexual commercialism, including prostitution. The National
    System for the Integral Development of the Family (DIF) receives an
    average of about 35,000 complaints per year of physical and mental
    abuse against children, the majority in Mexico City, Mexico State, and
    Nuevo Leon.
        Trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual exploitation is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.). On November 22, the Federal Attorney
    General's office established the Special Prosecutor's Office for
    Attention to Crimes of Trafficking in Children.
        The Government and various NGO's have programs directed at children
    that address human rights issues. Generally, the purpose of these
    programs is not only to protect the rights of children but also to
    instill a generational respect for human rights through educational
    programs. An example of this educational approach is the Tree House (La
    Casa del Arbol), an interactive learning project sponsored by the human
    rights commission of Mexico City.
        People with Disabilities.--Estimates of the number of disabled
    persons range from 2 to 10 million. In Mexico City alone, 124 NGO's
    dealt with issues affecting the physically disabled.
        Twenty-seven of the 31 states have laws protecting the disabled.
    Local law requires access for the disabled to public facilities in
    Mexico City, but not elsewhere in the country. However, in practice
    most public buildings and facilities in Mexico City do not comply with
    the law. The Federal District also mandated access for physically
    disabled children to all public and private schools. The Mexico City
    secretary of education, health, and social development has maintained
    that 78 percent of these children received some schooling. On August 2,
    the President's Office announced that 90,000 disabled children were
    integrated into a regular education system under the Zedillo
    Administration.
        In December President Fox established the Citizen's Commission
    Against Discrimination to be headed by former Social Democracy
    presidential candidate Rincon Gallardo. The Commission's objectives
    include ensuring equal opportunities and access for the disabled and
    codifying these rights in a legal framework.
        Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI), an NGO, discovered
    mistreatment and violations of the rights of the mentally disabled
    persons in government mental health facilities. Abuses uncovered from
    1996-99 included inhuman and degrading treatment, misuse of physical
    restraints, and criminal neglect that in some cases led to deaths of
    patients. The MDRI further alleged that because the process through
    which persons are admitted legally to state institutions is conducted
    without oversight by a judicial or independent body, which can lead to
    a total loss of independent decision making or consent to treatment by
    patients. As a result of its 1999 report and an expose in the January
    30 issue of the newsmagazine Proceso, in February the Secretariat of
    Health made over $800,000 (8 million pesos) available to improve
    conditions in Mexico City's institutions and to provide over $5,000
    (50,000 pesos) for each of the 400 persons living in these institutions
    to participate in community-based workshops. The Secretariat of Health
    also made $1.7 million (17 million pesos) available to improve the
    Ocaranza, Hildalgo institution as a pilot project.
        Indigenous People.--The indigenous population, long subject to
    discrimination, repression, and marginalization, is estimated at 29
    million persons of Indian descent, of whom 11 million live in Indian
    communities and 5 million are native speakers of Indian dialects. An
    estimated 9 million indigenous persons live in extreme poverty.
    According to the National Indigenous Plural Assembly for Autonomy
    (ANIPA), there are 56 distinct indigenous groups, each with its own
    unique culture and language. Indigenous people are located principally
    in the central and southern regions and represent a majority in the
    states of Oaxaca (53 percent) and Yucatan (52 percent). However, these
    groups have remained largely outside the political and economic
    mainstream, as a result of longstanding patterns of economic and social
    development. In many cases their ability to participate in decisions
    affecting their lands, cultural traditions, and allocation of natural
    resources is negligible.
        The 1994 Chiapas uprising focused unprecedented attention on the
    demands of that state's indigenous population for increased economic
    and social rights. Among its basic demands, the EZLN called on the
    Government to enact measures to protect indigenous cultures, provide
    more opportunity for employment, and invest in schools, clinics, and
    infrastructure projects. In the 1996 San Andres accords, the Government
    agreed with the EZLN on the need to expand indigenous rights. However,
    Congress has not yet approved these accords, and the conflict remains
    unresolved. The Government maintains a heavy military presence in parts
    of Chiapas, a presence that NGO's have called threatening and
    intimidating to the indigenous population (see Section 1.g.).
        In its report ``The War in Chiapas'', issued in April the Fray
    Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC) reported that the
    military was the principal aggressor in its 1999 cases. The CDHFBC also
    concluded that the presence of the military put at risk the human
    rights of life, physical integrity, liberty, and security of the local
    inhabitants. In addition other groups expressed concern during the year
    over growing instability and tension within the Indian communities
    provoked by the presence of military, police, and paramilitary troops.
        In April an ICRC representative stated that thousands of Indians
    who fled their homes in Chiapas were suffering from food shortages and
    malnutrition. At year's end, the ICRC was feeding over 9,000 persons at
    year's end on a continual basis. There still were cases of
    malnutrition, and the ICRC addressed those cases with 100 percent
    complete food supplements.
        At year's end, the federal and state government strove to create a
    positive atmosphere for negotiation in Chiapas through troop
    withdrawals and the release of Zapatista prisoners (see Section 1.g.).
        The Government, through the National Indigenous Institute, the
    CNDH, and various NGO's, operates programs to educate indigenous groups
    about their political and human rights. The Government generally
    professes respect for their desire to retain elements of their
    traditional culture. The CNDH's office of the Fourth Inspector General
    reviews and investigates violations of indigenous rights. More than 130
    NGO's are dedicated to the promotion and protection of indigenous
    rights.
        Indigenous people do not live on autonomous reservations, although
    some indigenous communities exercise considerable local control over
    economic, political, and social issues. In the state of Oaxaca, for
    example, 70 percent of the 570 municipalities are governed according to
    the indigenous regime of usages and customs, which may not follow
    democratic norms such as the secret ballot, universal suffrage, and
    political affiliation (see Section 3). These communities apply
    traditional practices to resolve disputes, including allegations of
    crimes, and to elect local officials. In 1998 Quintana Roo's state
    Legislature passed a similar usages and customs law. While the laws
    allow communities in these states to elect officials according to their
    traditions, these usages and customs tend to exclude women from the
    political process (see Section 3).
        The law provides some protection for indigenous people, and the
    Government provides support for indigenous communities through social
    and economic assistance programs, legal provisions, and social welfare
    programs. However, these were not sufficient to meet the needs of all
    indigenous people. Although the national population growth rate has
    slowed to less than 2 percent annually, the birth rate among
    marginalized indigenous groups such as those in Chiapas is around 5
    percent. The General Education Act provides that teaching shall be
    promoted in the national language (i.e. Spanish) without prejudice to
    the protection and promotion of indigenous languages. However, many
    indigenous persons speak only their native languages. As a result, 1999
    ANIPA statistics suggest that indigenous people suffer from a high rate
    of illiteracy and a low rate of school attendance. Non-Spanish speakers
    frequently are taken advantage of in commercial transactions involving
    bilingual middlemen and have difficulty finding employment in Spanish-
    speaking areas.
        Religious Minorities.--There is a long history of religious
    intolerance in, and expulsions from, certain indigenous communities
    whose residents follow syncretistic (Catholic/Mayan) religious
    practices and view other religious practices as a threat to indigenous
    culture. In parts of Chiapas, local bosses of indigenous communities
    sometimes regard evangelical groups and Catholic lay catechists as
    unwelcome outside influences and potential economic and political
    threats. As a result, these bosses sometimes acquiesced in, or actually
    ordered, the harassment or expulsion of individuals belonging
    primarily, but not exclusively, to Protestant evangelical groups. In
    many cases, these expulsions involved the burning of homes and crops,
    beatings, and, occasionally, killings. These problems more frequently
    arise in ``autonomous indigenous areas'' under the influence of the
    EZLN, according to evangelical leaders. The abuse related to these and
    other incidents, apparently did not occur solely and exclusively on the
    basis of religion. While religious differences were often a prominent
    feature of such incidents, ethnic differences, land disputes, and
    struggles over local political and economic power were very often the
    basic cause of the problems.
        There were reports of conflict between Catholic/Mayan syncretists
    and Protestant Evangelicals in Chiapas. For example, on March 5,
    Catholic/Mayan syncretists evicted at least 70 evangelical families
    from Plan de Ayala, Chiapas. Later that month, 250 state police
    escorted the Evangelicals back to Plan de Ayala, where they remained
    for 2 weeks. However, in early April the Catholic/Mayan syncretists
    again evicted 20 of the evangelical families from that community. On
    April 16, the Catholic/Mayan syncretists drove out the 70 police
    officers stationed there to keep the peace and set up roadblocks around
    the town. The following day the expelled Evangelicals attempted to
    return to the community, but were prevented from doing so by the
    roadblock. Expelled evangelical families reported that the Catholic/
    Mayan syncretists demanded that they sign a statement renouncing their
    faith as a prerequisite for their return to the community. Attempting
    to mediate, Governor Roberto Albores offered social programs to the
    Catholic/Mayan syncretists if they allowed the Evangelicals access to
    the town. The Catholics accepted the offer, but denied blocking access
    to community members, claiming that they only wanted to ``prevent
    strangers from infiltrating the community and causing problems.'' They
    removed the roadblock, but tensions remain.
        Tension between Catholic/Mayan syncretists and evangelical groups
    continues to be a problem in the municipality of San Juan Chamula. The
    Evangelical Commission for the Defense of Human Rights claims that
    municipal authorities have expelled 30,000 persons in the last 30
    years. The children of Evangelicals have been denied access to the
    local public schools in six communities since 1994.
        Adventists in Oaxaca report that families who were members of their
    denomination were expelled from the community of Santo Tomas Kirri. In
    Santo Domingo, Mexico state, Adventists reported that they were forced
    temporarily to close their church. In Chiapas the Adventists viewed the
    local government as reluctant to intervene in towns governed by
    traditional ``practices and customs.''
        On May 17, the body of an alleged witch doctor was found in
    Comitan, Chiapas. The motive for his death is suspected to be the
    victim's practice of witchcraft, which is common in rural areas of
    southern Mexico; no suspects were arrested or charged.
        Progovernment supporters had in the past accused the Catholic
    Church in the San Cristobal diocese in Chiapas of supporting the EZLN.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Federal
    Labor Law (LFT) provide workers with the right to form and join trade
    unions of their choice. About 25 percent of the total work force is
    unionized, mostly in the formal sector, where about one-half the labor
    force is employed.
        No prior approval is needed to form unions, but they must register
    with the Federal Labor Secretariat (STPS) or state labor boards (JLCA)
    in order to function legally. Registration requirements are not
    onerous. However, the STPS or the JLCA occasionally have withheld or
    delayed registration of unions hostile to government policies,
    influential employers, or established unions. The STPS and the JLCA
    also have registered unions that turned out to be run by extortionists
    or labor racketeers falsely claiming to represent workers. To remedy
    this, STPS officials required evidence that unions were genuine and
    representative before registering them. Genuine unions are those that
    can demonstrate that they actually have members and represent the
    workers at the workplace. Some labor organizations have complained that
    they have found it difficult to obtain registration, especially from
    some local conciliation and arbitration boards.
        Human Rights Watch criticized the Government's system of labor
    tribunals in a December 1999 report that claimed that the right to
    freedom of association often was violated even when courts ruled in
    favor of organizing workers. The report states that in the case of the
    Democratic Union of Workers of the Ministry of the Environment, Natural
    Resources, and Fishing the courts allowed workers to organize formally,
    but Government officials continued to interfere in such a way that the
    union could not function effectively.
        Like the Federal Labor Board (JFCA), the JLCA are tripartite.
    Although trade union presence on the boards is usually a positive
    feature, it sometimes led to unfair partiality in representation
    disputes. For example, the board member from an established union may
    work to dissuade a JLCA from recognizing a rival organization. Trade
    union registration was the subject of follow-up activities pursuant to
    a 1995 agreement reached in ministerial consultations under the NAALC.
        Unions form federations and confederations freely without
    government approval. Most unions belong to such bodies. They also must
    register to have legal status. The largest trade union central is the
    Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), traditionally a part of the
    labor sector of the PRI, but affiliation is by individual unions.
        The Federal Employee Union Federation (FSTSE), the Revolutionary
    Worker and Peasant Confederation, and most of the separate national
    unions, smaller confederations, and federations in the Labor Congress
    (CT) also are allied with the PRI. However, several unions do not ally
    themselves with the PRI, including the large teachers' union, which
    severed its PRI ties a decade ago, and freed its minority factions to
    cooperate openly with other parties, particularly the PRD. Rivalries
    within and between PRI-allied centrals are strong. There also are a few
    small labor federations and independent unions outside the CT not
    allied with the PRI. One is the small, left-of-center Authentic Labor
    Front (FAT). Most FAT members sympathize with the PRD, but the FAT is
    independent and not formally tied to the PRD. In November 1997, 160
    labor organizations representing workers in the private and public
    sectors, led by the telephone workers and social security workers
    unions, formed the National Union of Workers (UNT)--a labor central in
    competition with the officially recognized CT. In April 1999, the
    Mexican Electricians Union (SME) announced that it would withdraw from
    the CT over its failure to give full support to the SME's opposition to
    the Government's plan to privatize partially the electric power sector.
    The SME had not withdrawn officially from the CT at year's end;
    however, it currently maintains no contact with the CT.
        PRI-affiliated union officers traditionally helped select, ran as,
    and campaigned for, PRI candidates in federal and state elections and
    supported PRI government policies at crucial moments. This gave unions
    considerable influence on government policies but limited their freedom
    of action to defend member interests in other ways, particularly when
    this might harm the government or the PRI. The CT, especially the CTM,
    was well represented in the PRI senatorial and congressional
    delegations, although its numbers diminished significantly after the
    1997 and the July elections.
        The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has found that certain
    restrictions in federal employee labor law, adopted at FSTSE request,
    violate ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association. These restrictions
    allow only one union per jurisdiction, forbid union members from
    quitting the union, and prohibit reelection of union officials. In 1998
    the COE and the ILO Committee on Application of Standards reiterated
    their criticism and asked the Government to amend the law. The
    Government had not amended the law by year's end; however, a May 1999
    Federal Supreme Court decision now permits the formation and
    recognition of more than one union per federal entity. A 1996 Supreme
    Court decision invalidated similar restrictions in the laws of two
    states, but the decision applied only in the specific instances
    challenged. In May 1999, the Supreme Court extended this interpretation
    to unions in federal government entities.
        The Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to strike. The
    law requires 6 to 10 days' advance strike notice, followed by brief
    government mediation. If federal or state authorities rule a strike
    ``nonexistent'' or ``illicit,'' employees must remain at work, return
    to work within 24 hours, or face dismissal. If they rule a strike
    legal, the company or unit must shut down completely, management
    officials may not enter the premises until the strike is over, and the
    company may not hire replacements for striking workers. Provisions for
    maintaining essential services are not onerous. The law also makes
    filing a strike notice an effective, commonly used threat that protects
    a failing company's assets from creditors and courts until an agreement
    is reached on severance pay. Although few strikes actually occur,
    informal stoppages are fairly common, but uncounted in statistics, and
    seldom last long enough to be recognized or ruled out of order. The law
    permits public sector strikes, but formal public sector strikes are
    rare. Informal ones are more frequent.
        During the year, the JFCA reported that 8,282 strike notices were
    filed and 26 legal strikes occurred in federal jurisdiction. Federal
    labor authorities did not stretch legal requirements to rule strikes
    nonexistent or illicit, nor did they use delays to prevent damaging
    strikes and force settlements. However, in 1998 strikers at the Han
    Young maquiladora plant in Tijuana filed an ``amparo'' (a type of
    injunction) action in a Federal District court challenging the ruling
    of the JLCA in Tijuana that declared the strike begun on May 22 of that
    year to be illegal. On May 3, 1999, the court recognized the striking
    union's right to the collective bargaining contract and declared the
    1998 strike to have been legal. Acting quickly on that decision, the
    union put strike flags at the plant, but the JLCA declared the new
    strike illegal because the board had not yet been informed officially
    of the court's ruling nor given time to act on that ruling. Efforts to
    resolve the conflict through the courts continued throughout the year.
    The union's leader and lawyer were the subjects of arrest warrants for
    allegedly detaining the plant manager against his will; however, these
    individuals had not been taken into custody at year's end.
        The dissident leaders of the teachers' union who were charged with
    forcing entry into the Senate and holding several senators hostage in
    1998 were released within 3 months from pretrial detention when charges
    were reduced substantially. There is no record that they were ever
    tried on the reduced charges.
        During the first major strike in 10 years that occurred at a Ciudad
    Juarez plant in July, some protesting workers reported that they were
    harassed by police and representatives of the union holding the
    contract at the plant. Earlier in the summer, the leader of a group of
    workers challenging the existing union at a plant in Tamaulipas
    asserted that he had been kidnaped and held for more than 24 hours by
    representatives of that union. However, state labor authorities
    eventually recognized the new union, which allowed it to negotiate with
    plant management.
        The Constitution and the LFT protect labor organizations from
    government interference in their internal affairs, including strike
    decisions. However, this also can protect undemocratic or corrupt union
    leaders. The law permits closed shop and exclusion clauses, allowing
    union leaders to vet and veto new hires and to force dismissal of
    anyone the union expels. Such clauses are common in collective
    bargaining agreements.
        Employer organizations slowed efforts to push for labor law reform
    early in 1999 and entered into ongoing discussions with the Government
    and labor unions about reforming the LFT's rules of procedure.
    Government, employers, and unions had negotiated reforms through
    tripartite national agreements and collective bargaining at the
    enterprise level. Reforms were effected also through cooperation in
    programs to increase, and compensate for, productivity. Government,
    national labor unions, and employer organizations met periodically
    throughout the year to discuss ways and means of cooperation to boost
    productivity, wages, and competitiveness. The need to reform the LFT
    was an issue in the presidential campaign and in the fall session of
    Congress.
        Unions are free to affiliate with, and increasingly are interested
    in actively participating in, trade union internationals. Reflecting
    that change in attitude and relationship, the International Federation
    of Metalworkers Unions opened an office in Mexico, and U.S., Canadian,
    and Mexican autoworker union representatives held meetings in the
    country during the year.
        A complaint alleging a refusal on the part of the Government to
    register the Academic Workers Union of the National College of
    Technical Occupational Education (SINTACONALEP) as a union is pending
    before the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA).
    SINTACONALEP's employer, the National College of Technical Occupational
    Education (CONALEP), requires its teaching staff to sign documents
    denying the existence of an employment relationship thereby feigning a
    type of relationship that is covered under the civil code and not the
    LFT even though the form, terms, and conditions all correspond to an
    employment relationship. Hence according to STPS, SINTACONALEP members
    do not meet the definition of workers under the LFT to be registered as
    a union. In 1999 the CFA issued an interim report requesting that the
    Government provide a copy of the applicable law that denies trade union
    status to SINTACONALEP and that the Government investigate the
    allegations of interference and antiunion discrimination on the part of
    CONALEP. The ILO had not received a response from the Government by
    year's end.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution and the LFT provide for the right to organize and bargain
    collectively. Interest by a few employees, or a union strike notice,
    compels an employer either to recognize a union and negotiate with it
    or to ask the federal or state labor board to hold a union recognition
    election. LFT prounion provisions led some employers to seek out or
    create independent ``white'' or company unions as an alternative to
    mainstream national or local unions. Representation elections are
    traditionally open, not secret. Traditionally, management and union
    officials are present with the presiding labor board official when
    workers openly declare their votes, one by one. Such open recounts are
    prevailing practice but are not required by law or regulation. Secret
    ballots are held when all parties agree.
        Wage restraints no longer exist, except for those caused by
    recession or an employer's difficult situation. Wages in most union
    contracts appeared to keep pace with or ahead of inflation, but most
    workers had not yet regained buying power lost over the past decade.
        The country's record in internal union democracy and transparency
    was mixed. Some unions were democratic, but corruption and strong-arm
    tactics were common in others.
        A disputed 1997 election for the right to the collective bargaining
    contract for workers at a Korean-owned maquiladora in Tijuana, Baja
    California continued to provoke controversy. Although the parties
    reached a settlement in January 1998, allegations that plant management
    violated health and safety regulations were considered in a public
    hearing by the U.S. NAO that year. The dispute over union
    representation at the plant continued, and in May the U.S. and Mexican
    Secretaries of Labor signed an agreement on steps to resolve this
    dispute; pursuant to that agreement the Mexican Labor Secretariat held
    a public NAFTA conference in Tijuana in June to address the issues
    raised in the complaint.
        In another case involving freedom of association linked to the
    right to organize unions, in December 1997, 9 unions and 24 human
    rights NGO's jointly filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging that
    a CTM-affiliated union used strong-arm tactics to intimidate workers so
    that they would not vote in favor of a rival union to represent workers
    at a plant in Mexico state. This submission also alleged violations of
    health and safety regulations. The Canadian NAO also received a
    submission on this case in the spring of 1998. The U.S. NAO issued a
    report in July 1998 that recommended ministerial consultations. At
    year's end, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian labor authorities continued to
    discuss the issues raised in both submissions. The May agreement
    between the U.S. and Mexican Labor Secretaries and adhered to by the
    Canadian Labor Minister provided that the Mexican Labor Secretariat
    hold a public NAFTA conference in Mexico City in late fall to address
    the issues raised in the complaints. However, the conference had not
    taken place by year's end.
        In November 1999, the U.S. Association of Flight Attendants filed a
    submission with the U.S. NAO alleging violations of worker rights to
    freedom of association and to bargain collectively; protection of the
    right to organize; minimum employment standards; and prevention of
    occupational injuries and illnesses at Executive Air Transport, Inc.
    (TAESA). The complaint focused on the voting process employed when the
    Mexican flight attendants union sought the right to represent flight
    attendants employed by TAESA. The U.S. NAO held a public hearing in
    Washington in March and issued a report in July recommending
    ministerial consultations.
        The public sector is almost totally organized. Industrial areas are
    heavily organized. Even states with little industry have transport and
    public employee unions, and rural peasant organizations are
    omnipresent. The law protects workers from antiunion discrimination,
    but enforcement is uneven in the few states with low unionization.
        Unionization and wage levels in the in-bond export sector vary by
    area and sophistication of the manufacturing process. Wages have been
    lower and job creation has been greater in this sector than in more
    traditional manufacturing. Wages in the maquiladora sector are still
    lower than in the traditional manufacturing sector, although they are
    approaching manufacturing sector level. Some observers allege poor
    working conditions, inadequate wages, and employer and government
    efforts to discourage unionization in this sector. There is no evidence
    that the Federal Government opposes unionization of the plants (the
    maquiladora sector tends to be under state jurisdiction), but some
    state and local governments in the west are said to help employers
    discourage unions, especially independent ones, through the use of
    protection contracts. Protection contracts, to which the workforce is
    not privy, are used in the maquila sector and elsewhere to discourage
    the development of authentic unions. These contracts are collective
    bargaining agreements negotiated and signed by management and a
    representative of a so-called labor organization, sometimes even prior
    to the hiring of a single worker.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor, which includes forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, there were some cases of trafficking in persons for
    purposes of forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
    There also were cases of abuses of refugees and illegal immigrants in
    Chiapas (see section 2.d.). There were no reports of forced child
    labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution prohibits children under 12 years of age
    from working. The law sets the minimum legal work age at 14 years.
    Those between the ages of 14 and 15 may work only limited hours, with
    no night or hazardous work, which generally makes hiring them
    uneconomical. Enforcement was reasonably good at large and medium-sized
    companies, especially in export industries and those under federal
    jurisdiction. Enforcement was inadequate at many small companies and in
    agriculture and construction. It was nearly absent in the informal
    sector, despite continued government efforts.
        In 1996 the ILO reported that 18 percent of children 12 to 14 years
    of age work, often for parents or relatives. Most child labor is in the
    informal sector (including myriad underage street vendors), family-
    owned workshops, or in agriculture and rural areas. Mexico City's
    central market employs approximately 11,000 minors between the ages of
    7 and 18, who work as cartpushers, kitchen help, and vendors. The
    children do not receive a fixed wage, and most work long shifts,
    starting in the early morning hours. The CTM agricultural union's
    success years earlier in obtaining free transport for migrant seasonal
    workers from southern states to fields in the north inadvertently led
    to a significant increase in child labor. The union and employers were
    unable to convince indigenous farm workers to leave their families at
    home, and many have settled near work sites in the north. The union has
    had some limited success in negotiating with employers to finance
    education in Spanish and indigenous languages near work sites and in
    obtaining social security child care centers, but it has had difficulty
    in persuading member families not to bring their children into the
    fields. Many urban child workers are migrants from rural areas, are
    illiterate, and have parents who are unemployed.
        The Federal Government increased the number of obligatory school
    years from 6 to 9 in 1992 and made parents legally liable for their
    children's attendance, as part of a reform to upgrade labor force
    skills and long-term efforts to continue increasing educational
    opportunities for and participation by youth. Scholarships offered to
    families of the abject poor under the Government's ``Progresa''
    antipoverty program kept an additional 100,000 children in school in
    1999. According to ``Progresa,'' that number increased by 18 percent
    during the year.
        In March the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor. The government of the Federal District
    implemented a law adopted in July 1999 that increased limitations on
    working hours and conditions for children employed as supermarket
    baggers and automotive attendants.
        The law bans child labor, including forced or bonded labor, and
    there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution and the LFT
    provide for a daily minimum wage. The tripartite National Minimum Wage
    Commission (government, labor, and employers) usually sets minimum wage
    rates each December, effective January 1, but any of the three parties
    can ask that the Commission reconvene during the year to consider a
    changed situation. In December 1999, the wage commission adopted a 10
    percent increase effective January 1, based in part on the Government's
    projection of a 10 percent annual inflation rate for. For the first
    time, all labor representatives on the Commission abstained from the
    vote in protest, and also for the first time, the Government stood firm
    on its original offer. During the course of the year, wage and benefit
    adjustments to collective bargaining contracts averaged about 13 to 15
    percent, which was several points above the final inflation rate of 8.9
    percent for the year.
        In Acapulco, Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, southeast
    Veracruz State's refining and petrochemical zone, and most border
    areas, the minimum daily wage was set at $3.99 (37.90 pesos). However,
    employers actually paid $4.55 because of a supplemental 14 percent
    subsidy. These income supplements to the minimum wage, agreed to in
    annual tripartite pacts, are for all incomes less than four times the
    minimum wage, decreasing as wages and benefits rise. In Guadalajara,
    Monterrey, and other advanced industrialized areas, the minimum daily
    wage (before the subsidy) was $3.70 (35.10 pesos). In other areas, it
    was $3.44 (32.70 pesos). There are higher minimums for some
    occupations, such as building trades.
        The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. Few workers (about 16 percent) earn only the minimum
    wage. Industrial workers average three to four times the minimum wage,
    earning more at larger, more advanced, and prosperous enterprises.
        The law and contract arrangements provide workers with extensive
    additional benefits. Legally required benefits include free social
    security medical treatment and pensions, individual worker housing and
    retirement accounts, substantial Christmas bonuses, paid vacations, and
    profit sharing. Employer costs for these benefits add from about 27
    percent of payroll at marginal enterprises to over 100 percent at major
    firms with good union contracts. In addition, employers frequently
    subsidize the cost of meals, transportation, and day care for children,
    and pay bonuses for punctuality and productivity.
        The LFT sets six 8-hour days as the legal workweek, but with pay
    for 56 hours. For most industrial workers, especially under union
    contract, the true workweek is 42 hours, although they are paid for 7
    full 8-hour days. This is one reason why unions vigorously defend the
    legal ban on hourly wages. Workers asked to exceed 3 hours of overtime
    per day or required to work overtime on 3 consecutive days must be paid
    triple the normal wage.
        There are 11 special labor arbitration and conciliation boards (in
    Queretaro, Pachuca, Ciudad del Carmen, Zacatecas, Orizaba, Ciudad
    Juarez, Cancun, Colima, La Paz, Reynosa, and Tijuana) and 4 more state
    offices of the STPS to make it more convenient for workers to file
    complaints and bring other actions before the labor court system. In
    addition, the Labor Secretary has transferred more personnel to the
    JFCA to reduce backlogs. He also has highlighted as special issues
    child labor, women in the workplace, and the physically disabled by
    assigning responsibility for them directly to one of the under
    secretaries. In February 1999, the Labor Secretariat established a
    separate office for equality and gender issues.
        The law requires employers to observe occupational safety and
    health regulations, issued jointly by the STPS and the Social Security
    Institute (IMSS), and to pay contributions that vary according to their
    workplace safety and health experience ratings. LFT-mandated joint
    management and labor committees set standards and are responsible for
    workplace enforcement in plants and offices. These committees meet at
    least monthly to consider workplace needs and file copies of their
    minutes with federal labor inspectors. Federal and state authorities
    exchange information.
        STPS and IMSS officials continued to report that compliance is
    reasonably good at most large companies. However, because smaller firms
    are far more numerous and so much more difficult to monitor, these
    officials were unable to draw any general conclusions about their
    compliance. Federal inspectors are stretched too thin for effective
    enforcement if companies do not comply voluntarily and fulfill their
    legal obligation to train workers in occupational health and safety
    matters. There are special problems in construction, where unskilled,
    untrained, poorly educated, transient labor is common, especially at
    many small sites and companies. Many unions, particularly in
    construction, are not organized effectively to provide training, to
    encourage members to work safely and healthily, to participate in the
    joint committees, or to insist on their rights.
        In July a large group of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican labor
    organizations and NGO's filed a submission with the U.S. NAO alleging
    the failure of Mexican labor authorities to comply with health and
    safety regulations resulting in occupational injuries to a number of
    workers at maquiladora plants belonging to a U.S. company in the border
    state of Tamaulipas. The U.S. NAO accepted the submission in September
    for formal review and conducted a public hearing in San Antonio, Texas,
    on December 12.
        On July 23, about 150 workers at a construction site for a hospital
    in Ciudad Juarez rioted over mistreatment by police and poor working
    conditions. The workers complained of low pay and extremely poor living
    conditions at the barracks where they were housed.
        Many agricultural workers are internal migrants, who often travel
    with their families, including young children. They often are paid by
    volume of the work they produce, rather than by the day. Working
    conditions vary by area of the country and from one locality to
    another. Allegations have been made that workers, including young
    children accompanying them, have been exposed to pesticides and other
    chemicals.
        Individual employees or unions also may complain directly to
    inspectors or safety and health officials. Workers may remove
    themselves from hazardous situations without jeopardizing their
    employment. Plaintiffs may bring complaints before the federal labor
    board at no cost to themselves.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws that
    prohibit the trafficking of persons; however, immigration laws, the
    federal organized crime law, and federal and state penal codes contain
    laws that are used to prosecute traffickers of undocumented migrants,
    women, and children, and trafficking is a serious problem. The country
    is a transit country for the trafficking of persons, especially from
    China, to the United States and Canada. There also are isolated cases
    of trafficking Mexican nationals for the purpose of forced prostitution
    or sexual services, domestic servitude, forced or bonded sweatshop
    labor, or other debt bondage. The Government has strengthened
    significantly its cooperation with China, the United States, and other
    countries. There were credible reports that police, immigration, and
    customs officials were involved in the trafficking of such persons (see
    Section 2.d.).
        On July 31, the Honduran Government stated that it was working to
    repatriate from Mexico approximately 400 Honduran girls, between the
    ages of 10 and 16 years, who after having tried to enter the United
    States illegally were forced into prostitution in Mexico.
        A study that was jointly funded by UNICEF and DIF and released in
    June studied the commercial sexual exploitation of children in six
    cities. Its author estimated that the number of children involved in
    the sex trade countrywide at 16,000. Most are Mexicans, although there
    are significant numbers from Central America--principally Guatemala,
    Honduras, and El Salvador. The Central American children enter the
    country through Chiapas. In many cases they are brought there by
    procurers who promise them employment in legitimate occupations. They
    are thereafter sold to the owners of bars and other establishments and
    then forced into prostitution to ``pay off their debts.'' This debt
    peonage often never ends because the children accrue more debt for
    their meals and housing. Oftentimes, the owners will sell or trade the
    children among themselves. Other children are transported to Mexico
    City for training. They are then sent to centers of tourism. Some
    children are trafficked to the United States and Canada. The study
    concludes that the commercial sexual exploitation of children is a
    phenomenon that is present today throughout the whole country.
                                   __________

                                   NICARAGUA

        Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy, with a directly elected
    president, vice president, and unicameral legislature. President
    Arnoldo Aleman was elected in a free and fair election in 1996,
    defeating his closest competitor, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista
    National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Supreme Electoral Council is an
    independent fourth branch of government. A series of political accords
    between the governing Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) and the
    Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), though highly
    controversial, ceded the FSLN more power in several governmental
    institutions in exchange for the avoidance of the use of violent
    protests to achieve political ends. FSLN leaders largely refrained from
    using or threatening the use of violence. The Constitution provides for
    an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is at times
    susceptible to political and financial influence.
        The President is the supreme chief of the national defense and
    security forces. President Aleman established the first-ever civilian
    Defense Ministry upon his inauguration. The Ministry of Government
    oversees the National Police, which is charged formally with internal
    security. However, the police share this responsibility with the army
    in rural areas. The National Police recently diminished the role of
    voluntary police, private citizens contracted by the National Police to
    help fill staffing gaps, in law enforcement. The civilian authorities
    generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Some
    members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
        Nicaragua is an extremely poor country, with an estimated per
    capita gross domestic product of less than $480. The economy is
    predominantly agricultural; coffee, seafood exports, sugar, beef, and
    some light manufacturing are the key sectors. The economy grew at 7
    percent in real terms in 1999, but the rate declined in 2000. Real GDP
    growth rate for 2000 is estimated at 5 percent. The estimated annual
    rate of inflation was 8 percent, marking the second consecutive year of
    single digit price increases. While the Government estimated that
    unemployment is less than 11 percent, some nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) calculated the rate of unemployment and
    underemployment as high as 40 to 50 percent. Private foreign investment
    continued to increase during the year; however, economic growth is
    hindered by unresolved property disputes and unclear land titles
    stemming from massive confiscations by the Sandinista government in the
    1980's. The country continued to have a precarious balance of payments
    position and remained heavily dependent on foreign assistance and
    remittances from citizens living abroad.
        The Government generally respected many of its citizens' human
    rights; however, serious problems remained in some areas. Members of
    the security forces committed six reported extrajudicial killings.
    Police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There were
    allegations of torture by the authorities. Prison and police holding
    cell conditions remain harsh, although they improved somewhat. Security
    forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens at an increased rate.
    The Government effectively punished some of those who committed abuses;
    however, a degree of impunity persisted. Lengthy pretrial detention and
    long delays in trials remain problems; however, the judiciary has made
    efforts to reduce the large case backlog. The judiciary also is subject
    at times to political influence and corruption. The Supreme Court
    continued its structural reform program for the judicial system. A new
    Judicial Organic Law, intended to address many of these problems, came
    into effect in January 1999; however, the weakness of the judiciary
    continued to hamper prosecution of human rights abusers in some cases.
    The Human Rights Ombudsman made several publicized recommendations
    during the year that openly challenged the policies of the Aleman
    Administration. These led to little concrete action. Violence against
    women, including domestic abuse and rape, remained a problem.
    Discrimination against women is an ingrained problem. Violence against
    children is a problem and child prostitution continues. Discrimination
    against indigenous people is a problem. Child labor also remained a
    problem. There were reports of trafficking for forced labor and
    trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution.
        The civil war formally concluded in June 1990 with the
    demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN, or ``Contras'').
    However, the rule of law and basic infrastructure do not extend to all
    rural areas. Despite the Government's disarmament campaigns, many
    citizens, especially in rural areas, are heavily armed. Marauding
    criminal gangs, some of which claimed political agendas, continued to
    be a problem in the mountainous regions of the north, as well as on the
    Atlantic Coast.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government officials; however, the
    police registered six reports of extrajudicial killings by police.
        The Inspector General's office (IG) of the National Police reported
    6 instances in which a member of the police killed an alleged criminal
    and 35 instances in which police seriously wounded criminal suspects
    while attempting to arrest them. The IG automatically remands to the
    court system for review cases in which police use deadly force;
    however, the cases often take considerable time to process. The police
    do not make a final decision on cases sent to the courts until the
    courts respond with a verdict. While the police await the decisions
    from the courts, the IG's office normally applies a mild punishment,
    such as suspension or confinement to precinct. Of the 48 cases the IG
    remanded to the courts during the year, there were no reports of case
    adjudication.
        On August 19, in Managua, police officers Juan Ramon Velasquez and
    Leonel Antonio Velasquez shot and killed 20-year-old Javier de Jesus
    Solorzano Hernandez. Solorzano and his friend Marlon Antonio Obando
    Madrigal were leaving a neighborhood block party when two unknown
    thieves reportedly attempted to rob them. When Solorzano and Obando
    refused to give up their money, the four youths entered into a fight.
    The thieves had beaten Solorzano to the ground when the Velasquez
    brothers, who were patrolling the neighborhood, arrived on the scene.
    The thieves reportedly escaped just before the police arrived, at which
    time one of the two policemen approached Solorzano, believing that
    Solorzano and Obando were gang members. The officer hit Solorzano with
    his police baton until he fell down again. Obando then claimed that one
    of the two officers, at close range, fired two bullets into Solorzano's
    chest. Juan Ramon Velasquez claimed that when they arrived on the scene
    Solorzano was brandishing a gun. The police reported that they shot
    Solorzano in an act of self-defense. It remained unclear if Solorzano
    indeed was brandishing a revolver, and the preliminary autopsy report
    raised questions about the veracity of Velasquez's story. Juan Ramon
    Velasquez was suspended from his position and was awaiting trial at
    year's end.
        In late October clashes between police and members of the Yatama
    political party led to one reported death and several injuries (See
    Section 5).
        The police authorities treated another death involving police
    officers as a justified homicide in self-defense. On April 6,
    roadblocks on major transit arteries in the Southern Atlantic
    Autonomous Region (RAAS) by former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance
    resulted in clashes with police and the death of one of the protesters.
    The roadblocks were organized allegedly in response to the Government's
    failure to follow through on accords to settle longstanding claims for
    land titles and other benefits. According to a police report, the
    police were in the process of negotiating an end to the roadblock when
    five of the protesters attacked a policeman, Rafael Urbina Ortega. One
    of the assailants, Mauricio Mendoza, took the policeman's rifle and
    started shooting indiscriminately, injuring one policeman and four
    protesters. Mendoza, whom the police claim was inebriated, then was
    shot fatally by police. The local court in Rama, RAAS had yet to decide
    on the culpability of the police in the killing at year's end.
        National Police reports indicate that the four policemen involved
    in the January 1999 killings of Hilario Briones Arostegui and Santos
    Arostegui Torres were never investigated.
        There were no further developments in the May 1999 case of Pedro
    Gonzalez Talavera who was shot and killed by policemen in Villa
    Sandino, Chontales. At year's end, the case was still pending in the
    Appellate Court of Juigalpa.
        There were no further developments in the 1997 Wamblan case in
    which 16-year-old Irma Lopez was killed, after allegedly being raped,
    by an army patrol.
        There were no further developments in the 1997 La Patriota case, in
    which the army allegedly killed five members of a criminal band as they
    slept.
        In 1997 the Government negotiated the disbandment and disarmament
    of over 1,200 members, a majority of them former contras, of the
    ``Northern Front 3-80'' and promised them food, clothing, seeds, and
    small plots of land. It also disarmed 423 members of the proSandinista
    ``Andres Castro United Front'' (FUAC). Despite these successful
    disarmaments, armed bands, including former members of the 3-80 front
    and FUAC, engaged in murder, kidnapping for ransom, and armed robbery
    in the north and north-central regions. FUAC members have alleged that
    they were acting in opposition to the Aleman administration, and FSLN
    leaders have made positive reference to the FUAC activities in public
    statements. However, law enforcement groups, human rights
    organizations, and political analysts described the political
    motivations as tenuous and stated that most of these actions were
    purely criminal in nature. The violent criminal activities of the FUAC-
    related gangs received so much public attention that in June the army
    launched an intensive military operation to eliminate the gangs in the
    region (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law makes the use of torture a punishable crime;
    however, police continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees. There
    were numerous credible reports that police beat or physically
    mistreated detainees, often to obtain confessions. During the year, the
    Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH) received 70 complaints
    of torture or degrading treatment by the authorities. However,
    according to government figures, the Ombudsman's Office for the Defense
    of Human Rights (PPDDH) submitted the majority of human rights cases to
    the police authorities; 39 of the 40 cases received by the police
    investigative bodies resulted from PPDDH inquiries. Police Inspector
    General Eva Sacasa proved willing to prosecute abusers. During the
    year, her office recorded 177 complaints of physical abuse by police,
    including those submitted by the ANPDH and others, and found 50 to have
    merit. The Inspector General sanctioned 131 officers in these cases.
        Between January and November, 27 police officers were discharged
    dishonorably.
        The National Police recently diminished the role of voluntary
    police in law enforcement. Volunteer police are private citizens who
    are contracted by the National Police on a volunteer basis to help fill
    staffing gaps in several precincts. The National Police provide them
    with a uniform, and in some cases, with a gun, at the discretion of the
    police chief. Voluntary police do not receive a salary from the
    statealthough they may be ``subcontracted'' to provide security to
    businesses and farms--nor do they receive any professional training.
    Given the sustained criticism of voluntary police for their involvement
    in human rights violations, on August 8, Chief of Police Franco
    Montealegre approved a new police statute terminating the employment of
    all voluntary police in Managua. Government authorities report that
    there still are 3,303 voluntary police located throughout the country.
        While the Inspector General's office investigated allegations of
    abuse and sanctioned the offenders in many cases, a degree of impunity
    persisted. Inadequate budget support for the National Police also
    hampered efforts to improve police performance and resulted in a
    continuing shortage of officers. However, the police were provided with
    extensive training during the year, much of it through international
    assistance programs.
        The Office of Civil Inspection for Professional Responsibility is
    responsible for monitoring allegations of illegal detention and police
    abuse and forwarding complaints received to the police Inspector
    General for follow-up action. A small budget and a small staff limited
    its effectiveness. Police Inspector General Sacasa received a total of
    863 complaints of human rights violations by police officers during the
    year, including complaints forwarded by the Office of Civil Inspection
    for Professional Responsibility, and found 177 of these cases to have
    merit. She sanctioned a total of 288 officers for violations of human
    rights. Of those sanctioned, 69 officers were discharged dishonorably,
    and 48 were remanded to the courts; the rest received lesser
    punishments, including demotion, suspension, and loss of pay.
        On February 16, voluntary policeman Julio Cesar Montenegro Pacheco
    accompanied by Lt. Roger Perez entered the house of Jose Francisco
    Fernandez in Managua, allegedly without authorization, after hearing
    what sounded like a gunshot. When the police began to beat Fernandez,
    he ran out of the house and tried to climb over a fence. Montenegro
    then used Perez's gun to shoot Fernandez twice in the legs. Montenegro
    later defended his actions, claiming that he only fired in Fernandez's
    general direction without intending to hit him when Fernandez tried to
    throw a machete at the police to impede their pursuit. However, the
    inquiries and site investigation of the Nicaraguan Center for Human
    Rights (CENIDH) concluded that Montenegro used unnecessary force and
    faulted Perez for allowing the voluntary policeman to use his gun. The
    National Police subsequently dismissed Montenegro and subjected Perez
    to disciplinary action.
        On March 2, several members of the National Police stopped Rene de
    Jesus Membreno Calero, a Nicaraguan citizen who was traveling from
    Costa Rica to his mother's house in the department of Boaco. Captain
    Juan Manuel Chavez and other members of the patrol force, for unknown
    reasons, severely beat Mr. Membreno, causing rib fractures and other
    lesions. After making an investigation, the National Police concluded
    that the officers were innocent of all charges and closed the case.
        On March 10, several police officers from San Rafael del Norte
    entered the home of Rafael Ubeda Castro to arrest Roger Antonio and
    Carmen Rafael Ubeda Castro without showing any type of arrest warrant.
    Roger Ubeda reported to ANPDH that when the police officers Mario
    Castillo and Mario Rojas took him and his brother Carmen outside the
    home of their father, the police officers began to beat them with a
    wooden stick and the handles of their pistols. The police officers took
    the victims to the police headquarters in Jinotega to interrogate them
    about possible involvement in armed gangs. Roger and Carmen remained in
    a holding cell for 3 days, at which time the police released them for
    lack of evidence and the receipt of good conduct reports by private
    citizens who knew the individuals (see Section 1.d.).
        On March 11, police allegedly apprehended, handcuffed, and brutally
    beat Jesus Ramon Olivas Espinoza as he left a bar in Wiwili. The ANPDH
    reported that police officers Antonio Armador Ciclon, Teodoro Vanegas,
    and several others punched and kicked Olivas several times. The police
    officers reportedly carried Olivas to a freight container and continued
    physically abusing him in the presence of six other detainees also held
    in the container. Olivas claimed that for 3 days the Wiwili police
    transferred him and the six other detainees to the holding cells at
    night while during the day they were moved to the container. The
    container attracted so much heat from the sun that the detainees were
    reportedly close to dying from asphyxiation. The police apprehended
    Olivas because he was suspected of destroying the propaganda of
    political parties. On March 14, the local judge dismissed the case
    against Olivas for insufficient evidence. Olivas filed a complaint of
    mistreatment with police captain Alberto Garcia Pineda, but an
    investigation remained pending at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        On June 13, CENIDH reported that army soldiers Ricardo Lopez
    Navarrete and Jose Danilo Hernandez sexually abused Yadira Mendez
    Chavarria and robbed Ismael Reyes in the city of Rosita, Northern
    Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAN). The soldiers were part of a military
    operation, carried out in June, to combat the illicit and violent
    activities of gangs in the region. The local judge in Rosita ruled in
    favor of the soldiers, but the Military Appeals Court found the
    soldiers guilty and sentenced them to 4 years in prison.
        On August 6, police officer Allan Gonzalez and a police cadet
    repeatedly kicked a minor in Managua when the youth would not abandon
    the sidewalk in front of a private store. Spectators took photographs
    of the abuse, and all the major newspapers and human rights
    organizations criticized the event. Police Chief Franco Montealegre
    dismissed the officer and the cadet from the police department.
        On August 23, four soldiers in civilian clothing, including Eleazar
    Miguel Romero, robbed a bus full of civilians in Palacaguina, Madriz,
    and then fired their guns at the passengers. After hijacking the bus,
    they fired their rifles in the air and began to rob the passengers,
    including in one instance shooting one, Jose Santos Cordoba Garcia, in
    both his legs. Once they stole everything, they stepped off the bus and
    allegedly began to shoot indiscriminately into the side of the bus,
    injuring a total of nine persons. Erling Suyapa Figueroa, a 15-year-old
    girl, was wounded in her left hand. The only identified assailant,
    Eleazar Miguel Romero, said that the soldiers committed the crime to
    augment their small salaries. While the military investigation remains
    pending, as of September, the case already was presented before the
    local judge in the region. In December the court found three of the
    four soldiers guilty, sentenced them to 16 years in prison, and
    acquitted the other soldier.
        On August 26, Miguel Angel Toruno Orozco accused police officer
    Lizandro Exiles Moncada of shooting him in the chin at close range on
    May 22. Toruno claimed that while he and a friend named Francisco Reyes
    were walking home from a restaurant in the northern city of Esteli,
    Moncada, who was drunk and in civilian clothing, jumped out of a truck
    and pointed a pistol at him. Moncada threatened to kill Toruno and
    then, at close range, shot Toruno in the chin and left him lying in the
    street. While confined to a hospital bed for 2 months in critical
    condition, Toruno contacted local human rights organizations and the
    police to investigate the case. The local police allegedly closed the
    investigation claiming that Toruno was shot by friend, Francisco Reyes.
    However, Toruno flatly denied the police claim because he recognized
    Moncada before the incident, and Reyes does not know how to drive. The
    police in Esteli advised Toruno to take his case to the Office of
    Internal Affairs at the National Police headquarters. The office of
    internal affairs sent the case to a local magistrate. The police
    forensics team concluded that the bullet used to wound the victim did
    not come from the gun of the police officer. Based on that evidence,
    the local judge acquitted police officer Lizandro Exiles Moncada of all
    charges.
        On April 11, three antiriot police were shot and wounded seriously
    when police attempted to disperse a group of 500 to 600 former members
    of the Resistance. The former Resistance members had established a
    roadblock at Boaco, in central Nicaragua. One member of the police,
    Ernesto Moises Lopez, lost his right eye, while another was shot in the
    stomach and a third in the back. The CENIDH reported that Jose Jesus
    Jiron, of the former Resistance, was killed in the incident. An
    individual riding on a bus also was shot in the leg. Police arrested 12
    to 15 former Resistance members. The protesters allegedly were armed
    with grenades and shotguns at the time of the incident. The police sent
    three of the protesters to a local court in Boaco and released the
    others for lack of evidence.
        Prison conditions remained harsh, but improved somewhat. The
    Supreme Court (CSJ), the National Police, the Attorney General, the
    Department of Prisons, and several human rights organizations worked
    together during the year to significantly reduce the number of
    prisoners who spent 6 months or more of incarceration without a trial
    (see Section 1.d.). The initiative helped to alleviate overcrowded
    prisons. As of September, only one of the eight correctional facilities
    maintained prison populations significantly higher than the standards
    established by U. N. conventions on the treatment of prisoners; the
    Granada penitentiary exceeded the U.N. standards by 146 prisoners.
    According to government statistics, the prisons had a total inmate
    population of 4,903 in September, compared with 5,298 in September
    1999.
        However, the prison system remains underfunded and medical
    attention ranges from inadequate to nonexistent. For example, for all 8
    penitentiaries and 4,903 prisoners, prison authorities only maintained
    a staff of 22 specialists, which include doctors, psychologists,
    teachers, and social workers. Prison authorities also reported that 31
    percent of prisoners remained without beds, forcing prisoners to sleep
    on concrete beds or floors. The percentage of prisoners without beds or
    bed mattresses would likely be higher without the periodic inflow of
    privately donated mattresses.
        On June 6, then-Minister of Government Rene Herrera appointed
    Rosario Gaitan to replace Carlos Quintana as Director of Prisons.
    Gaitan previously served as Deputy to Quintana, has maintained a career
    in the penal system since 1980, and has earned both the respect of the
    prison personnel and the prisoners.
        Prison officials calculated that the daily expenditure per prisoner
    for food was about $0.50 (6 cordobas) and reported that the annual
    budget for food remained constant. There was some improvement in prison
    food, but malnutrition remained a problem in local jails and police
    holding cells. Many prisoners also received additional food from
    visiting family and friends. Medical care available to prisoners fell
    far short of basic needs. Some prisons and many police holding cells
    were dark, poorly ventilated, and unhygienic. At the Bluefields jail,
    there were only 2 showers and 4 toilets for more than 102 prisoners.
        Only Managua has a separate prison for women; outside the Managua
    area, women were housed in separate wings in prison facilities and were
    guarded by female custodians. As of September, females made up 2.6
    percent of the prison population. The Public Defender's office assigned
    two full-time employees to work with the women's prison system to help
    ensure its proper functioning in such areas as timely release of
    inmates granted parole.
        As of September, 3 percent of the prison population were between
    the ages of 15 and 18, compared with 4 percent in 1999 and 8.5 percent
    in 1998. All youths were housed in separate prison wings from adults.
    During the year the Department of Prisons completed the process of
    establishing separate facilities for juveniles or converting part of
    their existing prison space into a separate youth wing for all prisons.
        Conditions in jails and holding cells remained harsh. Police
    station holding cells were severely overcrowded. Suspects often were
    left in these cells during their trials, since budgetary shortfalls
    often restricted the use of fuel for frequent transfers to distant
    courtrooms. At the Corn Island jail, six cells each holding six
    detainees frequently were filled to capacity. The authorities
    occasionally released detainees when they no longer could feed them.
    Several churches and national and international NGO's donate
    foodstuffs, beds, and medicine to the prison system to help alleviate
    shortfalls. The ANPDH worked with the Director of Prisons in an effort
    to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely fashion when their
    sentence had been served or they were granted parole (see Section
    1.e.). Prison guards received human rights training from NGO's and the
    Catholic Church and generally treated prisoners well, although there
    were some reports of abuses.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention by the police remains a problem. The Police Functions Law
    requires police to obtain a warrant prior to detaining a suspect and to
    notify family members within 24 hours of the detainee's whereabouts.
    Compliance with this law increased significantly in 1999, largely
    because of pressure applied by the police internal affairs office and
    support for compliance from Chief of Police Franco Montealegre.
    Detainees do not have the right to an attorney until they have been
    charged formally with a crime. Local human rights groups are critical
    of the law for providing inadequate judicial oversight of police
    arrests.
        The 1995 constitutional reforms reduced from 72 to 48 hours the
    time police may hold a suspect legally before they must bring the
    person before a judge to decide if charges should be brought. The judge
    must then either order the accused released or transferred to prison.
    Although cumbersome, this law was observed more closely than in past
    years, and few prisoners were held illegally beyond the 48-hour
    deadline (see Section 1.c.).
        An interinstitutional effort comprised of the Supreme Court (CSJ),
    the National Police, the Department of the Penitentiary System, and
    several human rights organizations significantly reduced the number of
    prisoners with 6 months or more of incarceration without a trial.
    Specifically, on February 4, the Penal Bench of the Supreme Court
    passed an order to all local magistrates to give priority to those
    cases involving pretrial prisoners with 6 months or more of
    incarceration. According to government statistics, only 4 percent of
    the 4,958 prisoners have been in jail for 6 months or longer without a
    trial; in 1999, 8 percent of the prison population experienced an
    unusually long delay before their court hearing (see Section 1.c.).
        During the year, ANPDH received 155 complaints of illegal arrest
    and arbitrary detention. Of those cases sent to the police IG's office
    by ANPDH and other human rights organizations, 28 complaints were found
    to merit investigation. Of these, 2 were determined to be without merit
    and 26 remained under investigation at year's end. As in past years,
    incidents of arbitrary detention were most common in Managua and in the
    rural northern and north-central regions, where much of the civil war
    was fought.
        Exile is not practiced. There were no reports of political violence
    against any citizens returning from civil war era self-imposed exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible at times
    to corruption and political influence. The judiciary is hampered by
    arcane legal codes, prosecutors who play a passive role, an
    underfunded, and understaffed defender's office, judges and lawyers who
    often lack sufficient training or education, and corruption. In the
    past, many judges were not lawyers. Judges' political sympathies or
    acceptance of bribes reportedly often influenced judicial actions and
    findings.
        The judicial system comprises both civil and military courts. The
    16-member Supreme Court is the system's highest court, and in addition
    to administering the judicial system, also is responsible for
    nominating all appellate and lower court judges. The Court is divided
    into specialized chambers on administrative, criminal, constitutional,
    and civil matters. Under the Law of the Child and Family, which took
    effect in 1998, the Attorney General's office rather than the police
    investigates crimes committed by and against juveniles. The 1994
    Military Code requires the civilian court system to try members of the
    military charged with common crimes.
        A 5-year administration of justice reform program, begun in 1997,
    continued during the year. A Judicial Organic Law, passed by the
    National Assembly in 1997 to overhaul the archaic structure of the
    court system, finally was signed by President Aleman in 1998 and took
    effect in January 1999. The law contains a provision establishing
    minimum professional standards for judicial appointees. The Supreme
    Court commission supervising the revision of the country's outdated
    criminal codes and procedures continued its work, in coordination with
    the National Assembly's Judicial Commission. Reform of these codes is
    intended to reduce judicial delays and resulting excessive pretrial
    detention. By year's end, the Assembly had begun the process to approve
    a new draft Criminal Code. However, the Assembly still must approve
    each chapter of the draft Criminal Code before it can go into effect.
    At year's end, a special subcommission of the National Assembly
    Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court finalized a new draft
    Criminal Procedures Code. In 1999 the National Assembly approved a
    reform of the Public Ministry's office that streamlined the judicial
    process by separating the defense and the prosecution functions.
    President Aleman vetoed it in May but later rescinded his veto.
        In July the Government opened new property tribunals to handle
    cases concerning seized properties (see Section 1.f.). This ends the
    nearly 3-year freeze in property-related lawsuits that started when the
    processing of such cases in district courts was suspended in December
    1997.
        Although the civil and criminal courts made significant progress in
    expediting the judicial process for those in prison without a prior
    court hearing, human rights and lawyers' groups in general continued to
    complain about the delay of justice, sometimes for years, caused by
    judicial inaction.
        Judges appeared susceptible to corruption and political influence.
    The shelving of politically charged cases or ruling in favor of the
    politically connected party remained the most common manifestations of
    judicial corruption. For example, on May 26, Alejandro Carrion
    McDonough, the brother of Army Commander General Javier Carrion
    McDonough, allegedly killed Pablo salon Leal Aguirre, a rural farmer,
    in Masaya when Leal allegedly refused to provide access to the water
    pipeline leading to Carrion's farm. The family of Leal took the case to
    the police and judicial authorities, but in spite of an arrest warrant,
    the police never apprehended Alejandro Carrion. Several weeks after the
    incident, including an announcement by Leal's family that the Carrion
    family attempted to bribe them in exchange for dropping the charges,
    alternate judge Walter Solis in the Criminal Court of Managua dismissed
    the charges. Largely due to public pressure, the Supreme Court forced
    alternate judge Solis, previously suspected of official misuse of
    authority, to retire from the bench. The Leal family appealed the
    decision of Solis, but at year's end, the Court of Appeals acquitted
    Alejandro Carrion. The case then went to the Supreme Court where it was
    pending at year's end.
        In an ongoing campaign to reduce incompetence and corruption in the
    judiciary, the Supreme Court removed an additional 10 judges during the
    first half of 1999, bringing the total removed since the campaign began
    in 1997 to 104--more than one-third of the 300 judges in the system.
    The Judicial Inspector's office received 238 official complaints
    against lawyers, judges, and judicial functionaries in the first half
    of 1999.
        In criminal cases, the accused has the right to legal counsel, and
    defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Judicial
    Organic Law provided for the establishment of a Public Defender's
    office to represent indigent defendants. The office in Managua
    maintained a staff of 13 appointed public defenders throughout the
    year; however, more are needed. The Court has requested funding for 26
    additional public defenders to be located outside of Managua. Elsewhere
    in the country where public defenders have not been available, the
    system in effect before the passage of the new law continued in use.
    Under that system, the presiding judge appoints attorneys from a
    standard list to represent indigent defendants, but, because they are
    not paid by the State, many attorneys have paid a fine of about $8.30
    (100 cordobas) rather than represent such clients.
        According to the ANPDH, despite difficulties in implementing fully
    the provisions of the new law, the number of indigent defendants who
    went to trial without an attorney to represent them decreased
    significantly. However, high-ranking officials in the Public Defender's
    office complained that they continued to encounter blatant judicial
    corruption and the willingness of several judges to sentence defendants
    without a public defender present.
        Under the Napoleonic legal system, a trial does not consist of a
    public hearing. Rather, there is a desk review by a magistrate of the
    file of the accused. An initial hearing usually is held within the
    constitutionally mandated 10 days. Although very simple cases or those
    with high profile or outside interest may be resolved quickly, many
    languish for months. Due to a lack of administrative coordination
    between judges and the penal system, many prisoners have remained in
    prison after their scheduled release date. The Supreme Court tried to
    alleviate the problem by issuing instructions to prison authorities to
    release prisoners immediately upon the return of an innocent verdict.
    In addition, the ANPDH worked with the Director of Prisons during the
    year in an effort to ensure that prisoners were released in a timely
    manner after serving their sentence or being granted parole.
        Despite improvements to the criminal law system, the country still
    lacks an effective civil law system. As a result, cases more properly
    handled in a civil proceeding often are transmuted into criminal
    proceedings. One party then effectively is blackmailed, being jailed
    due to action by the party wielding greater influence with the judge.
    In addition, this heavy civil-based criminal caseload claims attention
    from an overburdened public prosecutor's office and diverts resources
    that otherwise could be directed toward genuine criminal matters.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against these
    abuses, and the Government generally respected these provisions in
    practice. The Constitution stipulates that all persons have the right
    to privacy of their family and to the inviolability of their home,
    correspondence, and communications; requires warrants for searches of
    private homes; and excludes from legal proceedings illegally seized
    letters, documents, and private papers.
        In November 1997, the National Assembly passed a law intended to
    resolve longstanding property disputes that stemmed from massive
    confiscations by the Sandinista government in the 1980's. The
    legislation provided for the establishment of new property tribunals
    with procedures that include mediation, binding arbitration, and
    expedited trials. After numerous delays, the new property tribunals
    finally started accepting cases for filing in July. The tribunals'
    administrative offices are fully staffed and operational. Any lawyer
    interested in serving as a judge may submit his or her resume. The
    Supreme Court then selects judges by lottery, after which the names of
    the designated judges are published in newspapers for public comment.
    The Supreme Court can eliminate from consideration those judges about
    whom they received complaints. The judges for Managua and Leon already
    have been selected, and the process is continuing for tribunals in
    other regions. As of December, the tribunals reported that almost 100
    cases have been filed. A total of 35 cases were settled through
    mediated settlement agreements. The unsuccessfully mediated cases
    passed on to arbitration or expedited trials. By year's end, the
    tribunals had not yet issued a final determination in any case, and it
    was too early to judge their fairness and efficiency.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. However, several constitutional provisions
    potentially qualify freedom of the press. The 1987 Constitution
    stipulates that citizens have the right to accurate information,
    thereby providing an exception by which the freedom to publish
    information that the Government deems inaccurate could be abridged.
    Although the right to information cannot be subject to censorship,
    there is retroactive liability established by law, defined as a social
    responsibility, implying the potential for sanctions against
    irresponsibility by the press. Although the legislature did not modify
    these provisions in the 1995 constitutional reforms, the Government has
    not invoked these provisions to suppress the media.
        The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) reported that during
    1999, members of the pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union and
    leaders and members of the Nicaraguan Journalists' Association
    attempted to revive legislation to establish a professional
    journalists' guild. Although in 1996 the National Assembly passed a
    bill that would have established such a guild, the bill never was
    signed into law. The journalistic community was divided sharply over
    whether such a law would improve the quality of journalism or merely
    restrict freedom of speech and of the press. The IAPA expressed concern
    about any attempts to revive this proposal and also about the possible
    effect on press freedom of a provision in the new draft criminal code
    approved by the Judicial Commission of the National Assembly (see
    Section 1.e.) that would increase the possible penalties for libel and
    slander.
        The privately owned print media, the broadcast media, and academic
    circles freely and openly discussed diverse viewpoints in public
    discourse without government interference. In April a popular daily
    newspaper revealed a corruption scandal that received significant
    attention from the Government and the public. Over a period of several
    weeks the newspaper provided substantial evidence that the Director of
    Internal Revenues Collection (DGI) Byron Jerez misused his position and
    authority. The journal's coverage of the scandal forced the Government
    to investigate the scandal and take action; in June Byron Jerez was
    forced to resign from his office.
        The IAPA continued to report that the Government directed a
    disproportionate amount of total government advertising in the print
    media to publications favorable to the Government and denied to a
    newspaper critical of the government certain tax benefits provided to
    other media businesses.
        Media representatives also charge the Aleman Government with using
    other means to retaliate against critics. La Prensa, the newspaper most
    active in unearthing government corruption, has been in a tax dispute
    with the DGI that the paper claims is based purely on politics. Channel
    8 is involved in a dispute over the nonpayment of social security fees
    for its employees, a dispute that the owner of Channel 8 also
    attributes to political machinations on the part of the administration
    for his vocal criticism of the President. The administration also
    proposed a bill that would set minimum wage levels for print, radio,
    and television journalists. The media claimed that the President had an
    ulterior motive in proposing the bill that would set unrealistically
    high minimum salaries and force media outlets to either close or
    drastically reduce their operations. In February the National
    Assembly's Commission on Education, Media, Culture, and Sports rejected
    the proposal.
        The news medium with the largest national audience is radio, but
    polls show that television is the primary source of news in the cities.
    There are 117 chartered radio stations in the country; listeners
    receive a wide variety of political viewpoints, especially on the 67
    stations based in Managua. There are seven Managua-based television
    stations, six of which carry news programming, often with noticeable
    partisan political content. In addition, there are 60 cable television
    franchises that offer services in most large and medium-sized cities.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    recognizes the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission, and
    the Government generally respects this right in practice. However, the
    Constitution also recognizes the right to public assembly,
    demonstration, and mobilization ``in conformity with the law,'' and the
    law requires demonstrators to obtain permission for a rally or march by
    registering its planned size and location with the police. The
    authorities routinely granted such permission, but many groups chose
    not to register because, they claimed, the process was too cumbersome.
    Throughout the year, several groups threatened to cause civil unrest as
    a result of the newly instituted constitutional and electoral reforms.
    In August coffee growers held small demonstrations to protest
    government policies and a lack of government support.
        In late October clashes between police and members of the Yatama
    political party led to the reported death of one demonstrator and
    injuries to several others (see Section 5).
        The Constitution provides for the right to organize or affiliate
    with political parties, and the Government respects this right in
    practice. Opposition and independent associations functioned freely
    without government interference or restriction. Private associations do
    not have legal status to conduct private fund raising or receive public
    financial support until they receive this authorization from the
    National Assembly, which it routinely confers.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    to travel and reside anywhere in the country and to enter and exit the
    country freely, and the Government respects these rights in practice.
    In December 1998, the Government abolished a requirement that citizens
    and residents obtain an exit visa to leave the country. The right of
    citizens to return to the country is not established in the
    Constitution, but in practice the Government has not restricted
    anyone's return.
        In May the Government nullified the citizenship application of
    former Minister of Defense Jose Antonio Alvarado. This action was
    portrayed widely in the media as a response by President Aleman to
    Alvarado's aspirations to the presidency in 2001. Alvarado, a
    Nicaraguan by birth, relocated abroad during the civil war in the
    1980's and acquired foreign citizenship. Alvarado claimed that he
    returned to Nicaragua in 1990, and reacquired his Nicaraguan
    citizenship. Minister of Government Rene Herrera nullified Alvarado's
    application for ``repatriation'' based on allegations of fraud and
    other irregularities in the application. This administrative action
    effectively removed Alvarado's opportunity to qualify for the 2001
    national elections. A new constitutional reform stipulates that elected
    positions can be occupied only by Nicaraguans who have maintained their
    citizenship for the 4 years immediately prior to the date of the
    general elections. In August an appeals court ruled in favor of
    Alvarado, thus suspending Herrera's administrative action. The Supreme
    Court ultimately is to decide the case.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for asylum, and refugees
    cannot be expelled to the country that persecuted them. The issue of
    the provision of first asylum did not arise.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens exercised their right peacefully to change their
    government in free and fair national elections in 1996 held under the
    auspices of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), an independent branch
    of government. Over 90 percent of eligible voters registered, and 76
    percent of eligible voters voted in 1996. Over 3,000 national and
    international observers declared the elections free and fair, despite
    some logistical and organizational problems.
        The 1995 reforms to the 1987 Constitution established a more equal
    distribution of power and authority among the four coequal branches of
    government. The President heads the executive branch and a cabinet
    appointed by the President, who is both head of state and head of
    government, as well as supreme chief of the defense and security
    forces. The Vice President has no constitutionally mandated duties or
    powers. Both the President and Vice President are elected to 5-year
    terms by direct popular vote, with the possibility of a runoff election
    between the top two candidates if one does not obtain at least 35
    percent of the vote on the first ballot. The Constitution does not
    permit the President to hold consecutive terms in office.
        A single-chamber National Assembly exercises legislative power. In
    October 1996, voters chose 93 members, including 20 deputies from
    nationwide lists, 70 from lists presented in each of the 15 departments
    and the 2 autonomous regions, and 3 defeated presidential candidates
    who obtained a minimum percentage of the national vote. Members elected
    concurrently with the President and Vice President in 1996 are to serve
    5-year terms. The ruling PLC holds the highest number of deputy seats
    with 36; the FSLN has 35; a dissident liberal caucus has 8; the
    Conservatives have 5; and a conglomeration of minor parties make up the
    remaining 9 seats.
        On January 20, the National Assembly approved a package of proposed
    constitutional amendments supported by the leadership of both the
    governing PLC and the opposition FSLN. Key elements of the legislation
    included a change in the requirements that a presidential candidate
    must meet to avoid a second-round runoff election; expansion of the
    Supreme Court from 12 to 16 judges; expansion of the CSE from 5 to 7
    magistrates; an automatic assembly seat for the outgoing President and
    Vice President; a requirement for a two-thirds majority vote in the
    Assembly, rather than the previous qualified majority vote, to remove
    presidential immunity from prosecution; and the replacement of a single
    Controller General with the current 5-person collegial body charged
    with investigating allegations of wrongdoing or financial malfeasance
    by Government officials. The legislation provided for election of the
    President and the Vice President in the first round of voting if one
    political party wins at least 40 percent of the vote, or if one party
    wins at least 35 percent of the vote and the party in second place is
    more than 5 percentage points behind the front-runner. In addition, a
    party will lose its legal status if it obtains less than 4 percent of
    the vote in a general election. The latter provision is expected
    greatly to reduce the number of parties eligible to field candidates in
    general elections; over 20 parties ran candidates in the 1996
    elections.
        There are no restrictions in law or practice against women,
    indigenous groups, or other minorities voting or participating in
    politics; however, they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Women served as President and Vice President until January
    1997, and a woman served as president of the CSE until January.
    Additionally, 2 of 16 Supreme Court justices are women; women hold
    ministerial, vice ministerial, and other senior positions in
    government; and voters elected 10 women to the National Assembly in
    October 1996. Two members of the National Assembly claim indigenous
    heritage.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        With some exceptions, human rights groups operated without
    government interference. Major organizations included the Permanent
    Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), the (ANPDH), and the Nicaraguan
    Center for Human Rights (CENIDH). The ANPDH, the CENIDH, the CPDH, and
    the Catholic Relief Services continued to conduct human rights
    workshops at the police training academy, at various police
    headquarters, and with army units throughout the country. Some military
    officers received internationally sponsored human rights training.
        On March 29, Amnesty International (AI) reported that the
    Government accused Vilma Nunez de Excorcia, President of CENIDH, of
    obstructing police. On June 2, AI reported that she had received
    telephonic threats to her life. Nunez alleges that the death threats
    are because she spoke out against Government complicity in alleged
    army-ordered assassinations of FUAC leaders. When she asked the police
    to investigate, they concluded that her charges were unfounded and
    closed the case.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (PPDDH), the only autonomous
    government-financed human rights office, continued to focus on filling
    staffing gaps and organizing its scope and activities. In 1995 the
    National Assembly passed a law creating a Human Rights Ombudsman's
    office, with the Ombudsman to be elected by the Assembly. In June,
    after a delay of nearly 5 years, the National Assembly elected Benjamin
    Perez, formerly the head of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission, as
    the country's first Ombudsman and Julian Corrales as Deputy Ombudsman.
    Perez relied on the participation of most local human rights
    organizations to select the Special Ombudsmen for Children's Issues and
    for Women Issues, Carlos Emilio Lopez and Patricia Obregon,
    respectively. In December he selected the Special Ombudsman for
    Indigenous Affairs, Rev. Norman Bent. The PPDDH also began to
    investigate actively human rights violations during the year. Perez
    began demonstrating the effective independence of his office from the
    Aleman Administration when he publicly criticized the Government for
    violating the constitutional rights of former Defense Minister Jose
    Antonio Alvarado by nullifying his repatriation application (see
    Section 2.d.). However, he has been reluctant to exercise the full
    powers of his office.
        In July 1997, the Organization of American States' (OAS) Technical
    Cooperation Mission (TCM), opened at the request of the Government and
    continues to operate. The TCM is a small successor organization to the
    OAS International Support and Verification Commission. The TCM focuses
    on the 13 municipalities that were affected most adversely by the
    decade-long civil war, where the TCM works on conflict resolution,
    reconciliation, improving local government, and extending legal
    infrastructure. The TCM and Catholic Relief Services help maintain more
    than 200 peace commissions in the northern and central parts of the
    country, intended to give inhabitants of the area a means of dispute
    resolution, a means of monitoring human rights abuses, and a vehicle
    for expressing their concerns to government authorities. Many of the
    commissions operate in areas that are without any governmental
    presence, and serve as surrogates for absent police and courts. The
    Government granted legal standing to additional such grassroots
    organizations during the year. Some peace commission members initially
    reported that soldiers, rural police, and local residents sometimes
    misunderstood their efforts at advocacy on behalf of jailed criminals,
    interpreting them as challenges to law enforcement officials'
    authority. However, during the year, the commissions continued to
    report increased support from all elements of the societies they serve,
    including law enforcement.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of birth,
    nationality, political belief, race, gender, language, religion,
    opinion, national origin, economic condition, or social condition;
    however, in practice the Government made little or no effort to combat
    discrimination. Few, if any, discrimination suits or formal complaints
    were filed with government officials.
        Women.--The most prevalent violations of women's rights involved
    domestic and sexual violence, which were widespread and underreported.
    The National Police reported that of 20,905 reports filed by women
    between January and August, more than 11,086 concerned physical or
    sexual abuse.
        The Criminal Code provides punishment for sexual abuse, and
    stipulates that any person convicted of physically abusing or raping
    another person will face from 9 months to 4 years in prison. The
    National Police, as well as local human rights groups, have confirmed
    that while police sometimes intervene to prevent domestic violence,
    they rarely prosecute perpetrators because victims often refuse to
    press charges. Those cases that actually reached the courts usually
    resulted in a not guilty verdict due to judicial inexperience with, and
    lack of legal training related to, proper judicial handling of such
    violence.
        The 1996 Law against Aggression against Women reformed the Criminal
    Code to make domestic violence a crime and to provide up to 6 years'
    imprisonment for those found guilty of such violence. The law also
    provided for the issuance of restraining orders in cases in which women
    fear for their safety.
        According to statistics from the National Police, the police
    received 1,181 rape complaints during the year. In 1999 there were
    1,367 reported instances of rape. Many women are reluctant to report
    abuse or file charges due to social stigmas attached to victims of
    rape.
        The police manage 18 women's commissariats in 14 cities. Each
    commissariat is located adjacent to a police station and is staffed by
    six police officers, two social workers, one psychologist, and one
    lawyer. However, due to a lack of funding, the staff size is often
    limited to a far smaller number. The commissariats provide both social
    and legal help to women and mediate spousal conflicts.
        In October 1999, with the help of the CENIDH, Zoilamerica Narvaez
    filed a complaint with the IACHR against her stepfather, FSLN leader,
    National Assembly Deputy, and former President Daniel Ortega. Narvaez
    asserted that Ortega sexually molested and harassed her from the time
    she was 11 years old until she filed charges against him in 1997. The
    case publicized the problems of incest, rape, and women's rights and
    also highlighted the issue of immunity from prosecution for
    parliamentary deputies. In 1998, Narvaez championed an effort to
    persuade the National Assembly to withdraw Ortega's immunity so that
    she could bring a lawsuit against him; however, the Assembly did not
    take up the issue of Ortega's immunity by year's end. In November 1999,
    the IACHR officially opened a case in response to Narvaez's complaint
    and advised the Government that it would be required to respond to the
    charges. On September 27, the Government responded that the claims made
    by Narvaez were unfounded and merited no further investigation. The
    Government argued that the State did not violate her constitutional
    rights because the legislative and judicial branches gave her case due
    consideration. The IACHR has not responded to the Government.
        Prostitution is common, and there were credible reports that some
    women were trafficked and forced into prostitution (see Sections 6.c.
    and 6.f.). In Managua most prostitutes work on the streets,
    clandestinely in nightclubs and bars, or offer sexual services in
    massage parlors. In towns along the Pan American Highway, women and
    girls sell sexual services to truck drivers and other travelers, often
    foreigners driving north from Costa Rica. In port cities such as
    Corinto, the primary clientele are sailors. Corinto is unusual in that
    prostitutes receive medical examinations, and a card certifying their
    health if they are free of disease. In addition, prostitutes in Corinto
    reportedly often work together to maintain a rudimentary price-setting
    structure that enabled them to earn much more than they would in other
    areas. However, in most areas, prostitutes do not have access to
    medical screening or treatment.
        Although the Constitution provides for equality between the sexes,
    reports of discrimination against women are persistent and credible.
    According to a poll released on April 16, women comprise about 61
    percent of the public labor force, a number much larger than that in
    the private sector. It also showed that even with comparable
    educational backgrounds, salaries for male and female workers differ
    significantly, with men making sometimes twice as much as women in the
    same positions. Even with similar qualifications, men advance more
    quickly than women do. Women constitute the majority of workers in the
    traditionally low-paid education and health service sectors. According
    to a 1998 report, women have equal or somewhat better access to
    education than men, especially in urban areas.
        There are many NGO and government programs that target
    discrimination against women, mostly by analyzing the current status of
    women in the workplace. The Program for Reform and Modernization of the
    Public Sector, directed by the Vice President, collects statistics on
    salary differences and hiring techniques in the public sector, thereby
    publicizing the issue of discrimination. However, it is unclear what
    measures have been taken to actually counteract such discrimination in
    practice.
        Children.--The Government expresses its commitment to children's
    human rights and welfare publicly, but does not commit adequate funding
    levels for children's programs or primary education. A constitutional
    provision known as the ``6 Percent Rule'' automatically allots 6
    percent of the annual budget to a higher education consortium, often at
    the expense of funding for primary and secondary education programs.
    Children 18 years of age and younger made up approximately 53 percent
    of the population. A 1995 study showed that as many as 40 percent of
    all children are not registered officially. Education is compulsory
    through the sixth grade, but this provision is not enforced. The study
    also indicated that 45 percent of children do not attend school.
    Primary school enrollment rates for boys and girls are estimated at 73
    and 75 percent, respectively; secondary school enrollment rates are 39
    and 47 percent.
        Children increasingly were involved in crime both as victims and as
    perpetrators. From 1993 to 1997, offenders under the age of 17
    increased from approximately 1.5 percent to approximately 15 percent.
    From January to August, 29 minors died as a result of violent crime.
    During the same period, victims of rape included 222 children under the
    age of 13, and 351 between the ages of 13 and l7. Children, especially
    boys in street gangs, contributed to an ongoing rise in the crime rate,
    which resulted in a police crackdown on youth gangs in August that
    involved over 500 juvenile arrests. During the year, there were about
    3,500 reported cases of child abandonment and abuse, 1,506 cases of
    children who were hospitalized for severe burns, and 105 children who
    disappeared. It is estimated that about 63 percent of sexual abuse
    victims are under the age of 18, and that 36 percent are younger than
    13. Over 676,000 children are at-risk and exposed daily to violence,
    abuse, exploitation, and neglect. According to UNICEF, this number is
    expected to increase because the population of children under 5 years,
    living on the streets, is increasing.
        As a result of the Child and Family Law, which took effect in late
    1998, juvenile prisoners could no longer be held in adult facilities,
    or for more than 24 hours without being charged. However,
    implementation of the new law proved problematic. In August 1999, 17-
    year-old Modesto Perez ambushed and killed his former employer,
    National Assembly deputy Jose Cuadra, after Cuadra fired Perez. Public
    outrage at the inability of the system to punish Perez effectively was
    directed primarily at the new law, in particular the provision that
    minors charged with crimes be prosecuted in new juvenile courts, where
    the possible penalties for serious crimes are less than those imposed
    on adults. In addition, the juvenile courts were operational only in
    Managua and Ciudad Dario; consequently, minors charged with crimes
    elsewhere in the country often avoided prosecution entirely. The
    National Assembly, the Catholic Church, and other organizations spoke
    out in favor of reforming the law to allow the prosecution of minors
    who commit serious crimes as adults. In September a jury found Perez
    guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
        Child labor is a problem (see Section 6.d.).
        The First Lady has established several commissions on children's
    issues. Mrs. Aleman headed the National Council for the Protection of
    Children and the National Council for the Eradication of Child Labor.
        According to local media and the Ministry of the Family, the
    incidence of child prostitution increased, especially in Managua, and
    near border cities and ports. According to press reports, UNICEF noted
    significant growth in prostitution among children between the ages of
    12 and 16 in towns where taxi drivers were said to serve as middlemen.
    OAS personnel in the country also noted growth in prostitution among
    girls as young as 10 years of age; in rural areas, their clients are
    often truck drivers and other travelers, including foreigners, who
    patronize prostitutes in towns along the Pan American Highway. From
    December 1998 to May 1999, the Ministry of the Family sponsored an
    investigation into child prostitution in five municipalities. Of the
    more than 300 children surveyed, 82 percent reported that they had
    started engaging in prostitution within the past year. Many of those
    surveyed said that they engaged in prostitution to buy basic
    necessities such as food and clothing, or to support a drug habit. A
    1999 survey by the NGO Casa Alianza reported that of 520 children, 504
    admitted to consuming drugs, usually glue. There have been cases of
    adults who exchange sexual favors with street children in return for
    glue. There were cases of trafficking in children for the purpose of
    forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). In 1999 a National Forum
    against the Sexual and Commercial Exploitation of Children and
    Adolescents was created to fight for children's rights and bring this
    issue to the public attention; however, it failed to take any actions
    during the year.
        People with Disabilities.--In 1998 the Ministry of Health created a
    National Council for Rehabilitation to address the needs of the 600,000
    citizens with some type of disability, only 3 percent of whom receive
    medical treatment. Through its clinics and hospitals, the Government
    provides care to war veterans and other disabled persons, but the
    quality of care is generally poor. However, with assistance from
    international NGO's, foreign governments, and the public health care
    system, the Government has procured thousands of prostheses and other
    medical equipment for veterans and former resistance members.
        Despite some efforts, the Government's past role in helping the
    disabled is minimal and often has been criticized. It has not
    legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility to buildings for the
    disabled. In the spring, the Ministry of the Family announced that it
    would cut a considerable amount of financial support for the Blue Bird
    Protection Association that shelters about 100 disabled persons, aged
    from 10 months to 40 years old, who are considered unable to care for
    themselves. Although the Ministry agreed to cover a significant percent
    of the Association's budget, its failure to do so forced the
    Association's employees to go without pay, and a significant decrease
    in medicinal, clothing, and food supplies. Many organizations centered
    on helping the disabled called for the Government to focus more
    attention on the needs and interests of the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--Indigenous people constitute about 5 percent of
    the country's population and live primarily in the Northern Autonomous
    Atlantic Region (RAAN) and Southern Autonomous Atlantic Region (RAAS).
    The RAAN and the RAAS, which were created in 1987 out of the former
    department of Zelaya and which border the Caribbean Sea, constitute 47
    percent of the national territory. Based on 1998 information from the
    Center for Investigation and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast and
    other sources, the four major identifiable tribes are the Miskito (with
    approximately 100,000 members), the Sumo (10,000), the Garifuna
    (3,000), and the Rama (1,000).
        In an effort to encourage indigenous participation in Atlantic
    coast regional elections held in 1998, the CSE distributed electoral
    and civic education materials in four languages, including Miskito and
    Sumo. The indigenous people of the RAAN, primarily the Miskito and the
    Sumo, have a political organization known as Yatama, which has
    representation in regional and municipal councils. There is also an
    armed faction of the same name; the extent to which the two groups are
    linked is not clear. Like many armed groups operating since the end of
    the civil war, the Yatama groups mix banditry with a genuine desire to
    force the Government to devote more resources to their under-developed
    region. However, two factors differentiate the armed groups in the RAAN
    from those that have operated elsewhere in the country. First, most
    participants in these groups are Amerindians who long have seen
    themselves as having a separate culture. Second, drug trafficking and
    drug money on the Atlantic coast have become far more pervasive than
    elsewhere in the country. The total strength of Yatama armed groups was
    estimated at 210 men.
        In September 1999, President Aleman signed a disarmament agreement
    with representatives of the Yatama armed groups. In return, the
    Government made a number of promises to the Miskitos including land to
    fighters who turned in their arms, support for housing for Yatama-
    affiliated families, agricultural credits, protection of traditional
    Amerindian fishing rights, and resolution of long-standing disputes
    about the boundaries of communal Miskito land. However, these
    provisions had not been implemented at year's end which has caused
    recent threats of remobilization by the Yatama groups.
        The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) ruled in August that the Yatama
    political party did not meet the qualifications to participate in the
    November 5 municipal elections. The party attempted to enter into a
    political alliance with two other Atlantic-coast parties, but the CSE
    determined that the alliance failed to meet the electoral eligibility
    requirements for the municipal elections, thus eliminating Yatama's
    participation in the November elections. Yatama leader Brooklyn Rivera
    led protests against the party's exclusion in Puerto Cabezas and other
    areas of the RAAN. In subsequent clashes between October 26-29 between
    police and Rivera's followers, several followers were injured and
    scores were arrested. One person was killed; however, it was unclear
    whether his death resulted from the disturbance. There were high levels
    of abstention on election day mainly due to dissatisfaction with the
    CSE ruling. Consequently, the PLC and the FSLN won all the contested
    offices in the RAAN. Since the electoral body ruled late in the year on
    the eligibility of the alliance, it granted Yatama automatic
    qualification for the 2001 national elections.
        The 1987 Autonomy Law requires the Government to consult indigenous
    people regarding the exploitation of their areas' resources. Indigenous
    people claim that the central Government often made decisions without
    adequate community consultation. As in previous years, some indigenous
    groups complained that central government authorities excluded the
    indigenous people of the Atlantic coast from meaningful participation
    in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the
    allocation of natural resources. Government health care exists in the
    Atlantic towns of Puerto Cabezas, Siuna, and Bluefields, but a majority
    of indigenous people in rural areas have no access to modern health
    care. Critics of government policy cited extremely high unemployment
    rates, but calculation of reliable employment statistics was
    complicated because most of the working indigenous population on the
    Atlantic coast is engaged in subsistence fishing, farming, and mining.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens are of mixed
    background, and ethnicity is not a barrier to political or economic
    success. However, various indigenous groups from both the RAAN and the
    RAAS sometimes linked the Government's failure to expend resources in
    support of the Atlantic coast population to the existence of ethnic,
    racial, and religious (principally members of the Moravian church)
    minorities that predominate in that region.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of workers to organize voluntarily in unions, and this right was
    reaffirmed in the new Labor Code that entered into effect in 1996 and
    replaced the antiquated 1944 code. All public and private sector
    workers, except those in the military and the police, may form and join
    unions of their own choosing, and they exercise this right extensively.
    The Labor Code permits the existence of more than one union,
    representing the same group of workers, at any place of employment. To
    become a union, a group of at least 20 persons must petition the
    Ministry of Labor for legal status and the right to engage in
    collective bargaining. The new code legally recognizes cooperatives,
    into which many transportation and agricultural workers are organized.
    Less than half of the formal sector work force, including agricultural
    workers, is unionized, according to labor leaders. Union membership
    continued to fall during the year. The unions are independent of the
    Government, although many are affiliated with political parties.
        The Constitution recognizes the right to strike. The Labor Code
    requires a majority vote of all the workers in an enterprise to call a
    strike. The Labor Code requires that before a union may strike, it must
    first receive approval from the Labor Ministry. To obtain approval, the
    union must go through a process that requires good faith negotiation
    with management.
        The Labor Code prohibits retribution against strikers and union
    leaders for legal strikes. However, this protection may be withdrawn in
    the case of an illegal strike. In 1999 the national construction
    workers' union was about to begin a legal strike after having spent 2
    years following all the necessary measures. The Ministry of Labor would
    have declared the strike legal, but the strike was avoided when the
    construction branch of the Private Enterprise Council finally agreed to
    negotiate with the union. Legal strikes are rare, and there was only
    one during the year. The Labor Ministry asserts that it would take
    approximately 6 months for a union to go through the entire process to
    be permitted to have a legal strike. Observers contend that the process
    is inappropriately lengthy and so complex that there has been only one
    legal strike since the 1996 Labor Code came into effect.
        The Labor Code provides protected status to union leaders,
    requiring that companies receive permission from the Ministry of Labor
    after having shown just cause to fire union executive board members.
    Such protection is limited to nine individuals per union. However, the
    Labor Code allows businesses to fire any employee, including union
    organizers, provided the business pays the employee double the normal
    severance pay. This practice is used sometimes by business leaders to
    stymie unionization attempts.
        Unions freely form or join federations or confederations and
    affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right to bargain collectively, and this
    right was reaffirmed in the 1996 Labor Code. The Government generally
    sought to foster resolution of pressing labor conflicts (usually in the
    public sector) through informal negotiations rather than through formal
    administrative or judicial processes. According to the reformed Code,
    companies engaged in disputes with employees must negotiate with the
    employees' union if the employees have thus organized themselves.
    However, the possible existence of more than one union at any place of
    employment means that several unions, each with different demands, can
    coexist at any one enterprise. Similarly, management may sign
    collective bargaining agreements with each union.
        There are 29 enterprises operating in the government-run free trade
    zones (FTZ), employing approximately 24,000 workers. In addition, there
    are 4 authorized private FTZ's; the 9 enterprises in these zones employ
    some 2,000 workers.
        Approximately half the workers in the government-run FTZ are
    represented by a union organization; however, only about 10 percent of
    them are actual union members. While some of these unions have real
    collective bargaining power, others are primarily symbolic.
        There have been several allegations of violations of the right to
    organize, primarily at the Las Mercedes FTZ, the largest in Managua,
    with 15 enterprises and approximately 19,000 workers. The Ministry of
    Labor has investigated these allegations and has concluded that
    employers have acted within the law. Notwithstanding the legality of
    employer actions, the result has been to weaken significantly an
    important union in the FTZ, the Sandinista Workers Central (CST). The
    CST has declared several strikes without first exhausting the very
    lengthy and complex administrative process of getting the required
    majority of the workers. Consequently, the Ministry of Labor
    consistently has ruled the strikes illegal. Employers then fire the
    striking workers based on the Ministry's ruling.
        In essence, employers have taken advantage of the extensive
    administrative requirements required to declare a strike legal and the
    CST's failure to follow the prescribed rules.
        In April Chentex, a Taiwanese-owned textile factory, tried and
    failed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with an
    independent union, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN), and the CST.
    Negotiations broke down because the CST demanded an increase in the
    factory minimum salary from $62-115 (800 to 1,500 cordobas) per month.
    Although management considered this an inordinate increase, 1,500
    cordobas falls below the Government's estimate of 1,600 cordobas per
    month for a basic basket of goods. After 50 CST workers participated in
    a work stoppage, management requested and received permission to fire
    11 of the 13 CST board members based on participation in an illegal
    strike. All dismissed members filed an appeal before the labor court,
    which subsequently found that the workers had been fired properly. The
    CST appealed that finding to an appellate court, which had not issued a
    decision by year's end. In addition, scores of workers were fired while
    many others resigned to show their support for the fired board members.
        Meanwhile the CST organized a series of work stoppages leading to
    the occupation of the factory on May 2. Chentex then filed criminal
    charges against the 9 board members for damaging property, kidnapping
    management personnel, and injuring security persons during the
    takeover. Chentex also later filed a petition to have the CST's legal
    status dropped because after the firings and resignations, they failed
    to meet the legal minimum of members. There are ongoing negotiations
    between the union and Chentex to resolve these issues; however, these
    negotiations were stalled at year's end.
        On January 6, Mil Colores, a textile factory, asked the Ministry of
    Labor for permission to fire 50 workers as a money-saving measure,
    included were 26 of the 34 workers who petitioned, on January 11, to
    recertify the CST union. Another union--the Mil Colores Workers Union
    (MCWU)--had been certified earlier in the month. The Ministry denied
    the CST's request because it claimed that CST failed to meet the 20-
    member minimum requirement for certification. The CST alleged collusion
    between the Ministry and the company, specifically that the Mil Colores
    request to the fire workers was backdated to precede the attempt to
    form a union. On January 27, during a CST-organized protest protesters
    broke through the factory doors, leading to the hospitalization of over
    30 persons and the arrest of another 5. Shortly thereafter the company
    filed criminal charges against 68 workers for involvement in the
    incident. The president of Mil Colores subsequently dropped all charges
    and came to an agreement with the CST to rehire dismissed workers on a
    case by case basis.
        In October 1999, JEM III, an American-owned company, laid off over
    100 workers, reportedly because of the seasonal nature of their
    product--flannel shirts. The company began negotiations with the CST
    over these and future layoffs. In December 1999, after failure to reach
    an agreement, the CST workers went on strike. The company immediately
    petitioned the Ministry of Labor to declare the strike illegal, which
    would allow the company eventually to fire the strikers. However, the
    Ministry declared the strike legal, and the workers went back to work
    after obtaining minimum concessions. The JEM III strike is the only
    strike at the FTZ ever to be found legal by the Ministry of Labor.
    However, in January, another 70 workers were fired, including most CST
    board members. Because of various internal problems, the CST did not
    grieve the firings and the Ministry had no further involvement.
    However, the net effect was that the CST disappeared from JEMIII.
        In response to longstanding complaints by union representatives
    that the Ministry of Labor did a poor job of enforcing the Labor Code
    in the FTZ's, in 1997 the Ministry opened an office in the Managua FTZ
    to ensure that the code was being enforced. FTZ officials claim that,
    due to memories of the corrupt and ineffective unions of the 1980's,
    many workers in the FTZ enterprises simply have no interest in
    unionizing. They also claim that wages and working conditions in FTZ
    enterprises are better than the national average. For example, some FTZ
    enterprises assert that they pay wages that average over $192 (2,400
    cordobas) per month, three times the minimum wage.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor but does not specifically address
    forced or bonded labor by children, and such practices occur. The
    Ministry of Labor continues to report that some children were forced to
    beg by their parents, and that some were rented by their parents to
    organizers of child beggars (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). There have
    been reports this year of trafficking in persons for forced labor or of
    trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution
    (see Section 6.f.).
        In July the Labor Ministry investigated charges of forced labor at
    a textile factory located outside the FTZ, but which operates under the
    same rules and enjoys the same tax incentives as FTZ companies. The
    inspector verified that some 34 workers had begun work at 7:00 a.m. the
    previous day and were still working at 10:00 a.m. the next day when the
    inspector arrived--a total of 27 hours. The company produced signed
    documents from the workers stating that they had agreed voluntarily to
    work extra hours. Privately, the workers stated that they had signed
    the document for fear that they would be fired if they refused.
    Moreover, they understood that they would work only 2 extra hours.
    Although there is no evidence that the company made any threats, the
    fact that all 34 workers who were requested to work overtime agreed to
    do so indicates that the workers believed they would be fired if they
    refused. The workers were only provided a piece of bread and a bottle
    of soda during the night that they spent at the factory. The human
    resources manager who allowed the inspector into the factory
    subsequently was fired. The Ministry of Labor issued the company a
    warning and threatened heavy fines and possible closure if the problem
    reoccured.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution provides for the protection of children's
    rights and prohibits child labor that can affect normal childhood
    development or interfere with the obligatory school year. The country
    has comprehensive labor legislation to protect children up to age 18.
    The Constitution also provides protection from any type of economic or
    social exploitation. The 1996 Labor Code raised the age at which
    children may begin working with parental permission from 12 to 14
    years. Parental permission to work also is required for 15- and 16-
    year-olds. The law limits the workday for such children to 6 hours and
    prohibits night work. However, because of the economic needs of many
    families, a cultural legacy of child work among peasants, and lack of
    effective government enforcement mechanisms, child labor rules rarely
    are enforced except in the small formal sector of the economy.
        In mid-September, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182
    regarding the worst forms of child labor; most of its provisions
    already were incorporated in the Labor Code.
        There are no reliable figures regarding the number of working
    children, but the Government reports that child labor occurs in both
    urban and rural areas. The latest official figures estimate that
    approximately 161,000 children between 10 and 19 are employed while
    CENIDH estimates that there are approximately 322,000 working children.
        Over 140,000 children are employed in rural areas at coffee,
    tobacco, rice, and banana plantations. In Managua over 6,000 children
    work on city streets, selling merchandise, cleaning automobile windows,
    or begging.
        According to a 1998 UNICEF report, approximately 42 percent of
    children between the ages of 6 and 9 work. A study published in 1996 by
    the National Commission against Child Labor concluded that over 161,000
    children between 10 and 19 years of age work, including approximately
    109,000 employed in rural areas such as coffee, tobacco, rice, and
    banana plantations. The study found that 6,219 children work in urban
    areas as beggars, or selfemployed car washers or parking attendants.
    Comprehensive labor legislation, intended to protect children up to 18,
    prohibits child labor in areas such as mines and garbage dumps, and
    imposes heavy fines for illegal employment. The Ministry of Labor
    established an inspection unit to monitor occupational safety and
    health in the agricultural sector, signed agreements with nightclubs
    and restaurant owners who pledged to comply with labor laws, and issued
    a resolution in 1999 prohibiting employment of minors specifically in
    the free trade zones. However, there have been some exceptions due to
    most families' need of extra income. The 1996 Labor Code authorizes
    children to work under certain circumstances, provided they are no
    younger than 14 years of age and have parental permission.
        Child prostitution is a serious problem. Although national figures
    are not available, a study conducted in Managua in 1998 found that 40
    percent of the 1,200 prostitutes in the city were under the age of 18.
    No numbers were available for other cities, but in 1998 UNICEF reported
    that teenage sexual exploitation had increased in recent years in rural
    areas, border cities, ports, and in Managua.
        The Ministry of Labor has begun to take steps to combat child labor
    (See Section 5). It has signed agreements with nightclubs and
    restaurant owners whereby these establishments pledged to comply with
    child labor laws. In 1999 it issued a resolution specifically
    prohibiting the employment of minors in the FTZ's.
        The Ministry of Family sponsors several programs that target
    working minors. These programs, which cover up to 10,000 children
    nationwide, include childcare services, returntoschool programs, and
    technical and vocational training. The programs also include training
    for parents and teachers. The Ministry of the Family, in conjunction
    with the Ministry of Education, established a program to keep 647
    children off city intersections where they wash windshields. The
    program provides housing for the 75 percent of these children who are
    homeless and schooling for the 60 percent who are school dropouts.
        Despite comprehensive legislation prohibiting child labor,
    structural economic problems have prevented its eradication. The
    Government has been able to make progress in combating child labor in
    the ``formal sector"; i.e., that sector of the economy which is
    regulated by the Government, such as factories, construction,
    restaurants, and nightclubs. Most of the problems exist in the
    ``informal sector,'' which is not regulated by the Government. Workers
    in this sector, which is characterized by a lack of an obvious
    employer, include street vendors, windshield washers, parking lot
    attendants, garbage dump scavengers, beggars, prostitutes, and
    agricultural workers.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is set through
    tripartite (business, government, and labor) negotiations, and must be
    approved by the Legislative Assembly. A new minimum wage scale took
    effect in August 1999 and, although by law it was to be revisited 6
    months later, has not been adjusted since. In November the Ministry of
    Labor called for new negotiations on the minimum wage. The various
    groups met sporadically, but no new minimum wage had been set by the
    year'' end. Minimum wages vary by sector; monthly rates are as follows:
    Agriculture, $36 (450 cordobas plus food); fisheries, $56 (700
    cordobas); mining, $68 (850 cordobas); industrial manufacture, $48 (600
    cordobas); electric, gas, and water utilities, $72 (900 cordobas);
    construction, $96 (1,200 cordobas); restaurants and hotels, $72 (900
    cordobas); transportation, $72 (900 cordobas); banking, $80 (1,000
    cordobas); community and social services, $56 (700 cordobas); central
    and municipal government (includes health and education employees), $44
    (550 cordobas); and FTZ $64 (800 cordobas). The minimum wage does not
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. It falls
    below the Government estimate of what an urban family must spend each
    month for a basic basket of goods ($128, or 1,600 cordobas). The
    majority of urban workers earn well above the minimum rates.
        The Labor Code incorporates the constitutionally mandated 8-hour
    workday; the standard legal workweek is a maximum of 48 hours, with 1
    day of rest weekly. The 1996 code established severance pay at from 1
    to 5 months, depending on the duration of employment and the
    circumstances of firing. However, persons fired for cause may be denied
    severance pay through a process that requires employers to demonstrate
    proof of worker misconduct. The Code also established an employer's
    obligation to provide housing to employees who are assigned temporarily
    to areas beyond commuting distance.
        The Labor Code seeks to bring the country into compliance with
    international standards and norms of workplace hygiene and safety, but
    the Ministry of Labor's Office of Hygiene and Occupational Security
    lacks adequate staff and resources to enforce these provisions. The
    Code gives workers the right to remove themselves from dangerous
    workplace situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, the Government does not enforce the law adequately.
    There are reports that the country was a source for the trafficking in
    women and children for purposes of prostitution in Mexico. According to
    the reports, procurers from Mexico induce young people to travel there
    on the promise of legitimate employment. Upon their arrival, they are
    sold to the owners of brothels and then forced to work as prostitutes
    to repay their debts. Children are trafficked in Guatemala by organized
    crime rings for the purposes of prostitution. In July 1999, the media
    reported that Nicaraguan girls had been lured to Guatemalan clubs to
    work as dancers and waitresses but upon arrival were forced into
    prostitution.
                                   __________

                                     PANAMA

        Panama is a representative democracy with an elected executive
    composed of a president and 2 vice presidents, an elected 71-member
    unicameral legislature, and an appointed judiciary. In September 1999,
    President Mireya Moscoso replaced former President Ernesto Perez
    Balladares. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;
    however, the judicial system is subject to corruption and political
    manipulation.
        Panama has had no military forces since 1989. In 1990 the
    Government created the Panamanian Public Forces, which consist of the
    Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National Maritime Service (SMN),
    the National Air Service (SAN), and the Institutional Protection
    Service (SPI). In 1994 a constitutional amendment formally prohibited
    the establishment of a permanent military, although it contains a
    provision for the temporary formation of a ``special police force'' to
    protect the borders in case of a ``threat of external aggression.'' The
    Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), a semiautonomous body with leadership
    appointed by the Supreme Court, is a separate branch of law enforcement
    under the Attorney General's Office, and performs criminal
    investigations in support of public prosecutors. The Ministry of
    Government and Justice oversees the PNP, the SMN, and SAN; the Ministry
    of the Presidency supervises the SPI and the PTJ. Police forces respond
    to civilian authority, have civilian directors, and have internal
    review procedures to deal with police misconduct. There were reports of
    instances of abuse by some members of the security forces.
        The service-oriented economy uses the U.S. dollar as currency,
    calling it the Balboa. Gross domestic product grew by 3.2 percent in
    1999, but growth estimates for 2000 range from 2.3 to 2.8 percent.
    While economists predicted higher growth during the year due to the
    transfer of the Panama Canal and related property, economic benefits
    were not yet evident at year's end. Poverty persists and income
    distribution remains extremely skewed with large disparities between
    rich and poor. Unemployment is estimated at 13.3 percent; however,
    private economists believe that it may be higher.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there continued to be serious problems in several
    areas. Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, is a recurrent
    problem of the prison system; however, there were reports that
    incidents of abuse decreased during the year in one prison. Overall
    prison conditions remained harsh, with occasional outbreaks of internal
    prison violence. Arbitrary detention and prolonged pretrial detention
    are problems. The judiciary is subject to political manipulation, and
    the criminal justice system is inefficient and often corrupt. There
    were complaints that in some cases police failed to follow legal
    requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. Police conduct
    towards public protesters improved. The media is subject to political
    pressure, libel suits, and punitive action by the Government. Violence
    against women remains a serious problem. Women hold some high positions
    in Government, including the presidency; however, discrimination
    against women persisted. Discrimination against indigenous people,
    blacks, and ethnic minorities continues to be a problem. Worker rights
    were limited in export processing zones. Urban and rural child labor
    are also problems. Trafficking in persons, particularly Asian and South
    American immigrants, is a continuing problem.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        There was little progress on past cases. Four PNP guards at the
    Tinajitas prison were on administrative duty and awaiting trial in the
    March 1997 beating death of detainee Jose Luis Alvarado at year's end.
        In January 1999, the Supreme Court dismissed the case against the
    PNP personnel responsible for the June 1997 shooting death of Ngobe-
    Bugle tribe member Juan Santos Chobra in the community of Puente
    Blanco. The Court ruled that the shooting was accidental after
    reviewing videotaped evidence of the shooting.
        In September 1999, President Moscoso cancelled the pardons granted
    by former President Perez Balladares to 33 former civilian and military
    collaborators of former ruler General Manuel Noriega. One such official
    reportedly was involved in the execution of 11 persons following a
    failed coup attempt against Noriega in 1989. In this specific case, a
    Superior Court confirmed Moscoso's order to cancel the pardon granted
    by former President Perez Balladares. It was unknown whether similar
    cases were pending at year's end.
        In September 1999, the authorities discovered an unmarked grave
    containing two bodies on the grounds of a former military base near
    Panama City. On August 23, Public Ministry authorities stated that one
    set of these remains belonged to leftist leader Heliodoro Portugal.
    Portugal had been reported missing since May 1970, during the early
    stages of the military regime. The identity of the second body remains
    unknown. Long-standing rumors that there are other gravesites scattered
    around the country dating from this period continued to circulate
    during the year. In December the authorities resumed their search for
    remains. At that time, human remains of five individuals were excavated
    from a former military garrison site. The investigation continued at
    year's end. Also in December, President Moscoso announced plans to
    create a ``Truth Commission'' to follow up on such cases.
        On October 15, approximately 60 unknown assailants, widely believed
    to be members of a Colombian armed group, attacked the village of
    Nazaret, near the border with Colombia. One 11-year-old girl was
    killed, and approximately 12 persons were wounded, including 3 members
    of the PNP. The Government had not established firmly responsibility
    for the attack at year's end; however, some observers believe that
    members of the guerrilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC) were responsible. Following the attack, two police
    officers in Darien reportedly tortured an Embera Indian suspected of
    aiding Colombian rebel groups (see Section 1.c.).
        There were some unconfirmed killings of homosexual men.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        The Hector Gallego Committee for Disappeared Relatives maintains a
    list of 120 persons who disappeared during the military dictatorships
    of 1968-89 and are still unaccounted for.
        FARC guerrillas reportedly kidnaped persons in the Darien region
    along the border with Colombia. In 1999 three individuals were abducted
    and held for ransom; only one had been released by year's end. There
    were reports that the FARC harassed and even killed Darien residents.
    One girl was killed by an armed group in October (see Section 1.a.).
    There were unconfirmed reports that Colombian citizens have been
    kidnaped and then retained in Panamanian territory.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of measures that could
    harm the physical, mental, or moral integrity of prisoners or detainees
    and the public security forces generally performed in a professional
    and restrained manner; however, there were reports of excessive use of
    force and inhuman punishment against prison inmates. There also were
    reports that police used physical violence and psychological threats to
    control detainees during the initial arrest, interrogation, and holding
    phases.
        In December Indian community leader Francisco Olivo complained that
    two police officers in Darien tortured an Embera Indian after he was
    arrested and accused of aiding Colombian rebel groups. The torture
    incident reportedly occurred soon after an October attack on Nazaret
    (see Section 1.a.). Police Director Carlos Bares responded by saying
    that he would order an investigation and would punish anyone found
    responsible. An investigation continued at year's end.
        The 1997 legislation providing the legal basis for the PNP includes
    specific guidelines for use of force, including deadly force; requires
    that police officers respect human rights; and prohibits instigation or
    tolerance of torture, cruelty, or other inhuman or degrading behavior.
    However, there is no follow-on training in the use of force provided to
    the PNP.
        The PTJ and the PNP have offices of professional responsibility
    that act as internal affairs organs to hold officers accountable for
    their actions. Both have staffs of independent investigators as well as
    administrative authority to open internal investigations. In both
    organizations, a defined legal process is followed in which, upon
    completion of the process, the respective director of the PTJ or PNP
    has the final authority to determine the disposition of each case. The
    PNP deputy director and secretary general address human rights problems
    that arise in the police force. The offices of professional
    responsibility are well known in the community, and the rate of
    complaints has remained roughly constant in both offices.
        The PNP Office of Professional Responsibility receives on average
    six complaints per week, of which 30 to 35 percent result in some type
    of punitive action. Penalties include reduction in rank, dismissal, and
    in severe cases, criminal prosecution. By November the authorities had
    dismissed 16 officers for corruption, burglary, and/or bribery. A total
    of 206 other cases were under investigation as of November; 108 cases
    were dismissed; 82 cases were still under investigation.
        The PTJ receives complaints from the public, and officers can make
    anonymous complaints of corruption and other problems. By October the
    PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had conducted 179
    investigations, which resulted in the dismissal of 52 agents. The
    majority of the cases were for mishandling official property such as
    misplacing guns or radios (22 cases), and personal conduct or improper
    behavior when off duty (30 cases).
        In May the PNP disciplinary committee exonerated a sergeant and
    three officers for the March 1999 shooting in Pueblo Nuevo, and
    concluded that they acted in self-defense, and that the victim was not
    a minor as originally reported. According to residents of the
    neighborhood, the victim was lying on the ground in handcuffs at the
    time of the shooting.
        Corruption among police officers also remains a problem. By October
    the PTJ Office of Professional Responsibility had dismissed 20 agents
    for corruption. In some cases, PNP and PTJ directors enforced other
    disciplinary measures against officers with proven involvement in
    illicit activities; however, both organizations only react to egregious
    abuses, due to a lack of staff, independence, and institutional
    priority.
        During the year, police generally exercised restraint in their
    treatment of street protesters, despite an increase in the frequency of
    street demonstrations. However, police commonly used tear gas against
    protesters.
        Police arrested and detained children for minor infractions during
    neighborhood sweeps (see Section 5).
        The FARC guerrillas and the paramilitary forces of the United Self-
    Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) share a long history of spillover of
    violence from Colombia into the border area on the Darien peninsula,
    including killings, kidnaping, robbery, and various forms of harassment
    of innocent bystanders (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
        Despite some technical improvements and some training of prison
    guards during the year, overall prison conditions remained harsh and in
    some cases, threatening to prisoners' health and safety, due largely to
    budget constraints. The current prison system has over 9,018 prisoners
    but an allotted capacity of only 6,893 persons. Most prisons are
    dilapidated and overcrowded. Many of the problems within the prisons
    stem not only from the obvious overcrowding but also from the lack of
    separation of inmates according to the type or severity of the crime
    committed. Medical care is inadequate and sometimes withheld from
    inmates. Tuberculosis, AIDS, and other communicable diseases are common
    among the prison population. The Corrections Department does not have
    an ambulance to take prisoners to hospitals in case of emergencies.
    Over the last 4 years, 10 inmates have been killed and 25 injured due
    to gang violence. In June gang members at La Joya prison stole keys and
    entered the cell block of a rival gang armed with knives, murdering two
    prisoners and wounding another five.
        Abuse by prison guards, both PNP and civilian, is a recurrent
    problem of the prison system. At year's end, there were 8 cases open
    with the Public Ministry regarding human rights abuses in the prisons,
    involving 25 civilian custodians and 6 members of the PNP. Pending
    cases include three custodians awaiting trial for abuses committed in
    La Joya prison in 1996 against prisoner Jorge Reyes Alvarez, and PNP
    guards awaiting trial for the beating death of prisoner Jorge Alvarado
    at Tinajitas prison (see Section 1.a.). In another high profile case,
    10 members of the PNP are expected to be tried for beating naked
    prisoners with baseball bats in the (now closed) Modelo prison in 1998.
    The special prosecutor in charge of the 8 cases has handled 13 others
    since 1996. In 1999 six custodians from La Joya each were sentenced to
    40 months in prison for having abused La Joya prisoner Carlos Cisneros
    Naranjo.
        The main prisons in Panama City include La Joya (a maximum-security
    facility), Tinajitas, the Feminine Center (women's prison), and the
    Juvenile Detention Center. Two additional facilities, La Joyita and El
    Renacer, hold inmates generally accused of less serious crimes. In July
    foreign experts found that conditions at El Renacer have improved
    substantially and that the new prison director is attempting to make
    many needed reforms. Conditions at La Joyita remain problematic. The
    notorious island prison colony of Coiba is still in operation. There
    are also prisons of significant size in David and Santiago, and a large
    facility is planned for construction in Divisa in 2001. Small jails
    attached to local police stations around the country sometimes house
    prisoners for the entire length of their sentence. The authorities
    frequently do not address cases of abuse and neglect in these
    provincial jails due to their low profile in the prison system. Prison
    authorities hope eventually to close down these provincial jails and
    house all prisoners in the central jails.
        The General Penitentiary Directorate (DGSP) largely depends on PNP
    officers to supply both internal and perimeter security at all prisons.
    Ideally, civilian corrections officers (or ``custodians'') with
    specialized training are supposed to handle inmates in all prisons, but
    funding constraints have prevented reform. Newly appointed DGSP
    Director Concepcion Corro wants to replace PNP guards with civilians,
    but has been granted only enough funding to train and fill 237 of 2,500
    potential civilian positions. Custodians do handle inmates within La
    Joya, El Renacer, and the central women's prison, which uses only
    female guards. Because prison security rests almost entirely with the
    PNP, tensions arise between PNP officers and their civilian directors.
    In addition, PNP officers are untrained for prison duty and generally
    find the assignment distasteful, contributing to tension and abuses
    within the prison system. The DGSP does not have authority to
    discipline prison guards with criminal or civil sanctions; only the PNP
    disciplinary board can sanction a PNP agent or a custodian.
        Prison conditions on the island penal colony of Coiba remained
    harsh and dangerous. In January 1998, a prison gang reportedly beheaded
    four prison escapees who belonged to a rival gang. The authorities
    concluded a lengthy investigation, and the case is expected to go to
    trial in 2001. Some of the accused prisoners are detained in the Panama
    City jail, and others are held in a jail in Santiago. The authorities
    have not yet brought anyone to trial in the case of eight murders that
    were discovered in 1998 in which both guards and prisoners have been
    implicated. In June the remains of three individuals were found on the
    nearby island of Jicarita. At year's end, the authorities had not yet
    determined the identity of the remains nor the circumstances of their
    deaths.
        National prison authorities occasionally have discussed plans to
    close Coiba, but at year's end there were no definite plans for a
    shutdown. Although the facility no longer holds the most dangerous
    criminals, it continues to relieve overcrowding elsewhere in the prison
    system. The prison population at the island prison colony was reduced
    to 130 inmates, compared with 361 in 1999; none are pretrial detainees.
        Geographic isolation and lack of communications on Coiba separate
    detainees from their attorneys and cause many to miss trials. Prisoners
    suffer from malnutrition and shortages of potable water. Medical care
    is practically nonexistent; prisoners with AIDS told reporters that
    they are isolated in small cells and that medical attention is provided
    once a year. Escapes from Coiba reportedly are common.
        La Joya is the primary maximum security facility and houses most
    prisoners accused of serious crimes. La Joya has a planned capacity of
    1,250, but houses over 2,000 inmates. Gang violence is a problem. In
    June in La Joya, 22 inmates with AIDS went on a hunger strike to
    protest their lack of access to medical treatment and their need for
    special permits to receive medicine.
        Prison conditions in Colon province also are harsh. The Human
    Rights Commission of the Legislative Assembly described the Public
    Prison of Colon as a ``time bomb,'' which fails to provide the most
    basic health needs. The prison frequently has no running water or
    functioning sewage system. The Commission also reported that prisoners
    at the Women's Prison of Colon suffer from overcrowding, semidarkness
    day and night, constantly wet floors, and virtually no health care.
    Colon's main prison, Nueva Esperanza, is under construction and is
    expected to absorb inmates from Colon's women's prison and the
    dilapidated public prison, both of which are scheduled to shut down.
    The new inmates are to be housed in separate sections of Nueva
    Esperanza, where construction was quite advanced at year's end, with
    some of the new cells already outfitted with bunks and toilets.
    However, inmates from the rapidly deteriorating Public Prison
    reportedly were apprehensive about being moved to Nueva Esperanza,
    where their access to the outdoors is expected to be limited. At year's
    end, male prisoners were housed at Nueva Esperanza; approximately 60
    female prisoners are scheduled to be transferred there once
    construction is complete.
        Conditions at women's prisons and at juvenile detention centers
    were noticeably better than at adult male prisons. However, female
    prisoners, especially those in the primary detention area, reportedly
    suffered from overcrowding, poor medical care, and lack of basic
    supplies for personal hygiene. Juvenile detention centers throughout
    the country suffer from inadequate resources to provide for education
    or adequate supervision of children, many of whom spend the majority of
    their time in a bare cell.
        The law and the Criminal Code provide for conditional release
    programs for inmates charged with minor offenses who have served a
    substantial part of their sentence, but this provision has not been
    implemented consistently in practice. A conditional release program was
    part of the organizational reforms that authorities introduced in July
    1998. During the year, the DGSP provided information in a more timely
    manner to the President for her signature to allow such conditional
    releases. The Government released some 800 inmates by year's end. The
    release program helped to relieve pressure on the overcrowded prisons.
        Accusations by the media of corruption within the DGSP and its
    parent organization, the Ministry of Government and Justice, declined
    during the year. A criminal complaint filed in June 1999 by former
    National Penitentiary Director Enriqueta Davis against then-Minister of
    Government and Justice Mariela Sagel never was submitted to court.
        The Government generally allows prison visits by independent human
    rights monitors. However, the authorities arrange appointments ahead of
    time, and monitors generally speak to prisoners in the presence of
    guards or administrators. Prisoners may not feel comfortable speaking
    freely under such conditions, and they have expressed fear of
    retaliation if they complain. Contrary to the previous year, there were
    no reports that officials from the Ombudsman's office had trouble
    gaining access to prisons. Justicia y Paz, the Catholic Church's human
    rights watchdog group, brings prison abuses to the attention of the
    authorities.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    stipulates that arrests must be carried out with a warrant issued by
    the appropriate authorities, and the Government generally respected
    this provision. Previously, the authorities often violated the
    provision that suspects are to be brought promptly before a judge;
    however, this provision was enforced more strictly during the year.
    Exceptions are permitted when an officer apprehends a person during the
    commission of a crime, or when disrespect by an individual towards an
    officer prevents the officer from carrying out his duty. The law
    requires the arresting officer to inform the detainee immediately of
    the reasons for arrest or detention and of the right to immediate legal
    counsel, to be provided to the indigent by the State (see Section
    1.e.).
        The Constitution also provides for judicial review of the legality
    of detention and mandates the immediate release of any person detained
    or arrested illegally. The Constitution prohibits police from detaining
    suspects for more than 24 hours without bringing them before a judge.
    Contrary to previous years, the authorities did not violate often the
    24-hour time limit by several days. Under law the preliminary
    investigation phase may last 8 days to 2 months, and the followon
    investigation phase another 2 to 4 months, depending on the number of
    suspects. The courts frequently grant extensions of these limits,
    leaving the accused in detention for a long period without having been
    charged formally. The law permits these extensions; however, many legal
    authorities (including court officials) criticized judges for excessive
    use of this measure.
        Extended pretrial detention continued to be one of the most serious
    human rights problems, due in part to the elaborate notification phase
    in criminal cases. According to government statistics, the number of
    pretrial detainees increased slightly to 4,851, or about 58 percent of
    the prison population. This proportion is roughly the same as 1999,
    when 59 percent of prisoners were still awaiting trial. The average
    period of pretrial custody was 16 months, and pretrial detention in
    excess of the maximum sentence for the alleged crime was common. For
    example, a man recently released from La Joyita Prison had spent 4
    years in jail for a crime with a maximum sentence of 6 months. A legal
    mechanism exists to hold the Government financially accountable in
    cases where a detainee spends more than 1 year in jail but subsequently
    has all charges dismissed at a preliminary hearing. The dismissal must
    be either because the act of which the detainee was accused is not
    ruled a crime or because there is no evidence to link the suspect to
    the crime. Although this redress procedure is not complicated, few
    former detainees have employed it.
        Legal alternatives to prison exist but are not implemented widely.
    Options such as house arrest have been used in some cases involving the
    elderly or minors, but require that the defendants have access to and
    understanding of their legal options.
        The Constitution prohibits exile; there were no reports of forced
    exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is susceptible to
    corruption and outside influence, including manipulation by other
    branches of government.
        The President appoints nine Supreme Court magistrates to 10-year
    terms, subject to Legislative Assembly ratification. In July 1999, the
    Assembly passed a law that created an additional chamber to the Supreme
    Court, allowing then-President Perez Balladares to appoint three
    additional Supreme Court Justices before leaving office. However, in
    October 1999, the Assembly approved a proposal by the new Moscoso
    Administration to repeal the law.
        The Supreme Court magistrates appoint appellate (Superior Tribunal)
    judges, who, in turn, appoint circuit and municipal court judges in
    their respective jurisdictions. Judicial appointments are supposed to
    be made under a merit-based system, but the top-down appointment system
    lends itself to political tinkering and undue interference by higher-
    level judges in lower-level cases in which they often have no
    jurisdiction.
        The Attorney General appoints the superior and circuit level
    prosecutors. Previously, the Attorney General also appointed the
    Director and Sub-Director of the PTJ, but a 1998 law transferred this
    power to the Supreme Court, and requires Supreme Court approval of
    their removal from office. The same law also gave these two officials
    the power to name other PTJ officials without consulting the Attorney
    General. Opposition and media critics charged that this law increased
    the influence of the Supreme Court over criminal investigators, removed
    the generally positive oversight of the Attorney General, and made
    cooperation between prosecutors and the police much more difficult. On
    April 24, the Supreme Court approved Attorney General Jose Antonio
    Sossa's request to dismiss Director Alejandro Moncada of the PTJ, and
    Sossa did so the following day. Tensions between the Attorney General
    and the PTJ under its new director did not completely abate, although
    they appeared to have lessened by year's end.
        At the local level, mayors appoint administrative judges, or
    ``corregidores,'' who exercise jurisdiction over minor civil and
    criminal cases and who hold wide powers to arrest and to impose fines
    or jail sentences of up to 1 year. This system has serious
    shortcomings: Defendants lack adequate procedural safeguards;
    administrative judges outside of Panama City are usually not attorneys;
    many have not completed secondary education; and some engage in corrupt
    practices. In practice, appeal procedures are nonexistent. Affluent
    defendants tend to pay fines while poorer defendants go to jail, which
    contributes to prison overcrowding.
        In 1998 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loaned the
    Government $18.9 million to reform the judicial system; the Government
    contributed another $8.1 million to the program. The loan is being used
    at national and local levels to improve conditions in the court system,
    including better information management, revision of judicial
    procedures, and training of personnel. The loan also includes the
    construction of two ``model courts'' in San Miguelito and David, which
    are to hold offices for judges, prosecutors, and the PTJ in one
    building. The IDB's database linking prison population data with
    prosecutors and the courts, which is intended to facilitate the
    systematic release of prisoners who have served time beyond their
    potential maximum sentence but still are awaiting trial, was completed
    by year's end. Coordination between the IDB and the Government has
    improved with the 1999 appointment of Supreme Court Chief Justice
    Mirtza Franceschi de Aguilera. The Ministry of Economy and Finance has
    approved a second phase of the project and listed funding for the
    project in its budget request.
        The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes have the
    right to counsel, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to
    refrain from incriminating themselves or close relatives, and to be
    tried only once for a given offense. If not under pretrial detention,
    the accused may be present with counsel during the investigative phase
    of the proceeding. Judges can order the presence of pretrial detainees
    for the rendering or amplification of statements, or for confronting
    witnesses. Trials are conducted on the basis of evidence presented by
    the public prosecutor. Under limited circumstances, the law permits
    trials without the accused being present. The Constitution and the
    Criminal Procedure Code provide for trial by jury at the defendant's
    election, but only in cases where at least one of the charges is
    murder.
        The Constitution obliges the Government to provide public defenders
    for the indigent. However, many public defenders are appointed late in
    the investigation, and the prosecutor may have already evaluated the
    bulk of the evidence and made a decision to recommend trial or the
    dismissal of the charges. Public defenders' caseloads remained
    extremely high, averaging some 600 cases per attorney per year,
    compared with 550 cases in 1999. Only 3 new public defenders have been
    hired since 1992, making a total of 38 nationwide, with a similar
    number of assistants. This heavy workload undermined the quality of
    representation, with many prisoners meeting their public defender for
    the first time on the day of trial.
        In July 1999, the Supreme Court upheld a law popularly known as the
    ``Faundes Law,'' which requires judges and other public officials to
    retire at age 75.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    home, private papers, and telephonic communications, and the Government
    generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were
    complaints that in some cases police failed to follow legal
    requirements and conducted unauthorized searches. The authorities may
    not enter private residences except with the owner's permission, or by
    written order from the appropriate authority for specific purposes.
    These may include entry to assist the victims of crime or disaster, or
    to conduct lawful health and safety inspections. The authorities may
    not examine private papers and correspondence, except as properly
    authorized by competent legal authority, and in the presence of the
    owner, a family member, or two neighbors.
        Although the Constitution prohibits all wiretapping, the Government
    maintains that wiretapping with judicial approval is legal, and that
    the Attorney General may authorize a wiretap when confronted with
    probable cause in a serious crime. Under the guidelines established by
    1994 antinarcotics legislation, the Public Ministry may engage in
    undercover operations, including ``videotaping and recording of
    conversations and telephonic communications.'' The Supreme Court has
    not issued a final ruling on whether wiretapping is constitutional, but
    it remains an established practice.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice; however, the media is subject to
    political pressure, and the Government used libel laws to pressure
    journalists.
        There is an active and often adversarial press and a broad range of
    print and electronic media outlets, including foreign newspapers, radio
    and television broadcasts, and cable stations. Six national daily
    newspapers, 4 commercial television stations, 2 educational television
    stations, and approximately 100 radio stations provide a broad choice
    of informational sources; all are privately or institutionally owned. A
    June 1999 law prohibits newspapers from holding radio and television
    concessions, and vice versa. While many media outlets took identifiable
    editorial positions, the media carried a wide variety of political
    commentaries and other perspectives, both local and foreign. There is a
    noticeable concentration of control of television outlets in the hands
    of close relatives and associates of former President Perez Balladares,
    who is a member of the largest opposition party.
        Panamanian and foreign journalists worked and traveled freely
    throughout the country. A 1978 law requires directors and deputy
    directors of media outlets to be citizens.
        Under ``gag laws'' dating from the military dictatorship, the
    Government had legal authority to prosecute media owners and reporters
    for criminal libel and calumny. A special executive branch authority
    had discretionary powers to administer the libel laws, which provided
    for fines and up to 2 years in prison. Under the statute, opinions,
    comments, or criticism of government officials acting in their official
    capacity are exempted specifically from libel prosecution, but a
    section of the law allows for the immediate discipline of journalists
    who show ``disrespect'' for the office of certain government officials.
    In December 1999, President Moscoso ratified the Legislative Assembly's
    decision to eliminate these gag laws, improving the legal status of the
    media. However, legal actions against many journalists remained
    pending, and vestiges of the former gag laws still provide a means for
    penalizing journalists. Ombudsman Italo Antinori stated that there were
    at least 40 cases of journalists who had been accused of defamation.
        Attorney General Jose Antonio Sossa ordered the arrest of El Siglo
    newspaper editor Carlos Singares on two occasions during the year for
    libel. Frontpage articles in El Siglo had accused Sossa of illicit
    activities, but the newspaper presented little proof to back up its
    allegations. President Moscoso defused the first arrest attempt, but
    upon the second arrest order Singares was jailed for 8 days. During his
    detention, he was held with approximately 50 common prisoners. While
    Singares was in jail, a court sentenced him to 20 months in prison for
    criminal libel against former President Perez Balladares. Singares
    appealed the conviction, and the appeal was pending at year's end.
        In August police surrounded the homes of three journalists from La
    Prensa in an attempt to force them to testify in a criminal libel case
    filed against them by Attorney General Sossa; the police left after the
    journalists agreed to testify.
        On July 14, a court sentenced Jean Marcel Chery, a reporter for the
    daily newspaper Panama America, to 18 months in jail or a fine of
    $1,800 for criminal libel; Chery had reported a woman's allegations
    that police robbed her of $33,000 during a search of her apartment.
    Chery appealed, and her appeal was pending at year's end.
        In 1998 then-PNP Director Jose Luis Sosa used the libel laws to
    bring charges against law professor and former Moscoso adviser Miguel
    Bernal for statements that criticized the PNP for allowing the
    decapitations of prisoners on Coiba Island (see Section 1.c.). In
    November 1999, there was a preliminary hearing on Sosa's charges, but
    no trial date was set by year's end. Bernal requested that the judge
    accept 37 witnesses; however, the judge rejected 34 of them. Bernal
    appealed this decision, which was pending at year's end.
        Libel charges against La Prensa journalist Herasto Reyes filed by
    then-President Perez Balladares, after Reyes published a story in
    August 1998 accusing the administration of trying to cover up a
    government embezzlement scandal, still were pending at year's end.
        In another 1998 case, a prosecutor acting on behalf of Attorney
    General Sossa used the libel laws to charge La Prensa journalists
    Gustavo Gorriti and Rolando Rodriguez with a ``crime against the honor
    of the authorities'' for a story accusing the Attorney General of
    accepting dubious checks in his unsuccessful 1994 campaign for a seat
    in the Legislative Assembly. Subsequent press reports suggested that
    the story was erroneous. The charges remained pending at year's end.
    Gorriti is facing six criminal libel cases.
        In October a superior court magistrate sentenced former President
    Guillermo Endara to 18 months in jail for libel and slander against
    Minister of Canal Affairs Ricardo Martinelli, the former Director
    General of the Social Security Institution. The magistrate suspended
    the sentence on the condition that former President Endara not commit
    any other crime. Endara had not appealed the ruling at year's end.
        On July 31, the Legislative Assembly passed legislation that limits
    access by citizens to specific information about international
    agreement negotiations and national security, to administrative files
    within the Solicitor General's office, and to information about such
    matters as private citizens' health, political leanings, marital
    status, police or prison records, and bank accounts. The measure took
    effect on August 2. The Solicitor General's office indicated that these
    restrictions already existed in practice, but were codified by the new
    law. Nevertheless, some legal experts challenged this interpretation
    and the media harshly criticized the measure. A Special Rapporteur from
    the Organization of American States also criticized the law during a
    September visit to the country. In November the Legislative Assembly
    amended Article 70 of the Solicitor General's Organic Law that
    regulated press access to files. The amendment states that the
    confidential classification of a given piece of information must be
    established objectively and pursuant to the conditions contained in the
    current laws, in order to prevent public officials from denying the
    release of information under the excuse of limited access. President
    Moscoso had not signed the amendment at year's end.
        The Electoral Tribunal must approve election polling results before
    publication. During the year, the Government alleged that the newspaper
    El Panama America commissioned Gallup polls that were rigged to portray
    the Government negatively. In April 1999, the Tribunal had fined the El
    Panama America $10,000 for failing to follow the approval procedure
    before printing Gallup poll results.
        The press laws provide for the establishment of a censorship board.
    The board monitors radio transmissions and has the authority to fine
    stations that violate norms regarding vulgar and profane language.
        In July Bishop Romulo Emiliani left the Darien region following
    anonymous death threats; he had criticized publicly Colombian
    paramilitaries, guerrillas, and drug traffickers.
        The law provides for academic freedom, which generally was
    respected in both public and private universities.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    generally respects this right in practice. No authorization is needed
    for outdoor assembly, although prior notification for administrative
    purposes is required. Throughout much of the year, police showed
    restraint and professionalism while monitoring large protests by
    students, political activists, prisoners, and workers. While police
    commonly used tear gas against protesters, unlike the previous year,
    police generally did not break up public demonstrations with birdshot,
    rubber bullets, beatings, or other abusive treatment. However, in June
    and July, students and workers protested government policy by blocking
    traffic for several hours on a major thoroughfare and by throwing rocks
    at the police; on those occasions, the police responded with tear gas,
    rubber bullets, and water hoses laced with chemical irritants. Injuries
    and arrests at other demonstrations were minimal but protesters
    nevertheless complained about abuse at the hands of the police.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. Citizens have the
    right to form associations and professional or civic groups. New
    political parties must meet strict membership and organizational
    standards in order to gain official recognition and participate in
    national campaigns. In February the Government refused to recognize a
    homosexual rights organization as a nongovernmental organization (see
    Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, although recognizing
    Catholicism as ``the religion of the majority of Panamanians,''
    provides for free exercise of all religious beliefs, provided that
    ``Christian morality and public order'' are respected. The Government
    generally respects religious freedom in practice, and there is a broad
    diversity of religions. The Constitution prohibits clerics from holding
    public office, except as related to social assistance, education, or
    scientific research. The Constitution dictates that Catholicism be
    taught in public schools, although parents have the right to exempt
    their children from religious instruction.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice. The Government
    enforced exit permit requirements for foreigners who overstayed their
    initial visas. A 9:00 p.m. curfew for unaccompanied minors in the
    Panama City area remains in effect although enforcement generally is
    poor.
        The law provides for granting refugee status in accordance with the
    1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. In 1998 President Perez Balladares signed a decree granting
    protection to all persons entering the country due to ``state
    persecution based on race, gender, religion, nationality, social group,
    or political opinion.'' The decree grants 2 months of temporary
    protection to displaced persons in the case of a large influx; the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticized this provision,
    on the grounds that it puts persons at risk for forced repatriation
    within a few weeks of entering the country, without analysis of their
    possible refugee status. However, in practice this has not occurred.
    For example, the Government has not forcibly repatriated displaced
    Colombians, and many Colombians have lived in the country for years
    without formal refugee status. A small number of Colombians were
    granted asylum during the year. The Government generally cooperates
    with the office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. However, the Government generally is reluctant to
    classify displaced Colombians as refugees, and therefore has opposed a
    permanent UNHCR presence in the country, although the UNHCR regularly
    visited border areas to aid displaced Colombians.
        Large groups of displaced persons periodically flee violence in
    Colombia by crossing the border into Panama. In December 1999, some 800
    Colombians fled violence in the Colombian town of Jurado and settled in
    the Darien town of Jaque. Since their arrival, the Government has
    cooperated with the Catholic Church and the U.N. High Commission for
    Human Rights to provide these displaced persons with humanitarian
    assistance. By the end of the year, some 200 Colombians remained in
    Jaque, while others returned to Colombia voluntarily or migrated
    elsewhere in Panama. In January President Moscoso granted provisional
    refuge to nearly 400 Colombian peasants who had fled fighting between
    guerrillas and the Colombian Navy.
        The Government has offered Colombians the chance to participate in
    a voluntary repatriation program in coordination with the Government of
    Colombia, and many agreed to return. The Government worked with the
    UNHCR and the Catholic Church to provide displaced Colombians with
    food, medical care, and access to public services, including schools
    and clinics. The Government provided these services in Jaque and other
    areas of the Darien. However, many displaced Colombians living along
    the remote Darien border area were beyond the reach of organized
    assistance from the Government, the UNHCR, or the Church.
        There were reports early in the year that the police set up a small
    number of improvised explosive devices in close proximity to their
    stations to use against possible attacks by armed Colombian groups;
    however, there were no subsequent reports of the devices or of their
    use.
        Aside from large groups of displaced persons, aliens are also
    picked up in the Darien in small groups. These immigrants are usually
    Colombian, but many Ecuadorians, Peruvians, and even Asians and
    Africans have been detained. All but 15 of a group of some 150 aliens
    detained in the Darien town of La Palma were deported or returned
    voluntarily to Colombia, despite protests by the Catholic Church that
    some of the Colombians in the group should be afforded refugee status.
        Colombian migration, whether political or economic, has drastically
    increased pressures on local populations in the Darien and caused the
    displacement of Panamanian citizens. In addition, the Government
    suspects that Colombian migration conceals or attracts the presence of
    armed Colombian groups in the Darien Region. The effects of Colombian
    migration are also evident in Panama City and Colon, where large
    populations of Colombians have settled.
        There were no other reports of the forced return of persons to a
    country where they feared persecution; however, throughout the year,
    there were unconfirmed reports that the police along the border, on an
    ad hoc basis, required Colombians to return to Colombia.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    Government, and citizens freely exercised this right in the 1999
    general elections. The Constitution provides for a representative
    democracy with direct popular election by secret ballot of the
    President, two vice presidents, legislators, and local representatives
    every 5 years. The independent Electoral Tribunal arranges and
    supervises elections. While the Constitution provides for independent
    legislative and judicial branches, the executive dominates in practice.
    The Government respected the rights of its citizens to join any
    political party, propagate their views, and vote for candidates of
    their choice.
        In May 1999, Arnulfista presidential candidate Mireya Moscoso
    defeated Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Martin Torrijos
    and Christian Democratic Party candidate Alberto Vallarino, winning
    44.8 percent of the popular vote. Domestic and international observers
    characterized the elections as generally free and fair; however,
    several local contests were marred by reports of vote buying. The PRD
    won 34 seats in the Legislative Assembly; the Arnulfistas, 18;
    Solidarity, 4; the National Liberal Party, 3; MOLIRENA, 3; Democratic
    Change, 2; MORENA, 1; the Christian Democratic Party, 5; and the Civic
    Renewal Party, 1. During President Moscoso's first year in office, she
    maintained a one-vote majority in the Legislative Assembly through her
    Arnulfista Party members' coalition with other parties. However, on
    September 1, the coalition realigned, and the President's party no
    longer controls the legislature.
        There are no legal barriers to participation by women, members of
    minorities, or persons of indigenous descent, but they generally are
    underrepresented in government and politics. However, women's
    participation has increased in recent years. Mireya Moscoso is the
    country's first female president. Women hold 7 of 71 Legislative
    Assembly seats; a woman served as the Assembly's first vice president
    in 1999-2000, and another woman holds this position for the 2000-2001
    legislative season. Three women hold cabinet positions, and a woman is
    the director of the Public Registry. Two female judges sit on the
    Supreme Court, one of whom was elected Chief Justice in October 1999.
    In May 1999, an indigenous person served as President of the
    Legislative Assembly from September 1999 until August.
        The Government provides semi-autonomous status to several
    indigenous groups in their homelands, including the Kuna Yala, Ngobe-
    Bugle, Embera Wounaan, Kuna de Madungandi, and Wargandi reserves. There
    are two Kuna legislators in the Legislative Assembly, one Ngobe, one
    part-Ngobe, and one Embera. Locally, tribal chiefs govern each reserve;
    they meet in a general congress at regular intervals. Neither the
    Madugandi nor the Embera-Wounaan reserve has its own dedicated
    legislators, but each has a separate governor. The Government continued
    the process of demarcating electoral districts within a new reserve
    created for the NgobeBugle. May 1999 elections allowed many Ngobe-Bugle
    to choose their own local representatives in these newly created
    electoral districts.
        The law prohibits discrimination against any social, religious, or
    cultural group; however, naturalized citizens may not hold certain
    categories of elective office.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights organizations, including both religious and secular
    groups, operated without government restrictions. These organizations
    carried out a full range of activities, including investigations and
    dissemination of their findings. Organizations generally had access to
    government officials while conducting investigations.
        The office of Human Rights Ombudsman was created in 1996 and began
    to handle cases in 1998. The office receives 15 to 20 complaints daily,
    but does not have authority to investigate violations involving the
    administration of justice. Human Rights Ombudsman Italo Antinori, the
    first person to fill the position, sparred with the Perez Balladares
    Government constantly but reduced his public profile after the 1999
    election of President Moscoso. Antinori's term runs until June 2004.
        On December 27, President Moscoso announced her intention to create
    a commission to investigate crimes committed during the 1968-89
    dictatorship.
        In February Minister of Government and Justice Winston Spadafora
    denied a petition by the Association of New Men and Women, an informal
    gay rights organization, to register as a nongovernmental organization.
    Human Rights Ombudsman Antinori publicly supported Spadafora's
    decision.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits either special privileges or
    discrimination on the basis of race, birth status, social class, sex,
    religion, or political views. However, societal prejudices persist.
    Cases of discrimination are difficult to prove, and legal remedies for
    victims are complicated, time-consuming, and costly. There were some
    unconfirmed killings of homosexual men.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women continued to be a serious
    problem. The 1995 Family Code criminalized family violence (including
    psychological, physical, or sexual abuse) but convictions are rare
    unless a death occurs. The PTJ registered 610 cases of domestic
    violence through September, compared with 451 through June 1999. The
    PTJ also registered 408 cases of rape and 102 cases of attempted rape
    through September, compared with 514 cases of rape and 135 cases of
    attempted rape in 1999. The Center for the Development of the Woman
    estimated that victims report as few as 20 percent of sexual assaults
    to judicial or law enforcement authorities. A widely acknowledged
    characteristic of rape is that it frequently occurs in the home. The
    Foundation for the Promotion of the Woman, among other women's advocacy
    groups and government agencies, operated programs to assist victims of
    abuse, and to educate women on their legal rights.
        Trafficking in women for forced labor and forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment also is a threat to the equal status of women in
    society. According to a report by the Latin American Committee for the
    Defense of Women, in 1995, the latest year statistics were available,
    about 70 percent of female government employees reported having endured
    sexual harassment in the workplace--42 percent by their immediate
    supervisors and 18 percent by more senior supervisors. Anecdotal
    evidence suggests that many women are propositioned for sexual favors
    at the time of their initial job interview. A bill to criminalize
    sexual harassment failed to pass the legislature in 1995, and further
    legislation has not been introduced.
        The 1995 Family Code recognizes joint or common property in
    marriages. However, insufficient resources hampered government efforts
    to enforce the code's provisions effectively. According to Supreme
    Court Justice Mirtza de Aguilera, there should be 80 family judges;
    however, only 20 have been appointed due to lack of resources.
        The Constitution mandates equal pay for men and women in equivalent
    jobs, but wages paid to women are on average 20 percent lower and
    increase at a slower rate. There are credible reports of irregular
    hiring practices based upon age and ``appearance.'' A 1998 law
    reiterates protections laid out in the Constitution and prohibits
    discrimination on the basis of sex.
        In 1998 the Government created the Ministry of Youth, Women,
    Children, and Family Affairs. The Ministry is largely a consolidation
    of departments previously operating in other government ministries, and
    its activities have not attracted a great deal of public attention. A
    number of private women's rights groups concentrate on disseminating
    information about women's rights, countering domestic abuse, enhancing
    employment and other skills, and pressing for legal reforms.
        Children.--Minors (under 18 years of age) represent 48 percent of
    the population. Education is compulsory through the equivalent of 9th
    grade, but children do not always attend school due to traditional
    attitudes, the lack of transportation, and insufficient government
    resources to enforce the requirement. The problem is most extreme in
    the Darien province and among indigenous groups. The Government
    furnishes basic health care for children through local clinics run by
    the Ministry of Health. A central children's hospital in Panama City
    operates on government funds as well as private donations.
        The Superior Tribunal for Minors and Superior Tribunal for Families
    are judicial authorities charged with overseeing the protection and
    care of minors. The Minister of Youth, Women, Children, and Family
    Affairs acts much like an ombudsman, and the office proposes and
    reviews laws and monitors government performance. Through September the
    PTJ registered 130 cases of child abuse, compared with 171 in all of
    1999. Neglect of children is a problem. Malnutrition and inadequate
    medical care are generalized problems that are most severe among rural
    indigenous groups. Rural and urban child labor are problems (see
    Section 6.d.).
        Juvenile courts continue to report a high incidence of juvenile
    delinquency in major urban areas. The authorities report a continued
    increase in such crimes as drug trafficking, armed robberies,
    kidnappings, car thefts, and murders that are attributed to juveniles.
    Youth participation in criminal gangs is an increasing problem. Police
    arrested and detained children for minor infractions during
    neighborhood sweeps.
        People with Disabilities.--The Ministry of Education is responsible
    for educating and training disabled minors, while the Ministry of
    Youth, Women, Children, and Family Affairs protects the rights of
    disabled adults. Disabled children traditionally have been separated
    out from the general population; however, on February 4, the
    Legislative Assembly passed a law that requires schools to integrate
    children with special needs into the student body.
        The Department of Labor is responsible for placing workers with
    disabilities in suitable jobs. Placement remains difficult despite a
    1993 executive order granting tax incentives to firms that hire
    disabled employees. Disabled persons also tend to make only the minimum
    salary, notably less than employees without disabilities.
        The 1998 municipal building code for Panama City requires that all
    new construction projects include handicapped accessible features, with
    fines from $100 to $500 for noncompliance. In 1999 a national law was
    passed with similar requirements for new construction projects, but it
    is not yet clear whether the law is to be enforced. Awareness of
    handicapped issues has increased over the past 5 years, and commercial
    establishments increasingly provide and enforce handicapped parking
    spaces. However, basic services such as sidewalks and handicapped
    accessible bathrooms are largely unavailable.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution protects the ethnic identity
    and native languages of indigenous people, requiring the Government to
    provide bilingual literacy programs in indigenous communities.
    Indigenous people have legal rights and take part in decisions
    affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and the allocation of
    natural resources. Indigenous people number approximately 194,000
    persons (8 percent of the population) and have the same political and
    legal rights as other citizens. The Government has passed legislation
    over the years setting aside indigenous reserves for the country's
    native groups, including the Embera-Wounan, Ngobe-Bugle, and Kuna. The
    Ministry of Government and Justice in Panama City maintains the low-
    profile Office of Indigenous Policy. Federal law is the ultimate
    authority on indigenous reserves, but local groups are allowed a great
    deal of local autonomy. For example, the Government recognizes
    traditional indigenous marriage rites as the equivalent of a civil
    ceremony. Despite legal protection and formal equality, indigenous
    people generally endure relatively higher levels of poverty, disease,
    malnutrition, and illiteracy than the rest of the population.
    Discrimination against indigenous people, although generally not overt,
    is widespread.
        The Indigenous Affairs Commission of the Legislative Assembly,
    which was created in 1995, sponsored bills during the year to protect
    intellectual property rights, set up regulations for artisan fairs, and
    construct a health center. The Commission also sponsored a law that
    created the new 190-acre Kuna Wargandi reserve.
        Though their population suffers from poverty and malnutrition, Kuna
    leaders have had the most success enforcing their territorial
    boundaries and maintaining their cultural integrity. There are two Kuna
    legislators, (one was President of the 1999-2000 Legislative Assembly);
    and they have more financial resources than the other groups. Other
    indigenous groups have not succeeded in using their autonomy to
    preserve their culture or develop economic independence. Most live in
    extreme poverty and isolation. Illiteracy among indigenous groups is at
    almost 50 percent, while the figure is only 10 percent among the
    population as a whole.
        Since indigenous populations infrequently master Spanish and are
    unfamiliar with the country's legal system, they often misunderstand
    their rights and fail to employ legal channels when threatened. The
    problem is exacerbated by government inattention to indigenous issues.
    For example, the EmberaWounan in the Darien have been moved out of
    their reserves in increasing numbers due to encroachment by settlers,
    loggers, and Colombian immigrants. The Ngobe also are under threat due
    to the isolation of their reserves, encroachment by settlers, and
    generalized poverty. Indigenous workers consistently do not receive the
    basic rights provided by the Labor Code, such as minimum wage, social
    security benefits, termination pay, and job security. Even when working
    in close proximity of each other, indigenous laborers in the country's
    sugar, coffee, and banana plantations work under poorer conditions than
    their nonindigenous counterparts. Indigenous migrant workers are
    unlikely to be provided with housing or food, and their children are
    much more likely to work long hours of heavy farm labor than non-
    indigenous children.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially
    diverse, and minority groups generally have been integrated into
    mainstream society with overall success. However, discrimination
    against the country's newer immigrants, especially Chinese, often is
    overt. The ethnic Chinese community is estimated to be about 120,000
    persons. Cultural differences and language difficulties hinder and may
    prevent many Chinese immigrants from fully integrating into mainstream
    society. In addition, Panamanians often resent Chinese immigrants for
    their perceived indifference towards the culture of their adopted
    country and their perceived clannish behavior. Racial slurs directed at
    Asians are used openly among the general population, and substantial
    numbers of Panamanian-resident Chinese frequently are treated as
    secondclass citizens. On the other hand, second and third generation
    Chinese are seen as distinct from recent immigrants, and generally are
    accepted in society. These established Chinese generally do not want to
    be associated with the recent arrivals from China.
        In addition to Chinese immigrants, Middle Eastern and Indian
    residents also suffer from racially motivated discriminatory treatment.
    All three groups operate much of the country's retail trade,
    particularly in urban areas. Legal and illegal immigrants, especially
    Chinese, are accorded fewer legal protections than are citizens for
    their trade activities. A constitutional provision reserving retail
    trade to Panamanian citizens is not enforced in practice; however,
    immigrants legally cannot own their businesses, and sometimes encounter
    bureaucratic difficulties in practicing their professions.
        Racism against blacks occurs, although it generally is expressed in
    more subtle terms. Blacks are conspicuously absent from positions of
    political and economic power. The country's white elite successfully
    marginalizes citizens with darker skin through preferential hiring
    practices in the private sector and manipulation of government
    resources in the public sector.
        Antillean blacks, often identifiable by dress and speech pattern,
    are a particular target for racial slurs and poor treatment by citizens
    and by Spanish-speaking blacks. Their geographic clustering in the
    economically depressed province of Colon and poorer neighborhoods of
    Panama City heightens their isolation from mainstream society. Black
    Canal workers traditionally commanded significantly higher financial
    resources compared with blacks elsewhere in society, but many have
    retired or emigrated and there is some anecdotal evidence that the rest
    are being replaced by white personnel. Mainstream political elites
    generally are unconcerned by the economic issues of black populations
    and a concomitant rise in drug use, crime, and gang violence. Colon,
    the country's second largest city, suffers from a conspicuous lack of
    government services. Indifference among the general population is a
    major impediment to change.
        Although such practices are illegal, clubs and restaurants often
    discriminate against black and indigenous individuals by denying them
    admission. In 1999 students protesting in front of Panama City's most
    popular nightclubs brought public attention to the issue. A draft bill
    to expand and support the Constitution by penalizing cases of
    discrimination for reasons of race, birth, social class, gender, and
    ideology failed midway through the year, but another bill was being
    prepared to penalize establishments that deny entry based on race.
        Racial discrimination against all ethnic groups is evident in the
    workplace, where light-skinned persons are represented
    disproportionately in management positions and jobs that require
    dealing with the public (such as bank tellers and receptionists).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers have the right
    to form and join unions of their choice, subject to the union's
    registration by the Government. A 1995 labor code reform package
    significantly increased workers' ability to establish unions. It
    streamlined the accreditation and registration process for unions, and
    established the minimum size at 40 workers. If the Government does not
    respond to an application within 15 days, the union automatically gains
    recognition and is accorded all rights and privileges under the law.
    The package also addressed a longstanding concern of the International
    Labor Organization (ILO) by allowing labor leaders to keep their union
    positions if fired from their jobs.
        Approximately 10 percent of the total employed labor force is
    organized. There are over 250 active unions, grouped under 48
    federations and 7 confederations representing approximately 80,000
    members in the private sector. Neither the Government nor political
    parties outwardly control or finance unions; however, the Government
    and political parties do exercise political, ideological, or financial
    influence over some unions. The labor sector traditionally supports the
    Democratic Revolutionary Party.
        The 1994 Civil Service Law permits most government workers to form
    public employee associations and federations and establishes their
    right to represent members in collective bargaining with their
    respective agencies. It also provides a small core of civil servants
    with the right to strike, bargain collectively, and evade summary
    dismissal, except for those in areas vital to public welfare and
    security, such as the police and health workers. However, the law has
    proven insufficient to protect the country's 150,000 public workers,
    because only a small percentage are members of the civil service and
    therefore enjoy job security. Public workers are not allowed to form
    unions. The ILO's Committee of Experts has observed for some years that
    the prohibition of public servants' associations is inconsistent with
    the country's obligations under ILO Convention 87, but no changes have
    been made.
        The law governing the autonomous Panama Canal Authority prohibits
    the right to strike for its 10,000 employees, but does allow unions to
    organize and to bargain collectively.
        In October the authorities detained, then immediately released,
    union leaders following protests by the SUNTRACS union.
        Union organizations at every level may and do affiliate with
    international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    provides most workers, including all private sector workers, with the
    right to organize and bargain collectively, and unions exercise it
    widely. The law protects union workers from antiunion discrimination
    and requires employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
    The Ministry of Labor has mechanisms to resolve complaints against
    antiunion employers. The Civil Service Law allows most public employees
    to organize and bargain collectively and grants some of them a limited
    right to strike; however, 130,000 public sector workers do not have the
    right to bargain collectively or to strike. While the right to strike
    applies to some 10,000 civil servants, it does not apply to the
    approximately 140,000 other government workers. The Labor Code
    establishes a conciliation board in the Ministry of Labor to resolve
    labor complaints and provides a procedure for arbitration. In March
    1999, the Supreme Court ruled that an article of the Labor Code that
    obligated private sector strikers to submit to binding arbitration
    after a given period was unconstitutional.
        Employers commonly hire temporary workers to circumvent onerous
    labor code requirements for permanent workers. Temporary workers are
    excluded from social security benefits, job security, and vacation
    time. Labor law requires companies to submit copies of all labor
    contracts for permanent workers to the Labor Ministry for review to
    ensure compliance and requires the Labor Ministry to conduct periodic
    inspections of the work force. The Labor Ministry may levy fines
    against companies not in compliance with the law. However, these
    measures have proven ineffective in practice. The practice of blank
    contracts is, according to union sources, becoming more widespread.
        Over the past 5 years, the Government has issued cabinet decrees
    restricting labor activity in export processing zones (EPZ's). Current
    EPZ legislation provides for collective bargaining with
    ``representatives of employees'' but makes no specific mention of trade
    unions. It requires mandatory arbitration of disputes; and it allows
    for the participation of an unrepresentative worker delegate in the
    tripartite (government, labor, and industry) arbitration commission. A
    strike may be considered legal only after 36 workdays of conciliation
    are exhausted; if this requirement is not met, striking workers may be
    fined or fired. A 1998 ILO ruling noted that this regulation does not
    mention arbitration or specify procedures to resolve disputes in the
    courts, and that the Government should amend the EPZ labor regulations
    to conform with international norms; however, the Government has not
    made any changes in response to the ruling. Minimum wage provisions do
    not apply in the EPZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children, and it
    generally does not occur; however, trafficking in women for forced
    labor and forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under
    14 years of age with some exceptions, and also prohibits the employment
    of children under age 15 if the child has not completed primary school.
    However, a Government report estimates that 27,000 children between the
    ages of 12 and 14 work. Children under age 16 legally cannot work
    overtime, and those under age 18 cannot work at night. Children between
    the ages of 12 and 15 may perform light farm or domestic work, with the
    authorization of the Labor Ministry, as long as it does not interfere
    with their schooling. The Labor Code provides that children between the
    ages of 14 and 16 may work 6-hour a day shifts that do not exceed 36
    hours a week. The Ministry of Labor enforces these provisions in
    response to complaints and may order the termination of unauthorized
    employment. The Government acknowledges that it is unable to enforce
    some child labor provisions in rural areas, due to insufficient staff.
    In May the Government ratified ILO Conventions 138 and 182 establishing
    the minimum age to work and prohibiting the worst forms of child labor.
        The Permanent Committee Against Child Labor asserts that 11 percent
    of all children between the ages of 10 and 17 are working or actively
    are seeking employment. Most of these children, both rural and urban,
    are believed to be working at their parent's insistence. Some of these
    children may be providing a substantial part of their family income.
        Child labor violations occur most frequently in rural areas, during
    the harvest of sugar cane, coffee, bananas, and tomatoes. Farm owners
    usually pay according to the amount harvested, leading many laborers to
    bring their young children to the fields to help with the work. In many
    small rural communities, the entire able-bodied population participates
    in a harvest, and parents are not willing to leave their children
    behind unattended. Many children also are involved extensively in
    subsistence agriculture producing coffee and sugar; they work with
    their families or are employed by independent plantations.
        The problem of child labor in agricultural areas appears to fall
    most heavily on indigenous families, who often are forced to migrate
    out of their isolated reserves in search of incomegenerating
    activities. These frequent migrations not only interrupt schooling, but
    also leave the family vulnerable to sometimes unscrupulous contractors.
    The Government claims that it is unable to enforce child labor
    provisions in rural areas due to insufficient staff, such as in the
    coffee and banana plantations near the border with Costa Rica, where
    government resources are especially scarce. However, the lack of
    enforcement also can be attributed to widely held beliefs that
    indigenous persons are accustomed to poverty and hard work. In April
    the Minister of Labor suggested that child labor in the sugar cane
    fields was a ``cultural tradition among the indigenous'' and that
    children cutting sugar cane received more food during harvest time;
    these comments led to a series of critical newspaper editorials. A
    series of press reports during the year that exposed primarily
    indigenous child labor in sugar cane fields led to a series of letters
    to the editor from the public. Children in banana plantations also face
    difficult conditions (see Section 6.e.).
        Urban supermarkets employ an estimated 1,500 children who bag
    groceries for tips. Despite the requirements of the Labor Code, some of
    the children are as young as age 9, and many of them work late hours.
    Some supermarket managers claim that the children actually are not
    employed by their firm, despite the fact that ``baggers'' conform to
    schedules, wear uniforms, and must comply with company codes of
    conduct. Urban child labor also includes domestic workers, street
    vendors, and car washers. The Government has demonstrated little
    interest in reducing the general problem of urban child labor, and has
    been unwilling to challenge the larger supermarket chains, where large
    numbers of children work. Urban child labor problems also include
    children working as street vendors or performers, washing cars, and
    running errands for businesses or local criminal groups.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the
    Government enforces this provision (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes
    minimum wage rates for specific regions and for most categories of
    labor. The minimum wage ranges from $0.80 per hour to $1.50 per hour,
    depending on the region and sector. This wage is not sufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
    workers formally employed in urban areas earn the minimum wage or
    above. However, because unemployment is relatively high at 11 to 13
    percent, an estimated 39 percent of the population work in the large
    informal sector and earns far below the minimum wage. This is
    particularly the case in most rural areas, where unskilled laborers
    earn $3 to $6 per day, without benefits; the Government does not
    enforce labor laws in most rural areas. In December 1999, a commission
    composed of representatives from government, the private sector, and
    labor convened to negotiate an increase in the minimum wage. The
    commission failed to reach consensus by the mandated date, and
    accordingly, in July responsibility for setting the new minimum wage
    was passed to the President, who issued a decree that raised the
    minimum wage by 13 percent, effective August 1. Public sector workers
    do not fall under the Labor Code and do not always receive the minimum
    wage.
        The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 48 hours and
    provides for at least one 24-hour rest period weekly.
        As is general practice in the country's public offices after
    elections, newly elected politicians and appointees began dismissing
    public workers immediately upon taking office to free up positions for
    loyal followers. The numbers of those dismissed were impossible to
    confirm. Despite ILO protest, public workers do not benefit from union
    protection or Labor Code standards. They were excluded from the most
    recent increase in the minimum wage. The Government has indicated that
    it would consider increasing their wages in 2001, if feasible.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing health and
    safety standards and generally does so. The standards are fairly broad
    and generally emphasize safety over long-term health hazards, according
    to organized labor sources. Inspectors from both the Labor Ministry and
    the occupational health section in the Social Security Administration
    conduct periodic inspections of hazardous employment sites and respond
    to complaints. Both agencies suffer from budget constraints and
    experience difficulty attracting qualified personnel and resources.
    Construction workers and their employers are notoriously lax about
    conforming to basic safety measures, usually resulting in several
    deaths a year. In rural areas, the most severe oversight in basic
    safety measures occurs in the banana industry, where poisoning by
    chemical agents is a recurrent issue. Workers have complained of
    sterility and more recently of adverse skin conditions as a result of
    exposure to the chemicals. In several plantations, indigenous workers
    are not provided with shelters, sanitary or cooking facilities, or
    fresh water; they also did not have machetes or gloves for their work.
    Complaints of health problems also continued in the cement and milling
    industries.
        The law protects from dismissal workers who file requests for
    health and safety inspections. Workers also have the right to remove
    themselves from situations that present an immediate health or safety
    hazard without jeopardizing their employment. They generally are not
    allowed to do so if the threat is not immediate, but may request a
    health and safety inspection to determine the extent and nature of the
    hazard.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits trafficking in
    women and children; however, trafficking remains a problem. The Code
    provides for prison sentences of 2 to 4 years for the promotion or
    facilitation of the entry to or exit from the country of a person for
    the purposes of prostitution. In some circumstances, the penalty is
    increased to 6 years. The country is a transit point for aliens seeking
    to reach the United States, some of whom are trafficked into indentured
    servitude. There were reports of women being trafficked to Israel for
    purposes of prostitution. Prosecutions are rare. The authorities held
    several persons in custody for trafficking; they remained in prison
    awaiting trial at year's end. Corruption, legal technicalities, and
    lack of resources contribute to the Government's inability to combat
    the problem fully. Traffickers frequently bribe or evade local law
    enforcement officials.
        Trafficking in women for sexual purposes occurs in the country, but
    the extent of the practice is unknown. Public prosecutors are
    investigating a case of Panamanian women smuggled into Israel in 1999
    to work in brothels. Smugglers deprived the women of their money and
    their passports. Some of the women apparently were aware that they were
    traveling to work in the sex industry, others were not. The case was
    before a criminal court at year's end; one hearing was held during the
    year.
        An estimated 30,000 aliens transit the country annually, generally
    posing as tourists. The majority of aliens transiting Panama originate
    in Ecuador and Peru, but a significant and increasing number come from
    India and China. Their travel is facilitated by a network of alien
    smugglers, travel agents, hotels, and safehouses. Anecdotal evidence
    indicates that illegal aliens transiting through the country are
    subject to frequent hardship. They commonly are deprived of adequate
    food and shelter. Chinese aliens are particularly vulnerable to poor
    treatment, and ultimately those trafficked for the purpose of forced
    labor are coerced into working off their debt, which may be as high as
    $30,000, as indentured servants. The Government does not conduct
    educational campaigns to warn of the dangers of trafficking, and there
    are no programs to aid victims.
                                   __________

                                    PARAGUAY

        Paraguay is a constitutional republic with an executive branch and
    a bicameral legislature. The President is the Head of Government and
    cannot succeed himself. The bicameral Congress is made up of a 45-
    member Senate and an 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The Colorado Party
    has a small majority in both houses of Congress; however, factional
    differences within the party result in shifting alliances depending
    upon the issue. President Luis Gonzalez Macchi's ``National Unity
    Government'' was weakened in February when the Liberal Party withdrew
    from the Government, claiming that the President's Colorado Party
    refused to share power with its coalition partners. On May 18, members
    of two army units and a group of National Police officers loyal to
    former General Lino Oviedo attempted to overthrow President Gonzalez
    Macchi. The coup attempt lasted less than 1 day, and the majority of
    the military remained loyal to the Government. President Gonzalez
    Macchi declared and Congress ratified a controversial and unpopular
    state of exception on May 19, in response to the coup attempt; he
    lifted it on May 31. The Government used the state of exception to
    imprison those it suspected of involvement in the coup attempt and to
    limit public meetings and demonstrations. Although the Constitution
    provides for an independent judiciary, and the Supreme Court continued
    a reform process, the courts continued to be subject to pressure from
    politicians and others.
        In general the military no longer plays an overt role in politics;
    the attempted coup was an exception to this practice. However, many
    citizens remained concerned about possible erosion of the military's
    apolitical status. Nonetheless, during the attempted coup in May, all
    but two groups within the armed forces remained loyal to the
    constitutional order. The national police force has responsibility for
    maintaining internal security and public order; while it is nominally
    under the authority of the presidency, in practice it reports to the
    Ministry of the Interior. The civilian authorities generally maintain
    effective control of the security forces. Members of the security
    forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        Paraguay has a market economy with a large informal sector. The
    formal economy is oriented toward services, with less than half of the
    $7.8 billion gross domestic product resulting from agriculture and
    industry. Over 40 percent of the population are engaged in agricultural
    activity, and approximately 10 percent of all families depend on cotton
    farming. Wealth continues to be concentrated, with both urban and rural
    areas supporting a large subsistence sector. Hydroelectric power and
    agricultural commodities (soybeans, cotton, lumber, and cattle) were
    the most important export items. The economy grew by approximately 0.5
    percent in 1999 but experienced zero real growth during the year.
    Annual per capita income was approximately $1,700.
        The Government's human rights record remained generally poor, and
    there continued to be serious problems. The principal human rights
    problems included extrajudicial killings; torture and abuse of criminal
    suspects, prisoners, and military recruits; and extremely poor prison
    conditions. Arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy pretrial detention,
    a general weakness within the judiciary, and infringements on citizen's
    privacy rights also were problems. The Government at times restricted
    freedom of the press. Following the May coup attempt, the Government
    arrested journalists and destroyed two radio stations; several
    journalists were threatened. The Government restricted freedom of
    assembly, and police used force to disperse protesters on several
    occasions, sometimes severely injuring citizens. Violence and
    discrimination against women, abuse of children, discrimination against
    the disabled and indigenous people, and incomplete protection of worker
    rights also were problems. There were instances of forced labor. Child
    labor and trafficking in women and girls also are problems.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The police and
    military were responsible for some extrajudicial killings.
        On January 8, police killed 3 persons while attempting to evict 400
    landless peasants from a ranch that they had taken over. Nine policemen
    were injured during the incident.
        In December in Itakyry, police shot and killed 10 men suspected of
    robbing an armored vehicle. One of the suspects, slightly wounded but
    alive when the police transported him to a local medical center, was
    dead upon arrival, with eight bullet holes in his body. At year's end
    the police were conducting an investigation.
        No further information was available regarding the disposition of
    extrajudicial killings from previous years, including the following
    cases: Jose ``Coco'' Villar, whom police killed in June 1999; Guillermo
    Jara Ramirez, whom antinarcotics police killed in July 1999; and
    Fernando Aristides Gutierrez and Marcial Torres, recruits killed during
    their military service.
        At least eight recruits died in questionable circumstances during
    the year, including 14-year-old Pedro Centurion, whom the military
    allegedly conscripted into service with false documents at 13 years of
    age against his wishes. In September he was shot and killed; the
    military claimed that he shot himself by accident. It was discovered
    later that Centurion was in fact an Argentine citizen. Human rights
    monitors, including a support group for families of military recruits,
    report that 104 recruits, most of whom were underage, were killed or
    died in accidents since 1989 while fulfilling their mandatory military
    service. Although military law requires that recruits be at least 18
    years of age to serve in the armed forces (or 17 in the year of their
    18th birthday), only an estimated 20 percent of those serving during
    the year met that requirement, and over 30 percent were 15 or younger.
        In November the Government proposed an agreement to the Inter-
    American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding the deaths of 14-
    year-old military recruits Cristian Nunez and Marcelino Gomez. Military
    officers abandoned the two boys in the inhospitable Chaco region during
    a training exercise in 1998. According to the agreement, the Government
    accepted responsibility for the deaths of the boys.
        The March 1999 assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Argana,
    which has been attributed widely to allies of then-president Raul Cubas
    Grau, led to political protests in which the police and civilian
    supporters of President Cubas fired on student demonstrators, killing 7
    and injuring over 100. The Gonzalez Macchi Government made little
    progress in bringing those responsible to justice. Three suspects were
    convicted in the assassination; others remained at large. The
    authorities charged and imprisoned a number of suspects for the
    shootings of demonstrators in the plaza following the assassination,
    but the courts have not convicted any of them, and few have been
    released from confinement. As a result, many of those charged remain in
    legal limbo, with their political rights limited, although their
    involvement with the crimes never has been confirmed.
        Former army commander Lino Oviedo, who played a prominent role in
    the downfall of the Cubas Government in 1999, and whose whereabouts
    were unknown after he fled Argentina (where he had received asylum) in
    December 1999, was arrested in Brazil in June and remains in prison in
    Brasilia. Several extradition requests for Oviedo are at various stages
    in the Brazilian justice system. He faces charges stemming from his
    alleged involvement in the March 1999 killing of Vice President Argana
    and seven antigovernment protesters. Two individuals with long criminal
    records, suspected of having participated in the Argana assassination
    and who were imprisoned in a federal police facility in downtown Buenos
    Aires, escaped from the jail in September. In November the authorities
    captured one of them in Ciudad del Este; at year's end he awaited trial
    in Asuncion. The other was thought to be hiding in Brazil.
        Authoritarian regimes ruled the country until 1989, when dictator
    Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown by General Andres Rodriguez, who was
    elected President later that year. In 1996 an appellate court affirmed
    the convictions for human rights abuses of five Stroessner-era
    officials (former police Investigations Director Pastor Coronel and
    police officers Lucilo Benitez Santacruz, Agustin Belotto Youga, Camilo
    Almada Morel, and Juan Aniceto Martinez). Pastor Coronel died in
    detention in September.
        The 1998 arrest of former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet
    in the United Kingdom and his subsequent return to Chile drew renewed
    attention to extrajudicial killings and other abuses that occurred in
    Paraguay under the Stroessner regime. There were renewed allegations
    that Stroessner cooperated in Operation Condor, a regional plan to
    eliminate leftists. One human rights activist who was a political
    prisoner during that time has filed cases with Spanish judge Baltasar
    Garzon, who was preparing the case against Pinochet, and has provided
    him with documents from Paraguayan archives that he claims implicate
    General Stroessner in Operation Condor. There was no progress during
    the year on Operation Condor cases.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture as well as cruel,
    inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment; however, torture
    (primarily beatings) and brutal and degrading treatment of convicted
    prisoners and other detainees continued. A human rights nongovernmental
    organization (NGO), the Committee of Churches, reported several cases
    of police torture and other abusive treatment of persons, including
    women and children, designed to extract confessions, punish escape
    attempts, or intimidate detainees. The Attorney General's office and
    the Committee of Churches compiled numerous examples of police abuse.
        In May during the state of exception several of the persons
    arrested reported that they were tortured during their detention. Some
    of these persons reported that former Interior Minister Walter Bower
    witnessed and encouraged the beatings of suspects in three unrelated
    cases. Bower was not charged with any crime related to these
    accusations; however, he was removed from his position in October.
    Press reports also tied him to the torture of eight peasants in
    Concepcion in March; police reportedly beat them in Bower's presence
    after they were arrested for illegally chopping down trees.
        Police used force to disperse protesters on several occasions,
    sometimes seriously injuring civilians (see Section 2.b.). Police also
    beat at least one person, a labor union leader, during a strike in June
    (see Section 6.a.).
        Violence erupted several times during the year when police removed
    squatters from lands they occupied. For example, on May 10 and 11, over
    400 police officers tried to remove squatters from a ranch in Caazapa
    using tear gas. Some shots were fired, and peasants were armed with
    Molotov cocktails, machetes, and scythes.
        In addition there were several allegations of mistreatment of
    military recruits by noncommissioned and commissioned officers.
    Recruits commonly charged that the military does not give them enough
    to eat and forces them to hunt wild animals or steal cattle to kill for
    food. In one case, a 15-year-old recruit, Cesar Francisco Pereira,
    reported that he was forced to fight another recruit by two sergeants
    who wagered a can of beer on the outcome. When Pereira lost, he was
    pistol-whipped by Julio Cesar Alarcon, the sergeant who lost the bet,
    and spent a month in a clinic recovering. Many recruits have claimed
    that they were tortured or beaten while fulfilling their mandatory
    service obligations.
        Prison conditions are extremely poor. Mistreatment of prisoners is
    a serious problem. Overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions were
    the most serious problems affecting all prisoners. Tacumbu prison, the
    largest in Asuncion, was built to hold 800 inmates but houses over
    1,500. Other regional prisons generally hold about three times more
    inmates than originally planned.
        Security is another problem in the prison system. There are
    approximately 120 guards for over 1,500 prisoners at Tacumbu prison,
    and 3 inmates were killed during the year by other inmates. At the
    Asuncion women's prison, Buen Pastor, there have been several reported
    rapes of prisoners by their guards, although laws governing prisons
    forbid male guards in the women's prisons. Conditions in the women's
    prison are better than at Tacumbu, with less overcrowding and a
    generally safer environment. There is a separate prison for juveniles.
        The Congressional Human Rights Commission has criticized the
    prisons for their poor nutritional standards. Prisons generally serve
    one meal a day, and prisoners seldom get vegetables, fruit, or a meat
    protein source, unless they have individual means to purchase them.
    Prisons have separate accommodations for well-to-do prisoners, which
    ensures that those with sufficient means receive far better treatment
    than other prisoners. Pretrial detainees are not held separately from
    convicted prisoners.
        The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions
    by human rights organizations. Members of the International Committee
    of the Red Cross had access to the detained supporters of Oviedo who
    were arrested in March 1999 and to those arrested in May.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are persistent problems. The Constitution prohibits detention
    without an arrest warrant signed by a judge and stipulates that any
    person arrested must appear before a judge within 24 hours to make a
    statement. The police can arrest persons without a warrant if they
    catch them in the act of committing a crime but must bring them before
    a judge within 24 hours. However, the authorities often violated these
    provisions, and the recent introduction of new penal and criminal
    procedure codes, which are not yet well understood by prosecutors and
    police, has exacerbated the problem.
        Following the May 18-19 coup attempt, police detained journalists
    (see Section 2.a.).
        Following the assassination of Vice President Argana and the
    killing of student protesters in March 1999, authorities arrested over
    45 persons in connection with these cases. Many of those arrested were
    well-known political figures, including legislators allied with the
    former Government. There was little evidence presented to support the
    charges against most of them, and most of the accused were held without
    bail, leading some observers to question whether due process had been
    observed. At year's end, many of those detained still remained in jail,
    and at least 10 prominent suspects who had been remanded to house
    arrest had not yet been cleared of the charges against them and
    therefore remained in an uncertain legal status.
        Pretrial detention remains a serious problem; 91 percent of persons
    in prison were held pending trial, many for months or years after their
    arrest. While the law encourages speedy trials, the Constitution
    permits detention without trial until the accused completes the minimum
    sentence for the alleged crime, which often occurs in practice. A bail
    system exists for most crimes, and judges have discretion over it.
    Judges frequently set relatively high bail, and many accused persons
    are unable to post bond. In March the Supreme Court, the Public
    Ministry, and a judicial working group took steps to reduce the large
    number of pretrial detainees but achieved only modest results. The
    Supreme Court and many criminal court judges also make quarterly visits
    to the prisons to identify and release improperly detained individuals.
        The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government does
    not use it.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, judges often are pressured by
    politicians and other persons whose interests are at stake. There were
    allegations that members of the judiciary who issued arrest warrants
    against the Oviedistas following the events of March 1999 were
    pressured to do so by politicians who opposed Oviedo. While there are
    credible reports of political pressure affecting judicial decisions,
    the judiciary is not allied with any one political group.
        The nine-member Supreme Court appoints lower court judges and
    magistrates, based upon recommendations by the magistrate's council.
    There are five types of appellate tribunals: Civil and commercial,
    criminal, labor, administrative disputes, and juvenile. Minor courts
    and justices of the peace fall within four functional areas: Civil and
    commercial, criminal, labor, and juvenile. The military has its own
    judicial system.
        The judicial system remains relatively inefficient; however, the
    1999 enactment of new penal and criminal procedure codes is expected to
    improve the judicial system's efficiency over time. The judiciary
    continues to suffer from insufficient resources. There is also a large
    backlog of cases. The Constitution stipulates that all defendants have
    the right to an attorney, at public expense if necessary, but this
    right often is not respected in practice. Many destitute suspects
    receive little legal assistance, and few have access to an attorney
    sufficiently in advance of the trial to prepare a defense. In Asuncion
    for example, there are only 26 public defenders available to assist the
    indigent, and only 102 nationwide, although 25 new positions are
    planned. In practice, public defenders lack the resources to perform
    their jobs adequately.
        The new Penal and Criminal Procedures Code entered fully into force
    in March and replaced the antiquated 1914 code. It provides the legal
    basis for the protection of fundamental human rights. The new code
    includes procedures for an oral and accusatorial system, as well as a
    faster and more transparent criminal trial process. If implemented
    effectively, these reforms could improve the credibility of the
    judicial system and reduce the number of persons in pretrial detention.
        Enactment of the new Penal and Criminal Procedures Code has
    introduced gradually oral proceedings. A prosecutor is responsible for
    bringing charges against accused persons within 180 days. Defendants
    and the prosecutor can present written testimony of witnesses as well
    as other evidence. All interested parties have access to all documents
    reviewed by the judge, and defendants can rebut witnesses. Defendants
    enjoy a presumption of innocence. The judge alone determines guilt or
    innocence and decides punishment. During the pretrial phase, the judge
    receives and may request investigative reports. The accused often
    appears before the court only twice: to plead and to be sentenced.
    Defendants have the right to appeal. If the sentence is appealed, an
    appeals court reviews the verdict. The law provides for appeals to the
    Supreme Court if constitutional questions arise.
        There were no reports of political prisoners. More than 45
    supporters of former General Lino Oviedo were arrested after the
    killings of Vice President Argana and the student protesters in March
    1999, and many remained in jail at year's end. They assert that they
    are being detained because of their political opposition to President
    Gonzalez Macchi (see Section 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--At times the Government infringed on citizens' privacy
    rights. While the Government and its security forces generally did not
    interfere in the private lives of citizens, human rights activists
    claimed that local officials and police officers abuse their authority
    by entering homes or businesses without warrants and harassing private
    citizens. The Constitution provides that the police may not enter
    private homes except to prevent a crime in progress or when the police
    possess a judicial warrant. There were allegations that the Government
    occasionally spied on individuals and monitored communications for
    political and security reasons. There were allegations of the forced
    conscription of underage youth (see Section 5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression and the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights in practice during most of the year; however,
    there were several exceptions during the state of exception in May and
    following the vice presidential election in August.
        The print and electronic media are independently owned; however,
    some newspapers, radio and television stations are closely tied to
    political parties, factions of those parties, or business interests.
    The media commonly criticized the Government and freely discussed
    opposition viewpoints.
        Following the coup attempt of May 18-19, the Government arrested
    journalists, and police destroyed two radio stations. During the coup
    attempt, Radio Asuncion, whose owners, Miguel and Adriana Fernandez,
    had been linked to Oviedo, broadcast appeals to the public to support
    the uprising. Early in the afternoon of May 20, as many as a dozen
    uniformed officers of the Paraguayan National Police entered Radio
    Asuncion's studios, where they destroyed some broadcast equipment and
    stole other items, effectively dismantling the station, and detained
    both the owners. Radio Asuncion was unable to resume operations and was
    off the air at year's end. The Government also detained Juan Carlos
    Bernabe of Radio Nanawa. On June 2, the authorities released Bernabe
    and the Fernandezes.
        Radio 970 in Asuncion, which the Government similarly accused of
    supporting the coup attempt while it was in progress, reported being
    threatened with closure in the days following the uprising. Senator
    Francisco Jose de Vargas said during a public session of the Senate
    that he had requested that President Gonzalez Macchi send a helicopter
    to bomb the transmission tower of the station during the May 18-19
    incidents because it was ``abetting the insurrection.''
        Also after the coup attempt, under the decree implementing the
    state of exception, President Gonzalez Macchi ordered the detention of
    Hugo Ruiz Olazar, editor of the Asuncion daily newspaper ABC Color and
    local correspondent for Agence France Presse and El Clarin of Buenos
    Aires, on suspicion of having participated in planning the coup
    attempt. Police maintained surveillance outside the newspaper,
    monitoring movements to and from the building in an evident attempt to
    capture Ruiz. He was never arrested and returned to his position at ABC
    after the state of exception was lifted.
        In addition several journalists were threatened around the time of
    the vice presidential election on August 13. On the evening of August
    15, a reportedly drunken mob of several dozen Colorado Party supporters
    surrounded the studios of the country's leading station Radio Nanduti,
    threw stones and bottles, and threatened to storm the building. During
    the election campaign, Radio Nanduti's owner and leading commentator,
    Humberto Rubin, had been mildly critical of the Colorado Party and a
    prominent Colorado political family. Although the station called the
    police and also broadcast appeals for assistance, the police took more
    than an hour to arrive and disperse the crowd. Some windows were
    broken, but no one was reported injured. Then-Interior Minister Walter
    Bower later telephoned station owner Rubin on the air to offer
    apologies for the slow response.
        On December 19, Brazilian journalist Mauri Konig of the O Estado do
    Parana newspaper was beaten with chains and severely injured after
    photographing a police station in Alto Parana department, near the
    border with Brazil. Konig reported that at least one of the three men
    who beat him was wearing a police uniform, and a pickup truck
    reportedly used by his assailants was linked to several police
    officials. At year's end, the authorities had made no arrests in the
    case.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of all citizens to peaceful assembly, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice during most of
    the year; however, before and during the state of exception in May the
    Government restricted this right. Police used gunfire to disperse
    protesters on several occasions, sometimes severely wounding civilians.
        In 1997 the Government amended a law regulating demonstrations in
    Asuncion to further restrict areas where demonstrations may take place
    but expanded slightly the hours in which they may be held. Union groups
    were the most vocal opponents of the modifications. The law requires
    that organizers notify the Asuncion police 24 hours before any rally in
    the downtown area. The police may ban a protest but must provide
    written notification of such a ban within 12 hours of receipt of the
    organizers' request. The law permits a police ban only if another party
    already has given notice of plans for a similar rally at the same place
    and time. In addition the law prohibits public meetings or
    demonstrations in front of the presidential palace and outside military
    or police barracks. This law does not apply to religious processions.
        In March in San Pedro police removed a roadblock erected by
    peasants. During the altercation six persons were shot. However, police
    deny that they shot the peasants, claiming that they had only rubber
    bullets. Police also beat at least one person, a labor union leader,
    during a strike in June (see Section 6.a.).
        On April 3, dozens of police in riot gear prevented members of the
    UNACE faction of the Colorado Party from holding a meeting to discuss
    what position their party should take in the upcoming internal party
    elections. Police allegedly violently forced members to leave the area
    of the UNACE office and stopped members in cars from completing their
    trip. Party leader Luis Villamayor complained that the action violated
    the Constitution.
        The Government restricted freedom of assembly during the state of
    exception imposed in late May after the coup attempt. The Government
    prohibited public gatherings of UNACE followers during the state of
    exception and required other groups holding meetings or demonstrations
    first to receive authorization from the police. The police retained the
    right to forbid any meeting and to demand identification from anyone
    participating in a meeting or demonstration.
        Other political demonstrations and rallies occurred during the
    year, generally without major incidents. Labor unions continued to
    demonstrate for better working conditions, and peasant organizations
    closed roads on several occasions to bring attention to the needs of
    the rural population.
        The Constitution provides for the right of all citizens to free
    association, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Government requires that all religious groups be registered with the
    Ministry of Education and Culture, but imposes no controls on these
    groups, and many informal churches exist.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens may travel within the
    country with virtually no restrictions, and there are no restrictions
    on foreign travel or emigration. There were no travel restrictions
    during the state of exception. The alleged coup plotters are not
    allowed to leave the country and must sign in with the Justice Ministry
    once a month.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The Constitution provides for the granting of
    asylum; however, there are no established provisions to grant asylum or
    refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    The Immigration Department determines each request on a case-by-case
    basis in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Relations and
    Interior and the nongovernmental Committee of Churches. The issue of
    the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
    through democratic means. Multiple parties and candidates contest the
    country's leadership positions. Three parties are represented in the
    Congress. The Constitution and the Electoral Code mandate general
    elections every 5 years, voting by secret ballot, and universal
    suffrage. Debate in Congress is free and frank. The Congress often
    rejects the executive branch's proposals.
        Three major parties and several smaller political parties are
    active. Competing factions within the parties are distinguished by the
    personal ambitions of their leaders, not by policy differences. The
    opposition's power increased as a result of the changes brought about
    by the 1992 Constitution and the subsequent election of a civilian
    president and an opposition-controlled congress. President Gonzalez
    Macchi's ``National Unity Government'' was weakened in February when
    the Liberal Party withdrew from the Government, claiming that the
    Colorado Party refused to share power with its coalition partners. The
    president of the Liberal Party was elected Vice President in August and
    took office in September. International observers from the Organization
    of American States characterized the election as free and fair. This
    was the first national election won by the opposition in almost 90
    years. Interim gubernatorial elections that were scheduled for June
    were delayed because of a court challenge by the Colorado Party and
    were rescheduled for March 2001.
        On May 18, members of two groups of the armed forces and some
    National Police officers loyal to former General Lino Oviedo attempted
    to overthrow President Gonzalez Macchi. Two cavalry units led by some
    former military officers and politicians took over the major cavalry
    bases in and around Asuncion and threatened to overthrow the
    Government. The coup attempt lasted less than 1 day, and the majority
    of the military remained loyal to the Government. However, following
    the coup attempt President Gonzalez Macchi declared and the Congress
    ratified a controversial and unpopular state of exception on May 19 and
    lifted it on May 31.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government and politics; however, in practice they are
    underrepresented. There are 9 women in Congress (7 of 45 senators and 2
    of 80 national deputies), and there is 1 woman in the Cabinet. The new
    Electoral Code requires that, in their internal primaries, 20 percent
    of each party's candidates for elective office be women. Although women
    are represented in the judicial system as judges and prosecutors, there
    are no women on the Supreme Court.
        Members of indigenous groups are entitled to vote, and the
    percentage of indigenous people who exercised this right has grown
    significantly in recent years; however, members of indigenous groups
    are underrepresented in government and politics. The inhabitants of
    some indigenous communities report being threatened and prohibited from
    fully exercising their political rights.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several human rights groups operate, including the Committee of
    Churches (an interdenominational group that monitors human rights,
    investigates refugee claims, and provides legal assistance), Tekojoja
    (a group dedicated to the protection of children's rights), and SERPAJ
    (a group that defends conscientious objectors and provides legal
    assistance to those with grievances arising from military service). In
    1999 32 NGO's, civil organizations, and trade unions officially formed
    the Paraguay Human Rights Coordinator (CODEHUPY). The Government did
    not restrict the activities of any human rights group or advocates;
    however, it has a mixed record in cooperating with or responding to
    recommendations from such groups.
        The 1992 Constitution mandates that Congress name a human rights
    ombudsman through whom citizens could press claims against the state;
    however, the Congress has yet to do so. The Director General of Human
    Rights, located in the Ministry of Justice and Labor, chairs the
    National Commission on Human Rights. The Commission sponsors seminars
    to promote human rights awareness. The Director General's office has
    access to the congressional, executive, and judicial authorities. It
    does not have subpoena or prosecutorial power but may forward
    information concerning human rights abuses to the Attorney General for
    action. It also serves as a clearinghouse for information on human
    rights and has trained thousands of educators in human rights law.
        The office of the Attorney General's Special Adviser on Human
    Rights has been extremely active in pursuing justice against human
    rights abusers from the Stroessner regime. Although the position has
    little real authority, the Adviser is a strong spokesman for the human
    rights community and the rights of the disenfranchised and uses his
    position to identify and publicize human rights abuses by the
    Government. During the year, the Special Adviser heard complaints from
    many citizens regarding alleged human rights violations and sponsored
    several conferences on different human rights themes.
        On October 23, Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Esteban Aguirre and
    Inter-American Institute of Human Rights representative Roberto Cuellar
    signed a cooperative agreement between the Government and the San Jose-
    based Institute. Under the terms of the agreement, the Inter-American
    Institute is to provide assistance in the fields of human rights
    education, political participation, and access to justice.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Although the Constitution and other laws prohibit discrimination,
    certain groups, such as indigenous people, faced significant
    discrimination in practice.
        Women.--The most pervasive violations of women's rights involved
    sexual and domestic abuse, which is both widespread and vastly
    underreported. Spousal abuse is common. Although the new Penal Code
    criminalizes spousal abuse, it stipulates that the abuse must be
    habitual before being recognized as criminal, and then it is punishable
    only by a fine. Thousands of women are treated annually for injuries
    sustained in violent domestic altercations. Between January and
    September, the Secretariat of Women's Affairs registered 426 cases of
    violence against women. According to press reports published between
    January and August, nearly 60 percent of the cases of violence against
    women were rape cases. The authorities were able to detain the alleged
    attacker in less than 10 percent of those cases.
        According to a 1995-96 national poll on reproductive health, 14
    percent of women reported that they were abused physically at some
    point in their lives. Most observers believe that this number
    understates the reality. According to women's rights activists,
    official complaints rarely are filed or when filed soon are withdrawn
    due to spousal reconciliation or family pressure. The Secretariat of
    Women's Affairs chairs a national committee, made up of other
    government agencies and NGO's, which developed a national plan to
    prevent and punish violence against women. Under the plan, an office of
    care and orientation receives reports on violence against women and
    coordinates responses with the National Police, primary health care
    units, the Attorney General's office, and NGO's. However, in practice,
    these services are available only in Asuncion, and women living
    elsewhere in the country rarely benefit from them. The Secretariat also
    conducts training courses for the police, health care workers,
    prosecutors, and others.
        The Women's November 25th Collective, an NGO, operates a reception
    center where female victims of violence can receive legal,
    psychological, and educational assistance. No shelters for battered and
    abused women are available outside the capital of Asuncion.
        In July 1999, an IACHR report stated that in 1998 one case of rape
    was reported to the press every 3 days. During the first 4 months of
    that year, there was one case of rape reported each day. There are no
    specialized police units to handle complaints involving rape.
        Most women imprisoned reportedly were detained for assault,
    including murder, that they committed following domestic violence.
        The law prohibits the sexual exploitation of women, but the
    authorities do not enforce the prohibitions effectively, and
    trafficking in women is a problem. Prostitution by adults is not
    illegal, and exploitation of women, especially teenage prostitutes,
    remains a serious problem. Law enforcement officials periodically stage
    raids on houses of prostitution, and raids on two brothels in June
    confirmed that teenage prostitutes were working in both locations. A
    ring of traffickers sending women and teenage girls to Buenos Aires
    under the guise of working as domestic servants was uncovered during
    the year (see Section 6.f.).
        Recognizing that a majority of women in the workplace face sexual
    harassment, several unions have sponsored an ongoing campaign against
    it. Sex-related job discrimination continues to be common and widely
    tolerated. The Secretariat of Women's Affairs occasionally sponsors
    programs intended to give women free and equal access to employment,
    social security, housing, ownership of land, and business
    opportunities.
        Women have much higher illiteracy rates than men, with an estimated
    16 percent of rural women illiterate compared with about 10 percent of
    rural men. In addition, maternal mortality rates are high, and as many
    as 65 percent of such deaths are related to poor medical care. Several
    groups work to improve conditions for women, including Women for
    Democracy, which is active in civic and electoral education. Other
    groups include SUMANDO, an NGO that promotes educational reform and
    voter participation in elections; and SEFEM, which focuses on women and
    public policy and the participation of women in local development.
        Children.--The Constitution protects certain children's rights and
    stipulates that parents and the state should care for, feed, educate,
    and support children. The population is very young, with 41 percent
    under the age of 15, and 60 percent under the age of 20. Boys and girls
    are entitled to equal treatment in education and health care. However,
    female access to education is lower, particularly in rural areas. The
    educational system does not provide adequately for the educational
    needs of the population. However, in 1998 the educational system was
    changed to make elementary school education compulsory through the
    eighth grade, with plans to extend it through grade nine, although the
    Government lacks the money to implement the changes. Families pay a fee
    to cover each school's administrative expenses and must purchase books,
    uniforms, and other supplies for their children's use.
        Abuse and neglect of children is a problem. Children 14 and older
    are treated as adults for purposes of arrest and sentencing. According
    to UNICEF, 1 in 3 children (some 462,000) between the ages of 7 and 17
    work, many in unsafe labor conditions (see Section 6.d.). According to
    a study by a local NGO, many of the children who work on the streets
    suffer from malnutrition, lack of access to education, and disease.
    Some employers of the estimated 11,500 young girls working as domestic
    servants or nannies deny them access to education and mistreat them.
        Sexual exploitation of children also is a problem. According to the
    Attorney General's office, there are approximately 200 complaints per
    month regarding the mistreatment and sexual abuse of minors. In the
    city of Encarnacion, the authorities arrested a man for selling
    pornographic images of young girls over the Internet.
        Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        The Government has ordered that all military officers responsible
    for recruiting ensure that all conscripts meet the legally minimum
    mandated requirement age of 18 for military service. However, there
    were many reported violations, including allegations of military
    recruiters forcing underage youths to join units and providing them
    with false birth certificates and other documentation to show them to
    be of age. The military took no significant disciplinary action against
    those responsible for underage recruits. Poor families often knowingly
    send underage children to the armed forces for economic reasons.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for equal
    opportunity for persons with disabilities and mandates that the State
    provide them with health care, education, recreation, and professional
    training. It further requires that the State formulate a policy for the
    treatment, rehabilitation, and integration into society of disabled
    persons. However, the Congress never has enacted legislation to
    establish such programs or provide funding for them. Many persons with
    disabilities face significant discrimination in employment; others are
    unable to seek employment because of a lack of accessible public
    transportation. The law does not mandate accessibility for the
    disabled, and the vast majority of the country's buildings, both public
    and private, are inaccessible.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides indigenous people
    with the right to participate in the economic, social, political, and
    cultural life of the country; however, the indigenous population,
    estimated at 75,000 to 100,000, is unassimilated and neglected. Low
    wage levels, long work hours, infrequent payment (or nonpayment) of
    wages, job insecurity, lack of access to social security benefits, and
    racial discrimination are common. Weak organization and lack of
    financial resources limit access by indigenous people to the political
    and economic system. Indigenous groups relied primarily upon
    parliamentary commissions to promote their particular interests. The
    Constitution also protects the property interests of indigenous people,
    but these rights still are not codified fully. The Constitution allows
    Public Ministry officials to represent indigenous people in matters
    involving the protection of life and property.
        Lack of access to sufficient land also hinders the ability of
    indigenous groups to progress economically and maintain their cultural
    identity. This is made worse by insufficient police and judicial
    protection from persons encroaching on their lands.
        The Government's National Indigenous Institute (INDI) has the
    authority to purchase land on behalf of indigenous communities and to
    expropriate private property under certain conditions to establish
    tribal homelands. However, there have been significant allegations of
    wrongdoing within INDI, and in June a former INDI director was
    sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment for embezzlement. Furthermore, many
    indigenous people find it difficult to travel to the capital to solicit
    land titles or process the required documentation for land ownership.
    In August a group of indigenous people who had established a squatters'
    settlement on the edge of a highway were attacked by hooded men
    presumed to be ranch hands from a nearby property, in an attempt to
    dislodge them.
        Significant problems facing the indigenous population also include
    lack of shelter and medical care, economic displacement resulting from
    other groups' development and modernization, and malnutrition. Scarce
    resources and limited government attention resulted in little progress
    in dealing with these problems. However, there were individual small
    successes that benefited indigenous people, including the successful
    pursuit in the courts in February and in July by members of the Enxet
    group of compensation for the forced labor and unlawful firing of some
    of its members (see Section 6.c.).
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution allows both private
    and public sector workers (with the exception of the armed forces and
    the police) to form and join unions without government interference.
    The Constitution contains several provisions that protect fundamental
    worker rights, including an antidiscrimination clause, provisions for
    employment tenure, severance pay for unjustified firings, collective
    bargaining, and the right to strike. Approximately 121,000, or 15
    percent, of workers are organized in approximately 1,600 unions.
        In general unions are independent of the Government and political
    parties. One of the country's three labor centrals, the Confederation
    of Paraguayan Workers (CPT), traditionally was aligned closely with the
    ruling Colorado Party, but these ties appear to be loosening.
        All unions must be registered with the Ministry of Justice and
    Labor. The registration process is cumbersome and can take several
    months. Employers who wish to oppose the formation of a union can delay
    union recognition further by filing a writ opposing it. However,
    virtually all unions that request recognition eventually receive it.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, bans binding
    arbitration, and prohibits retribution against strikers and leaders
    carrying out routine union business; however, employers often took
    action against strikers and union leaders. Voluntary arbitration
    decisions are enforceable by the courts, but this mechanism still is
    employed rarely. Senior Labor Ministry officials are available to
    mediate disputes.
        The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts has
    noted deficiencies in the application of certain conventions ratified
    by the Government. These include conventions dealing with minimum wage,
    abolition of forced labor, minimum age of employment, freedom of
    association, equal remuneration, and employment policy. The ILO
    specifically criticized regulations requiring a minimum of 300 workers
    to form a union as inconsistent with international norms regarding the
    freedom of association.
        There were numerous strikes by members of all three worker centrals
    and smaller unions. Many of these were related to the firing of union
    officials, management violations of a collective contract, management
    efforts to prevent the free association of workers, or demands for
    benefits such as payment of the minimum wage or contribution to the
    social security system. A general strike called for 2 days in late June
    only lasted 1 day, and was observed rigorously only by bus drivers,
    after several had their buses burned or their windshields smashed for
    initially defying the strike. Some violence also occurred during the
    month-long strike by Sitrande, the national electric utility workers'
    union, including reported acts of sabotage by union members. The
    workers went on strike to protest the privatization of the utility
    company.
        There were unconfirmed allegations of several cases of intimidation
    and violence against union members during the year. In one case during
    a June transportation strike, union members and police clashed
    violently and one union leader was seriously injured.
        Unions are free to form and join federations or confederations and
    during the year were affiliated with and participated in international
    labor bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for collective bargaining, and this provision is respected in
    practice. The number of negotiated collective contracts continued to
    grow, surpassing 100 contracts by the end of the year. However, they
    were still the exception rather than the norm in labor-management
    relations and typically reaffirmed minimum standards established by
    law. When wages are not set in free negotiations between unions and
    employers, they are made a condition of individual offers of
    employment.
        The Constitution prohibits antiunion discrimination; however, the
    firing and harassment of some union organizers and leaders in the
    private sector continued. Union organizers sometimes are jailed for
    their role in leading demonstrations. Fired union leaders can seek
    redress in the courts, but the labor tribunals have been slow to
    respond to complaints and typically favored business in disputes. The
    courts are not required to order the reinstatement of workers fired for
    union activities. As in previous years, in some cases where judges
    ordered the reinstatement of discharged workers, the employers
    disregarded the court order with impunity. There are a number of cases
    in which trade union leaders, fired as long as 6 years earlier, have
    not yet received a decision from the courts.
        The failure of employers to meet salary payments also frequently
    precipitated labor disputes. Principal problems included bottlenecks in
    the judicial system and the inability or unwillingness of the
    Government to enforce labor laws. There were also complaints that
    management created parallel or ``factory'' unions to compete with
    independently formed unions. There were several cases of workers who
    chose not to protest because of fear of reprisal or anticipation of
    government inaction.
        The union representing workers in Antelco, the state-run telephone
    provider, asserts that a new privatization law violates the conditions
    of a collective agreement between the Government and the bargaining
    unit by reducing the amount paid to workers who would be fired after
    the company is sold. The workers organized a strike in response to the
    privatization law.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor, including that performed by children; however, cases of
    abuse of national service obligations occurred (see Section 6.d.).
    There were reports of conscripts forced to work as servants or
    construction workers for military officers in their residences or
    privately owned businesses. There also were allegations of forced
    conscription of underage youths (see Section 5). Apart from the abuse
    of national service obligations, the authorities appear to enforce the
    law effectively; however, trafficking in women and girls also is a
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        It is a common practice for families who cannot afford to raise a
    child, most often a daughter, to send her to relatives or colleagues,
    where she may be expected to work in exchange for room, board, and
    access to education. Sometimes these girls, who can be as young as 5
    years old, are abused by those charged with providing for them.
        In February and July, courts ordered ranch owners to pay
    compensation to members of the Enxet indigenous group for forced labor
    and unlawful firing of some members (see Section 5).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Director General for the Protection of Minors in the
    Ministry of Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing child labor
    laws. Minors between 15 and 18 years of age may be employed only with
    parental authorization and cannot be employed in dangerous or unhealthy
    conditions. Children between 12 and 15 years of age may be employed
    only in family enterprises, apprenticeships, or in agriculture. The
    Labor Code prohibits work by children under 12 years of age, and all
    children are required to attend elementary school through the eighth
    grade.
        In general the Government does not have the resources to enforce
    minimum working age regulations. According to UNICEF, 1 in 3 children
    (some 462,000) between the ages of 7 and 17 work, many in unsafe
    conditions. Recent studies indicate that 42 percent of these children
    began working by the age of 8, and some 37 percent do not attend
    school. According to a study by a local NGO, some 6,000 children and
    adolescents work in the streets of Asuncion, of whom a third are under
    10 years of age. Thousands of children in urban areas, many of them
    younger than 12 years of age, are engaged in informal employment such
    as selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many of
    the children who work on the streets suffer from malnutrition, lack of
    access to education, and disease. Some employers of the estimated
    11,500 young girls working as domestic servants or nannies deny them
    access to education and mistreat them. Employers sometimes file false
    charges of robbery against those who seek to leave domestic jobs and
    turn them over to the police. In rural areas, it is not unusual for
    children as young as 10 years of age to work beside their parents in
    the field. Local human rights groups do not regard families harvesting
    crops together as an abuse of child labor.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and generally
    it is enforced effectively; however, there were allegations of forced
    conscription of underage youths and trafficking in girls for forced
    prostitution (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The executive, through the
    Ministry of Justice and Labor, has established a private sector minimum
    wage sufficient to maintain a minimally adequate standard of living for
    a worker and family. The minimum salary is adjusted whenever annual
    inflation exceeds 10 percent and was approximately $195 (680,162
    guaranies) per month at year's end. However, the Ministry is unable to
    enforce the minimum wage, and most analysts agree that 50 to 70 percent
    of workers earn less than the decreed minimum. The Labor Code requires
    that domestic workers be paid at least 40 percent of the minimum wage
    and allows them to work up to a 12-hour day.
        The Labor Code allows for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours (42
    hours for night work), with 1 day of rest. The law also provides for an
    annual bonus of 1 month's salary and a minimum of 6 vacation days a
    year. The law requires overtime payment for hours in excess of the
    standard. However, many employers violate these provisions in practice.
    There are no prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime. Workers in
    the transport sector routinely stage strikes to demand that their
    employers comply with the Labor Code's provisions on working hours,
    overtime, and minimum wage payments.
        The Labor Code also stipulates conditions of safety, hygiene, and
    comfort. The Ministry of Justice and Labor and the Ministry of Health
    did not effectively enforce these provisions, due in part to a lack of
    inspectors and other resources.
        Workers have the right to remove themselves from situations that
    endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their continued
    employment, but they may not do so until such conditions are recognized
    formally by the Ministries of Justice and Labor and Health. Although
    there are laws intended to protect workers who file complaints about
    such conditions, many employers reportedly took disciplinary action
    against them.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no specific legislation to
    prevent trafficking in persons, and there were sporadic reports of
    trafficking of women and girls for sexual purposes. In August the press
    reported that a trafficking ring had been uncovered that sent women and
    young girls to Buenos Aires, Argentina, under the guise of working as
    domestic servants, and then forced them into prostitution. In one
    prominent case, two girls escaped from an Argentine brothel in April
    and returned to their homes. The authorities brought charges against a
    number of Paraguayans under laws criminalizing the forced prostitution
    of a minor, but at year's end, none had been convicted. An Argentine
    television station also conducted an investigation of prostitutes
    working in greater Buenos Aires and discovered a number of undocumented
    Paraguayan women and girls working there as virtual slaves, held as
    prisoners offering their services as prostitutes in exchange for their
    clothing, room, and board.
                                   __________

                                      PERU

        Peru is a multiparty republic with a dominant executive branch that
    for most of the year used its control of the legislature and the
    judiciary to the detriment of the democratic process. In May President
    Alberto Fujimori won a third 5-year term in elections that
    international and domestic observers judged to be significantly flawed;
    however, in November the Fujimori administration collapsed, leading to
    a significant opening in the area of political rights. In June the
    Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a
    high level delegation visited the country to discuss the strengthening
    of democratic institutions. The visit resulted in talks sponsored by
    the OAS, which began in August and included members of civil society,
    the Government, and the political opposition. In August President
    Fujimori's Peru 2000 alliance gained a majority in Congress after more
    than a dozen elected legislators changed their affiliation from
    opposition parties to Peru 2000. Charges of corruption against
    presidential advisor and de facto head of the intelligence service
    Vladimiro Montesinos led President Fujimori to announce on September 16
    that he intended to hold new national elections in April 2001, in which
    he would not be a candidate. On November 22, President Fujimori sent
    his resignation to Congress from Japan, where he remained at year's
    end. Congress refused to accept his resignation and instead voted to
    remove him from office for ``moral incapacity.'' The President of
    Congress Valentin Paniagua of the Popular Action Party succeeded to the
    presidency on November 22. He announced that he would uphold
    legislation allowing for new presidential and congressional elections
    in April 2001, and he accelerated the implementation of democratic
    reforms initiated in the OAS-sponsored talks. In November the Congress
    restored three judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, and it resumed
    its work. The Tribunal had ceased to function in 1997, when Congress
    removed three of its judges for opposing President Fujimori's intent to
    seek reelection. The Constitution provides for an independent
    judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is inefficient, subject
    to corruption, and was for most of the year easily controlled by the
    executive branch. By year's end, the Government had taken steps to
    implement important judicial reform measures.
        The police and military share responsibility for internal security.
    In October Congress passed legislation, based on agreements made in the
    OAS talks, to dismantle the National Intelligence Service (SIN), and
    the Government took action to do so in that same month. The capture or
    death of several remaining terrorist leaders marked continuing progress
    in eliminating the still lethal threat posed by the terrorist group
    Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). In February the Government eliminated
    the last remaining emergency zones that covered over 5 percent of the
    country's territory and restored constitutional protections, including
    freedom of movement and of assembly, throughout the country where they
    previously had been suspended. Civilian authorities generally maintain
    effective control of the security forces; however, there were
    allegations that some members of the security forces who were loyal to
    Montesinos, were undermining civilian control of the military. In
    November President Paniagua appointed a new Defense Minister who
    retired dozens of officers, many of whom allegedly were tied to
    Montesinos. Members of the security forces committed serious human
    rights abuses.
        The Government has implemented major economic reforms, transforming
    a heavily regulated economy into a market-oriented one. The Government
    continued to privatize state enterprises but did not meet its target of
    selling those remaining by the end of the year. Inflation remained in
    the single digits, and economic growth reached 3.6 percent. Per capita
    gross domestic product is estimated at $2,060. Major exports include
    copper and other minerals, fishmeal, and textiles. The unemployment
    rate is estimated at 9.5 percent; underemployment remains around 45
    percent. More than one-half of the economically active population work
    in the informal sector. The poor constituted approximately 54 percent
    of the population; about 15 percent of the population live in extreme
    poverty.
        The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas, and
    serious problems remain; however, following the change of
    administration in November, the Paniagua administration took steps to
    implement important democratic reforms, including some which improved
    the exercise of civil and political rights, and to address allegations
    of corruption surrounding the former intelligence services and other
    government officials. Members of the security forces committed
    extrajudicial killings and tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    persons. Impunity remained a problem. Lack of accountability within the
    armed forces, particularly regarding counter-terrorist operations,
    continued to be a problem. Overall prison conditions remained poor and
    were extremely harsh in maximum security facilities. Arbitrary arrest
    and detention, prolonged pretrial detention, lack of due process, and
    lengthy trial delays continued to be problems. Despite extensive
    changes to reduce the executive dominance over the judiciary, at year's
    end problems persisted, including the general inefficiency of the
    system. At year's end, the Government was preparing to return to the
    contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
    from which it had withdrawn in 1999. The Government inhibited freedom
    of speech and of the press, and journalists faced harassment and
    intimidation and practiced self-censorship; however, nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) noted significant improvements after President
    Fujimori announced the disbanding of the intelligence forces. There
    were some limits on freedom of assembly, although political rallies
    occurred frequently and most were not impeded. The authorities at times
    sought to hinder the operations of human rights monitors. Violence and
    discrimination against women were widespread. Violence against children
    and discrimination against the disabled, indigenous people, and racial
    and ethnic minorities remained problems. Labor advocates argue that
    labor laws and practices restrict collective bargaining rights and the
    freedom of association. Child labor remained a problem.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman expanded its operations to 15 offices
    throughout the country. The ad hoc Pardons Commission completed its
    work after having reviewed over 3,000 cases of alleged wrongful
    conviction by military courts, and recommended and obtained pardons in
    481 cases. During the year, the Justice Ministry's Human Rights
    Commission approved an additional 32 pardons recommended previously by
    the ad hoc Commission. After taking office, the Paniagua administration
    reconstituted the ad hoc Commission, which at year's end had
    recommended 33 new pardons and was preparing to review additional cases
    left over from the previous administration. The Terrorism Division of
    the superior court traveled to remote areas outside Lima and dismissed
    300 longstanding arrest warrants on terrorism charges.
        Sendero Luminoso terrorists were responsible for killings, torture,
    and numerous other abuses.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings; however, security forces
    committed several extrajudicial killings.
        On March 1, police from the Northern Special Services Division
    reportedly detained Alejandro Damian Trujillo Llontop in Lima.
    Trujillo's father filed a complaint through the National Police
    inspector's office and then with the prosecutor. Police denied making
    any arrests on March 1. On May 8, officials informed the family that an
    unidentified body of a 25-year-old man had been found on March 2 on the
    beach in Callao, and delivered to a morgue in Ica. Medical tests showed
    that the man had been beaten before dying on or about March 1; he
    subsequently was identified as Damian Trujillo. In April the victim's
    family filed a case against the National Police, including charges of
    crimes against humanity and forced abduction. In August the prosecutors
    charged the 10 officers who arrested Llontop with his death, and in
    September the judge overseeing the case ordered their arrest. The trial
    was underway at year's end.
        On May 12, police in Tacna arrested Nelson Diaz Marcos for public
    intoxication. Diaz's wife, who was with him at the time of the arrest,
    arrived later at the police station to pick up her husband; the police
    told her that he was resting. Around 11 p.m., the police informed the
    wife that Diaz had died, and that his corpse was in the local hospital.
    The prosecutor in Tacna opened a murder investigation, and in June the
    provincial attorney filed charges of torture against policemen Victor
    Pachas Mamani and Carlos Laqui (see Section 1.c.). The policemen filed
    a motion to transfer the case to the military courts, but the Supreme
    Court assigned jurisdiction to a civilian court in October. The case
    was pending at year's end. According to reports from Amnesty
    International (AI), the director of a Tacna human rights organization
    representing the interests of the victim and his family received death
    threats (see Section 4). Human rights groups continue to represent the
    Diaz family.
        On November 27, police stopped taxi driver Carlos Lopez Flores in
    Ayacucho and accused him of involvement in narcotics trafficking.
    Eyewitnesses reported that they saw three ununiformed policemen beat
    and shoot Lopez. Lopez died 3 days later. The Public Minister's office
    was investigating the case in December, after a complaint was filed
    against the three police officers for torture and murder. NGO's
    reported that the officers had not been arrested by year's end.
        Although military service is no longer mandatory, mistreatment of
    military recruits continued to be a problem and resulted in four
    reported deaths (see Section 1.c.).
        In June 18-year-old Jose Luis Poma Payano voluntarily joined the
    Air Force and began service in Lima. He returned home in November and
    told his parents that members of the Air Force had abused him
    physically. On November 10, Poma's parents requested that military
    officials investigate. The military responded that they would
    investigate, and that Poma would not be harmed further. However, Poma
    was shot and killed upon his return to the base that day. The Air Force
    indicated that his death was a suicide. Poma's parents requested a full
    investigation, including an exhumation of his body for further
    examination. At year's end, prosecutors were investigating the case.
        In July military officials accused recruit Ronald Enrique Pena
    Garcia of stealing radio equipment and placed him in solitary
    confinement. Pena told his parents that military personnel tortured him
    during his detention, including submerging his head in water and
    burning him with cigarettes. Pena died on August 11 from a bullet
    wound. His father filed a complaint with the Human Rights Ombudsman,
    and the investigation was pending at year's end.
        On September 9, army recruit Lenin Castro Mendoza returned to the
    army base in Cerro de Pasco. To punish him for being intoxicated, an
    officer beat him and kicked him in the throat while he was laying in
    his bunk. Castro was taken to a nearby emergency room, where officials
    pronounced him dead on arrival. Police investigated the incident and
    concluded that the officer inflicted the injuries that lead to Castro's
    death. In September police sent the case to the military court in
    Huancayo.
        In December Mario Fernandez Sanchez died at a hospital in Lima due
    to injuries which were allegedly the result of torture by military
    officials. Prior to this incident of alleged torture, military
    officials reportedly tortured Fernandez both physically and
    emotionally, which drove him to desert his military base. He was
    brought before a military court in Concepcion to stand trial for
    desertion, where officers reportedly beat and tortured him again. His
    family filed a complaint with the Public Ministry and accused the
    military of torture. A prosecutor in Huancavelica had begun an
    investigation at year's end.
        There were no developments in the 1999 case of Carlos Yauri, who
    died under suspicious circumstances 5 months into his military service.
    With the support of a local NGO, the Huaraz province prosecutor
    investigated and requested the military prosecutor expedite an
    investigation into the case.
        No new information was available on several cases of recruits who
    died during their military service in recent years, including the cases
    of Juan Salazar Cayetano and Juan Espinoza Rodriquez.
        At least two prisoners died during unrest in prisons during the
    year. Celso Ponce Torres died in a riot at Yanamayo prison in February.
    A fellow inmate reportedly struck him in the head during the violence.
    One prisoner died in violent riots at Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho
    prison in the same month (see Section 1.c.).
        In February five peasants died after armed confrontations with
    landowners on land they occupied in Villa El Salvador.
        In July six bank security guards died in a fire that erupted during
    confrontations between police and protesters in Lima (see Section
    2.b.).
        In June the press reported that peasants had discovered a mass
    grave no older than 10 years containing the remains of 8 to 12 bodies
    in the area of Colcabambla, Huacavelica. According to NGO's, the grave
    site is located along a trail used frequently by army patrols and
    terrorist columns in the 1980s and early 1990s. An investigation headed
    by the provincial prosecutor was underway at year's end.
    Representatives from the Human Rights Ombudsman's office observed that
    a series of irregularities in handling of evidence had compromised the
    forensic integrity of the investigation.
        The case of Pablo Pascual Espinoza Lome, a jailed inmate killed in
    January 1999 by prison guards, remained pending. The courts had not
    reached a verdict because the Supreme Court had not ruled on a motion
    by prison guard Marcial Pirez, who originally had been acquitted of
    violating the 1998 antitorture law, which requested that the Court
    nullify a lower court's decision to sentence him to 4 years in prison.
        Charges against four prison officials for aggravated abuse of
    authority and crimes against humanity in the November 1999 death of
    Esteban Minan Castro remained pending at year's end. Minan Castro died
    after Tambo de Mora penitentiary guards reportedly used tear gas to
    subdue him and put him into solitary confinement after he had allegedly
    violated prison rules.
        There were no developments in the cases of Tito Mariluz Dolores,
    Ronny Machaca Flores, and Jose Antonio Palacios Garcia, all of whom
    died in police detention in 1999.
        The Chincha criminal court brought charges of torture against
    policemen Edwin Alfredo Saravia Torres, Marco Antonio Carrasco, and
    Julian de la Cruz Huyarote for the June 1999 death of Mario Clemente
    Guillen Mendez, who allegedly hanged himself after being detained by
    police. The case was pending at year's end.
        In the case of Carlos Arrellano Mallqui, who died in police custody
    in 1998 in Ancash, the Supreme Court assigned jurisdiction to a
    military court. The military court did not render a decision by year's
    end.
        There was no progress made in the investigation of the four
    soldiers suspected of robbing and killing Genaro Julca Bula and Alberto
    Aponte in 1998.
        There was no progress in the case of Mariel Barreto, a military
    intelligence (SIE) agent whose dismembered and decapitated body was
    found in 1997. The Government had promised an exhaustive investigation
    into her death in 1998.
        Sendero Luminoso terrorists killed 17 persons during the year in
    the course of over 100 acts of violence.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        In the case of Walter Munarriz Escoba, who disappeared in March
    1999 after being taken into police custody in Huancavelica, the
    provisional prosecutor brought formal charges against and ordered the
    detention of National Police captain Roberto Gastiaburu Nakada, Ensin
    Claudio Gutierrez Valasquez, and Adolfo Angeles Ramos. The prosecutor
    subsequently charged policemen Gunter Cuaresma Ramos and Percy
    Salvatierra Laura with torture and requested a 15-year sentence. The
    case still was pending at year's end.
        No information was available regarding the status of Ernesto Rafael
    Castillo Paez, who disappeared in 1990. In 1997 the Inter-American
    Court of Human Rights ordered the Government to compensate his family
    and to punish the police officers responsible for his death.
        In November the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman released an
    official report on approximately 4,000 persons who have disappeared
    since 1980 in the war against terrorism. The Ombudsman's report noted
    that the Sendero Luminoso or Tupac Amaru (MRTA) rebels abducted a
    majority of victims, who were mainly indigenous peasants. In 1995
    Congress passed a law granting amnesty to members of the security
    forces responsible for abuses committed in the war against terrorism.
    To date few members of the security forces have been held accountable
    for their role in disappearances. A report released in June by the
    Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) repeated the IACHR's
    previous calls for the amnesty law to be repealed. By year's end, the
    Government had not acted on this recommendation. In December President
    Paniagua directed the Justice Ministry to create a working group that
    would include members of NGO's, religious leaders, and government
    officials to make recommendations on the establishment of a truth
    commission that would hear evidence on disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture and inhuman
    or humiliating treatment; however, in practice torture and brutal
    treatment by the security forces continued to occur, and the Human
    Rights Ombudsman and NGO's contend that it continued to be widespread.
    Torture most often takes place during the period immediately following
    arrest. The incidence of torture is high during police detention in
    part because families are prohibited from visiting suspects while they
    are held incommunicado, and attorneys have only limited access to them
    (see Section 1.d.).
        Such abuse is particularly common in police cells operated by the
    National Counterterrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) and in detention
    facilities on military bases, where terrorism and treason suspects
    normally are held. Psychological torture and abuse, which result from
    the harsh conditions in which detainees are held, are more
    characteristic of the prisons.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman and NGO's reported 35 cases of
    aggravated torture by security forces. The majority of cases involved
    incidents of police brutality and beatings during detention.
        On May 12, police in Tacna arrested Nelson Diaz Marcos for public
    intoxication and allegedly tortured him before killing him (see Section
    1.a.). A prosecutor filed charges against the arresting officers and
    the case was pending at year's end.
        In August three police officers in Chinga, Ica, detained Luis
    Enrique Rojas Vasques on suspicion of his involvement in a robbery.
    They handcuffed, beat, and threatened him with torture if he did not
    confess to the robbery. They also threatened him with death if he filed
    a complaint against them. The police also allegedly discovered drugs on
    the victim, but NGO lawyers claim that the drugs were planted. Rojas
    filed a complaint against the three officers for torture and abuse of
    authority. In October the local prosecutor dropped the charges of
    torture. The charges of abuse of authority still were pending at year's
    end.
        In December AI released a report reviewing the facts and status of
    21 cases of alleged torture in the past 2 years. Supported by a large
    number of NGO's, AI called on the Government to stop impunity in cases
    of torture; to try all such cases in civilian, rather than military,
    courts; and to apply the 1998 legislation against torture to all
    security force members implicated in cases of torture. AI called for
    more aggressive prosecution of torture cases, noting that since the
    1998 legislation passed, only two perpetrators have been sentenced
    using the instruments provided in that law. Twenty persons have been
    charged under this law, including several cases of police brutality.
    However, after initial investigations in four cases, prosecutors either
    decided not to charge the alleged perpetrators with torture or dropped
    all pending charges. In several other cases, prosecutors filed charges
    on lesser offenses and sought milder sentences than required under the
    antitorture law. In a number of cases in the AI study, appeals or other
    legal action still were pending. A few of the cases were under review
    by the Supreme Court, which would rule on military or civilian
    jurisdiction. In three cases the accused perpetrators had been arrested
    and were awaiting trial.
        In April military officials allegedly arrested Amador Carmen
    Canchaparan on charges of working with the armed opposition and took
    him to a military base in Huanuco department. There members of the army
    reportedly tortured him by submerging his head in water, beating him,
    and applying electrical shocks in order to force him to confess. The
    officials then threatened Canchaparan with death if he brought charges
    against them. On May 2, authorities charged officials at Yanag military
    base with torture and abuse of authority. The prosecutor opened a
    preliminary investigation into the alleged abuses. The victim remained
    in custody at year's end, and was being investigated for committing or
    conspiring to commit terrorist acts.
        On May 25, journalist Fabian Salazar alleged that SIN officers
    broke into his office the previous evening, bound him, confiscated
    video tapes of government officials that implicated them in corruption,
    and sawed his arm to the bone. The Government appointed an ad hoc
    prosecutor to investigate Salazar's claims. Salazar fled the country in
    June before he was able to provide his testimony, and the investigation
    was suspended. Salazar subsequently petitioned the IACHR to
    investigate. The Government offered to investigate the case again, but
    Salazar refused, claiming that the Government was biased. While there
    were a number of inconsistencies in Salazar's account, and even critics
    of the Government and journalists suspect that he may have exaggerated
    his claims, a full investigation never was conducted.
        There continued to be a public perception that the armed forces
    operate with impunity in the war against terrorism; however, President
    Paniagua made changes in the military command that human rights
    activists noted as a sign of increased civilian control over the
    military. Prior to these changes, the Fujimori administration had
    asserted greater control over the military leadership in order to
    reduce the military's loyalty to former de facto SIN director Vladimiro
    Montesinos. The new attorney general began conducting investigations
    into corruption by former military officers.
        Human Rights groups criticized the manner in which police
    controlled protests on July 28, noting that they purposely fired tear
    gas into crowds at close range, seriously injuring some protesters who
    were hit by the cartridges. There were also reports that police used
    undue force in arresting protesters and that they beat protesters while
    in detention (see Section 2.b.).
        In the case of Huber Mendez Barzola, whom police detained in March
    1999 on suspicion of terrorism and allegedly stripped naked, beat, and
    sodomized with a metal chain weapon in police custody, the Supreme
    Court upheld the sentence of policemen Oscar Italo Flores Montanez,
    Carlos Palacios Soto, and William Saenz. In November 1999, a court had
    found Palacios Soto and Flores Montanez guilty of torture, sentenced
    them each to 6 years in prison, and fined them about $650 (2,000
    soles). The court reduced Saenz's sentence to 3 years in jail and a
    fine of about $150 (500 soles).
        In the 1998 case of Pedro Tinta Vera, whom police arrested in Lima
    on charges of aggravated terrorism, allegedly tortured, and to whom
    they neglected to provide medical treatment, prosecutors filed charges
    in October 1998 against police officers Domingo Arnaldo Gil, Guillermo
    Osorio, and Ricardo Loli for the crime of torture, and a judge ordered
    their arrest. In June a superior court judge suspended the arrest
    warrant against the officers but issued an order to appear at the
    Court. By year's end, the trial had not begun.
        In the case of Antero Espinoza Alzamora, whom police detained and
    allegedly beat in April 1999, the prosecutor in Piura had opened an
    investigation but did not file charges. In the 1999 case of Catalino
    Daga Ruiz and Bernardo Daga Ruiz, whom police arrested on suspicion of
    robbery, then allegedly beat, took to a cemetery, and buried up to
    their necks, the victims filed torture and illegal entry charges, and
    the prosecutor began an investigation.
        There were no updated reports on investigations and judicial
    proceedings on charges of torture or abuse of authority against members
    of the National Police in several cases brought to the public's
    attention in 1999: Jesus Natividad Roman Portocarrero, arrested in
    Piura in March; Mario Jimenez Roque, arrested in Pasco in April; Julio
    Armando Uribe, arrested in Moquergua in July; Moises Paco Mayhua,
    arrested in Puno in August; and Victor Valle Cabello, detained in Pasco
    in September.
        In 1999 a special prosecutor charged several naval officers under
    the antitorture law for allegedly torturing Raul Teobaldo in 1998.
    Personnel from the Aguaytia Naval Base detained and allegedly tortured
    Andahua by beating him, applying electric shocks, and sodomizing him,
    in order to force him to sign a confession indicating that he was a
    terrorist. However, the court issued an arrest warrant in 1999 against
    Julio Spencer Guido Davalos, on a much lesser charge of committing
    bodily harm. In January the Supreme Court ruled that the civilian
    courts had jurisdiction over the case. In September the prosecutor
    concluded that Andahua was the victim of torture and filed charges of
    torture against the implicated military officers. The trial had not
    begun as of year's end.
        No progress was made in the case of the 1998 beating and torture of
    Pablo Waldir by policeman Elmer Perez Arna.
        In October 1999, an Ayacucho court acquitted a policeman in the
    1998 case of torture that led to the death of Lucas Huaman Cruz. In
    November 1999, the Supreme Court prosecutor filed a motion to nullify
    the Ayacucho court's decision. The Supreme Court had decided to hear
    arguments on the case, but still had not taken action on the case by
    year's end.
        In the 1997 case of Leonor La Rosa, a military intelligence (SIE)
    officer who was beaten and tortured by four of her colleagues (and who
    now resides in Sweden), the Supreme Council of Military Justice awarded
    La Rosa approximately $1,500 (5,250 soles) as an indemnity in 1999. La
    Rosa's attorney considered the amount seriously inadequate, since she
    is a paraplegic as a result of the torture. The IACHR continued to
    facilitate a settlement between La Rosa and the Government.
        In addition to beatings, common methods of torture and other
    inhuman or degrading treatment included electric shock, water torture,
    asphyxiation, and the hanging of victims by a rope attached to hands
    tied behind the back, and, in the case of female detainees, rape.
    Common forms of psychological torture included sleep deprivation and
    death threats against both detainees and their families. Interrogators
    frequently blindfolded their victims during torture to prevent them
    from identifying their abusers. In some cases, the Government took
    action to investigate and prosecute security force personnel charged
    with torture, but impunity persisted. Crowded dockets and disputes over
    civilian or military jurisdiction contributed to long delays in legal
    proceedings in cases where officers were charged under the 1998
    antitorture law. At year's end, the cases of several officers whom the
    authorities had charged under the legislation were still pending a
    verdict.
        As in previous years, NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman received
    complaints that the military beat or otherwise mistreated some members
    of the military service. Mistreatment of military recruits continued to
    be a problem and resulted in several deaths (see Section 1.a.). The
    authorities failed to resolve a number of cases of torture and
    mistreatment from previous years, including the cases of Jaime Palacios
    Sanche and Elvis Lopez Tuya.
        On February 12, the army dropped tear gas from helicopters and used
    the force of gusts from helicopters to disperse squatters who had
    settled in Villa El Salvador.
        There continued to be credible reports that Sendero Luminoso was
    also responsible for acts of torture, including cases that resulted in
    death (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions are poor and extremely harsh in maximumsecurity
    facilities, especially those operating at high altitudes. Low budgets,
    severe overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and poor nutrition and health
    care are serious problems within the prison system. Prison guards and
    fellow inmates routinely victimized prisoners. Corruption is a serious
    problem among poorly paid prison guards, many of whom participate in
    sexual abuse, blackmail, extortion, narcotics and weapons sales, and
    the acceptance of bribes in exchange for favors that ranged from
    providing a mattress to arranging an escape. Since prison authorities
    do not supply adequate bedding and budget only about $0.75 (2.5 soles)
    per prisoner per day for food, the families of prisoners typically must
    provide for these basic needs. In high-security prisons, female inmates
    are allowed to see their children once a week. In prisons that house
    only common criminals, such as Lima's Chorrillos women's prison,
    children 3 years of age and younger live with their jailed mothers.
        Overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure hamper efforts to
    improve the living conditions of prison inmates. There are 28 prisons
    in the country that held approximately 27,305 prisoners during the
    year. At Lima's San Juan de Lurigancho men's prison, the country's
    largest, more than 6,000 prisoners live in a facility built to
    accommodate 1,500 persons. Inmates have only intermittent access to
    running water; bathing facilities are inadequate; kitchen facilities
    are unhygienic; and prisoners sleep in hallways and common areas due to
    lack of cell space. Illegal drugs are abundant in many prisons, and
    tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are reportedly at near-epidemic levels.
    Detainees held temporarily while awaiting arraignment in Lima are not
    allowed outside for fresh air and have restricted access to bathrooms.
    At year's end, the Government was preparing to implement new
    regulations regarding prisoners' access to visitors and prisoners time
    outside of cell.
        In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman published a report on prison
    conditions and administration, which highlighted many serious
    shortcomings, including a shortage of trained medical personnel,
    unreliable legal representation for prisoners, and insufficient numbers
    of social workers. The Ombudsman and the IACHR have reported that the
    Government fails to supply enough lawyers, medical staff, or
    psychologists to service the prison system, resulting in serious
    problems for treatment and adequate legal counsel. The Ombudsman noted
    that the operating philosophy in the prison system is one of punishment
    rather than rehabilitation. Roughly half of all prisoners performed
    some form of voluntary work, and only 28 percent participate in some
    kind of educational activity.
        According to human rights monitors, the Challapalca prison in
    Tarata, Tacna, seriously violates international norms and standards,
    particularly with respect to its isolation and high altitude. Located
    at an altitude of about 14,000 feet, Challapalca's freezing
    temperatures and oxygen-thin air have unavoidably detrimental effects
    on prisoner health. The prison can be reached only after an all-night
    bus ride from the nearest population center, limiting inmates' contact
    with family. Hospital care is 8 hours away by overland transportation.
    Face-to-face consultations by inmates with their attorneys are rare. To
    relieve some of the isolation, the International Committee of the Red
    Cross (ICRC), and to a lesser extent the Government, fund a monthly
    visit by families to inmates. In 1998 the International Federation of
    Human Rights, as well as visiting members of the IACHR and the
    Ombudsman, called on the Government to shut the prison down.
        There were a number of protests and hunger strikes in various
    prisons, including the high security prisons at the Callao Naval
    Station and Yanamayo. In February prison inmates rioted and took over
    Yanamayo prison for roughly a week before authorities reestablished
    control. Conflicts between prisoners resulted in one death and several
    injuries. A wave of prison protests followed all over the country,
    including in Lima's Lurigancho prison, where security forces intervened
    to reestablish control. One prisoner died in the violence at
    Lurigancho, and over 40 prisoners were injured either by fellow inmates
    or by the security forces who acted to restore order. The Human Rights
    Ombudsman asked prison authorities to allow his staff to visit the
    prison following the riots, but was denied such access until after the
    riots ended. Some prison protests in Lima continued in September,
    October, and November, resulting in minor injuries but no reported
    deaths. Imprisoned Sendero Luminoso leaders began a hunger strike in
    December.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors, including the ICRC. For most of the year, prison authorities
    did not grant representatives of the Human Rights Ombudsman access to
    the military prisons; however, that practice began to change under the
    Paniagua administration. Members of the Ombudsman's office were allowed
    to visit the naval facility in Callao in December (see Section 4).
    During the year, the ICRC performed 115 visits to prisons, detention
    facilities, and juvenile detention facilities, visiting a total of
    3,061 prisoners. The ICRC also visited seven prisoners in custody at
    the maximum security naval base facility in Callao every 2 months.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain problems. The Constitution, Criminal Code, and
    antiterrorist statutes delineate the arrest and detention process. The
    Constitution requires a written judicial warrant for an arrest unless
    the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act. However, the Organic
    Law of the National Police permits the police to detain a person for
    any investigative purpose. Although the authorities must arraign
    arrested persons within 24 hours, they often violate this requirement.
    In cases of terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, arraignment must
    take place within 30 days. Military authorities must turn over persons
    they detain to the police within 24 hours; in remote areas of the
    country this must be accomplished as soon as practicable. However, the
    authorities often disregard this requirement. In December Congress
    passed legislation allowing the authorities to detain suspects in
    investigations of corruption for up to 15 days without arraignment. The
    law also permits authorities to prohibit suspects under investigation
    of corruption from traveling.
        In February the President suspended all remaining emergency zones
    and restored the constitutional protections in those areas. Previously,
    the Government suspended constitutional protections against arbitrary
    arrest and detention in emergency zones, and security forces did not
    need an arrest warrant in order to detain a suspect.
        Police may detain terrorism and treason suspects for a maximum of
    15 days, and hold them incommunicado for the first 10 days. Treason
    suspects, who are handed over automatically to military jurisdiction,
    may be held incommunicado for an additional 30 days. When suspects are
    held incommunicado, the authorities prohibit families from visiting
    suspects, and attorneys have access to them only during the preparation
    and giving of sworn statements to the prosecutor.
        By year's end, the special terrorism division of the superior court
    dismissed 300 arrest warrants of the estimated 5,228 persons still
    subject to detention orders. These cases involved many who were forced
    against their will to participate in terrorist activities during the
    internal conflict, or who were accused falsely of links with terrorist
    groups. In 1998 the Human Rights Ombudsman called on the Government to
    rescind all outstanding detention orders that were more than 5 years
    old, and to cancel all orders that did not comply with legal
    specifications.
        By year's end, the Government had approved 65 pardons recommended
    by the ad hoc Pardons Commission and the Justice Ministry's Council on
    Human Rights, which evaluated and recommended pardons for persons
    convicted of terrorism, bringing the grand total to 546 pardons (see
    Section 1.e.).
        Detainees have the right to a prompt judicial determination of the
    legality of their detention and adjudication of habeas corpus
    petitions; however, according to human rights attorneys, judges
    continued to deny most requests for such hearings. In Lima and Callao,
    detainee petitions for habeas corpus are restricted severely, because
    under a 1998 executive branch decree issued as part of the war on
    crime, only 2 judges are able to hear such petitioners, instead of the
    40 to 50 judges in previous years, thereby significantly delaying
    justice. In December the Paniagua administration restored the number of
    judges able to hear habeas corpus petitions to its original level as
    part of the restructuring of the court system. Judges rarely allow the
    unconditional release of suspected terrorists, even if there is
    insufficient evidence to bring a case against them, despite 1993
    amendments to antiterrorism laws that gave lower court and superior
    court judges the power to do so. As a result, persons charged with
    terrorism sometimes must wait until their cases have been reviewed and
    dismissed by the Supreme Court before they are freed. This process can
    last more than a year.
        In December figures from the National Penitentiary Institute (INPE)
    showed that approximately 46 percent of a total prison population of
    27,305 had been sentenced. Over 50 percent of the prison population
    remained in Lima; of these prisoners, 74 percent remained unsentenced.
    The June IACHR report and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights report in
    July both expressed concern about the large number of unsentenced
    prisoners. The problem of prisoners who have served their terms and
    still have not been released continued. In December President Paniagua
    committed the Ministry of Justice to assess procedures for reviewing
    cases with pending sentences. By year's end, the Justice Ministry had
    recommended better ways to track the status of prisoners in the penal
    system.
        In 1998 the Catholic Bishops' Social Action Commission called for
    implementation of a system that would allow first-time detainees to
    post bail. According to the INPE, the elapsed time between arrest and
    trial in civil, criminal, and terrorism cases averages between 26 and
    36 months. Those tried by military courts on treason charges generally
    do not have to wait more than 40 days for their trial; however, since
    trial procedures in military courts are largely devoid of due process
    protections, the speed with which trials are concluded offers little
    benefit to the defendants involved. Once trials have concluded,
    prisoners have to wait long periods before receiving their sentences.
        According to two human rights organizations, police routinely
    detain persons of African descent on suspicion of having committed
    crimes, for no other reason than the color of their skin, and rarely
    act on complaints of crimes against blacks (see Section 5).
        The Constitution does not permit forced exile, and the Government
    respects this prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
    inefficient, subject to corruption, and easily controlled by the
    executive branch. As a result, public confidence in the judiciary
    remains low. In November the Government abolished an executive
    commission of the judicial branch and an executive commission of the
    Public Ministry. The duty of these commissions was to reform the
    judiciary; however, its members regularly ruled in favor of the
    executive branch under the Fujimori administration, compromising the
    independence of the judicial system and furthering the executive's
    control of it.
        Previous attempts to reform the judiciary did little to restore its
    independence from the executive, and the lack of a fully functioning
    Constitutional Tribunal overshadowed procedural improvements. In
    November Congress restored to the Constitutional Tribunal three judges
    whom Congress removed in 1997 after they had opposed the application of
    a law allowing President Fujimori to seek a third term. This had
    paralyzed the court's ability to rule on any constitutional issues for
    lack of a quorum. Other serious problems affecting the judiciary
    included the curtailment of the authority of the National Council of
    Magistrates (CNM) to investigate, discipline, and remove judges, the
    continuing large number of provisional judges in the court system, and
    the transfer of jurisdiction of sensitive cases to courts more inclined
    to rule in the Government's favor.
        Throughout most of the year, roughly 80 percent of the country's
    approximately 1,700 civilian judges were provisional appointments,
    meaning that they had received temporary appointments that did not
    correspond to their rank, including 21 of the 33 judges on the Supreme
    Court. In some cases, the judges were assigned independently and
    without having gone through the proper channels for training. Critics
    charged that since these judges lacked tenure, they were more
    susceptible to outside pressures.
        Working with opposition and civil society representatives in the
    OAS democratization dialog (see Section 3), the Government began taking
    steps designed to restore the judiciary's independence from the
    executive. In October Congress passed legislation that eliminated
    eligibility of provisional judges to hold administrative positions,
    such as posts on the National Elections Board (JNE) or the CNM. In
    November the Paniagua Administration began a comprehensive review of
    the court system, including the assignment of judges and prosecutors.
    By year's end, the Government had reassigned hundreds of provisional
    judges and prosecutors to positions more appropriate to their actual
    rank. Several provisional judges and prosecutors resigned or were
    removed from their positions permanently and were not reassigned.
        The Government's reliance on untenured, provisional and temporary
    judges was demonstrated when the executive commission of the judicial
    branch created two specialized chambers of the Supreme Court in 1998.
    These chambers, staffed by provisional and temporary judges, assumed
    control over tax, customs, and narcotics crimes previously under the
    jurisdiction of the tenured judges of the Lima superior court. This
    practice enabled the executive branch to supervise closely such cases
    as that of Baruch Ivcher, his family, and associates (see Sections 2.a.
    and 2.d.). In December the Supreme Court eliminated these two
    specialized courts. In the same month, evidence emerged that showed how
    former intelligence advisor Montesinos improperly influenced cases
    through provisional judges on the Supreme Court and through the
    Attorney General, who was also a provisional appointee. The majority of
    implicated officials have either resigned or been suspended, and
    several investigations into corrupt judicial practices were underway at
    year's end.
        There is a three-tier court structure that consists of lower and
    superior courts and a Supreme Court of 33 judges. In November the
    Constitutional Tribunal resumed its mandate to rule on the
    constitutionality of congressional legislation and government actions;
    the National Judiciary Council tests, nominates, confirms, evaluates,
    and disciplines judges and prosecutors; and the Judicial Academy trains
    judges and prosecutors.
        The justice system generally is based on the Napoleonic Code. In
    civilian courts criminal cases move through three distinct phases.
    First, in a lower court a prosecutor investigates cases and submits an
    opinion to the examining judge, who determines whether there is
    sufficient evidence to issue an indictment. If there is, the judge
    conducts all necessary investigations and prepares and delivers a case
    report to the superior court prosecutor. Second, the superior court
    prosecutor reviews the lower court decision to determine if formal
    charges should be brought and renders an advisory opinion to another
    superior court, where a three-judge panel holds an oral trial. All
    criminal case convictions in civilian courts must proceed to a third
    phase, where the Supreme Court hears appeals and confirms or rejects
    the previous sentences. All defendants have the right to be present at
    their trial. Defendants also have the right to counsel; however, the
    public defender system often fails to provide indigent defendants with
    qualified attorneys.
        Under the military justice system, judges in the lower courts have
    the power to sentence and are required to pass judgment within 10 days
    of a trial's opening. Defendants may then appeal their sentences to the
    Superior Military Council, which has 10 days to make its decision. A
    final appeal may be made to the Supreme Council of Military Justice,
    which must issue its ruling within 5 days. At the Superior Military
    Council and Supreme Council levels, a significant number of judges are
    active-duty line officers with little or no professional legal
    training.
        In December 1999, Congress abolished the classification of acts of
    extreme violence such as criminal gang activity, homicide, kidnaping,
    and the use of explosives as aggravated terrorism. Under new law, such
    cases are designated as ``special terrorism'' and jurisdiction over
    such crimes falls under the civilian courts. In October Congress
    disbanded the SIN, including the National Intelligence Directorate for
    Social Peace and Safety, which had investigated such crimes.
        While simple terrorism cases for civilians are tried in civilian
    courts, cases of treason, which is defined as being a terrorist leader
    or participating in a terrorist group's attack or activities, for
    civilians are tried only before military courts. Human rights groups
    and legal experts charge that the vaguely worded definitions of certain
    crimes in the antiterrorism statutes often lead military judges to
    issue sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed. Moreover,
    defendants in treason cases who are found not guilty by a military
    court may be remanded to a civilian court for a second trial on
    terrorism charges based on the same facts.
        Human rights groups and legal experts strongly criticize the power
    of the military courts to try civilians in cases of treason or
    aggravated terrorism and the powerlessness of the civilian judicial
    system to review military court decisions. In 1997 Gustavo Adolfo Cesti
    Hurtado, an insurance broker who had retired from military service 13
    years earlier, was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to
    prison by the military justice system in a complicated case involving,
    in part, alleged insurance fraud in a military purchase of helicopters.
    When a civilian court approved a habeas corpus petition and ordered the
    military court to release Cesti, the military court not only refused to
    do so, but also charged the civilian judges with usurpation of power
    and sought to have them reassigned. The case was brought before the
    Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which rejected a government
    motion to dismiss it. The Court ruled in September 1999 that the
    Government had violated the American Convention on Human Rights, and
    ordered that the habeas corpus petition be honored and that the
    reparations stage be initiated in order to compensate the victim. In
    November 1999, the authorities released Cesti from military prison;
    however, Cesti's legal status remained unresolved at year's end,
    pending a request from the Government to the Inter-American Court for
    further clarification of its ruling.
        In August the case of Lori Berenson, who was tried for terrorism by
    a military tribunal without sufficient guarantees of due process, was
    transferred to the civilian courts pursuant to a Military Supreme Court
    review based on new evidence. At year's end, a civilian prosecutor was
    investigating to determine if charges should be brought.
        Proceedings in these military courts--and those for terrorism in
    civilian courts--do not meet internationally accepted standards of
    openness, fairness, and due process. Military courts hold treason
    trials in secret. Such secrecy is not required legally, but in some
    cases the courts deem that circumstances require it. Defense attorneys
    in treason trials are not permitted adequate access to the files
    containing the State's evidence against their clients, nor are they
    allowed to question police or military witnesses either before or
    during the trial. Some military judges have sentenced defendants
    without even having notified their lawyers that the trials had begun.
    Since the creation of the special military courts in 1992, 747
    civilians have been sentenced for treason or aggravated terrorism, and
    by year's end 180 civilians still had cases pending. In December the
    Minister of Justice created a commission charged with reviewing the
    laws governing the military justice system.
        The Council of Magistrates (CNM), established by the 1993
    Constitution, regained many of its original functions in December. A
    March 1998 law had transferred the CNM's power to investigate and
    dismiss Supreme Court judges and prosecutors to the executive
    commissions of the judicial branch and the Public Ministry,
    respectively, both of which were controlled by strong allies of
    President Fujimori. Critics pointed to this action as a further example
    of executive branch control of the judiciary. A September 1998 law
    partially restored the CNM's powers, while leaving the Public Ministry
    in charge of determining whom the CNM could investigate.
        Responding to OAS dialog recommendations, in November the
    Government and opposition agreed to establish a transitory judicial
    council, with all the legal powers of the CNM, in order to restore full
    power to the CNM, including sanctioning and ratification of judges and
    magistrates. The council is expected to work for 90 days reviewing laws
    and regulations put in place by the executive commission since 1998.
    Three judges and three jurists, appointed by consensus within the OAS
    dialog, compose the council. Since it began operating on December 6,
    the council has dismissed judges, reinstated others judged to have been
    unfairly discharged, and returned to lower courts judges who were
    serving provisionally in higher courts.
        The first class of judges that the CNM selected was scheduled to
    graduate in the fall; however, their nominations to judgeships were
    delayed by the restructuring that resulted from the OAS talks. The
    Academy continued its in-service training program for judges and
    magistrates, which consists of a few hours of classes each week during
    the first year, and practical training during the second. The Academy's
    training program, originally scheduled to last 6 months but later
    extended to 2 years, was strongly criticized as further prolonging
    reliance on provisional and temporary officials, who are more
    susceptible to manipulation by the executive.
        In June 1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled
    against the Government in the case of four Chileans convicted of
    treason by a military tribunal and sentenced to life in prison. The
    Court found that the military had denied the defendants' due process
    rights provided by the American Convention on Human Rights and ruled
    that a civilian court should have had jurisdiction. It also ruled that
    military authorities held the suspects too long in pretrial detention;
    and that defense attorneys lacked access to witnesses and evidence and
    did not have sufficient time to review the case. The Court directed the
    Government to provide the four with new, civilian trials.
        Subsequently, the Supreme Court delegated to the Supreme Military
    Council the final decision regarding enforcement of the Court's
    decision. The Council ruled that it could not grant the Chileans new
    civilian trials because laws passed after signing the Convention
    required military trials in cases of treason and aggravated terrorism.
        However, the Government refused to accept the Inter-American
    Court's jurisdiction in cases involving terrorism, including the case
    of the Chileans, because laws passed after signing the Convention
    establishing the Court required military trials in cases of treason and
    aggravated terrorism. The Government's decision to withdraw from the
    Court's jurisdiction in these cases effectively restricted citizens'
    constitutional rights to seek redress in the hemisphere's preeminent
    international tribunal. The Court continued to process pending cases
    and stated that the Government could not withdraw immediately from the
    Court's contentious jurisdiction. In August the Government agreed to
    discuss the full integration of the country into the Inter-American
    human rights system, and the issue was discussed as a priority in the
    OAS-sponsored dialog. At year's end, the Government was preparing to
    return to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.
        In the civilian jurisdiction, a specialized terrorism division of
    the superior court tries cases. The division is based in Lima, but its
    judges travel to the provinces as needed. During the year, judges from
    this court traveled around the country to hear several hundred cases of
    persons with old warrants outstanding for terrorism charges. Of these,
    judges found 300 persons innocent and ordered the suspension of their
    warrants. Human rights NGO's and the Human Rights Ombudsman noted that
    this addresses the concerns of those who considered themselves
    innocent, but who feared coming forward for an abbreviated and unfair
    trial. However, approximately 5,000 warrants remain in effect (see
    Section 1.d.).
        The ad hoc Pardons Commission, which consisted of the Human Rights
    Ombudsman as chairman, the Minister of Justice, and President
    Fujimori's representative Father Hubert Lanssiers, ended its work on
    December 31, 1999. The Commission's mandate was to consider
    applications of those who believed themselves to be accused unjustly of
    terrorism. By the end of 1999, 3,056 of a total of 3,878 persons
    accused of these crimes had applied for clemency, and 481 had received
    the Commission's recommendation for pardon. A December 1999 law
    assigned the Commission's functions to the Justice Ministry's National
    Human Rights Council. Between January and November, the Council
    recommended (and President Fujimori granted) 32 pardons. After the
    Paniagua Government took office in November, the Government established
    a new ad hoc Pardons Commission that had by year's end recommended 33
    additional pardons that were granted, bringing the total to 546. At
    year's end, the new Commission continued to review petitions not
    previously recommended. NGO's advocated that the new commission expand
    its review to include all convictions and sentences rendered by
    military courts, but by year's end, the Government had not made a
    decision on the matter.
        There was no congressional action on the Human Rights Ombudsman's
    1999 recommendation for legislation for monetary compensation of
    innocent persons released through the Pardon Commission's program. The
    matter was added to the agenda of the OAS talks in October, but
    Congress had not taken any action by year's end.
        The Extrajudicial Conciliation Law, which Congress passed in 1998,
    was to have made conciliation a mandatory first step in most civil
    cases by January; however, due to administrative and other delays,
    partial implementation of the law was not scheduled to begin until
    January 2001 in Trujillo, and is scheduled to begin in Lima and Calloa
    in March 2001, expanding progressively to other cities during the year.
        There were no reports of political prisoners. Sendero Luminoso and
    MRTA members charged with terrorism are not considered to be political
    prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution requires security forces to have a
    written judicial warrant to enter a private dwelling; however, NGO's
    indicate that this requirement is not always observed in practice. In
    February the Government eliminated emergency zones that covered
    approximately 5 percent of the country. Prior to that constitutional
    protections, including freedom of movement and other due process
    guarantees, had been suspended in those areas.
        In the past, the Human Rights Ombudsman and human rights NGO's
    received complaints regarding the forced conscription of young men,
    including minors, by security forces as part of the constitutionally
    mandated system of compulsory 2-year military service. A law went into
    effect in January that makes military service voluntary and prohibits
    the practice of forced conscription. Registration for military service
    remains obligatory for men aged 18 and older. The President retains the
    authority to decree the reestablishment of mandatory service. The Human
    Rights Ombudsman monitors implementation of the law to ensure that the
    military abides by it, since past efforts to prohibit forced
    conscription did not prevent it.
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to private
    communication, but the media, politicians, some government officials,
    and private individuals continued to report that the Government
    violated this right. The case of former SIE agent Luisa Margarita
    Zanatta Muedas, who fled the country in 1998, after allegedly providing
    information regarding SIE wiretapping operations, remained pending at
    year's end. In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman recommended that the
    Government pardon Zanatta, that the Public Ministry investigate the
    wiretapping, and that Congress broaden the investigation conducted by
    its committee on defense. By year's end the Government had not taken
    action on those recommendations.
        In May the IACHR recommended that the Inter-American Court hear the
    wiretapping case filed by opposition Congresswoman Anel Townsend and 13
    journalists. They charged that the Government had violated their
    constitutional right to privacy and sought civil damages. The Supreme
    Court had dismissed the charges in 1998. The congressional Committee on
    Defense, Intelligence, and Internal Order conducted a summary
    investigation of the charges in 1999. The investigation not only
    exonerated the intelligence services and security forces, but concluded
    that the aggrieved journalists had wiretapped themselves and
    recommended that they be charged with having fabricated and
    disseminated false information that tainted the honor of the military.
    Having exhausted their domestic resources, the journalists took their
    case to the IACHR in November 1999.
        Opposition politicians continued to report credible incidents of
    wiretapping and surveillance. Although high-level government officials
    denied government involvement in any of these incidents, there was
    little effort to investigate the allegations. In 1999 presidential
    candidate Luis Castaneda Lossio accused David Pinedo Torres of being a
    SIN agent and charged that Pinedo was surveilling him. The case against
    Pinedo was dropped during the year, as was the case against Castaneda
    for detaining Pinedo.
        Reports of forced conscription by the MRTA (most of whose surviving
    members are jailed) and the greatly weakened Sendero Luminoso terrorist
    groups diminished significantly. However, Sendero Luminoso continued to
    coerce indigenous people to join its ranks (see Section 5).
        During the year, the Ombudsman's office received isolated
    complaints of abuses committed by family planning personnel.
    Allegations first arose in 1997 that a number of health workers in
    public hospitals and family planning clinics administered by the
    Ministry of Health had induced female patients to opt for sterilization
    by promising them food or another type of good or service, or by not
    providing them with complete information about available alternatives.
    In a 1999 report, the Ombudsman recommended that family planning
    practitioners provide all clients with complete information about
    alternatives available to them, that they pressure no client into using
    any particular contraceptive method, and that if a patient chose
    sterilization, that the patient be afforded a 72-hour waiting period
    during which to consider that option. The Ombudsman also recommended
    that the Ministry integrate men fully into its family planning program,
    thereby disseminating reproductive and contraceptive information more
    equitably across gender boundaries. The Ministry of Health accepted the
    Ombudsman's report and implemented many of his recommendations.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and press; however, in practice the Government
    inhibited the full exercise of these freedoms for most of the year.
    Manipulation of opposition journalists through the judicial system and
    the use of government advertising revenues to influence reporting in
    print and broadcast media were serious problems. Human rights groups
    contend that government harassment of and alleged attacks against
    journalists also were problems. As a result, much of the media,
    especially the financially vulnerable broadcast television networks,
    practiced self-censorship. Many in the press regard the Fujimori
    administration's harassment of the media as a key reason for his
    victories in presidential elections. Following the establishment of the
    OAS dialog in August and the deactivation of the SIN in October, the
    climate of press freedom improved. Television stations began to show
    more balanced political coverage and allowed opposition views to be
    presented. Tabloids that were suspected of being financed by the SIN
    discontinued publication, and the remaining tabloids changed their
    coverage to nonpolitical reporting.
        The press represents a wide spectrum of opinion, ranging from left-
    leaning opposition views to those favoring the Government. In the
    greater Lima area alone, there are 20 daily newspapers, 7 television
    stations, 65 radio stations, and 3 news channels on 2 commercial cable
    systems. There are numerous provincial newspapers and radio stations.
    The Government owns one daily newspaper, one television network, and
    two radio stations, none of which has a particularly large audience.
        Several international press groups, including the Committee to
    Protect Journalists (CPJ), the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA),
    and Freedom House, as well as the OAS, reported various cases and types
    of press harassment and accused the Government of being responsible for
    some of it. The CPJ named former President Fujimori as one of the
    world's ``Top Ten Enemies of the Press'' for the second year in a row.
    In October the media advocacy group Prensa Libre issued a report in
    which it cited numerous instances of surveillance and harassment of
    journalists, which it attributed to the Government and intelligence
    services. The group also noted limitations on access to airtime for
    opposition candidates, as well as a defamation campaign against the
    political opposition and independent journalists in tabloid newspapers
    allegedly funded by the Government.
        Media outlets can, and do, criticize the Government; however, under
    the Fujimori administration, they risked reprisal through the loss of
    government advertising (often a major source of revenue), libel suits,
    or other judicial action on apparently unrelated issues. The Fujimori
    administration filed lawsuits against owners or managers of many
    antigovernment media outlets whose content appeared to depend as much
    on political as much as legal criteria. Incidents such as the high-
    profile 1997 loss by television owner Baruch Ivcher of his station and
    his citizenship (see Section 2.d.), TV Channel 13's co-owner Genaro
    Delgado-Parker's loss of his station in 1999, and the February seizure
    of Radio 1160's transmitters and sound equipment restricted press
    freedom and encouraged journalists and media owners to practice self-
    censorship.
        The limitations on press freedom were particularly evident during
    the election campaign season that dominated the first half of the year,
    when broadcast television tilted heavily in favor of the Government and
    against the opposition in its news coverage and public affairs
    programming. On March 8, a month before the first round of voting, the
    OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Santiago Canton,
    noted his concern and that of the IACHR over freedom of expression in
    the electoral process. On June 4, shortly after the final round of
    elections, the IACHR issued a statement describing the violations of
    freedom of expression. It specifically noted government pressure on the
    media to suppress coverage of and sale of airtime to opposition
    candidates, and government financing of pro-government tabloid papers
    that harassed opposition candidates and supporters.
        The Government agreed to address freedom of the press issues as
    part of the OAS democracy talks, and in August the OAS dialog,
    established a working group to resolve former television owner Baruch
    Ivcher's Peruvian nationality, revoked by executive order in 1997, and
    to examine ways to resolve disputed ownership claims over Channel 2 and
    Channel 13. In October the Government agreed to restore Ivcher's
    citizenship and did so in December (see Section 2.d.). In early
    December, Ivcher returned to the country and regained control of
    Channel 2. Several days later, Delgado-Parker regained control of
    Channel 13. By year's end both stations were providing independent
    political reporting and analysis.
        Journalists and media outlets also have been intimidated
    physically. According to the National Journalists Association (ANP),
    there were many cases of media harassment by the National Police and
    the military, and by local political and commercial organizations. The
    ANP reported 104 cases of journalist harassment through August, of
    which 61 percent were in the provinces and two-thirds involved
    violence.
        The CPJ reported that in April an unidentified person fired shots
    at journalist Hernan Carrion, who directs a daily news program in
    Chimbote. Carrion requested protection from the provincial authorities,
    but continued to receive threatening phone calls following his
    continued criticism of the Government on his program. At the same time,
    the Government told the owner of the radio station that broadcasts
    Carrion's program to resubmit tax papers or be charged a substantial
    fee. The station suspended Carrion's program, asserting that it was for
    his own protection.
        The Fujimori administration and its supporters used libel laws to
    suppress criticism of political leaders or offices. In August the pro-
    government newspaper Expreso and the director of the National Reserve
    Bank (who is the executive chairman of Expreso) filed a libel suit
    against Carlos Hildebrandt, the director of opposition newspaper
    Liberacion and an outspoken critic of the Government, and a journalist
    who wrote an article criticizing the management of Expreso. The
    plaintiffs sought monetary damages amounting to $1 million, a sum that
    appeared designed to bankrupt Liberacion. The case was pending at
    year's end. In another August incident, the Government's intellectual
    property rights administration filed a libel complaint against the
    majority owner of a web site specializing in publishing investigative
    reports critical of the Government on an unrelated matter.
        In August the pro-government weekly news magazine Gente filed a
    libel suit against cable television news channel Canal N; Hugo Guerra,
    a senior editor of El Comercio (Canal N's parent newspaper); and
    opposition journalist Gustavo Gorriti for describing Gente as having
    ties to the intelligence service and the Government. Gente withdrew the
    lawsuit on September 20, 4 days after President Fujimori's September 16
    announcement calling for new elections and the deactivation of the SIN.
        The political opposition, press organizations, and rights groups
    charged that the Government used improper influence over the judiciary
    to intimidate and harass the press. Government manipulation of the
    legal system in these cases is difficult to prove, and in some cases,
    genuine legal disputes may have occasioned the lawsuits against media
    outlets. Opposition or independent media seem to encounter a
    disproportionate number of legal difficulties, including prosecution on
    tax issues, compared to media outlets that are uncritical of or
    favorable to the government in their coverage. Prominent cases included
    a March lawsuit filed by minority shareholders against leading daily
    newspaper El Comercio shortly after the paper exposed a massive
    signature forgery scheme used to register one of President Fujimori's
    electoral parties. In the El Comercio case, an investigation was opened
    despite the fact that the statute of limitations on the alleged crime
    of fraud had expired. The case was closed in July after stockholders
    reached an agreement on the matter.
        In April a judge ordered the seizure of the printing press used to
    print opposition newspapers Liberacion and Punto Final as part of a
    bankruptcy proceeding. In a similar action, a judge ordered the seizure
    of bank accounts and real estate belonging to Editora Correo, a company
    that publishes a chain of independent papers in the provinces and whose
    shareholders also have a financial interest in a leading Lima tabloid
    newspaper Ojo. For several months thereafter, Ojo cut back
    substantially on its previously independent political coverage and
    later stopped publishing editorials.
        Journalists continued to be intimidated by potential criminal
    prosecution when the Government leaves charges against them pending. By
    year's end, prosecutors had not closed their case for falsification of
    official documents against Guillermo Gonzalez, director of the NGO
    Prensa Libre, who broke a 1999 story on government wiretapping of
    opposition political candidates. In May the IACHR issued a
    recommendation that charges against him be dismissed for lack of
    evidence.
        Throughout the electoral process, a number of tabloid newspapers
    made character assaults on opposition candidates in what appeared to be
    a coordinated campaign to tarnish President Fujimori's political
    opponents and critical members of the press. Intelligence agents
    allegedly orchestrated this campaign. The six tabloids that carried
    such attacks had almost identical headlines and text, and similar text
    also appeared on the Internet.
        Suspicious infrastructure problems also seemed to plague opposition
    or independent media outlets during the election campaign and
    immediately thereafter, and some suggested that it was a form of
    harassment against the press. In one incident in February, an
    electrical failure prevented Radio Miraflores, a Lima opposition radio
    station, from reporting on a provincial tour by opposition candidate
    Luis Castaneda Lossio. In May a similar electrical outage prevented
    Canal N from broadcasting a rally for opposition presidential candidate
    Alejandro Toledo. At the height of the campaign period, from March to
    May, the Institute for Press and Society, an organization advocating
    press freedom, suffered systematic attacks on its e-mail system.
        In July the Government limited a cable news channel's helicopter's
    access to the downtown Lima area by banning all civilian aircraft from
    flying below 9000 feet over the city. This occurred only days before a
    large-scale protest against President Fujimori's inauguration ceremony
    was to take place. Critics assert that this prohibited the media from
    monitoring the protests. CPJ noted that in September the Government
    prohibited flights over downtown Lima, which according to the Committee
    to Protect Journalists was a measure promulgated to prevent news
    agencies from providing aerial news coverage of protests after a
    scandal involving former de facto SIN head Vladimiro Montesinos became
    public. The Government stated that the flight restrictions were
    necessary for public security during the inauguration and protests.
        In May Fabian Salazar, a former Channel 2 employee and associate of
    Baruch Ivcher, and a collaborator for opposition newspaper La
    Republica, alleged that agents from the SIN broke into his office and
    tortured him by sawing his wrist to bone (see Section 1.c.). This
    occurred after he had received a videotape that he claimed compromised
    high government officials. A full investigation into the matter never
    was conducted.
        The Government does not censor books or publications, films, plays,
    or limit access to the Internet.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the authorities
    generally respect this right in practice; however, police used force to
    disrupt protests during the year, injuring several protesters. The law
    does not require a permit for a public demonstration; however,
    organizers must inform the political authority (Prefecto) about the
    kind of demonstration and its location. Permission may be denied only
    for reasons of public safety or health. Municipal authorities usually
    granted permission for demonstrations.
        Major demonstrations and political rallies were common throughout
    the year. Most were peaceful; however, in some cases, police and
    demonstrators clashed. In those instances, police usually use water
    cannons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. In February over
    3,000 labor union, student, and opposition political party
    representatives protested unfair election conditions. When several
    protesters carrying sticks and throwing rocks confronted police, police
    used a powerful water cannon and tear gas to disperse the marchers. The
    police briefly detained a number of protesters who were throwing rocks
    and attempting to destroy private property.
        On April 9, election day, nearly 100,000 persons gathered in Lima
    to celebrate the fact that President Fujimori had not won an absolute
    majority in elections. The event continued into the early morning of
    April 10, when protesters, led by Peru Posible leader and presidential
    candidate Alejandro Toledo, marched on the presidential palace. Police
    dispersed them with tear gas. Clashes between protesters and police
    were reported throughout the major cities. Some protesters sustained
    minor injuries.
        During the period between April 9 and May 28, when second round
    presidential elections were held, Toledo led rallies and protests
    around the country. In mid-April a large protest in central Lima
    resulted in significant damage to the National Board of Elections (JNE)
    office building from rocks thrown by protesters, who were believed to
    be members of the Civil Construction Union. Several injuries were
    reported.
        On July 26-28, approximately 100,000 persons gathered in Lima from
    all parts of the country to protest the inauguration of President
    Fujimori. On July 26 and July 27, these demonstrations were peaceful,
    with no confrontations. However, on July 28, the protests became
    violent. Small groups of protesters clashed with police at different
    points of a security perimeter formed to protect politicians and
    visiting dignitaries attending the inauguration. Unidentified
    individuals set fire to the National Bank building and the Justice
    Ministry and caused hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage during a
    day of confrontations that left six bank security guards dead from a
    fire. Police used tear gas and water cannons, and charged several
    persons with arson. The authorities also charged protest organizers for
    damage. Protest organizers alleged that government agents infiltrated
    the protests and set the fires. Police officials alleged that extremist
    groups used the protest as a pretense to provoke violence. Human rights
    groups allege that police prohibited human rights observers from
    entering the area of the violent protests to document the events, and
    that police used excessive force to control demonstrators (see Section
    1.c.). The police maintained that they acted in order to ensure the
    safety of those attending the inauguration.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman continued to promote dialog between
    protest groups and police on basic rules of conduct. Monitors from the
    Ombudsman's office served as official observers to ensure adherence to
    these rules by police and protesters alike. The Ombudsman's office
    reported that these measures reduce significantly tensions and the
    level of arbitrary arrests, while diminishing the risk of damage to
    public and private property. According to the Ombudsman, with some
    exceptions, groups were able to express their opinions publicly, while
    the National Police generally maintained order in a lawful manner.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman worked with groups of protesters to
    inform authorities of their activities and work out rules of conduct
    prior to the protests against President Fujimori's inauguration in
    July. However, during large-scale demonstrations on July 28, the
    authorities and demonstration organizers failed to agree on ways to
    reduce the likelihood of confrontations and violence.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    authorities generally respect this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, the Catholic Church receives preferential treatment from the
    State. Although the Constitution establishes the separation of church
    and state, it also acknowledges the Catholic Church as ``an important
    element in the historical, cultural, and moral development'' of the
    nation. The preferential status accorded to Roman Catholicism in public
    life is apparent in the special treatment and tangible benefits the
    Church receives from the State, including remuneration to certain
    clergy and church personnel, and tax exemptions on clergy salaries and
    real estate holdings. Teaching about Roman Catholicism in primary and
    secondary schools is mandatory. Conversion to other religions is
    permitted, and missionaries are allowed to enter the country and
    proselytize. By law, the military may hire only Catholic clergy as
    chaplains and Catholicism is the only recognized religion of military
    personnel.
        In April 1998, the President issued an executive order that
    established basic Catholic religion courses for all public and private
    primary school students. Religion teachers must be approved by the
    bishop presiding over the local diocese. Most schools devoted 1 hour a
    week to such study. Parents who do not wish their children to
    participate in the prescribed religion classes must submit a written
    request for an exemption to the school principal. Non-Catholics who
    wish their children to receive a religious education in their own
    particular faith are usually free to organize such classes during the
    weekly hour allotted by the school for religious education, but must
    supply their own teacher. The Freedom of Conscience Institute
    (PROLIBCO), an NGO that favors the strict separation of church and
    state and opposes the preferential treatment accorded to the Catholic
    religion, opposes the requirement for Catholic teaching in the school
    curriculum and claims that the alternatives made available to non-
    Catholic parents violate the constitutional protection of the privacy
    and confidentiality of persons' convictions and beliefs.
        PROLIBCO and other religious groups legal had challenged the
    mandatory teaching of Roman Catholicism, but in October the Supreme
    Court dismissed their claim. PROLIBCO maintains that the ruling was
    issued in an irregular manner and without prior notice to its lawyers.
    PROLIBCO claims that the financial subsidies and tax benefits that the
    Government provides to the Catholic Church and its clergy are far more
    widespread and lucrative than publicly acknowledged. PROLIBCO also has
    alleged discrimination against non-Catholic groups who must pay import
    duties and a sales tax on Bibles brought into the country. At year's
    end, PROBLICO was preparing to take its case to the IACHR.
        Sendero Luminoso rejects religion and in the past has threatened
    and intimidated religious workers.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    of free movement; however, passengers on public transportation and
    drivers in private vehicles may be checked at control points throughout
    the country. Until February the Government suspended the right of free
    movement in emergency zones, which had covered approximately 5 percent
    of the country in 1999, and travelers, including human rights monitors,
    could be prohibited from traveling to those areas. The Government
    eliminated all emergency zones in February.
        There are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel or
    emigration; however, the authorities legally can restrict persons with
    pending criminal and, in some cases, civil charges against them from
    leaving the country. Repatriates, both voluntary and involuntary, are
    not treated differently from other citizens.
        The Constitution prohibits the revocation of citizenship; however,
    according to the Nationality Law, naturalized Peruvians can lose their
    citizenship for, among other reasons, committing crimes against the
    State, national defense, and public security, as well as for reasons
    that ``affect the public interest and the national interest.'' Critics
    believe it was the Nationality Law that provided the Government with
    the legal basis for its 1997 invalidation of the citizenship through
    naturalization of Israeli-born television owner Baruch Ivcher. However,
    the Government claimed that its decision was based upon irregularities
    in Ivcher's original naturalization petition 13 years earlier. In
    October the Government agreed to restore Ivcher's citizenship and
    subsequently did so (see Section 2.a.).
        Sendero Luminoso occasionally interrupts the free movement of
    persons by setting up roadblocks in sections of the Upper Huallaga
    Valley.
        Political violence in the 1980's and early 1990's resulted in the
    internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons from their
    original homes, and massive migration. Most families migrated to Lima
    or to one of several other department capitals. This movement created
    problems which, for the most part, remain unresolved despite continued
    efforts by the Government and NGO's to address them.
        According to the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human
    Development (PROMUDEH), since 1995 the Program for the Repopulation and
    Development of Emergency Zones (PAR) has supported the return of
    between 450,000 and 600,000 displaced persons. The PAR has assisted
    thousands of these persons to returned to their homes; however, the PAR
    and NGO's agree that the majority of displaced persons have not
    returned permanently to their original communities due to various
    factors, including economic changes and social ties.
        Despite governments and NGO efforts, many displaced persons lack
    basic documentation, such as birth certificates and voter registration
    cards. The Government established a PAR office to provide documentation
    that can be used both to request PAR assistance to return to one's
    community of origin and to apply for a national identity card. In 1999
    the Government conducted a national registration drive to provide
    displaced persons with identity documents, which are required for a
    variety of social and other government services, and to register them
    to vote in the April national elections. According to NGO's and
    election monitors, this program was successful in reaching millions of
    voters across the country.
        Another unresolved problem related to the displaced persons are
    pending arrests warrants against approximately 5,000 such persons, who
    fall into the category of ``requisitoriados''--persons who were forced
    to join terrorist groups and who were accused falsely of voluntarily
    joining such groups and continue to have outstanding detention orders
    against them. Judges from the special Terrorism Court traveled from
    Lima and dismissed 300 such warrants during the year (see Section
    1.d.). The pending legal status of such persons, along with the fact
    that the majority of these individuals speak only Quechua, increases
    their vulnerability and reduces even further their capacity for
    economic and social integration into urban areas.
        Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous people to join its
    ranks during the year, which resulted in further internal displacement.
    There is also a large population of indigenous Ashaninkas who have
    faced not only a terrorist threat, but also the encroachment of oil
    exploration companies on their tribal lands (see Section 5).
        The law includes provision for granting refugee and asylee status
    in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
    cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in granting
    asylum and refugee status and recognizes the Catholic Migration
    Commission as the official provider of technical assistance to refugees
    and applicants for asylum. The Commission also advises citizens who
    fear persecution at home and seek asylum abroad. The Government
    recognized 24 persons as new refugees during the year. There were
    approximately 756 refugees in the country. Refugees are allowed to live
    and work without restrictions and can apply for naturalization. The
    status of refugees is reviewed annually. The question of first asylum
    did not arise.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    government; however, serious problems in the process of elections held
    in April and May, including questions about President Fujimori's
    constitutional eligibility to be a candidate, the registration of
    candidates, allocation of Government resources to influence voters, and
    intimidation of the opposition, led domestic and international
    observers to call attention to the flawed nature of the process and to
    question the validity of election results and the state of democracy in
    the country. In September President Fujimori announced that he would
    exercise his constitutional power to convoke new national elections, to
    be held in April 2001, and in which he would not be a candidate. In
    November Congress removed President Fujimori for ``moral incapacity,''
    and President of Congress Valentin Paniagua succeeded to the
    presidency. Voting is by secret ballot and mandatory for all citizens
    between the ages of 18 and 70. Members of the armed forces and the
    police, as well as felons, are ineligible to vote. The law bars groups
    that advocate the violent overthrow of the Government from
    participating in the political process.
        The Constitution establishes three bodies to administer elections:
    the National Board of Elections (JNE); the National Office of Electoral
    Processes (ONPE); and the National Registry of Identification and Civil
    Affairs (RENIEC). The JNE sets the legal parameters and rules on
    election-related disputes and challenges. ONPE administers elections
    and the RENIEC issues election identity documents. Many complaints
    about the elections centered around the executive branch's dominance of
    the JNE and ONPE, and their inability to administer elections in an
    unbiased manner. In October and November, Congress passed legislation
    that allowed the Government to appoint new leadership for these
    institutions. By year's end, ONPE had a new director who had replaced
    over 100 of the organization's 180 permanent employees; 4 of 5
    magistrates of the JNE also were replaced. In December Congress
    approved the creation of multiple district representation for electing
    members to Congress, which was designed to provide more specific
    geographic representation.
        The Constitution stipulates that the President can be elected to a
    term of 5 years and may be reelected for one additional successive
    term. On December 27, 1999, President Fujimori announced his candidacy
    for a third term, on the grounds that he had completed only one full
    term under the 1993 Constitution. On December 31, 1999, the JNE
    dismissed 18 objections filed by opposition groups, political parties,
    and other civic groups who argued that a third term would be
    unconstitutional; the JNE claimed that it rendered its decision on
    technical grounds. The Human Rights Ombudsman subsequently stated that
    the JNE's decision did not correspond to constitutional law, but that
    because the Constitution vested the JNE with the final decision on
    electoral matters, citizens had to respect the JNE's decision.
        The undermining of the Constitutional Tribunal by congressional
    action in 1997 (see Section 1.e.) set the stage for Fujimori's ability
    to seek a third term. Constitutional challenges to Fujimori's candidacy
    for a third successive term rested largely on a series of controversial
    actions taken by the executivedominated Congress. In 1996 Congress
    passed the Law of Authentic Interpretation, which declared President
    Fujimori's 1995 victory as his first under the 1993 Constitution. In
    1997 opponents of the law challenged its constitutionality, but the
    Constitutional Tribunal was unable to obtain the six of seven votes
    needed to overturn the law. Congress subsequently voted to remove three
    members of the Tribunal who had announced their nonbinding opinion that
    the law could not apply to Fujimori, leaving the Tribunal effectively
    unable to rule on any constitutional issues for lack of quorum.
        In the April 9 elections, in accordance with the 1997 election law,
    10 registered political parties presented 120-candidate slates for
    Congress, and 9 parties presented presidential candidates; the Peru
    2000 alliance presented President Fujimori as a candidate. Local NGO's,
    the Human Rights Ombudsman, and international groups monitored the
    electoral campaign and the first round of elections. These groups
    enjoyed access to electoral institutions and government officials.
    However, there were attacks in pro-government media against some of
    these groups at various points in the campaign (see Section 2.a.). At
    the Government's invitation, the OAS sent observers for the April 9
    elections. OAS observers also worked with local electoral institutions
    in preparations for the second round runoff, but none of the observer
    groups fielded monitors for the May 28 runoff elections because of the
    Government's unwillingness to postpone the election date so that vote
    tabulation software could be tested.
        International and domestic observers viewed the general elections
    on April 9 and presidential runoff elections on May 28 as significantly
    flawed. Conditions for free and fair elections fell short of
    international standards. Several factors created a seriously flawed
    electoral process: disagreement over the legitimacy of President
    Fujimori's candidacy for a third consecutive term; complaints by
    opposition candidates of unfair campaign conditions that favored pro-
    government candidates; lack of public confidence in electoral
    institutions; and lack of transparency in vote tabulation and
    reporting. Although the Government took steps to improve the electoral
    environment, they were insufficient to ensure a level playing field.
        Preelection conditions heavily favored government candidates.
    Several groups of electoral observers reported that government
    resources were used to the benefit Fujimori's candidacy and others in
    his coalition. There were credible reports that military and police
    personnel worked on behalf of the pro-government candidates. The NGO
    Transparencia filed 170 formal complaints regarding use of government
    resources; the Public Ministry dismissed all but 2 of the complaints.
    In one case, prosecutors dismissed a complaint that employees of a
    public welfare and nutrition service distributed pro-government
    campaign literature. In another, the national tax authority conducted a
    surprise audit of one of the opposition candidate's businesses.
        The JNE refused to investigate opposition complaints in many of
    these cases, stating that it did not have the resources or mandate to
    investigate. When the JNE or the Public Ministry did investigate,
    charges frequently were dismissed for lack of evidence. Only after
    repeated complaints from electoral observers did the JNE pledge to
    investigate use of government land for pro-government party paintings
    and signs. The President also issued a nationwide executive order
    against use of government resources. However, these measures were
    adopted too late in the campaign to overcome a widespread impression of
    preferential treatment enjoyed by the Peru 2000 alliance.
        The preelectoral period also lacked impartiality and effectiveness
    in the administration in some significant areas. In late February, the
    newspaper El Comercio reported that a member party of the President
    Fujimori's Peru 2000 alliance had falsified over 1 million voter
    signatures in its registration drive. Accounts by 4 participants in the
    scheme detailed a large operation in which over 400 persons
    participated. The group allegedly worked for 1 month in a building
    behind the offices of pro-government legislator Oscar Medelius. Others
    accused of involvement included Peru 2000 official Luis Navarrete and
    Peru 2000 Secretary General Daniel Chuan. ONPE, the JNE, and the
    Attorney General pledged to investigate the allegations. ONPE concluded
    that the JNE had jurisdiction, and in March ONPE sent the JNE its
    report, along with the forged documents in question. In April the JNE
    deferred to the special prosecutor appointed to investigate the case.
    The JNE also ruled that Congress would have jurisdiction over
    legislatorselect with alleged links to the scandal. In July Congress
    absolved the legislators linked to the forgery scandal.
        In June the prosecutor filed charges against the witnesses who had
    exposed evidence implicating government employees, and who had
    themselves participated in the falsified signatures scheme. In
    September a judge dismissed charges against the informers, while the
    National Council of Magistrates opened an investigation against ONPE
    director Jose Portillo for allegedly investigating the case improperly.
    In October a judge ruled that no crime had been committed because
    official documents had not been falsified. However, the CNM removed
    Portillo from office.
        Opposition candidates did not receive equal access to broadcast
    television station news coverage, and the pro-government tabloid press
    conducted smear campaigns against them (see Section 2.a.). The JNE
    claimed that it could not intervene because media laws did not give it
    authority to dictate programming on privately owned television
    stations. Formal complaints by candidates to the JNE often were
    dismissed for lack of evidence. Beginning in late March, broadcast
    television stations provided broadcast time to opposition candidates,
    but these spots were usually not aired during peak viewing hours.
    Though the opening reflected a government response to electoral
    observer criticism, the measure came too late to reverse the ill
    effects that opposition candidates had suffered from earlier lack of
    media access. Throughout the campaign, broadcast television coverage
    favored President Fujimori.
        The April 9 elections were largely peaceful, and millions of
    citizens participated as voters, election workers, political party
    observers, and election monitors. Over 31,000 volunteers affiliated
    with local NGO's worked as poll monitors. International monitors found
    no specific instances of fraud during the polling.
        However, there were widespread irregularities in the voting and
    vote tabulation processes. Observers cited illegal propaganda in or
    around polling areas as the most common irregularity. They also
    reported irregularities in voting materials, such as premarked ballots
    and some missing the name of the leading opposition candidate as a
    choice. Observers reported several instances of attempted intimidation
    of political party observers by police and military officials demanding
    their names and identification documents. Several hundred voting sites
    reported that more ballots were cast than the number of voters who had
    signed in. (Under the electoral law, the authorities count the extra
    votes unless the number of ballots exceeds the number of registered
    voters at that site.)
        Several problems marred the vote tabulation and computation.
    Several vote tabulation centers did not open until late in the day.
    There were problems with the computer systems used to count the vote,
    and ONPE was unable to conduct a successful simulation of its data
    collection and tabulation process until shortly before polls closed.
    Although observers and party monitors were allowed to watch the
    computation at ONPE and regional collection centers, the systems used
    did not allow for independent verification of the results.
        ONPE presented only partial results of the presidential returns on
    April 9, and an inexplicable delay in the computation created
    widespread allegations that politicians or others influenced the count.
    Election day exit polls and quick counts by the NGO Transparencia and
    polling firms showed that no candidate had won over 50 percent of the
    vote and that a runoff would be necessary. Electoral authorities
    released additional election results on April 12, and announced that it
    was ``mathematically impossible'' for any of the candidates to have won
    the first round. The next day officials confirmed definitively that
    there would be a second round. Final official results of the first
    round presidential elections were declared on April 28. Electoral
    monitors concluded that the vote tabulation and announcement process
    lacked transparency and created a lack of confidence in the official
    results.
        After the announcement that no presidential candidate had won in
    the first round, the Government negotiated with second place candidate
    Alejandro Toledo and the OAS regarding measures to improve electoral
    conditions. Several working groups formed by the Human Rights
    Ombudsman, ONPE, the OAS, and the political parties worked to address
    access to the media and media coverage, reform of ONPE's vote
    tabulation computer programs, and training of electoral personnel.
    While these groups made significant progress, the OAS sought
    postponement of the second round election to test ONPE's voting data
    computer programs.
        Toledo withdrew from the race 10 days before the May 28 runoff,
    citing unfair electoral conditions and the Government's refusal to
    postpone the elections at the OAS's request. However, the JNE rejected
    his petition to remove his name from the ballot, and Toledo urged his
    supporters to purposely spoil their ballots in protest. On May 28,
    according to ONPE's unverifiable results, President Fujimori won 51
    percent of the popular vote. Toledo won 17.68 percent of the votes and
    29.93 percent were spoiled ballots of null. Observers, with the
    exception of one group, refused to monitor the vote, and Toledo and
    other opposition groups charged that the results were fraudulent.
        Definitive results from congressional elections were not released
    until May 12, which also raised questions about the validity of those
    results. The JNE ratified the congressional results the same day,
    despite a number of pending challenges, including some claiming fraud.
    On April 12, initial returns had indicated that no party had won a
    controlling majority; however, in subsequent result announcements,
    there were significant changes in the results that favored pro-
    government candidates. There were, moreover, many changes of party
    affiliation that drew many representatives elected from opposition
    party lists to the pro-government coalition in Congress. By the time
    the new Congress was sworn in on July 24, nearly a dozen legislators
    elected on opposition slates had changed parties to join the Peru 2000
    alliance, which gave it a majority in the 120-seat unicameral Congress.
    There were widespread allegations of bribery, blackmail, and other
    illegal and questionable practices; however not all party affiliation
    changes were necessarily the result of illegal actions. For example,
    the promise of a position as committee chair or the potential of being
    able to help a regional constituency was a factor cited by some who
    changed party affiliation. However, circumstantial evidence suggests
    that questionable practices were used in a number of instances. Luis
    Caceres Velasquez was declared ineligible for Congress due to a
    previous felony conviction. After he declared his intent to change from
    an opposition to the government party, the Supreme Court overturned the
    conviction and the JNE gave him back his seat. Edilberto Canales,
    implicated in a vote buying scandal, changed alliances and his legal
    problems were settled. Jorge Polack, who complained that he had been
    harassed by criminal legal proceedings because of antigovernment views
    broadcast on his radio station, had charges against him dropped after
    he changed his membership to the ruling party.
        There were also widely reported irregularities in ONPE's tabulation
    of preferential votes for individual Congressional candidates. Several
    parties alleged that ONPE employees had been bribed to alter voting
    results. The Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor to
    investigate these allegations. In June JNE officials declared that
    Congress would be responsible for investigating newly elected
    legislators who allegedly benefited from manipulated results. On July
    6, Congress approved a report that found 31 ONPE data entry officials,
    several regional ONPE center managers, and ONPE's information chief
    responsible for altering voting returns. The report concluded that five
    legislators representing government and official parties who benefited
    from the altered vote bore no responsibility. A television news program
    reported that of the 30 congressional candidates who benefited from
    alteration of the individual preferential vote count, 10 eventually
    were elected. By year's end, none of these elected legislators had been
    investigated for violating election laws.
        In June the OAS General Assembly discussed the country's elections.
    OAS election monitoring mission head Eduardo Stein reported that the
    elections had been carried out in accordance with international
    standards. The OAS foreign ministers concluded that ``the credibility
    of both the process and the outcome of those elections has been
    undermined by persisting reports of irregularities'' and agreed to send
    OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
    Axworthy to Peru to establish a dialog on reforming the country's
    democratic institutions.
        The OAS mission met with government officials, members of the
    opposition, and civil society representatives in late June and
    developed 29 recommendations grouped in 5 categories: (1) ensuring
    judicial independence; (2) freedom of expression and the media; (3)
    electoral reforms; (4) supervision and balance of powers among the
    executive branch and congress; and (5) measures to strengthen
    congressional oversight, reforms to the intelligence and military
    services. Although opposition and some civil society groups continued
    to call for new elections, the OAS delegation noted that the OAS
    General Assembly mandate explicitly precluded discussion of new
    elections. However, delegates of the OAS added that local figures were
    not precluded from continuing to advance new elections.
        The OAS dialog began in August. At the opposition's insistence, the
    Government agreed to form four working groups to address priority
    issues including the return to the Inter-American Court of Human
    Rights, the reestablishment of the Constitutional Tribunal, the
    resolution of Baruch Ivcher's nationality and ownership of television
    stations 2 and 13 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.), and the reorganization
    of the intelligence services.
        In September Moral Independence Front party leader Fernando Olivera
    presented a videotape showing opposition legislator-elect Alberto Kouri
    taking a $15,000 payment from then-de facto intelligence service chief
    Vladimiro Montesinos. The video showed Montesinos presenting Kouri with
    a contract committing him to switch party alliances. Montesinos was
    recorded remarking that he was aiming for a pro-government majority of
    at least 70 seats. When asked about the transaction, Kouri claimed that
    the money was a personal loan. Congress formed a committee to
    investigate Kouri and suspended him for 120 days. Kouri left the
    country when he learned of the investigation.
        The airing of the tape also apparently influenced President
    Fujimori to announce on September 16, that there would be new national
    elections in which he would not be a candidate. He later appointed a
    special prosecutor to investigate Montesino's role in illegal
    activities. By year's end, the investigation had expanded to include
    investigation into his role in money laundering, illegal arms sales,
    narcotics trafficking, and bribery of public officials. Montesinos fled
    the country in October in order to avoid prosecution in these matters.
        On November 22, President Fujimori sent his resignation to Congress
    from Japan, where he remained at year's end. Congress refused to accept
    his resignation and instead voted to remove him from office for ``moral
    incapacity.'' The President of Congress Valentin Paniagua of the
    Popular Action Party succeeded to the presidency on November 22. He
    announced that he would uphold legislation allowing for new
    presidential and congressional elections in April 2001, and he
    accelerated the implementation of democratic reforms initiated in the
    OAS-sponsored talks.
        By November participants in the OAS talks had agreed upon, and
    Congress had ratified, amendments to the Constitution that would end
    the term of the President and Congress in July 2001, thereby making new
    elections possible. The OAS dialog also produced agreement on
    deactivating the SIN, with provisions for including a civil society
    member in the executive branch's oversight commission and for creating
    a bipartisan congressional oversight committee.
        The OAS dialog drew to a close after Paniagua assumed the
    presidency in November. Congress approved and the Paniagua
    administration continued to implement many of the OAS recommendations.
    By year's end, the Government made significant legal and electoral
    reforms (see Section 1.e.).
        Legal actions against potential opposition candidates for
    congressional campaigns removed some of them from eligibility for
    public office. In 1999 Congress passed a law prohibiting candidacies
    for certain offices such as president or congress by anyone who had
    served in high office and had been charged with a crime against the
    State. In effect this law presumes the guilt of any persons charged but
    not convicted of a crime and removes the right to compete for office.
    This law disqualified former Labor Minister Jorge Mufarrech and
    Representative Beatrice Merino from standing as candidates. Congress
    annulled the law in October.
        Women and some minorities participate actively in government and
    politics, although they are under-represented in both fields. From
    August to November, the president and three vice presidents of Congress
    were women. In December Congress amended the electoral law to include
    provisions requiring parties to include at least 30 percent of
    candidates on their slates to be of each sex; previously the level was
    25 percent. At year's end there were 26 women in the 120-seat Congress.
    One of 15 cabinet ministers and several vice ministers are women, as
    are 3 of the 36 judges of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General.
    In conjunction with the year's election campaign, four women's
    organizations sought to identify female candidates, promote women's
    interests, increase the number of female voters, prepare a woman's
    political agenda, and train women who were elected to office.
        Citizens of Asian descent hold numerous leadership positions in
    government; former President Fujimori is of Japanese descent and one
    recent president of the Council of Ministers was of Chinese descent.
        Several members of Congress have mixed ancestry, and a recent Vice
    President was a Quechua speaker, as was a recent Minister of
    Transportation and Communications. However, it is rare for indigenous
    people, who make up more than one-third of the population, to hold high
    public offices. The Afro-Peruvian minority, unofficially estimated at 3
    to 5 percent of the total population, is not represented in the
    leadership of any branch of the Government. There are three Afro-
    Peruvian members of Congress.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        In general the Government permitted numerous NGO's dedicated to
    monitoring and advancing human rights to operate freely; however, the
    authorities at times sought to hinder the operations of human rights
    monitors, including harassment of members of the National Human Rights
    Coordinator.
        Military commanders often did not grant access to local and
    international human rights monitors to investigate alleged abuses on
    military bases. However, by year's end, this policy began to change
    under the Paniagua administration. In December members of the Human
    Rights Ombudsman's office were granted access to the naval military
    prison in Callao for the first time ever.
        Government, military, judicial, and police officials, as well as
    some members of Congress publicly accused NGO's and the IACHR of being
    overprotective of criminals and terrorists to the detriment of victims.
    These statements at times created a hostile environment for human
    rights groups but did not appear to hamper their ability to carry out
    their work. For much of the year, communication between the human
    rights community and the military ranged from strained to nonexistent.
    However, dialog between the NGO human rights community and civilian
    authorities improved significantly with the opening of the OAS
    sponsored dialog in August (see Section 3). By year's end, human rights
    organizations and the Government were represented in a number of the
    working groups which were examining legal reforms and pursuing the idea
    of a truth commission to examine past human rights abuses. Human rights
    community members reported that the Paniagua administration had
    initiated improvements in government-civil society relations, including
    the appointment of several former NGO leaders to his cabinet.
        Most human rights NGO's are independent, thorough, and generally
    objective. The National Coordinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora),
    established in 1985, provides an umbrella organization for 60 human
    rights NGO's. The Coordinadora does not politicize its positions on
    human rights issues, although its constituent members may do so in
    their own names. A number of other human rights groups associated with
    the Catholic Church or with government institutions operate on the
    margins of the Coordinadora.
        The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, created in 1993, receives
    funds from the Government and foreign governments and is considered an
    independent and effective institution for bringing citizens justice.
    The Ombudsman has investigative independence and the ability to inform
    the public of his conclusions and recommendations. However, the office
    has no enforcement mechanism other than moral suasion. Because of its
    reputation and role in society, the Ombudsman's office was asked to
    join in the OAS dialog to address the problems of the election and the
    ongoing process of democratization. The Ombudsman's office issued
    reports throughout the year on the elections, freedom of the press, the
    activities of the ad hoc Pardons Commission, the situation of 4,000
    unresolved disappearance cases, and an annual report on the overall
    human rights situation, among others.
        The Human Rights Ombudsman has a legal mandate to monitor prison
    facilities. However, until December, Ombudsman representatives
    continued to be denied access to the military prison in Callao (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In July the IACHR published a report updating its 1998 factfinding
    mission. Although the Government welcomed the Commission's recognition
    of action it had taken, such as the creation of the Human Rights
    Ombudsman's office and the abolition of faceless judges, the report
    concluded that the Fujimori administration continued to reject the
    Commission's call to return to the Inter-American Court (see Section
    1.e.). The IACHR report also noted the existence of impunity,
    restrictions on the freedom of expression, significant problems
    regarding the free practice of political freedoms and flawed elections,
    and the subjugation of the other branches by the executive branch under
    the Fujimori administration. In addition, the report stated that the
    significant problems that occurred during the electoral process were
    the ``foreseeable outcome of several years in which the arbitrary will
    of the Government has prevailed over the law and democratic
    institutions.''
        Human Rights Watch and other groups reported on harassment or
    attacks on human rights workers. Among such attacks were telephonic
    threats against Jesus Agreda Paredes, who investigated the death of a
    detainee in police custody, and death threats against members of the
    Legal Defense Institute. NGO's reported that such harassment and
    threats dropped significantly after the Paniagua administration took
    office in November.
        In July 1999, the Government announced its decision to withdraw
    from the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
    Rights after the Court determined that the Government failed to provide
    due process in the case of four Chileans convicted of treason by a
    military tribunal. Members of the OAS dialog discussed with the
    Government terms for its return to the Court beginning in August. By
    year's end, legislation approving a return to the Court's jurisdiction
    had been approved by committees and was waiting for a plenary vote, and
    the Government was preparing to return to the Court's contentious
    jurisdiction.
        At least two human rights organizations reported theft of their
    documentation during the year. On November 1, burglars stole computers
    and other documentation that the Human Rights Commission collected
    regarding human rights violations. On November 4, armed burglars broke
    into the office of the NGO Peace and Hope in Lima. The burglars held a
    security guard at gunpoint while they removed information from
    computers. In both cases burglars did not take valuable items or
    machines. AI alleged that the burglaries were organized by the SIN, and
    that their objective was to intimidate the human rights community.
    Police investigations had not identified those responsible by year's
    end.
        There were no reports of Sendero Luminoso hampering the work of
    human rights monitors.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
    specifically prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, race,
    sex, language, religion, opinion, or economic condition. Nevertheless,
    discrimination against women, the disabled, indigenous people, and
    racial and ethnic minorities continued, although progress is being made
    in a number of areas. In December Congress passed legislation that made
    racial discrimination a crime.
        Women.--Violence against women, including rape, spousal abuse, and
    sexual, physical, and mental abuse of women and girls, continued to be
    a chronic problem. Such abuses are aggravated by insensitivity on the
    part of law enforcement and judicial authorities toward the female
    victims of abuse. A 1999 Population Council study estimated that 80
    percent of women surveyed were beaten by their husbands. Human rights
    organizations believe a large number of domestic violence cases remain
    unreported. Nationwide in 1998 there were 27,935 complaints of domestic
    abuse (77 percent for violence and 23 percent for psychological abuse).
    Although official figures for the number of arrests and convictions in
    abuse cases are unavailable, NGO sources contend that the vast majority
    of reported cases do not result in formal charges due to fear of
    retaliation from the accused spouse, or because of the cost involved in
    pursuing a complaint. In addition, legal and physical protection is
    limited by delays in legal processes, ambiguities in the law, and lack
    of alternative shelter and income for victims.
        The 1997 domestic violence law gives judges and prosecutors the
    authority to prevent the convicted spouse or parent from returning to
    the family's home. The law also authorizes the victims' relatives and
    unrelated persons living in the home to file complaints of domestic
    violence. Whereas previously victims of domestic violence had to have a
    specialist in legal medicine certify their injuries and had to pay for
    the report, the new law eliminated the required fee and stipulated that
    the report may be prepared by any health professional. In March Human
    Rights Watch called on the Government to improve legislation on
    domestic violence by eliminating mandatory conciliation sessions
    between victims and abusers, and by providing law enforcement and
    social service providers with training to improve their sensitivity to
    victim's needs.
        In March 1999, PROMUDEH created the Women's Emergency Program to
    call attention to the legal, psychological, and medical problems facing
    women and children who were victims of violence. The program received
    approximately 9,000 cases during the year. PROMUDEH continued its
    public education campaign to sensitize government employees and the
    public on domestic violence.
        According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, many women
    complain that police officers react indifferently to charges of
    domestic violence, even though the law requires all police stations to
    receive such complaints. The Ministry of Women's Advancement and Human
    Development, with NGO assistance, educates police about domestic
    violence and trains officers in all police stations in processing
    domestic violence cases. The Ministry also runs over 30 facilities,
    staffed entirely by women, that bring together in one place
    representatives of all government institutions--police, prosecutors,
    counselors, and public welfare agents--to which abused women might have
    recourse.
        According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, many rape victims complain
    that court-appointed medical examiners inappropriately delved into
    their past sexual histories. They also accused judges of looking more
    favorably on rape victims who were virgins prior to the rape and of
    believing that a woman who was raped must have enticed her attacker.
        In 1999 Congress responded to an appeal from the Human Rights
    Ombudsman and amended the Criminal Code to provide greater protection
    to victims of sexual violence. The amendments eliminated provisions
    that had allowed rapists and other sexual predators the opportunity to
    avoid prosecution if they reached a private settlement with their
    victims. In addition, the Ombudsman recommended rescinding the
    provision that specifies that, in cases of sexual abuse of victims over
    14 years of age, only victims themselves may file a complaint; in
    November, the Government rescinded that provision of the law. Many
    victims are afraid of personally filing a complaint of sexual abuse,
    particularly in cases where the perpetrators were police officers.
        In 1999 the Human Rights Ombudsman published an updated report on
    sterilization without informed consent of women in public hospitals and
    family planning clinics, and the Government took action on some of its
    recommendations during the year (see Section 1.f.). Acting on the Human
    Rights Ombudsman's findings, clinics implemented procedures to insure
    that patients are fully apprised of their options and their
    consequences. There were isolated complaints regarding this problem
    during the year.
        The Constitution provides for equality between men and women, and
    the 1995 amendments to the Employment Promotion Law, as well as other
    laws relative to marriage, divorce, and property rights, prohibit
    discrimination against women. Racial and sexual discrimination in
    employment advertisements or announcements of educational training
    opportunities is prohibited; however, it continues to occur in
    practice. In 1998 Congress removed the police rank of health-care
    professionals in police hospitals and accorded them civilian status
    only. Since over 80 percent of such professionals are women, the Human
    Rights Ombudsman challenged the constitutionality of the new law and
    its implementing regulations, on grounds of discrimination. The
    Superior Court of Lima ruled against the Ombudsman, who then appealed
    to the Supreme Court. By year's end, the Supreme Court had determined
    that the workers were stripped improperly of their police rank but had
    not made a decision concerning damages. In 1999 the Congress passed
    legislation protecting pregnant women against arbitrary firing.
        Traditional assumptions and misconceptions often impede access by
    women to leadership roles in both the public and private sectors.
    Because of societal prejudice and discrimination, women historically
    have suffered disproportionately from the country's pervasive poverty
    and unemployment. ``Mibanco,'' a program supported by the Government
    and a consortium of NGO's, represents an effort to improve women's
    ability to generate income by providing credit to small businesses
    started by enterprising women. More than 60 percent of its clients are
    women.
        Children.--The Government provides free, compulsory education
    through secondary school. Education is generally available throughout
    the country. However, approximately 6 percent of children between the
    ages of 6 and 12, and 17 percent of adolescents between the ages of 12
    and 17, either never have attended school or have abandoned their
    education. Among children and adolescents who live in poverty or
    extreme poverty, the corresponding figures are 47.7 percent for
    children under 5 years old, 51 percent for children ages 5 to 9 years
    old, and 49.9 percent for children age 10 to 14. School nonattendance
    is highest in rural and jungle areas and affects girls more than boys.
    In 1998 Congress amended the Child and Adolescent Code to provide
    pregnant school-age girls with the right to begin or continue attending
    school. The law also provided for regional offices to enforce
    children's rights.
        The Children's Bureau of the Ministry of Women's Advancement and
    Human Development coordinates child and adolescent related government
    policies and programs. The National Initiative on the Rights of the
    Child is the largest NGO of its kind and coordinates the work of 27
    groups concerned with the problems of children throughout the country.
        At the grassroots level, 1,010 Children's Rights and Welfare
    Protection Offices receive and resolve complaints ranging from physical
    and sexual abuse to child support, abandonment, and undetermined
    guardianship. Provincial or district governments operate some 55
    percent of these offices, while schools, churches, and NGO's run the
    remaining 45 percent. Law students staff most of the units; only the
    offices in the wealthiest districts of the country have professionally
    trained lawyers, psychologists, and social workers. When these offices
    cannot resolve cases, officials typically refer them to the local
    prosecutors' offices of the Public Ministry. Settlements adjudicated by
    these offices are binding legally and have the same force as judgments
    entered by a court of law.
        Violence against children and the sexual abuse of children are
    serious problems. It is estimated that only 10 to 20 percent of
    mistreatment and abuse cases are reported, since many persons believe
    that such problems belong within the family and should be resolved
    privately. Nonetheless, in Lima alone, at least 400 rapes of minors are
    reported annually.
        According to the 1993 Census, 69.6 percent of children 6 to 17
    years old lived in poverty. Of these, roughly half live in rural areas.
    Of all children and adolescents under 17 years of age, 20 percent live
    in extreme poverty. In 1996 the infant mortality rate was 43 per 1,000.
    However, this figure masks wide regional disparities: it is 30 per
    1,000 in urban areas, compared with 62 per 1,000 in rural areas.
    Approximately 26 percent of children under age 5, and 48 percent of
    children ages 6 to 9, suffered from chronic malnutrition. In those
    homes where the mother has a low level of education, as many as 50
    percent of the children suffer from chronic malnutrition, and 114 per
    1,000 die from preventable causes before they reach age 5.
        According to a study by the National Institute of Statistics,
    children who live in poverty are less likely to reach high levels of
    education. The study indicated that approximately 75 percent of
    children not living in poverty attend school through the high-school
    level, whereas, only 43 percent of children living in poverty reach
    high school. Children living in poverty average only 4.5 years of
    education, compared to 9.3 years for children living above the poverty
    line. Only 1.2 percent of children living in extreme poverty attain
    university-level education, compared with 25.6 percent of children who
    live above the poverty line.
        Street crime committed by children and adolescents, including
    robbery, physical assault, and vandalism, is often gang-related.
    According to a 1998 congressional commission study, gangs carry out 75
    percent of all acts of vandalism, 29 percent of assaults, and 23
    percent of robberies. The majority of these crimes are committed under
    the influence of drugs and alcohol, and their underlying causes are
    unemployment, nonattendance at school, and difficult family
    relationships.
        In 1999 the Government repealed a series of measures that had been
    used to reduce street crime, including prosecuting 16- to 18-year-old
    criminal gang members in military courts and sentencing those convicted
    to no less than 25 years in adult prisons.
        As many as 1.9 million children work to help support their
    families. Of this total, some 500,000 children are under the age of 14,
    while 700,000 are between the ages of 15 and 17 (see Section 6.d.).
        Although laws exist that prohibit sexual abuse of minors and police
    enforce such laws, there continued to be reports that minors work in
    the sex trade.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that severely
    disabled persons have ``the right to have their dignity respected and
    to be provided by law with protection, care, rehabilitation, and
    security.'' In 1998 comprehensive legislation established the National
    Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities and specified
    the rights, allowances, programs, and services that should be provided
    for the disabled. The statute prohibits discrimination, mandates that
    public spaces be barrier-free and that buildings be architecturally
    accessible, and provides for the appointment of a disability rights
    specialist in the Human Rights Ombudsman's office. However, in practice
    the Government devotes little attention and resources to the disabled,
    and they remain economically and socially marginalized.
        The Government does not allocate sufficient funds to make genuine
    integration of the disabled into the economy possible. According to the
    National Coordinator of the Association of Disabled People, the
    Government allocates an annual budget of approximately $250,000 (1
    million soles) to integrate the disabled into the economy. Although the
    law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, it is vague regarding
    the source of funds to pay for the human assistance, technological
    support, and environmental adaptations that often are necessary to
    enable disabled workers to be productive. As a result, disabled
    individuals and the private agencies serving them generally must rely
    on public charity and on funding from international organizations.
        The 1993 census counted 288,526 disabled persons, or 1.3 percent of
    the population; however, the Ministry of Health and the Pan American
    Health Organization estimate that the actual number of disabled persons
    could be as high as 3 million, or 13.8 percent of the population.
        It is difficult for many disabled persons to obtain insurance
    coverage because carriers typically believe that a severe disability
    necessarily increases a person's vulnerability to accidents and
    illnesses.
        Although construction regulations mandate barrier-free access by
    persons with physical disabilities to public service buildings, no
    effort has been made to implement this provision. Nor do accommodations
    exist, such as accessible polling stations, interpreters for the deaf
    in government service offices, and Braille or recorded versions of the
    Constitution, which would facilitate the participation of the disabled
    in the basic processes of democracy and citizenship. The Government
    made efforts to make voting easier for disabled persons in the April
    and May elections, although there were many complaints about inadequate
    access. In November the Human Rights Ombudsman's office announced a
    program to facilitate voter education and access for the handicapped
    for elections scheduled for April 2001.
        According to officials of the Institute for Social Security, less
    than 1 percent of severely disabled citizens actually work. Among those
    who do, many have been channeled into a restricted number of
    occupations traditionally assumed to be ``suitable'' for the disabled,
    such as telephone switchboard operation and massage, in the case of the
    blind. Some private companies have initiated programs to hire and train
    the disabled, and a private foundation provides small loans to the
    disabled for the purpose of starting their own businesses.
    Nevertheless, disabled persons faced discrimination by potential
    employers. For example, the statute governing the policies and
    procedures of the judicial branch specifically prohibits the blind from
    serving as judges or prosecutors, a discriminatory provision that the
    National Judiciary Council has interpreted to apply to all persons with
    disabilities. In 1998 SEDAPLA, Lima's water utility, dismissed all its
    blind switchboard operators, ostensibly as part of a nondiscriminatory,
    across-the-board cost-cutting measure. However, the chief advocate for
    the disabled in Congress reported that all the blind operators
    immediately were replaced by younger, sighted recruits. The disabled
    only recently have begun to organize and demand equal rights and
    opportunities as a minority.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution prohibits discrimination based
    on race and provides for the right of all citizens to speak their
    native language; however, the large indigenous population still faces
    pervasive discrimination and social prejudice. Many factors impede the
    ability of indigenous people to participate in, and facilitate their
    deliberate exclusion from, decision making directly affecting their
    lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
    According to indigenous rights groups, the provisions in the 1993
    Constitution and in subsequent implementing legislation regarding the
    treatment of native lands are less explicit about their inalienability
    and unmarketability than were earlier constitutional and statutory
    protections. Pervasive discrimination and social prejudice intensify
    feelings of inferiority and second-class citizenship. Many indigenous
    people lack such basic documents as a birth certificate or a voter's
    registration card that normally would identify them as full citizens
    and enable them to play an active part in society.
        Persons of indigenous descent who live in the Andean highlands
    speak Aymara and Quechua, which are recognized as official languages.
    They are ethnically distinct from the diverse indigenous groups that
    live on the eastern side of the Andes and in the tropical lowlands
    adjacent to the Amazon basin. A 1998 regulation stipulating that all
    school teachers be certified initially caused fears that uncertified
    indigenous teachers would lose their jobs, and that the continued use
    of Aymara and Quechua as languages of instruction, as well as the very
    survival of indigenous cultures, had been put in jeopardy; however, due
    to the unwillingness of many certified teachers to work in rural areas,
    uncertified Aymara and Quechua-speaking teachers continue to work.
        The native population of the Peruvian Amazon, estimated at between
    200,000 and 300,000 persons, faces pervasive discrimination and social
    prejudice. In accordance with local culture and traditions, most of the
    native communities have a spiritual relationship with their land, and
    the concept of land as a marketable commodity is alien to them.
    Nevertheless, according to the director of the Human Rights Ombudsman's
    Native Communities Program, the only right still statutorily set aside
    for this native population with respect to its land is that of
    ``unassignability,'' which prevents the title to such lands from being
    reassigned to some nonindigenous tenant by right of tenure. However,
    the marketing and sale of the lands are no longer prohibited.
        Many other factors also contribute to the marginalization of
    indigenous people in society. Poor transportation and communications
    infrastructure in the highlands and in the Amazon jungle region makes
    political mobilization and organization difficult. The geographic
    isolation of much of the indigenous population and the centralization
    of government action in Lima further limit the access and participation
    of indigenous people in society.
        In many jungle areas, encroachment on native lands comes from a
    variety of sources, including colonists and coca growers, terrorists,
    and business interests in search of exploitable natural resources. For
    example, there are approximately 25 oil exploration fields and numerous
    gold mining operations on indigenous lands in the Amazon region. The
    45,000 Aguaruna and the 5,000 Huambisa people, who inhabit the area
    near the Peru-Ecuador border are only two of many indigenous groups
    that complain about intolerable living conditions and inaccessible
    public services. In the same region, along the Pastaza River, the 4,700
    Achuar people live in 36 communities, only 12 of which have title to
    their land. In addition, the Achuar are fighting an incursion by oil
    exploration and drilling interests, as well as against a government-
    sponsored influx of colonists. Title to land does not include mineral
    or other subsoil rights; this condition leads to conflicts between
    mining interests and indigenous communities. Such encroachment often
    can damage the environment and negatively affect the health of the
    native people. About 20 indigenous groups in the Amazon Basin have
    requested communal reserves to hunt game, which is allowed under the
    law, but the Government took no action on this request.
        The two principal NGO's that represent the interests of the native
    population of the Peruvian Amazon are the Inter-Ethnic Association for
    the Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP) and the Confederation
    of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP). Both organizations joined
    the Permanent Conference of Indigenous Peoples, an umbrella body that
    coordinates the activities of the country's indigenous population. Both
    AIDESEP and CONAP are critical of the 1995 land law, which permits
    Amazonian land to be bought and sold if no one is living on it or
    otherwise making use of it. However, CONAP believes that mining and
    other development operations are inevitable and, therefore, wants
    native communities to share appropriately the benefits of that
    development. AIDESEP remains opposed to territorial encroachments by
    government, commercial, and other interests.
        Although indigenous rights advocates protest the low priority
    assigned by the Government to the socioeconomic condition of indigenous
    people and the lack of consultation regarding matters affecting their
    welfare, the Human Rights Ombudsman believes that the Government's
    attitude has changed. The Government's Indigenous Affairs Commission,
    formed in November 1998, is working to fulfill its mandate to
    coordinate all available state services to meet the needs of indigenous
    people better. The Commission, which is chaired by the Ministry of
    Women's Advancement and Human Development, has among its members
    officials from a variety of relevant ministries as well as four
    representatives of the indigenous peasant population in the highland
    and coastal areas and the native population of the Amazon jungle. In
    1999 Congress created an Indigenous Affairs Committee; however, the
    Committee was largely inactive during the year.
        Sendero Luminoso continued to be a leading violator of the rights
    of indigenous people. Isolated primarily along the Ene River in Junin
    department, Sendero Luminoso continued to coerce indigenous Ashaninkas
    to join its ranks, which resulted in further internal displacement in
    this region.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In December Congress passed
    legislation that made racial discrimination a crime. The minority
    population includes several racial minorities, the largest of which are
    persons of Asian and African descent. Afro-Peruvians, who tend to be
    concentrated along the coast, often face discrimination and social
    prejudice, and they are among the poorest groups in the country.
        Afro-Peruvians generally do not hold leadership positions in
    government, business, or the military; however there are three Afro-
    Peruvian members of Congress. Both the navy and the air force are
    widely believed to follow unstated policies that exclude blacks from
    the officer corps. The law prohibits employment advertisements in the
    newspapers from specifying the race of the candidates sought, but
    employers often find discreet ways to relegate blacks to low-paying
    service jobs. The law prohibits various forms of discrimination by
    retail establishments against prospective customers. However, the law
    has not deterred significantly discriminatory practices. In one
    reported case, a foreign diplomat and his family were denied membership
    to a prestigious Lima social club because of race.
        According to two organizations specializing in the rights of
    persons of African descent, police continue to detain persons of
    African descent on suspicion of having committed crimes, on the basis
    of their skin color. Similarly, police rarely act on complaints of
    crimes against Afro-Peruvians. Afro-Peruvians are portrayed
    unflatteringly by the entertainment industry as individuals of
    questionable character.
        Although Peruvians of Asian descent historically have suffered
    discrimination, their social standing has improved markedly during the
    past decade, as the country has sought to emulate Asia's earlier
    economic growth and as the Asian community achieved financial success.
    In addition to former President Fujimori, who is of Japanese descent,
    many other persons of Asian descent hold leadership positions in
    business and government.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
    for the right of association; however, worker rights advocates claim
    that the laws are overly restrictive. About 5 percent of the total work
    force of 8.5 million belong to organized labor unions. More than half
    of all workers participate in the informal sector of the economy.
    Workers are not required to seek authorization prior to forming a trade
    union, nor can employers legally condition employment on union
    membership or nonmembership. However, groups including the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) assert that
    laws promulgated by the Fujimori administration in 1992, as well as
    provisions included in the 1993 Constitution, fail to protect the
    rights of workers to form unions. Labor rights advocates claim that
    many workers are reluctant to organize due to fear of dismissal.
        The International Labor Organization (ILO) indicated that several
    aspects of the labor law are not consistent with the international
    standard of freedom of association. The ILO specifically criticized a
    provision that permits businesses to employ youth workers between the
    ages of 16 to 25 as up to 30 percent of the workforce; workers in this
    age bracket are precluded from union membership and participation. The
    ILO requested modifications to the laws that regulate the right to
    strike, including a requirement that a majority of workers in an
    enterprise, regardless of union membership, must vote in favor of any
    strike.
        Unions represent a cross section of political opinion. Although
    some unions traditionally have been associated with political groups,
    the law prohibits unions from engaging in explicitly political,
    religious, or profit-making activities. The several union leaders who
    ran for Congress in the April elections all did so in their own names,
    without official union sponsorship. Nevertheless, some union activists
    who run for public office receive unofficial backing from their unions.
        The main union confederations have criticized the Employment
    Promotion Act, amended in 1995 and 1996, for restricting the rights of
    workers, including the freedom of association. Unions also complain
    that the law eliminates the right of dismissed workers to compulsory
    reinstatement if they prove that employers dismissed them unjustly. In
    practice, the legislation allows companies to offer financial
    compensation instead of reinstatement. Although the law prohibits
    companies from firing workers solely for their involvement in union
    activities, this provision has not been rigidly enforced. In practice,
    the legislation continued to have a negative impact on the right of
    association by making it easier for companies to fire workers involved
    in union activities. There is no legal protection against employer
    interference in trade unions.
        The Peruvian General Workers' Union (CGTP) and other labor groups
    held several general strikes throughout the country during the year.
    According to press accounts, one strike in August drew support from
    civil service workers, health providers, and construction workers, as
    well as support from a broad range of religious and social
    organizations and opposition politicians. In September a work stoppage
    culminated in protest marches around the country, including a large
    gathering of up to 20,000 persons in downtown Lima. The Government took
    no actions to prevent the strikes or reprimand participants.
        On July 25, unknown persons broke into the headquarters of the
    United Worker's Center (CUT) and stole printed material and other items
    just before the Four Quarters March. The ICFTU noted that the police
    refused to register the CUT's complaint or begin an investigation.
    Moreover, the ICFTU asserted that police officers attempted to
    infiltrate union and other demonstrators who were planning the march.
        Confrontations in Lima between union-affiliated protesters and
    police occurred in several different instances. In some cases these
    confrontations were reportedly provoked by protesters who burned tires,
    threw rocks, and tried to destroy public and private property. Police
    action resulted in injuries in several cases.
        In August medical workers undertook a 2-day strike to protest low
    wages and working conditions. In November the Paniagua administration
    met with labor leaders in the health care sector to try to resolve
    wages and benefit related complaints. The Paniagua administration
    leaders also met with union leaders from the education sector to
    discuss their long standing grievances.
        There are no restrictions on the affiliation of labor unions with
    international bodies. Several major unions and labor confederations
    belong to international labor organizations such as the ICFTU, the
    international trade secretariats, and regional bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution recognizes the right of public and private sector workers
    to organize and bargain collectively; however, it specifies that this
    right must be exercised in harmony with broader social objectives.
    Labor regulations provide that workers may form unions on the basis of
    their occupation, employer affiliation, or geographic territory. The
    regulations prohibit probationary, apprentice, and management employees
    from union membership. The law does not prohibit temporary employees
    from joining a union, but they cannot join the same union as permanent
    workers.
        According to the regulations, union officials must be active
    members of their union, but the number of individuals each union may
    designate as ``official'' is limited, as is the amount of time they may
    devote to union business on company time. The Labor Code requires
    employers to reinstate workers or compensate financially those whom
    companies have fired. It is illegal to fire workers for union
    activities, though reports from labor activists indicate that this is a
    common practice.
        To become an official collective bargaining representative, a union
    must represent at least 20 workers. Representatives may participate in
    collective bargaining negotiations and establish negotiating
    timetables. Management negotiating teams cannot exceed the size of
    union teams, and both sides are permitted to have attorneys and
    technical experts present as advisers.
        Proposals for a strike require secret ballot approval of a majority
    of all workers in a company, whether union members or not; labor
    activists find the requirement to be onerous. A second vote must be
    taken, if petitioned by at least 20 percent of the workers. However,
    labor rights advocates complain that many workers are reluctant to
    participate even in secret ballots, due to fear of employer
    retaliation, particularly since a full list of workers who attend
    meetings in which such ballots are taken must be submitted to
    management. Strikes can only be called in defense of labor rights.
    Unions that employ workers in public services deemed essential by the
    Government are further restricted from striking.
        In November the ILO's Committee of Freedom of Association issued a
    report in response to allegations of antiunion discrimination. It
    recommended that the Government enact and enforce legislation
    protecting workers from dismissal on account of membership in a union
    or participation in union activities.
        The labor movement criticizes the amended Employment Promotion Law,
    which it asserts makes it easier for employers to dismiss employees and
    thereby to impede the right of workers to bargain collectively. There
    are no legal restrictions that prevent unions from negotiating for
    higher levels of worker protection than the baseline standards provided
    for by law.
        Labor regulations permit companies unilaterally to propose
    temporary changes in work schedules, conditions, and wages, and to
    suspend collective bargaining agreements for up to 90 days, if obliged
    to do so by worsening economic circumstances or other unexpected
    negative developments, provided that they give their employees at least
    15 days' notice of such changes. However, worker rights advocates
    allege that, in practice, few employers respected this provision. If
    workers reject an employer's proposed changes, the Ministry of Labor is
    required to resolve the dispute based on criteria of ``reasonableness''
    and ``economic necessity.'' Whether the changes proposed by employers
    in such instances are upheld in full or in part, employers are required
    to adopt all possible measures, such as the authorization of extra
    vacation time, in order to minimize the negative economic impact on
    their employees.
        In December the Paniagua administration established a national
    labor council to promote dialog among business, labor, government, and
    international organizations. The dialog focused on discussing reforms
    to legal provisions regarding dismissal policies and collective
    bargaining rights.
        Although a conciliation and arbitration system exists to resolve
    management and labor disputes, union officials complain that their
    proportionate share of the costs of arbitration often exceeds their
    resources. In addition, union officials claim that, as the law
    prohibits temporary workers from participating in the same union as
    permanent workers, companies have resorted to hiring workers on
    temporary, personal services contracts to prevent increases in the
    number of union members. Although the law restricts the number of
    temporary workers hired to 20 percent of a company's work force, worker
    rights advocates allege that this quota rarely is respected. Employers
    deny that they are biased against unions, and argue that the labor
    stability provisions of the legislation have made long-term commitments
    to workers too expensive.
        Special regulations aimed at giving employers in export processing
    and duty free zones a freer hand in the application of the law provide
    for the use of temporary labor as needed, for greater flexibility in
    labor contracts, and for setting wage rates based on supply and demand.
    As a result, workers in such zones have difficulty in unionizing,
    although worker rights advocates admit these zones are few in number
    and do not contribute substantively to labor's unionizing difficulties.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
    forced labor during the year. The law specifically prohibits forced or
    bonded labor by children. Forced labor previously was found in the gold
    mining industry in the Madre de Dios area; however, the changing nature
    of the industry and government efforts to regulate it seem to have
    addressed the problem. During the year, the Ministry of Energy and
    Mines reported that the number of registered dredging companies fell,
    while informal operations continued. NGO sources and the ILO reported
    in 1999 that mechanization largely has replaced manual labor, and the
    Ministry of Labor inspection programs helped deter illegal child labor
    in this industry. According to the ILO, PROMUDEH, and the Ministry of
    Labor, there were no reports of forced child labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Child and Adolescent Code of 1992 governs child and
    adolescent labor practices. The legal minimum age for employment is 14.
    However, children between the ages of 12 and 14 may work in certain
    jobs to help support their families if they obtain special permission
    from the Ministry of Labor and certify that they also are attending
    school. In certain sectors of the economy, higher minimums are in
    force: age 14 in agricultural work; age 15 in industrial, commercial,
    or mining work; and age 16 in the fishing industry. Certain types of
    employment are prohibited, such as work underground; work that involves
    the lifting and carrying of heavy weights; work where the child or
    adolescent is responsible for the safety of others; night work; or any
    work that jeopardizes the health of children and adolescents, puts at
    risk their physical, mental, and emotional development, or prevents
    their regular attendance at school. The ILO and NGO's report that child
    labor remained a problem nationwide, and especially in the informal
    sector.
        Human and labor rights groups criticized the modification of the
    Child and Adolescent code, passed in August, that maintained the
    current minimum age for work at 12 years old (with permission), and
    argued that it contradicts international guidelines on the minimum age
    of child workers.
        The Constitution provides for compulsory, free education through
    secondary school. Nevertheless, largely because of widespread poverty,
    approximately one-third of all school-age children and adolescents work
    during daytime hours rather than attend classes, and only a few of them
    attend classes at night.
        Many children are pressed to help support their families from a
    very early age by working in the informal economy, which escapes
    government supervision of wages and working conditions. Other children
    and adolescents work either in formally established enterprises, or as
    unpaid workers at home, or at times in the sex trade (see Section 5).
        Adolescent workers must be authorized to work and must be
    registered unless they are employed as domestic workers or as unpaid
    family workers. Adolescents may only work a certain number of hours
    each day: 4 hours for ages 12 through 14, and 6 hours for ages 15
    through 17. Adolescent employment must be remunerated in accordance
    with the principle of equal pay for equal work. In practice, the Child
    and Adolescent Code provisions are violated routinely, especially in
    the informal sector. Child and adolescent laborers work long hours in
    the agricultural sector. Many other children are at times reportedly
    employed in dangerous occupations or in high-risk environments, such as
    gold mining, garbage collection, loading and unloading produce in
    markets, and brick making, or work in stone quarries and fireworks
    factories, among others.
        In recent years, government surveys have estimated the number of
    child and adolescent workers at anywhere from 500,000 to 1.9 million. A
    1996 government study found that 8 percent of the work force is between
    the ages of 6 and 14 (see Section 5). Child and adolescent labor tends
    to be seasonal, with the highest survey statistics reported during
    school vacation periods.
        There were two allegations of child labor in the informal gold
    mines of Madre de Dios department in during the year. The authorities
    investigated the incidents and intervened with the families involved.
        The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded
    labor by children, although there are laws which prohibit this practice
    (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides that
    the State promote social and economic progress and occupational
    education. It states that workers should receive a ``just and
    sufficient'' wage to be determined by the Government in consultation
    with labor and business representatives, as well as ``adequate
    protection against arbitrary dismissal.''
        In March the Government raised the statutory minimum wage to $117
    (410 soles) a month, which is not considered sufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. That year the
    Government estimated the poverty line to be about $45 (157 soles) a
    month per person. According to some estimates, as much as half the work
    force earns the minimum wage or below.
        The Constitution provides for a 48-hour workweek, a weekly day of
    rest, and an annual vacation. In addition, it prohibits discrimination
    in the workplace; however, it continued to be a problem in practice.
    The labor code provides for a 48 hour work week for women. Labor
    advocates state that workers have been pressured to work longer hours
    to avoid dismissal.
        While occupational health and safety standards exist, the
    Government lacks the resources to monitor firms or enforce compliance.
    Labor advocates continued to argue that the Government dedicated
    insufficient resources to enforce existing legislation. The Ministry of
    Labor employs a force of 100 inspectors to carry out unannounced visits
    throughout the country. When firms are found to be in violation of the
    law, the Government sanctions them with fines or, in some cases,
    closure. In cases of industrial accidents, the level of compensation
    awarded to the injured employee usually is determined by agreement
    between the employer and the individual involved. The worker does not
    need to prove an employer's culpability in order to obtain compensation
    for work-related injuries. No provisions exist in law for workers to
    remove themselves from potentially dangerous work situations without
    jeopardizing their continued employment. The Ministry of Labor
    continued to receive worker complaints and intervened in hundreds of
    cases.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons. In November 1999, the Government
    adopted legislation that criminalized alien smuggling, which is defined
    as promoting, executing, or assisting in the illegal entry or exit of
    persons from the country. Prostitution is legal, but the law prohibits
    and sanctions activities of those who would obtain benefits from
    prostitution, such as pimping. Laws prohibiting kidnaping, sexual abuse
    of minors, and illegal employment are enforced and could be used to
    sanction traffickers in persons. Available information suggests that
    trafficking in persons to, from, within, or through from the country is
    not a significant problem.
                                   __________

                             SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

        Saint Kitts and Nevis is a multi-party, parliamentary democracy and
    a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Constitution provides the
    smaller island of Nevis considerable self-government under a premier,
    as well as the right to secede from the Federation in accordance with
    certain enumerated procedures. The Government comprises a prime
    minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. The Governor
    General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
    state, with largely ceremonial powers. In national elections held on
    March 6, Denzil Douglas of the ruling St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party
    remained Prime Minister; his party won 8 of 11 seats in the
    legislature. The judiciary is independent; however, intimidation of
    witnesses in high-profile, drug-related cases is a problem.
        Security forces consist of a small police force, which includes a
    50-person Special Services Unit that receives some light infantry
    training, a coast guard, and a small defense force. The forces are
    controlled by and responsive to the Government. There were occasional
    allegations of abuse by the police.
        The mixed economy is based on sugar cane, tourism, and light
    industry. Most commercial enterprises are privately owned, but the
    sugar industry and 85 percent of arable land are owned by a state
    corporation. In 1998 and 1999, hurricanes caused an estimated $450
    million damage, affecting over 85 percent of the houses and buildings,
    greatly reduced sugar production, and caused significant losses in the
    tourism industry. However, during the year, construction, small
    manufacturing, and the services sector registered some improvement. Per
    capita gross domestic product remained about $7,000 in 1999.
        The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
    there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison conditions, apparent
    intimidation of witnesses and jurors, government restrictions on
    opposition access to government-controlled media, and violence against
    women were the principal problems.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture or other
    forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the
    authorities observe this prohibition in practice. However, there were
    occasional allegations of excessive use of force by the police,
    particularly during the annual Carnival celebration or other special
    events. The police force conducts its own internal investigation when
    complaints are made against members.
        Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners suffer from severe
    overcrowding and poor food, and security is lax. These conditions have
    contributed to riots in the past, although none has occurred since
    1994. The prison, built in 1840, was designed to accommodate 60 inmates
    but houses over 100 prisoners. A prison on Nevis houses 20 inmates.
    Female inmates are segregated from male prisoners; however, there are
    no separate facilities for juveniles.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government respects
    this provision in practice. The law requires that persons detained be
    charged within 48 hours or be released. If charged, the police must
    bring a detainee before a court within 72 hours. Family members,
    attorneys, and clergy are permitted to visit detainees regularly.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, intimidation of witnesses and potential
    intimidation of jurors in high-profile, drug-related cases threatened
    this traditional independence. The Government is exploring the
    possibility of a program to protect witnesses, judges, and jurors
    through the Caribbean Community.
        The court system comprises one high court and four magistrate's
    courts at the local level, with the right of appeal to the Eastern
    Caribbean Court of Appeal. Final appeal may be made to the Privy
    Council in the United Kingdom. Free legal assistance is available for
    indigent defendants in capital cases only.
        The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime must
    receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these requirements
    generally are observed. In the latter part of the year, approximately
    29 persons were being held on ``remand'' (detention pending trial or
    further court action). The length of remand varies according to offense
    and charges; persons may be held for days, weeks, or months.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions. The law requires
    judicially issued warrants to search private homes.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and, for the most part, the
    authorities respected these provisions in practice.
        There are no daily newspapers; each of the major political parties
    publishes a weekly or biweekly newspaper. A third weekly newspaper is
    nonpartisan. The publications are free to criticize the Government and
    do so regularly and vigorously. International news publications are
    readily available.
        The Government owns the only radio and television station on St.
    Kitts, and these media generally did not adequately publicize rallies
    and other events held by opposition parties. A Trinidadian company
    manages the station; however, the Government appoints three of its five
    board members. There is a religious television station and a privately
    owned radio station on Nevis.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly. Political parties
    organized demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings during the March
    election campaign without government interference.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
    exists. The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise. There
    were no reports of forced return of persons to a country where they
    feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government by peaceful means, and citizens exercise this right in
    practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage. A vigorous multi-party political system exists, in which
    political parties are free to conduct their activities. All citizens 18
    years of age and older may register and vote by secret ballot. Despite
    some irregularities, orderly general elections were held in March.
        The Legislative Assembly has 11 elected seats; 8 for St. Kitts and
    3 for Nevis. The Government holds 8 of the 11 seats; opposition parties
    hold the other 3 seats. In the March elections, Douglas' St. Kitts and
    Nevis Labour Party won all eight seats on St. Kitts; the People's
    Action Movement (PAM) lost the one seat it had held. The Concerned
    Citizens Movement won two of the three Nevis seats; the Nevis Reform
    Party won the remaining one. The island of Nevis has considerable self-
    government, with its own premier and legislature.
        In accordance with its rights under the Constitution, the Nevis
    Island Assembly in 1996 initiated steps towards secession from the
    Federation, the most recent being a referendum in August 1998 that
    failed to secure the required two-thirds majority for secession.
    However, the matter of secession remained open, and in October the
    newly appointed opposition leader publicly stated his desire to have
    ``two separate governments.''
        Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of
    political opinion or affiliation, the former opposition party PAM
    alleges widespread employment discrimination by the St. Kitts and Nevis
    Labour Party against public sector employment of persons perceived to
    be PAM supporters. PAM alleged that the ruling party dismissed or
    demoted many PAM supporters from their jobs in order to replace them
    with its own supporters. The Government acknowledged that it had
    withheld pension benefits from opposition members of Parliament voted
    out of office but asserted that it had paid pension benefits to those
    entitled to them.
        There are no impediments in law or in practice to the participation
    of women in leadership roles in government or political parties. There
    are 3 women in the Cabinet, 3 of 4 magistrates are women, the court
    registrar is female, and 7 of 20 permanent secretaries are female.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        While there are no governmental restrictions, no local human rights
    groups have been formed. There were no requests for investigations or
    visits by international human rights groups.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, place
    of origin, birth out of wedlock, political opinion or affiliation,
    color, sex, or creed, and the Government generally respects these
    provisions in practice.
        Women.--According to a government official, violence against women
    is a problem, but many women are reluctant to file complaints or pursue
    them in the courts. Despite this reluctance, there were publicly
    reported cases of both domestic violence and rape, and a few
    convictions. There is no legislation addressing domestic violence.
        The role of women in society is not restricted by law but is
    circumscribed by culture and tradition. There is no overt societal
    discrimination against women in employment, although sectoral analyses
    suggest that women do not yet occupy as many senior positions as men.
    The Bureau of Women's Affairs, under the Ministry of Health and Women's
    Affairs, is active in promoting change in the areas of domestic
    violence, poverty, health, institutional mechanisms to advance the
    status of women, and leadership positions for women. Since 1997 the
    Bureau has also been active in training the police and school guidance
    counselors on issues of domestic violence, sexual crimes, and child
    abuse.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
    welfare and has incorporated most of the provisions of the U.N.
    Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation. The
    law mandates compulsory education up to the age of 16; it is free and
    universal.
        People with Disabilities.--Although there is no legislation to
    protect the disabled or to mandate accessibility for them, the
    Government and the Constitution prohibit discrimination in employment,
    education, and other state services.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions. The law
    permits the police, civil service, and other organizations to have
    associations that serve as unions. The major labor union, the St. Kitts
    Trades and Labour Union, is associated closely with the St. Kitts and
    Nevis Labour Party and is active in all sectors of the economy. There
    is also a newly active teachers' union, a union representing
    dockworkers in the capital city, and two taxi drivers' associations.
        The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well
    established and respected in practice. Restrictions on striking by
    workers who provide essential services, such as the police and civil
    servants, are enforced by established practice and custom, but not by
    law. There were no major strikes during the year.
        Unions are free to form federations or confederations and to
    affiliate with international organizations. The islands' unions
    maintain a variety of international ties.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
    are free to organize and to negotiate for better wages and benefits for
    union members. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination but does not
    require employers found guilty of such action to rehire employees who
    were fired for union activities. However, the employer must pay lost
    wages and severance pay. There is no legislation governing the
    organization and representation of workers, and employers are not
    legally bound to recognize a union, but in practice employers do so if
    a majority of workers polled wish to organize. Collective bargaining
    takes place on a workplace-by- workplace basis, not industrywide. The
    Labor Commissioner mediates all types of disputes between labor and
    management on an ad hoc basis. However, in practice few disputes
    actually go to the Commissioner for resolution. If neither the
    Commissioner nor the Ministry of Labor are able to resolve the dispute,
    the law allows for a case to be brought before a civil court.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    forbids slavery and forced labor, and they do not occur in practice.
    While neither the Constitution nor the law specifically address bonded
    labor, it has not been a problem in practice.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1966 Employment of Children Ordinance outlaws slavery,
    servitude, and forced labor, and prescribes the minimum legal working
    age, which is 14 years. The Labor Ministry relies heavily on school
    truant officers and the community affairs division to monitor
    compliance, which they do effectively. The law mandates compulsory
    education up to the age of 16. Although the law does not specifically
    address bonded labor, it has not been a problem in practice (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage rates for various
    categories of workers, such as domestic servants, retail employees,
    casino workers, and skilled workers, were last updated in 1994, and
    manufacturing sector wages were revised in 1996. The minimum wage
    varies from $56.18 (EC$ 150) per week for full-time domestic workers to
    $74.91 (EC$ 200) per week for skilled workers. These provide a barely
    adequate living for a wage earner and family; many workers supplement
    wages by keeping small animals such as goats and chickens. The Labor
    Commission undertakes regular wage inspections and special
    investigations when it receives complaints; it requires employers found
    in violation to pay back wages. The Government provides unemployment
    benefits to workers who lose their jobs temporarily or permanently.
        The law provides for a 40- to 44-hour workweek, but the common
    practice is 40 hours in 5 days. Although not required by law, workers
    receive at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The law provides
    that workers receive a minimum annual vacation of 14 working days.
    While there are no specific health and safety regulations, the
    Factories Law provides general health and safety guidance to Labor
    Ministry inspectors. The Labor Commission settles disputes over safety
    conditions. Workers have the right to report unsafe work environments
    without jeopardy to continued employment; inspectors then investigate
    such claims, and workers may leave such locations without jeopardy to
    their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons.
        An ``economic citizenship'' program allows foreign investors to
    purchase passports through loosely monitored procedures involving cash
    inflows ranging from $200,000 (EC$540,000) to $285,000 (EC$770,000).
    This program reportedly has facilitated the illegal immigration of
    persons from China and other countries to North America where, in some
    instances, criminal organizations that provided the funds to such
    persons force them to work under conditions similar to bonded labor
    until their debt is repaid.
                                   __________

                                  SAINT LUCIA

        Saint Lucia is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy and a member
    of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Government is composed of a prime
    minister, a cabinet, and a bicameral legislative assembly. A Governor
    General, appointed by the British monarch, is the titular head of
    state, with largely ceremonial powers. In general elections in 1997,
    the Saint Lucia Labour Party (SLP) defeated the incumbent United
    Workers Party (UWP), gaining 16 of 17 seats in the House of Assembly.
    Dr. Kenny Anthony of the SLP assumed the prime ministership from the
    UWP's Dr. Vaughan Lewis. The judiciary is independent.
        The Royal Saint Lucia Police is the only security force and
    includes a small unit called the Special Services Unit (which has some
    paramilitary training) and a coast guard unit. They are controlled by
    and responsive to the Government. There were occasional allegations of
    abuse by the police.
        The economy is based on tourism and on the export of bananas, which
    represent the principal sources of foreign exchange earnings. Saint
    Lucia is diversifying its economy into other types of agriculture,
    light manufacturing, and construction. Unemployment, estimated at 21
    percent, remains a source of potential instability. Per capita gross
    domestic product for 1999 was provisionally estimated at $3,648.
        The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
    there were problems in a few areas. The major problems included an
    extrajudicial killing by police; occasional credible allegations of
    physical abuse of suspects or prisoners by the police; very poor prison
    conditions; some censorship; long delays in trials; and recurring
    domestic violence against women. Child neglect and abuse are problems.
    On December 31, a deadly attack on parishioners in a Catholic church,
    although believed to be an isolated act by disturbed persons, raised
    concerns about religious tolerance.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, there was one extrajudicial
    killing by police.
        On November 19, police shot and killed an escaped prisoner, Alfred
    Harding, who was jailed on charges of armed robbery and attempted
    murder. Harding, a Barbadian national, had escaped from prison in that
    country and also escaped from prison in Castries in July 1999. The
    police reported that he was killed while trying to flee, armed with an
    ice pick; some witnesses contradicted police reports and said that the
    police shot the prisoner after recapture, while he was subdued and held
    on the ground. Human rights groups criticized the police action as an
    example of the use of excessive force by police. The Minister for Home
    Affairs stated that an international group would be invited to conduct
    an impartial investigation; results still were pending at year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there
    were no reports of such abuse. However, human rights groups assert that
    the police occasionally use excessive force.
        In July 1999, when the police recaptured escaped prisoner Alfred
    Harding (see Section 1.a.), they detained him in chains and shackles
    and kept him continuously in solitary confinement amid the general
    prison population. He filed a court case asserting that his rights were
    violated, but he was held in this manner until his human rights case
    was decided. In August the High Court awarded him $9,250 (EC$25,000) in
    compensation, stating that prison authorities were wrong in keeping him
    in shackles and solitary confinement for so long.
        Prison conditions are very poor. The island's only prison, built in
    the 1800's to house a maximum of 101 prisoners, was subject to severe
    overcrowding with over 340 inmates. The prison's conditions,
    overcrowding, and lengthy trial delays led to a prison riot in June
    1997; prisoners set fires that destroyed over half of the antiquated
    prison. The inmates asserted that the fires were part of a protest for
    improved prison conditions. Following the fires, the authorities
    transferred about 250 inmates to a factory shell outside the capital
    and stationed the paramilitary Special Services Unit at the prison. The
    prison since has been repaired, the majority of prisoners have been
    returned to the prison, and the Special Services Unit has ceased
    guarding the prison.
        Following the riots, the Government invited Penal Reform
    International (PRI), a London-based nongovernmental organization, to
    study the prison and make recommendations. Its recommendations included
    the release of prisoners awaiting trial for minor offenses and the
    introduction of noncustodial alternatives as a sentencing option. As a
    result of the PRI report, the authorities selected a new superintendent
    of prisons who took over in February 1998, established a permanent
    Complaints Board composed of prominent citizens to meet every month to
    hear prisoners' complaints, hired 24 new prison officials, and made
    some limited improvements to the facility. Despite these measures,
    inmates made another attempt to burn down the main prison facility in
    September 1998 but caused only limited damage. According to the
    superintendent, both the 1997 and the 1998 incidents of unrest occurred
    prior to the start of a new session of the High Court when prisoners on
    ``remand'' (detention pending trial or further court action) discovered
    that their cases were not on the published list of cases to be heard.
    At any given time, there may be 100 or more prisoners on remand who
    have been denied bail and are awaiting trial.
        The Government started the groundwork for a new $17 million (EC$50
    million) prison in the more remote eastern part of the island in 1998.
    It was scheduled for completion during the year, but progress was
    delayed and officials expect it to be completed in 2001.
        The Government maintains a separate facility for women and in
    September there were 11 female prisoners. Conditions in the women's
    facility are somewhat better than those at the men's prison. Detained
    juveniles are held in the same facility as women.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government adheres
    to the constitutional provisions that prohibit arbitrary arrest or
    imprisonment and require a court hearing within 72 hours after
    detention. However, the authorities frequently have held prisoners for
    years on remand after charging them (there is no constitutional
    requirement for a speedy trial). At the time of the 1997 prison riot,
    about 160 of the prisoners were on remand. For example, two foreign
    nationals, a Ghanaian and a Nigerian, have been held on remand since
    1996. These individuals are detained for immigration violations,
    pending resolution of who is to pay the expense of their deportations.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
        There are two levels of courts: Courts of summary jurisdiction
    (magistrate's courts) and the High Court. Both levels have civil and
    criminal authority. The lower courts accept civil claims up to about
    $1,850 (EC$5,000) in value and criminal cases generally classified as
    ``petty.'' The High Court has unlimited authority in both civil and
    criminal cases. All cases can be appealed to the Eastern Caribbean
    Court of Appeal. Cases may be appealed to the Privy Council in London
    as the final court of appeal.
        The Constitution requires public trials before an independent and
    impartial court and, in cases involving capital punishment, provision
    of legal counsel for those who cannot afford a defense attorney. In
    criminal cases not involving capital punishment, defendants must obtain
    their own legal counsel. Defendants are entitled to select their own
    legal counsel; are presumed innocent until proven guilty in court; and
    have the right of appeal. The authorities observe both constitutional
    and statutory requirements for fair public trials.
        However, the court system continued to face a serious backlog of
    cases. In the latter part of 1998, the magistrate's courts had a
    backlog of over 6,000 cases. Following an official study, in July 1999,
    the Government hired a new director of public prosecutions and provide
    him an assistant to attempt to speed up the trial process and reduce
    the backlog. His work and the flow of cases through the court system
    continue to be hampered by a shortage of magistrates and resources, and
    the backlog likely has not diminished. Previously, the Government had
    invited a team of justices from Australia to conduct a study and to
    make recommendations for reducing the backlog. The team issued a report
    (the Bauer report) in 1998. At year's end, the Government still was
    reviewing the report's recommendations.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanctions.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice; however, some censorship is
    practiced. In September a representative of a small foreign publishing
    house arrived in the country from Martinique with a number of books.
    Customs authorities seized 57 of them under a law that bans certain
    books. The authorities returned 37 of the books but kept the others for
    further review. The publisher questioned the banning and confiscation
    as a violation of freedom of speech. A number of the books seized were
    on religion or religious themes (see Section 2.c.).
        There are five privately owned newspapers, two privately owned
    radio stations, and one partially government-funded radio station. They
    carry a wide spectrum of political opinion and are often critical of
    the Government. The radio stations have discussion and call-in programs
    that allow persons to express their views. The two local television
    stations also are owned privately and cover a wide range of views. In
    addition there is subscription cable television service, which provides
    programming from a variety of sources.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice. The law requires permits for public meetings
    and demonstrations if they are to be held in public places, such as
    streets, sidewalks, or parks. The police routinely grant such permits;
    the rare refusal generally stems from the failure of organizers to
    request the permit in a timely manner, normally 48 hours before the
    event.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. However,
    a number of the books customs authorities seized in September were on
    religion or religious themes, including titles such as The Egyptian
    Book of the Dead, The Greater Key of Solomon, The Lost Books of the
    Bible, and The Ancient Mysteries of Melchizedek (see Section 2.a.).
        On December 31, two men alleged to be members of the Rastafarian
    movement attacked a Sunday Mass in a Catholic Church. They killed a
    nun, set the priest on fire, and wounded 12 other persons. At year's
    end, the authorities brought charges of murder and arson against the
    two men, and the investigation continued. Rastafarian leaders
    criticized the attack, and Archdiocese representatives criticized what
    they termed ``an atmosphere of intolerance'' and a ``callous disrespect
    for authority'' in the country. The Government criticized the attack as
    the work of mentally disturbed persons who underscored the plight of
    ``impoverished and marginalized youth'' alienated from societal norms.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
    exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There
    were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim
    to refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government and exercised
    that right in 1997 when the SLP defeated the UWP, which had governed
    with only one interruption since 1964. The SLP won 16 of 17 seats,
    campaigning on a platform of job creation and economic diversification
    and appealing explicitly to women and younger voters. In response to
    concerns about the size of the SLP's parliamentary majority, Prime
    Minister Anthony publicly emphasized that the Government would make
    efforts to reach out to the opposition to ensure that the country's
    democratic traditions were not undermined by the small size of the
    parliamentary opposition. The 1996 merger of smaller parties--the
    Concerned Citizens' Movement, the Saint Lucia Freedom Party, and the
    Citizens' Democratic Party--into the SLP left the country with only two
    major political parties. The Governor General, who had been affiliated
    with the UWP, stepped down following the elections. He was replaced by
    Pearlette Louisy.
        Under the Constitution, general elections must be held at least
    every 5 years by secret ballot, but may be held earlier at the
    discretion of the government in power. Two members of the Senate are
    independent, appointed by the Governor General.
        There are no legal impediments to participation by women and
    minorities in government and politics; however, they are
    underrepresented. Two of the 13 members of the Cabinet are women, as is
    the Governor General.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government generally does not restrict international or
    nongovernmental investigations of alleged violations of human rights.
    In some cases it has requested international organizations to
    investigate possible abuses.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution does not address discrimination specifically;
    however, government policy is nondiscriminatory in the areas of
    housing, jobs, education, and opportunity for advancement. There are no
    legal restrictions on the role of women or minorities.
        Women.--There is increased awareness of the seriousness of violence
    against women. The Government does not prosecute crimes of violence
    against women unless the victim presses charges. If the victim chooses
    for any reason not to press charges, the Government cannot bring a
    case. Charges must be brought under the ordinary Civil Code. In 1997
    the Government established a family court to hear cases of domestic
    violence and crimes against women and children.
        The police force conducts some training for police officers
    responsible for investigating rape and other crimes against women, but
    there is no special unit that handles crimes against women. Police and
    courts enforce laws to protect women against abuse, although police are
    hesitant to intervene in domestic disputes, and many victims are
    reluctant to report cases of domestic violence and rape or to press
    charges.
        The 1994 Domestic Violence Act allows a judge to issue a protection
    order prohibiting an abuser from entering or remaining in the place
    where the victim is. It also allows the judge to order that an abuser's
    name be removed from housing leases or rental agreements, with the
    effect that the abuser would no longer have the right to live in the
    same residence as the victim.
        The Saint Lucia Crisis Center for women was established in 1988 in
    Castries, the capital; a second opened in the southern town of Vieux
    Fort in January 1999. These centers monitor cases of physical and
    emotional abuse and help clients deal with such problems as incest,
    alcohol and drug abuse, homelessness, nonpayment of child support,
    custody, and visitation rights. The Crisis Center has publicized the
    plight of battered women and has protested the rare deaths of women who
    were victims of domestic violence. The organizers continued to work to
    establish a shelter for battered women and homeless girls; however, no
    progress had been made at year's end. The Crisis Center reports that
    the number of new cases declined since the establishment of the family
    court because women can seek help in two places. Some secondary schools
    address the problems of sexual harassment and battering in their
    curriculum topics.
        Women's affairs come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
    Health, Human Services, Family Affairs, and Women. The Minister is
    responsible for protecting women's rights in domestic violence cases
    and preventing discrimination against women, including ensuring equal
    treatment in employment.
        Children.--Since independence, successive governments have given
    high priority to improving educational opportunities and health care
    for the nation's children. Education is free and compulsory from age 5
    through 15. However, only about one-third of primary school children
    continue on to secondary schools, and the drop-out rate from primary to
    secondary school is higher for boys than for girls. Government clinics
    provide prenatal care, immunization, child health care, and health
    education services throughout the island.
        A broad legal framework exists for the protection of children
    through the Criminal Code, the Children and Young Persons Act, the
    Family Court Act, the Domestic Violence Act, and the Attachment of
    Earnings Act. Although the Government adopted a national plan of action
    in November 1991 for the survival, protection, and development of
    children, it still has not fulfilled this program by implementing
    effective programs. The Saint Lucia Crisis Center reported that the
    incidence of child abuse remains high. There were reports of abandoned
    children at times roaming the streets with no organized, fully
    functioning safety net or adequate supporting institutions to assist
    them. There are no specific laws enacted to cover foster care,
    adoptions, and child welfare social services.
        People with Disabilities.--No specific legislation protects the
    rights of the disabled, nor mandates provision of access to buildings
    or government services for them. There is no rehabilitation facility
    for the physically disabled, although the Health Ministry operates a
    community-based rehabilitation program in residents' homes. There are
    schools for the deaf and for the blind up to the secondary level. There
    is also a school for the mentally retarded.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution specifies the right
    of workers to form or belong to trade unions under the broader rubric
    of the right of association. Most public sector employees are
    unionized; about 20 percent of the total work force is unionized.
    Unions are independent of government and are free to choose their own
    representatives in often vigorously contested elections. There are no
    restrictions on the formation of national labor federations. In 1994
    several of the major unions formed an umbrella grouping called the
    Industrial Solidarity Pact.
        Strikes in both the public and private sectors are legal, but there
    are many avenues through collective bargaining agreements and
    government procedures that may preclude a strike. The law prohibits
    members of the police and fire departments from striking. Other
    ``essential services'' workers--water and sewer authority workers,
    electric utility workers, nurses, and doctors--must give 30 days'
    notice before striking.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations, and
    some have done so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--On January 11,
    the Registration Status and Recognition of Trade Unions and Employer
    Organizations Act entered into effect. Unions have the legal right to
    engage in collective bargaining, and they fully exercise this right.
    Although union representatives have reported attempts by the Government
    and other employers to undermine this process, the new law is viewed
    widely as prounion, and it has resulted in increased organizational
    activity by unions.
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, and there
    are effective mechanisms for resolving complaints. It also requires
    that employers reinstate workers fired for union activities.
        Labor law is applicable in the export processing zones (EPZ's), and
    there are no administrative or legal impediments to union organizing or
    collective bargaining in those zones. However, in practice many firms
    resist union efforts to organize in the EPZ's, but there has been some
    progress because of the new law.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
    While there is no specific prohibition of forced or bonded labor by
    children, there were no reports of such practices.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--While the Children and Young Persons Act permits a minimum
    legal working age of 14 years, education legally is required through
    age 15. Ministry of Labor officials are responsible for enforcing the
    law. There were no reports of violations of child labor laws. The
    Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
    children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Wages Regulations (Clerks)
    Orders, in effect since 1985, set out minimum wage rates only for
    clerks. These office workers receive a legislated minimum wage of about
    $300 (EC$800) per month. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide
    a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but some
    categories of workers receive more than the legal minimum for clerks,
    which is used only as a guide for setting pay for other professions.
        There is no legislated workweek, although the common practice is to
    work 40 hours in 5 days. Special legislation covers hours that shop
    assistants, agricultural workers, domestics, and young people in
    industrial establishments may work.
        Occupational health and safety regulations are relatively well
    developed. The Labor Ministry periodically inspects health and safety
    conditions at places of employment under the Employees' Occupational
    Safety and Health Act of 1985. The Ministry enforces the act through
    threat of closure of the business if it discovers violations and the
    violator does not correct them. Workers are free to leave a dangerous
    workplace situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons were
    trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                        SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

        St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a multiparty, parliamentary
    democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. A prime
    minister, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative assembly compose the
    Government. The Governor General, appointed by the British monarch, is
    the titular head of state, with largely ceremonial powers. During the
    spring, divisive general strikes were settled only because Prime
    Minister Sir James F. Mitchell, whose New Democratic Party (NDP) had
    won an unprecedented fourth term in June 1998 by a slim margin, agreed
    to resign, with elections to be held by March 31, 2001. On October 27,
    Mitchell resigned, and Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian, replaced
    him. The judiciary is independent.
        The Royal St. Vincent Police, the only security force in the
    country, includes a coast guard and a small Special Services Unit (SSU)
    with some paramilitary training, that is often accused of using
    excessive force. The force is controlled by and responsive to the
    Government, but police continued to commit some human rights abuses.
        St. Vincent has a market-based economy. Much of the labor force is
    engaged in agriculture. Bananas are the leading export and a major
    source of foreign exchange earnings. However, the banana industry is
    declining, and the growing tourism sector is becoming the leading
    earner of foreign exchange. Unemployment is estimated to be 35 percent,
    and the 1999 per capita gross domestic product was approximately
    $2,550.
        The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
    there were problems in a few areas. The police SSU was accused of an
    extrajudicial killing. Other principal human rights problems continued
    to include occasional instances of excessive use of force by police,
    the Government's failure to punish adequately those responsible for
    such abuses, poor prison conditions, and an overburdened court system.
    Violence against women and abuse of children also were problems.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In March the police SSU shot and killed David Browne as they were
    taking him into custody for building a shack on the grounds of a
    secondary school. The police said he sustained an accidental but fatal
    shot to the temple when he resisted arrest. Human rights activists
    called for an inquiry and claimed that the police SSU used excessive
    and injudicious force leading to the death.
        On December 14, 1999, a police antidrug patrol shot and killed
    Junior Harry, who they said was fleeing while the patrol conducted a
    search for narcotics in buildings near the town of Barrouallie. A
    police spokesman said that Harry was armed with a shotgun. Although the
    authorities planned to hold an inquest to establish whether police used
    excessive force, there was no information as to the results of any such
    inquiry.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other forms of
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. However, regional
    human rights groups have noted that a high percentage of convictions
    are based on confessions. One human rights group believes that some of
    these confessions resulted from unwarranted police practices, including
    the use of physical force during detention, illegal search and seizure,
    and failure to inform properly those arrested of their rights.
        There is no independent review board to monitor police activity and
    to hear public complaints about police misconduct. Human rights
    advocates recommend such a board to protect the rights of citizens who
    complain about police misconduct.
        Prison conditions are poor. Prison buildings are antiquated and
    overcrowded, with one holding an average of 300 inmates in a building
    designed for 75, which results in serious health and safety problems.
    An inmate who wishes to speak with his lawyer must do so by written
    correspondence, and the authorities sometimes monitor and censor such
    correspondence.
        In July 1999, prisoners rioted and seized control of the prison,
    protesting poor conditions and treatment. The Government acceded to a
    number of the prisoners' demands; however, conditions did not change
    significantly. In the spring, prisoners again demonstrated, and the
    Government appointed a former SSU commander as the new Superintendent
    of Prisons. Local human rights activists have acknowledged that he has
    tried to improve internal communications and training for prison
    personnel. However, the Government has not implemented any of the
    recommendations made by a Commission of Inquiry following the July-
    August 1999 disturbances.
        In August identified prisoners whipped another prisoner, burned him
    with acid, and cut a piece of his ear off with a knife. The assaulted
    inmate asserted that this action was carried out as punishment when he
    had not supplied them with drugs after he had been released earlier
    from jail. Prison officials asserted that police failed to respond to
    arrest the inmates who had tortured and mutilated this prisoner.
        Prison officials expressed frustration with the lack of resources,
    proper training, personnel, and progress in securing a new facility.
    The jail is in the center of the capital city with low walls that are
    accessible to passers-by. Prison guards are known at times to
    collaborate with prisoners in corrupt and illegal practices. Some
    guards have been disciplined for engaging in sexual acts with inmates.
    Reportedly, guards also supply drugs and other contraband or stand by
    while rough, abusive, or inhuman prison punishment is meted out either
    by fellow prisoners or other guards.
        There is a separate section for female inmates in the prison.
        Conditions are inadequate for juvenile offenders. There is a small
    facility for delinquent boys; however, it is not financed by the
    Government and depends upon donations. As a result, it is in disrepair
    and only houses a small number of boys. Youngsters may be charged and
    convicted as criminals from the age of 8. In such cases, youngsters may
    then be jailed with older criminals. Although separate legal statutes
    exist for youthful offenders, there are no separate magistrates,
    prosecutors, or procedures to handle such cases.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides that persons detained for criminal offenses must receive a
    fair hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court. Although
    there are only two official magistrates, the registrar of the High
    Court and the presiding judge of the family court effectively serve as
    magistrates when called upon to do so. While this practice reduced the
    backlog, complaints continue regarding police practices in bringing
    cases to court. Some defense attorneys claim that this has caused 6- to
    12-month delays in preliminary inquiries for serious crimes.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent and impartial court, and the judiciary is independent in
    practice.
        The judiciary consists of lower courts and a High Court, with
    appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal and final appeal to the
    Privy Council in the United Kingdom. There are three magistrates, as
    well as one magistrate who serves only the family court.
        The Constitution provides for public trials. The court appoints
    attorneys for indigent defendants only when the defendant is charged
    with a capital offense. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven
    guilty and may appeal verdicts and penalties. There is a large backlog
    of pending cases. In January a fire destroyed offices with records in
    the magistrates' court. The family court handled some cases, but the
    backlog increased. The court reopened in September with 1 day per week
    set aside to handle an increasing workload of drug-related cases. The
    court docket may average 55-60 cases a day, when reasonably only 5 to 7
    may be heard, adjudicated, or disposed.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary search and
    seizure or other government intrusions into the private life of
    individual citizens, and there were no reports of such abuses.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice.
        There are two major newspapers and numerous smaller, partisan
    publications; all are privately owned, and most are openly critical of
    the Government's policies. There were no reports of government
    censorship or interference with the operation of the press. However,
    individual journalists believe that government advertising, a
    significant source of revenue, sometimes is withheld from newspapers
    that publish articles that are less than favorable to the Government.
        The lone television station in St. Vincent is privately owned and
    operates without government interference. Satellite dishes are popular
    among those who can afford them. There is also a cable system with
    mainly North American programming that has over 300 subscribers. The
    Government controls programming for the government-owned radio station.
        The Government does not restrict academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        No formal government policy toward refugee or asylum requests
    exists. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There
    were no reports of forced expulsion of anyone having a valid claim to
    refugee status; however, government practice remains undefined.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government through
    regularly scheduled free and fair elections. St. Vincent has a long
    history of multiparty parliamentary democracy. During the June 1998
    election, the ruling New Democratic Party won a slim 1-seat majority (8
    of 15) in Parliament, despite losing the popular vote by a 55 to 45
    percent margin to the opposition Unity Labour Party (ULP). Calling this
    outcome an ``overt manifestation of rejection by the public'' of Prime
    Minister Mitchell's Government, the ULP made claims of election fraud
    and demanded new elections.
        The Prime Minister refused the ULP demand and instead proposed a
    constitutional review to consider possible amendments, such as a
    provision for proportional representation. Lingering dissatisfaction
    led to thousands of persons participating in rallies and strikes in
    April and May calling for the Prime Minister's resignation. A rally by
    the Organization in Defense of Democracy, comprised of leading private
    and public sector unions, said new elections should be held immediately
    and threatened ``a total shutdown of the country'' on May 3. After
    mediation by regional figures, the Prime Minister and his ruling NDP
    signed a six-point agreement known as the Grand Beach Accord, which
    confirmed that the Prime Minister would resign by January 2001 and call
    early elections before March 31, 2001. On October 27, Mitchell resigned
    and was replaced by Arnhim Eustace, an NDP parliamentarian. In November
    leaders of the three political parties signed a ``Code of Conduct''
    intended to govern the campaign period. It includes a pledge of equal
    time on local radio and other electronic media and an agreement not to
    incite or encourage violence.
        There are no legal impediments to women's full participation in
    politics or government; however, they are underrepresented. There is
    only one woman in Parliament, as a member of the opposition.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Opposition political groups and the Vincentian press often comment
    on human rights matters of local concern. The St. Vincent and the
    Grenadines Human Rights Association (SVGHRA) monitors government and
    police activities, especially with respect to treatment of prisoners,
    publicizing any cases of abuse. The Government generally is responsive
    to public and private inquiries about its human rights practices.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law
    regardless of race, sex, or religion, and the Government adheres to
    this provision.
        Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence,
    remains a major problem. The Government took legislative steps to
    address this problem through the Domestic Violence/Matrimonial
    Proceedings Act (1994) and the more accessible Domestic Violence
    Summary Proceedings Act (1995). Both laws provide for protective
    orders, as well as occupation and tenancy orders; the former only is
    accessible through the High Court, but the latter can be obtained
    without the services of a lawyer in family court. Since passage of the
    laws, the SVGHRA has conducted numerous seminars and workshops
    throughout the country to familiarize citizens with their rights under
    these acts. Increasing numbers of women are coming forward with
    domestic violence complaints.
        Depending on the magnitude of the offense and the age of the
    victim, the punishment for rape is generally 10 or more years in
    prison.
        A 1995 amendment to the Child Support Law allows for payments
    ordered by the courts, even when notice of an appeal has been filed.
    Previously, fathers who had been ordered to pay child support could
    appeal decisions and not pay while the appeal was being heard. This
    resulted in a huge backlog of appeal cases and effectively reduced the
    number of mothers and children receiving support payments. There is a
    family court in the capital city of Kingstown with one magistrate.
    According to the SVGHRA, because there is only one bailiff to service
    all the country, summonses often are not served on time for cases to be
    heard as scheduled in court.
        The Ministry of Education, Women's Affairs, and Culture has a
    women's desk that assists the National Council of Women with seminars,
    training programs, and public relations. The minimum wage law specifies
    that women should receive equal pay for equal work.
        Marion House, a social services agency established by the Catholic
    Church in 1989 and staffed by four trained counselors and three foreign
    volunteers, provides counseling and therapy services.
        Children.--Education is not compulsory, but the Government states
    that it investigates cases in which children are withdrawn from school
    before the age of 16. Although the Government has played a more
    prominent role in legislating health and welfare standards since
    independence, the infant mortality rate is still very high. One
    underlying cause is the large number of children born to teenage
    mothers.
        The Domestic Violence Summary Proceedings Act provides a limited
    legal framework for the protection of children. Nevertheless, reports
    of child abuse remain high and are on the increase. The Social Welfare
    Office is the government agency responsible for monitoring and
    protecting the welfare of children. The police are the enforcement arm;
    the Social Welfare Office refers all reports of child abuse to the
    police for action.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation
    addressing persons with disabilities, and the circumstances for
    disabled individuals are generally difficult. Most severely disabled
    persons rarely leave their homes because of the poor road system and
    lack of affordable wheelchairs. The Government partially supports a
    school for the disabled which has two branches. A separate, small
    rehabilitation center treats about five persons daily.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides citizens
    the right to form unions and to organize employees, and the Trade
    Unions and Trade Disputes Act allows the right to strike. Employers
    often ignore the constitutional provisions that provide for union
    rights, and claim that they have a constitutional right not to
    recognize a trade union. However, some employers seek a good industrial
    relations environment and cooperate with trade unions.
        In April and May, thousands of persons, including members of
    leading private and public sector unions, participated in rallies and
    strikes calling for the Prime Minister's resignation (see Section 3).
    Other than these, there were no major strikes during the year.
        St. Vincent and the Grenadines joined the International Labor
    Organization in 1997 and assumed all its obligations for enforcement of
    labor standards.
        Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There are no
    legal obstacles to organizing unions; however, no law requires
    employers to recognize a particular union as an exclusive bargaining
    agent. Some companies offer packages of benefits with terms of
    employment better than, or comparable to, what a union normally can
    obtain through negotiations. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination
    by employers. Generally effective mechanisms exist for resolving
    complaints. The authorities may order employers found guilty of
    antiunion discrimination for firing workers without cause (including
    for participation in union activities) to reinstate the workers or give
    them severance pay.
        According to press reports in August and September, seven workers
    at the East Caribbean Group of Companies (ECGC--an agricultural
    manufacturing concern)--six of whom were executive members of a newly
    formed, government-registered ECGC Workers Union--were fired for
    ``undisclosed reasons'' following a 2-day sick-out. Shortly thereafter,
    Labor Minister Jerry Scott intervened in an attempt to resolve the
    matter, but the ECGC board refused to reinstate the workers. Instead,
    they provided fired workers with a severance package that included a
    statement that these workers had conspired to close down the company.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
    Government does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by
    children, but there were no reports that it occurred.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law sets the minimum working age at 16 years of age,
    although a worker must be 18 years of age to receive a national
    insurance card. The labor inspection office of the Ministry of Labor
    monitors and enforces this provision, and employers generally respect
    it in practice. The age of leaving school at the primary level is 15
    years; when these pupils leave school, they usually are absorbed into
    the labor market disguised as apprentices. There is no known child
    labor except for children working on family-owned banana plantations,
    particularly during harvest time, or in family-owned cottage
    industries. The Government does not prohibit specifically forced or
    bonded labor by children, but there were no reports that it occurred
    (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law sets minimum wages,
    which were last promulgated in 1989. They vary by sector and type of
    work and are specified for several skilled categories, including
    attendants, packers, cleaners, porters, watchmen, and clerks. In
    agriculture the wage for workers provided shelter is $0.82 (EC$2.25)
    per hour; skilled industrial workers earn $7.36 (EC$20) per day, and
    unskilled workers earn $3.68 (EC$10) per day. In many sectors the
    minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
    for a worker and family, but most workers earn more than the minimum.
    The Wages Council, according to law, should meet every 2 years to
    review the minimum wage, but it has not met since 1989.
        There is no legislation concerning the length of the workweek;
    however, the general practice is to work 40 hours in 5 days. The law
    provides workers a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks.
        According to the Ministry of Labor, legislation concerning
    occupational safety and health is outdated. The most recent
    legislation, the Factories Act of 1955, has some regulations concerning
    only factories, but enforcement of these regulations is ineffective.
    Workers enjoy a reasonably safe working environment; however, the trade
    unions have dealt with some violations relating to safety gear, long
    overtime hours, and the safety of machinery. There were some reports of
    significant visual deficiency by visual display unit workers, and some
    reports of hearing impairment by power station and stone crushing
    employees. It was not clear under present legislation whether workers
    have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
    health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
    addressing trafficking in persons. There were no reports that persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    SURINAME

        After over a decade of predominantly military rule, Suriname
    installed a freely elected Parliament and inaugurated a democratically
    chosen president in 1991. After free and fair elections in May, the new
    51-member National Assembly elected Ronald Venetiaan of the National
    Party of Suriname (NPS) as President in August with the necessary two-
    thirds majority required by the Constitution; he replaced Jules
    Wijdenbosch of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Venetiaan had
    previously served as President in 1991-96. The Constitution provides
    for an independent judiciary, and previous disputes over appointees by
    the former president were alleviated when the appointees in question
    resigned from the judiciary; by year's end, the judiciary appeared to
    be acting independently.
        The armed forces are responsible for national security and border
    and immigration control; they are under the control of the civilian
    Minister of Defense. Civilian police bear primary responsibility for
    the maintenance of law and order; they report to the Ministry of
    Justice and Police. The first Venetiaan Government had reformed the
    military in 1995-96 by purging military officers and supporters of
    former dictator Desi Bouterse, who ruled the country in the 1980's.
    Although in the May elections Bouterse's party won 10 seats in the
    National Assembly, 1 of which he occupies, the party's influence within
    the military has declined steadily. Members of the security forces
    continue to commit some human rights abuses.
        The economy depends heavily on the export of bauxite derivatives.
    Unregulated gold mining is an increasingly important economic activity
    that highlights a lack of land rights for indigenous and tribal people,
    and it has a serious environmental impact. The Government and state-
    owned companies employ over half the working population. Overall
    economic conditions deteriorated during the year, and estimated gross
    domestic product declined by approximately 4 percent. The inflation
    rate was 82 percent, compared with 113 percent in 1999. Per capita
    annual income was about $1,000.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, serious problems still remain in some areas. Police
    mistreat detainees, particularly during arrests; guards abuse
    prisoners; and local detention facilities remain overcrowded. The
    judiciary suffers from ineffectiveness and a huge case backlog. There
    was some harassment and media self-censorship, and societal
    discrimination against women and indigenous and tribal people persists.
    Violence against women and trafficking in women and girls are problems.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        While there have been no recent reports of political killings, the
    Government has not addressed past abuses, and they continue to be a
    focus of concern. The authorities have not taken action against prison
    guards who allegedly beat a prisoner to death in 1993. Late in the
    year, the Government began an investigation into the December 1982
    executions by the Bouterse regime of 15 opposition leaders; there has
    yet to be an investigation into the 1986 massacre of civilians at the
    village of Moiwana.
        In December 1997, the Wijdenbosch administration appointed a
    ``committee to establish the framework for a commission to investigate
    past human rights abuses.'' Human rights groups, which had been
    pressing since 1995 for an independent human rights commission to
    investigate violations committed during the 1980's, neither were
    informed nor consulted prior to the establishment of the committee.
    Moreover, the chairman of the committee was reportedly a member of
    Bouterse's team of legal advisers; his appointment raised questions
    regarding the objectivity of the group's work. Although the committee's
    report was presented to the former President in September 1999, the
    Government did not release its contents or recommendations. In view of
    the human rights record of the Bouterse regime, many of whose members
    participated in the Wijdenbosch Government, human rights organizations
    remained concerned about the potential for a deterioration of civil
    liberties.
        After the elections, there were calls for the new Government to
    investigate the December 1982 murders before the 18-year statute of
    limitations expired in December. In October the Court of Justice began
    hearings on the murders in response to a request from relatives of the
    victims. Bouterse's lawyer sought to postpone the hearings, but the
    court denied his request. The court heard testimony from the victims'
    relatives, human rights activists, and the prosecutor's office, which
    had not yet made any investigation into the killings. Previously,
    Bouterse himself had requested an investigation, after the victims'
    relatives asked a Dutch court to prosecute him in that country.
    Following an order from the Court of Justice, an examining judge called
    for a full investigation into the 1982 murders, including the actions
    of 36 suspects.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        However, the new Government has yet to take any action to
    investigate allegations of some disappearances that occurred under
    previous regimes.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman treatment or
    punishment, but human rights groups continue to express concern about
    official mistreatment and have documented cases of police mistreatment
    of detainees, particularly during arrests, and guard abuse of
    prisoners.
        Prison conditions are poor. There are three state prisons and
    several detention facilities at police stations, where arrestees are
    detained until they appear before a judge for trial. Human rights
    activists are concerned about conditions in the prisons and especially
    about conditions in local detention facilities. They report that the
    jails are overcrowded, that guards mistreat prisoners, and that medical
    care and living conditions are inadequate. Police officers, who are not
    trained in prison work, serve as the jailers at local detention
    facilities, a situation that human rights groups assert contributes to
    the abuses.
        Women's jail and prison facilities and conditions are, in general,
    better than the men's facilities and conditions. There is a wing of an
    adult prison for boys under age 18 who have committed serious crimes.
    Juvenile facilities for boys between the ages of 11 and 18 within the
    adult prison were adequate; educational and recreational facilities
    were provided.
        In February 1999, the human rights group Moiwana '86 issued a
    report that accused prison officials at two of the federal prisons of
    using electrical shocks to discipline prisoners. The report further
    asserted that different ethnic groups receive different forms and
    degrees of punishments. Prison officials denied the accusations, and
    the Government took no investigative action. Moiwana '86 did not pursue
    the issue further.
        The completion of a new prison and renovation of existing jails
    have reduced somewhat the problems and improved overall health and
    safety conditions. However, the older jails remain seriously
    overcrowded, with as many as four times the number of detainees for
    which they were designed. In addition these older prisons are
    unsanitary. At police stations, guards allow detainees no exercise and
    only rarely permit them to leave their cells. Detainees and human
    rights groups also complain about inadequate prison meals, although
    families are permitted and encouraged to provide food to incarcerated
    relatives. Local detention facilities remain overcrowded.
        Since 1996 Moiwana '86 has monitored the condition of prisoners.
    Representatives of the group report that in general they have access to
    prisoners and receive cooperation from prison officials on routine
    matters. Moiwana '86 and the police cooperated to develop a detention
    officer training program for police guards working at the local
    detention facilities. The program consists of lectures given at the
    state prison to both guards and prisoners.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally respect
    these provisions in practice. However, delays have caused prisoners who
    appeal their sentences to remain in prison until a ruling is reached on
    their appeal, even if they have served the full term of their original
    sentence. Lawyers have filed complaints, but the problem has not been
    resolved.
        The law provides that the police may detain for investigation for
    up to 14 days a person suspected of committing a crime for which the
    sentence is longer than 4 years. During the 14-day period, the law also
    permits incommunicado detention, which must be authorized by an
    assistant district attorney or a police inspector. Within the 14-day
    period, the police must bring the accused before a prosecutor to be
    charged formally. If additional time is needed to investigate the
    charge, a prosecutor may authorize the police to detain the suspect for
    an additional 30 days. Upon the expiration of the initial 44 days, a
    judge of instruction may authorize the police to hold the suspect for
    up to 120 additional days, in 30-day increments (for a total of 164
    days), before the case is tried. The judge of instruction has the power
    to authorize release on bail, but that power is used rarely, if ever.
        Pretrial detainees, who constitute a large percentage of inmates,
    routinely are held without being brought before a judge. They often are
    held in overcrowded detention cells at local police stations. Of those
    held in police custody or detention cells, a steadily growing number
    already had been convicted but not yet placed in prisons.
        The military police continued to observe the requirement to hand
    over to the civil police civilians arrested for committing a crime in
    their presence. The military police continued to maintain
    responsibility for control of the country's borders and airports, but
    it no longer investigated civilian crimes.
        The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced exile;
    however, it is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
    for an independent judiciary, an ongoing dispute between the previously
    sitting judges and a new slate appointed by the former Government
    severely damaged the concept of an independent judiciary. However, the
    change in government led to the resignations of the disputed judges.
    The new Government appointed an acting president of the Court of
    Justice and named the Solicitor General to act also as Attorney
    General. As a result of the conflict, the effectiveness of the civilian
    and military courts still was limited in practice, but at year's end,
    the judiciary appeared to be acting independently.
        The judicial system consists of three lower courts and an appeals
    court, which is called the Court of Justice; there is no Supreme Court.
    In July 1998, President Wijdenbosch named a new President of the Court
    of Justice and Prosecutor General without consulting with, and over the
    objections of, the sitting justices. Most legal authorities interpret
    the Constitution to require that consultation, and the members of the
    court refused to recognize the named President of the court or
    Prosecutor General. In spite of the continued objections, President
    Wijdenbosch named additional justices without consultation in December
    1998. In May 1999, the appointed President of the Court of Justice
    first swore in himself, and then he swore in the new justices. With the
    change in Government, the President of the Court and other disputed
    judges resigned. The 1987 Constitution calls for the establishment of
    an independent constitutional court. Although the previous Government
    did not take any steps to set up such a court, at year's end the
    Venetiaan Government was assembling a group of judges to sit on the
    court.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial in
    which defendants have the right to counsel if needed. The courts assign
    lawyers in private practice to defend indigent prisoners and pays
    lawyers from public funds. However, the court-assigned lawyers usually
    only appear at the trial, if they appear at all. The courts must, and
    in practice do, free a detainee who is not tried within the 164-day
    period. In one instance, a court levied a fine against the Government
    for failing to release detainees as directed by the court. Trials are
    before a single judge, with the right of appeal. Due to the conflict
    over the legitimacy of the president of the Court and the justices,
    there is a large backlog in the judicial system.
        Military personnel generally are not subject to civilian criminal
    law. A soldier accused of a crime immediately comes under military
    jurisdiction, and military police are responsible for all such
    investigations. Military prosecutions are directed by an officer on the
    public prosecutor's staff and take place in separate courts before two
    military judges and one civilian judge. The military courts follow the
    same rules of procedure as the civil courts. There is no appeal from
    the military to the civil system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy.
    The law requires warrants for searches, which are issued by quasi-
    judicial officers who supervise criminal investigations. The police
    obtain them in the great majority of investigations. There have been
    complaints of surveillance of human rights workers by members of the
    military police and the division of central intelligence. There is
    still a threat of forced resettlement of indigenous populations due to
    the granting of timber and gold concessions (see Section 5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights; however, in practice there were reports of
    intimidation and harassment.
        The parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition criticize the
    Government freely. Some media members continue to practice some self-
    censorship because of the history of intimidation and reprisals by
    certain elements of the former military leadership.
        The Wijdenbosch Government publicly reprimanded radio stations and
    newspapers for their negative coverage of protest demonstrations that
    took place in May 1999. Although the Government threatened to censor
    the press, it ultimately took no action, and there continued to be
    reports unfavorable to the Government.
        In April one of the two daily newspapers, De West, was firebombed
    one night. At year's end, the incident remained under investigation.
        On July 24, a group of Bouterse supporters harassed and attempted
    to beat a journalist outside the National Assembly. The journalist was
    known to be critical of Bouterse, and the attack took place the first
    day Bouterse occupied his new seat in the Assembly. The police
    intervened, but the Bouterse supporters threatened to find the
    journalist anywhere in the country.
        The two daily newspapers, five television stations, and most of the
    radio stations are owned privately. Two television stations and two
    radio stations are owned publicly. Four companies provide cable
    television, which includes international channels. Two companies, one
    private and one public, offer unrestricted access to electronic media.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice. However, in response to a series of public
    demonstrations in May 1999, the Government announced that it intended
    to begin enforcing a 1930's law requiring a permit to hold a public
    demonstration or gathering. After the announcement, in late July 1999,
    the authorities detained two opposition leaders for demonstrating
    without a permit but quickly released them. Subsequent public marches
    were allowed to proceed without permits.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may change their residence and
    workplaces freely and may travel abroad as they wish. Political
    dissidents who emigrated to the Netherlands and elsewhere during the
    years of military rule are welcome to return. Few of them have chosen
    to do so, generally for economic reasons. Citizenship is not revoked
    for political reasons.
        Although it is possible for persons to be granted refugee status
    under special circumstances, there are no provisions in the law for
    granting asylum or refugee status in accordance with the standards of
    the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
    1967 Protocol.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not
    arise. There were no reports of forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for this right, but in the past the
    military prevented its effective exercise. Although the military twice
    has transferred power to elected civilian governments following coups,
    2000 marked the second time since independence from the Netherlands in
    1975 that one elected government succeeded another in accordance with
    constitutional provisions. The Government is still in the process of
    institutionalizing democratic, constitutional rule.
        The Constitution stipulates that power and authority rest with the
    citizens and provides for the right to change the government through
    the direct election by secret ballot of a National Assembly of 51
    members every 5 years. The National Assembly then elects the President
    by a two-thirds vote. If the legislature is unable to do so, as was the
    case both in the 1991 and 1996 national elections, the Constitution
    provides that a national people's assembly, composed of Members of
    Parliament and regional and local officials, shall elect the President.
        The Constitution provides for the organization and functioning of
    political parties. Many parties and political coalitions are
    represented in the National Assembly. After the May elections,
    President Venetiaan formed a cabinet from members of the New Front
    coalition, comprised of the NPS, a predominantly Creole party; the
    Progressive Reform Party, a predominantly Hindustani party; the
    Suriname Labor Party, a political wing of the largest labor union; and
    Pertjaja Luhur, a predominantly Javanese party.
        There are historical and cultural impediments to equal
    participation by women in leadership positions in government and
    political parties, and they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. In the past, most women were expected to fulfill the roles of
    housewife and mother, thereby limiting opportunities to gain political
    experience or position. Participation by women in politics (and other
    fields) generally was considered inappropriate. While women have made
    limited gains in attaining political power in recent years, political
    circles remain under the influence of traditional male-dominated
    groups, and women are disadvantaged in seeking high public office. In
    the May elections, voters elected nine women to the National Assembly,
    compared with six who held seats in the previous assembly, and the
    Assembly appointed a woman as vice chairperson. The Cabinet includes
    one woman as Minister of Foreign Affairs, another as Minister of
    Internal Affairs, and a third as Deputy Minister of Social Affairs.
        Although the Constitution prohibits racial or religious
    discrimination, several factors limit the participation of Maroons
    (descendants of escaped slaves who fled to the interior to avoid
    recapture) and Amerindians in the political process. Most of the
    country's political activity takes place in the capital and a narrow
    belt running east and west of it along the coast. The Maroons and
    Amerindians are concentrated in remote areas in the interior and
    therefore have limited access to, and influence on, the political
    process. Voters elected the first Amerindians to the National Assembly
    in 1996. After the May elections, there are eight Maroons and one
    Amerindian in the National Assembly. There are no Maroons or
    Amerindians in the Cabinet.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases;
    however, government officials generally are not cooperative or
    responsive to their views. There have been complaints of surveillance
    of human rights workers by members of the military police and the
    division of central intelligence.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and laws, with the exception of ethnic marriage
    laws, do not differentiate among citizens on the basis of their ethnic
    origins, religious affiliations, or other cultural differences.
    However, in practice several groups within society suffer various forms
    of discrimination.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The law does not
    differentiate between domestic violence and other forms of assault. The
    Government has not addressed specifically the problem of violence
    against women. According to a national women's group, victims continue
    to report cases of violence against women and complain of an inadequate
    response from the Government and society to what appears to be a trend
    of increasing family violence. Although the police have been reluctant
    to intervene in instances of domestic violence, a national women's
    group noted that police attitudes have improved significantly as a
    result of training conducted in 1999.
        There are no specific laws to protect women against trafficking and
    sexual exploitation. Prostitution is illegal; however, the police lack
    the resources to enforce these laws effectively. There were credible
    reports of trafficking in women for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        Women have the right to equal access to education, employment, and
    property. Nevertheless, social pressures and customs, especially in
    rural areas, inhibit their full exercise of these rights, particularly
    in the areas of marriage and inheritance. Women experience economic
    discrimination in access to employment and in rates of pay for the same
    or substantially similar work. The Government has not made specific
    efforts to combat economic discrimination.
        The National Women's Center is a government agency devoted to
    women's issues; there is also a women's policy coordinator. Their
    effectiveness is limited severely by financial and staffing
    constraints. The principal concerns of women's groups are political
    representation, economic vulnerability, violence, and discrimination.
        Children.--School attendance is free and compulsory until 12 years
    of age, but some school-age children do not have access to education
    due to a lack of transportation, facilities, or teachers. There is no
    legal difference in the treatment of girls and boys in education or
    health care services, and in practice both are treated fairly equally.
    Both students and parents complained about the Government's decision to
    double enrollment fees for public school, which occurred both in 1999
    and 2000. Children face increasing economic pressure to discontinue
    their education in order to work.
        The Government allocates only limited resources to ensure
    safeguards for the human rights and welfare of children. There are
    continuing reports of malnutrition among poor children, but it is
    difficult to quantify the extent of the problem. In the capital, where
    most of the country's population is concentrated, there are several
    orphanages and one privately funded shelter for sexually abused
    children. Elsewhere, distressed children usually must rely on the
    resources of their extended families. There were credible reports of
    hospitals refusing to hand newborns over to their mothers until
    hospital bills were paid in full, sending them instead to a state
    facility. The Government denied that such refusals occurred and stated
    that there was no such policy; one human rights group continued its
    investigation into the matter.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children;
    however, some children are exploited sexually, and there were credible
    reports of trafficking in girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    The legal age of sexual consent is 14; however, it is not enforced
    strictly, and the Asian Marriage Law lowers the marriage age for
    children of Asian descent to 12 years for girls and 15 years for boys.
    Otherwise, one must be 31 years old to marry without parental
    permission.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no laws concerning disabled
    persons and no provisions for making private or public buildings
    accessible to them. There are also no laws mandating that they be given
    equal consideration when seeking jobs or housing. However, there are
    some training programs for the blind and others with disabilities. In
    practice disabled persons suffer from discrimination when applying for
    jobs and services.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution affords no special protection
    for, or recognition of, indigenous people. Most Amerindians and Maroons
    suffer a number of disadvantages and have only limited ability to
    participate in decisions affecting their lands, cultures, traditions,
    and natural resources. The country's political life, educational
    opportunities, and jobs are concentrated in the capital and its
    environs, while the majority of Amerindians and Maroons live in the
    interior. Government services in the interior became largely
    unavailable, and much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the
    1986-91 domestic insurgencies; progress in reestablishing services and
    rebuilding the infrastructure has been very slow.
        The Government appointed the Consultative Council for the
    Development of the Interior in September 1995. This council, provided
    for in the 1992 peace accords that formally ended the insurgencies,
    includes representatives of the Maroon and Amerindian communities.
    However, the Government did not consult with representatives of these
    communities about the granting of gold and timber concessions on
    indigenous and tribal lands. Early in the year, the Widjenbosch
    Government made an attempt to grant some land rights to indigenous
    people. Tribal leaders rejected the proposal, asserting that it was too
    weak. In November the new Government's Minister of Natural Resources
    met with tribal leaders and promised to work with tribal authorities
    toward a solution regarding land grants.
        Organizations representing Maroon and Amerindian communities
    complain that small-scale mining operations, mainly illegal Brazilian
    gold miners, dig trenches that cut residents off from their
    agricultural land and threaten to drive them away from their
    traditional settlements. Mercury runoff from these operations also
    contaminates and threatens traditional food source areas.
        Maroon and Amerindian groups continued to cooperate with each other
    in order to exercise their rights more effectively. Two summits, or
    ``gran krutus,'' bringing together Maroon and Amerindian tribal
    leaders, have been held, the most recent in September 1996. During
    these summits, indigenous leaders reiterated their demands for the
    right to participate in decisions concerning the use of natural
    resources on land they claim as their own and for greater autonomy from
    the Government.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution protects the right
    of workers to associate and to choose their representatives
    democratically. Nearly 60 percent of the work force is organized into
    unions, and most unions belong to one of the country's six major labor
    federations. Unions are independent of the Government but play an
    active role in politics. The small Labor Party historically has been a
    very influential force in government.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Civil servants
    have the right to strike, and strikes in both the public and private
    sectors are common as workers try to secure wage gains to protect their
    earning power from inflation.
        There are no restrictions on unions' international activities.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution explicitly recognizes these rights, and the authorities
    respect them in practice. Collective bargaining agreements cover
    approximately 50 percent of the labor force. Bauxite industry workers
    are organized, but gold miners are not. The law prohibits antiunion
    discrimination by employers, and there are effective mechanisms for
    resolving complaints of such discrimination. Employers must have prior
    permission from the Ministry of Labor to fire workers, except when
    discharging an employee for cause. The Labor Ministry individually
    reviews dismissals for cause; if it finds a discharge unjustified, the
    employee must be reinstated.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to
    occur. However, there were credible reports of trafficking in women and
    girls for prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The law prohibits forced and
    bonded labor by children, and such practices generally are not known to
    occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years;
    however, the Ministry of Labor and the police enforce this law only
    sporadically. Children under 14 years of age work as street vendors,
    newspaper sellers, or shop assistants. Working hours for youths are not
    limited in comparison with the regular work force. School attendance is
    compulsory until 12 years of age. The law prohibits forced and bonded
    labor by children, and there were no reports of such practices,
    although trafficking of girls for prostitution does occur (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage
    legislation. In October 1999, civil servants were granted a tax-free 60
    percent pay increase for those with the lowest wages, a 55 percent
    increase for middle wage earners, and a 50 percent increase for the
    highest wage earners. Including that pay increase and a cost of living
    allowance of about $12 (Sfl 30,000), the lowest wage for civil servants
    is about $40 (Sfl 102,000) per month. This salary level makes it very
    difficult to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. Government employees, who constitute approximately 50 percent
    of the work force of 100,000, frequently supplement their salaries with
    second or third jobs, often in the informal sector. The President and
    Council of Ministers set and approve civil service wage increases.
    Civil service and other wages are not keeping pace with inflation.
        Work in excess of 9 hours per day or 45 hours per week on a regular
    basis requires special government permission, which is granted
    routinely. Such overtime work earns premium pay. The law requires one
    24-hour rest period per week.
        A 10- to 12-member inspectorate in the Occupational Health and
    Safety Division of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing
    legislated occupational safety and health regulations. Resource
    constraints and lack of trained personnel preclude the division from
    making regular inspections of industry. Accident rates in local
    industry do not appear to be high, and the key bauxite industry has an
    outstanding safety record. However, there is no law authorizing workers
    to refuse to work in circumstances they deem unsafe. They must appeal
    to the inspectorate to declare the workplace situation unsafe.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The only laws that specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons are old ``white slavery laws'' that are
    enforced only rarely.
        There were credible reports of trafficking in women and girls for
    prostitution. Women and girls from the interior are brought to the
    capital city and also to various gold mining locations in the interior.
    Several clubs in the capital also are known for recruiting women from
    Brazil and the Caribbean. There were credible reports of individuals
    using the country as a transit point to transport Brazilian women to
    Europe and the United States for purposes of prostitution.
        In addition alien smuggling organizations use the country as an
    intermediate destination to smuggle Chinese nationals, including women
    and girls, to the United States, where frequently they are forced into
    bonded-labor situations.

                                   __________

                              TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

        Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a
    parliamentary democracy in which there have been free and fair general
    elections since independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. A
    bicameral parliament and a prime minister govern the country.
    Parliament elects a president, whose office is largely ceremonial. In
    elections on December 11, voters returned the ruling United National
    Congress (UNC) party led by Prime Minister Basdeo Panday to power with
    19 seats in the 36-member Parliament. A 12-member elected House of
    Assembly handles local matters on the island of Tobago. The judiciary
    is independent but inefficient.
        The Ministry of National Security controls the police service and
    the defense force, which are responsive to civilian authority. An
    independent body, the Police Service Commission, makes all personnel
    decisions in the police service, and the Ministry has little direct
    influence over changes in senior positions. Police and prison guards
    committed some abuses.
        Oil and natural gas production and related downstream petrochemical
    industries form the basis of the market-based economy. The service
    sector is the largest employer, although continued industrialization
    has created many jobs in the construction industry. Agriculture, while
    contributing only 2 percent to gross domestic product, remains an
    important employer, both at the subsistence and commercial level.
    Although per capita income is approximately $5,700 annually, 12.5
    percent unemployment contributes to a skewed income distribution, which
    has not improved despite economic growth of 6.7 percent. Government
    efforts to address this problem by further diversification into
    manufacturing and tourism have been only partially successful.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. Nonetheless, police and guard abuse
    of prisoners, poor prison conditions, long delays in trials, and
    extensive violence against women remain problems.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        In the December 31, 1999, murder of politician Hanraj Sumairsingh,
    which some thought might have had a political motivation, the police
    arrested and charged a member of Jamat al Muslimeen, a radical group.
    However, bribery and corruption were believed to be motives behind the
    killing.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them; however, there were credible
    reports of police and prison personnel abusing prisoners in incidents
    that involved beating, pushing, and verbal insults.
        A 1999 ruling permits corporal punishment for certain crimes,
    including aggravated assault, rape, deliberate shooting, and robbery
    with violence. During the year, the courts sentenced 5 persons to
    corporal punishment (ranging from 5 to 10 birch strokes) in addition to
    prison terms. The law also was changed to increase the corporal
    punishment for rape from 15 strokes to 20.
        Prison conditions at the women's prison and two of the three men's
    prisons meet minimum international standards. However, conditions are
    worse in the Port of Spain prison, which dates from the 1830's. It was
    designed for 250 inmates but houses about 1,000. Diseases such as
    chicken pox, tuberculosis, AIDS, and other viruses spread easily, and
    prisoners generally must purchase their own medication. Overcrowding is
    a problem for the entire prison system, which housed 4,700 inmates in
    prisons built to accommodate 1,800. A new maximum security prison
    opened in 1998 houses about 850 prisoners, but it is not yet fully
    functional. With an eventual capacity of 2,100, this prison is expected
    to help alleviate the problem.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and the Government generally
    observes this prohibition.
        A police officer may arrest a person either based on a warrant
    issued or authorized by a magistrate or without a warrant when the
    officer witnesses commission of the alleged offense. For less serious
    offenses, the authorities typically bring the accused before a
    magistrate within 24 hours; for indictable offenses, the accused must
    appear within 48 hours. At that time, the magistrate reads the charge
    and determines whether bail is appropriate. Magistrates may deny bail
    to violent or repeat offenders. If for some reason the accused does not
    come before the magistrate, the case comes up on the magistrate's
    docket every 8 to 10 days until a hearing date is set. The courts
    notify persons of their right to an attorney and allow them access to
    an attorney once they are in custody and prior to any interrogation.
    However, the authorities do not always comply with these standards.
    Allegations of corruption among justices of the peace also raised
    concerns about compliance; the Government pledged to dismiss and
    prosecute any justice found to have violated these standards (see
    Section 1.e.).
        The Minister of National Security may authorize preventive
    detention in order to prevent actions prejudicial to public safety,
    public order, or national defense, and the Minister must state the
    grounds for the detention. A person detained under this provision has
    access to counsel and may have the detention reviewed by a three-member
    tribunal established by the Chief Justice and chaired by an attorney.
    The Minister must provide the tribunal with the grounds for the
    detention within 7 days of the detainee's request for review, which
    shall be held ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' following receipt
    of the grounds. There have been no reports that the authorities abused
    this procedure.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and it is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
    After the Chief Justice warned in 1999 that the executive branch was
    encroaching upon judicial independence, the Government appointed two
    independent commissions to review the issue. A Commonwealth commission
    concluded that the judiciary was not threatened by the Attorney
    General's involvement in judicial administration; however, a law
    association group recommended that executive requests should be handled
    by the Prime Minister, not the Attorney General.
        The court system consists of a court of appeal, a high court, and a
    magistrate's court. A criminal offense first is sent to a magistrate's
    court for a preliminary inquiry to determine if it can be heard before
    a magistrate without a jury. If the magistrate determines that the
    offense is a serious one, it is referred to the High Court, where it is
    heard before a judge and jury. All civil matters are heard by the High
    Court. Appeals can be filed with the local court of appeal and
    ultimately to the Privy Council in London. There is considerable
    support for abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and establishing a
    Caribbean Court of Justice, located in Trinidad and Tobago, to serve as
    the final court of appeal.
        An October decision of the Privy Council ruled that all death row
    prisoners throughout the Caribbean have a right to be heard before its
    Mercy Committee, which can stay death sentences. The Council decided
    that prisoners should be given access to all material put before the
    Mercy Committee. In addition procedures followed by the Mercy Committee
    now can be subject to judicial review.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
    independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right. All criminal
    defendants have the right to an attorney. In practice the courts
    sometimes appoint attorneys for those persons charged with indictable
    offenses (serious crimes) if they cannot retain one on their own
    behalf. The law requires a person accused of murder to have an
    attorney. An indigent person may refuse to accept an assigned attorney
    for cause and obtain a replacement.
        Despite serious efforts to improve the judiciary, severe
    inefficiency remains in many areas. Several criminal cases were
    dismissed due to judicial or police inefficiency. Despite significant
    progress, lengthy trial delays remain a serious problem.
        The Government continued to take steps against corruption in the
    criminal justice system. Over a 2-year period, the authorities charged
    at least 80 persons with various offenses after a presidential
    commission's investigation found collusion among justices of the peace,
    bailiffs, and police officers in the granting and fixing of bail. The
    Government revoked the licenses of 25 justices of the peace. However,
    at year's end, the charges brought against these individuals were still
    before the court. Only one of those indicted as a result of the
    commission's inquiry had come to trial. In that case, a court convicted
    one of the justices of the peace and sentenced him to 4 years'
    imprisonment.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. An independent press and a functioning democratic
    political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
        The three major daily newspapers freely and often criticize the
    Government in editorials. Widely read weekly tabloids tend to be
    extremely critical of the Government. All newspapers are privately
    owned. The two local television newscasts, one of which appears on a
    state-owned station, are sometimes critical of the Government but
    generally do not editorialize.
        Over the past several years, the Media Association of Trinidad and
    Tobago and the Publishers' Association have expressed concern about
    media treatment and access to the Government. For its part, the
    Government sometimes charges unfair treatment by the media, which the
    press views as unwarranted criticism. When the Prime Minister labeled
    Ken Gordon, head of a major media corporation, a ``pseudo-racist'' for
    editorials about the rise of the ruling UNC party, Gordon filed suit
    for libel. In November a court found the Prime Minister guilty of libel
    and ordered him to pay damages to Gordon.
        A Board of Film Censors is authorized to ban films that it
    considers to be against public order and decency or contrary to the
    public interest. This includes films that it believes may be
    controversial in matters of religion or race, or that contain seditious
    propaganda. In practice films rarely are banned.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. The police routinely grant the required advance
    permits for street marches, demonstrations, or other outdoor public
    meetings. In 1998 the Government amended the Summary Offences Act to
    put greater controls on holding public rallies. The amendments require
    that permits for public meetings and rallies be applied for 48 hours in
    advance instead of 24 hours, and make it an offense to hold a public
    meeting without a permit under the guise of conducting an exempted
    religious, educational, recreational, or sports function. In practice
    the amendments have not restricted unduly public meetings,
    demonstrations, or exempted events. One planned political youth
    demonstration was postponed when the police denied a permit due to
    concerns about size and safety.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Registration or other
    governmental permission to form private associations is not required.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
        In October Parliament passed an Equal Opportunities Bill that
    prohibits acts that offend or insult another person or group on the
    grounds of race, origin, or religion, or which incite racial or
    religious hatred. In November Parliament passed a separate bill that in
    part removed certain legal provisions interfering with the religious
    practices of the Spiritual Shouter Baptist and Orisa faiths.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        There is no provision for persons to claim or be classified as
    refugees or asylum seekers; the Ministry of National Security's
    Immigration Division handles any such requests on a case-by-case basis.
    The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. Parliamentary elections are held at intervals not
    to exceed 5 years. Elections for the 12-member Tobago House of Assembly
    are held every 4 years. The Constitution extends the right to vote to
    citizens as well as to legal residents at least 18 years of age who are
    citizens of other Commonwealth countries.
        In the 1995 general elections, the former opposition UNC and the
    ruling People's National Movement (PNM) each won 17 seats in the 36-
    member Parliament. The National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) won
    two seats and joined with the UNC to form a new government. Basdeo
    Panday became the country's first Prime Minister of East Indian
    descent. The PNM is primarily but not exclusively Afro-Trinidadian; the
    UNC is primarily but not exclusively Indo-Trinidadian. In general
    elections in December, voters returned Prime Minister Panday and his
    UNC party to power with a 19-seat majority. The PNM won 16 seats and
    the NAR 1 seat. Election observers noted that the elections were
    wellorganized, peaceful, free, and fair. Several recounts were
    requested and proceeded without incident. By year's end, opposition
    challenges to election results in two districts had not yet been
    decided.
        There are no specific laws that restrict the participation of women
    or minorities in government or the political parties. Women hold many
    positions in the Government and political party leadership but are
    still under-represented. Four of 36 elected members of the House of
    Representatives and 9 of 31 appointed Senators are women, with 2 women
    serving as ministers. Prime Minister Panday appointed the first woman
    to serve as Attorney General; she since has moved to the position of
    Minister of Education. Prime Minister Panday also appointed the first
    female acting Prime Minister.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. While government officials are cooperative, the
    Government has bitterly attacked Amnesty International's criticism of
    prison conditions and due process. An independent Ombudsman receives
    complaints relating to governmental administrative issues and
    investigates complaints of human rights abuse. The Ombudsman can make
    recommendations but does not have authority to force government offices
    to take action.
        The Government sought to curtail appeals by death row inmates to
    the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the U.N.
    Human Rights Committee. In 1999 it withdrew from the IACHR following
    its required 1-year notice. The Government also withdrew from the
    Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
    Rights, but reacceded with the reservation that the U.N. Committee
    would not have jurisdiction over death penalty cases.
        The Government's moves were prompted by a Privy Council ruling that
    failure to execute a condemned prisoner within 5 years of sentence
    constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
    Constitution. To meet this 5-year deadline, the Government established
    time limits for appeals to courts and human rights bodies. Local
    appeals are now disposed of within an average of 16 months compared
    with the previous average of 7 years.
        The Government asked the IACHR and the U.N. Committee each to agree
    to dispose of petitions within 8 months. According to the Government,
    both bodies responded that they could not provide such assurances. The
    Government stated that the conflict between a binding Privy Council
    ruling and its obligations to the human rights organs had to be
    resolved in favor of the Constitution and the Privy Council. The
    Government indicated that it would execute condemned prisoners who have
    exhausted all their appeals and have unresolved petitions pending more
    than 8 months before one of the human rights bodies.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions
    for fundamental human rights and freedoms for all without
    discrimination based on race, origin, color, religion, or sex. In
    October Parliament passed an Equal Opportunities Bill that makes
    discrimination illegal on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, religion,
    marital status or disability. It also establishes a commission to
    investigate cases of alleged discrimination and a tribunal to judge
    complaints.
        Women.--Physical abuse of women continued to be an extensive
    problem. There has been increased media coverage of domestic abuse
    cases and signs of a shift in public opinion, which held that such
    cases were a private matter. The Government has taken action to improve
    aid to victims. Murder, rape, and other crimes against women are
    reported frequently; 30 percent of all female homicide victims were
    believed to have been killed by their husbands or lovers. Rape, spousal
    abuse, and spousal rape are criminal offenses. The 1991 Domestic
    Violence Act was intended to facilitate court-issued restraining orders
    to protect victims and extended protection to common-law relationships,
    a frequent form of marital union. However, some observers say that the
    number of restraining orders issued has not increased at the rate
    expected since the enactment of the law. The establishment of a
    community police division improved police responsiveness to reports of
    domestic abuse, but some police officers are reported to be
    unsympathetic or reluctant to pursue such cases, resulting in
    underreporting of crimes of violence against women. There were more
    than 4,000 complaints of spousal abuse during the year; police handled
    an average of 9 cases a day that led to reports by victims, with the
    actual incidence of such abuse considered to be much higher. Two
    government ministries, operating independently, direct the
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that run most of the country's
    social programs addressing domestic violence, including five shelters
    for battered women. A rape crisis center offers counseling for rape
    victims and perpetrators on a voluntary basis. A government-sponsored
    hot line receives about 300 calls per month.
        In 1999 a new Domestic Violence Act came into effect. That law
    strengthened provisions of the 1991 law and allows easier access for
    police in instances of domestic violence. Parliament approved
    amendments to the Sexual Offences Act that broaden the definition of
    sexual offenses, increase the punishment for such crimes, and require
    the police to keep a register of sexual offenders.
        Many women hold positions in business, the professions, and
    government, but men tend to hold the most senior positions. There is no
    law or regulation requiring equal pay for equal work; during the year,
    a bill containing such provisions was introduced into Parliament, but
    no action was taken on it.
        The Division of Gender Affairs in the Ministry of Culture and
    Gender Affairs is charged with protecting women's rights in all aspects
    of government and legislation. Several active women's rights groups
    also exist.
        Children.--The Government's ability to protect children's welfare
    is limited by a lack of funds and expanding social needs. Education is
    free and compulsory through primary school. Some parts of the public
    school system seriously fail to meet the needs of the school age
    population due to overcrowding, substandard physical facilities, and
    occasional classroom violence by gangs. There is no societal pattern of
    abuse directed at children. The Domestic Violence Act provides
    protection for children abused at home. Abused children are usually
    placed with relatives if they are removed from the home. If there is no
    relative who can take them, there are several government institutions
    and NGO's that accept children for placement.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no legislation that
    specifically enumerates or protects the rights of disabled persons or
    mandates the provision of access to buildings or services, although
    NGO's lobbied Parliament to pass such legislation. The lack of access
    to transportation, buildings, and sidewalks is a major obstacle for the
    disabled. The Government provides some public assistance and partial
    funding to a variety of NGO's which, in turn, provide direct services
    to disabled members or clients.
        Indigenous People.--Members of a very small group in the population
    identify themselves as descendants of the original Amerindian
    population of the country. They maintain social ties with each other
    and other aboriginal groups and are not subject to discrimination.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Various ethnic and religious
    groups live together peacefully, generally respecting one another's
    beliefs and practices. However, at times racial tensions appear between
    Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians. Each group comprises about 40
    percent of the population. The private sector is dominated by Indo-
    Trinidadians and people of European, Middle Eastern, or Asian descent.
    Indo-Trinidadians also predominate in agriculture. Afro-Trinidadians
    tend to find employment in disproportionate numbers in the civil
    service, police, and military. Some Indo-Trinidadians assert that they
    are excluded from equal representation in the civil service due to
    racial discrimination. Since Indo-Trinidadians constitute the majority
    in rural areas and Afro-Trinidadians are in the majority in urban
    areas, competition between town and country for public goods and
    services often takes on racial overtones.
        In 1996 there were reports that several popular recreational clubs
    refused entry to Afro-Trinidadians and dark-skinned Indo-Trinidadians.
    The reports led to criticism of racism by the local press, and the
    Government pledged to implement a law banning racial discrimination in
    entry policies for private clubs. However, the Government has not yet
    taken such action.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1972 Industrial Relations Act
    provides that all workers, including those in state-owned enterprises,
    may form or join unions of their own choosing without prior
    authorization. Union membership has declined in recent years, with an
    estimated 25 to 30 percent of the work force organized in 19 active
    unions. Most unions are independent of the Government or political
    party control, although the Sugar Workers' Union historically was
    allied with the UNC. The Prime Minister formerly was president of the
    Sugar Workers' Union.
        The law prohibits antiunion activities before a union is registered
    legally, and the Ministry of Labor enforces this provision when it
    receives a complaint. A union also may bring a request for enforcement
    to the Industrial Court. All employees except those in ``essential
    services,'' which include the police and many other government
    employees, have the right to strike.
        The Labor Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and
    provides for grievance procedures if needed. A special section of the
    Industrial Court handles mandatory arbitration cases. Arbitration
    agreements are enforceable and can be appealed only to the Industrial
    Court. Most observers consider this court to be impartial; it consists
    of government, business, and labor representatives.
        Unions freely join federations and affiliate with international
    bodies. There are no restrictions on international travel or contacts.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Industrial
    Relations Act establishes the right of workers to collective
    bargaining. The Ministry of Labor's conciliation service maintains
    statistical information regarding the number of workers covered by
    collective bargaining agreements and the number of antiunion complaints
    filed.
        The Industrial Court may order employers who are found guilty of
    antiunion activities to reinstate workers and pay compensation, or it
    can impose other penalties including imprisonment. When necessary the
    conciliation service also determines which unions should have senior
    status.
        There are several export processing zones (EPZ's). The same labor
    laws apply in the EPZ's as in the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
    prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, but there were no
    reports that it was practiced. There were also no reports of forced or
    bonded labor by children.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The minimum legal age for workers is 12 years. Education
    is compulsory through primary school. Children from 12 to 14 years of
    age may work only in family businesses. Children under the age of 18
    legally may work only during daylight hours, with the exception of 16-
    to 18-year-olds, who may work at night in sugar factories. The
    probation service in the Ministry of Social Development and Family
    Services is responsible for enforcing child labor provisions, but
    enforcement is lax. There is no organized exploitation of child labor,
    but children are seen begging or working as street vendors. The
    Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
    children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1998 Minimum Wages Act
    established a minimum wage of about $1.10 (TT$7.00) per hour. The
    minimum wage is not sufficient to support a worker and family, but most
    workers earn more than the minimum. The Ministry of Labor enforces the
    minimum wage regulations.
        The Minimum Wages Act also established a 40-hour workweek, time-
    and-one-half pay for the first 4 hours of overtime on a workday, double
    pay for the next 4 hours, and triple pay thereafter. For Sundays,
    holidays, and off days, the act also provides for double pay for the
    first 8 hours and triple pay thereafter. Daily rest periods and paid
    annual leave form part of most employment agreements.
        The Factories and Ordinance Bill of 1948 sets requirements for
    health and safety standards in certain industries and provides for
    inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The Industrial Relations
    Act protects workers who file complaints with the Ministry of Labor
    regarding illegal or hazardous working conditions. If it is determined
    upon inspection that hazardous conditions exist in the workplace, the
    worker is absolved for refusing to comply with an order that would have
    placed him or her in danger.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--While there are no laws that
    specifically address trafficking in persons, the illegality of such
    acts is covered broadly in a variety of legislation dealing with
    kidnaping, labor conditions, pimping and prostitution, slavery, and
    indentured servitude. There were no reports of persons being trafficked
    to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    URUGUAY

        Uruguay is a constitutional republic with an elected president and
    a bicameral legislature. In November 1999, voters elected Senator Jorge
    Batlle of the Colorado party President, and he assumed office on March
    1. In legislative elections in October 1999, the left-of-center Broad
    Front coalition won approximately 40 percent of the vote in a four-
    party race, thus constituting the largest congressional bloc. The two
    traditional parties, the Colorados and the Blancos, which collaborate
    in a coalition-style arrangement, together control over half of the
    seats in the legislature. The judiciary is independent.
        The Interior Ministry administers the country's police departments
    and the prison system and is responsible for domestic security and
    public safety. The military is responsible for external security within
    the prison system. The civilian authorities exercise effective control
    over the security forces. The police at times committed human rights
    abuses.
        The economy is a mixture of private and state enterprises and is
    heavily dependent on agricultural exports and agroindustry. The leading
    exports are meat, leather, and rice. The Government respects private
    property rights. The unemployment rate was estimated at 14.4 percent in
    November. The economy shrank by between 0.5 and 1 percent during the
    year, following a decline of 3.2 percent in 1999. Annual per capita
    income was about $6,348 in 1999.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary generally provide effective means
    of dealing with individual instances of abuse. However, there were
    problems in some areas, principally instances of police abuse and
    mistreatment of detainees, poor prison conditions, and delays in the
    justice system. Court cases sometimes last for many years, resulting in
    lengthy pretrial detention. In August the President created a Peace
    Commission to clarify what happened to about 160 persons who
    disappeared for political reasons during the 1973-85 military
    dictatorship. Violence against women and societal discrimination
    against women and the black minority are problems. In September the
    police arrested the leader of a small neo-Nazi group.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        The 1986 Amnesty Law prohibits criminal prosecution of members of
    the security forces who perpetrated extrajudicial killings, torture,
    and other abuses during the 12 years of military rule in 1973-85.
    However, some victims and relatives of victims had success using the
    civilian courts to seek redress.
        In the case initiated in 1999 by the widow of a criminal suspect
    who in 1998 died under suspicious circumstances while in police
    custody, the court dismissed charges against the principal suspect.
    Although an appellate court ordered the trial court to investigate the
    causes of the criminal suspect's death, the judge and prosecutor
    shelved the investigation.
        The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice was pending in the
    case of 12 former political prisoners and their families who sued the
    Government for damages suffered as a result of their imprisonment,
    torture, and in three cases death in custody during the military
    dictatorship. Although in 1998 a trial-level court ordered the
    Government to pay each plaintiff approximately $93,600 (1.17 million
    pesos) in damages, an appellate-level court later reduced this award to
    approximately $16,850 (210,600 pesos) per person for 11 of the cases
    and $23,640 (295,500 pesos) for the other case. The plaintiffs have
    appealed the appellate court's decision to the Supreme Court of
    Justice.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        Although the 1986 Amnesty Law required the Government to
    investigate the fate of those citizens who were detained and who then
    disappeared during the dictatorship, the first three administrations
    following the return to democracy consistently refused to do so. During
    the year, the new Government for the first time undertook such an
    effort.
        On August 9, President Batlle created a Peace Commission in order
    to clarify the fate of the approximately 160 Uruguayans believed to
    have disappeared for political reasons during the dictatorship (115 in
    Argentina, 36 in Uruguay, 6 in Chile, and 2 in Paraguay). The
    Commission was charged with receiving and analyzing information
    relevant to the disappeared persons. It is to prepare individual
    summaries of its conclusions as to the fate of each person and to
    recommend legal measures that the Government should adopt to compensate
    the families of the victims and resolve the victims' legal status, such
    as by declaring them legally dead. The Commission consists of six
    members appointed by the President and operates under the supervision
    of the office of the President. One retired military officer told the
    press that ``hundreds'' of current and retired officers serving during
    the period of military rule had adopted a pact of silence with regard
    to the disappearances. Although the Commission was created for an
    initial mandate of 120 days, in early December its mandate was extended
    for an additional 4-month period.
        Shortly after taking office, President Batlle personally intervened
    to resolve one of the most high-profile cases of a disappeared person,
    that of the granddaughter of Argentine poet Juan Gelman. By combining
    information provided by Gelman with information obtained from other
    sources, Batlle succeeded in locating the young woman, who had been
    born in captivity in Uruguay to Gelman's daughter-in-law and adopted by
    an Uruguayan family after her mother died in prison.
        Since the 1986 Amnesty Law precludes criminal actions against
    suspected participants in human rights violations during military rule,
    some persons have sought justice in non-Uruguayan courts. In March
    1999, Sara Mendez filed papers in an Argentine court formally accusing
    five present and former members of the Uruguayan military with the 1976
    kidnaping of her infant from her Buenos Aires home. The case remained
    pending in Argentine courts and, during the course of the year, Mendez
    gave testimony on several occasions. A DNA sample taken in May from a
    young man believed possibly to have been Mendez' kidnaped son indicated
    that he was not related to Mendez. An Italian prosecutor continued to
    investigate charges brought in an Italian court in 1999 against four
    present and former members of the military and one police officer
    accused of responsibility in the disappearance of eight Italian-
    Uruguayan dual nationals.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits brutal treatment of prisoners,
    but the police continued at times to commit abuses. On occasion such
    abuse resulted in forced confessions (see Section 1.d.).
        The judicial and parliamentary branches of government are
    responsible for investigating specific allegations of abuse. An
    internal police investigative unit receives complaints from any person
    concerning possible noncriminal police abuse of power, but it is
    understaffed and only can issue recommendations for disciplinary
    action. While the courts seldom convicted and punished law enforcement
    officials for such abuse in the past, such prosecutions were occurring
    more frequently. In the first 5 months of the year, the authorities
    prosecuted approximately 40 police officers for a variety of crimes,
    typically involving corruption, excessive use of force, or theft of
    suspects' property. They brought homicide charges against one officer,
    who shot and killed a neighbor who had a dispute with the officer's
    brother-in-law.
        Police officers charged with less serious crimes may continue on
    active duty; those charged with more serious crimes are separated from
    active service until a court resolves their cases. A 1999 Ministry of
    Interior study reported that courts had investigated or convicted 179
    police officers, and that 117 of these cases were linked directly to
    the exercise of their jobs. The 1995 Public Security Law requires a
    proportional use of force by the police and the use of weapons only as
    a last resort, in accordance with U.N. codes regarding the use of
    force.
        Some torture victims and relatives of victims continued to use the
    courts to seek redress for their grievances. A group of 12 former
    political prisoners (and their survivors) appealed the decision of an
    appellate court to reduce the award made by a trial court for the
    damages that they suffered due to their imprisonment and torture (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Conditions in prisons for the approximately 4,450 prisoners remain
    poor but not life threatening. A 1997 legislative human rights
    commission report criticized the ``excessive use of force and abuse of
    authority'' by prison guards and officials, and stated that sanitation
    and health standards in the prison system were ``unacceptable.'' This
    report reflected the work of a previous commission that in 1996
    published a report to the Government citing overcrowding, lack of staff
    training, corruption, and physical violence as problems. Prisoners
    often find that they must supplement prison provisions with bedding,
    medicines, and toiletries brought by friends or relatives. According to
    press reports and a study conducted by SERPAJ, a nongovernmental
    organization (NGO), HIV-positive inmates sometimes received inadequate
    medical treatment. There were several incidents of prisoner unrest
    during the year, including at least one hunger strike in which several
    hundred prisoners demanded better prison conditions, but none were as
    serious as the incidents of unrest that occurred in 1999.
        Female prisoners are held in separate facilities from male
    prisoners; most are held in a women's prison in Montevideo. Some
    provincial prisons have separate facilities for their small number of
    female prisoners. In general conditions for female prisoners are
    significantly better than for male prisoners, in large part because of
    the small number of female inmates.
        Minors are held in institutions operated by the National Institute
    for Minors (INAME). The most controversial aspect of the 1995 Public
    Security Law would allow the Government to put minors with a record of
    violent crimes in adult prisons if INAME has no room in its own
    institutions. Even though the law stipulates that minors would occupy
    separate facilities within the prisons, human rights groups adamantly
    opposed this provision. As a result, INAME has decided that it will not
    send minors to adult prisons. Juvenile offenders are separated
    according to their gender, age, and the severity of their crime. Those
    juveniles who commit serious crimes are incarcerated in juvenile
    detention centers, which resemble traditional jails and have cells.
    Conditions in these facilities are generally better than those in
    ordinary jails, in part because they are less crowded. Juvenile
    offenders who pose less of a threat to society are placed in halfway
    house facilities, oriented toward rehabilitation, in which a group of
    offenders lives together with adult counselors. These facilities
    provide educational, vocational, and other opportunities, and the
    juvenile offenders are able to enter and leave without restriction.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors,
    although prisoner unrest, as well as the requirement to route all such
    requests through the Ministry of Interior, at times caused delays.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    requires the police to have a written warrant issued by a judge before
    making an arrest, and the authorities generally respect this provision
    in practice. The only exception is when the police apprehend the
    accused during commission of a crime. The Constitution also provides
    the accused with the right to a judicial determination of the legality
    of detention and requires that the detaining authority explain the
    legal grounds for the detention. In June the President signed a new law
    that obligates police officers to inform individuals of the reason for
    their arrest. Police may hold a detainee incommunicado for 24 hours
    before presenting the case to a judge, at which time the detainee has
    the right to counsel. It is during this 24-hour period that police
    sometimes abuse prisoners, occasionally resulting in forced confessions
    (see Section 1.c.).
        A 1980 law stipulates that police confessions obtained before a
    prisoner appears before a judge and attorney (without the police
    present) have no validity. Further, should a prisoner claim that he has
    been mistreated, by law the judge must investigate the charge.
        If the detainee cannot afford a lawyer, the courts appoint a public
    defender. If the crime carries a penalty of at least 2 years in prison,
    the accused person is confined during the judge's investigation of the
    charges unless the authorities agree to release the person on bail
    (which seldom happens). As a result, as of mid-year approximately 73
    percent of all persons incarcerated were awaiting a final decision in
    their case (compared with 68 percent in mid-1999). However, this
    proportion used to be 90 percent; declines in recent years are due to
    the Government's efforts to improve the functioning of the criminal
    justice system. Because of the slowness of the judicial process, the
    length of time prisoners spend in jail before the judge issues a
    verdict may exceed the maximum sentence for their crime. The
    uncertainty as to how long one will be imprisoned is a factor creating
    tension within the country's prisons.
        The Government does not use forced exile as a means of punishment.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The Supreme Court heads the judiciary system and supervises the
    work of the lower courts. A parallel military court system operates
    under a Military Justice Code. Two military justices sit on the Supreme
    Court but participate only in cases involving the military. Military
    justice applies to civilians only during a state of war or
    insurrection.
        Trial proceedings usually are based on written arguments to the
    judge, which are not made public routinely. Only the prosecutor and
    defense attorney have access to all documents that form part of the
    written record. The courts introduced oral argument in 1990, but
    individual judges use it at their option. Most judges choose to retain
    the written method, a major factor slowing the judicial process. There
    is no legal provision against self-incrimination, and judges may compel
    defendants to answer any question they pose. Either the defense
    attorney or the prosecutor may appeal convictions to a higher court,
    which may acquit the person of the crime, confirm the conviction, or
    reduce or increase the sentence.
        A 1997 law to reform and modernize the Criminal Code provides for
    more oral argument by prosecution and defense attorneys, less
    investigative responsibility for judges, and is expected to accelerate
    the pace of criminal trials. Although the law was to take effect in
    1998, budget constraints have resulted in repeated postponement of its
    implementation, and it is not scheduled for implementation until 2004.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, but the authorities may abridge
    these rights if persons are deemed to be inciting violence or
    ``insulting the nation.''
        All elements of the political spectrum freely express their
    viewpoints in both print and broadcast media.
        Montevideo has 5 daily newspapers and 9 important weeklies; there
    are also approximately 80 other weekly and a few daily newspapers
    throughout the country. Montevideo has one government-affiliated and
    three commercial television stations. There are about 150 radio
    stations, 25 television stations, and 250 cable television stations in
    the country.
        A 1989 law stipulates that expression and communication of thoughts
    and opinions are free, within the limits contained in the Constitution,
    and it outlines methods of responding to ``inexact or aggravating
    information.'' The law calls for 3 months' to 2 years' imprisonment for
    ``knowingly divulging false news that causes a grave disturbance to the
    public peace or a grave prejudice to economic interests of the State''
    or for ``insulting the nation, the State, or their powers.'' The
    authorities use this law intermittently to set and enforce certain
    limits on freedom of the press.
        Human rights activists and journalists have alleged that state
    enterprises such as the telephone and electric companies on occasion
    have withheld advertising from independent media that are critical of
    the Government and have favored media friendly to the Government with
    extensive paid advertising.
        In February Nery Colombo, a former local official seeking
    reelection, shot and killed journalist and radio station owner Julio
    Cesar da Rosa, after the latter suggested in a broadcast that the
    former was unfit to run for public office. Colombo committed suicide
    immediately after the killing. On the night of May 2, unknown
    assailants shot at journalist and political activist Julio Cesar
    Sanchez Padilla while he was driving his car. Sanchez was not injured,
    and the authorities were unable to identify the perpetrators of, or a
    motive for, the attack.
        In August the press association criticized the newspaper
    distributors' union for a 1-day refusal to distribute one newspaper
    (see Section 6.a.).
        The national university is autonomous, and the authorities respect
    academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        In May, as in prior years, thousands of persons marched in memory
    of the persons who disappeared during the rule of the dictatorship.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government grants refugee status in accordance with the 1951
    U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. The Government grants asylum only for political crimes as set
    forth in the 1928 Treaty of Havana, the 1889 Treaty of Montevideo, and
    the 1954 Caracas Convention. The Government cooperates with the office
    of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government grants
    first asylum in cases in which a refugee's claims are verified by the
    UNHCR. The Government works actively with international organizations
    in the provision of temporary protection to refugees from Colombia.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The country is a multiparty democracy with
    mandatory voting for those 18 years of age or older, and there are no
    suffrage restrictions regarding race, sex, religion, or economic
    status. The Colorado party, the National (Blanco) party, the Broad
    Front coalition, and the New Space party are the four major political
    groupings.
        Women and minorities are under-represented in politics and
    government. None of the 13 cabinet ministers are women, and only 3 of
    30 senators and 13 of 99 deputies are women. There are no female
    justices on the Supreme Court. There has never been a black
    parliamentarian or cabinet-level official except in July when, for the
    first time, an Afro-Uruguayan elected as an alternate deputy
    substituted in legislative sessions for an absent deputy for
    approximately 10 days.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
    cooperative and responsive to their views.
        In August the President created a Peace Commission to clarify what
    happened to the persons who disappeared for political reasons during
    the 1973-85 military dictatorship (see Section 1.b.).
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on race,
    sex, religion, or disability. Despite these provisions, discrimination
    against some groups exists.
        Women.--Violence against women continues to be a serious problem. A
    1999 Ministry of Public Health study projected that within 5 years,
    domestic violence would constitute the second most prevalent threat to
    public health, after traffic accidents. In a 1997 poll of 545 urban and
    suburban households, 47 percent of respondents reported physical or
    psychological abuse from their partners, with 23 percent reporting
    severe abuse. The law provides for sentences of 6 months to 2 years in
    prison for a person found guilty of committing an act of violence or of
    making continuing threats to cause bodily injury to persons related
    emotionally or legally to the perpetrator. The Montevideo city hall's
    hot line for victims of domestic violence received about 4,500
    complaints during the year, compared with 5,975 complaints in 1999.
    Persons calling the hot line are provided counseling, free legal
    advice, and may be referred to NGO's that can provide further social
    services. A new law signed in June increased sentences for rape and
    certain other sexually related crimes. The Criminal Code covers spousal
    abuse and spousal rape, although criminal charges rarely are initiated
    for those crimes. Similarly, although the law prohibits sexual
    harassment in the workplace, few complaints are ever filed under this
    provision.
        The Government has established an office of assistance for victims
    of domestic violence that trains police how to resolve complaints of
    violence against women. A directorate within the Ministry of Interior
    instituted a public awareness campaign about domestic violence and
    founded community assistance centers where abuse victims receive
    information and referrals to government and private organizations in
    their area that aid abused women. Both the Ministry of Interior and
    NGO's operate shelters in which abused women and their families can
    seek temporary refuge.
        Women enjoy equality under the law but face discrimination stemming
    from traditional attitudes and practices. The work force exhibits
    segregation by gender. Women, who make up almost one-half the work
    force, tend to be concentrated in lower paying jobs. Women's salaries
    average two-thirds those of men, a figure that reflects gradual
    improvement in recent years with respect to pay equity. In 1999 about
    60 percent of the students at the public university were women. Women
    often pursue professional careers but are underrepresented in
    traditionally male-dominated professions. In 1997 the Government
    approved regulations to implement a 1989 law for equality in the
    workplace that had previously gone unenforced, and it formed a national
    commission for workplace equality that includes representatives from
    the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education and Culture, chambers
    of commerce, and the umbrella labor organization. However, there never
    have been any cases brought under the new regulations. There were 13
    female cadets enrolled in the Air Force Academy's 75-member student
    body, representing nearly a doubling of the female enrollment since
    1999. Four female cadets are expected to receive commissions as pilots
    or navigators in the air force during the year. The Army Military
    Academy has 27 female cadets, out of a total enrollment of
    approximately 225. The Naval Academy admitted its first female cadet
    during the year.
        A small institute in the Ministry of Education coordinates
    government programs for women. There are a number of active women's
    rights groups, and many of their activities remained centered on
    followup to the platform of action of the 1995 U.N. Conference on
    Women.
        Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
    children's rights and welfare, and it regards the education and health
    of children as a top priority. An institute in the Ministry of Interior
    oversees implementation of the Government's programs for children but
    receives only limited funding for programs. An estimated 40 percent of
    children under the age of 5 live in the poorest 20 percent of homes.
    The Government is attempting to extend proper health care and education
    to them with the help of UNICEF. The Government provides free,
    compulsory primary and secondary education, and 95 percent of children
    complete their primary education. Girls and boys are treated similarly.
    Free education is available through the undergraduate level at the
    national university.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Minors under the
    age of 18 are not subject to criminal trial but receive special
    treatment with special judges and, when sentenced, stay in institutions
    run by the National Institute for Minors for the period determined by
    the judge. The INAME-run institutions emphasize the rehabilitation of
    minors. INAME maintains an extensive network of programs, including
    shelters for at-risk children. INAME also operates a confidential hot
    line for children who are victims of domestic abuse.
        A draft Code of the Child, intended to bring the law into
    compliance with the provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
    the Child, was introduced into the new legislative session during the
    year. The previous legislative session ended before a prior version of
    the bill could be enacted into law.
        People with Disabilities.--A national disabilities commission
    oversees implementation of a 1989 law on the rights of the disabled.
    Although the law mandates accessibility for disabled persons only to
    new buildings or public services, the Government is providing access to
    a number of existing buildings. The law reserves 4 percent of public
    sector jobs for the disabled. There is no governmental discrimination
    against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision
    of other state services. The country has a generally excellent mental
    health system and an interest in the rights of persons with mental
    disabilities.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's black minority,
    estimated at 5.9 percent of the population, continues to face societal
    discrimination. A government study conducted in 1996-97 found that the
    unemployment rate for blacks was 1.5 times the rate for whites. The
    National Institute of Statistics found that blacks earn an average of
    20 percent less than whites who perform the same job. According to a
    recent study published by Mundo Afro (an NGO), the illiteracy rate
    among black women is twice the national average, and the percentage of
    black women who have pursued higher education is one-third the rate in
    the population at large. According to the same study, one-half of Afro-
    Uruguayan women work as household domestics. Blacks are practically
    unrepresented in the bureaucratic and academic sectors.
        Religious Minorities.--Isolated neo-Nazi elements have carried out
    occasional, limited attacks and activities since 1997. Law enforcement
    authorities have responded vigorously to such activities. In August
    1999, an intensive police investigation resulted in the arrest of eight
    members of a very small neo-Nazi group suspected of creating racist and
    anti-Semitic Internet websites. The authorities charged five of the
    suspects with subversive association; two also were charged with
    inciting hate or violence towards a particular group. Pending the
    court's final decision in the case, the defendants were released after
    serving approximately 3 months of imprisonment, the minimum statutory
    penalty for first offenders in cases of this nature. In September the
    police arrested and charged with inciting racial hatred the leader of
    another small neo-Nazi group believed responsible for pro-Nazi
    propagandizing.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution states that laws
    should promote the organization of trade unions and the creation of
    arbitration bodies; however, there is almost no legislation concerning
    union activities. Unions traditionally organize and operate free of
    government regulation. Civil servants, employees of state-run
    enterprises, and private enterprise workers may join unions. An
    estimated 15 percent of the work force is unionized. Labor unions are
    independent of political party control but traditionally have
    associated more closely with the Broad Front, the leftist political
    coalition.
        The Constitution provides workers with the right to strike, and
    there were numerous strikes during the year. The Government may legally
    compel workers to work during a strike if they perform an essential
    service which, if interrupted, ``could cause a grave prejudice or risk,
    provoking suffering to part or all of the society.'' In June the
    umbrella labor confederation PIT/CNT organized a 1-day general strike.
    In December the PIT/CNT organized a second 1-day general strike to
    protest the Government's 5-year austerity budget proposal.
        In August after the newspaper El Pais printed a story reporting on
    high costs charged by the newspaper distributors' union, the union
    refused to distribute El Pais for 1 day in protest. The union asserted
    that it was being blamed for the demise of newspapers, while the press
    association called the protest an assault on freedom of the press.
        There are mechanisms for resolving workers' complaints against
    employers, but unions complained that these mechanisms sometimes were
    applied arbitrarily. The law generally prohibits discriminatory acts by
    employers, including arbitrary dismissals for union activity. Unions
    maintain that organizers are dismissed for fabricated reasons, thus
    allowing employers to avoid penalty under the law.
        There are no restrictions on the right of unions to form
    confederations or to affiliate with international trade union groups;
    however, the one national confederation has chosen not to affiliate
    officially with any of the world federations. Some individual unions
    are affiliated with international trade secretariats.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining between companies and their unions determines a number of
    private sector salaries. The executive branch, acting independently,
    determines public sector salaries. There are no laws prohibiting
    antiunion discrimination, but a 1993 executive decree established fines
    for employers engaging in antiunion activities. The law does not
    require employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
    However, in cases of legal challenges by union activists, courts tend
    to impose indemnization levels that are higher than those normally paid
    to dismissed workers.
        Union members continued to file claims of discrimination with the
    Ministry of Labor, which has a labor commission that investigates all
    claims. In 1999 there were 16 claims of antiunion discrimination
    submitted to the Ministry of Labor. (The Ministry's mediation service
    received a total of 353 laborrelated complaints that year, of which it
    successfully mediated 307 cases and failed to resolve 31 cases; 15
    remained open at the end of that year. Nearly half of all complaints
    related to workers' wages.) While there was no specific information on
    the antiunion discrimination complaints, most were resolved through
    rehiring the employee with full rights or compensation of the employee
    (without being rehired). Most complaints are resolved within a few
    months, but a few cases remained unresolved at year's end. Labor unions
    have complained that some businesses have encouraged formation of
    worker cooperatives, which serve to reduce their labor costs. Although
    such cooperatives do not necessarily affect workers' social insurance
    and other public benefits, they can reduce workers' job security and
    result in a loss of seniority. They also weaken the power of trade
    unions and of collective bargaining.
        All labor legislation fully covers workers employed in special
    export zones. There are no unions in any of these zones, but the few
    workers in these zones are not in traditionally organizable
    occupations.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
    law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Child Labor Code protects children; the Ministry of
    Labor and Social Security is responsible for enforcing the law. Some
    children work as street vendors in the expanding informal sector or in
    the agrarian sector, which generally are regulated less strictly and
    where pay is lower; however, illegal child labor is not a major
    problem. By law minors under the age of 14 may not be granted
    permission to work, and this is enforced in practice. Minors between
    the ages of 14 and 15 are granted permission to work only in extremely
    rare circumstances and even then usually only to work with other
    members of their families. Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 require
    government permission to work, and such permission is not granted for
    dangerous, fatiguing, or night work.
        Permission to work is only granted to minors who have completed 9
    years of compulsory education or who remain enrolled in school and are
    working toward completing the period of compulsory education. A total
    of 95 percent of children complete primary school education, which is
    free and compulsory. Controls over salaries and hours for children are
    more strict than those for adults. Children over the age of 16 may sue
    in court for payment of wages, and children have the legal right to
    dispose of their own income. In conjunction with an NGO, in March INAME
    began a pilot program to pay families $83 (1,000 pesos) per month to
    parents who take their children off the streets and send them to
    school. This amount approximates what a child might earn working on the
    street. On December 8, the Government created a National Committee for
    the Eradication of Child Labor, which is to create a national action
    plan to combat it.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the
    Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor
    effectively enforces a legislated minimum monthly wage which is in
    effect in both the public and private sectors. The Ministry adjusts the
    minimum wage whenever it adjusts public sector wages. The minimum wage,
    which was set in January at about $86 (1,060 pesos) per month,
    functions more as an index for calculating wage rates than as a true
    measure of minimum subsistence levels, and it would not provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. The vast majority of
    workers earn more than the minimum wage.
        The standard workweek is 48 hours in industry and 44 hours in
    commerce, with a 36-hour break each week. The law stipulates that
    industrial workers receive overtime compensation for work in excess of
    48 hours and that workers are entitled to 20 days of paid vacation
    after a year of employment.
        The law protects foreign workers and does not discriminate against
    them. However, in order to receive official protection, the companies
    that employ foreign workers must report them as employees. Many
    workers--both native and foreign--work off the books and thus forfeit
    certain legal protection.
        The Ministry of Labor and Social Security enforces legislation
    regulating health and safety conditions in a generally effective
    manner. However, some of the regulations cover urban industrial workers
    more adequately than rural and agricultural workers. Workers have the
    right to remove themselves from what they consider hazardous or
    dangerous conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws specifically
    addressing trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
    persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                   VENEZUELA

        Venezuela is a republic with an elected president and a unicameral
    congress. The Constitution, which entered into effect on December 30,
    1999, also provides for a ``Citizen Power'' branch of government, which
    includes the Ombudsman, the Public Prosecutor, and the Controller
    General, and an ``electoral power''--the National Electoral Council
    (CNE). On July 30, voters reelected President Hugo Chavez Frias of the
    Fifth Republic Movement (MVR). The MVR also won 92 seats in the 165-
    member legislature. According to international observers, the year's
    general elections were generally free and fair; however, there were
    localized technical problems and irregularities, and the process
    leading to the elections was a controversial and difficult one. The
    date for the elections originally was set for May 28, but as that date
    approached it became increasingly apparent that the CNE had failed to
    organize the elections adequately. Constant changes to the voter
    database--which both the opposition and nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's) alleged were intended to offer electoral advantage to President
    Chavez's supporters--made it impossible to complete programming of the
    electronic voting machines or carry out other necessary steps. The
    Supreme Court ordered a delay and gave responsibility for setting the
    new date to the National Legislative Committee (a panel serving as the
    country's legislature pending election of the National Assembly). The
    civilian judiciary is legally independent; however, it is highly
    inefficient and sometimes corrupt, and judges are subject to influence
    from a number of sources.
        The security apparatus includes civilian and military elements,
    both accountable to elected authorities. The Interior and Justice
    Ministry controls the Judicial Technical Police (PTJ), which conducts
    most criminal investigations, and the State Security Police (DISIP),
    which is primarily responsible for investigating cases of corruption,
    subversion, and arms trafficking. The Defense Ministry controls the
    General Directorate for Military Intelligence, which is responsible for
    collecting intelligence related to national security and sovereignty.
    The National Guard, an active branch of the military, has arrest powers
    and is largely responsible for guarding the exterior of prisons and key
    government installations, maintaining public order, monitoring
    frontiers, conducting counterdrug operations, and providing law
    enforcement in remote areas. It also supplies the top leadership for
    various state and municipal police forces, which fall under the
    authority of the respective state governors or municipal mayors. The
    Metropolitan Police is the main civilian police force in and around
    Caracas. There was continued controversy during the year over the use
    of the armed forces in traditionally nonmilitary roles in government
    and society, including the appointment of military officers to high-
    ranking government positions. Some 70,000 members of the military
    continued to participate in a public works program begun in 1999,
    including conducting a census of the unemployed; providing medical care
    to the needy; renovating schools, playgrounds, and medical care
    centers; and removing garbage. At year's end, 3 of the 14 members of
    the President's Cabinet, including the Minister of Defense, were either
    active or retired career military officers, as were the presidents of
    the major state-owned corporations Petroleos de Venezuela, CITGO, and
    Corporacion Venezolana de Guyana. There are also a number of military
    officers in high and mid-ranking government positions in agencies
    responsible for social development, public works, and finance. Both
    police and military personnel were responsible for human rights abuses
    during the year.
        The country has abundant natural resources, and its per capita
    gross domestic product (GDP) is $4,302. However, income is distributed
    unevenly with approximately 80 percent of the population living at or
    below the poverty line, which is $1,986 per capita. Oil accounted for
    27 percent of GDP, 53 percent of government revenues, and 84 percent of
    the country's exports during the year. Nonoil exports also are
    dominated by natural resources, with some basic refining. Iron,
    aluminum, steel, and petrochemical products together comprise nearly
    half of the country's nonoil exports. The vast majority of all natural
    resource extraction and production is done by entities owned and
    operated wholly or in part by the Government. During the year, the
    economy began to recover from its deepest recession in 10 years as oil
    prices increased from historic lows to the highest prices since the oil
    crises of the 1970's. Growth for the year is estimated at 3.2 percent;
    the economy contracted by 6.1 percent in 1999.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor in some areas;
    although there were improvements in some areas, serious problems
    remain. During the year, the police and military committed
    extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects at an increased rate.
    Excessive use of deadly force by police and security forces was a
    serious problem; over 2,000 suspected criminals were killed in
    shootouts with the police during the first 8 months of the year.
    Investigations continued into the forced disappearances of criminal
    suspects by the security forces. Torture and abuse of detainees
    continued, and the Government failed to punish police and security
    officers guilty of abuse. While overcrowding was reduced in some
    prisons, prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to
    underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff, violence, and
    overcrowding in some prisons so severe as to constitute inhuman and
    degrading treatment. Arbitrary arrest and detention increased. Lengthy
    pretrial detention, and corruption and severe inefficiency in the
    judicial and law enforcement systems also were problems. The Government
    struggled to implement the Organic Criminal Procedures Code (COPP),
    which required a major shift from a secretive inquisitorial system to
    an open adversarial system; however, there were successes including a
    reduction in the number of prisoners who had not been convicted of a
    crime. The authorities suspended a number of judges for incompetence or
    corruption. The December 1999 Constitution established civilian trials
    for soldiers accused of abuses and committed the Government to the
    rulings of international courts. Security forces committed illegal
    searches. Concern over freedom of the press increased, and some critics
    charged that the Government intimidated the media. Self-censorship was
    reportedly widespread. Concern over freedom of association increased,
    due in part to a Supreme Court ruling that could limit the legal rights
    of some associations. The Government described some refugees as
    ``displaced persons in transit'' and restricted their ability to
    request asylum. The new Constitution created a national Ombudsman, who
    repeatedly and frankly advocated for the respect of human rights.
    Violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children,
    discrimination against the disabled, and inadequate protection of the
    rights of indigenous people continue to be problems. Concern over labor
    rights increased, and on December 3, voters approved a referendum to
    ``overhaul'' union leadership. Child labor persisted, and there were
    reports of trafficking in children for forced labor. Killings due to
    vigilante justice increased significantly.
                            respect for human rights
    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of targeted political killings; however, the security forces
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings, primarily of criminal
    suspects, at significantly increased levels. The Venezuelan Program of
    Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), a highly respected human
    rights NGO, documented 170 extrajudicial killings from October 1999
    through September, compared with 101 killings from October 1998 to
    September 1999. The killings involved summary executions of criminal
    suspects, indiscriminate or excessive use of force, and death resulting
    from mistreatment while in custody. According to PROVEA, state police
    forces other than the Metropolitan Police were responsible for 82
    killings; the Metropolitan Police were responsible for 25 killings; the
    PTJ, 25 killings; the National Guard, 9 killings; the municipal police
    forces, 8 killings; the army, 6 killings; the DISIP, 4 killings; and
    other security forces, 11 killings. These figures reflect a range of
    killings in very different situations committed by organizations with
    varying levels of control and responsibilities. The majority of the
    killings were attributed to various state and municipal police forces
    that report to local officials and usually have little training or
    supervision. Excessive use of deadly force was a problem; according to
    the Government, over 2,000 suspected criminals were killed in shootouts
    with the police during the first 8 months of the year. There are
    reports that police fire on criminal suspects who disobey orders to
    halt. Many politicians contributed to a climate of official acceptance
    of the excessive use of force when, during the national election
    campaign, they employed slogans such as ``bullets for the underworld''
    and ``the only good criminal is a dead criminal.''
        The perpetrators of extrajudicial killings act with near impunity,
    as the Government rarely prosecutes such cases. The police often fail
    to investigate crimes allegedly committed by their colleagues and
    characterize incidents of extrajudicial killings as ``confrontations,''
    even when eyewitness testimony and evidence strongly indicate
    otherwise. In addition, the civilian judicial system still is
    struggling to implement the new Organic Criminal Procedures Code and,
    in the meantime, remains highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt (see
    Section 1.e.). In the small number of prosecutions in which the courts
    convict perpetrators of extrajudicial killings and other abuses, the
    sentences issued are frequently light, or the convictions are
    overturned on appeal. The December 1999 Constitution established that
    trials for military personnel charged with human rights abuses would be
    held in civilian courts; however, the provision does not apply to
    military trials for cases that predate the new Constitution (see
    Section 1.e.). Unlike common criminals, members of the security forces
    charged with or convicted of crimes rarely spend much time in prison.
        Red de Apoyo, an NGO, reported that on January 6, the Yaracuy state
    police detained Jaime Hilarion Palima and Richard Lucambio on a city
    street in San Felipe. Hilarion's and Lucambio's bodies were found 5
    days later on a river bed and a highway, respectively. The case was
    under investigation at year's end.
        On April 8, the Metropolitan Police fired indiscriminately at a
    group of individuals who had just seen them shoot and kill a suspected
    criminal, and also killed one of the witnesses, Guillerma Colmenares.
    The police also tortured another witness, Donis Ramirez (see Section
    1.c.). The case was under investigation at year's end.
        On June 30, the Metropolitan Police arrested Ronny Tovar, age 17,
    Francisco Mister, age 14, and Luis Hernandez, age 21, in their homes.
    Witnesses heard shots and saw the bodies of the three young men being
    taken from the scene in a police vehicle. The bodies later were
    recovered, and the case was under investigation at year's end.
        Security forces committed some killings in prisons; however, the
    majority of the 338 inmate deaths during the year resulted from gang
    confrontations, riots, fires, and generally unsanitary and unsafe
    conditions in prison facilities (see Section 1.c.).
        The authorities continued to investigate allegations of human
    rights violations by the military and security forces sent to Vargas
    state in December 1999. The forces were sent to restore order after an
    outbreak of looting following heavy rains, which triggered flooding and
    landslides that killed an estimated 20,000 persons. Witnesses claim
    that military and security forces beat, detained, and killed alleged
    criminal suspects and other individuals between December 19 and
    December 25, 1999 (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., and 4). On May 22,
    Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel stated that confirmed cases of
    these abuses were ``numerous and important.''
        For example, on December 25, 1999, National Guard Corporal Lorenzo
    Badillo Cano shot and killed Luis Bastardo as he celebrated the
    Christmas holiday on a street in La Guaira. The Prosecutor General,
    with the cooperation of the PTJ and the National Guard, successfully
    prosecuted Badillo, who pled guilty to murder and, on September 6, was
    sentenced to 10 years in prison, less than the 15 to 25 years
    established by law. The authorities also are investigating four
    disappearance cases from the same time period in Vargas (see Section
    1.b.).
        There were no prosecutions for the June 1999 death of Jhon Linares,
    who was detained by the Metropolitan Police and later was found dead
    from three bullet wounds at the hospital, or Oswaldo Blanco, who died
    in February 1999 due to abuse by the National Guard.
        At year's end, the trial of a police officer for the February 1999
    death of Angel Castillo Munoz was ongoing. Castillo died when Sucre
    state police broke up a peaceful student demonstration; he was hit in
    the head by a rubber bullet and fell unconscious into an area saturated
    by tear gas. Police reportedly continued to fire, despite students'
    attempts to surrender, resulting in a delay of medical care to the
    injured students.
        The PTJ made no progress in the investigation of the May 1998
    killings of Carlos Alberto Colmenares Garcia, Richard David Palacios
    Garcia, and Avelino Rafael Vega, who died after the Sucre municipal
    police opened fire on their car. There has been no further
    investigation into the January 1998 killings of Harold Michael Zambrano
    Gonzalez and Arturo Jose Hernandez Ramirez by the Metropolitan Police.
        There was no further information on the appeal by the prosecution
    of a court's 1999 decision to exonerate a PTJ member implicated in the
    1995 execution-style killing of 21-year-old Hector Rojas, despite
    evidence of the officer's guilt.
        On August 4, a court convicted two National Guardsmen and one
    prison guard and sentenced them to terms ranging from 15 to 30 years in
    prison for the 1996 deaths of 25 inmates in a fire started by prison
    guards at La Planta prison.
        In March the victims' families and the Government reached an out-
    of-court settlement in the case of the 1992 killings of at least 63
    prisoners at Catia prison.
        In November 1999, before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
    the Government accepted its responsibility in 44 cases of extrajudicial
    killings by security forces during and after the civil unrest of
    February-March 1989, in which some 300 alleged extrajudicial killings
    were committed. The Government also agreed to compensate the families
    of the victims and to identify and punish those responsible; however,
    during the year there was considerable disagreement regarding
    compensation, and an agreement had not been reached at year's end. The
    Committee of Family Members of Victims of the Unrest had referred a
    total of 45 cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
    (IACHR) in 1995. In 1991 a police officer was found guilty of one
    killing, but the courts released the officer from prison 1 year later.
    In October 1997, the IACHR called on the Government to investigate this
    case, provide compensation to the victim's family, and bring to justice
    those responsible for the death. By year's end, the Government had
    complied partially; it had investigated and made a payment, but it had
    not punished any of those responsible.
        Mob lynching of supposed criminals increased significantly due to
    the public's perception of increased impunity resulting from the
    difficult implementation of the COPP. The victims were almost always
    known criminals who preyed on residents of poor neighborhoods. Between
    October 1999 and September, PROVEA recorded 22 lynchings and 107
    attempted lynchings, compared to 2 lynchings and 24 attempted lynchings
    between October 1998 and September 1999. Vigilante groups known as
    ``brigadas'' continued to operate.
        b. Disappearance.--The December 1999 Constitution prohibits forced
    disappearance, obliges an individual to disobey an order to carry out a
    disappearance, and provides for the prosecution of the intellectual
    author of the crime. There were no reports of targeted political
    disappearances; however, there were reliable reports of persons who
    disappeared after being detained by the security forces at the end of
    1999.
        The authorities are investigating allegations that the military and
    security forces carried out forced disappearances of alleged criminal
    suspects and other individuals in Vargas state during a crackdown on
    looters in December 1999. On December 21, 1999, army paratroopers
    separately arrested Oscar Blanco Romero and Marco Monasterio without
    explanation, in their homes in Caraballeda, Vargas state. Following the
    filing of habeas corpus petitions, the army made a formal response in
    which they acknowledged detaining the men but stated that they were
    immediately turned over to the DISIP. The DISIP first stated that they
    had no agents in the area at the time, then reversed that position, but
    stated that they did not have Blanco and Monasterio in detention.
        On December 21, 1999, army paratroopers beat and arrested Jose
    Rivas Fernandez on a city street in Caraballeda, Vargas state,
    according to reliable reports. The army command states that it did not
    detain Rivas. On December 23, 1999, DISIP agents seized Roberto
    Hernandez Paz in his uncle's home in La Guaira, Vargas state. The uncle
    subsequently heard Hernandez plead to the security agents and a gunshot
    coming from the family's garden. Neighbors witnessed the injured victim
    being placed in a DISIP vehicle and driven away. The DISIP stated that
    it did not arrest Hernandez. Neither individual had been located at
    year's end; investigations into both cases continued.
        The Government's investigation of the Vargas cases has been slow
    and disorganized, and charges have been filed in only one case (see
    Section 1.a.). The investigating team has been changed three times,
    with each new team starting a new inquiry afresh. The Government has
    been unable to compel the cooperation of the DISIP. In response to a
    request to provide photographs of the agents who operated in Vargas at
    the time of the disappearances, the DISIP supplied an album that
    included photographs of retired agents, deceased officers, and
    prisoners. Prosecutors also are investigating whether DISIP agents
    broke any laws when they visited army paratroopers and asked questions
    about army officers who had served in Vargas in December 1999. Since
    investigation of the paratroopers is the responsibility of the
    Prosecutor General and the army, the possibility that DISIP agents were
    engaged in witness intimidation is under investigation. Human right
    groups called for obstruction of justice charges to be brought against
    the DISIP to compel its cooperation.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The new Constitution prohibits torture and the holding of
    detainees incommunicado, provides for the prosecution of officials who
    instigate or tolerate torture, and grants victims the right to
    rehabilitation. Under the COPP, detainees have the right to a judicial
    determination of the legality of their detention within 3 days, a
    reduction from the previous 8-day period that human rights groups
    argued was the principal time in which detainees were tortured (see
    Section 1.d.); however, the security forces continue to torture and
    abuse detainees physically and psychologically. Credible human rights
    groups report that this abuse most commonly consists of beatings during
    arrest or interrogation, but there have been incidents when the
    security forces used near suffocation and other forms of torture that
    leave no telltale signs. Most victims come from the poorest and least
    influential parts of society.
        PROVEA documented 429 cases of torture, beatings, and other abuse
    from October 1999 through September, compared with 424 cases from
    October 1998 through September 1999. According to PROVEA, the
    Metropolitan Police of the Caracas federal district were responsible
    for 94 of the reported incidents; other state police forces were
    responsible for 147 incidents; the National Guard, 93 incidents; the
    municipal police forces, 58 incidents; the DISIP, 22 incidents; the
    army, 9 incidents; and the PTJ, 6 incidents. In April 1999, human
    rights NGO's presented a report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture
    in which they documented 120 torture cases since 1987 that they have
    investigated and reported to the Prosecutor General and the National
    Human Rights Commission, but that still have not been investigated
    fully by the Government.
        Torture, like extrajudicial killings, continues because the
    Government does not ensure the independent investigation of complaints
    needed to bring those responsible to justice. In addition to lack of
    vigor by the judiciary, the fact that the Institute of Forensic
    Medicine is part of the PTJ also contributes to a climate of impunity,
    since its doctors are unlikely to be impartial in their examinations of
    cases that involve torture by members of the PTJ. Very few instances of
    torture have resulted in convictions.
        On March 1, according to Red de Apoyo, the Zulia state police
    arrested Jose Matheus in his home and accused him of involvement in a
    kidnaping. The police held Matheus incommunicado for 11 days and
    severely beat him and tortured him psychologically.
        On April 8, the Metropolitan Police tortured and threatened to kill
    Donis Ramirez if she spoke to the authorities. Ramirez had seen the
    police fire indiscriminately at a group of individuals who had just
    witnessed them shoot and kill a suspected criminal, also killing one of
    the witnesses, Guillerma Colmenares (see Section 1.a.).
        There was no prosecution for the August 1999 torture of Juan de la
    Cruz Bravo by the PTJ in Guasdualito. Bravo, who had been accused of
    murder, allegedly was drugged, beaten, and subjected to electrical
    shock. There was also no prosecution for the March 1999 beating of
    Andres Flores by the Metropolitan Police.
        No action ever was reported against some 50 Baruta municipal police
    officers who attacked residents of the poor working class Caracas
    suburb of Petare in December 1997, injuring 43 persons. There was no
    reported progress from the criminal court investigation or the internal
    investigation by the chief of the Baruta municipal police.
        The police used tear gas and pellet guns against peaceful
    demonstrators, resulting in some injuries (see Section 2.b.).
        In the Colombian border area where some constitutional protections
    had been suspended since 1994, the National Guard and army acted with
    near impunity until the suspension of the protections was lifted in
    1999. Complaints against the security forces in this area subsequently
    decreased. The Support Network for Justice and Peace has documented
    many human rights abuses in this region by amassing detailed witness
    testimony. There has been no resolution of the border area cases from
    1995, in which members of the military, in separate incidents in
    reaction to guerrilla attacks, tortured 23 rural workers near Cararabo
    and 19 peasant farmers in La Victoria, both in Apure state. The
    investigations into these incidents continued at year's end.
        Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh due to
    underfunding, poorly trained and corrupt prison staff and National
    Guard members, violence, and overcrowding in some prisons so severe as
    to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. During the year, the
    prison population decreased to 84 percent of capacity, due to the
    implementation of the COPP. However, because of the poor distribution
    of inmates, approximately 40 percent of prisoners still are housed in
    seriously overcrowded facilities.
        The Government failed to provided adequate security in prisons,
    resulting, according to PROVEA, in 338 deaths and 1,255 injuries from
    violence in jails from October 1999 through September 2000--a decrease
    from a total of 390 deaths and 1,695 injuries from violence between
    October 1998 and September 1999. The majority of the 338 inmate deaths
    resulted from prisoner-on-prisoner violence, especially during clashes
    between rival gangs, riots, fires, and generally unsafe conditions in
    prison facilities. Many others died as a consequence of poor sanitary
    conditions, poor diet, and inadequate medical care. Security forces
    committed a small number of the killings in prisons. Prisoners also had
    false expectations with respect to the benefits of the COPP, which
    resulted in increasing levels of tension and violence. Funding for
    prisons remained extremely low, preventing significant improvement in
    most penitentiaries.
        Inmates often have to pay guards as well as each other to obtain
    necessities such as space in a cell, a bed, and food. Because of the
    prison food's low quality and insufficient quantity, only about 30
    percent of inmates consume it. Most prisoners get their food from their
    families, by paying prison guards, or in barter with other prisoners.
    Many inmates also profit from exploiting and abusing others. This
    problem is exacerbated by the absence of a rational system of prisoner
    classification: convicted murders and rapists are housed with
    unsentenced first-time petty offenders. Gang-related violence and
    extortion is fueled by the substantial trafficking in arms and drugs
    that occurs in the prisons.
        Female prisoners are detained in separate prisons, where conditions
    generally are better than those in the men's facilities. Security
    forces and law enforcement authorities often detain minors together
    with adults; however, separate facilities exist for juveniles. Because
    reform institutions are filled to capacity, hundreds of children
    accused of infractions are confined in juvenile detention centers where
    they are crowded into small, filthy cells, fed only once a day, and
    forced to sleep on bare concrete floors.
        On August 31, the prison emergency, which had been declared on
    September 30, 1999, was ended, and the Interinstitutional Commission
    managing it was disbanded. Despite resistance from the Catholic Church
    and NGO's, the Government sporadically used the National Guard,
    normally charged with guarding the outside of the prisons, to maintain
    internal control of the prisons.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
    COPP provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
    the security forces routinely continued to arrest and detain citizens
    arbitrarily at an increased rate.
        There continued to be arbitrary detentions by the Metropolitan
    Police of the federal district of Caracas, the DISIP, municipal police
    forces, the National Guard, and the PTJ--especially during anticrime
    sweeps in impoverished sections of major cities. The authorities
    detained persons during the sweeps for up to 2 days while they checked
    criminal records; most were released without charges. PROVEA documented
    8,981 persons detained in sweeps from October 1999 through September,
    an increase from the 6,236 persons detained in sweeps from October 1998
    through September 1999.
        Amnesty International reported that in September, police in
    Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered persons, who were
    held incommunicado for 2 days without food or drinking water (see
    Section 5).
        In December 1999, security forces arbitrarily detained suspected
    looters in Vargas state (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 4).
        The COPP states that a person accused of a crime cannot be
    incarcerated during criminal proceedings unless that person is caught
    in the act of committing a crime, or a judge determines that there is a
    danger that the accused may flee or impede the investigation. Under the
    previous system, the police could hold persons without an arrest
    warrant for up to 8 days, and in many cases, the police abused
    detainees physically and psychologically during that period and
    illegally held them incommunicado (see Section 1.c.). The law provides
    for the right to a judicial determination of the legality of the
    detention within 72 hours. Persons accused of crimes must be brought
    before a judge within 24 hours of arrest or be freed pending charges.
    In early March, the Government announced that pretrial hearings would
    be held on weekends to allow the authorities to process detainees in
    accordance with the COPP's provisions, rather than release suspected
    criminals. In no case can the detention of a person accused of a crime
    exceed the possible minimum sentence for the crime committed, nor can
    it exceed 2 years. Confusion over the new code still exists, and
    arbitrary arrests continue to be common. Prison officials often
    illegally demand payment from prisoners for transportation to judicial
    proceedings. Those who are unable to pay often are forced to forgo
    their hearings.
        Before the COPP came into effect in 1999, roughly 70 percent of
    prisoners had not been convicted of a crime because, under the old
    procedural code, most criminal defendants were incarcerated rather than
    granted provisional liberty while their prosecutions were pending. In
    addition, the slow and secretive inquisitorial justice system of the
    old code had led to an inefficient, overwhelmed, and corrupt justice
    system, which resulted in cases languishing an average of 4 to 5 years
    in the courts, during which time the accused usually remained in jail.
    Under the COPP, prisoners accused of petty crimes who have not been
    convicted but already have served 2 years or the minimum sentence
    possible for that crime (whichever is lesser) are to be released if
    they pass a psychiatric examination. During the year, approximately
    9,000 prisoners were released under the new provisions and benefits
    provided by the law. There were approximately 14,200 prisoners at
    year's end, 45 percent of whom have not been convicted of a crime--a
    decrease from 57 percent in 1999.
        Prisoners carried out protests to demand that the Government
    expedite the review of the cases of inmates who might benefit from the
    COPP's provisions. While there were still some prisoners who had not
    been convicted but already had served 2 or more years in prison,
    prisoners also had false expectations with respect to the benefits of
    the COPP, which resulted in tension and violence (see Section 1.c.).
        Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The civilian judiciary is legally
    independent; however, it is highly inefficient and sometimes corrupt,
    and judges are subject to influence from a number of sources, including
    the executive branch.
        The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Court, which is the
    court of final appeal; the Prosecutor General, who provides opinions to
    the courts on prosecution of criminal cases and brings public employee
    misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners or
    accused persons to the attention of the proper authorities; the
    Ministry of Interior and Justice, which manages the national police
    force, oversees the prisons, and files complaints in criminal courts;
    and the executive directorate of the magistrate, which oversees the
    lower courts as well as the selection and training of judges. The lower
    court system includes district and municipal courts as well as trial
    and appeal courts that deal with civil and criminal matters.
        Both the old code and its 1999 replacement, the new Organic Code of
    Criminal Procedures, provide for the right to a fair trial and consider
    the accused innocent until proven guilty in a court. However, under the
    old secretive inquisitorial code, the presumption of innocence was
    ineffective in the justice system, which became overburdened,
    inefficient, and corrupt under a paper-intensive, costly, and time-
    consuming judicial process. Judges are underpaid, poorly disciplined,
    and susceptible to political influence. The COPP introduced for the
    first time open, public trials with oral proceedings and verdicts by
    juries or panels of judges. This new adversarial system of justice
    gives practical effect to the presumption of innocence and eliminates
    the secret stage of trial that had existed in the previous system. It
    also establishes the right to plead guilty and make reparation
    agreements, a statute designed to clear the overburdened justice system
    of simple cases and minor offenses. Lengthy delays in trials were still
    common, although there has been some improvement.
        The Government continued to struggle to implement the COPP, which
    required a major shift in the fundamental concept of how justice is
    carried out, the legal procedures involved, and the respective roles of
    the police, the judge, and the lawyers. The police no longer may detain
    persons arbitrarily for up to 8 days and now must work under the
    supervision of a prosecutor; judges have ceased to be investigators and
    are now arbiters of law; and prosecutors and defense attorneys confront
    one another in open court. For the second year, open, oral trials took
    place around the country despite a shortage of trained personnel and
    resources. The COPP's successful implementation over the long term is
    expected to require further progress, including increased training for
    police and lawyers and a significantly increased number of prosecutors
    and defenders to handle the workload.
        The law provides for public defenders for those unable to afford an
    attorney; however, there are not enough public defenders to handle the
    caseload. The Executive Directorate of the Magistrature (DEM), which
    replaced the Judicial Emergency Commission, reported that there are
    approximately 275 public defense attorneys for the entire country.
        The Government ended the Judicial Emergency created in 1999 to
    bring about reform of the judicial system; however, significant
    attempts to reform the judicial system continued. During the year, the
    DEM--which oversees the selection, training, and discipline of judges--
    removed 100 judges from office based on charges of incompetence or
    corruption and suspended an additional 350 judges. Suspended judges
    continued to receive salaries; however, some observers charged that
    their right to appeal was restricted. The Government announced that it
    expected to hold the first competitive examinations for judicial
    vacancies, a process established under the COPP, in January 2001 in
    Miranda and Vargas states. Judges with pending cases against them were
    not eligible to take the examinations, and judges who had been
    reprimanded had points deducted from their scores.
        In July legal experts expressed concern about interference with the
    independence of the judiciary when a politician close to the President
    telephoned the Inspector General of the courts, Rene Molina, and asked
    him to ``take care'' with the process to suspend a judge handling a
    politically sensitive libel case against editor Pablo Lopez Ulacio (see
    Section 2.a.). In August Molina resigned, claiming that he lacked the
    political support needed to continue his duties.
        The military courts implemented a similar reform of the military
    justice system and are making the transition to the new system. The
    December 1999 Constitution established that trials for military
    personnel charged with human rights abuses would be held in civilian
    courts; this represented a fundamental change in human rights policy.
    However, the provision does not apply to military trials for cases that
    predate the new Constitution. Human rights NGO's expressed concern that
    the Supreme Court's selection of military judges from a list of
    candidates provided by the Minister of Defense links the careers of
    military judges to the high command, making them more responsive to the
    views of their military leaders and influencing them to act slowly in
    cases in which the military is implicated. As a result, military judges
    trying human rights cases that predate the new Constitution can be
    subject to improper influence, and offenders might evade punishment for
    extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Constitutional provisions prohibit arbitrary
    interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; however,
    the security forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Security
    forces often conducted searches of homes without warrants, especially
    during anticrime sweeps in impoverished neighborhoods. There were no
    complaints during the year by human rights NGO's of illegal wiretapping
    by the security forces.
        In April DISIP announced that it had dismissed some 50 agents for
    engaging in illegal wiretapping of other government agencies. In July
    during a dialog the DISIP held with the national Ombudsman's office and
    NGO's about a proposed restructuring of the National Intelligence
    System (which was not carried out at year's end), the agency stated
    that it had files on 1 in every 19 citizens (or 520,000 individuals).
        During the campaign for the July 30 elections, DISIP agents
    searched offices of an opposition governor, despite a 1999 promise by
    President Chavez that the DISIP would not be used for political
    operations (see Section 3).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and while the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice, some media critics charge that the
    Government intimidates the media and report that self-censorship is
    widespread. Individuals and the media freely and publicly criticize the
    Government; however, concern over freedom of the press increased during
    the year. A provision in the December 1999 Constitution states that all
    persons have the right to ``timely, truthful, and impartial''
    information, without censorship. This ``truthful information'' article
    has raised concerns among many in the domestic and international media
    that it could be used by the Government to censor or intimidate the
    press. In April the governor of Apure state issued a decree requiring
    ``true information'' within the state. There were immediate protests,
    and the governor withdrew the decree. Also in April, officials of the
    National Electoral Council stated that the Council was considering
    possible regulations governing the publication of political polls.
    There were strong protests from the media, and no regulation or
    legislation ever was proposed formally.
        There were numerous allegations of inappropriate government
    pressure against the media. In January the DISIP questioned two
    reporters from the daily El Nacional about articles they had written
    about beatings and extrajudicial killings in Vargas in December 1999
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). A subpoena was issued that required one
    reporter to name her sources. She was threatened with imprisonment or
    fines for noncompliance; however, no action was taken against her when
    she refused to provide the information. In May the television program
    24 Hours, hosted by Napoleon Bravo on the Venevision station, was
    canceled. Bravo charged that government pressure was to blame;
    government and network officials denied the accusation. Individual
    journalists and editors have reported receiving intimidating or
    threatening phone calls.
        The Constitution also provides for the ``right to reply'' for
    individuals who believe they are portrayed inaccurately in media
    reports. President Chavez demanded a right to reply on several
    occasions. However, certain individuals named by the President in his
    weekly national radio show have complained that they have not been
    granted the right to reply.
        In September a court dismissed a long-running criminal defamation
    suit against a journalist and editor of the monthly magazine Exceso.
    The Inter-American Press Association had protested the case, in which
    it was alleged that a businessman who was the subject of a critical
    article in Exceso used improper influence over the judiciary to
    retaliate against the magazine. A separate criminal defamation suit,
    against weekly newspaper La Razon, continued at year's end; the
    International Committee to Protect Journalists has protested this case.
    On July 8, a judge ordered Pablo Lopez Ulacio, the editor of La Razon,
    placed under house arrest for failure to appear in court to answer
    libel charges brought against him by Tobias Carrero Nacar, a
    businessman and friend of President Chavez. In the spring, La Razon
    published articles that alleged that Luis Miquilena, president of the
    National Legislative Committee (CLN), had influenced improperly
    insurance contracts to Carrero. The DEM sanctioned the judge who issued
    the house arrest order, and he eventually recused himself from the
    case. In July legal experts expressed concern about interference with
    the independence of the judiciary when a politician close to the
    President telephoned the Inspector General of the courts, Rene Molina,
    and asked him to ``take care'' with the process to suspend the judge
    (see Section 1.e.). Lopez was released from house arrest after 1 week;
    however, a new arrest order was issued, and Lopez went into hiding.
    Because of the lengthy process and considerable legal costs, both
    lawsuits have been interpreted by some observers as examples of the use
    of criminal defamation or libel lawsuits, or the threat of such
    lawsuits, to intimidate journalists and discourage investigative
    journalism.
        There were no reports of government-sponsored attacks on
    journalists; however, several journalists were assaulted physically or
    verbally for what appear to have been political motives. Some observers
    assert that President Chavez's aggressive rhetoric in criticizing the
    media as having portrayed him unfairly has contributed to a climate of
    intimidation and hostility toward the media that encourages such
    attacks. At one presidential press conference in Maracay in March,
    reporters refused to ask President Chavez questions in protest of what
    one termed ``the President's constant attacks against the media.''
    During a May 1 campaign march by President Chavez, some partisans
    attending the campaign chanted slogans that characterized reporters as
    ``traitors'' and ``enemies,'' pushed or hit journalists, and attempted
    to destroy their equipment. President Chavez later condemned these
    assaults. In February anonymous leaflets were distributed throughout
    the Caracas subway that criticized journalists as ``enemies of the
    revolution'' and named certain prominent journalists.
        In September 1999, government officials complained that
    international media coverage of events was unfair, and some made
    allegations of ``an international media conspiracy.'' Also during that
    month, a small group of activists occupied the offices of the
    Associated Press in protest of the news service's supposed
    antigovernment stance. A regional radio station alleged that state
    security agents searched its offices in what the radio viewed as an
    effort to intimidate.
        Instances of bomb threats--and on two occasions in December 1999,
    discoveries of small explosive devices in or near newspaper buildings--
    have contributed to what some journalists have called ``a climate of
    intimidation'' of the media. In February the Venezuelan Press
    Association publicly commented on the deteriorating situation for press
    freedom in the country.
        There is no statutory censorship. The Government has tools to
    influence the press, such as licensing requirements for journalists,
    broadcast licensing concessions for television and radio stations, and
    lucrative public sector advertising. However, in practice, the media
    environment is free and open, although some journalists believe that
    self-censorship is becoming more widespread. Few newspapers regularly
    publish editorials that reflect the view of the newspaper, but signed
    articles on opinion pages carry abundant and varied perspectives, often
    highly critical of the Government. Radio and television stations do not
    broadcast overt institutional political opinions, although opinion and
    talk shows are common.
        A 1994 law requires practicing journalists to have journalism
    degrees and be members of the National College of Journalists. These
    requirements are waived for foreigners and for opinion columnists, on
    the grounds of tolerance of free speech. Media owners challenged the
    law in November 1995, but the Supreme Court still had not ruled on this
    matter at year's end.
        Print and electronic media are independent. There are state
    television and radio stations whose directors are named by the
    President but whose broadcast policies are autonomous. The Government
    financed and published the newspaper The President's Post during the
    first 6 months of the year. The President has a weekly call-in radio
    show on state-run Radio Nacional. At the President's discretion, his
    speeches or other public appearances may be declared a ``national
    broadcast.'' All television and radio stations are required by law to
    preempt scheduled programming and transmit the national broadcasts in
    their entirety (on occasion, 2 or more hours) instead. A documentary-
    style ``news program,'' varying in length from 5 to 15 minutes,
    produced by the President's staff, began airing in June. The program,
    which focuses heavily on the activities of the President and the
    Government, is produced one or more times a week. It is broadcast
    before regularly scheduled evening news programs. Like the national
    broadcasts, by law every television station must broadcast these
    programs.
        The International Association of Broadcasting and domestic media
    figures criticized provisions of a telecommunications law enacted in
    June. The parts of the law related to broadcast content and frequency
    concessions were particularly controversial. Article 209 establishes
    that the President, ``when he judges it convenient to the interests of
    the nation, or when required for reasons of public order or security,
    can suspend telecommunications broadcasts, in conformity with the
    Constitution.'' Some observers believe that this article might allow
    the suspension of media broadcasts for vague and arbitrary reasons.
        In April Monsignor Baltazar Porras, the president of the Roman
    Catholic Episcopal Conference of Venezuela (CEV), publicly criticized
    the Government regarding a lack of electoral transparency, growing
    social instability, and the supra-constitutional activities of the CLN.
    Following these criticisms, the press reported that DISIP videotaped a
    Mass said by Monsignor Porras. The Director of DISIP immediately
    apologized, the agent was suspended, and the national Ombudsman's
    office opened an investigation of the incident. Bishops also reported
    receiving telephone threats during the CEV's assembly. In October the
    governor of Merida state announced that he had made a formal request to
    the public prosecutor to begin a criminal investigation of Monsignor
    Porras for alleged financial irregularities relating to the Church's
    administration of a publicly funded hospital. Because Monsignor Porras
    has criticized the Government, some observers interpreted the
    investigation as retaliation for that criticism.
        There is no state censorship of books, films, or other media
    products. Internet access is completely free and uncontrolled.
        The Government traditionally has respected academic freedom;
    however, there have been isolated allegations that individual
    professors at state universities have been removed or warned of
    possible removal from their academic positions because of outspoken
    political views.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice. Public meetings, including those of
    all political parties, generally are held unimpeded. The Government
    requires permits for public marches but does not deny them for
    political reasons.
        The December 1999 Constitution prohibits the use of firearms to
    control peaceful demonstrations; however, as in previous years, some
    demonstrations turned violent and were quelled by security forces.
    According to PROVEA, no persons were killed, but 139 persons were
    injured during demonstrations from October 1999 through September,
    compared with 2 persons killed and 77 injured from October 1998 through
    September 1999. The student and teaching sectors carry out the largest
    number of protests, and the security forces quell the majority of their
    demonstrations.
        On April 5, residents of Cojedes state protested threats by the CLN
    to remove Governor Alberto Galindea for alleged financial
    irregularities. The protests in San Carlos and Tinaquillo turned
    violent, and the National Guard and state police intervened with tear
    gas. Approximately 18 persons were wounded and affected by tear gas;
    the state legislative assembly building was destroyed.
        On November 5-6, students in Merida protested the death of a fellow
    student under suspicious circumstances at the hands of the police. The
    protest became violent and security forces sent tanks, 350 soldiers,
    and 150 police to stop the demonstration. Police detained 18 persons.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice; professional and academic
    associations generally operate without interference. However, on
    November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that (1) Nongovernmental
    organizations that receive funding from foreign governments or whose
    leaders are not Venezuelan are not part of ``civil society'' and
    therefore may not represent Venezuelan citizens in court or bring their
    own legal actions; (2) Religious organizations are not part of civil
    society and are subject to the same restrictions; and (3) The
    Government has an obligation to ensure that NGO's are ``democratic in
    nature'' and therefore that the internal elections of nonprofit groups
    (such as for boards of directors) can be regulated by the National
    Electoral Council. While there is ambiguity as to how the ruling is to
    be implemented, NGO's, labor unions, and other members of civil society
    expressed serious concerns about the ruling. The national Ombudsman's
    office questioned the constitutionality of the ruling and argued that
    it was up to civil society itself to define its members, not the
    Government.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, on the condition that the practice of a religion does not
    violate public morality, decency, and the public order, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        Each local church must register with the Directorate of Justice and
    Religion in the Ministry of Interior and Justice in order to hold legal
    status as a religious organization and to own property. The
    requirements for registration are largely administrative. However, some
    groups have complained that the process of registration is slow and
    inefficient. Foreign missionaries require a special visa to enter the
    country, which is obtained through the Ministry. Missionaries are not
    refused entry generally, but many complain that the Government often
    takes months or years to process a request.
        In 1964 the Government and the Holy See signed a concordat that
    underscores the country's historical ties to the Roman Catholic Church
    and provides government subsidies to the Church, including to its
    social programs and schools. Other religious groups are free to
    establish and run their own schools, but they do not receive subsidies
    from the Government.
        On November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that religious
    organizations are not part of civil society and that their legal rights
    therefore were restricted (see Section 2.b.).
        On several occasions, leaders of the Roman Catholic Church were
    monitored or threatened by state agents for political reasons (see
    Section 2.a.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    of citizens and legal residents to travel within the country and to go
    abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these rights.
    However, the Government can suspend the freedom to travel, as it did
    from June 1994 to July 1995. The Government also restricts foreign
    travel for persons being investigated for criminal activities. For 3
    weeks in December 1999 and in January, the security forces sometimes
    restricted movement in and out of the areas hardest hit by the floods.
        The Constitution recognizes and provides for the right to asylum
    and refuge and mandates the passage of an organic law to codify this
    right. However, there is no domestic legislation regarding
    determination of refugee status, the procedure or criteria to be
    applied, and no independent organization to handle asylum requests
    exists. In the absence of any such legislation, the Government
    established an Interministerial Technical Commission (CTI) in 1999 to
    address cross-border movements and allows the Venezuelan Bishops'
    Conference to coordinate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) in assisting refugees. In 1999 there were a total of 188
    persons in the country who had been granted refugee status.
    Approximately 100 individuals filed asylum claims during the year;
    however, the CTI did not rule on any requests.
        The Government in theory provides first asylum. However, in August
    500 Colombians entered the country following a paramilitary attack in
    the La Gabarra-Tibu area of Colombia. The Government provided
    humanitarian aid but, in coordination with the Colombian Government,
    quickly repatriated all of the Colombians. The Government determined
    that the Colombians were not refugees but ``displaced persons in
    transit.'' This term does not exist in international humanitarian law,
    and its use appeared to be designed to avoid the Government's
    international obligations to ``refugees.'' The accelerated procedures
    adopted by both governments for the return of the Colombians limited
    their opportunity to seek asylum, despite the intention previously
    stated by some members of these groups to different NGO's and the
    UNHCR.
        A similar episode occurred in June 1999, when some 3,500 Colombians
    entered the country in 3 waves following a paramilitary offensive in
    the Catatumbo area of Colombia. These individuals also were termed
    ``displaced persons in transit,'' and quickly repatriated in
    coordination with the Colombian Government. There are reports that some
    of those returned subsequently were killed by paramilitary forces in
    Colombia. There were no other reports of the possible forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to change
    their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
    periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage. The Constitution provides for the direct election of the
    President and unicameral National Assembly, as well as of state
    governors, state legislative councils, and local governments. Political
    parties organize, and their candidates are allowed freely to run for
    office and to seek the support of voters. The President has extensive
    powers; however, the legislature appoints the members of the Supreme
    Court, the National Electoral Council, and the so-called Citizen Power
    consisting of the Prosecutor General, Ombudsman, and Controller
    General.
        At President Chavez's behest, the National Constituent Assembly
    (ANC) decreed general elections in order to ``relegitimize''
    authorities elected under the (now-defunct) 1961 Constitution. The new
    Constitution, which went into effect on December 30, 1999, replaced the
    previous bicameral legislature with a unicameral body, and membership
    in the former could not simply be carried over to the latter.
        The CNE, whose members were appointed on a temporary basis by the
    ANC at the end of December 1999, organized the elections. In making
    these appointments the ANC, citing an earlier Supreme Court decision
    acknowledging that it had ``super-constitutional'' powers, made no
    attempt to apply even in spirit the procedures set forth in the new
    Constitution regarding civil society participation in the selection
    process. This unilateral selection by the ANC (which easily approved a
    slate provided by its leadership) of the members of the CNE was
    criticized widely by the political opposition, media, and NGO's. These
    groups also criticized similar measures taken by the ANC in choosing
    its replacement body--the National Legislative Committee, as well as in
    making interim appointments to the Supreme Court and the Citizen Power.
    The CLN was an unrepresentative 21-member panel given responsibility in
    January for serving as the country's legislature pending election of
    the National Assembly. The CNE invited representatives from the
    campaign teams to participate in their work.
        Elections were scheduled by the ANC for May 28 for every elected
    office in the country; more than 35,000 candidates ran for some 6,000
    offices. On March 28, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court
    dismissed two suits that challenged the constitutionality of the
    election law and consequently the scheduled date of May 28 for the
    elections. However, as the scheduled date approached, it became
    increasingly apparent that the CNE had failed to organize them
    adequately. Constant changes to the voter data base--which both the
    opposition and NGO's have alleged were intended to offer electoral
    advantage to President Chavez's supporters--made it impossible to
    complete programming of the electronic voting machines or carry out
    other necessary steps.
        Faced with the prospect of a chaotic and highly contested election,
    the CNE decided at the last minute to serve as a friend of the court in
    a pending suit by two NGO's before the CNE seeking delay of the
    election. On May 25, the Supreme Court ordered the delay and gave
    responsibility for setting the new date to the CLN. This decision also
    gave the Controller General oversight powers over the CNE.
        The members of the CNE resigned following the delay, after the CLN
    formally requested their resignations. After some initial reluctance
    the CLN agreed that a ``national roundtable,'' on which some of its
    members and representatives of civil society would sit, would choose
    the new Council. That new Council included nonpartisan civil society
    members, including its president. Observers generally agree that the
    new National Electoral Council, chosen by the CLN on June 3, organized
    the elections in a competent and fair way.
        The CLN set the date for the elections at July 30. It also decreed
    that, for practical reasons, those elections would be limited to
    president of the republic, national and state legislators, governors,
    and mayors, with election of municipal and parish councils to be held
    on October 1. The CLN noted that July 30 was the earliest date by which
    even the smaller-scope elections it had now decided on could be held,
    as the new CNE had to redo almost all the preparatory work of its
    predecessor. The CLN also noted that to include municipal and parish
    councils in the July 30 vote would triple the number of candidates and
    offices and, for organizational reasons, would postpone the vote for
    several months and further prolong the country's period of
    constitutional transition. Citizens, including many members of the
    opposition and media, generally regarded these arguments as valid.
    However, leading presidential challenger Francisco Arias Cardenas
    criticized the decision of the CLN to split the elections and hold the
    first component on July 30, a decision that he alleged was intended to
    put him at a disadvantage. In July a confidential report by the
    Controller General was leaked to the press; the report identified
    deficiencies in the work of the CNE.
        During the election campaign, DISIP agents carried out searches of
    the offices of the opposition governor of Merida state, despite the
    fact that, upon taking office in 1999, the Chavez Government declared
    that the DISIP and other intelligence agencies no longer would be used
    for domestic political purposes. While the stated reason for the
    operations was to gather evidence for corruption investigations, the
    timing of the searches gave the impression of political harassment.
        On July 30, voters reelected President Chavez with 59 percent of
    the vote. His challengers, Francisco Arias Cardenas and Claudio Fermin,
    received 38 percent and 3 percent respectively. Chavez's supporters won
    a majority (92 seats) in the 165-seat National Assembly, although not
    the two-thirds majority required to pass most important pending
    legislation. His supporters also won half the governorships. The
    Organization of American States and observers from various countries
    were of the opinion that, despite some technical irregularities, the
    vote was generally free and fair. A limited number of voting machines
    failed to accept ballots or otherwise broke down, and there was
    disorganization at some polling places, but in the opinion of observers
    these were localized problems. Standard backup procedures for voting
    machine failure, such as placing ballots in sealed boxes for later
    manual counting or processing by functioning voting machines, were
    followed. However, some of the losing candidates alleged fraud. For
    example, Arias maintained, among other things, that voting machines
    were programmed to undercount votes received by him. He and other
    disappointed candidates were pursuing existing administrative and
    judicial remedies at year's end. Losing candidates for several
    governorships alleged that fraud or irregularities affected the outcome
    of the voting. The CNE investigated these allegations, ordered recounts
    in some cases, and determined that the disputes were valid in several
    states, in which it ordered partial revotes. The CNE's follow-up work
    to the July 30 elections continued at year's end.
        On December 3, voters participated in elections for municipal and
    parish councils and voted on a controversial referendum on labor issues
    (see Section 6.a.).
        In December the President and the National Assembly replaced the
    interim appointees to the Supreme Court and the Citizen Power in a
    process that was criticized by the political opposition, the media, and
    NGO's, who argued that the procedures set forth in the new Constitution
    regarding civil society participation in the selection process were not
    followed. The Ombudsman and others challenged the selection procedure
    in the courts; however, the appointments were made and the new
    officials took office in December, despite the fact that the Supreme
    Court had not yet ruled on the legal challenge.
        In November the National Assembly passed an ``enabling law'' that
    gave President Chavez the authority to legislate by decree on selected
    issues related to the economy, reorganization of government ministries,
    and crime. However, only one law had been passed using these new powers
    by year's end.
        Women and nonwhites participate fully in government and politics;
    however, they remain under-represented in senior leadership positions
    and national elective office. The National Assembly's Family, Women,
    and Youth Committee promotes political office-holding opportunities for
    women. In the July 30 elections, women won 20 seats as deputies in the
    165-seat legislature. In August President Chavez named 3 women to his
    14-member Cabinet as Ministers of Labor, Trade, and Environment. In
    December President Chavez appointed Adina Bastidas as vice president.
        Indigenous people traditionally have not been integrated fully into
    the political system due to their limited knowledge of politics, low
    voter turnout, geographic isolation, and fewer economic and educational
    opportunities. During the year, 300 Yanomami, with the assistance of
    the Amazonas state ombudsman, filed suit over obstacles they faced in
    registering to vote. The Yanomami argued that the Government's slowness
    in providing national identity cards, which are required to register to
    vote, was infringing on their right to suffrage. The Supreme Court
    ruled against the group's request for an exception to be made to the
    registration deadline, and they were unable to vote in the July 30
    elections. The group of Yanomami subsequently was able to register, and
    they voted in the December municipal elections. The new Constitution
    reserved three seats in the National Assembly for indigenous people,
    and these seats were filled in the July 30 election. There are no
    indigenous members of the Cabinet.
    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups generally operate without
    government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights cases.
        In January President Chavez criticized a report by PROVEA on the
    human rights violations in Vargas state as ``suspicious and
    superficial'' and said that the NGO's refusal to name the witnesses on
    which the report was based was irresponsible. The President later
    pledged to investigate the abuses and met with the victims' families,
    and the Government invited the IACHR to make an on-site visit to the
    country, which had not taken place at year's end.
        On November 21, the Supreme Court ruled that NGO's that receive
    funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not Venezuelan
    are not part of ``civil society'' and therefore may not represent
    Venezuelans in court or bring their own legal actions (see Section
    2.b.).
        A fundamental change in the Government's own human rights bodies
    was made when the December 1999 Constitution created the position of
    ``Defender of the People'' (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman is responsible
    for compelling the Government to adhere to the Constitution and laws
    and, together with the Prosecutor General and Controller General, makes
    up the Citizen Power branch of government. Throughout the year, the
    country's first Ombudsman, Dilia Parra, repeatedly and frankly
    advocated for the respect of human rights and assisted investigations
    of abuses by acting as a liaison between complainants and the
    Prosecutor General. Despite a limited budget, the Ombudsman's office
    established branches and public attention centers in all 23 states. On
    December 20, in a process that some observers charged was
    unconstitutional, the National Assembly named attorney German Mundarain
    as the new Ombudsman to replace Parra (see Section 3). The new
    Constitution also obliges the Government to make amends to the victims
    of human rights violations and commits it to implement decisions of
    international bodies on individual cases of abuse.
        Human rights groups remained concerned about the Chavez
    administration's lack of a human rights agenda and a lack of support
    for the national human rights agenda formulated by the previous
    Government in a July 1997 symposium with NGO's. Unlike the previous
    year, President Chavez did not meet with NGO's to discuss human rights
    issues. The Government continued to fail to support the National Human
    Rights Commission created by former President Rafael Caldera in 1996 as
    a mechanism to coordinate the Government's human rights programs and to
    serve as a forum for dialog with NGO's. Despite the commission's
    paralysis, NGO's have developed good relationships with specific
    government bodies such as the Ministry of Education to develop
    educational materials on human rights, and the Foreign Ministry to
    discuss the resolution of existing human rights cases against the
    Government in international courts.
        The Defense Ministry's human rights office expanded its staff from
    one to three officials and continued to carry out training courses as
    part of the armed force's curriculum. The Defense Ministry continued to
    reject the validity of NGO reports of alleged human rights violations
    by the armed forces and remained unwilling to provide evidence to
    refute the charges, citing confidentiality regulations.
        Following the July 30 elections, the National Assembly established
    an Interior, Justice, Human Rights, and Constitutional Guarantees
    Committee.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1999 Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination on the
    basis of politics, age, race, sex, creed, or any other condition, and
    the law prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, sex, or
    disability. However, the Government does not protect women adequately
    against societal and domestic violence, ensure the disabled access to
    jobs and public services, or safeguard adequately the rights of
    indigenous people. Amnesty International reported that in September
    police in Valencia, Carabobo state, detained four transgendered
    persons, who were held incommunicado for 2 days without food or
    drinking water (see Section 1.d.). The family of one of the detainees
    filed a formal complaint with the Public Ministry.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem, and women face
    substantial institutional and societal prejudice with respect to rape
    and domestic violence. Domestic violence against women is very common
    and has been aggravated by the country's economic difficulties. A total
    of 14,683 cases of domestic violence were reported to the authorities
    in 1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available.
    According to local monitors, the police generally are unwilling to
    intervene to prevent domestic violence, and the courts rarely prosecute
    those accused of such abuse. In addition, poor women generally are
    unaware of legal remedies and have little access to them. On January 1,
    the 1999 Law Against Violence Toward Women and Children came into
    force. The PTJ opened the division against violence to accommodate its
    provisions. This law requires the police to receive reports of domestic
    violence and obligates hospital personnel to advise authorities of
    abuse.
        The law makes rape extremely difficult to prove, requiring at a
    minimum medical examination within 48 hours of the violation. A
    provision in the Penal Code provides that a man guilty of rape can
    avoid punishment if, before sentencing, he marries the victim. Few
    police officers are trained to deal responsibly with rape victims. In
    1997, the most recent year for which statistics were available, the
    police received 7,426 reports of sexual crimes, of which over 3,600
    were cases of rape. However, women's organizations assert that such low
    figures do not accurately portray the problem of rape and sexual
    assault. They claim that many victims do not report the incident or
    press charges due to societal pressure and their own feelings of guilt.
    There were reports that a number of rapes were committed in Vargas
    state in December 1999 during the lawlessness that followed the
    flooding.
        In 1996 the National Women's Council (which was reorganized during
    the year and renamed the National Institute for Women), an agency of
    the presidency with representation from the Ministries of Justice,
    Education, Family, Health, and Labor, prepared a manual on violence
    against women and children, which includes information on where the
    victims might obtain assistance. There are a number of NGO's concerned
    with domestic violence, sex education, and economic discrimination.
    However, the recommendations of these groups have not been implemented
    widely by the police or other concerned governmental agencies.
        Sexual harassment in the workplace is a common problem.
        There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain for purposes
    of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        Women and men are legally equal in marriage. Women account for
    roughly half the student body of most universities and have advanced in
    many professions, including medicine and law. In June the Government
    announced its intention to allow women to attend military academies and
    serve in expanded roles as officers in the armed forces; however, this
    had not occurred by year's end. Women gradually have surmounted many of
    the barriers to their full participation in political and economic
    life; nonetheless, they still are underrepresented in the higher ranks
    of labor unions and private industry and, on average, earn 30 percent
    less than men.
        The 1999 Constitution provides for sexual equality in exercising
    the right to work. The Labor Code specifies that employers must not
    discriminate against women with regard to pay or working conditions,
    must not fire them during pregnancy or for a year after giving birth,
    must grant them unpaid leave and benefits for 6 weeks before the birth
    of a child and 12 weeks after, and must provide them with 10 weeks of
    unpaid leave if they legally adopt children under 3 years of age.
    According to the Ministry of Labor and the major labor federation,
    these regulations are enforced in the formal sector, although social
    security payments often are delayed.
        Children.--Government expenditures on education, health, and social
    services increased during the year due to an improved economy and a
    larger government budget. While the law provides for universal free
    education, about one-third of the Ministry of Education budget was
    dedicated to post-secondary education, leaving both primary and
    secondary education chronically underfunded. According to UNICEF, only
    75 percent of eligible children enter the first grade. During the year,
    some 500,000 children attended school for the first time when the
    Government prohibited registration fees. However, the 2000 annual
    report of the Community Centers for Learning (CECODAP) stated that
    500,000 children are not eligible to receive government assistance,
    including public education, because their births are not documented
    properly. In 1998 the Government attempted to remedy this problem by
    adopting a new regulation that requires hospitals to register the
    births of all children; during the year, the Government sent mobile
    teams into poor neighborhoods to register minors.
        According to CECODAP's study, an estimated 500,000 children, most
    under the age of 5, have an average of 2 episodes of gastroenteritis a
    year, a sickness that is the ninth leading cause of death in the
    country. According to a 1999 study by the National Nutrition Institute,
    23 percent of children under the age of 15 have a nutritional deficit.
    Approximately 76 percent of minors live in poverty. These conditions
    contribute to the increase in preventable diseases that are leading
    causes of infant mortality. Children living in Vargas state suffered
    the effects of the flooding in that area, particularly with regard to
    sanitation and schooling.
        An increase in poverty has raised the level of stress within
    families and led to a rise in the number of abandoned children and to
    more child abuse. A 1994 survey by the National Institute for Minors
    determined that 206,000 children were involved in illicit activities,
    principally begging but also petty theft, prostitution, and drug
    trafficking. Some 40,000 children were exploited sexually, according to
    a 1994 study.
        The authorities in Caracas and several other jurisdictions tried to
    cope with the phenomenon of street children by continuing to impose
    curfews for unsupervised minors. Children's rights advocates claim that
    curfews permit the police to act arbitrarily in detaining persons who
    have committed no crime. Because reform institutions are filled to
    capacity, hundreds of children accused of infractions are confined in
    juvenile detention centers (see Section 1.c.).
        In October 1997, Amnesty International reported past incidents in
    which minors were subjects of extrajudicial killings and abuse, as well
    as deficiencies in law and practice with regard to the detention of
    children. For example, security forces and law enforcement authorities
    often detain minors together with adults (see Section 1.c.). In April
    Congress passed the Organic Procedural Law on Adolescents and Children
    (a criminal code); however, observers expressed concern over the slow
    implementation of the law's provisions.
        Reports of child abuse are rare due to a fear of entanglement with
    the authorities and ingrained attitudes regarding family privacy. The
    overburdened judicial system, although very slow, generally ensures
    that in most situations children are removed from abusive households
    once a case has been reported. However, public facilities for such
    children are inadequate and have poorly trained staff.
        Children's rights advocates criticized the Government's efforts to
    reunite children and parents who had been separated in the flooding in
    Vargas state. At year's end, some 12 months after the natural disaster,
    some children still were separated from their families. CECODAP
    estimates that there are 120 children in refugee centers who have not
    yet been returned to their families. The national Ombudsman's office is
    investigating whether some of these children may have been trafficked.
    There were also reports of trafficking in children from other South
    American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids
    (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The physically disabled have minimal
    access to public transportation, and ramps are practically nonexistent,
    even in government buildings. According to local advocates, the
    disabled are discriminated against in many sectors, including
    education, health care, and employment.
        A 1993 comprehensive law to protect the rights of the disabled
    requires that all newly constructed or renovated public parks and
    buildings provide access for the disabled. The law also forbids
    discrimination in employment practices and in the provision of public
    services. However, the Government has not made a significant effort to
    implement the law, to inform the public of it, or to try to change
    societal prejudice against the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--Although the law prohibits discrimination based
    on ethnic origin, members of the country's indigenous population
    frequently suffer from inattention to and violation of their human
    rights. Many indigenous people are isolated from modern civilization
    and lack access to basic health and educational facilities. High rates
    of cholera, hepatitis B, malaria, and other diseases plague their
    communities. There are approximately 316,000 indigenous people in 27
    ethnic groups.
        The Constitution provides for special laws governing ``the
    protection of indigenous communities and their progressive
    incorporation into the life of the nation.'' Nonetheless, local
    political authorities seldom take account of the interests of
    indigenous people when making decisions affecting their lands,
    cultures, traditions, and allocation of natural resources. As farmers
    and miners intrude on their habitats, indigenous communities are
    threatened by deforestation and water pollution. Few indigenous people
    hold title to their land, but many do not want to since most indigenous
    groups reject the concept of individual property and want the
    Government to recognize lands traditionally inhabited by them as
    territories belonging to each respective indigenous group.
        At year's end, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on a lawsuit
    filed by environmental and indigenous organizations challenging a 1997
    decree that permitted the expansion of legal mining activities in the
    Imataca forest reserve. The groups charged that only Congress can
    change the nature of the reserve, that there was an inadequate public
    review process prior to the change, and that expanded mining activities
    would affect adversely the health of the Warao, Arawako, Karina,
    Akawaio, and Pemon indigenous communities that inhabit the Imataca
    watershed area. In November 1997, the Supreme Court ordered the
    Government not to issue any new mining concessions in the Imataca
    reserve until the court ruled on the constitutionality of the
    presidential decree. In 1999 President Chavez said that he planned to
    enact a new law to regulate the use of the reserve and that the 1997
    decree would be annulled, but at year's end no action had been taken.
        The controversy over infrastructure development and the maintenance
    of traditional indigenous lifestyles is most evident in Bolivar state,
    where the Pemon continued to protest the building of power lines that
    export electricity to Brazil through Canaima national park. On July 20,
    a total of 55 of the 58 Pemon communities affected by the power lines
    signed an agreement under which the Government pledged, among other
    commitments, to establish a commission for the demarcation of native
    lands and to create a development fund for indigenous people. However,
    many Pemon remain highly skeptical of the Government's willingness and
    ability to comply with the accord's provisions.
        The Yanomami, among the most isolated of the indigenous people,
    have been subject to persistent incursions into their territory by
    illegal gold miners. The miners have introduced not only new diseases
    but social ills as well. In December 1996, a number of human rights
    organizations, acting on behalf of the Yanomami community of Haximu,
    petitioned the IACHR in connection with the 1993 massacre of 16 members
    of the community by Brazilian miners. The petition alleged that the
    Government failed in its obligation to protect the Yanomami and to seek
    appropriate punishment of the killers, who were released by the
    Brazilian authorities after 3 months' detention. In May 1998, the
    Government agreed to work with the NGO's under IACHR mediation to
    resolve the case. In late 1999, an out-of-court settlement was reached
    under which the Government pledged, among other commitments, to provide
    better security and to carry out health care projects in the area.
        During the year, 300 Yanomami, with the assistance of the Amazonas
    state ombudsman, filed suit over obstacles they faced in registering to
    vote (see Section 3).
        Since 1998 hundreds of members of the Warao indigenous group have
    migrated from their traditional homelands in the swampy Orinoco delta
    region to the capital of Caracas where they live in the streets,
    selling their traditional crafts and begging. The Warao say that
    flooding and petroleum exploration have eroded their traditional means
    of survival, which are fishing and horticulture. In addition, many
    Warao no longer want to or no longer possess the knowledge required to
    survive in their traditional manner. However, the Caracas city
    government and the Metropolitan Police have maintained a policy of
    forcing the Warao to return to the delta by rounding them up and
    loading them onto buses. In 1998 they returned, on average, groups of
    100 Warao, at least 15 times. Many of the Warao return to Caracas,
    citing lack of jobs and money in the delta and their ability to receive
    approximately $225 (130,000 bolivars) per week in handouts in Caracas.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and labor law
    recognize and encourage the right of workers to organize; however,
    concerns over labor rights increased during the year. According to the
    new Constitution, all workers, without prejudice or previous
    authorization, have the right to form freely unions that they believe
    can help them defend their rights and interests, as well as to join--or
    decide not to join--these organizations in accordance with the law. The
    Constitution provides that these organizations are not subject to
    intervention, suspension, or administrative dissolution, and workers
    are protected against any discrimination or measure contrary to this
    right. Additionally, labor organizers and leaders may not be removed
    from their positions during the period of time and under the conditions
    that they exercise their leadership functions. However, Articles 23 and
    95 of the 1999 Constitution, which provide for freedom of association,
    are contradicted by Article 293, which gives the National Electoral
    Council the authority to administer the internal elections of labor
    confederations, in violation of the Government's commitments to
    Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
    charter. On December 3, a referendum was held that was followed by the
    resignation of the leaders of the country's major labor union
    confederation.
        At year's end, labor law pursuant to the 1999 Constitution had not
    yet been drafted. The existing comprehensive 1990 Labor Code extends
    the right to form and join unions of their choosing to all private and
    public sector employees (except members of the armed forces). The code
    mandates registration of unions with the Ministry of Labor, but it
    reduces the Ministry's discretion by specifying that registration may
    not be denied if the proper documents (a record of the founding
    meeting, the statutes, and membership list) are submitted. Only a judge
    may dissolve a union, and then only for reasons listed in the law, such
    as the dissolution of a firm by agreement of two-thirds of the
    membership.
        The ILO repeatedly has expressed concerns that the Organic Labor
    Act violates freedom of association by requiring a high number of
    workers (100 workers) to form self-employed workers' trade unions and a
    high number of employers to form employer trade unions (10 workers).
    The ILO also notes that the long and detailed list of duties entrusted
    to workers' and employers' organizations and the requirement that
    foreign workers must be in residence for more than 10 years in order to
    hold trade union offices also are in violation of the Convention on
    Freedom of Association.
        In early March, the National Legislative Committee passed a decree
    that suspended collective bargaining in the petroleum and public sector
    for 180 days (see Section 6.b.) and suspended internal labor leadership
    elections for the same period of time. On July 14, the CNE prohibited
    labor leadership elections until February 2001. In late March, the CLN
    passed a decree that violated the Campesino Federation's right to
    associate freely by intervening in the federation's right to hold
    internal elections, embargoing federation property, and placing it in
    the custody of the national Ombudsman.
        One major union confederation, the Confederation of Venezuelan
    Workers (CTV), three small union confederations, and a number of
    independent unions operate freely. About 20 percent of the national
    labor force is unionized. The CTV represents most of the unionized
    workers and has a membership of 800,000 workers. The CTV is especially
    strong in the public sector. The CTV's top leadership includes members
    of several political parties, but the majority are affiliated with one
    of the traditional parties, Democratic Action (AD) or the Christian
    Democrats (COPEI). The CTV and the AD traditionally have influenced
    each other.
        On December 3, the Government held a public ``workers referendum''
    to consider the ``overhaul of union leadership'' and the ``suspension''
    of union officials. International labor authorities, including the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the ILO, declared
    the referendum to be a violation of freedom of association and an
    unacceptable government intervention in organized labor affairs. The
    fact that the referendum included the participation of all registered
    voters on an issue affecting independent labor organizations was viewed
    as particularly offensive to international labor standards and the
    right of freedom of association. A CNE spokesman defended the
    participation of all registered voters, observing that all citizens
    ``are workers or related to workers.'' The Public Prosecutor and
    Ombudsman both declared the measure unconstitutional as violations of
    freedom of association and the Government's international agreements,
    as provided for in the 1999 Constitution, and recommended that the
    Supreme Court do the same; however, the Court ruled in favor of moving
    forward with the referendum.
        In the referendum voters were asked to approve an ``overhaul of
    union leadership in 180 days, under a special law drafted by the
    electoral council, in accordance with the principles of term limits and
    universal, direct and confidential suffrage'' in accordance with the
    Constitution and to suspend ``the function of union officials'' during
    that time. Approximately 65 percent of those citizens who voted
    approved the question. The CNE later announced that voter turnout was
    23 percent.
        On December 6, the CTV leadership voluntarily resigned and was
    replaced by a transitional committee consisting of a broad spectrum of
    labor and civil society representatives that included individuals
    connected with the CTV as well as other labor organizations not
    traditionally aligned with the CTV. Following this change in
    leadership, the parties involved began to prepare for discussions on
    reforming the country's labor union structure.
        On September 3, President Chavez announced the creation of the
    ``Bolivarian'' Worker's Force (FTB) as a new labor federation allied
    with the ruling MVR to displace, or at least compete with, the CTV.
    President Chavez said that the FTB was preparing an ``all out war'' to
    ``demolish'' the CTV. Seats on the new ``transitional committee''
    heading the CTV had been set aside for members of the FTB.
        The new Constitution and the comprehensive 1990 Labor Code
    recognize the right of all public and private sector workers to strike
    in accordance with conditions established by the law, which still was
    being drafted at year's end. However, public servants may strike only
    if the strike does not cause ``irremediable damage to the population or
    to institutions.'' Replacement workers are not permitted during legal
    strikes. The Labor Code allows the President to order public or private
    sector strikers back to work and to submit their dispute to arbitration
    if the strike ``puts in immediate danger the lives or security of all
    or part of the population.'' During the year, most strikes were brief
    and occurred among government employees such as petroleum workers,
    health workers in public hospitals and clinics, firefighters, teachers,
    and transportation workers. In mid-October, the main petroleum workers'
    union, FEDEPETROL, held a successful 4-day strike against the state oil
    company PDVSA and persuaded the Government to concede to strikers'
    demands for a 30-month contract. The strike was settled through
    tripartite negotiations, which included the active participation of
    then-Vice President Isaias Rodriguez, who noted the ``historic role''
    of labor leaders in gaining benefits for workers.
        There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
    organizations, and many union organizations are active internationally;
    however, a November Supreme Court ruling regarding the legal abilities
    of NGO's that receive funding from foreign sources potentially could
    restrict the international affiliations of union organizers (see
    Section 2.b.).
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--According to
    the December 1999 Constitution, all public and private sector workers
    have the right to voluntary collective bargaining and to arrive at
    collective bargaining agreements, without any additional requirements
    other than those established by the law. The Constitution provides that
    the State is to ensure development of collective bargaining and to
    establish conditions favorable to collective relationships and the
    solution of labor conflicts. The 1990 Labor Code stipulates that
    employers must negotiate a collective contract with the union that
    represents the majority of their workers. The ILO repeatedly has
    expressed concerns that this provision restricts freedom of association
    and in March requested that the Government amend it so that ``in cases
    where no union organization represents an absolute majority of workers,
    minority organizations may jointly negotiate a collective agreement on
    behalf of their members.'' The code contains a provision stating that
    wages may be raised by administrative decree, provided that the
    legislative body approves the decree.
        The law also prohibits employers from interfering with the
    formation of unions or with their activities or from stipulating as a
    condition of employment that new workers must abstain from union
    activity or must join a specified union. The 1999 Constitution
    prohibits measures that ``alter the sanctity and progressiveness'' of
    labor rights and worker benefits, declares labor rights to be
    irrevocable, and provides that ambiguities regarding the application or
    interpretation of norms are to be applied in the manner most favorable
    to the worker.
        Ministry of Labor inspectors hear complaints regarding violations
    of these regulations and traditionally have been able to impose a
    maximum fine of twice the monthly minimum wage for a first infraction.
    Under the 1999 Constitution, union officials have special protection
    from dismissal. Under the 1990 Labor Code, if a judge determines that
    any worker was fired for union activity, the worker is entitled to back
    pay plus either reinstatement or payment of a substantial sum of money,
    which varies according to his years of seniority.
        The right to bargain collectively was violated in early March, when
    the National Legislative Committee passed a decree that suspended
    collective bargaining in the petroleum and public sector for 180 days
    (see Section 6.a.). On July 14, the CNE extended the decree until
    October 15.
        Labor law and practice are the same in the sole export-processing
    zone, located in Punto Fijo, as in the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1990 Labor Code
    states that no one may ``obligate others to work against their will,''
    and such practices generally are not known to occur. Apart from the
    general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law does not prohibit
    specifically forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices
    generally are not known to occur; however, there were reports of
    trafficking in children (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1990 Labor Code and the Tutelary Law for Minors
    contain provisions to protect children from exploitation in the
    workplace. The Ministry of Labor and the National Institute for Minors
    enforce child labor policies effectively in the formal sector of the
    economy but less so in the informal sector, in which an estimated 1.2
    million children work. According to UNICEF, approximately 47 percent of
    children are in the labor market, and work in agriculture, as artisans,
    in offices, and in the services sector.
        Primary school education is compulsory, free, and universal (see
    Section 5). However, 64 percent of children leave school before the
    ninth grade. In a 1996 survey of working children conducted by the
    National Institute for Minors, 45 percent of those polled stated that
    they were not in school. The actual figure is probably much higher
    considering that those who stated that they attended school also
    reported that they worked on average 7-1/2 hours per day, 4 to 7 days a
    week.
        The 1990 Labor Code allows children between the ages of 12 and 14
    to work only if the National Institute for Minors or the Labor Ministry
    grants special permission. It states that children between the ages of
    14 and 16 may not work without the permission of their legal guardians.
    Minors may not work in mines or smelters, in occupations that risk life
    or health, that could damage intellectual or moral development, or in
    public spectacles. The 1999 Constitution prohibits adolescents from
    working at jobs that will affect their development, protecting them
    from economic and social exploitation.
        Those under 16 years of age must by law work no more than 6 hours a
    day or 30 hours a week. Minors under the age of 18 may work only
    between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7 p.m. The estimated 1.2 million
    children who work in the informal sector, mostly as street vendors,
    generally work more hours than the total permitted under the law. In
    the National Institute for Minors survey of working children, half the
    children worked both morning and afternoon, and 64.5 percent worked 6
    or 7 days a week. The Government's Central Office of Statistics and
    Information reports that 12 percent of the country's children between
    the ages of 10 and 17 are working, have worked at some time, or are
    seeking work. Of that number, approximately 70 percent work in the
    informal sector of the economy. Less than 300,000 of children who work
    in the informal sector have permits.
        Apart from the general prohibition of compulsory labor, the law
    does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but
    such practices generally are not known to occur; however, there were
    reports of trafficking in children (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1999 Constitution provides
    workers with the right to a salary that is sufficient to allow them to
    live with dignity, and provides them and their families with the basic
    material, social, and intellectual necessities. The Constitution
    obliges the State to provide public and private sector workers with an
    annually adjusted minimum wage, using the cost of the basic basket of
    necessities as a reference point. The monthly minimum wage is $206
    (142,000 bolivars) in the private sector for urban workers and $170
    (118,000 bolivars) for rural workers, effective May 1.
        Total take-home pay in the private sector, the product of a
    presidential decree, was at least equal to that received by public
    sector minimum wage workers. Fringe benefits are added to these minimum
    figures; they vary with the worker's individual circumstances but in
    general increase wages by about one-third. However, even with these
    benefits, the minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. Unions point out that a
    worker's income is often less than the cost of a family's basic monthly
    food basket, estimated by the Center for Documentation and Analysis for
    Workers in August at $308 (212,205 bolivars). The basic basket, which
    includes medical care, transportation, clothing, and housing, in
    addition to food, stood at $905 (624,413 bolivars) for August.
        Under the 1990 Labor Code, minimum wage rates are set by
    administrative decree, which the legislature may suspend or ratify but
    may not change. The law excludes only domestic workers and concierges
    from coverage under the minimum wage decrees. The Ministry of Labor has
    enforced minimum wage rates effectively in the formal sector of the
    economy, but about one-half of the population works in the informal
    sector where labor laws and protections generally are not enforced.
        The 1999 Constitution also stipulates that the workday may not
    exceed 8 hours daily or 44 hours weekly and that night work may not
    exceed 7 hours daily or 35 hours weekly. Managers are prohibited from
    obligating employees from working extraordinary hours, and workers also
    have the right to weekly time away from work and annual remunerated
    vacations. Some unions, such as the petroleum workers, have negotiated
    a 40-hour week. Overtime may not exceed 2 hours daily, 10 hours weekly,
    or 100 hours annually, and may not be paid at a rate less than time-
    and-one-half. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforces these
    standards in the formal sector.
        The 1999 Constitution provides for secure, hygienic, and adequate
    working conditions; however, the authorities have not yet promulgated
    regulations to implement the 1986 Health and Safety Law, which is not
    enforced. The delay is due largely to concern that the law provides
    penal sanctions against management when violations of health and safety
    occur and that there is ambiguity in the law over what constitutes a
    violation. The 1990 Labor Code states that employers are obligated to
    pay specified amounts (up to a maximum of 25 times the minimum monthly
    salary) to workers for accidents or occupational illnesses, regardless
    of who is responsible for the injury.
        The code also requires that workplaces maintain ``sufficient
    protection for health and life against sickness and accidents,'' and it
    imposes fines ranging from one-quarter to twice the minimum monthly
    salary for first infractions. However, in practice Ministry of Labor
    inspectors seldom close down unsafe job sites. Under the law, workers
    can remove themselves from dangerous workplace situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The new Constitution prohibits
    trafficking in persons, and this provision was codified in legislation
    during the year. There were reports that women were trafficked to Spain
    for purposes of prostitution. The national Ombudsman's office is
    investigating whether some of the children separated from their parents
    in the flooding in Vargas state may have been trafficked (see Section
    5). There also were reports of trafficking in children from other South
    American countries to work in Caracas as street vendors and housemaids.
    The ease with which fraudulent government documents of nearly all types
    are obtained contributed to the trafficking problem. The Government's
    efforts to prevent trafficking are the responsibility of the Prosecutor
    General's family protection directorate (which also handles
    prosecutions) and the National Institutes for Women and Minors. NGO's
    such as CECODAP also are involved in activities to combat trafficking.

                                   APPENDIXES

                                  ----------

                APPENDIX A.--NOTES ON PREPARATION OF THE REPORTS

        We base the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on
    information available from all sources, including American and foreign
    government officials, victims of human rights abuse, academic and
    congressional studies, and reports from the press, international
    organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) concerned with
    human rights. We find particularly helpful, and make reference in most
    reports to, the role of NGO's, ranging from groups within a single
    country to those that concern themselves with human rights worldwide.
    While much of the information that we use is already public,
    information on particular abuses frequently cannot be attributed, for
    obvious reasons, to specific sources.
        By law we must submit the reports to Congress by February 25. To
    comply with this requirement, we provide guidance to U.S. diplomatic
    missions in July for submission of draft reports in September and
    October, which we update at year's end as necessary. Other offices in
    the Department of State provide contributions, and the Bureau of
    Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor prepares a final draft. Because of
    the preparation time required, it is possible that yearend developments
    may not be reflected fully. We make every effort to include reference
    to major events or significant changes in trends.
        We have attempted to make these country reports as comprehensive as
    space will allow, while taking care to make them objective and as
    uniform as possible in both scope and quality of coverage. We have
    given particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency
    despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious problems related to
    varying degrees of access to information, structural differences in
    political and social systems, and trends in world opinion regarding
    human rights practices in specific countries.
        It is often difficult to evaluate the credibility of reports of
    human rights abuses. With the exception of some terrorist
    organizations, most opposition groups and certainly most governments
    deny that they commit human rights abuses and often go to great lengths
    to conceal any evidence of such acts. There are often few eyewitnesses
    to specific abuses, and they frequently are intimidated or otherwise
    prevented from reporting what they know. On the other hand, individuals
    and groups opposed to a particular government sometimes have powerful
    incentives to exaggerate or fabricate abuses, and some governments
    similarly distort or exaggerate abuses attributed to opposition groups.
    We have made every effort to identify those groups, for example,
    government forces or terrorists, that are believed, based on all the
    evidence available, to have committed human rights abuses. Where
    credible evidence is lacking, we have tried to indicate why it is not
    available. Many governments that profess to oppose human rights abuses
    in fact secretly order or tacitly condone them or simply lack the will
    or the ability to control those responsible for them. Consequently, in
    judging a government's policy, it is important to look beyond
    statements of policy or intent in order to examine what in fact a
    government has done to prevent human rights abuses, including the
    extent to which it investigates, brings to trial, and appropriately
    punishes those who commit such abuses. We continue to make every effort
    to do that in these reports.
        To increase uniformity, the introductory section of each report
    contains a brief setting, indicating how the country is governed and
    providing the context for examining the country's human rights
    performance. A description of the political framework and the role of
    security and law enforcement agencies with respect to human rights is
    followed by a brief characterization of the economy. The setting
    concludes with an overview of human rights developments in the year
    under review, mentioning specific areas (for example, torture, freedom
    of speech and press, discrimination) in which abuses and problems
    occurred.
        We have continued the effort from previous years to expand
    reporting on human rights practices affecting women, children, and
    indigenous people. We discuss in the appropriate section of the report
    any abuses that are targeted specifically against women (for example,
    rape or other violence perpetrated by governmental or organized
    opposition forces, or discriminatory laws or regulations). In Section
    5, we discuss socioeconomic discrimination; societal violence against
    women, children, or minority group members; and the efforts, if any, of
    governments to combat these problems.
        To obtain more information on governmental policies on the welfare
    of children, readers may wish to consult ``The State of the World's
    Children 2000,'' published by the U.N. Children's Fund. The report
    provides a wide range of data on health, education, nutrition, rates of
    infant mortality, and mortality under 5 years of age in 193 countries,
    as well as information on the degree of progress that these countries
    are making in reducing the key mortality rate for persons under age 5.
        The following notes on specific categories of the report are not
    meant to be comprehensive descriptions of each category but to provide
    definitions of key terms used in the reports and to explain the
    organization of material within the format:
        Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Includes killings in
    which there is evidence of government instigation without due process
    of law or of political motivation by government or by opposition
    groups; also covers extrajudicial killings (for example, deliberate,
    illegal, or excessive use of lethal force by the police, security
    forces, or other agents of the State whether against criminal suspects,
    detainees, prisoners, or others), as well as killings committed by
    police or security forces in operations or while in the performance of
    their duties that resulted in the death of persons without due process
    of law (for example, mistargeted bombing or shelling or killing of
    bystanders); excludes combat deaths and killings by common criminals,
    if the likelihood of political motivation can be ruled out (see also
    Section 1.g.). Although mentioned briefly here, deaths in detention due
    to official negligence are covered in detail in Section 1.c.
        Disappearance.--Covers unresolved cases in which political
    motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found
    or perpetrators have not been identified; cases eventually classed as
    political killings in which the bodies of those missing are discovered
    also are covered in the above category, while those eventually
    identified as arrest or detention may be covered under ``Arbitrary
    Arrest, Detention, or Exile.''
        Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Defines torture as an extremely severe form of cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, committed by or at the
    instigation of government forces or opposition groups, with specific
    intent to cause extremely severe pain or suffering, whether mental or
    physical. Concentrates discussion on actual practices, not on whether
    they fit any precise definition, and includes use of physical and other
    force that may fall short of torture but which is cruel, inhuman, or
    degrading. Covers prison conditions, including information based on
    minimum international standards, and deaths in custody due to
    negligence by government officials.
        Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Covers cases in which
    detainees, including political detainees, are held in official custody
    without charges or, if charged, are denied a public preliminary
    judicial hearing within a reasonable period. Also discusses whether,
    and under what circumstances, governments exile citizens.
        Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Describes briefly the court system
    and evaluates whether there is an independent judiciary and whether
    trials are both fair and public (failure to hold any trial is noted in
    the category above); includes discussion of ``political prisoners''
    (political detainees are covered above), defined as those convicted and
    imprisoned essentially for political beliefs or nonviolent acts of
    dissent or expression, regardless of the actual legal charge.
        Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Discusses the ``passive'' right of the individual to
    noninterference by the State; includes the right to receive foreign
    publications, for example, while the right to publish is discussed
    under ``Freedom of Speech and Press;'' includes the right to be free
    from coercive population control measures, including coerced abortion
    and involuntary sterilization, but does not include cultural or
    traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, which are
    addressed in Section 5.
        Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--An optional subsection for use in describing
    abuses that occur in countries experiencing significant internal armed
    conflict. Includes indiscriminate, nonselective killings arising from
    excessive use of force, for example, by police in putting down
    demonstrations, or by the shelling of villages (deliberate, targeted
    killing is discussed in Section 1.a.). Also includes abuses against
    civilian noncombatants. For reports in which use of this section would
    be inappropriate, that is, in which there is no significant internal
    conflict, lethal use of excessive force by security forces (which
    herein is defined as a form of extrajudicial killing) is discussed in
    Section 1.a.; nonlethal excessive force in Section 1.c.
        Freedom of Speech and Press.--Evaluates whether these freedoms
    exist and describes any direct or indirect restrictions. Includes
    discussion of academic freedom.
        Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Evaluates the
    ability of individuals and groups (including political parties) to
    exercise these freedoms. Includes the ability of trade associations,
    professional bodies, and similar groups to maintain relations or
    affiliate with recognized international bodies in their fields. The
    right of labor to associate, organize, and bargain collectively is
    discussed under Section 6, Worker Rights (see Appendix B).
        Freedom of Religion.--Discusses whether the constitution or laws
    provide for the right of citizens of whatever religious belief to
    worship free of government interference and whether the government
    respects that right. Includes the freedom to publish religious
    documents in foreign languages; addresses the treatment of foreign
    clergy and whether religious belief affects membership in a ruling
    party or a career in government.
        Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,
    and Repatriation.--Includes discussion of forced resettlement;
    ``refugees'' may refer to persons displaced by civil strife or natural
    disaster as well as persons who are ``refugees'' within the meaning of
    the Refugee Act of 1980, that is, persons with a ``well-founded fear of
    persecution'' in their country of origin or, if stateless, in their
    country of habitual residence, on account of race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion.
        Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
    Government.--Discusses the extent to which citizens have freedom of
    political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to
    change the laws and officials that govern them; assesses whether
    elections are free and fair.
        Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
    Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.--Discusses whether
    the government permits the free functioning of local human rights
    groups (including the right to investigate and publish their findings
    on alleged human rights abuses) and whether they are subject to
    reprisal by government or other forces. Also discusses whether the
    government grants access to and cooperates with outside entities
    (including foreign human rights organizations, international
    organizations, and foreign governments) interested in human rights
    developments in the country.
        Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
    or Social Status.--Contains a subheading on Women, Children, and People
    with Disabilities. As appropriate, also includes subheadings on
    Indigenous People, Religious Minorities, and National/Racial/Ethnic
    Minorities. Discrimination against groups not fitting one of the above
    subheadings is discussed in the introductory paragraph(s) of Section 5.
    Addresses discrimination and abuses not discussed elsewhere in the
    report, focusing on laws, regulations, or state practices that are
    inconsistent with equal access to housing, employment, education,
    health care, or other governmental benefits for members of specific
    groups. (Abuses by government or opposition forces, such as killing,
    torture and other violence, or restriction of voting rights or free
    speech targeted against specific groups would be discussed under the
    appropriate preceding sections.) Discusses societal violence against
    women, e.g., ``dowry deaths,'' wife beating, rape, and government
    tolerance of such under the subheading on women. Discusses the extent
    to which the law provides for, and the government enforces, equality of
    economic opportunity for women. Discusses violence or other abuse
    against children under that subheading. Discusses female genital
    mutilation, which is most often performed on children, also under that
    subheading.
        Worker Rights.--See Appendix B.

                                   __________

                    APPENDIX B.--REPORTING ON WORKER RIGHTS

        The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act requires
    reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that
    internationally recognized worker rights include ``(A) the right of
    association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a
    prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a
    minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable
    conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
    occupational safety and health.'' All five aspects of worker rights are
    discussed in each report in a final section under the heading ``Worker
    Rights.'' A final category, listed as (F), addresses trafficking in
    persons. The discussion of worker rights considers not only laws and
    regulations but also their practical implementation, taking into
    account the following additional guidelines:
        A. ``The right of association'' has been defined by the
    International Labor Organization (ILO) to include the right of workers
    and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing
    without previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and
    rules, elect their representatives, and formulate their programs; to
    join in confederations and affiliate with international organizations;
    and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative
    authority.
        The right of association includes the right of workers to strike.
    While strikes may be restricted in essential services (that is, those
    services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal
    safety, or health of a significant portion of the population) and in
    the public sector, these restrictions must be offset by adequate
    guarantees to safeguard the interests of the workers concerned (for
    example, machinery for mediation and arbitration; due process; and the
    right to judicial review of all legal actions). Reporting on
    restrictions affecting the ability of workers to strike generally
    includes information on any procedures that may exist for safeguarding
    workers' interests.
        B. ``The right to organize and bargain collectively'' includes the
    right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and
    settlement of disputes with employers; the right to protection against
    interference; and the right to protection against acts of antiunion
    discrimination. Governments should promote machinery for voluntary
    negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations.
    Reporting on the right to organize and bargain collectively includes
    descriptions of the extent to which collective bargaining takes place
    and the extent to which unions, both in law and practice, are
    effectively protected against antiunion discrimination.
        C. ``Forced or compulsory labor'' is defined as work or service
    exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which the
    person has not volunteered. ``Work or service'' does not apply in
    instances in which obligations are imposed to undergo education or
    training. ``Menace of penalty'' includes loss of rights or privileges
    as well as penal sanctions. The ILO has exempted the following from its
    definition of forced labor: compulsory military service; normal civic
    obligations; certain forms of prison labor; emergencies; and minor
    communal services. Forced labor should not be used as a means of (1)
    mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; (2)
    racial, social, national, or religious discrimination; (3) political
    coercion or education, or as a punishment for holding or expressing
    political views or views ideologically opposed to the established
    political, social, or economic system; (4) labor discipline; or (5) as
    a punishment for having participated in strikes. Constitutional
    provisions concerning the obligation of citizens to work do not violate
    this right so long as they do not take the form of legal obligations
    enforced by sanctions and are consistent with the principle of ``freely
    chosen employment.''
        D. ``Minimum age for employment of children'' concerns the
    effective abolition of child labor by raising the minimum age for
    employment to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental
    development of young people. ILO Convention 182 on the ``worst forms of
    child labor,'' which has been ratified by over 60 countries, identifies
    anyone under the age of 18 as a child and specifies types of employment
    as ``the worst forms of child labor.'' Worst forms of labor include
    slavery, debt bondage, forced labor, forced recruitment into armed
    conflict, child prostitution and pornography, involvement in illicit
    activity such as drug production or trafficking, and ``work which, by
    its nature, or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely
    to harm the health, safety or morals or children.'' ILO Convention 182
    permits employment of children between the ages of 16 and 18 in what
    the convention describes as an ``unhealthy environment,'' if adequate
    protective measures have been taken.
        E. ``Acceptable conditions of work'' refers to the establishment
    and maintenance of machinery, adapted to national conditions, that
    provides for minimum working standards, that is, wages that provide a
    decent living for workers and their families; working hours that do not
    exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified
    annual paid holiday; and minimum conditions for the protection of the
    safety and health of workers. Differences in the levels of economic
    development are taken into account in the formulation of
    internationally recognized labor standards. For example, many ILO
    standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their
    scope and coverage. They also may permit countries a wide choice in
    their implementation, including progressive implementation, by enabling
    countries to accept a standard in part or subject to specified
    exceptions. Countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve
    the higher levels specified in such standards. However, it should be
    understood that this flexibility applies only to internationally
    recognized standards concerning working conditions. No flexibility is
    permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic principles contained
    in human rights standards, that is, freedom of association, the right
    to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor,
    and the absence of discrimination.
        F. ``Trafficking in persons'' is defined as all acts involving the
    recruitment, harboring, provision, or obtaining of a person (man,
    woman, or child) for labor or services, through the use of force,
    fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
    servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Sex trafficking is
    defined as an act in which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
    fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act
    has not attained 18 years of age. Reporting describes legal
    prohibitions against trafficking; the extent to which the government
    enforces these prohibitions; the extent of trafficking in persons to,
    from, within, or through the country, other geographic regions or
    countries affected by the traffic; and aid or protection available to
    victims.

                                   __________

                                                       APPENDIX C--INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS
                                           [See Appendix D for a description of the various Human Rights Conventions]
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 COUNTRY               A     B   C    D    E    F    G    H    I    J    K    L    M    N    O    P    Q    R    S    T    U    V    W    X
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Afganistan                         p              p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                                  s    p    p
    Albania*                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Algeria                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Andorra                                                     p    p         p                                                                p         p
    Angola                                  p              p    p    p              p         p         p    p    p    p              p         p         p
    Antigua & Barbuda                  p    p    p    p    p    p    p              1    p    p    p              p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
    Argentina                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Armenia                                           p         p    p         s                   p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Australia                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Austria                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Azerbaijan                         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p
    Bahamas                            p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p              p    p              p    p    p         p
    Bahrain                                 p         p         p    p                   p    p    p                                  p    p         p    p
    Bangladesh                         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
    Barbados                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p         p
    Belarus                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    Belgium                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Belize                             1    p    p    p    p    p    p                   1    p    s    p    s    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Benin                              2    p    p         p    p    p                        p    s    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Bhutan*                                                     p    p                             s                                            p         p
    Bolivia                            p         p    s    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Bosnia & Herz.                     p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Botswana                           1    p    p         p    p    p                   1    p    p    p         p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Brazil                             p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
    Brunei*                            1                        p    p                   1                                            p    p              p
    Bulgaria                           2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Burkina Faso                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Burma                              p    p    p    p         p    p    s         s                                                           p         p
    Burundi                                 p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Cambodia                                p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Cameroon                           p    p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Canada                             p         p    p         p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Cape Verde                              p    p         p    p    p                        p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p
    Cen. African Rep.                  2    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
    Chad                                    p    p         p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Chile                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    China                                             p         p    p              p              p    s    s    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
     Hong Kong                         p              p                             p              p                                            p    p    p
     Macau                                            p                   p              p         p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p
      (to 12-19-99)
     Macau                                            p                                            p                                                 p    p
      (from 12-20-99)
    China                                             p
     (Taiwan only)*                    p              p                        p    p         p    s    s
    Colombia                           s    p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
    Comoros                                 p    p         p    p    p                        p    s                                  p    p    p    s    p
    Congo, Dem.                        p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p
     Rep. of
    Congo,                             2    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
     Republic of
    Costa Rica                              p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Cote D'Ivoire                      2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Croatia                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Cuba                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p                             p    p    p    p    p    p
    Cyprus                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Czech Republic                     2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Denmark                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Djibouti                                p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p                   p    p              p    p    p         p
    Dominica                           p    p    p         p    p    p              1    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p
    Dom Republic                       p    p    p    s    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s    p
    Ecuador                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Egypt                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    El Salvador                             p         p         p    p              s    s    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Equatorial                                                  p    p                                  p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
     Guinea
    Eritrea                                 p    p         p    p    p                        p                                  p              p         p
    Estonia                            2    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Ethiopia                           p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Fiji                               p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p              p    p                        p         p
    Finland                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    France                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p
    Gabon                                   p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Gambia*                            1              p         p    p                   1         p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
    Georgia                                 p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Germany                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Ghana                              2    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Greece                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Grenada                            1    p    p    1    p    p    p              1    1    p    s    p    p              p         p    p    p         p
    Guatemala                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Guinea                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Guinea-Bissau                           p              p    p    p                        p    s    s    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
    Guyana                             1    p    p         p    p    p                   1    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    Haiti                              2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p                   p         p
    Holy See                                                    p    p                             p              p    p              p    p              p
    Honduras                                p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Hungary                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Iceland                                 p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    India                              p    p         p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                                  p    s    p
    Indonesia                               p    p         p    p    p              p         p    p                             p              p    p    p
    Iran                               s    p         p         p    p    s              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              s    s              p
    Iraq                               p    p         p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p                   p              p         p
    Ireland                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    s    p
    Israel                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p
    Italy                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Jamaica                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p         p
    Japan                                   p    p         p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p
    Jordan                             p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    Kazakhstan                                   p    p         p    p                             p              p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Kenya                                   p              p    p    p                        p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Kiribati*                          1                        p    p              1    1              1    1         1                                  p
    Korea, Dem.                                       p         p    p                                  p    p                        p                   p
     Rep. of*
    Korea, Rep. of                                    p         p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Kuwait                             p    p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    Kyrgyzstan                         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Laos                                    p         p         p    p    p         p    p         p    s    s                        p    p    p         p
    Latvia                             2         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Lebanon                            p    p         p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
    Lesotho                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p         p
    Liberia                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s         s    s    p    p    s    s    p    p              p    p    p         p
    Libya                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    Liechtenstein*                                    p         p    p         p                   p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Lithuania                          s    p    p    p    p    p    p         p              p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Luxembourg                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Macedonia, F.Y.R.O.                2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Madagascar                         p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p         p
    Malawi                             p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Malaysia                                p         p    p    p    p                   p    p                                  p              p         p
    Maldives*                                         p         p    p                             p                                  p    p    p         p
    Mali                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
    Malta                              p    p    p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Marshall Islands*                                                                                                                                     p
    Mauritania                         p    p    p              p    p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p              p    p              p
    Mauritius                          p    p              p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    Mexico                             p    p    p    p         p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p
    Micronesia*                                                 p    p                                                                p    p              p
    Moldova                                 p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p         p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
    Monaco*                            p              p         p    p                             p    p    p    p                        p    p         p
    Mongolia                           p         p    p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p                        p    p    p         p
    Morocco                            p    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    s    s    p    p    p
    Mozambique                                   p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p         p    p              p         p    p    p
    Namibia                                 p    p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p
    Nauru*                                                                                                                                                p
    Nepal                              p              p    p    p    p              p    p         p    p    p                   p              p    p    p
    Netherlands                        p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    New Zealand                        p    p         p         p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Nicaragua                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    s    p
    Niger                              p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Nigeria                            p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
    Niue                                                                                                                                                  p
    Norway                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Oman*                                   p                   p    p                                                                p    p              p
    Pakistan                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p                                  s    s    p         p
    Palau                                                       p    p                                                                p    p              p
    Panama                             s    p    p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Papua                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p              p    p         p              p         p
     New Guinea
    Paraguay                                p    p    s    p    p    p              p         p    s    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
    Peru                                    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    s    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p
    Philippines                        p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    s    p    p    p    p
    Poland                             2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Portugal                           2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Qatar                                   p                   p    p                             p                                  p              p    p
    Romania                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Russia                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Rwanda                                       p    p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
    Samoa*                                                      p    p                                            p    p              p    p    p         p
    San Marino                              p    p         p    p    p         p         p    p         p    p                   p    p    p              p
    Sao Tome                                     p         p    p    p                             s    s    s    p    p              p    p    s    s    p
     & Principe
    Saudi Arabia                       p    p         p         p    p                   p    p    p                                  p         p    p    p
    Senegal                            2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Seychelles                         2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         1    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Sierra Leone                       p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    s    p
    Singapore                               p         p    p    p    p    p              p                                                      p         p
    Slovak Republic                    2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Slovenia                                p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Solomon Islands                    p    p                   p    p              p    p         1         1    p    p              p    p              p
    Somalia                                 p                   p    p                        p    p    p    p    p    p                                  p
    South Africa*                      p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         s         p    p    p    s    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Spain                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Sri Lanka                          p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p                   p              p    p    p
    St. Kitts                          1    p    p         p    p    p              1    1    p                                       p    p    p         p
     & Nevis*
    St. Lucia                          p    p    p    1    p    p    p              1    p    p    p                                  p    p    p         p
    St. Vincent*                       p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p         p
    Sudan                              p    p              p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p    p                             s    p
    Suriname                           2    p    p         p    p    p              1    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p         p
    Swaziland                          1    p    p         p    p    p              p    1    p    p              p    p              p    p              p
    Sweden                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Switzerland                        p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Syria                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p                        p                   p
    Tajikistan *                            p    p         p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Tanzania                           p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
    Thailand                                p                   p    p              p         p         p    p                                  p         p
    Togo                               2    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Tonga*                             1              p         p    p              1    1    1    p                                                      p
    Trinidad                           p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p         p                        p         p
     & Tobago
    Tunisia                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Turkey                             p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    s    s    s    p    p         p              p    p    p
    Turkmenistan                       p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Tuvalu*                            1                        p    p              1    1              1         p    p                        p         p
    Uganda                             p    p         p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p
    Ukraine                            p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p                   p    p    p    p    p    p
    United Arab Emir.                       p                   p    p                        p    p                             p    p    p              p
    United Kingdom                     p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    United States                      p              p         p    p              p    p    p    p    p    s         p    s         s    s    s    p    s
    Uruguay                            s    p    p    p    p    p    p              s         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Uzbekistan                              p         p    p    p    p              p         p    p    p    p                        p    p    p    p    p
    Vanuatu*                                                    p    p                   1                                            p    p    p         p
    Venezuela                               p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p
    Vietnam*                           p              p         p    p                             p    p    p                        p         p         p
    Yemen                              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p         p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Zambia                             p    p    p         p    p    p              p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p
    Zimbabwe                           1    p         p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p    p    p    p    p         p    p    p    p         p
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    P = Party.
    S = Signatory.
    * designates a non-ILO member.
    1 = Based on general declaration concerning treaty obligations prior to independence.
    2 = Party to 1926 Convention only.

                                  ----------

              APPENDIX D.--INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

        A -- Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of
    September 25, 1926, as amended by the Protocol of December 7, 1953.
        B -- Convention Concerning Forced Labor of June 28, 1930 (ILO
    Convention 29).
        C -- Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
    the Right to Organize of July 9, 1948 (ILO Convention 87).
        D -- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
    Genocide of December 9, 1948.
        E -- Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
    Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively of July 1, 1949 (ILO
    Convention 98).
        F -- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
    War of August 12, 1949.
        G -- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
    Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949.
        H -- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
    of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of March 21, 1950.
        I -- European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
    Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
        J -- Convention on the Political Rights of Women of March 31, 1953.
        K -- Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
    Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of
    September 7, 1956.
        L -- Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor of June
    25, 1957 (ILO Convention 105).
        M -- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
    Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965.
        N -- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
    December 16, 1966.
        O -- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
    of December 16, 1966.
        P -- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28,
    1952.
        Q -- Protocol Relating to the Status Of Refugees of January 31,
    1967.
        R -- American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969.
        S -- Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
    of June 26, 1973 (ILO Convention 138).
        T -- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
    1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
    Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977.
        U -- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
    1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
    Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of June 8, 1977.
        V -- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
    Against Women of December 18, 1979.
        W -- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
    Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 10, 1984.
        X -- Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989.

                                   __________

                                                                                    APPENDIX E.--SELECTED U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: FY2000 ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
                                                                                                                [BA $ thousands]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                                  Export                        Peace
                                                               DA/DFA       CSD         ESF       IMET       FSA        SEED     INCLE\1\      MRA       NADR     Control     ATA       CT      Corps        FMF        PKO         Total
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regional Allocations:
    Africa
    Angola, Luanda.........................................      5,096      4,900          --        --         --         --          --         --     3,096        --        --        --        --          --         --        13,092
    Benin, Cotonou.........................................      3,826     10,058          --       356         --         --          --         --        --        --        --     1,950        --          --     16,190
    Botswana, Gabonone.....................................         --         --          --       479         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           479
    Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou..............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,915          --         --         1,915
    Cameroon, Yaounde......................................         --         --          --       189         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,923          --         --         3,112
    Cape Verde, Praia......................................         --         --          --       123         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,159          --         --         1,282
    Central African Republic, Bangui.......................         --         --          --       103         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           103
    Chad, N'Djamena........................................         --         --          --       100         --         --          --         --       622        --        --        --        --          --         --           722
    Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Kinshasa............        830      8,980          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         9,810
    Cote D'Ivoire, Abidjan.................................         --         --          --        22         --         --          --         --     1,600        --     1,600        --     2,731          --         --         4,353
    Djibouti, Djibouti.....................................         --         --          --       163         --         --          --         --       746        --        --        --        --          --         --           909
    Eritrea, Asmara........................................      4,694       4133          --        27         --         --          --         --       500        --        --        --        --          --         --         9,354
    Ethiopia, Addis Ababa..................................     12,439     27,299          --       152         --         --          --         --       250        --        --        --        --          --         --        40,140
    Gabon, Libreville......................................         --         --          --        47         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,460          --         --         2,507
    Gambia, The, Banjul....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,509          --         --         1,509
    Ghana, Accra...........................................     22,381     15,220          --       450         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,728          --         --        40,779
    Guinea, Conakry........................................      8,634      9,930          --       179         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,548          --         --        21,291
    Guinea-Bissau, Bissau..................................         --         --          --        22         --         --          --         --        99        --        --        --       173          --         --           294
    Kenya, Nairobi.........................................     21,503      8,370          --       422         --         --          --         --        37        --        37        --     3,520          --         --        33,852
    Lesotho, Maseru........................................         --         --          --        86         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,957          --         --         2,043
    Liberia, Monrovia......................................      4,140      2,552          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,692
    Madagascar, Antananarivo...............................     12,916      4,050          --       160         --         --          --         --       494        --       494        --     1,914          --         --        19,534
    Malawi, Lilongwe.......................................     19,048     11,356          --       345         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,716          --         --        32,465
    Mali, Bamako...........................................     22,370     12,876          --       270         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,576          --         --        38,092
    Mauritania, Nouakchott.................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       461        --        --        --     1,539          --         --         2,000
    Mauritius, Port Louis..................................         --         --          --        79         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            79
    Mozambique, Maputo.....................................     37,569     11,450          --       178         --         --          --         --     3,840        --        --        --     1,212          --         --        54,249
    Namibia, Windhoek......................................      7,237      4,002          --       175         --         --          --         --       485        --        --        --     2,285          --         --        14,184
    Niger, Niamey..........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,173          --         --         2,173
    Nigeria, Lagos.........................................     20,500     17,000      20,000       525         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --      10,000         --        68,025
    Rwanda, Kigali.........................................      9,820      6,300          --       164         --         --          --         --       285        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,569
    Sao Tome, Principe.....................................         --         --          --        45         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            45
    Senegal, Dakar.........................................     17,153      6,400          --       764         --         --          --         --        55        --        55        --     2,762          --         --        27,134
    Seychelles, Victoria...................................         --         --          --        72         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            72
    Sierra Leone, Freetown.................................         --        500       1,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         2,000
    Somalia, Mogadishu.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --     1,400        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,400
    South Africa, Pretoria.................................     32,979     13,188          --       904         --         --          --         --     1,133        --     1,133        --     2,284          --         --        50,488
    Swaziland, Mbabane.....................................         --         --          --       105         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           105
    Tanzania, Dar es Salaam................................     14,322      9,500          --       167         --         --          --         --        89        --        89        --     2,206          --         --        26,284
    Togo, Lome.............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,683          --         --         1,683
    Uganda, Kampala........................................     29,544     19,468          --       247         --         --          --         --        18        --        18        --       276          --         --        49,553
    Zambia, Lusaka.........................................     16,000     15,228          --       137         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,432          --         --       33,7974
    Zimbabwe, Harare.......................................      6,926      5,200          --       286         --         --          --         --     1,152        --        --        --     1,710          --         --        15,274
    REDSO/ESA/GHAI.........................................     17,360      6,900          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        24,260
    PEGO/ATRIP.............................................     12,004         --       2,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        14,004
    Sahel Regional.........................................      8,085        200          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         8,285
    West Africa Regional...................................      7,200      9,900          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        17,100
    SADC/ISA...............................................     23,907         --       1,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        24,907
    Other AFR Regional.....................................     38,650     35,838          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        74,488
    Education for Development and Democracy (EDDI).........      9,855        200      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        20,055
    Africa Regional Democracy Fund (ARDF)..................         --         --       6,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       6,000--
    Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI)..................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
    Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP).....................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     16,654        16,654
    Africa Crisis Response Initiatve (ACRI)................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     20,000        20,000
    East Africa Regional Fund (EARF).......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Safe Skies for Africa Initiative (SSK).................         --         --       2,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         2,000
    Countries in Transition Fund (CIT).....................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
    Regional ATA Training--Africa..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Migration/Refugee Assistance--Africa...................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --    177,127        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       177,127
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, Africa..........................................    446,988    280,998      62,500     7,543         --         --          --    117,127    16,352        --     3,426        --    52,341      10,000     36,654     1,090,513
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Regional Allocations:
    East Asia & Pacific
    Burma, Rangoon.........................................         --      3,000       3,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,500
    Cambodia, Phnom Penh...................................         --      3,550      10,000        --         --         --          --         --     2,580        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,130
    China, Beijing.........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,458          --         --         1,458
    Fji, Suva..............................................         --         --          --        78         --         --          --         --        79        --        79        --        --          --         --           157
    Indonesia, Jakarta.....................................     53,050     18,950      23,000        --         --         --          --         --       197        --       197        --        --          --         --        95,197
    Laos, Vientiane........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --       4,000         --     1,486        --        --        --        --          --         --         5,486
    Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.................................         --         --          --       740         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           740
    Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar..................................         --         --       6,000       512      6,000         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,578          --         --        14,090
    Papua New Galnea, Port Moresby.........................         --         --          --       177         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,441          --         --         1,618
    Philippines, Manila....................................     22,500      7,200          --     1,415         --         --          --         --     3,258        --     1,258     2,000     1,738       1,437         --        37,548
    Samoa, Apia............................................         --         --          --        85         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,242          --         --         1,327
    Solomon Islands, Honiara...............................         --         --          --        53         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       991          --         --         1,044
    Thailand, Bangkok......................................         --         --          --     1,730         --         --       3,000         --     2,370        --     1,150        --     1,198          --         --         8,298
    Vanuatu, Republic of, Port Vila........................         --         --          --        63         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,251          --         --         1,314
    Viet-Nam, Hanoi........................................      1,250      1,500          --        --         --         --          --         --     1,000        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,750
    Other Asia Regional....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia (AERA)..........     11,750      1,000       5,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        17,750
    East Asia and Pacific Environment Initiatives..........     15,000         --       3,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        18,500
    Asia Regional Democracy Fund (Asia RDF)................         --         --       3,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,000
    South Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty............         --         --      14,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        14,000
    Regional Security......................................         --         --         250        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           250
    Migration/Refugee Assistance--East Asia & Pacific......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --     14,485        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        14,485
    East Timor.............................................         --         --      25,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --      8,500        33,500
    China NGO (Tibetan Culture)............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Regional Women's Issues................................         --         --       2,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         2,500
    Regional--KEDO.........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --    55,307        --        --        --        --          --         --        55,307
    Regional ATA Training--East Asia & Pacific.............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Kiribati...............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,055          --         --         1,055
    Micronesia & Palau.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,609          --         --         1,609
    Tonga..................................................         --         --          --       103         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,114          --         --         1,217
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, East Asia & Pacific.............................    103,550     35,200      95,750     4,956      6,000         --       7,000     14,485    66,277        --     2,684     2,000    14,675       1,437      8,500       357,830
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Regional Allocations:
    Russia & Independent States
    Armenia, Verevan.......................................         --         --          --        --    102,550         --          --         --       300        --        --        --     1,418          --         --       104,268
    Azerbaijan, Baku.......................................         --         --          --   --31,968        --         --         607        100         7        --        --        --        --      32,575
    Belarus, Minsk.........................................         --         --          --        --      8,489         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         8,489
    Georgia, Tbilisi.......................................         --         --          --       409    108,533         --          --         --        27        --        --        --       318       3,000         --       112,287
    Kazakstan, Almaty......................................         --         --          --       567     44,826         --          --         --     1,081     1,050        31        --     2,186       1,500         --        50,160
    Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek....................................         --         --          --       358     30,064         --          --         --       385        --       385        --     1,246       1,000         --        33,053
    Moldova, Chisinau......................................         --         --          --       487     50,436         --          --         50        50        --        --     1,654     1,250          --     53,877
    Russia, Moscow.........................................         --         --          --       717    186,631         --          --         --     4,125     4,125        --        --     3,898          --         --       195,371
    Tajikistan, Dushanbe...................................         --         --          --        --      9,926         --          --         --        50        50        --        --        --          --         --         9,976
    Turkmenistan, Ashgabat.................................         --         --          --       313      6,195         --          --         --       235       235        --        --     1,360         600         --         8,703
    Ukraine, Kiev..........................................         --         --          --     1,338    174,154         --          --         --     1,256     1,090       166        --     2,739       3,250         --       182,737
    Uzbekistan, Tashkent...................................         --         --          --       547     20,042         --          --         --        63        --        63        --     1,724       1.750         --        24,126
    Regional Export Control................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       300       300        --        --        --          --         --           300
    Regional FSA...........................................         --         --          --        --     55,998         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        55,998
    Regional ATA Training--Russia & NIS....................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, Russia & the Independent States.................         --         --          --     4,736    829,812         --          --         --     8,479     7,000       652        --    16,543      12,350         --       871,920
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Regional Allocations:
    Europe
    Albania, Tirana........................................         --         --          --       646         --     32,000          --         --     1,135        --     1,135        --        --       1,600         --        35,381
    Bosnia and Herzegovina, Saraevo........................         --         --          --       601         --    100,000          --         --       405        --       405        --        --          --     51,271       152,277
    Bulgaria, Sofia........................................         --         --          --     1,000         --     32,000          --         --       560       560        --        --     1,785       4,800         --        40,145
    Croatia, Zagreb........................................         --         --          --       514         --     36,200          --         --        --        --        --        --        --       4,000         --        40,714
    Cyprus, Nicosia........................................         --         --      14,950        --         --         --          --         --     1,576       310     1,266        --        --          --         --        16,526
    Czech Republic, Prague.................................         --         --          --     1,441         --         --          --         --     1,335       540       795        --        --       6,000         --         8,776
    Estonia, Tallinn.......................................         --         --          --       789         --         --          --         --       565       265        --        --       664       4,000         --         6,018
    Greece, Athens.........................................         --         --          --        25         --         --          --         --        15        --        15        --        --          --         --            40
    Hungary, Budepest......................................         --         --          --     1,398         --         --          --         --       430       430        --        --        --       6,000         --         7,828
    Ireland, Dublin........................................         --         --      23,525        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        23,525
    Latvia, Riga...........................................         --         --          --       749         --         --          --         --       420       420        --        --       997       4,000         --         6,166
    Lithuania, Vilnius.....................................         --         --          --       750         --         --          --         --       730       730        --        --       996       4,400         --         6,876
    Macedonia, Skopje......................................         --         --          --       504         --     30,000          --         --     1,263       335       928        --       810          --         --        32,577
    Malta, Valletta........................................         --         --          --       100         --         --          --         --       375       375        --        --        --         450         --           925
    Poland, Warsaw.........................................         --         --          --     1,670         --         --          --         --     1,751       891       861        --     2,100       8,000         --        13,521
    Portugal, Lisbon.......................................         --         --          --       656         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           656
    Romania, Bucharest.....................................         --         --          --     1,093         --     35,000          --         --       505       505        --        --     2,128       6,000         --        44,726
    Slovakia, Bratislava...................................         --         --          --       633         --         --          --         --       200       200        --        --     1,528       2,600         --         4,961
    Slovenia, Ljubljana....................................         --         --          --       579         --         --          --         --       375       375        --        --        --       2,000         --         2,954
    Turkey, Ankara.........................................         --         --          --     1,554         --         --          48         --       872        --       872        --        --          --         --         2,474
    Yugoslavia, Belgrade (Serbia)..........................         --         --          --        --         --     25,000          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        25,000
    OSCE Regional..........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Partnership for Peace..................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Regional ESF...........................................         --         --      21,139        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        21,139
    Regional SEED..........................................         --         --          --        --         --     85,470          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        85,470
    Kosovo.................................................         --         --          --        --         --    164,800          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     33,375       198,175
    Montenegro.............................................         --         --          --        --         --     42,500          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         42500
    Regional ATA Tralning--Europe..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    Migration/Refugee Assistance--Europe...................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --    171,329        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       171,329
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Europe...........................................         --         --      59,614    14,702         --    582,970          48    171,329    12,512     5,935     6,277        --    11,008      53,850     84,646       990,679
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Regional Allocations:
    Near East
    Algeria, Algiers.......................................         --         --          --       115         --         --          --         --       146        --       146        --        --          --         --           261
    Bahrain, Manama........................................         --         --          --       216         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           216
    Egypt, Cairo...........................................         --         --     727,267     1,006         --         --          --         --       909        --       909        --        --   1,300,000         --     2,029,182
      Egypt Supplemental...................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --      25,000         --        25,000
    Israel, Tel Aviv.......................................         --         --     949,056        --         --         --          --     60,000        57        --        57        --        --   1,920,000         --     2,929,113
      Israel--Wye..........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --   1,200,000         --     1,200,000
    Jordan, Amman..........................................         --         --     149,500     1,679         --         --          --         --     2,241        --       730        --     1,535     150,000         --       304,955
      Jordan--Wye..........................................         --         --      50,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --      74,715         --       124,715
      Kuwait, Kuwait City..................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        35        --        35        --        --          --         --            35
    Lebanon, Beirut........................................         --         --      15,000       582         --         --          --         --     1,282        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,864
    Morocco, Rabat.........................................      7,250      3,000          --       904         --         --          --         --       631        --       531        --     2,271       1,500         --        15,456
    Oman, Muscat...........................................         --         --          --       230         --         --          --         --     2,683        --     1,686        --        --          --         --         2,913
    Tunisia, Tunis.........................................         --         --          --       906         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --       3,000         --         3,906
    UAE....................................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       930        15       915        --        --          --         --           930
    Yemen, Sanaa...........................................         --         --          --       125         --         --          --         --     2,183        --       947        --        --          --         --         2,308
    Migration/Refugee Assistance--Near East................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --    108,250        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       108,250
    Multinational Force and Observers......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --     15,902        15,902
    Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --        450           450
    North Africa Trade and Investment......................      1,000         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,000
    Regional ATA Training--Near East.......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --       140        --       140        --        --          --         --           140
    Middle East Democrary Fund (MERDF).....................         --         --       6,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,000
    Iraq Opposition........................................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
    Middle East Multilaterals..............................         --         --       4,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,000
    Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC)................         --         --      10,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        10,000
    West Bank/Gaza.........................................         --         --      85,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        85,000
    West Bank/Gaza--Wye....................................         --         --     400,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       400,000
    U.S.-North Africa Partnership..........................         --         --       5,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         5,000
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, Near East.......................................      8,250      3,000   2,410,823     5,763         --         --          --    168,250    11,137        15     6,076        --     3,806   4,674,215     16,352     7,301,596
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Regional Allocations:
    South Asia
    Afghanistan, Kabul.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --     3,000        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,000
    Bangladesh, Dhaka......................................     31,063     14,836          --       456         --         --          --         --       185        --       185        --       998          --         --        47,538
    India, New Delhi.......................................     28,700     22,750          --       480         --         --          --         --     1,014       285       729        --        --          --         --        52,944
    Maldives Islands, Male.................................         --         --          --       100         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           100
    Nepal, Kathmandu.......................................      9,900      7,000          --       216         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,775          --         --        18,891
    Pakistan, Islamabad....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --       3,250         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,250
    Sri Lanka, Colombo.....................................      3,250        300          --       203         --         --          --        394        --       394        --        --        --          --      4,147
    Migration/Refugee Assistance--South Asia...............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --     33,074        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        33,074
    Regional ATA Training--South Asia......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    South Asia Anti-Trafficking............................      1,000         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,000
    South Asia Regional Programs...........................         --         --       3,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         3,000
    South Asia Energy & Environment........................      7,600         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         7,600
    South Asia Regional Democracy Fund (SARDF).............         --         --       8,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         8,000
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, South Asia......................................     81,513     44,886      11,000     1,455         --         --       3,250     33,074     4,593       285     1,308        --     2,773          --         --       182,544
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Regional Allocations:
    Western Hemisphere.....................................
    Antigua-Barbuda........................................         --         --          --       113         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         515         --           628
    Argentina, Buenos Aires................................         --         --          --       740         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         450         --         1,190
    Bahamas, Nassau........................................         --         --          --       112         --         --       1,000         --        --        --        --        --        --          50         --         1,162
    Barbados, Bridgetown...................................         --         --          --        71         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          55         --           126
    Belize, Belize City....................................         --         --          --       161         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,277         100         --         1,538
    Bolivia, La Paz........................................     25,538      7,583          --       548         --         --     158,000         --        --        --        --     2,865        --          --    194,534
    Brazil, Brasilia.......................................      8,490      2,900          --       223         --         --       5,000         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,613
    Chile, Santiago........................................         --         --          --       499         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           499
    Colombia, Bogota.......................................         --         --          --       900         --         --     894,429         --     2,071        --     2,071        --        --          --         --       897,400
    Costa Rica, San Jose...................................         --         --          --       280         --         --       1,900         --        --        --        --        --       501          --         --         2,681
    Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo......................      6,800      3,300          --       487         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     3,501         400         --        14,488
    Ecuador, Quito.........................................     11,720        550          --       518         --         --      21,200         --     1,011        --        11        --     2,358          --         --        37,357
    El Salvador, San Salvador..............................     19,508     10,495          --       523         --         --       3,000         --        80        --        80        --     2,004          --         --        35,610
    Grenada, St George's...................................         --         --          --        47         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         165         --           212
    Guatemala, Guatemala City..............................     13,150      7,810      20,000       225         --         --       3,000         --        --        --        --        --     3,334          --         --        47,522
    Guyana, Georgetown.....................................      3,200        200          --       168         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       802         100         --         4,470
    Haiti, Port-au-Prince..................................         --         --      60,000       222         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     1,367         300      3,800        65,689
    Honduras, Tegucigalpa..................................     12,633      7,400          --       548         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     4,075          --         --        24,656
    Jamaica, Kingston......................................      7,810      3,357          --       461         --         --         800         --        --        --        --        --     2,290         500         --        15,218
    Mexico, Mexico City....................................      9,462      4,400          --       865         --         --       4,071         --         1        --         1        --        --          --         --        18,799
    Nicaragua, Managua.....................................     14,450      7,932          --       194         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,405          --         --        24,981
    Panama, Panama City....................................      3,500         --          --       117         --         --       4,000         --        --        --        --        --     1,795          --         --         9,412
    Paraguay, Asuncion.....................................      5,175         --          --       210         --         --          --         --       740        --       740        --     2,925          --         --         9,050
    Peru, Lima.............................................     27,902      7,000          --       455         --         --      80,000         --     1,020        --        20        --        --          --         --       116,377
    Suriname, Paramaribo...................................         --         --          --       102         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       889          --         --           991
    Trinidad and Tobago, Port-of-Spain.....................         --         --          --       132         --         --       2,100         --        --        --        --        --        --         250         --         2,482
    Uruguay, Montevideo....................................         --         --          --       326         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           326
    Venezuela, Caracas.....................................         --         --          --       384         --         --       4,200         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,584
    Central American Regional Development..................      8,200      3,150          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        11,350
    Latin America Regional (LAC)...........................     33,792     14,080          --        --         --         --       8,793         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        56,665
    Migration/Refugee Assistance--Western Hemisphere.......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --     16,456        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,456
    Administration of Justice/ICITAP.......................         --         --       6,500        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         6,500
    Regional ATA Training--Western Hemisphere..............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --            --
    St. Kitts--Nevis.......................................         --         --          --        67         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --        125           192
    St. Lucia..............................................         --         --          --        79         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         165         --           244
    St. Vincent & Grenadines...............................         --         --          --        52         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --       125          --        177
    Dominica...............................................         --         --          --        58         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --         150         --           208
    Eastern Caribbean......................................        540         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --     2,289          --         --         2,829
    Western Hemisphere Regional Democracy Fund (WRDF)......         --         --      27,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        27,000
    Peru/Ecuador Peace.....................................         --         --      11,000        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        11,000
    OAS/IADB Demining......................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --     1,903        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,903
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, Western Hemisphere..............................    211,870     80,157     124,500     9,890         --         --   1,191,493     16,486     6,826        --     2,923        --    34,677       3,450      3,800     1,683,149
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Total Regional Allocations.............................    852,171    444,241   2,764,187    49,045    835,812    582,970   1,201,791    580,752   126,186    13,235    23,346     2,000   135,823   4,755,302    149,952    12,478,232
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Global Programs........................................    358,089    280,207      28,000       765         --         --     120,550     41,873    89,594     1,295     7,654        --   108,246      32,995         --     1,060,319
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other Foreign Operation Accounts.......................
    Export-Import Bank--Loan Subsidy.......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       756,064
    Export-Import Bank--Administrative Expenses............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        54,900
    Export-Import Bank--Direct Loans, Negative Subsidies...         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --      (15,000)
    OPIC--Administrative Expenses..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        34,934
    OPIC--Net Offsetting Collections.......................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     (108,776)
    OPIC--Credit Funding...................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        23,842
    Trade and Development Agency...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        43,833
    Development Credit Authority...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       [3,000]
    IDA--Int. Disaster Assistance..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       227,014
    Micro/Small Enterprise--Subs...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,500
    Micro/Small Enterprise--Admin..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --           500
    Urban/Environment Credit--Subs.........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,500
    Urban/Environment Credit--Admin........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,990
    USAID Operating Expenses...............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       518,960
    USAID OIG Operating Expenses...........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        24,950
    IAF--Inter-American Foundation.........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       [4,981]
    African Development Foundation.........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --      [14,345]
    ERMA...................................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        12,452
    Treasury Technical Assistance..........................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         1,500
    Debt Restructuring.....................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       123,000
    IBRD--Global Environment Facility (GEF)................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        35,800
    IDA--International Development Association.............         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       771,290
    MIGA--Mutilaterial Investment Guarantee Agency.........         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,000
    IDB--Inter-American Development Bank (Ord. Cap.).......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        25,611
    Asian Development Bank.................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        13,728
    Asian Development Fund.................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        77,000
    African Development Fund...............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       127,000
    African Development Bank...............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --         4,100
    EBRD--European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel.......         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        35,779
    Inter-American Investment Corporation..................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --        16,000
    MDB Arrears............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [104,000]
    IO&P--International Organizations and Programs.........         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --       188,300
    Assistance to Plan Colombia--FY 2000...................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --   [1,018,500]
    Balkans/Southeast Europe Supplemental..................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [250,875]
    Debt Restructuring (HIPC)..............................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [210,000]
    ESF--Wye...............................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     [450,000]
    FMF--Grant--Wye........................................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --   [1,375,000]
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, Other Foreign Operation Accounts................         --         --          --        --         --         --          --         --        --        --        --        --        --          --         --     3,004,771
    ========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================

    Grand Total, FY 2000 Foreign Operations................   1,210,260   724,448   2,792,187    49,810    835,812    582,970   1,322,341    622,625   215,780    14,530    31,000     2,000   244,069   4,788,297    149,952    16,543,322
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ INCLE allocations include funds appropriated for Plan Colombia.

                     APPENDIX F.--56th UNHRC VOTING RECORD

      Resolutions Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its Fifty-
                                 Sixth Session

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Method of        Agenda
        Year/No.               Title               adoption \1\       item
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2000/1           Strengthening of the       without a vote            4
                      Office of the United
                      Nations High
                      Commissioner for Human
                      Rights.
    2000/2           Question of Western        without a vote            5
                      Sahara.
    2000/3           The use of mercenaries as  roll-call vote            5
                      a means of violating       [35/11/5]
                      human rights and
                      impeding the exercise of
                      the right of peoples to
                      self-determination.
    2000/4           Situation in occupied      roll-call vote            5
                      Palestine.                 [44/1/6]
    2000/5           The right to development.  without a vote            7
    2000/6           Question of the violation  roll-call vote            8
                      of human rights in the     [31/1/19]
                      occupied Arab
                      territories, including
                      Palestine.
    2000/7           Human rights in the        roll-call vote            8
                      occupied Syrian Golan.     [31/1/19]
    2000/8           Israeli settlements in     roll-call vote            8
                      the occupied Arab          [50/1/1]
                      territories.
    2000/9           Question of the            without a vote           10
                      realization in all
                      countries of the
                      economic, social and
                      cultural rights
                      contained in the
                      Universal Declaration of
                      Human Rights and in the
                      International Covenant
                      on Economic, Social and
                      Cultural Rights, and
                      study of special
                      problems which the
                      developing countries
                      face in their efforts to
                      achieve these human
                      rights.
    2000/10          The right to food........  roll-call vote           10
                                                 [49/1/2]
    2000/11          Human rights and           roll-call vote           10
                      unilateral coercive        [36/9/7]
                      measures.
    2000/12          Human rights and extreme   without a vote           10
                      poverty.
    2000/13          Women's equal ownership    without a vote           10
                      of, access to and
                      control over land and
                      the equal rights to own
                      property and to adequate
                      housing.
    2000/14          Racism, racial             without a vote            6
                      discrimination,
                      xenophobia and related
                      intolerance.
    2000/15          Situation on human rights  without a vote            9
                      in the Democratic
                      Republic of the Congo.
    2000/16          Human rights situation in  roll-call vote            9
                      southern Lebanon and       [51/1/1]
                      west Bakaa.
    2000/17          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                      in Iraq.                   [32/0/21]
    2000/18          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                      in Afghanistan.
    2000/19          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                      in Equatorial Guinea and
                      assistance in the field
                      of human rights.
    2000/20          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                      in Burundi.
    2000/21          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                      in Rwanda.
    2000/22          Cooperation with           without a vote            9
                      representatives of
                      United Nations human
                      rights bodies.
    2000/23          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                      in Myanmar.
    2000/24          The Situation of human     without a vote            9
                      rights in Sierra Leone.
    2000/25          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                      in Cuba.                   [21/18/14]
    2000/26          Situation of human rights  without a vote            9
                      in the Federal Republic
                      of Yugoslavia (Serbia
                      and Montenegro), the
                      Republic of Croatia and
                      Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    2000/27          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                      in the Sudan.              [28/0/24]
    2000/28          Situation of human rights  roll-call vote            9
                      in the Islamic Republic    [22/20/11]
                      of Iran.
    2000/29          Hostage-taking...........  without a vote           11
    2000/30          Human rights and           roll-call vote        11(f)
                      terrorism.                 [27/13/12]
    2000/31          Extrajudicial, summary or  without a vote        11(b)
                      arbitrary executions.
    2000/32          Human rights and forensic  without a vote           11
                      science.
    2000/33          Implementation of the      without a vote        11(e)
                      Declaration on the
                      Elimination of All Forms
                      of Intolerance and of
                      Discrimination Based on
                      Religion or Belief.
    2000/34          Conscientious objection    without a vote        11(g)
                      to military service.
    2000/35          Draft optional protocol    without a vote        11(a)
                      to the Convention
                      against Torture and
                      Other Cruel, Inhuman or
                      Degrading Treatment or
                      Punishment.
    2000/36          Question of arbitrary      without a vote           11
                      detention.
    2000/37          Question of enforced or    without a vote           11
                      involuntary
                      disappearances.
    2000/38          The right to freedom of    without a vote           11
                      opinion and expression.
    2000/39          Human rights in the        without a vote           11
                      administration of
                      justice, in particular
                      juvenile justice.
    2000/40          The incompatibility        without a vote           11
                      between democracy and
                      racism.
    2000/41          The right to restitution,  without a vote           11
                      compensation and
                      rehabilitation for
                      victims of grave
                      violations of human
                      rights and fundamental
                      freedoms.
    2000/42          Independence and           without a vote           11
                      impartiality of the
                      judiciary, jurors and
                      assessors and the
                      independence of lawyers.
    2000/43          Torture and other cruel,   without a vote        11(a)
                      inhuman or degrading
                      treatment or punishment.
    2000/44          Traffic in women and       without a vote           12
                      girls.
    2000/45          Elimination of violence    without a vote           12
                      against women.
    2000/46          Integrating the human      without a vote           12
                      rights of women
                      throughout the United
                      Nations system.
    2000/47          Promoting and              roll-call vote           11
                      consolidating democracy.   [45/0/8]
    2000/48          Human rights of migrants.  without a vote        14(a)
    2000/49          International Convention   without a vote        14(a)
                      on the Protection of the
                      Rights of All Migrant
                      Workers and Members of
                      Their Families.
    2000/50          Tolerance and pluralism    14
                      as indivisible elements
                      in the promotion and
                      protection of human
                      rights without a vote.
    2000/51          Human rights of persons    without a vote           14
                      with disabilities.
    2000/52          Rights of persons          without a vote           14
                      belonging to national or
                      ethnic, religious and
                      linguistic minorities.
    2000/53          Internally displaced       without a vote           14
                      persons.
    2000/54          Violence against women     without a vote           14
                      migrant workers.
    2000/55          Human rights and mass      without a vote           14
                      exoduses.
    2000/56          Working Group on           without a vote           15
                      Indigenous Populations
                      of the Sub-Commission on
                      the Promotion and
                      Protection of Human
                      Rights and the
                      International Decade of
                      the World's Indigenous
                      People.
    2000/57          Working Group of the       without a vote           15
                      Commission on Human
                      Rights to elaborate a
                      draft declaration in
                      accordance with
                      paragraph 5 of General
                      Assembly resolution 49/
                      214 of 23 December 1994.
    2000/58          Situation in the Republic  roll-call vote            9
                      of Chechnya of the         [25/7/19]
                      Russian Federation.
    2000/59          Question of draft          without a vote           13
                      optional protocols to
                      the Convention on the
                      Rights of the Child on
                      involvement of children
                      in armed conflict and on
                      the sale of children,
                      child prostitution and
                      child pornography.
    2000/60          Abduction of children      without a vote           13
                      from northern Uganda.
    2000/61          Human rights defenders...  roll-call vote        17(b)
                                                 [50/0/3]
    2000/62          Promotion of the right to  roll-call vote           17
                      a democratic and           [30/17/6]
                      equitable international
                      order.
    2000/63          Human rights and human     roll-call vote           17
                      responsibilities.          [22/21/10]
    2000/64          The role of good           roll-call vote           17
                      governance in the          [50/0/2]
                      promotion of human
                      rights.
    2000/65          The question of the death  roll-call vote           17
                      penalty.                   [27/13/12]
    2000/66          Towards a culture of       without a vote           17
                      peace.
    2000/67          Status of the              without a vote        17(a)
                      International Covenants
                      on Human Rights.
    2000/68          Impunity.................  without a vote           17
    2000/69          Fundamental standards of   without a vote           17
                      humanity.
    2000/70          Enhancement of             without a vote           17
                      international
                      cooperation in the field
                      of human rights.
    2000/71          United Nations Decade for  without a vote        17(c)
                      Human Rights Education.
    2000/72          Adverse effects of the     roll-call vote           10
                      illicit movement and       [37/16]
                      dumping of toxic and
                      dangerous products and
                      wastes on the enjoyment
                      of human rights.
    2000/73          Composition of the staff   roll-call vote           18
                      of the Office of the       [35/17/1]
                      United Nations High
                      Commissioner for Human
                      Rights.
    2000/74          Regional cooperation for   without a vote           18
                      the promotion and
                      protection of human
                      rights in the Asian and
                      Pacific region.
    2000/75          Effective implementation   without a vote           18
                      of international
                      instruments on human
                      rights, including
                      reporting obligations
                      under international
                      instruments on human
                      rights.
    2000/76          National institutions for  without a vote           18
                      the promotion and
                      protection of human
                      rights.
    2000/77          The protection of United   without a vote           18
                      Nations personnel.
    2000/78          Situation of human rights  without a vote           19
                      in Haiti.
    2000/79          Situation of human rights  without a vote           19
                      in Cambodia.
    2000/80          Advisory services and      without a vote           19
                      technical cooperation in
                      the field of human
                      rights.
    2000/81          Assistance to Somalia in   rights without a         19
                      the field of human.        vote
    2000/82          Effects of structural      roll-call vote           10
                      adjustment policies and    [30/15/7]
                      foreign debt on the full
                      enjoyment of all human
                      rights, particularly
                      economic, social and
                      cultural rights.
    2000/83          Work of the Sub-           without a vote           16
                      Commission on the
                      Promotion and Protection
                      of Human Rights.
    2000/84          Defamation of religions..  without a vote            6
    2000/85          Rights of the child......  without a vote           13
    2000/86          Human rights and thematic  without a vote           18
                      procedures.
    2000/87          Establishment of a         roll-call vote           15
                      Permanent Forum on         [43/0/9]
                      Indigenous Issues.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In the case of a vote, the figures in brackets represent: votes in
      favour/votes against/abstentions

                                   __________

                                      APPENDIX G.--HUMAN RIGHTS VOTING TABLE: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR) 56 [Part I]
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               Cuba            China (No Action)               Iran               Democ.
                                 COUNTRY                              --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        97   98   99  2000  95*  95*   97   99  '00   97   98   99   GA  '00    99      '00
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AFRICA (15)
      Algeria........................................................   A   --   --    --    Y    N    Y   --   --    Y   --   --    A   --      --      --
      Burundi........................................................  --   --   --     N   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    A      --       Y
      Cameroon.......................................................  --   --   --    --    Y    N   --   --   --   --   --   --    A   --      --      --
      Djibouti.......................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
      DROC...........................................................   N    N    N    --   --   --    Y    Y   --    Y    A    A    N   --       Y      --
      Liberia........................................................  --   --    A     N   --   --   --    A    A   --   --    Y    A    N       Y       Y
      Libya..........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
      Madagascar.....................................................   A    A    A     N   --   --    Y    Y    Y    A    A    A   --    A       Y       Y
      Mauritius......................................................  --   --    A     A    A    A   --    A    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Niger..........................................................  --   --    N     N   --   --   --    A    Y   --   --    A   --    N       Y       Y
      Nigeria........................................................  --   --   --     N   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --    A    A      --       Y
      Senegal........................................................  --    A    A     A   --   --   --    A    A   --    A    N    N    N       Y       Y
      South Africa...................................................   N    N    N    --   --   --    N    N   --    A    A    A    A   --       Y      --
      Swaziland......................................................  --   --   --     A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --    A    A      --       Y
      Zambia.........................................................  --   --   --     N   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --    A    A      --       Y
      Botswana.......................................................  --    A    A     A   --   --   --    Y    Y   --    Y    A    A    A       Y       Y
      Congo-B........................................................  --    N    N     N   --   --   --    Y    Y   --    N    Y    N    N       Y       A
      Morocco........................................................  --    A    Y     Y   --   --   --    Y    Y   --    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
      Rwanda.........................................................  --    N    N     A   --   --   --    N    A   --    A    Y   --    Y       Y       A
      Sudan..........................................................  --    N    N     N    Y    N   --    Y    Y   --    N    N    N    N       Y       A
      Tunisia........................................................  --    A    N     N   --   --   --    A    A   --    A    N    N    N       Y       Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    Asia (12)
      China..........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       A       A
      India..........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
      Indonesia......................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
      Japan..........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Korea..........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    A    A    A    A    A    A    A    A    A    A      --       Y
      Malaysia.......................................................   A    N   --    --    Y    N    Y   --   --    N    N   --    N   --      --      --
      Pakistan.......................................................   A    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       A
      Qatar..........................................................  --   --    N     A   --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --    N    N    N       Y       A
      Saudi Arabia...................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
      Syria..........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
      Thailand.......................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    A   --      --      --
      Vietnam........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    N   --      --      --
      Bangladesh.....................................................   A    A    A     A    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
      Bhutan.........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    A    N    N    N    N       Y       A
      Nepal..........................................................   A    A    A     A    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    A    A    A    N    N       Y       Y
      Philippines....................................................   A    A    A     A    N    A    A    A    A    A    N    N    N    N       Y       Y
      Sri Lanka......................................................   A    A    N     A    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    A    A    N    N    N       Y       Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    GRULAC (11)
      Argentina......................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y   --   --    A    A    A    Y    Y    A    A    A       Y       Y
      Brazil.........................................................   A    A   --     A    A    A    A   --    A    Y    Y   --    Y    Y      --       Y
      Colombia.......................................................   A   --    A     A    A    A    Y    Y    N    A   --    N    N    A       Y       Y
      Costa Rica.....................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    Y   --      --      --
      Cuba...........................................................   N    N    N     N    Y    N    Y    Y    Y    N    N    N    N    N       A       A
      Ecuador........................................................   A    A    Y     A    N    Y    A    A    A    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Guatemala......................................................  --    A    A     Y   --   --   --    A    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Mexico.........................................................   A    A    N     A    A    A    A    A    A    Y    A    A    A    A       Y       Y
      Peru...........................................................  --    A    N     N    Y    N   --    Y    Y   --    Y    A    A    A       Y       Y
      Uruguay........................................................   Y   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --    A   --       Y       A
      Venezuela......................................................  --    A    N     N    A    A   --    Y    Y   --    Y    N    N    N       Y       Y
      Chile..........................................................   Y    A    Y     Y    A    A    N    A    A    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      El Salvador....................................................   Y    Y    A     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    E. EURO. (5)
      Czech Repub....................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y   --   --    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Latvia.........................................................  --   --    Y     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --   --    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Poland.........................................................  --    Y    Y     Y    N    Y   --    N    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Romania........................................................  --   --    Y     Y    N    Y   --    A    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Russia.........................................................   A    N    N     N    N    N    A    Y    Y    Y    Y    A    A    N       Y       Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    WEOG (10)
      Belgium........................................................  --   --   --    --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --   --    Y   --      --      --
      Canada.........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      France.........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Germany........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Italy..........................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Norway.........................................................  --   --    Y     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Portugal.......................................................  --   --   --     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --   --    Y    Y    Y      --       Y
      Spain..........................................................  --   --   --     Y   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --    Y    Y      --       Y
      UK.............................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      US.............................................................   Y    Y    Y     Y    N    Y    N    N    N    Y    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
      Luxembourg.....................................................  --    Y    Y     Y   --   --   --    N    N   --    Y    Y    Y    Y       Y       Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
      Yes............................................................  12   13   16    17    9   11   10   12   14   16   17   17   20   18      40      45
      No.............................................................   5    9   13    14   11    9    9   13   16    6    6   10   16   12       0       0
      Abstain........................................................   9    7    6     8    6    6    6   10    8    4    6    9   14   10       2       4
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    Final CHR Vote
      Yes............................................................  19   16   21    21   22   20   27   22   22   26   23   23   --   22      51      45
      No.............................................................  10   19   20    18   22   21   17   17   18    7   14   16   --   20       0       0
      Abstain........................................................  24   18   12    14    9   12    9   14   12   19   16   14   --   11       2       8
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
    **Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
    Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
    Countries in italic are no longer on the Commission.
    Y = Yes.
    N = No.
    A = Abstain.
    C = Agreed to by consensus.
    -- = Absent.

                                      APPENDIX G.--HUMAN RIGHTS VOTING TABLE: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR) 56 [Part II]
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  Iraq                    Sudan                     FRY              Chech
                                  COUNTRY                              -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         97   98   99   GA  '00   97   98   99   GA  '00   97   98   99   GA  '00     '00
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AFRICA (15)
      Algeria.........................................................   A   --   --    A   --     C  --   --    N   --     C  --   --    Y   --         --
      Burundi.........................................................  --   --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --   **   --   --   --   --    Y          Y
      Cameroon........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    A   --         --
      Djibouti........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      DROC............................................................   Y    A    A   --   --     C   A     C   N   --     C   A    Y    A   --         --
      Liberia.........................................................  --   --    Y   --    A   --   --     C  --   **   --   --    Y   --    Y          A
      Libya...........................................................  --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      Madagascar......................................................   A    A    A   --    A     C   A     C  --   **     C   A    Y    Y    A          N
      Mauritius.......................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y   **   --   --    A    Y    Y          Y
      Niger...........................................................  --   --    A   --    A   --   --     C  --    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Nigeria.........................................................  --   --   --    A    A   --   --   --    A    A   --   --   --    Y    A          A
      Senegal.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      South Africa....................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y   --     C   Y     C   Y   --     C   Y    A    Y   --         --
      Swaziland.......................................................  --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --   --    A   **   --   --   --    A    Y          A
      Zambia..........................................................  --   --   --    Y    A   --   --   --    A   **   --   --   --    Y    A          Y
      Botswana........................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Congo-B.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A   --    A     C   A   **   --    A    A    A    A          N
      Morocco.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A   --    A     C   N   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Rwanda..........................................................  --    A    Y   --    Y     C   A     C  --   **   --    A    Y   --    Y          Y
      Sudan...........................................................  --    A    A    N    A     C   N     C   N    A   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Tunisia.........................................................  --    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    Asia (12)
      China...........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   A    A    A    A          N
      India...........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   A    A    A    A          N
      Indonesia.......................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Japan...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Korea...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Malaysia........................................................   A    A   --    A   --     C   A   --    A   --     C   Y   --    Y   --         --
      Pakistan........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Qatar...........................................................  --   --    A   --    A   --   --     C   N    A   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Saudi Arabia....................................................  --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      Syria...........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      Thailand........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      Vietnam.........................................................  --   --   --    A   --   --   --   --    N   --   --   --   --    A   --         --
      Bangladesh......................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Bhutan..........................................................   A    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   A     C   A    A     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Nepal...........................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A    A     C   Y    A    Y    A          A
      Philippines.....................................................   A    A    Y    A    Y     C   A     C   A   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Sri Lanka.......................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   A     C   A    A     C   A    Y    Y    Y          A
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    GRULAC (11)
      Argentina.......................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Brazil..........................................................   Y    Y   --    Y    Y     C   Y   --    Y   **     C   Y   --    Y    Y          A
      Colombia........................................................   Y   --    Y    Y    Y     C  --     C   Y   **     C  --    Y    Y    Y          A
      Costa Rica......................................................  --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      Cuba............................................................   A    A    A    A    A     C   N     C   N    A     C   A    A    A    A          N
      Ecuador.........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Guatemala.......................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Mexico..........................................................   Y    A    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    A     C   Y    A    Y    Y          A
      Peru............................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Uruguay.........................................................   Y   --   --    Y   --     C  --   --    Y   --     C  --   --    Y   --         --
      Venezuela.......................................................  --    A    Y    Y    A   --    Y     C   Y   **   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          A
      Chile...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      El Salvador.....................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y   **     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    E. EURO. (5)
      Czech Repub.....................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Latvia..........................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y    Y   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Poland..........................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Romania.........................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y    Y   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Russia..........................................................   Y    A    Y    Y    A     C   Y     C   Y    A     C   A    N    N    N          N
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    WEOG (10)
      Belgium.........................................................  --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --   --   --   --    Y   --         --
      Canada..........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      France..........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Germany.........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Italy...........................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Norway..........................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Portugal........................................................  --   --    Y    Y    Y   --   --     C   Y    Y   --   --    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Spain...........................................................  --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --   --    Y    Y   --   --   --    Y    Y          Y
      UK..............................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      US..............................................................   Y    Y    Y    Y    Y     C   Y     C   Y    Y     C   Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
      Luxembourg......................................................  --    Y    Y    Y    Y   --    Y     C   Y    Y   --    Y    Y    Y    Y          Y
    ========================================================================================================================================================
      Yes.............................................................  18   18   26   33   25     C  20     C  30   --     C  23   28   43   32         20
      No..............................................................   0    0    0    1    0     C   5     C  13   --     C   0    1    1    1          5
      Abstain.........................................................   8   11    9   13   14     C   4     C   6   --     C   6    6    7    6         13
    ========================================================================================================================================================
    Final CHR Vote
      Yes.............................................................  31   32   35   --   32     C  31     C  --   28     C  41   46   --   44         25
      No..............................................................   0    0    0   --    0     C   6     C  --    0     C   9    1   --    1          7
      Abstain.........................................................  22   21   18   --   21     C  16     C  --   24     C  12    6   --    8         19
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *China 95 had a tie in the no-action vote (22-22-9) and lost the actual vote (20-21-12).
    **Sudan was not a roll call vote so there is no official count. People raised their hand and the chair counted silently.
    Countries in bold are new to the Commission this year.
    Countries in italic are no longer on the Commission.
    Y = Yes.
    N = No.
    A = Abstain.
    C = Agreed to by consensus.
    -- = Absent.

                                   __________

               APPENDIX H.--UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

                                    Preamble

        Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
    inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
    of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

        Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
    barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
    advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
    and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
    highest aspiration of the common people,

        Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
    recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
    oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

        Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
    relations between nations,

        Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
    reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
    worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and
    have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life
    in larger freedom,

        Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
    operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect
    for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

        Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of
    the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

        Now, therefore, The General Assembly, proclaims this Universal
    Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
    peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
    organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
    strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights
    and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international,
    to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
    both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
    peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

    Article 1

        All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
    They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
    another in a spirit of brotherhood.

    Article 2

        Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
    this Declaration, without distinction of an kind, such as race, colour,
    sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
    origin, property, birth or other status.

        Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
    political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
    territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
    non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

    Article 3

        Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.

    Article 4

        No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
    trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

    Article 5

        No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
    degrading treatment or punishment.

    Article 6

        Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before
    the law.

    Article 7

        All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
    discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
    equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
    Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

    Article 8

        Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
    national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
    him by the constitution or by law.

    Article 9

        No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

    Article 10

        Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
    by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
    rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

    Article 11

        1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
    presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public
    trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

        2. No one shall be held guilty without any limitation due to race,
    of any penal offence on account of nationality or religion, have the
    any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under
    national or international law, at the time when it was committed.

    Article 12

        No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
    privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
    and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
    against such interference or attacks.

    Article 13

        1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
    within the borders of each state.

        2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
    and to return to his country.

    Article 14

        1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
    asylum from persecution.

        2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
    genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to
    the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

    Article 15

        1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

        2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor be
    denied the right to change his nationality.

    Article 16

        1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
    nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.
    They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and
    at its dissolution.

        2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
    consent of the intending spouses.

        3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
    and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

    Article 17

        1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
    association with others.

        2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

    Article 18

        Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
    religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
    and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
    private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
    worship and observance.

    Article 19

        Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
    right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
    seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
    regardless of frontiers.

    Article 20

        1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
    association.

        2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

    Article 21

        1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his
    country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

        2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
    country.

        3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
    government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
    elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
    held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

    Article 22

        1. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
    security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
    international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and
    resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
    indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
    personality.

    Article 23

        1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
    just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
    unemployment.

        2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
    for equal work.

        3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
    remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
    human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
    protection.

        4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
    protection of his interests.

    Article 24

        Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
    limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

    Article 25

        1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
    health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
    clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
    the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
    disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
    circumstances beyond his control.

        2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
    assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
    enjoy the same social protection.

    Article 26

        1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
    least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
    shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
    generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to
    all on the basis of merit.

        2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
    personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
    fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
    friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
    further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
    peace.

        3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that
    shall be given to their children.

    Article 27

        1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
    life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
    advancement and its benefits.

        2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
    material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
    production of which he is the author.

    Article 28

        Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
    the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
    realized.

    Article 29

        1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
    full development of his personality is possible.

        2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
    subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
    the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
    freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
    public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

        3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary
    to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

    Article 30

        Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
    State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
    perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
    freedoms set forth herein.

    Hundred and eighty-third plenary meeting
    Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
    December 10, 1948

     0(this material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without
              permission; citation of this source is appreciated.)

                                       -