    [JPRT 107-32]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    107th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                             JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
     1st Session                                                    107-32
    _______________________________________________________________________

                        COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
                               PRACTICES FOR 2000
                                    VOLUME I

                                   __________

                                  R E P O R T

                                SUBMITTED TO THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                                  U.S. SENATE

                                    AND THE

                      COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                     BY THE

                              DEPARTMENT OF STATE

         IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
                       ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    71-555v1                   WASHINGTON : 2001

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                    JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr, Delaware, Chairman
    PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
    CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
    RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
    PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
    BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Isdland
    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
    JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
        Virginia
                         Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
                Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

                      COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                       HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         TOM LANTOS, California
    JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
    EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
    PETER T. KING, New York              BRAD SHERMAN, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
    AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
    JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana              GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado         BARBARA LEE, California
    RON PAUL, Texas                      JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    NICK SMITH, Michigan                 JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
    JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania        EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
    ERIC CANTOR, Virginia                GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
    BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
             Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
                   Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
          Kristin Gilley, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Foreword.........................................................   vii

    Letter of Transmittal............................................    ix

    Preface..........................................................    xi

    Overview and Acknowledgments.....................................  xiii

    Introduction.....................................................  xvii

                                    Volume I

    Africa:
        Angola.......................................................     1
        Benin........................................................    16
        Botswana.....................................................    25
        Burkina Faso.................................................    36
        Burundi......................................................    46
        Cameroon.....................................................    59
        Cape Verde...................................................    85
        Central African Republic.....................................    91
        Chad.........................................................   103
        Comoros......................................................   115
        Congo, Democratic Republic of................................   122
        Congo, Republic of...........................................   156
        Cote d'Ivoire................................................   166
        Djibouti.....................................................   193
        Equatorial Guinea............................................   204
        Eritrea......................................................   215
        Ethiopia.....................................................   228
        Gabon........................................................   253
        Gambia, The..................................................   262
        Ghana........................................................   272
        Guinea.......................................................   294
        Guinea-Bissau................................................   310
        Kenya........................................................   317
        Lesotho......................................................   345
        Liberia......................................................   353
        Madagascar...................................................   367
        Malawi.......................................................   374
        Mali.........................................................   382
        Mauritania...................................................   391
        Mauritius....................................................   407
        Mozambique...................................................   415
        Namibia......................................................   433
        Niger........................................................   446
        Nigeria......................................................   455
        Rwanda.......................................................   479
        Sao Tome and Principe........................................   493
        Senegal......................................................   496
        Seychelles...................................................   507
        Sierra Leone.................................................   513
        Somalia......................................................   524
        South Africa.................................................   537
        Sudan........................................................   557
        Swaziland....................................................   579
        Tanzania.....................................................   588
        Togo.........................................................   608
        Uganda.......................................................   622
        Zambia.......................................................   642
        Zimbabwe.....................................................   656

    East Asia and the Pacific:
        Australia....................................................   683
        Brunei.......................................................   693
        Burma........................................................   700
        Cambodia.....................................................   723
        China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).........................   736
        China (Taiwan only)..........................................   824
        East Timor...................................................   836
        Fiji.........................................................   846
        Indonesia....................................................   858
        Japan........................................................   899
        Kiribati.....................................................   912
        Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.......................   914
        Korea, Republic of...........................................   927
        Laos.........................................................   938
        Malaysia.....................................................   950
        Marshall Islands.............................................   985
        Micronesia, Federated States of..............................   989
        Mongolia.....................................................   992
        Nauru........................................................   999
        New Zealand..................................................  1002
        Palau........................................................  1008
        Papua New Guinea.............................................  1012
        Philippines..................................................  1017
        Samoa........................................................  1036
        Singapore....................................................  1040
        Solomon Islands..............................................  1054
        Thailand.....................................................  1062
        Tonga........................................................  1076
        Tuvalu.......................................................  1079
        Vanuatu......................................................  1082
        Vietnam......................................................  1085

                                   Volume II

    Europe:
        Albania......................................................  1107
        Andorra......................................................  1118
        Armenia......................................................  1121
        Austria......................................................  1137
        Azerbaijan...................................................  1147
        Belarus......................................................  1164
        Belgium......................................................  1192
        Bosnia and Herzegovina.......................................  1200
        Bulgaria.....................................................  1223
        Croatia......................................................  1241
        Cyprus.......................................................  1260
        Czech Republic...............................................  1271
        Denmark......................................................  1290
        Estonia......................................................  1294
        Finland......................................................  1302
        France.......................................................  1306
        Georgia......................................................  1318
        Germany......................................................  1341
        Greece.......................................................  1355
        Hungary......................................................  1371
        Iceland......................................................  1383
        Ireland......................................................  1390
        Italy........................................................  1399
        Kazakhstan...................................................  1407
        Kyrgyzstan...................................................  1434
        Latvia.......................................................  1450
        Liechtenstein................................................  1457
        Lithuania....................................................  1462
        Luxembourg...................................................  1471
        Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of.......................  1474
        Malta........................................................  1485
        Moldova......................................................  1489
        Monaco.......................................................  1503
        Netherlands, The.............................................  1506
        Norway.......................................................  1513
        Poland.......................................................  1517
        Portugal.....................................................  1535
        Romania......................................................  1542
        Russia.......................................................  1555
        San Marino...................................................  1605
        Slovak Republic..............................................  1608
        Slovenia.....................................................  1621
        Spain........................................................  1626
        Sweden.......................................................  1637
        Switzerland..................................................  1645
        Tajikistan...................................................  1656
        Turkey.......................................................  1670
        Turkmenistan.................................................  1707
        Ukraine......................................................  1718
        United Kingdom...............................................  1742
        Uzbekistan...................................................  1760
        Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of..............................  1780

    Near East and North Africa:
        Algeria......................................................  1823
        Bahrain......................................................  1836
        Egypt........................................................  1848
        Iran.........................................................  1869
        Iraq.........................................................  1890
        Israel and the occupied territories..........................  1908
        Jordan.......................................................  1950
        Kuwait.......................................................  1968
        Lebanon......................................................  1983
        Libya........................................................  1998
        Morocco......................................................  2007
        The Western Sahara...........................................  2050
        Oman.........................................................  2055
        Qatar........................................................  2064
        Saudi Arabia.................................................  2071
        Syria........................................................  2087
        Tunisia......................................................  2100
        United Arab Emirates.........................................  2120
        Yemen........................................................  2131

    South Asia:
        Afghanistan..................................................  2157
        Bangladesh...................................................  2175
        Bhutan.......................................................  2201
        India........................................................  2212
        Maldives.....................................................  2263
        Nepal........................................................  2271
        Pakistan.....................................................  2286
        Sri Lanka....................................................  2325

    Western Hemisphere
        Antigua and Barbuda..........................................  2351
        Argentina....................................................  2356
        Bahamas......................................................  2371
        Barbados.....................................................  2377
        Belize.......................................................  2383
        Bolivia......................................................  2390
        Brazil.......................................................  2403
        Canada.......................................................  2431
        Chile........................................................  2440
        Colombia.....................................................  2453
        Costa Rica...................................................  2498
        Cuba.........................................................  2506
        Dominica.....................................................  2526
        Dominican Republic...........................................  2530
        Ecuador......................................................  2551
        El Salvador..................................................  2563
        Grenada......................................................  2577
        Guatemala....................................................  2581
        Guyana.......................................................  2615
        Haiti........................................................  2625
        Honduras.....................................................  2642
        Jamaica......................................................  2662
        Mexico.......................................................  2671
        Nicaragua....................................................  2701
        Panama.......................................................  2719
        Paraguay.....................................................  2734
        Peru.........................................................  2745
        St. Kitts and Nevis..........................................  2776
        Saint Lucia..................................................  2779
        St. Vincent and the Grenadines...............................  2784
        Suriname.....................................................  2789
        Trinidad and Tobago..........................................  2796
        Uruguay......................................................  2802
        Venezuela....................................................  2809

    Appendixes:
        A. Notes on preparation of the reports.......................  2829
        B. Reporting on worker rights................................  2831
        C. Selected international human rights conventions...........  2833
        D. Explanation of chart in Appendix C........................  2836
        E. FY 2000 U.S. economic and military assistance--actual
          obligations................................................  2837
        F. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting
          record.....................................................  2849
        G. 56th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission voting
          table......................................................  2851
        H. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights......  2854

                                    FOREWORD

                                  ----------

        The country reports on human rights practices contained
    herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance
    with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
    of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative
    requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
    amended.
        The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations
    that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not.
    They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the
    consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance
    legislation.

                                           Jesse Helms,
                              Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

                                          Henry J. Hyde
                        Chairman, Committee on International Relations.

                                     (vii)

                             LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  ----------

                                           Department of State,
                                     Washington, DC, February 25, 2001.
    Hon. Jesse Helms,
    Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
        Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
    am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
    Practices for 2000, prepared in compliance with sections
    116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
    amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
    amended.
        We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
    can provide any further information.
                Sincerely,
                                        Barbara Larkin,
                              Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
        Enclosure.

                                      (ix)

                                    PREFACE

                                  ----------

                          HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

        I am pleased to transmit to the United States Congress this
    25th edition of the Department of State's Country Reports on
    Human Rights Practices.
        For the past quarter of a century, these reports have grown
    in breadth and stature every year. As such they reflect our
    country's deep and abiding commitment to universal human rights
    and the unprecedented growth in democracy, freedom, and human
    rights throughout the world.
        The year 2000 saw many improvements in human rights--from
    the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana to the
    defeat of an entrenched dictator in Serbia and the election of
    a new president in Mexico. At the same time, the continued
    deterioration of conditions in China and Cuba and the abusive
    policies pursued by the regimes in Iraq and Sudan and a number
    of other countries offer proof that the battle to promote
    universal human rights is far from finished. We who believe in
    human freedom and the rule of law must not lose sight of the
    challenges that lie before us.
        This year's report covers 195 countries. No country, our
    own included, can claim a perfect human rights record; nor
    should any seek exemption from international scrutiny. Each
    nation must be accountable for the way it treats its citizens.
    The purpose of these reports, therefore, is to provide to the
    best of our ability a comprehensive and accurate report on the
    human rights conditions in every country.
        The interest in these annual Country Reports can be seen in
    the hundreds of thousands of hits our web site at www.state.gov
    will receive from every part of the world over the next few
    days, and in the countless discussions, both public and
    private, that will follow. The Report for the year 2000 thus
    takes its place within the context of a new and revolutionary
    era of global human discourse. It is my deepest hope,
    therefore, that these reports can stimulate new dialogue and
    provide new encouragement for all countries to strengthen their
    commitments to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.
        I would like to thank all those who had a hand in preparing
    this year's Country Reports--whether overseas or in the
    Department of State. Without their dedication and hard work, a
    report of this quality and scope would simply be impossible.
                                               Colin L. Powell,
                                                    Secretary of State.

                          OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

                                  ----------

                          HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

    Why The Reports Are Prepared
        This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
    of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the
    Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section
    504 of the Trade Assistance Act of 1974, as amended. The law
    provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the
    Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
    Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and
    complete report regarding the status of internationally
    recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A)
    in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B)
    in all other foreign countries which are members of the United
    Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human
    rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports
    on several countries that do not fall into the categories
    established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by
    the congressional requirement.
        The responsibility of the United States to speak out on
    behalf of international human rights standards was formalized
    in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation
    creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of
    State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In
    1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for
    Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal
    requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
    account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
    and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
    annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only
    countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 195
    reports are submitted.
    How The Reports are Prepared
        In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen
    further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections
    in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to
    corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts
    were made to link mission programming to the advancement of
    human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights
    and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the
    Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a
    broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking
    issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 2000
    human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by
    hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S.
    Government employees.
        Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the
    reports, gathered information throughout the year from a
    variety of sources across the political spectrum, including
    government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists,
    human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This
    information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign
    Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying
    and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of
    human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of
    individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human
    rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
    governments.
        After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were
    sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of
    Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other
    State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate,
    analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on
    their own sources of information. These included reports
    provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
    government officials, representatives from the United Nations
    and other international and regional organizations and
    institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers
    also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee
    issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal
    matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant
    information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly
    as possible.
        The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for
    shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance,
    training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve
    as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private
    groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized
    human rights.
        The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
    internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and
    worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
    Human Rights. There rights include freedom from torture or
    other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
    from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or
    clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of
    the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
        Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human
    dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons
    have the inalienable right to change their government by
    peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of
    expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion,
    without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
    origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a
    necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the
    reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights,
    including the right of association; the right to organize and
    bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory
    labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age
    for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
        Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
    the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of:
    Editor in Chief--William E. Dilday; Editor in Chief Ex
    Officio--Marc J. Susser; Senior Advisor--Leslie A. Gerson;
    Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical Editor--Larry
    Arthur; Senior Editors--Frank B. Crump, Susan F. Kovalik,
    Gregory P. Moody, Diana D. Perry-Elby, Rachel D. Settlage;
    Editors--Sara M. Allinder, Stefanie R. Altman, Liana Brooks,
    Cynthia R. Bunton, Michelle Eyrich Day, Claire Ehmann, Imogen
    Fua, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan, Amy E.
    McKee, Martine K. Miller, Donald E. Parker, Jennifer M.
    Pekkinen, Yvette Saint-Andre, John J. Sheerin, Jolynn M.
    Shoemaker, James C. Todd, William J. Tomlyanovich, Stephen W.
    Worrel; Assistant Editors--Eric M. Barboriak, Melanne A. Civic,
    George T. Constantine, Douglas B. Dearborn, Thomas F. Farr,
    Carol G. Finerty, Stephen M. Epstein, Nancy Hewett, Peter
    Higgins, Alden H. Irons, Herman Keizer, Susan E. Keogh, Richard
    Marshall, Janet L. Mayland, Edmund McWilliams, Susan
    O'Sullivan, Maria B. Pica, Tamara J. Resler, Daniel J. Schuman,
    Christopher Sibilla, Wendy B. Silverman, Danika Walters, James
    D. Wulff; Editorial Assistants--Phillip L. Antweiler, Timothy
    Brittingham, Paige E. Chabora, Andrew Chen, Lewis K. Elbinger,
    Charles W. Evans, Dr. Sudha Haley, Rashid U. Haq, Kristy L.
    Hofkens, Adrienne Lauson, David G. Leyden, Coleman Mehta,
    Philip A. Mirrer-Singer, Mark N. Templeton, Steven A.
    Wagenseil, Melissa A. Waters, Gerri L. Williams, Anne Zollner;
    Technical Support--Mitchell R. Brown.

     INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR THE
                                   YEAR 2000

                                  ----------

                   I. The 25th Edition of the Country Reports

        For the past quarter of a century, the Country Reports on
    Human Rights Practices have chronicled the ebb and flow of
    human rights, bearing witness to the conditions that affect
    people's lives in every nation of the world. Yet despite all
    the suffering--or perhaps because of it--the cause of human
    rights is stronger now than ever.
        The expansion of democracy and human freedom that the world
    has experienced over the past 25 years has many causes. This
    expansion rests on the fundamental belief that there are rights
    and freedoms to which every human is entitled no matter where
    he or she resides. This idea is so powerful and so universal
    that it gains strength with every passing year.
        The primary focus of the Country Reports always has been
    events in the countries that the reports cover. If newspapers
    are the first drafts of history, the reports are surely the
    second drafts, carefully researched cross-sections of the good
    and bad that transpire around the world every year. But the
    reports are not just history. They are documents backed by the
    full weight of the U.S. people and Government. They speak for
    those who have no voice, bearing witness for those who have not
    had access to free trials, nor have enjoyed other fundamental
    human rights and protections. As the reports have done since
    their first appearance in March 1977, they represent the
    nation's commitment to respect for universal human rights and
    its interest in promoting these rights in every country of the
    world. The reports are a tangible manifestation of the
    Department of State's intense focus on human rights issues.

                             II. The Year in Review

        The year saw a number of advances in human rights,
    democracy, and fundamental freedoms. The Yugoslav people voted
    Slobodan Milosevic out of office in September, ending more than
    a decade of authoritarian rule and offering hope for a new,
    more tolerant and democratic era in Yugoslavia. Nigeria
    continued to make progress in its transition to democracy,
    while a peaceful transfer of authority took place in Ghana
    following generally free and fair elections. Ethiopia and
    Eritrea signed a peace accord in December, ending a conflict
    that created at least a million internally displaced civilians
    in both countries. The election of Vicente Fox marked the first
    time in modern Mexican history that a member of an opposition
    party was elected President. Peru's decision to renew its
    acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American
    Court of Human Rights appeared to represent a renewed
    commitment to the rule of law. And South Korean President Kim
    Dae Jung's engagement policy led to some easing of tensions
    with North Korea.
        U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reiterated the United
    Nation's support for the promotion of human rights and
    instructed its agencies to place emphasis on both reporting and
    programming initiatives that strengthened respect for human
    rights. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
    Yugoslavia continued to try alleged war criminals, including a
    war crimes trial based on charges of rape and other sexual
    violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda also
    continued to try persons for genocide-related crimes. At the
    regional level, a number of institutions continued to work to
    strengthen democratic norms and practices. The Organization of
    African Unity denied a seat at its summit to Cote d'Ivoire due
    to its 1999 coup. The Organization of American States (OAS)
    sent a mission to Peru in the wake of elections that
    international and domestic observers deemed to be seriously
    flawed. The Government subsequently announced new elections
    that are scheduled to take place in April 2001. The OAS mission
    also sponsored a dialog among government, opposition
    politicians, and civil society representatives aimed at
    reforming the country's beleaguered democratic institutions.
    The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe engaged
    in active and public human rights reporting in Kosovo and
    monitored elections in a number of countries. A number of
    member states of the Council of Europe began to publish reports
    of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
        At the international level, the global spread of democracy
    was affirmed in both governmental and nongovernmental arenas.
    The Governments of over 100 countries that have chosen a
    democratic path and that represent every region of the world,
    level of development, and various historical experiences,
    convened a June ministerial meeting in Warsaw, Poland, under
    the rubric of a Community of Democracies. Participants endorsed
    the Warsaw Declaration, which committed their Governments to
    uphold democratic principles and practices. The Community of
    Democracies meeting sought to enhance cooperation among
    participating Governments through several avenues, including an
    informal caucus at the U.N. General Assembly to share
    information and support democracy-related issues and
    resolutions within the U.N. system.
        At the same time these positive trends took place, China's
    poor human rights record worsened during the year, as the
    authorities intensified their harsh measures against
    underground Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists, destroyed
    many houses of worship, and stepped up their campaign against
    the Falun Gong movement. China also sharply suppressed
    organized dissent. In Burma the military continued its severe
    repression, holding Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for
    much of the year, detaining her supporters, imprisoning many
    religious believers, and coercing numerous persons, including
    children, into forced labor. North Korea's situation remained
    among the worst in the world: The Government stifled all
    dissent and widely curtailed freedom of religion, political
    prisoners were held in forced labor camps, and malnutrition
    remained widespread. In Afghanistan the Taliban continued to be
    a major violator of human rights, severely restricting women's
    and girls' access to education, medical facilities, and
    employment. Iraq remained under the complete domination of one
    of the world's most repressive regimes, as security forces
    routinely executed, tortured, beat, raped, or otherwise
    intimidated and abused any perceived political opponents.
    Cuba's overall human rights record remained poor, as the
    Government retained tight surveillance over anyone considered a
    potential opponent. The human rights situation in Belarus
    worsened in a number of areas, as the Lukashenko regime took
    severe measures to neutralize political opponents and repressed
    all calls for democracy. Turkmenistan remained one of the most
    totalitarian countries in the world, as the Committee on
    National Security maintained tight control over the country,
    and a personality cult centered around President Saparmurat
    Niyazov continued. In Israel and the occupied territories,
    following the outbreak of violence in September, Israeli
    security forces sometimes used excessive force in contravention
    of their own rules of engagement, killing approximately 300
    Palestinians and injuring thousands in response to violent
    demonstrations and other clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and
    Gaza. Palestinian security forces and members of Fatah's Tanzim
    killed numerous Israeli soldiers and civilians in the cycle of
    violence.
        Continuing internal conflict marred the human rights
    situation in a number of countries. In Colombia both
    paramilitary and guerrilla groups continued to commit acts of
    violence and other serious abuses in many parts of the country,
    with numerous massacres of civilians and the murder, kidnaping,
    and intimidation of human rights defenders, trade unionists,
    journalists, and other targeted groups. War, exacerbated by
    external intervention, continued to wrack the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo, enabling perpetrators of human rights
    violations to enjoy virtual impunity in large portions of the
    country. The Government of Sudan continued its bombing of
    civilian population centers, support for slave taking, and
    forced religious conversions, while preventing international
    humanitarian assistance from reaching large portions of the
    country. Numerous credible reports of human rights abuses by
    Russian forces in Chechnya, which included extrajudicial
    killings, torture, and rape, provoked widespread condemnation
    and calls for accountability; the Chechens committed numerous
    abuses as well, such as the execution of prisoners. In
    Indonesia security forces were responsible for numerous
    instances of indiscriminate shootings of civilians, torture,
    beatings, and other abuses in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere,
    and the Government was ineffective in deterring social,
    interethnic, and interreligious violence in the Moluccas and
    Sulawesi.

            III. Developments in Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor

        Global Democratic Trends: The year witnessed new strides
    towards the globalization of democracy. Many, if not most,
    governments, civil society leaders, and multilateral
    institutions now pursue and promote open economies and freer
    societies. A majority of people in the world now live in
    democratic countries or countries that have begun to implement
    some democratic and political reforms. The overall trend
    remains one of positive, incremental change, despite some
    reversals.
        Elections bolstered democratic transitions in Croatia,
    Ghana, Mexico, Suriname, and Yugoslavia during the year. An
    active civil society and increasingly independent media helped
    to ensure the success and transparency of these elections.
    Setbacks included continuing conflict in the Middle East and
    Africa, a coup in Fiji, and a breakdown of the Government and
    law and order in the Solomon Islands. In China, despite
    widespread Government abuses, important aspects of civil
    society continued to develop. Seriously flawed elections took
    place in other countries, most notably in Azerbaijan,
    Kyrgyzstan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Haiti.
        On the nongovernmental side, increased global networking
    among organizations and private citizens mirrored the growth of
    active civil societies at the national level. The World Forum
    on Democracy, held jointly with the Warsaw Community of
    Democracies Ministerial in June, brought together an
    unprecedented international gathering of scholars, civic,
    religious, labor, and business leaders to assess the challenges
    to democracy. The Forum provided to the ministerial assembly
    recommendations that included convening the informal caucus of
    democracies that was launched at the United Nations in the
    fall. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
    from over 80 countries also met in Sao Paulo during November to
    consider how to meet the challenges to democracy. They
    developed a list of practical steps NGO's could take in their
    own countries to support the democratic process.
        Integrity of the Person: In Algeria reports of abuses such
    as torture and arbitrary detention continued to decrease during
    the year; however, extrajudicial killings by security forces
    and terrorist groups claimed the lives of many hundreds of
    persons. The torture of political opponents is widespread in
    Uzbekistan. Cameroon's security forces reportedly killed many
    dozens of persons over a 6-month period in the city of Douala,
    and the abuse of detainees throughout the country remained
    endemic. The brutality associated with the Revolutionary United
    Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone abated somewhat; however, there
    continued to be reports of serious abuses, such as
    extrajudicial killings, rapes, and beatings in the 60 percent
    of the country that the Government does not control. The RUF
    also committed human rights abuses in Guinea. The Libyan
    government resorted to intimidation to control the political
    opposition, as security forces arbitrarily arrested and
    detained individuals who frequently were held incommunicado or
    tortured.
        Press Freedom: Freedom of the press remains nonexistent in
    such countries as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Turkmenistan. There
    were severe restrictions on the press in Sudan, Uzbekistan, and
    China, except in Hong Kong. The disappearance of Ukrainian
    Georhiy Gongadze, whose alleged remains were found late in the
    year, raised serious concern about press freedom in Ukraine. In
    Russia Kremlin efforts to gain control over a major independent
    television network posed a threat to hard-won press freedom as
    well. In Iran dozens of newspaper offices were closed, and a
    number of Iran's most prominent journalists and editors were
    arrested or harassed as hard-line elements within the
    Government sought to silence their critics. However, there was
    some easing of press restrictions in Syria, and the press in a
    number of countries in North Africa continued to demonstrate
    more freedom.
        Religious Freedom: The year saw the continuation of
    religious repression and discrimination in every region of the
    world. Based on the Department's Annual Report on International
    Religious Freedom 2000 (issued in September and covering the
    period July 1999 through June 2000), all five countries
    designated as ``countries of particular concern'' by the
    Secretary of State in 1999--Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and
    Sudan--were redesignated. This designation reflects the
    particularly severe violations of religious freedom by the
    Governments of those countries. In each the situation remained
    serious; in some--notably China--religious repression
    increased.
        In Uzbekistan, despite the release of some religious
    prisoners, the Government continued to incarcerate and abuse
    others because of their religious beliefs and practices. In
    particular some Muslims were vulnerable to mistreatment because
    of their alleged association with terrorists. The Government of
    Turkmenistan failed to allow non-Sunni Muslims and non-Russian
    Orthodox Christian believers to register, despite earlier
    promises to do so, and continued its crackdown on Protestant
    worshipers and its suppression of practitioners of other faiths
    for not being registered. In Russia there were concerns about
    the uniform implementation by local officials of federal
    regulations requiring the reregistration of religious groups
    and organizations. In Georgia there was increased
    discrimination against some religious minorities, including
    Jehovah's Witnesses. In Laos some religious prisoners were
    released, but the practice by certain local officials of
    forcing Christians to sign renunciations of their faith
    continued, as did the harsh treatment of Christians in prison.
        In Saudi Arabia non-Muslim public worship is prohibited,
    and the Government detained and subsequently deported several
    persons whom it considered to have violated the prohibition.
    The Government supports the Sunni Muslim majority, and
    discrimination against members of the Shi'a minority persists.
    Pakistan's blasphemy law continued to be abused and directed
    against the country's religious minorities, in particular the
    Ahmadiya and Christian communities. In Europe some states have
    adopted or are considering discriminatory legislation or
    policies that tend to stigmatize expressions of religious faith
    by certain groups by wrongfully associating them with dangerous
    ``sects'' or ``cults.''
        On a more positive note, religious life in a number of
    countries of the New Independent States continued to progress
    during the year, as some governments tried with varying degrees
    of success to bring local and regional officials into line with
    national policy. In Azerbaijan the treatment of religious
    groups continued to improve, as it has since President Aliyev's
    public commitment to religious liberty in 1999.
        Women: The year saw women's human rights attract more
    international attention than in the past, but actual gains
    worldwide were limited. In Egypt women were granted the right
    to divorce on grounds of incompatibility. In Rwanda a law was
    passed that improves women's rights in inheritance, family
    matters, and credit. Despite some progress made in these and
    other areas, serious problems remain. In many parts of Africa,
    female genital mutilation continued to damage the physical and
    psychological health of women and girls. Societal
    discrimination prevented women in many countries from taking
    advantage of economic opportunities. In Afghanistan the
    Taliban's restrictions on education and work continued to
    confine women to the home. Traditional patriarchal societies
    continued to devalue women and girls. In China coercive family
    planning practices continued to harm women and female children,
    despite some government experimentation with noncoercive
    practices. In a number of countries in the Middle East and
    South Asia, so-called honor killings and dowry deaths continued
    to be major problems.
        Violence against women remained a pervasive problem,
    cutting across social and economic lines. Domestic and sexual
    violence against women is found on every continent. While
    governments publicly condemned violence against women, too few
    took concrete steps to address it.
        Children: Children are among the most vulnerable of any
    group in society and face particular threats to their human
    rights. Around the world, children face dangerous and unhealthy
    conditions, working in factories, fields, and sweatshops, as
    domestic servants, or, in some cases, as prostitutes. The
    trafficking of children for forced labor, prostitution, and
    pornography is a growing and lucrative business for criminals.
    In many cities large numbers of street children lack shelter,
    food, education, and support and are vulnerable to many forms
    of abuse, despite the best efforts of governments and NGO's. In
    countries such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and
    Uganda, armed rebels force children to serve as soldiers or
    recruit them with promises or threats. In many countries,
    children are denied access to education--in some cases because
    they cannot afford the fees for books and uniforms, in others
    because they must work to support their families--thereby
    severely reducing their chances for a better life. Many
    governments deny girls the opportunity to attend school or
    complete their schooling.
        Some improvements in the lives of children took place
    during the year, as some governments took steps to aid children
    and strengthen protection of their rights. For example, in
    Venezuela some 500,000 children attended school for the first
    time when the Government prohibited registration fees. The
    Government of Tunisia sponsors an immunization program that
    targets preschool age children and reports that over 95 percent
    of children are vaccinated. At the end of the year, the
    Moroccan UNICEF chapter and the National Observatory of
    Children's Rights began a human rights awareness campaign
    regarding the plight of child maids that received widespread
    media exposure. The Minister of Justice in Benin established a
    National Commission for Children's Rights, which held its
    initial session in July; the Benin Government also has made
    serious efforts to combat child abuse and trafficking in
    children. In March several government agencies in the
    Philippines signed a memorandum of agreement on the handling
    and treatment of children involved in armed conflict, which
    treats child insurgents as victims to be rescued and
    rehabilitated, rather than as enemies to be neutralized and
    prosecuted. The United Nations opened two important documents
    for signature during the year: the Optional Protocol to the
    Convention on the Rights of the Child Concerning Children in
    Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
    the Rights of the Child Concerning the Sale of the Child. NGO's
    also are extremely active in the field of children's rights
    throughout the world, advocating legal reform and providing
    services.
        Worker Rights: During the year, there were countervailing
    negative and positive trends affecting worker rights. Among the
    positive developments, over 50 countries ratified the
    International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on the
    Worst Forms of Child Labor (Convention 182), the most rapid
    international approval for any convention in the organization's
    81-year history. The U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000
    encouraged international community ratification of the
    convention by linking ratification to continued eligibility for
    Generalized System of Preferences status. The act also
    incorporated worker rights criteria into trade preference
    eligibility for African and Caribbean Basin programs.
        For the first time, the ILO adopted a resolution that
    called for measures to secure compliance with fundamental
    worker rights. In November the ILO's Governing Body judged that
    the Government of Burma had not taken effective action to deal
    with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced labor. It
    called on all ILO member states to take appropriate measures to
    ensure that Burma does not perpetuate or extend its system of
    forced or compulsory labor.
        Among negative trends during the year was the impunity with
    which a dramatically increasing number of trade unionists were
    killed, tortured, and intimidated in Colombia. Elsewhere a
    growing trend toward the negotiation of individual contracts
    between companies and workers and the resort to the formation
    of ``cooperatives'' in place of trade unions deprived workers
    of the protection afforded by union representation and of
    protection under national labor legislation.
        Trafficking in Persons: Trafficking in persons poses a
    serious challenge to human rights. This rapidly growing global
    problem affects countries and families on every continent.
    Traffickers prey upon women, children, and men from all walks
    of life, and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers
    particularly exploit women and children who suffer from poverty
    and are marginalized within their own societies--the most
    vulnerable segments of the population. Trafficking has grown
    significantly in recent years and serves as one of the leading
    sources of revenue for international criminal organizations--in
    part because it is low-risk and high-profit. In some countries,
    local police and immigration and customs officials are involved
    or complicit in trafficking. Traffickers deprive their victims
    of their basic human dignity, subject them to inhuman and
    degrading treatment, and treat them as chattel that can be
    bought and sold into forced and bonded labor across
    international and within national borders. Victims often find
    themselves in a strange country, unable to speak the language,
    and without identification or documentation. Many are subject
    to violent and brutal treatment by their captors. Some come
    from countries in which the police and other authorities are a
    source of repression rather than a source of help, and they are
    reluctant to seek assistance. Many are threatened with
    retribution against themselves or their families should they
    try to escape. Many victims face additional risks from
    dangerous working conditions, including the threat of harm from
    exposure to dangerous pesticides or sexually transmitted
    diseases.
        The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to
    quantify. Reliable estimates range from 700,000 to 2 million
    persons trafficked globally each year. Victims are trafficked
    into sweatshop labor, prostitution, domestic servitude, unsafe
    agricultural labor, construction work, restaurant work, and
    various forms of modern-day slavery. Governments around the
    world have taken steps to combat these heinous practices,
    enacting legislation to criminalize trafficking and strengthen
    penalties against it, and taking steps to aid victims. In
    December 81 countries signed the Trafficking in Persons
    Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
    Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the U.N.
    Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. More
    countries are expected to sign the Trafficking Protocol in the
    coming months. NGO's are especially active in the
    antitrafficking field; their efforts globally include awareness
    campaigns, the provision of medical and psychological support
    and shelter for victims, as well as job training.
        Corporate Responsibility: In recent years, partnerships
    among governments, businesses, and civil society to promote
    human rights, support civil society, and address corporate
    responsibility needs have expanded. Two of the best-known
    examples are the Sullivan Principles and the U.N. Global
    Compact, which encourage corporations, on a voluntary basis, to
    recognize international human rights, labor, and environmental
    standards. During the year, a group of major oil, mining, and
    energy companies; human rights and corporate responsibility
    organizations; and an international trade union federation
    worked with the U.S. and British Governments to forge a set of
    voluntary principles on security and human rights. The
    principles provide a mechanism for a continuing dialog on
    important security and human rights issues.

                    IV. History of the Human Rights Reports

        The first edition of the Country Reports was a product of
    its times. While the United States had been at the forefront of
    the international human rights movement since the end of World
    War II and the creation of the United Nations, the Cold War and
    the gradual ending of colonialism dominated the first decades
    of that movement. However, the early 1970s gave rise in the
    Congress and throughout the country to new concepts and
    measures of accountability. An important force behind this
    changing environment was an ever-growing community of NGO's
    whose global outlook, commitment to human rights, and access to
    the media helped shape public opinion and government
    decisionmaking.
        In 1973 Representative Donald Fraser held hearings on human
    rights in the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
    International Organizations. That same year, a sense of
    Congress resolution was passed urging the Nixon Administration
    to link U.S. foreign assistance programs to respect for human
    rights within those recipient countries. The Congress amended
    the Foreign Assistance Act 3 years later to require the
    Secretary of State to transmit to Congress ``a full and
    complete report'' every year concerning ``respect for
    internationally recognized human rights in each country
    proposed as a recipient of security assistance.''
        Thus in March 1977, the first volume of Country Reports was
    submitted to Congress. The report covered 82 countries. Because
    it focused on nations with whom the United States had formal
    security assistance programs, most of them were longstanding
    allies and friends. The initial report was brief--only 143
    pages--and at the end of each entry was a rating, taken from
    Freedom House, judging whether the country was free, partly
    free, or not free.
        Like any innovation, the new report had its critics. To
    some the very existence of such a document harmed relations
    with the very nations with which the United States had
    established the best ties. To others the report fell short of
    full disclosure. Such criticism has helped improve the reports
    ever since. They now cover virtually every country of the world
    and include a level of detail that would have stunned earlier
    readers.
        For the 1978 report, 33 additional countries that received
    U.S. economic assistance were added to the original 82. The
    next year, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended again to
    require an entry on each member of the United Nations. The 1979
    report thus expanded to 854 pages and covered 154 countries,
    including for the first time discussions of Cuba, the Soviet
    Union, and the People's Republic of China.
        By then the basic format of the report had been
    established, although it would undergo many modifications over
    time. The first section was Respect for the Integrity of the
    Person, and it included, as it still does, subsections on
    torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
    arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial;
    and invasion of the home. The second section was entitled
    Government Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of such Vital
    Needs as Food, Shelter, and Health Care. Third was Respect for
    Civil and Political Liberties. This section included separate
    subsections on freedom of speech, press, religion, and
    assembly; freedom of movement within the country for travel and
    immigration; and freedom to participate in the political
    process. Fourth was Government Attitude and Record Regarding
    International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
    Violations of Human Rights.
        In 1980 a subsection was added on disappearances. The
    following year's report saw a recasting of the section on
    fulfillment of vital needs as Economic and Social
    Circumstances. The 1982 report added subsections on political
    and extrajudicial killing and disappearances and expanded the
    discussions on freedom of speech and the press, peaceful
    assembly, religion, movement, and the political process. The
    following year, the right of citizens to change their
    government was added. In 1986 a new section entitled
    Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or
    Social Status was introduced, along with another section on the
    Status of Labor.
        In 1989 a subsection was added on the use of excessive
    force and violations of human rights in internal conflicts. The
    labor section was revised to include specific discussions of
    the right of association, the right to organize and bargain
    collectively, minimum age for employment of children, and
    acceptable conditions of labor. The 1993 report saw an
    expansion of the discrimination section to include specific
    discussions of the rights of women, children, the indigenous,
    people with disabilities, and national, racial, and ethnic
    minorities. In 1993 the reports appeared on the Department of
    State's web site for the first time, an event that dramatically
    increased the number of individuals who had immediate access to
    them. Additional coverage on refugees and asylum was added 3
    years later. In 1997 the subsection on forced and bonded child
    labor was upgraded substantially. In 1998 the report was
    published for the first time in two volumes.
        Later in 1998, Congress passed the International Religious
    Freedom Act, which mandated annual reports on the state of
    international religious freedom in every country. The first of
    these reports appeared in September 1999, the same year that
    Congress requested that a new section be added to the reports
    on trafficking in persons. The reports that year also included
    a new focus on access to political prisoners and genocide.
                                     Michael E. Parmly,
                           Acting Assistant Secretary of State,
                          Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

                                     AFRICA

                                  ----------

                                     ANGOLA

        The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has ruled
    the country since its independence from Portugal in 1975. The country's
    competing independence movements began a civil war immediately after
    independence, which lasted until the signing of the Bicesse Accords in
    1991. Under the Bicesse Accords, one-party rule ended with the passage
    of a new Constitution that legalized opposition parties and called for
    U.N.-monitored elections which were held in 1992. President Jose
    Eduardo Dos Santos of the MPLA won a plurality of the votes cast in an
    election that U.N. observers considered free and fair. The National
    Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), under the
    leadership of Jonas Savimbi, rejected the results of the vote and
    resumed the civil war. In 1994 in an effort to end the civil war, the
    Government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol, which called for the
    demilitarization of UNITA, the creation of a national army, the seating
    of a government of national unity and reconciliation, and the extension
    of state administration to areas formerly under UNITA control. The
    Government generally complied with its obligations under the protocol,
    although the conduct of the police and, to a lesser extent, military
    units in former UNITA areas drew widespread criticism. UNITA failed to
    comply with several fundamental aspects of the protocol. It maintained
    a significant military capability, and it refused to surrender to state
    administration the territory it held. At the end of 1998, fighting
    resumed between the Government and Jonas Savimbi's armed faction of
    UNITA. A splinter group of UNITA called UNITA-Renovada and another
    larger peaceful faction of UNITA both rejected war; during the year,
    the two groups continued to pursue their goals through peaceful
    political activity, including as members of the National Assembly. In
    late 1999, a massive offensive by the Angolan armed forces (FAA)
    destroyed the conventional military capacity of UNITA, and by January
    drove the rebels from their heartland on the central plateau into the
    country's far east and into scattered pockets elsewhere. By March the
    FAA had consolidated its military control of most of the nation's
    territory; however, UNITA reorganized itself as a guerrilla force and
    carried out ambushes or attacks on lightly defended targets. In June
    1999, the National Assembly voted to postpone new elections
    indefinitely due to the renewal of conflict; during the year, the
    Government stated its intention to hold elections in 2001, but later
    postponed them until 2002. The judiciary, where it functions, is
    subject to the influence of the President and the MPLA in practice.
        The Ministry of Interior is responsible for internal security, a
    function that it exercises through the Angolan National Police (ANP),
    the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR), which was created in 1992 as an
    elite paramilitary force, and other organs of state security. The Armed
    Forces of Angola (FAA) are responsible for protecting the State against
    external threats and have intervened in regional conflicts every year
    since 1996. The FAA claimed that it had integrated more than 10,000
    UNITA soldiers since the 1999 fall offensive. With the resumption of
    localized hostilities within the country, the FAA became involved in
    counterinsurgency operations against UNITA. The FAA also is involved in
    similar operations, although on a smaller scale, against the Front for
    the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-
    FAC). The Government's security forces remain firmly under civilian
    leadership. Security forces committed numerous, serious human rights
    abuses.
        The security factors that inhibited the country's transition to
    full multiparty democracy had a similar effect on the country's
    transition from a directed, state-dominated economic system to one
    based on market principles. Forty percent of the budget remains
    dedicated to defense (or 22 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)).
    The economy was in disarray and despite abundant natural resources,
    output per capita is extremely low. Angola produces more than 750,000
    barrels of oil per day, a total that is expected to rise to over 1
    million by the end of 2002. Due to its control of oil revenues, the
    parastatal oil company Sonangol plays a dominant role in both the
    economy and government. The country produced an estimated $600 million
    worth of diamonds in the areas controlled by the Government. There also
    are lucrative untapped mineral, agricultural, and hydroelectric
    resources in the country; however, corruption and mismanagement are
    pervasive in the public sector and widespread in the private sector.
    The Government has begun to liberalize its import regimes and reform
    its regulatory agencies to better allow the importation of the goods
    and services on which the economy depends. Annual per capita GDP was
    approximately $450. The country's wealth continued to be concentrated
    in the hands of a small elite who often used government positions for
    massive personal enrichment, and corruption continued to be a common
    practice at all levels. The average monthly salary of urban wage
    earners (approximately 20 percent of the labor force) was far below
    what is required for basic subsistence, and rural wages are even lower
    because the majority of the rural economy is dependent on subsistence
    agriculture and is highly vulnerable to political unrest.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain.
    Citizens have no effective means to change their government. Members of
    the security forces committed extrajudicial killings, were responsible
    for disappearances, and tortured, beat, raped and otherwise abused
    persons. The Government often failed to pay the salaries of the
    majority of its security service personnel. The poor discipline and
    poor working conditions of the police force made it the worst offender;
    military units generally have better discipline and a more effective
    chain of command. Other than those personnel assigned to elite units,
    the Government gives tacit permission for security personnel to
    supplement their income--through the extortion of the civilian
    population. Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. The
    Government routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy
    pretrial detention is a problem. Although the Government made some
    efforts to discipline members of the security services for abuses, the
    Government often did not punish those in the security services who were
    responsible for abuses. The judiciary is subject to executive
    influence, only functions in certain parts of the country, and does not
    ensure due process. The legal code and rules of procedure remain
    outdated. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and
    forcibly recruited military-age males. The Government at times
    restricted freedom of speech and of the press, and intimidated
    journalists into practicing self-censorship. A Government crackdown on
    the independent media continued until March and resulted in the
    harassment, arrest, detention, and trials of journalists; however, by
    April the Government expanded the limits of public expression in most
    areas of the country. The Government restricted freedom of assembly.
    The Government restricted association and movement; however, it allowed
    some peaceful public protest. The Government continued to limit
    independent investigations of human rights abuses, although it allowed
    international human rights organizations, including Amnesty
    International, to conduct research in the country. Violence and
    discrimination against women were common; adult and child prostitution
    are problems; and children and the disabled continued to suffer as a
    result of the ongoing conflict and poor economic conditions. The
    Government continues to dominate the labor movement and restricts
    workers' rights, although there were improvements in the independent
    labor sector. Forced labor, including forced child labor, is a problem.
        The armed faction of UNITA under Savimbi was responsible for
    numerous, serious abuses during the year; the other two factions of
    UNITA were not responsible for abuses. The armed UNITA forces, under
    the control of Jonas Savimbi, were responsible for killings,
    disappearances, torture, rape, and other abuses. UNITA military units
    reportedly pillaged rural areas, depopulated parts of the country,
    killed traditional leaders, and eliminated all opposition, real or
    potential. UNITA prevented freedom of speech, the press, assembly,
    association, and movement. UNITA refused all attempts to conduct
    investigations in areas under its control. UNITA continued forced
    military recruitment, including of underage males, and used forced
    labor for a large part of its local-level logistical support. The
    sexual abuse of women conscripted to work as porters was common in
    UNITA areas.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed extrajudicial killings. Police participated in shakedowns,
    muggings, and carjackings. There were reports that army units engaged
    in a scorched earth policy during the year, burning villages and
    killing civilians in Cuando Cubango and Lunda Sul provinces. There were
    also reports that soldiers summarily executed civilians.
        There were reports that Government soldiers killed civilians in
    Namibia. After Namibia decided in December 1999 to allow FAA to launch
    anti-UNITA attacks from Namibian territory, there was extensive cross-
    border fighting which resulted in civilian deaths and injuries. FAA
    soldiers killed a number of Namibian civilians during the year. On
    January 22, an FAA member killed Thadeus Mubili in Mushangara in
    western Caprivi. No further information was available on the case at
    year's end. On May 27, an FAA member killed Thaddeus Vili at Bagani
    near the Kavango and Caprivi regions. An FAA member was arrested by
    police in Namibia; there was no further information available on the
    case at year's end. In July the army executed two Namibian civilians
    and injured another.
        Some individual members of the FAA reportedly also committed
    summary executions in the Republic of the Congo.
        Prison conditions are life threatening due to inadequate food,
    medicine, and sanitation, and many prisoners died in official custody
    (see Section 1.c.).
        In December 1999, there was an unconfirmed report that the FAA
    killed 47 civilians during operations in the Lunda Sul province. There
    was no investigation into the incident nor was any action taken by
    year's end. In February 1999, government forces reportedly killed
    several civilians after retaking the town of Mbanza Congo from UNITA.
    There was no investigation into the incident nor action taken by year's
    end.
        There were no investigations into, nor was any action taken against
    those responsible for the extrajudicial killings of more than 40
    persons during 1998, including the UNITA provincial secretary in Xa-
    Cessau, the UNITA communal secretary of Quibaxe, and the local UNITA
    secretary of Cangundu.
        Numerous localities changed hands during the year, a process that
    often involved the extrajudicial killing of government or UNITA
    administrators and persons accused of collaboration. Internally
    displaced persons and refugees risked their lives to flee to
    government-held areas or neighboring countries. Undocumented Congolese
    workers in diamond fields were targeted by government or UNITA forces
    seeking to take control of alluvial diamond mining operations. An
    unknown number of civilians died in the course of engagements between
    the security services and insurgents, particularly in the Central
    Highlands and in the northwest. Strong anecdotal information suggested
    that both sides summarily executed prisoners of war (POW's).
        On January 12, over 100 persons reportedly were killed in Bie
    province. Although there were unconfirmed reports that UNITA killed 150
    persons while passing through the area, other observers claimed that
    these persons were killed by the Government for being too sympathetic
    to UNITA. There were reports that at least one mass grave was
    discovered in the area, which the Government attributed to UNITA.
        During the year, there was a conviction in the case of the 1996
    killing of state-television reporter Antonio Casimiro (see Section
    2.a.).
        UNITA used landmines in Namibia, which resulted in dozens of deaths
    and numerous injuries of civilians and security force officers. At the
    end of September, the Government reported that more than 130 persons
    had been killed or injured by landmines in Namibia. Landmine explosions
    killed at least 10 civilians and injured 36 others in the Kavango
    region of the country by the end of June.
        Both Government and UNITA forces continued to use antipersonnel
    landmines (see Section 1.g.). According to the National Institute for
    the Removal of Explosive Obstacles and Devices, a government agency,
    100 persons were killed and 327 were injured by landmine explosions
    during the first half of the year; most of the incidents occurred in
    areas that had been mined by UNITA. There was an unconfirmed report
    that on February 17, 10 persons were killed and 18 were injured when a
    truck hit an antitank mine. In April 33 persons were killed and 17
    injured, including two young children, in two landmine attacks in the
    province of Uige. The Government blamed UNITA rebels for the deaths.
        UNITA military units reportedly pillaged rural areas, depopulated
    parts of the country, killed traditional leaders, and eliminated all
    opposition, real or potential. UNITA troops committed numerous
    extrajudicial killings during attacks on villages. Interviews with many
    refugees indicated that UNITA committed abuses, including public
    extrajudicial killings, as a deliberate policy. On February 6, UNITA
    shelled and attacked Santa Clara in Cunene province; at least 26
    civilians were killed and more than 40 were injured. There was an
    unconfirmed report that on March 21, UNITA rebels stoned and crucified
    six children for allegedly giving information to the Government. On May
    20 and 21 in Bie province, UNITA attacked and looted a hospital in
    Camacupa. On June 7, the government press reported the discovery of 17
    mass graves in the Bie province, each containing more than 100 bodies;
    however, the report was not confirmed by independent sources by year's
    end. On July 8, an orphanage in Huambo province was attacked and
    looted, reportedly by 100 UNITA bandits; a teenager was killed, 4 were
    injured, and 25 were kidnaped. On August 8, UNITA rebels killed four
    civilians during an attack on the town of Catete.
        UNITA killed numerous civilians during attacks on civilian traffic
    on roads in the interior of the country; such attacks were designed to
    halt transportation, disrupt commerce, isolate populations, and
    maintain a climate of insecurity. Many such attacks occurred on the
    Malanje-Luanda road during the year.
        UNITA forces reportedly killed 80 Christians during the year for
    providing information to the Government (see Section 2.c.).
        During raids in the Kavango and Caprivi regions of Namibia, UNITA
    forces killed civilians. On January 9, suspected UNITA forces shot and
    killed two civilians outside of Rundu. In February UNITA forces killed
    three civilians and burned nine houses in Shinyungwe village.
        There were reports that UNITA continued to use forced conscription
    and killed persons who attempted to desert (see Sections 1.b. and
    1.f.).
        On October 2, the body of journalist Antonio Paciencia was
    discovered in Zambia. The results of an investigation determined that
    he had been killed, but did not attribute responsibility for the
    killing; however, the Government and some journalists blamed UNITA for
    the killing.
        UNITA never has accounted for the deaths of numerous senior party
    officials. A number of high-ranking UNITA officials who have defected
    revealed the extent of extrajudicial killings in UNITA-held areas. Two
    former UNITA secretaries general, a former head of UNITA intelligence,
    and others reported that Savimbi personally ordered extrajudicial
    killings of opponents and, in some cases, personally carried out the
    executions. UNITA does not allow the U.N. to investigate claims of
    human rights abuses in the limited areas (less than 5 percent of the
    country's territory) that it controls.
        There were no further developments into the September 1999 case in
    which National Assembly Deputy Joao Ngolongombe Jacob, who was a member
    the non-Savimbi faction of UNITA, was killed by unknown persons. In
    January 1999, a U.N. chartered aircraft was shot down; there was no
    further information available on the case at year's end. In January
    1999, Father Albino Saluaco and two catechists were killed by armed men
    in Huambo (see Section 2.c.); although no group claimed responsibility
    for the killings, there were credible reports that it was UNITA.
        UNITA and the separatist group FLEC-FAC killed foreign nationals.
    For example, on April 27, FLEC-FAC killed a foreign national during an
    ambush north of Dingo.
        FLEC-FAC forces tortured and killed civilians in the Cabinda region
    (see Section 1.a.). In May FLEC-FLAC forces kidnaped three foreign and
    one local employee of a construction company.
        On June 2, 12 persons were killed and 52 were injured when a group
    of children brought a discarded missile into a refugee camp near
    Malanje, and it exploded.
        On June 10, polio vaccination workers passing through the Huambo
    area discovered an ambushed truck with 7 dead persons inside.
        On July 9, approximately 100 members of UNITA attacked a
    residential school and training center in Huambo Province; the UNITA
    members kidnaped 21 children, killed 1 boy, and injured at least 4
    others.
        On October 20, there were reports that dozens of persons were
    killed during an attack by unknown gunmen on two buses and a car.
    Reportedly a bus was set on fire with the passengers still inside; the
    gunmen also burned the other two vehicles.
        b. Disappearance.--Persons taken into police custody often
    disappeared without a trace, particularly in rural areas. Suspects
    accused of illegal weapons ownership or collaboration with UNITA
    disappeared.
        Civilians abducted by UNITA generally either were recruited
    forcibly as soldiers or support personnel, or were considered
    government collaborators. The frequent discovery of bodies in the
    aftermath of attacks suggested that suspected collaborators were
    executed summarily. Those who escaped UNITA custody and were able to
    return to government-held areas reported that they were subjected to
    torture, beatings, and sexual abuse (see Section 1.c.). There was an
    unconfirmed report that on January 29, six armed men abducted two
    teenage girls from a village near the border. UNITA rebels were
    suspected in the incident; however, no further information was
    available on the incident by year's end. On July 9, approximately 100
    members of UNITA attacked a residential school and training center in
    Huambo Province; the UNITA members kidnaped 21 children, killed 1 boy,
    and injured at least 4 others. On July 18, UNITA kidnaped two priests,
    eight nuns, and five students during an armed attack on a Roman
    Catholic mission in Benguela Province. The kidnaped persons were
    released on July 26.
        There were also reports that members of the FLEC-FAC separatist
    group kidnaped civilians. On May 25, members of FLEC-FAC kidnaped three
    foreign and one local employee of a Portuguese company in Cabinda;
    FLEC-FAC claimed that they still were holding them at year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code explicitly prohibit
    all forms of mistreatment of suspects, detainees, or prisoners;
    however, security forces tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused
    persons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the U.N.,
    and human rights organizations reported that there was widespread
    government abuse of suspects.
        Security service personnel frequently employed torture and other
    forms of cruel and degrading treatment, including rape. Police used
    torture and coerced confessions frequently during investigations and
    rarely, if ever, were punished for such abuses. Those suspected of ties
    to UNITA regularly are detained under inhuman conditions and are
    subjected to primitive and brutal forms of interrogation. Nonpolitical
    criminal suspects also are subjected to detention and abuse, although
    to a much lesser extent. There have been no cases in which an army or
    police official has been disciplined for the use of excessive force
    against an UNITA suspect. Police often beat and released suspects in
    lieu of trials (see Section 1.d.). Police frequently participate in
    shakedowns, muggings, carjackings, and killings. Police also extorted
    money from travelers at checkpoints, and routinely harassed refugees
    (see Section 2.d.).
        Reports that government forces raped women in the central highlands
    increased during the year; government forces reportedly attacked women
    in their homes, while they were working in the fields, near military
    camps, and during searches of homes (see Section 1.f.). Rapes by
    government forces were reported most commonly in the Bie, Huambo and
    Uige provinces.
        Police officers and soldiers reportedly harassed internally
    displaced persons (IDP's) and denied them humanitarian assistance due
    to misappropriation of supplies (see Section 2.d.).
        There were reports that police beat protesters during
    demonstrations in February (see Section 2.b.).
        There were numerous reports of abuses of Namibian citizens by the
    FAA in the border areas. A Namibian human rights organization reported
    that in July the army executed two Namibian civilians and wounded
    another (see Section 1.a.).
        Some individual members of the FAA reportedly committed acts of
    rape and looting in the Republic of the Congo (see Section 1.a.).
        Landmines laid by both sides during the conflict resulted in an
    increasing number of fatalities and injuries, including maiming (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
        The U.N. and human rights organizations report that abuse of
    suspects is universal in areas remaining under UNITA control.
    Interviews with persons who have fled UNITA-held areas revealed that
    UNITA uses cruel and inhuman practices, including public torture, to
    punish dissent and deter further acts of disloyalty. Torture is used at
    all levels of the UNITA forces. There have been repeated credible
    allegations that UNITA president Jonas Savimbi has ordered suspects
    tortured and executed in his presence. There were reports that UNITA
    engaged in reprisal attacks on civilians during the year. UNITA
    reportedly cut off the ears and hands of civilians in order to extract
    information and to discourage civilians from providing the Government
    with information on UNITA or from fleeing to government-controlled
    areas. On July 9, approximately 100 members of UNITA attacked a
    residential school and training center in Huambo Province; the UNITA
    members kidnaped 21 children, killed 1 boy, and injured at least 4
    others.
        There were numerous reports that UNITA forces abused Namibian
    citizens in the border areas.
        FLEC-FAC forces tortured and killed civilians in the Cabinda region
    (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Cells are
    overcrowded and lack basic sanitary facilities. The prison system holds
    approximately five times the number of prisoners that it was built to
    hold. Many prisons, lacking financial support from the Government, were
    unable to supply prisoners with adequate food and health care. There
    were credible reports that many prisoners died of malnutrition and
    disease. For example, at the Viana Prison malnutrition and disease are
    pervasive problems. In November the Government and the National
    Assembly Committee on Human Rights acknowledged that conditions are
    inhuman and announced modest appropriations for improvements in the Sao
    Paulo Prison hospital in Luanda and Viana prison outside the capital.
    Members of the Committee visited both institutions and donated
    mattresses and other supplies to the inmates.
        Prison officials routinely beat detainees. Prisoners depend on
    families, friends, or international relief organizations for basic
    support, including food; prisons often do not provide any food to
    prisoners. Prison officials, who are chronically unpaid, support
    themselves by stealing from their prisoners and extorting money from
    family members. Juveniles, often incarcerated for petty theft, are
    housed with adults and suffer abuse by guards and inmates. Female
    prisoners are held separately from male prisoners. There were reports
    that prison guards sexually abused female prisoners. Detained
    journalists were also housed with other prisoners.
        The Government permitted foreign diplomatic personnel and local and
    international human rights monitors to visit prisons during the year,
    and unlike in the previous year, they were permitted to visit
    individual prisoners. A local NGO was launched to document prison
    conditions in Luanda (see Section 4).
        The conditions of UNITA's prisons were not known; however,
    extensive testimony from defectors described harsh conditions of
    confinement and summary executions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are serious ongoing problems. Security forces used arbitrary
    arrest and detention during the year. Under the law, a person caught in
    the act of committing a crime may be arrested and detained immediately.
    Otherwise, the law requires that a judge or a provincial magistrate
    issue an arrest warrant. Arrest warrants also may be signed by members
    of the judicial police and confirmed within 5 days by a magistrate. The
    Constitution provides for the right to prompt judicial determination of
    the legality of the detention. Under the law, the prosecution and
    defense have 90 days before a trial to prepare their case, although
    both sides generally have the right to request an extension of this
    deadline under extenuating circumstances. The Constitution also
    provides prisoners with the right to receive visits by family members.
    Such rights are frequently ignored in practice; however, the Government
    paid increased attention to the rights of prisoners during the year;
    however, there was no substantial change in practice by year's end.
    There is a scarcity of personnel and resources and a lack of official
    determination to ensure these rights. Although the Ministry of Justice
    is nominally in charge of the prison system, the Ministry of the
    Interior continued to arrest and detain persons systematically,
    arbitrarily, and secretly for all categories of crimes and for
    indefinite periods, often with no apparent intent to bring the
    detainees to trial.
        Under the criminal law a person may not be held for over 135 days
    without trial. The National Security Law provides for a maximum of 180
    days of preventive detention. In practice, laws regarding preventative
    detention frequently are ignored. Over 90 percent of inmates in Luanda
    still are awaiting trial, and it is believed that the national average
    is over 50 percent. Inmates who have been awaiting trial for 2 or 3
    years are common. In many cases, police beat and then released
    detainees rather than make any effort to prepare a formal court case.
        In February police disrupted several demonstrations; they arrested
    and detained protestors (see Section 2.b.).
        On October 27, the Independent Union of Maritime and Association
    Workers of Angola (SIMA) engaged in a strike. Management threatened to
    fire the striking workers in retaliation, but all of the striking
    workers retained their jobs. Police arrested six strikers, but they
    were released on October 30 and acquitted of charges of disturbing the
    peace.
        In December 1999, a journalist, Andre Domingos Mussamo, was
    arrested and held in preventive detention for 3 months on charges of
    defamation before being released on bail in March (see Section 2.a.).
    Although the Press Law only allows a maximum of 15 days in detention,
    and other laws allow for a maximum detention of 45 days, the provincial
    Attorney General extended Mussamo's detention to 90 days; in April
    Mussamo was released without a trial, and in May all criminal charges
    against him were dropped.
        The Government holds an unknown number of suspected UNITA officials
    and supporters in areas where government control was regained. In past
    years, the Government invariably accused these persons of illegal
    weapons possession or collaboration with UNITA, although formal charges
    rarely were filed. However, the Government improved its compliance with
    the law, and there were no documented cases of further detentions of
    suspected UNITA officials and supporters during the year.
        UNITA continued to kidnap and detain persons primarily from rural
    areas against their will. The number of such persons is unknown.
        The Lusaka Protocol provides for the release, under International
    Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices, of persons detained for
    war-related reasons. Neither the Government nor UNITA regularly
    notified the ICRC or any other institution that it had POW's in
    custody. Between 10,000 and 15,000 UNITA soldiers have surrendered or
    been captured; most of them either entered the FAA or were released by
    the Government and placed in IDP camps.
        The Government did not use forced exile as a form of punishment.
    Some UNITA members claimed that they went into self-imposed exile
    because the Government threatened their lives.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary, where it functions, is
    not independent of the President and the MPLA, and political pressure
    from the presidency affected the outcome of cases. In practice the
    court system lacked the means, experience, training, and political
    backing to assert its independence from the President and the ruling
    MPLA party. The President has strong appointive powers, including the
    power to appoint Supreme Court justices without confirmation by the
    National Assembly. The judicial system largely was destroyed during the
    civil war and did not function in large areas of the country. In many
    cases, police beat and then released detainees rather than make any
    effort to prepare a formal court case.
        The court system consists of the Supreme Court at the appellate
    level plus municipal and provincial courts of original jurisdiction
    under the nominal authority of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
    serves as the appellate division for questions of law and fact. A
    Constitutional Court provided in the 1991 Constitution had not been
    established by year's end; the Constitution provides for judicial
    review of constitutional issues by the Supreme Court until the
    Constitutional Court is established. There are long delays for trials
    at the Supreme Court level.
        Trials for political and security crimes are supposed to be handled
    exclusively by the Supreme Court; however, there were no known cases of
    such trials. During the trial of Rafael Marques and Aguiar Dos Santos,
    the judge closed proceedings to the general public (except for members
    of the Bar Association), although visitors were allowed to observe the
    closing statements and the announcements of the final ruling (see
    Section 2.a.).
        The Constitution provides defendants with the presumption of
    innocence, the right to a defense, and the right to appeal. Legal
    reform in 1991 established the right to public trials, a system of
    bail, and recognized the accused's right to counsel; however, the
    Government does not respect these rights in practice. Trials are open
    to the public; however, each court has the discretion to close
    proceedings arbitrarily. Defendants do not have the right to confront
    their accusers. Judges are usually lay persons, not licensed lawyers.
    The judge and two lay persons elected by the full court act as the
    jury.
        On November 24, the MPLA introduced a general amnesty bill to the
    National Assembly, which was approved on November 29. Although the non-
    Savimbi faction of UNITA introduced its own version, it later withdrew
    the proposal. The bill requires a voluntary request for amnesty by any
    individual and covers national security crimes, honesty (defamation),
    military crimes and common crimes. The bill also includes a 90-day
    period during which an individual is allowed to request amnesty. The
    bill was not implemented formally by year's end; however, many
    prisoners were released under its provisions during the year.
        In the past, UNITA established a nominal military and civilian
    court system in territories under its control and claimed that its
    Civil Code is equivalent to the Portuguese Civil Code used by the
    Government; however, there was no indication that UNITA maintained this
    system during the year. The areas under UNITA's control diminished to
    isolated pockets that composed about 5 percent of the country, and
    reports during the year indicated that strict martial law applies in
    those areas.
        There were reports that the Government holds political prisoners;
    however, the number is unknown. The Government denied that it holds
    political prisoners and insisted that persons considered by some of
    civil society to be political prisoners are criminals.
        There are numerous confirmed reports that UNITA holds political
    detainees. It is not known if persons detained by UNITA were convicted
    by UNITA judicial procedure; decisions made by UNITA courts have no
    standing under the country's legal system, and persons were denied due
    process protections.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Government maintained a sophisticated security apparatus dedicated
    to the surveillance, monitoring, and wiretapping of certain groups,
    including opposition party leaders, journalists, members of the
    National Assembly and foreign diplomats. Legal requirements for search
    warrants routinely are disregarded.
        There were reports that army units engaged in a scorched earth
    policy during the year, burning villages and killing civilians (see
    Section 1.a.). Government forces reportedly attacked women in their
    homes, while they were working in the fields, near military camps, and
    during searches of homes (see Section 1.c.).
        On June 20, armed individuals dressed as security forces visited
    the Voice of America (VOA) offices and demanded the addresses of the
    homes of several independent media correspondents; the addresses were
    not given to them. The Government did not acknowledge nor attribute
    responsibility for the incident.
        The Government threatened to evict from his home a journalist who
    had been charged with defamation (see Section 2.a.).
        To enforce laws on mandatory military service, the armed forces and
    police conducted forced conscription drives in many of the areas under
    the control of the Government, including Luanda, in which some minors
    may have been recruited. Under the law, military service is obligatory,
    but the pattern of the forced recruitment targeted poor communities and
    unemployed young men. Persons who could prove that they had jobs
    usually were released, and those with financial means could purchase an
    exemption from the armed forces. The Government denied that forced
    recruiting was taking place. Church groups, civil society institutions,
    and foreign embassies protested the manner of conscription.
        UNITA reportedly looted and destroyed property while replenishing
    their supplies of food and medicine.
        UNITA continued to conscript civilians, including children
    forcibly, for military duty (see Section 1.g.).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Military operations by both the Government and
    UNITA continued to result in numerous human rights violations. The
    Government and UNITA continue to use antipersonnel landmines to
    strengthen defensive positions and, in the case of UNITA, to prevent
    residents within its own areas from fleeing to government-held areas
    (see Section 2.d.). Large areas have been remined since the resumption
    of fighting in 1999, mostly by UNITA. Military attacks have resulted in
    indiscriminate and summary killings, torture, abductions, destruction
    of property, and theft (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.). The
    provinces most affected were Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Bie, and
    Moxico, although UNITA also has mounted raids on or near the coast.
    There were several attacks on Congolese miners during the year. The
    Government's failure to pay, feed, and equip many of its army and
    police personnel resulted in frequent extortion and theft. Government
    personnel frequently confiscated food, including donated relief
    supplies, livestock, and personal property; however, respect for
    humanitarian workers and property by security forces improved during
    the year as the result of an order from the Armed Forces Chief of Staff
    and better liaison between the Government and the U.N. on such
    problems.
        There were reports that army units engaged in a scorched earth
    policy, burning villages and killing civilians (see Section 1.a.).
        The Government continued to use forced conscription (see Section
    1.f.).
        In July the local government in Kwanza Norte evicted journalist
    Isidoro Natalicio from his home on the grounds that his work for
    independent and international radio stations violated his lease (see
    Section 2.a.).
        In May the U.N. estimated that as many as 7 million landmines have
    been laid in the country, and new mines were laid during the year.
    There were numerous injuries and deaths resulting from landmines (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Various NGO's participated in landmine
    clearance operations during the year, and the Government implemented a
    Mine Action Plan.
        UNITA forces routinely violated citizen's rights in pursuit of
    military objectives. UNITA attacks against civilian populations as a
    guerrilla strategy resulted in hundreds of casualties. There were
    continued reports of deaths resulting from UNITA attacks on villages
    throughout the country and executions of suspected government
    supporters by UNITA forces (see Section 1.a.). The Government
    attributed the discovery of mass graves to UNITA actions (see Section
    1.a.).
        The number of IDP's continued to increase (see Section 2.d.).
        UNITA carried out forced recruiting, including of children,
    throughout all of the country's disputed territory. Recruits were taken
    to isolated military camps and subjected to psychological stress and
    extreme hardships; those who attempted to desert were executed. Women,
    many as young as 13 years of age, were recruited forcibly to serve as
    porters and camp followers, and reports of sexual assault were
    widespread and credible.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression and of the press and specifically provides that
    the media cannot be subject to ideological, political, or artistic
    censorship; however, the Government does not always respect this right
    in practice. Although the Government's respect for freedom of the press
    improved marginally beginning in March, the Government continued to
    intimidate and threaten journalists into practicing self-censorship.
    There were reports that the Government pays journalists to publish
    progovernment stories. The Government detained for up to several months
    or placed under investigation journalists who reported on sensitive
    issues, including military operations, government corruption, and
    UNITA, especially Jonas Savimbi. However, there was increasing private
    media attention to corruption, economic mismanagement, and opposition
    politics; journalists acknowledge that they exercise self-censorship
    when reporting on the military situation, internal security, or other
    highly sensitive matters.
        The news ban on war coverage that was instituted in 1999 remained
    effective; however, the strong discouragement of negative news coverage
    by the Government that occurred in 1999 lessened during the year.
        Defamation against the President or his representatives is a
    criminal offense, punishable with imprisonment or fines. There is no
    truth defense to defamation charges; the only allowable defense is to
    show that the accused did not produce the actual writing alleged to
    have caused harm. In June journalist Gustavo Costa, the editor of a
    Portuguese newspaper, was convicted of defamation against the Governor
    of Kwanza North, Manuel Pacavira. In June the director of the
    independent weekly Agora, Aguiar Dos Santos, and a columnist for Folha
    8, Rafael Marques, were found guilty of defamation. On October 27, the
    Supreme Court upheld the convictions of Marques, Aguiar Dos Santos, and
    Costa. Aguiar Dos Santos was sentenced to 2 months in prison, a fine,
    and travel restrictions; their sentences were suspended for 3 years.
    Costa was sentenced to 8 months for defamation, which also was
    suspended for 3 years, and travel restrictions were imposed on him. On
    December 11, the Supreme Court ordered the police to lift the travel
    restrictions that had been imposed on Marques, Dos Santos, and another
    journalist, Antonio Freitas; however, on December 12, government
    officials prevented Marques from leaving the country and temporarily
    confiscated his passport. Travel restrictions subsequently were lifted
    for the three journalists.
        In January Rafael Marques, a columnist for the independent weekly,
    Folha 8 who was arrested and detained for a July 1999 article critical
    of President Dos Santos, was released on bail after 45 days of
    preventive detention (see Section 1.d.). His trial for defamation of
    the President in March was closed to the public (although members of
    the Bar Association could observe); the judge refused to allow
    Marques's lawyer to present evidence regarding the truth of what
    Marques wrote. Marques was convicted and given a suspended sentence of
    6 months, the maximum under the law, as well as a large fine. On April
    27, police again interrogated Rafael Marques after he wrote an article
    that criticized the Government for the reinstitution of the military
    draft.
        In November 1999, Isidoro Natalicio was convicted of defamation,
    and his appeal was pending at year's end. During the year, the local
    government threatened to evict Natalicio from his home, and filed
    another defamation charge against him. In July the local government in
    Kwanza Norte evicted him from his home on the grounds that his work for
    independent and international radio stations violated his lease.
        In August 1999 the Government banned Isaias Soares, a VOA and Radio
    Ecclesia journalist, from covering official events or reporting on
    military issues in Malange. In July and August, the Government
    continued to harass Soares, and the provincial government seized his
    motorcycle, which was his only means of transport.
        In 1999 the Government harassed, arrested, and detained more than
    20 journalists on charges of slander, defamation, and crimes against
    the security of the State; however, such incidents decreased during the
    year. In July individuals claiming they represented government
    authorities kidnaped Catholic Radio Ecclesia director Paulo and forced
    him to drive at gunpoint to the outskirts of Luanda, where he managed
    to escape unhurt. The Government later disclaimed responsibility for
    the assault. In December 1999, police arrested and detained in Kwanza
    Norte province Andre Mussamo, correspondent for Angolan National Radio
    and contributor to Folha 8, for ``violation of a state secret.'' On May
    31, the charges were dropped when it was shown that Mussamo had not
    published any material from a secret document; however, the person who
    provided Mussamo with the document was convicted. Mussamo reportedly
    still is under investigation, and he has been barred from leaving the
    country or from practicing journalism. The Union of Angolan Journalists
    criticized the Government's actions in the Mussamo case.
        The majority of the media is state-run and carries very little
    criticism of the Government; however, the Government has tolerated
    progressively more criticism of its policies and actions in the
    independent media. There are five private weekly publications with
    circulations in the low thousands. There are also five commercial radio
    stations including the Catholic Radio Ecclesia, and Radio Lac Luanda,
    which openly criticized aspects of government policies and highlighted
    poor socioeconomic conditions. A committee composed of the Minister of
    Social Communication, the spokesman of the presidency, and the
    directors of state-run media organizations controls policy and
    censorship authority. The MPLA's secretary general also influences the
    content and tone of state-run media reporting. The Government used its
    control of the media to engage in a hostile propaganda campaign against
    UNITA, including unconfirmed allegations of UNITA massacres, as a means
    of influencing local and international public opinion.
        There were some attempts by the Government to improve relations
    with the media, including visits to independent radio and newspapers by
    the Vice-Minister of Social Communication. Media harassment diminished
    in most areas in the latter half of the year, with the exception of
    Kwanza Norte and Malange, where the Government continued to target
    journalists.
        As a result of the Marques trial, the Government decided to revise
    the press law. In August a committee appointed by the President
    released a draft law for public comment. Despite wide criticism of the
    new text, the Government encouraged a series of public seminars, and
    radio and television programming on the topic. In September the
    Government extended the original 6-week review period by 3 weeks to
    accommodate public feedback. The draft was criticized widely for not
    allowing the expansion of political dialog and discussion and for
    increasing the criminal penalties for defamation. The Committee to
    Protect Journalists (CPJ) recommended the withdrawal of the draft law.
    In October the Government suspended the drafting process, withdrew its
    draft, and announced its intention to appoint a committee consisting of
    both government and nongovernment representatives to reconsider the
    drafting process; however, the process had not begun by year's end.
        The Government generally did not restrict the activities of foreign
    media, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and VOA;
    however, it continued to refuse to allow direct retransmission of their
    broadcasts. Foreign journalists must obtain authorization from the
    Ministry of the Interior in order to obtain access to government
    officials or to travel within the country. Media requests to travel to
    areas that were not controlled by the Government were routinely denied.
    The Government placed no abnormal visa restrictions on foreign
    journalists and allowed them freedom to report on all aspects of
    society.
        During the year, there was a conviction in the case of the 1996
    killing of state-television reporter Antonio Casimiro (see Section
    1.a.).
        UNITA does not permit freedom of expression in the areas under its
    control.
        Academic life has been circumscribed severely by the civil war;
    however, there is academic freedom, and academics do not practice self-
    censorship.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government strictly
    controls this right in practice, although official tolerance for public
    protest increased. The law requires a minimum of 3 days' prior notice
    before public or private assemblies are held, and makes participants
    liable for ``offenses against the honor and consideration due to
    persons and to organs of sovereignty.'' Applications for progovernment
    assemblies are granted routinely without delay; however, applications
    for protest assemblies rarely are granted.
        On February 18, 25 members of the Party for the Support of
    Democracy and Progress in Angola (PADPA) members demonstrated in front
    of the Carmo Church in downtown Luanda in a highly publicized hunger
    strike against an increase in fuel prices. Police dispersed the
    demonstration on the grounds that the police had not received the
    required 3-day notification prior to the demonstration, and police
    detained 12 protesters. There also were allegations of police assault
    against protestors. On February 23, police dispersed a demonstration
    outside the Luanda Provincial Government and reportedly beat some
    demonstrators. On February 24, police with rifles dispersed a
    demonstration, arrested 10 protestors, including the leaders of 2
    opposition parties, and reportedly beat some of the protestors. On
    February 25, the police issued an apology for the arbitrary arrests.
        The Government became more tolerant of public protest during the
    latter half of the year. On March 11, officials permitted an opposition
    march by 100 members of opposition parties against high fuel prices;
    this was the first authorized opposition demonstration since 1992.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
    the Government restricts this right in practice. Legislation allows the
    Government to deny registration to private associations on security
    grounds; however, in practice the Government accepts virtually all
    applications, including those for political parties. However, there are
    informal government constraints on the operation of associations. The
    Government arbitrarily limits organized activities deemed adverse to
    its interests, by refusing to grant licenses and through other means.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The Government does not require religious groups to register.
    Colonial era statutes banned all non-Christian religious groups from
    the country; while those statutes still exist, they are no longer
    enforced.
        Members of the clergy in government-held areas regularly use their
    pulpits to criticize government policies.
        While in general UNITA permits freedom of religion, interviews with
    persons who left UNITA-controlled areas reveal that the clergy does not
    enjoy the right to criticize UNITA policies.
        In January 1999, unknown gunmen killed Father Albino Saluaco, a
    Catholic parish priest, and two catechists in a town in the province of
    Huambo that was under UNITA military occupation. No group had claimed
    responsibility for the incident by year's end (see Section 1.a.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement and residence, and freedom of exit from and entry into the
    country; however, the Government does not respect these rights in
    practice. A network of government security checkpoints throughout the
    country interfered with the right to travel. Such checkpoints serve
    also as the principal source of income for many of the country's
    security service personnel. Extortion at checkpoints is routine in the
    center of Luanda and pervasive on major commercial routes. Police
    routinely harassed refugees at checkpoints (see Section 1.c.). The
    Government routinely cuts off access to areas of the country that are
    deemed insecure or beyond the administrative authority of the State.
    Insecurity prevented persons from transporting goods during the year.
    The Government did not place restrictions on emigration and
    repatriation; however, there were reports that immigration officials
    harassed and extorted money from foreign businessmen.
        Journalists who were convicted of defamation were temporarily
    prohibited by the Government from traveling outside of the country (see
    Section 2.a.).
        Landmines are a major impediment to the freedom of movement. UNITA
    used landmines primarily on roads and trails to disrupt transportation,
    and to control village populations. Government mining generally was
    confined to strategic positions around towns for defensive purposes.
    Estimates of the total number of landmines deployed throughout the
    country range into the millions. Fear of injury and death from
    landmines effectively imprisoned and impoverished entire communities.
    There were at least 100 fatalities due to landmine explosions during
    the year, and there are over 80,000 survivors of landmine explosions
    (see Section 1.g.).
        In April the Angolan Ministry of Assistance and Social Re-Insertion
    (MINARS) estimated that there were 3,800,000 IDP's in the country. In
    the same month, the U.N. reported 1,480,942 confirmed IDP's and a total
    of 2,299,314 reported IDP's in the country. There are 120 IDP camps in
    the country, 35 of which were inaccessible due to their distance from
    urban centers, and there is a lack of adequate water supply in these
    areas. Many IDP's are former returnees from neighboring countries who
    were reintegrated into the country from 1994 to 1998. There were
    instances in which IDP's were harassed by police officers and soldiers,
    and denied humanitarian assistance due to misappropriation by the
    authorities. IDP's were conscripted forcibly in both Government and
    UNITA controlled areas (see Section 1.f.). Provincial governments in
    the country at times relocated IDP's to areas with security problems.
    On June 2, 9 persons were killed and 50 were injured when a discarded
    missile exploded in an IDP camp (see Section 1.a.). There have also
    been reports of male IDP's being forced by authorities to leave IDP
    camps and return to their places of origin. However, the IDP's overall
    situation improved during the year. Many IDP's were moved from transit
    camps and urban warehouses with poor conditions to rural, safe security
    areas, and provided with homes, small land parcels, medical care, and
    education by the Government and UNHCR. In November the UNHCR began new
    IDP assistance programs and now provides protection and assistance in
    three provinces.
        Approximately 170,000 citizens sought refuge in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a result of the conflict. In November
    the UNHCR reported that between 15,000 and 18,000 citizens gathered
    near the border with DRC; they remained near the border at year's end.
    Thousands of citizens reportedly crossed into Namibia during the year.
        The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees. The Government provides first asylum to
    refugees. An eligibility committee to evaluate asylum claims meets
    regularly to evaluate asylum requests. According to UNHCR, the country
    has approximately 12,000 refugees, 90 percent of whom are from the DRC.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with valid
    claims to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides all adult citizens with the right to vote
    by secret ballot in direct multiparty elections to choose the President
    of the Republic and deputies in the 220-seat National Assembly;
    however, in practice citizens have no effective means to change their
    government. The Lusaka Protocol establishes the mechanism for returning
    the country to an electoral calendar. The Constitutional Committee of
    the National Assembly continued to work on a new constitution and a new
    electoral law; however, the process was not completed by year's end.
    During the year, the Government announced that elections were scheduled
    for 2001, but later postponed them until 2002. Opposition parties
    complained of harassment and intimidation by the Government.
        The President is elected by absolute majority. If no candidate wins
    such a majority, a runoff must take place between the two candidates
    with the most votes. Of the 220 deputies in the National Assembly, 130
    are elected on a national ballot, and 90 are elected to represent the
    provinces. The Electoral Law also calls for the election of three
    additional deputies to represent citizens living abroad; however, those
    positions were not filled in the 1992 elections.
        Ruling power is concentrated in the President and other members of
    the Council of Ministers, through which the President exercises
    executive power. The Council can enact decree-laws, decrees, and
    resolutions, thereby controlling most functions normally associated
    with the legislative branch. Although the Constitution establishes the
    position of Prime Minister, the President dismissed the Prime Minister
    during the MPLA Party Congress at the end of 1998, assumed the position
    himself by decree, and continued to hold the position at year's end.
    The National Assembly has, since its inception, served as a rubber
    stamp for the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, with opposition
    deputies holding about 43 percent of National Assembly seats,
    substantive debates sometimes took place on issues ranging from the
    peace process to the Government's budgeting priorities and
    accountability. In August the parliamentary opposition held a 3-day
    conference in a National Assembly annex with the specific objective of
    organizing an electoral coalition; the conference included 300
    activists from seven opposition parties.
        The 1992 elections were the first multiparty democratic elections
    in the country's history; they were conducted with U.N. supervision and
    financial support. MPLA president Jose Edardo Dos Santos won a
    plurality of votes cast in the presidential election (49 percent), and
    UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi finished second (40 percent). Although local
    and international observers declared the election to be generally free
    and fair and called on UNITA to accept the results, UNITA claimed that
    the elections were fraudulent, rejected the results, and returned the
    country to civil war. The runoff election between Dos Santos and
    Savimbi was never held. The Lusaka Protocol stated that it would take
    place following a U.N. determination that requisite conditions exist.
    The National Assembly voted in June 1999 to cancel the runoff election,
    pending a determination that conditions are appropriate for a new
    election.
        In 1997 UNITA and 10 smaller opposition parties joined the ruling
    MPLA in a government of national unity and reconciliation. In 1998
    UNITA officials assumed 4 ministerial and 7 vice-ministerial positions,
    and 70 UNITA deputies took their seats. UNITA governors, vice
    governors, and local administrators were nominated, but remaining
    positions were filled by members of a splinter UNITA group, UNITA-
    Renovada, which is recognized and assisted by the Government. The
    National Assembly promulgated a special status for Savimbi, declaring
    him to be the leader of the largest opposition party and providing him
    with 5 official residences and a bodyguard contingent of 400 personnel.
    The National Assembly revoked Savimbi's status in 1998 for abrogating
    his duties under the Lusaka Protocol. In 1999 the Government declared
    Savimbi a war criminal and issued a warrant for his arrest; the warrant
    remained outstanding at year's end.
        There are no legal barriers to the participation of women in the
    political process; however, women are under represented in government
    and politics. Women occupy 10 of 83 cabinet positions, 35 of 220 seats
    in the National Assembly, and none of the 9 places on the Supreme
    Court.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not prohibit independent investigations of its
    human rights abuses; however, it fails to cooperate and often uses
    security conditions as a false justification to deny access to affected
    areas.
        There were more than 120 registered NGO's operating in the country;
    approximately 45 were domestic NGO's. Local NGO's actively promoted
    human rights during the year. In October a local NGO, Maos Livres, was
    launched to document and expose prison conditions in Luanda. During the
    year, Maos Livres also provided free legal counsel to detained strikers
    from an independent longshoremen's union (see Section 6.a.).
        Several international organizations have a permanent presence in
    the country including the ICRC and the human rights division of the
    U.N. Human Rights Watch visited the country three times during the
    year.
        The Constitution provides for the creation of an Office of the
    Provider of Justice, or Ombudsman, designated by the National Assembly
    for a 4-year-term, to defend citizens' rights and liberties. However,
    this office had not been established at year's end.
        During the year, U.N. activities in the country resumed with a
    limited mandate and staff.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Under the Constitution, all citizens are equal before the law and
    enjoy the same rights and responsibilities regardless of color, race,
    ethnicity, sex, place of birth, religion, ideology, degree of
    education, or economic or social condition. The Government does not
    have the ability to enforce these provisions effectively.
        Women.--Violence against women was widespread. Credible evidence
    indicated that a significant proportion of homicides was perpetrated
    against women, usually by spouses. In 1997 the Ministry of Women and
    Family was created to deal in part with violence against women. The
    Government continued its project to reduce violence against women and
    improve the status of women, and efforts during the year included
    public education campaign. Allegations of rape by Government forces in
    the central highlands increased during the year (see Section 1.c.).
    There were some unconfirmed reports of rape by UNITA forces.
        The Constitution and Family Code provide for equal rights without
    regard to gender; however, societal discrimination against women
    remained a problem, particularly in rural areas. In addition a portion
    of the Civil Code dates to colonial times and includes discriminatory
    provisions against women in the areas of inheritance, property sales,
    and participation in commercial activities. There are no effective
    mechanisms to enforce child support laws, and women carry the majority
    of responsibilities for raising children. Due to poor economic
    conditions, an increasing number of women engaged in prostitution. The
    law provides for equal pay for equal work; however, in practice, women
    rarely are compensated equally. Some women hold senior positions in the
    armed forces (primarily in the medical field) and civil service, but
    women mostly are relegated to low-level positions in state-run
    industries and in the small private sector. In much of the country,
    women constituted a growing percentage of the disabled, as they were
    most likely to become victims of landmines while foraging for food and
    firewood in agricultural areas. Under the law, adult women may open
    bank accounts, accept employment, and own property without interference
    from their spouses. Upon the death of a male head of household, the
    widow automatically is entitled to 50 percent of the estate with the
    remainder divided equally among legitimate children.
        A series of national conferences on women's rights, partially
    funded by foreign donors, continued to produce calls for the Government
    to amend the Civil Code to end women's legal inequality, create a
    social welfare program, and strengthen enforcement mechanisms for
    existing legislation.
        Children.--Approximately 50 percent of the population is believed
    to be under the age of 15; however, the Government gave little
    attention to children's rights and welfare. The Ministry of Education
    barely functioned due to a lack of resources and corrupt
    administration. Private religious, community, or corporate groups have
    been unable to fill this vacuum. Although primary and secondary
    education was free, students often have to pay significant additional
    expenses. Although primary education was compulsory, there were not
    enough schools and many children had to work to support their families.
    Teachers were chronically unpaid and often demanded unofficial payment
    or bribes from students. Teachers engaged in strikes in provinces
    throughout the country during the year (see Section 6.a.). The net
    enrollment rate of school-age children is 40 percent; however, while 50
    percent of children 5 to 14 years of age are in school, only 30 percent
    of children remain in school after grade 5. There was an 18 percent
    enrollment rate gap favoring boys over girls. Almost 1 million children
    are estimated to be out of school, with no prospect of integrating them
    into the education system. Most of the educational infrastructure was
    either partially or totally damaged and lacks basic equipment and
    teaching materials. Only 42 percent of the population was literate, and
    the illiteracy rate for women is almost twice that of men.
        UNITA and the Government allowed 8,000 child soldiers to be
    demobilized in 1996-97. The Government has not brought any significant
    numbers of children back into the armed forces, although some children
    have been caught up in forced recruitment campaigns (see Section 1.f.).
    There were credible reports that UNITA often forcibly recruits children
    as young as 10 years of age into its armed forces.
        Children often were victims in the civil war. Government and UNITA
    forces killed, kidnaped, and injured children during attacks throughout
    the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.). Children were killed and
    injured by landmine explosions in increasing numbers (see Section
    1.a.).
        The U.N. Children's Fund in 1998 estimated that there were
    approximately 5,000 street children in Luanda; some were orphans or
    abandoned while others ran away from their families or government
    facilities that were unable to support them. Living conditions in
    government youth hostels are so poor that the majority of homeless
    children preferred to sleep on city streets. Street children shine
    shoes, wash cars, and carry water, but many resort to petty crime,
    begging, and prostitution in order to survive (see Section 6.d.). An
    international NGO that works with street children estimated that there
    are 500 to 1,000 underage prostitutes in Luanda. There are no laws that
    specifically prohibit child prostitution; however, child prostitution
    is prohibited by a general criminal statute. The age of sexual consent
    is 12 years, and any sexual relations with a child under 12 years of
    age is considered rape. Sexual relations with a child between the ages
    of 12 and 17 can be considered sexual abuse. There are no laws
    specifically against child pornography; however, pornography is
    prohibited statutorily. The Ministry of Family and Women's Affairs
    enforces and oversees special family courts, and the National Institute
    for Assistance to Children has daily responsibility for children's
    affairs.
        The government-sponsored National Institute for Children was
    established in the late 1980's to enforce child protection, but it
    lacks the capacity to work adequately with international NGO's to
    assist dispossessed youth. The Government publicized the problems of
    street and homeless children during the year. There are no active
    private children's rights advocacy groups.
        People with Disabilities.--The number of the physically disabled
    persons includes an estimated 80,000 disabled landmine survivors. While
    there was no institutional discrimination against the disabled, the
    Government did little to improve their physical, financial, or social
    conditions. There is no legislation mandating accessibility for the
    disabled in public or private facilities, and, in view of the
    degradation of the country's infrastructure and high unemployment rate,
    it was difficult for the disabled to find employment or participate in
    the education system.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Years of war and internal
    dislocation have produced substantial integration of ethnic and
    linguistic groups, particularly in the coastal areas, where as much as
    half of the population resides. The largest ethno-linguistic group,
    about 40 percent of the country's population, is Ovimbundu, whose
    traditional region includes much of the south-central part of the
    country. Although they form the base for UNITA, there is little
    evidence of systematic discrimination against them by the Government or
    other groups. Other important ethno-linguistic groups include the
    Bakongo in the north; Kimbundu in the north-central area; and Chokwe in
    the far east. The coastal population centered in Luanda and, to a
    lesser extent, Benguela-Lobito, predominantly speaks Portuguese as a
    first language. The Portuguese-speaking group includes a large minority
    of ``Mesticos'' of mixed European and African ancestry and a small,
    white, predominantly Portuguese-descended population. In addition about
    30,000 Portuguese citizens live in the country, forming the bulk of the
    nonrefugee expatriate community.
        The population also includes 1 to 2 percent of Khoisan and other
    linguistically distinct hunter-gatherer tribes scattered through the
    provinces of Namibe, Cunene, and Cuando Cubango. There is no evidence
    that they suffer from official discrimination or harassment, but they
    do not participate actively in the political or economic life of the
    country, and they have no ability to influence government decisions
    concerning their interests.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to form and join trade unions, engage in union activities, and
    strike; however, the Government does not respect these rights
    consistently in practice. The Government dominates the National Union
    of Angolan Workers (UNTA), which is the labor movement affiliated with
    the ruling MPLA party; however, there are two independent unions, the
    General Center of Independent and Free Labor Unions of Angola (CGSILA)
    and the small Independent Union of Maritime and Related Workers (SIMA).
    The CGSILA has a membership of approximately 50,000 members, and UNTA
    claims to have over 400,000 members. There are tensions between the two
    organizations. The law requires that labor unions be recognized by the
    Government. Restrictions on civil liberties potentially prevent any
    labor activities not approved by the Government; however, the major
    impediment to labor's ability to advocate on behalf of workers is the
    60 percent formal sector unemployment rate.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike. Legislation
    passed in 1991 provides the legal framework for, and strictly
    regulates, that right. The law prohibits lockouts and worker occupation
    of places of employment and provides protection for nonstriking
    workers. It prohibits strikes by armed forces and police personnel,
    prison workers, and fire fighters. The law does not prohibit employer
    retribution against strikers effectively.
        There were several strikes during the year by teachers. On August
    7, teachers in four provinces engaged in strikes to protest lack of
    training and low wages (see Section 5).
        In September the Angolan Teachers Union organized a protest to
    demand a salary increase and back pay. Although teachers were paid
    arrears in Benguela, Lobito, and Kwanza South, other provinces claimed
    they were unable to make payments, and teachers returned to work by
    year's end. On October 27, the Independent Union of Maritime and
    Association Workers of Angola (SIMA) engaged in a strike. Management
    threatened to fire the striking workers in retaliation, but all of the
    striking workers retained their jobs. Police arrested six strikers, but
    they were released on October 30 and acquitted of charges of disturbing
    the peace. On December 12, UNTA organized a 3-day strike for an
    increase in the minimum wage. The CGSILA refused to cooperate and
    openly criticized UNTA for coopting CGSILA's long-standing support for
    a minimum wage increase, but demanding half of the amount that the
    CGSILA had advocated. The minimum wage had not been increased by year's
    end. In 1999 the National Union of Teachers, affiliated with CGSILA,
    twice called for a national strike to demand better and regular pay in
    order to correct the Government's chronic failure to pay teachers on
    schedule. On the first occasion, the Government negotiated with the
    union, but on the second occasion some members of the union were
    arrested and tried for acts against the State, although none were
    convicted or imprisoned as a result.
        Unions have the right to affiliate internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right to organize and for collective
    bargaining; however, the Government generally does not respect those
    rights in practice. The Government dominates the economy through state-
    run enterprises. The Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and
    Social Security sets wages and benefits on an annual basis. Legislation
    prohibits discrimination against union members and calls for worker
    complaints to be adjudicated in regular civil courts. Under the law,
    employers found guilty of anti-union discrimination are required to
    reinstate workers who have been fired for union activities. In practice
    neither the Labor Code nor the judicial system are capable of defending
    these rights.
        On November 5, several railroad workers were ordered home after
    they reportedly attempted to change their union affiliation from UNTA
    to CGSILA; none of the workers were fired, and they continued to belong
    to UNTA at year's end.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law permits the
    Government to force workers back to work for breaches of worker
    discipline and participation in strikes, and has been cited by the
    International Labor Organization (ILO) as an example of forced labor in
    violation of ILO conventions. There were reports that the army forcibly
    conscripted persons (see Section 1.f.). The law prohibits forced or
    bonded child labor, and there are no reports that such labor occurs in
    government-held areas; however, the Government does not have the
    capacity to enforce this legislation in nongovernment-held areas.
        UNITA forces regularly abducted children for military service and
    other forms of forced labor (see Sections 1.b., 1.f., and 5). UNITA
    depended on forced labor for much of its logistical support. Refugees
    and internally displaced persons reported that rural women frequently
    were forced to work as porters for UNITA military units and kept in
    life-threatening conditions of servitude. There continued to be some
    reports of sexual assault of abductees during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 14 years. Children
    between the ages of 14 and 18 may not work at night, in dangerous
    conditions, or in occupations requiring great physical effort, and
    children under 16 years of age are prohibited from factory work;
    however, these provisions generally are not enforced. The Inspector
    General of the Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and
    Social Security is responsible for enforcing labor laws. Although child
    labor law enforcement is under the jurisdiction of the courts, in
    practice, the court system does not provide adequate protection for
    children. Child labor violations were punishable with fines and
    restitution. There is no formal procedure for inspections and
    investigations into child labor abuses outside of the family law
    system, although private persons can file claims for violations of
    child labor laws. The ministry maintains employment centers where
    prospective employees register, and the center screens out applicants
    under the age of 14; however, many younger children work on family
    farms, as domestic servants, and in the informal sector as street
    vendors. Family-based child labor in subsistence agriculture is common.
    Children under 12 years of age work for no reimbursement for their
    families and in apprenticeships. Poverty and social upheavals have
    brought large numbers of orphaned and abandoned children, as well as
    runaways, into unregulated urban employment in the informal sector. The
    Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
    child labor; however, there are no reports that such child labor exists
    in the country.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded child labor; however, the
    Government is unable to enforce these provisions, and children were
    regularly abducted by UNITA forces for forced labor (see Section 6.c.
    and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage set by the
    Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security was
    approximately $30 (600 kwanzas) per month during the year; however, the
    Government does not enforce this standard. The majority of urban
    workers earn less than $10 (200 kwanzas) per month. Most workers hold
    second jobs, engage in subsistence agriculture, rely on aid from
    relatives, or engage in corruption to supplement their incomes. Neither
    the minimum wage nor the average monthly salary, which are estimated at
    $20 (400 kwanzas) to $200 (4,000 kwanzas) per month, are sufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. As a
    result, most wage earners depend on the informal sector, subsistence
    agriculture, corruption, or support from abroad to augment their
    incomes. The Government took no measures to rectify the national system
    of setting the minimum wage during the year. Employees receiving less
    then the legal minimum wage have the right to seek legal recourse;
    however, it is uncommon for workers to do so.
        A 1994 government decree established a 37-hour work week; however,
    the Ministry of Public Administration was unable to enforce this
    standard, just as it was unable to enforce existing occupational safety
    and health standards. Workers cannot remove themselves from dangerous
    work situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking
    in persons; however, there continued to be allegations that UNITA
    abducted persons, including children, for forced labor, and abducted
    women for use as sex slaves. There were reports that the Government
    forcibly recruited persons (see Section 1.f.). There were credible
    reports that UNITA forcibly recruited children into its military (see
    Section 5).
                                   __________

                                     BENIN

        The Republic of Benin is a constitutional democracy headed by
    President Mathieu Kerekou, who was inaugurated on April 4, 1996, after
    elections that observers generally viewed as free and fair. President
    Kerekou, who ruled Benin as a Socialist military dictator from 1972 to
    1989, succeeded his democratically elected predecessor and continued
    the civilian, democratic rule begun in the 1990-91 constitutional
    process that ended his previous reign. The next presidential election
    is scheduled for March 2001. There are 19 political parties represented
    in the unicameral, 83-member National Assembly. The March 1999
    parliamentary elections, which were free, fair, and transparent,
    resulted in significant gains by the opposition, notably the party of
    former President Nicephore Soglo, which gained 27 seats in Parliament.
    Although a loose alliance of progovernment deputies holds a 42 to 41
    seat majority, some progovernment deputies side with the opposition,
    depending on the issue. Consequently, legislative power is shared
    between opposition and progovernment forces. For example, the President
    of the National Assembly belongs to an opposition party. The Government
    respects the constitutional provision for an independent judiciary;
    however, the executive has important powers in regard to the judiciary,
    and the judiciary is inefficient and susceptible to corruption at all
    levels.
        The civilian-controlled security forces consist of the armed
    forces, headed by the Minister Delegate for Defense Matters in the
    Office of the President, and the police force under the Interior
    Minister. The Ministry of Defense supervises the gendarmerie, which
    exercises police functions in rural areas while the Ministry of
    Interior supervises other police forces. The armed forces continued to
    play an apolitical role in government affairs despite concerns about
    lack of morale within its ranks and an ethnic imbalance within the
    forces. Members of the police committed some human rights abuses.
        Benin is an extremely poor country with average yearly per capita
    income below $400. The economy is based largely on subsistence
    agriculture, cotton production, regional trade (including transshipment
    of goods to neighboring countries), and small-scale offshore oil
    production. The port of Cotonou serves as a major conduit for goods
    entering neighboring Nigeria legally and illegally. The Kerekou
    administration maintained the austerity program begun by its
    predecessor; privatized state-owned enterprises; reduced fiscal
    expenditures; and deregulated trade. In spite of an inefficient
    bureaucracy and widespread unemployment, the country's economic
    recovery continued under liberal economic policies instituted since the
    return to democracy. Although the economy expanded, real growth was
    lower than in the previous year. The Government estimated the growth
    rate at 5 percent for the year; however, approximately 2 percent of
    this growth can be credited to major infrastructure projects, such as
    road construction, that were funded by foreign aid. Inflation was 4
    percent at year's end, prompted by price hikes for imported oil and
    derivative products. In July the Minister of Finance took the newly
    privatized state-owned oil company, Sonacop, to court over improper
    financial operations in the acquisition of the company by tycoon, Sefou
    Fagbohoun, a close associate of the President. Also the Government
    announced delays in the privatization of the port of Cotonou and the
    cotton parastatal, Sonapra.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in several areas. There were
    credible reports that police sometimes beat suspects, and at times the
    authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The most
    prominent human rights problems continued to be the failure of police
    forces to curtail acts of vigilantism and mob justice; harsh and
    unhealthy prison conditions; serious administrative delays in
    processing ordinary criminal cases with attendant denial of timely,
    fair trials; judicial corruption; violence and societal discrimination
    against women; and trafficking in and abuse of children. The practice
    of female genital mutilation (FGM) and, to a lesser extent, infanticide
    also remain problems. Child labor continues to be a problem. The
    Constitutional Court has demonstrated independence.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by
    government officials.
        In September Amnesty International-Benin reported that police had
    conducted a regular investigation in the 1998 deaths of Florent Adoko
    and Alexandre Adjakieje (the date of the investigation was not
    available). They allegedly died as a result of abusive force used by
    the police, but the Government did not follow up the investigation nor
    were the results of the investigation released publicly by year's end.
        On May 4, a riot in the Lokossa prison (Mono Department) resulted
    in the death of three prisoners and severe injury to a magistrate who
    attempted to mediate the dispute; prisoners rioted over lengthy
    pretrial detention.
        As in the previous year, incidents of mob justice were reported by
    the media and other sources. Most often these were cases of mobs
    killing or severely injuring suspected criminals, particularly thieves
    caught in the act. Although a number of these incidents occurred in
    urban areas and were publicized in the press, the Government apparently
    made no concerted attempt to investigate or prosecute anyone involved.
    In 1999 a rural popular leader, the self-styled Colonel Devi, incited
    mobs to lynch more than 100 suspected criminals in the southwestern
    part of the country. Most of the victims were burned alive, many after
    being abducted, beaten, and tortured by Devi's followers. Although the
    number of such killings decreased during the year, reliable reports
    indicate that incidents of mob justice by Devi's followers persisted,
    despite a promise Devi made in 1999 to order his followers to cease
    lynching suspected wrongdoers and instead turn them over to the
    authorities. Individual incidents of mob justice continued to occur
    nationwide, and police most often ignored vigilante attacks. On March
    18, a mob took a convicted thief, ``DeGaulle,'' from the automobile of
    the director of the Lokossa prison and burned him death.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
    were credible reports that police sometimes beat criminal suspects. For
    example, in June the police shot a man twice in the pelvis, handcuffed
    him, and left him for several hours without medical attention. The
    press reported the incident; however, the Government took no action
    against the police. The Government continued to make payments to
    victims of torture under the military regime that ruled from 1972 to
    1989.
        An investigation was completed in the case of the March 1999
    beating of Deputy Sacca Fikara. The incident reportedly occurred in
    daytime when the police stopped Fikara's car for an alleged traffic
    infraction but did not recognize him. The Attorney General did not
    render a decision regarding this incident by year's end.
        Mob justice resulted in serious injuries to a number of persons
    (also see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions continued to be extremely harsh. Extensive
    overcrowding and lack of proper sanitation and medical facilities posed
    a risk to prisoners' health. The prison diet is seriously inadequate;
    malnutrition and disease are common. Family members are expected to
    provide food for inmates to supplement prison rations. Prisoners are
    allowed to meet with visitors such as family members, lawyers, and
    others.
        Some progress was made in 1998 with the opening of three modern
    facilities in the departments (provinces) of Borgou, Mono, and Atacora
    through foreign funding. The prisons provided, for the first time,
    separate units for men, women, and minors. However, by April two out of
    three of the new prisons already were overcrowded. These, like other
    prisons, at times were filled to more than three times their capacity.
    The prison in Natitingou (in Atacora province) was the only one of
    eight prisons nationwide below full capacity.
        Efforts to complete a facility in Misserete (in Oueme) for 1,000
    prisoners were delayed because of funding problems. On July 31, the
    night before the country's 40th Independence Day, President Kerekou
    announced that some prisoners who were convicted of minor crimes, such
    as petty theft, between August 2, 1998, and August 1, 1999, could have
    their prison sentences reduced. The presidential pledge had to be
    approved by the Council of Ministers and other government bodies;
    however, by year's end, the majority of the prisoners were released.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In
    February a delegation headed by the president of the Commission
    Beninoise des Droits de L'Homme toured prison facilities in Cotonou. In
    April the president of the Beninese chapter of Amnesty International
    also visited several prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits the arbitrary arrest and detention; however, at times the
    authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The Constitution
    prohibits detention for more than 48 hours without a hearing by a
    magistrate whose order is required for continued detention. However,
    there were credible reports that authorities exceeded this 48-hour
    limit in many cases, sometimes by as much as a week, using the common
    practice of holding a person indefinitely ``at the disposition of'' the
    public prosecutor's office before presenting their case to a
    magistrate. Approximately 75 percent of persons in prison are pretrial
    detainees.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile of citizens, and it is not
    practiced. Many citizens who went into exile prior to the establishment
    of democratic rule have returned.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
    provision in practice; however, the executive has important powers in
    regard to the judiciary, and the judiciary remains inefficient in some
    respects and is susceptible to corruption at all levels.
        The President appoints career magistrates as judges in civil
    courts, and the Constitution gives the Ministry of Justice
    administrative authority over judges, including the power to transfer
    them. Inadequate facilities, poorly trained staff, and overcrowded
    dockets result in a slow administration of justice. The low salaries of
    magistrates and clerks have a demoralizing effect on their commitment
    to efficient and timely justice and make them susceptible to
    corruption.
        A civilian court system operates on the national and provincial
    levels. There is only one court of appeals. The Supreme Court is the
    court of last resort in all administrative and judicial matters. The
    Constitutional Court is charged with deciding on the constitutionality
    of laws and on disputes between the President and the National Assembly
    and with resolving disputes regarding presidential and National
    Assembly elections. Its rulings in past years against both the
    executive and legislative branches, which were respected by both
    branches, demonstrated its independence from both these branches of
    government. The Constitution also provides for a High Court of Justice
    to convene in the event of crimes committed by the President or
    government ministers against the State. Under the Constitution, the
    High Court is to consist of members of the Constitutional Court (except
    for its president), six deputies elected by the National Assembly and
    the Supreme Court, and the Chairman of the Supreme Court. Implementing
    legislation to create the High Court of Justice was passed in 1996. On
    August 11, after several years of legislative delays, the National
    Assembly elected six deputies by an absolute majority to serve on the
    first High Court of Justice. Only a new Chairman of the Supreme Court,
    currently awaiting appointment, must be chosen by the President.
    However, at year's end, the law had not been promulgated. Inefficiency
    and corruption particularly affect the judiciary at the trial court and
    investigating magistrate levels. Military disciplinary councils deal
    with minor offenses by members of the military services, but they have
    no jurisdiction over civilians.
        The legal system is based on French civil law and local customary
    law. The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial. A
    defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence and has the right to be
    present at trial and to representation by an attorney, at public
    expense if necessary. In practice the court provides indigent
    defendants with court-appointed counsel upon request. A defendant also
    has the right to confront witnesses and to have access to government-
    held evidence. Trials are open to the public, but in exceptional
    circumstances the president of the court may decide to restrict access
    to preserve public order or to protect the parties.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
    government authorities generally respect these prohibitions in
    practice. The Government denied charges of wiretapping involving former
    President Soglo, and the National Assembly investigation into the case
    was hampered by Soglo's absence from the country for much of the year.
    Police are required to obtain a judicial warrant before entering a
    private home, and they usually observed this requirement in practice.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. The government entity with oversight responsibility
    for media operations is the High Authority for Audio-Visual Media and
    Communications (HAAC), which requires broadcasters to submit weekly
    lists of planned programs and requires publishers to deposit copies of
    all publications with it. However, this requirement is not observed by
    the media in practice.
        The law provides for sentences of imprisonment involving compulsory
    labor for certain acts or activities related to the exercise of the
    right of free expression (see Section 6.c.).
        There is a large and active privately owned press consisting of
    more than a dozen daily newspapers. These publications criticize the
    Government freely and often, but their effect on public opinion is
    limited because of their urban concentration. The majority of citizens
    are illiterate and live in rural areas; they largely receive their news
    via radio. A nongovernmental media ethics commission (ODEM) was
    established in May 1999 and censured a number of journalists in 1999
    and during the year for unethical conduct, as well as commending some
    journalists for adherence to the standards of their profession.
        In 1999 a trial court sentenced five journalists to various jail
    terms not exceeding 1 year and fines for criminal libel in several
    cases that did not involve criticism of the Government. For example,
    Vincent Foly, a reporter for Le Point au Quotidien, was arrested in
    January 1999 following a tough editorial and sentenced to 1 year in
    prison in August 1999. At year's end, none of these 1999 sentences had
    been executed and appeals remained pending. Foly was arrested again on
    January 27, following his publication of an editorial critical of a
    court's decision to dismiss narcotics trafficking charges against a
    senior government official, and released approximately February 1. No
    charges were brought against Foly in this incident.
        Journalists sought during the year to eliminate jail sentences as a
    penalty for violating the libel law, but the Government has not
    responded. In December at the opening of the U.N.-sponsored Fourth
    International Conference on New and Reestablished Democracies, the
    President admonished the press for its lack of professional standards
    and indicated that journalism should be improved.
        New privately owned radio and television stations began
    broadcasting in 1997. Throughout the year, they broadcast programs that
    criticized the Government without interference. It is unclear what
    effect the private electronic media have on public opinion; however, an
    increase in the number of ``call-in'' and panel shows during the year
    contributed to significantly increased public involvement in political
    affairs and a heightened awareness of important national problems.
        The Government continued to own and operate the media that were
    most influential in reaching the public because of its broadcast range
    and infrastructure. Radio is probably the most important information
    medium, given that half of the population is illiterate. Until 1997, it
    owned the only radio stations that transmitted locally. The Benin
    Office of Radio and Television (ORTB) transmits on the FM and AM bands
    and by short wave, in French and local languages. Radio France
    International (RFI) also transmits on a local FM band under an
    agreement with the Government. In 1999 the British Broadcasting
    Corporation began French and English language broadcasting in Cotonou.
    Five rural radio stations governed by local committees broadcast
    several hours a day exclusively in local languages. These stations
    receive support from the ORTB.
        A similar arrangement exists for television transmissions: the ORTB
    broadcasts 5 hours per day on a signal that is easily received in urban
    areas. Approximately 80 percent of the ORTB's television programming is
    in French. TV5, a commercial venture with investments by television
    broadcasting organizations in France, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland,
    broadcasts locally 24 hours per day entirely in French under an
    agreement with the Government. A new privately owned television
    station, LC-2, began broadcasting in Cotonou in 1997. LC-2 is owned
    entirely by a local businessman and features light entertainment and
    news, although news coverage requires payment in many circumstances.
    Although neither television station broadcasts partisan programs in
    support of, or unduly critical of, the Government, the vast majority of
    news programming centers on government officials' activities,
    government--sponsored conferences, and international stories provided
    by French television or other foreign sources.
        The Government does not censor works by foreign journalists,
    authors, or artists.
        HAAC regulations govern satellite reception equipment and movie and
    video clubs. There is little enforcement of these regulations.
        Internet service is available in major cities; there are no
    restrictions on its use.
        In general academic freedom is respected. University professors are
    permitted to lecture freely, conduct research, and publish their work.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice. The Government requires permits for use of
    public places for demonstrations and generally grants such permits;
    however, during the year, the mayor of Cotonou denied permits to
    protesters angry over rising gasoline prices, and in at least two
    instances, citing the visit of a foreign head of state (see Section
    6.a.). In other instances, gasoline price protest permits were granted.
        In June police dispersed a march to protest the rising gas prices
    (see Section 6.a.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. The Government
    requires associations to register and routinely grants registrations.
    In August the Government published a list of 167 schools that it
    claimed were operating as nonregistered organizations; it suspended
    these institutions until they registered. The Government closed a few
    of the schools; however, most continued to operate despite being listed
    as nonregistered. Others reopened after completing the fairly
    complicated registration process. By year's end, schools were operating
    normally.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Persons
    who wish to form a religious group must register with the Ministry of
    Interior. Registration requirements are identical for all religious
    groups. There were no reports that any group has been refused
    permission to register or has been subjected to untoward delays or
    obstacles in the registration process. Religious groups are free from
    taxation.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
    however, the presence of police, gendarmes, and illegal roadblocks
    impedes domestic movement. Although ostensibly meant to enforce
    automotive safety and customs regulations, many of these checkpoints
    serve as a means for officials to exact bribes from travelers. The
    Government maintained previously implemented measures to combat such
    petty corruption at roadblocks.
        The Government's policy toward the seasonal movement of livestock
    allows migratory Fulani herdsmen from other countries to enter freely;
    it does not enforce designated entry points. Disputes have arisen
    between the herdsmen and local landowners over grazing rights.
        The Government does not restrict international travel for political
    reasons, and those who travel abroad may return without hindrance.
        The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Historically, the Government
    has cooperated closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees,
    including those in need of first asylum. The Government provided first
    asylum to up to 200,000 citizens of Togo during the 1993 political
    violence in that country. While most have returned to Togo, in December
    there were 991 refugees at the Kpomasse camp and a total of 1,519
    Togolese in the country. Despite severe economic pressures that limit
    its ability to provide education for children, the Government has
    allowed these Togolese to enroll their children in local schools and to
    participate in some economic activities. During the year, the
    Government welcomed about 731 at-risk refugees from the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo destined for eventual resettlement in another
    country.
        In contrast the UNHCR estimates that 250 Ogoni refugees from
    Nigeria, disadvantaged because they do not speak French, cannot work,
    nor can their children attend schools. UNHCR officials have directed
    them to remain within the confines of the Kpomasse refugee camp to
    avoid potential confrontations with local inhabitants and to maintain
    administrative control over their activities.
        In addition there are lesser numbers of other refugees from
    Nigeria, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic,
    Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
    Ethiopia, Niger, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Sierra Leone. The UNHRC
    estimated that, as of November, there were 5,628 refugees of different
    nationalities in the country and that approximately 2,800 persons
    resident in the country were requesting asylum.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons having a
    valid claim to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully. Citizens exercised this right in legislative
    elections in 1991, 1995, and in presidential elections in 1991 and
    1996, all of which were considered free and fair. The Constitution
    provides for a 5-year term of office for the President (who is limited
    to two terms) and 4-year terms for National Assembly members (who may
    serve an unlimited number of terms). The next presidential election,
    which will take place in two rounds, is scheduled for March 2001.
        Women participate actively in the political parties but are under
    represented in government and politics. Following a Cabinet reshuffle
    in June 1999, there are 2 women in the 19-member Cabinet, 1 less than
    in the previous 18-member Cabinet. There are 5 female deputies in the
    83-member, unicameral National Assembly, including the leader of the
    largest opposition party. The previous legislature consisted of 82
    deputies with 6 female members. The President of the Constitutional
    Court and the Solicitor General (which is not a cabinet position) are
    women.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups, both domestic and international,
    operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
    their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
    generally cooperative and responsive to their views.
        The Beninese branch of Amnesty International and other
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued to report without
    government interference on the alleged discovery of hundreds of bodies
    of victims of Togolese security forces washed up on Beninese beaches in
    1998. Investigation by a joint U.N.-Organization of African Unity
    commission into this case continued. A three-person team visited the
    country in November and held several interviews with regard to the
    problem, despite continued reluctance by witnesses to come forward.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, and
    religion, but societal discrimination against women continued.
        Women.--While no statistics are available, violence against women,
    including wife beating, occurred. At times the press reports incidents
    of abuse of women, but judges and police are reluctant to intervene in
    domestic disputes, considering such disputes a family matter.
        Although the Constitution provides for equality for women in the
    political, economic, and social spheres, women experience extensive
    societal discrimination, especially in rural areas where they occupy a
    subordinate role and are responsible for much of the hard labor on
    subsistence farms. In urban areas, women dominate the trading sector in
    the open-air markets. By law women have equal inheritance and property
    rights, but local custom in some areas prevents them from inheriting
    real property. Women do not enjoy the same educational opportunities as
    men, and female literacy is about 18 percent (compared with 50 percent
    for males). However, elementary school pass rates in recent years
    highlighted significant progress by girls in literacy and scholastic
    achievement.
        There are active women's rights groups that have been effective in
    drafting a family code that would improve the status of women and
    children under the law. The draft code has yet to be adopted by the
    National Assembly, although it has been on the legislature's agenda for
    6 years and has been considered by parliamentary committees. Many
    observers believe that consideration of the draft was postponed because
    of provisions that would threaten male prerogatives, which is a highly
    volatile political issue. Action on the draft code is not anticipated
    until after a president is elected in March 2001 and the next regular
    session of the legislature convenes in April 2001.
        Children.--The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible
    for the protection of children's rights, primarily in the areas of
    education and health. The National Commission for Children's Rights and
    the Ministry of Family and Social Protection have oversight roles in
    the promotion of human rights issues with regard to children and their
    welfare. In April the Minister of Justice established a National
    Commission for Children's Rights, which held its initial session in
    July.
        Education is neither free (although the charge is nominal) nor
    compulsory. In particular the Government is trying to boost primary
    school enrollment, which is approximately 78 percent for males and only
    approximately 46 percent for females nationwide. In some parts of the
    country, girls receive no formal education.
        Some traditional practices inflict hardship and violence on
    children, including most prominently the custom of ``vidomegon,''
    whereby poor, often rural, families place a child, primarily a
    daughter, in the home of a more wealthy family to avoid the burden the
    child represents to the parental family. The children work, but the
    arrangement is voluntary between the two families. There is
    considerable, but an unquantified amount of abuse in the practice, and
    there are instances of sexual exploitation. Ninety to 95 percent of the
    children in vidomegon are young girls. Children are sent from poorer
    families to Cotonou and then some of the children are sent to Gabon,
    the Cote d'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic to help in markets
    and around the home. The child receives living accommodation, while
    income generated from the child's activities is split between the
    child's parents remaining in the rural area and the urban family that
    raises the child. In July 1999, the Ministry of Justice launched a
    nationwide publicity campaign to alert parents to the risks of placing
    their children in vidomegon and to inform adults with vidomegon
    children of their responsibilities and of the children's rights. In
    August in conjunction with UNICEF, the Ministry of Family and Social
    Protection sponsored a 4-day workshop on educating vidomegon children
    about their rights.
        During the year, the parents of a young female house servant to the
    daughter-in-law of President Kerekou filed a formal complaint regarding
    the abuse of their daughter by Kerekou's daughter-in-law. The parents
    of the child reportedly requested a preliminary inquiry, and reportedly
    the case was closed without further action.
        In the 1996 case of an official detained for beating a 12-year-old
    maid to death that year, a criminal court found the defendant, Mrs.
    Christine Tchitchi, ex-wife of a former Minister of Culture, guilty in
    1996. The former Minister of Culture was not detained. The court
    sentenced her to 5 years imprisonment. Already confined in pretrial
    detention, she was given credit for time served, completed her
    sentence, and was released.
        Other traditional practices include the killing of deformed babies,
    breech babies, and one of two newborn twins (all of whom are thought to
    be sorcerers in some rural areas). There is also a tradition in which a
    groom abducts and rapes his prospective child bride (under 14 years of
    age). Criminal courts mete out stiff sentences to criminals convicted
    of crimes against children, but many such crimes never reach the courts
    due to lack of education and access to the courts or fear of police
    involvement in the problem.
        Forced child labor and the trafficking in Beninese children for
    purposes of forced labor or prostitution in other countries remains
    problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        The Government, in concert with NGO's, made serious efforts to
    combat child abuse and trafficking in children, including media
    campaigns, programs to assist street children, greater border
    surveillance, and a conference on trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
    Despite such efforts, the abuse of children remained a serious human
    rights problem.
        The Government has been less successful in combating female genital
    mutilation, which is not illegal. FGM is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health. FGM is practiced on females ranging from infancy
    through 30 years of age and generally takes the form of excision.
    Surveys, including one conducted by the World Health Organization in
    1999, reliably placed the estimate of the number of women who had
    undergone FGM at approximately 50 percent. A prominent NGO, the Benin
    chapter of the Inter-African Committee, has made progress in raising
    awareness of the dangers of the practice; the Government has cooperated
    with its efforts. According to recent research, there is a strong
    profit motive in the continued practice of FGM by those who perform the
    procedure, usually older women. The Government, in cooperation with
    NGO's, held workshops during 1999 aimed at eradicating the practice,
    and several NGO's continued the effort during the year. One
    international NGO (Intact) paid those who perform the procedure to
    abandon their profession. Another local NGO also was active. In January
    Dignite Feminine collected 60 excision knives from practitioners of FGM
    in the northern section of the country who renounced the practice
    voluntarily. In April the Social Affairs Minister attended a ceremony
    in which 17 women turned in their cutting tools in exchange for small
    grants (worth approximately $176 (123,200 CFA).
        Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--Although the Constitution provides that
    the State should care for people with disabilities, the Government does
    not mandate accessibility for them. It operated a number of social
    centers for disabled persons to assist their social integration.
    Nonetheless, many are unable to find employment and must resort to
    begging to support themselves.
        The 1998 Labor Code includes provisions to protect the rights of
    disabled workers. The code was enforced with moderate effectiveness
    during the year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There is a long history of
    regional rivalries. Although southerners are preeminent in the
    Government's senior ranks, many prominent military officers come from
    the north. During the year, the imbalance was reduced by new
    appointments. The south has enjoyed more advanced economic development,
    a larger population, and has traditionally held politically favored
    status. In the 1996 elections, a northerner was elected President.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides workers
    with the freedom to organize, join unions, meet, and strike, and the
    Government usually respects these rights in practice. A new Labor Code
    went into effect in January 1999. The code was approved after long
    discussions between the Government, labor unions, and the National
    Assembly. The labor force of approximately 2 million is engaged
    primarily in subsistence agriculture and other primary sector
    activities, with less than 2 percent of the population engaged in the
    modern (wage) sector.
        Although approximately 75 percent of the wage earners belong to
    labor unions, a much smaller percentage of workers in the private
    sector are union members. There are several union confederations, and
    unions generally are independent of government and political parties.
    The Economic and Social Council, a constitutionally mandated body
    established in 1994, includes four union representatives.
        Strikes are permitted; however, the authorities can declare strikes
    illegal for stated causes, for example, threatening to disrupt social
    peace and order, and require strikers to maintain minimum services. The
    Government declared two strike-related marches illegal during the year,
    but it did not declare the strikes illegal.
        During the year, there were several major peaceful strikes over
    increases in the price of gasoline, which significantly reduced
    workers' purchasing power. For example, in June a strike at the port of
    Cotonou succeeded in reversing a government decision to privatize the
    port. During strikes unions generally called for higher wages, lower
    fuel prices, and the dismissal of the mayor of Cotonou, who refused to
    issue permits to march during a visit by the Libyan head of state in
    June (see Section 2.b.). One such march began before police dispersed
    it without violence. During an authorized march in July, President
    Kerekou addressed the workers and rebuked the unions for failing to
    recognize their relative well-being in relation to that of neighboring
    countries. Labor unions continued to oppose the Government's merit-
    based promotion scheme. Unions also opposed a 1969 decree (which is
    still in effect) permitting the Government to dock the wages of
    striking public sector employees.
        There were no known instances of efforts by the Government to
    retaliate against union activity; however, the ICFTU alleged that
    hostility to trade unions persisted and that union members were
    intimidated. A company may withhold part of a worker's pay following a
    strike. Laws prohibit employer retaliation against strikers, and the
    Government enforces them effectively.
        Unions may form freely or join federations or confederations and
    affiliate with international bodies. The two major labor confederations
    are known to be affiliated with the Brussels-based Confederation
    Internationale de Syndicats Libres.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    provides for collective bargaining, and workers freely exercised these
    rights. Wages in the private sector are set in negotiations between
    unions and employers.
        The new Labor Code permits unions to become affiliated with
    international organizations. It also includes a section on the rights
    of disabled workers. The Government sets wages in the public sector by
    law and regulation.
        The Labor Code prohibits employers from taking union membership or
    activity into account regarding hiring, work distribution, professional
    or vocational training, or dismissal. The Government levies substantial
    penalties against employers who refuse to rehire workers dismissed for
    lawful union activities.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor and specifically prohibits forced
    and bonded labor by children; however, forced child labor and
    trafficking in children are problems (see Section 6.f.). Some
    financially desperate parents indenture their children to ``agents''
    recruiting farm hands or domestic workers, often on the understanding
    that money paid to the children would be sent to the parents. According
    to press reports, in some cases, these agents take the children to
    neighboring countries for labor (see Section 6.f.). The Government has
    taken steps to educate parents and to prevent such kidnapings of
    children. Also, many rural children are sent to cities to live with
    relatives or family friends, often on the understanding that in return
    for performing domestic chores, they would receive an education. Host
    families do not always honor their part of the bargain, and the abuse
    of child domestic servants occurs. The Government has taken some steps
    to curb abuses, including media campaigns, regional workshops, and
    public pronouncements on child labor problems.
        The law provides for sentences of imprisonment involving compulsory
    labor for certain acts or activities related to the exercise of the
    right of free expression (see Section 2.a.); however, no such sentences
    were imposed during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment or apprenticeship
    of children under 14 years of age in any enterprise; however, child
    labor remains a problem. The Ministry of Labor enforces the Labor Code
    in only a limited manner (and then only in the modern sector), due to
    the lack of inspectors. To help support their families, children of
    both sexes--including those as young as 17 years old--continue to work
    on rural family farms, in small businesses, on construction sites in
    urban areas, in public markets, and as domestic servants under the
    practice of vidomegon. In February one report estimated that 75 percent
    of apprentices working as seamstresses, hairdressers, carpenters, and
    mechanics were younger than 15 years of age. Most of these apprentices
    are also under the legal age of 14 for apprenticeship. Children also
    commonly work as street vendors.
        The Government did not ratify ILO Convention 182 on eliminating the
    worst forms of child labor; however, it was before the National
    Assembly at year's end.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; but the
    Government is unable to enforce these prohibitions except in the modern
    sector, and there are reports of forced child labor (see Sections 6.c.
    and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively
    sets minimum wage scales for a number of occupations. In July the
    Government raised the minimum wage to approximately $35 (CFA francs
    25,000 per month) increased from CFA francs 21,924 in April 1997. The
    decision was made in consultation with trade unions. However, this
    increase is not adequate to cover the costs for food and housing even
    of a single worker. Many workers must supplement their wages by
    subsistence farming or informal sector trade. Most workers in the wage
    sector earn more than the minimum wage, although many domestics and
    other laborers in the informal sector earn less.
        The Labor Code establishes a work week of from 40 to 46 hours,
    depending on the type of work, and provides for at least one 24-hour
    rest period per week. Domestic and agricultural workers frequently work
    70 hours or more per week. The authorities generally enforce legal
    limits on work weeks in the modern sector. The code establishes health
    and safety standards, but the Ministry of Labor does not enforce them
    effectively. The code does not provide workers with the right to remove
    themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued
    employment. The Ministry of Labor has the authority to require
    employers to remedy dangerous work conditions but does not do so
    effectively.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, trafficking in children is a problem. Article 15 of
    the Constitution provides for fundamental civil rights, and long-
    standing provisions of the criminal code prohibit kidnaping. Laws
    dating to 1905 but still in force prohibit trafficking in persons in
    general and in underage females in particular. Trafficking in children,
    which remained a problem, continued to be the subject of considerable
    media coverage. Most victims are abducted or leave home with
    traffickers who promise educational opportunities or other incentives.
    They are taken to places in foreign countries (according to the press,
    principally located in Nigeria, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon) and
    sold into servitude in agriculture, as domestics, or as prostitutes. In
    addition hundreds of children are taken across the border to Togo and
    Cote d'Ivoire to work in plantations.
        According to a survey of child labor conducted by the Government in
    1999, the World Bank, and INSAE (a nutritionally focused NGO), 49,000
    rural children, constituting 8 percent of the rural child population
    between the ages of 6 and 16, work abroad, primarily as agricultural
    workers on plantations in the Cote d'Ivoire and as domestic workers in
    Gabon. Only children who had been trafficked explicitly for labor
    purposes were counted among the 49,000 children that were estimated to
    be victims of trafficking. However, the children who left ``for other
    reasons'' may conceal an additional number of trafficked children and
    bring the number close to 80,000. Of the trafficked children, 61
    percent were boys and 39 percent were girls. Certain villages have been
    particularly victimized by organized child traffickers, and there were
    villages where up to 51 percent of children were trafficked.
        The Minor Protection Brigade, under the jurisdiction of the
    Interior Ministry, combats crimes against children. The media reported
    that during the year, the brigade, in addition to gendarmes and police,
    intercepted and arrested a number of traffickers trying to smuggle
    children into and out of the country.
        On January 14, according to press reports, authorities arrested an
    adult male citizen attempting to smuggle six children, all younger than
    10 years old, out of the country reportedly to work on farms in
    Nigeria. The press also reported the arrest of 13 adults on April 25 as
    they were attempting to smuggle 26 children into Togo for work as
    domestics and farm hands. At year's end, there were no reports on
    subsequent legal action against the traffickers.
        In 1998 the Justice Minister stated that in 3 years a total of
    1,363 children had been intercepted and returned to their parents.
    There was no further information during the year on additional
    interceptions by the Government. The Government worked with NGO's to
    combat trafficking in children, including media campaigns and greater
    border surveillance (see Section 5); however, police complained that
    they lacked equipment to monitor trafficking adequately.
        In July a 4-day subregional workshop, sponsored by the
    International Labor Organization and the International Program on the
    Elimination of Child Labor, on child trafficking in West and Central
    Africa was held in Cotonou and featured speeches by Justice Minister
    Joseph Gnonlonfoun, Labor Minister Ousmane Batoko, and foreign
    representatives.
                                   __________

                                    BOTSWANA

        Botswana is a longstanding, multiparty democracy. Constitutional
    power is shared between the President and a popularly elected National
    Assembly. The House of Chiefs, representing all of the country's major
    tribes and some smaller ones, has no legislative power but may offer
    its views to both the President and National Assembly on legislation.
    Festus Mogae, who, as Vice President, became President upon former
    president Sir Katumile Masire's retirement in 1998, continued to lead
    the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has held a majority of seats
    in the National Assembly continuously since independence. In October
    1999 elections generally regarded as largely free and fair, despite
    initial restrictions on opposition access to radio and press reports of
    ruling party campaign finance improprieties, the BDP increased its
    majority in the National Assembly and elected President Mogae to a
    second term. The Government respects the constitutional provisions for
    an independent judiciary.
        The civilian Government exercises effective control over the
    security forces. The military, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), is
    responsible for external security only, unlike in past years when the
    BDF at times performed internal security functions. The Botswana
    National Police (BNP) are responsible for internal security. Members of
    the security forces, in particular, the police, occasionally committed
    human rights abuses.
        The economy is market oriented with strong encouragement for
    private enterprise, and has achieved rapid sustained real per capita
    economic growth since independence. Per capita gross domestic product
    (GDP) is slightly more than $2,681 (14,495 pula). Diamond exportation
    provided over two-thirds of the country's export income and much of the
    revenue of the Government, which owned half of a company engaged in the
    production of diamonds from existing mines. Nearly 50 percent of the
    population is employed in the informal sector, largely subsistence
    farming and animal husbandry. Rural poverty remains a serious problem,
    as does a widely skewed income distribution.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, problems continued in several areas. There were
    credible reports that the police sometimes beat or otherwise mistreated
    criminal suspects in order to obtain evidence or coerce confessions.
    The authorities took action in some cases against officials responsible
    for such abuses. Prison conditions were poor; however, unlike in the
    previous year, there were no reports of torture and deaths under
    suspicious circumstances in prisons. In many instances, the judicial
    system did not provide timely fair trials due to a serious backlog of
    cases. The Government continued to dominate domestic radio
    broadcasting, although to a lesser extent than in the previous year. At
    times the Government held newly arrived refugees from neighboring
    countries in local jails or special areas in prisons until they could
    be interviewed by refugee officials. Violence against women remained a
    serious problem, and women continued to face legal and societal
    discrimination. Some citizens, including groups not numbered among the
    eight ``principal tribes'' of the Tswana nation, the majority ethnic
    group, still did not enjoy full access to social services and, in
    practice, remained marginalized in the political process. Trade unions
    continued to face some legal restrictions, and the Government did not
    always ensure that labor laws were observed in practice.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        Unlike in previous years, there were no instances of suspicious
    deaths in prisons.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution explicitly forbids torture, inhuman, and
    degrading treatment or punishment, and the authorities generally
    respect this prohibition in practice; however, instances of abuse
    occur. In some cases, the authorities have taken disciplinary or
    judicial action against persons responsible for abuses. While coerced
    confessions are inadmissible in court, evidence gathered through
    coercion or abuse may be used in prosecution. There were credible
    reports that police sometimes beat persons and used intimidation
    techniques in order to obtain evidence or elicit confessions. In
    general, however, beatings and other forms of extreme physical abuse
    remained rare.
        There were reports that BDF soldiers at the Dukwe refugee camp beat
    and abused Dukwe residents. One refugee applicant claimed that BDF
    soldiers beat him on December 1 for allegedly stealing a bag of sugar.
    The refugee applicant received medical treatment for his injuries. The
    Acting Station Commander at Dukwe has stated that his office is
    investigating the case (see Section 2.d.).
        Some international NGO's reported that government game wardens
    abused the Basarwa (Bushmen) in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
    (CKGR) (see Section 4).
        Customary courts continued to impose corporal punishment sentences
    in the form of lashings on the buttocks, generally against young
    offenders in villages for crimes such as vandalism, theft, and
    hooliganism. The Government in 1999 refused to adopt a motion submitted
    by the House of Chiefs to reinstate flogging across the back rather
    than the buttocks.
        Prison conditions were poor; however, unlike the previous year,
    there were no reports of torture and deaths under suspicious
    circumstances. A December 1999 report by the Gaborone Prison Visiting
    Committee cited ``appalling'' conditions in prisons, and these
    conditions did not change during the year. With the country's high
    incidence of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, prison overcrowding constitutes
    a serious health threat. The 21 prisons across the country have a
    capacity of 3,198 but held 7,000 at year's end. To alleviate
    overcrowding, the Government began constructing 2 new prisons that are
    scheduled to be completed in 2001; these would bring prison capacity to
    over 4,000. Construction of a third prison for male juvenile offenders
    was delayed due to lack of funds, but is scheduled to begin in 2001. In
    July Parliament passed a bill that would give the Prison Commissioner
    authority to release terminally ill prisoners and prisoners in the last
    12 months of their sentences (under current law, the Commissioner only
    can grant an early release to prisoners in the last 6 months of their
    sentences). The bill also would grant the Commissioner authority to
    allow prisoners with sentences of 12 months or less to perform
    ``extramural'' labor. The President signed the bill into law during the
    year. The Government estimated that as many as 1,492 prisoners could be
    released under the program.
        The Commissioner of Prisons ordered full investigations into the
    management and conditions of prisons covered in the GPVC report. A
    report was completed and submitted to the Commissioner during the year
    which reportedly cleared the Government of responsibility for the
    conditions; however, the report was not publicly released by year's
    end. The December 1999 report by the Gaborone Prison Visiting Committee
    cited the suspicious deaths in prison of two inmates during 1999. The
    Commissioner of Prisons stated that a post-mortem examination conducted
    by medical authorities in 1999 supported prison officials' statements
    that Boitumelo Nthoiwa died of pneumonia and Andrew Molefe died after
    taking an illegal substance smuggled in by another inmate. Human rights
    organizations in the country have not challenged either case.
        The Prisons Act, which covers both prison officials and prisoners,
    makes it illegal for prison officials to mistreat prisoners. In
    September the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public
    Administration stated that stiff penalties would be imposed upon prison
    officials who treat inmates improperly. When there is an allegation or
    suspicion of mishandling of prisoners by prison officials, the
    Department of Prisons is required to forward the case to the police for
    investigation. Three prison officials appeared before a magistrate in
    early December for alleged abuse of prisoners in previous years. In
    December the magistrate discharged one of the officials, and the other
    two officials were scheduled to appear before the magistrate again in
    March 2001.
        The Prisons Act provides for a governmental visiting committee for
    each prison, the members of which are appointed by the Minister of
    Labor and Home Affairs. Members of these committees serve 1-year terms
    and must visit their prison four times within their first term and
    issue a report both to the Commissioner of Prisons and the Minister of
    Labor and Home Affairs. These reports normally are not released to the
    public. During the year, the committees visited each prison every 3
    months and last issued their last report in December.
        While the Prisons Act grants relatives, lawyers, magistrates, and
    church organizations the right to visit prisoners for ``rehabilitative
    purposes,'' the Commissioner of Prisons has the authority to decide
    whether domestic and international human rights organizations may
    visit. In practice the Commissioner does not generally allow such
    visitations; however, some local human rights organizations have been
    granted access to visit specific prisoners. In 1999 the Botswana Center
    for Human Rights was permitted to make prison visitations. There were
    no visitation requests from human rights organizations during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Under the Constitution,
    ``every person in Botswana'' is entitled to due process, the
    presumption of innocence, and freedom from arbitrary arrest; and the
    authorities respected these provisions in practice. Suspects must be
    informed of their legal rights upon arrest, including the right to
    remain silent, to be allowed to contact a person of their choice, and
    generally to be charged before a magistrate within 48 hours. A
    magistrate may order a suspect held for 14 days through a writ of
    detention, which may be renewed every 14 days. Most citizens charged
    with noncapital offenses are released on their own recognizance; some
    are released with minimal bail. Detention without bail is highly
    unusual, except in murder cases, where it is mandated.
        Detainees have the right to hire attorneys of their choice, but in
    practice most are unable to afford legal counsel. However, poor police
    training and poor communications in rural villages make it difficult
    for detainees to obtain legal assistance, and authorities do not always
    follow judicial safeguards. The Government does not provide counsel for
    the indigent, except in capital cases. One NGO, the Botswana Center for
    Human Rights, provides free legal services, but its capacity is
    limited. Another NGO, the University of Botswana Legal Assistance
    Center, provides free legal services in civil, but not criminal,
    matters. Constitutional protections are not applied to illegal
    immigrants, although the constitutionality of denying them due process
    has not been tested in court.
        Pretrial detention has been prolonged in a large number of cases.
    In Gaborone Central Prison, the average wait in prison before trial was
    1 year. The Government is attempting to alleviate the backlog of cases
    by temporarily hiring more judges.
        The Government sometimes held newly arrived refugees and asylum
    seekers in local jails until they could be interviewed by the Botswana
    Council for Refugees (BCR) or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR). Once persons were granted refugee status, the Government
    transferred them to the Dukwe Refugee Camp. An illegal immigrant
    internment center, which is to house foreigners awaiting repatriation,
    is currently under construction and is scheduled to open by February
    2001. However, even with this new facility, refugees would continue to
    be housed first in local jails and then in Dukwe. Approximately 60
    refugees from Namibia's Caprivi Strip who had left the Dukwe Camp or
    were involved in disturbances and were being held in Mahalapye Prison
    were released back to Dukwe. At year's end, six detainees were being
    held in protective custody at Mahalapye Prison; they were transferred
    from Dukwe after they committed criminal offenses while at the camp.
    Five of the detainees were released by year's end, and one detainee
    continued to serve a sentence for a narcotics conviction. A Namibian
    asylum seeker in extradition proceedings has accused the Government of
    unfair detention and violations of human rights. He successfully
    challenged his detention in court and was released in June (see Section
    2.d.).
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The judiciary consists of both a civil court (including
    magistrates' courts, a High Court, and a Court of Appeal) and a
    customary (traditional) court system.
        The law provides for the right to a fair trial. However, the civil
    courts remained unable to provide for timely, fair trials in many cases
    due to severe staffing shortages and a backlog of pending cases. Most
    trials in the regular courts are public, although trials under the
    National Security Act (NSA) may be held in secret. Those charged with
    noncapital crimes are tried without legal representation if they cannot
    afford an attorney. As a result, many defendants may not be informed of
    their rights in pretrial or trial proceedings. In October 1999, a High
    Court judge declared a mistrial in the case of two Basarwa (Bushmen)
    men who had been convicted in 1995 of a murder that occurred the same
    year, and were awaiting execution. A human rights group claimed that
    the two did not understand the language used at the trial and that
    translations were poor. It also questioned whether the accused
    understood their rights or the charges against them, and noted that
    attempts by the men to change their court-appointed lawyers had been
    disregarded. Ruling that the two had been deprived of their
    constitutional rights, the judge ordered a new trial. A date had not
    yet been set for the new trial by year's end (see Section 5).
        Most citizens encounter the legal system through the customary
    courts, under the authority of a traditional leader. These courts
    handle minor offenses involving land, marital, and property disputes.
    In customary courts, the defendant does not have legal counsel and
    there are no precise rules of evidence. Tribal judges, appointed by the
    tribal leader or elected by the community, determine sentences, which
    may be appealed through the civil court system. The quality of
    decisions reached in the traditional courts varies considerably. In
    communities where chiefs and their decisions are respected, plaintiffs
    tend to take their cases to the customary court; otherwise, persons
    seek justice in the civil courts.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice; however, the State continues to
    dominate domestic radio broadcasting, although to a lesser extent than
    in the previous year.
        The independent press is small but growing, and has a long
    tradition of vigorous, candid, and unimpeded discourse. It actively
    covers the political arena and is frequently critical of the Government
    and the President. The circulation of privately owned print media
    continues to be limited mostly to the main cities and towns. At year's
    end, six privately owned weekly newspapers were published in Gaborone
    and distributed to the country's main cities and towns. One privately-
    owned weekly newspaper was published in Francistown, the country's
    second-largest city. Nine privately-owned magazines were published
    monthly. These publications reported and editorialized without fear of
    closure or censorship.
        Government officials sometimes complain of bias in the private
    press. However, government officials and other public figures have
    recourse to the courts if they believe that they have been libeled.
    Libel is a civil law matter; there are no criminal libel laws.
        The Government's Botswana Press Agency (BOPA) provides most of the
    information found in the media owned and operated by the Government -
    the free Daily News newspaper, Radio Botswana, which broadcasts
    nationally to almost all of the country, and the new Botswana
    Television. News coverage in the state-owned media focuses on the
    activities of government officials and supports government policies and
    actions. The Daily News also publishes general coverage of current
    events and issues, and includes a second front page in Setswana, the
    most commonly spoken tribal language.
        Radio remained the most important medium of public communication;
    the circulation of privately owned print media continued to be limited
    mostly to the main cities and towns. In past years, the state
    monopolized domestic radio broadcasting; however, in 1999 the
    Government granted licenses to two private radio stations, Yarona FM
    and Gabz FM, and they began broadcasting in June and November 1999,
    respectively. Both broadcast in a 56-mile radius of Gaborone, an area
    that includes 5 of the country's 10 largest cities; state-owned radio
    continued to be the only domestic radio service broadcasting to the
    rest of the country. Both private radio stations have a news component
    to their programming, with no discernible policy of supporting a
    particular political party. A 1998 broadcast law provides for issuance
    of broadcast licenses to private companies and provides copyright
    protection of broadcast material. The law also mandates the
    establishment of a National Broadcast Board, which grants broadcast
    licenses. On November 30, the Board held its first meeting at BTA
    offices in Gaborne.
        On July 31, the Government opened its new national television
    station, Botswana Television (BTV), amid skepticism from the public and
    some parliamentarians over delays and overspending. BTV began
    broadcasting with technical and programming assistance from the British
    Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and an emphasis on the Setswana
    language service. Transmission extends south from Gaborone to Lobatse,
    north to Serowe and Francistown, and is scheduled to be available
    across the country within the next few years.
        The debut of BTV generated considerable discussion among members of
    the public, parliamentarians, and government officials about whether
    its status as a government-owned station would interfere with its
    ability to function independently, especially with respect to reporting
    the news. During the opening ceremony, the Acting Minister for
    Presidential Affairs and Public Administration stated that editorial
    policies of the station would not be subject to government influence;
    however, according to newspaper reports in August, BTV management was
    criticized by the Government for reporting on the eviction of squatters
    by the Ministry of Lands and Housing. A Permanent Secretary in the
    Office of the President responded by convening a press conference on
    August 30 on the private Yarona FM radio station and stating that it
    was important for BTV to broadcast news that promoted government
    policies and not reports that ``encourage trouble and criticize the
    government.''
        Responding to calls for the privatization of BTV after it began
    operations on July 31, the Government announced that it was considering
    turning the Department of Information and Broadcasting into a
    parastatal. However, on December 1, the Minister of Presidential
    Affairs and Public Administration, Thebe Mogami, stated that BTV would
    remain under government control. This proposal would affect BTV, Radio
    Botswana, the Daily News and BOPA. The opposition Botswana Congress
    Party has criticized government control over media and has urged that
    they be privatized or turned into parastatals.
        The privately-owned Gaborone Broadcasting Company (GBC), which has
    operated since 1987, broadcasts mostly foreign-made programming and is
    the only other television station operating in the country. GBC
    broadcasts reach viewers only in the capital area.
        Independent radio and television from neighboring South Africa are
    received easily. An analogue television service from South Africa,
    which had been available free to viewers, was discontinued on October
    1, when the signal was scrambled and viewers were required to pay to
    receive the service. Satellite television from a South African-based
    company is readily available, although its cost prevents many persons
    from subscribing to the service.
        Internet access is spreading quickly. The Government does not
    restrict e-mail or Internet usage. Four Internet service providers are
    available to the domestic market: three of them are private companies,
    and one, Botsnet, is the commercial arm of the parastatal Botswana
    Telecommunications Corporation.
        During the 1999 election campaign, opposition candidates initially
    had limited access to state-owned media, including state-owned radio,
    which was the only domestic radio service and the sole domestic source
    of news for most of the rural population. During the first part of the
    campaign season, the state-owned media gave opposition candidates less
    news coverage than ruling party candidates. When opposition politicians
    complained about this, the Government initially countered that the
    activities of ministers and other government figures were inherently
    more newsworthy and therefore deserving of more coverage. However, the
    Government subsequently changed its policy, and during the latter part
    of the election campaign season the state-owned media gave balanced
    news coverage to the main opposition parties and included stories about
    the smaller political parties as well. Opposition leaders expressed the
    view that government media practices seriously disadvantaged opposition
    parties relative to the ruling party during the election campaign.
        On occasion the Government has taken steps, under loosely defined
    provisions of the National Security Act, to limit publication of
    information that in its view impinged on national security; however,
    there were no such incidents during the year.
        Academic freedom is not restricted.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    The Constitution provides for the suspension of religious freedom in
    the interests of national defense, public safety, public order, public
    morality, or public health. However, any suspension of religious
    freedom by the Government must be deemed ``reasonably justifiable in a
    democratic society.''
        All religious organizations must register with the Government. To
    register a group submits its constitution to the Ministry of Home
    Affairs. After a generally simple bureaucratic process, the
    organization is registered. There are no legal benefits for registered
    organizations. Unregistered groups are potentially liable to penalties
    including fines up to $192 (1,000 Pula), up to 7 years in jail, or
    both. Except for the case of the Unification Church, there is no
    indication that any religious organization has ever been denied
    registration.
        The Unification Church was denied registration (but not suspended)
    in 1984 by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the public order grounds
    stipulated in the Constitution. The Government also perceived the
    Unification Church as anti-Semitic and denied registration because of
    another constitutional provision, which protects the rights and
    freedoms of individuals to practice their religion without
    intervention. In the intervening 16 years, although it has petitioned
    unsuccessfully the offices of the President and Vice President, the
    Unification Church has made no move to challenge the Ministry's
    decision in the courts.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice. There are no
    formal barriers to domestic and international travel or emigration.
        Some human rights organizations continued to assert that the
    Government has pressured several Basarwa (Bushmen) communities within
    the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) into relocating to partially
    built settlements outside of the Reserve. Government officials
    maintained that the ``voluntary'' resettlement was necessary in order
    to provide the Basarwa with better public services and to avoid
    conflicts between wildlife and humans within the CKGR. When the Basarwa
    arrived at the new settlements, beginning in 1995, services and
    facilities were substandard or nonexistent. Although conditions later
    improved, they remain very basic. The Government permits relocated
    Basarwa to return to the CKGR, but does not provide services within the
    reserve. Some international NGO's reported that government game wardens
    abused the Basarwa in the CKGR; however, no further information was
    available by year's end.
        The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
    Government has maintained a policy of considering asylum requests only
    from refugees from bordering countries; although in practice, the
    Government often considers refugee applications from Angolans. Although
    the Government sometimes held newly arrived refugees and asylum seekers
    in local jails until they could be interviewed by BCR or UNHCR
    officials, it transferred persons granted refugee status to the Dukwe
    Refugee Camp, pending resettlement or voluntary repatriation (see
    Section 1.d.). There were 3,409 refugees at Dukwe by year's end; they
    were primarily from Namibia, Angola, and Somalia. A small number of
    refugees were being held in ``protective custody'' in Mahalapye Prison.
    At year's end, there were six refugees from Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria,
    Somalia, and Burundi being held in Mahalapye Prison. The Government
    strictly applies a policy of first asylum. Refugee applicants who are
    unsuccessful in obtaining asylum are allowed to remain at Dukwe until
    the Government refers their cases to the UNHCR for resettlement.
        There were reports that BDF soldiers at Dukwe beat and abused Dukwe
    residents. One refugee applicant claimed that BDF soldiers beat him on
    December 1 for allegedly stealing a bag of sugar. The refugee applicant
    received medical treatment for his injuries. The Acting Station
    Commander at Dukwe has stated that his office is investigating the case
    (see Section 1.c.).
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
        More than 2,500 refugees from the Caprivi Strip in neighboring
    Namibia have fled to the country since late 1998. Many were armed and
    linked to the ethnically based opposition groups based in the Caprivi
    Strip of Namibia. Male refugees linked to such groups requested asylum
    based on their claim that they were being forced into the Namibian army
    to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government
    provided first asylum to all such persons. In consultation with the
    UNHCR in 1999, the Government began negotiations with the Government of
    Namibia to facilitate the voluntary return of Nambian refugees. During
    the year, five persons were returned voluntarily to Namibia. UNHCR
    experienced problems obtaining permission from Namibia to return other
    such persons. In August 1999, the Government detained members of a
    Caprivi separatist group who had fled into the country after a military
    offensive in Katima Mulilo in Namibia. The group's leader, Meshake
    Muyongo, was resettled in a third country. Eight of Muyongo's group of
    15 Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) leaders and their families who
    feared for their safety in Namibia were awaiting adjudication of their
    resettlement applications by year's end.
        During the year, the Government's Refugee Advisory Committee, which
    includes a UNHCR representative, found that 19 Namibian asylum seekers
    failed to qualify for asylum. In September the Government filed for the
    extradition of 15 of these individuals, 13 of whom appeared in court
    (one was ill, and another fled). One of the 15 accused the Government
    of unfair detention and violations of human rights and successfully
    challenged his detention in court (see Section 1.d.). The extradition
    process was continuing at year's end; three of the cases were returned
    to Namibia for further documentation, and one other application was
    dismissed. The 19 failed asylum seekers were being detained in various
    local jails at year's end. Their trial began in December and was
    ongoing at year's end.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, generally free and fair elections held on the basis
    of universal adult (18 years of age) suffrage. The President is elected
    by the National Assembly and is limited to two 5-year terms in office.
    Members of the BDP have held a majority of seats in the National
    Assembly, and as a result also the presidency, continuously since
    independence.
        Elections for the National Assembly were held in October 1999 and
    generally were regarded as largely free and fair by domestic and
    international observers, despite preferential access for BDP candidates
    during much of the campaign to state-owned media including state-owned
    radio, the sole domestic source of news for most of the rural
    population, and despite press reports of large anonymous campaign
    contributions to the ruling party, purportedly by international diamond
    interests (see Section 2.a.). The BDP increased its majority in the
    National Assembly from 31 to 37 of 44 seats, thereby ensuring the
    election of its presidential candidate, incumbent President Mogae. In
    1998 Mogae, then Vice President, had succeeded Sir Ketumile Masire as
    President upon the latter's retirement. Of the 7 seats won by
    opposition parties in October, the Botswana National Front (BNF) won 6
    and the Botswana congress Party (BCP) won 1 seat.
        The House of Chiefs, an advisory body with limited powers, is
    restricted constitutionally to the eight ``principal tribes'' of the
    majority Tswana ethnic group and four elected chiefs representing
    smaller tribes, including the Bakalanga, Lozi, Humbukush, and
    Bakgalagadi. Consequently, other groups, for example, the Basarwa,
    Herero, Baloi, or Bayei are not represented there. Given the limited
    authority of the House of Chiefs, the impact of excluding other groups
    of citizens is largely symbolic, but some non-Tswana view it as
    important in principle (see Section 5). Members of the National
    Assembly are required to speak English.
        The State is highly centralized. There are 406 district governments
    with elected councilors, but they have no fiscal autonomy and must rely
    on the central Government for revenue.
        In practice women are underrepresented in the political process.
    However, the 1999 elections doubled the number of women serving in the
    National Assembly, from 4 to 8 of 44 members. The number of women
    serving in the cabinet also increased from 3 to 4 of 15 members. Of the
    13 High Court justices, 1 was a woman.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic and international human rights groups operate without
    government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights cases. Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Center for Human Rights,
    actively promotes human rights and investigated alleged abuses. The
    Metlhaetsile Women's Information Center, Emang Basadi, and Women
    Against Rape are active on issues concerning women's rights,
    particularly rape and domestic violence. Government officials are
    generally cooperative and responsive to these groups. The Government
    does not have a human rights office.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution forbids State discrimination on the basis of
    ethnicity, race, nationality, creed, sex, or social status, and these
    provisions are implemented in practice by government authorities.
    However, neither the Constitution nor any known law prohibits
    discrimination by private persons or entities.
        Women.--Violence against women remains a serious problem. Domestic
    abuse is one area of concern. Under customary law and in common rural
    practice, men have the right to ``chastise'' their wives. Police rarely
    are called to intervene in cases of domestic violence. Reports of
    sexual exploitation, abuse, and criminal sexual assault are increasing,
    and public awareness of the problem generally is growing. The national
    police force has begun training officers in handling domestic violence
    problems to make them more responsive in such cases. Rape is another
    grave national problem, and the Government acknowledged in 1999 that,
    given the high incidence of HIV/AIDS, sexual assault has become an even
    more serious offense. In 1998 Parliament enacted legislation that
    increased all penalties for rape, incest, and other forms of sexual
    assault by imposing minimum sentencing requirements where none existed
    previously. The minimum sentence for rape is now 10 years, with the
    minimum increasing to 15 years with corporal punishment if the offender
    is HIV positive and to 20 years with corporal punishment if the
    offender knew of his or her HIV status. In 1999 a High Court ruled
    unconstitutional a provision in the new law that allowed the detention
    of rape suspects without bail. The law does not address the issue of
    marital rape. A recent study of rape by the police service urges police
    to develop improved methods of rape investigation, including the use of
    DNA tests in all rape cases. The police force purchased new equipment
    and an officer was trained to use it during the year.
        Although the Government has become far tougher in dealing with
    criminal sexual assault, societal attitudes toward other forms of
    domestic violence remain lax. Half the murders of women were linked to
    histories of domestic violence. Human rights activists estimate that 6
    women in 10 are victims of domestic violence at some time in their
    lives.
        Sexual exploitation and harassment continue to be problems as well,
    with men in positions of authority, including teachers, supervisors,
    and older male relatives, pressuring women to provide sexual favors.
    Greater public awareness and improved legal protection have led more
    victims of domestic violence and sexual assault to report incidents to
    the authorities. In March 1999, the Women's Affairs Department
    submitted the Report on the Study of Socio-Economic Implications of
    Violence Against Women in Botswana to the Attorney General's office,
    which is working with all of the ministries to further investigate
    these problems.
        Women legally enjoy the same civil rights as men; however, in
    practice discrimination persists. A number of traditional laws enforced
    by tribal structures and customary courts restrict women's property
    rights and economic opportunities. A woman married under traditional
    law or in ``common property'' is held to be a legal minor, requiring
    her husband's consent to buy or sell property, apply for credit, and
    enter into legally binding contracts. Under a law enacted in 1996,
    women married under an intermediate system, referred to as ``in
    community of property,--are permitted to own immovable property in
    their own names; however, their husbands still retain considerable
    control over jointly-held assets of the marriage. The law was a step
    toward equalizing a husband's and a wife's legal control over property
    held in community of property. Moreover, the 1998 Deeds Registry Act
    stipulates that neither spouse can dispose of joint property without
    the written consent of the other party.
        Women have, and increasingly are exercising, the right to marriage
    ``out of common property,'' in which case they retain their full legal
    rights as adults. Polygyny is still legal under traditional law with
    the consent of the first wife, but it rarely is practiced. In September
    1998, consultants submitted to the Labor Ministry a report identifying
    provisions of existing law that potentially discriminate against women.
        Well-trained urban women enjoy growing entry level access to the
    white-collar job market, but the number of opportunities decreases
    sharply as they rise in seniority. Discrimination against women is most
    acute in rural areas where women engaged primarily in subsistence
    agriculture have weak property rights.
        Young women do not have access to military or national service
    training. Military service is voluntary for men only, and available to
    very few young women who serve as clerical workers. The Government
    abolished its national service program in April, a program that
    previously allowed male and female high school graduates to serve in
    government departments, mostly in rural areas. Government officials
    recently announced that there are no plans to recruit women into the
    Botswana Defense Force, due to infrastructure concerns such as lack of
    adequate living quarters and training facilities that made integration
    impracticable; the statement prompted women's rights activists to claim
    a denial of equal opportunity.
        The Government and interested NGO's meet regularly to implement the
    long-term plan of action described in the National Policy on Women
    adopted in 1996. The plan identifies six critical areas of concern,
    prioritized as follows:(1) women and poverty, (2) women and
    powersharing and decisionmaking, (3) education and training of women,
    (4) women and health, (5) the girl child, and (6) violence against
    women. The Women's Affairs Department of the Ministry of Labor and Home
    Affairs, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program,
    developed the Program Support Document (PSD) in 1997, which provides a
    framework for implementation of the national policy on women through
    2002. Its five target areas include: (1) institutional strengthening at
    the national level, (2) advocacy and social mobilization, (3)
    institutional strengthening of NGO's, (4) research and information
    sharing, and (5) economic empowerment.
        A number of women's organizations have emerged to promote the
    status of women. The Government has entered into a dialog with many of
    these groups. While some women's rights groups reportedly felt that the
    Government has been slow to respond concretely to their concerns,
    women's NGO's state that they are encouraged by the direction of change
    and by the increasingly collaborative relationship with government
    authorities. Major women's NGO's include the Emang Basadi Women's
    Association, which promotes the social, economic and legal status of
    women; the Metlhaetsile Women's Information Centre, which provides
    legal assistance to poor women; and the Botswana Council of Women.
        Children.--The Government provides 7 years of free primary
    education for children, although attendance is not compulsory.
    Government estimates of the proportion of children who never attend
    school have ranged from 10 to 17 percent, and fewer than 20 percent of
    children complete secondary school; school attendance and completion
    rates are highest in urban areas, and lowest in remote rural areas,
    especially those inhabited chiefly by Basarwa (San or Bushmen). The
    national literacy rate is 69 percent: 70 percent for females and 67
    percent for males. However, in some cases, girls are denied schooling
    because of religious or customary beliefs. The Government continued to
    allocate the largest portion of its operating expenditures to the
    Ministry of Education, and the second-largest portion to the Ministry
    of Local Government, Lands, and Housing, which administered primary
    education. It also continued to allocate a large part of its investment
    expenditures to construct primary and secondary schools, so that
    children have ready access to education.
        It was estimated during the year that 35.8 percent of adults are
    infected with HIV/AIDS, and due largely to deaths from HIV/AIDS, 60,000
    orphans were registered by the Ministry of Health countrywide.
    Increasing numbers of children, mostly believed to be orphans, were
    observed begging or engaging in prostitution in urban areas. Orphans
    infected with HIV/AIDS also were denied inheritance rights by their
    relatives.
        The rights of children are addressed in the Constitution and the
    1981 Children's Act. Under the act, The country has a court system and
    social service apparatus designed solely for juveniles. The Government
    launched a 10-year program of action for children in 1997,
    incorporating the seven major global goals identified at the 1990 U.N.
    World Summit for Children. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor and Home
    Affairs transferred responsibility for children to the Social Welfare
    Department in the Ministry of Local Government, Lands, and Housing.
    Laws pertaining to children continued to be under review to align them
    with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Adoption Act
    also continued to be reviewed to ensure that adopted children are
    provided for and not exploited as cheap labor.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although
    incest and other forms of child abuse have received increased attention
    from the media and from local human rights groups.
        The problem of sexual harassment of students by teachers is a
    national concern. Reports of rape and sexual assault of young women,
    and cases of incest and ``defilement'' of young girls appear with
    greater frequency in the news. The age of sexual consent is 16. Child
    prostitution and pornography are criminal offenses, and 1998 amendments
    increased penalties for ``defilement'' of persons under 16.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate on
    the basis of physical or mental disability, although employment
    opportunities for the disabled remain limited. The Government does not
    require accessibility to public buildings and public conveyances for
    persons with disabilities, and the NGO community only recently has
    begun to address the needs of the disabled. In 1997 Parliament adopted
    a national policy that provides for integrating the needs of disabled
    persons into all aspects of government policymaking. The Government
    funded NGO's that provide rehabilitation services and supported small-
    scale work projects by disabled workers.
        Indigenous People.--The Basarwa (also known as San), who now
    inhabit chiefly the Kalihari Desert, are the earliest known inhabitants
    of the country, and were the only inhabitants until Bantu groups
    arrived during the 16th century. They are physically, linguistically,
    and culturally distinct from the rest of the population. They remain
    economically and politically marginalized; they have lost access to
    their traditional land in fertile regions of the country and are
    vulnerable to exploitation by their non-Basarwa neighbors. Their
    isolation, ignorance of civil rights, and lack of political
    representation have stymied their progress. The estimated 52-55,000
    Basarwa persons represent about 3 percent of the country's total
    population. Although the Baswara traditionally were hunter-gatherers,
    most Basarwa now are employed as agricultural workers on farms or at
    cattle posts belonging to other ethnic groups. The formation of the
    20,000 square mile Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) by the colonial
    government in 1961 on traditional Basarwa lands set the stage for
    conflict between the Basarwa's pursuit of their traditional way of life
    and wildlife conservation. The Government in the past followed a policy
    of prohibiting human habitation in the CKGR with the goal of wildlife
    preservation, but has made accommodation for the estimated 1,000 to
    3,000 Basarwa who still pursue hunting and gathering there. The
    Government has provided very limited social services within the CKGR,
    and has encouraged those living there to leave the reserve for
    permanent settlements; there were some reports that the Government
    sometimes forced Baswara to leave the reserve. However, the Government
    has made little real progress since international attention in 1996
    focused on the intractable problem of resettling Basarwa living in the
    CKGR. Both the Basarwa and the Government are seeking out concerned
    NGO's to assist with the resettlement process and to address the larger
    issue of improving the Basarwa's standard of living without sacrificing
    what remains of their traditional way of life.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Well over half of the country's
    1.5 million inhabitants belong to the Tswana ethnic group, of which the
    Constitution recognizes eight principal tribes, and which has a
    tradition of peacefully coexisting with non-Tswana groups. Some non-
    Tswana ethnic groups are more numerous than the Tswana in some rural
    areas of the country: the Kalanga and Lozi in areas of the north; the
    Bayei and Herero in the Okavango Delta region; and the Baswara in the
    arid west. There are also communities of persons of Asian and European
    descent.
        Apart from the lack of schooling in their own languages and their
    present lack of representation in the House of Chiefs (see Section 3),
    the country's non-Tswana communities are not subject to discrimination
    by the State. Societal discrimination also is limited. Intermarriage
    between Tswana and non-Tswana ethnic groups is common. Urban
    neighborhoods are not ethnically segregated. There generally is little
    correlation between income and ethnicity among persons of African
    descent, although many persons of Asian and European descent are
    prominent in the commercial sector.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of association. In practice all workers are free to join or
    organize unions of their own choosing. The country ratified ILO
    Convention 151 during the year, which permits government employees to
    organize their own unions. The industrial or wage economy is small, and
    unions are concentrated largely in mineral extraction and to a lesser
    extent in the railway and banking sectors. There is only one major
    confederation, the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), but
    there are no obstacles to the formation of other labor federations.
        Unions are independent of the Government and are not closely allied
    with any political party or movement. Unions may employ full-time
    administrative staff, but the law requires elected union officials to
    work full time in the industry that the union represents. This rule
    severely limits union leaders' professionalism and effectiveness, and
    has been criticized by the International Confederation of Free Trade
    Unions (ICFTU).
        The law also severely restricts the right to strike. Legal strikes
    are theoretically possible after an exhaustive arbitration process, but
    in practice none of the country's strikes has been legal. Sympathy
    strikes are prohibited.
        Unions may join international organizations, and the BFTU is
    affiliated with the ICFTU. The Minister of Labor must approve any
    affiliation with an outside labor movement, but unions may appeal to
    the courts if an application for affiliation is refused.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for collective bargaining for unions that have
    enrolled 25 percent of a labor force. In reality only the mineworker
    unions have the organizational strength to engage in collective
    bargaining. Elected labor union officials are required by law to work
    full time in whatever industry they represent; consequently, there are
    no full-time elected labor leaders in the country. However, unions may
    employ full-time staff.
        Workers may not be fired for union-related activities. Dismissals
    may be appealed to labor officers or civil courts, but labor offices
    rarely do more than order 2 months' severance pay.
        The country has only one export processing zone, located in the
    town of Selebi-Phikwe, and it is subject to the same labor laws as the
    rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The constitutional
    provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens,
    although there are no laws that specifically prohibit forced or bonded
    labor by children; there were no reports of forced or bonded labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
    of Children.--Although education is not compulsory, the Government
    provides 7 years of free primary education to every child, and most
    children take advantage of this opportunity. Only an immediate family
    member may employ a child age 13 or younger, and no juvenile under age
    15 may be employed in any industry. Only persons over age 16 may be
    hired to perform night work, and no person under age 16 is allowed to
    perform hazardous labor, including mining. District and municipal
    councils have child welfare divisions, which are responsible for
    enforcing child labor laws. Two laws focus on the protection of orphans
    and adopted children from exploitative labor. The Adoption Act ensures
    that adopted children are not exploited as cheap labor, and the
    Employment Act protects orphans from exploitation as cheap labor or
    coercion into prostitution. Because research on the issue of child
    labor is limited, it is difficult to state whether child labor laws are
    enforced effectively. However, there is general agreement among the
    Labor Commissioner, officials of the Ministry of Local Government,
    Lands, and Housing, and UNICEF that the child labor problem is limited
    to young children in remote areas who work as cattle tenders, maids, or
    babysitters.
        The Government ratified ILO Convention No. 182 on the worst forms
    of child labor on January 3, and is in the process of bringing its
    national laws into compliance with international treaty obligations.
    The Government launched a 10-year program of action for children in
    1997; however, implementation has proceeded slowly.
        The constitutional provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor
    applies to all citizens, although there are no laws that specifically
    prohibit forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 6.c.); there
    were no reports of forced or bonded labor by children.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum daily wage for most
    full time labor in the private sector was $3.15 (17 Botswana pula),
    which remained less than 50 percent of what the Government calculates
    is necessary to meet the basic needs of a family of five. Wage policy
    is determined by the Cabinet, which decides on recommendations made by
    the National Economic, Manpower and Incomes Committee (NEMIC), which
    consists of government, BFTU, and private sector representatives. The
    Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage, and
    each of the country's districts has at least one labor inspector. Civil
    service disputes are referred to an ombudsman for resolution. Private
    labor disputes are mediated by labor commissioners, but insufficient
    numbers have resulted in 1 to 2 year backlogs. In 1999 the Ministry of
    Labor received over 9,000 labor disputes and referred a small but
    undisclosed number of them to the Industrial Court for its review,
    which currently has a 9-18 month backlog.
        Formal sector jobs almost always pay well above minimum wage
    levels. Informal sector employment, particularly in the agricultural
    and domestic service sectors, where housing and food are included,
    frequently pay below the minimum wage. There is no mandatory minimum
    wage for domestic workers, and the Ministry of Labor no longer
    recommends a minimum wage for them. Illegal immigrants from poorer
    neighboring countries, primarily Zambians and Zimbabweans, are
    exploited easily in labor matters, as they would be subject to
    deportation if they filed grievances against their employers.
        The law permits a maximum 48-hour workweek, exclusive of overtime,
    which is payable at time and a half for each additional hour. Most
    modern private and public sector jobs are on the 40-hour workweek.
        The law provides that workers who complain about hazardous
    conditions may not be fired. However, the Government's institutional
    ability to enforce its workplace safety legislation remains limited by
    inadequate staffing and unclear jurisdictions between different
    ministries. Nevertheless, employers generally provide for worker
    safety, with the occasionally notable exception of the construction
    industry.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, although penal code provisions cover such related offenses
    as abduction and kidnaping, slave trafficking, compulsory labor, and
    procuring women and girls for the purpose of prostitution. There were
    no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through
    the country.
                                   __________

                                  BURKINA FASO

        President Blaise Compaore continued to dominate the Government of
    the Fourth Republic, assisted by members of his party, the Congress for
    Democracy and Progress (CDP), despite increasing challenges from a
    number of fronts within society. In spite of the existence of dozens of
    political parties, there is little viable opposition to the President
    and his Government. The Government includes a strong presidency, a
    Prime Minister, a Council of Ministers presided over by the President,
    a two-chamber National Assembly, and the judiciary. In November 1998,
    President Compaore was reelected to a second 7-year term with 88
    percent of the vote; 56 percent of the electorate voted. Both national
    and international observers described the presidential election as
    substantially free and fair and an improvement over the 1997
    legislative elections, particularly with regard to the logistical
    organization of the balloting and the functioning of the polling
    stations; however, there were a limited number of voting
    irregularities. The national observers identified a number of systemic
    weaknesses in the electoral code that precluded the serious assurance
    of a perfectly regular and transparent vote, and a coalition
    representing a number of opposition parties boycotted the election. The
    CDP now controls 102 of 111 seats in Parliament. International
    observers considered the 1997 legislative elections to be substantially
    free and fair, although a collective of 14 local nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) cited generalized and systematic corruption and
    voter list irregularities. In November President Compaore and
    representatives from the opposition parties that agreed to participate
    in the Government signed a protocol that, among other items, ceded one-
    third of the cabinet posts to the opposition. The judiciary is subject
    to executive influence.
        The security apparatus consists of the armed forces and the
    gendarmerie, both of which are controlled by the Ministry of Defense;
    the national police, controlled by the Ministry of Territorial
    Administration; and the municipal police, controlled by municipalities.
    Some members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
        Over 80 percent of the population of approximately 11.4 million
    persons engages in subsistence agriculture. Frequent drought, and
    limited communication and transportation infrastructures, in addition
    to a 77 percent illiteracy rate, are longstanding problems. The 50
    percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 made imports more
    expensive for salaried workers and civil servants, but improved the
    competitiveness of livestock and cotton exports. Since 1991 the
    Government has adopted a series of structural adjustment programs
    designed to open the economy to market forces and to reduce government
    deficits, while shifting resources to the education and health sectors.
    In recent years, the country has registered strong gains in life
    expectancy, literacy, and school attendance rates, although it remains
    a very poor country with annual per capita income of about $240.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor in a number of
    areas; although there were improvements in a few areas, serious
    problems remain. The continued dominance of President Compaore and his
    ruling party limited citizens' right to change their government,
    although the 1998 presidential election represented a further step
    toward democratic government. The security forces were responsible for
    at least one extrajudicial killing and continued to mistreat detainees.
    Prison conditions remained harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention are
    problems, and authorities do not ensure detainees due process. Although
    the Government continued attempts to improve its respect for human
    rights, a general climate of impunity for members of the security
    forces and members of the President's family, along with a lack of
    progress in identifying or punishing those responsible for abuses
    committed, continued to tarnish its record. Courts are subject to
    executive influence, and authorities do not ensure fair trials. At
    times authorities restricted media activity, and the media practices
    self-censorship. The death of internationally respected journalist
    Norbert Zongo, his brother, and two other men in a suspicious car fire
    in December 1998 remained a focus of public concern during the year.
    The Government restricted freedom of assembly. Violence and
    discrimination against women persisted. Violence against children,
    particularly female genital mutilation (FGM), remained a problem. The
    Government took steps to educate citizens about the dangers of FGM.
    Child labor is a problem and there were occasional reports of
    trafficking of women and children. Killings of criminal suspects by
    vigilante mobs remained a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, there was one extrajudicial
    killing. On December 6, gendarmes shot and killed Flavien Nebie, a 12-
    year-old student, while forcibly dispersing a student demonstration in
    the town of Bousse (see Section 2.b.). The Government characterized the
    killing as accidental and, at year's end, promised an investigation.
        In August 1999, police officers shot and killed mechanic Mamadou
    Kone when he was in their custody in Banfora, a village in the province
    of Comoe. Kone had been arrested as a result of an investigation
    involving stolen car engines; while he was being booked, Kone struck at
    two police officers in an attempt to escape. He then was shot by a
    third police officer. The policeman accused of assaulting and killing
    Kone was indicted for involuntary homicide in September 1999 and held
    in custody until he was released on bail in March. At year's end, a
    trial date had not been set.
        The January 1998 extrajudicial killing of David Ouedraogo, the
    chauffeur of President Compaore's brother Francois, was resolved in
    August. Ouedraogo, along with two other domestic employees of Francois
    Compaore, had been taken to the Presidential Guard barracks in December
    1997 after being accused of stealing money from the home of the
    President's brother. Francois Compaore's refusal to cooperate with
    judicial authorities impeded the official investigation, and he was
    never arrested. In March 1999, the civil court handling the case
    declared itself incompetent to rule on the matter since Ouedraogo died
    at the hands of members of the Presidential Guard within their
    barracks. As a result, the case was sent to a military tribunal.
        Six members of the Presidential Guard were implicated in the
    Ouedraogo killing. One died in a road accident before criminal charges
    could be filed against him; five were arrested in 1999. On August 19,
    the military tribunal found three of the defendants guilty of
    assaulting and killing Ouedraogo; two of the convicted defendants
    received 20-year prison sentences, and the other received a 10-year
    sentence. The military tribunal acquitted the final two defendants, the
    lowest ranking of the accused Presidential Guards, on the basis of
    insufficient evidence. Warrant Officer Abdoulaye Siemde, who admitted
    falsifying a police report in the David Ouedraogo case, died on May 26
    in the mental ward of Ouagadougou's main hospital under unknown
    circumstances.
        The Independent Investigatory Commission examining the deaths of
    journalist Norbert Zongo, his brother, and two other men in a
    suspicious car fire in December 1998 released its report in May 1999.
    The report determined that the four died for ``purely political
    motives'' and postulated that the probable reason for Zongo's murder
    was to stop the articles that he was writing on the January 1998
    killing of David Ouedraogo. The Commission stated that the six members
    of the Presidential Guard implicated in the Ouedraogo case also were
    ``serious suspects'' in the Zongo murder. The Commission also noted
    that official documents from the Presidential Guard and the army that
    might have shed light on the whereabouts of the six Presidential Guard
    members on the day of the murders could not be found and probably were
    destroyed intentionally. During the year, the Zongo case remained a
    highly divisive issue. Despite the convictions of three of the five
    accused Presidential Guard members for the apparently related killing
    of David Ouedraogo and despite strong public sentiment favoring a trial
    of Zongo's alleged killers, by year's end, no one was charged in the
    Zongo case.
        In its report on the Zongo case, the Independent Investigatory
    Commission also recommended that the separation of functions between
    the police and the military be enforced; that the Presidential Guard
    limit its duties to the protection of the Chief of State; that
    unresolved cases of disappearances and killings in the recent past be
    settled; and that the National Assembly pass a law to eliminate any
    time limit for resolving the Zongo case. At year's end, the separation
    of functions between the police and military was being enforced;
    however, the Presidential Guard had not limited officially its duties
    to protecting the President nor had it been reorganized, no unresolved
    cases of disappearances and killings in the recent past were settled,
    and the National Assembly had not passed a law to eliminate any time
    limit for resolving the Zongo case.
        In May 1999, in response to the Independent Investigatory
    Commission's report, the President announced the creation of a Council
    of Wisemen to review the political crimes that have taken place since
    the country's independence, and to make recommendations for restoring
    social peace in the wake of the Zongo killings. In August 1999, the
    Council of Wisemen issued its final report which recommended reform of
    the judicial system; creation of a temporary, consensual commission to
    review certain articles of the Constitution; formation of a government
    of national unity; creation of a truth and justice commission to direct
    the nation's reconciliation process; and dissolution of the National
    Assembly. By year's end, only the recommendation to restructure the
    government had been accepted (see Section 3).
        No progress was made in punishing those responsible for abuses
    reported in previous years. The major problem with law enforcement
    remains a general climate of impunity for human rights abusers and
    members of the President's family, fostered by the failure of
    government investigations to result in guilty findings and appropriate
    sanctions. Inquiries tend to continue until they are overshadowed by
    subsequent incidents or quietly shelved. Appeals by human rights
    organizations generally go unanswered.
        On December 21, the trial of a gendarme accused of fatally shooting
    two unarmed high school demonstrators in the city of Garango in 1995
    was delayed indefinitely to permit a new government investigation; the
    original investigation was seriously flawed.
        In June militiamen who claimed allegiance to Naba Tigre, the
    traditional chief of the city of Tenkodogo, killed trader Mamadou Kere,
    reportedly for showing disrespect to Naba Tigre. The victim actually
    had criticized Naba Tigre's son, a parliamentarian who supported the
    CDP. Although Naba Tigre was temporarily held in police custody from
    July 7 to 19, he was released, and at year's end, no one had been
    charged in Kere's killing.
        Killings by vigilante mobs and self-styled militias remained a
    problem nationwide. The vast majority of such killings targeted
    suspected thieves and other alleged criminals, who typically were
    burned or beaten to death. On several occasions during the year,
    vigilantes destroyed the property of persons accused of sorcery and
    expelled them from their communities.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits the mistreatment of detainees; however,
    members of the security forces continued to mistreat persons and
    suspects are often subject to beatings, rough handling, and threats,
    frequently to extract confessions. There are credible reports that
    officials at Maco prison continued to employ degrading treatment
    subjecting prisoners to overcrowded, unsanitary conditions and
    providing inadequate food. The Government is not known to have taken
    any disciplinary action against those responsible, and the climate of
    impunity created by the Government's failure to prosecute abusers
    remains the largest obstacle to ending abuses.
        On April 8, police used tear gas and batons to disperse a march,
    injuring 20 persons (see Section 2.b.). On April 10, while dispersing
    continued violent protests, security forces arrested several marchers
    and shaved their heads while they were in custody (see Section 2.b.).
        On April 12 to 13, police arrested 20 demonstrators and shaved the
    heads of several demonstrators while they were in detention (see
    Section 2.b.).
        On August 30, police used tear gas to disperse refugees peacefully
    demonstrating for improved living conditions and transfer to other
    countries (see Section 2.d.).
        On November 30, gendarmes detained approximately 15 students,
    reportedly beat them, stripped them to their undergarments, and
    subsequently left them in a park near the outskirts of the city (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
        On December 6, police used tear gas and fired upon a student
    demonstration in Bousse, killing a boy (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
        Prison conditions are harsh, overcrowded, and can be life
    threatening. The federal prison in Bobo-Dioulasso, built in 1947,
    houses approximately 1,000 prisoners, although it was designed to hold
    less than half that number. The prison diet is poor, and inmates often
    must rely on supplemental food from relatives. There are separate
    facilities for men, women, and children.
        According to human rights monitors, prison visits are granted at
    the discretion of prison authorities. Permission is granted routinely,
    and advance permission is not required.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention were problems, and authorities did not ensure due process.
    The Constitution provides for the right to expeditious arraignment and
    access to legal counsel. The law limits detention for investigative
    purposes without charge to a maximum of 72 hours, renewable for a
    single 48-hour period; however, in practice police rarely observe these
    provisions. The average time of detention without charge is 1 week, and
    the law allows judges to impose an unlimited number of 6-month
    preventive detention periods. It is not unusual for defendants without
    access to legal counsel to be imprisoned for weeks or months before
    appearing before a magistrate. In some cases, prisoners were held
    without charge or trial for a longer period than the maximum sentence
    that they would have received if convicted of the alleged offense.
        On November 30, gendarmes detained approximately 15 students during
    a peaceful demonstration in Ouagadougou. After forcibly removing the
    students from a church, gendarmes reportedly beat the students,
    stripped them to their undergarments, and subsequently left them in a
    park near the outskirts of the city (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        In November 1998, eight armed policemen temporarily detained
    opposition Party for Democracy and Progress (PDP) deputy Gerard
    Karambiri and a PDP supporter. Police awakened both men in their
    respective homes in the early hours of the morning. The officers lacked
    the required warrants and entered their homes at times other than the 6
    a.m. to 9 p.m. ``legal hours.'' Police took them to headquarters,
    interrogated them for about 2 hours, and then released them.
    Parliamentarians believed that the detention of Deputy Karambiri
    violated the parliamentary immunity granted to all deputies under the
    Constitution. Several days later, after demanding that the detentions
    be investigated fully, PDP deputies walked out of the National Assembly
    in protest. The governing CDP parliamentary group expressed support for
    the PDP, and National Assembly President Melegue Traore addressed a
    letter to the Prime Minister asking that the incident be investigated.
    At year's end, the Government has not responded.
        While dispersing violent protesters on April 10, security forces
    arrested several marchers and shaved their heads while in custody (see
    Section 1.c.). On April 12 to 13, the police arrested 6 prominent
    leaders and approximately 12 members of the Collective of Mass
    Democratic Organizations and Political Parties following a
    demonstration.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to
    executive influence. The President has extensive appointment and other
    judicial powers. The Constitution stipulates that the Head of State is
    also the President of the Superior Council of the Magistrature, which
    can nominate and remove some high-ranked magistrates and can examine
    the performance of individual magistrates.
        The Zongo killing (see Section 1.a.) and its aftermath have focused
    attention on the severe weaknesses in the justice system, including
    removability of judges, outdated legal codes, an insufficient number of
    courts, a lack of financial and human resources, and excessive legal
    costs.
        The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is the highest
    court in the country. Beneath the Supreme Court are 2 Courts of Appeal
    and 10 provincial courts (``de grande instance''). There is also a High
    Court of Justice, with jurisdiction to try the president and senior
    government officials for treason and other serious crimes. In 1995 the
    National Assembly passed legislation reforming the military court
    system, making military courts less susceptible in principle to
    executive manipulation; however, their independence has not yet been
    demonstrated.
        In addition to the formal judiciary, customary or traditional
    courts, presided over by village chiefs, handle many neighborhood and
    village problems, such as divorce and inheritance disputes. The
    population generally respects these decisions, but citizens also may
    take a case to a formal court.
        The Constitution provides for the right to public trial, access to
    counsel, and has provisions for bail and appeal. While these rights
    generally are respected, the ability of citizens to obtain a fair trial
    remains circumscribed by their ignorance of the law--78 percent of the
    population is illiterate--and by a continuing shortage of magistrates.
    Amendments to the Penal Code to make it more relevant to modern
    requirements, such as the revision making FGM a crime, were adopted by
    Parliament in 1996 and entered into effect in 1997.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for these rights, and in
    practice the authorities generally do not interfere in the daily lives
    of ordinary citizens. However, in national security cases a law permits
    surveillance, searches, and monitoring of telephones and private
    correspondence without a warrant. By law and under normal
    circumstances, homes may be searched only with the authority of a
    warrant issued by the Attorney General.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1991 Constitution and the 1990
    Information Code provide for freedom of speech and of the press;
    however, in practice these freedoms still remain circumscribed both by
    government action and by a certain degree of self-censorship. The
    President and his Government remain sensitive to criticism. Provisions
    in the code granting the Government strong legal powers to intimidate
    the press through a broad interpretation of defamation were removed in
    1993. As a result, journalists charged with libel may defend themselves
    in court by presenting evidence in support of their allegations. The
    independent press, particularly the written press, continued to
    exercise greater freedom of expression. However, the suspicious death
    of internationally respected journalist and newspaper editor Norbert
    Zongo in December 1998 raised serious questions on the limits to the
    exercise of this freedom (see Section 1.a.). Zongo was well known for
    his investigative reports on government scandals.
        All media are under the administrative and technical supervision of
    the Ministry of Communication and Culture. The audiovisual media are
    regulated further by the Superior Council of Information (CSI).
        The official media, including the daily newspaper Sidwaya, and the
    national radio and television displayed progovernment bias. The
    independent press includes five daily and approximately a dozen weekly
    newspapers; some newspapers appear only occasionally. There are more
    than 50 independent radio stations and a religious television station.
    The only private commercial television station ceased to broadcast in
    1999, due to financial difficulties. These media outlets included
    stations that are critical of the Government.
        In 1998 the CSI released new regulations for private and
    independent radio and television; which entered into effect in 1999.
    The regulations allowed reinstatement of call-in shows, which were
    suspended in 1997. However, radio stations are held responsible if
    their call-in programs threaten the public order or the rights of any
    third party. On April 14, the Government permanently suspended call-in
    programs, which allowed criticism of the Government, on two private FM
    stations. The Government also temporarily closed one of the stations,
    Radio Horizon, from April 16 to June 17. In May 1999, employees from
    two radio stations were questioned by the police after broadcasting a
    call-in show on the Zongo killings that featured the secretary general
    of Reporters Without Borders, Robert Menard. After being threatened
    with formal expulsion, Menard involuntarily left the country. In
    September 1999, he was denied entry into the country.
        National and international observers reported that the CSI
    effectively fulfilled its responsibilities under the Electoral Code to
    assure equal media treatment of the candidates during the period prior
    to the November 1998 presidential election. The collective of
    independent election observers stated after the election that the press
    generally was open to the different candidates. Press reporting on
    candidates' campaigns, with the exception of the national television
    and state-owned newspaper, which initially gave the President more
    attention than that provided to the other two candidates, became more
    balanced after a complaint presented to the CSI early in the campaign
    by Green Party candidate Ram Ouedraogo.
        Academic freedom is respected. In April the Government closed the
    University of Ouagadougou and primary and secondary schools in
    Ouagadougou and several other cities in response to political
    demonstrations by students. The primary and secondary schools reopened
    in approximately a week, and the University reopened several weeks
    later. In October the Government again closed the University in
    response to a series of strikes, walkouts, and violent confrontations
    between riot police and student groups. After instituting a series of
    reforms and conceding to the concerns of teachers and student groups,
    University registration began in late December. The University was
    scheduled to reopen early in 2001.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, at times the Government
    restricted this right in practice. Police forcibly dispersed several
    demonstrations, and in December the Government banned all public
    demonstrations or gatherings except for weddings, funerals, and
    religious ceremonies. At year's end, the ban remained in effect.
        Previously, political parties and labor unions were allowed to hold
    meetings and rallies without requesting Government permission. However,
    the law requires that authorities be notified in advance of planned
    demonstrations and gives the executive the right to invoke the need to
    preserve public order to forbid demonstrations. Penalties for
    violations include 2 to 5 years imprisonment. Permits must be obtained
    from municipal authorities for political marches. Applicants must
    indicate the date, time, duration, and itinerary of the march or rally,
    and authorities may alter or deny requests on grounds of public safety.
    Denials or modifications may be appealed before the courts.
        On April 8, security forces dispersed a march protesting the
    impunity from prosecution of members of the President's family and
    entourage. The police used tear gas and batons to disperse the
    demonstrators, injuring 20 persons.
        Protests continued on April 10 for progress on the Zongo case and
    expanded political freedom and a more effective justice system.
        While dispersing violent street demonstrations, police arrested
    several persons and shaved their heads while they were in custody. From
    April 12 to 13, the Collective of Mass Democratic Organizations and
    Political Parties led largely peaceful demonstrations to demand
    truthful information in both the Zongo and David Ouedraogo cases (see
    Section 2.b.). The police arrested approximately 12 members and 6
    prominent leaders of the collective, including human rights leader
    Halidou Ouedraogo; lawyer Benewende Sankara; union leader Tole Sagnon;
    and Sankarist party leader Norbert Tiendrebeogo. The police detained
    them (without charge) for 3 days and shaved their heads while they were
    in custody.
        On August 30, police used tear gas to disperse refugees
    demonstrating for improved living conditions (see Section 2.d.).
        In October civil servants widely observed a peaceful general strike
    called by opposition parties to demand truth in the Zongo case,
    although it was ignored generally by the private sector (see Section
    6.a.).
        On November 30, gendarmes detained approximately 15 students during
    a peaceful demonstration in Ouagadougou, reportedly beat them, stripped
    them to their undergarments, and left them in a park near the outskirts
    of the city (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On December 6, students from Ouagadougou University demonstrated in
    the town of Bousse against proposed government reforms at the
    university. Gendarmes used tear gas to disperse the demonstration and
    fired upon the demonstrators, killing a boy. The Government
    subsequently banned all public demonstrations until further notice.
        Despite the ban on demonstrations, a small group of protesters
    marked the second anniversary of Zongo's death on December 13; security
    forces dispersed them with tear gas.
        Journalists and human rights activists were not permitted to hold
    public meetings during the International Press Freedom Festival in
    Ouagadougou on December 12 to 16. The Government also refused to permit
    a number of foreign journalists and human rights activists to enter the
    country to attend the festival.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this in practice. Since early 1990,
    political parties and labor unions usually have been permitted to
    organize without seeking government permission.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The Government requires that religious groups register with the
    Ministry of Territorial Administration. Registration establishes a
    group's legal presence in the country but entails no specific controls
    or benefits. There are no penalties for failure to register.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement, and authorities generally respect this right in practice.
    Gendarmes routinely stop travelers for identity and customs checks and
    the levying of road taxes at police and military checkpoints; some
    foreign journalists were not permitted to enter the country. There is
    no restriction on foreign travel.
        Following the Government's December ban on demonstrations (see
    Section 2.b.), progovernment vigilantes intimidated human rights
    activists and forced some to flee from cities such as Koudougou (see
    Section 4).
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
    in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Refugees are accepted
    freely. The Government provides first asylum. The Government cooperated
    with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Most refugees
    departed voluntarily for neighboring countries; however, a few hundred
    refugees from the Great Lakes region remained in the country at year's
    end. The majority of these refugees come from the Democratic Republic
    of the Congo, Congo Brazzaville, and Chad; they live singly or in small
    groups in Ouagadougou.
        During the year, 30 of the 600 refugees from several Francophone
    Africa countries who were resettled in the country in 1998 by the UNHCR
    held a sustained protest regarding their harsh living conditions. They
    accused the Foreign Ministry's National Committee for Refugees of
    misappropriating large sums of money intended for the refugees. On
    August 30, police used tear gas to disperse demonstrating refugees.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution. There were no reports of the forced
    expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
    through multiparty elections; however, although the November 1998
    presidential election represented a further step toward democratic
    government, in practice citizens are unable to exercise this right
    fully due to the continued dominance of the President and his ruling
    party. President Compoare won 88 percent of the vote; 56 percent of the
    eligible voters went to the polls. The irregularities cited by
    observers in the actual voting process were limited in number and scope
    and did not appear to affect the ultimate outcome of the election.
    However, the national observers identified a number of systemic
    weaknesses in the electoral code that precluded a perfectly regular and
    transparent vote, and a coalition representing a number of opposition
    parties boycotted the election. Nevertheless, neither of the two
    candidates opposing President Compaore contested the results.
        In October 1999, President Compaore instructed the Prime Minister
    to reshuffle and broaden the Government. The new cabinet included four
    members from small opposition parties; however, the major opposition
    bloc, the Group of 14 February (G-14), refused to participate. In
    October 1999, the Council of Ministers passed decrees creating a
    Commission for Political Party Consultations and a Commission of
    National Reconciliation. The Commission issued a final report in
    December 1999. The President announced in his traditional 1999 New
    Year's Eve address that he would accept all of the report's
    recommendations, including designating a formal leader of the
    opposition in Parliament and reintroducing presidential term limits
    beginning in 2005. He said that he would call new parliamentary
    elections ``if necessary.'' At year's end, he had taken none of the
    recommended steps.
        In November President Compaore and representatives from the
    opposition parties that agreed to participate in the Government signed
    a protocol that ceded one-third of the cabinet posts to the opposition.
    Ernest Yonli was designated Prime Minister. The protocol also set out a
    commitment to strengthen dialog with opposition parties, civil society,
    associations, and trade unions, and to strengthen ethics in political
    life. Members of the opposition held 12 of 36 posts, but members of the
    largest opposition party, the Party for Democracy and Progress (PDP) as
    well as the other parties belonging to the G-14 bloc, refused to
    participate in the Government.
        The 1997 legislative elections gave the ruling CDP 101 out of 111
    parliamentary seats. (The CDP now controls 102 seats because of a
    defection to the ruling party by an opposition deputy.) The victory
    reflected both general support for policies of the governing party and
    a lack of viable opposition alternatives. While international observers
    described the elections as substantially free and fair, a collective of
    14 local NGO's cited generalized and systematic corruption and voter
    list irregularities. The Supreme Court annulled the results in four
    constituencies because of these irregularities.
        In May 1998, the National Assembly approved the establishment of an
    independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), funded by the
    Government. Although developing electoral lists remains the
    responsibility of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and
    Security, the CENI is responsible for creating a census bureau,
    installing voting stations, training poll workers, organizing election
    observation, ensuring election security, and distributing election
    material. During the 1998 presidential election, the CENI was unable to
    carry out its functions in some areas due to inadequate staffing. On
    May 17, the Government promulgated a new electoral code that gave the
    CENI more independence. Under the revised code, the CENI has full
    responsibility for managing its budget and is the only organization
    responsible for monitoring elections and referendums. However, during
    the September 24 municipal elections, the CENI appeared to defer to the
    Government on important questions such as postponing the elections and
    candidate eligibility.
        The CDP won over 70 percent of the seats in nationwide municipal
    elections held on September 24, but lost its majority in Koudougou, the
    third largest city. The CDP won the majority of seats, and thus the
    mayor's office, in 42 of the country's 49 communes. Despite some
    allegations of fraud, the vote was held without disruption and the CENI
    generally had adequate staff and personnel to perform its duties.
    Nationwide turnout was approximately 60 percent of registered voters,
    but less than half of eligible voters were registered. Seventeen
    parties participated in the elections; however, 8 opposition parties
    actively boycotted them.
        The Compaore Government includes a strong presidency, a Prime
    Minister, a Council of Ministers presided over by the President, a two-
    chamber National Assembly, and the judiciary. The legislature is
    independent, but it remains susceptible to external influence from the
    executive branch.
        In November 1999, a presidential decree established a Commission on
    Political Reforms. Pursuant to the Commission's recommendation in
    December 1999, Article 37 of the Constitution was amended in April to
    provide that the presidential term of office be 5 years, renewable
    once, starting in 2005; the provision is not retroactive. Previously
    the Constitution allowed the President to run for an unlimited number
    of terms.
        There are no restrictions in law or practice on the participation
    of women or minority group members in politics; however, women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. Only 4 of the 36 ministers
    and 8 of the 111 National Assembly deputies are women. The President of
    the Social and Economic Council is a woman. In part because of the
    important role that women played in reelecting President Compaore in
    1998, the Congress for Democracy and Progress voted at its first
    ordinary Congress held in July 1999 to increase the number of women on
    its National Executive Council from two to six.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        In general the Government did not interfere with the activities of
    local human rights organizations during the year. A number of such
    groups operated during the year according to monitors, including the
    Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP), GERDES, and the
    Association of Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT).
        In March 1999, the Council of Ministers terminated the agreement
    that had existed between the Government and the InterAfrican Human
    Rights Union (UIDH) since 1995. The Council stated in 1999 that UIDH
    head Halidou Ouedraogo, who also served as president of the Burkinabe
    Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP) and as president of the collective,
    had mixed politics with human rights and thus acted in ways
    incompatible with the agreement. The Council also considered illegal
    the UIDH's participation on a parallel inquiry commission that was set
    up in January 1999 by the Collective to investigate the Zongo killings.
    Under the 1995 agreement, the UIDH benefited from tax exemptions, a
    government subsidy that paid $500 (300,000 CFA) a month to rent
    temporary offices for the organization; Ouedraogo, a Burkinabe
    national, had enjoyed diplomatic immunity as head of an international
    organization. In May the President promised to reinstate the agreement
    providing a tax exemption and subsidy to the UIDH; however, these
    actions had not taken place by year's end.
        The Government again failed to answer inquiries from international
    human rights organizations concerning past abuses.
        Amnesty International (AI) still is awaiting the results of the
    Government inquiry into the 1995 killings in Garango, but the
    Government has not responded to AI's request for information.
        Following the Government's December ban on demonstrations (see
    Section 2.b.), progovernment vigilantes intimidated human rights
    activists and forced some to flee from cities such as Koudougou.
        The Government permitted international human rights groups to visit
    and operate in the country. The MBDHP is affiliated with the
    InterAfrican Human Rights Union (UIDH) and representatives of other
    human rights groups visited the country during the year.
        In 1994 the Government announced the creation of the Office of
    Ombudsman, called ``Mediateur du Faso.'' Retired General Marc Garango
    was appointed to the position, which is responsible for mediating
    disputes between the state and its citizens. In June 1998, the
    Ombudsman's Office issued its first activity report, which indicated
    that half the cases brought before it dealt with career problems of
    civil servants and the other half with a variety of issues, including
    land questions and bureaucratic inaction. On July 20, Garango issued
    another report and retired effectively on November 10. The report
    attempted to resolve approximately 300 outstanding citizen complaints
    against the Government and urged the Government to pay compensation in
    a number of cases.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    religion, or ethnic origin. Minority ethnic groups, like the majority
    Mossi, are represented in the inner circles of the Government, and
    government decisions do not favor one group over another.
        Women.--Violence against women, especially wife beating, occurs
    frequently. Cases of wife beating usually are handled through customary
    law and practice. There are no statistics on rape, although it is
    recognized as a crime. Spousal rape is not discussed. There are
    organizations that counsel rape victims, including Catholic and
    Protestant missions, the Association of Women Jurists in Burkina, the
    Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights, the Association of Women, and
    Promofemmes, a regional network that works to combat violence against
    women. The Government is attempting to change attitudes toward women,
    using education through the media. The Penal Code explicitly prohibits
    sexual harassment, but it has no special laws protecting women against
    violence other than general laws dealing with violence.
        Forced marriage is prohibited by law with specific penalties under
    the Penal Code for violators. Polygyny is permitted, but both parties
    must agree to it prior to a marriage, and the woman maintains the power
    to oppose further marriages by her husband if she can provide evidence
    that he abandoned her and her children. Either spouse can petition for
    divorce; custody of children is granted to either parent on the basis
    of the children's best interests.
        Although the law provides equal property rights to women and some
    inheritance benefits depending on other family relationships, in
    practice customary law prohibits women from the right to own property,
    particularly real estate. In rural areas, land belongs to the family of
    the man whom a woman marries. Customary law does not recognize
    inheritance rights for women and regards the woman as property that can
    be inherited upon her husband's death.
        There are no specific constitutional provisions or laws protecting
    women, who face extensive discrimination. In general women continue to
    occupy a subordinate position and experience discrimination in such
    areas as education, jobs, property, and family rights. Overall, women
    represent 45 percent of the work force; however, in the modern sector
    women make up one-fourth of the government work force, although they
    usually are found in lower paying positions. Women still do much of the
    subsistence farming work. After the May 1997 parliamentary elections,
    the Government created a Ministry of Women's Affairs and appointed a
    woman as minister; the minister actively promoted women's rights during
    the year.
        There were occasional reports of trafficking in women (see Section
    6.f.).
        Children.--The Constitution nominally protects children's rights.
    The Government has demonstrated its commitment to improving the
    condition of children by continuing a national policy to revitalize
    primary health care through the privatization of hospitals, which
    provided greater autonomy in hospital management. The Government has
    stated its commitment to improve access to primary education and as of
    1996 had raised the literacy rate to 22 percent. Although the law
    provides for free compulsory primary education, the Government lacks
    the means to provide universal, free primary instruction; many
    children, especially girls, do not attend school. A 1995 estimate
    indicated that about 30 percent of males and 9 percent of females were
    literate. The Government devoted approximately 21 percent of its budget
    to education and provided free primary school education to all
    children. If a child qualifies on the basis of grades and social
    condition (that is, the family is ``poor''), free education can
    continue through junior high and high school. In practice the family
    condition requirement often is ignored, giving many children a free
    education through high school.
        Females constitute approximately one-third of the total student
    population in the primary school system and are represented in the
    secondary and higher educational systems, although the percentage
    decreases significantly beyond the primary level. Schools in rural
    areas have disproportionately fewer female students than schools in
    urban areas. The Government has set up a scholarship program for female
    secondary students to encourage them to stay in school.
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, still is practiced widely, especially in many
    rural areas, and usually is performed at an early age. The percentage
    of females who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 70
    percent. The Government has made a strong commitment to eradicate FGM
    through educational efforts, and The National Committee for the Fight
    Against Excision campaigns against the practice. The Penal Code was
    revised in 1996 to make FGM a crime, with stricter punishments for
    those involved in its practice. Perpetrators are subject to 6-months to
    3-years imprisonment and a significant fine. The Government continued
    its sensitization campaign regarding the deleterious effects of this
    practice. According to press reports in 1999 and during the year, some
    persons who have practiced FGM and the victims' parents were arrested,
    and some FGM practitioners were prosecuted and received prison
    sentences under the 1996 law forbidding FGM. Another form of
    mutilation, scarification of the faces of both boys and girls of
    certain ethnic groups, gradually is disappearing.
        There were occasional reports of trafficking in children (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--While there are modest government
    subsidies for workshops for the disabled, there is no government
    mandate or legislation concerning accessibility for the disabled. There
    is no legislation to protect persons with disabilities from
    discrimination. Programs to aid the disabled are limited, but human
    rights groups are not aware of any discrimination against the disabled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1962 Labor Code has been amended
    several times during the past decade. During the year, the Government
    repealed provisions requiring public servants to respect the
    revolutionary order under penalty of disciplinary sanctions. Under this
    legislation, workers, including civil servants, traditionally have
    enjoyed a legal right of association, which is recognized under the
    Constitution. There are 4 major labor confederations and 12 autonomous
    trade unions linked by a national confederal committee. They represent
    a wide ideological spectrum; the largest and most vocal member espouses
    socialist doctrine. Approximately 85 percent of the workforce is
    engaged in subsistence agriculture. Of the remainder, approximately 50
    percent of private sector employees and 60 percent of public sector
    employees are union members. Essential workers, such as police, may not
    join unions.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and workers use
    strike actions to achieve labor goals. Many strikes were called
    throughout the year both by labor organizations to advance workers'
    objectives, and by the Collective of Mass Organizations and Political
    Parties to press for justice in the aftermath of the Zongo killings.
    The Government allowed peaceful strikes on a number of occasions,
    including in the health and banking sectors. University and medical
    students also struck on several occasions, including strikes in
    February and May protesting for improved study and working conditions,
    better food, and subsidized transportation. In October civil servants
    widely observed a peaceful general strike called by opposition parties
    to demand truth in the Zongo case (see Section 1.a.), although it was
    ignored generally by the private sector (see Section 2.b.).
        Labor unions may affiliate freely with international trade unions.
    The National Confederation of Burkinabe Workers is affiliated with the
    Brussels-based World Confederation of Labor.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
    right to bargain for wages and other benefits, both directly with
    employers and with industry associations. These negotiations are
    governed by minimums on wages and other benefits contained in the
    Interprofessional Collective Convention and the Commercial Sector
    Collective Convention, which are established with government
    participation. If no agreement is reached, employees may exercise their
    right to strike. Either labor or management may refer an impasse in
    negotiations to labor tribunals. Appeals may be pursued through the
    Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, whose decision is binding on both
    parties. Collective bargaining is extensive in the modern wage sector,
    but it encompasses only a small percentage of workers.
        The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination. The Labor
    Ministry handles complaints about such discrimination, which the
    plaintiff may appeal to a labor tribunal. If the tribunal sustains the
    appeal, the employer must reinstate the worker. Union officials believe
    that this system functions adequately.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor; however, there were occasional reports of
    trafficking in women for forced prostitution or domestic service (see
    Section 6.f.).
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, there were occasional reports of trafficking in children for
    forced prostitution or domestic service (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 14
    years, the average age for completion of basic primary school. However,
    the Ministry of Employment, Labor, and Social Security, which oversees
    labor standards, lacks the means to enforce this provision adequately,
    even in the small wage sector. Children commonly work with their
    parents in rural areas or in family-owned small businesses in villages
    and cities. Most children actually begin work at an earlier age on
    small, family subsistence farms, in the traditional apprenticeship
    system, and in the informal sector. There are no reports of children
    under the age of 14 employed in either state or large private
    companies. The Government prohibits forced or bonded child labor;
    however, there were reports of trafficking in children (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        In December the National Assembly unanimously ratified ILO
    Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor, but at year's end,
    the President had not yet signed the bill into law. The Ministry of
    Labor is expected to be responsible for its enforcement.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code mandates a
    minimum monthly wage, a standard workweek of 40 hours with at least one
    24-hour rest period for nondomestic workers and a 60 hour workweek for
    household workers, and establishes safety and health provisions. The
    minimum monthly wage in the formal sector, about $41 (28,911 CFA), does
    not apply to subsistence agriculture, which employs about 85 percent of
    the population. The Government last set a minimum wage in 1996. It is
    not adequate for an urban worker to support a family. Wage earners
    usually supplement their income through reliance on the extended
    family, subsistence agriculture, or trading in the informal sector.
        A system of government inspections under the Ministry of
    Employment, Labor, and Social Security and the labor tribunals is
    responsible for overseeing health and safety standards in the small
    industrial and commercial sectors, but these standards do not apply in
    the subsistence agricultural sector. However, the Government's Labor
    Inspector Corps does not have sufficient resources to fulfill its
    duties adequately. Every company is required to have a work safety
    committee. If a workplace has been declared unsafe by the Government's
    Labor Inspection Office for any reason, workers have the right to
    remove themselves from dangerous work without jeopardy to continued
    employment. In practice there are indications that this right is
    respected, but such declarations are relatively rare.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, there were occasional reports of trafficking in women
    and children for the purposes of forced prostitution or domestic
    service. The country is an occasional source country for women who
    travel to Europe, believing they are going to work as domestics, but
    who, upon their arrival, are forced to work as prostitutes.
        The country is a source and transit point for trafficking, most
    frequently of children destined for agricultural labor, usually in Cote
    d'Ivoire. In many instances, children voluntarily travel to Cote
    d'Ivoire to work as agricultural laborers to escape poverty at home;
    however, in other cases, children are lured to plantation work in Cote
    d'Ivoire by false promises of generous remuneration, only to be forced
    to work under very harsh conditions for little or no payment. Some
    children are forced to work long hours without pay, allegedly to repay
    costs of their transport to Cote d'Ivoire and the costs of food and
    housing on the plantation.
        The Government only has limited resources to combat trafficking in
    women or children. During the year, a number of children destined for
    plantations in Cote d'Ivoire were intercepted by the authorities, and
    the traffickers were arrested; however, none were prosecuted during the
    year. The Government provided initial shelter to the children and
    helped return them to their homes. Some children asserted that they
    were going voluntarily to Cote d'Ivoire in search of work.
                                   __________

                                    BURUNDI

        Burundi is ruled by an authoritarian military regime led by self-
    proclaimed interim President Pierre Buyoya, who was brought to power in
    a bloodless coup by the largely ethnic Tutsi armed forces in 1996 and
    who abrogated the Constitution. Buyoya holds power in conjunction with
    a political power structure dominated by members of the Tutsi ethnic
    group. In 1998 the Buyoya regime reached a political agreement with the
    opposition-dominated National Assembly, which adopted a Transitional
    Constitutional Act and a transitional political platform. The agreement
    brought the predominantly ethnic Hutu opposition party FRODEBU into the
    Cabinet. Political parties operate under significant restraints. Since
    1993 the civil war has caused thousands of civilian deaths and mass
    internal displacement. In June 1998, the Government and opposition
    parties began peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. On August 28, the
    Buyoya regime and other groups present at the peace talks signed a
    peace agreement, which was ratified by the National Assembly on
    November 30. The agreement proposes extensive reforms of the security
    forces, the judiciary, and the country's political institutions.
    Several of the parties signed with reservations parts of the agreement,
    including the key issues of leadership of the transitional government,
    integration of the army, and the electoral system. Negotiations were
    ongoing at year's end. The two major armed rebel groups declined to
    join the peace process. The judiciary is controlled by the ethnic Tutsi
    minority and is not impartial.
        The security forces are controlled by the Tutsi minority and
    consist of the army and the gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defense,
    the judicial police under the Ministry of Justice, and the intelligence
    service under the presidency. Members of the security forces continued
    to commit numerous serious human rights abuses.
        The country is poor and densely populated, with 92 percent of the
    population dependent on subsistence agriculture. Many internally
    displaced citizens have been unable to grow food and depend largely on
    international humanitarian assistance. Per capita income fell from $200
    in the early 1980's to $121 in 1999, according to the Ministry of
    Development and Reconstruction. The civil war has caused severe
    economic disruption, especially to the small modern sector of the
    economy, which is based mainly on the export of coffee, tea, and
    cotton. The Government has announced plans to privatize publicly owned
    enterprises, but made little progress during the year.
        The Government's human rights record was poor. Citizens do not have
    the right to change their government. Security forces continued to
    commit numerous extrajudicial killings. The armed forces killed armed
    rebels and unarmed civilians, including women, children, and the
    elderly. Rebel attacks on the military often were followed by army
    reprisals against civilians suspected of cooperating with the
    insurgents. Despite Buyoya's stated commitment to end abuses by the
    military, numerous abuses were committed and perpetrators were not
    punished. Impunity for those who commit serious human rights
    violations, and the continuing lack of accountability for those who
    committed past abuses, remained key factors in the country's continuing
    instability. There were credible reports of disappearances, and the
    security forces continued to torture and otherwise abuse persons.
    Soldiers raped women. Despite some improvements, prison conditions
    remained life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy
    pretrial detention were problems, and there were reports of
    incommunicado detention. The court system suffers from a lengthy case
    backlog; however, the Government took steps to diminish the backlog.
    The dysfunctional justice system was unable to resolve pressing issues
    of detention and impunity because of its lack of independence,
    inefficiency, a lack of resources, systemic corruption, administrative
    disruption due to the war, and the partiality of Tutsi officials.
    Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
    controlled the media and restricted freedom of speech and of the press.
    It restricted freedom of assembly and did not permit political
    demonstrations by government opponents. The Government restricted
    freedom of association and freedom of movement. Since 1993 the civil
    war has caused thousands of civilian deaths and mass internal
    population displacement. During the first half of the year, the army
    continued its forced regroupment policy, requiring an estimated 330,000
    persons (mostly Hutus) to live in forced regroupment camps to prevent
    rebel attacks on the nearby capital, Bujumbura; however, by August the
    Government had closed all regroupment camps. The armed forces sometimes
    limited access to certain areas by human rights observers, citing
    dangerous security conditions. Violence and discrimination against
    women continued. The Government was unable to protect the rights of
    children, and child prostitution is a problem. Discrimination against
    the disabled also is a problem. The indigenous Twa (Pygmy) people
    remain marginalized economically, socially, and politically. Incidents
    of ethnically motivated property destruction and killing occurred
    throughout the country. State discrimination against Hutus was
    widespread. Soldiers required persons who were regrouped forcibly,
    including children, who were mostly Hutus, to perform forced labor.
    Child labor was a problem.
        Hutu rebels also continued to commit numerous serious abuses
    against civilians, including killings, rapes, theft, and forced labor.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed numerous extrajudicial killings. On February 15, a police
    officer allegedly tortured to death a domestic servant who insulted the
    officer's wife (see Section 1.c.). The officer was arrested later that
    day, but released on March 15. The U.N. protested his release.
        On April 1, a soldier killed a local Bujumbura government official
    and four members of the official's family, allegedly in retaliation for
    four soldiers killed by rebels. The soldier was arrested for the
    murders and he remained in detention pending trial at year's end.
        In early May, members of the security forces tortured and
    decapitated a man who had thrown stones at them while they looted
    houses in the forced regroupment camp Kavumu, in Bujumbura Rural
    province (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and 2.d.). The Government began an
    investigation into this incident, but did not complete it by year's
    end.
        On June 24-25, soldiers killed 69 persons in Taba commune, Gitega
    province, on the suspicion that the residents were cooperating with
    rebels.
        On July 22-23, soldiers killed 53 persons in Butaganzwa commune,
    Ruyigi province. Observers believe that the killings were in response
    to intense pressure from the Government to combat rebels and their
    supporters in the province.
        On August 19, in Nyambuye zone, Bujumbura Rural province, soldiers
    killed 35 civilians who had sought refuge in Bujumbura on August 17
    after 2 days of confrontations between the army and rebels. Apparently
    the civilians were trying to go home when they encountered the rebels
    on August 19. Soldiers shot the civilians as they fled, ostensibly
    having mistaken them for rebels.
        On October 3, soldiers shot and killed Antonio Bargiggia, a
    Catholic brother from Italy, who ran a hospital in Mutoyi (see Section
    2.c.). On October 19, two soldiers, including Napoleon Manirakiza, who
    was convicted of killing Bargiggia, were executed for murder without
    having had legal representation during their trial or a chance to
    appeal their convictions (see Section 1.e.). The other soldier, Rene
    Rukemanganisi, was convicted of killing Caritas Nahimana, the director
    of the Gitega medical school, and her two sons. These were the first
    executions since July 1999.
        Fighting between security forces and rebels resulted in a number of
    deaths. On February 14, there were reports that three rebel attacks on
    a regroupment camp in Kavumu commune, near Bujumbura, resulted in the
    deaths of at least six civilians (see Section 2.d.). It is unclear
    whether they were killed during fighting between security forces and
    rebels or as a result of security forces firing into the camp. On
    September 15, at least 11 persons reportedly were killed in Bujumbura's
    northern neighborhoods of Kamenge, Ngagara, and Gikizi, during fighting
    between security forces and rebels. It is unknown who initiated the
    fighting, although some reports place the blame on rebels. On November
    16, there were reports that several civilians were killed during
    fighting between security forces and rebels after security forces
    forced approximately 100 men to remove foliage from near the
    battleground (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that soldiers
    shot and killed some persons who tried to leave regroupment sites to
    which Hutus were relocated forcibly starting in September 1999 (see
    Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
        Deaths in prisons continued due to disease and malnutrition (see
    Section 1.c.); however, the number of such deaths decreased during the
    year.
        Comprehensive and accurate information about landmines was hard to
    obtain; however, the armed forces apparently used landmines to prevent
    rebels from accessing government territory. There were reports that the
    security forces mined the border with Tanzania in order to prevent
    rebels from crossing the border. An international organization received
    reports of 9 antipersonnel landmine incidents in the first 7 months of
    the year, a decrease from the 47 incidents reported during the previous
    12 months. The decline in reported incidents may be due in part to
    self-imposed limitations on the movement of U.N. personnel during the
    year. Other sources reported that in midApril a landmine that exploded
    on a footpath on the northeastern edge of the capital killed two women
    and three children.
        There were no developments in the October 1999 case of the soldier
    who killed six persons at the Ruyaga regroupment site. The Government
    did not conclude its investigation into reports that government
    soldiers killed 50 persons in August 1999, in Kanyosha on the outskirts
    of Bujumbura, or its investigation into reports that in December 1999
    soldiers shot and killed an unarmed FRODEBU Hutu parliamentarian. By
    year's end, the Government had not released the findings of an
    investigation into a January 1999 case in which soldiers killed more
    than 55 civilians in Mubone, Kabezi commune, Bujumbura Rural province,
    nor was any action taken against those responsible. There was no
    investigation nor action taken in a May 1999 case in which soldiers
    killed 11 Hutu civilians, including women and children, most of whom
    lived in the household of a man suspected of participating in the 1993
    killing of Tutsis. There was no investigation nor action taken in a
    July 1999 case in which soldiers killed 30 civilians in Kanyosha
    commune, Bujumbura Rural province.
        In September the U.N. formally protested the release of a
    lieutenant accused in the November 1998 killing of up to 200 persons in
    Mutambu commune, Bujumbura Rural province.
        In May 1999, the media reported a judgment in the trial of the 1993
    assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye. The Supreme Court
    sentenced 5 members of the army to death and 23 others to prison.
    Another 38 persons were acquitted, 10 cases were sent back to the court
    for further review, and 5 cases were dropped because the suspects had
    died. No high-ranking army officers were convicted, although charges
    originally were brought against many past and present senior army
    members. The new Attorney General, who is a Hutu, announced in June
    1999 that the case would be reopened; new trials are scheduled for
    January 2001.
        There was no investigation nor action taken in a January 1999 case
    in which 178 civilians were killed either by rebels or because they
    were caught in a crossfire between rebels and the army.
        Media and NGO reports indicate that about 200,000 persons, mostly
    civilians, have been killed in ethnic violence between October 1993 and
    the end of the year; however, the source of this figure is unclear. No
    credible countrywide casualty figures were available. The Government
    and security forces frequently have prevented journalists and human
    rights observers from going to areas where casualties occurred, making
    it difficult to gather information about the perpetrators and the
    victims. Much of the extrajudicial killing and property destruction
    during the year was concentrated in the province around the capital and
    in the southern and eastern provinces of Bururi, Makamba, Rutana, and
    Ruyigi.
        There were urban bombings during the year. For example, on August
    23, at least two persons were killed and several others were injured
    when a hand grenade exploded in the Buyenzi market, a suburb of
    Bujumbura. No suspect had been identified by year's end; however, in
    August the twin brother of a labor organizer was arrested for
    involvement in the attack (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
        In October there were reports that unidentified attackers killed an
    Italian nun in Gitega (see Section 2.c.). No suspect had been
    identified by year's end.
        Rebels killed persons near regroupment camps, sometimes during
    battles with government troops. Hutu rebels also killed Hutu and Tutsi
    civilians; Hutu rebels sometimes deliberately targeted and killed
    Tutsis. There are no definitive statistics available on how many
    persons were killed by Hutu rebels; the Government stated that rebels
    were responsible for the majority of civilian casualties. Rebels
    reportedly often kill persons for suspected collaboration with the
    regime and for their refusal to pay ``taxes'' to rebels. There were
    numerous reports throughout the year that Hutu rebels ambushed
    minibuses carrying persons on national highways, and robbed and killed
    the occupants. U.N. security forces reported 146 ambushes in the first
    7 months of the year; however, this figure probably does not represent
    all incidents.
        On March 5, rebels killed six persons in an ambush in the southern
    province of Makamba, on National Highway 3 between Mabanda and Nyanza
    Lac communes. On March 25, rebels killed seven Tutsi women and children
    in Bukeye commune, Muramvya province. Over the weekend of April 22 to
    23, rebels reportedly killed 3 persons in Bubanza province, 7 persons
    on National Route 1 in Bujumbura Rural province, and 16 persons in a
    camp for internally displaced Tutsis in Makamba province (see Section
    2.d.).
        On December 24 and 25, there were reports that hundreds of
    suspected rebels attacked the town of Bukemba, Rutana province, killed
    15 civilians, and injured 6 persons.
        On December 28, rebels shot and killed 20 persons and injured 20
    others on a road north of Bujumbura when they ambushed a civilian bus
    traveling from Kigali, Rwanda, to Bujumbura. By year's end, no one had
    claimed responsibility for the attack, nor had any perpetrator been
    identified.
        There were unconfirmed reports that rebels took landmines planted
    by government forces and later used them against the army.
        Government authorities blamed rebels for the October 1999 killings
    of two U.N. foreign staff members and seven others in Rutana province,
    and stated that the rebels had fled to Tanzania after the attack. No
    arrests were made in the case. Rebels accused the armed forces of
    committing the killings.
        b. Disappearance.--Human rights groups reported that abductions and
    disappearances occurred during the year, but no credible overall
    figures were available. There were no developments in the disappearance
    of three men in September 1999. Rebels were responsible for many of the
    disappearances, although credible reports suggest that such abductions
    were infrequent; rebels kidnaped and raped women (see Section 1.c.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Transitional Constitution Act prohibits these abuses;
    however, members of the security forces continued to torture and
    otherwise abuse persons. On February 15, a police officer allegedly
    tortured to death a domestic servant who insulted the officer's wife
    (see Section 1.a.). The officer was arrested later that day, but
    released on March 15. The U.N. protested his release. On February 26,
    police officers reportedly beat several persons while forcibly
    dispersing a demonstration against the peace talks; a number of persons
    were arrested (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). In early May, members of
    the security forces tortured and decapitated a man who threw stones at
    them because they were looting houses in the forced regroupment camp
    Kavumu, in Bujumbura Rural province (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). On
    November 16, there were reports that several civilians were injured
    during fighting between security forces and rebels after security
    forces forced approximately 100 men to remove foliage near the
    battleground (see Sections 1.a. and 6.c.). According to press reports,
    in December six university students were injured when security forces
    used tear gas to forcibly disperse a group of students demonstrating
    against exam schedules (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Government
    soldiers raped women in regroupment camps (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
    There were no known prosecutions of members of the security forces for
    these abuses.
        Government troops used excessive force in areas where there were
    civilians and often fired on Hutu civilians, stating that it was
    difficult to distinguish them from rebels.
        Landmine explosions resulted in some casualties (see Section 1.a.).
    For example, the domestic human rights organization, Iteka, reported
    that four persons from a forced regroupment camp in Bujumbura Rural
    province surrounding the capital were injured in a landmine explosion
    while working in their fields during the year (see Section 2.d.). It is
    unknown if the landmine was laid by government forces or by rebels.
        There also were reports that soldiers used children for forced
    labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
        At the end of the year, signs emerged of renewed government support
    for policing of the capital and countryside by armed civilians, which
    raised fears of the return of the militias created in 1995 to
    destabilize the then Hutu-led government. There have been unconfirmed
    reports that the Government armed civilians in Ruyigi, Rutana, and
    Bururi provinces.
        Rebels killed, beat, and stole from civilians, and kidnaped and
    raped women (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 5). Rebels used civilians,
    including children, for forced labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.).
    On December 24 and 25, hundreds of rebels attacked the town of Bukemba,
    Rutana province, injured 6 persons and killed approximately 15 others
    (see Section 1.a.). On December 28, rebels injured 20 persons, and
    killed 20 persons, when they ambushed a civilian bus traveling from
    Kigali, Rwanda, to Bujumbura (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions remained life threatening. Conditions in state-
    run prisons improved, largely due to efforts by the International
    Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to improve sanitation, hygiene,
    medical care, food, and water. However, severe overcrowding continued,
    prisoners still relied on family members to provide an adequate diet,
    and according to government officials, prisoners suffered from
    digestive illnesses, dysentery, and malaria. Harsh prison conditions
    contributed to the deaths of prisoners from disease and malnutrition.
    Approximately 10,000 inmates were housed in facilities built to
    accommodate a maximum of 3,650 persons, according to Iteka. With the
    return of the ICRC, the death rate in the prisons containing 80 percent
    of all inmates dropped from 2.3 deaths per 10,000 per day to 0.4 deaths
    per 10,000.
        International and local human rights monitors were permitted to
    visit prisons and speak with inmates (see Section 4).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--On January 1, a new
    criminal code that prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile
    took effect; however, the code was not respected and security forces
    arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Limits on the length of
    pretrial detention were not respected. The law requires arrest
    warrants, and presiding magistrates are authorized to issue arrest
    warrants. Police and gendarmes can make arrests without a warrant, but
    are required to submit a written report to a magistrate within 48
    hours. The law requires that suspects appear in court within 7 days. A
    magistrate can order the release of suspects or confirm charges and
    continue detention, initially for 15 days, then subsequently for
    periods of 30 days, as necessary to prepare the case for trial. The
    police are required to follow the same procedures as magistrates;
    however, the police have detained suspects for extended periods without
    announcing charges, certifying the cases, or forwarding them to the
    Ministry of Justice as required. Bail was permitted in some cases.
    Human rights organizations reported that incommunicado detention
    exists, although law prohibits it.
        There were numerous instances of arbitrary arrest. In March police
    arrested 20 teenage girls at a club for prostitution (see Sections 5
    and 6.d.). In May security forces arrested seven residents of the
    Kavumu regroupment camp in Bujumbura Rural province while conducting a
    search of residences (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.); one of the seven
    later was found decapitated (see Section 1.a.). In August police
    arrested the twin brother of a labor organizer who called for a general
    strike and accused the twin brother of involvement in a grenade attack
    on the Buyenzi market (see Sections 1.c. and 6.a.)
        There were numerous instances of the arbitrary arrest of persons
    demonstrating against the peace process (see Section 2.b.). On February
    7, authorities in Bujumbura arrested and detained for 1 week at least
    eight persons who were demonstrating against the Arusha peace talks
    (see Section 2.b.). On February 26, police arrested and detained for 1
    week 11 participants during another demonstration against the peace
    talks (see Section 2.b.). On March 25 security forces dispersed,
    arrested, and detained briefly several persons demonstrating against
    the peace process (see Section 2.b.). On April 19, authorities
    reportedly arrested and fined 15 persons also protesting the peace
    process. On August 18, authorities arrested and detained several
    protesters during a rally against the peace process, including the
    president of a labor union (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). On August 20,
    police arrested Diomede Rutamucero, president of a self-described
    mainly Tutsi self-defense group PA-Amasekanya, for holding a non-
    violent demonstration against aspects of the peace process on August 19
    (see Section 2.b.). Rutamucero was detained for longer than a week
    before he appeared before a judge and was fined.
        The disruption of the political process and the generally poor
    security conditions severely impeded the judicial process.
        The ICRC estimates that the prison population is approximately
    8,700 persons and that 70 percent of those are pretrial detainees.
    According to the local human rights organization, Iteka, an estimated
    3,255 pretrial detainees constituted 54 percent of the total prison
    population at year's end, down from 78 percent the previous year. The
    decline was due to government efforts to release prisoners while
    pending trial, to the release of prisoners charged with minor crimes,
    or those released because there was not enough evidence to support an
    indictment. By year's end, the Government had released approximately
    1,000 prisoners without files.
        The Government does not used forced exile as a means of political
    control; however, many persons remained in voluntary exile in Belgium,
    Kenya, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and
    elsewhere. Some senior authorities maintain members of their families
    outside the country. A number of officials of the Government of deposed
    president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, who fled the country in 1996, have
    not yet returned.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Transitional Constitutional
    Act provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the
    judiciary is not independent of the executive and is dominated by
    ethnic Tutsis. Reform of the judicial system is a priority of the peace
    accord, which has not yet been implemented. An international human
    rights organization estimated that ethnic Hutus account for only 10
    percent of the country's lawyers and 5 percent of High Court judges; in
    lower courts, 10 percent of the judges are Hutu, although Hutus
    constitute an estimated 85 percent of the population. This discrepancy
    is due in part to unequal access to education, and in part to the
    conflict in which a number of Hutu judges and lawyers were killed or
    fled the country. Most citizens assume that the courts promote the
    interests of the dominant Tutsi minority; members of the Hutu majority
    believe that the judicial system is biased against them.
        The judicial system is divided into civil and criminal courts with
    the Supreme Court at the apex. The armed forces have a separate
    judicial system, and there is a labor court.
        Citizens generally did not have regular access to civilian and
    military court proceedings. Defendants in theory are presumed innocent
    and have the right to appeal; however, in practice some lawyers say
    that the structure of the court system inappropriately limits the
    possibility of appeals for defendants accused of the most serious
    crimes. While defendants have a right to counsel and to defend
    themselves, in practice few have legal representation. The civil court
    system functions, but the lack of a well-trained and adequately funded
    judiciary constrains expeditious proceedings. Many citizens have lost
    confidence in the system's ability to provide even basic protection.
    The majority of persons arrested on criminal charges since October 1993
    remain in pretrial custody.
        On January 1, a new criminal code took effect that provides for
    suspects' rights to a lawyer before official charges are filed and
    during pretrial investigations; however, not all aspects of the new
    code were respected, particularly the section that requires that
    detainees be charged and appear in court within 7 days of their arrest.
    Authorities sometimes are unable to carry out their investigations or
    transport suspects and witnesses to the appropriate court due to
    resource constraints and poor security conditions.
        On October 19, two soldiers, including one convicted of killing
    Antonio Bargiggia, were executed for murder without having had legal
    representation during their trial or the chance to appeal their
    convictions (see Section 1.a.). These were the first executions since
    July 1999. According to the law, the prisoners had a right to appeal to
    the military's court of appeal, then to the Supreme Court, and then to
    the President for clemency; however, this process did not occur.
        The Government holds political prisoners. An international
    organization estimated that up to 2,000 of all convicted inmates were
    being held for political crimes; however, no reliable figures are
    available. Charges against defendants convicted for nonpolitical crimes
    sometimes are politically motivated. The peace agreement, which has not
    been implemented, calls for the creation, within 30 days of the
    installation of the transitional government, of a commission to
    investigate and make recommendations on the existence and release of
    any political prisoners.
        According to the ICRC, an agreement is in place between the ICRC
    and the Ministries of Justice and Defense regarding access to prisoners
    and detained persons, including persons detained for ``reasons relating
    to the conflict.'' The Ministries cooperate with the ICRC; however, the
    ICRC did not have a formal agreement with the Ministry of the Interior
    at year's end.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Transitional Constitutional Act provides for the
    right to privacy; however, the authorities do not respect the law
    requiring search warrants. Security forces widely are believed to
    monitor telephones regularly.
        In 1999 the Government forcibly relocated approximately 330,000
    mainly Hutu inhabitants of Bujumbura Rural province in regroupment
    camps where security forces could more readily monitor and control
    their movements (see Section 2.d.). The sites were opened in September
    1999, and had inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to water,
    food, shelter, and medicine. The Government's stated rationale for
    these forced relocations was to protect the regrouped population from
    rebel attacks. In May security forces conducted a search of residences
    at the Kavumu regroupment camp in Bujumbura Rural. Residents protested
    that soldiers stole their belongings and some of the residents threw
    rocks at the soldiers. Seven residents were arrested (see Section
    1.d.); one of the seven later was found decapitated (see Section 1.a.).
    A National Assembly committee on human rights launched an investigation
    in May; however, no findings were made public by year's end. All of the
    regroupment sites were closed by August. Many of the residents of the
    regroupment camps returned home to find their fields ravaged, their
    homes looted or destroyed, and their livestock gone. Observers believe
    that members of both the military and the rebels were responsible for
    the damage.
        International humanitarian aid agencies could not reach some of the
    Government's forced regroupment camps in remote sections of Bujumbura
    Rural province due to lack of infrastructure or because they were
    prevented from doing so by security forces (see Sections 2.d. and 4).
    These camps, composed of mainly Hutu residents, reportedly had
    insufficient water, food, sanitation, medicine, and shelter.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Transitional Constitutional
    Act does not impose restrictions on the media; however, the Government
    restricts freedom of speech and of the press. A press law requires that
    newspaper articles undergo review by a government censor 4 days before
    publication, and the Government controls the media and harasses and
    detains journalists.
        The regime controlled much of the news, since it owns the only
    regularly published newspaper and the major radio and television
    stations. The government-owned Le Renouveau was published 3 times a
    week. Other newspapers, including at least one opposition newspaper,
    appeared irregularly. Political tracts circulated, and two private
    faxed newsheets were published almost daily. These represented mainly
    Tutsi political viewpoints. The National Communications Council
    prevented the publication of one edition of the FRODEBU opposition
    political party's newspaper, La Lumiere, in July (see Section 3).
    Journalists practice self-censorship.
        The Government and its security forces harass journalists,
    questioning or detaining them or having their property searched and
    seized. In September the editor and a journalist of a private faxed
    newsheet were detained for 1 week and interrogated about their sources
    in a criminal investigation against the twin brother of a labor leader
    (see Sections 1.d. and 6.b.).
        The government-owned radio broadcasts in the Kirundi language,
    French, and Swahili, and offers limited English programming. The
    private radio station, Umwizero, is financed by international donors
    and broadcasts in French and Kirundi. Listeners also can receive
    transmissions of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Voice
    of America, and Radio France Internationale. On March 21, the National
    Communications Council and the BBC signed an agreement allowing the BBC
    to begin broadcasting from within the country; the BBC began
    broadcasting later in the spring.
        No laws or regulations limit academic freedom, and no persons at
    the University of Burundi were persecuted for what they published or
    said. However, the population at the state university remains primarily
    ethnic Tutsi. Tensions have flared occasionally between Hutu and Tutsi
    students on campus, where politically and ethnically motivated killings
    occurred in 1995 and 1996. According to press reports, in December
    security forces forcibly dispersed university students demonstrating
    against exam schedules, which resulted in several injuries (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In December 1999, the staff of the University
    of Burundi held a series of strikes, which ended in the spring (see
    Section 6.a.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    restricts freedom of assembly. It banned several meetings by mainly
    Tutsi groups critical of government policy and the peace process (see
    Section 3). On June 24, police prevented a meeting organized by the
    Tutsi group, PA-Amasekanya, by locking the doors of the assembly hall.
        The Transitional Constitutional Act permits political
    demonstrations, but in practice the Government has allowed none. During
    the year, police arrested protesters taking part in a series of non-
    violent protests against the peace process. On February 7, authorities
    in Bujumbura arrested at least eight persons who were demonstrating
    against the Arusha peace talks (see Section 1.d.). On February 26,
    police forcibly dispersed 1,000 unauthorized persons demonstrating
    against the peace talks; 11 persons were arrested (see Section 1.d.).
    There were reports that police beat some of the protesters (see Section
    1.c.). On February 27, police and gendarmes prohibited members of
    organized clubs from going on weekly runs or runs with members of clubs
    in which political ideas are discussed. On March 25 and April 19,
    security forces dispersed and arrested several persons demonstrating
    against the peace process (see Section 1.d.). On August 18 and 19,
    protesters demonstrated against the peace process. On August 18,
    protesters attempted to implement a ``ville morte'' or dead city strike
    by shutting down road traffic on one of the national routes; university
    students then threw rocks and tree limbs onto the street near the
    university campus; however, security forces intervened and reopened the
    road. On August 19, police dispersed approximately 100 persons marching
    in Bujumbura to protest the peace talks and on August 20, arrested
    Diomede Rutamucero, president of PAAmasekanya, which organized the
    march (see Section 1.d.). Authorities arrested and detained several
    protesters during the August 18 rally (see Section 1.d.), including
    PierreClaver Hajayandi, President of the Confederation of Burundi
    Unions (COSYBU), which organized the rally (see Section 6.a.).
    According to press reports, in December security forces used tear gas
    to forcibly disperse university students demonstrating against exam
    schedules, which resulted in injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
        The Government restricts freedom of association and has arrested
    members of organizations and political parties. The Transitional
    Constitutional Act permits political parties to operate; however, the
    regime places restrictions on groups critical of its policies.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Transitional Constitutional Act
    provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice.
        The Government requires religious groups to register with the
    Ministry of Internal Affairs, which keeps track of their leadership and
    activities. The Government requires that religious groups have a
    headquarters in the country. Once registered, religious organizations
    enjoy taxfree status, and clergy theoretically do not have to pay duty
    on purchased goods. However, one religious group reported that it was
    required to pay duty on all imported goods, except books and other
    publications.
        On October 3, soldiers shot and killed Antonio Bargiggia, a
    Catholic brother from Italy, who ran a hospital in Mutoyi (see Section
    1.a.). In October there were reports that unidentified attackers killed
    an Italian nun in Gitega (see Section 1.a.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Immigration, and Repatriation.--The Transitional Constitutional Act
    provides for these rights; however, the Government restricts these
    rights in practice. There was a government-imposed curfew in parts of
    the country; in Bujumbura the curfew begins at 11 p.m. and ends at 5
    a.m. During the first half of the year, the Government continued its
    forced regroupment policy that required approximately 330,000 Hutus
    from Bujumbura Rural province to live in governmentcontrolled camps
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.). Residents of parts of Bujumbura Rural
    more heavily populated by Tutsis were not subject to relocation. The
    relocated population at times lacked access to food, safe drinking
    water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. Some regroupment
    camps were difficult to access (see Sections 1.f. and 4). Authorities
    stated that they were relocating the population to protect it from
    rebels, but the displacements also were used to separate rebels from
    the relocated population and to impede civilian assistance to rebels.
    Inhabitants of these sites raised some of their own food with the
    permission of the armed forces; however, residents were not given full
    access to their fields. Unlike in the previous year, there were no
    reports that persons who tried to leave the sites were shot by
    soldiers.
        On February 14, there were reports that three rebel attacks on a
    regroupment camp in Kavumu commune, near Bujumbura, resulted in the
    deaths of at least six civilians (see Section 1.a.).
        In early May, members of the security forces tortured and
    decapitated a man who had thrown stones at them while they looted
    houses in the forced regroupment camp Kavumu, in Bujumbura Rural
    province (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
        According to the U.N., there were 324,100 internally displaced
    persons (IDP's) living in 212 sites at year's end, which represents
    about 5 percent of the total population. Many were Tutsis who fled to
    other parts of the country starting in 1993 because of ethnic violence
    and never returned home. Soldiers did not restrict the movement of
    residents of IDP camps. Soldiers guarding these camps provide a measure
    of protection to camp inhabitants; however, they sometimes committed
    human rights abuses against them (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.). Camp
    inhabitants often were required to perform labor for the soldiers
    without compensation (see Section 6.c.).
        Persons who remain outside the sites reportedly were killed by Hutu
    rebels for allegedly collaborating with authorities and by the armed
    forces on suspicion of collaborating with the rebels (see Section
    1.a.). Over the weekend of April 22 to 23, rebels reportedly killed 16
    persons in a camp for internally displaced Tutsis in Makamba province
    (see Section 1.a.).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the
    authorities restricted foreign travel for political reasons. The
    majority of citizens could travel legally in and out of the country.
    Travel within the country was possible but could be hazardous in areas
    of rebel activity, particularly in parts of Bujumbura Rural, Bururi,
    Rutana, Ruyigi, and Makamba provinces.
        Real and claimed insecurity in rural areas was cited by the
    Government in denying access to some areas of the country to human
    rights observers (see Section 4).
        The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention on
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, there is a
    special ad hoc administrative body in the Government that coordinates
    refugees, and the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government has granted first asylum in recent
    years. Approximately 23,600 citizens of the DRC live in Burundi, many
    of whom claim asylum. Of these, about 1,400 are ethnic Tutsi known as
    Banyamulenge. Rwandan refugees who fled the 1994 ethnic massacres in
    Rwanda departed the country by 1997. Another 200,000 Rwandans who came
    in earlier waves of refugees, some as early as 1959, are not registered
    officially with the UNHCR and are integrated into Burundian society.
        The UNHCR reported that as of the end of September, about 10,000
    Burundian refugees had returned during the year from Rwanda, Tanzania,
    the DRC, and other countries. During the same period, an estimated
    47,528 persons fled to Tanzania, according to the UNHCR. Approximately
    563,700 refugees, most of them Hutu, remained in Tanzania. About 200,00
    of these persons fled as early as 1972, and many fled following the
    assassination of former president Ndadaye in October 1993. Another
    23,408 refugees, most of them Hutu, are in Angola, Cameroon, the DRC,
    the Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia.
        There were unconfirmed reports that the Government had hired
    mercenaries to invade refugee camps in Tanzania; however, the
    Government strongly denied these reports.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
    Transitional Constitutional Act makes no provision for elections. The
    1992 Constitution and 1994 Convention of Government were suspended by
    the Buyoya military regime that assumed power on July 25, 1996, in a
    bloodless coup. On that date, the regime dissolved the National
    Assembly and banned political parties. About 3 weeks later, Buyoya
    announced the restoration of the National Assembly and political
    parties with certain restrictions. The opposition party, FRODEBU, which
    is mostly ethnic Hutu, holds just over half of the National Assembly
    seats.
        In April 1998, multiparty peace talks began in Arusha, Tanzania,
    and the Government subsequently launched an internal peace process. On
    June 4, 1998, Buyoya's regime and the National Assembly entered into a
    partnership agreement. The National Assembly adopted the Transitional
    Constitutional Act and a Transitional Political Platform. The act
    changed the structure of government by eliminating the post of prime
    minister, creating two vice presidents, removing the National Assembly
    Speaker from the line of presidential succession, and enlarging the
    National Assembly. The act placed no time limits on the President's or
    the National Assembly's term of office. On August 28, the Buyoya regime
    and other groups present at the peace talks signed a peace agreement,
    which was ratified by the National Assembly on November 30. The August
    28 peace agreement instructs the country's next transitional government
    to hold local, national, and presidential elections within a 3-year
    period, and to oversee elections for a newly formed Senate; however,
    this agreement was not implemented by year's end. Representation of
    both Hutus and Tutsis in institutions, including the army, the National
    Assembly, and a proposed Senate, is a key component of the agreement.
        The Transitional Political Platform endorses in general terms the
    restoration of democracy and correction of the ethnic imbalance within
    the army and the judicial system. It calls for the creation of an
    international tribunal to try crimes of genocide. Although the peace
    accord also provides for such a tribunal as well as a National Truth
    and Reconciliation Commission to investigate other crimes, the
    agreement had not been implemented and no tribunal had been created by
    year's end.
        On June 12, 1998, a new Government was announced in which the First
    Vice President and 10 of the 22 cabinet ministers are members of
    FRODEBU. The Cabinet includes 12 Hutus, including the Minister of
    External Relations. Progovernment ethnic Tutsi members hold the key
    Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Finance.
        Under the 1992 Constitution, deposed President Ntibantunganya would
    have remained in office until 1998. The last elections to fill the
    Assembly took place in June 1993. The Transitional Constitutional Act
    stipulates that the National Assembly shall consist of 121
    parliamentarians: Those elected in 1993 who sat in the previous
    National Assembly, plus 40 new members28 members of civil society
    appointed by the President and one representative each (selected by
    their respective parties) from all 12 officially recognized political
    parties not previously represented. Not all of those elected in 1993
    are alive or in the country, and the vacant seats were filled by
    substitutes from the same political party as the original
    parliamentarian. Tutsi supporters of the Government filled 22 of the 40
    new seats.
        Political parties operate under significant constraints. The
    National Communications Council prevented the publication of one
    edition of the FRODEBU opposition political party's newspaper, La
    Lumiere, in July (see Section 2.a.). The Government banned several
    meetings by mainly Tutsi groups critical of government policy and the
    peace process. On June 24, police prevented a meeting organized by the
    Tutsi group, PA-Amasekanya, by locking the doors of the assembly hall
    (see Section 2.b.).
        Police often disrupted political demonstrations and beat and
    arrested demonstrators (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
        The National Assembly has nominal budgetary oversight, but the
    Council of Ministers legally can enact a budget if the National
    Assembly fails to do so. The Transitional Constitutional Act gives the
    President the authority to declare a state of emergency by decree after
    consulting with the National Assembly Speaker, the Constitutional
    Court, and the National Security Council, which has not been convened
    since 1996.
        No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women; however,
    women are underrepresented in government and politics. Of the 22
    cabinet seats, 1 is filled by a woman, who serves as the Minister of
    Women, Welfare, and Social Affairs. In 1993 women were elected to 9 of
    81 seats in the National Assembly. The expansion of the National
    Assembly and the filling of vacant seats have brought the total number
    of female parliamentarians to 17. Two of the nine members of the
    Supreme Court are women, as are three of the seven Constitutional Court
    members, including its president.
        No legal restrictions hinder the participation of indigenous
    people; however, the ethnic Twa (Pygmies) are underrepresented in
    government and politics. About 1 percent of the population is Twa, but
    there are no Twa in the Cabinet. One Twa is an appointed member of the
    National Assembly (see Section 5). Under the peace accord, up to three
    Twa could be appointed to sit in the Senate.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic human rights groups received varying degrees of
    cooperation from government ministries. The local human rights group,
    Iteka, continued to operate and publish a newsletter. Human Rights
    Watch maintained an office in the country. Amnesty International
    representatives visited the country several times during the year, and
    the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visited once during the
    year. The office of the UNHCR maintained a three-person observer team,
    down from nine observers in 1999. The observer reductions resulted from
    security restrictions following an October 1999 attack on a U.N.
    humanitarian mission.
        Real and claimed insecurity in rural areas was cited by the
    Government in denying access to journalists, international relief
    workers, and human rights observers to some areas of the country,
    including to regroupment camps (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). Army
    elements in the field frequently denied access to human rights
    observers where the army was accused of human rights violations. Human
    rights NGO's frequently were unable to investigate reports of killings
    due to these restrictions. In the spring, the U.N. resumed normal field
    operations in much of the country following the deaths of two workers
    in 1999 (see Section 1.a.); however, many areas of the country,
    particularly near Bujumbura, near the border with the DRC, and near the
    border with Tanzania, remain off limits for normal operations.
        On May 21 and 22, rebels attacked the city of Makamba; no injuries
    were reported. There were reports that the target of the attack was
    Doctors Without Borders, an international NGO.
        On November 25, on the road between Bujumbura and Gitega, a group
    of men, some allegedly dressed in military uniform, robbed at gunpoint
    a truck belonging to World Vision, an international NGO.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
            or Social Status
        The Transitional Constitutional Act provides equal status and
    protection for all citizens, without distinction based on sex, origin,
    ethnicity, religion, or opinion; however, the Government failed to
    implement effectively the act's provisions and discrimination persists.
    Hutus continued to perceive, correctly, that the Tutsi-dominated
    Government and army discriminate against them. The question of
    exclusion was a central question during the peace talks.
        Women.--Violence against women occurred, but its extent is
    undocumented. Wives have the right to charge their husbands with
    physical abuse, but they rarely do so. Police normally do not intervene
    in domestic disputes, and the media rarely report incidents of violence
    against women. No known court cases dealt with the abuse of women.
        Women face legal and societal discrimination. Explicitly
    discriminatory inheritance laws and credit practices continued. By law
    women must receive the same pay as men for the same work, but in
    practice they do not. Women are far less likely to hold mid-level or
    high-level positions. In rural areas, women traditionally perform hard
    farm work, marry and have children at an early age, and have fewer
    opportunities for education than men.
        Rebels kidnaped and raped women, although credible reports suggest
    that such incidents were infrequent (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
        Children.--The law provides for children's health and welfare, but
    the Government cannot adequately satisfy the needs of children and, in
    particular, of the large population of orphans resulting from the
    violence since 1993 and HIV/AIDS. Many of the victims in the civil war
    are children, and many children have lost family members and witnessed
    violence.
        More than a quarter of the primary schools have been destroyed in
    the war, and many teachers have been killed. Teacher training has been
    interrupted, and it is difficult to find qualified teachers to work in
    the provinces most affected by fighting. The Government provides
    elementary education at nominal cost through grade six; however,
    inequitable distribution of educational resources favors those children
    in southern and central areas of the country, according to
    International Alert, an international NGO. The Government estimates
    that approximately 45 percent of children are enrolled in primary
    school and approximately 44 percent of children are enrolled in
    secondary school.
        Teenage prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.d.). During the
    year, the Government began a campaign to curb underage prostitution in
    Bujumbura. In March police arrested, detained for several days, and
    fined 20 teenage girls at a club for prostitution.
        There were reports that soldiers used children for forced labor
    (see Section 6.c.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted
    legislation or otherwise mandated access to buildings or government
    services for persons with disabilities. Discrimination against the
    disabled is a problem. There are few job opportunities for the
    physically disabled in the country, where most jobs involve significant
    manual labor.
        Indigenous People.--The Twa (Pygmies), who are believed to be the
    country's earliest inhabitants, now make up about 1 percent of the
    population, and generally remain marginalized economically, socially,
    and politically. Most Twa live in isolation, without formal education,
    and without access to government services, including health care.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal national problems
    continued to be ethnic conflict between the majority Hutus and the
    minority Tutsis, and regional inequities between southern Bururi
    province and much of the rest of the country. Almost 4 decades of
    violence and systematic discrimination have exacerbated the genocide
    and exclusion fears of both Tutsis and Hutus. Tutsis claim to have been
    the targets of genocide carried out in 1993 by Hutus angered by the
    assassination of democratically elected Hutu president Ndadaye. The
    Tutsis, particularly southern Tutsis, historically have held power, and
    they dominate educated society and control the security forces. In 1996
    Major Pierre Buyoya, a southern Tutsi, deposed President
    Ntibantunganya, a central Hutu, in a coup.
        The Transitional Constitutional Act provides equal status and
    protection for all citizens, without distinction based on sex, origin,
    ethnicity, religion, or opinion; however, the Government failed to
    implement effectively the act's provisions. The Tutsi-dominated
    Government and army discriminate against Hutus. Northern and eastern
    Tutsis also have a more difficult time acceding to positions of power.
    State discrimination against Hutus, who constitute an estimated 85
    percent of the population, affects every facet of society, but most
    strikingly higher education and certain branches of the Government such
    as the armed services and the judicial system. The President and the
    Tutsi-dominated army retain their dominance in decision-making and do
    not share power equally with Hutu members of the Government.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code protects the rights of
    workers to form unions; however, the army, gendarmerie, and foreigners
    working in the public sector are prohibited from union participation.
    Most union workers are urban civil servants.
        According to the Confederation of Free Unions of Burundi (CSB), an
    umbrella trade union, 60 percent of the 80,000 formal private sector
    employees are unionized. All employees in the public sector, except
    those prohibited by law, are unionized.
        Since gaining independence from the Government in 1992, the CSB has
    been dependent financially on a system of checkoffs, or voluntary
    contributions, as are local unions. In 1995 a rival trade union, the
    Confederation of Burundi Unions (COSYBU), was founded. Both COSYBU and
    the CSB represented labor in collective bargaining negotiations in
    cooperation with individual labor unions during the year.
        Tutsis dominate the formal sector of the economy and the unions.
        The Labor Code permits the formation of additional unions or
    confederations outside the CSB. When settling disputes in which more
    than one labor union is represented, the law stipulates that the
    Minister of Labor must choose the union representing the greatest
    number of workers to participate in the negotiations.
        The Labor Code provides workers with a restricted right to strike.
    The restrictions on the right to strike and to lock out include: All
    other peaceful means of resolution must be exhausted prior to the
    strike action; negotiations must continue during the action, mediated
    by a mutually agreed upon party or by the Government; and 6 days'
    notice must be given. The law prohibits retribution against workers
    participating in a legal strike; however, this provision was not
    respected.
        In December 1999, the staff of the University of Burundi held a
    series of strikes, which ended in the spring (see Section 2.a.). In
    January civil servants held several strikes to protest price and tax
    hikes; however, the strikes were not observed widely due to government
    intimidation. All striking employees returned to work on January 19.
    The Government initially had agreed to negotiate with COSYBU, but later
    refused. The vice president of the union was arrested twice, but
    released.
        On August 18, authorities arrested and detained several protesters
    during a rally against the peace process (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.),
    including Pierre-Claver Hajayandi, President of the COSYBU, which
    organized the rally. In September police arrested a labor organizer who
    called for a general strike against government policies. The
    organizer's twin brother, whom they accused of involvement in a grenade
    attack on a popular market (see Section 1.c.), also was arrested (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Unions are able to affiliate with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    recognizes the right to collective bargaining, formerly acknowledged
    only by ordinance. Since most workers are civil servants, government
    entities are involved in almost every phase of labor negotiations.
        Public sector wages are set in fixed scales in individual contracts
    and are not affected by collective bargaining. In the private sector,
    wage scales also exist, but individual contract negotiation is
    possible.
        The Labor Code gives the Labor Court jurisdiction over all labor
    dispute cases, including those involving public employees. Negotiations
    are conducted largely under the supervision of the tripartite National
    Labor Council, the Government's highest consultative authority on labor
    issues. The Council represents government, labor, and management and is
    presided over and regulated by the Minister of Labor.
        The Labor Code prohibits employers from firing or otherwise
    discriminating against a worker because of union affiliation or
    activity. This right is upheld in practice.
        There are no functioning export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    the performance of forced or compulsory labor; however, soldiers
    guarding internally displaced persons sites and soldiers at military
    posts often require persons to cook, fetch water, chop wood, work in
    the fields of military leaders, and perform other chores without
    compensation (see Section 2.d.). The military also require persons to
    perform regular night watches.
        The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however,
    there were reports that soldiers forced children to perform occasional
    tasks, such as carrying supplies.
        On November 16, there were reports that security forces forced
    approximately 100 men from the northern neighborhoods of Bujumbura to
    remove foliage near Tenga, a densely wooded area where security forces
    were fighting with rebels. Several civilians were killed or injured
    during the fighting (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Rebel groups also require the rural population to perform
    uncompensated labor, including the transport of rebel supplies and
    weapons. Rebels also recruit and use children for labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code states that children under the age of 16
    cannot be employed by ``an enterprise'' even as apprentices, although
    it also states that they may undertake occasional work that does not
    damage their health or interfere with their schooling. In practice
    children under the age of 16 in rural areas do heavy manual labor in
    the daytime during the school year.
        The minimum age for military service is 18, but observers believe
    that there are some children below that age in the military.
        Children are prohibited legally from working at night, although
    many do so in the informal sector. Most of the population lives by
    subsistence agriculture, and children are obliged by custom and
    economic necessity to participate in subsistence agriculture, family-
    based enterprises, and the informal sector.
        Teenage prostitution is a problem (see Section 5).
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however,
    there were reports that it occurred (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The formal minimum wage for
    unskilled workers is $0.21 (160 francs) per day in the cities Bujumbura
    and Gitega and $0.14 (105 francs) in the rest of the country, with a
    graduated scale for greater skill levels. This amount does not allow a
    worker and family to maintain a decent standard of living, and most
    families rely on second incomes and subsistence agriculture to
    supplement their earnings.
        Unionized employees, particularly in urban areas, generally earn
    significantly more than the minimum wage. Public sector wages are set
    by agreement between the Government and either the CSB or COSYBU. The
    government wage scale has remained unchanged since 1992, but
    allowances, such as the one for housing, have risen.
        The Labor Code stipulates an 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek,
    except in cases where workers are involved in activities related to
    national security. Supplements must be paid for overtime. Foreign
    workers are protected by law and are not subject to discrimination.
        The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that require
    an employer to provide a safe workplace and assigns enforcement
    responsibility to the Minister of Labor. However, the Ministry does not
    enforce the code effectively. Health and safety articles in the Labor
    Code do not address directly workers' rights to remove themselves from
    dangerous tasks.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    CAMEROON

        Cameroon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Since
    independence a single party, now called the Cameroon People's
    Democratic Movement (CPDM), has remained in power and limited political
    choice. In October 1997, CPDM leader Paul Biya won reelection as
    President in an election boycotted by the three main opposition
    parties, marred by a wide range of procedural flaws, and generally
    considered by observers not to be free and fair. Although the
    Government legalized opposition parties in 1990 after widespread
    protests, most subsequent elections, including the May 1997 legislative
    elections, which were dominated by the CPDM, were flawed by numerous
    irregularities. International and local observers generally consider
    the election process, which is controlled by the Government's Ministry
    of Territorial Administration, as not free and fair. No President has
    ever left office in consequence of an election. The President retains
    the power to control legislation or to rule by decree. In the National
    Assembly, government bills take precedence over other bills, and no
    bills other than government bills have been enacted since 1991,
    although the Assembly sometimes has not enacted legislation proposed by
    the Government. The President repeatedly has used his control of the
    legislature to change the Constitution. The 1996 Constitution
    lengthened the President's term of office to 7 years, while continuing
    to allow Biya to run for a fourth consecutive term in 1997 and making
    him eligible to run for one more 7-year term in 2004. In July the
    Government began discussions on an action plan to create the
    decentralized institutions envisioned in the 1996 constitution, such as
    a partially elected senate, elected regional councils, and a more
    independent judiciary. Government timetables for establishing these
    bodies extend until 2004. Although the country's first local government
    elections were held in 1996, President Biya limited their scope in many
    pro-opposition cities by expanding the number of municipal governments
    led by presidentially appointed delegates rather than headed by mayors
    chosen by the directly-elected municipal councils. The Government
    remained highly centralized and is dominated by the presidency. The
    judiciary is subject to political influence and suffers from corruption
    and inefficiency.
        Internal security responsibilities are shared by the national
    police (DGSN), the National Intelligence Service (DGRE), the
    gendarmerie, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, military
    intelligence, the army, and to a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard.
    On February 20, the Government created a military Operational Command
    to fight crime in Douala and the Littoral Province. The police and the
    gendarmerie have dominant roles in enforcing internal security laws.
    The security forces, including the military forces, remain under the
    effective control of the President, the civilian Minister of Defense,
    and the civilian head of police. The security forces continued to
    commit numerous serious human rights abuses.
        The country's population of approximately 15 million had a recorded
    mean per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of approximately $607.
    Economic growth has continued over the past 4 years, despite decreases
    in world prices for the country's major primary product exports. Over
    the past 3 years, GNP growth has averaged 4 to 5 percent annually;
    however, economic recovery continues to be inhibited by a large
    inefficient parastatal sector, excessive public sector employment, and
    the Government's inability to deregulate the economy to attract more
    investment. Widespread corruption in government and business also
    impedes growth. Members of the Beti and Bulu ethnic groups dominate the
    civil service and the management of state-owned businesses. The
    majority of the population is rural, and agriculture accounts for 25
    percent of GNP. Principal exports include timber, coffee, cocoa,
    cotton, bananas, and rubber. The Government also continued to receive
    substantial assistance from international financial institutions.
        The Government's human rights record continued to be generally
    poor, and government officials continued to commit numerous serious
    abuses. Citizens' ability to change their government remained limited.
    Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings; were
    responsible for disappearances, some of which may have been motivated
    politically; and tortured, often beat, and otherwise abused detainees
    and prisoners, generally with impunity. However, the Government
    prosecuted a few of the most egregious offenders, including some who
    were convicted and sentenced to prison terms and others who remain in
    prison awaiting trial. Conditions remained harsh and life threatening
    in almost all prisons, although the Government granted international
    humanitarian organizations access to prisoners. Security forces
    continued to arrest and detain arbitrarily various opposition
    politicians, local human rights monitors, and other citizens, often
    holding them for prolonged periods, often without charges or a chance
    for trial and, at times, incommunicado. The judiciary remained corrupt,
    inefficient, and subject to political influence. At times military
    tribunals exercise criminal jurisdiction over civilians, which in the
    past denied some civilians fair trials. Security forces conducted
    illegal searches and harassed citizens. The Government infringed on
    citizens' privacy and monitored and harassed some opposition activists.
    The Government continued to impose limits on press freedom. Although
    private newspapers enjoyed considerable latitude to publish their
    views, journalists continued to be subject to official and, on
    occasion, serious harassment. There were no reports that the Government
    seized newspaper editions; however, the Government continued its
    prosecutions of pro-opposition journalists under criminal libel laws.
    The Government continued to obtain convictions against journalists
    under these laws. In July the Government implemented a 1990 law
    designed to end its virtual monopoly of domestic broadcast media. Five
    radio stations subsequently applied for licenses to operate and
    continued to broadcast pending final authorization. The Government
    restricted freedom of assembly and association. At times the Government
    used its security forces to inhibit political parties from holding
    public meetings. Government security forces limited freedom of
    movement. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
    problems. The abuse of children was a problem and female genital
    mutilation (FGM) persisted in some areas. Discrimination against
    indigenous Pygmies continued. Societal discrimination based on religion
    persisted in some areas. Discrimination against ethnic minorities
    remained widespread. The Government continued to infringe on workers'
    rights, and restricted the activities of independent labor
    organizations. Child labor remained a serious problem. Slavery
    reportedly persisted in northern parts of the country. Forced labor,
    including forced child labor, was a problem. There were reports of
    trafficking in persons, primarily children, for purposes of forced
    labor. Mob violence continued to result in some deaths.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political killings; however, the security forces
    continued to use excessive, lethal force against private citizens and
    committed numerous extrajudicial killings.
        In mid-January Atangana, a gendarme serving at the Douala port,
    shot and killed Alhadji Bapetel, a customs officer also serving at the
    port. The shooting followed a quarrel over authority issues. The
    Government arrested the gendarme, who was awaiting trial on charges of
    ``assault occasioning death'' at year's end.
        On March 2, an unidentified Douala soldier, who reportedly was
    drunk, shot and killed Pascal Kalo, a young Nigerian businessman. The
    death occurred after the soldier shot wildly at a group of customers
    who left the bar without paying their bill, but instead hit Kalo, who
    was eating dinner in a nearby restaurant. Reportedly there was no
    investigation nor action taken in this case by year's end.
        On April 6, police officers beat to death Emmanuel Ebanda, a porter
    at the Douala International Airport (see Section 1.c.). The police
    claim that Ebanda died because he beat his own head against the wall;
    however, a jailed witness contests these charges, claiming that he
    called repeatedly for medical assistance for Ebanda, but that the
    police ignored his pleas. The police investigated the case and on
    August 21, three police officers were arrested; they remained in
    detention pending trial at year's end.
        On May 7, a police officer by the name of Bahiga shot and killed
    Laurent Abbe in Yaounde, allegedly during an illegal search of Abbe's
    friend's residence (see Section 1.f.). The Government arrested Bahiga,
    who was in detention pending trial at year's end.
        On May 11 in Yaounde, a mixed patrol of police officers, gendarmes,
    and soldiers attempted to seize a vehicle illegally for non-emergency
    purposes. The driver loudly disputed the seizure, and attracted a crowd
    that began to laugh at the security forces. One of the officers,
    angered by the laughter, shot indiscriminately at the crowd, killing
    two women. Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in
    this case by year's end.
        On May 29, police officers from the Yaounde special operation
    grouping (GSO) detained, tortured, and killed Edouard Leuwat, a Yaounde
    taxicab driver (see Section 1.c.). One GSO policeman, with assistance
    from other officers, had arrested Leuwat without warrant on May 28,
    believing Leuwat to be the driver of a taxicab in which the policeman
    had left his handgun on May 27. Leuwat denied the charge, and the
    policeman tortured Leuwat to extract a confession. The Government
    arrested eight police officers involved in the case and charged them
    with ``torture having resulted in death.'' On June 20, the Government
    transferred the eight to the Yaounde-based Kondengui Central Prison,
    where they were awaiting trial at year's end.
        On June 21, security officers shot two alleged bandits in Yaounde's
    Nlongkak Circle, killing one. A neighborhood resident walked up to the
    remaining, incapacitated bandit and slit his throat with a machete.
    Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in this case by
    year's end.
        On September 14, Mathew Titiahonjo, who gendarmes at the NDOP
    brigade in the Northwest Province had arrested and detained on May 23,
    died in prison reportedly from torture (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On October 28, Operational Command Sergeant Jean Claude Mbita
    allegedly shot and killed Luc-Benoit Bassilekin, a technician, while
    attempting to arrest him; Bassilekin's brother was arrested. In
    November the Government announced that it had arrested Mbita on charges
    of intentional homicide; he remained in detention pending trial at
    year's end.
        On October 30, Operational Command officers reportedly shot and
    killed Paul Petchueke, a taxicab driver, because Petchueke had
    attempted to make a U-turn in front of a command roadblock. On November
    13, the Government announced that it had arrested Paul Essoh, a soldier
    at the Douala Airbase, on charges of unintentional homicide for
    Petchueke's killing; he remained in detention at Douala New Bell prison
    pending trial at year's end.
        There were reports that the Douala Operational Command committed
    numerous summary executions, which totaled at least several dozens.
    There were reports that some persons were tortured before they were
    killed (see Section 1.c.). This special military unit, created to fight
    crime in Douala, operates above the authority of other security forces
    currently in the city. This command killed some suspects in shoot-outs
    and high-speed car chases during the year. It also reportedly used a
    network of informants, including a large number of convicted criminals
    and prison officials, to obtain the names of suspected bandits who they
    then arrested and summarily executed. The Operational Command also used
    neighborhood sweeps to search for criminals, occasionally executing
    suspects for minor offenses such as smoking marijuana. Press and other
    reports allege that the Operational Command has several mass graves,
    including in the ``Forest of Monkeys'' (Bois des Singes) and off the
    ``Old Road'' between Douala and Edea, where bodies were abandoned in
    pits or buried. Cardinal Tumi, the Archbishop of Douala, estimated the
    total number of extrajudicial killings committed by the Operational
    Command to be as high as 500.
        Credible reports by the press and the Maroua-based Movement for the
    Defense of Human Rights and Liberties (MDHRL), one of the few operating
    human rights organizations in the Far North Province, describe a large
    but undetermined number of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by a
    special antigang gendarmerie unit tasked with combating highwaymen.
    This unit was created under the direct authority of the Minister of
    Defense and operates outside the normal chain of command for law-and-
    order units. While some armed suspects were killed in firefights with
    security forces, there were credible reports that others caught in
    dragnet operations were executed summarily. Families of the deceased
    and human rights NGO's have accused the head of this unit, Colonel Pom,
    of extrajudicial killings of local civilians. The MDHRL estimated that
    up to 1000 persons have been killed since the beginning of 1998. The
    Government's National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF)
    corroborated this information, although it was unable to determine the
    exact number of persons killed, since many of the victims' families are
    too frightened to speak with human rights groups. At least one private
    newspaper, the Yaoundebased triweekly Mutations, also reported in 1998
    that security forces summarily executed hundreds of alleged highway
    robbers in northern areas of the country during recent years.
        Numerous prisoners died in custody due to abuse inflicted by
    members of the security forces or harsh prison conditions and
    inadequate medical treatment (see Section 1.c.).
        In November 1999, the U.N. released a report by the Special
    Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel Rodley, regarding his visit to the country
    in May 1999. In this report, Rodley noted that torture and long-term
    detention is widespread. He also commented on deaths resulting from
    torture and extrajudicial killings, primarily in the Far North Province
    (see Sections 1.c. and 4), but he did not provide any specific examples
    of such deaths.
        In November the Government announced plans to investigate alleged
    killings by the Douala Operational Command. In the fall, the National
    Human Rights Commission, under the Prime Minister, sent teams to Douala
    to investigate. Although two reports were produced for the President
    and the Prime Minister, there are no plans to release the reports
    publicly.
        There were no known developments in the following 1999 cases: The
    January 1999 killing of Yves Atiback by a gendarme captain; the
    February 1999, killing of three Fulani shepherds by villagers acting on
    the orders of the Fon of Bali; the March 1999 killing of Denis Nzidchen
    by prison guards; the September 1999 beating death of Theopole Mbasi
    Ombe by three members of the presidential guard; the October 1999
    beating death of Frederic Djomeli by police in the Haut-Nkam division.
        On April 12, the Yaounde higher court sentenced police officer
    Francois Bilongo to seven years in jail and $10,000 in damages for the
    1998 killing of Leonard Fouda. In May Police Constable Kuete Pierre was
    convicted and sentenced to 14 years in prison for the June 1998 police
    shooting of truck driver Jean-Marie Penga at a roadblock in Douala.
        There were no known developments in three open 1998 cases: The
    reported January 1998 police killing of Serge Francois Massoma; the
    June 1998 police killing of a 17-year-old male during racial violence
    against whites in Yaounde. Two gendarmes reportedly facing manslaughter
    charges in connection with the 1998 killing of an Anglophone barkeeper
    who died while in detention, reportedly as a result of torture,
    remained in detention at year's end.
        There continued to be no developments in the 1997 security force
    killing of Faustin Fetsogo and the killing of five persons in 1997
    during opposition politician Koulagne Nana's election campaign
    following a skirmish with the forces of a traditional ruler loyal to
    the ruling party.
        While ethnic conflicts caused deaths in previous years (see
    Sections 1.c. and 5), there were no reports of such deaths during the
    year.
        Mob violence and summary justice directed against suspected thieves
    and those suspected of practicing witchcraft and other crimes
    reportedly continued to result in a number of deaths and serious
    injuries. Although the number of reported cases of mob killings had
    diminished in past years, increased crime in the major cities of Douala
    and Yaounde caused a rise in such incidents during the year. On April
    5, a thief was stripped naked, beaten unconscious, and burned alive by
    a mob. On March 9, a mob reportedly killed two suspected thieves by
    burning tires around their necks. On April 14, a crowd of citizens in
    Buea, Southwest Province, beat to death Jean-Paul Kamdem and Alfred
    Mbakwa Fowa, alleged members of a gang that stole electronic items from
    a businessman's home (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were reports of disappearances of persons
    in the custody of security forces. Some disappearances may be
    attributed to summary executions by security forces in Douala or the
    northern regions (see Section 1.a.); in these instances, bodies rarely
    are found, although the suspects are presumed dead.
        On May 9, plain clothes security officials in Mamfe, Manyu
    Division, Southwest Province, searched the homes of John Enow, Joseph
    Tafong, Chief Assam, Mathias Takunchung, and several others, without
    search warrants. The victims' families have neither seen nor heard from
    the victims since that time, and believe that the security forces
    summarily executed them. In a letter written on May 12 and sent to the
    National Human Rights Commission, the families claim that more than 30
    people have disappeared in Mamfe under similar circumstances. According
    to the commission, four persons still were missing at year's end.
        In August 10 of the 13 refugees from Equatorial Guinea detained at
    a military base since 1998 left for refugee resettlement in another
    country (see Section 1.d.). Three refugees disappeared before they
    could depart; however, they were believed to have returned voluntarily
    to Equatorial Guinea or to have established unofficial residence in the
    country.
        The Government did not initiate any public investigation into any
    of these disappearances by year's end, nor did the Government
    investigate the 1998 disappearances of Chadian refugees Jim Temba and
    El Hadj Bakeye, Chadian herders, or the truck driver Mahamat Oumar.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Penal Code proscribes torture, renders inadmissible in
    court evidence obtained thereby, and prohibits public servants from
    using undue force against any person; however, although President Biya
    also promulgated a law in 1997 that bans torture by government
    officials, there were numerous credible reports that security forces,
    including the Operational Command, continued to torture, beat, and
    otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees. There were reports that
    security forces, including the Operational Command, detained persons at
    specific sites where they tortured and beat detainees (see Section
    1.d.). The Operational Command reportedly tortured some persons before
    summarily executing them (see Section 1.a.). The U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel Rodley, in his report on the country
    released in November 1999, stated that torture was widespread and used
    indiscriminately against persons under arrest or detained. Security
    forces also reportedly subjected women, children, and elderly people to
    ill-treatment. Most cases apparently were not reported to the relevant
    authorities because of ignorance, lack of confidence, or fear of
    reprisals on the part of the victims and their families. In New Bell
    and other nonmaximum-security penal detention centers, beatings are
    common and prisoners reportedly are chained or flogged at times in
    their cells. However, the authorities often administer beatings not in
    prison facilities, but in temporary detention areas in a police or
    gendarme facility. Two forms of physical abuse commonly reported to be
    inflicted on detainees include the ``bastinade,'' in which the victim
    is beaten on the soles of the feet, and the ``balancoire,'' in which
    the victim, with his hands tied behind his back, is hung from a rod and
    beaten, often on the genitals. Nonviolent political activists often
    have been subjected to such punitive physical abuse during brief
    detentions following roundups of participants in antigovernment
    demonstrations or opposition party political rallies.
        Security forces subjected prisoners and detainees to degrading
    treatment that includes stripping, confinement in severely overcrowded
    cells, and denial of access to toilets or other sanitation facilities.
    Police and gendarmes often beat detainees to extract confessions and
    the names and whereabouts of alleged criminals. In his report, U.N.
    Special Rapporteur Rodley noted that the Government increasingly was
    moving toward punishing offenders, but that ``some of those
    incriminated act out of ignorance and others out of pure habit, for
    they have regularly acted that way for a long time without fear of any
    consequences.'' Pretrial detainees sometimes were required, under
    threat of abuse, to pay so-called ``cell fees'' (essentially a bribe to
    the prison guards to prevent further abuse).
        On January 27, security forces intervened in a student strike at
    the University of Douala (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). The police used
    water cannons and nightsticks on the students, which resulted in eight
    injuries; police also beat several students severely.
        On January 28, four gendarmes reportedly arrested and tortured
    customs inspector Vincent Nkengfua, who they suspected of kidnaping a
    child. The gendarmes also arrested, detained, and tortured all the
    workers at Nkengfua's plantation in Mbanga, including a child (see
    Section 1.d.). In September Nkengfua filed a lawsuit against the
    gendarmes with the Mbanga High Court for abuse of power, arbitrary
    arrest and seizure of property, false evidence, calumny, and torture.
    The status of the lawsuit was unknown at year's end.
        On March 27, a crowd dragged Jean-Paul Kentsa to the Tsinga
    gendarmerie station in Yaounde after a woman claimed that he had tried
    to kidnap her 7-year-old son. After listening to the woman's statement,
    a gendarme began beating Kentsa, without allowing Kentsa to tell his
    side of the story. According to a witness, the gendarme tied his arms
    and legs and subjected him to ``balancoire'' torture for over half an
    hour. When a crowd formed to watch the beating, the gendarme beat two
    of the onlookers without cause using a machete.
        On April 6, police officers beat to death Emmanuel Ebanda, a porter
    at the Douala International Airport (see Section 1.a.). The police are
    investigating the case, though no charges have been filed against the
    officers.
        On April 20, government security forces reportedly attacked the
    parish of Notre Dame de Sept Douleurs in Douala during a Mass. Security
    forces reportedly arrested some parishioners and beat others (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        On April 27, a gendarme officer serving at the mobile gendarmerie
    unit, Abessolo-Abessolo, assaulted, beat, and seriously injured Nico
    Ajong in Ajong's tailoring store in the Yaounde neighborhood of Ngoa-
    Ekelle. The gendarme entered Ajong's workshop, demanded the identity
    cards of Ajong and a customer, and pocketed Ajong's identity card. When
    Ajong asked why the gendarme had taken his identity card, Abessolo-
    Abessolo began beating Ajong on the face and body. A medical report
    indicated that the resulting injuries incapacitated Ajong for 21 days.
        On April 27, Bessala, a soldier on patrol in the Yaounde
    neighborhood of Coron, shot Cecile Ngono. Ngono was a passenger in a
    taxicab that did not stop at a police checkpoint, and when Bessala shot
    at the car, he hit and wounded Ngono.
        In April a gendarme in Limbe, Southwest Province, beat and tortured
    a foreign volunteer teaching at the government bilingual high school.
    The gendarme interrogated the volunteer about his connections with the
    Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), an organization which calls
    for secession of the two English-speaking Anglophone provinces.
        On May 1, Dieudonne Dibong, a police officer, shot at a Yaounde cab
    after the cab ignored his traffic directions, seriously wounding the
    driver and the occupants of the vehicle. The General Delegate for
    National Security (DGSN) ordered disciplinary sanctions, and the
    Government arrested Dibong, whose trial was pending at year's end.
        On May 23, police and gendarmes forcibly dispersed a demonstration
    by students of the University of Yaounde, in which students protested
    the poor road conditions that killed 14 persons in a May 17 bus
    accident (see Section 2.b.). Police arrested approximately 50 students
    and severely beat several of them (see Section 1.d.).
        On May 23, gendarmes at the NDOP brigade in the Northwest Province
    arrested and detained Mathew Titiahonjo, Nathaniel Ntam, John Nivame,
    and several others (see Section 1.d.), and beat and tortured Titiahonjo
    and Nivame. One of the gendarmes claimed he suspected the men of
    belonging to a group of bandits who reportedly accosted him on May 19,
    seized his gun, pulled off his shoes, and tied him to a palm tree.
    According to the victims, Nivame caught the gendarme asleep with
    Nivame's girlfriend and stole the gendarme's shoes and gun in
    retaliation. On September 14, Titiahonjo died in prison reportedly from
    torture (see Section 1.a.); the Prime Minister released the remaining
    nine on October 31.
        On May 25, officers of the GSO police unit arrested Madeleine Ngo
    Songane, the sister of an alleged bandit. They took her to their
    headquarters and beat her violently in an effort to extract information
    on the whereabouts of her brother.
        On May 28, the same GSO police officers in Yaounde who tortured
    Edouard Leuwat to death (see Section 1.a.), arrested and tortured
    Achille Tchoumba Heubo, also in an effort to extract a confession
    concerning the officer's lost gun.
        On May 29, Edouard Leuwat, a Yaounde taxicab driver, died in
    custody as a result of torture by police officers from the Yaounde
    special operation grouping (GSO) (see Section 1.a.). The Government
    arrested eight police officers involved in the case and charged them
    with ``torture having resulted in death.'' On June 20, the Government
    transferred the eight to the Yaoundebased Kondengui Central Prison,
    where they were awaiting trial at year's end.
        In June in Ndop, Northwest Province, a gendarme who had lost his
    gun enlisted the support of his brigade to search for the weapon
    without a warrant. Press reports indicated the gendarmes ransacked
    homes and business, assaulting citizens in the process (see Section
    1.f.).
        On the night of June 7, a police patrol from the Yaounde 8 police
    district arrested and beat Beatrice Elouga for failing to carry her
    national identity card (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
        In early June, a gendarme officer identified as Okala, alias
    Tohmugwah, threw a hand grenade into a bar at Belo, Northwest Province,
    wounding several people. Okala apparently was angry with Amina
    Nyonghabi, the bartender, who wanted the gendarme to pay the bill for
    the drinks he had consumed. The previous day, the same gendarme slapped
    Nyonghabi in the face twice when she requested that he pay his bar
    bill.
        In early June, soldiers at a military garrison near the intendance
    roundabout in Yaounde brutalized and stripped naked Amelie, a young
    female soccer player with ``Canon-filles,'' a Yaounde-based soccer
    team. Amelie was returning home with her boyfriend when the soldiers
    demanded her identification. The gendarmes accused her of holding a
    fake national identity card with a female name, and, after beating
    Amelie, the soldiers decided to strip her naked publicly to verify her
    gender, only to realize that she had spoken the truth and her identity
    card was authentic.
        On July 27, Police Commissioner Theophile Tocko arrested Magloire
    Evouta, a businessman, at a Yaounde hotel. Evouta, who suffered from a
    chronic illness, was denied medical treatment and died at the Yaounde
    judicial police station on August 2. On August 28, the President
    dismissed Tocko from his position; Tocko was arrested and in detention
    pending trial at year's end.
        On September 12, members of the Operational Command unit of the
    Mboppi Brigade allegedly raped two young girls. The girls reportedly
    were detained because their identification papers were damaged
    partially by water.
        On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by
    opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
    Security forces arrested several marchers, seized journalists' cameras,
    and beat one journalist (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        Security forces harassed and threatened journalists (see Section
    2.a.). For example, on April 15 and 16, a gendarme patrol detained Alex
    Lembe, a journalist with Afrik Netpress, and demanded his identity card
    (see Section 2.a.). When the patrol commander realized he was a
    journalist, he insulted Lembe, beat him, and held him overnight.
        Security forces frequently used roadblocks to exact bribes or
    thwart opposition political activities (see Section 2.d.).
        In the vast majority of cases of torture or abuse, the Government
    rarely investigated or punished any of the security officials involved.
        Seke Columban, the police commissioner in Guider, North Province,
    beat Madi Baddai while arresting him in a nightclub in September 1999,
    and during a subsequent 4-day detention, causing serious injuries.
    Although Madi Baddai filed charges against the commissioner, no action
    had been taken by year's end.
        At year's end, the Buea military tribunal was preparing to try the
    commander of the 11th Navy Battalion and two noncommissioned officers
    in connection with looting and alleged beatings and rapes of civilians
    by naval cadets in the Anglophone Southwest Province port of Limbe in
    November 1998. There were no developments in other 1998 cases of
    nonlethal violence by security forces.
        On June 16, the Yaounde Court of First Instance sentenced Leon
    Ongolo, a Yaounde police commissioner, to 6 months imprisonment, a $70
    (50,000 CFA) fine, and $450 (300,000 CFA) in victim damages, for
    brutalizing his neighbors over a dispute concerning electrical wiring
    in 1996.
        Mob violence directed against suspected thieves reportedly
    continued to result in a number of deaths, some because of beatings or
    torture (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Prisons are
    seriously overcrowded, unsanitary, and inadequate, especially outside
    major urban areas. Serious deficiencies in food, health care, and
    sanitation due to a lack of funds are common in almost all prisons,
    including in ``private prisons'' in the north operated by traditional
    rulers. U.N. Special Rapporteur Rodley described prison conditions in
    the country as ``universally appalling.'' Rodley also reported that:
    ``overcrowding, unhygienic sanitation, lack of health care, and
    shortage of food, reportedly are the main failings in the Cameroonian
    prison system. These conditions cannot be blamed only on lack of
    financial or material resources, but also result from deliberate
    policies or serious neglect on the part of the relevant officials.''
    Rodley wrote that these conditions are ``endangering the health and
    even the lives of the detainees.'' Prisoners are kept in dilapidated
    colonial-era prisons, where the number of detainees is four to five
    times the original capacity. Authorities confirmed to Rodley that one
    cell measuring 6 square meters housed 16 people; one prisoner stated
    that the cell sometimes held up to 23 people. Health and medical care
    almost are nonexistent, and prisoners' families are expected to provide
    food for their relatives in prison. Prison officials torture, beat, and
    otherwise abuse prisoners (see Section 1.c.). Rodley reported that the
    vast majority of those in detention had been tortured or abused. Rodley
    specified cases of machete beatings, toenails being ripped out, and
    victims shot by police who had received no medical attention. Prisoners
    routinely die due to harsh prison conditions and inadequate medical
    treatment. In Douala's New Bell Prison, there were only 7 water taps
    for a reported 3,500 prisoners; this contributed to poor hygiene,
    illness, and deaths. In New Bell and other nonmaximum-security penal
    detention centers, families are permitted to provide food and medicine
    to inmates; however, beatings are common. Prisoners reportedly are
    chained or flogged at times in their cells and often are denied
    adequate medical care. In April the new Minister of Territorial
    Administration and the new Secretary of State for Territorial
    Administration in charge of penitentiary administration visited Douala
    and Yaounde prisons. The Yaounde prison was so dirty that the Minister
    ordered the immediate release of funds for repainting. In Douala the
    Minister said that the prison would be improved with funding from a
    foreign government; however, the project had not been implemented fully
    by year's end.
        Credible press reports indicate that Douala's New Bell prison,
    originally built for 600 inmates, held more than 3,500 during the year,
    of which 2,000 were pre-trial detainees. A 1997 report on prison
    conditions indicated that Bertoua Prison, which was built to hold 50
    inmates, housed over 700 persons. The Kondengui Central Prison in
    Yaounde, constructed in 1967 to hold 1,500 inmates and equipped with
    only 16 toilets or showers and 400 beds, held approximately 3,300
    inmates, including 700 women during the year. In 1999 the government
    official in charge of prisons said that the Central Prison of
    Bafoussam, built for 320 inmates, held 3,140 persons. Press reports
    indicate that the Bamenda Central Prison, built for 300 inmates,
    currently holds 900 persons, approximately 750 of whom are pre-trial
    detainees. Overcrowding is exacerbated by the large number of long
    pretrial detentions and the practice of ``Friday arrests'' (see Section
    1.d.). According to credible press reports, more than 1,400 of the
    inmates of the Douala prison were pretrial detainees, whereas only 900
    were convicted prisoners.
        Juveniles and nonviolent prisoners often are incarcerated with
    adults, although not usually in the same cells. There are credible
    reports of sexual abuse of juvenile prisoners by adult inmates.
    Corruption among prison personnel is widespread. Persons awaiting trial
    routinely are held in cells with hardened criminals. There are few
    detention centers for women; women routinely are held in prison
    complexes with men, occasionally in the same cells. Mothers often are
    incarcerated with their children or babies. The U.N. Special Rapporteur
    on Torture reported that he saw at least one 14-year-old child being
    kept with adult offenders, one woman being held in the same cell as
    male prisoners, and one woman incarcerated with her 9-month-old child.
    Some high-profile prisoners are able to avoid some of the abuse that
    security forces routinely inflict on many common criminals. They are
    kept in elite wings of certain prisons, where they enjoy relatively
    lenient treatment.
        On March 14, a group of detainees in the Douala Central Prison
    addressed a letter to the governor of the Littoral Province,
    complaining about the conditions of their detention. They charged that
    many prisoners must sleep on the ground and without shelter from rain
    due to lack of floor space within the crowded prison.
        Numerous NGO's, diplomatic missions, and the NCHRF all have
    criticized publicly the conditions of the group of Anglophone detainees
    arrested in 1997. One reliable report described 28 detainees sharing a
    cell measuring 14 square meters (about 140-square feet). At least eight
    of the original detainees reportedly have died from abuse or lack of
    medical care: Emmanuel Konseh, Samuel Tita, Mathias Gwei, Neba Ambe,
    Mado Nde, Richard Fomusoh Ngwa, Patrick Jimbou, and Lawrence Fai.
        In the north, the Government permits traditional Lamibe (chiefs) to
    detain persons outside the government penitentiary system, in effect in
    ``private prisons.'' The places of detention in the palaces of the
    traditional chiefs of Rey Bouba, Gashiga, Bibemi, and Tcheboa have the
    reputation of seriously mistreating their inmates. Members of the
    National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) party, which was an
    opposition party until late 1997, have alleged that other UNDP members
    have been detained in these private jails and that some have died from
    mistreatment.
        Both the Cameroonian Red Cross and the NCHRF visited prisons only
    infrequently during the year. However, the International Committee of
    the Red Cross (ICRC) began to visit prisons in March 1999, pursuant to
    a December 1998 agreement with the Government under which the ICRC was
    to have free access to all detention centers and prisons, have private
    discussions with the inmates, and make repeated or unscheduled visits
    (see Section 4). Although the ICRC does not release its findings
    publicly, the Government generally complied with its agreement with the
    ICRC, which had not conducted prison visits in the country during the
    previous 7 years due to dissatisfaction with the limited access allowed
    by the Government. However, despite government assurances to the
    contrary, officials denied U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights
    Rodley access in May 1999 to holding cells operated by the Government's
    special antigang unit (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Penal Code requires
    an arrest warrant for any arrest, except when the criminal is caught in
    the act; however, security forces continued to arrest and detain
    citizens arbitrarily. The Penal Code also stipulates that detainees
    must be brought promptly before a magistrate; however, arbitrary,
    prolonged detention remained a serious problem, as security forces
    often failed to bring detainees promptly before a magistrate and
    sometimes held them incommunicado for months or even years.
        Police legally may detain a person in custody in connection with a
    common crime for up to 24 hours, renewable three times, before bringing
    charges. However, the law provides for the right to a judicial review
    of the legality of detention only in the two Anglophone provinces.
    Elsewhere, the French legal tradition applies, precluding judicial
    authorities from acting on a case until the administrative authority
    that ordered the detention turns the case over to the prosecutor. After
    a magistrate has issued a warrant to bring the case to trial, he may
    hold the detainee in administrative or ``pretrial detention''
    indefinitely, pending court action. Such detention often is prolonged,
    due to the understaffed and mismanaged court system. According to U.N.
    Special Rapporteur Rodley, 80 percent of the prison population consists
    of untried prisoners. Rodley wrote that the length of pre-trial
    detention, often stretching as long as 7 years, makes it ``inhuman in
    itself.'' In addition Rodley claimed that ``pretrial detention is used
    not to attain its primary goal of upholding order and security and
    facilitating investigation, but rather, in the perception both of the
    public and of the forces of law and order, as a sanction.''
    Furthermore, a 1990 law permits detention without charge by
    administrative authorities for renewable periods of 15 days, ostensibly
    in order to combat banditry and maintain public order. Persons taken
    into detention frequently are denied access to both legal counsel and
    family members. The law permits release on bail only in the Anglophone
    provinces, where the legal system includes features of British common
    law; however, bail is granted infrequently in those provinces.
        There were reports that security forces, including the Operational
    Command, detained persons at specific sites where they tortured and
    beat detainees (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Government officials and security forces continued to use arbitrary
    arrest to harass and intimidate members of opposition parties and other
    critics of the Government.
        On January 7, gendarmes in Limbe arrested and briefly detained 23
    people who were looking at a flag hoisted by SCNC secessionists without
    pulling it down. Gendarmes retained the identity cards of 19, telling
    them to come back on January 10 to retrieve them. When they did so, the
    gendarmes photographed the individuals before releasing them with their
    identity cards.
        On January 8 and 9, in Limbe, Southwest Province, the Government
    arrested a group of demonstrating members of the SCNC (see Section
    2.b.). The Government released all of the detainees except Justice
    Frederick Ebong, Chief Ayumba, and James Sam Sabum, three of the
    group's leaders. The Government did not charge them with any crime, but
    it transferred them from Limbe to Buea and then to the underground
    Yaounde prison cells of the Secretariat of State for Defense, where
    they were awaiting trial on unspecified charges by the state security
    court at year's end. On May 9, the Buea High Court ruled against a
    motion for bail for the three SCNC leaders, stating the court lacked
    jurisdiction over the case.
        On January 9, gendarmes of the Nkongsamba (Littoral Province)
    brigade arrested Sylvestre Tchakoutio, a political activist and member
    of the opposition Union of Cameroon Democratic Forces (UFDC), on
    unspecific charges. On January 12, three gendarmes searched his
    residence without a search warrant (see Section 1.f.). On January 18,
    during questioning by the brigade commander, Tchakoutio learned that an
    anonymous false report to the Government's senior divisional officer of
    Mungo Division claimed that Tchakoutio was hiring people to engage in
    operations to destabilize the Government. The gendarmes released
    Tchakoutio on January 30 when they found no evidence to support the
    accusations.
        On January 27, security forces intervened in a student strike at
    the University of Douala (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Several
    students, including one of the strike's leaders, Guy Simon Ngakam, were
    arrested and detained for 2 days.
        The Government continued to harass and arrest a high-profile Douala
    political activist, Mboua Massok. On January 27, Douala police arrested
    Mboua Massok near the Douala University campus for his apparent support
    of the January 18 student strike (see Section 2.b.). The gendarmes
    released him without charge or trial on March 16. On April 11, members
    of the Douala gendarmerie again detained Massok for several hours
    regarding a human rights essay he published (see Section 2.a.).
        On January 28, four gendarmes reportedly arrested and tortured
    customs inspector Vincent Nkengfua, who they suspected of kidnaping a
    child, and all the workers at Nkengfua's plantation in Mbanga,
    including a child (see Section 1.c.). In September Nkengfua filed a
    lawsuit against the gendarmes with the Mbanga High Court for abuse of
    power, arbitrary arrest and seizure of property, false evidence,
    calumny, and torture.
        In March the Prefet (Senior Divisional Officer) of Bangangte, Nd
    Division, West Province, ordered the arrest of Catherine Yami and Roger
    Tankeu, respectively the SDF president for the Basssamba electoral
    district, and the SDF West provincial coordinator (see Section 2.b.).
    The two leaders had tried to prevent gendarmes from dispersing a
    meeting in the district.
        On March 20, security forces raided the palace of Fon Omer Tawun,
    the traditional ruler of Chup, in Nkambe, Northwest Province, under the
    suspicion that he was storing illegal weapons (see Section 1.f.).
    Although security forces found no weapons or ammunitions, they arrested
    Fon Tawun, Moses Khan (treasurer of division), and Francis Adamu
    (second deputy town mayor). Security forces detained the three for 2
    days in the town jail, then transferred them to the gendarmerie legion
    in Bamenda, where they questioned and released them.
        On April 20, government security forces reportedly attacked the
    parish of Notre Dame de Sept Douleurs in Douala during a Mass. Security
    forces reportedly arrested some parishioners and beat others (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
        On April 21 and 22, security forces arrested and detained briefly
    hundreds of SCNC supporters and sympathizers in the towns of Kumba and
    Muyuka, Southwest Province. The arrests, ordered by the Southwest
    Province governor, were based on allegations that the SCNC was
    considering overthrowing the Province's officials.
        On May 10, plainclothes policeman in Mamfe, Manyu Division,
    Southwest Province, arrested without warrants Mathias Takunchung Ebai,
    Daniel Akwo, John Enow, Tambong, and four other members of the SDF. The
    police transferred them to the gendarmerie legion in Buea, where
    gendarmes questioned them for 3 days concerning their support for the
    SCNC before releasing them on May 13.
        On May 23, gendarmes at the NDOP brigade in the Northwest Province
    arrested and detained Mathew Titiahonjo, Nathaniel Ntam, John Nivame,
    and several others, and beat and tortured Titiahonjo and Nivame (see
    Section 1.c.). On September 14, Titiahonjo died in prison reportedly
    from torture; the Prime Minister released the remaining nine on October
    31.
        On May 23, police and gendarmes forcibly dispersed a demonstration
    by students of the University of Yaounde, in which students protested
    the poor road conditions that killed 14 persons in a May 17 bus
    accident (see Section 2.b.). Police arrested approximately 50 students
    and severely beat several of them (see Section 1.c.). The students were
    released on May 25.
        On the night of June 7, a police patrol from the Yaounde 8 police
    district arrested and beat Beatrice Elouga for failing to carry her
    national identity card (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
        On August 24, gendarmes released Bassy Okon Edet, a Nigerian
    fisherman, after a 7-day incarceration. Edet apparently was fishing in
    the Atlantic Ocean near the disputed Bakassi Peninsula when gendarmes
    in the region picked him up, permanently seizing his fishing boat,
    fishing nets, and clothes. Edet claims that the gendarmes blindfolded
    him, did not feed him, and forced him to do labor during his
    incarceration (see Section 6.c.); the fisherman claims that other
    Nigerians remain in the same detention camp.
        In November the Prefet of Dschang arrested two union leaders
    allegedly because of an unsigned labor agreement (see Section 6.a.);
    ten others also were questioned. All 12 were released the next day.
        On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by
    opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
    Security forces arrested several marchers, seized journalists' cameras
    (see Section 2.a.), and beat one journalist (see Section 1.c.).
        Security forces harassed and occasionally detained journalists and
    beat demonstrators and members of human rights NGO's (see Sections 2.a.
    and 2.b.). For example, in late June, police commissioner Jean-Joel
    Ondo, from the central provincial judicial police, detained for 2 hours
    two journalists of the Douala-based French-language tri-weekly
    newspaper, La Nouvelle Expression. According to the journalists, the
    commissioner arrested them for chatting with two young women who were
    close to the commissioner. The commissioner also ordered the two women
    brought to the police station, where police beat one of them severely
    (see Section 1.c.).
        Many of the public officials arrested in 1999 in the Government's
    high-profile but short-lived corruption crack-down still were awaiting
    trial at year's end. In September and October 1999, the Government
    arrested these officials, including former Minister of Posts and
    Telecommunications Monchipou Seidou, Ministry Budget Director Guillaume
    Yetna Hiobi, and Ministry Director of Production Philip Tarkang, on
    charges of corruption or embezzlement.
        On March 3, political activist Sanda Oumarou was released from
    jail; he had been held without formal charges or judicial proceedings
    since July 1999.
        In 1997 government security forces detained 13 former senior
    military officers of Equatorial Guinea who had been granted refugee
    status by the UNHCR and had lived in the country for 4 years. In 1998
    these 13 officers, who were affiliated with an Equato-Guinean
    opposition party and included Alfonso Mba Nsogo, former head of the
    Equato-Guinean military, contested the Government's assertion that it
    had arrested them for their own protection. In August 10 of the 13
    refugees from Equatorial Guinea detained at a military base since 1998
    left for refugee resettlement in another country. Three refugees
    disappeared before they could depart (see Section 1.b.); however, they
    were believed to have returned voluntarily to Equatorial Guinea or to
    have established unofficial residence in the country.
        Nana Koulagne, a former member of the National Assembly and UNDP
    activist, has remained in prison in Garoua since May 1997, when members
    of the security forces attacked and arrested him and other activists of
    the then-opposition UNDP while he was campaigning for election in the
    North Province. On July 17, after more than 3 years in detention, the
    Garoua Military Tribunal formally charged Koulagne with complicity in
    assassination, group looting, arson, and desecrating cadavers. On
    August 31, the Garoua Military Tribunal sentenced Koulange to 3 years
    in prison, counted as time served in detention. He was released on
    August 31. No members of the Lamido's traditional guard, who also were
    involved in the incident, were charged with a crime.
        The Government continues to incarcerate illegally Nda Yinzi
    Ousmanou, Pierre Mbock, Jules Zoa, Ambadiang Adebada, and Michel Kamga.
    The Government arrested the five on April 30, 1996, on charges of
    aggravated theft, illegal possession of firearms, and forgery. Despite
    an October 1997 Douala court ruling of innocence and a court order to
    release the men, the Government refuses to let them out of prison. Nda
    Yinzi Ousmanou died on November 21, 1998, and the other four remain
    incarcerated.
        Four Anglophones, Abel Achah Apong, Crispus Kennebie, John Kudi,
    and Zacque Njenta, have been detained in the Yaounde Central Prison
    since 1995, and a fifth, Etchu Wilson Arrey, since 1997. Each was
    incarcerated after signing or displaying a petition for a referendum on
    independence for the Anglophone provinces. At year's end, none of these
    detainees had been brought before a judge or charged with a crime.
        Police and gendarmes often arrest persons on spurious charges on
    Fridays at mid-day or in the afternoon (see Section 1.c.). While the
    law provides for a judicial review of an arrest within 24 hours, the
    courts do not convene sessions on the weekend, so the detainee remains
    in prison at least until Monday. Police and gendarmes commonly accept
    bribes to make such ``Friday arrests'' from persons who have private
    grievances against the person arrested. There are no known cases of any
    policemen or gendarmes being sanctioned or punished for this practice.
        Government intimidation extends beyond the police stations and
    holding cells. In efforts to combat highwaymen (``coupeurs de route''),
    Colonel Pom and his special antigang gendarmerie unit (see Section
    1.a.) use informants to identify and accuse persons of taking part in
    highway robbery. Standards of proof for such accusations are
    nonexistent. Accusations occasionally have been used to pursue private
    grievances, and informants repeatedly have extorted money from innocent
    persons by threatening to accuse them of being bandits. The Douala
    Operational Command reportedly uses informants in a similar fashion.
    These informants often are former criminals or prison guards, and are
    used to target criminals who are then summarily executed (see Section
    1.a.).
        The Government does not use forced exile; however, some human
    rights monitors or political opponents who considered themselves
    threatened by the Government have left the country voluntarily and
    declared themselves to be in political exile.
        On April 11, the traditional rulers of Ekondo-Titi, Southwest
    Province, acting under the authority of the Balondo Development
    Association (BACUDA), ordered the expulsion of Iyassa Anou, Joseph
    Regeant, Johnson Mambo Naseri, Mathew Ajong Awor, Christian Buma,
    Francisca Nyando, and James Okenye, for allegedly bewitching to death a
    resident of the town of Lobe; however, the order to expel the seven was
    not implemented by year's end. BACUDA was investigating the charges of
    alleged witchcraft at year's end.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary remains highly subject to
    political influence and corruption. The court system remains
    technically part of the executive branch, subordinate to the Ministry
    of Justice. The Constitution specifies that the President is the
    guarantor of the legal system's independence. He also appoints judges
    with the advice of the Supreme Council of the Magistrature. However,
    during the 1990's, elements of the judiciary began to show some modest
    signs of growing independence. Since 1997 the courts repeatedly have
    used powers given them under the 1996 press law to order the Ministry
    of Territorial Administration to desist from seizing print runs of
    newspapers critical of the Government. In 1999 an appeals court
    overturned a criminal libel conviction of journalists on the grounds
    that it violated 1990 legislation providing for freedom of the press
    (see Section 2.a.); however, some politically sensitive cases never are
    heard.
        The court system includes the Supreme Court, a court of appeals in
    each of the 10 provinces, and courts of first instance in each of the
    country's 58 divisions.
        Military tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over civilians not
    only when the President declares martial law, but also in cases
    involving civil unrest or organized armed violence. A law on the
    organization of the judiciary promulgated in 1998 also transferred to
    military tribunals jurisdiction over gang crimes, grand banditry, and
    highway robbery. The Government apparently interprets these guidelines
    quite broadly and sometimes uses military courts to try matters
    concerning dissident groups and political opponents.
        The legal system includes both national law and customary law, and
    many cases can be tried using either. Customary law is based upon the
    traditions of the ethnic group predominant in the region and is
    adjudicated by traditional authorities of that group. Accordingly,
    particular points of customary law differ depending upon the region and
    the ethnic group where a case is being tried. In some areas,
    traditional courts reportedly have tried persons accused of some
    offenses, such as practicing witchcraft, by subjecting them to an
    ordeal, such as drinking poison (see Section 2.c.); however, there were
    no known incidents during the year. Customary courts may exercise
    jurisdiction only with the consent of both parties to a case; either
    party has the right to have any case heard by a national rather than a
    customary court, and customary law is supposed to be valid only when it
    is not ``repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience.''
    However, many citizens in rural areas remain unaware of their rights
    under civil law and have been taught since birth that customary laws
    form the rules by which they must abide. Consequently, traditional
    courts remain important in rural areas and serve as an alternative for
    settling disputes. Their authority varies by region and ethnic group,
    but they often are the arbiters of property and domestic disputes and
    may serve a probate function as well. Most traditional courts permit
    appeal of their decisions to traditional authorities of higher rank.
        Corruption and inefficiency in the courts remain serious problems.
    Justice frequently is delayed or denied before reaching the trial stage
    (see Section 1.d.). Political bias often brings trials to a halt or
    results in an extremely long process, punctuated by extended court
    recesses. Powerful political or business interests appear to enjoy
    virtual immunity from prosecution; some politically sensitive cases are
    settled with a payoff and thus never are heard. Private journalists,
    political opponents, and critics of the Government often are charged or
    held and sometimes jailed under libel statutes considered by observers
    as unduly restrictive of press freedom (see Section 2.a.). Prisoners
    may be detained indefinitely during pretrial proceedings.
        The legal structure is influenced strongly by the French legal
    system, although in the Anglophone provinces certain aspects of the
    Anglo-Saxon tradition apply. The Constitution provides for a fair
    public hearing in which the defendant is presumed innocent. Because
    appointed attorneys receive little compensation, the quality of legal
    representation for indigent persons is often poor. The Bar Association
    and some voluntary organizations, such as the Cameroonian Association
    of Female Jurists, offer free assistance in some cases. Trials are
    normally public, except in cases with political overtones judged
    disruptive of social peace.
        The Government holds a number of political prisoners; however, as
    in previous years, there were no reliable estimates of the number of
    political prisoners held at the end of the year.
        In April 1999, the Government began the trial of the 65 surviving
    Anglophones who had been detained, some for more than 2 years, on
    suspicion of participating in armed attacks against government
    installations in the Northwest Province in March 1997. This judicial
    process did not follow either international or national legal norms. In
    October 1999, the military tribunal convicted 37 of the accused,
    sentencing 3 to life imprisonment and 34 to terms ranging from 1 to 20
    years in prison. The tribunal acquitted 28 defendants, some of whom had
    been detained for 30 months, during which at least 8 of the persons
    originally arrested in this case died in custody, some of them as a
    result of torture inflicted on many of these detainees (see Section
    1.c.). At year's end, 19 of the Anglophones convicted remained in
    prison in Yaounde; the other 18 were released following the completion
    of their sentences. On November 6, the Government released four
    Anglophones, Abel Achah Apong, Crispus Kennebie, John Kudi, and Zacque
    Njenta, who had been in the Yaounde Central Prison since 1995, and a
    fifth, Etchu Wilson Arrey, since 1997. Each was incarcerated after
    signing or displaying a petition for a referendum on independence for
    the Anglophone provinces. The tribunal declared itself incompetent to
    rule on two accused illegal Ghanaian immigrants, who remain
    incarcerated. International human rights NGO's, including Amnesty
    International, criticized the trial as unfair and protested the
    sentences.
        Titus Edzoa, former Minister of Health and longtime presidential
    aide, who had declared himself a candidate to oppose incumbent
    President Biya in the 1997 election, remains incarcerated, together
    with Michel Atangana, his campaign manager. They were sentenced in 1997
    to 15 years' imprisonment on embezzlement and corruption charges, for
    which Edzoa was arrested shortly after declaring his presidential
    candidacy (see Section 3). In 1999 the Yaounde Court of Appeals
    confirmed their convictions and their 15-year prison terms. At year's
    end, Edzoa reportedly still was held in confinement at the maximum
    security gendarmerie headquarters, in cramped quarters with very
    limited access to visitors.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The preamble of the Constitution provides for the
    inviolability of the home, for protection against search except by
    virtue of law, and for the privacy of all correspondence; however,
    these rights are subject to the ``higher interests of the State,'' and
    there were a number of credible reports that police and gendarmes
    harassed citizens, conducted searches without warrants, and opened or
    seized mail. The Government continued to keep some opposition activists
    and dissidents under surveillance.
        The law permits a police officer to enter a private home during
    daylight hours without a warrant if he is pursuing an inquiry and has
    reason to suspect that a crime has been committed. The officer must
    have a warrant to make such a search after dark. However, a police
    officer may enter a private home at any time in pursuit of a criminal
    observed committing a crime.
        An administrative authority may authorize police to conduct
    neighborhood sweeps in search of suspected criminals or stolen or
    illegal goods without individual warrants. Such sweeps are conducted
    frequently. During the year, as in 1999, sweeps involving forced entry
    into homes occurred in Yaounde, Douala, Ekondo Titi, Maroua, and
    Kousser. An increase in crime during the year led to a dramatic
    increase in the number of such sweeps, called ``kali-kali'' or
    ``raffles,'' in Douala and Yaounde. Government security forces also
    conducted neighborhood sweeps in Buea and Limbe. Typically, security
    forces seal off a neighborhood, systematically search homes, arrest
    persons arbitrarily, and seize suspicious or illegal articles. There
    were credible reports that security forces used these sweeps as a
    pretext to loot homes and arbitrarily arrest persons for minor
    offenses, such as not possessing identity cards (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.d.). In a June letter to government officials, the Catholic
    Archbishop of Douala stated that security forces arrested some parents
    during these operations, forcing them to leave babies or sick children
    alone at home.
        In the past, Government administrative officials have used the
    armed forces to conduct tax raids on civilian communities; however, the
    Government reportedly did not conduct any such raids this year. In the
    past, the Government publicly has blamed opposition parties for its
    inability to collect internal revenues, but it did not repeat such
    accusations this year.
        On January 12, three gendarmes of the Nkongsamba (Littoral
    Province) brigade searched the residence of Sylvestre Tchakoutio, a
    political activist, for guns without a search warrant. Tchakoutio had
    been arrested on January 9 (see Section 1.d.).
        On March 20, security forces, under instructions from the senior
    divisional officer, raided the palace of Fon Omer Tawun, the
    traditional ruler of Chup, in Nkambe, Northwest Province, under the
    suspicion that he was storing illegal weapons. Eyewitness accounts
    reported that security forces violated sacred places in the palace
    during the search, including the ``kwifon,'' which houses the
    traditional secret society of the village. Though security forces found
    no weapons or ammunitions, they arrested Fon Tawun, Moses Khan
    (treasurer of division), and Francis Adamu (second deputy town mayor)
    (see Section 1.d.).
        On May 7, a police officer by the name of Bahiga shot and killed
    Laurent Abbe in Yaounde during an allegedly illegal search of Abbe's
    friend's residence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
        In June in Ndop, Northwest Province, a gendarme who had lost his
    gun enlisted the support of his brigade to search for the weapon
    without a warrant. Press reports indicated the gendarmes ransacked
    homes and business, assaulting citizens in the process (see Section
    1.c.).
        Following the November 1999 destruction of the Kobba-Bonaberi
    neighborhood in Douala, some residents returned to the neighborhood in
    May and began to rebuild their homes. In June the authorities warned
    the returning residents to leave, or the Government would destroy their
    homes again. A few residents continue to maintain that they have valid
    permits to build homes.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression and of the press; however, the Government
    continued to impose limits on these rights. The Penal Code's libel laws
    specify that defamation, abuse, contempt and dissemination of false
    news are offenses punishable by prison terms and heavy fines. These
    statutes sometimes are invoked by the Government to silence criticism
    of the Government and government officials.
        While approximately 60 private newspapers were published, only
    about 20 were published on a regular basis. Most continued to be highly
    critical of President Biya, and his Government, and reported on
    controversial issues, including corruption, human rights abuses, and
    economic policies. Since the Government's 1994-95 crackdown on the
    private press, most private journalists have begun to practice a higher
    degree of fact checking and thus have increased journalistic accuracy.
    Journalists continue to be critical of the Government; however, some
    journalists practiced self-censorship.
        In 1996 the Government repealed the law that had authorized the
    Government both to censor private publications and extrajudicially to
    seize publications ``dangerous to public order,'' or suspend
    newspapers' publication licenses. Previously, the Government often had
    taken these extrajudicial actions to inflict economic damage on
    newspapers critical of the Government and had done so often during
    election years.
        Formal censorship ceased in 1997. Since 1998, the Government
    largely has ceased to interfere with private newspaper distribution or
    seize print runs of private newspapers; however, on May 10, the Prefet
    (Senior Divisional Officer) of Kumba, Meme Division, Southwest
    Province, signed an order to ban one issue of the Bamenda-based
    English-language publication Today in his district. The Prefet took the
    measure following an increase in the secessionist activities in the
    region, and increased reporting of such activities.
        Security forces continued frequently to restrict press freedom by
    harassing or abusing private print media journalists.
        The Government continued to harass and arrest the high-profile
    Douala political activist, Mboua Massok (see Section 2.b.). On April
    11, members of the Douala gendarmerie detained Massok for several hours
    regarding a human rights essay he published (see Section 1.d.).
        On April 15 and 16, a gendarme patrol detained Alex Lembe, a
    journalist with Afrik Netpress and formerly with Aurore Plus, a Douala-
    based, French-language weekly newspaper. The patrol had stopped Lembe
    and demanded his identity card. When the patrol commander realized he
    was a journalist, he insulted Lembe, beat him, and held him overnight
    (see Section 1.c.).
        In late June, police commissioner Jean-Joel Ondo, from the central
    provincial judicial police, detained for 2 hours two journalists of the
    Douala-based French-language tri-weekly newspaper, La Nouvelle
    Expression (see Section 1.d.). According to the journalists, the
    commissioner arrested them for chatting with two young women who were
    close to the commissioner.
        On September 15, members of the Operational Command unit arrested
    three employees of Le Messager in Douala and detained them at the
    Mboppi gendarmerie camp (see Section 1.d.). They were released the
    following day without charges.
        On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by
    opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
    Security forces arrested several, seized journalists' cameras, and beat
    one journalist (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        From March through May, the Government harassed some newspapers
    through fiscal means. On April 30, the Center Provincial Taxes
    Department sealed the office of the Yaounde-based French-language
    newspaper, L'Anecdote, demanding that the paper pay tax arrears of
    $280,000 (200 million CFA). According to one newspaper, the move was
    prompted by an article the paper had published in September 1999,
    accusing the wife of a senior official of the Ministry of Finance of
    involvement in the embezzlement scandal at the Ministry of Posts and
    Telecommunications, for which the Government later arrested her. On May
    19, the Government sealed the offices of the Douala-based French-
    language publication Le Front Independent for one day due to non-
    payment of taxes estimated at $21,000 (15 million CFA) by the Littoral
    Province Office of Taxation. In early June, the Government again sealed
    the paper's offices, claiming that arrears had jumped to $57,000 (40
    million CFA). The newspaper and the taxation office reportedly were
    negotiating a deal at year's end.
        Since 1996 the Government frequently has prosecuted its critics in
    the print media under the criminal libel laws. These laws authorized
    the Government, at its discretion and at the request of the plaintiff,
    to criminalize a civil libel suit, or to initiate a criminal libel suit
    in cases of alleged libel against the President and other high
    government officials. There continued to be allegations that government
    ministers and other high officials offered to drop criminal libel suits
    in exchange for cash payments from newspapers or journalists. During
    the year, the Government arrested, prosecuted, or convicted four
    members of the press on criminal libel charges. However, this practice
    declined in frequency and severity from previous years, apparently due
    in part to greater fact checking on the part of journalists.
        On April 3, the Bafoussam High Sentence Court sentenced Michel
    Eclador Pekoua, publisher of the Bafoussam-based French-language weekly
    newspaper Ouest Echoes to 6 months in jail and damages of $1150
    (800,000 CFA) for libel in a suit brought by Blanche Penda Ekoka, an
    employee of the national hydrocarbon company (SNH). On July 14, 1999,
    Ouest Echoes published a leaflet on behalf of a group of SNH employees,
    denouncing unjust working conditions and blaming the SNH General
    Manager and Penda Ekoka, said to be his girlfriend. In August 1999,
    Penda Ekoka's lawyer and the instructing magistrate demanded that
    Pekoua disclose the names of those who had written the leaflet. Pekoua
    refused, and the Government charged and convicted Pekoua with
    defamation, abuse (insulting expressions), and false reporting. On May
    2, after 30 days of detention in the Bafoussam Penitentiary, the judge
    granted provisional release to Pekoua, pending an appeal.
        On April 12, security forces arrested Severin Tchounkeu, publisher
    of the Douala-based French-language tri-weekly La Nouvelle Expression,
    and newspaper journalists Edmond Kamguia and Alain Bengono, and
    detained them in the cells of the Secretariat of State for Defense for
    3 days. The Government had filed a complaint against the paper for its
    March 31 ``April Fool's'' article that said that bandits attacked the
    gendarmerie station in Yaounde, seizing arms, and holding the gendarmes
    hostage. On April 14, the Government charged Tchounkeu and Bengono with
    ``dissemination of false news'' and released them pending trial. The
    Government did not file charges against Edmond Kamguia.
        On July 19, a Douala court sentenced Daniel Atangana and Thierry
    Mbouza, two journalists of the Douala-based French-language biweekly
    Dikalo, to 6 months in prison. The publisher, Celestin Biake Difana,
    received a suspended 6-month prison term. The Douala court had
    convicted the journalists of defamation, false reporting, and the
    dissemination of false news charges, based upon Dikalo's 1998
    publication of a memorandum written by members of the National Union of
    Road Transporters (SNTR), denouncing the poor management of SNTR
    President Pierre Sime. Sime responded with a libel suit. The case was
    suspended and Dikalo was appealing previous judgments against the
    newspaper at year's end.
        No new developments were reported in the following 1999 criminal
    libel cases: The February 1999 criminal libel conviction of SDF Party
    Chairman Fru Ndi and journalists Severin Tchounkeu and Henriette Ekwe;
    the June 1999 sentencing of Severin Tchounkeu and Souley Onohiolo for
    libel and dissemination of false news; and the June 1999 sentencing of
    Anselme Mballa for criminal libel.
        The Government publishes an official newspaper, The Cameroon
    Tribune. This paper occasionally implies criticism of the Government;
    however, its reporters do not report extensively on activities or
    political parties critical of the Government, overtly criticize the
    ruling party, or portray government programs in an unfavorable light.
        Despite the large number of newspapers in the country, the
    influence of the print media on the average person is minimal.
    Circulation is low, distribution is problematic outside of Yaounde and
    Douala, and prices are high. Print media reaches only a tiny percentage
    of the population, most notably the urban elite. The Cameroon Tribune
    has a print run of only about 5,000; the four most important opposition
    papers Dikalo, Le Messager, Mutations, and Nouvelle Expression, have
    print runs of between 5,000 and 10,000 each.
        Radio remains the most important medium for reaching most citizens.
    There are approximately 2 million radios in the country. Television is
    less pervasive but is still more influential than the print media.
    There are an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 television sets in the
    country, and viewership is high, since many persons watch television in
    extended family groups or together in commercial establishments.
        On April 3, the Government issued a decree that implements the 1990
    law liberalizing the broadcast media and sets out the conditions and
    procedures for establishing independent radio and television stations.
    Rural radio stations must submit an application to broadcast but are
    exempt from fees. Potential commercial radio and television
    broadcasters must submit a licensing application and pay a fee when the
    application is approved. The annual licensing fees stipulated in the
    decree potentially are prohibitive: $15,600 (10 million CFA) for radio
    broadcasters, $73,000 (50 million CFA) for local television stations,
    and $146,000 (100 million CFA) for national television stations.
    Nonetheless, the Ministry of Communication received more than a hundred
    applications from potential broadcasters.
        Five Yaounde-based private radio stations that previously had been
    broadcasting illegally submitted applications and paid an interim fee
    of $727 (500,000 CFA). The Government authorized them to continue
    broadcasting, pending final approval of their application and
    subsequent payment of the full licensing fee. Of these stations, two
    are religious: The Pentecostal ``Radio Bonne Nouvelle'' and ``Radio
    Reine,'' which is managed by a Catholic priest, though not officially
    sponsored by the Catholic Church. Two others are affiliated with
    private non-accredited academic institutions: NDI Samba University's
    ``Radio Lumiere'' and the Siantou University's ``Radio Siantou.'' The
    fifth station is ``Radio Venus,'' which plays only music. A small
    number of radio stations that had been broadcasting illegally including
    ``Radio Soleil,'' which broadcasts from the Muslim quarter of Yaounde,
    did not apply for licenses, claiming the fees are too high. The
    Government has not yet acted against these operators.
        The state-owned Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) broadcasts on
    both television and radio and is currently the only officially-
    recognized and fully-licensed broadcaster in the country. The
    Government levies taxes on all registered taxpayers to finance CRTV
    programming, giving it a distinct advantage over newly-competing
    independent broadcasters.
        There are several low-power, rural community radio stations mostly
    funded by foreign countries, with extremely limited range, which
    broadcast educational programs to small audiences but are not allowed
    to discuss politics. In addition this year's decree allows for
    broadcasting of foreign news services but requires them to form a
    partnership with a national station. Radio France International and the
    British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) have announced their intention
    to work with CRTV and hope to begin broadcasting in 2001.
        During the year, the Government continued to allow the reception of
    international cable and satellite television broadcasts (see Section
    1.f.).
        Like the Cameroon Tribune, CRTV provides broad reporting of CPDM
    functions, while giving relatively little attention to the political
    opposition. CRTV management, which in the past repeatedly has
    instructed CRTV staff to ensure the Government views prevail at all
    times in CRTV broadcasts, continued during the year to punish CRTV
    journalists who criticized government policy. In late May, CRTV
    censored a program concerning the Douala Operational Command, the
    security unit instituted to fight Douala city crime. CRTV had started
    broadcasting the program, including portions that reported public
    allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture, and extortion. The
    Government censored the second part of the program before it was
    broadcast, allegedly because the first part had caused some
    embarrassment to the military hierarchy and the Government. In November
    CRTV suspended two journalists for broadcasting a program that
    criticized members of the ruling party for their lifestyles.
        CRTV television and radio programming include a weekly program,
    Expression Directe, which ostensibly fulfills the Government's legal
    obligation to provide an opportunity for all political parties
    represented in the National Assembly to present their views. However,
    CRTV continued to restrict the opposition SDF party's freedom of
    expression through that program, occasionally censoring and
    significantly shortening proposed SDF programming. For example, on
    March 9 and 22, the General Manager of CRTV censored SDF submissions,
    arguing that the content of the programs violated provisions of the
    law. Both CRTV and the SDF appealed to the National Council on
    Communication, the regulatory organ for communication, for support.
    There was no report of a ruling or decision by the National Council on
    Communication by year's end.
        High-tech communications, including the Internet, e-mail, and
    satellite phones, are not available or utilized widely; however, a few
    cybercafes provide occasional Internet or e-mail access in some urban
    areas. There are at least six domestic Internet service providers, one
    of which has been in operation for 3 years. Some are privately owned.
    The Government has not attempted to restrict or monitor these forms of
    communications.
        Although there are no legal restrictions on academic freedom, state
    security informants operate on university campuses. Many professors
    believe that adherence to opposition political parties can affect
    adversely their professional opportunities and advancement. Free
    political discussion at the University of Yaounde is dampened by the
    presence of armed government security forces. Security forces subjected
    Dr. Charley Mejame Ejede, a professor of philosophy at the University
    of Douala who is also national secretary of the Liberal Democratic
    Alliance political party, to prolonged harassment, presumably due to
    his political activism in previous years; however, there were no
    reports of such harassment during the year. Security forces forcibly
    dispersed some student protests during the year (see Section 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts this right
    in practice. The law requires organizers of public meetings,
    demonstrations, or processions to notify government officials in
    advance; it does not require prior government approval of public
    assemblies, and does not authorize the Government to suppress public
    assemblies that it has not approved in advance. However, for many years
    government officials routinely have asserted that this provision of the
    Penal Code implicitly authorizes the Government to grant or deny
    permission to public assemblies, often have not granted permits to
    assemblies organized by persons or groups critical of the Government,
    and repeatedly have used force to suppress public assemblies whose
    organizers submitted advance notice as required by law but for which
    government authorities did not issue permits. The Government continued
    to allow opposition political parties greater freedom of assembly.
        In early January, two administrative orders banned all political
    activities in Buea and Limbe, Fako Division, Southwest Province,
    following a series of secessionist activities in December 1999. On
    January 8 and 9, in Limbe, Southwest Province, the Government arrested
    several demonstrating members of the SCNC, including the rally's leader
    Justice Frederick Ebong and two of his associates (see Section 1.d.).
    Approximately 25 SCNC members marched and raised the flag of the
    ``Federal Republic of the Southern Cameroons.'' The march followed the
    December 1999 announcement by the SCNC that proclaimed the independence
    of two southern provinces.
        On January 27, security forces intervened in a student strike at
    the University of Douala. The students went on strike on January 18 to
    demand changes at the university. The police used water cannons and
    nightsticks on the students, and beat several students severely (see
    Section 1.c.). Police also arrested several students and detained them
    for 2 days (see Section 1.d.). Political activist Mboua Massok also was
    arrested near the campus for his apparent support of the strike (see
    Section 1.d.).
        In early March, the Prefet (Senior Divisional Officer) of
    Bangangte, Nd Division, West Province, ordered the arrest of Catherine
    Yami and Roger Tankeu, respectively the SDF president for the Basssamba
    electoral district, and the SDF West provincial coordinator (see
    Section 1.d.). The two leaders had tried to prevent gendarmes from
    dispersing a duly declared meeting in the district.
        On March 30, Pierre Minlo, the Delegate General for National
    Security (DGSN) in Yaounde, banned three peaceful marches by the Union
    of Cameroon Democratic Forces (UFDC), an opposition party. The UFDC
    wanted to protest against growing crime in Yaounde and had declared to
    the sub-divisional officers (sous-prefets) in the three affected
    neighborhoods their intent to march. In his communique, the DGSN stated
    that the UFDC had no right to march because it was not represented at
    the National Assembly, a requirement which does not exist in any of the
    laws regulating public meetings and processions.
        On March 30, the Government banned a press conference by five SDF
    mayors in Douala suburbs, and police officers from the Douala First
    Police District barred entry to journalists and participants. According
    to the commissioner leading the squad, authorities banned the
    conference because they feared it might disturb public order; the
    commissioner made this deduction because the mayors allegedly refused
    to disclose what they planned to say at the press conference.
        On May 23, police and gendarmes forcibly dispersed a demonstration
    by students of the University of Yaounde, in which students protested
    the poor road conditions that killed 14 persons in a May 17 bus
    accident. Police arrested approximately 50 students and severely beat
    several of them (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On November 13, security forces forcibly dispersed a march by
    opposition SDF parliamentarians in Yaounde. The Governor of the Center
    Province had banned the march on November 7. The parliamentarians
    marched to highlight the need for an independent electoral commission
    (see Section 3). Security forces arrested several marchers, seized
    journalists' cameras and beat one journalist (see Sections 1.c. and
    2.a.). On November 24 in Yaounde, security forces dispersed a similar
    protest by several dozen SDF parliamentarians; the SDF did not seek
    Government approval for the march as required under the law. No arrests
    were made.
        The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
    generally respected this right in practice during the year, although
    there were some exceptions. The conditions for government recognition
    of a political party, a prerequisite for many political activities,
    were not onerous. Over 150 political parties operated legally, together
    with a large and growing number of civic associations. However, in past
    years, the Government has been suspected widely of fomenting splits in
    the main opposition party, the SDF. Some members of the SCNC claim that
    the Government encourages splits within the organization as a way of
    undercutting the group's secessionist message.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
        Relations between the State and religious groups are governed
    chiefly by the Law on Religious Congregations. Religious groups must be
    approved and registered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration
    in order to function legally; there were no reports that the Government
    refused to register any group. It is illegal for a religious group to
    operate without official recognition, but the law prescribes no
    specific penalties for doing so. Although official recognition confers
    no general tax benefits, it allows religious groups to receive real
    estate as gifts and legacies for the conduct of their activities. In
    order to register, a religious denomination must fulfill the legal
    requirement to qualify as a religious congregation. This definition
    includes ``any group of natural persons or corporate bodies whose
    vocation is divine worship'' or ``any group of persons living in
    community in accordance with a religious doctrine.'' The denomination
    then submits a file to the Minister of Territorial Administration. The
    file must include a request for authorization, a copy of the charter of
    the group that describes planned activities, and the names and
    respective functions of the officials of the group. The Minister
    studies the file and sends it to the presidency with a recommendation
    for a positive or negative decision. The President generally follows
    the recommendation of the Minister, and authorization is granted by a
    presidential decree. The approval process usually takes several years,
    due primarily to administrative slowness. The only religious groups
    known to be registered are Christian and Muslim groups and the Baha'i
    Faith, but other groups may be registered. The Ministry has not
    disclosed the number of registered denominations, but the number of
    registered religious groups is estimated to be in the dozens. The
    Government does not register traditional religious groups, on the
    grounds that the practice of traditional religions is not public but
    rather private to members of a particular ethnic or kinship group, or
    to the residents of a particular locality.
        The sites and personnel of religious institutions were not exempt
    from the widespread human rights abuses committed by government
    security forces. On April 20, government security forces reportedly
    attacked the parish of Notre Dame de Sept Douleurs in Douala during a
    Mass. Security forces reportedly arrested some parishioners and beat
    others (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On April 24, the Ministry of
    National Education announced the suspension of two teachers of the
    Bertoua technical high school. The two teachers were accused of having
    ``enticed'' some of their students into their religious group.
        In January 1998, an undisclosed number of personnel of the 21st
    Navy Battalion, allegedly broke into a church in Douala, beat and
    stabbed the priest and several youths, raped young women, and stole
    funds. On February 22, the Douala Military Tribunal convicted the
    personnel of breach of orders causing bodily harm and destruction. The
    tribunal sentenced them to 1-year imprisonment with no possibility of
    remission.
        Disputes within registered religious groups about control of places
    of worship, schools, real estate, or financial assets are resolved in
    the first instance by the executive branch rather than by the
    judiciary.
        Government officials criticized and questioned criticisms of the
    Government by religious institutions and leaders, but there were no
    reports that Government officials used force to suppress such
    criticism.
        The practice of witchcraft is a criminal offense under the national
    penal code; however, persons generally are prosecuted for this offense
    only in conjunction with some other offense, such as murder. Witchcraft
    traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of which the
    causes were unknown.
        There was a media report that in September 1999 traditional
    authorities in Lobe, in Ndian Division of the Southwest Province,
    banished from the locality six persons, including one blind man,
    accused of having killed a woman by practicing witchcraft. According to
    the report, a traditional court tried the accused by requiring them to
    drink poison that traditionally is believed to kill only those who lie
    to the court, convicted the accused when they refused to drink, ordered
    them to pay inkind, bloodprice damages, and expelled them from the
    locality when they refused to pay. The accused reportedly filed a
    protest with the divisional officer of the central Government; however,
    initial investigations could not confirm this report.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law does not restrict freedom of
    movement within the country; however, in practice government security
    forces routinely impede domestic travel. Police frequently stop
    travelers to check identification documents, vehicle registrations, and
    tax receipts as security and immigration control measures. Police
    commonly demand bribes from citizens whom they stop at roadblocks or at
    other points.
        Roadblocks and checkpoints manned by security forces have
    proliferated in cities and most highways and make road travel both
    time-consuming and costly, since extortion of small bribes is
    commonplace at these checkpoints. In past years, violent and sometimes
    fatal confrontations have occurred repeatedly at such checkpoints when
    travelers would not or could not pay the bribes demanded by the
    security forces.
        There were credible reports that police arrested and beat
    individuals who failed to carry their identification cards (see
    Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.).
        The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The country has long
    been a safe haven for displaced persons and refugees from nearby
    countries. The Government provides first asylum to persons who arrive
    at the border without documentation but who can show a valid claim to
    refugee status. The UNHCR estimated that there were about 47,000
    refugees in the country for whom Cameroon was a country of first
    asylum. However, some NGO's claim that the number is as high as 60,000.
    The majority of these persons are Chadians, whose total number was
    estimated to be more than 41,000. In May 1999, the UNHCR began a
    repatriation program for Chadian refugees. The remaining refugees
    principally were from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo, with small numbers from Liberia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The
    Government accepts for resettlement refugees who are granted refugee
    status by the UNHCR.
        In 1997 government security forces detained 13 former senior
    military officers of Equatorial Guinea who had been granted refugee
    status by the UNHCR and had lived in the country for 4 years (see
    Section 1.d.). In August 10 of the 13 refugees from Equatorial Guinea
    detained at a military base since 1998 left for refugee resettlement in
    another country. Three refugees disappeared before they could depart
    (see Section 1.b.); however, they were believed to have returned
    voluntarily to Equatorial Guinea or to have established unofficial
    residence in the country.
        Some illegal immigrants have been subjected to harsh treatment and
    imprisonment. In August Bassy Okon Edet, a Nigerian fisherman released
    after 7 days of incarceration by gendarmes (see Section 1.d.), claimed
    that security forces continue to hold other Nigerians for fishing in
    waters close to the disputed Bakassi Peninsula. Communities of
    Nigerians and Chadians often have been the targets of police and
    gendarme harassment. During raids, members of the security forces often
    extort money from those who do not have regular residence permits or
    those who do not have valid receipts for store merchandise (see Section
    5).
        There were no confirmed reports of the forced return of persons to
    a country where they feared persecution. Although the Government
    occasionally returns illegal immigrants, there were no reports of
    forced repatriation of recognized refugees.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides that citizens have the right to change
    their government, but dominance of the political process by the
    President and his party limits the ability of citizens to exercise this
    right. President Paul Biya has controlled the Government since 1982 and
    the ruling party since 1985. The 1992 and 1997 presidential elections
    and the 1997 legislative contests were criticized widely and viewed as
    fraudulent by international and domestic observers. In these elections,
    which were administered by the Ministry of Territorial Administration,
    members of largely pro-opposition ethnic groups and inhabitants of
    largely pro-opposition localities effectively were prevented from
    registering or voting, registration and vote counting procedures were
    not transparent, a public announcement of results was delayed, and the
    number of votes cast in some progovernment areas exceeded the adult
    population.
        Elections are held by balloting that officially is described as
    secret but may permit voters to leave the polling place with evidence
    of how they voted. At polling places on election day, registered
    citizens receive a package containing one card for each candidate.
    While alone inside a closed booth, citizens choose a ballot and seal it
    into an envelope. Citizens then exit the booth and vote by depositing
    the sealed envelope into a ballot box. Polling officials are supposed
    to provide a method by which voters can dispose of the unused ballots
    privately before exiting the closed booth, but this rarely was done in
    the 1996 or 1997 elections.
        Following the flawed 1997 legislative elections, international
    observers endorsed a series of reform measures, including the creation
    of a permanent and autonomous electoral commission to replace the
    present system of elections run by the Ministry of Territorial
    Administration. The Government's control of the electoral process leads
    to a variety of abuses including preelection manipulation of voter
    registration lists.
        President Biya's October 1997 reelection was marred by serious
    procedural flaws as well as by a boycott by the three major opposition
    parties. While the boycott made the outcome a foregone conclusion, most
    observers nonetheless considered the contest to be neither free nor
    fair. Election irregularities especially were egregious in opposition
    strongholds, where boycotting opposition activists chose not to be
    present to monitor the voting count.
        In December 1997, after the Supreme Court announced the official
    election results declaring President Biya the winner with 92.57 percent
    of the vote, the UNDP, which previously had been an opposition party,
    joined the CPDM in a coalition government. The new ruling coalition
    also included a faction of the UPC party, which was not the same
    faction that had participated in previous CPDM-dominated coalition
    governments under President Biya.
        In 1998 talks between the ruling CPDM party and the leading
    opposition party, the SDF, broke down over the issue of creating an
    independent electoral commission, as recommended by most international
    observers of the 1992 and 1997 Presidential elections. The SDF demanded
    such a commission but the CPDM initially refused to grant this demand;
    however, on December 13, the National Assembly passed legislation to
    create a National Election Observatory (NEO) to monitor all stages of
    the electoral process; however, the legislation was not implemented by
    year's end.
        The Biya administration has proven particularly intolerant of
    opposition from within its Beti/Bulu ethnic-regional base in the Center
    Province. Following the unexpectedly strong showing of opposition
    parties in the region in the 1996 municipal elections, Titus Edzoa, a
    ruling CPDM member from the southern part of the country, a former
    Minister of Health, and a longtime presidential aide, declared himself
    a candidate to oppose incumbent President Biya in the October 1997
    election. Edzoa and his campaign manager were arrested shortly after he
    declared his candidacy and before the election was held. They were
    sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on embezzlement and corruption
    charges and remained incarcerated at year's end (see Section 1.e.).
        The President's control over the country's administrative apparatus
    is extensive. The President appoints all Ministers, including the Prime
    Minister, who serve at the President's pleasure. The President also
    directly appoints the governors of each of the 10 provinces. The
    governors wield considerable power in the electoral process,
    interpreting the laws and determining how these should be implemented.
    The President also has the power to appoint important lower level
    members of the 58 provincial administrative structures, including the
    senior divisional officers, the divisional officers, and the district
    chiefs. The governors and senior divisional officers wield considerable
    authority within the areas under their jurisdiction, including,
    significantly, the authority to ban political meetings that they deem
    likely to threaten public order. They also may detain persons for
    renewable periods of 15 days to combat banditry and other security
    threats.
        The 1996 amendments to the 1972 Constitution retained a strongly
    centralized system of power, based on presidential authority. However,
    the amendments imposed a limit of two 7-year (in place of unlimited 5-
    year) terms on the President. They provided for the creation of a
    partially elected (70 percent) and partially appointed (30 percent)
    senate, along with the creation of a similarly constituted set of
    provincial assemblies with limited power over local affairs. Although
    promulgated by the President in January 1996, the senate and regional
    council amendments have not yet been implemented.
        Citizens' right to choose their local governments remained
    circumscribed. In 1996 the Government held local government elections
    that were unprecedented in the Francophone region and the first such
    elections since the 1960's in the Anglophone region. These elections
    were for mayors or deputy mayors and council members in Douala,
    Yaounde, provincial capitals, and some division capitals. President
    Biya first promised such elections in 1992, but postponed them twice.
    In the meantime, the Government greatly increased the number of
    municipalities run by presidentially-appointed delegates, who have
    authority over elected mayors. Delegate-run cities, of which there were
    only four in 1992, by 1996 included most of the provincial capitals and
    some division capitals in pro-opposition provinces, but not in the
    southern provinces that had tended to support the CPDM. In 1998 a
    60member Committee on Good Governance, created by the Government,
    publicly recommended that the Government eliminate the position of
    delegate in order to allow elected local officials to manage municipal
    governments more freely. Even in municipalities with elected mayors,
    local autonomy is limited, since elected local governments must rely on
    the central Government for most of their revenues and their
    administrative personnel.
        Like the 1992 National Assembly elections, the 1996 municipal
    elections were less flawed than other elections held since 1990.
    Foreign observers considered the elections largely free and fair,
    having detected few instances of malfeasance during or after the
    voting; however, opposition parties credibly alleged systematic
    preelection government manipulation of the registration lists and
    arbitrary government disqualification of their candidates, especially
    in the south. Government election authorities acknowledged that
    opposition candidates won 104 of the 336 offices at stake. Ninety-six
    contests in which the Government declared the ruling party candidate
    the winner were appealed to the Supreme Court, which declared itself
    unqualified to adjudicate many of these complaints, but nullified the
    results of 18 elections, which it ordered the Government to hold again.
    As of year's end, the Government had not complied with any of these
    Supreme Court orders.
        There were no new developments in the 1999 criminalized civil libel
    case against SDF Party Chairman John Fru Ndi by a disgruntled former
    SDF official. Fru Ndi's February 1999 felony conviction still is
    pending an appeal in the Yaounde High Court. Some observers believe
    that Fru Ndi's conviction might enable the Government in the future to
    disqualify him for any public office for which he may seek to run.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no
    laws that specifically prohibit women or members of minorities from
    participating in government, in the political process, or in other
    areas of public life. Women hold 4 of 50 cabinet posts, 10 of 180 seats
    in the National Assembly, and few of the higher offices of major
    political parties, including the CPDM.
        Many of the key members of the Government are drawn from the
    President's own Bulu/Beti ethnic group, as are disproportionately large
    numbers of military officers and CPDM officials. Members of some of the
    other 200 ethnic groups hold 30 cabinet seats, compared with 18 cabinet
    positions held by members of the President's ethnic group.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Domestic and international human rights monitoring groups generally
    have considerable latitude to operate. A large number of independent
    human rights monitoring groups exist, although the activities of
    virtually all are limited by a shortage of funds and trained personnel.
    The Government did not formally prevent human rights monitors from
    operating. In the past, the Government used its authority to approve or
    withhold official recognition of NGO's, but there have been no recent
    cases in which such recognition was withheld. However, Government
    officials repeatedly impeded the effectiveness of human rights NGO's by
    limiting access to prisoners, by refusing to share information, and
    increasingly by threatening and using violence against personnel of
    human rights NGO's (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        Domestic human rights NGO's include the National League for Human
    Rights, the Organization for Human Rights and Freedoms, the Association
    of Women Against Violence, the Cameroonian Association of Female
    Jurists, the Cameroonian Association for Children's Rights, Conscience
    Africaine, the Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties
    (MDHRL), the Human Rights Defense Group, the National Association of
    Nontribalists and Nonracists, the Committee of Action for Women's and
    Children's Rights (CADEF), the Human Rights Clinic and Education
    Center, the Association of Women against Violence, the Cameroon
    National Association for Family Welfare (CAMNAFAW), Tribes Without
    Frontiers (TSF), the Association for the Promotion of Communal
    Initiatives, and the League for Rights and Freedoms (LDL). A number of
    these groups issued press releases or reports detailing specific human
    rights violations. Many held seminars and workshops on various aspects
    of human rights.
        In 1999 the Government generally cooperated with the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur for Human Rights on a visit to the Far North Province, but
    Colonel Pom's special antigang gendarmerie unit denied him access to
    its holding cells (see Section 1.c.). In 1999 the Government allowed
    the ICRC, for the first time in 7 years, to generally have unrestricted
    access to all prisons and detention places and to hold private
    discussions with inmates.
        The governmental NCHRF, although hampered by a shortage of funds,
    conducted a number of investigations into human rights abuses, visited
    prisons, and organized several human rights seminars aimed at judicial
    officials, security personnel, and other government officers. Although
    the Commission infrequently condemned the Government's human rights
    abuses publicly, its staff intervened with government officials in
    specific cases of human rights harassment by security forces, attempted
    to stop Friday arrests (see Section 1.d.), and attempted to obtain
    medical attention for jailed suspects in specific cases. The law
    prohibits the NCHRF from publishing information on specific human
    rights cases. However, it may and does submit reports on specific
    alleged abuses to the government authorities directly involved, along
    with recommendations for improving conditions or punishing violators.
    During the year, the NCHRF sent teams to Douala to investigative
    allegations of extrajudicial killings by the Operational Command (see
    Section 1.a.). Although the Commissioner sent two reports to the
    President and the Prime Minister, there are no plans to release the
    reports publicly.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution does not explicitly forbid discrimination based on
    race, language, or social status. The Constitution prohibits
    discrimination based on sex and mandates that ``everyone has equal
    rights and obligations,'' but the Government does not enforce these
    constitutional provisions effectively.
        Women.--Violence against women remains high. Women's rights
    advocates report that the law does not impose effective penalties
    against men who commit acts of domestic violence. There are no
    genderspecific assault laws, despite the fact that women are the
    predominant victims of domestic violence. Spousal abuse is not a legal
    ground for divorce. In cases of sexual assault, a victim's family or
    village often imposes direct, summary punishment on the suspected
    perpetrator through extralegal means ranging from destruction of
    property to beating. While there are no reliable statistics on violence
    against women, the large number of newspaper reports, which observers
    believer are a fraction of actual incidents indicates that it is
    widespread.
        Despite constitutional provisions recognizing women's rights, women
    do not, in fact, enjoy the same rights and privileges as men. Civil law
    theoretically provides equal status and rights for men and women;
    however, no legal definition of discrimination exists, and some points
    of civil law are prejudicial to women. The 1981 Civil Code allows a
    husband to oppose his wife's right to work in a separate profession if
    the protest is made in the interest of the household and the family.
    While the law gives a woman the freedom to organize her own business,
    the Commercial Code allows a husband to end his wife's commercial
    activity by notifying the clerk of the commerce tribunal of his
    opposition based upon the family's interest. Partly for this reason,
    some employers require a husband's permission before they hire a woman.
    Polygyny is permitted by law and tradition, but polyandry is not. In
    cases of divorce, the husband's wishes determine the custody of
    children over the age of 6. While a man may be convicted of adultery
    only if the sexual act takes place in his home, a female may be
    convicted without respect to venue.
        Civil law offers a more equal standard than customary law, which is
    far more discriminatory against women, since in many regions a woman
    customarily is regarded as the property of her husband. Because of the
    importance attached to customs and traditions, laws protecting women
    often are not respected. Despite the law that fixes a minimum age of 15
    years for a bride, many girls are married off by their families by the
    age of 12. In the customary law of some ethnic groups, husbands not
    only maintain complete control over family property, but also can
    divorce their wives in a traditional court without being required to
    provide either verifiable justification or alimony. Traditional law
    normally governs the extent to which a woman may inherit from her
    husband in the absence of a will, and customs vary from group to group.
    In many traditional societies, custom grants greater authority and
    benefits to male than to female heirs. Another problem facing women is
    forced marriage; in some regions, girls' parents can and do give them
    away in marriage without their consent. Often, the husband, who is
    sometimes many years older than the girl, pays a bride's parents a
    ``bride price.'' Since a price has been paid, the girl is considered
    the property of the husband. When a married man dies, his widow often
    is unable to collect any inheritance, since she herself is considered
    part of the man's property. Often the widow is forced to marry one of
    the deceased's brothers. Refusal means that she must repay the bride
    price in full (she usually has no source of funds) and leave the family
    property. In the northern provinces, some Lamibe (traditional rulers)
    reportedly prevent their wives and concubines from leaving their
    palaces. The lack of a national legal code covering the family leaves
    women defenseless against male-oriented customs.
        Children.--The Constitution provides for a child's right to
    education, and schooling is mandatory through the age of 14. After
    almost a decade of budget cuts for education, the Government took
    measures during the year to improve access to schools. In February
    President Biya announced the elimination of tuition fees for public
    elementary schools. In June the National Assembly passed a budget bill
    that increased spending on national education by 49 percent.
    Nonetheless, education spending during the 1999/2000 fiscal year was
    only approximately 2 percent of GDP. Since parents must pay uniform and
    book fees for primary school, and because tuition and other fees for
    secondary education remain even more costly, education remains
    unaffordable for many children. According to 1998 Government
    statistics, approximately 3.5 million children, about 81 percent of all
    children, were enrolled in school. In practice although not in law,
    girls suffer from discrimination in access to education. The gap in
    school attendance rates between boys and girls is 9 percent nationally
    and 14 percent in the three northern provinces. This problem, which is
    especially acute in rural areas, results in higher levels of illiteracy
    among women than among men. According to a 1995 study by a U.N. agency,
    the adult literacy rate was 75 percent for men but only 52 percent for
    women. In addition fewer girls are found at higher levels of education;
    according to a 1992 study by the Ministry of Women's Affairs, women
    made up only 23 percent of postsecondary students.
        While the Government has closed unlicensed primary and secondary
    schools in the past, there were no reports of such closings this year.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which has been condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is not practiced widely, but it is traditional
    and continues to be practiced in some areas of Far North and Southwest
    Provinces. It includes the most severe form of the abuse, infibulation,
    and usually is practiced on preadolescent girls. The Government has
    criticized the practice; however, no law prohibits FGM.
        The degree of familial child abuse is not known but is one of
    several targeted problems of children's rights organizations. During a
    crime wave in the country's largest cities of Yaounde and Douala,
    newspaper reports often cited children as victims of kidnapping,
    mutilation, and even infanticide. There were several credible stories
    of mothers (usually young, unemployed, and unmarried) abandoning
    newborns in streets, garbage cans, and pit toilets. The Yaounde-based
    Center for Helpless Children, created by the Minister of Social Affairs
    in 1997, currently harbors 24 abandoned or abused children, only a
    fraction of the suspected cases of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.
        Reports also indicate an alarming trend in the country's prisons of
    incarcerating juvenile offenders with adult prisoners, occasionally in
    the same cells or wards (see Section 1.c.). There are credible reports
    of sexual abuse of juvenile prisoners by adult inmates. The law
    specifies that children should not be detained without trial beyond 3
    months after an investigation, but the Government detains children for
    longer periods of time. In June press sources indicated that between 34
    and 38 children are detained in the Douala New Bell Prison. Some
    children (particularly infants) are jailed with their detained mothers.
        There were reports of forced child labor, child prostitution, and
    trafficking in children during the year (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and
    6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--A 1983 law and subsequent implementing
    legislation provide certain rights for persons with disabilities. These
    include access to public institutions, medical treatment, and
    education. The Government is obliged to bear part of a disabled
    person's educational expenses, to employ disabled persons where
    possible, and, as necessary, to provide them with public assistance.
    However, these rights in fact rarely are respected. There are few
    facilities for disabled persons and little public assistance of any
    kind. Lack of facilities and care for the mentally disabled is
    particularly acute. In recent years, the Government reportedly has
    reduced the share of its expenditures that benefit disabled persons and
    has terminated subsidies to NGO's that help disabled persons. Society
    tends to treat the disabled as tainted, leaving churches or foreign
    NGO's responsible for providing assistance. However, there is no
    widespread societal discrimination against the disabled. The law does
    not mandate special access provisions to buildings and facilities for
    the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--A population of perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 Baka
    (Pygmies), a term that encompasses several different ethnic groups,
    primarily reside in the forested areas of the South and East provinces,
    of which Pygmies were the earliest known inhabitants. While no legal
    discrimination exists, other groups often treat Pygmies as inferior and
    sometimes subject them to unfair and exploitative labor practices.
    There have been credible reports of Pygmies being forced out of their
    homes by logging companies and security forces. There continued to be
    reports that Pygmies complain that the forests they inhabit are being
    logged without fair recompense for the negative consequences suffered
    by the Pygmies of the region. Some observers believe that sustained
    logging is destroying the Pygmies' unique, forest-oriented belief
    system, forcing them to adapt their traditional social and economic
    systems into a more rigid modern society similar to their Bantu
    neighbors. Some local activists also criticized possible effects from
    the Chad-Cameroon pipeline on nearby pygmy settlements.
        Religious Minorities.--Approximately 40 percent of the population
    are at least nominally Christian, about 20 percent are at least
    nominally Muslim, and about 40 percent practice traditional indigenous
    religions or no religion. Of Christians, approximately half are
    Catholics, and about half are affiliated with Protestant denominations.
    Christians are concentrated chiefly in the southern and western
    provinces; the two Anglophone provinces of the western region largely
    are Protestant; and the Francophone provinces of the southern and
    western regions largely are Catholic. Muslims are concentrated mainly
    in the northern provinces, where the locally dominant Fulani (or Peuhl)
    ethnic group is overwhelmingly Muslim, and other ethnic groups, known
    collectively as the Kirdi, generally are partly Islamicized. The Bamoun
    ethnic group of the western provinces is also largely Muslim.
    Traditional indigenous religions are practiced in rural areas
    throughout the country but rarely are practiced publicly in cities, in
    part because many such religions are intrinsically local in character.
        Relations among different religious groups generally are amicable;
    however, some religious groups face societal pressures within their
    regions. In the northern provinces, especially in rural areas, societal
    discrimination by Muslims against persons who practice traditional
    indigenous religions is strong and widespread. Some Christians in rural
    areas of the north complain of discrimination by Muslims, but this
    reported discrimination may reflect ethnic as much as religious
    differences. The northern region suffers from ethnic tensions between
    the Fulani, a Muslim group that conquered most of the region 200 years
    ago, and the Kirdi, the descendents of groups that practiced
    traditional indigenous religions and whom the Fulani conquered or
    displaced, justifying their conquest on religious grounds. Although
    some Kirdi subsequently have adopted Islam, the Kirdi remain socially,
    educationally, and economically disadvantaged relative to the Fulani in
    the three northern provinces. The slavery still practiced in parts of
    the north is reported to be largely enslavement of Kirdi by Fulani (see
    Section 6.c.).
        In the past, there have been occasional reports of isolated
    conflict between Christians and practitioners of traditional indigenous
    religions; however, no specific incidents or violence stemming from
    religious discrimination were reported this year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is divided into
    more than 200 ethnic groups, among which there are frequent and
    credible allegations of discrimination. Members of virtually all ethnic
    groups commonly provide preferential treatment to fellow members when
    they are able to do so. Ethnic-regional differences continue to pose
    obstacles to political and economic liberalization.
        Members of President Biya's Bulu ethnic group and of closely
    related Beti groups of southern parts of the country are represented
    disproportionately and hold key positions in government, the civil
    service, state-owned businesses, the security forces, the military, and
    the ruling CPDM party. The large size and centralized character of the
    public sector has long been perceived widely to favor these groups.
    Prospective economic and political liberalization is widely perceived
    as being likely to harm these groups, and to favor other groups, such
    as the large Bamileke and Anglophone ethnic-cultural groups of the
    west, whose members tend to be more active in private commerce and
    industry and have tended to support the SDF since the legalization of
    opposition parties. Since 1990 natives of the two Anglophone provinces,
    the Northwest and Southwest Provinces, have suffered disproportionately
    from human rights violations committed by the Government and its
    security forces (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.); have been
    underrepresented in the public sector; and generally believe that they
    have not received their fair share of public sector goods and services.
    Since the flawed 1992 presidential election (see Section 3), many
    residents of the Anglophone region have sought to achieve greater
    freedom, greater equality of opportunity, and better government, at
    least partly by regaining regional autonomy rather than through
    nationwide political reform. They have formed several quasipolitical
    organizations to pursue that goal.
        At least one Anglophone group, the SCNC, advocates secession from
    the country. Subsequent to SCNC secessionist incidents in 1999, such
    activity calmed considerably during the year; however, the Government
    continued to hold some SCNC activists or suspected SCNC supporters in
    jail without trial (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). The opposition
    SDF party (whose base of support rests in the Anglophone provinces)
    reiterated its commitment to pursuing nonviolent political struggle to
    restore a federal republic.
        Northern areas of the country suffer from ethnic tensions between
    the Fulani (or Peuhl), a Muslim group that conquered most of the region
    200 years ago, and the ``Kirdi,'' the descendants of diverse groups who
    then practiced traditional indigenous religions and whom the Fulani
    conquered or displaced, justifying their conquest on religious grounds.
    Although some Kirdi subsequently have adopted Islam, the Kirdi remain
    socially, educationally, and economically disadvantaged relative to the
    Fulani in the three northern provinces. Traditional Fulani rulers
    (Lamibe) continue to wield great power over their subjects, often
    including Kirdi, sometimes subjecting them to tithing and forced labor
    (see Section 6.c.). The slavery still practiced in northern parts of
    the country is reported to be largely enslavement of Kirdi by Fulani.
    Although the UNDP party is based largely in the Fulani community, the
    ruling CPDM party has long been perceived widely to represent Fulani as
    well as Beti-Bulu interests.
        During the 1990's, local-language broadcasts by
    governmentcontrolled regional radio stations in southern areas of the
    country, as well as private French-language newspapers with close ties
    to leading government and CPDM figures, broadcast or printed anti-
    Bamileke and anti-Anglophone commentaries; however, there were no
    reports of these types of commentaries during the year.
        Members of the country's large community of Nigerian immigrants
    often complain of illegal discrimination and even persecution by
    elements of the Government (see Section 2.d.). Government officials
    repeatedly have announced crackdowns on undocumented Nigerian
    immigrants.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code allows workers to
    form and join trade unions of their choosing. The Labor Code requires
    that unions register with the Government; it permits groups of at least
    20 workers to organize a union by submitting a constitution, internal
    regulations, and non-conviction certifications for each of the 20
    founding members. For unions in the private sector, the Government
    requires registration with the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and
    Social Insurance. Unions for public sector workers must register with
    the Ministry of Territorial Administration. The law does not permit the
    creation of a union that includes both public and private sector
    workers. The Government indicated that it remits certification within 1
    month of union application; however, in practice, independent union
    especially in the public sector, have found it difficult to obtain
    registration. In addition the requirement for union registration
    apparently contradicts ILO Convention 87, to which the country signed
    and agreed in 1960, and which states that unions have the right to
    exist through declaration, not through Government recognition or
    registration. Registered unions are subject to Government interference.
    The Government chooses the unions with which it will bargain; some
    independent unions have accused the Government of creating small, non-
    representative unions amenable to the Government position and with
    which it can negotiate. Some sections of the Labor Code have never
    taken effect because the presidency has not issued implementing
    decrees.
        There are two trade union confederations. Until 1995 the sole labor
    confederation was the Confederation of Cameroonian Trade Unions (CCTU),
    formerly affiliated with the ruling CPDM party under another name (the
    Organization of Cameroonian Trade Unions). In 1995 the Government
    encouraged the creation of a new labor confederation, the Union of Free
    Trade Unions of Cameroon (USLC), with which it maintains close ties.
    This move was seen as an effort by the Government to create a rival
    trade union confederation more firmly under its control. In 1997 the
    CCTU, government control of which had been eroding since large public
    sector salary cuts in 1993, split into two rival factions, and the
    Government banned a conference by the CCTU's reformist faction, led by
    Benoit Essiga. A CCTU Congress held in April 1999, which was attended
    by international observers and held under the auspices of the
    International Labor Organization (ILO), elected the reform faction
    slate of candidates to the CCTU leadership positions. However, the
    losing faction did not accept the results and continues to claim that
    it is the real CCTU. The Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social
    Insurance has stated that it will not recognize the new CCTU leadership
    as long as another CCTU faction uses the same name. In September 1998,
    the new CCTU leadership took their case to court and won; however, the
    Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Insurance continues to
    withhold official status. Other ministries within the Government
    informally recognize the new CCTU leadership and include them in
    appropriate seminars and invitations. In a February press conference
    and an August ``unity'' conference, the Ministry of Labor, Employment,
    and Social Insurance appeared to back publicly the losing CCTU faction
    at the expense of the reformist faction. However, a court declared the
    August unity conference, attended by 400 people, illegal, stating that
    only the reformist faction of the CCTU had the power to convoke such a
    conference.
        The Labor Code explicitly recognizes workers' right to strike, but
    only after mandatory arbitration. Arbitration proceedings are not
    enforceable legally and can be overturned or simply ignored by the
    Government. The Labor Code provides for the protection of workers
    engaged in legal strikes and prohibits retribution against them.
    However, these provisions of the Labor Code do not apply to civil
    servants, employees of the penitentiary system, or workers responsible
    for national security. Instead of strikes, civil servants are required
    to negotiate grievances directly with the minister of the concerned
    department and with the Minister of Labor.
        During the year, labor unrest continued. There were strikes by
    workers in the privatized railroad company Camrail, the sugar producing
    company of Camsuco, the cotton producing company of Cicam, as well as
    strikes by some elementary and secondary school teachers and employees
    of the Douala Municipal Council. The National Autonomous Union of
    Telecommunications Workers (SYNATTEL) also discussed and negotiated
    salary and benefit issues, despite the Government's argument that it
    had not obtained full legal recognition.
        The CCTU is a member of the Organization of African Trade Unions
    and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The USLC is a
    member of the Organization of African Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    provides for collective bargaining between workers and management in
    workplaces, as well as between labor federations and business
    associations in each sector of the economy; however, no formal
    collective bargaining negotiations have taken place since 1996. When
    labor disputes arise, the Government chooses which labor union to
    invite into the negotiations, selectively excluding some labor
    representatives. Once agreements are negotiated, there is no mechanism
    to enforce implementation; some agreements between the Government and
    labor unions have been shelved or ignored by the Government after being
    negotiated. The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination, and
    employers guilty of such discrimination are subject to fines of up to
    an amount equivalent to approximately $1,600 (1 million CFA). However,
    employers found guilty are not required to compensate the workers
    against whom they discriminated, or to reinstate fired workers. The
    Ministry of Labor has reported no complaints of such discrimination
    during recent years; however, one organizer of the Union for
    Telecommunications Workers claims that his state-owned company demoted
    him due to his union activism.
        In November the Prefet of Dschang arrested two union
    leadersuniversity professors trying to organize the University of
    Dschangallegedly because of an unsigned labor agreement (see Section
    1.d.); ten others also were questioned. They were released the next
    day. There is an industrial free trade zone regime, but the Government
    did not grant approval to any firms to operate under it during the
    year. Free trade zone employers are exempt from some provisions of the
    Labor Code but must respect all internationally recognized worker
    rights.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the Labor Code prohibit forced or compulsory labor; however, it occurs
    in practice. The authorities continued to allow prison inmates to be
    contracted out to private employers or used as communal labor for
    municipal public works. Forced or bonded labor by children is not
    prohibited specifically, and there were reports that it occurs in
    practice (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        On August 24, gendarmes released Bassy Okon Edet, a Nigerian
    fisherman, after a 7-day incarceration (see Section 1.d.). Edet claims
    that the gendarmes forced him to do labor during his incarceration.
        There were credible reports that slavery continued to be practiced
    in northern parts of the country, including in the Lamidat of Rey
    Bouba, a traditional kingdom in the North Province (see Section 5). In
    the South and East Provinces, some Baka (Pygmies), including children,
    continued to be subjected to unfair and exploitative labor practices by
    landowners, such as working on the landowners' farms during harvest
    seasons without payment (see Section 5). There were reports of
    trafficking in children (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--A 1969 Ministry of Labor order and the 1992 Labor Code
    provide the legal framework for the protection of children in the field
    of labor and education, and specify penalties ranging from fines to
    imprisonment for infringement of the law. In April 1998, the National
    Assembly authorized President Biya to ratify ILO Convention 138
    regarding to employment of children; however, the President has not
    signed the bill. Article 86 of the Labor Code and the Ministerial Order
    both set the minimum age for the employment of children at 14. The
    Ministerial Order also bans night work and enumerates tasks that cannot
    be performed legally by children between the ages of 14 and 18. These
    tasks include moving heavy weights, dangerous and unhealthy tasks,
    working in confined areas, or tasks that could hurt a child's morality.
    The order also states that a child's workday cannot exceed 8 hours. In
    order to improve knowledge and education of children between the ages
    of 14 and 18, employers are required to train them. To this end, work
    contracts must contain a training provision for these minors. The law
    prohibits children from working before 6 a.m. or after midnight, though
    enforcement of this law is inefficient.
        According to an ILO study conducted during the year in conjunction
    with local NGO's and the Ministry of Labor, child labor remains a
    serious problem, although the Government has made some progress to
    address it. The ILO estimates there are 602,000 child laborers. In the
    nation's major cities of Yaounde, Douala, and Bamenda, from March to
    April, the ILO estimated that 40 percent of employed children were
    female, 7 percent were less than 12 years of age, and 60 percent had
    dropped out of primary schools. Primary education is compulsory through
    the age of 14, but the relatively high cost for school precludes many
    children from attending.
        The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Labor are
    responsible for enforcing existing child labor laws through site
    inspections of registered businesses; however, lack of resources
    inhibits an effective inspection program. Moreover, the legal
    prohibitions do not include family chores, which in many instances are
    beyond a child's capacity to do. According to the ILO study, child
    labor in cities exists mainly in the informal sector such as street
    vending and car washing or other non-qualified jobs. An increasing
    number of children work as household help, and some children are
    involved in prostitution. In the north of the country, there are
    credible reports that children from needy homes are placed with other
    families to do household work for money.
        In rural areas, many children begin work at an early age on family
    farms. Often, relatives employ rural youth, especially girls, as
    domestic helpers, while many urban street vendors are less than 14
    years of age.
        The Government is a signatory to ILO Convention 182; however, the
    National Assembly had not ratified the convention by year's end.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is not prohibited specifically,
    and there were reports that it occurs in practice (see Section 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Under the Labor Code, the
    Ministry of Labor is responsible for setting a single minimum wage
    applicable nationwide in all sectors. The minimum wage is approximately
    $40 (23,514 CFA) per month. It does not provide a decent standard of
    living for an average worker and family.
        The Labor Code establishes a standard workweek of 40 hours in
    public and private nonagricultural firms, and 48 hours in agricultural
    and related activities. The code makes compulsory at least 24
    consecutive hours of weekly rest.
        The Government sets health and safety standards, and Ministry of
    Labor inspectors and occupational health doctors are responsible for
    monitoring these standards; however, they lack the resources for a
    comprehensive inspection program. There is no specific legislation
    permitting workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
    without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code provides that any person
    who engages in any trafficking in persons shall be punished with
    imprisonment of from 10 to 20 years and that the court may also impose
    a forfeiture penalty. Trafficking is a problem, and an ILO report
    during the year pinpointed trafficking in children as especially
    serious.
        An ILO study conducted in March and April in Yaounde, Douala, and
    Bamenda revealed that trafficking accounted for 84 percent (or
    approximately 530,000) of an estimated 610,000 child laborers (see
    Sections 5 and 6.c.). In most cases, intermediaries presented
    themselves as businessmen, approaching parents with large families or
    custodians of orphans and promising to assist the child with education
    or training. The intermediary paid parents an average of $8 (6,000 CFA)
    before taking the child, transporting the child to the city where the
    intermediary would subject the child to forced work for remumeration
    which was far below the minimum wage level. In 4 out of 10 cases, the
    child was a foreigner transported to the country for labor. The report
    also indicated that the country is a transit country for regional
    traffickers as well, transporting children between Nigeria, Benin,
    Niger, Chad, Togo, the Republic of the Congo, and the Central African
    Republic.
        While there has been no study on trafficking in persons besides
    children, anecdotal evidence from the NCHRF indicates that there may
    also be some trafficking in adults, primarily women, as well. No NGO's
    were known to be working to reduce trafficking in persons.
        The Government has condemned the practice of trafficking in
    persons, and the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Insurance is
    responsible for fighting trafficking. However, that ministry is
    severely under-funded, and there are no known cases of prosecution of
    traffickers or protection of victims.
                                   __________

                                   CAPE VERDE

        Cape Verde is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which
    constitutional powers are shared between the elected Head of State,
    President Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, an independent; the Head of
    Government, Prime Minister Carlos Wahnon Veiga; and Veiga's party, the
    Movement for Democracy (MPD). The MPD has an absolute majority in the
    National Assembly, although a disagreement within the top levels of the
    MPP during the year resulted in a split within the party and the
    formation of a new party. The principal opposition party, the African
    Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), held power in a one-
    party state from independence in 1975 until 1991. National elections
    are scheduled for January and February 2001. The judiciary is
    independent; however, there were accusations of politicized and biased
    judicial decisions.
        The Government controls the police, which has primary
    responsibility for maintenance of law and order. Some members of the
    police and prison guards committed human rights abuses.
        Cape Verde has a market-based economy but little industry and few
    exploitable natural resources. Based on 1998 data, the per capita
    income is $1,312. The country has a long history of economically driven
    emigration, primarily to Western Europe and the United States, and
    remittances from citizens abroad remained an important source of
    income. Even in years of optimum rainfall, the country can produce food
    for only 25 percent of the population of approximately 435,000 persons,
    which resulted in heavy reliance on international food aid.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There were a
    number of credible reports of police abuse, including beatings, of
    citizens detained on suspicion of criminal activity. While in principle
    the law and the judiciary provide means to deal with isolated instances
    of abuse, in practice the Government has not held accountable police
    officers who were credibly accused of human rights abuses. There were
    reports that immigration authorities harassed Nigerian citizens. Prison
    conditions are poor. The judicial system is overburdened, lengthy
    delays in trials are common, and there continued to be accusations of
    politicized and biased judicial decisions. There were some limitations
    on press freedom, and there continued to be allegations of media self-
    censorship. Revisions of the Constitution in 1999 created an
    independent ombudsman. Violence and discrimination against women and
    mistreatment of children continued to be serious problems. Although the
    Government supported legislation to ameliorate these problems, it
    failed to adopt, implement, and enforce policies designed to address
    the most critical challenges. There were reports of trafficking in
    persons.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, but there was
    one credible report that police beat a detainee on Sal Island in
    August; at year's end, no action had been taken against the police.
    While mechanisms for investigating citizen complaints of police
    brutality exist in theory, in practice these mechanisms neither ensure
    the punishment of all of those responsible nor effectively prevent
    future violations. In addition in some instances of violence against
    women, the police did not protect the victims effectively (see Section
    5). There were reports that immigration authorities harassed Nigerian
    citizens (see Section 2.d.).
        Prison conditions are poor, and they are severely overcrowded;
    however, there were no reports of prison deaths. The President's
    amnesty did not reduce the overcrowding. Sanitation and medical
    assistance is poor; a doctor and a nurse were available and prisoners
    were taken to the public hospitals for serious problems. Psychological
    problems were common. Although women and men are held separately,
    juveniles are not held separately from adults.
        According to a study by the Ze Moniz Association (AZM), there were
    reports that guards abused female prisoners.
        The Government permits both formal visits by human rights monitors
    to prisons and routine visits to individual prisoners; however, other
    than the AZM study there were no visits by human rights groups.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The laws provide for
    protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities
    generally observe these laws in practice. The law stipulates that a
    suspect must be charged before a judge within 48 hours of arrest.
    Police may not make arrests without a court order unless a person is
    caught in the act of committing a felony. In 1999 the Government
    revoked a provision that allowed authorities to detain a person for up
    to 5 days in exceptional cases.
        The courts have jurisdiction over state security cases. There is a
    functioning system of bail.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
    judiciary independent of the executive branch, and the Government
    respects this provision in practice; however, there continued to be
    accusations of politicized and biased judicial decisions. In July 1999,
    a prosecutor dismissed a case against four persons associated with the
    main opposition party who had been arrested for church desecration in
    1996. In 1998 a judge ordered their release from detention because of
    lack of evidence. The Attorney General refused to confirm the
    prosecutor's decision and declared that the case should await better
    proof that the persons were not culpable (see Section 5). At year's
    end, the case remained pending.
        The judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court and the
    regional courts. Of the five Supreme Court judges, one is appointed by
    the President, one by the National Assembly, and three by the Superior
    Judiciary Council. This council, created by the 1999 revision of the
    Constitution, consists of the President of the Supreme Court, the
    Attorney General, eight private citizens, two judges, two prosecutors,
    the senior legal inspector of the Attorney General's office, and a
    representative of the Ministry of Justice. Judges are independent and
    may not belong to a political party.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial. Defendants
    are presumed to be innocent; they have the right to a public, nonjury
    trial; to counsel; to present witnesses; and to appeal verdicts. Free
    counsel is provided for the indigent. Regional courts adjudicate minor
    disputes on the local level in rural areas. The Ministry of Justice
    does not have judicial powers; such powers lie with the courts.
    Defendants may appeal regional court decisions to the Supreme Court.
        The judiciary generally provides due process rights; however, the
    right to an expeditious trial is constrained by a seriously
    overburdened and understaffed judicial system. A backlog of cases
    routinely leads to trial delays of 6 months and more.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
    freedom to express ideas by words, images, or any other means, and for
    freedom of the press without censorship; however, although the
    Government generally respected these rights in practice, there were
    some restrictions on press freedom. There is a substantial and growing
    independent press. Nevertheless, there was continued criticism by
    independent political figures of the performance of the state-
    controlled television, radio, and print media for their failure to
    exercise vigorously their monitoring role in a multiparty system. In
    several instances, persons in the media (and other sectors) whose views
    did not coincide with those of the Government and the ruling party were
    transferred, fired, or subjected to other disciplinary actions; the
    Government does not acknowledge that the divergence of views was the
    reason for such actions. There continued to be reports of media self-
    censorship.
        The constitutional provision of freedom of expression was amended
    in 1999, to exclude using this freedom as a defense in cases involving
    defamation or offense to personal honor. This wording was criticized
    strongly by opposition politicians and some journalists as potentially
    limiting the freedom of expression; however, at year's end, no legal
    challenge had been made to the provision.
        There are three independent newspapers and one state-owned
    newspaper. There are six independent radio stations and one state-owned
    radio station. One television station is state-owned and two others are
    foreign-owned. Foreign broadcasts are permitted. Journalists are
    independent of government control and are not required to reveal their
    sources; however, there are credible reports that journalists within
    the government-controlled media still practice self-censorship. In
    November opposition party members demonstrated in Praia against what
    they considered to be MPD control of the public media.
        Government authorization is not needed to publish newspapers or
    other printed material. Despite the broadly interpreted criminal libel
    laws, no independent media outlets reported direct pressure in their
    daily operations or business activities. The national radio station
    provided live broadcasts of National Assembly sessions.
        The law requires a formal licensing mechanism for mass media,
    including government authorization to broadcast; however, there were no
    reports that licenses were denied or revoked or that the Government
    refused to authorize broadcasts.
        The Government did not restrict Internet access. There was a
    single, private sector Internet service provider. There were technical
    limitations on Internet use related to bandwidth and the unavailability
    of electricity and telephone lines in isolated parts of the country.
        The Constitution provides for academic freedom, and this right is
    respected in practice.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respected
    this right in practice. Throughout the year, labor organizations,
    opposition political parties, civic action groups, and numerous others
    exercised this right without government interference or objection.
        In July students demonstrated in front of government offices in
    Praia to protest the requirement that they pass an achievement
    examination before receiving government scholarships. The
    demonstrations initially were peaceful, but they became violent when
    students blocked off main roads with burning tires; police fired into
    the air to disperse the demonstrators. There were no reported injuries.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respected this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
    practice.
        The overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent) of citizens are at
    least nominally Roman Catholic. It generally is recognized that the
    Catholic majority enjoys a privileged status in national life; for
    example, the Government provides it with free television broadcast time
    for religious services and observes its holy days as official holidays.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides citizens with the right
    to travel and establish residence without government restrictions.
        The Constitution provides for repatriation, and the Government
    respected this right in practice.
        The Constitution provides for the right of asylum by refugees, and
    no violations were reported. The law provides for the granting of
    refugee and asylum status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. According to
    the U.N. Human Rights Commission, credible media reports, and
    government officials, Nigerian citizens have been subjected to
    harassment and prejudice by immigration authorities. The Government has
    not reviewed charges of misconduct by immigration officials. Nigerians
    alleged that they have been subjected to discriminatory treatment by
    Government officials; however, some Nigerians were illegally present in
    the country or convicted of crimes. Other observers reported no
    evidence of a government policy of discrimination against Nigerians.
    Three or four Basque separatist asylees remained in the country; there
    are no refugees.
        The Government has not formulated specific policies regarding
    refugees or first asylum, and the issue of first asylum has never
    arisen.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government. Power was
    transferred peacefully by the PAICV to the MPD following free and fair
    elections in 1991; a second general election in 1995 and municipal and
    presidential elections in 1996 also were judged free and fair by
    international observers. National elections are scheduled to be held on
    January 14 and February 11, 200l.
        The Constitution provides for the separation of powers. Cabinet
    ministers are not required to be members of the National Assembly, but
    they are individually subject to confirmation by the President.
    Collectively, they must retain the support of a parliamentary majority.
    The President may dismiss the Government with the approval of the
    political parties represented in the National Assembly and the Council
    of the Republic. This council consists of the President of the National
    Assembly, the Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional
    Court, the Attorney General, the Ombudsman, the President of the
    Economic and Social Council, the former presidents, and five private
    citizens appointed by the President.
        In November 1999, a disagreement within the top levels of the MPD
    ended cooperation between the party's factions, and the group that
    controlled the party bureaucracy dismissed a number of dissident
    ministers and senior officials from the Government. Those who were
    dismissed claimed that they could not get a fair hearing for their
    views and formed a new political party, the Partido da Renovacao
    Democratica (PRD), which was legalized on October 25.
        There are no restrictions in law or practice regarding the rights
    of women or members of minorities to vote or to participate in the
    political process; however, women are underrepresented in government
    and politics. Women constitute 11 percent of the deputies elected to
    the 72-member National Assembly. There are 2 female cabinet ministers
    and 3 female secretaries of state (junior ministers) in a cabinet
    consisting of 14 ministers and 6 secretaries of state.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are two private human rights groups, the National Commission
    of the Rights of Man and the Ze Moniz Association. During 1999 a
    foreign government financed a professional study of prison conditions
    by the Ze Moniz Association, which was released to the Government and
    the public in September. The Government cooperated with the researchers
    who prepared the report and, upon its publication, expressed interest
    in using the report to help formulate new laws and regulations;
    however, no action had been taken by year's end.
        The post of an independent Ombudsman, to be elected by the National
    Assembly, was created by the 1999 revision of the Constitution. The
    Ombudsman's powers remained undefined at year's end, and no Ombudsman
    has been elected.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, disability, language, or social status. However, despite the
    Government's increasing efforts to enforce all relevant constitutional
    provisions, it still does not do so effectively, and not all elements
    of society, particularly women and children, enjoy full protection
    against discrimination.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women, including wife beating,
    remains common. The Government and civil society encourage women to
    report criminal offenses such as rape and spousal abuse to the police;
    however, longstanding social and cultural values inhibit victims from
    doing so, and according to the media, such reports remain rare.
    Nevertheless, reporting of such crimes to police slightly increased
    during the year, and the media continued to report their occurrence.
    Women's organizations continued to seek legislation to establish a
    special family court to address crimes of domestic violence and abuse;
    however, they made no progress in achieving the required legislation.
        Violence against women has been the subject of extensive public
    service media coverage in both government--and opposition--controlled
    media. In 1998 the Parliament revised the Penal Code, widening the
    scope of sexual abuse and strengthening penalties against abusers.
        Despite constitutional prohibitions against sex discrimination and
    provisions for full equality, including equal pay for equal work,
    discrimination against women continued. Although they often are paid
    less than men for comparable work, women are making modest inroads in
    various professions especially in the private sector. However, some
    employers continued to claim that they prefer to hire men.
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women in
    inheritance, family, and custody matters; however, largely because of
    illiteracy, most women are unaware of their rights. Women often are
    reluctant to seek redress of domestic disputes in the courts. The
    Organization of Cape Verdean Women alleged that there is disparate
    treatment in inheritance matters, despite laws that call for equal
    rights. For example, some women are pressured to sign judicial
    agreements detrimental to their statutory inheritance rights.
        In July a group of female attorneys formed the Assoiagao
    Caboverdiana das Mulheres Juristas, an association whose purpose is to
    provide free legal assistance to women throughout the country suffering
    from social abuse (both violence and discrimination) and spousal abuse.
        Children.--The Government updated its studies of social policy
    priorities and legal rights for children and adolescents and, during
    the year, it restructured the Cape Verdean Institute for Children in
    accordance with norms established in the Convention on the Rights of
    the Child. The Government provides free mandatory education for 6 years
    of primary school for all children. Normally this benefit covers
    children from age 6 to 12. Education is compulsory until age 16;
    however, secondary education is free only for children whose families
    have an annual income below approximately $1,700 (160,000 escudos).
    According to 1998 UNICEF statistics, primary school attendance is
    approximately 97 percent for children. Attendance rates by boys and
    girls differ by less than 1 percent. The Government also seeks to
    reduce infant mortality and disease, combat drug and alcohol abuse, and
    discourage teenage pregnancy; however, progress continued to be slow.
        Child abuse and mistreatment, sexual violence against children, and
    juvenile prostitution are continuing but isolated problems, exacerbated
    by chronic poverty, large unplanned families, and traditionally high
    levels of emigration of adult men. The media reported cases of sexual
    abuse against children and adolescents. The inefficiencies of the
    judicial system made it difficult for government institutions to
    address the problem.
        People with Disabilities.--Although the Constitution mandates
    ``special protection'' for the aged and disabled, the Government does
    not require access to public buildings or services for the disabled.
    There are no official schools or trained teachers for the disabled,
    although several nongovernmental groups, including an association for
    the blind, are active.
        Religious Minorities.--More than 20 cases involving the desecration
    of Catholic churches have been reported to the police over the years.
    While some cases date from 1975, after 1990 the rate of incidence
    increased; however, in contrast to previous years, there were no
    incidents during the year. The persons responsible for the desecrations
    never were identified, and the topic has remained a controversial
    electoral issue since the MPD accused supporters of the main opposition
    party PAICV of involvement in the crimes; however, the courts have
    dismissed every formal accusation that has been brought against PAICV
    members, usually for lack of evidence. In August 1999, the Attorney
    General rejected a local prosecutor's dismissal of the case against the
    four individuals of the ``S. Domingos Group,'' who were accused of
    desecrating a Catholic church in 1996 (see Section 1.e.), and no
    further action was taken during the year.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that
    workers are legally free to form and join unions without government
    authorization or restriction. There are two umbrella union
    associations: The Council of Free Labor Unions, composed of 11 unions
    with about 14,000 members; and the National Union of Cape Verde
    Workers, formed by the former ruling party but operating independently,
    composed of 14 unions with about 16,000 members. The Government does
    not interfere with the activities of these organizations, but the
    National Union of Cape Verde Workers claims that it received less than
    its share of funds for unions. Both unions suffer from a shortage of
    funds.
        The Constitution provides union members with the right to strike,
    and the Government generally respects this right. However, in July and
    August 1999, the workers of the shipping company Arca Verde made two
    attempts to strike. The Government invoked a ``civil request,'' under
    which it has the power, in an emergency or if a strike threatens
    coverage of basic needs, to name a list of minimum services that a
    union must continue to provide during any strike. Because of the
    Government's ``civil request,'' the crew and workers of four of the
    five ships in the fleet were required to continue working. According to
    the National Union of Cape Verde Workers, the Government's decision
    violated the law, since there was no emergency. The union claimed that,
    under such circumstances, the ``minimum services list'' that it
    presented to the Government would have ensured the continuation of
    essential services of public interest. The union presented the case to
    the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which in August
    1999 filed a complaint against the Government with the International
    Labor Organization (ILO). At year's end, the complaint remained
    unresolved.
        In its November report, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
    (CFA) noted that the Government amended legislation in April 1999 so
    that organizations of workers may enjoy the right to peaceful
    demonstration without unreasonable restrictions, in particular with
    regard to time. The CFA also reported that the Government began to take
    measures to amend its legislation so that in the event of disagreement
    between the parties on the minimum services to be respected during
    strikes, this difference of opinion is resolved by an independent body.
    However, at year's end, the Government had not created an independent
    body to resolve such differences.
        The law requires an employer either to reinstate a worker fired
    unjustly or to provide financial compensation. This law is enforced in
    practice.
        There were a number of strikes during the year, including a 3-day
    strike by firemen in Praia in February demanding wages equivalent to
    those of the police and a 2 day strike by teachers in November to
    protest delays in the payment of their salaries. There also were
    strikes by undergraduate students in November and meteorology workers
    in December; however, neither of the strikes resulted in concessions to
    the strikers.
        In 1999 the ILO invited the Government to contest a case presented
    by the labor union UNTO-CS regarding the arrest of two of its activists
    in connection with a demonstration in 1998. The Government contested
    the case in July, and the ILO requested that the Government revise its
    legislation to permit an independent agency to resolve disputes
    concerning the provision of minimum services during a strike. During
    the year, the Government took no action to revise its legislation;
    however, it did not prosecute persons who struck without providing
    ``minimal services'' such as the strike by firemen in February.
        Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have ties with
    African and international trade union organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right to organize, to operate without
    hindrance, and to sign collective work contracts. Workers and
    management in the small private sector, as well as in the public
    sector, reach agreement through collective bargaining. Although there
    are no collective labor contracts, workers succeeded in collectively
    negotiating important issues such as salary increases. However, as the
    country's largest employer, the Government continued to play the
    dominant role in setting wages. It does not fix wages for the private
    sector, but salary levels for civil servants provide the basis for wage
    negotiations in the private sector. There are no collective bargaining
    agreements.
        A 1991 legislative decree bans antiunion discrimination by
    employers with fines for offenders. No cases were brought to court
    during the year.
        Praia has a 30-acre export processing zone, which houses two
    Portuguese companies and a Cape Verdean-Sengalese joint venture. There
    are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws for such
    zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids
    forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
    enforces this prohibition effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 14 years. The law
    prohibits children under the age of 16 from working at night, more than
    7 hours per day, or in establishments where toxic products are
    produced; but the Government rarely enforces the law. In practice the
    Ministry of Justice and Labor enforces minimum age laws with limited
    success, and then only in the urban, formal sectors of the economy.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces
    this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        The Government has taken no action on ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no established minimum
    wage rates in the private sector. Large urban private employers link
    their minimum wages to those paid to civil servants. For an entry-level
    worker, this wage is approximately $120 (11,193 escudos) per month. The
    majority of jobs pay wages insufficient to provide a worker and family
    with a decent standard of living; most workers also rely on second
    jobs, extended family help, and subsistence agriculture.
        The maximum legal workweek for adults is 44 hours. While large
    employers generally respect these regulations, many domestic servants
    and agricultural laborers work longer hours.
        The Director General of Labor conducts periodic inspections to
    enforce proper labor practices and imposes fines on private enterprises
    that are not in conformity with the law. However, the Government does
    not enforce labor laws systematically, and much of the labor force does
    not enjoy their protection. Few industries employ heavy or dangerous
    equipment, and work-related accidents are rare.
        There is no legal provision for workers to remove themselves from
    unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no law addressing trafficking
    in persons. Illegal trafficking in emigrants to various points in
    Europe is believed to be a thriving business, with the country as a
    transit point; it has become a concern for local authorities. Several
    notices in the press report that the police have arrested some persons,
    traffickers as well as victims. During the year, cases involved fewer
    than 30 persons. The Government is cooperating with European
    authorities, neighboring governments, and embassies to counter the
    problem.
                                   __________

                            CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

        The Central African Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
    multiparty legislature. Ange Felix Patasse, leader of the Movement for
    the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC), who first was
    elected president in 1993, was reelected with a narrow majority in
    1999. The 1999 presidential election, like National Assembly elections
    held in late 1998, generally was free but was controlled by the
    Government and was marred by irregularities that tended to favor the
    ruling party candidate. Although the Constitution provides for
    separation of powers, the legislature is vulnerable to manipulation by
    the President, who dominates the Government. The president can veto
    legislation, although two-thirds of the unicameral legislature can
    override his veto, and he can rule by decree under special conditions.
    The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is
    subject to executive interference.
        The National Police under the direction of the Ministry of Interior
    and Public Security, and the military forces and the national
    gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for
    presidential security and share responsibility for internal security.
    On January 26, President Patasse issued a decree which dissolved the
    Special Forces for the Defense of the Democratic Institutions
    (FORSDIR), the body responsible for internal security, and replaced
    them with the Special Presidential Unit (USP). The decree also
    decreased the number of presidential security forces from approximately
    1,200 to approximately 400, and placed them under the full control of
    the Ministry of Defense. The integration of USP/FORSDIR into the
    military was completed by March; however, some remaining components of
    the decree were not implemented fully by year's end. The military, much
    of which mutinied in 1996-97, is widely perceived to be of doubtful
    loyalty to the Patasse Government, and implementation of government
    plans to reduce its size have been delayed by lack of funds for
    severance pay and pensions. MINURCA, a 1,350-person peacekeeping force,
    was deployed by the United Nations Security Council in 1998, with a
    mandate to assist national security forces in maintaining law and
    order, to strengthen the national reconciliation process, to maintain a
    climate of security and stability during the legislative and
    presidential elections, and to facilitate the disarmament process. In
    December 1999, MINURCA began to withdraw its forces over a 3-month
    period; the withdrawal was completed by February. The domestic security
    forces, and the USP in particular, continued to commit serious human
    rights abuses.
        The country is landlocked and sparsely populated. The majority of
    the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Principal exports
    are coffee, cotton, timber, tobacco, and diamonds. Annual per capita
    gross domestic product decreased from an estimated $330 in 1999 to an
    estimated $273 (CFA 206,388). Foreign assistance is an important source
    of national income. Salary arrears continued during the year for
    civilian employees and the military. The arrears continued to impair
    the functioning of the Government and the authority of the state to
    enforce the rule of law. The misappropriation of public funds and
    corruption in the Government diminished in comparison to previous
    years, but remained widespread; the decrease contributed to an increase
    in the country's revenue. The country suffered a major fuel shortage
    from May to July, which initially was provoked by the unauthorized use
    of the country's fuel reserves that were stored in neighboring
    Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The civil war in the DRC also
    impeded the safe passage of fuel by river into the country, which
    negatively impaired the economy.
        The Government's overall human rights record remained poor, with
    serious problems in many areas and deterioration in others. Citizens
    generally were able to choose their national government; however, the
    Government controls the electoral process. Security forces continued to
    commit extrajudicial killings, including government-approved executions
    of suspected bandits and killings reportedly committed for political
    reasons by members of the presidential guard. There also were credible
    reports of deaths of prisoners due to police abuse. Police continued to
    torture, beat, and otherwise abuse suspects and prisoners. Other human
    rights abuses included harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and
    detention; prolonged detention without trial; limits on judicial
    independence; and infringements on citizens' right to privacy. The
    Government restricted freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and
    association. There were some limits on freedom of religion and some
    limits on freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against
    women; female genital mutilation (FGM); child prostitution;
    discrimination against indigenous people (Pygmies); and child labor,
    including instances of forced child labor, continued to be problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
        Freedom From
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings, including government-
    approved executions of suspected bandits and killings reportedly
    committed for political reasons by members of the presidential guard.
    There also were credible reports of deaths of prisoners due to police
    abuse.
        A special police Squad for the Repression of Banditry (OCRB),
    formed in response to the spread of armed robbery throughout Bangui
    following the military mutinies of 1996 and 1997, continued to operate.
    The police commissioner continued repeatedly to publicize on radio and
    television the crimes of criminals apprehended by this squad; the OCRB
    executed these criminals the following day without a trial.
    Extrajudicial killings by the OCRB reportedly declined from over 100 in
    1998 to fewer than 6 during the year, according to BONUCA, the U.N.
    peace-building office in Bangui. Joseph Bindoumi, the country's chief
    prosecutor, indicated that he has no records regarding the activities
    or detainees of this police squad. Medical staff have confirmed that
    the OCRB often takes the bodies of persons it has executed to the
    hospital and leaves them for the family to pick up. The OCRB's use of
    extrajudicial killing has both official Government and popular support,
    and is seen as an effective means of reducing crime and increasing
    public security. The Government tacitly approved the actions taken by
    the police squad to reduce armed robbery; it never has prosecuted
    members of the security forces for these extrajudicial killings.
    Officials justify the unit's actions as a consequence of nonexistent
    prison facilities in Bangui.
        Some detainees died as a result of torture (see Section 1.c.). The
    Government tacitly approved the actions taken by the police squad to
    reduce armed robbery; it never has prosecuted members of the security
    forces for these extrajudicial killings. Police and security forces are
    immune from prosecution for extrajudicial killings.
        In November 1999, armed men, reportedly members of FORSDIR, killed
    former army lieutenant Antoine Gbodo, in his home in Kembe, and four
    others. In December 1999, the Government dispatched a team of gendarmes
    to Kembe to investigate the incident, accompanied by a group of
    National Assembly members from the largely pro-opposition region;
    however, no representative of the Government's Office of Human Rights
    was permitted to accompany the team. According to Kembe deputy Desire
    Kolingba, the Government submitted a report based on its independent
    investigation into the Kembe killing to the National Assembly. The
    Assembly did not discuss the report during its October session and it
    had not been released publicly by year's end. According to the Ministry
    of Defense, the general prosecutor concluded his investigation, but the
    results of that investigation also were not released by year's end.
        On February 5, armed bandits attacked a vehicle transporting
    religious personnel, killing one nun and wounding another (see Sections
    1.c, 2.d., and 5). The Government conducted a full investigation into
    the incident; however, it did not result in any arrests or indictments
    by year's end.
        On August 29, armed bandits shot the Libyan Ambassador, Al Sanoussi
    Awad Abdallah, in a carjacking attempt as he was leaving a restaurant
    in Bangui; he died 3 days later. In September authorities arrested
    three persons and charged them with the murder; the three remained in
    detention pending trial at year's end. A French suspect was released
    shortly after being arrested on September 5; he left the country.
    Although political motives were suspected, an investigation by the
    police concluded that the killing was the result of an attempted
    carjacking.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no deaths during the year
    due to mob violence, nor any mob killings of persons suspected of
    practicing witchcraft. There was no progress in the trial of those
    alleged to be involved in the February 1999 mob killing of three men
    suspected of witchcraft.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Although the Penal Code prohibits torture and specifies
    sanctions for those found guilty of physical abuse, police continued to
    torture, beat, and otherwise abuse criminal suspects and prisoners. As
    in previous years, family members and human rights groups, including
    the Human Rights League (HRL) Executive Committee, continued to file
    court complaints with the prosecutor, Joseph Bindoumi, based on the
    deaths of several prisoners due to police abuse. Approximately 15 to 20
    complaints were filed during the year; however, the authorities
    continued to take no action (see Section 1.a.).
        On January 23, several members of the Karako militia marched on
    President Patasse's residence demanding to be enlisted in the regular
    army (see Section 2.b.). The Special Anti-Riot Police Squad (FECU) used
    automatic weapons and teargas grenades to disperse the protesters, and
    arrested five persons (see Section 1.d.). One man was taken to the
    hospital with serious injuries as a result of being beaten by police.
    On February 4, police and ex-presidential guardsmen fired shots into
    the air to disperse a similar protest (see Section 2.b.).
        On November 14, riot police used tear gas and rubber bullets to
    disperse approximately 3,000 civil servants who marched in Bangui to
    protest salary arrears (see Section 6.a.). Witnesses said that police
    also beat several demonstrators.
        On December 19, USP and riot police used tear gas to violently
    disperse a demonstration at Bangui's Bonga-Bonga stadium (see Sections
    1.d. and 2.b.); police reportedly also beat several persons.
    Approximately 20 persons were injured during a stampede caused by the
    tear gas.
        Legislation adopted in November 1999 to restructure the military
    placed the Presidential Security Unit (USP), formerly the FORSDIR,
    under the civilian control of the Minister of Defense. The President
    signed the restructuring implementing decree on January 26, and the
    Presidential Security Unit was reduced in size and placed under the
    command of the Army Chief of Staff. The USP, like the FORSDIR, is a
    well-equipped force parallel to the military that frequently used
    excessive force in its operations; it reportedly also was responsible
    for other serious human rights abuses.
        The Government has not taken legal action against members of the
    presidential guard who tortured and beat trade union leader Sonny Cole
    in 1999.
        Travelers and religious groups, particularly Catholic priests and
    nuns, were victims of organized highway bandits near Grimari, 180 miles
    northeast of Bangui (see Section 2.d.). On February 5, armed bandits
    attacked a vehicle transporting religious personnel, killing one nun
    and wounding another. A week later, the funeral procession for the nun
    was attacked near the same place (see Section 5); no injuries were
    reported. The Government conducted a full investigation into the
    incidents; however, it did not result in any arrests by year's end.
        There were no developments in the case of the six armed men,
    alleged to be DRC soldiers, who in 1999 allegedly raped three foreign
    nuns at their residence in Bangassou, near the border with the DRC, and
    beat a local priest.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no cross-border conflicts
    or foreign troop movements by armed foreigners.
        Prison conditions are harsh. Ngaragba, Bangui's main prison, was
    ransacked during the 1996 mutinies. Approximately 255 detainees, half
    of whom are awaiting trial, still were being kept in 10 police stations
    around Bangui; however, President Patasse officially pardoned and
    released most of them during the year and the number remaining in
    detention at year's end was unknown. Police station cells in Bangui and
    prisons elsewhere are overcrowded, and basic necessities, including
    food, clothing, and medicine, are in short supply and often are
    confiscated by prison officials for their personal use. Prisoners
    frequently are forced to perform uncompensated labor at the residences
    of government officials and magistrates (see Section 6.c.). Male and
    female prisoners are confined in separate facilities in Bangui but
    housed together elsewhere. There are no separate detention facilities
    for juvenile offenders and minors in Bangui; elsewhere juvenile
    offenders routinely are housed with adults and are subjected to
    physical abuse. Although the Government has solicited funds to rebuild
    Bangui prison, construction had not started by year's end.
        The Government permits prison visits by international and local
    human rights monitors. The national Red Cross and international and
    local religious groups routinely provide supplies, food, and clothes to
    prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
    unrestricted access to prisoners. On June 19, a representative of the
    African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights responsible for
    monitoring prison conditions in Africa visited prisons and detention
    facilities throughout the country, including those located in Bangui
    (see Section 4). He concluded that general prison conditions in the
    country did not meet international standards.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides
    protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
    security forces often ignored these provisions. The law stipulates that
    persons detained in cases other than those involving national security
    must be brought before a magistrate within 96 hours. In practice
    authorities often do not respect this deadline, in part due to
    inefficient judicial procedures. Judicial warrants are not required for
    arrest. By law, national security detainees are defined as ``those held
    for crimes against the security of the State'' and may be held without
    charge for up to 2 months.
        Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem; approximately
    one-half of the male prison population is made up of pretrial
    detainees. President Patasse officially pardoned and released most of
    them during the year, and the number remaining in detention at year's
    end was unknown.
        On January 23, police arrested five protesters during
    demonstrations by members of the Karako militia; however, they
    subsequently were released without charges (see Sections 1.c. and
    2.b.).
        On December 19, police arrested 73 persons, including 4 members of
    the National Assembly, following a demonstration at Bangui's Bonga-
    Bonga stadium (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). All 73 persons subsequently
    were released. On December 20, police issued an arrest warrant for
    attorney Assingambi Zarambaud, an open critic of the Government, in
    connection with the December 19 rally. Zarambaud went into hiding after
    the rally; his whereabouts were unknown at year's end.
        The law does not permit the use of exile, and the Government does
    not employ it in practice. The Government has stated repeatedly that
    any person in self-imposed exile for strictly political, rather than
    criminal, reasons may return without fear of persecution.
        e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it is subject to executive
    interference.
        The judiciary consists of regular and military courts. New courts
    of justice were created in 1997 in both urban and rural areas. A
    juvenile court was created in 1998. However, these courts are not
    functioning due to inefficient administration, shortage of trained
    personnel, growing salary arrears, and a lack of material resources.
    The Criminal Court did not meet in session during the year.
        In criminal cases, the accused are presumed innocent and have the
    right to legal counsel, to public trial, to be present at their trials,
    and to confront witnesses. The Government generally respects these
    safeguards in practice in many cases; however, a number of persons were
    subjected to prolonged detention without trial or were summarily and
    extrajudicially killed by the OCRB (see Section 1.a. and 1.d.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits invasion of homes without a warrant
    in civil and criminal cases. On occasions police used provisions of the
    Penal Code governing certain political and security cases that allowed
    them to search private property without a warrant. Security forces
    continued to carry out warrantless searches for guns and ammunition in
    private homes, a practice initiated in 1997 as part of a disarmament
    process following the 199697 military mutinies. The increase of
    banditry in Bangui has become a pretext for police to carry out
    warrantless house searches. The Government continued to monitor the
    telephones of some opposition figures and to engage in wiretapping
    without judicial authority.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times
    restricted the freedom of the print media to criticize the Government.
    Legislation enacted in 1998 rescinded the Government's authority to
    censor the press, defined the rights and responsibilities of private
    media, and created a High Broadcast Council to regulate the media;
    however, the Government continued to dominate domestic broadcast media.
    In August President Patasse issued a decree dissolving the High
    Broadcast Council without further explanation. Many observers believe
    that the President took such action because the Government cannot
    control the local private press. Libel cases are addressed in civil
    rather than criminal courts.
        Citizens continued to speak freely and publicly, criticizing the
    Government and political parties. Opposition leaders in particular used
    press statements, manifestos, and copies of open correspondence to the
    Government to circulate their views. The Government made no apparent
    effort to censor, seize, or halt the printing and circulation of these
    materials.
        The Government owns and controls two newspapers, the Agence
    Centrafricaine de Presse (ACAP) bulletin, which appears sporadically,
    and Be Africa Sango, which was not published during the year due to
    lack of finances. Echo de CentrAfrique, a private daily newspaper
    created at the beginning of 1999, is close to the ruling party. More
    than a dozen private newspapers were published over varying intervals;
    eight were published on a regular basis during the year. These
    newspapers often were outspoken in their criticism of the President,
    the Government's economic policies, and official corruption. In January
    both the President and Prime Minister threatened local journalists with
    sanctions if any newspaper transgressed the media code and went beyond
    journalistic propriety.
        On August 4, the editor of the private daily ``Le Citoyen'' was
    arrested and detained at the gendarmerie in Bangui. A presidential
    spokesman accused Maka Gbassokoto, the editor, of defamation following
    the newspaper's publication of an official letter sent by the spokesman
    to all businessmen requiring them to buy pictures of President Patasse
    and to deposit the payments in a special account opened for this
    purpose by the President's communication advisor. These instructions
    violated restrictions imposed by the IMF and the World Bank; only the
    public treasury is authorized to collect and manage government funds.
    Gbassokoto was released on August 5, immediately rearrested on
    presidential orders, and finally released on August 8, pending an
    August 21 trial. However, on August 20, the spokesman withdrew his
    complaint, which was seen by the private press as a victory over
    government harassment; all charges were dropped and the judge cancelled
    the trial.
        Radio is the most important medium of mass communication, since
    literacy is not universal and newspapers and television are relatively
    expensive and rarely are found outside urban areas. The Government owns
    and operates a radio station and a television station. Programming
    continued to be dominated by reporting on the activities of the
    President and senior government officials. It is a common complaint
    among political observers that ruling majority parties received more
    coverage of their activities or meetings than opposition parties. The
    presidency, especially the President's communications advisor,
    reportedly controls the radio programs and broadcasts. In 1999 some
    programs, such as a popular call-in show, whose listeners often
    expressed opinions critical of the Government, were taken off the air.
        Government television and radio broadcasts included weekly programs
    that provided an opportunity for political parties to present their
    views and discuss their programs during the 1999 presidential
    elections. Although the opposition originally welcomed this promised
    access to the public media, in practice such access did not
    materialize. During the 1998 legislative and 1999 presidential
    elections, political parties had access to the public media according
    to a schedule established by the High Council of Communication;
    opposition candidates received equal coverage and had equal access to
    state-owned media.
        Since the mid-1990's, the Government has relaxed partially its
    monopoly of domestic radio broadcasting. A private radio station,
    Africa Number One, part of a French-owned network based in Libreville,
    Gabon, has been broadcasting in Bangui since 1995. Its programming
    includes national news coverage by a correspondent based in the
    country. Radio Notre Dame, which is affiliated with the Catholic
    Church, also began operations in 1995. Its programming includes
    national news, debates, legal counseling, and human rights education.
    Radio France International (RFI) has been broadcasting domestically
    since 1997. Its programming includes some national news coverage by a
    correspondent based in the country. Radio MINURCA, the U.N.
    peacekeeping forces' radio that began broadcasting in 1998, ceased its
    operations on February 15. On June 3, a new private radio, N'deke Luka
    (Sangho for ``bird of luck''), started broadcasting from Bangui on FM
    and shortwave frequencies with assistance from foreign governments and
    development organizations. One of N'deke Luka's objectives is to
    promote peace and development by publicizing programs of international
    and local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) working in the region.
    There are no broadcast media entities either privately owned or
    operated by citizens of the country, as distinct from transnational
    French networks or Catholic networks. There are no privately owned
    stations that broadcast domestically produced national news or
    political commentary.
        The Government continued to monopolize domestic television
    broadcasting. Private television broadcasting is allowed by law; the
    High Council of Communication is responsible for authorizing private
    television as well as radio stations. No applications to establish a
    private television station have been received. The Government does not
    restrict domestic receipt or distribution of satellite or cable
    television, but few citizens can afford it, and it is not widespread
    even in the capital. A private telecommunications company, which was
    established pursuant to a 1996 law that liberalized telecommunications,
    operates a domestic Internet and e-mail service provider as well as
    cybercafes. Few citizens can afford home access to the Internet, but
    many urban residents rent brief access at cybercafes.
        Unlike in the previous year, the Government did not impede foreign
    journalists in their work.
        The Government respects academic freedom. University faculty and
    students belong to many political parties and generally express their
    views without fear of reprisal.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government restricted
    this right in practice on at least one occasion. In addition some legal
    restrictions on freedom of assembly remain. A 1992 decree requires
    organizers of demonstrations and public meetings to register with the
    Government 48 hours in advance and also prohibits political meetings in
    schools or churches. Unlike in the previous year, the Government did
    not ban public demonstrations and mass meetings nationwide; however, it
    rarely granted approval for public demonstrations. Prior to 1999, the
    Ministry of Interior generally had not prohibited demonstrations or
    public meetings if notified in advance. There were several incidents of
    Government interference with opposition meetings during the year. In
    1999 the Government banned the Union des Forces Acquises a la Paix
    (UFAP), a coalition of political parties, labor unions, and NGO's, from
    holding public meetings on the grounds that it was not a registered
    organization. The organization dissolved following the presidential
    election; on November 15, opposition parties formed The Coalition of
    Opposition Political Parties, replacing the UFAP.
        On January 23 and February 4, police forcibly dispersed
    demonstrations by members of the Karako militia (see Section 1.c.). The
    Karako militia, which come from President Patasse's district in the
    northwestern part of the country, was formed initially to protect the
    presidential regime during the 1996 and 1997 mutinies. The Ministry of
    Defense has enlisted several hundred of the 1000 Karako militiamen as
    it promised to do when recruiting the militiamen during the mutiny.
        On November 14, riot police forcibly dispersed approximately 3,000
    civil servants who marched in Bangui to protest salary arrears (see
    Section 6.a.). On November 24, over 10,000 civil servants and their
    union representatives marched through Bangui to protest salary arrears.
    Although the Government did not authorize the march, it did not take
    action to disperse it (see Section 6.a.).
        On December 19, at Bangui's Bonga-Bonga stadium, USP and riot
    police violently dispersed approximately 4,000 demonstrators. The
    rally, which had been banned by the Government, was organized by
    opposition leaders to protest salary arrears and call for the
    President's resignation; several persons were injured and numerous
    persons were arrested (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricted this right in practice. All associations
    including political parties must register with the Ministry of Interior
    in order to enjoy legal status. The Government usually grants
    registration expeditiously.
        There are more than 35 registered political parties and a variety
    of nonpolitical associations. The Government normally allows them to
    hold congresses, elect officials, and publicly debate policy issues
    without interference except when they advocated sectarianism or
    tribalism. Unlike the previous year, there were no incidents reported
    of Government restrictions on NGO activities during the year.
        The law prohibiting nonpolitical organizations from coalescing for
    political purposes remains in place; no significant reports of
    enforcement of this law were reported during the year, although
    government officials complained publicly about labor unions
    coordination with opposition political parties in year-end
    demonstrations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, but establishes fixed legal conditions and prohibits what the
    Government considers religious fundamentalism or intolerance. The
    constitutional provision prohibiting religious fundamentalism is widely
    understood to be aimed at Muslims. There is no state religion. In
    practice the Government permits adherents of all religions to worship
    without interference. Religious organizations and missionary groups are
    free to proselytize, worship, and construct places of worship.
        Religious groups (except for traditional indigenous religious
    groups) are required by law to register with the Ministry of Interior.
    This registration is free and confers official recognition and certain
    limited benefits, such as customs duty exemption for the importation of
    vehicles or equipment, but does not confer a general tax exemption. The
    Ministry's administrative police keep track of groups that have failed
    to register, but have not attempted to impose any penalty on such
    groups. The Ministry of Interior has registered more than 100 religious
    and nonreligious groups since 1993. However, any religious or non-
    religious group that the Government considers subversive is subject to
    sanctions. The Ministry may decline to register, suspend the operations
    of, or ban any organization that it deems offensive to public morals or
    likely to disturb the peace. The Government has banned the Unification
    Church since the mid-1980's as a subversive organization likely to
    disturb the peace, specifically in connection with alleged paramilitary
    training of young church members. However, the Government imposed no
    new sanctions on any religious group during the year. The Ministry also
    may intervene to resolve internal conflicts about property, finances,
    or leadership within religious groups.
        Muslims, particularly Mbororo (also known as Peulh or Fulani)
    herders, claim to be singled out for harassment by authorities,
    including extortion by police, due to popular resentment of their
    presumed affluence.
        The practice of witchcraft is a criminal offense under the Penal
    Code; however, persons generally are prosecuted for this offense only
    in conjunction with some other offense, such as murder.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Persons are free to move about within
    the country, but the police, security forces, and other officials
    harass travelers unwilling or unable to pay bribes at checkpoints along
    major intercity roads and at major intersections in Bangui. However,
    under pressure from the National Assembly, the Ministry of Interior
    continued to remove some security forces checkpoints on the main roads
    outside the capital during the year.
        USP forces continued to be stationed at the airport to control
    travelers. The Government generally allows opposition leaders to travel
    outside or inside the country without restrictions. Although in the
    previous year, some citizens were prevented from leaving the country
    because their names were on unspecified official lists, there were no
    reports of such incidents during the year.
        Attacks by bandits on major routes to the north and east sometimes
    occurred, even though most travelers moved in convoys with military
    escorts. Travelers and religious groups, particularly Catholic priests
    and nuns, were victims of organized highway bandits near Grimari, 180
    miles northeast of Bangui. On February 5, armed bandits attacked a
    vehicle transporting religious personnel, killing one nun and wounding
    another. A week later, the funeral procession for the nun was attacked
    near the same place (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5); no injuries were
    reported. Archbishop Joachim Ndayen protested assaults against Catholic
    clergy by accusing the Government of indifference and of not stopping
    highway banditry or prosecuting the perpetrators. The Government also
    established military bases in East Zemio, Bambari, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro,
    and Bossangoa in an effort to curb highway banditry.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government respects
    these provisions in practice. The Government continued to work with the
    United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in hosting Chadian,
    Sudanese, Rwandan, and Congolese refugees. Almost all refugees were
    registered with the National Commission for Refugees. However, there is
    concern that the Government and the UNHCR may not be prepared to handle
    a mass influx of Congolese refugees from the war in the DRC. The
    Government and the UNHCR established refugee camps in Boubou, Kaga-
    Bandoro, and Mongoumba during the year.
        During the week of January 24, the Government moved Rwandan
    refugees from the Bouca camp, near Boubou, due to pressure from local
    residents. The refugees were relocated to Bangui, where they remained
    at year's end.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no cross-border conflicts
    or foreign troop movements by armed foreigners.
        Applicants for asylum generally are treated well and often are
    accepted. There were no reports of the forced return of persons
    considered to be refugees under international standards to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government. This right first was exercised in free and fair elections
    in 1993 that were the culmination of a successful democratization
    movement led by Ange Felix Patasse. Patasse's MLPC won both the
    presidency and a majority of seats in the unicameral national
    legislature. Citizens again exercised their constitutional right to
    change their government by democratic means through National Assembly
    and presidential elections in 1998 and 1999, respectively.
    International observers deemed both elections generally free and fair;
    however, the presidential elections were marred by irregularities in
    voter registration and distribution of electoral materials. Some of the
    registration irregularities tended to favor the ruling party.
        In the 1998 National Assembly elections, opposition parties won 55
    seats, while the ruling MLPC party of President Patasse and its allies
    won 54 seats. However, the defection of one opposition National
    Assembly member in December 1998 gave the ruling party and its
    coalition a one-seat majority. The opposition parties and the UFAP
    strongly protested this defection and boycotted the inauguration of the
    new session of the legislature.
        President Patasse's first term of office expired in 1999, but he
    was eligible constitutionally to seek a second consecutive term. In
    June 1999, the Government established an Independent Electoral
    Commission (CEMI) to supervise the presidential election. Although the
    CEMI included representatives from many political parties on its board,
    persons loyal to the President controlled it. The Government explicitly
    rejected suggestions by elements of the international community, which
    provided material and financial support for the election, that the
    executive branch of the Government not involve itself in the management
    of the electoral process. In August 1999, President Patasse promulgated
    a decree that subordinated CEMI to the state Organ of Control (OCASPA),
    a state organization that he had created by decree in May 1999 to
    oversee the election process. Before the presidential election, there
    were credible reports of attempts to inflate sharply the number of
    registered voters in pro-MLPC northern areas, although this was
    corrected before the polling. The Government postponed the first round
    of the presidential election, first from August 29 to September 12, and
    then to September 19, after serious problems in ballot distribution
    became evident; however, the Government denied requests from opposition
    leaders for further delays to permit more complete resolution of the
    problems with the electoral process. Some provisions of the electoral
    code, requiring publication of voter lists at least 15 days before the
    election and distribution of voter identification cards at least 8 days
    before the election, were not respected. On election day, a shortage of
    ballots was reported in some largely pro-opposition districts.
    Opposition party poll-watchers reported the use of some falsified voter
    identification documents by voters, and there were several reports of
    ballot boxes being delivered to the CEMI without certified tally
    sheets, or from unofficial polling places.
        Two weeks after the voting, the Constitutional Court announced the
    official results of the election and declared President Patasse
    reelected with 51.6 percent of the votes cast. Nine other candidates
    certified by the Constitutional Court had competed in the election. The
    Constitution required a secondround runoff election if no candidate
    received 50 percent of votes cast in the first round election. However,
    only one of the unsuccessful candidates filed a complaint with the
    Constitutional Court.
        There was occasional violence during the presidential election
    campaign, including fighting in Bangui between supporters of President
    Patasse and former president Kolingba, and attacks by some opposition
    supporters on foreign diplomats whose governments' were perceived to
    have supported Patasse.
        The Constitution provides for multiple political parties. The state
    is highly centralized. The central Government appoints all subnational
    government officials, and subnational government entities have no
    significant fiscal autonomy. The Government has not held
    constitutionally required local elections in recent years, ostensibly
    due to budgetary restrictions. The Government has appointed four
    successive mayors, including the current mayor of Bangui, the capital,
    a southern city well outside the ruling party's main political base in
    the north (see Section 5).
        On April 14, the opposition groups in Parliament filed a motion of
    censure against Prime Minister Anicet-Georges Dologuele and his cabinet
    in response to a series of political and financial scandals in the
    early part of the year, including allegations of connections of public
    officials with organized crime, the illegal transfer of laundered money
    through the Central Bank, the duty-free purchase and subsequent sale of
    oil in the country by a company close to the presidency, and the
    renting of government cars to visitors attending an official conference
    organized by the Government. The latter scandal led to the resignation
    of two ministers and a partial reshuffle of government officials. The
    motion won 43 of the 50 opposition votes, but the Prime Minister
    survived this vote of noconfidence with 58 votes (out of 109).
        On July 8, following the month-long fuel crisis, 6 opposition
    parties holding 5 of the 109 seats in the National Assembly called on
    President Patasse to resign. In meetings with and statements to private
    newspapers, opposition leaders attributed the fuel crisis to the
    President's irresponsibility, incompetence, corruption, predation, and
    his ambiguous relationship with both DRC President Laurent Desiree
    Kabila and rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba. In reaction, political
    parties and personalities close to Patasse expressed their support for
    the President through a communique read on local radio and television,
    and accused the opposition of a brainwashing campaign.
        There are no laws that restrict the participation of women or
    minorities in the political process; however, women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. Before and during the
    legislative and presidential elections in 1998 and 1999, the
    Government's Department of Social Affairs and women's NGO's implemented
    programs and launched an extensive public awareness campaign to
    encourage women to register to vote and to compete for public office;
    however, the effect has been nominal as there are very few women in
    prominent government positions. Only 8 members of the National Assembly
    are women, and only 3 of the 25 cabinet members are women. In 1999 the
    President, for the first time, appointed five women as prefects.
        There are no laws that restrict the participation of minorities, in
    the political process; however, minorities are underrepresented in
    government and politics.
        President Patasse is a member of the Sara-Kaba ethnic group.
    Members of northern ethnic groups, including the Sara and Baya,
    continued to predominate among the President's advisors, in the
    leadership of the ruling party, and among ruling party members of the
    National Assembly. Both Prime Minister Dologuele and National Assembly
    President Luc Dondon Konambaye are distant relatives of Patasse. In
    November 1999, President Patasse appointed a more ethnically diverse
    Government, which now includes more than 12 different ethnic groups,
    such as the Gbaya, Banda, Kaba, Dagba, Manjda, Ngbaka, Azande, Youlou,
    Rounga, Yakoma, and Banziri groups. At year's end, there was one Muslim
    in the Prime Minister's cabinet, and there were at least five Muslims
    in the National Assembly.
        Pygmies (Ba'aka), the indigenous inhabitants of the southern part
    of the country, who represent 1 to 2 percent of the population, are not
    represented in the Government and have little political power or
    influence.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Central African Human Rights League (LCDH) publicizes human
    rights violations and pleads individual cases of human rights abuses
    before the courts. The LCDH continued to distribute to prisons, police
    stations, courts, schools, and other NGO's pamphlets describing human
    rights and information on judicial access. In August the LCDH issued a
    press release protesting the arbitrary arrest and detention of Maka
    Gbassokoto, editor of the daily newspaper ``Le Citoyen,'' (see Section
    2.a). Unlike in the previous year, security forces did not harass the
    president of the LDCH.
        The Association of Central African Women Lawyers advises women of
    their legal rights (see Section 5). Several other NGO's, including the
    Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Humanitarian Action and
    some religious groups actively monitor human rights problems. Although
    the Government supported the role that some of these NGO's played in
    mediating its negotiations with military mutineers in 1996 and 1997, it
    did not welcome their criticism that some officials close to MLPC
    involved in alleged corruption scandals were neither arrested nor tried
    (see Section 3).
        International NGO's are permitted in general to visit and monitor
    human rights problems; however, no organizations other than the African
    Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHRR) visited the country
    during the year. On June 19, a representative of the ACHRR visited
    prisons and detention facilities throughout the country (see Section
    1.c.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution stipulates that all persons are equal before the
    law without regard to wealth, race, sex, or religion, but the
    Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and
    significant discrimination exists.
        Women.--Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs
    although inadequate data make it impossible to quantify the extent.
    Victims seldom report incidents. The courts try very few cases of
    spousal abuse, although litigants cite these abuses during divorce
    trials and civil suits. Some women reportedly tolerate abuse in order
    to retain a measure of financial security for themselves and their
    children. The Government did not address this problem during the year.
        In practice women are treated as inferior to men both economically
    and socially. Single, divorced, or widowed women, even with children,
    are not considered by society to be heads of households. Only men are
    entitled to family subsidies. Women in rural areas generally suffer
    more discrimination than do women in urban areas. Approximately 60 to
    70 percent of urban women have attended primary school, whereas only 10
    to 20 percent of their rural counterparts have done so. At the primary
    level, women and men enjoy equal access to education, but the majority
    of young women drop out at age 14 or 15 due to social pressure to marry
    and bear children. Only 20 percent of the students at the University of
    Bangui are female. There are no accurate statistics on the percentage
    of female wage earners. Women's access to educational opportunities and
    to jobs, particularly at upper levels in the professions or in the
    government service, traditionally has been limited. Several active
    women's groups organized workshops and seminars to promote women's and
    children's rights and to fully participate in the political process. In
    February in Bossangoa, UNESCO funded a workshop to educate women on the
    principles of peace and democracy. On December 6, BONUCA organized a
    seminar with different NGO's, including many women's groups, on
    promoting human rights. In October a delegation of women attended the
    Women's International Symposium on Health and World March of Women.
        Polygyny is legal, although this practice faces growing resistance
    among educated women. The law authorizes a man to take up to four
    wives, but a prospective husband must indicate at the time of the first
    marriage contract whether he intends to take additional wives. In
    practice many couples never marry formally because men cannot afford
    the traditional bride payment. Women who are educated and financially
    independent tend to seek monogamous marriages. Divorce is legal and may
    be initiated by either partner. The law does not discriminate against
    women in inheritance and property rights, but a number of conflicting
    customary laws often prevail. A family code designed to strengthen
    women's rights was enacted in May 1998; it has had a positive effect in
    strengthening women's rights, particularly in the courts. The
    Association of Central African Women Lawyers advises women of their
    legal rights, and publishes pamphlets in conjunction with the Ministry
    of Social Affairs on the dangers of female genital mutilation (FGM).
        Children.--Although there is no official discrimination against
    children, the Government spends little money on programs for children.
    Churches and NGO's have relatively few programs for youths. The failure
    of the education system, caused by a meager budget and salary arrears,
    has resulted in a shortage of teachers and an increase in the number of
    street children. Public education is free and education is compulsory
    from ages 6 to 14; however, parents rarely are prosecuted for their
    children's nonattendance. Moreover, in practice, the age that a child
    starts school often varies by 2 to 3 years in rural areas. Many
    children survive by begging and stealing. Several charitable
    organizations work to assist children. In some rural areas, teachers or
    principals use their pupils as farm laborers (see Section 6.c.). The
    teachers' strike that lasted throughout 1999 and further reduced
    education opportunities for children ended in August; however, the
    strike resumed in October and was ongoing at year's end.
        Juvenile prisoners routinely are housed with adults and often are
    subject to physical abuse (see Section 1.c.).
        Some girls enter prostitution to earn money for their families (see
    Section 6.c.). Until late 1999, child prostitution increased in the
    capital due to the presence of international peacekeeping forces;
    however, the number of teenage prostitutes in the country decreased
    during the year as international peacekeeping forces withdrew from the
    country. The Government did not address this problem during the year.
        The Penal Code forbids parental abuse of children under the age of
    15 years. The Family Code was designed to strengthen children's rights.
    Illegitimate children now have the same rights as those born in
    wedlock. A juvenile court was set up in 1998 but has not begun
    operations due to lack of resources (see Section 1.c.).
        A 1996 ordinance banned female genital mutilation (FGM), which is
    widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both
    physical and psychological health; however, girls continued to be
    subjected to this traditional practice in certain rural areas, and to a
    lesser degree in Bangui. Approximately 45 to 50 percent of adult
    females have undergone FGM. In August the International Committee of
    African Women for Development (CIFAD), a central Africanbased women's
    rights organization, began a national campaign against FGM with
    financial assistance from a foreign donor. During the year, a
    Government-NGO campaign continued to reduce incidence of FGM in rural
    areas.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no codified or cultural
    discrimination against the disabled. There are several government-
    initiated programs designed to assist the disabled, including
    handicraft training for the blind and the distribution of wheelchairs
    and carts by the Ministry of Social Services. There are no legislated
    or mandated accessibility provisions for the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--Despite constitutional protection, there is
    societal discrimination against Pygmies (Ba'aka), the earliest known
    inhabitants of the rain forest in the southern part of the country, who
    make up approximately 1 to 2 percent of the country's population. In
    general Pygmies have little input in decisions affecting their lands,
    culture, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
    Indigenous forest-dwelling Pygmies, in particular, are subject to
    social and economic discrimination and exploitation, which the
    Government has done little to correct. Pygmies often work for villagers
    at wages lower than those paid to members of other groups.
        Religious Minorities.--Although religious tolerance among members
    of different religious faiths is the norm, there have been occasional
    reports that some villagers who were believed to be witches were
    harassed, beaten, or sometimes killed by neighbors. Witchcraft
    traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases for which the
    causes were unknown. The practice of witchcraft is widely understood to
    encompass attempts to harm others not only by magic, but also by covert
    means of established efficacy such as poisons. Courts have tried,
    convicted, and sentenced some persons for crimes of violence against
    suspected witches. Unlike in the previous year, there were no mob
    killings of persons suspected of practicing witchcraft during the year.
        Muslims (who constitute about 15 percent of the population),
    particularly Mbororo (also known as Peulh or Fulani) herders, continued
    to claim that they were singled out for harassment by authorities,
    including extortion by police, due to popular resentment of their
    presumed affluence. Muslims play a preponderant role in the economy.
        Generally, amicable relations exist among members of different
    religious faiths. When serious social or political conflicts have
    arisen between the various religious communities, simultaneous prayer
    ceremonies have been held in churches, temples, and mosques to ask for
    divine assistance. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace often
    conducts developmental and educational programs and seminars throughout
    the country. The members work closely with other church groups and
    social organizations on social issues. On April 15, the commission
    organized a large, nationally televised rally at the national stadium
    to promote dialogue on peace and tolerance, with President Ange-Felix
    Patasse and other government officials in attendance.
        Religious groups, particularly Catholic priests and nuns, were
    victims of organized armed highway bandits northeast of Bangui (see
    Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of about 3.5
    million includes approximately 90 ethnic groups; many of these groups
    speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated regionally
    outside urban areas. The largest ethnic groups are the Baya (more than
    30 percent), the Banda (more than 25 percent), the Mandja (more than 20
    percent), and the Sara (about 10 percent). The Mbororo make up about 5
    percent of the population but play a preponderant role in the economy.
    They are involved in mining development and remain the most important
    cattle breeders in the country.
        Until 1993 members of Kolingba's ethnic group, the Yakoma subgroup
    of the Ngbandi, held a disproportionate number of senior positions in
    government, the armed forces, and stateowned firms. As a result of
    President Patasse's 1993 election, Yakomas no longer hold a
    disproportionate number of positions in the civil service, but the
    armed forces still are being restructured to achieve greater ethnic
    balance. At year's end Yakomas still constituted the majority of the
    army. Approximately 80 percent of USP, former FORSDIR, members are
    native to the President's northern region; many belong to the
    President's Kaba ethnic group or closely related groups.
        Major political parties tend to have readily identifiable ethnic or
    ethnic-regional bases. The results of the 1998 legislative elections
    and the 1999 presidential election confirmed that the MLPC Party of
    President Patasse has strong support in the north, especially among the
    Sara and Baya ethnic groups, but also has strengthened its support in
    the capital. The Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD) party of
    former President Dacko is strong in the southwestern part of the
    country and the Central African Democratic Rally (RDC) Party of
    Kolingba, is popular in the southeast, in the Oubangui River basin,
    especially among the Yakoma.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the Labor Code, all workers are
    free to form or join unions without prior authorization. A relatively
    small part of the workforce has exercised this right, chiefly wage
    earners such as civil servants. There are five recognized labor
    federations. The two most important are the Organization of Free Public
    Sector Unions and the Labor Union of Central African Workers (USTC),
    which are independent of the Government.
        Unions have the right to strike in both the public and private
    sectors. To be legal, strikes must be preceded by the union's
    presentation of demands, the employer's response to these demands, a
    conciliation meeting between labor and management, and a finding by an
    arbitration council that union and employer failed to reach agreement
    on valid demands. The union also must provide 8 days' advance written
    notification of a planned strike. The Labor Code states that if
    employers initiate a lockout that is not in accordance with the code,
    the employer is required to pay workers for all days of the lockout.
    Other than this, the code contains no other provisions regarding
    sanctions on employers for acting against strikers. No employer actions
    against strikers are known to have occurred during the year. The
    teacher's strike that lasted throughout 1999 and further reduced
    education opportunities for children ended in August; however, the
    strike resumed in October and was ongoing at year's end. Health workers
    went on strike several times during the year to protest unpaid salaries
    and poor working conditions. The last such strike began in August and
    was ongoing at year's end.
        Since October the major labor federations have mobilized all
    striking civil servants to demand that the Government pay at least 12
    months worth of salary arrears. On November 14, approximately 3,000
    civil servants marched through Bangui to protest 30 months of unpaid
    salary. The Government had agreed to pay 3 months of arrears; however,
    it only paid 2 months worth to some civil servants. The march was
    dispersed by riot police who released tear gas, shot rubber bullets at
    the protesters, and reportedly beat several demonstrators (see Section
    1.c.). On November 24, labor federations representing civil servants
    marched through Bangui again to protest salary arrears. The Government
    did not authorize the strike by over 10,000 civil servants and their
    union representatives; however, unlike in the previous march, the riot
    police did not disperse the protestors. Following the march, the
    Government agreed to pay 1 month of arrears; however, only some police,
    military officials, gendarmes, Justice Department officials, and health
    and education workers were able to collect their salaries. On December
    11, all unions organized a ``ville morte'' or dead city strike to
    protest salary arrears. The strike closed offices, shops, and markets
    in Bangui from 5 a.m. to 4 p.m. On December 13, students from the
    University of Bangui marched to protest arrears, and on December 14,
    women's organizations marched for the same reason.
        Labor federations are free to affiliate internationally. The USTC
    is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
    unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    grants trade unions full legal status, including the right to sue in
    court. It requires that union officials be full-time wage-earning
    employees in their occupation, but they are allowed to conduct union
    business during working hours. The code does not provide specifically
    that unions may bargain collectively. While collective bargaining has
    taken place in the past, there was no collective bargaining during the
    year.
        The Ministry of Labor and Civil Service sets wage scales. Salary
    arrears continued during the year at the same rate as the previous year
    for both civilian (12 months) and military (9 months) personnel;
    arrears continued to be a major complaint of the unions.
        The law expressly forbids discrimination against employees on the
    basis of union membership or union activity. Employees can have their
    cases heard in the labor court. The Labor Code does not state whether
    employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to
    reinstate workers fired for union activities; however, employers
    legally are required to pay damages, including back pay and lost wages.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
    specifically prohibited by the Labor Code; however, prisoners were
    forced to work without compensation for government officials or
    magistrates (see Section 1.c.). The Labor Code also applies to
    children, although it does not specifically prohibit forced labor by
    children; however, the Government does not have sufficient resources to
    enforce the prohibition effectively and some parents force their
    daughters into prostitution to help support the family (see Sections 5
    and 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code forbids the employment of children less
    than 14 years of age; however, the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service
    enforces the provision only loosely. In practice child labor is common
    in many sectors of the economy, especially in rural areas. In some
    rural areas, teachers or principals use school children as labor on
    farms some rural schools have farms where teachers ostensibly teach
    school children how to work the land, because many students do not
    further their education beyond secondary school and return to their
    villages to work. The schools use the proceeds from the sale of the
    farm produce to purchase school supplies and equipment and to fund
    school-related activities. The Labor Code generally covers all labor
    sectors, although specific regulations cover specific sectors. In some
    cases, the Labor Code provides that the minimum age for employment
    could be reduced to 12 years of age for some types of light work in
    traditional agricultural activities or home services. The Government
    has adopted laws and regulations proscribing the worst forms of child
    labor, which the Labor Code defines as ``dangerous work or work
    involving serious risk for the children's health, security or
    morality.'' In addition to the minimum age for basic employment, the
    code also defines age 14 as the maximum age at which children are
    required to be enrolled in school.
        The Labor Code prohibits forced and bonded labor in general
    although it does not specifically prohibit forced labor by children;
    however, the Government does not enforce its provisions effectively and
    there were reports of forced prostitution by children (see Sections 5
    and 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code states that the
    Minister of Labor must set minimum wages by decree. The minimum wage
    varies by sector and by kind of work. For example, the monthly minimum
    wage is equivalent to approximately $12 (CFA 7,800) for agricultural
    workers but approximately $28 (CFA 18,000) for office workers. The
    minimum wage does not enable a worker and family to maintain a decent
    standard of living. Most labor is performed outside the wage and social
    security system, especially by farmers in the large subsistence
    agricultural sector. The Government owes at least 12 months worth of
    salary arrears to civil servants (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., and
    6.a.).
        The law sets a standard workweek of 40 hours for government
    employees and most private sector employees. Household employees may
    work up to 55 hours per week. The law also requires a minimum rest
    period of 48 hours a week.
        There also are general laws on health and safety standards in the
    workplace, but the Ministry of Labor and Civil Service neither
    precisely defines nor actively enforces them, a matter about which the
    International Labor Organization has expressed concern to the
    Government for many years. The Labor Code states that a labor inspector
    may force an employer to correct unsafe or unhealthy work conditions,
    but it does not provide the right for workers to remove themselves from
    such conditions without risk of loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law was known specifically to
    prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
    persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                      CHAD

        Chad is a centralized republic dominated by a strong presidency.
    President Idriss Deby, leader of the Patriotic Salvation Movement
    (MPS), has ruled since taking power in a 1990 rebellion. The Sovereign
    National Conference (CNS) confirmed Deby in 1993 as Chief of State, and
    he was elected President in 1996 under a Constitution adopted in a
    referendum earlier that year. According to credible reports, fraud,
    widespread vote-rigging, and local irregularities marred both the 1996
    presidential election and the 1997 legislative elections in which
    members of the MPS won 65 of 125 seats in the National Assembly. The
    Government remained unable to exert effective control over the
    northwestern region of the country where former Defense Minister
    Youssouf Togoimi began a rebellion in October 1998. The Supreme Court
    began full operations in October. In May the National Assembly enacted
    a law calling for the election of 15 members of the High Court of
    Justice as required by the Constitution; they were elected on May 24.
    Despite these steps in fulfilling the 1996 Constitution's requirement
    for the establishment of an independent judiciary, the courts remained
    ineffective, overburdened, and subject to outside interference,
    including by the executive branch.
        The army, Gendarmerie (State Police Force), police, National and
    Nomadic Guard (NNG), and intelligence services are responsible for
    internal security. Officers from President Deby's ethnic group dominate
    the Rapid Intervention Force (FIR), and the National Security Agency
    (ANS), a counterintelligence organization that has acted as an internal
    political police force. The National Army, Gendarmerie, the NNG, and
    the Republican Guard (the Presidential Security Force) were deployed to
    fight the rebels. The security forces continued to commit serious human
    rights abuses.
        The economy is based on subsistence agriculture, herding, and
    fishing. Annual per capita income is estimated at $239. The country has
    little industry; its chief export is cotton. Among the impediments to
    sustainable economic growth are corruption, numerous state-owned
    monopolies, a bloated civil service, and a thriving informal sector
    outside government taxation policies. The Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline
    project officially started in October, and the construction of
    infrastructure for the project began during the year. The Government
    remains heavily dependent on assistance from external donors and
    international financial institutions.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and serious
    problems continued. The Government limited citizens' right to change
    their government. State security forces committed extrajudicial
    killings, disappearances, and tortured, beat, abused, and raped
    persons. Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening.
    Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention.
    Although the Government detained and convicted some members of the its
    security forces implicated or accused of criminal acts, it rarely
    prosecuted or sanctioned members of the security forces who commit
    human rights abuses. The Government also did not prosecute or punish
    security force personnel accused in previous years of killings, rape,
    torture, arbitrary arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention
    remained a problem. The judiciary remains subject to executive
    interference and is unable to provide citizens with prompt trials. The
    Government holds political detainees. Security forces used illegal
    searches and wiretaps and monitored the contents of private mail. The
    Government at times infringed on freedom of speech and of the press.
    The Government continued to threaten judicial action against
    independent newspapers for publishing material, which it deemed
    prejudicial to the Government, on the rebellion in the north and
    actions of senior officials. The Government limited freedom of
    assembly. At times the Government limited freedom of religion and
    movement. Violence and societal discrimination against women remained
    common. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widespread. Both
    official and societal ethnic and regional discrimination remained
    widespread; northerners, in particular members of President Deby's
    Zaghawa ethnic minority, continued to dominate key positions in the
    public sector. There also were reports of forced labor, including
    forced child labor. Child labor is a problem. Serious armed conflict
    between the Government and rebels in the Tibesti continued.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Officially
    sanctioned extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals by police,
    customs officers, and gendarmes continued, although some members of the
    security forces, who committed such acts, were taken into custody for
    judicial adjudication. Units of the armed forces were responsible for
    the extrajudicial killings of suspected members of the northwestern
    rebellion in the Tibesti.
        In January a relative of an advisor to rebel leader Togoimi
    reported that police killed 25 Tabou men, including a relative of
    Togoimi, after arresting them (see Section 1.d.).
        According to human rights groups, in May the armed forces arrested
    and killed four persons, Sougui Mahamat Taher, Chaha Bougar, Ali Bakai
    Boursa, and Sougou Allatchi Tollymi in Zouar (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti).
    They were suspected of being supporters of the MDJT. At year's end,
    there had been no government investigation of the incident and no
    action taken against the personnel involved.
        In May Le Temps newspaper reported that 8 armed Republican Guards
    kidnaped 10 persons, including 7 soccer players, from a public park in
    N'Djamena. The Republican Guards killed a 20-year-old man by breaking
    his neck. The others of those kidnaped received serious injuries; they
    were beaten by the Republican Guards. There were no reports of legal
    action against the Republican Guards involved.
        On October 5, security officials reportedly beat and abused a
    Zaghawa tribesman, who died at his home 3 days after his release from
    custody (see Section 1.c.).
        Armed bandits operated on many roads, assaulting, robbing, and
    killing travelers; some bandits were identified as active duty soldiers
    or deserters (see Section 2.d.).
        There was no action taken in several 1999 extrajudicial killings.
    For example, no action was taken against officials in Bol who beat to
    death three men in February 1999 or against police in Tan'djile after
    two businessmen died while in their custody in January 1999. No action
    was taken against the security forces who killed seven presumed thieves
    in the Mayo Kebbi and Bongor areas in January 1999. Likewise, no action
    was taken against Hemchi Dogori, a gendarme who in July 1999 fired on a
    group of villagers in Gourma and wounded nine persons and killed
    another.
        During the year, approximately 10,000 government armed forces
    engaged in sporadic battles with 1,000 to 2,000 insurgents in the
    Tebesti region in the northwest part of the country. Both government
    and insurgent forces suffered heavy casualties, including members of
    the leadership. On July 17, the Government suffered heavy casualties
    when the insurgents seized a major base. At year's end, the fighting
    intensified, and there were heavy casualties on both sides.
        Throughout the year, members of the Tibesti rebellion reported that
    members of the army committed human rights abuses and killed suspected
    collaborators among the civilian population.
        Landmines laid by government, foreign, and rebel forces in previous
    years caused several deaths and injuries during the year.
        b. Disappearances.--In May soldiers in Tibesti followed and opened
    fire on businessman Souleyman Toke and a friend who were returning from
    Libya by car. Souleyman's friend was injured seriously and evacuated to
    Faya hospital. Toke was accused of supporting the Togoimi rebellion and
    sent to N'Djamena. He has not been seen since that time.
        Cases of disappearances from 1998 remained unsolved. Political
    detainees either eventually are released or they disappear. In February
    1998, security forces arrested Kibel Justin in Sarh for suspicion of
    aiding rebel leader Dr. Nahor Ngawara Mamouth. Although most of the
    detainees who were held for complicity in Dr. Nahor's 1998 kidnaping of
    four Frenchmen were released in July 1998, Kibel Justin cannot be
    accounted for nor has he been located in other prisons.
        c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and
    degrading or humiliating treatment; however, members of the security
    forces tortured, beat, abused, and raped citizens. During the year,
    three members of the security forces were prosecuted; however, they
    escaped from prison.
        In March a group of policemen led by the deputy police chief of
    Pala beat Tigalou Mbaiky, a local secondary school teacher. They
    subjected him to various forms of torture including ``arbatachar''
    (where the victim's arms and legs are tied behind his back cutting off
    circulation and sometimes resulting in paralysis). The police then
    dragged Mbaiky to the jail, which was approximately 45 yards away,
    where he was detained without charge or trial; however, by year's end,
    he was released.
        In March according to human rights groups, uniformed soldiers
    threatened and harassed the wife and minor children of rebel leader
    Youssouf Togoimi. In March the Government refused to issue them
    passports. In another attack upon Mrs. Togoimi, according to Le Temps,
    security forces were prevented from entering her home by relatives;
    however, on March 17, they beat her as she left her home. In April
    members of the armed forces illegally evicted the Togoimi family from
    their home in N'Djamena. At year's end, they were staying with a
    relative in N'Djamena with their movements closely observed by
    government security agents. No charges were filed against Mrs. Togoimi.
        In May eight armed Republican Guards reportedly kidnaped 10 persons
    from a public park in N'Djamena, killing 1 and seriously injuring the
    others (see Section 1.a.).
        In May 12 customs agents beat Armel Ramadji, a high school student,
    and fractured his skull. The newspaper Le Temps reported that Ramadji
    was returning home about 5:00 p.m. when he was stopped by several
    customs agents. The agents reportedly believed he was a smuggler,
    ordered him to open his briefcase, and then began beating him. Also in
    May, members of the N'Djamena police severely beat a civilian,
    Abdoulaye Absakine. The police chief reportedly ordered one of his
    agents to shoot Absakine, but the agent refused to do so.
        In June the army badly beat and tortured inhabitants of several
    villages in the south--Bessokoyan, Bekolo, Bembaitada, and Bamadja--
    whom they accused of supporting the rebel chief Kette Nodji Moise.
    Soldiers beat the Bessokoyan village chief, Gaston Gangnon, and
    tortured the chief of Bekolo, paralyzing his left arm. Soldiers also
    raped women in the villages and stole possessions.
        On August 15, five soldiers attacked and stoned a defendant at a
    session of N'Djamena's criminal court. The soldiers were friends of the
    person the defendant was accused of murdering. Later that day, the
    Minister of Justice publicly criticized the attack and said that the
    soldiers should protect the courts, not abuse them. On August 17, the
    Minister of Defense delivered the five soldiers to the Minister of
    Justice. Four of the five were convicted and sentenced to 4 years in
    prison without parole and fined $100 (75,000 CFA); one of the accused
    was acquitted.
        On October 5, two security officials reportedly beat and abused a
    Zaghawa tribesman by the name of Hissein who was acting erratically
    near a Western embassy. He died at his home 3 days after his release
    from the National Security prison on October 11. At year's end, no
    action had been taken against the officials.
        After obtaining authorization from President Deby, victims filed a
    class action suit against torturers in the Habre regime on January 25;
    however, at year's end, the action had not been adjudicated.
        In September 1999, members of police and military forces tortured a
    businesswoman. Although President Deby dismissed the Minister of
    Justice and other senior officials as a result of the negative
    publicity generated by the incident, there was no legal action against
    the police or military officials. No action was taken against the
    military officers and ANS agents who tortured Dr. Djibrine Ibrahim from
    February 1998 to June 1999. The Government did not permit Dr. Ibrahim
    legal counsel nor did it bring him before a judge on formal charges. No
    action was taken against police who dispersed demonstrations in
    February 1999 and injured two students. No action was taken against
    members of the N'Djamena gendarmerie who severely beat a member of the
    National Sugar Society for allegedly embezzling funds, nor against two
    members of the Ati gendarmerie who broke the arm of a student in
    January 1999.
        The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit (RAID), a specialized
    police unit under the Ministry of Interior's authority, which committed
    numerous human rights abuses in previous years, was disbanded in 1999.
    During the year, a new chief of the Police Rapid Action Company (CARP)
    dismissed corrupt members of the unit.
        Impunity for those who commit human rights abuses remained
    widespread. Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. Prisons
    were characterized by serious overcrowding; poor sanitation; inadequate
    food, shelter, and medical facilities. The Government reported that
    there were 2,385 prisoners in 46 operational prisons throughout the
    country with one-third in N'Djamena's Central Prison. The prison,
    reportedly scheduled to be completed in June, did not open during the
    year. Juvenile males were held with adult male prisoners. Female
    prisoners usually were separated from males. The law provides that a
    doctor must visit each prison three times a week; however, there were
    credible reports that this was not done. The law authorizes forced
    labor in prison.
        In 1999 human rights organizations called on the Government to
    investigate numerous accusations by citizens in the Kenga canton of the
    Guera prefecture who claimed that the canton chief was operating a
    private prison in which some prisoners were tortured and whipped.
    During the year, observers reported that the canton chief had closed
    the prison and that no prisoners were being held.
        The Government permitted the International Commission of the Red
    Cross (ICRC) to visit all prisons including some military prisons,
    although the Government insisted on advance notice; the ICRC conducted
    25 prison visits during the year. Domestic nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's), including human rights groups, may visit a
    prison only with authorization from a court or from the Director of
    Prisons. These groups reportedly were not allowed access to military
    prisons, and their access to civilian prisons depended greatly on the
    personal inclinations of judges and prison administrators.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
    Penal Code prohibit arbitrary arrest; however, security forces continue
    to use arbitrary arrest and detention. A judicial official must sign
    arrest warrants; however, the Government often does not respect this
    requirement.
        In January the director general of SONASUT (sugar parastatal), Ali
    Abderamane Haggar, submitted his resignation, and President Deby jailed
    him and ordered an investigation of SONASUT's finances to determine if
    there had been corruption. After an exhaustive investigation and being
    charged with misappropriation of public funds, Haggar was declared
    innocent and released from jail 8 months later. In March the police
    chief of Pala arrested and tortured a schoolteacher, Tigalou Mbaiky
    (see Section 1.c.). He was detained without charge or trial, and a
    human rights organization reported that he was released by year's end.
    In May the Sultan of Kanem arrested a large number of adherents of an
    Islamic group, Faydal Djaria (see Section 2.c.).
        A relative of an advisor to the rebel Togoimi reported that the
    police arrested him and 25 other Toubou men in April. The person is now
    free, but he reported credibly to a human rights group that the other
    25 men were killed.
        Members of a special police unit (CARP) under the Ministry of
    Interior's authority were responsible for numerous cases of arbitrary
    arrest and detention; they beat, tortured, and raped detainees, without
    sanction by government authorities. Subsequently the CARP chief was
    replaced, and one officer was fired for abuses; however, legal
    authorities took no action against him.
        In January the Association of Chadian Jurists (AJT) protested the
    detention of Ali Abderaman Haggar and Malloum Maina, who were detained
    illegally for 5 and 24 days respectively in 1999 before being
    officially charged; they were never tried or convicted, but were
    imprisoned for 8 and 9 months respectively before being released in
    January. In a January press release, the Chadian League for Human
    Rights denounced the political nature of their arrest.
        Persons accused of crimes may endure up to several years of
    incarceration before being charged or tried, especially those arrested
    for felonies in the provinces, who must await remand to the overcrowded
    house of detention in N'Djamena.
        Human rights organizations cited the cases of over 100 detainees
    held from as early as 1996 by the canton chief in Kenga, Guera, who was
    accused of operating a private prison and abusing his authority in
    numerous cases; however, the prison was closed during the year, and no
    prisoners were being held at year's end.
        The Government continued to hold political detainees. Detainees
    implicated in Dr. Nahor's rebellion in 1998 remained in jail without
    charges and without trial at year's end. Despite the arrests of
    individuals on suspicion of subversive activities against the
    Government, no one has been tried for such crimes since Deby came to
    power. Political detainees either eventually are released or they
    disappear (see Section 1.b.). In June 1999, the army returned from the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo with a group of Congolese prisoners of
    war, many of whom were ordinary civilians. Although the Government
    claimed that they were Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers, the group
    consisted entirely of Congolese nationals who were housed initially at
    a military facility in N'Djamena but were exchanged for Chadian
    detainees in 1999.
        The Government does not practice forced exile; however, some family
    members of persons who have joined the northern rebellion choose to
    leave Chad for security reasons.
        e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution mandates an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was ineffective,
    underfunded, overburdened, and subject to executive interference. In
    practice government officials and other influential persons often
    enjoyed immunity from judicial sanction. During the year, the President
    intervened in a number of legal cases for political reasons. Ali
    Abderamane Haggar and Malloum Maina were accused of misappropriation of
    funds and imprisoned for 8 and 9 months respectively (see Section
    1.d.); they were never tried or convicted but were released in January.
    President Deby supported the prolonged incarceration of these two
    former administrators despite a lack of evidence. In April the Chief
    Justice demoted two Supreme Court justices, Maki Adam and Ruth Romba,
    reportedly because they made a decision adversely affecting the
    interests of the Chief Justice.
        On August 15, five soldiers attacked and stoned a defendant at a
    session of N'Djamena's criminal court. The soldiers were friends of the
    person that the defendant was accused of murdering. Later that day, the
    Minister of Justice publicly criticized the attack and said that the
    soldiers should protect the courts, not abuse them (see Section 1.c.).
        On April 28, 1999 President Deby swore in 16 members of the Supreme
    Court as well as 9 members of the Constitutional Court. In May the
    National Assembly enacted legislation calling for the election of 15
    members of the High Court of Justice; however, they were appointed by
    President Deby and the president of the National Assembly. The court
    began formal operations on May 24 after the justices were appointed.
    The establishment of these bodies fulfills the Constitution's mandate
    for an independent judicial branch; however, due to inadequate funding,
    the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court did not begin operations
    until October.
        The Constitution mandates a Superior Council of Magistrates to act
    as a guarantor of judicial independence; however, at year's end, it had
    not been established. The national judicial system operates with courts
    located in provincial capitals. The N'Djamena court of appeals is
    supposed to conduct regular sessions in the provinces, but funding
    limitations do not permit the court to make periodic circuit visits.
        Applicable law can be confusing, as courts often tend to blend the
    formal French-derived legal code with traditional practices. Residents
    of rural areas often lack effective access to formal judicial
    institutions. In most civil cases, they rely on traditional courts
    presided over by village chiefs, canton chiefs, or sultans. Decisions
    may be appealed to a formal court.
        Official inaction and executive interference continue to plague the
    judiciary. Long delays in trials result in lengthy pretrial detention
    (see Section 1.d.). The 48-hour temporary police custody period after
    which a prisoner can be released if not brought before a judge is not
    respected. Prisoners are not released but remain in jail due to lack of
    evidence, witnesses, or poor preparation of their cases.
        The salaries of judicial officials often are low. Although the
    Government has stated that the strengthening and reform of the
    judiciary are top priorities, it made little progress in these areas.
        The Government has not enforced the Military Code of Justice since
    the 1979-80 civil war, and courts-martial instituted early in the Deby
    regime to try security personnel for crimes against civilians no longer
    operate.
        There were no reliable figures concerning the number of political
    prisoners. During the year, the Government reported that there were no
    political prisoners. In June detainees implicated in Kette Moise's
    rebellion, Charles Mbairem, Padja Ortingar, Mbairassem Elysee,
    Djikossem Nidja, Todjimbaye, and Michel Mbailemel received public
    trials. However, other individuals arrested for suspicion of subversive
    activities against the Government in the Tibesti region simply were
    released, or they disappeared (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
    home, correspondence, and other communications, as well as freedom from
    arbitrary search; however, authorities infringed on those rights. The
    Penal Code requires authorities to conduct searches of homes only
    during daylight hours and with a legal warrant; however, in practice
    security forces ignored these provisions and conducted extrajudicial
    searches at any time.
        The Government engages in wiretapping without judicial authority,
    monitors the contents of private mail through the postal service, and
    monitors private e-mail through the main post office server. The
    president of the political party Mouvement pour la Democratie au Chad
    reported to human rights groups that his telephone line continued to be
    tapped. According to a local newspaper, the N'Djamena Hebdo of March
    16, the telephone lines of two embassies and opposition supporters also
    were tapped.
        The Government illegally and forcibly conscripted young men from
    eastern Chad and Sudan into the army where they were trained for
    fighting against rebel forces in northern Chad.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times
    infringed on this right in practice. The Government continued to
    threaten journalists with legal retaliation for publishing material on
    the rebellion in the northern part of the country or about senior
    government officials accused of corruption or responsibility for
    attacks on Chadians in Libya. However, although the Minister of
    Communications labeled such material as seditious and urged the press
    not to publish it, the Government did not retaliate legally against
    journalists or other media for such coverage during the year. Several
    opposition newspapers strongly criticized government actions, and the
    Government did not prosecute private print journalists for libel.
        The Government controls the newspapers Info Tchad and Victoire and
    influences Le Progres; however, it does not dominate the press. A
    number of private newspapers are published in the capital; most were
    extremely critical of government policies and leaders.
        The Government reacted strongly to the Le Temps and L'Observateur
    editions of March 5 and 10. L'Observateur published a picture of rebel
    leader Togoimi in a vehicle with heavy weapons; Le Temps accused the
    President's party (MPS) of being Fascist. Both newspapers received
    unspecified threats from government officials. On March 10, the Le
    Temps editor Nadjikimo Benoudjita reported that both he and
    L'Observateur editor Sy Koumbo Gali had heard rumors of possible
    reprisals at their offices by state security forces; however, no
    official action was taken.
        Due to widespread illiteracy and the relatively high cost of
    newspapers and television, radio is the most important medium of mass
    communication and information. La Voix du Paysan, which is owned by the
    Catholic Church, began operating in 1997. Located in Doba, it
    broadcasts locally produced programming including news coverage and
    political commentary in French and indigenous languages over a 140-mile
    range. The High Council on Communications (HCC), an independent
    institution, has set the licensing fee for a commercial radio station
    at a prohibitively high level: approximately $9,000 (5 million CFA) per
    year, 10 times the fee for radio stations owned by nonprofit NGO's like
    La Voix du Paysan. A community radio station in N'Djamena, DJA-FM99
    received a license in 1999 from the HCC; DJA-FM99 began operations in
    May 1999 and programming in October 1999, but it only broadcast music.
    Station FM Liberte, owned by a group of human rights organizations,
    also received a license in 1999, but it did not start operations and
    programming until August.
        The Government owns and operates the only domestic television
    station. There have been no requests to establish a private television
    station as the economic preconditions, such as a sizeable audience with
    purchasing power, do not exist. There is one privately owned cable
    television station service that distributes foreign-sourced programming
    in French and Arabic, but relatively few citizens can afford to
    subscribe to the service. A South African cable station also sells
    subscriptions.
        The sole Internet access server is provided by the government-owned
    telecommunications monopoly. The Government does not restrict access to
    the Internet; however, the state-owned firm reportedly set prices and
    provided a quality of service that has discouraged the establishment of
    private domestic Internet service providers.
        The official media, consisting of a national radio network, a press
    agency, and N'Djamena's only national television station, are subject
    to both official and informal censorship; however, at times they were
    critical of the Government. The official media also gave top priority
    to government officials and events, while providing less attention to
    the opposition. The HCC acts as an arbiter whose main function is to
    promote free access to the media; however, it has no powers of
    enforcement.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government limited this
    right in practice. The law requires organizers of public demonstrations
    to notify local authorities 5 days in advance of the demonstration.
    Authorities banned demonstrations critical of the Government despite
    being notified in advance as required by law. In September the Ministry
    of Interior refused permission to Njarlejy Yorongar, leader of the
    Federation-Action-Republic political party, to hold a meeting. Les
    Forces Vives, an association of political parties, also was waiting for
    permission from the Interior Ministry to hold a march; they were denied
    permission, and at year's end, they had not been authorized to hold a
    march. By contrast peaceful demonstrations in support of the Government
    and its policies are condoned.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respected this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, at times it limited this right. The Constitution also provides
    that the country shall be a secular state; however, despite the secular
    nature of the state, a large proportion of senior government officials,
    including President Deby, are Muslims, and some policies favor Islam in
    practice. For example, the Government sponsored annual Hajj trips to
    Mecca for certain government officials.
        The Government requires religious groups, including both foreign
    missionary groups and domestic religious groups, to register with the
    Ministry of Interior's Department for Religious Affairs. Registration
    confers official recognition but not any tax preferences or other
    benefits. There are no specific legal penalties for failure to
    register, and there were no reports that any group had failed to apply
    for registration or that the registration process is unduly burdensome.
    The Government reportedly has denied official recognition to some
    groups of Arab Muslims in Ati, near the eastern border with Sudan, on
    the grounds that they have incorporated elements of traditional African
    religion, such as dancing and singing, into their worship. Non-Islamic
    religious leaders claim that Islamic officials and organizations
    receive greater tax exemptions and unofficial financial support from
    the Government. State lands reportedly are accorded to Islamic leaders
    for the purpose of building mosques, while other religious
    denominations must purchase land at market rates to build churches.
        On May 31, the Supreme Court rejected a request from one branch of
    a Christian evangelical church to deny government recognition to its
    independent sister branch. In 1998 the Eglise Evangelique des Freres
    (EEF) split into moderate and fundamentalist groups. The moderate
    branch of the EEF retained the legal registration for the Church, but
    on April 7, 1999, the Ministry of Interior awarded recognition to the
    fundamentalist branch under a new name, Eglise des Freres Independentes
    au Tchad (EFIT). Since 1999 the EEF branch has sought to bar the EFIT
    church legally from practice, and ultimately the case went before the
    Supreme Court, which upheld the rights of the EFIT to continue its
    religious work and its right to function.
        The Government has imprisoned and sanctioned fundamentalist Islamic
    imams believed to be promoting conflict among Muslims.
        A fundamentalist imam in N'Djdamena, Sheikh Faki Suzuki was
    restricted from preaching Islam for 6 months, from October 1998 to
    March 1999, and the authorities also placed him under house arrest
    during the same period. Although no longer under house arrest, Suzuki
    has experienced problems since the beginning of the year with the
    Islamic Committee in N'Djamena for painting their name and logo on his
    car. He was warned twice to not represent the committee, and he
    responded by removing the committee name from his car. In January 1999,
    the Government arbitrarily arrested and detained Imam Sheikh Mahamat
    Marouf, the fundamentalist Islamic leader of the northeastern town of
    Abeche, and refused to allow his followers to meet and pray openly in
    their mosque. Sheikh Marouf was released from prison in November 1999
    after nearly 1 year in jail. Sheikh Marouf may pray but is not
    permitted to lead prayers. His followers are allowed to pray in their
    mosques, but they are forbidden from debating religious beliefs in any
    way that might be considered proselytizing; however, the Tidjani
    followers throughout the country are allowed to proselytize.
        In both instances, the Government claimed that the imams were
    responsible for inciting religious violence; their followers rejected
    the Government's claim and cited religious differences with the
    Government.
        On May 25, the Sultan of Kanem arrested a large number of adherents
    of an Islamic group, Faydal Djaria. The group arrived in the country
    from Nigeria and Senegal and incorporates singing and dancing into its
    religious ceremonies and activities. The group is found from the Kanem
    region around Lake Chad into neighboring Chari Baguirmi. The Chadian
    Superior Council of Islamic Affairs considered that the Faydal Djaria
    group does not conform to Islamic tenets, and it requested the Ministry
    of Interior to arrest the group's spiritual leader, Ahmat Abdallah. In
    January 1998, the Minister of Interior banned the group; however, from
    the beginning of the year, the group was increasingly active, resulting
    in the arrests in the Kanem. The new Director of Religious Affairs at
    the Ministry of Interior requested that the Superior Council of Islamic
    Affairs provide the specific sections of the Koran that support the ban
    of the group. There was an undetermined number of Faydal Djaria
    prisoners in Kanem at year's end.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, there are some limits on them in practice. The
    Government did not require special permission for travel in areas that
    it effectively controls; however, elements of the security forces,
    rebels, and bandits continued to maintain many roadblocks throughout
    the country, extorting money from travelers. The Government did not
    officially condone such behavior on the part of members of security
    forces, but it did not discourage it effectively. In addition armed
    bandits operated on many roads, assaulting, robbing, and killing
    travelers; some bandits were identified as active duty soldiers or
    deserters (see Section 1.a.).
        In March the Government refused to issue passports to the wife and
    children of rebel leader Togoimi. At year's end, Togoimi's family
    limited their movements in response to government surveillance; they
    did not pursue their request for passports, despite the Ministry of
    Interior's statements indicating that the Government was disposed to
    reconsider favorably the Togoimi family's earlier request (see Section
    1.c.).
        Some family members of persons who have joined the northern
    rebellion choose to leave Chad for security reasons.
        The Government adheres to the principles of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
    however, these principles are not incorporated into the law. An
    official national structure, the National Committee for Welcoming and
    Reinsertion, is in place to deal with domestic and foreign refugee
    affairs. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations assisting
    refugees. Since 1993 the Government has registered refugees in
    N'Djamena and sent their applications for refugee status to UNHCR
    Central African headquarters in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo, or other regional UNHCR offices in Africa. A person whose
    application is accepted is eligible to enroll in a 6-month care
    maintenance program that includes a monthly subsistence allowance,
    medical care, and assistance in finding work. This program is funded by
    a local NGO. The Government provides first asylum for refugees and has
    done so in past years. The Government has granted refugee and asylee
    status informally to persons from Sudan and the Republic of the Congo
    and has allowed them to remain for resettlement. The World Refugee
    Survey stated that the country hosted 20,000 Sudanese refugees.
        Chadian refugees are legally free to repatriate. In May the
    Cameroonian Government repatriated 300 Chadian refugees to Lere, with
    the assistance of the UNHCR. This group is the first of 2,400 Chadian
    refugees who fled the country during the civil war in 1980. In October
    about 350 families were repatriated from Libya after clashes between
    Libyans and Subsaharan Africans, which were described in the press as
    xenophobic. Most Chadian refugees reside in the Central African
    Republic, Niger, Libya, Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The World Refugee
    Survey stated that approximately 15,000 Chadians were refugees (5,000
    in the Central African Republic, 5,000 in Sudan, 3,000 in Cameroon, and
    1,000 in Nigeria).
        A group of foreign individuals, mostly Sudanese, claiming to be
    refugees, continue to charge that foreign officials often monitor
    refugees applying at the UNHCR branch office in N'Djamena and have
    stated that this surveillance intimidates some refugees. There were no
    confirmed reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim
    to refugee status, but refugees continue to complain about threats to
    their safety while waiting for their cases to be adjudicated.
        There were no known instances of persons being returned to a
    country where they feared persecution. Persons forcibly repatriated by
    Sudan and initially under movement restrictions were free to leave the
    country during the year.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully; however, the Government continued to limit this
    right in practice. The 1996 presidential election and the 1997 National
    Assembly elections, in which President Deby's MPS party won 65 of a
    total of 125 seats in the National Assembly, were the first multiparty
    elections in many years; however, both elections were compromised by
    widely reported fraud, including vote rigging and other irregularities
    committed by election officers, government officials, members of the
    ruling party, and others.
        The Government is headed by a prime minister who is nominated by
    the President and confirmed by the National Assembly. In December 1999,
    President Deby replaced former Prime Minister Nassour Ouaidou
    Guelengdouksia with Nagoum Yamassoum.
        The State remains highly centralized. The national government
    appoints all subnational government officials, who must also rely on
    the central government for most of their revenues and their
    administrative personnel. Using its parliamentary majority, the
    Government passed twin legislative bills in 1999 outlining the
    country's proposed decentralization structure for local government
    elections as required by the Constitution. Local elections have been
    delayed since the conclusion of the 1997 parliamentary elections and
    had not taken place by year's end. In September 1999, the
    Constitutional Court returned both legislative bills to the Parliament
    after finding that they violated the Constitution. On January 4, the
    Constitutional Court rejected a decree redrawing provincial borders and
    separately rejected the bill on decentralization.
        Many political parties objected to the Government's proposed
    decentralization plan and presidentially decreed internal territorial
    divisions, which appeared to be an attempt at gerrymandering.
    Opposition political leaders accused the Government of coopting their
    most popular local politicians to run as MPS members in upcoming local
    elections and also alleged intimidation by the military against those
    party members who refused.
        The National Assembly created an Independent Elections Commission
    (CENI) in September to prepare for the presidential and National
    Assembly elections. The President's political party dominates the CENI.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics; few women
    hold senior leadership positions. There is 1 woman of cabinet rank, and
    there are 3 women who are members of the 125-seat National Assembly.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights organizations generally operate with few overt
    restrictions, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases; however, the Government obstructed the work of human
    rights organizations during the year through arrest, detention, and
    intimidation. Government officials often are accessible to human rights
    advocates; however, they generally are unresponsive or hostile to their
    findings. Incidents between state security forces and human rights
    activists occurred in Kelo, Bessao, and Bedaralal.
        Human rights groups are outspoken, and often partisan, in
    publicizing the abuses through reports, press releases, and the print
    media, but only occasionally are they able to intervene successfully
    with authorities. They often send statements to diplomatic missions and
    international NGO's. Many human rights groups are composed of opponents
    of the Government, which impairs their credibility with the Government
    and also with international organizations.
        NGO's have gained recognition under the Deby regime and play a role
    in political events. Human rights groups have assisted the Government
    in meditation efforts to reconcile the ancient conflict between herders
    and farmers over land and water rights.
        At the turn of the year, the Collective of Human Rights
    Associations, consisting of five human rights organizations, issued a
    declaration urging the Government to respect human rights; at year's
    end, there was no government response.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens,
    regardless of origin, race, religion, political opinion, or social
    status. In practice cultural traditions maintain women in a status
    subordinate to men, and the Government favors its ethnic supporters and
    allies.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women is believed to be common,
    although no statistics were available. By tradition wives are subject
    to the authority of their husbands, and they have only limited legal
    recourse against abuse. Family or traditional authorities may act in
    such cases; however, police rarely intervene.
        Discrimination against women remains widespread. In practice women
    do not have equal opportunities for education and training, making it
    difficult for them to compete for the few formal sector jobs. Property
    and inheritance laws do not discriminate against women, but traditional
    practice favors men. The exploitation of women is especially pervasive
    in rural areas, where women do most of the agricultural labor and are
    discouraged from formal schooling. Illiteracy was estimated at 65
    percent for women, but only 38 percent for men. Under the law, polygyny
    is the norm; however, spouses may opt for monogamy. If a monogamous
    relationship is violated, the marriage may be dissolved at the wife's
    request alone; however, she must repay the dowry and other expenses
    related to the marriage.
        During the year, the Government promoted increased awareness of
    women's rights by sponsoring a national women's march in N'Djamena on
    October 17. In August 1999, the Government held meetings with
    representatives of religious groups and civil society to update the
    Family Code. In the absence of a comprehensive law governing women's
    rights, the Family Code sets the parameters of women's rights under the
    law. In a subsequent meeting with the national women's group during the
    year, the group called upon the Government and the rebels to cease the
    fighting in the Tibesti.
        Children.--The Government took several actions to improve
    children's rights and welfare, but it devoted few resources and little
    attention to implementing its proposals. Although the Government
    continued to increase modestly its assistance to the education sector,
    it has not committed adequate funding to public education and medical
    care. Government education policy for children and youth is focused on
    increasing classroom facilities and infrastructure.
        The Government does not enforce compulsory education. The
    Constitution provides for free education; however, parents complained
    that they must pay tuition to public schools. Educational opportunities
    for girls are limited, mainly because of tradition. About as many girls
    as boys are enrolled in primary school, but the percentage of girls
    enrolled in secondary school is extremely low, primarily because of
    early marriage. Although the law prohibits sexual relations with a girl
    under the age of 14, even if married, this law is rarely enforced, and
    families arrange marriages for girls as young as the age of 12 or 13;
    the minimum age for engagements is 11 to 12. There are some forced
    marriages, for the financial gain of a dowry (see Section 6.c.). Many
    young wives are then forced to work long hours of physical labor for
    their husbands in fields or homes. Children also work in agriculture
    and herding (see Section 6.d.).
        The law considers any citizen under the age of 18 years as a minor.
    Sexual relations, even with consent, before the age of 13 years are
    considered to be rape and the prescribed sentence is for hard labor in
    perpetuity; the age of consent is 14. Rape of children and child abuse
    are problems.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is widespread and deeply rooted in tradition. A
    U.N. study in 1995 estimated that approximately 60 percent of all
    females have undergone FGM; the practice is especially prevalent among
    ethnic groups in the east and south, where it was introduced from
    Sudan. All three types of FGM are practiced; the least common but most
    dangerous and severe form of FGM, infibrulation, is confined largely to
    the region on the eastern border with Sudan. FGM usually is performed
    prior to puberty as a rite of passage and an occasion during which many
    families profit from gifts from their communities.
        Opposition to the elimination of FGM is strong. Both the Government
    and the NGO community in recent years have conducted active and
    sustained public education campaigns against this practice. The
    Ministry of Social Action and the Family is responsible for
    coordinating activities to combat FGM. The law makes FGM theoretically
    a prosecutable offense as a form of assault, and charges can be brought
    against the parents of FGM victims, medical practitioners, or others
    involved in the action; however, no suits have been brought under the
    law. A law to criminalize the practice of FGM was passed by the Council
    of Ministers; however, by year's end, no action had been taken by the
    National Assembly.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no official discrimination
    against disabled persons; however, the Government operates only a few
    therapy, education, or employment programs for persons with
    disabilities, and no laws mandate access to buildings for the disabled.
    Several local NGO's provide skills training to the deaf and blind.
        Religious Minorities.--Although the different religious communities
    generally coexist without problems, there were reports of increasing
    tension between Christians and Muslims due to the proselytizing by
    evangelical Christians. In addition tensions and conflicts between
    government supporters from the politically dominant northern region and
    rebels from the politically subordinate southern region occasionally
    have religious overtones.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 200
    ethnic groups, many of which are concentrated regionally and speak
    distinct primary languages. Most ethnic groups are affiliated with one
    of two regional and cultural traditions: Arab and Saharan/Sahelian zone
    Muslims in the north, center, and east; and Sudanian zone Christian or
    animist groups in the south.
        Societal discrimination continued to be practiced routinely by
    members of virtually all ethnic groups and was evident in patterns of
    buying and employment, in patterns of de facto segregation in urban
    neighborhoods, and in the paucity of interethnic marriages, especially
    across the north-south divide. Although the law prohibits state
    discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, in practice ethnicity
    continued to influence government appointments and political alliances.
    Northerners, in particular members of President Deby's Zaghawa ethnic
    group, continued to dominate the public sector and were overrepresented
    in key institutions of state power, including the military officer
    corps, elite military units, and the presidential staff. Political
    parties and groups generally continued to have readily identifiable
    regional or ethnic bases.
        In the army's struggle against the Tibesti rebels, hundreds of
    soldiers were killed or injured by landmines in 1998 and 1999; deaths
    and injuries from landmines continued during the year. In 1999 the
    Government exhibited a pattern of discrimination in selectively
    separating wounded northerners, especially Zaghawa, from southerners
    for treatment, with the Zaghawa given preferential medical treatment,
    including evacuation abroad. Human rights groups in Faya Largeau
    charged that many untreated wounded southerners were left to die as a
    result of the selective access to medical treatment based solely on
    ethnicity; however, there were no similar reports during the year.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes freedom
    of association and union membership, as well as the right to strike,
    and the Government generally respected the right to organize and strike
    in practice. All employees, except members of the armed forces, are
    free to join or form unions. However, few workers belong to unions,
    since most workers are unpaid subsistence cultivators or herders. The
    main labor organization is the Federation of Chadian Unions (UST). Its
    former major constituent union, the Teacher's Union of Chad, broke off
    from UST and became independent in 1998. Neither union has a tie to the
    Government. A number of minor federations and unions, including the
    Free Confederation of Chadian Workers, also operated, some with ties to
    government officials.
        Ordinances of the law permitted forced labor imprisonment for
    participation in strikes; however, there was no such punishment during
    the year.
        The 1996 Labor Code ended long-standing legal restrictions on trade
    union rights; however, there were reports that a 1962 ordinance
    requiring prior authorization from the Ministry of the Interior before
    an association can be formed is still in force. The ordinance also
    allowed for the immediate administrative dissolution of an association
    and permitted the authorities to oversee associations' funds. Although
    the Government allegedly has applied this law to unions on several
    occasions despite assurances that only the Labor Code would govern the
    unions, there were no reports of such action during the year.
        A strike by butchers from January to March was provoked by the new
    value added tax and caused a shortage in the meat supply for several
    weeks and a consequent price increase for meat.
        Labor unions have the right to affiliate internationally. The Union
    des Syndicates du Tchad (UST) affiliates with the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution contains only general provisions for the rights of the
    Government to set minimum wage standards and to permit unions to
    bargain collectively. The Labor Code has specific provisions on
    collective bargaining and workers' rights. The Labor Code empowers the
    Government to intervene in the bargaining process under certain
    circumstances.
        The Labor Code protects unions against antiunion discrimination,
    but there is no formal mechanism for resolving such complaints.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
    the Labor Code prohibit slavery and forced or compulsory labor by
    adults and children; however, there were reports of forced labor
    practices in the formal economy, and isolated instances of forced labor
    by both children and adults in the rural sector by local authorities as
    well as in military installations in the north. During the year, a
    local newspaper reported that workers in SONOSUT, the sugar parastatel,
    were forced to work but were not paid. Some young girls were forced
    into marriages by their families; these girls then were forced to work
    in their husbands' fields or homes (see Section 5). There were reports
    that Zaghawas were conscripted forcibly into the armed forces
    throughout the year. In December security forces in N'Djamena
    reportedly rounded up army deserters and other individuals described as
    bandits, sent them to the northern military front, and forced them to
    fight alongside government troops. Ordinances of the law permitted
    forced labor imprisonment for participation in strikes.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates that the minimum age for
    employment in the formal sector is 14 years; however, the Government
    does not enforce the law in practice. Children are rarely employed
    except in agriculture and herding due to the high unemployment rate;
    however, in agriculture and herding, nearly all children work. Children
    rarely are employed in the commercial sector; however, some children
    work on contract with herders.
        Abusive and exploitative child labor exists and affects an
    estimated 19 percent of children between the ages of 6 and 18 years of
    age. For example, Ngaryade Togyambaye, a 12-year-old student in the
    third grade, and Nanguerimbaya Masrabaye, a 16-year-old student in the
    sixth grade, were taken from school and delivered by their father,
    Ngaryade Victor, to Ahmat Izergue, a herder, for $13 (6,600 CFA). Such
    practices are a consequence of parental resignation, dislocation of the
    family unit, endemic poverty, lack of appropriate legal protection,
    demographic and population explosion, and civil war. The instability
    resulting from civil wars contributed to the Government's limited
    ability to improve living conditions of children. Despite the
    ratification of international conventions on child labor, no government
    policies protecting child labor existed before the National Assembly
    ratified the Convention on Children's Rights on August 4.
        There were reports that in the southern part of the country,
    families contract out their children to Arab nomadic herders to help
    care for their animals, and the children often are abused and return
    with little financial compensation for their work. Some children work
    as domestic servants in the households of relatives for little
    compensation.
        The Government does not support the use of minors in the military,
    and observers believe that most minors were demobilized in 1997;
    however, there were credible reports that minors continue to serve in
    the military. President Deby reportedly conscripted teenage Zaghawa to
    fight in the Tibesti.
        During the year, the Government sponsored a number of workshops,
    seminars, and radio broadcasts to raise awareness of the abuses of
    child labor and to advocate elimination of the worst forms of child
    abuse. The Council of Ministers adopted ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor in October 1999, and the National Assembly
    ratified the convention in August. The labor law states anyone under
    the age of 18 is a minor, and, in accordance with ILO Convention 182,
    it prohibits children from undertaking ``any work which, by its nature
    or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the
    health, safety or morals of children.''
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, it does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code applies to both
    foreign and domestic workers and requires the Government to set minimum
    wages. The minimum wage at year's end was $50 (25,480 CFA) per month.
    Most wages, including the minimum wage, were insufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. Nearly all private
    sector and state-owned firms paid at least the minimum wage, but the
    lowest public sector wages remained below the minimum wage. The
    Government increased civil servant's salaries by 5 percent in January
    1999, but salaries were not increased subsequently. In 1999 the
    Government reduced wages paid to the armed forces, which were already
    well below the minimum wage.
        The State, which owns businesses that dominate many sectors of the
    formal economy, remained the largest employer. The Government reduced
    significantly the large salary arrears owed to civil servants and
    military personnel, although some arrears remain. Nevertheless, wages
    remained low and many state employees continued to hold second jobs,
    raise their own food crops, or rely on family members for support.
        The law limits most agricultural work to 39 hours per week, with
    overtime paid for supplementary hours. Agricultural work is limited to
    2,400 hours per year. All workers are entitled to an unbroken period of
    48 hours of rest per week, although in practice these rights rarely are
    enforced.
        The Labor Code mandates occupational health and safety standards
    and inspectors with the authority to enforce them; however, these
    standards rarely are respected in practice in the private sector and
    nonexistent in the civil service. The UST has alleged before the ILO
    that the labor inspection service is not allocated the resources
    necessary to perform its duties. In principle workers can remove
    themselves from dangerous working conditions; however, in practice they
    cannot leave without jeopardizing their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
        The Penal Code makes trafficking in persons a crime punishable by 5
    to 20 years in prison; however, no governmental organization focused on
    the potential problem, and no economic or financial aid would be
    available unless a victim seeks damages in court. The Government has
    sponsored educational campaigns through the media to advise parents to
    instruct children about the danger of trusting strangers.
                                   __________

                                    COMOROS

        The Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is ruled by Colonel
    Azali Assoumani, who took power in a coup in April 1999. The country
    consists of three islands (Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Moheli) and
    claims a fourth, Mayotte, which is governed by France. Comoros has been
    prone to coups and political insurrection since independence in 1975.
    In April 1999, army commander Colonel Azali staged a bloodless coup and
    overthrew President Tadjiddine Ben Said Massounde, the Interim
    President who had held office since the death of democratically elected
    President Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim in November 1998. In December 1999,
    in response to international criticism, Azali appointed a civilian
    prime minister, Bianrifi Tarmidi; however, Azali remains the Head of
    State and army Commander in Chief. When he took power, Azali said that
    he would step down on April 14 and relinguish power to a democratically
    elected president, but by year's end, he had not done so. In May 1999,
    Azali decreed a Constitution that gave him both executive and
    legislative powers. In August Azali organized a national congress in
    response to pressure from his political supporters to restore civilian
    rule. Opposition parties boycotted the National Congress, but pro-Azali
    parties participated. The Congress agreed on a new constitution in
    which Azali would remain Head of State, but daily government
    administration would be handled by the civilian Prime Minister and the
    Council of State, which would act as both a legislature and constituent
    assembly. In November a Tripartite Commission, composed of
    representatives from Grande Comore, Moheli and Anjouan, was inaugurated
    and charged with developing a new constitution based on the Fomboni
    Declaration--an agreement between the Government and Anjouan--and the
    constitution that was articulated by the National Congress in August.
    In December Azali named a new civilian Prime Minister, Hamada Madi, and
    formed a new civilian Cabinet. The opposition parties initially refused
    to participate in the Tripartite Commission, but in December met with
    the Azali Government. At year's end, the Organization for African Unity
    (OAU) was mediating negotiations between the Government and the
    opposition on the provisions of the new constitution and a timetable
    for elections in 2001; however, it remained unclear whether the
    representatives from Anjouan would participate in or accept any
    agreement resulting from the negotiations. Although the OAU initially
    had maintained the position that the Antananarivo Accord was the only
    viable option to reunify the islands, in December the OAU stated its
    intention to accept an agreement that maintained the territorial
    integrity the country and that provided for a democratic constitutional
    government. The August constitution provided for the continuation of an
    independent judiciary; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
    In the past, both the executive and other elites influenced the outcome
    of cases, and the executive intervened in at least two cases during the
    year.
        The Anjouan secession crisis subsided after the August 26 signing
    of the ``Fomboni Declaration of National Unity'' by Azali and
    separatist leader Lieutenant Colonel Said Abeid. The Fomboni
    Declaration provides for a loose confederation between the islands,
    giving each island the ability to maintain an army and conduct its own
    foreign relations. On Anjouan the signing of the Fomboni Declaration
    resulted in 4 days of violent clashes between opponents and supporters
    of Abeid's separatist faction.
        The Comorian Defense Force (FCD), and the gendarmerie are
    responsible for internal security and are under Azali's direct control.
    Security forces committed some human rights abuses.
        The economy of this extremely poor country is dominated by
    agriculture. Revenues from the main crops--vanilla, essence of ylang-
    ylang, and cloves--continued to fall while the population of 547,600
    has been growing at a rate of 2.7 percent annually. Per capita income
    was approximately $400 per year in 1997--the national accounts have not
    been updated since 1998. The country depends heavily on foreign
    assistance from the European Union and Arab countries, including
    Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
        The Government's human rights situation remained poor, and it
    continued to commit abuses. Citizens do not have the right to change
    their government. Security forces reportedly continued to threaten
    Christians. Separatist authorities on Anjouan tortured, beat, and raped
    opponents of the separatist Government. Prison conditions remain poor.
    Security forces and the separatist authorities on Anjouan used
    arbitrary arrest and detention. In at least two instances, the
    executive intervened with the judiciary. Authorities restricted
    citizens' privacy rights. There were infringements on freedom of the
    press and assembly and movement. The military Government limits freedom
    of religion. Societal discrimination against women and Christians
    continued to be serious problems. There were some instances of forced
    child labor.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by security forces
    on Grande Comore or Moheli.
        Between May 11 and 13, 1998, police clashed with protestors on
    Grand Comore over the May 6, 1998, government closure of the opposition
    party's Radio Tropique. Police seriously injured several persons, but
    the only death reportedly was due to a traffic accident caused by the
    fighting. By year's end, no police officers were held responsible for
    their actions during the protests.
        In addition to the police and the military, there are many groups
    throughout Anjouan that are armed, including paramilitary forces,
    militias, and civilians. In 1999 battles between rival militias
    resulted in approximately 12 deaths; however, there were no such deaths
    reported during the year.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution does not prohibit torture or other cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment specifically; however,
    while there were no reports of security force brutality, police
    reportedly continued to threaten Christians on Grande Comore (see
    Section 2.c.).
        On October 13, police used tear gas to disburse forcibly
    demonstrators protesting against rising fuel prices and protestors who
    were marching to the OAU offices in Moroni (see Section 2.b.). Police
    reportedly also threw tear gas canisters into private homes (see
    Section 1.f.). Two policemen and several protestors reportedly were
    injured, and some protestors reportedly were arrested.
        Separatist security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    persons on Anjouan. There were reports that separatist security forces
    on Anjouan intimidated, arrested, and beat persons during the
    referendum at the end of January (see Section 3). In August separatist
    authorities on Anjouan arrested approximately 100 opponents of the
    Fomboni Declaration, following demonstrations against the agreement
    (see Section 1.d.). There were unconfirmed reports that as many as 28
    of those arrested, who primarily were members of the Comoros Red
    Crescent Society and the opposition party GIRMA (Group for the Recovery
    Initiative for the Anjouan Movement), were tortured, and, in one case,
    raped. By November the Government had freed all of those arrested;
    there were no reports of government action against those persons
    responsible for the abuses.
        In April 1999, quasi-police authorities known as embargoes
    arrested, beat, and detained three local Christians; there was no
    further information on the incident at year's end. Prison conditions
    continued to be poor. A lack of proper sanitation, overcrowding,
    inadequate medical facilities, and poor diet are common problems. The
    military Government has not taken action to remedy these problems.
    Although there were reports of deaths as a result of disease in prisons
    in previous years, there were no reports of such deaths during the
    year. Female prisoners are held separately from male prisoners.
    Juveniles are not imprisoned; they are returned to the custody of their
    parents.
        The military Government permits prison visits by independent
    monitors; however, no such visits occurred during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution does
    not prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention specifically, and there
    were instances in which authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained
    citizens. The new constitution, approved in August, prohibits arbitrary
    arrest and detention; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
        Two Azali opponents who reportedly led a coup attempt in March were
    detained in a military prison. In November one of the opponents escaped
    from prison; the other opponent remained in detention at year's end
    (see Section 3).
        On August 15, authorities arrested four opposition politicians,
    including Cheik Ali Bacar Kassim, former Member of Parliament (M.P.)
    and owner of the opposition radio station Radio Tropique, for allegedly
    plotting to overthrow Colonel Azali. The four were detained in a
    military prison, despite a judge's order to transfer them to the
    civilian prison in the capital of Moroni. Cheik Ali reportedly was
    denied access to defense counsel until he launched a hunger strike in
    protest (see Section 1.e.).
        After the August demonstrations against the Fomboni Declaration,
    separatist authorities on Anjouan arrested and beat numerous opposition
    supporters (see section 1.c.). At the end of September, 3 of the
    approximately 100 persons arrested were freed by a tribunal in
    Anjouan's capital, Mutsamudu. At the end of November, authorities
    reportedly freed Kassim on the condition that he leave the country;
    when he refused to leave, he reportedly was returned to prison. No
    trial date had been scheduled by year's end.
        On Anjouan local authorities continued to attempt to suppress or
    convert the Christian minority.
        On October 13, police arrested approximately 20 persons while
    dispersing a demonstration in Moroni; police broke into houses and one
    mosque to make arrests (see Section 1.c., 1.f., 2.b., and 2.c.). The
    protestors were released within 24 hours, and no charges were filed
    against them.
        One Anjouanais Christian estimated that approximately 50
    Christians, both men and women, were detained in Anjouan by embargoes
    during the past 18 months.
        In September 1999, secessionist authorities on Anjouan exiled a
    group of opponents to Mayotte, then imprisoned several of the group's
    leaders when they were sent back to Anjouan by French authorities. The
    opponents were released from prison in early October, and no charges
    were filed against them.
        The Constitution does not prohibit forced exile, but the military
    Government did not use it.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in the past, the executive and other
    elites have exercised influence over court cases, and the executive
    intervened in at least two cases during the year. The Head of State
    names magistrates by decree. In August despite regulations that prevent
    the removal of judges, Colonel Azali transferred to other duties nine
    judges who had initiated a strike calling for judicial reform and
    regular payment of salaries. In October Colonel Azali issued a
    presidential decree which reduced the number of Supreme Court justices
    from nine to five and transferred judges to other courts. Although the
    official reason for the action was a lack of resources, opposition
    critics accused Azali of punishing certain judges for questioning
    government policies and participating in a strike by judges and court
    personnel. In the case of detained opposition politician Cheik Ali
    Bacar Kassim and three others, the trial judge resigned in protest when
    authorities failed to obey his order to transfer the opposition leaders
    from a military prison to a civilian prison in Moroni. Authorities
    stated that the poor condition of the Moroni Prison prohibited the
    transfer.
        The High Council, made up of four members appointed by the
    President, three members elected by the Federal Assembly, and a member
    of each island council, also serves as the High Court of the Republic
    and rules on cases of constitutional law. The August Constitution,
    which was not implemented during the year, provides for equality before
    the law of all citizens and provides for the right of accused to mount
    a defense. Trials are open to the public except for limited exceptions
    defined by law. The legal system incorporates Islamic law as well as
    French legal codes. After he was arrested in August (see Section 1.d.),
    opposition leader Cheik Ali was denied access to defense counsel for
    almost 1 month, but authorities allowed Cheik Ali's lawyer to visit him
    after he began a hunger strike. There are very few lawyers in the
    country, making it difficult to obtain legal representation. The
    military Government does not provide legal counsel to the accused. Most
    disputes are presented to village elders for possible resolution before
    being taken to court.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--There were no known cases of arbitrary interference
    with correspondence; however, police interfered with the privacy of the
    home. On October 13, during protests in Moroni, police reportedly
    raided houses by breaking down doors and throwing canisters of tear gas
    through windows; police arrested approximately 20 persons during the
    raids, and there were reports that some protestors and police were
    injured (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Police also arrested worshipers
    in a mosque (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        Bans on alcohol and immodest dress are enforced sporadically,
    usually during religious months, such as Ramadan. Alcohol can be
    imported and sold with a permit from the Government.
        In October several hundred Comorian illegal immigrants were evicted
    from their homes and places of employment after the local Government in
    Mayotte announced new penalties against persons who housed or employed
    illegal immigrants (see Section 2.d.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution does not provide
    specifically for freedom of the press, and on at least one occasion
    authorities infringed on this right. In August former M.P. Cheik Ali
    Bacar Kassim, who also owns the independent radio station Radio
    Tropique and is a well-known opposition figure, was arrested for
    allegedly plotting to overthrow the Azali Government (see Sections 1.d.
    and 1.e.). The new constitution approved in August, provides for
    freedom of the press; however, it was not implemented during the year.
        There are two independent newspapers that publish regularly. These
    newspapers exist side-by-side with the semiofficial weekly Al-Watwan.
    Some of the independent newspapers criticized the Government freely.
        The government-controlled radio station, Radio Comoros, was the
    only national radio station until the opposition radio station Radio
    Tropique resumed operations in June 1999. In August Radio Tropique
    stopped broadcasting news for a week to protest the arrest of its
    owner, Cheik Ali Bacar Kassim. In addition there are at least 10
    regional and local stations, some of which are openly critical of the
    Government. Residents also receive broadcasts from Mayotte Radio, as
    well as from French television, without government interference. A
    national television station is under construction with assistance from
    the Government of the People's Republic of China. There are several
    private local television stations, and satellite antennas are popular.
    Amateur radio licenses have been issued without hindrance in the past.
        Foreign newspapers are available, as are books from abroad.
    Internet service was introduced in 1998.
        In August 1999, an independent radio station on Anjouan, Radio
    Ushababi, which was opposed to the independence movement, reportedly
    was forced to cease broadcasting after being harassed by police and
    threatened on several occasions by a group of separatist militiamen. In
    November the station resumed broadcasting.
        The Government respects academic freedom. There is no university,
    but secondary students and teachers spoke freely and criticized the
    Government openly. Strikes by teachers and students resulted in
    periodic school closures.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    does not provide specifically for freedom of assembly and association,
    and on at least one occasion the Government restricted this right in
    practice. The new constitution, approved in August, provides for
    freedom of assembly; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
        On October 13, a general strike was held in the capital of Moroni
    to protest the rising cost of fuel. Police and protestors violently
    clashed after the demonstrators reportedly blocked roads with stones
    and burning tires. The protest began after an earlier demonstration by
    women in Mtsangani district was held to protest the military
    Government. There were reports that police raided numerous homes,
    disrupted persons in a mosque during prayers, and arrested persons
    during the incident (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.c.). Two policemen
    and several protestors reportedly were injured, and some protestors
    reportedly were arrested. There were also reports that security forces
    used tear gas to disperse protesters who were marching to the OAU
    offices. Police briefly detained some of the protestors who were
    marching to the OAU offices. There were reports that some protestors
    and police officers were injured.
        Between August 28 and 31 on Anjouan, separatist authorities clashed
    violently with opposition protesters who were demonstrating against the
    Fomboni Declaration of National Unity. Separatist authorities arrested
    as many as 100 of the protesters, some of whom reportedly were tortured
    and raped while in custody. (see sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        The Constitution does not provide specifically for freedom of
    association; however, the Government generally respects this right in
    practice. The new constitution, approved in August, provides for
    freedom of association; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution does not prohibit
    discrimination based on religion or religious belief specifically, and
    authorities infringed on freedom of religion. An overwhelming majority
    of the population is Sunni Muslim, and authorities restricted the right
    of Christians to practice their faith. Police regularly threatened and
    sometimes detained practicing Christians. In previous years, the
    authorities held those detained for a few days and often attempted to
    convert them to Islam forcibly; however, there were no reports of such
    actions during the year. In October 1999, two citizens were arrested,
    tried, and convicted of ``anti-Islamic activity'' in part because they
    possessed Christian books and audiovisual material. One of the citizens
    was sentenced to 18 months in prison, while the other was sentenced to
    4 months. Although in previous years, local government officials
    attempted to force Christians to attend services at mosques against
    their will, there were no reports of such incidents during the year.
    The Fombani Declaration that was signed by Azali and the Anjouan
    separatist leader in August included an agreement to make Islam the
    national religion. The constitution, approved in August, provides for
    equality of citizens under the law regardless of religion, belief, or
    ideology; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
        During protests in Moroni on October 13, there were reports that
    police arrested persons inside a mosque while they were praying (see
    Section 1.f. and 2.b.).
        There are two Roman Catholic churches and one Protestant church.
    However, prior to the April 1999 coup, the former military Government
    restricted the use of these three churches to noncitizens. There was no
    information available as to whether the new military Government
    continued this practice. Many Christians practice their faith in
    private residences. The Government permited Christian missionaries to
    work in local hospitals and schools, but did not permit them to
    proselytize.
        An Anjouanais Christian estimated that approximately 50 Christians,
    both men and women, have been detained by the embargoes during the last
    18 months. In April 1999, embargoes on Anjouan arrested, beat, and
    detained three local Christians for a day. Some community authorities
    on Anjouan banned Christians from attending any community events and
    banned Christian burials in a local cemetery.
        Bans on alcohol and immodest dress are enforced sporadically,
    usually during religious months, such as Ramadan. Alcohol can be
    imported and sold with a permit from the Government.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution does not specifically
    provide for these rights and the military Government restricts these
    rights in practice. The new constitution, approved in August, provides
    for these rights; however, it was not implemented by year's end.
        In February in response to a call by the OAU, the Azali Government
    imposed partial sanctions on Anjouan for its failure to sign the
    Antananarivo Accords by the February 1 deadline. These sanctions
    included travel and financial restrictions on Anjouan's leaders. In
    March broader sanctions were imposed on Anjouan, including restrictions
    on all telecommunications, air, and sea links, on oil and petroleum
    products, and on the non-recognition of travel documents and passports.
    Following the signing of the Fomboni Declaration in August, the Azali
    Government lifted the embargo unilaterally, permitting travel between
    Grande Comore and Anjouan. However, the embargo continued to be
    enforced by other nations.
        There were reports during the year that persons fled Grand Comore
    and Anjouan for Mayotte; many of these persons reportedly drowned when
    they attempted to reach Mayotte on rafts or by swimming.
        Comorian illegal immigrants in Mayotte are sometimes harassed by
    citizens of Mayotte. For example, in October several hundred Comorian
    illegal immigrants were evicted from their homes and places of
    employment after the local government in Mayotte announced new
    penalties against persons who housed or employed illegal immigrants.
        The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum. During the 1990's, refugees from central
    Africa fled to the country. Some have received asylum in other
    countries; approximately 10 of these refugees remained in the country,
    and they were awaiting placement by the UNHCR in other countries at
    year's end.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution does not provide for the right of citizens to
    change their government specifically, and in practice citizens do not
    have this right. The Constitution states that national sovereignty
    belongs to the nation's citizens who may exercise it through
    referendums; however, the Government had not scheduled a referendum by
    year's end.
        According to the Constitution, the Head of State is appointed by
    the national army and has legislative power, which he then delegates to
    the Prime Minister and the Council of State. All laws proposed by the
    Council must be approved by the Head of State. In December 1999, in
    response to international criticism, Azali appointed a civilian Prime
    Minister, Bianrifi Tarmidi; however, Azali remains the Head of State
    and army Commander in Chief.
        In March dissident political and army elements attempted a coup
    against Azali. This coup was suppressed, and the leaders of the coup
    were detained. In November one of the detained leaders escaped from
    prison, and the other leader remained in detention at year's end. The
    Government had not filed charges against the coup leaders by year's
    end.
        In August Azali organized a national congress in response to
    pressure from his political supporters to restore civilian rule.
    Opposition parties boycotted the National Congress, but pro-Azali
    parties participated. The Congress agreed on a constitution in which
    Azali would remain Head of State, but daily government administration
    would be handled by the civilian Prime Minister and the Council of
    State, which would act as both a legislature and constituent assembly.
    The constitution was approved the National Congress in August, but it
    was not implemented by year's end.
        On August 26, the Fomboni Declaration was signed by Azali and
    separatist leader Abeid. The declaration was an agreement to create a
    ``new Comorian entity,'' in which the islands would share a common
    policy on religion, nationality, currency, foreign relations, and
    defense. In November a Tripartite Commission, composed of
    representatives from Grande Comore, Moheli, and Anjouan, was
    inaugurated and charged with developing a new constitution based on the
    Fomboni Declaration--an agreement between the Government and Anjouan--
    and the constitution that was articulated by the National Congress in
    August. The opposition parties initially refused to participate in the
    Tripartite Commission, but in December they met with the Azali
    Government. By year's end, the OAU was mediating negotiations between
    the Government and the on the provisions of the new constitution and a
    timetable for elections in 2001; however, it remained unclear whether
    the representatives from Anjouan would participate in or accept any
    agreement resulting from the negotiations. Although the OAU had
    initially maintained the position that the OAU-brokered Antananarivo
    Accord was the only viable option to reunify the islands, in December
    the OAU stated that it would accept an agreement that maintained the
    territorial integrity of the country and that provided for a democratic
    constitutional government. On December 12, Azali named a new civilian
    Prime Minister, Hamada Madi, and formed a new civilian Cabinet, which
    is composed of Azali supporters.
        There were no bans in effect on political parties, which continued
    openly to criticize the Government without penalty. There are 21
    political parties in the country; 5 parties represent the Azali
    Government and 16 parties represent the opposition.
        Village chiefs and Muslim religious leaders tend to dominate local
    politics. Traditional social, religious, and economic institutions also
    affect the country's political life in important ways.
        Although women have the right to vote and to run for office,
        they are underrepresented severely in national politics and
    government. At least three women hold senior government positions; one
    is the Minister for National Education; one is the President of the
    Tribunal of First Instance, and the third is the General Secretary of
    the State Council, which advises the Cabinet.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The military Government did not prevent the operation of human
    rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and a number of NGO's
    operated in the country. However, the Comoros Human Rights Association,
    established in 1990, was on the verge of disintegration due to a lack
    of funds, and it was inactive during the year.
        The military Government cooperated with international NGO's, and a
    few international NGO's operated in the country.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on these
    factors specifically, but only states that the judiciary is the
    guardian of individual liberties. There is discrimination against
    women, and local communities discriminate against and harass
    Christians. The new constitution, approved in August, provides for
    equality under the law to all citizens regardless of sex, origin, race,
    religion, belief, or ideology; however, it was not implemented by
    year's end.
        Women.--Violence against women occurs, but medical authorities, the
    police, and women's groups believed that it was rare. In theory a woman
    could seek protection through the courts in the case of violence, but
    the problem is addressed most often within the extended family or at
    the village level.
        Men have the dominant role in society. A matriarchal African
    tradition affords women some rights, especially in terms of
    landholding. Societal discrimination against women is most apparent in
    rural areas where women have onerous farming and childrearing duties,
    with fewer opportunities for education and wage employment. In contrast
    an improvement in the status of women was most evident in the major
    towns, where growing numbers of women are in the labor force and
    generally earn wages comparable to those of men engaged in similar
    work; however, few women hold positions of responsibility in business.
    While legal discrimination exists in some areas, in general inheritance
    and property rights do not disfavor women. For example, the house that
    the father of the bride traditionally provides to the couple at the
    time of their marriage remains her property in the event of divorce.
        Children.--The Government has not taken any specific action to
    protect or promote children's welfare. Education is compulsory until
    the age of 10; however, attendance is not enforced. An estimated 60
    percent of children attended primary school, while only 34 percent
    attending secondary school. Fifty-five percent of boys attended school,
    and 45 percent of girls attended school. Population pressure and
    poverty forced some families to place their children in the homes of
    others. These children, often as young as 7 years of age, typically
    worked long hours as domestic servants in exchange for food and shelter
    (see Section 6.c.). Legal provisions that address the rights and
    welfare of children were not enforced because of a lack of inspectors.
        Child prostitution and child pornography are criminalized under the
    law. Unmarried children under the age of 13 are considered minors, and
    they are legally protected from sexual exploitation, prostitution, and
    pornography.
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, generally is not practiced. Child abuse appears
    to be rare.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of widespread
    discrimination against the disabled in the provision of education or
    other services. There are no laws concerning accessibility to public
    buildings or services for persons with disabilities.
        Religious Minorities.--There is widespread societal discrimination
    against Christians in all sectors of life. Attempts have been made to
    isolate Christians from village life. In September and October 1999, on
    Anjouan, a religious leader started an unofficial campaign against
    Christians. Committees were formed in many villages to harass
    Christians, and lists of names of suspected Christians were circulated.
    Anti-Christian rhetoric was broadcast on the radio. This campaign
    resulted in threats, but there were no reports of violence. Christians
    faced insults and threats of violence from members of their
    communities. Christians have been harassed by mobs in front of mosques
    and called in for questioning by religious authorities. In some
    instances, families forced Christian members out of their homes or
    threatened them with a loss of financial support. Some Christians have
    had their Bibles taken by family members. Local government officials,
    religious authorities, and family members have attempted to force
    Christians to attend services at mosques against their will.
        Islamic fundamentalism is growing in popularity as more students
    return to the country after studying Islamic subjects in foreign
    countries.
        In 1999 community members and authorities in Lingoni, Anjouan,
    banned Christians from attending any community events, and in Mremeni,
    Anjouan, they banned Christian burials in the local cemetery.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution does not provide for
    the right to unionize; however, the Government has not prevented
    industries from unionizing. Farming on small land holdings, subsistence
    fishing, and petty commerce make up the daily activity of most of the
    population. The wage labor force is small, and numbers less than 7,000
    including government employees, and less than 2,000 excluding them.
    Teachers, civil servants, and dockworkers are unionized. Unions are
    independent of the Government. The Constitution does not provide for
    the right to strike; however, the right to strike has been exercised
    freely by public sector workers. The new constitution, approved in
    August, provides for the right to strike; however, it was not
    implemented by year's end.
        Government workers and teachers held strikes intermittently during
    the year. Teachers and hospital workers strike intermittently, mostly
    because they often are not paid for months at a time (see Sections 1.e.
    and 2.a.). In August, despite regulations that prevent the removal of
    judges, Colonel Azali transferred to other duties nine judges who had
    initiated a strike from mid-June to early August that called for
    judicial reform and regular payment of salaries. There are no laws
    protecting strikers from retribution, but there were no known instances
    of retribution.
        There are no restrictions on unions joining federations or
    affiliating with international bodies; however, none are known to do
    so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
    right to bargain collectively, and strikes are legal. Wages are set by
    employers in the small private sector and by the Government, especially
    the Ministries of Finance and Labor, in the larger public sector. The
    Labor Code, which is rarely enforced, does not include a system for
    resolving labor disputes, and it does not prohibit antiunion
    discrimination by employers.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    does not prohibit forced or bonded labor, but it generally is not
    practiced; however, some families place their children in the homes of
    others where they work long hours in exchange for food or shelter (see
    Section 5).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code defines the minimum age for employment as
    15 years of age. The Ministry of Labor has few resources to enforce
    this provision; however, except for domestic work, child labor is not a
    problem due to the general lack of wage employment opportunities.
    Children generally help with the work of their families in the
    subsistence farming and fishing sectors (see Section 5).
        The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor, and there were
    some instances of forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 5 and
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. The
    Government often pays workers late or fails to pay them at all; during
    the year, government workers received wages through August.
        The Labor Code specifies 1 day off per week plus 1 month of paid
    vacation per year, but the Government has not set a standard workweek.
        There are no safety or health standards for the minuscule
    manufacturing sector.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                        DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

        Much of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)
    continued to be ruled by President Laurent Desire Kabila, whose
    Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL)
    overthrew the authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko by armed force
    in 1997. Kabila continued to rule by decree, despite creating and
    personally selecting members of a Constituent and Legislative Assembly,
    and the Government continued to operate without a constitution. The
    State continued to be highly centralized formally, although in practice
    the country's dilapidated transportation and communications
    infrastructure impaired central government control. The Government
    recognized two progovernment political parties and a splinter group of
    a prominent opposition party; however, it banned all other opposition
    parties. The ``People's Power Committees'' (CPP's) continued to monitor
    the activities of citizens in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces.
    War broke out in 1998 between the Government and rebel forces. The
    Lusaka Accords, which were signed on July 10, 1999, provided for a
    political dialog among the Government, rebel factions, the unarmed
    opposition, and elements of civil society; however, the Government
    repeatedly frustrated attempts to begin initial talks during the year.
    The judiciary continued to be subject to executive influence and
    corruption.
        As the war grew into an increasing stalemate, government forces
    controlled less than half of the country. Several rebel groups, the
    Congolese Rally for Democracy based in Goma (RCD/Goma), the Movement
    for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the Congolese Rally for
    Democracy based in Bunia (RCD/ML) controlled the remaining territory,
    with the active military support of the Rwandan and Ugandan
    Governments. The RCD/Goma remained dominated by members of the Tutsi
    ethnic minority and continued to be supported by the Government of
    Rwanda; the RCD/ML commanded fewer troops and, like the largely non-
    Tutsi MLC, was supported by the Government of Uganda. War broke out in
    August 1998, when Kabila tried to expel Rwandan military forces that
    had helped him overthrow Mobutu. Congolese Tutsis as well as the
    Governments of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda all relied on the Rwandan
    military presence for protection against hostile armed groups operating
    from the eastern part of the country. These groups included: The
    Interahamwe militia of Hutus, mostly from Rwanda, which took part in
    the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda and who fought the Tutsi-
    dominated Government of Rwanda; Hutu members of the former Rwandan
    armed forces, which also took part in the 1994 genocide of Tutsis in
    Rwanda, and which also fought the Government of Rwanda; the Mai Mai, a
    loose association of traditional Congolese local defense forces, which
    fought the influx of perceived Rwandan immigrants; the Alliance of
    Democratic Forces (ADF), made up of Ugandan expatriates and supported
    by the Government of Sudan, which fought the Government of Uganda; and
    several groups of Hutus from Burundi fighting the Tutsi-dominated
    Government of Burundi. In the ensuing war, elements of the armed forces
    of Rwanda and Uganda operated inside the country in support of the RCD
    or the MLC; elements of the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, and
    Zimbabwe operated inside the country in support of the Government; and
    the Mai Mai and Hutu armed groups operated inside the country on the
    side of the Government, often as guerrillas operating inside territory
    held by antigovernment forces. Elements of the armed forces of Burundi
    operated inside the country against armed groups of Hutus from Burundi
    who used the country as a base. Libya was among those countries
    supplying arms and logistical support to the Kabila Government, but did
    not conduct combat operations in the country. North Korea had advisers
    in the country who trained government troops. The front that separated
    government from antigovernment forces generally was stable, except in
    the province of Equateur, where government and rebel MLC troops fought
    running engagements along the Ubangi River. The cease-fire agreement,
    negotiated as part of the Lusaka Accords, was violated by all parties,
    especially in the north and east where the Government launched a major
    military offensive along the Ubangi River. In October the Congolese
    Armed Forces (FAC) launched an offensive on the rebel-occupied
    territories in northern Katanga Province; however, the offensive was
    pushed back by Rwandan and RCD forces, who captured the town of Pweto.
        The Government's security forces consist of a national police force
    under the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Council (CNS),
    the National Intelligence Agency (ANR), and the FAC, which includes an
    Office for the Military Detection of Subversive Activities (DEMIAP).
    The Presidential Guard was integrated into forces of the 7th Military
    District to form the Forces d'Intervention Rapide (FIC) during the
    year. The immigration service, Direction General de Migration (DGM),
    the Autodefense Forces (FAP), and CPP's also functioned as security
    forces. In 1999 Kabila gave Mai Mai leaders commissions in the FAC and
    coordinated operations with the Mai Mai and Hutu militias. The People's
    Defense Committees (CPD's), which are armed elements of the CPP's and
    operated outside the formal structure of the State, had not yet been
    armed in some areas by year's end. The police force, reorganized in
    1997, handles basic criminal cases. The CNS shares responsibility for
    internal and external security with the ANR, including border security
    matters. The FAC retains some residual police functions. Military
    police have jurisdiction over armed forces personnel. The security
    forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
        Most sectors of the economy continued to decline. Production and
    incomes continued to fall, and the modern sector virtually has
    disappeared. Physical infrastructure was in serious disrepair,
    financial institutions have collapsed, and public education and health
    have deteriorated. Annual per capita national income remained at less
    than $100. Subsistence activities, a large informal sector, and
    widespread barter characterized much of the economy; the insolvent
    public sector could not provide even basic public services. External
    economic assistance remained limited, and the State's revenues from
    diamond exports, its leading source of foreign exchange, declined.
    Public sector employees, including most soldiers, routinely went months
    without pay, which caused widespread hardship and contributed to
    tensions within the armed forces; however, unlike in 1999, there were
    no strikes. Rebel-held areas increasingly were integrated financially
    and administratively with the economies of Rwanda and Uganda. The
    Governments of Rwanda and Uganda established commercial agreements,
    maintained cadres in key income-collecting agencies, levied and
    collected taxes and customs duties, and systematically extracted hard
    currency from the regions they controlled.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
    continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the
    right to change their government peacefully. Security forces were
    responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings, disappearances,
    torture, beatings, rape, and other abuses. In general security forces
    committed these abuses with impunity, although a special military
    tribunal tried and executed some security force members for various
    human rights abuses. Prison conditions remained harsh and life
    threatening. Security forces increasingly used arbitrary arrest and
    detention throughout the year. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a
    problem, and citizens often were denied fair public trials. The special
    military tribunal tried civilians for political offenses, frequently
    with total disregard for due process protections, and sentenced
    civilians to death; however, no civilians were executed during the
    year. The judiciary remained subject to executive influence and
    continued to suffer from a lack of resources, inefficiency, and
    corruption. It largely was ineffective as either a deterrent to human
    rights abuses or a corrective force. Security forces violated citizens'
    rights to privacy. Forcible conscription of adults and children
    continued, although children were conscripted to a lesser extent than
    in the previous year. Government security forces continued to use
    excessive force and committed violations of international law in the
    war. Government aircraft routinely bombed civilian populated areas in
    rebel-held territory. Although a large number of private newspapers
    often published criticism of the Government, the Government continued
    to restrict freedom of speech and of the press by harassing, arresting,
    detaining, and torturing newspaper editors and journalists and seizing
    individual issues of publications, as well as by increasing its
    restrictions on private radio broadcasting. Harassment of journalists,
    human rights activists, and opposition politicians increased during the
    year. The Government severely restricted freedom of assembly and
    association. Government forces committed some abuses against religious
    entities. The Government continued to restrict freedom of movement and
    continued to require exit visas. The war resulted in a massive increase
    in internally displaced persons (IDP's). The Government continued to
    ban political party activity and used security services to stop
    political demonstrations, resulting in numerous arrests and detentions.
    It also harassed, imprisoned, and tortured members of opposition
    parties and harassed human rights nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's). Violence against women was a problem and rarely was punished.
    Discrimination against women was widespread and common. Female genital
    mutilation (FGM) persisted among isolated populations in the north.
    Child prostitution was a problem. Discrimination against indigenous
    Pygmies and ethnic minorities was a problem. Serious governmental and
    societal violence and discrimination against members of the Tutsi
    ethnic minority continued; however, the Government protected many
    Tutsis who were at risk and facilitated the departure of approximately
    3,000 to neighboring countries. On occasion tension between the Hema
    and Lendu flared into violence that resulted in hundreds of deaths. The
    Government restricted worker rights. The Government arrested labor
    leaders during public sector strikes and allowed private employers to
    refuse to recognize unions. There were reports of forced conscription,
    including of children, and there were reports of forced child labor.
    Child labor, including use of child soldiers, remained a problem. Mob
    violence resulted in killings and injuries.
        There were numerous credible reports that Mai Mai groups fighting
    on the side of the Government committed serious abuses, including many
    killings, torture, and the arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians.
        During the year, antigovernment forces committed serious abuses
    against civilians living in territories under their control, including
    deliberate, large-scale killings, disappearances, torture, rape,
    extortion, robbery, dismemberment, arbitrary arrests and detention,
    harassment of human rights workers and journalists, and forcible
    recruitment of child soldiers. In particular RCD/Goma and Rwandan units
    committed mass killings generally in reprisal for Mai Mai attacks
    against RCD or Rwandan forces. There also were numerous and widespread
    unconfirmed reports that armed bands of Rwandan Hutus posing as
    Interahamwe fighters committed abuses. The Rwandan army allegedly
    recruited these groups in order ostensibly to demonstrate the need for
    a continued Rwandan military presence in the areas they controlled.
    Rebel organizations severely restricted freedom of speech, assembly,
    association, and religion in areas they held. There were reports of
    attacks against local and international NGO's in rebel-held areas.
    There also were many deaths due to interethnic mob violence in areas
    held by antigovernment forces.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
    security forces committed extrajudicial killings, and the Government
    misused the judicial system to try, sentence, and execute numerous
    persons without due process. The Government also materially supported
    Mai Mai and Hutu armed groups, which, according to credible reports,
    repeatedly killed unarmed as well as armed persons in areas held by
    antigovernment forces. An international humanitarian NGO estimated that
    as many as 1.7 million persons have died during the war because of
    killings, malnutrition, or starvation (see Section 1.g.).
        On January 5, FAC soldiers shot and killed William Mbulu in the
    Lingwala district of Kinshasa for no apparent reason. On January 14, in
    the Limete district of Kinshasa near Kuaka, a soldier in the
    Presidential Guard known by the name of Pipiyu killed a policeman who
    intervened on behalf of a civilian being harassed by the soldier. On
    the morning of January 28, in the Masina district of Kinshasa near
    Mizola, a FAC soldier shot and killed Addy Lisasi in a building near
    the railroad tracks. On May 21, in the village of Kimpaka, near
    Kinshasa, soldiers killed ``Ya Rolly'' Ngimbi after he refused to give
    them money. The soldiers then raped and killed his wife, and stole
    money and valuables from the household before leaving. On May 25, near
    the village of Kimbiolongo, there were unconfirmed reports that FAC
    soldiers killed Nsiala Nkia Mbiyavanga for unknown reasons. The
    soldiers then beat his parents severely, raped his 13yearold sister
    Mirielle, and stole numerous items from their home (see Section 1.c.).
    On May 25, there were unconfirmed reports that Mukoko died from
    injuries inflicted during a severe beating by FAC soldiers. The
    soldiers later allegedly tortured his family members when they sought
    justice from village authorities (see Section 1.c.). On May 31, Mpadi
    Mamikamona Moko, a veterinarian at the MULENDA MBO farm outside of
    Kinshasa and a resident of the Masina district of Kinshasa, was beaten
    to death and thrown into the Ndjili river by men dressed in military
    uniforms. On the evening of July 22, in the MontNgafula district of
    Kinshasa, two armed men believed to be soldiers broke into the home of
    Irenge Kako, an employee of the Central Bank of the Congo. The men
    stole money from Kako and then shot him twice in the head, killing him.
    On September 8, government soldiers shot and killed 47 men and 4 women
    in a house in Dongo; 2 persons survived by jumping out of a window. The
    soldiers reportedly killed the persons while retreating from a rebel
    attack.
        On October 31, security forces rearrested Commandant Anselme Masasu
    Nindaga, a political prisoner arrested in 1998 but released on March 24
    (see Sections 1.b., 1.d., and 1.e.). On November 24, there were reports
    that government officials executed Masasu and 35 suspected
    collaborators at a FAC military court near Pweto, allegedly for
    plotting a coup against President Kabila during the year. There also
    were widespread rumors that the Government executed hundreds of
    suspected Masasu collaborators with Kivusian origins in Kinshasa.
        On December 7, a group of armed police attacked the car of
    JeanClaude Masangu as he was returning home. The police shot and killed
    Masangu's bodyguard; Masangu and his chauffeur escaped without harm.
    The local press declared that the police were attempting to kill
    Masangu; however, at year's end, the intent of the attack remained
    unknown. On December 11, a military court tried, convicted of
    manslaughter, sentenced to death, and executed two of the policemen.
        Throughout the year, government military tribunals continued to
    sentence to death many civilians after military trials that were often
    perfunctory, and many of these civilians were executed (see Section
    1.e.). Members of the security forces repeatedly killed civilians,
    particularly in areas that they were preparing to abandon to advancing
    antigovernment forces. The military justice system, which was revised
    in 1997, prosecuted FAC members for individual incidents ranging from
    armed robbery to rape to murder, and sentenced to death and executed at
    least 17 FAC members during the year (see Section 1.e.).
        Harsh prison conditions and abuse led to an undetermined number of
    deaths in prisons. Many prisoners died of illness or starvation (see
    Section 1.c.). It was reported that, since Kabila took power in 1997,
    both extrajudicial killings and deaths due to torture and neglect have
    become common at a secret detention center known as ``Alfa,'' which was
    run directly by the Office of the President. On January 21, in Inongo,
    Bandundu Province, Iyela Mokolo died in detention from injuries he
    sustained while being tortured (see Section 1.c.).
        No action is known to have been taken against the members of the
    security forces responsible for the following 1999 killings: University
    student Remy Lushima Nyamangombe in January 1999; a person in the
    Sebastian bar in Kinshasa in February 1999; public transportation
    driver Kalle in April 1999; a minibus driver in April 1999; Colonel
    Ndoma Moteke who was tortured in May 1999; a 12-year-old boy in July
    1999; Charles Bokeleale in July 1999; student Kamba Kanyinda in
    November 1999; and Simon Makoko in November 1999.
        The Government did not prosecute any state officials or other
    persons in connection with the mass extrajudicial killings of Tutsis in
    1998.
        There were reports that landmines continued to be used,
    particularly in the eastern half of the country, despite agreements not
    to do so in the Lusaka Accords. Government forces, rebel groups, and
    the armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Chad allegedly used
    landmines; however, it is impossible to know which groups laid
    landmines.
        In July a Belgian judge issued an arrest warrant against Congolese
    Foreign Minister Yerodia Abdoulaye after a number of Tutsis in Belgium
    claimed that Yerodia's radio broadcasts in August 1998 incited the
    populace to murder Tutsis randomly. A similar case was filed against
    Kabila in September.
        There were widespread reports throughout the year of killings and
    other human rights abuses by both progovernment and antigovernment
    forces. Verification of these reports was extremely difficult,
    particularly those emanating from remote areas and those areas affected
    by active combat, primarily in the eastern areas of the country.
    Independent observers often found access difficult due to hazardous
    security conditions as well as frequent impediments imposed by
    authorities (see Section 4). Both progovernment and antigovernment
    forces extensively used propaganda disseminated via local media,
    including charges leveled at opposing forces, further complicating
    efforts to obtain accurate information (see Section 2.a.).
        Progovernment Mai Mai guerilla units killed many civilians,
    sometimes after torturing them, in areas where they operated. In August
    there were reports that Mai Mai killed dozens of civilians fleeing from
    Shabunda. Hutu militia units fighting on the side of the Government,
    and reportedly supported materially by the Government, also killed many
    noncombatants. Information about killings by Mai Mai, Interahamwe, and
    Hutu militia units remained very incomplete, and many such killings may
    not have been reported.
        Mob violence resulted in killings, but the Government did not
    incite directly lethal mob violence during the year. However, following
    the October death of Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko of Bukavu due to a
    heart attack, the Kabila Government claimed that Tutsis had poisoned
    the Archbishop, a charge the Catholic Church denied (see Section 2.c.).
    The government statement contributed to demonstrations in the occupied
    territories that were suppressed by RCD/Goma rebel authorities (see
    Section 2.b.). At least one child was killed by gunfire during the
    incident.
        Throughout the year in the Ituri district in Orientale Province, an
    area dominated by Ugandan and Ugandan-supported forces, fighting
    continued between members of the Lendu and Hema tribes, which
    reportedly killed thousands of persons and displaced tens of thousands
    of others (see Section 5). This fighting reportedly arose from a
    dispute about land use and also reportedly was manipulated by Ugandan
    troops who charged the tribes fees in order to provide protection to
    their members. Specific incidences of violence were difficult to verify
    due to the general unrest in the region. There were reports during the
    year that intertribal fighting between December 28 and 31, 1999, in the
    area of Blukwa in the Walendu Pitsi collective, left 300 persons dead,
    the majority Hema, according to credible sources. There were unverified
    reports of up to 40 Lendu killed at Lita, near Katoto, in late August,
    and between 20 to 25 Lendu killed at Nyangaray. According to credible
    sources, clashes occurred in August and September in Linga, Ngongo,
    Kobu, and Bunia.
        In July a group believed to be Interahamwe attacked an internally
    displaced persons (IDP) camp in North Kivu Province (see Section 2.d.).
    Approximately 50 persons were killed, including some who were burned
    alive inside their homes. On September 5, Interahamwe reportedly
    attacked settlements near Goma; six persons were killed and nine were
    wounded. On September 6, Interahamwe reportedly attacked a team of
    civilian conservationists in the Gahuzu-Biega National Park near
    Bukavu; 10 persons were killed, including a journalist and 2 park
    guides, and a number of others were injured. Progovernment forces
    routinely bombed civilian populations in air raids against towns held
    by antigovernment forces, which resulted in heavy civilian casualties
    (see Section 1.g.).
        On two occasions during the year in May and June, Rwandan and
    Ugandan forces fought in Kisangani, resulting in hundreds of civilian
    deaths, thousands of wounded, and 60,000 displaced persons (see Section
    2.d.). The most severe of these clashes occurred from June 5 to 11,
    during which time both forces shelled the city with artillery and
    mortar fire, destroying homes and much of the city's infrastructure.
    Credible sources claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops raped many women
    and shot persons during extensive fighting in the city. Humanitarian
    organizations report that approximately 700 Congolese civilians were
    killed during the fighting; many died as a result of lack of medical
    attention since transportation to hospitals during the fighting often
    was unavailable. Many displaced persons remained for several months at
    a camp outside of the city because they feared to return (see Section
    2.d.). There were reports that both Ugandan and Rwandan forces used
    landmines during the fighting in Kisangani.
        During the year, antigovernment forces committed repeated mass
    killings. In particular RCD/Goma and Rwandan units committed mass
    killings generally in reprisal for Mai Mai attacks against RCD or
    Rwandan forces. Some of the many reports of such killings were
    credible, particularly attacks, murders, and looting committed against
    members and facilities of the Catholic Church (see Section 2.c.).
    Investigations of many reported killings often were difficult, and
    details of reported abuses sometimes emerged long after the events
    occurred. There have been no known serious attempts by any of the
    combatants in the conflict to investigate incidences in which their
    troops allegedly committed numerous murders, rapes, lootings, and other
    abuses in areas under their control.
        During the year, there were numerous credible reports that RCD
    forces, participating with or supported by the Rwandan Patriotic Army
    (RPA), beat, tortured, and then buried alive 15 women at Mwenga in
    December 1999. However, the Rwandan Government denied these charges and
    claims that 3 women, not 15, only were beaten severely by civilians who
    accused the women of witchcraft. According to the Rwandan Government,
    the women were rescued from mob justice by RCD troops but later died
    from their injuries. In December 1999, the RCD/RPA arrested Frank
    Kasereke, the RCD commander, but he escaped from jail on February 5
    along with 32 other detainees.
        On January 29, in Bunia, a Rwandan soldier reportedly summarily
    executed a Congolese rebel soldier based on the suspicion that the
    Congolese soldier was passing information to an opposing rebel group
    (see Section 1.e.).
        On February 5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village
    of Kilambo, North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men,
    raped their wives in front of them (see Section 1.c.), and then killed
    30 persons.
        On February 12, RCD/Goma rebels killed Kitoko, chief of the
    Lulonge-Fizi, and Tchalanga, chief of the Ziralo, in Kalele, South Kivu
    Province.
        On February 16, a Banyamulenge militia attacked a Catholic mission
    in the Kilibu area of South Kivu Province (see Section 2.c.). Two
    priests fled, but militiamen captured a third priest, Father Pepin
    Beta; the militiamen forced the priest to kneel, and then shot and
    killed him.
        From March 6 to 8, RPA forces reportedly made repeated attacks on
    the village of Kilambo in Masisi, North Kivu Province, and allegedly
    executed numerous persons suspected of collaborating with the
    Interahamwe. Among others, the RPA reportedly killed two men known as
    Kapalata and Mamboleo, Samuel Kanyomo, a woman named Suzana, and her
    three children.
        On March 10, RCD soldiers killed Lwina Samuel, the chief of the
    Office of Environmental Protection in Rutshuru, North Kivu Province,
    for refusing to allow soldiers to steal his belongings. RCD soldiers
    later killed Lwina Bwangi, Samuel's 17-year-old son, after he
    identified his father's killers.
        On March 24, RCD soldiers shot and killed Thomas Kumbuka in the
    village of Kishondja in Masisi, North Kivu Province, after they
    allegedly mistook him for an Interahamwe militiaman.
        On April 10, Muulwa, a farmer from the village of Habula in
    Walikale territory, North Kivu Province, was killed by RCD soldiers who
    had entered the village to investigate whether the residents were
    harboring Interahamwe soldiers. On April 16, following a Mai Mai attack
    on the RCD/Goma camp at Mulume Munene in South Kivu Province, RCD
    soldiers attacked the village of Izege. Soldiers reportedly warned
    villagers to leave their homes, then set the homes on fire, and killed
    four persons; soldiers burned hundreds of homes and animals.
        On May 14 and 15, in response to the apparent Mai Mai slaying of
    RCD commander Ruzagura during an ambush on his motorcade, RCD/Goma
    forces killed hundreds of civilians in and around the town of Katogota
    in South Kivu Province. According to some reports, RCD soldiers killed
    as many as 300 villagers by slitting their throats.
        On June 23, in Walikale, RPA Captain Alexis Rugira and other RPA
    soldiers killed Baligizi Mufungizi, stole his bicycle, and robbed him.
    Captain Rugira, Lieutenant Gapfunsi, S/Major Rutabana, and two privates
    were arrested and were in pretrial detention awaiting prosecution by
    the military tribunal at year's end.
        Between August 18 and 24, following a period of intense fighting
    between Mai Mai and RCD forces in the Shabunda region of South Kivu
    Province, the RCD carried out a punitive campaign against the villages
    between the towns of Lulingu and Nzovu. Soldiers sent by RCD Commandant
    Macumu burned the villages; more than 300 villagers were burned alive
    and 3,000 homes were destroyed.
        On August 29, Bukavu students demonstrated to protest the arrest of
    four civil society members (see Sections 1.d and 2.b.). In their effort
    to disperse the demonstrations, RCD soldiers fired into the air and
    reportedly shot and killed one student.
        On August 30, RCD/Goma vice military police commandant Tshisekedi
    ordered subordinates to arrest his younger brother, Mbuyi Tshibwabwa,
    and Nyamulinduka Ndelo Zagabe, whom he suspected of stealing his sewing
    machine. Military police repeatedly beat the two men with hammers,
    shovels, and clubs until they eventually died (see Section 1.c.). There
    was no known action taken against Tshisekedi by year's end.
        On September 1, RPA Captain Peter Kabanda and other RPA soldiers
    allegedly killed 67 unarmed civilians in Masisi, North Kivu Province.
    The captain and the other RPA soldiers were arrested for acting
    contrary to operational orders and for failing to differentiate between
    the enemy and unarmed civilians. The soldiers were in detention
    awaiting prosecution for murder before the military tribunal at year's
    end.
        On November 1, a group of suspected Interahamwe soldiers armed with
    guns, machetes, and clubs attacked the village of Kehero, near Goma,
    North Kivu Province, allegedly in revenge for an October 10 killing by
    RCD forces of their leader known as Rwenderi. The alleged Interahamwe
    killed nine persons on suspicion that they had collaborated with the
    RCD forces.
        On November 8, Ugandan soldiers allegedly shot and killed nine
    persons at a wedding party in the village of Kikere, near Butembo,
    North Kivu Province; the soldiers believed the village to be
    sympathetic to the Mai Mai. The attack reportedly followed violent
    clashes between Ugandan and Mai Mai forces in the surrounding area. The
    soldiers also allegedly set fire to houses in the village; 11 persons
    burned to death in the houses.
        There also were reports of killings by Banyamulenge militias and
    Burundian military forces. On July 19, in the Fizi district of South
    Kivu Province, Banyamulenge and Burundian soldiers killed an estimated
    150 persons in the town of Lubamba by slitting their throats. The local
    population sought refuge in the nearby town of Dine.
        Although unconfirmed, there were widespread and numerous reports
    throughout the occupied territories of a Rwanda-supported Hutu militia
    posing as Interahamwe and operating as an instrument of terror against
    civilians. Rwandan authorities reportedly coordinated attacks by this
    group on civilian and church targets and then blamed the attacks on the
    Interahamwe. Rwandan authorities allegedly used the insecurity brought
    on by this Hutu militia to further justify its military presence in the
    country.
        By year's end, it was more difficult to identify the armed groups
    responsible for attacks. On June 19, approximately 50 unidentified
    soldiers attacked and pillaged a Catholic church and convent, a
    hospital, and homes in the town of Kabare, South Kivu Province (see
    Section 2.c.); 3 civilians were killed. The RCD blamed the attack on
    the Interahamwe, but local humanitarian groups disputed this claim
    because of the number of RPA soldiers in the area.
        During the night of July 9 and 10, an unidentified militia attacked
    an encampment of displaced persons at Sake, in the Masisi territory of
    North Kivu Province (see Section 2.d.). Official estimates indicated
    that the assailants killed as many as 40 persons and wounded a number
    of others; 20 were treated at Goma General Hospital. In addition 48
    homes were burned and 2 pharmacies were looted.
        There were numerous reported killings along the road from Uvira to
    Bukavu in South Kivu Province; many were aimed at looting and theft.
    Observers believe that Mai Mai, Interahamwe, FDD, Banyamulenge, or RPA
    combatants could have been responsible for the attacks, with or without
    the knowledge or consent of their commanders. The climate of insecurity
    in the occupied territories and particularly in the Kivu Provinces
    forced many local residents to abandon their homes and created food
    shortages as armed bands kept farmers from working in their fields.
        b. Disappearance.--There were many reported cases of disappearance,
    most as a result of the war. Government forces reportedly were
    responsible for the disappearance of many persons. Throughout the year,
    government security forces regularly held alleged suspects in detention
    for varying periods of time before acknowledging that they were in
    custody. Typical accounts described unidentified assailants who
    abducted, threatened, and often beat their victims before releasing
    them. Journalists and opposition members claimed that they were targets
    of such actions.
        On October 31, security forces rearrested Commandant Anselme Masasu
    Nindaga, a political prisoner who had been arrested in 1998 but
    released on March 24 (see Sections 1.a, 1.d., and 1.e.). Masasu
    reportedly was detained in undisclosed locations in Kinshasa for at
    least 3 weeks. On November 24, there were reports that government
    officials executed Masasu and 35 suspected collaborators. The
    Government has denied these reports. The persons reportedly executed
    remained unaccounted for at year's end.
        In the 1999 disappearance cases of Commandant Jean Nkumu Wangala,
    Bernard Ntandou, Jean Mpalabouna, Justin Djuambe Tegi, Michel Gbetoro,
    and Belmonde Ma Gloire Coffi, human rights NGO La Voix des Sans Voix
    (VSV) reported that Belmonde Ma Gloire Coffi had been executed and that
    Jean Nkumu Wangala fled the country. VSV believed that the others also
    had fled, but did not have evidence to prove this belief.
        There have been no developments in the December 1998 case of Donnat
    N'Kola Shamuyi, an investigator for the human rights NGO Collectif pour
    le Development des Droits de l'Homme, who disappeared while working in
    Tshikapa in Western Kasai Province.
        The bodies of many persons killed in the war were burned, dumped in
    rivers, or buried in mass graves that remain unopened. Neither side is
    known to have kept or released records of the identities of the persons
    whom its forces killed.
        Antigovernment and rebel forces reportedly were responsible for the
    disappearance of many persons. There were reports that antigovernment
    forces repeatedly failed to acknowledge detaining persons.
        On April 2, RCD security forces arrested Christian Ngongo Kasumba
    at the border post of Bunagana. Kasumba was returning from a business
    trip to Nairobi, Kenya, via Kampala, Uganda; he has not been seen since
    his arrest. Efforts to locate him have been unsuccessful; an RCD
    commandant named Karim reportedly was responsible for Kasumba's arrest
    and detention.
        On May 15, Rwandan soldiers reportedly arrested Ainakafota, the
    director of the Bolongo-Bas office of Friends of Nelson Mandela for
    Human Rights (ANMDH) in Orientale Province, and two other staff members
    of the human rights NGO, on suspicions of spying (see Section 4). The
    ANMDH and family members have not been able to locate Ainakafota or the
    staff members since their arrests; inquiries to Rwandan officials
    concerning their whereabouts have produced no results.
        Reportedly persons whom rebel, Rwandan, or Ugandan forces allegedly
    detained sometimes were transferred to Rwanda or Uganda. Persons
    reported missing in 1998, including 22 Franciscan friars from Sola in
    Katanga Province and 3 university professors from Bukavu in South Kivu
    Province, still were unaccounted for at year's end.
        Ugandan and Rwandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels, reportedly
    abducted many young women from the villages they raided. These night
    raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of the Kivu
    Provinces peasants slept in their fields.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law forbids torture; however, security forces and
    prison officials used torture, and often beat prisoners in the process
    of arresting or interrogating them. The Government has not responded to
    charges of inmate abuse and repeated beatings by its security force and
    prison officials. Members of the security forces also raped, robbed,
    and extorted money from civilians; some abusers were prosecuted.
    Incidents of physical abuse by security forces occurred during the
    arrest or detention of political opponents, journalists, businessmen,
    and others (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        On January 1, Albert Angbana Mate, a Mobutu government official,
    was arrested in Mbandaka by the ANR for predicting that rebels soon
    would capture the government-held town of Bikoro (see Section 1.d.).
    Agbana was transferred to the ANR facility in Kinshasa (Lemera), where
    security agents reportedly subjected him to severe torture.
        On January 9, 7th Military District soldiers forcibly entered the
    home of Christophe Kalonji Ntambwe in Kinshasa's Barumbu commune,
    ransacked the home, and arrested Kalonji. The soldiers reportedly were
    working as agents of Joseph Mbuyi Lusambo, who wished to expropriate
    land owned by Kalonji. On January 13, the soldiers returned to
    Kalonji's home, searched his files, and destroyed furniture. When
    Kalonji's wife, Muawuka Kena Bantu, visited him at the 7th Military
    District holding facility, she was detained from January 13 to 15, and
    stripped. During their detention, soldiers commanded by Major Jose
    Mopia Agaga beat both Kalonji and his wife, who was 5 months pregnant.
    Kalonji was released on February 8.
        On January 13, security forces arrested, detained, and tortured for
    5 days Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) activist Crispin
    Ipondo Banda, reportedly for distributing brochures on the Lusaka
    Accords published by the NGO LINELIT. Police held Banda at the
    Inspection Provinciale de la Police de Kinshasa before transferring him
    to another ANR facility. He was accused of committing offenses against
    President Kabila but all charges subsequently were dropped, and he was
    freed on February 2. On February 29, rapid intervention police arrested
    seven members of the UDPS in Kinshasa, near the home of UDPS president
    Etienne Tshisekedi, and detained them at a jail in the Kasavubu
    district of Kinshasa where security agents reportedly lashed the
    detainees with whips until their release the following morning (see
    Section 1.d.).
        On January 21, in Inongo, Bandundu Province, Iyela Mokolo died in
    detention from injuries he had sustained while being tortured (see
    Section 1.a.). He had been detained in December 1999 on accusations of
    illegal possession of weapons and poaching.
        There were many recorded instances of torture, harassment, and
    theft committed against the residents of villages that surround Dingi-
    Dingi, the location of a FAC airfield that was under construction
    during the year. On February 19, FAC soldiers beat Makengo Mbila Mbua,
    a resident of the village of Kinsala, and stole his money, chickens,
    and sacks of corn. On February 20, FAC soldiers lashed Godet Hiemba, a
    resident of Ingidi village, 50 times with a whip and confiscated his
    belongings because he did not respond properly to the Commandant of the
    Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) at the airfield. The same day,
    soldiers lashed Mawete Mbiyavanga 10 times with a whip and confiscated
    all of the food and money that she had in her possession. Also on
    February 20, FAC soldiers beat Manianga after he prevented the
    Commandant of the PPU from sexually exploiting Manianga's daughter. The
    soldiers also confiscated his belongings and money.
        On the night of March 10, security forces reportedly abducted and
    detained five Congolese refugees from Angola's enclave of Cabinda. The
    refugees were registered with U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) in Angola and reportedly were associated with an Angolan
    independence movement. Security officials released three of the
    detainees; however, two remained in detention at a Conseil de Securite
    d'Etat facility in Kinshasa at year's end. Security forces reportedly
    beat and tortured the two who remained in detention, Macario Romao
    Lembe and Vosso Fuila. One of the detainees reportedly is in poor
    health as a result of torture.
        In March a police commandant severely beat the president of the
    Front for the Survival of Democracy (FSD) after he inquired at the
    police station about the arrests of FSD supporters who gathered for a
    FSD demonstration on March 16 (see Section 2.b.).
        On March 20, police officers publicly raped a young girl in the
    town of Pusuku, Bandundu Province, after villagers intervened on behalf
    of a young man named Kituku who had an altercation with another officer
    (see Section 1.d.). There was no known action taken against the
    officers.
        On April 7, government security forces under the command of Faustin
    Numbi arrested and tortured Freddy Lomboto wa Lomboto, the second vice
    president of the opposition party FONUS (Forces Novatrices pour l'Union
    et la Solidarity or New Forces for Unity and Social Progress).
    Lomboto's interrogators smashed his fingers with metal bars and beat
    him until he lost control of his bodily functions in order to extract
    information regarding the party and its president, Joseph Olenghankoy.
    The Government released him after 4 days of questioning and further
    abuse; however, on June 9, Commandant Numbi's soldiers returned to
    Lomboto's house and interrogated his wife when they could not find him;
    she later fled.
        On April 30, members of the Special Presidential Security Group
    allegedly beat Koyagialo Ahonzima Wasana for ignoring government
    restrictions on movement within the vicinity of the Marble Palace,
    President Kabila's residence (see Section 2.d.).
        On May 25, near the village of Kimbiolongo, FAC soldiers killed
    Nsiala Nkia Mbiyavanga for unknown reasons (see Section 1.a.). The
    soldiers then beat his parents severely, raped his 13yearold sister
    Mirielle, and stole numerous items from their home.
        On May 25, there were unconfirmed reports that a man known as
    Mukoko died from injuries inflicted during a severe beating by FAC
    soldiers (see Section 1.a.). The soldiers later allegedly tortured his
    family members when they sought justice from village authorities.
        On October 11, security agents abducted seven UDPS members from a
    street corner in Kinshasa (see Section 1.d.). They reportedly continued
    to be detained at Camp Kokolo at year's end and were subjected to daily
    beatings by security agents.
        On October 18, national police arrested military court officials
    Ambroise Kusa and Ndaba (see Section 1.d.). Kusa and Ndaba reportedly
    were detained at Makala prison and were beaten and tortured. They were
    released on October 25.
        On November 16, police reportedly beat 10 students who intervened
    on behalf of two students arrested while carrying their lunches on the
    campus of the Institut Pedagogique National (IPN) in Kinshasa, because
    the police wanted the food. Several students were arrested (see Section
    1.d.). On November 17, approximately 800 students demonstrated to
    protest the incident; allegedly FAC forces briefly detained a
    journalist covering the protest and confiscated her recordings (see
    Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The commander of the police detachment
    reportedly was arrested following the incident.
        On November 26, a group of armed government soldiers assaulted and
    shot in the leg Athanese Matenda Kyelu, the manager of the Chamber of
    Commerce, at his house in the Ngaliema district of Kinshasa. The
    soldiers searched and robbed the house (see Section 1.f.). Matenda
    received treatment at Ngaliema Hospital.
        On at least two occasions, members of the security forces beat
    taxicab and minibus passengers who were unable to pay bribes at
    roadblocks (see Section 2.d.).
        Security forces harassed, beat, and tortured journalists, including
    foreign journalists, during the year (see Section 2.a.). For example,
    on January 3, security forces arrested Freddy Loseke Lisumbu, editor of
    the newspaper Le Libre Afrique (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a). Security
    agents allegedly subjected Loseke to torture; he reportedly was in ill
    health at year's end but was denied medical attention. In May a
    military court sentenced Loseke to 3 years in prison (see Section 1.e).
        On February 26, police arrested, detained, and severely beat Zuzi
    Phukuta Dieudonne, a reporter for the newspaper Palme d'Or and
    president of the human rights NGO Justice Sans Frontiere (see Sections
    1.d. and 2.a.). Phukuta reportedly was riding in a public van with a
    number of students who shouted anti-Kabila remarks; Phukuta was accused
    of having insulted the President. Security force agents reportedly
    tortured Phukuta, and the beatings left permanent scars. Police
    released Phukuta shortly after his arrest but have continued to
    threaten his life.
        There was no known action taken against members of the security
    forces responsible for torturing, beating, or abusing the persons in
    the following 1999 cases: The January case of human rights activists
    Christophe Bintu and Bienvenu Kasole; the January case of newspaper
    publisher Thierry Kyalumba; the February case of Toussaint Muhavu
    Shankulu; the February case of Luyinumu Lelo Koko and Jonas Ndoko; the
    February case of Professor Tshibangu Kalala; the March case of two
    female money changers; the March case of a journalist; the April case
    of Lambert Edimba; the May case of eight members of the opposition
    Parti Lumumbist Unifie (PALU) party; the May case of Christian
    Badibangi, president of the opposition party Union Socialist
    Congolaise; the May case of Colonel Ndoma Moteke; the June case of
    journalists for the daily newspaper Tempete des Tropiques; the June
    case of the owner of a dugout canoe known as Motinga; the July case of
    Jean Marie Kashils of the Agence Congolaise de Presse and Bienvenu
    Tshiela of Kasai Horizon Radio Television; the July case of Professor
    Kambaj Wa Kambaji; the September case of human rights NGO activist
    Wetemwani Katembo Merikas; the September case of Francois Mpoyi
    Mukandu, the legal advisor of the governor of Eastern Kasai Province,
    Marcel Mpuanga Mindu, who also was an attorney, and Ditutu bin Bwebwe,
    a court clerk; and the October case of Pascal Kusehuka, secretary
    general of the PALU opposition party for Bandundu Province.
        Street children in Kinshasa were subject to severe harassment and
    exploitation, particularly by soldiers and police (see Section 5).
    There were credible reports that the FAC sexually exploited homeless
    girls.
        There were numerous reports that nongovernmental armed groups
    fighting on the side of the Government, and reportedly materially
    supported by the Government, tortured, raped, and otherwise physically
    abused many persons during the year. Mai Mai guerillas reportedly
    killed persons by torture, including by mutilation and crucifixion (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that mobs beat
    persons.
        There were reports that Interahamwe militia in South Kivu Province
    often raped women.
        There also were numerous reports of torture by antigovernment
    forces in the occupied territories.
        During the year, there were numerous credible reports that RCD
    forces, participating with or supported by the RPA, beat, tortured, and
    then buried alive 15 women at Mwenga in December 1999 (see Section
    1.a.). However, the Rwandan Government denied these charges and claims
    that 3 women, not 15, only were beaten severely by civilians who
    accused the women of witchcraft.
        There were reports that Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers allegedly
    raped women during extensive fighting in Kisangani in May and June (see
    Section 1.a.). Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also reportedly engaged in
    the rape of women in public and often in the presence of their families
    and in-laws. A woman raped in this manner generally is forced out of
    the village, leaving her husband and children behind (see Section 5).
    In June an RCD/Goma soldier, described only as a Munyamulenge, stopped
    a young girl, Fitina, on the road between Baraka and Mboko and raped
    her. After he raped her, the soldier discharged his weapon into her
    vagina. According to a number of credible human rights organizations,
    marauding bands of armed men in the occupied territories often put
    victims of rape through further painful humiliations by inserting
    rocks, sharp sticks, and hot peppers into their vaginas.
        On February 5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village
    of Kilambo, North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men,
    raped their wives in front of them, and then killed 30 persons (see
    Section 1.a.).
        On March 25, security agents for the rebel group RCD/ML arrested
    Kule Thatha, coordinator for the human rights NGO Fondation Yira pour
    les Droits de l'Homme in North Kivu Province. He was detained in the
    town of Beni, where security forces tortured him for having criticized
    the RCD/Goma. He was released on June 15.
        On July 12, the Goma provincial police detachment, which is a part
    of the RCD/Goma rebel government, arrested and tortured Jules Saruti
    for stealing. Police Commandant Charles LumbuLumbu and officer Emmanuel
    Sikuli burned Saruti's tongue with a cigarette, tied him to a pole,
    stuffed his mouth with toilet rags, and beat him. Saruti was
    hospitalized for his injuries following his August release.
        On July 29, RCD/ML security forces detained two of their senior
    officials, Deputy Director of Mining Michel Rudatenguha and Brigade
    Commander Mukalayi, on suspicion of conspiring to overthrow the leader
    of the RCD/ML rebel movement, Professor Wamba dia Wamba (see Section
    1.d.). The officials were allies of the deputy leader of the RCD/ML
    movement, Tibasima Mbogemu Ateenyi, who was then in conflict with
    Wamba. RCD/ML forces loyal to Wamba at the military training camp at
    Rwampara tortured the men while they were detained. It was not known
    whether the men had been released by year's end. Other RCD/ML soldiers
    who were suspected of disloyalty also were tortured.
        On August 30, RCD/Goma vice military police commandant Tshisekedi
    ordered subordinates to arrest his younger brother, Mbuyi Tshibwabwa,
    and Nyamulinduka Ndelo Zagabe, whom he suspected of stealing his sewing
    machine. Military police repeatedly beat the two men with hammers,
    shovels, and clubs until they eventually died (see Section 1.a.). There
    was no known action taken against Tshisekedi.
        On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly publicly arrested, detained,
    and beat 13 human rights activists who attended a meeting of a human
    rights umbrella group in Bukavu (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 4).
        There were reports that both Ugandan and Rwandan forces used
    landmines during the fighting in Kisangani (see Section 1.a.).
        There were numerous reports of killings and torture of prisoners by
    some antigovernment forces. A number of prisoners reportedly died of
    suffocation after guards detained them in overcrowded shipping
    containers. Guards reportedly sealed the prisoners inside overcrowded
    containers without ventilation, then denied them all food and water,
    causing death by dehydration, suffocation, and exhaustion. This
    treatment reportedly was reserved for suspected Interahamwe or Mai Mai
    collaborators.
        The Kabila Government operated 220 known prisons and other places
    of detention, and in all such facilities, conditions remained harsh and
    life threatening; there reportedly were many other secret or informal
    detention centers (see Section 1.d.). During the year, the Government
    continued to make limited efforts to improve conditions at Kinshasa's
    main prison, the Makala National Penitentiary and Reeducation Center.
    The Government provided food at some prisons, but not in sufficient
    quantities to ensure adequate nutrition for all inmates. Prison
    conditions remained a threat to prisoners' lives. Living conditions
    were harsh and unsanitary, and prisoners were treated poorly. The penal
    system suffered from severe shortages of funds, medical facilities,
    food, and trained personnel.
        Overcrowding and corruption in the prisons were widespread.
    Prisoners reportedly were beaten to death, tortured, deprived of food
    and water, or starved to death (see Section 1.a.). Prisoners are wholly
    dependent on the personal resources of family or friends for their
    survival. Guards have been known to steal food brought to prisoners.
    Inmates at Makala prison in Kinshasa sleep on the floor without bedding
    and have no access to sanitation, potable water, or adequate health
    care. There were reports of guards forcing 55 or 60 prisoners into a
    small cell with room only to stand. No water or food is given to these
    prisoners. There are no toilets, forcing prisoners to urinate and
    defecate on the floor. Tuberculosis, red diarrhea, and other infectious
    diseases are common and widespread.
        According to credible reports, prison guards demand bribes to allow
    family members to bring food to prisoners. Prisoners also pay bribes to
    receive better treatment. On February 29, three NGO activists who were
    arrested in Bukavu had to pay bribes in order to be moved from a closet
    where they had spent the first night in detention. Guards have shown
    reluctance to release prisoners due to fear of losing part of their
    incomes.
        Although authorities do not target women for abuse, prison guards
    rape female inmates. In general women and juveniles are detained
    separately from men.
        The Government exacerbated the overcrowding of civilian prisons by
    incarcerating many soldiers who declined to fight for the Kabila
    Government in the war. In July President Kabila pardoned and ordered
    the release of approximately 500 former Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ)
    troops held at Makala prison; however, there were reports that these
    soldiers immediately were reenlisted in Kabila's military and sent to
    fight against the rebels. At year's end, it was unknown how many
    soldiers, if any, continued to be detained in civilian prisons.
        In June the Government released 93 Rwandan prisoners of war (POW's)
    in accordance with the Lusaka Accords (see Section 1.g.).
        The Government allowed some international humanitarian
    organizations to visit political prisoners on a regular basis, but only
    when the detainees were held in an official prison (see Section 1.e.);
    however, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was denied
    access to some regular detention facilities. The Government did not
    allow these organizations to visit the numerous unpublicized and
    unofficial detention sites scattered throughout the country where most
    newly arrested detainees are held, questioned, and sometimes subjected
    to abuse. The ICRC was denied access to these sites; however, the ICRC
    visited facilities where the Government holds Tutsis for their own
    protection. The ICRC is the only international NGO allowed to visit
    POW's.
        In the previous year, it was reported that RCD/Goma forces
    frequently used the private residences of Rwandan or rebel military
    commanders for incarcerations; it was not known whether such detentions
    occurred during the year. Reports from former detainees indicate a
    systematic pattern of beatings, undernourishment, and deliberate
    killings in these houses.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite legal provisions
    governing arrest and detention procedures, the security forces were
    responsible for numerous cases of arbitrary arrest and detention.
        Under the law, serious offenses (those punishable by more than 6
    months' imprisonment) do not require a warrant for a suspect's arrest.
    Only a law enforcement officer with ``judicial police officer'' status
    is empowered to authorize arrest. This status also is vested in senior
    officers of the security services. The law requires security forces to
    bring detainees to the police within 24 hours. The law also requires
    that detainees be charged within 24 hours and be brought within 48
    hours before a magistrate, who may authorize provisional detention for
    varying periods.
        In practice these provisions were violated systematically. Security
    forces, especially those carrying out the orders of any official who
    could claim authority, used arbitrary arrest to intimidate outspoken
    opponents and journalists. Charges rarely were filed, and the political
    motivation for such detentions often was obscure. When the authorities
    did press charges, the claims that they filed sometimes were contrived
    or recitations of archaic colonial regulations.
        Detention without charge has been a frequent problem under the
    Kabila administration. During the year, a number of human rights and
    religious organization leaders continued to indicate that it
    increasingly was difficult to monitor arrests and detentions or
    investigate reports of arbitrary arrest and detention due to increases
    in the number of arrests and detentions, in the number of security
    agencies involved, and in the number of detention facilities. There
    were many secret or unofficial detention centers in Kinshasa, some of
    which reportedly were run by the Office of the President (see Section
    1.a.); there were several reports of secret jails on the premises of
    the presidential palace.
        The Government no longer followed a policy of arresting and
    detaining members of the Tutsi ethnic group without charge and merely
    on the basis of their ethnicity. Approximately 1,516 Congolese Tutsis
    arrested in 1998 after the start of the war were allowed to depart
    between August 1999 and February for refugee camps in Cameroon and
    Benin and eventual resettlement abroad. On May 26, 156 Rwandans were
    repatriated by the ICRC from Lubumbashi to Rwanda. In June 1999, the
    ICRC repatriated detained Tutsis whom the Government regarded as
    Rwandan, Ugandan, or Burundian nationals, and who were willing to
    depart the country; however, approximately 300 Tutsis chose to remain
    in detention due to difficulties in repatriating them to neighboring
    countries, notably Uganda and Burundi. Terms of detention became
    increasingly liberal during the year and included substantial freedom
    of movement by year's end. Government detention of Tutsis became
    protective rather than punitive. Many Tutsis increasingly felt safer in
    government custody than elsewhere in the government-controlled part of
    the country (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and 5). In July Human Rights
    Minister She Okitundu opened the Institut National de Securite Sociale
    (INSS) protection facility to the foreign diplomatic corps, media, and
    international organizations.
        On January 1, Albert Angbana Mate, a Mobutu government official,
    was arrested in Mbandaka by the ANR for predicting that rebels would
    soon capture the government-held town of Bikoro. Agbana was transferred
    to the ANR facility in Kinshasa (Lemera), where security agents
    reportedly subjected him to severe torture (see Section 1.c.).
        On the morning of January 2, security officials arrested Jose
    Malika, advisor to the Economics Minister, at his home in the Binza
    district of Kinshasa. The security officials questioned Malika at Camp
    Kokolo without revealing the charges for his detention; his personal
    property, including his car, were confiscated.
        On the evening of January 6, four police officials arrested
    Professor Balanda Mikueni, former president of the Supreme Court, at
    his home in the Kintambo district of Kinshasa. The police entered the
    house without an arrest warrant and reportedly threatened to beat
    Balanda's son. Balanda was detained at a holding prison at Kin Maziere
    and then moved to an unknown location before being released on January
    20. Security officials confiscated his house; it was returned by year's
    end.
        On January 13, police arrested and tortured Crispin Ipondo Banda, a
    member of the opposition party UDPS, for talking about the Lusaka peace
    accords with a group of friends (see Section 1.c.). The police
    initially detained him at their facilities in the Kalamu district of
    Kinshasa, but subsequently transferred him to the Provincial Inspection
    Center of Kinshasa.
        On January 14, ANR agents arrested Kayembe Kasuku, a member of the
    human rights NGO Lawyers Without Borders. Kayembe was the defense
    counsel for two Lebanese citizens who were tried by the military courts
    on charges of smuggling money. He also was responsible for the seizure
    of a vessel in the port of Matadi that reportedly was carrying goods
    destined for a Kinshasa merchant. Security agents detained Kayembe at
    the ANR holding facility at Ma Campagne. He reportedly was stripped and
    beaten for several hours for having insulted the President; jailers
    threw water mixed with cement and sand on him during the beating. On
    January 16, he was released and flown to South Africa for medical
    treatment for multiple injuries. It was unknown whether any charges
    were filed against Kayembe, and there was no known action taken against
    the security agents.
        On January 24, ANR agents arrested four missionaries, Jean Denis
    Lokulo, Jean Robert Bompanda, Henri Bofala, and Jean Andiswa, from
    Equateur Province, and detained them at the Lemera holding facility on
    the suspicion that they were rebel informants (see Section 2.c.). The
    missionaries were released on February 22.
        On February 5, security agents at Ndjili airport arrested Belgian
    development workers Pieter Vermaerke and Jesse Cnudde as they were
    about to board a flight to Brussels following a 1-week visit to
    Kinshasa. They were arrested when inspectors found reports on local
    prison conditions and development policies in their bags. Police
    detained them at an interrogation facility in the Ngaliema section of
    Kinshasa; they were released on February 19.
        On February 7, police arrested Time Missine and Betshi Pitchal in
    Matadi, Bas Congo Province, for possessing literature distributed by a
    human rights NGO. The women were sent to Kinshasa and released on
    February 15. It was unknown whether any charges were filed against
    Missine or Pitchal.
        On February 17, ANR agents arrested four members of the PALU
    opposition political party for engaging in political activities (see
    Section 3). They were released on February 25.
        On February 26, police arrested, detained, and severely beat Zuzi
    Phukuta Dieudonne, a reporter for the newspaper Palme d'Or and
    president of the human rights NGO Justice Sans Frontiere. Phukuta
    reportedly was riding in a public van with a number of students who
    shouted anti-Kabila remarks; Phukuta was accused of having insulted the
    President. Security force agents reportedly tortured Phukuta, and the
    beatings left permanent scars. Police released Phukuta shortly after
    his arrest but have continued to threaten his life (see Sections 1.c.
    and 2.a.).
        On February 29, rapid intervention police arrested seven members of
    the political party UDPS in Kinshasa, near the home of UDPS president
    Etienne Tshisekedi, and detained them at a jail in the Kasavubu
    district of Kinshasa where security agents reportedly lashed the
    detainees with whips until their release the following morning (see
    Section 1.c.). Police provided no explanation for their arrest. On
    October 11, security agents abducted seven other UDPS members from a
    street corner in Kinshasa. They reportedly continued to be detained at
    Camp Kokolo at year's end and were subjected to daily beatings (see
    Section 1.c.).
        On March 8, security agents from the DGM detained Joseph
    Olenghankoy, president of the opposition party FONUS, as he was
    departing Kinshasa for Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo. The security
    agents confiscated his documents and prevented him from leaving the
    country (see Section 2.d.).
        On March 16, security agents prevented a planned demonstration by
    the FSD in the Ndjili district of Kinshasa (see Section 2.b.).
    Immediately prior to the event, police arrested some FSD members who
    gathered for the demonstration; all were released the same evening or
    the following morning. The police commandant severely beat the
    president of the FSD, Eugene Diomi, when he arrived at the precinct in
    Ndjili to inquire about the arrests. Police also arrested a woman whom
    they wrongly thought to be Diomi's wife; she later was released. On
    November 15, security forces arrested Diomi after he questioned whether
    the aggression against the country began in 1998 when Rwanda invaded or
    in 1996 when the AFDL took over the country with the help of Rwanda. He
    was released from Makala prison on December 7.
        On March 20, in the town of Pusuku, Bandundu Province, an
    altercation between a police officer named Masango and a young man
    named Kituku escalated after villagers intervened to assist Kituku. The
    police officer initially fled; however, federal police from the
    Mungindu station returned to the town the same evening and destroyed
    Kituku's home. The police arrested any persons who approached the house
    and forced them to pay bribes to secure their release.
        On April 22, police arrested Francois Lumumba, President of MNC-L,
    during a party meeting at his home (see Section 2.b.). He was detained
    without formal charges at the Palais du Peuple in Kinshasa until May 3.
        On May 1, security forces arrested Raphael Ghenda, the Secretary
    General of the CPP's. The Government released Ghenda several days
    later, but provided no explanation for his arrest or detention.
        On May 5, police arrested four tax authority employees, Blaise
    Banzwa Kabo, Albano Mopipi, Andre Yoba Mbesi, and Kakale Makala, and
    detained them for 10 days for ``endangering state security'' (see
    Section 6.a.).
        On May 25, security forces arrested Kinshasa University students
    Placide Nkoso and Jean-Pierre Mofila Mboma for involvement in a student
    demonstration on May 17 (see Section 2.b.). Both were detained on the
    charge of suspected collaboration with MLC rebel leader Jean-Pierre
    Bemba. Both Mofila and Nkoso remained in detention at Makala prison at
    year's end (see Section 2.a. and 2.b.). It was unknown at year's end
    whether the students had been charged. On July 18, security force
    agents arrested a Kinshasa University student known only as Kosso, in
    connection with a student demonstration on July 17 (see Section 2.b.).
    Kosso remained in jail at year's end.
        On May 29, the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) arrested Felicien
    Malanda and Georges Nazimbika, leaders of the National Council of
    Development NGO's (CHONGD), and detained them until June 27 without
    formal charges.
        On June 3, ANR agents arrested Felicien Malanda Nsumba, executive
    secretary of CNONGD, and detained him at the BinzaMacampagne facility
    in Kinshasa. He was released later in June but received no explanation
    for his arrest.
        On June 3, police arrested Jeannot Bemba Saolona, Minister of
    Economy and Industry and father of MLC rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba,
    Badimanyi Mulumba, Minister of State for Planning, and Frederic
    Kibassa-Maliba, Minister of Mines; President Kabila released the three
    on July 5. On June 10, government authorities arrested Victor Mpoyo,
    Minister of State for Petroleum Affairs. Bemba was accused of
    misappropriating hard currency; however, no specific charges were given
    for the other arrests.
        On the night of June 10, in the Masina district of Kinshasa, there
    were unconfirmed reports that soldiers forcibly entered the home of
    Reverend Placide Tshisumpa Tshiakatumba, president of the International
    Society for Human Rights (ISHR). Under the pretense of searching for
    ``suspicious'' documents, the soldiers allegedly systematically
    searched Tshisumpa's belongings and stole jewelry, money, and a camera.
    The soldiers reportedly then blindfolded and bound Tshisumpa, abducted
    him in their jeep, and drove him around Kinshasa until 3 a.m. (see
    Section 1.f.).
        On June 23, security police arrested Jonas Mukamba Nzemba, former
    governor of Eastern Kasai Province and head of an Mbuji Mayi diamond
    company, and 33 guests at his home. Mukamba was released on December 7;
    the others were released in small groups prior to Mukamba's release.
        On July 7, security forces arrested Transportation Minister Odette
    Babandoa on charges that she took bribes and favored her husband's
    business interests (see Section 2.a.). She was released on July 8. On
    July 13, Babandoa was arrested again but was released on July 21.
        On July 22, security forces arrested and detained for 4 days Eddy
    Kapend, Aide de Camp to President Kabila, for embarrassing the
    President.
        On July 22, security agents arrested Catherine Nzuzi, leader of the
    major faction of the MPR. She was charged with treason after she
    complained in a radio broadcast of harassment by Kabila's security
    organizations (see Section 2.a.). On September 18, Nzuzi was allowed to
    return home, but she remained under house arrest and faced possible
    trial before a military court. In November authorities again detained
    Nzuzi in Makala prison; however, she was released on December 7. In
    1999 she was arrested and detained for 5 hours on charges of violating
    a decree prohibiting political activity.
        On July 27, army troops arrested Faustin Kamala, Deogratias
    Bihaira, and Thomas Kataala at their home. They reportedly were being
    held incommunicado by the ANR in the Ngaliema section of Kinshasa at
    year's end.
        On October 18 and 19, national police arrested military court
    officials Mwakobila Itonge, Ambroise Kusa, and Ndaba allegedly for
    possessing information regarding government abuses. Mwakobila
    reportedly was detained at the Kin-Masiere Prison. Kusa and Ndaba
    reportedly were detained at Makala prison and were beaten and tortured
    (see Section 1.c.). All three were released on October 25.
        On October 31, security forces rearrested Commandant Anselme Masasu
    Nindaga, a political prisoner who was released on March 24 (see Section
    1.e.). Masasu reportedly was detained in undisclosed locations in
    Kinshasa for at least 3 weeks. On November 24, there were reports,
    including from human rights NGO Association Africaine de Defense des
    Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO), that government officials had tried at a
    FAC military court near Pweto, sentenced to death, and executed Masasu
    and 35 suspected collaborators, allegedly for plotting a coup against
    President Kabila during the year (see Section 1.a.).
        On November 16, police arrested two students who were carrying
    their lunches on the campus of the Institut Pedagogique National (IPN)
    in Kinshasa, because the police wanted the food. Police reportedly
    arrested several students and beat 10 students who intervened on the
    behalf of the arrested students (see Section 1.c.). On November 17,
    approximately 800 students demonstrated to protest the incident;
    allegedly FAC forces briefly detained a journalist covering the protest
    and confiscated her recordings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). The
    commander of the police detachment reportedly was arrested following
    the incident.
        On December 5, intelligence officers arrested Steve Mbikay,
    Secretary General of the Solidarity Union, as he left a union meeting;
    he was suspected of instigating popular discontent at the Customs
    Authority (see Section 6.a.). He continued to be detained without
    charges by the ANR in Gombe at year's end.
        During the year, government security forces arrested and detained
    more than 10 journalists compared to 80 in 1999; few of them were
    tried. The decrease in arrests and detentions during the year was
    attributed to efforts by Leonard She Okitundu, former Minister of Human
    Rights and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the U.N. Human
    Rights Commission. At least five journalists remained incarcerated at
    year's end. The Government also detained foreign journalists (see
    Section 2.a.).
        On January 5, a human rights NGO announced that Laurent Kantu
    Lumpungu, president of L'Association des Cadres Penitentiaires du
    Congo, was released from prison on December 29, 1999. He had been
    arrested in May 1999 after making critical remarks about prison
    conditions.
        In October 1999, ANR security forces arrested Charles M. Mfwamba
    Mukendi, the director of Centre d'Etude et de Formation Populaire
    Kasayi (CEFOP), for reportedly publishing a report that outlined
    government human rights abuses in the province. He was released on
    January 6; it was unknown if the charges against him were dropped.
    Personal items confiscated during his arrest reportedly were not
    returned.
        In November 1999, security forces arrested Cleophas Kamitatu,
    president of a newly formed opposition group, Community of the
    Pluralist Democratic Opposition (CODEP), after he criticized the
    Government in a foreign radio broadcast. However, he was charged with
    malfeasance in connection with prior service as ambassador to Japan.
    Kamitatu reportedly signed over the deed of a provincial house in
    return for a promise of release. On June 12, Kamitatu was sentenced to
    4 years of ``forced labor'' for misappropriating state funds; he
    remained in detention at year's end (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
        At year's end, two human rights workers had been arrested by the
    Kabila Government. They were Laurent Kantu Lupungu, president of the
    Association des Cadres Penitentiaires du Congo (ACPC); and Denis
    Ilounga Kabeya, member of Friends of Nelson Mandela (ANMDH), who was
    jailed in Mbuji Mayi.
        There were no developments in the 1999 arrests and detentions of
    Tabu Kalaia, president of the Katangan provincial branch of the
    opposition UDPS party; Professor Kambaj wa Kambaji; Wetemwani Katembo
    Merikas, an activist with the youth-oriented human rights NGO Cojeski;
    Innocent Kyuma; and the seven UDPS activists, all of whom remained in
    detention at year's end.
        On November 27, the Government released 509 prisoners from Makala
    prison in honor of the President's birthday (see Section 1.e.).
        Pretrial detention often was prolonged. In October it was reported
    credibly that the total number of prisoners at Makala prison was over
    2,400, almost 90 percent of whom were awaiting trial. In February a
    presidential decree offered amnesty to those arrested and imprisoned
    for endangering the security of the State and related charges. During
    the year, over 800 prisoners were freed; however, most were soldiers
    whom the Government reenlisted and sent to the front to fight the rebel
    forces.
        The Government also held prisoners of war (POW's). In June the
    Government released 93 Rwandan POW's in accordance with the Lusaka
    Accords, and in return the Government of Rwanda released 35 Zimbabwean
    and 11 Namibian prisoners. The Government claimed that it no longer
    detained any POW's at year's end.
        There were many reported arbitrary arrests by antigovernment forces
    in the occupied territories, and antigovernment forces reportedly
    detained persons repeatedly (see Section 1.b.). Many of those whom
    antigovernment forces detained reportedly were Hutus. In March rebel
    security agents harassed a number of religious and civil society
    leaders who traveled to Kinshasa to take part in the National
    Consultations. Over 40 delegates from the occupied territories, many of
    them associated with human rights NGO's, were subjected to harassment,
    delays, and detention (see Sections 3 and 4).
        On April 22, security forces arrested civil society activist Bruno
    Bahati as he returned from the National Consultations and reportedly
    kept him in detention in both Rwanda and the Kivu Provinces until
    August (see Section 2.d.). Rwandan authorities released Bahati
    following international pressure.
        On May 15, RCD/ML forces arrested Sylvain Mudimbi Masudi, external
    relations director of the human rights NGO Friends of Nelson Mandela
    (ANMDH), in Beni, North Kivu Province. Masudi was returning from the
    56th session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. RCD officials
    imprisoned Mudimbi in a crowded cell with Mai Mai combatants for 2
    days; on May 17, he was expelled from the country along the Ugandan
    border (see Section 4).
        On July 29, RCD/ML security forces detained two of their senior
    officials, Deputy Director of Mining Michel Rudatenguha and Brigade
    Commander Mukalayi, on suspicion of conspiring to overthrow the leader
    of the RCD/ML rebel movement, Professor Wamba dia Wamba (see Section
    1.c.).
        On August 29, RCD/Goma security forces arrested 4 civil society
    members, Paulin Bapolisi Bahuga, Gervais Chiralwirhwa Nkunzimwami,
    Aloys Muzalia Wakyebwa, and Regine Mutijima in Bukavu ostensibly in
    connection with a grenade attack on an outdoor festival that killed 8
    persons and wounded approximately 100 (see Section 1.a.). The four
    reportedly had blamed Rwandan soldiers for the bombing. They were all
    active members of South Kivu Province civil society and the first three
    were employed at the teacher training school in Bukavu. President
    Kabila recently had nominated three of the four, without their
    knowledge or consent, to the National Constituent Assembly, as part of
    the delegation representing the occupied territories. The four were
    taken to Kisangani for questioning. Despite international calls to
    release the civil society workers, the four were detained until
    September 30.
        On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly publicly beat, arrested, and
    detained 13 human rights activists who attended a meeting of a human
    rights umbrella group in Bukavu, at Camp Saio (see Sections 1.c. and
    2.b.).
        On October 29, RCD forces reportedly arrested Jean-Paul Ramazani
    Kulimushi, director of the Congolese National Radio-Television (RTNC),
    in Goma (see Section 2.a.). He was detained in solitary confinement in
    the ``Mean Dog'' cellblock at year's end.
        In April 1999, members of the Presidential Guard attacked, severely
    beat, and abducted Ralph Biteo because he had the facial features of a
    Tutsi (see Section 5). Biteo told the guardsmen that he was visiting
    the hospital to see the burned child of a cousin, Mirimo Mulongo.
    Members of the Presidential Guard then arrested Mulongo, and both Biteo
    and Mulongo were taken to the GLM detention facility in the Gombe area
    of Kinshasa. Both were denied visitors and still were believed to be in
    detention at year's end.
        Government soldiers captured by antigovernment forces reportedly
    were held by the RCD/Goma or MLC, which reportedly did not permit the
    ICRC to visit them.
        The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not use it
    in practice; however, the Government did release approximately 3,000
    Congolese Tutsis from detention on the condition that they leave the
    country through internationally sponsored relocation programs. These
    Tutsis freely chose to leave the country rather than remain in
    government detention; however, another 300 Congolese Tutsis, Rwandans,
    Burundians, and Ugandans remained in the country due to difficulties in
    arranging their repatriation to neighboring countries, particularly
    Uganda and Burundi. These persons chose to remain under government
    protection rather than face possible reprisals abroad.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Transitional Act of the Mobutu
    regime and Kabila's Decree Law No. 3 provide for the independence of
    the judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary was not independent
    of the executive branch, which manipulated it during the year. The
    Kabila administration continued to refuse to establish mechanisms to
    ensure the independence of the judiciary; a judicial reform decree,
    reportedly awaiting presidential approval since 1997, still had not
    been promulgated. The judiciary also was ineffective and suffered from
    corruption. For example, on October 18 and 19, national police arrested
    military court officials Mwakobila Itonge, Ambroise Kusa, and Ndaba
    allegedly for possessing information regarding government abuses (see
    Section 1.d.). All three were released on October 25.
        The civil judiciary, including lower courts, appellate courts, the
    Supreme Court, and the Court of State Security, largely was
    dysfunctional; during the year, military tribunals that have been
    organized since August 1997 tried nearly all cases and sentenced
    civilians as well as military personnel to death after summary trials.
    Defendants before these tribunals had no automatic right to appeal to a
    higher court, and many apparently lacked counsel.
        Death sentences and executions resulting from summary military
    trials became increasingly frequent as the year progressed.
    Approximately 200 individuals have been executed by military courts as
    of year's end, including at least several dozen soldiers executed
    during the year in relation to a coup plot against the President (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.d.); however, during the year, no civilians
    were known to have been executed following a death sentence handed down
    by the military court. Government military tribunals repeatedly
    sentenced civilians to death for nonviolent offenses, including
    mismanagement of public funds and violations of government restrictions
    on private economic activity, such as private distribution of state-
    monopolized and state-rationed gasoline. During her visit to the
    country in October, Kabila assured U.N. High Commissioner for Human
    Rights Mary Robinson that the military no longer would try civilian
    cases; however, similar promises have been made previously. Military
    tribunals also convicted and ordered the execution of military persons
    charged with armed robbery, murder, inciting mutiny, espionage, and
    looting while in a state of mutiny. Persons convicted by military
    tribunals sometimes were executed publicly in ceremonies held in
    stadiums and presided over by senior government officials, such as
    provincial governors; however, it was unknown whether any public
    executions occurred during the year.
        Civil and criminal codes are based on Belgian and customary law.
    The legal code provides for the right to a speedy public trial, the
    presumption of innocence, and legal counsel at all stages of
    proceedings; however, the Government did not respect these rights in
    practice. Defendants have the right to appeal in all cases except those
    involving national security, armed robbery, and smuggling, all of which
    are adjudicated in theory by the Court of State Security, and except
    those cases adjudicated by the special military tribunals, whose
    jurisdiction appears ill defined. The law provides for court-appointed
    counsel at state expense in capital cases, in all proceedings before
    the Supreme Court, and in other cases when requested by the court. The
    Kabila administration still had not stated a position on providing
    counsel by year's end, and had provided it only at its discretion.
        Corruption remained pervasive, particularly among magistrates, who
    were paid very poorly and only intermittently, and who also were
    trained poorly. The system remained hobbled by major shortages of
    personnel, supplies, and infrastructure.
        On January 15, security agents arrested Oscar Mudiayi Wa Mudiayi
    and Bernard Tshishimbi, both former employees of the Petroleum
    Ministry, and brought them before a military court for allegedly
    selling petroleum illegally. They were detained in Makala prison, where
    they remained until March 10.
        On January 28, eight soldiers were executed after a military court
    found them guilty of attempting to incite a mutiny in a battalion
    attached to the Special Rapid Intervention Brigade.
        On February 2, nine soldiers were executed, including four from the
    Presidential Guard, on accusations of murder and armed robbery.
        In May a military court sentenced Freddy Loseke Lisumbu, editor of
    the newspaper Le Libre Afrique, to 3 years in prison (see Section
    2.a.).
        On June 12, Cleophas Kamitatu was sentenced to 4 years of ``forced
    labor'' for misappropriating state funds; he remained in detention at
    year's end (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In November 1999, security
    forces had arrested Kamitatu, president of CODEP, after he criticized
    the Government in a foreign radio broadcast (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.a.).
        On February 19, President Kabila decreed a general amnesty for all
    prisoners detained for crimes against the security of the State.
    Although several hundred prisoners reportedly were freed as a result of
    the decree, hundreds more reportedly remain in detention (see Section
    1.c.).
        On March 10, the Government released 55 political prisoners, and on
    March 24, released 89 political prisoners, including AFDL cofounder
    Anselme Masasu (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.) and former Bas Congo
    Province governor Fuka Unzola and five associates, all of whom were
    convicted and sentenced to long prison terms in 1998. The majority of
    those released in March were soldiers who were retrained and sent to
    the front.
        The Government continued to hold some political prisoners.
    Observers believe that there were nine political prisoners at year's
    end, including Kambale Mututulo, former Minster of Parastatals; Luis
    Hamuli, former employee of the Information Ministry; and Mubake Mumeme,
    former Deputy Chief of Staff for the President. The precise number of
    political prisoners could not be ascertained due to restrictions on
    access to prisons by independent monitors (see Section 1.c.). Persons
    whom the Government incarcerated during the year for political
    offenses, including violations of Kabila's ban on political activity,
    mostly were detained without being tried (see Section 1.d.). The
    Government allowed some international humanitarian organizations to
    visit political prisoners on a regular basis, but only when the
    detainees were held in an official prison. The Government does not
    allow these organizations to visit the numerous other detention
    facilities scattered throughout the country. It is in these facilities
    where most recently arrested detainees are held, questioned, and
    sometimes subjected to abuse.
        In the territories occupied by the various rebel factions,
    particularly the RCD/Goma, the system of justice remained essentially
    nonfunctional. Judges seldom were paid their salaries. There were
    credible reports of judges accepting bribes in return for favorable
    decisions. RCD/Goma officials and others with influence reportedly used
    the judicial system to arrest individuals on false charges to extract
    money and property from these individuals. Credible sources claim that
    higher RCD/Goma authorities reprimanded judges who refused to
    participate in such schemes. There also were documented cases of
    indiscriminate military justice in which individuals suspected of
    treason were executed without a trial. For example, on January 29, in
    Bunia, a Rwandan soldier reportedly summarily executed a Congolese
    rebel soldier based on the suspicion that the Congolese soldier was
    passing information to an opposing rebel group (see Section 1.a.).
        Officially, the RCD/Goma established measures to investigate and
    punish rebel soldiers guilty of committing atrocities against civilian
    populations. However, the initiative remains largely ignored and
    ineffective, and there were no reports that RCD/Goma tried, convicted,
    or punished any of its troops for committing atrocities.
        Persons reportedly incarcerated by antigovernment forces for
    political reasons generally were reported to be detained without being
    formally tried (see Section 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Security forces routinely ignored legal provisions for
    the inviolability of the home, the family, and private correspondence.
    Security force officials often harassed and robbed persons. Government
    security forces routinely kept under surveillance the headquarters of
    opposition parties and the movements of leading opposition political
    figures (see Section 2.b.).
        The security forces repeatedly raided private businesses, including
    newspapers, banks, and law firms, seized documents and other property,
    and arrested and detained employees whom they accused of collaborating
    with antigovernment forces (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). Security
    forces routinely ignored requirements for search warrants, entering and
    searching at will.
        When unable to locate a specific individual, authorities routinely
    arrested or beat the closest family member (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.d.). For example, in July 1999, military personnel held hostage the
    wife and sister of Innocent Kyuma until Kyuma appeared. He was arrested
    on July 9, 1999, without a warrant and for no apparent reason; his
    release still had not been reported by year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        Security agents forced their way into private homes without search
    or arrest warrants, often beating the inhabitants and stealing money
    and goods. There were reports that security forces raped women during
    these raids. The police often raided opposition party leaders'
    residences, made arrests, and seized files (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.d.). For example, on November 26, a group of armed government
    soldiers searched and robbed the house of Athanese Matenda Kyelu, the
    manager of the Chamber of Commerce, in the Ngaliema district of
    Kinshasa (see Section 1.c.).
        On January 9, 7th Military District soldiers forcibly entered the
    home of Christophe Kalonji Ntambwe in Kinshasa's Barumbu commune,
    ransacked the home, and arrested Kalonji (see Section 1.d.). The
    soldiers reportedly were working as agents of Joseph Mbuyi Lusambo, who
    wished to expropriate land owned by Kalonji. On January 13, the
    soldiers returned to Kalonji's home, searched his files, and destroyed
    furniture.
        On January 29, a group of soldiers ransacked the home of Christophe
    Gbenye, president of the political party Congolese National Movement/
    Lumumba (MNC/L), for 2 hours while Gbenye was absent. The soldiers were
    searching for weapons; however, the soldiers confiscated much of
    Gbenye's personal property before leaving.
        On May 2, a group of soldiers ransacked the home of Somwe a Somwe,
    situated in the Selembao district of Kinshasa.
        On the night of June 10, in the Masina district of Kinshasa, there
    were unconfirmed reports that soldiers forcibly entered the home of
    Reverend Placide Tshisumpa Tshiakatumba, the president of the
    International Society for Human Rights (ISHR). Under the pretense of
    searching for ``suspicious'' documents, the soldiers searched
    Tshisumpa's belongings and stole jewelry, money, and a camera. The
    soldiers blindfolded and bound Tshisumpa, threw him in their jeep, and
    drove him around for several hours.
        ANR security agents monitored mail passing through private express
    delivery companies as well as through the largely dysfunctional state
    mail service. The Government widely was believed to monitor telephone
    communications.
        There were credible reports that government forces used forced
    conscription, and that many of those forced to enlist were children
    (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.d.). On June 9, President Kabila issued a
    decree to reduce the Government's use of child soldiers and curtail
    forcible conscription of children during the year; however, the decree
    was not implemented by year's end. There was no general demobilization
    of child soldiers during the year, and many children already in the
    armed forces continued to serve in them. In addition government
    military commanders allegedly used child soldiers to inflate the ranks
    of troops under their command in order to acquire additional food and
    pay, which the commanders would confiscate. Commanders reportedly often
    concealed child soldiers during visits by human rights NGO's and other
    monitoring groups (see Section 5). There were credible reports that the
    FAC forcibly conscripted homeless boys.
        Some Mai Mai and Hutu militia units fighting on the side of the
    Government routinely seized private property and looted homes to supply
    themselves. Mai Mai and other progovernment groups also regularly
    recruited children from the areas in which they operated.
        Antigovernment forces subjected civilians to arbitrary interference
    with privacy, family, home, and correspondence of civilians in the
    areas that their forces dominated (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        In the provinces of North and South Kivu, RCD rebels and other
    antigovernment groups regularly recruited children from the areas in
    which they operated. In 1999 rebel forces stated that they would reduce
    their use of child soldiers, and the problem reportedly continued to
    diminish during the year; however, there were no reports that they
    generally demobilized child soldiers, and many child soldiers
    reportedly continued to serve in rebel armed forces.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Throughout the year, war continued with external
    intervention on both sides. The war began in August 1998, when Kabila
    tried to expel from the country Rwandan military forces that had helped
    him overthrow Mobutu. Congolese Tutsis and the Governments of Rwanda,
    Uganda, and Burundi relied on these Rwandan forces for protection from
    hostile nongovernmental armed groups operating out of the eastern part
    of the country. These groups included: The Interahamwe militia of
    ethnic Hutus, mostly from Rwanda, which fought the Tutsi-dominated
    Government of Rwanda, and Hutu members of the former Rwandan armed
    forces, two groups whose members are believed to be responsible for the
    1994 genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda; the Mai Mai, a loose association of
    traditional Congolese local defense forces that is growing in both
    popularity and numbers; the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF),
    consisting of Ugandan expatriates and supported by the Government of
    Sudan; and several groups of Hutus from Burundi fighting the Tutsi-
    dominated Government in Bujumbura. Kabila's attempt to expel the
    Rwandan armed forces was frustrated by the outbreak in August 1998 of a
    rebellion, led by the RCD. The RCD/Goma was dominated by members of the
    Tutsi ethnic minority, but from the outset depended heavily on troops,
    material, and direction from the Government of Rwanda, and, to a lesser
    extent, the Government of Uganda. Military intervention by Angola,
    Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe resulted in the defeat of an RCD drive on
    Kinshasa in August 1998, but antigovernment forces advanced elsewhere.
    In 1999 the rebels split into three factions: A Rwandan-supported
    faction of the RCD based in Goma; a Ugandan-supported faction of the
    RCD based in Bunia; and the Ugandan-supported Movement for the
    Liberation of the Congo, which unlike the original RCD was not
    dominated by ethnic Tutsis. Nevertheless, antigovernment forces
    advanced and controlled most of the country's territory, including its
    eastern and northern regions; however, during the year, the military
    situation largely stabilized except in Equateur Province. Elements of
    the armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda continued to operate inside the
    country in support of rebels, and elements of the armed forces of
    Burundi operated inside the country against armed groups of Hutus from
    Burundi. Elements of the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe
    continued to operate inside the country in support of the Government
    throughout the year, but Chadian forces withdrew from the country in
    May 1999. Nongovernmental armed groups such as the Interahamwe, former
    Rwandan Hutu military, and Mai Mai continued to operate inside the
    country on the side of the Government, often as guerrillas inside
    territory held by antigovernment forces. Cease-fire accords signed in
    July and August 1999 between progovernment and antigovernment forces
    only briefly reduced the intensity of the war. During the year, all
    sides violated the cease-fire, although the level of fighting generally
    was limited. All sides repeatedly used excessive force and committed
    numerous abuses. An international humanitarian NGO estimated that as
    many as 1.7 million persons have died during the war because of
    killings, malnutrition, or starvation (see Section 1.a.).
        Government and progovernment forces routinely used excessive force
    by bombing civilian populations in air raids against towns held by
    antigovernment forces. The crude bombs used, their manner of delivery
    (rolled out of an aircraft through an open hatch), and the fact that
    the raids were carried out at night over populated areas, nearly always
    resulted in heavy civilian casualties and little or no damage to
    antigovernment forces; however, it is uncertain how many civilians were
    killed in these attacks. According to a report by the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic
    of the Congo, not only the Government's armed forces but also elements
    of the armed forces of other countries, including Zimbabwe, conducted
    such bombings.
        Government security forces continued to use child soldiers but
    reduced their overall forcible recruitment of child soldiers during the
    year (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
        There were reports that Mai Mai and Hutu guerrillas fighting on the
    side of the Government killed and tortured noncombatants (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.c.).
        There were many reports, at least some of them credible, that
    elements of the Rwandan armed forces and the Goma faction of the RCD
    repeatedly committed mass killings of noncombatants, usually in
    reprisal for attacks in the same area on RCD forces by Mai Mai or Hutu
    groups (see Section 1.a). In addition Rwandan soldiers and RCD rebels
    reportedly engaged in dismembering their victims with machete blows
    while they still were alive. Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also
    reportedly engaged in the raping of women in public and often in the
    presence of their families and in-laws (see Section 1.c.). Rebel forces
    reportedly continued to use child soldiers (see Sections 1.f. and
    6.c.).
        On two occasions during the year, Rwandan and Ugandan forces fought
    open battles in the streets of Kisangani, resulting in hundreds of
    civilian deaths, as well as thousands of wounded and displaced persons
    (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
        The Government also held POW's. An exchange of POW's was called for
    in the Lusaka Accords. In June the Government released 93 Rwandan
    POW's, and in return the Government of Rwanda released 35 Zimbabwean
    and 11 Namibian POW's.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Statutes provide for freedom of
    speech and of the press, and remain in effect; however, the Government
    increasingly restricted these rights in practice.
        The CPP's that Kabila formed in 1999 monitored persons' speech,
    association, and movement, in residential areas, workplaces, and
    schools, and reported speeches critical of the Government to security
    forces. Although the CPP's were not part of the formal structure of the
    State, they clearly acted as agencies of the Government.
        Incidents of harassment, intimidation, and detention of journalists
    continued to occur, and violations of press freedom were more common,
    particularly in the last few months of the year. During the year,
    government security forces arrested and detained more than 10
    journalists compared to 80 in 1999; few of them were tried. The
    decrease in arrests and detentions during the year was attributed to
    efforts by Leonard She Okitundu, former Minister of Human Rights and
    current Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the U.N. Human Rights
    Commission. At least five journalists remained incarcerated at year's
    end. Other journalists were subjected to harassment, beatings, and
    torture. Police seized radio stations, shut down newspapers, and set
    fire to publishing houses. The Government shut down radio and
    television stations and disrupted the operations of newspapers. State
    authorities arrested, questioned, harassed, and expelled foreign
    journalists and banned the transmission of some international radio
    broadcasts.
        Almost 400 newspapers were licensed to publish, and a number of
    them appeared regularly in Kinshasa. There also was an active private
    press in Lubumbashi, and some private newspapers were published in
    other provincial cities. Of the Kinshasa-based newspapers, eight were
    dailies; the rest of the newspapers that appeared regularly were
    published between one and three times a week. Most private news
    publications relied on external financing, often from political parties
    and individual politicians. News publications tended to emphasize
    editorial commentary and analysis rather than factual descriptions of
    events; many were highly critical of the Government. There were no
    overtly government-controlled newspapers; however, at least two
    newspapers, L'Avenir and L'Observateur, were supported respectively by
    the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Le
    Forum and Le Palmares have close ties to the security services. Of
    these, only Le Palmares and l'Avenir were published daily.
        A 1996 press law regulates the newspaper industry. Publishers must
    continue to deposit copies of their publications with the Information
    Ministry; however, there is no longer a formal censorship regime.
    Criminal libel laws exist but were not used against journalists. In
    most cases where journalists were charged formally, state authorities
    charged them with ``endangering the State'' through the publication or
    broadcast of political news, or news of the war. Charges often were
    brought under the 1996 press law; however, the Government had not
    published the law in 4 years, and many of the judges, as well as the
    journalists on trial, are unfamiliar with it. Government officials
    criticized or implicated in fraudulent practices by the press at times
    encouraged police to arrest the journalists responsible for such
    stories.
        In November 1999, security forces arrested Cleophas Kamitatu,
    president of CODEP, after he criticized the Government in a foreign
    radio broadcast (see Section 1.d.). On June 12, Kamitatu was sentenced
    to 4 years of ``forced labor'' for misappropriating state funds;
    however, he remained in detention at year's end (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.b.).
        On January 3, security forces arrested and tortured Freddy Loseke
    Lisumbu, editor of the newspaper Le Libre Afrique, after he reportedly
    wrote two articles that claimed that elements in Kinshasa were planning
    a coup against President Kabila (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d). Security
    forces reportedly kept Loseke incommunicado at Makala prison; family
    members were not allowed to visit him, and guards reportedly stole and
    ate the food that family members brought for him. Security agents
    allegedly subjected Loseke to torture (see Section 1.c.); he reportedly
    was in ill health at year's end but was denied medical attention. In
    May a military court sentenced Loseke to 3 years in prison for
    publishing an article about a general who allegedly was plotting to
    assassinate President Kabila (see Section 1.e.).
        On January 8, presidential guards arrested Mossi Mwassi, a
    journalist, allegedly for speaking English. He was charged with libel
    and infringing on public security, but was released on January 11.
        On January 10, ANR agents summoned to an unknown location Father
    Fabien Kenta, director of the private Catholic radio station Radio
    Elikya. Security agents said that the radio station had broadcast anti-
    Kabila messages under the guise of human rights information and ordered
    Kenta not to broadcast anti-Kabila messages.
        On February 26, police arrested and severely beat Zuzi Phukuta
    Dieudonne, a reporter for the newspaper Palme d'Or and president of the
    human rights NGO Justice Sans Frontiere. Phukuta reportedly was riding
    in a public van with a number of students who shouted anti-Kabila
    remarks. The students fled when police surrounded the vehicle after it
    stopped in traffic; however, the police found Phukuta inside the
    vehicle and severely beat him before placing him under detention (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Police accused Phukuta of having insulted the
    President; security forces reportedly tortured Phukuta and left
    permanent physical scars. Police reportedly continue to threaten his
    life, although he was released shortly after his arrest (see Section
    4).
        On March 13, police arrested journalist Nyembo Kimunyi because of
    an article he wrote in the weekly newspaper La Tribune that claimed
    Kabila's deceased brother had engaged in human rights abuses as head of
    the ANR in Lubumbashi. The article reportedly stated that the ANR in
    Lubumbashi is known for ``terror, extortion, and retaliation.'' The ANR
    released Kimunyi in July; it was unknown whether any charges were filed
    against him.
        On April 24, police arrested two journalists, Jean Bruno Kadima and
    Jose Ntumba Moukanda, the director of publications and a reporter for
    the weekly newspaper Umoja respectively (see Section 1.d.). Security
    forces gave no reason for the arrest, nor were any charges made against
    the pair. They were released on May 3.
        On June 12, security forces arrested Aime Kakese of the newspaper
    La Carousel after he refused to provide police with the address of a
    journalist that they were seeking. A military court sentenced Kakese to
    2 years in prison; however, he was released in December.
        On June 12, security forces arrested Richard Nsamba, editor of Le
    Messager African, for publishing articles unfavorable to Charles Okoto,
    the former governor of Eastern Kasai Province and current head of the
    parastatal MIBA. He was convicted by a military court, but he was
    released in September after serving a brief sentence.
        Also in June, security forces arrested Jean-Pierre Ekanga of the
    newspaper La Tribune de la Nation for allegedly providing inaccurate
    information on the newspaper's relationship with Nicolas Katako,
    husband of Transportation Minister Odette Babandoa. Katako was jailed
    for collaborating with journalists; Ekanga was sentenced to 2 years in
    prison but was released in December.
        On July 22, security agents arrested Catherine Nzuzi, leader of the
    major faction of the MPR (see Section 1.d.). She was charged with
    treason after she complained in a radio broadcast of harassment by
    Kabila's security organizations.
        On September 1, police arrested journalist Frank Baku of the daily
    newspaper La Reference Plus after Baku criticized the country's
    judicial system. Baku was released in October.
        On November 8, ANR agents arrested and detained Kinyongo Saleh,
    editor of the newspaper La Vision, at a facility in Kinshasa. Family
    members were not permitted to visit Kinyongo, and he remained in
    detention at year's end.
        On November 12, security forces arrested Feu d'or Bosange Ifonge, a
    music reporter for the newspaper L'Alarme, for selling copies of the
    newspaper with an article that claimed that the city of Mbandaka in
    Equateur Province was burning.
        On November 17, FAC forces allegedly briefly detained a journalist
    covering the student protest at the Institut Pedagogique National (IPN)
    in Kinshasa and confiscated her recordings (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
    and 2.b.).
        In November 1999, security forces arrested and detained Honsek
    Hokwoy, the editor of the newspaper La Solidarite, after Honsek claimed
    in print that Finance Minister Mawampanga Mwana Nanga had been
    arrested. He was released on February 4.
        In November 1999, security forces arrested and detained for 66 days
    without trial Kazadi Djodjo Mbayo, director of the publication La Palme
    d'Or; he was released on January 15. Kazadi reportedly was arrested for
    ``having committed an outrage against the Chief of State and inciting
    revolt.'' As a condition of his release, Kazadi reportedly promised
    never to write another article about the President that could be deemed
    derogatory; he also promised to inform the ANR of any other derogatory
    information.
        In December 1999, security forces arrested and detained a newspaper
    street vendor, Gaspard Baila, after the front page of the Pot-Pourri
    satirical newspaper he was selling criticized fraud and embezzlement
    within the Government. Security forces reportedly subjected Baila to
    physical abuse. He was released on January 12.
        Security forces continued to detain Albert Bosange Yema, a
    journalist employed by L'Alarme, who was arrested in 1999 after he
    reportedly wrote an erroneous article on the capture of Lake Mukamba by
    the rebels. However, he had escaped from prison and was living in exile
    at year's end.
        The Government also harassed foreign journalists and academics by
    searching their luggage for professional notes, preventing their
    departure from the country, and detaining them for questioning. On
    September 15, immigration authorities arrested foreign journalist
    Francois Grignon after searching his luggage at the airport and
    uncovering interview notes. Grignon had been researching a report for
    the International Crisis Group (ICG). On September 22, security agents
    arrested foreign journalist Nicholas Long on suspicion that he was
    working with Grignon. Long was released within a few hours; Grignon
    spent 1 week in detention before authorities allowed him to leave the
    country. On September 27, immigration police detained foreign
    journalists Richard Dowden and Koert Lindyer after searching their
    luggage and uncovering notes, which were believed to have contained
    information on interviews with government officials and foreign
    diplomats. Both were released within a few days and departed the
    country.
        Government security forces sometimes seized individual issues of
    various newspapers or printing equipment. During the year, security
    forces continued occasionally to seize newspapers from street vendors
    to prevent circulation of articles deemed damaging to the Government.
        On November 30, the ANR warned independent newspapers in Kinshasa
    not to publish stories about the army or the security services.
        Due to limited literacy and the higher costs of newspapers and
    television, radio remained the most important medium of public
    information. At year's end, six radio stations operated in Kinshasa.
    During the year, the Government nationalized one radio and television
    station, RTKM, which was owned by Ngongo Ngongo Lowowo, a former
    Information Minister under Mobutu. In 1997 the Government lifted the
    Mobutu regime's ban on news programming on private radio; however, two
    radio stations continued to be state-owned and government-controlled.
    Opposition parties were unable to gain access to state-owned radio, and
    private radio was markedly less critical of the Government than private
    newspapers. During the year, the Government closed down private radio
    stations because they broadcast news unfavorable to the Government or
    commentary critical of the Government.
        Eight television stations broadcast in the Kinshasa area, two of
    which are state-controlled and two of which are religious. The status
    of these stations remains unclear after the Ministry of Communication
    announced in September that it would nationalize three broadcast
    corporations, including RTKM and two television stations owned by Jean-
    Pierre Bemba: ``Antenne A'' and ``Canal Kin.'' The Ministry also
    ordered seven privately owned radio stations and three privately owned
    television stations to cease broadcasts. Communication Minister
    Dominique Sakombi invoked a 1996 broadcast law to legitimize the
    closings. Credible sources claim that the move also had financial
    motivations, as Sakombi ordered each of the stations that were shut
    down to pay the Communication Ministry a tax equivalent to 18 percent
    of each station's advertising revenue; the Ministry of Finance normally
    collects such taxes. However, by October most broadcast stations that
    the Government closed had resumed broadcasting. The Government motive
    for the shutdowns and reopenings remained unclear. Opposition parties
    remained unable to gain access to state-controlled television. Other
    methods of silencing the broadcast media have included burning down
    radio stations and expelling journalists from their homes; however, no
    such incidents occurred during the year.
        The Government continued to restrict severely foreign broadcasts
    during the year. In 1999 then Information Minister Didier Mumengi
    ordered privately owned radio and television stations to cease
    transmitting foreign broadcasts. The order was aimed at Elikya, a
    Catholic radio station that transmits Radio Vatican, and Raga FM, which
    broadcasts the Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting
    Corporation (BBC) world service, and Deutsche Welle. However, Kinshasa
    still receives Radio France Internationale, which is transmitted from
    nearby Brazzaville.
        At year's end, there were two domestic Internet service providers.
    Because of technical difficulties and high costs, the Internet is not
    used widely.
        Some antigovernment forces, including the RCD/Goma, reportedly
    restricted freedom of speech and of the press; at year's end, there
    reportedly were no independent media in areas controlled by the RCD/
    Goma.
        Antigovernment forces reportedly arrested journalists. For example
    on October 29, RCD forces allegedly arrested Jean-Paul Ramazani
    Kulimushi, director of the RTNC, in Goma. Ramazani Kulimushi reportedly
    broadcast a commentary critical of the conduct of certain RCD soldiers.
    He was detained in solitary confinement in the ``Mean Dog'' cellblock
    at year's end.
        In 1999 RCD/Goma security forces in Bukavu in South Kivu Province
    seized the radio transmitter and other equipment from the private radio
    station Radio Maendeleo, effectively taking it off the air. Despite
    wide appeals, RCD authorities refused to return the confiscated
    equipment.
        Academic freedom continued to be endangered as professors exercised
    self-censorship or modified their lectures to suit the views of their
    patrons in the Government. Faculty members complained that members of
    the Government took a strong interest in activities at their
    universities. The regime monitored university classrooms through
    student and teacher members of the CPP's (see Section 2.b.). During the
    year, the CPP's remained active on university campuses in Kinshasa and
    Lubumbashi, employing a cadre of both students and faculty. Several
    students were arrested after CPP members reported them for questioning
    the Government. Some students went into hiding after security forces
    suspected that they were in contact with foreigners. Security officials
    arrested several students for organizing strikes at Kinshasa University
    (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In July 1999, security forces in
    Lubumbashi arrested Professor Kambaj wa Kambaji because of the
    professor's critical analysis of the use of ethnic hate radio in
    Congolese politics. Professor Kambaji and two colleagues, Richard
    Tshivuadi and Tabu Kalala, were released from an ANR facility in
    Kinshasa on April 6.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There is no legal
    protection for freedom of assembly, and the Government continued to
    restrict this right severely. The Government considers the rights to
    assemble and associate subordinate to the maintenance of ``public
    order.'' The Government requires all organizers to apply for permits,
    which are granted or rejected at the Government's discretion. Public
    activities generally are dispersed by government security services.
    However, the Government sanctioned pro-Kabila demonstrations, including
    demonstrations against foreign embassies and the offices of the U.N.,
    which included rock throwing and threats.
        On January 7, military security officials arrested seven members of
    the opposition political party PALU when they attempted to hold a
    meeting in the commune of Lemba. Authorities filed no formal charges,
    and the matter never was presented to a civil court for arbitration.
    The seven were released on January 11.
        On March 16, security agents prevented a planned demonstration by
    the FSD in the Ndjili district of Kinshasa. Immediately prior to the
    event, police arrested some FSD members who had gathered for the
    demonstration (see Section 1.d.); all were released that evening or the
    following morning. The police commandant severely beat the president of
    the FSD, Eugene Diomi, when he arrived at the precinct in Ndjili to
    inquire about the arrests.
        On May 17, police dispersed a demonstration by Kinshasa University
    students to demand that the University repair restrooms that had not
    functioned properly for almost a year. On May 25, security agents
    arrested student Placide Nkoso, allegedly for organizing the
    demonstration (see Section 1.d.). Police also arrested another student,
    Jean-Pierre Mofila Mboma, and detained both students for collaborating
    with MLC rebels (see Section 1.d.). On July 18, there were unconfirmed
    reports that security force agents arrested a Kinshasa University
    student known only as Kosso, in connection with a student demonstration
    on July 17 (see Section 1.d.); the protest also was directed against
    poor sanitation. Kosso remained in detention at year's end.
        On July 19, security forces arrested 10 members of the UDPS
    opposition party who had gathered at the home of a party member. They
    remained in detention pending trial at year's end; two members
    reportedly are in poor health.
        On November 17, approximately 800 students at the Institut
    Pedagogique National (IPN) in Kinshasa reportedly demonstrated to
    protest the arrest and beating of 10 classmates the previous night. The
    incident reportedly started on November 16 when police arrested two
    students carrying their lunches on campus, because the police wanted
    the food. Police beat 10 students who intervened on the others' behalf,
    and several students were arrested. Allegedly FAC forces briefly
    detained a journalist covering the protest and confiscated her
    recordings (see Section 2.a.). The commander of the police detachment
    reportedly was arrested following the incident.
        On April 6, two UDPS party members, who were arrested for attending
    an ``illegal'' political meeting in May 1999, were released from
    detention. The two activists, Professor Alidor Muamba Ntita and Raymond
    Kabala, were detained without charges.
        Freedom of assembly sometimes was respected in rebel-held areas in
    the country. On January 31 in Bukavu, and on February 7 in Goma,
    citywide strikes (``villes mortes'') were held to protest the
    occupation of the cities by rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan forces. The
    Bukavu strike was enforced strictly by organizers who threatened those
    who tried to go to work.
        On July 19, approximately 4,000 Banyamulenge reportedly
    demonstrated in Bukavu and Uvira against the presence of RCD/Goma and
    Rwandan troops in the Kivu Provinces (see Section 1.g.).
        On August 29, RCD/Goma soldiers arrested and detained for a month
    four South Kivu Province civil society members in connection with the
    bombing of an outdoor festival in Bukavu, after the four reportedly
    blamed Rwandan and RCD soldiers for the bombing (see Section 1.d.). On
    August 29, Bukavu students demonstrated to protest their arrest. In
    their effort to disperse the demonstrations, RCD soldiers fired into
    the air and reportedly shot and killed one student (see Section 1.a.).
    RCD forces arrested several students but released them the following
    day (see Section 1.d.).
        The law provides no protection for freedom of association, and the
    Government severely restricted this right. Upon assuming power in 1997,
    the Government suspended political party activities but not political
    parties themselves. In 1999 President Kabila issued a decree that
    partially lifted the ban on political party activities; however, the
    decree allows the Interior Minister to ban parties arbitrarily, and
    requires that legally recognized parties have members from all
    provinces, a requirement that could not be satisfied under war
    conditions. Moreover, in practice the Government continued to ban any
    political activity by opposition groups beyond small administrative
    meetings. On April 29, the Interior Minister stated that no political
    party was authorized to operate unless it conformed to the decree and
    that no non-profit organization was authorized to operate unless it
    conformed to Decree No. 195.
        In July 1999, Kabila issued a presidential decree that legalized
    the CPP's and proclaimed that all political activity must pass through
    the CPP's, which he leads. This decree was criticized widely.
        Individuals from opposition parties served in Kabila's Government,
    but in their individual capacities (see Section 3). Political party
    offices generally remained open, and parties continued internal
    administrative functions. At different times and for different periods,
    the headquarters of various political parties were under surveillance,
    padlocked, or patrolled by soldiers (see Section 3). The Government
    effectively prevented public political gatherings and even arrested
    opposition activists engaged in small private meetings (see Section
    1.d.). The effects of the restrictions on political parties varied
    widely throughout the country, and they were enforced less strictly in
    some provinces.
        The law allows anyone to form a new political party by registering
    with the Minister of Interior; however, in practice no political
    parties were registered during the year. The President's January 1999
    decree required that all political parties, including existing parties,
    register. Two progovernment parties and a splinter group completed the
    registration process but were not registered by year's end. The
    splinter group was a dissident faction of the UDPS. The Government
    recognized and registered the group in September in an attempt to
    diminish the stature and political potential of the original UDPS and
    its leader, Etienne Tshisekedi. The move came shortly after
    Tshisekedi's party filed a legal claim against President Kabila in a
    Belgian court. The UDPS already had filed a similar claim against then-
    Foreign Minister Yerodia Abdoulaye, which concluded in July with the
    issuance of an international arrest warrant for Yerodia on changes of
    inciting racial hatred and genocide (see Section 1.a.).
        On January 16, policemen surrounded the home of Joseph Olenghankoy,
    president of the FONUS opposition party, in the Ngaliema neighborhood
    of Kinshasa, to disrupt a ceremony in which Olenghankoy intended to
    deliver a New Year's Message. Police arrested Mukendi Kadima, who was
    attending the ceremony, after they searched him and discovered a
    business card belonging to the leader of the Human Rights NGO, La Voix
    des Sans Voix (VSV). Mukendi was detained for 2 days and questioned by
    police. Under pressure from the VSV and family members, police released
    Mukendi on January 18.
        On February 14, police and ANR agents in Matadi stopped five
    members of Bundi Dia Kongo (BDK) and told them that the provincial
    governor wished to see them. The police drove them to the train station
    and sent them to Kinshasa where they were arrested and detained by the
    ANR. The five were detained without formal charges until March 7;
    however, police claimed that they were conspiring to incite an anti-
    Kabila revolt in the Bas Congo Province.
        On February 29, police arrested 10 members of the UDPS opposition
    political party, who reportedly were standing outside the home of party
    president Etienne Tshisekedi, when they became involved in a
    confrontation with two women who reportedly provoked them by singing
    pro-Kabila songs. Police released them on March 1 without filing any
    formal charges.
        On April 8, police arrested 12 members of the National Alliance for
    Development and Reconstruction (ANADER) in the Lemba district of
    Kinshasa. They were charged with conducting political activities
    outlawed under Decree No. 194, which governs political activity. Police
    released them on April 10.
        On June 5, security agents at Ndjili airport in Kinshasa prevented
    leaders of opposition parties and civil society from traveling to
    Cotonou, Benin, to attend preparatory meetings for the Congolese
    National Dialogue (see Section 2.d.).
        In November 1999, security forces arrested Cleophas Kamitatu
    Massamba after he founded a political organization of former Mobutuists
    and criticized the Government in a radio broadcast. On June 12,
    Kamitatu was sentenced to 4 years of ``forced labor'' for
    misappropriating state funds. The Kabila Government claimed Kamitatu
    inappropriately had sold the Congolese Embassy building without
    government authorization while he was ambassador to Japan several years
    earlier. He remained in prison at year's end.
        NGO's are required to register with the Minister of Justice and
    file copies of internal regulations and descriptions of organizational
    structure. In 1999 President Kabila promulgated a decree that
    restricted the activities of NGO's, including religious organizations,
    by establishing requirements for their activities. However, some
    existing organizations were exempt, and the decree was not enforced
    during the year.
        Security forces arrested individuals visiting foreign embassies, as
    well as persons who had contact with NGO's or citizens living in other
    countries (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 4).
        Antigovernment forces seriously restricted freedom of assembly and
    association in the areas that they controlled. In March 1999, RCD/Goma
    authorities refused to let women march in Bukavu in celebration of
    International Woman's Day and to protest the war. In March the women
    planned to stay at home in what they called ``A Day Without Women'' in
    order to protest fathers and husbands dying in the war. On March 6,
    RCD/Goma security agents raided the offices of a women's group, Reseau
    des Femmes Pour La Defense de Droits et de la Paix (see Section 4).
    Security agents claimed that the women were plotting genocide and
    threatened to shoot them. Several women lost their jobs after the
    incident after RCD/Goma authorities coerced employers to dismiss them.
        Following the death of Archbishop Kataliko on October 3, RCD/Goma
    security forces used gunfire to disperse a demonstration on October 4
    in Bukavu following news of the Archbishop's death. RCD soldiers
    reportedly killed a child in the shooting.
        On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly dispersed a meeting of a human
    rights umbrella group in Bukavu, and publicly beat, arrested, and
    detained 13 human rights activists who attended the meeting at Camp
    Saio (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Although there is no constitution
    currently in effect, the Government generally respected freedom of
    religion in practice, provided that worshipers neither disturbed public
    order nor contradicted commonly held morals; however, government forces
    committed some abuses.
        A 1971 law regulating religious organizations grants civil servants
    the power to establish and dissolve religious groups. There have been
    no reports of the Government suspending or dissolving a religious group
    since 1990, when the Government suspended its recognition of Jehovah's
    Witnesses; that suspension subsequently was reversed by a court.
    Although this law restricts the process for official recognition,
    officially recognized religions are free to establish places of worship
    and to train clergy. In practice religious groups that are not
    recognized also worship freely.
        On January 29, 1999, President Kabila promulgated a decree that
    restricts the activities of NGO's, including religious organizations,
    by establishing requirements for them; however, existing religious
    organizations were exempt, and the decree subsequently was not
    enforced.
        In July the progovernment press printed articles critical of
    religious organizations.
        Although the Government required foreign religious groups to obtain
    the approval of the President through the Minister of Justice, foreign
    religious groups generally operate without restriction once they
    receive approval from the Government. Many recognized churches have
    external ties, and foreign missionaries are allowed to proselytize. The
    Government generally did not interfere with foreign missionaries.
    However, foreign missionaries have not been exempt from general human
    rights abuses by security forces.
        While the Government is tolerant in matters of religion, some
    abuses occurred in government-controlled areas as a result of the war.
    These abuses, usually the ransacking of churches and the pilfering of
    church property, generally were the result of a lack of discipline
    among government troops.
        A government order in July 1999 prohibiting private radio stations
    from transmitting foreign radio broadcasts effectively targeted a
    Catholic radio station that was compelled to cease broadcasting
    programs of foreign origin (see Section 2.a.). The target was not
    religious broadcasts; rather it was foreign programs critical of the
    Government. Catholic radio stations did not broadcast foreign radio
    transmissions during the year.
        On January 10, ANR agents summoned Father Fabien Kenta, director of
    the private Catholic radio station Radio Elikya to an unknown location.
    Security agents said that the radio station had broadcast anti-Kabila
    messages under the guise of human rights information and ordered Kenta
    not to broadcast anti-Kabila messages.
        In areas of the country under the military occupation of Rwanda,
    Uganda, and their respective rebel clients, religious freedom
    deteriorated. Numerous human rights groups reported significant abuses
    in these areas by the occupying troops of Rwanda and Uganda, as well as
    various rebel factions, which targeted Catholic clergy. Abuses
    reportedly took the form of attacks on missions, killings of priests,
    the rape of nuns, and the burning of churches. Credible reports
    indicate that occupying troops and their rebel allies deliberately
    targeted Catholic churches as a means of both intimidating the local
    population and in revenge for the Church's perceived role in the 1994
    genocide in Rwanda.
        On February 11, RCD/Goma rebel forces operating in eastern areas of
    the country prevented the Archbishop of Bukavu, Emmanuel Kataliko, from
    returning to his diocese (see Section 2.d.). Rebels alleged that the
    Archbishop's Christmas message urged harassment of Tutsis in the East.
    A number of sources in the occupied territories indicate that the
    decision to exile Kataliko in the town of Bunia was made by officials
    of the Government of Rwanda. Archbishop Kataliko was allowed to return
    to Bukavu in September; however, on October 3, the Archbishop died of a
    heart attack while in Rome.
        On February 16, a Banyamulenge militia attacked a Catholic mission
    in the Kilibu area of South Kivu Province (see Section 2.c.). Two
    priests fled, but militiamen captured a third priest, Father Pepin
    Beta, whom they forced to kneel, and then shot and killed (see Section
    1.a.).
        On June 18 and 19, approximately 50 soldiers attacked and pillaged
    a Catholic church and convent in the town of Kabare, South Kivu
    Province; 3 civilians were killed (see Section 1.a.). The RCD blamed
    the attack on the Interahamwe, but local humanitarian groups disputed
    this claim because of the number of RPA soldiers in the area.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the law allows for freedom of
    movement, the Government, and in particular the security forces acting
    independently, continued to restrict this freedom; the Government
    increased its restrictions after the war began. The war also brought
    new restrictions on internal travel within the government-controlled
    and rebel-controlled zones and made movement between the two zones
    difficult and dangerous.
        Even before the war, security forces throughout the country
    established and manned many roadblocks at which they demanded that
    travelers produce documents and bribes. There were many more such
    roadblocks than could be justified by public safety considerations;
    both their numbers and the conduct of the security force members
    manning them indicated that their main function was to extort money and
    goods from travelers to supplement their below-subsistence level
    official wages. This made internal travel costlier, more time
    consuming, and more dangerous, since violence, including shootings, was
    not uncommon at these roadblocks.
        In Kinshasa police and soldiers commonly erected roadblocks in
    order to extract bribes from taxibus drivers and passengers. On January
    18, in the Gombe district of Kinshasa, there were unconfirmed reports
    that security forces forced passengers who allegedly were riding in
    excess of the capacity of a taxibus to pay bribes. Security forces
    allegedly severely beat one passenger, 30-year-old Mawete Pindi.
    Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in this case by
    year's end. In January FAC soldiers and police erected roadblocks in
    various districts of Kinshasa in order to extort money from each
    minibus passenger who crossed the roadblock. On the evening of January
    20, soldiers under the command of Commandant Mvunzi beat a passenger,
    known as Ndule, for not having enough money to pay the fee. Reportedly
    there was no investigation nor action taken in this case by year's end.
        On April 30, members of the Special Presidential Security Group
    allegedly beat Koyagialo Ahonzima Wasana for ignoring government
    restrictions on movement within the vicinity of the Marble Palace,
    President Kabila's residence (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government required exit visas for all foreign travel. No data
    on the refusal rate for exit visa applications was available; however,
    there were several known cases in which a political leader was denied
    an exit visa during the year. Security forces occasionally hindered
    foreign travel by citizens, including journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        In January immigration officials prevented FONUS opposition leader
    Joseph Olenghankoy from traveling abroad. The Government gave no
    explanation for its actions. On March 8, immigration security agents
    again detained Olenghankoy as he attempted to depart Kinshasa for
    Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo. Immigration officials confiscated
    all of his documents and prevented him from leaving the country.
        On February 16, immigration officials confiscated the passport and
    airline ticket of Christophe Lutundula Apala, a member of the Mouvement
    Solarite pour la Democracie et le Development (MSDD), a think tank, as
    he prepared to board a plane to attend an international conference on
    democratic transitions in Benin. He departed on February 18 after La
    Francophonie and other organizations petitioned the Government to
    permit his departure.
        In June President Kabila and government authorities prevented the
    departure of a number of opposition and civil society leaders,
    including Joseph Olenghankoy (president of FONUS), Francois Lumumba
    (president of the MNC/L), and Catherine Nzuzi wa Mbombo (president of
    the MPR) who were invited to participate in a preparatory meeting of
    the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Benin, as authorized by the Lusaka
    Accords (see Section 3). The Government already had expressed its
    intention not to participate in the U.N.-sponsored forum, which had
    been organized by Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitator and former
    Botswana Prime Minister Sir Ketumile Masire. The Government
    successfully prevented initial efforts to launch the forum by
    preventing civil society and opposition groups from participating and
    confiscating all travel documents of intended participants. By year's
    end, the Government still had not returned the travel documents of
    these individuals.
        The Government also prevented the departure of foreign journalists.
    Airport immigration officials searched luggage, confiscated notes, and
    detained the journalists for questioning (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government lifted Kinshasa's nighttime curfew in December 1999.
    No new curfew was imposed during the year.
        The significant risk of rape, sometimes perpetrated by uniformed
    men, restricted freedom of movement at night for women in many
    neighborhoods. Groups of citizens implemented neighborhood watch
    programs, but women in many parts of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi did not
    leave their homes at night due to fear of attack.
        Freedom of movement in the rebel-controlled territories was
    restricted severely during the year as a result of fighting between the
    rebels, Rwandan and Ugandan forces, the Mai Mai, and the Interahamwe.
    Travel across the war front often was inconvenient and sometimes
    impossible.
        In the eastern portion of the country, rebel forces prevented
    travel and harassed travelers. On February 11, RCD/Goma rebel forces
    operating in eastern areas of the country prevented the Archbishop of
    Bukavu from returning to his diocese (see Section 2.c.). RCD/Goma
    officials allowed Archbishop Kataliko to return to Bukavu in September,
    following visits and direct appeals to the RCD/Goma by high level
    foreign government and Catholic Church officials; however, the
    Archbishop died of a heart attack less then 3 weeks later while in
    Rome.
        Rebel and Rwandan authorities used threats and intimidation to
    prevent several dozen Congolese who had traveled from the occupied
    territories from returning after attending the National Consultations.
    This action resulted in civil society members from the occupied
    territories being stranded in Kinshasa for weeks, and sometimes months,
    after the National Consultations. On April 22, security forces arrested
    civil society activist Bruno Bahati as he returned from the National
    Consultations, and reportedly kept him in detention in both Rwanda and
    the Kivu Provinces until August. Rwandan authorities freed Bahati
    following international pressure (see Section 1.d.).
        An international human rights NGO estimates that there are
    approximately 1.5 million IDP's in the country. Approximately 60,000
    persons were displaced during fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan
    forces in Kisangani in May and June (see Section 1.a.). There are many
    camps for IDP's, especially in the eastern half of the country. Persons
    at these camps were subjected to attacks by government and rebel
    groups. For example, in July a group believed to be Interahamwe
    attacked an IDP camp in North Kivu Province. Approximately 50 persons
    were killed, including some who were burned alive inside their homes
    (see Section 1.a.). During the night of July 9 and 10, an unidentified
    militia attacked an encampment of displaced persons at Sake, in the
    Masisi territory of North Kivu Province (see Section 1.a.).
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
    Government continued to provide first asylum. Refugees were accepted
    into the country from the Republic of the Congo during the year, and
    approximately 330,000 refugees from neighboring countries, including
    Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda, and Sudan, live in the country.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no known reports of the
    forced repatriation of refugees during the year.
        According to international human rights NGO's, approximately
    300,000 Congolese refugees lived in neighboring countries during the
    year, including approximately 100,000 in the Republic of the Congo and
    9,000 in the Central African Republic. In the last months of the year,
    thousands of refugees fled to Zambia from the increased fighting in
    Katanga Province.
        The Government's cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies fluctuated wildly.
    The Government consistently denied humanitarian access to NGO workers
    in areas controlled by the Government (see Section 4). The Minister of
    Interior personally had to sign travel authorizations for foreign aid
    workers, which created delays in travel. The Ministry of Human Rights
    and in particular Human Rights Minister She Okitundu played an active
    role in organizing the protection and voluntary departure of Tutsis who
    were not incarcerated before their departure from the country. Since
    the start of the war, the Government has stopped its former practice of
    involuntarily repatriating Hutus to Rwanda.
        UNHCR cooperated with NGO's and antigovernment forces in
    voluntarily repatriating Rwandan Hutus to Rwanda. There was no
    independent confirmation of news reports from May 1999 that
    antigovernment forces were repatriating Rwandan Hutus involuntarily;
    there were no known reports of such forced repatriation during the
    year.
        Antigovernment forces also imposed travel restrictions on NGO's
    (see Section 4).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government
    peacefully. Citizens have not been able to change their government
    through free elections since independence in 1960.
        In his May 1997 inaugural address, President Kabila promised a
    constitution and elections by 1999; however, the 1998 outbreak of war
    effectively prevented the holding of national elections. The President
    used the pretext of war to suppress the activities of political
    opposition parties and continued to rule by decree. The war also
    provided a reason for security forces to arrest persons at will on
    charges of subversion or being in league with the rebellion (see
    Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
        The Government did not pursue the ratification of the proposed
    constitution drafted in 1998; after it was disseminated in 1998 to the
    press, many leaders of political parties, NGO's, and religious
    organizations criticized it as insufficiently democratic.
        The cease-fire accords signed in July and August 1999 at Lusaka,
    Zambia, between the Government, progovernment, and antigovernment
    forces called for an open national dialog among all political parties
    and civil society groups. However, the Government repeatedly used its
    power to stifle any meaningful dialog. In March church groups attempted
    to hold a National Consultation, an initiative that the Government
    seized to carry out its own agenda; it filled meetings with its own
    supporters. Despite the Government's effort to control the National
    Consultation, the body did not accept the Government's agenda. In April
    the delegates presented President Kabila with a list of
    recommendations. The delegates urged the Government to release
    political prisoners, open the political process, abolish the CPP's, and
    free jailed journalists. The Government ignored these recommendations
    and instead turned to the guidance provided by its own delegates, which
    in essence urged the President to ignore key provisions of the Lusaka
    Accords. The Government subsequently reaffirmed during the year its
    commitment to participate in a national dialog under the control of a
    neutral facilitator; however, it continued to obstruct and frustrate
    facilitator Sir Ketumile Masire. Throughout the year, the Government
    attempted to divert the national dialog by using a variety of political
    maneuvers designed as substitutes for real political discussion and
    sought to create a forum that the Government intended to control. The
    Government created the Constituent and Legislative Assembly to draft a
    new constitution, prepare a national budget, and approve decrees and
    motions handed down by the President. The Government also appointed
    members of the Assembly based on past services to President Kabila and
    loyalty to the Kabila regime.
        In June President Kabila and government authorities prevented the
    departure of a number of opposition and civil society leaders,
    including Joseph Olenghankoy (president of FONUS), Francois Lumumba
    (president of the MNC/L), and Catherine Nzuzi wa Mbombo (president of
    the MPR) who were invited to participate in a preparatory meeting of
    the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Benin, as authorized by the Lusaka
    Accords (see Section 2.d.).
        Although the Government did not ban political parties, it continued
    to impose severe restrictions on their activities, and to enforce these
    restrictions with numerous arrests and detentions (see Sections 1.d.
    and 2.b.). On occasion authorities tortured opposition activists,
    including UDPS activist Crispin Ipondo Banda and FONUS second vice
    president Freddy Lomboto wa Lomboto (see Section 1.c.). In practice the
    Government continued to restrict operations of political parties to
    internal administrative functions only. At various times, government
    security forces put opposition political party members under
    surveillance, and police also raided party headquarters and homes (see
    Section 1.f.). Authorities at times denied exit visas to opposition
    political leaders (see Section 2.d.).
        Hundreds of political activists were arrested for engaging in
    political activity and detained for prolonged periods (see Sections
    1.d. and 2.b.). For example, on February 17, ANR agents arrested four
    members of the PALU opposition political party for engaging in
    political activities (see Section 1.d.). They were released on February
    25.
        The State continued to be highly centralized in many ways. The
    central government executive, in Kinshasa, generally appointed
    governors, but once in the provinces they had considerable autonomy,
    due in part to poor communications and transportation infrastructure.
    Territorial administrators also were appointed from Kinshasa.
    Provincial government resources, both financial and logistical, have
    come almost exclusively from Kinshasa since Kabila took control of the
    Government.
        A disproportionate number of officials in Kabila's Government were
    from the President's home province of Katanga and from his Muluba tribe
    (see Section 5).
        There are no official restrictions on the participation of women or
    minorities in politics; however, in practice women and minorities are
    underrepresented in government and politics, and there are few women or
    Muslims in senior positions in the Government or in political parties.
    There were six female ministers and vice ministers in the Cabinet at
    year's end. There were no known Muslim ministers in the Cabinet.
        The rebel movements established civil administrations in the areas
    controlled by antigovernment forces, including appointment of
    provincial governors and issuance of visas for foreigners to travel
    into their areas. Rebel authorities reportedly began training police
    forces but appointed local officials rather than holding local
    elections.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government showed increased hostility to effective human rights
    organizations, both domestic or international, operating in the
    country. Local human rights NGO's continued to investigate and publish
    their findings on human rights cases, but these activities took place
    in the context of significant government harassment. Such harassment
    led to a decrease in reporting of human rights violations. There
    reportedly were several attacks against local and international human
    rights NGO's during the year.
        The main domestic human rights organizations operating in the
    country include Comite Droits de l'Homme Maintenant, a national network
    of human rights organizations; VSV, an active Kinshasabased
    organization; Groupe Jeremie and Groupe Amos, two Christianinspired
    groups that focus on human rights and democracy problems; Comites des
    Observateurs des Droits de l'Homme, a human rights monitoring group;
    Toges Noires, an international association of lawyers and judges
    involved with human rights; and Associations de Defense des Droits de
    l'Homme. In addition numerous groups are active that are involved with
    development and with specific problems such as voter education and
    women's rights.
        Local human rights activists were subjected to frequent harassment,
    arrest, and detention by security forces (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and
    1.f.). The legality of such arrests often was unclear, as was the
    authority of the security forces members who affected the arrests and
    detentions. Security agents and police arrested, and on some occasions,
    beat or tortured, a number of persons for being members of human rights
    NGO's or for possessing literature distributed by human rights NGO's,
    including Kayembe Kasuku, a member of Lawyer's Without Borders; Time
    Missine; Betshi Pitcal; Zuzi Phukuta Dieudonne, a reporter for the
    newspaper Palme d'Or and president of Justice Sans Frontiere; and
    Reverend Placide Tshisumpa Tshiakatumba, president of the International
    Society for Human Rights (ISHR) (see Section 1.d.). Unlike in the
    previous year, VSV staff was not subjected to government harassment.
        The Government often obstructed the travel of MONUC personnel
    throughout the country. The Government consistently denied humanitarian
    access to NGO workers in areas controlled by the Government (see
    Section 2.d.).
        U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Democratic Republic
    of the Congo, Roberto Garreton, visited the country in August. After
    reviewing the prevailing human rights situation, the U.N. Rapporteur
    called for the release of political prisoners and the end of capital
    punishment in the country. He expressed concern at the abuses of and
    absence of due process in government military tribunals, as well as at
    a wide variety of serious abuses in both government-controlled and RCD-
    controlled territory.
        Human rights groups and members of political, religious, and other
    nongovernmental organizations in the parts of the country held by
    antigovernment forces frequently were harassed and detained on
    suspicion of helping the Government (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On March 6, RCD/Goma security agents raided the offices of a
    women's group, Reseau des Femmes Pour La Defense de Droits et de la
    Paix (see Section 2.b.). Security agents claimed that the women were
    plotting genocide and threatened to shoot them. Several women lost
    their jobs after the incident as RCD/Goma authorities coerced employers
    to dismiss them.
        Rebel security agents, including Rwandan Government and RCD/Goma
    officials, harassed a number of religious and civil society leaders who
    traveled to Kinshasa to take part in the National Consultations in
    March. Over 40 delegates from the occupied territories, many of them
    associated with human rights NGO's, were subjected to harassment,
    delays, and detention in February and March (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
    Following international pressure, all of the delegates were released.
    On April 22, security forces arrested and detained civil society
    activist Bruno Bahati when he returned from the National Consultations
    (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        On May 15, RCD/ML forces arrested and detained Sylvain Mudimbi
    Masudi, external relations director of the human rights NGO Friends of
    Nelson Mandela (ANMDH), in Beni, North Kivu Province (see Section
    1.d.).
        On October 9, RCD rebels reportedly dispersed a meeting of a human
    rights umbrella group in Bukavu and publicly beat, arrested, and
    detained 13 human rights activists who attended the meeting at Camp
    Saio in Bukavu (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). The rebels also
    looted the offices of Groupe Jeremie where the meeting occurred.
        Antigovernment forces permitted some humanitarian NGO's to work in
    rebel-held areas, and those NGO's reported that their working
    environment improved in some of those areas during the year.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The previous constitutions prohibited discrimination based on
    ethnicity, sex, or religious affiliation; however, the Government did
    not enforce these prohibitions effectively and continued to act with
    serious official prejudice against members of the Tutsi ethnic group.
    Societal discrimination remained an obstacle to the advancement of
    certain groups, particularly women, Tutsis, Muslims, and the indigenous
    Pygmy (Batwa) people.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women, including rape, is common,
    but there are no known government or NGO statistics on the extent of
    this violence. The police rarely intervene in domestic disputes. Rape
    is a crime, but the press rarely reported incidents of violence against
    women or children. Press reports of rape generally appear only if rape
    occurs in conjunction with another crime.
        Women are relegated to a secondary role in society. They constitute
    the majority of primary agricultural laborers and small-scale traders
    and are almost exclusively responsible for child rearing. In the
    nontraditional sector, women commonly receive less pay for comparable
    work. Only rarely do they occupy positions of authority or high
    responsibility. Women also tend to receive less education than men.
    Women are required by law to obtain their spouse's permission before
    engaging in routine legal transactions, such as selling or renting real
    estate, opening a bank account, accepting employment, or applying for a
    passport. A 1987 revision of the Family Code permits a widow to inherit
    her husband's property, to control her own property, and to receive a
    property settlement in the event of divorce. In practice sometimes
    consistent with customary law, women are denied these rights. Widows
    commonly are stripped of all possessions--as well as their dependent
    children--by the deceased husband's family. Human rights groups and
    church organizations are working to combat this custom, but there
    generally is no government intervention or legal recourse available.
    Women also are denied custody of their children in divorce cases, but
    they retain the right to visit them. Polygyny is practiced, although it
    is illegal. Father-child relationships resulting from polygynous unions
    are recognized legally, but only the first wife is recognized legally
    as a spouse.
        Prostitution is not a crime and there has been an increase in
    prostitution due to poor economic conditions. Women sometimes are
    forced into prostitution by their families due to economic necessity.
    There was no information available as to the extent of prostitution
    outside of the cities.
        There were a number of active and effective women's groups in both
    the government-controlled and rebel-controlled areas of the country.
        Children.--Government spending on children's programs nearly is
    nonexistent. Primary school education is not compulsory, free, or
    universal. Primary school enrollment rates dropped to less than 70
    percent during the year. In public schools, parents are required
    formally to pay a small fee, but parents often are expected informally
    to pay teachers' salaries. Extremely poor economic circumstances often
    hamper parents' ability to afford these added expenses, meaning that
    children may not be able to attend school. Most schools function only
    in areas where parents have formed cooperatives. The Government's
    economic policies have resulted in massive unemployment, inflation, and
    a devaluation of the currency, putting basic education out of reach of
    many families. There have been reports of economic circumstances
    forcing children to hunt or fish for their family's livelihood instead
    of attending school (see Section 6.d.). In both the government- and
    rebel-controlled areas, poverty brought on by the war has led to
    greatly diminished educational opportunities for girls. Parents under
    severe economic hardship no longer can afford to educate both their
    sons and their daughters, resulting in the withdrawal of many girls
    from school.
        The Juvenile Code includes a statute prohibiting prostitution by
    children under the age of 14; however, child prostitution is common in
    Kinshasa and in other parts of the country. There were reports during
    the year that girls as young as 8 years of age were forced into
    prostitution to provide income to their families (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.d.).
        The number of orphans and street children increased during the
    year. Street children in Kinshasa were subject to severe harassment and
    exploitation, particularly by soldiers and police. There were credible
    reports that the FAC sexually exploited homeless girls.
        There are no documented cases in which security agents or others
    targeted children for specific abuse, although children suffer from the
    same conditions of generalized social disorder and widespread disregard
    for human rights that affect society as a whole. These conditions
    sometimes render parents unable to meet their children's basic human
    needs.
        Some children as young as 10 years of age have been allowed to
    enlist as soldiers in the FAC. The Government has not taken
    comprehensive measures to remove child soldiers from its armed forces,
    although it has stated its intention of demobilizing child soldiers
    once the war is over. While many child soldiers continued to serve in
    the armed forces, during the year the Government recruited fewer
    children into the armed forces; however, the Government continued to
    encourage the enlistment of children in paramilitary organizations.
    Commanders reportedly often concealed child soldiers during visits by
    human rights NGO's and other monitoring groups (see Section 1.f.).
    There were credible reports that the FAC forcibly conscripted homeless
    boys to fight. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that
    unemployed youth in Katanga Province were recruited for military
    service.
        Rebel forces reportedly continued to use child soldiers already in
    service, but greatly reduced recruitment of them during the year (see
    Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Credible reports have indicated that rebel
    forces have conscripted forcibly boys as young as age 10, and there
    were reports that this practice continued during the year.
        Rwandan and Ugandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels, reportedly
    abducted many young women from the villages they raided. These night
    raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of the Kivu
    Provinces peasants slept in their fields.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is not widespread, but it is practiced on young
    girls among isolated groups in the north. The Government has not
    addressed the problem.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
    to buildings or government services for the disabled. There are some
    special schools, many with missionary staff, which use private funds
    and limited public support to provide education and vocational training
    to blind and physically disabled students.
        Physically disabled individuals are subject to discrimination in
    employment, education, and the provision of other government services.
    Disabled persons are not required to conform to all civil laws, such as
    paying taxes.
        Indigenous People.--There is a population of fewer than 10,000
    Pygmies (Batwa), who are believed to have been the country's original
    human inhabitants, and societal discrimination against them continued.
    Although they are citizens, most Pygmies continued to live in remote
    areas and took no part in the political process.
        Religious Minorities.--Approximately 50 percent of the population
    are Roman Catholic, 20 percent are Protestant, and 10 percent are
    Muslim. About 20 percent practice traditional indigenous religions
    exclusively. Many persons practice elements of both traditional
    indigenous religions and Christianity or Islam. Unlike in the previous
    year, there were no known reports of attacks against Muslims nor
    reports that accusations of witchcraft caused tensions or contributed
    to violence between Christians and Muslims during the year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The last official census was
    taken in 1984. It is estimated that the population is now 45 to 50
    million, and comprises more than 200 separate ethnic groups. These
    groups generally are concentrated regionally and speak distinct primary
    languages. There is no majority ethnic group; the four largest ethnic
    groups are the Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and Angbetu-Azande, who together
    make up about 45 percent of the population. Four indigenous languages,
    Kiswahili, Lingala, Kikongo, and Tshiluba have official status. French
    is the language of government, commerce, and education.
        Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is practiced
    widely by members of virtually all ethnic groups and is evident in
    private hiring and buying patterns and in patterns of de facto ethnic
    segregation in some cities; however, intermarriage across major ethnic
    and regional divides is common in large cities.
        Persons from President Kabila's home province, Katanga, and from
    his Mulaba tribe, filled a disproportionate number of positions in his
    Government and in the senior ranks of the civil service, and dominated
    the FAC officer corps. Katangans in the FAC were substantially more
    likely both to be promoted and to be paid than persons from other
    regions. Since the beginning of the war, Tutsis have been absent from
    the Government, which previously included persons from all regions and
    major ethnic groups.
        Birth on national territory reportedly does not necessarily confer
    citizenship. The Government continued to refuse to recognize the
    citizenship claims of longtime residents whose ancestors immigrated to
    the country, including the Banyamulenge Tutsis. According to some
    accounts, resentment of their noncitizen status contributed to the
    participation of many Tutsi residents of the country, first in Kabila's
    rebellion against Mobutu and then in the RCD rebellion against Kabila.
        Since the start of the war in August 1998, ethnic Tutsis have been
    subjected to serious abuses, both in the capital and elsewhere, by
    government security forces and by some citizens for perceived or
    potential disloyalty to the regime (see Section 1.a.). During the year,
    there were no reports of extrajudicial killings of noncombatant Tutsis
    in government-controlled areas. There were increasing reports of the
    participation of the Government of Rwanda in arming Hutus and sending
    them into the Congo in order to terrorize the population. These groups
    reportedly posed as Interahamwe fighters in order to justify Rwanda's
    military occupation of areas of the Kivu Provinces. Unlike in the
    previous year, government officials and state media did not publish
    anti-Tutsi propaganda. The Government materially supported Mai Mai and
    Hutu armed groups, which, according to credible reports, repeatedly
    killed both unarmed and armed Tutsis in areas militarily dominated by
    antigovernment forces. However, the Government no longer incited mob
    violence against unarmed Tutsis, and there were no reports of mass
    extrajudicial killings of Tutsis by the security forces.
        However, human rights groups increasingly complained that the
    killing of and other human rights violations against Congolese
    civilians by persons perceived to be of Tutsi ethnicity and their
    supporters presented an increasing problem.
        In April 1999, members of the Presidential Guard attacked, severely
    beat, and abducted Ralph Biteo because he had the facial features of a
    Tutsi. Members of the Presidential Guard then also arrested Biteo's
    cousin Mirimo Mulongo and both Biteo and Mulongo were taken to the GLM
    detention facility in the Gombe area of Kinshasa. Both were denied
    visitors and were believed still to be in detention at year's end (see
    Section 1.d.).
        The longstanding violent conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic
    groups continued inside the country; however, unlike in previous years,
    there were no reports that Congolese Hutu militias continued to recruit
    from populations of Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in
    neighboring countries, including the Republic of the Congo and Zambia.
        Unlike in previous years, government officials and state media did
    not represent the war as part of a larger supranational conflict
    between Bantus and Nilotics, nor did Nilotic-Bantu rhetoric appear in
    private publications and broadcasts in the country.
        State-owned television and radio and progovernment private
    newspapers repeatedly published racist statements directed not only
    against Tutsis and Nilotics, but also against Europeans, in connection
    with propaganda alleging that countries in Europe, and populations
    largely of European ethnicity, supported antigovernment forces in the
    war.
        Following the sudden death on October 3 of Emmanuel Kataliko, the
    Archbishop of Bukavu, who had spent 8 months in rebelimposed internal
    exile, the Kabila Government incited the populace by claiming that
    Tutsis killed Kataliko with poison. These statements, which quickly
    were circulated and published by independent newspapers, possibly
    contributed to demonstrations that broke out in Bukavu, which resulted
    in a child being killed by rebel gunfire.
        Throughout the year in the Ituri district in Orientale Province, an
    area dominated by Ugandan and Ugandan-supported forces, fighting
    between members of the Lendu and Hema tribes reportedly killed
    thousands of persons and displaced tens of thousands of persons. This
    fighting reportedly arose from a dispute over land use (see Section
    1.a.). Reportedly Ugandan troops manipulated the fighting by charging
    the tribes fees in order to provide protection.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Legislation in effect from the Mobutu
    period permits all workers except magistrates and military personnel to
    form and join trade unions. The National Union of Congolese Workers
    (UNTC) remains the largest labor federation. There also are almost 100
    other independent unions, which now are registered with the Labor
    Ministry. Some of the independent unions are affiliated with political
    parties or associated with a single industry or geographic area;
    however, they also have ties to larger unions, such as the UNTC, which
    have more diverse membership. Two other large federations also are
    active.
        The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
    alleged in its Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2000
    that the Labor Code does not protect adequately workers against
    antiunion discrimination and interference by employers into union
    affairs. The ICFTU also claimed that enforcement of the Labor Code
    ``remains virtually nonexistent.''
        Government security forces arrested and detained labor leaders and
    activists. On May 5, police arrested four tax authority employees,
    Blaise Banzwa Kabo, Albano Mopipi, Andre Yoba Mbesi, and Kakale Makala,
    and detained them for 10 days for ``endangering state security.'' The
    four previously had spent a year in prison for protesting the
    government policy of moving government employees from one service to
    another.
        On November 30, intelligence officers arrested Steve Mbikay,
    secretary general of the Solidarity Union, as he left a union meeting
    with ONARTRA, the Government's parastatal transportation company (see
    Section 1.d.). He continued to be held without charge at year's end.
        On July 7, provincial police in Goma arrested union organizers who
    sent a letter to the management of OFIDA (the customs office) on behalf
    of workers. Police took Fanchon Sakukombo, Felix Zirahira, Kamitanyi
    Nyarukemba, Jean Sengusu, Bababebole Kadite, and Alexis Balibonera to
    the DGS detention center for questioning; they were released on July
    13.
        Unlike in previous years, police did not arrest any communications
    workers who attempted to form unions for the purpose of collective
    bargaining.
        The law recognizes the right to strike. However, legal strikes
    rarely occur since the law requires prior resort to lengthy mandatory
    arbitration and appeal procedures. Labor unions have not been able to
    defend effectively the rights of workers in the deteriorating economic
    environment. The law prohibits employers or the Government from
    retaliating against strikers, but this prohibition rarely is enforced.
        On March 23, civil servants at the offices of Tax Collection,
    Duties and Customs, and Government Receipts went on strike to protest
    against low salaries. The strike was short-lived because the Government
    laid off some employees and reassigned others to the ``Portfolio
    Ministry.'' The layoffs were conducted along tribal lines and
    intimidated employees who remained in the offices.
        Following a series of strikes in 1999 to protest low salaries and
    unpaid wages, the Government claimed in October 1999 that it would meet
    the demands of the strikers. It did so in June by implementing
    progressively a comprehensive, higher civil service salary scale;
    however, civil servants still were paid only sporadically during the
    year.
        On January 31 in Bukavu, and on February 7 in Goma, citywide
    strikes (``villes mortes'') were held to protest the occupation of the
    two cities by antigovernment forces (see Section 2.b.). The Bukavu
    strike was enforced strictly by organizers who threatened those who
    tried to go to work.
        Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The UNTC
    participates in the organization of African Trade Union Unity, and the
    Central Union of Congo is affiliated with the World Confederation of
    Labor.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right to bargain collectively, and an agreement
    between the UNTC and the employers' association formerly provided for
    wages and prices to be negotiated jointly each year under minimal
    government supervision. This system broke down in 1991 as a result of
    the rapid depreciation of the currency. The professional unions and the
    Congolese Business Federation signed a cooperative agreement in 1997;
    however, while collective bargaining still exists in theory, continuing
    inflation encouraged a return to the use of pay rates individually
    arranged between employers and employees.
        The collapse of the formal economy also has resulted in a decline
    in the influence of unions, a tendency to ignore existing labor
    regulations, and a buyer's market for labor. The Labor Code prohibits
    antiunion discrimination, although this regulation was not enforced
    effectively by the Ministry of Labor. The law also requires employers
    to reinstate workers fired for union activities. In the public sector,
    the Government sets wages by decree; public sector unions act only in
    an informal advisory capacity.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor; however, the Government forcibly conscripts
    adults (see Section 1.f.). There also were reports that some Mai Mai
    guerrillas fighting on the side of the Government in the war demanded
    forced labor from persons in rural areas.
        The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
    children, and the Government forcibly conscripted children (see
    Sections 1.g. and 5). In addition there also were reports that girls as
    young as 8 years of age were forced into prostitution to provide income
    to their families (see Section 6.d.)
        Antigovernment forces also forcibly conscripted adults and children
    (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 18 years.
    Employers legally may hire minors between the ages of 14 and 18 with
    the consent of a parent or guardian, but those under age 16 may work a
    maximum of 4 hours per day; those between the ages of 16 and 18 may
    work up to 8 hours. The employment of children of all ages is common in
    the informal sector and in subsistence agriculture, which are the
    dominant portions of the economy. Such employment often is the only way
    a child or family can obtain money for food. Many children have been
    forced by their parents to leave school and beg in the streets or work
    in order to provide income to their families. Neither the Ministry of
    Labor, which is responsible for enforcement, nor the labor unions make
    an effort to enforce child labor laws. Larger enterprises generally do
    not exploit child labor.
        The availability of education for children is extremely limited in
    practice (see Section 5).
        The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
    children, and the Government forcibly conscripts children (see Sections
    1.g., 5, and 6.c.). In addition there were reports that girls as young
    as 8 years of age were forced into prostitution to provide income to
    their families (see Section 6.c.).
        The Government did not ratify ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms
    of child labor by year's end, nor does the law provide any provisions
    against such labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most citizens are engaged in
    subsistence agriculture or commerce outside the formal wage sector. The
    minimum wage, last adjusted by government decree in 1990, subsequently
    was rendered irrelevant by rapid inflation. The average wage does not
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most
    workers rely on the extended family and informal economic activity to
    survive. The maximum legal workweek (excluding voluntary overtime) is
    48 hours. One 24-hour rest period is required every 7 days.
        The Labor Code specifies health and safety standards. The Ministry
    of Labor officially is charged with enforcing these standards, but it
    does not do so effectively. No provisions in the Labor Code permit
    workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
    penalty.
        f.Trafficking in Persons
        There are no specific laws that prohibit trafficking in persons;
    however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from,
    within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                             REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

        The Republic of the Congo \1\ continued to be ruled by a
    transitional government that came to power by force of arms in October
    1997. President Denis Sassou-Nguesso wields executive power without
    meaningful legislative or judicial constraints. Forces supporting
    Sassou-Nguesso, a northerner, defeated those of the democratically
    elected former president Pascal Lissouba, a southerner, with the help
    of Angolan troops in 1997. SassouNguesso's principal base of political
    support lay in the sparsely populated northern region of the country.
    Renewed civil conflict broke out in August 1998 and continued
    throughout the south until the end of 1999 between forces supporting
    the Government, which included Angolan allies, Rwandan Hutu militiamen,
    and irregular fighters of Chadian and Democratic Republic of the Congo
    (DRC) nationality, and southern rebel groups, which included Cocoye
    militiamen operating in the Bouenza, Niari, and Lekoumou regions, and
    Ninja and Nsiloulou militiamen operating principally in southern Pool
    region. Fighting and heavy looting led to the destruction of many
    southern towns, including parts of Brazzaville, the capital, and
    displaced an estimated 800,000 civilians, approximately onethird of the
    country's total population. In 1999 the Government reestablished
    effective control over most of the south through military offensives,
    offers of amnesty, negotiations, and efforts to broaden the
    Government's political base. In November and December 1999, the
    Government signed cease-fire and reconciliation accords with rebel
    groups, which called for disarmament, demobilization, the reintegration
    of former militiamen, and a ``national dialog without exclusion'' to
    resolve political disputes underlying the military conflict. There were
    no cease-fire violations during the year. Omar Bongo, President of
    Gabon, serves as the facilitator of the cease-fire accords. Soon after
    taking power in 1997, President Sassou-Nguesso's Government replaced
    the country's 1992 constitution with a new Fundamental Act, which
    established a strong and highly centralized presidential system of
    government. The President appoints all members of the Government, all
    senior military officers and all subnational government officials,
    serves as commander in chief of the armed forces, and is mandated
    specifically to direct the general policy of the Government and to
    exercise regulatory powers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The United States Embassy evacuated its facilities in the
    country during the 1997 civil war and subsequently has operated out of
    the American Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fighting
    in both countries impeded efforts to collect information.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Legislative authority is vested in the 75-member National
    Transition Council (NTC), which was elected at the National
    Reconciliation Forum convoked by the Government in January 1998.
    Although the forum included some representatives of opposition
    political parties and nongovernmental actors, the event was
    orchestrated by the executive and did not constitute a sufficiently
    broad-based forum from which to elect a genuinely representative
    legislature. During the forum, the Government announced its intention
    to create a new constitution and hold elections within a flexible 3-
    year timetable. A constitutional committee named by the President in
    late 1998 presented him with a draft constitution in August 1999. In
    November the Cabinet formally endorsed the draft. Elections are
    scheduled to take place after the implementation of a draft
    constitution that outlines the structure and institutions of the state.
    The judiciary is overburdened and subject to political interference and
    corruption.
        The security forces include the police, the gendarmerie, and the
    armed forces; however, the functional distinction between these forces
    is not clear. In theory the police should be the first to respond to
    security incidents, with gendarmes and army units intervening later if
    necessary; in practice joint operations are common. Many new recruits
    who have joined the security forces since the 1997 civil war are former
    members of nongovernmental militias. Since the end of the 1998-1999
    conflict, the Government has established increasing control over pro-
    government ``Cobra'' militiamen who previously had been effectively
    autonomous. Units of the Angolan armed forces remain in the country in
    support of the Government for security. Rwandan Hutu militiamen,
    formerly in refugee camps in the country, as well as former soldiers
    from Zaire (DRC), remain in the country but no longer participate in
    government military operations. A major challenge for the country is
    re-integration of former militiamen from all sides in the 1998-1999
    conflict who have stopped fighting under the terms of the peace
    accords. In some cases, joint military units comprised of army troops
    and former rebels provide security in former rebel-controlled areas.
    Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights
    abuses during the year.
        The economy suffered serious losses from destruction and looting in
    much of the south during the 1997 civil war and the 199899 conflict,
    particularly in Brazzaville, where more than onethird of the country's
    population of roughly 2.8 million normally resides. However, this
    violence did not affect significantly the oil industry, which operates
    offshore. Oil exports, timber exports, and external assistance remained
    the country's main sources of foreign exchange. High world oil prices
    throughout the year increased government revenues and enabled continued
    payment of salaries to public sector employees, including members of
    the security forces. Although per capita gross domestic product was
    estimated at about $850 per year, this figure includes substantial oil
    exports, the benefits of which are not widely distributed throughout
    the population. Lack of transparency in government and high levels of
    defense and security spending continued to impede rehabilitation and
    development.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were some improvements in several areas during the year, there
    continued to be numerous serious problems. Citizens do not have the
    right to change their government peacefully. Security forces were
    responsible for extrajudicial killings, including summary executions,
    rapes, beatings, and physical abuse of detainees and the civilian
    population, arbitrary arrest and detention, and looting. The Government
    often deployed undisciplined troops, including some former Cobras.
    These government forces also were responsible for summary executions,
    as well as rape, looting, and other violent acts. Prison conditions
    remained life threatening. The judiciary was overburdened,
    underfinanced, subject to corruption and political influence, and
    unable to ensure fair and expeditious trials. The Government infringed
    on citizens' privacy rights. The Government and its political allies
    continued to monopolize domestic broadcast media; however, private
    newspapers circulated freely and often were critical of the
    authorities. There were some limits on freedom of movement, although
    security force restrictions on freedom of movement within the country
    decreased. The Government permitted opposition political parties and
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), including human rights
    organizations, to function, and there was a relatively open dialog on
    public policy issues. The Government sent mixed signals on political
    participation by opposition figures. While many former cabinet
    ministers and other officials of the Lissouba government have returned
    to Brazzaville and resumed political activities, several were tried and
    convicted in absentia of serious war crimes during the year. Violence
    and societal discrimination against women were serious problems;
    however, incidents of rape decreased during the year following the end
    of the 1998-1999 conflict. Societal discrimination on the basis of
    ethnicity remained widespread, including against minority indigenous
    Pygmies. Child labor, including forced child labor, continued. Citizens
    sometimes resorted to vigilante justice and killed suspected criminals.
        Members of Angolan troops allied with the government reportedly
    also committed acts of summary execution, rape, and looting.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings; however, the number of such
    killings decreased during the year following the end of the 1998-1999
    civil conflict. In August soldiers killed two family members of a
    policeman in revenge for the killing of a fellow soldier by another
    policeman. Reportedly there was no investigation nor action taken in
    this case by year's end. In some cases, security forces summarily
    executed soldiers who were responsible for rapes or other abuses (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). For example, in September in Mouyondzi
    (Bouenza Region), the military command executed three soldiers
    recruited from former militia forces for attempted looting and
    extortion. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reported cases of
    the summary execution of suspected rebels among displaced civilians.
        There were a number of armed confrontations between members of
    government military units and affiliated militias during the year,
    which resulted in civilian deaths. On July 13, a personal dispute
    between a member of the Presidential Guard and a Police Officer
    escalated into an armed confrontation between their units, which lasted
    several hours in Brazzaville's Poto-Poto neighborhood. Members of the
    Presidential Guard involved in the incident reportedly were punished
    for undisciplined behavior; however, the forms of punishment were not
    known. In September in Brazzaville's Kinsoundi neighborhood, fighting
    between security forces, Willy Matsanga, a security advisor at the
    Ministry of Interior and former militia commander, and some of
    Matsanga's supporters after a dispute over access to the airport,
    resulted in the death of one civilian by a stray bullet.
        The Government often deployed undisciplined troops, including some
    recruited from President Sassou-Nguesso's former Cobra militia. These
    government forces were responsible for summary executions as well as
    rape, looting, and other violent acts. In October 1999, the Minister of
    Defense announced that military tribunals would be established to bring
    to justice soldiers responsible for abuses, and the Government
    introduced legislation to that end. However, by year's end, no such law
    had been adopted and these tribunals were not yet in place.
        Angolan troops allied with the government generally were better
    disciplined, but individual troops reportedly also committed acts of
    summary execution, rape, and looting.
        On November 12 and 13, 12 persons, many of whom were under the age
    of 18, suffocated in an overcrowded jail cell in Pointe Noire (see
    Section 1.c.). Senior government officials acknowledged the incident
    publicly, and the duty officer was brought to trial. The status of the
    case was not known at year's end.
        According to a report by the International Federation of Leagues of
    Human Rights, one of the detainees held without charge since 1998 in
    Pointe Noire and then in Impfondo, Gabriel Louya, died in detention
    after suffering a stroke as a result of torture and poor prison
    conditions (see Section 1.c.).
        There continued to be deaths due to mob violence, as civilians took
    vigilante action against presumed criminals, although police sometimes
    intervened to stop such action.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of disappearance during
    the year.
        The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Directorate continued to
    investigate allegations that up to 350 young men, who took refuge in
    the DRC in 1999, were separated from their families by security forces
    upon returning to Brazzaville in May 1999, and subsequently
    disappeared. While some sources reported that security forces had shot
    and killed these men, no firm evidence was available, and a poor
    counting of the returnees made it difficult to verify what had happened
    to them after arrival in Brazzaville. The results of the Government's
    investigation were not released by year's end.
        Given the incomplete figures on those killed or displaced in the
    1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 civil conflict, and the massive
    displacement of the civilian population as a result of the fighting,
    many disappearances may have occurred that have not been reported.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment.--
    The Fundamental Act prohibits torture; however, in practice, security
    forces sometimes used beatings to extract confessions or merely to
    punish detainees, and sometimes raped women detainees. During the
    second half of the year, a police newsletter published several reports
    of such incidents and described the administrative discipline, criminal
    investigations, and judicial proceedings pursued against those
    responsible. Members of the security forces looted citizens' homes (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.f.), and security forces extorted money from
    travelers at checkpoints, although less frequently than in the previous
    year (see Section 2.d.). There were no reports that security force
    officers beat and released civilian looters instead of arresting them.
        Undisciplined government forces were responsible for summary
    executions as well as rape, looting, and other violent acts. While
    there were some improvements in government forces' discipline, serious
    abuses continued.
        In some cases, security forces summarily executed soldiers who were
    responsible for rapes or other abuses (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security forces
    harassed internally displaced persons (IDP's); all IDP's returned to
    their homes during the year (see Section 2.d.).
        Angolan troops allied with the government generally were better
    disciplined, but individual troops reportedly also committed acts of
    summary execution, rape, and looting.
        In May a court convicted and sentenced to death in absentia former
    Prime Minister Kolelas of torture and other crimes during the 1997
    civil war (see Section 1.e.). The court also sentenced to death former
    Interior Minister Philippe Bikinkita on similar charges in the same
    trial.
        Unlike during the 1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 conflict, there
    were no reports during the year of activity by rebel militia groups,
    including killings, rape, torture, or looting.
        Prison conditions remained life threatening due to overcrowded
    facilities and scarcity of resources to provide food or health care to
    the inmates. Prisons (Maisons d'Arret) functioned in Brazzaville and
    Pointe Noire and to a lesser degree in the smaller, more remote towns
    of Owando, Ouesso, and Djambala. The Ministry of Justice continued to
    repair some prisons during the year. Detainees held at police stations
    often were subjected to beatings, overcrowding, extortion, and other
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. On November 12 and 13, 12
    persons, many of whom were under the age of 18, suffocated in an
    overcrowded jail cell in Pointe Noire (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
    Police had detained approximately 40 detainees in a cell designed to
    hold 10. The police captain responsible was suspended from his post and
    was being investigated at year's end. The Minister of Interior stated
    publicly that those responsible would be prosecuted; however, no action
    was taken by year's end.
        According to a report by the International Federation of Leagues of
    Human Rights, one of the detainees held without charge since 1998 in
    Pointe Noire and then in Impfondo, Gabriel Louya, died in detention
    after suffering a stroke as a result of torture and poor prison
    conditions (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
        Access to prisons and detention centers by domestic and
    international human rights groups improved during the year. Local human
    rights groups, including the Congolese Observatory for Human Rights
    (OCDH), the Association for the Human Rights of the Incarcerated
    (ADHUC), and a Catholic church organization visited prisons during the
    year. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted
    regular visits to prisons and detention centers throughout the country.
    For example, between September and December, ICRC visited five police
    detention centers and one gendarmerie detention center in Brazzaville
    and Doloise.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Fundamental Act
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice security
    forces frequently commit such acts. The Code of Penal Procedure, which
    remains in force, requires that a person be apprehended openly and that
    a lawyer be present during initial questioning. The code further
    stipulates that warrants be issued before arrests are made and that
    detainees be brought before a judge within 3 days and either charged or
    released within 4 months. In practice the Government often violates
    these legal provisions. However, detainees usually were informed of the
    charges levied against them, and lawyers and family members usually had
    free access to them.
        There were no known political detainees at year's end. In January
    the Government released 17 political detainees who had been held
    without charge since 1998 in Pointe Noire and then in Impfondo. The
    detainees primarily were minor officials of the former Lissouba
    Government and affiliated parties. According to a report by the
    International Federation of Leagues of Human Rights, one of the
    detainees, Gabriel Louya, died in detention after suffering a stroke as
    a result of torture and poor prison conditions (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.).
        The Fundamental Act does not address forced exile, and the
    Government does not practice it formally; however, some officials of
    the predecessor government, including former president Lissouba and
    former Prime Minister Kolelas remained outside the country in self-
    imposed exile (see Sections 1.e. and 3). Many other officials of the
    former government, including cabinet members, have returned to the
    country and resumed political activity.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Fundamental Act mandates the
    President to ensure the independence of the judiciary through the
    Higher Council of Magistrates; however, in practice the judiciary
    continued to be overburdened, underfinanced, and subject to corruption
    and political influence. Lack of resources became more acute as a
    result of the destruction and looting sustained by judicial facilities
    during the 1997 and 1998-1999 conflicts. In January Minister of Justice
    Jean Martin Mbemba acknowledged many of these shortcomings in a speech;
    and the Ministry of Justice continued rehabilitation of courthouses
    during the year, including the local court serving the southwest
    Brazzaville neighborhoods of Bacongo and Makelekele.
        The judicial system consists of local courts, courts of appeal, the
    Supreme Court, and traditional courts. In rural areas, traditional
    courts continued to handle many local disputes, especially property and
    probate cases, and domestic conflicts that could not be resolved within
    the extended family.
        In general defendants are tried in a public court of law presided
    over by a state-appointed magistrate. The defense has access to
    prosecution evidence and testimony and the right to counter it. In
    formal courts defendants are presumed innocent and have the right of
    appeal; however, the legal caseload far exceeded the capacity of the
    judiciary to ensure fair and timely trials. Some cases never reach the
    court system. In October 1999, the Government announced plans to
    establish military tribunals to try soldiers for abuses committed
    during recent periods of conflict, and the Government introduced
    legislation to establish these tribunals; however, the tribunals were
    not functioning by year's end.
        In December 1999, President Sassou-Nguesso signed a law and
    implementing regulations to give amnesty for acts committed during the
    conduct of the civil conflicts in 1993-1994, 1997, and 1998-1999;
    however, this amnesty does not cover the political ``authors'' of these
    conflicts.
        In May former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas was tried, convicted,
    and sentenced to death in absentia on charges of having maintained
    private prisons in which opponents were tortured during the 1997 war.
    The court also sentenced to death former Interior Minister Philippe
    Bikinkita on similar charges in the same trial. The Government asserted
    that this was a purely judicial matter; however, observers believe
    there were political overtones evident in the broadcast of the trial on
    state-run television. In 1999 a court convicted and sentenced in
    absentia to 20 years' imprisonment former President Lissouba and three
    other former government officials on charges of having conspired to
    kill President Sassou-Nguesso in June 1999 (see Section 3).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The Fundamental Act provides for the inviolability of
    the home, and for privacy of letters, correspondence,
    telecommunications, and other forms of communication, except as may be
    provided by law; however, in practice government security forces
    sometimes illegally entered, searched, and looted private homes;
    however, the widespread systematic looting that occurred during the
    19981999 conflict ceased.
        Citizens generally believed that the Government widely monitored
    private mail and telephone communications; however, unlike in the
    previous year, there were no reports that security forces arrested
    persons due to the content of their private communication.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Fundamental Act provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and in practice the Government
    generally respected these rights; however, it continued to monopolize
    broadcast media. The 1996 Press Law, which sharply increased criminal
    penalties for libel, remained in effect.
        There is no state-owned newspaper. Approximately 10 private
    newspapers appear weekly in Brazzaville. Some of these newspapers take
    editorial positions critical of the Government and print articles
    unflattering to the authorities. Newspapers continued on occasion to
    publish open letters written by opponents of the Government who are in
    detention or living abroad. A small elite in Brazzaville and Pointe
    Noire has access to print media, which do not circulate widely beyond
    the two cities.
        Most citizens obtained their news from the broadcast media, which
    remained effectively a government monopoly.
        Government-owned Radio Congo and Radio Brazzaville broadcast
    approximately 18 hours a day; Government-owned Television Congo
    broadcast for fewer hours. Radio France Internationale was rebroadcast
    on a local FM station, and radio and television broadcasts from
    neighboring Kinshasa, DRC, could be received in Brazzaville. The
    private independent station, Radio Liberte, established by President
    Sassou-Nguesso's forces during the 1997 civil war, continued to
    broadcast. Local rebroadcasts of the Gabon-based Africa Number One also
    continued during the year.
        The news coverage and the editorial lines of the state-owned media
    reflected government priorities and views. Government broadcast media
    focused its attention on the activities of government officials and
    their supporters; there was no meaningful airing of alternative
    political views.
        Internet service was available through the Government's Ministry of
    Post and Telecommunications during the year. Additional connections
    were available through providers based in the DRC.
        There were no known restrictions on academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Fundamental
    Act provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice. Political parties and civic
    associations held numerous meetings during the year. Public
    demonstrations were less common, and there were no known public
    protests. Groups that wished to hold public assemblies were required to
    inform the Ministry of Interior, which could withhold authorization for
    meetings that threatened public order; however, there were no known
    instances in which the authorities withheld permission to meet.
        The Fundamental Act provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice. The act permits
    associations, political parties, and other groups to form freely,
    provided that they respect principles of sovereignty, territorial
    integrity, national unity, and democracy. No political parties were
    banned or suspended. The parties of some prominent leaders of the
    former government continued to operate, but under the leadership of
    political figures willing to cooperate with the Government.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Fundamental Act provides for freedom
    of religion and the Government respected this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Fundamental Act provides for freedom
    of movement, and the Government's respect of this right improved during
    the year although there still were some limitations. Military
    checkpoints that sometimes interfered with the movement of civilians
    continued to operate during the year, and soldiers frequently extorted
    money from commercial traders to assure passage through these
    checkpoints; however, the use of checkpoints decreased during the year.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that government
    forces stopped vehicles carrying displaced persons.
        Former Cocoye rebels near the town of Makabana, in Niari region,
    operated informal checkpoints to extort money from travelers during the
    first half of the year, but this practice had ended by mid-year. Former
    Nsiloulou rebels near the town of Vinza in southern Pool continued to
    maintain checkpoints at year's end.
        Unlike during the 1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 conflict, there
    were no reports during the year that rebel ``Ninja'' and ``Nsiloulou''
    militiamen prevented the return of displaced persons to Brazzaville;
    these rebel groups were dismantled. There also were no reports of the
    disruption of train service between Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.
        According to U.N. estimates, the 1998-1999 conflict displaced
    approximately 800,000 civilians; all IDP's returned to their homes
    during the year.
        Tens of thousands of citizens fled into neighboring countries,
    particularly Gabon and the DRC. A total of approximately 45,000 persons
    fled to the Bas-Congo Province of the DRC in late 1998 and early 1999;
    however, all but about 5,000 had been repatriated to the country by
    year's end. Approximately 15,000 citizens fled to Gabon in 1999 and,
    according to U.N. figures, 12,000 persons remained there at year's end.
    During the year, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began
    discussions with the Government to facilitate the return of these
    persons.
        The Fundamental Act contains provisions for the granting of refugee
    and asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government granted
    first asylum to refugees from other countries. The country continued to
    host a small number of Burundians and approximately 7,000 Rwandans,
    largely members of the Hutu ethnic group, who fled camps in eastern
    Zaire in 1996 and arrived in the country in May and June 1997. The
    Government, in collaboration with the office of UNHCR, integrated
    approximately 2,000 of these refugees in the north-central regions of
    the country; however, some remain loosely grouped in an encampment
    north of Brazzaville, and others have integrated informally into
    Congolese society. In March all UNHCR support to Rwandan refugees
    ended. Approximately 6,000 Angolan refugees fled the Angolan province
    of Cabinda in 1992. Humanitarian NGO's reported that there were 20,800
    Angolan refugees in Pointe Noire at year's end. Of these 5,900 continue
    to receive UNHCR assistance in camps; the remaining 14,900 have
    integrated into the local communities and receive little if any
    assistance.
        More than 100,000 refugees and several hundred combatants,
    including DRC troops, fled to the northern Cuvette and Likouala regions
    of the country due to fighting in the DRC's Equateur Province during
    the year. Some of the combatants were repatriated to Kinshasa by year's
    end. Lack of roads and airstrips, and insecurity along the Congo and
    Ubangui Rivers, complicated humanitarian access to these refugees.
    UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies only had access to approximately
    70,000 of the DRC refugees in the area by year's end.
        Hutu militiamen from refugee camps who had been permitted to join
    in military operations with government forces in 1999 did not
    participate in such operations following the end of the 1998-1999
    conflict.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government
    peacefully. The Sassou-Nguesso Government came to power by force of
    arms in 1997 with the help of the armed forces of Angola. During the
    National Reconciliation Forum that it convened in January 1998, the
    Government announced its intention to enact a new constitution and hold
    elections within 3 years. A constitutional committee appointed by the
    President presented him with a draft Constitution in August 1999.
    According to a schedule outlined by the President in August, the draft
    constitution is to be the subject of nationwide consultations organized
    by the Government, then submitted to the NTC in 2001, and finally
    ratified by a popular referendum. During the summer, the document was
    released publicly, and presented to the Cabinet for review in
    September. The Cabinet considered the draft constitution during three
    meetings in September and October and on October 28, established an ad
    hoc committee to prepare a final draft for Cabinet. On November 15, the
    Cabinet approved an amended version of the constitution draft, which
    will then be submitted to, and is expected to be adopted by, the NTC.
    Following approval by the NTC, the draft must then be ratified by
    popular referendum. In August President Sassou-Nguesso announced that
    Government-led consultations on the draft constitution would constitute
    the ``national dialog without exclusion'' called for in the December
    1999 Peace Accords; however, many opposition groups have criticized
    this claim. Opposition leaders also have criticized key components of
    the draft constitution.
        The executive branch dominates the government. Under the
    Fundamental Act, the President is mandated to direct the general policy
    of the Government and to exercise regulatory powers. He appoints all
    significant military, executive, and judicial officials. The President
    convenes the interim national legislature, the NTC. The NTC was elected
    at the 1998 National Reconciliation Forum, which included some
    representatives of opposition political parties and nongovernmental
    actors; however, the event was orchestrated by the executive branch and
    did not constitute a sufficiently broad-based forum from which to elect
    a genuinely representative legislature. The NTC debates issues freely
    and summons cabinet ministers to answer questions about their
    portfolios; however, it was dominated by supporters of the President
    and did not serve as a meaningful check on executive authority.
        Major political parties included the ruling Congolese Workers'
    Party, the Panafrican Union for Social Democracy, the Congolese
    Movement for Democracy and Integrated Development, the Union for
    Democracy and the Republic, the Rally for Democracy and Social
    Progress, and many others. In some cases, party leaders remained in
    exile while other party officials willing to cooperate with the
    Government or to oppose it non-violently remained in the country (see
    Section 1.d.). In the absence of electoral politics or a constitutional
    framework for such politics, party leaders held meetings and party
    congresses, commented to the media on the political environment, and
    raised questions in the NTC.
        The State is highly centralized. Since the 1997 civil war, key
    regional and local leaders have been appointed by the central
    Government. Subnational government entities lack an independent revenue
    base and do not represent a significant check on central authority.
        In 1998 the NTC passed a law on genocide, war crimes, and crimes
    against humanity that permits the exclusion from public office of those
    found guilty of such crimes. This law could be used to exclude
    opponents from the political process, and the mere threat of charges
    under this law may dissuade political figures who are in exile from
    returning to the country. In December 1999, a court convicted in
    absentia former president Lissouba of plotting to kill President
    Sassou-Nguesso, and in May a court convicted in absentia former Prime
    Minister Kolelas of torture and other crimes during the 1997 civil war
    (see Section 1.e.). Nevertheless, many senior officials of the former
    government, including a number of former cabinet ministers, returned to
    the country during the year and resumed political activities without
    incident.
        There are no legal restrictions on political participation by women
    or minority populations; however, women were underrepresented in
    government and politics. Women held 2 of 7 leadership positions in the
    NTC, and 2 of 25 cabinet ministers were female. Pygmies continued to be
    effectively excluded from the political process, in part due to their
    isolation in remote forested areas of the country. The Cabinet included
    members of many ethnic groups from all areas of the country. Many key
    posts were held by northerners, including members of the President's
    Mbochi ethnic group; however, there was no consistent pattern of clear
    overrepresentation of any ethnic or regional group.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several domestic human rights organizations operated with minimal
    government restriction and investigated and published their findings on
    human rights problems. While some human rights leaders maintained that
    they sometimes were subjected to subtle forms of intimidation, they
    continued to publish reports that were highly critical of the
    Government with no apparent reprisal.
        The ICRC maintained an office in Brazzaville and, among other
    activities, continued its program of human rights training for units of
    the armed forces.
        Teams from the International Federation of Leagues of Human Rights
    (FIDH) and from Human Rights Watch Africa visited the country to
    evaluate conditions during the year. The Government permitted these
    teams to conduct their missions, and FIDH published a report of its
    visit.
        Insecurity in the north along the Ubangui River, Kindamba region in
    the Pool, parts of Bouenza, and in the upper Niari river system,
    prevented U.N. and other humanitarian agencies from assessing
    conditions in these areas during much of the year; however, access to
    these areas had improved by year's end, and humanitarian agencies
    visited some of these areas. Full access to the rest of the country was
    made possible by security improvements during the year.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Fundamental Act specifically prohibits such discrimination;
    however, societal discrimination persisted in practice, particularly
    against women and Pygmies. Ethnic and regional differences continued;
    however, there was no organized civil violence during the year.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women, including rape and
    beatings, is widespread but reported rarely. Domestic violence is
    handled within the extended family and only in the most extreme
    incidents is it brought to the police. There are no specific provisions
    under the law for spousal battery, apart from general statutes
    prohibiting assault. Rape is illegal, and widespread rape during the
    1998-1999 civil conflict raised public awareness of violence against
    women. NGO's, such as the International Rescue Committee, continued to
    draw attention to the issue and provided counseling and assistance to
    victims.
        The Fundamental Act provides for the equality of all citizens,
    prohibits discrimination based on sex, and stipulates that women have
    the right to equal pay for equal work. In practice women are
    underrepresented in the formal sector; most work in the informal sector
    and thus have little or no access to employment benefits. Women in
    rural areas especially are disadvantaged in terms of education and wage
    employment and are confined largely to family farming, petty commerce,
    and childrearing responsibilities.
        Marriage and family laws overtly discriminate against women. For
    example, adultery is illegal for women but not for men. Polygyny is
    legal; polyandry is not. While the Legal Code provides that 30 percent
    of the husband's estate goes to the wife, in practice the wife often
    loses all rights of inheritance upon the death of her spouse. The
    symbolic nature of the dowry set in the Family Code often is not
    respected, and men are forced to pay excessive brideprices to the
    woman's family. As a result, the right to divorce is circumscribed for
    some women because they lack the financial means to reimburse the
    brideprice to the husband and his family. This problem is more
    prevalent in rural areas than in urban centers.
        There are a number of nongovernmental organizations that work on
    women's problems. However, their effectiveness varies widely. The
    Ministry of Public Service, Administrative Reform, and the Promotion of
    Women is responsible for coordinating government initiatives regarding
    the status of women.
        Children.--The Fundamental Act affords children equal protection
    under the law. Education is compulsory and free until the age of 16.
    Girls and boys attend primary school in equal numbers; however, school
    attendance by girls declines precipitously at the high school level
    and, especially, at the university level. In 1997 the literacy rate was
    77 percent for the total adult population but only 70 percent for
    women.
        Child labor is illegal; however, in practice this law generally is
    not enforced, particularly in rural areas (see Section 6.d.). Children
    work with their families on farms or in small businesses in the
    informal sector. There are indigent street children in Brazzaville, and
    their numbers appear to be growing as a result of civil conflict since
    1997.
        There have been reports of isolated cases of child prostitution,
    particularly among the growing numbers of street children; however, the
    extent of the problem is not believed to be widespread (see Section
    6.d.).
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is not practiced indigenously, but may occur in
    some of the immigrant communities from countries such as Mauritania and
    Mali, where it is more common.
        There were some reports that child soldiers were used during the
    1997 civil war and the 1998-1999 conflict (see Section 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Fundamental Act prohibits
    discrimination based on physical condition; however, in practice, this
    prohibition generally was not enforced, because the ministry charged
    with implementation faced severe financial constraints. There was no
    overt discrimination against the disabled in employment and education.
    There were no laws mandating access for the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--The Fundamental Act prohibits discrimination
    based on ethnicity. In practice the indigenous Pygmy people, who number
    in the tens of thousands and live primarily in the northern forest
    regions, do not enjoy equal treatment in the predominantly Bantu
    society. Pygmies were marginalized severely in the areas of employment,
    health, and education, in part due to their isolation in remote
    forested areas of the country. They usually are considered social
    inferiors and have little political voice. Many have never heard of the
    concept of voting and have minimal ability to affect government
    decisions affecting their interests. There was no credible information
    on whether traditional practices in which Pygmies worked as indentured
    servants to a Bantu continued during the year. Many Pygmies, possibly
    including children, have been exploited by Bantus; however, little
    information is available regarding the extent of the problem during the
    year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Fundamental Act prohibits
    discrimination based on ethnicity; however, the Government did not
    enforce this prohibition effectively, and in practice, ethnic divisions
    persist. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the
    Government or its security forces discriminated against members of
    southern ethnic groups, or used violence against them.
        Four major ethnic groups make up about 95 percent of the country's
    population; these groups speak distinct primary languages and are
    concentrated regionally outside of urban areas. The largest ethnic
    group is the Kongo, who constitute the main ethnic group in the
    southern part of the country and about half the country's population.
    Within the Kongo group are various subgroups, including the Lari and
    the Vili. Other major ethnic groups include the Teke of the central
    region, with approximately 13 percent of the population, and the Mbochi
    of the northern region, with approximately 12 percent of the
    population.
        Societal ethnic discrimination is practiced widely among virtually
    all ethnic groups, and is evident in private sector hiring and buying
    patterns and de facto segregation of urban neighborhoods. Ethnic
    overtones were apparent in the 1997 civil war and the 1998-99 conflict.
    These conflicts sometimes were oversimplified as pitting northerners,
    who support President Sassou-Nguesso, against southerners, who support
    former president Lissouba and former prime minister Kolelas. There does
    tend to be heavy representation from each leader's ethnic group in his
    immediate entourage: Mbochi for Sassou-Nguesso, Lari for Kolelas, and
    the groups of the Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou regions for Lissouba;
    however, the correspondence between ethnic-regional and political
    cleavages is approximate, and supporters of the Government include
    persons from a broad range of ethnic and regional backgrounds.
    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Fundamental Act provides workers
    with the right to form unions, and the Government respected this right
    in practice. Any worker is free to join a union of his choice. The
    Labor Code affirms the right to associate freely and prohibits
    restrictions on the formation of trade unions. Most workers in the
    formal (wage) sector are union members, and unions have made efforts to
    organize informal sectors such as agriculture and retail trade.
        The Fundamental Act also affirms workers' right to strike, subject
    to conditions established by Law. Unions are free to strike after
    filing a letter of intent with the Ministry of Labor, thereby starting
    a process of nonbinding arbitration under the auspices of a regional
    labor inspector from the Ministry. The letter of intent must include
    the strike date, at which time the strike legally may begin, even if
    arbitration is not complete. Employers have the right to fire workers
    if they do not give advance notice of a strike. No formal strikes
    occurred during the year; however, some informal work stoppages
    occurred. For example, in October university workers protested salary
    arrears. During the year, the Government sought organized labor's
    agreement to a ``social truce'' during the period of post-conflict
    reconstruction, which was opposed by some labor organizations. The
    Government accepted certain conditions, such as regularization of
    salaries and rehiring of certain workers in several sectors; these
    conditions continued to be observed at year's end. Collective
    bargaining is not widespread due to the social disruption and economic
    hardship which occurred during much of the 1990's.
        Unions are free to affiliate with international trade unions and
    they maintain cooperative accords with foreign trade union
    organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    allows for collective bargaining, and this right generally is respected
    and practiced freely. The Government sets industry-specific minimum
    wage scales, but unions usually are able to negotiate higher wages for
    their members. Employers are prohibited from discriminating against
    employees who join a union. There were no reported firings for union
    activities.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children;
    however, such practices occur. There was no credible information on
    whether traditional practices in which Pygmies worked as indentured
    servants to Bantus continued during the year (see Section 5). Many
    Pygmies, possibly including children, have been exploited by Bantus;
    however, little information was available regarding the extent of the
    problem during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Ministry of Labor, which is responsible for enforcing
    child labor laws, concentrates its efforts only on the formal wage
    sector. Child labor is illegal, the minimum age for employment is 14,
    and education is compulsory until the age of 16 (see Section 5);
    however, child labor persists among children who continue to work for
    their families in rural areas and in the informal sector in cities
    without government supervision or monitoring. There were some reports
    that child soldiers were used during the 1997 civil war and 1998-1999
    conflict (see Section 5); however, the numbers appear to be small, and
    the Government plans to demobilize child soldiers as required in the
    cease-fire agreements. It was not known whether any child soldiers were
    demobilized by year's end. There have been reports of isolated cases of
    child prostitution, particularly among the growing numbers of street
    children; however, the extent of the problem is not believed to be
    widespread (see Section 5).
        The law prohibits forced labor by children; however, there have
    been allegations of exploitation of Pygmy children (see Sections 5 and
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Fundamental Law provides
    that each citizen has the right to remuneration according to his work
    and merit. The Labor Code stipulates that overtime must be paid for all
    work in excess of 40 hours per week and that regular days of leisure
    must be granted by employers. The minimum wage is $64 (50,000 CFA
    francs) per month. It is not sufficient to provide a worker and family
    with a decent standard of living. High urban prices and dependent
    extended families oblige many workers to seek opportunities beyond
    their principal employment.
        Although health and safety regulations call for twice-yearly visits
    by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor, in practice such visits occur
    less regularly. While unions generally are vigilant in calling
    attention to dangerous working conditions, the observance of safety
    standards is often lax. Workers have no specific right to remove
    themselves from dangerous working conditions without risking loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in persons, and there were reports that persons were
    trafficked to, from, within, or through the country. An ILO study
    conducted in March and April in Yaounde, Douala, and Bamenda, Cameroon,
    indicated that regional traffickers transported children between the
    Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Chad, Togo, and the
    Central African Republic, through Cameroon.
                                   __________

                                 COTE D'IVOIRE

        Prior to October presidential elections, Cote d'Ivoire had a
    military government. Brigadier General Robert Guei took power on
    December 24, 1999, following a bloodless coup d'etat, which forced the
    departure of then President Henri Konan Bedie. General Guei, who was
    Chief of Staff under Presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie,
    declared himself the new President, suspended the Constitution,
    dissolved the National Assembly, and formed the National Committee for
    Public Salvation (CNSP)--which consisted of himself, seven other
    military officers, one naval enlisted man, and one soldier who
    participated in the coup. Guei initially claimed no interest in
    retaining power and pledged to rewrite the Constitution, clean up
    government corruption, and hold fair and transparent elections during
    the year. In January Guei formed a transitional government made up of
    CNSP members as well as representatives of five political parties and
    civil society. In May Guei reshuffled the cabinet, effectively ridding
    the Government of most members of the Republican Rally (RDR), the party
    of rival presidential candidate and former Prime Minister Alassane
    Ouattara. On September 22, Guei again changed the cabinet, eliminating
    three additional members who were considered sympathetic to the RDR.
    The Constitutional and Electoral Consultative Commission (CCCE), which
    was created by the CNSP and included members of all major political
    parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and prominent members
    of civil society, drafted a new constitution; however, Guei made
    several substantive changes to the text, including inserting
    controversial language regarding the eligibility requirements to be
    president, before submitting the draft constitution to a referendum. On
    July 23 and 24, the citizens overwhelmingly approved the new
    Constitution in a referendum, and the Constitution was implemented on
    August 4. On October 26, after a flawed October 22 presidential
    election, which was marred by significant violence and irregularities,
    including a suspension of the vote count for several days, the Supreme
    Court declared Laurent Gbagbo the victor with 53 percent of the vote.
    Except for the RDR, which decided not to accept ministerial posts,
    major political parties were represented in the new Government, which
    was made up of 24 ministers. An election for the National Assembly was
    held on December 10 and was marred by violence, irregularities, and a
    very low participation rate. The Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) won 96 of
    the 225 seats; the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), the former
    ruling party, won 77; independent candidates won 17; and 4 other
    parties won a combined 7 seats. Twenty-eight seats remained unfilled at
    year's end. To protest the invalidation of the candidacy of party
    president Alassane Ouattara, the RDR boycotted and disrupted the
    legislative elections. The judiciary is subject to executive branch and
    other outside influence.
        Security forces include the army, navy, and air force, all under
    the Ministry of Defense; the Republican Guard, a well-funded
    presidential security force; the national police (Surete Nationale);
    and the Gendarmerie, a branch of the armed forces with responsibility
    for general law enforcement, maintenance of public order, and internal
    security, including suppression of violent crime. The National Security
    Council, which was formed in 1996 and coordinated internal and external
    security policy, was dissolved by the Minister of State for Security in
    January following the December 1999 coup. Also in January, General Guei
    created a special military unit, the P.C. Crise, to assist in
    reestablishing order, to control crime, and to put an end to abuses
    committed by the military. In May General Guei officially disbanded the
    P.C. Crise and other quasi-military groups, including the Kamajors,
    Cosa Nostra, Cobra, and Red Brigade, that had formed within the
    military following the coup, and which had come to be known as the
    ``parallel forces.'' However, some members of these groups continued to
    act as vigilante forces, and on September 20, the Government announced
    the formation of a new ``P.C. Crise Marine.'' The civilian Directorate
    of General Intelligence (DRG) is responsible for countering internal
    threats. A security staff (L'Etat Major de la Securite) collects and
    distributes information about crime and coordinates the activities of
    the security forces in times of crisis. The Special Anticrime Police
    Brigade (SAVAC) and the Anti-Riot Brigade (BAE) continued their
    operations. Upon taking office, President Gbagbo combined the
    Ministries of Interior and Security; however, he decided against
    altering the structure of the security forces. While the Gbagbo and
    Guei Governments generally maintained effective control of the security
    forces, there were instances in which security forces acted
    independently of government authority, most notably during military
    mutinies in March and July, and surrounding the presidential and
    parliamentary elections in October and December respectively. In
    addition there are major divisions within the military based on ethnic,
    religious, and political loyalties. Security forces, particularly the
    ``parallel forces,'' committed numerous human rights abuses.
        The economy is largely market-based and heavily dependent on the
    commercial agricultural sector. Most of the rural population remains
    dependent on smallholder cash crop production. Principal exports are
    cocoa, coffee, and wood. In 1999 approximately 56 percent of the adult
    population was literate, but the rate among women (44 percent) is only
    two-thirds of the rate among men (66 percent). Recorded gross national
    product per capita in 1999 was about $700. After several years of 6 to
    7 percent annual economic growth following the 1994 currency
    devaluation, growth slowed to about 3 percent in 1999 and was an
    estimated negative 2 to 3 percent during the year. Income remains
    unevenly distributed, and government expenditures for basic education
    and health services were far below planned levels. Widespread
    corruption is rooted in a lack of transparent and accountable
    governance. The political manipulations of the Guei Government, which
    resulted in investor and consumer uncertainty, further impeded economic
    growth. The Guei and Gbagbo Governments only received limited
    assistance from international financial institutions during the year
    due to the coup, government corruption, mismanagement, and political
    unrest following recent elections.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and there were
    serious problems in a number of areas. Citizens did not fully have the
    right to change their Government. Members of the security forces
    committed hundreds of extrajudicial killings. Following a September 18
    attack on General Guei's residence, military forces and gendarmes
    arrested numerous soldiers; 3 or 4 were tortured to death, and 23
    others were detained and tortured. The security forces beat and abused
    detainees and used force to disperse protesters. Prison conditions
    remained harsh and life threatening. The Government generally failed to
    bring perpetrators of these abuses to justice. The Government used
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged detention remained a
    problem. Journalists and opposition members, in particular, were
    detained without trial for long periods. In January the CNSP released
    from custody all members of the Bedie Government that were arrested
    following the December 1999 coup; however, former Minister of State for
    Interior and Decentralization Emile Constant Bombet was detained again
    for 33 days. By February all of the army officers arrested and detained
    during and after the December 1999 coup were released without having
    been tried. The judiciary did not ensure due process and was subject to
    executive branch influence, particularly in political cases. Security
    forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Guei Government
    restricted freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and movement.
    Despite some formal restrictions on freedom of association, the Guei
    and Gbagbo Governments generally respected this right in practice. At
    least 26 percent of the country's adult population, including many
    lifelong residents of the country, remained politically disenfranchised
    noncitizens. Discrimination and violence against women, abuse of
    children, and female genital mutilation (FGM) remained serious
    problems. Muslims and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions
    were subject to discrimination. Violent ethnic tensions persisted, and
    societal discrimination based on ethnicity remained a problem. Child
    labor, forced child labor, and trafficking in persons, including
    children, continued; however, efforts to combat these problems within
    the country showed some success.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed extrajudicial killings, including politically motivated
    killings. There were reports that government security forces killed
    three or four suspected coup plotters after an alleged assassination
    attempt on General Guei on September 18 (see Section 1.b.). For
    example, Sergeant Sansan Kambire was arrested shortly after the
    September 17 and 18 attack on General Guei's residence. His corpse was
    discovered in an Abidjan mortuary 3 days after his arrest. That same
    month, General Guei's personal guard tortured and killed Chief Sergeant
    Souleymane Diomande, also known as ``La Granade,'' while he was
    detained at Akouedo military camp. Soldiers poured acid on Diomande and
    then beat him to death. Guei's guard also arrested and tortured to
    death Corporal Abdoudramani Ouattara and an unidentified person from
    Burkina Faso for the September attack. In October the military
    prosecutor announced that, at the families' request, an investigation
    would be conducted into the deaths of the three soldiers; the
    investigation was ongoing at year's end.
        Security forces frequently resorted to lethal force to combat
    widespread violent crime. The CNSP-created special crime fighting unit,
    P.C. Crise, and other unofficial quasi-militia forces that sprang up
    after the 1999 coup committed the majority of these killings. Members
    of the P.C. Crise, the Kamajors, Cosa Nostra, Cobra, and Red Brigade
    pursued suspected criminals and frequently executed them immediately
    after capture; occasionally they publicly displayed the bodies.
    According to government statements and media reports, the security
    forces had killed hundreds of criminals by year's end. Such killings by
    the P.C. Crise ended after Gbagbo assumed the Presidency and formed the
    P.C. Crise Marine.
        On February 6, security forces shot several persons, including
    students and civil servants, while responding to a problem in a
    nightclub in Abidjan's Treichville neighborhood; two persons died.
    During a military mutiny on July 4 and 5, mutineers killed a woman in
    Abidjan's central business district of Plateau, allegedly because she
    refused to give up her car during a carjacking. The other reported
    deaths during this uprising occurred during clashes between mutineers
    and forces loyal to the Guei Government, in which 4 soldiers died and
    10 civilians were wounded.
        On October 16, a police officer shot a Nigerian woman, Confort
    Egiantey, while she was traveling on a public minibus. The officer was
    chasing the driver of another minibus that had refused to stop for a
    police check. The police officer was arrested, and his trial was
    pending at year's end. According to the Ivoirian Movement for Human
    Rights (MIDH), during and for several days following the October
    presidential election, more than 500 persons were killed in clashes
    with security forces or during clashes with other protesters, by
    gunshot, drowning, or torture. In addition 860 persons, many of whom
    were FPI and RDR militants, were injured. Gendarmes also killed some
    protestors while they were in detention. In December the Malian High
    Council reported that more than 20 Malians were killed and 10
    disappeared during the demonstrations and violence that followed the
    October presidential elections.
        In December there was a press report that security forces had
    killed at least 10 Nigerians, allegedly for supporting the opposition.
        The Gbagbo Government, which took power on October 26, had a mixed
    record in controlling the security forces. In October after the
    presidential elections and again in early December in the period prior
    to the parliamentary elections, gendarmes and police reacted violently
    against RDR political demonstrations. On October 25, 57 bodies of
    Muslims were discovered at a site in the Abidjan district of Yopougon.
    Gendarmes widely are believed to be responsible for these killings.
    Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other independent investigators published
    the testimony of alleged survivors who claim gendarmes had dragged them
    from their homes, marched them along a road where dozens of dead bodies
    lay, forced them into vans, and then shot dozens of them. Some
    survivors stated that they lay on the ground pretending to be dead
    until the gendarmes departed. After taking office, Gbagbo established
    an inquiry into the massacres at Yopougon; however, by year's end, the
    Government had not published the findings of its investigation nor had
    it taken action against members of the security forces responsible for
    the mass abuse.
        Following the November 30 Supreme Court announcement of the
    disqualification of Alassane Ouattara for legislative elections,
    thousands of RDR supporters demonstrated in protest of the decision
    (see Section 3). According to the Government, approximately 13 persons
    were killed in violent clashes with the military and gendarmes,
    including a municipal treasury official whose throat was slashed by RDR
    demonstrators; the RDR estimated that there were 30 killings. MIDH
    reported that 37 persons had died, most by gunshot, along with several
    hundred persons injured.
        By year's end, the Government had taken no action against the
    gendarmes and police officers responsible for the deaths and abuses
    committed against FPI and RDR demonstrations after the October 22
    presidential elections and in the period prior to and following the
    parliamentary elections on December 10.
        On December 4, gendarmes shot and killed Kaba Bakary, a 60yearold
    Guinean, in front of his family as he was getting ready for Muslim
    prayers. Reportedly he was shot because he was wearing a Muslim robe,
    which the gendarmes believed marked him as a supporter of the RDR. No
    action was taken against the gendarmes by year's end.
        On December 6, following RDR demonstrations, some presidential
    guards arrested RDR President Ouattara's private secretary, Abou
    Coulibaly, as he was passing President Gbagbo's residence in Cocody.
    When they found out that he was working for Ouattara, the presidential
    guards severely beat Coulibaly and took him to the Agban Gendarmerie
    camp where they continued to beat him. The security forces took him to
    a local medical clinic where he died from his injuries on December 7.
        No action was taken against police personnel responsible for a
    number of killings during demonstrations that occurred between April
    and October 1999.
        Trials still are pending at year's end against 15 trainee gendarmes
    arrested in 1999 for beating Camara Yaya to death.
        Police have made no arrests in the December 1998 death in police
    custody of Jean Claude Lama, a 16-year-old street child. The
    authorities continued to characterize the death as a suicide.
        Following the October 22 presidential election and subsequent
    demonstrations and violence, 18 bodies were found that had washed
    ashore in Abidjan's lagoon; the bodies had been shot numerous times. At
    year's end, it remained unknown who was responsible for the killings,
    and a government investigation into the incident was ongoing.
        Ethnic violence between Kroumen and settlers from Burkina Faso in
    the Southwest resulted in at least 13 deaths in September and another 5
    deaths in early October (see Section 1.a.).
        b. Disappearance.--Following the September 18 alleged assassination
    attempt on General Guei, government security forces arrested numerous
    soldiers suspected of involvement in the assassination attempt and in
    coup plotting (see Section 1.d.). Evidence and the testimonies of 13 of
    the 23 released soldiers suggest that 3 or 4 of the soldiers that
    disappeared were tortured and killed (see Section 1.a.).
        In the period following the October 22 presidential elections,
    scores of persons disappeared. Newspapers frequently published the
    appeals of families who were looking for their children or relatives.
    There were numerous reports that parents visited hospitals and the
    morgues looking for their children after failing to find them in any of
    the gendarmerie camps or at the police school. In November an
    independent newspaper, Soir Info, published an appeal from the chief of
    San Pedro to President Gbagbo to help him find his son.
        In December the Malian High Council reported that more than 20
    Malians were killed and 10 disappeared during the demonstrations and
    violence that followed the October presidential elections. It reported
    that most of the persons who had disappeared had been arrested by the
    police.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The new Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman
    treatment, humiliating and degrading punishment, torture, physical
    violence, and other mistreatment; however, in practice security forces
    regularly beat detainees and prisoners to punish them or to extract
    confessions and frequently forced detainees to perform degrading and
    humiliating tasks, such as crawling, eating dirt, doing push-ups while
    under threat of physical harm, drinking urine or blood, and eating
    excrement. Jurists' union officials and journalists working for the
    opposition press reported that police continue to beat suspects to
    obtain confessions and that suspects are afraid to press charges
    against the police officers involved. According to local human rights
    groups, police and gendarmes beat and humiliate detainees or prisoners.
    Press photographs regularly showed detainees with swollen or bruised
    faces and bodies. In general government officers who are members of the
    security forces are not held accountable for abuses.
        In December 1998, the Government enacted legislation allowing
    lawyers to assist their clients during the early stages of detention
    when abuse is most likely. In spite of this legislation, during the
    year, police officers and gendarmes continued to mistreat suspects and
    other persons summoned to police and gendarmerie stations, and on many
    instances, the security forces did not allow lawyers access to their
    clients (see Section 1.d.). Police also verbally abused lawyers who
    tried to assist their clients.
        On January 11, in Abidjan's Yopougon neighborhood, members of the
    police anti-riot brigade stopped a bus and forced the passengers out of
    the vehicle and beat and kicked several students who were on the bus,
    including a pregnant law student. Military personnel intervened to stop
    the beatings. The police explained their actions to their commander by
    claiming that students on the previous bus that had passed their
    checkpoint had insulted them. No action was taken against the
    responsible police officers.
        On January 18, members of the military beat citizens and ransacked
    residences in the city of Daoukro, the home town of former President
    Bedie, and surrounding villages. Many of the victims were Bedie's
    relatives or associates. On March 14, members of the military returned
    to Daoukro to beat citizens, including members of the Bedie family, and
    confiscated property that Bedie allegedly acquired illegally.
        On February 1, police used tear gas to disperse striking workers at
    the Commune of Cocody City Hall, seriously injuring two of the strikers
    who were hospitalized as a result of their injuries (see Section 6.a.).
        On February 4, ``Dozos'' (traditional northern hunters), who were
    hired by the Guei military Government to provide security, tied up and
    beat a university student after mistaking him for a crime suspect. The
    Government took no action against the Dozos responsible for the
    beating.
        On February 6, members of the P.C. Crise beat singer Honore Djoman
    and then transported him to the Akouedo military camp where they
    continued to beat him. Reportedly the P.C. Crise members were hired to
    beat Djoman by a person with whom he had a business dispute. On
    February 7, members of the P.C. Crise severely beat security guard
    Alain Patrice Dago after being told about a dispute over money that
    Dabo had with an acquaintance.
        On February 21, police severely beat nurse Boua Keke after
    mistaking him for a suspect they were pursuing. No action was taken
    against the police officers.
        On March 25 in Bouake, off-duty P.C. Crise member Salif Keita shot
    and injured a student, Aboudramane Coulibaly, whom he believed was
    going to assault a woman. Following Student Union statements
    criticizing the P.C. Crise, General Guei intervened within 48 hours to
    have Coulibaly transferred to an Abidjan hospital. Keita was tried by a
    military court and sentenced to 12 months in prison.
        On March 28, gendarmes in Man mistakenly beat a fellow gendarme
    after mistaking him for a robbery suspect.
        In May members of the military abused a judge who rendered a
    decision in a labor dispute with which they disagreed (see Section
    1.e.).
        During the July 4 to 5 military mutiny, soldiers seriously injured
    more than 10 civilians, including several who suffered gunshot wounds.
    Thirty-five mutineers were tried; however, they were not tried
    necessarily for their mistreatment of civilians.
        On July 9, gendarmes arrested, beat, and tortured Soumbiala
    Doumbia, a student, following Doumbia's alleged attempt to kill a rival
    student leader. The Government took no action against the responsible
    gendarmes.
        On September 25, members of the military beat students from the
    Federation of High School and University Students of Cote d'Ivoire
    (FESCI) on the university's Cocody campus; three of the students were
    injured seriously (see Section 2.a.). No action was taken against any
    members of the military.
        During and immediately following the October presidential
    elections, security forces killed and injured hundreds of persons (see
    Sections 1.a. and 3). For example, on October 24, soldiers loyal to
    General Guei attempted to disperse an FPI demonstration to protest
    General Guei's decision to remain in power despite his defeat in the
    presidential election. When police superintendent Tiagnere tried to
    prevent the soldiers' actions, the soldiers beat him, then drove him to
    an unknown location in the trunk of a car. He was discovered the
    following day with a broken leg and broken ribs.
        On October 25, 13 of the 27 soldiers arrested for their alleged
    participation in an attack against General Guei's residence on
    September 18 stated that they had been tortured during their detention
    in Akouedo camp. On November 20, le Patriote, a proRDR newspaper,
    published an interview granted by 1 of the 27 soldiers. The soldier
    stated that soldiers loyal to Lieutenant Laurent Yapi Boka and General
    Guei tortured him and his friends during their detention in Akouedo
    military camp in late September and early October. He stated that
    soldiers wrapped them in barbed wire, then stomped on them with their
    heavy boots, in addition to beating them with iron bars.
        In September soldiers tortured to death Sergeant Chief Souleymane
    Diomande while he was in detention (see Section 1.a.).
        On November 26, in the Abidjan district of Adjame-Agban, gendarmes
    beat and left in a critical state a minibus driver, Mourlaye Bamba,
    when another driver refused to stop at a police checkpoint. The
    gendarmes also shot another minibus driver and union leader, Sangouyana
    Cisse, in the leg while his vehicle was stopped at a red light.
        On December 5, gendarmes arrested and beat severely Jean Philippe
    Kabore, the son of RDR Secretary General Henriette Dagri Diabate, for
    allegedly transporting arms in his car. Kabore suffered a fractured
    skull and broken limbs. He was hospitalized for treatment and remained
    in detention in Abidjan's prison at year's end.
        On December 4 and 5, gendarmes and police officers violently
    dispersed members of the RDR who were demonstrating to protest against
    the invalidation of Ouattara's candidacy in the presidential and
    legislative elections, which resulted in numerous injuries (see
    Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3).
        According to the Ivoirian Association for the Defense of Women's
    Rights (AIDF), during RDR demonstrations on December 4 and 5, gendarmes
    raped at least 10 female protestors at the police school. President
    Gbagbo requested that the Ministry of Interior and Security conduct an
    investigation. The Ministry concluded that ``anti-demonstrators,'' not
    gendarmes or police officers, raped three women near the police school,
    but admitted that the rapes took place in the presence of gendarmes,
    after they had arrested the women.
        On December 5, six police officers that were pursuing RDR
    demonstrations forced their way into Traore Fousseni's house. They
    destroyed furniture, beat him with truncheons, and stole all of his
    money. They also beat Traore's wives and brotherinlaw. Reportedly they
    were beaten because they belonged to the ``Dioula'' ethnic group, which
    is represented highly among RDR members.
        On December 5, BAE members responding to a fire in a mosque used
    tear gas and beat Muslims who had gathered to inspect the damage to the
    mosque (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 5).
        On December 6, presidential guards beat to death Abou Coulibaby,
    RDR president Ouattara's private Secretary (see Section 1.a.).
        On December 15, the Agence France Presse (AFP) published the
    testimonies of several persons whom gendarmes tortured during and after
    the December 4 and 5 RDR demonstrations. The victims withheld their
    names, but some stated that they were from the north, while others
    stated that they were from neighboring countries. All claimed that
    drunken policemen beat them every night with truncheons, whips, and
    boards with nails, or burnt them. One man stated that the policemen
    burnt his genitals.
        Security forces regularly beat and harassed journalists (see
    Section 2.a.). For example, on October 26, gendarmes beat Raphael
    Lakpe, the publisher of the pro-RDR Le Populaire, and his bodyguard at
    the Koumassi Commando Camp (see Section 2.a.). On the same day,
    gendarmes also severely beat Bakary Nimaga, chief editor of the pro-RDR
    newspaper Le Liberal (see Section 2.a.).
        Police frequently used excessive force to disperse demonstrations.
    On July 31, military riot police used tear gas, rifle butts, and
    truncheons against demonstrators supporting statements by the French
    Government on candidate participation in the presidential election (see
    Section 2.b.). The demonstrators were prevented from gathering at the
    French Embassy, and many were beaten, forced to do push-ups, eat
    cement, and crawl through downtown streets in Abidjan. Security forces
    also beat a journalist covering the event (see Section 2.a.). There
    were 47 reported injuries, of which 17 were serious. On September 9,
    gendarmes used tear gas to disperse a crowd gathered in the Abidjan
    neighborhood of Yopougon to attend an RDR meeting (see Section 2.b.).
    Upon learning that the meeting had been canceled by the CNSP the
    previous evening, some of the crowd threw stones at the gendarmes, who
    responded with tear gas. Police also frequently used violence to
    restrain and disperse demonstrators.
        Police routinely harassed and abused noncitizen Africans (see
    Section 5). On occasion police entered the homes and businesses of
    citizens, noncitizens Africans, and other noncitizens, and extorted
    money from them (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). In October and December,
    foreigners complained publicly that the police often stopped them for
    identity checks and confiscated their documents to later sell them back
    to the original owners. They reported that even when their residence
    permits were valid, police would take them to police stations where
    they were beaten and detained overnight if they did not pay a bribe to
    the officers. In December a newspaper quoting some of the hundreds of
    Nigerians who returned to Nigeria to escape the antiforeigner violence
    reported that security forces had tortured Nigerians.
        Many unemployed and homeless detainees reported that authorities
    beat them while they were in detention.
        Military and other forces were responsible for numerous robberies,
    carjackings, widespread looting, and acts of intimidation. These abuses
    were widespread particularly during the military mutiny of July 4 and
    5. Mutineers robbed, looted, destroyed property, and terrified the
    citizenry. The mutineers targeted the cities of Abidjan, Bouake,
    Katiola, Korhogo, and Yamoussoukro in particular. Following the July
    mutiny, the Government arrested 114 soldiers and 6 officers for their
    actions during the uprising. The Government released 74 of the soldiers
    after questioning and tried the remaining 40; 35 soldiers were
    convicted of participating in the mutiny. Four of the six officers were
    awaiting trial at year's end; charges against the other two officers
    were dismissed following an investigation.
        No action was taken against the two police officers who shot and
    injured Momble Roger Zemon, a driver for Sucrivoire, in Abidjan's
    Yopougon district in 1999. No action was taken against police officers
    who beat and detained Issa Traore, a 30year-old member of the Truck
    Drivers and Truck Owners Trade Union in Abidjan's Adjame district in
    1999.
        Even though prison deaths have declined, harsh and lifethreatening
    conditions still result in hundreds of fatalities each year. Problems
    include overcrowding, malnutrition, a high incidence of infectious
    disease, and lack of treatment facilities and medications. HIV/AIDS,
    diarrhea, and tuberculosis also reportedly are significant causes of
    death. In 1999 there were 537 inmate deaths in the nation's prison
    system, of which 122 deaths occurred at the Abidjan House of Arrest and
    Corrections (MACA), including 27 deaths of inmates who were trampled on
    December 23, 1999.
        The Director of Penitentiary Administration stated that the death
    rate at the MACA had dropped by 60 percent since October 1998 and was
    expected to remain low due to improvements made in 1999 to the
    sanitation system. Improvements were financed jointly by Doctors
    Without Borders and the Government. Doctors Without Borders reported
    that the death rate in prisons had fallen approximately 90 percent from
    1997.
        During the December 1999 coup, the mutineers released all 6,693
    inmates of the MACA. The unforeseen outcome of this action was improved
    conditions due to less overcrowding; however, by November the MACA
    population numbered approximately 3,800 inmates. The MACA was designed
    to hold only 1,500 inmates. On December 31, President Gbagbo announced
    a presidential pardon for 2,500 prisons nationwide. It was unclear how
    many of those pardons went to MACA prisoners.
        In July the government newspaper Fraternite Matin stated that
    prison conditions for women especially were difficult. In 1998 the
    prison separated female and male prisoners and began using female
    guards for female prisoners and male guards for male prisoners. Female
    prisoners are housed in a separate building that can hold up to 120
    residents, and as of May, there were 78 women detained there. There
    still are no health facilities for women. There continued to be
    credible reports of children born in prison or living in prison with
    their mothers; as of May, there were 13 children living with their
    mothers in prison. During the year, there were no reports that guards
    raped female prisoners. Nevertheless, there still were reports that
    female prisoners engaged in sexual relations with their wardens in
    exchange for food and more privileges.
        Since 1998 the Government has permitted the International Catholic
    Office for Children (BICE) to improve conditions at the MACA for women
    and their children. During the year, BICE removed 34 children from the
    prison and placed them with family members or foster families. BICE
    also provided female inmates with food, medical care, clothing, soap,
    and other necessities. BICE constructed a multi-purpose room for
    pregnant women, mothers, and children.
        Juvenile offenders are held separately from adults. At year's end,
    170 13-to 18-year olds, including 14 girls, were in detention.
        The Government permits access to prisons by local and international
    NGO's that seek to provide food and medical care to prisoners. In
    addition to BICE, humanitarian NGO's, including the International
    Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Prisoners Without Borders, and
    Doctors Without Borders had access to the prisons and visited them
    during the year to provide food and medical care to prisoners. However,
    none of these NGO's specifically monitored human rights conditions in
    the prisons. The Ivoirian Human Rights League (LIDHO), which monitors
    human rights conditions in prisons, does not have authorization to
    visit prisons without advance notice. LIDHO usually must write to the
    prison warden if it wants to visit inmates. Wardens rarely grant
    approval on the first request. LIDHO stated publicly that they did not
    visit the MACA during the year because the overcrowding problem
    temporarily was alleviated and conditions had improved somewhat
    following the December 1999 release of all inmates in MACA. However,
    during the year, LIDHO did visit Abidjan's military prison, the MAMA.
        After Gbagbo took office, there were no reports that NGO's had
    difficulty gaining access to prisons.
        On October 27, after five days of protests and fighting following
    the October 22 presidential election, a mass grave containing 57
    persons was discovered at Yopougon, northwest of Abidjan. International
    and local human rights groups immediately called for an inquiry, and
    President Gbagbo agreed to international investigations.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The new Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice
    arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. Under the Code of
    Penal Procedure, a public prosecutor may order the detention of a
    suspect for only 48 hours without bringing charges. A magistrate may
    order detention for up to 4 months but also must provide the Minister
    of Justice with a written justification for continued detention on a
    monthly basis. However, the law often is violated. Police and the CNSP
    have held persons for more than 48 hours without bringing charges.
    According to members of a jurists' union, this practice is common and
    magistrates often are unable to verify that detainees who are not
    charged are released.
        Defendants do not have the right to a judicial determination of the
    legality of their detention. A judge may release pretrial detainees on
    provisional liberty if the judge believes that the suspect is not
    likely to flee. Inmates continue to suffer long detention periods while
    awaiting trial in the MACA. On July 7, Ministry of Justice figures
    indicated that of the 2,975 inmates in the MACA, 1,063 (36 percent)
    were awaiting trial and 1,912 (64 percent) had been tried and were
    serving their sentences. In the 32 regional prisons outside of Abidjan,
    out of 9,059 inmates, only 1,787 (20 percent) were awaiting trial,
    while 5,275 (80 percent) were serving their sentences. In spite of a
    1998 law that limits pretrial detention to 10 months in civil cases and
    22 months in criminal cases, some detainees have spent as many as 5
    years in detention awaiting trial.
        On February 1, members of the military briefly detained the players
    of the Ivoirian National Soccer Team as they returned from the African
    Cup of Nations in Ghana. Soldiers transported the team to the Zambakro
    Military Camp, confiscated the players' cell phones and passports, and
    detained them for 48 hours. General Guei stated that the team, which
    had performed disappointingly in the tournament, needed to learn a
    lesson in patriotism, civics, and sportsmanship. He threatened the
    players with military service the next time they lacked patriotism.
        On February 3, in the town of Toumodi, members of the military fire
    brigade detained Judge Aka Allou and forced him to release from custody
    their colleague Kouanda Ismalia. Kouanda had been convicted of breach
    of trust and was serving his sentence at the time. Following strong
    protests from two magistrates' unions, the Guei Government intervened
    and ordered the military firemen to release Judge Allou and return
    Ismaili to prison.
        Between February and June, the Guei Government arrested
    approximately a dozen former ministers and high government officials
    considered close to former President Bedie as part of the anti-
    corruption fight known as ``Operation Clean Hands'' (see Section 3).
    For some officials, it was their second time being arrested since the
    coup. Authorities released all of the former government members by the
    end of July due to lack of evidence. Among those arrested were former
    Minister of State for the Interior and eventual PDCI presidential
    candidate Emile Constant Bombet. Security forces had arrested Bombet
    following the December 23 overthrow of Bedie and had detained him for 1
    month without charge. He was rearrested in February and held for 33
    days for allegedly having organized gatherings that endangered national
    security and for his alleged involvement in embezzling state funds set
    aside for organizing presidential and legislative elections in 1995. On
    September 6, the same day that Bombet was invested as the PDCI
    presidential candidate, the prosecutor reopened his case for further
    investigation. At year's end, Bombet was awaiting trial but no longer
    was in detention.
        On July 9, gendarmes arrested and tortured a student leader (see
    Section 1.c.).
        On July 12, gendarmes arrested three members and one suspected
    member of the RDR on suspicion of involvement in the July 4 and 5
    military mutiny. For 6 hours, gendarmes questioned Amadou Gon
    Coulibaly, Deputy Secretary General of the RDR; Ally Coulibaly, RDR
    National Secretary for Communication; Amadou Sangafowa, RDR Deputy
    National Secretary for Organization; and Mamadou Coulibaly, Amadou Gon
    Coulibaly's uncle, about the mutiny and then released them after 48
    hours in detention. The Government never disclosed the evidence linking
    the four to involvement in the July 4 and 5 events.
        On July 21, the CNSP briefly detained and questioned National
    Islamic Council (CNI) President El Hadj Idriss Kone Koudouss (see
    Section 2.c.). The CNSP warned Koudouss not to advise Muslims to vote
    against the Constitution in the July 23 referendum, as they accused him
    of doing in a previous sermon. The CNSP noted that such types of
    sermons could be considered inciting violence and rebellion. Koudouss
    was released after the warning.
        On July 28, the military tribunal detained and questioned Professor
    Morifere Bamba, the former Minister of Health in the transitional
    regime and leader of the Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS). He was
    accused of cooperating with the July 4 and 5 mutineers. In August he
    was released for lack of any evidence.
        In August authorities placed Zemogo Fofana, RDR National Secretary
    for External Relations and mayor of Boundiali, under house arrest. The
    Government accused Fofana of recruiting mercenaries to overthrow Guei
    and disrupt presidential elections. Authorities released Fofana within
    a week and allowed him to return to his home in Boundiali after the
    October 22 elections.
        On August 24, the gendarmes detained and questioned El Hadj
    Koudouss, four other prominent imams from the CNI, and one Islamic
    youth leader (see Section 2.c.). The Government accused them of
    procuring arms, in cooperation with RDR presidential candidate
    Ouattara, in order to destabilize the country. The gendarmes released
    all six after questioning. According to the imams, this was the fifth
    time that leaders of the CNI had been called in for questioning since
    the coup.
        On September 8, members of the security forces arrested Amadou
    Kone, computer engineer with the National Geographic Information and
    Teledetection Center. The Government accused him of revealing to the
    RDR strategic information and endangering national security. This
    information was the early partial results of the July 23 and 24
    referendum, which Kone helped the RDR attain by installing a
    computerized information system in their offices. Kone was released
    from custody on September 13, and charges against him were dropped for
    lack of evidence.
        Following the September 18 assassination attempt on General Guei,
    government security forces arrested numerous soldiers suspected of
    involvement in the attempt; one of the soldiers remained unaccounted
    for at year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
        On September 24, uniformed men arrested Alphonse Douaty, FPI
    National Secretary for the Mountains Region, at his home. According to
    his family, the men who arrested Douaty stated that they were taking
    him to General Guei who wanted to discuss Douaty's opposition to the
    General's presidential candidacy. Douaty was released on September 26.
        On November 8, police arrested Quartermaster General Lassana
    Palenfo and Air Force Brigadier General Abdoulaye Coulibaly and charged
    them with orchestrating an assassination plot against General Guei in
    September. Their hearing for the attempted assassination began on
    November 14 and continued at year's end; during the hearing, military
    prosecutors continued to introduce new evidence in order to keep the
    two generals incarcerated (see Section 1.e.).
        On December 5, police detained an imam who attempted to intervene
    to prevent beatings by BAE members of Muslims (see Sections 1.c., 2.c.,
    and 5.). The police also entered two mosques and detained persons
    inside. On December 6, some presidential guards arrested and beat Abou
    Coulibaly outside of President Gbagbo's residence; he later died from
    his injuries (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        During the year, members of the military regularly entered
    businesses unannounced and used threats to force local and expatriate
    businessmen to accompany them for questioning. The military members
    claimed to be searching for property that was stolen from the
    Government during the Bedie regime or looking for evidence of economic
    crimes; military members extorted payments frequently for these alleged
    crimes. This abuse decreased under the Gbagbo Government.
        Foreigners complained that they were subject to police harassment;
    in particular that police would take them to police stations where they
    were beaten and detained overnight if they did not pay a bribe to the
    officers (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
        During and following the December 1999 coup, the mutineers arrested
    approximately 150 ministers, military officers, and other officials
    known as supporters of the Bedie Government; however, formal charges
    were not filed. Many of these officials subsequently were released and
    rearrested during the next several months following the coup.
        During student strikes in May 1999, police arrested student leaders
    Kouame Kouakou and Drigone Faye in Bouake on charges of inciting
    violence and destruction of property under the 1992 Antivandalism Law.
    Charles Ble Goude, the secretary general of FESCI, was arrested on
    August 17 and also was charged with inciting violence and destruction
    of property. None of the students were charged with a crime, and all
    three students were released by October 1999.
        In December 1999, the Bedie Government issued a warrant for
    Ouattara's arrest for the alleged falsification of documents and their
    use. Newspaper accounts speculated that Bedie ordered the warrant
    issued to intimidate Ouattara and to prevent him from returning to the
    country.
        Journalists frequently were arrested, detained, or questioned for
    short periods of time without being charged, as were political party
    and religious leaders (see Sections 2.a., 2.c., and 3).
        Although it is prohibited by law, police restrict access to some
    prisoners. For example, gendarmes did not allow the lawyers of four RDR
    suspects arrested on July 12 to speak with their clients during their
    detention. Despite the frequency of arbitrary arrest, there is no
    accurate total of suspects held. There have been no reports of lawyer
    harassment during the year. Police also verbally abused lawyers who
    tried to assist their clients.
        Article 12 of the new Constitution specifically prohibits forced
    exile; however, the Guei Government prevented former President Bedie's
    return to the country. General Guei denied a request from the PDCI to
    allow Bedie's return in August to take part in their convention and
    possibly the presidential race.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The new Constitution provides for
    an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is subject
    to executive branch, military, and other outside influences. Although
    the judiciary is independent in ordinary criminal cases, it follows the
    lead of the executive in national security or politically sensitive
    cases. Judges serve at the discretion of the executive, and there were
    credible reports that they submit to political pressure.
        The formal judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and
    includes the Court of Appeals and lower courts. In July the Government
    named a new Supreme Court President and a new Constitutional Chamber to
    the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Chamber, whose main
    responsibility is to determine presidential candidate eligibility, was
    hand-picked by General Guei and was headed by Kone Tia, Guei's former
    legal advisor. At year's end, Kone Tia remained president of the
    Supreme Court. The Constitution grants the President of the Republic
    the power to replace the head of the court once a new parliament is in
    place, and Gbagbo is expected to do so in early 2001.
        Military courts do not try civilians. Although there are no
    appellate courts within the military court system, persons convicted by
    a military tribunal may petition the Supreme Court to set aside the
    tribunal's verdict and order a retrial.
        In rural areas, traditional institutions often administer justice
    at the village level, handling domestic disputes and minor land
    questions in accordance with customary law. Dispute resolution is by
    extended debate, with no known instance of resort to physical
    punishment. The formal court system increasingly is superseding these
    traditional mechanisms. In 1996 a Grand Mediator was appointed to
    settle disputes that cannot be resolved by traditional means. The new
    Constitution specifically provided for the office of Grand Mediator,
    which is designed to bridge traditional and modern methods of dispute
    resolution. The President names the Grand Mediator, and Mathieu Ekra
    has been Grand Mediator since the Bedie Government.
        The law provides for the right to public trial, although key
    evidence sometimes is given secretly. The presumption of innocence and
    the right of defendants to be present at their trials often are not
    respected. Those convicted have the right of appeal, although higher
    courts rarely overturn verdicts. Defendants accused of felonies or
    capital crimes have the right to legal counsel, and the judicial system
    provides for courtappointed attorneys; however, no free legal
    assistance is available, except infrequently when members of the bar
    provide pro bono advice to defendants for limited time periods. In
    April the bar began operating a telephone hotline for free legal advice
    from volunteer attorneys. On November 28, the president of the bar
    announced that the bar would not continue to provide free legal
    assistance to poor clients if their transportation and lodging expenses
    were not furnished by the Government. The bar has 200 members that help
    give free legal advice. In practice many defendants cannot afford
    private counsel and court-appointed attorneys are not available
    readily. In many instances, security forces did not allow lawyers'
    access to their clients (see Section 1.d.).
        Members of the military interfered with court cases and attempted
    to intimidate judges. They also intervened directly in labor disputes,
    sometimes arresting and intimidating parties. From May 20 to 22, judges
    stopped working to protest the treatment they were receiving from
    members of the military. Since the coup, the military had been
    attempting to influence court cases and in May verbally harassed and
    threatened Judge Olivier Kouadio after he rendered a decision in a
    labor dispute with which the military disagreed (see Section 6.b.).
    There are no reports of the military attempting to influence court
    cases under the Gbagbo Government.
        On November 8, police arrested CNSP members Quartermaster General
    Lassana Palenfo and Air Force Brigadier General Abdoulaye Coulibaly and
    charged them with orchestrating an assassination plot against General
    Guei in September. Their hearing for the attempted assassination began
    on November 14 and continued at year's end. During the hearing,
    military prosecutors continued to introduce new evidence and charges in
    order to keep the two generals incarcerated; however, there was no
    trial (see Section 1.d.).
        The new Constitution granted immunity to all CNSP members and all
    participants in the December 1999 coup d'etat for all acts committed in
    connection with the coup, which implicitly included all criminal
    activity such as looting, robbery, carjacking, and intimidation that
    occurred during the coup.
        On January 26, the Guei Government granted amnesty for all offenses
    committed during the September 27 and October 27, 1999 political
    demonstrations. This amnesty included all of the RDR leaders who had
    been tried and convicted under the previous regime's antivandalism law,
    which held leaders of a group responsible for any violence committed by
    one of its members during a demonstration. All of the RDR prisoners
    were released from prison on December 24, 1999, by the mutineers
    leading the December 1999 coup (see Section 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Code of Penal Procedure specifies that a police
    official or investigative magistrate may conduct searches of homes
    without a judicial warrant if there is reason to believe that there is
    evidence on the premises concerning a crime. The official must have the
    prosecutor's agreement to retain any evidence seized in the search and
    is required to have witnesses to the search, which may not take place
    between 9:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. in order to prevent the police and
    gendarmes from entering a home in the middle of night under the auspice
    of a search warrant.
        In practice police sometimes used a general search warrant without
    a name or address. On occasion police have entered the homes of
    noncitizen Africans (or apprehended them at large), taken them to local
    police stations, and extorted small amounts of money for alleged minor
    offenses. In the months following the December coup, soldiers
    frequently extorted money from citizens and foreigners and sold their
    services to private individuals, in some instances beating or abusing
    others on behalf of those citizens (see Section 1.c.). On February 23,
    General Guei reprimanded three members of the military, Sargent Albert
    Ble Ibo, Kouadio Paul Oura, and Konan Alla, who had been using their
    positions to enter homes and extort money from residents, to a military
    court to face sanctions. On February 15, another soldier, Mathurin
    Kouakou, and a police officer, Sargent Jean-Claude Ano, were removed
    from their posts and reprimanded for similar acts; in March they were
    convicted of extortion and given a suspended sentence of 2 months
    imprisonment and fined $43 (FCFA 30,000).
        In January and March, members of the military beat citizens and
    ransacked homes in Daoukro, the hometown of former President Bedie, and
    in surrounding villages (see Section 1.c.).
        On March 20, three soldiers searched the offices of Attorney
    Mathurin Dirabou without a warrant. The soldiers entered the office,
    pulled all of the lawyer's files from his drawers, and left without
    questioning anyone. Dirabou, who at the time was handling former
    Minister of State for the Interior Emile Constant Bombet's defense for
    alleged embezzlement, noted that a similar search had occurred on a
    previous occasion. Following a protest by the Abidjan Bar, the three
    soldiers apologized to Dirabou and stated that their actions were
    unrelated to the attorney's defense of Bombet but were motivated
    personally due to a relative's dispute with Dirabou.
        Police and gendarmes searched 17 mosques for arms prior to the
    October 22 presidential election.
        On August 27, approximately 25 gendarmes searched a mosque in
    Abidjan's Riviera 2 neighborhood, which is headed by one of the leaders
    of the NIC, Imam Sekou Sylla. Gendarmes also mistakenly searched the
    house of one of the imam's neighbors. The gendarmes had intended to
    search the imam's home, allegedly to look for arms that they suspected
    the Muslim community was hiding for the RDR. The gendarmes did not have
    warrants to conduct the search.
        On the night of August 28, gendarmes in the western town of Zouan-
    Hounien searched the home of Mouatapha Diably, the RDR Coordinator for
    the Department of Danane. Diably also was accused of storing arms for
    the RDR; the gendarmes did not have a warrant for the search.
        Following the September 18 alleged assassination attempt at General
    Guei's home in Abidjan (see Section 1.a.), gendarmes searched the homes
    of numerous members of the military who were suspected of taking part
    in or plotting the attack. This included the homes of the Minister of
    State for Security, General Lassana Palenfo, and the Minister of State
    for Transport, General Abdoulaye Coulibaly. The search of Palenfo's
    home occurred while he was out of the country attending the Olympic
    Games in Sydney. The RDR party headquarters in the Adjame district of
    Abidjan also were searched and ransacked. The evidentiary basis for the
    searches was unclear and had not been made public by year's end.
        On September 26, security forces searched the home of Zemogo
    Fofana, the RDR's National Secretary for External Relations, in the
    northern city of Boundiali. Although the purpose of the search was
    unclear, it is believed that the security forces were searching for
    arms. Military, police, and gendarmes also searched the residence of
    Kassoum Coulibaly in the northern city of Korhogo, allegedly looking
    for arms. Coulibaly, a former deputy from Korhogo, is considered to be
    close to General Guei.
        In September and October, gendarmes and members of the military
    made frequent visits, sometimes heavily armed and in armored vehicles
    or in boats, to the residence of RDR presidential candidate Alassane
    Ouattara, whose house is located on the Ebrie Lagoon. Despite at least
    one attempt, the security forces never entered Ouattara's home;
    however, their frequent presence restricted the family's movement and
    observers believe it was intended to intimidate Ouattara and his
    family. Hundreds of RDR supporters began full-time protection of the
    house after the visits began.
        On December 5, six police officers that were pursuing RDR
    demonstrators forced their way into Traore Fousseni's house. They
    destroyed furniture, beat him with truncheons, and stole all of his
    money (see Section 1.c.).
        Security forces reportedly monitored some private telephone
    conversations, but the extent of the practice was unknown. For example,
    on May 12, General Guei claimed to have a copy of a taped telephone
    conversation between RDR Deputy Secretary Amadou Gon Coulibaly and a
    student union member, which Guei claimed revealed the RDR's intention
    to endanger national security. Government authorities monitored letters
    and parcels at the post office for potential criminal activity; they
    are believed widely to monitor private correspondence, although no
    evidence of this has been produced. The Guei Government used students
    as informants at the University of Abidjan (see Section 2.a.); however,
    there were no reports the Gbagbo Government used students as
    informants.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The new Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression, and private newspapers frequently criticize
    government policies; however, the Guei Government imposed significant
    restrictions on this right. At times the Guei Government enforced these
    restrictions by inflicting physical harm upon, threatening, and
    arresting journalists, and ransacking media offices. Journalists
    continued to practice self-censorship.
        The two government-owned daily newspapers, Fraternite Matin and
    Ivoir Soir, offer little criticism of government policy. There are a
    number of private newspapers: 17 daily, 30 weekly, 5 bimonthly, and 10
    monthly. While these newspapers voice their disapproval of government
    or presidential actions frequently and sometimes loudly, the Government
    does not tolerate what it considers insults or attacks on the honor of
    the country's highest officials. A law enacted in 1991, soon after the
    Government first allowed substantial numbers of private newspapers to
    operate, authorizes the State to initiate criminal libel prosecutions
    against persons who insult the President, the Prime Minister, foreign
    chiefs of state or government or their diplomatic representatives,
    defame institutions of the State, or undermine the reputation of the
    nation. In addition the State may criminalize a civil libel suit at its
    discretion and at the request of the plaintiff. Criminal libel is
    punishable by 3 months to 2 years in prison. The Guei Government used
    this law against a number of journalists during the year.
        General Guei's initial transition Government included highly
    respected journalist and former television anchorman Levy Niamkey as
    Communications Minister. In October 1999, the Bedie Government had
    suspended Niamkey from his anchor duties due to a dispute over the
    content of his news reports, and eventually he resigned in protest.
    Observers viewed the CNSP's naming of Niamkey positively; however, in
    May Guei replaced Niamkey with CNSP member and Navy Lieutenant Henri
    Cesar Sama, who had no qualifications for the job other than loyalty to
    the General. The Guei Government then named Niamkey director of the
    television portion of the government broadcasting organization,
    Radiodiffusion Television Ivoirienne (RTI); however, he was fired in
    September after trying to provide equal access to television for all
    political parties.
        At the beginning of the year, the media was free to express their
    views in support of whichever candidate or policy they supported;
    however, in the latter half of the year, the Government and General
    Guei used threats, arrests, and beatings of journalists in order to
    control the press.
        On February 11, General Guei's guards summoned Tape Koulou,
    publisher of the staunchly pro-Bedie daily Le National, to the
    presidency. After waiting more than 8 hours, Koulou met with Chief
    Sergeant Ibrahima B. (I.B.) Coulibaly, a member of the presidential
    guard, who told him to stop writing about opposition leader Ouattara.
    On March 24, approximately 10 soldiers led by Corporal Issa Toure
    attacked the offices of Le National after it ran a story critical of
    General Guei. The soldiers fired shots several times into the office
    ceiling, destroyed furniture, threatened the journalists, and forced
    them to do push-ups. On June 23, police detained and questioned Asse
    Alefe, the Director of Publication for Le National, and one journalist
    concerning a story questioning the Ivoirian heritage of CNSP member and
    Minister of Communication Sama. The two journalists were detained for 1
    day before being released. On June 27, following rumors of a coup on
    June 24, the Director of the Cabinet for the Ministry of the Interior
    again questioned Asse Alefe, and his assistant, Traore Bouraima, for
    several hours on their role in the coup rumors. The Director of Cabinet
    accused them of spreading false information because they had reported
    coup rumors on June 22. The public prosecutor's office also questioned
    the two who were released but told to remain available to the courts.
    On June 28, the CNSP issued a statement concerning the incident,
    stating that while the Government supports press freedom, there are
    limits to that freedom. The release added that the articles in Le
    National threatened state security.
        On May 9, communication advisors for General Guei summoned to the
    presidency Honore Sepe and Christian Kara, two journalists from the
    pro-RDR daily Le Liberal, in order to reproach them for writing stories
    on the probable presidential candidacy of General Guei and its negative
    effect on the transition. On July 6, members of the military detained
    Le Liberal publication director Kone Yoro and two of his employees,
    Emmanuel Tanoh and Ibrahim Diamonde, and took them to the Ministry of
    Communication for questioning. Minister Sama warned the journalists
    about the content of their articles following the July 4 and 5 mutiny
    before releasing them from custody. On August 2, gendarmes arrested
    Yoro and Le Liberal journalist Kara Khristian for the defamation of
    General Guei in an article published the previous day concerning a
    check signed by the General, which the newspaper indicated would be
    used to finance Guei's presidential campaign. Gendarmes detained the
    two journalists for 2 days.
        On May 10, soldiers briefly detained and questioned Patrice Pohe,
    the publisher of the pro-RDR newspaper La Reference, and Kone Satigui,
    a journalist, at National Armed Forces Headquarters. The soldiers
    warned the journalists against publishing anti-CNSP articles. On May
    16, five members of the military destroyed computer equipment at the
    offices of La Reference and detained Pohe and three other journalists
    at the presidency, where they kicked the journalists and forced them to
    do push-ups. The four were released after several hours. In June in
    response to criticism from several NGO's regarding these incidents,
    General Guei asked the military to stop mistreating journalists. On
    August 26, military men claiming to be presidential security again
    arrested Pohe and questioned and threatened him for several hours. Pohe
    claimed he was arrested because of his support of opposition leader
    Ouattara.
        On June 28, a court sentenced Sidibe Pate, a Burkina Faso traveler
    who was staying at a hotel in Divo where he was overheard making
    negative comments about General Guei, to 12 months in prison for
    insulting the head of state. On July 31, security forces beat British
    Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist Mohamed Fofana Dara while he
    was covering a demonstration at the French Embassy (see Section 2.b.).
    The military and gendarmes, who forcibly dispersed the demonstration,
    continued to strike Fofana after he identified himself and showed his
    press identification (see Section 1.c.).
        On August 31, the public prosecutor had gendarmes detain Notre Voie
    journalist Freedom Neruda and publisher Eugene Allou and bring them in
    for questioning. During a press conference on August 13, Neruda had
    warned citizens that they should not allow General Guei to build up his
    hometown as previous Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie had done
    with their birthplaces. Gendarmes released the journalists after 1 day
    of questioning but warned them not to leave the country.
        On September 8, members of the military severely beat Joachim
    Buegre, a journalist and the political affairs editor for the Abidjan
    daily Le Jour. The beating occurred immediately following a meeting
    between Beugre and General Guei, during which Guei warned Buegre about
    an article that had appeared in Le Jour the previous day that called
    into question Guei's parentage and his eligibility to participate in
    the October presidential election. After forcing Beugre to show them
    where he lived, the soldiers beat him and left him on the side of an
    Abidjan road near the presidency. Beugre remained hospitalized for
    several days after the incident. In response private newspapers did not
    publish on September 21, and on September 22, journalists marched from
    the headquarters of the journalists' union to the presidency.
    Immediately after the march, General Guei met with the journalists and
    told them to concentrate on constructive criticism rather than on news
    that was false or could divide the country. Minister Sama also warned
    the media to stop publishing stories about the military, on the grounds
    that such articles created divisions in the military. On September 9, a
    presidential press aide called two journalists from the daily Le
    Patriote to the presidency to discuss that newspaper's running of the
    same story for which Le Jour journalist Beugre was beaten. The press
    aide questioned the journalists, who then were released unharmed
    several days after their initial detention.
        On October 24 in the Abidjan district of Plateau, the military
    arrested Franck Andersen Kouassi, a journalist and the deputy chief
    editor of Le Jour, and Yacouba Gbane, a journalist at Le Jour, while
    they were covering an event. The military beat and verbally abused them
    and confiscated their equipment. After several days in detention, they
    were released without being charged.
        On October 26, at the beginning of an RDR protest demonstration to
    demand new presidential elections, a group of 50 FPI members detained
    Raphael Lakpe, the publisher of Le Populaire, a pro-RDR newspaper. They
    then handed Lakpe over to gendarmes who took Lakpe and his bodyguard to
    the Koumassi Camp Commando where the gendarmes beat them with their
    belts, made them swim in dirty water, and insulted them for supporting
    Ouattara.
        On October 26, 20 FPI members severely beat Bakary Nimaga, the
    chief editor of the pro-RDR newspaper Le Liberal as he was going to
    work. They then handed Nimaga over to a group of gendarmes. The
    gendarmes took him to Abidjan's Riviera III suburb where they made him
    swim in a gutter, then took him through the neighborhoods of Anono,
    Blockhauss, and Cocody, where they stopped to beat him in front of
    onlookers. The gendarmes eventually took Nimago to the Agban
    Gendarmerie camp, where they threatened him and used pieces of wood,
    truncheons, and iron sticks to beat him. The gendarmes continued to
    beat Nimago after breaking his arm. Following the intervention of some
    other officers, Nimaga was released from the Agban Gendarmerie camp
    that evening with a broken arm, and wounds on his back, thighs, and
    ears. Nimaga stated that while he was being beaten, he saw
    approximately 40 gendarmes beating more than 100 persons including 2
    elderly men.
        On October 26, gendarmes also destroyed the equipment and the
    headquarters of Le Liberal.
        On November 6, the National Observatory for the Freedom of the
    Press (OLPED) held a press conference to criticize the rough military
    treatment of Franck Andersen Kouassi and Yacouba Gbane, and the
    beatings of Bakary Nimaga and Rapahel Lakpe by gendarmes. The OLPED
    also criticized the gendarmes' destruction of the headquarters of Le
    Liberal and the destruction of another newspaper, La Reference, by a
    crowd of demonstrators on October 25.
        Because literacy rates are very low, and because newspapers and
    television are relatively expensive, radio is the most important medium
    of mass communication. The government-owned broadcast media company,
    RTI, owns two major radio stations; only the primary government radio
    station is broadcast nationwide. Neither station offers criticism of
    the Government. There also are four major private domestic radio
    stations: Radio France Internationale (RFI), the BBC, Africa Number
    One, and Radio Nostalgie. They broadcast on FM in Abidjan only, except
    for RFI, which in 1998 signed an agreement with RTI to allow it to
    broadcast via relay antennas to the north and center of the country.
    The RFI and BBC stations only broadcast internationally produced
    programming. The Africa Number One station, which is 51 percent
    domestically owned, broadcasts 6 hours a day of domestically produced
    programming; the rest of the time it broadcasts programming from Africa
    Number One's headquarters in Libreville, Gabon. Radio Nostalgie is 51
    percent owned by Radio Nostalgie France. The RFI, BBC, and Africa
    Number One stations all broadcast news and political commentary about
    the country. The private stations have complete control over their
    editorial content. However, only Radio Nostalgie frequently was
    critical of the Government in its editorials.
        On July 4, during the military mutiny, gendarmes closed Radio
    Nostalgie. General Guei questioned Hamed Bakayoko, the station
    director, and Yves Zogbo, Jr., the program director. Bakayoko was
    considered an ally of Ouattara, and his station was considered pro-RDR
    by the authorities. Following the October 22 presidential election, RFI
    and BBC FM broadcasts were jammed for over a week.
        Radio station license applications are adjudicated by a commission
    under the Ministry of Information, which has accepted applications and
    awarded licenses only once, in 1993. On that occasion, the commission
    denied 7 of 12 applications on a variety of grounds, including, in one
    case, affiliation with a major opposition political party.
        In 1998 the Government authorized 43 community radio stations with
    very limited broadcast strength, no foreign-language programming, no
    advertisements, and public announcements limited to the local area.
    While the number of authorized community stations now stands at 52,
    only 26 stations were broadcasting at year's end. On August 1, Edmond
    Zeghehi Bouazo, President of the National Council of Audiovisual
    Communication, met with the promoters of community and commercial radio
    stations to remind them of programming restrictions and the prohibition
    on political content in programming. In 1999 Roman Catholic Church
    groups began to operate four community radio stations: Radio Espoir in
    Abidjan, Radio Paix Sanwi in Aboisso, Radio Notre Dame in Yamoussoukro,
    and Radio Dix-Huit Montagnes in Man. Although the Muslim associations
    received a broadcast license in 1999, no Muslim station had begun
    broadcasting by year's end.
        There are two television stations that broadcast domestically
    produced programs. Both are owned and operated by the Government. Only
    one broadcasts nationwide. Neither station criticizes the Government.
    The only private television station, Canal Horizon, is foreign owned
    and broadcasts no domestically produced programs. The Government has
    not accepted any applications to establish a privately owned domestic
    television station.
        On July 6, members of the military stopped journalist Frank Kouassi
    while he was filming a segment for the television program ``Point
    Media,'' forced him into a vehicle, and transported him to the Abgan
    Gendarme Camp for questioning. Captain Fabien Coulibaly questioned
    Kouassi on the events of the July 4 and 5 mutiny and on his relations
    with Ouattara before releasing him the same day.
        The National Council of Audiovisual Communication (NCAC),
    established in 1991 and formally organized in 1995, is responsible for
    regulating media access during the 2-week formal political campaign
    period and for resolving complaints about unfair media access.
    Following the December 1999 coup, the previously PDCI-dominated NCAC
    was taken over by the military Government. Because domestic television
    is controlled by the state, the NCAC is unable to fulfill its mandate
    at times. On October 9, Edmond Zegbehi Bouazo, president of the NCAC,
    announced that each of the five candidates in the October 24
    presidential elections would be granted 5 minutes per day on the radio
    as well as on television from October 9 to October 21. All of the radio
    channels broadcasted the messages of the candidates simultaneously.
    However, during the campaign, the FPI complained that Guei was granted
    more than the allotted 5 minutes on television daily; he and his wife's
    activities were broadcast at length.
        The Government does not restrict access to or distribution of
    electronic media. There are 12 domestic Internet service providers, of
    which 4 are major providers; the first began operations in 1996. All 12
    are privately owned and relatively expensive. The licensing
    requirements imposed by the government telecommunications regulatory
    body, ATCI, reportedly are not unduly restrictive.
        The Government continued to exercise considerable influence over
    the official media's program content, news coverage, and other matters,
    using these media to promote government policies. Much of the news
    programming during the year was devoted to the activities of the
    President, the Government, the PDCI, and proGuei groups. After Gbagbo
    took office, he indicated that the media would no longer be pressured
    to devote programming to his and the Government's activities.
        In June Minister of Communication Sama stopped the airing of RDR
    announcements publicizing a tour of the country by Ouattara. Sama
    claimed the spots featured ``Nazi music'' and forced the RDR to modify
    the advertisements. By the time the spots were cleared, it was too late
    to provide publicity for the tour and the announcement aired only once.
        Beginning in August, when the presidential campaign began,
    government television provided almost exclusive coverage of General
    Guei's activities and excluded coverage of the other candidates and
    their activities. While the political parties and print journalists
    complained about this practice, the content of the programming did not
    change; only occasionally it provided time to other candidates.
        International journalists were subject to government harassment and
    intimidation during the year. Following the September 18 assassination
    attempt on his life, General Guei criticized RFI for reporting ``lies''
    after it suggested that Guei had orchestrated the assassination plot.
    Prior to the December legislative elections, government authorities
    accused international journalists, such as RFI, of distorting the
    sociopolitical situation and threatened them with brutality if they did
    not report more news favorable to the government. Following the
    December legislative election, unidentified callers threatened Bruno
    Minas of RFI. Minas claims that he was threatened because he reported
    that RDR supporters were victims of government harassment and abuse;
    subsequently he was forced to leave the country for his own safety.
    Correspondents of AFP, the French daily Le Monde, and the BBC's Africa
    Bureau (BBCAfrica) also were forced to leave the country for their
    safety.
        There is no known law specifically concerning academic freedom,
    although academics have cited laws of French origin concerning the
    operations of universities to support their claims of academic freedom.
    In practice the Government tolerates much academic freedom; however, it
    inhibits political expression through its proprietary control of most
    educational facilities, even at the post-secondary level. In April
    1999, the president of the University of Cocody banned all meetings and
    sit-ins on the campus; 2 days later the Council of Ministers ratified
    and extended the President's action, banning all FESCI activities
    throughout the country. Following the December 1999 coup, the Guei
    Government allowed FESCI to resume operations. However, in September
    members of the military beat students from FESCI on the university's
    Cocody campus. Three of the students, all of whom were alleged to
    belong to a branch of FESCI that supports the RDR, were injured
    seriously.
        Unlike in the previous year, students at universities and secondary
    schools did not stage demonstrations and protests about educational
    problems, due to a decision by the student organizations to allow
    General Guei time to organize elections, and to a split within the
    organizations along political party lines. These splits in the student
    ranks led to violent confrontations between students and numerous
    injuries (see Section 1.c.). There were numerous student protests at
    the end of the year (see Section 2.b.).
        Many prominent scholars active in opposition politics have retained
    their positions at state educational facilities; however, some teachers
    and professors suggest that they have been transferred or fear that
    they may be transferred to less desirable positions because of their
    political activities. According to student union statements, government
    security forces continued to use students as informants to monitor
    political activities at the University of Abidjan.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The new
    Constitution allows for freedom of assembly; however, the Government
    restricted this right in practice. Until August 18, groups that wished
    to hold demonstrations or rallies were required by law to submit a
    notice of their intent to do so to the Ministry of Security or the
    Ministry of Interior 48 hours before the proposed event. No law
    expressly authorizes the Government to ban public meetings or events
    for which advance notice has been given in the required manner.
    Nevertheless, the Guei Government often denied the opposition
    permission to meet in public outdoor locations. On August 18, the
    Minister of Security and the Minister of the Interior further tightened
    the restrictions on public demonstrations. Groups were required to have
    authorization from both Ministries to hold a demonstration, and the
    authorization must be requested in writing 3 days in advance of the
    event. Even if authorization is granted, it later can be revoked.
    Gbagbo's Government retained the restrictions on public demonstrations;
    authorization still must be requested in writing 3 days in advance.
        For extended periods during the year, the Guei Government banned
    mass events and political meetings. On February 22, the Government
    issued a ban on political mass meetings and demonstrations until
    further notice. The ban was lifted in May after publication of the new
    constitutional text and electoral code. Initially parties and
    organizations abided by these bans to allow the transitional military
    regime an opportunity to organize. However, as the year progressed,
    opposition parties and other groups attempted to hold demonstrations.
    The Guei Government often refused to permit these demonstrations and
    sometimes prevented them by force. Nevertheless, during and after the
    presidential and legislative elections, several mass events and
    political meetings took place.
        On July 28, the Ministry of the Interior forbade Ouattara and the
    RDR from holding a press conference announcing their party platform for
    the upcoming elections. Officials stated that the official opening of
    the presidential campaign had not yet begun, and thus a political
    meeting could not take place; however, the FPI and the PDCI were
    allowed to hold installation ceremonies for their presidential
    candidates at that time. In September the RDR was allowed to hold their
    installation ceremony for Ouattara.
        In August and early September, the major political parties and
    General Guei generally ignored the new electoral code's ban on
    campaigning until 15 days before the election, which was scheduled for
    September 17. However, on September 7, following the postponement of
    the presidential election until October 22, Minister of the Interior
    Grena Mouassi banned all election meetings until the official opening
    of the campaign; the definition of meeting changed several times. For
    example, groups who supported Guei's candidacy were allowed to meet,
    assemble, and put up public posters.
        On August 24, the Guei Government refused to allow female members
    of a coalition of opposition groups known as the Forum to march in
    protest of General Guei's presidential candidacy. The Minister of
    Security Palenfo stated that the refusal was due to security concerns
    because another group was scheduled to demonstrate at the same time;
    however, observers believe that General Guei had forbidden any marches
    against his candidacy.
        After the alleged assassination attempt on General Guei on
    September 18 (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.e.), the Interior
    Minister extended the ban on demonstrations and political activity to
    include all meetings and gatherings except for meetings of party
    leaders at party headquarters.
        Police repeatedly used excessive violence to break up
    demonstrations and gatherings. On July 31, gendarmes and military
    forces forcibly prevented a rally in support of French policy for
    inclusive elections in front of the French Embassy. Security forces
    beat and abused rally participants and a journalist and dispersed the
    crowd using rifle butts and tear gas (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.). The
    majority of protesters at the demonstration were RDR supporters. On
    July 28 and 29, the Guei Government allowed and even encouraged
    demonstrations by its supporters against the French position. On
    September 9, gendarmes used tear gas to disperse a crowd of RDR
    supporters in Abidjan (see Section 1.c.). The supporters had gathered
    to attend an RDR meeting, not knowing that the CNSP had declared the
    meeting illegal the previous evening and had cancelled the event.
        Police forcibly disrupted some demonstrations surrounding the
    October presidential elections and killed or injured hundreds of
    persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). When Gbagbo was inaugurated on
    October 26, gendarmes loyal to the new president violently suppressed
    RDR street demonstrations held to demand new presidential elections.
        Following the November 30 Supreme Court announcement of the
    disqualification of Ouattara for legislative elections, thousands of
    RDR supporters demonstrated in protest of the decision (see Section 3).
    According to MIDH, 37 persons were killed during clashes with the
    military and gendarmes, including 19 by gunshot and 2 by torture;
    several hundred persons were injured; 840 were rounded-up and detained;
    and several disappeared and still were not found by year's end (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 1.d.).
        On April 26, the military Government repealed the 1992
    Antivandalism Law that held organizers of a march or demonstration
    responsible if any of the participants engaged in violence. The LIDHO,
    a leading civil rights NGO, and all major opposition parties criticized
    the law as unduly vague and as one that imposed punishment on some
    persons for the crimes of others.
        The new Constitution provides for freedom of association and allows
    the formation of political parties, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice.
        The new Constitution states that all parties must respect the laws
    of the Republic, including the requirement that all organizations be
    registered before commencing activities. In order to obtain
    registration, political parties must provide information on their
    founding members and produce internal statutes and political platforms
    consistent with the Constitution. Before the December 1999 coup, there
    were 102 legally recognized political parties, of which 3 were
    represented in the National Assembly. At year's end, there were 106
    parties; following the coup, some parties splintered or were formed to
    support the candidacy of General Guei. There were no reports that the
    Guei Government denied registration to any group, nor were there
    reports that the Gbagbo Government denied registration to any group.
        The new Constitution also prohibits the formation of political
    parties along ethnic or religious lines.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The new Constitution provides for freedom
    of religion, and both the Guei Government and the Gbagbo Government
    generally respected this right in practice. There is no state religion;
    however, for historical as well as ethnic reasons, the Government
    informally favors Christianity, in particular the Roman Catholic
    Church. Catholic Church leaders had a much stronger voice in government
    affairs than their Islamic counterparts, which led to feelings of
    disenfranchisement among the Muslim population. After assuming power
    following the coup, General Guei indicated that one of the goals of the
    transition Government was to end this favoritism and put all of the
    major religious faiths on an equal footing. In practice the Guei
    Government did not take steps to bring this about. In November the
    Gbagbo Government announced steps to bring religious groups into the
    national dialogue and included religious representatives on a national
    commission to promote reconciliation.
        The Government establishes requirements for religious groups under
    a 1939 French law. All religious groups wishing to operate in the
    country must submit to the Ministry of the Interior a file including
    the group's by-laws, the names of the founding members, the date of
    founding (or date that the founder received the revelation of his or
    her calling), the minutes of the general assembly, the names of members
    of the administrative board, and other information. The Interior
    Ministry investigates the backgrounds of the founding members to
    ascertain that the group has no politically subversive purpose.
    However, in practice the Government's regulation of religious groups
    generally has not been unduly restrictive since 1990, when the
    Government legalized opposition political parties. Although
    nontraditional religious groups, like all public secular associations,
    are required to register with the Government, no penalties are imposed
    on a group that fails to register. In practice registration can bring
    advantages of public recognition, invitation to official ceremonies and
    events, publicity, gifts, and school subsidies. No religious group has
    complained of arbitrary registration procedures or recognition. The
    Government does not register traditional indigenous religious groups.
        The Catholic Church began to operate community radio stations in
    1998, and on April 21, 1999, the Government authorized Muslims to
    operate a similar station; however, no Muslim radio station had begun
    operations by year's end (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government does not prohibit links to foreign coreligionists
    but informally discourages connections with politically radical
    fundamentalist movements, such as Islamic groups based in Iran and
    Libya.
        Some Muslims believe that their religious or ethnic affiliation
    makes them targets of discrimination by the Government with regard to
    both employment and the renewal of national identity cards (see Section
    5). Due to the tense political situation in the country and the ethnic
    divisions along which political party lines are drawn, northern Muslims
    sometimes are scrutinized more closely in the identity card process. As
    these northern Muslims share names, style of dress, and customs with
    several of the country's predominantly Muslim neighboring countries,
    they sometimes are accused wrongly of attempting to obtain nationality
    cards illegally in order to vote. This creates a hardship for a
    disproportionate number of Muslims.
        In May the Guei Government warned the imam leaders of the Muslim
    community, whom Guei believed to be supporters of Ouattara, to refrain
    from political discourse in their sermons. The Guei Government claimed
    the imams had been jeopardizing security with sermons that were too
    charged politically. In May, June, and July during travels to various
    regions in the country, General Guei continually asked imams and other
    Muslim leaders to stay out of politics. For example, on July 21, the
    CNSP briefly detained and questioned CNI President El Hadj Idriss Kone
    Koudouss; the CNSP warned him not to advise Muslims to vote against the
    new Constitution in his July 23 sermon.
        Security forces and the Government summoned Islamic leaders for
    questioning on several occasions and searched their homes based on
    suspicions that these leaders were plotting civil unrest during the
    year (see Section 1.d.). Muslims say that such acts by the Government
    are an attempt to make the Muslim community a ``scapegoat'' for the
    country's problems.
        On December 5 after youths set fire to a mosque in Abidjan's Abobo
    district, the BAE used tear gas and beat Muslims who had gathered to
    inspect the damage (see Section 5). When imam Bassama Sylla attempted
    to intervene, the police stripped him and detained him (see Section
    1.d.). Police also entered at least two other mosques in Abobo that day
    and detained persons inside.
        In December 1999, the new military regime requested that the
    Islamic Superior Council, an organization of imams that was seen as
    politically active and supportive of the previous regime, disband. The
    president of the council, Moustapha Diaby, did not oppose this demand,
    and the council ceased its operations. In March the Government allowed
    the council to resume its activities.
        In April local governments closed some Harrist churches to prevent
    an escalation of intrareligious violence (see Section 5). The
    Bingerville church had been closed in April 1999 following an appeals
    court decision, but a decision from the judicial chamber of the Supreme
    Court reopened it in December 1999.
        In July the Government allowed Felix Tchotche Mel, a Harrist
    preacher, to reopen his church in Bingerville.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The new Constitution does not provide
    specifically for these rights, and both the Guei and Gbagbo Governments
    on occasion restricted these rights in practice. The Government
    generally does not restrict internal travel. However, police,
    gendarmes, and water, forestry, and customs officials commonly erect
    and operate roadblocks on major roads, where they demand that passing
    motorists or passengers produce identity and vehicle papers and
    regularly extort small amounts of money or goods for contrived or minor
    infractions. The Guei and Gbagbo governments imposed curfews six times
    during the year during periods of political upheaval.
        Citizens normally may travel abroad and emigrate freely and have
    the right of voluntary repatriation. However, the Government severely
    restricted political party leaders from traveling outside of the
    country.
        On May 16, the CNSP announced in a communique that all overseas
    travel by political party leaders must be approved by the CNSP. The
    CNSP justified this action by saying it would allow it to ``better
    manage'' the period leading up to the July 23 referendum. On May 23,
    the CNSP refused to allow the FPI Secretary General, Abou Drahamane
    Sangare, to go to Algeria for the Socialist Forces Front Congress.
    Authorities also prevented Morifere Bamba, the leader of the Party for
    Progress and Socialism (PPS), from leaving the country. On July 25,
    after the referendum, the CNSP announced that the requirement to seek
    CNSP authorization to travel outside the country was no longer in
    force; however, on July 27, airport security forces prevented Ouattara
    from boarding a flight to Paris. On July 29, the CNSP reinstated
    restrictions on political party leaders leaving the country.
        On September 23, General Guei refused to grant political party
    leaders permission to leave the country to attend the special summit of
    African leaders on Cote d'Ivoire, citing the preelection travel ban.
    General Guei did not attend the event but sent Prime Minister Seydou
    Diarra and Foreign Minister Charles Gomis to represent the Government.
    President Gbagbo lifted the international travel ban shortly after
    taking office.
        On February 23, airport police prevented Tape Koulou, Publication
    Director for the pro-Bedie daily newspaper Le National, from boarding a
    flight to France. The airport police who prevented the boarding stated
    that they were directed to do so by higher authorities.
        There are no known cases of revocation of citizenship. The
    citizenship issue was debated extensively during the year; many
    citizens challenged the legitimacy of other voters' claims to
    citizenship. The public debate over Ouattara's citizenship continued at
    year's end. On November 30, the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber
    declared him ineligible for the legislative seat in his ancestral home
    of Kong (see Section 3.). Following that decision, thousands of RDR
    supporters demonstrated in Abidjan and northern cities (see Sections
    1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
        The country has not enacted legislation to provide refugee or
    asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    The only domestic statute in force is the 1990 immigration law, which
    includes refugees without specifying a separate legal status for them.
    Nevertheless, the Government respects the right to first asylum and
    does not deny recognition to refugees, either by law or custom. There
    were approximately 120,000 refugees in the country at year's end, at
    least 100,000 of whom are Liberian. Following the end of the Liberian
    civil war, an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 refugees returned to Liberia
    either under U.N. auspices or independently. The remaining refugees
    were from Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region, including Rwanda and
    Burundi.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) in health, education, and food distribution programs
    for refugees. In January International Rescue Committee (IRC) staff
    identified sanitation problems and severe overcrowding in schools at
    the Nicla Camp.
        On December 23, the Nigerian Government announced that it had begun
    repatriating its citizens who were subjected to repeated harassment by
    Ivoirian authorities (see Section 1.c.). Approximately 300 Nigerians
    stated that Ivoirian authorities regularly tore up their identity cards
    and stole goods. The Nigerians also accused the police of encouraging
    groups of youths to steal for them. Police would take them to police
    stations where they were beaten and detained overnight if they did not
    pay a bribe to the officers.
        There were no reports that persons who had a valid claim to asylum
    or refugee status were repatriated involuntarily to a country where
    they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The new Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change
    their government peacefully through democratic means; however,
    presidential elections held on October 22 were marred by significant
    violence and irregularities, including a suspension of the vote count
    for several days.
        The presidential elections followed several postponements and a
    controversial Supreme Court decision on October 6 disqualifying 14 of
    the 19 candidates, including all of the PDCI and RDR candidates. The
    new Constitution includes language that is considered more restrictive
    than the Electoral Code of the previous Constitution on the subject of
    parentage and eligibility requirements for candidates. Ouattara was
    excluded from running in the Presidential and the National Assembly
    elections following the Supreme Court's October 6 and November 30
    rulings that he had not demonstrated conclusively that he was of
    Ivoirian parentage. Furthermore the Court maintained that Ouattara had
    considered himself a citizen of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) earlier in
    his career. PDCI candidate and former Minister of State for Interior
    and Decentralization Emile Constant Bombet was disqualified because he
    faced outstanding charges of abuse of office from when he was Minister.
    Former President Bedie was disqualified for not submitting a proper
    medical certificate.
        Following the Supreme Court decision, most international election
    observers decided not to participate in the election. As a result,
    there were only 75 observers nationwide, 29 of whom were EU observers
    who originally were there assessing the overall security situation. The
    nationwide participation rate was 33 percent, and some polling places,
    especially in the North, closed early because of the lack of voters.
    Preliminary results showed that Gbagbo was leading by a significant
    margin. However, during the afternoon of October 23, soldiers and
    gendarmes entered the National Elections Commission (CNE) to stop the
    count. They expelled journalists and disrupted television and radio
    broadcasting. On October 24, Daniel Cheick Bamba, an Interior Ministry
    and CNE official, announced on national radio and television that CNE
    had been dissolved and declared General Guei the victor with 56 percent
    of the vote. Thousands of Gbagbo supporters began protesting almost
    immediately, demanding a proper vote count. Mass demonstrations
    continued until October 26 and resulted in numerous deaths and injuries
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In the early afternoon on October 25,
    national radio and television reported that Guei had stepped down.
        When Gbagbo was inaugurated on October 26, gendarmes loyal to the
    new president violently suppressed RDR street demonstrations held to
    demand new presidential elections.
        On December 4 and 5, gendarmes and police officers violently
    dispersed members of the RDR who were demonstrating to protest against
    the invalidation of Ouattara's candidacy in the legislative elections
    (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.b.).
        The National Assembly election took place on December 10 and was
    marred by violence, irregularities, and a very low participation rate.
    The FPI won 96 out of 225 seats in the National Assembly; the PDCI, the
    former ruling party, won 77 seats; independent candidates won 17 seats;
    and 4 other parties won 7 seats. Largely because of the RDR boycott of
    the elections to protest against the invalidation of Ouattara's
    candidacy, the participation rate in the legislative election was only
    33.12 percent. In addition the election could not take place in 26
    electoral districts in the north because RDR activists disrupted
    polling places, burned ballots, and threatened the security of
    elections officials.
        Before the adoption of the new electoral code, the number of
    registered voters in districts of the National Assembly, each of which
    elects one representative, varied by as much as a factor of 10; these
    inequalities systematically favored the ruling party. In August the
    Guei Government announced a fairer redistribution of constituencies.
    Before the December legislative elections, the Gbagbo Government
    completed the redistribution of electoral constituencies in line with
    the 1998 national census.
        The Constitution was drafted by the CNSP-created Constitutional and
    Electoral Consultative Commission (CCCE), which was made up of members
    of major political parties and civil society; however, the CNSP made
    changes to the CCCE's text prior to submitting the draft Constitution
    to a referendum. The Constitution was adopted in a referendum held on
    July 23 and 24 by 86 percent of those voting, the Constitution of the
    Second Republic was implemented formally on August 4. The referendum
    was supervised by a quasi-independent commission that included
    representatives from some government ministries, civil society, and
    political parties.
        The new Constitution and Electoral Code provide for legislative
    elections every 5 years and presidential elections every 5 years by a
    single and secret ballot. The new Constitution also continued the
    tradition of a strong presidency.
        General Guei and the CNSP dominated the governing of the country
    for most of the year, even though a largely civilian cabinet was put in
    place in January. General Guei changed the make-up of this cabinet four
    times during the year. The National Assembly remained suspended until
    the December elections, but the Supreme Court continued to function.
        Upon assuming power in October, Gbagbo sought to include
    representatives from all political parties in his government. Except
    for the Republican Rally (RDR), which decided not to accept ministerial
    posts, most major political parties were represented in the new
    Government, which is made up of 24 ministers including the Prime
    Minister. Nineteen ministers are members of the FPI; three ministers
    are members of the PDCI, the former ruling party, and two ministers are
    members of the PIT, a minor left-wing party.
        Citizens' ability to elect sub-national governments is limited. The
    State remains highly centralized. Sub-national government entities
    exist on several levels, and include 19 regions, 58 departments, 230
    sub-prefectures, and 196 communities. However, at all levels except for
    communities, which are headed by mayors elected for 5-year terms, and
    traditional chieftaincies, which are headed by elected chiefs, all sub-
    national government officials are appointed by the central Government.
    Sub-national governments generally must rely on the central Government
    for much of their revenue, but mayors have autonomy to hire and fire
    community administrative personnel.
        Although there are no legal impediments to women assuming political
    leadership roles, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Women held 3 of the 26 ministerial positions in the Guei
    transition Government, and Gbagbo's cabinet includes 5 women. There are
    three women on the Supreme Court. At year's end, there were 17 women in
    the National Assembly. In January 1999, Henriette Dagri Diabate was
    elected to the post of Secretary General of the opposition RDR; she
    became the first woman to lead a political party.
        There are no legal impediments to the exercise of political rights
    by any of the more than 60 ethnic groups in the country. General Guei
    increased the number of governmental posts filled by members of his
    ethnic group, the Yacouba, and other western ethnic groups. The Baoule,
    to which both former Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bedie belonged,
    and other Akan ethnic groups that have tended to support the PDCI, were
    overrepresented previously in both mid-level and low-level appointed
    positions throughout the public sector.
        However, President Gbagbo sought improved ethnic and regional
    balance in the Government by including members from seven different
    ethnic groups. Nine members of Gbagbo's first cabinet were from the
    Krou group in the western provinces from which Gbagbo comes. There were
    three ministers from the North (Mande and Senoufo). The remainder
    mostly were from the center and the east (Baoule). Three Ministers in
    Gbagbo's Cabinet were Muslims.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Both the Guei Government and the Gbagbo Government allowed inquiry
    and reporting by human rights NGO's. The LIDHO, a domestic human rights
    NGO formed in 1987 and recognized by the Government in 1990,
    investigated alleged violations of human rights actively and issued
    press releases and reports, some critical of the Government. Other
    local NGO's also monitored government human rights abuses and published
    press releases critical of the Government's record. For example, the
    MIDH investigated the December demonstrations following Ouattara's
    disqualification from legislative elections (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
    2.b., and 3). The MIDH stated that the Government had been
    accommodating to their investigation.
        The Government cooperated with international inquiries into its
    human rights practices. Following a visit by Amnesty International
    Secretary General Pierre Sane in May, General Guei formally disbanded
    the ``parallel forces'' upon Sane's advice. President Gbagbo invited
    several international human rights groups, including HRW and the
    International Federation of Human Rights, to conduct independent
    investigations into the mass grave at Yopougon (see Section 1.a.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The new Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination based on
    race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or religion; however, in
    practice women occupy a subordinate role in society. Societal ethnic
    discrimination and division are problems.
        Women.--Representatives of the Ivoirian Association for the Defense
    of Women (AIDF) state that spousal abuse (usually wife beating) occurs
    frequently and often leads to divorce. A July 1998 AIDF survey found
    that many women refused to discuss their experience of domestic
    violence; of women who completed the AIDF interview process, nearly 90
    percent had been beaten or struck on at least one occasion. Doctors
    state that they rarely see the victims of domestic violence. A severe
    social stigma is attached to such violence, and neighbors often
    intervene in a domestic quarrel to protect a woman who is the known
    object of physical abuse. The courts and police view domestic violence
    as a family problem unless serious bodily harm is inflicted, or the
    victim lodges a complaint, in which case they may initiate criminal
    proceedings. The Government does not collect statistics on rape or
    other physical abuse of women. The Government has no clear policy
    regarding spousal abuse beyond what is contained in the civil code. In
    December 1998, the National Assembly enacted the Law Concerning Crimes
    against Women, which forbids and provides criminal penalties for forced
    or early marriage and sexual harassment, but says nothing about spousal
    abuse.
        Women's advocacy groups have protested the indifference of
    authorities to female victims of violence and called attention to
    domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM). The groups also
    reported that women who are the victims of rape or domestic violence
    often are ignored when they attempt to bring the violence to the
    attention of the police. In July 1999, the AIDF launched a petition
    drive to pressure the authorities to enact and enforce laws against
    domestic violence, especially spousal abuse; 18,000 petitions were
    collected by the end of 1999. The AIDF also is active in opposing
    forced marriage and advancing the rights of female domestic workers. On
    July 17, AIDF established a national committee with members of national
    and international institutions in Abidjan to fight violence against
    women. The committee's objective is to define programs and actions to
    reduce social inequalities and to make recommendations on combating
    violence against women. One month after establishing the committee, the
    Minister of Women's Affairs and Family, Constance Yai, held a workshop
    on developing strategies to fight violence against women.
        The new Constitution and the law prohibit discrimination on the
    basis of sex; however, women occupy a subordinate role in society.
    Government policy encourages full participation by women in social and
    economic life; however, there is considerable informal resistance among
    employers to hiring women, whom they consider less dependable because
    of their potential pregnancy. Women are underrepresented in some
    professions and in the managerial sector as a whole. Some women also
    encounter difficulty in obtaining loans, as they cannot meet the
    lending criteria mandated by banks. These criteria include such
    elements as title to a house and production of profitable cash crops,
    specifically coffee and cocoa. Women in the formal sector are paid on
    an equal scale with men. In rural areas, women and men divide the
    labor, with men clearing the land and attending to cash crops like
    cocoa and coffee, while women grow vegetables and other staples and
    perform most menial household tasks.
        Children.--Primary education is compulsory, but this requirement is
    not enforced effectively. Primary education is free but usually ends at
    age 13. Poverty causes many children to leave the formal school system
    when they are between the ages of 12 and 14 if they fail secondary
    school entrance exams. Students who pass entrance exams may elect to go
    to free public secondary schools. Secondary school entrance is
    restricted by the difficulty of the exam, which changes each year, and
    the state's ability to provide sufficient spaces for all who would like
    to attend. Many children leave school after only a few years. According
    to UNICEF statistics, 79 percent of males and 58 percent of females of
    primary school age reportedly were enrolled in the period between 1990
    and 1996; more recent statistics were not available.
        There is a parental preference for educating boys rather than
    girls, which is noticeable throughout the country but is more
    pronounced in rural areas; however, the primary school enrollment rate
    for girls is increasing in the northern part of the country. The
    Minister of National Education stated that almost one-third of the
    primary and secondary school dropout rate of 66 percent was
    attributable to pregnancies, and that many of the sexual partners of
    female students were teachers, to whom girls sometimes granted sexual
    favors in return for good grades or money. In January 1998, in an
    effort to combat low enrollment rates for girls, the Government
    instituted new measures against the statutory rape of students by
    teachers.
        The penalty for statutory rape or attempted rape of either a girl
    or a boy aged 15 years or younger is a 1- to 3-year prison sentence and
    a fine of $140 to 1,400 (FCFA 100,000 to 1,000,000).
        There are large populations of street children in the cities.
    Fraternite Matin, the government daily newspaper, reported in April
    that the number of street children in the country is 200,000, of which
    50,000 are in Abidjan. Some children are employed as domestics and are
    subject to sexual abuse, harassment, and other forms of mistreatment by
    their employers, according to the AIDF and press reports (see Section
    6.d.).
        In September 1998, an Abidjan daily newspaper reported allegations
    by a 14-year-old boy that he had been sodomized repeatedly over many
    months by a network of pedophiles that included former Minister of
    Economic Infrastructure Ezan Akele and a foreign ambassador. Leading
    human rights organizations, including the LIDHO, demanded that the
    alleged pedophiles not be shielded from prosecution. In January 1999,
    judges released six of the eight accused in this matter on provisional
    liberty, and the trial court dismissed the suit in March 1999. The
    boy's parents have appealed the dismissal, and the appeal still was
    pending at year's end.
        According to an UNICEF study, approximately 15,000 Malian children
    were trafficked and sold into indentured servitude on Ivoirian
    plantations in 1999, and observers believe that the rate of trafficking
    remained approximately the same during the year (see Sections 6.c.,
    6.d., and 6.f.).
        The Ministries of Public Health and of Employment, Public Service,
    and Social Security seek to safeguard the welfare of children, and the
    Government also has encouraged the formation of NGO's such as the
    Abidjan Legal Center for the Defense of Children. In 1996 the
    Government announced a series of measures aimed at reducing the
    population of street children. These steps include holding parents
    legally and financially responsible for their abandoned children and
    the development of training centers where children can learn a trade;
    however, this in not abided to in practice. One of these centers opened
    in Dabou in July 1999.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is a serious problem. Until 1998 there was no law
    that specifically prohibited FGM, which was considered illegal only as
    a violation of general laws prohibiting crimes against persons.
    However, the December 1998 Law Concerning Crimes against Women
    specifically forbids FGM and makes those who perform it subject to
    criminal penalties of imprisonment for up to 5 years and a fine of
    roughly $650 to $3,500 (360,000 to 2 million FCFA francs); double
    penalties apply for medical practitioners. FGM is practiced
    particularly among the rural populations in the north and west and to a
    lesser extent in the center. The procedure usually is performed on
    young girls or at puberty as part of a rite of passage; it is done
    almost always outside modern medical facilities, and techniques and
    hygiene do not meet modern medical standards. According to the World
    Health Organization and the AIDF, as many as 60 percent of women have
    undergone FGM. Since the law on FGM was enacted in December 1998, six
    girls in Abidjan's Port Bouet district were mutilated, and police and
    social workers neither acted to prevent the mutilation nor to arrest
    the girls' parents. In response the Minister of Solidarity and the
    Promotion of Women organized numerous seminars and informational
    meetings on FGM concentrating on regions where it is practiced widely.
    The seminars targeted police, administrative authorities, and
    traditional political and religious leaders.
        As a result of the active campaign against FGM undertaken by the
    Government and NGO's, several excisors were arrested in the north for
    performing excisions. In prior years, arrests were made only following
    the death of the FGM victim. On May 6, two excisors from Guinea were
    arrested in Abobo and imprisoned following the death of a young
    Burkinabe girl who had been excised. On July 12, police arrested two
    Ivoirian women in the northern city of Kongasso and detained them in
    Seguela for practicing FGM on girls between the ages of 10 and 14.
        Women's advocacy organizations continued to sponsor campaigns
    against FGM, forced marriage, marriage of minors, patterns of
    inheritance that exclude women, and other practices considered harmful
    to women and girls. Children regularly are trafficked into the country
    from neighboring countries and sold into forced labor (see Sections
    6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--In October 1998, the National Assembly
    enacted a law that requires the State to educate and train disabled
    persons, to hire them or help them find jobs, to design houses and
    public facilities for wheelchair access, and to adapt machines, tools,
    and work spaces for access and use by the disabled. The law covers
    individuals with physical, mental, visual, auditory, and cerebral motor
    disabilities. The Government is working to put these regulations into
    effect; however, the law had not been implemented fully by year's end.
    Wheelchair accessible facilities for the disabled are not common, and
    there are few training and job assistance programs for the disabled.
        Laws also exist that prohibit the abandonment of the mentally or
    physically disabled and enjoin acts of violence directed at them.
        Traditional practices, beliefs, and superstitions vary, but
    infanticide in cases of serious birth disabilities is less common than
    in the past. Disabled adults are not specific targets of abuse, but
    they encounter serious difficulties in competing with nondisabled
    workers. The Government supports special schools, associations, and
    artisans' cooperatives for the disabled, but physically disabled
    persons still beg on urban streets and in commercial zones.
        Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religious
    communities generally are amicable; however, there is some societal
    discrimination against Muslims and followers of traditional indigenous
    religions.
        The country's Islamic communities are subject to a great deal of
    societal discrimination. Some non-Muslims have opposed construction of
    mosques, such as the new mosque in Abidjan's Plateau district, because
    the Islamic duty to give alms daily may attract beggars to
    neighborhoods containing mosques. Some non-Muslims also object to
    having to hear the muezzins' calls to prayer. Some persons consider all
    Muslims as foreigners, fundamentalists, or terrorists. Muslim citizens
    often are treated as foreigners by their fellow citizens, including
    government officials, because most Muslims are members of northern
    ethnic groups that also are found in other African countries from which
    there has been substantial immigration into the country. Muslims also
    frequently were discriminated against because of ethnic origin or
    political leanings. Many Muslims are northerners and tended to support
    the presidential candidacy of Ouattara.
        During the October demonstrations, FPI militants burned several
    mosques in the Abidjan's Yopougon district in retaliation, for RDR
    militants burning churches (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3). On October
    26 and again in early December, rival political groups burned a number
    of churches and mosques across the country. On December 5, youths set
    fire to a mosque in Abidjan's Abobo district.
        Followers of traditional indigenous religions are subject to
    societal discrimination. Many leaders of religions such as Christianity
    or Islam look down on practitioners of traditional indigenous religions
    as pagans, practitioners of black magic, or human sacrifice. Some
    Christians or Muslims refuse to associate with practitioners of
    traditional indigenous religions. The practices of traditional
    indigenous religions often are shrouded by secrecy, and include
    exclusive initiation rites, oaths of silence, and taboos against
    writing down orally transmitted history. However, there have been no
    reports of human sacrifice in the country since well before
    independence. Although the purported practice of black magic or
    witchcraft continues to be feared widely, it generally is discouraged
    by traditional indigenous religions, aspects of which commonly purport
    to offer protection from witchcraft. Traditional indigenous religions
    commonly involve belief in one supreme deity as well as lesser deities
    or spirits that are to be praised or appeased, some of whom in some
    religions may be believed to inhabit or otherwise be associated with
    particular places, natural objects, or manmade images. However, many
    practitioners of traditional indigenous religions are unaware of
    societal discrimination and have not complained.
        Conflicts between and within religious groups have surfaced
    occasionally. Members of the Limoudim of Rabbi Jesus, a small Christian
    group of unknown origin, have criticized and sometimes attacked other
    Christian groups, allegedly for failing to follow the teachings of
    Jesus. In January 1998, a conflict over land erupted between Catholics
    and Assembly of God members in Abidjan's Yopougon district. The same
    area was the scene of a land conflict between Baptists and their
    neighbors in August 1998; however, there were no reports of such
    conflicts during the year.
        The Celestial Christians are divided because of a leadership
    struggle, as are the Harrists, who have fought on occasion. In March
    due to the internal struggle in the Harrist Church, clergy leader
    Barthelemy Akre Yasse struck from the church rolls Harrist National
    Committee president Felix Tchotche Mel for insubordination. This battle
    for church leadership at the national level led to violent
    confrontations between church members at the local level. In April
    local governments, in order to prevent further violence, closed some
    Harrist churches (see Section 2.c.).
        Prior to the December 1999 coup, the Islamic leadership was
    fractured by disagreement between factions, two of which (the Superior
    Islamic Council and the Ouamma Islamic Front) were allied with the
    former ruling party, and two of which (the National Islamic Council and
    the Islamic Confederation for the Development of Cote d'Ivoire) were
    unaligned politically and had sought to create Islamic organizations
    that enjoy the same freedom from unofficial state oversight and
    guidance that Catholic organizations long have enjoyed. Following the
    December 1999 coup, the organizations began to work together.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
    approximately 15.3 million (1998 Census) is ethnically diverse. The
    citzenry--not including the large noncitizen part of the population--is
    made up of five major families of ethnic groups. The Akan family made
    up more than 42 percent of the citizenry; the largest Akan ethnic
    group, and the largest ethnic group in the country, is the Baoule.
    Approximately 18 percent of citizens belong to the Northern Mande
    family, of which the Malinke are the largest group. Approximately 11
    percent of citizens belong to the Krou family, of which the Bete are
    the largest group. The Voltaic family accounts for another 18 percent
    of the population, and the Senoufou are the largest Voltaic group.
    Approximately 10 percent belong to the Southern Mande family, of which
    the Yacouba are the largest group. Major ethnic groups generally have
    their own primary languages and their non-urban populations tend to be
    concentrated regionally.
        At least 26 percent of the population is foreign, of which 95
    percent are other Africans. Most of the Africans are from neighboring
    countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso and may not claim citizenship
    legally. Birth in Ivoirian national territory does not confer
    citizenship. The ethnic composition of the whole population, including
    these noncitizens, is quite different from that of the citizenry alone.
        All ethnic groups sometimes practice societal discrimination on the
    basis of ethnicity. Urban neighborhoods still have identifiable ethnic
    characteristics, and major political parties tend to have identifiable
    ethnic and regional bases, although interethnic marriage increasingly
    is common in urban areas.
        Some ethnic groups include many noncitizens, and their share of the
    electorate would be increased by enfranchising noncitizens. Other
    ethnic groups include few noncitizens, and their share of the
    electorate would be decreased by enfranchising noncitizens. There are
    societal and political tensions between these two sets of ethnic
    groups. This cleavage corresponds to some extent to regional
    differences; ethnic groups that include many noncitizens are found
    chiefly in the north. Members of northern ethnic groups that are found
    in neighboring countries as well as in the country often are required
    to document their citizenship, whereas members of historically or
    currently politically powerful ethnic groups of the south and west
    reportedly do not have this problem. Police routinely abuse and harass
    noncitizen Africans residing in the country (see Section 1.c.).
    Official harassment reflects the frequently encountered conviction that
    foreigners are responsible for high crime rates, as well as concern for
    Ivorian national identity and identity card fraud.
        The new Constitution includes a restrictive presidential
    eligibility clause that not only limits presidential candidates to
    those who can prove that both parents were born in the country, but
    also states that a candidate can never have benefited from the use of
    another nationality.
        Election law changes in 1999 also limited presidential candidates
    to those who could prove that both parents were born in the country.
    Because of this restriction, Ouattara was considered ineligible for
    both presidential and legislative elections during the year.
        Differences between members of ethnic groups are a major source of
    political tensions and since 1997 have erupted repeatedly into
    violence. Many members of the Baoule group, which long has inhabited
    the east-central region, have settled in towns and on previously
    uncultivated land in other areas, especially in more westerly regions.
    In the past, the Government generally has viewed use of land as
    conferring de facto ownership of land. However, in December 1998, the
    National Assembly enacted the new Land Use Law, which establishes that
    land title does not transfer from the traditional owner to the user
    simply by virtue of use.
        General Guei initially included many members of the previously
    disenfranchised northern and western ethnic groups in the transition
    Government, but over the course of the year he excluded northerners
    from the power structure. Guei filled an increasing number of
    government positions with members of his ethnic group, the Yacouba, and
    he brought a number of southern PDCI officials back into the
    Government. During the Bedie regime, members of the Baoule ethnic group
    dominated the PDCI and held disproportionate numbers of positions in
    the public sector, including the security forces, the civil service,
    and state-owned businesses (see Section 3). Gbagbo's cabinet, which
    took office on October 27, included three Muslims and three
    northerners, most significantly the Minister of State for Foreign
    Affairs.
        Tensions continued in the southwest between Kroumen and settlers
    from Burkina Faso, many of whom were born in the region or have lived
    in the region for up to 30 years. The most significant violence began
    in late August, then continued in September and October. In August and
    September, fighting in the villages of Trahe and Heke (Grand Bereby)
    resulted in at least 13 deaths. In October fighting in Trahe and Heke
    resulted in another five deaths. Fighting between August and October
    drove approximately 2,500 persons from their homes, including citizen
    Baoules and Kroumen who were caught in the battles. In November 1999,
    approximately 12,000 Burkinabe were forced to return to Burkina Faso as
    a result of land battles. Although some of those who left had returned
    by year's end, the majority remained in Burkina Faso. There were no
    further reports of violence between native Kroumen and settlers and
    migrant laborers from Burkina Faso during the year.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The new Constitution and the Labor
    Code grant all citizens, except members of the police and military
    services, the right to form or join unions. Registration of a new union
    requires 3 months. For almost 30 years, the government-sponsored labor
    confederation, the General Union of Workers of Cote d'Ivoire (UGTCI),
    dominated most union activity. The UGTCI's hold on the labor movement
    loosened in 1991 when several formerly UGTCIaffiliated unions broke
    away and became independent. In 1992 a total of 11 formerly independent
    unions joined to form the Federation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Cote
    d'Ivoire. There also are two other registered labor federations not
    affiliated with the Government, including the Dignite labor federation.
    Unions legally are free to join federations other than the UGTCI,
    although in the past the Government pressured unions to join UGTCI.
        The right to strike is provided by the new Constitution, and by
    statute. The Labor Code requires a protracted series of negotiations
    and a 6-day notification period before a strike may take place, making
    legal strikes difficult to organize. In the aftermath of the December
    1999 coup, the CNSP and the Labor Ministry arbitrated more than 80
    labor-related conflicts. Employees working for Solibra, Tropical
    Rubber, Cote d'Ivoire Blohorn, and PISAM Hospital, complained about
    severe problems including being underpaid, working in dangerous job
    conditions, and lack of safety concerns.
        On February 1, police used tear gas to disperse striking workers at
    the Commune of Cocody City Hall (see Section 1.c.).
        Public and private school teachers went on strike several times
    during the year to protest lack of pay raises and perceived government
    apathy to their demands. Public teachers, especially those hired under
    a 1991 law that cut starting salaries in half, demanded that the new
    Government fulfill promises made during the Bedie regime to raise
    salaries and improve benefits. Guei accepted most of their demands and
    agreed to implement the wage increases in 2001. President Gbagbo
    repeated these promises.
        In March private teachers also organized a series of strikes to
    protest nonpayment of salaries. In November six private school teachers
    went on a hunger strike to protest that their pay was not competitive
    with their public school counterparts. In December the Government
    offered to give the six private school teachers $7,000 (500,000 FCFA)
    each.
        In February the union of employees of the company BlohornUnilever
    attempted to negotiate a reduction in the substantial difference in
    salary between foreign workers (especially European) and those hired
    locally. Complaining of what workers called ``Salary Apartheid,'' union
    leaders called a 72-hour strike after talks failed. The strike ended
    when management promised to ``look into the issue;'' however, no
    improvements had been made by year's end.
        In August security guards assigned to a sub-prefecture in Abidjan
    and radio technicians in the Ministry of the Interior and
    Decentralization went on strike over lack of benefits and a set salary
    of $90 (62,000 FCFA) a month for workers regardless of work experience
    and length of service. Instead of negotiating with the workers,
    Interior Minister Grena Mouassi replaced them.
        Minibus owners and drivers union went on strike for 1 day on
    November 27 in response to gendarmes' abuse of some minibus drivers
    (see Section 1.c.). Truck drivers went on strike for 48 hours in
    November and obtained the arrest of the gendarme who had shot at a
    colleague. The gendarme's trial started November 28 but had not been
    completed by year's end.
        Unions are free to join international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The new
    Constitution provides for collective bargaining, and the Labor Code
    grants all citizens, except members of the police and military
    services, the right to bargain collectively. Collective bargaining
    agreements in effect are in many major business enterprises and sectors
    of the civil service. In most cases in which wages are not established
    in direct negotiations between unions and employers, salaries are set
    by job categories by the Ministry of Employment and Civil Service.
    Labor inspectors have the responsibility to enforce a law that
    prohibits antiunion discrimination. There have been no known
    prosecutions or convictions under this law, nor have there been reports
    of anti-union discrimination.
        Members of the military intervened directly in labor disputes,
    sometimes arresting and intimidating parties (see Section 1.e.).
        There were no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
    prohibited by law; however, the International Labor Organization's
    Committee of Experts in its 1996 annual report questioned a decree that
    places certain categories of prisoners at the disposal of private
    enterprises for work assignments without their apparent consent.
    Legislation exists allowing inmates to work outside of prison walls;
    however, because of a lack of funds to hire warden guards to supervise
    the inmates, the law often is not invoked. In April the NGO Doctors
    without Borders funded a project in which inmates where hired to
    improve the sanitation system in their prison. Although it did not
    finance the project, the Government did permit the prisoners to receive
    a salary for their work.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however, the
    Government did not acknowledge the problem until recently and does not
    enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.d.). Children
    regularly are trafficked into the country from neighboring countries
    and sold into forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--In most instances, the legal minimum working age is 14;
    however, the Ministry of Employment and Civil Service enforces this
    provision effectively only in the civil service and in large
    multinational companies. Labor law limits the hours of young workers,
    defined as those under the age of 18. However, children often work on
    family farms, and some children routinely act as vendors, shoe shiners,
    errand boys, car watchers, and washers of car windows in the informal
    sector in cities. There are reliable reports of some use of children in
    ``sweatshop'' conditions in small workshops. Children also work in
    familyoperated artisanal gold and diamond mines. Primary education is
    mandatory but far from universally enforced, particularly in rural
    areas (see Section 5). Since 1998 the Government has tried to develop
    special technical and vocational programs for those expelled from
    school at an early age. Some technical and vocational programs began
    operations in March and April; at year's end, it was not clear if they
    would be successful.
        Although the Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor, it
    does not enforce this prohibition effectively. Children regularly are
    trafficked into the country from neighboring countries and sold into
    forced labor. There was widespread abuse of foreign children for forced
    labor on agricultural plantations (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively
    determines monthly minimum wage rates, which last were adjusted in
    1996. President Gbagbo promised an overall pay raise, as did General
    Guei; however, no such raises had been granted by year's end. A
    slightly higher minimum wage rate applies for construction workers. The
    Government enforces the minimum wage rates only for salaried workers
    employed by the Government or registered with the social security
    office. Minimum wages vary according to occupation, with the lowest set
    at approximately $52 (36,607 FCFA) per month for the industrial sector,
    which is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
    worker and family. The majority of the labor force works in agriculture
    or in the informal sector where the minimum wage does not apply.
    According to a Labor Ministry survey, workers in the agricultural and
    fishing sector receive an average of $1040 (726,453 FCFA) a year.
        Through the Ministry of Employment and the Civil Service, the
    Government enforces a comprehensive Labor Code that governs the terms
    and conditions of service for wage earners and salaried workers and
    provides for occupational safety and health standards. Those employed
    in the formal sector generally are protected against unjust
    compensation, excessive hours, and arbitrary discharge from employment.
    The standard legal workweek is 40 hours. The law requires overtime
    payment on a graduated scale for additional hours. The Labor Code
    provides for at least one 24-hour rest period per week.
        Government labor inspectors can order employers to improve
    substandard conditions, and a labor court can levy fines if the
    employer fails to comply with the Labor Code. However, in the large
    informal sector of the economy involving both urban and rural workers,
    the Government's occupational health and safety regulations are
    enforced erratically, if at all. The practice of labor inspectors
    accepting bribes is a growing problem, and observers believe that it is
    widespread. Workers in the formal sector have the right under the Labor
    Code to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment by utilizing the Ministry of Labor's
    inspection system to document dangerous working conditions. However,
    workers in the informal sector ordinarily cannot remove themselves from
    such labor without risking the loss of their employment.
        Labor federations such as Dignite are working to provide some
    relief to workers when companies fail to meet minimum salary
    requirements. For example, the sanitary services company ASH continues
    to pay wages as low as $15.50 (12,000 FCFA) a month to female employees
    who work sweeping the streets of Abidjan. According to Dignite, labor
    inspectors continue to ignore this clear violation of the law. The
    shipbuilding company Carena discriminates between European engineers
    who are paid $11,400 (8 million FCFA) a month, compared with their
    African colleagues who receive $114 (80,000 FCFA) a month. Government
    labor and employment authorities have not responded to these problems.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and there were credible reports that it occurs. Since the
    mid 1990's, media reports have exposed the widespread practice of
    importing and indenturing Malian boys for field work on Ivoirian
    plantations under abusive conditions. For example, children recruited
    by Malians in the border town of Sikasso are promised easy and
    lucrative jobs in Cote d'Ivoire, transported across the border, and
    then sold to other Malians who disperse them throughout the plantations
    of the central region. These children are forced to work under grueling
    conditions in the fields and locked at night in crowded sheds, with
    their clothing confiscated. The Governments of Mali and Cote d'Ivoire
    confirmed these reports in a joint February press conference with
    UNICEF. The Government of Mali and UNICEF took steps to halt this
    trafficking and repatriate the children in Mali; more than 270 Malian
    children were returned to their families during the year. The extent of
    this practice is difficult to estimate because many Malian adults also
    worked on Ivoirian plantations in the same area under difficult
    conditions.
        On February 18, Ivoirian authorities working with the Malian Consul
    in Bouake repatriated 19 Malian men and children who were working as
    forced labor on a plantation in the western region of Bangolo. The
    youngest was 13 years-of-age, although 14 of them were under the age of
    20. The police filed criminal charges against the farm owner and the
    traffickers in February, but at year's end, their trial had not begun.
        In August the Governments of Cote d'Ivoire and Mali signed the
    Bouake agreement, which recognized the need to be more active in
    repatriating Malian children from Cote d'Ivoire. It is estimated that
    some 15,000 Malian children work on Ivoirian cocoa and coffee
    plantations. Many are under 12 years-of-age, sold into indentured
    servitude for $140 (100,000 FCFA), and work 12-hour days for $135 to
    $189 (95,000 to 125,000 FCFA) per year. In September authorities
    intercepted 26 young Malian children and 13 suspected traffickers led
    by Somboro Moussa on their way to Bouake; the children were repatriated
    in mid-September. During the year, more than 270 Malian children have
    been repatriated from Cote d'Ivoire; however, despite the Bouake
    accord, child trafficking remained a problem. In November the Minister
    of Employment announced that it plans to continue working with Malian
    authorities to repatriate child laborers.
        Children also are trafficked into the country from countries other
    than Mali. During the year, there were reports of children, some as
    young as 6 years-of-age, coming from Benin to work as agricultural
    laborers and maids. Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo are other sources of
    child labor. The Government discussed a labor agreement with the
    Government of Togo but had not signed an accord by year's end.
                                   __________

                                    DJIBOUTI

        On April 9, 1999, Djibouti elected its second president since
    gaining independence from France in 1977. Ismael Omar Guelleh, the
    candidate of the ruling party, the People's Rally for Progress (RPP),
    won the election with 74 percent of the vote. Opposition candidate
    Moussa Ahmed Idriss, of the Unified Djiboutian Opposition (ODU),
    received 26 percent of the vote. For the first time since multiparty
    elections began in 1992, no group boycotted the election. The ODU later
    challenged the results based on election ``irregularities'' and the
    assertion that ``foreigners'' had voted in various districts of the
    capital; however, international and locally-based observers considered
    the election to be generally fair and cited only minor technical
    difficulties. Guelleh took the oath of office as President in May 1999,
    with the support of an alliance between the RPP and the government-
    recognized section of the Afar-led Front for the Restoration of Unity
    and Democracy (FRUD). The RPP has been the ruling power since
    independence in 1977. Two main ethnic groups hold most political power:
    Somali Issas (the tribe of the President), and Afars. Citizens from
    other Somali clans (Issak, Gadabursi, and Darod), and those of Yemeni
    and other origins, are limited unofficially in their access to top
    government positions. In 1994 the Government and a faction of the FRUD
    signed a peace accord, ending 3 years of civil war. In the accord, the
    Government agreed to recognize the FRUD as a legitimate political
    party. The Government named two FRUD leaders to Cabinet positions in
    1995. On February 7, the Government and the faction of the FRUD that
    had rejected the 1994 peace accord signed a new peace accord, ending
    FRUD opposition to the Government. Since April the two sides have been
    negotiating many issues, including a role for this faction of the FRUD
    in the Government. Two other legal political parties have existed since
    1992, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Party for Democratic
    Renewal (PRD); neither holds a parliamentary seat or a cabinet level
    post. In 1997 the ruling party coalition that includes the FRUD party
    won all 65 seats in legislative elections, which took place without
    international observers and amid opposition claims of massive fraud.
    The judiciary is not independent of the executive.
        The 8,000-member National Police Force (FNP) is responsible for
    internal security and border control, and is overseen by the Ministry
    of Interior. The Ministry of Defense oversees the army. The Gendarmerie
    Nationale, a police force responsible for the President's security, is
    an autonomous unit under the presidency. A small intelligence bureau
    also reports directly to the President. Civilian authorities generally
    maintain effective control of the security forces, but there were
    instances in which the security forces acted independently of the
    Government's authority. Some members of the security forces committed
    human rights abuses.
        The country has little industry and few natural resources. Services
    provide most of the national income. Minor mineral deposits remain
    mostly unexploited. Only a tenth of the land is arable and only 1
    percent is forested. Outside the capital city, the primary economic
    activity is nomadic subsistence. Citizens are free to pursue private
    business interests and to hold personal and real property. The part of
    the annual gross domestic product not generated by and for the foreign
    community, which includes some 8,000 French citizens, is estimated at
    no more than $250 per capita annually. Unusually low rainfall caused
    drought conditions that negatively impacted some of the population. The
    Government did not pay the salaries of teachers, security forces, and
    civil servants for the 5 months prior to the end of the year.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were a few improvements in some areas, serious problems remain.
    Although the 1999 presidential elections were considered generally
    fair, the 1997 parliamentary elections took place amid claims of
    massive fraud, and the RPP continues to control the political system to
    suppress organized opposition. Members of the security forces committed
    extrajudicial killings. There were credible reports that security
    forces beat, otherwise abused, and at times tortured detainees, and
    raped female inmates. There were credible reports that police beat
    protesters. Prison conditions remained harsh. The Government continued
    to harass and intimidate political opponents, and to arrest and detain
    persons arbitrarily. Prolonged detention and incommunicado detention
    remained problems. The judiciary is not independent of the executive
    and does not ensure citizens' due process. The Government infringed on
    citizens' privacy rights. The Government at times restricted freedom of
    the press. The Government limited freedom of assembly, and restricted
    freedom of association. While the Government respected freedom of
    religion in general, it discouraged proselytizing. There were some
    limits on freedom of movement. The Government remained antagonistic to
    the formation of human rights groups. Violence and discrimination
    against women persisted, and the practice of female genital mutilation
    (FGM) continued to be widespread. Discrimination on the basis of
    ethnicity and clan background persisted. The Government restricted
    unions and harassed and intimidated their leaders. Child labor exists.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed several extrajudicial killings. On June 24, in a market in
    Balbala, police shot and killed Daher Guedi Fourreh, the nephew of
    Moumin Bahdon Farah, the leader of the opposition party Groupe pour la
    Democratie et Republique (GDR), because they mistook him for a
    smuggler. Police admitted he was shot by mistake and were investigating
    the shooting at year's end.
        On October 13, while forcibly dispersing an unruly crowd
    demonstrating in support of Palestinians, police fired into the crowd,
    killing one person and injuring several others (see Section 2.b.).
        On December 7, approximately 150 police officers, led by Police
    Chief Yacin Yabeh Galab, attempted to overthrow the Government (see
    Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 3); as many as 9 persons were killed and over
    10 injured during clashes in front of the presidential offices between
    the police and the gendarmerie, who were supporting the President. A
    stray bullet also killed a person praying at a nearby Mosque.
        The Government has not used landmines since signing the Mine Ban
    Treaty in 1997; however, the armed wing of the FRUD used landmines
    during its conflict with the Government. Both parties signed a peace
    accord in February, and efforts have begun since to demine the areas in
    which the FRUD operated. FRUD was cooperating with the Government to
    locate landmines laid in northern areas of the country. Landmines laid
    by the Government and FRUD forces in the 1990's remain in some areas of
    the country, especially in areas controlled by the FRUD prior to the
    peace accord (see Section 2.d.), and there were several deaths and
    injuries from landmine explosions during the year. On February 8, a
    military vehicle hit a landmine in Obock, killing one soldier and
    injuring four others. In March in Obock a landmine explosion seriously
    injured two children.
        There were no reports of any action or investigation into the
    following 1999 cases of extrajudicial killings: The March death of a
    political detainee in the main prison; the April killings of Abdallah
    Ahmed Mohamed Rebeh, Moussa Abdallah, Ahmed Yagouri, and Ali Mohamed
    Ali ``Derbi;'' the August killing of eight persons in Tadjourah
    district when an army helicopter exploded; and the September killing of
    one person by police attempting to arrest Moussa Ahmed Idriss.
        There were no reports of any action or investigation into the
    following 1998 cases of extrajudicial killings: The killing of one man
    when police shot into a crowd while attempting to make an arrest in
    downtown Djibouti and the killing of two Afar community elders near
    Assa Gueyla.
        In March 1999, the Paris-based Association for the Respect of Human
    Rights in Djibouti (ARHRD), and an unidentified citizen presented a
    complaint in a French court against former President Gouled and
    President Guelleh alleging human rights violations, including summary
    executions. The complaint listed a series of human rights abuses and
    judicial abuses dating back to 1995. No action was known to have taken
    place by year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        In May 1999, police detained an Ethiopian guard at a private
    residence, allegedly because he was an illegal immigrant. The guard's
    whereabouts still were unknown at year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution provides that no one shall be subjected
    to torture or to other inhuman, cruel, degrading, or humiliating
    punishments, and torture is punishable by 15 years' imprisonment;
    however, there continued to be credible reports that police and
    gendarmes beat, otherwise physically abused, and at times tortured
    prisoners and detainees.
        On October 13, while forcibly dispersing an unruly crowd
    demonstrating in support of Palestinians, police fired into the crowd
    injuring several persons (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
        On December 7, at least 10 persons were injured during clashes in
    front of the presidential offices between the police and the
    gendarmerie (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 3).
        There were widespread, although unconfirmed, reports that gendarmes
    and police beat, raped, or stole personal property from some of
    approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners arrested and detained on
    December 21; most of those arrested were Ethiopian (see Sections 1.d.,
    1.f., 2.d., and 5).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports during the year
    that government security forces in the northern districts denied access
    to food and water to citizens who refused to declare loyalty to the
    Government and renounce the FRUD.
        Landmine explosions resulted in at least one death and several
    injuries during the year (see Section 1.a.).
        There was no known action taken against members of the security
    forces responsible for torturing, beating, or abusing the persons in
    the following 1999 cases: The April case of Saleh Mohamed Dini who
    reportedly was tortured while in custody; the April case of
    approximately 20 Afars reportedly subjected to physical violence while
    in detention in Obock district; and the May case of a civilian who
    reportedly was beat after he refused to walk on a landmine. In March
    1999, an unidentified citizen in conjunction with the ARHRD presented a
    claim in a French court against President Guelleh and former President
    Gouled, alleging that he had been detained arbitrarily and tortured,
    and had suffered physical and psychological damage as a result. There
    were no reported developments in the case at year's end.
        In previous years, there have been credible reports that security
    force personnel raped at least 120 Afar women in the northern districts
    of Obock and Tadjourah (see Section 5). In almost all of the cases, the
    victims did not press charges due to shame and fear. There were no
    reported cases of rape during the year, and there were no developments
    in the 1999 rape case of Zenaba Agoden.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports of clashes
    between unemployed citizens and Ethiopians in various parts of the
    capital.
        In April unknown persons beat and robbed the cousin of Ali Dahan, a
    FRUD official, several days after the delegation of FRUD leaders
    returned to the country (see Sections 2.d. and 3); Dahan was residing
    at his cousin's residence. It still was unknown who the perpetrators
    were at year's end.
        Prison conditions are harsh, and prisons are overcrowded severely.
    Gabode prison, built for 350 persons, at times housed nearly twice that
    number. The Government sometimes shortens prison terms to reduce
    overcrowding. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 60 percent of
    prisoners are illegal Ethiopian immigrants who have committed crimes in
    the country, but that the majority of the approximately 200 prisoners
    in Gabode prison at year's end were citizens. Children of female
    inmates under the age of 5 sometimes are allowed to stay with their
    mothers; authorities say that milk is provided for them. Prisoners
    reportedly must pay authorities to obtain food. Health care sources
    reported that prison guards raped female inmates. Women and men are
    detained separately. Several prisoners were reported to be suffering
    from untreated illnesses or gunshot wounds received during arrest.
    Medical care is inadequate, and the prison infirmary lacks sufficient
    medication. There are no educational or rehabilitation facilities
    within the prison. The lack of funding hampers the ability of Ministry
    of Justice officials to provide even minimal services. In principle
    juveniles are housed separately from adult prisoners; however, in
    practice this is not always the case.
        In March 1999, Abdi Houfaneh Liban, a 35-year old political
    prisoner arrested in April 1998, died under unexplained circumstances.
    Djiboutian human rights groups in France asserted that Abdi's death was
    caused by harsh living conditions in the Gabode prison. Some opposition
    supporters believe that Abdi's death might have been due to poisoning.
    A foreign journalist who visited the prison shortly after Abdi's death
    believes that Abdi died after taking incorrect medication. The
    journalist noted that the prison infirmary was stocked poorly and
    prisoners often were given incorrect medications.
        Conditions at Nagad detention center, where Ethiopians and Somalis
    are held prior to deportation, also are extremely harsh. Detainees at
    Nagad are held in unsanitary conditions and often are not fed for
    several days before their deportation.
        An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate from
    Kenya made quarterly visits to the main prison. In March a visiting
    delegation from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Human Rights
    Committee visited Gabode prison. OAU observers stated that the
    conditions at the prison were desperate. The president of the
    Djiboutian Human Rights League (LDDH) was granted permission to visit
    prisoners in Gabode Prison during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite legal
    protections, arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. The 1995
    Penal Code stipulates that the State may not detain a person beyond 48
    hours without an examining magistrate's formal charge. Detainees may be
    held another 24 hours with the prior approval of the public prosecutor.
    All persons, including those accused of political or national security
    offenses, must be tried within 8 months of arraignment. Nevertheless,
    the police occasionally disregarded these procedures, typically
    arresting persons without warrants, and sometimes detaining them for
    lengthy periods without charge. The penal code provides for bail and
    expeditious trial. Incommunicado detention is used.
        On February 22, police detained and questioned for 7 hours Jean-
    Paul Abdi Noel, president of the LDDH, regarding a December 20, 1999,
    communique in which Abdi alleged government indifference to the
    populations of the Tadjourah and Obock districts. In March police again
    detained for 2 hours Abdi in conjunction with the same matter; he was
    not charged.
        On March 6, Abdoulfatah Moussa Ahmed, the son of opposition leader
    Moussa Ahmed Idriss, was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment and a fine
    of $129,980 (23 million DF) for misappropriation of public funds. He
    had been in provisional detention since June 22, 1999. He was released
    in April, and his appeal of the sentence was pending at year's end.
        On May 30, police arrested five bus union leaders for organizing a
    strike to protest fuel price increases (see Section 6.a.). On May 31,
    police arrested 15 bus drivers and owners in connection with the
    strike. All were released after 2 days following an agreement to raise
    bus fares.
        On June 3, police detained approximately 160 persons, mostly women
    and children, for blocking traffic in Djibouti City to protest the
    increased bus fares (see Section 2.b.). All were released after 1 or 2
    days.
        On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained
    approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were
    Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., 2.d., and 5). There were
    widespread, although unconfirmed, reports that gendarmes and police
    beat, raped, and stole personal belongings from some of those detained.
    Many of those detained were deported from the country by year's end.
        In April 1999, authorities arrested more than 20 Afars in the Obock
    district for expressing support for the FRUD. After 4 days in detention
    in a military camp at Medeho, five men were released, one was detained
    further, and nine were transferred to a police prison near the capital.
    The remaining nine were released as a result of an amnesty granted in
    February (see Section 1.e.).
        There were no developments in the 1999 cases of: Abdoulfatah Moussa
    Ahmed, who was rearrested in June 1999 and charged with an economic
    crime; and Saleh Mohamed Dini, chief of Mabla, who was arrested in
    April 1999 allegedly for insulting the President. Both remained in
    detention pending trials at year's end.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is not
    independent of the executive. Constitutional provisions for a fair
    trial are not respected universally, even in nonpolitical cases,
    because of interference from the executive branch. The Minister of
    Justice officially is responsible for human rights.
        The judiciary, based on the French Napoleonic code, is composed of
    a lower court, appeals courts, and a Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
    can overrule decisions of the lower courts. Magistrates are appointed
    for life terms. The Constitutional Council rules on the
    constitutionality of laws, including those related to the protection of
    human rights and civil liberties; however, its rulings are not always
    respected.
        The legal system is based on legislation and executive decrees,
    French codified law adopted at independence, Shari'a law, and nomadic
    traditions. Urban crime is dealt with in the regular courts in
    accordance with French-inspired law and judicial practice. Civil
    actions may be brought in regular or traditional courts. Shari'a law is
    restricted to civil and family matters. The Government promulgated a
    new law on judicial organization in August, which included the
    establishment of a National Committee for the Promotion and Protection
    of Human Rights and provided for the separation of the court system
    from the Ministry of Justice. The law was not implemented by year's
    end.
        Traditional law (Xeer) often is used in conflict resolution and
    victim compensation. For example, traditional law often stipulates that
    a blood price be paid to the victim's clan for crimes such as murder
    and rape.
        The Constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven
    guilty and has the right to legal counsel and to be examined by a
    doctor if imprisoned. Although trials are public officially, in
    politically sensitive cases security measures effectively prevent
    public access. Legal counsel is supposed to be available to the
    indigent in criminal and civil matters; however, defendants often do
    not have representation. Court cases are heard in public before a
    presiding judge and two accompanying judges. The latter receive
    assistance from two persons, assessors, who are not members of the
    bench, but who are thought to possess sufficient legal sophistication
    to comprehend court proceedings. The Government chooses assessors from
    the public at large, but credible reports indicate that political and
    ethnic affiliations play a role in the selection.
        Human rights attorney Aref Mohamed Aref and his colleague Djama
    Amareh Meidal remained disbarred for alleged irregularities in their
    representation of a client in a 1994 commercial transaction.
        On November 29, in honor of Ramadan, the Government announced that
    the President had signed a decree approved by the Council of Ministers,
    which granted a general amnesty to all prisoners serving sentences of 2
    years or less, and reduced the sentences by 6 months of all prisoners
    serving sentences of more than 2 years. By year's end, the Government
    had released 201 prisoners in accordance with the amnesty.
        From November 11 to 15, the Government sponsored a series of
    judicial assessment workshops to analyze the judicial system and to
    propose recommendations for strengthening the judiciary. The Government
    invited representatives from all opposition parties (see Section 3);
    however, some opposition leaders refused to participate because they
    had been invited in their personal capacity, not as political party
    leaders. Approximately 150 persons participated in the workshops, and
    the governmentowned media provided coverage of the event. The final
    workshop report and recommendations had not been completed by year's
    end.
        In February 1998, the Committee for the Support of Political
    Prisoners (CSPP) was created. In 1999 the CSPP reported that the
    Government held 52 political prisoners, including 12 relatives of
    former cabinet director Ismael Guedi Hared who were arrested in October
    1998, allegedly for hoarding weapons, and 40 FRUD dissidents who had
    been handed over by Ethiopian authorities or were FRUD rebels captured
    in clashes with the army. In March the Council of Ministers approved a
    law granting amnesty for political crimes committed by the FRUD prior
    to the signing of the peace accord. In February the Government released
    all FRUD political prisoners as a condition of the February peace
    accord; on February 10, the Government released 29 political prisoners,
    all members of the FRUD, and on February 12, the Government released an
    additional 18 political prisoners, including 11 followers of Ismael
    Guedi Hared. There were no remaining political prisoners at year's end.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    family, home, correspondence, and communications; however, the
    Government infringed on these rights. The law also requires that the
    authorities obtain a warrant before conducting searches on private
    property; however, in practice the Government does not always obtain
    warrants before conducting such searches, and it reportedly monitors
    and sometimes disrupts the communications of some Government opponents.
    On April 16, authorities searched the home and office of the Somaliland
    representative to Djibouti without a warrant and gave him 3 hours to
    gather his belongings and leave the country (see Section 2.d.). Unlike
    in the previous year, there were no reports that authorities harassed
    the family members of opposition leaders.
        On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained
    approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were
    Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.d., and 5). Unlike previous
    searches, police and gendarmes conducted a house to house search for
    these persons. Traffic into and out of entire neighborhoods was
    prohibited during the searches. Although unconfirmed, there were
    widespread reports that police beat, raped, or stole personal property
    from those who were arrested and detained.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the Government
    restricted these rights in practice. The law prohibits the
    dissemination of false information and regulates the publication of
    newspapers. The Constitution prohibits slander.
        The Government owns the principal newspaper, La Nation, which
    expanded publication from weekly to biweekly printings in 1999. There
    are several opposition-run weekly and monthly publications that
    circulate freely and openly criticize the Government.
        On June 22, the Government deported Abdirazak Hadji Soufi and
    Muridi Aboubaker Mahdi, two delegates attending the Somalia Peace and
    Reconciliation Conference, after they criticized the Government for
    allegedly interfering in the conference process (see Section 2.d.).
        In March the opposition newspapers Le Renouveau and Le Temps began
    publishing again following a 6-month ban imposed in 1999 following
    charges of distributing false information. The newspapers' editors had
    been arrested in August 1999 after Le Temps and Le Renouveau reprinted
    a letter in which the Paris-based FRUD leader Ahmed Dini claimed
    responsibility for the downing of an army helicopter. Both were
    released in December 1999 as part of a presidential amnesty.
        In April the Government banned the importation and sale of the
    Somaliland newspapers Jamhuuriya and The Republican. The ban remained
    in effect at year's end.
        The Government also owns the radio and television stations. The
    official media generally are uncritical of government leaders and
    government policy. On May 28, the British Broadcasting Corporation
    (BBC) began ``World Service'' in the country in conjunction with Radio-
    Television Djibouti (RTD), the official government station. The BBC and
    RTD plan to broadcast 24 hours a day in four languages on the radio.
    Radio France Internationale also broadcasts in the country.
        In May the Government allegedly restricted the activities of BBC
    journalists covering the Somali Conference.
        The country has one Internet service provider, which is owned by
    the Government.
        There are no specific laws or criminal sanctions that threaten
    academic freedom. In general teachers may speak and conduct research
    without restriction, provided that they do not violate sedition laws.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The right to free
    assembly is provided for in the Constitution; however, the Government
    limited this right in practice. The Ministry of Interior requires
    permits for peaceful assembly and monitors opposition activities. While
    permits generally are approved, the Government commonly uses a show of
    police force and threatening tactics to intimidate and discourage
    would-be demonstrators. Some opposition leaders effectively practiced
    self-censorship and, rather than provoke a Government crackdown,
    refrained from organizing popular demonstrations.
        In June the Government refused a request by the ODU to organize a
    march for peace and democracy in celebration of Independence Day.
        On June 3, police detained approximately 160 persons, mostly women
    and children, for blocking traffic in Djibouti City to protest
    increased bus fares (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
        On October 13, police used teargas to disperse an unruly crowd
    demonstrating in support of Palestinians in Djibouti City. A few police
    also fired into the crowd, killing one person and injuring several
    others.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association provided that
    certain legal requirements are met; however, the Government restricts
    this right in practice. A referendum held in 1993 approved limiting the
    number of political parties to four; however, this result has not yet
    been codified into law.
        Nonpolitical associations must register and be approved by the
    Ministry of Interior. The Ministry has delayed registering the
    Djiboutian Human Rights League, which has been trying to register since
    May 1999. By year's end, it still was not registered.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution, while declaring Islam to
    be the state religion, provides for freedom of religion, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice; however,
    proselytizing is discouraged.
        The Qadi is the country's senior judge of Islamic law and was
    appointed by the Minister of Justice in June 1999. His predecessor was
    named Minister of State for Charitable and Religious Affairs under the
    Ministry of Justice--a position that was created in May 1999, when
    President Guelleh formed his Cabinet and declared that Islam would be a
    central tenet of his Government. Although Islam is the state religion,
    the Government imposes no sanctions on those who choose to ignore
    Islamic teachings, or practice other faiths. Over 99 percent of the
    population is Sunni Muslim.
        The Government requires that religious groups be registered. There
    were no reports that the Government refused to register any religious
    groups.
        There is no legal prohibition against proselytizing, but
    proselytizing is discouraged. On a few occasions, police have
    questioned members of the Baha'i faith for possible proselytizing
    activities, but there have been no arrests.
        Islamic law based on the Koran is used only with regard to family
    matters, and is administered by the Qadi. Civil marriage is permitted
    only to non-Muslim foreigners. Muslims are required to marry in a
    religious ceremony, and non-Muslim men only can marry a Muslim woman
    after converting to Islam.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution allows freedom of
    movement; however, there were instances in which authorities limited
    this right. In general citizens may travel or emigrate without
    restriction or interference; however, a judge may order a passport
    seized for those under judicial surveillance or awaiting trial. In
    March the Embassy of Djibouti in Paris refused to issue a passport to
    Ali Dahan, Permanent Representative of the FRUD to the Americas, prior
    to the return of exiled FRUD leaders to the country. On June 5, the
    Government refused to issue a passport to Aden Robleh Awaleh, president
    of the PND, to attend an African Leadership Forum in Nigeria (see
    Section 3); no passport was issued by year's end. On June 30, airport
    police prevented Bogor Abdillahi Bogor Moussa, a participant in the
    Somalia Peace and Reconciliation Conference, from boarding a plane for
    Puntland, in Somalia. In July the Government returned Aref Mohamed
    Aref's passport, which authorities had seized in December 1998. In
    August the Government returned the passport of GDR leader Moumin Bahdon
    Farah, which it had seized and kept in October 1998 despite a court
    order to return it.
        Customary law, which is based on Shari'a (Islamic law),
    discriminates against women (see Section 5). Women are not permitted to
    travel without the permission of an adult male relative.
        On April 15, after the Administration of Somaliland, in Somalia,
    prevented a delegation from the Djiboutian Government to deplane in
    Hargeisa, the Administration closed its border with Djibouti. On April
    16, the Government closed its border with Somalia and expelled the
    Somaliland representative to Djibouti and his staff in retaliation. On
    June 22, the Government deported Abdirazak Hadji Soufi and Muridi
    Aboubaker Mahdi, two delegates attending the Somalia Peace and
    Reconciliation Conference (see Section 2.a.).
        Landmines laid by the Government and FRUD forces in the 1990's
    remain in some areas of the country, especially in areas controlled by
    the FRUD prior to the peace accord, and landmines laid in Tadjoura and
    Obock districts restricted freedom of movement (see Section 1.a.).
        The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government offers first asylum;
    however, the government committee responsible for determining refugees'
    status has not met since 1995. While the Government officially does not
    recognize those refugees under the protection of the U.N. High
    Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) absent this approval, the refugees are
    permitted to remain in the country.
        The country hosts up to 100,000 refugees and illegal immigrants
    from neighboring countries, equal to approximately one-fifth of the
    population. These numbers have increased since January due to the
    drought in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in May. The UNHCR
    assists 21,000 Somali and 1,000 Ethiopian residents of the two
    remaining refugee camps. Approximately 2,500 Ethiopian and Somali urban
    refugees are registered with the UNHCR office in Djibouti City. In May
    and June, approximately 1,100 Somali refugees, who were living in a
    camp in Eritrea, fled to a temporary camp in Obock to escape the
    Ethiopian-Eritrean war. In October UNHCR began a facilitated
    repatriation of these refugees back to Somalia. All remaining refugees
    in Obock camp were repatriated, and the camp was closed by year's end.
        In May UNHCR repatriated over 1,700 Ethiopian refugees who had fled
    to the country in 1984-85 and ceased to register Ethiopians as
    refugees. In previous years, the Djiboutian National Office for the
    Assistance of Refugees and Displaced Persons reported that it deported
    up to a thousand Ethiopians each week. Although the number of
    deportations still is believed to be high, no figures were available
    during the year.
        There are reports that members of the security forces sometimes
    compel illegal immigrants to work for them under the threat of
    deportation.
        On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained
    approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were
    Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 5). Police and gendarmes
    cordoned off entire neighborhoods and conducted house to house searches
    for these persons. Although unconfirmed, there were widespread reports
    that police beat, raped, or stole personal property from those who were
    arrested and detained. Many of those detained were deported from the
    country by year's end.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    Government, and citizens exercised this right through a democratic
    process in presidential elections held in April 1999. RPP candidate
    Ismael Omar Guelleh, the designated successor of former President
    Hassan Gouled Aptidon, won the 1999 election with 74 percent of the
    vote. ODU candidate Moussa Ahmed Idriss received 26 percent of the
    vote. For the first time since multiparty elections began in 1992, no
    group boycotted the vote. Although Moussa Ahmed Idriss and the ODU
    challenged the results, alleging election ``irregularities'' and
    asserting that ``foreigners'' voted in various districts of the
    capital, international and domestic observers considered the election
    to be generally fair and transparent, citing only minor irregularities.
    All five of the districts were visited by at least 1 of the 22
    international observers on election day. Observers representing the
    Arab League, the International Organization of Francophone States (La
    Francophonie), and the OAU issued a joint communique that expressed
    satisfaction with the transparency of the election, citing only minor
    technical problems. Representatives of both candidates were present in
    virtually all voting stations, and there was no ethnic strife among
    Afars, Yemenis, and Somalis. Large numbers of persons of all
    communities supported both candidates.
        In the December 1997 legislative elections, the RPP alliance with
    the legal FRUD party won all 65 seats. The elections took place without
    international observers amid opposition claims of fraud.
        The RPP, which has been in power since independence in 1977,
    continues to rule the country. The RPP also continues to control
    carefully the implementation of the four-party system to suppress any
    organized opposition. Previous efforts by both the legal and
    unrecognized opposition parties to unify also floundered due to
    disagreements among their leaders over who should lead a unified
    opposition. There is no independent election commission.
        The 1994 peace agreement between the Government and the FRUD
    required that FRUD members be included in senior government positions.
    Two FRUD members were named to the Cabinet in June 1995, and in May
    1999, two new FRUD members were appointed to the Cabinet: A former FRUD
    military commander was appointed to the Defense portfolio and another
    FRUD member assumed the Health portfolio. The government-recognized
    faction of the FRUD was registered as a political party in 1996. On
    February 7, the Government and the faction of the FRUD that had
    rejected the 1994 peace accord signed a new peace accord, ending FRUD
    opposition to the Government. The two sides were negotiating many
    issues at year's end, including the role of this branch of the FRUD in
    the government.
        Government harassment of opposition leaders continued to be a
    problem; however, the number of incidents reportedly decreased during
    the year. On June 5, Aden Robleh Awaleh, president of the PND, was
    refused a passport to attend an African Leadership Forum in Nigeria
    (see Section 2.d.).
        On December 7, approximately 150 police officers, led by Police
    Chief Yacin Yabeh Galab, attempted to overthrow the Government. As many
    as 9 persons were killed and over 10 others were injured during clashes
    in front of the presidential offices between the police and the
    gendarmerie, who were supporting the President (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.). The coup followed months of nonpayment of police salaries by the
    Government and rumors that the President had fired Yacin (see Section
    6.e.). On December 9, police arrested and detained Yacin and 12 others
    for attempting to overthrow the President (see Section 1.d.). On
    December 13, the magistrate in charge of the investigation charged the
    13 with conspiracy and breach of state security and cited them with
    calling on citizens to take up arms illegally, carrying and making use
    of weapons of war, and damaging public property. The 13 remained in
    detention at Gabode Prison pending trials at year's end. On December
    14, the President replaced Yacin as Police Chief with Colonel Ali
    Hassan.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics and have been
    excluded from senior positions in government and in the political
    parties even though they legally are entitled to participate in the
    political process. No women served in the legislature. In May 1999, the
    President announced the appointment of the first female minister to his
    cabinet. Hawa Ahmed Youssouf serves as Minister of State for the
    Promotion of Women's, Family, and Social Affairs, and reports to the
    Prime Minister. Khadija Abeba, President of the Supreme Court, is the
    highest-ranking female official and, according to the Constitution,
    would become interim President should that position become vacant.
        The President's subclan, the Issa Mamassans, wields
    disproportionate power in affairs of state. Afars hold a number of high
    Ministerial posts; however, they are not well represented at lower
    levels. Somali clans other than the Issa and Djiboutians of Yemeni
    origin are limited unofficially to one ministerial post each, which
    they hold. There also are informal limits on the number of seats for
    each group in the Parliament.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not support the formation of local human rights
    groups. The Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties
    (ADDHL), which ceased operations in 1997, briefly resumed activity as a
    progovernment organization in 1998; however, it has not resumed its
    investigations into, or criticisms of, human right abuses.
        The Committee in Support of Political Prisoners (CSPP) was formed
    in February 1998. The Committee's goal is to publicize the plight of
    political prisoners and mobilize support for the improvement of prison
    conditions and for the release of political prisoners.
        The Djiboutian Human Rights League (LDDH) operated without
    government interference during the year.
        The Union of Djiboutian Women (UNFD) and the Djiboutian Association
    for the Promotion of the Family (ADEPF) promote the rights of women and
    children.
        The ICRC maintains a small office that is staffed with locally-
    hired personnel. The ICRC regional representative, who is based in
    Nairobi, makes quarterly visits.
        In March the Government permitted a visit by a delegation of the
    OAU Human Rights Committee for the first time. The delegation met with
    senior government officials and had free access to prisons and human
    rights groups.
        In October 1999, a presidential decree created the post of
    government ombudsman, and in November 1999, the first incumbent took
    office. In August the Government promulgated a new law on judicial
    organization, included the establishment of a National Committee for
    the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights; however, the Committee
    was not established by year's end.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of language,
    race, sex, or religion; however, discrimination against women and
    ethnic minorities persists. In particular the Government's enforcement
    of laws to protect women and children is weak.
        Women.--Violence against women exists but reported cases are few.
    The Government remained concerned about the problem of rape, and the
    1995 revised Penal Code includes sentences of up to 20 years'
    imprisonment for rapists. More than 80 such cases were tried during the
    year, but only a few led to conviction. Violence against women normally
    is dealt with within the family or clan structure rather than in the
    courts. The police rarely intervene in domestic violence incidents, and
    the media report only the most extreme examples, such as murder. In
    almost all the cases of the rape of Afar women by soldiers in recent
    years, the victims did not press charges due to shame and fear (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Women legally possess full civil rights, but custom and traditional
    societal discrimination in education dictate that they play a secondary
    role in public life and have fewer employment opportunities than men.
    Few women work in managerial and professional positions; women largely
    are confined to trade and secretarial fields. Customary law, which is
    based on Shari'a (Islamic law), discriminates against women in such
    areas as inheritance, divorce, and travel (see Section 2.d.). Male
    children inherit larger percentages of an estate than do female
    children. Women are not permitted to travel without the permission of
    an adult male relative. The few women who are educated increasingly
    turn to the regular courts to defend their interests.
        Children.--The Government devotes almost no public funds to the
    advancement of children's rights and welfare. A few charitable
    organizations work with children. Primary education is compulsory;
    however, the Government does not monitor compliance. The Government
    provides public education for free; however, there are extra expenses
    that may be prohibitive to poorer families, such as transportation,
    book fees, and chalk. Many schools are in poor condition and need
    upgrading. The number of classrooms for secondary students is
    inadequate, and only approximately 20 percent of children who start
    secondary school complete their education. More than 53 percent of the
    population is illiterate: Only 32 percent of girls are literate
    compared with 60 percent of boys. Only 62 percent of girls attend
    primary school compared with 73 percent of boys, and only 23 percent of
    girls attend secondary school compared with 33 percent of boys. Girls
    made up only 36 percent of all secondary students. In November 1999,
    the Government reaffirmed its 1998 commitment to increase the number of
    female students in the educational system to 50 percent; however, there
    was no change in the number of female students or the literacy rate by
    year's end.
        It is believed that as many as 98 percent of females age 7 or older
    have undergone FGM, which is condemned widely by international health
    experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. FGM
    traditionally is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 10. In
    1988 the Union of Djiboutian Women (UNFD) began an educational campaign
    against infibulation, the most extensive and dangerous form of FGM. The
    campaign only has had a limited impact on the prevalence of this
    custom, particularly in rural areas, where it is pervasive. After the
    1995 U.N. Women's Conference in Cairo, Egypt, the UNFD declared that
    all forms of mutilation should be forbidden. The Penal Code states that
    ``violence causing genital mutilation'' is punishable by 5 years'
    imprisonment and a fine of over $5,650 (1 million DF). However, the
    Government has not yet convicted anyone under this statute. The efforts
    of the UNFD and other groups appeared to be having some effect, at
    least in the capital city. In 1997 some health workers reported a
    precipitous drop in the number of hospitalizations related to FGM in
    Djibouti City. Many believe that the incidence of infibulation has
    decreased, although no systematic data was available on the problem.
    U.N. and other experts believe that lesser forms of FGM still were
    practiced widely and that infibulation still was common in rural areas.
        Child abuse exists; however, except for FGM, it is not thought to
    be common. The Government has not addressed child abuse, which often is
    punished lightly; for example, when a child is raped or abused, the
    perpetrator usually is fined an amount sufficient to cover the child's
    medical care. The Government has not used applicable existing
    provisions of the Penal Code to deal with child abuse more severely.
        Child labor persisted (see Section 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
    accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled.
    Although disabled persons have access to education and public health
    facilities, there is no specific law that addresses the needs of the
    disabled, and there are no laws or regulations that prevent job
    discrimination against disabled persons. The disabled have difficulty
    finding employment in an economy where at least 60 percent of the able-
    bodied adult male population is underemployed or jobless.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government continued to
    discriminate against citizens on the basis of ethnicity in employment
    and job advancement. Somali Issas are the majority ethnic group and
    control the ruling party, the civil and security services, and the
    military forces. Discrimination based on ethnicity and clan affiliation
    limited the role of members of minority groups and clans, particularly
    the Afar minority ethnic group, in government and politics.
        The Government conducted periodic roundups of undocumented
    foreigners, which usually targeted Ethiopians and non-Djiboutian
    Somalis. On December 21, gendarmes and police arrested and detained
    approximately 5,000 undocumented foreigners, most of whom were
    Ethiopian (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Although
    unconfirmed, there were widespread reports that police beat, raped, or
    stole personal property from those who were arrested and detained. The
    Government blames undocumented foreigners for the country's economy,
    unemployment rate, and rising crime.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers are
    free to join unions and to strike provided that they comply with
    legally prescribed requirements; however, the Government limited these
    rights. In 1999 the Government took control of the two largest labor
    unions, the General Union of Djiboutian Workers (UGTD) and the Union of
    Djiboutian Workers (UDT). In May 1999, police broke into UDT offices
    and confiscated banners and the public address system that were to have
    been used in Labor Day ceremonies. At a July 1999 meeting, the
    Government elected its supporters to head the UDT and UGTD, and in
    September 1999, the Government took possession of union offices. The
    International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) criticized the Government's
    actions. On December 1, 1999, the ILO reported that the situation of
    the country's unions had ``gravely deteriorated.'' The ILO rejected the
    credentials of Government officials claiming to represent the UDT and
    UGTD at several international conferences.
        At its June meeting, the ILO demanded the Government enact the
    labor resolutions it had signed in 1998. The ILO noted ongoing abuses
    by the Government in forbidding union meetings and preventing union
    officials from receiving their mail. Prior to the Government takeover,
    approximately 70 percent of workers in the small formal economy were
    members of the UDT or UGTD; however, since the takeover, there have
    been almost no independent union activities. The Djiboutian Labor
    Congress (CIDJITRA), composed of Ministry of Labor officials, created
    by the Government to counter the UDT and UGTD, did not appear to exist
    any longer.
        The law requires representatives of employees who plan to strike to
    contact the Ministry of Interior 48 hours in advance. The Government
    did not pay the salaries of teachers, security forces, and civil
    servants for the 5 months prior to the end of the year (see Section 3).
    Teachers' strikes continued during the year, primarily to protest
    delays in salary payments. Beginning in May, there were periodic
    demonstrations by teachers and other civil servants protesting salary
    arrears (see Section 6.c.). The demonstrations generally took place on
    Thursday mornings and peacefully dispersed after 1 or 2 hours. Kamil
    Hassan, a schoolteacher, who previously had been detained in February
    1997 as a leader of a teacher's strike, still was not permitted to
    teach in public schools. On May 30, police arrested five bus union
    leaders for organizing a strike to protest fuel price increases, which
    increased 33 percent on May 31 (see Section 1.d.). On May 31, police
    arrested 15 bus drivers and owners in connection with the strike, which
    ended on June 3.
        The law permits unions to maintain relations and exchanges with
    labor organizations abroad. The UDT has been a member of the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) since 1994.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Although labor
    has the legal right to organize and bargain collectively, collective
    bargaining rarely occurs. Relations between employers and workers are
    informal and paternalistic. Wage rates generally are established
    unilaterally by employers on the basis of Ministry of Labor guidelines.
    In disputes over wages or health and safety problems, the Ministry of
    Labor encourages direct resolution by labor representatives and
    employers. Workers or employers may request formal administrative
    hearings before the Ministry's inspection service; however, critics
    claim that the service suffers from poor enforcement, due to its low
    priority and inadequate funding. The law prohibits antiunion
    discrimination, and employers found legally guilty of discrimination
    are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities; however,
    the Government does not appear to enforce the law.
        An export processing zone (EPZ) was established in 1994. Firms in
    the EPZ are exempt from the Government's social security and medical
    insurance programs. Instead they must provide either government or
    private accident insurance. Employers within the EPZ have authority to
    pay less than minimum wage, offer less annual leave than the rest of
    the country, and in the EPZ the work week is longer (see Section 6.e.).
    However, plans for the EPZ largely have failed; and it does little
    business and employs few people.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    all forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, while
    the law generally is observed, there are reports that members of the
    security forces sometimes compel illegal immigrants to work for them
    under the threat of deportation. There were no reports of forced child
    labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits all labor by children under the age of
    14, but the Government does not always enforce this prohibition
    effectively, and child labor, although not common, exists. A shortage
    of labor inspectors reduces the likelihood of investigation into
    reports of child labor. Children generally are not employed for
    hazardous work. Children may and do work in family-owned businesses,
    such as restaurants and small shops, at all hours. The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and there were no
    reports of forced child labor (see Section 6.c.). The Government
    ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Only a small minority of the
    population is engaged in wage employment. The Government
    administratively sets minimum wage rates according to occupational
    categories, and the Ministry of Labor is charged with enforcement. The
    monthly wage rate for unskilled labor, set in 1976, is approximately
    $90 (15,840 DF). Most employers pay more than the minimum wage. Some
    workers also receive housing and transportation allowances. The minimum
    wage for unskilled labor does not provide adequate compensation for a
    worker and family to maintain a decent standard of living. The
    Government owed 5 months worth of salary arrears to teachers, security
    forces, and civil servants at year's end (see Sections 3 and 6.a.).
        By law the workweek is 40 hours, often spread over 6 days. Some
    employers ask employees to work up to 12 hours per day and pay them an
    additional wage. Workers are provided daily and weekly rest periods and
    paid annual leave. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing
    occupational health and safety standards, wages, and work hours.
    Because enforcement is ineffective, workers sometimes face hazardous
    working conditions, particularly at the port. Workers rarely protest,
    mainly due to fear that others willing to accept the risks may replace
    them. There are no laws or regulations permitting workers to refuse to
    carry out dangerous work assignments without jeopardy to continued
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports of persons being trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                               EQUATORIAL GUINEA

        Equatorial Guinea nominally is a multiparty constitutional
    republic; however, in practice power is exercised by President Teodoro
    Obiang Nguema and the small Mongomo subclan of the majority Fang tribe,
    which has ruled since the country's independence in 1968. President
    Obiang, who has ruled since seizing power in a military coup d'etat in
    1979, was elected to a 7-year term in February 1996 in elections that
    were marred by extensive fraud and intimidation. The President's
    Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) controls the judiciary and
    the legislature; the latter was elected in elections in March 1999 that
    were criticized widely as seriously flawed by the international
    community. The judiciary is not independent.
        President Obiang exercises control over the police and security
    forces through the Minister of the Interior, who also serves as
    President of the National Electoral Board. The Director General of
    National Security is the President's brother, Armengol Ondo Nguema. The
    security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
        The majority of the population of approximately 474,000 lives by
    subsistence agriculture, supplemented by hunting and fishing.
    Unemployment and underemployment is very high. Barter is a major aspect
    of the economy, and the monetary sector is based on exports of
    petroleum, cocoa, and timber. Most foreign economic assistance was
    suspended due to the lack of economic reform and the Government's poor
    human rights record; however, in December 1999, the Government of Spain
    resumed aid. The per capita gross domestic product is approximately
    $1,800. Earnings from offshore oil exploitation are approximately $140
    million per year. However, the investment and other use of oil revenues
    lacked transparency despite repeated calls in previous years from
    international financial institutions and citizens for greater financial
    openness. Poor fiscal management and a lack of public accounting
    transparency in national finances have undermined the country's
    economic potential. Little evidence is apparent that the country's oil
    wealth is being devoted to the public good.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
    continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the
    ability to change their government in fair elections. The security
    forces committed a number of abuses, including torture, beating and
    other physical abuse of prisoners, suspects, and opposition political
    members. The Government continued to attempt to control opposition
    groups outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other
    countries. The victims of government kidnapings are detained (usually
    without charge), reportedly beaten or tortured, and later released.
    Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. There were
    reports that prison authorities tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    prisoners, and that such abuse, combined with a lack of medical care,
    resulted in the deaths of prisoners. Prisoners often are subjected to
    torture to extract confessions. Security forces used arbitrary arrest,
    detention, and incommunicado detention. The judicial system continued
    to fail to ensure due process and remained subject to executive
    pressures. The Government restricted the right to privacy, and security
    forces conducted searches without warrants. Members of the security
    forces generally commit abuses with impunity. The Government severely
    restricted freedom of speech and of the press. It continued to restrict
    the rights of assembly and association. The Government continued to
    limit freedom of religion and freedom of movement. There were no
    effective domestic human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
    In 1999 the Government promulgated a law that further restricted NGO's
    and precluded them from functioning in the area of human rights.
    Violence and discrimination against women remained a serious problem.
    Discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly the Bubi ethnic
    group, and foreigners continued. During the year, the Government
    restricted labor rights; no labor unions exist. Child labor persists,
    and forced prison labor is used.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of extrajudicial killings. Unlike in previous years, there were
    no reports that security forces committed extrajudicial killings.
        There have been reports that prison authorities tortured, beat, and
    otherwise abused prisoners, and that such abuse, combined with a lack
    of medical care, resulted in the deaths of prisoners.
        The Government did not prosecute any members of the security forces
    considered responsible for extrajudicial killings in previous years.
        On January 21, 1998, in the town of Luba on the island of Bioko,
    noncommissioned officers Felix Ndong Ondo, Mauro Era Nguema, and
    Alberto Nsue were killed. The Government claimed that they had been
    killed by armed men leading a revolt by ethnic Bubis organized by the
    Movement for Self-determination of Bioko (MIAB); MIAB denied
    involvement. There were unconfirmed reports of similar attacks and
    killings in the towns of Moka and Bako Grande. No independent observers
    were able to visit any of these towns or confirm the Government's
    account. A military court convicted 63 persons, 15 of whom were
    sentenced to death although the President subsequently commuted their
    sentences to life in prison (see Section 1.e.).
        b. Disappearance.--In previous years, there were unconfirmed
    reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, during the
    year, there were no reports of disappearances.
        The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups
    outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries
    (see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly are detained,
    questioned, and tortured before being released (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.d., and 2.d.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution mandates respect for the liberty and
    dignity of persons, but does not specifically prohibit torture or cruel
    or inhuman punishment, and members of the security forces tortured,
    beat, and otherwise abused suspects and prisoners. The level of these
    abuses is serious. A number of prisoners still are under sentence from
    the alleged revolt of 1998 (see Section 1.a.), and the U.N. Special
    Representative confirmed reports of their abuse and torture in November
    1999.
        Officials reportedly detained, interrogated, beat, and tortured
    opposition political activists (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups
    outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries
    (see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly are detained,
    questioned, and tortured before being released (see Section 2.d.).
        Local authorities singled out foreigners from neighboring countries
    for harassment such as verbal intimidation and extortion. Several
    thousand citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa continue to
    reside in the country; most are small traders and businesspersons (see
    Section 5).
        During the campaign period prior to the May municipal elections,
    there were reports that government security forces beat and detained
    opposition politicians daily (see Section 3.)
        Milagrosa Obono Ndong, a voting station representative for the
    Social Democracy Convergence Party (CPDS), was detained by security
    forces to prevent her presence on election day. While in custody she
    reportedly was raped by Jose Luis Abaga Nguema, the district judge of
    Evinayong.
        Conditions in prisons and jails are harsh and life threatening. In
    a 1999 study, a governmental body cited the extremely poor conditions
    of nearly all penal establishments. According to the government
    investigation, inmates are held without access to necessities
    including: food; medical care; working toilets or latrines; drinkable
    water; clean and healthful living space; and minimum equipment (e.g.
    beds). For example, the government investigation found the prison in
    Bata to be in an advanced stage of deterioration and unfit for human
    habitation. The prison had no food, medical care, or sanitation
    facilities; and beds and blankets were not provided.
        In March 41 Bubi prisoners, who were convicted of crimes associated
    with the January 1998 unrest and formerly held at Malabo prison, were
    moved to a mainland prison at Evinayong. The prison is approximately
    300 miles from their homes and families which made it difficult or
    impossible for the families to bring them medicines, food, and moral
    support. An ICRC representative visited them in April, but they have
    not been seen subsequently by international observers.
        There have been reports that prison authorities tortured, beat, and
    otherwise abused prisoners, and that such abuse, combined with a lack
    of medical care, resulted in the deaths of prisoners. The CNDHGE
    reported in 1999 that there was a lack of medical care, but stated that
    the prisoners were not mistreated; Amnesty International reported
    during the year that eight prisoners died as a result of torture and
    lack of medical assistance in 1999. Furthermore, the U.N. Special
    Representative reported in November 1999 that on October 19, 1999,
    Dingo Sepa Tobache died at the Malabo prison as the result of injuries
    caused by beatings and excessive mistreatment by guards during his
    incarceration.
        In November 1999, the U.N. Special Representative reported that
    when he visited the Malabo prison, he witnessed eight persons being
    held in cells measuring approximately 4.92 feet by 2.3 feet. A ninth
    prisoner normally held in the same cells had been hospitalized a few
    days earlier for a serious illness. The Special Representative was told
    that these prisoners were among those condemned to death for the events
    of January 1998, but whose sentences were later commuted to life
    imprisonment. The U.N. Special Representative confirmed that the nine
    persons were held in those cells permanently and were not allowed
    outside; that they received no medical care, although all of them were
    suffering from illnesses due to the prison conditions and the torture
    that they had suffered before trial; that their food was inadequate;
    and that they were allowed no contact with their families. All of the
    prisoners were in poor physical condition. The U.N. Special
    Representative also confirmed that the Bata gendarmerie detained and
    tortured Dr. Antimo Oyono Mba and Dr. Joaquin Mbana Nchama of the UP by
    beating them on the soles of their feet.
        Male and female prisoners were not held in separate facilities, nor
    were adult and juvenile prisoners. The CNDHGE reported that prisoners
    and prison authorities subjected female prisoners to sexual assaults.
        In its 1999 study, a government investigation noted that prisoners
    were exploited as virtual slaves by local judges and by administrators
    of the prisons. Prisoners told the investigators that they were used
    habitually as labor for others and as workers on construction projects
    for certain officials, without pay or other compensation. The U.N.
    Special Representative found that Juan Obiang Late, a man detained at
    the police headquarters in Bata, (see Section 1.d.) was taken from the
    jail to do work for an official in 1999. Judges also reportedly used
    prisoners as domestic workers.
        There are no local NGO's other than the government-controlled
    CNDHGE; as a result, there are no local NGO's that visited prisons or
    promoted prisoners' rights. Prison conditions ostensibly are monitored
    by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which
    historically has made recommendations to the Government; however, the
    head of the regional ICRC office was not granted access to any prisons
    or detention centers during the first 11 months of 1999. In October
    1999, a government body recommended that the Government enter into a
    dialog with the ICRC; as a result, the ICRC director was granted access
    in December 1999 to the prisons under the jurisdiction of the Minister
    of Justice. The ICRC visited some prisoners during the year, for
    example, in April inmates at Evinayong prison who had recently been
    moved from the Malabo prison. Another ICRC prison visit is planned for
    March 2001.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There are nominal legal
    procedural safeguards regarding detention, the requirement for search
    warrants, and other protection of citizens' rights; however, these
    safeguards are ignored systematically by security forces, which
    continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily.
        Police routinely hold prisoners in incommunicado detention.
    Foreigners from neighboring countries sometimes are targeted for
    arbitrary mistreatment and random arrest. In previous years, these
    included visitors and residents from Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Benin.
    Members of the security forces extorted money from them; however,
    reportedly such incidents were reduced during the year, and most
    checkpoints on the road from Luba to Malabo and within Malabo were
    removed.
        Security forces often detain individuals ``on orders from
    superiors'' without any further formality. For example, authorities,
    after receiving orders from their superiors detained Teodoro Abeso
    Nguema and Juan Obiang Late, beginning respectively on November 9 and
    11, 1999, at the Bata prison. According to Nguema, both men were
    detained because they copied an article on the health of President
    Obiang from the Internet (see Section 2.a.).
        Security forces detained relatives of prisoners or criminal
    suspects in an attempt to force the prisoners or suspects to surrender.
    For example, in October 1999, the CNDHGE found that Candida Nsue Mba
    had been held for 2 months at Bata prison as a hostage for her daughter
    who had escaped; at Nzok Nzomo prison, Monica Mangue was held hostage
    for her daughter; and the Mikomeseng and Anisok prisons each held a
    woman hostage against the appearance of their daughters.
        During the year, the Government arrested political activists and
    detained them without charge for periods up to several weeks during
    which time officials reportedly interrogated, beat, and tortured them
    (see Section 1.c.). For example, in September authorities in Bata
    arrested Francisco Nsue Masie, the Director of Public Works and son of
    former president Macias Nguema, and others and charged them with
    conspiracy against the State; they were transferred to the prison in
    Malabo. There were unconfirmed reports that these detainees were
    tortured (see Section 1.c.). Nsue Masie and the others remained in
    custody at year's end, pending a trial. Political detentions seldom
    lasted more than a few months. It was difficult to estimate the number
    of political detainees, although it was believed to be less than 100
    persons. The Government used the psychological effects of arrest, along
    with the fear of beatings and harassment, to intimidate opposition
    party officials and members.
        In September 1999, authorities arrested and detained Placido Miko
    Abodo, Secretary General of the opposition CPDS. Miko was held for a
    week, and upon his provisional release, he was told to report to the
    authorities in Bata twice a month; however, no formal charges ever were
    made against him. At year's end, Miko's case reportedly remained in the
    hands of a military examining magistrate.
        Following the 1998 revolt, approximately 500 ethnic Bubis
    reportedly were arrested and interrogated (see Section 1.e.); however,
    reliable information on the number and identities of detainees was not
    available readily. The majority of them were released, although 15 were
    tried and sentenced to death, but they had their sentences commuted to
    life imprisonment by President Obiang later in 1998.
        There was a report that Mariano Oyono Ndong of the opposition
    Democrat Republican Front (FDR) was confined to the limits of his town
    for 3 years beginning in June 1997, without any judicial action (see
    Section 1.e.). He was released in mid-year.
        Authorities often detain both men and women for failure to repay a
    dowry following the dissolution of a marriage; however, only divorced
    women or their responsible male relatives are imprisoned for not
    repaying a dowry. These cases arise from customary law, where the
    amount of money or goods due is set by traditional courts. A government
    investigation documented that as many as 20 persons were detained
    solely for failure to repay dowries, including Victoriana Abuy and
    Veronica Monanga at Mbini prison and Mariano Nsue Ela and Juan Esono
    Nguema at Nkue prison; two women at Mikomeseng; five men at Ebibeyin;
    one man at Nzok Nzomo; three persons at (Anizok; and two men (one 85 to
    90 years of age) at Akonibe. Their detention was not limited by the 72
    hours established by law even for those suspected of crime.
        During the year, government security forces on occasion detained
    employees of foreign oil companies. Police detained an employee of a
    foreign oil company for a short period in August for alleged
    irregularities in processing the import of equipment. The driver for an
    oil company alleged that police detained and beat him openly.
        The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups
    outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries
    (see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly are detained,
    questioned, and tortured before being released (see Sections 1.b.,
    1.c., and 2.d.).
        Security forces responsible for arbitrary arrest and detention and
    other abuses were not held accountable for their actions. The U.N.
    Special Representative noted that some executive officials closely
    related to the security apparatus of the Government are treated as
    being above the law. For example, Francisco Mba Mendam, a government
    delegate from Micomeseng, remained free, despite having been sentenced
    in October 1999 to 30 years in prison for the murder of a former
    ambassador to France; he received a presidential pardon in November.
        The Government does not use forced exile; however, some persons
    have fled the country for political reasons.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
    judicial independence; however, the judiciary is not independent.
    Judges serve at the pleasure of the President, and they are appointed,
    transferred, and dismissed for political reasons. Corruption is
    widespread.
        The court system is composed of lower provincial courts, two
    appeals courts, a military tribunal, and a Supreme Court. The President
    appoints members of the Supreme Court, who report to him and take their
    orders from him in practice; the President is the most powerful member
    of the judicial branch. Tribal elders adjudicate civil claims and minor
    criminal matters in traditional courts in the countryside.
        There are no objective criteria for the selection of judges below
    the Supreme Court; the law allows the Ministry of Justice to undertake
    periodic inspections and name judges. A government investigation noted
    in its 1999 report that some judges are regularly absent from their
    posts, resulting in delays in judicial proceedings. As a result of
    absences by judges, prisoners remain detained at police stations
    awaiting hearings for longer than the 72 hours prescribed by law and
    the jails available become even more overcrowded and unsanitary. Some
    persons are detained indefinitely as an alternative to formal arrest,
    trial, and imprisonment; they are held without any intention of formal
    judicial action.
        In August 1999, the Government created a Special Commission on
    Corruption to address court corruption. In January the President fired
    a substantial number of judges, including members of the Supreme Court.
    The firings reportedly were the result of the courts' diverting $7
    million from their budgets between 1996 and 1999. Following completion
    of the investigation by the Special Commission on Corruption, the
    President of the Supreme Court and two other justices, together with
    the secretary of the court, were implicated in corruption and replaced.
    Five other justices were not implicated and either were returned to the
    Supreme Court or promoted to other positions. The President of the
    Constitutional Court, one justice, and the attorney for that court also
    were implicated and removed from positions of responsibility.
        The Constitution and laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies provide
    for legal representation in trials and the right to appeal. In practice
    the authorities often do not respect these provisions. Civil cases
    rarely come to public trial. Cases involving national security are
    tried by the military tribunal. Cases that are essentially political in
    nature frequently are referred to military courts, even when the
    defendants are civilians and the charges are not related to the
    military. The 1945 Code of Military Justice permits persons who disobey
    a military authority to be tried in a military tribunal whether or not
    they are civilians. The military courts do not provide for due process
    or other procedural safeguards, and their proceedings are not made
    public. For example, the case of Placido Mico, the civilian opposition
    leader, was heard in secret by a military judge (see Section 1.d.). Two
    other FDR members, Mariano Oyono Ndong and Carmelo Biko Ngua, were
    tried in 1999 by a military tribunal; they remained in custody in June,
    and there was no indication that they had been released at year's end.
        The Government holds a number of political prisoners. In May 1998,
    the Government conducted a public trial before a military tribunal of
    116 persons allegedly involved in the January 1998 revolt on Bioko
    island. The defendants were charged with terrorism, undermining state
    security, and illegal possession of weapons. Many defendants claimed
    that the Government obtained confessions from them by torture (see
    Section 1.c.). At their trials in 1998, some defendants were found to
    be suffering from broken jaws, inflamed testicles, and other conditions
    indicative of torture; however, the president of the military tribunal
    refused to allow defense lawyers to raise the question of torture. The
    conduct of the trials drew universal criticism. The tribunal found 63
    persons guilty on at least 1 charge and acquitted 53 of all charges. It
    sentenced 15 convicted defendants to death, and sentenced the other 48
    to terms ranging from 6 to 26 years in prison. The 15 condemned to
    death were the only defendants absent from the court when the sentences
    were announced. President Obiang in 1998 commuted their sentences to
    life imprisonment.
        Two members of the ruling Mongomo clan and of the banned FDR party,
    former Education Minister Felipe Ondo and former Planning Minister
    Guillermo Nguema, remained in prison. In 1998 they were convicted of
    libel against the Government and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment
    in 1998, after Equatoguinean security forces repatriated them
    involuntarily from Gabon with the consent of the Government of Gabon
    (see Section 2.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires judicial warrants for searches;
    however, the Government does not enforce the law in practice. Security
    forces regularly search homes and arrest occupants, and they generally
    do so with impunity.
        There reportedly is government surveillance of members of the
    opposition parties and foreign diplomats.
        For lawyers, government employees, and some others, PDGE party
    membership is necessary for employment and promotion. Even in the
    private sector, many citizens claim that party membership is required
    in order to be hired.
        According to credible sources, in previous years, citizens living
    in rural areas were hesitant to associate with or even be seen with
    foreigners, due to the fear of repercussions from the authorities;
    however, there were no reports of such behavior during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
    restricted these rights in practice. Journalists practice self-
    censorship.
        The Government allows mild criticism of infrastructure, public
    institutions, and public sector mismanagement and permitted some
    increased criticism of minor administrative decisions; however, it
    permits no criticism of the President or the security forces. All
    journalists must be registered with the Ministry of Information.
    According to press sources, there are approximately 12 independent
    reporters registered with the Ministry of Information. Between 30 and
    40 reporters employed by the official party or government publications
    also are registered. In previous years, visiting foreign reporters were
    required to be accompanied by guides from the Ministry of Information;
    however, during the year, a journalist traveled unescorted.
        In April 1999, shortly before a national symposium on press liberty
    was scheduled, the Minister of the Interior ordered the removal of the
    democratically elected president of the Press Association (ASOPGE),
    Manuel Nze Nzogo, even though the ASOPGE was a legally recognized
    association. The reason given was that Nzogo supposedly was not
    qualified properly for the position; he remained removed from his
    position during the year and ASOPGE was inactive.
        There are five general-interest newspapers that were published
    regularly: La Gaceta, a Malabo-based publication with informal
    connections to the Government, which was published monthly; El Correo
    Guineo Ecuatoriano, a bimonthly newspaper published by the Gaceta
    group; La Opinion, an opposition newspaper that was published every 2
    to 3 weeks; El Tiempo, an opposition newspaper that published its first
    edition on December 30; and Ebano, a publication of the Ministry of
    Information, Tourism, and Culture, which appeared about twice a month.
    There was also a magazine (AYO) that was published by students at the
    university and a monthly cultural review, El Patio, published by the
    Guinean-Hispano Cultural Center. The PDGE published La Voz del Pueblo,
    and the opposition CPDS published La Verdad, which appeared one or two
    times per year.
        The 1992 press law reportedly is based on Spain's 1967 Franco-era
    press law and authorizes government censorship of all publications. In
    previous years, the Ministry of Information sometimes required
    publishers to submit copy for approval prior to publication; however,
    the practice reportedly has ended. All local publications exercise
    self-censorship and were subject to prior restraint. Few foreign
    publications were available for sale, and security forces confiscated
    literature from Spain that was critical of the Government.
        Radio is the most important medium of mass communication. The
    Government continued effectively to dominate domestic radio
    broadcasting. It owns and operates Radio Malabo; however, it received
    some competition from Radio France International on the FM band, which
    has transmitted from Malabo since 1995. In 1998 the Government
    permitted the establishment of the country's first private domestic
    radio station, the FM station Radio Asonga. However, that station
    reportedly is owned by the Minister of Forestry, Environment, and
    Fisheries, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the son of the President. The
    Government has not approved the one or two other applications to
    operate private radio stations that have been pending for several
    years.
        The domestic television station is government controlled and
    broadcasts only a few hours a day. Television Asonga, owned by
    President Obiang, broadcast by cable only in Bata. Foreign cable
    television is available, and offers the Cable News Network, French
    news, movies, sports events, and cartoons, but relatively few citizens
    can afford it. Satellite reception is increasingly available.
        The Government generally withholds access to domestic broadcasting
    from opposition parties and rarely refers to the opposition in anything
    but negative terms when broadcasting the news.
        Radio Exterior, the international short-wave service from Spain,
    often broadcasts news about the country and interviews with opposition
    politicians. It is virtually the only means for the opposition to
    disseminate its views and positions widely. Its editorials, like those
    of most of the Spanish media, often are highly critical of the
    Government. The Government regularly accused Radio Exterior--sometimes
    with justification--of misrepresenting the situation in the country,
    and in 1998 it asked the Spanish Government to halt broadcasts that
    ``may provoke problems.''
        Internet service is available, although access is expensive, and
    computer ownership is not widespread. In late 1999, two men were
    arrested for possessing an article taken off of the Internet that
    referred to the health of the President (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government recognized respect for academic freedom and
    encouraged educators and students to work ``peacefully and in harmony
    with the moral guidelines of the society;'' however, it imposed a few
    limits on academic freedom. During the year, students at the National
    University wrote a letter to the rector complaining about their food
    and housing. The students were brought before the President in March,
    publicly berated for their lack of gratitude for free accommodations,
    and then immediately evicted from the student housing.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government restricts
    this right in practice. Government authorization must be obtained for
    meetings of more than 10 persons in private homes for discussions that
    the Government considers political. Although the Government formally
    has abolished permit requirements for party meetings within party
    buildings, in practice opposition parties must inform the authorities
    in order to hold gatherings of any kind, regardless of location.
    Security forces generally observe gatherings in public places, even
    small gatherings. The Government required notification for public
    events and routinely denied permission for such events.
        The Government required that the Catholic NGO Autonomous Rural
    Development (DAR), in the diocese of Ebibeyin, inform the locally
    appointed official delegate each time that it had a board meeting. The
    DAR complied with the requirement and received permission to meet, but
    the local delegate insisted on being present during the meetings. The
    DAR refused to hold meetings with the delegate present, and
    consequently it did not meet during the year (see Section 2.c.).
        The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
    the Government restricted this right in practice. The law prohibits the
    formation of political parties along ethnic lines. A 1999 law on NGO's
    does not permit such groups to defend or promote human rights; any
    group attempting to do so is considered to be illegal (see Section 4);
    however, no groups were prosecuted during the year for attempting to
    promote human rights.
        Police routinely harass and detain members of opposition parties
    (see Section 1.d.). Reportedly the Government bribed members of the
    opposition. Opposition party members complained of disruption of
    meetings and of roadblocks at which they are forced to pay soldiers in
    order to proceed.
        The Progress Party (PP) of Severo Motto appealed a 1997 decision by
    the Government in which the PP was declared illegal. The Court of
    Appeals upheld the suspension of their right to operate, and, during
    the year, the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Court of
    Appeals. The PP was banned because Motto was accused of organizing an
    attempted coup d'etat in 1996. The FDR has sought recognition since
    1995 unsuccessfully; FDR directors are in jail in Malabo and Bata (see
    Section 1.d.). The Independent Democratic and Social Party (PIDS) also
    sought recognition unsuccessfully. The Movement for the Self-
    determination of Bioko (MIAB), an ethnic political party, is illegal
    (see Section 3). Reportedly MIAB was banned in reaction to its alleged
    role in the January 1998 unrest; subsequently, legislation made ethnic
    political parties illegal.
        On several occasions the Government reportedly attempted to force
    opposition members or officials to join the PDGE party (see Section 3).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, in practice the Government limits this right in some
    respects.
        The Government continued to restrict the freedom of expression of
    the clergy, particularly regarding any open criticism of the
    Government. The Government requires permission for any religious
    activities outside the church building, but in practice this
    requirement did not appear to hinder organized religious groups.
        Religious groups must be approved by and registered with the
    Ministry of Justice and Religion in order to function legally; however,
    there were no reports that the Government refused to register any
    group. The approval process usually takes several years, but such delay
    apparently is due primarily to general bureaucratic slowness and not
    the result of a clear policy designed to impede the operation of any
    religious group.
        The Government required that the Catholic NGO Autonomous Rural
    Development (DAR), in the diocese of Ebibeyin, inform the local
    delegate each time that it had a board meeting. The DAR complied with
    the requirement and received permission to meet, but the local delegate
    insisted on being present during the meetings. The DAR refused to hold
    meetings with the delegate present, and consequently it did not meet
    during the year (see Section 2.b.).
        Religious study is required in schools and is usually, but not
    exclusively, Catholic.
        In February 1998, security forces arrested a priest, Father Eduardo
    Losoha Belope, a member of the Bubi ethnic group and president of the
    Malabo chapter of the Catholic nongovernmental organization Caritas, in
    connection with the January 1998 revolt. Father Belope remained in
    detention at year's end, and was one of the Bubi prisoners transferred
    in March from Bioko island to Evinayong on the mainland (see Section
    1.c.).
        In July 1998, the Archbishop of Malabo, Laureano Ekua Obama, stated
    publicly that the Government now required Catholic priests to obtain
    government permission before celebrating mass and commented that the
    Government did this because the church repeatedly criticized human
    rights violations, social injustice, and corruption in the country. The
    Archbishop also stated that government harassment made it very
    difficult to be a Catholic priest in the country. Nonetheless, a 1992
    law includes a stated official preference towards the Catholic Church
    and the Reform Church of Equatorial Guinea due to their traditional
    roots and well-known influence in the social and cultural life of the
    populace. For example, a Roman Catholic mass is normally part of any
    major ceremonial function such as the October 12 national day.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
    and travel throughout the country; however, the Government limits these
    rights in practice. Local police routinely demand bribes from occupants
    of cars, taxis, and other vehicles traveling outside the capital. The
    police routinely stoped citizens, particularly members of the
    opposition, at roadblocks, subject them to searches, and extort money
    from them; however, during the year, the Government eliminated a number
    of checkpoints between Malabo and Luba and in the vicinity of Bata.
    Members of the Bubi ethnic group on the island of Bioko were unable to
    move about freely, according to credible sources. Roadblocks throughout
    the island prevented Bubis from traveling easily between villages.
        During his 1999 visit, the U.N. Special Representative confirmed
    that the existence of roadblocks substantially limited the freedom of
    movement, both on Bioko and on the mainland. The Government justified
    these roadblocks as customs controls to compensate for its inability to
    control the country's borders effectively. In November 1999, the
    Special Representative was stopped after taking a photograph of cars
    waiting at one such barrier, but he was released shortly thereafter.
    The Special Representative also concluded that these roadblocks
    effectively restricted the freedom of movement of members of the
    opposition and prevented them from either leaving or returning to their
    hometowns.
        All citizens are required to obtain permission to travel abroad
    from the local Police Commissioner, and members of opposition parties
    regularly were denied this permission. Those who do travel abroad
    sometimes were interrogated or detained upon their return. However,
    several prominent members of opposition parties were able to travel
    abroad without hindrance during the year.
        Government officials attempt to control the movements of citizens
    by refusing exit visas or denying or confiscating passports. During the
    campaign prior to the municipal elections in May, opposition
    politicians complained that the Government prohibited them from
    traveling from town to town to campaign.
        The Government is a signatory of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. During recent years,
    an average of one or two persons a year, from Mauritania, Nigeria, or
    the Congo, requested refugee or asylee status in the country. The
    Government provides first asylum and generally grants asylum requests.
    Although security forces reportedly have harassed asylum seekers in
    past years, there were no reports of such harassment during the year.
    The police reportedly continued to harass several thousand citizens of
    Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa most of whom are small traders
    and businesspersons (see Section 5) as well as harassing asylum seekers
    on an individual basis.
        There were no reports of the forced return of any persons to a
    country where they feared persecution.
        The Government continued to attempt to control opposition groups
    outside its borders by kidnaping citizens living in other countries
    (see Section 1.e.). Such individuals reportedly were detained,
    questioned, and tortured before being released (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.d.).
        In September 1997, 12 Equatoguinean refugees and their families in
    Cameroon were detained by Cameroonian security forces--ostensibly for
    their own protection--at a military base in Yaounde. The majority of
    the heads of family are former military officers and consider
    themselves in opposition to the Government. All have been granted
    refugee status by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. In October
    1999, the Cameroonian press reported that two of the refugees had
    escaped from the base and met with others to plot a coup attempt
    against the Government of Equatorial Guinea. They were arrested in
    Douala and returned to Yaounde. In mid-October 1999, senior government
    officials reportedly requested their extradition to Equatorial Guinea,
    which the Cameroonian Government did not grant. In July three of the
    former officers disappeared from the base in Cameroon after undergoing
    final processing for resettlement, and at year's end, they had not been
    found. The other nine refugees have been resettled with their families
    in another country.
        The Government continued to demand that the Spanish Government
    repatriate Severo Moto, leader of the now-banned Progress Party (see
    Section 2.b.), who led an attempt to overthrow the government by armed
    force in 1996 and to whom the Government of Spain had granted asylum in
    1997.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully; however, in practice there have been no free,
    fair, and transparent elections since independence in 1968. The
    President exercised complete power as head of state, commander of the
    armed forces, and leader of the government party, the PDGE. Leadership
    positions within the Government in general were restricted to the
    President's Mongomo clan of the Fang ethnic group and its closest
    supporters. The elected Chamber of Deputies was dominated completely by
    the Government. The Minister of the Interior also acted as President of
    the National Electoral Board.
        Significant segments of the political opposition either remained
    banned or had yet to be recognized by the Government by year's end,
    including the FDR, the Progress Party (PP), the Independent Democratic
    and Social Party (PIDS), and the Movement for the Self-Determination of
    Bioko (MIAB)(see Section 2.b.).
        The February 1996 presidential election, in which President Obiang
    claimed reelection with 98 percent of the vote, was considered openly
    fraudulent by international observers. Some opposition politicians who
    campaigned were beaten and jailed. Voting was done in the open and
    without secrecy, with opposition parties allegedly being barred from
    access to polling areas. There were credible reports of widespread
    arrests and violence against opposition party members before the
    elections, as well as of beatings, roadblocks, stuffed ballot boxes,
    and the presence of security forces. Most opposition parties, claiming
    that it was futile to run amidst such blatant corruption, boycotted the
    election.
        In 1997 the Government and 13 political parties promulgated a
    revised national pact following 3 months of debate. The pact called for
    the creation of a multiparty electoral commission and an observance
    commission to monitor compliance with the agreement. The pact also
    stipulated an end to various political and electoral abuses and the
    extension of voting rights already nominally provided in the
    Constitution. However, the Government has not abided by most of the
    pact's provisions. Opposition activists reported that the Government
    made virtually no effort to implement the pact. The Government's
    refusal to issue exit visas to some opposition figures violates the
    pact's principle of freedom of travel. The continued arrests of CPDS,
    UP, and FDR activists further undermined the Government's claims that
    it abides by the pact, as did its continued restrictions on freedom of
    movement and the continued lack of access to government media by the
    opposition.
        In 1998 the Government enacted a new electoral law that mandates
    the replacement of open voting by secret ballots in future elections
    but prohibits coalitions between political parties. Nevertheless in
    December five opposition groups including the CPDS, Front for
    Democratic Opposition (PSD), PP, Progressive Democratic Alliance (ADP),
    and the Popular Union (UP) joined to form the Front of Democratic
    Opposition (FOD). At year's end, the Government had not responded to
    this action.
        The legislative elections that should have been held in the fall of
    1998 were postponed until March 1999. The new electoral census was
    completed in December 1998, but not all of the opposition parties
    agreed to sign it due to irregularities including the inclusion of the
    underaged, the dead, and nonresidents, while excluding opposition party
    members. The three opposition parties initially called for a boycott of
    the polls to protest preelection irregularities; however, all but one
    of the parties, the CPDS, ultimately participated in the voting. One
    CPDS candidate was elected; however, he had refused to take his seat at
    year's end.
        International observers considered the legislative election process
    to be seriously flawed. The elections were characterized by numerous
    irregularities and by restrictions on the ability of the opposition to
    campaign. Roadblocks impeded the opposition's ability to travel; and
    opposition leaders were detained intermittently, sometimes with
    mistreatment, torture, or stiff fines. The UP and CPDS opposition
    parties won 5 of the 80 seats, refused to take their seats in the new
    legislature, and called for the results to be annulled and new
    elections held.
        During the municipal elections on May 28, the PDGE won all 30
    municipalities with more than 95 percent of the vote. The elections
    used the same flawed electoral census that was used in the 1999
    legislative elections. According to one opposition party leader, police
    beat and detained opposition politicians daily during the campaign (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Although there are no legal restrictions on the participation of
    women in politics, women remain seriously underrepresented in
    government and politics. There are 4 women in the 41-member Cabinet,
    and 5 in the 80-member legislature.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no effective domestic human rights nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's). In April 1999, the Government promulgated a law
    governing NGO's that restricted NGO's and identifies specific areas in
    which they may operate; human rights is not one of these areas.
        The Government required that the Catholic NGO Autonomous Rural
    Development (DAR), in the diocese of Ebibeyin, inform the local
    delegate each time it had a board meeting. The DAR complied with the
    requirement and received permission to meet, but the local delegate
    insisted on being present during the meetings. The DAR refused to hold
    meetings with the delegate present and consequently did not meet during
    the year.
        No international human rights NGO has a permanent presence in the
    country, and the Government neither acknowledged nor gave credibility
    to reports issued by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
    other international human rights organizations.
        The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visited in March and
    December 1998, and ostensibly he received the Government's cooperation;
    however, the Government succeeded in having the Rapporteur replaced
    early in 1999. A new Special Representative visited the country in
    November 1999 and released his report in March with recommendations for
    fundamental reforms, especially in the areas of political rights, the
    administration of justice, and the treatment of prisoners and
    detainees.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution condemns all forms of discrimination; however,
    both governmental and societal discrimination against women and ethnic
    minorities continued.
        Women.--Societal violence against women, particularly wife beating,
    is common. The public beating of wives is forbidden by government
    decree; however, violence in the home generally is tolerated. The
    Government does not prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence.
        Although the Constitution provides for equal rights, women largely
    are confined by custom to traditional roles, particularly in
    agriculture. Polygyny, which is widespread among the Fang, contributes
    to women's secondary status, as does limited educational opportunity.
    On average women receive only one-fifth as much schooling as do men.
        There is no discrimination against women with regard to inheritance
    and family laws, but there is discrimination in traditional practice.
    For an estimated 90 percent of women, including virtually all ethnic
    groups except the Bubi, tradition dictates that if a marriage is
    dissolved, the wife (or her father or brother) must return the dowry
    given her family by the bridegroom at the time of marriage. The husband
    automatically receives custody of all children born after the marriage,
    while the mother maintains custody of all children born prior to the
    marriage. In many instances, the woman has no funds or property after
    the divorce with which to repay the dowry, and, as a result, is
    incarcerated (see Section 1.d.). Many prisons do not have separate
    areas for men and women and women are subjected to sexual abuse from
    both the authorities and other prisoners while in detention (see
    Section 1.e.).
        In the Fang, Ndowe, and Bisio cultures, primogeniture is practiced,
    and because women become members of their husband's family upon
    marriage, they usually are not accorded inheritance rights. According
    to the law, women have the right to buy and sell property and goods;
    however, in practice the male-dominated society permits few women
    access to sufficient funds to engage in more than petty trading or to
    purchase real property beyond a garden plot or modest home.
        Children.--No provisions for the welfare of children are
    legislated. The Government devotes little attention to children's
    rights or their welfare and has no set policy in this area. Education
    is compulsory until the age of 14, but the law is not enforced. In
    practice following primary education, males are expected either to
    complete an additional 7 years of secondary school or to finish a
    program of vocational study. Pregnancy and the requirement to assist in
    agricultural work make this level of education less likely for females.
    The 1999 report by the U.N. Special Representative noted that only 12
    percent of girls reach the secondary level of education compared with
    over 24 percent of boys who reach the same level. Only 9 percent of
    girls finish fifth grade. In 1999 only 1.8 percent of the national
    budget was committed to education. Children suffer poor health and a
    high mortality rate. Child labor is common.
        There was no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
    When children or adolescents are arrested, they are imprisoned with
    adults (see Section 1.c.). There were no reports of abuse by guards or
    other inmates.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no constitutional or legal
    provision for the physically disabled with respect to discrimination in
    employment, education, or the provision of other government services;
    however, there is no notable discrimination against the disabled in
    practice. No law mandates access for the disabled to buildings or
    government services.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination against ethnic
    or racial minorities is not legal, and the Government does not overtly
    limit their participation in politics; however, the monopolization of
    political power by the President's Mongomo clan of the Fang ethnic
    group persists. In practice some members of ethnic minorities face
    discrimination because they are not members of the Fang ethnic group,
    or belong to a Fang subclan other than the President's. Ethnic
    minorities do not face discrimination in inheritance, marriage, or
    family laws.
        Differences between the majority Fang ethnic group and the Bubi
    ethnic minority are a source of political tension and historically
    often have erupted into violence. Bubis allegedly led the January 1998,
    separatist revolt on Bioko, after which the Fang-dominated Government
    and the security forces intensified their longstanding
    institutionalized repression of the Bubis and allowed Fang vigilante
    groups to abuse Bubi citizens with impunity. Before independence the
    Bubis were a majority of the population on the island of Bioko (then
    Fernando Po), which was both administratively distinct from and more
    economically developed than the larger and more populous mainland (then
    Rio Muni), where the Fang were a majority. The two Spanish colonies
    were united 9 years before independence, after which many Fang migrated
    to Bioko, where Malabo, the capital, is located. The Fang dominated the
    united independent state; during the first decade after independence,
    misrule by Obiang's uncle, Macias Nguema, reduced the country's
    population by about one-third and devastated the economy.
        Differences among clans of the Fang ethnic group, in particular
    resentment of the political dominance of the Mongomo clan, also were
    sources of significant political tensions and in past years, occasional
    violence; however, there were no reports of such violence during the
    year.
        Several thousand citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, and Francophone Africa
    continued to reside in the country. Most are small traders and
    businesspersons. The police reportedly continued to harass them (see
    Section 1.c.) as well as harassing asylum seekers on an individual
    basis.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides
    for the right to organize unions, no labor unions exist; however, there
    are a few cooperatives with limited power. The 1992 Law of Associations
    and Syndicates allows only workers in the same activity, numbering no
    fewer than 50, and grouped in the same geographic area, to form unions;
    this has effectively blocked union formation. Since 1992 the CPDS has
    tried unsuccessfully to legalize its affiliated Union Sindical de
    Trabajadores (UST). An independent union, Sindicator Independiente de
    Servicios (SIS), initially applied for registration twice in 1995 with
    subsequent application in 1996, but the Government denied SIS's
    applications. Although SIS's registration met the requirements of the
    1992 Trade Union Law, the authorities denied it. The 1992 law provides
    that a separate law be enacted to govern unions for civil servants;
    however, this law has not been enacted. The law prohibits strikes. The
    Labor Code contains provisions to uphold worker rights, but the
    Government generally does not enforce them.
        It generally is acknowledged that membership in the PDGE, the
    President's party, is a prerequisite for hiring and promotion, both in
    the public and private sectors (see Section 1.f.). Membership in a
    rival political organization is considered grounds for dismissal from
    any position, public or private. Opposition politicians who are not
    participating in the Government often claimed to have been dismissed
    from their jobs after joining alternate political groups.
        During the year, the country's major private employer, the oil
    industry, which is dominated by foreign firms, continued to take steps
    to reduce government control of hiring in the industry. Having ceased
    their exclusive reliance on the government employment agency APEGESA in
    1999, the companies employed methods ranging from public advertising of
    jobs and objective testing to screening of applicants by non-
    Equatoguineans only, in their attempt to eliminate the former political
    bias in the hiring process.
        In the past, APEGESA allegedly kept nearly two-thirds of employees'
    wages, although reportedly its ability to do so has been reduced.
    Recent legislation mandates that oil workers receive at least 60
    percent of their wages. Oil sector workers receive a much higher scale
    than elsewhere in the national economy, often 10 times the minimum
    wage. In the past, when several employees signed a petition complaining
    of ill treatment, they were fired; however, this abuse no longer
    exists.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no law
    regarding these rights or prohibiting antiunion discrimination. There
    is no evidence of collective bargaining by any group. The Government
    and employers set wages, with little or no participation by workers.
    Employers must pay the minimum wages set by the Government, and most
    companies pay more than the government-established minimum.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids
    forced or bonded labor and slavery; however, detainees and convicted
    felons perform extensive labor outside prison, including for prison
    officials, without compensation (see Section 1.c.). The law prohibits
    forced or bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
    occurred.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for the employment of children is 14
    years, but the Ministry of Labor does not enforce this law, and child
    labor is common particularly on family farms and businesses. The
    Government also does not enforce the law that stipulates mandatory
    education up to the age of 18. Underage youth perform both family farm
    work and street vending. While the Ministry of Labor is responsible for
    the enforcement of labor legislation, the Government does not have a
    comprehensive policy on child labor.
        The Chamber of Deputies approved ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor in December; however, the Government had not
    completed ratification of the convention by year's end. The Government
    has not established or identified any specific organization to
    implement the convention.
        The Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and
    there were no reports that it exists (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage was
    approximately $41 (27,000 CFA francs). The minimum wage is not
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family.
        The law prescribes a standard 35-hour workweek and a 48-hour rest
    period, which are observed in practice in the formal economy.
        The Labor Code provides for comprehensive protection for workers
    from occupational hazards; however, the Government does not enforce
    this in practice. The Government has nine labor inspectors, which was
    insufficient to oversee local industry.
        Employees who protested unhealthy or dangerous working conditions
    risked losing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, through, or within the country.
        A July 1998 UNICEF study stated that the country is a source for
    traffickers that feeds the domestic labor market in urban centers of
    countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon.
                                   __________

                                    ERITREA

        Eritrea became an independent state in 1993, following an
    internationally monitored referendum in which citizens voted
    overwhelmingly for independence from Ethiopia. The Eritrean People's
    Liberation Front (EPLF), which led the 30-year war for independence,
    has controlled the country since it defeated Ethiopian armed forces in
    1991; its leader, Isaias Afwerki, serves as the President. The EPLF
    became the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and
    redefined itself as a political party in 1994; it is the sole political
    party in the country. Elections, which were scheduled originally for
    1998, were postponed again due to the outbreak of an armed conflict
    with Ethiopia that began in May 1998. However, during the year, the
    Government established two committees to develop guidelines and rules
    for new elections and the formation of political parties. National
    Assembly elections are scheduled to take place in 2001. The
    Constitution provides for democratic freedom; however, while it was
    ratified in May 1997, its provisions had not yet been implemented fully
    by year's end. The judiciary is formally independent; however, it is
    weak and subject to executive interference.
        The police are responsible for maintaining internal security,
    although the Government may call on the armed forces, the reserves, and
    demobilized soldiers in response to both domestic and external security
    requirements. In May 1998, fighting broke out between Eritrean armed
    forces and Ethiopian militia along the border. The Government responded
    to an escalating military conflict by calling up reserves and
    increasing its armed forces to approximately 300,000 soldiers. In
    addition to the border conflict, the army has had to deal with the
    Eritrean Islamic Salvation (EIS), a small, Sudan-based insurgent group
    that has mounted terrorist attacks in the north and west since 1993.
    Some members of the security forces committed human rights abuses.
        The conflict with Ethiopia has resulted in severe economic
    disruption and the dislocation of more than 1 million persons. Problems
    included higher inflation, an increased fiscal deficit, a drop in
    economic activity, and increased pressure on the local currency as
    foreign exchange reserves fell. The fighting from May to June had a
    severe negative impact on agricultural production, making the country
    partially dependent on food donations. Inflation rose from about 8.3
    percent in 1999 to 30 percent during the year. Private foreign
    investment dropped nearly to zero as a result of the conflict with
    Ethiopia. Economic growth declined from 3 percent in 1999 to negative 9
    percent during the year. The severance of trade relations with
    Ethiopia, Eritrea's largest trading partner before the conflict, led to
    an extremely large drop in exports. The integration of as many as
    75,000 Eritreans or Ethiopians of Eritrean origin who have been
    deported from Ethiopia and the internal displacement of approximately 1
    million persons have strained resources and further aggravated
    pressures on the economy. In addition there was a shortage of skilled
    labor because of increased military conscription. As a result of a lack
    of foreign exchange, imports were curtailed during the year, resulting
    in shortages of basic consumer goods. While trade, services, and
    manufacturing account for the greatest portion of gross domestic
    product (GDP), the rural economy is based largely on subsistence
    agriculture, and more than 70 percent of the population of 3.6 million
    is engaged in farming and herding. The small industrial sector consists
    mainly of light industries, many using outmoded technologies. Principal
    exports include salt, leather products, and fish. Principal imports
    include machinery, spare parts, food, and military materiel.
    International economic assistance has accounted for a significant
    portion of external revenues. Eritreans who live abroad also provide a
    major source of external revenues, estimated at $300 to $400 million a
    year. Nominal GNP was estimated at $695 million. The country has an
    annual per capita income of less than $200, and about a third of the
    population depends on foreign emergency assistance. The PFDJ continues
    to exert a strong economic influence through a variety of investments
    and party-owned businesses.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems
    remain; however, there were improvements in a few areas. Citizens did
    not have the ability to change their government, which is dominated by
    the PFDJ. Many observers believe that the police occasionally resort to
    torture and physical beatings of prisoners, particularly during
    interrogations, and police severely mistreated army deserters and draft
    dodgers. There were reports that police beat Ethiopians detainees and
    credible reports that soldiers beat and raped female Ethiopian
    deportees. The Government generally does not permit prison visits by
    local or international human rights groups, although it permitted some
    independent monitoring of conditions in detention facilities after the
    conflict with Ethiopia began. In August the Government granted the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to Ethiopian
    civilian detainees and prisoners of war (POW's). Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. An unknown number of persons suspected of
    association with the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, radical Islamic
    elements, or terrorist organizations remained in prolonged detention.
    The judiciary is weak and subject to executive influence. The provision
    of speedy trials was limited by a lack of trained personnel, inadequate
    funding, and poor infrastructure. The use of a special court system
    limited due process. The Government infringed on the right to privacy.
    The Government restricted press freedom, including the rights of the
    religious media, and there were some limits on freedom of association.
    The Government restricted religious freedom in the case of Jehovah's
    Witnesses. The Government restricted freedom of movement. Violence and
    societal discrimination against women also are problems, and female
    genital mutilation (FGM) remains widespread despite government efforts
    to discourage the practice. Members of Jehovah's Witnesses and members
    of the Kunama ethnic group also face some government and societal
    discrimination. The Government restricted workers' rights and there
    were reports of forced labor.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no reports of
    political killings; however, there were reports that security forces
    killed some Ethiopian detainees. For example, there were reports that
    camp guards killed approximately 30 Ethiopian detainees at a camp in
    Wia. There was no investigation into these reports by year's end.
        The Government deployed military police in Asmara to find deserters
    and draft dodgers (see Section 1.d.). The Government authorized the use
    of deadly force against anyone resisting or attempting to flee;
    however, there were no reports that such force was used.
        In July and August, the Government deported thousands of Ethiopians
    to Ethiopia under difficult and dangerous conditions, which resulted in
    a number of deaths (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). On July 31, up to six
    deportees reportedly disappeared crossing the Mereb river and are
    believed to have drowned. Credible sources reported that during a
    deportation on August 2 five Ethiopian deportees disappeared and are
    believed to have died.
        In October six POW's in the Nakfa POW camp died from
    gastrointestinal illnesses (see Section 1.c.). There also were some
    reports that civilian detainees in camps at Sheb Mensheb and Afabet
    died (see Section 1.c.)
        During the year, approximately 100 Ethiopian civilians were killed
    in landmine explosions from landmines laid by Eritrean forces
    withdrawing from occupied territories.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that during the
    year the Government provided support to armed groups opposed to the
    Ethiopian Government operating out of Somalia and Kenya.
        During the year, the Ethiopian army reportedly laid landmines in
    the Eritrean territories that it occupied. According to the Government
    Commission for Coordination with the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission, there
    are an estimated 2.5 million landmines or other unexploded ordnances in
    the country, including approximately 500,000 landmines laid by Ethiopia
    during the 1962-91 war for independence. On occasion, new mines have
    been laid by the EIS or others. During the year, there were
    approximately 48 reported casualties, including a number of deaths, as
    a result of landmines and unexploded ordnances; however, it is not
    clear which landmines in particular were responsible for these
    casualties. The Commission reported that 15 children were killed by
    landmines and unexploded ordnances during the year. For example, in
    February a fuel truck hit a landmine in the west that reportedly was
    laid by the EIS; the driver and his assistant both were killed. In
    December a bus hit a landmine on the Tologamja-Kotobia road; the driver
    was killed and two passengers were injured; the mine was laid the
    previous night, but it is not known by whom. It is probable that there
    were additional, unreported deaths in remote areas.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
    motivated disappearances; however, the Ethiopian Government and media
    alleged that numerous Ethiopians in Eritrea disappeared during and
    after fighting that took place from May to June. These allegations
    reportedly were under investigation by international observers at
    year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The transitional Penal Code prohibits torture; however,
    many observers believe that the police at least occasionally resort to
    torture and physical beatings of prisoners, particularly during
    interrogations. During the year, the police severely mistreated and
    beat army deserters and draft dodgers, and the army subjected deserters
    and draft dodgers to various military disciplinary actions that
    included prolonged sun exposure in temperatures of up to 113 degrees
    Fahrenheit, or the tying of the hands and feet for extended periods of
    time (see Section 1.d.).
        In October a guard at the Keren detention facility shot in the
    shoulder an Ethiopian detainee who locked himself into a room with 68
    other detainees for fear of being punished. The guard apparently shot
    the detainee through a window. The detainee was treated at a hospital
    and he was repatriated to Ethiopia by year's end. No action is known to
    have been taken against the guard.
        In July the Government deported 92 Ethiopian women to Djibouti by
    boat (see Section 1.d.). There were credible reports that Eritrean
    soldiers beat and raped some of the women while they were in detention
    awaiting deportation.
        There were credible reports that at times security forces beat
    Ethiopian detainees who were awaiting deportation or repatriation to
    Ethiopia.
        In July and August, the Government deported to Ethiopia thousands
    of Ethiopians under potentially difficult or dangerous conditions
    without the participation of the ICRC (see Section 1.d.). On July 31,
    up to six deportees reportedly disappeared crossing the Mereb river and
    are believed to have drowned. During another deportation on August 2
    via the town of Tsorona, credible sources reported that five Ethiopian
    deportees disappeared and are believed to have died, one woman gave
    birth, and returnees were forced to march for 18 hours straight.
        There were some instances in which private Eritrean individuals
    threatened and beat Ethiopians after fighting resumed in May. In some
    cases, police intervened too late to prevent the abuse, or were unable
    to halt such abuse. For example, on May 18, the day after Ethiopian
    troops occupied the Eritrean town of Barentu, students harassed,
    assaulted, and occasionally beat Ethiopians in Asmara.
        During the year, there were approximately 48 reported casualties,
    including a number of deaths, from landmines and unexploded ordnances
    (see Section 1.a.). It is probable that there were additional,
    unreported injuries that occurred in remote areas.
        Prison conditions are Spartan. The Government permits three visits
    per week by family members. There were no confirmed reports that any
    prisoners died due to lack of proper medical care. Women and men are
    held in separate facilities. There are no juvenile detention centers or
    correction facilities and juvenile offenders often are incarcerated
    with adults.
        Between June and September, the Government established detention
    camps for Ethiopians scheduled for repatriation or deportation in a
    number of areas, including Wia, Sheib, Alla, Afabet, Megarih, Shiketi,
    and Wekerti (see Section 1.d.). Monitors who visited the camps at
    Afabet, Adi Abieto, and Alla reported that conditions in the camps were
    Spartan but generally adequate; however, there were reports that
    numerous detainees became sick due to camp conditions at Afabet, and
    that some died. In addition between 10 and 15 persons died in the Sheb
    Mensheb detention camp during the year; most were infants and young
    children who died of dehydration due to the extremely hot weather. The
    Government responded by sending in a team of doctors and additional
    supplies, including water. There were credible reports that at least
    some of these detainees were forced to work outside their camps (see
    Section 6.c). By December the Government reported that most of these
    camps had been shut down and that approximately 1,500 detainees
    remained at Afabet and that 150 Ethiopians who did not want to leave
    the country remained at Alla.
        Approximately 1,000 POW's were being held at a camp in Nakfa at
    year's end. Conditions at the POW camp reportedly were good; however,
    in October six POW's in the Nakfa POW camp died from gastrointestinal
    illnesses (see Section 1.c.). POW's were forced to perform labor on
    road-building projects; however, following an ICRC visit in late
    August, the POW's were no longer forced to perform such labor (see
    Section 6.c.).
        Prior to August 8, the Government generally did not permit prison
    visits by local or international human rights groups; however, in 1998
    the Government began to permit some independent monitoring of
    conditions in detention facilities by international groups after the
    conflict with Ethiopia began. Local groups reportedly were not
    permitted to monitor conditions in prisons. Beginning on August 8, the
    Government allowed the ICRC to visit and register civilian detainees in
    internment camps and prisons, and, beginning on August 30, the ICRC was
    permitted to visit Ethiopian POW's. In November for the first time, the
    ICRC was permitted to visit several police stations in Asmara where
    Ethiopians reportedly were being held. The ICRC was not granted access
    to approximately 800 Ethiopian detainees, mostly young men, who were
    being held at the Keren camp prior to their deportation in October.
        During the year, the Government reportedly denied officials from
    the Government of Sudan access to 14 Sudanese prisoners arrested in
    1994 (see Section 1.d.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The Penal Code stipulates that detainees may be
    held for a maximum of 30 days without being charged with a crime. In
    practice the authorities sometimes hold persons suspected of crimes for
    much longer periods. During the year, the Government detained between
    10,000 and 20,000 Ethiopians, many of whom were repatriated or deported
    to Ethiopia. By December the Government reported that approximately
    1,500 detainees remained at the Afabet internment camp and that 150
    Ethiopians who did not want to leave the country remained at the Alla
    internment camp.
        An unknown number of persons associated with radical Islamic
    elements or suspected terrorist organizations remained in detention
    without charge, in some cases for years. There were unconfirmed reports
    that the Government continued to hold numerous members of the Eritrean
    Liberation Front, an armed opposition group. Authorities sometimes
    arbitrarily arrest and detain former combatants or members of the PFDJ
    who violate an unwritten code of conduct (see Section 1.e.).
        In June approximately 200 members of the Kunama ethnic group were
    detained without charges on suspicion of collaborating with Ethiopian
    forces (see Section 5). Most were released within a few months;
    however, at year's end, several Kunamas remained in detention.
        At year's end, approximately five members of Jehovah's Witnesses
    remained in detention without charge and without being tried for
    failing to participate in national service. Some have been detained for
    more than 5 years without charge (see Section 2.c.).
        During the year, the Government released 6 Sudanese from a group of
    20 who reportedly were arrested in 1994. The other 14 Sudanese remained
    in detention at year's end. Officials from the Government of Sudan
    reportedly were denied access to these prisoners.
        The few deportees of Eritrean origin from Ethiopia who cannot
    demonstrate their ties to Eritrea are subject to detention. The
    Government grants these deportees documents that identify them as
    Ethiopians who are permitted to stay in the country (see Section 2.d.).
    Government and army officials who routinely check the identification
    cards of citizens in order to find draft dodgers and deserters
    reportedly consider these Ethiopian deportees to be Eritreans who are
    trying to avoid national service. As a result, they are subject to
    harassment and detention while the authorities check their status.
        There were reports that authorities arrested some Ethiopians in May
    for raising the Ethiopian flag in public places.
        On October 14, authorities detained eight journalists (see Section
    2.a.), six of whom were released on October 18. Reportedly the two
    other journalists were inducted into the military to fulfill their
    national service obligations.
        During the year, the Government deployed military police in Asmara
    to find deserters and draft dodgers (see Section 1.a., 1.c., and 1.f.).
    The military police detained persons who had not done their national
    service, including some disabled and mentally ill individuals who were
    detained in a camp near Asmara. Those who were deemed unfit for
    military training by a military medical board were released; the rest
    were required to fulfill their national service obligations.
        In June the Government began detaining Ethiopians in large numbers,
    and detained between 10,000 and 20,000 Ethiopians during the year.
    Between June and September, the Government established detention camps
    for Ethiopians scheduled for repatriation or deportation in a number of
    areas, including Wia, Sheib, Alla, Afabet, Megarih, Shiketi, Adi
    Abieto, and Wekerti (see Section 1.c.). There were credible reports
    that at least some of these detainees were forced to work outside their
    camps (see Section 6.c.). By December the Government reported that most
    of these camps were shut down and that approximately 1,500 detainees
    remained at Afabet and that 150 Ethiopians who did not want to leave
    the country remained at Alla. An unknown number of Ethiopians,
    particularly men, also were held in police stations, prisons, and jails
    in Asmara. The Government stated that Ethiopians detained in such
    places were being detained either for their own protection, because
    they had committed a crime, or because they were scheduled for
    deportation. There was no credible evidence that Ethiopians detained
    prior to deportation or detained for their protection continued to be
    held in police stations or jails at year's end.
        The Government generally does not use exile as a means of political
    control; however, in August the Government began deporting and
    repatriating Ethiopians to Ethiopia. At year's end the Government had
    returned more than 25,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea to Ethiopia. Most of
    these persons were repatriated voluntarily; however, many were deported
    forcibly. Only about half of these returns were conducted with ICRC
    participation (see Section 2.d.). Ethiopian women in Asmara working as
    barmaids, prostitutes, and housemaids were singled out for detention
    and deportation to Ethiopia (see Section 5). In July and August, the
    Government deported thousands of Ethiopians to Ethiopia under difficult
    and dangerous conditions without the participation of the ICRC. On July
    31, up to six deportees reportedly disappeared crossing the Mereb river
    and are believed to have drowned. During another deportation on August
    2 via the town of Tsorona, credible sources reported that five
    Ethiopian deportees disappeared and are believed to have died, one
    woman gave birth, and returnees had to march for 18 hours straight. Due
    to the long walk or dangerous river conditions, many of the deportees
    were forced to leave their belongings behind during deportations. In
    August the Government stated its intention to refrain from additional
    repatriations except under ICRC auspices.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is formally
    independent; however, it is weak and subject to executive interference.
    The continued use of an executive special court system allowed ongoing
    executive interference with the judicial process. In addition the
    judiciary relies on the Ministry of Justice for logistical and salary
    support, thereby further limiting the judiciary's independence.
        The judicial system has three parts: civilian, military, and
    special courts. The civilian court system consists of village courts,
    subregional courts, regional courts, and the High Court, which also
    serves as an appellate court. The still developing judicial system
    suffers from a lack of trained personnel, inadequate funding, and poor
    infrastructure that, in practice, limit the State's ability to grant
    accused persons a speedy trial. Although 16 new courthouses were
    completed in 1998, further development of the judicial infrastructure
    was constrained due to the conflict with Ethiopia. At independence the
    Government chose to retain the Ethiopian legal system but made some
    modifications to it. The Government has developed new commercial,
    penal, and criminal codes, which were ready for ratification by the
    National Assembly at year's end, although such ratification had not
    occurred by year's end. A new civil code is expected to be completed by
    2001.
        Under the legal system, minor infractions are brought to village
    courts and subregional courts. More serious offenses are argued before
    regional courts, and cases involving murder, rape, and other serious
    felonies are heard by the High Court. All cases except those argued
    before the High Court are heard by a single judge; on the High Court,
    panels of three judges hear cases. Defendants have access to legal
    counsel, usually at their own expense. Although there is no formal
    public defender's office, the Government has requested successfully
    that attorneys work without fee to represent defendants accused of
    serious crimes punishable by more than 10 years in prison, who are
    unable to afford legal counsel. Defendants may appeal verdicts to a
    High Court panel, which is composed of the High Court president and
    four other judges.
        Since the population is largely rural, most citizens only have
    contact with the legal system through the traditional village courts.
    Village judges, who are appointed by a panel composed of heads of
    regional courts, the regional prosecutor, and the regional governor,
    hear civil cases. Magistrates versed in criminal law hear criminal
    cases. Many local issues--for example, property disputes and most petty
    crimes--are adjudicated by local elders according to custom. In the
    case of Muslims, civil cases are heard under Shari'a law. The
    traditional courts cannot impose sentences involving physical
    punishment. The Ministry of Justice also offers training in alternative
    dispute resolution to handle some civil and petty criminal cases.
        The drafting of many civilians, including court administrators,
    defendants, judges, lawyers, and others involved in the legal system,
    into the national service due to the border conflict with Ethiopia has
    had a significant negative impact on the judiciary. The High Court was
    reduced from seven benches to three benches and provincial, zone, and
    village court personnel were reduced by 40 percent. As a result of
    these personnel constraints, there were lengthy delays in the
    processing of cases. However, during the year some court personnel were
    permitted to return to work.
        In February 1997, the Defense Minister created a special court
    system, ostensibly to reduce a growing backlog in the civilian court
    system; however, in practice, the special courts, which ban defense
    counsel and the right of appeal, allow the executive branch to mete out
    punishment without respect for due process. Judges in the special
    courts are senior military officers, most of whom have little or no
    legal experience. The special courts have jurisdiction over some
    criminal cases, such as capital offenses, felonies, misdemeanors, cases
    of tax evasion involving large sums, and cases of embezzlement by
    senior officials. The office of the Attorney General decides which
    cases are to be tried by a special court. The Attorney General also may
    allow the special courts to retry civilian court cases, including those
    decided by the High Court, thereby subjecting defendants to double
    jeopardy.
        The special courts also handle crimes involving corruption, theft,
    and misuse of government authority allegedly committed by former
    members of the EPLF during the war for independence. Senior former
    fighters and members of the PFDJ often are held to a stringent
    unwritten code of conduct, and violations of this code are handled by
    special courts outside the normal judicial process. Those accused of
    violating this circle of trust have been arrested and held without
    formal charge (see Section 1.d.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government at times infringed on the right to
    privacy. Under the law, warrants are required in routine searches and
    seizures, except in cases where authorities believe individuals may
    attempt to escape or destroy evidence. Warrants also theoretically are
    required before the Government can monitor mail, telephones, or other
    means of private communication; however, in practice the Government
    generally does not bother to obtain warrants and there were reports
    that the Government monitored some international telephone calls. There
    were unconfirmed reports that members of the PFDJ placed Ethiopians
    under surveillance. The Government has the authority to ban the import
    of any foreign publication; however, it has not yet done so (see
    Section 2.a.).
        In July there were credible reports that the Government impeded
    communication between Eritrean POW's being held in Ethiopia and
    immediate family members in Eritrea.
        There were unconfirmed reports that the Government took land from
    members of the Kunama ethnic group without compensation and gave it to
    members of other ethnic groups on the grounds that the land was not
    being exploited efficiently (see Section 5).
        During the year, military police were deployed in Asmara to find
    deserters and draft dodgers. Members of the force carried out frequent
    document checks and routinely detained individuals of military age who
    had not done their national service (see Section 1.d.).
        In August the Government shut down all businesses in Asmara that
    belonged to Ethiopians with only a few days' notice: approximately 300
    businesses owned by Ethiopians were shut down. The Government gave
    Ethiopians occupying government-owned housing a 1-month notice to
    vacate. The Government reportedly also froze some bank accounts and
    seized some assets belonging to Ethiopians. Some Ethiopians had
    difficulty renewing business licenses, driving licenses, resident
    permits, or leases. A significant but unknown number of Ethiopians were
    fired or lost their jobs because of their nationality; in some cases,
    this was due to the fact that Ethiopians were working for Ethiopian
    businessmen who left the country or whose businesses were shut down.
        During the fighting in May and June, Ethiopian forces looted and
    caused significant damage to a number of Eritrean towns and villages.
    Among the properties ransacked and looted were mosques and churches,
    factories, flour mills, health clinics, pharmacies, schools,
    warehouses, bridges, and the homes of government officials.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice, the
    Government restricts these rights, although it did so to a lesser
    extent than in the previous year. The Government uses the libel law to
    intimidate journalists. The editor-in-chief of the independent
    newspaper Kastedebana so far has been charged in seven libel cases; the
    cases were suspended pending the editor's return from serving a
    sentence for hard labor for leaving his post without proper leave
    papers. In 1999 the Government arrested an editor who refused to
    disclose the address of a reader whose letter to the editor criticized
    the commercial practices associated with Saudi Airlines operations in
    the country. He was rearrested briefly in late 1999 for additional
    questioning, and the Government brought more charges against him, some
    of which later were dropped. At year's end, the Saudi Airlines case and
    six other government charges of libel against the editor remained
    pending, and trial proceedings were suspended indefinitely when the
    editor was inducted into the army. While the Government has tolerated
    increased public debate over government decisions since the outbreak of
    conflict with Ethiopia, the media continues to practice self-censorship
    due, in part, to fear of Government reprisals.
        In August the Government arrested and detained for a day without
    charge the editor of the independent newspaper Zemen, allegedly for
    having expired leave papers.
        On October 14, authorities from the Ministry of Defense detained
    eight independent journalists, ostensibly to verify their draft status.
    Observers believe that the journalists were detained because their
    newspapers had been calling for access to National Assembly
    deliberations. Six of the journalists were released on October 18.
    Reportedly the two other journalists were inducted into the military to
    fulfill their national service obligations.
        Some journalists claim that they were targeted unfairly for the
    draft and complained of routine harassment by unknown individuals who
    they believe work for the Government. These journalists also allege
    that they received threatening telephone calls and that unidentified
    individuals showed up at their offices and threatened them.
        The Government controls much of the media, including three
    newspapers, one radio station, one television station, and one of only
    two newspaper printing presses in the country. There are no private
    radio or television stations. The Government has the authority to ban
    the import of any foreign publication, although it has not done so. The
    press proclamation issued in 1996 forbids the local reprinting of
    articles from banned publications. The Government continued to restrict
    the right of the religious media to comment on politics or government
    policies. In theory nonreligious print media are free to criticize the
    Government. Nonetheless, criticism tends to be limited and fairly mild,
    and the media practices a great deal of self-censorship.
        The Government's press proclamation allows individuals to publish
    newspapers, and private newspapers and magazines began publishing at
    the end of 1997. At year's end, there were nine independent newspapers
    and magazines operating. Four independent newspapers or magazines
    closed during the year when all of their reporters were called up for
    military service. Three independent newspapers, Setit, Kastedebana and
    Tsighenai, each have a circulation of 15,000. The pro-Government
    publication of the PFDJ's National Union of Eritrean Youth and
    Students, Trgta, has the widest circulation at 20,000. The press
    proclamation does not allow private ownership of any broadcast media or
    foreign influence or ownership of any media. The proclamation requires
    that all newspapers obtain a license from the Ministry of Information
    before publication and that all reporters must register with the
    Ministry. The Government also may punish ``whosoever insults, abuses,
    defames, or slanders the Government or one of the constituted
    legislative, executive, or judicial authorities,'' and forbids the
    publication of any subject matter that contravenes general morality.
    While there was no direct government censorship of the independent
    press during the year, the Government continued to exert pressure on
    the independent press through advice and warnings.
        In 1999 the Government began the process of implementing Internet
    access through its telecommunications system, and with foreign donor
    assistance, access to the Internet became available in November. There
    also are two independent Internet service providers.
        Although the Government claims that there were no restrictions on
    academic freedom, the University of Asmara refused to give diplomas to
    students who completed their studies unless they did their national
    service. In addition, new graduates occasionally were pressured to work
    for government entities. The University of Asmara was closed formally
    in May, a few weeks before final exams, due to the fighting with
    Ethiopia; it reopened in October, although exams were held in June.
    Students were sent to active duty or to military training.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this
    right in practice. The Government requires a permit from the Ministry
    of Local Government for a public meeting or demonstration. In general
    permits are granted freely for nonpolitical meetings or gatherings, and
    there were no reports that permits for political demonstrations were
    denied.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association and states
    that every citizen shall have the right to form organizations for
    political, social, economic, and cultural ends; however, in practice
    the Government restricts this right. The Government does not allow the
    formation of any political parties; however, during the year, the
    Government established two committees to develop guidelines and rules
    for new elections and the formation of political parties. The
    Government also has stated its opposition to the formation of any party
    based on ethnicity or religion. In 1999 journalists from the country's
    11 independent newspapers formed an organizing committee to establish
    an independent journalists' organization. In October 1999, they filed
    for a license with the Ministry of Local Government; however, the
    Government refused to issue a license and the group had not formed by
    year's end.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the Government restricts this right in the case of
    Jehovah's Witnesses. The Constitution provides for the ``freedom to
    practice any religion and to manifest such practice,'' and Islam and
    most forms of Christianity are practiced and tolerated widely
    throughout the country with persons free to worship at the church or
    mosque of their choice; however, the Government continued to harass,
    detain, and discriminate against members of the small community of
    Jehovah's Witnesses because of their refusal to perform National
    Service.
        In 1994 in accordance with a presidential decree, the Government
    revoked the trading licenses of some members of Jehovah's Witnesses and
    dismissed most of those who worked in the civil service. This
    governmental action resulted in economic, employment, and travel
    difficulties for many members of Jehovah's Witnesses, especially former
    civil servants and businessmen. In April 1997, the government labor
    office issued a form to all employers in Asmara and the surrounding
    area requesting information on any government personnel who were
    members of Jehovah's Witnesses. In addition to these measures, members
    of Jehovah's Witnesses also often are denied identification cards,
    passports, exit visas, trading licenses, and government housing unless
    they hide their religion.
        Most members of Jehovah's Witnesses refused on religious grounds to
    vote in the referendum on independence and have declined to participate
    in national service. This spurred widespread criticism that members of
    Jehovah's Witnesses collectively were shirking their civic duty. Some
    Muslims also have objected to universal national service with regard to
    the requirement that women perform military duty. The Government does
    not excuse individuals who object to national service for religious
    reasons or reasons of conscience, nor does the Government allow
    alternative service. Although persons from other religious groups have
    been punished in past years for failure to participate in national
    service, only members of Jehovah's Witnesses have been subject to
    dismissal from the civil service, had their trading licenses revoked,
    been evicted from government-owned housing, and been denied passports,
    identity cards, and exit visas. However, there were no reports that
    Jehovah's Witnesses who performed national service and participated in
    the national independence referendum were subject to discrimination.
    Jehovah's Witnesses have several churches and members are not barred
    from meeting in private homes.
        In 1998 several members of Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested for
    failure to comply with the national service law and some were tried,
    although there is no information available regarding the verdicts or
    sentences in these cases. At year's end, approximately five members of
    Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention without charge and without
    being tried for failing to participate in national service. These
    individuals had been detained for varying period of time, some for more
    than 5 years without charge. The maximum penalty for refusing to
    perform national service is only 3 years' imprisonment. Ministry of
    Justice officials have denied that any members of Jehovah's Witnesses
    were being held without charge, although they acknowledge that some
    members of Jehovah's Witnesses, and a number of Muslims, are in jail
    serving sentences for convictions on charges of evading national
    service. There is no indication that any persons are detained or
    imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs or practices;
    however, the Government has singled out members of Jehovah's Witnesses
    for harsher treatment than that received by members of other faiths for
    similar actions.
        The army resorted to various forms of extreme physical punishment
    to force objectors, including some members of Jehovah's Witnesses, to
    do their military service (see Section 1.c.).
        Unlike in previous years, there is no evidence that the Government
    discourages proselytizing by members of one faith among adherents of
    another.
        In a 1995 proclamation, the Government described specific
    guidelines on the role of religion and religiously affiliated NGO's in
    development and government, stating that development, politics, and
    public administration are the sole responsibility of the Government and
    citizens. The 1995 Proclamation bans religious organizations from
    involvement in politics and restricts the right of religious media to
    comment on political matters. Pursuant to the 1995 proclamation,
    religious organizations are permitted to fund, but not initiate or
    implement, development projects; however, this proclamation was not
    enforced in practice--several religious organizations executed small-
    scale development projects without government interference. The 1995
    proclamation also sets out rules governing relations between religious
    organizations and foreign sponsors.
        In 1998 authorities informed all religious organizations that all
    schools run by religious denominations providing general education
    would be incorporated into the public school system. At the time, it
    was not made clear whether the religious authorities would continue to
    administer the curriculum with government oversight or whether the
    school faculty would be absorbed into the Ministry of education.
    However, no action was taken to implement this initiative because of
    the outbreak of the border conflict with Ethiopia. In 1998 the
    Government decreed that religiously affiliated organizations were
    prohibited from running kindergartens; however, this decree still had
    not been implemented by year's end. According to officials in the
    Religious Affairs Office, the Government is expected to allow religious
    schools to operate independently as long as they adhere to a standard
    curriculum.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the rights
    of movement and emigration; however, while citizens can travel freely
    within the country and change their place of residence and work,
    authorities restrict freedom of movement and emigration in practice.
    The Government requires all citizens to carry national identification
    cards, which they must present on demand at security checkpoints. The
    Government restricted travel to some areas within the country for
    security reasons. Beginning in March, military police periodically set
    up numerous roadblocks in Asmara and other cities to find draft dodgers
    and military deserters (see Section 1.d.); however, the number of such
    roadblocks was reduced significantly by year's end.
        During the year, the Government repatriated or deported more than
    25,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea to Ethiopia (see Section 1.d.). Most of
    those who left the country were repatriated voluntary; however, many
    were deported forcibly (see Section 1.d.). Among the deportees were
    women who alleged that they were prevented from taking their children
    with them because their fathers were Eritreans (see Section 5). An
    estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Ethiopians remain in the country. Only about
    half of the returns were conducted with ICRC participation. In
    September the Government declared that it would conduct future
    repatriations only with the participation of the ICRC; however, while
    the Government generally abided by this declaration, on October 14, 800
    Ethiopians were deported from the Keren camp without ICRC
    participation. The Government stated publicly on several occasions that
    it had not adopted a policy of deporting all Ethiopian nationals from
    the country.
        Clashes between government forces and EIS members in 1997 led the
    Government to restrict travel along much of the border with Sudan. Some
    areas remain heavily mined, a legacy of the war for independence, and
    occasionally new mines are set by the EIS or others, leading to
    additional travel restrictions (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Some Ethiopians had difficulty renewing residence permits and were
    subject to detention when stopped by authorities with an expired
    residence permit (see Section 1.d.). In general Ethiopians were able to
    get exit visas.
        Citizens largely are free to travel outside the country after
    obtaining an exit visa, although members of Jehovah's Witnesses (see
    Section 2.c.), officials of the former Ethiopian military regime, and
    those who have not completed national service have been denied
    passports or exit visas. In addition as a result of the conflict with
    Ethiopia, the Government increasingly denied exit visas to some young
    men and women, apparently on the ground that they were approaching the
    age of eligibility for national service.
        In general citizens have the right to return; however, Eritreans
    must show proof that they paid a 2 percent tax on their annual income
    to the Government of Eritrea while living abroad in order to receive
    government services upon their return to the country. Instances in
    which citizens living abroad have run afoul of the law, have contracted
    a serious contagious disease, or have been declared ineligible for
    political asylum by other governments are considered on a case-by-case
    basis.
        The border with Ethiopia was closed in May 1998, due to the
    outbreak of war, although Eritreans deported from Ethiopia crossed the
    border and were allowed to resettle in Eritrea. As many as 75,000
    Eritreans or Ethiopians of Eritrean origin have been deported from
    Ethiopia. The deportees, if they wished, were placed in villages with
    friends or family. Those who no longer had connections in Eritrea were
    placed temporarily in camps with internally displaced persons (IDP's)
    before being settled among the general population. In order to
    facilitate the deportees' integration into society, the Government
    provided them with documentation good for 6 months that identified them
    as deportees. If, during that time, the deportees could find three
    Eritrean witnesses willing to testify to their Eritrean ties, the
    Government issued them documentation of Eritrean nationality; they then
    are considered to be permanent citizens. For the small minority of
    deportees who cannot demonstrate Eritrean ties, the Government grants
    them identity documents that specify that they are Ethiopian, but they
    are permitted to stay in the country. At times, these deportees are
    subject to harassment and detention by military authorities (see
    Section 1.d.). Deportees of military age who acknowledged Eritrean
    nationality were ordered to report for military service.
        Approximately 1.1 million citizens have been displaced internally
    as a result of the conflict with Ethiopia. At year's end, approximately
    243,000 IDP's were in 25 camps in the Debub, Gash-Barka, and Northern
    Red Sea zones, and there were approximately 100,000 IDP's outside of
    the camps. Camp facilities are basic, but conditions generally are
    adequate.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
    provides first asylum and provided it to Somali and Sudanese refugees
    during the year. In May when fighting resumed with Ethiopia, there were
    750 Sudanese refugees at the Elitte camp and 2,300 Somali refugees at
    the Harsile camp near the port of Assab. During the fighting, 1,228
    Somali refugees were evacuated from the Harsile camp to the Emkulu camp
    near Massawa and another 972 were sent to Yemen and Djibouti by the
    UNHCR. The remaining 100 Somali refugees chose to remain in Assab. The
    ERREC, a government agency, is the principal Eritrean organization
    responsible for refugee and internally displaced issues.
        In May the Government was scheduled to repatriate long-term
    Eritrean refugees from Sudan; however, the repatriations were postponed
    after the fighting with Ethiopia resumed. During the year,
    approximately 50,000 additional Eritreans from towns and villages in
    the southwest of the country fled to Sudan. By year's end, nearly all
    of these refugees in Sudan had returned to their villages or were in
    displacement camps inside Eritrea. The estimated 136,000 long-term
    Eritrean refugees in Sudan remained there at year's end.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Although the Constitution provides for this right, citizens have
    not been able to change their government in multiparty elections.
    Authority within the Government is held very narrowly among a small
    cadre of former fighters. The Government is dominated completely by the
    PFDJ, which came to power in the 1993 popular referendum in which over
    99.8 percent of voters chose an independent Eritrea managed by a
    transitional government run by the PFDJ rather than electing to remain
    part of Ethiopia. The PFDJ still has not fulfilled the ambitious
    program that it initially outlined for a transition to a democratically
    elected government by 1997. Elections, originally scheduled for 1997,
    have never been held. An electoral commission was established in 1997
    to draft an electoral code for 1998 elections, but accomplished little
    because of the outbreak of the conflict with Ethiopia, and elections
    again were postponed. The only political party permitted to operate is
    the PFDJ, and there are no opposition parties active domestically (see
    Section 2.b.). During the year, the Government established two
    committees to develop guidelines and rules for new elections and the
    formation of political parties; National Assembly elections are
    scheduled to take place in 2001.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In an effort
    to encourage broader participation by women in politics, the PFDJ named
    3 women to the party's 19-member Executive Council and 11 women to the
    75-member Central Council at the last party congress, held in 1994.
    Women participated in the Constitutional Commission (occupying almost
    half of the positions on the 50-person committee) and hold several
    senior government positions, including the positions of Minister of
    Justice and Minister of Labor. By law a third of regional National
    Assembly seats are reserved for women, and women also are able compete
    for the non-reserved seats.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Local
    Governments jointly are responsible for handling human rights
    inquiries. All NGO's must register with the ERREC; there were 36 non-
    domestic NGO's operating in the country, the majority of which are
    involved in emergency assistance. A local human rights organization,
    Citizens for Peace in Eritrea (CPE), formed in 1998 to investigate and
    publicize Ethiopian deportations of Eritreans, was registered in July
    as a local NGO and broadened its mandate to include other human rights
    problems. In June the CPE issued a statement appealing to citizens and
    the Government to safeguard the human rights of Ethiopians living in
    the country.
        In 1995 the Government proclaimed that religious organizations,
    including religious-based NGO's, could not engage in development
    activities; however, this proclamation never has been enforced in
    practice. In addition the four main religious groups (Orthodox,
    Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant) continued to coordinate the provision
    of relief services to deportees from Ethiopia in conjunction with the
    ERREC. A 1998 decree prohibiting religiously affiliated organizations
    from running kindergartens has not been implemented yet (see Section
    2.c.).
        A governmental proclamation issued in 1996 required that all
    private NGO's hire only those who have completed their national
    service; however, this proclamation was not enforced in practice. This
    proclamation was part of the Government's effort to provide benefits to
    citizens who have served in the military.
        In January 1998, the Government ordered most of the country's
    remaining NGO's to close down their programs, allegedly because they
    wasted too much money on administrative costs. Most NGO's left in 1998;
    however, several NGO's began returning in 1999 when the Government
    sought to encourage greater NGO participation in development and
    humanitarian aid. At year's end, there were 36 non-domestic NGO's
    operating in the country.
        Most international human rights organizations are not permitted to
    operate within the country, with the exception of the ICRC, which
    continued its programs during the year and provided shelter and
    supplemental food to approximately 243,000 persons displaced by the
    conflict with Ethiopia. However, the ICRC was not permitted to visit
    Ethiopian civilian detainees until August 8 and was not permitted to
    visit Ethiopian POW's until August 30 (see Section 1.c.), nor was it
    granted access to Ethiopian detainees held in several jails in Asmara
    until November (see Section 1.c.). In September the Government agreed
    to conduct future repatriations of Ethiopian civilians under ICRC
    auspices and to allow the ICRC to organize the return of Ethiopian
    POW's held in Eritrea; however, while the Government generally abided
    by this declaration, on October 14, 881 Ethiopians were deported from
    the Keren camp without ICRC participation (see Section 2.d.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and the transitional civil code prohibit
    discrimination against women and the disabled, and the Government
    generally enforces these provisions.
        Women.--The Government has taken a firm public stance against
    domestic violence; however, observers believe that violence against
    women, particularly in highland areas, is pervasive. Spousal abuse,
    especially wife beating, is common; however, domestic violence seldom
    is discussed openly by women because of societal pressures. Such
    incidents more commonly are addressed, if at all, within families or by
    religious clergy.
        The Government consistently has advocated improving the status of
    women, many of whom played a significant role as fighters in the
    struggle for independence. Since independence women have enjoyed a
    legal right to equal educational opportunities, equal pay for equal
    work, and legal sanctions against domestic violence. In 1994 the Third
    Party Congress advocated more rights for women, including parity in the
    right to land and other property. However, much of society remains
    traditional and patriarchal, and generally women do not enjoy a social
    status equal to men. The law provides a framework for improving the
    status of women, but laws are implemented unevenly, because of a lack
    of capacity in the legal system and ingrained cultural attitudes. In
    practice males retain privileged access to education, employment, and
    control of economic resources, with more disparities in rural areas
    than in cities.
        When the Government began detaining and returning Ethiopians to
    Ethiopia in June, authorities singled out young Ethiopian women,
    particularly prostitutes, barmaids, and waitresses, for detention and
    involuntary deportation (see Section 1.d. and 2.d.); reportedly this
    was due, in part, to the fear that these women spread HIV/AIDS.
    Reportedly those women who could demonstrate that they had a child with
    an Eritrean father were permitted to remain in the country. However,
    other female deportees alleged that they were prevented from taking
    their children because the fathers were Eritreans.
        The law requires that women between the ages of 18 and 40
    participate in the active national service program, and during the
    year, women were engaged in fighting in the conflict against Ethiopia.
    However, in 1999 the Government began moving more women away from
    direct combat roles and reassigned them to other responsibilities,
    including training and operation of heavy equipment.
        Children.--The Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare is responsible
    for government policies concerning the rights and welfare of children.
    The Children's Affairs Division under the Ministry of Labor and Human
    Welfare covers child care, counseling, and probation. The law
    criminalizes child prostitution, pornography, and sexual exploitation.
        Education through grade seven is compulsory and free; however,
    education above grade seven is neither free nor compulsory, and while
    the situation has improved, there is a shortage of schools and teachers
    at all levels. According the Ministry of Education, only 37 to 38
    percent of children attend school. Approximately 75 percent of the
    population are illiterate. In rural areas, young girls usually leave
    school early to work at home.
        A small number of children under the age of 18 entered military
    service, usually because of a lack of a birth certificate or other
    identification. When soldiers were found to be under the age of 18,
    they were removed from service.
        Child abuse is not thought to be common; however, female genital
    mutilation, which is widely condemned by international health experts
    as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widespread,
    with estimates placing the number of women and girls who have been
    subjected to FGM at 95 percent. FGM is practiced by almost all ethnic
    and religious groups in the country. In the lowlands, infibulation--the
    most severe from of FGM--is practiced. There is no law prohibiting FGM;
    however, the Government has worked to combat officially the practice of
    FGM. The Government and other organizations, including the National
    Union of Eritrean Women, sponsored education programs that discourage
    the practice. The U.N. Population Fund, through the Ministry of Health,
    sponsors reproductive health projects that provide training and
    awareness programs that focus on the negative physical and
    psychological impacts of FGM.
        People with Disabilities.--The long war for independence and the
    conflict with Ethiopia left thousands of men and women physically
    disabled from injuries they received as guerrillas, soldiers, and
    civilian victims. The Government spends a large share of its resources
    to support and train these disabled fighters, who are regarded as
    heroes, and does not discriminate against them in training, education,
    or employment. There are no laws mandating access for the disabled to
    public thoroughfares or public or private buildings; however, many
    newly constructed buildings provide access for disabled persons.
        Religious Minorities.--Societal attitudes toward members of
    Jehovah's Witnesses are the exception to a widespread religious
    tolerance. Members of Jehovah's Witnesses generally are disliked and
    face some societal discrimination because of their refusal to
    participate in the independence referendum in 1993 and to perform
    national service, a refusal that is seen widely as unpatriotic.
    However, the level of societal discrimination against Jehovah's
    Witnesses has declined since the previous year.
        Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There were reports of government and
    societal discrimination against the Kunama, one of nine ethnic groups
    in the country and which are concentrated primarily in the west.
    Because of the existence of a Kunama opposition group operating in
    Ethiopia and supported by the Ethiopian Government, some Kunama in
    Eritrea are suspected of supporting or having sympathies with the
    Ethiopia Government. During the fighting from May to June, Ethiopian
    forces occupied many areas inhabited by Kunamas; following the
    withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, some Kunama were accused of
    collaborating with the Ethiopian troops or of looting of property. In
    June approximately 200 Kunamas were detained without charges on
    suspicion of collaborating with the Ethiopian forces (see Section
    1.d.). There were unconfirmed reports that the Government took land
    from members of the Kunama ethnic group without compensation and gave
    it to members of other ethnic groups on the grounds that the land was
    not being efficiently exploited. There also is some societal
    discrimination against Kunamas due to the fact that Kunamas are seen,
    ethnically and culturally, as different from the majority of citizens.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Some government policies restrict
    free association or prevent the formation of unions, including within
    the civil service, the military, the police, and other essential
    services. The Ministry of Labor must grant special approval for groups
    of twenty or fewer persons seeking to form a union; the Government
    opposed the creation of a press association during the year (see
    Section 2.b.).
        Proclamation 8 of 1991 provides workers with the legal right to
    form unions and to strike to protect their interests. The National
    Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW), which was part of the EPLF
    during the war, maintains a close affiliation with the Government, and
    its leadership consists of high-ranking PFDJ members. The NCEW
    represents over 25,000 workers from 250 unions and receives some
    assistance from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and foreign
    labor organizations. The largest union within the NCEW is the Textile,
    Leather, and Shoe Federation. There were no strikes reported during the
    year.
        Unions may affiliate internationally, and all five workers'
    federations within the NCEW maintained affiliations with international
    unions during the year.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In 1993 the ILO
    began assisting the Government with a draft labor code, which prohibits
    antiunion discrimination by employers, allows groups of 20 or fewer
    workers to organize without Ministry of Labor approval, and establishes
    a new tripartite mechanism for resolving disputes; however, the code
    had not implemented by year's end. Under the new labor code, a
    tripartite board composed of workers, employers, and Ministry of Labor
    officials is to work to resolve differences. Under the labor law in
    force during the year, disputes are taken to court. During the year,
    the NCEW brought 65 cases to court, while an additional 75 NCEW cases
    remained pending or were settled through conciliation by the Ministry
    of Labor at year's end.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, there were reports that
    some Ethiopian civilian detainees were forced to perform paid farm
    labor and road repair. POW's were forced to perform labor on road-
    building projects; however, following an ICRC visit in late August, the
    POW's were no longer forced to perform such labor (see Section 1.c.).
    All citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 are required to participate
    in the National Service Program, which includes military training as
    well as civic action programs. High school students also are required
    to participate in a paid summer work program.
        The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children,
    and there were no reports that it occurred.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment is 18 years, although
    apprentices may be hired at age 14. The law also prohibits apprentices
    under 18 years of age from performing certain dangerous and abusive
    labor, such as working in mines or sewers. Labor inspectors in the
    Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare are responsible for the enforcement
    of laws pertaining to the employment of children; however, due to the
    small number of inspectors, inspections are infrequent. According to
    the Ministry of Education, only 37 to 38 percent of children attend
    school due, in part, to a shortage of schools and teachers. It is
    common for rural children who do not attend classes to work on family
    farms, fetching firewood and water, and herding livestock among other
    activities. In urban areas, some children work as street vendors of
    cigarettes, newspapers, or chewing gum. Children also work as child-
    minders, traders, and domestic accountants and in small-scale
    manufacturing. There were reports that the Government inadvertently
    employed children under the age of 18 as soldiers (see section 5).
        The Government has not yet ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor.
        The Constitution prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that
    performed by children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are two systems that
    regulate employment conditions--the civil service system and the labor
    law system. There is no legally mandated minimum wage in the private
    sector. In the civil service sector, wages vary from $34 to $400 (320
    to 3,800 nakfa) per month, with factory workers in government-owned
    enterprises earning the highest wages. The minimum wage in the civil
    service sector does not provide the average worker and family with a
    decent standard of living.
        The standard workweek is 44+ hours, but many persons work fewer
    hours. Under the Labor Law, workers are entitled to 1 day of rest per
    week, and most workers are allowed 1 to 1+ days off per week. The
    Government has instituted occupational health and safety standards, but
    inspection and enforcement vary widely among factories. Workers are
    permitted to remove themselves from dangerous work sites without
    retaliation.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that such trafficking
    occurred to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    ETHIOPIA

        Ethiopia continued its transition from a unitary to a federal
    system of government. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi leads the Government
    of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. In May the Ethiopian
    Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won general elections
    to the federal and regional parliaments. The elections were the second
    held based on an organizational concept of ethnic federalism
    incorporated into the 1994 Constitution. Most opposition political
    parties competed in the May election; however, due to lack of funds and
    often weak political organization, opposition parties contested only 20
    percent of the seats to the federal parliament. EPRDF and affiliated
    parties hold 518 seats in the 547-seat federal parliament. EPRDF and
    affiliated parties also hold all regional parliaments by large
    majorities, although opposition parties hold approximately 30 percent
    in the Addis Ababa region council and 9.5 percent in the southern
    region council. According to international and local observers, the
    elections were generally free and fair in most areas; however, serious
    election irregularities occurred in the Southern Nations and
    Nationalities Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS or southern region),
    particularly in Hadiya zone. The National Electoral Board (NEB)
    investigated complaints of the irregularities and determined that many
    of them had merit. The NEB conducted new elections in June in the
    SNNPRS, which were determined to be relatively free and fair by
    international observers, and resulted in the opposition winning 29
    seats in the federal parliament and 33 seats in the region council. The
    principal faction within the EPRDF remains Prime Minister Meles' Tigray
    Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF). Federal regions, largely organized
    along ethnic lines, increasingly are autonomous and have a large degree
    of local control over fiscal and most political issues. However, the
    relationship between the central government and local officials and
    among various judiciaries lacks consistent coordination, and
    occasionally actions are taken at the local level that conflict with
    stated federal policy. Highly centralized authority, poverty, civil
    conflict, and unfamiliarity with democratic concepts combine to
    complicate the implementation of federalism. The federal Government's
    ability to protect constitutional rights at the local level is limited
    and uneven. Local administrative, police, and judicial systems remain
    weak throughout the country. The judiciary is weak and overburdened but
    continued to show signs of independence.
        The Government's security forces consist of the military and the
    police, both of which are responsible for internal security. The
    police, which are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, report to the
    Security, Immigration, and Refugees Affairs Authority (SIRAA). The
    military consists of both air and ground forces and reports to the
    Ministry of National Defense. There was renewed fighting in May and
    June between Ethiopian and Eritrean armed forces. In June the two
    countries signed a cessation of hostilities agreement and, on December
    12, signed a formal peace treaty. In 1998 when the conflict with
    Eritrea broke out, military forces assigned to help police and local
    militia in the Gambella and Benishangul-Gomuz regions establish order,
    control banditry, and curtail rebel activities, were redeployed to
    areas bordering Eritrea. Without the military's assistance, these areas
    once again experienced a breakdown in law and order. There was
    increased internal military presence in some parts of the Somali region
    and Oromiya. Military forces conducted an increased number of low-level
    operations against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Somalia-based
    Al'Ittihad terrorist organization, and elements of the Ogaden National
    Liberation Front (ONLF) both in the country and in southern Somalia and
    northern Kenya. Some local officials and members of the security forces
    committed human rights abuses.
        The economy is based on smallholder agriculture, with more than 85
    percent of the estimated population of 63 million living in rural areas
    under very basic conditions. Agriculture accounts for approximately 80
    percent of total employment. Per capita gross national product is
    estimated at $100 per year. The real gross domestic product growth rate
    was estimated at 4.6 percent for the year. Total exports increased from
    between 2.9 and 6.9 percent over the previous year. Exports consist
    primarily of coffee, chat, hides, skins, beans, and oilseeds. Coffee
    accounted for 60 percent of the value of exports during the year, 60
    percent of the value of 1999 exports and 70 percent of 1998 exports.
    The conflict with Eritrea led to increased military spending. Military
    spending from July 1999 to July was $830 million dollars (6.8 billion
    birr). The Government continued to implement an economic reform program
    designed to stabilize the country's financial position, promote private
    sector participation in the economy, and attract foreign investment. In
    December 1999, the customs authority introduced a 10 percent surtax on
    most imports to raise funds for the military; however, the surtax was
    rescinded as of January 1.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained.
    Security forces committed a number of extrajudicial killings and at
    times beat and mistreated detainees. Prison conditions are poor.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention and prolonged pretrial detention
    remained problems. The Government continued to detain persons suspected
    of sympathizing with or being involved with the OLF. The Government
    continued to detain and deport without due process Eritreans and
    Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. Since the outbreak of the border
    conflict in May 1998, as many as 75,000 such persons have left Ethiopia
    for Eritrea; the vast majority were deported, although a small number
    left voluntarily. However, the Government stopped deporting Eritreans
    and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin after it signed the cessation of
    hostilities agreement with Eritrea in June. Another 1,200 male
    Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were being held in
    internment camps at Dedesa at year's end. Although prompted by national
    security considerations, the expulsions and detentions raised
    fundamental concerns regarding arbitrary arrest and detention, forced
    exile, the forcible separation of families, and nationality issues, as
    well as the hardships and financial losses suffered by those who were
    detained or expelled. Despite some efforts, the judiciary continued to
    lack sufficient trained staff and funds, which limited its ability to
    provide citizens the full protection provided for in the Constitution.
    During August and September, the federal courts were able to reduce the
    backlog of court cases by approximately a third. The judiciary also
    showed some signs of growing independence. The Government infringed on
    citizen's privacy rights, and the law regarding search warrants was
    ignored widely.
        The Government restricts freedom of the press and continued to
    detain or imprison members of the press; however, fewer journalists
    were detained than in previous years. Most were accused or convicted of
    inciting ethnic hatred, committing libel, or publishing false
    information in violation of the 1992 Press Law. Journalists continued
    to practice self-censorship. The Government at times restricted freedom
    of assembly. The Government limits freedom of association and, while
    the non-governmental organization (NGO) registration process continued
    to improve, the Government continued to refuse to register some NGO's.
    In July legislation to create a constitutionally mandated Human Rights
    Commission and office of the ombudsman, which was passed in October
    1999, entered into force; however, neither entity was operational at
    year's end. The Government generally respected freedom of religion;
    however, on occasion local authorities infringed on this right. The
    Government restricted freedom of movement. The border conflict with
    Eritrea displaced a large number of persons internally; however,
    approximately half of the internally displaced persons (IDP's) were
    able to return home by year's end.
        Violence and societal discrimination against women, and abuse of
    children remained problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is
    widespread. The Government supported efforts to eliminate FGM and other
    harmful traditional practices. The exploitation of children for
    economic and sexual purposes remained a problem. Societal
    discrimination against disabled persons was a problem. Discrimination
    against religious and ethnic minorities continued. Child labor,
    particularly in the informal sector, continued to be a problem. Forced
    labor, including forced child labor, was also a problem, and there were
    reports of trafficking in persons.
        The Government's Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) continued
    conducting the trials of persons accused of committing crimes under the
    brutal Marxist regime (1974-91) of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.
    Charges have been brought against 5,198 persons. All have been indicted
    and arraigned, and the testimony of victims continued to be heard in
    open court. However, more than half of those accused are not in custody
    and were charged in absentia. Most SPO detainees have been held in
    custody for 7 or 8 years awaiting trial and judgment.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The security forces
    committed a number of extrajudicial killings, including alleged
    political killings. In February in Soro, police tortured and killed two
    farmers--supporters of the opposition--while they were in police
    custody; the farmers allegedly were arrested for the non-payment of
    taxes (see Sections 1.d. and 3). No action was taken against the police
    by year's end. In March in Ambo, police killed a student, Getu Driba,
    injured 6 others, and detained over 1,000 students and 3 teachers after
    a demonstration (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). There was a
    credible report that in March security forces killed a student who was
    attempting to assist another person being arrested for the non-payment
    of taxes (see Section 1.d.). In April in Dembi Dolo, police killed a
    student during a student demonstration in support of detained Ambo
    students and teachers (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). In May in the
    SNNPRS region, Hadiya zone, security forces killed two women while they
    were voting, allegedly because they refused to mark their ballots for
    an EPRDF candidate (see Section 3). An election observer who saw the
    bodies stated that the women were shot in the face. A government
    investigation into the killings was conducted during the year; however,
    no results were released or further action taken in the matter by
    year's end. Also in May, according to Beyene Petros, the chairman of
    the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), police
    killed seven SEPDC supporters who were protesting outside two polling
    stations in the south (see Section 3). In December in Awassa, riot
    police shot and killed a student in a demonstration (see Section 2.a.
    and 2.b.). In December police reportedly beat to death a man detained
    allegedly in retaliation for election activities (see Section 1.c.).
    There also were numerous unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings
    by government security forces from Oromiya and the Somali region.
        There were some reports that Ethiopian troops in Somalia killed
    some civilians during the year. For example, on September 23,
    approximately 30 Ethiopian soldiers attacked Haji Salah village in
    Somaliland, killed two persons, and confiscated radio equipment.
    Somaliland President Egal wrote a letter to the Ethiopian Government
    and asked for an explanation for the attack.
        The Government provided financial support to a coalition of
    Eritrean opposition groups based in Sudan, which were reported to have
    laid landmines in Eritrea that resulted in several civilian deaths.
        In late November, armed men reportedly from Ethiopia killed nine
    persons and seriously injured five others in the town of Moyale near
    the Kenyan border. Local politicians claimed that the attackers had
    support from Ethiopian security forces; the incident was not resolved
    by year's end.
        There were some deaths in prison during the year due to illness and
    disease (see Section 1.c.).
        In November 1999, student protests against the arrest of two
    teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections
    of the SNNPRS led to widespread demonstrations and riots (see Sections
    1.d. and 5). Special police units called in to suppress the riot killed
    up to 10 persons and injured hundreds of others. The Government
    conducted an investigation into the incident but had not released a
    report by year's end.
        There was no action taken or investigation into reports that in
    August 1999 security forces fired on a group of Somalis who were
    protesting the military's occupation of a Somali border town, killing
    two persons.
        In June 1999, a youth attending the funeral of All Amhara People's
    Organization (AAPO) founder Dr. Asrat Woldeyes was shot and killed by
    an undercover security officer who subsequently was arrested and
    charged for the crime. No further action was taken in the case by
    year's end.
        In 1997 the Federal High Court in Addis Ababa began the arraignment
    and prosecution of 5,198 persons formally charged with genocide and
    other war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, under the previous
    regime (see Section 1.e.). Of the 5,198 persons charged, 2,246 were
    detained, while the remaining 2,952 were charged in absentia. At year's
    end, witnesses still were being heard and evidence taken in the ongoing
    trials. During the year, the Government acquitted and released a number
    of prisoners for lack of evidence. In November 1999, the Federal High
    Court handed down a death sentence in absentia to Getachew Tekeba, a
    former district governor and army lieutenant. Tekeba was convicted of
    ordering the detention, torture, and execution of five alleged
    opponents of the Mengistu Government. Tekeba's whereabouts remained
    unknown at year's end. In November the Federal High Court sentenced
    Colonel Sileshi Mekuria to life imprisonment for killings he committed
    while he was head of the palace guards under Mengistu. The Federal High
    Court also sentenced three former palace guards to 15 years'
    imprisonment.
        During the year, the Ethiopian army reportedly laid landmines in
    the Eritrean territories that it occupied. During the year, there were
    approximately 48 reported casualties in Eritrea, including a number of
    deaths, from landmines and unexploded ordnances; however, in addition
    to the landmines laid by Ethiopia during the conflict, Ethiopian forces
    also laid landmines during the Eritrean war for independence, and
    landmines were laid during the year by an armed group opposed to the
    Eritrean government. It was not clear which landmines in particular
    were responsible for the casualties. During the year, Eritrean forces
    also laid landmines as they withdrew from occupied territories;
    approximately 100 Ethiopian civilians were killed in landmine
    explosions from landmines laid by Eritrea.
        The OLF and the ONLF regularly used landmines, which resulted in
    numerous civilian deaths and injuries (see Section 1.c.). Explosions by
    landmines laid by the OLF and the ONLF were estimated to have killed 2
    to 5 persons per month during the year. The OLF has claimed
    responsibility for several landmine explosions along the railroad line
    from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, which resulted in between 5 and 15
    civilian deaths; OLF responsibility could not be confirmed. For
    example, during the summer, a freight train was derailed by a landmine
    explosion near Nazareth; two persons died and several were injured.
    Observers believe the landmines were laid by the OLF.
        Preelection and postelection violence resulted in some deaths (see
    Section 3). For example, on election day, three persons were killed
    when an EPRDF member threw a grenade into the home of an opposition
    party election observer while the observer was in his residence,
    killing him. In August in the Somali region, nine people, including
    five election observers, one opposition candidate, and three other
    passengers, were killed when the cars they in which they were riding
    were struck by either rockets or landmines. The identity of the
    perpetrators remained unknown at year's end.
        Banditry remained a serious problem in parts of the country.
    Bandits, often heavily armed, killed civilians during robberies and
    attempted robberies. Most evidence suggests that their motives
    primarily were economic.
        Ethnic clashes during the year resulted in a number of deaths (see
    Section 5). The drought has exacerbated tensions between the Oromo
    Borena community and ethnic-Somali Garre pastoralists in the south, and
    reportedly at least 150 people have been killed in clashes between the
    two communities during the year (see Section 5).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of
    disappearances perpetrated by the Government; however, there have been
    some unconfirmed reports of politically motivated disappearances.
        In 1997 the federal High Court in Addis Ababa began the arraignment
    and prosecution of 5,198 persons charged with genocide and other war
    crimes under the previous regime, including the disappearance of 14,209
    persons (see Section 1.a.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and
    mistreatment; however, there were credible reports that security
    officials sometimes beat or mistreated detainees. Government media
    published occasional reports of officials who were jailed or dismissed
    for abuse of authority and violations of human rights. In the fall,
    police reportedly beat a man who was detained allegedly in retaliation
    for election activities; he was beaten so severely that he sustained
    permanent damage. In December police reportedly beat another man to
    death who was detained for similar reasons (see Section 1.a.)
        In March in Ambo, police injured 6 students who were hospitalized
    for their injuries, killed a student, and detained over 1,000 students
    and 3 teachers after a demonstration (see Section 1.d. and 2.b.).
        In November 1999, student protests against the arrest of two
    teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections
    of the SNNPRS led to widespread demonstrations and riots (see Sections
    1.d. and 5). Special police units called in to suppress the riot
    injured hundreds of the demonstrators and killed up to 10 persons. The
    results of a government investigation into the incident were not
    released by year's end.
        Preelection and postelection violence resulted in some injuries and
    deaths (see Sections 1.a and 3).
        The OLF and the ONLF regularly used landmines, which resulted in
    numerous injuries and deaths (see Section 1.a). For example, there was
    a report that a landmine explosion injured a nurse and driver working
    on the National Polio Immunization Campaign. Landmine explosions
    derailed cargo and passenger trains on occasion during the year. For
    example, during the summer, a freight train was derailed by a landmine
    explosion near Nazareth; two persons died and several were injured (see
    Section 1.a.). Observers believe the landmines were laid by the OLF.
        Ethnic clashes throughout the year resulted in numerous injuries
    and the deaths of hundreds of persons (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        Prison conditions are poor, and overcrowding remains a serious
    problem. Prisoners often are allocated fewer than 21.5 square feet of
    sleeping space in a room that may contain up to 200 persons. Prison
    food is inadequate, and many prisoners have food delivered to them
    every day by family members or use their own funds to purchase food
    from local vendors. Prison conditions are unsanitary, and access to
    medical care is not reliable. There were some deaths in prison during
    the year due to illness and disease. Prisoners typically are permitted
    daily access to prison yards, which often include working farms,
    mechanical shops, and rudimentary libraries. Visitors are permitted.
    Prison letters all must be written in Amharic, making outside contact
    difficult for non-Amharic speakers; however, this restriction is not
    enforced. Female prisoners are housed separately from men, and rape
    does not appear to be a problem; however, there was a report in
    September that a guard raped a female prisoner. The guard was arrested
    in September and remained in detention pending a trial at year's end.
        Approximately 2,000 Eritrean soldiers were captured as a result of
    fighting conducted during May and June. These prisoners of war (POW's)
    have been interned in camps in Tigray region, in addition to those
    captured during earlier combat and imprisoned in a camp at Dedesa. In
    June 1999, approximately 1,200 internees of Eritrean origin and 172
    POW's were moved from the Bilate detention camp to the Dedesa
    internment camp in western Oromiya. The new camp is in an area less
    prone to malaria. Conditions in the camp are Spartan, but there are
    adequate housing, food, water and sanitation facilities. In July 1999,
    approximately 350 Eritrean POW's were moved from the Tigray region to
    the Dedesa internment camp. Following the signing of a formal peace
    treaty on December 12, the Government repatriated 359 severely wounded
    or ill POW's to Eritrea.
        The Government permits independent monitoring of prison conditions
    and police stations by the International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC) and by diplomatic missions. The ICRC generally had access to
    federal and regional prisons, civilian detention facilities, and police
    stations throughout the country; in May the Government granted the ICRC
    access to the Central Investigation Division (CID) detention facility
    in Addis Ababa, which holds upwards of 200 persons whose cases are
    under investigation. The ICRC had access to the Tatek military
    detention facility in the east but not to other military detention
    facilities where suspected OLF fighters are held. Unlike in the
    previous year, the ICRC was permitted access once in June to all 29
    police stations in Addis Ababa where it identified and registered three
    individuals of Eritrean origin. The Government generally permitted the
    ICRC access to detention facilities holding Eritrean POW's, including
    the main camp at Dedesa. The ICRC also regularly visited civilian
    Eritrean nationals and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin detained on
    national security grounds.
        Government authorities continued to permit diplomats to visit
    prominent detainees held by the SPO for alleged involvement in war
    crimes and terrorist activities. These detainees include the former
    housing ministry official and governor of Sidamo under Mengistu, Abera
    Yemane-Ab, 1968 Olympic marathon winner Mamo Wolde, and former Addis
    Ababa university president Dr. Alemayehu Tefera. Ethiopian Teachers
    Association (ETA) president Dr. Taye Woldesemayat, now serving a 15-
    year sentence for plotting violent insurrection, also is permitted
    visitors from the diplomatic community. However, although a delegation
    from the international NGO Education International had received visas
    to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in prison, they were turned back upon arrival
    at Addis Ababa airport in June (see Section 6.a.). A second delegation
    from Education International attempted to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in
    December; however, all but one of the delegation members were denied
    visas (see Section 6.a.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and
    both the criminal and civil codes prohibit arbitrary arrest and
    detention; however, the Government does not always respect these rights
    in practice.
        Under the criminal procedure code, any person detained must be
    charged and informed of the charges within 48 hours and, in most cases,
    be offered release on bail. Those persons believed to have committed
    serious offenses may be detained for 15 days while police conduct an
    investigation, and for additional 15-day periods while the
    investigation continues. Some offenses, such as murder and treason, are
    not bailable. In practice and especially in the outlying regions,
    authorities regularly detain persons without a warrant, do not charge
    them within 48 hours, and--if persons are released on bail--never
    recall them to court. Thousands of criminal suspects remained in
    detention without charge; most were accused of involvement in OLF
    terrorist activities. Often these lengthy detentions are due to the
    severe shortage and limited training of judges, prosecutors, and
    attorneys.
        Federal and regional authorities arrested and detained persons
    without charge or trial for activities allegedly in support of armed
    opposition groups. The vast majority of these incidents took place in
    the Oromiya and Somali regional states. Approximately 7,500 persons
    allegedly associated with armed opposition groups remained in detention
    at year's end. Most detainees were accused of participating in armed
    actions by the OLF or the ONLF. In typical cases, security forces
    arrested and held these persons incommunicado for several days or weeks
    before eventually releasing them.
        In August Dr. Moga Frissa, vice president of Mecha-Tulema, an Oromo
    civic organization, was arrested on charges of involvement with the
    OLF. The police and prosecutor charged Moga with subversion and
    aligning with a terrorist organization; however, the judge in this case
    did not accept the charges and ordered Moga released. Dr. Moga was
    released on September 24.
        There were reports that in June, soldiers arrested 200 persons in
    Malka Jabdu near the site of a landmine explosion that derailed a train
    in May (see Section 1.c.). The individuals arrested were mostly OLF or
    suspected OLF members.
        In February in Soro, police tortured and killed two farmers--
    supporters of the opposition--while they were in police custody (see
    Sections 1.a. and 3).
        In March in Ambo, police detained over 1,000 students and 3
    teachers, injured 6 students, and killed a student after a
    demonstration (see Section 1.c. and 2.b.). Most of the students were
    released after questioning, and all of the students and teachers were
    released by year's end.
        In December ethnic tensions between Oromo and Tigrayan students at
    Addis Ababa University led to some fighting and vandalism, and
    authorities arrested some Oromo students (see Section 5). The Oromo
    students claim that the arrests were out of proportion to their
    involvement in the fighting.
        In August authorities arrested the official driver of the Eritrean
    Embassy. He remained in detention at year's end; however, no further
    information on his case was available.
        There were credible reports that local authorities in the Oromiya,
    Amhara, and southern regions periodically arrested and detained
    supporters of opposition parties in the period prior to and following
    the May elections (see Section 3). For example, approximately 500
    Hadiya Nation Democratic Organization (HNDO) supporters were detained
    by the police ostensibly on charges of non-payment of taxes and
    fertilizer loans; most were released just prior to the May elections.
    There was a credible report that in March security forces killed a
    student who was attempting to assist another person being arrested for
    the non-payment of taxes (see Section 1.a.). Representatives of the
    SEPDC alleged in July that authorities in the southern region detained
    hundreds of SEPDC supporters in retaliation for voting for the
    opposition in the May elections (see Section 3). Some of those detained
    were released, some were released after paying a fine, and some
    remained in detention at year's end.
        A total of three journalists were detained during the year and five
    journalists remained in detention at year's end, including four
    journalists detained in 1997, and one journalist sentenced to a 1-year
    prison term in June (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). In February a
    journalist was released after the International Federation of
    Journalists protested her continued detention despite having posted
    bail in December 1999 (see Section 2.a.). She was convicted in July of
    having violated the Press Law and was sentenced to 6 months'
    imprisonment.
        In response to attacks by armed opposition groups operating out of
    Somalia and Kenya (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.), the Ethiopian military
    has conducted operations in and around the areas bordering Somalia and
    Kenya. These operations have resulted in the capture and detention of
    hundreds of opposition fighters and their suspected supporters on both
    sides of these borders.
        In December 1999, the Government arrested 26 Nuer tribal political
    activists associated with the Gambella People's Democratic Congress
    (GPDC); the Government released 12 of the activists, and 14 remained in
    detention at year's end (see Sections 3 and 5). Some of the activists
    were arrested for inciting Nuer students in November to demonstrate for
    the use of the Nuer language in school (see Section 2.b.), while others
    were arrested on suspicion of supporting the OLF.
        In November 1999, student demonstrations against the arrests of two
    teachers in Sodo in the SNNPRS for objecting to the use of a new
    language in student textbooks led to widespread weeklong demonstrations
    and riots (see Section 5). Special police units brought in to suppress
    the demonstrations killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and
    arrested up to 1,000 others (see Sections 1.a. and 5). A former Young
    Men's Christian Association camp in Sodo was used as a temporary
    detention facility for hundreds of demonstrators. Most of those
    arrested were released by year's end; however, approximately 50 elders,
    teachers, and civil servants were charged with subversion and remained
    in detention pending trials at year's end. Bail was set for the
    detainees from between $6,060 to $12,121 (50,000 and 100,000 birr), but
    none of the detainees were able to make bail.
        In June 1999, ETA president Dr. Woldesemayat was convicted of
    treason and alleged involvement in an underground terrorist
    organization and sentenced to 15 years in jail (see Section 6.a.). In
    handing down the sentence the court referenced two alleged terrorist
    acts that had been dropped from the list of charges against Dr.
    Woldesemayat during the trial. Dr. Woldesemayat's attorney appealed the
    conviction.
        The closed trial of 65 Oromos suspected of involvement in OLF
    terrorist acts and arrested in 1997 and indicted in 1998 continued. Six
    of the defendants staged a 10-day hunger strike in May 1999 to protest
    the prison policy of keeping them in handcuffs 24 hours a day. The
    defendants are no longer kept handcuffed.
        In 1997 the SPO formally charged 128 defendants with politically
    motivated genocide dating back to the 1976 ``red terror'' (see Section
    1.e.). The SPO has the authority to arrest and interrogate anyone
    suspected of involvement in the Red Terror Campaign under Mengistu. In
    December 1998, the SPO began presenting prosecution testimony in the
    case of former Addis Ababa University president Alemayehu Tefera,
    imprisoned since 1993, although the charges on which he originally had
    been detained were dropped the same year. His petition to separate his
    case from the 127 other defendants was denied (see Section 1.a.). The
    court also started hearing testimony in December 1998 on the case of
    former Olympic marathon champion Mamo Wolde, who was charged with
    genocide for the state-sponsored killing of 14 teenagers during the
    prior regime. Wolde has been detained since 1992. Both trials were
    ongoing at year's end. During the year, the Government freed a number
    of SPO prisoners for lack of evidence.
        Opposition groups allege that some of the persons detained by the
    SPO are held for political reasons. The Government denies that it holds
    persons for political reasons.
        Some civilian residents of Eritrean origin have been detained since
    the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The
    Government justified these detentions on grounds of security.
    Approximately 1,200 civilian residents of Eritrean origin remained
    detained in the internment camps at Dedesa at year's end (see Section
    1.c). The ICRC was conducting interviews with the detainees at year's
    end to determine their willingness to be repatriated to Eritrea;
    repatriations for those willing are scheduled to occur in early 2001.
    There were credible reports that hundreds of other detainees of
    Eritrean origin were held in police stations for months prior to being
    deported in 1999. In June for the first time, the ICRC was granted
    access to all 29 police stations in Addis Ababa (see Section 1.c.).
    Beginning in April 1999, authorities began releasing Eritrean civilian
    detainees if they could obtain visas to a country other than Eritrea.
    Approximately 90 detainees left Ethiopia in 1999, mostly to other
    African countries, particularly Uganda and Malawi. However, following a
    violent confrontation in August in Malawi between some former detainees
    and Malawi police, the Government reportedly decided to not let
    detainees travel to other African countries (see Section 2.d.).
        Approximately 2,000 Eritrean POW's, captured in fighting between
    Ethiopia and Eritrea, remained detained at year's end. In December 359
    severely wounded or ill POW's were repatriated to Eritrea; the
    remaining POW's are scheduled to be repatriated in early 2001 under
    ICRC supervision.
        Exile is illegal, and the Constitution provides that citizens shall
    not be deprived of their nationality against their wills; however,
    since the outbreak of conflict with Eritrea in May 1998, the Government
    has detained and deported as many as 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of
    Eritrean origin on national security grounds. Some of the deportees
    were voluntary returnees who had requested return to Eritrea; however,
    the vast majority were deported forcibly. Deportation orders originated
    from the SIRAA in Addis Ababa. The Government's actions raised serious
    issues of due process since there were no preliminary hearings to
    determine the merits of the deportations, no right to counsel was
    provided to detainees, and detainees only had a very circumscribed
    opportunity to register protests. In addition the issue of the
    nationality of Eritrean-origin Ethiopians has not been settled yet.
    Heads of households were taken without warning, detained, and often
    deported via overland routes within 48 hours. Remaining family members
    were given arbitrary deadlines to sell property and sometimes were
    subjected to departure taxes based on estimated annual income and
    unpaid balances on government bank loans. The ICRC monitored the
    deportation or repatriation of approximately 475 Eritreans or
    Ethiopians of Eritrean origin during the year; 747 were deported or
    repatriated without ICRC involvement. The Government stopped deporting
    Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin after it signed the
    cessation of hostilities agreement with Eritrea in June. Approximately
    400 Eritreans were voluntarily repatriated to Eritrea between June and
    December. In August 1999, all Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean
    origin over 18 years of age who had taken part in the 1993 referendum
    on Eritrean independence were required to register with the SIRAA and
    complete residence application forms. After registration applicants
    received identity cards and residence permits valid for 6 months (see
    Section 2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary remained weak and
    overburdened. Although the federal and regional courts continued to
    show signs of judicial independence, in practice severe shortages of
    adequately trained personnel in many regions, as well as serious
    financial constraints, combined to deny many citizens the full
    protections provided for in the Constitution.
        Consistent with the Constitution, the Government continued to
    decentralize and restructure the judiciary along federal lines with the
    establishment of courts at the district, zonal, and regional levels.
    The federal High Court and federal Supreme Court hear and adjudicate
    original and appeal cases involving federal law, transregional issues,
    and national security. The regional judiciary is increasingly
    autonomous, with district (woreda), zonal, high, and supreme courts
    mirroring the structure of the federal judiciary. In March the
    president of the federal High Court created two new three-judge benches
    at the High Court level to handle criminal cases. The Government has
    delegated some of the war crimes trials to the supreme courts in the
    regions where the crimes allegedly were committed.
        The Constitution provides legal standing to some preexisting
    religious and customary courts and gives federal and regional
    legislatures the authority to recognize other courts. By law, both
    parties to a dispute must agree before a customary or religious court
    may hear a case. Shari'a (Islamic) courts may hear religious and family
    cases involving Muslims. In addition some traditional courts still
    function. Although not sanctioned by law, these courts resolve disputes
    for the majority of citizens who live in rural areas and who generally
    have little access to formal judicial systems.
        The outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea adversely
    impacted the military justice system. Most foreign assistance to train
    officers and noncommissioned officers was suspended at the same time
    that the rapid expansion of the military greatly increased the need for
    trained military lawyers and judges.
        Regional offices of the federal Ministry of Justice monitor local
    judicial developments, and the regional courts have jurisdiction over
    both local and federal matters, but the federal judicial presence in
    the regions is limited nevertheless. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
    some local officials believe they will no longer be held accountable to
    a higher authority. For example, during the year local government
    officials in some areas ignored instructions from the National
    Electoral Board (NEB) on the acceptance of candidate endorsement
    signatures from opposition party candidates (see Section 3).
        To remedy the severe lack of experienced staff in the judicial
    system, the Government continued to identify and train lower court
    judges and prosecutors, although officials acknowledge that the pay
    scale offered does not attract the required numbers of competent
    professionals. Senior government officials charged with judicial
    oversight estimate that the creation of a truly independent and skilled
    judicial apparatus would take decades. The Government has welcomed
    foreign financial and technical assistance to accelerate this process.
    Pending the passage by regional legislatures of laws particular to
    their region, all judges are guided by the federal procedural and
    substantive codes.
        According to the Constitution, accused persons have the right to a
    public trial by an ordinary court of law within a reasonable time after
    having been charged. Accused persons have the right to be represented
    by legal counsel of their choice. However, in practice, lengthy
    pretrial detention was common, closed proceedings occurred, and at
    times, detainees were allowed little or no contact with their legal
    counsel. The public defender's office provides legal counsel to
    indigent defendants, although its scope remains severely limited,
    especially with respect to SPO trials. The law does not allow the
    defense access to prosecutorial evidence before the trial.
        The Constitution provides that persons arrested have the right to
    be released on bail. In most cases, bail is set between approximately
    $120 (1,000 birr) and approximately $1,200 (10,000 birr). Since 1999
    approximately 50 elders, teachers, and civil servants remained in
    detention pending trials at year's end because they were not able to
    make bail (see Section 5). Certain offenses such as capital crimes are
    not bailable.
        Authorities detained hundreds of persons without charge for
    supposed involvement with the OLF and the ONLF (see Section 1.d.). Such
    cases often reflect arbitrary actions on the part of local officials
    but also result from an overburdened and cumbersome judicial system
    marked by a shortage of trained and competent prosecutors and judges.
        The SPO was established in 1992 to create a historical record of
    the abuses committed during the Mengistu Government and to bring to
    justice those criminally responsible for human rights violations. The
    SPO has the authority to arrest and interrogate anyone suspected of
    involvement in the Red Terror Campaign under Mengistu. The federal High
    Court has considered the cases of 2,658 defendants accused of genocide,
    war crimes, and aggravated homicide. Trials began in 1994 and continued
    during the year; however, the process is subject to frequent and
    lengthy adjournments. Court appointed attorneys, sometimes with
    inadequate skills and experience, represent many of the defendants,
    following claims that they could not afford an adequate defense. Of the
    5,198 defendants, the Government is trying 2,952 in absentia, including
    former dictator colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who remained in exile in
    Zimbabwe. Cases were dealt with more quickly during the year; however,
    most cases still were in progress at year's end. No SPO defendant has
    been released on bail; however, at least 50 defendants were released
    for lack of evidence or acquitted. Several sentences were handed down
    during the year, including 5 death sentences, 1 life imprisonment, and
    at least 27 sentences of imprisonment of up to 15 years (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.c.). In July the special prosecutor, Girma Wakjira, was
    jailed for contempt of court after accusing one of the judges of having
    participated in abuses under Mengistu; he was released after 2 weeks.
    The judge in question was transferred to a different (criminal) court,
    and the president of the federal High Court took his place.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The law requires judicial search warrants; however,
    they seldom are obtained outside of Addis Ababa in practice. For
    example, in August Dr. Moga Frissa, vice president of an Oromo civic
    organization, was arrested without a warrant on charges of involvement
    with the OLF (see Section 1.d.).
        There were credible but unconfirmed reports that in certain rural
    areas local officials used threats of land redistribution and
    withholding of food aid and fertilizer to enforce support for the
    ruling coalition (see Section 3). There also were credible reports that
    teachers and other government workers have had their employment
    terminated if they were not of the dominant ethnic group in their
    region (see Section 5). According to the SEPDC, some SEPDC supporters
    were suspended or dismissed from their jobs in retaliation for voting
    for the opposition in the May elections (see Section 3).
        According to a few NGO's, there were reports that the Government
    had forcibly conscripted young men from eastern and southern states;
    however, repeated investigations by other international observers found
    no evidence to support these claims. Ethiopia maintains an all-
    volunteer military.
        During the fighting in May and June, Ethiopian forces looted and
    caused extensive damage to a number of Eritrean towns and villages.
    Among the properties ransacked and looted were mosques and churches,
    factories, flour mills, health clinics, pharmacies, schools,
    warehouses, bridges, and the homes of government officials.
        During the conflict with Eritrea, Eritrean and Ethiopians of
    Eritrean origin have lost their jobs, business licenses, and access to
    government services including health care facilities, and many were
    deported without due process (see Section 1.d. and 2.d.). Individuals
    often were taken without warning and at night, separated from their
    families, detained, and deported via overland routes within 48 hours.
    Remaining family members were given arbitrary deadlines to sell
    property and sometimes were subjected to departure taxes based on
    estimated annual income and unpaid balances on government bank loans
    (see Section 1.d.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the 1992
    Press Law provide for the freedom of speech and of the press; however,
    the Government used legal and other mechanisms to restrict these rights
    in practice. For example, the Government continued to prosecute
    journalists and editors for publishing articles that violated the Press
    Law. Some journalists practiced self-censorship. Nonetheless the
    private press was active and often published articles extremely
    critical of the Government.
        The Government used provisions of the Press Law concerning
    publishing false information, inciting ethnic hatred, and libel to
    justify the arrest of journalists. Three journalists were arrested
    during the year, and at year's end, five journalists remained in
    detention. Five journalists were released from detention on bail
    pending court cases during the year.
        Five journalists of the Oromo-oriented private weekly ``Urjii,''
    arrested in October and December 1997, are among the group of 65 Oromos
    indicted for involvement in OLF terrorist activities (see Section
    1.d.). Three of these journalists remained in detention at year's end,
    and their trials for Press Law violations were ongoing. In February a
    journalist with the newspaper Zegabi was released after the
    International Federation of Journalists protested her continued
    detention despite having posted bail in December 1999. In July she was
    convicted of violating the Press Law for writing an article on OLF
    activities and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. Former Urjii
    publisher and president of the Human Rights League, Garoma Bekele, who
    was sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment in 1999, completed his term in
    May but was convicted on two more press charges. He remained in prison
    at year's end, and three other Press Law charges were pending against
    him. In August Solomon Nemera, deputy editor-in-chief of Urjii, was
    convicted on three charges of violating the Press Law and sentenced to
    2 years'' imprisonment and fined approximately $1,600 (13,000 birr). A
    fourth unspecified charge was pending against him at year's end.
        In December journalist Zemedkur Mogus of the newspaper Atkurot,
    originally detained for violating the Press Law in 1998, was released
    on bail. Journalist Melasse Shine of the newspaper Ethop, arrested in
    November for violating the Press Law, reportedly was released on bail
    by year's end. Approximately 24 journalists, including Mogus and Shine,
    who obtained bail still were subject to trial for violations of the
    Press Law at year's end.
        In December 1999, Aberra Wegi, deputy editor-in-chief of Maebel was
    sentenced to 1-year's imprisonment on charges of publishing false
    information in a story about the TPLF killing captured government
    soldiers during the fight against the Derg regime. He was released in
    February without completing his sentence. In January Tesehalene
    Mengesha, deputy editor-in-chief of Zegabi, was sentenced to 6-months''
    imprisonment on charges of violating the Press Law. She had been
    arrested and released in February on bail of approximately $250 (2000
    birr).
        In June Tewodros Kassa, editor-in-chief of Ethiopia, was sentenced
    to 1-year's imprisonment or a penalty fine of approximately $1,800
    (15,000 birr) on charges of publishing fabricated news in a story about
    the disappearance of an OLF member.
        In January Mekonnen Worku, deputy editor-in-chief of Maebel,
    committed suicide by hanging himself in his home. The Ethiopian Free
    Press Journalists Association (EFPJA) released a statement claiming
    that Worku killed himself because of depression and frustration due to
    police surveillance. Mekonnen had been detained several times, and new
    charges were brought against him 3 weeks before his death.
        At year's end, 27 journalists remained abroad in self-imposed exile
    rather than face Press Law charges upon returning. In June Dawit
    Kebede, editor-in-chief of Fiameta (now defunct), who had 12 press
    charges pending in court, fled the country. In December Israel Seboka,
    the editor-in-chief of Seife Nebelbal newspaper, and Samson Seyoum
    Kebede, the former editor of GOH, fled the country. In 1999 Seyoum had
    been convicted on charges of incitement to war and attempting to spread
    Islamic fundamentalism; he was sentenced to 4+ years'' imprisonment but
    was released pending an appeal of his conviction. Six charges were
    pending against Seboka in court, and he had posted bail on two other
    charges.
        Despite the constant threat of legal action, the private press
    remained active. Many private newspapers continued to publish
    inaccurate information, unsubstantiated stories, and harsh
    antigovernment articles without any official sanction. The Government
    has not banned any newspaper or publication. The office of the
    Government spokesperson was created in 1998 as a temporary entity
    responsible for distributing press releases on the border conflict with
    Eritrea to the Ethiopian news agency, foreign news agencies, foreign
    embassies, and international organizations. The Government continued to
    bar some private newspapers and news organizations from attending
    government briefings and press conferences, and most government
    officials still refuse to meet with private journalists.
        On March 13, after a 7-year wait, EFPJA, which consists of about 80
    members from the private press, was registered as a professional
    association with the Ministry of Justice (see Section 2.b.).
        Although most independent newspapers have supported the
    Government's position on the conflict with Eritrea, the private press
    remained confrontational and continued to publish articles extremely
    critical of the Government and continued to report on human rights
    abuses.
        According to the Constitution, citizens generally are free to
    discuss publicly any topic they choose; however, on occasion the
    Government restricted this right in practice. The Government opposed
    the activities and operations of groups critical of the Government such
    as the ETA and the HRL (see Sections 2.b. and 4). Nevertheless several
    groups critical of the Government held press conferences and public
    meetings without retribution. Prior to the national elections in May, a
    series of political debates conducted in Addis Ababa and in regional
    towns between the EPRDF and opposition political parties were broadcast
    over national television; opposition candidates and members of
    opposition parties voiced sharp criticism of the EPRDF and its policies
    during the debates.
        There are approximately 30 independent political Amharic language
    weekly newspapers and 6 independent English language weekly newspapers
    with an estimated total circulation of approximately 160,000. There are
    5 EPRDF coalition party newspapers, published in Amharic, Tigrigna, and
    Oromiffa languages, with a total circulation of 120,000. In September
    the English thrice-weekly The Monitor began publishing on a daily
    basis, and the first independent daily in Amharic, Addis Daily, began
    publishing.
        Nearly all private newspapers as well as state newspapers are
    printed at one of the state-owned printing presses. In late July, the
    only two printing presses equipped to print tabloids, including the
    major state-run Berhanena Selam printing press, raised printing costs,
    because of an increase in the price of pulp and paper in the world
    market. The majority of private Amharic-language newspapers that are
    members of EFPJA temporarily stopped publication between September 11
    and 18 to protest unsuccessfully against the rise in printing costs.
        The Ministry of Information and Culture requires that newspapers
    show a bank balance of approximately $1,250 (10,000 birr) at the time
    of their annual registration for a license. Some of the newspapers that
    were shut down by the Government for failing to show sufficient bank
    assets began publishing again during the year under different names and
    with new licenses.
        While much of the private press continues to lack professionalism
    in its reporting, some print media are developing into more responsible
    publications. Others actually are opposition newsletters that often
    purvey unsubstantiated criticism of the Government. Several are tied to
    distinct ethnic groups, especially the Amharas and Oromos, and severely
    criticize the Government for being ethnocentric. Newspapers critical of
    government leaders and their policies are available widely in the
    capital but scarce elsewhere.
        Foreign journalists continued to operate freely and often wrote
    articles critical of government policies. They or their local
    affiliates were granted greater access to government officials than
    were local independent journalists. A number of foreign journalists
    were allowed to go to the war front under restricted circumstances.
    About 10 Ethiopian affiliates of foreign news agencies also were
    permitted to go to the war front in June and July to visit liberated
    areas and Eritrean POW's (see Section 1.c.). Local journalists
    representing privately-owned newspapers were denied access to the war
    front.
        Radio remains the most influential medium for reaching citizens,
    especially those who live in rural areas. The Press Law allows for
    private radio stations, but there are no truly independent radio
    stations. Two nongovernmental stations, Radio Fana, a station
    controlled by the ruling EPRDF coalition, and the Tigray People's
    Liberation Front (TPLF) radio, which broadcasts in the Tigrigna
    language from Mekele, have close ties to the Government. In June the
    state-run Radio Ethiopia began broadcasting news and music on a new 18-
    hour channel. Broadcasting time is sold to private groups and to
    individuals who want to buy spots for programs and commercials. The
    Government operates the sole television station, and news is controlled
    tightly. In September the state-run ETV started a new entertainment
    channel, ``TV Africa,'' contracted from a South African company.
    However, there are no restrictions on access to international news
    broadcasts. Ownership of private satellite receiving dishes and the
    importation of facsimile machines and modems are permitted. Internet
    access is provided through the government-controlled telecommunications
    company, which maintained a waiting list for new accounts. At the
    beginning of the year, access was restricted to existing lines while
    the Government expanded capacity; however, by year's end, new accounts
    were being issued. The Government issued further regulations for
    licensing private Internet service providers; however, no private
    Internet service providers were operating at year's end. Private
    satellite transmission uplinks generally are not allowed.
        In 1999 the Government issued a broadcast proclamation creating a
    broadcasting authority to review applications for private radio and
    television licenses; however, the authority had not been established by
    year's end. The broadcast proclamation prohibits political parties and
    religious organizations from owning stations; foreign ownership also is
    prohibited. Private entities that would like to be broadcasters claim
    that the delay in implementing the broadcast law is deliberate.
        The official media, including broadcast, wire service, and print
    media, legally are autonomous and responsible for their own management
    and partial revenue generation, although they continue to receive
    government subsidies. Government reporters practice self-censorship.
    The Government's press and information department acts as an official
    spokesperson and implemented the 1996 information policy, which guides
    contacts among the Government, the press, and the public.
        The Government generally respects academic freedom; however, in
    general, political activity is not encouraged on university campuses.
    In addition the Government requires that it appoint all deans and the
    Presidents at all eight public universities. The Ministry of Education
    has approved the charter for the country's first private university,
    Unity College, which began to offer a bachelor's degree program in
    September 1999. In May Unity College began offering a 2-year diploma
    course in journalism and communication.
        In July SEPDC representatives alleged that some teachers in the
    southern region who served as SEPDC election observers were subject to
    retaliation by local authorities (see Section 3); teachers reported
    that they were not able to collect their salaries and that they were
    denied entry to summer update courses.
        On a few occasions, police killed and injured some students during
    student demonstrations during the year (see Section 1.a., 1.c., 1.d.
    and 2.b.). For example, in December in Awassa, riot police shot and
    killed a student who was participating in a demonstration over
    inadequate school services (see Section 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, on occasion the
    Government restricted this right in practice. Organizers of large
    public meetings or demonstrations must notify the Government in advance
    and obtain a permit. While there were no reports that any permits were
    denied, there were long unexplained delays in issuing permits, which
    hindered the ability of groups to organize events. EHRCO and some
    opposition political parties reported that they had difficulties
    renting halls from local government officials. The ETA was not
    permitted to organize seminars in the regions, despite Ministry of
    Education assurances in 1998 that it would be allowed to do so.
        In March in Ambo, after a group of students demonstrated to protest
    the Government's refusal to fund and send them to fight forest fires in
    Bale zone, police killed a student, injured 6 students who were
    hospitalized, and detained over 1,000 other students and 3 teachers.
    Most of the students were released after questioning and all of the
    students and teachers were released by year's end. In April in Dembi
    Dolo, police killed a student during a student demonstration in support
    of detained Ambo students and teachers. In December in Awassa, riot
    police shot and killed a student who was participating in a
    demonstration over inadequate school services.
        In November 1999, student demonstrations against the arrest of two
    teachers who criticized new textbooks in the Welayita speaking sections
    of the SNNPRS led to widespread demonstrations and riots during which
    police killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and arrested and
    detained as many as 1,000 others (see Sections 1.d. and 5). Most of
    those arrested were released by year's end; however, approximately 50
    elders, teachers, and civil servants were charged with subversion and
    remained in detention pending trials at year's end.
        In November 1999, Nuer students in the Gambella region demonstrated
    for the use of the Nuer language in schools (see Section 5). In
    December 1999, the Government arrested up to 26 Nuer tribal political
    activists and leaders associated with the GPDC on charges of inciting
    the Nuer students to demonstrate (see Sections 1.d. and 5.). Twelve
    were released on bail in 1999, and 14 remained in detention at year's
    end.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the right
    to engage in unrestricted peaceful political activity; however, the
    Government limited this right in practice. The Government changed its
    procedures for registration of NGO's in 1996, which improved the NGO
    registration process significantly; however, a number of policy issues
    regarding NGO's remain unresolved, and the NGO registration process
    still was extremely slow. Primary registration rests with the Ministry
    of Justice. In March after a 7-year wait, the EFPJA, which consists of
    80 members from the private press, obtained a certificate of legal
    recognition as a professional association in March from the Ministry of
    Justice. The Ministry of Justice recognizes the Ethiopia Journalists'
    Association, which represents journalists working for government-owned
    media.
        Authorities closed the offices of the HRL in April 1998, on the
    grounds that some HRL board members wished to use the organization as a
    front for the OLF. Board members denied any connection to the OLF. The
    HRL had been operating without a license; however, it had fulfilled the
    prerequisites for licensing and has been waiting 3 years to get a
    license (see Section 4). The Government investigation of the HRL was
    ongoing at year's end, and the contents of its office, confiscated by
    the Government in 1998, have not been returned.
        The Government requires political parties to register with the NEB.
    Parties that do not participate in two consecutive national elections
    are subject to deregistration. Registered political parties also must
    receive permission from regional governments to open local offices. The
    opposition AAPO complained that in 1999 the Oromiya region government
    refused its application to open branch offices in the region. There are
    58 organized political parties; eight are national parties, and the
    remainder operate only in limited areas.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, on occasion local authorities infringed on this right.
        The Government requires that religious groups be registered.
    Religious institutions, like NGO's, are registered with the Ministry of
    Justice and must renew their registration every year. Unlike NGO's,
    religious groups are not subject to a rigorous registration process.
    Two religious organizations reportedly have refused to comply with the
    Government requirement that they register, without consequence. Under
    current law, a religious organization that undertakes development
    activities must register its development wing separately as an NGO. The
    Government does not issue work visas to foreign religious workers
    unless they are attached to the development wing of a religious
    organization. Religious groups are not accorded duty-free status;
    however, with the exception of Jehovah's Witnesses, they are given free
    government land for churches, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries.
    Religious groups, like private individuals or businesses, must apply to
    regional and local governments for land allocation. An interfaith
    effort was underway at year's end to promote revision of the law in
    order for religious organizations to obtain duty-free status.
        There are more than 6,000 members of Jehovah's Witnesses in the
    country. The Government continued its policy of not deporting members
    of Jehovah's Witnesses of Eritrean origin, who might face religious
    repression in Eritrea.
        Evangelical leaders have complained of strict regulations on the
    importation of bibles, as well as heavy customs duty on bibles and
    other religious articles; however, bibles and religious articles are
    subject to the same customs duty as are all imported books and most
    imported items.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no complaints from Muslim
    leaders that public school authorities sometimes interfered with their
    free practice of Islam.
        In December Samson Seyoum Kebede, the former editor of GOH, fled
    the country. In 1999 Seyoum was convicted on charges of incitement to
    war and attempting to spread Islamic fundamentalism; he was sentenced
    to 4+ years'' imprisonment, but was released pending an appeal of his
    conviction (see Section 2.a.). Under the Press Law, it is a crime to
    incite one religion against another.
        The Government has interpreted the constitutional provision for the
    separation of church and state to mean that religious instruction is
    not permitted in schools, whether public or private. Catholic,
    Orthodox, evangelical and Muslim-owned and operated schools are not
    permitted to teach religion as a course of study. Most private schools
    teach a morals course as part of the school's curriculum, and the
    Government Education Bureau in Addis Ababa has complained that such
    courses are not free of religious influence. Churches are permitted to
    have Sunday schools, the Koran is taught at mosques, and public schools
    permit the formation of clubs, including those of a religious nature.
        Protestant groups occasionally complained that local officials
    discriminate against them when seeking land for churches and
    cemeteries. Evangelical leaders complain that, because they are
    perceived as ``newcomers,'' they remain at a disadvantage compared with
    the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Supreme Islamic Council when it
    comes to the allocation of land.
        While some Pentecostals and evangelicals complained in past years
    that the police failed to protect them adequately during instances of
    interreligious conflict (see Section 5), there were no complaints of
    inadequate police protection during the year. In most interreligious
    disputes, the Government maintains neutrality and tries to be an
    impartial arbitrator. Some religious leaders have requested the
    establishment of a federal institution to deal with religious groups.
    The Government considered the request but had taken no action to
    establish such a federal institution by year's end.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement, including the right of travel, emigration, and repatriation;
    however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. Some AAPO
    codefendants, convicted in 1998 on charges of treason, completed their
    prison sentences in 1998 and 1999 but have not been permitted to leave
    the country. In May the Government denied entry visas to a Norwegian
    human rights group that wanted to monitor the elections (see Section
    3); they were granted visas when they changed the purpose of their trip
    to academic research.
        In principle citizens can freely change their residence or
    workplace; however, since the outbreak of the border conflict with
    Eritrea in May 1998, Eritreans and Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean
    origin were subjected to detention and deportation to Eritrea. By
    year's end, as many as 75,000 persons had been compelled to leave
    Ethiopia for Eritrea or had left under adverse conditions since 1998;
    the vast majority were deported, although a small number left the
    country voluntarily to join family members who were deported without
    due process (see Section 1.d.). The Government stopped deporting
    Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin after it signed the
    cessation of hostilities agreement with Eritrea in June. It is
    estimated that more than 200,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean
    origin remain in Ethiopia. In 1999 the Government decreed that all
    Eritreans 18 years of age and above residing in Ethiopia, who either
    had taken part in the 1993 referendum on the independence of Eritrea
    from Ethiopia or who had been granted Eritrean citizenship, had to
    register as aliens with the SIRAA. Those registering would be issued an
    identity card and given a 6-month residence permit, which was allowed
    to expire. However, the residence permits did not give individuals
    access to hospitals or other public services. The Ethiopian passports
    of residents of Eritrean origin routinely were confiscated or
    restricted in use for a single exit and no reentry.
        Beginning in April 1999, the Government adopted a policy of
    releasing those Eritrean detainees from the Bilate and Dedesa
    internment camps who could obtain visas to a country other than
    Eritrea. Approximately 90 detainees took advantage of this opportunity,
    with most going to African countries, particularly Uganda and Malawi.
    However, following an incident in August 1999, in which 25 detainees
    obtained fraudulent Malawian visas, traveled to Malawi with government-
    issued laissez-passers and were returned forcibly to Ethiopia after a
    violent confrontation with Malawi police in which one former detainee
    was killed and at least six others were injured, the Government
    reportedly decided not to permit detainees to depart for other
    countries in Africa.
        The law requires citizens and residents to obtain an exit visa
    before departing the country. Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean
    origin have been able to obtain exit visas but often are not permitted
    to return to the country.
        In Addis Ababa and western Gondar in the Amhara region there are
    very small concentrations of Ethiopian Jews (Falashas) and those who
    claim that their ancestors were forced to convert from Judaism to
    Ethiopian Orthodoxy (Feles Mora). Approximately 3,000 Feles Mora
    migrated voluntarily from the western Amhara region to Addis Ababa in
    1991 at the time of ``Operation Solomon,'' when a large number of
    Falashas were airlifted to Israel. The Feles Mora also seek to
    immigrate to Israel. The number of Feles Mora in the country is
    approximately 26,000. Israeli officials evaluate the Feles Mora
    immigration claims on a case-by-case basis and estimate that by year's
    end approximately 100 individuals were immigrating to Israel under the
    law of return each week. All of the eligible Falashas from Ethiopia had
    immigrated to Israel by December 1999.
        During the year, more than 25,000 Ethiopians were deported or
    repatriated from Eritrea to Ethiopia. These deportees and returnees
    were initially housed in camps in Adwa and possibly Adrigrat for a few
    days, before returning to their homes and families.
        As a result of the conflict with Eritrea, approximately 343,000
    persons have been displaced internally. The Government has presented
    relief and rehabilitation proposals for these internally displaced
    persons (IDP's) to bilateral donors and NGO's. By year's end, the
    Government, with international assistance, returned at least half of
    the IDP's to their homes and granted other assistance, including food
    and money, to the remaining IDP's.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
    Government generally treats asylum seekers fairly and cooperates with
    the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees and returning citizens.
        Ethiopia hosts approximately 300,000 refugees; most are from
    Somalia and Sudan. The Government in cooperation with the UNHCR
    continues to provide first asylum to refugees from Sudan and Somalia.
    Along the border of northwest Somalia, 195,345 Somali refugees were
    resident in 8 camps at year's end, down from 600,000 Somali refugees in
    1996. Along the Sudanese border approximately 60,000 Sudanese refugees
    were resident in 4 refugee camps around Gambella and Asossa at year's
    end. Approximately 80 percent of the Sudanese refugees are women and
    children. There are approximately 1,500 Djiboutian Afar asylum-seekers
    remaining in the country, down from a high of 18,000 when Djiboutian
    Afars first entered the country in 1993. By year's end, the UNHCR was
    able to register most Djiboutian Afars in the country, including 1,503
    Djiboutian Afars in the area of Assaita, and 57 in other parts of the
    country. The Afar claim that the Government arbitrarily reduced the
    estimated number of Afar refugees in the country without evidence that
    any refugees had actually left the country. These asylum seekers have
    requested, but never have been granted, formal registration by the
    Ethiopian Agency for Refugee and Resettlement Affairs (ARRA).
    Negotiations began in 1997 between the Government and the UNHCR
    concerning their status and were ongoing at year's end. ARRA conducted
    an informal registration of Djiboutian Afars in May 1999 without UNHCR
    involvement.
        In November the Governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, with UNHCR
    facilitation, began a second effort to repatriate approximately 4,800
    Kenyan refugees from the Moyale area. By year's end, all of the Kenyan
    refugees had been repatriated. During the year, the UNHCR facilitated
    the return of 44,000 Somalis to Somaliland. An additional 8,000 Somalis
    were resettled from camps in the east in the northern Ogaden region.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens exercised the right to vote for a national government in
    May, during elections for the House of People's Representatives (HPR).
    According to observers organized by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council
    (EHRCO), local U.N. staff, diplomatic missions, political parties, and
    domestic NGO's, the elections were generally free and fair in most
    areas; however, serious election irregularities occurred in the SNNPRS
    region, particularly in Hadiya zone. As a result, the NEB, acting on
    its constitutional authority, investigated complaints of the
    irregularities and determined that many of them had merit. These
    included incidents of election officials instructing voters for whom to
    vote, candidates campaigning at polling stations, and candidates being
    pressured into quitting. There were also credible reports of ballot
    stuffing, vote count fraud, voter intimidation or bribery, dismissals
    from work, withholding of salaries, detentions, abductions, and
    killings (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.). The NEB ordered new
    elections in some areas of SNNPRS that were held in June; they were
    declared generally free and fair by international observers. The NEB
    agreed to bring charges against those suspected of the worst election
    abuses in the SNNPRS; however, no action had been taken by year's end.
    Elections in the Somali region took place in August, after delays due
    to a food emergency and voter registration irregularities.
        Seventeen opposition political parties contested the May election,
    including the AAPO, the SEPDC, and the Oromo National Congress. The
    better-funded and better-organized incumbent party, the EPRDF,
    generally dominated over candidates of the relatively weaker and less-
    organized opposition parties and independent candidates, except in the
    SNNPRS, where the opposition made significant inroads. EPRDF candidates
    won 481 seats in the HPR, EPRDF affiliate candidates won 37 seats,
    opposition party candidates won 16 seats, and independent candidates
    won 13 seats.
        The Government made efforts to level the playing field for non-
    EPRDF political parties, by establishing a donor supported fund for
    opposition party candidates, providing opposition candidates access to
    state-owned electronic media, and changing the law to permit civil
    servants to run for office without first resigning their positions. The
    Government was willing to engage opponents in open debate at candidate
    and party forums. Many of these debates were broadcast live on national
    radio and television and reported on in both government and private
    newspapers (see Section 2.a.). Free radio broadcast time was set aside
    for the elections, and 225 independent candidates and 33 political
    parties made use of it.
        By the end of 1999, the NEB had begun investigating abuses of
    election laws related to candidate registration for the May election in
    the SNNPRS and the Gambella region. There were credible reports that
    local officials throughout the country ignored NEB instructions on the
    acceptance of candidate endorsement signatures from opposition party
    candidates. There were instances in which the NEB had to force local
    authorities to accept nominations. There were credible reports that
    during candidate registration in January, many kebele offices were
    closed for holidays or were otherwise unstaffed, hindering the
    registration process of opposition candidates. In the Somalia region
    prior to the August elections, thousands of ballots were reprinted to
    rectify the fact that a female opposition candidate had not been listed
    despite having met NEB requirements for candidate registration.
        There were credible reports that citizens who tried to register to
    vote were told by government personnel that they had to prove their
    citizenship in order to register; under the law only citizens can vote.
    Reportedly Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were not allowed to register
    or to vote. In May local officials denied three HNDO observers in
    possession of valid election authorization letters admission to a
    Wachara polling station when the ballot box was unsealed. A review of
    the polling station registration book by a diplomatic election observer
    indicated that no more than 20 individuals had voted, although the
    canvas ballot box was filled with ballots. In the Soro zone, there were
    credible reports of many NEB polling station officials being dismissed
    shortly before the election and being replaced by local government
    officials.
        In May the Government denied entry visas to a Norwegian human
    rights group that wanted to monitor the elections; they were granted
    visas when they changed the purpose of their trip to academic research
    (see Section 2.d.).
        There were credible reports that local authorities in the Oromiya,
    Amhara, and southern regions periodically arrested and detained
    supporters of opposition parties in the period prior to and following
    the May elections. Most of these individuals were eventually released
    without being charged formally. For example, in February and March, 16
    HNDO candidates were arrested. All were released on bail in April;
    however, while the charges against them have not been dropped, trials
    are not expected to be held. Three of the candidates were charged with
    treason for allegedly staging a coup d'etat and for publicly accusing
    the ruling party of directing most development money to projects in the
    Tigray region. The coup d'etat charges originated from instances in
    which HDNO personnel legally voted to replace ruling party personnel in
    their local peasant association. In addition approximately 500 HNDO
    supporters were detained by the police in April on charges of non-
    payment of taxes and fertilizer loans (see Section 1.d.); all were
    released by the end of that month.
        There were a number of killings as a result of preelection and
    postelection violence (see Section 1.a.). In February in Soro, police
    tortured and killed two farmers--who supported the opposition--while
    they were in police custody; the farmers allegedly were arrested for
    the non-payment of taxes (see Section 1.d.). No action was taken
    against the police by year's end. The deaths led to clashes between the
    villagers and the police, during which three police officers were
    injured. In May in the SNNPRS region, Hadiya zone, security forces
    killed two women while they were voting, allegedly because they refused
    to mark their ballots for an EPRDF candidate. An election observer who
    saw the bodies stated that the women were shot in the face. A
    government investigation into the killings was conducted during the
    year; however, no results were released nor further action taken in the
    matter by year's end. Also in May, according to Beyene Petros, the
    chairman of the SEPDC, police killed seven SEPDC supporters who were
    protesting electoral fraud outside of two polling stations in the
    south. On election day, three persons were killed when an EPRDF member
    threw a grenade into the home of an opposition party election observer
    while the observer was in his residence. The observer's son retaliated
    by killing a polling station official. In May there were reports of at
    least two other killings in the SNNPRS, in particular in the Gurage
    Zone. In August in the Somali region, nine people, including five
    election observers, one opposition candidate, and three other
    passengers, were killed when the cars they were riding in were struck
    by either rockets or landmines (see Section 1.a.). The identity of the
    perpetrators remained unknown at year's end. In the fall, police
    reportedly beat a man who was detained allegedly in retaliation for
    election activities; he was beaten so severely that he sustained
    permanent damage. In December police reportedly beat another man to
    death who was detained for similar reasons (see Section 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Following the May elections, the SEPDC filed a complaint with the
    NEB detailing election irregularities in various constituencies of the
    region. The NEB sent investigators to the region and later ordered that
    new elections be held in the Hadiya zone on June 25. According to the
    NEB, problems in other areas were not serious enough to warrant a new
    election. The NEB agreed to bring charges against those suspected of
    the worst election abuses in the SNNPRS; however, no action had been
    taken by year's end.
        In July there were credible reports that ruling party personnel
    withheld fertilizer and food aid in the SNNPRS region as retaliation
    for voters electing opposition candidates. The amount of government-
    supplied fertilizer available in the area was reported to have dropped
    from 100,000 quintals in 1999 to 10,000 quintals during the year, while
    the price was reported to have increased. Representatives of the SEPDC
    alleged in July that authorities in the southern region detained
    hundreds of SEPDC supporters in retaliation for voting for the
    opposition in the May elections (see Section 1.d.). According to the
    SEPDC, some SEPDC supporters were suspended or dismissed from their
    jobs in retaliation for voting for the opposition in the May elections.
    SEPDC representatives also alleged that some teachers in the southern
    region who served as SEPDC election observers were subject to
    retaliation by local authorities; teachers reported that they were not
    able to collect their salaries and that they were denied entry to
    summer update courses.
        In December 1999, the Government arrested 26 Nuer tribal political
    activists associated with the Gambella People's Democratic Congress
    (GPDC) on charges of inciting Nuer students in November 1999 to
    demonstrate for the use of the Nuer language in schools (see Sections
    1.d. and 5). The GPDC claimed that the charges were without merit and
    that the Government was attempting to interfere with the political
    process for the May elections. The NEB sent investigators to the
    region. Just prior to the May elections, 12 of the 26 Nuer tribal
    political activists associated with the GPDC were released. The
    remaining 14 still were in detention at year's end.
        Political participation remains closed to a number of organizations
    that have not renounced violence and do not accept the Government as a
    legitimate authority. These groups include MEDHIN, the Coalition of
    Ethiopian Democratic Forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
    Party, the OLF, some elements of the ONLF, and several smaller Somali
    groups. The AAPO complained that in 1999 the Oromiya regional
    government refused its application to open branch offices in some areas
    of the region (see Section 2.b.).
        Neither law nor practice restricts the participation of women in
    politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. One of the 15 members of the Council of Ministers is a woman;
    2 other women hold Ministerial positions; and a number of other women
    hold senior positions. There are 42 women among the 547 members of the
    HPR, and 10 of 113 members in the House of Federation are female,
    including the Speaker of the House. There are three women on the
    Supreme Court.
        The government policy of ethnic federalism led to the creation of
    individual constituencies to help ensure representation in the HPR of
    all major ethnic groups; however, small ethnic groups were not
    represented in the legislature. There are 23 nationality groups in 6 of
    the regional states that do not have a sufficient population to qualify
    for constituency seats; however, individuals from these nationality
    groups competed for 23 special seats in the 547-seat HPR in the May
    elections.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights organizations include EHRCO, the HRL, the Ethiopian
    Women's Lawyers Association, the Inter-Africa Group, the National
    Committee on Traditional Practices, the Peace and Development
    Committee, the Society for the Advancement of Human Rights Education,
    Enwayay, the Center for Local Capacity Building and Studies, African
    Initiatives for a Democratic World Order, and Hundee. These and
    numerous other groups primarily are engaged in civic and human rights
    education, legal assistance, and trial monitoring. The HRL, founded by
    prominent Oromo civic leaders in 1997, still was being investigated by
    the Government at year's end for its alleged ties to the OLF.
    Authorities closed the offices of the HRL in April 1998 and confiscated
    the contents of its offices, which have not been returned (see Section
    2.b.). In October 1999, the Ministry of Justice decertified the
    Ethiopian Congress for Democracy, reportedly for financial
    irregularities.
        In March 1999, 160 domestic and international NGO's signed a code
    of conduct and formed a code observance committee. The code details
    standards of conduct for numerous areas including moral and ethical
    integrity, transparency and accountability, good governance, gender
    equity, and environmental consciousness. The code observance committee,
    composed of five members elected by the NGO general assembly and two
    representatives from civil society at large, hears and decides matters
    in all instances involving a violation or breach of the code.
        The ICRC was able to carry out more of its normal program of
    registration and intervention than in the previous year. The ICRC
    conducted regular visits to detention centers and prisons throughout
    the country and in May was permitted access to the CID detention
    facility in Addis Ababa, which holds upwards of 200 persons whose cases
    are under investigation (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC was granted access
    to the Tatek military detention facilities but not to other military
    detention facilities where suspected OLF fighters are held. The ICRC
    visited the Dedesa POW internment camp and police stations in Addis
    Ababa once in June (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The ICRC registered
    1,700 new Eritrean POW's in the Tigray region following the May
    offensive. In September Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed that the ICRC would
    be the supervisory organization for the exchange of expellees or
    deportees. In December following the signing of the peace agreement,
    Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed that the ICRC would facilitate all POW
    exchanges. In May and June, the ICRC suspended emergency relief flights
    to Dire Dawa and Gode because Ethiopian Airlines demanded a high
    ``handling fee'' for each flight.
        The chairman of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
    (ACHPR) visited in February and March to investigate Eritrean
    complaints regarding government deportations of Eritreans and
    Ethiopians of Eritrean origin. His program included meetings with
    senior officials of the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
    The ACHPR did not release a report by year's end.
        A delegation from the international NGO Education International
    received visas to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in prison, but were turned
    back upon arrival at Addis Ababa airport in June. A second delegation
    from Education International attempted to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in
    December; however, all but one of the delegation members were denied
    visas (see Section 6.a.).
        The Government is required under the Constitution to establish a
    human rights commission and office of the ombudsman. The office of the
    ombudsman is expected to have the authority to receive and investigate
    complaints with respect to misadministration by executive branch
    offices. Parliament completed legislative action to create both
    entities in July; however, neither entity was operational by year's
    end.
        The Government continues to encourage international human rights
    groups and foreign diplomats to observe the war crimes trials that
    began in 1994. Officials of the Federal Security Authority generally
    have been responsive to requests for information from the diplomatic
    community. Several international human rights groups visited the
    country during the year.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law.
    The law provides that all persons should have equal and effective
    protection without discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex,
    language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
    origin, wealth, birth, or other status. However, the Government has not
    yet fully put into place mechanisms for the effective enforcement of
    these protections.
        Women.--Culturally based abuses including wife beating and marital
    rape are pervasive social problems. While women have recourse to the
    police and the courts, societal norms and limited infrastructure
    inhibit many women from seeking legal redress, especially in rural
    areas. Social practices obstruct investigations into rape and the
    prosecution of the rapist, and many women are not aware of their rights
    under the law. It is estimated that there are more than 1,000 rapes a
    year in Addis Ababa alone; however, only 168 rape convictions were
    handed down nationwide from September 1999 to September. Rape sentences
    have increased incrementally to 10 to 13 years, in line with the 10 to
    15 years prescribed by law. There was a report in September that a
    guard raped a female prisoner; he was arrested in September and was
    awaiting trial at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for the equality of women; however, these
    provisions often are not applied in practice. Furthermore, these
    provisions often are in conflict with the 1960 Civil Code and the 1957
    Penal Code, both of which still are in force but under review by the
    Ministry of Justice. The 1960 Civil Code is based on a monarchical
    constitution that treated women as if they were children or disabled.
    Discriminatory regulations in the civil code include recognizing the
    husband as the legal head of the family and designating him as the sole
    guardian of children over 5 years old. Family arbitration councils,
    which in the past had the power to dissolve marriages, engaged only in
    arbitration and reconciliation counseling, and only the courts have the
    legal power to dissolve marriages. Domestic violence is not considered
    a serious justification under the law to obtain a divorce. There is
    only limited juridical recognition of common-law marriage. Irrespective
    of the number of years the marriage has existed, the number of children
    raised, and the joint property, the woman is entitled to only 3 months'
    financial support should the relationship end. However, a husband has
    no obligation to provide financial assistance to his family and, as a
    result, women and children sometimes are abandoned when there is a
    problem in the marriage. All land belongs to the state; however, land
    reforms enacted in March 1997 stipulate that women may obtain
    government leases to land, and the Government has an explicit policy
    implemented in 1995 to provide equal access to land for women.
    Discrimination is most acute in rural areas, where 85 percent of the
    population lives. In urban areas, women have fewer employment
    opportunities than do men, and the jobs available do not provide equal
    pay for equal work.
        As a result of changes in the Labor Law in 1998, thousands of women
    traveled to the Middle East as industrial and domestic workers. There
    were credible reports that female workers were abused in these
    positions (see Section 6.f.).
        Although illegal, the abduction of women and girls as a form of
    marriage still is widely practiced in the Oromiya region and the
    SNNPRS. Forced sexual relationships often accompany most marriages by
    abduction, and women often are abused physically during the abduction.
    Abductions have led to conflicts between families, communities, and
    ethnic groups.
        To enhance the status of women, the Government formally adopted a
    national program of action in 1997. The program seeks to expand
    educational and work opportunities for women, improve women's access to
    health care, and educate women about certain unhealthy traditional
    practices such as early marriage. There have been few improvements in
    the status of women since the inception of this program; however,
    according to a study published by the National Committee on Traditional
    Practices of Ethiopia (NCTPE) in 1998, certain harmful traditional
    practices such as early marriage and marriage by abduction appeared to
    be on the decline. During the year, proclamations were passed that
    established the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the office of the
    ombudsman. The proclamations make special provision for a commissioner,
    in the case of the HRC, and an ombudsman to be particularly responsible
    for the rights of women and children.
        On July 29, Parliament adopted a new family law, drafted by
    Ministry of Justice in 1998; the family law was backdated and took
    effect on July 4. As a result, the revised civil code raises the legal
    age for marriage for girls from 15 to 18, the same as for boys; puts
    civil law above customary and religious law; allows for the legal
    sharing of property for unmarried couples who have lived together for
    at least 5 years (previously, there was no property sharing for couples
    separating, even if they had lived together their entire adult lives);
    eliminates family arbitrators as a means of settling marital disputes
    in lieu of the court system (historically women have fared poorly under
    the family arbitration system); allows for the joint administration of
    common marital property (previously a man could sell joint property
    without the consent or knowledge of his wife); and requires the courts
    to take into account the situation of children or the weakest member of
    the family in the event of a divorce or separation (previously women
    and children were often forced out of the family home in such cases).
        In 1999 the Ministry of Justice completed a revision of the 1957
    Penal Code and a national debate on the revisions continued during the
    year. Critical issues affecting women and children include the
    penalties for rape, domestic violence, and child molestation. However,
    regardless of changes to the Penal Code, tradition and culture often
    prevail over civil and criminal law, and in practice women do not enjoy
    equal status with men. For example, the harmful traditional practice of
    abduction as a form of marriage already is illegal under the Penal Code
    but still is practiced widely in many rural areas.
        Children.--The Government has encouraged efforts by domestic and
    international NGO's that focus on children's social, health, and legal
    issues. For example, local officials provided transportation and free
    facilities to NGO activities. During the year, proclamations were
    passed that established the HRC and the ombudsman. The proclamations
    make special provision for a commissioner, in the case of the HRC, and
    an ombudsman to be particularly responsible for the rights of women and
    children. However, the Government has limited ability to provide
    improved health care and basic education. By law primary education is
    compulsory, free and universal; however, despite efforts by the
    Government to increase the number of schools, there are not enough
    schools to accommodate the country's youth. In 1977 the Government
    adopted a three-shift system in all primary and secondary schools to
    maximize the utilization of classrooms and to provide an opportunity
    for working children to attend school. Nationwide only 61 percent of
    male primary age children and 41 percent of female primary age children
    attend school, and many do so in shifts; girls reportedly attended
    school in greater numbers in some regions. However, government reports
    show that approximately 30 percent of the children who attend school
    leave the system before they reach grade two of primary school. The
    chance of their relapsing to illiteracy is high. Only about 18 percent
    of children reach grade five. The overall literacy rate is
    approximately 20 to 30 percent, and only 17 percent of women are
    literate compared with 26 percent of men; however, it is difficult to
    estimate literacy rates accurately due to a lack of government
    statistics. Only 12 percent of males and 8.5 percent of females attend
    secondary school. During the year, 46,140 males and 27,418 females
    earned a school-leaving certificate, a prerequisite to attend college.
    There is space in institutions of higher education for only a small
    percentage of these graduates.
        In Addis Ababa's police stations, there are 10 Child Protection
    Units, which are staffed by members of an NGO and protect the rights of
    children by assisting them when they become victims of crime. Some
    police officers underwent training in 1997 on procedures for handling
    cases of child abuse and juvenile delinquency. Nevertheless there is a
    clear need for reform of the juvenile justice system. Three federal
    judges sit on one bench to hear all cases of juvenile offenses. There
    is a large backlog of juvenile cases and accused children often remain
    in detention with adults until their cases are heard. There is only one
    juvenile remand home with a capacity of 150 for children under age 15,
    and the juveniles who cannot be accommodated at the juvenile remand
    home are incarcerated with adults (see Section 1.c.).
        Societal abuse of young girls continues to be a problem. The
    majority of girls undergo some form of female genital mutilation (FGM),
    which is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging
    to both physical and psychological health. The NCTPE conducted a survey
    that was published in 1998, which indicated that 72.7 percent of the
    female population had undergone FGM, down from an estimated 90 percent
    of the female population in 1990. Clitoridectomies typically are
    performed 7 days after birth and consist of an excision of the labia.
    Infibulation--the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM--is performed
    at any time between the age of 8 and the onset of puberty. The law does
    not specifically prohibit FGM, although it is discouraged officially,
    and the Government has been very supportive of the NCTPE. The
    Government also is working to discourage the practice of FGM through
    education in public schools.
        Other harmful traditional practices surveyed by the NCTPE included
    uvulectomy, milk-teeth extraction, early marriage, marriage by
    abduction, and food and work prohibitions. A new family law adopted in
    July defines the age of consent as 18 for both females and males;
    however, early childhood marriage is common in rural areas where girls
    as young as age 9 are subjected to arranged marriages. In the Afar
    region of the east, young girls continue to be married to much older
    men, but this traditional practice is coming under greater scrutiny and
    criticism. There was a report that a girl was sold by her father to a
    local man in exchange for cattle; the girl's mother brought the case to
    the Ethiopian Women Lawyer's Association, and, at year's end, the case
    was being prosecuted in the courts (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The
    Tigray Women's Association also has had an impact in changing societal
    attitudes toward early marriage. Pregnancy at an early age often leads
    to obstetric fistulae resulting in lifelong misery due to total and
    permanent incontinence. Treatment is available at only one hospital in
    Addis Ababa that performs over 1,000 fistula operations a year. It
    estimates that for every successful operation performed, 10 other young
    women need the treatment. The maternal mortality rate is extremely high
    due, in part, to food taboos for pregnant women, poverty, early
    marriage, and birth complications related to FGM, especially
    infibulation.
        There are approximately 200,000 street children in urban areas, of
    which 150,000 reside in Addis Ababa; however, the figures are difficult
    to estimate, and observers believe the problem is growing. These
    children beg, sometimes as part of a gang, or work in the informal
    sector in order to survive (see Section 6.d.). Government and privately
    run orphanages are unable to handle the number of street children, and
    older children often abuse younger children. Due to severe resource
    constraints, abandoned infants often are overlooked or neglected at
    hospitals and orphanages. There are a few credible reports that
    children are maimed or blinded by their ``handlers'' in order to raise
    their earnings from begging.
        Child prostitution continues to be a problem and is perceived
    widely to be growing. There are no laws that criminalize child
    prostitution or prostitution in general. In 1996 the National Steering
    Committee Against Sexual Exploitation of Children was formed and is
    chaired by the Children, Youth, and Family Affairs Department of the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. In October 1999, the committee
    reported that child prostitution is on the increase especially in major
    urban centers; however, there are no statistics available. NGO's report
    that girls as young as age 11 are recruited to work in houses of
    prostitution where they are kept ignorant of the risks of HIV/AIDS
    infection. There have been many press reports of the large-scale
    employment of children, especially underage girls, as hotel workers,
    barmaids, and prostitutes in resort towns and rural truck stops. There
    were continued reports that poor rural families sold their young
    teenage daughters to hotel and bar owners on the main truck routes;
    however, these reports were difficult to confirm (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.). Social workers note that young girls are prized because their
    clients believe that they are free of sexually transmitted diseases.
    The unwanted babies of these young girls usually are abandoned at
    hospitals, police stations, welfare clinics, and adoption agencies.
    There were numerous anecdotal accounts of young girls going to the
    Middle East to work as house servants and nannies, some of whom were
    abused, including sexually. (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
    Factors aggravating the problem of child prostitution are pervasive
    poverty, migration to urban centers, early marriage, HIV/AIDS, and
    limited educational and job opportunities. There are several NGO's
    which work with child prostitutes, including the Forum on Street
    Children-Ethiopia, which provides shelter and protection for child
    prostitutes trying to get off the streets.
        In September 1999, a forum on child labor was launched by over 80
    government, NGO and foreign entities, including the International Labor
    Organization (ILO), to combat such problems as child prostitution. The
    forum held a series of meetings during the year.
        Child labor is pervasive, especially in the informal sector, and
    child laborers sometimes are subjected to abuse, including neglect,
    and, among children working as domestic servants, sexual abuse and rape
    (see Section 6.d.).
        It is the policy of the Ministry of Defense not to permit persons
    under the age of 18 to join the armed forces, and the Government made
    efforts to enforce this policy. While there were reports that some
    children under the age of 18 were recruited into the military in 1999,
    and military officers have admitted that underage applicants sometimes
    were enlisted, there were no such reports during the year. Ethiopia has
    an all-volunteer military; however, scarce birth certificates, poor
    educational opportunities, patriotism, and pervasive poverty conspired
    to entice underage applicants to try to circumvent restrictions on
    underage soldiers. If young boys are found be under the age of 18, they
    are prohibited from doing military service; however, in rural areas
    children often do not have birth certificates. If a unit commander
    suspects but cannot prove that a soldier is underage, he can transfer
    the soldier from a front-line combat unit to a rear-area command. There
    is evidence that children as young as age 14 were permitted to join
    local militia units in an effort to keep them close to home and prevent
    them from attempting to join the regular army.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution stipulates that the
    state shall allocate resources to provide rehabilitation and assistance
    to the physically and mentally disabled; however, the Government
    devoted few resources for these purposes. At year's end, the Government
    had not yet put into place mechanisms to enforce a 1994 law mandating
    equal rights for the disabled. The Government does not mandate access
    to buildings or government services for the disabled, and persons with
    minor disabilities sometimes complain of job discrimination. The
    conflict with Eritrea resulted in numerous soldiers losing limbs, many
    from landmine explosions; however, wheelchairs are rare in the country.
    According to an NGO report in 1998, only 500 of the approximately
    700,000 visually impaired persons in the country have access to
    employment opportunities. Although there are approximately 800,000
    mentally ill persons estimated in the country, there is only 1 mental
    hospital and only 10 psychiatrists. In the past several years, the
    mental hospital trained 117 psychiatric nurses to work in 33 rural
    clinics; however, half of these nurses subsequently left their jobs.
        There are numerous domestic NGO's that work with the disabled. For
    example, the Amhara Development Association operates a project to
    provide vocational training to disabled war veterans in Bahir Dar. The
    Tigray Development Association operates a center in Mekele that
    provides prostheses and seed money for business development, training,
    and counseling for disabled persons. The international NGO Landmine
    Survivors commenced operating in the country during the year; Landmine
    Survivors provides a number of services to victims of landmine
    explosions including counseling, and referrals to rehabilitation
    services. A 1994 census determined that there were 989,000 disabled
    persons in the country; however, observers believe that number has
    grown and is significantly higher.
        Religious Minorities.--Despite the generally broad level of
    societal tolerance for established faiths, there were instances of open
    conflict among religious groups before 1998, most noticeably between
    Ethiopian Orthodox Christians on the one hand, and Pentecostals and
    evangelicals on the other, and there continued to be pockets of
    interreligious tension and criticism during the year. Newer faiths such
    as Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals encountered overt opposition
    from the public. Muslims and Orthodox Christians complained about
    proselytization by Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses. Ethiopian
    Orthodox leaders complained that at times Protestants fail to respect
    Orthodox holy days and Orthodox customs. Muslims complained that some
    Pentecostal preachers disparage Islam in their services. There were
    complaints by Muslim leaders that the Ethiopian Orthodox church's
    desire to ``show supremacy'' sometimes caused irritation in the
    country's various regions. Protestant and Pentecostal leaders
    complained that, on occasion, Orthodox or evangelical adherents
    interrupted Protestant and Pentecostal religious meetings and attempted
    to prevent the construction of Protestant churches in predominately
    Orthodox or evangelical areas.
        In April 1999, two Muslim communities in the Dire Dawa and north
    Welo areas attempted to construct new mosques but abandoned the
    construction when local Orthodox church members caused damage to the
    construction sites and beat one Muslim who tried to prevent their
    actions. The Government intervened, and the mosques were being built at
    year's end.
        Nevertheless in most sections of the country Orthodox Christians
    and Muslims participated in each other's religious observances, and
    there is tolerance for intermarriage and conversion in certain areas,
    most notably in Welo, as well as in urban areas throughout the country.
    In Addis Ababa, persons of different faiths often live side-by-side.
    Most urban areas reflect a mixture of all religious denominations.
    Longstanding evangelical Protestant denominations, particularly the
    Mekane Yesus church and Kale Heywet churches, provide social services
    such as health care and education to nonmembers as well as to members.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are more than 80 ethnic
    groups. Although many of these groups influenced the political and
    cultural life of the country, Amharas and Tigrayans from the northern
    highlands played a dominant role. Some ethnic groups such as the
    Oromos, the largest single group, were subjugated during the 19th
    century. In an attempt to address ethnic concerns, the Government has
    established a federal system with political boundaries drawn roughly
    along major ethnic lines. With federalism regional states have much
    greater control over their affairs. For example, in Oromiya in 1999,
    the regional government required that all primary schools adopt
    Oromiffa as the language of instruction. This drew protests from groups
    that reside in Oromiya whose mother tongue is not Oromiffa and who
    believe that their children are now at a disadvantage. There are
    credible reports that teachers and other government workers have had
    their employment terminated if they are not of the dominant ethnic
    group in the region.
        Ethnic clashes during the year resulted in a number of deaths and
    injuries. In July there were reports of clashes between the Oromo
    Borena community and ethnic-Somali Garre pastoralists in the southeast,
    which reportedly resulted in the deaths of approximately 40 persons and
    the theft of hundreds of livestock. In October there were reports of a
    clash over grazing and watering rights between the two communities,
    which reportedly resulted in the killing of at least 150 people and
    injuries to many others.
        In December ethnic tensions between Oromo and Tigrayan students at
    Addis Ababa University were exacerbated when a Tigrayan student
    presented a paper which allegedly included a derogatory statement about
    Oromos. The students engaged in some fighting and vandalism, and
    authorities arrested some Oromo students (see Section 1.d.).
        In May 1999, local administrators in the SNNPRS informed elementary
    and high school teachers that new textbooks would be used in the North
    Omo zone, which merged four closely related languages spoken in the
    zone: Welayita, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro. Neither local communities nor
    teachers had been consulted before the decision was made to introduce
    the new textbooks. In November 1999, police arrested two teachers for
    objecting to the new language (see Section 1.d.). The arrests led to
    widespread demonstrations and rioting in the city of Sodo during which
    police killed up to 10 persons, injured hundreds, and arrested and
    detained as many as 1,000 others (see Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 1.d.).
    Most of those arrested were released, but approximately 20 elders,
    teachers, and civil servants were charged with subversion and remained
    in prison at year's end because they could not make bail of between
    $6,000 and $12,500 (50,000 and 100,000 birr--see Section 1.d.). As a
    result of the conflict, Welayita was used as the language of
    instruction in schools during the year, and Welayita became its own
    zone in November.
        There has been a long history of tension between the Nuer and Anuak
    tribal groups. In November 1999, Nuer students in the Gambella region
    demonstrated for the use of the Nuer language in schools instead of the
    Amharic language. In December 1999, the Government arrested 26 Nuer
    tribal political activists associated with the GPDC on charges of
    inciting the Nuer students to demonstrate (see Section 1.d.). The GPDC
    accused the Anuak tribe, whose political organization--the Gambella
    people's democratic party--is an EPRDF affiliate, of interfering with
    their political activities prior to the May elections. Twelve of those
    arrested were released prior to the May elections; 14 remained in
    custody at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        The expansion of the military from a low of 60,000 personnel in
    April 1998 to approximately 285,000 to 300,000 personnel during the
    year aided greatly in the goal of bringing more ethnic groups into the
    military. By most accounts, the military is an ethnically diverse
    organization with very little friction between the various groups
    represented, at least in the lower ranks. At the higher ranks the
    officer personnel is much less ethnically diverse. Promotions awarded
    in November and December were disproportionately high among the
    Tigrayan ethnic group, although promotions were given to officers from
    a range of ethnic groups; Oromos were represented among those promoted
    in higher numbers than the previous year.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides most
    workers with the right to form and join unions, but the 1993 Labor
    Proclamation specifically excluded teachers and civil servants,
    including judges, prosecutors, and security services, from organizing
    unions. Only 300,000 workers are unionized. The 1993 Labor Proclamation
    also decreed that workers who provide essential services are not
    allowed to strike. Essential services are defined broadly to include
    air transport services, railways, bus service, postal, police and fire
    services, banking, telecommunications, and medical services.
        Only a small percentage of the population is involved in wage labor
    employment, which is concentrated largely in urban areas. Approximately
    85 percent of the work force live in the countryside and are engaged in
    subsistence farming.
        The ETA formerly had a membership of 120,000; however, that number
    has decreased significantly due to government intimidation and
    restrictions on ETA activities. In 1995 the leadership of the ETA filed
    with the ILO a freedom of association complaint against the Government
    based upon credible reports that the Government has harassed the ETA
    leadership at all levels since 1993. Security forces harassed members
    of the ETA and closed their offices; however, the ETA still is
    registered. In November the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
    issued a strong criticism of the Government for its restrictions on
    freedom of association. The president of the ETA, Dr. Woldesemayat, was
    sentenced to 15 years in prison in 1999 for inciting violence. In 1994
    the Government encouraged and publicly supported the organization and
    registration of a second teachers'' association. A delegation from the
    international NGO Education International received visas to visit Dr.
    Woldesemayat in prison, but were turned back upon arrival at Addis
    Ababa airport in June. A second delegation from Education International
    attempted to visit Dr. Woldesemayat in December; however, all but one
    of the delegation members were denied visas (see Section 1.c.).
        There is no requirement that unions belong to the Confederation of
    Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU), which was established in 1993,
    decertified in December 1994 because of internal management and
    political disputes, and officially reestablished and recertified in
    April 1997. CETU includes all nine federations organized by industrial
    and service sectors rather than by region.
        The Labor Law stipulates that a trade organization may not act in
    an overtly political manner. The Labor Law explicitly gives workers the
    right to strike to protect their interests, but it also sets forth
    restrictive procedures that apply before a legal strike may take place.
    These apply equally to an employer's right to lock out workers. Strikes
    must be supported by a majority of the workers affected. The Labor Law
    prohibits retribution against strikers, but labor leaders state that
    most workers are not convinced that the Government would enforce this
    protection. Both sides must make efforts at reconciliation, provide at
    least 10 days' notice to the Government, include the reasons for the
    action, and in cases already before a court or labor board, the party
    must provide at least a 30-day warning. If an agreement between unions
    and management cannot be reached, the Minister of Labor may refer the
    case to arbitration by a Labor Relations Board (LRB). The Government
    has established LRB's at the national level and in some regions. The
    Minister of Labor and Social Affairs appoints each LRB chairman, and
    the four board members include two each from trade unions and employer
    groups. Some efforts to enforce labor regulations are made within the
    formal industrial sector. Some private sector workers, including
    construction workers and Ethiopian Airlines mechanics, went on strike
    during the year over salary issues. Labor officials have stated that in
    view of high unemployment and the inattention courts have given to
    labor cases, some workers are afraid to participate in strikes or other
    labor actions.
        Independent unions and those belonging to CETU are free to
    affiliate with and participate in international labor bodies. Some
    unions have affiliated with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is protected under the Labor Law and under the Constitution
    for most workers and is practiced freely throughout the country.
    Collective bargaining agreements concluded between 1975 and the
    promulgation of the 1993 Labor Law remain in force. Labor experts
    estimate that more than 90 percent of unionized workers are covered by
    collective bargaining agreements. Wages are negotiated at the plant
    level. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against
    union members and organizers. There are grievance procedures for
    hearings on allegations of discrimination brought by individuals or
    unions. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required
    to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Labor leaders point to
    a number of court cases that are 4 or 5 years old in which workers have
    been terminated for union activities as examples of inattention by the
    courts to worker rights. Seasonal and part-time agricultural workers
    are not organized even on state-owned plantations. Seasonal workers''
    compensation, benefits, and working conditions are far below those of
    unionized permanent plantation employees.
        In December a private company dissolved its labor union after a
    disagreement between management and workers. A total of 586 workers
    were expelled from the company, including union leaders. The Government
    attempted to mediate the dispute, but the employer did not cooperate;
    the case is expected to be referred to the Ministry of Labor and Social
    Affairs in 2001.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Criminal Code,
    which applies to persons over the age of 15, specifically prohibits
    forced labor; however, forced labor can be used by court order as a
    punitive measure. Forced or compulsory labor by children is illegal;
    however, young girls reportedly were sold or forced into prostitution
    by family members (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). There were continued
    reports that poor rural families sold their young teenage daughters to
    hotel and bar owners on the main truck routes; however, these reports
    were difficult to confirm. There was a report that a girl was sold by
    her father to a local man in exchange for cattle; the girl's mother
    brought the case to the Ethiopian Women Lawyer's Association, and the
    case was being prosecuted in the courts at year's end (see Sections 5
    and 6.f.). There also were numerous anecdotal accounts of young
    persons, especially girls, traveling to the Middle East to work as
    house servants and nannies, some of whom were abused, including
    sexually (see Section 6.f.). The Constitution proscribes slavery, which
    was abolished officially in 1942, and involuntary servitude. There were
    no reports of slavery within the country.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Under the Labor Law, the minimum age for wage or salary
    employment is 14 years; special provisions cover children between the
    ages of 14 and 18, including the prohibition of night work or hazardous
    work. The Government defines hazardous work as work in factories or
    involving machinery with moving parts, or any work that could
    jeopardize children's health.
        Children may not work more than 7 hours per day; work between the
    hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.; work on public holidays or rest days; or
    perform overtime work. While the Government has made some effort to
    enforce these regulations within the formal industrial sector, social
    welfare activists, civic organizers, government officials, and
    entrepreneurs agree that child labor is pervasive throughout the
    country, especially in the informal sector. In urban areas, children in
    large numbers can be seen working in a variety of jobs, including
    shining shoes, hustling passengers into cabs, working as porters,
    selling lottery tickets, and herding animals. Child domestic workers
    are common.
        Child laborers often are abused. A research study published in 1999
    reported that the prevalence of child abuse among urban child laborers
    is 70 percent, compared with 24.5 percent among non-economically active
    children from the same urban district. The study concluded that
    physical and emotional abuse were twice as common among child workers
    compared with nonworkers, sexual abuse was five times as common, and
    neglect was eight times as common. Among child workers surveyed, rapes
    occurred exclusively among child domestics.
        A second research study of child labor sponsored by CETU's National
    Federation of Farm, Plantation, Fishery, and Agro-industry Trade Unions
    and published in 1999 focused on rural locations. The study reported
    that 30 percent of the workers on state farms surveyed were between the
    ages of 7 and 14. Child workers, who worked alongside parents hired by
    the state, typically worked 6 days a week, received no benefits, and
    earned less than $10 (80 birr) a month. At one plantation, 75 percent
    of the children worked 12-hour days. There also is evidence that
    children as young as age 14 are permitted to join local militias with
    the consent of village leaders. This reportedly is part of an effort to
    keep children in local areas despite limited educational or employment
    opportunities (see Section 5). The Government maintains that most
    economically active children are engaged in family-based,
    nonexploitative child work that is part of the socialization process
    and maintains that there is not a child labor problem.
        In September 1999, a forum on child labor was launched by over 80
    governments, NGO and foreign entities, including the ILO, to combat
    such problems as child prostitution, which is widely perceived to be
    growing (see Section 5). The forum concluded that the worst forms of
    child labor have increased in recent years, particularly child
    prostitution and the use of children in agricultural work where they
    are exposed to pesticides and insecticides.
        The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is the authority
    designated to enforce child labor laws. The Government's definition of
    worst forms of child labor includes prostitution and bonded labor. The
    Government is not a signatory to the Worst Forms of Child Labor
    Convention.
        Forced or compulsory labor by children is illegal; however, there
    are reports that it occurs (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1995 the Government
    established a minimum wage of approximately $15 (120 birr) per month
    for all wage earners in both the private and public sectors. In
    addition each industry and service sector has established its own
    minimum wage. For example, public sector employees, the largest group
    of wage earners, earn a minimum wage of approximately $22 (175 birr)
    per month; employees in the banking and insurance sector have a minimum
    wage of $25 (200 birr) per month. According to the Office of the Study
    of Wages and Other Remuneration, these wages are insufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Consequently most families must have at least two wage earners to
    survive, which is one of the reasons children leave school early.
        The legal workweek, as stipulated in the Labor Law, is 48 hours,
    consisting of 6 days of 8 hours each, with a 24-hour rest period.
    However, in practice, most employees work a 40-hour workweek consisting
    of 5 8-hour days.
        The Government, industry, and unions negotiate to set occupational
    health and safety standards; however, the inspection department of the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs enforces these standards
    ineffectively, due to a lack of human and financial resources. Workers
    have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment; however, most workers fear losing
    their jobs if they were to do so.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law and the Constitution prohibit
    trafficking in persons; however, there were continued reports that poor
    rural families sold their young teenage daughters to hotel and bar
    owners on the main truck routes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). There was a
    report that a girl was sold by her father to a local man in exchange
    for cattle; the girl's mother brought the case to the Ethiopian Women
    Lawyer's Association. At year's end, the case was being prosecuted in
    the courts; it is the first case of this kind (see Sections 5 and
    6.c.). There were numerous anecdotal accounts of young girls traveling
    to the Middle East to work as house servants and nannies, some of whom
    are abused, including sexually. There reportedly is a network of
    persons based in the tourism and import-export sectors who are involved
    heavily in soliciting potential clients, recruiting young girls,
    arranging travel, and fabricating counterfeit work permits, travel
    documents, and birth certificates (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        Although illegal, the abduction of women and girls as a form of
    marriage still is widely practiced in Oromiya regions and the SNNPRS
    (see Section 5).
        As a result of a change in the Labor Law, the Government no longer
    acts as an employment agency for workers going abroad. Private entities
    now arrange for overseas work and, as a result, the number of women
    being sent to Middle Eastern countries, particularly Lebanon and Saudi
    Arabia, as domestic or industrial workers increased significantly.
    There continued to be credible reports that some domestic workers
    abroad were subjected to abusive conditions, including sexual
    exploitation (see Section 5); however, such reports decreased after the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs established an office in 1998 to
    review the contracts of prospective domestic workers and deny exit
    visas if the contracts did not appear satisfactory.
        The Government continued work on revising the federal Civil and
    Penal Codes to increase the penalties for traffickers. Training
    programs were implemented for police officers on the criminal aspects
    of trafficking. There are several NGO's that work on the issue of
    trafficking, some of which provide protection for trafficking victims.
                                   __________

                                     GABON

        Gabon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Although
    opposition parties have been legal since 1990, a single party, the
    Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), has remained in power since 1968 and
    has circumscribed political choice. Elections for the presidency and
    the National Assembly generally have not been free and fair but have
    varied widely in quality; some suffered chiefly from poor organization,
    while others were fraudulent. PDG leader El Hadj Omar Bongo has been
    President since 1967 and was reelected for another 7-year term in a
    December 1998 election marred by irregularities that generally favored
    the incumbent, including incomplete and inaccurate electoral lists and
    the use of false documents to cast votes. In July 1998, following
    opposition victories in 1996 elections for local government offices
    that recently had been made elective, the Government transferred key
    electoral functions to the Interior Ministry from an independent
    National Electoral Commission that had been established pursuant to a
    1995 constitutional referendum. Members of the PDG and allied parties
    hold large majorities of seats in both chambers of the national
    legislature: The directly elected National Assembly, for which the most
    recent elections, held in December 1996, were poorly run and
    fraudulent; and the Senate, members of which are chosen by municipal
    and regional government officials. The judiciary is independent but
    remains vulnerable to government manipulation.
        The national police, which is subordinate to the Interior Ministry,
    and the gendarmerie, which is subordinate to the Defense Ministry, are
    primarily responsible for domestic law enforcement and public security.
    In addition elements of the armed forces and the ``Republican Guard,''
    an elite, heavily armed unit that protects the President, sometimes
    have performed internal security functions; both the armed forces and
    the Republican Guard are subordinate to the Defense Ministry. Members
    of the security forces occasionally committed human rights abuses.
        The country's economy is underdiversified and heavily dependent
    upon external trade. The State dominates much of the economy through
    telecommunications, timber export, and oil refinery parastatals;
    however, the production of wood, oil, and minerals is largely private,
    and the water, electric, railroad, and sugar parastatals have been
    privatized. Government financial mismanagement and corruption have
    contributed to significant arrears in domestic and external debt
    payments. Since the discovery of offshore oil in the late 1970's, the
    oil industry has generated nearly half of recorded gross national
    product; oil export earnings have allowed the country's approximately 1
    million citizens to enjoy a relatively high material standard of living
    based on imports of consumer goods and have drawn to the country's
    capital, Libreville, a third of the country's citizens and many
    immigrants from poor African countries who work chiefly in the informal
    and service sectors. Average annual per capita gross domestic product
    was approximately $4,700, although income distribution remained badly
    skewed in favor of urban dwellers and a small economic elite, while the
    rural population continued to receive relatively few social services.
    The depletion of proven reserves of oil and timber contributed to
    declining export earnings and state revenues during the year.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor in some
    areas, and some longstanding human rights abuses continued. The ability
    of citizens to change their government remained limited. Outstanding
    cases of killings by security forces remain unresolved. The security
    forces beat and tortured prisoners and detainees, prison conditions
    remained harsh and life threatening, arbitary arrest and detention were
    problems, the judiciary remained subject to government influence, and
    authorities routinely infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Despite
    some improvements, the Government continued to restrict freedom of the
    press. Violence and societal discrimination against women were
    problems. Forced labor by foreign children as domestic and agricultural
    workers remained a problem, and there were reports of trafficking in
    children.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated extrajudicial killings; and there were
    no confirmed cases in which members of the security forces committed
    other extrajudicial killings. Outstanding cases of extrajudicial
    killings committed by the security forces remained unresolved.
        In April 1999, an off-duty member of the Republican Guard shot and
    killed a taxi driver who had refused to lend his taxi to the soldier.
    Despite demands from the media to prosecute the alleged assailant, the
    suspect never was charged. In the July 1999 case of a group of off-duty
    police officers who reportedly killed 2 persons and wounded 11 in a
    vendetta attack in a Libreville discotheque, the police officers
    initially were cleared of wrongdoing by their superiors, then later
    subjected to minor disciplinary measures. No arrests were made in
    either case.
        Although there were no confirmed reports of attempted killings that
    appeared to be politically motivated, an opposition candidate Pierre
    Mamboundou, who contested the December 1998 presidential election
    stated in December 1998 that armed commandos attempted to kill him on
    December 12, 1998. Mamboundou stated that he believed that the
    Government was responsible for the alleged attack, but no evidence
    supporting this allegation developed.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman
    punishment; however, security forces sometimes beat or physically
    mistreated prisoners and detainees as punishment and to exact
    confessions. There were unconfirmed reports in the African immigrant
    community that police and soldiers occasionally beat and raped non-
    Gabonese Africans during operations to round up and deport illegal
    immigrants (see Section 2.d.).
        In August a police officer raped a Cameroonian woman in custody.
    The case received wide media coverage, and shortly after the incident,
    the officer was dismissed from the police force. The national police
    leadership asserted that the police officer would be disciplined
    formally and then tried for rape; however, at year's end, the case had
    not been tried, and no further action had been taken against the
    officer.
        There were occasional incidents of violence in which practitioners
    of some traditional indigenous religions inflicted bodily harm on other
    persons (see Section 5). However, the details of these incidents are
    uncertain. The Ministry of the Interior maintained that violence and
    bodily harm to others in the practice of a traditional religion is a
    criminal offense and is prosecuted vigorously. Media reports suggested
    that this was true; however, little information about such prosecutions
    or their results was available.
        Conditions in most prisons are harsh and life threatening.
    Sanitation and ventilation are poor, and medical care is almost
    nonexistent. Prisons provide inadequate food for inmates. There were no
    known visits by human rights monitors to prisons during the year,
    although the Government was not known to have impeded such visits in
    past years.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The law provides for up to 48 hours of initial
    preventive detention, during which period police must charge a detainee
    before a judge. However, in practice police rarely respect this
    provision. Charges often are not filed expeditiously, and persons often
    are detained arbitrarily for long periods. Bail may be set if there is
    to be a further investigation. Pretrial detainees have the right to
    free access to their attorneys, and this right is respected in
    practice. Detainees have the right to an expeditious trial, as defined
    by the law. Pretrial detention is limited to 6 months for a misdemeanor
    and to 1 year for a felony charge. These periods may be extended for 6
    months by the examining magistrate. Prolonged pretrial detention is
    common. The Attorney General's Office estimates that roughly 40 percent
    of persons in custody are pretrial detainees.
        Authorities in Makokou arrested and detained Gabonese Confederation
    of Free Unions (CGSL) representative Jean-Remy Nguelany for over 3
    months in 1998 (see Section 6.b.).
        Members of the security forces frequently detained individuals at
    roadblocks. Although sometimes designed to locate illegal immigrants,
    most such operations were used by the security forces to extort money.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary is generally
    independent in principle, it remains vulnerable to government
    manipulation.
        The judicial system includes the regular courts, a military
    tribunal, and a civilian State Security Court. The regular court system
    includes trial courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The
    Constitutional Court is a separate body charged with examining
    constitutional questions, including the certification of elections.
    There are no traditional or customary courts. In some areas, minor
    disputes may be taken to a local chief, but the State does not
    recognize such decisions. The State Security Court, last convened in
    1990, is constituted by the Government as required to consider matters
    of state security.
        There were systemic resource and personnel shortages in the
    judiciary, which often contributed to prolonged pretrial detention (see
    Section 1.d.).
        The Constitution provides for the right to a public trial and the
    right to legal counsel. These rights generally are respected in
    criminal cases. Nevertheless, procedural safeguards are lacking,
    particularly in state security trials. A judge may thus deliver an
    immediate verdict of guilty at the initial hearing if sufficient
    evidence is presented by the State.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection from
    surveillance, from searches without warrant, and from interference with
    private telecommunications or correspondence; however, the Government
    restricts these rights in practice. As part of criminal investigations,
    police may request search warrants from judges, which they obtain
    easily, sometimes after the fact. The Government has used them in the
    past to gain access to the homes of opposition figures and their
    families.
        Government authorities also routinely monitor private telephone
    conversations, personal mail, and the movements of citizens.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, although citizens
    generally continued to speak freely and criticize the Government, the
    Government continued to restrict press freedom. Legislators in the
    National Assembly openly criticize government policies, ministers, and
    other officials.
        The only daily newspaper was the state-affiliated L'Union.
    Approximately 10 privately owned weekly or monthly publications in
    newspaper format, which represent independent views and those of
    various political parties, appeared during the year; however, most
    appeared irregularly due to financial constraints and, in some
    instances, to government suspensions of their publication licenses. All
    newspapers--including L'Union--actively criticized the Government and
    political leaders of all parties. Most also criticized the President.
        Journalists are subject to the Communication Code, a law that
    specifies their rights and responsibilities. Libel can be either a
    criminal offense or a civil matter. The law authorizes the State to
    initiate criminal libel prosecution against persons for libeling
    elected government officials; it also authorizes the State to
    criminalize civil libel suits.
        In April 1999, the National Communication Council (CNC), a
    government agency subordinate to the Communications Ministry, released
    its draft of a proposed new Communications Code that would further
    restrict press freedom by expanding the scope of criminal libel laws in
    the name of protecting ``dignity of the person;'' however, it would
    shift the penalties for libel away from imprisonment and toward
    monetary fines; it also would reduce prison sentences for journalists
    convicted of criminal libel while increasing fines that could be
    imposed on such journalists and on the newspaper firms that employ
    them. In April the National Assembly passed the new Communications
    Code, but it stalled in the Senate because of concerns about its
    constitutionality. In November the Senate passed a different version of
    the code, and the two bills were referred to a conference committee for
    reconciliation; no further action had been taken by year's end.
        In April 1999, the CNC suspended the publication license of La
    Griffe, a Libreville-based satirical weekly newspaper, on the grounds
    that it was publishing anonymous editorials in contravention of a legal
    requirement, necessary for the enforcement of criminal libel laws, that
    publications name the authors of everything that they publish. The
    Ministry of Communications previously suspended the same newspaper's
    license from August 1998 through March 1999 after the Government
    successfully prosecuted members of the newspaper's staff for criminal
    libel. The suspension of La Griffe's publication license ended in
    August, and the newspaper resumed publication shortly thereafter.
        The Government continued to use prosecutions for civil and criminal
    libel against journalists to restrict freedom of expression, especially
    criticism of the Government. In December 1999, Germain Lendoye,
    publisher of the satirical weekly Cigale Enchantee, was jailed for 2
    months after the newspaper failed to pay a fine of about $290 (200,000
    FCFA) that was awarded in 1999 to the Minister of Equipment and
    Construction for defamation. Cigale Enchantee remained closed for
    financial reasons. In July Lendoye launched a new satirical weekly, Le
    Scribouillard.
        In March and again in June, employees of Sogadel, a parastatal
    agribusiness firm, went on strike to protest the failure to pay back
    wages; police did not intervene. In August journalists at the national
    television station struck for back wages (see Section 6.a.).
        In May journalists Kare Black, Guy Mvelle, and publisher Noel Ngwa
    Nguema of the bimonthly Misamu were fined the equivalent of $14,500
    (10,000,000 FCFA) in a defamation suit brought by the Director General
    of Public Works at the Ministry of Equipment and Construction over a
    January article that alleged a diversion of public funds from a road
    project. The court ruled in favor of the director general despite the
    publication by Misamu of a lengthy rebuttal written by the director
    general.
        In May President Bongo pardoned La Griffe editor in chief Michel
    Ongoundou Loundah and journalist Raphael Ntoume Nkoghe (writing under
    the name of Pulcherie Beaumiel), who were convicted of criminal libel
    in August 1998. The two left the country in 1998 after a court
    sentenced them to 8 months in prison for reporting that the director
    general of the state airline had used the company to smuggle ivory
    internationally; both returned to the country during the year. Dorothee
    Ngouoni, an editor at La Griffe, left the country in July 1999 as a
    result of the same defamation case and was convicted of defamation
    shortly thereafter. She was not pardoned and remained abroad.
        The Government owns and operates two radio stations, which
    broadcast to all areas of the country. Much of their news coverage
    concerns the activities of government officials; however, their
    editorials are sometimes critical of specific government policies and
    even of specific government ministers. The CNC issues and, in the past,
    at times sometimes has suspended the broadcasting licenses of private
    radio and television stations. During the year, all existing
    suspensions were lifted, and no new suspensions were imposed. Financial
    considerations resulted in fluctuations in the number of radio stations
    operating. At year's end, approximately a dozen privately owned radio
    stations operated in the country; most were apolitical. The Government
    owns and operates two television stations, RTG-1 and RTG-2. At year's
    end, four apolitical, privately owned stations were broadcasting.
        In October 1999, the Government suspended the broadcasting license
    of two privately owned radio stations. One resumed broadcasting in
    November 1999; the other, a station affiliated with the Catholic
    Church, resolved its conflict with the Government without interrupting
    its broadcasts (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government did not interfere with domestic reception of
    broadcasts of international radio stations, including the Voice of
    America. Radio France International broadcast locally, and British
    Broadcasting Corporation radio sought and received a license to begin
    local broadcasts; but at year's end, they had not begun to broadcast.
    Foreign newspapers and magazines were widely available.
        The Government did not restrict access to or use of the Internet.
    At year's end, there were two Internet service providers in the
    country, one state owned and the other privately owned. In urban areas,
    there were public facilities that provided relatively affordable access
    to the Internet.
        There are no restrictions on academic freedom, including research.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice for citizens and recognized
    organizations. The law requires that groups obtain permits for public
    gatherings in advance, and the Government usually granted them.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respected this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government generally respected this right in practice.
    There is no state religion, and authorities do not engage in religious
    persecution. A 1983 decree banning Jehovah's Witnesses, which the
    Government promulgated on the grounds that Jehovah's Witnesses
    allegedly do not protect individuals who might dissent from the group's
    views adequately, remained in effect throughout the year; however, the
    Government did not enforce the ban.
        Some Protestants alleged that the government television station
    accorded free transmission time to the Catholic Church but not to
    minority religious groups. Others alleged that the armed forces favor
    Roman Catholics and Muslims in hiring and promotions. Some Protestant
    congregations had difficulty obtaining building permits.
        The Ministry of the Interior maintains an official registry of some
    religious groups; however, it does not register traditional indigenous
    religious groups. The Government does not require religious groups to
    register but recommends that they do so in order to assemble with full
    constitutional protection. No financial or tax benefit is conferred by
    registration. The Government has refused to register about 10 religious
    groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses. In practice the Government
    allows Jehovah's Witnesses to assemble and practice their religion. In
    addition the Government has made uncorroborated claims that it permited
    Jehovah's Witnesses to proselytize.
        In October 1999, the Government suspended the broadcasting license
    of a privately owned radio station affiliated with the Catholic Church.
    The station resolved its conflict with the Government without
    interrupting its broadcasts. Its license was restored in November 1999
    (see Section 2.a.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights. There are no legally mandated restrictions on internal
    movement. Police and gendarmes continued to stop travelers frequently
    to check identity, residence, or registration documents, and members of
    the security forces regularly harassed expatriate Africans working
    legally as merchants, service sector employees, and manual laborers.
    They extorted bribes and demanded services with the threat of
    confiscation of residency documents or imprisonment. Residency permits
    cost up to $145 (100,000 FCFA), and first time applicants also must
    provide the cost of a one-way air ticket to their country of origin. In
    theory, but usually not in practice, the Government refunds the cost of
    the air ticket.
        The government agency that controls immigration intermittently
    enforced an internal regulation requiring married women to have their
    husbands' permission to travel abroad, although a specific law to this
    effect was eliminated in 1990. An exit visa no longer is required for
    citizens to travel abroad; however, aliens resident in the country must
    obtain a visa in order to leave and return.
        There were unconfirmed reports that police occasionally beat and
    raped non-Gabonese Africans during operations to assemble and deport
    illegal immigrants. In November the Government used soldiers to conduct
    an official ``sweep'' operation. According to the Government, the sweep
    was intended to detain bandits, but the Government did not disclose if
    any persons were arrested. The sweep consisted of soldiers stopping and
    searching vehicles at roadblocks, as well as house-to-house searches
    conducted by soldiers and police in impoverished neighborhoods. The
    police conducted the same activity informally on a regular basis and
    frequently stopped vehicles to extort bribes.
        The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government strictly controls the
    process of refugee adjudication. Coordination with the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) generally is adequate. During the
    year, an estimated 17,000 refugees,
        14,000 from the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), remained in the
    country to avoid fighting between Congolese rebels and forces
    supporting the Congolese Government. The Government cooperated with the
    UNHCR and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that
    provided assistance to these refugees.
        There were no reports that the Government forcibly returned persons
    to a country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The 1991 Constitution explicitly provides this right, but
    mismanagement and serious irregularities in both the 1990 and 1996
    legislative elections and the 1993 and 1998 presidential elections
    called into serious doubt the extent to which this right exists in
    practice. A single party, the PDG, has remained in power since its
    creation by President Bongo in 1968, and political choice has remained
    limited in practice despite the legalization of opposition parties
    since 1990.
        In a July 1995 constitutional referendum, citizens approved by a 96
    percent majority reforms, that included most significantly the
    establishment of an independent National Electoral Commission (NEC).
    The referendum was carried out under arrangements that assured that all
    political parties could monitor voting and vote counting.
        The Republic is dominated by a strong Presidency. The President can
    veto legislation, dissolve the national legislature, call new
    elections, and issue decrees that have the force of law while the
    legislature is not in session. The legislature generally has approved
    legislation presented to it by the President but occasionally has not
    done so. The President appoints and can dismiss judges through the
    Ministry of Justice, to which the judiciary is responsible. The
    President appoints ministers of government, provincial governors,
    prefects and subprefects, and the heads of parastatal firms.
        PDG leader El Hadj Omar Bongo has been President since 1967, when
    the former President died while Bongo was Vice President. He was
    reelected for another 7-year term in a December 1998 election marred by
    irregularities that generally favored his incumbency, including
    incomplete and inaccurate electoral lists and the use of false
    documents to cast multiple votes. In July 1998, the Government
    transferred key electoral functions, including the maintenance of voter
    registration lists, from the NEC to the Interior Ministry. In October
    1998, the representatives of three major opposition parties withdrew
    from the NEC to protest their inability to verify the accuracy of voter
    registration lists. Official results showed Bongo winning approximately
    two-thirds of the votes cast.
        The most recent elections for the National Assembly, the lower
    house of the bicameral national legislature, held in 1996, were run
    poorly and fraudulent. National Assembly elections are held every 5
    years; the next elections are scheduled for late 2001. Candidates
    belonging to the PDG and other parties supporting President Bongo won
    more than 80 of the 120 seats, including 8 of 10 seats in the capital,
    where the opposition recently had won fairer local government
    elections. The military and NEC magistrates fraudulently ensured
    victory for parties supporting the President by altering vote counts
    arbitrarily, particularly in the capital.
        The ability of citizens to choose their subnational governments
    remains limited in practice. Among subnational officials, provincial
    governors, prefects, and subprefects are officers of the central
    Government, responsible to the President. Mayors and municipal councils
    are elected; however, municipal governments have limited financial
    autonomy and depend heavily on funding from the central Government.
        Local elections for mayors and municipal councils held in 1996 were
    organized poorly and later were repeated in key districts. In both sets
    of elections, opposition parties won most of the municipal council
    seats in the capital, Libreville, where the RNB candidate was elected
    mayor.
        The Senate, the upper house of the bicameral national legislature,
    was created in 1996. The first elections for Senators were held in
    1997. Municipal and regional government officials elect all 91
    senators.
        Major opposition parties include the RNB and the Gabonese
    Progressive Party (PGP). The RNB's political base is in the northern
    province of Woleu-Ntem, which is inhabited chiefly by members of the
    Fang ethnic group, and in Libreville neighborhoods with many Fang
    residents, although the party attracts some support from other regions
    and ethnic groups. Before the 1998 presidential election, the RNB split
    into two factions. In December it changed its name to the Rassemblement
    pour les Peuples Gabonais (RPG). The PGP enjoys strong support in Port
    Gentil, the center of the country's petroleum industry, and among the
    Myene ethnic group. Ideological splits and rivalries between Libreville
    and Port Gentil have reduced the effectiveness of the PGP.
        There are no restrictions on the participation of women and
    minorities in politics; however, women and minorities are
    underrepresented in government and politics. At year's end,
        7 of the 120 National Assembly representatives, 12 of the 91
    senators, and 5 of the 41 cabinet members were women. Indigenous
    Pygmies rarely participate in the political process, and the Government
    has made only limited efforts to include them (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government officially allows the existence of independent human
    rights groups, although few are active. These organizations advocate
    mostly on behalf of women, children, the disabled, and the homeless.
    The largest and best-financed domestic NGO's are government associated
    and financed; the president of one such NGO, GERDDES-Gabon, is a senior
    official of the ruling party. Despite an October 1999 announcement that
    it would establish a National Human Rights Commission, the Government
    had taken no action to establish one by year's end.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution forbids discrimination based on national origin,
    race, gender, or opinion. The Government does not uniformly enforce
    these constitutional provisions and tolerates a substantial degree of
    discrimination against women, especially in domestic affairs. It has
    also provided a lower level of health care and educational services to
    children of families of other African nationalities than it provided to
    citizens.
        Women.--Violence against women is common and is especially
    prevalent in rural areas. While medical authorities have not
    specifically identified rape to be a chronic problem, religious workers
    and hospital staff reported that evidence of beatings of women is
    common. Police rarely intervene in such cases, and women virtually
    never file complaints with civil authorities. Only limited medical and
    legal assistance is available.
        The law provides that women have rights to equal access in
    education, business, and investment. Women own businesses and property,
    participate in politics, and work throughout the government and the
    private sector. Women nevertheless continued to face considerable
    societal and legal discrimination, especially in rural areas. According
    to a U.N. agency, 52 percent of women were literate in 1994, compared
    with 74 percent of men.
        By law couples must stipulate at the time of marriage whether they
    intend to adhere to a monogynous or a polygynous relationship;
    according to one local NGO, polygynous marriages are more common. For
    monogynous married couples, a common property law provides for the
    equal distribution of assets after divorce. In a polygynous marriage,
    husbands are obligated to give all wives the same level of financial
    support; however, he may marry additional wives without permission from
    his existing wives. Wives who leave polygynous husbands receive half of
    their existing support as a one-time payment. In inheritance cases, the
    husband's family must issue a written authorization before his widow
    can inherit property. Common law marriage, which is accepted socially
    and widely practiced, affords a woman no property rights.
        An internal regulation still requires that a woman obtain her
    husband's permission to travel abroad; however, this requirement is not
    enforced consistently.
        Children.--The Government has used oil revenue to build schools,
    pay teachers'' salaries, and promote education, even in rural areas.
    However, with the decline in such revenues in the late 1990's, the
    upkeep of schools and payment of teachers has suffered. Education is
    compulsory until age 16 and is generally available, through sixth
    grade. However, there is evidence that fewer than half of secondary-
    school-age children attended school as of 1996; secondary school
    attendance rates for immigrant children appear likely to be lower,
    although public schools accept immigrant children, and the Government
    encouraged them to attend. Education is free except for miscellaneous
    expenses such as books and school supplies.
        The country has a relatively high infant mortality rate, and not
    all children have access to vaccinations, although the Government
    worked with international donors to improve the situation. Traditional
    beliefs and practices provide numerous safeguards for children, but
    children remain the responsibility of the extended family--including
    aunts, grandmothers, and older siblings. There is little evidence of
    physical abuse of children, although there were some reports that girls
    were sexually abused by family members after reaching puberty.
    Protection for children's rights is not codified in law. Forced child
    labor and trafficking in children are problems (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        There is concern about the problems facing the large community of
    children of African noncitizens. Almost all enjoy far less access to
    education and health care than do children of citizens and are
    sometimes victims of child labor abuses (see Section 6.d.). Female
    genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international
    health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health,
    occurs among the resident population of expatriate Africans. There are
    no laws against FGM, but according to local women's groups, it is not
    practiced on Gabonese children.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no laws that prohibit
    discrimination against persons with disabilities or that provide for
    access to buildings or services; however, there were no reports of
    discrimination against the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--The Baka people (Pygmies) are the earliest
    known human inhabitants of the country. Several thousand indigenous
    Pygmies live in the country, most in large tracts of still-intact rain
    forest in the northeast. Domestic law grants them the same civil rights
    as other citizens. Pygmies largely are independent of formal authority,
    keeping their own traditions, independent communities, and local
    decisionmaking structures. Pygmies did not participate in government-
    instituted programs that integrated many small rural villages into
    larger ones along major roads. As a result, their access to government-
    funded health and sanitation facilities was limited. There are no
    specific government programs or policies to assist or hinder Pygmies.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's citizen
    population includes several ethnic groups, each of which generally
    speaks a distinct primary language and is concentrated in an
    identifiable area of the country. There is no majority ethnic group;
    the largest ethnic group is the Fang, which makes up over 30 percent of
    the population and is concentrated in the north. Other major ethnic
    groups include the Myene, the Bapunu, the Bateke, the Obamba, and the
    Nzebi. Urban neighborhoods are not segregated ethnically; interethnic
    marriage is common.
        There was some correlation between ethnic and political divisions.
    Support for the ruling party is stronger among persons from southern
    ethnic groups, including President Bongo's Bateke ethnic group, than
    among the northern Fang group or the coastal Myene group (see Section
    3).
        The Government generally fostered ethnic balance in the public
    sector, throughout which persons from all major ethnic groups continued
    to occupy prominent positions. However, there was evidence that members
    of President's Bateke ethnic group and other ethnic southerners held a
    disproportionately large number of key positions throughout the
    military and security forces (see Section 3).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution places no
    restrictions on the right of association and recognizes the right of
    citizens to form trade and labor unions. Virtually the entire formal
    private sector work force is unionized. Unions must register with the
    Government in order to be recognized officially. Public sector
    employees may unionize although their right to strike is limited if it
    could jeopardize public safety. Until 1990 there was only one
    recognized labor organization, the Gabonese Labor Confederation
    (COSYGA), to which all unionized workers contributed a mandatory
    percentage of their salaries. In 1992 the Government accepted the
    establishment of independent unions and abolished the mandatory
    contribution to COSYGA. Since 1993 many independent unions have
    emerged, including powerful unions of teachers, civil servants,
    transport workers, and communications workers. Some independent unions
    have associated to form the Gabonese Confederation of Free Unions
    (CGSL). COSYGA has continued to be affiliated with the Government but
    has criticized publicly some government policies it perceived as
    contrary to labor interests.
        In 1994 the National Assembly passed an extensively revised version
    of the Labor Code, which was published and implemented in early 1995.
    The code provides extensive protection of worker rights.
        Strikes are legal if they are held after an 8-day notice advising
    that outside arbitration has failed. The Labor Code prohibits direct
    government action against individual strikers who abide by the
    arbitration and notification provisions. It also provides that the
    Government cannot press charges against a group for criminal activities
    committed by individuals.
        In March and again in June, employees of Sogadel, a parastatal
    agribusiness firm, went on strike to protest the failure to pay back
    wages. In both cases, although strikers burned tires and barricaded
    Libreville's main thoroughfare, police did not intervene. In August
    journalists at the national television station, RTG-1, also struck for
    back wages. The failure to pay salaries in both instances was
    attributed widely to a combination of managerial malfeasance and
    failure to receive adequate funds from the Government (see Section
    2.a.).
        Unions and confederations are free to affiliate with international
    labor bodies and participate in their activities. COSYGA is affiliated
    with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, while the CGSL is
    affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    Both COSYGA and CGSL have ties with numerous other international labor
    organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    provides for collective bargaining by industry, not by firm;
    collectively bargained agreements set wages for whole industries. Labor
    and management meet to negotiate differences, and the Ministry of Labor
    provides an observer. This observer does not take an active part in
    negotiations over pay scales, working conditions, or benefits.
    Agreements also apply to nonunion workers. While no laws specifically
    prohibit antiunion discrimination, the court may require employers who
    are found guilty by civil courts of having engaged in such
    discrimination to compensate employees.
        On October 16, 1998, authorities arrested and detained for more
    than 3 months the CGSL representative Jean-Remy Nguelany (see Section
    1.d.). Nguelany was denied bail initially but was released due to lack
    of evidence in January 1999.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor, and there are no reports that it exists in the adult
    community. The Government also specifically prohibits forced and bonded
    labor by children; however it does not enforce this prohibition
    effectively. Children--in particular immigrant children--are forced to
    work as domestic or agricultural help (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). The
    U.N. Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other concerned
    organizations reported that government officials might be involved in
    the trafficking of foreign children, mainly for use as domestic or
    agricultural workers.
        The Government cooperated actively with the UNICEF and the
    International Labor Organization (ILO) to combat forced child labor.
    The Government cohosted a regional conference on the problem in
    February and subsequently created an interministerial committee to work
    with UNICEF and the ILO to address the issue. However, critics
    maintained that government efforts were ineffective.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Children below the age of 16 may not work without the
    express consent of the Ministries of Labor, Education, and Public
    Health. These ministries rigorously enforce this law with respect to
    Gabonese children, and there are few citizens under the age of 18
    working in the modern wage sector. A significant number of children
    work in marketplaces or perform domestic duties. These children do not
    go to school, receive only limited medical attention, and often are the
    victims of exploitation by employers or foster families. Laws
    forbidding child labor theoretically extend protection to foreign
    children as well, but abuses often are not reported. Estimates of the
    number of child laborers range between 5,000 and 10,000, but the
    problem is difficult to quantify since most children work in the
    informal sector.
        The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182. It made a
    public commitment in February to eliminate the worst forms of child
    labor; however, the law does not define the worst forms of child labor
    or hazardous work, although the Legal Code stipulates fines and prison
    sentences for violations of the minimum age for working. The Ministry
    of Justice is responsible for implementing and enforcing child labor
    laws and regulations. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor are
    responsible for receiving, investigating, and addressing child labor
    complaints; however, the inspection force is inadequate, complaints are
    not investigated routinely, and violations are not addressed
    adequately. There are no legal remedies available to private persons
    victimized by the worst forms of child labor.
        From February 22 to 24, the Government cohosted a conference on
    child trafficking and exploitative labor in Central and West Africa as
    a cooperative effort between the Government, UNICEF, and the ILO; the
    Ministry of Labor chaired an interministerial committee to follow up on
    the recommendations of the regional conference. The Government also
    participated in a conference in Libreville from April 12 to 14 to
    address the problem of abandoned street children.
        Education is compulsory until age 16 and is generally available,
    through sixth grade. However, there is evidence that fewer than half of
    all secondary-school-age children attended school as of 1996; secondary
    school attendance rates for immigrant children appear likely to be
    lower, although public schools accept immigrant children, and the
    Government encourages them to attend.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but
    does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    UNICEF and other concerned organizations reported that government
    officials might be involved in the trafficking of foreign children,
    mainly for use as domestic or agricultural help (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code governs working
    conditions and benefits for all sectors and provides a broad range of
    protection to workers. The code stipulates a 40-hour workweek with a
    minimum rest period of 48 consecutive hours. Employers must compensate
    workers for overtime work. All companies in the modern wage sector pay
    competitive wages and grant generous fringe benefits required by law,
    including maternity leave and 6 weeks of annual paid vacation.
        Traditionally, representatives of labor, management, and the
    Government met annually to examine economic and labor conditions and to
    recommend a minimum wage rate within government guidelines to the
    President, who then issued an annual decree. This procedure has not
    been followed since 1994, in part because the Government was pursuing a
    policy of wage austerity recommended by international financial
    institutions. The monthly minimum wage, excluding benefits provided
    only to some workers, was approximately $93 (64,000 FCFA). Government
    workers receive transportation, housing, and family benefits; however,
    the law does not mandate housing or family benefits for private sector
    workers. Given the high cost of living, the minimum wage does not
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
        The Ministry of Health has established occupational health and
    safety standards, but it does not enforce or regulate them effectively.
    The application of labor standards varies greatly from company to
    company and between industries. The Government reportedly does not
    enforce Labor Code provisions in sectors where the bulk of the labor
    force is foreign. Foreigners, both documented and undocumented, may be
    obliged to work under substandard conditions; may be dismissed without
    notice or recourse; or may be mistreated physically, especially in the
    case of illegal aliens. Employers frequently require longer hours of
    work from noncitizen Africans and pay them less, often hiring on a
    short-term, casual basis in order to avoid paying taxes, social
    security contributions, and other benefits. In the formal sector,
    workers may remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
    fear of retribution.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits
    trafficking in persons, (although authorities have indicated that a
    provision of the Constitution that prohibits endangering the physical
    well-being of a person authorizes the State to prosecute persons who
    commit this abuse), and there were reports of trafficking in children.
        Children (especially girls) reportedly were trafficked into the
    country, primarily from West Africa, for use as domestic or
    agricultural labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). Some of the children
    reportedly suffered sexual abuse. UNICEF and other concerned
    organizations reported that government officials might be involved in
    the trafficking of foreign children, mainly for use as domestic or
    agricultural workers (see Section 6.c.). There were no reports that
    adults were trafficked to, from, through, or within the country during
    the year.
                                   __________

                                   THE GAMBIA

        The Gambia is ruled by President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, the former
    chairman of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) that
    seized power in a military coup in 1994, deposing a democratically
    elected government. Jammeh resigned his military commission and was
    elected president in controversial elections in September 1996, which
    observers considered neither free nor fair. Two of the 13 members of
    the current Cabinet are retired army officers who were Jammeh's allies
    during or immediately following the coup, and security forces continue
    to exert strong influence in the Government. In January 1997, the
    Constitution of the Second Republic came into effect, restoring formal
    constitutional government, and citizens chose a National Assembly in
    elections, the results of which generally were accepted by the
    opposition. Jammeh's party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation
    and Construction (APRC), won 33 of the 45 assembly seats filled by
    election. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;
    however, the judiciary, especially at lower levels, reportedly is
    subject at times to executive branch pressure, although the courts have
    demonstrated their independence on occasion.
        The Gambian National Army (GNA) reports to the Secretary of State
    for Defense (who is now the President). The police report to the
    Secretary of State for the Interior. The National Intelligence Agency
    (NIA), established in 1995 by government decree, reports directly to
    the President but is otherwise autonomous. Members of the security
    forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        The rapidly growing population of 1.384 million is divided between
    a rural majority and a growing urban minority. Much of the population
    is engaged in subsistence farming. The country's farmers, a majority of
    whom are women, grow rice, millet, corn, and groundnuts (the country's
    primary export crop). The private sector is led by tourism, trading,
    and fisheries. The high population growth rate has diluted the positive
    effects of modest economic expansion. Per capita gross domestic product
    is estimated to be $240, a decline from recent levels partly due to
    currency depreciation.
        The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it
    continued to commit serious abuses. President Jammeh's dominance and
    restrictions on opposition parties continued. In practice citizens do
    not have an effective right to change their government. Security forces
    committed some extrajudicial killings and beat or otherwise mistreated
    detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions remained very poor. Security
    forces arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens, particularly
    opposition politicians and journalists; some of the detainees alleged
    harsh treatment while being arrested and detained. The courts
    reportedly are subject to executive branch pressure, particularly at
    lower levels, although magistrates occasionally demonstrated some
    independence by ruling against the Government. There were reports of
    political prisoners. The Government at times infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. The Government significantly limited freedom of speech
    and of the press through intimidation and fear. Journalists practice
    self-censorship. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and
    association. The opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) was
    repeatedly attacked at political rallies by agents of the allegedly
    disbanded progovernment July 22 youth movement. The Government denied
    the UDP party permits to hold rallies at several times throughout the
    year. The Government at times limited freedom of movement. Violence and
    discrimination against women persisted. The practice of female genital
    mutilation (FGM) is widespread and entrenched. Child labor was a
    problem, and there were some instances of child prostitution.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings; however, on occasion,
    security forces committed extrajudicial killings.
        On March 9, Ebrima Barry, a student, died after being taken into
    custody and reportedly beaten by fire department personnel. Security
    forces killed at least 14 persons during student riots on April 10 and
    11 to protest the death of the student (see Section 2.b.). Security
    forces shot and killed Omar Barrow, a journalist and Red Cross
    volunteer, while he was working at the Red Cross facility to assist
    wounded demonstrators. Despite the Government's initial insistence that
    security forces did not use live ammunition to suppress the riot,
    student victims and other witnesses alleged otherwise. A government
    commission of inquiry reportedly concluded that the Police Intervention
    Unit (PIU) officers were ``largely responsible'' for many of the deaths
    and other injuries. The inquiry also revealed that five soldiers of the
    2nd Infantry Battalion were responsible for the deaths of two students
    at Brikama. The Government stated that the report implicated several
    PIU officers in the students'' deaths and injuries. The official
    coroner's report and commission of inquiry report were not publicized
    widely by the Government. Three police officers at Brikama were found
    to have unlawfully searched, arrested, and detained people there. At
    year's end, no action had been taken against those responsible for the
    shootings (see Section 1.d.).
        On January 15, soldiers shot and killed two military personnel whom
    they were trying to arrest for allegedly attempting to overthrow the
    Government (see Section 1.d.).
        In January 1999, rebels allegedly belonging to the Movement of
    Democratic Forces for the Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal crossed the
    border and attacked the village of Gambissara, killing two persons. On
    January 16, police arrested three alleged members of the MFDC; however,
    at year's end, the Government had taken no further action in the case.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture or inhuman or degrading
    punishment; however, security forces sometimes beat or otherwise
    mistreated detainees and prisoners. There also were reports that
    security forces beat military and security detainees, and that security
    prisoners sometimes are threatened with summary execution.
        Security forces beat several dozen persons including school
    children during the April 10 and 11 student demonstrations (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.a.). Many detained students claimed that
    armed soldiers beat them with gun butts and iron cables. One student
    detained at the army barracks claimed that he and other students were
    abused and harassed while in detention. Credible witnesses reported
    seeing elementary-school age children released from custody with severe
    bruises, bleeding cuts, and shaved heads, and stripped of their
    clothes. Other witnesses reported that a mother, attempting to see her
    child at the Kairaba police station, was beaten severely with a rifle
    butt. The students were protesting the death of a student on March 9
    while in custody of fire department personnel and the alleged early
    April rape of a girl by an unidentified man in uniform, whom many
    believed to be a member of the Government's security forces.
        On January 15, Ousman Ceesay, a freelance reporter, claimed to have
    suffered rough treatment and threats by soldiers in Banjul for
    interviewing a soldier at the site of an exchange of gunfire between
    soldiers and units of the State House Guards.
        In May a journalist from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
    reported that he was arrested, detained, beaten, and denied medical
    treatment by immigration authorities (see Section 1.d.).
        Armed soldiers at times harassed and detained citizens and
    foreigners at gunpoint, particularly at the Denton Bridge checkpoint
    outside of Banjul (see Section 2.d.).
        No action was taken in the 1999 case when police allegedly severely
    beat and tortured an opposition politician who was arrested and
    detained for 2 days. There were no developments in the promised
    investigation of the detention and torture of eight UDP officials in
    1997. At the time of the incident, the Government promised a full
    investigation and appropriate action by the Attorney General. Since the
    incident, police investigators have interviewed some witnesses, but
    some victims have said that they have not been contacted. No one has
    been arrested, and no results of the investigation have been made
    public.
        Conditions at Mile 2, Janjanbureh, and Jeshwang prisons remained
    very poor. Mile 2 prison was reported to be grim, overcrowded, and
    lacking in medical facilities. Prisoners were locked in their cells for
    over 20 hours each day. There were credible reports of beatings,
    malnourishment, and other harsh treatment of political, military, and
    security detainees. Women are housed separately; juveniles are housed
    with adults.
        Conditions in one representative local jail reportedly were
    unsanitary and overcrowded. Inmates slept on cement benches or on the
    floor without blankets. There was one water tap in the cell area but
    often no water. Police are reluctant to terminate fistfights between
    prisoners until the dispute is settled, and many of the prisoners are
    injured.
        Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) generally are permitted
    to visit prisons upon request. A member of the African Commission on
    Human and Peoples' Rights and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Prisons
    and Conditions of Detention in Africa visited the three prisons during
    the year. The International Committee of the Red Cross visited local
    prisons several times during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    includes provisions to protect against arbitrary arrest and detention;
    however, on occasion, security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained
    citizens. Periods of detention ranged from a few hours to several days.
        The Government has not revoked formally military decrees enacted
    prior to the current Constitution that give the NIA and the Secretary
    of State for Interior broad power to detain individuals indefinitely
    without charge if ``in the interest of national security.'' The
    Constitution provides that decrees remain in effect unless inconsistent
    with constitutional provisions. These detention decrees appear to be
    inconsistent with the Constitution, but they have not yet been subject
    to judicial challenge. The Government has stated that it no longer
    enforces these decrees; however, in some instances, the Government did
    not respect the constitutional requirement that detainees be brought
    before a court within 72 hours.
        In January military officials arrested and detained Lieutenant
    Landing Sanneh and at least 10 other military personnel accused of
    attempting to overthrow the Government on January 15. Lieutenant Almamo
    Manneh and Corporal Momodou Dumbuya, also implicated in the alleged
    plot, were shot and killed by soldiers who were trying to apprehend
    them. The treason hearing of Lieutenant Sanneh opened on May 12 at the
    High Court, but the other detained soldiers were not brought before a
    military or civilian court by year's end. In September the army
    announced that some of the soldiers who had been detained at the Yundum
    Barracks in connection with the January 15 alleged coup were released
    and returned to active duty. At year's end, at least one soldier, the
    alleged coup leader, was still detained without charge.
        On February 4, police arrested Momodou Wallom Jallow, an
    independent National Assembly member, in his constituency in Niamina
    district and detained him at the NIA headquarters in Banjul for 4 days
    without charge. Jallow's political opponents allegedly reported him to
    the police for making favorable comments regarding the alleged coup
    attempt.
        In April police arrested five UDP activists of Tambakoto village,
    North Bank Division and detained them at the Janjanburay prison for
    several days following a fight with the village head, who subsequently
    seized their farm lands (see Section 1.f.). The five claimed wrongful
    arrest and detention, and complained about poor prison conditions and
    inadequate food (see Section 1.c.).
        Following a demonstration on April 10 (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and
    2.b.), security forces arrested hundreds of students and detained them
    at police stations, military barracks, and the NIA headquarters between
    April 10 and 15. Some students were held incommunicado for over 72
    hours, often with little food or water. Student leaders were held for
    longer periods; some were held over 2 weeks. Parents were denied access
    to their children. On May 18 the Supreme Court ordered the release of
    all students. One student detained at the army barracks claimed that he
    and other students were abused and harassed while in detention.
    Credible witnesses report seeing elementary-school age children
    released from custody with severe bruises, bleeding cuts, and shaved
    heads, and stripped of their clothes.
        On April 12, police arrested a UDP National Assembly member, Buba
    Samura, in Brikama while he was traveling to Banjul. He was detained
    incommunicado at the Brikama Police station for several days without
    charge. Allegedly Samura was arrested after he was overheard commending
    the students for their actions during the April 10 and 11
    demonstrations and stating that President Jammeh's misrule caused the
    riots.
        In May Mohamad Mboyo, a visiting journalist from the DRC, reported
    that he was arrested unlawfully and detained for more than 24 hours by
    the police. Mboyo was arrested by an immigration officer at the Banjul
    ferry terminal and accused of ``being a Nigerian'' despite his
    identification papers to the contrary. He allegedly was beaten,
    detained, and denied medical treatment.
        On June 17, during a country-wide political campaign, UDP leader
    Ousainou Darboe, 80 UDP supporters, and journalist Madi Ceesay were
    detained at the Basse police station for 3 days following a clash
    between supporters of the ruling APRC and the UDP in which an APRC
    supporter allegedly was killed. Police denied the UDP party permits to
    hold rallies in Upper River Division after the incident. Darboe, 24 UDP
    supporters, and Ceesay were charged with the murder of the APRC
    supporter Alieu Njie. The Supreme Court dismissed the charges against
    19 UDP members and journalist Madi Ceesay in October; however, the
    murder charge against UDP leader Darboe and 4 of his closest associates
    remained in effect, and Darboe's trial began on November 1. No decision
    had been made on the case by year's end.
        Between June 22 and 23, security agents arrested and detained four
    civilians (Ebrima Yabo, Ebrima Barrow, Momodou Marenah, Modou Saho) and
    two security officers (lieutenants Lalo Jaiteh and Omar Darboe) on
    suspicion of attempting to violate state security. Persons claiming to
    be security forces abducted the civilians from their homes; initially,
    both the NIA and police denied knowledge of their arrests and
    detentions. After 3 weeks of complaints by their families, the
    Inspector General of Police revealed that the four civilians and two
    security officers had been arraigned before a Magistrates'' Court on
    July 14 on charges of treason. According to their attorneys, the
    accused were not charged within the constitutionally required 72 hours.
    At year's end, some of the individuals were released, but others
    continued to be detained pending a trial.
        In June army and NIA officers arrested, detained, and held
    incommunicado a local employee of a foreign embassy. He was questioned
    for 2 days in regard to his official duties and ultimately released
    without charge.
        On July 25, the police arrested the editor in chief and a
    journalist from the Independent newspaper and detained them at the
    Banjul police station for reporting on a hunger strike at Mile 2 Prison
    (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
        On September 2, police arrested Omar Kebba Mass, a UDP National
    Assembly member, and 16 UDP supporters and detained them at the
    Mansaknoko police station for approximately 13 hours without charge.
    The UDP officials allegedly were detained because of a fight with APRC
    supporters at a football match; the APRC supporters were not detained.
        In January charges of ``libel against the President'' were dropped
    for three journalists from The Independent newspaper.
        Police arrested and detained several opposition militants. Three
    opposition National Assembly members and supporters were arrested and
    detained during the year, some for more than 72 hours, without charge.
        The Government did not use forced exile; however, former President
    Jawara remains outside the country under threat of arrest and detention
    on corruption charges if he returns. Other senior officials of the
    former government, for example, Vice President Saihou Sabally and
    Secretary General Abdou Sara Janha, also remained outside the country,
    but do not face official charges.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judiciary reportedly is subject at
    times to executive branch pressure, especially at the lower levels. The
    courts nevertheless have demonstrated their independence on several
    occasions, at times in significant cases. For example, following the
    April riots, the Supreme Court ruled that the continued detention of
    Gambia Student Union leaders was illegal. Also the Supreme Court
    required that chieftaincy elections be held in the Saami district in
    November, ruling that a presidentially appointed chief was installed
    unconstitutionally following the President's dismissal of the previous
    chief.
        In 1997 the Court of Appeal, the country's highest court,
    overturned the treason convictions and death sentences of four men who
    led an abortive coup in November 1996. The Government has appealed this
    decision to the Privy Council in London, but at year's end, the case
    was pending before the Supreme Court.
        The judicial system comprises the Court of Appeal, high courts,
    eight magistrate's courts and a Supreme Court, which began operations
    in 1999. Village chiefs preside over local courts at the village level.
        The judicial system recognizes customary, Shari'a, and general law.
    Customary law covers marriage and divorce for non-Muslims, inheritance,
    land tenure, tribal and clan leadership, and all other traditional and
    social relations. Shari'a law is observed primarily in Muslim marriage
    and divorce matters. General law, following the English model, applies
    to felonies, misdemeanors in urban areas, and the formal business
    sector. Trials are public, and defendants have the right to an attorney
    at their own cost.
        Persons have been held extended periods without trial. For example,
    Suwandi Camara was arrested in Senegal in March 1997 and extradited to
    the Gambia in July 1997. Subsequently, he was interrogated by the NIA
    and taken to Mile 2 prison; no charge was brought against him, and in
    December the Government objected to his request for bail. However, on
    December 14, the High Court ruled that Camara's arrest and continued
    detention was unlawful and unconstitutional, and it ordered his
    immediate and unconditional release.
        The 1998 trial of three men accused of complicity in a July 1997
    coup attempt concluded in October 1998 with the conviction of treason
    of the three; they were sentenced to death. Their appeals of the
    convictions were pending at year's end.
        The junta that took power in 1994 appointed four commissions to
    investigate individuals and organizations suspected of corruption
    during the First Republic. These commissions had powers similar to a
    grand jury, with additional authority to recommend the seizure of
    assets, to imprison and fine for contempt, and to imprison or demand
    bond from individuals considered likely to abscond. The commissions
    were closed in December 1999; however, no findings were made public by
    year's end.
        There are reports of a small number of political prisoners,
    including the former AFPRC vice chairman, Lieutenant Sana Sabally, held
    at Mile 2 prison in Banjul. International and domestic human rights
    organizations were not permitted access to these individuals.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such abuses; however,
    although the Government generally respects these prohibitions, in
    practice there were some exceptions. The Government has not canceled
    Decree 45, which abrogates Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary
    search and permits search and seizure of property without due process.
    This decree remains formally in effect, pending a judicial finding that
    the decree is inconsistent with the Constitution. In practice the
    Government appears not to enforce it, but no court case has been
    brought to test the decree's constitutionality.
        Observers assume that the Government monitors citizens possibly
    engaged in activity that it deems objectionable. In the past,
    surveillance included monitoring of telephones and mail. In previous
    years, investigating commissions made findings resulting in the
    forfeiture of private property, principally that property held by
    former government and parastatal officials. The work of these
    commissions, which began under the AFPRC regime, is sanctioned under
    the Constitution with provisions for due process; however, it is not
    clear that the full rights of due process were accorded to officials
    investigated by the commissions before the Constitution took effect.
    The evidentiary standards applied by the commissions in ordering the
    forfeiture of money and property are not clear, and orders by the
    commissions have not yet been subject to effective judicial review.
        Following the student demonstrations, security forces undertook a
    search to arrest students suspected of participating in the
    demonstrations (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
        The Government restricted the right to transfer funds or assets of
    most senior officials of the former Jawara government accused of
    corruption.
        In April the Tambakoto village head illegally seized the land of
    five UDP activists; by year's end, the lands had not been returned.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and the press; however, in practice, the Government
    significantly limited the full exercise of these freedoms by using
    intimidation, police pressure, regulatory scrutiny, and laws that
    inhibit the media. The Government also employed arrest, detention, and
    interrogation to intimidate journalists and newspapers that published
    articles that it considered inaccurate or sensitive (see Section 1.d.).
    As a result, journalists practice a significant degree of self-
    censorship.
        In January President Jammeh dropped the libel charges against the
    Independent Newspaper's editor in chief Baba Galleh Jallow, managing
    editor Alhagie Yoro Jallow, and a journalist. The Independent staff
    were arrested and charged for ``libel against the President'' following
    an article they wrote in December 1999 that questioned the stability of
    Jammeh's marriage. However, the editors of The Independent claimed that
    the Government continued to harass and intimidate their staff and
    families after the charges were dropped. On June 20, immigration
    officers questioned Baba Galleh Jallow and Alhagie Yoro Jallow
    regarding their citizenship. On July 25, Baba Galleh Jallow and
    reporter Alhagie Mbye were taken to Banjul Police headquarters and
    detained for 7 hours because of an article that they published
    regarding a hunger strike at Mile 2 prison (see Section 1.c.).
        In July President Jammeh threatened to discharge the staff of the
    state-owned Gambia Radio because he suspected them of being opposition
    sympathizers. Jammeh made the threat during a meeting with APRC youth
    wing members on the anniversary of the July 22 coup that brought him to
    power. He claimed that members of the Radio Gambia staff misrepresented
    his speeches in their news bulletins, and he warned that anybody ``bent
    on disturbing the peace and stability of the nation will be buried 6
    feet deep''. Private journalists and the general public condemned
    Jammeh's threat and accused him of intimidating journalists of the
    public radio and television.
        Decrees 70 and 71, enacted in 1996, remained in effect and
    continued to inhibit free reporting. The decrees require all newspapers
    to post a $6,500 (100,000 Dalasis) bond or cease publication. The bond
    is required to ensure payment of any penalties imposed by a court for
    the publication of blasphemous or seditious articles or other libel.
    State-owned publications are not subject to these decrees. The
    possession and distribution of documents deemed to be ``political
    literature'' also is barred by decree. These decrees and the fear of
    reprisals and government action have had a chilling effect on the
    press. Although still independent, the nongovernment press practices a
    significant degree of self-censorship. However, strong criticism of the
    Government was frequent, and opposition views appeared in the
    independent press. English, French, and other foreign newspapers and
    magazines were available.
        Radio broadcasts from the government station and private stations
    normally reach listeners in the eastern part of the country. Private
    radio stations simulcast news provided by Radio Gambia, the government
    station. Only one private radio station produced independent news
    broadcasts throughout the year. In 1998 the Kanifing Magistrates Court
    seized the independent Citizen FM radio station and its equipment for
    failure to pay licensing fees. On July 3, the High Court ruled that the
    Government had seized Citizen FM radio station wrongly and ordered that
    the station's assets be returned to the station's proprietor. The
    station resumed broadcasting in October. Occasionally there were public
    affairs broadcasts on at least two independent radio stations. The
    British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio France International, and other
    foreign news reports sometimes are rebroadcast by local stations, and
    all are available via shortwave radio. Senegalese television and radio
    are available in many parts of the country. Wealthy residents also used
    television satellite systems for independent news coverage.
        On August 10, a group of unidentified arsonists attempted to burn
    the private radio station, Radio 1 FM. Owner George Christensen, a
    radio announcer, and a watchman were injured while trying to extinguish
    the fire. Christensen reported that he had been alerted 2 days earlier
    that some persons were planning to attack the radio station, and he had
    informed a senior army officer about the matter. On August 14, a group
    of unidentified persons again attempted to burn the house of a Radio 1
    announcer.
        Government radio and television gave very limited coverage to
    opposition activities, including statements by opposition
    parliamentarians in the National Assembly. In most other respects, the
    state media served as propaganda instruments for the Government and its
    supporters.
        There was convenient, inexpensive Internet access through Internet
    cafes and private accounts. The Government did not restrict Internet
    access or operation.
        There were no reports of any government restrictions on academic
    freedom. There is one national college, a university extension program,
    and several smaller, private, postsecondary educational institutions.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted
    this right in practice. The authorities interfered with efforts by the
    principal opposition party, the UDP, to organize public meetings.
        On April 10, Gambia Student Union members attempted to hold a
    peaceful demonstration to protest the alleged mishandling of the
    investigation into the death of a student while in the custody of fire
    officers (see Section 1.a.). The students also were protesting the
    alleged rape of a 13-year old school girl by an unidentified man in
    uniform (see Section 1.c.). When police attempted to stop the
    demonstration, the student demonstrators burned tires and threw stones.
    In response security forces used live ammunition against the students,
    killing and injuring many students and arrested hundreds of students
    (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.).
        In June and July, the Government denied the UDP permits to hold
    rallies following a clash between a group of former-July 22 APRC
    Movement members and UDP supporters on June 17. The UDP was blamed for
    violating conditions of the Public Order Act by using abusive words
    against government authorities and individuals at public rallies.
    However, after July the UDP held several rallies in the greater Banjul
    area without government intervention.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice. Decree 89 banned from
    political activity three major opposition political parties, and all
    former presidents, vice presidents, and ministers until 2024. The
    decree's penalty of life imprisonment for an individual or a $65,000 (1
    million Dalasis) fine for an organization considerably restricts
    political activity (see Section 3). Despite the fact that the decree
    apparently conflicts with provisions of the Constitution, it has not
    been challenged in court. The severe penalties for violating the decree
    have inhibited political challenge, since most cases would have to be
    brought by a person who violated the decree. The three banned major
    parties have not resumed activity nor have the various political
    figures covered under the ban done so.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
        In May 1998, the imam of the largest mosque in Brikama was arrested
    together with a leading opposition party politician and eight others in
    a dispute over minor construction work at a mosque that reportedly was
    financed by supporters of the ruling party. In February 1999, the High
    Court acquitted all of the defendants of destruction of property and
    discharged the case. However, the Government filed an appeal in the
    High Court for the imam and three others to be retried. The imam's
    lawyer filed a writ of summons in the High Court, which ruled that it
    had no jurisdiction over the matter and referred the case to a district
    tribunal. Subsequently, the case was filed at the Court of Appeal, but
    the case was adjourned until April. At year's end, it had not been
    heard. In November the imam was reinstated at the Brikama mosque and
    was leading prayers.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement but allows for ``reasonable restrictions,'' and there were
    instances in which the Government restricted this right. Following the
    alleged January 15 coup attempt, armed soldiers harassed and detained
    citizens and foreigners at the Denton Bridge checkpoint for not
    carrying their identification cards. However, the Army Chief of Staff,
    at a press conference on January 19, apologized to the victims and
    called on the public to understand that the soldiers only were
    conducting their duties for security reasons. There were no reported
    harassments and detentions thereafter.
        The authorities prohibited those under investigation for corruption
    or security matters from leaving the country. A few politicians
    associated with the opposition UDP also were denied passports, although
    they were not facing corruption or security charges. The leader of the
    opposition UDP and other opposition figures have traveled outside the
    country without incident.
        The law does not provide for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government
    cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
    Although there was no available estimate of the numbers involved, the
    Government provides first asylum and provided it to persons from
    Senegal and Guinea-Bissau during the year. The Government works with
    the UNHCR and local NGO's in processing refugee claims. The country
    hosts approximately 8,000 refugees from Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea-
    Bissau, Liberia, and other countries. The Government continued to host
    approximately 3,500 Senegalese refugees from the troubled Casamance
    region. There were no further UNHCR repatriations to the Casamance as
    in previous years.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons with a valid
    claim to refugee status to a country where they feared persecution.
        There were reports that on occasion, immigration authorities
    harassed and detained immigrants and others (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
    and 2.a.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Despite a new Constitution and legislative elections in 1997,
    citizens still do not have an effective right to change their
    government in practice. Citizens attempted to exercise this right in
    presidential elections in 1996; however, the few international
    observers who were present noted serious problems in the electoral
    process. Foreign governments criticized the election as not being free
    and fair, primarily because of government intimidation, restrictions
    imposed by the Government on opposition campaign efforts, and limited
    access to the government-owned media prior to the election.
        Government-owned media continued to deny news coverage and other
    access to opposition politicians and engaged in a number of other
    practices that restricted political activity (see Section 2.a.). The
    Government frequently refused to authorize opposition meetings (see
    Section 2.b.). Decree 89 bans three former political parties and all
    persons who held the offices of president, vice president, and minister
    since 1965 from involvement in politics until 2024 (see Section 2.b.).
    Although Decree 89 apparently is unconstitutional, it has not been
    challenged in the courts and remained in effect. The severe penalties
    for violating the decree have inhibited challenge, since most cases
    would have to be brought by a person who violated the decree.
        In January 1997, the Constitution of the Second Republic came into
    effect, and citizens chose a new National Assembly in elections whose
    results were accepted by the opposition. President Jammeh's party, the
    Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) won 33 of
    45 assembly seats filled by election; 4 members are appointed by the
    President. Procedural methods are used to restrict debate within the
    National Assembly.
        The Constitution provides for the democratic election of the
    President every 5 years. National Assembly elections are held 3 months
    after the presidential elections. Presidential elections are scheduled
    for 2001. Local elections originally scheduled for 1998 were postponed;
    no new date has been fixed yet.
        There are no legal obstacles to the participation of women in
    government; however, they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. One of the 45 members of the National Assembly is a woman.
    The Vice President (who is also Minister of Women's Affairs) is a
    woman, and there are two female ministers in the Cabinet.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are several organizations whose mandates provide for human
    rights monitoring. The AFPRC's Decree 81 of 1996 requires NGO's to
    register with the National Advisory Council, which has the authority to
    deny, suspend, or cancel the right of any NGO to operate (including
    that of international NGO's). However, the Government did not take
    action against any NGO's during the year.
        There are three major organizations whose primary mandate is the
    promotion of human rights--the International Society for Human Rights
    (ISHRA), the African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
    (ACDHRS), and the Institute for Human Rights and Development (IHRD).
    Both the ISHRA and the ACDHRS have conducted training in democratic
    rights and civic education. The IHRD focuses principally on the
    operations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, an
    organ of the Organization of African Unity based in Banjul. Other human
    rights groups included the African Society of International and
    Comparative Law with two-full time staff members and the Foundation for
    Research on Women's Health, Productivity, and the Environment organized
    in 1991 to work on issues pertaining to woman's health and productivity
    with two full-time staff working on FGM.
        In May 1999, President Jammeh appointed the first government
    ombudsman as required in the Constitution. On May 3, 1999, the National
    Assembly approved the appointment. During the year, the office of the
    ombudsman began operations and was charged with investigating
    allegations of maladministration, mismanagement, or discrimination;
    however, it did not take significant action in these areas.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government
    generally respects these prohibitions.
        Women.--Domestic violence, including abuse, is a problem; it is
    reported occasionally, and its occurrence is believed to be common.
    Police tend to consider these incidents to be domestic issues outside
    of their ordinary jurisdiction. Rape and assault are crimes under the
    law; rape is not common. The law does not differentiate between married
    and unmarried women in this regard. Sexual harassment is not believed
    to be widespread, although individual instances have been noted.
        Traditional views of women's roles result in extensive societal
    discrimination in education and employment. Employment in the formal
    sector is open to women at the same salary rates as men. No statutory
    discrimination exists in other kinds of employment; however, women
    generally are employed in endeavors such as food vending or subsistence
    farming.
        Shari'a law usually is applied in divorce and inheritance matters
    for Muslims, who make up approximately 90 percent of the population.
    Women normally receive a lower proportion of assets distributed through
    inheritance than do male relatives.
        Marriages often are arranged and, depending on the ethnic group,
    polygyny is practiced. Women in polygynous unions have property and
    other rights arising from the marriage. They have the option to
    divorce, but not a legal right to approve or be notified in advance of
    subsequent marriages.
        Active women's rights groups exist; they are focused primarily on
    economic issues and the elimination of female genital mutilation (FGM).
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare. The
    Department of Education and the Department of Health, Social Welfare,
    and Women's Affairs are the two most generously funded departments.
    However, the lack of resources limits state provision of both education
    and health services.
        The Constitution mandates free compulsory primary education, but
    the state of the educational infrastructure prevents effective
    compulsory education. However, in February 1998, the President
    announced an end to fees for the first 6 years of schooling, and the
    Government has implemented the decision. Opportunities for secondary
    education are more limited. The participation of girls in education is
    very low. Females constitute about 40 percent of primary school
    students and roughly one-third of high school students. The enrollment
    of girls is particularly low in rural areas where a combination of
    poverty and socio-cultural factors influence parents' decisions not to
    send girls to school.
        The care and welfare of children in distress is considered
    primarily a family responsibility. In cases of divorce, the Department
    of Social Welfare attempts to require periodic financial support by
    fathers; however, there is no criminal prosecution when fathers fail to
    provide financial support.
        Authorities generally intervene when cases of child abuse or
    mistreatment are brought to their attention; however, there is no
    societal pattern of abuse against children. Any person who has carnal
    knowledge of a girl under the age of 16 is guilty of a felony (except
    in the case of marriage, which can be as early as 12 years of age;
    incest is also illegal. These laws generally are enforced. Serious
    cases of abuse and violence against children are subject to criminal
    penalties.
        There are a few instances of child street begging. The tourist
    industry has stimulated a low level of child prostitution, which is
    prosecuted vigorously. In rural areas, most children assist their
    families in farm and housework. In urban areas, many children work as
    street vendors or taxi and bus assistants (see Section 6.d.).
        The practice of female genital mutilation, which is widely
    condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical
    and psychological health, is widespread and entrenched. Reports place
    the number of women having been subjected to FGM at between 60 and 90
    percent. Seven of the nine major ethnic groups practice FGM at ages
    varying from shortly after birth until 16 years old. In recent years,
    the Government publicly has supported efforts to eradicate FGM and
    discourages FGM through health education; however, the Government has
    not passed legislation against FGM, and FGM is not considered a
    criminal act. In February 1999, President Jammeh stated publicly that
    the Government would not ban FGM, and that FGM is a part of the
    country's culture.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no statutes or regulations
    requiring accessibility for the disabled. No legal discrimination
    against the physically disabled exists in employment, education, or
    other state services. Severely disabled individuals subsist primarily
    through private charity. Less severely disabled individuals are
    accepted fully in society, and they encounter no discrimination in
    employment for which they are physically capable.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Labor Act, which applies to
    all workers except civil servants, specifies that workers are free to
    form associations, including trade unions, and provides for their
    registration with the Government. It specifically prohibits police
    officers and military personnel, as well as other civil service
    employees, from forming unions or striking. About 20 percent of the
    work force is employed in the modern wage sector, where unions are most
    active. Approximately 30,000 workers are union members, constituting
    about 10 percent of the work force. The country became a full member of
    the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1995; however, it has not
    ratified any ILO conventions.
        The Gambian Worker's Confederation and the Gambian Workers' Union
    (GWU) are the two main independent and competing umbrella
    organizations. The Government recognizes both organizations.
        The Labor Act authorizes strikes but requires that unions give the
    Commissioner of Labor 14 days' written notice before beginning an
    industrial action (28 days for essential services). It prohibits
    retribution against strikers who comply with the law regulating
    strikes. Upon application by an employer to a court, the court may
    prohibit industrial action that is ruled to be in pursuit of a
    political objective. The court also may forbid action judged to be in
    breach of a collectively agreed procedure for settlement of industrial
    disputes. Because of these provisions and the weakness of unions, few
    strikes occur.
        In July there was a brief strike for higher wages at a Banjul soft-
    drink factory; the strike was resolved, but details of the settlement
    were not disclosed.
        Unions and union confederations may affiliate internationally, and
    there were no restrictions on union members' participation in
    international labor activities. The GWU is a member of the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1990 Labor
    Act allows workers to organize and bargain collectively. Although trade
    unions are small and fragmented, collective bargaining takes place.
    Each recognized union has guidelines for its activities specified by
    the appropriate industrial council established and empowered by the
    Labor Act. Union members' wages exceeded legal minimums and are
    determined by collective bargaining, arbitration, or agreements reached
    between unions and management after insuring that the agreements are in
    compliance with labor law. No denial of registration has been reported.
    The act also sets minimum contract standards for hiring, training,
    terms of employment, and provides that contracts may not prohibit union
    membership. Employers may not fire or discriminate against members of
    registered unions for engaging in legal union activities.
        The Government established an export processing zone (EPZ) at the
    port of Banjul and the adjacent bonded warehouses. Several companies,
    including peanut oil exporters, began operation in the EPZ in August.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
    law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by children;
    however, it is not known to occur. Most children performing customary
    chores or who are engaged in petty trading do so as a part of an
    extended family (see Section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment is 18 years.
    There is no effective compulsory education, and because of limited
    secondary school openings, most children complete formal education by
    age 14 and then begin work. Employee labor cards, which include a
    person's age, are registered with the Labor Commissioner, but
    enforcement inspections rarely take place. Child labor protection does
    not extend to youth performing customary chores on family farms or
    engaged in petty trading. In rural areas, most children assisted their
    families in farming and housework. In urban areas, many children worked
    as street vendors or taxi and bus assistants. The tourist industry has
    stimulated a low level of child prostitution (see Section 5).
        On November 8, the National Assembly approved ILO Convention 182 on
    the worst forms of child labor; however, as of year's end, the
    Government had not completed formal ratification procedures. The
    Department of State for Labor is responsible for implementing the terms
    of the convention.
        The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor by
    children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages and working hours
    are established by law through six joint industrial councils: Commerce;
    Artisans; Transport; Port Operations; Agriculture; and Fisheries.
    Labor, management, and the Government are represented on these
    councils. The lowest minimum wage is about $0.80 (12 Dalasis) per day
    for unskilled labor. This minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. Only 20 percent of
    the labor force, essentially those workers in the formal economic
    sector, are covered by the minimum wage law. The majority of workers
    are employed privately or are self-employed, often in agriculture. Most
    citizens do not live on a single worker's earnings, but they share
    resources within extended families.
        The basic legal workweek is 48 hours within a period not to exceed
    6 consecutive days. A 30-minute lunch break is mandated. Nationwide,
    the workweek includes 4 8-hour workdays and 2 4-hour workdays (Friday
    and Saturday). Government employees are entitled to 1 month of paid
    annual leave after 1 year of service. Private sector employees receive
    between 14 and 30 days of paid annual leave, depending on length of
    service.
        The Labor Act specifies safety equipment that an employer must
    provide to employees working in designated occupations. The Factory Act
    authorizes the Ministry of Labor to regulate factory health and safety,
    accident prevention, and dangerous trades, and the Ministry is
    authorized to appoint inspectors to ensure compliance with safety
    standards. Enforcement was inconsistent due to insufficient and
    inadequately trained staff. Workers may demand protective equipment and
    clothing for hazardous workplaces and have recourse to the Labor
    Department. Workers may refuse to work in dangerous situations without
    risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, through, or within the country.
                                   __________

                                     GHANA

        Ghana is a constitutional republic dominated by a strong
    presidency. Flight Lieutenant (ret.) Jerry John Rawlings ruled the
    country for 19 years after taking power in 1981. He became the first
    President of the Fourth Republic following controversial elections in
    1992. These elections ended 11 years of authoritarian rule under
    Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which had
    seized power from an elected government in 1981. Six opposition parties
    and the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) contested the
    presidential and parliamentary elections in December which, despite a
    few incidents of intimidation and election fraud, domestic and
    international observers judged generally free and fair. The largest
    opposition party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), won 100 seats out of
    the 200 seats in Parliament. The NDC, President Rawlings'' party, won
    92 seats; independents and 2 smaller opposition parties won 8 seats. On
    December 28, the NPP candidate John Agyekum Kufuor became president-
    elect with 56.7 percent of the vote. He was scheduled to assume office
    on January 7, 2001. The Constitution calls for a system of checks and
    balances, with an executive branch headed by the President, a
    unicameral parliament, an independent judiciary, and several autonomous
    commissions, such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative
    Justice (CHRAJ). In reality this system of checks and balances under
    President Rawlings has been circumscribed by a parliament dominated by
    the President's party, a hesitant judicial service, and a system-wide
    lack of resources that hobbled the effectiveness of all three branches.
    The presence of a significant number of opposition parliamentarians has
    led to increased scrutiny of the Government's activities. In 1998 in
    peaceful elections, voters elected new district assembly
    representatives and, for the first time, unit committee members to
    complete the local government structure outlined in the Constitution.
    The judiciary appears subject to executive influence on occasion and
    lacks adequate resources.
        Several security organizations report to various government
    departments. The police, under the jurisdiction of an eightmember
    Police Council, are responsible for maintaining law and order. A
    separate department, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI),
    handles cases considered critical to state security and answers
    directly to the executive branch. Although the security apparatus is
    controlled by and responsive to the Government, the monitoring,
    supervision, and education of the police in particular remain poor.
    Police and other security forces committed some serious human rights
    abuses.
        The economy remains dependent on agriculture, with about 41 percent
    of gross domestic product (GDP) and 59 percent of employment derived
    from this sector, according to government statistics. Gold, cocoa, and
    timber are the traditional sources of export earnings, although cocoa
    and gold revenues fell due to the drop in the prices of these
    commodities on the world market. Tourism is the third largest foreign
    exchange earner. Service sector growth outpaced both agriculture and
    industry, according to an International Labor Organization (ILO) study
    released in September 1999. The economy grew at a rate of 3.0 percent,
    down from 4.4 percent in 1999, due to the fall in the world price of
    gold and cocoa and the increase in the price of crude oil. Inflation
    increased from 14 percent to 40 percent. Per capita GDP remained at
    approximately $400.
        The Government's human rights record was poor in a number of areas;
    although there were significant improvements in several areas, some
    serious problems remained. Police use of excessive force resulted in
    some extrajudicial killings and injuries, although fewer than in
    previous years. There continued to be credible reports that members of
    the police beat prisoners and other citizens, and that police and some
    elements of the military arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.
    Police corruption was a problem. Prison conditions remained extremely
    harsh, and prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Inadequate
    resources and a system vulnerable to political and economic influence
    compromised the integrity of the overburdened judicial system. At times
    the Government infringed on citizens'' privacy rights. The Government
    continued to prosecute two criminal libel cases. The Government
    continued to pressure the media, and some journalists practiced self-
    censorship; however, the nongovernment media continued its vigorous and
    outspoken criticism of various government policies. At times the
    Government restricted freedom of assembly. Police used force to
    disperse demonstrations. Violence against women is a serious problem.
    Traditional practices, including a localized form of ritual servitude
    (Trokosi) practiced in some rural areas, still result in considerable
    abuse and discrimination against women and children. Female genital
    mutilation (FGM) still is practiced. Religious differences led to
    tension and occasional clashes between different groups. There were
    some incidents of ethnically motivated violence, and some ethnic groups
    complain of discrimination. Child labor is a problem in the informal
    sector, and forced child labor and trafficking in women and children
    also are problems. Vigilante justice also is a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed a number of extrajudicial killings. The number of deaths
    reportedly caused by members of the security services decreased from
    nine in 1999 to five during the year; the continued use of rubber
    bullets and water cannons gave the police the ability to manage crowd
    control situations without killings or serious injuries. In recent
    years, the police service in particular has come under severe criticism
    following incidents of police brutality, corruption, and negligence.
    Public confidence in the police remains low but was improving over the
    previous year; however, mobs attacked several police stations due to
    perceived police inaction, a delay in prosecuting suspects, rumors of
    collaboration with criminals, and the desire to deal with suspects
    through instant justice. In 1999 the presidential Archer Commission
    issued a white paper critiquing police operations and providing
    specific directives as to how to address police manpower, training, and
    logistical needs. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) publicly
    acknowledged these problems and attempted to address them through
    training in human rights and riot control.
        On January 2, a policeman shot a 23-year-old man who was sitting
    with friends in a cemetery in Madina (Greater Accra Region). Police
    investigations into the killing were ongoing at year's end.
        On April 20, police killed a miner during a conflict between 120
    military and police personnel and over 100 men attempting to steal ore
    from a gold mine in Bibiani, a Western Region town. As a result of the
    shooting, the illegal miners rioted, burning and stealing over $1.6
    million (8 billion cedis) worth of property. A joint police and
    military team arrested 94 suspects for involvement in the riot. Forty-
    eight were remanded to prison custody pending trial.
        On July 8, police killed a young man who had a history of mental
    illness in Akropong in the Eastern Region. The man reportedly resisted
    arrest and was beaten by police, necessitating a hospital trip for
    treatment. The police reportedly approached him again at the hospital
    and shot him. Police statements alleged that the man had become violent
    during the scuffle at the hospital, and that the policeman's gun fired
    accidentally, killing the man.
        On August 12, one person was killed and another injured during a
    dispute between off-duty junior military officers and the bartender at
    an Accra nightclub. President Rawlings, the Minister of Defense, and
    the acting army commander attended the person's funeral. Rawlings
    assured those at the funeral that the military would cooperate in the
    police investigation. Five officers were accused of involvement in the
    incident and remained in detention at year's end pending the results of
    the investigation, which was transferred from the police to the
    military. A sixth officer present at the nightclub that evening, a
    member of the 64th Infantry Regiment, was identified as the person who
    fired his weapon. He reportedly committed suicide within 2 weeks of the
    incident.
        On November 26, police shot and killed an alleged fuel smuggler in
    the Afedido in the Volta Region. The police were in pursuit of a
    reported fuel smuggling group, which ignored police calls to halt. The
    alleged smuggler died of gunshot wounds to the back and stomach. Police
    investigations were ongoing at year's end.
        A driver who on October 29 allegedly caused an accident involving
    the President and his wife and in which 4 of Rawlings'' bodyguards were
    killed, died of unexplained causes on December 8 while hospitalized. On
    December 5, the suspect had appeared before the Accra Circuit Tribunal
    charged with 2 counts of manslaughter and negligently causing harm. The
    chairman of the tribunal ordered the police to take the suspect to the
    Police Hospital because he appeared ill, which they did on December 6.
    The Bar Association condemned the circumstances of the driver's arrest
    and called for the autopsy report to be released to the public. The
    report had not been released by year's end.
        Many persons died in prisons due to extremely harsh conditions and
    lack of medical treatment (see Section 1.c.)
        A former chief and more than 60 residents of a town who were
    arrested in connection with the January 1999 case in which police shot
    and killed a farmer during a riot at Juaso in the Ashanti Region, were
    released on bail. The case was still under investigation at year's end.
        The IGP recommended an inquiry into the February 1999 case of
    police who fired into a crowd at the Konkomba market in Accra and
    ordered that those liable be prosecuted. The police have yet to
    announce the findings of the investigation.
        The employee of the National Security Council who allegedly shot
    and killed an agricultural officer in June 1999 received a death
    sentence in July. His lawyers filed an appeal.
        In February the Commissioner of the Police Criminal Investigations
    Division (CID) forwarded the 1999 case of a police shooting of a vendor
    who later died at Soe, near Bolgatanga in the Upper East Region, to the
    Attorney General's office for prosecution. The committal proceedings,
    when an alleged offender is brought before a district court to hear
    summary of the evidence against him, were ongoing at year's end.
        A police officer accused of killing a passenger in a truck in
    August 1999, after the driver refused to stop when signaled to do so in
    Winneba in the Central Region, was arraigned before a community
    tribunal and granted bail pending further investigation. The police
    have received the ballistic examination report and forwarded the case
    to the Attorney General for prosecution.
        An investigation into the November 1999 police killing of the
    driver of a timber truck at a police barricade in the Ashanti region
    town of Barekese was ongoing at year's end.
        There were no further developments in the September 1999 case in
    which police shot and killed a driver at his residence in Korpeyia,
    near the border with Togo. The police maintained that the deceased was
    a notorious criminal who threatened to kill a policeman who had gone
    into his house to arrest him, and that the policeman shot him in self-
    defense.
        In the December 1999 case of a police and military patrol team's
    killing of two taxi passengers in Tema (Greater Accra Region), the
    regional police commander in Tema submitted his reports to the
    commissioner of the CID in June. The report maintains that the two
    passengers were suspected armed robbers. The case is with the Attorney
    General's office for advice.
        In 1999 the committee investigating the police officer implicated
    in the May 31, 1998 killing of a bystander in Sekondi indicted the
    officer in charge. The police had not compensated the family of the
    victim by year's end, nor was there a trial; however, the leader of the
    police team was facing a departmental service inquiry for
    unprofessional conduct during the operation.
        In June 1999, the family of a man who died on November 9, 1998 in a
    Western Region police cell reasserted that the deceased was brutalized
    by police and detained in handcuffs for 5 days. In response to a family
    petition filed a week after the death, the regional police command
    denied that police mistreated the deceased. No independent inquiry or
    investigation has been conducted.
        The Government continued to refuse to investigate extrajudicial
    killings in the early years of PNDC rule (1981 to 1992), despite the
    July 1999 publication of the names of 199 alleged victims in an
    independent newspaper.
        During the year, chieftancy disputes led to several deaths and a
    number of injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
        The press reported numerous cases of vigilante style ``instant
    justice'' conducted by angry citizens and mobs on suspected criminals
    and suspected witches that led to a number of deaths and injuries.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or other cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were
    continued credible reports that members of the police and customs
    officials beat prisoners and other citizens. It generally is believed
    that severe beatings of suspects in police custody occur throughout the
    country but largely go unreported.
        On January 15, following a November 1999 traffic accident, a young
    man, whose 2-year relationship with the President's oldest daughter had
    ended, reportedly was abducted by members of the presidential guard and
    detained at the Castle (the President's office and residence).
    Reportedly the guards beat and threatened him. He claimed that members
    of the presidential guard shaved his head with a broken bottle. The man
    was released without charges on January 17. During his detention, the
    man's parents protested outside the Castle gates without receiving any
    information regarding their son's whereabouts and were detained and
    later convicted of offensive conduct and assault on a public officer
    (see Section 1.e.). On September 1, the First Lady stated that the man
    was arrested for a traffic offense, not abducted, and that his head was
    shaved for routine identification purposes. In July the young man left
    the country.
        In January after reports were made regarding a series of
    disturbances, including arson and looting due to a conflict between two
    chiefs, 20 police officers arrived in Asankranguaaa (Western Region) to
    maintain order. Upon their arrival unknown persons shot at the
    officers, killing one and injuring another. A civilian also was shot by
    another civilian. The police detained 70 persons during their
    investigation of the incident. Four persons accused of murdering the
    police officer were granted bail of $6,000 (30 million cedis) pending
    further police investigation. The regional minister set up a committee
    of inquiry to look into the alleged looting and arson and submit
    recommendations to the minister. In addition the Member of Parliament
    (M.P.) for the area requested that the police inspector further
    investigate allegations of police misconduct during the incident.
    Police burned houses, slaughtered animals, stole property, and
    assaulted civilians during the course of the incident.
        In January a 65-year-old cocoa farmer from Dadieso in the Western
    Region alleged that a police inspector detained him for 2 days without
    bail and beat him after allegations that he owed the Government money.
    The inspector denied the charges and refused to pay the farmer's
    hospital bills. The IGP was investigating the case at year's end.
        In January and June, police dispelled student demonstrations in
    Kumasi and caused some minor injuries (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
        On March 25, police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse a
    crowd that gathered as a result of a dispute between two assemblymen in
    the Eastern Region town of Asutsuare. Sixtyeight civilians were
    arrested 3 days after the conflict, including one of the assemblymen.
    Some of those arrested claimed that police brutalized them during the
    arrest. On July 23, the other assemblyman involved in the dispute and
    some other civilians allegedly attacked farms and residents in
    Asutsuare, burning and looting homes. Members of the 64th Infantry
    Regiment were dispatched to control the situation. Two soldiers later
    were arrested and charged with gross misconduct and unprofessional
    behavior for taking sides in the dispute. On August 14, five policemen
    sent to arrest some of the offenders were attacked by those involved in
    the July 23 incident, and one policeman was injured badly. Thirty men
    eventually were arrested, and 22 were remanded into custody on a charge
    of attempted murder. The military set up a committee to investigate the
    incidents and stated that those involved would be punished severely.
    The District Chief Executive, the M.P., and the chief for the area
    exhorted citizens to resolve their differences. The M.P. also denied
    allegations that he had hired policemen to harass the inhabitants. The
    district assembly agreed to help resettle those whose houses were
    burnt.
        On June 8, 25 off-duty soldiers attacked and injured over 20
    civilians, including a taxi driver who allegedly insulted a group of
    intoxicated soldiers the previous evening in the Asylum Down area of
    Accra. The soldiers chased the taxi driver and other witnesses, and
    allegedly beat them. One soldier was wounded in the counterattack. The
    first victim reported the incident to the police, and the police
    investigation continues. The armed forces stated that it was
    investigating the incidents independently.
        Police used tear gas to disperse a group of civilians who attacked
    the Navrongo police station (Upper East Region) on July 15, in an
    attempt to release suspects in the cells.
        On July 8, police beat a man who resisted arrest and then shot him
    at the hospital where he was being treated for his injuries (see
    Section 1.a.)
        On July 25, thousands of trade union members demonstrated
    nationwide to demand an increase in the minimum wage (see Section
    6.b.). Police used water cannons in Accra to prevent blocking of
    traffic at a major circle; however, no injuries were reported in Accra
    or elsewhere.
        In August a businessman reported that he was detained and abused by
    members of the elite 64th Infantry Regiment. He said that his former
    wife hired the soldiers to force him to repay a debt that she claimed
    that he owed her from a failed business transaction. He alleged that
    military personnel picked him up at his home on July 11, and held and
    beat him for 12 days. He was never charged formally but was released on
    July 24, only to be detained and beaten again from July 28 to July 31.
    He claimed that the soldiers confiscated his car and approximately
    $2,400 (16,320,000 cedis). Military authorities stated that the 64th
    Infantry Regiment, since it contains a detachment of police officers,
    has the authority to investigate civil cases and arrest suspects. They
    confirmed that the man was arrested and held, but denied that he was
    beaten or his property confiscated. The Government stated that it would
    investigate the case but had provided no additional information by
    year's end. This case and the August shooting by the 64th Infantry
    Regiment (see Section 1.a.) fueled growing concerns that unit personnel
    engage in extrajudicial activity and human rights abuses. On July 26,
    military authorities appealed to the public to desist from involving
    the military in solving personal disputes. At a subsequent graduation
    ceremony for new soldiers, an army official warned the soldiers not to
    let themselves be hired to resolve personal disputes. On September 23,
    the IGP warned police personnel not to involve themselves in land
    disputes, debt collection, and other forms of unauthorized duties that
    have no valid relationship to their official duties.
        On August 5, police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse
    students of Yendi Junior Secondary School (Northern Region) who
    attacked the local police station to demand the release of one of their
    teachers, who was arrested for assaulting the District Director of
    Education in a teacher demonstration against the director. The students
    threw stones at the police.
        On December 4, police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse
    a crowd gathered at the Supreme Court to hear a ruling on the use of
    thumbprint voter identification cards in the presidential and
    parliamentary elections scheduled for December 7. One man was injured
    by a rubber bullet (see Section 2.b.).
        On December 7, a soldier in the Ashanti Region capital of Kumasi
    roughed up a journalist who was trying to take videos of alleged
    electoral malpractice. The M.P. for the area was also injured with the
    butt of the soldier's rifle when he stated that he had been the one who
    brought the video photographer.
        On December 11, journalists from a private television station were
    assaulted by men wearing security uniforms (see Section 2.a.).
        Police set up illegal barriers to demand bribes from motorists (see
    Section 2.d.). In 1999 the IGP dismissed a constable who had been found
    extorting money randomly from drivers; however, police continue to
    demand bribes. There were credible reports that police abused their
    authority by arresting citizens in exchange for bribes from detainees''
    disgruntled business associates and demanding money before granting
    bail (see Section 1.d.). In March 1999, the IGP banned police from
    firing warning shots and also warned the police against demanding money
    from suspects as a precondition of their release on bail; however,
    police continue to demand money to release persons on bail. A survey
    released in 1999 showed that only 50 percent of the population trusted
    the police.
        There were no reports of progress in the investigations into the
    February and April 1999 beatings of two Kumasi men by off-duty soldiers
    and ``machomen.''
        In February 1999, five Achimota police officers were suspended
    after detaining a woman in a cell with her husband and 15 other males.
    A local human rights group was instrumental in spurring the police
    administration to investigate. In July 1999, after a human rights
    activist alerted the CHRAJ, news media reported the story of a woman
    who had become pregnant by a suspected criminal also in police custody
    while she was held in remand for 16 months on an attempted murder
    charge in Anloga in the Volta Region. In August 1999, the police
    administration suspended the district officer and launched an
    investigation into the breach of the policy that female suspects not be
    detained in cells with male counterparts. Details of the investigation
    reveal that the two suspects were never kept in the same cell but
    shared a common corridor.
        There were no new developments in the May 1999 case of a man shot
    by customs officers in Dodo-Ammanfrom (Volta Region), or the June 1999
    case of six persons wounded by soldiers at Nkunkum (Eastern Region).
        An August 1999 case in which off-duty soldiers clashed with
    civilians in Oshiye resulting in several injuries was pending before
    the courts at year's end.
        No action was taken against police who beat student demonstrators
    in August 1999.
        In March the December 1999 case of nine persons wounded in a
    conflict between soldiers, policemen, and demonstrators in the Western
    Region town of Abontiakoon was forwarded to the Attorney General for
    advice. At year's end, the Circuit Court had adjourned the case and
    released the defendants on bail.
        There were no reports of progress in the investigation into the
    December 1999 confrontation between police and youths in Zabzugu, in
    the Northern Region, which resulted in the wounding of two youths. A
    number of cases from 1998 remained open, although the implicated police
    officers were suspended in most instances. The officers involved in the
    October 7, 1998 beating of a farmer in Pramkese were suspended pending
    investigation. At year's end, the case was still under investigation.
    The police officers involved in the November 2, 1998 shooting of two
    girls in an arrest attempt near Accra were dismissed from the police
    force. Police stated that the officers were performing an unauthorized
    action (which would not obligate the police to compensate the girls''
    families). Of the remaining detainees in the November 24, 1998 killing
    of 2 police officers in Ablekuma, 9 of the accused were awaiting trial
    at year's end, 14 had their charges dismissed for lack of evidence, and
    7 were still in remand at year's end. Of the 9 suspects standing trial,
    1 was free on bail and 8 were still remanded in police custody at
    year's end. In March police were instructed to arrest 13 additional
    suspects in the case before a trial date could be set. In January a
    woman who was struck by a stray police bullet in December 1998 was
    refused a waiver of the hospital bill she incurred as a result of her
    injuries. The M.P. for her district appealed to the IGP for a reversal
    of the decision.
        In 1999 there were isolated incidents in which Accra Metropolitan
    Assembly (AMA) operatives known as the Chameleon Bombers, allegedly
    inflicted injury and destroyed property; however, the degree of
    violence decreased following media attention, and there were no such
    reports during the year. The AMA officially dissolved the group in late
    1998 following repeated public criticism, but continued to
    ``decongest'' vendors from the streets and destroy unauthorized
    structures. The Chameleon Bombers changed their name to the AMA Task
    Force during the year and participated in beautification projects
    around the city. In 1999 Kumasi, the country's second largest city,
    reportedly deployed a force called the Sanitation and Decongestion
    Tigers to remove unlicensed street vendors from city streets.
        ``Machomen'' and land guards, private security enforcers hired by
    citizens to settle private disputes and vendettas, caused injury and
    property damage during the year. The machomen are not legally
    constituted, but organized privately and operate outside the law.
    Unlike in 1999, there were no arrests of machomen during the year.
        During the year, chieftancy disputes led to numerous injuries (see
    Section 5).
        Prisons are in most cases very poorly maintained, and conditions
    are extremely harsh. In 1996 the CHRAJ published a report on prison
    conditions. It described prisons as unsanitary, overcrowded, and poorly
    ventilated. In October the commissioner of CHRAJ reported that
    conditions in prisons had not improved. Prisoners are malnourished.
    Reports of the daily food allowance per prisoner vary. In July 1999,
    the Minister of Interior informed Parliament that the country's
    prisons, with a total capacity of 5,000, housed some 9,783 inmates. The
    Minister also reported that there were about 90 mattresses and few beds
    for the approximately 700 prisoners at the Kumasi central prisons.
    Overcrowding contributes to a high prevalence of skin and other
    communicable diseases among prisoners. In April 1999, the prisoners'
    daily food allowance was raised from approximately $.28 (1,800 cedis)
    to about $.31 (2,000 cedis), bringing the total daily allowance to
    approximately $.50 (3,200 cedis), including housing, medical, and
    clothing costs; however, in practice this was a decline in real terms
    due to inflation and an unfavorable exchange rate. Families still
    supplement prisoners' food and bribe prison guards for visitation
    rights. Prisoners also suffer from lack of medicine unless paid for or
    provided by the inmates or their families, and many die of preventable
    diseases such as malaria because of a lack of medication. The report
    concluded that prison conditions were ``a flagrant violation of the
    individual's fundamental human rights.'' While the Government concurred
    with the 1996 findings, it stated that lack of funding prevented
    further improvements. In April President Rawlings granted amnesty to
    some 1,000 prisoners based on recommendations of the Prisons Service
    Council. Many had served a third of their sentences, and none had been
    convicted for rape, robbery, or narcotics. However, a retired military
    officer from the PNDC era who had been sentenced to death after being
    convicted of killing an intruder on his farm also was released after
    serving 10 years in prison. The President also convened a medical board
    to consider early release for 156 seriously ill or aged prisoners.
    Juveniles were separated from the adult prison population more
    frequently; however, the commissioner of CHRAJ, in his October report,
    noted with concern the continuing sentencing and imprisonment of
    juveniles with adults. The Ghana Prisons Service Council has formed an
    assessment team to inspect facilities. In April the Minister of
    Interior stated that the prisons service would recruit 288 persons to
    increase staff at the prisons, and that work would begin during the
    year to upgrade prison and staff accommodations and construct 3 new
    prisons; however, no steps had been taken to implement these measures
    by year's end.
        The Prison Service Council, established in 1998, visited Central
    and Volta Region prison facilities in early 1999. Following these
    inspections, the Council suggested that prison authorities adopt a more
    humane approach to dealing with prisoners. The Council identified the
    number of remand prisoners due to the courts' inability to hear cases
    promptly as the greatest problem facing the prison system. Some
    suspects allegedly plead guilty in order to be sent to prison and leave
    the unsanitary conditions in the police remand cells. The Council also
    criticized health hazards (including poor sanitation) and the state of
    prison structures. In a December 1999 speech at a prison officers''
    graduation ceremony, President Rawlings stated that the Government was
    considering the introduction of parole, suspended sentences, and
    community service as a way to alleviate the overcrowding in prisons;
    however, no steps were taken to implement these measures by year's end.
        While the CHRAJ has access to the prisons, the Government resisted
    granting access to the press. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's) are
    not given access to prisons on a routine basis.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The Constitution provides for protection
    against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile and states that an
    individual detained shall be informed immediately, in a language that
    the detained person understands, of the reasons for the detention, and
    of the right to a lawyer and to an interpreter, at state expense. It
    also requires judicial warrants for arrest and provides for arraignment
    within 48 hours. However, in practice many abuses occur, including
    detention without charge for longer than 48 hours and failure to obtain
    a warrant for arrest. Authorities do not routinely notify prisoners'
    families of their incarceration; such information is often obtained
    only by chance. Human rights activists criticized the common practice
    of arresting persons on Friday and keeping them in detention over the
    weekend until court was in session on Monday, which they described as a
    deliberate circumvention of the 48-hour detention rule.
        The court has unlimited discretion to set bail, which can be
    prohibitively high. The court may refuse to release prisoners on bail
    and instead remand them without charge for an indefinite period,
    subject to weekly review by judicial authorities. The Constitution
    allows judicial authorities to hold citizens for up to 48 hours without
    filing charges against them. However, in practice it is common to
    remand a prisoner to investigative custody. The Constitution requires
    that a detainee who has not been tried within a ``reasonable'' time be
    released either unconditionally or subject to conditions necessary to
    ensure that he appears at a later date for court proceedings. In June
    1999, the CHRAJ reported that there were a number of remand prisoners
    held for periods ranging from 1 week to 8 years. As of early July,
    about 20 percent, or approximately 2,000 of the 9,783 inmates
    nationwide, were remand prisoners. In October the acting Ashanti
    Regional Director of CHRAJ stated that over one third of the inmates of
    Kumasi Central Prison are remand prisoners. One-third remain in prison
    even after the warrants committing them to prison had expired. He
    criticized the judicial system for imposing prison sentences instead of
    levying fines, which could prevent further overcrowding of the prisons.
        Despite the provisions of the law, abuses occur. At times persons
    are detained for trivial offenses or on unsubstantiated accusations.
        On January 13, the editor of an independent newspaper, who is also
    the president of the West African Journalists' Association, was
    detained by military police acting on orders and taken to military
    headquarters overnight for questioning (see Section 2.a.).
        On January 15, members of the presidential guard abducted, detained
    at the Castle, and allegedly beat a young man whose 2year relationship
    with the president's oldest daughter had ended (see Section 1.c.).
        In January police detained 70 persons during an investigation into
    violence related to a chieftancy dispute in Asankranguaa (see Section
    1.c.).
        In June three European politicians were detained by Bureau of
    National Investigations (BNI) officers, prevented from leaving the
    country, and held overnight at police headquarters on allegations of
    illegal transfer of funds and breach of security. The politicians were
    visiting the country on business and to consult with opposition party
    leaders, who alleged that the politicians'' detention arose from their
    association with the opposition.
        In August members of the 64th Infantry Regiment allegedly abducted
    and illegally detained a man on two separate occasions. After his
    former wife allegedly hired the soldiers to collect a debt, he was
    detained for more than 2 weeks. He claims that the soldiers confiscated
    his car and approximately $2,400 (16,857,600 cedis). The military
    claims that the man was arrested and detained on charges of fraud, but
    not abused. The case is under investigation (see Section 1.c.).
        In September military police, acting on the orders of the Deputy
    Minister of Defense, briefly detained the news editor of a newspaper in
    Accra (see Section 2.a.).
        In November the BNI detained a television presenter and the editor-
    in-chief of a private newspaper (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government has not implemented any meaningful policy to reduce
    the number of pretrial detainees, although the independent press has
    called for reduction of harsh bail conditions for suspects who do not
    pose a threat to society. The Attorney General drafted a bill that
    would provide alternative dispute resolution methods to clear the court
    backlog, including a time limit on pending cases and is scheduled to
    forward it to the Cabinet in 2001. Many credible sources report that
    private citizens pay the police to arrest business associates in deals
    gone awry. The 1996 CHRAJ report on prison conditions recommended
    improvement in the administration of criminal justice, which currently
    denies many citizens their constitutional rights to be charged within
    48 hours, to have bail posted within the same period, and to a speedy
    trial. Similarly, in March 1999, the CHRAJ discovered that 10
    Nigerians, 2 Lebanese, and 4 Ghanaians were detained at the Osu police
    station for periods ranging from 1 to 5 weeks. The suspects had been
    convicted of various offenses and were awaiting deportation. A farmer
    in the Volta Region has been in remand for 9 years. He is suspected of
    poisoning and killing another farmer but has yet to be formally
    charged.
        In December 1999, the IGP warned policemen not to refuse to grant
    bail to suspects in order to settle personal scores and reminded police
    that the law is there to protect citizens and not to harass them.
        In November 1999, after a Muslim-Protestant conflict in the Central
    Region town of Agona Nyakrom, police arrested over 700 men and brought
    them to Accra for investigation (see Section 2.c.). Over 650 of them
    then signed bonds to be on good behavior. Thirty others, including a
    chief, were detained. The case still was pending at year's end.
        In July 14 suspects in the November 1998 murder of two policemen in
    Ablekuma were released for lack of evidence after having been held in
    custody without charge or bail since December 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
    Nine other suspects were charged formally following the Attorney
    General's completion of a bill of indictment. Their trial had not begun
    by year's end.
        Lawyers for a former army sergeant accused of involvement in an
    alleged 1994 plot to overthrow the Government continued their appeal of
    an Accra High Court decision to retry the sergeant for treason. His
    original trial ended in 1996, but judgment was postponed because of the
    illness and subsequent death of one of the trial judges. The defendant
    has been in custody since 1994. Government efforts to persuade the
    court to impanel a new judge were unsuccessful by year's end (see
    Section 1.e.).
        Rural women can be punished with banishment by traditional village
    authorities for being pregnant out-of-wedlock or suspected witchcraft.
    The press reported that hundreds of women accused of witchcraft were
    sent to penal villages in the Northern Region by traditional
    authorities such as a shaman (see Section 5). The CHRAJ estimates that
    over 5,000 women are residents in witches'' camps in the Northern
    Regions. Although the women face no formal legal sanction if they
    leave, most fear that they would be beaten to death if caught outside
    the penal villages (see Section 5).
        In 1999 the Presbyterian Church sponsored a ``go home'' project to
    reintegrate into society women accused of witchcraft and forced to live
    at the Gambaga ``witches'' village. A total of 55 of 200 such women
    have reunited with their families. The project also provided for loans
    to enable the liberated women to become more financially independent
    and to contribute to the well being of their families.
        The Government does not practice forced exile and encourages
    citizens, including dissidents living abroad, to return. Some former
    government and PNDC officials have returned and resumed careers and
    political activities.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary appears to be
    subject on occasion to executive influence. The Constitution allows the
    Government to nominate any number beyond a minimum of nine members to
    the Supreme Court; confirmation is the responsibility of Parliament.
    The Chief Justice is empowered to impanel the justices of his choice to
    hear cases. These provisions, along with a debilitating lack of
    resources, have called into question the court's role as a balance to
    the power of the executive branch and contributed to the perception
    that the judiciary is occasionally subject to executive influence.
        This perception was furthered by the judiciary's crackdown on
    members of the privately owned press in 1998, when three journalists
    were jailed in separate instances for up to a month following
    contemptofcourt cases, and two other journalists had their passports
    seized under court order pending their criminal libel lawsuits. All the
    affected journalists were known to be avowed opponents of the
    Government and aggressive in their highly personal criticism of the
    President and his family. The journalists in the criminal libel cases
    still were awaiting sentencing at year's end. The journalists in the
    contempt of court cases served 1 month imprisonment in 1998 and were
    each fined approximately $4,350 (10 million cedis) (see Section 2.a.).
        In January the editor of an independent newspaper that published an
    article critical of President Rawlings was sentenced to one day in jail
    and a fine for an unrelated article (see Section 2.a.).
        The trial of five defendants for allegedly plotting to overthrow
    the Government in 1994 concluded in 1999. A special court sentenced
    four of the defendants to death after finding them guilty and acquitted
    the fifth defendant for lack of evidence. Attorneys for the four
    condemned defendants appealed the judgment. Four of the defendants and
    a former officer who allegedly was part of the plot remained in prison;
    and the Government did not impanel a tribunal to try the officer by
    year's end. The officer's attorneys plan to contest the case on the
    grounds that he was abducted illegally from Sierra Leone to stand
    trial.
        On August 16, the parents of a man abducted by presidential guards
    who protested his abduction outside the Castle gates were convicted of
    offensive conduct and assault on a public officer. They were granted
    bail but held in remand between the verdict and their August 30
    sentencing. The parents were required to provide a bond of good
    behavior for 12 months or, if they defaulted, would serve a 6 month
    sentence (see Section 1.c.).
        The integrity of the legal system is compromised by a severe lack
    of financial, human, and material resources. There were no official
    charges of corruption on the part of judges; however, in September
    1999, a privately owned paper published an alleged report by the
    Serious Fraud Office that found evidence of malpractice in the awarding
    of contracts by the judicial service. The Government had not responded
    to the report by year's end. In August 1998, the BNI reportedly
    questioned a judge, the chairman of an Accra regional tribunal, about
    allegations that he and his staff accepted a $9,000 bribe to grant bail
    for a Nigerian woman arrested for drug smuggling. He has not been
    charged because the BNI has failed to find proof of the transaction;
    however, in August four judicial service employees were dismissed for
    complicity in the case. A 1997 survey revealed that 66 percent of
    citizens believe that money influences the judicial system.
        The Constitution establishes two basic levels of courts: superior
    and lower. The superior courts include the Supreme Court, the Appeals
    Court, the High Court, and regional tribunals. Parliament may establish
    lower courts or tribunals by decree. The CHRAJ provides a forum to
    which citizens with grievances against government agencies or private
    companies can bring cases for mediation and settlement (see Section 4).
        There are frequent reports that a large number of prisoners are
    held in detention for extended periods, sometimes years, without going
    to trial (see Section 1.d.). For example, a man was arrested in
    December 1995 on charges of robbing a taxi driver of $30 (60,000 cedis)
    and the contents of the driver's wallet. The accused appeared at the
    Accra High Court 17 times, only to have the case adjourned each time
    without proceeding to trial. In November 1999, an appeal for bail was
    filed on the defendant's behalf on the grounds of unreasonable delay in
    going to trial. In June after 4+ years in custody, the High Court judge
    granted bail to the defendant on the basis that he could not guarantee
    when the case would finally come to trial given the number of cases
    pending before the court. The Attorney General has drafted a bill that
    would provide alternative dispute resolution methods to reduce the
    court backlog, including a time limit on pending cases.
        The CHRAJ's charter provides for it to investigate alleged
    violations of human rights and take action to remedy proven violations.
    It continues to hold workshops to educate the public, traditional
    leaders, the police, and the military on human rights issues. It
    mediates and settles cases brought to it by individuals with grievances
    against government agencies or private companies.
        The Chieftaincy Act of 1971 gives village and other traditional
    chiefs power to mediate local matters and enforce customary tribal laws
    dealing with such matters as divorce, child custody, and property
    disputes. However, a number of laws passed during the PNDC era (1981-
    92), as well as the 1992 Constitution, have eroded steadily the
    authority of traditional rulers and vested it in civil institutions,
    such as courts and district assemblies.
        Legal safeguards are based on British legal procedures. Defendants
    are presumed innocent, trials are public, and defendants have a right
    to be present, to be represented by an attorney (at public expense if
    necessary), and to cross-examine witnesses. In practice the authorities
    generally respect these safeguards.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that a person shall be free
    from interference within the privacy of his home, property,
    correspondence, or communication; however, this provision has yet to be
    tested in court, and in practice the Government infringed on these
    rights at times. In April 1999, a combined municipal and military team
    without due process demolished a private hotel in Accra, which they
    claimed was blocking a drainage route. The owner of the hotel allegedly
    had fallen out with the ruling party prior to the demolition. Although
    the law requires judicial search warrants, police do not always obtain
    them in practice. On January 5, police forcibly entered the house of a
    freelance journalist and ransacked it (see Section 2.a.). Observers
    assumed that the Government continued surveillance of citizens engaged
    in activities that it deemed objectionable, including monitoring of
    telephones and mail. Several opposition political activists reported
    being followed. Opposition parties, and some persons in private
    business, continued to allege that many government contracts are
    awarded on the basis of ruling party membership. There were credible
    reports that ruling party supporters who associated with opposition
    leaders also were subject to surveillance.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and in practice these provisions
    generally were respected; however, the Government continued to pressure
    the media. Opposition political parties and others frequently criticize
    the Government, and the Government has allowed more control of print
    and electronic media to be transferred to the private sector. In
    February the Supreme Court ruled in a 4year-old case that the President
    cannot appoint chief executives to the state-owned media. Nonetheless,
    the Government continued to pressure some journalists and media
    organizations, sometimes directly (e.g., through telephone calls), and
    by filing libel suits when it found coverage to be offensive.
    Consequently, some journalists exercised selfcensorship. The criminal
    libel laws provide for 10 years' maximum imprisonment for reporting
    intended to injure the reputation of the State. At year's end, there
    were still over 100 libel suits before the courts, some of which had
    been in progress for over 2 years. Two of the pending suits were
    criminal libel suits filed by the Government, and the rest were filed
    by government officials in their personal capacities or by private
    individuals. In March a civil libel case brought by the First Lady in
    1999 was resolved successfully out of court by the National Media
    Commission (NMC), and the NMC settled out of court two pending libel
    cases brought by private citizens during the year. In November 1999,
    the editor of the Free Press was sentenced to 90 days in prison and a
    fine of approximately $460 (1.5 million cedis) in a criminal libel case
    involving allegations about the First Lady.
        There are more than a dozen newspapers including three
    governmentowned dailies, two government-owned weeklies, and several
    privately owned newspapers published weekly, biweekly, or triweekly.
    One of the government-owned dailies has national circulation. However,
    most newspapers circulate only in regional capitals, and many of the
    smaller private newspapers are available only in the capital. Some
    independent newspapers claimed that they were unable to obtain
    advertising revenues due to government pressure on businesses.
        The government-owned media occasionally reported charges of
    corruption or mismanagement in government ministries and government-
    owned enterprises, but they rarely criticized the Government's policies
    or President Rawlings' activities. In the past, the Government
    occasionally disciplined or dismissed journalists working in
    government-subsidized media for articles deemed unacceptable. The
    Government ended subsidies to the state-owned publishing companies, and
    the newspapers are published by profitmaking printing companies, but
    these have not been privatized.
        Some privately owned newspapers were harshly critical of the
    Government's policies and of President Rawlings, his wife, and his
    regime generally, and some reporters and editors were alleged, at
    times, to have failed to abide by professional ethical guidelines.
    Parties affected by such lapses--most often Government officials--
    showed a tendency to go to court. The Government, government officials,
    and private individuals filed numerous civil libel suits (over 100
    before the courts), and one criminal libel suit remained in progress at
    year's end. The Government continued to prosecute two independent
    journalists charged in 1996 under a rarely used sedition law for
    allegedly libeling President Rawlings and his wife, and, through them,
    the State. The trials, repeatedly postponed, were seen by many
    observers as a sign of press harassment. For example, in July 1998,
    after being found in contempt of court, two newspaper editors were
    sentenced to 1 month's imprisonment and each publisher was fined
    approximately $4,350 (10 million cedis) (see Section 1.e.). According
    to the Minister of Communications, the criminal libel law and other
    such laws simply check the excesses of journalists. The NMC is
    researching comparative freedom of information (FOI) legislation with
    the intent to propose draft FOI legislation for the Government's
    consideration. This draft legislation had not been presented to the
    Government by year's end.
        On January 5, police forcibly entered the house of a freelance
    journalist to arrest him for involvement with an allegedly seditious
    article about President Rawlings. The police ransacked his house and
    removed some documents. On January 31, the editor of the independent
    newspaper that printed the article was sentenced to one day in jail and
    a $200 (1 million cedis) fine for publishing an unrelated story about a
    commercial case pending before the courts. The judge stated that the
    article ``made comments and formed opinion'' on the case, which could
    prejudice the decision in court (see Section 1.e.).
        On January 13, the editor of an independent newspaper and president
    of the West African Journalists' Association was detained by military
    police acting on orders and taken to military headquarters overnight
    for questioning. The editor had printed a story regarding the refusal
    by soldiers to take part in a December 1999 route march; the military
    claimed that the article was ``calculated to create disaffection and
    acrimony'' among soldiers in the wake of the coup in Cote D'Ivoire.
    After public criticism by journalists and private citizens, the editor
    was released the next morning. Opposition parties, trade unions,
    journalists' associations, and foreign diplomats criticized the
    detention. The ruling party and the military justified the detention on
    the grounds that the journalist had endangered the country's peace and
    stability and stated that the military therefore had the right to
    intervene.
        On September 19, military police acting under orders from the
    Deputy Minister of Defense detained the news editor of an Accra
    newspaper. Earlier that day the editor had attempted to contact the
    Deputy Minister after receiving an allegation that he had threatened a
    guard at a local security company. The editor was released later that
    day.
        On November 7, BNI officials arrested and detained for questioning
    2 journalists. One of the journalists, a presenter for a government-
    owned television station, was arrested on the charge of insulting
    behavior after he criticized, during a public broadcast, the
    President's behavior at a political rally. He was released that evening
    on bail of $7,350 (50 million cedis). Charges were never pressed. The
    second journalist, the editor-in-chief of a private newspaper, was held
    for nearly 12 hours for questioning on a charge of ``dishonestly
    receiving'' information. He allegedly had received computer diskettes,
    apparently stolen from NDC headquarters, which contained information on
    alleged plans for election fraud on the part of the NDC. The editor was
    released on bail $735 (5 million cedis). On December 21, he was charged
    with the equivalent of possession of stolen goods and ordered to report
    to BNI three times a week until the case is concluded. The Ghana
    Journalists Association and the Private Newspaper Publishers
    Association condemned the arrests and criticized the BNI's role in the
    incident, which they stated circumvented due process. On November 10, 2
    computer technicians were arrested, charged with giving the journalist
    the diskettes, and remanded into BNI custody. On the same day, the
    Minister of Communications accused the journalists of misleading the
    public and defended the role of the BNI by noting that it may
    legitimately assist police in investigations as necessary.
        On December 11, men wearing security uniforms assaulted journalists
    from a private television station who were covering a press conference
    at NDC headquarters in Accra. The journalists allege that the officers
    who assaulted them were not members of the security service, but rather
    ``machomen'' disguised in uniform. The Ghana Journalists'' Association,
    the National Union of Ghana Students, and the New Patriotic Party
    condemned the assault. Police investigations were ongoing at year's
    end.
        According to the National Communications Authority, Accra has 1
    government-owned and 12 private FM radio stations, and there are about
    40 private FM stations across the country. Most stations are
    independent and air a wide range of viewpoints. There are several
    private metropolitan television stations that broadcast in Accra and in
    Kumasi. One semi-private Accra station began broadcasting in Kumasi in
    November. There is one government-owned television station that
    broadcasts nationwide. There are also three private cable networks that
    serve Accra, Kumasi, and Takoradi.
        The Government has yet to initiate a formal investigation into the
    substance of a tape publicized in October 1999 that appeared to
    implicate President Rawlings in several infamous extralegal actions of
    the predemocratic era. Neither did the Government pursue prosecution of
    the journalists and publisher involved in the broadcasting of the
    tapes.
        The Government readily granted accreditation to foreign
    journalists. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio
    France International have full-time FM rebroadcasting stations in
    Accra, and several foreign radio broadcasts, including Voice of America
    (VOA), have part-time affiliations with local stations in several
    cities. Foreign periodicals were sold in Accra and other major cities
    and circulated freely even when they contained articles critical of the
    Government. Most citizens obtain their news from the electronic media,
    the VOA, and the BBC radio service. Several companies have cable or
    satellite rebroadcasting stations that serve the country's three major
    cities.
        In the period prior to the December presidential and parliamentary
    elections, the government-owned television and radio stations allotted
    the equal broadcasting time to each of the parties fielding
    presidential candidates, although news coverage of government
    activities such as the commissioning of projects favored the ruling
    party. During the December presidential and parliamentary elections, FM
    radio stations acted as watchdogs, and called attention to
    irregularities in the voting process.
        There are currently three Internet Service providers (ISP's) in the
    country. In July the National Communications Authority closed three
    other ISP's on the grounds that they were providing Internet telephone
    services, which violated a 5-year exclusivity agreement that the
    Government had given to two telephone companies. The companies replied
    that they were unable to monitor telephone use of their ISP and should
    not be held responsible for such use. The Government maintained that
    such use could be monitored. One company had its equipment confiscated
    without due process, and the owner was held in jail overnight but not
    charged (see Section 1.d.). That company stated that it would bring the
    matter to court; however, in November the Government restored the
    company's equipment, and it resumed operations.
        There was no restriction of academic freedom. Academics are allowed
    to publish and pursue research. The National Union of Ghanaian
    Students, one of the more vocal critics of the Government, is allowed
    to organize and hold meetings. However, in late 1997, following a
    serious student brawl, the public university in Accra imposed a ban on
    campus demonstrations, which remained in effect at year's end. In
    January and June, police dispersed student demonstrations in Kumasi and
    caused some minor injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In August 1999
    students demonstrated against increased university fees, and police
    forcibly broke up the demonstration (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice; however, at times it restricted this
    right. The Government does not require permits for demonstrations.
    Parliament passed a public order law in late 1994 requiring that all
    organizers of ``special events'' or ``processions'' inform the police
    of their intentions at least 5 days in advance so that the police can
    institute precautionary measures. The law also provides for curfews and
    arrest without warrants in specified instances. In November 1999, a
    presidential aide called street demonstrations by registered political
    parties ``a provocative attempt to destroy the democratic order'' and
    ``a declaration of war on the national democratic order and an act
    totally against the national interest.'' Other government and ruling
    party officials echoed this view, as did other organized bodies who
    were widely believed to have done so at the Government's behest.
        On May 2, Accra textile traders were told that they could not hold
    a demonstration to protest a textile price hike because they lacked a
    police permit, although there is no legal requirement for a permit (see
    Section 6.a.).
        On July 25, thousands of trade union members demonstrated
    nationwide to demand an increase in the minimum wage. Police allowed
    the demonstrations to take place; however, they used water cannons on
    the Accra demonstrators to prevent them from blocking traffic at a
    major traffic circle. No injuries were reported in Accra or elsewhere
    (see Section 6.a.).
        In July the radio personality who was pressured not to hold a
    ``million man march'' in October 1999 held a poorly attended march on
    the same theme without any government interference.
        In December police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse a
    crowd gathered at the Supreme Court to hear a ruling on the use of
    thumbprint voter identification cards in the presidential and
    parliamentary elections scheduled for December 7. One man was injured
    by a rubber bullet (see Section 1.c.).
        The 1997 ban on campus demonstrations remained in effect, but
    generally was not enforced, at the public university in Accra; however,
    in January and again in June, police dispersed student demonstrations
    in Kumasi and caused some minor injuries (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    The students were demonstrating to demand disbursement of their student
    loans. Police reportedly beat the students who allegedly were throwing
    stones at the police, and some students were injured from police use of
    water cannons. In the June demonstration, 35 students were detained,
    but the police dropped the charges after the students apologized for
    their actions.
        Political parties generally held rallies and national congresses
    without hindrance during the year; however, in February the police
    prevented the National Reform Party (NRP) from holding a rally in the
    Labadi district of Accra, although the NRP had given the police the
    required advance notice of the event. Allegedly the police stopped the
    rally to prevent potential conflict because the NDC had planned a rally
    for the same day. The NRP held its rally at a later date.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. NGO's are
    required to register with the Registrar General's office and the
    Department of Social Welfare, but this registration is routine.
        The Electoral Commission (EC) must accredit political parties. The
    parties must show evidence of a ``national character,'' such as
    official representation in all 10 of the country's regions. The EC
    evaluates whether the party has shown evidence of a viable national
    support base before granting accreditation and can annul the
    registration of a party that fails to meet the criteria for being a
    viable party. In July 1999, the EC certified a breakaway faction of the
    ruling party as a political party in its own right.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, on at least one occasion local government officials restricted
    this right. The Government does not always prosecute those responsible
    for religiously motivated attacks. For example, none of those who
    attacked churches during the 1999 annual ban on drumming (see Section
    5) were arrested or charged with an offense. Police authorities said
    that pursuing the cases only would exacerbate tensions. No suspects
    were charged in the attacks on a Christian charismatic church in
    December 1996 and March 1998.
        Religious institutions that wish formal recognition are required to
    register with the Registrar General's Department. This is a formality
    only. Most traditional religions, with the exception of the Afrikania
    Mission, do not register. Formally recognized religions receive some
    tax relief. However, beyond a certain point the institutions are
    required to pay tax.
        There is no state-favored religion and no apparent advantage or
    disadvantage attached to membership in any particular sect or religion.
    Foreign missionary groups generally have operated throughout the
    country with a minimum of formal restrictions.
        The Government requires that all students in public schools up to
    the equivalent of senior secondary school level attend a daily
    ``assembly'' or devotional service; however, in practice this
    regulation is not always enforced. This is a Christian service and
    includes the recital of The Lord's Prayer, a Bible reading, and a
    blessing. Students at the senior secondary school level are required to
    attend a similar assembly three times per week. Students attending
    boarding school are required to attend a nondenominational service on
    Sundays.
        On February 20, the Ho (Volta Region) District Chief Executive
    (DCE) led a joint operation with police and health personnel to
    immunize the children at an Apostolic Faith of Kpalexose (``Wellrooted
    Faith'' in the Ewe language) church against poliomyelitis. Church
    members consistently have refused immunizations on the grounds that
    their faith forbids the use of orthodox medicine. Police surrounded the
    church during worship services, and health personnel administered the
    vaccine. It was reported that 155 children up to age 5 received the
    vaccine. Community response supported the overriding of individual
    religious convictions as being in the greater national interest of
    eradicating polio. However, a prominent human rights NGO criticized the
    forced immunizations because it was not applied consistently. Other
    guardians who had refused to immunize their children were not compelled
    to do so, and only approximately half of the children countrywide were
    immunized. The NGO argued that the Government should enact legislation
    compelling all children to be immunized before it could legitimately
    force guardians to immunize their own children. On October 15, members
    of the Baptist church in the James Town area of Accra tried to prevent
    health workers from immunizing children against polio because they
    claimed that their faith forbade members'' accepting medical treatment.
    Although the church members later apologized, the children were not
    immunized.
        The Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Accra officially
    suspended a priest in April for conducting unorthodox ``healing''
    services. When he was conducting one of these services, the gates to
    the Cathedral were locked, and police personnel prevented worshipers
    from entering the church premises.
        Although the Constitution prohibits slavery, religious servitude--
    Trokosi--exists on a limited scale. In June 1998, Parliament passed and
    the President signed legislation to ban the practice of Trokosi in
    comprehensive legislation to protect women and children's rights. Human
    rights activists believe that the goal of eradicating the Trokosi
    practice is attainable with the new law; however, the practice persists
    (see Section 5).
        The Government took some steps to promote interfaith understanding.
    At government meetings or receptions usually there are
    multidenominational invocations. The Greater Accra Regional
    Coordinating Council conducted a workshop on managing religious
    conflicts in April, several weeks before the annual ban on drumming in
    the ethnic Ga traditional area (May 8 to June 8), which resulted in a
    workable compromise between religious and traditional leaders. This
    compromise helped avoid a repeat of the violence between
    traditionalists and Christians that occurred in 1999. However, on
    August 20, after the ban had been lifted, youth in Teshie besieged the
    Open Heaven Mission International Church, seizing drums and injuring
    six worshippers (see Section 5).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights as an aspect of the provision for personal liberty, and the
    Government generally respects these provisions in practice.
        Citizens and foreigners are free to move throughout the country.
    Police checkpoints exist nationwide to prevent smuggling, but most are
    unmanned during daylight hours. There were numerous reports that police
    used checkpoints to solicit bribes. Citizen complaints about police
    harassment caused the Government to reduce the number of checkpoints
    from 125 to 38 in 1997 and to 31 by the end of 1998. Police roadblocks
    and car searches are a normal part of nighttime travel in larger
    cities. In February and August 1999, taxi drivers struck in Koforidua
    to protest extortion by motor transport and traffic unit police, and in
    June in Accra, police established additional roadblocks in an effort to
    combat a series of local murders of women (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    The police administration has admitted that the force has a problem
    with some members occasionally erecting illegal barriers to solicit
    bribes from motorists. In November and December, soldiers mounted
    checkpoints around the Brong Ahafo regional capital of Sunyanai and
    outside the Ashanti regional capital of Kumasi prior to national
    elections. Both towns were opposition strongholds. The Government
    stated that it was responding to reports of arms movements before the
    elections; however, many observers viewed these checkpoints as an
    attempt to intimidate voters or to discourage them from travelling to
    vote where they were registered. Citizens generally are free to travel
    internationally and to emigrate or to be repatriated from other
    countries.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The country has
    a liberal policy of accepting refugees from other West African nations.
    The Government provides first asylum. The country continued to provide
    first asylum to approximately 9,454 Liberians, 1,058 Togolese and 2,103
    Sierra Leoneans. It also provided first asylum to citizens of: Rwanda
    (30); Sudan (21); Ethiopia (6); Libya (6); Burundi (7); Congo
    Brazzaville (5); Cameroon (6); Burkina Faso (1); Somalia (1); Uganda
    (1); Nigeria (6); Bosnia (1); Angola (1); Chad (1); and the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo (12).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government, and citizens exercised this right through a democratic
    process in presidential and parliamentary elections held in December,
    which despite a few incidents of intimidation and election fraud,
    domestic and international observers judged be generally free and fair.
    The country continued its transition from a one-party state to a more
    established multiparty constitutional system. The political system
    includes recognized opposition parties, which express their views
    freely within Parliament and won a majority of the parliamentary seats
    in the December election.
        In November and December soldiers mounted roadblocks outside
    opposition strongholds, in what many observers interpreted as attempts
    to intimidate voters (see Section 2.d.).
        In the first round of the presidential elections, John Agyekum
    Kufuor of the NPP garnered 48.2 percent of the votes, followed by Vice
    President John Evans Atta Mills with 44.5 percent. On December 28, a
    presidential runoff was held in accordance with the constitutional
    requirement that the president be elected with at least 50 percent plus
    one of the votes. In the runoff Kufuor beat Mills with 56.7 percent of
    the vote. The new administration is scheduled to take office on January
    7, 2001. The NPP won 100 seats and gained control of the 200-member
    Parliament, while the NDC took 92 seats. Other parties and independents
    won the remaining eight seats.
        During the year, opposition members expressed frustration about
    impediments that the executive branch imposed by its refusal to support
    opposition amendments to proposed legislation. Parliament still is
    working to develop effective oversight of the workings of the executive
    branch. Although all M.P.'s can introduce bills, no one has ever done
    so; however, some have introduced motions.
        In 1998 citizens elected representatives to the district assemblies
    and, for the first time, unit committees, which form the basis of the
    local government structure. Of the 16,000 units, elections still must
    be held in the 3,724 units that failed to produce a quorum of
    candidates in 1998. These elections were held on a nonpartisan basis,
    as called for in the 1992 Constitution. However, opposition groups
    contend that the local government system is stacked in favor of the
    ruling party, which appoints approximately one-third of the district
    assembly and unit committee members, as well as the DCE's. DCE's must
    be confirmed by two-thirds of the district assembly members. In May
    1999, police and military forces were highly visible in Kintampo in the
    Brong Ahafo Region the day the district assembly was to vote on a
    controversial nominee for the DCE. The presence of security forces may
    have influenced some district assembly members to vote in favor of the
    ruling party's nominee, despite an earlier petition by the chiefs and
    residents of Kintampo against the nomination.
        There are no legal obstacles to the participation of women in
    government; however, they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. There were 19 female parliamentarians with 17 female M.P.'s
    elected to the new Parliament. Several ministers and Council of State
    members are women. In August a group of female parliamentarians and
    women's rights activists petitioned the Electoral Commission (EC) to
    waive registration fees for female candidates to encourage more women
    to run for office. The EC refused on the grounds that this would make
    competition for parliamentary seats unfair.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        NGO's interested in human rights continued to grow in number and
    effectiveness, and there were 20 NGO's in the field at the end of the
    year. These NGO's operated without government interference (see Section
    2.b.). The Government appears to cooperate with and to be responsive to
    human rights NGO's, with the exception of granting ready access to
    prisons (see Section 1.c.). Prominent NGO's include the Red Cross,
    Amnesty International (AI), the International Federation of Woman
    Lawyers (FIDA), Women in Law and Development in Africa, and Ghanalert.
    The Government cooperates with international humanitarian
    organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC).
        The CHRAJ, established by Parliament in 1993, is charged with
    investigating alleged violations of human rights and taking action to
    remedy proven violations. The CHRAJ continues to hold workshops to
    educate the public, traditional leaders, the police, and the military
    on human rights issues. It mediates and settles cases brought to it by
    individuals with grievances against government agencies or private
    companies. Parliament established the CHRAJ in 1993. By 1998 the CHRAJ
    had received a total of 23,744 petitions in its offices around the
    country and completed action on over 16,638 cases, (70.1 percent).
    Forty percent of the cases were resolved through mediation. On average
    the CHRAJ receives between 4,000 and 5,000 new petitions per year, with
    steady increases each year. The majority of the complaints lodged with
    the Commission were from those who believed that they suffered
    injustice as a result of public or private employers'' abuse of power,
    unfairness, and high handedness.
        In October 1996, the CHRAJ concluded a lengthy corruption probe of
    senior government officials. This probe launched an aggressive
    government rebuttal, which resulted in a 1998 Supreme Court decision
    that the CHRAJ could investigate matters predating the effective date
    of the 1992 Constitution. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
    Commission did not have jurisdiction to investigate property
    confiscated by the special courts or tribunals during the rule of the
    Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the military group that
    staged President Rawlings' first coup, and during the PNDC period.
        The CHRAJ continues to investigate corruption allegations filed
    against public officials. In 1997 it issued a report on its
    investigations at the ``witches camps'' on the Northern Region. The
    Commission also has provided periodic updates to various sections of
    its report on prison conditions.
        The Commission operates with no overt interference from the
    Government. Its biggest obstacle is a lack of adequate funding. Low
    salaries and poor working conditions result in the loss of many
    CHRAJtrained personnel to other government agencies that are able to
    pay their employees more. In late 1998, the Commission submitted a
    petition on this matter to the Government and had not received a
    response by year's end.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. The courts are
    empowered specifically to order enforcement of these prohibitions,
    although enforcement by the authorities is generally inadequate, in
    part due to limited financial resources.
        Women.--Violence against women, including rape and domestic
    violence, remains a significant problem. A 1998 study revealed that
    particularly in low-income, high-density sections of greater Accra, at
    least 54 percent of women have been assaulted in recent years. A total
    of 95 percent of the victims of domestic violence are women, according
    to data gathered by the FIDA. These abuses usually go unreported and
    seldom come before the courts. The police tend not to intervene in
    domestic disputes. However, 1998 legislation doubled the mandatory
    sentence for rape. The media increasingly report cases of assault and
    rape. In late 1998, the police administration established a ``women and
    juvenile unit'' to handle cases involving domestic violence, child
    abuse, and juvenile offenses. Located in Accra and Kumasi, the unit
    works closely with the Department of Social Welfare, FIDA, and the
    Legal Aid Board. During the year, the Accra Branch of this unit
    recorded over 530 cases, including 181 defilement cases, 35 rapes, 6
    cases of incest, 17 indecent assaults, 86 instances of assault and wife
    battery, 6 abductions, and 200 neglect cases.
        In May FIDA held a seminar to coordinate government and NGO support
    of the country's first domestic violence bill. FIDA presented the draft
    bill to the Director of Legislative Drafting of the Parliament, who is
    responsible for converting proposed bills into proper legislative
    format for eventual consideration by Parliament. The bill was not taken
    up by Parliament by year's end.
        In late 1998, a series of ``mysterious'' murders of women began to
    occur in the Mateheko area of Accra. Three of the 20 murders reportedly
    involved husbands' suspicion of their wives' infidelity. The men
    subsequently were arrested, but they were not convicted. There have
    been more than 30 murders in the past 2 years, and they are referred to
    as ``serial murders.'' Police have had no success in solving any of the
    murders and have instituted evening roadblocks throughout Accra in an
    attempt to catch the murderers. In March the Ministry of Interior
    offered a $10,000 reward to any member of the public who provided
    information leading to the arrest of any of the murderers. In July a
    group of seven organizations, including FIDA, AI, The Ghana Employers
    Association, and The Association of Business and Professional Women,
    issued a joint statement reflecting their disappointment at the
    police's lack of success, and encouraging the Government to seek
    international help to solve the murders. On December 22, this group,
    known as Sisters Keepers, marched peacefully to the Castle and
    submitted a petition to the President calling for the Minister of
    Interior and the IGP to resign because of their failure to solve the
    murders.
        On 3 occasions in 1999 and during the year, women in Accra
    demonstrated in a concerted effort to attract attention to violence
    against women.
        In 1998 Parliament passed legislation that amended the 1960
    Criminal Code to provide additional protection for women and children.
    The legislation added new definitions of sexual offenses and
    strengthened punishments for others. The provisions of the bill ban the
    practice of ``customary servitude'' (known as Trokosi), protect women
    accused of witchcraft, double the mandatory sentence for rape, raise
    the age of criminal responsibility from 7 years to 12, criminalize
    indecent assault and forced marriages, and raise punishments for
    defilement, incest, and prostitution involving children. There are no
    laws that specifically protect women from sexual harassment.
        In January 1999, the CHRAJ announced its decision in the country's
    first sexual harassment case, involving a flight attendant for a
    private airline and her immediate supervisor. The CHRAJ determined that
    the 22-year-old attendant was terminated for her refusal to submit to
    her supervisor's sexual advances over a 10-month period. The CHRAJ
    awarded her compensation for legal costs. However, the company's chief
    executive did not comply with the terms of the decision, and in
    December 1999, the CHRAJ went back to court to seek enforcement of the
    judgment. The case was not settled by year's end, principally because
    the airline had gone out of business.
        Rural women can be punished with banishment by traditional village
    authorities for pregnancy outside of wedlock or suspected witchcraft.
    The press reported that hundreds of women accused of witchcraft were
    sent to penal villages in the Northern Region by traditional
    authorities, such as a shaman. In 1998 a total of 815 persons (802
    women and 13 men, from 35 to 90 years old) were found to be living in
    witches' villages in four districts in the Northern Region. The CHRAJ
    estimates that as many as 5,000 women are inhabitants of camps
    throughout northern Ghana. In some cases, the women were sentenced by
    village authorities who claimed to have the power to determine who were
    witches. In other cases, relatives, or the women themselves, came to
    the village believing that they were witches, and asking to be
    protected and/or cured of the affliction. Human rights NGO's estimate
    that the number of occupants of the witches' camp is growing. NGO's
    also have found that at the Gambaga witches camp, 99 percent of those
    there are illiterate. Although the women face no formal legal sanction
    if they leave, most fear that they would be beaten to death or lynched
    if caught outside the penal villages (see Section 1.a.). Forced labor
    also occurs at the camps for women accused of witchcraft. Legislation
    passed in 1998 provides some additional protection to women banned from
    their communities for alleged witchcraft. The CHRAJ and human rights
    NGO's have mounted a campaign to end this traditional practice, which
    violates the victims' constitutional rights, but little concrete action
    has been taken. The challenge lies not only in persuading custodians of
    the witches' homes to abolish the practice, but also in educating the
    community so the women will be allowed to return safely to their homes.
    In 1998 FIDA had persuaded custodians to abolish the Gambaga witches
    home in the Northern Region, contingent on the performance of
    ``exorcism'' rites and payment of accommodation and discharge fees.
    However, a few months later, there was an increase in the number of
    alleged witches banished to the home, largely due to the communities'
    belief that these women were responsible for an outbreak of
    cerebrospinal meningitis which claimed many lives in the region.
        Women continue to experience societal discrimination. Women in
    urban centers and those with skills and training encounter little overt
    bias, but resistance to women entering nontraditional fields persists.
    Only about one quarter of university students are women, although
    women's enrollment is increasing. Women, especially in rural areas,
    remain subject to burdensome labor conditions and traditional male
    dominance. Traditional practices and social norms often deny women
    their statutory entitlements to inheritances and property, a legally
    registered marriage (and with it, certain legal rights), and the
    maintenance and custody of children.
        Women's rights groups are active in educational campaigns and in
    programs to provide vocational training, legal aid, and other support
    to women. The Government also is active in educational programs, and
    President Rawlings and his wife were among the most outspoken advocates
    of women's rights. In August the Government established a women's desk
    responsible for addressing the gender imbalance in the civil service.
        Children.--Within the limits of its resources, the Government is
    committed to protecting the rights and welfare of children. Education
    is neither free nor compulsory, and costs associated with schooling,
    such as uniforms and school supplies, preclude some children from
    attending school. While the Government states that basic education is
    free, in practice schools impose fees of up to $50 (335,000 cedis) per
    term, and students also must purchase uniforms and books. In addition
    teachers often withhold material during their regular lessons and ask
    students to pay additional fees for after-hours `tutoring' in those
    subjects as a way to supplement their incomes. Some children are unable
    to attend school because they must work to supplement their family's
    income (see Section 6.d.); they must travel long distances to reach the
    school; or there is a lack of teachers, especially in more rural areas.
    The Government has taken some concrete steps to support education,
    including support of ``informal'' schools (NGO-sponsored schools that
    are not regulated by the Government and provide nontraditional
    education), and increased emphasis on making sure students progress
    from one school grade to another. The dropout rate is decreasing, from
    9.1 percent nationwide in 1998 to 8 percent in 1999; however, the
    school enrollment rate has also dropped slightly from 2.58 million in
    1997 to 2.56 million in 1999. Overall enrollment probably is even
    lower, taking into account the country's almost 2.4 percent annual
    population growth.
        There is little or no discrimination against female children in
    education, but girls and women frequently drop out of school due to
    societal or economic pressures. The Government actively campaigns for
    girls' education and in 1997 established a girls' education unit within
    the basic education division of the Ghana Educational Service. Although
    the percentages of girls enrolled in school increased from 1996,
    participation is still low. In September 1999, the Government estimated
    that girls'' enrollment in primary school had increased from 75 percent
    in 1992 to 81 percent in 1997. Enrollment of women at the university
    level has increased by 5 percent from 1993 to 1998.
        A 1997 country report by the Ghana National Commission on Children
    further substantiated the gap between enrollment of boys and girls,
    particularly at the high school level. In the 8 districts examined,
    there were 22,418 boys and 14,318 girls enrolled at the high school
    level. In the report, officials attribute the lower female enrollment
    to the fact that many girls marry early or become pregnant. In the
    1998-99 academic year, the University of Ghana enrolled 852 women and
    2,226 men. In May the First Lady launched an initiative to establish
    the country's first women's university.
        The Ghana National Commission on Children (GNCC) is a policymaking
    and coordinating body established to improve the lives of children. The
    GNCC has provided the Women and Juvenile Unit of the police force with
    office equipment. The GNCC also has administered training programs for
    law enforcement and judicial officials around the country to
    familiarize them with the Children's Act and other pertinent child
    labor legislation.
        The governments of Ghana and Canada hosted a conference on children
    affected by war in West Africa on April 27-28. The resulting plan of
    action focused on ways that Economic Community of West African States
    could integrate child protection into ECOWAS peacemaking and
    peacekeeping initiatives.
        There are several traditional discriminatory practices that are
    injurious to the health and development of young females. In
    particular, female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned
    by international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is a serious problem. A 1998 study estimated that
    9 to 12 percent of women have been mutilated, but some estimates are as
    high as 30 percent. A Ministry of Health survey conducted between 1995
    and 1998 found that FGM is practiced among nearly all the northern
    sector ethnic groups, up to 86 percent in rural parts of the Upper West
    and Upper East Regions. A 1998 study reported that 51 percent of all
    women who had undergone FGM were excised before age 1, and 85 percent
    of total excisions were performed on girls under the age of 15. A 1999
    survey indicated that more than 50 percent of the women who were
    mutilated indicated that they disapproved of the practice. Officials at
    all levels have spoken out against the practice, and local NGO's are
    making some inroads through their educational campaigns to encourage
    abandonment of FGM and to retrain practitioners. There were no reports
    of arrests in the year. There have been seven arrests for the practice
    of FGM since the 1994 law made FGM a crime. Of those arrested, two
    offenders have been prosecuted and convicted. In some cases in which
    FGM is performed, the victims actively seek out practitioners,
    sometimes without their parents'' knowledge, in a quest to become ready
    for marriage.
        Members of the legal community advocate legislation to close
    loopholes in the FGM law, including extending culpability to family
    members and others who aid in carrying out FGM and to citizens who
    commit the crime outside the country's borders. Any person who conceals
    information about an instance of FGM would be liable. In addition, FGM
    would be banned no matter how medically safe the procedure is made--
    dispelling a belief by some that FGM is acceptable as long as the
    girls' health is protected. Traditional chiefs became more outspoken in
    their opposition to the practice of FGM.
        Although the Constitution prohibits slavery, it exists on a limited
    scale. Trokosi, a traditional practice found among the Ewe ethnic group
    and in part of the Volta Region, is an especially severe human rights
    abuse and an extremely serious violation of children's and women's
    rights. It is a system in which a young girl, sometimes under the age
    of 10, is made a slave to a fetish shrine for offenses allegedly
    committed by a member of the girl's family. In rare instances, boys are
    offered. The belief is that, if someone in that family has committed a
    crime, such as stealing, members of the family may begin to die in
    large numbers unless a young girl is given to the local fetish shrine
    to atone for the offense. The girl becomes the property of the fetish
    priest, must work on the priest's farm, and perform other labors for
    him. Because they are the sexual property of the priests, most Trokosi
    slaves have children by the priests. Although the girls' families must
    provide for their needs such as food, most are unable to do so. There
    are at least 2,200 girls and women bound to various shrines in the
    Trokosi system, a figure that does not include the slaves' children.
    Even when freed by her fetish priest from the more onerous aspects of
    her bondage, whether voluntarily or as a result of intervention by
    activists, a Trokosi woman generally has few marketable skills and
    little hope of marriage and typically remains bound to the shrine for
    life by psychological and social pressure arising from a traditional
    belief that misfortune may befall a Trokosi woman's family or village
    if she abandons her obligations to the shrine. When a fetish slave
    dies, her family is expected to replace her with another young girl,
    thus perpetuating the bondage to the fetish shrine from generation to
    generation.
        In 1998 Parliament passed legislation that banned the practice of
    Trokosi in comprehensive legislation to protect women and children's
    rights. Human rights activists believe that the goal of eradicating the
    Trokosi practice is achievable with the new law. NGO's, such as
    International Needs, and government agencies, like the CHRAJ, have been
    campaigning against Trokosi for several years and are familiar with the
    locations of the fetish shrines and the numbers of women and children
    enslaved. Activists know the community leaders and fetish priests and,
    thus, know with whom to negotiate. The CHRAJ and International Needs
    have had some success in approaching village authorities and fetish
    priests at over 316 of the major and minor shrines, winning the release
    of 2,800 Trokosi slaves to date and retraining them for new
    professions. The organizations continue to work for additional
    releases. The Government has not prosecuted any practitioners of
    Trokosi, and in August 1999, a presidential aide criticized anti-
    Trokosi activists for being insensitive to indigenous cultural and
    ``religious'' beliefs and practices. A local group, calling itself the
    ``Troxovi Institutional Council'' (Troxovi is alternate spelling for
    Trokosi), declared that Trokosi, as defined by CHRAJ and other human
    rights groups to be a form of ritual servitude, does not exist in the
    country. The group claimed that the practice of `Troxovi' does exist
    but neither enslaves nor exploits anyone. The Council also listed 23
    `genuine Troxovi shrines' in Ghana, describing them as educational
    institutions and as part of the ``Afrikania religion.'' These claims
    were widely refuted by chiefs, the press, and NGO's.
        There were reports that trafficking in children occurred, including
    children being sold into slavery either for forced labor or sexual
    exploitation (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Child labor is also a
    problem (see Section 6.d.).
        Another traditional practice that violates the rights of children
    is forced childhood marriage, which became illegal under the Children's
    Act. In February the Agona Swedru Circuit Court in the Central Region
    sentenced a man to 15 years'' imprisonment and hard labor for defiling
    a 7-year-old girl. In May a teacher in Kyermasu in the Brong Ahafo
    Region was sentenced to 18 years'' imprisonment and hard labor for
    defiling and impregnating a 15-year-old girl.
        In October the GNCC stated that it was working with the CHRAJ to
    effect the prosecution of the chief of Mpeasem-Easuakyir, in the
    Central Region, who coerced a 14-year-old girl into marrying him after
    he abused and impregnated her. FIDA supported the efforts and
    emphasized that the marriage violated the Children's Act, which sets
    the marriageable age at 18, as well as the Criminal Code, which
    prohibits sex with a child under 16 years of age.
        Child prostitution, although illegal, also exists. In March the
    Eastern regional branch of the Ghana Hairdressers and Beauticians
    Association announced that it would offer free apprenticeships to 150
    street girls in the Eastern Region to equip them with marketable
    skills.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution specifically provides
    for the rights of the disabled, including protection against
    exploitation and discrimination. In practice the disabled are not
    discriminated against in any systematic or overt manner. The
    Constitution also states that ``as far as practicable, every place to
    which the public has access shall have appropriate facilities for
    disabled persons.'' However, in practice this provision has yet to be
    implemented. In late August, Government officials stated that companies
    should take the needs of disabled persons into account when building
    and designing buildings and reminded the public that the disabled have
    rights that should be protected.
        Religious Minorities.--There was tension between ethnic Ga
    traditionalists and members of some Christian charismatic churches over
    the annual ban by Ga traditional leaders on drumming and noise-making
    prior to the Ga Homowo (harvest) festival; however, the level of such
    tension decreased compared with the previous year. Traditionalists
    believed that their time-honored customs should be accorded due
    respect, while some Christians resented the imposition of bans, which
    they believed infringed on their right to worship. The Government
    advocated mutual coexistence and understanding and alerted the
    population that police resources were insufficient to protect all
    churches during the several-week ban on drumming. There were attacks on
    churches in 1999 and in 1998. There were no reports of similar attacks
    during the year. No police action was taken in regard to attacks from
    previous years. Police are reluctant to prosecute any members of these
    groups due to an apparent fear of retaliation or counterattack.
        On January 25, members of the Christo Asafo Christian Church
    clashed with members of the Boade Baaka traditional shrine at Taifa,
    Greater Accra Region. The dispute arose days earlier after shrine
    members accused a Christian woman of witchcraft. In the process, the
    woman was injured slightly, and a crowd formed. Christo Asafo members
    attacked the shrine in retaliation. There were some minor injuries.
    Police did not arrest or prosecute any of the participants, but
    continue to investigate the incident.
        In March a dispute between five Pentecostal churches and landowners
    (tendaabas) led to tension in Jirapa, Upper West Region. After a member
    of the Kingdom of God ministries allegedly burned down a local shrine,
    the tendaabas banned religious activities of all churches except the
    Roman Catholic Church, until May when the Regional Coordinating Council
    brokered a resolution.
        On July 21, three Muslims were injured at Effiduase (Eastern
    Region) in a clash between two Muslim sects over doctrinal differences.
    Members of the Tijanniya school of Islam allegedly attacked members of
    the Al-Sunna school.
        On August 20, after the ban on drumming had been lifted, youth in
    Teshie (Greater Accra Region) besieged the Open Heaven Mission
    International Church, seizing drums and injuring six worshipers (see
    Section 2.c.).
        There was a development in the case of the November 1999 dispute
    between an Islamic middle school and a Methodist middle school in Agona
    Nyakrom in the Central Region, where five persons suffered gunshot
    wounds, and Muslim property was destroyed. All of those arrested were
    released, and the police have not charged any suspects. In June the
    Committee of Inquiry set up by the Central Regional Coordinating
    Council presented its report to the Central Regional Minister. Details
    of the report were not published; however, the Committee recommended
    ways to ensure lasting peace between the two communities, and the
    Regional Minister agreed to implement the recommendations.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Government plays
    down the importance of ethnic differences, its opponents occasionally
    complain that it is dominated by the Ewe ethnic group from the eastern
    part of the country. The President and some of his close advisers are
    Ewe, but most ministers are of other ethnic origins. A 1997 survey
    found that 25 percent of the respondents believed that they had
    experienced discrimination because of their tribal origins.
        During the year, there were several violent confrontations between
    and within ethnic groups related to chieftaincy issues, particularly
    those of succession and land. In January 1999, a chieftancy dispute in
    Juaso in the Ashanti Region resulted in the death of a policeman,
    several injuries, the burning of the police station, and the arrest of
    over 60 persons. The chief and his supporters were brought before the
    Kumasi tribunal and later granted bail. The case was ongoing at year's
    end. The police also are investigating some Juaso residents' claim of
    police mistreatment during the same event (see Section 1.a.). In July
    the Tamong and Puli clans in Bimbagu (West Mamprusi District in the
    Northern Region) clashed in a chieftancy dispute. Two persons were
    killed, and 56 houses were burned (see Section 1.a.). The police were
    sent to Bimbagu to maintain order during the clash. The police still
    were investigating the incident at year's end.
        On August 13, four persons were killed after a conflict over a
    chieftancy dispute in Weija (Greater Accra Region.)
        On December 7, 13 persons reportedly died, and over 25 were wounded
    in the Upper East Region capital Bawku in an electionrelated dispute
    that had ethnic overtones. The conflict initially was a dispute between
    ruling party and opposition supporters, and was fueled by ongoing
    tensions between the Mamprusi and Kusasi ethnic groups.
        Elders from the Guan and Akan ethnic groups, who were arrested and
    detained in 1999 for violence related to a chieftancy dispute, were
    awaiting prosecution at year's end. A 1999 chieftancy dispute in Teshie
    that resulted in numerous gunshot wounds, a stabbing, and destruction
    of property was pending before the Ga traditional council at year's
    end.
        An August 1999 case in which off-duty soldiers clashed with
    civilians in the Oshiye area of Accra in a chieftancy dispute,
    resulting in several injuries, was pending before the courts at year's
    end.
        In 1995 the Government created a permanent negotiating team made up
    of religious leaders, NGO representatives, Council of State members,
    and other interested parties to help resolve the continuing tensions
    between the Konkomba and other ethnic groups in the north. The
    Permanent Peace Negotiating Team (PPNT) is a facilitative body whose
    primary purpose is to mediate disputes. In 1997 in response to reports
    of latent insecurity, the PPNT extended its activities to some northern
    parts of the Volta Region and supervised a peace accord among all
    parties to the conflict there. Since 1997 there have been organized
    seminars and workshops designed to promote dialog between two feuding
    factions. The Government has a ban on firearms in the Northern Region
    and northern part of the Volta Region. Government officials, M.P.'s,
    and other prominent opinion leaders regularly call for peaceful
    coexistence. In February 1999, after 14 years of animosity, the Bimobas
    and the Konkombas of the East Mamprusi District of the Northern Region
    held a pacification and reconciliation ceremony. In August 1999, the
    Northern Region Youth and Development Association, an umbrella group of
    all the ethnic groups in the area, organized a workshop on building
    peace at the grassroots level.
        In January 1999, the Nipa-O-Nipa and Sika-O-Sika factions of
    Kumasi's ethnic Moshie community signed a peace agreement at the behest
    of the then Regional Minister. However, the longstanding dispute
    resurfaced in December 1999, after the Supreme Court had ruled on the
    Moshie leadership issue. One man died from a stab wound, and another
    was injured. In January a member of the Nipa-O-Nipa faction was
    sentenced to a week in prison for wounding a student during the
    December 1999 leadership dispute. In June three members of the Sika-O-
    Sika faction were sentenced to death by hanging for the murder of the
    son of the leader of the Nipa-O-Nipa faction. The lawyers for the three
    Sika-O-Sika faction members filed an appeal, which was pending at
    year's end. The dispute was resolved May after the Ashanti paramount
    chief gave formal recognition to the Sika-O-Sika faction's leadership
    claim.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association. This right is restricted formally, as the Trades Union
    Ordinance confers broad powers on the Government to refuse to register
    a trade union; however, the Government has not interfered with the
    right of workers to associate in labor unions and has encouraged
    pluralism in labor organizations. The Industrial Relations Act (IRA),
    initially enacted in 1958 and amended in 1965 and 1972, governs trade
    unions and their activities. The percentage of workers belonging to
    unions appears to be decreasing from 9 percent in 1998 as more of the
    workforce enters the informal sector where there is no union activity.
    The Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare has estimated that 86
    percent of the work force is employed in the informal sector, and that
    number is expected to increase. In August 1999, the Ghana Federation of
    Labor (GFL) was inaugurated. The GFL is intended to serve as an
    umbrella organization for several other labor unions, which were either
    previously part of or not encompassed by the Trades Union Congress
    (TUC), the original federation. The TUC, the largest labor organization
    in the country, consists of 17 national unions.
        Led by experienced union leaders, the TUC has been a vocal and
    constructive critic of the Government's economic policies when it felt
    it to be necessary. Civil servants have their own union, the Civil
    Servants Association, which operates outside of the TUC umbrella.
        The law recognizes a right to strike, but there have been no legal
    strikes since independence. Under the IRA, the Government established a
    system of settling disputes, first through conciliation, then through
    arbitration. A union may call a legal strike if the Government does not
    call for formal arbitration. However, no union has ever gone through
    the complete process. There were numerous unsanctioned strike actions
    during the year, none of which met the requirements for a legal strike
    detailed in the IRA. The IRA prohibits retribution against strikers,
    and this law is enforced. On May 2, Accra textile traders were told
    that they could not hold a demonstration to protest a textile price
    hike because they lacked a police permit. Instead they presented a
    petition to the Government on the issue (see Section 2.b.). On July 25,
    thousands of trade union members demonstrated nationwide to demand an
    increase in the minimum wage. Police used water cannons on the Accra
    demonstrators to prevent them from blocking traffic at a major traffic
    circle. No injuries were reported in Accra or elsewhere (see Sections
    1.c. and 2.b.).
        The Government convened a committee to investigate reports that a
    gold-miners' strike in May 1999 was instigated by persons not employed
    by the mine. The committee completed its report in September 1999, but
    the conclusions were not made public by year's end.
        Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. The
    TUC is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity
    headquartered in Accra and is also a member of the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA
    provides a framework for collective bargaining and some protection
    against antiunion discrimination. Trade unions engage in collective
    bargaining for wages and benefits for both private and state-owned
    enterprises without government interference. However, the Government,
    labor, and employers negotiate together through a tripartite commission
    to set minimum standards for wages and working conditions. A July 25
    trade union demonstration (see Section 6.a.) resulted from trade
    unions' accusations that they had not been consulted adequately in the
    Government's deliberations on the minimum wage. The Government argued
    that the unions had been included in tripartite dialog on the issue.
    The law requires employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination to
    reinstate workers fired for union activities. No union leaders have
    been detained in recent years for union or other activities.
        There is legislation that authorizes export processing zones
    (EPZ's), and a few EPZ's are in operation. Existing labor law applies
    in any EPZ, including the right to organize.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits slavery, and the law also prohibits forced or bonded labor,
    including that performed by children; however, at least 2,200 women and
    girls are bound to shrines through the localized Trokosi system (see
    Section 5). Forced labor also occurs at the camps in the north for
    women accused of witchcraft (see Section 5). Apart from the Trokosi
    system, it is difficult to determine the extent to which forced or
    bonded labor by children is practiced. In April the ILO commissioned
    the African Center for Human Development, a local NGO, to conduct a
    survey of the child labor situation. The NGO found that child labor and
    child trafficking are widespread in the informal labor sector,
    especially in larger cities and border areas. The country is both a
    source and a destination country for trafficked children (see Section
    6.f.). The NGO noted that law enforcement officials expressed a
    ``complete disregard'' for child labor and trafficking issues. The
    study recommended that law enforcement officials be tasked with
    monitoring and combating child labor and child trafficking.
        According to government labor officials, child labor problems do
    not exist in the formal labor sector because ``exploitive child labor''
    (defined as that which deprives a child of health, education, or
    development) is prohibited. However, many problems still exist in the
    informal sector. NGO's report that children as young as age 7 work
    illegally as porters, domestic servants, ``hawkers,'' rock-breakers in
    quarries, small-scale miners, farmers, and fishermen. They are paid
    poorly, if at all, and sometimes are molested or abused. They seldom
    receive sufficient food or health care, and do not attend school.
        There have been newspaper reports of children being sold into
    slavery for either sexual exploitation or labor, such as 10- to 12-
    year-old boys toiling in the service of fisherman in exchange for a
    yearly remittance to their families. A June 1999, report described this
    practice as rampant in 156 fishing villages along the Afram River and
    settlements along the Volta Lake in the Afram plains (see Section
    6.f.). The ILO continues to urge the Government to revise various legal
    provisions that permit imprisonment with an obligation to perform labor
    for offenses that are not countenanced under ILO Convention 105.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Labor legislation sets a minimum employment age of 15
    years and prohibits night work and certain types of hazardous labor for
    those under 18 years of age. In practice child employment is
    widespread, and young children of school age often perform menial tasks
    during the day in the market or collect fares on local buses. An ILO
    survey conducted in three rural districts between 1992 and 1993
    concluded that 11 percent of school-age children were employed for
    wages and another 15 percent work without remuneration (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.). In August the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare
    estimated that 18,000 children are working in Accra and 800,000
    countrywide. Of those, 70 percent have no education while 21 percent
    only have a primary education.
        The migration of children from rural to urban areas is increasing,
    due to economic hardship. Children are driven to the streets to fend
    for themselves, increasing child labor and the school dropout rate.
    Another ILO study in 1992 and 1993 found that almost 90 percent of the
    surveyed street children in Accra did not attend school. Observance of
    minimum age laws is eroded by local custom and economic circumstances
    that encourage children to work to help support their families. A 1996
    ILO survey revealed that the economic activity of more than 75 percent
    of children between ages 5 and 14 takes place in the context of a
    family enterprise.
        In late 1998, the President signed into law legislation to provide
    additional child labor protection and strengthen the punishment for
    violators under a comprehensive children's act. The act incorporates
    the existing labor legislation's minimum age for employment and
    prohibitions on night work and hazardous labor. In addition, the
    legislation allows for children aged 15 years and above to have an
    apprenticeship whereby the craftsmen and employers have the obligation
    to provide a safe and healthy work environment along with training and
    tools. Fines and imprisonment for violators are increased considerably.
    In May Parliament ratified ILO Convention 182 concerning the
    elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
        On March 1, the Government signed a memorandum of understanding
    with the ILO to inaugurate the International Program on the Elimination
    of Child Labor (IPEC) in Ghana. Implementation of the IPEC began during
    the year; a national coordinator and steering committee were
    established, and the Government's statistical service was conducting a
    national survey of the child labor problem.
        In May the acting executive secretary of the Ghana National
    Commission on Children (GNCC) expressed concern about the increasing
    use of child labor in fishing enterprises, and advocated greater law
    enforcement of child labor laws. She appealed to parents and fishing
    communities to combat the practice.
        Officials only occasionally punish violators of regulations that
    prohibit heavy labor and night work for children. Inspectors from the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare are responsible for enforcement of
    child labor regulations. They visit each workplace annually and make
    spot checks whenever they receive allegations of violations.
        The law prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed
    by children; however, at least 2,200 women and girls are bound to
    shrines through the Trokosi system and children are trafficked into and
    from the country (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        There were media reports of children being sold into slavery for
    either sexual exploitation or labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1991 minimum standards for
    wages and working conditions were set by a tripartite commission
    composed of representatives of the Government, labor, and employers. In
    November the daily minimum wage increased from about $.42 (2,900 cedis)
    to about $.62 (4,200 cedis), but is still insufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a single wage earner and family.
    Furthermore, there is widespread violation of the minimum wage law. In
    most cases, households have multiple wage earners, and family members
    engage in some family farming or other family-based commercial
    activities. Trade unions are lobbying the Government to increase the
    minimum wage to $.81 (5,500 cedis) and argue that an eventual minimum
    of a $1.00 (6,800 cedis) a day would provide a living wage to workers.
        The law sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours, with one break of at
    least 36 consecutive hours every 7 days. Through collective bargaining,
    however, the basic workweek for most unionized workers is 40 hours. In
    July 1999, the Government began compensating extra duty hours only for
    overtime actually worked, in accordance with labor equity, rather than
    as an automatic salary supplement.
        Occupational safety and health regulations exist, and the Labor
    Department of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare occasionally
    imposes sanctions on violators. However, safety inspectors are few and
    poorly trained. They take action if matters are called to their
    attention, but lack the resources to seek out violations. Workers have
    the right to withdraw themselves from dangerous work situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment, although they rarely exercise this
    right.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address trafficking in persons, and trafficking in persons is a
    problem.
        The country is both a source and a destination country for
    trafficked children. A local NGO noted that law enforcement officials
    expressed a ``complete disregard'' for child labor and trafficking
    issues (see Section 6.c.). Law enforcement officials also have a
    difficult time identifying persons who are being trafficked because of
    the fluid nature of family relations in the country e.g. a friend often
    is called a ``cousin,'' and an older woman an ``aunt,'' even if there
    is no blood relation. Trafficking's most common form involved teenage
    girls from the rural areas being sent by relatives to work in the
    cities as housemaids for little remuneration. Often an assurance is
    given that after several years' service, the housemaid would be
    sponsored to train in dressmaking or hairdressing. However, often an
    excuse is found to fire the housemaid before such apprenticeship
    begins. Over 100 boys were reportedly contracted out to Lake Volta
    fishermen (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). There were also reports of
    children abducted to work either in the country or in neighboring
    countries. Young persons (girls and boys) are lured into prostitution
    and hard labor in Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria on the
    pretext of finding work in agriculture or as domestic help. Women
    reportedly are also drafted into prostitution in Germany and the
    Netherlands. Citizens reportedly were lured to the Middle East,
    particularly to Lebanon, to work illegally in menial jobs. Traffickers
    in persons from other countries also reportedly used Accra as a transit
    point to Europe.
        In May two men who had attempted to sell two young men into forced
    labor for $9,100 (50 million cedis) each were remanded to prison
    custody and charged with ``slave dealings.'' The case was pending in
    court at year's end. In June the Government repatriated 180 citizens,
    mostly girls, who were stranded in Lebanon as indentured servants.
    These girls were told that they were to work as household help to
    Lebanese families; upon arrival in Lebanon their documents and money
    were stolen and some of the women were beaten.
        A local NGO in the north conducts rehabilitation programs for women
    who have been trafficked. The NGO provides counseling and training in
    professions such as sewing and hairdressing to give them a source of
    income. The NGO also carries out a public information program about the
    dangers of trafficking and prostitution.
                                   __________

                                     GUINEA

        Guinea is a constitutional republic in which effective power is
    concentrated in a strong presidency. President Lansana Conte has ruled
    since 1984, when he led the only successful coup d'etat in the
    country's history, first as head of a military junta, and since 1994 as
    a civilian president elected in 1993. Guinea held its first multiparty
    legislative elections in 1995, delivering more than 60 percent of the
    National Assembly seats to President Conte's Party of Unity and
    Progress (PUP). The PUP is one seat short of the number required to
    amend the Constitution. Although the PUP continues to dominate all
    three branches of Government, opposition parties on occasion have
    persuaded PUP Members of Parliament, including the National Assembly
    leadership, to vote with the opposition on specific legislative
    matters. Conte won a second 5-year term in a December 1998 election
    that was marred by violence and civil unrest before and after election
    day, widespread and diverse irregularities that tended to favor the
    incumbent, and the arrest and detention of major opposition candidates
    during the vote-counting process. Nevertheless, the election was much
    more transparent and fair than the 1993 election. In the 1998
    presidential election, the Government continued to dominate the
    electoral process and did not create an independent electoral
    commission as initially demanded by both opposition parties and ruling
    party dissidents; instead, it struck a compromise with the opposition
    and formed a High Council for Electoral Affairs, composed of
    representatives from many parties, but with authority limited to local
    vote counting and the transmission of results. The Government postponed
    municipal elections scheduled for 1999 until June. The elections were
    deeply flawed, with the opposition making credible charges of
    government intimidation, fraud, and manipulation. Legislative elections
    originally scheduled for 1999 have been postponed indefinitely at the
    request of both the PUP and opposition parties due to instability in
    the border region, which makes voter registration and campaigning
    extremely difficult. An increasingly disproportionate number of public
    sector positions, including senior military and cabinet posts, are held
    by members of the President's own minority ethnic group, the Soussou.
    The judiciary is subject to executive influence, particularly in
    politically sensitive cases.
        The gendarmerie and the national police share responsibility for
    internal security and sometimes play an oppressive role in the daily
    lives of citizens. Members of the Presidential Guard are accountable to
    almost no one except the President. Members of the security forces
    frequently committed human rights abuses.
        About 85 percent of the country's population of 7.6 million engage
    in subsistence agriculture. Annual recorded per capita gross domestic
    product was about $595 in 1999. More than 80 percent of export earnings
    come from mining, particularly bauxite, gold, and diamonds. Other
    exports include coffee and fruit. There has been modest economic growth
    in recent years, especially between 1996 and 1999, due in part to
    substantial assistance from international financial institutions and
    bilateral donors. However, economic performance has lagged since 1999,
    and government collaboration with international financial institutions
    and donors was complicated by additional defense spending in response
    to attacks from Sierra Leone and Liberia by RUF rebels and Liberian
    forces. In addition widespread corruption and limited transparency in
    Government blocked efforts at economic and fiscal reform; in particular
    corruption at the port and customs offices hampered effective
    collection of nonmining receipts.
        The Government's human rights record was poor; although there were
    some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained in many
    others. The Government's tight and sometimes partisan control of the
    electoral process, both in the 1998 presidential election and the
    deeply flawed June municipal elections; its refusal to create an
    independent electoral oversight mechanism; and its prohibition of
    nongovernmental broadcast media, effectively restricted citizens''
    right to change their government. Major human rights abuses include:
    Extrajudicial killings; disappearances; use of torture, beatings, and
    rape by police and military personnel; and police abuse of prisoners
    and detainees. Soldiers, police, and civilian militia groups killed,
    beat, and raped citizens, as well as refugees from Sierra Leone and
    Liberia. Security forces used arbitrary arrest and detention. Members
    of the security forces committed abuses with impunity. Prison
    conditions are inhuman and combined with inadequate medical care
    frequently resulted in deaths. Prolonged pretrial detention is a
    problem. The Government failed to ensure access by attorneys to clients
    in prison, maintained the executive branch's influence over the
    judicial system and the electoral process, and infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the
    press. The private print press criticized the Government freely, but
    the Government continued to monopolize the broadcast media, including
    radio, the most important medium of mass communication. The Government
    restricted freedom of assembly. The Government imposed cumbersome
    requirements for official recognition on associations, and infringed on
    freedom of movement. Violence and societal discrimination against
    women, prostitution of young girls, female genital mutilation (FGM),
    ethnic discrimination and interethnic violence, child labor, reports of
    trafficking of women and children, and vigilante actions by victims or
    others persisted.
        RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and armed attackers from Liberia
    committed a large number of killings, mutilations, abductions, and
    other abuses, including the burning of homes.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    committed fewer extrajudicial killings than during the previous year,
    and there were fewer violent riots and instances of government
    overreaction than in the previous year. However, during municipal
    elections held in June, security forces, along with ruling party
    militants, clashed with opposition party supporters, resulting in the
    death of eight persons and injuries to several others. There was no
    investigation into the incident. In late November or early December,
    security forces killed six persons, including a university professor,
    in Conakry; they reportedly were meeting to plan a demonstration
    against the Government's policy in the forest region, and security
    forces claimed that they thought they were armed rebels (see Section
    2.b.). No action was taken against the security forces by year's end.
        At the beginning of November, the army bombed several villages in
    northern Sierra Leone in a campaign against rebels from Sierra Leone
    and Liberia. On December 8, troops attacked Rosint Village in northern
    Sierra Leone and killed several civilians, abducted over 50 persons,
    and burned over 30 houses.
        There was at least one reported case of a prisoner being tortured
    to death (see Section 1.c.). Some opposition members believe that his
    death was linked directly to torture by government authorities at a
    small military camp on Kassa Island. The Government denied these
    charges. In addition in January 1999, during Alpha Conde's detention
    (see Section 1.e.), one of his codefendants died in prison, reportedly
    because of torture (see Sections 1.c.).
        Deaths in custody due to inhuman prison conditions and inadequate
    medical treatment remained frequent (see Section 1.c.). Human Rights
    Watch (HRW) confirmed that a refugee detained along with approximately
    3,000 others following a series of crossborder rebel raids died while
    in detention because of poor prison conditions (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.d.).
        There was no action taken in the October 1999 case in which
    security forces killed two students when using unauthorized lethal
    force to bring a violent protest under control; nor in the 1999 case of
    a woman who died of injuries inflicted by members of the security
    forces during their suppression of riots in Labe.
        No action was taken against Banian subprefect Jean Traore, who shot
    and killed a man and wounded two other persons in 1998 while attempting
    to disperse a gathering of supporters of the Rally of the Guinean
    People (RPG). No action was taken against members of the security
    forces or government officials, who used excessive force against
    opposition party supporters, resulting in deaths both before and after
    the December 1998 presidential elections.
        Government authorities continued to block efforts by human rights
    groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to investigate
    political killings that took place in the 1970's under thenPresident
    Sekou Toure. Visits during the year to Camp Boiro, where political
    prisoners were held during the Sekou Toure regime, suggested that there
    is an ongoing effort to destroy evidence of the former use of the camp.
        In January violent clashes between Christian and Muslim villages in
    the forest region left 30 persons dead (see Section 5).
        Many victims of crime fear that they may never receive justice
    because of judicial corruption and at times resort to exacting their
    own form of retribution through vigilante violence. Some suspected
    criminals, notably thieves and rapists, are beaten to death or burned
    by their victims or others after being soaked with a flammable liquid.
        RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and armed attackers from Liberia
    killed hundreds of civilians and members of the security forces in
    crossborder raids during the year. In the latter half of the year,
    armed Liberians crossed the border and attacked the town of Macenta,
    while RUF rebels from Sierra Leone attacked Forecariah; both groups
    killed villagers, burned houses, pillaged crops, and looted property
    (see Section 1.f.). Since early September, crossborder clashes resulted
    in over 900 deaths. For example, on September 3, RUF rebels and
    Liberian forces attacked the village of Massadou on the Liberian
    border, killed 47 persons, burned homes, and looted food supplies. On
    September 6, suspected RUF rebels from Sierra Leone killed 27 persons
    in a crossborder raid on the village of Pamalap. On September 16, in an
    attack on the border town of Macenta, unidentified armed men from
    Liberia killed Mensah Kpognon, a humanitarian worker from Togo, and 34
    other persons. They also abducted Sapeu Laurence Djeya, a humanitarian
    worker from Cote d'Ivoire, who was released on September 28 (see
    Section 1.b.). On September 27, suspected Liberian armed attackers
    possibly supported by Guinean dissidents in exile killed 67 persons,
    including 3 soldiers after an attack on Macenta. On September 30, armed
    rebels attacked the villages of Macenta and Forecariah; the Government
    reported that there were numerous deaths and injuries. On October 2,
    armed men from Liberia killed three persons in an attack on the village
    of Koyama. On November 13, rebels attacked Yagouya and Soumbazaya
    villages, killing one person and abducting all of the village
    residents. After a relatively calm period, hostilities increased at the
    beginning of December when RUF rebels and Liberian forces attacked
    Gueckedou and Kissidougou, killing approximately 100 civilians and
    displacing thousands of persons.
        b. Disappearance.--Opposition leaders, local NGO's, and the
    independent press occasionally report cases of politically motivated
    temporary disappearances that usually ended with the eventual release
    of the prisoners who were held by security forces.
        There were reports that members of the armed forces abducted
    persons from Sierra Leone after attacks by RUF rebels and Guinean
    dissidents. For example, on December 8, troops attacked Rosint Village
    in northern Sierra Leone and abducted over 50 persons, killed several
    civilians, and burned over 30 houses.
        In the months after the February 1996 mutiny, hundreds of soldiers
    and civilians disappeared during neighborhood sweeps conducted by armed
    members of the security forces. Baba Sarr, a relative of reported
    mutiny ringleader Major Gbago Zoumanigui, remains missing since his
    detention following the mutiny. Many of those missing after the 1996
    mutiny were in self-imposed exile, according to family members.
        On September 6, during a crossborder raid, RUF rebels from Sierra
    Leone abducted two Italian missionaries; they escaped on December 3. On
    September 17, armed attackers from Liberia abducted Sapeu Laurence
    Djeya, an Ivorian humanitarian worker; she was released after several
    days. Survivors of some of the crossborder attacks report that the
    entire populations of small villages were abducted and taken to Sierra
    Leone. For example, on November 13, rebels attacked Yagouya and
    Soumbazaya villages, abducting everyone then in the village and killing
    one person (see Section 1.a.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Penal Code and the Constitution prohibit torture and
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, both civilian and
    military security forces beat and otherwise abused civilians. There
    were also reports that security forces often use torture and beatings
    to extract confessions and employ other forms of brutality, including
    holding prisoners incommunicado without charges and under inhuman
    conditions. Local human rights organizations and former detainees
    stated that some prisoners are bound and hung by their feet before
    being beaten. There were no reported judicial proceedings against
    officers suspected of committing abuses. Many citizens view the
    security forces as corrupt, ineffective, and even dangerous. Police
    ignore legal procedures, and extort money from citizens at roadblocks
    (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). Refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone
    reported that some soldiers demanded sex in exchange for entry into the
    country. There are also reports of sexual assaults on refugees (see
    Section 2.d.).
        During June's municipal elections, diplomatic observers witnessed
    security personnel beating unresisting persons. A local human rights
    NGO reported that security forces also shot, beat, and raped civilians,
    and pillaged personal property during the June elections (see Sections
    1.a. and 3).
        In early September, after a series of rebel raids into the country,
    President Conte blamed the attacks on refugees. Subsequently soldiers,
    police, and civilian militia groups detained thousands of refugees from
    Sierra Leone and Liberia, so of whom they beat and raped (see Section
    2.d.).
        Defendants in the Alpha Conde trial often reported that they were
    tortured, starved, and neglected during their detention (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.e.). In January 1999, prison officials reportedly tortured
    to death warrant officer Guey Keita.
        Vigilante groups beat and robbed Liberian nationals in Conakry on
    several occasions. Refugees in the Katkama refugee camp reported at
    least two instances of sexual assault by vigilantes during the year. On
    September 30, armed gangs attacked the Farmoriah refugee camp near
    Forecariah, beating the refugees and burning their belongings. Groups
    of vigilantes in the Gueckedou area forced refugees and humanitarian
    workers to undress and then examined them for tattoos, which are
    presumed to be identification marks for rebel groups. In one instance
    in October, a group of vigilantes forced five of the refugees to the
    police station in Gueckedou where they were detained (see Sections 1.d.
    and 2.d.).
        During the year, RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberian rebels
    conducted a number of crossborder raids during which they killed,
    injured, and displaced persons, and burned and looted homes (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions are inhuman and life threatening. Family members
    and friends are responsible for feeding prisoners. Guards often
    demanded bribes in exchange for letting food through to those
    incarcerated. Standards of sanitation remained poor, and there were
    several dozen deaths due to malnutrition and disease. A former inmate
    held in the central prison in Conakry reported in 1998 being housed
    with between 60 and 80 prisoners in 1 cell, with a single toilet and no
    beds. Some prisoners have reported sleeping on their knees because
    their cells were so small. Prisoners reported threats, beatings, and
    harassment by guards, and some reported being denied food and a place
    to lie down. There are credible reports from prisoners that female
    inmates are subject to harassment and sexual assault by guards. Men and
    women are housed separately, but juveniles generally are mixed in with
    adults.
        The Organisation Guineenne de Defense des Droits de L'Homme et du
    Citoyen (OGDH) determined that prisoners in at least one major prison,
    located in N'Zerekore, suffered more from neglect and lack of resources
    than from mistreatment. According to the OGDH, the N'Zerekore prison is
    a converted grain warehouse built in 1932 for 70 prisoners, but it
    houses 120. There is no electricity or running water.
        The independent press, a local human rights organization, and a
    former prisoner reported in previous years that inmates routinely are
    beaten and subjected to other forms of abuse at the prison in Koundara
    in the north. Although the Minister of Justice has criticized inhuman
    prison conditions during televised visits to prison facilities, no
    concrete action was taken to improve conditions by year's end.
        The Government permits prison visits by local humanitarian and
    religious organizations, which offer medical care and food for those in
    severe need. A former prisoner reported that without this assistance
    those who do not have families or friends would starve to death.
        Opposition party members alleged that they had not been permitted
    to visit Alpha Conde in prison at year's end.
        In November 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC) signed a detention accord with the Government for satisfactory
    access to prisoners. The ICRC reported that, for the most part, it had
    access to prisoners during the year (see Section 4).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
    continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention regularly, despite
    procedural provisions in the Penal Code designed to safeguard
    detainees. In practice administrative controls over the police are
    ineffective, and security forces rarely follow the Penal Code.
        The Code of Penal Procedure allows only the gendarmerie to make
    arrests, but the army, the Presidential Guard (Red Berets), and the
    state police often detain persons as well. The Penal Code requires that
    the Government issue a warrant before an arrest can be made and that
    detainees be charged before a magistrate within 72 hours; however, many
    detainees are incarcerated for longer periods before being charged.
    After being charged, the accused may be held until the conclusion of
    the case, including a period of appeal. Release on bail is at the
    discretion of the magistrate who has jurisdiction. The Constitution
    proscribes incommunicado detention; however, at times it occurs in
    practice. The law provides for access by attorneys to their clients,
    but authorities frequently do not respect this provision.
        On February 7, police detained approximately 30 students, who were
    marching to protest poor conditions in school (see Section 2.b.).
        The Penal Code strictly forbids civilians being detained at
    military camps; however, this provision largely is ignored. During
    June's municipal elections, police arrested and detained 44 persons,
    including children, women, old men, and an imam. They were taken to a
    military camp, where they reportedly were stripped, threatened, beaten,
    and tortured. They were released through the intervention of local and
    religious authorities (see Sections 1.c. and 3).
        RPG members allege that authorities arrested and detained an
    individual who brought food to Alpha Conde; he was accused of
    threatening national security and was held in solitary confinement for
    one week before being released.
        Some police forces took advantage of the Alpha Conde trial (see
    Section 1.e.) by arresting and detaining their creditors and other
    enemies, beating them, and then falsely accusing them of complicity
    with Conde.
        In early September, after a series of crossborder raids by RUF
    rebels and mercenaries, police detained approximately 3,000 refugees,
    although most were released within several days (see Section 2.d.). HRW
    confirmed that a refugee died while in detention because of poor prison
    conditions (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). In September in Massakoundou,
    police arrested four refugees found to have tattoos on their bodies,
    although they were released a few days later. In October five refugees
    from the Gueckedou refugee camp were detained after vigilantes found
    tattoos on them (see Section 1.c.). Two eventually were released;
    however, one still is in detention in the Gueckedou police station, and
    two were transferred to Conakry.
        Bar Association attorneys, the independent press, and government
    sources describe a parallel system of justice run by unidentified
    uniformed personnel who conduct midnight arrests, detain suspects, and
    use torture in secret prisons to obtain confessions before transferring
    detainees to prosecutors (see Section 1.c.). In previous years, a
    member of a political opposition party, a soldier, a local human rights
    organization, and former prisoners all reported that the Government
    imprisons for political reasons persons considered a threat to state
    security at Kassa prison, allegedly located in a former French colonial
    structure on an island off the coast of Conakry. The Government denied
    the existence of the Kassa Island Prison and stated that prisoners
    identified as political detainees have been incarcerated for criminal
    acts and are located in other prisons. In 1998 foreign diplomats
    visited the military installation on Kassa Island, where they saw no
    evidence of a torture facility. However, there continued to be reports
    of the Kassa facility's existence. During the trial of Alpha Conde,
    many of the accused claimed that they were brought to Kassa Island and
    were tortured for time periods that ranged from a few days to several
    weeks (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.e.).
        Security forces frequently detained persons at roadblocks and
    extorted money from them (see Section 2.d.).
        On at least one occasion, authorities arrested a journalist (see
    Section 2.a.).
        On December 15, 1998, the day after the election, members of the
    security forces arrested Alpha Conde, the presidential candidate of the
    RPG opposition party, at the town of Lola on the Liberian border. The
    Government detained Conde incommunicado until December 30, 1998, when
    it charged him with trying to leave the country illegally, resisting
    arrest, engaging in illegal foreign currency transactions, and training
    an armed force to overthrow the Government. During the year, foreign
    officials, including the Senegalese Minister of Justice, and several
    foreign diplomats visited Alpha Conde in detention. Conde's lawyers
    reported that they had generally free access to their client as well as
    to the dossier of his case. Conde's doctor, but not his family members,
    also had access to him. Conde's trial, originally scheduled for 1999,
    was postponed until April and concluded in September (see Section
    1.e.).
        The Government does not practice forced exile, although several
    soldiers who fled the country in 1996 after a mutiny attempt remained
    in self-imposed exile according to their families (see Section 1.b.).
    There are credible reports that these soldiers were engaged in the
    armed attacks on the country in conjunction with RUF rebels from Sierra
    Leone and Liberian forces (see Section 1.a.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    judiciary's independence; however, judicial authorities routinely defer
    to executive authorities in politically sensitive cases. Magistrates
    are civil servants with no assurance of tenure. Due to corruption and
    nepotism in the judiciary, relatives of influential members of the
    Government often are, in effect, above the law. In 1996 the Cabinet
    stated that it would pursue those who violate the law but avoid
    punishment due to judicial corruption, including the autonomous
    Presidential Guard; however, no action has been taken. Judges often do
    not act independently, and their verdicts are subject to outside
    interference. Influential persons often intervene on behalf of their
    relatives to prevent a negative judgment from being carried out.
        The judiciary includes courts of first instance, the two Courts of
    Appeal, and the Supreme Court, which is the court of final appeal.
    Since 1988 civilian courts have rendered all judgments involving
    civilians under the Penal Code. A military tribunal prepares and
    adjudicates charges against accused military personnel, to whom the
    Penal Code does not apply. The Government announced in 1996 the
    creation of a Discipline Council for dealing with civil servants who
    abuse their positions as government employees, but by year's end, the
    Council still had not prosecuted any cases.
        During the year, the State Security Court was used to try Alpha
    Conde and his defendants. The State Security Court is comprised of
    magistrates directly appointed by the President, and the verdict is
    open only to an appeal on a point of law, not for the reexamination of
    evidence.
        The judicial system is plagued by numerous problems, including a
    shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates and an outdated and
    restrictive penal code. The Penal Code provides for the presumption of
    innocence of accused persons, the independence of judges, the equality
    of citizens before the law, the right of the accused to counsel, and
    the right to appeal a judicial decision. Although in principle the
    Government is responsible for funding legal defense costs in serious
    criminal cases, in practice it rarely disburses these funds. The
    attorney for the defense frequently receives no payment. By year's end,
    the new Minister of Justice had introduced a prisoner tracking system
    that enabled him to review the cases of individual prisoners and to
    follow up on cases that did not reach the courts in an appropriate
    amount of time.
        During the December 1998 presidential elections, the Government
    ordered the closure of all land borders. On December 15, 1998,
    presidential candidate Alpha Conde, leader of the RPG, and three others
    were arrested in Pine, Lola, near the Liberian border. Conde
    subsequently was charged with illegal use of military force,
    undermining the authority of the state and the integrity of the
    national territory, use of violence against a state security officer,
    wrongful possession and transfer of foreign currency, and an illegal
    attempt to cross the frontier. Conde's arrest led to street protests by
    RPG militants in Conakry, which were repressed by police, resulting in
    the arrest and detention of many protesters (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.b.).
        The Government continued its investigation, and it later arrested
    and charged several civilians and military officers in connection with
    Conde. In April Alpha Conde and 47 others were brought to trial. At the
    start of the trial, the presiding judge allowed an international team
    of lawyers to defend Conde and allowed international observers in the
    courtroom, over the objections of the Government. However, when the
    court refused to nullify the case based on Conde's parliamentary
    immunity, the legal team resigned in protest. The court immediately
    appointed other lawyers to defend Conde and his codefendants. Conde and
    one other defendant rejected those lawyers and refused to speak in
    court. Others accused the prosecution of witness tampering,
    intimidation, and outright fraud. An international NGO, Commission
    Internationale de Juristes, sent an observer to the trial who noted
    several problems with the conduct of the trial. On September 11, Conde
    was found guilty, and he was sentenced to 5 years in prison. Most of
    Conde's codefendants were found innocent and released, while all of the
    others were sentenced to time served.
        Many citizens are wary of judicial corruption and instead prefer to
    rely on traditional systems of justice at the village or urban
    neighborhood level. Litigants present their civil cases before a
    village chief, a neighborhood leader, or a council of wise men. The
    dividing line between the formal and informal justice systems is vague,
    and authorities may refer a case from the formal to the traditional
    system to ensure compliance by all parties. Similarly, if a case cannot
    be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties in the traditional
    system, it may be referred to the formal system for adjudication. The
    traditional system discriminates against women in that evidence given
    by women carries less weight, in accordance with Islamic precepts (see
    Section 5).
        At year's end, the Government held an unknown number of political
    prisoners. Such prisoners are individuals incarcerated for allegedly
    politically motivated acts, such as protests, meetings, and campaigns;
    but they were arrested and convicted under criminal laws, such as those
    applying to creating disorder, inciting violence, and corruption.
    Consequently some of these individuals received disproportionately
    harsh punishment due to their political affiliation. Members of
    political opposition parties and a local human rights organization
    stated that dozens of persons also are being detained or have
    disappeared for political reasons (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.). The
    Government denies holding any political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    home, and judicial search warrants are required by law; however, police
    frequently ignore these procedures. Police and paramilitary police
    often ignore legal procedures in the pursuit of criminals. Police and
    the military frequently detained persons at nighttime roadblocks for
    purposes of security and extortion (see Section 2.d.).
        It is believed widely that security officials monitor mail. Local
    businesses, including foreign companies, often complained of
    intimidation and harassment by public officials and authorities.
        In early September, after a series of crossborder raids, police and
    civilian militias looted houses, stole property, and destroyed property
    belonging to Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees. In late October,
    Governor Mbemba Bangoura reportedly told mayors of different communes
    within Conakry to conduct house to house searches for weapons.
        On December 8, troops entered Rosint Village in northern Sierra
    Leone and burned over 30 houses.
        RUF rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberian forces killed civilians,
    burned homes, pillaged crops, looted food supplies and other goods, and
    took civilian hostages during numerous crossborder raids (see Section
    1.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression, subject to certain limitations; however, despite
    government statements in support of free speech and a free press, the
    Government employs a broad range of restrictions on these rights. The
    Government prohibits what it considers seditious talk or chants in
    public, has established defamation and slander as criminal offenses,
    and prohibits communications that personally insult the President, that
    incite violence, discrimination, or hatred, or that disturb the public
    peace. Resulting sanctions may include revocation of press cards,
    imprisonment, and banishment. In December 1999, two journalists who
    published a financial scandal involving two highly placed ministers
    were arrested under these laws.
        The Government publishes an official newspaper, Horoya, and
    operates the official television and radio (ORTG) stations. In response
    to strong political pressure and in order to protect their jobs,
    journalists for the official press practice selfcensorship and avoid
    reporting on politically controversial issues. However, several younger
    broadcast journalists for the official press reported critically about
    the Government and posed critical questions at official press
    conferences.
        While the only daily newspaper, Horoya, is owned and operated by
    the state, there is a vocal private press that is critical of the
    President and the Government. For example, the weekly satirical
    newspaper Le Lynx published front-page cartoons lampooning the
    President and senior government officials. Five private newspapers (Le
    Lynx, La Lance, L'Oeil, L'Independant, and L'Independant Plus) publish
    weekly in Conakry, and up to 10 other publications appear sporadically,
    although they are hampered by technical and financial difficulties
    stemming from paper and ink taxes, among other informal obstacles. Le
    Lynx and La Lance, under the same management, also are connected to the
    Internet and have web sites. One newspaper, L'Espoir, is affiliated
    with the governing political party, and several other newspapers are
    affiliated with opposition parties. Other newspapers offer news and
    criticism of both the Government and the opposition. However, because
    the literacy rate is only around 35 percent and the price of newspapers
    is beyond the reach of the average citizen, the effect of the print
    media is limited. Despite the limited reach of the print media, the
    Government still occasionally criticized and harassed print journalists
    whom it considers threatening.
        The Government closed L'Independent and L'Independent Plus for
    several weeks during the year, and the editor reportedly was expelled
    from the country. The newspapers reappeared for a period as Le Democrat
    and Le Republicain; however, the original names eventually were
    reinstated.
        In July authorities arrested a journalist after he published an
    article about the electric company Sogel. He later was released, but
    his trial was pending at year's end.
        The Government owns and operates all domestic broadcast media
    including radio, which serves as the most important means of informing
    the public. It is estimated that every household in the country has at
    least one radio. Many citizens listen regularly to foreign-origin
    short-wave radio, because of a lack of confidence in the state media,
    and access to foreign television satellite broadcasts is growing. The
    Government does not restrict access to or distribution of foreign
    television programming via satellite or cable. Although relatively few
    citizens can afford these services, by stringing a network of cables to
    a single satellite dish, entire neighborhoods are gaining access to
    foreign programming.
        On July 28, the National Council of Communication announced the 2-
    month suspension of the accreditation of three foreign radio
    correspondents in Conakry for their allegedly biased reporting. Those
    affected by this measure were Mouctar Bah of Radio France International
    (RFI), Ben Daouda Sylla of Africa No. 1 (based in Libreville), and
    Amadou Diallo of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). On
    September 25, the National Council of Communication lifted the
    suspension.
        The country has had full Internet access since 1997. At year's end,
    there were three domestic service providers, two strictly private and
    one affiliated with SOTELGUI, a public and private telephone company
    that holds a monopoly on international telephone lines. The Government
    did not restrict Internet access. Storefront operations offering
    Internet access were common throughout downtown Conakry; however, a
    lack of reliable telephone lines inhibited home Internet access, even
    for the few who could afford it.
        The state-owned media are not impartial; they provide extensive,
    and almost invariably, favorable coverage of the Government and ruling
    party, while providing little coverage of opposition party activities.
    While in theory the law allows private electronic media, the Government
    has held up proposals for private radio and television stations, on the
    grounds of national security and stability.
        Political tracts occasionally circulate in Conakry and other urban
    areas. Some tracts support the Government, while others specifically
    criticize senior officials. Foreign publications, some of which
    criticize the Government, often are available, although the Government
    delayed the distribution of a February issue of L'Intelligent/Jeune
    Afrique for several days, while preparing a rebuttal to an article
    ``Guinee C'est L'enfer'' (``Guinea is Hell''), which criticized
    conditions in the prisons and focused on the Alpha Conde case.
        The Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research
    exercises limited control over academic freedom through its influence
    on faculty hiring and control over the curriculum. In general teachers
    are not subject to classroom censorship; however, both public and
    private schools are obliged to follow the Government's curriculum, on
    which the national examinations are based.
        In December security forces killed six persons, including a
    university professor, who were meeting to plan a demonstration against
    the Government's policy in the forest region (see Sections 1.a. and
    2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law restricts
    freedom of assembly, and the Government exercises its power to restrict
    unwanted political activity. The Penal Code bans any meeting that has
    an ethnic or racial character or any gathering ``whose nature threatens
    national unity.'' The Government requires notification 72 hours prior
    to public gatherings, otherwise the events are considered illegal.
        The Government bans all street marches except funerals. The law
    allows local authorities to cancel a demonstration or meeting if they
    believe that it poses a threat to public order. They may hold event
    organizers criminally liable if violence or destruction of property
    ensues.
        On February 7, riot police dispersed a crowd of students who were
    marching to the Education Ministry to protest overcrowding and poor
    conditions in schools. Police detained temporarily approximately 30
    students on the charge of being ``bandits.'' In late November or early
    December, security forces killed six persons, including a university
    professor, who were meeting to plan a demonstration against the
    Government's policy in the forest region; security forces claimed that
    they thought they were armed rebels (see Section 1.a.). In response on
    December 5, the Governor of Conakry announced that written permission
    from his office was required for all public meetings of all
    associations, nongovernmental organizations, groups, cooperatives, and
    political parties.
        Freedom of association is protected by law; however, the Government
    imposes cumbersome requirements to obtain official recognition.
    Political parties must provide information on their founding members
    and produce internal statutes and political platforms consistent with
    the Constitution before the Government recognizes them. There were
    approximately 46 legally recognized political parties; deputies of 9
    different parties were represented in the National Assembly.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion and permits religious communities to govern themselves without
    state interference, and the Government generally respects these rights
    in practice. The government-sponsored National Islamic League (NIL)
    represents the country's Sunni Muslim majority, who make up 85 percent
    of the population. The Government requires that all recognized
    Christian churches join the Association of Churches and Missions in
    order to benefit from certain government privileges, such as tax
    benefits and energy subsidies. Missionary groups are required to make a
    declaration of their aims and activities to the Ministry of Interior or
    to the NIL.
        The NIL states that it supports peaceful coexistence with other
    religious denominations and actively attempts to facilitate dialog to
    eliminate ethnic and religious tensions. Although the Government and
    the NIL have spoken out against the proliferation of Shi'a
    fundamentalist sects on the grounds that they ``generate confusion and
    deviation'' within the country's Islamic family, they have not
    restricted these groups. Foreign missionaries and church-affiliated
    relief agencies operate freely.
        Government support of the powerful, semi-official NIL has led some
    non-Muslims to complain that the Government uses its influence to favor
    Muslims over non-Muslims, although non-Muslims are represented in the
    Cabinet, administrative bureaucracy, and the armed forces. Conversions
    of senior officials to Islam, such as that of the Defense Minister, are
    ascribed to the NIL's efforts to influence the religious beliefs of
    senior government leaders. The Government refrains from appointing non-
    Muslims to important administrative positions in certain parts of the
    country, in deference to the particularly strong social dominance of
    Islam in these regions.
        There have been no recent reports that government officials have
    obstructed or limited missionary activities of Jehovah's witnesses, who
    had reported isolated instances of harassment in the past.
        Despite claims of separation of church and state, in July the
    Government announced that it would finance the renovation of Conakry's
    grand mosque, the mosque at which President Conte practices.
        In April 1999, for the first time, the Government required
    government ministers to take an oath on either the Koran or the Bible,
    which provoked criticism from those who saw the gesture as incompatible
    with the secular nature of the State.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
    the right to travel freely within the country and to change their place
    of residence and work; however, authorities infringed on these rights
    in some areas. The Government requires all citizens to carry national
    identification cards, which they must present on demand at security
    checkpoints. Travelers face harassment by police and at military
    roadblocks, particularly late at night. The private press and local
    NGO's reported that travelers often are pressured to pay bribes to
    allow passage. Government officials state that the corruption is being
    perpetrated by a few rogue soldiers; however, abuse at official
    checkpoints is systemic.
        During the June municipal elections, the Government closed roads in
    Conakry, preventing some voters from reaching polling stations (see
    Section 3).
        Although the Government permits foreign travel for its citizens, it
    retains the authority to limit such travel for political reasons. In
    September the speaker of the National Assembly complained that his
    passport was confiscated at Conakry's Gbessia Airport upon his return
    to the country. The Government claimed that it was a simple
    misunderstanding and said that the passport was taken for courtesy
    check-in. Similarly two National Assembly delegates reported that they
    were not given diplomatic passports because they were opposition party
    members.
        Following an August 13 release into Guinea of humanitarian workers
    held hostage in Kolahun, Liberia, by a dissident group, the Government
    closed its border with Liberia (see Section 1.d.). The border was
    reopened, and as of year's end, the border remained officially open.
        The Government closed its border with Sierra Leone intermittently.
    At the beginning of August, the Government closed the border, later
    allowing access only to ``vulnerable'' refugees, including pregnant and
    lactating women, children below the age of 18, and the elderly. At the
    beginning of September, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
    confirmed that at least 10,000 civilians were waiting to cross the
    border, and that a pregnant woman and at least 10 children had died due
    to poor conditions in makeshift camps on the border.
        There are approximately 150,000 to 200,000 internally displaced
    persons (IDP's) in the country as a result of the border attacks by RUF
    rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberian forces. The Government estimated
    this number at 209,000; however, the UNCHR believed that the number was
    lower.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    with the UNHCR, the World Food Program, other humanitarian
    organizations, and donor countries to assist refugees. The Government
    provides first asylum in accordance with U.N. and Organization of
    African Unity conventions. The UNHCR stated that as of October 3,
    approximately 500,000 Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees were
    resident in the country. According to the UNHCR, more than 200,000
    Sierra Leoneans entered Guinea since January 1998 and are mostly in the
    forest region. The Government claims that many more refugees are
    present in the urban areas of the country, and that the number of
    refugees in the country is closer to a million. Refugees account for
    half or more of the populations of the forest region cities of
    N'Zerekore, Gueckedou, and Macenta. Almost all of the refugees from
    Guinea-Bissau were repatriated by year's end.
        In past years, the Government has provided school buildings, access
    to local medical facilities, and land for farming to assist those
    designated as refugees. However, relief organizations reported that
    some local authorities have demanded portions of donated fuel and food
    from delivery convoys. In October instability in the southern border
    areas where most refugees lived prompted the Government and the UNHCR
    to call for assistance in moving refugees away from the border.
    However, although the Government initially was reluctant to allocate
    suitable arable land for the establishment of new refugee camps further
    from the border, it did so by year's end.
        In previous years, the Government generally was hospitable toward
    refugees; however, as crossborder raids by RUF rebels from Sierra Leone
    and Liberian forces intensified, the Government increasingly become
    less tolerant toward refugees. There was credible evidence that RUF
    forces used refugees as informants and disguised themselves as refugees
    to prepare for attacks on the country. For example, in early September,
    after a series of rebel raids into the country, President Conte, in a
    radio address, accused Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees living in
    the country of fomenting war against the Government. Soldiers, police,
    and civilian militia groups rounded up thousands of refugees, some of
    whom they beat and raped (see Section 1.c.). Approximately 3,000
    refugees were detained, although most were released by year's end (see
    Section 1.d.). HRW confirmed that a refugee died while in detention
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Reports have become rare that police and border patrol guards
    demanded bribes before allowing refugees into the country or that some
    border officers demanded sex from women who lacked money to pay bribes.
    However, there were some reports that refugees were forced to pay
    bribes to leave refugee camps guarded by the armed forces and then were
    forced to pay bribes to get past many of the checkpoints. Security
    forces arrested suspected rebels at the border as they tried to enter
    the country.
        Vigilante groups attacked Liberian nationals in Conakry on several
    occasions. Refugees in Katkama camp reported at least two instances of
    sexual assault by vigilantes during the year. Groups of vigilantes in
    the Gueckedou area forced refugees and humanitarian workers to undress
    and then examined them for tattoos, which are presumed to be
    identification marks for rebel groups (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Although the 1990 Constitution provides for a popularly elected
    President and National Assembly, the ability of citizens to exercise
    this provision effectively is restricted. The Government's tight and
    sometimes partisan control of the electoral process and lack of an
    independent electoral oversight mechanism call into serious doubt the
    ability of citizens to change their government peacefully.
        Although opposition political parties have been legal since 1991,
    the Government has continued to dominate the electoral process; General
    Conte has remained President, and his PUP party has retained a majority
    in the National Assembly. The Government controlled the first
    multiparty presidential election in 1993 and the first multiparty
    legislative elections in 1995, limiting the opposition to a subordinate
    role.
        Municipal elections took place on June 25; however, national
    legislative elections were postponed indefinitely at the request of
    both the PUP and opposition parties. In the June elections, President
    Conte's ruling PUP party claimed victory in 32 of 38 municipalities.
    The announcement of the results was delayed for several days in the
    wake of postelection violence. Reportedly the police killed eight
    persons during clashes between opposition demonstrators and police, and
    injured several more (see Section 1.a.). A diplomatic observer noticed
    an increased military presence in the interior municipalities of Mamou
    and Kankan, and on June 28, he witnessed eight soldiers beating three
    unresisting citizens (see Section 1.c.). The Government claimed that
    the elections were free and transparent, but the opposition strongly
    disagreed and claimed credibly that the Government and the ruling party
    engaged in massive ``obstruction, fraud, and intimidation'' (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.d.). Opposition figures alleged that the Government
    manipulated the voting by facilitating multiple ballot-casting by
    ruling party regulars and denying voting cards to opposition party
    supporters. President Conte made inflammatory and partisan speeches in
    June and July, threatening opposition leaders with arrest and claiming
    to rule the country by ``divine right,'' which widely were considered
    as attempts to intimidate his opponents. During the June municipal
    elections, the Government closed some roads in Conakry, ostensibly to
    prevent election fraud; however, in practice it prevented many voters
    living outside the district in which they were registered from reaching
    their polling stations and voting (see Section 2.d.). Candidates of a
    new party led by former Prime Minister Sidya Toure were denied access
    to the electoral process.
        When the victorious PUP councils could not agree on who should be
    appointed to leadership positions, President Conte named several mayors
    himself, in a move that observers criticized widely as unconstitutional
    and irregular.
        The country's second multiparty presidential election was held on
    December 14, 1998, under a somewhat improved electoral process;
    however, the Government continued to refuse to establish a national
    election commission independent of the Government, despite opposition
    demands. In September 1998, the Government and the CODEM, an umbrella
    group of opposition parties formed in 1995, agreed to establish a
    Superior Council for Electoral Affairs (SCEA) and local vote counting
    commissions, composed of CODEM as well as government and ruling party
    representatives, with oversight authority over local vote counting and
    transmission of local results to Conakry. However, the Government
    retained exclusive control of all registration and election procedures
    up to and including the casting of votes, as well as of the national
    tabulation of election results.
        According to the Government's tabulation of results, President
    Conte was elected to a second 5-year term, receiving 56 percent of the
    2.7 million votes cast, while Bah Mamadou of the Union pour la Nouvelle
    Republique received 25 percent and Alpha Conde of the RPG received 17
    percent. Had no candidate received a majority of votes cast, the
    Constitution would have required a second election between the two
    leading candidates.
        The election was much more transparent and fair than the 1993
    presidential election. Observers from various organizations affiliated
    chiefly with developing countries issued a statement that found no
    fault with the election-day vote-casting process; however, observers
    from European and other credible foreign organizations did not endorse
    that statement, which was issued before the election results were
    announced and did not address the registration, campaigning, and vote-
    counting processes.
        The 1998 presidential election was marred by violence and
    disruption of opposition campaigning before the polling, by civil
    unrest after the polling, by widespread and diverse irregularities that
    tended to favor the incumbent, and by the arrest and detention of major
    opposition candidates during the vote-counting process.
        There were credible reports during the 1998 election campaign that
    ruling party supporters and government officials used force to prevent
    or disrupt opposition party meetings in Conakry and in provincial towns
    during the campaign. Violence between PUP and opposition party
    supporters, as well as violent interethnic clashes with political
    overtones in Conakry, was frequent and widespread during the election
    campaign (see Section 5).
        Opposition candidates suffered from inferior access both to state
    election funds and to coverage by the state-monopolized domestic
    broadcast media, although the Government allotted each candidate an
    equal amount of television and radio broadcast time each day throughout
    the 1998 campaign.
        On election day, international observers noted a shortage of
    ballots for opposition candidates in some districts of Conakry, but an
    abundance of ballots for President Conte. There were no charges of
    widespread, systematic obstruction of pollwatchers, but opposition
    pollwatchers often were absent from heavily proConte areas, suggesting
    at least selective obstruction. Opposition party officials charged that
    security forces arrested and detained over 100 opposition pollwatchers
    on election day; manipulated voting procedures in some areas; and
    overlooked irregularities in voter registration and in ballot-counting
    procedures. Members of the armed forces were required to vote on the
    premises of the military installations to which they were posted and
    were subject to strong pressures to vote for President Conte.
        The Government postponed the announcement of its tabulation of the
    election results from December 16 to December 17, 1998. During the
    interim, there was violence and looting in several areas.
        Members of the PUP continue to hold 60 seats in the unicameral
    National Assembly, 1 short of the supermajority required to amend the
    Constitution.
        The President continued to hold the power to appoint the governors,
    prefects, and their deputies to administer regions and subregions
    respectively. Most of these officials are members of the PUP or of
    parties allied with it.
        Local governments generally have limited autonomy. Although they
    have some financial resources with which to fund local programs, most
    of their funds are controlled by the central Government. However, local
    government staff members, such as deputy prefects, are hired and can be
    fired by local authorities and are not considered central government
    employees.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Four women
    hold seats in the 26-member Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
    the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Tourism, and the Ministry of
    Social Affairs and Promotion of Women. There are 9 female deputies in
    the 114-member National Assembly. There are few women at senior levels
    below minister, and there are no women in the senior ranks of the armed
    forces. Women also play a minor role in the leadership of the major
    political parties.
        The Cabinet and armed forces leadership includes representatives of
    all major ethnic groups. However, a disproportionate number of senior
    military officers are Soussou, the President's ethnic group.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Local NGO's primarily interested in human rights issues include:
    The Guinean Organization for the Defense of Human Rights; the Diallo
    Telli Foundation; the Guinean Human Rights Association; the Children of
    the Victims of Camp Boiro; S.O.S. Burial Grounds; the Association of
    Victims of Repression; Humanitarian Assistance for Prisons; Defense of
    Prisoners' Rights; Women Jurists for Human Rights; the Committee for
    the Defense of Civic Rights; and the Coordinating Committee on
    Traditional Practices Affecting Women's and Children's Health.
    Government officials are generally cooperative and responsive to their
    views; however, some organizations allege that government officials try
    to intimidate them, and that they often meet resistance when trying to
    investigate abuses or engage in civil education. Various government
    officials have blocked private efforts to memorialize victims of the
    Sekou Toure regime that ruled the country from independence until 1984.
        A human rights office within the Ministry of Defense, International
    Humanitarian Rights, has conducted over 100 human rights seminars since
    1994 to teach military personnel about human rights recognized by
    international and regional agreements.
        In November 1999, the ICRC signed a detention accord with the
    Government for full access to prisoners. In January the ICRC suspended
    its prison visits because it was denied access to some prisoners,
    including Alpha Conde; however, the ICRC reported that it had access to
    prisoners, including Alpha Conde, at year's end.
        Following a series of crossborder raids by rebels, several NGO's
    suspended activities due to insecurity.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
    regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, language, beliefs, political
    opinions, philosophy, or creed; however, the Government does not
    enforce these provisions uniformly.
        Women.--Violence against women is common, although estimates differ
    as to the extent of the problem. Wife beating is a criminal offense and
    constitutes grounds for divorce under civil law; however, police rarely
    intervene in domestic disputes.
        Although the Government has made regular statements in the media
    against sexual harassment, women working in the formal sector in urban
    areas complain of frequent sexual harassment. The social stigma
    attached to rape prevents most victims from reporting it. In particular
    marital rape goes unreported, because most women and men view it as the
    husband's right. Several local NGO's are working to increase public
    awareness of the nature of these crimes and promote increased
    reporting. The Government has not pursued vigorously criminal
    investigations of alleged sexual crimes. There were reports that women
    were trafficked for the sex trade and illegal labor (see Section 6.f.).
        The Constitution provides for equal treatment of men and women, and
    the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women's Promotion works to advance
    such equality; however, women face discrimination throughout society,
    particularly in rural areas where opportunities are limited by custom,
    and the demands of childrearing and subsistence farming. For example,
    on February 7, President Conte remarked in a speech that there were too
    many women in the customs service, and then he gave instructions to
    recruit only men for the customs service. Women are not denied access
    to land, credit, or businesses, but inheritance laws also favor male
    heirs over females. Government officials acknowledged that polygamy is
    practiced commonly. Divorce laws generally tend to favor men in
    awarding custody and dividing communal assets. Legal evidence given by
    women carries less weight than that given by men (see Section 1.e.).
    The Government has affirmed the principle of equal pay for equal work;
    however, in practice women receive less pay than men in most equally
    demanding jobs.
        On May 17, the Government instituted a working plan to analyze the
    situation of women and children in the country. The program involves
    workshops and training for security and judicial personnel, as well as
    the education community.
        Children.--The Constitution provides that the Government has a
    particular obligation to protect and nurture the nation's youth, and
    the Government allocates a significant percentage of the budget to
    primary education. There is a Minister of Youth and a Cabinet Minister,
    appointed by the President, charged with defending women's and
    children's rights, and in 1996 created a permanent committee dedicated
    to defending the rights of the child, with members chosen from
    different ministries, NGO's, and other sectors. The Government provides
    free, compulsory primary school education for 8 years; however,
    enrollment rates are low due to school fees and lax enforcement of the
    laws mandating school attendance. Approximately 51 percent of all
    eligible students are enrolled in primary school, including 66 percent
    of eligible boys compared with only 37 percent of eligible girls. Girls
    often are taken out of school and sent to work to help pay for their
    brothers' educational expenses. In 1999 the Government spent less than
    6 percent of the national budget on education and training programs.
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is very widespread. It is practiced widely in all
    regions and among all religious and ethnic groups. FGM is illegal under
    the Penal Code, and senior officials and both the official and private
    press have spoken against the practice; however, there have been no
    prosecutions for violations of the code. FGM is performed on girls and
    women between the ages of 4 and 70, but exact figures on this procedure
    are difficult to establish due to its private nature. The Coordinating
    Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting Women's and Children's
    Health (CPTAFE), a local NGO dedicated to eradicating FGM and ritual
    scarring, cited a recent decline in the percentage of females subjected
    to FGM, estimating the figure to be between 65 and 75 percent. A 1999
    Demographic Health Survey estimates that over 99 percent of females
    undergo FGM. Expert estimates vary between 65 and 90 percent. The lower
    figure, if accurate, would represent a decline over recent years due to
    education of the population by women's rights groups about the health
    risks involved with the practice. However, infibulation, the most
    dangerous form of FGM, still is performed in the forest region, but
    less frequently than in previous years. Despite diseases resulting from
    crude and unsanitary surgical instruments and deaths resulting from the
    practice, the tradition continues, seriously affecting many women's
    lives. FGM also increases the risk of HIV infection since unsterilized
    instruments are shared among participants.
        The Government has made efforts to educate health workers on the
    dangers of this procedure, and it supports the CPTAFE's efforts. The
    CPTAFE reports high rates of infant mortality and maternal mortality
    due to FGM. In March 1997, working in collaboration with the World
    Health Organization, the Government initiated a 20-year strategy to
    eradicate FGM.
        A growing number of men and women oppose FGM. Urban, educated
    families are opting increasingly to perform only a slight symbolic
    incision on a girl's genitals rather than the complete procedure. In
    November 1999, the CPTAFE held a large public ceremony celebrating the
    ``laying down of the excision knife'' in which some traditional
    practitioners of FGM pledged to discontinue the practice; however, most
    of those who perform FGM oppose its eradication since it is quite
    lucrative for them.
        The CPTAFE, in conjunction with the Government, local journalists,
    and international NGO's, also is promoting an education campaign to
    discourage underage marriage. Although such marriages are prohibited by
    law, parents contract marriages for girls as young as 11 years of age
    in the forest region.
        Prostitution exists in the informal economic sector and employs
    girls as young as 14 years of age. The Government does not take action
    when prostitution of minors is brought to its attention, and it does
    not monitor actively child or adult prostitution. There were reports
    that girls were trafficked for prostitution and other labor (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Child labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that all
    persons are equal before the law. There are no special constitutional
    provisions for the disabled. The Government has not mandated
    accessibility for the disabled, and few disabled persons work, although
    some develop opportunities in the informal sector.
        Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religions are
    generally amicable; however, in some parts of the country, Islam's
    dominance is such that there is strong social pressure that discourages
    non-Muslims from practicing their religion openly.
        In January violent clashes between Christian and Muslim villages in
    the forest region left 30 persons dead. According to both the Secretary
    General of the Islamic League and the Archbishop of Conakry, the
    tensions were due primarily to a long-running land dispute, and they
    were not based on religion. The conflict calmed down after a visit by
    the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, but
    the region remained tense.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population is
    ethnically and regionally diverse. No single ethnic group constitutes a
    majority nationwide. The largest ethnic groups are the Puhlar, also
    called Peuhl or Fulani (about 40 percent of the population), the
    Malinke (about 30 percent), and the Soussou (about 20 percent). Each
    group speaks a distinct primary language and is concentrated in a
    distinct region: The Soussou in lower Guinea; the Puhlar in middle
    Guinea; and the Malinke in upper Guinea.
        While the Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit racial or ethnic
    discrimination, ethnic identification is strong. Mutual suspicion
    affects relations across ethnic lines, in and out of the Government.
    Widespread societal ethnic discrimination by members of all major
    ethnic groups is evident in private sector hiring and buying patterns,
    in urban neighborhoods that tend to be segregated ethnically, and in
    the relatively low levels of interethnic marriage, even in cities. The
    proportion of public sector positions occupied by Soussous,
    particularly at senior levels, is perceived widely as exceeding their
    share of the national population.
        The ruling PUP party, although generally supported by Soussous, has
    transcended ethnic boundaries more effectively than the major
    opposition parties, which have readily identifiable ethnic and regional
    bases; the UNR's main base is the Puhlar, while the RPG's main base is
    the Malinke. Soussou preeminence in the public sector and Malinke
    migration into the traditional homelands of smaller ethnic groups in
    the forest region have been major sources of political tensions that
    sometimes have erupted into violence.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of employees to form independent labor unions and prohibits
    discrimination based on union affiliation. Approximately 160,000
    workers were reported as unionized, although inadequate labor
    statistics make it difficult to estimate the exact percentage of
    workers in unions. About 52,000 are government workers and are
    automatically members of the government union. The rest are engaged in
    private, mixed, and informal sectors. The largest independent union,
    Union Syndicale des Travailleurs de Guinee (USTG), claims 64,000
    members, 18,000 of whom are women.
        The Labor Code states that all workers, except military and
    paramilitary personnel, have the right to create and participate in
    organizations that defend and develop their individual and collective
    rights as workers. The Labor Code requires elected worker
    representatives for any enterprise employing 25 or more salaried
    workers.
        The National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG) was the sole
    trade union before the Labor Code was enacted. CNTG is an umbrella
    organization for 16 individual unions of government employees, and each
    of the 16 individual unions is tied to a government ministry. Although
    there are now other trade unions and labor confederations, the CNTG
    remains the largest confederation.
        The CNTG is funded indirectly by the Government, although dissident
    members seek to increase the Confederation's freedom from government
    control. Independent unions and confederations have gained popularity,
    such as the Free Union of Teachers and Researchers of Guinea, the
    Professional Union Federation for Education, and the National
    Organization for Free Trade Unions of Guinea. Several dissident groups
    within the CNTG left the Confederation in 1996 citing corruption among
    its leadership. These groups joined with some independent unions to
    form the United Syndicates of Guinean Workers (USTG).
        The Labor Code grants salaried workers, including public sector
    civilian employees, the right to strike 10 days after their
    representative union makes known its intention to strike. It prohibits
    strikes in sectors providing ``essential services,'' which include
    hospitals, radio and television, army, and police, communications, and
    transport services.
        Strikes are met with intimidation from security forces and, as a
    result, often do not make it out of the organizational stage. In a 1999
    speech to workers at the Coyah water plant, President Conte spoke of
    the willingness of many unemployed workers to take the places of those
    who strike. One organization, SAG, tried to organize a strike, and
    called in the USTG to advise; however, the strike never got out of the
    planning stage because the organizers were fired quickly by their
    employers.
        The Government continues to subsidize CNTG representatives to the
    International Labor Organization (ILO) conferences, by paying their
    travel and lodging expenses. Other independent unions must provide
    their own funding to attend ILO conferences.
        Unions may affiliate freely with international labor groups.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the Labor
    Code, representative workers' unions or union groups may organize in
    the workplace and negotiate with employers or employer organizations.
    The law protects the right to bargain collectively concerning wages and
    salaries without government interference. Work rules and work hours are
    established by the employer in consultation with union delegates. The
    Code also prohibits antiunion discrimination. Union delegates represent
    individual and collective claims and grievances with management.
    However, in regional and prefecture levels, unionized labor faces stiff
    opposition from government officials. Union officials are selected on
    the basis of nepotism and patronage, rather than through a hierarchy of
    competence; these individuals are not sensitized to the rights of
    workers, and often view unions as an enemy of the State. As a result,
    union activities in the interior face harassment and interference from
    many governors and prefects. Individual workers threatened with
    dismissal or other sanctions have the right to a hearing before
    management with a union representative present and, if necessary, to
    take the complaint to the Conakry Labor Court, which convenes weekly to
    hear such cases. In the interior, civil courts hear labor cases.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    specifically forbids forced or compulsory labor, including forced and
    bonded labor by children; however, there were reports that women and
    girls were trafficked (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--According to the Labor Code, the minimum age for
    employment is 16 years. Apprentices may start to work at 14 years of
    age. Workers and apprentices under the age of 18 are not permitted to
    work at night, for more than 12 consecutive hours, or on Sundays. The
    Labor Code also stipulates that the Minister of Labor and Social
    Affairs must maintain a list of occupations in which women and youth
    under the age of 18 cannot be employed. In practice enforcement by
    ministry inspectors is limited to large firms in the modern sector of
    the economy. In 1997 the Ministry of Planning estimated that in rural
    areas, approximately 66 percent of children between the ages of 7 and
    14 were employed; the rate jumped to 91 percent in the 15 to 19 age
    group. In urban areas, approximately 19 percent of children between the
    ages of 7 and 14 were employed; the rate jumped to 50 percent for
    children between the ages of 15 and 19. Overall about 48 percent of
    children under age 15 were employed, accounting for approximately 20
    percent of the total working population and 26 percent of agricultural
    workers. The Government has not ratified the ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor. Child labor in factories is not a prevalent
    problem because of the low level of manufacturing. Working children are
    found mostly in the informal sector areas of subsistence farming, petty
    commerce, and smallscale mining. Girls as young as age 14 engage in
    prostitution (see Section 5). The worst forms of child labor can be
    found in the artisanal mining sector where children haul granite and
    sand for little or no money. The Government has spoken out against
    child labor, but lacks the resources, enforcement mechanism, and the
    legislative will to combat the problem. As a result, child laborers do
    not have access to education or health care; they suffer from chronic
    malnutrition, traumatic stress, and depression.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor; however,
    there were reports that girls were trafficked (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code of 1988 provides
    for the establishment by decree of a minimum hourly wage; however, the
    Government has not done this. Prevailing wages often were inadequate to
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. There also
    are provisions in the code for overtime and night wages, which are
    fixed percentages of the regular wage.
        According to the Labor Code, regular work is not to exceed 10hour
    days or 48-hour weeks, and there is to be a period of at least 24
    consecutive hours of rest each week, usually on Sunday. Every salaried
    worker has the legal right to an annual paid vacation, accumulated at
    the rate of at least 2 workdays per month of work. In practice the
    authorities enforce these rules only in the relatively small modern
    urban sector.
        The Labor Code contains provisions of a general nature regarding
    occupational safety and health, but the Government has not elaborated a
    set of practical workplace health and safety standards. Moreover, it
    has not issued any of the ministerial orders laying out the specific
    requirements for certain occupations and for certain methods of work
    that are called for in the Labor Code. The Ministry of Labor and Social
    Affairs is responsible for enforcing labor standards, and its
    inspectors are empowered to suspend work immediately in situations
    hazardous to health; however, enforcement remained more a goal than a
    reality. Labor inspectors acknowledge that they cannot cover even
    Conakry, much less the entire country, with their small staff and
    meager budget.
        Under the Labor Code, workers have the right to refuse to work
    under unsafe conditions without penalty. Nevertheless many workers fear
    retaliation should they refuse to work under unsafe conditions.
    Employees in high-risk professions, such as night guards, drivers, and
    police, have protested conditions without result. Sodefa, a joint
    venture of the Guinean and Chinese Governments, was criticized for
    inhuman working conditions, but when workers tried to protest, security
    forces were called to disperse them.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, some NGO's report that women and children are
    trafficked within the country, as well as internationally, for the sex
    trade and illegal labor. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain,
    because victims do not report the crime due to fear for their personal
    safety.
                                   __________

                                 GUINEA-BISSAU

        President Koumba Yala was elected in January with a 72 percent
    electoral majority in a runoff election following multiparty elections
    in November 1999. \1\ Both elections were considered by local and
    international observers to be generally free and fair, although there
    were reports of some irregularities in the November 1999 election. The
    Social Renewal Party (PRS), Yala's party, also won 38 of 102 National
    Assembly seats in the November 1999 elections. The PRS victory ended
    the 26-year domination of the African Party for the Independence of
    Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). In January President Yala named
    16 former Junta members as Ministers, creating an uneasy power-sharing
    arrangement between the military and the civilian government. In March
    at the behest of the U.N. Office on Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), the U.N.
    Security Council called on all parties, particularly the military junta
    that deposed President Bernardo Viera in May 1999, to uphold the
    results of the election. However, General Ansumane Mane, head of the
    military junta, did not accept the authority of the elected government
    completely. The coalition government did not resolve fully the issues
    of control over the budget and the military. This uneasy coalition
    lasted for most of the year, as Mane placed increasing restrictions on
    the elected civilian government. However, in November Yala nominated 30
    members of the armed forces for promotion without consulting Mane. In
    response Mane placed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces under house
    arrest, declared himself Chief of Staff, and directed his soldiers to
    disarm the Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard and other
    elements of the armed forces refused to take part in the coup, and
    General Mane and approximately 35 supporters fled the capital. For a
    week, they hid in the countryside; however, on November 30 in
    Quinhamel, 40 miles north of Bissau, Mane and his supporters were
    surrounded, and Mane was killed in an exchange of gunfire with
    government forces. Subsequently President Yala reshuffled his cabinet
    in an effort to control the military and move forward with
    reconstruction. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;
    however, it is subject to political influence and corruption.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ On June 14, 1998 the United States Embassy suspended operations
    in the midst of heavy fighting in Bissau and all official personnel in
    the country were evacuated. This report is based on information
    obtained by U.S. embassies in neighboring countries and from other
    sources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The police, under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior,
    have primary responsibility for the nation's internal security;
    however, a lack of resources and training continued to hamper their
    effectiveness. The armed forces are responsible for external security
    and may be called upon to assist the police in internal emergencies.
    Members of the police and the military committed serious human rights
    abuses.
        The population of 1.2 million relies largely upon subsistence
    agriculture and the export of cashew nuts. Both activities were
    affected negatively by the fighting beginning in 1998. Annual per
    capita gross domestic product (GDP) prior to 1998 has been estimated at
    $840. Due to the conflict, GDP declined by 28 percent in 1998 but
    improved modestly in 1999 and during the year. Exports of cashew nuts
    returned to preconflict levels during the year. Commercial banks and
    other monetary institutions, which had ceased operations with the
    outbreak of hostilities in June 1998, reopened in July 1999. The
    country remains burdened by heavy external debt and massive
    underemployment.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and, while there
    were improvements in a few areas, serious problems remained. Citizens
    were allowed to vote in generally free and fair elections. Security
    forces committed some extrajudicial killings. The police and members of
    the armed forces continued to use beatings, physical mistreatment,
    other forms of harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention. The
    Government did not punish any members of the security forces for
    abuses. Prison conditions remained poor. The Government at times used
    incommunicado detention. The judiciary is subject to political
    influence and corruption. The Government infringed on citizens''
    privacy rights. The Government at times limited freedom of the press,
    and journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government at times
    restricted freedom of movement. Violence and discrimination against
    women were problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) was practiced
    widely. Child labor and some forced child labor persisted.
        The conflict that ended with the May 1999 coup caused massive
    civilian dislocation and hardship, but by June 1999 most of the 350,000
    internally displaced persons had returned to their homes. By the end of
    1999, virtually all persons who sought refuge in neighboring countries
    had repatriated spontaneously.
        An estimated 2,000 persons were killed during the 11-month conflict
    between June 1998 and May 1999. Reports continued of deaths and
    injuries from land mines and unexploded shells that remain in populated
    areas.
        Rebel forces were responsible for beatings, other forms of
    harassment, detention, robbery, and looting.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    political killings; however, on November 30, in the aftermath of an
    attempted coup, General Ansumane Mane and eight supporters were killed
    in an exchange of gunfire with government forces, while they were
    attempting to escape.
        Troops loyal to or allied with President Vieira killed an unknown
    number of civilian noncombatants prior to the May 1999 coup.
        Prior to the May 1999 coup, President Vieira took no action to
    encourage forces allied with him to minimize the loss of life among
    prisoners of war and the civilian population. During the 1999 coup,
    reports indicate that loyalist forces based in the Marinha district of
    the capital Bissau fired at advancing rebel forces and killed 60
    civilians who had sought refuge in a nearby mission school. Overall, an
    estimated 2,000 persons were killed during the 11-month conflict. There
    was no investigation into nor action taken against the troops
    responsible for these killings by year's end.
        No suspect has yet been named in the August 22, 1999, murder of
    Nicandro Barreto, Justice Minister under President Vieira. Barreto was
    strangled at his home in Bissau.
        A mass grave uncovered in October 1999 contained the remains of 28
    persons and was believed to include those of former Vice President
    Paolo Correia, former Attorney General Viriato Pa, and military
    officers sentenced to death in 1985 by a military tribunal on charges
    of an attempted coup. No action was taken in this case during the year.
        The attack by rebel troops on the presidential palace in May 1999
    reportedly left 70 persons dead. Reports indicated that indiscriminate
    rebel shelling in civilian neighborhoods killed noncombatants. No
    action was taken against any rebel troops by year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman punishment,
    and evidence obtained through torture or coercion is invalid; however,
    the Government often ignored these provisions, and security forces
    beat, mistreated, and otherwise abused persons. Human rights observers
    noted repeated instances of police and members of the armed forces
    beating and abusing civilians for minor social or legal infractions.
    Security and police authorities historically have employed abusive
    interrogation methods, usually in the form of severe beatings or
    deprivation. The Government rarely enforced provisions for punishment
    of abuses committed by security forces.
        On September 7, Joao Monteiro, who had served as the intelligence
    chief under President Vieira, was convicted of torture and assault and
    sentenced to 12 years in prison. The Bissau Regional Court proved that
    while serving as Director General of State Security during the 1998 to
    1999 crisis leading to the overthrow of Vieira, he had ordered the
    arrest of Ansumane Faty, who subsequently was tortured.
        In November the Government arrested approximately 400 citizens and
    soldiers immediately following the attempted coup by General Mane (see
    Section 1.a.). Inacio Tavares, President of the Guinea-Bissau Human
    Rights League, alleged that the soldiers were held in three military
    camps, sometimes without drinking water, food, or medical attention. On
    December 14, he accused the military of physical abuse, torture, and
    persecution of the families of suspects. He called for accelerated
    hearings and permission for family visits, and, at year's end, all
    civilians and some soldiers were released; however, some soldiers
    remained in custody (see Section 1.d.).
        Prior to the May 1999 coup, forces loyal to Vieira engaged in
    widespread harassment, including stopping civilians and subjecting them
    to degrading body searches without cause. In January 1999, there were
    reports that Senegalese soldiers, who had entered the conflict at
    Vieira's request, entered the Simao Mendes hospital in Bissau and
    removed a junta soldier who had been wounded in the conflict. The
    soldier was returned the next morning with several cuts and what
    appeared to be cigarette burns, as well as gangrene, which may have
    been related to his original combat wound. The soldier died within a
    few days. No action was taken against the soldiers by year's end.
        In 1999 human rights monitors reported several incidents in which
    police accused of rape or the mistreatment of prisoners prior to the
    May 1999 coup were not prosecuted.
        In 1999 there were credible reports that rebel soldiers beat and
    harassed civilians suspected of government sympathies.
        Prison conditions remained poor, but generally they were not life
    threatening. Beatings and deprivation were used as a means of coercion.
    The June 1998 rebellion effectively stopped a program aimed at halting
    such methods. Prison authorities had very little control over inmates,
    many of whom simply left during the day. Following a request in 1998 by
    the Interior Minister for international donor assistance to
    rehabilitate the prisons, the European Union renovated two of them, but
    following the fighting in May 1999, no further repairs have been made.
    Many prisons were damaged during the fighting in May 1999, and the
    inmates escaped and have not been recaptured.
        The Human Rights League was given access to most prisoners during
    the year, including 600 loyalist troops detained as prisoners of war
    following the May 1999 coup. Of those persons detained, 180 were
    released immediately and another 50 individuals were released within a
    month. At the end of 1999, more than 385 persons remained in detention;
    however, at year's end, only Afonso Te, Vieira's former deputy chief of
    staff, remained in prison (see Section 1.d.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces
    arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.
        The law provides for procedural rights, such as the right to
    counsel, the right to release if no timely indictment is brought, and
    the right to a speedy trial; however, in practice the judicial system
    generally failed to provide these rights.
        Police detained suspects without judicial authority or warrants,
    occasionally using house arrest. Prior to the May 1999 coup, the
    Government held detainees without charge or trial for extended periods
    of time, sometimes incommunicado; however, during the year, such abuse
    was infrequent, and detainees were held for short duration. The
    authorities routinely did not observe bail procedures.
        In November the Government arrested approximately 400 citizens and
    soldiers immediately following the attempted coup by General Mane.
    Inacio Tavares, President of the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League,
    accused the military of physical abuse, torture, and persecution of the
    families of suspects. He called for accelerated hearings, and at year's
    end, many of the persons had been released (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.).
        On May 27, the Government arrested Fernando Gomes, the former
    president of the Guinea Bissau Human Rights League and president of the
    newly formed political party, Socialist Alliance of Guinea Bissau, and
    two television journalists. The three were held incommunicado for 2
    days in a windowless, unlighted cell. They were charged with slander
    and defamation after Gomes publicly accused Prime Minister Caetano
    N'tchama of corruption, making false statements, and incompetence. All
    three were released on bail on May 29; charges against the journalists
    were dropped on May 30, and at year's end, no further action had been
    taken against Gomes.
        Between November 24 and 26, the Government arrested several
    opposition politicians on suspicion that they supported the attempted
    coup by General Mane. Those detained included Francisco Benante, the
    president of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea (Bissau)
    and Cape Verde; Fernando Gomes; Fernando Mendoca; and several members
    of the Union for Change opposition party, including Amine Saad--the
    former Procurator General, Manuel Rambout Barcelos, Caramba Ture--an
    M.P., and Agnello Regala--director of Bombolon radio. Reportedly they
    were held for almost a week before a judge released them for lack of
    evidence. President Yala invalidated their passports and placed them
    under house arrest in Bissau. At year's end, some remained under house
    arrest.
        Amnesty International accused the Government of isolated incidents
    of arbitrary arrest and harassment.
        Following the May 1999 coup, the Government detained as prisoners
    of war about 600 of the loyalist forces who had defended Vieira; 180 of
    these soldiers were released immediately, and another 50 were released
    within a month. At the end of 1999, more than 385 remained in
    detention; however, at year's end, only 1 senior official associated
    with the May 1999 coup remained in prison (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government does not use forced exile. Following the May 1999
    coup, the military junta allowed President Vieira safe passage to leave
    the country for The Gambia to receive medical treatment, reportedly
    with the understanding that he would return to the country to stand
    trial on charges of corruption and human rights abuses. After leaving
    the country, Vieira traveled to Portugal and was granted asylum. In
    October 1999, the Attorney General traveled to Portugal to present
    evidence of human rights abuses by Vieira and to request his return to
    Guinea-Bissau to stand trial. The Government of Portugal stated that it
    had not received a request for Vieira's extradition, and there is no
    indication the Government has requested his extradition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, judges are trained and paid poorly, and
    sometimes are subject to political pressure and corruption. The Supreme
    Court is especially vulnerable to political pressure, because its
    members are appointed by the President and serve at his pleasure. The
    judiciary is reluctant to decide cases of a political nature. Cases
    against several former members of the Government were delayed. The
    Supreme Court failed to deal impartially with highly charged political
    cases. However, there is some evidence that the judiciary retains a
    degree of independence. Most officials who were charged with treason
    immediately following the ouster of former President Vieira in May 1999
    have been acquitted for lack of evidence. The Chief Justice of the
    Supreme Court was elected democratically by his colleagues on November
    22 and officially installed on December 6; he was not appointed by the
    President.
        Trials involving state security are conducted by civilian courts.
    Under the Code of Military Justice, military courts try only crimes
    committed by armed forces personnel. The Supreme Court is the final
    court of appeal for both military and civilian cases. The President has
    the authority to grant pardons and reduce sentences.
        Citizens who cannot afford an attorney have the right to a court-
    appointed lawyer.
        Traditional law still prevails in most rural areas, and urban
    dwellers often bring judicial disputes to traditional counselors to
    avoid the costs and bureaucratic impediments of the official system.
    The police often resolve disputes.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Home, or Correspondence.--
    The Constitution provides for the inviolability of domicile, person,
    and correspondence; however, the Government does not always respect
    these rights. The police do not always use judicial warrants and have
    forced entry into some private homes.
        Loyalist forces reportedly searched private residences in Bissau
    without cause and without warrants. Loyalist forces allegedly were
    guilty of theft from both private homes and stores.
        International and domestic mail at times was opened; however, this
    violation was by poorly paid postal employees in search of money or
    other valuables, not by security personnel. Limited mail service
    resumed in June 1999, after a 1-year shutdown following the destruction
    of the country's main post office building during the 1998 rebellion.
        Rebel forces allegedly stole from private homes and stores.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and the press; however, the Government at times
    limited these rights in practice, and journalists continued to practice
    self-censorship.
        Amnesty International alleged that in some cases the Government
    intimidated journalists. On May 17, soldiers fired shots and entered
    the office of the newspaper Diario de Bissau to threaten a journalist
    who wrote an opinion piece critical of President Yala's wife.
    Journalists of the national press faced retribution for making comments
    critical of government operations.
        Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in June 1998, the print media
    consisted of one independent daily, three independent weeklies, one
    government-owned biweekly, and one independent monthly. All of the
    newspapers during the year published only sporadically due to financial
    constraints and dependence on the state printing house. The national
    printing press, the only facility for publishing newspapers in the
    country, often lacked the raw materials to publish them. At the end of
    the year, the government-owned Diario de Bissau published several times
    a week; other newspapers, Banobero, Gazeta de Noticias, and No Pintcha,
    were weeklies.
        Prior to the 1998 rebellion, there were three independent radio
    stations and one government-controlled station in Bissau. In addition
    Radio Portugal and Radio France International broadcasts were received
    from Lisbon and Paris. There were also three community radio stations
    operated by the indigenous nongovernmental organization (NGO) Action
    for Development. One independent station rebroadcast the British
    Broadcasting Corporation and another rebroadcast the Voice of America.
    The government-controlled national radio continued to transmit from
    Radio Mavegro facilities that it took over in June 1998. The Voice of
    the Military Junta broadcasts from facilities that formerly broadcast
    Radio Bombolom, whose owner sympathized with the rebels. During the
    year, the independent stations Radio Pidjiguiti and Radio Mavegro
    resumed broadcasting; however, the NGO-assisted community stations have
    not resumed operations. Reportedly the government-controlled stations
    practice self-censorship.
        In December the Director of National Radio, Julio Ca, was suspended
    by government authorities; journalists said that they accused the
    Director of unbecoming behavior and censoring some stories.
        On May 27, the Government arrested two television journalists, for
    reporting a politician's allegations of corruption and incompetence
    against the Prime Minister. They were held incommunicado for 2 days in
    hot, dirty, and unlighted cells. On May 29, they were charged with
    slander and defamation and released from custody. After a meeting
    between the Prime Minister and journalists on May 30, all charges were
    dropped. In November the Government detained the director of Radio
    Bombolon. Many foreign journalists were able to circulate and report on
    political developments, including the January election.
        The Internet is available in the country; there were no reports of
    government interference.
        Academic freedom generally was observed until the outbreak of
    fighting in 1998. After ceasing to function following the June 1998
    rebellion, schools and research institutions reopened in most parts of
    the country in March 1999.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this
    right in practice. Government approval is required for all assemblies
    and demonstrations. Prior to the June 1998 rebellion and following the
    May 1999 coup, the Government approved all such requests. There were no
    public assemblies or demonstrations between June 1998 and May 1999.
    Following the May 1999 coup, numerous organizations held rallies, some
    of which were critical of the Government; however, there were no
    reports of demonstrations during the year.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respected this right in practice. The Government did not
    prohibit or discourage the formation of associations; however, all
    private associations were required to register with the Government.
    There were no reports of associations being denied registration.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
        Although the Government must license religious groups, no
    applications were refused during the year; however, there were no
    reports that applications were made.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, the Government limited them in practice. Checkpoints
    and police harassment occurred frequently during the year. After the
    outbreak of fighting in 1998, vehicle traffic was curtailed severely;
    however, during the year, such restriction was intermittent. Both
    government and rebel forces blocked the road from Bissau to the
    interior and interfered with the free movement of traffic. The
    Government carefully controlled movement within Bissau, prohibiting
    most traffic. Movement in the interior was restricted to a lesser
    extent, but it was still subjected to occasional interference by both
    government and rebel forces. The land borders with Senegal were closed
    to travelers during the early stages of the conflict. Later, Senegal
    allowed humanitarian convoys to transit the border. Land borders with
    Guinea generally remained open. The national airport, which had
    remained under rebel control after the outbreak of fighting, was
    reopened to commercial traffic in May 1999. Several times during the
    year, the Government closed the border with Senegal in reaction to
    cross-border raids by bandits in both countries. On September 6 and 7,
    the Governments of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau pledged to work to restore
    free trade and eliminate criminal cross border activities.
        The Minister of the Interior issues passports. Citizens have the
    right to return and are not subject to political revocation of their
    citizenship.
        The conflict that ended with the May 1999 coup caused massive
    civilian dislocation and hardship; however, by year's end, most of the
    350,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their homes; all
    areas of the country were open to returning citizens. By the end of
    1999, virtually all persons who sought refuge in neighboring countries
    had repatriated spontaneously.
        The Government does not have formal provisions to recognize refugee
    status, but it was granted on a case-by-case basis. The Government has
    provided first asylum to refugees from the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra
    Leone, and the Casamance region of Senegal. A January 1998 U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) census revealed the presence of just
    under 5,000 Senegalese refugees in Guinea-Bissau. The majority of these
    persons were found along the country's northern border with Senegal.
    Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1998, the UNHCR established a
    refugee camp south of the border region at Jolomete, which housed about
    700 refugees. After the May 1999 coup, the UNHCR continued efforts to
    relocate these refugees, most of whom were displaced internally when
    the fighting erupted.
        No refugees were deported forcibly to a country where they feared
    persecution. Foreign refugees who fled Bissau with the outbreak of
    fighting are believed to have done so voluntarily.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        President Koumba Yala was elected in January with a 72 percent
    electoral majority in a runoff election following multiparty elections
    in November 1999. Yala defeated interim president Malam Bacai Sanha of
    the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde
    (PAIGC). Both elections were considered to be generally free and fair
    by international observers, foreign diplomats, and local NGO's. Yala's
    party, the Partida de Renovacao Social (PRS), won 38 of 102 National
    Assembly seats. The victory of the PRS ended the 26-year domination of
    the PAIGC.
        The African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape
    Verde (PAIGC), the country's only legal party from 1974 to 1991 and the
    majority party in the National Assembly until the November 1999
    elections, won 24 of the 102 seats in the National Assembly, while
    opposition parties gained a majority. The Partido de Renovacao Sociat
    (PRS) won 38 seats, and the Resistencia da Guine Bissau (RGB) won 29
    seats, while 4 other parties split the remaining 11 seats. The
    elections, which included candidates from 13 parties, as well as
    several independents, were judged to be generally free and fair by
    international observers, although they reported some irregularities.
        In preparation for the November 1999 elections, the National
    Electoral Commission, with the assistance of the UNOGBIS, conducted a
    voter registration program among the estimated 1.2 million population.
    The current rolls showed 525,367 voters. About 400,000 persons voted in
    the November 1999 elections.
        PRS leader Koumba Yala and interim President Malan Bacai Sanha of
    the PAIGC led a field of 12 candidates for president. Neither candidate
    secured an absolute majority as required by law, so Yala and Sanha
    faced each other in a second round of voting on January 16.
        General Mane and the junta consistently declared that they would
    stay out of politics once a new civilian government was elected;
    however, Mane did not accept completely the authority of Yala's
    Government. When he was inaugurated in January, President Yala named 16
    former junta members as Ministers, creating an uneasy power-sharing
    arrangement between the military and the civilian government. The
    resulting coalition government did not resolve fully issues of control
    over the budget and the military. This uneasy coalition lasted for most
    of the year, as Mane placed increasing restrictions on the elected
    civilian government. However, in November Yala nominated 30 members of
    the armed forces for promotion without consulting Mane. In response
    Mane placed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces under house arrest,
    declared himself Chief of Staff, and directed his soldiers to disarm
    the Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard and other elements of
    the armed forces refused to take part in the coup, and General Mane and
    approximately 35 supporters fled the capital. For a week, they hid in
    the countryside, and on November 30 in Quinhamel, 40 miles north of
    Bissau, Mane and 8 of his supporters were killed in an exchange of
    gunfire with government forces. Subsequently, President Yala reshuffled
    his cabinet in an effort to control the military and move forward with
    reconstruction.
        Adequate and timely payment of soldier and veteran benefits
    remained a concern. Some international loan funds were devoted to such
    payments; the problem of back pay for members of the armed forces
    remained unresolved at year's end.
        The Government arrested several opposition politicians during the
    year (see Section 1.d.).
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
    National Assembly, women occupy 9 of the 102 seats. In the Government
    of National Unity inaugurated in February 1999, 1 of 10 cabinet
    ministers was a woman; however, there are no female ministers in
    President Yala's government.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government did not interfere with the privately operated
    Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League (LGDH), and international human
    rights groups continued to investigate human rights abuses without
    government harassment. International and nongovernmental human rights
    groups, which effectively ceased operations with the outbreak of
    hostilities in June 1998, resumed activities following the inauguration
    of a Government of National Unity in February 1999.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination on the basis of
    sex, race, and religion; however, in practice, the Government does not
    enforce these provisions effectively.
        Women.--Physical violence, including wife beating, is an accepted
    means of settling domestic disputes. Although police intervene in
    domestic disputes if requested, the Government has not undertaken
    specific measures to counter social pressure against reporting domestic
    violence, rape, incest, and other mistreatment of women.
        Discrimination against women persists, although officially it is
    prohibited by law. Women are responsible for most work on subsistence
    farms and have limited access to education, especially in rural areas.
    Women do not have equal access to employment. Among certain ethnic
    groups, women cannot own or manage land or inherit property.
        Children.--The Government allocates only limited resources for
    children's welfare and education. According to a November study by an
    international agency, enrollment in basic education rose from 42
    percent in 1993 to 62 percent in 1998 (girls went from 32 percent to 45
    percent, while boys went from 55 percent to 79 percent). However, in
    1998 10 percent of rural schools offered only the first grade, and 23
    percent offered only the first and second grades. Following the
    beginning of fighting in 1998, enrollment fell to 57 percent. Adult
    illiteracy is 66 percent for men and 82 percent for women.
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced widely within certain ethnic groups,
    especially the Fulas and the Mandinkas. The practice is increasing as
    the population becomes more Muslim and is being performed not only on
    adolescent girls, but also on babies as young as 4 months old. The
    Government has not outlawed the practice; however, it formed a national
    committee in the mid-1990's that continued to conduct a nationwide
    education campaign to discourage FGM. International NGO's, including
    the Swedish group Radda Barnen and Plan International, as well as
    several domestic NGO's, such as Friends of Children and Sinim Mira
    Nasseque, continued working through the national committee to eliminate
    FGM. The efforts of both domestic and international groups, largely
    suspended after the outbreak of fighting in June 1998, resumed in many
    parts of the country in February 1999.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no law mandating accessibility.
    The law does not prohibit discrimination against the disabled
    specifically, and the Government does not ensure equal access to
    employment and education; however, there were no reports of overt
    societal discrimination. The Government has made some efforts to assist
    disabled veterans through pension programs, but these programs do not
    address adequately veterans' health, housing, and food needs; there are
    no reports of funds for special programs for the disabled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all
    civilian workers with the freedom to form and join independent trade
    unions. However, the vast majority of the population works in
    subsistence agriculture. Most union members are government or
    parastatal employees; only a small percentage of workers are in the
    wage sector and are organized.
        The Government registers all labor unions. There are 11 labor
    unions registered and operating. All unions are officially independent
    of the Government, but seven unions are affiliated with the National
    Trade Union Confederation (UNTGB), which retains close informal ties
    with the PAIGC. The law does not favor UNTGB-affiliated unions over
    others. The Constitution provides for the right to strike and
    protection for workers from retribution for strike activities.
        The only legal restriction on strike activity is the requirement
    for prior notice. In past years, several unions have conducted legal
    strikes with no retribution against the strikers; however, there were
    no strikes during the year.
        Both enforcement of the law and the functioning of the formal
    economy, which largely ceased after the outbreak of hostilities in June
    1998, returned to preconflict levels following the inauguration of a
    Government of National Unity in February 1999.
        All unions are able to affiliate freely with national
    confederations and international labor organizations of their choice.
    The Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guinea-Bissau (UNTGB) is
    affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    Other unions belong to International Trade Secretariats.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution does not provide for or protect the right to bargain
    collectively, and there were no instances of genuine collective
    bargaining. Most wages are established in bilateral negotiations
    between workers and employers, taking into consideration the minimum
    salaries set annually by the Government's Council of Ministers.
        The Government's provisions for the protection of workers against
    antiunion discrimination have very little effect due to low union
    membership. Although there are no laws providing sanctions against
    employers practicing such discrimination, no workers have alleged
    antiunion discrimination, and the practice is not believed to be
    widespread.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
    these prohibitions generally are enforced in the formal sector;
    however, children often are forced by their parents or guardians to
    work as street traders or agricultural laborers in the informal sector
    (see Section 6.d.). The Government has not taken action to combat such
    practices.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1986 General Labor Act established a minimum age of 14
    years for general factory labor and 18 years for heavy or dangerous
    labor, including all labor in mines. These minimum age requirements
    generally are followed in the small formal sector, but the Ministry of
    Justice and the Ministry of Civil Service and Labor do not enforce
    these requirements in other sectors. Children in cities often work in
    street trading, and those in rural communities do domestic and field
    work without pay. The Government does not attempt to discourage these
    traditional practices.
        The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; however,
    while this prohibition generally is enforced in the formal sector, such
    labor occurs in the informal sector (see Section 6.c.).
        The Government has taken no action on ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government's Council of
    Ministers annually establishes minimum wage rates for all categories of
    work but does not enforce them. The lowest monthly wage is
    approximately $15 (9,000 CFA). This wage is insufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family, and workers must
    supplement their income through other work, reliance on the extended
    family, and subsistence agriculture. The maximum number of hours
    permitted in a normal workweek without further compensation is 45, but
    the Government does not enforce this provision. With the breakdown of
    the formal economy in June 1998, most of the country returned to
    barter, and both the Government and the private sector lacked the funds
    to pay salaries. Following the inauguration of a Government of National
    Unity in February 1999, activity in the formal economy started to
    return to preconflict levels, and the Government was able to pay most
    salary arrearages.
        With the cooperation of the unions, the Ministry of Justice and
    Labor establishes legal health and safety standards for workers, which
    then are adopted into law by the National Assembly. However, these
    standards are not enforced, and many persons work under conditions that
    endanger their health and safety.
        Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from unsafe
    working conditions without losing their jobs. In view of high
    unemployment, a worker who left for such reasons would be replaced
    readily.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, through, or within the country.
                                   __________

                                     KENYA

        Kenya is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. President
    Daniel Arap Moi, who has led the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) and
    served as President since 1978, was reelected most recently in 1997, in
    the country's second general election since the restoration of
    multiparty politics in 1991. Since independence in 1963, no president
    ever has left office in consequence of an election, and KANU has
    controlled both the presidency and the national legislature
    continuously, although other parties were illegal only from 1982 to
    1991. KANU again won a majority in the 1997 legislative elections and
    at year's end, KANU members held 118 of 222 seats in the unicameral
    National Assembly. While there were numerous flaws in the 1997
    elections, observers concluded that the vote broadly reflected the
    popular will. In addition to his role as President, Moi is the
    commander in chief of the armed forces, and he controls the security,
    university, civil service, judiciary, and provincial, district, and
    local governance systems. The judiciary suffers from corruption and is
    subject to executive branch influence.
        In addition to the armed forces, there is a large internal security
    apparatus that includes the police Criminal Investigation Department
    (CID), the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), the National
    Police, the Administration Police, and the paramilitary General
    Services Unit (GSU), which details members on a rotating basis to staff
    the 700-person Presidential Escort. The CID investigates criminal
    activity and the NSIS collects intelligence and monitors persons whom
    the State considers subversive. In 1999 in an effort to improve the
    accountability of investigative services, Parliament passed and
    implemented laws that removed arrest authority from the NSIS and
    separated the organization from the CID. Members of the security
    forces, especially the police, continued to commit serious human rights
    abuses.
        The large agricultural sector provides food for local consumption,
    substantial exports of tea, coffee, cut flowers, and vegetables, and
    approximately 70 percent of total employment. Although many sectors
    continued to be dominated by state-owned monopolies, the nonfarm
    economy includes large privately owned light manufacturing, commercial,
    and financial sectors. Tourism was second only to tea exports as the
    largest single source of foreign exchange. Major international
    financial institutions renewed nonproject assistance during the year,
    which had been suspended in 1997 due to widespread government
    corruption associated with a lack of transparency and accountability;
    however, by year's end the disbursement of some assistance was
    suspended due to the Government's inability to meet agreed conditions.
    During the year, annual per capita gross domestic product remained
    virtually unchanged in real terms, at approximately $279. The spread of
    HIV/AIDS, which was estimated to have infected about 14 percent of the
    population between the ages of 14 and 49, as well as drought and famine
    in some rural areas during the year, exacerbated economic problems.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and although there
    were improvements in some areas, serious problems remained. Citizens'
    ability to change their government peacefully has not yet been
    demonstrated fully. Security forces, particularly the police, continued
    to commit extrajudicial killings, torture and beat detainees, use
    excessive force, rape, and otherwise abuse persons. Prison conditions
    remained life threatening. Police arbitrarily arrested and detained
    persons, including journalists. The Government arrested and prosecuted
    a number of police officers for abuses; however, most police who
    perpetrated abuses were neither investigated nor punished. Lengthy
    pretrial detention is a problem, and the judiciary is subject to
    executive branch influence. The authorities infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. The Government limited freedom of speech and of the
    press, and harassed, intimidated, and economically pressured newspapers
    that often were critical of the Government; however, the Government
    significantly reduced its domination of the domestic broadcast media.
    The Government repeatedly restricted freedom of assembly, and police
    increasingly disrupted public meetings, used force to disperse
    demonstrators and protesters, and harassed and arbitrarily detained
    political dissidents, including opposition party legislators. The
    Government at times interfered with the activities of religious groups,
    and limited freedom of movement. The Government restricted freedom of
    association. The Government continued to limit the independence of its
    Standing Committee on Human Rights, and the President continued to
    criticize nongovernmental human rights organizations. Violence and
    discrimination against women and abuse of children remained serious
    problems. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained widespread, child
    prostitution remained a problem, and the spread of HIV/AIDS created
    many orphans. There was some discrimination against the disabled, and
    discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic minorities
    remained problems. The Government continued to exacerbate ethnic
    tensions by discriminating against many ethnic groups; interethnic
    tensions continued to result in numerous violent conflicts and some
    deaths. There were reports of a number of ritual murders associated
    with traditional indigenous religious practices, which contributed to
    growing public concern about satanism. The Government continued to
    limit some worker rights. Child labor remained a problem, and there
    were instances of forced child labor. Violence by mobs and by
    nongovernmental armed groups from neighboring countries also resulted
    in many deaths.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces,
    especially members of the police, the GSU, and the CID, continued to
    use lethal force and committed a number of extrajudicial killings.
    According to government figures, police killed 120 suspected criminals,
    and another 39 suspects and detainees died while in police custody by
    year's end. The nongovernmental Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC)
    reported that police killed 198 persons during the year (compared to
    243 persons in 1999), including at least 49 by torture (see Section
    1.c.). Police often lacked restraint in employing lethal force, and the
    Government generally failed to take appropriate action against members
    of the security forces accused of extrajudicial killings.
        On January 1, police attached to the Ng'araria Chief's Camp in
    Murang'a allegedly beat 10-year old Joseph Ndung'u Nyoike for suspected
    theft (see Section 1.c.); the boy died after spending the night in
    prison. District authorities arrested two police officers after autopsy
    results indicated that Ndung'u died from beatings. The case was under
    investigation by authorities at year's end. On January 15, police from
    the Mukuruwei-ini police station allegedly beat to death Philip Machau
    after he was caught stealing a piece of second-hand clothing (see
    Section 1.c.). According to press reports, police severely beat Machau
    despite onlookers' protests; Machau died at the police station that
    night. An inquest into the case by the Chief Magistrate in Nairobi was
    ongoing at year's end. On March 23, Philip Kipkoech Kirui, a brother of
    a nominated local councilor, died after being transferred from prison
    in Londiani to the local hospital for treatment; allegedly he had been
    tortured. Five police officers based at the Londiani Police Station,
    Dickson Liyayi, Peter Chelanga, Isaac Walimbwa, Robert Ombui Onyancha,
    and Boniface Onyango, were charged with Kirui's killing after a march
    was held to protest the alleged abuse of Kirui in Londiani. The case
    was pending in the courts at year's end. On March 24, officers from the
    Flying Squad (a quick response antitheft unit) shot and killed eight
    suspected carjackers as they fled from a car in Nairobi; the driver of
    the vehicle was unharmed. Some human rights observers criticized the
    officers' use of excessive force during the incident. On March 26, a
    police officer in Meru reportedly killed Wallace Kiogora. The officer
    was arrested for Kiogora's murder on March 29. On April 30, there were
    reports that Sophia Nyaguthii Mbogo, a pregnant 21-year-old woman, died
    in custody at the Kagio Police Post reportedly after she was beaten by
    a policeman (see Section 1.c.). No arrests were made in the case;
    however, an inquest before the Principal Magistrate's Court at Kerugoya
    was ongoing at year's end. On September 4, prison guards at the
    King'ong'o Prison in Nyeri killed six inmates who were attempting to
    escape. Officials initially claimed that guards shot the six as they
    fled; however, there were conflicting reports that the six died of
    blows to the head and severe beatings after recapture (see Section
    1.c.). The Attorney General ordered an investigation into the killings,
    and the police were investigating the matter at year's end. The
    Attorney General promised to prosecute the guards if they are suspected
    of wrongdoing. An inquest into the case was ongoing at year's end.
        In April after numerous deadly attacks on police, Marsden Madoka,
    Minister of State in the Office of the President, stated that police
    should use lethal force to eliminate criminals from the streets. The
    Minister's comments reflect a growing concern that security forces
    often are not armed or equipped sufficiently. In responding to
    continuing high levels of crime, some police used excessive force. On
    May 27, members of the Flying Squad allegedly seriously injured two
    suspected carjackers during arrest. The police brought the unconscious
    suspects to the City Morgue where the police reportedly shot and killed
    them. There were no reports of any investigation at year's end. On July
    1, police in Nairobi fired on unarmed suspected carjackers at a major
    traffic circle, killing the driver, Michael Ngigi, and seriously
    injuring the passenger, George Ngugi. Ngugi, a civil servant who owned
    the vehicle, reportedly begged police not to shoot before the officers
    fired at him. Several police officers were arrested; however, no
    charges were filed against them by year's end. There were reports that
    one of the officers involved in the incident fled the country.
        Police also killed several bystanders while exchanging gunfire with
    criminals. For example, in early January in East Baringo, police shot
    and killed 5-year-old Chesortich, when they fired on her family's home.
    Allegedly the officers suspected that the family was harboring cattle
    rustlers. In February police fired at suspected robbers who were
    fleeing from police and seriously wounded a teenaged boy from Maragwa
    in Central Province (see Section 1.c.).
        Some official efforts have been made to investigate and punish
    police abuses. In August 1999, police killed five Muslim worshipers in
    the Anas Bin Malik Mosque in Chai village, near Mombasa. Within 1 month
    of the killing, the Government charged two police officers, Julius
    Mugambi M'nabere and Stephan Musau Kilonzo, with the killings; they
    were released on bail pending trial at year's end. In November 1999, a
    trial began against Justus Munyao Kovu and Gabriel Muendo, two Makueni
    police officers accused of killing Mwendo Kiema during detention in
    July 1999. On September 6, Godwin Mukhwana, a member of the
    Presidential Escort, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 8
    years in prison for killing Jamal Abedi and Henry Musyoka, the driver
    and tout of a passenger van, in December 1998. In December 1998,
    Ephantus Njagi Nguthi died from injuries that he reportedly received
    while in custody in Matanya, Laikipia district. Police reportedly had
    beaten his testicles. Two police officers, Christopher Mugera and
    Muiruri (who died before year's end), were arrested in the case. Three
    Flying Squad officers, Isaiah Muoki Musyoka, Kenneth Kaunda Obiero, and
    Andrew Kimungetich Koros were found guilty of manslaughter and
    sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the July 1998 killing of James
    Odhiambo. On June 29, the High Court sentenced police constable Felix
    Nthiwa Munyao to life in prison for beating his wife to death in July
    1998. Munyao beat his wife so severely that she went into a coma and
    died 5 months later. The case was publicized widely because the police
    refused to charge Munyao with a crime until his wife had died. On June
    7, police officers Jackson Parsalach and Austine Kabarayo were found
    guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 2+ years imprisonment for the
    death in custody of 60-year-old Job Cherutich; police constables
    Michael Chebon Chelimo and Chebon were acquitted. In December an
    inquest was completed into the January 1997 death of Catholic lay
    brother Larry Timmons in Njoro, which concluded that a police officer
    should be prosecuted for the killing; the status of the prosecution was
    not known at year's end. In May a court in Nairobi sentenced to death
    police constable Martin Kimeu for the November 1995 murder of a petty
    theft suspect, Kennedy Omondi Omolo, whom he shot and killed while in
    custody.
        There were no effective police investigations into many cases of
    killings by members of the security forces. The authorities sometimes
    attribute the absence of an investigation into an alleged extrajudicial
    killing to the failure of citizens to file official complaints.
    However, the form required for filing complaints is available only at
    police stations, which often lack the forms or are not forthcoming in
    providing them. There also is considerable public skepticism of a
    process that assigns the investigation of police abuse to the police
    themselves.
        There were no reported investigations into the following 1999 cases
    during the year: The September killing of Mwanzia Mutkuku, who was
    killed when police opened fire on the night club below his apartment;
    the September killings of two armed men at a bank in Nairobi; the July
    killings of Peter Kariuki, Jacob Anaseti, and Ramadhani Barula while in
    police custody; the June killings of Victor Polo and Vincent Odhiambo,
    two suspected robbers; the April killing of Ahluwalia Subir Ahluwalia;
    the February killing of Elijah Kimani Mwaura, who allegedly was
    tortured and beaten to death while in police custody; the March killing
    of Ibrahim Kullow Hussein; the February killing of David Muragi, a
    grammar school student, who died after a night in police custody where
    he allegedly was beaten; and the January killing of two rice farmers in
    Mwea.
        There were no reported investigations into the following 1998 cases
    during the year: The police shooting death of Simon Githinji Kigera,
    also a policeman, in Nairobi--police maintain they shot in self
    defense; the killing of Vincent Nyumba Kiema due to a police beating;
    the killing of Sheik Mohammad Yahyah, who was tortured by army
    personnel; the killing of Muthoka Mukele after he apparently was beaten
    in police custody; and the killing of Alfred Kang'ethe after he was
    beaten by the Uthiru police.
        Several 1998 cases of extrajudicial killings remained unresolved at
    year's end. Police continued to investigate the June 1998 shooting
    death of Pastor Simeon Kiti Mwangoma (or Mwangalee) by Kilifi police,
    but took no further action during the year; police maintain Mwangoma
    was the leader of a notorious gang. Army officer Aden Almi and police
    officers Faneis Malaba Mbiya and Kennedy Bitange faced charges of
    murder in connection with the death in police custody in Garissa of Ali
    Hussein Ali; the High Court in Nairobi is scheduled to hear the case in
    March 2001. Kitui authorities charged assistant chief Simeon Mwandinga
    and four other persons with inciting or participating in the 1998 mob
    killing of Kamwila Kamungu. Two persons were sentenced to 3 years'
    imprisonment; Mwandinga and two other persons were acquitted. Another
    assistant chief, Josephine Matalu, was acquitted of instigating the
    1998 beating death of Kiema Mwisuve. The trial of the suspects in the
    1998 murder of Seth Sendashonga was ongoing at year's end.
        A hearing before the Senior Resident Magistrate in Kitale in the
    1997 deaths in police custody of Moses Macharia Gicheru and Lomurodo
    Amodoi was scheduled for early 2001.
        On August 24, Father John Anthony Kaiser, a Catholic priest working
    in the country for over 30 years, was found dead near Naivasha town.
    Father Kaiser was a vocal human rights activist and a critic of key
    members of the Government. The investigation was ongoing at year's end;
    there are no known suspects.
        On November 30 and December 1, Muslim worshippers and local traders
    fought over land surrounding a mosque in a residential neighborhood in
    Nairobi, resulting in the deaths of four persons and numerous injuries
    (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
        Hundreds of prisoners died in custody due to life-threatening
    prison conditions, including inadequate food and medical treatment (see
    Section 1.c.). The Government recorded 658 deaths in prisons during the
    first 10 months of the year. On June 10 and 11, inmates at Rumuruti GK
    Prison in Laikipia District rioted over a food shortage, which resulted
    in the death of one prisoner (see Section 1.c.).
        Mob violence increased during the year, which observers believe may
    have been associated with a continuously high crime rate. According to
    the KHRC, 138 persons were killed in mob violence during the year. The
    Government recorded 240 deaths due to mob violence during the year.
    Human rights observers attribute mob violence to a lack of public
    confidence in the police and the judicial process. The great majority
    of mob violence victims, who died by lynching, beating, or burning,
    were persons suspected of criminal activities, including robbery,
    cattle rustling, and membership in terror gangs. However, the social
    acceptability of mob violence also provided cover for personal
    vengeance under the guise of ``mob justice.'' According to media
    reports, on March 26 in Juja (Central Province), parishioners on their
    way to mass stoned to death two carjackers who were attempting to steal
    a fellow parishioner's automobile. No arrests were made in the case. On
    July 16, villagers in Munyu, Thika (Central Province), burned to death
    five teenaged boys, Walter Midamba, Juma Musyimi, Julius Nduati,
    Ibrahim Mburu, and Maina, on suspicion of theft. The five had been
    caught running through the yard of a man whose home had been robbed the
    previous week. In October President Moi advised citizens to rely on the
    police, not vigilantism, to deal with suspects.
        Occasionally mobs killed members of their communities on suspicion
    that they practiced witchcraft (see Sections 2.c. and 5); however,
    there were no known statistics about the number of deaths during the
    year. On October 3, a mob of residents of Nairobi's Kariobangi North
    neighborhood lynched three suspected child abductors (believed to be
    devil worshipers), including a grandfather who was walking with his
    grandchild (see Section 5). In late October in Kisii, police intervened
    to block villagers from killing seven suspected witches. Also in
    October, the press reported that villagers burned alive a suspected
    sorcerer in Kimburini.
        Interethnic violence in rural areas continued to cause numerous
    deaths (see Section 5).
        There were several incidents during the year in which persons were
    killed during interethnic disputes; some of these disputes crossed into
    the country from neighboring countries (see Section 2.d.).
        In late November, armed men reportedly from Ethiopia killed nine
    persons and seriously injured five others near the border town of
    Moyale. Local politicians claimed that the attackers had support from
    Ethiopian security forces; the incident was not resolved by year's end.
        The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an Ethiopian rebel group,
    reportedly has laid landmines in northern areas of the country near the
    Ethiopian border; however, there were no reports of any deaths or
    injuries during the year.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reported cases of politically
    motivated or other disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one shall be subject to
    torture or degrading punishment or other treatment;'' however, security
    forces continued to use torture and physical violence as methods of
    interrogation and to punish both pretrial detainees and convicted
    prisoners. Although police authorities periodically issue directives
    against the use of torture by police, the problem persists. Human
    rights organizations and the press highlighted scores of cases of
    torture, and several cases of indiscriminate beating of groups of
    persons by police during the year. Common methods of torture practiced
    by police included hanging persons upside down for long periods,
    genital mutilation, electric shocks, and deprivation of air by
    submersion of the head in water. The KHRC reported 49 torture related
    deaths during the year (see Section 1.a.).
        There were numerous allegations of police use of excessive force
    and torture. The KHRC recorded 157 cases of police brutality during the
    year. Detainees routinely claimed that they had been tortured, making
    it difficult to separate real from fabricated incidents. On January 1,
    police attached to the Ng'araria Chief's Camp in Murang'a allegedly
    beat 10-year-old Joseph Ndung'u Nyoike for suspected theft; the boy
    died after spending the night in prison (see Section 1.a.). On January
    15, police from the Mukuruwei-ini police station allegedly beat to
    death Philip Machau after he was caught stealing a piece of second-hand
    clothing (see Section 1.a.). In mid-January police in Kapsabet
    allegedly tortured William Tanui for 5 days while he was detained for
    illegally transporting maize. There was no known action taken against
    the police by year's end. In February police fired at suspected robbers
    who were fleeing from police and seriously wounded a teenaged boy from
    Maragwa, Central Province (see Section 1.a.). On February 5, in
    Nyahururu, Laikipia District, Mose Wambugu, a plainclothes police
    officer from the Special Crime Prevention Unit, reportedly shot Miriam
    Wamboi in the head after she refused the officer's demands for sex.
    Wamboi was in a coma for a month following the shooting and the bullet
    remains lodged in her brain. On February 6, Wambugu was arrested and
    remained in detention pending a trial at year's end. In April police
    beat and arrested Mohammed Sheikh, a journalist for the People (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On April 30, there were reports that Sophia
    Nyaguthii Mbogo, a pregnant 21-year-old woman, died in custody at the
    Kagio Police Post (see Section 1.a.). A newspaper article claimed that
    autopsy results concluded that she died from internal bleeding due to
    ``superficial'' bruises. A cellmate of Mbogo's told reporters that she
    saw a Kagio policeman by the name of Kaundu enter Mbogo's cell and beat
    her head with a club. On May 9, police officers Charles King'ori and
    Wilson Kinyanjui from the Makueni Police Station allegedly undressed
    Charles Muteti Mulwa, bound his hands and legs, and beat his testicles.
    A doctor from the Ministry of Health told reporters that Mulwa suffered
    from twisted testicles and cigarette burns on his feet. King'ori and
    Kinyanjui were charged with assault and their cases were pending before
    the Makindu Principal Magistrate at year's end; it was unknown whether
    they were in detention or released on bail. A woman, Margaret Njeri,
    claimed that police tortured her to extract a confession; police
    officers allegedly stripped, whipped, beat her until she bled, and
    sexually abused her. On May 28, Njeri filed a formal complaint to
    police and said that she intended to sue police for damages; the case
    was pending at year's end. In October 1999, police had arrested and
    detained Njeri in prison for 5 months before the courts acquitted her
    of charges of running a group of carjackers. On September 4, prison
    guards at the King'ong'o Prison in Nyeri killed six inmates who were
    attempting to escape (see Section 1.a.). Officials initially claimed
    that guards shot the six as they fled; however, there were media and
    NGO reports that the six had died of blows to the head and severe
    beatings after recapture. By some accounts, the dead inmates had their
    eyes gouged out and heads beaten, and they were disfigured beyond
    recognition. The Attorney General ordered an inquest into the killings,
    and the police were investigating the matter at year's end. The
    Attorney General promised to prosecute the guards if they are suspected
    of wrongdoing. On December 30, police chased and beat Betty Dindi, a
    journalist for The Nation, who was covering a shareholders meeting of
    Mbo-I-Kimati, a land-owning firm, which had been banned by police (see
    Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
        In September a magistrate in Nakuru granted the request of six army
    officers, Nahashoon Kili, Moses Kiprotich, John Masai, Joseph Tanui,
    Henry Buienei, and Tito Rono, to pursue charges of torture against
    members of the 66th Artillery Battalion. The six had been held for 6
    months on suspicion of mutiny in the first half of the year. The case
    was pending at year's end.
        According to organizations that work with street children, police
    also beat and abuse street children (see Section 5). The WEMA Street
    Girls Center pressed charges against two Mombasa police officers,
    Mwinge Chula and Peter Ndwiga, who were arrested for raping a 13-year-
    old street girl in May 1999. Hearings on the case began on December 22.
        Police repeatedly used excessive force and beat persons when
    breaking up demonstrations (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). On February
    28, police in Nanyuki disrupted a public civic education play by a
    theater group (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). According to the production
    organizers, the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD), police
    disrupted the play and beat several persons in the audience. On
    December 17, 100 riot police used tear gas and batons to forcibly
    disperse a march headed by 5 M.P.'s, including James Orengo, injuring
    numerous persons (see Section 2.b.).
        Following President Moi's December 8 ban on all future rallies by
    the Muungano wa Mageuzi (Movement for Change) (see Sections 1.d., 2.a.,
    2.b., and 3), police prevented or forcibly dispersed all rallies held
    by the group, which resulted in several injuries and arrests.
        In early May, President Moi was quoted widely in the press calling
    for action against the Mungiki religious and political group; police
    forcibly disrupted several of the group's meetings during the year,
    injuring several persons (see Section 2.b.). On July 30, police in
    Nyeri arrested 10 Mungiki members for holding an illegal assembly,
    reportedly injuring some of them (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        Police forcibly dispersed several protests after they became
    violent, injuring some persons (see Section 2.b.). On August 19 in
    Nairobi, there were several violent incidents between progovernment
    supporters, opposition supporters, and the police. When progovernment
    supporters broke up an opposition rally organized by Member of
    Parliament (M.P.) James Orengo (see Section 2.b.), police intervened,
    used tear gas, and beat and kicked participants. Police allegedly beat
    Sammy Mwange who died from severe head wounds, and injured dozens of
    persons. Television cameras also broadcast footage of 30 to 40 men
    outside Parliament searching vehicles, smashing windshields, and
    attacking an opposition M.P. in view of armed police who did not
    intervene. One M.P. claimed that he recognized three off-duty policemen
    in the group present at the Parliament. Rally organizers accused the
    Government of complicity in the violence. On September 11, antiriot
    police responded to a wildcat strike by several hundred guard service
    employees by firing tear gas at the striking guards after they began
    burning vehicles and attacking passers-by; several persons were injured
    (see Section 6.a.). On December 13, police forcibly disrupted a meeting
    held by Kipruto Kirwa, a dissident KANU M.P. (see Section 2.b.). Police
    fired several shots into the crowd while chasing several persons from
    the meeting through the village; one person was injured.
        Student protests and riots occurred frequently during the year, and
    police forcibly dispersed several protests after they became violent,
    which resulted in injuries (see Section 2.b.). On June 12, police
    forcibly dispersed approximately 200 students who commandeered 2
    university buses and attacked the offices of the Nation newspaper.
    Police did not intervene initially; however, they did so after the
    students began to set fire to a building. Police arrested at least 21
    persons (see Section 1.d.); several persons were injured during the
    incident.
        There were several violent incidents during the elections to the
    Kenya Tea Development Authority's Board of Directors (the cooperative
    which represents the country's 45 tea factories). On June 20, in
    Gatundu North Province, during fighting between police and farmers
    boycotting the elections at the Mataara tea center, police shot and
    killed two farmers and injured several others (see Section 1.a.). Later
    that evening, armed farmers in Mataara killed a local policeman and
    seriously injured several other police officers apparently in
    retaliation. On June 21, during fighting between farmers and police in
    Guchu District, police shot three farmers and dozens of others were
    injured.
        On June 21, 94 M.P.'s released a report entitled ``The
    Politicization and Misuse of the Kenya Police and the Administration
    Police Force,'' which criticized the police for misuse of force and
    human rights abuses. On June 22, President Moi ordered police to stop
    using live ammunition when quelling riots. It was unclear if Moi's
    pronouncement had any effect on police behavior by year's end.
        During the year, the Government investigated some allegations of
    police use of excessive force and torture, and prosecuted several
    police officers. According to the Government, two police officers were
    charged and sentenced during the year, and the Government recorded only
    two reported cases of torture during that same period. In May
    authorities disbanded a special squad of 30 police officers attached to
    the CID because they allegedly were involved in numerous robberies,
    carjackings, and killings. There were no reports that members of the
    squad, reportedly code-named Alfa Romeo, were prosecuted by year's end
    due to lack of evidence against them.
        There was no known action taken against members of the security
    forces responsible for torturing, beating, or abusing the persons in
    the following 1999 cases: The September case of Geoffrey Mbuthia
    Nduati, who allegedly was attacked by dogs in policy custody; the May
    case of residents of Balessa and El Hadi, who were beaten or tortured
    by security forces; the April case of Duncan Ndwega, a CID officer, who
    was tortured by the Flying Squad; the April case of M.P. James Orengo,
    who police beat and arrested while he spoke publicly in Nyanza
    province; the February case of Peter Macendu who was whipped and beaten
    unconscious by policemen in Kerugoya; the January case in which police
    beat a crowd protesting the results of the National Assembly by-
    election in Eastern Province; the January case of Jeremiah Kasuku, who
    was assaulted and detained illegally in Keiyani; the case of Julius
    Muhoro Mugo, who was tortured by CID officers; and the case of Johnnes
    Musyoka Kimonyi, who was beaten by police in Buru Buru.
        Marches and symposiums marked the beginning of the U.N.
    International Week in Support of Victims of Torture on June 22, which
    generated much discussion of torture in the press. One daily newspaper,
    The People, ran a series of articles on torture, featuring anecdotes,
    discussion of laws, and statistics. On June 23, a group of human rights
    organizations led by People Against Torture marched in Nairobi to mark
    the week. On June 26, more than 2,000 persons gathered at a Mau Mau
    massacre site in Nyeri for masses to commemorate Mau Mau war victims
    and other victims of torture. On June 26, in Nairobi, Attorney General
    Wako was the keynote speaker at a symposium on torture organized by
    human rights groups.
        Caning continued to be used as punishment in cases such as rape
    (see Section 5).
        Acts of violence, including rape, banditry, and shootings, occur
    regularly near refugee camps (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
        There were several violent incidents between progovernment
    supporters and opposition supporters during the year, namely during
    opposition rallies (see Section 2.b.). For example, during incidents
    from January 13 to 15, supporters of National Development Party (NDP)
    Raila Odinga reportedly beat and whipped several persons with whips and
    batons, resulting in numerous injuries. On November 26 in Kisumu,
    progovernment youths forcibly disrupted a meeting of the Ufungamano
    commission, a church-led constitutional review commission (see Sections
    2.b., 2.c., and 3). The youths threw Molotov cocktails, burned a
    vehicle, and beat severely several persons.
        On November 30 and December 1, Muslim worshippers and local traders
    fought over land surrounding a mosque in a residential neighborhood in
    Nairobi, resulting in the deaths of four persons and numerous injuries
    (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
        Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening, due both to a
    lack of resources and to the Government's unwillingness to address
    deficiencies in the penal system. Prisoners are subjected to severe
    overcrowding, inadequate water, poor diet, substandard bedding, and
    deficient health care. Police and prison guards subject prisoners to
    torture and inhuman treatment (see Section 1.a.). Rape of both male and
    female inmates, primarily by fellow inmates, is a serious problem, as
    is the increasing incidence of HIV/AIDS. Disease is widespread in
    prisons, and the death rate is high. Prisons do not have resident
    doctors, and only one prison had a doctor permanently assigned,
    although the position was vacant during the year. Prisoners sometimes
    are kept in solitary confinement far longer than the maximum 90 days
    allowed by law. Prisoners and detainees frequently are denied the right
    to contact relatives or lawyers (see Section 1.e.).
        The country's prisons reportedly hold 2 to 3 times their estimated
    combined capacity of 15,000 inmates. The average daily population of
    prison inmates was 41,010, 33 percent of which was pretrial detainees.
    While the prison population increased steadily over the last several
    years, prison facilities have not. The Government has built only two
    detention centers since the country became independent in 1963;
    according to the Government, there are 79 prison facilities.
    Overcrowding led to health related problems arising from the sharing of
    amenities, encouraged the spread of infectious diseases, and resulted
    in food and water shortages. According to the Government, 658 prisoners
    died in jails during the first 10 months of the year, compared with 196
    in the first 9 months of 1999, due chiefly to tuberculosis, dysentery,
    anemia, malaria, heart attack, typhoid fever, and HIV/AIDS, for which
    there is little access to health care and medicine.
        Men, women, and children officially are kept in separate cells, and
    unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that men and women
    were placed in the same cells. Women sometimes lack access to sanitary
    napkins and often have only one change of clothes, leaving them naked
    during the washing of their laundry. Young teenagers frequently are
    kept in cells with adults in overcrowded prisons and detention centers.
    Youth detention centers are understaffed, and inmates have minimal
    social and exercise time. Some young inmates remain for years in the
    centers, as their cases await resolution.
        By most accounts, prisoners receive three meals per day; however,
    there have been reports of food shortages, and reports that senior
    prison officers misappropriated the meat provided for prisoners. On
    June 10 and 11, inmates at Rumuruti GK Prison in Laikipia District
    rioted over a food shortage, which resulted in the death of one
    prisoner and injuries to dozens of others (see Section 1.a.). A week
    later at Rumuruti GK prison, according to several media reports, three
    prisoners died from hunger while working at the institution's farm.
    Prison officials denied these allegations. During a September 1999
    visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture, Nigel Rodley, prison
    authorities at Nakuru GK Prison confirmed that inmates on remand
    received half the ration of food provided to regular prisoners, because
    they did not work.
        Nearly all prisoners serving more than 6 months in prison work in
    the prison industries and farms. Men work in printing services, car
    repair, tailoring, metal work, and leather and upholstery work. Women
    are taught sewing, knitting, dressmaking, rug making, basket weaving,
    jewelry making, and other crafts. Outdated laws mandate prisoners'
    earnings at $0.35 to $0.70 per year (10 to 20 Kenyan cents per day).
    Prisoners on good conduct can, with permission, work beyond the 8-hour
    day to produce goods, from which they earn two-thirds of the profits.
    Prisons are unable to invest these sizable profits in the prisons
    because income generated from the sale of prison products is sent
    directly into the Government Consolidated Fund. Some observers allege
    that prison officials use the free prison labor for personal profit;
    however, many inmates leave prison with a valid trade certificate.
        Responding to public allegations of unacceptable detention
    conditions, in January the Government sent a fact-finding team to
    Kodiaga Prison, which found that prison conditions were acceptable. On
    January 30, Commissioner of Prisons Edward Lokopoyit dismissed
    allegations of widespread torture in prisons; however, press reports
    continue to highlight the substandard conditions in the prisons. On
    September 19, the Attorney General said publicly that some prisons were
    ``unfit for humans.'' The following day, the Nyeri District
    Commissioner decried poor prison conditions countrywide.
        The courts are responsible partly for overcrowding, as the backlog
    of cases in the penal system continues to fill the remand sections of
    prisons (see Section 1.e.). Many detainees spend more than 3 years in
    prison before their trials are completed, often because they cannot
    afford even the lowest bail. Very few can afford attorneys.
        The Government does not permit consistent independent monitoring of
    prison conditions. In general the Government does not permit domestic
    NGO's to visit prisons; however, some independent NGO's work with the
    Government in evaluating torture cases and performing autopsies on
    deceased prisoners. In July foreign diplomatic officials visited Kimiti
    Maximum Security Prison and Langata Women's Prison. In March the U.N.
    Special Rapporteur for Torture Nigel Rodley released a report on his
    visits to several prisons in 1999. Rodley noted the problems of limited
    access by observers, poor sanitation and health care, and overcrowding.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Despite constitutional
    protections, police continued to arrest and detain citizens
    arbitrarily. The Constitution provides that persons arrested or
    detained shall be brought before a court within 24 hours in noncapital
    offenses and within 14 days in capital cases. The Penal Code
    specifically excludes weekends and holidays from this 14-day period.
    The law does not stipulate the period within which the trial of a
    charged suspect must begin. Indicted suspects often are held for months
    or years before being brought to court. For example, Michael Owour, on
    remand at Kamiti Prison and charged by the Kiambu Court with a violent
    robbery, allegedly had been awaiting trial for 4 years. The Government
    has acknowledged cases in which persons have been held in pretrial
    detention for several years. Police from the arresting location are
    responsible for serving court summons and for picking up remandees from
    the prison each time the courts hear their cases. Police often fail to
    show up or lack the means to transport the remandees, who then must
    await the next hearing of their case. For example, in the case of six
    army officers who pursued charges of torture against members of the
    66th Artillery Battalion, the courts later criticized Police
    Commissioner Philemon Abong'o for failing to serve the accused army
    officials with the court summons; the case was ongoing at year's end
    (see Section 1.c.).
        The law provides that families and attorneys of persons arrested
    and charged are allowed access to them, although this right often is
    not honored. Family members and attorneys may visit prisoners only at
    the discretion of the Government. This privilege often is denied. For
    those who have been charged, it often is possible to be released on
    bail with a bond or other assurance of the suspect's return.
        In the early part of the year, the Government instituted the
    Community Service Order (CSO), a program whereby petty offenders
    perform community service rather than serve a custodial sentence.
    According to the Home Affairs Permanent Secretary, the Government has
    spent $250,000 (20 million shillings) on the CSO and is committed to
    providing $500,000 (40 million shillings) more in the next fiscal year.
    There are 11,000 petty offenders participating in the program
    currently. The program may help alleviate overcrowding; however, there
    was no indication of any change by year's end.
        Citizens frequently accuse police officers of soliciting bribes
    during searches or falsely arresting individuals to extract bribes (see
    Section 1.f.). The police continued repeatedly to conduct massive
    searches (``sweeps'') for illegal immigrants and firearms (see Sections
    1.f. and 2.d.). The KHRC recorded 1,950 arrests during sweeps
    throughout the year.
        Police arrested members of civil society groups and charged them
    with participating in illegal gatherings (see Section 1.c.). On January
    17, President Moi ordered Police Commissioner Philemon Abong'o to
    arrest those responsible for violent protests against the Parliament-
    led constitutional review process, namely those protests from January
    13 to 15 that resulted in numerous injuries (see Sections 1.c. and
    2.b.). On January 18, police arrested M.P. James Orengo on charges that
    he incited violence regarding the Parliament-led constitutional review
    process. He was released on bail and a hearing was scheduled for March
    27 and 28; this case and several others against Orengo were pending at
    year's end. On March 30, police in Nakuru arrested and detained 11
    activists who were participating in a public gathering to discuss land
    grievances among the minority Ogiek community (see Section 2.b.). KHRC
    employees Lumbumba Ondeda, Vincent Musebe, and James Nduko and nine
    Commission and Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4C's)
    members were detained in prison for several days awaiting sentencing
    for holding an illegal gathering. Human rights organizations viewed the
    arrests as a veiled effort by the Government to prevent civic education
    exercises throughout the country. The Attorney General subsequently
    dropped the charges. On April 3, police in Laikipia, allegedly on
    orders from District Officer Njeru, dispersed a Greenbelt Movement
    civic education gathering (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), and arrested
    Joseph Kirangathi Njoroge, Esther Wamucii, John Gitonga, and Mwangi
    Gachie Kamau. The four were charged with assembling in a manner likely
    to cause a breach of peace, but were released on bail pending trial at
    year's end. On April 13, police in Nairobi arrested and detained for
    several days 63 demonstrators, including 6 nuns and 5 clergymen during
    a march to present a petition to the World Bank offices in Nairobi (see
    Section 2.b.). The Attorney General later dropped the charges because
    the police had no case against the demonstrators.
        Student protests and riots occurred frequently during the year, and
    police arrested numerous students responsible for violence during the
    incidents (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.).
        On December 9, police in the Western Province dispersed a Mageuzi
    rally, arrested and detained several journalists, and injured six
    persons (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., 2.b., and 3).
        In April police arrested and beat Mohammed Sheikh, a journalist for
    the People, who had been arrested in 1999 for writing ``alarming''
    articles. He was released on bail and his case was pending at year's
    end. In April police arrested and briefly detained Maneno Mwikwabe, the
    editor of The Dispatch; he was not charged. Mwikwabe had been arrested
    in 1998 for writing ``alarming'' articles, but was released without
    charge.
        On July 30, police in Nyeri arrested 10 Mungiki members, reportedly
    injuring some of them (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.); the Mungiki were
    charged with illegal assembly.
        During the year, police arrested a number of journalists on charges
    of publishing information ``likely to cause alarm to the public'' (see
    Section 2.a.).
        On February 15, Johan Wandetto, a journalist for the People, who
    was arrested in February 1999, received an 18-month jail sentence for
    writing a report that ``risked causing alarm.''
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is often
    corrupt and subject to executive branch influence. The President has
    extensive powers over appointments, including those of the Attorney
    General, the Chief Justice, and Appeal and High Court judges. The
    President also can dismiss judges and the Attorney General upon the
    recommendation of a special presidentially appointed tribunal. Although
    judges have life tenure (except for the very few foreign judges who are
    hired by contract), the President has extensive authority over
    transfers.
        The court system consists of a Court of Appeals, a High Court, and
    two levels of magistrate courts, where most criminal and civil cases
    originate. The Chief Justice is a member of both the Court of Appeals
    and the High Court, which undercuts the principle of judicial review.
    Military personnel are tried by military courts-martial, and verdicts
    may be appealed through military court channels. The Chief Justice
    appoints attorneys for military personnel on a case-by-case basis.
        There were some indications of executive interference in the
    judiciary. Several cases involving opposition M.P.'s have been pending
    for years, with the courts repeatedly postponing the hearings, thereby
    requiring the M.P.'s to appear periodically in court or risk fines or
    imprisonment. On October 9, a Homa Bay court sentenced M.P. Shem
    Ochuodho to over 3 years in prison for a violent assault on a political
    rival during the 1997 election. While violence may have occurred,
    observers believe the court may have applied the law inequitably--no
    KANU M.P.'s were similarly charged despite credible allegations of
    violence on their part during campaigning. There were a number of
    protests against Ochuodho's conviction. On October 19, High Court
    Justice Barbara Tanui overturned the conviction, ordered a new trial,
    and released Ochuodho. Police immediately rearrested Ochuodho, took a
    statement regarding the case, and then released him on bail.
        Judges who ruled against the Government in the past sometimes were
    punished with transfer or nonrenewal of contracts; however, during the
    year no retaliatory action against justices was reported. Judges
    occasionally demonstrated independence.
        The Attorney General's constitutional power to discontinue
    proceedings in private prosecution cases was a problem. Arguing that
    citizens must first notify his office before initiating private
    prosecution, Attorney General Amos Wako used this authority on a number
    of occasions to terminate cases against government officials.
        In the previous year, the judiciary faced many accusations of
    corruption. In 1998 the Chief Justice appointed a special judiciary
    commission chaired by Justice Richard Kwach to report on the problems
    of the judiciary. The Kwach Commission cited ``corruption,
    incompetence, neglect of duty, theft, drunkeness, lateness, sexual
    harassment, and racketeering'' as common problems in the judiciary. The
    Commission recommended amending the Constitution to allow for the
    removal of incompetent judges, introducing a code of ethics, improving
    the independence of the judiciary, overhauling the Judicial Services
    Commission (the administrative branch of the judiciary), and shifting
    prosecutorial responsibilities from the police to the judiciary. Upon
    receipt of the report, the Chief Justice in late 1998 appointed another
    commission to investigate modalities of implementing the Kwach
    Commission's recommendations for improving the judiciary. No action was
    taken on those recommendations by year's end; however, the Judicial
    Services Commission circulated proposals for a judicial code of conduct
    in the first half of the year.
        There are no customary or traditional courts in the country.
    However, the national courts use the customary law of an ethnic group
    as a guide in civil matters so long as it does not conflict with
    statutory law. This is done most often in cases that involve marriage,
    death, and inheritance issues and in which there is an original
    contract founded in customary law. For example, if a couple married
    under national law, then their divorce is adjudicated under national
    law, but if they married under customary law, then their divorce is
    adjudicated under customary law. Citizens may choose between national
    and customary law when they enter into marriage or other contracts;
    thereafter, however, the courts determine which kind of law governs the
    enforcement of the contract. Some women's organizations seek to
    eliminate customary law because they feel it is biased in favor of men
    (see Section 5).
        Civilians are tried publicly, although some testimony may be given
    in closed session. The law provides for a presumption of innocence, and
    for defendants to have the right to attend their trial, to confront
    witnesses, and to present witnesses and evidence. Civilians also can
    appeal a verdict to the High Court and ultimately to the Court of
    Appeals. Judges hear all cases. In treason and murder cases, the deputy
    registrar of the High Court can appoint three assessors to sit with the
    High Court judge. The assessors are taken from all walks of life and
    receive a sitting allowance for the case. Although the assessors render
    a verdict, their judgment is not binding. Lawyers can object to the
    appointments of specific assessors.
        Defendants do not have the right to government-provided legal
    counsel, except in capital cases. For lesser charges, free legal aid is
    not usually available outside Nairobi or other major cities. As a
    result, poor persons may be convicted for lack of an articulate
    defense. Although defendants have access to an attorney in advance of
    trial, defense lawyers do not always have access to government-held
    evidence. The Government can plead the State Security Secrets Clause as
    a basis for withholding evidence, and local officials sometimes
    classify documents to hide guilt. Court fees for filing and hearing
    cases are high for ordinary citizens. The daily rate of at least $25
    (2,000 shillings) for arguing a case before a judge is beyond the reach
    of most citizens.
        Critics of the Government--politicians, journalists, lawyers, and
    students--have been harassed through abuse of the legal process. In a
    1997 study of the judiciary, the International Bar Association found
    ``a persistent and deliberate misuse of the legal system for the
    purpose of harassing opponents and critics of the Government.''
    Authorities continued to arrest opposition M.P.'s, journalists, and
    student leaders during the year (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.), and a
    number of opposition M.P.'s, student leaders, and human rights
    activists still had one or more court cases pending during the year,
    often for months or even years.
        There were no reported political prisoners during the year.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--At times authorities infringed on citizens' privacy
    rights. Although the Constitution provides that ``no person shall be
    subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by
    others on his premises,'' it permits searches without warrants ``to
    promote the public benefit.'' The Police Act permits police to enter a
    home forcibly if the time required to obtain a search warrant would
    ``prejudice'' their investigation. Although security officers generally
    obtain search warrants, they occasionally conduct searches without
    warrants to apprehend suspected criminals or to seize property believed
    to be stolen. Citizens frequently accuse police officers of soliciting
    bribes during searches or falsely arresting individuals to extract
    bribes (see Section 1.d.). Unlike in the previous year, there were no
    reports that Nairobi police searched offices of the media without
    warrants.
        The police continued repeatedly to conduct massive warrantless
    searches (``sweeps'') for illegal immigrants and firearms in
    residential neighborhoods of major cities (see Section 2.d.). The KHRC
    recorded 1,950 arrests during sweeps throughout the year (see Section
    1.d.). Residents complained that police who entered homes on the
    pretense of searching for weapons often asked for radio, television,
    and video receipts and permits and demanded bribes to refrain from
    confiscating those items in the absence of such documents. Unlike in
    the previous year, Nairobi police did not search the offices of tabloid
    publications and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) without
    warrants.
        Security forces monitored closely the activities of dissidents,
    following or otherwise harassing them. They employ various means of
    surveillance, including a network of informants to monitor the
    activities of opposition politicians and human rights advocates. Some
    opposition leaders, students, journalists, and others continued to
    report that the Government subjected them to surveillance and telephone
    wiretaps; however, there were no reports of interference with written
    correspondence during the year.
        According to press reports, in early February, police in Meru
    burned 300 homes, displacing over 1,000 persons. The residents, chiefly
    squatters living in makeshift houses, had occupied the land for as long
    as 10 years. A local councilor and some of the displaced contended that
    the plots previously were misallocated public land.
        Members of the coastal Bajuni, Mijikenda, and Digo communities
    accused the Government of denying them their rights to land (see
    Section 5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government broadly
    interprets several existing colonial era laws to restrict free
    expression. The Government continued to harass, beat, and arrest
    elements of the media during the year (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). The
    print media has been relatively independent for decades and since 1992
    has multiplied and become more outspoken; there was significant
    liberalization of electronic media during the year, particularly radio,
    television, and the Internet. The developing regulatory framework for
    broadcast media allowed abuse and manipulation in the issuance,
    withholding, and revoking of broadcast permits and frequencies. Police
    repeatedly dispersed demonstrators to prevent criticism of the
    Government (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Some independent periodicals
    reported that the business community came under pressure from the
    Government to refrain from advertising in these magazines, which kept
    some on the edge of insolvency. In spite of these pressures, the press,
    civic organizations, and the opposition continued to present their
    views to the public, particularly in the print media. Government
    pressure led journalists to practice some self-censorship.
        On the whole, the print media remained candid and independent. The
    mainstream print media include four daily newspapers that report on
    national politics. The largest newspaper, the Nation, is independent
    and often publishes articles critical of government policies. The
    second largest newspaper, the East African Standard, is controlled by
    an investment group with close ties to the Government and the ruling
    KANU party. It is generally, although not automatically, supportive of
    the Government. The third daily newspaper, The People, formerly a
    weekly, is owned by an opposition politician and is highly critical of
    the Government. The fourth daily, the Kenya Times, which has a small
    circulation, reflects KANU party views. Two former weekly newspapers,
    The Post and the Kenyan Star, did not publish regularly during the
    year. There also are numerous independent tabloid or ``gutter''
    periodicals, which appear irregularly and are critical highly of the
    Government. Reporting in these tabloids ran the gamut from revealing
    insider reports to unsubstantiated rumor mongering.
        The Government attempted to intimidate the pro-opposition press
    with arrests and intimidation, and by selective prosecution of
    journalists under a colonial-era section of the Penal Code that
    criminalizes the publication of information likely to cause fear or
    alarm. On February 15, Johan Wandetto, a journalist for The People, who
    was arrested in February 1999, received an 18-month prison sentence for
    writing a report that ``risked causing alarm.'' His story alleged that
    bandits held up the presidential escort. Wandetto appealed the case and
    was released on bond pending appeal. Aola Ooko, a correspondent for the
    Agence France Presse, was arrested following a March 9 article in which
    he fabricated allegations that police in Mombasa had stolen part of a
    4.8-ton drug seizure (see Section 1.d.). Simbi Kisumba, Mombasa bureau
    chief for The People, was arrested and faced charges in early March
    also for publishing an article on seized drugs that allegedly were
    missing from the police station. In March two writers for the small
    publication, Independent, were arrested and later released after
    writing an uncomplimentary article about the personal life of the
    Central Bank Governor (see Section 1.d.). On March 25, police from
    Eldama Ravine detained People reporter Elijah Kinyanjui Maina for
    several hours after he interviewed local residents about allegations
    that some of President Moi's livestock were stolen from his Kelelwet
    farm (see Section 1.d.). Police did not formally charge Maina. In April
    President Moi reportedly accused the Nation newspaper of unfairly
    attacking him and threatened to sue for slander and libel if necessary;
    however, no action was taken against the newspaper by year's end. In
    April police arrested and beat Mohammed Sheikh, a journalist for the
    People, who had been arrested in 1999 for writing ``alarming'' articles
    (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). He was released on bail and his case was
    pending at year's end. In April police arrested and briefly detained
    Maneno Mwikwabe, the editor of The Dispatch (see Section 1.d.); he was
    not charged. Mwikwabe had been arrested in 1998 for writing
    ``alarming'' articles, but was released without charge. On December 9,
    police in Western Province arrested and detained several journalists
    while forcibly dispersing a Mageuzi rally in Busia (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.d., 2.b., and 3). On December 30, in a widely publicized incident,
    police chased and beat Betty Dindi, a journalist for The Nation, who
    was covering a shareholders meeting, which had been banned by police,
    of Mbo-I-Kimati, a land-owning firm (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). The
    police officers reportedly threatened journalists covering the meeting
    for ``inciting shareholders.'' Dindi escaped from the police, but later
    was rebuffed when she went to the police station to register a
    complaint. The KHRC, the Kenya Union of Journalists, and the Kenya
    chapter of the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA)
    condemned the attacked on Dindi.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports during the year
    that any publications were refused registration or forced to suspend
    publication due to government action.
        The Government somewhat loosened its control over the electronic
    broadcast media in urban areas during the year--particularly over
    radio, the principal news medium for most citizens. There were 12 radio
    stations operating in Nairobi during the year, compared to 6 in Nairobi
    and 1 in Mombasa in 1999. The Government controls the Kenya
    Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which operates the country's premier
    radio, broadcast television, and cable television networks, including
    Metro Television, which began broadcasting to the Nairobi area in
    September. KBC stations do not criticize the Government and give a
    large share of news time to government or KANU party functions and
    little coverage to opposition activities. The Kenya Television Network
    (KTN), which is owned by KANU supporters, airs news programs with more
    balanced political coverage. Stellavision is owned by KANU supporters
    and provides balanced coverage. KTN and Stellavision both began
    broadcasting in Mombasa during the year. Citizen Radio covers much of
    the central areas of the country, whereas Citizen TV broadcasts to the
    Nairobi area. Citizen Radio and TV news programs generally are
    objective. Family TV and Radio, a Christian broadcasting network, and
    Nation Television and Radio began broadcasting television and radio in
    the Nairobi metropolitan area in 1999. Nation Television began
    broadcasting in Mombasa in August, providing independent media
    coverage.
        The Government continued to delay action on a large number of radio
    and television license applications throughout most of the year,
    reflecting the arbitrariness of the broadcast licensing process. The
    Ministry of Information, Transport, and Communication, continued to
    argue that it was waiting for the recommendations on media
    liberalization from the Attorney General's Task Force on Press Law.
    That Task Force made its initial report in December 1998; however, it
    still has several outstanding issues to resolve, including the manner
    of selection of the 13-member Media Commission, which would act as an
    independent body issuing broadcast licenses. In September the
    Government issued a permit to Voice of America (VOA) to broadcast
    locally and indicated that it would grant a frequency as soon as
    paperwork is completed; however, there was no progress on this during
    the year and VOA did not begin broadcasting by year's end. The Ministry
    for Information, Transport, and Communication has licensed a total of
    12 television and 20 radio stations to date, although only 5 private
    television stations (KTN, Citizen, Family, Nation, and Stellavision)
    and 9 private radio stations (Citizen, Family, Sayare Rehema, Capital,
    Nation Radio, Kiss, Baraka, BBC Nairobi, and BBC Mombasa) fully are
    operational. In 1999 Nation Media Group received authorization for
    radio broadcasts in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru, and began
    radio and television transmission to Nairobi. Nation Media also sued
    the Government for permission to broadcast radio and television
    nationwide, but the case still was before the courts at year's end. In
    1998 the Ministry approved radio and television broadcast licenses for
    a Muslim group and for a Christian group. In 1999 the Ministry of
    Information, Transport, and Communication licensed an Islamic radio
    station and three Catholic television stations. On May 26, the Supreme
    Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) began test-running Iqra Radio
    Station, which provides information, educational programming, and
    entertainment for Muslim audiences in Nairobi. At year's end, the
    Catholic Church had been assigned regional broadcasting frequencies,
    but not national frequencies; its petition for national frequencies was
    not resolved by year's end.
        In January the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) ordered the
    shutdown of Citizen Radio and Television, a new broadcast operation,
    for unpaid licensing fees and improper use of communications equipment.
    Citizen claimed that the shutdown, which only affected its operations
    outside Nairobi, was politically motivated. Citizen appealed the order
    in the courts and continued broadcasting in Nairobi; however, in March
    the court upheld the CCK's order and Citizen again appealed to the
    highest court, the Court of Appeal.
        In April during a speech to Parliament, Julius Sunkuli, the
    Minister of State in the Office of the President, criticized ethnic
    vernacular radio stations as being tribal and a detriment to national
    unity (see Section 5). In August President Moi's request that the
    Attorney General draft a law to force radio stations to broadcast only
    in English or Kiswahili drew negative public reaction, which caused
    several Government officials to deny that the Government intended to
    ban vernacular broadcasting. No such law was implemented by year's end.
        The KBC remained the only domestic source of current information
    for most persons outside the Nairobi area. This continued to limit
    severely the ability of opposition leaders and other critics of the
    government to communicate with the electorate.
        During the 1997 election campaign the Electoral Commission directed
    that the KBC accord equal treatment to all political parties; however,
    this directive was not implemented fully. KBC coverage remained heavily
    biased in favor of KANU and President Moi. In addition the KBC'S
    limited coverage of the opposition generally was negative, compared
    with uniformly positive coverage of KANU. Opposition politicians
    accused the Government of using similar tactics in the 1999
    byelections.
        Representatives of the international media remained free to
    operate, and approximately 120 foreign correspondents of nearly 100
    media organizations report out of Nairobi.
        The Government does not restrict access to the Internet. There were
    approximately 20 domestic Internet service providers, which generally
    are privately owned. Internet access was limited only by economic and
    infrastructural factors, and was fairly widespread in urban areas.
        A total of 79 publications remained banned, including such works as
    ``The Quotations of Chairman Mao Zedong'' and Salmon Rushdie's
    ``Satanic Verses.'' The 1997 reforms eliminated sedition as a ground
    for censorship of publications, and directed that a board be
    established to review existing, and future, publication bans. The
    Prohibited Publications Review Board was established in 1998.
        Despite constitutional provisions for free speech, the Government
    and school administrators continued to limit academic freedom. There
    were six private universities and six universities owned, subsidized,
    and administered by the Government. Most post-secondary students
    attended Government-run institutions, due in part to their lower fees.
    President Moi, as chancellor of all state universities, appoints the
    vice chancellors, who managed the institutions under the supervision of
    the Ministry of Education. A number of student activists have been
    expelled from universities in recent years because of political
    activities, and most have been refused readmission. Students claim that
    the Government interferes in student elections to ensure sympathetic
    student leaders. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports
    that government security forces followed student leaders.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts the
    right in practice. The Public Order Act, which the Government used for
    many years to control public gatherings and to restrict this right, was
    amended in 1997; the requirement that public meetings be licensed was
    replaced by the less restrictive requirement that organizers notify the
    local police in advance of planned public meetings. However,
    authorities continued repeatedly to disrupt public demonstrations about
    which organizers duly informed the police in advance; government
    officials claimed that the organizers lacked authorization to hold
    public gatherings, whereas there no longer appeared to be any basis in
    domestic law for requiring specific authorization. In August President
    Moi repeated his September 1999 statements that government officials
    should deny ``permits'' (for public demonstrations) to politicians who
    use public rallies to abuse other leaders; however, officials have
    legal authority to cancel planned public gatherings only if there are
    simultaneous meetings previously scheduled for the same venue, or if
    there are specific security threats. Cabinet Ministers Shariff Nassir
    and Francis Lotodo were quoted on several occasions during the year as
    threatening political opponents if they attended gatherings in the
    Ministers' constituencies. Lower ranking officials from various
    political parties also made similar threats against opponents.
        Police forcibly disrupted public assemblies, including some
    political protest demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). On February 28,
    police disrupted a public civic education play by a theater group and
    arrested seven members of the group and two persons from the audience
    on the pretext that they were holding an unlawful assembly and carrying
    offensive weapons (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.), a common charge to
    harass meeting organizers and participants. The organizers argued that
    such charges were baseless as plays are not governed by the Public
    Order Act (which requires prior notification) but the Film and Stage
    Plays Act (which has no prior notification clause). In a letter to
    Police Commissioner Philemon Abongo following the incident, CGD
    protested the arrests and claimed that the play was disrupted because
    of its civic education focus. In December the persons arrested were
    acquitted and released. On March 25 in Kapsabet, the officer commanding
    the police station, Gakuo Wanyaga, and riot police attempted to break
    up a rally organized by KANU M.P. Kipruto Kirwa and fellow M.P. John
    Sambu. The organizers claimed that they had notified the authorities of
    the planned meeting as required by law. After Sambu confronted the
    police and the crowd reportedly began chanting, the police left and
    allowed the rally to continue. On March 30, police in Nakuru arrested
    and detained in prison for several days 11 activists who were
    participating in a public gathering to discuss land grievances among
    the minority Ogiek community (see Section 1.d.). The Attorney General
    subsequently dropped the charges. On April 3, police in Laikipia,
    allegedly on orders from District Officer Njeru, dispersed a Greenbelt
    Movement civic education gathering, and arrested 4 persons (see
    Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On April 13, police in Nairobi arrested and
    detained for several days 63 demonstrators, including 6 nuns and 5
    clergymen during a march to present a petition to the World Bank
    offices in Nairobi (see Section 2.b.). The group had given prior notice
    to the police, who permitted them to march peacefully until they
    reached the World Bank offices. The Attorney General later dropped the
    charges because the police had no case against the demonstrators. On
    June 7, police in Molo prevented the KHRC from holding a civic
    education drive for the Ogiek community at Tinet Forest (see Section
    5). The police did not allow the KHRC members to enter the community
    and accused them of failing to obtain clearance from the police to
    stage a public meeting. A spokesperson for the KHRC claimed the police
    deliberately prevented the visit in an attempt to deny the Ogiek their
    rights. On September 30, police in Keiyo disrupted a meeting held by
    members of the Marichor community, even though organizers had notified
    police 2 weeks in advance of the event. The Officer Commanding Station
    Wanyama allegedly claimed that he was acting on orders from higher
    authorities. On December 17, 100 riot police used tear gas and batons
    to forcibly disperse a march headed by 5 M.P.'s, including James
    Orengo; numerous persons were injured and 24 persons were arrested (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On December 30, police disrupted a
    shareholders meeting of Mbo-I-Kimati, a land-owning firm, which had
    been banned by police as ``illegal'' for ``security reasons.'' The
    meeting was held to choose new directors and discuss a variety of
    grievances. The police officers reportedly threatened journalists
    covering the meeting and chased and beat Betty Dindi, a journalist for
    The Nation (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
        Police dispersed or intervened in some public assemblies after they
    became violent (see Section 1.c.). On January 29, fighting broke out at
    a rally in Bomet after persons allegedly paid by Assistant Minister
    Isaac Ruto attacked rival KANU Minister Kipkalya Kones and his
    supporters. On August 19, progovernment supporters broke up a rally
    organized by opposition M.P. James Orengo, police intervened, used tear
    gas, and beat and kicked participants (see Section 1.c.); police
    simultaneously blocked M.P.'s from leaving Parliament to attend the
    rally. On December 13, police forcibly disrupted a meeting held by
    Kipruto Kirwa, a dissident KANU M.P. (see Section 2.b.). Police
    allegedly sent in a group of 5 to 10 ``troublemakers'' to interrupt the
    meeting, then reportedly intervened and fired tear gas into the
    meeting. Police fired several shots into the crowd while chasing
    several persons through the village; one person was injured (see
    Section 1.c.).
        On December 8, President Moi ordered the police to prevent all
    future rallies by the Muungano wa Mageuzi (Movement for Change), an
    organization backed by a coalition of both opposition and dissident
    KANU M.P.'s (see Section 3), and to cancel any licenses that already
    had been issued. Moi said that licenses would only be given to
    registered political parties, and that the Government would ban events
    by any ``lobby groups, some religious organizations and nongovernmental
    organizations whose aims and operations were sinister.'' On November
    11, police in Eldoret used tear gas and batons to forcibly disperse a
    rally organized by the Mageuzi allegedly because the rally conflicted
    with another event and needed to be cancelled; several minor injuries
    were reported. On December 9, police in the Western Province set up
    roadblocks to prevent M.P.'s from attending a Mageuzi event in Busia,
    and police forcibly dispersed the rally; six persons were injured and
    several journalists were arrested and detained (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.a.). On December 12, police used tear gas and batons to prevent a
    Mageuzi rally at the Kamukunji Grounds in Nairobi; several persons
    suffered minor injuries.
        In early May, President Moi was quoted widely in the press calling
    for action against the Mungiki religious and political group and police
    disrupted several of the group's meetings during the year (see Section
    1.c.). On February 26, police in Thika forcibly dispersed a rally held
    by the Alliance of Patriotic Youth, a young group with strong ties to
    members of the Mungiki group, because the group reportedly had not
    given 3 days notice of their intent to rally. Police used tear gas and
    truncheons to disperse the crowd, which resulted in several injuries
    (see Section 1.c.). On May 14, a few hundred Mungiki reportedly were
    praying at Ngomongo grounds in Nairobi when police broke up the meeting
    and arrested at least three Mungiki members. On May 21, police in Embu
    allegedly blocked a Mungiki recruitment meeting. On September 17,
    police in Nairobi disrupted a Mungiki prayer gathering and then fought
    with Mungiki members, slum dwellers, and street children; there were no
    reported injuries.
        Student protests and riots occurred frequently during the year, and
    police forcibly dispersed several protests after they became violent,
    which resulted in injuries (see Section 1.c.).
        There were several violent incidents between progovernment
    supporters and opposition supporters during the year. On January 13,
    supporters of National Development Party (NDP) Chairman Raila Odinga
    attacked opposition M.P.'s James Orengo and Shem Ochuodho during a
    march against the Parliament-led constitutional review process.
    Supporters of the Parliament process reportedly beat several persons
    with whips and batons (see Section 1.c.). On January 14 and 15,
    students loyal to Orengo again marched in Nairobi to protest against
    the Parliament-led constitutional review process. Fighting between the
    students and pro-KANU and supporters of the Parliament process resulted
    in numerous injuries (see Section 1.c.). On June 22, armed youths
    disrupted meetings of the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC)
    in Kisumu, reportedly injuring several NCEC delegates. The incidents
    did not gain national media attention until NCEC leaders blamed M.P.
    Raila Odinga, Chairman of the NDP, and the Provincial Administration
    for instigating the violence; Raila denied the accusations. On November
    26, progovernment youths forcibly disrupted a meeting of the Ufungamano
    Initiative in Kisumu (see Sections 2.c. and 3). The youths threw
    Molotov cocktails, burned a vehicle, and beat severely several persons
    (see Section 1.c.). Police did not intervene.
        The Government continued to use the Societies Act to restrict
    freedom of association. The act requires that every association be
    registered or exempted from registration by the Registrar of Societies.
    For years after opposition parties again were legalized in 1992, the
    Government refused to act on a number of political party registration
    applications. However, since the enactment of reform legislation in
    1997, the Government has acted on some long-pending applications,
    increasing the number of registered political parties from 23 to 40.
    However, the Government continued to refuse to reverse its 1994 denial
    of registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), which was involved
    in a number of violent confrontations with police in 1992 (see Sections
    2.c. and 5). The United Democratic Movement political party has awaited
    registration since 1998, and continued to pursue its case in the
    courts; however, it still was not registered at year's end. In 1998 the
    Saba Saba Asili party postponed its petition for registration, because
    it believed that the Government would deny its application.
        The Government continued to criticize publicly and to intimidate
    NGO's, many of which it accuses of being ``subversive'' and of working
    with the opposition to overthrow the Government. The Government NGO
    Coordination Board under the NGO Act registers NGO's. The Government
    used this structure to put pressure on the nongovernmental National NGO
    Council. In 1997 the Board directed the Council to compile a list of
    ``political NGO's,'' presumably to carry out President Moi's threat to
    deregister all ``political NGO's,'' but the Council refused. In March
    1999, President Moi publicly stated that NGO's were trying to
    destabilize the country by channeling foreign funds to antigovernment
    student and labor organizations and using foreign funds to organize
    seditious mass protests. In April 1999, the Office of the President
    instructed all district governments to monitor NGO's within their
    districts with a view to ensuring that NGO's either advance government-
    approved objectives or cease to operate; however, NGO's did not report
    an increase in government monitoring during the year.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, while groups generally were allowed to worship freely, the
    Government at times interfered with other activities by religious
    groups.
        The Government requires religious organizations to register with
    the Registrar of Societies, which reports to the Office of the Attorney
    General. The Government allows traditional indigenous religious
    organizations to register, although many choose not to do so. Once
    registered, religious organizations enjoy tax-free status and clergy
    are not subject to duty on purchased goods. Religious organizations
    generally receive equal treatment from the Government; however, some
    small splinter groups have found it difficult to register due to their
    inability to define their status as more than an offshoot of a larger
    religious organization. The Government has not granted registration to
    the Tent of the Living God, a small Kikuyu religious group banned
    during the single party-era; however, with the arrival of a multiparty
    system in 1992, the Tent of the Living God has virtually disappeared.
        Despite 1997 legal reforms and the subsequent registration of a
    large number of political parties, the Government refused to reverse
    its 1994 denial of registration of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) on
    the grounds that the IPK had been involved in a number of violent
    confrontations with police in 1992, and because the party refused to
    drop the Islamic title from its party name.
        On April 3, William Ruto, Assistant Minister in the Office of the
    President, said following the discovery of ``cult'' killings in Uganda
    that the Government would crack down on religious groups that endanger
    the safety of their adherents; however, other than the Mungiki, there
    was no reported harassment of religious groups.
        On June 25, local authorities in Nairobi blocked entry to the Buru
    Buru Church of God ostensibly to prevent renewed fighting between rival
    factions in the Church, which had resulted in numerous injuries among
    worshipers 2 weeks earlier. The Church remained closed at year's end.
        Foreign missionary groups of nearly every faith operate in the
    country. The Government generally has permitted them to assist the poor
    and found of schools and hospitals. The missionaries openly promote
    their religious beliefs and have encountered little resistance;
    however, some missionary groups expressed concern following the 1999
    release of the report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into
    Devil Worship. The Commission's widely-publicized report included
    numerous reports of ritual murder, human sacrifice, and cannibalism,
    and feats of magic allegedly done by using powers acquired through such
    acts. It also reported that ``Satanists'' had infiltrated nonindigenous
    religious groups including Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus
    Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), and the Church of Christ
    Scientist (Christian Scientists), as well as other organizations,
    including the Masonic Order (Freemasons) and the Theosophical Society,
    making them ``doorways'' to Satanism. Most members of the Commission
    were senior members of mainline Christian churches; a deputy director
    of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) also served on the
    Commission. Fears of devil worship persisted during the year. In
    September police in Nairobi reportedly alerted residents to a growing
    number of ritual murders after a 7-year-old girl was found murdered. A
    women was arrested a week earlier for allegedly abducting a child.
        Purporting to practice witchcraft reportedly is a criminal offense
    under colonial-era laws; however, persons generally are prosecuted for
    this offense only in conjunction with some other offense, such as
    murder. Witchcraft traditionally has been a common explanation for
    diseases of which the causes were unknown. Although many traditional
    indigenous religions include or accommodate belief in the efficacy of
    witchcraft, they generally approve of harmful witchcraft only for
    defensive or retaliatory purposes and purport to offer protection
    against it. The practice of witchcraft is widely understood to
    encompass attempts to harm others not only by magic, but also by covert
    means of established efficacy such as poisons.
        Muslim leaders continued to charge that the Government is hostile
    toward Muslims. Muslims complain that non-Muslims receive better
    treatment when applying for proof of citizenship. According to Muslim
    leaders, government authorities more rigorously scrutinize the
    identification cards of persons with Muslim surnames and require them
    to present additional documentation of their citizenship (i.e., birth
    certificates of parents and, sometimes, grandparents). The Government
    has singled out the overwhelmingly Muslim ethnic Somalis as the only
    group whose members are required to carry an additional form of
    identification to prove that they are citizens. Ethnic Somalis must
    produce upon demand their Kenyan identification card and a second
    identification card verifying screening. Both cards also are required
    in order to apply for a passport. Although this heightened scrutiny
    originated as an attempt to deter illegal immigration, a senior
    official of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims alleged that it
    increasingly affects all Muslims.
        The Government at times disrupted public meetings that religious
    groups organized or participated in, sometimes for political reasons.
    For example, on April 3, police in Laikipia broke up a gathering in a
    Catholic church hall, on the grounds that the participants were former
    freedom fighters holding a secret meeting. The police arrested four men
    and charged them with holding an illegal meeting (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.b.).
        The Government historically has been unsympathetic to tribal
    religious groups that have engendered protest movements. The Government
    frequently harassed, and periodically arrested and detained members of
    the Mungiki, a small, controversial, predominately Kikuyu traditional
    religious group with strong political motivations. The group originated
    as an offshoot of the Tent of the Living God religious group, and many
    of its leaders reportedly have converted to Islam. On at least one
    occasion, police fired upon members of the Mungiki while attempting to
    disrupt their prayer meeting. Members of the Mungiki most commonly are
    charged with holding illegal assemblies and possessing offensive
    weapons. Mutual mistrust between Mungiki and police authorities
    aggravated the situation, and in May President Moi was quoted widely in
    the press calling for a crackdown on the Mungiki. On April 23, a few
    hundred members of the Mungiki approached the Nyahururu police station
    to demand the release of three members of the group. Police responded
    with force, including the use of rubber bullets and live ammunition,
    injuring dozens of persons and sending eight persons to the hospital
    with gunshot wounds (see Section 1.c.). Police later removed two of the
    wounded from their hospital beds and detained them, an act that
    hospital authorities strongly criticized (see Section 1.d.). On May 14,
    police reportedly broke up a prayer gathering at Ngomongo grounds in
    Nairobi attended by a few hundred Mungiki and arrested at least three
    adherents (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). On May 21, police in Embu
    allegedly broke up a Mungiki recruitment meeting. On June 25, police
    shot and injured 5 members of the Mungiki and arrested 23 others while
    attempting to disrupt a prayer meeting (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and
    2.b.). The Mungiki members responded to the police attempts to disrupt
    their meeting by throwing stones at the police. On July 8, police in
    Nairobi fought with Mungiki members as they gathered for an impromptu
    meeting. On July 30, police in Nyeri arrested 10 Mungiki members for
    holding an illegal gathering, reportedly injuring some of them (see
    Section 1.d.). On September 17, police in Nairobi broke up a Mungiki
    prayer gathering (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.), and then fought with
    Mungiki members, slum dwellers, and street children; there were no
    reported injuries. The debate over the rights of the Mungiki to
    practice their traditional religion and advance their political agenda
    is ongoing. The Mungiki group allegedly promotes female genital
    mutilation (FGM) and the taking of illegal oaths against the
    Government. It remains unclear whether the Mungiki violate the law in
    practicing their religion.
        On August 13, 1999, police killed five Muslim worshipers in an
    altercation in the Anas Bin Malik mosque in Chai village, near Mombasa.
    The Government charged two police officers, Julius Mugambi M'Nabere and
    Stephan Musau Kilonzo, with murder. The case was pending before the
    court at year's end (see Section 1.a.).
        On August 24, Father John Anthony Kaiser, a Catholic priest working
    in the country for over 30 years, was found dead near Naivasha town
    (see Section 1.a.). Father Kaiser was a vocal human rights activist and
    a critic of key members of the Government. The investigation was
    ongoing at year's end; there are no known suspects.
        In December 1999, a group of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu leaders
    formed an alternative process to reform the Constitution, the
    Ufungamano Initiative, which opposes the Parliament-led process (see
    Section 3). The Government, although critical of the Ufungamano group,
    permitted it to proceed with its constitutional review process.
    However, a Minister in the Office of the President, Shariff Nassir, and
    other ruling party politicians, warned of possible confrontation if the
    Ufungamano Commission attempted to collect citizen views in their
    constituencies.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--By law citizens may travel freely within
    the country and there were no reported violations of this right.
    However, police routinely stop vehicles and check vehicles' safety and
    drivers' documents on roads throughout the country. Many vehicles often
    are in disrepair, and many drivers often lack required documentation.
    Police often demand bribes at such checkpoints.
        The Government does not restrict emigration or foreign travel;
    however, the law requires a woman to obtain her husband's or father's
    permission in order to obtain a passport (see Section 5). However, in
    practice, adult women often are able to circumvent this restriction by
    claiming to be unmarried. Civil servants and M.P.'s must get government
    permission for international travel, which generally is granted
    routinely; however, during several legislative periods during the year,
    the Government denied permission to some government Ministers to travel
    because the Ministers were in session.
        In November the Government deported approximately 100 Ugandans who
    were attending a conference in Nairobi, because of fears of contagion
    due to the Ebola outbreak in Uganda.
        The majority of an estimated 400,000 persons displaced or forced to
    relocate during the early 1990's because of ethnic violence are
    believed to have returned to their homes or moved elsewhere; however,
    some still were waiting to return home at year's end. Many of the rural
    residents displaced by the violent ethnic clashes in Rift Valley in
    1991-93 still have not returned to their homes and remain displaced in
    urban areas. Some of the several thousand persons displaced by ethnic
    clashes in Rift Valley in 1998, and in the Pokot-Marakwet region
    throughout 1999, have not returned to their homes due to fear of
    renewed violence (see Section 5).
        In December the Government permitted the return of approximately
    4,500 Kenyan refugees from Ethiopia pursuant to an agreement with the
    UNHCR and Ethiopian Government. Government officials had refused to
    allow their return in November 1999, ostensibly because of concerns
    over the possible effect of their return on ethnic tensions in their
    areas of origin.
        The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylum
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, in 1991 the
    Government drafted legislation to establish a mechanism for granting
    refugee or asylum status. During the year, the drafting committee
    submitted the legislation to the Attorney General's office for review;
    however, no further action was taken by year's end. The UNHCR grants
    refugee status to Somali refugees at the Dadaab camps and to Sudanese
    refugees arriving at the Kakuma camp. A UNHCR eligibility committee in
    Nairobi performs a similar function for individuals of other
    nationalities.
        The Government offers first asylum and provided it to the
    approximately 200,000 refugees registered by the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR), who lived in official UNHCR camps. An
    undetermined number of refugees live outside the camps in cities and
    rural areas. Somalis accounted for about 80 percent of the total
    refugee population, followed by large numbers of Sudanese and a
    scattered number of other nationalities from across the region.
    Approximately 2,000 refugees, mostly of Somali and Ethiopian
    background, were repatriated during the year. Police performed
    nighttime sweeps in urban areas to round up illegal immigrants and
    refugees (see Section 1.d.).
        During the period between 1997 and 1999, the UNHCR, at the
    direction of the Government, closed 5 refugee camps near the coastal
    city of Mombasa and relocated over 7,000 refugees against their wishes
    to camps near the Somali and Sudanese borders. The Government requires
    all refugees to reside at these camps unless granted permission to live
    elsewhere in the country, primarily to attend higher education, undergo
    medical treatment, or avoid security threats at the camps. However,
    many refugees live illegally outside the camps, especially in Nairobi.
        The border with Somalia remained officially closed until April 12;
    however, many Somalis continued to arrive overland from Somalia to the
    camps near Dadaab during the closure.
        There were numerous incidents during the year in which persons were
    killed during interethnic disputes; some of which crossed the country's
    border (see Section 5).
        Incidents of rape of women and girls in refugee camps continued to
    occur, especially near the Dadaab camps (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Over
    80 percent of such rapes occurred when women and girls collected
    firewood and building materials outside the camps; however, reported
    rapes declined during the year, largely because of a firewood
    distribution program initiated at the Dadaab camps. On April 3, a court
    in Garissa convicted and sentenced a man to two concurrent 30-year
    prison terms for raping two refugee women near the Dadaab camp (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Acts of violence, including banditry and shootings, occur regularly
    near the camps. In January, February, and April Somali refugees at the
    Kakuma camp burned over 400 of their shelters, reportedly to attract
    attention to their demands for resettlement and to claim food ration
    cards allegedly lost in the fires.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion from the country of
    persons with a valid claim to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government through free and fair multiparty elections; however, their
    ability to do so has not yet been demonstrated fully. The National
    Assembly continued to be dominated by the same ruling party. The
    December 1997 general elections, despite numerous logistical and other
    flaws, generally reflected the will of the electorate. They were marked
    by much less violence and intimidation, less fraud, and less overt use
    of government resources to assist KANU candidates, than the 1992 polls.
    Due to greater fragmentation, the opposition was perceived widely to
    pose less of a challenge to Moi's reelection than it had in 1992.
    Opposition candidates won 60 percent of the vote, but these votes were
    split among four main and several fringe parties, thereby enabling Moi
    to win reelection for another 15-year term and giving KANU a narrow
    majority in the unicameral National Assembly. KANU victories in 1998
    and 1999 by-elections (four caused by the deaths of sitting opposition
    M.P.'s and one by a defection to KANU) increased KANU's majority in the
    National Assembly to 118 of 222 seats. The High Court required one by-
    election by overturning a 1997 opposition victory; the court continued
    not to take action on any opposition challenges to KANU victories in
    1997.
        At the local level, the President exercises sweeping power over the
    administrative structure. The President appoints both the powerful
    provincial and district commissioners and a multitude of district and
    village officials. In elections many local officials actively assist
    the ruling KANU. Unlike in previous by-elections in 1998 and 1999,
    there were no allegations of partisan electoral abuses by local
    officials during the one by-election in April in the Kwanza
    constituency, Rift Valley.
        At the national level, the Constitution authorizes the President to
    dissolve the legislature and prohibits debate on issues under
    consideration by the courts. This prohibition, in conjunction with a
    ruling by the Speaker of the Assembly that the President's conduct is
    inappropriate for parliamentary debate, has limited the scope of
    deliberation on controversial political issues. M.P.'s are entitled to
    introduce legislation, but in practice it is the Attorney General who
    does so. The President significantly influences the legislative agenda.
    However, in November 1999, the National Assembly amended the
    Constitution to give the National Assembly the power to hire its own
    staff and to vote its own budget, despite President Moi's long-
    expressed opposition to this amendment. On November 28, the National
    Assembly passed implementing legislation, which was being implemented
    at year's end.
        The Government continued to use both physical beatings and
    arbitrary arrest and prosecution to harass and intimidate opposition
    M.P.'s and to restrict their freedom of speech and assembly (see
    Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). The Government's domination of
    domestic broadcast media, especially outside major urban centers,
    continued to restrict severely the ability of opposition politicians to
    communicate with citizens (see Section 2.a.).
        On December 28, President Moi, acting as chairman of KANU,
    suspended six M.P.'s for dissent, including Jimmy Angwenyi, Kipkalya
    Kones, Anthony Kimeto, Cyrus Jirongo, and former Finance Minister
    Simeon Nyachae. The suspension prevents the M.P.'s from bringing any
    motions sponsored by their party to Parliament; however, they could
    still submit motions on their own and participate in all Parliament
    activities.
        Reforms adopted in 1997 ameliorated the lack of independence of the
    presidentially appointed Electoral Commission, which oversees
    elections, by nearly doubling its size to include members nominated by
    the opposition. One parliamentary byelection was held during the year
    on April 15, in the Kwanza constituency, Rift Valley. FORDKenya kept
    their seat in the by-election. While there was some violence in the
    period prior to the election, the election was held without incident.
        Since 1996 a broad coalition of NGO's and religious organizations
    has mobilized public opinion in support of a reform of the Constitution
    to reduce the power of the presidency. In 1997 the National Assembly
    enacted the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, which was amended in 1998
    to create a constitutional review commission to recommend changes in
    the Constitution. In 1999 the constitutional reform process stalled,
    when political parties were unable to agree how seats on the commission
    should be divided among the parties. Although demands by religious
    leaders and NGO's to restart the stalled constitutional reform process
    continued in 1999, Moi continued to insist that only the National
    Assembly was competent to review the Constitution. In December 1999,
    the National Assembly created a Parliamentary Select Committee to
    revise the existing act and form a review commission; the Ufungamano
    Initiative, a church-led group, formed the next day, creating a
    parallel process. The Parliament created a separate review commission
    in November, which also did not complete its review by year's end. In
    the latter half of the year, the Government and police harassed and
    disrupted meetings of the Muungano wa Mageuzi (Movement for Change), an
    organization backed by a coalition of both opposition and dissident
    KANU M.P.'s that promotes opposition unity to achieve political and
    constitutional reform. It is not a political party. On December 8,
    President Moi ordered the police to ban all future rallies by the
    Mageuzi and to cancel any licenses that already had been issued. He
    also accused Mageuzi and the Ufungamano Initiative of planning to
    overthrow the Government (see Section 2.c.). On November 11, police in
    Eldoret used tear gas and batons to disperse Mageuzi demonstrators (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). On December 9, police in the Western Province
    set up roadblocks to prevent M.P.'s from attending a Mageuzi event in
    Busia and forcibly dispersed the rally (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 2.a.,
    and 2.b.).
        Elected local councils exist, but the executive branch of the
    central Government has arrogated most of the revenues and functions
    that they had at independence. Although rural and municipal councils
    are authorized by law to provide a wide range of health, education, and
    infrastructure services, in practice their functions have been reduced
    to some oversight of nursery schools, secondary and tertiary roads,
    markets, and natural resources such as forests. Most councils lack
    sufficient financial autonomy and revenues to perform adequately even
    these limited services.
        Although there are no legal restrictions, traditional attitudes
    circumscribe the role of women in politics, and women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. The National Assembly
    included eight female M.P.'s (four elected and four nominated), up from
    seven in the last session. The Women's Political Caucus, formed in
    1997, continued to lobby over issues of concern to women and to
    increase the influence of women on government policy. A bill was
    introduced in June to create a number of parliamentary seats reserved
    for women; however, no action was taken on the bill by year's end.
        Although the President's Cabinet included persons from many ethnic
    groups, approximately one-third of the ministers were either Kalenjin
    or Luhya. At year's end, there were only two ministers from the
    country's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and no minister from the
    third-largest ethnic group, the Luo; both the Kikuyus and the Luos tend
    to support opposition parties. However, in 1999 President Moi appointed
    a person affiliated with the Kikuyu ethnic group as Vice President. The
    President continued to rely on an inner circle of advisors, drawn
    largely from his Kalenjin ethnic group. There is one nominated M.P. who
    is of Asian origin.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The number of human rights organizations continued to grow. These
    include NGO's such as the KHRC, the Kenya Antirape Organization, the
    Legal Advice Center, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the
    Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Center for
    Governance and Development, People Against Torture, the Independent
    Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), and the Release Political Prisoners pressure
    group. An array of legal organizations, including the International
    Commission of Jurists-Kenya, FIDA, the Law Society of Kenya, and the
    Public Law Institute, advocate human rights.
        Several NGO's maintain comprehensive files on human rights abuses.
    A number of attorneys represent the poor and human rights defendants
    without compensation, although they can handle only a small percentage
    of those who need assistance, and are concentrated chiefly in Nairobi
    and other large cities.
        The President instructed government officials to monitor NGO's
    carefully, and government officials including the President continued
    to intimidate, and threaten to disrupt human rights organizations and
    other NGO's (see Section 2.b.). According to a 1999 KBC news report,
    President Moi said that he would reveal a list of names of subversive
    NGO's and their antisocial activities; however, the President did not
    release such a list during the year.
        The Government allowed human rights organizations to witness some
    autopsies of persons who died in police custody. The Attorney General's
    Office generally responded in detail to foreign embassies' human rights
    inquiries.
        The KHRC produces a ``Quarterly Human Rights Report'' (formerly the
    ``Quarterly Repression Report'') that catalogs the human rights
    situation in the country, as well as special reports on pressing human
    rights issues. During the year, it also published a report entitled
    ``Damned and Debased: Women in Prison and Detention Centers in Kenya''
    (see Section 1.c.). The Institute for Education in Democracy and other
    NGO's monitor elections in cooperation with the Electoral Commission
    and diplomatic missions.
        The 10-member Government Standing Committee on Human Rights (SCHR)
    established in 1996 is empowered to ``investigate alleged violations of
    constitutional freedoms,'' including abuse of power by public
    officials. It is tasked with drafting recommendations on human rights
    problems and providing these to the government agencies under whose
    purview the problems fall. However, it is subordinate to the Office of
    the President, its chairman is a longstanding KANU loyalist, it has
    received sufficient funds to fill only 8 of its 27 authorized staff
    positions, and it has been relatively inactive. Since its inception,
    the Committee has maintained a low profile and kept its distance from
    most contentious human rights problems. The National Assembly was
    considering draft legislation, drafted by the Attorney General and the
    SCHR with the help of NGO's and civil society, that would grant the
    Committee greater autonomy and independence; however, the Assembly took
    no action on it by year's end.
        In October 1998, the Parliament passed a resolution to create an
    Ombudsman's office that would be charged with addressing complaints
    about inefficiency, corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power by public
    servants; however, the Attorney General had not drafted a bill to turn
    the resolution into law by year's end.
        In July the Government facilitated a fact-finding visit by foreign
    diplomatic personnel to visit the Kamiti Maximum Security Prison and
    Langata Women's Prison (see Section 1.c.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of a
    person's ``race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local
    connection, political opinions, color, or creed;'' however, government
    authorities did not enforce effectively many of these provisions. There
    is credible evidence that the Government sponsored large-scale ethnic
    violence during the early 1990's, and there were some indications that
    some government officials have at least tolerated and in some instances
    instigated ethnic violence on a smaller scale since that time.
        Women.--Violence against women is a serious and widespread problem.
    According to the Government, 165 cases of rape were reported to the
    police in Nairobi during the year, compared to 155 in 1999. The
    available statistics probably underreport the number of incidents, as
    social mores deter women from going outside their families or ethnic
    groups to report sexual abuse. A study by Kangemi Women Empowerment
    Centre, a small group based in one of Nairobi's largest low income
    communities, claimed that three out of five women in the community were
    victims of domestic violence, and that one-third of the women had
    suffered sexual abuse. The study noted that the abused women rarely
    reported the violations, because they believed that nothing would
    change. Although the validity of the study is unproven, the basic
    figures reflect other published figures and anecdotal evidence.
        The law carries penalties of up to life imprisonment for rape,
    although actual sentences usually are no more than 10 years. The rate
    of prosecution remains low because of cultural inhibitions against
    publicly discussing sex, fear of retribution, disinclination of police
    to intervene in domestic disputes, and unavailability of doctors who
    otherwise might provide the necessary evidence for conviction.
    Moreover, wife beating is prevalent and largely condoned by much of
    society. Traditional culture permits a man to discipline his wife by
    physical means and is ambivalent about the seriousness of spousal rape.
    There is no law specifically prohibiting spousal rape. Throughout the
    year, the media continued to report on violence against women,
    including widespread spousal abuse.
        There continued to be incidents of rape of refugee Somali women at
    the Dadaab refugee camps, where women were assaulted outside camp
    perimeters in the course of gathering firewood and occasionally within
    the camps themselves (see Section 2.d.). A 1999 KHRC report noted a
    yearly average of over 100 reported cases of rape among refugee women.
    The UNHCR initiated a program to distribute firewood to refugees, which
    reduced the incidence of rape outside the camps; however, such crimes
    remain a problem.
        Since 1994 the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) has collaborated
    with the police to stop domestic violence. Police typically view
    violence against women as a family matter, not a crime. FIDA has
    trained over 800 police officers about gender issues.
        Women experience a wide range of discriminatory practices, limiting
    their political and economic rights and relegating them to second class
    citizenship. The Constitution extends equal protection of rights and
    freedoms to men and women, but only in 1997 was the Constitution
    amended to include a specific prohibition of discrimination on grounds
    of gender. However, constitutional provisions allow only males
    automatically to transmit citizenship to their children. The Government
    has not passed domestic enabling legislation to implement international
    conventions on women's rights; however, the Attorney General submitted
    to Parliament three bills that are designed to protect women's rights:
    The Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Bill; The National Commission
    on Gender and Development Bill; and The Children Bill. The Task Force
    on Laws Relating to Women, established by the Attorney General in 1993,
    has yet to make its report.
        Women continue to face both legal and actual discrimination in
    other areas. For example, a married woman legally is required to obtain
    the consent of her husband before obtaining a national identity card or
    a passport.
        The Law of Succession, which governs inheritance rights, provides
    for equal consideration of male and female children; however, in
    practice most inheritance problems do not come before the courts. Women
    often are excluded from inheritance settlements, particularly if
    married, or given smaller shares than male claimants. Moreover, a widow
    cannot be the sole administrator of her husband's estate unless she has
    her children's consent. Most customary law disadvantages women,
    particularly in property rights and inheritance. For example, under the
    customary law of most ethnic groups, a woman cannot inherit land and
    must live on the land as a guest of male relatives by blood or
    marriage.
        Women make up about 75 percent of the agricultural work force and
    have become active in urban small businesses. Nonetheless, the average
    monthly income of women is about two-thirds that of men, and women hold
    only about 5 percent of land titles. Women have difficulty moving into
    nontraditional fields, are promoted more slowly than men, and bear the
    brunt of layoffs. Societal discrimination is most apparent in rural
    areas.
        The nation's best known women's rights and welfare organization,
    Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (``Development of Women'' in Swahili) was
    established as a nonpolitical NGO during the colonial era, but is
    aligned closely with the ruling party. A growing number of women's
    organizations are active in the field of women's rights, including
    FIDA, the National Council of Women of Kenya, the National Commission
    on the Status of Women, the Education Center for Women in Democracy,
    and the League of Kenyan Women Voters.
        Children.--The system of free education in the early years of the
    country's independence has given way to a ``cost-sharing'' education
    system in which students pay both tuition and other costs. These are a
    heavy burden on most families. Although the law mandates that schooling
    be available for all children up through grade 12 and that it be
    compulsory, there is a very high dropout rate in part because of large
    educational expenses. There are an estimated 4 million children between
    6 and 14 years of age who are out of school. The legally mandated
    universal schooling also does not occur in practice because of a
    shortage of schools. Levels of education for boys and girls differ
    widely. Although the number of boys and girls in school is roughly
    equal at the primary level, boys substantially outnumber girls in
    higher education. Rural families are more reluctant to invest in
    educating girls than in educating boys, especially at the higher
    levels. Seventy percent of illiterate persons in the country are
    female. The health care system for school children, which once provided
    periodic medical checkups and free milk, is defunct. Corporal
    punishment of students, including caning, by teachers is widespread in
    schools.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced by certain ethnic groups and remains
    widespread, particularly in rural areas. The press reported severe
    injuries to several girls from the practice of FGM. Health officials
    estimate that as much as 50 percent of women nationwide have suffered
    FGM. According to Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, the percentage is as high as
    80 to 90 percent in some districts of Eastern, Nyanza, and Rift Valley
    provinces. FGM usually is performed at an early age. In September six
    women attacked Josephine Gacheri Mbaabu, an adolescent student, as she
    collected firewood, and attempted to circumcise her. She escaped
    without being circumcised; however, she was injured in the eye, ear,
    and neck. Mbaabu reportedly had undergone a less severe form of FGM,
    which was insufficient for the women. President Moi has issued two
    presidential decrees banning FGM, and the Government prohibits
    government-controlled hospitals and clinics from practicing it;
    however, no law bans FGM. In an attempt to end FGM, some members of the
    Marakwet and Maasai tribes instituted new ``no cut'' initiation rites
    for girls entering adulthood. According to statistics compiled by a
    group of NGO's in Marakwet, only 169 girls suffered FGM in December
    1999, compared to 12,000 girls during the same month in the 4 previous
    years.
        In December a magistrate in Rift Valley ruled in favor of Ednah
    Chebet Kandie and Beatrice Jepkosgei Kandie, two sisters who sued their
    father over his traditional right to force them to undergo FGM. The
    December 12 court order prevents Pius Kandie from forcing his daughters
    to undergo FGM.
        Economic displacement and the spread of HIV/AIDS continued to fuel
    the problem of homeless street children. The number of Nairobi's street
    children is over 60,000, an estimated 20 percent increase from 1999.
    These children often are involved in theft, drug trafficking, assault,
    trespassing, and property damage. According to a 1997 Human Rights
    Watch report, street children face harassment as well as physical and
    sexual abuse from the police and within the juvenile justice system.
    They are held in extremely harsh conditions in crowded police station
    cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little food, and
    inadequate supplies (see Section 1.c.). They often are incarcerated
    with adults and frequently beaten by police.
        The problem of child rape and molestation continued to grow. There
    were frequent press reports of rape of young girls by middle-aged or
    older rapists. There were repeated reports of molestation or rape of
    children by schoolteachers, mostly in rural areas. Teachers at the Top
    Station Primary school in Kitale allegedly raped several students
    during the year. In a letter to the Minister of Education, FIDA
    demanded that the Government fire these teachers; however, no action
    had been taken at year's end. Legally, a man does not ``rape'' a girl
    under age 14 if he has sexual intercourse with her against her will; he
    commits the lesser offense of ``defilement.'' The penalty for the
    felony of rape can be life imprisonment, while the penalty for
    defilement is up to 5 years' imprisonment. Men convicted of rape
    normally receive prison sentences of between 5 and 20 years, plus
    several strokes of the cane.
        On June 9, the Nairobi Chief Magistrate ordered Julius Sunkuli, the
    Minister of State in the Office of the President, to appear before the
    court on June 23 to face rape charges brought by FIDA on behalf of
    Florence Nangini Mpayei, who claimed that Sunkuli raped her in his
    office in 1996 when she was 14 years old. Mpayei also alleged that she
    bore a child as a result of the rape. In September the court dropped
    the case at Mpayei's behest.
        Child prostitution is a major problem in Nairobi and Mombasa, often
    connected with the tourist trade. Child prostitution has grown
    considerably due both to economic contraction and the increase in the
    number of orphans due to the spread of HIV/AIDS.
        There were reports that children were killed for body parts by
    persons practicing healing rituals associated with traditional
    religions (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.). In September authorities in one
    part of Nairobi reportedly banned night worship temporarily after
    several young children were found dead in the area, allegedly victims
    of devil worship. In October several small riots ensued as residents
    attacked suspected child abductors and killed three suspects in the
    process (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.). Similar incidents occurred in
    Mombasa and Nakuru where mobs attacked suspected child abductors. One
    man died when Nakuru police fired on a crowd that was attempting to
    lynch a suspect.
        People with Disabilities.--Government policies do not discriminate
    officially against the disabled with regard to employment, education,
    or state services. However, disabled persons frequently are denied
    licenses to drive. There are no mandated provisions of accessibility
    for the disabled to public buildings or transportation. Kenya
    Television Network broadcasts some news programs in sign language.
        Religious Minorities.--There generally is a great level of
    tolerance among religious groups; however, there were a few instances
    of violence between adherents of different religions, and Muslims
    increasingly perceive themselves to be treated as second-class citizens
    in a predominantly Christian country. Intermarriage between members of
    Christian denominations is common and interfaith prayer services occur
    frequently. Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians, although less
    frequent, is also socially acceptable, and mosques and Christian
    churches can be found on the same city blocks.
        For years Muslims and Christians have held an open debate over
    their respective places in society. Each group claims to have a larger
    number of adherents than is plausible, and some Muslim groups believe
    that the Government and business communities deliberately have impeded
    development in predominantly Muslim areas. Muslims also believe that
    the national business community, dominated by largely Christian ethnic
    groups from inland ``up-country'' areas including the Kikuyu,
    deliberately allocates to non-Muslims most of the jobs it creates in
    predominantly Muslim areas including the coastal area. The debate at
    times has undermined mutual trust. The misuse of authority by mainly
    Christian security forces in the northeast, which is largely Muslim and
    in which banditry is widespread, has long contributed to Muslim
    mistrust. In recent years, the absence of effective government in
    southern Somalia and the OLF insurgency in southern Ethiopia have
    strained Christian-Muslim relations further by causing the Government
    to increase security force presence and operations in the northeast,
    where many security force members may find it hard to distinguish
    Kenyan Muslims from ethnically and culturally similar members of Somali
    militias or the OLF (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.).
        There were a few instances of violence between adherents of
    different religions. On April 21, a group of Muslims allegedly threw
    stones and attacked a group of Catholic worshipers who had stopped in
    front of the Majengo mosque in Nyeri to pray during a Good Friday
    ceremony. The Muslim worshipers were in the middle of their Friday
    prayers and believed that the Catholics were provoking them. A few of
    the Catholics received minor cuts and bruises. Top leaders of the two
    faiths met in Nyeri a few days later to reconcile their differences and
    apologize before the fight escalated. On April 23, Muslim youths in
    Kitui reportedly charged and dispersed a group of Christians who were
    making noise outside a mosque during evening prayers.
        On November 30 and December 1, Muslim worshippers and local traders
    fought over land surrounding a mosque in a residential neighborhood in
    Nairobi, resulting in the deaths of four persons and numerous injuries
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Although originally a land conflict, it
    may have become a religious conflict during the fighting when a mosque,
    a madrassa (learning center), a church, a nightclub, and kiosks were
    burned down. Riot police intervened to restore calm; however, there
    were no reported injuries caused by this intervention.
        During the year, there were reports of ritual murders allegedly
    associated with aspects of traditional indigenous religions. The
    victims, generally believed to be teenaged children, reportedly were
    killed and parts of their bodies removed for use in traditional rituals
    by persons seeking renewed youth or health. The Report of the 1994
    Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Devil Worship, presented to the
    Parliament in August 1999, contained similar reports from recent years.
        Mob violence against persons suspected of practicing witchcraft
    resulted in dozens of deaths (see Section 1.a.). There were no
    statistics on the number of mob killings of suspected witches during
    the year; however, unsubstantiated accusations of the practice of
    witchcraft or satanism appeared increasingly common.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
    approximately 29 million was divided into more than 40 ethnic groups,
    among which there were frequent and credible allegations of
    discrimination, as well as sporadic interethnic violence. In general
    each ethnic group has a distinct primary language and is concentrated
    in a distinct region; however, the languages of some groups are very
    similar to the languages of related ethnic groups. In private business
    and in the public sector, members of virtually all ethnic groups
    commonly discriminated in favor of other members of the same group when
    able to do so. Neighborhoods in large cities tended to be segregated
    ethnically, although interethnic marriage has become fairly common in
    urban areas. Political cleavages tended to correlate with ethnic
    cleavages (see Section 3).
        Unofficial results of the 1999 census indicated that the Kikuyu
    still constitute 21 percent of the population, and the Luhya were
    estimated to constitute 16 percent, the Kalenjin 12 percent, the Luo 11
    percent, and the Kamba 10 percent of the population.
        Ethnic-regional differences continue to pose obstacles to political
    and economic liberalization. Members of President Moi's Kalenjin ethnic
    group (a coalition of nine small ethnic groups) and other traditionally
    pastoral Nilotic ethnic groups are represented disproportionately and
    hold key positions in the Government, the ruling KANU party, the GSU,
    and the Presidential Escort. Many members of these groups appear to
    believe that economic and political liberalization would be likely to
    harm their groups, and to favor other groups. The Kikuyu and the
    closely related Kamba, Meru, and Embu groups make up more than a third
    of the country's population; members of these groups also dominate much
    of private commerce and industry and have tended to support opposition
    parties since they were legalized in 1992. The Kikuyu, the largest,
    best-educated, and most prosperous ethnic group, dominated the country
    under its first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu.
        In April during a speech to Parliament, Julius Sunkuli, the
    Minister of State in the Office of the President, criticized ethnic
    vernacular radio stations as being tribal and a detriment to national
    unity (see Section 2.a.). In August President Moi also criticized and
    sought ineffectively to ban radio broadcasts in languages other than
    English or Kiswahili (see Section 2.a.).
        In August 1999, a presidential Commission on Ethnic Clashes, a
    government-appointed panel of three judges formed in 1998, submitted to
    President Moi its report on the cause of ethnic clashes that occurred
    in the Rift Valley in 1992 and 1997, the Coast province in 1997, and
    the areas of Molo and Laikipia in 1998. Many of the hearings were
    public, and witnesses often directly accused local politicians of
    abetting the combatants, although they rarely provided other than
    hearsay evidence. However, key churches and NGO's claim that a number
    of witnesses were prevented from testifying, especially after, half way
    through the investigation, the Government changed the Commission's
    aggressive prosecutor John Nyagah Gacivih to the more progovernment
    Deputy Attorney General Bernard Chunga. The Government still had not
    released the report or announced that it was taking any formal action
    on its findings by year's end.
        Attacks and revenge counterattacks continued between ethnic groups
    throughout the country, resulting in an average of 75 to 100 deaths per
    month (see Section 1.a.). Significant conflict occurred between ethnic
    Pokots and Marakwets, between Pokots and Turkanas, between Turkanas and
    Samburus, between Luos and Kisiis, between Boranas and Somalis, and
    among various Somali clans. Many factors contributed to these
    conflicts, including the proliferation of guns, the commercialization
    of traditional cattle rustling, the weakening of state authority, the
    emergence of local militia leaders, the development of a modern
    warrior/bandit culture (distinct from the traditional culture),
    irresponsible local political leadership, shrinking economic prospects
    for affected groups, a regional drought, and the inability or
    unwillingness of security forces to stem the violence. In April
    approximately 400 armed men attacked a Somali clan in Isiolo District;
    20 to 40 persons reportedly were killed. In April an estimated 500
    Pokot raiders attacked a Turkana village near Baragoi; 27 persons were
    killed during the fighting. In June Pokot gangsters raided a Marakwet
    village; 10 persons were killed and several others reportedly were
    missing following the fighting. During the week of June 27, five
    persons were killed when disputes resurfaced over the ownership of a
    plot of land along the common border between Gucha and Migori
    districts, Western Province. When a Luo man attempted to till the land,
    a group of Kisii men attacked and killed him. In response the Luo's
    kinsmen killed two of the suspects. A band of Kisii men then killed
    another Luo in his home in revenge. In July 30 persons were killed
    during fighting between two Somali clans in Wajir district. Violence
    also broke out during several periods between ethnic Somali and Boranas
    in the Isiolo area, resulting in numerous deaths.
        Members of the coastal Bajuni, Mijikenda, and Digo communities
    accused the Government of denying them their rights to land, and of
    favoring members of inland ``up-country'' ethnic groups, who migrated
    to the coast largely during the period when Kenyatta was president. On
    June 7, police in Molo prevented the KHRC from holding a civic
    education drive for the Ogiek community at Tinet Forest (see Section
    2.b.). A spokesperson for the KHRC claimed the police deliberately
    prevented the visit in an attempt to deny the Ogiek their rights.
        The Government has singled out the overwhelmingly-Muslim ethnic
    Somalis as the only group whose members are required to carry an
    additional form of identification to prove that they are citizens. They
    must produce upon demand their national identification card and a
    second identification card verifying screening, which is a form of
    prior verification of citizenship through birth records of parents and
    sometime grandparents. Both cards also were required in order to apply
    for a passport. The continued presence of and at times criminal
    activities by Somali refugees has exacerbated the problems faced by
    citizens of Somali ethnicity (see Sections 2.c. and 2.d.).
        There is widespread resentment among citizens of African ethnicity
    toward Asians living in the country. The Asian community constitutes
    between 0.5 and 1 percent of the total population and consists of
    second and third generation Asians with full citizenship and a smaller
    body of recent immigrants. Many African Kenyans resent persons of Asian
    descent for their affluence, and for their reluctance to assimilate
    African culture and to employ blacks, particularly in management
    positions. They also see Asians as taking jobs and commercial
    opportunities. The involvement of some Asians in corrupt activities
    with government officials further fuels popular resentment.
    Politicians, both opposition and ruling party, from time to time appeal
    to majority prejudices by attacking Asian citizens, accusing them of
    exploiting and usurping the natural inheritance of African citizens.
    Chenge Mbitiru, Democratic Party M.P. from Laikipia West, has called
    Asians ``the greatest economic enemies'' of the country and in early
    September, called for ``Kenyans'' to isolate ``Asians'' unless the
    government acts to constrain them. The M.P. reportedly said that
    President Moi should consider expelling Asians ``or allow the Kenyan
    people to force them to leave through mass action.''
        Police conducted sweeps for illegal immigrants (see Sections 1.d.,
    1.f., and 2.d.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all workers,
    except for central government civil servants, medical personnel, and
    university academic staff, are free to join unions of their choice. The
    Police Act prohibits members of the national police force from joining
    unions. In practice workers employed in export processing zone (EPZ)
    firms, as well as those who work in many small firms, face dismissal if
    they join unions. The law provides that as few as seven workers may
    establish a union, so long as the objectives of the union do not
    contravene the law, and that another union is not representing the
    employees in question already.
        Unions must apply to and be granted registration by the Government.
    The Government also may deregister a union, but the Registrar of Trade
    Unions must give the union 60 days to challenge the deregistration
    notice. An appeal of the Registrar's final decision may be brought
    before the High Court. Since 1980 when the Kenya Civil Servants Union
    was deregistered for political reasons, civil servants also have been
    denied union membership. In August 1999, Dr. Richard Leakey, head of
    the civil service, announced that the Government may reregister the
    union and allow civil servants to become members; however, no action
    had been taken by year's end.
        There were 37 unions representing approximately 600,000 workers,
    about one-third of the country's formal-sector work force. All but five
    of these unions, representing approximately 250,000 workers, are
    affiliated with the one approved national federation--the Central
    Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). The largest non-COTU union is the
    240,000-member Kenya National Union of Teachers, which represents more
    than one-third of all unionized workers. The other four non-COTU unions
    are splinter organizations that separated from older bodies that
    remained within the COTU. The COTU leadership generally does not pursue
    workers' rights vigorously; however, most affiliates chose to remain
    rather than give up its even minimal support. As a result, most union
    activity takes place at the shop steward level and not at the
    industrial level where most labor-related decisions are made. This
    places the average worker at a disadvantage in disputes with
    management. Many COTU unions have evolved into de facto ethnic
    groupings.
        The Government created COTU in 1965 as the successor to the Kenya
    Federation of Labor and the Kenya African Workers' Congress. The 1965
    decree establishing COTU gives the President the power to remove COTU's
    three senior leaders from office and grants nonvoting membership on the
    executive board to representatives of the Ministry of Labor and of
    KANU. Although the board is composed of the leadership of affiliated
    unions, it is common for political parties, especially KANU, to provide
    funding and other support for the election of senior union officials.
    For the past few years, some leaders from affiliated unions have sought
    to bring about democratic reforms in the election of union leaders,
    independence from the Government, and establishment of links with any
    political party that supports worker rights. The reelection of the COTU
    leadership in 1996 indicated that there would be no major changes in
    the near future. Prior to the 1997 national elections, some trade union
    leaders began pushing the COTU to take part in the election reform
    dialog. The COTU leadership took a progovernment position.
        The Trade Disputes Act permits workers to strike, provided that 21
    days have elapsed following the submission of a written letter to the
    Minister of Labor. By law members of the military services, police,
    prison guards, and members of the National Youth Service may not
    strike. Other civil servants, like their private sector counterparts,
    can strike following the 21-day notice period (28 days if it is an
    essential service, such as water, health, education, or air traffic
    control). During this 21-day period, the Minister may mediate the
    dispute, nominate an arbitrator, or refer the matter to the Industrial
    Court, a body of five judges appointed by the President, for binding
    arbitration. Once a dispute is referred to mediation, factfinding, or
    arbitration, any subsequent strike is illegal. Moreover, the act gives
    the Minister of Labor broad discretionary power to determine the
    legality of any strike.
        In past years, the Minister used this power to declare strikes by
    bank workers and teachers illegal, although the required notice had
    been given; however, there were no such incidents during the year. In
    1997 the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) called a nationwide
    strike, which the Government quickly settled with pay increases of over
    200 percent spread over 5 years, rather than risk antagonizing the
    influential teachers before the election. The Government's failure to
    implement the second of the promised pay hikes resulted in a late 1998
    strike by the KNUT, which the Government declared illegal. The strike
    ended after 15 days when the Government refused to renegotiate. In
    November Dr. Gitu, the Ministry of Labor's Permanent Secretary,
    admitted that the Government should not have agreed to pay the 1997
    salary package for teachers. The KNUT threatened to hold a nationwide
    strike at year's end, but did not do so. The Government and the KNUT
    remain in irregular negotiation regarding the implementation of the
    agreed-upon salaries; however, the contracted pay hikes have not been
    paid, and relations between the KNUT and the Government continue to be
    poor.
        During the year there were several ``labor actions,'' usually
    informal or wildcat strikes; however, there were fewer than in the
    previous year. Most lasted 1 or 2 days, and some involved violence on
    the part of the strikers (usually in an attempt to keep other workers
    off the job). On September 11, antiriot police responded to a September
    wildcat strike by several hundred guard service employees by firing
    tear gas at the striking guards after they began burning vehicles and
    attacking passers-by (see Section 1.c.).
        Workers' rights groups continue to raise the general problem of the
    Government's harshness towards labor with the International Labor
    Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association.
        Internationally, the COTU is affiliated with both the Organization
    of African Trade Union Unity and the International Confederation of
    Free Trade Unions. Many of its affiliates are linked to international
    trade secretariats.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While not
    having the force of law, the 1962 Industrial Relations Charter,
    executed by the Government, the COTU, and the Federation of Kenya
    Employers, gives workers the right to engage in legitimate trade union
    organizational activities. Both the Trade Disputes Act and the charter
    authorize collective bargaining between unions and employers. Wages and
    conditions of employment are established in negotiations between unions
    and management. In 1994 the Government relaxed wage policy guidelines
    to permit wage increases of up to 100 percent and renegotiation of
    collective agreements. Collective bargaining agreements must be
    registered with the Industrial Court in order to ensure adherence to
    these guidelines.
        The Trade Disputes Act makes it illegal for employers to intimidate
    workers. Employees wrongfully dismissed for union activities can take
    their cases to the Industrial Court, and many have been awarded damages
    in the form of lost wages--reinstatement is not a common remedy. More
    often, aggrieved workers have found alternative employment in the
    lengthy period prior to the hearing of their cases.
        Legislation authorizing the creation of export processing zones
    (EPZ's) was passed in 1990. The EPZ authority decided that local labor
    laws, including the right to organize and bargain collectively would
    apply in the EPZ's, although it grants many exemptions in practice. For
    example, the Government waived aspects of the law that prevent women
    from working in industrial activities at night. In practice workers in
    EPZ firms may face dismissal if they join unions (see Section 6.a.).
    Labor and some government officials continued to criticize health and
    safety conditions in the EPZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    proscribes slavery, servitude, and forced labor, including forced and
    bonded labor by children; however, under the Chiefs' Authority Act, a
    local authority can require persons to perform community services in an
    emergency. The ILO Committee of Experts has found that these and other
    provisions of the law contravene ILO Conventions 29 and 105 concerning
    forced labor. The law remains in effect; however, attempts by chiefs to
    institute arbitrary community service during the year were overruled by
    the Government. Some observers allege that prison officials use free
    prison labor for personal profit. There reportedly were instances
    during the year, especially in rural areas, of children being loaned
    out as workers to pay off family debts (see Section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Employment Act of 1976 makes the employment in
    industry of children under the age of 16 illegal. The act applies
    neither to the agricultural sector, where about 70 percent of the labor
    force is employed, nor to children serving as apprentices under the
    terms of the Industrial Training Act. Ministry of Labor officers
    nominally enforce the minimum age statute, and the Government is making
    efforts to eliminate child labor, working closely with the COTU and the
    ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor;
    however, there are more than 4 million child laborers in the country.
    The problem has received considerable media attention for several
    years.
        Children often work as domestic servants in private homes. There
    are many instances of children working in the informal sector, mostly
    in family businesses. Children usually assist parents on family plots
    rather than seek employment on their own. However, deteriorating
    economic conditions and the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic have given
    rise to more child labor in the informal sector, which is difficult to
    monitor and control, and is a significant problem. A significant number
    of workers on coffee, sugar, and rice plantations are children, who
    usually work in family units. In addition a large number of underage
    children were active in the sex industry (see Section 5). In view of
    the high levels of adult unemployment and underemployment, the
    employment of children in the formal industrial wage sector in
    violation of the Employment Act is less common but not unknown.
        The Government is a signatory to ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor; however, the Parliament had not ratified the
    convention by year's end. There are no laws on the worst forms of child
    labor. Many NGO's are active in this area.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is prohibited by law; however,
    there reportedly were instances in which it occurred, primarily in
    rural areas as a form of family debt repayment (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for blue-
    collar workers in the wage sector has 12 separate scales, varying by
    location, age, and skill level. The lowest minimum wage is currently
    $42 (3,180 shillings) per month in the largest urban areas and $25
    (1,908 shillings) in rural areas. Workers covered by a collective
    bargaining agreement (CBA's) generally receive a better wage and
    benefit package than those not covered, including a mandated housing
    allowance of 15 percent and traditional benefits such as a transport
    allowance or a ``house owner occupier'' allowance.
        The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. The 6 percent minimum wage increase
    decreed by the Ministry of Labor in May was criticized widely by the
    workforce. Most workers relied on second jobs, subsistence farming,
    informal sector opportunities, or the extended family for additional
    support.
        The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act limits the
    normal workweek to 52 hours, although nighttime employees may be
    employed for up to 60 hours per week. Some categories of workers have a
    shorter workweek. As is the case with respect to minimum wage
    limitations, the act specifically excludes agricultural workers. An
    employee in the nonagricultural sector is entitled to 1 rest day per
    week. There also are provisions for 21 days of annual leave and sick
    leave. The law also provides that the total hours worked (regular time
    plus overtime) in any 2-week period for night workers not exceed 144
    hours; the limit is 120 hours for other workers. Workers in some
    enterprises claimed that employers forced them to work extra hours
    without overtime pay. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for
    enforcing these regulations, and there were few reports of violations.
    Foreign workers are covered by the same legislation and work rules as
    citizens.
        The 1951 Factories Act sets forth detailed health and safety
    standards; it was amended in 1990 to include agricultural and other
    workers. The 65 health and safety inspectors attached to the Ministry
    of Labor's Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services have
    the authority to inspect factories and work sites. As a result of the
    1990 amendments, the Directorate's inspectors may issue notices
    enjoining employers from practices or activities that involve a risk of
    serious personal injury. Previously, only magistrates were vested with
    this authority. Such notices can be appealed to the Factories Appeals
    Court, a body of four members, one of whom must be a High Court judge.
    The number of factory inspections has increased significantly since
    1992. One section stipulates that factories that employ at least 20
    persons have a health and safety committee with representation from
    workers. However, according to the Government, less than half of even
    the very largest factories have instituted health and safety
    committees. The vast majority of factories have yet to comply with the
    provision. Workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous
    conditions; however, many would be reluctant to remove themselves
    because of the high unemployment problem and the resulting risk of loss
    of their job.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws that
    specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, there are applicable laws
    against kidnaping and abduction that potentially could be used to
    prosecute traffickers; however, there were no reports that persons were
    trafficked to, from, within, or through the country during the year. In
    past years, there were unverified reports that citizens were trafficked
    to Saudi Arabia under the guise of employment opportunities, and that
    South Asians were trafficked into the country to work in sweatshops.
        The Government does not target trafficking specifically through any
    programs; however, several NGO's provide service to persons who may
    have been victims of trafficking.
                                   __________

                                    LESOTHO

        Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy with King Letsie III as Head
    of State. Under the 1993 Constitution, the King fills a ceremonial
    role, has no executive authority, and is proscribed from actively
    taking part in political initiatives. Prime Minister Pakalitha
    Mosisili, the leader of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party,
    took office in June 1998 and is the Head of Government. In the May 1998
    elections, the LCD won 79 seats in the expanded 80-member Parliament.
    The Basotho National Party (BNP) won the one remaining seat. Over 700
    foreign and national election observers concluded that the election met
    international standards for a transparent, multiparty election;
    however, the Langa Commission, a group of election auditors from the
    Southern African Development Community (SADC), reported that while
    there was no evidence to substantiate charges of electoral fraud,
    mismanagement of polling data made it impossible to confirm that fraud
    did not occur. Opposition parties claimed that the election result was
    fraudulent and launched a prolonged and aggressive protest at the royal
    palace in Maseru in August 1998. Opposition leaders urged the King--who
    had staged a coup in 1994--to dissolve the newly elected Parliament and
    install a government of national unity on the basis of their claim that
    the LCD rigged the election. In September and October 1998, the armed
    opposition protesters used violence to destabilize the Government,
    disarm the police, intimidate workers and business owners, shut down
    government and business operations, and facilitate a junior officer
    rebellion in the army. The army rebels, who were armed, aligned
    themselves with the opposition protesters. This action resulted in a
    virtual coup and severely strained relations between the Head of State
    and the Government. The palace vigil and protests resulted in
    politically motivated killings, injuries, violence, arson, and
    destruction. These events also precipitated intervention by a SADC
    military task force in September 1998 to quell the army mutiny and
    return society to a state of law and order. In the past, the judiciary
    had been subject at times to government and chieftainship influence;
    however, there were no reports of the use of such influence during the
    year.
        The security forces consist of the Lesotho Defense Force (LDF), the
    Lesotho Police Service (LPS), and the National Security Service (NSS).
    The Prime Minister is the Minister of Defense, with direct authority
    over the LDF and the NSS. The police force is under the authority of
    the Minister of Home Affairs. In 1996 and 1997, the Parliament passed
    the Lesotho Defense Act (1996), Regulations for Military Justice
    (1997), and amended the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police Force Act. This
    legislation was designed to bring these services under direct civilian
    control. However, the politicized armed services have a history of
    intervening in the country's politics and government. The LDF ruled the
    country with two successive military regimes from 1985-90, and 1990-93.
    In September 1998, a SADC task force put down an army rebellion,
    arrested LDF rebels, and disarmed the remaining soldiers. Fifty-two
    army personnel were arrested and tried in courts-martial for rebellion,
    mutiny, and treason. Fifteen of these soldiers were acquitted after
    trial or had the charges against them dropped, 1 died of natural
    causes, and 36 soldiers were convicted and sentenced to prison terms
    ranging from 3 to 13 years. This was the first instance in which a
    court-martial prosecuted LDF soldiers for infractions of the Defense
    Act. The LDF continues to be the subject of a national debate on the
    structure, size, and role of the armed forces. The NSS and the LPS also
    are undergoing comprehensive restructuring. There were allegations that
    members of the security forces on occasion committed human rights
    abuses.
        Lesotho is a landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and
    almost entirely dependent on its sole neighbor for trade, finance,
    employment, and access to the outside world. About 17 percent of the
    adult male work force works in mines in South Africa. Miners'
    remittances account for slightly over one-third of gross national
    product (GNP). Real gross domestic product grew by 2 percent in 1999,
    after a decline of 4.6 percent in 1998. Inflation was slightly more
    than 12 percent, with per capita GNP rising about 8 percent in local
    currency terms, to approximately $590. State-owned enterprises
    predominate in the agroindustrial and agribusiness sectors, but private
    sector activity dominates in the small manufacturing and construction
    sectors. The 1998 opposition protest and SADC intervention resulted in
    a wave of political violence and arson that destroyed nearly 80 percent
    of the commercial infrastructure in Maseru and other towns and
    villages. Thousands of jobs were lost, and many entrepreneurs went
    bankrupt. Hundreds of millions of dollars in losses occured. Under the
    traditional chieftainship structure, land use and tenure is controlled
    by the traditional chiefs and formally owned by the Kingdom (i.e.,
    ``crown lands'').
        The Government generally respected many of the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there continued to be problems in some areas. There
    were unconfirmed allegations of torture by security forces, and
    credible reports that the police, at times, used excessive force
    against detainees. Prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial
    detention is a problem. There are long delays in trials; 25 of 33 RLMP
    members charged in connection with a February 1997 police mutiny spent
    41 months in jail before being convicted in July. Domestic violence was
    common, and women's rights continued to be restricted severely.
    Societal discrimination against the disabled was common. Some worker
    rights were restricted. Government enforcement of prohibitions against
    child labor was improved in commercial enterprises that involve
    hazardous working conditions.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        During the 1998 opposition palace protest, violence between
    protesters and police, between antagonistic political factions, and
    between policemen and soldiers resulted in nine fatalities, including
    one police officer and eight civilians--four of whom were opposition
    supporters, and numerous injuries. These deaths resulted from gunshot
    wounds and fatal beatings sustained during enforcement actions and
    during violent clashes between political party supporters. Between
    September 21 and 28, 1998, nine South African soldiers were killed
    while suppressing the army mutiny. Over 50 LDF soldiers and 40
    civilians allied with the opposition died in fighting with SADC troops.
    Fifty-two LDF personnel have been arrested and court-martialed for
    mutiny and high treason in connection with these events. In 1999 three
    of the accused were acquitted after trial, and charges against another
    eight were dismissed upon motion by the Crown. In July three of the
    accused were convicted and received sentences ranging from 5 to 13
    years'' imprisonment. One of the accused died of natural causes
    unconnected with his incarceration while in prison. During the year, 4
    of the accused were acquitted after trial, and in December the
    remaining 33 were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from
    3 to 13 years.
        In March 1999, the Government began investigating the 1994 palace
    coup and the alleged involvement of military personnel in the killing
    of the Deputy Prime Minister; 14 members of the LDF were arrested and
    charged with involvement in the killing. Four of the soldiers also are
    facing courts-martial for their role in the 1998 army mutiny. The
    trials for the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister have been delayed
    until the courts-martial are completed.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture or inhuman or
    degrading punishment or other treatment, and the Government generally
    respects these provisions; however, there were credible reports that
    the police at times used excessive force against detainees.
        Prison conditions are poor. Prison facilities are overcrowded and
    in disrepair. In 1998 Amnesty International representatives visited the
    LDF soldiers accused of mutiny being held in the maximum security
    prison in Maseru and reported that conditions were poor. In January
    1999, the Judge Advocate ordered prison officials to improve conditions
    in the cells in which the soldiers were being held; conditions were
    improved as a result, and the Judge Advocate did not issue further
    orders. Women are housed separately from men, and juveniles are housed
    separately from adults. Rape in prison reportedly is not a problem.
        Prison conditions were not monitored independently, and there were
    no visits by local or international organizations during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and there were no reports of
    such abuses. During the 1998 crisis, a number of persons were arrested
    for arson, looting, and possession of stolen property and unlawful
    firearms. Some of the persons searched and arrested were opposition
    supporters; however, there was no clear evidence that the authorities
    exclusively targeted opposition supporters. The domestic legal and
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) communities are concerned that
    pretrial detainees, such as those alleged to have been involved in 1998
    arson and looting incidents, can be held for long periods of time
    before trial; however, efforts have been made to improve the judicial
    administration and reduce the backlog of cases. Some persons arrested
    in interior districts in January 1999 for looting, arson, and
    possession of stolen goods in connection with the 1998 crisis were
    tried and sentenced to fines or incarceration.
        In July a trial judge convicted 25 of the 33 RLMP members arrested
    in connection with the January 1997 police mutiny on charges of
    sedition and contravention of the 1984 Internal Security Act (ISA) and
    sentenced them to prison for terms ranging from 1 to 3 years. In
    passing the sentences, the trial judge took into account the 41 months
    that the defendants had spent in prison prior to convictions, and their
    sentences were reduced accordingly. Eight of the convicted RLMP members
    were released due to lack of evidence. Eight others also were charged
    with murder and kidnaping; although their trials were completed, the
    trial court had not rendered a judgment by year's end.
        Pretrial detainees on remand were a significant portion of the
    prison population. Because of serious backlogs of the court caseloads,
    the period of pretrial remand for some suspects can last months or even
    years.
        In 1997 the Government repealed the provisions of the ISA that
    allowed for investigative detention.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in the past, magistrates appeared at
    times to be subject to government and chieftainship influence. There
    were no reports of such influence during the year.
        The judiciary consists of the Court of Appeal (which meets
    semiannually), the High Court, magistrates courts, and customary or
    traditional courts, which existed largely in rural areas to administer
    customary law.
        The High Court also provides procedural and substantive advice and
    guidance on matters of law and procedure to military tribunals;
    however, it does not participate in arriving at judgments. Military
    tribunals operating under the 1996 Defense Act have jurisdiction over
    military cases only. Decisions by military tribunals can be appealed
    only to a special courtmartial appeal court, which is composed of two
    judges from the High Court, one retired military officer with a legal
    background, and the registrar of the High Court. In January 1999, the
    defense lawyers for the accused army mutineers asked the judge advocate
    to dismiss all charges, alleging that the courts-martial hearings were
    unconstitutional on the grounds that the proceedings were subject to
    inappropriate command influence and lacked judicial independence. The
    adjudication panelists were the same LDF officers who were rounded up
    at gunpoint during the mutiny and held incommunicado in the maximum
    security prison. The judge advocate denied the lawyers'' request. In
    June 1999, upon review, the Chief Justice also denied the request, as
    did the Court of Appeals in October 1999.
        Persons detained or arrested in criminal cases and defendants in
    civil cases have the right to legal counsel; however, there is no
    system to provide public defenders. The Ministry of Justice and the NGO
    community maintained a few legal aid clinics. The authorities generally
    respect court decisions and rulings. There is no trial by jury.
    Criminal trials normally are adjudicated by a single High Court judge
    who presides, with two assessors serving in an advisory capacity. In
    civil cases, judges normally hear cases alone. The 1981 Criminal
    Procedures and Evidence Act, as amended in 1984, makes provision for
    granting bail. Bail is granted regularly and generally fairly. There is
    a large case backlog, which leads to lengthy delays in trials. In
    September 1998, a Molotov cocktail attack on the High Court destroyed
    case files and other important documents and further hampered the
    operations of the courts.
        In civil courts, women and men are accorded equal rights; however,
    in traditional and customary courts, certain rights and privileges
    accorded to men are denied to women (see Section 5). When traditional
    law and custom are invoked in a court case, a male plaintiff can opt
    for customary judgments by a principal chief rather than a civil court,
    and the judgment is binding legally. This system greatly disadvantages
    women.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law does not fully protect citizens'' privacy
    rights, but there were no confirmed reports that authorities infringed
    on citizens'' privacy rights during the year. Although search warrants
    are required under normal circumstances, the ISA provided police with
    wide powers to stop and search persons and vehicles and to enter homes
    and other places without a warrant. There were no prohibitions against
    monitoring telephone conversations until 1999, when some restrictions
    were implemented. Observers believed that the security services
    continued to monitor telephone conversations of Basothos and
    foreigners, ostensibly on national security grounds.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice. There are several independent
    newspapers--including one controlled by the Roman Catholic Church, one
    controlled by the Lesotho Evangelical Church, and four English-language
    weeklies--that routinely criticized the Government. The official state-
    owned or state-controlled media consist of one radio station, a 1 1/2
    hour daily newscast on a local television channel, and two weekly
    newspapers. All faithfully reflect official positions of the ruling
    party. There are four private radio stations, but no private local
    television station. South African and global satellite television and
    radio broadcasts are widely available. Despite serious damage to a
    number of news publications caused by arson and looting in September
    1998, these news organizations resumed publishing within months.
        Internet services are freely available from a number of private
    Internet service providers.
        There is a lack of free access to government information, which
    often is described as a limitation on the free press; however, there
    are no other barriers that affect press coverage of government
    activities. In 1998 the National Press Association objected to rules
    established by the Independent Electoral Commission, which barred
    reporters from entering polling stations on election day.
        The Government respects academic freedom. Although the Government
    owns and administers the country's only university, the academic staff
    represents the full political spectrum and is free to express its
    views.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice. Under a 1993 revision of the ISA, a public
    meeting, rally, or march no longer required prior police permission,
    only advance notification. Political party meetings and rallies were
    held regularly and without hindrance from the Government.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. In addition to
    the LCD, the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), and the BNP, there were
    nine smaller, registered political parties.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move
    freely within the country and across national boundaries. The
    Government placed no obstacles in the way of citizens who wished to
    emigrate.
        In September 1998, numerous serious incidents and threats to the
    safety of citizens by opposition supporters who carried out assaults,
    car-jackings, attacks on residences, and sniper attacks led thousands
    of foreigners and ruling LCD supporters to flee to South Africa in the
    weeks immediately following the SADC military intervention. Almost all
    citizens had returned by the end of 1999; however, a large number of
    the foreigners who fled have moved across the border and commuted to
    their jobs in the country.
        The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1994 the Government allowed
    approximately 25 refugees from Somalia and Uganda registered with the
    U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to study in the country. They were
    expected to return to their countries of first asylum after completing
    their studies, but had not done so by year's end. Other than these
    students, there is no resident refugee population. The Government has
    provided first asylum; however, the issue did not arise during the
    year.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        In the first multiparty democratic elections in 1993, after more
    than 20 years of authoritarian and military rule, the BCP came to power
    with complete control of the National Assembly. Despite its landslide
    electoral victory, the BCP Government had to contend with a number of
    challenges to its power, including a violent opposition destabilization
    campaign based on allegations that the BCP had won by fraud. These
    challenges culminated in August 1994 when King Letsie III
    unconstitutionally suspended the Parliament and installed a ruling
    council. Many Basotho responded by demonstrating their support for the
    democratically elected BCP Government. Organized labor and others held
    two national demonstrations--stayaways--to express support for the
    ousted Government, and there were numerous rallies at the National
    University. As a result of both local and international pressure, the
    King reversed himself, and the BCP regained control of the Government.
        A 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between King Letsie III and
    Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, which was brokered by South Africa,
    Botswana, and Zimbabwe, called for the reinstatement of the King's
    father, Moshoeshoe II, who had been deposed by the previous military
    Government and exiled in 1990, and for measures to broaden
    participation in the political process. In early 1995, Moshoeshoe II
    was reinstated as King. In January 1996, upon the death of his father,
    King Letsie III was sworn in again as King. The formal coronation of
    King Letsie III was held in October 1997. The 1994 suspension of the
    Constitution by Letsie, although short-lived, highlighted the fragility
    of rule within the constitutional monarchy.
        The 1998 crisis was similar to that of the 1993-94 postelectoral
    period. In both cases, opposition party members alleged electoral
    fraud, suborned army supporters, sought the King's involvement, and
    effectively overthrew the elected Government. However, in 1998 the King
    did not take an active role in the opposition campaign, as he did in
    1994, and, based on the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding, Prime
    Minister Mosisili asked SADC to intervene militarily to stabilize the
    situation.
        In the May 1998 elections, the LCD won 79 of 80 parliamentary
    seats. The BNP won the other seat. International observers concluded
    that the elections met international standards for a multiparty
    election and reflected the will of the voters. Despite opposition
    coalition claims, the Langa Commission, composed of international
    observers from four southern African countries, reported no definitive
    findings of vote rigging or fraud; however, postelection management of
    electoral and polling station data was poor. The Commission stated that
    the documentation was in such disarray that it could not prove that
    fraud had not occurred. This judgement encouraged the opposition to
    charge that errors short of fraud could have affected the results.
        In October 1998, the LCD and the newly formed opposition alliance
    agreed to hold new elections within 2 years to resolve the ongoing
    political crisis. Local elections, scheduled to be held late in 1998,
    were postponed because of the 1998 crisis. Negotiations under SADC
    supervision resulted in the December 1998 establishment of the Interim
    Political Authority (IPA) with a mandate to prepare for new elections
    within 18 months (i.e., during the first half of the year). However,
    the IPA made little progress in meeting its objectives. The IPA and the
    Parliament continued efforts to negotiate an electoral arrangement that
    would be acceptable to all parties.
        In February anonymous flyers threatened a return to political
    violence if an election was not held or an election date announced by
    May 16. The flyers warned workers to stay away from work from May 10 to
    16. Although joint police and army patrols were deployed as a
    precaution, some workers stayed home due to a fear of reprisals by the
    opposition. On May 13, the Prime Minister announced that the next
    national multiparty elections were scheduled for March 2001.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government or politics, but women remain underrepresented in both
    areas. There are 2 women in the 80-member National Assembly, and there
    are 7 women in the 33-member Senate. A woman serves as the Minister of
    Environment, Women, and Youth Affairs. In October 1999, the Parliament
    unanimously elected the first female Speaker of the National Assembly.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of local and international human rights groups operated
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases, and the Government allowed
    international organizations to visit the country during the year.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language,
            Disability, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
    sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
    origin, birth, or other status, and the Government generally respected
    these prohibitions in practice; however, the Constitution also
    recognizes customary law as a parallel legal system, and women's
    inheritance and property rights are restricted severely under the
    traditional chieftainship system.
        Women.--Domestic violence, including wife beating, occurs
    frequently. Dependable statistics were not available, but the problem
    was believed to be widespread. In Basotho tradition, a wife may return
    to her ``maiden home'' if physically abused by her husband. Under
    common law, wife beating is a criminal offense and defined as assault;
    however, few domestic violence cases were brought to trial. Beatings
    and violence against women perpetrated by husbands or other male
    relatives occured frequently; however, increasingly it was considered
    socially unacceptable behavior. A national conference held in March
    1998 on the empowerment of women noted that of 100 cases of human
    rights abuses, 90 percent of the victims were women who were victims of
    domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment.
        Both law and custom under the traditional chieftainship system
    severely limited the rights of women in areas such as property rights,
    inheritance, and contracts. Women have the legal and customary right to
    make a will and sue for divorce; however, under customary law, a
    married woman was considered a minor during the lifetime of her
    husband. She cannot enter into legally binding contracts, whether for
    employment, commerce, or education, without her husband's consent. A
    woman married under customary law has no standing in civil court and
    may not sue or be sued without her husband's permission. Government
    officials have criticized publicly this customary practice, which
    discriminates against women. The tradition of paying a bride price
    (lobola) is common. Polygyny was practiced by a very small percentage
    of the population.
        Women's rights organizations have taken a leading role in educating
    women about their rights under customary and common law, highlighting
    the importance of women participating in the democratic process. In
    1998 the Government created a Ministry of Gender Affairs.
        Children.--The Government has not addressed adequately children's
    rights and welfare, although it has devoted substantial resources to
    primary and secondary education. Education is not compulsory even at
    the primary levels, and 25 percent of children do not attend school,
    particularly in rural areas where there are few schools, where children
    are involved in subsistence activities in support of their family's
    welfare, or where families cannot afford the costs associated with
    school attendance (for example, fees for the purchase of uniforms,
    books, and materials). The problem of school nonattendance affects boys
    disproportionately more than girls. In traditional rural Basotho
    society, livestock herding by young boys is a prerequisite to manhood
    in the community, and this frequently interferes with their school
    enrollment. The Government began implementation of a new program that
    provides free public education through the primary grades (one through
    six). The program commenced in all schools in the first grade during
    the year, and it covered the costs of school fees, books, and one meal
    per day. Expansion of the program to the second grade in all schools is
    scheduled for 2001.
        There is no pattern of societal abuse against children, but many
    children work at a relatively young age (see Section 6.d.). Familial
    stress, poverty, the spread of HIV/Aids, and divorce have led to a rise
    in child homelessness and abandonment, creating a growing number of
    street children.
        People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against physically
    disabled persons in employment, education, or provision of other
    government services is unlawful; however, societal discrimination is
    common. The Government has not legislated nor mandated accessibility to
    public buildings for the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Christianity, specifically Roman
    Catholicism, is the predominant religion. Approximately 90 percent of
    the population are Christian, and 70 percent of the Christians are
    Catholic. Muslims, members of other non-Christian religions, and
    atheists constitute the remaining 10 percent. Christians are scattered
    throughout the country, while Muslims are found mainly in the
    northeastern part of the country.
        There is generally mutual understanding and cooperation between
    Christians and Muslims. Although there were some tensions between
    Christians and Muslims in previous years, there were no reports of such
    tensions during the year.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most citizens speak a common
    language and share common historical and cultural traditions. Small
    numbers of Asians (primarily ethnic Chinese and Indians) and South
    African whites are active in the country's commercial life. Economic
    and racial tension between the Chinese business community and the
    Basotho remained a problem. In past years, civil unrest and riots
    targeted persons of Asian descent; however, there were no similar
    incidents reported during the year.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the law, workers have the right
    to join or form unions without prior government authorization. The
    Labor Code prohibits civil servants from joining unions. The Government
    regards all work by civil servants as essential. In a 1997 judgment by
    the High Court concerning a petition filed by the Lesotho Union of
    Public Servants (LUPE) against the registrar of law, the Chief Justice
    dismissed the LUPE's application to form a union on the grounds that it
    was not consistent with the Labor Code. The LUPE filed an appeal with
    the Appeals Court, which was dismissed after LUPE failed to file the
    necessary papers to proceed with the case.
        Under the 1993 Labor Code, prepared with the assistance of the
    International Labor Organization (ILO), all trade union federations
    require government registration. There are three small trade union
    federations that rarely cooperate with one another: the Lesotho Trade
    Union Congress; the Lesotho Federation of Democratic Unions; and the
    Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions. Unions are not affiliated formally or
    tied to political parties.
        The labor and trade union movement was very weak and fragmented.
    There are several small unions in the public and industrial sectors,
    but there was no unified trade union congress. There were cases of
    unions competitively organizing small numbers of workers in the same
    sector. Overall unionized workers represent only about 10 percent of
    the work force. Consequently efforts toward collective bargaining and
    tripartite policymaking were not amenable to strong trade union
    influences.
        There was credible evidence that some employers prevented union
    organizers from access to factory premises to organize workers or to
    represent them in disputes with owners or managers. There were reports
    that some employers harassed union organizers, intimidated members, and
    frequently fired union activists (see Section 6.b.). The Commission of
    Labor, which operates as part of the Labor Ministry, is charged with
    investigating allegations of labor law violations. Approximately 17
    percent of the male labor force works in the gold and coal mines of
    South Africa, and the majority of those who do not were engaged
    primarily in traditional agriculture. A majority of Basotho mine
    workers were members of the South African National Union of Mineworkers
    (NUM); however, as a foreign organization, the NUM is not allowed to
    engage in union activities.
        No legally authorized strike has occurred since independence in
    1966. Because civil servants generally are not allowed to strike, all
    public sector industrial actions are, by definition, unauthorized. In
    the private sector, the Labor Code requires an escalating series of
    procedures to be followed by workers and employers before strike action
    is authorized. In past years, some small unions and their members have
    undertaken wildcat strikes or spontaneous industrial actions without
    following the procedures for dispute resolution; however, there were no
    reported strikes during the year. Legal protection for strikers from
    retribution has not always been enforced in cases of illegal strikes.
    Security forces violently suppressed some wildcat strikes in the
    textile, garment, and construction industries in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
        There were no instances of governmental restrictions on
    international affiliations or contacts by unions or their members.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In principle
    all legally recognized trade unions in principle enjoy the right to
    organize and bargain collectively, and the Government generally
    respected these rights; however, some employers tried to restrict these
    rights in practice. Employers usually are cooperative; however, some
    employees are threatened with expulsion and loss of employment if they
    join unions. There was credible evidence that some employers in the
    textile and garment sector used blacklists to deny employment to
    workers who have been fired by another employer within that sector.
    There were reports that some employers harassed union organizers.
    Although there was some collective bargaining between unions and
    employers to set wage and benefit rates, employers generally continued
    to set wage rates through unilateral action. Employee grievances
    reportedly were handled promptly by the Labor Commission, and there
    were no significant backlogs of cases during the year.
        In May Parliament passed the Labor Code Amendments Bill; however,
    it was not implemented by year's end. The bill provides for the
    establishment of a Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Settlement
    with full-time arbitrators and conciliators; however, the Directorate
    was not staffed by year's end due to funding constraints. The bill does
    not permit public employees to join unions; however, it does allow them
    to form associations. The country has several industrial zones, in
    which mostly textile and apparel firms manufacture for export. All
    national labor laws apply in these industrial zones; however, employers
    in the zones do not always respect these rights in practice. Employers
    reportedly harassed and intimidated union organizers, and prevented
    them from entering the zones. There were reports that union activists
    often were fired. There were also reports that many companies in the
    zones paied below minimum wage, enforced long hours, and deducted wages
    when employees were found talking or taking more than one break a day.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1987 Employment
    Act prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children, and there were no reports that it occurred.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment in commercial or
    industrial enterprises is 15 years, and legal minimum age for hazardous
    employment is 18 years; however, children under 14 years of age
    reportedly are employed in family-owned businesses. Although there were
    allegations of child labor in the textile and garment sector,
    investigations by the ILO and the Labor Commission found no evidence to
    support the charges.
        There are statutory prohibitions against the employment of minors
    in commercial, industrial, or nonfamily enterprises involving hazardous
    or dangerous working conditions, and although enforcement of
    prohibitions was very lax in previous years, the Ministry of Labor and
    Employment's Inspectorate was adequately staffed and conducted
    quarterly inspections during the year. Children under 18 years of age
    may not be recruited for employment outside of the country. In
    traditional society, rigorous and occasionally dangerous working
    conditions for the country's young livestock, herdboys are considered a
    prerequisite to manhood, essential to the livelihood of families, and a
    fundamental feature of local culture beyond the reach of labor laws.
    Child labor laws covered all sectors except for the agricultural
    sector.
        The Government has not ratified the ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor, although it was being considered by the Cabinet
    at year's end with the support of the Lesotho Manufacturer's
    Association.
        The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by
    children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In general wages are low. A
    national minimum wage is determined annually by the Wage Advisory
    Board, a tripartite entity, consisting of Government, trade unions, and
    employers. The monthly minimum wage for unskilled laborers is $67 (467
    maloti), and $129 (901 maloti) for heavy vehicle operators. Minimum
    wages for workers in lower skilled jobs were insufficient to ensure a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most wage earners
    supplement their income through subsistence agriculture or remittances
    from relatives employed in South Africa. Many private employers paid
    more than minimum wages to attract and retain motivated employees.
    However, there is also reason to believe that some employers,
    especially in export sectors, treated the minimum wage as a maximum
    wage. This situation was made possible by the high levels of
    unemployment and underemployment, which provide a large pool of surplus
    unskilled labor that bid down wage rates and threatened job security
    for workers who made demands for better wages and conditions of work.
        The Labor Code spells out basic worker rights, including a maximum
    45-hour workweek, a weekly rest period of at least 24 hours, 12 days of
    paid leave per year, and paid public holidays; however, employers did
    not always respect these rights in practice. Unlike in the previous
    year, there were no reports of employers locking in workers until an
    order was finished without overtime pay or of employers refusing sick
    leave.
        Workers generally are unable to obtain an expeditious hearing in
    court on their complaints. The labor court has a large backlog of
    industrial dispute cases on the docket; there is only one labor judge
    to deal with cases filed as early as 1995. However, the Labor
    Commission is staffed adequately and handled most complaints within a
    1-month period, and it cooperated closely with the ILO in establishing
    inspection regimes. Labor inspectors generally conducted unannounced
    inspections in factories 4 times per year. The Labor Commission is
    authorized to order the reinstatement of wrongfully dismissed employees
    and the payment of back wages, but it does not have the authority to
    impose criminal fines.
        The Labor Code requires employers to provide adequate light,
    ventilation, and sanitary facilities for employees and to install and
    maintain machinery in a manner designed to minimize the risk of injury,
    and in practice employers generally follow these regulations. The Labor
    Code does not protect explicitly the right of workers to remove
    themselves from hazardous situations without prejudice to employment;
    however, Labor Code sections on safety in the workplace and dismissal
    implied that dismissal in such circumstances would be illegal.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and there were no reports of trafficking in persons to,
    from, or within the country during the year. There was a report that
    illegal immigrant smugglers, primarily from South and East Asia,
    continued to take advantage of the country's undersupervised borders to
    pass persons temporarily through the country to transportation hubs in
    South Africa for onward movement to Europe and North America. There was
    no clear evidence that these movements included women or children, or
    that these organizations were recruiting or transporting persons
    illegally for involuntary servitude, slavery, or forced or bonded
    labor. It was suspected that most of the persons who are moved by these
    criminal organizations were primarily economic immigrants seeking
    employment in other countries. There were no reports or evidence of
    forced or bonded labor or servitude in the country resulting from these
    activities.
        The Government took no specific action to address trafficking
    during the year.
                                   __________

                                    LIBERIA

        Liberia is a centralized republic, dominated by a strong
    presidency. The Constitution provides for three branches of government,
    but no effective system of checks and balances, and presidents
    traditionally have wielded extraordinary power. Americo-Liberians,
    descendants of freed slaves from the United States and the Caribbean,
    who make up approximately 5 percent of the population, dominated the
    country's government through the True Whig party until 1980. In 1980
    Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group,
    seized power in a military coup. Doe was killed by rebels in 1990 early
    in the 7yearlong, ethnically divisive civil war, which was ended by the
    Abuja Peace Accords in 1996. Forces led by Charles G. Taylor, who is of
    both indigenous and Americo-Liberian ancestry, emerged dominant. In
    1997, Taylor won the presidential election, and his National Patriotic
    Party (NPP) won threequarters of the seats in the legislature. The
    elections were administratively free and transparent, but were
    conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most voters believed
    that Taylor's forces would have resumed fighting if he had lost. Most
    other leaders of the former warring factions subsequently left the
    country. The bicameral legislature exercised little independence from
    the executive branch. The judiciary is subject to political influence,
    economic pressure, and corruption.
        The regular security forces include: The Armed Forces of Liberia
    (AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which has primary
    responsibility for internal security; the Antiterrorist Brigade (ATB)
    created in 1999, composed of an elite special forces group; and the
    Special Security Service (SSS), a large, heavily armed executive
    protective force. There also are numerous irregular security services
    attached to certain key ministries and parastatal corporations, the
    responsibilities of which appear to be defined poorly. The national
    army, which fought against Taylor's faction during the civil war, has
    yet to be downsized and restructured as required by the Abuja Peace
    Accords, due primarily to a lack of funding. By year's end, a
    commission had been formed with funding allocated at approximately
    $100,000. Only a few contingents have been deployed to maintain
    security in parts of rural areas. The ATB absorbed Taylor's most
    experienced civil war fighters, including undisciplined and untrained
    loyalists. During the year, the Government revived the National Bureau
    of Investigation (NBI), which had become defunct during the civil war.
    Security forces frequently acted independently of government authority,
    particularly in rural areas. Members of the security forces committed
    numerous, serious human rights abuses.
        Liberia is a very poor country with a market-based economy that has
    yet to recover from the ravages of the civil war. Average per capita
    income is estimated at $171, only a small fraction of the prewar level.
    Prior to 1990, the cash economy was based primarily on iron ore,
    rubber, timber, diamond, and gold exports. An unemployment rate of 85
    percent, a 25 percent literacy rate, the internal displacement of
    civilians in Lofa and Nimba counties, and the absence of infrastructure
    throughout the country continued to depress productive capacity,
    despite the country's rich natural resources and potential
    selfsufficiency in food. Government officials and former combatants
    continued to exploit the country's natural resources for personal
    benefit. Extortion is widespread in all levels of society.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and there were
    numerous, serious abuses in many areas. The security forces committed
    many extrajudicial killings, and they were accused of killing or
    causing the disappearance of persons. Security forces tortured, beat,
    and otherwise abused or humiliated citizens. The Government
    investigated some of the alleged abuses by the security forces;
    however, offenders were rarely charged or disciplined. Prison
    conditions remained harsh and sometimes life threatening. Security
    forces continued at times to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and
    lengthy pretrial detention remained common. The judicial system,
    hampered by political influence, economic pressure, inefficiency,
    corruption, and a lack of resources, was unable to ensure citizens'
    rights to due process and a fair trial. In some rural areas where the
    judiciary had not been reestablished, clan chieftains administered
    criminal justice through the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal;
    authorities tacitly condoned this practice. More than 20 political
    prisoners remained in jail. Security forces violated citizens' privacy
    rights, conducted warrantless searches, harassment, illegal
    surveillance, and looted homes. The Government restricted freedom of
    the press; it detained, threatened, and intimidated journalists into
    self-censorship and shut down two radio stations, one temporarily.
    Security forces restricted freedom of movement, using roadblocks to
    extort money from travelers and returning refugees. Security forces
    frequently harassed human rights monitors. Violence and discrimination
    against women remained problems. The welfare of children remained
    widely neglected, and female genital mutilation (FGM) continued to
    increase. Societal ethnic discrimination remained widespread, ethnic
    differences continued to generate violence and political tensions, and
    the Government continued to discriminate against indigenous ethnic
    groups that had opposed Taylor in the civil war, especially the
    Mandingo and the Krahn ethnic groups. Forced labor persisted in rural
    areas. Child labor remained widespread, and there were reports of
    forced child labor. Ritualistic killings also persisted.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
    continued to commit extrajudicial killings. Human rights organizations
    estimate the number of such killings to be have increased to several
    hundred during the year. Many of the abuses were linked to ongoing
    violence in Lofa county between security forces and antigovernment
    dissidents who launched a series of crossborder incursions from Guinea.
    No perpetrators were arrested or convicted for any of these killings.
        In February the police shot and killed Nyanqui Luoh, an accused
    armed robber. The police reported that they acted in selfdefense. A
    human rights organization called for an investigation of the incident,
    but none had been undertaken by year's end.
        There were credible reports that government forces as well as
    members of the Lorma ethnic group continued to harass, intimidate, and,
    on occasion, kill members of the Mandingo ethnic group in Lofa county.
    For example, in January armed men reportedly killed 18 Mandingos in the
    town of Bawon. In March security forces arrested and killed five
    Mandingos on a road linking Voinjama, Lofa County with Guinea. Human
    rights monitors reported that hundreds of Mandingos were killed during
    the year.
        There was no investigation into nor action taken in the May 1999
    death of a security officer allegedly while in detention.
        At year's end, the Government had not released a report on its
    November 1999 investigation of the reported killing of as many as 30
    Mandingos in Lofa county in August 1999. In that incident, the
    authorities initially arrested 19 persons, but they did not charge
    anyone with a crime.
        The trial of nine Krahn AFL soldiers accused of involvement in 1998
    violence ended in February; four soldiers were convicted of sedition
    and sentenced to 10 years in prison; the other five were acquitted and
    released.
        There was no further action taken in the 1998 extrajudicial
    killings of Mannah Zekay, John Nimely, or others reported during that
    year.
        In 1999 the President Pro Tempore of the Senate told the
    Interparliamentary Union that the investigation into the 1997 killings
    of opposition political leader Samuel Saye Dokie and three family
    members continued. However, there was no active investigation into the
    case during the year, and the case essentially was dropped.
        Since September there were reports of attacks by fighters based in
    Liberia on the Guinean border towns, which caused several deaths. These
    attacks generally are perpetuated by a combination of Revolutionary
    Front United (RUF) rebels from Sierra Leone, Liberian military, and
    some Guinean rebels; however, some attacks also were perpetuated by
    armed Liberian dissidents based in Guinea. There was at least one
    attack reported on a Guinean town close to the Sierra Leonean border.
        In November attacks were reported in northeastern Nimba, which
    resulted in numerous deaths, but it was unclear whether the rebel
    incursion was from Guinea or Cote d'Ivoire.
        In October in Nimba county, a property dispute between Mandigos and
    members of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups led to rioting, which
    reportedly killed four persons (see Section 5). A mosque and five other
    buildings were burned. Police arrested 12 persons in connection with
    this violence and charged them with arson. The 12 remained in detention
    pending a trial at year's end.
        Incidents of ritualistic killings, in which human body parts used
    in traditional rituals are removed from the victim, continued to be
    reported (see Section 5). The number of such killings is difficult to
    ascertain, since police often described deaths as accidents even when
    body parts have been removed. Deaths that appear to be natural or
    accidental sometimes are rumored to have been the work of ritualistic
    killers (see Section 5). In February there was a riot in the town of
    Ganta, Nimba county when police released on parole two suspects in the
    death and mutilation of a 10-year-old girl. The two suspects eventually
    were charged with her killing. A police investigation launched in
    August 1999 into alleged ritual killings in Harper resulted in the
    acquittal of one of four defendants; no information was available on
    the status of the three remaining defendants.
        b. Disappearance.--Security forces were responsible for
    disappearances. In June security personnel arrested seven refugees
    returning from Guinea in an UNHCR vehicle after discovering that one of
    them carried a photograph of a former faction leader who opposed
    President Taylor during the civil war. The authorities claimed they
    were dissidents plotting to overthrow the Government. The detainees
    were charged with treason; however, their whereabouts were unknown at
    year's end despite legal challenges to the Government to produce them.
        Security forces produced suspects whom they had held without charge
    when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the applications of
    human rights organizations. Their disappearances often were the result
    of prolonged illegal detention at the Gbartala base (see Section 1.c.).
        There were no indications by year's end that the Government carried
    out its promised investigation of the reported disappearance of
    Mandingos following the violence in Lofa county in 1999.
        There were no developments in the 1998 disappearance case of market
    woman Nowai Flomo.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other degrading
    treatment; however, government police and security forces frequently
    tortured, beat, and otherwise abused and humiliated citizens. In some
    cases, security forces produced suspects whom they had held without
    charge when the courts issued writs of habeas corpus on the
    applications of human rights organizations. Detainees continued to
    charge that they were tortured while in detention, especially at a
    security training base in Gbatala. Victims and witnesses reported
    beatings, torture, killings, and sexual abuse at the base. In October
    1999, human rights organizations called for the closure of the base
    because of a number of credible reports of torture there; however, the
    base remained opened. A local NGO, the Catholic Affiliated Justice and
    Peace Commission, tried to investigate claims; however, the Government
    blocked their efforts.
        On several occasions, government security personnel harassed,
    assaulted, and arrested journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        Law enforcement personnel, including the security forces, were
    implicated in numerous reports of harassment, intimidation, and
    looting. For example, in February SSS members carried out a series of
    armed robberies and shot and injured an LNP officer in the West Point
    area of Monrovia. In April armed soldiers clashed with marketers in
    Monrovia; they confiscated goods and harassed the marketers. There was
    a series of incidents involving harassment or looting and assault of
    foreign diplomats and local embassy employees. In February LNP officers
    pulled a foreign diplomat from his car in Monrovia and assaulted him.
    In March LNP officers demanded money from an embassy security guard and
    beat him with metal pipes. After various complaints in March from
    members of diplomatic corps, the Government called for investigations
    and punishment for offenders. Meetings with security agencies also were
    organized to brief them on diplomatic immunity; however, in June
    another local embassy employee was assaulted, searched for weapons, and
    robbed by AFL officers.
        Paul Mulbah, who was appointed director of the LNP in August 1999,
    took some steps in 1999 to curb abuse of the LNP; however, in general
    his efforts were unsuccessful and made no difference in the situation
    by year's end. In February Mulbah ordered that off-duty armed security
    men be removed from the streets. However, a human rights organization
    criticized Mulbah's order to police, issued early in the year, to shoot
    on sight any robbers resisting arrest.
        There were credible reports that government forces as well as
    members of the Lorma ethnic group continued to harass, intimidate, and,
    on occasion, kill members of the Mandingo ethnic group in Lofa county
    (see Section 1.a.).
        Rival security personnel occasionally clashed violently. In March
    there was gunfire at Roberts International Airport between personnel of
    the antiterrorist brigade and the LNP's special operations division
    prior to President Taylor's arrival from an official visit abroad. A
    few persons were injured. There also was shooting between AFL and LNP
    personnel in downtown Monrovia in March, resulting in injuries to two
    bystanders.
        Security force personnel in rural areas were paid and provisioned
    inadequately and often extorted money and goods. For example, in March
    a special task force commander reportedly robbed an army payroll truck
    in Lofa county. There were many credible reports that security forces
    harassed returning refugees and displaced persons, especially in the
    border areas.
        The international community publicly criticized the Government's
    support for the RUF rebels in the civil war in Sierra Leone.
        Clan chieftains continued to use the traditional practice of trial-
    by-ordeal to resolve criminal cases in rural areas. The Supreme Court
    ruled that trial-by-ordeal--commonly the placement of a heated metal
    object on a suspect's body in an attempt to determine whether the
    defendant is telling the truth--is unconstitutional; however, the
    practice continued under an executive order. A local human rights
    organization sponsored a conference in March to urge that trial-by-
    ordeal be abolished throughout the country. A 1994 lawsuit for injuries
    resulting from a trial-by-ordeal that was pending before the Supreme
    Court was suspended indefinitely.
        Prison conditions remained harsh and in some cases lifethreatening.
    There were credible reports of unofficial detention facilities,
    including one at the executive mansion, in which detainees were held
    without charge and in some cases tortured. The Government did not
    provide detainees or prisoners with adequate food or medical care.
    Cells at Monrovia Central Prison are overcrowded, mostly with detainees
    awaiting trial. Only about 10 percent of the total prison population
    has been convicted of criminal offenses. Convicted prisoners and
    detainees awaiting trial are not confined in separate facilities.
    Similar conditions exist in the Barclay Training Center military
    stockade. In some counties, the structure that serves as a jail is a
    container with bars at one end. In May the wives of 13 Krahn political
    prisoners held at Monrovia's Central Prison publicly complained about
    denial of medical care and other abuse of the detainees. The Government
    did not respond to these complaints by year's end.
        Women, who constituted about 5 percent of the prison population,
    are held in separate cells. Their conditions are comparable to those of
    the male prisoners and detainees. There were no separate facilities for
    juvenile offenders. Women and particularly juveniles were subject to
    abuse by guards or other inmates.
        In a number of cases, human rights groups and interested
    individuals achieved the release of detainees and prisoners. However,
    for the most part, these cases tended to be nonpolitical in nature.
        The Government generally permits the independent monitoring of
    prison conditions by local human rights groups, the media, and the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); however, visits to
    unofficial detention centers often are denied. For example, despite
    requests made by NGO's to the Defense Ministry, no independent monitor
    has been allowed to visit the Gbatala base where victims have been
    detained and tortured. The ICRC is allowed to visit persons held in
    prison facilities and police detention centers without third parties
    present and to make regular repeat visits.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces
    continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The
    Constitution provides for the rights of the accused, including warrants
    for arrests and the right of detainees either to be charged or released
    within 48 hours. Although the Government generally adheres to these
    standards, warrants were not always based on sufficient evidence, and
    detainees, especially those without the means to hire a lawyer, often
    were held for more than 48 hours without charge. In some cases, persons
    were detained secretly at unofficial detention centers including one at
    the executive mansion (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for the right of a person who is charged
    to receive an expeditious trial; however, lengthy pretrial and
    prearraignment detention remained a serious problem. In some cases, the
    length of the pre-trial detention equaled or exceeded the length of
    sentence for the crime in question. Five detained soldiers awaiting
    court-martial for desertion during the September 1998 incident have
    been incarcerated in the stockade since November 1998. Their
    courtsmartials still are pending; should they be convicted, the maximum
    sentence would be 6 months'' imprisonment.
        The police only have limited logistics and forensic capabilities
    and cannot adequately investigate many crimes, including murder cases.
    When the courts release known criminals for lack of evidence, police
    officers often rearrest them on specious charges.
        In August the Government arrested Auditor General Raleigh Seekie
    and charged him with treason. Police searched Seekie's home and office
    for subversive documents, arms, and ammunition but did not find
    anything. Nevertheless, he is charged with aiding armed dissidents
    trying to overthrow the Government.
        Security forces arrested and detained a number of journalists
    during the year (see Section 2.a.). For example, in August the
    Government arrested four foreign journalists and charged them with
    espionage (see Section 2.a.). The four were denied bail but were
    released a week later in response to international pressure.
        The Government did not use forced exile; however, as a result of
    frequent harassment and threats by the security forces, a number of
    opposition figures and human rights activists fled the country due to
    fear for their personal safety or that of their families. These
    included human rights activist James Torh and Muslim organization
    leader Lartin Konneh (see Sections 2.e. and 5). During the year,
    President Taylor publicly alleged that some of these opposition figures
    had gone abroad to conspire in the overthrow of his Government, which
    kept numerous prominent opposition figures and former warlords out of
    the country throughout the year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
    for an independent judiciary, judges are subjected to political,
    social, familial, and financial pressures, leading to the corruption of
    the judiciary. Some judges and magistrates are not lawyers. The
    judiciary has determined that it is not feasible to retire all judicial
    personnel who are not legally trained, but intends to replace those
    currently sitting with lawyers as they retire. By statute members of
    the bar must be graduates of a law school and pass the bar examination.
    The executive branch continued to exert undue influence on the
    judiciary. For example, in response to an appeal of the 1999 treason
    convictions of 13 ethnic Krahn AFL members, the Government demanded in
    1999 that their sentences be changed from 10 years'' imprisonment to
    death. In December 10 years was added to their sentences for a total of
    20 years'' imprisonment.
        The judiciary is divided into four levels, with the Supreme Court
    at the apex. All levels of the court system in Monrovia, including the
    Supreme Court, functioned sporadically. The Government's efforts to
    revitalize the court system outside of Monrovia continued to be
    troubled by lack of trained personnel, infrastructure, and a lack of
    adequate funding. Although judges were assigned throughout the country,
    in some cases they were unable to hold court due to lack of supplies
    and equipment. Traditional forms of justice administered by clan
    chieftains remained prevalent in some localities (see Section 1.c.).
        Under the Constitution, defendants have due process rights that
    conform to internationally accepted standards; however, in practice
    these rights are not always observed. Defendants have the right to a
    public trial and timely consultation with an attorney; however, there
    is no effective system to provide public defenders, especially in rural
    areas. Some NGO's provide legal services to indigents and others who
    have no free representation. Courts regularly received bribes or other
    illegal gifts out of damages that they awarded in civil cases. Defense
    attorneys often suggested that their clients pay a gratuity to appease
    judges, prosecutors, and police officers to secure favorable rulings.
    In October the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court stated publicly that
    delays in salary payments to judicial personnel contributed to
    corruption in the judiciary.
        Human rights organizations reported that 24 political prisoners,
    including AFL personnel, were sentenced for treason in February and in
    April 1999; however, this number reportedly includes a few political
    detainees who have not yet been convicted of a crime (see Section
    1.a.).
        The Government permits access to political prisoners by
    international humanitarian organizations.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and
    the sanctity of the home; however, authorities regularly infringed on
    these rights. The Constitution provides that the police must obtain a
    warrant, or have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress, or is
    about to be committed, before entering a private dwelling. In practice
    police and paramilitary officers frequently entered private homes and
    churches without warrants to carry out arrests and investigations.
        The security forces harassed and threatened perceived opposition
    figures and their families by conducting illegal surveillance. In some
    cases, they entered the homes of opposition figures, usually at night.
    For example, security personnel watched the homes of activists James
    Torh and Lartin Konneh for several weeks (see Section 2.a.). Fearing
    for their safety, both activists fled the country. Several student
    leaders remained under surveillance at year's end (see Section 2.a.).
    Several journalists and human rights activists resided in the homes of
    friends or relatives for months at a time due to fear that the security
    forces might follow through with their threats against them. Incidents
    of harassment and threats increased with the continuing violence in
    Lofa county. In rural areas, particularly in remote parts of Lofa
    county, armed security forces illegally entered homes, most often to
    steal food, money, or other property (see Section 1.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted
    this right in practice. Security agents threatened, detained, and
    assaulted journalists and intimidated many journalists into practicing
    self-censorship.
        In January human rights activist James Torh's sedition trial for
    criticizing President Taylor began. Decisions made on motions during
    his trial indicated that an impartial judgement was not possible and,
    fearing for his safety, Torh fled the country in March. Muslim
    organization leader Lartin Konneh, charged with treason for calling on
    Muslim government officials to resign their positions, also fled the
    country.
        With some notable exceptions, government officials are reluctantly
    tolerant of the press; however, they frequently rebuked the media
    publicly for what they considered negative reporting of events.
    Security personnel sometimes interpreted such criticism as a license to
    harass, threaten, and even assault targeted persons. Reporting that
    criticized the Government brought threats of violence, closure, or
    directives from powerful government figures to advertisers that they
    should discontinue business with that media outlet. For example,
    another respected newspaper ceased publication, and most of the
    management left the country after repeated threats were made against
    them because of editorials written by the newspaper's publisher from
    his home abroad.
        Nevertheless, in general journalists are outspoken and even
    provocative. However, journalists also practice selfcensorship,
    especially in regard to information about the President and his
    immediate family members and particularly after being threatened or
    harassed.
        In April the LNP briefly detained broadcast journalist Isaac Redd
    of the Liberia Communication Network (LCN) for allegedly making
    inflammatory remarks against the President.
        In August the Government arrested four foreign journalists from
    Britain's Channel Four network who visited the country to gather
    material for a documentary about countries in post-conflict stages in
    West Africa, and charged them with espionage; while in detention,
    security personnel beat and threatened them. They also were denied bail
    because the charge was considered a capital offense by the prosecution,
    although the law did not require such a ruling. The journalists were
    released a week later after the international community criticized the
    Government. In October security forces arrested and briefly detained
    newspaper reporter Philip Moore for alleged treasonous remarks.
        In March security forces detained the president of the Press Union
    of Liberia (PUL), Suah Deddeh, after the organization planned a mass
    meeting to respond to the closing of two radio stations. The meeting
    never happened, and nonmembers of the PUL were threatened with arrest.
    Deddeh was released after spending a night in jail. In May police
    detained Deddeh a second time when the Press Union, in celebration of
    World Press Freedom, was planning a march through the center of
    Monrovia. Security forces also threatened other activists who opposed
    the radio closings.
        No action was taken during the year in the case of the police
    forces'' 1998 flogging of journalist Hassan Bility or the 1999 assault
    on the editor of the Inquirer newspaper, Philip Wesseh.
        In Monrovia eight newspapers were published during the year,
    although some publish very irregularly. Two are independent dailies and
    five generally appeared once or more a week; they vary in their
    political balance. The Public Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of
    Information, Culture, and Tourism publishes one newspaper, and the
    communications network owned by the President publishes one weekly
    newspaper. Several newspapers that had not published regularly, and an
    alternative press organization became active following the news
    blackout in March organized by the press union in response to the
    closure of two radio stations. There were numerous reports that
    government officials funded these newspapers, and that they generally
    reported only progovernment news. The ruling party also published a
    newspaper that circulated frequently during the period following the
    closures of the radio stations; however, the frequency of its
    publishing lessened later in the year.
        Newspaper availability fluctuated during the year. The two leading
    independent dailies continued to publish despite being labeled as
    dissident newspapers after they participated in the news blackout
    following the closure of two radio stations and after subsequently
    being criticized by the Government and the ruling party.
        The Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism did not accept
    late license payment from two newspapers with the result that they had
    to cease publication. The Ministry did not renew the annual licenses of
    two newspapers because the Government believed that they were supported
    by ``agent provocateurs''--persons whom, in the government's view, want
    to overthrow the Government.
        Management of the one printing facility capable of producing
    newspapers is subject to pressure from the Government. To meet costs of
    production, the typical newspaper's eight pages include two or three
    pages of advertisements or paid announcements, further reducing the
    amount of news reported. Some articles included are the result of
    ``cadeaux,'' gifts or money that supplement reporters' meager salaries.
        Due to the high price of newspapers, the high rate of illiteracy,
    (estimated at 75 percent), high transportation costs, and the poor
    state of roads elsewhere in the country, newspaper distribution
    generally is limited to the Monrovia area. As a result, radio is the
    primary means of mass communication. A number of independent radio
    stations existed at the beginning of the year in Monrovia including
    Star Radio, Radio Monrovia, two commercial stations (DC-101 and Radio
    Monrovia), and Radio Veritas, which operated under the Catholic
    Archdiocese. Radio Monrovia closed in January due to insufficient
    funding. There also is the national station, and FM and short-wave
    stations operated by President Taylor's private LCN. The President's
    radio station is the only station with a short-wave frequency strong
    enough to reach all parts of the country. Radio Veritas has short-wave
    frequency but a limited broadcast area and antiquated equipment. There
    is a French broadcast through the national radio facility, a religious
    station, and a growing number of small local stations in cities around
    the country. Media practitioners believe that the ruling party funds
    many of these stations.
        Call-in radio talk shows are popular and frequently a forum for
    both government and opposition viewpoints; however, they sometimes
    resulted in threats generally from the Government, party leaders and
    security agents to the radio hosts and station managers. Interviews
    with prominent persons are broadcast frequently.
        Due to the economic situation in the country and the dependence on
    generators requiring expensive fuel purchases, most of the stations
    limited broadcasting hours and in some cases ceased operation for short
    periods.
        In March the Government closed two radio stations (Star Radio and
    Radio Veritas) without due process. Shortly before their closure, both
    stations had been relicensed by the Ministry of Information. The order
    to close them came from the President, who said that the two stations'
    broadcasts threatened the security of the State. Radio Veritas, owned
    by the Catholic Church, was allowed to reopen a week after its closing,
    but Star Radio, which was a politically neutral FM station funded
    primarily through international organizations, remained closed at
    year's end.
        Television is limited to those who can purchase sets, the
    generators, and fuel to provide electricity. For those persons and
    businesses with satellite capability, the Cable News Network is
    available. There are two television stations: the LCN owned by
    President Taylor, and the Ducor Broadcasting Corporation which is
    privately owned but assisted by President Taylor's generator.
        Government officials criticized journalists who used the Internet
    to express opinions that the authorities considered too critical of the
    Government. For much of the year, there was no direct access to
    information through the Internet. Star Radio's internet operations also
    were closed in March. Star Radio had supplied daily news summaries to
    its parent foundation, which put these on the Internet. Copies also
    were provided to the Ministry of Information, and the Government
    demanded (contrary to international practice) a special licensing fee
    for Star Radio's transmission of news on the Internet. During a press
    conference in March following the Government's closure of Radio Veritas
    and Star Radio, President Taylor indicated that he believed ``cyber-
    warfare'' was being waged as part of an international conspiracy
    against the country. Many observers believe that the Government blocked
    the operation of potential Internet providers.
        When the closure of Star Radio did not stop the negative propaganda
    about the country on the Internet, which was generated primarily by
    opposition figures abroad, the Government and the ruling party began to
    use the Internet to provide news and sponsored several websites. An
    Internet provider reemerged mid-year and opened a cybercafe that the
    few persons with sufficient funds can access. Because of the ties
    between the provider and the Government, some potential patrons
    believed that their use of the Internet was monitored by government
    security personnel and choose not to use it.
        The Government generally respects academic freedom at the
    University of Liberia; however, on occasion the Government detained
    students who criticized the Government. University administrators were
    concerned about the militancy of student groups on campus, whose
    memberships include a high percentage of former combatants; however,
    actual physical violence was rare. At times students, whom observers
    believe to be paid informants, reported professors'' opinions to
    various government officials. In July student leaders issued a
    statement questioning the official accounts of the seriousness of the
    fighting in Lofa county. In response security forces entered the
    Monrovia campus, took the student leaders in custody, and offered to
    fly them to Lofa to tour the conflict area and forced them to visit
    wounded soldiers hospitalized in Monrovia. The media was urged to cover
    this visit, after which the students were compelled to offer apologies
    and were released. In November student leaders released a press
    statement that strongly criticized the economy and urged the government
    to forge ties with countries that could assist national growth. They
    also called for the expulsion of RUF leader Sam Bockarie and for the
    Government to break ties with Libya and Burkina Faso. LNP director
    Mulbah subsequently visited the campus with armed police to convince
    the students they should meet with President Taylor to discuss their
    complaints and stated publicly that they would not be detained;
    however, fearing arrests, the students went into hiding. After
    continued public declarations by Mulbah and President Taylor that the
    students would not be arrested, the students came out of hiding and met
    with President Taylor at the end of November to discuss their
    complaints. The student leaders continued to be under surveillance and
    received warnings on a regular basis about speaking out.
        Students occasionally protested the lack of resources, which they
    blamed more on central government appropriation practices than on the
    university administration.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    generally respected this right in practice. In May the LNP, citing
    security concerns, abruptly stopped a march through downtown Monrovia
    sponsored by PUL in observance of World Press Freedom Day. The police
    allowed the commemoration to continue indoors. In November President
    Taylor warned that while the Government would tolerate different views,
    it would not tolerate anarchic demonstrations in the streets; however,
    this warning did not result in the subsequent dispersal of any
    demonstrations during the year.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
        There is no established state religion. However, government
    ceremonies invariably open and close with prayer and may include hymn
    singing. The prayers and hymns are usually Christian but occasionally
    are Muslim.
        All organizations, including religious groups, must register their
    articles of incorporation with the Government, along with a statement
    of the purpose of the organization. However, traditional indigenous
    religious groups generally need not and do not register. The
    registration is routine, and there have been no reports that the
    registration process is either burdensome or discriminatory in its
    administration.
        The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, Islamic
    leaders complained of discrimination against Muslims. Although there
    are some Muslims in senior government positions, many Muslims believe
    that they are bypassed for desirable jobs. Many Muslim business
    proprietors believe that the Government's decision to enforce an old
    statute prohibiting business on Sunday discriminated against them. Most
    Mandingos, and hence most Muslims, allied with factions that opposed
    Taylor during the civil war and still belong to opposition parties.
        In March the Government suspended Radio Veritas broadcasts, pending
    assurances that the station would confine itself to ``purely religious
    matters.'' The station reopened a week later and resumed its previous
    broadcast programming. The closure was believed to be politically
    motivated rather than prompted by religious discrimination (see Section
    2.a.). There were no Islamic-oriented radio stations and little radio
    broadcasting of any kind in the northern and eastern counties where the
    Muslim population is concentrated.
        In February Muslim activist Lartin Konneh was arrested on charges
    of treason after he called upon Muslims to resign their government jobs
    in protest of the Government's inaction since the burning of five
    mosques in Lofa county in January (see Section 5). Konneh went into
    hiding and subsequently fled the country. While the Government has not
    taken actions openly against Muslims, its inaction over reports of
    abuses in Lofa county contributed to ethnic tension between Muslim and
    nonMuslim ethnic groups in that area of the country.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement throughout the country as well as the right to leave or enter;
    however, the Government restricted this right in practice. Security
    forces maintained checkpoints where travelers routinely were subjected
    to arbitrary searches and petty extortion. Security forces also
    extorted money from returning refugees. In February and October, units
    of the ATB, citing security concerns, set up temporary checkpoints that
    interdicted traffic and visitors to a foreign embassy in Monrovia.
        In June, ostensibly in order to curtail the illegal use of national
    travel documents, President Taylor issued an executive order that
    required passport applicants to obtain clearance from the National
    Security Agency (NSA). Opposition parties and human rights
    organizations criticized this directive, arguing that it violated the
    constitutional right of freedom of travel. Reportedly this executive
    order was not enforced during the year. In November the Government
    announced that it would no longer accept Economic Community of West
    African States (ECOWAS) safe conduct documents as valid travel
    documents for entering the country; however, reportedly this was not
    enforced.
        As a result of the civil war, there were 157,000 IDP's in
    approximately 36 camps in 1997. International agencies and the Liberia
    Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) have been able
    to resettle approximately 126,243 displaced persons since 1998. In
    October the fighting in northern Lofa county further increased the
    number of displaced persons. There were an estimated 15,000 to 20,000
    IDP's in the country at year's end. International and local NGO's faced
    limited funding and resources to assist these IDPs.
        In October after some delays approximately 400 Liberian refugees in
    Guinea were repatriated to the country. By year's end, a total of 5,000
    Liberians were repatriated. These refugees, who are mostly Mandingos,
    were resettled in the Lofa or Nimba counties where political and ethnic
    clashes still occurred (see Section 5).
        The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in
    accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government continued
    to provide first asylum to nearly 86,000 refugees, the vast majority of
    whom were from Sierra Leone towards the end of the year. The Government
    generally cooperated with the Office of the U.N. High Commission for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees.
        In June security personnel arrested seven Liberians who were
    returning from Guinea in a UNHCR truck (see Section 1.b.). The
    Government claimed that the men were members of a dissident armed
    faction based in Guinea. The men have not been seen since their arrest,
    and NGO's and relatives believe that they were killed.
        In October the UNHCR protested the recruitment of refugees by
    security personnel on behalf of the RUF rebels from Sierra Leone. UNHCR
    reported that such recruitment ceased after its protest.
        Former RUF leader, Sam Bockarie, and several hundred of his
    supporters took refuge in Liberia early in December 1999. President
    Taylor denied that the Government was training the RUF fighters or that
    it has been supplying them with arms. He claimed that the ECOWAS
    leadership permitted these arrangements in order to advance the
    implementation of the Sierra Leone peace process. A coalition of civic,
    religious, and political groups repeatedly have asked for President
    Taylor to expel the RUF rebels and disassociate the Government from
    them.
        In 1999 after a series of raids and attacks by security forces and
    dissidents bases in Guinea, a group of Sierra Leonean refugees migrated
    south from northern Lofa county towards another established refugee
    camp in Sinje. The Government cooperated with the UNHCR's efforts to
    assist the migration to the new location. International donors remained
    unwilling to send any further assistance to Lofa county, and the
    international and domestic NGO's are reluctant to resume operations
    there because of security concerns. The Government and the UNHCR
    established a second refugee camp in Sinje, a location easily
    accessible from Monrovia, to accommodate the refugees from Lofa county.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right to vote in free and fair
    elections, and citizens exercised this right in 1997 in elections that
    international observers deemed free and transparent; however, the
    elections were conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as most
    voters believed that military forces loyal to Charles Taylor would have
    resumed the civil war if Taylor lost the election. Since the
    legislative elections were held on the basis of proportional
    representation, Taylor's National Patriotic Party won control of the
    legislature by the same 75 percent majority that he received in the
    popular vote for the presidency. The 1997 legislative and presidential
    elections were held under a special election law in accordance with the
    terms of the Abuja Peace Process.
        The legislature did not exercise genuine independence from the
    executive branch. There were 16 opposition parties, most of which had
    little popular support outside of the capital, and opposition
    legislators, who held only one-quarter of the seats in the House of
    Representatives and in the Senate, generally were more passive than
    members of the ruling NPP. Congressional committees failed to develop
    expertise in their respective areas of responsibility. No major
    legislation was enacted during the year. However, during the year, the
    House of Representatives refused to vote in favor of a government-
    sponsored rural property tax and strategic commodities act.
        In August the Government indicted an opposition leader residing
    abroad, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, for treason for alleged ties to armed
    dissidents operating in Lofa county.
        In June Vice President Enoch Dogolea died, and in July President
    Taylor selected Moses Z. Blah, a founding member of the ruling party,
    to fill the position.
        The State is highly centralized. The President appoints the
    superintendents (governors) of the 13 counties. Municipalities and
    chieftaincies are supposed to elect their own officials, but elections,
    postponed in 1998 due to lack of funds and disorganization, were not
    held during the year for the same reason. Local governments at all
    levels have no independent revenue base and rely entirely on the
    central government for funds. Education, health services, and public
    works are provided by the central government. Local officials serve
    mainly to lobby the central Government.
        There are no restrictions on the participation of women in
    politics; however, women remained underrepresented in government and
    politics. The number of women in high-ranking positions in the
    Government and in the various political parties is low. Only 5 of the
    26 senators and 5 of the 64 members of the House of Representatives are
    female. Of the 20 cabinet positions, 4 are held by women. A woman
    serves as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and another chairs the
    National Reconciliation Commission. There are no women's caucuses, but
    the ruling party has a women's organization.
        There are relatively few Muslims in government and politics; only
    one cabinet minister is a Muslim.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government permitted domestic and international human rights
    groups to operate largely without interference; however, members of the
    security forces often harassed domestic democracy and human rights
    activists. During the year, the Government blocked efforts by a local
    NGO, the Catholic Affiliated Justice and Peace Commission, to
    investigate claims of torture at Gbatala security training base (see
    Section 1.c.). Government officials frequently criticized domestic
    human rights groups publicly. For example, in December at a pro-
    government rally, President Taylor criticized democracy and human
    rights activists and opposition leaders of destabilizing the
    government, and he warned that these individuals would be punished.
        In November about 100 men ransacked the offices of the Center for
    Democratic Empowerment (CEDE) and beat former interim president and
    human rights defender, Amos Sawyer, and executive director of CEDE,
    Conmany Wesseh. Preliminary investigation by the Government revealed
    that former combatants were responsible; however, only seven or eight
    persons were arrested, and reportedly they were not the primary
    assailants. Numerous sources reported that the attack commenced from
    NPP headquarters, and that those arrested were paid by the NPP after
    they were released on bond. Prosecution still was pending at year's
    end.
        In 1999 legislators from southeast counties sued a child rights
    advocacy group for defaming the counties reputation in its report on
    forced child labor (see Section 6.c.). The suit was dropped when the
    child rights activist who brought the suit fled the country.
        Domestic human rights organizations are underfunded, understaffed,
    and their personnel lacked adequate training. There are three
    coalitions of human rights groups: The National Human Rights Center of
    Liberia has eight member organizations; eight other groups comprise the
    Network of Human Rights Chapters; and four belong to the Federation of
    Human Rights Organizations. All of these organizations sought to
    increase public discussion of human rights problems.
        Some human rights groups paid regular visits to detainees at police
    headquarters and prisoners at the Monrovia Central Prison (see Section
    1.c.). Several domestic human rights organizations have established
    branches outside of the capital and perform similar monitoring
    functions there. No discernible pattern of government interference with
    these activities emerged.
        The Government permits international NGO's and human rights
    organizations to operate in the country, and a few international
    organizations did so during the year. In November an international
    democracy and human rights organization, the Carter Center, terminated
    its programs in the country and stated in a letter to President Taylor
    that it was leaving the country because of conditions in the country
    and the Government's poor human rights record.
        The Government's Human Rights Commission, created in 1997, remained
    largely inactive throughout the year. It received no funding from the
    Government, and the Senate again failed to confirm the appointments of
    three of its five commissioners. The chairman of the Commission fled
    the country in August 1999 and is seeking asylum in another country.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on ethnic
    background, race, sex, creed, place of origin, or political opinion;
    however, discrimination exists. There are no laws against gender
    discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or female genital mutilation.
    Differences involving ethnic groups, notably the Krahn and Mandingo
    ethnic groups, continued to contribute to serious political violence
    and abuses.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women is extensive; however, it
    was not addressed seriously as a problem by the Government, the courts,
    or the media. Several NGO's in Monrovia and Buchanan continued programs
    to treat abused women and girls and increase awareness of their rights.
        The status of women varies by region, ethnic group, and religion.
    Before the outbreak of the civil war, women held onefourth of the
    professional and technical jobs in Monrovia. On the whole, women have
    not recovered from the setbacks caused by the civil war, when most
    schools were closed, and they could not carry out their traditional
    roles in the production, allocation, and sale of food.
        Women married under civil law can inherit land and property;
    however, women married under traditional laws are considered the
    properties of their husbands and are not entitled to inherit from their
    husbands or retain custody of their children if their husbands die.
    Women's organizations continued to press for legislation on behalf of
    inheritance rights in traditional marriages. There continued to be few
    programs to help former combatants reintegrate into society, and there
    were none specifically to benefit former female combatants. However,
    several women's organizations advanced family welfare issues, helped
    promote political reconciliation, and assisted in rehabilitating both
    former female combatants and women who were victims of the civil war.
        Throughout the year, professional women's groups--including
    lawyers, market women, and businesswomen--remained vocal about their
    concerns regarding government corruption, the economy, security abuses,
    rape, domestic violence and children's rights. Government officials
    often responded negatively to public criticism. There were credible
    reports of harassment and possible surveillance of outspoken critics
    (see Section 1.f.). In August the Justice Ministry granted power to the
    Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) to assist in the
    prosecution of rape cases.
        Children.--The Government generally was unable to provide for the
    education and health of children, although it continued its nationwide
    anti-polio vaccination campaign during the year. Due to the poor
    condition of government schools, most children who attended school went
    to private institutions. Since many private schools still need to be
    refurbished due to wartime damage, school fees were increased
    significantly, thereby making education unattainable for many school-
    age children. In both public and private schools, families of children
    often were asked to provide their own books, pencils, and paper. At the
    end of 1999, 622,645 out of an estimated 1.4 million school age
    children were enrolled in primary and secondary schools, 263,556 of
    which were girls. Expenditures on education were estimated at $6.4
    million (288 million ld). In 1995 the literacy rate for boys was at
    53.9 percent and girls at 22.4 percent.
        Young persons were victimized seriously during the civil war. An
    estimated 50,000 children were killed; many more were wounded,
    orphaned, or abandoned. Approximately 100 underfunded orphanages
    operate in and around Monrovia; however many orphans live outside these
    institutions. The National Military Families Association of Liberia
    (NAMFA) tries to provide for orphaned military children; it has
    registered 650 street children. These institutions do not receive any
    government funding, but rely on public donations. Nearly all youths
    witnessed terrible atrocities, and some committed atrocities
    themselves. Approximately 21 percent (4,306) of the combatants who
    disarmed under the provisions of the Abuja Peace Accords were child
    soldiers under the age of 17. Many youths remain traumatized, and some
    still are addicted to drugs. The number of street children in Monrovia
    and the number of abandoned infants increased significantly following
    disarmament. NGO's and the U.N. Children's Fund continued retraining
    and rehabilitation programs for a limited number of former child
    fighters; however these children were vulnerable to being recruited in
    subregional conflicts, since most had no other means of support.
        Children continued to be incarcerated with adults, and there were
    long delays in deciding cases involving minors (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.e.).
        Child advocacy groups reported forced child labor in the rural
    areas of the country (see Section 6.c.).
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international public health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, traditionally was performed on young girls in
    northern, western, and central ethnic groups, particularly in rural
    areas. Prior to the onset of the civil war in 1989, approximately 50
    percent of women in rural areas between the ages of 8 and 18 were
    subjected to FGM. A local organization, Human Rights Watch Women and
    Children, which does not receive government funding, launched a
    campaign during the year to eradicate FGM. AFELL also has spoken out
    against FGM.
        Social structures and traditional institutions, such as the secret
    societies that often performed FGM as an initiation rite, were
    undermined by the war. While many experts believe that the incidence of
    FGM dropped to as low as 10 percent by the end of the war, traditional
    societies are reestablishing themselves throughout the country, and the
    increase in the incidence of FGM continued. The most extreme form of
    FGM, infibulation, reportedly is not practiced. The Government has
    taken no action against FGM.
        In January a well-known 17-year-old child rights activist fled the
    country to escape persistent harassment of himself, his family,
    teachers, and high school classmates by security personnel (see Section
    1.f.). He remained in self-imposed exile at year's end.
        People with Disabilities.--As a result of the civil war, a large
    number of persons have permanent disabilities, in addition to those
    disabled by accident or illness. It is illegal to discriminate against
    the disabled; however, in practice they do not enjoy equal access to
    public buildings. No laws mandate accessibility to public buildings or
    services. Disabled persons face discrimination particularly in rural
    areas. Deformed babies often are abandoned.
        Religious Minorities.--Some tensions exist between the major
    religious communities. The law prohibits religious discrimination;
    however, Islamic leaders complained of societal discrimination against
    Muslims. The private sector in urban areas, particularly in the
    capital, gives preference to Christianity in civic ceremonies and
    observances, and discrimination against followers of other organized
    religion spills over into areas of individual opportunity and
    employment. There is an interfaith council that brings together leaders
    of the Christian and Islamic faiths.
        Ethnic tensions continued in Lofa County between the predominantly
    Muslim Mandingo ethnic group and the Lorma ethnic group. In January
    five mosques were burned. There was no report of a government
    investigation or action taken against the arsonists.
        Ritual killings, in which body parts used in traditional indigenous
    rituals are removed from the victim, continue to occur. The number of
    such killings is difficult to ascertain, since police often describe
    deaths as accidents even when body parts have been removed. Deaths that
    appear to be natural or accidental sometimes are rumored to be the work
    of ritual killers. Little reliable information is readily available
    about traditions associated with ritual killings. It is believed that
    practitioners of traditional indigenous religions among the Grebo and
    Krahn ethnic groups concentrated in the southeastern counties most
    commonly engage in ritual killings. The victims are usually members of
    the religious group performing the ritual. The underlying religious
    beliefs may be related to incidents during the civil war in which
    faction leaders sometimes ate (and in which one faction leader had
    himself filmed eating) body parts of former leaders of rival factions.
    Removal of body parts for use in traditional rituals is believed to be
    the motive for ritual killings, rather than an abuse incidental to
    killings committed by religious group members called ``heart men.''
    Since the civil war, common criminals inured to killing also may sell
    body parts.
        In August 1999, the Government sent a high-level delegation of the
    National Police to the southeastern counties to investigate reports of
    ritual killings. There were no reports released from this
    investigation.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Constitution bans
    ethnic discrimination, it also provides that only ``persons who are
    Negroes or of Negro descent'' may be citizens or own land. Many persons
    of Lebanese and Asian descent who were born or lived most of their
    lives in the country are denied full rights as a result of this racial
    distinction.
        The country is ethnically diverse. The population of about 3
    million is made up of 16 indigenous ethnic groups and the Americo-
    Liberian minority--descendants of freed slaves from the United States
    and the Caribbean--which until 1980 dominated the government and the
    public sector through the True Whig party. The indigenous ethnic groups
    generally speak distinct primary languages, and they are concentrated
    regionally. No ethnic group constitutes a majority of the population.
        Many members of the predominantly Muslim Mandingo minority
    encountered hostility when they sought to return, after the end of the
    civil war, to their villages in Lofa, Bong, and Nimba counties. Many
    Mandingos were unable to reoccupy their homes, which had been taken
    over by squatters. Members of the Lorma, Gio, and Mano minorities
    generally held all Mandingos responsible for atrocities committed by
    the Ulimo-Mandingo faction during the civil war. The lack of competent
    security forces and a fully functioning judiciary in these areas
    prevented many Mandingos from seeking redress.
        The continuing cross-border violence in Lofa county exacerbated
    ethnic tensions between the Mandingos and the Lormas (see Section
    1.a.).
        Recent tension with the Guinean government aggravated unrest in
    Nimba between the Manos and Mandingos (see Section 1.a.). For example,
    in October in Nimbia, a property dispute between the Mandingos and
    members of Mano and Gio ethnic groups led to rioting, which reportedly
    killed four persons (see Section 1.a.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that
    workers, except members of the military and police, have the right to
    associate in trade unions, and workers are allowed to join unions in
    practice. The Constitution also provides that unions are prohibited
    from engaging in partisan political activity. However, government
    interference in union activities, especially union elections and
    leaderships struggles, was common both before and during the civil war.
        Although most economic activity was interrupted by the war, unions
    proliferated. There are 32 functioning unions organized loosely under
    two umbrella groups--the Federation of Liberian Trade Unions and the
    Congress of Liberian Trade Unions--with the common objective of
    protecting the rights of their 60,000 members, who largely were
    unemployed. The actual power that the unions exercise was extremely
    limited. Since the country's work force is largely illiterate, economic
    activities beyond the subsistence level were very limited, and the
    labor laws tend to favor management.
        During the year, the Government strictly enforced the union
    registration requirements that fell into disuse during the war.
        Labor laws provide for the right to strike. A decree passed by the
    People's Redemption Council in 1984 outlawed strikes, but it was not
    enforced during the year. Due to the destruction of the economy and the
    estimated 85 percent unemployment rate, strikes were infrequent.
        In a wage dispute in February, workers at a rubber plantation in
    Bomi county burned some property. The dispute was settled later that
    month when the management of the plantation agreed to increase wages
    and to provide other benefits.
        Labor unions traditionally have been affiliated with international
    labor groups such as the International Confederation of Free Trade
    Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--With the
    exception of civil servants, workers (including employees of public
    corporations and autonomous agencies) have the right to organize and
    bargain collectively. In the past, agreements were negotiated freely
    between workers and their employers without government interference;
    however, these rights were largely moot during the year because of the
    lack of economic activity.
        There are no export processing zones. All of those previously
    existing were destroyed during the civil war.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor; however, this prohibition was ignored widely in
    many parts of the country, such as rural areas where farmers were
    pressured into providing free labor on ``community projects'' that
    often benefited only local leaders. The Government denied allegations
    that unpaid laborers were forced to harvest crops on President Taylor's
    private farm.
        The Constitution prohibits forced child labor; however, there were
    reports that it occurred (see Section 5). Some former combatants,
    including some in the security forces, were accused of forcing children
    to work in the mining industry. In 1999 a child rights advocacy group
    released a report on forced child labor in the southeastern counties.
    The advocacy group's report and that of another prominent human rights
    group contradicted an earlier government report that failed to find any
    conclusive evidence of forced child labor. Subsequently legislators
    from three counties sued the child rights advocacy group for defaming
    the counties' reputations. At year's end, the case still was pending.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
    of 16 during school hours in the wage sector, but enforcement
    traditionally is lax. The Ministry of Labor did not make any
    inspections during the year and lacks the resources to carry out its
    mandate. Throughout rural areas--particularly where there were no
    schools--small children continued to assist their parents as vendors in
    local markets or on the streets, to take care of younger brothers and
    sisters, and to work on family subsistence farms.
        The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor.
        The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, there were reports that it occurred (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law provides for a
    minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards, but
    enforcement was targeted solely against profitable firms that generally
    observed these standards. Due to the country's continued economic
    problems, most citizens were forced to accept any work they could find
    regardless of wages or working conditions.
        The 1977 Labor Law requires a minimum wage of approximately $0.25
    (10 ld) per hour not exceeding 8 hours per day, excluding benefits, for
    unskilled laborers. The law requires that agricultural workers are to
    be paid $1.50 (60 ld) for an 8-hour day, excluding benefits. Skilled
    labor has no minimum fixed wage, but industrial workers usually
    received three or four times the wage paid to agricultural workers. The
    muchsoughtafter minimum wage jobs provided a minimal standard of living
    for a worker and family; however, there were very few such jobs.
    Families dependent on minimum wage incomes also engage in subsistence
    farming, small-scale marketing, petty extortion, and begging.
        The Ministry of Labor did not have the resources to monitor
    compliance with labor laws.
        The Labor Law provides for a 48-hour, 6-day regular workweek with a
    30-minute rest period per 5 hours of work. The 6-day workweek may
    extend to 56 hours for service occupations and to 72 hours for miners,
    with overtime pay beyond 48 hours.
        Prior to 1990, there were government-established health and safety
    standards, enforced in theory by the Ministry of Labor. During the war,
    these regulations were not enforced. Even under the Labor Law, workers
    did not have a specific right to remove themselves from dangerous
    situations without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, through, or within the country.
                                   __________

                                   MADAGASCAR

        Madagascar held its second presidential election under the 1992
    Constitution in 1996, following the impeachment of then-President
    Albert Zafy earlier that year. The election was accepted widely as free
    and fair, and the winner, former Second Republic President Didier
    Ratsiraka, took office in February 1997. An extensive revision of the
    1992 Constitution was approved narrowly in a March 1998 constitutional
    referendum. While observers from the International Foundation for
    Election Systems concluded that the referendum generally was free and
    fair, it was marred by significant difficulties in compiling voter
    lists, distributing electoral cards, and other problems, which led to
    charges of fraud and manipulation. Although power remains formally
    divided between the President, his Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and a
    bicameral legislature (Senate and National Assembly), the revised
    Constitution significantly strengthened the presidency and weakened the
    National Assembly. National Assembly elections held in May 1998
    generally were accepted as free and fair; however, there were a number
    of credible complaints of electoral fraud. In November 1999, nationwide
    communal elections were held that resulted in a near majority for the
    President's party, the Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar
    (AREMA). Other parties criticized the elections as poorly organized and
    fraudulent; a lack of transparency made it difficult to assess reliably
    the extent of abuses. A number of institutions provided for in the
    revised Constitution, including the Senate, a restructured judiciary,
    and autonomous provincial governments, still were pending at year's
    end. The judiciary is subject to executive influence.
        The State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior for Public Security
    and the national police, which are under the State Secretary, are
    responsible for law and order in urban areas. The Ministry of Armed
    Forces oversees the army, the air force, the navy, and the gendarmerie.
    The gendarmerie has primary responsibility for security except in major
    cities and is assisted in some areas by regular army units in
    operations against bandit gangs and cattle thieves. After a number of
    years of decline, the military force has stabilized at about 22,000
    troops, including the gendarmerie. There also are local traditional
    laws called ``dina'' that are enforced by village-level law enforcement
    groups, particularly in areas where the Government's presence is weak.
    There continued to be occasional reports that police, gendarmes, and
    dina authorities committed human rights abuses.
        Madagascar is a very poor country. The economy relies heavily on
    agriculture. Agricultural exports, led by shrimp, grew 4.3 percent with
    vanilla, coffee, cloves, and pepper registering increases. Textiles
    were another major export. The smuggling of vanilla, gold, precious
    stones, and cattle continued to be major concerns. Overall economic
    performance improved, but nearly three-fourths of the population of
    about 14.7 million live in poverty. Living standards are low, with the
    annual per capita gross domestic product estimated at $269. Foreign
    assistance remains a major source of national income. Inflation rose
    from 6.4 percent in 1998 to 14.4 percent in 1999. Unemployment and
    underemployment, especially among youth, remained high, although there
    was significant job growth in Antananarivo during the year. The
    Government made progress on economic reform, including privatization.
        The Government generally respected citizens'' human rights in
    several areas; however, a number of problems remained. There were
    occasional reports that police or other security forces mistreated
    prisoners or detainees. Prison conditions were harsh and life
    threatening. In some prisons, women experienced physical abuse,
    including rape. Arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems.
    Lengthy pretrial detention remained a major problem, and suspects often
    were held for periods that exceeded the maximum sentence for the
    alleged offenses. The Government continued a major effort to reduce the
    number of preventive detainees. Dina authorities imposed summary
    justice--including several executions--in rural areas where the
    Government's presence was weak, although, overall, government efforts
    to bring dina authorities under closer regulation and scrutiny
    continued to show results. At times the Government pressured the media
    to curb its coverage of certain events and issues; journalists
    practiced self-censorship. There was virtually no political violence
    during the year. Women continued to face some societal discrimination.
    Child labor remained a problem. Some prisoners were used as forced
    labor. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of trafficking
    in women and girls.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government forces; however, harsh
    prison conditions and the authorities'' failure to provide adequate
    food and medical treatment contributed to an undetermined number of
    deaths in custody (see Section 1.c.).
        Village dina authorities continued to mete out summary justice, and
    there were several cases of dina executions in the southeast.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    person; however, there were occasional reports that police or other
    security forces mistreated prisoners or detainees.
        Village dina authorities continued to mete out summary judgments.
    Dina authorities continued to use torture to gain confessions.
        Prison conditions remain harsh and life threatening. Prisoners'
    diets are inadequate, and family members must augment daily rations.
    Prisoners without relatives nearby sometimes go for days without food.
    Prison cells average less than 1 square yard of space per inmate. The
    authorities do not provide adequate medical care. The prison population
    of approximately 19,200 suffers a range of medical problems that are
    treated rarely or inadequately, including malnutrition, infections,
    malaria, and tuberculosis. These conditions have caused an unknown
    number of deaths (see Section 1.a.). There were instances in which
    prisoners were used as forced labor (see Section 6.c.).
        Women in prisons suffered abuses, as did children who sometimes
    were confined with them. Gender segregation was not absolute, and rapes
    by other prisoners were reported.
        The Government permits prison visits by the International Committee
    of the Red Cross, religious and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's),
    lawyers, and investigative journalists.
        For example, a local Catholic NGO visited prisoners during the
    year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides for due process for accused persons; however, arbitrary arrest
    and detention remain problems. In practice the authorities do not
    always observe legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention.
    In particular, excessive investigative detention of suspects resulted
    in the denial of due process. However, as the result of international
    pressure, many long-term detainees were released.
        By law a criminal suspect must be charged, bound over, or released
    within 3 days of arrest. An arrest warrant may be obtained but is not
    always required. Defendants in ordinary criminal cases have the right
    to be informed of the charges against them, must be charged formally
    within the specified time permitted, and must be allowed access to an
    attorney.
        Court-appointed counsel is provided for indigent persons accused of
    crimes that carry a minimum 5-year jail sentence. An attorney or the
    accused may request bail immediately after arrest, after being formally
    charged, or during the appeals process, but bail rarely is granted in
    the case of violent crimes.
        Of a prison population of approximately 19,200, about two-thirds of
    persons held in custody were in pretrial detention. Despite existing
    legal safeguards, investigative detention often exceeds 1 year, and 3
    or 4 years'' detention is common, even for crimes for which the maximum
    penalty may be 2 years or less. The accused may wait years in prison
    only to be exonerated ultimately in court. Poor record keeping, a lack
    of resources, and infrastructure problems that leave parts of the
    country isolated make it difficult to identify long-term pre-trial
    detainees. The Ministry of Justice continued a program to reduce
    excessive pretrial detention through case reviews and expedited
    judgments. Over 665 detainees have been tried and an indeterminate
    number of others were freed. In May the Ministry of Justice reported
    that over 71 percent of prisoners detained 2 years or more had been
    tried and over 1,200 were released. The Ministry stated that its goal
    was to bring the remaining
        long-term detainees to trial during the year.
        Although the law allows detainees to sue the Government for damages
    in cases of unlawful detention, no such suits were reported. By law
    persons accused of subversive activity may be detained incommunicado
    for 15 days and are subject to indefinite detention if considered
    necessary by the Government; however, this law was not invoked during
    the year.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The revised Constitution provides
    for an autonomous judiciary; however, implementing legislation has not
    yet been passed, and the High Constitutional Court is subject to the
    President's influence.
        The judiciary has three levels of jurisdiction: local courts for
    civil and criminal cases carrying limited fines and sentences; the
    Court of Appeals, which includes a criminal court for cases carrying
    sentences of 5 years or more; and the Supreme Court. The judiciary also
    includes courts designed to handle specific kinds of cases such as
    cattle theft. The High Constitutional Court is an autonomous court that
    undertakes technical reviews of laws, decrees, and ordinances, and
    certifies election results. The establishment of a number of
    decentralized courts, also provided for in the Constitution, awaits the
    creation of the Senate, which depends on the as-yet-unscheduled
    elections of autonomous provincial councils.
        The judiciary remained under the control of the Ministry of
    Justice. In 1999 salaries of magistrates were raised to improve their
    performance, but reports of corruption in the judiciary persisted.
    Although efforts were underway to address the problem, a large backlog
    of cases remained, which contributed to excessive investigative
    detention. The Ministry of Justice implemented some measures to
    increase transparency in judicial proceedings, including posting signs
    outside courthouse offices specifying procedures, regulations, costs,
    and timelines, in addition to opening a comment and complaint log in
    all courts.
        Trials are public, and defendants have the right to an attorney, to
    be present at the trial, to confront witnesses, and to present
    evidence. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence under the Penal
    Code.
        The right of traditional village institutions to protect property
    and public order is codified in the Constitution as well as in earlier
    laws. Civil disputes within and between villages sometimes are
    addressed by local traditional laws called dina. Dina also are
    established in some urban areas. In practice, dina deal with criminal
    cases because of the isolation of many rural areas, a rise in crime,
    and the ineffectiveness of the police and the judiciary outside major
    urban centers. Punishments based on dina were at times severe,
    including several cases of executions (see Section 1.a.). There also
    were problems with due process in the administration of dina
    punishments.
        Decisions based on dina are not subject to codified safeguards for
    the accused, but in some instances, they may be challenged at the
    appeals court level. Some cases also have been referred to the Office
    of the Mediator (ombudsman), which investigates and may seek redress
    from formal judicial authorities. An interministerial committee that
    includes the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Armed Forces was
    established to improve the surveillance of dina authorities and assure
    their adherence to the law. The committee held a workshop in each of
    the provinces and drafted a dina to be applied throughout the country.
    After the bill was submitted to the National Assembly in 1999, the
    committee was disbanded. The Ministry of Justice has moved away from
    its earlier permissive approach to dina and emphasized their
    subordination under the formal judicial system.
        The Government continued to combat crime and insecurity in isolated
    rural regions by augmenting the gendarmerie--traditionally responsible
    for law and order in rural areas--with army units. Military courts are
    integrated into the civil judicial system and differ only in the kinds
    of cases tried and in the inclusion of military officers on jury
    panels. Such courts have jurisdiction over some cases involving
    national security, including acts allegedly threatening the nation and
    its political leaders; invasion by foreign forces; and rioting that
    could lead to the overthrow of the Government. Defendants in military
    cases, as in civil law, enjoy an appeals process that reexamines points
    of law rather than the facts of the case. A civilian magistrate,
    usually joined on the bench by a panel of military officers, presides
    over military trials.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
    government authorities generally respect these prohibitions in
    practice. Violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the Government
    pressures the media to curb its coverage of certain events and issues.
    Opposition politicians rarely are given access to state-run media;
    while they do have access to private media, these do not provide the
    nationwide coverage of state media. In addition journalists practice
    self-censorship.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice; however, local authorities sometimes deny
    requests by political opposition groups to assemble or march in
    specified locations.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        Religious groups must register and obtain authorization from the
    Ministry of Interior. In January 1998, an organization widely perceived
    to be affiliated with the Reverend Sun Myung Moon was refused
    registration, apparently due to concerns about its use of mind-control
    practices. There is no indication that the organization has reapplied
    for registration, nor that the Government has changed its decision.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice; however, the fear
    of crime effectively restricts travel in some areas, especially at
    night.
        The country does not have a law governing refugees nor has it
    ratified the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government cooperates
    closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in processing the
    small number of refugees or asylum seekers in the country. There were
    no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with recognized or
    pending claims to refugee status. The issue of provision of first
    asylum has never arisen.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government through direct
    universal suffrage by secret ballot. Didier Ratsiraka was elected to a
    5-year term as President in 1996 in the second presidential election
    held under the 1992 Constitution. In May 1998, the National Assembly's
    150 members were elected to 5-year terms. In November 1999, communal
    elections were held in which the President's party, AREMA, won over 40
    percent of the mayoral races. The elections were peaceful and well-
    organized; however, there were numerous reports of fraud. In December
    1999, the High Constitutional Court recognized serious irregularities
    and reordered elections in five communes. The lack of transparency of
    the electoral process made it difficult to assess reliably the extent
    of abuses.
        On August 25, the National Assembly passed a Law on the Autonomous
    Provinces, and on August 29, the President promulgated the law. The law
    provides for the establishment of autonomous provinces and allows for
    the creation of an upper house of the legislature with provincial
    representatives.
        Under the Constitution, the President has primary responsibility
    for national defense and foreign policy, while the Prime Minister is
    the head of government and responsible for domestic policy. The
    President selects the Prime Minister. The Constitution gives the
    President the right to dissolve the National Assembly for cause. The
    revised Constitution retains the possibility of censure by a two-thirds
    majority of the National Assembly and Senate. The Senate was not
    established pending the creation of autonomous provinces. In September
    1998, the Prime Minister pledged publicly that all of the institutions
    called for in the Constitution would be created by March; however, this
    nonbinding target date was not achieved by year's end, and the
    Government did not make a commitment to implement the institutions by a
    specified date. In August the National Assembly approved a law defining
    the powers of autonomous provincial governments, and the President
    promulgated the law with several implementing decrees. The law allows
    the Senate to be convened, with representatives from the provinces.
    However, there is concern about whether the central Government will
    provide the necessary resources to support the establishment of the
    provincial councils; furthermore, there still is confusion regarding
    the specific responsibilities of the provincial governments. Elections
    were held on December 3 in the provinces to establish provincial
    councils and governorships; however, the results of the provincial
    elections were not published and the provincial councils were not
    established by year's end. Under the revised Constitution,
        two-thirds of the Senate's members are to be elected within the
    autonomous provinces, and one-third of the members are to be appointed
    by the President. The first senatorial elections were scheduled for
    March 2001.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government or politics, but in practice they are underrepresented in
    both areas. The Government of 31 ministers and state secretaries
    appointed in July 1998 includes 4 women. Less than 7 percent of
    National Assembly deputies (10 of 150) are women.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials usually are cooperative and
    responsive to their views.
        The Government is open to visits by international human rights
    groups and to domestic and international election observers.
        Domestic election observers from local NGO's were active in the
    country during the year.
        The Constitution provides for an independent office to promote and
    protect human rights. In 1994 the National Assembly assigned that role
    to the Office of the Mediator (ombudsman), which relies on moral
    suasion to correct abuses. The office publishes annual reports on its
    activities and distributes brochures to educate citizens on their
    rights and responsibilities. Its reports have outlined the rights of
    women and children and focused public attention on the potential for
    human rights violations under dina laws.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits all forms of discrimination and outlaws
    groups that advocate ethnic or religious segregation. No specific
    government institutions are designated to enforce these
    antidiscrimination provisions.
        Women.--Violence against women is not widespread. Police and legal
    authorities intervene when physical abuse is reported. Only the law
    against rape deals specifically with violence against women. Spouses
    can be tried for nonrape abuses, generally under civil law.
        The law neither prohibits nor condones prostitution. The law
    prohibits the incitement of minors to debauchery. The Government
    criticizes sexual tourism; however, while it attempts to investigate
    allegations of exploitation, a lack of resources hampers effective
    action.
        In urban areas, where many women manage or own businesses or hold
    management positions in state industries, there is relatively little
    societal discrimination against women. According to one government
    official, women own 30 percent of the formal sector companies and 53
    percent of the informal sector companies. However, discrimination
    against women in rural areas remained a problem. A number of NGO's
    focus on the civic education of women and girls to ensure that their
    rights and legal protections are understood fully and acted upon as
    appropriate.
        Under a 1990 law, wives have an equal voice in selecting the
    location of a married couple's residence, and they generally receive an
    equitable share of common property on divorce. Widows with children
    inherit half of joint marital property. A tradition known as ``the
    customary third'' occasionally is observed in some areas. Under this
    custom, the wife has a right to only one-third of a couple's joint
    holdings. However, a widow receives a pension, while a widower does
    not.
        Children.--While official expenditures on children's welfare are
    low, the Government increased the spending levels of the Ministries of
    Health and Education despite continued fiscal austerity. These levels
    are not sufficient to maintain adequate public services under current
    economic conditions. The Government provides education through the
    secondary or vocational level, and it is compulsory through the age of
    14. Although figures vary depending upon the source, approximately 65
    percent of primary-school-age children apparently are enrolled in
    school. However, only 29 percent of working children go to school:
    rural children drop out to help on family farms, and urban children
    work as domestics (see Section 6.d.).
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child
    labor continues to be a pervasive problem. Children sometimes are
    imprisoned with adults (see Section 1.c.).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no systematic discrimination
    against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision
    of other state services. There is no law mandating access to buildings
    for persons with disabilities. The National Assembly passed a law to
    define the rights of the disabled in February 1998, but implementing
    regulations have not been issued. The Ministry of Population scheduled
    a public consultation exercise for October to discuss the
    implementation with concerned NGO's prior to submitting draft
    regulations to the Government. Interministerial review of the draft
    regulations was still pending at year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Malagasy, who are of mixed
    Malayo-Polynesian, African, and Arab heritage, include 18 distinct
    groups differing in regional and ancestral affiliation. Although there
    are some linguistic differences, nearly all speak a dialect of the
    Malagasy language. None of these groups constitutes a majority of the
    population. There are significant minorities of Chinese and Indo-
    Pakistani heritage, as well as a large number of resident French
    nationals.
        A long history of military conquest and political consolidation
    raised the political and economic status of highland ethnic groups of
    Asian origin above that of coastal groups of more African ancestry.
    Centralized administration and economic planning since independence has
    reinforced the concentration of economic and political power in the
    central highlands, where the capital is located. These policies feed
    enduring tension between coastal and highland persons. Ethnicity,
    caste, and regional solidarity often are factors in hiring practices.
        An Indo-Pakistani community has resided in the country since the
    early part of the 20th century. Traditionally engaged in commerce, this
    community now numbers about 20,000. Relatively few of these individuals
    have made successful claims to Malagasy nationality, which is
    customarily acquired through a native-born Malagasy mother. Indo-
    Pakistani merchants are mistrusted widely. In past years, their shops
    have been looted during civil disturbances.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1995 Labor
    Code provide workers in the public and private sectors with the legal
    right to establish and join labor unions of their choosing without
    prior authorization; however, essential service workers, including
    police and military personnel, may not form unions. Unions are required
    to register with the Government, and registration is granted routinely.
    About 80 percent of the labor force of 5 million is engaged in agrarian
    production. Union members account for only about 5 percent of the total
    labor force.
        There are a number of trade union federations, many of which are
    affiliated formally with political parties. Neither public nor private
    sector unions have played a major political or economic role in recent
    years. The Government exercises very limited control over organized
    labor.
        The Labor Code and the Constitution include the right to strike.
    This right extends to export processing zones (EPZ's). Workers in
    essential services have a recognized but restricted right to strike,
    although in practice short strikes took place without reprisal. The
    code requires workers to exhaust conciliation, mediation, and
    arbitration procedures before striking, but this has not been a
    significant deterrent to legal strikes in practice.
        Short and generally nondisruptive strikes took place over fiscal
    and administrative issues in some cities.
        The International Labor Organization (ILO) has noted a number of
    instances in which the Government has failed to bring law and
    regulation into conformity with existing conventions or otherwise
    submit texts for ILO review, including those addressing forced labor,
    freedom of association, safeguarding of machinery, hygiene in commerce
    and offices, and weight limits. In most instances, these failures
    indicated legislative inertia rather than abuses.
        Unions freely join and participate in international bodies and may
    form federations or confederations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Both the Labor
    Code and the Constitution provide for the right to bargain
    collectively. The code states that collective bargaining may be
    undertaken between management and labor on the initiative of either
    party; however, collective bargaining agreements are rare in practice.
    The Government often is involved in the bargaining process, in part
    because of the large percentage of public employees who are union
    members.
        The Labor Code prohibits discrimination by employers against labor
    organizers, union members, and unions. In the event of antiunion
    activity, unions or their members may file suit against the employer in
    civil court. Labor laws apply uniformly throughout the country;
    however, the Government's enforcement of labor laws and regulations is
    hampered by a lack of staff and financial resources. Approximately 35
    inspectors from the Ministry of Labor visit industrial work sites with
    some regularity, but most often only those located near the capital.
        There are many EPZ's which are, in practice, firms operating under
    special import and export rules. Such firms are required to follow all
    pertinent labor laws and regulations, including minimum wage laws;
    however, the Government allegedly does not enforce its labor laws
    adequately in EPZ's due to inadequate resources.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    explicitly prohibits forced labor, and generally it is not known to
    occur; however, there were instances of prisoners being illegally
    ``hired out'' by prison officials to private enterprise. There also
    apparently has been systematic use of detainees and prisoners as
    personal servants by a substantial number of magistrates, judiciary
    officials, and local government figures. Some prison officials or
    judicial authorities have falsified records to ensure a supply of
    unpaid labor for themselves or other government officials. The
    Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and it does
    not occur in practice.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code defines a child as any person under the age
    of 18 years. The legal minimum age of employment is 15 years, and work
    by individuals under the age of 18 is prohibited at sites where there
    is apparent and imminent danger to health, safety, or morals. Night
    work also is forbidden for individuals below age 18. The Government
    enforces child labor laws in the small formal economic sector through
    inspectors of the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws;
    however, because inspectors only cover wage earners, the enforcement of
    child labor laws in the informal sector is pursued through the courts.
    Nevertheless, child labor continued to be a pervasive problem: nearly
    one in three children age 7 to 14 works. In the large agricultural
    sector, young children work with parents on family farms at much
    younger ages. In urban areas, many children work as petty traders,
    casual transport workers, and beggars.
        The Government has participated in an international program with
    the ILO to eliminate child labor since 1997. For example, in May over
    20 labor inspectors representing all 6 provinces received training
    regarding the worst forms of child labor.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and it does not
    occur in practice (see Section 6.c.).
        The age of sexual consent is 14, and although the law does not
    criminalize prostitution, it forbids ``inciting to debauchery'' of
    anyone under the age of 21 (see Section 5). The Labor Ministry in
    conjunction with the ILO conducted a national survey of child
    prostitution and trafficking that was ongoing at year's end (see
    Section 6.f).
        Education is compulsory to the age of 14. While approximately 65
    percent of primary-school-age children apparently are enrolled, only 29
    percent of working children attend school (see Section 5).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code and implementing
    legislation prescribe working conditions and wages, which are enforced
    by the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws. The law makes
    separate provisions for agricultural and nonagricultural labor.
        The Government sets the minimum wage of approximately $24 (FMG
    160,156) per month for the nonagricultural private sector. This wage
    does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family
    and must be supplemented by subsistence agriculture, petty trade,
    support from relatives, or employment of other family members. Minimum
    wage rates are not respected always, since high unemployment and
    widespread poverty lead workers to accept wages at lower levels.
        The standard legal workweek in nonagricultural and service
    industries is 40 hours, and 42+ hours in agriculture. At least one
    consecutive 24-hour rest period each workweek is mandated. The Labor
    Code sets rules and standards for worker safety and worksite
    sanitation. An administrative decree forbids women and minors from work
    that could endanger their health, safety or morals (see Section 6.d.).
    Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Laws officials monitor
    labor conditions; however, they usually are able to cover only the
    capital region effectively. If violators do not remedy cited violations
    within the time allowed, they may be sanctioned legally or assessed
    administrative penalties. In some sectors, safety equipment is not used
    due to the expense of protective clothing and other safety devices.
    There have been no published reports on occupational health hazards or
    accident trends. There is no explicit right for workers to leave
    dangerous workplaces without jeopardizing their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking; however,
    in 1999 there were reports that women and girls were trafficked to the
    nearby islands of Reunion and Mauritius for prostitution. No arrests or
    convictions have been made in connection with the trafficking. While
    the Government expressed concern, it lacked the resources to address
    this issue effectively. The Government conducted a survey on child
    trafficking which was ongoing at year's end (see Section 6.d.).
                                   __________

                                     MALAWI

        On June 15, 1999 the Republic of Malawi held its second democratic
    presidential and parliamentary elections since independence in 1964.
    Independent observers concluded that the elections were ``free and
    substantially fair;'' however, there was limited opposition access to
    media and problems in registration, and the opposition appealed the
    result to the courts. The six parliamentary by-elections held since
    June 1999 have been marred by violence, allegations of vote fraud, and
    contested results. Constitutional power is shared between a popularly
    elected president and the 193-member National Assembly. In the 1999
    elections, President Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF)
    party was reelected to serve a second 5-year term, defeating Gwanda
    Chakuamba, the joint presidential candidate of the two leading
    opposition parties, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Alliance
    for Democracy (AFORD). The UDF has 96 seats in the National Assembly;
    the MCP has 61 seats; AFORD has 30 seats; and there are 5 independent
    members in the National Assembly. There is no clear-cut ideological
    difference among the three political parties. The first local
    government elections to select councilors and mayors, as mandated under
    the 1998 Local Government Act, were held on November 21. The ruling UDF
    won over 70 percent of the seats in the elections, which were marked by
    low voter turnout and opposition complaints of voter intimidation and
    lack of media access. The Government respects the constitutional
    provisions for an independent judiciary; however, the judicial system
    is inefficient and lacks resources.
        The National Police, headed by the Inspector General of Police
    under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are responsible for internal
    security. The police occasionally called on the army for support. There
    continued to be credible allegations that the police committed human
    rights abuses.
        The country is very poor, with a narrow economic base characterized
    by a small and highly concentrated industrial sector, low levels of
    foreign and domestic investment, and few mineral resources. Agriculture
    dominates the economy, contributing nearly half of its gross national
    product (GNP), and employing over 80 percent of the labor force.
    Tobacco, tea, and sugar crops together generate over 70 percent of
    export earnings, with tobacco providing the largest share (about 60
    percent). There is little industry and mining, and no known
    economically viable deposits of gemstones, precious metals, or oil. The
    country is landlocked, but improved rail service to the Mozambican
    deepwater port of Nacala, subsequent to the December 1999 privatization
    of Malawi Railways, is expected to lower significantly the share of
    transport costs in the country's import bill. The Government continues
    to move forward with its multisector privatization program, and
    endorses private sector participation in infrastructure. Wealth remains
    concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Annual per capita income is
    approximately $200. Average annual inflation was 44.9 percent in 1999,
    up from 29.7 percent in 1998.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
    in many areas; however, its record in other areas was poor, and serious
    problems remained. There were extrajudicial killings, including deaths
    of detainees while in, or shortly after release from, police custody.
    The police are known to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and to use
    excessive force in handling criminal suspects. Prison conditions
    remained harsh and life-threatening and resulted in a large number of
    deaths. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, and lengthy pretrial
    detention is a serious problem. An inefficient and understaffed
    judicial system and limited resources called into question the ability
    of defendants to receive a timely, and in many cases, fair trial.
    Security forces at times infringed on citizens'' privacy rights. The
    print media are able to report freely; however, there were a few
    exceptions, and there was some self-censorship. The seven private radio
    stations experienced relative freedom in broadcasting international
    news and entertainment programming; however, the Government continued
    to control news coverage and editorial content at the Malawi
    Broadcasting Corporation's two radio stations. At times police used
    force against demonstrators. Violence against women is common. Women
    continued to experience severe societal discrimination. The Government
    took steps in its economic development programs to assist disadvantaged
    women. Abuse of children remained a problem. Child labor, including
    instances of forced child labor, also is a problem. Mob violence
    triggered by anger over high levels of common crime resulted in mob
    executions of alleged criminals.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however there were extrajudicial
    killings, including deaths of detainees while in, or shortly after
    release from, police custody. These deaths involved possible use of
    excessive force or possible negligence. There was at least one credible
    report that prison officials beat a prisoner to death. Both the
    Inspectorate of Prisons and the Office of the Commissioner of Prisons
    carried out investigations into the killing, though results of the
    investigations were not released by year's end. Seven prison guards
    were charged in the killing and are currently in custody. Inquests into
    deaths while in custody are not held routinely.
        In August 1999, police shot and killed one former Eritrean detainee
    and wounded six others in a confrontation in Lilongwe. No action was
    taken against the police (see Section 2.d.).
        A large number of prisoners died largely due to harsh prison
    conditions (see Section 1.c.).
        Frustrated by inadequate law enforcement and rising crime, angry
    mobs sometimes resorted to vigilante justice in beating, stoning, or
    burning suspected criminals to death. Serial killings during a 3-month
    period during the year brought international attention to the country.
    During the course of the investigations in February and March, police
    detained and held approximately 25 suspects. One of the suspects died
    while in police custody, allegedly due to police abuse. On May 31, the
    Director of Public Prosecutions eventually charged 4 suspects with the
    killings and scheduled 19 suspects for release. Realizing the potential
    for mob justice or independent acts of violence against the released
    suspects, police and prosecutors mounted a public information campaign,
    including town meetings. The 19 suspects were released on June 8 and
    were able to return to their communities without incident. On September
    16, the Director of Public Prosecutions dropped the charges against one
    of the four charged suspects; on October 6, two of the suspects were
    sentenced to death and one was acquitted.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of disappearances.
        c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, police continued to beat and
    otherwise abuse detainees and to use excessive force in handling
    criminal suspects. The Inspectorate of Prisons is an investigative body
    mandated by the Constitution, and the findings of its May report--the
    most recent document of its kind--are considered indicative of prison
    conditions by domestic and international nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's). The report notes that techniques used by police included
    beatings, physical assault, and the use of wire instead of handcuffs to
    restrain prisoners and to force confessions. Police sometimes hide
    these abuses by keeping prisoners in police custody until wounds heal
    before turning them over to the prison system for remand. The
    mistreatment is partly due to the mistaken belief of many police
    officers that the law requires them to present a case (not just
    charges) to the court within 48 hours of arrest. Lack of financial
    resources for appropriate equipment, facilities, and training also
    contributed to mistreatment.
        At Freedom Day celebrations on July 6, police reportedly beat
    demonstrators outside the official venue (see Section 2.a.).
        In May police used force, including tear gas, to disperse
    demonstrations (see Section 2.b.).
        Police continued efforts to improve investigative skills and to
    introduce the concept of victims'' rights though workshops and other
    training exercises, particularly in the areas of sexual abuse and
    domestic violence (see Section 5). While higher ranking officials
    demonstrated familiarity with new standards for the humane treatment of
    prisoners, their subordinates commonly employed unacceptable
    techniques. The Government continued to seek community involvement in
    its comprehensive reform of the police. In 1999 Parliament created a
    community service alternative for some offenders. Four cities have
    begun pilot community service programs.
        Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening.
    Overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, substandard sanitation, and poor
    health facilities remained serious problems. There was at least one
    credible report of prison officials beating a prisoner to death (see
    Section 1.a.).
        According to the 2000 Inspectorate of Prisons report, 140 persons
    died in prison between January and December 1998. Most of the deaths
    resulted from disease, including tuberculosis and AIDS. Between January
    and December 1999, a total of 213 prisoners died at Zomba central
    prison alone. Although women are not kept in separate facilities, they
    are segregated within the prison compound and tended by female guards.
    Although four prisons are supposed to have separate facilities for
    juveniles, in practice the separation is inadequate. In the other
    prisons, juveniles are incarcerated with adults.
        The Inspectorate of Prisons, domestic NGO's, and international
    NGO's are permitted to make visits to monitor prison conditions without
    government interference. NGO's report good collaboration with prison
    authorities.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution grants
    the accused the rights to challenge the legality of detention, to have
    access to legal counsel, and to be released on bail or informed of
    charges by a court of law within 48 hours; however, these rights seldom
    are respected in practice. The use of temporary remand warrants is
    widespread and used to circumvent the 48-hour rule. Police often resort
    to beatings to obtain information deemed necessary to their cases. In
    cases where the court determines that a defendant cannot afford to
    supply his own counsel, legal services are provided by the Government.
    With few persons able to afford legal counsel, the country's five
    public defenders were not sufficient to represent all indigent
    detainees in a timely manner. Bail frequently is granted to reduce
    prison overcrowding. Its use often bears only a tenuous relationship to
    the merits of an individual's situation. There are now over 8,000
    inmates, over half of which are awaiting trial. Police are accused of
    arbitrary arrests due to political motives.
        In February and March, police detained approximately 25 suspects in
    connection with a series of murders (see Section 1.a.).
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice; however, the judicial system is inefficient and is
    handicapped by serious weaknesses, including poor record keeping, a
    shortage of attorneys and trained personnel, a heavy caseload, and a
    lack of resources. The Constitution provides for a High Court, a
    Supreme Court of Appeal, and subordinate magistrate courts. The Chief
    Justice is appointed by the President and confirmed by the National
    Assembly. The President appoints other justices, following a
    recommendation by the Judicial Service Commission. All justices are
    appointed until the age of 65 and may be removed only for reasons of
    incompetence or misbehavior, as determined by the President and a
    majority of the Parliament.
        By law defendants have the right to a public trial but not to a
    trial by jury. In murder cases, the High Court nevertheless used juries
    of 12 persons from the defendant's home district. Defendants also are
    entitled to an attorney, the right to present and challenge evidence
    and witnesses, and the right of appeal. However, the judiciary's
    budgetary and administrative problems effectively denied expeditious
    trials for most defendants. On July 14,the Department of Public
    Prosecutions, under the Ministry of Justice, hired 12 paralegals to
    help reduce the case backlog and assist the very small staff of 9
    prosecuting attorneys. The paralegals are to serve as lay prosecutors
    and to prosecute minor cases in the magistrate courts.
        In July 1999, the High Court concluded a training program for 48
    lay magistrates and conducted training for 61 lay magistrates from
    September 1999 through January. Traditional court judges, absorbed into
    the magistrate court system, also receive some training in court
    procedure and the body of law that they administer. In August 1999, the
    High Court began a 2-month refresher-training program for traditional
    court judges.
        In March Parliament passed the Courts Amendment Bill, which was
    aimed at increasing the civil jurisdiction of magistrates, simplifying
    small claims procedures, and giving magistrate courts jurisdiction over
    customary marriages. Although the law was implemented during the year,
    there were no documented effects of the law by year's end.
        Juvenile offenders have special rights under the Constitution,
    including the right to be separated in custody from adults, to be
    treated in a manner that recognizes their age and the possibility for
    rehabilitation, and to be exempt from the punishment of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of release. However, the
    protection they are accorded in principle is often denied in practice,
    and many juvenile offenders are incarcerated with adults (see Section
    1.c.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Government authorities generally respected
    constitutional provisions that protect these rights; however, army and
    police forces, in carrying out sweeps for illegal weapons, did not
    always obtain search warrants as required by law.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights in practice; however, there were some
    exceptions. Limited self-censorship still exists, in part due to habits
    that evolved during the country's 30-year single party political
    system, which ended in 1994. A broad spectrum of political and
    ideological opinion is presented in the country's two dozen newspapers,
    usually without government interference. However, the Government still
    threatened and harassed members of the media. At Freedom Day
    celebrations on July 6, police confiscated the camera of a photographer
    with an independent weekly and destroyed her film, allegedly for taking
    pictures of police beating demonstrators outside the official venue
    (see Section 1.c.).
        At the beginning of August, the DPP dropped a 1999 case involving
    the arrest and 3-day detention of an editor and senior reporter of the
    opposition weekly Malawi News for ``inciting to mutiny'' and
    ``publishing an article prejudicial to public safety.'' On August 3,
    the High Court ruled that the arrest was contrary to constitutional
    press protections.
        The editor of the main opposition newspaper, The Daily Times, was
    suspended in August by the editor-in-chief and subsequently replaced by
    an acting editor more inclined to refrain from publishing articles
    critical of the Government.
        The state-owned Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) dominates the
    radio market with its two stations, transmitting in major population
    centers throughout the country. News coverage and editorial content are
    clearly progovernment. In June four employees of MBC allegedly were
    suspended due to insufficient loyalty to the ruling party (see Section
    4). The Office of the Ombudsman began an investigation of the incident,
    which was ongoing at year's end. The MBC consistently denied opposition
    candidates equal access to the media during the presidential and
    parliamentary election campaigns in violation of the law. In contrast,
    slogans and songs of the ruling UDF party are broadcast throughout the
    year. The Government began limited television broadcasting in March
    with editorial control similar to that on MBC radio.
        There are five private radio stations. One commercial station began
    broadcasting in Blantyre in August 1998. A second commercial station
    began broadcasting in Blantyre in March. There is a rural community
    radio station run by local women with the help of the Malawi Media
    Women's Association (MAMWA). A religious station broadcasts in the
    capital and its environs.
        In May 1999, the Government established the Malawi Communication
    Regulatory Authority (MACRA), an independent regulatory body, to issue
    broadcasting licenses for radio, television, and Internet service
    providers. The Government split the state-owned Malawi Posts and
    Telecommunication Corporation (MPTC) into the Malawi Posts Corporation
    (MPC) and the Malawi Telecommunications Limited (MTL) in preparation
    for the privatization of MTL. There are two cellular telephone service
    providers and seven Internet service providers. Between February and
    October, MACRA issued licenses to an additional nine providers that had
    not yet begun operations by year's end.
        There were no restrictions on academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice; however, there were instances in which police
    limited this right.
        Authorities routinely granted official permits, which are required
    by law for large meetings. However, in May, police used force to
    disperse a peaceful demonstration, firing tear gas into an unarmed
    crowd that had gathered to protest the World Bank sponsored
    consultative group meetings in Lilongwe. At Freedom Day celebrations on
    July 6, police reportedly beat demonstrators outside the official venue
    (see Section 2.a.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. The Government requires
    organizations, including political parties, to register with the
    Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice. There were no reports of
    groups being denied registration during the year.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Religious
    groups must register with the Government. There were no reports that
    the Government refused to register any religious group.
        Some opposition politicians and clerics have raised Islam as a
    political issue. Citing the President's adherence to Islam, his contact
    with Islamic countries such as Libya and Sudan, and the building of new
    mosques, some opposition politicians and clerics have accused the
    ruling party of attempting to ``Islamicize'' the country. An attempt by
    the Government early in the year to replace ``bible knowledge'' in the
    school curriculum with the more universal ``moral and religious
    education'' course has met with widespread criticism from Christian
    leaders. When the President suspended the introduction of the new
    curriculum and returned ``bible knowledge'' to the curriculum, Muslim
    leaders rebuked him.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have freedom of movement and
    residence within the country, and the right to leave and return.
        The law provides for the granting of refugee and asylee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1961 Protocol; however, there are long delays in the
    process. The Government cooperated with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in providing protection and
    assistance to refugees. According to the UNHCR, the country hosted over
    3,600 refugees, primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
    the Great Lakes region, at the country's refugee center in Dowa. The
    majority of refugees reside at the Dzaleka camp, and the UNHCR
    estimates that between 300 and 400 new refugees arrived each month.
    Although the Government grants refugee status, the law does not accept
    refugees for permanent resettlement and does not permit them to work or
    study. While no legal framework exists, the Government has allowed
    refugees to seek both employment and educational opportunities. UNHCR,
    NGO's, and the Government collaborated to provide children in refugee
    camps with access to education. A new school was being constructed at
    the Dowa refugee camp at year's end.
        Asylum applicants are granted hearings to make their case for
    asylum status. The Government denied asylum to many of the Rwandans and
    Congolese who either had requested asylum in another country or had the
    opportunity to do so.
        In August 1999, the Government denied the UNHCR access to a group
    of 25 Eritrean detainees with fraudulent visas. Police killed one
    detainee and forcibly returned the remaining detainees to Ethiopia (see
    Section 1.a.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens are able to exercise their constitutional right to vote in
    periodic elections. There is universal suffrage for citizens 18 years
    of age and older. International election observers found the June 1999
    presidential and parliamentary elections to be free and substantially
    fair; however, the electoral process was flawed, as opposition access
    to the broadcast media was limited; there were registration problems in
    some areas of the country; and the Electoral Commission at times
    displayed bias in favor of the ruling party. The opposition appealed
    the outcome of the presidential vote, and on May 19, the High Court
    ruled in favor of the President. In October the Supreme Court of Appeal
    upheld the High Court ruling in favor of the President (see Section
    2.a.).
        President Muluzi, First Vice President Justin Malewezi, and a 34-
    member cabinet exercise executive authority. The second vice-presidency
    remains vacant. The executive exerts considerable influence over the
    legislature; the legislature follows the parliamentary system, and
    consequently a number of cabinet ministers also sit as Members of
    Parliament (M.P.'s). Although the Government and opposition have never
    reached agreement on the applicability of the 1997 High Court ruling
    that cabinet ministers cannot simultaneously sit as M.P.'s, the issue
    currently is not a topic of debate.
        Local government elections were held on November 21 and were
    conducted in an open and transparent manner according to local and
    international observers; however, they were marked by low voter
    turnout, allegations of voter and candidate intimidation, and unequal
    access to the media. The ruling UDF won over 70 percent of the seats;
    opposition parties and some NGO's criticized the Government for
    manipulating the process.
        Although the Government does not prevent the operation of
    opposition political parties, the parties continue to allege that the
    Government uses bribery and other inducements to encourage opposition
    party divisions and defections of key personnel to the ruling party.
        There are no laws that restrict the participation of women or
    minorities in the political process; however, there are very few women
    in prominent government positions, and women are underrepresented in
    politics and in positions of authority in general. Four of the 34
    cabinet members are women; women hold 17 of the 193 seats in the
    National Assembly. A citizen of European origin and several of Asian
    descent are sitting members of the National Assembly.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
    operated without government restriction, training civic educators,
    advocating changes to existing laws and cultural practices, and
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
    Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
    views.
        The Ombudsman is mandated by the Constitution to investigate and
    take legal action against government officials responsible for human
    rights violations and other abuses. The Ombudsman's freedom of action
    is circumscribed by legislation that requires a warrant and a 3-day
    waiting period to gain access to certain government records. The
    activities of the Ombudsman are subject to judicial review, and in a
    June case involving MBC employees allegedly dismissed on political
    grounds (see Section 2.a.), the Supreme Court upheld a constitutional
    provision that granted the Ombudsman discretionary authority to
    investigate any and all cases where it is alleged that a person has
    suffered injustices, except when there is a judicial remedy available
    (see Section 2.a.).
        The Constitution provides for a National Compensation Tribunal
    (NCT) to adjudicate claims of criminal and civil liability against the
    former government. As of September, the NCT had registered over 13,000
    claims, of which 4,200 have been awarded interim compensation payments.
    The NCT's lack of funds limits its ability to settle claims. The
    constitutionally mandated Human Rights Commission (HRC) is charged to
    monitor, audit, and promote human rights provided for under the
    Constitution, and to carry out investigations regarding violations of
    any human rights. The Human Rights Commissioners have met more than 10
    times since February 1999. Despite limited resources, in February the
    HRC produced and published its first annual report; the report focused
    primarily on institution-building concerns and the 1999 elections but
    did not address human rights problems. The HRC also has demonstrated
    its independence from the Government. For example, in August the HRC
    released a statement criticizing a presidential decree to round up
    commercial sex workers, describing the decree as unconstitutional and
    gender biased in its targeting of women.
        In December the international human rights organization, Article
    19, released a report that claimed that President Muluzi, senior
    government officials, and UDF leaders refused to support investigations
    or the creation of a proposed independent commission of inquiry into
    human rights abuses during the Banda regime because they feared that
    they would be implicated.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution specifically provides for equal rights for women;
    forbids discrimination based on language, culture, or religion; and
    generally provides for equality and recognition before the law for
    every citizen; however, in practice the capacity of government
    institutions to assure equal rights for all citizens is limited.
        Women.--Spousal abuse, especially wife beating, is common. Society
    has begun to take the problem of violence against women seriously. The
    press published frequent accounts of rape and abuse, and the judiciary
    continued to impose heavier penalties on those convicted of rape.
    However, domestic violence seldom is discussed openly by women,
    reportedly even among themselves, and in part due to the lack of
    resources. There are no confidential shelters or facilities for
    treatment of women who suffer physical or sexual abuse. Police do not
    normally intervene in domestic disputes.
        Under the Constitution, women have the right to full and equal
    protection by law and may not be discriminated against on the basis of
    sex or marital status; however, in practice discrimination against
    women is pervasive, and women do not have opportunities equal to those
    available to men. Women have significantly lower levels of literacy,
    education, formal and nontraditional employment opportunities, and
    access to resources to increase agricultural productivity.
        Women, especially in rural areas, historically have been unable to
    complete even a primary education, and are therefore at a serious
    disadvantage in finding employment. Accepted economic and social
    practice hampers the ability of women and girls to gain an education.
    The literacy rate among women between the ages of 15 and 45 is less
    than 37 percent. Male literacy in the same age group is about 45
    percent.
        Women often have less access to legal and financial assistance, and
    wives are often victims of discriminatory inheritance practices in
    which the majority of the estate is taken unlawfully by the deceased
    husband's family. Women are usually at a disadvantage in marriage,
    family, and property rights, but they have begun to speak out against
    abuse and discrimination. Households headed by women are represented
    disproportionately in the lowest quarter of income distribution. In a
    country where 85 percent of the population is rural, the majority of
    farmers are women; 70 percent of the rural female population farm full
    time. Typically, women work more hours than men to complete the same
    farm tasks because they rarely have comparable tools and equipment and
    remain responsible for all household tasks. Women have limited access
    to agricultural extension services, training, and credit. Some progress
    has been made in all of these areas with gender training for
    agricultural extension workers and the gradual introduction of rural
    credit programs for women. The participation of women in the limited
    formal labor market is particularly constrained; they constitute less
    than 5 percent of managerial and administrative staff.
        The Law Commission has undertaken a review of legislation that
    discriminates against women and has proposed legislation to bring the
    law into compliance with new constitutional standards. Based on the Law
    Commission's recommendations, in 1997 Parliament passed an affiliation
    bill that raised the minimum level of child support. In 1998 Parliament
    passed a wills and inheritance bill that increased widows' rights, and
    in June Parliament debated and passed the Employment Act, which
    includes a provision granting women the right to maternity leave. These
    laws were in effect during the year; however, only individuals who
    utilized the formal legal system benefited from these legal
    protections.
        On May 5, women joined the army for the first time in noncombat
    positions as a result of a 1994 revision in the government directive
    that previously had prohibited women from military service. The Law
    Commission conducted a review and proposed changes in the Army Act to
    the Cabinet during the year that allow for the recruitment and
    deployment of women in the armed services. The Government is studying
    the possibility of allowing women to serve in combat roles.
        The Government addresses women's concerns through the Ministry of
    Gender, Youth, and Community Services.
        Children.--The Constitution provides for equal treatment of
    children under the law, and the Government greatly increased spending
    on children's health and welfare. The Government established free
    primary education for all children in 1994, although education is not
    compulsory. Girls drop out of school more frequently than boys do, and
    in the final year of primary school, only about 25 percent of students
    are girls. Despite recent significant gains in girls' access to
    education, large gaps remain between girls' and boys' achievement
    levels. However, there have been signs of improvement in education for
    girls. In 1999, the last year for which data is available, girls
    entered primary school in the same proportion as boys, although only 39
    percent of secondary school entrants were female.
        Well over half of the country's children live in poverty, mostly in
    rural areas. Children in rural households headed by women are among the
    poorest. A few charitable organizations attempted to reduce the number
    of child beggars in urban areas and find alternative care for them. The
    problem of street children worsened as the number of orphans whose
    parents died from HIV/AIDS increased. A total of 9.2 percent of
    children under age 15 were estimated to be orphans (426,421) and 61.4
    percent of those (251,822) were orphaned due to AIDS. AIDS is expected
    to result in an estimated 364,450 orphans, or 72.9 percent of all
    orphans in the country by 2005. Such children and other orphans
    normally are cared for by extended family members.
        Only a third of children have easy access to safe drinking water.
    Infant mortality is high. Child malnutrition is a serious problem.
        Child labor, including instances of forced child labor, is a
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        There are societal patterns of abuse of children. There is
    anecdotal evidence that a few small ethnic groups practice female
    genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international
    health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
    The Government took no action against FGM during the year. The media
    also have begun to report on the sexual abuse of children, especially
    in relation to traditional practices of initiation. While rites to
    initiate girls into their future adult roles are still secret,
    information suggests that abusive practices are widespread and quite
    damaging. Although the age of sexual consent is 14, there is no age
    specified for the protection of minors from sexual exploitation, child
    prostitution or child pornography. The belief that children are
    unlikely to be HIV positive and the widespread belief that sexual
    intercourse with virgins can cleanse an individual of sexually-
    transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS contributes to the sexual
    abuse of minors.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has not mandated
    accessibility to buildings and services for the disabled, but one of
    the national goals in the Constitution is to support the disabled
    through greater access to public places, fair opportunities in
    employment, and full participation in all spheres of society. There are
    both public and privately supported schools and training centers, which
    assist individuals with disabilities. There are also several self-
    supporting businesses run by and for persons with disabilities. In
    December 1998, President Muluzi established a new cabinet-level
    position, the Minister of State Responsible for Persons with
    Disabilities, which currently is held by a disabled person.
        Religious Minorities.--There are generally amicable relations
    between the various religious communities; however, in an isolated
    incident in April, Muslims and Christians clashed over the efforts of
    an evangelical preacher to promote an audiotape comparing the Bible and
    the Koran. Muslims find the tape provocative and blasphemous, and the
    issue remains an open point of contention between followers of the two
    religions.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of African heritage
    are members of indigenous tribes and are not discriminated against by
    the Government or society. There is no legal discrimination against
    citizens of Asian heritage, although societal tensions exist between
    the communities of African and Asian origin.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1996 Labor Relations Act (LRA)
    governs labor-management relations. Workers have the legal right to
    form and join trade unions; however, union membership is low due to the
    small percentage of the work force in the formal sector (about 12
    percent), the lack of awareness of worker rights and benefits, and a
    resistance on the part of many employees to joining unions. Only 13
    percent of persons employed in the formal sector belong to unions.
    Accurate statistics on the numbers of union members are not available.
    Trade union rights have existed for only 7 years, and labor relations
    are still evolving. Employers, labor unions, and the Government lack
    sufficient knowledge of their legitimate roles in labor relations/
    disputes.
        Unions must register with the Registrar of Trade Unions and
    Employers' Organizations in the Ministry of Labor and Vocational
    Training (MOLVT). As of September, 22 unions were registered. Army
    personnel and police may not belong to trade unions, but other civil
    servants are allowed to form unions. There are no unusually difficult
    registration procedures. Unions are independent of the Government,
    parties, and other political forces.
        There are no restrictions on the number of union federations. There
    are two federations in the country: the Malawi Congress of Trade Unions
    (MCTU), with 19 affiliates, and the Congress of Malawi Trade Unions
    (COMATU), with 3 affiliates.
        The LRA allows members of a registered union to strike only after
    all dispute settlement procedures established in a collective agreement
    and conciliation procedures have failed. The law requires a notice in
    writing to the employer and the MOLVT at least 7 days before a strike.
    The law also forbids the temporary replacement of labor, and allows
    peaceful picketing during strikes. However, members of a registered
    union in ``essential services'' do not have the right to strike.
    Essential services are specified as services whose interruption would
    endanger the life, health, or personal safety of the whole or part of
    the population; they are determined by the Industrial Relations Court
    upon application by the Minister of Labor. The law provides similar
    procedures for lockouts. Laws do not specifically prohibit retaliation
    against strikers. There is no prohibition on actions against unions
    that are not registered legally. Arbitration rulings are legally
    enforceable.
        Unions may form or join federations and have the right to affiliate
    with and participate in international workers' organizations, with the
    permission of the Government.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
    right to organize and bargain collectively. The LRA requires that at
    least 20 percent of employees (excluding senior managerial staff)
    belong to a union before such a union can engage in collective
    bargaining at the enterprise level. The LRA requires at least 15
    percent union membership for collective bargaining at the sector level.
    The law provides for the establishment of industrial councils in the
    absence of collective agreements for sector-level bargaining.
    Industrial council functions include wage negotiation, dispute
    resolution, and industry-specific labor policy development. Collective
    agreements are binding legally, and both parties must deposit them with
    the Registrar of Trade Unions.
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers and
    requires that employers reinstate workers dismissed because of union
    activities.
        Parliament approved legislation to establish export-processing
    zones (EPZ's) in 1995. At year's end, 25 firms held licenses to operate
    under EPZ status, and all were operational. The full range of labor
    regulations applies to the EPZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor, and such labor generally is not used; however,
    there are allegations that some large agricultural estates engage in
    the practice.
        The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, at least one local NGO has reported that in urban
    areas it is not uncommon to find young girls working as domestic
    servants, receiving little or no wages, and existing in a state of
    indentured servitude.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution defines children as persons under 16
    years of age. It prohibits the employment of children in work that is
    hazardous, harmful, or interferes with their education. Significant
    child labor in agricultural work and domestic service occurs largely as
    a result of extreme poverty and long-standing cultural traditions.
    Primary education is free and universal, but not compulsory. Budgetary
    constraints largely preclude minimum work age and child labor law
    enforcement by police and MOLVT inspectors. There is significant child
    labor on tobacco and tea farms, subsistence farms, and in domestic
    service. There is no special legal restriction on children's work
    hours.
        In October the Ministry of Labor began a 12-month International
    Labor Organization (ILO) funded study to establish the magnitude of
    child labor and to use the results as a basis for drafting an action
    plan to implement ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.
        The law does not prohibit forced and bonded labor by children
    specifically, and there was at least one report that it occurs (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The MOLVT sets separate urban
    and rural minimum wage rates based on recommendations of the Tripartite
    Wage Advisory Board (TWAB) composed of representatives of labor,
    government, and the private sector. However, the TWAB has encountered
    problems due to inefficient organizational structure and inadequate
    funding, which hindered timely and accurate revision of the wage rate
    recommendations. The urban minimum wage amounts to about $0.69 (MK 55)
    per day; in all other areas it is roughly $0.51 (MK40.70) per day.
    Although minimum wage rates were raised on December 1, they remain
    insufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of
    living. Wage earners tend to supplement their incomes through farming
    activities. The MOLVT lacks the resources to enforce the minimum wage
    effectively. However, the minimum wage largely is irrelevant for the
    great majority of citizens, who earn their livelihood outside the
    formal wage sector.
        The maximum legal workweek is 48 hours, with a mandatory weekly 24-
    hour rest period. The laws require payment for overtime work and
    prohibit compulsory overtime. In practice employers frequently violate
    statutory time restrictions.
        The law protects foreign workers in correct legal status. Illegal
    foreign workers are subject to deportation.
        In 1998 the Government issued a revised ``policy statement and new
    guidelines'' for the issuance and renewal of employment permits (the
    temporary employment permit or ``TEP'') for foreigners that underscored
    its desire to make such permits readily available to foreigners. The
    guidelines state that investors may employ foreign personnel in areas
    where there is a shortage of ``suitable and qualified'' citizens. The
    guidelines also mandated that processing times for TEP applications
    shall not exceed 40 working days. There were no reports of complaints
    concerning TEP's during the year.
        Mechanisms for protecting internationally recognized worker rights
    are weak. There are serious manpower shortages at the Ministry of
    Labor; as a result, there are almost no labor standards inspections.
        The Workers' Compensation Act includes extensive occupational
    health and safety standards. Enforcement of these standards by the
    MOLVT is erratic. Workers--particularly in industrial Jobs--often work
    without basic safety clothing and equipment. Workers dismissed for
    filing complaints about workplace conditions have the right to file a
    complaint at the labor office or sue the employer for wrongful
    dismissal. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous
    work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. However,
    given the low level of education of most workers and the high level of
    unemployment, they are unlikely to exercise this right.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country during the year.
                                   __________

                                      MALI

        Mali is a constitutional democracy, which continued to implement a
    decentralized form of government. President Alpha Oumar Konare was
    reelected to a second 5-year term in 1997. A collective of 12
    opposition parties boycotted the 1997 presidential and legislative
    elections, which were administratively flawed but considered generally
    free and without evident fraud. The opposition parties claimed that the
    elections were unconstitutional because the Government failed to carry
    out annual updates of electoral lists; however, some opposition
    candidates chose to participate by running as independents. The ruling
    Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), led by President Konare,
    dominates the National Assembly, which includes representatives of
    opposition and ADEMA-aligned parties. In August the National Assembly
    approved changes to the Constitution and approved changes to the
    electoral law. The process of amending the Constitution, the electoral
    law, and other texts began during a National Political Forum in January
    that involved political parties, civil society, and the Government. The
    Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
    practice the Government continues to exert influence on the judiciary.
        Security forces are composed of the army, air force, Gendarmerie,
    the National Guard, and the police. The army and air force are under
    the control of the civilian Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans,
    as are the Gendarmerie and the National Guard. The police are under the
    Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. The police and gendarmes
    share responsibility for internal security; the police are in charge of
    urban areas only. The Government completed the process of integrating
    elements of former Tuareg rebel forces into its armed forces in 1999.
        Mali is a very poor country with a market-based economy. Most of
    the work force is employed in the agricultural sector, particularly
    farming and animal husbandry. The country's principal exports are
    cotton, livestock, and gold. There is a very small industrial sector,
    largely based on the manufacture of textiles, beverages, and processed
    food products. The gross national product is approximately $255 per
    capita, which provides most of the population with a low standard of
    living. The economy depends heavily upon foreign assistance.
    Desertification, deforestation, soil degradation, and social
    limitations, including a current estimated literacy rate of
    approximately 30 percent (48 percent for men and 12 percent for women)
    and a high population growth rate (2.8 percent), contribute to poverty.
    Poor infrastructure, minimal foreign investment, administrative
    inefficiency, and corruption are also important factors in limiting
    economic growth.
        The Government generally respected its citizens'' human rights;
    however, problems remained in several areas. Security forces reportedly
    tortured and killed two suspects in custody. The Government did not
    release the results of an investigation into the incident by year's
    end. Prison conditions remained poor. Prolonged pretrial detention is
    sometimes a problem. The judicial system's large case backlog resulted
    in long periods of pretrial detention and lengthy delays in trials. The
    judiciary continued to be subject to executive influence, and there
    were reports of corruption in the courts. Domestic violence against
    women was widespread. Discrimination against women persisted, and
    social and cultural factors continued to limit sharply economic and
    educational opportunities for most women. Female genital mutilation
    (FGM) is widespread, although educational campaigns against FGM are
    underway. Child labor is frequent in agriculture and domestic areas.
    Children were trafficked into forced labor in Cote d'Ivoire; the
    Government returned a number of these children to their families during
    the year. Hereditary servitude relationships continued to link
    different ethnic groups.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by security forces during the year;
    however, there was a report that security forces committed
    extrajudicial killings. Following the February murder of 3 tourists in
    Kidal, the Government questioned at least 40 persons and detained 9 in
    connection with the murders. Three suspects reportedly died while being
    transported to jail; there were reports that soldiers tortured and
    killed two of the suspects (see Section 1.c.). Three other suspects
    remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.). The Government
    initiated an investigation into the incident, but it had not released
    the results by year's end; no action had been taken against the
    soldiers.
        Individuals accused of seeking to disrupt the June 1998 elections
    in Segou by throwing a grenade into the courtyard of the regional
    representative of the electoral commission were released from prison in
    1999. During that 1998 attack, a deputy chief commissioner's daughter
    was killed and several other persons were wounded. On October 12, 1999,
    the detainees were released provisionally to await arraignment and
    trial; during the year, the case was dismissed.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
    were reports that soldiers tortured and killed two suspects arrested in
    connection with the February murder of three tourists (see Section
    1.a.).
        Some police and gendarmes extorted bribes at vehicle checkpoints
    (see Section 2.d.).
        Prison conditions are poor. Prisons continued to be overcrowded,
    medical facilities were inadequate, and food supplies were limited. In
    Bamako juvenile offenders usually are held in the same prison as adult
    offenders, but they are kept in separate cells. Women are housed in the
    same prison facility as men, but they live in a separate compound. In
    regional prisons outside the capital, men and women are housed in the
    same building but in separate cells. In these facilities, children
    share cells with adult prisoners of the same sex; however, there were
    no reports that women or juveniles were abused by other inmates or by
    guards. The Judiciary Forum meeting of civil society representatives
    held in 1999 concluded that prison conditions remained poor; however,
    the 1999 Democracy Forum noted that the Government had taken some steps
    to improve the conditions for detainees, including opening separate
    facilities for the reeducation of young offenders and training programs
    for guards on the rights of detainees. The Democracy Forum again
    discussed prison conditions at its December 10 meeting, although not in
    extensive detail. It noted improvements in medical attention and food
    quality.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    Several organizations, including the Malian Association of Human
    Rights, the Malian Association of Women Jurists, and other
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have visited prisoners and are
    working with women and juvenile prisoners to improve their conditions.
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to visit
    imprisoned leading members of the former government.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and, in general, the
    Government does not employ them. However, in February authorities
    questioned at least 40 persons and arrested 9 suspects in connection
    with the murder of 3 tourists. According to unconfirmed reports,
    soldiers tortured and killed two of the suspects (see Section 1.a.);
    three of the suspects remained in detention. The Government issued
    warrants for murder, but the investigation continued at year's end.
        The Constitution provides that suspects must be charged or released
    within 48 hours and that they are entitled to counsel; however, in
    practice detainees are not always charged within the 48-hour period.
    Moreover, administrative backlogs and insufficient lawyers, judges, and
    courts often caused lengthy delays in bringing persons to trial. In
    extreme cases, individuals have remained in prison for several years
    before coming to trial.
        Judicial warrants are required for arrest. Local lawyers have
    estimated that about half of prison inmates are pretrial detainees.
    This judgment was confirmed in March 1999 during the Judiciary Forum
    seminar. Limited rights of bail or the granting of conditional liberty
    exist, particularly for minor crimes and civil matters. On occasion the
    authorities released defendants on their own recognizance.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the executive branch continues to exert
    influence over the judicial system. The Ministry of Justice appoints
    and has the power to suspend judges; it supervises both law enforcement
    and judicial functions. The President heads the Superior Judicial
    Council, which oversees judicial activity. Domestic human rights groups
    alleged that there were instances of bribery and influence peddling in
    the courts. The Government launched a campaign against corruption early
    in the year that led to the detention of many government senior civil
    servants, businessmen, and political leaders from all parties. At
    year's end, they still were detained and under investigation.
        The Supreme Court has both judicial and administrative powers. The
    Constitution established a separate Constitutional Court that oversees
    issues of constitutionality and acts as an election arbiter. The
    Constitution also provides for the convening of a High Court of Justice
    with the power to try senior government officials in cases of treason.
        Except in the case of minors, trials are public, and defendants
    have the right to be present and have an attorney of their choice.
    Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to confront
    witnesses and to appeal decisions to the Supreme Court. Court-appointed
    attorneys are provided for the indigent without charge. The village
    chief in consultation with the elders decides the majority of disputes
    in rural areas. If these decisions are challenged in court, only those
    found to have legal merit are upheld.
        In 1997 former President Traore, his wife Mariam, and former
    customs commissioner Douah Abraham Sissoko, who were placed under
    detention following the fall of the Traore regime in 1991, were charged
    with ``economic crimes,'' including ``abuse of a position of power''
    and ``illicit enrichment.'' They had been convicted and sentenced to
    death in 1993, but President Konare commuted their sentences to prison
    terms in December 1997. The trial in their cases and similar cases
    involving five other senior officials of the Traore regime began in
    October 1998. Traore, his wife Mariam, and Sissoko were convicted and
    sentenced to death in January 1999; these sentences also were commuted
    in 1999, and they are serving life sentences. In August Traore and his
    wife were released in order to travel to Algiers for medical treatment;
    they returned after they received treatment, and they remained in
    prison at year's end. Imprisoned former government leaders also receive
    nondiscriminatory medical treatment.
        There were no other reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
    home, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    Police searches are infrequent and require judicial warrants. However,
    security forces maintain physical and technical surveillance of
    individuals and groups believed to be threats to internal security,
    including surveillance of telephone and written correspondence of
    individuals deemed by a magistrate to be a threat to national security.
    There were no reports of such government surveillance during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights in practice.
        The Superior Council of Communication (CSC) was installed
    officially in 1994, although it was created in 1992. The CSC's primary
    function is to regulate the media, both protecting and controlling
    journalists. The Committee of Equal Access to State Media is activated
    during election campaigns. Mandated by the Constitution, it oversees
    equal access to the government- controlled media for all political
    parties.
        There are more than 100 private newspapers and journals in French,
    Arabic, and local languages throughout the country, and there are as
    many as 30 newspapers in Bamako. There are seven daily newspapers: six
    are privately owned, of which one, Les Echoes, is allied with the
    ruling party, and one is government controlled (L'Essor). All
    newspapers must be registered with the Ministry of Communications;
    however, registration not complicated and can be completed quickly.
        The Government controls the only television station and 1 of more
    than 100 radio stations; however, all present a wide range of views,
    including those critical of the Government, the President, the Prime
    Minister, and other politicians. The relative expense of newspapers and
    television, coupled with a low literacy rate, makes radio the most
    prevalent medium of mass information and communication. There are as
    many as 15 private radio stations in Bamako, and there are
    approximately 115 additional stations throughout the country. As well
    as commercial radio stations, private radio broadcasters include those
    run by associations and others directed toward smaller villages (the
    latter two radio services enjoy special tax advantages).
        A number of foreign broadcasters operated in Bamako either through
    local media or a chosen affiliate. These included Radio France
    International, African No. 1, the British Broadcasting Corporation,
    Voice of America, and Radio Netherlands; all have FM frequencies.
        There are no private television stations that broadcast
    domestically produced programs. The legal framework for private
    television has been in place since 1992; however, the Government still
    is developing the fee schedules. The Government made no progress toward
    private television licensing during the year.
        The Government does not censor print, broadcast, or electronic
    media, which frequently offer editorials critical of both the
    Government and the opposition. Laws passed in 1993 regulate the press
    and provide for substantial criminal penalties, including imprisonment,
    for libel and for public injury to the Head of State, other officials,
    and foreign diplomats; these laws leave injury undefined and subject to
    judicial interpretation. However, the Government never has prosecuted
    journalists on criminal libel charges. No journalists were arrested on
    libel charges during the year. In August the National Assembly approved
    a proposal to eliminate imprisonment as a punishment for libel charges;
    however, at year's end, the proposal had not been implemented as law.
        Domestic reception and distribution of foreign satellite and cable
    television is permitted and fairly widespread, especially in Bamako.
    Eight domestic servers provide access to the Internet. Licenses to
    operate Internet servers are granted freely and are not prohibitively
    expensive.
        The Government generally respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice; however, there were a few exceptions. The law
    requires groups that wish to hold public meetings to obtain the mayor's
    permission; however, such permission was granted routinely during the
    year.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    The law allows for religious practices that do not pose a threat to
    social stability and peace. The Constitution declares the country a
    secular state.
        The Government requires that all public associations, including
    religious associations, register with the Government. However,
    registration confers no tax preference and no other legal benefits, and
    failure to register is not penalized in practice. The registration
    process is routine and is not burdensome. Traditional indigenous
    religions are not required to register.
        The Minister of Territorial Administration and Security can
    prohibit religious publications that he concludes defame another
    religion; however, there were no reports of instances in which
    publications were prohibited.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. The
    Government generally does not restrict internal movement and does not
    restrict international travel; however, police routinely stop and check
    both citizens and foreigners to restrict the movement of contraband and
    to verify vehicle registrations. Some police and gendarmes use the
    occasion to extort bribes.
        A 1998 law conforms to the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As a follow-
    up to this law, in December 1998 the Government created a national
    committee in charge of refugees. The committee began operations in
    January 1999 with institutional assistance from the office of the U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Government cooperates with
    the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
    The Government provides first asylum for refugees.
        According to both UNHCR and government estimates, there were
    approximately 11,000 Mauritanians refugees, mostly Fulani herders,
    living in the Kayes region of western Mali at year's end. However, the
    UNHCR, Mauritania, and Mali never have agreed on recognition of the
    refugee status of these persons, who have lived in the country for
    nearly a decade; members of these pastoralist border groups
    historically make cross-border migrations. Throughout 1998 the UNHCR
    provided some limited material assistance and incentives to
    pastoralists of Mauritanian origin to return to Mauritania. In June
    1999, the UNHCR completed its assistance to such persons, which
    consisted of community support at their living sites as opposed to
    repatriation assistance. Mauritanians may register for refugee status,
    although few actually do.
        The country hosted approximately 1,900 urban refugees as of
    November 1999; four-fifths are from Sierra Leone and 90 percent are in
    Bamako. The Government opened a transit center in 1998 located 120
    miles from Bamako, where it hosts approximately 100 of the most
    vulnerable refugee and asylum applicants. The center has a capacity of
    approximately 300 persons that could be expanded to hold 900.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government and do so
    through periodic elections. In 1997 citizens elected President Alpha
    Oumar Konare to a second 5-year term by secret ballot in elections that
    were open to all and free of evident fraud and manipulation. Konare won
    96 percent of the vote, but voter turnout was reportedly 20 to 25
    percent; most opposition parties boycotted the election, citing flaws
    in the voter registration system. The opposition continued to contend
    that the Government failed to carry out constitutionally mandated
    annual electoral list revisions and that, therefore, the elections
    should be declared invalid; however, the issue was not pursued during
    the year.
        All political parties agreed to participate in and to prepare for
    elections scheduled for 2002. The process of amending the Constitution,
    the electoral law, and other texts began during a National Political
    Forum in January that involved political parties, civil society, and
    the Government. In August the National Assembly approved changes to the
    Constitution and approved changes to the electoral law. Pursuant to
    these changes, legislative elections will provide a mixed system that
    allows for 110 deputies to be elected by majority vote from electoral
    district lists and 40 to be elected on a proportional basis from a
    national list. The constitutional amendments and the revised electoral
    law must be approved by referendum; the referendum is scheduled for
    September 30, 2001.
        Under the Constitution, the President is Chief of State and
    Commander in Chief of the armed forces and is elected for a term of 5
    years with a limit of two terms. The President appoints the Prime
    Minister. Additionally, the President appoints other members of the
    Government and sets limits on their powers. He names civil servants
    (national directors, regional government delegates, and others) and
    high military officers as mandated by the Constitution. The President
    also promulgates laws within 15 days, following transmission to the
    Government of a final adopted text. He can veto and return legislation
    to the National Assembly for reconsideration. There is no provision for
    the National Assembly to override a presidential veto. The President
    may submit any question of national interest to a referendum after
    consultation with the Constitutional Court. He exercises the power of
    pardon and can grant amnesty. The President may dissolve the National
    Assembly and call for new elections, although not in the year following
    legislative elections. Theoretically, he can declare a state of
    emergency and rule by decree, although President Konare has never done
    so.
        National Assembly members were elected in 1992 and 1997. The
    Constitutional Court cancelled the results of the initial 1997
    legislative elections, citing flaws in the electoral process. These
    elections were repeated later in 1997, and the results were
    implemented. Citing problems in the voter registration process, a
    collective of 18 opposition parties boycotted these elections, which,
    although administratively flawed, were considered by most independent
    observers to be generally free and without evident fraud. ADEMA holds
    130 of 147 seats in the National Assembly, with 12 held by allied
    parties and 5 held by opposition parties.
        The Government instituted far-reaching administrative reforms
    during 1999. As of September 1999, governing authority is shared by
    elected mayors in the 701 communes (including the 19 cities), and
    appointed officials (``commissaires du gouvernement'') who are the
    representatives of the central Government in the District of Bamako,
    the regions, and the cercles (districts roughly equivalent to
    counties). Local governments benefit from central government subsidies,
    but they also are able to collect local taxes to support their
    operations. Decentralization is still a controversial issue. The
    process has changed traditional power relationships between government
    and governed and has relieved formerly powerful civil servants of their
    authority. The new administrators often are inexperienced and
    undereducated. Despite governmental pressure to move ahead with
    decentralization, the nonparliamentary opposition says that the
    Government is moving too fast, and it should implement the process step
    by step as administrators lack adequate funding to govern effectively.
        After local elections in 1998 held to choose council members (who
    oversee the activities of mayors in the communes and suggest procedures
    and policies) for the 19 urban communities, the long-awaited rural
    elections were carried out in May and June 1999. Several opposition
    parties that had boycotted earlier elections participated in the rural
    elections with considerable success. In two communities (Kidal and
    Almoustarat), council members could not elect a mayor due to
    intercommunity disputes. In Kidal local traditional authorities
    prevented the woman who was elected as mayor from assuming office.
    These conflicts were solved during the year, and in June the local
    communities in Kidal and Almoustarat appointed mayors by consensus.
        There are no restrictions, legal or otherwise, on voting by women
    or minorities; however, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. A total of 18 women hold seats in the 147-member National
    Assembly, compared with 3 elected in 1992. There are 7 female cabinet
    members of a total of 21. Members of historically marginalized
    pastoralist ethnic minorities, including the Fulani and the Tuaregs,
    occupy seats in both the Cabinet and National Assembly. The President
    of the Assembly is Fulani (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Independent human rights organizations--including the Malian
    Association for Human Rights (AMDH), a smaller Malian League of Human
    Rights, and a local chapter of Amnesty International (AI)--operate
    openly and without interference from the Government. The ICRC has
    offices in Bamako, Tomboctou, and Gao.
        Since 1994 the Government has held an annual Democracy and Human
    Rights Forum in December to which it has invited citizens to voice
    discontent and grievances against the Government publicly in the
    presence of the media and international human rights observers. The
    events are well attended by local citizens from all walks of life, and
    discussion is free and open. Held on December 10, the Democracy Forum
    convened to review the previous year's work and to make recommendations
    to the Government. The topics for discussion included women's rights,
    access to government services, and judicial reform. The Forum called on
    the Government to make these issues a priority in the coming year.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on social origin,
    color, language, sex, or race, and the Government respects these
    provisions in practice; however, social and cultural factors give men a
    dominant role.
        Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, is
    tolerated and common; however, no statistics were available on the
    extent of the problem. Assault in marriage is a crime; however, police
    were reluctant to enforce laws against domestic abuse.
        Women's access to employment in the professions and government, and
    to economic and educational opportunities, traditionally has been
    limited. A 1995-96 national demographic and health survey found that 81
    percent of women (compared with 69.3 percent of men) between the ages
    of 15 and 49 received no education. A 1998 report indicated that
    national literacy rate was 12 percent for women over 15 years of age.
    Women constitute approximately 15 percent of the labor force. The
    Government, the country's major employer, pays women the same as men
    for similar work. Women often live under harsh conditions, especially
    in rural areas, where they perform difficult farm work and do most of
    the childrearing. Despite legislation giving women equal rights
    regarding property, traditional practice and ignorance of the law
    prevent women from taking full advantage of the law. Prospective
    spouses choose between polygynous and monogamous marriages; both
    parties must consent to the marriage. However, when no preference is
    specified in the marriage certificate, judges assume that the marriage
    is polygynous. A community property marriage must be specified in the
    marriage contract. Traditional practice discriminates against women in
    inheritance matters.
        Women have equal access to military service, and there are
    approximately 2,500 women and 8,000 men in the armed forces. Service in
    the armed forces is not obligatory; there is alternative national
    service available both to men and women.
        In 1996 the Government launched a 4-year national plan of action
    for the promotion of women. The plan, financed by national, regional,
    and local community budgets, seeks to reduce inequalities between men
    and women in six target areas, including education, health, and legal
    rights. Despite its initial 4-year mandate, the plan is not close to
    completion, and it was not extended officially during the year;
    however, it continued to influence government project development.
        There are numerous, active women's groups that promoted the rights
    of women and children. Women have very limited access to legal
    services. They are particularly vulnerable in cases of divorce, child
    custody, and inheritance rights, as well as in the general protection
    of civil rights.
        Children.--Although by law primary education is compulsory and free
    through the sixth grade, only 50 percent of children receive a basic
    education. Literacy rates among females remain significantly lower than
    for males. There is a low degree of adherence to the requirement for
    compulsory education, a lack of primary schools, poverty, cultural
    tendencies to place less emphasis on education for girls, and the fact
    that most of the population live in rural areas.
        There is no constitutional or legal provision to protect the
    interests and rights of children, and there is no juvenile court
    system. However, the Malian Social Services Department investigates and
    intervenes in cases of reported child abuse or neglect. According to
    local human rights organizations, reported cases are rare; however,
    statistics are unreliable.
        There were credible reports that children were sold into forced
    labor in Cote d'Ivoire (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Female genital mutilation, which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is still common, especially in rural areas, and
    is performed on girls at an early age. According to domestic NGO's,
    approximately 95 percent of adult women have undergone FGM. The
    practice is widespread among most regions and ethnic groups, is not
    subject to class boundaries, and is not religiously based. There are no
    laws against FGM, and the Government has not proposed legislation
    prohibiting FGM. The Government is pursuing a program of public
    awareness rather than legal prosecution of women involved in the
    practice. It supports educational efforts to eliminate the practice
    through seminars and conferences and provides media access to
    proponents of its elimination. In 1997 the Ministry for the Promotion
    of Women created a National Committee Against Violence Towards Women
    that links all the NGO's active in preventing FGM. Throughout the year,
    various NGO's campaigned against FGM. In 1999 the Government instituted
    a two-phased plan to eliminate all forms of FGM by 2008. The first
    phase, scheduled for 1999-2004, is intended to be one of education and
    dissemination of information. There has been some public dissemination
    of information in urban areas, but the program has developed slowly.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no specific legislation
    protecting the rights of the physically or mentally disabled, nor
    mandating accessibility. The Government does not discriminate against
    the physically disabled in regard to employment, education, and other
    state services; however, the Government has not made provision for the
    disabled in these areas. There is no societal discrimination against
    the disabled; however, in view of the high unemployment rate, the
    physically disabled often are unable to find work.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of about 10
    million is ethnically, culturally, and regionally diverse. Major
    ethnic-cultural groups include: the Mande, concentrated in the
    southwest, which constitutes about half the population and includes the
    Bambara and Malinke ethnic groups; the Voltaic, concentrated in the
    south and comprising the Bobo and Senoufo groups; the Sudanic,
    concentrated in the central regions and comprising the Sarakole,
    Songhai, Dogon, and Bozo groups; and the pastoralist, comprising the
    Tuaregs and Moors of the northeast and northwest, respectively, and the
    Peul (or Fulani) widely dispersed from east to west across the southern
    third of the country.
        Longstanding tensions between the long-marginalized Moor and Tuareg
    pastoralist groups and the more populous nonpastoralist groups have
    been a leading source of political instability and violence, including
    the Tuareg rebellions of the early 1990's. In June and July 1999, there
    were two violent incidents over natural resource management between
    Fulani herders and Sarakole farmers in the western region of Kayes
    bordering Senegal and Mauritania. A dozen persons were killed, and
    several were wounded. Clashes between Arab and Kounta communities in
    September 1999 resulted in the death of 33 persons, with several others
    wounded. In both cases, traditional and parliamentary mediators
    negotiated peace between the parties in conflict. There were no further
    incidents during the year.
        No single ethnic group predominates in either the private sector or
    the public sector. All three presidents since independence have been
    affiliated with the Bambara group, which accounts for roughly half of
    the country's population, but no ethnic group holds disproportionate
    numbers of government positions or predominates in the military or
    civil service. Political parties, by and large, do not have readily
    identifiable ethnic bases, but some reflect regional constituencies.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    specifically provide for the freedom of workers to form or join unions
    and protect freedom of association. Only the military, the Gendarmerie,
    and the National Guard are excluded from forming unions. Virtually all
    salaried employees are organized. Workers have established independent
    unions for teachers, magistrates, health workers, and senior civil
    servants, and most are affiliated with the National Union of Malian
    Workers (UNTM) confederation. The UNTM has maintained its autonomy from
    the Government.
        There are two major labor federations, the UNTM and the Syndicated
    Confederation of Malian Workers (CSTM). The UNTM, formerly the only
    major labor body, split in late 1997, dividing the country's 12 labor
    organizations into 2 federations.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, although there
    are restrictions in some areas. For example, civil servants and workers
    in state-owned enterprises must give 2 weeks' notice of a planned
    strike and must enter into mediation and negotiations with the employer
    and a third party, usually the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Code
    prohibits retribution against strikers, and the Government respects
    this requirement in practice. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO) requested the Government to amend Section 229 of the 1992 Labor
    Code to restrict the Minister of Labor's authority to impose
    arbitration to end strikes that were liable to cause an acute national
    crisis. The Government noted in its report to the ILO that it was
    undertaking an in-depth, tripartite discussion on Section 229 to make
    the legislation fully consistent with the principles of freedom of
    association; at year's end, the review was ongoing.
        During the year, there were strikes in the transportation, cotton
    growing, and public sectors for better conditions and higher wages. In
    all cases, the Government negotiated in good faith, and the strikes
    ended peacefully. In July judges went on strike to demand better
    working conditions. The strike ended when the Government agreed to
    renegotiate salaries and provide security for judges who believed that
    they were threatened because of their work.
        Unions are free to associate with and participate in international
    bodies. The union representing salaried employees regularly
    participated in programs sponsored by French labor unions. Other unions
    have participated in various programs sponsored by international
    unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The growth of
    independent unions has led to more direct bargaining between these
    unions and their employers. However, wages and salaries for workers
    belonging to the UNTM unions are set by tripartite negotiations between
    the Ministry of Labor, labor unions, and representatives of the
    federation of employers of the sector to which the wages apply. Salary
    levels are pegged nationally to an index established by the Government
    on which civil service pay is based. These negotiations usually set the
    pattern for unions outside the UNTM. The Ministry of Labor acts as a
    mediator in labor disputes. The 1997 split in the UNTM did not change
    the basic procedures of these negotiations.
        Neither the Constitution nor the Labor Code addresses the question
    of antiunion discrimination, but there have been no reports or
    complaints of antiunion behavior or activities. If the parties cannot
    come to agreement, the dispute goes to the Labor Court for decision.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
    children; however, organized traffickers sold Malian children into
    forced labor in Cote d'Ivoire (see Section 6.f.).
        The law prohibits the contractual use of persons without their
    consent; penalties included a fine and hard labor. The penalties
    increased significantly if a minor, defined as someone under 15 years
    of age, was involved.
        Although there have been no other reports of forced or bonded child
    labor, apprenticeship, often in a family member's or a parent's
    vocation, begins at an early age, especially for children unable to
    attend school.
        There were some reports that the de facto slavery long reported to
    have existed in northern salt mining communities has evolved toward
    wage labor in recent years; however, reliable current evidence about
    labor conditions in those remote facilities remained unavailable.
    Hereditary servitude relationships link different ethnic groups,
    particularly in the north. For example, there is a hereditary service
    relationship between members of the Bellah ethnic group and other
    Tuareg populations.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1996 Labor Code has specific policies that pertain to
    child labor. The authorities enforce the Labor Code provisions through
    the use of labor inspectors from the Ministry of Employment, Public
    Service, and Labor who conduct surprise inspections and complaint-based
    inspections; however, resource limitations restrict the frequency and
    effectiveness of oversight by the Labor Inspection Service, and the
    Service operates only in the modern sector.
        The Labor Code permits children between the ages of 12 and 14 to
    work up to 2 hours per day during school vacations with parental
    approval. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 may work up to 4+
    hours per day with the permission of a labor inspector, but not during
    nights, holidays, or Sundays. Children between the ages of 16 and 18
    may work in jobs that are not physically demanding; boys may work up to
    8 hours per day and girls up to 6 hours per day.
        These regulations often are ignored in practice. Moreover, the
    Labor Code has no effect on the vast number of children who work in
    rural areas, helping with family farms and herds, and on those who work
    in the informal sector, for example, as street vendors. These children
    are not protected by laws against unjust compensation, excessive hours,
    or capricious discharge.
        The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
    child labor on July 14. The Programme National de Lutte contre le
    Travail des Enfants au Mali, led by the International Program for the
    Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC)-Mali, is responsible for
    investigating abusive forms of child labor. IPEC relies on labor
    inspectors appointed by the Government in Bamako and in regional
    offices in the country. IPEC also was assisted by NGO's combating child
    labor and government regional offices in charge of the promotion of
    women and children. Government resources include inspectors, NGO's, and
    IPEC funding. There is no predetermined number of inspections per year;
    however, investigations are held when information is provided by NGO's
    or the media that there is an instance of abusive child labor.
        Education is free and, in principle, is open to all, although the
    majority of students leave school by the age of 12. Students must
    provide their own uniforms and school supplies to attend public
    schools. While primary school is compulsory, only 50 percent of
    children receive a basic education. Child labor predominates in the
    agricultural sector and, to a lesser degree, in crafts and trades
    apprenticeships, and cottage industries.
        The Labor Code prohibits forced or bonded child labor; however,
    Malian children were sold into forced labor abroad by organized
    traffickers, and apprenticeship begins at an early age (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code specifies
    conditions of employment, including hours, wages, and social security;
    however, in practice many employers either ignore or do not comply
    completely with the regulations. The national minimum wage rate, set in
    1994, is approximately $40 (26,000 CFA francs) per month. Workers must
    be paid overtime for additional hours. The minimum wage does not
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The
    minimum wage is supplemented by a required package of benefits,
    including social security and health care. While this total package
    could provide a minimum standard of living for one person, in practice
    most wage earners support large extended families and must supplement
    their income by some subsistence farming or work in the informal
    sector.
        The normal legal workweek is 40 hours (45 hours for agricultural
    employees), with a requirement for at least one 24-hour rest period.
    The Social Security Code provides a broad range of legal protection
    against hazards in the workplace, and workers' groups have brought
    pressure on employers to respect parts of the regulations, particularly
    those affecting personal hygiene. However, with high unemployment,
    workers often are reluctant to report violations of occupational safety
    regulations. The Labor Inspection Service of the Ministry of Labor
    oversees these standards but limits enforcement to the modern, formal
    sector. It was not effective in investigating and enforcing workers''
    safety and was funded insufficiently for its responsibilities. Workers
    have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations and
    request an investigation by the Social Security Department, which is
    responsible for recommending remedial action where deemed necessary.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--While the law does not specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, there are laws that prohibit the
    contractual use of persons without their consent; however, children are
    trafficked for forced labor in Cote d'Ivoire. An estimated 15,000
    Malian children between the ages of 9 and 12 have been sold into forced
    labor on the cotton, coffee, and cocoa plantations of northern Cote
    d'Ivoire over the past few years; an even greater number have been
    pressed into domestic service. Organized networks of traffickers
    deceive the children and their families into believing that they will
    be given paid jobs outside of their villages. They then are sold to
    plantation owners for sums ranging from $20 to $40 (10,000 to 20,000
    CFA). According to media reports the children are forced to work 12
    hours per day without pay, and often they are abused physically.
        Penalties for violations of the law prohibiting forced contractual
    labor include a fine or hard labor; penalties increase if a minor is
    involved; however, these penalties were not applied during the year.
    The problem of trafficking is handled by both the Ministry for the
    Promotion of Women, Children, and the Family and the Ministry of
    Employment, Public Services, and Labor; however, there is no specific
    program of protection for victims. Both ministries in coordination with
    the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Territorial
    Administration have developed a program designed to operate until the
    end of 2001 to identify and rehabilitate victims, educate the
    population, and strengthen the legal system with regard to the movement
    and trafficking of minors. However, at year's end, the program was
    still being organized.
        The Government took some steps to halt child trafficking and
    repatriate children to the country from Cote d'Ivoire; however, there
    was no estimate of the number of children in Cote d'Ivoire. In the
    spring, more than 50 children were returned to their families from Cote
    d'Ivoire. In August the Governments of Mali and Cote d'Ivoire signed a
    treaty to cooperate in combating trafficking; however, no traffickers
    were prosecuted during the year.
        The Government assisted repatriated workers in communicating with
    family members; however, the total of those assisted was unknown,
    partly because the number of trafficked persons in neighboring
    countries could not be determined.
                                   __________

                                   MAURITANIA

        Mauritania is a highly centralized Islamic Republic dominated by a
    strong presidency. The 1991 Constitution provides for a civilian
    government composed of a dominant executive branch, a senate, and a
    national assembly. President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya has governed
    since 1984, first as head of a military junta, and since the 1992
    multiparty election as head of a civilian government. In December 1997,
    Taya was reelected President, receiving over 90 percent of the vote.
    The election, which was contested by four opposition candidates but
    boycotted by the five-party Opposition Front coalition, was regarded
    widely as fraudulent. Most opposition parties also boycotted earlier
    parliamentary elections but participated in senate elections in 1994
    and 1996; they gained only one seat. In the country's first multiparty
    elections to the 79-member National Assembly held in 1996, 1 opposition
    and 6 independent candidates were elected; candidates of the ruling
    Republican, Democratic and Social Party (PRDS) won 72 seats. The
    outcome of these elections was marred by fraud on all sides and
    pervasive government intervention. Senate elections held in April
    generally were considered free and fair by international observers;
    however, some opposition parties boycotted the election, and only the
    governing party and the parties associated with it presented
    candidates. The elections resulted in the one sitting opposition member
    being reelected along with three independents. The Constitution
    provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary is
    subject to significant pressure from the executive through its ability
    to influence judges.
        The Government maintains order with regular armed forces, the
    National Guard, the Gendarmerie, and the police. The Ministry of
    Defense directs the armed forces and Gendarmerie; the Ministry of
    Interior directs the National Guard and police. The armed forces are
    responsible for national defense. The National Guard performs police
    functions throughout the country in areas in which city police are not
    present. The Gendarmerie is a specialized paramilitary group
    responsible for maintenance of civil order in and outside metropolitan
    areas. Security forces are under the full control of the Government and
    are responsible to it. Some members of the security forces committed
    human rights abuses.
        Mauritania, which has an estimated population of 2.5 million, has a
    generally market-oriented economy based on fishing, mining, subsistence
    farming, herding, and a small commercial sector. Fish and iron ore are
    the country's main export-earners. Drought, desertification, and insect
    infestation have contributed to rapid urbanization, extensive
    unemployment, pervasive poverty, and a burdensome foreign debt. The
    concentration of much of the country's wealth in the hands of a small
    elite, including the President's tribe and related Moor tribes, as well
    as a lack of transparency and accountability in certain areas of
    governance, also impedes economic growth. Annual per capita national
    income is estimated at $440. Mauritania receives foreign assistance
    from bilateral and multilateral sources.
        The Government's human rights record remained generally poor; there
    was some improvement in a few areas, but problems remained in others.
    Democratic institutions remain rudimentary, and the Government
    circumscribes citizens' ability to change their government. Police used
    excessive force, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and used arbitrary
    arrest and detention, incommunicado detention, and illegal searches;
    however, reports of police abuses decreased during the year. The
    Government failed to bring to justice most officials who committed
    abuses, although some abuses were sanctioned during the year. Prison
    conditions remained harsh and unhealthy; however, a new men's prison
    was completed in Nouakchott which improved overcrowding and unsanitary
    conditions. Pretrial detention continued; however, the length of pre-
    trial detentions were shorter due to improved organization of the
    courts. The Government continued its program of judicial reform and
    training; however, the executive continued to exercise significant
    pressure on the judiciary, and in practice the right to a fair trial
    was not always realized. At times the Government restricted freedom of
    speech. While the Government tolerates a critical independent press, it
    continued to censor individual editions. The Government restricted
    freedom of assembly and used excessive force in breaking up
    demonstrations by the major opposition party. In May during a period of
    widespread public unrest, the Government banned all public
    demonstrations. The Government limited freedom of assembly and
    religion. The Government continued to refuse to recognize officially
    some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and human rights
    organizations. Discrimination against women continued, and female
    genital mutilation (FGM) remained a serious problem despite government
    efforts to halt the practice. Ethnic tensions continued to ease, but
    the largely southern-based ethnic groups, including the Halpulaar (also
    called Fulani or Peuhl), Soninke, and Wolof ethnic groups, remained
    underrepresented in political life and some of their members feel
    excluded from effective political representation. Child labor in the
    informal sector is common. A system of officially sanctioned slavery in
    which government and society join to force individuals to serve masters
    does not exist; however, there continued to be reports that slavery in
    the form of forced and involuntary servitude persists in some isolated
    areas, or that unofficial, voluntary servitude persists and that former
    slaves continue to work for former masters or others for food, shelter,
    and clothing, although they were under no legal compulsion to do so.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other forms of cruel or
    inhuman punishment; however, the police reportedly continued on
    occasion to beat criminal suspects while in custody. Police used undue
    force in controlling public crowds and breaking up peaceful
    demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). In April authorities forcibly
    disrupted political opposition demonstrations in Nouakchott and
    Nouadhibou and beat some demonstrators protesting the detention of an
    opposition leader (see Sections 1.d and 2.b.). On June 17 and 18,
    police used excessive force in breaking up demonstrations by Black
    Moors protesting land redistribution, which resulted in some
    demonstrators being beaten and injured (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and
    2.d.). The Government sanctioned the Governor and the head of police by
    removing them from their posts.
        In 1999 the Director of Security traveled to each region of the
    country to meet with police forces to inform their members that the
    Government would not tolerate the use of torture or undue force and
    that violators would be prosecuted. These visits reportedly were
    successful. The Government has continued its in-service training of
    police and other security personnel, which has shown some positive
    results. Reports of the use of excessive force, requests for payoffs,
    or other abusive behavior decreased during the year, and some violators
    were sanctioned.
        In July 1999, two Halpulaar political refugees in France charged
    Mauritanian Captain Ely Ould Dah, a Black Moor in France as part of a
    military cooperation program, with having tortured them during events
    in 1990 and 1991. A French judge in Montpellier had Ould Dah arrested
    under the International Convention against Torture. The arrest sparked
    a lively debate among opinion leaders from all ethnic groups, which was
    covered extensively in the press, on how to further national
    reconciliation (see Section 4). While awaiting trial in France, Ould
    Dah forfeited bail and returned to Mauritania on April 4, apparently
    with the aid of the Government of Mauritania.
        In past years, the National Guard has fired on fish poachers
    causing at least one injury. In July the Government signed an agreement
    with the Government of Senegal to allow and regulate through licensing
    the fishing of small craft fishermen in each others'' waters. Since the
    agreement, there have been no further incidents of police shootings.
        Prison conditions remained harsh; however, conditions in
    Nouakchott's prison continued to improve due to the opening of a newly
    constructed section of the men's prison, which put an end to serious
    overcrowding. The former men's prison is used to provide space for
    educational and sports programs for children. In other prisons,
    overcrowding persisted and sanitation facilities remained inadequate
    and reportedly have contributed to diseases such as tuberculosis,
    diarrhea, and dermatological ailments. Medical supplies, mainly
    provided by an international NGO, remained insufficient in all prisons.
    Some prisoners received special treatment based on family and position.
    Prisoners with high-level connections and families to bring them food,
    medicines, and reading material fared better than the less privileged
    or citizens from other countries. New guard force management continued
    to enforce instructions against beatings and torture; however, there
    were reports of beatings of detainees at the Commissariat outside of
    the prison. The overall prison capacity is 700 and the prison
    population was 1,352 in 1999. The prison population in Nouakchott was
    567, a decrease of 100 from 1998 as a result of shorter pretrial
    detention. There were 517 men, 24 women and 26 minors; minors are held
    in separate facilities. In May 1999, female prisoners were moved to a
    new upgraded facility that contained a communal garden. Children of
    female prisoners remain with their mothers or the Ministry of Justice
    gives temporary custody of the children to another family member. The
    Noura Foundation, an NGO working in the prison, continued to provide a
    program of education and microenterprise projects to the female
    prisoners. UNICEF in collaboration with the French organization CARITAS
    has been providing increased services including training and sports in
    the juvenile detention centers. The Government cooperated with an NGO
    to provide training for female guards to replace the male guards
    currently at the women's prison; in March the Ministry of Justice
    appointed 15 women to serve as prison guards in the women's prison as a
    protective measure for female prisoners. A doctor and nurse assigned to
    the men's prison also provide medical care for the women's and
    children's prison, but the infirmary remains understaffed.
        The new prison administration instituted in August 1997 has
    improved markedly the conditions of prison food, health, hygiene, and
    family contacts; however, last year's budget funding for increased
    expenditures per prisoner for improved food and nutrition, medical
    services and supplies, and new bedding and cleaning supplies was not
    met.
        The Government permits prison visits by domestic and international
    diplomats and human rights monitors. Foreign diplomats visited some
    prisons during the year. The International Committee of the Red Cross
    (ICRC) has access to prisons, but did not conduct prison visits during
    the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    stipulates that authorities cannot arrest, detain, prosecute, or punish
    anyone except as provided for under the law; however, at times police
    arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The actual application of
    the constitutional safeguards continued to vary widely from case to
    case.
        The law requires that courts review the legality of a person's
    detention within 48 hours of arrest. The police may extend the period
    for another 48 hours, and a prosecutor or court may detain persons for
    up to 30 days in national security cases. Only after the prosecutor
    submits charges does a suspect have the right to contact an attorney.
        Human rights activists report that police showed greater respect
    for legally mandated procedures and that prison administration
    continued to show improvement; however, pretrial detention after
    arraignment often is prolonged. An estimated 15 to 20 percent of those
    in prison have not yet been tried, or were awaiting sentencing
    following their trials. In May the Government and an NGO sponsored a
    10-day seminar for 50 police officers to inform them of the rights of
    children and the legal treatment of detained suspects.
        Some indicted detainees are released before trial without
    explanation; familial, tribal, or political connections may explain
    some of these cases. There is a provision for granting bail, but it is
    used rarely.
        Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest, detention, and
    intimidation against the banned opposition party. Police detained Ahmed
    Ould Daddah, leader of the banned opposition party Union of Democratic
    Forces-New Era (UFD-A) and held him for 5 days in April; police
    arrested Ould Daddah again in December and held him incommunicado for 3
    days before releasing him (see Section 2.b). Ould Daddah never was
    charged, but was questioned by the Government about his contacts with
    foreign and local political groups. Other party leaders and members in
    Nouakchott and Nouadhibou protesting his detention in April were beaten
    and detained (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        There continued to be occasional reports of arbitrary arrest and
    detention by security forces against those protesting the
    redistribution of land and against returned refugees in communities in
    the south along the Senegal River (see Section 1.f and 2.d.) The reform
    has met with resistance from those who had part of their traditional
    landholdings that had lain fallow confiscated. On June 18, police
    arrested and beat 13 people in the Brakna region, who protested the
    redistribution of their traditionally held land to relatives of the
    Wali (Governor); they were released 2 weeks later (see Section 1.c.).
    The Governor and the head of police were removed from their posts in
    September. At year's end, the land still had not been restored to its
    original owners. In some cases the fallow land was granted to wealthy
    Moors who developed commercial agricultural enterprises (see Section
    1.f.).
        There were no reports of forced exile. The Government continued to
    welcome the return of any citizens who had been expelled or who had
    fled from 1989 to 1991.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
    for the independence of the judiciary, in practice the executive branch
    exercises significant pressure on the judiciary through its ability to
    appoint and influence judges. In addition poorly educated and poorly
    trained judges who are susceptible to social, financial, tribal, and
    personal pressures limit the judicial system's fairness. However, the
    Government is carrying out a program to improve judicial performance
    and independence.
        There is a single system of courts with a modernized legal system
    that conforms with the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law). The
    judicial system includes lower-, middle-, and upperlevel courts, each
    with specific jurisdictions. Departmental, regional, and labor
    tribunals are the principal instances at the lower level. The 53
    departmental tribunals, composed of a president and magistrates with
    traditional Islamic legal training, hear civil cases involving sums
    less than $41 (10,000 UM) and family issues, such as domestic, divorce,
    and inheritance cases. Thirteen regional tribunals accept appeals in
    commercial and civil matters from the departmental tribunals and hear
    misdemeanors. Three labor tribunals, composed of a president and two
    assessors (one who represents labor and one who represents employers),
    serve as final arbiters for labor disputes. At the middle level, three
    courts of appeal, each with two chambers (a civil and commercial
    chamber, and a mixed chamber) hear appeals from the regional courts and
    have original jurisdiction for felonies. Nominally independent, the
    Supreme Court is headed by a magistrate appointed to a 5-year term by
    the President. The Supreme Court reviews decisions and rulings made by
    the courts of appeal to determine their compliance with the law and
    procedure. Constitutional review is within the purview of a six-member
    Constitutional Council, composed of three members named by the
    President, two by the National Assembly President, and one by the
    Senate President. Annual review of judicial decisions is undertaken by
    the Supreme Council of Magistrates, over which the President presides;
    the president and senior vice president of the Supreme Court, the
    Minister of Justice, three magistrates, and representatives from the
    Senate and National Assembly are members of this Council. The annual
    review is intended to determine whether courts applied the law
    correctly and followed proper procedures. The most recent review was
    used as a basis for evaluating the reform process, providing for
    retraining of judges, and making reassignments based on their
    qualifications.
        The minimum age for children to be tried is 12. Those between the
    ages of 12 and 18 are tried and sentenced to the juvenile detention
    center (see Section 1.c.). In April a special court to hear the cases
    of children under the age of 18 became operational. Children appearing
    before the court received more lenient sentences than did adults, and
    extenuating circumstances were considered.
        In March the Government continued its education program to upgrade
    the qualifications and training of judicial personnel. In September the
    Government convened a Congress under the auspices of the Minister of
    Justice for government and non-governmental lawyers, magistrates, and
    other judicial professionals. Thirty judicial personnel, out of a total
    of 224, received overseas training to qualify them for one of the
    specialized courts: Children, civil, administrative, commercial, or
    correctional.
        The Constitution provides for due process and the presumption of
    innocence until proven guilty by an established tribunal. All
    defendants, regardless of the court or their ability to pay, have the
    legal right to representation by counsel during the proceedings, which
    are open to the public. If defendants lack the ability to pay for
    counsel, the court appoints an attorney from a list prepared by the
    National Order of Lawyers, which provides defense free of charge. The
    law provides that defendants may confront witnesses, present evidence,
    and appeal their sentences, and these rights generally are observed in
    practice.
        Shari'a Islamic law provides the legal principles upon which the
    law and legal procedure are based, and because of the manner in which
    Shari'a is implemented in the country, courts do not in all cases treat
    women as the equals of men (see Section 5). For example, the testimony
    of two women is necessary to equal that of one man. In addition in
    awarding an indemnity to the family of a woman who has been killed, the
    courts grant only half the amount that they would award for a man's
    death. For commercial and other modern issues not specifically
    addressed by Shari'a, the law and courts treat women and men equally.
        With international assistance, the Government continued a program
    to improve judicial performance and independence, which consists of
    organizing all laws and statutes into a single reference text and
    training officials throughout the justice system. Separate tribunals
    established in 1999 for specific types of disputes held court sessions
    more frequently, and in July, as a result of dropping of the
    requirement to have three judicial personnel present for each trial,
    pre-trial detention periods generally were shorter. The Government
    continued to hold security officials accountable and prosecuted
    officials for abuses. This has improved the public perception of the
    judicial system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires judicial warrants in order to execute
    home searches; however, the authorities reportedly often ignore this
    requirement.
        Government surveillance of dissidents and the political opposition
    is believed to continue, although the extent to which the Government
    used informants is unknown.
        There were a number of reports that some Government officials were
    misappropriating land under the land reform system, confiscating the
    land of southern ethnic groups or the land traditionally held by
    Haratines, and distributing it to their own friends and family (see
    Section 6.c.). The Government began implementation of the 1983 land
    reform law in 1990. The reform aimed at providing land for rural
    landless persons, including victims of desertification in the northern
    and central regions (both White Moors and Black Moors) and also, in
    recent years, for returning southerners who had been expelled from 1989
    to 1991. The reform also aimed to increase the amount of land under
    cultivation by leasing uncultivated land to those with the means to
    cultivate it. The unconfirmed reports of confiscation may reflect
    abuses in the program's implementation; the proper implementation of
    the land reform does not leave families landless, and the program is
    not explicitly discriminatory. However, there may have been a net
    redistribution of land from southerners and Haratines to White Moors
    under that program, since the south has been less affected by
    desertification than the more northerly regions historically inhabited
    by the Moors. There also were some reports that some southerners who
    had been expelled or fled from the country from 1989 10 1991 were
    unable either to regain possession of the land they had farmed before
    1989 or to gain possession of other land from the Government, although
    other reports indicate that all those previously on the land were
    granted some land rights (see Sections 1.d. and 6.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continues
    to restrict these rights through prepublication press censorship by the
    Interior Ministry. NGO's and the privately owned press openly
    criticized the Government and its leaders. Antigovernment tracts,
    newsletters, and petitions circulated widely in Nouakchott and other
    towns.
        The Press Law requires publishers to submit copies of newspapers to
    the Ministries of Interior and Justice before distributing them. The
    Ministry of the Interior reviews all newspaper copy prior to
    publication and usually authorizes sales and distribution within 2 to 3
    days. However, the Press Law provides that the Minister of the Interior
    can stop publication of material that discredits Islam or threatens
    national security. During the year, the authorities seized 13
    individual issues of different journals and, on December 16, banned the
    weekly newspaper Al Alam. In November the GIRM suspended the
    accreditation of a Middle East Information Agency representative. The
    Government provided no specific reasons for the seizures, the censure
    or the banning other than to cite Article 11 of the Constitution, which
    prohibits materials that undermine national sovereignty, territorial
    integrity, or national unity.
        All newspapers must register with the Ministry of the Interior.
    There are over 400 journals and newspapers registered with the Ministry
    of the Interior, a third of which do not publish regularly, some never
    having issued an edition. There only are approximately 20 privately
    owned newspapers that publish on a regular basis. These journals are
    weeklies and reach limited audiences. The Government issues press cards
    to journalists and requires that they show this identification for
    participation in official press events. Private journals reported
    openly and critically on both the opposition and the Government and
    published party declarations and tracts without government censure or
    restraint during the municipal elections. Publications are exempt from
    all taxes on materials used to produce newspapers, journals, or books
    for the private press.
        All broadcast media (radio and television) and two daily
    newspapers, Horizons and Chaab, are government-owned and operated.
    Radio is the most important medium in reaching the public, and the
    official media strongly support government policies. During the April
    senatorial election campaign, the Government provided all candidates
    with equal access to its two newspapers and to the electronic media,
    allowing citizens to hear and read criticism of the Government in these
    media in addition to in the private press. Opposition parties' access
    to government radio broadcast facilities at other times is limited.
    Citizens can receive foreign television broadcasts including from
    France and from Arab countries; however, in October the Government
    requested that the Government of Qatar discontinue its Al Jazeera
    broadcast in the country, which had aired several programs highly
    critical of the GIRM. In November the Government also discontinued
    broadcasts of Radio France International for the same reason. The
    Government continued to deny private applications to establish domestic
    radio stations.
        There are five domestic Internet servers, which operate without
    governmental restrictions. Internet connections exist in Nouadhibou,
    the major commercial center, and five other regional capitals.
        Academic freedom generally is respected, and there were no cases in
    which the Government prevented research or publication or censored
    lectures. The country's one university is governmentfunded and
    operated.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricted
    this right in practice and forcibly dispersed some demonstrations by
    the opposition (see Sections 1.c and 1.d.). The law requires that all
    recognized political parties and NGO's apply to the local prefect for
    permission for large meetings or assemblies.
        In April authorities forcibly disrupted demonstrations by the
    political opposition protesting increased prices in Nouakchott and
    Nouadhibou. Authorities used teargas and batons to forcibly disperse
    demonstrators and injured three people in Nouakchott and two in
    Nouadhibou (see Section 1.c. and 1.d.).
        Beginning in May, in response to widespread demonstrations on price
    increases and the situation in the Middle East, the Government banned
    all public demonstrations and dispersed some demonstrations. The
    Government also refused to grant permits to demonstrators.
        Citizens in the southwest demonstrated on June 17 and 18 to protest
    land redistribution policies in their region. Police forcibly disrupted
    the demonstrations and detained and beat 13 persons (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.d., and 1.f.).
        A number of public marches in November and December protesting
    violence in the Middle East became violent. The authorities used force,
    injured protestors, and prohibited all further public demonstrations.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government limited this right in practice and circumscribed the efforts
    of some groups by denying them official recognition. All political
    parties must register with the Ministry of the Interior. The number of
    political parties, labor unions, and NGO's continued to increase. Some
    23 political parties and a wide array of NGO's, many of them highly
    critical of the Government, functioned openly, issued public
    statements, and chose their own leadership. Since September 1998, the
    Government has recognized 75 new NGO's and associations, bringing the
    total of such organizations to more than 600. The Government has not
    yet granted some NGO's official standing but did not prevent them from
    functioning. Among these are the Mauritanian Association for Human
    Rights (AMDH) and SOS-Esclaves (an antislavery NGO), which the
    Government claims are potentially divisive in that they appeal to
    specific ethnic groups, namely the southern and Black Moor communities
    respectively. However, in October the Government dissolved the major
    opposition party, the Union of Democratic Forces (UFD), claiming it
    threatened security by inciting violence.
        Following diplomatic confrontation with Iraq, resulting from
    Mauritania's opening full diplomatic relations with Israel, the
    Government accused Iraq of undertaking subversive action against it,
    fomenting violent antigovernment demonstrations, and financing the
    Taliaa (Vanguard) political party. The Government disbanded the Taliaa
    party, whose officials had been meeting with Iraqi Ba'ath party
    representatives, citing constitutional prohibitions against
    ``cooperation with a foreign party, accepting foreign funds for
    political propaganda, and carrying out illegal acts.''
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the country
    as an Islamic republic and decrees that Islam is the religion of its
    citizens and the State, and the Government accordingly limits freedom
    of religion.
        There is no religious oath required of government employees or
    members of the ruling political party, except for the President and the
    members of the 5-person Constitutional Council and the 10-person High
    Council of Magistrates presided over by the President. The
    Constitutional Council and the High Council of Magistrates advise the
    President in matters of law and the Constitution. The oath of office
    includes a promise to God to uphold the law of the land in conformity
    with Islamic precepts.
        All but a small number of citizens are Sunni Muslims and are
    prohibited by their religion from converting to another religion.
    Shari'a, proclaimed under a previous government in 1983, includes the
    Koranic prohibition against apostasy; however, it has never been
    codified in civil law or enforced. The small number of known converts
    from Islam suffered no social ostracism, and there were no reports of
    societal or governmental attempts to punish them.
        Although there is no legal codification of a prohibition against
    proselytizing by non-Muslims, in practice the Government prohibits
    proselytizing by non-Muslims under Article 11 of the Press Act, which
    bans the publication of any material that is against Islam or
    contradicts or otherwise threatens Islam. The Government views any
    attempts by Christians to convert Muslims as undermining society. There
    are no known non-Muslim groups engaged in proselytizing; foreign
    Christian NGO's limit their activities to humanitarian and development
    assistance.
        Christians in the foreign community and the few Christian citizens
    practice their religion openly and freely. Under Article 11 of the
    Press Law, the Government may restrict the importation, printing, or
    public distribution of Bibles or other non-Islamic religious
    literature, and in practice Bibles are neither printed nor sold
    publicly in the country. However, the possession of Bibles and other
    Christian religious materials in private homes is not illegal, and
    Bibles and other religious publications are available among the small
    Christian community.
        In addition to privately-run Koranic schools that nearly all
    children attend, the public schools include classes on religion. These
    classes teach both the history and principles of Islam and the
    classical Arabic of the Koran. Although attendance at these religion
    classes is ostensibly required, many students, the great majority of
    whom are Muslims, decline to attend these classes for diverse ethno-
    linguistic and religious reasons. They nevertheless are able to advance
    in school and ultimately to graduate with diplomas, provided that they
    compensate for their failure to attend the required religion classes by
    their performance in other classes.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement and residence within all parts of the territory, and provides
    for the freedom to enter and leave, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice. Historically there were few
    restrictions on travel in Mauritania's nomadic society. With
    urbanization and automobile travel, the Government has set up regular
    road checkpoints where the Gendarmerie checks the papers of travelers,
    and reportedly often solicits bribes. During the year, the Government
    reduced the number of road checkpoints, and reduced the time taken in
    questioning and conducting vehicle searches; however, there were
    reports that searches conducted in the southern border areas continued
    to be more stringent.
        Of the approximately 70,000 members of largely southern-based
    ethnic groups who were expelled by the Government or fled to Senegal
    and Mali during the 1989-91 crisis, and of those born abroad since that
    time, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documented 33,248
    returnees to four provinces along the Senegal River. Both the UNHCR and
    the Government agreed that many others have returned on their own to
    the larger towns and cities. Many more returnees among nomads, who are
    difficult to document, and urban dwellers are not included in UNHCR's
    figures. Informed observers estimate that the actual number of
    returnees ranges between 40,000 and 65,000. Entire villages as well as
    almost all Peulh (nomadic herders of the Halpulaar ethnic group) have
    returned. The Government has stated since 1993 that any citizen outside
    the country may return; however, the Government, the countries of
    asylum, and the UNHCR have signed no tripartite repatriation agreement.
    The UNHCR terminated programs to help returnees at the end of December
    1998. The UNHCR estimated that there are 15,000 to 20,000 Mauritanian
    refugees remaining in Senegal, although refugees have continued to
    return independently in small numbers and have benefited from small-
    scale agroforestry, health and sanitation projects continued by NGO's
    and humanitarian workers.
        Cooperation by local authorities in addressing restitution and
    citizenship matters varies greatly, depending on individual officials
    and the returnee's region. Repatriation efforts achieved greater
    results in the Trarza and Brakna regions than in Gorgol and Guidimaka
    to the east; however, observers noted that the situation in Gorgol
    improved considerably. Many returnees received their original homes,
    some property, and all or a portion of their land (see Section 1.f.).
    Timely restoration of identity papers varied, and some of those who
    returned in 1995 have not yet received identification cards. In some
    regions, persons lacking identity cards could not travel freely.
        The law does not contain provisions for the granting of refugee or
    asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, in practice the
    Government accepts UNHCR recommendations on the granting of asylum and
    refugee status. The Government, which has cooperated with the UNHCR and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees since 1989
    signed a local headquarters agreement with the UNHCR in May 1999. In
    recent years, the Government has provided first asylum to refugees from
    neighboring countries including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Ivory
    Coast, Mali, and Guinea Bissau. The Government also has accepted the
    UNHCR's registration of some 200 asylum seekers, mostly from Sierra
    Leone and Liberia.
        Mauritania is host to over 50,000 nationals of other West African
    countries who seek refuge and employment, primarily in Nouakchott and
    Nouadhibou. An estimated 60 percent of Mauritania's small craft
    fishermen are Senegalese. There is a population of approximately 300
    Sierra Leoneans living in Nouakchott. Some arrived more than 10 years
    ago and are fully employed. Approximately 225 of these have been
    granted refugee status and receive UNHCR assistance. The Sierra
    Leoneans held protest demonstrations at the U.N. compound on several
    occasions throughout the year demanding increased assistance and
    refugee status for all members of the group, including those with full-
    time employment, and resettlement in the West.
        Approximately 2,000 former refugees from Mali who could repatriate
    have remained in the country and largely have been integrated into the
    local population. Nearly all these Malian refugees are Moors. The UNHCR
    no longer considers them refugees.
        There were no reports of refugees being forced to return to a
    country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government; however, the Government circumscribes this right in
    practice. The 1992 multiparty election of a civilian president ended 14
    years of military rule; however, both the opposition and international
    observers concluded that the elections were fraudulent. Although
    civilians fill all ministerial-level positions, some members of the
    Military Council that ruled from 1984 to 1992, in addition to President
    Taya, remained in positions of power within the executive branch, the
    National Assembly, the armed forces, and government-owned enterprises.
    The armed forces avoided involvement in politics during the year; by
    law members of the military must resign if they wish to participate in
    partisan politics. Except during the election campaign, the Government
    denied elements of the opposition the opportunity to receive full
    access to government media and to compete on an equal footing.
        The country's first multiparty legislative elections were held in
    1996 and the ruling PRDS party won by an overwhelming majority;
    subsequent elections are scheduled to be held every 5 years. President
    Taya won an overwhelming victory in the 1997 presidential elections,
    although his opponents fared much better in the cities than in the
    rural areas. The official turnout of 75 percent and the winning
    percentage of 90 percent were inflated, since many individuals voted
    more than once. The Government distributed four voter registration
    cards to some persons, including government employees, instructing them
    to vote repeatedly for the incumbent. The opposition also distributed
    multiple voter registration cards to some persons, instructing them to
    vote repeatedly. The outcome of the elections was marred by fraud on
    all sides including pervasive government intervention to support
    candidates from the ruling party. The 1997 Presidential elections were
    boycotted by a coalition of four opposition parties that had demanded
    enhanced media access, an opposition role in election preparation,
    creation of an independent electoral commission, enlargement of the
    commission charged with revision of the electoral list, and provision
    of official copies of the voting report from each polling station to
    representatives of each candidate. During the election campaigning, the
    Government granted the opposition equal access to the official media,
    but did not meet the other demands.
        One-third of the Senate is elected by the indirect balloting of
    municipal councils every 2 years; the latest elections were held on
    April 17. The elections generally were well-organized and were
    considered free and fair by international observers. However, four
    parties of the Political Opposition Front boycotted the national
    elections. As a result, only the governing party and parties affiliated
    with the governing party presented candidates. The ruling parties
    gained 14 of 18 seats being contested with one independent retaining
    his seat and three members of the ruling PRDS gaining seats as nominal
    independents. The first female candidate was elected to the Senate.
        Elections are held by secret ballot. At polling places on election
    day, registered citizens receive a package of color-coded cards,
    containing one card for each candidate. Each citizen votes by entering
    a booth where they place the card of their candidate of choice into a
    sealed envelope. Voters then deposit the envelope into a sealed ballot
    box in front of observers from each political party. The unused cards
    are discarded on the floor. Although voters could in theory take the
    unused cards out of the polling place with them, the ready availability
    of many unused cards on the floor makes unused cards worthless as
    evidence of how a voter has voted and effectively eliminates the
    potential for abuse in such a multiple ballot system. A countrywide
    census, taken at the end of 1998, designed to register all citizens and
    standardize the current complex system of names, also was aimed in part
    at providing the basis for free and fair elections. In April the
    Government began the distribution of identity cards which is intended
    to form the basis for voter registration in future elections.
        The country is divided into 12 provinces that are divided further
    into prefectures. The Government appoints the Walis (governors) and
    Hakems (prefects). Municipal councils are elected by general ballot,
    and they elect their mayors, usually the head of the majority party's
    list. Most government services are provided by the central Government.
    The elected councils are responsible for some public services, such as
    sanitation, and have fiscal autonomy and taxing power. Their
    administrative staff is independent of the Government. The councils
    elect the national Senate.
        Women have the right to vote, and formed the majority of voters in
    the 1997 presidential election; however, women are underrepresented in
    government and politics. Women occupy some senior government positions:
    Four cabinet level posts including the cabinet-level post in charge of
    informatics, one secretary-general post, two senior presidential
    advisors (including a Halpulaar), and four senior advisors to
    ministers. Women are well represented in the Secretariat of Women's
    Affairs, including a number from minority ethnic groups. There are four
    female members of the National Assembly, and one newly elected Senator.
    Three of the 14 members of the Executive Bureau of the ruling PRDS are
    women, and a woman heads the UDP party, a part of the ruling coalition.
        Haratines, Halpulaars, Soninkes, and Wolofs are underrepresented in
    senior government positions. Of the Government's 20 ministerial posts,
    3 incumbents are Haratine, 2 are Halpulaar,
        1 is Soninke, and 1 is mixed White Moor/Soninke; the remaining 13
    are of either White Moor or mixed White Moor/Haratine ethnicity (see
    Section 5). The full 28-member Cabinet, including secretaries of state,
    has 4 Haratines, 3 Halpulaars,
        1 Soninke, and 1 mixed White Moor/Soninke. The 56-member Senate has
    3 Haratines, 4 Halpulaars, 3 Soninkes, and the remaining 46 are of
    either White Moor or mixed White Moor/Haratine heritage. The 79-member
    National Assembly has 2 Haratines, 7 Halpulaars, 2 Soninkes, and 1
    Wolof.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are three human rights organizations concerned with overall
    human rights issues, only one of which operates with official
    government registration. The oldest is the Mauritanian League for Human
    Rights (LMDH), an independent, government-recognized body. A second
    organization, the Mauritanian Human Rights Association (AMDH), is still
    unrecognized (see Section 2.b.). While not affiliated with the
    opposition, the AMDH has many opposition members. The AMDH has been
    more critical of the Government than the LMDH, particularly on the
    unresolved abuses of the 1989-91 period. The International Study and
    Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in
    Africa (GERDDES-Africa) established a branch in Mauritania in 1994 that
    has not been officially recognized. The Government has not responded to
    the applications of these organizations, on the grounds that they are
    ethnically based organizations that are in violation of the law and
    divisive; however, the unrecognized organizations continued to carry
    out their activities unimpeded.
        Other organizations, including 14 unregistered associations, also
    address human rights issues. Two groups, SOS-Esclaves and the National
    Committee for the Struggle Against the Vestiges of Slavery in
    Mauritania, focus their efforts on overcoming the country's vestiges of
    slavery (see Section 6.c.). SOS-Esclaves is particularly active in
    claiming that slavery remains pervasive and appealing to national and
    international audiences to contribute to its eradication. SOS-Esclaves
    leader Boubacar Ould Messoud traveled abroad freely in 1999 and made
    such claims during a speaking tour; however, during the year, Messoud
    did not conduct speaking tours and there were no reports of SOS-
    Esclaves activities.
        Attention to the events of 1989 through 1991 resurfaced following
    the arrest on July 3 of Captain Ely Ould Dah in France and his
    subsequent return on April 4 to the country. Ould Dah, who had been
    undergoing training at the French Army College, was accused by two
    Mauritanians resident in France of torturing them in 1990 (see Section
    1.c.). He was arrested under the International Convention Against
    Torture despite a general amnesty passed by Parliament in 1993. The
    Government reacted strongly to what it considered an infringement on
    its sovereignty by a French court and refused entry to a French
    prosecutor who sought to gather information to support the charges.
    Ould Dah was released on bail in September 1999 and was awaiting trial
    when he returned illegally on April 4 to Mauritania. The arrest and
    Dah's subsequent return engendered public debate on ways to further
    national reconciliation (see Section 1.c.).
        The Committee of Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in
    Mauritania is concerned with the plight of the 1989 expellees. The
    Consultative Group for the Return of the Refugees was founded to
    promote the return of the remaining Mauritanian refugees in Senegal.
    The Collective of Worker Victims of the 1989 Events seeks redress for
    government employees who lost their jobs in the events of 1989. The
    Committee of the Widows and the Collective of Survivors focus on the
    sufferings of the victims of the 1990-91 military purge and their
    families. The Collective of Survivors of Political Detention and
    Torture was established in 1996 to seek redress for abuses committed
    during the 1986-87 period. These groups and other groups of individuals
    with common concerns function openly and actively, but their efforts
    are circumscribed somewhat because they are not recognized officially
    (see Section 2.b.). The Coalition of Human Rights NGO's is an umbrella
    organization for 12 of these organizations; it represents the group in
    various forums, including representations to foreign embassies.
        The only international association concerned with human rights to
    visit the country during the year was the ICRC, which makes routine
    annual visits. In July after consulting with international
    developmental NGO's, both houses of the Parliament passed legislation
    governing the procedures and conditions under which international NGO's
    can conduct business in the country. The Executive signed the
    legislation in July, and at year's end legislation was awaiting a
    decree that would put it into force. This legislation would facilitate
    the legal right for NGO's to conduct their work by providing for duty
    free imports, licensing of vehicles, and other provisions.
    International development NGO's have been working without governing
    legislation.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality before the law for all
    citizens, regardless of race, national origin, sex, or social status,
    and prohibits racial or ethnic propaganda. In practice the Government
    often favors individuals on the basis of ethnic and tribal affiliation,
    social status, and political ties. Societal discrimination against
    women, strongly rooted in traditional society, is endemic, although the
    situation continued to improve.
        Women.--Human rights monitors and female lawyers report that
    physical mistreatment of women by their husbands is rare, particularly
    among the Moor population. The police and judiciary occasionally
    intervene in domestic abuse cases, but women in traditional society
    rarely seek legal redress, relying instead upon family and ethnic group
    members to resolve domestic disputes. The incidence of reported rape is
    low; it occurs, but newspaper accounts of attacks are rare.
        Women have legal rights to property and child custody, and, among
    the more modern and urbanized population, these rights are recognized.
    By local tradition, a woman's first marriage, but not subsequent
    marriages, requires parental consent. In accordance with Shari'a
    (Islamic law) as applied in the country (see Section 1.e.), marriage
    and divorce do not require the woman's consent, polygyny is allowed,
    and a woman does not have the right to refuse her husband's wish to
    marry additional wives. In practice polygyny is very rare among Moors
    but common among other ethnic groups. Arranged marriages are also
    increasingly rare, particularly among the Moor population. Women
    frequently initiate the termination of a marriage, which most often is
    done by husband or wife by repudiation rather than divorce. It is also
    common in Moor society for a woman to obtain, at the time of marriage,
    a contractual agreement that stipulates that her husband must agree to
    end their marriage if he chooses an additional wife. The rate of
    divorce among Moors is estimated to be 37 percent, and the remarriage
    rate after divorce is 72.5 percent.
        Women still face some legal discrimination. For example, the
    testimony of two women is necessary to equal that of one man, and the
    value placed on women's lives in court-awarded indemnities is only half
    the amount awarded for a man's death (see Section 1.e.). However, women
    do not face legal discrimination in areas not specifically addressed by
    Shari'a. The Secretariat for Women's Affairs works with many NGO's and
    cooperatives to improve the status of women. A booklet published late
    in 1996 advises women of their rights. The Government, women's groups,
    and national and international NGO's organized meetings, seminars, and
    workshops throughout the year to publicize women's rights.
        The Government seeks to open new employment opportunities for women
    in areas that traditionally were filled by men, such as health care,
    communications, police, and customs services. Women became more
    involved in the fishing industry and established several women's
    fishing cooperatives. In 1999 for the first time, women were hired by
    the army to serve as police inspectors and customs officials. In June
    the first female Acting Police Commissioner was appointed in the
    capital; she was also serving as Chief Investigator in the same police
    station at year's end. Seventy jurists and female lawyers established
    an association of female jurists and, under the auspices of the
    Ministry of Justice, organized their first national congress dedicated
    to the legal concerns of women.
        The law provides that men and women receive equal pay for equal
    work. While not universally applied in practice, the two largest
    employers, the civil service and the state mining company, respect this
    law. In the modern wage sector, women also receive family benefits,
    including 3 months of maternity leave.
        Children.--The Government does not require attendance at school,
    primarily because it lacks the financial resources to provide
    educational facilities and teachers throughout the country, especially
    in remote areas; however, education receives the largest share of the
    national budget at 11.3 percent. The Government has made universal
    primary education a priority; however, there was no increase in
    attendance from the previous year, in which the school enrollment rate
    was 86 percent. There are no legal restrictions on the education of
    girls. Girls constituted 48.8 percent of all children enrolled in
    school in 1998. Some 84 percent of school-age girls attended elementary
    school in 1998 and 1999, up from 44.8 percent in 1990 (compared with 88
    percent for boys, up from 58.3 percent). At the secondary level, female
    students constituted 37.4 percent of those enrolled. Despite these
    increases, enrollment in eastern Mauritania, the Brakna, and along the
    Senegal River remained at a lower level. The Government introduced a
    special countrywide program in 1995and 1996 to boost female enrollment
    at the elementary level. Female students made up 17 percent of the
    university's 1998-99 enrollment, compared with 9 percent in 1990.
    Female students also constituted 30.5 percent of students enrolled in
    technical schools, compared with 2 percent in 1990. The literacy rate
    for women is 36 percent compared with 50 percent for men. Almost all
    children, regardless of sex or ethnic group, attend Koranic school from
    the ages of 5 to 7 and gain at least rudimentary skills in reading and
    writing Arabic (see Section 2.c.)
        The law makes special provision for the protection of children's
    welfare, and the Government has programs to care for abandoned
    children; however, these programs are hampered by inadequate funding.
    Local NGO's estimate that there are over 253 street children. The
    Government relies on foreign donors in such areas as child
    immunization. Moreover it does not enforce existing child labor laws,
    and children perform a significant amount of labor in the informal
    sector in support of family activities (see Section 6.d.).
        Traditional forms of mistreatment of females continue, mostly in
    isolated rural communities, but these practices appear to be on the
    decline. One form of such mistreatment is the forced feeding of
    adolescent girls (gavage) which is practiced only among the Moors.
    Experts previously estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of women
    experienced gavage but now conclude that very few Moor women continue
    to experience gavage. The change in figures appears to reflect both
    prior overestimation and a significant decline in the practice in
    recent years. While there is no law prohibiting gavage, the Government
    has made it a policy to end the practice. The Government continued
    intensive media and educational campaigns against gavage during the
    year in the Government print and broadcast media and through public
    seminars.
        Female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced among all ethnic groups except the
    Wolof. It is performed most often on young girls, often on the seventh
    day after birth and almost always before the age of 6 months. A March
    1996 report by the United Nations Population Fund and a study published
    in 1997 by Jeune Afrique Economie cited the country as one in which 25
    percent of women undergo FGM. Among Halpulaar women, over 95 percent
    undergo FGM. Preliminary results of a foreign-funded study indicate
    that 66 percent of those who perform FGM recognize that the practice is
    detrimental to women's health, and 54 percent of imams agree that the
    practice is dangerous. Local experts agree that the least severe form
    of excision is practiced, and not infibulation, the most severe form of
    FGM. The practice of FGM has decreased in the modern urban sector.
        The Government continued intensive media and educational campaigns
    against FGM during the year. It is a clear public policy of the
    Government, through the Secretariat of Women's Affairs, that FGM should
    be eliminated, and the Government bars hospitals from performing it.
    Public health workers and NGO's educate women to the dangers of FGM and
    to the fact that FGM is not a requirement of Islam. For example, a 1996
    officially produced Guide to the Rights of Women in Mauritania (with
    religious endorsement) stresses that Islam does not require FGM and
    that, if medical experts warn against it for medical reasons, it should
    not be done. The campaign against FGM appears to be changing attitudes
    towards the practice, according to several women's rights experts.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not provide specifically
    for the disabled, and the Government does not mandate preference in
    employment or education or public accessibility for disabled persons.
    However, it does provide some rehabilitation and other assistance for
    the disabled. NGO's have become increasingly active in raising public
    awareness of issues affecting the disabled. In 1974 the Government
    opened the first school for the deaf and the blind in Nouakchott. It
    became more active in 1986, and during the year it operated 6
    classrooms and enrolled 35 students (20 girls and 15 boys); however,
    they lack trained staff. During the year, the school obtained the
    services of a volunteer expert who provided professional training for
    the staff.
        There is no societal discrimination against the disabled.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic minorities and low-caste
    individuals among all ethnic groups confront societal discrimination.
    Ethnic and cultural tension and discrimination arise from the
    geographic and cultural line between traditionally nomadic Arabic-
    speaking (Hassaniya) Moor herders and Peuhl herders of the Halpulaar
    group in the north and center, and sedentary cultivators of the
    Halpulaar (Toucouleur), Soninke, and Wolof ethnic groups in the south.
    Although culturally homogeneous, the Moors are divided among numerous
    ethno-linguistic clan groups and are racially distinguished as Beydane
    and Haratine, or White Moors and Black Moors, though it is often
    difficult to distinguish between the two groups by skin color. The
    majority of those known as Black Moors are Haratine, literally ``one
    who has been freed,'' although some Black Moor families never were
    enslaved. ``White'' Moors, large numbers of whom are dark-skinned after
    centuries of intermarriage with members of Sub-Saharan African groups,
    dominate positions in government and business. The Halpulaar (the
    largest non-Moor group), the Wolof, and the Soninke ethnic groups are
    concentrated in the south and are underrepresented in the military and
    security sectors.
        A number of accounts indicate that redistribution of southern
    farmland to Moors since the acceleration of desertification in the
    1970's has contributed to tensions between Moors and southern-based
    ethnic groups. Although much of the Government's redistribution of land
    has been from southerners to southerners, some Moors have been
    resettled in the south. Ethnic tensions surfaced dramatically in the
    mass expulsions of southern-based ethnic groups--mostly Halpulaars--in
    1989 and 1990 and the purge of Halpulaars from the military in 1991.
    Few regained their positions; however, tensions have lessened.
        The Constitution designates Arabic along with Pulaar, Soninke, and
    Wolof as Mauritania's national languages. However, successive
    governments--both civil and military--have pursued various policies of
    ``Arabization'' in the schools and in the workplace. Non-Arabic-
    speaking ethnic groups have protested this policy, as have Arabic-
    speaking groups that want their children to obtain a bilingual Arabic-
    French education.
        In April 1999, the National Assembly approved educational reforms
    to replace the separate track Arabic-French system of education, which
    had been in place for 20 years, with a unified system for all citizens
    in which both French and Arabic would be the languages of instruction
    for all students. Under the separate track system, Moors generally
    attended Arabic language schools, while Halpulaars, Soninke, and Wolof
    attended French-language schools. The Government concluded that the
    separate track system had contributed to ethnic divisions. Reversion to
    the previous unified system, with all students attending the same
    schools, is expected to promote social cohesion. The reform also
    provides for English and civics to be introduced at an early stage. The
    promotion of other national languages, previously included at the
    elementary level, was moved to the university level.
        Ethnic rivalry contributed significantly to political divisions and
    tensions. Some political parties tend to have readily identifiable
    ethnic bases, although political coalitions among them are increasingly
    important. The acceleration of desertification during the 1970's that
    destroyed much of the traditional economic basis of Moorish society,
    and an upsurge of Arab nationalism among White Moors during the 1980's,
    contributed to explosive ethnic violence precipitated by a dispute with
    Senegal during 1989-91; this violence entailed the expulsion or flight
    of many non-Moors living in the south and occupation of much of their
    land by Moors, including Black Moors. Interethnic bitterness and
    hostility persists, and continues to be aggravated by climatic, land,
    and population pressures.
        A number of accounts suggest that some members of the long-dominant
    White Moor community, which traditionally enslaved darker skinned
    groups, may continue to expect or desire servility on the part of
    members of the generally darker Black Moors and southern ethnic groups,
    and that such attitudes may impede efforts to build a nondiscriminatory
    society and to eliminate the vestiges and consequences of slavery,
    goals to which both the Government and major opposition parties are
    committed. There are indications that racism on the part of some White
    Moors may have contributed both to the persistence of vestiges and
    consequences of past White Moor enslavement of Black Moors, and to the
    expulsions and reported dispossession of members of darker southern
    ethnic groups with no tradition of servility to White Moors. However,
    southern-based ethnic groups and Black Moors have manifested little
    racial solidarity socially or politically, and racial differences did
    not contribute either to historical slavery or to the persistence of
    its vestiges and consequences among southern-based ethnic groups.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association and the right of citizens to join any political or labor
    organization. All workers except members of the military and police are
    free to associate in and establish unions at the local and national
    levels.
        Prior to the 1993 amendment of the Labor Code, which repealed
    provisions restricting trade union pluralism, the governmentcontrolled
    labor confederation, the Union of Mauritania Workers (UTM), was the
    only labor confederation allowed by law. However, there are now three
    labor confederations; the Union of Mauritanian Workers (UTM), the
    General Confederation of Mauritanian Workers (CGTM), and the Free
    Confederation of Mauritanian Workers (CLTM). There are also four
    unaffiliated professionally based labor unions. The oldest of the three
    confederations, UTM, still is viewed by many workers as closely allied
    with the Government and the PRDS. It has lost ground to the CGTM, which
    was recognized in 1994 with 23 member unions, and the CLTM, which was
    founded in 1995 and recognized in 1998. The CGTM is not affiliated with
    any party, although most of its members tend to favor the opposition.
    The CLTM is associated with the opposition party, Action for Change.
        The Government provides funds to the confederations in proportion
    to their memberships. All three confederations supplied representatives
    to the country's four labor tribunals, and were included in most
    government deliberative or consultative bodies. Several independent
    trade unions, in particular three for teachers at the elementary,
    secondary, and university levels, also were active.
        The bulk of the labor force is in the informal sector, with most
    workers engaged in subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry; only
    25 percent are employed in the wage sector. However, nearly 90 percent
    of industrial and commercial workers are organized. The law provides
    workers with the right to strike. It also provides for tripartite
    arbitration committees composed of union, business, and government
    representatives. Once all parties agree to arbitration, the committee
    may impose binding arbitration that automatically terminates any
    strike. There were no strikes or work stoppages during the year. In
    September a dockers'' union of the CLTM threatened a strike during
    negotiations, but a settlement was reached before the date set for the
    strike.
        International trade union activity increased. The Government
    included CGTM, UTM, and CLTM representatives in its delegation to the
    International Labor Organization (ILO) in June. The national syndicates
    continued to organize training workshops for their memberships
    throughout the country.
        Unions are free to affiliate internationally. The UTM participates
    in regional labor organizations. The CGTM and UTM are both members of
    the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU). The UTM
    has been accepted into the Organization of African Trade Union Unity
    (OATUU), but the CGTM's application was not accepted, as the OATUU only
    accepts one member union from each country.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides that unions may organize workers freely without government or
    employer interference. General or sectoral agreements on wages, working
    conditions, and social and medical benefits are negotiated in
    tripartite discussion and formalized by government decree. Wages and
    other benefits also can be negotiated bilaterally between employer and
    union and the results of such negotiations are filed with the
    Directorate of Labor.
        Laws provide workers with protection against antiunion
    discrimination and employees or employers may bring labor disputes to
    three-person labor tribunals administered jointly by the Ministries of
    Justice and Labor with the participation of union and employer
    representatives.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    all forms of slavery and forced and bonded labor; however, the
    Government does not enforce this prohibition effectively. Citizens
    continue to suffer the effects and consequences of the practice of
    slavery over generations and of caste distinctions including the
    traditional existence of a slave caste in both Moor and southern
    communities. Slavery was abolished officially three times in
    Mauritania, most recently by the post-independence government in 1980.
    Even before 1980, the practice of slavery among the traditionally
    pastoralist Moors had been greatly reduced by the accelerated
    desertification of the 1970's; many White Moors dismissed their former
    Black Moor slaves because the depletion of their herds left them unable
    either to employ or to feed slaves. However, widespread slavery also
    was traditional among ethnic groups of the largely nonpastoralist
    south, where it had no racial origins or overtones; masters and slaves
    alike were black. The south has suffered less from desertification, and
    some reports identify it as the region in which vestiges and
    consequences of slavery may persist most strongly.
        A system of officially sanctioned slavery in which government and
    society join to force individuals to serve masters does not exist.
    There has been no open trading in slaves for many years; however, there
    continued to be unconfirmed reports that slavery in the form of forced
    and involuntary servitude may persist in some isolated areas.
    Unofficial voluntary servitude persists, with some former slaves
    continuing to work for former masters in exchange for monetary or
    nonmonetary benefits such as lodging, food, or medical care. Many
    persons, including some from all ethnic groups, still use the
    designation of slave in referring to themselves or others. The reasons
    for the persistence of such practices appear to be economic,
    psychological, and religious, although they vary widely and may be
    quite different among pastoralist or formerly pastoralist Moors from
    what they are among the southerners and the less numerous
    nonpastoralist Moors. Poverty, persistent drought, and a weak economy
    provide few economic alternatives for many and leave some former slaves
    vulnerable to possible exploitation by former masters. There are
    reports that some former slaves in some sedentary communities have
    continued to work for their former masters or others in order to retain
    access to the land they traditionally farmed, although the law provides
    for distribution of land to the landless including to former slaves,
    and this law has been enforced in many cases (see Section 1.f.). In
    addition to their usual compensation, some former slaves, who continue
    to work for former masters, also receive gifts on important family
    occasions such as births, marriages, and deaths. Deeply embedded
    psychological and tribal bonds also make it difficult for many
    individuals who have generations of forebears who were slaves to break
    their bonds with former masters or their tribes. Finally, because of
    the belief that their slave status had been religiously ordained, some
    individuals continue to link themselves to former masters for fear of
    religious sanction if that bond is broken.
        Adults cannot be obliged by law to remain with former masters nor
    can they be returned if they leave. However, adult females with
    children may have greater difficulties and may be compelled by
    pressures other than physical force to remain in a condition of
    servitude. For example, in some cases, especially where the former
    master claims to be the father, former masters refuse to allow children
    to accompany their mothers when the mother leaves the master. In most
    cases involving custody disputes between former masters and former
    female slaves the courts have been instructed by the Minister of
    Justice to rule in favor of the women, and in virtually all custody
    cases the courts have ruled for the women. In other cases, the greater
    economic responsibility of supporting a family may be the principal
    impediment to a woman seeking a new life. Children's legal status is
    more tenuous than that of adults. There have been no reports of sales
    or ``transfer'' of children or other individuals from one employer or
    master to another since 1996, when there were occasional confirmed
    cases of transfers; however, reports of sales are rare, cannot be
    confirmed, and appear to be confined to past years.
        The legacy of caste distinctions continues to affect the status and
    opportunities available to various groups. In some groups, for example,
    individuals of a higher caste who seek to marry someone of a lower
    caste may be barred by their families or by the community, and in
    Soninke communities members of the slave caste cannot be buried in the
    same cemetery as other castes.
        NGO positions on the existence of slavery are not uniform. For
    example, SOS-Esclaves in an April 1997 report characterized slavery as
    a persistent social reality, whose occurrence among disadvantaged
    classes is far from negligible (see Section 4). The Organization of
    African Unity's (OAU) African Commission on Human and People's Rights
    issued a report in June 1997 that disputed the conclusions of the April
    1997 SOS-Esclaves report. While allowing for the possibility of
    isolated cases of slavery in the remote countryside, the Commission
    concluded that slavery does not exist as an institution and that the
    persistence of vestiges of slavery was the more convincing explanation
    of social relations. Anti-Slavery International has stated that there
    is insufficient evidence one way or the other to conclude whether or
    not slavery exists, and that an in-depth, long-term study was required
    to determine whether the practice continues.
        Problems related to the vestiges and consequences of slavery
    usually enter the public domain in judicial cases, most often in the
    form of child custody and inheritance disputes between former masters
    and former slaves or their descendants. However, court adjudication of
    such cases is rare. Several inheritance disputes between Haratines and
    the descendants of their former master were adjudicated in court in
    recent years. Most such disputes were decided in accordance with the
    law, as the courts ruled that the descendants of the former slaves
    should inherit their property. However, in some cases involving land
    tenure, courts reportedly did not uphold the property rights of former
    slaves. In June the land of several Black Moor families, some of whom
    were former slaves, in the Dar El Barka and Boghe communes was
    confiscated by the Wali (Governor) for redistribution to his relatives
    and supporters. The Haratines held protest demonstrations during which
    several of them were beaten and detained by the police (see Sections
    1.c., 1.d., and 1.f.). The Government sanctioned the Governor by
    removing him from his post. The new Governor was considering returning
    the land to the Haratine communes, but had not done so by year's end.
        A case involving a former master, who was awarded custody of three
    children in early 1997 because he was deemed to be the father, was
    resolved by mediation in 1999, with the children living with their
    mothers in Nouakchott. The determination of such cases is problematic
    in a country where there is polygyny, ``secret'' marriages, no written
    records, and divorce by repudiation. The courts are prepared to pursue
    the concept of genetic testing to determine paternity, but no such
    cases have yet been brought.
        Three NGO's--SOS-Esclaves, the National Committee for the Struggle
    Against the Vestiges of Slavery in Mauritania, and the Initiative for
    the Support of the Activities of the President--focused on issues
    related to the history of slavery in Mauritania. Of these SOS-Esclaves
    was particularly active in bringing to public attention cases in which
    it found the rights of former slaves to have been abridged and in
    assisting former slaves in their difficulties with former masters.
    Other human rights and civic action NGO's also follow this issue
    closely. The independent press, which includes journals that are
    published by Haratines and southern-based ethnic groups who emphasize
    issues of importance to these ethnic groups, is also quick to report
    any incident that comes to its attention in which the rights of former
    slaves have not been respected.
        The Government focuses on education, literacy, and agrarian reform
    as the main means to eradicate the vestiges of slavery and deal with
    its consequences. The Government has raised the level of primary school
    attendance from 45 percent in 1986 to 85 percent in 1999. Classes are
    fully integrated, including boys and girls from all social and ethnic
    groups. In recent years, the Government's record in cases in which an
    individual's civil rights were adversely affected because of status as
    a former slave was weak. When complaints were filed with the Government
    to remedy cases involving detention of individuals against their will,
    the Government intervened in accordance with the law, although
    sometimes only after considerable prodding and passage of time. In May
    1999, the Government created a new cabinet post, the Commissariat for
    Human Rights, Poverty Alleviation, and Integration. A major focus of
    the commissariat is to address the vestiges and consequences of
    slavery.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and, unlike
    in the previous year, there were no reports that it occurred.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code states explicitly that children must not be
    employed before the age of 14 in the nonagricultural sector unless the
    Minister of Labor grants an exception due to local circumstances. The
    Government has a functional labor inspectorate empowered to refer
    violations directly to the appropriate judicial authorities. The
    Government lacks sufficient resources to enforce existing child labor
    laws (see Section 5).
        Labor law specifies that no child under the age of 13 may be
    employed in the agricultural sector without the permission of the
    Minister of Labor, nor under the age of 14 in the nonagricultural
    sector. The law states that employed children between the ages of 14
    and 16 should receive 70 percent of the minimum wage, and that those
    between the ages of 17 and 18 should receive 90 percent of the minimum
    wage. Young children in the countryside commonly pursue herding,
    cultivation, fishing, and other significant labor in support of their
    families' activities. In keeping with longstanding tradition, many
    children serve apprenticeships in small industries and in the informal
    sector. There is no child labor in the modern industrial sector.
        On July 12, the Government signed ILO Convention 182 against the
    worse forms of child labor; the Convention was ratified in December by
    the Parliament. The Government organized a national campaign in August
    to publicize the rights of children including pertinent labor
    regulations and the objective of universal education.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and,
    unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that it occurred.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage for
    adults is $48.36 (9,872 ouguiya). It is difficult for the average
    family to meet minimum needs and maintain a decent standard of living
    at this salary.
        The standard, legal, nonagricultural workweek may not exceed either
    40 hours or 6 days without overtime compensation, which is paid at
    rates that are graduated according to the number of supplemental hours
    worked. Domestic workers and certain other categories work 56 hours.
    The Labor Directorate of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for
    enforcement of the labor laws, but in practice inadequate funding
    limits the effectiveness of the Directorate's enforcement.
        The Ministry of Labor also is responsible for enforcing safety
    standards but does so inconsistently, due to inadequate funding. In
    principle workers can remove themselves from hazardous conditions
    without risking loss of employment; in practice, they cannot.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    through, to, or within the country.
                                   __________

                                   MAURITIUS

        The Republic of Mauritius, a parliamentary democracy since 1968, is
    governed by a prime minister, a council of ministers, and a national
    assembly. The President, who is nominated by the Prime Minister and
    confirmed by the National Assembly, serves as Head of State, with
    largely ceremonial powers. National and local elections, supervised by
    an independent commission, take place at regular intervals. According
    to international and local observers, the national elections, held on
    September 11, were free and fair, and resulted in a victory for an
    opposition coalition, the Mauritian Socialist Movement/Militant
    Mauritian Movement (MSM/MMM). There are numerous political parties, and
    partisan politics are open and robust. The judiciary is independent.
        A paramilitary Special Mobile Force under civilian control is
    responsible for internal security. This force, commanded by the
    Commissioner of Police, is backed by a general duty police force. Both
    forces are largely apolitical, but were criticized for being
    inadequately trained to prevent and control rioting that broke out
    nationwide in February 1999. Some members of the security forces
    committed serious human rights abuses.
        The economy is based on labor-intensive, export-oriented
    manufacturing (mainly textiles), as well as sugar and tourism. The
    standard of living is high, with a per capita gross domestic product of
    $3,274 per year. The Government is diversifying the economy by
    promoting investment in new sectors such as information technology and
    financial services.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. There was at
    least one extrajudicial killing by police, and judicial inquiries were
    ongoing in at least eight cases of deaths in police custody. There
    continued to be occasional reports that police abused suspects and
    detainees and delayed suspects'' access to defense counsel. The
    Government's monopoly in broadcasting local news and programming
    continued. In some cases, police restricted freedom of assembly.
    Although the law to establish a national human rights commission to
    investigate complaints against the police, including allegations of
    police brutality, went into effect in February 1999, the commission was
    not established by year's end. Violence and discrimination against
    women and abuse of children continued to be problems. There were some
    restrictions on the rights of workers in the export processing zone
    (EPZ). Child labor and forced child prostitution remained problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings; however, police committed at
    least one extrajudicial killing.
        In January in the southern part of the country, police shot and
    killed Rajen Sabapathee, a prisoner who escaped in August 1999; two
    police officers were wounded in the exchange of shots. No action was
    taken against the police officials.
        In November four men were found guilty and sentenced to life in
    prison for setting a May 1999 fire at a Chinese social club in Port
    Louis that resulted in seven deaths (see Section 5).
        On March 23, 1999, the Prime Minister responded to a parliamentary
    question and stated that eight detainees had been found dead in police
    cells between January 1, 1998, and February 28, 1999. The deaths were
    under investigation at year's end (see Section 1.c.). Additionally,
    three persons died in prison in August and November 1999, and three
    more persons died in prison in February and April (see Section 1.c.).
    None of these deaths were reported as involving police abuse; all
    investigations have been closed; however, at year's end, the Government
    had made no official response.
        The judicial inquiry continued into the February 1999 death in
    police custody of a popular Creole singer, Kaya. Kaya's death sparked 3
    days of rioting in February 1999 during which police shot and killed
    three protesters, one police officer died of cardiac arrest, and shops,
    homes, and churches were burned and looted, resulting in an estimated
    $50 million (1,250 million rupees) in damages. Following a second
    inquiry into the death of another Creole musician, who was shot and
    killed by police during the February 1999 riots, the Director of Public
    Prosecutions recommended in May that disciplinary proceedings be
    introduced against the three police officers accused of the killing of
    the second musician. In October the Government released a report on the
    riots compiled by a judicial commission. The report criticized the
    previous Government and the police for their handling of the riots; it
    also criticized some opposition politicians and Creole activists for
    inciting some of the riots. Although the commission did not investigate
    Kaya's death, it criticized the police for holding the musician in a
    high security area although the crime he was accused of did not warrant
    it (see Section 5.) At year's end, the investigation into the death of
    Kaya continued; however, no actions were taken with regard to any of
    the deaths that occurred during the riots.
        Little progress was made in resolving the case of a person who died
    in police custody in 1996. An April 1998 preliminary inquiry into the
    case did not result in any charges being filed against police officers.
    Human rights lawyers asserted that the police were attempting to
    conceal the facts surrounding the death and were not conducting
    thorough, unbiased investigations.
        On December 4, authorities arrested Hizbullah leader Mohammad
    Fakemeeah (also known as Cehl Meeah) and charged him with the killings
    of three rival Muslim political activists during the 1996 municipal
    election campaign (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.). By year's end, police
    had arrested three other Hizbullah members in connection with the
    killings. In two separate incidents in December, four other suspects
    committed suicide rather than surrender to police. Trials for all four
    suspects were pending at year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and inhuman punishment, and
    authorities generally respected this prohibition; however, there
    continued to be complaints of abuses by the police. The most frequent
    form of alleged police abuse is the use of force to coerce a suspect to
    sign a confession.
        On December 4, police arrested Hizbullah leader Cehl Meeah for a
    1996 killing (see Section 1.a.). Supporters alleged that police
    mistreated Meeah in detention; Meeah was hospitalized on December 6 for
    observation and x rays. The police commissioner appointed a high-level
    committee to investigate the allegations (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
        In October and November, approximately a dozen individuals detained
    by the Central Investigative Division (CID) of the police on suspicion
    of crimes including armed robbery and murder reported that police had
    beaten them during interrogation. In December the Commissioner of
    Police opened an investigation into the complaints; however, at year's
    end, no results had been announced.
        In November officials of an antidrug squad detained a foreign
    national for 2 days, verbally abused him, and subjected him twice to
    intrusive body cavity searches and drug testing (see Section 1.d.).
        A judicial inquiry was ongoing into the circumstances behind the
    February 1999 death in police custody of the popular singer Kaya (see
    Section 1.a.).
        In response to the eight reported deaths in police custody between
    January 1, 1998, and February 28, 1999 (see Section 1.a.), the
    Commissioner of Police established in October 1999 a Complaints
    Investigation Bureau (CIB) to investigate complaints against police; it
    is funded and staffed by the police. Since its inception, the CIB has
    received 587 complaints. The National Human Rights Commission (see
    Section 4), mandated by law in 1998 and scheduled to supervise the CIB,
    had not been formed at year's end.
        Prison conditions generally are adequate; however, there were some
    deaths in prison. Food, water, and medical care were available to all
    prisoners; sanitation was adequate. Women were held separately from
    men, and juveniles were held separately from adults. There were no
    reports of abuse of women or juveniles in prison.
        In February a terminally-ill prisoner died of pneumonia in the
    central prison outside Port Louis; at the time of his death, the
    prisoner's body reportedly was covered with bruises and scratches of
    unknown origin. In April a prisoner in police custody in the southern
    part of the country died of burns that he received when the mattress in
    his cell caught fire. Also in April, a prisoner died in the central
    prison; the cause of death initially was listed as death by cerebral
    pulmonary edema, but later was amended to be death by poisoning after
    authorities concluded laboratory analysis. Authorities still were
    investigating this death at year's end. In all of the other cases of
    deaths in prison subsequent to February 1999, police conducted
    investigations, and there were no reports of abuse or neglect (see
    Section 1.a.).
        The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats,
    the national Ombudsman, a team from the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
    and the press. The Government stated in 1999 that it would investigate
    conditions and treatment in police holding cells; however, it did not
    begin an investigation by year's end.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally
    observes these prohibitions. In most cases, suspects are provided
    prompt access to family and defense counsel; however, police in some
    cases delayed suspects'' access to defense counsel. Minors and those
    who did not know their rights were more likely not to be provided
    prompt access.
        In November officials of an antidrug squad detained a foreign
    national for 2 days, verbally abused him, and subjected him twice to
    intrusive body cavity searches and drug testing. The officials refused
    to allow him access to embassy officials; ultimately he was released
    without charge. No action was taken against the antidrug officials (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In April an investigation by the Director of Public Prosecutions
    revealed that authorities in the southern part of the country held a
    man suspected of murder in police custody for 2 years without formally
    charging him with a crime. A judicial inquiry is ongoing, but at year's
    end there were no results.
        In January the Government passed the Public Security Act, which
    would allow police with the rank of assistant superintendent and above
    to detain individuals without a warrant in any situation where the
    delay in obtaining a warrant may be prejudicial to public safety;
    however, the Government did not implement the law in response to public
    opposition. The then political opposition, which also opposed the bill,
    became the Government in September (see Section 2.b.) and, at year's
    end, had taken no action on the law.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
    not use it.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
    provision in practice.
        The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, which has
    appellate powers, and a series of lower courts. Final appeal may be
    made to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the
    judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Defendants have the right to
    private or court-appointed counsel. In December the National Assembly
    passed a Dangerous Drugs Act, which allows law enforcement authorities
    to hold suspected drug traffickers for up to 36 hours without access to
    bail or legal counsel. At the same time, the National Assembly passed a
    constitutional amendment to permit the 36-hour detention of suspects
    without legal counsel. A similar Dangerous Drugs Act was passed in
    1995, but it had been undergoing judicial review because of its alleged
    conflict with the Constitution.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these provisions, and violations are
    subject to legal sanction. Both human rights lawyers and police
    authorities stated that illegal entry by the intelligence service had
    ceased. The acting Commissioner of Police stated that police do not use
    illegal wiretaps on telephones.
        In January the Government passed the Public Security Act, which
    would allow police of the rank of assistant superintendent and above to
    search any premises without a warrant in any situation where the delay
    in obtaining a warrant may be prejudicial to public safety; however,
    the Government did not implement the law in response to public
    opposition (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice.
        More than a dozen privately owned newspapers presented varying
    political viewpoints and expressed partisan views freely. The
    Government has the ability to counter press criticism by using strict
    libel laws; however, the Government has not invoked these measures to
    inhibit the press. Libel suits between private parties are common.
        The government monopoly in broadcasting local news and programming
    continued. In August the National Assembly passed legislation, the
    Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, which created the Independent
    Broadcast Authority (IBA). The IBA's mandate is to regulate and license
    all radio and television broadcasting, and the law provides for private
    ownership of broadcasting stations and the independence of the IBA.
    However, the IBA is to be composed of representatives of several
    government ministries and will be chaired by an appointee of the Prime
    Minister. The IBA is also subject to the Prime Minister on matters of
    national security and public order; however, at year's end, it had not
    been created. One private news organization began local news broadcasts
    in July 1998 on the Internet, thereby circumventing the ban on private
    party television or radio local news broadcasts. Foreign international
    news services, such as the United Kingdom's Sky News, France's Canal
    Plus, and Cable News Network, are available to the public by
    subscription.
        Opposition and media observers criticized the state-owned Mauritius
    Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) for supporting the governing alliance in
    the September 11 election campaign. The new Government stated following
    the elections that it would depoliticize the MBC. Representatives of
    the Mauritian Journalists Association noted in October that broadcast
    journalists reported less governmental pressure on their reporting, and
    the directors of the MBC met in November to discuss ways to make the
    MBC more apolitical; however, at year's end, no specific action had
    been taken.
        In 1999 the then opposition MSM/MMM, in a judicial challenge to the
    results of a September 1999 by-election, formally accused the MBC of
    providing biased coverage favoring the Government's candidate during
    the by-election campaign; the MBC rejected this charge. The Supreme
    Court postponed a hearing on this matter, which was scheduled for
    November 1999. The hearing was not rescheduled by year's end; and the
    MSM/MMM victory in the September election made further legal action
    unnecessary.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice; however, police permission is
    required for demonstrations and mass meetings, and such permission was
    refused in certain cases during the year. However, there is a right of
    judicial appeal, and in one high-profile case in August during the
    election campaign, the Supreme Court overturned a decision not to
    permit a demonstration. In this case, police refused to allow a public
    gathering to discuss alleged corruption by then-government ministers.
    The Supreme Court overturned this refusal, stating that the threats of
    defamation and disturbing the peace were not sufficiently compelling to
    prohibit the gathering. While groups have the right to challenge
    denials, one group went ahead with its demonstration without police
    permission; police verbally reprimanded its organizer.I11In December
    supporters of Hizbullah leader Cehl Meeah demonstrated on two occasions
    to protest his alleged mistreatment while in police custody (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.c.). Police did not interfere with the
    demonstrations.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        In January the Government passed the Public Security Act, which
    would allow the Commissioner of Police to proscribe any organization
    believed to promote or engage in terrorism. The act also would allow
    police to arrest any group of 10 or more persons who riot or threaten
    to riot and to arrest any individual present at the scene of a riot.
    The Government did not implement the law in response to public
    opposition (see Section 1.d.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The Government is generally secular in both name and practice;
    however, the previous administration favored the Hindu majority of the
    population.
        Foreign missionary groups are allowed to operate on a case-by-case
    basis. There are no government regulations detailing the conditions of
    their presence or limiting their proselytizing activities. Groups must
    obtain both a visa and a work permit for each missionary. Foreign
    missionaries sometimes are prohibited from residing in the country
    beyond 5 years (which would permit them to seek Mauritian citizenship),
    but religious organizations are permitted to send new missionaries to
    replace them.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign, Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government does not grant asylum to refugees in general on the
    grounds that the country is small, has limited resources, and does not
    wish to become a haven for large numbers of refugees. In 1999 the
    Government allowed a Seychelles citizen and his family to remain in the
    country while they sought asylum in another country; they were granted
    asylum in another country in March. In June two refugees from the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo sought asylum. The U.N. High
    Commissioner on Refugees refused to grant them refugee status, and the
    Government expelled them to Zimbabwe at the end of July.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
        In November a group of citizens who are natives of the Chagos
    Archipelago (also known as the British Indian Ocean Territory) won a
    lawsuit against the British Government that claimed they had been
    removed illegally from their homeland in 1971. In response to the
    lawsuit, the British Government ruled that the Chagossians could return
    to the outer islands of the archipelago but not to Diego Garcia. The
    Chagossians planed to visit the islands in 2001 in preparation for
    their eventual return.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
    According to international and local observers, free and fair national
    elections based on universal suffrage were held on September 11, and
    the opposition MSM/MMM federation defeated the governing Labor Party/
    Parti Mauricien Xavier Duval coalition. In December 1998, the National
    Assembly passed legislation granting voting rights in the general
    elections to the 300 residents of the island of Agalega; previously,
    they had not been represented in the National Assembly. This leaves
    only the residents of the island of Saint Brandon without suffrage.
    There are approximately 100 fishermen on 6- to 12-month contracts
    living on Saint Brandon.
        Women continued to be underrepresented in government and politics.
    Of the 70 National Assembly seats, 4 are held by women, and there is 1
    female minister. In the National Assembly, up to eight members are
    appointed through a ``best loser'' system to ensure that all ethnic
    groups are represented; there are eight such members.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction and actively investigate and publish their findings on
    human rights cases; these groups include Amnesty International,
    Transparency International, and SOS Femmes. Government officials
    cooperated with and responded to the views of human rights groups.
        The constitutionally mandated, autonomous Ombudsman investigates
    complaints of human rights abuses. The Ombudsman receives approximately
    500 complaints a year and presents an annual report to the Government
    that details the status of investigations into these complaints. A
    National Human Rights Commission, provided for by a 1998 law, had not
    been established by year's end. Authorities have not nominated a
    president of the commission, who according to the law, must be a former
    Supreme Court judge. The commission is to have three other members, of
    whom one must be a lawyer or a judge with 10 years of experience, and
    the other two must have experience in the human rights field. The
    commission is to investigate abuses by any public servant, but it
    cannot investigate complaints that are already the subject of an
    inquiry by the Ombudsman, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the
    Public Service Commission, or the Disciplined Forces Service
    Commission. The commission is to have the authority to visit centers of
    detention or prisons to assess and make recommendations on conditions.
    The commission first tries to resolve complaints through conciliation.
    If not successful, the commission can forward cases to the Director of
    Public Prosecutions (if criminal in nature), to the service commissions
    for disciplinary measures, or to the responsible authority in question.
        Numerous international NGO's were active during the year, including
    Amnesty International, Transparency International, Rotary
    International, Soroptomist, and many others.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis
    of race, caste, place of origin, political opinion, color, religion, or
    sex, and the Government generally respected these provisions.
        Women.--Violence against women, particularly spousal abuse, is a
    problem according to the Ministry of Women's Rights, Child Development,
    and Family Welfare, attorneys, and NGO's. The Protection from Domestic
    Violence Act, partially enacted in 1997, came into full force in 1998;
    it criminalized domestic violence and provided the judicial system with
    greater powers to combat this problem. In November the Ministry of
    Women's Rights, Child Development, and Family Welfare released a study
    on domestic violence conducted by independent consultants. The study
    stated that 6,367 cases of domestic violence were reported to
    authorities between September 1998 and August 1999. According to the
    study, 1,242 protection orders were issued against abusive partners in
    1999. According to officials, the number of reported spousal abuse
    cases has risen primarily due to a greater awareness of women's rights
    and the Government's readiness to enforce them. Nevertheless, many
    victims still choose not to prosecute or report their attacker,
    primarily due to cultural pressures. A UNICEF-funded study from 1998
    reported that alcohol was a contributing factor in 56 percent of
    domestic violence cases.
        Since women often depend on their spouses for financial security,
    many remain in abusive situations for fear of being unable to provide
    for their children as single parents. While a magistrate can order a
    spouse to pay child support, some spouses have stopped working in order
    to avoid payment. However, in 1998 several amendments to the Criminal
    Code were enacted that made it a crime to abandon one's family or a
    pregnant spouse for more than 2 months, not to pay court-ordered food
    support, or to engage in sexual harassment.
        Traditionally women have played subordinate roles in society, and
    societal discrimination continues; however, women have access to
    education, employment, and government services. The Minister of Women,
    Family Welfare, and Child Development stated in August 1999 that 25.8
    percent of managers are women.
        Children.--The Government placed strong emphasis on the health and
    welfare of children and displayed a commitment to expand educational
    opportunities for children. Education is free and mandatory until the
    age of 12; attendance at the primary level is 100 percent, but only 60
    percent of children attend school at the secondary level (which
    includes the ages from 12 to 19). In 1998 the former Government set a
    goal to increase this to age 15 once 60 new schools were authorized and
    built. The new Government has stated that it plans to increase
    mandatory education to the age of 16. The new Government confirmed
    plans for school construction, and sites for 20 new schools were
    identified during the year; however, no new schools had been built by
    year's end.
        In 1998 the Government began preparing a curriculum for human
    rights education to be introduced into social studies courses at the
    primary and secondary levels. The original goal was to implement the
    curriculum at the primary level in 1999 and at the secondary level in
    2002; however, the curriculum had not been implemented at either level
    by year's end.
        In 1998 the legislature passed additional provisions to the
    Protection of the Child Act, making certain acts compromising the
    health, security, or morality of children a crime. Under the act, child
    prostitution is criminalized, but only the adult is an offender and the
    child involved is given social aid. Child pornography also is
    criminalized, and the child is offered social aid while the adult
    offender is prosecuted.
        Although incidents of child abuse are reported, private voluntary
    organizations claim that the problem is more widespread than is
    acknowledged publicly. Most government programs are administered by the
    state-funded National Children's Council and the Ministry of Women's
    Rights, Family Welfare, and Child Development, which provides
    counseling, investigates reports of child abuse, and takes remedial
    action to protect affected children. In June the Ministry of Women's
    Rights, Child Development, and Family Welfare announced that 3,350
    cases of child abuse have been reported since 1997.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    government services. The law requires organizations that employ more
    than 10 persons to set aside at least 3 percent of their positions for
    the disabled. There is no law mandating access to public buildings or
    facilities. The law does not require that work sites be accessible to
    the disabled, making it difficult for persons with disabilities to fill
    many jobs.
        Religious Minorities.--Tensions between the Hindu majority and
    Christian, Creole, and Muslim minorities persisted; however, there were
    no violent confrontations during the year.
        Mauritius is a small island nation, and ethnic groups, known as
    ``communities,'' are quite tightly knit. Intermarriage is relatively
    rare. An individual's name easily identifies his or her ethnic and
    religious background. There is a strong correlation between religious
    affiliation and ethnicity. Citizens of Indian ethnicity are usually
    Hindus or Muslims. Citizens of Chinese ancestry usually practice
    Buddhism and Catholicism. Creoles and citizens of European-descent are
    usually Catholic. However, there is a growing number of Hindu converts
    to evangelical Christian churches, a fact that is of growing concern to
    Hindu organizations.
        In December police arrested and charged the leader of the local
    chapter of Hizbullah, an international Shia Muslim group, Cehl Meeah
    and three others for the 1996 killing of three rival Muslim political
    activists (see Section 1.a.). On December 5 and 6, Hizbullah supporters
    demonstrated to protest the alleged mistreatment of Meeah while in
    custody (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Despite fears of unrest, there
    were no violent confrontations as a result of the arrest.
        In the wake of violent confrontations in February and May 1999 that
    were partially the result of ethnic tensions, the Government took steps
    to foster unity, including the establishment in October 1999 of an
    annual National Unity Award, which is given to individuals who have
    implemented programs that promote national unity. In April 1999, the
    President also formed a Committee for the Promotion of National Unity,
    which organized activities to foster goodwill between ethnic groups. In
    April 1999, the heads of the Catholic Diocese and the Hindu House
    recommended that the President establish an interreligious council;
    however, such a council had not been created by year's end.
        Some minorities, usually Creoles and Muslims, allege that a glass
    ceiling exists within the upper echelons of the civil service that
    prevents them from reaching the highest levels.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Tensions among the Hindu,
    Creole, Muslim, European, and Chinese communities persisted; however,
    there were no violent confrontations during the year. In February 1999,
    there were several days of rioting and interethnic confrontations after
    a popular Creole singer died in police custody, resulting in four
    deaths and approximately $50 million (1,250 million rupees) in property
    damage. In October the Government released a report on the riots
    compiled by a judicial commission. The report criticized the previous
    government and the police for its handling of the riots; it also
    criticized some opposition politicians and Creole activists for
    inciting some of the riots. The commission made general recommendations
    to the Government and the police for handling similar future incidents
    (see Section 1.a.).
        In November four men were found guilty and sentenced to life in
    prison for setting a fire at a Chinese social club in Port Louis in May
    1999 that resulted in seven deaths.
        As a result of the ethnic violence that occurred in February and
    May 1999, several initiatives were taken in 1999 to improve relations
    between ethnic groups.
        In April 1999, the President established a Committee for the
    Promotion of National Unity, which consists of 20 members from a wide
    cross section of the public and private sectors. The committee has
    sponsored a variety of activities to promote goodwill between ethnic
    groups. The Mauritian Council of Social Service (MACOSS), which serves
    as an umbrella group for NGO's in the country, created a conflict
    resolution working group to address ethnic tensions. The Mauritius
    Peace Initiative held a second conflict resolution seminar in July, and
    the MACOSS working group held meetings throughout the year. In addition
    a group of citizens based in the northern part of the country formed an
    NGO in March 1999 geared toward promoting ethnic unity. During the
    year, they organized community events around religious holidays in
    which residents of all faiths participated.
        In June 1999, the Rodrigues Government Employees Association sued
    the Public Service Commission and the Government for placing different
    service conditions on those civil servants who were born and live on
    Rodrigues, an island 360 miles off the country's east coast with a
    population of 36,000, compared with civil servants who were born on the
    main island of Mauritius and work on Rodrigues. In December the Supreme
    Court rejected the association's suit; however, the group appealed.
    Under the law, a Supreme Court decision may be appealed to the Privy
    Council of the United Kingdom; a Privy Council appeal in this case is
    scheduled for October 2001.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution explicitly protects
    the right of workers to associate in trade unions, and there is an
    active trade union movement. Approximately 335 unions represent 111,231
    workers, or 21.5 percent of the work force. Many unions are small,
    having fewer than 1,000 members. Ten major labor federations serve as
    umbrella organizations for these smaller unions. With the exception of
    members of the ``disciplined force,'' namely, the police and the
    Special Mobile Force, and persons in state services who are not public
    officers such as contractors, workers are free to form and join unions
    and to organize in all sectors, including in the export processing
    zone. Although only 10 percent of EPZ workers are unionized, these
    workers are covered by national labor laws (see Section 6.b.). The
    Mauritian Labor Congress asserts that union membership is low in the
    EPZ in part because employers in the EPZ intimidate employees and
    restrict access to union organizers. The International Confederation of
    Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) alleged that employers have established
    employer-controlled work councils for workers in the EPZ. Labor unions
    are independent of the Government, and they have established ties to
    domestic political parties and addressed political issues.
        Under the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), unions have the legal
    right to strike; however, the IRA requires a 21-day cooling-off period,
    followed by binding arbitration, which has the effect of making most
    strikes illegal. The IRA states that worker participation in an
    unlawful strike is sufficient grounds for dismissal, but workers may
    seek remedy in court if they believe that their dismissals are
    unjustified. There were no strikes during the year. The IRA grants the
    Prime Minister the prerogative to declare any strike illegal if he
    considers that it ``imperils the economy.''
        Under the law, unions may establish ties with international labor
    bodies, and some unions have done so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    protects the right of employees to bargain collectively with their
    employers. The ICFTU reported that the law does not protect trade
    unions adequately against acts of interference by employers. The
    International Labor Organization (ILO) reported that the Government
    began a labor law reform project with ILO technical assistance;
    however, no new legislation was enacted during the year. Minimum wages
    for nonmanagerial level workers are set by the National Remuneration
    Board (NRB), whose chairman is appointed by the Minister of Labor;
    however, most unions negotiate wages higher than those set by the NRB.
    Almost 13 percent of the labor force works for national or local
    government. The IRA prohibits antiunion discrimination. There is an
    arbitration tribunal that handles any such complaints.
        Approximately 90,765 persons work in the EPZ. Workers in EPZ firms
    enjoy the same basic protections as workers in other firms; however,
    there are some EPZ-specific labor laws, including the provision for 10
    hours per week of mandatory, paid overtime at a higher wage than for
    ordinary working hours. The Mauritian Labor Congress asserts that union
    membership is low in the EPZ in part because employers in the EPZ
    intimidate employees and restrict access to union organizers.
        The ICFTU 2000 report stated that there was very little collective
    bargaining in the EPZ and that the National Renumeration Board
    determined wages after representations by employers and workers''
    representatives.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor, including that by children, is prohibited by law outside the
    EPZ; however, there are reports of forced child prostitution, which the
    Government has targeted as a top law enforcement priority (see Section
    6.d.). Labor laws that cover the EPZ allow for 10 hours of compulsory
    overtime a week and compulsory work on public holidays, although at a
    higher hourly wage (see Sections 6.b. and 6.e.).
        According to the ILO Committee of Experts, the Merchant Shipping
    Act contains provisions that are not compatible with international
    standards regarding forced labor. Certain breaches of discipline by
    seamen are punishable by imprisonment. The Government indicated that it
    proposed to amend the Merchant Shipping Act to make it compatible with
    ILO Convention 10; however, it took no action during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under age 15
    and limits the employment undertaken by youth between ages 15 and 18;
    the Government respects this law in practice.
        The legal minimum age for the employment of children is 15 years;
    however, children unable to attend secondary school often seek
    apprenticeships in the trades. Six vocational schools were opened in
    1998 to train students who fail the primary education certificate exam
    taken by students at the end of the sixth year of primary education.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for the enforcement of child
    labor laws and conducts frequent inspections. According to the Ministry
    of Women's Rights, Child Development, and Family Welfare, 2,000
    children between the ages of 12 and 14 were employed or looking for
    work in 1998. Child labor in homes, on farms, and in shops is common on
    the island of Rodrigues. Forced or bonded labor involving children is
    prohibited by law; however, forced child prostitution exists. In
    October the new Minister of Women's Rights, Child Development, and
    Family Welfare released a 1998 study on the sexual exploitation of
    children that the previous government had withheld. Although it did not
    provide the number of child prostitutes, the study reported that
    children enter into prostitution as early as age 13; their clientele
    included industrialists, professionals, police officers,
    parliamentarians, and ministers. The Government has targeted child
    prostitution as a top law enforcement priority; however, at year's end,
    it had not taken specific action.
        In June the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor. The Ministry of Labor is responsible for
    investigating reports of child labor abuses; 30 inspectors are employed
    by the Ministry to investigate all reports of labor abuses, including
    those of child labor. The inspectors performed approximately 5,000
    inspections during the year.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government administratively
    establishes minimum wages, which vary according to the sector of
    employment, and it mandates minimum wage increases each year based on
    inflation. The minimum wage for an unskilled worker in the EPZ is
    $13.27 (345 rupees) per week, while the minimum wage for an unskilled
    factory worker outside the EPZ is about $14.94 (388 rupees); these sums
    do not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but
    the actual market wage for most workers is much higher due to a labor
    shortage and collective bargaining. The standard legal workweek in the
    industrial sector is 45 hours. Labor laws that cover the EPZ allow for
    10 hours of compulsory overtime a week and compulsory work on public
    holidays, although at a higher hourly wage. According to the Mauritian
    Labor Congress, 10 hours of overtime a week is mandatory at certain
    textile factories in the EPZ (see Section 6.b.).
        In October the Minister for Training Skills Development and
    Productivity reported that there are 24,292 foreign workers in the
    country, 20,081 of whom work in the textile sector. Since they often do
    not speak English, French, or Creole, it is difficult for them to
    demand their rights, which are the same as those of citizen employees,
    including the right to belong to a union. There were cases in which
    foreign workers obtained local legal counsel to redress their
    grievances.
        The Government sets health and safety standards, and Ministry of
    Labor officials inspect working conditions and ensure compliance with
    the law. The small number of inspectors limits the Government's
    enforcement ability; however, through voluntary compliance, the number
    of occupational accidents has been cut. Workers have the right to
    remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardy to
    continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    children, but does not specifically mention trafficking in adults. In
    1999 there were reports from the nearby island of Madagascar that women
    and children were trafficked to the islands of Reunion and Mauritius
    for prostitution; however, there were no further reports of this nature
    during the year. The penalties for those found guilty of child
    trafficking are a minimum fine of $370 (10,000 rupees) or imprisonment
    for up to 5 years.
                                   __________

                                   MOZAMBIQUE

        Mozambique's constitutional Government, headed by President Joaquim
    Chissano, held its second general multiparty elections in December
    1999. President Chissano was reelected, and his party, the Front for
    the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), won 133 seats in the 250-seat
    Assembly of the Republic, with the remaining 117 seats going to the
    opposition coalition of the Mozambique National Resistance--Electoral
    Union (RENAMO-UE). According to international observers, the elections
    were generally free and fair; however, they were marred by allegations
    of vote-counting irregularities. Chissano and the leadership of
    FRELIMO, which have ruled the country since independence in 1975,
    dominate policymaking and implementation. The Assembly is a multiparty
    parliament that provides increasingly useful debate on national policy
    issues and generates some proposals independently. During legislative
    sessions, the Assembly influenced the executive branch on some policy
    issues, and RENAMO had some limited influence on the executive.
    Opposition parties in the Assembly boycotted most parliamentary
    activities during most of the year to protest the election results;
    however, they resumed full participation in October. Despite the
    boycott and the contentious atmosphere in the Assembly, the FRELIMO
    majority accepted several proposals from opposition parties, including
    one that established ad hoc commissions to revise the electoral law and
    aspects of the Constitution. The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the executive branch dominates the
    judiciary, which lacks adequate resources, and is chronically
    understaffed, susceptible to corruption, and largely ineffectual.
        The forces responsible for internal security under the Ministry of
    Interior include: the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), the
    Mozambican National Police (PRM), and the Rapid Reaction Police (PIR).
    The State Information and Security Service (SISE) reports directly to
    the President. The military continued to suffer from a lack of money
    and long term strategy. Many former military personnel of all ranks
    work in other government security forces. Members of the security
    forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
        Mozambique is a very poor country. Approximately 80 percent of the
    population is employed in agriculture, mostly on a subsistence level,
    and approximately 75 percent of the population lives in poverty. The
    primary exports are shrimp, sugar, cotton, cashew nuts, and bulk
    electric power. The transition to a market economy continued during the
    year. The gross domestic product (GDP) continued to be approximately
    $3.9 billion. Inflation was approximately 11.4 percent, an increase
    from the 1999 level of 6.2 percent. The economy and government budget
    remained heavily dependent on foreign aid. The economy had a $848
    million trade deficit, down from a $929 million deficit in 1999. Annual
    per capita income was $222. High unemployment and underemployment in
    the formal and informal sectors continued. Corruption continued to be a
    problem in the public and private sectors. Flooding caused by heavy
    rains and cyclones in February and March severely damaged crops,
    livestock, and rural infrastructure in the south-central portion of the
    country. The damage, estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
    negatively impacted economic growth.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor. Police
    continued to commit numerous abuses, including extrajudicial killings,
    disappearances, excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses.
    Police officers tortured and beat persons in custody, and abused
    prostitutes and street children. In September the president of the
    League of Human Rights (LDH), a local non-governmental organization,
    noted that the LDH documented an overall decline in the respect of
    human rights by police forces during the year. Police violently
    dispersed demonstrations by opposition supporters. Prison conditions
    remained extremely harsh and life-threatening; many prisoners died due
    to the harsh conditions, including more than a hundred RENAMO
    demonstrators who suffocated to death in an overcrowded jail cell.
    Police continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, and lengthy
    pretrial detention was common. Fair and expeditious trials were not
    possible due to an inefficient, understaffed, and underfunded
    judiciary, which is dominated by the executive and subject to
    corruption. There were reports of some infringements on the right to
    privacy. The Government generally respected freedom of the press;
    however, one journalist was killed and many others were harassed during
    the year by unknown assailants. Media outlets owned by the Government
    and State enterprises largely reflected the views of the ruling party;
    however, the number and diversity of independent media increased, and
    their criticism of the Government, its leaders, and their families
    largely is tolerated. Human rights violations received extensive
    coverage in both government and independent media during the year. The
    law restricts freedom of assembly, and security forces forcibly
    dispersed some demonstrations during the year. Both the Government and
    the law imposed some limits on freedom of association. The Government,
    at times, infringed on freedom of movement. Domestic violence against
    women as well as widespread discrimination against women in employment
    and property rights, remained problems. The abuse and criminal
    exploitation of street children, including child prostitution,
    increased in urban areas. Discrimination against the disabled and child
    labor remained problems. There were reports that women were trafficked
    to South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor. Occasional
    mob violence resulted in several deaths.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

        Section 1 Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
    From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were several
    unconfirmed reports of political killings by security forces; RENAMO
    officials claimed that security forces killed party members Eduardo
    Foao, Ricardo Moaine, and Geraldo Carvalho in Sofala Province in
    February. Police denied that the three were killed by security forces
    and claimed that an autopsy showed that Moaine died of natural causes.
    There were also reports of extrajudicial killings by security forces.
        On March 31, police arrested Tomas Paulo Nhacumba and Gildo Joaquim
    Bata in Maputo for possession of an illegal firearm. On April 1, police
    visited the families of the two men and demanded $750 for their
    release; the families were unable to pay the sum. When Nhacumba's
    family visited him that same day they witnessed police officers
    torturing detainees. On April 2, family members were informed that the
    two men had been transferred to the Criminal Investigative Unit but
    were unable to locate them. In April the bodies of the two men were
    identified by family members at the Maputo Central Hospital morgue,
    listed under false names. The bodies were delivered to the morgue by
    police officers, who attributed their deaths to natural causes despite
    the presence of bullet wounds in their upper torsos.
        On May 5, police fired upon and reportedly killed at least six
    civilians at a police station during a confrontation between supporters
    of a jailed RENAMO member and the police (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        The LDH reported a possible pattern of execution-style killings
    committed by uniformed police in the Marracuene area. In June police
    allegedly took Emidio Raul Nhancume from his family's home in Matola.
    The family located his body more than a month later in Marracuene,
    Maputo Province. Local residents stated that police shot and killed
    Nhancume on the day of his disappearance, and then buried his body. The
    Government had not investigated the incident nor taken other action by
    year's end. On July 5, Eliseu Geraldo Muainga disappeared after
    visiting his girlfriend's house. The girlfriend observed uniformed
    police hiding outside; she was later advised by neighbors that he was
    being held at a police station. She visited the facility, but the
    police denied that they were holding Muainga. His body was found on
    July 18 in Marracuene by residents of the area. The Government had not
    investigated the incident nor taken other action by year's end.
        On August 23, soldiers of the Presidential Guard who were guarding
    a VIP guesthouse shot and killed an unarmed citizen who had reportedly
    become argumentative when told he could not walk down the street. The
    Government defended the soldier's actions as appropriate under existing
    security laws and took no action to address the incident by year's end.
        On November 9, as many as 54 persons were killed during violence
    related to rallies and marches held throughout the country to protest
    the outcome of the December 1999 elections (see Sections 1.c., 1.d.,
    1.e., and 2.b.). The total number of persons killed remains in dispute
    among human rights groups, the opposition, and the National Assembly.
    The LDH reported that police in Nampula province and the Balama
    district of Cabo Delgado province fired on, killed, and injured unarmed
    demonstrators to prevent rallies and marches. The LDH alleged that the
    interim police commander in Balama ordered the police under his command
    to kill demonstrators. In Montepuez, Cabo Delgado, there were credible
    reports that RENAMO demonstrators attacked a local jail, freed
    prisoners, ransacked government buildings, and held the local district
    administrator hostage. Police responded with lethal force, killing 17
    persons; 7 police officers also were killed. Rioters reportedly
    mutilated the bodies of the police officers. On December 5, the
    National Assembly established a bipartisan Parliamentary Commission of
    Inquiry to investigate the violence surrounding the November 9
    demonstrations and the subsequent deaths in custody.
        In October 1999, the domestic NGO Human Rights and Development
    (DHD), published a critical assessment of human rights conditions (see
    Section 4); among the complaints were alleged police killings. The
    Government did not respond to the report by year's end.
        Extremely harsh prison conditions and torture resulted in the
    deaths of many persons in custody, and in November more than 100
    detainees died of asphyxiation in their cell (see Section 1.c.).
        In March 1999, relatives of a detainee accused police of killing
    him in Beira central prison. Authorities attributed the man's death to
    an unspecified illness; an eyewitness testified in March that he saw
    police beating the victim on the way to the prison. The case was
    referred by the LDH to the Attorney General's office but still was
    pending at year's end.
        There was no investigation into the 1998 death in police custody of
    Intipa Faque in the northern province of Nampula; nor was any action
    taken against the officers responsible. The LDH sent several written
    inquiries to the Nampula Province prosecutor regarding the case;
    however, they had received no answer by year's end.
        The Government reportedly investigated the police killing of a
    demonstrator during a labor strike at a security services company in
    1998; however, no report was released publicly, nor was any action
    taken against the officers responsible by year's end (see Section
    6.a.).
        Occasional mob and vigilante killings continued in both urban and
    rural areas due to general public frustration with rising crime. In
    Costa de Sol and Matola in the Maputo area, suspected thieves were
    beaten to death by mobs.
        Some of the hundreds of thousands of landmines still in the ground
    since the 1960's caused 8 deaths during the year. The Government
    continued to cooperate with international organizations in demining
    efforts during the year.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances; however, police were responsible for unexplained
    disappearances of prisoners. In some instances persons who disappeared
    while in police custody were later discovered to have been killed (see
    Section 1.a.).
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel or
    inhuman treatment; however, the police continued to commit serious
    abuses, and torture, beatings, death threats, physical and mental
    abuse, extortion, and unexplained disappearances of some prisoners
    remained problems. During the year, the LDH reported 59 complaints of
    torture, including several instances involving the sexual abuse of
    women, beating, illegal detention, and death threats. In September the
    LDH reported an overall decline in the observance of human rights.
        Corruption in the police forces extends throughout the ranks, and
    the PRM used violence and detention to intimidate persons from
    reporting abuses.
        Journalists continued to report that police extorted money from
    street vendors, many of whom are widowed and divorced women, sometimes
    beating the women, and often stealing their merchandise. There also
    were reports of police abuse of prostitutes and street children (see
    Section 5).
        The national budget allocated more funding for the hiring and
    training of police, as well as for higher salaries. In 1999, new
    standards for the police force were imposed, requiring a minimum
    educational level of the tenth grade. In September a new 4-year police
    service academy opened, which provides college-level training to police
    officers in the mid-ranks and higher. Human rights training is becoming
    mandatory for all security officers, with human rights groups like the
    DHD teaching some of the courses. The LDH discontinued its training
    program during the year, reportedly because of reluctant cooperation
    from the police.
        On March 31, police arrested Tomas Paulo Nhacumba and Gildo Joaquim
    Bata in Maputo for possession of an illegal firearm. When Nhacumba's
    family visited him on April 1, they witnessed police officers torturing
    detainees (see Section 1.a.).
        On May 3, police reportedly arrested a RENAMO supporter who had
    urged a vendor not to pay a market fee collector in order to protest
    the Government's legitimacy; police forced the man to march naked
    through the town from his home to the local jail. On May 5, when 40
    unarmed friends and family members went to the police station to gain
    the man's release, a police officer allegedly assaulted an elderly man
    in the group, which resulted in a confrontation between the crowd and
    police. The police responded to the confrontation by firing into the
    crowd, reportedly killing at least six persons and injuring several
    others (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). The Government defended the
    actions by the police as appropriate and lawful; however, a group of
    local NGO's, including the LDH, conducted an independent investigation
    and reported that the police used inappropriate force. The Government
    did not respond to the report, and the FRELIMO majority in Parliament
    blocked an initiative to form a commission of inquiry to investigate
    the incident.
        There was some sporadic political violence in the provinces during
    the year related to tensions between supporters of RENAMO and local
    security forces, including incidents in Marumbala, Beira, and Aube. On
    November 9, violence erupted in at least 15 of the more than 60
    demonstrations held throughout the country by RENAMO to protest the
    outcome of the December 1999 elections; as many as 54 persons died in
    the violence (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). In addition, approximately
    200 persons were injured and approximately 457 demonstrators were
    detained (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The LDH reported that police
    used excessive force against the demonstrators in Nampula province and
    Balama, Cabo Delgado province and cited an anonymous police source who
    alleged that police severely beat and tortured detainees in custody. A
    RENAMO Member of Parliament (M.P.) claimed that police beat him and
    broke his right clavicle during his arrest; he publicly stated that
    police tortured him and other detainees while they were held at the
    Beira maximum security prison.
        During November and December, a number of journalists were
    threatened and attacked by unknown assailants (see Section 2.a.).
        Prison conditions in most of the country are extremely harsh and
    continued to pose a threat to inmates' health and lives. A LDH report
    released in January 1999 on the Beira central prison found that
    conditions remain significantly below minimum international standards.
    Latrine facilities are primitive; in some prisons, inmates must keep
    human waste in their cells until they persuade or bribe attendants to
    remove it. Food is substandard and scarce. Most prisoners receive only
    one meal per day on a regular basis. It is customary for families to
    bring food to prisoners; however, there are sporadic reports that
    guards demand bribes in return.
        From September through December, the DHD conducted a series of
    prison and jail visits in 7 of the country's 11 provinces. The DHD
    reported that prisons provided substandard facilities and minimal care
    to detainees. A comprehensive U.N. Development Program (UNDP) report
    released during the year stated that prisons were decaying,
    overcrowded, and inadequately supplied. The Prime Minister responded to
    the UNDP report by calling publicly for a national effort to improve
    prison conditions. The Prison Fellowship of Mozambique (FPM) also
    commenced operations during the year and conducted prison visits (see
    Section 4).
        There were many deaths in prison, the vast majority due to illness
    and disease; the UNDP report noted that there were 157 prison deaths
    during 1999, mostly due to malaria, tuberculosis, and respiratory
    diseases aggravated by poor conditions and lack of space (see Sections
    1.c.). RENAMO alleged that three protestors who were detained during
    the November 9 demonstrations died from asphyxiation in November in a
    maximum security prison in Beira, Sofala. The Government acknowledged
    the death of one of the detainees but attributed his death to natural
    causes. Between November 18 and 19, at least eight detained RENAMO
    supporters died in a Montepuez jail cell. Between November 20 and 21,
    more than 100 additional RENAMO supporters died of asphyxiation in a
    detention cell in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado; lack of water and food may
    have contributed to the deaths. The final number remains in dispute
    between the Government, the opposition, and human rights NGO's; many of
    the detainees never were formally processed and were buried in mass
    graves. The LDH and the DHD alleged that local police officials
    purposely deprived the detainees of oxygen by closing the cell door and
    that the police commander threatened that the detainees would not leave
    the prison alive. The Government, with the assistance of a South
    African team of pathologists, investigated the incident. Although the
    results of the investigation were not released by year's end, the
    Government stated that the deaths were caused by asphyxiation due to
    overcrowding, and independent investigations by the LDH and the DHD
    confirmed the finding. Several police officers were fired, and
    investigations continued at year's end, including a National Assembly
    commission of inquiry. In December President Chissano and RENAMO
    President Dhlakama agreed to establish a separate bipartisan working
    group to investigate the Montepuez deaths; the working group was
    scheduled to begin meeting in February 2001. The Government did not
    investigate the March 1999 deaths of three juveniles who died in
    detention, allegedly from illness and lack of food. While the health
    problems of most inmates remain unattended, the Ministry of Justice and
    the Ministry of the Interior made specific efforts to address some of
    the more serious diseases in the prison system during the year,
    including cholera, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses.
        Two National Directorates of Prisons (DNP's), one under the
    Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the other under the Ministry of Interior
    (MOI), operate prisons in all the provincial capitals. The DNP's also
    hold prisoners at an agricultural penitentiary in Mabalane and
    industrial penitentiaries in Nampula and Maputo. In MOI facilities
    detainees who have not yet been charged are held with prisoners
    sentenced for serious offenses that specify maximum security. Detainees
    who have not been charged are usually held for longer periods than the
    48 hours permitted under the law. In MOJ facilities detainees who have
    been charged but not yet tried are held with prisoners who have been
    tried and sentenced to prison for relatively minor cases where moderate
    security imprisonment is deemed sufficient. Pretrial detainees are
    usually held for several months before trial, and delays over 1 year
    are common. MOI and MOJ facilities, while separate, often are connected
    physically. Military and civilian prisoners are held in the same
    prisons.
        Detention facilities remained severely overcrowded, generally
    housing 4 to 6 times the number of prisoners that they were built to
    accommodate. The National Association for the Support and Protection of
    Prisoners, a domestic NGO, stated that during the year, Beira Central
    Prison held 513 inmates in a prison built to hold 200; Manica held 475
    in a prison built to hold 300; Tete held 464 in a prison built to hold
    90. Inhambane Provincial Prison held 296 in a prison built to hold 75;
    Nampula held 775 in a prison built for 70; and Cabo Delgado held 245 in
    a prison built for 90. Maputo Central Prison, built to hold 800
    inmates, held 2,470 inmates. However, the Maputo Machava Maximum
    Security Prison, with a capacity of 600, held considerably less than
    that. Approximately 4,032 pretrial detainees were held in jails and
    prisons during the year.
        Minors are incarcerated with adult inmates. During a visit to the
    Beira Central Prison in August 1999, the Minister of Coordination of
    Social Action found 25 minors detained there. However, the LDH reported
    noticeably fewer minors held in detention nationwide. At times Maputo
    City Prison houses children as young as 3 years of age, brought there
    by mothers sentenced for long periods.
        International as well as domestic human rights groups may have
    access to prisoners at the discretion of the MOJ and MOI; however,
    officials sometimes cite unsanitary conditions or security risks as
    reasons to delay or cancel visits. Several local and international
    organizations, including the LDH, the DHD, and the UNDP, visited prison
    facilities during the year and reported on prison conditions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides that the duration of preventive imprisonment be set by law;
    however, the police continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens
    in practice. Under the law, the maximum preventive imprisonment is 48
    hours, during which time a detainee has the right to have his case
    reviewed by judicial authorities, after which he can be detained up to
    another 60 days while the case is investigated by the PIC. In cases
    where a person is accused of a very serious crime carrying a sentence
    of more than 8 years, he may be detained up to 84 days without being
    charged formally. If a court approves, such detainees may be held for
    two more periods of 84 days each without charge while the police
    complete the investigation process. The law provides that if the
    prescribed period for investigation has been completed and no charges
    have been brought, the detainee must be released. In many cases, the
    authorities either are unaware of these regulations or ignore them,
    often also ignoring a detainee's constitutional right to counsel and to
    contact relatives or friends.
        On May 3, police reportedly arrested a RENAMO supporter under
    humiliating circumstances after an argument between a market fee
    collector and a vendor (see Section 1.c.).
        In October police arrested three individuals for handing out
    opposition pamphlets in Beira. The court sentenced them to prison terms
    ranging from 12 to 18 months for distributing materials offensive to
    the Government and the President and for incitement to civil
    disobedience (see Section 3).
        In October Mario Frank, a RENAMO member and former general, was
    arrested after police raided RENAMO party headquarters in Beira, Sofala
    province and confiscated a number of weapons. In November officials
    released him after holding him in detention for 22 days without charge.
        During the November 9 demonstrations, police detained approximately
    457 RENAMO members and supporters during more than 60 rallies and
    marches to protest the outcome of the December 1999 elections; there
    were reports that police beat and tortured detainees in custody (se
    Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.e., and 2.b.). Three RENAMO members reportedly
    died in custody in Beira; RENAMO alleged that these deaths resulted
    from asphyxiation (see Section 1.c.). In addition more than 100 RENAMO
    detainees died of asphyxiation in a jail cell in Montepuez (see Section
    1.c.). In November courts in the Manica, Cabo Delgado, Sofala, and
    Nampula provinces acquitted 15 RENAMO members and supporters and
    sentenced 130 others to prison terms ranging from 15 days to 2 years
    for their involvement in the November 9 demonstrations (see Sections
    1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.). FRELIMO and RENAMO established a working
    group to examine, among other matters, the cases of the detained
    demonstrators; the group was scheduled to make initial recommendations
    to the President and RENAMO by March 15, 2001.
        Many persons complained that security officials often detained them
    for spurious reasons and demanded identification documents; many
    officers also demanded bribes to permit persons to continue toward
    their destinations (see Section 2.d.). The media reported that citizens
    complained to authorities that police detained persons for not carrying
    identification documents and demanded money when they could not produce
    documents. Many victims lived in areas where there was no notary public
    available to validate their documents. Many victims chose not to seek
    police assistance because of their usual demand for bribes or a lack of
    confidence that the police would help.
        In January the Supreme Court acquitted an imam who was arrested in
    1999 in connection with a murder (see Section 2.c.); in July the court
    found two other men guilty of the murder and sentenced them to 9 and 16
    years'' imprisonment.
        Most citizens also are unaware of their rights provided by the
    Constitution, the law, and the Penal Process Code. As a result,
    detainees can spend many weeks, months, and even years in pretrial
    status. The bail system remains poorly defined, and prisoners, their
    families, and NGO's continue to complain that police and prison
    officials demand bribes to release prisoners. On March 31, police
    arrested Tomas Paulo Nhacumba and Gildo Joaquim Bata in Maputo for
    possession of an illegal firearm. On April 1, police visited the
    families of the two men and demanded $750 for their release; the
    families were unable to pay the sum; they later identified the two
    men's bodies at a hospital morgue (see Section 1.a.).
        Under the Penal Code, only those suspects caught in the act of
    committing a crime can be held in detention. Justice Ministry officials
    say that some police lack adequate training and do not know how to
    charge a person properly with a stated crime. A detainee may be
    subjected to indefinite detention. The National Directorate of Prisons
    reported that there are 6,422 persons in the prison system, 4,032 of
    whom were detainees who had not been charged. In response to this
    problem, a legal enforcement commission convened in May 1999 and
    ordered cases of detainees to be reviewed so that those who had served
    their time or were being held illegally (without charge) could be
    released. In Beira alone, 230 prisoners were released from the central
    prison during May and June 1999. During the year, the Government
    created an inter-ministerial review committee to continue this process,
    and the committee periodically reviewed the status of prisoners
    throughout the country to prevent unnecessary detentions. It was not
    known how many prisoners were released during the year under this
    process. The DHD report on human rights conditions released in October
    1999 gave particular emphasis to the problem of arbitrary arrest and
    detention (see Section 4).
        Drug cases are subject to a special regime. A 1996 law specifies
    that the legal period of preventive detention in drug trafficking cases
    is 10 days. The same law authorizes a long period of investigation--up
    to 9 months--in cases involving drug smuggling, drug production and
    transfer, and criminal association.
        The Constitution expressly prohibits exile, and the Government does
    not use exile as a form of punishment.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution formally
    established an independent judiciary and specifically states that the
    decisions of the courts take precedence over all other authorities and
    individuals and must be obeyed; however the executive, and by extension
    the FRELIMO party, continued to dominate the judiciary, which is
    understaffed and manned by inadequately trained appointees. The DHD
    report on human rights conditions released in October 1999 gave
    particular emphasized to problems in the judiciary (see Section 4).
        The President appoints the President and Vice President of the most
    important tribunal, the Supreme Court. Supreme Court nominations
    initially are prepared by the Higher Judicial Magistrate's Council
    (CSMJ), the body responsible for overseeing professional behavior among
    magistrates. The CSMJ, generally all FRELIMO party members, submits a
    list of qualified persons to the President of the Republic. The
    president then submits his choices to the National Assembly for
    approval. No assembly approval is needed for other judicial
    appointments.
        There are two complementary formal justice systems: the civil/
    criminal system and the military system. Civilians are not under the
    jurisdiction of, or tried in, military courts. A 1991 law empowered the
    Supreme Court to administer the civil/criminal system; it also hears
    appeals, including military cases, although the Ministry of Defense
    administers the military courts. Below the Supreme Court there are
    provincial and district courts. There also are courts that exercise
    limited, specialized jurisdiction, such as the administrative court,
    customs court, fiscal court, maritime court, and labor court. The
    Constitution called for the creation of a constitutional court, but the
    Government has not yet passed implementing legislation. In the absence
    of this body, the Supreme Court is tasked with ruling on issues of
    constitutionality, as it did when assessing the eligibility of
    presidential candidates for the general elections. Persons 16 years old
    and younger fall under the jurisdiction of a court system for minors.
    Through this legal channel, the Government can send minors to
    correctional, educational, or other institutions. As with the
    provincial and district courts, the specialized and minor court systems
    are ineffective due to a lack of qualified professionals.
        In August 1999, Supreme Court Chief Justice Mario Mangaze
    complained that only 25 percent of citizens had access to the official
    judicial system. Outside the formal court system, a number of local
    customary courts and traditional authorities adjudicate matters such as
    estate and divorce cases. These courts are staffed by respected local
    arbiters who have no formal training but who exercise a substantial
    judicial and executive role, particularly in the area of arbitration.
        Persons accused of crimes against the State are tried publicly in
    regular civilian courts under standard criminal judicial procedures.
    The law provides definitions of crimes against the State, such as
    treason, terrorism, and sabotage. The Supreme Court has original
    jurisdiction over members of Parliament and other persons who are
    immune from trial in the lower courts.
        A judge may order a closed trial because of national security
    interests or to protect the privacy of the plaintiff in cases
    concerning sexual assault.
        In regular courts, all accused persons are in principle presumed
    innocent and have the right to legal counsel and the right of appeal;
    however, authorities do not always respect these rights. The great
    majority of the population is either unaware of these rights or does
    not possess the means to obtain any form of legal counsel. Although the
    law specifically provides for public defenders, such assistance
    generally is not available in practice, particularly in rural areas.
    Some NGO's, such as the LDH, the Government's National Institute for
    Legal Assistance, and the Mozambican Association of Women in Judicial
    Careers, continued to offer limited legal counsel at little or no cost
    to both defendants and prisoners.
        A lack of licensed attorneys exacerbates the judicial system's
    weakness. There are an estimated 200 licensed attorneys in the country;
    the vast majority work in Maputo. There continued to be a shortage of
    qualified judicial personnel, with 160 judges nationwide. There are
    appeals courts in all provinces, but few of these courts are staffed by
    formally trained judges, despite the fact that the Judicial Magistrates
    Statute requires a law degree. Some districts have no formal courts or
    judges at all. Several donor initiatives to remedy these shortages were
    continued or completed during the year, including the training of
    district court judges and public prosecutors.
        In 1998 while speaking at the opening of the Supreme Court session,
    Chief Justice Mangaze complained that a number of judges and others
    responsible to the courts were guilty of unacceptable practices,
    including corruption and bribe taking, chronic absenteeism, unequal
    treatment, and deliberate delays and omissions in handling cases.
    Justice Mangaze also presides over the CSMJ, which has expelled 24
    judges for corruption since 1995. A Ministry of Justice official
    estimated that 17 judges were removed from office since 1998. During
    the year several judicial expulsions occurred, including the dismissal
    of the Attorney General and six of his senior legal staff in July and
    the suspension of a judge involved in a fraud case regarding the Banco
    Comercial de Mocambique (BCM). In 1998 the National Assembly passed a
    law, which was implemented in 1999, that speeds the implementation of
    CSMJ decisions affecting judges who appeal charges of misconduct, thus
    removing them from the bench more swiftly.
        In October a court sentenced 3 individuals to prison terms ranging
    from 12 to 18 months for distributing materials offensive to the
    Government and the President and for incitement to civil disobedience
    (see Section 2.a.).
        In November courts in the Manica, Cabo Delgado, Sofala, and Nampula
    provinces acquitted 15 RENAMO members and supporters and sentenced 130
    others to prison terms ranging from 15 days to 2 years for their
    involvement in the November 9 demonstrations. The courts held that the
    demonstrations were illegal because they took place outside of the
    legal time limits. The speed with which these trials occurred and the
    sentences handed out raised serious questions as to the integrity of
    the judiciary and the right of due process (see Section 1.c.).
        The Penal Code contains legal guidelines for the judicial treatment
    of minors and forbids the imprisonment of minors below the age of 16;
    however, there are many documented reports that some judges ordered the
    incarceration of minors in common prisons without trial (see Section
    1.c.). In most areas of the country, it is difficult to accurately
    assess age because the information is not well documented and many
    persons do not have identification cards.
        There were no confirmed reports of political prisoners; however,
    RENAMO alleged that the persons held in detention for participation in
    the November 9 demonstrations were political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of privacy and
    expressly forbids the use of surveillance techniques, and the
    Government generally respected these provisions. There were no
    documented reports of such search activity; however, some political
    groups claimed that their telephones were tapped by government
    intelligence agencies and claimed that security forces kept watch on
    their activities. By law police need a warrant to enter homes and
    businesses; however, in July a few Maputo residents complained that
    customs agents searched their homes illegally.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution, the 1991 Press
    Law, and the 1992 Rome Peace Accords provide for freedom of expression
    and of the press, and the Government generally respected these
    provisions; however, limitations on these freedoms are permitted if
    they relate to the media's obligations to respect the Constitution,
    human dignity, and imperatives of foreign policy and national defense.
    In 1999 the Higher Council of Social Communication (CSCS), an
    enforcement body for the press law that is dominated by the ruling
    party, expressed concern that the vagueness of ``imperatives of foreign
    policy and national defense'' could lead to unwarranted restrictions.
    However, in December the CSCS expressed its concerns regarding recent
    articles, editorials, and comments that it considered contrary to
    national unity and prescribed media goals; some journalists criticized
    the CSCS for attempting to restrict press freedom and promote self-
    censorship. While criticism of the President is not prohibited, the
    1991 Press Law holds that in cases of defamation against the President,
    truth is not a sufficient defense against libel. This law has not been
    tested in court; however, the President experienced considerable verbal
    and written criticism during the year without invoking this clause.
        In October police arrested three individuals for handing out
    opposition pamphlets in Beira. The court sentenced them to prison terms
    ranging from 12 to 18 months for distributing materials offensive to
    the Government and the President and for incitement to civil
    disobedience (see Section 3).
        Government and state-owned media largely reflected the views of the
    ruling party, but many such media sources also carried significant
    criticism of Government actions, including the Government's handling of
    the flood-related rescue operations and post-flood distribution of
    relief goods. Media ownership is diversified. In 1999 the U.N.
    Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Media
    Project estimated that 34 percent of the country's media were public,
    36 percent were private commercial, and 28 percent were private
    nonprofit (church affiliated); however, the public category includes
    the country's only daily newspapers, the only Sunday newspaper, and the
    only weekly newsmagazine. Two progovernment newspapers--Noticias and
    Domingo--together with a third sports-oriented weekly are owned by a
    single corporation, Noticias Limited, in which state-owned enterprises
    hold majority shares. Both evidenced consistent bias in favor of the
    ruling party, FRELIMO, during the post-election period; however both
    newspapers continued pushing for reform of the justice system.
        A large number of periodicals and broadcasting entities have been
    licensed since 1992, and the independent media criticisms of government
    leaders and their families largely is tolerated. For example, the
    independent media was extremely critical of the Government's reaction
    to the November 9 RENAMO demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). There were
    five independent weekly newspapers published in Maputo, and five other
    independent weekly journals published in provincial capitals. According
    to a survey by the Panos Institute, the 10 weekly newspapers had a
    combined total circulation of 50,910. There are an additional 20
    printed periodicals with a combined circulation of approximately
    34,000. There also are 8 periodicals that transmitted daily editions
    electronically, with a combined subscription of more than 1,500. The
    second oldest faxed daily, Imparcial, is owned by RENAMO. Websites were
    developed in 1999 for several independent media. Only a small minority
    of the population receives news directly through the print media.
        While the Government no longer owns most radio and television
    stations, government stations are the only broadcasters capable of
    countrywide transmission; however, there are local and independent
    broadcasts in almost all urban areas. Government media are showing
    greater transparency in reporting and some independence of editorial
    content. Radio Mozambique, the public's most important source of
    information, is government-owned; however, its news coverage is
    considered generally unbiased and fair. Radio Mozambique receives the
    largest single subsidy from the state budget of any public media
    company. It broadcasts in Portuguese and 18 indigenous languages; its
    external service broadcasts in English as well as in Portuguese for
    citizens in neighboring South Africa. Radio Mozambique regularly
    broadcasts public debates that include a variety of participants with
    differing opinions.
        In addition to Radio Mozambique, there are 16 independent
    (primarily church-supported) and state-supported radio stations, most
    using local languages in addition to Portuguese, which have spread to
    over a dozen cities. One such station, Radio Terra Verde (RTV), is
    linked directly to the principal opposition party, RENAMO. RTV is
    second only to Radio Mozambique's youth-oriented Radio Cidade in
    popularity, outside of broadcast times for soccer matches. Foreign
    radio programs, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),
    Radio France International (RFI), Radio Diffusao Portugal (RDP) Africa,
    and the Voice Of America (VOA) reach all major population centers and
    report local news via Mozambican-based part-time reporters; the BBC and
    the RFI carry news in Portuguese but broadcast most of the day in
    English and French, respectively.
        TV Mozambique (TVM) continued to demonstrate strong bias towards
    the Government. Portuguese Television for Africa (RTP Africa), a
    station owned by the government of Portugal, offers a second source of
    televised news to all parts of the country reached by TVM. Privately
    owned television transmission continued to be limited to Maputo.
    International television news is available via cable in Maputo and via
    satellite nationwide.
        In 1999 a media development report released by UNESCO expressed
    concern about the strong concentration of national and local media in
    Maputo city and province, mirroring lopsided socio-economic development
    nationwide. Furthermore, a 1997 census revealed that 60.5 percent of
    citizens over age 15 are illiterate in any language, and 70 percent of
    the population over 5 years of age do not speak Portuguese, which
    further limits the reach of the media beyond Maputo.
        In 1999 Article 19, a United Kingdom-based NGO, reported that the
    independent media are constrained by the high cost of newsprint,
    distribution, and equipment. It claimed that publications close to the
    Government have an advantage in securing exemptions from customs
    duties. In September 1999, UNESCO's Media Diversity Project announced
    that it would assist 24 private sector print and faxed journals from
    all provinces to lower their paper costs and strengthen their ability
    to negotiate better commercial arrangements with the privatized Cegraf
    printing press in Maputo.
        The National Union of Journalists (SNJ) continued to work with the
    Austrian Institute for North-South Development to improve working
    relationships between journalists and police officers.
        Final debate on recommendations that membership in the CSCS be
    redefined to eliminate majority control by governmental appointees was
    deferred for another year. The CSCS was among the several
    organizations, including a joint operation by the LDH and Article 19,
    which monitored media fairness during the December 1999 presidential
    and parliamentary elections; however, the CSCS did not issue an
    evaluation of the elections by year's end, nor is it expected to do so
    at a future date.
        The Prime Minister's weekly press conferences are important
    opportunities for journalists to discuss politics and government
    policies; while they were suspended during the electoral campaign in
    1999, they were reinstated during the year. The Prime Minister's
    Information Office seeks to facilitate international press access to
    key government officials and to provide policy guidance on how news
    media should be regulated. The Prime Minister's Information Office
    continues to monitor press content informally.
        Journalists were subjected to attacks during the year. In November
    two unknown assailants killed Carlos Cardoso, an investigative
    journalist who was the founder and editor of the news fax agency
    Metical, in an execution-style shooting. In November unknown assailants
    attacked a radio journalist in Beira, slashing his cheek and tongue and
    warning him to ``keep quiet.'' In November unknown assailants beat a
    radio journalist near Maputo; he required hospitalization for his
    injuries. In December the news fax agency Mediacoop received an
    anonymous bomb threat. In December the editor of the newspaper Savana
    received a telephone death threat.
        There are no formal restrictions on academic freedom. Private
    educational institutions, both church-related and secular, are well
    established and continued to expand in several cities. A new Islamic
    college constructed facilities and hired faculty during the year,
    although actual instruction had not commenced by year's end.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law imposes restrictions
    on this right, and security forces forcibly dispersed some
    demonstrations during the year, including those of the opposition. The
    law regulates public demonstrations but does not apply to private
    gatherings held indoors and by individual invitation, nor does it cover
    religious gatherings or election campaigning.
        The law specifies time limitations on the exercise of the right to
    gather or demonstrate peacefully. The law states that marches, parades,
    and processions can only be held on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or
    between 5:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on other days. The law provides for
    possible exceptions to this regulation, if justified, but such
    decisions are not made in an open and established manner. Further, the
    law states that any organizers of gatherings or demonstrations must
    submit a notice to civil and police authorities with at least 10
    signatures for the holding of any such demonstration, along with a
    justification of the purpose of the gathering. The law stipulates that
    the Government must reply to any such request within 2 days of
    receiving the request, and that no reply within this period shall be
    understood to mean governmental acceptance.
        On May 5, approximately 40 friends and family members of a detained
    RENAMO supporter went to a police station in Aube, Nampula province,
    for the detainee's release. The police responded by firing into the
    crowd, killing between six and eight civilians and injuring several
    others; the number of deaths remains in dispute, despite numerous
    investigations (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        On November 9, violent clashes occurred between police and RENAMO
    supporters during 15 of the more than 60 rallies and marches to protest
    the December 1999 election results; as many as 54 persons were killed,
    approximately 200 persons were injured, and police detained
    approximately 457 demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.e.).
    RENAMO officials maintained that they had applied for and received
    permits to march in most cases; however, police stated that the
    demonstrators did not comply with the law and had blocked roads and
    occupied buildings unlawfully. Courts in Manica, Sofala, and Cabo
    Delgado provinces held that the demonstrations violated the legally-
    prescribed time limits for such activities (see Section 1.e.). Security
    forces also disrupted and prevented RENAMO party gatherings in Beira in
    August and Angoche in September.
        The law provides for freedom of association; however, both the
    Government and the law imposed some limits on this right. Legislation
    promulgated in 1991 sets forth the process for the registration of
    political parties. There are 27 registered, active political parties.
    Under 1992 legislation, a political party must demonstrate that it has
    no racial, ethnic, or religious exclusiveness and secure at least 2,000
    signatures of citizens in order to be recognized.
        The Government requires nonpolitical groups such as NGO's and
    religious organizations to register. In 1998 the Government issued a
    decree regulating the registration and activities of foreign NGO's.
    NGO's must register their presence and scope of work with the Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; the Ministry then issues permits to
    those NGO's whose programs the Government decides complement its
    priorities. Observers believe that these new requirements worsen the
    already lengthy bureaucratic process that NGO's must follow to work in
    the country. Although the registration process is not always
    transparent and can take many months, the authorities rarely reject
    applications from new associations. The law forbids the organization of
    political parties based on religious, ethnic, or regional affiliation;
    however, there were no reports of government attempts to impede the
    right of association for political purposes during the year (see
    Section 2.c.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides that all
    citizens have the freedom to practice or not to practice a religion and
    gives religious denominations the right to pursue their religious aims
    freely; the Government generally respects these rights in practice.
        The 1989 Law on Religious Freedom requires religious institutions
    and missionary organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice,
    reveal their principal source of funds, and provide the names of at
    least 500 followers in good standing. No particular benefits or
    privileges are associated with the registration process, and there were
    no reports that the Government refused to register any religious groups
    during the year.
        In January the Supreme Court acquitted an imam who was arrested in
    1999 in connection with a murder; in July the court found two other men
    guilty of the murder and sentenced them to 9 and 16 years''
    imprisonment.
        The law governing political parties specifically forbids religious
    parties from organizing, and any party from sponsoring religious
    propaganda. In late 1998, the Independent Party of Mozambique (PIMO), a
    predominantly Muslim group without representation in Parliament, began
    arguing for the right of political parties to base their activities on
    religious principles. The Government has tolerated PIMO's activities,
    although it has criticized the group. PIMO and some members of the
    legislature argued that the Movimento Islamico, a parliamentary caucus
    of Muslims from the ruling FRELIMO party, was tantamount to a religious
    party.
        The Constitution gives religious groups the right to own and
    acquire assets, and these institutions are allowed by law to own and
    operate schools. While virtually all places of worship nationalized by
    the State in 1977 have been returned to the respective religious
    organizations, the Catholic Church and certain Muslim communities
    complained that some other properties such as schools, health centers
    and residences unjustly remain in state hands and continued to press
    for their return. In 1982 the Ministry of Justice founded the
    Directorate for Religious Affairs to address the issue of the return of
    church properties. Government sources stated that the majority of
    property was returned, with a few cases still being examined on an
    individual basis, including two cases in Maputo. Provincial governments
    have the final responsibility for establishing a process for property
    restoration. The return of church property is perhaps most problematic
    when the facility is in use as a public school, health clinic, or
    police station, as funds for construction of new facilities are in
    short supply.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    to live anywhere within national territory and to travel within the
    country and abroad; however, at times authorities infringed on these
    rights.
        Police traffic checkpoints occasionally affected freedom of
    movement, sometimes for security concerns. In an effort to reduce
    harassment and confiscation of travelers' possessions at the borders,
    customs supervisors levied disciplinary fines and fired abusive customs
    agents. In large cities, the police often stop foreign pedestrians and
    order them to present original passports or resident papers, sometimes
    refusing to accept notarized copies, and fining or detaining those who
    failed to show proper documents (most persons do not like to carry the
    originals of documents due to the risk of theft). Police also detained
    local citizens routinely for failure to carry identity papers and
    demanded bribes (see Section 1.d.).
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In
    cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
    Government offered shelter to approximately 2,000 refugees, the vast
    majority of whom came from other African countries. The UNHCR planned
    to phase out its operations in the country during the year; however,
    the increasing number of refugees, especially from the Great Lakes
    region, prevented this from happening. By early August, there were
    approximately 400 refugees in the Bobole camp in Maputo province. In
    August approximately 100 refugees from the Bobole camp, most of them
    from the Great Lakes region, demonstrated outside the UNHCR office and
    a foreign embassy for better living conditions, employment and
    education opportunities, and resettlement abroad. The Government
    operates two refugee centers near Maputo. Niassa and Tete provinces
    have scattered groups of refugees, many of whom arrived from the Great
    Lakes region and had not settled in existing refugee centers during the
    year. Due to the heightened conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo, there were additional refugees in Niassa province. Refugee camp
    conditions continued to be poor, and some refugees claim to fear attack
    by fellow refugees on the basis of ethnicity. The UNHCR occasionally
    makes alternative shelter available to those who feel threatened. The
    Government offers first asylum and offered it to some refugees during
    the year.
        There were several cases of voluntary repatriation but no reports
    of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to elect their
    representatives in universal, direct, secret, and periodic elections,
    and in December 1999 citizens freely exercised their right to vote in
    the country's second multiparty general elections that international
    observers considered to be generally free and fair; however, the
    elections were marred by allegations of vote counting irregularities.
    President Chissano was returned to office with approximately 52 percent
    of the vote, and the ruling FRELIMO party won 133 of the 250 assembly
    seats. The largest opposition group, RENAMO-UE, made a strong showing
    in the elections, winning 117 seats in the Assembly and 48 percent of
    the presidential vote. In January the President appointed a new
    Cabinet; in February the new National Assembly took its oath of office,
    and in July the President announced new provincial governors. All
    ministers and governors, and most vice ministers, are FRELIMO members.
        Voter registration commenced on July 20, 1999 and continued for 60
    days. Despite some minor technical difficulties, including long lines
    and missing equipment, the registration process ran smoothly.
    Approximately 85 percent of the eligible voting population registered
    to vote. The 6-week campaign period was marked by some sporadic
    violence attributable to both FRELIMO and RENAMO-UE supporters,
    although at significantly reduced levels than during the 1994
    elections. Leaders of both parties called for an end to the violence.
        According to international and domestic observers, the voting
    process was transparent, peaceful, and orderly with approximately 75
    percent of the registered voters participating; however, international
    and domestic observers complained of a lack of full access to the vote
    count and the opposition coalition RENAMO-UE charged that there was
    fraud in the votecounting process. Due to a large number of illiterate
    voters, there were a significant number of ballots on which preferences
    were unclear and which required interpretation by the Electoral
    Commission. The Commission also did not count tally sheets from several
    hundred polling stations at both the provincial or national level due
    to mathematical errors, omissions, and other problems.
        International observers were not given full access to the process
    of examining the contested ballots and tally sheets, or to the vote
    counting. RENAMO-UE charged that this affected them disproportionately
    because tally sheets were discarded from provinces where RENAMO-UE
    support was strong. RENAMO-UE took this issue and several others to the
    Supreme Court on December 23, 1999, and on January 4, 1999 the Court
    unanimously rejected RENAMO-UE's complaints, acknowledging that there
    were some minor irregularities but concluding that these did not change
    the results of the elections.
        The opposition coalition refused to accept the election results or
    the Supreme Court's decision and initiated a partial boycott of
    parliamentary activities; however, the FRELIMO majority agreed to
    several RENAMO proposals to create ad hoc committees to revise the
    electoral law and aspects of the Constitution. In October RENAMO ended
    its parliamentary boycott. On December 20, President Chissano and
    RENAMO leader Dhlakama met to discuss the political situation in the
    country. During the meeting, they agreed to establish working groups to
    consider constitutional and judicial matters, defense and security
    matters, civil service appointments and local government official's
    nominations, and the status of RENAMO supporters who were arrested in
    connection with the demonstrations on November 9. The working groups
    were scheduled to begin discussions in February 2001.
        In March RENAMO officials claimed that security forces killed
    several party members in Beira earlier in the month (see Section 1.a.).
        On November 9, RENAMO members and supporters demonstrated in
    approximately 60 locations to protest the December 1999 elections.
    Fifteen of the demonstrations resulted in violent confrontations with
    the police, causing a number of deaths, injuries, and arrests (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 2.b.).
        Article 19 and the LDH monitored media coverage of the national
    electoral campaign. Radio Mozambique generally presented balanced
    coverage, whereas TVM was biased towards the ruling party. The
    government-supported newspapers Noticias, Diario de Mozambique, and
    Domingo demonstrated pro-government partisanship. The National Election
    Commission was criticized for categorizing these government-supported
    newspapers as private-sector media, thereby exempting them from the
    electoral law's requirement that public media provide fair and balanced
    treatment of all parties during the electoral campaign.
        There are no legal restrictions hindering women's involvement in
    government; however, while the number of women in the National Assembly
    and the Cabinet increased after the December 1999 elections, women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. There are 105 women in the
    250-member National Assembly, three female Cabinet ministers, and five
    female vice ministers. FRELIMO's policy mandates that at least 30
    percent of the party's two governing bodies must be women. During the
    year, the Political and Central Committees met this mandate.
    Nevertheless, cultural factors inhibit women's effectiveness in public
    life (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no legal obstacles to the formation of domestic human
    rights groups, although registration procedures applying to NGO's are
    onerous and expensive (see Section 2.b.). In December the National
    Human Rights Association (ANDH) was established as an umbrella
    organization for the country's 13 human rights oriented NGO's. The
    Prison Fellowship of Mozambique (FPM) and the National Association for
    the Support and Protection of Prisoners also commenced operations
    during the year and conducted prison visits (see Section 1.c.). In
    October 1999, the DHD published a report on human rights in the country
    and plans to report periodically on human rights. The report's critical
    assessment gave particular emphasis to problems in the judiciary,
    conditions in prisons, and arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens.
    Among the complaints were alleged police killings, domestic violence,
    labor disputes, and land title conflicts. The DHD and the LDH conduct
    human rights education seminars and workshops for a wide range of
    audiences including political parties, security agencies, businesses,
    and NGO's.
        The Government responded to human rights-related inquiries from the
    LDH and the DHD on a case-by-case basis. Both the LDH and the DHD
    investigated the demonstrations and deaths in prison in Montepuez and
    released reports during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Other
    rights-oriented groups also have had contact with the Government.
        In July the Chairwoman of the LDH stated that a police contact
    warned her of police threats on her life following her appearance in a
    televised debate in which she made remarks critical of the PIC. The
    Government did not respond to the matter.
        International NGO's and human rights groups are permitted to visit
    and work in the country. In July Amnesty International visited the
    country in preparation for its annual report.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, or disability; however, in practice discrimination against
    women and the disabled persists.
        Women.--Although official statistics are not kept, according to
    health officials, women's groups, and other sources, domestic violence
    against women--particularly rape and beating--is widespread. Many women
    believe that their spouses have the right to beat them, and cultural
    pressures discourage women from taking legal action against abusive
    spouses. There is no law that defines domestic violence as a crime;
    however, domestic violence can be prosecuted under other crimes such as
    rape, battery, and assault. During the year, the NGO, All Against
    Violence (TCV) registered 699 requests for assistance in cases
    involving domestic violence, of which 10 were forwarded to the courts.
    In May police commanders from the Maputo area held a seminar on
    domestic violence, where they were instructed to handle such cases as
    criminal matters. Hospitals usually do not ascribe evidence of physical
    abuse to domestic violence. The DHD report on human rights conditions
    released in October 1999 gave particular emphasis to the problem of
    domestic violence (see Section 4).
        A group of women's NGO's, including Women in Law and Development,
    Mozambican Women in Education, Women in Judicial Careers, and the
    FRELIMO-sponsored Mozambican Women's Organization, support the
    organization All Against Violence, which serves as a monitoring and
    educational group for problems of domestic violence and sexual abuse of
    women and children, including counseling of victims and mediating
    within families. The organization continued to expand during the year.
    All NGO's actively opposing domestic violence worked to involve police
    in education, enforcement, and identifying domestic violence as a
    public order problem.
        Despite constitutional provisions for the equality of men and women
    in all aspects of political, economic, social, and cultural life, the
    civil and commercial legal codes contradict one another and the
    Constitution. Under the law of the Family and Inheritance, the husband
    or father is the head of household, and both wives and daughters must
    obtain male approval for all legal undertakings. For example, a woman
    must have the written approval of her husband, father, or closest male
    relative in order to start a business. Without such approval, a woman
    cannot lease property, obtain a loan, or contract for goods and
    services. The legal domicile of a married woman is her husband's house,
    and she may work outside the home only with the express consent of her
    husband. While it appears that these legal restrictions on women's
    freedom are not enforced regularly in urban areas they leave women open
    to extortion and other pressures.
        Family law provides that a married couple's assets belong to the
    husband, who has full authority to decide on their disposition. When a
    husband dies, his widow is only fourth in line (after sons, fathers,
    and brothers) to inherit the household goods. A contradictory provision
    of the law states that a widow is entitled to one-half of those goods
    that are acquired during the marriage, but in practice women rarely
    know of or demand this right.
        Customary law varies within the country. In some places, it appears
    to provide women less protection than family law, and unless a marriage
    is registered a woman has no recourse to the judicial branch for
    enforcement of the rights provided her by the civil codes. A new Land
    Law was adopted in 1997; sections pertaining to rural areas came into
    force in 1998, and those related to urban areas became effective in
    1999. The law is expected to have a significant effect on women, who
    are the primary cultivators of family land. Under customary law, they
    often had no rights to the disposition of the land. The revised Land
    Law specifically permits women to exercise rights over community land
    held through customary rights. However, domestic NGO's such as the
    Rural Women's Development Association and Rural Mutual Assistance
    Association have cautioned that a considerable investment of time and
    education would be necessary before the new rights granted to women
    would supersede traditional practice.
        The Constitution grants citizenship to the foreign-born wife of a
    male citizen, but not to the foreign-born husband of a female citizen.
        Women continued to experience economic discrimination in practice.
    Women constitute slightly more than half the population but are
    responsible for two-thirds of economic production, according to the
    1997 census. Women in the workplace receive lower pay than men do for
    the same work. According to Members of Parliament who debated the
    proposed revision of the Labor Law in 1998, women are subject to sexual
    harassment and to discrimination in hiring because of potential
    absences on maternity leave; although the Labor Law entitles a woman to
    60 days of maternity leave, employers often violate this right. The
    Government continued to target maternal and child health and focused on
    immunizations for women in childbearing years and for young children.
    The estimated maternal mortality rate is 1,500 per 100,000. Numerous
    development organizations and health-oriented NGO's also emphasize
    programs to improve women's health and increasingly focus resources to
    combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases.
        The law permits the entry of women into the military; however,
    there are few women in the armed forces, and the highest ranking woman
    in the army is a major. The military began to recruit more women during
    the year and brought in 93 new female recruits.
        There were reports that women were trafficked to South Africa for
    forced prostitution and forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government has made children's rights and welfare a
    priority, but admits that some children are in significant trouble.
    Primary education is compulsory through the fifth year; however, there
    are few education facilities, which limits enrollment. A few new
    primary schools opened during the year throughout the country; however,
    schools are overcrowded, and there is much corruption in the school
    system. In addition, a number of schools were destroyed or converted to
    emergency shelters during the floods of February and March. Newspapers
    frequently reported that the parents of school children had to bribe
    teachers or officials to enroll their children in school, and that
    girls exchanged or were forced to exchange sex with teachers for
    passing grades. The 1997 census estimated that some 50 percent of
    children of ages 6 through 10 are in primary school. Only a fraction of
    children continue with secondary studies.
        Girls continued to have less access to education than boys above
    the primary level: 42 percent of students in grades 1 through 5 were
    girls, and 40 percent of students in grades 6 through 10 were girls.
    The percentage increased to 48.4 percent for grades 11 and 12. However,
    there are only 105 public secondary schools nationwide, of which only
    23 offer classes through grade 12. About 76 percent of females over 15
    years of age are illiterate. Outside the main cities, secondary schools
    are fewer, and where boarding is required for attendance, the number of
    female students drops significantly. In a case that gained national
    attention in 1998, residents of Morrumbene district in Inhambane
    Province demanded the exclusion of girls from the dormitories at the
    Cambine secondary school. In the absence of separate boarding
    facilities, local residents blamed schoolgirls for immoral behavior in
    the community and pressured authorities to comply with the illegal
    demand, which effectively prevented many girls from attending the
    school. The few out-of-town girls who remained to study were forced to
    live in unprotected shacks.
        An NGO, the Association to Support Mozambican Children (ASEM),
    operated 2 alternative-learning centers in Beira for more than 900
    children who were not able to return to their regular schools after
    being expelled from their homes or because they had left school to
    work. During the year, the Government supplied ASEM with textbooks.
        NGO's and the Government took some steps to protect and reintegrate
    into families or other supervised conditions an estimated 3,000 street
    children in the Maputo metropolitan area. Street children sometimes are
    beaten by police and frequently are victims of sexual abuse. Some
    remedial government programs continued, including programs on
    education, information dissemination, health care, and family
    reunification. The mortality rate for infants was 135 per 1,000, and
    for children under the age of 5 it was 201 per 1,000. The Maputo City
    Social Action Coordination Office continued its program of rescuing
    abandoned orphans and assisting single mothers who head families of
    three or more persons. The same group offered special classes to
    children of broken homes in local schools. Other NGO groups sponsored
    food, shelter, and education programs in all major cities. ASEM, in
    Beira, also provided counseling to parents who have expelled children
    from their homes, which usually happens when a wife has children who
    are unacceptable to a new husband.
        Social workers have found that some parents of disabled children
    did not permit their children to leave their homes; provincial social
    action officials continued their educational campaign to reverse
    traditional attitudes toward disabled children.
        The law does not specifically provide an age of sexual consent, nor
    does the law criminalize the offering or procuring of child
    prostitution or child pornography, and sexual abuse. Exploitation of
    children below the age of 15 continued (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    However, authorities in several provinces took steps to combat child
    prostitution. Child prostitution appears to be most prevalent in Maputo
    and Beira, although it may also exist in rural areas. Child
    prostitution reportedly is growing in the Maputo, Beira, and Nacala
    areas, which have highly mobile populations and a large number of
    transport workers. According to the Network for Children, a domestic
    NGO, some members of the U.N. peacekeeping force that was in the
    country between 1992 and 1994 may have initiated child prostitution in
    Manica Province. In addition many child prostitutes have been infected
    with HIV/AIDS.
        In Sofala province, where child prostitution exists along the Beira
    development corridor (frequented by truck drivers and businessmen), the
    Government operates information centers in affected areas to provide
    information to families and friends of children who are raped and
    exploited, and counsels them on how to deal with the police, public
    prosecutors, and judges. In order to address child prostitution, the
    National Assembly passed a law in May 1999 prohibiting the access of
    minors to bars and clubs; however, the Government does not have
    adequate resources to enforce the law effectively. In June the Ministry
    of Women and Social Action launched a campaign against the sexual
    exploitation of children and is working to educate hotels about the
    problem of child prostitution. The UNDP assisted the Government with
    training police to aid child prostitutes; however, there is a lack of
    accommodation centers, and the Government is unable to offer safe
    shelter to child prostitutes when they have been removed from danger.
        In 1999 during an Africa-wide conference on child soldiers that was
    held in Maputo, the NGO Restore Hope was successful in obtaining a
    promise from the Defense Ministry that former child soldiers would not
    be conscripted.
        There were reports that children in rural areas were used as
    bargaining chips to settle financial and other disputes (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.). Families delegated their children to work limited
    periods of time to settle debts.
        There are numerous reports that children are incarcerated with
    adults in prisons throughout the country (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution states that ``disabled
    citizens shall enjoy fully the rights'' that it provides for; however,
    the Government provided few resources to implement this provision.
    Representatives of disabled groups and wounded veterans frequently
    protested that societal discrimination continues against the disabled.
    Victims of landmines are among the most politically organized disabled
    citizens. About 1.9 percent of citizens are physically or mentally
    disabled. In July disabled and homeless veterans occupied vacant land
    in Matola to protest the municipality's delays in allocating land to
    the homeless.
        Disabled women protested in 1998 that the Government only provided
    four schools nationwide for hearing and vision impaired persons and for
    the physically and mentally disabled. There are few job opportunities
    for disabled persons in the formal sector, although the 1997 census
    reported that 55 percent of disabled persons worked or held a job.
        Social workers found that some parents of disabled children in
    several districts, including the populous towns of Gorongosa and Dondo,
    did not permit their children to leave their homes. Provincial Ministry
    of Social Action officials continued their educational campaign to
    reverse traditional attitudes toward disabled children. During the
    year, the Government provided scholarships for 615 disabled children in
    education facilities.
        The Government continued to rely on NGO's to assist the disabled.
    Founded in 1991, the Association of Disabled Mozambicans (ADEMO)
    addresses social and economic needs of the disabled. Smaller NGO's also
    have formed, including the Association of Handicapped Military and
    Paramilitary Mozambicans, the Association of Blind and Visually
    Impaired Mozambicans (ACDVM), the Association of Mozambican Disabled
    Soldiers (ADEMIMO), the Association of Deaf Mozambicans (ASUMO), the
    Association of Demobilized War Veterans (AMODEC), and the Association
    of Disabled Divorced Women (AMODD). In July ADEMO held a conference to
    address the rights of people with disabilities.
        Concerns of the disabled include accessibility to buildings and
    transportation, and a lack of wheelchairs. The only provisions that the
    Government has enacted for accessibility to buildings and
    transportation for the disabled were in the electoral law governing the
    country's first multiparty elections, which addressed the needs of
    disabled voters in the polling booths. Special access facilities are
    rare. On June 23, 1999, the Cabinet issued a resolution that approved
    the first national policy on disabled persons and laid out principles
    and strategies aimed at encouraging their active participation in the
    country's socio-economic development; the plan would address concerns
    of the disabled, including access to public buildings and government
    infrastructure. However, the plan had not been implemented by year's
    end due to funding constraints.
        Religious Minorities.--Relations among communities of different
    faiths generally are amicable, especially at the grassroots level. The
    black and Indian Islamic communities tend to remain separate; however,
    there were no reports of conflict.
        Civil society and the media highlighted aspects of the draft Family
    Law legislation early in the year. Debate focused on the need for legal
    recognition of religious and common law marriages, as only civil
    marriages are legal at present. Under the proposed law, polygamous
    marriages would not be recognized, although the law would offer
    protection to the widows and children of polygamous unions. Several
    leaders within the Islamic community oppose the proposal for not
    recognizing polygamy. On the other hand, approximately 50 Muslim women
    staged a public protest against polygamy in early May. There was also
    debate between some Islamic groups and several Christian groups over a
    section of the law that would raise the legal age of marriage.
        In January the Supreme Court acquitted an imam who was arrested in
    1999 in connection with a murder (see Section 2.c.); in July the court
    found two other men guilty of the murder and sentenced them to 9 and 16
    years'' imprisonment.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There was no systematic
    persecution or discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity;
    however, the FRELIMO Government traditionally has included at all
    levels a large number of southerners, mostly from the Shangaan ethnic
    group, which has engendered complaints from residents of other parts of
    the country. There also were complaints against the Government that it
    favors economic development in the southern part of the country over
    other areas. The Government has taken several steps to address such
    concerns; the central and northern provinces have been included in the
    Government's 5-year development plan, its economic and social plan, its
    poverty alleviation strategy, and its investment incentive program. In
    addition, the President, the Prime Minister, and Cabinet members spent
    significantly more time in the provinces as compared with the previous
    year. The Government also includes in senior positions persons
    originally from the northern part of the country.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that all
    workers are free to join or refrain from joining a trade union, and
    workers enjoy these rights in practice. Labor relations are governed by
    the 1991 Labor Law, which protects workers'' rights to organize and
    engage in union activities, and the 1985 Labor Law which was revised
    and promulgated in 1998. Trade unions remained concerned that free
    trade zones created under the revised 1998 law would result in less
    favorable labor rights, due to government incentives offered to foreign
    investors.
        Until 1992 the only trade union federation was the Organization of
    Mozambican Workers (OTM), which was affiliated with, and dominated by,
    the FRELIMO party. Three unions broke away from the OTM in 1992, and by
    1994 had formed their own central union, the Free and Independent Union
    of Mozambique (SLIM). In January 1999, the Ministry of Labor recognized
    this second central union as a legal entity, known as the Confederation
    of Free and Independent Unions of Mozambique (CONSILMO). CONSILMO is
    permitted to participate in national negotiations on the minimum wage
    with the Consultative Labor Commission, a body including
    representatives from labor, private employers, and Government. CONSILMO
    maintained the SLIM's working relationship with the OTM, and includes
    the powerful 28,000-member Union of Industrial Construction Workers of
    Mozambique (SINTICIM) construction trades union, an early promoter of
    the rights of female workers.
        In 1994 the OTM declared itself free of commitments to any
    political party, companies, or religious groups, and its regulations
    prohibit persons holding high ranks within any political party from
    simultaneously holding top positions in the trade union. Other labor
    unions maintain that the OTM is not independent of the Government.
        The Constitution explicitly provides for the right to strike, with
    the exception of civil servants, police, military personnel, and other
    essential services (which include sanitation, fire fighting, air
    traffic control, health care, water, electricity, fuel, post office,
    telecommunications, and funeral services). In August the OTM and other
    unions threatened a general strike following a lack of progress in
    resetting the minimum wage level in tripartite negotiations involving
    the unions, the Government, and employers'' organizations (see Sections
    6.b. and 6.e.). After negotiations came to a standstill, the Council of
    Ministers implemented a salary increase of 26 percent in July and
    agreed to an additional 4 percent increase; however, the addition was
    not granted during the year due to financial constraints.
        Provisions of the 1991 Labor Law forbid retribution against
    strikers, the hiring of substitute workers, and lockouts by employers.
    Specific labor disputes generally are arbitrated through special
    workers' committees, formally recognized by the Government.
        Two members of the workers' committee of a security services
    company were suspended from their duties after giving advance
    notification of a January 1998 strike action to company management. The
    law specifies that strikers must notify police, government, union, and
    employers 48 hours in advance of intended strikes. The firm charged the
    two with illegally representing employees who were protesting the
    company's failure to answer a wage and benefits appeal made in late
    1997 and with allegedly assaulting company managers. Their case has not
    yet been resolved.
        The Government reportedly investigated the killing by police of a
    demonstrator during a labor strike at a security services company in
    1998; however, no report was released publicly, nor was any action
    taken against the officers responsible by year's end.
        The Constitution and labor legislation give unions the right to
    join and participate in international bodies. The OTM is a member of
    the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the Southern African
    Trade Union Coordinating Council.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law
    protects the right of workers to organize and engage in collective
    bargaining. It expressly prohibits discrimination against organized
    labor. In 1991 the Government decreed that it would no longer set all
    salary levels. Negotiation of wage increases was left in the hands of
    existing unions. The Consultative Commission on Labor met periodically
    to negotiate changes in the minimum wage. In August the OTM and other
    unions threatened a general strike following a lack of progress in
    resetting the minimum wage level in tripartite negotiations involving
    the unions, the Government, and employers organizations (see Section
    6.a.). In 1998 for the first time since independence, the country's
    banks, which are entirely privatized, signed a collective bargaining
    agreement, regulating the labor relationship between bank management
    and staff.
        The law provides for the creation of export processing zones
    (EPZ's); in July MOZAL became the first firm to produce goods in an
    EPZ. Workers in EPZ's are subject to the same labor regulations as
    other workers, and worker rights are respected in practice.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor is prohibited by law; however, while there were no reports of
    such practices in the formal economy, there were reports that women
    were trafficked to South Africa for forced prostitution and forced
    labor (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) The law does prohibit forced and bonded
    labor by children, although children in rural areas were used as labor
    to settle financial and other disputes, with their families delegating
    their children to work limited periods of time to settle economic debts
    (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Child labor is regulated by the 1998 Labor Law. In the
    wage economy, the working age without restrictions is 18 years. The
    revised 1998 labor law permits children between the ages of 15 and 18
    to work subject to certain restrictions. Children between the ages of
    12 and 15 are permitted to work under special conditions authorized
    jointly by the Ministries of Labor, Health, and Education. For minors
    under 18 years, the maximum workweek is 38 hours, and the maximum
    workday is 7 hours. Children must undergo a medical examination before
    beginning work. By law children must be paid at least the minimum wage
    or a minimum of two-thirds of the adult salary, whichever is higher.
    The Ministry of Labor regulates child labor in both the informal and
    formal sectors.
        Child labor remains widespread in the country, especially in rural
    areas where children sometimes work alongside their parents or
    independently in seasonal harvests or commercial plantations. Employers
    normally pay children on a piecework basis for such work, which
    principally involves picking cotton or tea leaves.
        Because of high adult unemployment in the formal sector, estimated
    at around 50 percent, few children are employed in regular wage
    positions; however, children, including those under age 15, commonly
    work on family farms or in the urban informal sector, where they
    perform such tasks as ``guarding'' cars, collecting scrap metal, or
    selling trinkets and food in the streets. The informal labor sector is
    unregulated. Children also are employed in domestic positions; the
    number of children in domestic positions appeared to be rising. In a
    September 1999 newspaper survey, labor union representatives noted the
    growing presence of children in construction jobs. Child prostitution
    also appears to be growing, especially in the Maputo, Beira, and Nacala
    development corridors, which have highly mobile populations and a large
    number of transport workers. Child prostitution also appears to be
    growing in rural areas (see Section 5).
        Less than 50 percent of school-age children attend classes (see
    Section 5); children not in school frequently are employed in the
    agricultural and casual labor sectors.
        In June 1999 the Government signed ILO Convention 182 on the Worst
    Forms of Child Labor; however, the Government had not ratified it by
    year's end.
        The law does prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, although
    children in rural areas were used as labor to settle financial and
    other disputes, with families delegating their children to work limited
    periods of time to settle economic debts (see Sections 5, 6.c., and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The industrial minimum wage of
    approximately $35 (568,980 meticais) per month, is set by ministerial
    decree, although the level is recommended through an administrative
    process which consists of a tripartite commission composed of labor
    unions, government representatives, and employer groups. There is also
    an agricultural minimum wage of approximately $24 (382,725 meticais)
    per month, which is established through the same tripartite process.
    Neither minimum wage is considered sufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for an average worker and family, and many workers
    must turn to a second job, if available; maintain their own gardens; or
    depend on the income of other family members to survive. Only a small
    percentage of laborers work at the minimum wage level. Less than 10
    percent of workers are in salaried positions, and the majority of the
    labor force is employed in subsistence farming and the informal sector.
    Although the industrial sector frequently pays above minimum wage,
    there is little industry outside of the Maputo area. In August the OTM
    and other unions threatened a general strike following a lack of
    progress in resetting the minimum wage level in tripartite negotiations
    (see Section 6.a.). Following tripartite negotiations among the
    Government, employers, and labor unions, the Government agreed to raise
    the minimum wage by 30 percent. The Government granted an increase of
    26 percent in July; however, due to funding constraints, the final 4
    percent was not yet implemented by year's end.
        The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage
    rates in the private sector, and the Ministry of Planning and Finance
    in the public sector. Violations of minimum wage rates usually are
    investigated only after workers register a complaint. It is customary
    for workers to receive benefits such as transportation and food in
    addition to wages. There is an obligation for workers or employers to
    participate in a social security scheme, although they voluntarily may
    create and contribute to private accounts or plans with the National
    Institute of Social Security, to cover retirement, unemployment
    compensation, and emergency benefits. Worker complaints about employers
    deducting social security contributions from wages but failing to pay
    them into accounts grew. During the year, many workers were unable to
    claim unemployment benefits. Workers who previously had labored in East
    Germany have requested sums that were set aside from their wages to
    serve as pensions at a later date; the German government previously
    attempted to transfer these amounts to the Government, Government never
    received these amounts due to suspected embezzlement by a government
    employee, and the Government claimed that it could not reimburse the
    workers.
        The standard legal workweek is 44 hours, with a weekly 24-hour rest
    period.
        In the small formal sector, the Government has enacted health and
    environmental laws to protect workers; however, the Ministry of Labor
    enforces these laws ineffectively, and the Government only occasionally
    has closed firms for noncompliance. The Labor Ministry reported 729
    industrial accidents in 1999, with 38 deaths. Most of these accidents
    were blamed on unsafe practices or the lack of safety equipment. During
    the parliamentary debate in 1998 on revision of the Labor Law,
    delegates noted that there continued to be significant violations of
    labor legislation in many companies and services. Workers have the
    right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger their
    health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment,
    although this right was restricted in practice.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws that
    prohibit trafficking in persons, although trafficking can be addressed
    under labor, immigration, and child welfare laws, and there were
    reports that women were trafficked to South Africa for forced
    prostitution and forced labor (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Women are
    lured into the country by international organized crime syndicates with
    the promise of jobs and decent wages, and then forced to work as
    prostitutes, in some cases to pay off debts to those who smuggled them
    into the country. The LDH was investigating a report by two women from
    Manhica that they were promised jobs in South Africa and then forced to
    work in a brothel when they arrived there; the investigation was
    ongoing at year's end. On occasion the media reported that citizens
    worked in foreign countries for low wages or in poor conditions.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that women and
    children were trafficked to Swaziland.
        There were reports that children in rural areas often were used as
    bargaining chips to settle financial and other disputes in rural areas
    (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Families delegate their children to work
    limited periods of time to settle economic debts.
        The Government did not take any specific actions to combat
    trafficking during the year.
                                   __________

                                    NAMIBIA

        Namibia is a multiparty, multiracial democracy. President Sam
    Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),
    was reelected in 1999 general elections, which international and
    domestic observers agreed were free, but included some instances of
    government harassment of the opposition and unequal access to media
    coverage and campaign financing. Although the Constitution formerly
    limited the President to two terms in office, in November 1998, the
    National Assembly amended the Constitution to permit President Nujoma
    to run for a third term. In the 1999 elections, President Nujoma won 77
    percent of the vote and SWAPO won three-quarters of the seats in the
    National Assembly. The judiciary is independent.
        The police, including the paramilitary Special Field Force (SFF),
    supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Namibian Defense
    Force (NDF), supervised by the Ministry of Defense, share
    responsibility for internal security. The Namibian Central Intelligence
    Service (NCIS) has responsibility for national security related
    intelligence inside and outside the country. As a result of crossborder
    fighting from Angola, there were increased abuses by the security
    forces in the Kavango and Caprivi regions. NDF soldiers were sent to
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998 and remained there
    throughout the year. Members of the police force committed serious
    human rights abuses.
        Namibia's modern market sector produces most of its wealth, while a
    traditional subsistence agricultural sector (mainly in the north)
    supports most of its labor force. The principal exports are diamonds
    and other minerals, cattle, and fish. Ranching still is controlled
    largely by white citizens and foreign interests. In other industries,
    including the important mining, fishing, and tourism sectors, the
    participation of indigenous entrepreneurs is being increased to provide
    opportunities for black citizens. Per capita annual gross domestic
    product is approximately $1,400. However, there is an extreme disparity
    between income levels of black citizens and white citizens.
    Unemployment was nearly 40 percent and affected primarily the black
    majority.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were serious problems in several areas.
    Members of the security forces committed several extrajudicial killings
    while conducting extensive security operations in the Kavango and
    Caprivi regions along the country's northern border with Angola. After
    fighting between the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and forces from the
    National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) crossed
    into the country, security forces involved in anti-UNITA security
    operations killed civilians. The Government did not account for the
    whereabouts of some persons detained by the security forces. During
    arrests and detentions, security force members beat citizens and
    Angolan refugees who were suspected of complicity with UNITA. There
    were other reports of police mistreatment of suspects in detention, and
    refugees were denied legal protections during detention. Some security
    force members who committed abuses were arrested and tried in military
    courts or the civilian criminal justice system; however, the Government
    did not take legal or administrative action in many other cases. Prison
    conditions and conditions in military detention facilities were
    spartan. Arbitrary arrest and lengthy pretrial detention are problems.
    A large court backlog, due primarily to resource constraints, continued
    to lead to lengthy delays of trials. High-level government officials
    continued to respond to criticism of ruling party and government
    policies with verbal abuse. There continued to be pressure on
    journalists who worked for government-owned media outlets not to
    criticize the Government. There continued to be a ban on all public
    demonstrations that did not have prior police approval, and, on a few
    occasions, the Government prevented some demonstrations. On occasion
    the Government restricted freedom of movement. The authorities
    continued to deport Angolan citizens without review by an immigration
    tribunal, as required by the law; however, there were no reports of
    such deportations during the latter half of the year. Violence against
    women and children, including rape and child abuse, continued to be
    serious problems; however, the Government took some steps during the
    year to address these problems. Women continued to experience serious
    legal and cultural discrimination. Racial and ethnic discrimination and
    serious disparities in education, health, employment, and working
    conditions continued. Discrimination against indigenous persons
    persisted, especially in remote rural areas where indigenous persons
    often were unaware of their rights. There were reports of forced labor,
    including by children. The Government took steps to end child labor,
    and the problem of child labor declined.
        Members of the FAA and UNITA involved in the crossborder fighting
    in the northern part of the country committed extrajudicial killings,
    beat civilians, and according to local and international human rights
    groups, committed a number of rapes.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
    security forces committed several extrajudicial killings in the Kavango
    and Caprivi regions along the northern border, where fighting between
    FAA and UNITA forces crossed over into the country. At times security
    forces used excessive violence against citizens and Angolan civilians
    along the northern border of the country, and security forces involved
    in anti-UNITA operations killed a number of civilians during the year.
    On January 10, SFF members in Hakusembe fired into a crowd of refugees
    and shot and killed a 6 year-old girl, Heremine Nyumbu. On January 27,
    SFF members shot and killed Mpengu Haininga as he tried to escape
    arrest in Sheghuru village east of Rundu. On March 10, a SFF member
    shot and killed Mapeu Moroshi in Thipanana Rughongo village. A SFF
    member was arrested and charged with the killing; however, there was no
    further information available on the case by year's end. On June 8, NDF
    soldiers shot and killed Felizberto Toto in the village of Nakazaza
    west of Rundu.
        At times the Government took action against security forces
    responsible for deaths; however, in many other cases, the Government
    failed to take action against security force members responsible for
    killings.
        During the early months of the year, senior civilian and military
    government officials made public statements acknowledging that security
    forces abused and killed civilians in the Kavango and Caprivi regions
    during security operations in response to crossborder UNITA attacks in
    the country, and they publicly called for greater discipline and
    respect for human rights by the NDF and police forces. The NDF and
    police forces implemented human rights training with the assistance of
    UNHCR and the Legal Assistance Center, a domestic nongovernmental
    organization (NGO).
        In November 1999, a police officer in Okahandja beat to death a
    student who was arrested and in custody for disorderly conduct. The
    police officer immediately was suspended, charged, and released on
    bail; his trial was still pending at year's end.
        In August 1999, security force officers killed 8 Caprivi Liberation
    Army (CLA) rebels and several civilians, and they beat, arrested and
    detained suspected CLA rebels and sympathizers during operations
    against the CLA after an August 1999 CLA attack at Katima Mulilo. No
    action had been taken against the implicated officers by year's end.
    Representatives of some international human rights organizations
    visited the country to investigate the August 1999 killings and abuses,
    and Amnesty International (AI) released a report during the year (see
    Section 4).
        There was no further information available on the case against a
    SFF officer who shot and killed James Chilunda, a civilian, in the
    Caprivi village of Singalamwe in July 1999.
        After the Government decided in December 1999 to allow the FAA to
    launch anti-UNITA attacks from the country's territory, there was
    extensive crossborder fighting, which resulted in civilian deaths and
    injuries. On January 9, two civilians were shot and killed during
    crossborder fighting in Nkonke. In February three civilians were killed
    and nine houses were burned during crossborder fighting in Shinyungwe
    village.
        FAA soldiers killed a number of civilians during the year. On
    January 22, an FAA member killed Thadeus Mubili in Mushangara in
    western Caprivi. On May 27, the FAA killed Thaddeus Vili at Bagani near
    the Kavango and Caprivi regions. In both cases, the responsible FAA
    members were arrested immediately after the killings and returned to
    the FAA for punishment; however, it is not known if the FAA took
    further action by year's end.
        During raids in the Kavango and Caprivi regions, UNITA forces
    killed civilians.
        UNITA used landmines, which resulted in dozens of deaths and
    numerous injuries of civilians and security force officers. The
    Government reported that by October 12 persons were killed and 107 were
    injured by landmines in the Kavango region and the western part of the
    Caprivi region (see Section 1.c.). There also was some evidence that
    FAA members used landmines in villages.
        On January 3, unknown armed men attacked a family of foreign
    tourists on the Trans-Caprivi Highway, killing three children and
    injuring their parents; the incident was under investigation at year's
    end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of
    disappearances perpetrated by the security forces during the year.
    Although the Government arrested a number of suspected UNITA supporters
    in the Kavango and Caprivi regions and detained them for several weeks,
    they all were accounted for by year's end.
        During several crossborder attacks into the northern area of the
    country, UNITA kidnaped Namibian citizens and took them to Angola.
    There were reports that some of the kidnaped persons were raped or
    forced to serve as combatants or porters (see Section 6.c.).
        There were no further developments on the disappearance of persons
    detained by SWAPO prior to independence.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution provides that no persons shall be subject
    to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
    however, in practice, prisoners sometimes were beaten or otherwise
    mistreated by police, especially by members of the SFF. There were
    serious abuses in the Kavango and Caprivi regions along the northern
    border, where fighting between FAA and UNITA forces spilled into the
    country. During arrests and detentions, security force members beat
    citizens and Angolan refugees who were suspected of complicity with
    UNITA.
        On January 7, SFF members arrested Erkki Fiderato in a village east
    of Rundu. The SFF members allegedly beat Fiderato with rifle butts
    during his arrest and with an iron bar while he was in detention at
    Utokota SFF base. On January 10, SFF members in Hakusembe shot and
    wounded Kandepwe Kapama when they fired shots into a crowd of refugees
    (see Section 1.a.). On January 12, police shot and injured Kathumbi
    Diyeve in the head as he ran from security forces in the village of
    Muitjiku in western Caprivi. On January 28, members of the SFF beat
    Lucas Kavura and his father, Daniel Nyambe, in their home in the Sambyu
    area and again at a special field force base. On February 3, SFF
    members arrested Kamungwe Ngondo and held him in detention for 2 weeks
    at the Rundu airport military base, during which time officers
    reportedly beat him with rubber whips, called sjamboks. On February 4,
    members of the SFF shot and wounded Muyeva Thadeus Munango, reportedly
    while he was fishing in the Kavango River. On February 10, SFF officers
    arrested Hompa Anton in Sauyemwa near Rundu; they beat him with rifle
    butts, whipped him, and kicked him during his arrest and detention. He
    was hospitalized for a broken vertebrae.
        SFF members reportedly beat persons whom they stopped for
    identification checks. For example, on January 24, SFF members arrested
    Kapindi Mpepo, Haupindi Hamuyera, and Petrus Paulus and beat them with
    sjamboks when they were unable to produce Namibian identity documents;
    the three were later found to be citizens and were released.
        On September 18, 18 NDF soldiers were convicted by courts-martial
    of assault for severely beating and pouring hot water on seven persons
    on August 21 in Sivara, west of Rundu. The soldiers were sentenced to 2
    years in prison; however, they remained in the NDF and their sentences
    were suspended on the condition that they not commit assault within the
    next 2 years.
        In October there were reports that security forces targeted members
    of the Kxoe minority group for harassment during antiUNITA operations
    in the Caprivi region.
        At times, security force members who committed abuses were arrested
    and tried in military courts or the civilian criminal justice system;
    however, in many other cases, the Government did not take any action
    against those responsible for abuses.
        In 1999 security forces responded with violence to secessionist
    attacks. The Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) was representing former
    parliamentarian Geoffrey Mwilima in a civil suit against the Government
    for damages for their mistreatment by police after the August 1999 CLA
    attack at Katima Mulilo. Security forces beat Mwilima and other
    suspected CLA members and sympathizers with sjamboks and rifle butts
    during arrest and detention. A police spokesman stated publicly on
    several occasions that the Police Complaints and Discipline Unit was
    conducting investigations into the abuse of detainees; however, at
    year's end, the LAC case against the Government had not been heard, and
    the Government had not taken administrative action against those
    responsible. Chrispin Sinfua also initiated a civil suit against the
    Government for the abuse that he suffered in 1999; the trial had not
    begun by year's end. The LAC reported that 120 civil suits had been
    filed relating to the 1999 state of emergency in Caprivi.
        In 1994 the police instituted a human rights training course
    designed by the LAC, which was ongoing; during the year, the LAC
    introduced a police human rights manual. During the March 30 opening of
    the human rights training facility, the head of the Police Complaints
    and Discipline Unit, Commissioner Sebastian Ndeitunga, announced that
    the Inspector General had prohibited the use of sjamboks by police, a
    directive which became effective immediately. The directive generally
    was observed by police and resulted in some decrease in reports of
    police brutality; however, police still are permitted to use batons.
    There was one report of police use of sjamboks after March 30; it is
    not known whether disciplinary action was taken against the officer
    responsible.
        Numerous crossborder attacks into the country by UNITA forces, the
    use of landmines by UNITA, and the abuse of civilians in the northern
    part of the country by FAA troops resulted in dozens of deaths and many
    injuries to civilians (see Section 1.a.). The Government reported that
    by October, 107 persons had been injured by landmines. There were
    reports that UNITA forces kidnaped female citizens and raped them.
    There were reports of intimidation and abuse of civilians by the FAA,
    including sexual harassment, threatening behavior by drunken soldiers,
    and indiscriminate use of firearms. In August the all-SWAPO region
    council for Kavango recommended the removal of Angolan Government
    troops from the country because of their harassment of Namibian
    civilians.
        In September 1999, many detainees exhibited evidence of extensive
    injuries inflicted by police during their detentions, including
    detainees Oscar Lupalezwi, Stephan Ntelamo, and Allen Sameja. All three
    identified their abusers as police sergeant Patrick Liswani and two
    constables named ``Haipa'' and ``Oupa.'' During the year, the
    Prosecutor General requested additional investigations in the criminal
    case against FAA officers Patrick Liswani, Haipa, and Oupa; there was
    no further action on the case by year's end.
        On January 3, foreign tourists were attacked and injured by unknown
    armed men on the Trans-Caprivi Highway (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions and conditions in military detention facilities
    are spartan, although the Government continued to focus attention on
    improving living conditions. Visits by the International Committee of
    the Red Cross (ICRC) and foreign diplomats found conditions in prisons
    to be clean and orderly. Human rights organizations continued to
    complain about prison overcrowding. In 1995 the Government created a
    Ministry of Prisons and Correctional Services, charged with
    administering the country's prisons and jails. The Government also made
    efforts to separate youthful offenders from adult criminals, although
    in many rural areas juveniles continued to be held with adults. There
    are several pilot programs that provide alternatives to incarceration
    for juvenile offenders. Female prisoners are held separately from male
    prisoners. There have been allegations that female prisoners sometimes
    were abused by prison guards. The Government continued to grant NGO's
    regular access to prisons and prisoners. The ICRC requested and
    received prison access, including access to the high security Dorbabis
    detention facility.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution forbids
    arbitrary arrest or detention except in situations of national
    emergency; however, security forces used arbitrary arrest and detention
    in practice. According to the Constitution, persons who are arrested
    must be informed of the reason for their arrest and must be brought
    before a magistrate within 48 hours of their detention. Those accused
    are entitled to defense by legal counsel of their choice, and those who
    cannot afford a lawyer are entitled to state-provided counsel. However,
    in practice many accused persons in remote and rural areas are not
    represented by counsel, primarily due to resource constraints. A trial
    must take place within ``a reasonable time,'' or the accused must be
    released. Human rights organizations have criticized the length of time
    that pretrial detainees were held, which have extended up to 1 year in
    some cases (see Section 1.e.). Under a state of emergency, the
    Constitution permits detention without trial, although the names of
    detainees must be published in the government gazette within 14 days,
    and their cases must be reviewed within 1 month by an advisory board
    appointed by the President.
        On January 7, SFF members arrested Erkki Fiderato in a village east
    of Rundu and allegedly beat him while he was in detention at Utokota
    SFF base (see Section 1.c.). On February 10, SFF officers arrested
    Hompa Anton in Sauyemwa near Rundu; they beat him with rifle butts,
    whipped him, and kicked him during his arrest and detention (see
    Section 1.c.). On February 18, the Central Intelligence Service
    detained the Katima Mulilo-based head of National Society for Human
    Rights'' (NSHR) Caprivi office, Moses Nasileli, for questioning and
    they expelled him from the country to Zambia on February 21 (see
    Section 4). On June 9, a group of Angolan and Congolese refugee
    musicians were arrested for performing at a Congress of Democrats (COD)
    rally (see Section 2.d.). The Government returned the musicians to the
    Osire refugee camp and revoked their permission to live in Windhoek.
    When some of the musicians later left the camp without government
    permission, the Government attempted to arrest them. The musicians,
    represented by the LAC, obtained an injunction against their detention
    and expulsion from the country. Although the Government initially
    announced that it would arrest them again, no such action had been
    taken by year's end. During a security force operation in August, the
    Government arrested 82 alleged Angolan illegal immigrants in the
    northern part of the country and detained them under Section 49 of the
    Immigration Control Act, a provision that gives the Government greater
    powers to arrest and detain immigrants who may pose a security threat.
    A majority of the arrested immigrants had lived in the country for many
    years, and they were detained based on suspicion of involvement in
    UNITA crossborder attacks. The detainees were held for a month in
    secrecy before the Government made the arrests and detentions public in
    September. Although the detainees were interviewed by the ICRC and
    UNCHR, they were denied legal counsel. The NSHR stated that at least
    one of the detainees was a citizen and provided his identification card
    number; however, the Government has disputed the detainee's
    citizenship, and he continued to be held at Dorbabis detention facility
    at year's end. The Government stated that it would not forcibly return
    the detained immigrants to Angola. The detainees remained at Dorbabis
    at year's end; they had not been charged, and they were not granted
    access to legal counsel, although ICRC arranged for the Namibian Red
    Cross to transmit messages to and from their families.
        In October there were reports that security forces arrested and
    detained 3 senior headmen and 10 children from the Kxoe minority group
    (see Section 1.c.). The children reportedly were later released.
        Some traditional leaders reportedly continued to detain and
    imprison persons accused of minor offenses without recourse to police
    or judicial review. In response the Government instructed traditional
    leaders on the legal limits of their authority.
        During the August 1999 state of emergency declared in response to
    CLA attacks in Katima Mulilo, the security forces detained several
    hundred of suspected CLA members and sympathizers. Most of the detained
    were held incommunicado for 2 weeks, which the Constitution allows
    during states of emergency, before the Government provided public
    notice of the detentions. All of the detained were arraigned on
    charges, but were denied bail and remained in detention at year's end;
    their trials were postponed until April 2001. While the majority of
    detentions during the state of emergency occurred in the Caprivi
    region, on August 7 and 8, Albert Sibeya and Martin Sichimwa Mutumba
    were arrested in Ongwediva in the north-central part of the country.
    The NSHR protested the use of emergency measures to detain suspects
    outside of the Caprivi region, and the LAC initiated a constitutional
    case against the arrests. The case had not been heard by year's end.
        The Government generally does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The formal court system has three levels: 30 magistrates' courts;
    the High Court; and the Supreme Court. The latter also serves as the
    court of appeals and as a constitutional review court.
        Most rural citizens first encounter the legal system through the
    traditional courts, which deal with minor criminal offenses such as
    petty theft and infractions of local customs among members of the same
    ethnic group. The Traditional Authorities Act delineates which offenses
    may be dealt with under the traditional system.
        The constitutional right to a fair trial with a presumption of
    innocence until proven guilty generally is afforded by the judiciary;
    however, this right is somewhat limited in practice by long delays in
    hearing cases in the regular courts and the uneven application of
    constitutional protections in the traditional system.
        The lack of qualified magistrates, other court officials, and
    private attorneys has resulted in a serious backlog of criminal cases,
    which often translated into delays of up to a year or more between
    arrest and trial, contravening constitutional provisions for the right
    to a speedy trial. Many of those awaiting trial were treated as
    convicted criminals.
        In July the Minister of Home Affairs criticized foreign judges
    serving in the judiciary after a High Court issued a restraining order
    against the Government and threatened to withdraw work permits of
    foreign judges; however, in August the Minister subsequently apologized
    (see Section 2.a.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides all citizens with the right
    to privacy and requires arresting officers to secure a judicial warrant
    before conducting a search, except in situations of national emergency,
    and government authorities generally respected these rights in
    practice. In general violations were subject to legal action.
        Under the 1997 Namibian Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) Bill,
    the NCIS is authorized to conduct wiretaps, intercept mail, and engage
    in other covert activities, both inside and outside the country, to
    protect national security. However, wiretaps and covert surveillance
    require the consent of a judge.
        In February UNITA forces killed three civilians and burned nine
    houses in Shinyungwe village (see Section 1.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, subject to ``reasonable
    restrictions'' in situations such as a state of emergency, and the
    Government generally respected these rights; however, at times high
    level government officials responded to criticism of the ruling party
    and government policies with verbal abuse. There also were reports of
    government pressure on reporters who worked for the governmentowned
    media.
        Reporters for independent newspapers continued to criticize the
    Government openly and do not engage in self-censorship. During the
    year, high-level government officials sharply and publicly criticized
    journalists, human rights groups, and opposition politicians in
    response to perceived criticism of the Government or ruling party (see
    Section 4). The NSHR issued a report in 1999 citing 20 such incidents.
    Such verbal attacks do not appear to have had a major impact on the
    aggressive style of the independent media or the work of human rights
    groups or opposition political parties. NGO's involved in media issues
    maintained that reporters working for the government-owned New Era
    newspaper were subjected to indirect and direct pressure not to report
    on certain controversial topics, and although the New Era sometimes
    covered opposition party activities and views that were critical of the
    Government, the Government exerted increasing control over its news
    content during the year.
        The government-owned NBC operates most radio and television
    services. Media observers believe that NBC reporters exercised
    considerable self-censorship on certain controversial issues, although
    the NBC provided some coverage to opposition parties and viewpoints
    critical of government policies. However, a newly-appointed NBC
    Director instituted management changes that were criticized for
    enforcing ideological compliance with the Government and seeking to
    diminish government opposition. In September a senior NBC staff member
    won a court injunction against her reassignment, which was part of the
    restructuring process, but it was perceived by journalists and legal
    and human rights groups to be as a response to her critical news
    coverage of the Government.
        There were five private radio stations, one private television
    station in the town of Rehoboth, and a private cable and satellite
    television service that broadcasts the Cable News Network, the British
    Broadcasting Corporation, and a range of South African and
    international news and entertainment programs. The ruling SWAPO party
    owns 51 percent of this cable service. There are no restrictions on the
    private ownership of satellite dishes, and the use of satellite dishes
    and cable television is growing.
        There are no restrictions on Internet access or use. There are
    growing numbers of domestic web pages, and one of the independent
    newspapers has a popular website.
        In October 1997, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
    (MOIB) issued new regulations for journalists. In March the MOIB was
    absorbed into a combined Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Information
    and Broadcasting. Regulations require foreign journalists who seek to
    visit the country to provide a month's advance notice to the Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs and Information and Broadcasting, stating the
    purpose of their proposed visit. Journalists are required to schedule
    appointments with government officials through the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs and Information and Broadcasting and request permission to
    visit areas under the control of the Ministry of Environment and
    Tourism. Additionally journalists must obtain a temporary work permit
    from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Several major conferences in the
    country attracted large numbers of international journalists.
        The Government respects academic freedom. There were no reports of
    interference with, or harassment of, these activities.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, except in situations of national
    emergency, and the Government generally has respected this right in
    practice; however, on a few occasions the Government prevented
    demonstrations.
        Organizers of public meetings were required to obtain prior police
    approval, but many public gatherings took place without such approval
    and without interference by the Government. In August the Government
    prevented two peaceful protest marches from delivering petitions to
    State House during the summit of heads of state of the Southern African
    Development Community (SADC).
        On June 8, SWAPO supporters intimidated COD members arriving for a
    rally in the Gobabis ``singles quarters'' (used during the apartheid
    era to house male workers living away from their families). The COD
    cancelled the rally.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, even in times
    of national emergency, and the Government generally respected this
    right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, except in situations of national emergency; however, on
    occasion the Government restricted these rights in practice. SFF
    members reportedly beat persons whom they stopped for identification
    checks. For example, on January 24, SFF members arrested three persons
    and beat them with sjamboks when they were unable to produce Namibian
    identity documents (see Section 1.c.).
        Namibian and Angolan security forces forcibly returned Angolan
    refugees entering the Kavango region on several occasions during the
    year. There were allegations that young males were separated from their
    families, arrested, returned to Angola, or forced into conscription
    with the Angolan army. UNHCR requested and was granted access to
    immigration tribunal proceedings. The UNHCR provided training for
    security and immigration officials in response to a Government request,
    and there were no reported forced returns during the latter half of the
    year.
        A law containing provisions for dealing with refugees in accordance
    with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
    its 1967 Protocol was passed in 1998 and signed into law by the
    President in March 1999. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR on
    the granting of refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government's
    eligibility committee continued to meet on a regular basis to consider
    asylum requests, and the UNHCR was permitted to intervene in those
    cases where immigrants would qualify for refugee status. Illegal
    immigrants continued to be detained for short periods prior to their
    deportation proceedings. In cases where illegal immigrants are alleged
    to pose a security threat, they can be detained for longer periods
    under Section 49 of the Immigration Act.
        The Government provided first asylum and continued to permit asylum
    seekers to enter the country. The UNHCR estimates that approximately
    26,000 persons eligible for refugee status are residing within the
    country. There were approximately 18,000 refugees and asylum seekers at
    the Osire camp, 95 percent of whom are from Angola. The remaining
    refugees are from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi,
    Rwanda, Tanzania, and other African countries. Government officials
    interview asylum seekers. Those granted refugee status generally were
    not permitted to work, live outside the Osire refugee camp, or attend
    schools. Schools have been established at the Osire refugee camp. The
    Osire camp, which was designed to accommodate 5,000 refugees,
    experienced severe overcrowding problems during the year.
        During the first few months of the year, the authorities deported
    some Angolan citizens without review by an immigration tribunal, as
    required by law. The deportation of military-age Angolan men led the
    NSHR to accuse the police of assisting the Angolan government in its
    conscription efforts (see Section 2.d.). After the local UNHCR office
    provided training for immigration and security force officials
    beginning in late 1999, the number of such extra-legal deportations
    declined.
        On February 21, the Central Intelligence Service expelled from the
    country to Zambia the Katima Mulilo-based head of NSHR's Caprivi
    office, Moses Nasileli. Nasileli was a Zambian national who had lived
    in the country since 1985, was married to a citizen, and had six
    citizen children (see Section 4).
        In October officials denied foreign Red Cross members access to the
    Osire refugee camp based on new permit requirements. The Namibian Red
    Cross Society (NRCS) temporarily withdrew from the Osire camp after the
    incident. In April the Government, UNHCR and the NRCS entered into a
    tripartite agreement to provide for refugees in the Osire camp; the
    agreement designates the NRCS as the primarily service provider. As a
    result, coordination among the parties improved during the year.
        In August the Government arrested and detained 82 alleged Angolan
    illegal immigrants in the northern part of the country based on
    suspicion of UNITA involvement. The majority of the arrested immigrants
    had lived in the country for many years. Although the detainees were
    interviewed by the ICRC and UNHCR, they were denied legal counsel. The
    Government stated that it would not forcibly return the detained
    immigrants to Angola (see Section 1.d.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens exercised their right to change their government by
    electing a President and National Assembly for the second time since
    independence during the November 30 to December 1, 1999, general
    election, which international and domestic observers agreed was
    generally free and well-administered despite some irregularities.
    Observers noted instances of harassment of opposition members during
    the campaign, and unequal access to media coverage and campaign
    financing were problems. Nevertheless voter turnout was over 60 percent
    and the election proceeded peacefully. Sam Nujoma, leader of the ruling
    party SWAPO, was reelected. Although the Constitution formerly limited
    the President to two terms in office, in November 1998, the National
    Assembly amended the Constitution to permit President Nujoma to run for
    a third term. President Nujoma won 77 percent of the vote and SWAPO won
    55 of 72 elected National Assembly seats. Four opposition parties won a
    total of 17 seats in the National Assembly, including the COD party,
    which won the largest number of opposition votes, the Democratic
    Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the United Democratic Front, and the Monitor
    Action Group.
        The Constitution establishes a bicameral Parliament and provides
    for general elections every 5 years and regional elections every 6
    years.
        Opposition parties generally were able to undertake political
    activity such as advertising and holding party conferences and public
    rallies. However, prior to the June National Assembly by-election in
    Gobabis, SWAPO supporters prevented the COD from holding a rally (see
    Section 2.b.).
        In July 1998, the Government created an independent electoral
    commission and named a broad based group of respected individuals to
    the commission. The Government also named a respected former journalist
    as the new Director of Elections.
        Leaders of the opposition have criticized the ruling party for its
    decision to amend the Constitution to permit the President to seek a
    third term. Ambassador Ben Ulenga, the High Commissioner to Great
    Britain and also a high level ruling party official, resigned in 1998
    from his diplomatic post after he was unsuccessful in getting the
    ruling party to debate the third term issue. In March 1999, Ulenga
    formed the COD opposition party, and in the general election the COD
    won approximately 10 percent of the vote and seven seats in the
    National Assembly.
        Members of the National Assembly are elected on a party list system
    on a proportional basis.
        Women remained underrepresented in government and politics. There
    were 3 female ministers and 4 female deputy ministers of a total of 42
    ministerial and deputy ministerial positions. In addition one women
    held a cabinet-level position as Director of the National Planning
    Commission. Women served as Ombudswoman and as the Government Attorney.
    Women held 18 of 98 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly. In
    1996 female legislators formed a Women's Caucus in Parliament to review
    legislation for gender sensitivity.
        Historic economic and educational disadvantages have served to
    limit the participation of the indigenous San ethnic group in politics;
    however, a member of the San community representing the SWAPO party was
    elected to the National Assembly in the 1999 general elections.
    Virtually all of the country's other ethnic minorities were represented
    in Parliament and in senior positions in the Cabinet. Members of
    smaller ethnic groups hold the offices of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
    Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Speaker of the National
    Assembly.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        During the year, high-level government officials continued to use
    harsh language in responding to criticisms of the ruling party and
    government policies by nongovernmental organizations. For example,
    government officials publicly stated on numerous occasions during the
    year that critics were a ``fifth column for UNITA'' and guilty of
    ``treason.'' Government officials also have attacked verbally the NSHR
    and the Breaking of Walls of Silence (BWS) movement, which acts as an
    advocate for former detainees imprisoned by SWAPO prior to
    independence. In January a member-elect of the National Assembly from
    the ruling party stated on a call-in radio show that he supported an
    earlier caller's threat to ``eliminate'' the executive director of the
    NSHR.
        On February 18, the Central Intelligence Service detained the
    Katima Mulilo-based head of NSHR's Caprivi office, Moses Nasileli, for
    questioning and expelled him from the country to Zambia on February 21.
    Although the Government justified the deportation based on his alleged
    support for Caprivi separatists, reportedly he was deported because of
    his NSHR affiliation. Nasileli was a Zambian national who had lived in
    the country since 1985, was married to a citizen, and had six citizen
    children.
        However, despite verbal attacks, other local NGO's such as the LAC,
    the NSHR, the BWS Movement, and those working with indigenous groups
    continue to criticize government policies freely. Both the NSHR and the
    Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) maintain field offices in the
    Kavango region. Human rights organizations are generally free to
    investigate reports of abuses in the region and to release reports.
        In addition human rights organizations and academic organizations,
    such as the Media Institute for Southern Africa, the Centre for Applied
    Social Sciences, and the Human Rights Documentation Centre, worked
    openly on a variety of human rights problems affecting the press,
    women, ethnic minorities, and other groups. For example, in the early
    part of the year, leaders of the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN)
    criticized the Government for the behavior of security forces along the
    Angolan border. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), which is
    based in Windhoek, periodically issues reports criticizing the
    Government.
        Representatives of international human rights organizations,
    including AI, visited the country to investigate allegations of human
    rights abuses, including reports of summary executions and the
    treatment of Caprivi separatists arrested in August 1999 (see Sections
    1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.). In March AI issued a highly critical report of
    abuses by security forces along the Angola border.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, creed,
    gender, or religion, and specifically prohibits ``the practice and
    ideology of apartheid.'' During the year, there was a significant
    improvement in the attention paid to women's issues and the rights of
    the disabled.
        Women.--Violence against women, including beating and rape, is
    widespread. Traditional attitudes regarding the subordination of women
    exacerbated problems of sexual and domestic violence. However, there
    continued to be an improvement in the attention paid to the problems of
    rape and domestic violence. Government ministers joined in public
    protests against domestic violence, and the President, members of his
    Cabinet, and parliamentarians continued to speak out against it. Longer
    prison sentences were handed down to convicted rapists and abusers in
    many cases during the year. NGO's expressed concern that the court
    system does not have mechanisms to protect vulnerable witnesses from
    open testimony, and the Government worked on establishing judicial
    procedures to address the problem. Police stated that more women came
    forward to report cases of rape and domestic violence. On February 22,
    the National Assembly passed the Combating of Rape Act. In April the
    act was passed by the National Council and signed by the President. The
    act defines rape in broad terms, and allows for the prosecution of rape
    within marriage.
        In June the police began a special training course on gender
    sensitivity. Centers for abused women and children in Oshakati,
    Windhoek, Keetmanshoop, Walvis Bay, and Rehoboth are staffed with
    specially trained female police officers to assist victims of sexual
    assaults. Safe houses opened in Mariental, Swakopmund, and Tsumeb. At
    the end of February, the LAC sponsored a 3-day national conference on
    violence against women.
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, including
    employment discrimination. The Married Persons Equality Act prohibits
    discriminatory practices against women married under civil law. Women
    married in customary (traditional) marriages continued to face legal
    and cultural discrimination. Traditional practices that permit family
    members to confiscate the property of deceased men from their widows
    and children still existed; however, the frequency of such cases
    lessened considerably during the year.
        In 1996 the President elevated the head of the Department of Women
    Affairs to cabinet rank, and it became the Ministry of Women's Affairs
    and Child Development in March. In June 1998, President Nujoma
    addressed traditional leaders; he made a forceful case for better
    treatment of women in traditional communities.
        There were reports that UNITA forces kidnaped female citizens and
    raped them (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
        Children.--The Constitution enumerates children's rights, including
    those in the area of education and health. During the year, 25 percent
    of government expenditures were designated for education and 15 percent
    for health care, a slight decrease from previous years. However, in
    practice, outmoded policies and laws and an untrained work force led to
    inadequate attention to child welfare. The Constitution provides
    children with the right to primary and junior secondary education
    (grades 1 to 10); however, the numerous fees, which included fees for
    uniforms, books, hostel costs, and school improvement, placed a burden
    on students'' families. The inability of poorer families to pay the
    fees, which varied greatly between regions, precluded some children
    from attending school. In these cases, families were less likely to
    continue to pay fees for girls, particularly those at the junior
    secondary level. Many San children do not attend school. It is
    difficult for the Government to ensure enforcement of national laws
    against child labor on commercial farms (see Section 6.d.).
        Child abuse is a serious and increasingly acknowledged problem. The
    authorities vigorously prosecuted cases involving crimes against
    children, particularly rape and incest. The 1960 Children's Act
    criminalizes and protects children under 18 years from sexual
    exploitation, child pornography and child prostitution. The age of
    sexual consent is 16 years. Courts handed down stiffer sentences
    against child rapists than in previous years, and the Government
    provided training for police officials to improve the handling of child
    sex abuse cases. Centers for abused women and children were working
    actively to reduce the trauma suffered by abused children. The LAC
    launched a national campaign to revise legislation on child maintenance
    in 1999. The Child Maintenance Bill was sent to the Cabinet for
    discussion in 1999; however, by year's end no movement was made towards
    tabling it in Parliament. The bill would require divorced spouses to
    provide maintenance allowances for their children.
        The Government expanded programs to separate juvenile offenders
    from adults in the criminal justice system. Separate facilities for
    child offenders have been established in Windhoek and Mariental (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Overcrowding at the Osire refugee camp has affected children who
    are residing there. There were approximately 6,000 school-age children
    at Osire, and there was a shortage of classrooms (see Section 2.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--While discrimination on the basis of
    disability is not addressed in the Constitution, the 1992 Labor Act
    prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in employment;
    however, enforcement in this area is weak. Although there was no legal
    discrimination against persons with disabilities, societal
    discrimination persists. The Government legally does not require
    special access to public buildings for the disabled, and many
    ministries remain inaccessible to the disabled. Although some municipal
    governments have installed ramps and special curbing for the disabled
    at street crossings, physical access for those with disabilities
    remained a problem due to resource constraints. Disability issues
    received greater public attention than in previous years, with wider
    press coverage of the human rights problems that confront persons with
    disabilities. In December 1998, the Government launched a campaign to
    expand economic opportunities for and change attitudes about persons
    with disabilities.
        Indigenous People.--The Bushmen, also known as the San people, the
    country's earliest known inhabitants, historically have been exploited
    by other ethnic groups. The Government has taken a number of measures
    to end societal discrimination against the San, including seeking their
    advice about proposed legislation on communally-held lands and
    increasing their access to primary education; however, many San
    children do not attend school. In late 1999, a San was nominated by the
    SWAPO party for the National Assembly and won the election; he was
    sworn in in March. Reports from the NSHR and in the press claim that
    civilians from the Mafwe and Kxoe San ethnic groups were targeted for
    harassment during the police campaign against Caprivi separatists in
    1998 and continued throughout the year.
        By law all indigenous groups participate equally in decisions
    affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, and allocations of natural
    resources. However, Bushmen and other indigenous citizens have been
    unable to exercise fully these rights as a result of minimal access to
    education, limited economic opportunities under colonial rule, and
    their relative isolation.
        In 1997 the Government unilaterally announced plans to expand a
    prison in the West Caprivi Game Park on land claimed by the Kxoe ethnic
    group. The expansion would deny access by members of the Kxoe ethnic
    group to revenues from community-based tourism projects on their lands.
    The projects are an important mechanism for empowering the Kxoe to
    benefit from tourism activities in their community. However, there was
    some question regarding the Kxoe's right to occupy that land. As of
    year's end, no final decision on the prison expansion had been
    announced.
        The Government plans to build a hydroelectric dam on the Kunene
    River that would flood ancestral graves and grazing areas of the semi-
    nomadic Himba people. The project was highly controversial. The
    Government has made repeated efforts to consult with Himba leaders
    regarding the project, but many of the Himba chiefs remain adamantly
    opposed to the project. Government leaders have criticized harshly
    those opposed to the project, terming them ``enemies of development.''
        The 1995 Traditional Authorities Act, defined the role, duties, and
    powers of traditional leaders. The act provided that customary law is
    invalid if it is inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution. It
    enumerated the types of crimes that may be addressed in traditional
    courts. The act assigned to traditional leaders the role of guardians
    of culture and tradition, and it also mandated that traditional leaders
    elected to Parliament choose between their traditional and elected
    offices before the end of 1996. This provision has not been enforced,
    and several traditional leaders remain in Parliament.
        The Government's authority to confer recognition or withhold it
    from traditional leaders, even in opposition to local preference, was
    especially controversial because of the leaders'' influence on local
    events including local police powers. In some cases, the Government has
    withheld recognition from genuine traditional leaders who have sympathy
    for the political opposition. This has been especially true in the Khoe
    San and Mafwe communities in the Caprivi and in the Herero community.
    Mafwe chief Boniface Mamili fled the country with other Caprivi
    separatists in late 1998. Despite opposition from the Mafwe community,
    Minister of Local Government Nicky Iyambo ruled that Mamili had
    forfeited his position, and in March 1999, the Government installed a
    rival chief. In June 1998, a number of traditional leaders boycotted
    the inauguration of the Traditional Leaders' Council, claiming that the
    installation was illegal, as some of the leaders chosen by the
    Government did not represent their communities.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution prohibits
    discrimination based on race and other factors and specifically
    prohibits ``the practice and ideology of apartheid.'' In July 1998,
    Parliament passed amendments to the 1991 Racial Discrimination
    Prohibition Act that strengthened the act and the penalties for
    discriminatory practices. The act codified certain protections for
    those who cite racial discrimination in the course of research
    (including academic and press reporting) or in trying to reduce racial
    disharmony. Nevertheless, as a result of more than 70 years of South
    African administration, societal, racial, and ethnic discrimination
    persists. There were several reported cases of black farm workers
    suffering discrimination in remote areas at the hands of white farm
    owners. Many non-whites continued to complain that the Government was
    not moving quickly enough in education, health, housing, employment,
    and access to land.
        Some citizens complained that the SWAPO-led government provided
    more development assistance to the numerically dominant Ovambo ethnic
    group of the far north than to other groups or regions of the country.
        NSHR claimed that members of the Kxoe minority were harassed during
    security force operations in the Kavango region (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.d.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association, including freedom to form and join trade unions, and
    the Government respects this right in practice. The 1992 Labor Act
    extended that right to public servants, farm workers, and domestic
    employees. However, farm workers and domestic servants working on rural
    and remote farms often were ignorant of their rights, and unions
    experienced obstacles in attempting to organize these workers; as a
    result, they suffered abuse by employers. Trade unions had no
    difficulty registering, and there were no government restrictions on
    who may serve as a union official. Despite concerns created by a 1999
    Ministry of Labor report that questioned a growing number of trade
    unions, the Government has not taken action to dissolve any trade
    unions.
        Unions are independent of the Government and may form federations.
    The two principal trade union organizations are the National Union of
    Namibian Workers (NUNW) and the Namibia Federation of Trade Unions
    (NFTU). Prior to independence, the NUNW was affiliated with SWAPO;
    despite claims that its affiliation came to an end at independence, the
    two still are closely linked. The NUNW was invited to nominate
    candidates for SWAPO's 1999 National Assembly slate, and the NUNW
    president was nominated by SWAPO and elected to the National Assembly.
    In 1997 the mine workers union established the Mine Workers Union
    Investment Company to supplement union dues. The NFTU, launched in
    October 1998 and made up of several large public service, teachers,
    mining, and maritime unions, is critical of the Government. Less than
    20 percent of full-time wage earners were organized. Trade unions
    lacked capacity and resources.
        Except for workers providing essential services such as jobs
    related to public health and safety, and workers in the export
    processing zones (EPZ's), workers enjoy the right to strike once
    conciliation procedures have been exhausted, and 48-hour notice has
    been given to the employer and labor commissioner. Under the Labor Act,
    strike action can be used only in disputes involving specific worker
    interests, such as pay raises. Disputes over worker rights, including
    dismissals, must be referred to a labor court for arbitration. The
    Labor Act protects workers engaged in legal strikes from unfair
    dismissal. In September there was a strike in the fishing industry.
        Unemployment, which is nearly 40 percent, remained a significant
    problem and affected primarily the black majority.
        Trade unions were free to exchange visits with foreign trade unions
    and to affiliate with international trade union organizations. Unions
    exercise this right without interference.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1992 Labor
    Act provides employees with the right to bargain individually or
    collectively. Collective bargaining is not practiced widely outside the
    mining and construction industries, which have centralized, industry-
    wide bargaining. Almost all collective bargaining is at the workplace
    and company level. However, as unions became more active, informal
    collective bargaining was becoming more common. The Ministry of Labor
    cited lack of information and basic negotiation skills as factors
    hampering workers'' ability to bargain with employers successfully.
        The Labor Act provides a process for employer recognition of trade
    unions and protection for members and organizers. The law also empowers
    the Labor Court to remedy unfair labor practices and explicitly forbids
    unfair dismissals, which may be appealed to the Labor Court.
        There are EPZ's at the Walvis Bay and Oshikango industrial parks
    and a number of single-factory EPZ's outside of these parks. The Labor
    Act applies to EPZ's, including the one in Walvis Bay; however, workers
    in EPZ's were prohibited from striking, and employers were prohibited
    from engaging in lockouts. Some trade unionists continued to challenge
    the constitutionality of the agreement reached by government and NUNW
    representatives codified in the 1995 Export Processing Zone Act because
    it limited the right to strike. Under the agreement, labor-related
    issues in the EPZ were referred to a special EPZ dispute settlement
    panel composed of employers and workers for expeditious resolution. If
    a dispute is not resolved at this level, it is referred to compulsory
    arbitration. With only a few businesses operating in the Walvis Bay
    EPZ, the effectiveness of this agreement in securing the rights of
    workers in the EPZ could not be determined.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor by adults and children; however, during the
    year, there were ongoing reports in the media that farm workers
    (including some children on family-owned commercial farms) and domestic
    workers often received inadequate compensation for their labor and were
    subject to strict control by employers. Ministry of Labor inspectors
    sometimes encountered problems in gaining access to the country's
    large, family-owned, commercial farms in order to investigate possible
    labor code violations.
        There were reports that UNITA forces kidnaped citizens and forced
    them to serve as combatants and porters in Angola (see Section 1.b. and
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Under the 1992 Labor Act, the minimum age for employment
    is 14 years, with higher age requirements for night work and for
    certain sectors such as mining and construction. Ministry of Labor
    inspectors generally enforced minimum age regulations, but children
    below the age of 14 often worked on family-owned commercial farms and
    in the informal sector. The 1991 census, which reported on the status
    of children, estimated that 13,800 children under 15 years of age were
    in the labor force. Of this total, 41 percent were working as unpaid
    laborers on family-owned, commercial farms. There were also reports
    that Ministry of Labor inspectors reportedly encountered problems
    gaining access to family-owned, commercial farms to investigate
    possible illegal child labor. Since 1991 the Government has taken steps
    to end abuses, and the child labor problem has declined. There were
    also reports that Angolan and Zambian children worked on communal and
    cattle farms in border areas, although such occurrences have been
    curtailed since late 1999 by the deportation of illegal immigrants.
        The 1960 Children's Act criminalizes and protects children under 18
    years from sexual exploitation, child pornography and child
    prostitution. The age of sexual consent is 16 years.
        On November 15, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor, and the worst forms of child labor are not
    practiced commonly. Criminal penalties and court orders are available
    to the Government to enforce child labor laws, although there are no
    specific remedies available to individuals for incidents of the worst
    forms of child labor.
        The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children;
    however, the media reported that some children worked as farm laborers
    without adequate compensation (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no statutory minimum
    wage law. In Windhoek's non-white urban area townships, many workers
    and their families have difficulty maintaining a minimal standard of
    living. Black citizens were significantly disadvantaged in standards of
    living during the apartheid era; however, since 1990 there has been a
    rapid growth in the living standards of black citizens, and the major
    economic resources in the country are no longer exclusively controlled
    by white citizens.
        The standard legal workweek is 45 hours, and requires at least one
    24-hour rest period per week. An employer may require no more than 10
    hours per week of overtime. The law mandates 24 consecutive days of
    annual leave, at least 30 workdays of sick leave per year, and 3 months
    of unpaid maternity leave. However, in practice these provisions are
    not observed or enforced rigorously by the Ministry of Labor. In 1996
    two NGO studies--one of farm workers and the other of domestic
    employees--highlighted the extremely poor conditions that some
    employees encounter while working in these occupations.
        The Government mandates occupational health and safety standards.
    The Labor Act empowers the President to enforce these standards through
    inspections and criminal penalties. The law requires employers to
    ensure the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. It provides
    employees with the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
    situations; however, some workers do not have this right in practice.
        For example, on April 13, 1999, workers at the Navachab gold mine
    near Karibib occupied the control room at the Ore Mill and shut down
    production to protest the extreme heat and shortage of oxygen in the
    mine's metallurgy plant. A prior agreement between the mine and the
    mineworkers union gave workers the right to leave the workplace if they
    believed that their safety was threatened; however, mine management
    protested the shutting of the mill as an ``illegal industrial action''
    and threatened to fine the employees involved. On April 22, the workers
    reached a compromise with management to set up an independent panel of
    experts to investigate whether there was an unacceptable health risk at
    the mill. The panel found that health risks existed at the mill, and
    management withdrew disciplinary measures against the workers. Although
    the management agreed to improve working conditions in the mill and to
    address other labor grievances, the company did not pay strikers for
    the time when they were engaged in the industrial action, penalized
    workers who occupied the control room by refusing to give them a
    month's salary, and issued written warnings to other mill workers who
    joined sympathy strikes.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, it does prohibit slavery, kidnaping,
    forced labor, including forced prostitution, child labor, and alien
    smuggling; however, there were reports that UNITA forces kidnaped
    citizens and forced them to serve as combatants and porters in Angola
    (see Section 1.b. and 6.f.).
                                   __________

                                     NIGER

        Niger is beginning a process of consolidating a democratic system
    and a constitutional government following a period of instability
    during the last democratic government and coups d'etat in 1996 and
    1999. An April 1999 coup led to the installation of a military-led
    government, which instituted a 9-month transition to a democracy. A
    July 1999 referendum approved a new Constitution that provided for a
    power sharing-presidential system and granted amnesty to perpetrators
    of the 1996 and 1999 coups. The first round of presidential elections
    took place in October 1999, and presidential runoff and legislative
    elections were held in November 1999. Tandja Mamadou was elected
    president with 60 percent of the vote in an election that international
    observers called free and fair. The National Movement for the
    Development of Society and the Democratic and Socialist Convention
    (MNSD/CDS) coalition, which backed Tandja, won 55 of the 83 seats in
    the National Assembly. In January Tandja appointed MNSD member Hama
    Amadou as Prime Minister. The new Government made some progress toward
    democratization and political modernization, including instituting a
    transparent budget process and auditing the military budget. During the
    year, the legislative and judicial branches exercised for the first
    time their constitutional right to audit the Government's budget. The
    judiciary is showing signs of independence; however, family and
    business ties can influence lower courts.
        Security forces consist of the army, the Republican Guard, the
    gendarmerie (paramilitary police), and the national police. The police
    and gendarmerie traditionally have primary responsibility for internal
    security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of the
    security forces. The armed forces, after a crisis in June prompted by
    the kidnaping of a senior military official, publicly stated that they
    would abide by the rules of democracy and stayed out of politics.
    Members of the security forces committed abuses.
        The economy is based mainly on subsistence farming, herding, small
    trading, and informal markets. Less than 15 percent of the economy is
    in the modern sector. Uranium is the most important export, though
    declining world demand has made this sector less profitable. Per capita
    income is less than $200, and the country faces problems of drought,
    deforestation, soil degradation, and exceedingly low literacy. The
    economy remained severely depressed. Most international aid (an
    important factor in the economy) was suspended following the April 1999
    coup d'etat; however, following the presidential and legislative
    elections in 1999, the country again is receiving foreign assistance.
        The Government's human rights record remained generally poor;
    although there were improvements in several areas, some serious
    problems remain. With the 1999 election of President Tandja and members
    of the National Assembly in generally free and fair elections, citizens
    exercised their right to change their government. Two prisoners
    disappeared after having last been seen in the custody of military
    officers. Police and members of the security forces beat and otherwise
    abused persons, and there were incidents of torture by the military.
    Prison conditions remained poor, and arbitrary arrest and detention
    remained problems. Delays in trials resulted in long periods of
    pretrial confinement. The judiciary also was subject to executive and
    other influence. Security forces infringed on citizens'' privacy
    rights. The Government limited freedom of the press. While in general
    the Government supports the right to association, on at least one
    occasion, the Government limited this right. The Government frequently
    restricted freedom of movement. Domestic violence and societal
    discrimination against women continue to be serious problems. Female
    genital mutilation (FGM) persists, despite government efforts to combat
    it. There was societal discrimination against the disabled and ethnic
    and religious minorities. Worker rights generally are respected. There
    were reports that a traditional form of servitude still is practiced.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Unlike in the
    previous year, there were no reports of political or other
    extrajudicial killings.
        On April 9, 1999, members of the presidential guard assassinated
    President Ibrahim Mainassara Bare and killed or seriously injured
    several other members of his entourage. The subsequent military-
    controlled transition government insisted that Bare was killed in an
    ``unfortunate accident;'' all perpetrators were granted amnesty by the
    1999 Constitution and an amnesty law in January. Members of the Bare
    family continued to press for a full investigation and punishment for
    Bare's assassins, although no such action was taken by year's end.
        In August 1999, prison guards used tear gas on a group of prisoners
    in their cells at the Niamey Central Prison, resulting in the deaths of
    29 prisoners. A prison supervisor and guard were arrested as a result
    of the deaths; however, judicial proceedings had not begun by year's
    end (see Section 1.c.). As a result of this incident, the Minister of
    Justice promised in 1999 a full investigation and the reform of the
    prison system, including training guards and humanizing prison
    conditions; however, at year's end, the Government had not completed
    the investigation, and no results were released.
        In February 1999 a mass grave containing 149 bodies alleged to be
    those of missing Toubou former rebels was discovered at Bosso near Lake
    Chad in the far eastern region of the country. The missing men had been
    expelled from Nigeria as part of a Chad-Niger-Nigeria joint military
    operation. When last seen by their families in October 1998, the
    Toubous were in the custody of the Nigerien armed forces. The
    Government acknowledged the existence of the mass grave. Domestic and
    international human rights groups called for an independent
    investigation; however, no such investigation was forthcoming by year's
    end.
        There was no investigation nor action taken in the 1999 case in
    which a Nigerien-Algerian team of security forces attacked a camp of
    alleged Islamic fundamentalists in the northwestern corner of Niger,
    killing between 4 and 15 persons.
        The Lake Chad area continues to be patrolled by Nigerian-Nigerien-
    Chadian joint military forces; however, during the year, the region
    became more secure, and intercommunal conflict, which in previous years
    resulted in some killings, declined significantly following the 1998
    Toubou Peace Accords.
        Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of violent
    disagreements over land use between sedentary farmers and herders in
    the Tillaberi Department along the Malian border and the Lake Chad
    region. Government officials maintained active relations with Malian
    officials on security and criminal problems. Likewise, security in the
    North Tillaberi pastoral zones improved significantly, and there were
    no reported instances of violence during the year.
        There were no reports of vigilante killings during the year.
        b. Disappearance.--In June two army sergeants disappeared after
    they were arrested by other soldiers for their alleged involvement in
    the June 10 kidnaping of Major Djibrilla Hima, the commander of the
    army's only armor squadron (see Section 1.d.). Djibrilla was kidnaped
    at an army recreation center and released approximately 24 hours later
    on June 11 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). Army sources claimed that the
    two escaped from the country, but their families said that they have
    not seen or heard from them since they were arrested. In July an
    investigating judge had a grave on the outskirts of Niamey reopened to
    determine if it contained the remains of one the sergeants, but it was
    impossible to identify the decomposed corpse.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, police
    and soldiers beat and otherwise abused persons, and there were
    incidents of torture by the military.
        On June 11 and 12, soldiers beat severely 3 of the 18 soldiers
    arrested for suspected involvement in the kidnaping of a senior
    military officer, Major Djibrilla Hima (see Sections 1.b. and 1.d.);
    others may have been abused. There also were reports that the soldiers
    tortured the detainees by beating them with fists, belts, and rifle
    butts. Soldiers who bribed or threatened prison guards to allow them
    access to the detainees allegedly carried out the beatings. Soldiers
    reportedly beat one of the detainees in front of Djibrilla and his
    wife. The prosecutor with overall responsibility for the kidnaping case
    investigated the torture and disappearance allegations; however, he was
    removed from the case in mid-August following a month of intensive
    investigation. By year's end, there was no further investigation into
    the incident, and no action had been taken against the alleged
    torturers.
        On several occasions, in April and May police used tear gas to
    disperse protesting students (see Section 2.b.). One student reportedly
    suffered a broken leg while running from the tear gas.
        No action was taken against prison guards who beat and otherwise
    abused a taxi driver held in detention without charge in 1999.
        Prison conditions are poor. Prisons are underfunded and
    understaffed; all 35 of the country's prisons are dangerous to the
    health and safety of the prisoners. Prisons are overcrowded. For
    example, in Niamey's Civil Prison there are more than 700 prisoners in
    a facility built for 350. Dietary, health, and sanitary conditions are
    very poor. Family visits are allowed, and prisoners can receive
    supplemental food and other necessities from their families. Prisoners
    are segregated by sex, and minors and adults are incarcerated
    separately.
        Corruption among prison staff is rampant. There are credible
    reports that prisoners can bribe officials to leave prison for the day
    and serve their sentences in the evenings. Prisoners also can claim
    illness and serve their sentences in the national hospital.
        The majority of the prisoners who escaped from the prison in Zinder
    in 1999 were recaptured; however, others remained at large at year's
    end.
        There was neither investigation nor action taken in the March 1999
    case in which military personnel ambushed and beat the publishing
    director of La Voix du Citoyen. There was no action taken in the
    November 1999 case in which police officials used tear gas to disperse
    students holding a sit-in in Niamey to press claims for payments of
    their scholarships; at least 20 students were injured.
        Human rights monitors, including the International Committee of the
    Red Cross, were granted unrestricted access to prisons and detention
    centers and visited them during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. Although the Constitution prohibits arbitrary
    arrest and detention, and the law prohibits detention without charge in
    excess of 48 hours, police sometimes violate these provisions in
    practice. If police fail to gather sufficient evidence within the
    detention period, the prosecutor can give the case to another officer,
    and a new 48-hour detention period begins. Police, acting under
    authority given them by the Security Law, conduct sweeps to detain
    suspected criminals.
        In June authorities arrested 18 soldiers and former soldiers in
    connection with the kidnaping of Major Djibrilla Hima; several were
    beaten or tortured, and 2 disappeared (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.). Six
    individuals remained in custody pending trial; they have been charged
    with kidnaping and conspiracy, but at year's end, they had not been
    brought to trial.
        A number of journalists were arrested during the year (see Section
    2.a.).
        Following the Maradi riots on November 8 and 9, police arrested
    approximately 100 persons in Maradi and others in Niamey. At year's
    end, 31 persons remained in custody in Maradi pending trial and 27
    others were in custody in Niamey; they were charged with unauthorized
    demonstration and threatening public order.
        The judicial system is seriously overloaded. There are no legal
    limits on pretrial confinement of indicted persons. Detention often
    lasts months or years; however, the Justice Ministry made efforts
    during the year to accelerate the process. Nevertheless some persons
    have been waiting as long as 6 years to be charged. Of the prisoners in
    Niamey's Civil Prison, approximately 500 are awaiting trial or had no
    charges brought against them.
        The law provides for a right to counsel, although there is only one
    defense attorney known to have a private practice outside the capital.
    A defendant has the right to a lawyer immediately upon detention. The
    Government provides a defense attorney for all indigents in felony
    cases, including minors. Bail is available for crimes carrying a
    penalty of less than 10 years' imprisonment. Widespread ignorance of
    the law and lack of financial means prevent full exercise of these
    rights.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and there were no reports of its
    use.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it is occasionally subject to executive
    interference. Although the Supreme Court on occasion has asserted its
    independence, human rights groups claimed that family and business ties
    influence lower courts. Judges sometimes feared reassignment or having
    their financial benefits reduced if they rendered a decision
    unfavorable to the Government. However, there was evidence during the
    year of increased judicial independence; for example, in the cases
    against two Canard Libere journalists, the court dismissed the cases on
    procedural grounds; however, the cases were refiled (see Section 2.a.).
    In addition in the case against six military officers who continued to
    be held at year's end for kidnaping Major Djibrilla (see Section 1.d.),
    the investigating judge actively investigated charges of torture,
    although subsequently he was removed from the case.
        Defendants and prosecutors may appeal a verdict, first to the Court
    of Appeals, then to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals reviews
    questions of fact and law, while the Supreme Court reviews only the
    application of the law and constitutional questions. There are also
    customary courts.
        Traditional chiefs can act as mediators and counselors and have
    authority in customary law cases as well as status under national law
    where they are designated as auxiliaries to local officials. They
    collect local taxes and receive stipends from the Government, but they
    have no police or judicial powers and can only mediate, not arbitrate,
    customary law disputes. Customary courts, located only in large towns
    and cities, try cases involving divorce or inheritance. They are headed
    by a legal practitioner with basic legal training who is advised by an
    assessor knowledgeable in the society's traditions. The judicial
    actions of chiefs and customary courts are not regulated by law, and
    defendants may appeal a verdict to the formal court system. Women do
    not have equal legal status with men and do not enjoy the same access
    to legal redress (see Section 5).
        Defendants have the right to counsel, to be present at trial, to
    confront witnesses, to examine the evidence against them, and to appeal
    verdicts. The Constitution affirms the presumption of innocence. The
    law provides for counsel at public expense for minors and indigent
    defendants charged with crimes carrying a sentence of 10 years or more.
    Although lawyers comply with government requests to provide counsel,
    generally they are not remunerated by the Government.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires that police have a search warrant,
    normally issued by a judge; however, human rights organizations report
    that police often conduct routine searches without warrants. Police may
    conduct searches without warrants when they have strong suspicion that
    a house shelters criminals or stolen property. The State Security Law
    also provides for warrantless searches.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, on several occasions, the
    Government limited this right in practice. On five occasions during the
    year, government officials initiated lawsuits against journalists for
    articles that either criticized them personally or criticized the armed
    forces; however, several of the cases resulted in convictions. Canard
    Libere journalists were convicted of libel against the Prime Minister
    and undermining the morale of the armed forces; the L'Inqueteur
    journalists were convicted of publishing false information.
        The Government publishes a French-language daily newspaper, Le
    Sahel, and its weekend edition. There are approximately 12 private
    French-language weekly or monthly newspapers, some of which are
    affiliated loosely with political parties. The private press remained
    relatively assertive in criticizing government actions. Foreign
    journals circulate and report freely. However, strict accreditation
    requirements imposed on journalists by the 1997 press law remained in
    place.
        In May the armed forces chief of staff, Colonel Moumouni Boureima,
    brought charges of ``undermining the morale of the armed forces''
    against two Canard Libere journalists, following a series of personal
    slights regarding Boureima. A court dismissed the case for procedural
    reasons in June; however, in July Defense Minister Sabiou Dady Gaoh
    filed the same charge against the same two individuals. They were
    convicted on October 3, sentenced to 6 months in jail, and fined $710
    (500,000 CFA) each. The prison sentence was suspended. The two
    journalists planned to appeal, but the appeal was pending at year's
    end.
        In July police arrested the same two journalists with Canard Libere
    and detained them for several days for publishing an article calling
    Prime Minister Hama Amadou a ``coward'' for his alleged avoidance of
    responsibility in the Djibrilla kidnaping affair. They were tried, but
    the court again dismissed the case for procedural reasons. Hama again
    filed the case in July, and the court found one of the journalists
    guilty of libel in October, fined him approximately $710 (500,000 CFA),
    and gave him a suspended sentence. The decision was appealed, but it
    remained pending at year's end.
        In November three journalists from the newspaper L'Enqueteur were
    convicted on charges brought by the Minister Sabiou for publishing
    ``false news'' and ``sensitive information'' related to articles on
    purported troop movements near the Benin border in October. The
    newspaper publisher, Soumana Maiga was sentenced to 8 months in prison
    and fined approximately $710 (500,000 CFA); his editor and a reporter
    received 6-month suspended sentences, and each was fined approximately
    $430 (300,000 CFA). Maiga remained in prison at year's end; all three
    appealed their verdicts, which were pending at year's end.
        Since literacy and personal incomes are both very low, radio is the
    most important medium of public communication. The government-owned
    Radio Voix du Sahel transmits 14 hours per day, providing news and
    other programs in French and several local languages. There are several
    private radio stations; most are locally owned and some feature popular
    news programs in local languages. These private radio stations
    generally were less critical of government actions than were the
    private newspapers. Radio Anfani and Radio et Musique presented news
    coverage that included a variety of points of view. The government-
    operated multilingual national radio service provided equitable
    broadcasting time for all political parties during the year.
        In 1998 the Government's Superior Council on Communication
    prohibited domestic broadcasting services from rebroadcasting programs
    of foreign origin, such as Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting
    Corporation (BBC), and Deutsche Welle programs without a time delay
    that would enable the Government to hold local broadcasters responsible
    for the programs'' content. However, domestic affiliates of
    international services generally did not comply with this prohibition,
    and during the year, the Government ceased efforts to prohibit domestic
    rebroadcasting of foreign programs.
        Television is a far less important medium than radio. The
    government-owned Tele-Sahel broadcasts about 4 hours every evening,
    with programming emphasizing news in French and other major national
    languages. There was a private television station, TV Tenere. The
    director of a private radio station operates a wireless cable
    television service for the capital, offering access to international
    channels.
        The news coverage of the state-owned media reflects government
    priorities. Presidential activities and conferences dealing with
    development issues always are reported. Analysis or investigative
    reporting on domestic topics is extremely rare.
        SONITEL, the state-owned telephone monopoly, is the country's only
    Internet service provider (ISP). There are no private ISP's because
    telecommunications regulations set rates at prohibitive levels. The
    Government does not restrict access to the Internet through SONITEL,
    although service frequently had technical difficulties.
        Academic freedom is generally respected. In April and May, students
    protested sporadically in protest of the nonpayment of their academic
    scholarships (see Section 2.b.). Ultimately the Government paid
    university students their scholarships; however, at year's end,
    scholarships for high school students had not been paid. Due to
    financial problems, the university did not function during the academic
    year; however, a normal schedule was planned for 2001.
        b. Freedom of Assembly and Association.--The Constitution provides
    for freedom of assembly; however, the Government retains the authority
    to prohibit gatherings either under tense social conditions or if
    advance notice (48 hours) is not provided. Political parties legally
    are permitted to hold demonstrations, and there were no reports of
    political parties being denied permission for demonstrations during the
    year.
        Students protested sporadically in April and May in protest of the
    nonpayment of their academic scholarships and the prospect of fees for
    tuition and examinations. On several occasions, police used tear gas to
    disperse protesting students after they started throwing rocks and
    burning tires.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however,
    citizens may not form political parties based on ethnicity, religion,
    or region. In reaction to rioting by Islamic fundamentalist groups in
    November, the Government banned six fundamentalist-oriented
    organizations. There are 24 political parties.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for ``the right
    of the free development of each individual in their...spiritual,
    cultural, and religious dimensions,'' and the Government supports the
    freedom to practice religious beliefs, as long as persons respect
    public order, social peace, and national unity.
        Religious organizations must register with the Interior Ministry.
    This registration is a formality, and there were no reports that it
    ever has been denied. The State must authorize construction of any
    place of worship. Foreign missionaries work freely, but their
    organizations must be registered officially as associations.
        In April 1999, the Assemblies of God Church in Niamey was notified
    by the mayor's office that it had to close until the ``new order'' was
    established, presumably until a democratically elected government was
    in place. The church had been in its location since 1996 and had an
    ongoing dispute with one of its neighbors, another Christian group,
    which had been trying actively to have the church closed since its
    establishment. The authorities ordered the church to close; however,
    this order was not enforced, and the church remained open during the
    year and functioned without interference (see Section 5).
        In reaction to rioting by Islamic fundamentalist groups in
    November, the Government banned six fundamentalist-oriented
    organizations (see Section 5). The Government, supported by local human
    rights NGO's, sought to restore order and discourage further violence.
    In November the country's most important human rights NGO, the
    Association Nigerien de Defense de Droit de L'Homme, strongly
    criticized religious intolerance and violence.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
    and restricts neither emigration nor repatriation; however, authorities
    imposed some restrictions on these rights. Ministers of the former
    government no longer are prohibited from leaving the country pending
    inquiries into their financial affairs. Security forces at checkpoints
    monitor the travel of persons and the circulation of goods,
    particularly near major population centers, and sometimes demand
    payments or bribes. Attacks by bandits on major routes to the north
    have declined considerably. Among the Hausa and Peul in the east, some
    women are cloistered and may leave their homes only if escorted by a
    man and usually only after dark (see Section 5).
        The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status in
    accordance with the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the Government
    cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
    Government offers first asylum, and to date it has offered asylum to
    several thousand persons. A few Chadian refugee families remain in the
    country.
        There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons to a
    country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    government, and citizens were able to exercise that right during the
    November 1999 election. However, this has not always been the case; the
    January 1996 coup, the fraudulent 1996 presidential election, the
    disruption of local elections in February 1999, and the April 1999 coup
    effectively disenfranchised citizens in previous years. In November
    1999, Tandja Mamadou was elected president with 60 percent of the vote
    in an election that was considered by international observers to be
    generally free and fair. Reportedly 39 percent of the country's
    population participated in the election. In the November 1999 National
    Assembly elections, the National Movement for the Development of
    Society and the Democratic and Social Convention (MNSD/CDS) coalition,
    which backed Tandja, won 55 of the 83 seats in the assembly. Five of
    the country's 11 active political parties are represented in the
    National Assembly. Tandja was inaugurated on December 22, 1999.
        Pursuant to the July 1999 Constitution, which immediately entered
    into force after it was approved by 90 percent of the 31 percent that
    voted in the constitutional referendum, the country has a power sharing
    presidential system with the President as head of state and the Prime
    Minister as head of government. The President must choose the Prime
    Minister from a list of three persons presented by the majority party
    or coalition in the National Assembly. In January Tandja appointed Hama
    Amadou as Prime Minister.
        The Constitution provides for a political system with checks and
    balances, a representative one-chamber National Assembly, and an
    independent judiciary. Citizens 18 years of age and over can vote, and
    voting is by secret ballot.
        The Constitution granted a general amnesty to the perpetrators of
    the 1996 and 1999 coups; the amnesty was approved during the first
    session of the National Assembly, which met in January. The
    Constitution also allowed governmental authorities to remain in place
    until new elections were held.
        Women traditionally play a subordinate role in politics. The
    societal practice of husbands' voting their wives' proxy ballots
    effectively disenfranchises many women. This practice was used widely
    in the 1999 presidential and National Assembly elections.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 1 woman
    won a seat in the 83-seat National Assembly; there are 2 female
    ministers in the Government. The National Assembly passed a law in May
    mandating that women would receive 25 percent of government positions,
    but at year's end, women did not fill that percentage of government
    positions.
        The Government supported greater minority representation in the
    National Assembly, but no seats in the National Assembly are reserved
    for ethnic minorities. Although there are some questions about
    President Tandja's ethnicity, he is reportedly of mixed ethnicity (half
    Peul and half Kanouri). He is the country's first president who is not
    from either the Hausa or the Djerma ethnic groups, which make up about
    56 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the country's population
    (see Section 5). All major ethnic groups are represented in the
    Government.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several independent human rights groups and associations normally
    operate without government hindrance, and they publish findings and
    conclusions that often are highly critical of the Government in their
    own publications and in the small independent press. Notable among the
    associations are the Nigerian Association for the Defense of Human
    Rights (ANDDH); Democracy, Liberty, and Development (DLD); the Nigerien
    League for the Defense of Human Rights (LNDH); the Association for the
    Protection and Defense of Nigerien Human Rights (ADALCI); the Network
    for the Integration and Diffusion of the Rights in the Rural Milieu
    (RIDD-FITLA); the Niger Independent Magistrates Association (SAMAN);
    and the Association of Women Jurists of Niger. There are several other
    women's rights groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross is
    active in the country. During the year, the Government created, but did
    not fund, the National Commission on Human Rights and Fundamental
    Liberties with a mandate to include communication, advocacy, and
    investigation of human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the organization
    functioned during the year; it published in October a credible report
    on the Djibrilla kidnaping case (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, and
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, social
    origin, race, ethnicity, or religion. However, in practice there are
    instances of discrimination against women, children, ethnic minorities,
    and disabled persons, including, but not limited to, limited economic
    and political opportunities.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women is widespread, although
    firm statistics are lacking. Wife beating is reportedly common, even in
    upper social classes. Families often intervene to prevent the worst
    abuses, and women may (and do) divorce because of physical abuse. While
    women have the right to seek redress in the customary or modern courts,
    few do so due to ignorance of the legal system, fear of social stigma,
    or fear of repudiation. Women's rights organizations report that
    prostitution is often the only economic alternative for a woman who
    wants to leave her husband.
        Despite the Constitution's provisions for women's rights, the deep-
    seated traditional belief in the submission of women to men results in
    discrimination in education, employment, and property rights. Such
    practices are worse in rural areas, where women do much of the
    subsistence farming as well as child-rearing, water- and wood-
    gathering, and other work. Despite constituting 47 percent of the work
    force, women have made only modest inroads in civil service and
    professional employment and remain underrepresented in these areas.
        Women's inferior legal status is evident, for example, in head of
    household status: A male head of household has certain legal rights,
    but divorced or widowed women, even with children, are not considered
    to be heads of households. Among the Hausa and Peul ethnic groups in
    the east, some women are cloistered and may leave their homes only if
    escorted by a male and usually only after dark. In 1999 the Government
    ratified the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
    Discrimination Against Women; in August the Ministry of Justice formed
    a committee of legal scholars began reviewing appropriate law. Islamic
    groups criticized the ratification and complained that they were not
    consulted beforehand. Women's groups have so far been silent on the
    ratification, allegedly due to fear of reprisals.
        National service is mandatory for all young women who have
    completed university studies or professional training. National service
    lasts from 18 months to 2 years, and women can serve as teachers,
    health service workers, or technical specialists; however, military
    service is not an option.
        Children.--Although the Constitution provides that the Government
    promote children's welfare, financial resources are extremely limited.
    The minimum period of compulsory education is 6 years; however, only
    about 32 percent of children of primary school age attend school, and
    about 60 percent of those who finish primary schools are boys. The
    majority of young girls are kept at home to work and rarely attend
    school for more than a few years, resulting in a female literacy rate
    of 7 percent, compared with 18 percent for males.
        Some ethnic groups allow families to enter into marriage agreements
    on the basis of which young girls from rural areas are sent by the age
    of 10 or 12 and sometimes younger to join their husband's family under
    the tutelage of their mother-in-law. In August the Minister of Justice
    formed a commission to examine the problem of child brides; at year's
    end, the commission's work was ongoing.
        There are credible reports of underage girls being drawn into
    prostitution, sometimes with the complicity of the family. Child
    prostitution is not specifically criminalized, and there is no precise
    age of consent; however, the law condemns ``indecent'' acts towards
    minors, but it is left to a judge to determine what constitutes an
    indecent act. Such activity and a corollary statute against ``the
    incitement of minors to wrongdoing'' are punishable by 3 to 5 years in
    prison.
        Female genital mutilation, which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced by several ethnic groups in the
    western department of Tillaberi (which includes Niamey and the towns of
    Say, Torodi, and Ayorou) and the eastern department of Diffa. FGM is
    not illegal, but the Government is engaged in an effort to eliminate
    the practice. A 1998 study by CARE International indicated that 5
    percent of women between 15 and 49 years of age had undergone FGM;
    however, a June 1999 symposium cited a World Health Organization global
    study of 20 percent; statistics regarding this practice are not
    considered to be fully reliable. Clitoridectomy is the most common form
    of FGM. In October seven FGM practitioners turned in their knives at a
    public ceremony attended by the Justice Minister and pledged to
    discontinue performing FGM. The Government worked closely with a local
    NGO, the U.N. Children's Fund, and other donors to develop and
    distribute educational materials at government clinics and maternal
    health centers.
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution mandates that the State
    provide for the disabled; however, the Government has yet to implement
    regulations to mandate accessibility to buildings and education for
    those with special needs. Regulations do not mandate accessibility to
    public transport, of which there is little. Societal discrimination
    against persons with disabilities exists.
        Religious Minorities.--There are generally amicable relations
    between the various religious communities, but there have been
    instances when members of the majority religion (Islam) have not been
    tolerant of the rights of members of minority religions to practice
    their faith. In November several hundred Muslims rioted in the
    provincial capital of Maradi, burned a Protestant church and a nearby
    seminary facility belonging to the Abundant Life Church, and looted
    houses and an office at a compound of a foreign missionary
    organization. At year's end, the leaders of the riots were in prison
    awaiting legal action (see Section 2.c.).
        In 1999 members of the Southern Baptist mission in Say received
    threats of physical harm from members of a local Islamic association
    unless they left the city within a week. The missionaries were
    threatened periodically since late 1998 when they announced their
    intention to build a church in Say, which is considered an Islamic holy
    city. Following these threats, the missionaries left Say in late 1999
    and moved permanently to another location in the country (see Section
    2.c.), where they operated without incident. However, some local
    Christians remain in Say. On May 14, the same members of the local
    Islamic community in Say threatened to burn the meeting place of the
    local Christians who remained. Leaders of the same organization also
    threatened to beat or have arrested a local Christian man in the
    village of Ouro Sidi because he continued to work with the Southern
    Baptists; however, there were no reports that such threats were carried
    out.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Hausa and Djerma ethnic
    groups make up about 56 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the
    country's population of some 11 million. These two groups also dominate
    government and business. Tandja Mamadou is the country's first
    president who is neither Hausa nor Djerma; however, Tuaregs, Arabs,
    Peuls, Toubous, and Kanouris have few representatives in the
    Government, and many of these ethnic groups assert that the Hausa and
    Djerma groups discriminate against them. The Government increased
    education for ethnic minorities; health care for minorities was at the
    same level as the rest of the population. It supported the 1995 peace
    accord calling for special development efforts in the north where the
    Tuareg population is dominant. However, nomadic people, such as Tuaregs
    and many Peul, continued to have less access to government services,
    and the temporary suspension of foreign assistance in 1999 limited the
    Government's ability to fulfill its commitments to former rebel areas.
    During the year, foreign assistance resumed, and the region is
    receiving assistance again.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides formal
    recognition of workers' right to establish and join trade unions;
    however, more than 95 percent of the work force is employed in the
    nonunionized subsistence agricultural and small trading sectors.
        The National Union of Nigerien Workers (USTN), a federation
    consisting of 38 unions, represents the majority of salary earners;
    most are government employees, such as civil servants, teachers, and
    employees in state-owned corporations. The USTN and affiliated National
    Union of Nigerian Teachers (SNEN) profess political autonomy, but they
    have informal ties to political parties. There is also a small
    breakaway union confederation and independent teachers' and
    magistrates' unions. The water and forest worker unions, shut by the
    Government in 1996 because of their ``paramilitary nature'' resumed
    operation; however, the police union remains suspended. The National
    Trade Union of Customs Officials of Niger (SNAD), dissolved by the
    Government in 1997, was authorized in April to resume operations.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
    security forces and police. The law specifies that: labor must give
    notice and begin negotiations before work is stopped; public workers
    must maintain a minimum level of service during a strike; the
    Government can requisition workers to provide minimum service; and
    striking public sector workers may not be paid for the time they are on
    strike. The latter condition already prevailed in the private sector.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized a 1996 legal
    order that says striking state employees can be requisitioned in
    exceptional cases arising as a result of the need to preserve the
    general interest.
        There were a number of strikes during the year. There were repeated
    work stoppages by judiciary, communications, health care, and education
    workers due to government inability to pay workers'' salaries. In March
    Finance Ministry employees went on strike without providing legal
    notice to demand bonuses; they cancelled a subsequent strike notice
    when threatened with punitive action by the Government.
        On October 16, teachers went on strike for 4 weeks. On November 1,
    the judge ordered the teachers to stop their ``illegal and savage''
    strike and return to work. SNEN issued a strike notification that they
    believed complied with the law and continued the strike with marches
    scheduled for the week of November 6. The teachers ended their strike
    on November 6 and resumed normal work; they were promised 1 month of
    the 12 months of pay owed to them, to be paid early in 2001.
        The USTN is a member of the Organization of African Trade Union
    Unity and abides by that organization's policy of having no formal
    affiliations outside the African continent; however, it receives
    assistance from some international unions. Individual unions such as
    the teachers union are affiliated with international trade union
    secretariats.
        b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--In addition to the
    Constitution and the Labor Code, there is a basic framework agreement
    between the USTN, employers, and the Government that defines all
    classes and categories of work, establishes basic conditions of work,
    and defines union activities. In private and state-owned enterprises,
    unions widely used their right to bargain collectively with management
    without government interference for wages greater than the statutory
    minimum as well as for more favorable work conditions. Collective
    bargaining also exists in the public sector. The USTN represents civil
    servants in bargaining with the Government. Agreements between labor
    and management apply uniformly to all employees.
        The Labor Code is based on ILO principles, and it prohibits
    antiunion discrimination by employers; labor unions reported no such
    discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except by legally convicted
    prisoners; however, although slavery is prohibited by the Constitution,
    there were a few reports that a traditional form of slavery still is
    practiced by the Tuareg and Arab ethnic minorities, particularly in
    remote northern regions. Persons are born into a traditionally
    subordinate caste and are expected to work without pay for those above
    them in the traditional social structure. None of these individuals
    appear to have been forced into servitude. Individuals can change their
    situations and are not pursued if they leave their positions; however,
    most do not and accept their circumstances as natural. A local NGO,
    Timidria, worked actively against this practice.
        In November 1999, a traditional chief was arrested based on charges
    that he practiced slavery. The chief was tried and convicted on the
    charges, served a sentence of several months, and was released during
    the year. The code does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded
    labor by children; however, such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law permits child labor in nonindustrialized
    enterprises under certain conditions. Children under the age of 14 must
    obtain special authorization to work, and those 14 to 18 years of age
    are limited to a maximum of 4+ hours per day and certain types of
    employment so schooling may continue. The law requires employers to
    ensure minimum sanitary working conditions for children. Ministry of
    Labor inspectors enforce child labor laws. Minimum compulsory education
    is 6 years, but far fewer than half of school-age children complete 6
    years of education.
        Child labor is practically nonexistent in the formal (wage) sector,
    and there are no known instances of the use of child labor in
    factories; however, children work in the unregulated agricultural,
    commercial, and artisan sectors, and some, especially foreign youths,
    are hired in homes as general helpers and baby sitters for very low
    pay. The majority of rural children regularly work with their families
    from a very early age--helping in the fields, pounding grain, tending
    animals, getting firewood and water, and other similar tasks. Some
    children are kept out of school to guide a blind relative on begging
    rounds. Others sometimes are employed by marabouts (Koranic teachers)
    to beg in the streets. There is no official recognition of this labor.
        In June the National Assembly passed a law permitting the
    ratification of ILO Convention 182, which bans the worst forms of child
    labor; and the Government subsequently ratified the convention. The
    Ministry of Labor is responsible for implementing the convention;
    however, at year's end no further specific action had been taken.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is not prohibited specifically;
    however, there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code establishes a
    minimum wage for salaried workers of each class and category within the
    formal sector. The lowest minimum wage is $33 (24,565 CFA) per month.
    Additional salary is granted for each family member and for such
    working conditions as night shifts and required travel. Minimum wages
    are not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for workers
    and their families. Government salaries are substantially in arrears.
    Most households have multiple earners (largely in informal commerce)
    and rely on the extended family for support.
        The legal workweek is 40 hours with a minimum of one 24-hour rest
    period; however, for certain occupations the Ministry of Labor
    authorizes longer workweeks of up to 72 hours. There were no reports of
    violations.
        The Labor Code also establishes occupational safety and health
    standards; however, due to staff shortages, inspectors focus on safety
    violations only in the most dangerous industries: mining; building; and
    manufacturing. Although generally satisfied with the safety equipment
    provided by employers, citing in particular adequate protection from
    radiation in the uranium mines, union workers are in many cases not
    well informed of the risks posed by their jobs. Workers have the right
    to remove themselves from hazardous conditions without fear of losing
    their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; while in general there were no reports that persons were
    trafficked, to, from, through, or within the country, there was
    anecdotal evidence that organized rings may victimize young coastal
    girls who come to work as household helpers.
        In August the Justice Minister stated that the Government intended
    to study the issue of trafficking as part of the more comprehensive
    legal modernization effort launched by a commission of legal experts.
    At year's end, the study was ongoing; no statistics were available
    regarding the extent of the problem.
                                   __________

                                    NIGERIA

        Nigeria is a federal republic composed of 36 states and a capital
    territory, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. On
    May 29, 1999 President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic
    Party was inaugurated to a 4-year term after winning elections in
    February 1999 that were marred by fraud and irregularities perpetrated
    by all contesting parties, but most observers agreed the elections
    reflected the will of the majority of voters. These elections marked
    the end of 16 years of military-led regimes. On May 5, 1999, the
    Abubakar Government signed into law a new Constitution based largely on
    the suspended 1979 Constitution; the new Constitution entered into
    effect on May 29, 1999. The Constitution provides for an independent
    judiciary; however, in practice the judicial branch remains susceptible
    to executive and legislative branch pressure, is influenced by
    political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffers
    from corruption and inefficiency.
        The Federal Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is tasked with law
    enforcement. The Constitution prohibits local and state police forces.
    Internal security is the duty of the State Security Service (SSS). The
    SSS's profile continued to decline under the Obasanjo regime. Until the
    advent of the civilian administration in May 1999, special paramilitary
    anticrime squads called ``Rapid Response Teams'' operated in every
    state. Under Obasanjo the military personnel dispatched to these units
    returned to their barracks, but the units remained intact in most
    states, staffed by regular policemen and with a reduced role and a less
    menacing presence. The Obasanjo Government lessened its reliance on the
    army to quell internal disorder and the degree of civilian control over
    the Rapid Response Teams and the national police force improved during
    the course of the year. Despite these new controls, members of the
    security forces, including the police, anticrime squads, and the armed
    forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
        The economy has declined for much of the last three decades. Most
    of the population of approximately 120 million was rural and engaged in
    small-scale agriculture. Agriculture accounted for less than 40 percent
    of gross domestic product but employed more than 65 percent of the work
    force. The agriculture and manufacturing sectors deteriorated
    considerably during the oil boom decades. The collapse of market
    agriculture contributed significantly to the country's urbanization and
    increased unemployment. Although the great bulk of economic activity is
    outside the formal sector, recorded gross domestic product per capita
    was $250. Much of the nation's wealth continued to be concentrated in
    the hands of a tiny elite mostly through corruption and nontransparent
    government contracting practices. During the year, petroleum accounted
    for over 98 percent of the country's export revenues, most of the
    government's revenues, and almost all foreign investment. During the
    year the economy was static, with growth still impeded by grossly
    inadequate infrastructure, endemic corruption, and general economic
    mismanagement. The country's ports, roads, water, and power
    infrastructure are collapsing. Chronic fuel shortages which afflicted
    the country for several years continued to be a problem. Food
    production has not kept pace with population growth. An estimated two-
    thirds of the country's more than 120 million people live in poverty
    and are subject to malnutrition and disease. Since the end of military
    rule in 1999, the Government has made progress in liberalizing the
    exchange rate regime, reducing controls on the private sector, and
    increasing expenditures for key social sectors.
        The Government's human rights record was poor; although there were
    some improvements in several areas during the year, serious problems
    remain. The national police, army, and security forces continued to
    commit extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to quell civil
    unrest and ethnic violence, although they did so less frequently than
    under previous military governments. Army, police, and security force
    officers regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and
    convicted prisoners; however, there were no reports of torture of
    political dissidents. The Government took steps to curb torture and
    beating of detainees and prisoners, including the dismissal and arrest
    of senior officials known for such practices. Shari'a courts sentenced
    persons to harsh punishments including caning and amputation. Prison
    conditions were harsh and life threatening, and along with the lack of
    food and medical treatment, contributed to the death of numerous
    inmates. At different times in the year, the Government released
    several hundred prisoners in an attempt to ease prison congestion. In
    May 1999, the Government repealed the State Security (Detention of
    Persons) Decree of 1984 (Decree 2), which allowed prolonged arbitrary
    detention without charge; however, police and security forces continued
    to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Prolonged pretrial detention
    remains a major problem. The judiciary is subject to political
    influence, and is hampered by corruption and inefficiency. The judicial
    system was incapable of providing citizens with the right to a speedy,
    fair trial. The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy
    rights; however, there were no reports of members of the armed forces
    looting property, destroying buildings, or driving persons away from
    their homes. The Government generally respected freedom of speech and
    of the press; however, there were some exceptions. Security force
    beatings of journalists, government seizures of newspaper print runs,
    and harassment of newspaper printers, advertisers, and distributors
    continued to decline. The Government continued to relax its
    restrictions on the rights of freedom of association and assembly. The
    Government occasionally restricted freedom of movement. The Government
    restricts freedom of religion in certain respects, and religious
    freedom deteriorated during the year due to the expansion of Shari'a
    law in several northern states. In June 1999, the Government
    established a governmental panel, the Human Rights Violations
    Investigation Panel (HRVIP), to review cases of human rights violations
    since 1966; in October the panel began public hearings.
        Domestic violence against women remained widespread and some forms
    were sanctioned by traditional, customary, or Shari'a law.
    Discrimination against women remained a problem. Female genital
    mutilation (FGM) remained widely practiced, and child abuse and child
    prostitution were common. Localized discrimination and violence against
    religious minorities persisted. Ethnic and regional discrimination
    remained widespread and interethnic, religious, and regional tensions
    increased significantly. Thousands of persons were killed in various
    local ethnic and religious conflicts throughout the country. In
    February and May rioting between Muslim and Christian groups over the
    proposed expansion of Shari'a law resulted in the deaths of more than
    1,500 persons. Some members of the Ijaw ethnic group in the oil-
    producing Niger Delta region who seek greater local autonomy continued
    to commit serious abuses, including killings and kidnapings. The police
    often could not protect citizens from interethnic, interreligious,
    communal, and criminal violence. The Government took steps to improve
    worker rights; however, some restrictions continued. Some persons,
    including children, were subjected to forced labor. Child labor
    continued to increase. Trafficking in persons for purposes of forced
    prostitution and forced labor is a problem and collusion of government
    officials in trafficking was alleged. Vigilante violence increased
    throughout the country, particularly in Lagos and Onitsha, where
    suspected criminals were apprehended, beaten, and sometimes killed.
                            respect for human rights
        Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
    Freedom From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--National police,
    army, and security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used
    excessive force to quell civil unrest under the Obasanjo Government,
    although they did so less frequently than under previous military
    regimes. The Government largely ceased using lethal force to repress
    nonviolent, purely political activities; however, lethal force was used
    when protests or demonstrations were perceived as becoming violent or
    disruptive, or in the apprehension and detention of suspected
    criminals. The state anticrime task forces remained the most egregious
    human rights offenders. Neither the task forces, the police, nor the
    armed forces were held accountable for excessive, deadly use of force
    or the death of individuals in custody. They operated with impunity in
    the apprehension, illegal detention, and sometimes execution of
    criminal suspects. Since taking office, President Obasanjo largely
    resisted pressure to call in military troops to quell domestic unrest,
    which reduced the risk that the armed forces would overreact or harass
    civilians. Instead, Obasanjo preferred to let the police deal with
    clashes between rival ethnic groups and only sent in military
    reinforcements when the police were unable to restore order; however,
    the President threatened to use military troops in various states to
    reinforce the police. In February and May, the military was deployed in
    Kaduna state to stem ethnic violence that arose following the proposed
    introduction of Shari'a law. Multinational oil companies and Nigerian
    oil producing companies subcontract police and soldiers from area units
    particularly to protect the oil facilities in the volatile Niger Delta
    region.
        On May 5, a member of Lagos deputy governor's security detail
    allegedly killed a young woman when she obstructed the security detail
    as it was trying to clear traffic for a motorcade. Reports vary as to
    whether she was in a car or was a pedestrian. The security officer was
    charged with murder by a magistrate court. At year's end, the case had
    not been transferred to a court with jurisdiction over murder cases and
    a trial date had not been set.
        Police and military personnel used excessive and sometimes deadly
    force in the suppression of civil unrest, property vandalization, and
    interethnic violence, primarily in the oil and gas regions of Lagos,
    Kaduna and Abia states. Confrontations between increasingly militant
    ``youths'' (who tend to be unemployed males between the ages of 16 and
    40), oil companies, and government authorities continued during the
    year. Reportedly 28 Delta youths were killed in such conflicts over
    protests or suspected vandalization near oil flow stations.
        The use of excessive force to suppress protests was not confined to
    conflicts pertaining to oil company activities. For example, in March
    and April police conducted operations in Ogoniland, Rivers State, home
    of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which
    resulted in the killing of several civilians, the destruction of a
    number of buildings, and the arrest of several Ogoni activists,
    including Ledum Mitee, the MOSOP leader. In June police killed two
    persons in Abuja and injured hundreds of persons who were involved in a
    5-day petrol increase strike (see Section 6.a.). In July police killed
    one person while dispersing a strike by state workers outside of the
    Lagos State secretariat complex (see Section 6.a.). In July police in
    Lagos used tear gas to disperse a demonstration by striking public
    sector workers. One person died in the violence (see Section 6.a.). In
    August the police protecting President Obasanjo's motorcade killed a
    Nnamdi Azikiwe University student who was protesting the removal of
    Senate President Chuba Okadigbo (see Sections 2.a. and Section 3).
        On many occasions during the year the Government authorized the use
    of deadly force to combat crime, and police, military, and anticrime
    taskforce personnel committed numerous extrajudicial killings in the
    apprehension and detention of suspected criminals. For example, police
    used deadly force against suspected vandals near oil pipelines in the
    Niger Delta Region. In June the police killed at least five persons for
    suspected vandalization. Police were instructed by the Federal
    Government to use deadly force in conflicts in Lagos State with the
    Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) vigilante group. By August police in Lagos
    reported killing 509 armed robbers and injuring 113, during the course
    of making 3,166 arrests; not all of those killed were OPC members. No
    legal action was taken against these security officials by year's end.
        Violence and lethal force at police roadblocks and checkpoints was
    reduced greatly during part of the year; however, some instances of
    such violence continued. Obasanjo's order in 1999 to reduce the number
    of checkpoints and roadblocks also applied to the National Drug Law
    Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and resulted in a decrease in the use of
    violence and lethal force at NDLEA checkpoints and roadblocks. By
    year's end, the number of roadblocks and checkpoints at major
    intersections increased again as authorities sought to prevent criminal
    activity from reaching major cities (see Section 1.f.); however, the
    violence associated with roadblocks, as reported in the previous year,
    did not increase.
        Criminal suspects died from unnatural causes while in official
    custody, usually as the result of neglect and harsh treatment. The
    Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) (a credible human rights
    organization) filed a petition with the National Human Rights
    Commission and the Justice Pout Panel concerning the death of Godfrey
    Opuoru while in detention in 1999. Sunday Aghedo, the Lagos state
    police commissioner under whose command the death occurred was replaced
    by Mike Okiro on August 2, 1999. The case was referred to a magistrate
    rather than the High Court, and the case was pending at year's end.
        In Anambra State, the state government supported the extrajudicial
    activities of the vigilante group known as the Bakassi Boys. Like most
    vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys kill suspected criminals rather than
    turn them over to police; however, in some cases, the Bakassi Boys have
    chosen to cut off the hands or arms of perpetrators, rather than
    killing them outright. They also were accused of harassing and
    threatening political opponents of the state government.
        Harsh and life threatening prison conditions and denial of proper
    medical treatment contributed to the death of numerous inmates (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In October the HRVIP began hearings into 150 cases of killings by
    members of the security forces (see Section 4).
        The Government did not address the November 1999 leveling of Odi in
    Bayelsa State by federal troops. The Government did not hold
    accountable any of the soldiers involved in the destruction of the town
    and the killing of several hundred inhabitants; there were newspaper
    reports that some of the soldiers were promoted. Trials against Keniwer
    Imo Neweigha, Monday Diongoli, Timi Epengele, Onoriode David, Ebi
    Clifford Saibu, Derioteidou Aganaba, Timinepre Keren, Joshua Godspower,
    John Zitua, and Benson Odiowei for the alleged murders of 12 policemen
    and 6 civilians that sparked the Odi incident, were ongoing at year's
    end. When the prosecution could not produce Odiowei for trial in
    October, the case was postponed to a later date.
        The prosecution of Hamza al-Mustapha, Mohammed Abacha, Mohammed
    Rabo Lawal, Lateef Shofalan, Mohammed Aminu and Sergeant Rogers
    Mshiella for the 1996 murder of Kudirat Abiola, a prominent
    prodemocracy activist and the wife of Moshood Abiola, was adjourned
    repeatedly during the year; defense lawyers for each individual had
    filed numerous motions for adjournment in the Lagos High Court. The
    Government continued to investigate and detain former Abacha government
    officials and family members, including former Minister of the Interior
    Capital Territory Jerry Useni, former National Security Advisor Ismaila
    Gwarzo, Abacha's wife Maryam, Abacha's son Mohammed, and Colonel
    Ibrahim Yakassai, for the murder and attempted murders of other
    prominent prodemocracy activists in Lagos from 1996 to 1998. All of the
    cases were ongoing at year's end.
        In 1999 the trial against former Army Chief of Staff Ishaya Bamaiyi
    for the attempted murder in 1996 of Guardian newspaper publisher Alex
    Ibru began. Hamza al-Mustapha, former Lagos Police Commissioner James
    Danbaba, and Colonel Yakubu, also were charged in the attempt on Ibru
    but their trials were pending at year's end. All of the defendants were
    being held at Kiri Kiri maximum-security prison at year's end.
        Organized vigilante groups in large cities, particularly Lagos,
    Kano, and Onitsha, committed numerous killings of suspected criminals.
    These vigilante groups engage in lengthy and wellorganized attempts to
    apprehend criminals after the commission of the alleged offenses. In
    Lagos State, the vigilante group known as the OPC clashed repeatedly
    with the police over their protection of Yoruba neighborhoods and over
    political issues. In October an OPC demonstration against Libya's
    expulsion of several Nigerian citizens resulted in a number of injuries
    and the death of a guard at a foreign embassy. On October 14, clashes
    broke out between members of the OPC and police in Ilorin. The violence
    spread to Lagos over the following 2 days; however, the fighting in
    Lagos was between members of the mainly Yoruba OPC and members of the
    Hausa ethnic group and originated in a dispute over the capture and
    killing of alleged robbers of the Hausa ethnic group by members of the
    OPC. The rioting resulted in the deaths of over 100 persons, the
    destruction of buildings in Lagos and the outlawing of the OPC by the
    Government. In some southern states, such as Anambra, vigilante groups
    like the Bakassi Boys are supported and paid by the state government.
        There also were numerous reports of street mobs apprehending and
    killing suspected criminals. The practice of ``necklacing'' criminals
    (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around a victim's neck or torso and
    then igniting it, burning the victim to death) caught in the act
    occurred in several cities.
        During the year, there was an upsurge in lethal interethnic and
    intraethnic violence throughout the country (see Section 5). In
    February and May, rioting between Muslim and Christian groups over the
    proposed extension of Shari'a in Kaduna caused the deaths of more than
    1,500 persons and massive property destruction (see Section 2.c.). Over
    500 persons, predominantly of the Hausas ethnic group, were killed in
    reprisal violence that took place in Abia, Imo, and other eastern
    states. Religious and ethnic violence resulted in deaths in other
    communities as well (see Section 2.c.). For example, one person was
    killed and one Christian church was destroyed in Sokoto when ``area
    boys'' (neighborhood criminals) took advantage of the absence of
    police--who were managing a pro-Shari'a student demonstration elsewhere
    in the city--to attack and loot the church and its rectory in the
    predominantly Christian part of town. In Damboa, Borno, one person was
    killed and five churches were burned in a dispute concerning the
    location of a Christian church in a predominantly Muslim neighborhood.
    In May the discovery of a corpse sparked riots by Christians in the
    Narayi neighborhood in Kaduna; at least 500 persons were killed. A
    National Assembly member, Ibrahim Abdullahi, was burned alive in his
    car during the rioting.
        Clashes between the Ife and the Modakeke ethnic groups caused the
    deaths of as many as 50 persons and much property destruction in Osun
    State (see Section 5).
        In the east, over 150 persons were killed in border disputes
    between Cross River and Akwa Ibom states (see Section 5).
        A clash between rival groups for the throne of the Owo in Ondo
    state cost the lives of at least five persons and the destruction of a
    number of homes and businesses (see Section 5).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
    motivated disappearances by government security forces during the past
    year; however, the OPC charged that the police were responsible for the
    disappearance of at least two of its members in January (see Section
    1.a.).
        Members of minority ethnic groups in the oil-producing areas
    kidnaped foreign and local oil company employees throughout the year to
    press their demands for more redistribution of wealth generated by
    joint ventures with the state-controlled petroleum corporation and for
    specific projects in their areas. Minority youth groups took as many as
    250 persons hostage during the year. In all instances the victims were
    released unharmed after negotiations between the captors and the oil
    firms; the firms usually paid ransoms and promised improved conditions.
        In addition to the political rationale for kidnaping, there were
    numerous instances of strictly criminal kidnaping, in which the
    perpetrators' sole objective was ransom for the release of the victims.
    Some kidnapings appear to have been part of longstanding ethnic
    disputes. For example, in July a group of youths boarded a boat of
    traders from Okuagbe in Delta State and took all of the passengers
    captive. The attack was believed to be part of a dispute between the
    Ijaw and Urhobo ethnic groups. During the year, kidnapings by criminals
    to extort money were more numerous than those perpetrated for ``
    political'' reasons. Due to limited manpower and resources, the police
    and armed forces rarely were able to confront the perpetrators of these
    acts, especially in the volatile Delta region. A lack of resources
    prevented judicial investigations from taking place so that kidnapings
    were routinely left uninvestigated.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and mistreatment of
    prisoners, and the law provides for punishment for such abuses;
    however, although there were no reports of torture of political
    dissidents during the year, army, police, and security force officers
    regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted
    prisoners. Police regularly physically mistreated civilians in attempts
    to extort money from them. Detainees often were kept incommunicado for
    long periods of time. The 1960 Evidence Act prohibits the introduction
    into trials of evidence obtained through torture.
        The extension of Shari'a law in many northern states generated a
    public debate on whether Shari'a punishments such as amputation for
    theft, caning for fornication and public drunkenness constituted
    ``torture or'' inhuman or degrading treatment'' as stipulated in the
    Constitution. Caning as a punishment is available under Nigerian common
    law, the Northern Nigerian Penal Code, and Shari'a law and has not been
    successfully challenged in the court system as a violation of the cruel
    and inhuman punishment clause of the 1999 Constitution. In March in
    Zamfara state, Malam Buba Bello Jangebi's hand was amputated after he
    was convicted of cattle rustling in a Shari'a court. Jangebi chose not
    to appeal his sentence. In September a Sokoto Shari'a court handed down
    a sentence of amputation for a thief; the sentence had not been carried
    out by year's end. The first sentence handed down by Zamfara's Shari'a
    courts was for caning for a pregnant unwed mother and her boyfriend;
    both had confessed to fornication. In September Bariya Ibrahim Magazu,
    a 17-year old-girl, was sentenced to 100 lashes for engaging in
    fornication and 80 additional lashes for naming in court but not being
    able to prove who the possible father of the unborn child was. Magazu's
    sentence was suspended until 3 months after the birth of her child and
    at year's end had not been carried out. In August two motorcycle taxi
    drivers were caned for carrying Muslim female passengers in violation
    of the law in Zamfara State (see Section 5). A non-Muslim was pulled
    from a motorcycle in Zamfara State for breaking the new rule requiring
    separate transportation for women.
        In the numerous ethnic clashes that occurred throughout the year
    (see Sections 1.a. and 3.c), hundreds of persons were beaten and
    injured severely. Police and security forces failed to respond to many
    criminal acts in a timely manner and were unable to protect Christians
    and Muslims caught in sectarian unrest in Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, and Abia
    states. For example, during the Kaduna riots of late February (see
    Section 2.c.), Kaduna residents at the Baptist Theological Seminary
    called upon police for protection from the roaming mobs that were
    firebombing their buildings. The police told the seminarians that they
    would have to protect themselves because they were too busy to respond
    to further calls; five persons were killed in the seminary's compound
    during the 2 days of rioting that followed. Mosques and Muslim
    adherents also were attacked during the rioting but were denied police
    protection despite pleas for assistance to the authorities. Order was
    restored only after the military was brought in to quell the
    disturbances.
        No action was taken against army personnel responsible for rapes
    and other abuses in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states as reported in
    1999.
        After the November 1999 release of Jerry Needam, Editor of the
    Ogoni Star newspaper, the Government representatives failed to appear
    in court for any hearings relating to his case. Police reportedly beat
    Needam, forced him to sign a confession, and did not allow him access
    to medical treatment during his detention in 1999.
        In June police killed two persons and injured hundreds of others
    during a 5-day petrol strike (see Section 1.a.).
        In August police reported killing 509 persons and injuring 113 in
    pursuit of robbers in Lagos state (see Section 1.a.).
        On a number of occasions security forces beat and detained
    journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        Prison and detention conditions remained harsh and life
    threatening. Most prisons were built 70 to 80 years ago and lack
    functioning basic facilities. Lack of potable water, inadequate sewage
    facilities, and severe overcrowding resulted in unhealthy and dangerous
    sanitary conditions. Disease was pervasive in the cramped, poorly
    ventilated facilities, and chronic shortages of medical supplies were
    reported. Prison inmates were allowed outside their cells for
    recreation or exercise only irregularly and many inmates had to provide
    their own food. Only those with money or whose relatives brought food
    regularly had sufficient food; petty corruption among prison officials
    made it difficult for money provided for food to reach prisoners. Poor
    inmates often relied on handouts from others to survive. Beds or
    mattresses were not provided to many inmates, forcing them to sleep on
    concrete floors, often without a blanket. Prison officials, police, and
    security forces often denied inmates food and medical treatment as a
    form of punishment or to extort money from them. Harsh conditions and
    denial of proper medical treatment contributed to the deaths in
    detention of numerous prisoners. A reputable human rights organization
    estimated in 1999 that at least one inmate died per day in the Kiri
    Kiri prison in Lagos alone. According to the same nongovernmental
    organization (NGO), dead inmates promptly are buried in mass graves on
    the prison compounds, usually without their families having been
    notified. A nationwide estimate of the number of inmates who die daily
    in the country's prisons is difficult to obtain because of poor (if not
    nonexistent) record keeping by prison officials. A number of NGO's
    alleged that prison conditions were worse in rural areas than in urban
    districts.
        In practice women and juveniles are held with males, especially in
    rural areas. The extent of abuse in these conditions is unknown.
        The Government acknowledged the problem of overcrowding as the main
    cause of the harsh conditions common in the prison system. According to
    government sources, approximately 45,000 inmates were held in a system
    of 148 prisons (and 83 satellite prisons) with a maximum designed
    capacity of 33,348 prisoners. Some human rights groups estimate a
    higher number of inmates--perhaps as many as 47,000. The Controller-
    General of prisons estimated that two-thirds of prisoners are detainees
    awaiting trial who have not been charged (see Section 1.d.) and further
    admitted that the number of such inmates increased by 83 percent in the
    first half of the year. In May the Yobe state Attorney-General and
    Commissioner for Justice, Alhaji Audu Mohammed Lawson, announced
    publicly that 287 inmates were awaiting trial and that at least 2
    prisons, in Gashua and Potiskum, were at full capacity. Local officials
    blamed the lack of functioning police transport vehicles for the
    overcrowding since the state had no other means to transport prisoners
    to court securely.
        Several times during the year, authorities attempted to ease
    congestion in some smaller prisons. For example, in honor of the Eid-
    El-Kabir holiday in March, the Governor of Kano State released 159
    prisoners, 52 of whom were pretrial detainees held without charge.
    Those released also were provided with travel funds to return to their
    homes.
        In September President Obasanjo directed the Ministry of Justice to
    create a judicial administration committee to address the questions of
    overcrowding, prison conditions, and rehabilitation.
        Throughout the year, the Government allowed both international and
    domestic NGO's occasional access to prisons; however, it did not allow
    them continuous access to all prisons. Prisoners Rehabilitation and
    Welfare Action and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    have regular access to the prisons and publish newsletters on their
    work. The Government admits that there are problems with its
    incarceration and rehabilitation programs and worked with groups such
    as these to address those problems. However, groups such as Rotary
    International report difficulties at the local level in gaining access
    to prisons and jails to do rehabilitation programs.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government
    rarely observed these prohibitions. Police and security forces
    continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention.
        Police and security forces were empowered to make arrests without
    warrants if they believed that there was reason to suspect that a
    person had committed an offense; they often abused this power. Under
    the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedures Rules of the Constitution
    (based on those of the 1979 Constitution), police may arrest and detain
    persons for 24 hours before charging them with an offense. The law
    requires an arresting officer to inform the accused of charges at the
    time of arrest and to take the accused persons to a station for
    processing within a reasonable amount of time. By law police must
    provide suspects with the opportunity to engage counsel and post bail.
    However, police generally did not adhere to legally mandated
    procedures. Suspects routinely were detained without being informed of
    the charges, denied access to counsel and family members, and denied
    the opportunity to post bail for bailable offenses. There was no
    functioning system of bail, so many suspects were held in investigative
    detention. Numerous suspects alleged that police demanded payment
    before they were taken to court to have their cases heard. If family
    members attend court proceedings, an additional payment is demanded by
    police.
        The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights reports that 302 OPC
    members were arrested in January following clashes with the police in
    Lagos. Of those detainees, 95 were released during the year. The
    remaining detainees were not been able to obtain legal representation
    and either could not make bail or were not eligible for bail due to the
    charges brought against them.
        In March and April, police operations on Ogoniland, Rivers State
    resulted in the killing of several civilians, the destruction of
    buildings, and the arrest of several Ogoni activists (see Section
    1.a.).
        In May, alleged perpetrators of rioting between Christians and
    Muslims in Kaduna state were detained, but eventually were released
    without standing trial (see Section 5).
        Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem. According to
    the Constitution, persons charged with offenses have the right to an
    expeditious trial; however, in practice this right was not respected
    (see Section 1.c.). Serious backlogs, endemic corruption, and undue
    political influence continued to hamper the judicial system (see
    Section 1.e.). Estimates of the percentage of pretrial detainees held
    without charge in the prison population range from 33 to 65 percent of
    the estimated 44-47,000 detainees (see Section 1.c.). Many prisons held
    200 to 300 percent more persons than they were designed to hold, and
    many of the pretrial detainees held without charge had been detained
    for periods far longer than the maximum allowable sentence for the
    crimes for which they were being held. Police cited their inability to
    securely transport detainees to trial on their scheduled trial dates as
    one reason why so many of the detainees were denied a trial.
        Persons who happen to be in the vicinity of a crime when it is
    committed normally are held for interrogation for periods ranging from
    a few hours to several months. After their release, those detained
    frequently are asked to return repeatedly for further questioning.
    Police and members of the NDLEA continued the practice of placing
    relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without criminal
    charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest, although this was
    done much less often than under the Abacha regime (see Section 1.f.).
    There were reports that Imo state prison officials work with some
    pretrial detainees to blackmail those who knowingly or unknowingly
    purchased stolen goods from the detainees. These persons, usually
    prominent individuals residing in larger cities such as Abuja and
    Lagos, are remanded to Imo state custody and told that they will be
    prosecuted also for the transfer of stolen goods; however, if they pay
    a bribe, they are released as is the pretrial detainee who colluded
    with the prison officials.
        On a number of occasions security forces beat and detained
    journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        Students in general are no longer singled out for arrest because of
    political activities; however, on October 1, police arrested two
    student leaders, Philip Suaib and Olusegun Oluwole, of the National
    Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) for disrupting Independence Day
    activities. The students claim that they were only passing out
    pamphlets critical of the Government's education policy. The two
    students were released from custody the following day without formal
    charge. Many students have been detained for allegedly taking part in
    cult or criminal activities on university campuses.
        On March 23, police in Gombe arrested 19 reportedly peaceful
    persons for unlawful assembly (see Section 2.c.).
        There were unconfirmed reports that members of the armed forces
    beat and raped members of ethnic minorities.
        No information on political detainees emerged during the year.
        In July 1999 Abacha's presidential security officer who is widely
    believed to have orchestrated killings, torture, and hundreds of
    extrajudicial detentions brought suit against the Federal Government
    because he was detained without being charged with a crime (see Section
    1.a.). The suit later was dropped.
        Samaila Gwarzo, the national security advisor to Abacha, was placed
    under house arrest for 18 months without any charges being brought.
        The 1999 Constitution prohibits the expulsion of citizens, and the
    Government does not use forced exile. Many citizens who had lived
    abroad due to fear of persecution under previous military regimes
    continued to return to the country during the year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary remained
    subject to executive and legislative branch pressure, was influenced by
    political leaders at both the state and federal levels, and suffered
    from corruption and inefficiency. For example, all suspects arrested
    following the February violence in Kaduna were released allegedly on
    orders from the Government (see Section 2.c.). Understaffing,
    underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption continued to prevent the
    judiciary from functioning adequately. Citizens encountered long delays
    and frequent requests from judicial officials for small bribes.
        Under the Constitution, the regular court system is composed of
    federal and state trial courts, state appeals courts, the Federal Court
    of Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court. There also are Shari'a
    (Islamic) and customary (traditional) courts of appeal for each state
    and for the federal capital territory (Abuja). Courts of the first
    instance include magistrate or district courts, customary or
    traditional courts, Shari'a courts, and for some specified cases, the
    state high courts. The nature of the case usually determines which
    court has jurisdiction. In principle customary and Shari'a courts have
    jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree. However, in
    practice fear of legal costs, delays, and distance to alternative
    venues encouraged many litigants to choose the customary and Shari'a
    courts over the regular venues. Shari'a courts have begun to function
    in nine northern states and have carried out at least one sentence of
    amputation (see Section 1.c.). The proposed expansion of Shari'a law in
    Kaduna and other states led to widespread rioting and violence.
        Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of
    arraignment for most categories of crimes. Understaffing of the
    judiciary, inefficient administrative procedures, petty extortion,
    bureaucratic inertia, poor communication between police and prison
    officials, and inadequate transportation continued to result in
    considerable delays, often stretching to several years, in bringing
    suspects to trial (see Section 1.d.).
        Trials in the regular court system are public and generally respect
    constitutionally protected individual rights, including a presumption
    of innocence, the right to be present, to confront witnesses, to
    present evidence, and to be represented by legal counsel. However,
    there is a widespread perception that judges easily are bribed or
    ``settled,'' and that litigants cannot rely on the courts to render
    impartial judgements. Most prisoners are poor and cannot afford to pay
    the costs associated with moving their trials forward, and as a result
    they remain in prison. Wealthier defendants employ numerous delaying
    tactics and in many cases used financial inducements to persuade judges
    to grant numerous continuances. This, and similar practices, clogged
    the court calendar and prevented trials from starting.
        Some courts are understaffed. Judges frequently fail to appear for
    trials, often because they are pursuing other means of income. In
    addition court officials often lack the proper equipment, training, and
    motivation to perform their duties, again due in no small part to their
    inadequate compensation. For example, a Grand Khadi (judge) in the
    Sokoto state Shari'a court system was asked to resign because he had
    contracted to obtain new law books, which duplicated books already
    donated and in the court's possession, allegedly for personal gain.
        There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups from
    testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less weight;
    however, the testimony of women and non-Muslims is usually accorded
    less weight in Shari'a courts (see Section 5).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the
    Saro-Wiwa family continued to petition President Obasanjo, the Minister
    of Justice, and the Oputa Human Rights panel to reverse the verdict of
    the Auta Tribunal that convicted Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni-9 in October
    1995. At year's end, the Government had not responded to the 2 year old
    appeal to clear the names of Saro-wiwa and the Ogoni activists, who
    were executed by the regime of Sani Abacha in November 1995.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with
    privacy, family, home, or correspondence; however, although government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, authorities continued
    at times to infringe on these rights.
        Police and security forces continued the practice of placing
    relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without criminal
    charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest, although this was
    done much less frequently than under previous military regimes. There
    were calls by human rights groups for the police to end the practice.
        Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of members of the
    armed forces looting property, destroying buildings, and driving
    persons away from their homes.
        Although the expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply to
    Christians, the Christian minority, especially in Zamfara and Sokoto
    states, was subjected to many of the social provisions of the law, such
    as the separation of the sexes in public transportation vehicles (a law
    that was repealed after only 2 weeks), and in health facilities, the
    segregation by gender of school children, and bans on the selling of
    alcohol (see Section 2.c.).
        Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights; however, there were problems in some areas.
        Although there is a large and vibrant private domestic press that
    is frequently critical of the Government, the Government also owns or
    controls many publications.
        On May 26, 1999, in the last days of Abubakar regime, Decree 60 was
    signed into law and created the Nigerian Press Council which was
    charged with the enforcement of professional ethics and the sanctioning
    of journalists who violated these ethics. The Nigerian Press Council
    immediately was criticized by the media as ``an undisguised instrument
    of censorship and an unacceptable interference with the freedom of the
    press.'' Decree 60 attempted to put control of the practice of
    journalism into the hands of a body of journalists who were appointed
    by and received payment from the Government. In 1999 the NUJ, the
    professional association of all Nigerian journalists, and the Newspaper
    Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) rejected the creation of the
    Press Council. The NPAN called the decree unconstitutional and a
    violation of press freedom, because there were already enough laws
    concerning the operation of the press. The decree, which virtually made
    members of the council employees of the Government, also contained a
    number of provisions inimical to the operation of a free press. Among
    other provisions, Decree 60 gave the Press Council the power to
    accredit and register journalists and the power to suspend journalists
    from practicing. Decree 60 required that publications be registered by
    the council annually through a system entitled ``Documentation of
    Newspapers.'' In applying for registration, publishers were expected to
    submit their mission statements and objectives and could be denied
    registration if their objectives failed to satisfy the Council. The
    penalties for practicing without meeting the Council's standards were a
    fine of $2,500 (250,000 naira) or imprisonment for a term not to exceed
    3 years. The decree also empowered the Council to approve a code of
    professional and ethical conduct to guide the press and to ensure
    compliance by journalists. Under the decree, publishers were expected
    to send a report of the performance of their publications to the
    Council; failure to do so was an offense that carried a fine of $1,000
    (100,000 naira). The Nigerian Press Council continued after Obasanjo's
    inauguration, and in 1999 former Minister of Information Dapo Sarumi
    expressed the view of the new civilian Government that the council
    would continue to operate, and said, ``It is in line with journalists'
    demands.'' The council had not yet begun operating at year's end;
    however, it remained on the books in principle, and many journalists
    believe that the existence of such a decree is a significant limitation
    on freedom of the press.
        During the year there were a few cases of threats against and
    attacks on the press. In January police beat, arrested and detained
    Igha Oghole, a journalist with Radio Benue, Makurdi, after he insisted
    on conducting a scheduled interview with the police commissioner rather
    than interviewing his subordinate.
        In March 50 armed policemen entered the International Press Center
    (IPC) in Ogba, Lagos and arrested 4 journalists who they held for 5
    hours and then released without charge. The police subsequently claimed
    that the attack was not directed at journalists but was to find members
    of a militant faction of the OPC, who had engaged in battles with the
    police (see Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 1.d.). The police claimed that they
    were acting on information that militant members of the OPC were
    planning to address a press conference at the center.
        In March members of the NPF seized most of the print run of the
    March 4 edition of the Kaduna-based newspaper Today as well as its
    Hausa language affiliate newspaper, Ayaqu, and sealed off their
    offices. The police justified their action on the grounds that the
    publications carried headlines that could have engendered violence in
    the Shari'a dispute (see Section 2.c.).
        On April 4, an armed detachment of SSS sealed off for several hours
    the premises of Leaders and Company, the publishers of This Day
    newspaper in order to search the grounds for what the Government
    described as ``subversive and incriminating documents'' and to arrest
    the editor-in-chief, Nduka Obaigbena. Obaigbena was not on the premises
    at the time and was not arrested. The charges against him were dropped
    1 week later, but Obaigbena was told to cease investigations of
    Obasanjo's national security adviser, Aliyu Gusau (see Section 1.d.).
    In August police and security agents again sealed off the premises of
    This Day newspaper and ordered the staff to leave the premises.
        State governments also have threatened and detained journalists who
    have criticized their policies. According to the country's Media Rights
    Agenda, since May 1999 there were nine cases of arrests and detentions
    of journalists and vendors; state security personnel were the
    perpetrators in all of these incidents. In March Ebonyi state police
    detained two journalists with the Ebonyi Times, Emmanuel Okike-ogah and
    Ogbonaya Okorie, for publishing what the State Government described as
    ``seditious articles in an unregistered newspaper.'' The articles
    claimed that the governor of Ebonyi State had bribed state legislators
    into approving a list of commissioners. Also in March, police in Aba,
    Abia state, arrested and detained Ademola Adegbamigbe of The News
    magazine, and a professional photographer who Adegbamigbe had hired to
    assist him, while covering the civil violence following the
    introduction of Shari'a law in the north (see Section 2.c.). On March 2
    in Kaduna state, police raided the offices of the Nigerian Tribune in
    Ibadan after the publication of an article on Islamic law, and Zamfara
    state seized copies of the Nigerian Tribune, the Guardian, and Vanguard
    after they published articles critical on Shari'a law (see Section
    2.c.).
        In January Abuja FCT police accompanied Yusuf Mamman, an Alliance
    for Democracy (AD) faction leader, to the AD headquarters in Abuja to
    prevent a rival faction leader, Adamu Song, from holding a press
    conference. Police attempted to seize the videocamera of an Africa
    Independence Television cameraman and the digital camera of a This Day
    newspaperman. Mamman asked police to arrest Song for ``invading'' AD
    offices; however, they failed to do so following the press conference.
    Police routinely are involved in political disputes under the guise of
    breach of the peace or assault. Nothing was ever done about the
    potentially improper use of the police in this case.
        There are two national, government-owned daily newspapers in
    English, the New Nigerian and the Daily Times. The New Nigerian
    publishes an additional Hausa edition. Several states own daily or
    weekly newspapers that also are published in English. They tend to be
    poorly produced, have limited circulation, and require large state
    subsidies to continue operating. Several private newspapers and
    magazines have begun publication since the inauguration of the civilian
    government. Five major daily newspapers, one newsmagazine, and several
    sensational evening newspapers and tabloid publications had begun
    publication at year's end.
        Because newspapers and television are relatively expensive and
    literacy is not universal, radio remains the most important medium of
    mass communication and information. There is a national radio
    broadcaster, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, which broadcasts
    in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and other languages. Fifty-one state
    radio stations broadcast in English and local languages. For many
    years, the Government prohibited nationwide private radio broadcasting,
    but the Abacha regime granted broadcasting rights to local and regional
    private radio stations in 1994. There were six private radio stations
    operating at the beginning of the year. Several of these stations
    continue to struggle with financial difficulties, including Raypower
    FM, which ceased operations in September. No new private radio licenses
    were issued during the year by the National Broadcasting Commission
    (NBC), the body responsible for the deregulation and monitoring of the
    broadcast media. Ten applications pending from 1999 were still awaiting
    NBC approval at year's end.
        The National Television Station, NTA, is federally owned, while 30
    states also operate television stations. There are nine privately owned
    television stations that broadcast domestic news and political
    commentary. There are two private satellite television services. The
    1993 Press Law requires local television stations to limit programming
    from other countries to 40 percent. The 1993 Press Law also restricts
    the foreign content of satellite broadcasting to 20 percent, but the
    Government does not restrict access to, or reception of, international
    cable or satellite television. The Government did not restrict Internet
    access, although unreliable and costly digital telephone service
    limited access and hindered service providers. All Internet service
    providers were privately owned.
        In October 1999, the NBC, in cooperation with the Information
    Ministry, revoked the licenses of 20 private radio and television
    broadcasters for nonpayment of license fees. The Director General of
    NBC cited Decree 38 of 1992, which mandates the commission to revoke a
    license where the prescribed fee was not paid on the due date. Several
    major domestic broadcasters as well as affiliates of international
    broadcasters such as Voice of America and the British Broadcasting
    Corporation were among those affected. They were reported to owe a
    total of $745,000 (70 million naira). All 20 of the broadcasters paid
    the delinquent fees and continued broadcasting.
        While private television and radio broadcasters remained
    economically viable on advertising revenues alone, despite the
    restrictions that the Government imposed on them, governmentsponsored
    broadcasters complained that government funding and advertising were
    inadequate for their needs.
        Journalists and editors of state media reportedly no longer fear
    suspension for their editorial decisions, although some selfcensorship
    lingered. State broadcasters and journalists remain important tools for
    civilian governors; these officials use the state-owned media to
    showcase the state's accomplishments and to stress the extent to which
    their states are in political accord with the Government.
        Since the May 1999 elections, foreign journalists who sought to
    enter the country to cover political developments generally have been
    able to obtain visas, and many of the obstacles that previously
    frustrated foreign journalists were removed. Officials within the
    Ministry of Information became more accommodating to requests from
    foreign journalists.
        Throughout the Abacha regime there was no academic freedom for
    students or academic staff; however, under Obasanjo's government,
    concrete steps have been taken to address the problems in the education
    sector and to restore academic freedom. In May 1999, Obasanjo approved
    the establishment of four new private universities, but the quality of
    secondary education continued to deteriorate. However, student groups
    alleged that numerous strikes, inadequate facilities, and the rise of
    cultism (or gangs) on campuses continue to hamper educational progress.
    On several occasions during the year, protests by students resulted in
    harassment and arrest by police forces and in one incident, the killing
    of a student (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). For example, in October
    protests during the country's Independence Day celebrations resulted in
    the arrests of 2 students in Lagos (see Section 1.d.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1999
    Constitution provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; and
    the Government generally respected this right, although some limits
    remained.
        Throughout the year, the Government nominally required organizers
    of outdoor public functions to apply for permits, although both
    government authorities and those assembling often ignored this
    requirement. The Government retained legal provisions banning
    gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious content might lead to
    unrest. Open-air religious services away from places of worship
    remained prohibited in most states due to religious tensions in various
    parts of the country. For example, the Kogi state government banned
    open air preaching and public processions beginning on March 2, but it
    did so in consultation with a number of religious and traditional
    groups, and local governments. Also in March, the Kaduna state
    government banned processions, rallies, demonstrations, and meetings in
    public places in order to prevent repetition of the violence that
    followed the establishment of Shari'a law in February (see Sections
    1.a. and 2.c.).
        In late February, the Enugu police halted in mid-session a
    conference on the history of Biafra that was attended by many eastern-
    based ethnic groups, including those of Igbo, Ibibio, Oron, and Ikot
    Ebere ethnicity due to concerns that the conference could fuel to
    existing ethnic violence. On March 1, the Assistant Commissioner of
    Police, Francis Ihechere, was quoted in the Guardian newspaper as
    stating that the Government had prohibited gatherings of more than four
    persons. In March Gombe state announced that it had prosecuted and
    convicted 19 people for unlawful assembly during the Shari'a crisis.
    The police claimed that the assembly would lead to a breach of the
    peace and that they were protecting other citizen's constitutional
    rights to peace and security. The defendants were sentenced to either 6
    months'' imprisonment or a $10 (1,000 naira) fine. On September 3, the
    Lagos police denied a permit to the Committee of Concerned Citizens
    (CCC), a southern-based interest group comprised primarily of Christian
    elder statesmen, who wished to hold a 2-day workshop on the adoption of
    Shari'a law. Police claimed that they knew of plans to disrupt the
    meeting and were denying the permit to protect the committee and
    prospective workshop attendees.
        The Constitution provides for the right to associate freely with
    other persons in political parties, trade unions, or special interest
    associations, and the Government generally respected this right in
    practice; however, there were exceptions. In July Lagos state police
    used tear gas to disperse a demonstration by striking public sector
    workers. One person died from the violence (see Section 6.a.). On April
    13, Lagos State police prevented approximately 1,000 members of the
    Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra from
    staging a rally and raising the Biafran flag.
        c.Freedom of Religion
        The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including
    freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom to manifest and
    propagate one's religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and
    observance; however, the Government restricted these rights in practice
    in certain respects. The status of respect for religious freedom
    deteriorated during the year due to the implementation of an expanded
    version of Shari'a law in several northern states, which challenged
    constitutional protections for religious freedom and sparked
    interreligious violence.
        The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from
    adopting an official religion; however, it also provides that states
    may elect to use Islamic (Shari'a) customary law and courts. About half
    of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent Christian, and about 10
    percent practice traditional indigenous religion or no religion. Since
    independence, the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts has been limited to
    family or personal law cases involving Muslims, or to civil disputes
    between Muslims and non-Muslims who consent to the courts'
    jurisdiction. However, the Constitution states that a Shari'a court of
    appeal may exercise ``such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon
    it by the law of the State.'' Some states have interpreted this
    language as granting them the right to expand the jurisdiction of
    existing Shari'a courts to include criminal matters. Several Christians
    have alleged that, with the adoption of an expanded Shari'a law in
    several states and the continued use of state funds to fund the
    construction of mosques, teaching of Alkalis (Muslim judges), and
    pilgrimages to Mecca (Hajj), Islam has been adopted as the de facto
    state religion of several northern states. However, state funds also
    are used to fund Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In general states
    with a clear Christian or Muslim majority explicitly favor the majority
    faith. The Constitution also provides that the Federal Government is to
    establish a Federal Shari'a Court of Appeal and Final Court of Appeal;
    however, the Government had not yet established such courts by year's
    end.
        The Government continued to enforce a ban on the existence of
    religious organizations on campuses of primary schools, although
    individual students retain the right to practice their religion in
    recognized places of worship. Many states allow the teaching of Koranic
    or Biblical knowledge in primary and secondary schools; however, in
    almost all states with religious minorities, there are reports that
    students are forced to take classes that violate their religious
    principles. Islam is a mandatory part of the curriculum in public
    schools in Zamfara and other northern states, to the exclusion of
    Christianity. State authorities claim that students are permitted to
    decline to attend these classes or to request a teacher of their own
    religion to provide alternative instruction. In practice the dominant
    religion of the state is taught in the school, and students cannot use
    these other mechanisms. There are reports that Christianity is taught
    in the same manner in Enugu and Edo states, and that Muslim students
    cannot access Koranic teaching in the public schools.
        The law prohibits religious discrimination; however, reports were
    common that government officials discriminated against persons
    practicing a religion different from their own, notably in hiring or
    awarding contracts. Christians in the northern, predominantly Muslim
    part of the country accused local government officials of attempting to
    use zoning regulations to stop or slow the establishment of non-Muslim,
    usually Christian, churches. Typically, a small section of a city was
    unofficially segregated for nonMuslims to build their places of
    worship. In several cases, citizens in these enclaves reported that
    they were discriminated against by not receiving police protection or
    waste removal services.
        Purdah continued in parts of the country leading to continued
    restrictions on the freedom of movement of women (see Section 5).
        In October 1999, the governor of Zamfara state signed into law two
    bills aimed at instituting Islamic Shari'a law in his state.
    Implementation of the law began on January 22. Zamfara's law adopted
    traditional Shari'a in its entirety, with the exception that apostasy
    was not criminalized. Following Zamfara's lead, several northern states
    began to implement varying forms of expanded Shari'a; by year's end 9
    states had adopted variations of Shari'a law `` Sokoto, Niger, Kano,
    Kebbi, Jigawa, Yobe, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna states. Previously,
    Shari'a law had been practiced in the north in the areas of personal
    law, only if both litigants agreed to settle their disputes in Shari'a
    courts. Elements of Shari'a also had been present in the northern penal
    code, which had been applicable in the north since independence.
        As the result of nationwide violence in February and March related
    to the expansion of Shari'a laws (see Section 5), several northern
    state governments banned open air preaching and public religious
    processions. The Kogi state government enacted such a ban on March 1,
    and the Kaduna State government followed shortly thereafter, enacting a
    ban on all forms of ``processions, rallies, demonstrations, and
    meetings in public places.'' On March 23, Gombe state officials
    arrested 19 reportedly peaceful persons for ``unlawful assembly capable
    of causing a breach of peace in the state.'' Such bans were viewed as
    necessary public safety measures after the death of approximately 1,500
    persons. However, large outdoor religious gatherings continued to be
    quite common, especially in the southern part of the country.
        On February 29, in response to the nationwide violence (see Section
    5), President Obasanjo convened a meeting of the Nigerian Council of
    State, a consultative body consisting of the President and Vice
    President, all past heads of state and past chief justices, all
    governors, the Attorney General, and the President of the Senate and
    Speaker of the House. The result of the meeting was an agreement that
    northern governors would halt initiatives to expand Shari'a laws and
    return to the northern Nigerian Penal Code; however, a few states
    continued to expand their Shari'a laws. Niger state declared that it
    would expand Shari'a laws on the same day as the Council of State
    meeting, and the amputation of the cow thief's right hand in Zamfara
    state occurred on March 23 (see Section 1.c.).
        Although the expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply to
    Christians, the Christian minority, especially in Zamfara state, was
    subjected to many of the social provisions of the law, such as the
    separation of the sexes in public transportation vehicles (a law that
    was repealed after only 2 weeks) and bans on the selling of alcohol.
    Niger State also enforced a ban on selling alcohol. However, the
    federal Government has disregarded the ban on alcohol sales in military
    installations. All Muslims were subjected to the new Shari'a provisions
    in the states that enacted them, which, according to many legal
    scholars, constitute an abridgement of their freedom of religion and
    conscience. The implementation of Shari'a law has been challenged
    constitutionally. For example, in May an international human rights
    nongovernmental organization (NGO), Huri-Laws, took the Zamfara state
    government to court, challenging the constitutionality of Zamfara's
    expanded Shari'a penal code. The case was ongoing at year's end. No
    other cases had reached the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Shari'a
    courts have begun to execute sentences of amputation, at least in
    Zamfara state (see Section 1.c.).
        In September, Lagos police denied the CCC a permit to hold a
    workshop on the adoption of Shari'a law (see Section 2.b.).
        Although distribution of religious publications remained generally
    unrestricted, the Government continued to enforce lightly a ban on
    published religious advertisements. There were reports by Christians in
    Zamfara State that the state government restricted the distribution of
    religious (Christian) literature. The Right Reverend Samson Bala, First
    Bishop of Zamfara, Gusau diocese, said that the state radio station had
    ``closed its doors to Christians.'' Commercials and paid advertisements
    containing Christian literature are not accepted, he said, and only
    Islamic religious programs are aired.
        Following violence in relation to the expansion of Shari'a laws in
    Kaduna in February, several northern state governments banned any type
    of proselytizing, in spite of the fact that it is permitted by the
    Constitution. Missionaries reported that law enforcement officials
    harassed them when they proselytized outside of majority Christian
    neighborhoods. Proselytizing did not appear to be restricted in the
    southern part of the country.
        The Federal Government continued to settle property claims by
    Muslim Brotherhood leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky for compensation for his
    home and mosque, which were razed by law enforcement in 1997. All 96 of
    the Muslim Brotherhood followers jailed under the previous regime were
    released during the year.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution entitles citizens to
    move freely throughout the country and reside where they wish, and in
    general, the Government respected this right; however, police
    occasionally restricted this right by setting up roadblocks and
    checkpoints where security and law enforcement officials routinely
    engaged in extortion, violence, and excessive use of force (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). For example, the Governor of Niger State
    allegedly instructed state police on March 1 to install roadblocks to
    prevent southerners from returning to their homes. The southerners,
    particularly Igbo traders, were attempting to return home because they
    feared violent reprisals in response to the deaths of Hausas in Aba and
    Owerri (see Section 1.a.).
        Clashes between the Ife and Modakeke ethnic groups resulted in a
    dusk-to-dawn curfew following the deaths of as many as 50 persons (see
    Sections 1.a. and 5). In June youths set up roadblocks outside of the
    Osun state town of Ife and killed passengers who were not members of
    the same ethnic group (see Section 1.a.).
        The Constitution also prohibits the denial of exit or entry to any
    citizen, and the Government generally respected this law; however, the
    law also provides that women are required to obtain permission from a
    male family member before having an application for a passport
    processed. Some men take their wives' and children's passports and
    other identification documents with them while traveling abroad to
    prevent their family from leaving the country (see Section 5).
        Prominent human rights and prodemocracy activists who fled the
    country during the regime of General Sani Abacha continued to return to
    the country as did many economic refugees. There were no reports that
    the Government denied passports to political figures or journalists or
    interrogated citizens who were issued visas to foreign countries;
    however, there have been sporadic reports that persons still were
    questioned upon entry or exit to the country at Murtala Muhammed
    international airport. These persons, all of whom were opponents of the
    Abacha regime, were identified in immigration computer systems as
    individuals to be questioned by immigration or security officers. For
    example, Dr. Olua Kamalu, deputy president of MOSOP, reported that the
    SSS seized his passport on July 25. Dr. Kamalu was planning a trip to
    Ghana to attend a visa interview at a foreign embassy.
        During periods of civil unrest, numerous persons were displaced
    temporarily from their villages. Thousands of persons, both Christian
    and Muslim, were displaced internally following the Kaduna riots in
    February and in May. A large number of Muslim families left the city of
    Onitsha due to continued ethnic and religious tension in nearby Aba,
    Abia State. Hundreds of persons voluntarily left other states
    throughout the country in anticipation of violent reprisals following
    interfaith and interethnic clashes in Kaduna and Onitsha (see Section
    2.c.). Typically, only the head of household returned to areas of
    unrest after authorities regained control. Most returnees remained
    apprehensive about continuing to work in these areas and returned only
    to finish business contracts or to sell their homes in order to arrange
    a more organized departure.
        A few hundred residents of the Odi village, razed by soldiers in
    1999, have returned to the area; however the federal Government has not
    provided them with assistance to reconstruct their village (see Section
    1.a.).
        The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee and asylum
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated
    with the Lagos office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies in assisting refugees through
    the National Commission for Refugees and its Federal Commissioner. The
    Eligibility Committee established under Decree 52 of 1989, which
    governs the granting of refugee status, asylum, and resettlement,
    reviews refugee and resettlement applications. A representative from
    the UNHCR participates in this committee. The issue of the provision of
    first asylum has not arisen since the establishment of the National
    Commission for Refugees under Decree 52.
        At year's end, there were 6,933 recognized refugees: 13 from
    Angola; 23 from Benin; 4 from Cameroon; 1,703 from Sierra Leone; 3,194
    from Chad; 74 from Sudan; 1,561 from Liberia; 69 from Cote d'Ivoire;
    and 292 from other countries. The Government also resettled in the
    country 3 Cameroonians, 3 Chadians, 5 Sudanese, 13 Liberians, and 17
    persons from other countries.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.
        Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
    Change Their Government
        In 1998 and 1999 citizens had the opportunity to exercise their
    right to change their government. General Abdulsalami Abubakar oversaw
    a transition to civilian rule that included elections for local
    governments (in December 1998), state governors and assemblies (in
    January 1999), and national legislators and the president (in February
    1999). Voter apathy and widespread fraud marred the legislative
    elections; however, the turnout increased for the presidential race,
    which proceeded peacefully with reports of only a few violent
    incidents. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
    certified former President Olusegun Obasanjo's victory over Chief Olu
    Falae with a reported 62 percent of the votes.
        Irregularities occurred at each stage of the electoral process,
    particularly the presidential nominating convention and election where,
    for example, large sums of money were offered by both political camps
    to delegates to vote against political opponents. During the
    presidential election, international observers and foreign diplomats
    witnessed serious irregularities in procedures. All three parties
    engaged in the local purchase of false ballots and fraudulent tally
    sheets so that there were vast discrepancies between what observers saw
    and inflated tallies in some areas. In addition there were
    administrative problems such as late delivery of voting materials at a
    large number of polling stations. Those areas with the worst problems
    were the southern tier of states in the Niger Delta region, several
    states in Igboland, and a handful of north central states. The
    production of ``ghost votes'' in these states amounted to as much as 70
    or 80 percent of the total reported votes. Although all parties engaged
    in attempts to rig the vote, the PDP machine in the Delta and Igboland
    was responsible for the worst excesses. These votes may have added an
    estimated 15 percent to Obasanjo's total figure; however, observers
    believe that even if they were thrown out, he still would have
    maintained roughly a 15 percent lead over Falae's total. International
    observers confirmed the results and stated that, despite widespread
    fraud, Obasanjo's victory reflected the will of most voters. Although
    Falae initially protested the election results, eventually he dropped
    his legal challenge. INEC issued a report on the conduct of the
    election in July 1999 that documented the fraud. Obasanjo, 109
    senators, 360 members of the House of the National Assembly, and 36
    governors and state assemblies assumed office on May 29, 1999. The
    President, Vice President, and other national and state officials serve
    4-year terms. The next state and national elections are scheduled for
    2003, while local government elections are scheduled for 2002. INEC is
    working with several international electoral assistance organizations
    to help improve the process in 2003; however, no INEC officials have
    faced disciplinary action as result of their involvement in corrupt
    activities in the 1999 election.
        The Constitution outlaws the seizure of the government by force and
    contains provisions for the removal of the President, Vice President,
    ministers, legislators, and state government officials for gross
    misconduct or medical reasons. In November 1999, Senate President Evan
    Enwerem was removed after another credentials scandal. His replacement,
    Chuba Okadigbo, was removed in August after an internal Senate
    investigation on contracting procedures resulted in his indictment.
    Several other public officials were subjected to close scrutiny by the
    press, public, and legislative investigators.
        The political system remains in transition. The three branches of
    the new government acted independently during the Administration's
    first year in office. Despite his party's substantial majority in the
    legislature, the President was not able to exercise authority without
    legislative oversight and inclusiveness. The Senate and the House of
    Representatives took the screening of government ministers,
    ambassadorial appointments, budget review, and other executive
    initiatives seriously and amended the Government's budget request,
    anticorruption commission bill, and various personnel procedures. They
    also rejected several ministerial and ambassadorial appointments.
    Obasanjo created several commissions to investigate past government
    contracts and human rights abuses, which were overwhelmed with
    applications to present evidence of wrongdoing (see Section 4).
    However, the judicial branch remained weakened by years of neglect and
    politicization.
        Abubakar's military Government, which consulted with a selected
    group of constitutional and legal experts around the country to revise
    the 1979 and 1995 Constitutions, promulgated the 1999 Constitution on
    May 5, 1999. The constitution-writing process was criticized for not
    being open to enough participants and for not being subjected to wider
    debate on the country's federal structure, revenue allocation and
    power-sharing formulas, and minority ethnic groups' rights. Complaints
    about the Constitution persisted and there were continued calls for a
    national conference, mainly from the southwest.
        Although the Constitution allows the free formation of political
    parties, only three parties were registered with the INEC. The
    Constitution requires parties to have membership in two-thirds of the
    country's 36 states. In anticipation of the 2003 election INEC began
    preparing a draft electoral law for the National Assembly to consider
    in the next legislative session. Public forums were held during the
    year in all 36 states and the federal capital territory of Abuja to
    solicit citizens'' views on the draft law. Over 10,000 citizens
    participated in these public fora; however, the draft law was not
    subject to much public debate outside of this exercise. The new law is
    designed to specify the requirements of party formation and
    registration.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    there were no legal impediments to political participation or voting by
    women. Men continued to dominate the political arena. NGO's continued
    to protest the underrepresentation of women in the political process,
    and women were underrepresented in the new civilian government. Only 6
    women were appointed as ministers out of a total of 56 positions. There
    were 3 women among the Senate's 109 members, and only 12 women were
    elected to the 360-member House of Representatives. Women's rights
    groups pushed local, state, and the Federal Government (and local
    levels as well) to adopt a 30 percent affirmative action program;
    however, these efforts were unsuccessful.
        There are no legal impediments to participation in government by
    members of any ethnic group. The Constitution requires that government
    appointments reflect the country's ``federal character.'' However,
    there are more than 250 ethnic groups, and it is difficult to insure
    representation of every group in the Government. The federal- and
    state-level ministers generally are selected to represent the country's
    regional, ethnic, and religious makeup. President Obasanjo attempted to
    create an ethnically inclusive Government. The 56-member Cabinet and
    109 ambassadorial slots were allocated to an equal number of candidates
    from each state to achieve a regional balance. Despite this effort,
    northerners and southeasterners criticized the Government for favoring
    westerners or ethnic Yorubas, while the southwesterners criticized the
    Government for relying too heavily on northern and southeastern
    appointments.
        Middle-belt and Christian officers dominate the military hierarchy.
    In June 1999, Obasanjo retired all military officers who held political
    office, which meant that a disproportionate number of northern Hausa
    officers--who dominated the upper ranks under the previous military
    regimes--left the service.
        Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
    Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
        The Government permitted local human rights groups to operate and
    did not interfere with their activities; nor did it detain, intimidate,
    or harass their members. Criticisms of the Government's past human
    rights record were abundant in various media. High-level government
    officials noted that the human rights community assisted in the
    advancement of democracy. In June President Obasanjo, along with a
    number of cabinet members and National Assembly members, met with a
    number of prominent human rights representatives for discussions.
        The Catholic Secretariat, a local sectarian interest group,
    continued to hold a monthly open forum in Lagos on various subjects
    relating to past and present human rights issues. Discussion panels
    have included a number of NGO's, media, and religious leaders. Each
    session ended with recommendations to the Government on how best to
    resolve these issues. The Government had not responded to any of these
    recommendations at year's end.
        The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is active, with
    offices in Abuja and Lagos under the direction of a regional delegate.
    Its primary human rights activities during the year involved the
    training of prison officials on human rights, sanitation, and prisoner
    health.
        The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established by
    Decree 22 in 1995 and tasked with monitoring and protecting human
    rights in the country, enjoyed greater recognition by and coordination
    with NGO's, and was moving slowly toward establishing its credibility
    as an independent monitoring body. The NHRC is chaired by retired
    Justice Uche Omo and includes 15 other members. The NHRC is represented
    in some states by state-level affiliates. The NHRC is supposed to work
    closely with NGO's that are devoted to human rights issues. Since its
    inception, the NHRC has been denied adequate funding to do its job
    properly. At year's end, the NHRC had created a strategic work plan
    through 2002, and was in the process of developing a national action
    plan to be deposited with the UNCHR.
        The HRVIP, commonly known as the Oputa panel, is a one-time panel
    that was established in June 1999 by President Obasanjo to investigate
    human rights abuses dating to 1966 and the time of the first military
    coup. The Oputa panel can recommend courses of action to the justice
    system for perpetrators of past abuses, something the NHRC does not do.
    According to Justice Oputa, the chair, the panel's primary goal is to
    provide the country with a systematic examination of past human rights
    abuses to develop a national consensus on the boundaries of acceptable
    behavior by government entities as well as individuals. The panel will
    hear individual cases to establish patterns of abuses. The most common
    cases involved allegations of unlawful arrest, detention, and torture.
    The panel will also hear cases in which the rights of groups were
    violated. On October 23, the commission began a series of public
    hearings across the country to investigate the claims of over 10,000
    petitioners.
        Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
    Language, or Social Status
        The 1999 Constitution provides citizens with the right to freedom
    from discrimination based on ``community, place of origin, ethnic
    group, sex, religion, or political opinion.'' However, customary and
    religious discrimination against women persisted, occasional religious
    violence was a problem, social discrimination on the basis of both
    religion and ethnicity remained widespread, and ethnic and regional
    tensions continued to contribute to serious violence both between
    groups of citizens and between citizens and the security forces.
        Women.--Reports of spousal abuse are common, especially those of
    wife beating. Police normally do not intervene in domestic disputes,
    which seldom are discussed publicly. The Penal Code permits husbands to
    use physical means to chastise their wives as long as it does not
    result in ``grievous harm,'' which is defined as loss of sight,
    hearing, power of speech, facial disfigurement, or other life
    threatening injuries. A women's rights group has estimated that spousal
    abuse occurs in 20 percent of adult relationships. In more traditional
    areas of the country, courts and police are reluctant to intervene to
    protect women who accuse their husbands formally if the level of
    alleged abuse does not exceed customary norms in the areas. Rape and
    sexual harassment continue to be problems. Prostitution is rampant,
    particularly in urban areas. A number of states, including most
    northern states which have begun the enforcement of Shari'a law, have
    begun to enforce existing laws or to introduce new laws to combat
    prostitution. Katsina, Jigawa, and Edo states have recently
    criminalized prostitution but it is not illegal in Lagos State;
    however, authorities can use statutes that outlaw pandering as a
    justification for arresting prostitutes (See Section 6.c). The adoption
    of Shari'a-based legal systems by northern states has led to the strong
    enforcement of laws against prostitution for both adults and children
    (see Section 2.c.). Southern states, like Edo, also are criminalizing
    prostitution and raising the legal age for marriage from 16 to 18.
    There is an active market for trafficking in women to Europe, and
    elsewhere (see Section 6.f.). In some parts of the country, women
    continue to be harassed for social and religious reasons. Purdah, the
    Islamic practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion from men
    outside the family, continued in parts of the far north.
        Women experience considerable discrimination as well as physical
    abuse. There are no laws barring women from particular fields of
    employment; however women often experience discrimination because the
    Government tolerates customary and religious practices that adversely
    affect them. The Nigerian NGO's Coalition expressed concern about
    continued discrimination against women in the private sector,
    particularly in access to employment, promotion to higher professional
    positions, and in salary inequality. There are credible reports that
    several businesses operate with a ``get pregnant, get fired'' policy.
    Women remain underrepresented in the formal sector but play an active
    and vital role in the country's important informal economy. While the
    number of women employed in the business sector increases every year,
    women do not receive equal pay for equal work and often find it
    extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or to obtain tax
    deductions or rebates as heads of households. Unmarried women in
    particular endure many forms of discrimination.
        While some women have made considerable individual progress, both
    in the academic and business world, women remain underprivileged.
    Although women are not barred legally from owning land, under some
    customary land tenure systems only men can own land, and women can gain
    access to land only through marriage or family. In addition many
    customary practices do not recognize a women's right to inherit her
    husband's property, and many widows were rendered destitute when their
    in-laws take virtually all of the deceased husband's property. Widows
    are subjected to unfavorable conditions as a result of discriminatory
    traditional customs and economic deprivation. ``Confinement'' is the
    most common rite of deprivation to which widows are subjected, and it
    occurs predominately in eastern Nigeria. Confined widows are under
    restrictions for as long as 1 year and usually are required to shave
    their heads and dress in black garments. In other areas, a widow is
    considered a part of her husband's property, to be ``inherited'' by his
    family. Polygyny continues to be practiced widely among all ethnic
    groups and among Christians as well as Muslims and practitioners of
    traditional persuasions. Women are required by law to obtain permission
    from a male family member to get a passport (see Section 2.d.). The
    testimony of women is not equal to that of men in Shari'a courts. If
    one woman testifies, a second woman must also to provide testimony to
    equal the weight of the testimony of one man.
        A number of states--Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Jigawa, Sokoto, Kano,
    and Yobe--have adopted Islamic (Shari'a) law in varying degrees. In
    Zamfara state, local governments are instituting laws that will require
    the separation of Muslim men and women in transportation, health care,
    and primary educational services (see Section 2.c.). Separate
    transportation and health facilities for men and women already had
    begun to be implemented. A woman was pulled from a motorcycle and
    injured by vigilantes for breaking the new rule requiring separate
    transportation for women in a local government area of Zamfara State.
    The woman was not a Muslim. In September an unmarried 17-year-old woman
    was sentenced to 180 lashes for fornication and false testimony (see
    Section 1.c.).
        A national network of women's rights NGO's described the
    Government's 1998 report on the implementation of the Convention on the
    Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for
    the period 1986-94 as ``inaccurate'' in its positive portrayal of the
    status of women. The NGO Coalition for a Shadow Report on the
    Implementation of CEDAW (NGO CEDAW Coalition) issued its alternative
    report in March 1999, which was critical of the Government's failure to
    remove legal impediments and social discrimination faced by women.
    During the year, there reportedly was not much progress made to rectify
    the problems described in the NGO report.
        Children.--Public schools continued to be inadequate, and limited
    facilities precluded access to education for many children. The
    Constitution's general provisions call for the Government, ``when
    practical,'' to provide free, compulsory, and universal primary
    education; however, despite the President's commitment to compulsory
    education, compulsory primary education rarely was provided,
    particularly in the north (see Section 6.d.). Girls are discriminated
    against in access to education for social and economic reasons. The
    literacy rate for males is 58 percent but only 41 percent for females.
    Rural girls are even more disadvantaged than their urban counterparts.
    Only 42 percent of rural girls are enrolled in school compared with 72
    percent of urban girls. In the north, Muslim communities favor boys
    over girls in deciding which children to enroll in secondary and
    elementary schools. In the south, economic hardship also restricts many
    families' ability to send girls to school and, instead, they are
    directed into commercial activities such as trading and street vending.
    While the Government increased spending on children's health in recent
    years, it seldom enforced even the inadequate laws designed to protect
    the rights of children.
        Cases of child abuse, abandoned infants, child prostitution, and
    physically harmful child labor practices remained common throughout the
    country (see Sections 6.c and 6.d.). Although the law stipulates that
    ``no child shall be ordered to be imprisoned,'' juvenile offenders are
    incarcerated routinely along with adult criminals. The Government only
    occasionally criticized child abuse and neglect, and it made little
    effort to stop customary practices harmful to children, such as the
    sale of young girls into marriage (see Section 6.f.). There were
    credible reports that poor families sell their daughters into marriage
    as a means of supplementing their income. Young girls often are forced
    into marriage as soon as they reach puberty, regardless of age, in
    order to prevent the ``indecency'' associated with premarital sex.
        A number of states have adopted Islamic (Shari'a) law in varying
    degrees. While most schools in the north traditionally have separated
    children by gender, it is now required by law in Zamfara, Sokoto, and
    Kebbi state schools (see Section 2.c.).
        There was evidence of trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
        The Government publicly opposes Female Genital Mutilation (FGM),
    which is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging
    to both physical and psychological health; however, it has taken no
    legal action to curb the practice. There are no federal laws banning
    FGM. Because of the considerable problems that anti-FGM groups faced at
    the federal level, most are refocusing their energies to combat FGM at
    the state and local government area (LGA) level. Edo State banned FGM
    in October. Ogun, Cross River, Osun, Rivers, and Bayelsa states banned
    FGM during the year. However, the punishments imposed are minimal, in
    Edo state the punishment is a $10.00 (1,000 Naira) fine and 6 months
    imprisonment. In addition once a state legislature criminalizes FGM,
    NGO's have found that they must convince the LGA authorities that state
    laws are applicable in their districts.
        The Women's Centre for Peace and Development (WOPED) estimated that
    at least 50 percent of women are mutilated. Studies conducted by the
    U.N. Development Systems and the World Health Organization estimated
    the FGM rate at approximately 60 percent among the nation's female
    population. However, according to local experts, the actual prevalence
    may be as high as 100 percent in some ethnic conclaves in the south.
    While practiced in all parts of the country, FGM is more predominant in
    the southern and eastern zones. Women from Northern states are less
    likely to be mutilated; however, those affected are more likely to
    undergo the severe type of FGM known as infibulation. WOPED believes
    that the practice is perpetuated because of a cultural belief that
    uncircumcised women are promiscuous, unclean, unsuitable for marriage,
    physically undesirable, or potential health risks to themselves and
    their children, especially during childbirth. The National Association
    of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives, The Nigerian Women's Association, and
    the Nigerian Medical Association worked to eradicate the practice and
    to train health care workers on the medical effects of FGM; however,
    contact with health care workers remains limited. Nevertheless, most
    observers agree that the number of females who are currently subjected
    to FGM is declining.
        Indigenous forms of FGM vary from the simple removal of the
    clitoral hood or labia minora to excision of the clitoris and the most
    dangerous form, infibulation. The age at which females are subjected to
    the practice varies from the first week of life until after a woman
    delivers her first child. The Ministry of Health, women's groups, and
    many NGO's sponsored public awareness projects to educate communities
    about the health hazards of FGM. The press repeatedly criticized the
    practice.
        People with Disabilities.--While the Government called for private
    business to institute policies that ensured fair treatment for the
    disabled, it did not enact any laws requiring greater accessibility to
    buildings or public transportation, nor did if formulate any policy
    specifically ensuring the right of the disabled to work.
        Religious Minorities.--The law prohibits religious discrimination;
    however private businesses frequently are guilty of informal religious
    discrimination in their hiring practices and purchasing patterns.
        Religious differences often correspond to regional and ethnic
    differences. For example, the northern region is overwhelmingly Muslim
    as are the large Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups of the region. Many
    southern ethnic groups are predominantly Christian. Consequently, at
    times it is difficult to distinguish religious discrimination and
    tension from ethnic and regional discrimination and tension, which are
    pervasive. Religious tensions underscored what were predominantly
    ethnic confrontations throughout the year.
        When Kaduna state announced plans to implement Shari'a law, the
    large Christian minority in the state protested on February 21, leading
    to several days of violent confrontations. Estimates of the number of
    persons killed range from 1,000 to 1,500; many churches and mosques
    were burned. Many Christians in the north, fearing continued violence,
    returned to their historic homelands in the southeast.
        On February 28, when the bodies of the victims from the Kaduna
    violence were returned home to the southeast, reciprocal violence
    erupted in Aba, Abia state, and, to a lesser extent, in the neighboring
    towns of Owerri, Imo state, and Onitsha, Anambra state. This violence
    was characterized by attacks on the minority Muslim Hausas by the
    majority Igbos. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from
    400 to 500. Many of the Hausas were victimized due to their ethnic
    identity rather than their religious beliefs.
        In addition to the violence related to the expansion of Shari'a law
    in Kaduna, Aba, Owerri, and Onitsha, there was civil unrest on March 7
    in Sokoto following a pro-Shari'a rally by university students.
    Although there were no confirmed deaths, at least one church was burned
    and two others were vandalized. Local Christians sought refuge in
    military barracks, but they returned to their homes once calm was
    restored.
        On March 27, at least one person was killed and several were
    injured in Borno State when a long-festering argument over the location
    of a church escalated into violence between Muslims and Christians. The
    church was burned down.
        On May 22 and 23, rioting erupted in Nayari, Kaduna state after
    Christian residents found the body of a person whom they believed to
    have been a Christian killed by Muslims. Christians retaliated against
    Muslims and almost completely destroyed all Muslim residences and
    businesses, causing most Muslim residents to flee. Press reports
    indicated that as many as 200 persons were killed, although this total
    could not be confirmed. The exact cause of the outbreak remains
    unclear, although some observers believe that the violence was
    organized and preplanned by Kaduna Christians in order to prevent
    Muslims from returning to the neighborhood to rebuild their community
    following the violence related to the expansion of Shari'a laws in
    February (see Section 2.c.). Some alleged perpetrators were detained,
    but eventually were released without standing trial.
        In September Christians attacked Muslims in the Bambam community in
    southern Gombe State. The attackers, protesting against the arrival of
    the state's Shari'a committee, killed 18 persons and burned a number of
    buildings including places of worship for both Muslims and Christians,
    businesses, and at least 20 residences.
        Sporadic incidents of attacks on individual religious leaders were
    reported, but the nature and perpetrators of the attacks varied (see
    Section 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
    about 120 million is ethnically diverse, and consists of more than 250
    groups, many of which speak distinct primary languages and are
    concentrated geographically. There is no majority ethnic group. The
    three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba
    of the southwest, and the Igbos of the southeast, together make up
    about two-thirds of the population. The Ijaw of the South Delta area,
    the fourth largest group, claim a population of 12 million, roughly the
    same as the Kanuri population in the far northeast and Tiv population
    in the south. Because of the lack of reliable statistics, it is
    difficult to determine the populations of the various ethnic groups.
        The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the Government.
    In addition the Constitution mandates that the composition of the
    federal, state, and local governments and their agencies, as well as
    the conduct of their affairs, reflect the diverse character of the
    country in order to promote national unity and loyalty. This provision
    was designed as a safeguard against domination of the Government by
    persons from a few states or ethnic and sectional groups. These
    provisions were included in response to previous domination of the
    Government and the armed forces by northerners and Muslims. The
    Government of Olusegun Obasanjo was an example of this diversity.
    Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the Vice President is a
    northerner, and the Senate President is an Igbo. The Government also
    attempted to balance key positions and deputy positions among the
    different regions and ethnic groups. For example, the Minister of
    Defense is from one of the middlebelt states, while his deputy is a
    southwestern Yoruba. The Senate used its oversight role to reject many
    of Obasanjo's ambassadorial appointments and insisted on three nominees
    from each state for each appointment. The political parties also
    engaged in ``zoning,'' the practice of rotating positions within the
    party among the different regions and ethnicities to ensure that each
    region and ethnicity is given adequate representation. Nonetheless,
    claims of marginalization by members of southern minority groups and
    Igbos continued. The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta, in particular,
    continued their calls for high-level representation on petroleum issues
    and within the security forces. Northern Muslims, who lost previously
    held positions within the military hierarchy, accused the Obasanjo
    Government of favoring southerners. Traditional linkages continued to
    impose considerable pressure on individual government officials to
    favor their own ethnic groups for important positions and patronage.
        Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is widely
    practiced by members of all ethnic groups and is evident in private
    sector hiring patterns, de facto ethnic segregation of urban
    neighborhoods, and a continuing paucity of marriages across major
    ethnic and regional lines. There is a long history of tension among the
    diverse ethnic groups (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
        Clashes between the Ife and the Modakeke ethnic groups, both
    composed of Yoruba speakers and located in Osun state, increased from
    March to May, prompting a dusk-to-dawn curfew following the deaths of
    as many as 50 persons and much property destruction. Youths from both
    sides reportedly stopped vehicles at roadblocks to determine the ethnic
    status of passengers and shot those not of the same ethnic background.
    In the east, over 150 persons were killed in border disputes between
    Cross River and Akwa Ibom states. A clash between rival groups for the
    throne of the Owo in Ondo state resulted in the deaths of at least five
    persons and the destruction of a number of homes and businesses,
    resulting in another dusk to dawn curfew. In all of these inter-
    religious and interethnic clashes, the police were accused of favoring
    sides based on their own religious or ethnic identity.
        The competing aspirations and tensions among the smaller ethnic
    groups related to the control and powers of subnational governments
    occasionally erupted into violence. Clashes occurred between rival
    ethnic groups in Delta, Rivers, Benue, Cross River, Bayelsa, Osun,
    Kaduna, Nassarawa, and Taraba states, often resulting in fatalities
    (see Section 1.a.).
        There were unconfirmed reports that members of the armed forces
    beat and raped members of ethnic minorities (see Section 1.c.).
        Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa,
    and Akwa Ibom states, have echoed the Ogoni ethnic group's claims of
    environmental degradation and government indifference to their
    development in the Delta. Groups such as the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo,
    and Isoko continued to express their unhappiness about their perceived
    economic exploitation and the environmental destruction of their
    homelands, and incidents of ethnic conflict and confrontation with
    government forces increased in the delta area, particularly after the
    Ijaw Youth Council issued the Kaiama Declaration in December 1998 (see
    Section 1.a.). Other ethnic groups saw the Kaiama Declaration, which
    terms the entire Delta the property of the Ijaw, as threatening their
    rights. Disparate organizations of youths from a variety of ethnic
    groups continued to take oil company personnel hostage in the delta
    region (see Section 1.b.). In August Ijaw youth took 250 persons
    hostage in a Mallard Bay facility during a protest for more contracting
    jobs. As a result of this ongoing violence, many oil companies
    continued to employ local police, and in some cases military troops, to
    protect their facilities and personnel. Local youths claimed that these
    ``militias'' engaged in extrajudicial killings and other human rights
    abuses, in some cases with the support of foreign oil companies (see
    Section 1.a.).
        In late October, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), an
    entity proposed in 1999 to increase government resources committed to
    the area and grant more local autonomy over expenditure of these
    resources, began operations. The 19 members of the commission come from
    both oil producing and non-producing states, ostensibly to provide a
    balanced representation of interests. The National Assembly must
    authorize a separate budgetary appropriation in order for the NDDC to
    begin the bulk of its work. The commissioners are scheduled to begin
    consultations in the Delta region in early 2001.
        The Government continued its investigation into all contracts
    previously awarded under the auspices of the Oil and Minerals Producing
    Areas Development Commission. This commission, established in 1992
    during the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, widely was regarded as
    corrupt and ineffective in improving the conditions of Niger Delta
    residents.
        In February the Enugu police halted a conference on the history of
    Biafra (see Section 2.b.)
        Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all
    citizens with the right to assemble freely and associate with other
    persons, and to form or belong to any trade union or other association
    for the protection of their interests; however, several statutory
    restrictions on the right of association and on trade unions remained
    in effect despite repeals of parts of the military-era antilabor
    decrees. Only a single central labor federation (the Nigerian Labour
    Congress) is permitted, and the Government recognizes only 29 trade
    unions. Trade unions must be registered formally by the Federal
    Government, and a minimum of 50 workers is required to form a trade
    union. Nonmanagement senior staff are prevented from joining trade
    unions, and senior staff associations are denied a seat on the National
    Labor Advisory Council. The ILO Committee of Experts has repeatedly
    cited several of these restrictions; however, the Government had not
    addressed these problems by year's end.
        Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees
    designated as essential by the Government, may join trade unions.
    Essential workers include members of the armed forces and government
    employees in the police, customs, immigration, prisons, federal mint,
    central bank, and telecommunications sectors. Employees working in a
    designated export-processing zone may not join a union until 10 years
    after the start-up of the enterprise (see Section 6.b.).
        According to figures provided by the Nigerian Labour Congress,
    total union membership is approximately 4 million. Less than 10 percent
    of the total work force belongs to unions. With the exception of a
    small number of workers engaged in commercial food processing, the
    agricultural sector, which employs the bulk of the work force, is not
    unionized. The informal sector and small and medium enterprises remain
    mostly nonunionized.
        Since 1978 the Government has mandated a single trade union
    structure with service and industrial unions grouped under the NLC. The
    trade union movement is composed of two groups consisting of junior and
    senior staff workers. The single trade union structure and segregation
    of junior from senior staff were intended to dilute the bargaining
    strength of workers. Junior staff workers--primarily blue-collar
    workers--are organized into 29 industrial unions with a membership of
    approximately 4 million persons and are affiliated with the NLC.
    Twenty-one unions make up the Senior Staff Consultative Association of
    Nigeria (SESCAN), which has a membership of approximately 400,000 to
    600,000. SESCAN--which is composed primarily of white-collar workers--
    has not been officially sanctioned by the Government, is prohibited
    from affiliating with the NLC, and is not seated on the National Labor
    Advisory Council. In 1999 SESCAN continued, without success to lay the
    legal and political groundwork to achieve government recognition, which
    will require legislation.
        In August the Government decertified the maritime workers union on
    the grounds that the union had not scheduled internal elections in
    accordance with its charter's requirement. In September the Government
    issued directives requiring maritime workers to register with specific
    contracting firms. As a result this historically powerful union was
    weakened; however, it continued to challenge the Government's action
    during the year.
        Workers have the right to strike; however, certain essential
    workers are required to provide advance notice of a strike. Essential
    services include banking, postal services, transportation,
    firefighting, public health, and utilities.
        There were several strikes throughout the year. The most important
    strike occurred in June, following a government decision to increase
    fuel prices by 50 percent. The NLC called a general strike that was
    widely observed, resulting in significant economic disruption.
    Following negotiations, the fuel price increase largely was eliminated.
    The strike action damaged relations between the NLC and the Government
    (see Section 2.b.). The oil worker unions National Union of Petroleum
    and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and Natural Gas
    Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (Pengassan) successfully went on
    strike in September over wages in order to force oil marketing
    companies to negotiate. The oil workers' wage demands were triggered in
    part by the Government's announcement of public sector salary increases
    in May. The oil worker unions also called wildcat strikes over issues
    including the firing of one company's tanker truck drivers who sought
    to affiliate with NUPENG, and, the raiding of a NUPENG office during
    civil unrest in the Delta. Academic and teacher unions went on strike
    several times during the year over nonpayment of wages and poor working
    conditions, as did doctors in Ibadan.
        In July Lagos public sector workers went on strike to protest the
    state government's refusal to pay a higher minimum wage. On July 5, the
    protests turned violent when police used tear gas to disperse workers
    demonstrating outside of the Lagos State Secretariat complex. One
    person reportedly died in the violence, although the reason for the
    death was unclear. A compromise package offered by the state was
    accepted by the workers; however, the local union leadership continued
    to press for more pay at year's end.
        There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers and
    strike leaders, but strikers who believe that they are victims of
    unfair retribution may submit their cases to the Industrial Arbitration
    Panel (IAP) with prior approval of the Labor Ministry. The IAP's
    decisions are binding on all parties but may be appealed to the
    Nigerian Industrial Court (NIC). Union representatives have described
    the arbitration process as cumbersome and time consuming, and as an
    ineffective deterrent to retribution against strikers.
        The NLC and labor unions are free to affiliate with international
    bodies; however, prior approval from the Minister is required. The NLC
    has affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor laws
    provide for both the right to organize and the right to bargain
    collectively between management and trade unions. Collective bargaining
    occurs throughout the public sector and the organized private sector.
    Complaints of antiunion discrimination may be brought to the Ministry
    of Labor for mediation and conciliation. The Labor Minister may refer
    unresolved disputes to the IAP and the NIC (see Section 6.a.). Union
    officials have questioned the independence of the NIC in view of its
    refusal in previous years to resolve various disputes stemming from the
    Government's failure to fulfill contract provisions for public sector
    employees. Union leaders also have criticized the arbitration system's
    dependence on the Labor Minister's referrals. The previous Labor
    Minister made no referrals to the IAP. The IAP and NIC were active
    during the year, following the Government's appointment of new members
    to these bodies. The Ministry referred to the IAP and NIC a highprofile
    case involving the wages of Lagos state workers. Those bodies decided
    in favor of the employer.
        Under the law, a worker under a collective bargaining agreement may
    not participate in a strike unless his representative has complied with
    the requirements of the Trade Disputes Act, which include provisions
    for mandatory mediation and for referring the labor dispute to the
    Government. The Act allows the Government discretion to refer the
    matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel, board of inquiry, or
    the National Industrial Court. The Act also forbids any employer from
    granting a general wage increase to its workers without prior approval
    by the Government. However, in practice the Act does not appear to be
    enforced effectively; strikes, including in the public sector, are
    widespread (see Section 1.a.) and private sector wage increases
    generally are not submitted to the Government for prior approval. The
    Government retains broad authority over labor matters and often
    intervenes in disputes seen to challenge key political or economic
    objectives.
        In 1999 the Government directed each state administration to
    establish its own salary structure on the basis of its ability to pay
    and with reference to the national minimum wage (see Section 6.e.). The
    Government's decision was taken without consultation with the civil
    service unions. Several state governments have argued that they are
    unable to pay the approximately $65 (6,500 naira) monthly minimum wage
    to their employees (see Section 6.e.). An important case involving
    Lagos state, the largest public sector employer outside the Federal
    Government, was dismissed as unready for adjudication by the NIC. Other
    states are pursuing pay concessions, layoffs, the elimination of
    ``ghost'' workers, or a combination of all three actions to meet the
    new wage scale.
        An export-processing zone (EPZ) remains under development in
    Calabar, Cross River State, while a second EPZ is planned for Port
    Harcourt, Rivers State. Workers and employers in such zones are subject
    to national labor laws, which provide for a 10-year amnesty on trade
    unions in EPZ's from the startup of an enterprise. The ILO has
    commented that this prohibition and a 10-year prohibition on strikes
    and lockouts is incompatible with Convention 87 (on freedom of
    association and protection of the right to organize). The 1992 Export
    Processing Zones Decree has been criticized by the ILO for not allowing
    any unauthorized person to enter any EPZ.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1974 Labor
    Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit forced or compulsory labor;
    however, trafficking in women and children for purposes of forced
    prostitution and forced labor is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    In addition, forced labor has been used in ``Environmental Saturday''
    community clean-up projects that continued until Obasanjo abolished
    them in July 1999. ``Environmental Saturday'' was observed the last
    Saturday of every month in Lagos and was purportedly a community-based
    clean-up effort. However, uniformed ``sanitation police'' had the power
    (and regularly exercised it) to invade citizens'' homes and force them
    to clean the areas surrounding their homes until the police deemed them
    clean. Widespread harassment of citizens by police was reported on
    ``Environmental Saturdays.''
        Although employment of persons under 18 years of age generally is
    prohibited, except for agriculture and domestic work, the Government
    does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children.
    There were occasional reports of forced child labor, including child
    slavery rings operating between Nigeria and neighboring countries where
    children are imported to work as domestic servants (see Sections 5 and
    6.f.). The reports suggest that Nigerian children are exported to other
    African countries for domestic and agricultural work, and that children
    from neighboring countries are imported to work as domestic servants.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children
    less than 15 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts other
    child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The law
    further stipulates that children may not be employed in agricultural or
    domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The Decree allows the
    apprenticeship of youths at the age 13 under specific conditions.
        Primary education is compulsory until grade 6, although this
    requirement rarely is enforced. Studies indicate declining school
    enrollment due to continuing deterioration of public schools and to
    increased economic pressures on families. The lack of sufficient
    primary school infrastructure and high school fees has ended some
    families' access to education, forcing them to place children in the
    labor market. Growing economic difficulties have led to a substantial
    increase in the use of children in commercial activities aimed at
    enhancing family incomes which tend to be meager. The ILO estimates
    that upward of 12 million children ages 10-14 (25 percent of all
    children) are employed in some capacity. The use of children as
    beggars, hawkers, and bus conductors is widespread in urban areas. The
    use of children as domestic servants is common. According to an ILO
    statement in 1998, the incidence of trafficking in children for forced
    prostitution also is growing (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        Private and government initiatives to stem the growing incidence of
    child employment continue but have not been effective. UNICEF operated
    a program in Kaduna that sought to remove young girls from the streets
    where they hawked petty goods and relocate them to an informal
    educational setting. UNICEF reported that despite the narrow focus on
    young girls, the program only began to address the problem during the
    year. In conjunction with the ILO, the Government formulated a national
    program of action in support of child rights, survival, protection,
    development, and participation. In August a formal agreement
    establishing the program was signed by the ILO and the Labor Ministry;
    however, the program had not shown any results by year's end due to
    logistical problems and changing personnel in the Ministry.
        The Labor Ministry has an inspections department whose major
    responsibilities include enforcement of legal provisions relating to
    conditions of work and protection of workers. However, there are less
    than 50 inspectors for the entire country, and the Ministry conducts
    inspections only in the formal business sector where the incidence of
    child labor is not significant.
        The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1999 Constitution prohibit forced or
    compulsory labor, a prohibition that extends to children, although they
    are not mentioned specifically in the laws; however, there continue to
    be cases of trafficking in children as indentured servants or for
    criminal activities such as prostitution (see Sections 5, 6.c and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The 1974 Labor Decree set a
    minimum wage, which is reviewed on an ad hoc basis. In April the
    minimum wage was reviewed and increased, along with the public sector
    wage scale.
        In May the minimum wage increased to $75 (7,500 naira) per month
    for federal workers and $55 to $65 (5000 to 6500 naira) per month for
    state employees. Private employers in the formal sector track the
    public sector wage scale. Along with the many allowances that are paid,
    this boost in the minimum wage appears sufficient to support a decent
    standard of living. However, many government agencies were slow to pay
    the new wage scale, and all federal salaries were frozen for 3 months
    during the summer, pending a census of government employees. ``Ghost
    workers'' (who appear on the employment rolls but not on the job)
    remained a significant problem that was not addressed fully during the
    year. As in 1998, the Government decided to increase federal salaries
    without adequate consultations with state governments, whose employees
    demanded similar wages; as a result, several state governments
    maintained that they could not afford to pay this wage. The issue of
    the minimum wage caused several labor disruptions throughout the year,
    and remains unresolved in several states.
        The 1974 Labor Decree called for a 40-hour workweek, prescribed 2
    to 4 weeks annual leave, and stipulated that workers must be paid extra
    for hours worked over the legal limit. The Decree also stated that
    employees who work on Sundays and statutory public holidays must be
    paid a full day's pay in addition to their normal wages. There is no
    law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime.
        The 1974 Labor Decree sets out general health and safety
    provisions, some of which are aimed specifically at young or female
    workers. While it requires that the factory inspectorate of the
    Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect factories for compliance with
    health and safety standards, this agency is greatly understaffed, lacks
    basic resources and training, and consequently neglects safety
    oversight of many enterprises, particularly construction sites and
    other nonfactory work. The Decree also requires employers to compensate
    injured workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial
    accidents. The Labor Ministry, which is charged with enforcement of
    these laws, has been largely ineffective in identifying violators. The
    Government has failed to act on various ILO recommendations since 1991
    to update its moribund program on inspection and accident reporting.
    The Labor Decree does not provide workers with the right to remove
    themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law makes trafficking in persons a
    crime. There is an active and growing market for trafficking in women
    and children to Europe. The full nature and scope of the trade remained
    unknown, but immigration and police officials throughout Europe
    reported a steady flow of women entrapped and sold into prostitution in
    Europe, particularly the Netherlands, Italy, and the Czech Republic.
    Italian authorities deported several hundred sex workers to Nigeria
    during the year. Other European countries deported similar numbers.
    Nigerian Interpol claimed that women usually entered the sex trade
    independently, were not controlled by syndicates, and were economically
    motivated. However, Human Rights Watch recently reported that according
    women's rights organizations, hundreds of women migrated to Europe in
    response to job offers as domestic workers or waitresses. Upon arrival,
    many were forced into prostitution in order to pay off debts. In
    addition, there is evidence that Nigerian crime syndicates may use
    indebtedness, threats of beatings and rape, physical injury to the
    victim's family, arrest, and deportation to persuade those forced into
    sex work from attempting to escape. The police reported that the
    women's families often condoned their entry into the trade. In 1999
    there was at least one documented case of the trafficking in children
    to work as indentured servants in the United States.
        The ILO reported that, based on a nationwide survey of child
    trafficking, approximately 19 percent of school children and 40 percent
    of street children have been trafficked for forced labor. The economic
    strategies that underlie child trafficking may be reflected in the fact
    that families who employ them also pay their school fees. Child
    traffickers also take advantage of a cultural tradition of
    ``fostering'' under which it is culturally accepted to send one's child
    to live and work with a family in an urban center for educational and
    employment purposes. Often the children in these situations only work
    and do not get any formal education. They are forced to serve as
    domestics or to become street hawkers selling nuts, fruits, or other
    items. There were credible reports that poor families sell their
    daughters into marriage as a means of supplementing their income (see
    Section 5).
        According to reports from the media and the ILO, there is an active
    trade in child laborers, some of whom are exported to Cameroon, Gabon,
    Benin, and Equatorial Guinea to work in agricultural enterprises,
    others of whom are coerced into prostitution. Authorities also have
    identified a trade route for traffickers of children for labor through
    Katsina and Sokoto to the Middle East and East Africa. The eastern part
    of the country and some southern states such as Cross River and Akwa
    Ibom have been the focus of trafficking of children for labor and, in
    some cases, human sacrifice. The country remains a destination point
    for the trafficking of Togolese children to serve as domestic or
    agricultural workers.
        The Government is investigating allegations of the collusion of
    customs officials in trafficking. Some of the returnees have alleged
    that immigration officials actively connive with syndicates; however,
    there were no arrests of immigration officials for trafficking offenses
    during the year.
        The Assistant Inspector General of Police is investigating
    allegations of the collusion of customs officials in trafficking.
        There is government and societal acknowledgement that trafficking
    in women is a continuing problem, particularly to Western Europe.
    Police attempts to stem the trafficking of persons include extended
    jail sentences and public humiliation; however, such actions focused
    primarily on victims. Traffickers were not punished. Awareness
    campaigns, often conducted by NGO's and others, only recently have
    begun to generate widespread attention. For example, in September the
    Edo state governor and his wife, who heads a local NGO knows as the
    Idia Renaissance, used the passage of new legislation banning
    prostitution and related activities to raise awareness of the
    trafficking problem. Also in September, President Obasanjo's wife
    assisted a Catholic charity in distributing new passports to sex
    workers stranded in Italy. However, there are no reliable statistics to
    determine if these campaigns were effective in reducing incidences of
    trafficking. The development of a reliable statistical base for
    assessing the child trafficking problem began under ILO auspices.
                                   __________

                                     RWANDA

        The largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took power
    following the civil war and genocide of 1994, is the principal
    political force and controls the Government of National Unity. On March
    23, President Pasteur Bizimungu, who had been President since 1994,
    tendered his resignation. In accordance with the 1993 Arusha Accords,
    the RPF submitted two candidates to the National Assembly, which
    elected former Vice President and Minister of Defense General Paul
    Kagame, who was sworn in as President on April 22. The leadership
    transition took place without incident and was the first nonviolent
    presidential change in the country's history. President Kagame did not
    name a Vice President, but named a new Minister of Defense, Colonel
    Emmanuel Habyarimana, shortly after taking office. On February 28,
    Prime Minister Pierre Celestin Rwigema resigned and in accordance with
    the Arusha accords, on March 8, he was replaced by Bernard Makuza. The
    Prime Minister runs the Government on a daily basis and is responsible
    for relations with the National Assembly, which is influenced by the
    executive branch. In January the former Speaker of the Assembly, Joseph
    Seberenzi, was forced from office due to a political party power
    struggle. In 1994 the parties agreed to suspend party activity below
    the national level for the duration of the transition period, which
    originally was scheduled to end in July 1999. However, in June 1999,
    the Government announced the extension of the transition period for
    another 4 years. While March 1999 local elections for community
    development committees were held, commune level elections were
    postponed until 2001 due to legislative, logistical, and financial
    problems. The judiciary suffers from a lack of resources, inefficiency,
    and some corruption.
        The Minister of Defense is responsible for external security and
    military defense; the Minister of Internal Security is responsible for
    civilian security matters as well as supervision of the prisons and the
    national police. The new civilian Rwandan National Police (RNP)
    replaced the gendarmerie and the communal police. The security
    apparatus consists of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the police.
    A volunteer force of armed civilian local defense units with limited
    arrest powers also works throughout the country. The security situation
    in the northwest remained calm. There were numerous and widespread
    unconfirmed reports that armed bands of Rwandan Hutus posing as
    Interahamwe fighters committed abuses in the DRC. The Rwandan army
    allegedly recruited these groups in order ostensibly to demonstrate the
    need for a continued Rwandan military presence in the areas they
    controlled. Members of the security forces committed serious human
    rights abuses, although to a lesser extent than in the previous year.
        The country is very poor, and 70 percent of the population lives in
    poverty. The 1994 genocide destroyed the country's social fabric, human
    resource base, institutional capacity, and economic and social
    infrastructure. A 2-year drought has led to food shortages and famine
    in some parts of the country. Per capita annual income is $252.
    Subsistence agriculture employs more than 90 percent of the labor
    force. The principal exports are coffee and tea. Small-scale commercial
    activities are increasing, but the industrial and tourism base remains
    limited.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the
    Government continued to be responsible for numerous, serious abuses;
    however, there were some improvements in a few areas. Citizens do not
    have the right to change their government. The security forces
    committed extrajudicial killings within the country; there also were
    many reports, some of which were credible, that Rwandan army units
    operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) committed
    deliberate extrajudicial killings and other serious abuses. Some deaths
    in custody were due to mistreatment or abuse by corrupt officials.
    There were allegations of a small number of disappearances. Security
    forces beat suspects, and there were some reports of torture. Prison
    conditions remained harsh and life threatening and prisoners died from
    starvation, curable diseases, or abuse. Most of the prisoners housed in
    jails and local detention centers (cachots) are accused of
    participating in the 1994 genocide; many have been detained for up to 6
    years without being charged. Arbitrary arrest and detention, and
    prolonged pretrial detention remained problems. The Government took
    steps to prosecute and punish some human rights abusers. The judiciary
    is subject to executive influence and does not always ensure due
    process or expeditious trials. Genocide trials continued at a slow
    pace. The Government released approximately 3,000 detainees whose files
    were incomplete, who were acquitted, or who were ill or elderly. The
    Government restricted freedom of the press, and limited freedom of
    assembly and association. The Government imposed some restrictions on
    freedom of religion. The Government limited freedom of movement.
    Security forces generally did not harass refugees who returned from
    neighboring countries. The Government was hostile toward some
    nongovernmental human rights organizations. Violence and discrimination
    against women were problems, as was discrimination based on indigenous
    and ethnic status. There were reports that prisoners were hired out for
    labor in private homes and businesses. Child labor persists,
    particularly in the agricultural sector.
        Insurgents tied to those responsible for the 1994 genocide
    committed several killings.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The RPA continued to
    commit extrajudicial killings inside the country, although fewer than
    the previous year, due to its success in largely suppressing the
    insurgency in the northwest, as it pushed Hutu rebels including the
    former Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia inside
    the territory of the DRC. Security in the northwest remained calm.
    However, there were credible reports that RPA forces committed
    extrajudicial killings in the DRC.
        On March 5, three men reportedly in military uniform shot and
    killed Assiel Kabera, an advisor to then-President Bizimungu, outside
    his house. The Government maintains that Kabera's killing was related
    to a family dispute involving Antoinnette Kagagu, who was killed the
    week before outside her home. In February Kagagu was acquitted of the
    1998 murder of her husband and Kabera reportedly was involved in a
    dispute over custody of her children. No one was arrested or charged in
    Kabera's murder by year's end; however, the Government stated that an
    investigation was ongoing.
        Human rights organizations claim that several incidents of alleged
    attacks by rebels led to counterattacks by security forces. In late
    December 1999, there were reports that soldiers illegally detained a
    man from Gisenyi and four others in a ditch for 6 weeks (see Section
    1.d.). When the men escaped in mid-February, allegedly after having
    been told they were to be killed the next day, RPA soldiers recaptured
    one, shot him, and left him for dead. When the soldiers discovered the
    man still was alive, they told residents they were transporting him to
    the hospital, but beat the man to death instead. There also were
    reports that in early January, security forces beat to death Jean
    Damascene Gatabazi, an alleged bandit. During the year, the Government
    began to provide to human rights organizations, and even other
    governments, systematic replies and rebuttals to allegations of human
    rights abuses. It also increased measures to arrest alleged offenders
    from the security services; according to the Government, 27 soldiers
    were arrested and detained on charges of murder, manslaughter, or armed
    robbery in the DRC. Others were arrested on charges of offenses
    committed in Rwanda. According to the Government, all of those arrested
    were awaiting trial in military prisons at year's end.
        The improvement in the security situation in the northwest led to a
    corresponding decline in alleged reprisals by the RPA; however, there
    were reports of incursions and murders by armed infiltrators in the
    northwest, some of whom were ex-FAR or Interahamwe.
        The National Demining Office (NDO), an independent unit of the RPA,
    reported three deaths from landmine or unexploded ordnance explosions
    in July; numerous persons were injured (see Section 1.c.). These mines
    are believed to be left over from the 199094 conflict between the
    former government and the RPA.
        Harsh prison conditions contributed to the deaths of approximately
    1,100 inmates during the year. Some deaths in custody were due to abuse
    by corrupt prison officials (see Section 1.c.).
        Since the start of the current war in the DRC in August 1998, RPA
    troops have participated on the side of the Congolese rebel movement
    Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) against the DRC
    Government. In July 1999, all parties involved in the war in the DRC
    signed the Lusaka Agreement, which included a cease-fire; however, all
    parties, including RPA soldiers, repeatedly participated in battles
    after the declaration.
        There were allegations of human rights violations during fighting
    between RPA and Ugandan army troops in Kisangani, DRC, in May and June,
    which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, over 1,700 persons
    injured (see Section 1.c.), and 60,000 displaced persons (see Section
    2.d.). The most severe of these clashes occurred from June 5 to 11,
    during which time both forces shelled the city with artillery and
    mortar fire, destroying homes and much of the city's infrastructure.
    Credible sources claim that RPA and Ugandan troops raped many women and
    shot persons during extensive fighting in the city. Humanitarian
    organizations report that approximately 700 Congolese civilians were
    killed during the fighting. Many died from injuries because they were
    unable to get medical attention; transportation to hospitals during the
    fighting often was unavailable. Many displaced persons remained at a
    camp outside of the city for several months because they feared to
    return to their homes. There was widespread reporting throughout the
    year of killings and other human rights abuses by both pro-DRC and
    anti-DRC government forces, including the RPA, in the conflict in the
    DRC. Verification of these reports was extremely difficult,
    particularly those emanating from remote areas and those affected by
    active combat, primarily in eastern DRC. Independent observers often
    found access difficult due to hazardous security conditions and
    frequent impediments imposed by authorities. Both pro- and anti-DRC
    Government forces extensively used propaganda disseminated via local
    media, including charges leveled against opposing forces, further
    complicating efforts to obtain accurate information regarding such
    events.
        The Government admits that human rights abuses have occurred in
    territory under RPA/RCD control, but claims that these were acts
    committed by individuals, not by the military as an institution. On
    January 29, in Bunia, a Rwandan soldier reportedly summarily executed a
    Congolese rebel soldier based on the suspicion that the Congolese
    soldier was passing information to an opposing rebel group. On February
    5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village of Kilambo,
    North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men, raped their
    wives in front of them (see Section 1.c.), and then killed 30 persons.
    From March 6 to 8, RPA forces reportedly made repeated attacks on the
    village of Kilambo in Masisi, North Kivu Province, and allegedly
    executed numerous persons suspected of collaborating with the
    Interahamwe. For example, the RPA reportedly killed two men known as
    Kapalata and Mamboleo, Samuel Kanyomo, a woman named Suzana, and her
    three children. On June 23, in Walikale, DRC, RPA Captain Alexis Rugira
    and other RPA soldiers, stole Baligizi Mufungizi's bicycle and killed
    him. Captain Rugira, Lt. Gapfunsi, S/Maj. Rutabana, and two privates
    were arrested and were in pretrial detention awaiting prosecution by
    the military tribunal at year's end. On September 1, RPA Captain Peter
    Kabanda and other RPA soldiers allegedly killed 67 unarmed civilians in
    Masisi, North Kivu, DRC. The captain and the other RPA soldiers were
    arrested for acting contrary to operational orders and for failing to
    differentiate between the enemy and unarmed civilians. The soldiers
    were in detention awaiting prosecution for murder before the military
    tribunal at year's end. There were other reports of extrajudicial
    killings committed either by elements of the RCD, which the RPA
    materially supported and in some respects often directed, or in which
    direct involvement by RPA soldiers was not clear to persons who found
    it difficult to distinguish between RCD and RPA forces. Some of these
    reports of RPA killings surfaced in Kinshasa, DRC, media directly or
    indirectly controlled by the DRC Government; however, other such
    reports emerged through international religious or humanitarian
    organizations and were based on the accounts of multiple witnesses or
    photographic or other evidence. The reported extrajudicial killings of
    civilians by RCD and Rwandan forces in the DRC often reportedly were
    committed in reprisal for guerrilla attacks on RCD or Rwandan forces.
        There were unconfirmed reports that Rwandan and Ugandan forces used
    landmines during the fighting in Kisangani; however, the number of
    resulting deaths and injuries is unknown.
        There was no investigation nor action taken in the January 1999
    case in which the RPA killed two infiltrators in Gitarama prefecture.
    There was no investigation nor action taken in the February 1999 case
    in which the RPA killed four insurgents in Ruhengeri, and put the body
    of one on display at the Nyarutovu internally displaced persons (IDP)
    camp. There was no investigation nor action taken in the May 1999 case
    in which the army reportedly killed 49 persons, mostly women and
    children, after they fled into Volcanoes National Park.
        Although the Government has arrested and investigated several
    soldiers for their roles in human rights violations committed in DRC
    territory since the start of the current war in 1998, none of those in
    custody listed in the Government's report had been brought to trial by
    year's end. The RPA and RCD claimed that they continue to investigate
    the RCD commanders believed to be responsible for the January 1999
    massacre in Makobola, DRC; in that incident 37 civilians allegedly were
    killed in revenge for the killing of RCD soldiers by Mai-Mai forces.
    One suspect was arrested, but allegedly escaped from detention and fled
    to Uganda. The Government claims the Interahamwe militia, not the RCD,
    killed Roman Catholic Father Kakuja in November 1999. RCD forces
    allegedly killed six militiamen in pursuit of the priest's attackers.
    During the year, there were numerous reports that RCD forces,
    participating with or supported by the RPA, buried 15 women alive at
    Mwenga in December 1999. However, the Government denied these charges
    and claims that 3 women, not 15, were only badly beaten by civilians
    who accused the women of witchcraft. According to the Government, the
    women were rescued from mob justice by RCD troops, but later died from
    their injuries. In December 1999, the RCD/RPA arrested the RCD
    commander, but he escaped from jail on February 5 along with 32 other
    detainees.
        Domestic courts continued adjudicating cases arising from the 1994
    genocide (see Section 1.c.). On June 14, following a 19-month trial,
    the Court of First Instance acquitted of all genocide charges Roman
    Catholic Bishop Augustin Misago, the highest-ranking Catholic clergyman
    and the first Bishop to be charged with genocide. The Government has
    filed an appeal, which was pending at year's end. In August two group
    trials were held by the Court of First Instance in Cyangugu prefecture
    resulting in numerous convictions, for which sentences, including death
    and life imprisonment were handed down. On October 25, the Ruhengeri
    Court of Appeals overturned the convictions of Edouard Nturiye and
    Francois Kayiranga, two Catholic priests who were sentenced to death in
    1998 on genocide charges.
        In June 1999 in the DRC, Rwandan prosecutorial police arrested and
    transferred to Kigali former Radio Milles Collines broadcaster Valerie
    Bemeriki on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. She
    allegedly incited persons to kill during the 1994 genocide with her
    inflammatory radio broadcasts. Bemeriki remained in detention pending
    trial at year's end.
        The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), based in
    Arusha, Tanzania, also prosecuted genocide suspects (see Section 4). On
    January 27, Alfred Musema was sentenced to life imprisonment for
    genocide and crimes against humanity, including rape. On March 31, the
    ICTR Appeals Chamber ruled that JeanBosco Barayagwiza, former officer
    in the foreign ministry and a member of the Radio Television Libre des
    Mille Collines planning committee, remain in ICTR custody to be tried
    for genocide and crimes against humanity (see Section 4). A joint trial
    broadcast by the media, including Barayagwiza, began on September 18
    and was ongoing at year's end. On October 19, the ICTR denied former
    Prime Minister Jean Kambanda's appeal against a life sentence for
    genocide; he immediately was remanded to begin his sentence. Kambanda
    had challenged his 1998 sentence on various grounds. The joint trial
    against former Minister of Family and Women's Affairs Pauline
    Nyiramasuhuko and other former government officials was placed on the
    schedule for April 2001.
        A number of ICTR cases were ongoing at year's end. The genocide
    trial against former mayor Ignace Bagilishema continued during the
    year. Former Information Minister Eliezer Niyitegeka, former Health
    Minister Casimir Bizimungu, and a number of former ministers remained
    in detention awaiting trial in Arusha. Major Francois-Xavier
    Nzuwonemey, former Reconnaissance Battalion Commander, and Lt. Colonel
    Tharcisse Muvunyi, both of whom were transferred to Arusha during the
    year, were in detention pending trial at year's end (see Section 4).
    Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a preacher who was extradited to Arusha in
    March, remained in detention pending trial for allegedly inciting the
    massacre of hundreds of Tutsi seeking refuge in his church (see Section
    4). Bernard Ntuyahaga, a former army major, who feared he would be
    deported to Rwanda to face trial, turned himself in to the ICTR seeking
    to be a protected witness; however, he was released from ICTR custody
    and subsequently was arrested by Tanzanian authorities on immigration
    violations. In November former army captain Innocent Sagahutu was
    transferred from Denmark to Arusha. Sagahutu and Ntuyahaga are accused
    of murdering the former Prime Minister and 10 Belgian peacekeepers
    assigned to protect her in 1994. Ntuyahaga remains in a Tanzanian jail
    awaiting a ruling on Belgium's and Rwanda's extradition requests.
    Sagahutu remained in detention pending a joint military trial by the
    ICTR for 12 counts of complicity in the 1994 genocide.
        Lightly armed civilian local defense units (LDU's) exist, but are
    not professional security forces. During the year, soldiers and LDU
    members allegedly killed civilians on several occasions when they
    mistook the civilians for infiltrators from the Congo. There were
    reports that individual LDU members or demobilized soldiers were
    responsible for the shooting and killing of some civilians. Most
    killings apparently were the result of personal quarrels, thievery, or
    drunkenness. There was no investigation nor action taken in the August
    1999 case in which members of an LDU shot and killed a woman in the
    Nkamira transit camp.
        In June approximately 12 bodies, some headless or without clothes,
    were seen floating in the Akagera River, but it is unclear who the
    persons were or how they were killed.
        b. Disappearance.--Based on interviews with residents of Kibungo
    prefecture, local and international human rights organizations alleged
    that some Hutu residents, mostly boys and small business owners,
    disappeared from their homes or from prisons (see Section 1.c.).
        There were sporadic, unconfirmed reports that persons arrested and
    detained in areas of the DRC controlled by anti-DRC government forces
    were transferred to Rwanda and remained unaccounted for by year's end.
    For example, on May 15, RPA soldiers reportedly arrested Ainakafota,
    the director of the BolongoBas office of Friends of Nelson Mandela for
    Human Rights (ANMDH) in Orientale Province, DRC, and two other staff
    members of the human rights NGO, on suspicions of spying. The ANMDH and
    family members have not been able to locate Ainakafota or the staff
    members since their arrest; inquiries to Rwandan officials concerning
    their whereabouts have produced no results.
        In the DRC, RPA and Ugandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels,
    reportedly abducted many young women from the villages they raided.
    These night raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of
    the Kivu Provinces peasants slept in their fields.
        There were no developments regarding several refugees returning
    from the DRC in 1999 who registered at a transit center, but failed to
    arrive in their home communes.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The fundamental law prohibits torture; however, a
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) credibly reported that beatings at
    the time of arrest are common, and some released detainees reported
    that they had been tortured. There were Amnesty International and Human
    Rights Watch reports in April that accused the RPA of forcibly
    returning to the country and mistreating former soldiers and others
    alleged to have helped political opponents leave the country, or
    believed to support the former King. For example, there were reports
    that four men arrested in Burundi and Tanzania under false pretenses
    were detained and tortured by RPA soldiers after being forcibly
    repatriated to the country; however, the National Commission for Human
    Rights (NCHR) and the men's families visited the men in detention and
    reported that the men did not appear to have been tortured. In June the
    Government refuted such claims in a written response to Human Rights
    Watch. There were reports that at least three of the men was released
    by year's end.
        On August 11, three soldiers harassed and beat the wife of Vales
    Kwitegetse, a journalist with the governmentcontrolled newspaper Imvaho
    (see Section 2.a.).
        The NDO reported that 22 persons were injured from landmine or
    unexploded ordnance explosions during the year; 3 persons also were
    killed (see Section 1.a.).
        During the year, there were numerous credible reports that RCD
    forces, participating with or supported by the RPA, beat, tortured, and
    then buried alive 15 women at Mwenga, DRC, in December 1999 (see
    Section 1.a.). However, the Government denied these charges and claims
    that 3 women, not 15, were beaten severely by civilians who accused the
    women of witchcraft.
        There were reports that Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers allegedly
    raped women during extensive fighting in Kisangani in May and June (see
    Section 1.a.). Rwandan troops and RCD rebels also reportedly engaged in
    the rape of women in public places and often in the presence of their
    families. A woman raped in this manner generally is forced out of her
    village, and must leave her husband and children behind.
        On February 5, RCD and RPA soldiers reportedly attacked the village
    of Kilambo, North Kivu Province. The rebels allegedly tied up men,
    raped their wives in front of them, and then killed 30 persons (see
    Section 1.a.).
        There were reports that both Rwandan and Ugandan forces used
    landmines during the fighting in Kisangani (see Section 1.a.).
        The RPA continues to dismiss soldiers for indiscipline and criminal
    offenses.
        At least one international NGO has complained that government
    security forces have harassed some of its informants (see Section 4).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports during the year
    from a domestic human rights group that detainees interviewed for its
    reports showed wounds resulting from mistreatment.
        There was no investigation nor action taken against the police who
    reportedly beat and arrested six university students who, along with
    other students, were marching to the Prime Minister's office in August
    1999.
        Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. The International
    Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has registered approximately 110,000
    prisoners detained on genocide-related or security-related charges and
    estimates that an additional 5,000 prisoners are detained on charges
    unrelated to the genocide; however, the Ministry of Justice routinely
    refers to the prison population as 130,000. The prison population has
    remained stable since early 1998. The ICRC feeds inmates in the 19 main
    prisons and also provides additional expertise and logistical and
    material support to improve conditions for inmates. Overcrowding is a
    chronic problem, and sanitary conditions are extremely poor. The ICRC
    does not believe that prison conditions have improved with the 1999
    transfer of prison administration to the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
    however, conditions in the cachots have improved. The Government does
    not provide adequate food or medical treatment. On some occasions
    during the year, the Government was unable to provide any food; in June
    a food shortage was remedied with supplies from the ICRC. Harsh prison
    conditions and malnutrition contributed to the deaths of numerous
    inmates. Some deaths in custody were due to abuse by officials. Most of
    the approximately 1,100 deaths during the year were the result of
    curable diseases, suspected HIV/AIDS, or the cumulative effects of
    severe overcrowding. The Ministry continued to dismiss prison
    officials, some of whom subsequently were jailed on corruption charges.
    Women are detained separately from men; however, hundreds of children
    were incarcerated with adults throughout the prison system (see Section
    5).
        There were reports that some Hutu residents, mostly boys and small
    business owners, disappeared from their homes or from prisons (see
    Section 1.b.).
        The ICRC, human rights organizations, diplomats, and journalists
    have regular access to the prisons. The ICRC continued its visits to
    communal jails and military-supervised jails.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The fundamental law
    provides legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention;
    however, authorities rarely observed them in practice, and security
    forces continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. The justice
    system collapsed during the war and genocide of 1994. With help from
    the international community it is being rebuilt slowly and is beginning
    to function more normally. The Government does not have the capacity to
    ensure that provisions in the Constitution are enforced or that due
    process protections are observed.
        In December 1999, there were reports that soldiers illegally
    detained a man from Gisenyi and four others in a ditch for 6 weeks (see
    Section 1.a.).
        On April 22 in the DRC, security forces arrested civil society
    activist Bruno Bahati as he returned from the National Consultations,
    and reportedly kept him in detention in both Rwanda and the Kivu
    Provinces until August (see Section 2.d.). Rwandan authorities freed
    Bahati following international criticism.
        In late July, security forces detained several members of the taxi
    drivers union, ATRACO, who staged a protest and peaceful demonstration
    against the union's leader for internal reasons (see Section 6.a.); it
    was unknown whether the protest was legal.
        In general the law requires that authorities investigate, then
    obtain a judicial warrant before arresting a suspect. The police may
    detain persons for up to 48 hours without a warrant; formal charges
    must be brought within 5 days of arrest. These provisions are
    disregarded widely. The law permits preventive detention if authorities
    believe that public safety is threatened or that the accused might
    flee. There is no bail, but the authorities may release a suspect
    pending trial if they are satisfied that there is no risk that the
    person may flee or become a threat to public safety.
        Over 95 percent of the approximately 115,000 individuals presently
    incarcerated are awaiting trial on genocide charges. Some have been in
    jail since 1994. The Government does not have the capacity to process
    cases within a reasonable time frame. In March 1997, the Government,
    with extensive assistance from donors, established mobile groups whose
    mandate is to establish or complete files, which indicate the basis for
    charges, for all prisoners. While these groups have handled more than
    60,000 cases, approximately 18,000 prisoners remain without files. In
    1999 the National Assembly amended the law to permit the continued
    detention of genocide suspects through mid-2001.
        On April 21, former chairman of the Mouvement Democratique
    Republicain (MDR) political party Bonaventure Ubalijoro was released
    provisionally for humanitarian reasons after 13 months in prison
    without charges. He had been arrested in March 1999, allegedly for
    embezzlement, but there were rumors that Ubalijoro was arrested for his
    presumed involvement in the death of a dozen prisoners in the 1960's
    while he was Minister of Internal Security.
        Despite some problems with reprisals in communities that had not
    been sufficiently sensitized to receiving released prisoners, the
    Government continued to release prisoners who were elderly, ill,
    without files, acquitted, or sentenced to terms outside of prison.
    Prisoners without files were presented to their villages to allow
    villagers to make complaints against the prisoners or to confirm that
    there was no reason to detain them. As of December, 480 suspects were
    presented to the public in this process, called the Gisovu Project, and
    of these, 226 were released. Many of the nearly 3,000 detainees
    released were those without case files. Rearrests because of community
    criticism were rare. This change was attributed to improved enforcement
    by the Ministry of Justice of the laws governing arrest and to
    recognition of the fact that the existing prison caseload is already
    more than the system can handle. In 1999 in Kibuye prefecture, judicial
    officials delayed the release of 1,000 genocide suspects who have no
    case files due to fear that the community had not been sensitized
    sufficiently to receive the suspects peacefully.
        During the year, international human rights organizations were
    granted access to military detention facilities where civilians
    sometimes are detained.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The fundamental law provides for
    an independent judiciary; however, the Government did not respect this
    provision fully; the judiciary is subject to executive influence and
    also suffers from inefficiency, a lack of resources, and some
    corruption. There were occasional reports of bribery of officials,
    ranging from clerks to judges. The 12-member Anti-Corruption Commission
    charged with fighting corruption in the judiciary continued to make
    progress. It is chaired by the Minister of Justice and charged with
    investigating all activities involving corruption and educating
    citizens on methods that can be used to fight corruption. Several
    magistrates and prosecutors were suspended or dismissed on corruption
    charges during the year. There were reports that some magistrates were
    removed from office from May through August following ``not guilty''
    verdicts of suspects alleged to have participated in the 1994 genocide.
    There also were credible reports that a few magistrates were removed
    from offices on false charges of genocide.
        The fundamental law provides for a system of communal courts,
    appeals courts, and a Supreme Court of six justices. The President
    nominates two candidates for each Supreme Court seat, and the National
    Assembly may choose one or reject both; however, the latter is not
    known to have happened.
        The law provides for public trials with the right to a defense, but
    not at public expense. The shortage of lawyers and the abject poverty
    of most defendants make it difficult for many defendants to obtain
    representation. International NGO's such as Avocats Sans Frontiers (ASF
    or Lawyers Without Borders) provide defense and counsel some of those
    in need, but it is estimated that less than 50 percent of prisoners
    have defense counsel. Lawyers from ASF rarely accept individual cases
    and assist mostly in group trials; numerous individuals represent
    themselves without legal assistance. During the year, new judges,
    prosecutors, and judicial defenders were sworn in and assigned to
    courts throughout the country. Over 100 judicial defenders trained by a
    foreign NGO began their work. However, the Government does not have
    sufficient prosecutors, judges, or courtrooms to hold trials within a
    reasonable time. The judiciary is focused on resolving the enormous
    genocide caseload of some 110,000 prisoners. The Government increased
    its use of group trials as one method of reducing the caseload. It also
    embarked on a nationwide campaign to explain gacaca, a grassroots
    participatory form of justice aimed at prosecuting genocide suspects,
    ahead of its expected enactment. On June 13, the former Secretary
    General in the Ministry of Justice, Aloysie Cyanzayire, was elected
    President of the sixth chamber of the Supreme Court, which will oversee
    the implementation of gacaca. The gacaca bill had not become law by
    year's end, but it is estimated that gacaca trials may begin in 2001.
    According to the draft gacaca law, lawyers will not to be permitted to
    participate officially in gacaca proceedings, and gacaca ``judges'' are
    to be elected by their communities.
        By year's end, approximately 3,343 persons had been judged on
    genocide-related charges, most following group trials. According to a
    detailed study by LIPRODHOR, a local human rights organization, between
    January and September, 1,588 persons were judged. Of the 585 persons
    judged on genocide-related charges between January and March, 58
    received the death penalty; 124 were sentenced to life in prison; 248
    received various prison terms; 75 received other penalties; and 80 were
    acquitted. The vast majority of trials met international standards. The
    military tribunals conducted no trials during the first quarter of the
    year. LIPRODHOR also actively monitors trials and interviews released
    prisoners. No public executions occurred.
        A portion of the Organic Genocide Law is designed to encourage
    confessions in exchange for reduced sentences for the vast majority of
    those involved in the genocide. As a result of efforts by the
    Government, international donors, and NGO's to advertise widely the
    confession provisions, over 20,000 prisoners had confessed since the
    law was implemented in 1996. However, only a small number of
    confessions were processed due to the lengthy administrative review and
    hearing, and the lack of officials to process the confessions through
    the system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
    authorities generally respected these prohibitions.
        Forced conscription has been practiced by the RPA, particularly
    after the RPA entered the conflict in the DRC. Citizens who served in
    the military may be recalled to compulsory duty at any time.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The fundamental law provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted
    freedom of the press in practice, despite some improvements. Some
    journalists were critical of the Government and generally were not
    harassed. Other journalists, including one foreign journalist, claimed
    that the Government intimidated journalists whose reporting was
    contrary to official views. Most journalists practice selfcensorship
    due to fear of government reprisals.
        On September 2, Vales Kwitegetse, a journalist with the government-
    controlled newspaper Imvaho, fled to Uganda after military officers
    threatened his life and beat his wife (see Section 1.c.). Kwitegetse
    was investigating a story about corruption involving the chief of the
    Government's antismuggling unit.
        In September 1999, Helena Nyirabikali, a female journalist who
    worked for the state-owned weekly newspaper Imvaho for over 15 years,
    was arrested on genocide charges. She was transferred to a hospital
    during the year where she died from a heart-related illness.
        In February 1999, John Mugabi, editor of the monthly newspaper
    Newsline, was detained on libel charges after he refused to reveal the
    source(s) for an article he had written. Mugabi was released
    provisionally in May 1999. Several conditions were placed on his
    freedom of movement and travel; however, although those conditions were
    not lifted, he faced no restrictions during the year, and was able to
    travel outside of the country.
        All associations, including the Rwandan Journalists Association
    (ARJ), and all NGO's, must register and apply for a license under the
    NGO legislation that the National Assembly passed in 1999; however,
    this legislation had not become law by year's end. In June the
    Government required all NGO's to reregister and temporary permits were
    awarded pending implementation of the new law. Without a license, the
    Association legally may not act on behalf of its members nor apply for
    assistance from NGO's or other donors. The Government did not act on
    the application of any NGO for a license; however, the Government gave
    temporary permits to NGO's, including the ARJ, in order for them to
    operate legally until the new law is implemented and it can receive a
    license.
        Media sources are limited. There are several privately owned
    newspapers, which publish weekly in English, French, or Kinyarwanda.
    There is no daily newspaper. The Government owns the only national
    radio station and the only television station, which has 5 hours of
    programming per day. The government-controlled radio station, Radio
    Rwanda, is widely listened to and each Sunday broadcasts a call-in
    program, which discusses and debates controversial subjects. Radio
    Rwanda journalists are civil servants of the National Office of
    Information (ORINFOR). The British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts
    on FM from Kigali in several languages. The German broadcasting service
    Deutsche Welle also broadcasts from Kigali.
        The government-owned telecommunications company is the sole
    Internet service provider; however, during the year, several licenses
    were granted to private companies that plan to provide Internet
    services in the future.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The fundamental
    law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the authorities
    limited this right in practice. They legally may require advance notice
    for outdoor rallies, demonstrations, and meetings; authorities
    generally prohibit nighttime meetings.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government limited this right in practice. Private organizations are
    required to register but, with few exceptions (see Section 2.a.), the
    Government generally grants licenses without undue delay. All unions
    must register with the Government (see Section 6.a.).
        The National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Development
    (MRND), and the Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR), both
    implicated in planning and executing the 1994 genocide, are banned by
    law.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, it imposes some restrictions. There is no state religion.
        The Government requires nonprofit organizations, including
    religious groups, to register with the Ministry of Justice in order to
    acquire ``juridical existence.'' This registration generally is routine
    and not burdensome. Relevant legislation makes no provision for tax-
    exempt status for such organizations. Failure to register leaves an
    organization unable to legally conclude agreements with other
    organizations, including agreements to receive assistance.
        There were no reports that government officials barred from office
    persons who refused for religious reasons to take the oath of office;
    such an incident occurred during the 1999 election. The law provides
    for small fines and imprisonment for up to 6 months for anyone who
    interferes with a religious ceremony or with a minister in the exercise
    of his profession.
        The Government forbids religious meetings at night on the grounds
    that insurgents formerly used the guise of nighttime ``religious
    meetings'' to assemble their supporters before attacking nearby
    targets.
        Local officials on several occasions briefly detained persons who,
    on religious grounds, refused to participate in nighttime security
    patrols or cooperate in other government programs. Among the detainees
    were adherents of ``Temperance'' and ``Abagorozi,'' both said to be
    offshoots of the Adventist Church and Jehovah's Witnesses. The
    Government harassed, arrested, and detained some members of Jehovah's
    Witnesses during the first 6 months of the year. Despite these
    accusations, there does not appear to be a pattern of systemic
    government discrimination against any particular religious group.
        After the doomsday cult-related deaths in Uganda in March, the
    Government cautioned local officials to be alert to similar cults in
    Rwanda. In April local officials detained nine leaders and members of a
    religious organization called ``The Evangelic Ministry in Africa and
    the World'' in Byumba prefecture, near the border with Uganda. This
    organization had convinced a number of persons to leave work or school
    and surrender their material possessions in expectation of an imminent
    second coming of Christ.
        Several members of the clergy of various faiths, notably
    Catholicism, have faced charges of genocide in both Rwandan courts and
    the ICTR. In June a Rwandan Court found Roman Catholic Bishop Augustin
    Misago not guilty of all charges related to his actions during the 1994
    genocide. He was released soon after the decision was announced. On
    October 25, two Catholic priests were released when their 1998
    convictions on genocide charges were overturned upon appeal (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Catholic officials have charged that the Government is prejudiced
    against the Church. Catholic officials also have criticized the
    determination of the Government to maintain some massacre sites in
    churches as memorials to the genocide, rather than returning the
    buildings to the Church.
        Numerous human rights groups reported that RPA and Ugandan troops
    in the DRC, as well as various rebel factions, targeted Catholic clergy
    for abuse. Abuses reportedly took the form of attacks on missions,
    killings of priests, the rape of nuns, and the burning of churches.
    Credible reports indicate that occupying troops and their rebel allies
    deliberately targeted Catholic churches as a means of both intimidating
    the local population and in revenge for the Church's perceived role in
    the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
        On February 11, RCD/Goma rebel forces operating in DRC prevented
    the Archbishop of Bukavu, Emmanuel Kataliko, from returning to his
    diocese. Rebels alleged that the Archbishop's Christmas message urged
    harassment of Tutsis in eastern DRC. A number of sources in eastern DRC
    indicate that the decision to exile Kataliko to the town of Bunia was
    made by officials of the Government of Rwanda. Archbishop Kataliko was
    allowed to return to Bukavu, DRC, in September; however, on October 3,
    the Archbishop died of an apparent heart attack while in Rome.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, the Government limited them in practice. Citizens must
    show identification when requested. Travel authorization is not needed
    and citizens can move or settle temporarily anywhere without a
    residence permit. However, citizens must obtain a new national
    identification card when making a permanent move to a new commune.
        Rebel and Rwandan authorities used threats and intimidation to
    prevent several dozen Congolese who had traveled from eastern DRC from
    returning after attending the National Consultations. This action
    resulted in civil society members from eastern DRC being stranded in
    Kinshasa for weeks, and sometimes months, after the National
    Consultations. On April 22, security forces arrested civil society
    activist Bruno Bahati as he returned from the National Consultations,
    and reportedly kept him in detention in both Rwanda and the Kivu
    Provinces until August. Rwandan authorities freed Bahati following
    international criticism (see Section 1.d.).
        Over 600,000 persons were displaced in the northwest in late 1998
    and moved into villages, called umudugudus, as a result of insurgent
    activities and government military operations to halt them. During late
    1998 and the first half of 1999, the displaced persons were moved into
    183 villages under the Government's policy of villagization. Although
    the Government claimed that the move to villages was voluntary, some
    observers believe that many persons were compelled to move by
    government authorities; others may have relocated out fear of
    government security forces or insurgents. The Government no longer
    compels these persons to remain in the villages; however, restrictions
    on where persons can build houses forces some to remain in the
    villages. One NGO estimates that over 90 percent of the population of
    Kibungo prefecture and 60 percent of Umutara prefecture were living in
    villages; however, other sources dispute those percentages.
        The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylum
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Constitution recognizes
    the right to asylum ``under conditions determined by law;'' however,
    there is no law in place to recognize refugees. The Government
    cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and provided first asylum to a number of refugees. The vast
    majority were Congolese refugees who fled their country during unrest
    in 1996. Approximately 500 Burundians still are awaiting compensation
    for their property seized in 1997 when the Government revoked their
    refugee status, granted in the 1970's.
        Over 80,000 Rwandan refugees remain in the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda,
    Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Angola, Republic of the Congo, Cameroon,
    Central African Republic, Togo, and Benin. However, due to the conflict
    in the DRC, many refugees have returned to the country. The average
    weekly rate of return of refugees from northeast DRC was approximately
    400.
        There were reports of persons from Kibungo prefecture seeking
    refuge in Tanzania during the year, at least in part due to drought
    conditions. Other persons in the region left after men or boys in their
    families reportedly disappeared (see Section 1.b.). With the
    replacement of the Kibungo prefect and other local leaders in August,
    the flow of refugees into Tanzania from Kibungo decreased
    significantly. By September approximately 60 refugees per week returned
    from Tanzania.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government by
    democratic means. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the dominant
    political force in the country. Following the genocide of 1994,
    political parties agreed to form a government of national unity based
    on the 1992-93 Arusha Accords. This agreement laid the basis for the
    apportionment of ministries and other offices. The RPF brought
    representatives of four opposition parties into the Government after
    its military victory in 1994, but none of the officials was elected.
    Political parties also agreed to suspend political activities for a
    period of 5 years, during which time the transition to elected
    government was to have been completed. This 5year period was scheduled
    to end in July 1999; however, the Government announced in June 1999 the
    extension of the transition period by 4 additional years. The
    announcement did not mention political party activities; however, the
    parties continue to observe the suspension. Other political parties
    alleged that the RPF actively promoted itself regionally and at the
    communal level, while prohibiting other political parties from doing
    the same. A National Assembly is functioning, with nine political
    entities represented, including the RPA. The political bureaus or
    executive committees of their respective parties chose assembly
    members, known as deputies. For the first time in 1999, the ``political
    forum,'' an informal grouping of senior members of each of the
    political parties represented in parliament, dismissed 21 deputies for
    misconduct, alleged corruption, or incompetence. The parliamentary
    commissions of inquiry investigated allegations of corruption and other
    alleged misdeeds of ministers. Some of the inquiries resulted in the
    sanctioning and resignation of ministers.
        The central Government appoints officials at the commune and
    prefecture levels. The Government announced that planned communal
    elections, the first since 1968, would be postponed until 2001 due to
    legislative, logistical, and financial difficulties. Political parties
    will not participate in the communal elections. In March 1999, the
    Government held elections for local development committees at the cell
    level (the smallest geographic jurisdiction) and sectors (the
    nextlargest jurisdiction). Some of the committees were very active;
    they proposed, selected, and implemented development projects financed
    by the limited resources available to them.
        The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, charged with
    educating the public on such issues as ethnic understanding, peace
    building, history, and civics, is active. The National Constitution
    Commission, charged with the preparation of a new Constitution, was
    established and its 12 members appointed in November.
        No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
    political life; however, women remain underrepresented in politics and
    in the Government. The Constitution was revised to increase the number
    of seats in the assembly from 70 to 74, including 2 seats for female
    representatives; however, the women were not sworn in by year's end.
    Prior to the increase in seats, there were 18 female assembly members
    and 3 female cabinet members. The Batwa ethnic group also is largely
    underrepresented in government and politics.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A variety of domestic human rights groups operate without
    government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights violations. However, none has the resources to conduct
    extensive human rights monitoring. Local NGO activities often are
    limited to receiving and compiling reports from citizens about human
    rights abuses and conducting selective investigations. Reports are
    published occasionally; statements criticizing specific incidents are
    more common. Only one or two local human rights NGO's are viewed as
    strictly impartial.
        The Government was critical of the reports by some international
    human rights NGO's, and was hostile towards those whose reporting was
    perceived as biased and inaccurate. In June the Government produced
    point-by-point refutations to the accusations contained in the Human
    Rights Watch report published in April, calling into question the
    authors' motives. At least one international NGO has complained that
    government security forces have harassed some of its informants (see
    Section 1.c.).
        The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) hosted several
    human rights seminars during the year. The Government allows the
    commission to operate independently and without undue influence. The
    NCHR intervened in some cases of human rights abuses on behalf of
    citizens. For example, following a request from family members, the
    NCHR raised with the Government the case of four men arrested in
    Burundi and Tanzania and forcibly repatriated to the country (see
    Section 1.c.).
        The ICRC operates normally and is active in visiting prisons.
        The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, continued to prosecute
    genocide suspects during the year (see Section 1.a.). Cooperation
    between the Government and the ICTR improved following the ICTR Appeals
    Chamber's March 31 decision that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza remain in ICTR
    custody to be tried for genocide and crimes against humanity; his trial
    began on September 18 (see Section 1.a.). The judges revised their
    decision on the basis of the chief prosecutor's introduction of
    additional facts. The ICTR operates under an agreement signed in 1999,
    which clarified some aspects of protection measures, but concentrated
    largely on the ICTR staff's privileges and immunities. During the year,
    the Government of Swaziland signed an agreement with the ICTR to accept
    prisoners convicted by the ICTR; the Governments of Mali and Benin
    signed similar agreements in 1999. The Government of Italy also agreed
    to house Georges Riuggiu, the only non-Rwandan in ICTR custody;
    however, the implementation of this agreement had not occurred by
    year's end. On February 6, in London, Lt. Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi was
    arrested and transferred to Arusha on genocide charges. On May 23,
    Major Francois-Xavier Nzuwonemey, former Reconnaissance Battalion
    Commander, was transferred from France to Arusha. In March Elizaphan
    Ntakirutimana was extradited to Arusha for trial.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the
    law, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, origin,
    ethnicity, clan, sex, opinion, religion, or social standing; however,
    the Government provides only limited enforcement of these provisions.
        Women.--Violence against women is common. Wife beating and domestic
    violence occur frequently. Cases normally are handled within the
    context of the extended family and rarely come before the courts.
        Numerous suspects have been tried and convicted for crimes of
    violence against women and girls. In April Aman Bazambanza was found
    guilty in a 15 suspect group trial of raping 2 young girls in Kigali
    rural prefecture; the court sentenced 10 of the suspects to 20 years in
    prison and 4 others to 10 years. The lengthy sentences for rape were
    the first such sentences in the justice system. Several other rape
    trials were held throughout the country in which perpetrators received
    the maximum sentences under the law.
        Despite constitutional provisions, women continue to face
    discrimination. Women traditionally perform most of the subsistence
    farming and play a limited role in the modern sector; however, a number
    of women run small and medium-sized enterprises or are executives.
    Women have limited opportunities for education, employment, and
    promotion. The 1992 Family Code generally improved the legal position
    of women in matters relating to marriage, divorce, and child custody
    but does not meet the constitutional commitment to gender equality. For
    example, the code formally designates men as heads of households. Civil
    society groups and human rights NGO's provided training on women's
    rights under the matrimonial regimes and inheritance law, which came
    into effect at the end of 1999. The law allows women to inherit
    property from their husbands and fathers and allows couples to choose
    the type of property rights they wish to adopt (i.e., joint ownership,
    community property, etc.).
        The Ministry of Gender and Women in Development is charged with
    handling issues of particular concern to women. The Minister is an
    active advocate for women's rights. Since the 1994 genocide a large
    number of women's groups has emerged. These organizations are extremely
    active in promoting women's issues, particularly problems faced by
    widows, orphaned girls, and households headed by children, and
    addressing social and cultural barriers to the equality of women.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
    welfare. It attempts to provide education and health care to every
    child. Over 85 percent of the children who were separated from or lost
    their parents during the 1994 genocide and the massive repatriation in
    1996 have been reunited with family members or placed in foster homes.
    At an August conference on children's rights hosted by UNICEF, the
    Government asked for the immediate return of approximately 30,000
    children living abroad; it claims that most were taken without the
    consent of their parents during the genocide. Many of the children
    abroad have been adopted. In November the Government asked that 41
    children adopted in Italy be repatriated; discussions between the
    Governments of Rwanda and Italy continued at year's end.
        All families must pay school fees to enroll a child. The Government
    routinely waived fees for orphans. UNICEF estimates that over 60,000
    children age 18 or younger head households in the country. The
    Government worked closely with local and international NGO's to secure
    assistance for children in such situations. The Government regularly
    held sessions with local officials to sensitize them to the needs of
    households headed by children and emphasized the additional
    responsibility officials bear in connection with this group.
        The public schools lack essential and basic supplies and cannot
    accommodate all children of primary school age. A UNICEF study reports
    that 400,000 school-aged children were unable to go to school in 1999.
    Private schools often are too distant or too expensive to serve as an
    alternative for many children. Entry to secondary school is by
    examination. According to the 1996 study conducted by the Government
    and the U.N. Population Fund, 59.6 percent of the population age six
    and over had primary education, but only 48 percent of the whole
    population is literate; 52 percent of men are literate compared to 45
    percent of women. Only 3.9 percent of citizens had completed secondary
    school and only 0.2 percent had an university education. The highest
    percentage of those with no education is in the 30andover age group,
    indicating a trend toward increased educational levels in recent years.
        Although the Penal Code prohibits the imprisonment of children with
    adults, the ICRC reported that 185 children, most of whom are age 2 or
    younger, are incarcerated with their mothers. In 1999 the ICRC reported
    that approximately 570 children who were under the age of 14 at the
    time of their arrest are incarcerated on genocide-related charges; some
    25 children under the age of 14 currently are incarcerated.
        On February 1, local authorities again arrested 1,300 street
    children and ordered them to return to their communes of origin or face
    the penalties for vagabondage and other crimes attributed to them. Many
    returned to street again a short time later.
        In the DRC, RPA and Ugandan troops, in addition to RCD rebels,
    reportedly abducted many young women from the villages they raided.
    These night raids on villages became so frequent that in many parts of
    the Kivu Provinces rural peasants slept in their fields.
        People with Disabilities.--Although there are no laws restricting
    persons with disabilities from employment, education, or other state
    services, in practice few disabled persons have access to education or
    employment. No laws or provisions mandate access to public facilities.
        Indigenous People.--With the removal of ethnic labels from
    identification cards in 1996, the Batwa are no longer designated
    officially as an ``ethnic group.'' Less than 1 percent of the
    population is considered Batwa. The Batwa, survivors of the Twa (Pygmy)
    tribes of the mountainous forest areas bordering the DRC, exist on the
    margins of society and continued to be treated as inferior citizens by
    both the Hutu and Tutsi groups. There are seven Batwa organizations
    focused on the protection of their interests, access to land, housing,
    and education, and eradication of discrimination against them; however,
    they have been unable to protect their interests. Few Batwa have access
    to the education system, resulting in their minimal representation in
    government institutions. There is no reliable information on specific
    human rights abuses perpetrated against the Batwa population since the
    1994 upheaval. There is one Batwa representative on the National
    Commission for Human Rights.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Before April 1994, an estimated
    85 percent of citizens were Hutu, 14 percent were Tutsi, and 1 percent
    were Batwa (Twa). However, Hutus and Tutsis are not clearly distinct
    groups, since the two have intermarried for generations. The 1994 mass
    killings and migrations probably affected the ethnic composition of the
    population, but the extent and nature of the changes are unknown.
        Large-scale interethnic violence in the country between Hutus and
    Tutsis has erupted on three occasions since independence in 1962,
    resulting on each occasion in tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths.
    The most recent and severe outbreak of such violence, in 1994, involved
    genocidal killing of much of the Tutsi population under the direction a
    Hutu-dominated government and implemented in large part by Hutu-
    dominated armed forces (now the ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militia; that
    genocide ended later the same year when a predominately Tutsi militia,
    operating out of Uganda and occupied Rwandan territory, overthrew that
    government and established the current Government. The Government has
    called for national reconciliation and committed itself to abolishing
    policies of the former government that had created and deepened ethnic
    cleavages. It eliminated references to ethnic origin from the national
    identity card. The Government has not addressed statutorily the problem
    of ethnic quotas in education, training, and government employment, but
    discrimination against the Tutsi minority in education, training, and
    government employment effectively ceased with the change of government
    in 1994. Some Hutu organizations and individuals accuse the Government
    of favoring Tutsis, particularly English-speaking Tutsis, in government
    employment, admission to professional schooling, recruitment into or
    promotion within the army, and other matters. Some organizations also
    complain that in hiring, the government favors English-speaking Tutsis
    over French-speaking Tutsis.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right to create professional associations and labor unions, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. The labor
    movement has been hampered in practice due to the massive disruptions
    caused by the 1994 genocide. Unions have been continued to regroup and
    assert themselves.
        Union membership is voluntary and open to all salaried workers,
    including public sector employees. There are no restrictions on the
    right of association, but all unions must register with the Ministry of
    Justice for official recognition. There are no known cases in which the
    Government denied recognition. The law prohibits unions from having
    political affiliations, but in practice this is not always respected.
    Union activists complain that employers threaten to fire employees who
    attempt to organize or join unions.
        Organized labor represents only a small part of the work force.
    More than 90 percent of workers are engaged in small-scale subsistence
    farming. About 7 percent work in the modern (wage) sector, including
    both public and private industrial production, and about 75 percent of
    those active in the modern sector are members of labor unions.
        Until 1991 the Central Union of Rwandan Workers (CESTRAR) was the
    only authorized trade union organization. With the political reforms
    introduced in the 1991 Constitution, the CESTRAR officially became
    independent of the Government and the later-outlawed MRND political
    party. Unions outside the CESTRAR have been registered.
        The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
    public service workers. A union's executive committee must approve a
    strike, and a union must try to resolve its differences first with
    management according to steps prescribed by the Ministry of Public
    Service and Labor. Members of the taxi drivers union, ATRACO, staged a
    protest and peaceful demonstration against the union's leader for
    internal reasons in late July; security forces detained several persons
    (see Section 1.d.).
        Labor organizations may affiliate with international labor bodies.
    The CESTRAR is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Union
    Unity and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for collective bargaining, although only the
    CESTRAR had an established collective bargaining agreement with the
    Government. In practice since most union members are in the public
    sector, the Government is involved intimately in the collective
    bargaining process (see Section 6.e.).
        The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and there were reports
    during the year that some employers threatened their employees who
    wished to join unions. No formal mechanisms exist to resolve complaints
    involving discrimination against unions.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor; however, prisoners are assigned to work details, which
    generally involved rebuilding houses, clearing land, or other public
    maintenance duties. Prisoners also can be hired to perform work on
    private residences and businesses. It is unclear how much revenue the
    prisoners are given in return for their work.
        Although the law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded
    labor by children, such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age For
    Employment.--Except for subsistence agriculture, the law prohibits
    children under age 18 from working without their parents' or guardians'
    authorization, and they generally may not work at night. The minimum
    age for full employment is 18 years, and 14 years for apprenticeships,
    providing that the child has completed primary school. The Ministry of
    Public Service and Labor has not enforced child labor laws effectively;
    however, in July the Ministry of Public Service and Labor and the
    Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs, in collaboration with
    UNICEF, announced a national program aimed at educating children about
    their rights. It is rare to see child labor outside the agricultural
    sector.
        The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
    children; however, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
    6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Public Service
    and Labor sets minimum wages in the small modern sector. The
    Government, the main employer, effectively sets most other wage rates
    as well. There is no single minimum wage; minimum wages vary according
    to the nature of the job. The minimum wages paid are insufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family and in
    practice, workers accept less than the minimum wage. Often families
    supplement their incomes by working in small business or subsistence
    agriculture.
        Officially, government offices and private sector entities have a
    40hour workweek. The law controls hours of work and occupational health
    and safety standards in the modern wage sector, but labor inspectors
    from the Ministry of Public Service and Labor enforce them only
    loosely. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without jeopardizing their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                             SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

        The Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe is a multiparty
    democracy. The Government is composed of an executive branch and a
    unicameral legislature (the National Assembly). The President appoints
    the Prime Minister, who in turn appoints the ministers of the
    Government. Miguel Trovoada, leader of the Independent Democratic
    Alliance (ADI), was reelected President in 1996 for a second 5-year
    term in an election deemed generally free and fair by international
    observers, despite allegations of an unconstitutional modification of
    the voter lists between the first and second rounds. In the November
    1998 legislative elections, the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome
    and Principe (MLSTP) won an outright majority with 31 of 55 seats, and
    holds all 10 seats in the Cabinet. The judiciary is generally
    independent; however, it is subject at times to influence and
    manipulation.
        The Minister of National Defense, Security, and Internal Order
    supervises the military services and the police. Many members of the
    military are part-time farmers or fishermen. After a military mutiny in
    1995, the Government and international donors have dedicated resources
    to improving soldiers' living conditions. No defense expenditures have
    been used for lethal weapons since the advent of multiparty democracy
    in 1990.
        The economy is based on the export of a single product, cocoa,
    produced in an archaic, state-run system of plantations called
    ``rocas.'' The Government has privatized some of the state-held land
    but had limited success in privatizing state-owned enterprises. The
    Government has not been successful in its efforts at structural
    adjustment, and the economy continued to face serious difficulties.
    While the inflation rate held at 10 percent during the year and the
    currency stabilized, the country remained highly dependent on foreign
    aid, and external debt is six times gross domestic product. Per capita
    income is less than $330 per year, and economic growth is slow.
    Unemployment, although difficult to quantify, remained very high.
        The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens;
    however, there were problems in a few areas. The principal human rights
    problems continued to be harsh prison conditions, an inefficient
    judicial system, violence and discrimination against women, and
    outdated plantation labor practices that limit worker rights.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            from:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman
    punishment, and the Government respects these prohibitions in practice.
    There were no reports of violations during arrests or interrogations.
        Prison conditions are harsh but not life threatening. Facilities
    are overcrowded, and food is inadequate. Women and men are held
    separately, and juveniles are separated from adults.
        Human rights monitors are not known to have requested permission to
    make prison visits; it is believed that the Government would permit
    such visits if requested.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    respects these prohibitions in practice.
        Exile is not used as a punishment. All those exiled under the one-
    party regime of 1975 to 1990 remain free to return, and several
    prominent politicians have done so.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respect the independence of
    the judiciary in principle; however, the judicial system is subject to
    influence and manipulation. The judiciary has returned verdicts against
    both the President and the Government. The Government has important
    powers relating to the judiciary, including setting salaries for judges
    and all ministerial employees in accordance with standard government
    salary guidelines. Government salaries are extremely low, and the
    authorities are concerned that judges may be tempted to accept bribes.
        The legal system is based on Portuguese and customary law, with the
    Supreme Court at the apex.
        The Constitution provides for the right to fair public trial, the
    right of appeal, and the right to legal representation. However, in
    practice the judicial infrastructure suffers from severe budgetary
    constraints, inadequate facilities, and a shortage of trained judges
    and lawyers, causing long delays in bringing cases to court and greatly
    hindering investigations in criminal cases.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the integrity of the
    person and the right to privacy of home, correspondence, and private
    communication, and the Government respects these provisions in
    practice. The Government does not engage in intrusive practices, such
    as surveillance of persons or the monitoring of communications. The
    judicial police are responsible for criminal investigations and must
    obtain authorization from the Ministry of Justice to conduct searches.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and the Government
    generally respects these rights in practice. Two government-run and six
    independent newspapers and newsletters are published sporadically,
    usually on a monthly or bimonthly basis.
        Television and radio are state operated. While there are no
    independent local stations, no laws forbid them. The Voice of America,
    Radio International Portugal, and Radio France International
    rebroadcast locally. The law grants all opposition parties access to
    the state-run media, including a minimum of 3 minutes per month on
    television.
        All parties freely distribute newsletters and press releases
    stating their views and criticizing the Government, the President, and
    one another. There were no reports of government censorship or threats
    of censorship from any group, nor any reports of efforts by national
    security forces to suppress criticism.
        The Government does not restrict access to or the use of e-mail,
    the Internet, or satellite telephones. However, the only domestic
    Internet service provider is a joint venture in which the Government's
    Post and Telecommunications Office is a partner, and the cost of
    Internet access remains high; consequently, access remains limited in
    practice.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. The Government requires that requests for
    authorization for large-scale events be filed 48 hours in advance, but
    it generally grants the appropriate permits.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        Domestic law contains no specific provisions for granting asylee or
    refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Regarding
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the authorities
    traditionally have welcomed those seeking refuge or asylum. No requests
    for first asylum were reported during the year, but in theory the
    Government would be prepared to grant such requests.
        There were no reports that persons were forced to return to a
    country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens exercised this right for the first time in 1991 in free
    and fair presidential and legislative elections, and subsequently in
    the 1994 and 1998 legislative elections, and the 1996 presidential
    elections. These elections resulted in the peaceful transfer of power
    between political party coalitions. Voter participation exceeded 80
    percent in these elections. International observers noted that the 1998
    legislative elections were free and transparent. Each of the three
    principal political parties has significant representation in the
    unicameral National Assembly. Elections are by secret ballot on the
    basis of universal suffrage for citizens 18 years of age or older. In
    the 1998 legislative elections, the MLSTP won an outright majority with
    31 out of 55 seats and filled all 10 Cabinet positions.
        The Constitution provides for the election of the President, who as
    Head of State names the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister appoints
    members of the Government.
        There are no restrictions in law or in practice on the
    participation of women in politics; however, women are underrepresented
    in politics and government. Women hold 4 of 55 seats in the National
    Assembly, 1 of 12 seats in the Cabinet, and 3 of 4 seats on the Supreme
    Court.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A small number of local human rights groups have formed since 1991
    and operate without restriction or governmental interference. There
    were no known requests by international human rights groups to visit
    the country.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens
    regardless of sex, race, racial origin, political tendency, creed, or
    philosophic conviction; however, the Government has not sought actively
    to enforce these provisions.
        Women.--While the extent of the problem is unknown, violence
    against women occurs, and medical professionals and officials reported
    firsthand experience in dealing with violence, including rape. They
    also reported that although women have the right to legal recourse--
    including against spouses--many were reluctant to bring legal action or
    were ignorant of their rights under the law. Traditional beliefs and
    practices also inhibit women from taking domestic disputes outside the
    family.
        While the Constitution stipulates that women and men have equal
    political, economic, and social rights, and while many women have
    access to opportunities in education, business, and government, in
    practice women still encounter significant societal discrimination.
    Traditional beliefs concerning the division of labor between men and
    women leave women with much of the hard work in agriculture, with most
    child-rearing responsibilities, and with less access to education and
    to professions. According to a 1991 study, female literacy is
    approximately 62 percent, while male literacy is approximately 85
    percent.
        Children.--A number of government and donor-funded programs were
    established to improve conditions for children, notably an ongoing
    malaria control project and purchase of school and medical equipment.
    There has been improvement in maternity and infant care, in nutrition,
    and in access to basic health services, especially in urban areas.
    Mistreatment of children was not widespread; however, there were few
    social protections for orphans and abandoned children.
        Education is free and universal; there are no differences between
    the treatment of girls and boys in regard to education. Education is
    compulsory through sixth grade, irrespective of the age of the student.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate access to
    buildings, transportation, or services for persons with disabilities.
    There are no reports of discrimination against the disabled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association and the right to strike. Few unions exist in the very
    small modern wage sector; however, independent cooperatives have taken
    advantage of the government land distribution program to attract
    workers and in many cases to improve production and incomes
    significantly. Public sector employees still make up the great majority
    of wage earners. Strikes are legal, including those by government
    employees and other essential workers. There were frequent strikes
    during the year by civil servants seeking an increase in the minimum
    wage, while the Government sought to reduce expenses. However, in
    November the Government reached agreement with the strikers. There are
    no laws or regulations that prohibit employers from retaliating against
    strikers; however, there were no reports of retaliation.
        No restrictions bar trade unions from joining federations or
    affiliating with international bodies, but none have done so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides that workers may organize and bargain
    collectively; however, due to its role as the principal employer in the
    wage sector, the Government remains the key interlocutor for labor on
    all matters, including wages. There are no laws prohibiting antiunion
    discrimination, but there were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor, and it is not known to occur. The Government
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices are
    not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Employers in the modern wage sector generally respect the
    legally mandated minimum employment age of 18 years. The Ministry of
    Justice and Labor is responsible for enforcing this law. Children are
    engaged in labor in subsistence agriculture, on plantations, and in
    informal commerce, sometimes from an early age. The Government
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the prohibition is
    respected in practice (see Section 6.c.). The Ministry of Labor is
    responsible for enforcing the prohibition against forced and bonded
    labor by children.
        The Government has not taken action on ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Working conditions on many of
    the state-owned plantations--the largest wage employment sector--are
    extremely bad. There is no legally mandated minimum wage. The average
    salary for plantation workers does not provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family, and the real value of their pay is
    eroded constantly by high rates of inflation. In principle workers and
    their families are provided free (but inadequate) housing, rudimentary
    education for their children, and health care, as well as the privilege
    of reduced prices and credit at the ``company store.'' These
    arrangements are intended to subsidize food and clothing. However,
    corruption is widespread, and international lending institutions have
    criticized the Government for ineffective administration of these
    subsidies. Workers often are forced to pay higher prices on the
    parallel market to obtain the goods theoretically provided at a
    discount as part of their compensation.
        The Government, with foreign donor assistance, privatized or
    redistributed the land in many state-run plantations in an effort to
    improve work, pay, and living conditions. While the program has
    redistributed some land, not all of the newly privatized plantations
    were successful, particularly because the world price for cocoa
    dropped.
        The legal workweek is 40 hours with 48 consecutive hours mandated
    for a rest period, a norm respected in the modern wage sector. The 1979
    Social Security Law prescribes basic occupational health and safety
    standards. Inspectors from the Ministry of Justice and Labor are
    responsible for enforcement of these standards, but their efforts are
    ineffective. Employees have the right under the law to leave unsafe
    working conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    SENEGAL

        Senegal is a moderately decentralized republic dominated by a
    strong presidency. In March opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, backed by
    a coalition of opposition parties, defeated President Abdou Diouf,
    whose Socialist Party had dominated political life for the past 40
    years, in an election considered to be both free and fair and marred
    only by reports of sporadic pre-election violence and minor procedural
    irregularities. The post election transition period was markedly free
    from violence and characterized by good conduct on the part of all
    candidates. In 1998 the Government amended the Constitution to create a
    second legislative chamber, a Senate, to which the President appoints
    one-fifth of the members, and an electoral college consisting largely
    of elected local and regional government officials chooses most of the
    others. In protest against this electoral system, most of the
    opposition parties boycotted the first senatorial elections held by the
    Government in January 1999. The ruling Socialist Party won all seats in
    this election, and the Government formally inaugurated the Senate in
    February 1999. In May 1998, the PS won 50 percent of votes cast and 93
    of 140 seats in elections for an expanded National Assembly. Unlike
    previous elections, these were supervised by a National Election
    Observatory (ONEL), independent of the Government. Although the
    elections were marred by violence and by persistent flaws in the
    electoral system, observers concluded that they were generally free,
    fair, and transparent. The Government continued to implement
    decentralized regional and local administrations. Sporadic fighting
    continued in the Casamance area in the southern part of the country
    between the Government and the secessionist Movement of Democratic
    Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). On December 16, the Government and the
    MFDC, joined by representatives from both the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau,
    met in Zinguinchor to start a new round of peace talks. The prospects
    for success of these talks were still unclear by year's end. The
    Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is
    subject in practice to government influence and pressure.
        The armed forces are professional and generally disciplined. They
    traditionally remain aloof from politics and are firmly under civilian
    control. The paramilitary gendarmerie and the police are less
    professional and less disciplined. Some members of the security forces,
    the gendarmerie, and the police continued to commit serious human
    rights abuses.
        The country is predominantly agricultural with about 70 percent of
    the labor force engaged in farming. Recorded gross domestic product
    (GDP) per capita is estimated at about $600, but this excludes a large
    informal economy. Since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, the
    Government has implemented a series of economic policy reforms to
    enhance competitiveness by dismantling monopolies, liberalizing
    markets, and privatizing several state-owned industries. Recorded GDP
    per capita has grown at an average rate of between 2 and 3 percent per
    year since 1995. Exports account for about one-third of recorded GDP,
    and are led by fish and fish products, phosphates and fertilizers,
    tourism, and peanuts. The Government continued to receive external
    assistance from international financial institutions and other sources,
    and such assistance represents approximately 32 percent of the national
    budget.
        The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens in
    some areas; however, its human rights record was marked by serious
    problems in other areas. Free and fair presidential elections in March,
    in which the opposition candidate won, ended the Socialist Party's
    domination of political life; however, the previous Government's 1998
    creation of a second legislative chamber, in which no members are
    elected directly by the citizenry and one-fifth of the members are
    appointed by the President, reduced the ability of citizens to change
    their Government and increased the presidency's domination of the
    State. Government forces reportedly were responsible for extrajudicial
    killings, including some civilian deaths. Police tortured and beat
    suspects during questioning and arbitrarily arrested and detained
    persons.
        Prison conditions are poor, and lengthy pretrial detention is a
    problem. The Government rarely tries or punishes members of the
    military, gendarmerie, or police for human rights abuses. The judiciary
    is subject to government influence and pressure and suffers from low
    salaries and insufficient resources. In the past, the police sometimes
    infringed on citizens'' privacy rights. At times the Government limited
    freedom of the press. There were some instances in which the Government
    limited freedom of assembly. In April the Government announced the
    establishment of a Human Rights Office in the President's office to
    investigate complaints filed by individuals regarding human rights
    violations. The office had not begun to function by year's end,
    although it reportedly received numerous letters. Domestic violence and
    discrimination against women, female genital mutilation, and child
    labor remained problems. Mob violence also is a problem.
        Rebel MFDC forces reportedly were responsible for killings,
    torture, and rape.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of political killings by government officials;
    however, government forces reportedly were responsible for
    extrajudicial killings, including some civilian deaths. After a period
    of calm during 1999, the incidence of violence in the Casamance region
    increased during the year and resulted in some deaths. During the year,
    the press continued to report on frequent small arms attacks, raids,
    ambushes and clashes with military forces by suspected MFDC gunmen,
    with continuing military and civilian fatalities.
        While there were no new reported cases of death caused by civilian
    law enforcement authorities this year, cases from previous years
    remained unsolved.
        No investigation or other action was taken in the April 1999 case
    in which security forces shot a young man mistaken for a rebel.
        In February 1998, police officers from the Thiaroye station in
    Dakar arrested and beat a young man after he tried to flee during an
    identity verification check. The young man died before receiving
    medical care, and the authorities listed the cause of death as natural.
    With the help of the African Assembly for the Defense of Human rights
    (RADDHO), a local human rights organization, the family of the deceased
    filed a legal complaint. According to RADDHO, in August 1999 the Dakar
    regional court supported the finding of ``death from natural causes''
    and closed the case.
        In December 1997, a child was shot and killed in the Hann area of
    Dakar when police opened fire on a group that was demonstrating against
    an eviction order. With the help of RADDHO, the family of the deceased
    filed a legal complaint in December 1998 which was still pending at
    year's end.
        On many occasions vigilante groups and mobs lynched suspected
    thieves. This type of mob violence generally remains unpunished.
    However, on October 18, a mob in Medina killed a man suspected of
    having committed a burglary in the area. Members of the household
    allegedly robbed by the man and some of their neighbors were charged
    with manslaughter and tried on November 15 by the regional court in
    Dakar. On November 30, the court sentenced the accused to 6 months in
    prison.
        On April 11, a group of suspected MFDC gunmen attacked a military
    post in Sare Wali, about 19 miles from the provincial capital of Kolda
    close to the border with Guinea-Bissau, killing 3 government soldiers.
    According to official sources, government forces killed 15 rebels
    during the incident. In a separate incident on April 11 suspected MFDC
    gunmen attacked the village of Fanda, during which they killed one
    government soldier, harassed civilians and stole property. According to
    official press sources, government security forces killed several MFDC
    gunmen during the attack.
        There were at least two reports of deaths caused by the use of
    landmines by suspected MFDC rebels in the Casamance region. The
    incidents reportedly occurred in May in the Niomone and Cap Skirring
    areas, with eight civilian deaths reported in the Niomone area and two
    in the Skirring area.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances during the year.
        In 1999 there were several credible reports of disappearances in
    connection with the conflict in the Casamance. In its 1999 annual
    report, RADDHO accused security forces of responsibility for the
    disappearance of seven civilians in June, and 3 suspected rebels in
    April of that year (see Section 1.d.). These persons remained
    unaccounted for at year's end.
        In September a group of Casamance professionals helped family
    members of two missing persons, Alexis Etienne Diatta and Jean Diandy,
    file legal complaints against security forces for abduction. The
    families of both Diatta and Diandy reported the disappearances to
    civilian authorities, who were unsuccessful in finding either person.
    Government investigations into both disappearances reportedly are
    underway.
        RADDHO alleged that government security forces abducted two
    civilians in September and December 1998 respectively. Their
    whereabouts remain unknown.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There are credible reports that police and gendarmes often
    beat suspects during questioning and pretrial detention, in spite of
    constitutional prohibitions against such treatment. The press
    repeatedly reported instances of torture perpetrated by police, usually
    beatings, and the problem remained a serious public concern.
        According to human rights activists from Guinea-Bissau, in June
    Senegalese security officials arrested four Guinea Bissauan citizens
    from the border village of Kuntima in northern GuineaBissau. The four
    reportedly were suspected of involvement in attacks by armed robbers
    from Guinea-Bissau, or by MFDC separatist rebels. Human rights
    activists alleged that security forces tortured the suspects while they
    were detained in a jail in the city of Kolda. The suspects were
    released later that month.
        Despite stronger legal provisions against torture put in place in
    1997, those cases that are pursued often take years before a final
    judgment is reached. Government action to resolve the October 1998 case
    of alleged rough, abusive, and inhuman treatment of RADDHO's Casamance
    regional office head, Ankilling Diabone, by security forces remained
    pending during the year. According to RADDHO, the Government opened an
    investigation that it could not complete without interviewing Diabone,
    who went to France and has declined to return.
        According to credible press reports, on May 5 suspected MFDC
    separatist rebels brutalized and raped four women abducted from a farm
    in Sanoun, close to the Guinea-Bissau border. The women were released
    the following day.
        On June 21 suspected MFDC rebels attacked the village of Sare
    Kambi, and stole property. During the attack gunmen beat up a man and
    abducted his two wives. The rebels reportedly were attacking villages
    in the border area in retaliation for their alleged cooperation with
    government security forces.
        On July 4, a panel of judges in the Court of Criminal Appeals
    dropped charges of torture and complicity in crimes against humanity
    made against former Chadian president Hissen Habre, arguing that the
    court has no jurisdiction in the case. Attorneys representing the
    coalition of human rights organizations that initiated the lawsuit
    appealed the decision before the Court of Final Appeals, and the case
    was pending at year's end.
        Prison conditions are poor. Prisons remain overcrowded, and food
    and health care are inadequate. However, there have been no reports of
    deaths in prison as a result of these conditions.
        The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights
    monitors. Local human rights groups such as RADDHO, the National
    Organization for Human Rights (ONDH), and the International Prison
    Observatory occasionally visit prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the authorities at
    times arbitrarily arrest and detain persons.
        The law specifies that warrants, issued by judges, are required for
    arrests; however, laws also grant the police broad powers to detain
    prisoners for lengthy periods. Police officers may hold without charge
    a person suspected of a crime for 48 hours after arrest and for up to
    96 hours if ordered by a public prosecutor. This period may be doubled
    in the case of crimes against the security of the State. The prosecutor
    decides whether to forward the case to an investigating judge who may
    open an investigation. At this point, the suspects are charged
    preliminarily and may be held or released on their own recognizance.
    There is a system of bail, but it rarely is used. During the initial 48
    hours of detention the accused has no access to family or an attorney,
    but has the right to demand a medical exam. Government-sponsored
    legislation passed in January 1999 enhanced the rights of the accused
    by according the right to an attorney after this initial period of
    detention. Previously this right was accorded only after formal charges
    were filed. The accused may be held in custody for 6 months, and the
    investigating magistrate can certify that an additional 6-month
    extension is required. Such extensions may be reviewed by a court on
    appeal. The new legislation also gave judges the right to order release
    pending trial without the prosecutor's consent.
        Police rarely are prosecuted for violations of arrest and detention
    procedures, and the authorities may detain a prisoner for long periods
    of time while they investigate and build a case against a suspect. The
    authorities routinely hold prisoners in custody unless and until a
    court demands their release. Despite the 6-month limitation on
    detention, the time between the charging phase and trial averages 2
    years. In a 1998 effort to improve the administration of justice the
    Government recruited 48 law school graduates to be trained as
    magistrates over a 2year period. In 1999 approximately 90 graduated
    judges were assigned to different courts nationwide, which allowed for
    the opening of judicial districts in all 30 administrative districts
    and access to the judicial system by citizens in the countryside.
        According to human rights activists from Guinea-Bissau, in June
    Senegalese security officials arrested and detained four GuineaBissauan
    citizens from the border village of Kuntima in Northern Guinea-Bissau
    (see Section 1.c.)
        Following fighting in the Casamance in late April 1999, the
    military rounded up 15 persons with Diola names on suspicion of
    involvement with the MFDC. All but three of these prisoners were
    released within 4 days; however, those three remained unaccounted for
    at year's end.
        In January 1999, the National Assembly passed legislation to
    eliminate the law that held ``acts or maneuvers aimed at casting
    discredit on government institutions'' as criminal offenses punishable
    by imprisonment of 3 to 5 years and a fine of up to $2,500 (1.5 million
    CFA francs). Legal experts considered this provision to be a legal
    instrument that the Government could use to jail political dissenters.
    On a few occasions in the past the Government had jailed opposition
    leaders under this provision, apparently on the basis of their
    political activities.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not used.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
    judiciary independent of the executive, the legislature, and the armed
    forces; however, in practice it is subject to government influence and
    pressure. Magistrates are vulnerable to outside pressures due to low
    pay, poor working conditions, and family and political ties. Also, the
    Minister of Justice and subordinate authorities have extensive
    authority to influence judicial procedures by keeping the accused in
    pretrial detention.
        The legal system is based on French civil law and is composed of
    ordinary courts and a number of higher and special courts, including
    the three created in May 1992 to replace the Supreme Court: The Council
    of State; the Constitutional Council; and the Court of Final Appeal.
    These courts remain understaffed, and many of the special courts,
    including one to deal with unlawful enrichment and others to try
    government officials for treason and malfeasance, are dormant. Muslims
    have the right to choose customary law or civil law for certain civil
    cases, such as those concerning inheritance and divorce. However,
    customary law decisions are rendered by civil court judges. There is a
    separate system of military courts for members of the armed forces and
    the gendarmerie. The right of appeal exists in all courts except
    military courts and the special Unlawful Enrichment Court. Military
    courts may try civilians only if they are involved in violations of
    military law committed by military personnel.
        In principle the accused is innocent until proven guilty, and when
    brought to trial it is the State's burden to prove that the accused is
    guilty of the charges. Trials are public, and defendants have the right
    to be present in court, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and
    to have an attorney. However, some defendants are denied legal
    assistance at public expense due to a lack of funding. Evidentiary
    hearings may be closed to the public and the press, but the defendant
    and counsel have access to all evidence presented and may introduce
    their own evidence before the investigating judge decides to refer the
    case to the prosecutor for trial. A panel of judges presides over
    ordinary courts for both civil and criminal cases; in criminal cases
    citizens also serve on the panel.
        The Minister of Justice has taken steps to eliminate the backlog of
    cases in the judiciary system. In December the Government adopted
    legislation for the appointment of judges in charge of monitoring the
    implementation of court decisions and for the establishment of
    alternative justice mechanisms, including a ``maison de la justice'' to
    be staffed by voluntary jurists--usually retired judges or attorneys.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary invasion of the
    home, and there was little government interference in the private lives
    of citizens. The law requires search warrants, and only judges may
    issue them. In past years, during high profile or politically charged
    investigations, police often proceeded without the required search
    warrants; however, there were no reports of this during the year.
        There were no reports that government officials monitored mail or
    telephone communications without judicial authorization.
        MFDC rebels sought to collect supplies and money from civilians. On
    June 25 suspected MFDC separatist rebels attacked and stole civilian
    property in the villages of Sare Manfaly, Sare Ansou, Sare Yero Oussou,
    close to the border with Guinea-Bissau. In a separate violent attack
    launched on June 28, gunmen stole civilian property and set fire to
    village food supplies and seed stocks.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice; however, at times it imposed some
    limits on these rights. Laws prohibit the press from the expression of
    views that ``discredit'' the State, incite the population to disorder,
    or disseminate ``false news.'' A criminal case against three Sud
    Communication journalists for defamation was pending at year's end.
        On July 27, the Government filed a lawsuit against the publisher of
    the independent weekly paper Le Temoin and one of its reporters, on
    charges of publishing false news. The charges were made in connection
    with a story published by the newspaper a few weeks earlier, in which
    the newspaper claimed that President Wade had yelled at Mauritanian
    President Ould Taya during a telephone conversation. A few weeks
    earlier, the publisher of Le Temoin was interrogated twice by internal
    security officials. The lawsuit was pending at year's end.
        On August 23, the Government charged the publisher and the
    Casamance correspondent of the independent daily newspaper Le Matin
    with publishing false news and undermining the morale of the armed
    forces and of the populace, and with compromising the State's internal
    security. The Government also charged the publisher of Le Matin with
    insulting the head of state. In a radio interview following the
    announcement of the Government's decision to file a lawsuit against Le
    Matin, the publisher of Le Matin criticized the Government's action. On
    August 26, after meeting with the publisher and owner of Le Matin,
    President Wade withdrew all of the lawsuits that he had filed against
    both Le Matin and Le Temoin.
        On December 13, the Government issued a general warning to the
    national press that the dissemination of communications from the MFDC
    would be considered attempts to derail the Casamance peace process and
    would be prosecuted under the penal code. On the same day, the
    publisher and managing editor of the newspaper Le Populaire were
    summoned and interrogated for 7 hours by the criminal investigation
    division after the newspaper published a review of the 19-year old
    Casamance conflict. On December 16, they were arrested and then
    released on the same day after being charged with ``disseminating false
    news and undermining public security.'' Their cases were pending at
    year's end.
        A broad spectrum of thought and opinion is available to the public
    through regularly published magazines and newspapers, including foreign
    publications. Political and economic views expressed in the independent
    press often are critical of the Government and its programs. While
    publishers are required to register prior to starting publication, the
    Government routinely approves such registrations.
        Radio, being relatively inexpensive, remained the most important
    medium of mass information and the main source of news for citizens
    outside urban areas. Six privately owned radio stations broadcast
    within the country; of these, citizens own five. There are also three
    international stations that rebroadcast within the country. All of the
    locally owned stations broadcast national news and political
    commentary. Some of them often were critical of the Government; no
    harassment was reported.
        A government monopoly controls local television, an important
    source of news. While there are no privately owned domestic television
    stations, French-owned pay television is available but offers no local
    news.
        In August 1999 the Government investigated an incident in which
    some followers of a local Islamic leader belonging to the Mouride
    Brotherhood set fire to the bedroom of the local correspondent of a
    Dakar-based daily newspaper. The case was closed without arrests or
    criminal charges that same month.
        At year's end, at least 10 Internet service providers operated in
    the country. The Government did not restrict access to the Internet. A
    personal account with unlimited access time cost about $18 (10,000 CFA
    francs) per month. Several cybercafes in the capital city, Dakar,
    provided short-term access to the Internet that was used by many
    persons unable to afford personal accounts.
        Academic freedom generally is respected; however, student meetings
    on part of the campus of the University of Dakar are banned informally
    (see Section 2.b.), ostensibly to prevent militant student groups from
    disrupting classes and studies. In March 1999, on two occasions, police
    forcibly dispersed, and destroyed the property of, students
    demonstrating on the campus of Dakar University in favor of increased
    scholarships (see Section 2.b.). In December 1999, police personnel
    also forcibly dispersed similar protests by students demanding
    immediate payment of scholarships (see Section 2.b.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and while the Government
    generally respected this provision in practice, there were a few
    instances in which the Government limited this right. The Government
    requires prior authorization for public demonstrations, which it
    usually grants. Meetings by students on the academic campus of the
    University of Dakar are banned informally, but this prohibition does
    not extend to the dormitory areas of the campus. In March and December
    1999, police officials forcibly dispersed two unauthorized student
    demonstrations.
        While in past years, the Government frequently denied authorization
    or forcibly dispersed peaceful marches by the opposition, there were
    significantly fewer such incidents during the year. In January the
    Government authorized a peaceful march by the Front for Election
    Transparency (FRTE), a group composed of representatives of all
    opposition parties and formed for the purposes of the march, to protest
    alleged irregularities in the electoral process, including the
    importation of voter cards from Israel. Prominent opposition leaders
    and thousands of their supporters joined the march to the Ministry of
    the Interior (MOI) where march leaders formally delivered their
    platform to the Minister. However, on November 15, the Government,
    citing security concerns, banned a political rally called by the Front
    for Patriotic Alliance, a minor political party.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the
    Government generally respects this provision in practice. Citizens who
    wish to form associations must register with the MOI. Business-related
    associations register with the Ministry of Commerce. By law and in
    practice, the MOI must register such groups as long as the objectives
    of the association are stated clearly and they do not violate the law.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        Any group--religious or other--that wants to form an association
    with legal status must register with the MOI in accordance with the
    civil and commercial code. Registration, which generally is granted,
    enables an association to conduct business, including owning property,
    establishing a bank account, and receiving financial contributions from
    any private source. Registered religious groups, like all registered
    nonprofit organizations, also are exempt from many forms of taxation.
    The Minister must have a legal basis for refusing registration. There
    were no reports of any applications for such registration being delayed
    or denied during the period covered by this report.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. Some
    public employees, including teachers, are required by law to obtain
    government approval before departing the country, although this is not
    regularly enforced in practice.
        At times, usually during sweeps for MFDC rebels, the security
    forces temporarily restricted access to the Casamance region or areas
    within it. The security forces also regularly maintained checkpoints in
    the Ziguinchor region to screen for MFDC rebels and arms transports.
    Security forces generally allowed travelers to proceed after checking
    documents and searching vehicles. In late July and early August,
    citizens in the Kolda and Ziguinchor regions closed the border with
    Guinea-Bissau for several days to protest the Government's failure to
    provide adequate security.
        Following several violent attacks perpetrated by suspected MFDC
    separatists from neighboring Guinea Bissau, more than 2,600 civilians
    from the rural communities of Tankato Escale and Sare Yoba, including
    women, elderly people and children, fled from their homes and sought
    refuge in the region of Kolda, where they received government
    resettlement assistance.
        The law includes provisions for granting refugee or asylee status
    in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Since 1989 as a
    country of first asylum, Senegal has hosted Mauritanian refugees. The
    Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in providing assistance for refugees. The UNHCR reported
    no significant protection problems for these refugees. While no formal
    repatriation agreement exists with the UNHCR, the two governments have
    cooperated to permit repatriation for several years. As a result, the
    UNHCR terminated its assistance programs for Mauritanian refugees at
    the end of 1998, although it continued to provide protection services.
    Mauritanian refugees generally live in dispersed locations along the
    length of the Senegal-Mauritania border and are allowed free movement
    within Senegal. However, most of these refugees are unable to obtain
    current refugee documents from the authorities and sometimes encounter
    administrative difficulties when using their expired refugee
    application receipts issued in 1989. Due to the lack of a formal and
    supervised repatriation, and in the absence of an up-to-date
    registration program, the exact number of remaining Mauritanian
    refugees is difficult to establish. The UNHCR estimates that under
    30,000 remain in the country.
        Several hundred Guinea-Bissauan refugees chose to remain in
    Senegal, living with relatives or on their own.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the constitutional right to change their Government
    through periodic multiparty elections, and they exercised this right
    during the February/March presidential election that ended the
    Socialist Party's 40-year domination of political power. After 26 years
    in opposition, Abdoulaye Wade, backed by a coalition of opposition
    parties, defeated incumbent President Abdou Diouf in what was
    considered to be a free and fair election, which was marred only by
    reports of sporadic preelection violence and minor procedural
    irregularities. A new draft constitution, originally scheduled for a
    popular referendum in November, was postponed; a referendum is
    scheduled to take place in 2001. However, the previous Government's
    1998 creation of a second legislative chamber, in which no members are
    directly elected by the citizenry and one-fifth of the members are
    appointed by the President, reduced the ability of citizens to change
    their Government and increased the presidency's domination of the
    State.
        In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation proposed by the
    Government to increase its membership from 120 to 140 in order to
    equalize the number of deputies elected by simple majority vote in the
    districts and by proportional representation nationwide. There are 56
    legally registered parties.
        Also in 1998, the National Assembly passed a bill that created a
    second legislative chamber, a 60-member Senate. Forty-five of its
    members are elected by an electoral college on the basis of dual
    proportional and majority systems and regional slates. The electoral
    college has 13,920 members consisting of elected local government
    officials and members of the National Assembly. The President appoints
    12 members of the Senate, and the remaining 3 are elected from slates
    representing several associations of expatriate citizens. Most major
    opposition parties decided to boycott the first Senate election held in
    January 1999 under this electoral system because the ruling party's
    domination of elected local and regional offices gave opposition
    parties little chance of winning Senate seats. With the exception of 2
    minor party members who filled appointed seats, the Senate, inaugurated
    in February, was made up entirely of PS members until the March
    Presidential elections, after which 6 PS senators defected to the PDS.
        In 1997 the Government created the National Observatory of
    Elections to supervise and oversee elections. The ONEL was established
    as a temporary, independent oversight body empowered to order
    bureaucrats to obey the law and to take legal action against
    individuals and parties who violated it. The MOI remains responsible
    for the actual organization and implementation of the elections, which
    is done through a directorate of elections. The ONEL significantly
    improved the level of transparency of the May 1998 National Assembly
    elections and the February/March presidential election, despite
    persistent flaws in the system. In July the Prime Minister announced
    the Government's intention to transform the ONEL into a permanent
    independent electoral commission; however, this had not occurred by
    year's end.
        The period prior to the March elections was marked by some
    violence. In February during the election campaign, suspected PDS
    militants in Saint Louis set fire to the office of the proDiouf PLS
    party, a spin-off of the PDS party. The incident followed a clash
    between activists from both parties. During the same month, opposition
    activists in Rufisque set fire to the house of the Socialist Party
    mayor following a clash between supporters of the opposition candidate
    Abdoulaye Wade and those of then-President Diouf.
        The electoral process was marked by minor irregularities such as
    the illegal issuance of birth certificates to Socialist party
    supporters in Keur Madiabel by a judge in the district court in
    Kaolack. Following a complaint filed by the ONEL, the documents were
    cancelled. ONEL also noted that national identity card applications
    were processed illegally in some instances. Access to personal
    identification cards was an important issue in the election, since they
    are necessary to vote.
        Elections are held by balloting that is described officially as
    secret but may permit voters to leave the polling place with evidence
    of how they voted. At polling places on election day, registered
    citizens receive a package of ballot papers, one for each candidate.
    Each citizen votes by depositing into a sealed ballot box, alone inside
    a closed booth, an envelope containing one of these ballots. In the
    same booth, a trash receptacle is provided in which the voter may
    privately dispose of the unused ballots; however, polling officials
    cannot readily ensure that this is done. Nevertheless, despite apparent
    potential for abuse, this balloting system has not been the subject of
    complaints or reports of abuse in recent elections.
        Women are underrepresented in the political process. While there
    are no legal impediments to their participation in government and
    politics, cultural and educational factors hamper them. In addition
    political parties often rank women low on party lists, making it
    difficult for them to be elected to the National Assembly or to be
    appointed ministers. Only 5 of the 29 ministers in the President's
    Cabinet are women, and there are only 2 women in the 19-member Economic
    and Social Council, the Government's policymaking body. During 1999, a
    woman, Marieme Wane Ly, formed and headed a political party for the
    first time. Only 18 female deputies hold seats in the 140-member
    National Assembly. There are only 10 women in the 60-seat Senate.
    Women's lower representation reflects not only a disparity in education
    (see Section 5) but also cultural factors.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
    receptive to their views.
        In 1997 the Government enacted a law to strengthen the National
    Committee on Human Rights. The Committee includes members from the
    Government and civic organizations, including private human rights
    groups. It may, on its own initiative, investigate human rights abuses,
    including torture; however, it did not investigate any cases of abuse
    during the year.
        In July a panel of judges dropped charges of torture and complicity
    in crimes against humanity that the Government brought against former
    Chadian President Hissen Habre (see Section 1.c.)

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that ``men and women shall be equal in
    law'' and prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, sex, class,
    or language. However, discrimination against women is pervasive, and
    the Government frequently does not enforce antidiscrimination laws.
        Women.--There are credible reports that violence against women,
    usually wife beating, is common. According to a study funded by the
    Canadian Center for International Research and Development (CECI)
    focusing on the capital Dakar and on the city of Kaolack, 87 percent of
    515 women interviewed had suffered from some form of domestic violence.
    The study also showed that domestic violence was more widespread in
    Dakar than in Kaolack. Police usually do not intervene in domestic
    disputes, and most people are reluctant to go outside the family for
    redress. In contrast, the law and society view rape as a very serious
    crime, and the law stipulates that persons convicted of rape may be
    imprisoned for up to 10 years. If the victim is a minor, her age is
    considered an aggravating circumstance. Rape trials often result in
    convictions. In January 1999, the Government passed legislation
    amending the criminal law to make sexual harassment a crime punishable
    by imprisonment of up to 3 years and a fine of $650 (500,000 CFA
    francs). The legislation also increased the potential fine for domestic
    violence to $650 (500,000 CFA francs) and the length of imprisonment
    for domestic violence to 5 years. Several women's groups have formed to
    address this problem.
        Despite constitutional protections, women face extensive societal
    discrimination, especially in rural areas where Islamic and traditional
    customs, including polygyny, and Islamic rules of inheritance are
    strongest, and women generally are confined to traditional roles. By
    law women have the right to choose when and whom they marry; however,
    in some areas, traditional practice can restrict a woman's choice. The
    minimum age of consent to marry is 21 for males and 16 for females.
    Under certain conditions, a judge may grant a special dispensation to a
    person under age. The law is not enforced in some communities, where
    marriages occasionally are arranged. Under family law, women may or may
    not consent to polygynous unions when contracting a marriage; however,
    once in polygynous unions women do not have the right of notification
    or approval prior to a subsequent marriage. In the countryside, women
    perform much of the subsistence farming and child rearing and have
    limited educational opportunities. Although the Government has
    committed itself to equalizing male and female primary school
    enrollment, there is still much social discrimination against women in
    educational opportunities. Only 23 percent of females over 15 years of
    age are literate, while the rate for males over age 15 is 43 percent.
        It is estimated that only 20 percent of women are engaged in paid
    employment. Moreover, traditional practices make it difficult for women
    to obtain bank credit. Due to the fact that legally men are considered
    heads of household, women pay higher taxes than men for equal wages and
    employers pay child allowances to men and not women. Women usually
    marry young (the majority by age 16 in rural areas) and average 5.7
    live births (down from 7 in 1995). About half of all women live in
    polygynous unions.
        In urban areas, women encounter somewhat less discrimination and
    are active in government, political life, the legal profession, and
    business. About 14 percent of lawyers are women. Urban women are more
    likely to take advantage of the Government's efforts to increase
    respect for women's legal rights to divorce, alimony, and child
    support, and to seek education and employment. In general urban women
    receive equal pay for equal work.
        Children.--The Ministry of Family, Social Action, and National
    Solidarity, established in 1990 (formerly the Ministry of Women,
    Children, and the Family, and renamed in 1998), is responsible for
    promoting children's welfare. Numerous organizations assist the
    Ministry in support of children's rights, including the Ministry of
    Health, which maintained a nationwide effort focusing on child
    survival. The Government continues to increase the number of classrooms
    and encourage more children, particularly females, to enter and stay in
    school. The law requires that children attend school until age 12, but
    this is not enforced due to a shortage of schools. Organized street
    begging by children who are Koranic students results in a significant
    interruption of their education, and many children work in their
    family's fields (see Section 6.d.).
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is not practiced by the country's largest ethnic
    group, the Wolofs (representing 43 percent of the population), but it
    is performed on girls belonging to some other ethnic groups.
    Infibulation, the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM, is practiced
    by members of the Toucouleur and Peulh ethnic groups, particularly
    those in rural areas. Unsubstantiated recent studies estimate that
    between 5 and 20 percent of girls are mutilated.
        In January 1999 the Government passed legislation banning FGM. The
    law made FGM a criminal offense, carrying a jail term ranging from 6
    months to 5 years for persons directly practicing FGM or ordering it to
    be carried out on a third person. Most human rights organizations
    considered the law to be a decisive step towards greater protection of
    women. However, a few women's rights activists criticized the new
    legislation because they perceived it as being dictated by Western
    donors. A few Muslim religious leaders also criticized the law because
    they consider FGM to be a religious practice. While the Government
    sponsors programs to educate women regarding the dangers of FGM, other
    critics of the new law contended that these programs should have been
    more widespread prior to implementation of the ban.
        On April 7, inhabitants of 26 villages on the Sine Saloum Islands
    publicly announced their decision to ban the practice of FGM in their
    communities. The decision was the result of an educational campaign
    initiated by the Government with the assistance of a number of
    international and domestic NGO's. Since July 1997, approximately 172
    villages nationwide have banned FGM among their inhabitants.
        In January 1999, the Government passed a law mandating longer jail
    terms of up to 10 years for convicted pedophiles.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no laws that mandate
    accessibility for the disabled, and in practice most persons with
    disabilities are generally unable to participate in many occupations
    due to physical barriers and a lack of equipment and training
    opportunities that would make such participation possible.
        On June 29, the Council of State (the country's highest
    administrative court) ruled on an antidiscrimination lawsuit filed in
    October 1999 by the National Association of Disabled People (ANHMS)
    against the regional educational board in the eastern province of
    Tambacounda. The board had refused to hire a physically disabled
    candidate who had passed a recruitment test, on the grounds that
    physically disabled persons are not qualified for the job of teaching.
    The court overruled the board's decision on the grounds that a physical
    disability did not represent a valid legal ground for barring a person
    from teaching.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is ethnically
    diverse. The largest ethnic groups are the Wolof (more than 40 percent
    of the country's population), the Pular (also called Peuhl or Fulani,
    nearly 25 percent), and the Serer (more than 15 percent). Other smaller
    groups include the Diola, Mandingo, and Soninke. Each group has its own
    primary language although French and Wolof are widely used as secondary
    languages. While general regions of origin can be identified for most
    ethnic groups, these regional separations are no longer distinct.
        In most of the country, ethnic and regional tensions have not
    contributed significantly to recent human rights abuses, and opposition
    to the Government generally has taken the form of nonviolent political
    parties that have not had readily identifiable ethnic or regional
    bases. This has not been true in the Casamance region, the part of the
    country to the south of The Gambia. Casamance is substantially less
    arid, less Islamic, and less Wolof than the rest of the country.
    Resentment on the part of Casamance groups, including the Diola, of
    domination by northerners, including the Wolof, reportedly has
    contributed significantly to the secessionist MFDC rebellion in the
    Casamance region, which began in 1982 and has continued to give rise to
    many human rights abuses (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). Flaws in
    the country's first local and regional elections, held in 1996, have
    reduced the effectiveness of the Government's ongoing decentralization
    program.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
    provide all workers with the right of association, and they are free to
    form or join unions; however, the Labor Code requires the Minister of
    the Interior to give prior authorization before a trade union can exist
    legally.
        The International Labor Organization (ILO) continued to call on the
    Government to ensure that trade unions are not subject to dissolution
    by administrative authority and to amend the law, which accords power
    to the Minister of Interior to approve the formation of unions. Any
    group of workers in the same occupation, similar trades, or the same
    professions may form a union. While the Ministry does not always grant
    initial recognition to a union, once it gives recognition, it virtually
    never withdraws it. However, the Government may disband a union if its
    activities deviate from its charter. The Labor Code does not apply to
    the informal and agricultural sectors where most persons work.
        Although they represent a small percentage of the working
    population, unions wield significant political influence because of
    their ability to disrupt vital sectors of the economy. The small
    industrial component of the total work force of 4 million is almost
    totally unionized. The only union in the agrarian sector is one
    representing workers at a privately owned sugar company. Some farmers
    are organized into the National Farming Association, an advocacy
    organization.
        The National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS), the
    largest union organization, has close ties to the Socialist Party, and
    several members hold Socialist Party seats in the Assembly. While
    ostensibly an independent organization, the umbrella CNTS consistently
    supported government policies during the Diouf administration.
        The rival to the CNTS is the National Union of Autonomous Labor
    Unions of Senegal (UNSAS). The UNSAS is a federation of strategically
    important unions such as those formed by electrical workers,
    telecommunication workers, teachers, water technicians, and hospital,
    railroad, and sugar workers.
        The Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the right to
    strike, but with restrictions. Unions representing members of the civil
    service must notify the Government of their intent to strike no less
    than 1 month in advance, and private sector unions must make a similar
    notification 3 days in advance. The Government or the employer can use
    the time to seek a settlement to the dispute but cannot stop the
    strike.
        There were no illegal strikes during the year.
        The Labor Code permits unions to affiliate with international
    bodies. The CNTS is active in regional and international labor
    organizations and is the dominant Senegalese member of the Organization
    of African Trade Union Unity.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides unions with the right to organize and to bargain collectively,
    and these rights are protected in practice. There are also legal
    prohibitions governing discrimination by employers against union
    members and organizers. Employers found guilty of antiunion
    discrimination are required to reinstate workers. There were no known
    instances in which workers were prevented from exercising the right to
    organize and bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) can
    intervene in disputes between labor and management if requested, and it
    plays a mediation role in the private and state enterprise sectors.
        Labor laws apply to all industrial firms including those in the
    Dakar industrial free trade zone.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There were no
    reports of forced or bonded labor, which is prohibited by law. The
    Constitution prohibits child labor of all kinds, including forced and
    bonded labor, and the Government enforces this ban in the formal
    sector. There were no reports that forced or bonded labor by children
    takes place in the informal or agricultural sectors.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution bans child labor of all kinds, and the
    Government enforces this ban in the formal sector, which is under the
    purview of the labor law. However, instead of attending school, many
    children work in their family's fields.
        In 1998 the country began a 3-year program of action for the
    elimination of child labor, the International Program for the
    Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), which is scheduled for completion in
    2001. Under the law, the minimum age for employment is 16 years for
    apprenticeships and 18 years for all other types of work. In June the
    legislature ratified ILO Convention 132 To Eliminate the Worst Forms of
    Child Labor; it is scheduled to take effect in 2001. Inspectors from
    the MOL closely monitor and enforce minimum age restrictions within the
    small formal wage sector, which includes state-owned corporations,
    large private enterprises, and cooperatives. However, children under
    the minimum age frequently work in the much larger traditional or
    informal sectors, such as family farms in rural areas or in small
    businesses, where the Government does not enforce minimum age and other
    workplace regulations. On June 1, Senegal ratified ILO Convention 182,
    outlawing the worst forms of child labor.
        The Constitution prohibits child labor of all kinds, including
    forced and bonded labor, and there is no evidence that forced or bonded
    child labor takes place in the informal or agricultural sectors (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation mandating a monthly
    minimum wage has been in force since the country's independence in
    1960. The Ministries of Labor and Finance determine wage rates after
    negotiating with the unions and management councils. The minimum wage
    is $0.37 (223.7 CFA francs) per hour. This wage still is not adequate
    to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
        Within the formal sector, the law mandates a standard workweek of
    40 to 48 hours for most occupations, with at least one 24hour rest
    period and 1 month per year of annual leave; enrollment in government
    systems for social security and retirement; safety standards; and a
    variety of other measures. These regulations are incorporated into the
    Labor Code and are supervised by inspectors from the MOL. However,
    enforcement is uneven, especially outside the formal sector.
        There is no explicit legal protection for workers who file
    complaints about unsafe conditions. While there are legal regulations
    concerning workplace safety, government officials often do not enforce
    them. In theory workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe
    working conditions, but in practice the right seldom is exercised in
    circumstances of high unemployment and a slow legal system.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, there were reports from Portugal that women from
    Senegal were trafficked there for purposes of forced prostitution.
                                   __________

                                   SEYCHELLES

        President France Albert Rene and the Seychelles People's
    Progressive Front (SPPF) have governed since a 1977 military coup. In
    the 1990's, the SPPF guided the country's return to a multiparty
    political system, which culminated in 1993 in the country's first free
    and fair presidential and parliamentary elections since 1977. President
    Rene and the SPPF won in 1993 and again in 1998 elections, which were
    judged by international and national observers to have been free and
    fair despite the fact that President Rene and the SPPF dominated the
    election. In 1998 Rene was reelected president with 67 percent of the
    ballots cast. The SPPF won 30 of the 34 National Assembly seats, 24 by
    direct election and 6 by proportional representation. The President and
    the SPPF dominate the country through a pervasive system of political
    patronage and control over government jobs, contracts, and resources.
    The judiciary is subject to executive interference.
        The President has complete control over the security apparatus,
    which includes a national guard force, the army, the Presidential
    Protection Unit, the coast guard, the marines, and the police. There is
    also an armed paramilitary Police Mobile Unit. Security forces on
    occasion were responsible for some human rights abuses.
        The economy provides the country's 80,410 residents with an average
    per capita income of more than $6,800 per year. The Government provides
    generally adequate social services. The Government in recent years has
    diversified the economy by increasing the revenues received from
    fishing rights and investing in the fish processing sector with foreign
    joint partners in order to move the economy away from its heavy
    reliance on tourism. Manufacturing now has surpassed tourism as the
    most important economic activity; however, no significant new
    investments were made during the year. Overall growth remained
    sluggish, largely due to shortages of foreign exchange and the
    pervasive presence of inefficient state enterprises. There was no
    progress toward privatization during the year. The country's
    application to join the World Trade Organization has forced it to
    consider reforming its trade and foreign exchange regimes; however, it
    has made few substantive changes to date.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. President Rene,
    whose party dominates the legislature, continued to wield power
    virtually unchecked. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained
    citizens; however, such actions were limited to detention during the
    weekend in order to avoid compliance with the Constitution's 24-hour
    ``charge or release'' provision. The Government failed to investigate
    or punish those involved in the violations of citizens'' human rights
    during a law enforcement crackdown in 1998. The judiciary is
    inefficient, lacks resources, and is subject to executive influence.
    Violence against women increased and child abuse remained a problem.
    Discrimination against foreign workers also was a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution expressly forbids torture; however, while
    there were no reported instances of the use of torture by the army,
    there was a report that police beat a man while he was in police
    custody in March on the island of La Digue. The family of the detainee
    sued the Commissioner of Police and the three police officers on duty
    at the time for $4,386 (SR 25,000) in damages. Police were
    investigating the claim at year's end; however, no action had been
    taken.
        The Government has failed to investigate or punish those members of
    the security forces who allegedly tortured suspects in custody in 1998.
    Several cases that were brought against the Government and the army by
    individuals who claimed to have been detained illegally and tortured in
    1998 remained pending. In two cases, the Government accepted liability,
    but the question of damages remained pending. In two other cases, the
    Government continued to contest both its liability and its
    responsibility for damages. In November 1999, a citizen fled to another
    country and sought refugee status, claiming that members of the
    security forces harassed him because they believed that he maintained
    documentation of human rights abuses by the security forces. The
    citizen was granted asylum in another country in January.
        Conditions at the Long Island prison, the only such facility in the
    country, remained Spartan. With approximately 166 inmates, the prison
    was considered overcrowded; approximately 32 prisoners were released
    during the last 3 months of the year to alleviate overcrowding.
    Prisoners have access to medical care. Family members were allowed
    monthly visits, and prisoners have access to reading but not writing
    materials. Men are held separately from women, and juveniles are held
    separately from adults. There were no reports of abuse of women or
    juveniles by guards or other inmates.
        There is no regular system of independent monitoring of prisons;
    however, local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
    were allowed to visit. At least one visit was conducted during the
    year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides that persons arrested must be brought before a magistrate
    within 24 hours with allowances made for boat travel from distant
    islands. The law provides for detention without charge for up to 7 days
    if authorized by court order. Defense attorneys assert that extended
    periods of detention under harsh conditions are used to extort
    confessions from suspects. In some instances, the police continued to
    detain individuals on a Friday or Saturday in order to allow for a
    longer period of detention without charge, thereby avoiding compliance
    with the Constitution's 24-hour ``charge or release'' provision. The
    police released such persons on a Monday before the court could rule on
    a writ of habeas corpus.
        Detainees have the right of access to legal counsel, but security
    forces, in hopes of eliciting a confession or other information,
    sometimes withhold this right. Free counsel is provided to the
    indigent. Bail is available for most offenses.
        Several persons have brought civil cases against the police for
    unlawful arrest or entry, with limited success. The military's Chief of
    Staff was subpoenaed in November 1998 to appear in court to answer
    charges of contempt of the Supreme Court concerning the continued
    illegal detention of a man who had been ordered released by the court.
    This case and several others, involving claims for damages related to
    illegal detention and torture, were settled out of court during the
    year (see Section 1.c.).
        The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not employ
    it. Following the 1977 coup, a number of persons went into voluntary
    exile, and others were released from prison with the condition that
    they leave the country immediately. A number of these former exiles who
    returned to the country were able to reacquire their property; however,
    several claims remained in the court system at year's end.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it is inefficient, lacks resources, and
    is subject to executive interference.
        The judicial system includes magistrates' courts, the Supreme
    Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Court of Appeal.
        Depending on the gravity of the offense, criminal cases are heard
    by magistrates' court or the Supreme Court. A jury is used in cases
    involving murder or treason. Trials are public, and the accused is
    considered innocent until proven guilty. Defendants have the right to
    counsel, to be present at their trial, to confront witnesses, and to
    appeal. The Constitutional Court convenes weekly or as necessary to
    consider constitutional issues only. The Court of Appeal convenes three
    times per year for 2 weeks in April, August, and October to consider
    appeals from the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court only.
        Defendants generally have the right to a fair trial. All judges are
    appointed for 7 years and can be reappointed by the President on the
    recommendation of the Constitutional Appointment Committee. All sitting
    judges were hired from other Commonwealth countries, including
    Mauritius, India, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Zambia; none are citizens,
    with the exception of the Chief Justice, who is a naturalized citizen.
    The Seychelles Bar Association has criticized the Government for not
    advertising domestically that judicial positions are available, since
    30 citizens practice law either domestically or abroad. Some observers
    criticized expatriate judges for a perceived lack of sensitivity on
    issues such as human rights. Legal organs of the Government, such as
    the Attorney General's Office and the Ombudsman, are reluctant to
    pursue charges of wrongdoing or abuse of power against senior
    officials.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy and
    freedom from arbitrary searches. The law requires a warrant for police
    searches, and the authorities generally respected this requirement in
    practice. While in 1998 soldiers reportedly forcibly entered homes, and
    seized and detained citizens, no such incidents were reported during
    the year. The law requires that all electronic surveillance be
    justified on the grounds of preventing a serious crime and be approved
    by a judge. The Government maintained telephone surveillance of some
    political figures.
        Some members of opposition parties claimed that they lost their
    government jobs because of their political beliefs and are at a
    disadvantage when applying for government licenses and loans.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, it also provides for
    restrictions on speech ``for protecting the reputation, rights, and
    freedoms of private lives of persons'' and ``in the interest of
    defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public
    health,'' and as a result both freedom of speech and of the press are
    constrained by the ease with which civil lawsuits can be filed to
    penalize journalists for alleged libel. In February the National
    Assembly passed the Broadcasting and Telecommunication Bill, which
    allows the Minister of Information Technology to prohibit the broadcast
    of any material believed to be against the ``national interest'' or
    ``objectionable;'' however, the bill was not used against journalists
    or the media during the year. The legislation also requires
    telecommunications companies to submit subscriber information to the
    Government. In most instances, citizens speak freely, including in
    Parliament.
        The Government has a near monopoly in the media, owning the only
    television and radio stations, the most important means for reaching
    the public, and the only daily newspaper, the Nation. The official
    media adhere closely to the Government's position on policy issues and
    give the opposition and news adverse to the Government only limited
    attention. While both opposition parties publish an assortment of
    newsletters and magazines, only one significant opposition newspaper,
    the weekly Regar, is in circulation. Government officials have sued
    Regar for libel nine times in the last 5 years. The most recent suit,
    in which the Minister of Agriculture and Marine Resources sued Regar in
    1999 for taking pictures of the house he was constructing, was settled
    out of court in October. The Minister dropped the suit in exchange for
    Regar's agreement not to publish the photos.
        In January the Government sued Regar's editor and publisher for
    contempt for failing to turn over to authorities a letter published by
    the paper. Regar officials argued that providing officials with the
    letter would violate their right to keep sources confidential. The
    Supreme Court dismissed the charge in April; however, the Attorney
    General's office sought a court order to obtain a copy of the letter.
    In August a judge ruled that the matter would be heard in the
    Constitutional Court; however, by year's end, no action had been taken.
        In February 1999, the National Assembly again rejected a motion
    presented by the leader of the opposition to reduce the license fee for
    a private radio or television station from $151,200 (SR 800,000) per
    year to that of a newspaper publishing license, $760 (SR 4,000) plus a
    bank guarantee of $19,000 (SR 100,000). The motion was refused. The
    high fees were a deterrent to the establishment of private radio and
    television.
        In November 1999, the opposition party filed suit with the
    Constitutional Court and claimed that the appointment of 8 civil
    servants and the President's wife to the 10-member board of the
    Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) violated the constitutional
    requirement that state-owned media be managed by a body independent of
    the government. In August the court agreed to hear the case; however,
    no decision was reached by year's end.
        The Internet was available in the country, and the Government
    permitted access to it without restriction.
        Academic freedom is limited due to the fact that one cannot reach
    senior positions in the academic bureaucracy without demonstrating at
    least nominal loyalty to the SPPF. There are no universities; secondary
    school teacher appointments largely are apolitical. The Government
    controls access to the Polytechnic, the most advanced learning
    institution.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the
    Government respected these rights in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
        The Government has not demonstrated favoritism toward one religion
    over another in the past, but in May the opposition Seychelles National
    Party (SNP), which is led by an Anglican minister, claimed that the
    Government gave a grant of $164,000 (SR 900,000) to the Baha'i faith in
    1999, following its incorporation. According to the SNP, this grant has
    not been offered to other faiths that have been established recently in
    the country. The Government has not responded to the SNP's claim.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement, and there was no known abridgment of domestic or
    international travel; however, although it was not used to refuse a
    passport application, the 1991 Passport Act allows the Government to
    deny passports to any citizen if the Minister of Defense finds that
    such denial is ``in the national interest.'' While the resident
    departure tax of $95 (SR 500) is payable in local currency, government
    foreign exchange regulations and the foreign exchange shortage hinder
    many citizens from being able to afford foreign travel, although they
    might have sufficient means in local currency. According to a law in
    effect since May 1999, citizens cannot possess any foreign exchange
    unless in possession of a receipt from a licensed foreign exchange
    vendor. In addition banks provided only $95 (SR 500) to a maximum $200
    (SR 1,146) to those departing the country because of the extreme
    foreign exchange shortage.
        The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As there have been no recent
    refugee cases, there were no reports of government cooperation with the
    UNHCR; however, there are no indications that the Government would not
    cooperate.
        There were no known requests for asylum, and there are no refugees
    in the country. The issue of first asylum did not arise during the
    year. The Immigration Act does not discuss asylum. There are no known
    instances of persons being forcibly deported to a country where they
    feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens exercised the right to change their government in the 1993
    and 1998 National Assembly and presidential elections, which were
    judged by international and national observers to have been free and
    fair, despite the fact that President Rene and the SPPF dominated the
    elections. Suffrage is universal.
        A joint Commonwealth and Francophone observer group for the 1998
    elections noted that the elections took place on a more level playing
    field than in 1993. The group's principal criticism was that the
    Government adopted a program of accelerated means-testing for social
    benefits during the final week of the campaign and approved a number of
    new applications in an attempt to increase political support. The group
    urged an improvement in the effective separation of state and party
    political functions.
        The President's SPPF party continued to utilize its political
    resources and those of the Government to develop a nationwide
    organization that extends to the village level. The opposition parties
    have been unable to match the SPPF's organization and patronage, in
    part because of financial limitations. In 1999 the Government
    substantially reduced funding for political parties in the budget, from
    $1.8 million (SR 9.5 million) per year to $95,000 (SR 500,000). In this
    year's budget, the SPPF was allocated $54,202 (SR 308,952), the
    Seychelles National Party (SNP) $22,889 (SR 130,470), and the
    Democratic Party $10,628 (SR 60,578).
        In the March 1998 parliamentary elections, the SNP--then known as
    the United Opposition--won one directly elected seat and two
    proportionally elected seats, thereby becoming the leading opposition
    party. Former Prime Minister James Mancham's Democratic Party won only
    one proportional seat, and Mancham lost the role of leader of the
    opposition to the SNP's Wavel Ramkalawan. Ramkalawan has played
    effectively the role of chief government critic as leader of the
    opposition.
        In May the National Assembly amended the Constitution to allow the
    President to call presidential elections separately from National
    Assembly elections at any time after the first year of his 5-year term
    in office.
        There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
    politics; however, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Women hold 3 of the 12 ministerial positions and 8 of the 34
    seats in the National Assembly, 6 by direct election and 2 by
    proportional election. There are no legal restrictions on the
    participation of minority groups in politics; however, they are
    underrepresented. All members of the Cabinet are members of the SPPF.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Two private human rights related organizations, the first of their
    kind in the country, were launched in December 1998. The Friends for a
    Democratic Society pledged to focus on raising awareness of individual
    rights in a democracy, but has thus far proved to be an inactive
    organization. In April 1999, the Center for Rights and Development
    (CEFRAD) published a 5-year action plan that stresses respect for human
    rights, participation in a civil society, and sensible approaches to
    development. CEFRAD also established ties with other national and
    international NGO's. Historically, both the churches and some NGO's
    have been strong voices for human rights and democratization, and the
    Government has not interfered with their activities. There were no
    known requests by international human rights groups to visit the
    country.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution affirms the right to be free from all types of
    discrimination, but it does not prohibit discrimination based on these
    factors specifically. Nevertheless, in practice there is no overt
    discrimination in housing, employment, education, or other social
    services based on race, sex, ethnicity, nationality, or religious
    identification.
        Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, remains
    a problem and increased during the year. Police seldom intervene in
    domestic disputes, unless the dispute involves a weapon or major
    assault. The few cases that reach a prosecutor often are dismissed, or,
    if a case reaches court, the perpetrator usually is given only a light
    sentence. Rape, spousal rape, and domestic abuse are criminal offenses.
    As of September 30, the Probation Services recorded 100 domestic
    violence cases against women, an increase from the previous year. A
    survey of six church parishes conducted in 1999 by the Association for
    the Promotion of Solid Humane Families, an NGO, revealed that 25
    percent of those surveyed stated that they have been victims of
    domestic violence, confirming the general belief that the problem is
    more widespread than official statistics indicate. Participants in the
    NGO survey stated that alcohol was one of the main causes of domestic
    violence. There was growing societal concern about domestic violence
    and increased recognition of the need to address it. During the year,
    local NGO's sponsored awareness campaigns and training programs for
    women and girls.
        The society is largely matriarchal, with 75 percent of births out-
    of-wedlock in 1998. There were no reports of societal discrimination
    against unwed mothers, and fathers are required by law to support their
    children. The age of consent was lowered from 16 to 14 in 1993, and 13
    percent of all births in 1998 occurred to women under 20 years of age.
    Girls are not allowed to attend school when they are pregnant, and many
    do not return to school after the birth of a child. There is no
    officially sanctioned discrimination in employment, and women are well-
    represented in business. Inheritance laws do not discriminate against
    women.
        Children.--Children have legal protection from labor and physical
    abuse, and they are required to attend school. Free public education is
    available through the secondary level until age 18. Since January 1999,
    parents contributed up to two-thirds of the cost of postsecondary
    education and training based on their income for both in country and
    overseas schools. Children are encouraged to attend school to the tenth
    grade. According to government figures, all children between the ages
    of 6 and 16 attend school, and the enrollment of boys and girls is
    roughly equal. In 1995 the Government created an institutional
    framework for aiding children, and, in 1998, the National Assembly
    established an 18-member family tribunal to hear and determine all
    matters relating to the care, custody, access, and maintenance of
    children; only paternity cases remain under the courts. The tribunal
    became operational in November 1998 after the Minister of Employment
    and Social Affairs appointed the members. During the year, 2,461 cases
    were presented to the tribunal. Of these 95 dealt with child abuse; the
    tribunal started hearing child abuse cases in May.
        Sexual abuse of young girls, usually in low-income families, is a
    serious problem. Although only 20 cases of sexual abuse were reported
    as of October, Ministry of Health data and press reports indicate that
    there are a significant number of rapes committed against girls under
    the age of 15. Very few child abuse cases actually are prosecuted in
    court. The strongest public advocate for young victims is not the
    Government but a semiautonomous agency, the National Council for
    Children. There is criticism that the police fail to investigate
    vigorously charges of child abuse.
        There were no reports of child prostitution or child pornography.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate
    against persons with disabilities in housing, jobs, or education;
    however, there is no legislation providing for access to public
    buildings, transportation, or government services.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The education gap between
    Creoles and citizens of white or Asian origin continued to narrow. The
    Government is attempting to reduce this gap through universal access to
    public education. Creoles are well-integrated into society, business,
    and politics.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the 1993 Industrial Relations
    Act (IRA), workers have the right to form and join unions of their
    choosing. Police, military, prison, and fire-fighting personnel may not
    unionize. Under the act, the former government-controlled union, the
    National Workers Union, lost its monopoly position. Between 15 and 20
    percent of the workforce is unionized.
        There are two unions: One dominated by the SPPF, the Seychelles
    Federation of Workers Union (SFWU), and one independent, the Seychelles
    Workers Union (SWU). Another independent union, the Public Service
    Union, was disbanded in 1997 after repeated discrimination against the
    union's office holders, according to one independent unionist. An
    attempt in 1999 to organize an independent union incorporating
    employees from both governmental ministries and government-owned
    entities was thwarted by government legal action in the same year.
        Workers are not permitted to strike.
        Unions can affiliate freely with international bodies. While the
    Government did not invite the SWU to join the delegation attending the
    1999 annual meeting of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the
    SWU participated with the SFWU in an ILO seminar held in June.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The IRA
    provides workers with the right to engage in collective bargaining;
    however, in practice free collective bargaining normally does not take
    place. The Government has the right to review and approve all
    collective bargaining agreements in the public and private sectors.
    There is little flexibility in setting wages. In the public sector,
    which employs 57 percent of the labor force, the Government sets
    mandatory wage scales for employees. Wages in the private sector
    generally are set by the employer in individual agreements with the
    employee, but in the few larger businesses, wage scales are subject to
    the Government's right of review and approval. Private employers
    historically have paid higher wages than the Government in order to
    attract qualified workers. However, economic problems during the year
    led to continued downward pressures on wages.
        The 1987 and 1995 Employment Acts constitute the basic labor law.
    They authorize the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs to
    establish and enforce employment terms, conditions, and benefits.
    Workers frequently have obtained recourse against their employers
    through the ministry.
        While the law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers
    against union members, there was widespread discrimination against the
    members of the independent public sector union, the Public Service
    Union, before it was disbanded in 1997.
        There are 20 companies that participate in an export processing
    zone known as the Seychelles International Zone (SITZ). The SITZ is
    bound only by the Seychelles Trade Zone Act and is not obliged to
    adhere to property, tax, business, immigration, and labor laws,
    including the Employment Act. In 1999 one of the companies based in the
    SITZ, Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT), discharged workers who had come from
    Madagascar. IOT claimed that the workers were engaging in prostitution,
    and they were returned to Madagascar. The workers alleged that they
    were being mistreated and were not receiving their salaries.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to exist. Following its
    ratification of ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor,
    the Government considered forced or bonded labor by children to be
    illegal. There have been no reports of forced or bonded labor by
    children.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Article 31 of the Constitution states that the minimum age
    for employment is 15, ``subject to exceptions for children who are
    employed part time in light work prescribed by law without harm to
    their health, morals, or education.'' It is a criminal offense
    punishable by a fine of $1,130 (SR 6,000) to employ a child under the
    age of 15.
        Children are encouraged to attend school until the 10th grade. The
    National Youth Service was disbanded in January 1999 and replaced with
    a noncompulsory fifth year of secondary school. After completing
    secondary school, students can go to the Polytechnic School for
    Vocational Training, abroad for university studies, or to
    apprenticeship or short-term work programs. Children in the latter
    program receive a training stipend, which is below the minimum wage.
    The Government enforces child labor laws through inspections by the
    Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs.
        On September 28, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor. The Ministry of Employment and Social
    Services was responsible for investigating abuses of child labor. The
    Ministry reported that it handled such complaints within its general
    budget and staffing; however, at year's end, there was no information
    on the number of cases investigated.
        Following ratification of ILO Convention 182, the Government
    prohibited forced and bonded labor by children, and such practices are
    not known to occur.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The complicated minimum wage
    scale is regulated administratively by the Government; it covers the
    public and state-owned sectors and differentiates among various job
    classifications. The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs enforces
    minimum wage regulations. The official minimum wage is $360 (SR 1,900)
    per month. Trade unions contend that government entities pay some
    workers less than the legal minimum wage. Even with the free public
    services that are available, primarily health care and education,
    independent labor unions dispute that a single salary at the low end of
    the pay scale provides a worker and family with a minimum decent
    standard of living.
        In recent years, there has been a growing trend in government
    policy to admit foreign workers, primarily from China, India, the
    Philippines, and Madagascar, to work in the construction and commercial
    fishing sectors, because few citizens choose to work in these sectors.
    Although it is difficult to determine the living and working conditions
    of these workers, there is evidence that the labor laws are flouted
    routinely with the Government's knowledge and acquiescence. These
    workers are paid lower wages and forced to work longer hours than
    citizens.
        In March about 100 Indian construction workers stopped working to
    protest their inability to send their earnings home to their families.
    Most of the workers were employed by a government-affiliated
    construction company, which reportedly agreed to permit the workers to
    repatriate most of their earnings; however, the workers claimed that
    they were allowed to repatriate less than a third of their salaries and
    only if they worked 7 days a week. In April half of the workers
    returned to India after authorities informed them that their contracts
    had expired. The remaining workers also returned to India in April when
    it became clear that their demands would not be met.
        The legal maximum workweek varies from 45 to 52 hours, depending on
    the economic sector, while government employees work shorter hours.
    Each full-time worker is entitled to a half-hour break per day and a
    minimum of 21 days of paid annual leave. Workers are permitted to work
    overtime up to 60 additional hours per month. The Government generally
    enforces these regulations. Foreign workers do not enjoy the same legal
    protections.
        The Government issued comprehensive occupational health and safety
    regulations in 1991. The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs has
    formal responsibility for enforcing these regulations; however, the
    Ministry of Health seeks a role in this area. An ILO team, which
    visited in early 1995, found serious deficiencies in the management and
    effectiveness of government monitoring and enforcement efforts.
    Occupational injuries are most common in the construction, marine, and
    port industries. A worker who removes himself from a potentially
    dangerous situation on the job is considered to have resigned. Safety
    and health inspectors rarely visit job sites. Two work-related deaths
    were reported officially during the year.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, through, or within the country.
                                   __________

                                  SIERRA LEONE

        Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected
    president and a unicameral legislature; however, due to continuing
    civil conflict, the democratically elected government did not control
    the whole country effectively at any time during the year. This
    situation continued despite a cease-fire that went into effect on May
    24, 1999, and the July 7, 1999 signing of a peace accord by the
    Government and insurgents led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
    who have fought successive governments since 1991. The President's
    party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has held a majority in the
    Parliament since the 1996 elections. In May 1997, a group of army
    officers, which called itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
    (AFRC), overthrew the elected government in a coup, driving it into
    exile in Guinea. The AFRC then invited the RUF to join the junta. The
    RUF/AFRC junta then was driven out of Freetown by forces of the
    Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group
    (ECOMOG), composed mainly of units from the armed forces of Nigeria, in
    February 1998. The Government was restored to power in March 1998, but
    fighting between government and rebels continued. Government-insurgent
    fighting, albeit on a significantly reduced scale, continued after the
    July 1999 Lome Accord, which included the RUF in a power-sharing
    arrangement in the Government. Following the signing of the Lome
    Agreement, many RUF leaders and fighters moved into Freetown.
        In 1999 the U.N. Security Council approved a peacekeeping
    operation, the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and approved
    strength increases several times during the year. ECOMOG completely
    withdrew its forces from the country in April. During the year, there
    were several armed clashes between government forces and rebel forces,
    including the RUF. In the first half of the year, tensions rose between
    the Government and the RUF, and in a series of separate incidents in a
    10-day period from late April to early May, more than 700 U.N.
    peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were
    killed in these incidents and at other times during the year. In May
    RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested after demonstrators were killed
    outside of his residence, and he remained in government custody at
    year's end. In November the Government and the RUF signed the Abuja
    Agreement, which included a 30-day cease-fire that largely still was
    being observed at year's end; however, the RUF did not respect other
    terms agreed to in the Abuja Agreement, including disarming and
    allowing peacekeepers into the part of the country under their control.
    At year's end, the RUF still controlled almost two-thirds of the
    country. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program
    called for in the Lome Accord includes provisions to protect the human
    rights of the former combatants. Prior to May, nearly 25,000 ex-
    combatants of an estimated 45,000 had disarmed and entered the
    demobilization process. With the de facto withdrawal by the RUF from
    observance of the Lome Accord in May, many of the demobilized
    combatants rearmed and rejoined either the RUF or the West Side Boys, a
    splinter group of the ex-SLA. The officially independent judiciary
    functioned only in part of the country but demonstrated substantial
    independence in practice.
        Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had
    primary responsibility for internal order; however, due to the
    continuing insurgency, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the Civil Defense
    Forces (CDF), and ECOMOG shared de facto responsibility with the police
    in security matters until the April withdrawal of ECOMOG troops from
    the country when UNAMSIL assumed responsibility. The CDF were
    traditional hunting societies loyal to paramount chiefs--traditional
    leaders with administrative and judicial powers--which formed into
    independent militias under a national structure. The Armed Forces
    Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which staged a 1997 military coup, no
    longer exists. During the year, SLA units were reorganized and began
    undergoing a training program provided with the assistance of a foreign
    government; the program was ongoing at year's end. While government,
    ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL forces committed serious human rights abuses, the
    incidences of abuses were significantly less than during the previous
    year.
        Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based
    economy and a per capita income of less than $150 per year. Only an
    estimated 15 percent of adults are literate. Although the country is
    rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold,
    rutile, and bauxite) and has large areas of fertile land suitable for
    farming, the 9-year insurgency brought mineral extraction and
    agricultural production almost to a standstill, except for illicit
    diamond mining. There is little manufacturing, and there are few
    exports; approximately 70 percent of the Government's budget comes from
    foreign assistance. Years of fighting, corruption, and mismanagement
    have resulted in a crumbling infrastructure.
        The Government's human rights record was poor in several areas;
    while there were significant improvements in some areas, serious
    problems remained. Poorly trained or poorly led members of government
    forces and international forces committed most serious abuses. There
    were reports that government and ECOMOG forces operating in support of
    the Government committed extrajudicial killings and reportedly
    summarily executed suspected rebels and their collaborators.
    Government, ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL forces at times beat noncombatants;
    however, there were fewer reports of human rights violations involving
    the SLA in the latter half of the year due to training and
    reorganization. Prison and jail conditions remained harsh and sometimes
    life threatening. Government and ECOMOG forces continued to
    occasionally arrest and detain persons arbitrarily. Prolonged detention
    and long delays in trials, due to the inability of the judicial system
    to function in some parts of the country and during some parts of the
    year, remained problems. Government security forces on a few occasions
    harassed, arrested, and beat some journalists and used libel laws
    against journalists; however, the Government took significant steps to
    end the restrictions on press freedom from the previous year. Violence
    and discrimination against women and prostitution remained problems.
    CDF units continued to induct child soldiers. Female genital mutilation
    continued to be a widespread practice. Discrimination against ethnic
    minorities persists. There was some forced labor in rural areas. Child
    labor persists.
        During the year, an ex-SLA splinter group called the West Side Boys
    and RUF rebels committed numerous serious abuses, including killings,
    abductions, deliberate mutilations, and rape. Rebel forces abducted
    civilians, missionaries, aid workers from nongovernmental agencies, and
    U.N. personnel; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided refugee
    sites; and extorted and stole food. The RUF forces continued the
    longstanding practice of abducting villagers (including women and
    children) and using them as forced laborers, child soldiers, and sex
    slaves. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds
    of thousands of civilians over the past several years; however, such
    displacement was reduced significantly during the year. As many as half
    a million persons fled in past years to neighboring countries to escape
    the civil conflict and remained outside the country on their own or in
    refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were reports
    that both government forces and ECOMOG forces operating in support of
    the Government committed extrajudicial killings. There were reports in
    the first half of the year that both SLA and CDF forces summarily
    executed suspected rebels and rebel collaborators; however, because of
    the insecurity in most of the country, it was difficult to gather
    detailed information on abuses or to corroborate reports. There also
    were reports in the first quarter of the year that ECOMOG soldiers
    summarily executed suspected rebels. There were no reports of
    extrajudicial killings after July by the newly trained and reorganized
    SLA units or CDF forces.
        There is credible evidence that on several occasions throughout the
    year a government helicopter gunship fired on possible RUF positions
    within urban areas, including one market area, causing many civilian
    deaths (see Sections 1.g. and 2.d.). For example, there were reports
    that on July 9, the SLA attacked suspected rebel positions in Bunumbu
    with a gunship and killed a number of civilians, along with several RUF
    rebels. In attacks in May and June, there were reports that a gunship
    killed 27 persons and wounded 50 persons in the towns of Makeni,
    Magburaka, and Kambia.
        On July 17, there was an unconfirmed report that CDF soldiers
    executed a RUF fighter who allegedly had been trying to surrender.
        There were reports that ECOMOG soldiers committed human rights
    abuses, including killings, during the first quarter of the year. In
    January an ECOMOG soldier reportedly stabbed a civilian in a market
    without provocation; the man later died from his injuries. On April 28,
    ECOMOG personnel shot and killed one exSLA soldier and wounded another
    during an argument over a stolen vehicle; a riot ensued, and several
    persons were injured.
        There were credible reports that the RUF and ex-SLA rebels
    committed a substantial number of summary executions of civilians in
    rebelheld areas throughout the country. However, because of the
    insecurity, access to rebel areas has been difficult, and in most cases
    the identities of the victims were difficult to establish. There were
    credible reports of persons being tortured or killed for attempting to
    flee RUF-occupied areas (see Section 2.d.).
        On May 8, RUF rebels shot and killed at least 20 demonstrators
    outside of Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown, including a
    journalist, and injured at least 80 others (see Sections 2.a. and
    2.b.).
        In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late
    April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage
    by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents and at
    other times during the year.
        On May 25, RUF rebels shot and killed two journalists, Kurt Schork
    of Reuters and Miguel Gil Moreno of Associated Press Television Network
    and injured two others during an attack on a SLA patrol. There were
    reports that on June 15, rebels attacked Port Loko; reportedly there
    were 15 casualties, and 10 rebels were captured. In August there were
    unconfirmed reports that suspected RUF rebels killed 9 civilians and
    abducted 15 others in an attack on the village of Folloh.
        Some victims of rebel kidnap attempts also were killed (see Section
    1.b.).
        There were unconfirmed reports that RUF rebels also summarily
    executed other RUF rebels. For example, on February 4, RUF rebels
    stopped UNAMSIL vehicles and relieved the soldiers of their weapons.
    There were unconfirmed reports that the rebels may have been executed
    by other RUF rebels for disobeying orders not to interfere with UNAMSIL
    vehicles.
        Over the course of the decade-long conflict, rebel mutilations
    caused hundreds if not thousands of deaths; however, there were fewer
    reports of mutilations during the year.
        At the beginning of November, the Guinean army bombed several
    villages in the northern part of the country in a bombing campaign
    against rebels from Sierra Leone and Liberia. In December Guinean
    troops attacked Rosint village in the northern part of the country,
    killed several civilians, abducted over 50 persons, and burned over 30
    houses.
        b. Disappearance.--The RUF and West Side Boys continued to detain
    illegally individuals as part of a wide-scale harassment and terror
    campaign against the civilian population in certain areas of the
    country where they operated. Ex-SLA and RUF forces also continued the
    longstanding practice of kidnaping children, women, and men and
    compelling them to work as slave labor (see Sections 5, 6.c., and
    6.f.). Women also were forced to act as sexual slaves. Unlike in the
    previous year, there were no confirmed reports that rebels kidnaped
    persons to use them as shields to prevent government attacks. The
    United Nations estimates that rebel forces abducted some 20,000 persons
    throughout the country during the 1991-1999 period. Only about 1,400 of
    them have been released and have gone through a formal reintegration
    process; most of those released were children. Many others have
    escaped, but the U.N. believes that many of those abducted still remain
    prisoners despite the Lome Accord's directive that all captives and
    prisoners of war be released.
        On January 18, RUF rebels abducted a group of four aid workers from
    CARITAS and their driver, held them for several hours, and accused them
    of being spies. On January 31, armed rebels detained some UNAMSIL
    soldiers for several hours and relieved them of their weapons. There
    were reports that in February rebels attacked a bus near Masiaka and
    abducted 11 persons. On March 7, RUF rebels abducted five humanitarian
    workers but released them the following day.
        In a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late
    April to early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage
    by RUF rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents. By
    August 1, all of the peacekeepers had been rescued or released.
        On July 24, West Side Boys rebels reportedly abducted 18 passengers
    during a bus attack. At the end of July, the West Side Boys attacked a
    group of foreign workers and detained one person. On August 25, the
    West Side Boys abducted 11 foreign soldiers and 1 SLA officer. Five
    soldiers were released several days later; the remaining hostages were
    rescued during a mission that resulted in the death of a British
    paratrooper, injuries to 11 foreign soldiers, the deaths of 25 rebels,
    and the capture of 18 other rebels. In August there were unconfirmed
    reports that suspected RUF rebels killed 9 civilians and abducted 15
    others in an attack on the village of Folloh.
        There were reports that at the beginning of June, pro-government
    militiamen released approximately 140 children, many of whom were ex-
    soldiers, to the U.N. Children's Fund.
        According to the U.N. Children's Fund, as of December approximately
    4,000 children registered as missing during the war had yet to be
    located. Rebels released a number of child soldiers during the year.
    For example, in January ex-SLA rebels released approximately 150
    children.
        In addition to demanding ransom payments for civilians they
    abducted, in past years, rebel forces targeted Roman Catholic priests
    and nuns, largely on the assumption that the Church would pay ransom
    for their return and because troops from ECOMOG used their missionary
    radio network in support of the Government (see Section 2.c.).
        There were reports that Guinean troops abducted persons from Sierra
    Leone after attacks by RUF and Guinean dissidents.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were
    credible reports that government entities, including the SLA, the CDF,
    and ECOMOG forces occasionally tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    noncombatants suspected of being rebels. According to human rights
    observers, the conduct of the SLA improved during the second half of
    the year after training and reorganization.
        There were reports that attacks during the year by a government
    helicopter gunship on possible RUF positions in urban areas caused
    civilian and rebel injuries and deaths (see Section 1.a.). For example,
    there were reports that in attacks in May and June, a gunship killed 27
    persons and wounded 50 persons in the towns of Makeni, Magburaka, and
    Kambia.
        Reports of abuses by the CDF continued to rise throughout the year.
    There was an increase in the number of rapes committed by CDF forces,
    which in past years reportedly had not engaged in rape. For example, in
    July some CDF members raped three women that they accused of
    transporting goods to rebel-held areas. There were reports that on
    October 10, four CDF members beat and detained a journalist and
    released him after 2 days (see Section 2.a.).
        There were reports that CDF forces manned roadblocks and bridges
    and routinely extorted large sums of money from travelers. Drivers
    often were subjected to abuse, including beatings, when they were
    unable to pay. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that on
    August 15, CDF forces severely beat two truck drivers and detained one
    of them for several hours because they could not produce the requested
    bribe.
        On April 28, ECOMOG personnel killed one exSLA soldier and wounded
    another during an argument over a stolen vehicle; a riot ensued, and
    several persons were injured (see Section 1.a.).
        There were reports that UNAMSIL soldiers committed human rights
    abuses against suspected rebels in May. An investigation was ordered by
    UNAMSIL; however, no further information was available by year's end.
        On May 17, British paratroopers reportedly injured at least one
    civilian during a confrontation with RUF rebels at Lungi Lo.
        On February 4, ex-SLA rebels allegedly became angry after not
    receiving the payment promised to them for disarming and began throwing
    stones at vehicles. The rebels robbed several passengers and pulled at
    least one person from a vehicle and beat him.
        RUF and ex-SLA combatants such as the West Side Boys also committed
    numerous abuses against civilians during the year. On February 24,
    foreign observers visited 15 RUF combatants who were being held by
    their RUF colleagues for having tried to join the disarmament process
    and who were severely beaten. On March 8, rebels abducted Aaron Kargbo
    and Aruna Sherrif, both Adventist Development and Relief Agency staff
    members, and left them in critical condition on the side of a road. In
    a series of separate incidents in a 10-day period from late April to
    early May, more than 700 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by RUF
    rebels. Some peacekeepers were killed in these incidents. On May 8, RUF
    rebels injured at least 80 demonstrators outside of Foday Sankoh's
    residence in Freetown and killed at least 20 others (see Sections 2.a.
    and 2.b.). On July 24, the West Side Boys attacked a bus, injuring
    three passengers.
        RUF forces and ex-SLA combatants such as the West Side Boys
    continued to use rape as a terror tactic against women. There were many
    credible reports of gang rapes and that groups of women were raped.
        During the year, although there were fewer reports of deliberate
    mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears, and legs;
    attempted and successful decapitations; and severe cuts with machetes
    by the RUF, there was no indication that the practice was discontinued
    completely. U.N. officials and humanitarian organizations estimated
    that hundreds if not thousands of individuals, including children, had
    one or both limbs amputated over the decade-long conflict. During the
    overall course of the conflict, it has been estimated that for every
    one of those wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid,
    at least three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, the
    hazards of the journey, or from lack of adequate medical assistance.
    There were credible reports that the RUF continued the practice of
    carving the initials ``RUF'' into the skin of civilians it abducted.
        There were reports of injuries sustained in RUF-held areas that
    were attributed to landmines; however, observers believe that they were
    caused by unexploded ordnances.
        On October 7, there were reports that relatives of the Minister of
    Transport and Communication beat a journalist, Mustapha Bai Attila (see
    Section 2.a.). No police or judicial action was taken against the
    individuals.
        Prison and police lockup facilities conditions generally are harsh;
    at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The Pademba
    Road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325 prisoners,
    routinely houses hundreds more. Diet and medical care were inadequate,
    and only a handful of toilets were available for use. Male and female
    quarters were separate. Adults and juveniles were incarcerated
    together; however, there were no reports of the abuse of juveniles in
    prison. Convicted felons, those in the middle of the judicial process,
    and those who had not yet been charged formally also were incarcerated
    together. Other prison facilities were equally rudimentary, and
    conditions in the holding cells in police offices were extremely poor.
        The Government generally has permitted prison visits; however, the
    Government did not allow the International Committee for the Red Cross
    (ICRC), U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit the
    prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates between May and August.
    UNAMSIL human rights officials were permitted to visit Pademba Road
    Prison in August; during their visit they found 30 minors, 13 of whom
    were suspected RUF child combatants, incarcerated with adults. The ICRC
    declined to visit Pademba Road Prison because the Government would not
    accept ICRC conditions, including private visits with prisoners.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Government and ECOMOG
    forces continued at times to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily.
    Although the Constitution and the law provide for a speedy trial, in
    practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced
    long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the
    judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any
    time during the year and functioned in other parts of the country only
    during part of the year. Many criminal suspects were held for months
    before their cases were examined or formal charges were filed.
        In May officers from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested
    editor Abdul Kouyateh for endangering state security by requesting an
    interview with Foday Sankoh; he was released on October 11 (see Section
    2.a.).
        The CDF, which does not have arrest and detention authorities, in
    particular was criticized for having arrested and detained prisoners.
    On August 15, HRW reported that CDF forces severely beat two truck
    drivers and detained one of them for several hours because they could
    not produce the requested bribe. On October 10, four CDF members beat
    and abducted a journalist after he published an article about the
    Kamajors, one of the ethnic groups in the CDF, and the SLA, but
    released him after 2 days.
        There were credible reports that ECOMOG forces detained civilians
    fleeing rebel-held territory and subjected them to harsh treatment in
    the belief they were rebel collaborators (see Section 1.c.).
        It was reported that a large number of RUF rebels were held in
    detention without charge throughout the country. Over a hundred
    suspected RUF in detention were released in August; however, many
    others still were believed to be held, including suspected child
    combatants (see Section 1.d.). For example, on April 8, there was a
    skirmish between RUF rebels and UNAMSIL, and there were reports that at
    least one RUF member was detained. At the end of July, 23 suspected RUF
    women and girls were arrested and detained at the Lungi police station.
        As of December 1, 568 persons were detained in Pademba Road Prison,
    including 22 women and 13 children. A total of 291 persons, mostly RUF
    members and supporters of other armed groups, remained in detention
    without charge at year's end under emergency powers declared by the
    Government. Reportedly these detainees have been held incommunicado,
    have not been informed of their legal status, and do not have access to
    legal advice.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice; however, the judiciary functioned only in part of the
    country, but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it
    did function.
        The judicial system consists of the Supreme Court, appeals courts,
    and a high court whose justices are chosen by the Head of State. Local
    courts administer traditional law with lay judges; appeals from these
    lower courts move to the superior courts.
        Although there often are lengthy delays between arrests, the
    impositions of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are usually
    free and fair; however, there is evidence that corruption has
    influenced some cases. Traditional justice systems continued to
    supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases
    involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural
    areas.
        The right of appeal from a court-martial to the Court of Appeal was
    deleted from the Armed Forces Act of 1961 by the Royal Sierra Leone
    Military Forces Act of 1971; however, in July Parliament approved the
    Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, which
    reinstated the right of members of the armed forces to appeal a
    sentence handed by a court-martial to the Court of Appeal.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and
    government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.
        Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel
    forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized
    civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.).
        The kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces
    were serious problems (see Sections 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). For years
    rebels have kidnaped young boys and girls to augment their forces and
    at times forced them to abduct other children. Frequently commanders
    also had boys act as bodyguards. The RUF utilized ``Small Boy Units''
    (SBU's) and ``Small Girl Units'' (SGU's), which served in combat.
        There were reports that Guinean troops destroyed private property
    and burned homes (see Section 1.a.).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--There were reports that Government, UNAMSIL, and
    ECOMOG troops, which continued to perform a peacekeeping role in the
    country until April, committed some human rights abuses against RUF
    collaborators and suspected rebels. There were reports that a
    government helicopter gunship reportedly fired on possible RUF
    positions within urban areas, causing rebel and civilian casualties and
    contributing to the displacement of some of the population from RUF-
    held areas (see Section 1.a.).
        The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct children into its
    ranks despite having pledged in June 1999 to stop the practice.
        RUF rebel forces and West Side Boys routinely committed numerous
    serious abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those
    who either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government.
    While these abuses continued during the year, reports were
    significantly lower than in previous years. In large parts of the
    country outside the effective control of the Government, these groups
    kidnaped children and women to work for them and men to carry
    equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and
    cooperation; and forcibly inducted children into their ranks under
    penalty of their own mutilation or death (see Sections 1.c., 1.f., and
    5). They forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty of their
    own mutilation or death; harassed peacekeepers; and seized
    peacekeepers'' weapons. The RUF continued its practice of amputations
    and mutilations, although at a greatly reduced rate from the past year
    (see Section 1.c.). There were reports of injuries from unexploded
    ordnances laid by RUF rebels (see Section 1.c.).
        Relief organizations suspended activities in parts of the country
    at several times during the year due to increased fighting and the
    obstruction of access by rebels. For example, in early March, Medecins
    Sans Frontieres (MSF) suspended activities in parts of the country due
    to the hostage taking by rebels and other instances of looting,
    threats, detention of staff, and extortion (see Sections 1.b., 1.c.,
    1.d., and 1.f.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press
        The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press;
    however, Government security forces on a few occasions harassed,
    arrested, and beat some journalists and used libel laws against
    journalists. The Government took some steps to end the restrictions of
    the previous year. The written press and radio reported freely on
    security matters, corruption, and political affairs generally without
    interference.
        On February 16, authorities arrested the managing editor of Rolyc
    Newspaper, Ayodele Lukobi Johnson, and reporter Ayodele Walters charged
    them with ``sedition, libel, and publishing false news'' after they
    published a negative article about President Kabbah. In May officers
    from the Criminal Investigation Department arrested Abdul Kouyateh, the
    acting editor of the private Freetown weekly Wisdom Newspaper, for
    endangering state security by requesting an interview with Foday
    Sankoh. He was released on October 11.
        On October 7, relatives of the Minister of Transport and
    Communication beat Mustapha Bai Attila, a blind reporter from the radio
    station Voice of the Handicapped, who on several occasions had exposed
    corruption at the parastatal company Sierratel.
        Joseph Mboka, a journalist who was detained in May 1999, was
    released after 2 weeks. Emmanuel Sanossi, a journalist from Cameroon
    who was detained in August 1999, was released after several weeks.
        On October 10, four CDF members beat and detained a journalist for
    the Standard Times newspaper after he published an article about the
    SLA and the Kamajors, one of the ethnic groups in the CDF. He was
    released 2 days later.
        Over 50 newspapers were published in Freetown alone, covering a
    wide spectrum of interests. Most of the newspapers were independent of
    the Government, and several were associated with opposition political
    parties. The number of newspapers fluctuated weekly; many contained
    sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried by other
    newspapers. Newspapers openly and routinely criticized the Government
    and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.
        Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of
    newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of
    public information. Several government and private radio and television
    stations broadcast; both featured domestic news coverage and political
    commentary.
        The parastatal Sierratel communications company provided Internet
    access in Freetown, although the condition of its telephone lines often
    made Internet connectivity problematic.
        On May 8, a local journalist was killed by RUF rebel gunfire during
    a demonstration outside of Foday Sankoh's residence. At least one other
    journalist was injured and another threatened during the incident (see
    Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). On May 25, rebels shot and killed two
    journalists and wounded two others during an attack on a SLA patrol
    (see Section 1.a.).
        The Government generally respected academic freedom. All
    institutions of higher learning were open during most of the year;
    however, infrastructure destroyed during the conflict has not yet been
    restored fully.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice. While in general the Government did
    not deny requests to use public areas for meetings or demonstrations,
    many of which took place throughout the year, the Government did not
    allow RUF meetings and rallies because of the declared State of
    Emergency, which was enacted in February 1998 following the ousting of
    the AFRC and was renewed in August 1999.
        On May 8, 8,000 to 9,000 persons, including doctors, lawyers,
    teachers, petty traders, union leaders, and others marched through
    Freetown and demonstrated outside Foday Sankoh's residence in Freetown
    to protest the behavior of the RUF, the detention of hundreds of U.N.
    peacekeeping troops, and Foday Sankoh. Peacekeepers fired into the air
    but were unable to keep the demonstrators from continuing toward
    Sankoh's house. RUF members opened fire on the demonstrators, killing
    at least 20 persons and injuring at least 80 others.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic,
    philanthropic, and social organizations, and the registration system
    was routine and apparently nonpolitical. No known restrictions were
    applied to the formation or organization of the 18 opposition political
    parties and 60 registered civic action nongovernmental organizations
    (see Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.
        In the past, rebel forces have attacked both churches and mosques
    and targeted Christian and Muslim religious leaders. In addition to
    demanding ransom payments for civilians they abducted, in the past,
    rebel forces have targeted Roman Catholic priests and nuns, largely on
    the assumption that the Church would pay ransom for their return and
    because troops from ECOMOG used their missionary radio network in
    support of the Government. On March 8, rebels abducted Aaron Kargbo and
    Aruna Sherrif, both Adventist Development and Relief Agency staff
    members and left them in critical condition on the side of a road. On
    July 21, rebels from the West Side Boys abducted 4 church workers
    allegedly because they feared an attack by the Government and released
    them after 10 days. On September 7, RUF insurgents abducted two
    missionary priests, Father Victor Mosele and Father Franco Manganello,
    in Pamalap, Guinea, and brought them to Sierra Leone. The priests were
    not mistreated and were allowed some freedom of movement; they later
    escaped.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation
        The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government
    generally respected them in practice; however, according to occasional
    reports, government troops manning roadblocks attempted to extort food
    or money from travelers (see Section 1.c.). Citizens were required to
    get a police clearance within 72 hours before international travel, but
    such clearances were issued nonrestrictively; the Government did not
    attempt to limit citizens' departure or return for political or
    discriminatory reasons.
        RUF rebels and West Side Boys also manned roadblocks to extort
    money and goods from travelers.
        More than an estimated 1 million citizens--almost one-quarter of
    the population--still either are displaced internally or have fled the
    country to escape the continuing insurgency. Reported attacks by a
    government helicopter gunship on possible RUF positions within urban
    areas contributed to the exodus of the population from RUF-held areas
    (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). More than 500,000 persons remain
    in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others remain in The Gambia,
    Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, and other African nations, while still others are
    in countries outside of Africa.
        There were reports that due to the exodus of a large number of
    persons from RUFoccupied areas, the RUF attempted to terrorize the
    remaining population to prevent them from leaving. There are credible
    reports of persons being tortured or killed for attempting to flee (see
    Section 1.a.).
        At year's end, thousands of Sierra Leoneans returned to the country
    from Guinea because of attacks and ill treatment by RUF forces and
    Guinean forces. Some of these internally displaced persons (IDP's) were
    housed in camps, but many live in Freetown. The large influx of IDP's
    and the lack of resources caused tension between local residents and
    the returning IDP's. In one instance in November, a fight broke out
    between the IDP's and local residents at an IDP camp in Bo. At least 13
    persons were injured seriously.
        There is no formal process for granting political asylum or refugee
    status. The Government cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees and other organizations on repatriation matters and continued
    to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who fled to Sierra
    Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years. There
    were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they
    feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his
    Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty
    elections in the country in 30 years. Several political parties were
    represented in the unicameral legislature and in the cabinet. Locally
    elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system control local
    government. Preparations for local elections, which were to have taken
    place in 1999, were postponed in accordance with the 1991 Constitution
    because of continued fighting. The July 1999 Lome Accords included the
    RUF in a power-sharing arrangement in the Government, and in July 1999,
    the Parliament ratified a bill allowing the RUF to transform itself
    into a political party. Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, was offered and
    accepted the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of
    Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development with the
    status of vice president. In November 1999, the Revolutionary United
    Front Party (RUFP) received a provisional registration certificate from
    the interim National Election Commission. In May the RUF broke away
    from its agreements under the Lome Accord, returned to insurgency, and
    ceased to interact in a political capacity.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are
    relatively few women in senior government positions: Only 2 of the 18
    cabinet positions were filled by women, and of the 80 members of the
    unicameral legislature, only 7 were female.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated
    without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
    findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally
    cooperative and responsive to their views; however, due to insecurity
    caused by the rebel insurgency, the activities of human rights monitors
    were limited to government-held areas. Representatives of various local
    and international NGO's, foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N. human
    rights officers were able to monitor trials and to visit prisons and
    custodial facilities during most of the year; however, between May and
    August the Government did not allow the ICRC, U.N. human rights
    officials, or other observers to visit prisons to assess conditions or
    meet with inmates (see Section 1.c.). The ICRC declined to visit
    Pademba Road Prison because the Government would not accept ICRC
    conditions, including private visits with prisoners.
        On February 22, Parliament approved the Truth and Reconciliation
    Commission (TRC) Bill which would create a TRC to provide a forum for
    publicly airing the grievances of victims and the confessions of
    perpetrators from the civil war; however, the Commission had not been
    established by year's end.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and
    provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and
    ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for
    persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks
    citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community and for other
    persons with non-African fathers.
        Women.--Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common.
    The police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in
    cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not
    recognized as a societal problem; however, rape is recognized as a
    societal problem and is punishable by up to 14 years'' imprisonment.
    There is a significant amount of prostitution: Many women, especially
    those displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to
    prostitution as a means to secure income for themselves and their
    children. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c.
    and 1.g.) and forced women and girls to act as sexual slaves (see
    Sections 1.b., 6.c., and 6.f.). There are almost no medical or
    psychological services for women who were raped after they were
    abducted.
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for women; however, in
    practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In
    particular their rights and status under traditional law vary
    significantly depending upon the ethnic group to which they belong. The
    Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to
    inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to
    male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women
    cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a
    number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active
    in civic organizations and NGO's, were instrumental in pressuring the
    previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in
    1996, and were vocal representatives of civil society during the peace
    talks in Lome in 1999.
        Women do not have equal access to education, economic
    opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas,
    women perform much of the subsistence farming and have little
    opportunity for formal education. Women are very active in civic and
    philanthropic organizations, and a significant number are employed as
    civil servants.
        Children.--Although the Government is committed to improving
    children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic
    education and health services for them. The law requires school
    attendance through primary school; however, schools, clinics, and
    hospitals throughout the country were looted and destroyed during the
    9-year insurgency, and most have not been rebuilt. A large number of
    children receive little or no formal education. Schools are financed
    largely by formal and informal fees, but many families cannot afford to
    pay them. The average educational level for girls is markedly below
    that of boys, and only 6 percent of women are literate. At the
    university level, male students predominate. The Ministry of Social
    Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs has primary responsibility for
    children's issues.
        Up to an estimated 5,000 child soldiers at a time served alongside
    adults on both sides during the civil conflict, but in greater numbers
    on the RUF side; some observers place the number at almost double that
    figure. The recruitment of children for military service by the CDF
    remained a problem, and there is credible evidence that the CDF forces
    continued to accept children as volunteer soldiers.
        The kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces
    were serious problems (see Sections 1.b., 1.f., 6.c., and 6.f.). For
    years rebels kidnaped young boys and girls to augment their forces and
    to abduct other children. Girls are forced to perform as sexual slaves
    (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). In some cases rebel forces have
    forced these children to commit atrocities involving family members.
    However, even children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes
    are rejected by their families and communities because of their
    perceived involvement in rebel activities.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society,
    although with varying frequency. The less severe form of excision is
    practiced. Some estimates, including by UNICEF, of the percentage of
    women and girls who undergo the practice range as high as 80 to 90
    percent; however, local groups believe that this figure is overstated.
    FGM is practiced on girls as young as 5 years old. No law prohibits
    FGM. A number of NGO's are working to inform the public about the
    harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however, an active
    resistance by secret societies countered the wellpublicized
    international efforts against FGM.
        People with Disabilities.--Public facility access and
    discrimination against the disabled are not considered to be public
    policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide
    for other assistance for the disabled. Although a few private agencies
    and organizations attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there
    was no government policy or program directed particularly at the
    disabled. There does not appear to be outright discrimination against
    the disabled in housing or education. However, given the high rate of
    general unemployment, work opportunities for the disabled are few.
        Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or
    had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving special
    assistance from various local and international humanitarian
    organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery,
    prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work
    skills. The Lome Accord also called for the creation of a special fund
    to implement a program for rehabilitation of war victims, although the
    fund had not yet been established by year's end. Attention to amputees
    increased the access of others with disabilities to health care and
    treatment.
        National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities
        The country's population is ethnically diverse and consists of at
    least 13 ethnic groups. These groups generally all speak distinct
    primary languages and are concentrated outside urban areas. However,
    all ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, little ethnic
    segregation is apparent in urban areas, and interethnic marriage is
    common. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern
    part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these
    groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population.
        Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the
    armed forces, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic
    groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts,
    military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear
    to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political
    cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute
    appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict.
    No ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels
    was identifiable, and they controlled territory by terror and coercion
    rather than by popular consent.
        Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political
    restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of
    patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction
    effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the
    Lebanese community.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of association, and in practice workers had the right to join
    independent trade unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the
    workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized,
    but attempts to organize agricultural workers and mineworkers have met
    with little success. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone
    Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary. Police and
    members of the armed services are prohibited from joining unions. There
    are no reliable statistics on union membership, but the membership
    numbers have declined as a percentage of all workers because of the
    virtual collapse of the small manufacturing sector.
        The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade
    union by applying to the registrar of trade unions, who has statutory
    powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The
    registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an
    insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry
    already served by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If
    the registrar rejects an application, the decision may be appealed in
    the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.
        Workers have the right to strike, although the Government can
    require 21 days' notice. No strikes were reported during the year. No
    laws prohibit retaliation against strikers, even a lawful strike. An
    employee fired for union activities may file a complaint with a labor
    tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against
    trade unions are made to a tribunal.
        Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate
    internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1971
    Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal
    framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take
    place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal
    number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are
    covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working
    conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for
    negotiations; in case of a deadlock the government may intervene. The
    Industrial Court for Settlement of Industrial Disputes, as required by
    Section 44 of the 1971 Act, was created and began hearing cases during
    the year.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that performed by
    children; however, forced labor remains a problem. Under the Chiefdom's
    Council Act, individual chiefs may impose compulsory labor and may
    require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of
    common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no
    penalty for noncompliance. There were reports of some compulsory labor,
    possibly including labor by children in rural areas.
        Ex-SLA and RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into
    their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude and to perform
    as sexual slaves. Many became fighters with the rebel forces. Women
    were also forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and
    6.f.).
        Rebel forces also forced civilians, including children, to labor as
    porters and as workers in diamond fields under their control despite
    the signing of the peace accord in July 1999.
        d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The
    minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, although children
    between the ages of 12 and 18 years may be employed in certain
    nonhazardous occupations, provided they have their parents'' consent.
    In practice this law is not enforced because there is no government
    entity charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family
    businesses and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work
    seasonally on family subsistence farms.
        Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are
    involved in the industrial sector. Foreign employers have hired
    children to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in
    poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International
    Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to
    see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.
        The law requires school attendance through primary school; however,
    there is a shortage of schools and teachers (see Section 5). Many
    children consequently enter the work force with few skills and with
    limited, if any, literacy.
        The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
    forms of child labor.
        The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that
    by children; however, such practices exist (see Sections 5, 6.c., and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A 1997 law set the minimum wage
    at approximately $12 (21,000 Leones) per month; it has not been
    adjusted since then. The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most workers support
    an extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced
    by the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common to pool incomes
    and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.
        The Government's suggested workweek is 38 hours, but most workweeks
    for those who are employed exceed that figure.
        Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks
    the funding to enforce them properly. Trade unions provide the only
    protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions.
    Initially a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working
    condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day
    strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work
    situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were reports that rebel forces kidnaped young boys
    and girls, forcibly impressed them, and forced the children to serve
    them and to perform as sexual slaves (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Women
    also were forced to act as sexual slaves (see Sections 1.b., 5, and
    6.c.). Rebel forces also forced civilians, including children, to work
    as porters and in diamond fields (see Section 6.c.). The Government is
    attempting to combat this practice through its efforts to compel the
    RUF to disarm and demobilize.
                                   __________

                                    SOMALIA

        Somalia \1\ has been without a central government since its last
    president, dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, fled the country in 1991.
    Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the
    killing, dislocation, and starvation of thousands of persons and led
    the United Nations to intervene militarily in 1992. Following the U.N.
    intervention, periodic attempts at national reconciliation were made,
    but they did not succeed. In September 1999, during a speech before the
    U.N. General Assembly, Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh
    announced an initiative on Somalia to facilitate reconciliation under
    the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development. In
    March formal reconciliation efforts began with a series of small focus
    group meetings of various elements of Somali society in Djibouti. In
    May in Arta, Djibouti, delegates representing all clans and a wide
    spectrum of Somali society were selected for a ``Conference for
    National Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia.'' The Conference opened
    on June 15 with more than 900 delegates, including representatives of
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In July the Conference adopted a
    charter for a 3-year Transitional National Administration and selected
    a 245-member Transitional Assembly, which included members of Somali
    minority groups and 25 women. On August 26, the assembly elected
    Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as Transitional President, and he was sworn in
    on August 28. Ali Khalif Gallayr was named Prime Minister in October,
    and on October 20, the Prime Minister appointed the 25-member Cabinet.
    Administrations in the northwest (Somaliland) and northeast (Puntland)
    areas of the country do not recognize the results of the Djibouti
    Conference, nor do several Mogadishu-based factional leaders. Serious
    interclan fighting occurred in part of the country, notably in the
    central regions of Hiran and Middle Shabelle, and the southern regions
    of Gedo and Lower Shabelle. Hussein Aideed is the leader of the Somali
    National Alliance (SNA), which ceased to assert that it was the
    government of the entire country following the Djibouti Conference.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no skirmishes between the SNA
    and other militias. No group controls more than a fraction of the
    country's territory. There is no national judicial system.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\  The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
    Somalia. This report draws in part on non-U.S. Government sources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Leaders in the northeast proclaimed the formation of the
    ``Puntland'' state in July 1998. Puntland's leader publicly announced
    that he did not plan to break away from the remainder of the country,
    but the Puntland Administration did not participate in the Djibouti
    Conference or recognize the Transitional National Administration that
    emerged from it. In the northwest, the ``Republic of Somaliland''
    continued to proclaim its independence within the borders of former
    British Somaliland, which had obtained independence from Britain in
    1960 before joining the former Italian-ruled Somalia. Somaliland has
    sought unsuccessfully international recognition since 1991.
    Somaliland's government includes a parliament, a functioning civil
    court system, executive departments organized as ministries, six
    regional governors, and municipal authorities in major towns. The ban
    in Puntland on all political parties remained in place; however, in
    June the Somaliland ban on political parties was lifted.
        After the withdrawal of the last U.N. peacekeepers in 1995, clan
    and factional militias, in some cases supplemented by local police
    forces established with U.N. help in the early 1990's, continued to
    function with varying degrees of effectiveness. Repeated intervention
    by Ethiopian troops helped to maintain order in Gedo region, a base of
    support for a local radical Islamic group called Al'Ittihad. In
    Somaliland over 60 percent of the budget was allocated to maintaining a
    militia and police force composed of former troops. In September a
    Somaliland presidential decree, citing national security concerns, in
    the wake of the conclusion of the Djibouti conference, arrogated
    special powers to the police and the military. Also in September, the
    Transitional Government began recruiting for a new 4,000-officer police
    force to restore order in Mogadishu. In November the Transitional
    Government requested former soldiers to register and enroll in training
    camps to form a national army. Over 10,000 former soldiers were
    enlisted by year's end. Police and militia committed numerous human
    rights abuses throughout the country.
        The country is very poor with a market-based economy in which most
    of the work force is employed as subsistence farmers,
        agro-pastoralists, or pastoralists. The principal exports are
    livestock and charcoal; there is very little industry. Insecurity and
    bad weather continued to affect the country's already extremely poor
    economic situation. The country's economic problems caused a serious
    lack of employment opportunities and led to pockets of malnutrition in
    southern areas of the country.
        The human rights situation is poor, and serious human rights abuses
    continued throughout the year. Citizens' right to change their
    government is circumscribed by the absence of an established central
    authority. Many civilian citizens were killed in factional fighting,
    especially in the Gedo, Hiran, Lower Shabelle, and Middle Shabelle
    regions. In Somaliland and Puntland, police used lethal force while
    disrupting demonstrations. The use of landmines, reportedly by the
    Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), resulted in several deaths. Kidnaping
    remained a problem. There were some reports of the use of torture by
    Somaliland and Puntland Administrations and militias. Prison conditions
    are harsh and life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention remained
    problems. Somaliland authorities detained a number of persons for
    participation in the Djibouti Conference. The judicial system relied in
    most regions on some combination of traditional and customary justice,
    Shari'a (Islamic) law, and the pre-1991 Penal Code; there were
    occasional reports of harsh physical punishments by Islamic Shari'a
    courts, including public whippings and stonings. Citizens' privacy
    rights were limited. There were restrictions on the freedoms of the
    press, assembly, association, and religion. There were restrictions on
    freedom of movement. There were numerous attacks on international
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Violence against women and
    discrimination against women remained problems. The abuse of children,
    including the nearly universal practice of female genital mutilation
    (FGM) remained a problem. Abuse and discrimination against ethnic
    minorities in the various clan regions continued. There is no effective
    system for the protection of worker rights, and there were isolated
    areas where local gunmen forced minority group members to work for
    them. Child labor and trafficking also were problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence
    and banditry have been endemic since the revolt against Siad Barre, who
    fled the capital in January 1991. Since that time, tens of thousands of
    persons, mostly noncombatants, have died in interfactional and
    interclan fighting. Although reliable statistics were not available,
    numerous persons were killed during the year. On January 7, militia of
    the Matan Abdulle, an Abgal sub-clan, killed five persons and injured
    six in an attack on a bus in North Mogadishu. Observers believe that
    the probable target of the attack was businessman Mohamed Hassan Ali,
    alias ``Maqarre,'' who was killed in the attack. On January 31,
    fighting between the Mohammed Zuber and Aulihyan sub-clans began in
    Doble (Lower Juba region) and lasted for several days; numerous persons
    were killed and hundreds injured. On February 4 in Lower Shabelle,
    fighting between the Islamic Court Militias and the Rahanweyn
    Resistance Army resulted in the deaths of approximately 15 persons and
    injuries to 10 others. On March 14, fierce fighting near the village of
    Buulo Fulaay between fighters from the Rahanweyn Resistance Army and
    militias from the Rahanweyn Salvation Army and the Digil Salvation Army
    resulted in the deaths of over 30 persons and injuries to numerous
    others. On March 19 in the village of Harardere (Mudug region),
    fighting between militias of the Abgal Wa'aysle sub-clan and the Habr
    Gedr Ayer resulted in the deaths of five persons. On March 20 near Bulo
    Burti (Hiran region), fighting between 2 Dir sub-clans resulted in the
    deaths of at least 20 persons and injuries to 10 others. On April 10,
    the Samawada Rehabilitation and Development Organization (SAREDO), a
    local NGO, accused the Islamic Court militias in Merka, Lower Shabelle,
    of killing one of its guards, Abukar Ali Ismail. The militias
    reportedly killed Ismail after he refused their order to disarm. On May
    20, in Buulo Waambo, Kurtunwaarey District, Jiiddo clan militia killed
    seven members of the Garre clan, reportedly in retaliation for the
    earlier killing of two Jiiddo clan members in Hilowgey village by the
    Garre clan. Between May 26 and 28, in Guri Ceel District, Galgadud
    region, fighting between the Habr Gedr and Galjeel clans resulted in
    the deaths of 13 persons. On June 9, two members of warlord Mohamed
    Said Hersi ``Morgan's'' militia murdered Jama Habeb, the commander of
    the militia, reportedly because of internal conflict within the
    militia. On June 22 in Qoryoley district, fighting between militias of
    the Garre and Jiiddo clans resulted in the deaths of over 30 persons;
    the clashes began after a Garre clansman killed a Jiiddo clansman. On
    July 7, fighting between militia loyal to SNA Commander Hussein Aideed
    and residents of southwest Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of seven
    persons; the fighting erupted when residents refused to pay a tax
    levied by the SNA. On July 26 in Lower Shabelle, renewed fighting
    between the Jiiddo and Garre clans killed numerous persons. On August 4
    in the village of Kabsuuma, Lower Shabelle region, following the
    alleged rape of a Galjeel girl, fighting between militias of the
    Galjeel and Bimal clans resulted in the deaths of at least 9 persons
    and injuries to 10 others. On August 8, a revenge killing sparked
    fighting between the Hawadle and the Galjeel clans that left one person
    dead and several injured. On August 11 in Belet Weyne (Hiran district),
    fighting between the Hawadle and Galjeel, allegedly resulting from a
    dispute over the distribution of relief food resulted in the deaths of
    11 persons and injuries to 20 others. There were no investigations into
    any of these incidents, nor was any action taken against militia
    responsible for abuses; however, local mediation efforts took place in
    some incidents, which resolved some cases.
        Although many civilians died as a result of fighting during the
    year, politically motivated extrajudicial murder was uncommon; however,
    in the latter part of the year, acts of violence, including several
    killings, increased against supporters or members of the Transitional
    Government. In October in Mogadishu, unidentified men shot and killed
    Yusuf Tallan, a former army general under the Barre regime and a
    delegate to the Djibouti conference. He was shot after he refused to
    get into a vehicle with the men. The killing was linked to warlord
    Osman Atto because of Atto's business deals in the north and the
    possibility of a deal between Somaliland President Egal and Atto in
    order to destablize the south. General Galal, chairman of the National
    Security Committee, also was linked to the killing; there was suspicion
    that he might have killed Tallan in order to prevent Tallan from
    becoming head of the National Security Committee. Tallan had been named
    as the head of a committee to oversee demobilization of the country's
    militias. In December the President announced that the police had
    arrested Tallan's alleged killers with foreign assistance; however,
    there has been no independent confirmation of this claim. The alleged
    killers were not known to have been charged or tried by year's end. On
    November 12, two unidentified men shot and killed Hasan Ahmed Elmi,
    also known as Hasan Jaale, a member of the Transitional National
    Assembly; he was killed in front of his wife and children at his home
    in Mogadishu. Observers believe that the attack may have been in
    retaliation for the recent killing of a Daud clan member by the
    Galje'el clan, of which Elmi was a member. An investigation into the
    killing was conducted; however, it was inconclusive. On November 17, 40
    militiamen ambushed a convoy carrying a member of the Transitional
    Assembly, killing at least 7 persons and injuring at least 9 others.
    Local mediation occurred and the case was closed.
        On at least two occasions police in Somaliland and Puntland used
    lethal force while disrupting demonstrations. On March 30, police in
    Puntland killed two persons while forcibly dispersing a demonstration
    in Bosasso (see Section 2.b.) and arrested several others (see Section
    1.d.). On November 11 in Hargeisa, police forcibly dispersed a crowd
    blocking the main road to the airport (see Section 2.b.); more than 60
    protesters were arrested (see Section 1.d.) and 2 persons were killed.
    There was no investigation nor action taken in these cases by year's
    end.
        There were a number of attacks on humanitarian and NGO workers by
    militia and other groups (see Section 4). On January 2 in Balad
    District, Abgal militia opened fire on a vehicle transporting three
    staff members from the NGO, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief
    Everywhere (CARE) members (see Section 4). Shucayb Mohamed Hussein, a
    CARE engineer, was killed in the attack. On January 28 near the village
    of Buqdah, approximately 60 armed gunmen attacked another CARE convoy,
    killing 5 convoy security guards and 4 villagers (see Section 4). On
    January 29 in the town of Sablale, unidentified persons attacked the
    office of ACCORD, an international NGO, killing two persons (see
    Section 4). In response to this attack, ACCORD suspended its Polio
    Eradication Campaign. No investigation was made into the incident;
    however, the local community mobilized the Islamic Shari'a courts. A
    gunman was apprehended and his vehicle was towed to Merka.
        There were occasional reports of the use of harsh physical
    punishments by the five Islamic Shari'a courts in Mogadishu, which are
    aligned with different subclans, including public whippings and stoning
    (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.). The courts generally refrained from
    administering the stricter Islamic punishments, like amputation, but
    their militias administered summary punishments, including executions,
    in the city and its environs. For example, in June an Islamic Court in
    Buulo village, Lower Shabelle, sentenced Nuurto Muhammad Ali to death
    by stoning after she was discovered to have three husbands (see Section
    1.c.).
        On March 11, a firing squad in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, executed a
    man, Hassan Ahmed, accused of murdering a woman on February 27. Ahmed
    was executed after the Mohammand Musa subclan of Abgal clan, which both
    Ahmed and the women were members of, decided that he should be put to
    death. On April 24, South Mogadishu's Shirkole Islamic Court executed
    Farhan Muhammad Jama, who was accused of killing businessman Ahmad
    Muhammad Ali after the Saleban subclan of the Habr Gidr clan, which
    both men were members of, decided that he should be put to death.
        Numerous extrajudicial killings during the year centered on
    conflicts over land or livestock. For example, on October 22 near the
    town of Qoryoley, fighting over land between Jiiddo clans and local
    farmers from other clans killed at least 10 persons and injured 15
    others.
        In October in Bosasso, an unidentified person threw a grenade into
    a temporary shelter for persons traveling to Yemen, killing two persons
    and injuring five others.
        Landmines laid by different groups, particularly the RRA and
    possibly the SNA, caused several deaths and injuries during the year.
    On January 20 in the Hiran region, a landmine exploded, killing at
    least six persons. On January 30 in the Hiran region, landmines and gun
    battles killed 21 persons. On January 30 near El Ali, five escorts of a
    food convoy were killed when their vehicle hit a mine. Also on January
    30, an aid convoy hit a landmine while crossing the Shabelle River for
    the Bakool Region. The Abgal clan reportedly planted the landmine; 10
    persons were killed and 8 others injured. On February 5, landmines
    destroyed three ``technicals,'' combat vehicles, belonging to the
    Islamic Court militias near the village of Buulo Warbo, west of
    Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle. The explosions killed three persons and
    injured five others.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports of attacks
    within Ethiopian territory by armed groups opposed to the Government of
    Ethiopia, supported by Eritrea, operating out of Somalia. Aideed and
    the SNA reconciled with Ethiopia, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
    was disarmed and expelled from the country.
        No action is known to have been taken against the persons
    responsible for the following 1999 killings: The February 1999 killing
    of Dr. Singh Bohgal; the March 1999 killing of a foreign religious
    worker; the July 1999 killing of Osman Jeyte; the August 1999 killing
    of one person during a demonstration at the Ismail Jumale Center for
    Human Rights; the September 1999 killing of a senior UNICEF official;
    and the September 1999 killing of businessman Haji Abdullahi.
        No investigation was conducted into a 1998 attack by militia
    fighters on a World Food Program Convoy that killed two persons.
        The investigation into the 1997 killing of a Portuguese doctor
    still was pending at year's end.
        On November 24, an appeals court in Rome convicted Hashi Omar
    Hassan, a Somali, of the 1994 murder of two Italian journalists in
    Mogadishu (see Section 2.a.). The court sentenced Hassan to life in
    prison.
        In 1997 a War Crimes Commission in Hargeisa in Somaliland began
    investigating the killings in 1988 of at least 2,000 local residents,
    including women and children, by Siad Barre's troops. Heavy rains in
    1997 revealed numerous mass graves in the Hargeisa area. During the
    year, the War Crimes Commission continued to record eyewitness accounts
    and other evidence.
        On September 23, approximately 30 Ethiopian soldiers attacked Haji
    Salah village in Somaliland, killed two persons, and confiscated radio
    equipment. Somaliland President Egal wrote a letter to the Ethiopian
    Government and asked for an explanation for the attack.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no known reports of unresolved
    politically motivated disappearances, although cases easily might have
    been concealed among the thousands of refugees and displaced persons.
        Kidnaping remained a problem, particularly for relief workers and
    critics of faction leaders. On July 12 in Bosasso, Mohammed Deq, editor
    of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan,'' was abducted by a group of men in
    military uniform from the Puntland Criminal Investigation Division
    (CID) while standing in front of the CID headquarters (see Section
    2.a.); he was released later that day. On May 29 in Bosasso,
    unidentified gunmen reportedly broke into the newspaper's offices and
    assaulted Deq (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). On July 26, technicals and
    Sa'ad militia attacked the compound of Action Against Hunger (ACF), an
    international NGO, in south Mogadishu. Militiamen kidnaped two foreign
    ACF employees and detained them until September 18.
        There have been no developments in the February 1999 kidnaping case
    of two OLF officials from Ethiopia and a senior Al'Ittihad official.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Transitional National Charter, adopted in July, but
    not implemented by year's end, prohibits torture, and the Puntland
    Charter prohibits torture ``unless sentenced by Islamic Shari'a courts
    in accordance with Islamic law;'' however, there were some reports of
    the use of torture by the Puntland and Somaliland administrations and
    by warring militiamen against each other or against civilians.
    Observers believe that many incidents of torture were unreported.
        Although reliable statistics were not available, a large number of
    persons were injured as a result of interfactional and interclan
    fighting (see Section 1.a.).
        On May 29 in Bosasso, unidentified gunmen reportedly broke into the
    offices of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan'' and assaulted Editor
    Mohammed Deq (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.); on July 12 in Bosasso, Deq
    was abducted briefly (see Section 1.b.).
        On September 10 in Borama, Somaliland police used small arms and
    guns to forcibly disperse a demonstration in support of the Djibouti
    reconciliation process (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). Police reportedly
    injured several persons.
        In the latter part of the year, acts of violence, including several
    killings, increased against supporters or members of the Transitional
    Government (see Section 1.a.). For example, on November 17, 40
    militiamen ambushed a convoy carrying Ahmed Duale Gelle ``Haf,'' a
    member of the Transitional Assembly, and killed 7 persons and injured
    12 others. Elders of the attackers' and Haf's subclan later met at
    Haf's home. They agreed that some government security forces should be
    posted where the attack took place.
        There were a number of attacks on humanitarian and NGO workers by
    militia and other groups, which resulted in killings and injuries (see
    Sections 1.a. and 4).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no bomb explosions in
    Hargeisa, Somaliland. In December 1999, there was an explosion at the
    U.N. Development Program office in Hargeisa. Somaliland police
    attributed the bombing to disgruntled persons who had failed to get
    jobs with various international organizations, and reported that a
    number of persons had been arrested in connection with the bombings;
    however, no action had been taken against them by year's end.
        There were occasional reports of the use of harsh physical
    punishments by Islamic Shari'a courts, including public whippings and
    stoning (see Section 1.e.).
        In February representatives of the local Islamic Court militias
    flogged Omar Dini, a reporter for the Mogadishu-based newspaper
    ``Qaran,'' allegedly for an anti-Islamic article he had written (see
    Sections 2.a. and 2.c.). In June an Islamic Court in Buulo village,
    Lower Shabelle, sentenced Nuurto Muhammad Ali to death by stoning after
    she was discovered to have three husbands (see Section 1.a.). The
    execution was suspended until after Ali, who was pregnant, gave birth;
    however, she was not executed by year's end. The same court sentenced
    Dalmar Mahmud Ahmad to a punishment of one hundred lashes for adultery
    on April 8.
        As during past years, labor disputes sometimes led to the use of
    force (see Section 6.b.). For example, the Habr Gibr clan used force
    against the Digil and Biyamal clans in Lower Shabelle during the year.
        There were no reported attacks within Ethiopia by armed opposition
    groups operating out of Somalia (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions varied by region. Conditions at the south
    Mogadishu prison controlled by the Aideed forces continued to improve
    because of visits by international organizations; however, conditions
    at the north Mogadishu prison of the Shari'a court system remained
    harsh and life threatening. Hareryale, a prison established by the
    Murursade subclan at the border between north and south Mogadishu
    reportedly holds hundreds of prisoners, including many children.
    Conditions at Hareryale are described as overcrowded and poor.
    Juveniles share cells with adult prisoners and there is a high
    incidence of tuberculosis. Similar conditions exist at Shirkole prison,
    an Islamic Court militia-run prison in south Mogadishu and at a north
    Mogadishu prison for Abgal clan prisoners run by warlord Musa Sudi. A
    local NGO that visited the central prison in Hargeisa, Somaliland,
    documented a shortage of medicine, widespread tuberculosis, and
    juveniles sharing cells with adults. In May there was an outbreak of
    diarrhea in Burao prison, Somaliland, resulting in the death of one
    prison guard. According to an international observer, men and women
    were housed separately in the Puntland prison in Bosasso; this is the
    case in other prisons as well. Abuse by guards reportedly was common in
    many prisons. Conditions in other prisons reportedly were less severe,
    according to international relief agencies. The detainees' clans
    generally pay the costs of detention. In many areas, prisoners are able
    to receive food from family members or from relief agencies. Ethnic
    minorities make up a disproportionately large percentage of the prison
    population.
        The Jumale Center for Human Rights visited prisons in Mogadishu
    during the year. The Puntland administration permits prison visits by
    independent monitors, and in April an international observer visited
    the Bosasso, Puntland, prison. Somaliland authorities permit prison
    visits by independent monitors, and such visits occurred during the
    year. In August a local NGO visited Hargeisa, Somaliland, central
    prison.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the absence of
    constitutional or other legal protections, various factions and armed
    bandits continued to engage in arbitrary detention, including the
    holding of relief workers. On July 11, a group of men seized a foreign-
    registered cargo ship off the coast of Puntland and demanded a ransom.
        In March Somaliland authorities detained three men for 2 days for
    sending a letter in support of the Djibouti reconciliation conference
    to the President of Somaliland.
        On March 20 in the town of Galkayo, the Mudug (Puntland) region
    security committee detained five persons demonstrating in support of
    the Djibouti reconciliation process (see Section 2.b.). The
    demonstrators were released on March 28. On March 30, police in
    Puntland killed two persons and arrested and detained for a few days
    several others while forcibly dispersing a demonstration in Bosasso
    (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
        On September 10 in Borama, Somaliland police arrested five persons
    after forcibly dispersing a demonstration in support of the Djibouti
    reconciliation process (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        Somaliland authorities detained a number of persons for
    participating in the Djibouti reconciliation conference. On February
    28, Somaliland authorities detained for several days without charge
    four members of the Habr Awal sub-clan in Hargeisa for attempting to
    participate in the Djibouti reconciliation conference process. In March
    Somaliland police detained for several days without charge two men in
    Hargeisa for protesting against alleged pollution by a petroleum
    company in the town of Berbera (see Section 2.b.). On March 21,
    Somaliland authorities detained for several days 20 delegates to the
    Djibouti Conference as they attempted to cross the SomalilandDjibouti
    border (see Section 2.d.). In May in Borama, Somaliland authorities
    detained one person for participating in the Djibouti reconciliation
    conference; he was released in late June. On May 12 in Hargeisa,
    Somaliland officials arrested Abdi Hashi, a Mogadishu-based scholar,
    for taking part in a conference of intellectuals in Djibouti. On August
    30, Puntland President Abdullahi Yussuf decreed the arrest of any
    person returning to Puntland from Arta, Djibouti (see Section 3). On
    September 4, Somaliland authorities arrested and charged with treason
    Garad Abshir Garad Salah, Transitional National Administration
    representative and elected member of the Transitional Assembly, for his
    participation in the Djibouti conference (see Section 1.e.). Salah was
    sentenced to 7 years in prison for treason; however, he was released on
    October 4. On October 4 in Bosasso, Puntland police arrested and
    detained Bile Mahmud Qabowsadeh, editor of local newspaper ``Yool,''
    after he returned from the Djibouti conference (see Section 2.a.). In
    November the Somaliland Administration arrested Sultan Mohamed
    Abdulkadir when he returned to the country from Djibouti. On November
    11 in Hargeisa, police forcibly dispersed a crowd protesting his
    arrest; more than 60 protesters were arrested and two persons were
    killed (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.).
        Somaliland authorities detained some foreigners for proselytizing.
    For example, on February 3 in Somaliland, nine Ethiopians allegedly
    were detained for engaging in Christian missionary activities (see
    Section 2.c.). In May 1999, seven Christian Ethiopians were arrested in
    Somaliland, allegedly for attempting to proselytize; they remained in
    detention at year's end (see Section 2.c.).
        On November 5 in Baidoa, RRA soldiers forcibly abducted and
    detained more than 12 local elders believed to support the Transitional
    Government; however, they were released by year's end.
        Authorities in Somaliland, Puntland, and in areas of the south
    detained both local and foreign journalists (see Section 2.a.).
        There were no reports of lengthy pretrial detention in violation of
    the pre-1991 Penal Code in Somaliland or Puntland.
        None of the factions used forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no national judicial
    system.
        The Transitional Charter, adopted in July, provides for an
    independent judiciary, and for a High Commission of Justice, a Supreme
    Court, a Court of Appeal, and courts of first reference; however, the
    Charter had not been implemented by year's end. Some regions have
    established local courts that depend on the predominant local clan and
    associated faction for their authority. The judiciary in most regions
    relies on some combination of traditional and customary law, Shari'a
    law, the penal code of the pre-1991 Siad Barre Government, or some
    combination of the three. For example, in Bosasso and Afmadow criminals
    are turned over to the families of their victims, which then exact
    blood compensation in keeping with local tradition. Under the system of
    customary justice, clans often hold whole opposing clans or sub-clans
    responsible for alleged violations by individuals. Islamic Shari'a
    courts continued to operate in several regions of the country, filling
    the vacuum created by the absence of normal government authority.
    Islamic Shari'a courts traditionally ruled in cases of civil and family
    law, but extended their jurisdiction to criminal proceedings in some
    regions beginning in 1994. There were occasional reports of the use of
    harsh physical punishments by Islamic Shari'a courts, including public
    whippings and stoning. In Berbera courts apply a combination of Shari'a
    law and the former penal code. In south Mogadishu, a segment of north
    Mogadishu, the Lower Shabelle, and parts of the Gedo and Hiran regions,
    court decisions are based on a combination of Shari'a and customary
    law. Only three of the five Islamic Shari'a courts in Mogadishu
    continued to function during the year, those belonging to the Ayr,
    Saleban, and Murursade clans. The other two courts, belonging to the
    Sarur and Duduble clans, do not function. They are aligned with
    different subclans, raising doubts about their independence. The courts
    generally refrained from administering the stricter Islamic
    punishments, like amputation, but their militias administered summary
    punishments, including executions. In April Somaliland adopted a new
    constitution based on democratic principles, but continued to use the
    pre-1991 Penal Code. The constitution provides for an independent
    judiciary; however, the judiciary is not independent in practice. A
    U.N. report issued in January again noted a serious lack of trained
    judges and of legal documentation in Somaliland, which caused problems
    in the administration of justice. The Puntland Charter implemented in
    May 1998, provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary
    is not independent in practice. The Puntland Charter also provides for
    a Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and courts of first reference. In
    Puntland clan elders resolve the majority of cases using traditional
    methods; however, those with no clan representation in Puntland are
    subject to the Administration's judicial system.
        The Transitional Charter, which was not implemented by year's end,
    provides for the right to be represented by an attorney. The right to
    representation by an attorney and the right to appeal do not exist in
    those areas that apply traditional and customary judicial practices or
    Shari'a law. These rights more often are respected in regions that
    continue to apply the former Government's penal code, such as
    Somaliland and Puntland.
        There was one known political prisoner in the country. On September
    4, Somaliland authorities arrested and charged with treason Garad
    Abshir Garad Salah, Transitional National Administration representative
    and elected member of the Transitional Assembly, for his participation
    in the Djibouti conference. On September 16, the Berbera Court
    sentenced Salah to 7 years in prison for treason. President Egal
    pardoned Salah to reduce political tensions and Salah was released on
    October 4.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not
    implemented by year's end, provides for the sanctity of private
    property and privacy; however, looting and forced entry into private
    property continued in Mogadishu, although on a smaller scale that in
    the previous year. The Puntland Charter recognizes the right to private
    property; however, authorities did not respect this right on at least
    one occasion. On May 29 in Bosasso, unidentified gunmen reportedly
    broke into the offices of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan'' and
    assaulted Editor Mohammed Deq (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 2.a.).
        Most properties that were occupied forcibly during militia
    campaigns in 1992-93, notably in Mogadishu and the Lower Shabelle,
    remained in the hands of persons other than their prewar owners.
        Approximately 300,000 persons, or 40 percent of the population,
    have been displaced internally as a result of interfactional and
    interclan fighting.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Transitional Charter, adopted
    in July, provides for freedom of the press; however, the charter was
    not implemented by year's end and there were incidents of harassment,
    arrest, and detention of journalists in all areas of the country,
    including Puntland and Somaliland. The Puntland Charter provides for
    freedom of the press ``as long as they respect the law;'' however, this
    right is not respected in practice. The Somaliland constitution also
    provides for freedom of the press, but this right is restricted in
    practice. The print media consist largely of short, photocopied
    dailies, published in the larger cities and often linked to one of the
    factions. Several of these newspapers nominally are independent and are
    critical of the faction leaders.
        Somaliland has two independent daily newspapers, one government
    daily, and an independent English-language weekly. Treatment of
    journalists in Somaliland reportedly continued to improve during the
    year.
        In February Somaliland authorities detained for 4 hours the
    publisher of the daily newspaper Jamhuriya and of the weekly The
    Republic for printing a letter critical of Somaliland courts.
        In February representatives of the local Islamic Court Militias
    flogged Omar Dini, a reporter for the Mogadishu-based newspaper
    ``Qaran,'' allegedly for an anti-Islamic article he had written (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
        On March 13 in south Mogadishu, the Hararyale Islamic Court in
    Wardhigley District arrested Mohammed Ali Salad, a reporter for the
    Mogadishu-based newspaper ``Qaran,'' allegedly because he wrote
    articles critical of deforestation caused by the activities of charcoal
    exporters. He was detained at the Hararyale Islamic Court in Wardigley
    District for several days before being released in late March.
        On May 29 in Bosasso, unidentified gunmen reportedly broke into the
    offices of the Puntland newspaper ``Sahan'' and assaulted Editor
    Mohammed Deq (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). On July 12 in Bosasso,
    Puntland, CID agents abducted and briefly detained Deq while standing
    in front of Criminal Investigation Division headquarters (see Section
    1.b.).
        On August 21, Islamic Court Militias detained Ahmed Abd Al-Rahman
    Dhalbaaq, the editor of the Merka, Lower Shabelle, bi-monthly newspaper
    ``Gaim,'' allegedly for reporting on a decrease in security in the
    town. He was released on bail pending trial later that day. It was not
    known whether his trial occurred by year's end.
        On October 4 in Bosasso, Puntland police arrested and detained Bile
    Mahmud Qabowsadeh, editor of local newspaper ``Yool,'' after he
    returned from the Djibouti conference (see Section 1.d.).
        In late October, Puntland authorities fired sheikh Abdi Rahman
    Bulbul, the head of religious programs at Galkayo Radio, because they
    believed him to be a supporter of the Transitional Government.
        On November 24, an appeals court in Rome convicted Hashi Omar
    Hassan, a Somali, of the 1994 murder of two Italian journalists in
    Mogadishu. The court sentenced Hassan to life in prison.
        In 1999 in Puntland, the regional administration arrested Abulkadir
    Ali and Mohamed Deq of the newspaper Sahan, and Ahmed Mohamed Ali of
    the newspaper Riyaq, reportedly for writing articles critical of the
    Government. They remained in detention at year's end.
        Most citizens obtain news from foreign news broadcasts, chiefly the
    British Broadcasting Corporation, which transmits a daily Somali-
    language program. The major faction leaders in Mogadishu, as well as
    the authorities of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, operate
    small radio stations.
        There are restrictions on academic freedom; academics operate under
    restrictions similar to those imposed on members of the media. There is
    no organized higher education system in most of the country. There is a
    university one north Mogadishu and another university in Somaliland.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There is no
    mention of freedom of peaceful assembly in the Transitional Charter,
    nor is there legal protection for freedom of assembly, and although
    citizens are free to assemble in public, the lack of security
    effectively limits this right in many parts of the country. On August
    30, Puntland President Abdullahi Yussuf ordered regional governors to
    ban all antigovernment demonstrations. Demonstrations occurred
    throughout the country during the year; however, authorities in
    Somaliland, Puntland, and the south sometimes forcibly dispersed
    demonstrations and used excessive force in some instances (see Sections
    1.a. and 1.c.).
        In March in Hargeisa, Somaliland police detained for several days
    two men for protesting against alleged pollution by a petroleum company
    in the town of Berbera. On March 20 in the town of Galkayo, the Mudug
    (Puntland) region security committee detained five persons
    demonstrating in support of the Djibouti reconciliation process (see
    Section 1.d.). The demonstrators were released on March 28. On March
    29, Puntland police fired shots to disperse a demonstration in Gardo,
    Bari region, against the Puntland President; however, there were no
    reported injuries. On March 30 in Bosasso, Puntland police killed two
    persons while forcibly dispersing a demonstration in support of the
    Djibouti conference and against President Yusuf (see Section 1.a.) and
    arrested several other participants (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). On
    September 10 in Borama, Somaliland police forcibly dispersed a
    demonstration in support of the Djibouti reconciliation process.
    Several persons reportedly were injured in the clash and five persons
    were arrested (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). On November 1, security men
    guarding the Lafweyn Hotel in Mogadishu shot at a group of
    demonstrators protesting against the Transitional Government's
    recruitment of police forces in front of the hotel. There were no
    reported injuries. On November 11 in Hargeisa, police forcibly
    dispersed a crowd blocking the main road to the airport. More than 60
    protesters were arrested and 2 persons were killed (see Sections 1.a.
    and 1.d.). The crowd was protesting the Somaliland Administration's
    arrest of Sultan Mohamed Abdulkadir when he returned from Djibouti (see
    Section 1.d.).
        There were a number of peaceful demonstrations that occurred during
    the year without interference by authorities. For example, on June 15,
    members of a conservative Mosque protested against alleged Christian
    proselytizing by teachers at schools funded by the Coordinating
    Committee of the Organization for Voluntary Service (COSV) (see
    Sections 2.c. and 4). On October 17, hundreds of persons in the Bay and
    Bakol regions demonstrated against Hassan Mohamed Nur Shargudud, leader
    of the RRA, following his statements that he would no longer recognize
    the Transitional Government.
        The Puntland Charter provides for freedom of association; however,
    the Puntland Administration banned all political parties for 3 years,
    beginning in August 1998. The Somaliland constitution provides for
    freedom of association. In June the Somaliland parliament approved
    legislation governing the formation of political parties (see Section
    3). The law limits to three the number of political parties allowed to
    contest general elections. An ad hoc commission, nominated by the
    President and approved by the House of Representatives, will be
    responsible for considering applications. Approved parties that win
    twenty percent of the next Somaliland elections will be permitted to
    operate.
        Professional groups and local NGO's operate as security conditions
    permit.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--There is no national constitution and no
    legal provision for the protection of religious freedom, and there were
    some limits on religious freedom.
        The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by
    year's end, establishes Islam as the national religion. There is no
    central government, but some local administrations, including the
    Republic of Somaliland and Puntland, have made Islam the official
    religion in their regions. The judiciary in most regions relies on some
    combination of traditional and customary law (Xeer), Shari'a law, the
    Penal Code of the pre-1991 Siad Barre Government, or some combination
    of the three. There are three Islamic Shari'a courts operating in
    Mogadishu, which are aligned with different subclans, raising doubts
    about their independence (see Section 1.e.). These courts generally
    refrained from administering the stricter Islamic punishments, such as
    amputation, but their militias administered summary punishments,
    including executions, in the city and its environs (see Section 1.a.).
    There were occasional reports of the use of harsh physical punishments
    by Islamic Shari'a courts including public whipping and stoning (see
    Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        In March 1999, the Minister of Religion in Somaliland issued a list
    of instructions and definitions on religious practices. Under the new
    rules, religious schools and places of worship are required to obtain
    the Ministry of Religion's permission to operate. The Ministry must
    approve entry visas for religious groups, and certain unspecified
    doctrines are prohibited.
        Local tradition and past law make it a crime to proselytize for any
    religion except Islam. Proselytizing for any religion except Islam is
    prohibited by law in Puntland and Somaliland. Christian-based
    international relief organizations generally operate without
    interference, as long as they refrain from proselytizing. On February 3
    in Somaliland, nine Ethiopians allegedly were detained for 1 month for
    engaging in Christian missionary activities (see Section 1.d.); all
    nine were deported following their release. Seven Christian Ethiopians
    arrested in Somaliland in May 1999, for allegedly attempting to
    proselytize, remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        In February representatives of the local Islamic Court militias
    flogged Omar Dini, a reporter for the Mogadishu-based newspaper
    ``Qaran,'' allegedly for an anti-Islamic article he had written (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Transitional Charter, adopted in
    July but not implemented by year's end, and the Puntland Charter
    guarantee freedom of movement; however, this right continued to be
    restricted in some parts of the country. Checkpoints manned by
    militiamen loyal to one clan or faction inhibit passage by other
    groups. In the absence of a recognized national government, most
    citizens do not have the documents needed for international travel.
        The Somaliland and Puntland administrations impeded the travel of
    participants in the Djibouti Conference. Numerous persons were arrested
    and detained for attempting to attend the conference (see Section
    1.d.). On August 26, the Puntland Administration attempted to prohibit
    flights from landing at Bosasso Airport in an effort to restrict the
    movements of participants to and from the Djibouti Conference. On
    August 30, Puntland President Abdullahi Yussuf decreed the arrest of
    any person returning to Puntland from Arta, Djibouti (see Section
    1.d.). In September the Puntland Administration reportedly denied entry
    to 12 Egyptian doctors and 30 Egyptian teachers who arrived at the
    Bosasso airport from Arta; they were allowed to enter the country at a
    later date. There were reports that some clan leaders sent armed
    militia to assist in the entry of some persons into the country in
    defiance of President Yussuf's decree.
        As security conditions continued to improve in many parts of the
    country, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) returned to
    their homes. Approximately 10,000 Somali refugees were returned from
    Ethiopia under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) during the year, and unlike in the previous year, there were no
    interruptions in the repatriation process. Despite sporadic harassment,
    including the theft of UNHCR food packages by militiamen and attacks on
    World Food Program convoys, repatriation generally took place without
    incident. Approximately 9,000 refugees had returned to Somaliland by
    year's end. However, despite the relative stability in many parts of
    the country, many citizens continued to flee to neighboring countries,
    often for economic reasons. Most migrants left from the northeast and
    traveled via boat to Yemen. There were reports that hundreds of such
    migrants drowned in accidents at sea during the year.
        There are approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons in the
    country, representing approximately 4 percent of the population.
        The U.N. estimates that approximately 500,000 Somalis are living as
    refugees in neighboring countries, including approximately 125,000 in
    Kenya at year's end, down from more than 400,000 at the height of the
    humanitarian crisis in 1992. There were 170,000 Somali refugees in
    Ethiopia and 22,600 Somali refugees in Djibouti at year's end.
        As there is no functioning central government, there is no policy
    of first asylum nor are there any laws with provisions for the granting
    of refugee or asylee status. A small number of Ethiopian refugees
    remained in the country, mostly in the northeast near Bosasso. The
    authorities in Somaliland have cooperated with the UNHCR and other
    humanitarian assistance organizations in assisting refugees. There were
    no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to
    refugee status.
        In October in Bosasso, an unidentified person threw a grenade into
    a temporary shelter for persons traveling to Yemen, killing two persons
    and injuring five others.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        In the absence of a fully functioning national government, citizens
    cannot exercise this right. In most regions, local clan leaders
    function as de facto rulers. Although many such groups derive their
    authority from the traditional deference given clan elders, most face
    opposition of varying strength from political factions and radical
    Islamic groups.
        In the Republic of Somaliland, the existence of which was endorsed
    by clan elders in 1991 and 1993, a clan conference led to a peace
    accord early in 1997. This accord demobilized militia groups,
    established a constitution and bicameral parliament with proportional
    clan representation, and elected a president and vice president from a
    slate of candidates. The Hargeisa authorities have established
    functioning administrative institutions in virtually all the territory
    they claim, which equals the boundaries of the Somaliland state that
    achieved international recognition in 1960. In June the Somaliland
    parliament approved legislation governing the formation of political
    parties (see Section 2.b.). Parties approved by an ad hoc commission
    that win 20 percent of the next Somaliland elections will be permitted
    to operate. Regional elections are scheduled for 2002 in Somaliland.
        In March 1998, Puntland was established as a regional government
    during a consultative conference with delegates from six regions,
    including traditional community elders, the leadership of political
    organizations, members of legislative assemblies, regional
    administrators, and civil society representatives. Representatives of
    Puntland-based subclans chose Abdullahi Yussuf as President. Puntland
    has a single chamber quasi-legislative branch known as the Council of
    Elders, which plays a largely consultative role. Political parties are
    banned in Puntland. Regional elections are scheduled for 2001 in
    Puntland.
        In May in Arta, Djibouti, delegates representing all clans and a
    wide spectrum of Somali society were selected for a ``Conference for
    National Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia,'' which opened on June 15
    with more than 900 delegates. In July the Conference adopted a charter
    for a 3-year Transitional National Administration and selected a 245-
    member Transitional Assembly, which included 24 members of Somali
    minority groups and 25 women. On August 26, the assembly elected
    Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as Transitional President, and he was sworn in
    on August 28. Ali Khalif Gallayr was named Prime Minister in October,
    and on October 20, the Prime Minister appointed the 25-member Cabinet.
    The Somaliland and Puntland Administrations do not recognize the
    results of the Djibouti Conference, nor do several Mogadishu-based
    factional leaders.
        The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by
    year's end, provides for universal suffrage. Both of the Puntland and
    Somaliland Administrations provide for universal suffrage.
        Women as a group remained seriously underrepresented in regional
    government and politics, and no women held prominent public positions;
    however, several women were important behindthescenes figures in the
    various factions. There only are five female representatives out of a
    total of 69 representatives in the Puntland Parliament. Women played a
    prominent role in the Djibouti Conference. In the Transitional National
    Assembly women were allocated 25 seats out of a total of 245 seats.
    Minorities were allocated 24 seats in the Transitional National
    Assembly during the Djibouti conference.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several local human rights groups were active during the year,
    including the Mogadishu-based Ismail Jumale Center for Human Rights and
    the Hargeisa-based Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch Committee. The
    Ismail Jumale Center investigated the causes of conflict in the
    Mogadishu area, supported the Djibouti Reconciliation process,
    conducted effective human rights monitoring, protested the treatment of
    prisoners before the Islamic Shari'a courts, and organized periodic
    demonstrations for peace. The Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch
    Committee monitored human rights in Somaliland. Women's NGO's also
    played an important role in galvanizing support in the country for the
    Djibouti Initiative.
        In Hargeisa in Somaliland, local NGO's continued to operate freely
    and without harassment during the year.
        Numerous international organizations operated in the country during
    the year, including the Red Cross, CARE, the Halo Trust, Save the
    Children, and various other demining agencies. The Somaliland and
    Puntland administrations permitted visits by U.N. human rights
    representatives during the year. Sporadic security problems complicated
    the work of some local and international organizations, especially in
    the South. There were reported incidents of harassment against NGO's,
    including attacks on aid convoys and airplanes, which disrupted food
    distribution and U.N. flights into and out of the country (see Sections
    1.b. and 1.c.). A number of humanitarian workers were killed in such
    attacks and one NGO suspended its programs as a result (see Section
    1.a.).
        On September 18, eight Islamic Court Militia gunmen attacked a
    World Health Organization (WHO) compound in Merca. Although they shot
    over 200 rounds of ammunition at the building, there were no injuries.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by
    year's end, contains provisions that prohibit discrimination on the
    basis of sex and national origin; however, societal discrimination and
    violence against women and widespread abuse of children continued to be
    serious problems. The 1997 Somaliland Constitution also contains
    provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and
    national origin; however, these rights were not respected in practice.
        Women.--Violence against women exists, although there are no
    reliable statistics on its prevalence. Women suffered
    disproportionately in the civil war and in the strife that followed.
    Rape is commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts. Laws prohibiting
    rape exist; however, they are not enforced. A statistically
    insignificant number of rapes were prosecuted during the year. Unlike
    in the previous year, there were no reports that fighters loyal to
    Hussein Aideed routinely raped women in southern Qoryoley district.
        Women are subordinated systematically in the country's
    overwhelmingly patriarchal culture. Polygyny is permitted, but
    polyandry is not. Under laws issued by the former government, female
    children could inherit property, but only half the amount to which
    their brothers were entitled. Similarly, according to the Shari'a and
    Somali tradition of blood compensation, those found guilty in the death
    of a woman must pay only half as much to the aggrieved family as they
    would if the victim were a man.
        Several women's groups in Hargeisa (Somaliland), Mogadishu, Bosasso
    (Puntland), and Merka (Lower Shabelle) actively promote equal rights
    for women and advocate the inclusion of women in responsible government
    positions. Women's groups played a prominent role in the Djibouti
    Conference.
        Trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual exploitation was a
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Children.--Children remain among the chief victims of the
    continuing violence. Boys as young as 14 or 15 years of age have
    participated in militia attacks, and many youths are members of the
    marauding gangs known as ``morian,'' ``parasites,'' or ``maggots.''
    Even in areas with relative security, the lack of resources has limited
    the opportunity for children to attend school. There are three
    secondary schools in Somaliland and more than three secondary schools
    in Mogadishu; however, only 10 percent of those few children who enter
    primary school graduate from secondary school. Parents generally pay
    fees for their children's education. Schools at all levels lack
    textbooks, laboratory equipment, and running water. Teachers are
    trained poorly and paid poorly. Approximately 10 to 20 percent of the
    school-age population attends school; more boys than girls are enrolled
    in school. The literacy rate is less than 25 percent. In 1999 the
    Somaliland authorities drafted guidelines for a national education
    policy; however, no action on such a policy was taken by year's end.
        Medical care is rudimentary, and only a small percentage of
    children have access to adequate medical facilities.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international experts as damaging to both physical and psychological
    health, is a near-universal practice. Estimates place the percentage of
    women who have been subjected to FGM at 98 percent. The majority of
    women are subjected to infibulation, the most harmful form of FGM. The
    practice was illegal prior to 1991, when the Siad Barre Government
    collapsed, and in Somaliland it remains illegal under the Penal Code
    (see Section 1.e.); however, the law is not enforced. In November 1999,
    Puntland authorities passed legislation banning FGM in northeastern
    areas of the country; however, in practice the law is not enforced
    strictly. While U.N. agencies and NGO's have made intensive efforts to
    educate persons about the danger of FGM, no reliable statistics are
    available on the success of their programs.
        People with Disabilities.--In the absence of a functioning state,
    no one is in a position to address systematically the needs of those
    with disabilities. There are several local NGO's in Somaliland that
    provide services to the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Non-Sunni Muslims often are viewed with
    suspicion by members of the Sunni majority. There is strong social
    pressure to respect Islamic traditions, especially in enclaves
    controlled by radical Islamists, such as Luuq in the Gedo region and
    Dobley and Kulbiyow in such Lower Jubba region. There was an increase
    in religious intolerance among Muslims by Al'Ittihad, a local radical
    Islamic group, which is an affiliate of the international Al'Ittihad
    group. There reportedly have been mosque takeovers in Puntland and
    Lower Shabelle. On June 15 in Merca, members of a conservative Mosque
    protested against alleged Christian proselytizing by teachers at
    schools funded by COSV, an Italian NGO (see Section 2.b.). During the
    march, three members of Merca's ``Shura'' or council threw a grenade
    into the offices of COSV. There were no reported injuries; staff
    members were evacuated, and COSV programs were suspended for 2 weeks.
        There was a continued influx of foreign Muslim teachers into the
    country to teach in new private Koranic schools. These schools are
    inexpensive and provide basic education; however, there were reports
    that these schools required the veiling of small girls and other
    conservative Islamic practices not normally found in the local culture.
        There is a small, low-profile Christian community. Christians, as
    well as other non-Muslims, who proclaim their religion sometimes face
    societal harassment.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--More than 80 percent of
    citizens share a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomadic-
    influenced culture. The largest minority group consists of ``Bantu''
    Somalis, who are descended from slaves brought to the country about 300
    years ago. In most areas, members of groups other than the predominant
    clan are excluded from effective participation in governing
    institutions and are subject to discrimination in employment, judicial
    proceedings, and access to public services.
        Members of minority groups are subjected to harassment,
    intimidation, and abuse by armed gunmen of all affiliations.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Constitution provided
    workers with the right to form unions, but the civil war and factional
    fighting negated this provision and shattered the single labor
    confederation, the then government-controlled General Federation of
    Somali Trade Unions. In view of the extent of the country's political
    and economic breakdown and the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms,
    trade unions could not function freely.
        The Transitional Charter, adopted in July but not implemented by
    year's end, the Puntland Charter, and the Somaliland Constitution
    established the right of freedom of association, but no unions or
    employer organizations yet exist.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Wages and work
    requirements in the traditional culture are established largely by ad
    hoc bartering, based on supply, demand, and the influence of the clan
    from which the worker originates. As during past years, labor disputes
    sometimes led to the use of force (see Section 1.c.). For example, the
    Habr Gibr clan used force against the Digil and Biyamal clans in Lower
    Shabelle during the year.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The pre-1991 Penal
    Code prohibits forced labor; however, local clan militias generally
    forced members of minority groups to work on banana plantations without
    compensation. Trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual
    exploitation was a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). The pre-1991
    labor code prohibits child labor, including forced or bonded labor by
    children; however, child labor occurs, and there are child soldiers
    (see Sections 5 and 6.d.). Trafficking in children for forced labor is
    a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The pre-1991 labor code prohibits child labor, including
    forced or bonded labor by children; however, child labor occurs, and
    there are child soldiers (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Formal employment
    of children was rare, but youths commonly are employed in herding,
    agriculture, and household labor from an early age. The lack of
    educational opportunities and severely depressed economic conditions
    contribute to child labor. There were reports that trafficking in
    children for forced labor is a serious problem.
        The country did not ratify ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of
    child labor by year's end.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no organized effort by
    any of the factions or de facto regional administrations to monitor
    acceptable conditions of work during the year.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The pre-1991 Penal Code prohibits
    trafficking; however, there were some reports of trafficking during the
    year. In July Djibouti law enforcement authorities arrested members of
    a group that was smuggling Somali women to such destinations as Lebanon
    and Syria to work in brothels (see Section 5). The number of women
    being trafficked from Somalia appears to be small. There were reports
    that trafficking in children for forced labor is a serious problem (see
    Sections 5 and 6.d.).
                                   __________

                                  SOUTH AFRICA

        South Africa is a multiparty parliamentary democracy in which
    constitutional power is shared between the President and the
    Parliament. The Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the
    National Council of Provinces. President Thabo Mbeki leads the African
    National Congress (ANC) party, which holds 266 seats in the 400-seat
    National Assembly. The Parliament was elected in free and fair
    elections in June 1999; the Parliament, in turn, elected the President.
    The country continued to consolidate the democratic transformation
    initiated by the 1994 elections. The Government includes ministers from
    the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) but is dominated by the
    ANC. The Democratic Party (DP) is the official opposition in the
    National Assembly. The judiciary, including the Constitutional Court,
    is independent.
        The South African Police Service (SAPS) has primary responsibility
    for internal security, although the Government continues to call on the
    South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to provide support for the
    SAPS in internal security situations. The SAPS continued its major
    restructuring and transformation from a primarily public order security
    force to a more accountable, community service-oriented police force;
    however, it remained understaffed, overworked, and undertrained. The
    SANDF and the SAPS border control and policing unit share
    responsibility for external security. The Government continued to train
    and deploy the new Special Directorate of Investigations (SDI), dubbed
    ``the Scorpions,'' to coordinate efforts against organized crime. Some
    members of these forces committed human rights abuses.
        The economy continues to undergo important fundamental changes as
    the Government attempts to shift towards the manufacturing and services
    sectors and away from a focus on mining and commodities exports. The
    gross domestic product is $130 billion, of which manufacturing accounts
    for 18 percent, services 43 percent, and mining 6 percent. Agriculture,
    although only 4 percent of the gross national product, is an important
    source of export earnings. Since the fall of apartheid, foreign
    investors have used the country as a base of operations for economic
    expansion into the Sub-Saharan region. The economy is driven largely by
    market forces, although a lack of competition still exists in some
    sectors. For example, banking and mining remain tightly controlled by a
    handful of powerful corporations. Although a privatization program is
    underway, the State continues to hold majority stakes in the
    telecommunications, transport, and power sectors. The Government's
    Growth, Employment, and Redistribution macroeconomic program largely
    has been successful in controlling inflation and instilling discipline
    in government spending. Ownership of wealth remains highly skewed along
    racial lines. The disparity between skilled and unskilled workers is
    considerable, as is the income distribution gap between white and
    black, and urban and rural citizens. Official unemployment is
    approximately 23 percent, although figures are debated widely. A
    significant number of citizens, particularly blacks, are employed in
    the largely retail-oriented informal sector. The numerous social and
    economic problems that developed largely during the apartheid era are
    expected to persist for many years.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, serious problems remain in several areas. Some
    members of the security forces committed killings due to use of
    excessive force, and there were deaths in police custody. In addition
    to killings by security forces, there were an estimated 166 politically
    motivated or extrajudicial killings during the first 10 months of the
    year. The Government took action to investigate and punish some of
    those involved and to prevent future abuses. Political violence
    remained a problem; however, it was reduced from 1999 levels, both in
    KwaZulu-Natal and countrywide. Some members of the security forces were
    responsible for torture, excessive use of force during arrest, and
    other physical abuse. The Government took action to investigate and
    punish some of those involved. Prisons are seriously overcrowded. The
    judiciary is overburdened, and lengthy delays in trials and prolonged
    pretrial detention are problems. Violence against women and children,
    and discrimination against women and the disabled remained serious
    problems. Child labor, including forced child labor, is a problem.
    Vigilante violence and mob justice increased during the year.
    Trafficking in persons is a problem.
        The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), created to
    investigate apartheid-era human rights abuses, make recommendations for
    reparations for victims, and grant amnesty for full disclosure of
    politically motivated crimes, continued its work on a large backlog of
    amnesty and restitution applications following the release of its 1998
    report.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of The Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police use of lethal
    force during apprehensions resulted in numerous deaths, and deaths in
    police custody also remain a problem. The Government took action to
    investigate and punish some of those involved and to prevent future
    abuses. The Government's Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)
    investigates deaths in police custody and deaths as a result of police
    action. The ICD reported 511 deaths as a result of police action in the
    last 8 months of the year, including 186 that occurred while in police
    custody. These figures represent an increase in the monthly rate of
    deaths as a result of police action, compared with the estimated 450
    deaths as a result of police action that occurred in the first 10
    months of 1999. The ICD's report lists the subcategories under deaths
    in police custody, which include natural causes, suicide, injuries in
    custody, injuries prior to custody, and possible negligence. The ICD
    experienced greater cooperation from the police than in the previous
    year.
        On April 10, police in Barkly East in the Eastern Cape province
    arrested six teenagers for a local burglary. In the course of the
    arrest, they dragged two of the boys behind their police vehicle,
    killing a 14 year-old boy. Three police officers were charged with
    murder, assault and related crimes; their trials were postponed until
    March 2001. The police officers were released on bail and suspended
    from duty pending their trials.
        On July 30, SAPS members claiming to be searching homes for illegal
    weapons shot and killed an ANC Member of Parliament, Bheki Mkhize, in
    his parents' home in Mahlabathini. There was no indication that the
    officers had a warrant or that they attempted to search other homes in
    the area. Three officers were charged in the killing; they were
    released on bail in August, and an investigation into the matter was
    ongoing at year's end. ANC spokesmen alleged that the police were
    committing murders for the IFP, the ANC's political rival. There was in
    fact a consistent pattern of attacks and killings between members of
    both parties prior to the June 1999 elections.
        The TRC continued to consider throughout the year amnesty
    applications involving apartheid era violence and killings (see Section
    4). During the year, a number of applicants were granted amnesty,
    including Eugene de Kock, the principal of the apartheid government's
    Vlakplaas unit (although he remains in custody for other crimes);
    police officers who killed antiapartheid activist Stanza Bopape; and
    the IFP members involved in a massacre in Boipatong. On September 7,
    the TRC granted 11 ANC guards amnesty for their participation in the
    1994 killing of 8 IFP demonstrators (see Section 4). The application of
    Ferdie Barnard of the Civil Cooperation Bureau remained pending at
    year's end.
        Racial tensions in the military between white commanding officers
    and their black subordinates resulted in several killings during the
    year. In 1999 a black lieutenant killed six white officers at an army
    base in Tempe before he was shot and killed. In December 1999, The
    Ministry of Defense announced the formation of a commission of inquiry
    into the shootings and into racism within the SANDF in general; the
    final report had not yet been released by year's end. On July 10, a
    black platoon commander murdered his white company commander at an army
    base near Phalaborwa. On September 19, a black navy seaman shot and
    killed his white commanding officer at Simons Town naval base.
    Investigations into these killings were ongoing at year's end, but the
    Defense Minister stated publicly that racism was likely a motivating
    factor in the cases.
        The South Africa Institute for Race Relations, a nongovernmental
    organization (NGO) concerned with political and extrajudicial killings,
    reported 166 politically motivated killings during the first 10 months
    of the year, most of which occurred in the province of KwaZulu-Natal,
    compared with 286 for the same period in 1999.
        In 1999 7 persons were arrested for the 1999 murder of the general
    secretary of the United Democratic Movement (UDM), Sifiso Nkabinde, and
    5 persons were arrested for a retaliatory attack after the murder in
    which 11 persons associated with the ANC were killed and several others
    were wounded. Seven suspects in the Nkabinde killing went on trial in
    March, and five were convicted in October. The trial of the five
    suspects in custody for the retaliatory attack is scheduled for March
    2001. In November 1999, prominent Zulu leader and ANC member Prince
    Cyril Zulu, was killed by unknown persons. It is not known whether this
    was a politically motivated killing; a suspect was apprehended, but the
    trial had not begun by year's end.
        The trial of Dr. Wouter Basson was ongoing at year's end. Basson
    was the head of the chemical warfare program under the former apartheid
    regime, and faces 61 charges including 30 counts of murder, fraud, and
    narcotics trafficking. During his trial, it was revealed that the
    former apartheid regime was involved in the murders of hundreds of
    members of the Namibian Liberation Movement between 1980 and 1987. The
    trial was ongoing at year's end.
        There was no further action on the March 1999 killing in Cape Town
    of one ANC member and four UDM members.
        A peace process continued between the IFP and the ANC, the two
    parties most closely associated with the political violence in KwaZulu-
    Natal. In May 1999, a special bilateral IFP-ANC Peace Committee signed
    a provincial code of conduct for peace, which was still in effect
    during the year. Although violence in KwaZulu-Natal remained higher
    than in other provinces, resulting in dozens of deaths during the year,
    including the killings of several ANC and local IFP leaders, there was
    an improved level of overall tolerance attributable to the IFP-ANC
    peace process, as well as an increased police presence. However, the
    committee established to enforce the provincial code of conduct
    received complaints regarding the intimidation of party members,
    primarily rural members. Some rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal that
    previously had experienced violence remained tense, although the
    overall level of violence continued to decrease. Factional and
    intraparty rivalry in the Nongoma area continued to cause deaths, and
    the authorities had limited success in solving the killings. The Public
    Order Policing Unit from Durban was moderately effective in calming
    tensions, but investigations continued to be handled by local
    authorities. There are several theories to explain the violence in
    KwaZulu-Natal, including a legacy of ``warlordism'' that fuels
    interparty conflict, and the actions of criminal elements involved in a
    Mafia-like illegal trade in drugs, arms, and wildlife. Some observers
    have blamed an undefined ``third force,'' which allegedly combines
    criminal and conservative elements determined to undermine the new
    political order. Observers warn that the fact that the province has not
    yet been demilitarized and disarmed promotes the area's violence.
        Violence in Richmond was reduced significantly during the year due
    largely to the replacement in 1998 of the regular police force in the
    area with a special, larger ``public order police'' force.
        There were reports that five persons were killed in an incident
    that may have been politically motivated during the December 5 local
    elections in the East Rand area of Johannesburg. Nine suspects were
    arrested, and eight were charged with the killings. Although it is not
    known if the shooting was politically motivated, the shooting occurred
    near a polling place in an area with a history of interparty violence.
    Three of the eight suspects were charged with murder; they were denied
    bail and were being held in pretrial detention at year's end. Charges
    against two suspects were dropped; the other three suspects were
    charged with reckless endangerment while using a weapon and released on
    bail. A trial date had not been announced at year's end.
        Taxi drivers in crime-ridden neighborhoods were responsible for a
    continuing series of attacks on rivals. Conflict between taxi companies
    led to gun battles and other street violence, and resulted in the
    deaths and injuries of bystanders in several cities. In Cape Town, taxi
    owners were believed to have instigated attacks and shootings of
    drivers working for the Golden Arrow bus company. Four drivers were
    killed and several other persons, including passengers, were injured in
    a series of attacks. In September one person pled guilty to the bus
    drivers'' murders and was sentenced to 75 years in prison. No arrests
    were made in connection with the taxi violence in Cape Town that
    occurred in 1999.
        Vigilante action and mob justice increased during the year. In
    Northern and Mpumalanga provinces, a vigilante group called Mapogo A
    Mathamaga has grown in membership and has opened offices in at least
    nine cities, including Pretoria. Mapogo members attacked and tortured,
    including beating with clubs and whips, suspected criminals,
    particularly targeting those they suspected of property crimes against
    their members. In November the Director of Public Prosecutions created
    a task team to investigate more than 200 cases attributed to Mapogo
    members in the Northern and Mpumalanga provinces, which included the
    crimes of kidnaping, murder, assault, and intimidation. In Eastern
    Cape, the Umfela Ndawonye group also killed and attacked suspected
    criminals in vigilante violence. People Against Gangsters and Drugs
    (PAGAD), an Islamic-oriented, communitybased organization calling for
    stronger action against crime and drugs, continued to be suspected of
    acts of intimidation and violence against drug dealers and gang
    leaders, and against critics of its violent vigilantism. In September a
    PAGAD G-force (murder squad) member testified in court that in January
    he had been ordered by PAGAD leadership to attack a gang stronghold and
    kill gang members and drug dealers. The Minister of Justice and
    Minister of Safety and Security publicly charged that PAGAD G-force
    cells and members of Qibla, an Islamic-based political organization
    whose membership may share affiliation with PAGAD, were responsible for
    urban terror incidents in Cape Town throughout the year. These attacks
    included nine bombings (see Section 1.c.) that caused serious injuries
    but no deaths. No organization has claimed responsibility for the
    incidents. Authorities based their accusations against PAGAD on
    circumstantial evidence regarding attacks linked to PAGAD members'
    trials, including violence directed against particular courts and
    police officers, intimidation of witnesses, and the September murder of
    a regional court magistrate who was hearing PAGAD cases. Since November
    1998, there have been 16 convictions and 14 acquittals of PAGAD
    members. Pending cases include 13 charges of murder, 63 charges of
    attempted murder, 10 charges for possession of explosives, and 18
    charges for illegal possession of firearms. In December hundreds of
    cases were pending against PAGAD members in Western Cape courts,
    including 40 cases in which bail was denied to the accused. The Muslim
    community protested the infrequent availability of bail and staged
    periodic small-scale protests, criticizing the treatment of suspects as
    unfair compared with the judicial treatment of non-Muslims (see Section
    2.c.). There were three sets of murder trials pending at year's end:
    Ebrahim Jeneker, Abdulla Maansdorp, and Ismail Maansdorp; Moegamat Zain
    Cornelson and Anees Adams; and Moegamat Isaacs. In August Ebrahim
    Jeneker and Ismail Edwards, alleged PAGAD members, were charged with
    the killing of a police captain who had been investigating PAGAD; the
    trial was pending at year's end.
        Murders of farm families in rural parts of the country have
    received considerable media attention, but data on numbers of attacks
    have not been available since the SAPS declared an embargo on crime
    statistics in July (see Section 2.a.). AgriSA, an organization formed
    in October 1998 to represent farmers' interests, reported 804 attacks
    on farms and small holdings during the year, usually by black
    assailants, which resulted in 119 killings of farm owners, most of whom
    were white. There is widespread concern among white farmers that they
    are being targeted for racial and political reasons, although no
    evidence exists that the murders are part of an organized political
    conspiracy.
        There were incidents of abuse and killings of black farm laborers
    by their white employers. NGO's claim that rural police and courts
    refuse to arrest or prosecute whites in many incidents. During the
    year, the HRC launched an investigation into allegations of abuse of
    black farmworkers, local justice system prejudice against farmworkers,
    and violence against white farm owners. The HRC report was not released
    by year's end (see Section 4).
        In December two guards were shot to death in Cape Town in what
    police believe was a strike-related attack (see Section 1.c. and 6.a.).
        In the Northern province, where traditional beliefs regarding
    witchcraft remain strong, there were occasional reports of attacks on
    persons accused of witchcraft by their rural communities. Some
    survivors of attacks and their families were driven from their villages
    and were living in ``witch villages'' for safety. The Ministry of
    Safety and Security with the assistance of the quasigovernmental
    Commission on Gender Equality and traditional leaders, instituted
    programs to end violence against suspected practitioners of witchcraft.
    Traditional leaders cooperated with the programs and reported threats
    against persons suspected of witchcraft to the police. There reportedly
    were some prosecutions, although statistics were not available by
    year's end. Government officials claimed a decrease in attacks as a
    result of the programs; however, because of the embargo on crime
    statistics by the SAPS (see Section 2.a.) precise data were not
    available. There were reports of only one witchcraft related murder
    since 1997, compared with more than 500 between 1990 and 1995.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances caused by government authorities or agents.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution's Bill of Rights prohibits torture and
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and provides for the right to
    be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
    sources; however, some members of the police beat, raped, tortured, and
    otherwise abused suspects and detainees. Some incidents of torture and
    ill-treatment by the police and SANDF occurred during interrogation,
    arrest, detention and searches of persons'' homes. The ICD reported 19
    cases of torture and 9 cases of rape perpetrated by security forces
    between April and December; the Government investigated these
    allegations and prosecuted some offenders.
        On April 10, police in Barkly East in Eastern Cape province dragged
    two boys behind a police vehicle during the course of making an arrest,
    killing a 14-year-old boy (see Section 1.a.). Three police officers
    were charged with murder, assault, and related crimes. The trial was
    postponed until March 2001; the officers were released on bail and
    suspended from duty.
        In May some COSATU members reportedly clashed with police during a
    COSATU strike, and police used tear gas after the crowd reportedly
    threw stones (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
        On November 7, a video filmed in 1998 was broadcast on national
    television showing six white police officers beating and torturing
    three black illegal immigrants with vicious dogs while yelling racial
    insults. The officers were arrested and charged with assault and
    attempted murder, and suspended from duty; the investigation was
    ongoing at year's end. Several similar cases were reported to the ICD
    after the broadcast of the video. For example, in August police of the
    North Rand Dog Unit allegedly took seven Mozambican immigrants to a
    deserted field near Springs, ordered them out of the police vehicle,
    and attacked them with police dogs. After receiving medical treatment
    and being detained for several days in a police jail, the victims were
    taken to the Lindela Repatriation Centre and returned to Mozambique.
    Another Mozambican immigrant reported that a similar incident took
    place in October in the West Rand area. The ICD was investigating the
    incidents at year's end.
        Incidents of police harassment and attacks against foreigners
    increased. Some state hospitals routinely refused treatment to indigent
    foreigners, despite regulations that required such treatment.
        There were reports of police abuse of detainees awaiting
    deportation (see Section 2.d.). In December after a 2-year
    investigation, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) released a report
    assessing conditions at the Lindela Repatriation Centre, the largest
    detention facility for undocumented immigrants in the country. The
    report described abuses against detainees, which included long
    detentions, poor living conditions, xenophobia, abuse and corruption by
    officials, and sexual abuse of women. In December the HRC reported that
    the Department of Home Affairs had not responded to its
    recommendations, and, although the contractor operating the facility
    had improved conditions, Home Affairs officials continued to assault
    detainees and subject them to degrading treatment. On November 28,
    approximately 300 refugees demonstrated in front of the Department of
    Home Affairs to protest its refusal to process asylum applications for
    those applicants without certain documents. Some of the refugees
    alleged that Home Affairs employees assaulted them and requested
    bribes. The HRC sued the Department of Home Affairs to compel the
    processing of all applications by asylum seekers, as required by the
    1998 Refugees Act; the case still was pending at year's end (see
    Section 2.d.).
        Two officers who were filmed by the British Broadcasting
    Corporation as they beat suspected criminals in a 1999 documentary were
    fined and given suspended prison sentences on July 10.
        In 1998 police at a Guguletu police station severely beat a Cape
    Town journalist, Thabo Mabaso, after he went to the station to report a
    traffic accident. The officers responsible were initially suspended,
    then reinstated and transferred to another police station pending their
    trial. On July 7, nine officers were charged for the beating. On August
    30, six of the officers were acquitted; three were convicted and
    sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 5 years.
        The Government made efforts to address abuses with an official
    antitorture policy and training programs for police and SANDF officers.
    Broad efforts to reform police practices continued to reduce abuses,
    and the ICD investigates reports of police misconduct and corruption
    (see Section 1.a.). In November 1999, the SAPS Training Division
    initiated a human rights program; by September 15, over 15,000 of the
    estimated 90,000 targeted officers had undergone training. The largest
    number of officers have been trained in the Western Cape province, and
    officials credited the training with an increase in police disciplinary
    actions in the province.
        The SAPS continued to undergo sweeping, mostly positive changes,
    including the institution of reforms designed to create partnerships
    between local police forces and the communities that they serve.
    Resignations and retirements of senior police officials have permitted
    the infusion of new personnel at senior levels, from both inside and
    outside the SAPS; these appointments also have served to promote
    affirmative action within the SAPS. However, the SAPS has been left
    with deficiencies in midlevel leadership, and institutional memory that
    have been harmful to its overall performance. The SAPS continued to be
    understaffed, overworked, and undertrained.
        There was a consistent pattern of attacks and killings between ANC
    and IFP members in the province of KwaZulu Natal; however, the level of
    violence diminished during the year (see Section 1.a.).
        There were a number of bombings during the year, which resulted in
    numerous casualties, including 9 pipe and car bomb explosions in Cape
    Town, for which no organization claimed responsibility (see Section
    1.a.). This represents a decline from the 80 bomb explosions that
    occurred in 1999. Since November 1998, 16 PAGAD members were convicted
    and 14 were acquitted in connection with urban terror attacks (see
    Section 1.a.). In July D. Essop and R. Shaik were sentenced to 7 years
    in prison for possession of a pipe bomb.
        There were incidents of abuse, including killings, of black farm
    laborers by their white employers, and NGO's claim that rural police
    and courts refuse to arrest whites in many incidents (see Section
    1.a.).
        There were a few illegal strikes that resulted in some worker
    violence, in particular incidents of intimidation and threats of
    violence by striking workers against nonstriking and replacement
    workers. In December during a legal strike of security guards, strikers
    used intimidation and violence against nonstriking and replacement
    guards and also against journalists covering the strike. Nonstriking
    security guards were harassed by groups of strikers while taking public
    transportation; the groups stripped them, forced them to lay down in
    dirt, and beat them. Two guards were shot to death in December in Cape
    Town in what police believe was a strike-related attack (see Section
    1.a. and 6.a.).
        Conflict between warring taxi companies led to gun battles and
    other street violence, and resulted in the deaths and injuries of
    bystanders in several cities (see Section 1.a.).
        Vigilante action and mob justice resulted in attacks on suspected
    criminals and drug dealers, some of whom were tortured (see Section
    1.a.).
        Xenophobia is a growing problem. Xenophobia was expressed in
    institutional and social interactions with foreigners, particularly
    those from other African countries. There were a number of violent
    attacks on foreigners, including refugees and asylum seekers. Many of
    those attacked were hawkers and street vendors. Foreigners faced harsh
    reactions from antiimmigrant groups such as the Unemployed Masses of
    South Africa, which criticized immigrants for job losses, and in August
    demonstrated against employers who hired noncitizen workers. NGO's
    continued to encourage the Government to give equal access to health,
    education, and legal protection to foreigners. The U.N. High Commission
    on Refugees (UNHCR), the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs, and
    the Human Rights Commission (HRC) continued their ``Roll Back
    Xenophobia'' campaign to raise public awareness of the situation and
    rights of refugees and the difference between refugees and economic
    migrants. The campaign has produced publications and organized several
    public relations events.
        Three suspects were arrested for a series of bombings in January
    1997, including a mosque in Rustenberg that injured two persons; the
    trial concluded during the year, but the sentence was not announced by
    year's end (see Section 5).
        Prison conditions do not always meet the country's minimum legal
    requirements. Food, especially for prisoners with HIV/AIDS and other
    medical problems, frequently is of poor quality and quantity. NGO's
    reported that prison employees steal food from prisoners. Although
    prisoners generally have access to health care, prison officials
    sometimes withheld prescribed treatment as punishment. Severe
    overcrowding in some prisons led to poor health; as many as 75 inmates
    may occupy a cell designed to hold 40 inmates. The Department of
    Correctional Services (DCS), which manages prisons, reported that in
    July there were 169,0000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold only
    101,000. In September 8,262 prisoners awaiting trial but unable to post
    bail due to poverty were released in an effort to reduce overcrowding.
    There were abuses of prisoners, including physical and sexual assaults
    by prison employees and other prisoners. Press reports indicated that
    detainees awaiting trial contracted HIV/AIDS through rape. Male and
    female prisoners are held separately; however, female prison wards are
    often on the same grounds as male wards, and Amnesty International
    reported rapes of women by other prisoners.
        Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18 accused of serious crimes,
    including murder or rape, sometimes are placed in pretrial detention in
    prisons with adult offenders (see Section 5). DCS statistics from May
    documented that there were 27,638 youth offenders (prisoners under age
    21), 4,253 of whom were 17 years of age or younger. Juveniles normally
    are not housed with adults; however, in August 200 juveniles under 18
    years of age awaiting trial were transferred to secure care centers
    after it was discovered that they were detained with adult prisoners
    and receiving insufficient medical attention at Pollsmoor Prison near
    Cape Town. There were credible reports that youths from juvenile wards
    were sold to adult prisoners for purposes of rape. In June a 17-year-
    old prisoner died in Johannesburg prison after being repeatedly raped
    by adult prisoners.
        In 1997 the Government commissioned the first of several planned
    ``C-MAX'' prisons in Pretoria. C-MAX prisons are designed to hold the
    country's most dangerous criminals. Human rights groups have raised
    serious concerns regarding C-MAX facilities, including the Government's
    criteria for transferring prisoners from other prisons to a C-MAX
    facility and the restrictive, solitary conditions of the prisons
    themselves. No additional CMAX prisons were opened by year's end, but a
    new prison based on the C-MAX model was under construction and
    scheduled to begin operations in April 2001.
        Parliament passed legislation in late 1998 to restructure the
    prison service and bring prison law in line with the Constitution.
    Parts of the Correctional Services Act went into effect in 1998;
    although additional sections relating to the treatment of prisoners
    went into effect during the year, sections on parole board policy were
    not yet implemented. The parole boards still are staffed by lower
    ranking DCS employees, to which NGO's have attributed the low number of
    parole decisions and an exacerbation of the overcrowding conditions in
    prisons.
        A Judicial Inspectorate for prisons began operations during 1999,
    and a number of civilian prison visitors were appointed throughout the
    country. Visits were conducted during the year; however, most visitors
    were not trained in legal matters. Those who received some training
    from NGO's generally were more successful in encouraging compliance
    with regulations on inmate treatment.
        The Government generally permits independent monitoring of prison
    conditions, including visits by human rights organizations; however,
    only those organizations that are able to send legal practitioners are
    allowed to visit prisons. Other prisoners'' rights organizations
    routinely are denied access.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Bill of Rights
    prohibits detention without trial, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice. It also provides that every detained
    person has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the
    detention; to be advised promptly of the right to remain silent and the
    consequences of waiving that right; to be charged within 48 hours of
    arrest; to be detained in conditions of human dignity; to consult with
    legal counsel at every stage of the legal process; to communicate with
    relatives, medical practitioners, and religious counselors; and to be
    released (with or without bail) unless the interests of justice require
    otherwise.
        Courts and police generally respected these rights; however, there
    was a continuing problem with bringing detainees to trial
    expeditiously. According to the HRC, prisoners wait on average for 6
    months to be tried in the regional courts and 6 months to 1 year in the
    high courts; however, in extreme cases detention may extend up to 2
    years. This problem primarily is the result of an understaffed,
    underfunded, and overburdened judiciary (both magistrates and
    prosecutors), with more cases than can be handled efficiently (see
    Section 1.e.). Human rights groups, judges, and judicial scholars
    continued to express concern about the Criminal Procedure Second
    Amendment Act of 1997, which mandates minimum jail sentences and
    prohibits bail in certain cases, thus raising concern about judicial
    independence and civil liberties.
        There were reports that authorities abused detainees awaiting
    deportation. In December the HRC reported that immigrants in Lindela
    Repatriation Centre experienced long detentions and abuse (see Sections
    1.c. and 2.d.).
        There were no reports of forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent and impartial judiciary subject only to the Constitution
    and the law, and the Government respects this provision in practice.
        Under the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest
    court for interpreting and deciding constitutional issues, while the
    Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court for interpreting and
    deciding other legal matters. Generally magistrates' courts and high
    courts are the courts of original jurisdiction in criminal cases.
        Judges and magistrates hear criminal cases; the jury system was
    abolished in 1969. The presiding judge or magistrate determines guilt
    or innocence. The 1998 Magistrates Court Amendment Act made it
    compulsory to have a panel of lay assessors hear cases along with a
    magistrate in cases involving murder, rape, robbery, indecent assault,
    and assault leading to serious bodily harm. The two assessors may
    overrule magistrates on questions of fact. Magistrates also are
    required to use their discretion in using assessors in an advisory
    capacity in bail applications and sentencing. The Office of the
    National Director of Public Prosecutions (the so-called super Attorney
    General) exercises national control over prosecution policy and applies
    a consistent national policy for the prosecution of offenses. There are
    nine provincial directors and offices to coordinate and streamline
    prosecutions.
        The Bill of Rights provides for due process, including the right to
    a fair, public trial within a reasonable time after being charged, and
    the right to appeal to a higher court. It also gives detainees the
    right to state-funded legal counsel when ``substantial injustice would
    otherwise result.'' In practice the law functions as intended; however,
    a general lack of information on the part of accused persons regarding
    their rights to legal representation and the Government's inability to
    pay the cost of those services are continuing problems. There were
    serious backlogs in the numbers of cases that have gone to trial. In
    July the National Prosecuting Authority reported that there were
    approximately 140,000 cases awaiting hearings. There was public concern
    about the capacity of the criminal justice system to deal with the high
    level of crime, as well as the continuing political violence in
    KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere. The resurgence of vigilante justice
    substantiates this concern (see Section 1.a.).
        Some human rights groups expressed concern with parts of laws
    passed in 1997 that provided minimum sentencing guidelines and refusal
    of bail for certain serious offenses, stating that they would harm
    judicial independence and limit civil liberties. The law mandating
    minimum sentences came into force in 1998. The new bail law was upheld
    by the Constitutional Court in 1999. In December the South African Law
    Commission submitted a report to the Minister of Justice on the effects
    of minimum sentencing laws. The report showed that there remained
    disparities in the application of the sentencing guidelines, mostly at
    the regional level. Courts have the authority to depart from the
    guidelines if ``substantial and compelling circumstances'' justify it.
    Some human rights groups continued to have concerns about the effects
    of the minimum sentencing laws. The new laws have affected prison
    overcrowding by imposing an increased number of long-term prison
    sentences.
        The Government and legal bodies have acted to redress historic
    racial and gender imbalances in the judiciary and the bar. The ranks of
    judges, magistrates, senior counsels, and attorneys are more reflective
    of society, although they still fall far short of a representative
    composition. The majority of judges of the Constitutional and High
    Courts remain white and male. Magistrates courts continue to face large
    case loads and a shortage of resources.
        The TRC continued to investigate apartheid-era gross human rights
    abuses committed between 1960 and 1994, to grant amnesty to
    perpetrators of a broad range of politically motivated crimes, and to
    recommend compensation for victims of human rights abuses (see Section
    4).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.
        On January 25, Parliament passed the Promotion of Access to
    Information Act. Although the purpose of the act was to increase
    transparency, opposition parties and human rights NGO's objected to it
    because it includes a broadly-defined provision that enables the
    Government to access individuals'' personal information.
        On July 30, SAPS members, claiming to be searching homes for
    illegal weapons, shot and killed an ANC Member of Parliament, Bheki
    Mkhize, in his parents' home in Mahlabathini; the officers reportedly
    did not have a warrant to enter the home (see Section 1.a.).
        In 1994 the Redistribution of Land Rights Act established the
    Constitutional Land Court and the Commission on Restitution of Land
    Rights. The Land Court's mission is to settle cases previously screened
    and evaluated by the Commission. Claims only can be filed for land
    dispossessions following the promulgation of the Natives Land Act of
    1913, although this does not include dispossessions that occurred in
    1913, the year of the Government's most significant land redistribution
    in favor of whites. The various forms of compensation offered to
    claimants are the return of the original land, a deed to another piece
    of land, financial remuneration, or preferential access to government
    housing. A deadline of December 31, 1998 was set for receiving claims.
    There is no deadline for completion of the claim settlements, and the
    pace at which cases are moving is slow. By the December 1998 deadline,
    the Commission had received 67,531 claims; some claims represent
    several households. The Commission is scheduled to determine which
    claims are valid by the end of 2001. At year's end, 8,288 claims had
    been settled, allotting land or money to 20,473 households. A provision
    passed by Parliament in late 1997, allowed the Ministry of Land Affairs
    to offer settlements without first going to court, and has expedited
    the resolution process.
        In May following land reform disturbances in a neighboring country
    during the year, the media reported on a series of farm occupations by
    landless farm workers in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. Subsequent
    information showed that there was no organized effort to seize land,
    and the occupations were by either longtime squatters or claimants
    frustrated by long delays from the Commission on Restitution of Land
    Rights. On May 10, President Mbeki stated before Parliament that the
    Government would not tolerate land seizures.
        There were reports of persons accused of witchcraft being driven
    from their villages in rural communities (see Section 1.c.).
        There are three known villages in the Northern Province in which
    persons accused of witchcraft and their families were offered unused
    land by traditional leaders. The villages have no running water or
    electricity. Although some persons accused of witchcraft returned to
    their homes, many persons remained in the villages and requested
    government assistance for schools and basic infrastructure.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice; however, these rights can be limited by law in some
    circumstances. Several apartheid-era laws that remain in force pose a
    potential threat to media independence. In addition, the Constitution
    bans the advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender, or
    religion that constitutes incitement to cause harm. Nevertheless, the
    press criticizes both the Government and the opposition.
        Several laws remain in effect that permit the Government to
    restrict the publication of information about the police, the national
    defense forces, prisons, and mental institutions. While these laws have
    not been employed often, journalists perceive them to be a threat to
    constitutional free press rights. The Criminal Procedure Act may be
    used to compel reporters to reveal their sources. In June 1999, the
    South African National Editors' Forum (SANEF) launched a media campaign
    to compel changes to legislation that restricts the free flow of
    information. In July 1999, SANEF and the Government reached an informal
    agreement to introduce safeguards to prevent the use of the Criminal
    Procedure Act against journalists; however, in September 1999 the
    Provincial Director of Public Prosecutions decided to invoke a section
    of the Criminal Procedure Act against an unnamed person. The Act
    reportedly was not invoked officially by year's end. The SANEF
    continued to push without success for a formal amendment of the Act
    that would ensure this agreement.
        In June the National Police Commissioner announced that the
    Government would withhold the release of current crime statistics and
    other information to the public, on the grounds that crime statistics
    could not be verified and statisticsgathering methods were inaccurate.
    He stated that the embargo was temporary but did not set a date for it
    to be lifted. Judge Willem Heath stated that his anticorruption unit
    also would reduce the amount of information given to the public
    regarding the progress of his special investigations.
        The Government used both legislative and structural means to
    encourage greater diversity in the media. The media offer a broad range
    of news, opinion, and analysis. Coverage of news and expression of
    opinion is vigorous. High-ranking government officials on occasion have
    reacted sharply to media criticism of government programs and problems,
    and have at times accused journalists, particularly black journalists
    and editors, of disloyalty. Some journalists express concern that the
    Government would like to control the media. A larger number of
    journalists believe that the Government's sensitivity to criticism
    causes self-censorship in the media.
        In October police officers raided the offices of the South African
    Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Reuters, the Associated Press, and the
    Mail & Guardian newspaper. Police confiscated material for use in the
    trial of PAGAD national coordinator Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim and three
    others in the killing of Rashaad Staggie (see Section 1.a.). On July 5,
    there were reports that government officials harassed two journalists
    who were covering a government staff protest. Officials temporarily
    confiscated a camera, notebook and documents, but later returned them.
        All newspapers are owned by conglomerates. In early September, 50
    percent of the Natal Witness Publishing Company was sold to the
    conglomerate Nasionale Pers (Naspers). This sale reflected the growing
    dominance of the newspaper market by a few companies that feature
    strong infrastructure and capital investment. One of the prominent
    companies, New Africa Media, is a black-owned consortium that controls
    the country's leading black-oriented newspaper, The Sowetan, as well as
    a major white-oriented publishing business, Times Media Limited. The
    Sowetan has the largest daily circulation in the country.
        Print media reaches only about 20 percent of the population due to
    illiteracy, the lack of newspapers in rural areas, and the cost of
    newspapers. The majority of the population receive the news through
    radio broadcasts.
        The government-owned SABC, a limited liability company, continues
    to own and control the majority of the television and radio outlets. In
    April the SABC was scheduled to be split into two operational units: a
    public broadcasting company and a commercial entity. However, the
    restructuring had not yet occurred by year's end, and the process is
    expected to take more than a year. At present the SABC is managed by
    black executives, provides broadcasting in the country's main African
    languages, and offers news coverage of the Government and the leading
    opposition parties. The SABC maintains editorial independence from the
    Government, although the balance between editorial independence and
    national interest remains a delicate issue with governmental officials;
    critics allege that top officials are chosen for political reasons
    without regard for media expertise or relevant experience. In February
    the outgoing SABC Board Chairman, Paulus Zulu, raised the concern that
    the SABC was ``dictated to from above'' when making editorial
    decisions.
        The first commercial television station, E-TV, has been
    broadcasting for over 2 years. Although E-TV's signal reaches 75
    percent of the population, E-TV's share is consistently only about 10
    percent of viewers. Most of E-TV's schedule consists of newscasts and
    foreign-produced programs; the government is encouraging E-TV to meet
    its licensing conditions, which would require programming to include at
    least 30 percent local content. Majority ownership of E-TV is held by
    Midi Television, a black-owned consortium composed of a number of South
    African associations and syndicates representing workers, women, and
    disabled persons.
        In addition to E-TV, the SABC competes with two pay-per-view
    broadcasters, M-NET (encoded UHF transmissions) and MultiChoice (direct
    from satellite broadcasts); several commercial radio broadcasters; and
    a large number of low-power, not-for-profit community radio stations.
    Government broadcast regulators have issued more than 100 community
    radio licenses since 1994; many of the 80 stations continue to
    experience financing and personnel retention problems. Nevertheless,
    community radio provides radio access for the first time to thousands
    of historically marginalized citizens, providing special event
    information and news tailored for specific interest groups.
        Internet access is unrestricted for persons with the ability to pay
    for the service. The number of Internet users doubled during the year.
    All major newspapers maintain Internet sites, most of which are updated
    daily with the latest news and features.
        In August the Human Rights Commission (HRC) published the finding
    of its investigation into racism in the media. The investigation
    examined selected publications over a limited period, looking at the
    issue of subliminal racism and the disproportionate representation of
    whites in media ownership and newsroom staffing. The Commission's
    report concluded that: ``To the extent that expressions in the media
    reflect a persistent pattern of racist expressions and content of
    writing that could have been avoided, the media can be characterized as
    racist institutions.'' The report recommended workshops and conferences
    to sensitize journalists to the risk of racial prejudice in their
    reporting. This suggestion was supported by the SANEF and the Freedom
    of Expression Institute (FXI); however, both organizations were less
    receptive to the Commission's recommendation that a single regulatory
    authority be established for the media. Although the proposed authority
    would be funded and under the control of the media, SANEF and FXI
    assert that radio and television require different controls than
    newspapers. They are concerned that the Government's alleged attempts
    to silence expressions of dissent could eventually be codified into
    law.
        A ruling by the Supreme Court in 1998 decreed that journalists who
    could prove that they had taken all the steps necessary to verify that
    the information they obtained was genuine and that the articles
    published as a consequence were reasonable and not negligent would not
    be liable for defamation. Media freedom advocates noted the ruling as
    an important change in the allocation of the burden of proof from the
    media to the plaintiff.
        There are several government agencies with media-related
    responsibilities. Under the South African Communications Regulatory
    Authority Bill passed in May, the IBA and the South African
    Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) were merged to form the
    Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). Under the
    new regulations, ICASA has less independence from the Ministry of
    Telecommunications than was previously granted to the IBA. Additionally
    the Minister of Telecommunications has a direct role in the awarding of
    telecommunication-service licenses. This role came under scrutiny
    during the extended bidding process for the third cellular license in
    the country after unsuccessful bidders for the cellular license alleged
    that the regulator unfairly recommended one bidder for the contract;
    they sued to have the decision's basis reviewed, but the case was not
    resolved by year's end. The Government Board of Censors reviews and
    passes judgment on written and graphic materials published in or
    imported into the country. The Board has the power to edit or ban
    books, magazines, movies, and videos. It regularly exercises that
    power, although with restraint. The Government Communications and
    Information Service (GCIS) was created in 1998 to coordinate and
    facilitate communications with the citizenry through its Directorate
    for Media Diversity and Development, which began operations in 1999.
        In December during a legal strike of security guards, strikers used
    intimidation and violence against journalists covering the strike (see
    Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 6.a.).
        There are no official restrictions on academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
    this right in practice. On May 9, police used tear gas while dispersing
    a COSATU strike after the crowd reportedly threw stones (see Section
    6.a.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        The Constitution states that religious instruction at public
    schools is permitted so long as it is voluntary and religions are
    treated equally. Many public schools have dropped religious instruction
    in practice. In schools that do administer religious instruction,
    students have the right not to attend the religious instruction, and
    school authorities respect this right in practice. The current syllabus
    allows local boards to decide whether to include religious instruction
    in their schools. There are some private religious schools in which
    religious instruction is required.
        Members of PAGAD complained that they were the targets of police
    brutality (see Section 1.a.). There was no indication that police
    targeted PAGAD members for investigation because of their religious
    affiliation.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice.
        The law contains provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1998 the National Assembly
    and the National Council of Provinces passed the Refugees Act--
    framework legislation that codified the country's obligations under the
    U.N. Convention and its Protocol. The Act's regulations, which
    delineate actual government procedures and responsibilities, became
    effective in April. The Refugees Act stipulates that no person shall be
    expelled, extradited, or returned to any other country if they face
    persecution due to race, religion, or political affiliation, or when
    ``his or her life, physical safety, or freedom would be threatened.''
    The act also stipulates that designated refugees lose their status if
    they voluntarily return to their country of origin, take citizenship of
    another country, or if the circumstances that caused their flight from
    the country of origin change. However, the act stipulates that in order
    to renew their temporary residency permits, asylum seekers must return
    to the town in which they originally lodged their application to be
    recognized as refugees. Permits that are lost, stolen, or destroyed are
    not renewed. If found without a valid permit, asylum seekers are
    subject to arrest, detention, and deportation.
        The UNHCR is assisting the Government in processing asylum
    applications. The regulations implementing the Refugees Act require the
    Department of Home Affairs to interview asylum seekers within 14 days
    of entry and to determine their status within 180 days of the
    interview; however, asylum application are not efficiently processed by
    the Department of Home Affairs due to poor management and insufficient
    resources. There were interview delays of up to 3 months, followed by a
    6-month adjudication period, and under new procedures, applicants are
    prohibited from working or attending school until asylum is granted.
    Human rights groups have criticized the Department of Home Affairs for
    not following the provisions of the act. New applicants for asylum and
    NGO's assisting refugees reported abuse and assaults by immigration
    authorities and requests for bribes to process applications for permits
    to remain in the country (see Section 1.c.). On November 28,
    approximately 300 refugees demonstrated in front of the Department of
    Home Affairs to protest its refusal to process asylum applications for
    those refugees without passports. Some of the refugees alleged that
    Home Affairs employees assaulted them and requested bribes.
        The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
    organizations in assisting refugees. The Government provides first
    asylum, granting applicants the right to work and study. The Department
    of Home Affairs reported that as of November, 61,120 persons had
    applied for asylum since 1994. Of this number, 14,735 were granted
    asylum and refugee status, 24,177 were refused, and 16,053 were
    awaiting a decision. The majority of recognized refugees came from
    Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola; there also
    were refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Republic of the Congo.
        The majority of illegal immigrants come from Mozambique and
    Zimbabwe. Illegal immigrants are processed for deportation at a central
    facility, and sent back to Mozambique and Zimbabwe by weekly trains.
    Inadequate security on the trains allows many deportees to jump from
    the train en route, perpetuating the illegal immigration problem.
    Despite numerous procedural safeguards, efforts to combat a growing
    illegal immigration problem occasionally resulted in the wrongful
    deportation of aliens legally in the country. However, there were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared
    persecution. There were credible reports of overcrowded, unhygienic
    detention facilities; beatings by security personnel in detention
    centers; and the theft of money and personal possessions from refugees
    by security personnel.
        In December after a 2-year investigation, the HRC released a report
    assessing the conditions at the Lindela Repatriation Centre, the
    largest detention facility for undocumented immigrants in the country.
    The report described abuses against detainees, which included long
    detentions, poor conditions, xenophobia, abuse and corruption by
    officials, and sexual abuse of women. In December the HRC reported that
    the Department of Home Affairs had not responded to its
    recommendations, and although the contractor operating the facility had
    improved conditions, Home Affairs officials continued to assault
    detainees and subject them to degrading treatment.
        Xenophobia led to a number of violent attacks on foreigners (see
    Section 1.c.).
        On November 7, a video taped in 1998 was broadcast on national
    television showing six white police officers beating and torturing
    three black illegal immigrants with dogs (see Section 1.c.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic free and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage. In June 1999 national elections were held that observers
    deemed to be free and fair. There was an improved level of overall
    tolerance during the campaigning and voting period compared with the
    1994 elections, attributable to IFP-ANC talks, as well as an increased
    police presence. Complaints primarily concerned posters being removed
    or defaced, individuals being threatened because of political
    affiliation, and other incidents of intimidation.
        The new Constitution went into effect in February 1997. Under its
    terms, the country retains a bicameral parliament, an executive state
    presidency, and an independent judiciary, including a constitutional
    court.
        The 400-member National Assembly was retained under the
    Constitution. A National Council of Provinces (NCOP), consisting of six
    permanent and four rotating delegates from each of the nine provinces,
    functions as the second chamber of Parliament. The NCOP, created to
    give a greater voice to provincial interests, must approve legislation
    that involves shared national and provincial competencies according to
    a schedule in the Constitution. An 18-member Council of Traditional
    Leaders, which the Constitution accords an advisory role in matters of
    traditional law and authority, was inaugurated in 1997.
        Two parties, the ANC and the IFP, continued to share executive
    power, although the ANC dominated the Government and gained in
    parliamentary strength in the 1999 elections. The ANC fills 24 of the
    27 ministerial positions. In 1999 the ANC leader, Thabo Mbeki,
    succeeded Nelson Mandela as President and Head of State. As a result of
    the 1999 national elections, the Democratic Party (DP) replaced the New
    National Party (NNP) as the official opposition in the National
    Assembly. In June the DP and NNP, along with the Federal Alliance (FA),
    formed the Democratic Alliance, which is expected to consolidate into a
    single party as soon as electoral laws permit them to do so. The
    National Assembly also includes the UDM, the African Christian
    Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress, the United Christian
    Democratic Party, the Freedom Front, the Afrikaner Unity Movement, the
    Azanian People's Organization, and the Minority Front.
        Traditional leaders expressed concern over the redrawing of
    municipal boundaries in anticipation of nationwide municipal elections
    that were held on December 5. These leaders traditionally have held all
    of their subjects'' agricultural land in trust for their subjects and
    have controlled many aspects of social and cultural life in rural
    areas. They claimed that the new demarcations split and diminished
    their hereditary status and power bases. They also complained that new
    municipal structures and legislatures denied them voting rights in
    local councils, which control development funds for local communities.
    Although some chiefs advocated a boycott of the December elections,
    most decided to participate based on an agreement with the Government
    to negotiate compromise legislation. Negotiations continued
    intermittently after the December elections; however, there was no
    agreement on legislation by year's end. There were very few reports of
    violence or irregularities during the December 5 local elections;
    however, in the East Rand area of Johannesburg, there were reports that
    five persons were killed in two incidents of violence that may have
    been politically motivated (see Section 1.a.).
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government; however, women are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Of the 400 National Assembly members, 119 are women, while in
    the NCOP, 17 of the 54 permanent delegates are women. Women occupy
    three of four parliamentary presiding officer positions (speaker and
    deputy speaker of the National Assembly, and chair of the NCOP). Women
    hold 8 of 27 ministerial positions, as well as 8 of 13 deputy
    ministerial slots.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
    investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
    Government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
    views. Many organizations participate in governmental bodies that seek
    to gather public input and to fashion policies related to human rights.
        The government-created HRC is tasked with promoting the observance
    of fundamental human rights at all levels of government and throughout
    the general population. The HRC also has the power to conduct
    investigations, issue subpoenas, and hear testimony under oath. While
    commissioners were named in late 1995, the HRC's powers were not
    determined formally until May 1996. Following the August release of its
    report on the 1999 investigation into racism in the media, opposition
    parties again questioned the HRC's broad interpretation of its mandate
    and the impartiality of the Commission. During the year, the HRC began
    an investigation into allegations of abuse of black farmworkers, local
    justice system prejudice against farmworkers, and violence against
    white farm owners. The HRC report was not released by year's end.
        The Office of the Public Protector investigates abuse and
    mismanagement by the Government, and acts as an office of last resort
    to which citizens report unfair treatment by government organizations.
    Such complaints generally take the form of concerns over lost pension
    checks or unfair hiring practices. The office handles an increasing
    number of complaints but is hampered by severe resource constraints.
        Under its 1995 enabling legislation, the TRC was empowered to
    investigate apartheid-era gross human rights abuses committed between
    1960 and 1994, to grant amnesty to perpetrators of a broad range of
    politically motivated crimes, and to recommend compensation for victims
    of human rights abuses. Due to the volume of work, the TRC's original
    2-year mandate was extended to allow the continuation of amnesty
    hearings, and the TRC continued to operate freely throughout its 5th
    year. Its five-volume report was released in 1998, and a codicil is to
    be added upon completion of the amnesty process. In its report, the TRC
    found that apartheid was a crime against humanity, that the former
    apartheid regime was responsible for most of the human rights abuses
    during the era of its rule, and that the ANC and other liberation
    movements also committed abuses during their armed struggle. Following
    a court challenge in 1998, findings on former State President F.W. De
    Klerk were excised from the report, pending a hearing that has been
    postponed indefinitely.
        By January 1999, 7,112 amnesty applications had been filed with the
    TRC; no new applications have been accepted since 1997. By September
    287 cases remained outstanding, 136 of which remained unheard. An
    estimated 80 to 90 percent of all applications were from persons
    already incarcerated. In October 1999, the TRC began amnesty hearings
    on 10 former members of the Umkhonoto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the
    ANC, for their role in a series of 1986 bar bombings; the case was
    still pending at year's end. The killers of ANC activist Ruth First
    were granted amnesty, although relatives of First and other victims
    challenged the decision in court. During the year, the TRC granted
    amnesty to a number of other persons, including Eugene de Kock, the
    principal of the apartheid government Vlakplaas unit (although he
    remains in custody for other crimes); police officers who killed
    antiapartheid activist Stanza Bopape; and the IFP members involved in a
    massacre at Boipatong. The TRC still is considering former Minister of
    Law and Order Adrian Vlok's amnesty applications for several offenses.
    On September 7, the TRC granted 11 ANC guards amnesty for their
    participation in the 1994 killing of 8 IFP demonstrators.
        The TRC report called for a reconciliation summit to be scheduled
    in 1999, but had not received a formal response from the Government by
    year's end. The TRC also called for increased counseling services for
    victims of trauma, and consideration of a mechanism for restitution,
    such as a wealth tax. Victims'' groups such as Khulumani called for the
    Government to set aside $870 million (6 billion rands) for reparation
    funding according to the TRC formulas. The Government did not approve
    the TRC's recommendations for an overall payment formula for
    reparations, which include monetary compensation as well as community
    support and legal and symbolic reparations, by year's end. The
    Government had not resolved any of these matters by year's end;
    however, the processing of emergency financial reparation applications
    from eligible victims continued, with approximately $4.4 million (35
    million rands) paid by year's end. During the year, interim assistance
    was given to those considered to be in the greatest financial
    difficulty. The TRC officially expressed concern regarding delays in
    implementing reparation measures, along with doubt about the level of
    government support for reparation funding.
        In 1999 the Director of Public Prosecutions stated that his office
    had established a special unit to set up a process for proceeding
    against those persons who had failed to ask for amnesty or to whom
    amnesty had been denied. The unit would establish uniform criteria on
    which cases should be prosecuted; the criteria would include the
    strength of evidence available as well as the ``implications for
    national reconciliation.'' The case against Dr. Basson is the first
    case pursued by this unit to go to trial (see Section 1.a.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race,
    religion, disability, ethnic or social origin, color, age, culture,
    language, sex, pregnancy, or marital status. Legal recourse is
    available to those who believe that they have been discriminated
    against; however, entrenched attitudes and practices, as well as
    limited resources, limit the practical effect of these protections.
        Women.--There is an extremely high rate of violence against women,
    including rape, assault and battery, and domestic violence. Police
    reported that the rate of reported rapes was 48.9 per 100,000 persons
    for the first 5 months of the year. The rate for 1999 was 47.5 per
    100,000. The actual population figure and numbers of reported rapes
    were not published. According to a victims'' survey study by Statistics
    South Africa, a government-related organization, only 47 percent of
    sexual crimes committed in 1998 were reported to the police. Women's
    groups estimate the reporting rate to be even lower. Entrenched
    patriarchal attitudes towards women are a significant factor in
    underreporting. Abused women have difficulty getting their cases
    prosecuted effectively and also often are treated poorly by doctors,
    police, and judges.
        The 1998 Domestic Violence Act defines victims of domestic
    violence, facilitates the serving of protection orders on abusers,
    provides places of safety for victims, allows police to seize firearms
    at the scene and arrest abusers without a warrant, and compels medical,
    educational, and other practitioners working with children to report
    abuse immediately. The 1993 Prevention of Family Violence Act defines
    marital rape as a criminal offense, and it allows women to obtain
    injunctions against their abusive husbands and partners in a simpler,
    less expensive, and more effective manner than under previous
    legislation. However, the implementation process is inadequate, as some
    police are reluctant to enforce the act. As a consequence, a limited
    number of women filed complaints under the law, despite government and
    NGO efforts to increase public awareness of it. At year's end, the
    parliamentary monitoring committee on women's affairs was completing
    consultations with NGO's and local and national government officials
    regarding defects in the domestic violence laws, preparing a report for
    the relevant ministries on how the legislation can be modified to
    ensure more effective implementation, and focusing on efforts to ensure
    that the budget oversight process included greater emphasis on the
    effects of government programs on women. While some progress was made,
    the number of shelters for battered women remained insufficient. The
    SAPS continued to operate 46 Family Violence, Child Protection, and
    Sexual Offenses units, which deal specifically with these issues and
    which are intended, in part, to increase victims' confidence in the
    police, thereby leading to increased reporting of such crimes. However,
    these units often were hampered by a lack of training among officers.
    During the year, the Government began a training program for these
    units.
        Female immigrants and asylum seekers were sexually abused during
    detention. The Lindela Repatriation Centre, the largest facility for
    the detention of undocumented immigrants in the country, has no special
    facilities for women, and although male and female detainees resided in
    separate sections of the Centre, they often used common facilities (see
    Section 2.d.).
        Discrimination against women remains a serious problem despite
    legal and constitutional protections, particularly in areas such as
    wages, extension of credit, and access to land. Progress was made in
    bringing customary law in line with constitutional provisions. The 1998
    Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill recognizes customary marriages,
    both monogamous and polygynous, but it does not address religious
    marriages, which are not recognized by the law. However, the bill was
    not implemented by year's end. The bill includes a number of safeguards
    for women and children, including requiring a minimum age of 18 and the
    consent of both spouses to enter into such marriages and a court decree
    to dissolve them. The bill also addresses inequities of property
    arrangements under some customary laws. The 1998 Maintenance Bill, the
    final section of which was enacted into law during the year, tightens
    procedures for child support payments and improves the ability of
    caregivers, most of whom are women, to collect maintenance payments
    from partners. Other legislation, such as the Employment Equity Act,
    which includes both antidiscrimination and affirmative action
    provisions, and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, address
    discrimination against women in the workplace. The legislation
    reportedly has resulted in an improvement in the numbers of women in
    professional and technical positions, although it has not had as much
    effect at the management level. The 1997 Interim Protection of Informal
    Land Act protects persons who have insecure and informal rights and
    interests in land; many women are in this category.
        Polygyny continues to be practiced by several ethnic groups.
    Exacting a bride price (``lobola'') also is a traditional practice of
    some ethnic groups.
        Recent studies have shown a connection between women and the
    likelihood of poverty. A women's NGO reported that femaleheaded
    households have a 50 percent higher incidence of poverty than male-
    headed households; that a high proportion of working women live in poor
    households; and that 61 percent of the elderly poor are women.
        A number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations monitor
    and promote women's rights. The Office on the Status of Women, located
    in the Deputy President's office, coordinates departmental gender
    desks, which develop strategies to ensure integration of gender
    concerns in policy and planning. The Commission on Gender Equality
    (CGE), a constitutionally mandated body, is authorized to investigate
    allegations of gender discrimination and make recommendations to
    Parliament on any legislation affecting women. As with some of the
    other statutory watchdog bodies, the CGE continued to be hampered by a
    lack of funding. There were reports that women are trafficked into the
    country for forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Constitution stipulates that children have the right
    ``to security, education, basic nutrition, and basic health and social
    services.'' The Government remains committed to providing these
    services and has made some progress toward developing the mechanisms
    for delivering them, including improvements in the provision of
    education and a campaign against child abuse. However, the demand for
    such services far outstrips the resources available.
        The 1996 Schools Act and the National Education Policy Act provide
    greater educational opportunities for disadvantaged children--
    traditionally black children--through a uniform system for the
    organization, governance, and funding of schools. It mandates
    compulsory education from ages 7 to 15 and ensures that children cannot
    be refused admission to public schools due to a lack of funds.
    According to the Department of Education, approximately 90 percent of 7
    to 15-year-olds and 83 percent of 16 to 19-year-olds are enrolled in
    school. The school funding formula, based on norms and standards tied
    to physical resources and performance, devotes 60 percent of
    nonpersonnel resources toward the 40 percent most needy schools. Each
    of the nine provincial departments of education has responsibility for
    the schools in their provinces, which has resulted in the uneven
    distribution of educational facilities. The disparity has affected the
    areas of Eastern Cape, the Northern Province, and KwaZulu-Natal most
    severely. The availability and quality of primary schooling still is a
    problem, especially in rural areas where schools may not be easily
    accessible or children may have to work (see Section 6.d.). To address
    this problem, the Government continued to build some new schools,
    introduce basic skills development and prevocational training into the
    curriculum and, in some cases, develop plans to provide food for
    disadvantaged children.
        Student populations on university campuses are becoming more
    representative of the general population, with previously allwhite
    universities reaching out to recruit students from black and colored
    communities. The enrollment of black students had risen to 41 percent
    in 1999 at the nation's top five universities.
        Social programs known as ``Presidential Initiatives,'' which were
    included in the Government's Reconstruction and Development Program,
    continued to receive government support. These initiatives offer free
    health care to pregnant women and to children under 6 years of age and
    provide nutritious meals for primary school children.
        In December 1999, a Cape Town High Court heard a case brought by
    residents of a squatter camp petitioning for government-provided
    housing. The court ruled that the children in squatter camps have a
    constitutional right to housing and, thus, are entitled to state-
    provided shelter. The court also ruled that the children have a
    constitutional right to family and therefore, have the right to be
    accompanied by their family members in the state-provided shelter. The
    Constitutional Court, the country's highest court, held hearings on the
    case in May, and ruled that the Government had failed to carry out its
    obligation to provide housing, but did not rule specifically on the
    constitutional rights of children to housing.
        Violence against children remains widespread. While there has been
    increased attention to the problem by the Government, the public, and
    the media, a lack of coordinated and comprehensive strategies to deal
    with violence crimes continues to impede the delivery of needed
    services to young victims. Reports of child rape have increased
    significantly, as have reports that men are committing rape due to a
    growing myth that having sexual intercourse with a virgin can cure HIV/
    AIDS.
        Traditional circumcision rituals still are practiced on teenage
    boys in rural areas of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal and resulted
    in the hospitalization, mutilation, or death of several boys and young
    men. The provincial department of health reported at least 18 deaths, 5
    mutilations, and 42 hospitalizations during the summer initiation
    season that began in September. In December provincial health
    authorities began to regulate the practice by requiring the presence of
    trained medical personnel during the rituals.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, still is practiced in some rural areas of the
    Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, although it is not thought to be
    widespread. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
    Discrimination Act of 2000 specifically prohibits FGM as unfair
    discrimination; however, that provision had not been implemented by
    year's end.
        Child prostitution is on the rise, primarily in Cape Town, Durban,
    and Johannesburg. There reportedly has been an increase in the number
    of children who live on the streets, and observers believe that this
    circumstance has contributed to the growing number of child
    prostitutes. The child sex industry increasingly has become organized,
    with children either being forced into prostitution or exploited by
    their parents to earn money for the family (see Sections 6.c., 6.d.,
    and 6.f.). The 1999 Child Care Amendment Bill, which was implemented in
    January, prohibits the commercial sexual exploitation of children.
        Parliament passed legislation in 1995 prohibiting the detention of
    unconvicted juveniles in prisons, police cells, or lock-ups. A 1996 law
    gave courts limited discretion to detain in prison 14 to 18-year-old
    children who were awaiting trial for serious crimes such as murder or
    rape. The measure was expected to be temporary pending the
    establishment of ``places of safety,'' also called ``secure care
    centers,'' for the detention of juveniles. However, due to delays in
    the establishment of such centers, provisions of the 1996 law lapsed.
    Amid concerns that dangerous juvenile offenders were being released to
    return to the streets, additional legislation was passed in 1998 to
    regulate limited pretrial detention of juvenile offenders accused of
    serious crimes. The law states that any child under the age of 14 must
    be released within 24 hours into the custody of a parent or guardian
    when possible. In August 200 juveniles awaiting trial were transferred
    to secure care centers after it was discovered that they were being
    held with adult prisoners and receiving insufficient medical attention
    at Pollsmoor prison near Cape Town (see Section 1.c.). Immigrant
    children detained in the Lindela Repatriation Centre received the same
    general treatment as adult detainees, were not provided with separate
    sleeping facilities from adults, and were not always provided with food
    and clothing by the facility (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
        There were reports that children were trafficked for forced
    prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution prohibits
    discrimination on the basis of disability. Society is increasingly open
    to the concept of persons with disabilities as a minority whose civil
    rights must be protected. The Government attempts to ensure that all
    government-funded projects take account of the needs of disabled
    citizens. However, in practice government and private sector
    discrimination against the disabled in employment still exists.
    According to an NGO, the Affirmative Action Monitor, fewer than two-
    thirds of companies target the disabled as part of their affirmative
    action programs. The law mandates access to buildings for the disabled,
    but such regulations rarely are enforced, and public awareness of them
    remains minimal. The Employment Equity Act requires private firms with
    more than 50 workers to create an affirmative action plan with
    provisions for achieving employment equity for the disabled. The
    National Environmental Accessibility Program, an NGO comprising
    disabled consumers as well as service providers, has established a
    presence in all nine provinces to lobby for compliance with the
    regulations and to sue offending property owners when necessary.
        Religious Minorities.--Relations between the various religious
    communities generally are amicable. However, there is a concern among
    some Christians about the perceived growing influence of political
    Islam. Reports of violence perpetrated by PAGAD have fueled these
    concerns.
        PAGAD portrays itself as a community organization opposed to crime,
    gangsterism, and drugs; however, it is known for its violent
    vigilantism (see Section 1.a.). PAGAD is a multifaith movement,
    although its orientation is Islamic and the vast majority of its
    members are Muslim. PAGAD is most active in the Western Cape, but also
    has branches elsewhere in the country. Surveys indicated that some two-
    thirds of Muslims supported PAGAD soon after its inception in 1995, but
    that figure has dropped significantly since. While PAGAD continues to
    lose support when it is linked to violent acts, it gains sympathy when
    high-profile incidents occur that are perceived by the Muslim community
    to have been acts of discrimination against Muslims.
        There were occasional reports of killings linked to the continued
    practice of witchcraft in some rural areas (see Section 1.a.). In the
    Northern Province, where traditional beliefs regarding witchcraft
    remain strong, officials reported dozens of killings of persons
    suspected of witchcraft. The Government has instituted educational
    programs to prevent such actions.
        In December 1998, a synagogue in Wynberg was bombed. Four suspects
    were arrested, and their trials were scheduled to be heard in 2001.
        In January 1997, a mosque in Rustenberg was damaged in a series of
    bombings that also struck a post office and a liquor store. In
    September Pieter Nel, Christian Harmse, and Pierre Jacobs, believed by
    authorities to be affiliated with the right wing Afrikaaner
    Weerstandsbeweging group, were convicted on charges that included
    attempted murder, possession of explosives, and sabotage, and were
    sentenced in September to prison terms ranging from 16 to 19 years.
        Indigenous People.--The Constitution provides for the recognition
    of ``the institution, status, and role of traditional leadership,'' and
    requires the courts to ``apply customary law when that is applicable,
    subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals
    with customary law.''
        The Constitution further permits legislation for the establishment
    of provincial houses of traditional leaders and a National Council of
    Traditional Leaders to deal with matters relating to traditional
    leadership, the role of traditional leaders, indigenous and customary
    law, and the customs of communities that observe a system of customary
    law. Six provinces have established houses of traditional leaders.
    Under the terms of the Constitution and implementing legislation, the
    National Council of Traditional Leaders was inaugurated in 1997. The
    Council is to advise the Government on matters related to traditional
    authorities and customary law. However, much work remains to be done to
    integrate traditional leadership and customary law into the formal
    legal and administrative system. No agreement had been reached by
    year's end (see Section 3).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution and Bill of
    Rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic or social
    origin, or culture. The Government continued efforts to reorganize and
    redesign the educational, housing, and health care systems to benefit
    all racial and ethnic groups in society more equally. The Employment
    Equity Act of 1998 prohibits discrimination on 19 grounds and requires
    companies with 50 or more employees to ensure that previously
    disadvantaged groups--defined as blacks, women, and the disabled--are
    adequately represented at all levels of the workforce. By December all
    such companies were required to submit affirmative action plans to the
    Department of Labor. In October the Minister of Labor stated that
    senior management positions in 2,170 large employers (those with 150 or
    more employees) that reported on time and in the correct format
    reported 28 percent blacks and 24 percent women in those positions.
    This result indicated no significant change from baseline figures
    recorded in 1998. Blacks and women comprise 79 percent and 40 percent,
    respectively, of the economically active population. The employers
    cited a lack of training and development, poor recruitment processes,
    and an antagonistic corporate culture as the main impediments to
    affirmative action. No figures are available on the disabled. The armed
    forces have struggled with the process of integrating blacks into the
    predominantly white officer corps (see Section 1.a).
        Xenophobia led to a number of violent attacks on foreigners (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
        The continued killings of mostly white farm owners by black
    assailants created concern among white farmers that they were being
    targeted for racial and political reasons (see Section 1.a.). There
    also were reports that white employers abused and killed black farm
    laborers, but avoided penalty due to collusion with the authorities
    (see Section 1.a.).
        On August 30, the Government sponsored a 3-day National Conference
    on Racism in Johannesburg, which was organized by the HRC, NGO's, and
    government representatives. Approximately 1,000 citizens and 20
    international visitors attended.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
    of association and the right to strike, and these rights are given
    statutory effect in the 1996 Labor Relations Act (LRA). All workers in
    the private sector are entitled to join a union. Workers in the public
    sector, with the exception of members of the National Intelligence
    Agency and the Secret Service, also are entitled to join a union. In
    1999 the Constitutional Court struck down the prohibition on members of
    the National Defense Force joining a union, although they still may not
    strike. No employee may be fired or discriminated against because of
    membership in or advocacy of a trade union. Union membership in the
    private sector has continued to decline steadily in the last few years
    as a result of job layoffs and declining employment, including in
    sectors that have been heavily unionized, such as mining. However, some
    public sector unions have experienced growth. Total union membership is
    approximately 3.3 million persons, nearly 35 percent of those employed
    in the wage economy.
        The largest trade union federation, COSATU, is aligned formally
    with the African National Congress and the South African Communist
    Party (SACP). Several ANC members of Parliament and of the Cabinet have
    a COSATU leadership background, and the current premier of Gauteng, the
    country's richest province, is a former COSATU general secretary.
    COSATU's largest rival, the Federation of Unions of South Africa
    (FEDUSA), is an apolitical, multiracial federation that was formed in
    1997 by merging several smaller worker organizations. A relatively
    minor labor federation, the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU),
    is independent of any political grouping. Some unions do not belong to
    any federation.
        The LRA is designed to create an industrial relations regime that
    is stable and recognizes that basic worker rights need to be protected.
    The act, which applies to both the public and private sectors, protects
    workers against unfair dismissal, recognizes their right to form trade
    unions, provides for the right to strike, and establishes a simple set
    of procedures that protect striking workers from the threat of
    dismissal. Essentially, for a strike to proceed, all that is required
    is that a dispute be referred for conciliation. There is no time limit
    on conciliation efforts; however, if conciliation fails to resolve the
    dispute, or lasts more than 30 days, a trade union is entitled to
    advise an employer of intent to strike so long as it gives 48-hours
    notice to a private sector employer or 7-days notice to a state
    employer. Organized labor also has the right to engage in
    ``socioeconomic protest,'' whereby workers can demonstrate, without
    fear of losing their jobs, in furtherance of broader social issues. The
    LRA also allows employers to hire replacement labor for striking
    employees, but only after giving 7 days' notice to the striking trade
    union. Employers have the right to lock out workers if certain
    conditions are met.
        The LRA applies to public as well as private sector workers. Public
    sector employees, with the exception of essential services and the
    three components of the security services, also have the right to
    strike. Strikes by workers in essential services, for example, police
    and hospital workers, are prohibited. If disputes between workers in
    essential services and their employers cannot be resolved though
    collective bargaining or conciliation, they are referred to
    arbitration.
        COSATU held a 1-day nationwide general strike on May 10 which was
    the culmination of a 3 1/2 ``rolling mass action,'' consisting of
    lunchtime demonstrations and successive provincial-level strikes
    building up to the general strike, to protest job losses throughout the
    economy. Some COSATU members reportedly clashed with police during the
    strike, and police used tear gas after the crowd reportedly threw
    stones. There were a few illegal strikes that resulted in some worker
    violence, including a strike against a Volkswagen manufacturing
    facility in Eastern Cape in January and an illegal strike of municipal
    workers in Johannesburg in July (see Section 1.c.).
        There were incidents of intimidation and threats of violence by
    striking workers against nonstriking and replacement workers. In
    December during a legal strike of security guards, strikers used
    intimidation and violence against nonstriking and replacement guards
    and also journalists covering the strike. Nonstriking security guards
    were harassed and beaten by groups of strikers while taking public
    transportation. Two guards were shot to death in Cape Town in what
    police believe was a strikerelated attack (see Section 1.a.).
        The Government does not restrict union affiliation with regional or
    international labor organizations. COSATU, FEDUSA, and NACTU are
    affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
    (ICFTU).
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law defines
    and protects the rights to organize and bargain collectively. The
    Government does not interfere with union organizing and generally has
    not interfered in the collective bargaining process. The LRA
    statutorily provides for ``organizational rights,'' such as trade union
    access to work sites, deductions for trade union dues, and leave for
    trade union officials, which strengthens the ability of trade unions to
    organize workers.
        Union participation as an equal partner with business and
    government in the National Economic Development and Labor Council, a
    tripartite negotiating forum, ensures a direct voice for labor in the
    formulation of economic, social, and labor policy.
        The LRA allows for the establishment of workplace forums that are
    intended to promote broad-based consultation between management and
    labor over issues such as work organization, corporate downsizing, and
    changes in production processes. The forums, in order to receive
    statutory protection, can be established by trade unions only in
    businesses with more than 100 employees. Although trade unions in a few
    factories have established workplace forums, the intent of the law is
    to build wide support within the trade union movement and business for
    such cooperative workplace relationships.
        Although 1994 labor laws protected farm workers, the
    COSATUaffiliated South African Agricultural, Plantation and Allied
    Workers'' Union (SAAPAWU), and the NACTU-affiliated National Union of
    Farmworkers have encountered difficulties trying to organize farm
    workers, because union organizers are considered trespassers on private
    property. There were many incidents of physical abuse of farm workers,
    non-payment of wages, and other forms of arbitrary treatment (see
    Section 1.a.). During the year, the Department of Labor conducted a
    survey on the prevailing conditions in the agricultural sector, which
    was ongoing at year's end.
        To further reduce the adversarial nature of labor relations, the
    LRA also created a Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and
    Arbitration (CCMA). Since its inception in 1996, the CCMA has resolved
    successfully many disputes referred to it and remains critical to the
    emergence of a less confrontational business climate. The CCMA also
    gradually is beginning to play an interventionist role by becoming
    involved in disputes before they deteriorate into full-fledged strikes
    or lockouts. A labor court and a labor appeals court are other
    important creations of the LRA. The labor court has jurisdiction to
    resolve disputes that the CCMA is unable to mediate to the satisfaction
    of both parties. Notwithstanding the existence of the CCMA and
    specialist courts for labor disputes, the aim of industrial relations
    is to minimize the need for judicial intervention in labor relations,
    leaving it to the contending parties to resolve disputes whenever
    possible.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor by
    adults is illegal under the Constitution; however, there were reports
    that smugglers used the country as a transit and destination point for
    trafficking in persons for the purposes of forced prostitution and
    forced labor (see Section 6.f.). The Constitution prohibits forced
    child labor; however, there were reports that children were trafficked,
    forced into prostitution, or exploited by their parents to earn money
    for their families (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). A 1999 survey conducted
    by Statistics South Africa reported that up to 2,000 children work to
    pay off outstanding debts to employers or obligations to their
    landlords (see Section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 makes it a
    criminal offense to employ a child under 15 years of age. It is a
    criminal offense to employ a child between 15 and 18 years of age if
    such employment ``places at risk the child's well-being, education,
    physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral or social development.''
    This policy is enforced effectively in the formal nonagricultural
    sector and less effectively in other sectors by Department of Labor
    inspectors, who are required to ensure that all of their inspections
    address child labor problems. The inspectors attempt to resolve any
    problems by counseling employers, child workers, and parents, and by
    cooperating with the Departments of Welfare and Education. Criminal
    prosecution is reserved for ``extreme circumstances,'' and there have
    been no prosecutions to date.
        Many children, especially in the rural areas of the former
    ``homelands'' where electricity and running water are rare, are
    expected to help with household chores and school maintenance.
    According to a survey conducted by Statistics South Africa in 1999, 45
    percent of children between ages 5 and 17 worked for 1 hour or more per
    week in an economic activity, 5 hours or more per week in school labor,
    or 7 hours or more in household chores. The most common economic
    activity in which children participated was gathering wood and water
    for domestic use, which occupied 4.5 million of the 13.4 million
    children between the ages of 5 to 17 years for 1 hour or more per week.
    Of the 2 million children who spent at least 1 hour per week in
    activities for pay, profit, or family economic gain, 59 percent were
    involved in agriculture and 33 percent in trade. A survey noted that of
    the 13.4 million children between the ages of 5 and 17, 17.8 percent
    were engaged in subsistence farming, 5.3 percent in services, 0.4
    percent in manufacturing, 0.1 percent in transport, 0.1 percent in
    informal finance, and 0.05 percent in construction and mining.
        Child laborers from Zimbabwe and Mozambique work in the country on
    commercial farms, for the taxi industry, or as domestic servants.
        Child prostitution is a growing problem in metropolitan areas (see
    Section 5). NGO's estimate that there are 10,000 children working as
    prostitutes in Johannesburg and at least 1,000 in Cape Town. Along
    trucking routes child prostitutes are sought after because of the
    belief that they are more likely to be disease-free or that, if they
    are virgins, sex with them cures diseases such as HIV/AIDS (see Section
    5). The Government previously had established a task force to develop a
    plan of action to combat the sexual exploitation of children, and has
    created training courses for the police force and the judiciary
    regarding the problem.
        The Government has stated that it is committed to abolishing child
    labor through new legislation and improving the enforcement of current
    child labor laws. In 1998 the Department of Labor established a Child
    Labor Inter-sectoral Group (CLIG) composed of representatives of trade
    unions, employers' organizations, NGO's, and officials of the
    Departments of Labor, Welfare, and Education. The CLIG debates policy
    options and ensures coordination of initiatives between these different
    groups.
        Following the Government's ratification of International Labor
    Organization Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor in June,
    the Department of Labor began provincial consultations in order to
    develop and complete a comprehensive program of action to implement the
    convention.
        The Constitution prohibits children under the age of 18 from
    participating in armed conflict. The minimum age for military
    recruitment is 17 years.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is illegal under the
    Constitution; however, there were reports that children were
    trafficked, forced into prostitution, and that some children work in
    conditions that amount to bondage (see Sections 5, 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legally mandated
    national minimum wage. Unionized workers in the formal sector of the
    economy set wage rates on an industry-by-industry basis through annual
    negotiations with employer organizations. Such wages generally are
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. In those sectors in which workers are not organized
    sufficiently to engage in the collective bargaining process, the Basic
    Conditions of Employment Act, which went into effect in 1998, gives the
    Minister of Labor the authority to set wages, including, for the first
    time, for farm laborers and domestic workers. However, income
    disparities between skilled and unskilled workers and the income
    distribution gap between rural and urban workers mean that many workers
    are unable to provide a decent standard of living for themselves and
    their families.
        The Basic Conditions of Employment Act standardizes time-and-a-half
    pay for overtime, establishes a 45-hour workweek, and authorizes 4
    months of maternity leave for women. A ministerial determination
    exempted businesses employing fewer than 10 persons from certain
    provisions of the act concerning overtime and leave.
        Occupational health and safety issues are a top priority of trade
    unions, especially in the mining and heavy manufacturing industries.
    Although attention to these issues has increased significantly,
    including passage in 1993 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act,
    the country's industrial and mining processes are dangerous and
    sometimes deadly. Government attempts to reduce mining fatalities
    culminated in the 1996 Mine Health and Safety Act, which went into
    effect in January 1997. The act provides for the right of mine
    employees to remove themselves from work deemed dangerous to health or
    safety. Moreover, it establishes a tripartite mine health and safety
    council and an inspectorate of mine health and safety, which is tasked
    with enforcing the act and monitoring compliance with its provisions.
    The act specifically makes it an offense for a company to discriminate
    against an employee who asserts a right granted by the act (for
    example, to leave a hazardous work site) and requires mine owners to
    file annual reports that provide statistics on health and safety
    incidents for each mine being worked.
        There are no laws or regulations in other industries that permit
    workers to remove themselves from work situations deemed dangerous to
    their health or safety without risking loss of employment; however, the
    Protected Disclosures Act protects employees from retaliation who, with
    ``reasonable belief that the health or safety of an individual has
    been, is being, or is likely to be endangered,'' disclose dangerous
    workplace conditions to the appropriate authorities.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Alien Control Act prohibits
    trafficking in persons; however, the country is a transit and
    destination point for the trafficking of persons from Mozambique,
    Zimbabwe, Thailand, and other countries for forced prostitution and
    forced labor. Women and children reportedly are lured into the country
    by international organized crime syndicates with the promise of jobs
    and decent wages, and then forced to work as prostitutes, in some cases
    to pay off debts to those who smuggled them into the country. Women
    from Thailand, China, and Russia were trafficked into the country for
    prostitution by Chinese and South African organized crime syndicates.
    While many of these women come willingly, some claim that they were
    tricked into coming, or that they were forced to continue working as
    prostitutes until they had paid off the cost of their transport.
        The country is also a transit point for trafficking operations
    between developing countries and Europe, the United States, and Canada.
    Migrants from foreign countries, particularly China, India, the Middle
    East, Eastern European countries, and other African countries, are
    lured to the country with accounts of money and jobs in the West. Once
    in the country they are provided with documentation and accommodation
    before being moved on to final destinations, where they are forced into
    prostitution, drug dealing, or other criminal activity, or forced to
    work in factories as virtual slaves until they pay off the debt of
    their travel expenses. Traffickers apparently have identified the
    country as one in which temporary entry permission often is granted,
    fraudulent documents are easy to obtain, and direct flight and shipping
    routes are available to most countries in the developed world.
        The Government made efforts to address the trafficking problem with
    investigations and arrests by the police. These efforts are hampered by
    police corruption, lack of training, and understaffing. In February
    police discovered prostitutes from Thailand, Bulgaria, Russia, the
    Czech Republic, Romania, and Zambia at a brothel near Johannesburg, and
    arrested the owner. Some of the women were returned to their home
    countries, and the case against the owner was ongoing at year's end.
    The courts generally deal with trafficking through deportations and
    fines, rather than exacting criminal penalties.
                                   __________

                                     SUDAN

        The 1989 military coup that overthrew Sudan's democratically
    elected government brought to power Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Al-
    Bashir and his National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC).
    Bashir and the RCC suspended the 1985 Constitution, abrogated press
    freedom, and disbanded all political parties and trade unions. In 1993
    the RCC dissolved itself and appointed Bashir President. Presidential
    and parliamentary elections were held in December. All major opposition
    parties boycotted the elections, and there were allegations of official
    interference and electoral fraud. Bashir was elected to another 5-year
    term, and the National Congress/National Islamic Front (NC/NIF) won 340
    out of 360 seats in Parliament in the deeply flawed process. Despite
    the adoption of a new Constitution through a referendum in June 1998,
    the Government continued to restrict most civil liberties. Since 1989
    real power has rested with the NIF, founded by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi,
    who became Speaker of the National Assembly in 1996. In November 1998,
    the NIF renamed itself the National Congress (NC); NIF/NC members and
    supporters continue to hold key positions in the Government, security
    forces, judiciary, academic institutions, and the media. In December
    1999, Bashir declared a 3-month state of emergency, dismissed Turabi,
    and disbanded Parliament 2 days before it was to vote on a bill
    introduced by pro-Turabi legislators to reduce Bashir's presidential
    powers. On March 12, the state of emergency, which suspends basic civil
    liberties including freedom of expression and association, was extended
    until the end of the year, and in late December it was extended for
    another year. In May Bashir expelled Turabi from the NC, which prompted
    Turabi to create a new political party, the Popular National Congress
    Party (PNCP). The judiciary is subject to government influence.
        The civil war, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of
    2 million persons, continued into its 18th year. The principal
    insurgent faction is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the
    political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA
    remains the principal military force in the insurgency. In April 1997,
    the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, which broke away from the
    SPLA in 1991, and several smaller southern factions concluded a peace
    agreement with the Government. However, the SPLM/SPLA and most
    independent analysts regard the 1997 agreement as a tactical government
    effort to enlist southerners on the Government's side. The 1997
    agreement remains largely unimplemented, and there was significant
    fighting between pro-government and antigovernment elements who had
    signed the 1997 agreement during the year. In December 1999, Rieck
    Machar, a Southern leader who had signed the agreement, broke away from
    the Government and in January formed a new rebel movement, the Sudan
    People's Democratic Front (SPDF). The SPLM/SPLA and its northern allies
    in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) carried out military
    offensives in limited areas along the borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea
    and in large parts of the south during the year. As in 1999, neither
    side appears to have the ability to win the war militarily; although
    oil revenues allowed the Government to invest increasingly in military
    hardware. There was no significant progress toward peace during the
    year. Government and SPLM/SPLA delegations met with mediators from the
    Kenyabased Peace Secretariat four times during the year and
    participated in Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)-
    mediated peace talks. The Bahr El Ghazal humanitarian cease-fire, which
    began in July 1998, was extended by both the Government and the SPLM
    several times in 1999, and in August 1999, the Government offered a
    comprehensive ceasefire, which in October 1999 it extended through
    January 15. However, the Government continued its bombing campaign
    during this period. The SPLM similarly extended its cease-fire through
    the same dates, but effectively limited its offer to the humanitarian
    cease-fire as agreed to in Bahr El Ghazal. In June the SPLA launched an
    offensive in Bahr El Ghazal and fighting between the Government and the
    SPLM resumed, marking the end of the humanitarian cease-fire.
        In addition to the regular police and the Sudan People's Armed
    Forces, the Government maintains an external security force, an
    internal security force, a militia known as the Popular Defense Forces
    (PDF), and a number of police forces, including the Public Order Police
    (POP), whose mission includes enforcing proper social behavior,
    including restrictions on alcohol and ``immodest dress.'' The Popular
    Police Force, which was made up of nominees from neighborhood popular
    committees for surveillance and services, was disbanded during the
    year. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human
    rights abuses.
        Civil war, economic mismanagement, over 4 million internally
    displaced persons (IDP's) in a country of an estimated 27.5 million
    persons, and, to a lesser extent, the refugee influx from neighboring
    countries have devastated the country's mostly agricultural economy.
    Approximately 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture.
    Exports of gum Arabic, livestock, and meat accounted for more than 50
    percent of export earnings. Private investment in the oil sector led to
    significant increases in oil production during the year. Reforms
    beginning in the early 1990's aimed at privatizing state-run firms and
    stimulating private investment failed to revive a moribund economy that
    maintains massive military expenditures and a large foreign debt of
    approximately $21.5 billion. Per capita national income is estimated at
    $900 per year.
        The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor, and
    although there were some improvements in a few areas, it continued to
    commit numerous, serious abuses. Citizens do not have the ability to
    change their government peacefully. Government security forces were
    responsible for extrajudicial killings, and there were reports of
    Government responsibility for disappearances. Government security
    forces regularly beat, harassed, arbitrarily arrested and detained, and
    detained incommunicado opponents or suspected opponents of the
    Government with impunity, and there were a few reports of torture.
    Security forces beat refugees, reportedly raped women abducted during
    raids, and reportedly on occasion harassed and detained persons on the
    basis of their religion. Prison conditions remained harsh and life-
    threatening, prolonged detention is a problem, and the judiciary
    continued to be subservient to the Government. The authorities do not
    ensure due process, and the military forces summarily tried and
    punished citizens. The Government continues to infringe on citizens''
    privacy rights. The Government still does not fully apply the laws of
    war to the southern insurgency, has taken few prisoners of war (POW's),
    and does not cooperate with the International Committee of the Red
    Cross (ICRC) regarding POW's. Cooperation with U.N.-sponsored relief
    operations was poor. In 1999 the Government for the first time allowed
    U.N. teams to perform humanitarian assessments in the Nuba Mountains on
    two occasions, and in July the Government permitted an initial U.N.
    flight into the Nuba Mountains. Government forces continued to obstruct
    the flow of humanitarian assistance. Problems with relief flights in
    the south centered on the Government's frequent denials of aircraft
    clearances to the U.N.'s Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), particularly
    for Western Upper Nile.
        Restrictions on press freedom continued as the Government
    repeatedly suspended publications that criticized or disagreed with the
    government line, and detained journalists. Moreover, all journalists
    continued to practice self-censorship. The Government continued to
    restrict severely freedom of assembly, association, religion, and
    movement. In the context of the Islamization and Arabization drive,
    government pressure including forced Islamization--on non-Muslims
    remained strong. Fears of Arabization and Islamization and the
    imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) fueled support for the civil war
    throughout the country. Violence and discrimination against women and
    abuse of children remained problems. Prostitution is a growing problem,
    and female genital mutilation (FGM) is widespread. Discrimination and
    violence against religious minorities persisted, as did discrimination
    against ethnic minorities and government restrictions on worker rights.
    Child labor is widespread. Slavery and trafficking in persons remained
    problems. Government security forces were responsible for forced labor
    (including forced child labor), slavery, and the forced conscription of
    children.
        Insurgent groups continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The
    SPLM/SPLA continued to violate citizens'' rights, despite its claim
    that it was implementing a 1994 decision to assert civil authority in
    areas that it controls, and in many cases, has controlled for many
    years. The SPLM/SPLA was responsible for extrajudicial killings,
    beatings, rape, arbitrary detention, and forced conscription. SPLM/SPLA
    officials were guilty of, or complicit in, theft of property of
    nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and U.N. agencies operating in
    the south. The ICRC reported in 1996 that the SPLA had begun to observe
    some basic laws of war; it takes prisoners on the battlefield and
    permits ICRC visits to some of them. However, the SPLA has not allowed
    the ICRC to visit prisoners accused by the insurgent group of treason
    or other crimes.

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were reports
    of extrajudicial killings. In their attacks on insurgent forces,
    government troops killed a large number of civilians (see Section
    1.g.). For example, at the beginning of November during an NDA attack
    on Kassala, 52 civilians and soldiers were killed during fighting
    between government and NDA troops (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). The
    Government suspended NGO operations in the area until the hostilities
    ended several days later. Government forces and allied militia pursued
    a scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around the
    newly built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities, which
    reportedly resulted in some deaths (see Section 1.g.). On numerous
    occasions, the Government bombed civilian facilities resulting in a
    number of civilian deaths, including children (see Section 1.g.).
    Explosions by government-laid landmines resulted in some deaths (see
    Section 1.g.). There were reports that during raids and attacks on
    civilian settlements, government forces killed a number of persons, and
    there were reports that persons abducted during those raids at times
    were killed (see Sections 1.b. and 6.c.). In early June in Gumriak, an
    attack by government air and ground forces in the vicinity of a
    Catholic mission reportedly resulted in the deaths of 32 persons,
    including women and children.
        In February the Government's PDF allegedly attacked several
    villages in eastern Aweil and Twic counties, northern Bahr El Ghazal,
    killed 16 civilians, abducted over 300 women and children, stole
    cattle, and looted and burned villages. In November there were
    unconfirmed reports that the PDF attacked the village of Guong Nowh,
    killed several persons, abducted 24 persons, and stole cattle.
        In September security forces in several cities in the north used
    tear gas and live ammunition to forcibly disperse some demonstrations;
    several persons were killed, and a number of persons were injured
    severely (see Section 2.b.).
        There was no action taken in the 1999 case of Abdallah Chol, Hassan
    Abu Adhan, and Gladino (Sam) Okieny, who died as a result of torture
    while in the custody of military intelligence personnel.
        University of Khartoum law student Mohamed Abdelsalaam Babeker was
    found dead in 1998 after being arrested by NIF security forces; an
    autopsy indicated that the cause of death was a brain hemorrhage
    allegedly caused by a head wound. A case was filed against an unknown
    person, and the police reportedly conducted an investigation; however,
    they did not release their findings by year's end.
        There was no investigation into the January 1998 reports of
    reprisal killings of Dinka men by government forces.
        Insurgent forces reportedly committed political and other
    extrajudicial killings, particularly in areas of active conflict;
    however, details generally were unavailable. There were reports that in
    July and August in the Western Upper Nile, SPLA forces and SPDF forces
    killed at least 50 civilians and abducted more than 20 women and
    children in intraethnic fighting.
        Rebel forces killed a large number of civilians during their
    attacks on government forces (see Section 1.g.). Insurgent forces laid
    landmines indiscriminately on roads and paths that killed and maimed
    both soldiers and civilians (see Section 1.g.). Prisoners reportedly
    have died while in SPLA custody due to poor prison conditions (see
    Section 1.c.). There are reliable reports that rebel forces that
    captured villages along the border with Ethiopia in 1997 carried lists
    used to identify leading government figures whom they killed summarily.
        In January two relief workers were killed in an attack by
    unidentified assailants. Also in January, rebels believed to be from
    the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacked a humanitarian
    vehicle, killing eight aid workers. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported
    that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member, committed abuses
    against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to another rebel
    group, including summary executions, torture, and detention of
    prisoners in a pit in the ground. SAF denied the allegations.
        Sometime before March 30, 1999, a local Red Crescent worker and
    three government officials who accompanied an ICRC team near the town
    of Kong in the south were killed while in the custody of the SPLA under
    circumstances that remain unclear. The SPLM alleges that the four were
    killed in crossfire during a rescue attempt. The SPLM neither arranged
    for the return of the bodies nor permitted an independent
    investigation, and there was no further action on this case by year's
    end.
        Interethnic and intraethnic tensions continued into the early part
    of the year resulting in numerous deaths. In the first half of the
    year, ongoing fighting between ethnic Dinkas and Didingas in the New
    Cush and Chukudum areas in Eastern Equatoria led to a number of deaths
    (see Section 5). Tensions eased with the departure of some Dinka to Bor
    County in May and June, and a dialog on a lasting resolution to the
    interethnic tensions continued during the year.
        On December 8, supporters of the outlawed Takfeer and Hijra group
    killed 26 persons and injured 40 others at a Sunna mosque in Omdurman
    (see Section 5).
        b. Disappearance.--There were continued allegations that the
    Government was responsible for the arrest and subsequent disappearance
    of persons suspected of supporting rebels in government-controlled
    zones in the south and the Nuba Mountains. Persons arrested by
    government security forces often were held for long periods of time in
    unknown locations without access to lawyers or family members.
        There were reports that during raids on civilian settlements,
    government forces abducted persons, including women and children (see
    Sections 1.g. and 6.c.). In the last 15 years, between 5,000 and 15,000
    Dinka women and children have been abducted; between 10,000 and 12,000
    persons, most of whom are Dinka, remained abducted at year's end.
    Observers believe that some of the abductees were sold into slavery,
    while others were used as forced labor or drafted into the military. In
    some cases, observers believe that the abductees escaped or eventually
    were released or ransomed, and that in other cases some were killed. In
    February the Government's PDF forces allegedly attacked several
    villages in eastern Aweil and Twic counties, northern Bahr El Ghazal,
    abducted over 300 women and children, killed 16 civilians, stole
    cattle, and looted and burned villages. In November there were
    unconfirmed reports that the PDF attacked the village of Guong Nowh,
    abducted 24 persons, killed several persons, and stole cattle.
        HRW reported that Islamic student militias operating under the
    protection of security forces abducted and tortured a number of student
    activists.
        In February a U.N. plane flew three commanders of a progovernment
    militia to another location where they attended a meeting with
    commanders of an anti-government militia; the pilots claim they did not
    know the identity of these passengers. When they returned, the pro-
    government militia detained the two pilots, a U.N. worker, and a
    Sudanese relief worker for 1 week.
        There were reports that in July and August in the Western Upper
    Nile, SPLA and SPDF forces abducted over 20 women and children and
    killed at least 50 civilians during intraethnic fighting.
        Approximately 3,000 Ugandan children have been abducted and forced
    to become soldiers or sex slaves for the LRA, a Ugandan armed
    opposition group in the south, which is actively supported by the
    Government (see Section 5).
        There also were reports of periodic intertribal abductions of women
    and children in the Eastern Upper Nile (see Section 5).
        In 1996 the Government established the Special Commission to
    Investigate Slavery and Disappearances in response to a resolution
    passed by the 1995 U.N. General Assembly. The Commission technically
    still is functioning but has yet to produce a final report. In May
    1998, the Government formed the Committee for the Eradication of the
    Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWAC). The Committee and UNICEF
    jointly sponsored a workshop on abductions in July 1999, during which
    the committee recognized abduction as a problem that the Government
    could and should address. The committee formed mechanisms to identify
    and return abductees. Several high-ranking Government officials
    participated in the activities of the committee. These mechanisms
    resulted in the identification and release of approximately 300
    individuals who were returned to their homes during the year. An
    additional 1,200 have been identified; however, the Government's
    refusal to allow flights into SPLA territory prevented their return. In
    addition the Government did not record the identity of the abductors in
    these cases and chose not to prosecute the abductors.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The 1999 Constitution prohibits torture; however,
    government security forces continued to beat and harass suspected
    opponents and others. In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
    described torture as a fairly extensive problem; however, during the
    year, reports of torture were infrequent. Members of the security
    forces rarely, if ever, are held accountable for such abuses.
        Security forces beat and otherwise abused youths and student
    leaders and others whom were deemed to be opponents of the Government.
        There continued to be reports that security forces used ``ghost
    houses,'' places where security forces tortured and detained government
    opponents incommunicado under harsh conditions for an indeterminate
    time with no supervision by the courts or other independent authorities
    with power to release the detainees; however, reports of the use of
    ``ghost houses'' ceased during the latter half of the year.
        There continued to be reports that security forces harassed and at
    times used threats and violence against persons on the basis of their
    religious beliefs and activities (see Section 2.c.). For example, in
    June police in Hilla Kuku beat a Catholic seminarian on the neck and
    wrist with a stick after he refused to remove a wooden cross that he
    was wearing (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        Security forces used excessive force, including beatings, tear gas,
    and firing of live ammunition to disperse unapproved demonstrations
    (see Section 2.b.). For example, in February security forces detained
    and beat two students for political activity (see Section 1.d.).
    Several times in September police used tear gas, batons, and live
    ammunition to disperse demonstrators and in some instances, beat or
    otherwise injured numerous individuals (see Section 2.b.). In May
    security forces raided Alnasr Technology College twice; they arrested,
    beat, and injured students, and fired bullets in the air to disperse a
    student protest on education issues. Security and police forces used
    sticks and tear gas in an attack on Juba University in Khartoum in
    June, arresting and detaining over 120 students. Refugees also were
    subjected to beatings and mistreatment (see Section 2.d.). HRW reported
    that Islamic student militias operating under the protection of
    security forces abducted and tortured a number of student activists.
        Government forces were responsible for injuring many civilians
    during attacks on insurgent forces, during raids on civilian
    settlements, and while bombing civilian targets (see Section 1.g.).
    There were reports that persons abducted during those raids were
    subjected to torture and rape (see Section 6.c.). In November during an
    NDA attack on government forces in Kassala, government soldiers
    detained and severely beat a foreign International Red Cross worker
    (see Sections 1.d. and 1.g.). He was held incommunicado for two days
    and then released. Explosions of government-laid landmines resulted in
    a number of injuries (see Section 1.g.). Soldiers were responsible for
    raping women (see Section 1.g.).
        In accordance with Shari'a (Islamic) law, the Criminal Act provides
    for physical punishments including flogging, amputation, stonings, and
    crucifixion--the public display of a body after execution. In a 1999
    case involving ethnic clashes in the Darfur region in the west (see
    Section 5), an emergency court sentenced 10 persons to hanging and
    subsequent crucifixion. These sentences had not been carried out by
    year's end. During the year, there were six reported cases of
    amputations of limbs as punishment under Shari'a law for aggravated
    cases of theft.
        The Government's ``scorched earth'' policy in the area surrounding
    the oil fields in Upper Nile resulted in a number of serious injuries
    (see Section 1.g.).
        There was no investigation into, nor action taken, in the 1999 case
    in which prison officials tortured a convicted bank robber so severely
    while in detention that he was blinded.
        Insurgent forces were responsible for a number of civilian injuries
    and for raping women (see Section 1.g.). Landmines laid
    indiscriminately in years past on roads and paths killed and maimed
    both soldiers and civilians (see Section 1.g.). There are credible
    reports of beatings and other punishment of prisoners by the SPLA
    rebels.
        HRW reported that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member,
    committed abuses against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to
    another rebel group, including torture, summary executions, and the
    detention of prisoners in a pit in the ground. SAF denied these
    allegations.
        There were numerous injuries as a result of religious tensions. For
    example, on December 8, supporters of the outlawed Takfeer and Hijra
    group killed 26 persons and injured 40 others at a Sunna mosque in
    Omdurman (see Section 5).
        Conditions in government prisons remain harsh, overcrowded, and
    life threatening. Built before the country's 1956 independence, most
    prisons are maintained poorly, and many lack basic facilities such as
    toilets or showers. Health care is primitive, and food is inadequate.
    Minors often are held with adults. There was a report in 1999 that 16
    children who were living with their imprisoned mothers died of
    diseases. Female prisoners are housed separately from men; rape in
    prison reportedly is rare. Prison officials arbitrarily denied family
    visits. High-ranking political prisoners reportedly often enjoy better
    conditions than other prisoners do.
        The Government does not permit regular visits to prisons by human
    rights monitors. No independent domestic human rights organizations
    monitor prison conditions.
        Prisoners reportedly have died while in SPLA custody due to poor
    prison conditions. The SPLM allowed the ICRC to visit some POW's during
    the year and released some prisoners due to poor health.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1999 Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention without charge; however, the
    Government continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention in practice.
    Under the Constitution and the criminal code, an individual may be
    detained for 3 days without charge, which can be extended for 30 days
    by order of the Director of Security and another 30 days by the
    Director of Security with the approval of the prosecuting attorney.
    Under the amended National Security Act, which was approved on December
    15 by the Council of Ministers and subsequently made law by
    presidential decree and supercedes the criminal code when an individual
    is accused of violating national security, an individual may be
    detained for 3 months without charge, renewable by the Director of
    Security for another 3 months. During the state of emergency, the
    Government is not constrained by the National Security Act and can
    detain individuals indefinitely without judicial review, which
    reportedly it has done. During the year, the Government used the state
    of emergency to detain over 100 individuals.
        The law allows for bail, except for those accused of crimes
    punishable by death or life imprisonment. In theory the Government
    provides legal counsel for indigent persons in such cases; however,
    reports continue that defendants do not always receive this right, and
    that counsel in some cases only may advise the defendant and may not
    address the court. In some cases, courts have refused to allow certain
    lawyers to represent defendants.
        Authorities continued to detain political opponents of the
    Government during the year. The NGO Sudanese Human Rights Group (SHRG)
    reported several cases of this, including: A political activist who was
    detained in Atbara for several days in January; two students who were
    detained and beaten because of political activities in February; a
    lawyer and leading member of the National Democratic Alliance to
    Restore Democracy (NARD) who was arrested and detained in March; Dr.
    Tobi Madot, Chairperson of the Democratic Forces Front (JAD) who was
    detained in March; four students at the University of Sudan who were
    detained for 4 days in April for union activities (see Section 6.a.);
    Sid Ahmed Al-Hussein, deputy secretary-general of the Democratic
    Unionist Party (DUP), who was detained on several occasions in April;
    six members of the Communist Party who were detained in May; five
    students in Omdurman who were detained in June; leading members of the
    DUP and UMMA parties who were arrested and detained in June in Sennar
    City; a lawyer who was arrested for political activities in August in
    Khartoum; and a leading DUP member was arrested in September in
    Khartoum. Over 150 members of Hassan al-Turabi's PNCP were detained
    after allegedly participating in demonstrations against the Government
    in September and October. In general the Government detains persons for
    a few days before releasing them without charge or trial; however,
    detentions of PNCP and NDA members generally were much longer. There
    were unconfirmed reports that security forces tortured, detained
    without charge, and held incommunicado the members of PNCP. Human
    rights activist Ghazi Suleiman also was detained several times during
    the year. In addition to detentions, government security forces
    frequently harassed political opponents by summoning them for
    questioning, forcing them to remain during the day without questioning,
    and then ordering them to return the following day. This process
    sometimes continued for days.
        In December government forces broke up a meeting of NDA
    representatives with a foreign diplomat, detained the diplomat briefly,
    eventually expelled the diplomat from the country, and arrested seven
    NDA representatives. In the following weeks, human rights activist
    Ghazi Suleiman and Ali Mahmoud Hassanein, head of the opposition
    Democratic Unionist Party, opposition lawyers for the NDA, were
    arrested by the Government (see Section 2.b.). After approximately 6
    weeks in detention, the Government charged the NDA representatives with
    treason and sedition. There was no trial by year's end. The lawyers
    were not charged and remained in detention at year's end.
        A number of journalists were arrested and detained during the year
    (see Section 2.a.).
        In May security forces raided Alnasr Technology College twice; they
    arrested, beat, and injured students, and fired bullets in the air to
    disperse the students'' protest on education issues (see Section 2.a.).
    Security and police forces used sticks and tear gas in an attack on
    Juba University in Khartoum in June, arresting and detaining over 120
    students.
        In November during an NDA attack on government forces in Kassala,
    government soldiers detained and severely beat a foreign International
    Red Cross worker (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). He was held
    incommunicado for 2 days and then released.
        Security forces detained persons because of their religious beliefs
    and activities; however, such detentions decreased in the latter half
    of the year (see Section 2.c.). For example, in June police in Hilla
    Kuku detained and beat a Catholic seminarian after he refused to remove
    a wooden cross that he was wearing; he later was released (see Sections
    1.c. and 2.c.). Generally detentions based nominally on religion were
    of limited duration; because the practice of religion is not
    technically illegal, detainees could not be held formally on grounds
    indefinitely. However, the Government resorted to accusing, at times
    falsely, those arrested for religious reasons of other crimes,
    including common crimes and national security crimes, which resulted in
    prolonged detention. In May President Bashir ordered that all women in
    prison for violations of the Public Order Law be released and rescinded
    the prohibition on the brewing of alcohol; 563 women were released (see
    Section 2.c.). Despite the fact it is legal to brew alcohol, police
    continued to arrest southern women, and reportedly the police demand
    bribes in exchange for releasing the women.
        In December the Government arrested and detained 65 leading members
    of the Takfeer and Hijra group following an attack on a rival group's
    worshippers; most of the individuals remained in detention and had not
    been tried as of year's end (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
        In September security forces detained numerous persons while
    forcibly dispersing demonstrations in several cities in the north (see
    Section 2.b.). In September security forces also briefly detained 25
    women who participated in a National Democratic Women's Association
    demonstration against the governor of Khartoum's decree prohibiting
    women from working in hotels, restaurants, and gas stations (see
    Sections 2.b. and 5). In October police arrested and detained four
    students at a rally at the University of Khartoum (see Section 2.b.).
        Persons arrested by government security forces often were held for
    long periods of time in unknown locations without access to lawyers or
    family members.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
    and is largely subservient to the Government. The Chief Justice of the
    Supreme Court, formerly elected by sitting judges, is nominated by a
    Judiciary Committee and appointed by the President. As the senior judge
    in the judicial service, the Chief Justice also controls the judiciary.
    On occasion some courts display a degree of independence. Appeals
    courts on several occasions overturned decisions of lower courts in
    political cases, particularly public order courts.
        The judicial system includes four types of courts: Regular courts,
    both criminal and civil; special mixed security courts; military
    courts; and tribal courts in rural areas to resolve disputes over land
    and water rights and family matters. In November 1998, Parliament
    passed a bill to form a constitutional court, which was implemented in
    December 1998. The President appointed the court's seven members at the
    end of 1998. Within the regular court system there are civil and
    criminal courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court. Public order
    courts, which heard only minor public order issues, were suspended, and
    public order cases were heard in criminal courts.
        The 1999 Constitution provides for fair and prompt trials; however,
    it has not resulted in changes in practice. The 1991 Criminal Act
    governs criminal cases, and the 1983 Civil Transactions Act applies in
    most civil cases. Military trials, which sometimes are secret and
    brief, do not provide procedural safeguards, sometimes have taken place
    with no advocate or counsel permitted, and do not provide an effective
    appeal from a death sentence. Other than for clemency, witnesses may be
    permitted to appear at military trials.
        Trials in regular courts nominally meet international standards of
    legal protections. For example, the accused normally have the right to
    counsel, and the courts are required to provide free legal counsel for
    indigent defendants accused of crimes punishable by death or life
    imprisonment. However, in practice these legal protections are applied
    unevenly. Persons arrested by government security forces often were
    held for long periods of time in unknown locations without access to
    their lawyers or family members.
        In 1989 the Special Courts Act created special three-person
    security courts to deal with a wide range of offenses, including
    violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, some
    sections of the Penal Code, as well as drug and currency offenses.
    Special courts, on which both military and civilian judges sit, handle
    most security-related cases. Attorneys may advise defendants as
    ``friends of the court'' but normally may not address the court.
    Lawyers complain that they sometimes are granted access to court
    documents too late to prepare an effective defense. Sentences usually
    are severe and implemented at once; however, death sentences are
    referred to the Chief Justice and the Head of State. Defendants may
    file appellate briefs with the Chief Justice.
        The Government dissolved the respected Sudanese Bar Association in
    1989 and reinstated it with an NIF-controlled leadership in 1997. In
    1997 elections for the leadership of the Bar Association, an NIF-
    associated group won overwhelmingly amid accusations of blatant fraud.
    Lawyers who wish to practice must maintain membership in the Bar
    Association. The Government continued to harass and detain members of
    the legal profession whom it views as political opponents.
        The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose
    population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the Criminal Act;
    however, the act permits the possible future application of Shari'a law
    in the south, if the State assemblies so decide. No reports cited
    court-ordered Hudood punishments, other than lashings, in government-
    controlled areas of the south. Fear of the imposition of Shari'a law
    remained a key problem in the rebellion.
        Parts of the south and the Nuba Mountains fell outside effective
    judicial procedures and other governmental functions. According to
    credible reports, government units summarily tried and punished those
    accused of crimes, especially for offenses against civil order.
        Magistrates in SPLM/SPLA-held areas follow a penal code roughly
    based on the 1925 Penal Code. In rural areas outside effective SPLM
    control, tribal chiefs apply customary laws. In 1996 the SPLM
    proclaimed a civilian structure to eliminate the conduct of secret and
    essentially political trials such as those conducted by military
    commanders in previous years. The SPLM has a judicial system of county
    magistrates, county judges, regional judges, and a court of appeals.
    While officials have been appointed for most of these positions, the
    court system did not function in many areas due to lack of
    infrastructure, communications, funding, and an effective police force.
    Some cases were heard at the magistrate and county levels. The SPLM
    recognizes traditional courts or ``Courts of Elders,'' which usually
    hear matters of personal affairs such as marriages and dowries, and
    base their decisions on traditional and customary law. Local chiefs
    usually preside over traditional courts. Traditional courts are
    particularly active in Bahr El Ghazal. The SPLM process of conducting a
    needs assessment for the courts continued during the year.
        There are political prisoners in the country, although the
    Government maintains that it holds none. The Government usually charges
    political prisoners with a crime, allowing the Government to deny their
    status as political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The 1999 Constitution provides for the inviolability
    of communication and privacy; however, the Government routinely
    interferes with its citizens'' privacy. Security forces frequently
    conducted night searches without warrants, and they targeted persons
    suspected of political crimes. During demonstrations in September (see
    Section 2.b.), riot police reportedly broke into private homes to
    search for demonstrators. Some residents of Khartoum filed lawsuits
    against the riot police for violating their privacy and damaging
    property in the aftermath of September 1999 riots; the suits eventually
    were dismissed as lacking jurisdiction. In the north, security forces
    also targeted persons suspected of making alcoholic beverages, which
    are illegal.
        Security personnel routinely opened and read mail and monitored
    telephones. The Government continued to restrict the ownership of
    satellite dishes by private citizens through use of its licensing
    requirement.
        A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim, but a Muslim woman cannot
    marry a non-Muslim, unless he converts to Islam (see Section 5);
    however, this prohibition is not observed or enforced universally,
    particularly in the south and among Nubans. NonMuslims may adopt only
    non-Muslim children; no such restrictions apply to Muslim parents.
        Various government bodies have decreed on different occasions that
    women must dress according to modest Islamic standards (see Sections
    2.c. and 5). Enforcement of female dress standards by the Public Order
    Police continues, but was reduced greatly during the year. There were
    no reports of corporal punishment to enforce public order during the
    year; enforcement generally took the form of verbal admonishment by
    security forces.
        Non-Muslim prison inmates were pressured to convert to Islam, as
    were PDF trainees, children in government-controlled camps for vagrant
    minors, and persons in government-controlled peace camps (see Sections
    1.g. and 2.c.).
        Government forces pursued a scorched earth policy aimed at removing
    populations from around the newly built oil pipeline and other oil
    production facilities, which resulted in deaths and serious injuries
    (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government continued to raze some squatter dwellings; however,
    the practice decreased greatly during the year.
        A wide network of government informants conducted pervasive
    surveillance in schools, universities, markets, workplaces, and
    neighborhoods. However, government-instituted neighborhood ``popular
    committees''--ostensibly a mechanism for political mobilization--which
    served as a means for monitoring households'' activities were
    disbanded.
        The Government continued to dismiss military personnel summarily as
    well as civilian government employees whose loyalty it considered
    suspect. The government committee set up in 1995 to review cases of
    persons summarily dismissed since the 1989 coup continued to function
    in theory; however, it has released no results since May 1996.
        Government armed forces burned and looted villages and stole cattle
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
        The Government continued to conscript citizens forcibly, including
    high school age children (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        As a result of the prolonged war, approximately 4 million persons
    are displaced internally (see Section 2.d.).
        The insurgent SPLM/SPLA generally is not known to interfere with
    privacy, family, home, or correspondence in areas that it controls,
    although correspondence is difficult in war zones; however, rebel
    factions continued to conscript citizens forcibly including high school
    age children (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited
    Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Since the civil war resumed in 1983, an estimated
    2 million persons have been killed, and 4 million displaced internally
    as a result of fighting between the Government and insurgents in the
    south, interethnic fighting, and famine. The civil war continued
    despite limited cease-fires, and all sides involved in the fighting
    were responsible for violations of humanitarian norms. At year's end,
    the Government controlled virtually all of the northern two-thirds of
    the country but was limited to garrison towns in the south. In June the
    SPLA launched an offensive in Bahr El Ghazal, fighting resumed between
    the SPLA and government forces, and the humanitarian cease-fire broke
    down. During the year, government bombings continued, often killing or
    injuring innocent civilians and destroying homes, schools, and
    hospitals. Some Government bombing intentionally was directed at
    civilian targets; most bombing was indiscriminate and resulted in
    deaths and injuries or destruction of property. In early February,
    government bombs struck a school in the Nuba Mountains, killing 15
    persons and wounding 17 others. On March 4, a government bombardment of
    the town of Yirol damaged the compound of Irish NGO Concern, killing 2
    persons and wounding 11 others. On March 14, government forces bombed
    the Diocese of Torit hospital, killing one person and injuring seven
    others. In early July in Rumbek, a young girl and a pregnant woman were
    killed and 23 persons were injured when bombs hit an open area between
    the Catholic and Episcopal churches and a market place. On July 15, the
    Government bombed the town of Chelkou and damaged an ICRC airstrip, an
    ICRC plane, and relief station, and injured an ICRC employee. In mid-
    September on two different occasions, government bombs killed 11
    persons in Narus and Ikotos, and the Diocese of Torit Clinic was
    destroyed. On November 21, government forces bombed Yei; 19 persons
    were killed and 45 others were injured. In November government forces
    also bombed the towns of Polit Abur and Ikotos, killing 8 persons and
    seriously injuring 32 others.
        The Government also conducted bombing raids that targeted NGO's and
    often impeded the flow of humanitarian assistance to the south. On
    March 1, the Government bombed a hospital run by the NGO Samaritan's
    Purse in Lui in Western Equatoria. Norwegian People's Aid reported that
    on April 16, government forces dropped bombs near a child feeding
    compound. On July 28, in Akhuem in northern Bahr El Ghazal, several
    bombs landed close to a Doctors Without Borders plane and near its
    health center, prompting the medical team to evacuate the area. On
    August 7, government planes bombed an airstrip in Mapel where an OLS
    plane was parked. On August 9, government aircraft again bombed Mapel
    endangering U.N. personnel and facilities. On October 12, bombs were
    dropped on the towns of Ikotos and Parajok in Eastern Equatoria, which,
    according to relief workers, occurred during a food distribution and
    injured at least seven persons, including four persons seriously. On
    October 23, relief workers reported that 23 bombs were dropped on the
    town of Nimjule in 2 separate attacks during a 12-day cease-fire to
    allow for a U.N. polio vaccination campaign. No one was injured,
    although a nursery and several houses were destroyed.
        The Government and government-allied militia carried out raids and
    attacks on civilian settlements particularly in Bahr El Ghazal. These
    raids were accompanied by killings, abductions, rapes, the burning and
    looting of villages, the theft of cattle, and significant displacement
    of civilian populations. However, the Government pledged to end this
    practice, and there were fewer reports of such raids during the year
    (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 6.c.).
        The Government and government-associated forces have implemented a
    scorched earth policy along parts of the oil pipeline and around some
    key oil facilities. These forces have injured persons seriously,
    destroyed villages, and driven out inhabitants in order to create an
    uninhabited security zone.
        Victims of government bombings, and of the civil war in general,
    often flee to government-controlled peace camps. Some NGO's reported
    that persons in the peace camps were subject to forced labor and at
    times pressured to convert to Islam (see Section 2.c.).
        Government forces routinely kill rebel soldiers captured in battle.
    Only a small group of prisoners captured before the 1989 coup and a few
    soldiers taken in the east in 1998 and during the year reportedly are
    held as POW's in governmentcontrolled areas. The Government does not
    concede that it holds POW's. It has not responded to ICRC inquiries
    about POW's and has refused the ICRC access to POW's.
        Government forces in the south raped women and forcibly conscripted
    men and boys (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Government forces routinely
    displaced, killed, and injured civilians, and destroyed clinics and
    dwellings intentionally during their offensive operations. At the
    beginning of November, during an NDA attack on Kassala, 52 civilians
    and soldiers were killed during fighting between government and NDA
    troops.
        In addition to bombings that have made humanitarian assistance
    difficult, the Government routinely has denied flight clearances. The
    Government banned all relief flights to Western Upper Nile and Eastern
    Equatoria during the year. In July the Government informed OLS that it
    would require 7 days notice for all relief flights (previously 48 hours
    notice was required), thus reducing OLS's flexibility. Until 1999 the
    Government had not permitted U.N. humanitarian assistance to Blue Nile.
    In June 1999 and September 1999, U.N. teams conducted humanitarian
    assessment visits to rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains, and in
    October 1999, the U.N. conducted a humanitarian assessment in
    government-held areas of the Nuba Mountains. During the year, the
    Government on two occasions permitted polio eradication teams to visit
    the Nuba Mountains but denied access for other humanitarian assistance.
        During a March 1999 visit by the U.N. Special Representative for
    Children and Armed Conflict, both the Government and SPLM/SPLA agreed
    to stop using anti-personnel mines. However, in the early part of the
    year, a government militia raided a relief center at Mading and placed
    landmines in an NGO compound forcing the permanent evacuation of the
    center. Reportedly the SPLA continued to lay landmines in Eastern
    Equatoria for defense purposes. Injuries continued to occur during the
    year from landmines previously laid by the Government to protect
    garrison towns and from landmines laid by the SPLA and its allies
    during the course of the war.
        Northern Muslim opposition groups under the 1995 NDA umbrella
    structure, which includes the SPLA, took military action against the
    Government. The NDA attacked government garrisons, the oil pipeline,
    and strategic points near the Ethiopian and Eritrean borders.
        There were reports that in July and August in the Western Upper
    Nile region rebel SPLA and SPDF forces killed at least 50 civilians and
    abducted over 20 women and children in intraethnic fighting (see
    Section 5). In Kerial and Koch, soldiers burned huts and looted food
    and other household goods, and several chiefs reported that their
    villagers were forced to relocate.
        The SPLA has taken a number of prisoners over the years. The SPLA
    often cooperates with ICRC and allows regular visits to prisoners. The
    SPLA released a limited number of POW's for health reasons during the
    year. Prisoners reportedly have died while in SPLA custody due to
    extremely poor prison conditions.
        There are credible reports of SPLA taxation and occasional
    diversion of relief supplies. The SPLM leadership repeatedly has
    committed itself to eliminating these problems; however, in practice it
    appears unable to impose consistently those commitments on its
    representatives in the field. There were reports that the Sudan Relief
    and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) diverted humanitarian food to the
    SPLA.
        Insurgent forces in the south forcibly conscripted men and boys and
    reportedly raped women (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.). Insurgent forces
    also routinely displaced, killed, and injured civilians, and destroyed
    clinics and dwellings intentionally.
        In March the SPLM/SPLA expelled 11 NGO's, which handled 75 percent
    of NGO-provided humanitarian aid entering the south, for refusing to
    sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on NGO activities that had
    been under negotiation for several years. Several other NGO's that
    refused to sign left the area before the deadline. All but a few of the
    NGO's that were expelled or left before the deadline returned to the
    southern part of the country and later in the year signed the MOU (see
    Section 2.b.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1999 Constitution provides for
    freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of the press ``as
    regulated by law;'' however, the Government severely restricts freedom
    of speech and of the press. Government detentions of journalists,
    intimidation, surveillance, and suspensions of newspapers continued to
    inhibit open, public discussion of political issues. Journalists
    practice self-censorship.
        As a result of a limited easing of press restrictions that the
    Government began in 1997, some lively discussions of domestic and
    foreign policy were published in the press. Nonetheless, the Government
    still exercised control of news reporting, particularly of political
    topics, the war, and criticism of the Government, through the National
    Press Council and security forces. The National Press Council applies
    the Press law and is directly responsible to the President. It is
    charged with licensing newspapers, setting press policy, and responding
    to complaints. In the event of a complaint, it can give a newspaper a
    warning or suspend it for up to 15 days. It also can suspend a
    newspaper indefinitely and suspend journalists for up to 2 weeks. The
    National Press Council consists of 21 members: 7 selected by the
    President; 5 from the National Assembly; 7 directly elected by
    journalists from the Journalists'' Union; and 2 selected by the
    Journalists'' Union leadership. In February President Bashir fired five
    members of the National Press Council because they had been selected by
    the dissolved National Assembly (see Section 3). Observers believe the
    Journalist's Union is government-controlled. The National Press Council
    was active in suspending journalists and newspapers during the year.
        The Government restricted freedom of the press through detention of
    journalists and editors (see Section 1.d.), the confiscation of already
    printed editions, prepublication censorship, and pressure, which
    resulted in self-censorship.
        In March security forces arrested and detained Kamal Hassan
    Bakheit, Chief Editor of ``Al Sahafa'' and four of the paper's
    journalists for publishing poetry calling on Egypt to rescue the
    country from ``the unjust war'' and writing an article supportive of
    the NDA. In May security forces arrested Idris Hassan, Chief Editor,
    and El Badawi Yousif, Editing Director of ``Al Rai AlAam'' newspaper
    for ``crimes against the state'' involving alleged false accusations
    and insults to public servants executing judicial proceedings. They
    were released after 1 day, and those editions of the newspaper were
    confiscated. In August security forces arrested Osman Mirghani,
    journalist for ``Al Rai Al-Aam'' for an article criticizing government
    education policy. In August security forces also arrested Alwola Burhi
    Kaidani, journalist for ``Al-Rai Al Akhar'' for an ``anti-government''
    article.
        In July the National Press Council suspended an independent Arabic
    daily Al-Rai Al-Aam for 1 day following the publication of an article
    critical of the police.
        The editor in chief of the newspaper Al-Rai al-Akher, who was
    arrested in June 1999, and the editors in chief of two other
    newspapers, Elsharee Elsyasi and Al-Ousbou, who reportedly were
    arrested at the same time all were released after a few days.
        All journalists, even in the privately owned Arabic daily press,
    continued to practice self-censorship. There are 11 daily newspapers
    and one English newspaper, which generally represents the viewpoint of
    southerners. Of the Arabic papers, one is government-controlled,
    several generally reflect the Government's viewpoint, and several are
    independent. A wide variety of Arabic and English publications are
    available; however, they are subject to censorship.
        Radio and television are controlled directly by the Government and
    are required to reflect government policies. Television has a permanent
    military censor to ensure that the news reflects official views. There
    are no privately owned television or radio stations, although one
    television cable company is jointly owned by the Government and private
    investors.
        The Government often charged that the international, and
    particularly the Western, media have an anti-Sudan and antiIslam bias.
        In spite of the restrictions on ownership of satellite dishes,
    citizens have access to foreign electronic media; the Government does
    not jam foreign radio signals. In addition to domestic and satellite
    television services, there is a pay cable network, which directly
    rebroadcasts uncensored Cable News Network (CNN), the British
    Broadcasting Company (BBC), the London-based, Saudiowned Middle East
    Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), DubaiTV, Kuwait-TV, and a variety of
    other foreign programming.
        Uncensored Internet access is available through two Internet
    service providers.
        Rebel movements have provided relatively few opportunities for
    journalists to report on their activities.
        Academic freedom is restricted. In public universities, the
    Government appoints the vice-chancellors who are responsible for
    running the institutions. While many professors'' lecture and write in
    opposition to the Government, they must exercise selfcensorship.
    Private universities are not subject to direct government control;
    however, professors also exercise selfcensorship.
        Security forces detained, and at times, beat student activists (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In May security forces raided Alnasr
    Technology College twice; they arrested, beat, and injured students,
    and fired bullets in the air in an effort to disperse a student protest
    on education issues. On a few occasions, security forces forcibly
    dispersed student demonstrations, killing and injuring some students
    (see Section 2.b.).
        The Government officially requires that young men between the ages
    of 17 and 19 enter military service to be able to receive a certificate
    on leaving secondary school, which is a requirement for entry into a
    university (see Section 5). This decree effectively broadened the
    conscription base.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The declaration
    of the state of emergency and of martial law on June 30, 1989,
    effectively eliminated the right of assembly, and the Government
    continued to severely restrict this freedom. The authorities permitted
    only government-authorized gatherings and routinely denied permission
    for or disrupted gatherings they view as politically oriented. Islamic
    orders associated with opposition political parties, particularly the
    Ansar and Khatimia, regularly have been denied permission to hold large
    public gatherings. In June the Independent Students Congress group of
    Sennar University organized an unapproved political rally at the
    University. Armed troops intervened and fired automatic weapons on the
    campus; the troops killed a student, seriously injured another, and
    approximately 20 students were hospitalized. In September demonstrators
    in several cities in the northern part of the country protested poor
    economic conditions, lack of water and electricity, government failure
    to pay teacher salaries, and compulsory military conscription. Claiming
    that the demonstrations threatened to become violent, police and
    security forces used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse
    demonstrators; the security forces killed several persons, and detained
    and beat numerous individuals. The individuals later were released.
    Also in September, the National Democratic Women's Association, which
    is associated with the NDA, held a peaceful demonstration against the
    Khartoum governor's decree banning women from working in public places.
    Riot police dispersed the protesters using tear gas; numerous women
    were injured, and security forces arrested and later released more than
    25 women. In September and October, over 150 members of Hassan al-
    Turabi's PNCP were detained after allegedly participating in
    demonstrations against the Government (see Section 1.d.). In October
    police used batons and tear gas to break up a rally and protest held by
    the PNCP and Islamic students at the University of Khartoum; students
    allegedly fired shots at the police, pelted them with stones, and used
    Molotov cocktails. Six policemen were injured, and four students were
    arrested but later were released.
        In December government forces broke up a meeting of NDA
    representatives with a foreign diplomat, detained the diplomat briefly,
    and eventually expelled him from the country; they also arrested seven
    NDA representatives. After approximately 6 weeks of detention, the
    Government charged the NDA representatives with treason and sedition.
    There was no trial by year's end. In the following weeks, human rights
    activist Ghazi Suleiman and Ali Mahmoud Hassanein, head of the
    opposition Democratic Unionist Party, opposition lawyers for the NDA,
    were arrested by the Government (see Section 1.d.). The lawyers were
    not charged and remained in detention at year's end. Following the
    incident, the Government announced restrictions on diplomatic,
    international, and regional organizations'' contact with any Sudanese
    political organizations, including the NDA, that it considered to be
    waging war against it. The Government stated it would restrict travel
    into rebelcontrolled areas without prior written permission from the
    Ministry of External Affairs; however, this restriction was not
    enforced during the year.
        The Government severely restricted freedom of association. In
    December 1998, implementing legislation linked to the new Constitution
    that in theory would allow the existence of political parties passed
    into law. As a result, there are now 20 officially registered political
    parties; however, the legislation includes restrictions that
    effectively prohibit traditional political parties if they are linked
    to armed opposition to the Government. Observers believe that the
    Government controls professional associations.
        In March the SPLA implemented a MOU drafted in August 1999 that was
    the subject of negotiation between the SPLM, NGO's, and donors. It
    included items such as: Increased SPLA control over NGO interaction
    with local communities; SPLA control over the planning and distribution
    of humanitarian assistance; a requirement to work ``in accordance with
    SPLA objectives'' rather than solely humanitarian principles; the
    payment of ``security fees;'' and additional fees for services,
    including charges for the landing of aircraft carrying humanitarian aid
    and for NGO movement within SPLA-held areas. In March the SPLA expelled
    11 NGO's, which handled 75 percent of NGO-provided humanitarian aid
    entering southern Sudan, for refusing to sign the MOU; several NGO's
    who refused to sign the memorandum left the area before the deadline
    (see Section 1.g.). Most NGO's returned by year's end, and most NGO's
    that provide assistance to the south reported that the MOU had little
    or no effect on their operations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The 1999 Constitution provides for freedom
    of religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in
    practice. The Government treats Islam as the state religion and has
    declared that Islam must inspire the country's laws, institutions, and
    policies. The Constitution states that ``Shari'a and custom are the
    sources of legislation.''
        Religious organizations are subject to the 1994 Societies
    Registration Act, which replaced the controversial 1962 Missionary
    Societies Act. The act theoretically allows churches to engage in a
    wider range of activities than did the Missionary Act, but churches are
    subject to the restrictions placed on nonreligious corporations.
    Religious groups, like all other organizations, must be registered in
    order to be recognized or to gather legally. The Government also
    requires that houses of worship be approved. Registered religious
    groups are exempt from most taxes. Nonregistered religious groups, on
    the other hand, find it impossible to construct a place of worship or
    to assemble legally. Registration reportedly is very difficult to
    obtain in practice, and the Government does not treat all groups
    equally in the approval of such registrations and licenses.
        Muslims may proselytize freely in the government-controlled areas,
    but non-Muslims are forbidden to proselytize. Foreign missionaries and
    religiously oriented organizations continue to be harassed by
    authorities; however, there were fewer reports of harassment in the
    second half of the year. On occasion requests by foreign missionaries
    and religiously oriented organizations for work permits and residence
    visas were delayed or denied. The Government refused to renew visas of
    several long-term Catholic missionaries, forcing them to leave the
    country and reapply with no assurances that the visas will be granted
    again. The Government generally is least restrictive of Christian
    groups that historically have had a presence in the country, including
    Copts, Roman Catholics, and Greek Orthodox, and is more restrictive of
    newer arrivals.
        Although the Government considers itself an Islamic government,
    restrictions often are placed on the religious freedoms of Muslims,
    particularly against those orders linked to opposition to the
    Government. Islamic orders such as the Ansar and the Khatimia regularly
    are denied permission to hold large public gatherings (see Section
    2.b.).
        The Government permits non-Muslims to participate in services in
    existing and otherwise authorized places of worship; the Government
    continued to deny permission for the construction of Roman Catholic
    churches, although some other Christian groups have received
    permission. However, the Government permitted some makeshift structures
    to be used.
        There is a longstanding dispute between the Episcopal Church and
    the Government. In September 1999, the Episcopal Church stated that the
    Government had moved to seize a portion of the property on which church
    offices in Omdurman stand. A government-run health care center had
    operated on the site since 1973. The Church claims that it has a
    freehold title to the land, while the Government claims that it is a
    leasehold. The Church claims that the courts will not act independently
    of the Government in the case. The case still is unresolved. In
    December 1999, police injured five persons in a clash in northwest
    Khartoum over an Episcopal Church school. Local authorities claim that
    the school was built without a proper permit. Despite a court ruling in
    favor of the Church, the school eventually was taken over by the
    Government and reopened as a Government school.
        Government authorities, using soldiers for security, reportedly
    have razed approximately 30 religious buildings with bulldozers since
    1990. In June 1999, local press reports indicated that an agreement had
    been signed between the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly
    and the Minister of Engineering Affairs of Khartoum State not to remove
    schools or houses of worship during slum demolitions unless adequate
    alternative sites were found. In October 1999, the First Vice President
    directed that the demolition of churches and other Christian facilities
    in Khartoum be suspended and that a committee be formed under the
    Second Vice President to review the issue; the committee was formed and
    began operations during the year. During the year, no religious schools
    or houses of worship were razed. The Government was trying to take over
    the unused part of a Christian cemetery in Khartoum in order to build
    shops; the dispute was not resolved by year's end.
        The Government requires instruction in Islam in public schools in
    the north. In public schools in areas in which Muslims are not a
    majority, students have a choice of studying Islam or Christianity;
    however, Christian courses are not offered in the majority of public
    schools, ostensibly due to a lack of teachers or Christian students,
    and, in practice this means that many Christian students attend Islamic
    courses.
        Children who have been abandoned or whose parentage is
    unknownregardless of presumed religious origin--are considered Muslims
    and can be adopted only by Muslims. Non-Muslims may adopt only other
    non-Muslim children. No equivalent restriction is placed on adoption by
    Muslims of orphans, or other abandoned children. These children are
    considered by the State to be both Sudanese citizens and Muslims, and
    therefore can be adopted only by Muslims. In accordance with Islamic
    law, Muslim adopted children do not take the name of their adoptive
    parents and are not automatic heirs to their property.
        Various government bodies have decreed on different occasions that
    women must dress according to modest Islamic standards. This, at the
    least, entails wearing a head covering. For example, in January 1999,
    the governor of Khartoum State announced that women in public places
    and government offices and female students and teachers would be
    required to conform to what is deemed an Islamic dress code. However,
    none of these decrees have been the subject of legislation, and
    enforcement of the dress code regulations was uneven. During the year,
    dress code enforcement was relaxed and, when it occurred, generally
    consisted of verbal admonishment by security forces. In September the
    Governor of Khartoum State issued a decree forbidding women from
    working in businesses that serve the public such as hotels,
    restaurants, and gas stations, defending the ban as necessary under
    Shari'a law to protect the dignity of women (see Section 5). At year's
    end, the decree was before the Constitutional Court pending a decision
    on appeal.
        While non-Muslims may convert to Islam, the 1991 Criminal Act makes
    apostasy (which includes conversion to another religion) by Muslims
    punishable by death.
        Authorities continued to restrict the activities of Christians,
    followers of traditional indigenous beliefs, and other nonMuslims, and
    there continued to be reports that security forces harassed and
    arrested persons for religious beliefs and activities (see Section
    1.d.).
        There were reports that police in Hilla Kuku harassed members of
    the Catholic Church. In June a Catholic seminarian reported that police
    stopped him at the bus station in Hilla Kuku and ordered him to remove
    a wooden cross that he was wearing. When he refused, the police took
    him to a police station, detained him, and beat him on the neck and
    wrist with a stick. After 3 hours of interrogation, they returned the
    cross and released him. In July at the same bus station, a Catholic
    worker was abducted by unidentified men, reportedly security personnel,
    and taken to an unidentified house. He was kept in a chair, with his
    hands tied behind his back, and questioned about church activities. He
    was released after dark but warned not to discuss the incident.
        The Government officially exempts the 10 southern states, whose
    population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts of the Criminal Act, which
    permits physical punishments based on Shari'a (Islamic law). In June
    approximately 100 Christian secondary school students were not allowed
    to continue compulsory military service because they left their duties
    to pray; it was unclear if these students were abused because they were
    Christian. Without successfully completing military service, they will
    not be allowed to enter the university.
        PDF trainees, including non-Muslims, are indoctrinated in the
    Islamic faith. In prisons and juvenile detention facilities, government
    officials and government-supported Islamic NGO's pressured and offered
    inducements to non-Muslim inmates to convert. Some persons in the
    government-controlled camps for internally displaced persons reportedly
    were subject to forced labor and at times pressured to convert to Islam
    (see Section 1.f.). Children, including non-Muslim children, in camps
    for vagrant minors are required to study the Koran, and there is
    pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam (see Section 5). There are
    credible reports that some boys in vagrant camps and juvenile homes
    have undergone forced circumcision. Some children from Christian and
    other non-Muslim families, captured and sold into slavery, were
    converted forcibly to Islam.
        The Government bombed villages in the Nuba Mountains and other
    southern rebel-held areas, at times striking hospitals, schools,
    mosques, Christian churches, and religious services (see Section 1.g.).
    For example, on February 8, government forces bombed a Catholic school
    in the Nuba Mountains killing at least 14 children and 1 teacher, and
    wounding 14 other persons. Government officials described the incident
    as a legitimate bombing. On March 14, government forces bombed the
    Diocese of Torit hospital, killing 1 person and injuring 7 others. In
    September government forces dropped 12 bombs on a Catholic mission,
    injuring 6 persons and destroying a medical dispensary.
        In June a group of 12 armed police entered the priests'' residence
    of the Catholic Comboni College secondary school with a warrant to
    search for illegal immigrants and foreign currency. The rooms of two
    priests and a medicine storeroom were searched. The police did not
    arrest anyone, and spoke with one priest. Police took a camera, a file
    of newspaper cuttings, five boxes of slides, a corrector tape, three
    floppy disks, and a bottle of whiskey. The items were accounted for at
    the time and returned 2 days later. A mobile telephone and cash are
    believed to have disappeared, but were not listed among the items taken
    by police during the search. No charges were filed in the case. The
    Catholic Comboni College has a religiously and ethnically mixed student
    body and generally operates without interference or harassment.
        There were some areas in which the Government took steps that
    improved religious freedom somewhat, including releasing religious
    prisoners and detainees, relaxing enforcement of public order laws,
    releasing women imprisoned under the public order law, and easing
    restrictions on religious visitors and gatherings. For example, during
    the year, the Archbishop of Canterbury visited the country as did
    German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke. Open air services in Khartoum were
    attended by tens of thousands of persons. Catholic Church
    representatives said thousands of persons routinely attended jubilee
    festivities in governmentheld areas without interference or harassment.
        In rebel-controlled areas, Christians, Muslims, and followers of
    traditional indigenous beliefs generally worship freely, although it
    appears that many of the region's Muslim residents have departed
    voluntarily over the years. The SPLM officially favors secular
    government; however, the SPLM is dominated by Christians, and local
    SPLM authorities often have a very close relationship with local
    Christian religious authorities.
        Government and SPLM/SPLA delegations participated in four rounds of
    IGAD-mediated peace talks in Kenya during the year. The delegations
    continued discussions of the role of religion in national affairs
    without resolution. The Government continues to insist that Shari'a or
    Islamic law form the basis of a unified state while southerners insist
    on a secular state.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The 1999 Constitution provides for
    freedom of movement and residence, including exit from and entry into
    the country; however, the Government restricted these rights in
    practice. The Government denied exit visas to some categories of
    persons, including policemen and physicians. The Government also
    maintains lists of political figures and other citizens who are not
    permitted to travel abroad.
        Women may not travel abroad without permission of their husbands or
    male guardians. Some former political detainees have been forbidden to
    travel outside Khartoum. Movement generally was unhindered for other
    citizens outside the war zones, but travelers who failed to produce an
    identity card at checkpoints risked arrest. Foreigners needed permits,
    which were often difficult to obtain and sometimes were refused, for
    domestic travel outside of Khartoum; however, foreign diplomats can
    travel to many locations under government escort. Foreigners must
    register with the police on entering the country, seek permission to
    move from one location to another, and reregister at each new location
    within 3 days of arrival. Foreign NGO staffs sometimes had problems
    obtaining entry visas or work or travel permits once they had entered
    the country. In December the Government announced restrictions on
    travel by diplomatic, international, and regional organizations and
    others into rebelcontrolled areas without prior written permission from
    the Ministry of External Affairs; however, this restriction was not
    enforced during the year.
        Insurgent movements also require that foreign NGO personnel obtain
    permission before traveling to areas that they control, although they
    generally granted such permission. NGO workers who have worked in
    government-held territory encountered problems receiving permission to
    work or travel in insurgentheld territory. In March the SPLA drew up a
    Memorandum of Understanding for NGO's to sign that restricted much of
    their work in the southern part of the country and, as a result, many
    NGO's left the country (see Section 1.g.).
        Tens of thousands of persons, largely southerners and westerners
    displaced by famine and civil war, continue to live in squatter slums
    in the Khartoum area. The Khartoum State government plans to upgrade
    conditions in some camps, requiring the movement of populations to
    other areas so that roads may be built or enlarged and services
    established. The state government is in contact with foreign NGO's and
    U.N. agencies concerning this effort.
        Approximately 380,000 Sudanese are refugees in neighboring
    countries. Refugees have fled to Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. Up
    to 4 million persons are displaced internally due to the civil war.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylum
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperated
    with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
    humanitarian assistance organizations and accorded refugees generally
    good treatment. The UNHCR estimated that there were approximately
    400,000 refugees, primarily from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda, the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Approximately 150,000
    refugees are in camps, and the rest are scattered in urban areas
    throughout the country. The Government provides first asylum, although
    no statistics were available for the year.
        In April the Government signed an agreement with the Government of
    Eritrea to repatriate longtime Eritrean refugees in Sudan; however, it
    was not implemented because of the conflict between Eritrea and
    Ethiopia.
        In August the UNHCR signed an agreement with the Government of
    Sudan and the Government of Ethiopia to repatriate pre-1991 Ethiopian
    refugees to their homeland by the end of the year; however, only some
    of the Ethiopian refugees were repatriated by year's end.
        There were some reports of the mistreatment of refugees, including
    beatings and arbitrary arrests by government officials. Refugees could
    not become resident aliens or citizens, regardless of their length of
    stay. The Government allowed a large number of refugees to work.
        There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited
    Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
        There were no reports that the Government forcibly returned persons
    to a country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens had no genuine opportunity to change their government
    peacefully. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in
    December and there were allegations of serious irregularities;
    including official interference, electoral fraud, inadequate
    opportunities for all voters to register, and inadequate election
    monitoring. All major opposition parties boycotted the election. Bashir
    was elected to another 5-year term, and the NC/NIF won 340 out of 360
    seats in Parliament in the deeply flawed process.
        In December 1999, President Bashir declared a 3-month state of
    emergency, dismissed the speaker of the National Assembly, Dr. Turabi,
    and disbanded Parliament 2 days before it was to vote on a bill
    introduced by pro-Turabi legislators to reduce Bashir's presidential
    powers. Bashir suspended the Parliament on the grounds that it was
    necessary for the unity of the country. The State of Emergency remained
    in effect throughout the year and was extended through next year. The
    new Parliament elected in December is expected to take office in
    February 2001.
        The Constitution, which provides in theory for a wide range of
    rights, was passed by referendum in June 1998, and was implemented
    early in 1999. There was widespread skepticism about the Government's
    claims that the constitutional referendum passed with 96.7 percent
    approval and 91.9 percent participation. Critics of the new
    Constitution charged that it neither was drafted nor passed with truly
    national participation. Some critics also objected to the statement
    that ``Islamic law'' would be among ``the prevalent sources of law'' in
    regard to amending the Constitution (see Section 5). The new
    Constitution has resulted in few changes in practice.
        In 1989 the National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC)
    abolished all political parties and detained the major party leaders
    for a short period. In 1990 the RCC rejected both multiparty and one
    party systems and, 2 years later, established an entirely government-
    appointed Transitional National Assembly, based on a Libyan-style
    political structure with ascending levels of nonpartisan assemblies.
    The essentially powerless appointed legislature was replaced following
    the 1996 elections by an elected National Assembly. In December 1998,
    implementing legislation linked to the new Constitution passed a law
    that would allow the restricted existence of political parties. As a
    result, there are 20 officially registered political parties; however,
    the legislation included restrictions that effectively prohibit
    traditional political parties if they are linked to armed opposition to
    the Government. The Government continued routinely to deny permission
    for and disrupt gatherings that it viewed as politically oriented (see
    Section 2.b.). Security forces arrested, detained, and on occasion,
    beat political opponents during the year (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        The federal system of government was instituted in 1995 and slowly
    is developing a structure of 26 states, which the Government considers
    a possible inducement to the insurgents for accommodation through a
    principle of regional autonomy; however, southerners are
    underrepresented in the Government. This underrepresentation remained a
    key obstacle to ending the rebellion.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
    they have the right to vote. There is one female Minister, who serves
    as a government advisor; one female State Minister, who serves on the
    Council of Ministers and is the former head of the legislative
    committee of Khartoum State; and there is one female Supreme Court
    judge.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Due to government restrictions on freedom of association (see
    Section 2.b.), there is only one independent domestic human rights
    organizations--the Sudan Human Rights Organization. There is one local
    NGO that addresses health concerns related to the practice of female
    genital mutilation (FGM) and other ``traditional'' practices (see
    Section 5). During the year, the Government conducted bombing raids
    that targeted NGO's and often impeded their activities in the south
    (see Section 1.g.).
        Government-supported Islamic NGO's pressured imprisoned nonMuslims
    to convert to Islam. There were reports that Christian NGO's used their
    services to pressure persons to convert to Christianity during the
    year.
        The Human Rights Advisory Council, a government body whose
    rapporteur is the Solicitor General for Public Law, continued its role
    in addressing human rights problems within the Government. The Council
    is composed of representatives of human rights offices in 22 government
    ministries and agencies. While the council is charged with
    investigating human rights complaints, its effectiveness was hampered
    by lack of cooperation on the part of some of the ministry and agency
    offices. In May 1998, the Government formed the CEAWAC, which in turn
    formed mechanisms to identify and return abductees (see Sections 1.b.
    and 6.f.).
        In September 1998, the U.N. named a new Special Rapporteur on
    Sudan, Leonardo Franco. Franco visited the country in February and
    filed a report with the UNHCR and the U.N. General Assembly.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1999 Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    or religious creed; however, discrimination against women and ethnic
    minorities continued. Mechanisms for social redress, especially with
    respect to violence against women and children, are weak. The 1992
    General Education Act stipulates equal opportunity in education for the
    disabled.
        Women.--Violence against women continued to be a problem, although,
    because reliable statistics do not exist, the extent is unknown. Many
    women are reluctant to file formal complaints against such abuse,
    although it is a legal ground for divorce. The police normally do not
    intervene in domestic disputes. Displaced women from the south were
    vulnerable to harassment, rape, and sexual abuse. The Government does
    not address the problem of violence against women, nor is it discussed
    publicly. The punishment for rape under the Criminal Act varies from
    100 lashes to 10 years imprisonment to death. In most cases,
    convictions are not announced; however, observers believe that
    sentences often are less than the maximum provided for by law.
    Prostitution is a growing problem, although there is no sex tourism
    industry. There are no specific laws regarding sexual harassment.
        Some aspects of the law, including certain provisions of Islamic
    law as interpreted and applied by the Government, and many traditional
    practices, discriminate against women. Gender segregation is common in
    social settings. In accordance with Islamic law, a Muslim woman has the
    right to hold and dispose of her own property without interference.
    Women are ensured inheritance from their parents; however, a daughter
    inherits half the share of a son, and a widow inherits a smaller
    percent than do her children. It is much easier for men to initiate
    legal divorce proceedings than for women. These rules only apply to
    Muslims and not to those of other faiths, for whom religious or tribal
    laws apply. Although a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim, a Muslim
    woman cannot marry a non-Muslim unless he converts to Islam; however,
    this prohibition is not observed or enforced in areas of the south not
    controlled by the Government, nor among Nubans. Women cannot travel
    abroad without the permission of their husbands or male guardians (see
    Section 2.d.); however, this prohibition is not enforced strictly for
    women affiliated with the NCP.
        A number of government directives require that women in public
    places and government offices and female students and teachers conform
    to what the Government deemed an Islamic dress code. This, at the
    least, entailed wearing a head covering. However, enforcement of the
    dress code regulations has been uneven. During the year, dress code
    enforcement was relaxed and, when it occurred, generally consisted of
    verbal admonishment by security forces. In May a presidential decree
    released 563 women who were in prison for violating the Public Order
    Law. Most were southerners who had been convicted of illegally making
    and selling alcohol in Khartoum. Subsequent to the decree, police
    continued to arrest numerous women for the same violation and
    reportedly the police demand bribes in exchange for releasing the
    women.
        Women generally are not discriminated against in the pursuit of
    employment; however, in September the Governor of Khartoum State issued
    a decree forbidding women from working in businesses that serve the
    public, including hotels, restaurants, and gas stations. The Governor
    defended the ban as necessary to protect the dignity of women and to
    adhere to Shari'a law. Within a week, the Constitutional Court
    suspended the ruling, and the case was pending appeal at year's end.
        Women enjoy equal access to education. Approximately 50 percent of
    university students are women, in part because men are conscripted for
    war.
        There are credible reports that government and government-
    associated forces abducted and sold women for work as domestic servants
    and concubines (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Children.--Education is compulsory through grade eight, although
    local inability to pay teachers'' salaries reportedly has resulted in
    declining attendance. In the northern part of the country, boys and
    girls generally have equal access to education, although many families
    with restricted income choose to send sons and not daughters to school.
    Girls do not have equal access to education in the south. The male
    literacy rate is 57.7 percent, and the female literacy rate is 34.6
    percent; however, this rate is for the country as a whole; the literacy
    rate in the south reportedly is lower due to a lack of schools in many
    areas.
        A considerable number of children suffered serious abuse, including
    abduction, enslavement, and forced conscription in the war zones (see
    Sections 1.f., 6.c., and 6.f.). There continued to be credible reports
    that government and government-associated forces abducted children for
    purposes of forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        The Government forcibly conscripted young men and boys into the
    military forces to fight in the civil war. Conscription frequently was
    carried out by government authorities who raided buses and other public
    places to seize young men. The Government officially requires that
    young men between the ages of 17 and 19 years enter military service to
    be able to receive a certificate on leaving secondary school. Such a
    certificate is a requirement for entry into a university, and the
    decree effectively broadened the conscription base. There are credible
    reports that the government-controlled militia leader, Paulino Matip,
    forcibly conscripted boys as young as 10 years of age to serve as
    soldiers. In October the SPLA pledged to demobilize child soldiers from
    its forces, and during the year, 116 boys were removed from the army
    and placed in school. There are credible reports that child soldiers
    continued to serve in the SPLA.
        The Government operated camps for vagrant children. Police
    typically send homeless children who have committed crimes to these
    camps, where they are detained for indefinite periods. Health care and
    schooling at the camps generally are poor, and basic living conditions
    often are primitive. All of the children in the camps, including non-
    Muslims, must study the Koran, and there is pressure on non-Muslims to
    convert to Islam (see Section 2.c.). There were reports that boys in
    these camps and in homes for delinquent youths were forced to undergo
    circumcision. Teenagers in the camps often are conscripted into the PDF
    (see Section 1.f.).
        During the last 10 years, thousands of children were abducted by
    the government-supported LRA, a Ugandan armed opposition group with
    bases in the southern part of the country (see Section 6.f.). The LRA
    forced many of the boys to become soldiers and the girls to become sex
    slaves. In December 1999, the Governments of both countries agreed to
    stop supporting each other's rebel armies and to return abductees.
    Subsequently, the Government assisted in repatriating a small number of
    individuals who had escaped from the LRA. In September both Governments
    agreed at the Winnipeg International Conference on War Affected
    Children to work for the speedy release and repatriation of LRA
    captives; however, implementation has proved problematic due to a lack
    of cooperation on the part of the LRA.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is widespread, especially in the north. An
    estimated 90 percent or more of females in the north have been
    subjected to FGM, with consequences that have included severe urinary
    problems, infections, and even death. Infibulation, the most severe
    type of FGM, is also the most common type. Usually it is performed on
    girls between the ages of 4 and 7 by traditional practitioners in
    improvised, unsanitary conditions, causing severe pain, trauma, and
    risk of infection to the child. No form of FGM is illegal under the
    Criminal Code; however, the health law forbids doctors and midwives
    from performing infibulation. Women displaced from the south to the
    north reportedly are imposing FGM increasingly on their daughters, even
    if they themselves have not been subjected to it. A small but growing
    number of urban, educated families are abandoning the practice
    completely. A larger number of families, in a compromise with
    tradition, have adopted the least severe form of FGM, Sunna, as an
    alternative to infibulation. The Government neither arrested nor
    prosecuted any persons for violating the health law against
    infibulation. The Government does not support FGM, and recently it has
    introduced information about FGM in some public education curriculums.
    One local NGO is working to eradicate FGM.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate
    against disabled persons but has not enacted any special legislation
    for the disabled, such as mandating accessibility to public buildings
    and transportation for the disabled. The 1992 General Education Act
    requires equal educational opportunities for the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Muslims predominate in the north, but are in
    the minority in the south, where most citizens practice traditional
    indigenous religions or Christianity. There are from 1 to 2 million
    displaced southerners in the north who largely practice traditional
    indigenous religions or Christianity. About 500,000 Coptic Christians
    live in the north. Traditionally there have been amicable relations
    between the various religious communities, although in previous years
    there were a small number of clashes.
        There are reliable reports that Islamic NGO's in war zones withhold
    food and other services from the needy unless they convert to Islam.
    There were reports that Christian NGO's used their services to pressure
    persons to convert to Christianity during the year.
        Non-Muslims legally are free to adhere to and practice their
    faiths; however, in practice the Government's treatment of Islam as the
    state religion creates an atmosphere in which non-Muslims are treated
    as second class citizens (see Section 2.c.). In government-controlled
    areas of the south, there continued to be credible evidence of
    prejudice in favor of Muslims and an unwritten policy of Islamization
    of public institutions, despite an official policy of local autonomy
    and federalism. In the past, some non-Muslims lost their jobs in the
    civil service, the judiciary, and other professions. Few non-Muslim
    university graduates found government jobs. Some non-Muslim businessmen
    complained of petty harassment and discrimination in the awarding of
    government contracts and trade licenses. There also were reports that
    Muslims receive preferential treatment for the limited services
    provided by the Government, including access to medical care.
        On December 8, supporters of the outlawed Takfeer and Hijra Muslim
    groups attacked a rival group's worshippers at a Sunna mosque in
    Omdurman during Ramadam prayers, killing 26 persons and injuring 40
    others. The Government arrested and detained 65 leading members of the
    Takfeer and Hijra group; most of the individuals remained in detention
    and had not been tried as of year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The estimated population of
    27.5 million is a multiethnic mix of over 500 Arab and African tribes
    with scores of languages and dialects. Northern Muslims, who form a
    majority of approximately 16 million persons, traditionally have
    dominated the Government. The southern ethnic groups fighting the civil
    war (largely followers of traditional indigenous religions or
    Christians) total approximately 6 million and seek independence, or
    some form of regional self-determination, from the north.
        The Muslim majority and the NIF/NC-dominated Government continued
    to discriminate against ethnic minorities in almost every aspect of
    society. Citizens in Arabic-speaking areas who do not speak Arabic
    experienced discrimination in education, employment, and other areas.
    The use of Arabic as the language of instruction in higher education
    discriminated against nonArabs. For university admission, students
    completing high school are required to pass examinations in four
    subjects: English language; mathematics; Arabic language; and religious
    studies. Even at the university level, examinations in all subjects
    except English language were in the Arabic language, placing nonnative
    speakers of Arabic at a disadvantage.
        There were reports that in July and August in the Western Upper
    Nile, predominantly Nuer SPLA forces and predominately Nuer SPDF forces
    killed at least 50 civilians and abducted more than 20 women and
    children in intraethnic fighting.
        There also were periodic reports of intertribal abductions of women
    and children in the south, primarily in the Eastern Upper Nile. The
    abductions are part of traditional warfare in which the victor takes
    women and children as a bounty and frequently tries to absorb them into
    their own tribe.
        In March 1999, at a grassroots peace conference in Wunlit, Bahr El
    Ghazal, representatives of the Nuer and Dinka tribes signed a peace
    covenant. The Dinka and the Nuer are the two largest tribes and had
    been on opposite sides of the war since 1991. The Wunlit accord
    provided concrete mechanisms for peace, including a cease-fire, an
    amnesty, the exchange of abducted women and children, and monitoring
    mechanisms. The Wunlit accord greatly reduced conflict between the
    Dinka and Nuer tribes during the year. Thousands of Nuer IDP's have
    fled into Dinka lands from Upper Nile, and generally they were well
    received.
        A similar attempt in April and May in Lilirr to broker peace on the
    East Bank among various ethnic groups, including Dinka, Nuer, and Murle
    clans was less successful, and some of the conflicts between these
    groups continued.
        Although details generally were unavailable, there were credible
    reports of civilian casualties as a result of ongoing fighting between
    ethnic Dinkas and Didingas in the New Cush and Chukudum areas in
    eastern Equatoria (see Section 1.a.). Interethnic tensions in the first
    half of the year resulted in some deaths. Interethnic tensions eased in
    May and June with the departure of some Dinka to Bor County as part of
    a relocation program to return them to their homes after having been
    displaced by the war.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The RCC abolished the pre-1989 labor
    unions, closed union offices, froze union assets, forbade strikes, and
    prescribed severe punishments, including the death penalty, for
    violations of its labor decrees. Several unions functioned during the
    year, including the government-controlled Sudan Workers'' Trade Union
    Federation (SWTUF); however, there were no independent unions. The
    Government dismissed many labor leaders from their jobs or detained
    them, although most of those arrested during the year were freed by
    year's end. For example, in April security forces detained four
    students at the University of Sudan for 4 days for union activities.
    The 1999 Constitution provides for the right of association for
    economic and trade union purposes; however, it has resulted in no
    changes in practice.
        The SWTUF is the leading blue-collar labor organization with about
    800,000 members. In 1992 local union elections were held after a delay
    to permit the government-controlled steering committees to arrange the
    outcomes. The elections resulted in government-approved slates of
    candidates voted into office by prearranged acclamation. In 1997
    largely the same leadership was reelected.
        There were some teacher strikes during the year, some lasting
    several months, to protest the government's failure to pay salaries.
    During some of the strikes, police and security forces used tear gas
    and live ammunition to disperse demonstrators; the security forces
    killed several persons, and detained and beat numerous individuals (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
        Unions remained free to form federations and affiliate with
    international bodies, such as the African Workers'' Union and the Arab
    Workers'' Union.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1989 RCC
    constitutional decree temporarily suspended the right to organize and
    bargain collectively. Although these rights were restored to labor
    organizing committees in 1996, government control of the steering
    committees meant in practice that the Government dominates the process
    of setting wages and working conditions. The continued absence of labor
    legislation allowing for union meetings, the filing of grievances, and
    other union activity greatly reduced the value of these formal rights.
    Although local union officials have raised some grievances with
    employers, few carried them to the Government. The law does not
    prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers. The 1999 Constitution
    provides for the right of organization for economic or trade union
    purposes; however, it resulted in no changes in practice.
        A tripartite committee comprising representatives of the
    Government, labor unions, and business sets wages. Specialized labor
    courts adjudicate standard labor disputes; however, the Ministry of
    Labor has the authority to refer a dispute to compulsory arbitration.
        In 1993 the Government created two export processing zones (EPZ's);
    it later established a third at Khartoum International Airport. During
    the year, only the EPZ at Khartoum International Airport was open. The
    labor laws do not apply in the EPZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1999
    Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, slavery
    persists, particularly affecting women and children. The taking of
    slaves, particularly in the war zones, and their transport to parts of
    central and northern Sudan continued.
        There have been frequent and credible reports that Baggara raiders,
    supported by government troops, took women and children as slaves
    during raids in Bahr El Ghazal state. The Government did not take any
    action to halt these practices and continued to support some Baggara
    tribal militias. The majority of the victims were abducted in violent
    raids on settlements carried out by government-affiliated militias
    accompanying and guarding troop trains to the southern garrison town of
    Wau. During the raids, the militias, which frequently are not paid by
    the Government for their services, exact their own remuneration by
    abducting women and children, looting villages, and stealing cattle to
    take back to the north. Civilians often were killed and villages were
    destroyed. The Government has pledged to end this practice, and there
    were fewer reports of such raids during the year (see Sections 1.b. and
    1.g.). Following the raids, there were credible reports of practices
    such as the sale and purchase of children, some in alleged slave
    markets, and the rape of women. Abductees frequently are forced to herd
    cattle, work in the fields, fetch water, dig wells, and do housework.
    Abductees are subjected to torture and rape, and at times, are killed.
    These practices all have a pronounced racial aspect, as the victims are
    exclusively black southerners and members of indigenous tribes of the
    Nuba Mountains.
        The Government long has denied slavery but acknowledges that
    abductions occur. The Government also denies involvement or complicity
    in slavery, and states that hostage taking often accompanies tribal
    warfare, particularly in war zones not under government control.
    However, in 1998 the Government formed the Committee to Eliminate the
    Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWAC) and pledged to end the
    practice of hostage-taking. Since the creation of CEAWAC, reports of
    abductions and slavery have been less frequent. However, during the
    year the Government refused to approve flight clearances for the
    transfers of the abductees, which has prevented additional
    reunifications, and the Government did not record the identity of the
    abductors or forced labor owners and chose not to prosecute them.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the
    Government does not enforce it effectively. There continued to be
    credible reports that government or government-associated forces took
    children as slaves.
        Both the Government and rebel factions continued to conscript men
    and boys forcibly into the fighting forces (see Sections 1.f. and 5).
    Conscripts face significant hardship and abuse in military service. The
    rebel factions continued to force southern men to work as laborers or
    porters.
        Approximately 3,000 Ugandan children have been forced to become
    soldiers or sex slaves for the LRA, a Ugandan armed opposition group in
    the south, which is actively supported by the Government (see Section
    5).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for workers is 18 years; however,
    the law is not enforced in practice. Children as young as 11 or 12
    years of age worked in a number of factories, particularly outside the
    capital, including the factories at Um Ruwaba that produce edible oils.
    In addition severe poverty has produced widespread child labor in the
    informal, unregulated economy. In rural areas, children traditionally
    assist their families with agricultural work from a very young age. The
    1999 Constitution provides that the State protect children from
    exploitation; however, it resulted in no changes in practice.
        Child labor exists in SPLM/SPLA-held areas, particularly in the
    agricultural sectors. Child labor in such areas is exacerbated by lack
    of schools, extreme poverty, and the lack of an effective legal minimum
    age for workers.
        The Government does not adhere to the ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor and has not taken any action to investigate
    abuses or protect child workers.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the
    Government does not enforce it effectively, and there were credible
    reports that children are taken as slaves (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage is
    enforced by the Ministry of Labor, which maintains field offices in
    most major cities. Employers generally respect the minimum wage.
    Workers who are denied the minimum wage may file a grievance with the
    local Ministry of Labor field office, which then is required to
    investigate and take appropriate action if there has been a violation
    of the law. In January 1999, the minimum wage theoretically was raised
    from approximately $9 (24,000 Sudanese pounds) per month to
    approximately $11 (3,000 Sudanese dinars or 30,000 Sudanese pounds) per
    month; however, most government offices continue to pay the old rate.
    The Sudanese Workers Trade Union Federation requested the Minister of
    Finance to execute the increase retroactively, and the Minister
    promised to increase the minimum wage when submitting the next
    Government budget; however, such an increase of the minimum wage had
    not occurred by year's end. The current minimum wage is insufficient to
    provide a decent standard of living for an average worker and family.
        The workweek is limited by law to six 8-hour days, with a day of
    rest on Friday, which generally is respected.
        Legal foreign workers have the same labor rights as domestic
    workers. Illegal workers have no such protections and, as a result,
    typically work for lower wages in worse conditions than legal workers.
        Although the laws prescribe health and safety standards, working
    conditions generally were poor, and enforcement by the Ministry of
    Labor is minimal. The law does not address the right of workers to
    remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons, the 1999 Constitution specifically
    prohibits slavery and forced labor; however, slavery persists,
    particularly affecting women and children (see Sections 5 and 6.c). The
    taking of slaves, particularly in war zones, and their transport to
    parts of central and northern Sudan, continued. Credible reports
    persist of practices such as the sale and purchase of children, some in
    alleged slave markets. Libyans have been implicated in the purchase of
    Sudanese slaves, particularly women and children who were captured by
    government troops. During the year, there were occasional reports of
    abductions of women and children by government and government-
    associated forces who sold women for domestic servants.
        There were unconfirmed reports that the SPLA forcibly recruited
    Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in their forces.
        There are credible reports that intertribal abductions of women and
    children continued in the southern part of the country.
        During the past 10 years, approximately 3,000 Ugandan children were
    kidnaped by the LRA, taken to southern Sudan, and forced to become sex
    slaves or soldiers. The Government actively supported the LRA. There
    were also reports in previous years that the LRA had sold and traded
    some children, mostly girls, or provided them as gifts, to arms dealers
    in Sudan. In December 1999, the Government agreed to cease supporting
    the LRA. During the year, there were talks between both Governments
    aimed at repatriation of the abductees (see Section 5).
        While the Government has pledged to end abduction and slavery, and
    the creation of the CEAWAC in May 1998 (see Section 1.b.) has resulted
    in the return of approximately 300 abducted individuals, 10,000 to
    12,000 slaves remain in captivity at year's end. During the year, the
    Government's refusal to approve flight clearances for the transfers of
    the abductees prevented additional reunifications. Furthermore, the
    Government did not record the identity of the abductors or forced labor
    owners, and chose not to prosecute them.
                                   __________

                                   SWAZILAND

        Swaziland is governed as a modified traditional monarchy with
    executive, legislative, and limited judicial powers ultimately vested
    in the King (Mswati III). The King rules according to unwritten law and
    custom, in conjunction with a partially elected parliament and an
    accompanying structure of published laws and implementing agencies.
    Despite a professed intention to alter the current system, the steps
    taken by the King toward reform have resulted in little progress.
    Parliamentary and municipal elections were held in 1998 and introduced
    increased representative government; however, political power continues
    to rest largely with the King and his circle of traditional advisors,
    including the Queen Mother. The 1968 Constitution was suspended by the
    present King's father in 1973. Based upon the 1973 decree, the King has
    the authority to issue decrees that carry the force of law, and
    exercised this authority with the introduction of the 1998
    Administrative Order. The 1973 decree also bans political parties,
    meetings, and processions except in local ``Tinkhundla'' administrative
    centers or as authorized by the police. There are public demands to
    lift the 1973 decree. The judiciary is generally independent; however,
    the King has certain judicial powers. In addition, the judiciary's
    independence was occasionally challenged by individuals in high
    positions, including the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
    and the traditional governor of the royal family, who have made
    attempts to influence or overturn some court decisions. The Chief
    Justice of the High Court (a South African citizen appointed by the
    King) has resisted pressure to yield any powers to those outside the
    judiciary.
        Both the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force and the Royal Swaziland
    Police operate under civilian control and are responsible for external
    and internal security. Some communities, questioning the ability of
    National Police to deal with enforcement at the community level, have
    formed community police. Reports of conflicts between national and
    community police have subsided. Members of both the National Police and
    the community police committed some human rights abuses.
        Swaziland has a free market economy, with relatively little
    government intervention. The majority of citizens are engaged in
    subsistence agriculture, although a relatively diversified industrial
    sector now accounts for the largest component of the formal economy.
    The economy relies heavily on the export sector, especially on the wood
    pulp, soft drink concentrate, and sugar industries, which are composed
    primarily of large firms with mostly foreign ownership. The country
    depends heavily on South Africa from which it receives almost all of
    its imports and to which it sends the majority of its exports. A quasi-
    parastatal organization established by royal charter maintains large
    investments in major sectors of the economy, including industry,
    agriculture, and services. This parastatal normally requires
    partnership with foreign investors and international development
    agencies.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor, and there
    continued to be serious human rights problems. Citizens still are not
    able to change their government. Police continued to torture and beat
    some suspects. The Government generally failed to prosecute or
    otherwise discipline officers who committed abuses. Prison conditions
    meet minimum international standards; however, government remand
    centers are overcrowded. The Government continued to use a nonbailable
    offense provision. The Government infringed on citizen's privacy
    rights. The Government continued to limit freedom of speech and of the
    press, restraints continued on news coverage by government-owned
    broadcast houses, and all media practiced some self-censorship,
    although journalists spoke out on key issues. There has been slow
    progress in the drafting of a media policy to replace the proposed
    media council bill. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and
    association and retained prohibitions on political activity, although
    numerous political groupings operated openly and voiced opinions
    critical of the Government, which received prominent press coverage.
    However, the police on occasion harassed political activists. Police
    forcibly dispersed a community prayer service alleged to be a political
    activity. There are some limits on freedom of movement. Legal and
    cultural discrimination and violence against women, as well as abuse of
    children, remained problems. Some societal discrimination against mixed
    race and white citizens persisted. The Government restricted workers''
    rights. In June the King signed the Industrial Relations Act 2000 (IRA)
    into law and it became effective on August 25; the act was amended in
    November, and the amended act remedies many of the inequities in the
    1996 labor law.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government agents. Three bombings took
    place between August and November 1998, apparently timed to coincide
    with major state events; one of the bombings killed one person.
    Although a previously unknown group claimed responsibility for the
    bombings, the existence of the group was unconfirmed and the
    perpetrators remained unidentified and their motives unknown.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There were credible reports by criminal defendants that
    the security forces used torture during interrogation. Police sometimes
    beat criminal suspects and occasionally used the ``tube'' style of
    interrogation, in which police suffocate suspects through the use of a
    rubber tube around the face and mouth. The Government generally failed
    to prosecute or otherwise discipline police officers for such abuses.
    An internal complaints and discipline unit investigates reports of
    human rights abuses by the police, but no independent body has the
    authority to investigate police abuses. However, courts have
    invalidated confessions induced through physical abuse; for example, in
    September 1998, the High Court awarded a former prisoner approximately
    $7,000 (42,000 emalangeni) in damages for cruel and unusual punishment
    suffered while incarcerated in 1992-94.
        On September 9, police used force to disperse worshippers, injuring
    more than 60 persons (see Section 2.c.).
        Overcrowding and generally poor prison conditions were alleviated
    markedly through the opening of new institutions including a modern
    correctional facility for women. In 1998 foreign diplomats and
    representatives of international agencies toured the prisons, including
    maximum-security institutions, and reported favorably on improved
    medical care, nutrition, sanitation, and vocational training. The use
    of nonbailable provisions led to less favorable conditions, including
    continued overcrowding in government remand centers where suspects are
    held during pretrial detention and often are released for time served
    after being sentenced (see Section 1.d.). Women and juveniles are held
    in separate prison facilities.
        The Government routinely has permitted prison visits by diplomats,
    journalists, human rights monitors, and representatives of
    international organizations, and some prison visits by journalists and
    political figures occurred during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires
    warrants for arrests in most circumstances, except when police observe
    a crime being committed or have reason to believe that a suspect may
    flee. Detainees may consult with a lawyer of their choice and must be
    charged with the violation of a statute within a reasonable time,
    usually 48 hours, or, in remote areas, as soon as the judicial officer
    appears. The authorities generally respected these rights in practice.
        In September police detained without charges two members of the
    banned political party SWAYOCO for a few hours after they raided the
    home of opposition leader Zodwa Mkhonta (see Section 2.b.).
        On November 10, the president of the banned political party PUDEMO,
    Masuku, was arrested on charges of sedition; on November 15 he was
    released on bail, and his trial was pending at year's end.
        In September 1999, an editor of an independent newspaper was
    arrested for criminal defamation after reporting that the King's latest
    fiancee was a high-school dropout (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government continued to limit the provisions for bail for
    crimes appearing in the Nonbailable Offenses Order, which became
    effective in 1993 and was strengthened by Parliament in 1994. The Order
    currently lists 11 offenses. The mere charge of the underlying offense,
    without any evidentiary showing that the suspect is involved, is
    sufficient to employ the nonbailable provision. The Minister of Justice
    may amend the list by his own executive act.
        In November there were reports that the Government was considering
    reinstating the practice of detaining persons for up to 2 months
    without formal charges, a policy that had been used in the country
    under the predecessor to King Mswati III; however, the Government
    denied these reports, and such a policy was not implemented by year's
    end.
        The Government does not use forced exile. There are no barriers to
    prevent the return of dissidents.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is generally
    independent; however, the King has certain judicial powers. In
    addition, the judiciary's independence was occasionally challenged by
    individuals in high positions, including the Minister of Justice and
    Constitutional Affairs and the traditional governor of the royal
    family, who have made attempts to influence or overturn some court
    decisions. The Chief Justice of the High Court (a South African citizen
    appointed by the King) has resisted pressure to yield any powers to
    those outside the judiciary. However, the Government ignored a ruling
    on September 5 by the Chief Justice that prohibited the eviction of two
    Swazi chiefs. On October 5, the Chief Justice rescinded the injunction
    against the eviction after the Attorney General gave him an affidavit
    stating that the King had decreed the evictions and that the High Court
    had no jurisdiction over the case (see Section 3). The case was
    appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled on December 14 that the
    Chief Justice's original ruling was correct.
        Judicial powers are vested in a dual system, one independent and
    based on Western law, the other based on a system of national courts
    that follows unwritten traditional law and custom. In treason and
    sedition cases, the King can circumvent the regular judiciary by
    appointing a special tribunal, which may adopt rules and procedures
    different from those applied in the High Court; however, this power was
    used last in 1987.
        The Western judiciary consists of the Court of Appeals (composed
    entirely of expatriate, usually South African, judges), the High Court,
    and magistrate courts, all of which are independent of executive and
    military control and free from intimidation from outside forces. The
    expatriate judges, often distinguished members of their respective
    bars, serve on the basis of 2-year renewable contracts. Local judges
    serve indefinitely on good behavior. In magistrate courts, defendants
    are entitled to counsel at their own expense. Court-appointed counsel
    is provided in capital cases or when difficult points of law are at
    issue. There are well-defined appeal procedures up to the Court of
    Appeals, the highest judicial body. A lack of an independent court
    budget, lack of trained manpower, inadequate levels of salary
    remuneration, and managing case work remain problems for the judiciary.
        Most citizens who encounter the legal system do so through the
    traditional courts. The authorities may bring ethnic Swazis to these
    courts for minor offenses and violations of traditional law and custom.
    In traditional courts, defendants are not permitted formal legal
    counsel but may speak on their own behalf and be assisted by informal
    advisers. Sentences are subject to review by traditional authorities
    and can be appealed to the High Court and the Court of Appeals. The
    public prosecutor legally has the authority to determine which court
    should hear a case, but in practice the police usually make the
    determination. Accused persons have the right to transfer their cases
    from the traditional courts. Delays in trials are common.
        In November 1998, the King issued an administrative order that
    strengthened the judicial powers of traditional chiefs appointed by the
    King. The order provides for chiefs'' courts with limited civil and
    criminal jurisdiction and authorizes the imposition of fines up to
    approximately $50 (300 emalangeni), and prison sentences of up to 3
    months. Accused persons are required to appear in person without
    representation by a legal practitioner or advocate. However, chiefs''
    courts only are empowered to administer customary law ``insofar as it
    is not repugnant to natural justice or morality,'' or inconsistent with
    the provisions of any law in force. The order provides that defendants
    may appeal decisions of the chief's court to regional appeal courts and
    to the higher courts of appeal. Appeals in criminal matters can be
    taken to the Judicial Commissioner as a last resort, and the High Court
    is the court of last resort for civil matters. Human rights
    organizations and the press expressed serious concern over issuance of
    the 1998 administrative order.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law requires a warrant from a magistrate before
    police may search homes or other premises, and police generally respect
    this requirement in practice; however, police officers with the rank of
    subinspector or higher have the right to conduct a search without a
    warrant if they believe that evidence might be lost through the delay
    in obtaining a warrant. Searches without warrants occur occasionally.
        There were occurrences of physical surveillance by the police on
    members of labor unions and banned political groups.
        On October 13, the Operation Support Service Unit (OSSU) of the
    Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) and the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force
    (USDF) evicted from their residences and relocated two Swazi chiefs,
    members of their families, and supporters who opposed the imposition of
    a prince in the chiefs'' positions. Reportedly 200 villagers who were
    supporters of the chiefs were scattered throughout the country; some
    were moved to an open field where they sought temporary shelter
    unsuccessfully. Some families were allowed to return to their
    residences after apologizing to Prince Maguga and recognizing him as
    their chief.
        There were reports that in September police entered a private home
    and arrested two SWAYOCO members (see Section 2.b.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government limits freedom of
    speech and of the press through a continuing formal ban on political
    parties and occasional harassment of journalists. The Government also
    has discouraged critical news coverage of the royal family, and
    journalists practice self-censorship in regard to the immediate royal
    family and national security policy.
        During the October 13 eviction of two Swazi chiefs from their
    residences by the Government, some journalists were harassed, and a
    Swazi television journalist was arrested and detained for 4 hours after
    the police confiscated his tape recording and accused him of operating
    as an informant for a foreign government (see Sections 1.f. and 3).
        In September 1999, an editor of an independent newspaper was
    arrested for criminal defamation after reporting that the King's latest
    fiancee, now one of his wives, was a high-school dropout. After being
    released on bail, the editor was fired from his job. In response to the
    scandal, the Ministry of Public Service drafted antidefamation
    statutes, which were pending approval by the Attorney General and
    Parliament in 1999; however, there was no further action on them during
    the year. In February the authorities closed the Government-owned
    newspaper, Swazi Observer, due to alleged financial problems; many
    observers considered this a final response to the negative press
    reports regarding the King's fiancee. Some observers also considered
    the newspaper closure to be a response to the refusal of the newspaper
    to reveal the sources of several stories, including a report on the
    police raid of a SWAYOCO meeting (see Section 2.b.).
        In general both government-owned and independent newspapers covered
    a wide variety of sensitive topics and criticized government
    corruption, inefficiency, and waste, frequently using harsh invectives.
    However, the Government uses the same media to rebut such allegations.
    With some exceptions, the Government continued to withhold its
    advertising from the country's only independently-owned daily
    newspaper. The Prime Minister's office distributes a free weekly
    circular reporting on government policy and activities.
        The Government has a monopoly over television and radio
    programming. There are two government-owned radio stations. There is
    one independent station, but it only broadcasts religious programs. The
    government-owned television and radio stations--the most influential
    media in reaching the public--generally followed official policy
    positions. Government broadcast facilities retransmit Voice of America
    and British Broadcasting Corporation news programs in their entirety.
        Private companies and church groups own several newsletters,
    magazines, and one radio station that broadcasts throughout the region,
    but these generally avoid political controversy. The Christian
    Broadcasting Company radio station is allowed to operate despite the
    fact that it is government policy not to permit private broadcasters to
    operate in the country.
        The practice of self-censorship and the prohibition of political
    gatherings limit academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    restricts freedom of assembly. King Sobhuza's 1973 decree prohibits
    meetings of a political nature, processions, or demonstrations in any
    public place without the consent of the Commissioner of Police. The
    authorities did not routinely grant permission to hold such meetings,
    and on at least one occasion in September, police disrupted meetings
    organized by pro-democracy activists under the authority of the 1973
    decree. There were also reports that police raided a gathering of
    SWAYOCO members and beat and arrested two SWAYOCO members in September
    (see Section 1.d.).
        Several traditional forums exist for the expression of opinion,
    including community meetings, national councils, and direct dialog with
    area chiefs. However, these local channels are not meant as a vehicle
    for political change; they often depend on the whims of leaders and are
    not consistently effective channels for expressing political dissent.
    In addition there was a report that a chief threatened to evict
    families from ancestral land if they included members of a banned
    political party.
        On October 23, members of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions
    (SFTU) and the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT)
    marched to the Prime Minister's office to present a petition denouncing
    the eviction of two chiefs from their residences (see Sections 1.f. and
    3). On October 24, students from the University of Swaziland and
    William Pitcher Teachers'' College, along with opposition leaders, also
    marched to present a petition regarding the evictions but were denied
    entry by police in riot gear and blockades. After several hours, the
    police threatened forcible removal, and the protesters dispersed. It
    was reported that at least 18 students were injured (see Sections 1.c
    and 3).
        The Government restricts freedom of association. King Sobhuza's
    1973 decree prohibits political parties.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--There are no formal constitutional
    provisions for freedom of religion; however, the Government generally
    respects freedom of religion in practice. Followers of all religious
    faiths are generally free to worship without government interference or
    restriction; however, police cancelled two prayer meetings on August 26
    and September 3 on the grounds that they had political overtones. In
    addition, on September 9, police used force to disperse a community
    prayer service just as an opposition leader rose to address the
    meeting. Two individuals were wounded by rubber bullets and 60 persons
    were treated for minor injuries that occurred after police fired tear
    gas canisters into the crowd.
        New religious groups or churches are expected to register with the
    Government upon organizing in the country. Government permission is
    required for the construction of new religious buildings. Non-Christian
    groups sometimes experience minor delays in obtaining permits from the
    Government.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens may travel and work freely
    within the country; however, under traditional law, a married woman
    requires her husband's permission to apply for a passport, and an
    unmarried woman requires the permission of a close male relative. A
    citizenship law passed in 1992 removed several ambiguities relating to
    citizenship and nominally enabled nonethnic Swazis to obtain passports
    and citizenship documents. However, individuals seeking these documents
    sometimes experienced lengthy processing delays, in part due to
    occasional prejudice that mixed-race and white Swazis are not real
    Swazis. Political dissenters often have their citizenship questioned
    and can experience difficulty in obtaining travel documents.
        The Government treats several thousand ethnic Swazis living across
    the border with South Africa as virtually indistinguishable from local
    Swazis and routinely grants them travel and citizenship documents.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
    fully with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as
    the various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) involved in the care
    of refugees. According to the UNHCR, there are an estimated 1,000
    refugees in the country, the majority coming from the Great Lakes
    region and Angola. The issue of provision of first asylum has not
    arisen in recent years.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens are not able to exercise this right. The King retains
    ultimate executive and legislative authority, and political parties are
    prohibited. Passage of legislation by Parliament requires the King's
    assent to become law, which he is not obliged to give. When Parliament
    is not in session, the King may legislate by decree under his residual
    emergency powers. The King chooses the Prime Minister and, in
    consultation with the Prime Minister, also chooses the Cabinet, many
    senior civil servants, and the heads of government offices.
        Citizens elect most members of the lower house of parliament.
    Parliamentary elections were held by secret ballot in October 1998 for
    53 of the 55 elected seats in the 65-seat lower house (the King
    appoints the remaining 10 members), and a by-election was held in
    December 1998 for 1 of the 2 remaining constituencies. The final
    remaining constituency held its by-election in October 1999. The
    continuing ban on political parties and restrictions on political
    activity prompted some political groupings and trade unions to call for
    a boycott of the 1998 elections by their members. Members of the
    Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) who participated in the
    electoral process were threatened with disciplinary measures by the
    labor federation. Election officials reported that approximately
    200,000 of the 400,000 eligible citizens registered for the
    parliamentary elections, and that approximately 120,000 citizens voted,
    although critics questioned that figure.
        There was no formal international observer presence during the 1998
    elections, but there was intensive coverage by local and foreign media,
    and resident diplomats were granted accreditation to observe the
    proceedings freely. Candidates or their representatives also were
    allowed to monitor the elections. Election procedures generally were
    carried out in an orderly fashion. However, the decision to open
    polling stations for further voting a week after the election because
    of torrential rains led to irregularities, including persons being
    found with multiple copies of registration certificates. Alleged
    irregularities led to legal challenges in four constituencies, and the
    High Court overturned the result in one constituency as a result.
    Opposition political groupings remained highly critical of the entire
    electoral process, due to the continuing formal ban on organized
    political party activity.
        In the days leading up to the 1998 elections, the police searched
    dozens of homes, including those of trade union leaders and opposition
    political figures ostensibly in response to some of the bombing
    incidents that occurred between August and November 1998 (see Section
    1.a.). No one was arrested or detained.
        As provided under law, the House of Assembly nominated 10 members
    from the public at large to serve in the upper house or Senate. The
    King appointed the additional 20 Senate members. The Cabinet of
    Ministers, sworn in on November 20, 1998, included only three elected
    Members of Parliament, with the balance drawn from appointed members of
    the House and Senate.
        Elections were held by secret ballot without major difficulties in
    August 1998 to select new municipal councils in 11 cities and towns
    across the country. Approximately 70 percent of all eligible voters
    registered to vote, but only 22 percent of registered voters actually
    cast ballots. Citizens voted largely without interference or
    intimidation, except for scattered incidents in Mbabane where
    representatives of PUDEMO opposed to participation in the election
    attempted to deter voting activities.
        Pressure has been building for several years to modernize the
    political system, and both the King and the Government recognize that
    there is a need for political reform, including the drafting of a new
    constitution and, specifically, a bill of rights. In 1996 the King
    appointed a 30-member Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), with the
    stated purpose of examining the suspended 1968 Constitution, carrying
    out civic education, determining citizens'' wishes regarding a future
    system of government, and making appropriate recommendations on a new
    constitution. The CRC compiled a constitutional framework, including
    portions of the 1968 Constitution still in force, the 1973 decree as
    currently amended, and the 1992 Establishment of Parliament Order. The
    CRC distributed this framework nationwide as a starting point for
    discussion. However, the CRC made very limited progress due to members
    resigning to protest the Commission's terms of reference, and multiple
    internal disputes. At year's end, the CRC had 22 members after four
    members resigned and four died during the year. Observers criticized
    the independence of the CRC because the majority of its members are
    traditionalists. In addition the Government prohibited media coverage
    and group submissions. In October, after several extensions of its
    deadline, the CRC submitted a draft report to the King; however, the
    report was not released to the public by year's end, and it is not
    scheduled for release until 2001.
        On at least one occasion in September police disrupted meetings
    held by pro-democracy activists, and in February police raided a
    SWAYOCO meeting (see Section 2.b.).
        On October 13, the Operation Support Service Unit (OSSU) of the
    Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) and the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force
    (USDF) evicted from their residences and relocated two Swazi chiefs,
    members of their families and supporters. Although the Chief Justice
    issued a ruling against the eviction order on September 5, the Chief
    Justice subsequently rescinded it after the Attorney General presented
    an affidavit stating that the King had decreed the evictions (see
    Sections 1.e., 1.f., 2.a., and 2.b). The case was appealed to the Court
    of Appeals, which ruled on December 14 that the Chief Justice's
    original ruling was correct. The two chiefs and some of their
    supporters sought asylum in a neighboring country. The 1998
    Administrative Order was cited by the Minister of Home Affairs as a
    justification for ousting the two chieftains and imposing upon the
    communities Prince Maguga Dlamini of the royal family as the new chief
    despite the fact that custom implies that chieftancy is hereditary.
    Several communities organized prayer meetings where they questioned the
    validity of the order.
        Human rights organizations, church groups, labor unions, and other
    NGO's conducted their own active programs of constitutional and human
    rights civic education. In May the National Democratic Institute, in
    conjunction with the country's Council of Churches, organized a 3-day
    constitutional conference that was well-supported and well-received by
    these groups as well as the Government.
        Women generally have full legal rights to participate in the
    political process; however, women are underrepresented in the
    Government and politics. There are 4 women in the 65-member House of
    Assembly formed after the October 1998 elections, 4 women in the 30-
    seat Senate, and 2 women among the 16 ministers in the Cabinet. A woman
    serves as Secretary to the Cabinet and the head of the civil service.
    Three women serve as principal secretaries, the most senior civil
    service rank in the ministries. There are 3 women on the 30-person
    Constitutional Review Commission. However, in accordance with societal
    practice, widows in mourning (for periods that can vary from 6 months
    to 3 years) are prevented from appearing in certain public places and
    from being near the King and, as a result, can be excluded from voting
    or running for office.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government permits domestic human rights groups to operate.
    Human rights groups often have spoken out on a number of occasions,
    criticizing the lack of accountability and transparency in government
    circles. There were no visits by international human rights
    organizations, although foreign diplomats and local representatives of
    international agencies were invited to tour correctional facilities
    (see Section 1.c.). The Government solicited and obtained expert
    assistance from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1997 to
    form a tripartite committee charged with redrafting national industrial
    relations legislation, and in October requested the assistance of the
    ILO to bring the 2000 IRA into conformity with international labor
    standards (see Section 6). In November an ILO team traveled to the
    country to provide technical assistance in drafting a final, amended
    version of the 2000 IRA.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1980 Employment Act forbids employers to discriminate on the
    basis of race, religion, sex, or political affiliation. Under the act,
    employees may bring suit against employers for discrimination, and
    there also are provisions for criminal prosecutions; however, there is
    no record of any suits or prosecutions. The act reportedly has been
    used on occasion to bring moral suasion to bear against employers.
    Legal and cultural discrimination against women remains a problem.
    Mixed race citizens sometimes experience societal discrimination.
        Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, is
    frequent, despite traditional strictures against this practice. Women
    have the right to charge their husbands with assault under both the
    Western and the traditional legal systems, and urban women frequently
    do so, usually in extreme cases when intervention by extended family
    members fails to end such violence. Rural women often have no
    alternative but to suffer in silence if family intervention does not
    succeed, because the traditional courts can be unsympathetic to
    ``unruly'' or ``disobedient'' women and are less likely than the modern
    courts to convict men for wife beating. Rape is also common and is
    regarded by many men as a minor offense, while women are inhibited from
    reporting such crimes by a sense of shame and helplessness, especially
    when incest is involved. Even in the modern courts, sentences
    frequently amount to no more than several months in jail, a fine, or
    both. The Legal Code provides some legal protection from sexual
    harassment, but its provisions are vague and largely ineffective.
    Several NGO's provide support for victims of abuse or discrimination.
        Women occupy a subordinate role in society. In both civil and
    traditional marriages, wives are treated as minors legally, although
    those who marry under civil law may be accorded the legal status of
    adults, if stipulated in a signed prenuptial agreement. A woman
    generally requires her husband's permission to borrow money, open a
    bank account, obtain a passport, leave the country, gain access to
    land, and, in some cases, take a job. An unmarried woman requires a
    close male relative's permission to obtain a passport (see Section
    2.d). Despite the 1980 Employment Act that required equal pay for equal
    work, men's average wage rates by skill category usually exceed those
    of women.
        The dualistic nature of the legal system complicates the issue of
    women's rights. Since traditional marriage is governed by uncodified
    law and custom, women's rights often are unclear and change according
    to where and by whom they are interpreted. Couples often marry in both
    civil and traditional ceremonies, creating problems in determining
    which set of rules applies to the marriage and to subsequent questions
    of child custody and inheritance in the event of divorce or death. In
    traditional marriages, a man may take more than one wife. A man who
    marries a woman under civil law legally may not have more than one
    wife, although in practice this restriction sometimes is ignored.
    Traditional marriages consider children to belong to the father and to
    his family if the couple divorces. Children born out of wedlock are
    viewed as belonging to the mother. Under the 1992 Citizenship Act, a
    woman does not pass citizenship automatically to her children.
    Inheritances are passed through male children only.
        Changing socioeconomic conditions, urbanization, and the increasing
    prominence of female leaders in government and civic organizations are
    breaking down barriers to equality. Women routinely execute contracts
    and enter into a variety of transactions in their own names. The
    Government has committed itself to various women's initiatives, and the
    Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates women's issues. For example, the
    Government established a task force to address domestic gender issues
    and has held workshops for journalists in 1998 on gender sensitivity,
    while the Ministry of Education has launched an initiative to promote
    gender sensitization of school curriculums.
        Children.--The Government is concerned with the rights and welfare
    of children, and a number of laws directly address children's issues.
    The Government does not provide free, compulsory education for
    children. The Government pays teachers' salaries while student fees pay
    for books and the buildings' fund. Supplemental money sometimes must be
    raised for building upkeep, including teachers' housing. However, the
    country has a 99 percent primary school enrollment rate. A government
    task force educates the public on children's issues.
        Child abuse is a problem. Children convicted of crimes sometimes
    are caned as punishment. There is a growing number of street children
    in Mbabane and Manzini. The law provides protection to children under
    16 years from sexual exploitation and sets the age of sexual consent at
    16 years (see Section 6.d.); however, female children sometimes suffer
    sexual abuse, including by family members.
        People with Disabilities.--The Ministry of Home Affairs has called
    for equal treatment of the disabled; however, there are no laws that
    protect the rights of the disabled or that mandate accessibility for
    the disabled to buildings, transportation, or government services. A
    government task force was established in 1997 to address issues
    affecting persons with disabilities, and in December 1998 the Minister
    of Health and Social Welfare announced that a bill giving preferential
    treatment to disabled persons for building access and other needs was
    in the final stages of preparation for submission to the Parliament.
    The bill has yet to be introduced in Parliament; however, all new
    government buildings under construction include improvements for the
    disabled, including accessibility ramps.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1996 IRA permitted workers in all
    elements of the economy, including the public sector, to join unions
    and allowed unions to associate freely in the context of traditional
    trade union concerns; however, it imposed criminal penalties for union
    activity outside core union concerns, specifically on social or
    political issues, and provided that the Government could suspend or
    close down unions that focused too much on such noncore labor matters.
    It prohibited trade union federations (but not individual unions) or
    their officers from engaging in any act that ``causes or incites'' the
    slowdown or cessation of work or economic activity, or from acting in
    any way that might be construed as a ``restraint of trade,'' with 5
    years' imprisonment the maximum penalty for such violations. Employers
    faced equivalent penalties for unauthorized lockouts. The 1996 IRA
    confined unions and employer organizations to single industries, and
    did not permit organization across economic and industrial sectors,
    contrary to ILO Convention 87. On August 25, the Industrial Relations
    Act, signed into law in June by King Mswati III, came into effect and
    replaced the 1996 Industrial Relations Act. It was expected that the
    new act would improve many of the past inequities in the 1996 labor law
    and bring the country into full conformity with international labor
    conventions. The act had been endorsed by employees and employers, and
    passed both houses of Parliament; however, the Swaziland National
    Council (SNC), an appointed body of traditional advisors to the King,
    made several amendments to the legislation which Parliament then
    approved, before the King signed the act that inhibit the right of
    association. However, the Government, with technical assistance from
    the ILO, revised the controversial amendments in the act, and the
    amended act was passed by Parliament and signed by the King in
    November. The final, amended 2000 IRA remedies many of the inequities
    of the 1996 IRA and provides that an employee who is not engaged in an
    essential service has the right to participate in a peaceful protest
    action to promote socio-economic interests.
        The main trade union federation is the Swaziland Federation of
    Trade Unions (SFTU). A second trade union federation is the Swaziland
    Federation of Labor, which broke away from the SFTU in 1993 and gained
    formal recognition from the Government in 1994.
        Unions are free to draw up their own constitutions within the
    framework of the 2000 IRA, as under the 1996 IRA. The 2000 act
    specifies a number of provisions that must be addressed in a
    constitution, including the election of officers by secret ballot. The
    Labor Commissioner must approve the union constitution, and can strike
    out or amend provisions that violate the law. The Government may
    suspend unions that fail to maintain proper registration with the Labor
    Commissioner without recourse to judicial review (under the 1996 act it
    could dissolve such unions). There is no collusion between the
    Government and business in relation to worker rights. The Labor
    Commissioner may reinstate unions quickly, once they have met all the
    legal requirements of the 2000 act.
        The 2000 IRA, like the 1996 IRA, details the steps to be followed
    when disputes arise, including the definition of a legal or illegal
    strike. The final, amended 2000 IRA shortened the notice that an
    organization or federation is required to give before it commences a
    protest action from 3 weeks to 2 weeks. The act empowers the Government
    to mediate employment disputes and grievances through the Labor
    Advisory Board. When disputes arise, the Government often intervenes to
    try to reduce the chances of a strike, which may not be called legally
    until all avenues of negotiation have been exhausted, and a secret
    ballot of union members has been conducted. The 2000 law prohibits
    strikes in ``essential'' services, which include police and security
    forces, correctional services, fire fighting, health, and many civil
    service positions. The 1996 law had included other occupations such as
    electricity, water, sanitation, telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting
    under the ``essential services'' category.
        In recent years, there have been a number of strikes, usually over
    wages and benefits, or the dismissal of fellow workers. Approximately
    32 state television employees were dismissed in November 1999 after
    striking for higher wages and better working conditions. On September
    14, the Minister of Public Service and Information ordered the
    reinstatement of the employees; however, on September 20 he withdrew
    the order, citing lack of jurisdiction over the matter. On September 28
    and 29, the SFTU and Swaziland Federation of Labor (SFL) called a
    nationwide strike to protest the controversial clauses in the 2000 IRA;
    however, a last minute court order declared the strike illegal and
    discouraged many workers from participating. There were reports that
    riot police and soldiers were dispatched to the potential strike site
    and set up road blocks between the town of Manzini and the capital.
    Unionists alleged that police shot at a group of workers in Manzini,
    but there were no reports of arrests or injuries.
        Although the Government maintained that all outstanding issues
    already had been addressed, the SFTU continued to press for action on
    the 27 demands it presented in 1994, including calls for fundamental
    political change. These demands addressed a wide range of issues,
    including recognition of affirmative action, a national uniform minimum
    wage, an end to discrimination against women, the provision of better
    housing for workers, inclusion of worker representatives in
    constitutional discussions, and the lifting of the 1973 Decree that
    suspended the Constitution and outlawed political parties.
        The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) had noted discrepancies between
    the 1996 IRA and ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and ILO
    Convention 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectively. The
    COE concerns included the powers accorded government officials to
    control union activity and the strictures on the ability of workers to
    form unions and associate with other unions at home and abroad.
    Although the COE was expected to highlight any discrepancies between
    the 2000 IRA and the ILO conventions at its November-December meeting,
    the Government's revisions of the act in November, with ILO assistance,
    precluded that review.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 2000 IRA,
    like the 1996 IRA, provides for the right to organize and bargain
    collectively and outlaws antiunion discrimination. Collective
    bargaining is widespread; approximately 80 percent of the formal
    private sector is unionized. The law obliges employers to recognize a
    union when it achieves over 50 percent membership among employees.
    Employers must allow representatives of legally recognized unions to
    conduct union activities on company time. The Industrial Court may
    refuse to register collective bargaining agreements in the event of
    nonobservance of any requirement of the 2000 IRA. The 1996 IRA
    prohibited trade union federations or their officers, but not
    individual unions, from inciting any slowdown of work or economic
    activity or acting in any way that might be construed as a restraint of
    trade. It provided equivalent penalties to employers in the case of
    unauthorized lockouts. The 2000 IRA entitles works councils, which are
    to be established in factories with 25 or more employees in the absence
    of a trade union, to negotiate terms and conditions of work, wages, and
    welfare.
        Disputes were referred to the Labor Commissioner and the Industrial
    Court, if necessary. Although many employers resisted recognition and
    forced the issue to the Industrial Court, the Court generally ruled in
    favor of the unions in these cases. In the case of unfair dismissal,
    the court could order reinstatement and compensation for the employee,
    as well as fine the employer. Union leaders made credible charges that
    management in various industries dismissed workers for union activity.
    The Government sometimes instigated such dismissals. The 2000 act
    provides for disputes to be referred to the Conciliation, Mediation,
    and Arbitration Committee (CMAC). The Deputy Labor Commissioner chairs
    the CMAC.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor, including by children, and the Government generally
    enforces this prohibition effectively; however, the SFTU cited the 1998
    Administrative Order as a form of forced labor, because it reinforces
    the tradition of residents doing traditional tasks for chiefs and
    allows the chiefs to fine their subjects for failing to carry out the
    manual labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1980 Employment Act prohibits the hiring of a child
    below the age of 15 in an industrial undertaking, except in cases where
    only family members are employed in the firm, or in technical schools
    where children are working under the supervision of a teacher or other
    authorized person. Legislation limits the number of night hours that
    can be worked on schooldays, and limits children's work-hours overall
    to 6 per day or 33 per week. Employment of children in the formal
    sector is not customary; however, children below the minimum age
    frequently are employed in the agricultural sector, particularly in the
    eastern cotton-growing region. Children also are employed as domestic
    workers, and as herd boys in rural areas. The Ministry of Labor is
    responsible for enforcement, but its effectiveness is limited by
    personnel shortages. The law prohibits prostitution and child
    pornography. The age of protection against sexual exploitation and the
    age of sexual consent is 16 years; however, there were reports that
    Mozambican girls worked as prostitutes in the country.
        The law prohibits forced labor, including by children, and the
    Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legally mandated
    sliding scale of minimum wages depending on the type of work performed.
    These minimum wages generally provide a worker and family with a decent
    standard of living. The minimum monthly wage for a domestic worker is
    approximately $30 (180 emalangeni), for an unskilled worker $47 (280
    emalangeni), and for a skilled worker $75 (450 emalangeni).
        Labor, management, and government representatives have negotiated a
    maximum 48-hour workweek in the industrial sector, except for security
    guards who work up to six 12-hour shifts per week. The Employment Act
    and the Wages Act entitle all workers to 1 day of rest per week. Most
    workers receive a minimum of 12 days annual leave. The Labor
    Commissioner enforces standards in the formal sector. There are
    extensive provisions allowing workers to seek redress for alleged
    wrongful dismissal; these provisions frequently are brought into play.
    There also are penalties for employers who conduct unauthorized
    lockouts.
        Extensive legislation protects worker health and safety. The
    Government sets safety standards for industrial operations, and it
    encourages private companies to develop accident prevention programs.
    Recent growth in industrial production has necessitated more government
    action on safety issues. However, the Labor Commissioner's office has
    conducted few safety inspections in recent years because of staffing
    deficiencies. Workers have no formal statutory rights to remove
    themselves from dangerous work places without jeopardizing their jobs;
    nor do any collective bargaining agreements address the matter.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, although there are laws prohibiting procurement, including
    by coercion and within and across borders, for the purposes of
    prostitution, and, unlike in the previous year, there were no reports
    that women and children were trafficked for sexual exploitation during
    the year.
                                   __________

                                    TANZANIA

        The United Republic of Tanzania amended its Constitution in 1992 to
    become a multiparty state. On October 29, the country conducted its
    second multiparty national elections for president and parliament. On
    the mainland, international observers concluded that the elections were
    free and fair and conducted peacefully. The incumbent President of the
    mainland, Benjamin Mkapa, was reelected with 71 percent of the vote,
    and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party made significant gains
    in its majority in Parliament, winning 167 out of 181 seats. In the
    October elections, opposition candidates gained 11 seats in 6 of the 19
    mainland regions, giving them a total of 14 seats in Parliament in 8
    out of 20 regions. In the 5 administrative regions of Zanzibar, the
    opposition Civic United Front (CUF) won 16 seats. The islands of
    Zanzibar are integrated into the United Republic's governmental and
    party structure; however, the Zanzibar Government, which has its own
    president and parliament, exercises considerable autonomy. In October
    presidential and parliamentary elections took place in Zanzibar;
    however, the vote was marred by irregularities, voter intimidation, and
    politically-motivated violence. Votes were cancelled in 16
    constituencies, and new votes were held on November 5. The CUF
    boycotted the revotes in protest. The ruling CCM party won a majority
    of 34 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 seats in the
    National Assembly. The national judiciary is formally independent but
    suffers from corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference.
        The police have primary responsibility for maintaining law and
    order. They formerly were supported by citizens'' anticrime groups and
    patrols known as ``Sungusungu.'' The Sungusungu remain active in rural
    areas, but have virtually disappeared from urban areas. There are also
    Sungusungu groups composed of refugees in most refugee camps that act
    as quasi-official security forces. The military is composed of the
    Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF). The People's Militia Field
    Force (FFU) is a division of the national police force. Security forces
    regularly committed human rights abuses.
        Agriculture provides 85 percent of employment. Cotton, coffee,
    cashews, sisal, tea, and gemstones account for most export earnings.
    The industrial sector is small. Economic reforms undertaken since 1986,
    including liberalization of agricultural policy, the privatization of
    state-owned enterprises, the rescheduling of foreign debt payments, and
    the freeing of the currency exchange rate, helped to stimulate economic
    growth, as has the decline in the rate of inflation. In 1999 the gross
    domestic product (GDP) was $8,019 million. The GDP growth rate was 4
    percent and per capita GDP equaled $252 for the first quarter of the
    year. While the Government has attempted to improve its fiscal
    management, pervasive corruption constrains economic progress.
        The Government's human rights record was poor; while there were
    improvements in a few areas, there continued to be serious problems.
    Citizens' right to change their government in Zanzibar continued to be
    circumscribed severely by abuses of and limitations on civil liberties.
    Police continued to harass and intimidate members and supporters of the
    political opposition before and after the October elections. Security
    forces committed extrajudicial killings and beat and otherwise
    mistreated suspects. The police in Zanzibar attacked and beat
    civilians, and there were reports that police in Zanzibar used torture,
    including floggings. Police also beat demonstrators. Prison conditions
    remained harsh and life threatening. Arbitrary arrest and detention and
    prolonged detention remained problems. The inefficient and corrupt
    judicial system often did not provide expeditious and fair trials.
    Pervasive corruption, which was documented in the Warioba Commission's
    1997 report, continued to have a broad impact on human rights. The
    Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and limited freedom of
    speech and of the press, and freedom of assembly and association.
    Significant resentment and hostility led to attacks on some refugees.
    The Government obstructed the formation of domestic human rights
    groups. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
    problems. Abuse of children, female genital mutilation (FGM), and child
    prostitution were problems. The Government continued to infringe on
    workers' rights and child labor persisted. There were some instances of
    forced labor. Mob justice remained severe and widespread.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, the authorities were
    responsible for a number of extrajudicial killings. Security forces
    used excessive force while dispersing demonstrations and political
    meetings on the mainland, which resulted in some deaths (see Section
    2.b.). In May FFU officers in Iringa were accused of beating a man to
    death for not paying a ``development levy;'' no further information was
    available on the case at year's end. In July police killed a prisoner
    while he was in remand. No further information was available on the
    case at year's end.
        In February 1999, two police and two FFU officers were accused of
    beating to death a prisoner in detention. No further action was taken
    against those responsible by year's end.
        In October 1999, in retaliation for a theft, TPDF soldiers in
    Dodoma attacked a village, killing one civilian. No further action was
    taken against those responsible by year's end.
        In February 1999, members of the quasi-official citizens''
    anticrime group known as Sungusungu killed five persons accused of
    murdering witches in Shinyanga. The case still was under investigation
    by local authorities, and no further action was taken by year's end.
        Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. A prisoner in
    Moshi Prison died in July. Although the police denied responsibility,
    the autopsy showed the body was beaten badly and possibly strangled.
    The Government had not undertaken an investigation into the incident by
    year's end (see Section 1.c.).
        In 1998 police opened fire on protestors who rioted in Mwembechai
    when police attempted to disperse a crowd of Muslims protesting the
    arrest of a popular Muslim leader, killing three persons and wounding
    several others. Subsequently, 23 Members of Parliament (M.P.'s)
    demanded parliamentary discussion of police brutality in connection
    with the incident, but the National Assembly Speaker denied the
    request, saying that it was an internal police matter. No further
    action was taken in connection with the matter during the year.
        There were no developments in the 1993 police killing of a member
    of the opposition party Civic United Front (CUF) on the island of
    Pemba. After a lengthy investigation, the authorities charged the
    policeman who fired the shots with involuntary manslaughter; the
    officer remains free on bail. Nearly 8 years after the event, the case
    still has not gone to trial. Observers believe that the case will never
    be tried.
        Instances of mob justice against suspected criminals continued to
    claim dozens of lives. Throughout the year, the media reported numerous
    incidents in which mobs killed suspected thieves, who were stoned,
    lynched, beaten to death, or doused with gasoline and set on fire. Such
    events are so common that they often are grouped together in newspapers
    with reporting on car accidents and other mishaps. Many instances never
    are reported. The widespread belief in witchcraft has led, in some
    instances, to the killing of alleged witches by their ``victims,''
    aggrieved relatives, or mobs. The Government estimated in 1998 that in
    the Mwanza region alone at least 50 persons are killed every year by
    those who believe them to be witches. Government officials criticized
    these practices and some arrests were made; however, most perpetrators
    of witch killing or mob justice elude arrest, and the Government did
    not take preventive measures during the year.
        On October 6, 21 persons were beaten to death and 50 injured in a
    clash over a theft between ethnic Sonje and Maasai groups (see Section
    5).
        There was continuing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by
    some Burundian and Rwandan refugees, although such violence has
    diminished since 1999 (see Section 1.c.). Local officials complained
    that refugees committed killings and robberies. In a well-publicized
    case, Burundian refugees were accused of killing a local schoolteacher
    in May 1999, and in a reprisal attack, a group of men raped
    approximately 50 refugee women (see Section 1.c.).
        On August 7, 1998, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy in Dar Es
    Salaam, killing 11 persons and injuring more than 85 others. The
    Government cooperated with international efforts to apprehend the
    suspects; one suspect was arrested in 1999, and the trial was scheduled
    for early 2001.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and inhuman
    or degrading treatment; however, the police regularly threaten,
    mistreat, or occasionally beat suspected criminals during and after
    their apprehension and interrogation. Police also use the same means to
    obtain information about suspects from family members not in custody
    (see Section 1.f.). There were reports that police in Zanzibar use
    torture. Police and security forces used beatings and other forms of
    physical abuse regularly by police and security forces to disperse
    large gatherings and as a form of public punishment. Although
    government officials usually criticize these practices, the Government
    seldom prosecutes police for such abuses.
        Incidents of police brutality occurred during the year. Repeated
    reports indicate that the police used torture, including beatings and
    floggings, in Zanzibar, notably on the island of Pemba. Both the
    Zanzibar and Union Governments have denied these charges, and no action
    was taken against those responsible for abuses. There were numerous
    reports that police randomly beat pedestrians, bicyclists, and
    automobile drivers that they had stopped at intersections. For example,
    in April CUF supporters severely beat and injured two police officers
    who sought to break up an indoor opposition meeting (see Sections 1.d.
    and 2.b.). In response, the police in the following 2 weeks randomly
    attacked and beat pedestrians and passers-by on the streets of Stone
    Town. In April the Union Inspector General Omari Mahita, said publicly
    that the show of force was needed to restore respect for the police
    force in Zanzibar. Beginning on April 6 and continuing throughout the
    month, there were credible reports of police brutality in Zanzibar. On
    April 12, there were reports that police officers marched through Stone
    Town and indiscriminately beat passers-by, including children, with
    batons and rifle butts. Several persons received injuries that required
    medical treatment, including a 13-year-old girl with a fractured elbow.
        Credible evidence indicates that police seriously injured children
    as young as 7 years of age and elderly residents, in some cases
    inflicting limb fractures and facial scars. There also was credible
    evidence that during this period, police officers shot and injured a
    bicyclist and threw him into a ditch. Several diplomatic missions
    formally criticized the Government for these abuses. The Government had
    not investigated the incident nor punished the responsible officers by
    year's end.
        On January 19, police used tear gas to disperse riots that began
    when hundreds of CUF supporters were not allowed to observe the trial
    of 18 CUF supporters accused of treason (see Section 1.d.). The
    incident lasted for 4 hours, and approximately 70 persons were injured,
    including some police officers (see Sections 1.e. and 3). Several
    persons were arrested and detained during the incident.
        In early October, eight members of the FFU reportedly beat a man
    after they took him into custody (see Section 1.d.).
        On October 11, police shot and injured six CUF supporters at a
    CUFsponsored election rally at a party office in Zanzibar (see Sections
    2.b. and 3). Members of the TPDF who arrived after the shootings
    criticized the FFU for not following correct procedures; however, the
    police had not investigated the incident nor punished the responsible
    officers by year's end.
        On October 28, police beat a man during a CUF meeting after he
    reportedly did not move his food stand quickly enough for the police
    (see Section 2.b.).
        On October 29, Fortunatus Masha, an opposition candidate who was
    vice-chairman of his party was beaten and injured by police in Mwanza
    district during an altercation at a ballot counting center over
    possible ballot rigging in favor of the CCM party.
        On October 30, police used excessive force and beat both
    demonstrators and bystanders during rallies and demonstrations in the
    Darajani district of Stone Town in Zanzibar (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
    FFU officers beat and shot demonstrators, who were chanting
    antigovernment slogans, resulting in a number of injuries and arrests.
    On October 30, police also used tear gas, rubber bullets, and live
    ammunition against CUF opposition activists in Zanzibar, injuring six
    persons. There also were reports that police beat with truncheons and
    rifle butts at least 15 persons whom they had forcibly removed from
    shops.
        On October 29, police injured several persons whom they arrested at
    a CUF office in Pemba (see Section 1.d.).
        After the elections, police reportedly beat persons for violating a
    7 p.m. curfew imposed in Wete, Pemba (see Section 1.f.).
        On November 1, a group of CCM members reportedly beat several CUF
    officials in Stone Town in Zanzibar as police watched without
    intervening.
        In November police reportedly broke the jaw of a detainee (see
    Section 1.d.).
        There were reports of beatings and assault by police officers and
    army units in areas around roadblocks in Pemba. Police reportedly
    targeted elderly, infirm, and mentally ill persons (see Section 2.d.).
        During the repeat elections on November 5, police beat and
    reportedly tortured opposition officials in Zanzibar (see Section 3).
    There were reports that police beat and tortured opposition officials
    who they had taken at gunpoint to a beach. There were reports that
    police beat and whipped two CUF supporters, and forced them to lie in
    the street in urine.
        Pervasive corruption is a serious problem in the police force (see
    Section 1.d.). The Government took some steps during the year to
    discourage and punish such abuses. In July the police force began an
    internal investigation of a police officer in Dar Es Salaam accused of
    harassing and attempting to bribe a local businessman. The spokesperson
    for the police force stated that if the police officer was found
    guilty, the police force would take ``exemplary'' measures; however, no
    action was taken on this case by year's end.
        The People's Militia Laws, as amended by Parliament in 1989, bestow
    quasilegal status on the traditional Sungusungu neighborhood and
    village anticrime groups. Participation in these groups was compulsory
    prior to the 1995 election. In the past, these groups were criticized
    for using excessive force against criminal suspects. While largely
    moribund since 1995, the Sungusungu still exist, particularly in rural
    areas such as the Tabora, Shinyanga, and Mwanza regions. As a result of
    the President's 1997 initiative to have government law enforcement
    officials work cooperatively with Sungusungu, members of Sungusungu
    were given additional benefits on a par with those given to members of
    the police officials, including the right to arrest persons. In return
    members of Sungusungu were to be held accountable for any abuses;
    during the year, one member was prosecuted for abuses, and three others
    reportedly were sentenced to 30 years in prison for killing civilians
    in Tabora.
        On November 6, a bomb exploded at a school in Stone Town in
    Zanzibar that was being used as a polling office for the November 5 re-
    run elections (see Section 3). No group had claimed responsibility by
    year's end.
        On October 6, 21 persons were beaten to death and 50 injured in a
    clash over a theft between ethnic Sonje and Maasai groups (see Section
    5).
        As a result of increased criminal activity allegedly perpetrated by
    some Burundian refugees, there is significant hostility and resentment
    against Burundian refugees. In May 1999, in Kasulu, approximately 50
    Burundian refugee women collecting firewood allegedly were attacked and
    raped by villagers in reprisal for the killing of a local teacher (see
    Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). Eleven men were arrested for the rape in 1999.
    On December 17, the case was dismissed on a technicality. The police
    appealed the magistrate's decision to the High Court in Tabora, which
    overturned the dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court for
    retrial. The retrial was pending in Kigoma at year's end.
        There was continuing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by
    some armed Burundian and Rwandan refugees, although such violence has
    diminished since 1999. Local officials reported incidents of banditry,
    armed robbery, and violent crime, perpetrated by refugees in the areas
    surrounding refugee camps (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Women and girls in
    refugee camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse
    perpetrated by other refugees (see Section 5). There were also credible
    reports that some refugees engage in vigilante justice within camps,
    occasionally beating other refugees (see Section 2.d.).
        Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Government
    officials acknowledged that prisons are overcrowded, and living
    conditions are poor. The prisons were designed to hold 21,000 persons,
    but the actual prison population is estimated at 43,000 persons; an
    estimated 40 percent of this number are remandees. The Government is
    expanding prisons, but its efforts have not kept pace with the growing
    number of prisoners. Some prisoners are paroled or receive suspended
    sentences as a means of relieving overcrowding problem. The Government
    did not release statistics on the prison expansion program or on the
    exact extent of the overcrowding during the year. The daily amount of
    food allotted to prisoners is insufficient to meet their nutritional
    needs, and even this amount is not provided regularly. Convicted
    prisoners are not allowed to receive food from outside sources and
    often are moved to different prisons without notification to their
    families. In April a prisoner on remand alleged that he was held for 4
    days without being given food (see Section 1.d.).
        In 1998 the Commissioner of Prisons stated that his department
    received inadequate funds for medicine and medical supplies. Prison
    dispensaries only offer limited treatment, and friends and family
    members of prisoners generally must provide medication or the funds
    with which to purchase it. Serious diseases, such as dysentery,
    malaria, and cholera, are common and result in numerous deaths. Amnesty
    International visited the prison and reported that 18 CUF prisoners who
    were in prison on treason charges were denied adequate medical
    treatment while in the Zanzibar Central Prison (see Section 1.d.).
    However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited
    the 18 CUF prisoners and reported that they consistently were given
    better food, space, and medical treatment than other prisoners held in
    the same location. A prisoner in Moshi Prison died in July (see Section
    1.a.). Prison officials claim the death was a result of tuberculosis
    and AIDS, but the autopsy that showed the body was badly beaten. There
    are credible reports that guards beat and abuse prisoners. There were
    reports that prisoners were strip-searched in front of other prisoners.
    The Warioba Commission released in 1997 reported that wardens give
    favorable treatment to certain prisoners at the expense of others.
    Pretrial detainees are held together with those serving sentences but
    are allowed to receive food from the outside.
        The Prisons Act requires that prisoners be separated based on age
    and gender, and female prisoners are held separately from male
    prisoners in practice. Women sent to remand prison report being forced
    to sleep naked and being subjected to sexual abuse by wardens.
    Juveniles are protected under both the Prisons Act and the Young
    Persons Ordinance Act, which also requires separation according to age.
    However, there are limited resources to provide for juveniles and only
    two juvenile detention facilities in the country, and as a result
    juveniles are not always separated from adults in practice.
        Local nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are permitted to
    monitor prison conditions; however, the Government has not granted
    permission to international NGO's to monitor prison conditions. The
    ICRC was permitted to visit select groups of prisoners 4 times per
    year, including the 18 CUF members arrested in Zanzibar, and combatants
    imprisoned in the western part of the country. The Government requested
    ICRC assistance with a cholera outbreak in mainland prisons during the
    year. It also invited the ICRC to monitor conditions in a small prison
    that holds special categories of refugees that are not included under
    UNHCR jurisdiction, such as combatants. The Government denied a request
    from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to visit refugees
    in prisons in Dar Es Salaam.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. The Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 1985,
    requires that a person arrested for a crime, other than a national
    security detainee under the Preventive Detention Act, be charged before
    a magistrate within 24 hours; however, in practice the police often
    fail to comply. During the year, authorities on the mainland and in
    Zanzibar arrested or threatened with arrest opponents of the Government
    for acts that it regarded as seditious.
        The 1985 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code restricted the
    right to bail and imposed strict conditions on freedom of movement and
    association when bail is granted. Because of backlogs, an average case
    takes 2 to 3 years or longer to come to trial. Observers estimate that
    only approximately 5 percent of persons held in remand ultimately are
    convicted, and in many cases, those convicted already had served their
    full sentences before their trial was held. On March 10, inmates at
    Keko remand prison went on a hunger strike to press for prompt hearings
    of their cases. Court officials stated that the cases had been delayed
    because of a lack of funds.
        In April authorities held a drug suspect in Moshi in remand for 4
    days without questioning him, despite a law that requires detainees be
    questioned within 48 hours of their arrest. The detainee alleged that
    he was held without food during that time. There was no further
    information available on the case at year's end.
        In some cases, accused persons are denied the right to contact a
    lawyer or talk with family members. Bribes often determine whether bail
    is granted or even whether a case is judged as a civil or criminal
    matter. There are reports of prisoners waiting several years for trial
    because they could not pay bribes to police and court officials. The
    authorities acknowledge that some cases have been pending for several
    years.
        Under the Preventive Detention Act, the President may order the
    arrest and indefinite detention without bail of any person considered
    dangerous to the public order or national security. This act, as
    amended in 1985, requires that the Government release detainees within
    15 days of detention or inform them of the reason for their detention.
    A detainee also is allowed to challenge the grounds for detention at
    90-day intervals. The Preventive Detention Act has not been used for
    many years nor was it used during the year; however, despite a landmark
    ruling by the Court of Appeal in 1991 that the Preventive Detention Act
    could not be used to deny bail to persons not considered dangerous to
    society, the Government still has not introduced corrective
    legislation. In 1992 the Nyalali report on repressive laws, drafted by
    the president-appointed Nyalali Commission in 1992, recommended that
    the act be repealed; however, in 1998 the Government stated that there
    was no need to rewrite the Constitution or repeal any legislation,
    including the Preventative Detention Act. The Government has additional
    broad detention powers under the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act
    and Area Commissioners Act of 1962. These acts permit regional and
    district commissioners to arrest and detain for 48 hours, persons who
    may ``disturb public tranquillity.''
        Police continued to make arbitrary arrests, often as a means of
    securing money. In previous years, the police occasionally arrested
    relatives of criminal suspects and held them in custody without charge
    for as long as several years in an attempt to force suspects to
    surrender; however, there were no reports of this occurring during the
    year. Such detainees who managed to get their cases before a judge
    usually were set free; however, some were rearrested immediately when
    they left the courtroom.
        On April 1, police arrested CUF leader Seif Shariff Hamad at an
    indoor CUF meeting in Zanzibar; on April 3, he was released on bail. In
    April police launched a campaign to apprehend persons who had attacked
    police officers attempting to break up the meeting (see Section 1.c.),
    and arrested numerous persons on the streets. Police also broke into
    homes and businesses, beat persons inside, arrested and detained them,
    and charged them with loitering and breach of the peace.
        In December four persons reportedly were arrested for the November
    gasoline bombing of a primary school that housed a polling station. The
    four still were in custody at year's end.
        There were reports that at least 150 CUF members were arrested in
    the aftermath of the October 29 elections. After the new Zanzibar
    President Amani Karume took office in October, he pardoned and released
    all detainees arrested in connection with the elections.
        There were numerous arrests in Pemba after the October elections.
    On October 29, authorities reportedly arrested 12 persons in a CUF
    office in Wete, Pemba, and injured several of them during the arrest.
    An appeal was filed in November, and the case was still pending at
    year's end. In November 10 persons reportedly were arrested on charges
    of setting off gasoline explosives at a hotel in Wete, Pemba. The 10
    suspects reportedly remained in custody at year's end and were not
    granted bail. In November six persons reportedly were arrested on
    charges of attempted manslaughter of a Zanzibar Electoral commission
    officer in Wete, Pemba. Their bail reportedly was set at $875 (700,000
    shillings), which the detainees'' defense counsel argued was so high
    that it amounted to ``technically denying bail'' to the accused. In
    early November, four persons reportedly were arrested for allegedly
    setting off a bomb in Wete, Pemba. They reportedly remained in custody
    at year's end, and their case was pending.
        On the mainland, police reportedly arrested Pembans without charge
    and forcibly returned them to Pemba under police custody.
        In September an opposition Member of Parliament (M.P.) was detained
    in Songea on allegations of causing a breach of peace at a police
    station where she had gone to determine why her supporters had been
    detained. She was held in remand and released without charges.
        Several journalists were arrested and detained by police following
    the October 29 elections in Zanzibar (see Section 2.a.).
        There were reports that police at times arrested innocent persons,
    accuse them of fictitious crimes, and withdraw or reduce the charges
    upon payment of bribes. During 1999, there were several complaints that
    police regularly hide their badge numbers while on duty so that
    complainants cannot report abuses; however, there were no such
    confirmed reports during the year. The Government began to take action
    during the year to punish police for abuse of their positions. For
    example, in November the district commissioner in Songea removed a
    police official from his duties for ``ignoring ethics.'' In November
    there were also reports that two police officers were fired for
    corruption in Tabora.
        In October 1999, the authorities arrested and detained opposition
    leader Augustine Mrema for making derogatory statements about President
    Mkapa's wife and the NGO that she operates. Mrema was also charged with
    sedition for statements he made about former President Julius Nyerere.
    Although most of the charges were dropped due to insufficient evidence,
    Mrema was scheduled to be tried in February 2001 for three charges of
    sedition, based on the claim that he presented fraudulent documents to
    Parliament. In November 1999, the authorities arrested opposition
    leader Reverend Christopher Mtikila and a boy for distributing
    audiocassettes, which contained derogatory statements about Nyerere.
    The boy was released on bail, but Mtikila remained in detention. In
    February a magistrate temporarily adjourned Mtikila's sedition trial.
    In October he was charged again with sedition, detained, and prevented
    from campaigning during the last weeks before the October elections. In
    November the charges were dropped, and he was released (see Sections
    1.d., 2.a., and 3).
        In January authorities dropped the charges against Dr. Walid
    Kaborou, the Kigboma regional chairman of the Chadema Party and Chadema
    Party candidate, who had been arrested in 1999 for inciting the public
    to violence as a result of Chadema's challenge to the results of a
    local by-election. After 35 days in detention, Kaborou was released
    with no charges filed against him (see Sections 2.a. and 3).
        Since the 1995 election, police in Zanzibar, particularly on Pemba,
    regularly have detained, arrested, or harassed CUF members and
    suspected supporters. Despite orders from the Union Government's
    Inspector General of Police, officers in Zanzibar continued these
    activities. In 1997 and 1998, police arrested 18 CUF officials,
    including M.P.'s, and charged them in January with treason for
    attempting to overthrow the Zanzibar Government. Treason, which is a
    nonbailable offense, carries a mandatory death sentence. On January 19,
    the Zanzibar High Court began trial proceedings against the CUF
    officials. The first court session was marred by violence when police
    fired tear gas and used batons against supporters and family members of
    the defendants who were protesting their lack of access to the High
    Court gallery (see Section 1.c.). Fifteen persons were arrested. The
    defendants had been held without bail since November 1997. The trial
    proceeded slowly and was suspended in August, pending a defense request
    for the Court of Appeals to invalidate the treason charges. On November
    9, the High Court dismissed the case on instructions from incoming
    President Karume and released the 18 defendants.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it suffers from executive interference,
    corruption, and inefficiency. Nevertheless, the higher courts
    increasingly have demonstrated independence from the Government. Senior
    police or government officials no longer pressure or reassign judges
    who make unpopular rulings. However, independent observers continued to
    criticize the judiciary, especially at lower levels, as corrupt and
    inefficient, and questioned the system's ability to provide a defendant
    with an expeditious and fair trial. The Warioba Commission reported in
    1997 that pervasive corruption affected the judiciary from clerks to
    magistrates. Clerks took bribes to decide whether or not to open cases
    and to hide or misdirect the files of those accused of crimes.
    Magistrates occasionally accepted bribes to determine guilt or
    innocence, pass sentences, withdraw charges, or decide appeals. In
    April the Minister of Justice acknowledged in public statements that
    problems within the judiciary include unwarranted delays in the hearing
    of cases, falsified recording of evidence in court records, bribery,
    improper use or failure to use bail, and unethical behavior on the part
    of magistrates. The Court of Appeals delayed hearing any cases from
    1999 until the backlog of cases from 1997 and 1998 have been heard (see
    Section 1.b.). Judicial ethics committees were established by statute
    in 1997 but could not begin operating until committee members were
    trained; the first training course was conducted in late 1999. The
    ethics committees were tasked with drafting recommendations to improve
    the credibility and conduct of the judiciary; however, they had not yet
    drafted a report by year's end. The committees have no mechanism to
    redress grievances or enforce decisions, and are weak and ineffective.
    The Government made some progress in addressing judicial corruption.
    During the year, several magistrates were arrested after the Chief
    Justice was presented with credible evidence of their corruption.
        The legal system is based on the British model, with modifications
    to accommodate customary and Islamic law in civil cases. Christians are
    governed by customary or statutory law in both civil and criminal
    matters. Muslims may apply either customary law or Islamic law in civil
    matters. The court system consists of primary courts, district courts,
    the High Court, and the Court of Appeal. Advocates defend clients in
    all courts, except in the primary courts. There is no trial by jury. In
    addition to judges, there are district (or resident) magistrates. The
    law also provides for commercial courts, land tribunals, housing
    tribunals, and military tribunals. Military courts do not try
    civilians, and there are no security courts. Defendants in civil and
    military courts may appeal decisions to the High Court and Court of
    Appeal. In refugee camps, Burundian mediation councils called
    abashingatahe, comprised of male refugee elders, often handle domestic
    abuse cases of Burundian refugees even though the law does not allow
    these councils to hear criminal matters.
        Zanzibar's court system generally parallels that of the mainland
    but retains Islamic courts to adjudicate Muslim family cases such as
    divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Islamic courts only adjudicate
    cases involving Muslims. Cases concerning Zanzibar constitutional
    issues are heard only in Zanzibar's courts. All other cases may be
    appealed to the national Court of Appeal.
        Criminal trials are open to the public and to the press; courts
    must give reasons on the record for holding secret proceedings.
    Criminal defendants have the right of appeal.
        Bail is set on a discretionary basis by judges based on the merits
    of each case (see Section 1.d.). However, there is no bail in murder or
    armed robbery cases.
        The code provides for a right to defense counsel. The Chief Justice
    assigns lawyers to indigent defendants charged with serious crimes such
    as murder, manslaughter, and armed robbery. There are only a few
    hundred practicing lawyers in the country, and most indigent defendants
    charged with lesser crimes do not have legal counsel.
        A separate facility for young offenders was established in 1997;
    however, the court is underutilized and many juvenile offenders still
    are tried in adult courts. In 1998 a magistrate ordered prosecutors to
    stop prosecuting juveniles in adult courts; however, because of the
    huge backlog in the country's only juvenile court, some cases continue
    to be sent through the traditional court system where they are
    processed faster because of a less significant backlog than in the
    regular civil court system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners on the mainland;
    however, 18 CUF members accused of treason were held as political
    prisoners in Zanzibar until they were released in November (see Section
    1.e.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution generally provides for these rights;
    however the Government continued to interfere with these rights. During
    the years in which Tanzania was a one-party state, the CCM penetrated
    all levels of society through local cells, varying in size from single
    family homes to large apartment buildings and containing from 10 to 200
    persons. Unpaid party officials served as 10-cell leaders with
    authority to resolve problems at the grassroots level and to report to
    authorities any suspicious behavior, event, or noncompliance with
    compulsory night patrol service in the neighborhood. The role of the
    cells has diminished considerably, particularly in areas where
    opposition parties are strong; however, the CCM remained influential.
    While in the past CCM membership was necessary for advancement in
    political and other areas, CCM membership is voluntary. Although in
    past years some government employees, particularly in Zanzibar, who
    supported opposition candidates lost their jobs, and some students were
    expelled from school because of their families' political affiliation.
        The Criminal Procedures Act of 1985 authorizes police officials,
    including the civilian anticrime groups, to issue search warrants;
    however, the act also authorizes searches of persons and premises
    without a warrant if necessary to prevent the loss or destruction of
    evidence connected with an offense or if circumstances are serious and
    urgent. In practice police and members of other security services
    rarely requested warrants and often searched private homes and business
    establishments at will. The security services reportedly monitor
    telephones and correspondence of some citizens and foreign residents.
        Although in previous years, police threatened, mistreated,
    occasionally beat, and arrested relatives of criminal suspects and
    detained them without charge in an effort to force suspects to
    surrender, there were no reports of this occurring during the year.
        In April police broke into homes and businesses in Zanzibar,
    beating and arresting those inside and destroying property (see
    Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There were also credible eyewitness reports of
    police breaking into shops and looting in Stone Town, in the presence
    of union police officials from the mainland.
        There were reports that police and army units made nightly rounds
    in Pemba following the elections, conducting house-to-house searches
    (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
        In 1999 the Government repealed the Human Resources Deployment Act
    of 1983, which allowed forced labor and forced relocation of citizens
    to ensure productive employment. The new law, the Employment Services
    Promotion Act of 1999, does not permit either forced labor or forced
    relocation (see Sections 2.d. and 6.c.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government limited
    these rights in practice. Various laws, such as the Newspaper Act and
    the Broadcasting Act, limit the media's ability to function
    effectively. Government ministers and the Registrar of Newspapers
    pressure journalists to practice self-censorship. The Government denied
    political opponents unrestricted access to the media. In August the
    Government banned the book, ``The Mwembechai Killings and the Political
    Future of Tanzania'' for being ``incendiary.'' Unlike the previous
    year, the Government did not ban any newspapers.
        On October 28, members of the FFU beat up, detained, and
    confiscated the film of a photojournalist; he was released after
    several hours of questioning.
        Except in Zanzibar, citizens generally enjoyed the right to discuss
    political alternatives freely, although there were instances in which
    the freedom of speech was restricted severely. Political parties are
    required by law to support the continuation of the Union. Opposition
    political party members and others openly criticize the Government and
    ruling party in public forums; however, persons using ``abusive
    language'' against the country's leadership may be subject to arrest,
    and the Government used this provision to detain some opposition
    figures (see Section 1.d.). For example, Reverend Christoper Mtiila was
    held on sedition charges for making comments abusive to the Government
    (see Section 1.d.).
        In June charges were dropped due to insufficient evidence against
    opposition leader Augustin Mrema, who was detained for 18 days in April
    and in 1999 for making derogatory statements about President Mkapa's
    wife and using seditious words against the late President, Julius
    Nyerere (see Section 1.d.).
        In February a magistrate temporarily adjourned the sedition trial
    of Reverend Christopher Mtikila, a leader of the Democratic Party, who
    was arrested in late 1999 for distributing audiocassettes that
    contained derogatory statements about former President Nyerere. In
    October Mtikila was detained and charged with sedition for alleging
    during a campaign speech in Singida that former President Julius Nyere
    had died of HIV/AIDS, and prohibited from campaigning during the last
    weeks before the October national elections (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
        In January Dr. Walid Kaborou, an opposition M.P. who was arrested
    for sedition in late 1999, was released after 35 days in detention. No
    charges were filed against him (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
        In Zanzibar the Government controls radio and television, and also
    implements a restrictive policy with regard to print media. In 1998 a
    Zanzibar government minister threatened three newspapers because of
    their allegedly negative reporting. Soon thereafter, amendments to the
    Zanzibar News Act further circumscribed journalists' freedom of action,
    by giving authorities greater protection for the harassment, detention,
    and interrogation of journalists. Private mainland newspapers are
    widely available in Zanzibar, and many residents can receive mainland
    television.
        On January 19, police confiscated a journalist's notebook and
    camera at a demonstration outside the courtroom where 18 CUF members
    were being tried in Zanzibar (see Section 1.d.).
        In June at a political rally in Zanzibar, a regional CCM official,
    in the presence of President Mkapa, threatened an international radio
    journalist with physical harm for allegedly broadcasting politically
    biased reports about Zanzibar.
        Several journalists were arrested and detained by police following
    the October 29 elections in Zanzibar (see Section 2.a.). For example,
    on November 1, authorities in Zanzibar arrested and detained a British
    Broadcasting Corporation correspondent for allegedly kidnaping and
    assaulting two women after he interviewed the women and broadcast their
    comments about witnessing voter fraud during the elections; he was
    released later without being charged.
        The press on the mainland is, on the whole, lively and outspoken.
    Even the government-owned newspaper regularly reports events that
    portray the Government in an unflattering light. There are 9 daily
    newspapers and 15 other newspapers in English and Kiswahili, along with
    another dozen periodicals, some of which are owned or influenced by
    political parties, both the CCM and the opposition. There is no
    official censorship, but throughout the year the Government continued
    to pressure newspapers to suppress or change articles unfavorable to it
    in some instances. In October 1999, the Government revoked the
    registration of 291 publications that had not published during the
    previous 3 years.
        Private radio and television stations broadcast in Dar Es Salaam
    and in a few other urban areas, although their activities may be
    circumscribed. The Government reportedly does not censor news reports,
    but attempts to influence their content. Some journalists, such as
    those in Zanzibar, exercise self-censorship on sensitive problems.
    Journalists who report arrests can be charged with obstructing police
    activity under the 1964 Police Act. The Parliamentary Power,
    Privileges, and Immunities Act gives the Government authority to
    prevent television cameramen from filming the swearing-in of an
    opposition Member of Parliament, and the Government occasionally did so
    during previous years; however, there were no documented cases reported
    of this occurring during the year.
        The Union Government sought to maintain some control over the
    private media with the establishment in 1997 of a code of conduct for
    journalists and a media council. With the leadership of the local
    chapter of the Media Council for Southern Africa and the Association of
    Journalists and Media Workers, journalists forced the Government to
    agree in 1995 to a voluntary code of ethics and establishment of a
    Media Council intended to preserve and expand media freedom. The
    Council was inaugurated formally in August 1997, although it began
    operating in 1995. Although it initially proved ineffectual except as a
    sounding board for complaints against the media, the Council operated
    with some effectiveness during the year. The Council received
    approximately 20 cases for adjudication during the year. The Council
    serves as an adjudicating body when journalists infringe upon the code
    of ethics and has the power to impose fines. The Council consists of
    university professors and media lawyers, in addition to Judge Joseph
    Sinde Warioba. The president of the Council, Professor Geoffrey Mmari,
    has complained publicly that the laws governing the media are outdated.
        Academic freedom generally is respected in practice. Academics,
    increasingly outspoken in their criticism of the Government, continued
    their calls for reform during the year and were particularly critical
    of the union Government's actions in response to the political
    situation in Zanzibar.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
    limits this right in practice. Political parties that seek to hold
    rallies must give the police 48 hours' advance notice. Police have the
    authority to deny permission on public safety or security grounds or if
    the permit seeker belongs to an unregistered organization or political
    party. Authorities arrested citizens for assembling without the
    appropriate permit. For example, on June 27 authorities arrested CUF
    leaders for holding a rally without a permit in Dar es Salaam.
        Opposition parties, other than in Zanzibar, generally are able to
    hold rallies; however, CUF meetings have been banned periodically since
    1995. In Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, CUF rallies were more restricted
    than those of other political parties. CUF rallies were banned at least
    once in Dar es Salaam and several times in Zanzibar before the October
    elections. Several rallies were prevented through indirect means as
    cutting off electricity for loudspeakers, citing ad hoc time limits,
    and scheduling the same rally times for more than one group. Security
    officials interfered with citizens'' rights to assemble peacefully on
    numerous occasions (see Section 1.d. and 3).
        Police continue to break up meetings attended by persons thought to
    be opposed to the Zanzibar Government. In Pemba security forces broke
    up gatherings and intimidated opposition party officials. On January
    19, police used tear gas indiscriminately to disperse a crowd outside a
    courthouse in Zanzibar during a riot, injuring 70 persons (see Section
    1.c.). On April 1, police officers attempted to break up a CUF meeting
    at a party branch office in Zanzibar, despite the fact that the indoor
    meeting did not require a permit. In August police used tear gas and
    bullets to disperse demonstrators in Zanzibar (see Section 1.c.). On
    October 11, police forcibly dispersed a CUFsponsored election rally at
    a party office in Zanzibar; police used tear gas and shot and injured
    six CUF supporters (see Section 1.c.). The police opened fire on the
    demonstrators after they threw stones at a police car. The activists
    were demonstrating in protest of the decision by Zanzibar election
    officials to annul the vote in 16 constituencies because of voting
    irregularities (see Section 3). Police were criticized for not
    following the correct procedures and for using excessive force to
    respond to the incident by firing shots at demonstrators. On October
    28, police and army units circled a CUF meeting in Zanzibar, and shot
    bullets into the air during the presidential candidate's speech.
        Police used excessive force during rallies and demonstrations
    protesting the October 29 elections in Zanzibar (see Section 1.c.). On
    October 30, police beat both demonstrators and bystanders during
    rallies and demonstrations in the Darajani district of Stone Town in
    Zanzibar (see Sections 2.b. and 3). FFU officers beat and shot
    demonstrators, who were chanting antigovernment slogans, resulting in a
    number of injuries and arrests (see Section 1.c.).
        The Government continued to arrest opposition politicians for
    holding meetings, distributing information, and other acts that it
    regarded as seditious (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government limits this right in practice. The Registrar of Political
    Parties has sole authority to approve or deny the registration of any
    political party and is responsible for enforcing strict regulations on
    registered or provisionally registered parties. The Constitution and
    other legal acts stipulate that citizens cannot establish new political
    parties; candidates must be members of 1 of the 13 registered political
    parties. The Electoral Law prohibits independent candidates; requires
    all standing M.P.'s to resign if they join another party; requires all
    political parties to support the union with Zanzibar; and forbids
    parties based on ethnic, regional, or religious affiliation. Parties
    granted provisional registration may hold public meetings and recruit
    members. They have 6 months to submit lists of at least 200 members in
    10 of the country's 25 regions, including 2 regions in Zanzibar, in
    order to secure full registration and to be eligible to field
    candidates for election. Unregistered parties are prohibited from
    holding meetings, recruiting members, or fielding candidates. In
    October 1999, the Registrar of Political Parties stated that the
    registration provisions were too restrictive; however, no action was
    taken during the year to reform the provisions. One new party, Chama
    Cha Demokrasia Makini, was granted provisional registration in June.
        The most prominent unregistered party is the Reverend Christopher
    Mtikila's Democratic Party, which advocates the dissolution of the
    union and the expulsion of minorities from the mainland. Despite his
    party's lack of government recognition, Mtikila was able to publicize
    his views through his legally registered church and through ongoing
    lawsuits against the Government. In spite of his criticism of the
    Government, Mtikila campaigned actively for the October general
    elections after a magistrate temporarily adjourned Mtikila's sedition
    trial to allow him to campaign (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        Under the Societies Ordinance, the Ministry of Home Affairs must
    approve any new association. The Government suspended registration of
    new NGO's in 1997, pending the enactment of new NGO legislation, which
    was scheduled for late 1997; however, such legislation was not
    introduced and details of the proposed legislation (which is viewed as
    restrictive) still were being discussed within the Government, with
    some input from NGO's, at year's end. In the interim, new applications
    for registrations were considered under the Societies Ordinance and the
    Trustees Ordinance. There were 8,250 registered NGO's as of June.
    During the year, the Government continued a general suspension of
    registration of religious NGO's on the grounds that many were being
    formed for the purpose of evading taxes (see Section 2.c.). During the
    year, the Government denied registration to eight NGO's for abusing
    their exemptions by selling for profit goods that they brought into the
    country duty-free. The Government continued to harass the National
    Women's Council for allegedly engaging in political activity contrary
    to its charter. The Government struck the organization from the
    register in 1997, but the High Court overturned this action in 1999.
    The Government appealed the case to the Court of Appeal, but the Court
    has delayed hearing any cases from 1999 until the backlog of cases from
    1997 and 1998 have been heard (see Section 1.e.). The National Women's
    Council continued to operate at year's end.
        A number of professional, business, legal, and medical associations
    only have begun to address political topics. In 1999 the Government
    denied registration to the NGO Defenders of Human Rights in Tanzania
    (see Section 4), after withholding it for more than 3 years. In 1999
    the Government also denied a youth group registration on the grounds
    that there already was a youth organization affiliated with the CCM.
    Zanzibar has a separate NGO registration policy from the mainland,
    which is less restrictive; however, there was minimal NGO activity in
    Zanzibar during the year.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice,
    subject to measures that it claims are necessary to ensure public order
    and safety. The Government does not penalize or discriminate against
    any individual on the basis of religious beliefs or practices, and it
    does not designate religion on any passports or records of vital
    statistics. However, individual government officials are alleged to
    favor persons who share the same religion in the conduct of business.
        The Government requires that religious organizations register with
    the Registrar of Societies at the Home Affairs Ministry. In order to
    register, religious organizations must have at least 10 followers and
    must provide a constitution, the resumes of their leaders, and a letter
    of recommendation from their District Commissioner. Christian groups
    also must provide letters of recommendation from the leaders of three
    registered Christian churches or from a Christian Council of a similar
    denomination. Muslim groups also must have letters from the leaders of
    three registered mosques. These additional requirements apply to other
    religious organizations in the same manner. There were no reports that
    the Government refused to register any religious groups that met
    registration criteria; however, during the year, the Government
    continued a general suspension of registration of religious NGO's on
    the grounds that many were being formed for the purpose of evading
    taxes (see Section 2.b.).
        The law prohibits preaching if it incites persons against other
    religions. Following riots in Mwembechi in 1998, triggered by the
    arrest of a popular Muslim leader, the Government charged that some
    religious leaders were inciting their adherents to violence. In August
    government officials warned religious leaders to avoid using religion
    to incite their adherents to violence during and after the October
    election campaign.
        The Government failed to respond to growing tensions between the
    Muslim and Christian communities (see Section 5). The Government
    appeared to recognize that a problem exists, but it chose not to take
    action. The Government cancelled several meetings with Muslim and
    Christian leaders aimed at improving relations between the two
    communities. Even senior Muslim officials in the Government appear
    unwilling to address the problem, aside from general criticism of those
    who would foment religious conflict.
        National and regional parole boards, constituted in 1998, were
    dissolved when it was found that they did not include Muslim members,
    and the Government named new boards in January 1999. It was disclosed
    in February 1999 that the Government was investigating reports that the
    National Muslim Council of the country was receiving millions of
    dollars from unknown sources in the Middle East and was considered a
    possible ``security risk.'' The Government had not released publicly
    the results of the investigation by year's end.
        Christians are governed by customary or statutory law in both civil
    and criminal matters. Muslims may apply either customary law or Islamic
    law in civil matters. Zanzibar's court system generally parallels the
    mainland's legal system but retains Islamic courts to adjudicate cases
    of Muslim family law, such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance
    (see Section 1.e.).
        The Government has banned religious organizations from involvement
    in politics. In July Parliament passed a law which imposes fines and
    jail time on political parties who campaign in houses of worship or
    educational facilities. In September the Muslim Council of Tanzania, a
    private organization, indefinitely closed a school in Singida for
    holding a CUF political meeting on its grounds.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--In the previous year, the Government
    imposed some limits on these rights; however, in 1999 the Government
    repealed the Human Resources Act of 1983, which allowed the arbitrary
    transfer of citizens from one district to another in order to ensure
    that all citizens were engaged in productive employment (see Section
    6.e.). The National Employment Service Act provides for training of
    youths to be selfemployed and eliminates the ability of officials to
    move residents from one location to another.
        Passports for foreign travel may be difficult to obtain, mostly due
    to bureaucratic inefficiency and officials' demands for bribes.
    Citizens can return without difficulty.
        Mainlanders are required to show identification to travel to
    Zanzibar, although the requirement is largely ignored in practice;
    however, Zanzibaris need no special identification to travel to the
    mainland. Mainlanders are not allowed to own land in the islands,
    except in partnership with foreign investors. There is no prohibition
    against mainlanders working in the islands; however, in practice few
    mainlanders are hired.
        After the October elections, a curfew was imposed on Wete of Pemba.
    Any persons observed by the police after 7 p.m. were ordered to return
    home. There were also reports of beatings by the police (see Section
    1.c.).
        Police set up six roadblocks in Pemba after the elections; there
    were reports that police beat and assaulted persons in the area (see
    Section 1.c.).
        There were reports of police harassment of Pembans on the mainland.
    Police reportedly arrested persons without charge and returned them to
    Pemba under police custody. At least 20 persons reportedly were
    returned by year's end.
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
    status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
    Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and these
    provisions were respected in practice with a few exceptions. The
    Government granted prima facie refugee status to an estimated 500,000
    refugees during the year. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees. The Government traditionally has maintained
    a generous open border policy both with regard to neighboring
    countries' refugees and to persons seeking political asylum. In 1999
    the Government agreed to accept asylum applications from Rwandans who
    had been barred from seeking asylum in 1997 and 1998. During the year,
    a relatively small number of Rwandans who feared for their safety were
    granted asylum by the Government and appeals by others who petitioned
    for asylum were pending at year's end. The Government continues to
    offer first asylum to nearly 500,000 refugees from Burundi and the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo. There were 368,448 Burundian, 110,412
    Congolese, and 27,372 Rwandan refugees living in refugee camps in the
    country by year's end. In addition, there are at least 200,000 other
    Burundian refugees in the country who have lived in settlements since
    the early 1970's.
        The Government arrested, detained, and forcibly expelled 80 Rwandan
    and 580 Burundians during the year. Many of these refugees reportedly
    were denied the opportunity to collect their belongings or contact
    their families prior to being expelled. The refugees who were forcibly
    returned were living outside UNHCR camps and included Rwandans living
    in the country since the 1960's. The returns were ordered by the
    regional commissioner, reportedly without the involvement of higher
    government officials; however, the Ministry of Home Affairs took no
    action to reprimand the regional commissioner for the expulsions. In
    late June, the regional commissioner gave the refugees the choice of
    returning to their countries of origin or moving into UNHCR camps. The
    regional commissioner reportedly also gave the refugees the option of
    paying the required fees to become residents in the country, which were
    too expensive for the refugees to pay. In December a group of 1,500 of
    the refugees left the country for Rwanda. In February the Government
    forcibly returned two Rwandans and three Burundians to Rwanda. The
    number of Burundian refugees who were returned forcibly reportedly
    decreased after June and July, when the Government began to send
    refugees outside of refugee camps to the UNHCR rather than forcibly
    returning them to their countries of origin.
        Refugee camps in the west were plagued by food shortages,
    overcrowding, and malaria outbreaks during the year. Refugee camps were
    large and overcrowded, and the authorities restricted employment
    opportunities. Women and girls in refugee camps suffered a high level
    of rape and gender abuse perpetrated by other refugees. There were
    reports that women and girls were raped when they left the camps for
    daily tasks, such as collecting firewood. The Government does not
    adequately investigate, prosecute, or punish perpetrators of abuses in
    refugee camps. There is no mechanism within refugee camps to punish
    abusers, and most cases are not referred to local authorities. Police
    lack special training in the area of domestic abuse, and local and
    traditional courts, which both handle domestic violence cases, lack
    necessary resources. Among Burundian refugees, mediation councils
    called abashingatahe, comprised of male refugee elders, often handle
    domestic abuse cases (see Section 1.e). There were reports that some
    refugees engage in vigilante justice within camps, occasionally beating
    other refugees. There are nine camps and one long-term transit center
    for Rwandan refugees in the country.
        There is some resentment and hostility against Burundian refugees
    because of the availability of particular goods and services for
    refugees that are not available for the local population; however,
    during recent years, the UNHCR, NGO's, and international organizations
    have made many of these services available for the local population,
    thereby alleviating many tensions (see Section 1.c.).
        There was continuing concern over violence allegedly perpetrated by
    some armed Burundian and Rwandan refugees, although such violence has
    diminished since 1999. Local officials reported incidents of killings,
    banditry, armed robbery, and violent crime, perpetrated by refugees in
    the areas surrounding refugee camps (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). There
    were unconfirmed reports that the Burundian Government hired
    mercenaries to invade refugee camps, although the Burundian Government
    strongly denies these reports.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        A multiparty political system was introduced officially in 1992,
    and in 1995 for the first time in more than 30 years, citizens
    exercised their right to change their government through national
    elections for president and parliament. On October 29, the second
    multiparty national elections were held on the mainland and Zanzibar.
    On the mainland, international observers concluded that the elections
    were free and fair and conducted peacefully; however, in Zanzibar, the
    vote was marred by irregularities, voter intimidation and politically
    motivated violence. The incumbent President of the mainland, Benjamin
    Mkapa, was reelected with 71 percent of the vote. The ruling CCM party
    made significant gains in its majority in Parliament, winning 167 out
    of 181 seats. Opposition candidates gained 11 seats in 6 of the 19
    mainland regions giving them a total of 14 seats on the mainland, and
    the CUF won 15 seats in Zanzibar. The CUF continued to refuse to
    recognize the election results in Zanzibar and to demand new elections,
    and CUF elected representatives are boycotting the union and Zanzibar
    parliaments.
        In late 1996, following its loss in a by-election, the Government
    issued new directives limiting political activity and fund raising on
    the grounds of maintaining order.
        The Government continued to harass its opponents and arrested
    opposition politicians for holding meetings, distributing information,
    and other acts that it regarded as seditious (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.b.). The authorities forcibly dispersed a number of political rallies
    during the period prior to and after the October elections (see Section
    2.b.) In October police officials pulled opposition leader Augustine
    Mrema off of a platform in Kigoma during a campaign rally before he had
    finished speaking; he had a permit to speak for an additional 30
    minutes. In May 1999, Mrema had been prohibited from running for
    reelection by a High Court injunction that stated that he was
    ineligible to run because he had changed political parties, and had not
    yet been designated formally as chairman of his new party. The
    injunction against Mrema was dropped after the Court of Appeals ruled
    that the lower court had no grounds to prohibit his nomination as the
    Labor Party chairman in order to be eligible for presidential
    nominations. In October, police forced opposition leader John Cheyo to
    leave a campaign platform in Morogoro for speaking after the legal
    deadline for campaign rallies of 6 p.m. When Mr. Cheyo resisted, police
    threatened him with a police baton and physically removed him from the
    platform. On October 29, Fortunatus Masha, an opposition candidate who
    was vice-chairman of his party was beaten and injured by police in
    Mwanza district during an altercation at a ballot counting center over
    possible ballot rigging in favor of the CCM party.
        In January the authorities dropped the charges against Dr. Walid
    Kabouru, the Kigoma M.P. and the national chairman of the Chadema
    Party; he had been arrested in 1999 for inciting the public to violence
    as a result of Chadema's challenge to the results of a local by-
    election. After 35 days in detention, Kabouru was released with no
    charges filed against him (see Sections 1.d.).
        On April 1, police broke into a CUF branch office in Zanzibar
    during an indoor meeting and destroyed property (see Section 1.c.).
        In August local authorities forced persons attempting to register
    to vote in Mwanza to provide documentary proof that they had paid local
    government taxes before they allowed them to register, even though
    there is no legal requirement for voters to prove payment of taxes to
    register.
        The Constitution of Zanzibar provides citizens with the right to
    change their government peacefully; however, this right was
    circumscribed severely. In June 1999, a Commonwealth-brokered agreement
    between the ruling CCM party and the opposition CUF party was signed,
    but its provisions were not implemented fully during the year. While
    both parties failed to fulfill parts of the accord, impartial observers
    agree that the Government of Salmin Amour in Zanzibar did not appear to
    act in good faith. The Zanzibar Government refused to reform its
    electoral commission, a provision that was central to the agreement,
    and the Commonwealth Agreement was not implemented during the year. In
    Zanzibar there were credible reports of irregularities during the voter
    registration process conducted in August in preparation for the October
    elections. The ruling CCM party was accused by several opposition
    parties of illegally registering mainland citizens as voters in
    Zanzibar. Some transportation operators were asked by union officials
    to transport citizens from the mainland to Zanzibar without charge. One
    operator reported that his family received threatening telephone calls
    at home for refusing to comply with the request. Shehas (village
    headmen) were responsible for validating residency requirements for
    voting in the elections. The majority of shehas were CCM members, and
    international monitors reported that in some cases they abused their
    discretion during the registration process. There also were credible
    reports that CUF supporters attempted to intimidate legally registered
    voters believed to be CCM supporters in Zanzibar. The homes of several
    long-term residents of mainland origin reportedly were stoned, and in
    August, three residences were burned down, although no one claimed
    responsibility for these actions. Subsequently, some occupants decided
    to leave Zanzibar or to send family members to the mainland until after
    the election.
        Voting irregularities during the October 29 elections included the
    late arrival and absence of ballots, and the late opening of polling
    stations. The Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) stopped balloting and
    counting throughout Zanzibar at 5:30 in the evening, even in locations
    that did not have ballot shortages. Police and some officials from the
    Zanzibar Electoral Commission were implicated in the voting
    irregularities. Police officers, accompanied by ZEC officials, seized
    ballot boxes in many constituencies, including the entire island of
    Pemba, and most of the ballot boxes were not under independent or
    opposition supervision after they were seized. Four groups of
    international election observers criticized the Zanzibar vote and
    called for a re-run election in all of the Zanzibar constituencies;
    however, the Government only announced new elections in 16 of the 50
    constituencies to be held on November 5.
        Voter turnout for the new elections was low. The opposition
    boycotted the re-run election, claiming that the elections already had
    been compromised. After the re-run, the ruling party announced that it
    had won all of the constituencies in Zanzibar and four constituencies
    on Pemba (where they previously did not hold any seats). The final
    results of the re-run election gave the ruling CCM party 34 seats in
    the 50-seat House of Representatives and 35 seats in the 50-seat
    National Assembly. CCM candidate Amani Karume was declared the new
    Zanzibari President on November 7.
        Since the 1995 elections, government security forces and CCM gangs
    have harassed and intimidated CUF members on both main Zanzibar
    islands, Pemba and Ugunja, and such incidents sharply increased in the
    3 months before the October elections. Security forces forcibly
    dispersed gatherings and intimidated, harassed, arrested and beat
    persons (see Sections 1.c., 1.d. and 2.b.). During the November 5 re-
    run elections, police beat and reportedly tortured opposition officials
    (see Section 1.c.). Almost all international donors had suspended
    direct assistance to Zanzibar in response to the authorities' human
    rights abuses in 1995, and the suspension remained in effect by year's
    end.
        In November a bomb exploded at a primary school in Stone Town in
    Zanzibar at the location of a polling office for the November 5 revote
    (see Section 1.c.). In December four persons reportedly were arrested
    for the bombing; the four remained in custody at year's end (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are no
    legal restrictions on the participation of women in politics and
    government. There are 61 seats in Parliament that are occupied by
    women; 12 female M.P.'s are elected members of the CCM; 47 female
    M.P.'s occupy ``Special Women'' seats which are appointed by political
    parties based on the elected percentages of the constituent seats, and
    one M.P. was nominated by President Mkapa. There is one seat in the
    House of Representatives occupied by a woman. On February 10,
    Parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the Union Constitution, which
    requires 20 percent of seats in Parliament to be occupied by women.
    President Mkapa ratified the amendment in February. Three of the
    Cabinet's 27 ministers are female.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government has obstructed the formation of local human rights
    groups. Persons seeking to register human rights NGO's, such as the
    Tanzania Human Rights Education Society, complained that the Ministry
    of Home Affairs continued to delay action on their applications (see
    Section 2.b.). This hampered their access and efforts to monitor
    violations of human rights. The Government continued to refuse
    registration of the African Human Rights and Justice Protection Network
    on the grounds that it was politically oriented (see Section 2.b.). The
    Government had withheld registration from the NGO Defenders of Human
    Rights in Tanzania for more than 3 years before finally denying it
    registration in 1999. During the year, the Government appealed a High
    Court decision ordering the reinstatement of the National Women's
    Council, an NGO that the Government had deregistered in 1997 but the
    Court had not heard the case by year's end. The National Women's
    Council continued to operate at year's end (see Section 2.b.). At
    year's end, the ICRC was awaiting a response from the Government to its
    application for accreditation as a legal entity.
        Government officials have stated that international human rights
    groups are welcome to visit the country; several human rights
    organizations operated freely in the country and report little
    government interference. Amnesty International visited during the year,
    and had discussions both within the Government and among NGO's,
    concerning the formation of a human rights commission; however, sharp
    differences on the independence of the commission were not resolved by
    year's end. In February AI lobbied parliamentarians to create an
    independent human rights commission; however, the Government refused on
    the grounds that the President's Permanent Commission of Inquiry, which
    focuses on civil servant claims against the Government, could serve in
    both capacities. On November 20, President Mkapa announced to the
    National Assembly that the Government would establish a Human Rights
    and Good Governance Committee; however, the Committee would not be
    independent from the Government.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on nationality,
    tribe, origin, political affiliation, color, or religion.
    Discrimination based on sex, age, or disability is not prohibited
    specifically by law but is discouraged publicly in official statements.
    The Government issued several statements beginning in August
    encouraging religious and ethnic tolerance during the election
    campaign. Discrimination against women and religious and ethnic
    minorities persisted. Religious and ethnic tensions in society exist.
        Women.--Violence against women remained widespread. Legal remedies
    exist in the form of assault provisions under the Criminal Code;
    however, in practice these provisions are difficult to enforce. The
    Marriage Act of 1971 makes a declaration against spousal battery, but
    does not prohibit it or provide for any punishment. Traditional customs
    that subordinate women remain strong in both urban and rural areas and
    local magistrates often upheld such practices. Women may be punished by
    their husbands for not bearing children. It is accepted for a husband
    to treat his wife as he wishes, and wife beating occurs at all levels
    of society. Cultural, family, and social pressures prevent many women
    from reporting abuses to the authorities. Nonetheless, in 1998 the
    Ministry of Home Affairs noted that an average of 10,000 cases of wife
    beating are reported annually. A local NGO, Tamwa, reports that as many
    as 6 out of 10 women are beaten by their husbands. In 1998 the Ruvuma
    regional crime officer noted that a large number of women are killed by
    their husbands or commit suicide as a result of domestic battery.
    Government officials frequently make public statements criticizing such
    abuses, but action rarely is taken against perpetrators. Police often
    have biases against pursuing domestic abuse cases and have demanded
    bribes to investigate allegations. The Sexual Offenses Special
    Provisions Bill provides for life imprisonment for persons convicted of
    rape and child molestation. Several persons were prosecuted and
    convicted for rape and battery under this law during the year. Women in
    refugee camps suffered a high level of rape and gender abuse
    perpetrated by other refugees (see Section 2.d.).
        Several NGO's provide counseling and education programs on women's
    rights problems, particularly sexual harassment and molestation.
        There is no legal protection for adult women who undergo FGM. The
    Sexual Offenses Act, which prohibits cruelty against children, only
    protects persons under 18 years of age.
        During the year, Parliament amended the Constitution to prohibit
    sexual harassment against women in the workplace by a person in
    authority. During the year, several persons were arrested under the new
    law. Male colleagues sometimes harass women seeking higher education,
    and the authorities largely have ignored the practice. Although the
    Government advocates equal rights for women in the workplace, it does
    not ensure these rights in practice. In the public sector, which
    employs 80 percent of the salaried labor force, certain statutes
    restrict women's access to some jobs or hours of employment. For
    example, in general, women may not be employed between 10 p.m. and 6
    a.m., although this restriction is usually ignored in practice (see
    Section 6.e.). While progress on women's rights has been more
    noticeable in urban areas, strong traditional norms still divide labor
    along gender lines and place women in a subordinate position.
    Discrimination against women is most acute in rural areas, where women
    are relegated to farming and raising children, and have almost no
    opportunity for wage employment. Custom and tradition often hinder
    women from owning property such as land, and may override laws that
    provide for equal treatment.
        The overall situation for women is less favorable in Zanzibar,
    which has a majority Muslim population. Although women generally are
    not discouraged from seeking employment outside the home, women there,
    and on many parts of the mainland, face discriminatory restrictions on
    inheritance and ownership of property because of concessions by the
    Government and courts to customary and Islamic law. While provisions of
    the Marriage Act provide for certain inheritance and property rights
    for women, the application of customary, Islamic, or statutory law
    depends on the lifestyle and stated intentions of the male head of
    household. Thus far, the courts have upheld discriminatory inheritance
    claims, primarily in rural areas. Under Zanzibari law, unmarried women
    under the age of 21 who become pregnant are subject to 2 years'
    imprisonment.
        Children.--Government funding of programs for children's welfare
    remained miniscule. The Government has made some constructive efforts
    to address children's welfare, including working closely with UNICEF
    and other international and local organizations to improve the well
    being of orphans and neglected children. Child labor is a problem, and
    there were reports that forced labor of children occurred (see Sections
    6.c and 6.d.). There were unconfirmed reports in previous years that
    children were trafficked to work in mines and other businesses (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). A 1998 study funded by the International Labor
    Organization (ILO) reported a growth in child prostitution, including
    forced prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The Sexual Offences Special
    Provisions Act of 1998 criminalizes child prostitution and child
    pornography. The age criterion for protection from sexual exploitation
    is 18 years. Under the law, sexual intercourse with a child under 18
    years is considered rape regardless of consent; however, the law is not
    effective in practice because it is customary for girls as young as 14
    years of age to be considered adults for the purposes of sexual
    intercourse and marriage.
        The law provides for 7 years of compulsory education through the
    age of 15; however, education is no longer free on both the mainland
    and on Zanzibar. Fees are charged for books, enrollment, and uniforms,
    with the result that some children have been denied an education. In
    some cases, children were unable to attend school because poorly paid
    teachers demanded money to enroll them. The primary school dropout rate
    is between 30 and 40 percent. The literacy rate is approximately 70
    percent; however, for girls it is only 57 percent compared with 80
    percent for boys. The rate of girls' enrollment in school is lower than
    that of boys, and generally declines with each additional year of
    schooling. In some districts, there was a decline in attendance as the
    result of early marriage, often at the behest of parents. In the past,
    girls who became pregnant were expelled from school. Despite a 1996 law
    to permit pregnant girls to continue their education following
    maternity absences, the practice of forcing pregnant girls out of
    school remains in effect. Nevertheless, there have been across the
    board increases in the rate of girls' participation since 1990.
        Although the Government officially discourages female genital
    mutilation, which is widely condemned by international health experts
    as damaging to both physical and psychological health, it still is
    performed at an early age in approximately 20 of the country's 130 main
    ethnic groups. According to a 1996 health survey conducted by the
    Bureau of Statistics, FGM affects 18 percent of the female population.
    In some ethnic groups, FGM is compulsory, and in others, a woman who
    has not undergone the ritual may not be able to marry. Government data
    show this to be a problem that varies by region, with the most affected
    regions being Arusha (81 percent of women), Dodoma (68 percent), Mara
    (44 percent), Kilimanjaro (37 percent), Iringa (27 percent), Tanga/
    Singida (25 percent), and Morogoro (20 percent). FGM is almost
    nonexistent in the rest of the country. There is no law that
    specifically prohibits FGM. The country's educational curriculum does
    not include instruction on FGM but the issue is covered occasionally in
    secondary schools. Government officials have called for changes in
    practices that adversely affect women, and the 1998 Sexual Offenses
    Special Provisions Bill, which prohibits cruelty against children, has
    been used as the basis for campaigns against FGM performed on girls;
    however, police do not have adequate resources to protect victims. Some
    local government officials have begun to combat the practice and have
    convicted and imprisoned some persons who performed FGM on young girls,
    although there were no reported prosecutions during the year. Seminars
    sponsored by various governmental organizations and NGO's are held
    regularly in an attempt to educate the public on the dangers of FGM and
    other traditional practices. These practices include the tradition of
    inherited wives, which critics contend contributes to the spread of
    HIV/AIDS, and child marriages, which are sanctioned with parental
    consent under the Marriage Act of 1971 for girls 12 years of age or
    older. While some authorities believe that FGM is declining, a 1996
    government report has suggested that it is on the rise, especially in
    the central region. In 1998 the Dodoma Traditional Practices and
    Beliefs Committee, supported by a World Health Organization grant,
    began a program to eliminate FGM in the Dodoma region. The Ministry of
    Health began an educational campaign on FGM as part of its Safe
    Motherhood Initiative. The enforcement of policies to stop FGM remains
    difficult because some regional government officials are in favor of
    the practice or fear speaking out against it because of the power of
    traditional leaders.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate access
    to public buildings, transportation, or government services for the
    disabled. Although there is no official discrimination against the
    disabled, in practice the physically disabled effectively are
    restricted in their access to education, employment, and provision of
    other state services due to physical barriers. The Government provides
    only limited funding for special facilities and programs.
        Religious Minorities.--While Muslim-Christian relations are
    generally stable, some urban Muslim groups are sensitive to perceived
    discrimination in government hiring and law enforcement practices. The
    mainland is 60 percent Christian and 40 percent Muslim, whereas
    Zanzibar is 97 percent Muslim. The Muslim community claims to be
    disadvantaged in terms of its representation in the civil service,
    government, and parastatals, in part because both colonial and early
    post-independence administrations refused to recognize the credentials
    of traditional Muslim schools. As a result, there is broad Muslim
    resentment of certain advantages that Christians are perceived to enjoy
    in employment and educational opportunities. Muslim leaders have
    complained that the number of Muslim students invited to enroll in
    governmentrun schools still was not equal to the number of Christians.
    In turn Christians criticize what they perceive as lingering effects of
    undue favoritism accorded to Muslims in appointments, jobs, and
    scholarships by former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a Muslim. Despite
    these perceptions, there does not appear to be a serious widespread
    problem of religious discrimination in access to employment or
    educational opportunities.
        A few leaders in the Christian and Muslim communities appear to be
    fomenting religious tension between their groups. Christian leaders
    reportedly have used the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Dar Es
    Salem and Nairobi, Kenya, as a justification to criticize Muslims.
        There are signs of increasing tension between secular and
    fundamentalist Muslims, as the latter feel that the former have sold
    out to the Government. The fundamentalist Muslims accuse the Government
    of being a Christian institution, and Muslims in power as being only
    interested in safeguarding their positions. In these circles, secular
    Muslims who drink alcohol or marry Christian women are criticized
    severely. Muslim fundamentalists attempted, unsuccessfully, to
    introduce Muslim traditional dress into the national school system.
    Fundamentalist groups also have exhorted their followers to vote only
    for Muslim candidates.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the past, the Government
    discriminated against the Barabaig and other nomadic persons in the
    north. These ethnic groups continued to seek compensation for past
    government discrimination because of government efforts to make them
    adopt a more modern lifestyle and to restrict their access to pastoral
    lands that were turned into large government wheat farms. In 1994, 6
    Barabaig plaintiffs filed a class action suit, which included 750
    members of the Barabaig tribe, challenging their eviction by the
    National Food Corporation, a government parastatal organization. In
    1994 the High Court ruled that three of the plaintiffs had the right to
    return to their land and awarded them damages of 20,000 shillings,
    60,000 shillings, and 200,000 shillings respectively. However, the
    court found that the 3 other plaintiffs did not prove their cases and
    refused to award them compensation; the court also denied the cases of
    the 750 members of the tribe for not following correct procedures in
    filing their claim. The three plaintiffs who received compensation
    appealed the case, arguing that the compensation was not adequate. The
    other 3 plaintiffs and the 750 tribe members also appealed the denial
    of their case; the appeals were scheduled to be heard in February 2001.
        The Asian community, which is viewed unfavorably by many African
    citizens, has declined by 50 percent in the past decade to about 50,000
    persons. There are no laws or official policies that discriminate
    against Asians; however, as the Government places greater emphasis on
    market-oriented policies and privatization, public concern regarding
    the Asian minority's economic role has increased. This has led to
    demands by small, populist opposition parties for policies of
    ``indigenization'' to ensure that privatization does not increase the
    Asian community's economic predominance at the expense of the country's
    African population.
        On October 6, 21 persons were beaten to death and 50 were injured
    during a clash between a group of ethnic Sonje and Maasai in the
    Mererani region. The incident began when a group of Sonje youths stole
    gemstones from a Maasai miner and other Maasai retaliated with
    violence. However, the incident appeared to be economically motivated.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Both the Constitution and the 1955
    Trade Union Ordinance provide for freedom of association for workers,
    and the Government respected this right in practice. Worker rights are
    handled separately by the Union and Zanzibar Governments. The Union
    Government enforces labor laws for the mainland and the Zanzibar
    Government enforces legislation specific to Zanzibar and Pemba islands.
    The labor law that applies to the mainland applies to both public and
    private sector workers, but restricts the right of association for
    those workers broadly defined as ``essential.'' The 1999 labor law in
    Zanzibar applies only to private sector workers and does not protect
    trade union members from anti-union discrimination.
        On July 1, the 1999 Trade Union Act abolished the umbrella
    organization, the Tanzania Federation of Trade Unions (TFTU) and
    required its 11 independent unions to separately register with the
    Registrar of Trade Unions. The act permitted workers to form unions
    voluntarily without requiring membership in an umbrella organization.
    All of the 11 unions had registered by year's end.
        The 1999 Act gives the Registrar of Trade Unions the power to
    restrict freedom of association by allowing the Registrar to interfere
    union activities. The law permits the imposition of large fines,
    imprisonment, or both for failing to register a trade union. The
    Registrar is also permitted to deregister the smaller of two trade
    unions when more than one exists in an industry and to order the
    smaller union to remove members. The Registrar can suspend a trade
    union for contravening the act or the union's own rules, suspend a
    union for 6 months on grounds of public order or security, and
    invalidate the union's international trade union affiliation if certain
    internal union procedures are not followed. The Registrar did not use
    these powers during the year.
        Overall, only about 10 to 15 percent of the country's 2 million
    wage earners are organized. Registered trade unions nominally represent
    60 percent of workers in industry and government. All workers,
    including those classified broadly as ``essential'' service workers,
    are permitted to join unions, but essential workers are not permitted
    to strike.
        There are no laws prohibiting retribution against legal strikers;
    however, workers have the legal right to strike only after complicated
    and protracted mediation and conciliation procedures leading ultimately
    to the Industrial Court, which receives direction from the Ministry of
    Labor and Youth Development. If a union is not satisfied with the
    decision of the Industrial Court, it may then conduct a legal strike.
    The mediation and conciliation procedures can prolong a dispute by
    months without resolving it. During the year, the ILO submitted to the
    Union Government a list of recommended changes to the law to bring into
    conformity with ILO standards, but the Government had not taken action
    by year's end. Frustrated workers have staged impromptu, illegal
    wildcat strikes and walkouts pending a resolution of their cases in the
    Industrial Court. The last major strike took place in 1998 at Muhimbili
    Medical Center when more than 70 percent of the doctors and nurses went
    on strike for higher pay and better working conditions. In 1998 the
    Zanzibar Government pledged to review the island's labor laws in an
    effort to improve industrial relations and minimize labor disputes;
    however, there was no progress on this issue by year's end.
        In 1998 the regional ILO representative called on the Government to
    ratify conventions on freedom of association, minimum working age,
    equal opportunity, and freedom from discrimination. In April the
    Government ratified the convention on freedom of association. The
    regional ILO office continued to call upon the Government to ratify the
    other core conventions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is protected by law but does not apply to the public sector.
    The Government sets wages for employees of the Government and state-
    owned organizations administratively, although privatization and
    reductions in public sector employment have reduced such employees to
    about 5 percent of the work force.
        With the abolition of the TFTU, unions directly negotiate with the
    Association of Tanzanian Employers on behalf of private sector members.
    Collective agreements must be submitted to the Industrial Court for
    approval and may be refused registration if they do not conform with
    the Government's economic policy. The ILO has observed that these
    provisions are not in conformity with ILO Convention 98 on Collective
    Bargaining and the Right to Organize. None of the newly registered
    unions concluded new collective bargaining agreements by year's end.
    The Security of Employment Act of 1964 prohibits discriminatory
    activities by an employer against union members. Employers found guilty
    of antiunion activities are required under the law to reinstate
    workers. The Warioba Commission, in its White Paper Report of 1998,
    found that bribes often determine whether a worker dismissed from his
    job actually is reinstated.
        There are no export processing zones (EPZ's) on the mainland, but
    there are three in Zanzibar. Working conditions are comparable to those
    in other areas. Labor law protections apply to EPZ workers.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor; however, there were reports that
    it occurred (particularly of children). In 1999 the Government repealed
    the Human Resources Deployment Act of 1983, which allowed forced labor
    and forced relocation of citizens to ensure productive employment (see
    Section 2.d.). The new law, the Employment Services Promotion Act of
    1999, does not permit either and instead promotes self-employment.
    However, in some rural areas, villagers still are obligated to work in
    the village community gardens or on small construction projects, such
    as repairing roads. The Constitution does not specifically prohibit
    forced or bonded child labor, and there were reports that it occurred.
    There were reports of children forced into prostitution by parents or
    guardians in need of extra income, and there were unconfirmed reports
    in previous years that children were trafficked to work in mines and
    other businesses (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law provides for 7 years of compulsory education
    through age 15 (see Section 5). In accordance with ILO Convention 138,
    which the Government ratified in 1999, the Government prohibits
    children under the age of 14 from working in the formal wage sector in
    both urban and rural areas, and the Government enforces this
    prohibition; however, the provision does not apply to children working
    on family farms or herding domestic livestock. The minimum age for work
    of a contractual nature in approved occupations is set at 15 years.
    Children between the ages of 12 and 15 may be employed on a daily wage
    and on a dayto-day basis, but they must have parental permission and
    return to the residence of their guardian at night. Approximately
    250,000 children engage in child labor.
        The law prohibits young persons from employment in any occupation
    that is injurious to health and that is dangerous or otherwise
    unsuitable. Young persons between the ages of 12 and 15 may be employed
    in industrial work but only between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.,
    with some exceptions. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and
    Youth Development is responsible for enforcement; however, the number
    of inspectors is inadequate to police conditions. The effectiveness of
    government enforcement reportedly has declined further with increased
    privatization.
        Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 children engage in seasonal employment
    on sisal, tea, tobacco, and coffee plantations. Children working on
    plantations generally receive lower wages than their adult
    counterparts, although they may be in comparable jobs. Work on sisal
    and tobacco plantations is particularly hazardous and detrimental to
    children. From 1,500 to 3,000 children work in unregulated gemstone
    mines. Girls often are employed as domestic servants, mostly in urban
    households sometimes under abusive and exploitative conditions. In the
    informal sector, children assist their parents in unregulated piecework
    manufacturing. Children are engaged in labor in the areas of mining,
    domestic service, fishing, commercial agriculture and prostitution.
        Several government ministries, including the Ministry of Labor and
    Youth Development, the Bureau of Statistics, and the Department of
    Information Services, have special child labor units. The Government is
    working with NGO's to establish a specific prohibition against child
    labor. In 1999 the Government drafted a National Child Labor
    Elimination policy designed to bring national law into compliance with
    international conventions, and in December 1999 the Government invited
    labor organizations and NGO's to comment on the draft law. The
    Government has worked with the ILO's International Program on the
    Elimination of Child Labor to develop a national plan of action to
    address the issue, and in April implemented a program for the
    elimination of child labor. The Government had not ratified the ILO
    Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor by year's end.
        The Constitution does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded
    child labor, and there were reports of children forced into
    prostitution by their parents or their guardians; there also were
    unconfirmed reports in previous years that children were trafficked to
    work in mines and other businesses (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum wage
    for employment in the formal sector. The legal minimum wage is
    approximately $38 (30,000 shillings) per month. Even when supplemented
    with various benefits such as housing, transport allowances, and food
    subsidies, the minimum rate is not always sufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family, and workers must
    depend on their extended family or on a second or third job. Despite
    the minimum wage, many workers, especially in the small but growing
    informal sector, are paid less.
        There is no standard legal workweek; however, a 5-day, 40-hour
    workweek is in effect for government workers. Most private employers
    retain a 6-day, 44- to 48-hour workweek. In general, women may not be
    employed between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Several laws regulate safety in the
    workplace. An Occupational Health and Safety Factory Inspection System,
    set up with the assistance of the ILO, is managed by the Ministry of
    Labor and Social Welfare and Youth Development; however, its
    effectiveness is limited. Labor standards are not enforced in the
    informal sector.
        The Employment Services Promotion Act of 1999 provides for the
    creation of a facility to promote employment by creating selfemployment
    opportunities, allows the Government to collect reliable data and
    information on vacancies for the unemployed, and facilitates employment
    with other agencies and the private sector. However, the new facility
    was not funded by year's end.
        Union officials have claimed that enforcement of labor standards is
    effective in the formal sector, but no verification studies have been
    performed. Workers may sue an employer through their union if their
    working conditions do not comply with the Ministry of Labor's health
    and environmental standards. Workers who have lodged and won such
    complaints have not faced retribution; however, workers do not have the
    right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without
    jeopardizing their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking,
    and in previous years there were unconfirmed reports that children were
    trafficked away from their families to work in mines and other business
    entities; however, there were no such reports during the year. In 1998
    there were unconfirmed reports that senior government officials were
    involved in the practice; the ILO and a visiting foreign delegation
    were unable to confirm the reports.
                                   __________

                                      TOGO

        Togo is a republic dominated by President General Gnassingbe
    Eyadema, who has ruled since 1967, when he came to power in a military
    coup. Although opposition political parties were legalized following
    widespread protests in 1991, Eyadema and his Rally of the Togolese
    People (RPT), strongly backed by the armed forces, have continued to
    dominate the exercise of political power. Eyadema used his entrenched
    position to repress genuine opposition and to secure another 5-year
    term in an election held in June 1998, which, like previous multiparty
    elections, was marred by systematic fraud. Serious irregularities in
    the Government's conduct of the election strongly favored the incumbent
    and appear to have affected the outcome materially. Despite the
    Government's professed intention to move from authoritarian rule to
    democracy, institutions established ostensibly to accomplish this
    transition did not do so in practice. However, on April 5, the
    President promulgated a new Electoral Code, which was drafted by the
    RPT-controlled Government in consultation with opposition parties. The
    Electoral Code establishes an Independent Electoral Commission (CENI),
    composed of 20 members, 10 from the President's RPT party and 10 drawn
    from opposition parties. The CENI is intended to monitor, collect,
    tally, and announce the results of the next legislative elections. In
    the March 1999 legislative elections, which were boycotted by the
    opposition, the RPT won 79 of the 81 seats in the National Assembly,
    and the elections were marred by procedural problems and significant
    fraud, particularly the misrepresentation of voter turnout. In July
    1999, President Eyadema promised new legislative elections in March;
    however, such elections were not held by year's end. Eyadema and his
    supporters maintain firm control over all facets and levels of the
    country's highly centralized Government and have perpetuated the
    dominance of northern ethnic groups, including Eyadema's Kabye ethnic
    minority, throughout the public sector, especially the military. The
    executive branch continues to influence the judiciary.
        The security forces consist of the army (including the elite
    Presidential Guard), navy, air force, the Surete Nationale (including
    the national police), and the Gendarmerie. Approximately 90 percent of
    the army's officers and 70 percent of its soldiers are from the Kabye
    ethnic minority. Although the Minister of the Interior is in charge of
    the national police, and the Defense Minister has authority over most
    other security forces, all security forces effectively are controlled
    by President Eyadema. Members of the security forces continued to
    commit serious human rights abuses.
        Approximately 80 percent of the country's estimated population of 5
    million is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but there is also an
    active commercial sector. The main exports are phosphates, cotton, and
    cocoa, which are the leading sources of foreign exchange. Per capita
    gross domestic product remains less than $400 a year. Economic growth
    continues to lag behind population growth. The economy is impeded by a
    large and inefficient state-owned sector, high (although drastically
    reduced) spending on the security forces, widespread corruption, and
    lack of Government budget and fiscal discipline. Most major bilateral
    donors have suspended their aid due to the Government's weak
    democratization efforts and poor human rights record. Several
    international financial institutions also halted budgetary assistance
    to the Government.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    were a few improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain.
    Citizens'' right to change their government is restricted. Unlike
    previous years, there were no confirmed reports of extrajudicial
    killings. Security forces committed beatings. The Government did not,
    in general, investigate or punish effectively those who committed
    abuses, nor did it prosecute openly those persons responsible for
    extrajudicial killings and disappearances in previous years. Prison
    conditions remained very harsh. Arbitrary arrest and detention was a
    problem, and prolonged pretrial detention was common, with prisoners
    often detained 6 to 7 months without being charged. The Government
    continued to influence the judiciary, which is understaffed and
    overburdened, and did not ensure defendants' rights to fair and
    expeditious trials. Security forces often infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. The Government and the security forces restricted
    freedom of speech and of the press, often using investigative detention
    and criminal libel prosecutions to harass journalists and political
    opponents. Laws were passed in January allowing for an extended
    imprisonment of journalists who write articles critical of the
    Government and its officers. The Government restricted academic
    freedom. The Government restricted freedom of assembly, association,
    and movement. The National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) continued
    to be dominated by supporters of the President, and the Government
    restricted and impeded the work of independent human rights groups.
    Violence and societal discrimination against women remained a problem.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM) among some ethnic groups persisted;
    although there is a 1998 law that prohibits FGM, the Government
    enforced it rarely. Discrimination against ethnic minorities remained a
    problem. The Government limits workers' rights to collective
    bargaining. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution
    and trafficking in children for forced labor remained problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Unlike previous
    years, there were no confirmed reports of extrajudicial killings.
        On March 27, an agitator reportedly paid by the Government was
    killed on the University of Benin campus in Lome during a confrontation
    between demonstrating students and a group of false student
    demonstrators paid by the Government to disrupt the demonstration (see
    Section 2.a.).
        There were no developments in the October 1999 killing of a
    missionary in Lome. One soldier and one assailant were killed in an
    exchange of gunfire between police, military personnel, and the
    assailants.
        There were no developments or arrests in the January 1999 case in
    which gendarmes raided the Akodessewa-Kpota shantytown neighborhood in
    Lome and set fires that reportedly killed two children.
        An Amnesty International (AI) report issued in May 1999 stated that
    hundreds of bodies--presumably members of the opposition--were thrown
    into the sea around the time of the June 1998 presidential election
    (see Sections 1.b. and 4). The Government denied the charges and called
    for an international inquiry. In September the Government accepted a
    joint U.N./OAU commission to investigate allegations of hundreds of
    extrajudicial killings around the time of the 1998 presidential
    election. The U.N./OAU commission of inquiry visited the country in
    November to investigate these charges; the three-person commission met
    with the President and members of his cabinet, as well as with
    fishermen and farmers in the country and in Benin. Under the terms of
    the inquiry, the Government pledged not to retaliate against the
    witnesses. The commission is scheduled to release the results of its
    investigation in early 2001 (see Section 4).
        There was no development in the August 1998 killing of Liman
    Doumongue, Deputy Secretary General of the National Association of
    Independent Unions of Togo (UNSIT), a pro-opposition labor federation.
    In May 1999, UNSIT wrote a letter to President Eyadema requesting an
    independent investigation into the killing; however, the Government did
    not respond. The September 1998 killing of Koffi Mathieu Kegbe, a local
    activist in the opposition Action for Renewal Committee (CAR) party,
    was still under investigation at year's end. There were no developments
    in the 1998 killings of the Togolese Human Rights League founding
    member Dr. Tona Pierre Adigo and businessman Malou Borozi. There has
    been no public investigation into the June 1998 killing of the child,
    Ayele Akakpo. The Government claims that the August 1998 attack on
    Union of Forces for Change (UFC) Secretary-General Fabre's residence
    was carried out by coup plotters from Ghana.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances during the year.
        An AI report issued in May 1999 reported that hundreds of bodies--
    presumably those of opposition members--were thrown into the sea around
    the time of the June 1998 presidential election (see Sections 1.a. and
    4). According to AI, the corpses were found and buried by Beninese
    fishermen. The Government strongly denied the accusations and initiated
    legal proceedings against AI in 1999; however, it has not pursued the
    charges. The independent Benin Human Rights League reported that bodies
    were dropped along the coastal waters by military aircraft, although
    other official sources in Benin denied that this event happened. In
    September a U.N./OAU commission arrived to investigate those charges
    and other alleged disappearances.
        AI also reported that on August 20, 1998, two young men, Komlan
    Edoh and Kodjo Kouni, were beaten and arrested by security forces in a
    northwest suburb of Lome, then taken to a nearby military camp, after
    which they disappeared. There were no further developments in the case
    during the year.
        There was no investigation into the mass burials of 1997 and 1998
    reportedly in the vicinity of Lome.
        There were no developments in the 1994 disappearance of David
    Bruce, a high-level Foreign Ministry employee sympathetic to the
    opposition, which remained under investigation by the Government.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and physical abuse of prisoners
    and detainees; however, security forces often beat detainees
    immediately after arresting them. Some suspects have claimed credibly
    to have been beaten, burned, or denied access to food and medical
    attention.
        Security forces harassed, intimidated, and beat journalists (see
    Section 2.a.).
        Security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse demonstrators
    forcibly (see Section 2.b.). On January 12, police forcibly dispersed
    opposition party demonstrators using tear gas and truncheons,
    inflicting minor injuries (cuts and bruises) on the demonstrators (see
    Section 2.b.). On July 6, security forces forcibly dispersed a UFC
    rally and beat several demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). Although
    several protestors were detained briefly, the Government did not press
    charges; no action was taken against the security forces.
        On February 17, students demonstrated in protest of the selection
    of the president of an independent student organization; government
    security forces dispersed the demonstrators with truncheons and tear
    gas; some students suffered cuts and bruises (see Section 2.a.).
        Impunity remains a problem, and the Government did not publicly
    prosecute any officials for these abuses.
        An Angolan diplomat accredited to Benin and Togo was arrested and
    allegedly tortured in November 1999 for allegedly attempting to kidnap
    one of Jonas Savimbi's children. The diplomat was released quickly and
    deported immediately; the Government took no action on the allegations
    of torture.
        There was neither investigation into nor action taken on the 1999
    case in which security forces reportedly tortured a human rights
    monitor. There was no investigation into nor action taken in the August
    1999 case in which five young men, who traveled from Lome to Kara to
    hold discussions on the Lome Framework Agreement, said that they were
    detained and beaten on two occasions by police, gendarmes, and military
    personnel in Kara. Authorities maintained that their wounds resulted
    when they resisted arrest. There was no investigation into nor action
    taken in the May 1999 case in which security forces allegedly beat and
    tortured Ameen Ayodele, a member of the Nigerian section of AI (see
    Section 4). There was no investigation into nor action taken in the
    March 1999 case in which security forces in Lome beat university
    student Gerard Amedjro and a female friend, allegedly after the latter
    refused to undress for them.
        Prison conditions reportedly remained very harsh, with serious
    overcrowding, poor sanitation, and unhealthy food. Lome's central
    prison, built for 350 prisoners, reportedly housed 1,500 inmates or
    more during the year. Medical facilities are inadequate, and disease
    and drug abuse are widespread. Despite these problems, for the fourth
    consecutive year there were no reported deaths of prisoners due to
    disease or inadequate medical facilities. Prison guards in the
    overcrowded civil prison of Lome charge prisoners a small fee to
    shower, use the toilet, or have a place to sleep. Prisoners reportedly
    have to pay $2.50 (CFA 1,500) to guards before being allowed to visit
    the infirmary if sick. The children of convicted adults often are
    incarcerated with the female inmates, who are housed separately from
    the male prisoners. Juvenile prisoners are held separately from adults.
        In September a local NGO, the African Center for Democracy, Human
    Rights, and Protection of Detainees (CADEPROD), began to conduct a
    census of civilian prisons funded by a foreign Government. The study
    was proceeding at year's end.
        Although some international and local private organizations have
    access to prisons for monitoring purposes, the International Committee
    of the Red Cross did not request a visit during the year. Following an
    October seminar on torture sponsored by the Togolese Human Rights
    League and attended by gendarmes, prison guards, and magistrates, the
    Justice Minister agreed to authorize a prison visit by the league's
    president accompanied by the prison director. However, after the prison
    tour on December 21, there was no change in the treatment of the
    prisoners.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain problems. The law allows authorities to hold arrested
    persons incommunicado without charge for 48 hours, with an additional
    48-hour extension in cases deemed serious or complex. In practice
    detainees can be, and often are, held without bail for lengthy periods
    with or without the approval of a judge. Family members and attorneys
    officially have access to a detainee after an initial 48- or 96-hour
    detention period; however, authorities often delay, and sometimes deny,
    access.
        Judges or senior police officials issue warrants. Although
    detainees have the right to be informed of the charges against them,
    police sometimes ignore this right. The law stipulates that a special
    judge conduct a pretrial investigation to examine the adequacy of
    evidence and decide on bail. However, a shortage of judges and other
    qualified personnel, plus official inaction, have resulted in lengthy
    pretrial detention--in some cases several years--and confinement of
    prisoners for periods exceeding the time they would have had to serve
    if they had been tried and convicted. For example, Kokou Alowou and
    Dela Atidepe were arrested in 1993, charged with armed robbery and
    manslaughter, and were still awaiting trial at year's end. An estimated
    50 percent of the prison population is pretrial detainees.
        The Government continued to use brief investigative detentions of
    less than 48 hours to harass and intimidate opposition activists and
    journalists for alleged defamation of Government officials (see Section
    2.a.). On February 24, security forces arrested seven members of the
    opposition UFC party, the day after a confrontation between UFC and RPT
    party members; no RPT members were arrested. After many delays during
    which time some of the UFC members remained in detention, they were
    tried in August; two were acquitted and five others were convicted of
    disturbing the peace and destroying public property. They received jail
    sentences of 2 to 6 months and were ordered to pay a $700 (CFA 500,000)
    fine. On July 31 and August 1, Kofi Messa Devotsu of the LTDH was
    questioned and threatened with arrest by the Minister of the Interior
    after the LTDH published a report on July 20 that was critical of human
    rights in the country (see Section 4). A number of independent
    journalists also were questioned at the same time for publishing
    articles on the LTDH report. The Government at times has resorted to
    false charges of common crimes to arrest, detain, and intimidate
    opponents.
        Members of the security forces arrested and detained journalists
    without charging them with any offense (see Section 2.a.).
        Members of the security forces detained human rights monitors and
    activists (see Sections 2.b. and 4).
        On December 23, 1999, authorities arrested Roland Comlan Kpagli,
    publisher of L'Aurore newspaper on charges of reporting false
    information (see Section 2.a.). In response to international pressure,
    he was not tried, was never charged officially, and was finally
    released on February 4. On January 28, authorities arrested Norbert
    Gbikpi-Benissan of the UNSIT teachers' union and Allagua Odegui,
    Secretary General of the FETRAN/UNSIT, for allegedly providing false
    information to Kpagli for the article that prompted his arrest.
    International pressure resulted in their release within a month.
        In November 1999, security forces arrested and allegedly tortured
    an Angolan diplomat for allegedly attempting to kidnap one of Jonas
    Savimbis'' children (see Section 1.c.). He was released subsequently
    and immediately deported.
        The status of UFC activist Abevi Abbey, detained by security forces
    in April 1999 for distributing leaflets that urged the public to
    participate in UFC-sponsored Independence Day demonstrations, remains
    unknown. A domestic NGO believed that he had been released.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this
    prohibition; however, several opposition and human rights workers
    remain in self-imposed exile because they fear arrest.
        For example, on March 8, several student opposition leaders were
    sentenced to 18-month jail terms for inciting riots on the campus of
    the University of Benin. Some students fled into self-imposed exile in
    Ghana before they could be arrested.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in practice the executive branch
    continued to exert control over the judiciary. A majority of the
    members of the Supreme Council for the Magistrature are supporters of
    President Eyadema. Judges who belong to the pro-Eyadema Professional
    Association of Togo Magistrates (APMT) reportedly receive the most
    prestigious assignments, while judges who advocate an independent
    judiciary and belong to the National Association of Magistrates (ANM)
    are marginalized.
        The Constitutional Court stands at the apex of the court system.
    The civil judiciary system includes the Supreme Court, Sessions (Court
    of Assizes), and Appeals Courts. A military tribunal exists for crimes
    committed by security forces, but its proceedings are closed. In June
    1999, when President Eyadema named a new cabinet, he appointed former
    Interior Minister General Seyi Memene to replace a civilian Justice
    Minister.
        The court system remained overburdened and understaffed (see
    Section 1.d.). Magistrates, like most government employees, are not
    always paid on time. The judicial system employs both traditional law
    as well as the Napoleonic Code in trying criminal and civil cases.
    Trials are open to the public, and judicial procedures generally are
    respected. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal. The Bar
    Association provides attorneys for the indigent. Defendants may
    confront witnesses, present evidence, and enjoy a presumption of
    innocence. In rural areas, the village chief or council of elders may
    try minor criminal and civil cases. Those who reject the traditional
    ruling may take their cases to the regular court system, which is the
    starting point for cases in urban areas.
        Impunity for those who commit abuses, particularly those close to
    Eyadema, remains a problem.
        There were no reports of political prisoners. On March 11, 1999,
    the three remaining members of the opposition group MO5, arrested in
    1994 and sentenced in 1996 to 5 to 7 years in prison, were freed.
    Although their crime appeared to have been politically motivated, the
    state prosecutor did not apply the December 1994 general amnesty law to
    this case and they remained in prison until their release in March
    1999.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity of
    residences, the secrecy of correspondence and telecommunications, and
    prohibits searches and seizures not prescribed by law; however,
    security forces often infringed on these rights. In criminal cases, a
    judge or senior police official may authorize searches of private
    residences. In political and national security cases, the security
    forces need no prior authorization. Police conducted searches without
    warrants, searching for arms caches as well as for criminals, often
    under the guise of searching for identity cards. Armed security
    checkpoints exist throughout the country, and security forces regularly
    search vehicles, baggage, and individuals in the name of security (see
    Section 2.d.).
        In May the Government stationed security guards around the home of
    former human rights Minister Harry Olympio and restricted his
    movements, ostensibly for his own protection following an attempt to
    kill him.
        Citizens believe that the Government monitors telephones and
    correspondence, although this surveillance has not been confirmed. The
    police and Gendarmerie perform domestic intelligence functions. The
    Government maintains a system of informers on the university campus
    (see Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricts
    these rights in practice. The Government repeatedly harassed and
    intimidated print media journalists through threats, detentions, and
    criminal libel prosecutions. Police and gendarmes occasionally harassed
    newspaper vendors and confiscated issues of some opposition newspapers.
    Advertisers reportedly often were intimidated as well. Few opposition
    newspapers are distributed outside the Lome area, particularly in areas
    not known to be ruling party strongholds.
        On January 4, the National Assembly adopted an amendment to the
    1998 Press and Communication Code. Article 1 of the 1998 code declares
    that the media are free; most of the remaining 108 articles restrict
    media freedom. Article 62 makes the intentional publication of false
    information a criminal offense, punishable by fines of $900 to $1,800
    (CFA 500,000 to 1 million). Articles 90 to 98 make defamation of state
    institutions or any member of certain classes of persons, including
    government officials, a crime punishable by imprisonment for up to 3
    months and fines of up to $4,000 (CFA 2 million). Article 89 makes it a
    crime, punishable by up to 3 months in prison for a second offense, to
    ``offend the honor, dignity or esteem'' of the President and other
    government leaders. The law also provides that editors and publishers,
    including legislators with parliamentary immunity, are liable for
    crimes committed through the press. The January amendment revised
    Article 89 to provide for 3- to 6-month jail terms for first offenders,
    who previously were subject only to 3-month suspended sentences. In
    practice first-time offenders were imprisoned in spite of the former
    article, which was changed to conform to practice.
        On August 10, the National Assembly passed a law further regulating
    journalism, which included a provision requiring that all journalists
    must have a journalism degree; however, there are no journalism
    programs offered in the country. Although a grandfather clause applies
    to those already active in journalism, observers believe that this law
    could be used to prevent persons seen as unsympathetic to the
    Government from becoming journalists. Although it is not necessary to
    be an accredited journalist to publish an editorial or opinion article,
    the Government may take reprisals if offended by published material,
    such as arresting or detaining the writer, or firing a civil servant.
        Despite Government interference, there is a lively press, most of
    which is heavily politicized and some of which is often highly critical
    of President Eyadema. About 16 privately owned newspapers publish with
    some regularity. The only daily newspaper, Togo-Presse, is government-
    owned and controlled. A private Lome-based newspaper, Crocodile,
    publishes on a biweekly schedule.
        There is no prepublication censorship of print media in law or
    practice; however, security forces frequently threatened or detained
    print media journalists and interfered with the distribution of
    newspapers.
        On April 6, security forces seized copies of opposition newspaper
    Crocodile without explanation. Authorities seized the April 13 edition
    of L'Exile and detained editor Hippolyte Agboh after the newspaper
    published an article alleging the death of Eyadema's daughter in a
    late-night car accident. Agboh was released on June 16, just prior to
    the OAU summit in Lome; he was never charged and no further action was
    taken in the case. On June 5, security forces seized copies of the
    weekly newspaper Le Combat du Peuple. The newspaper's publisher, Lucien
    Messan, was charged with libel and fined more than $900 (CFA 600,000).
    By year's end, no journalists remained in prison.
        On July 31 and August 1, the Minister of the Interior questioned
    and threatened with arrest Kofi Messa Devotsu of the Togolese Human
    Rights League (LTDH) after the LTDH published a report on July 20 that
    was critical of human rights in the country (see Section 4). A number
    of independent journalists also were questioned at the same time for
    publishing articles on the LTDH report.
        On December 23, 1999, Roland Comlan Kpagli, editor of L'Aurore, was
    arrested for publishing false news regarding the death of a schoolgirl
    during a police response to a student demonstration. Kpagli was
    released on February 4 without being charged.
        At year's end, no further action had been taken in the case of Ame
    Kpeto, an army warrant officer who made critical statements about
    Government officials at a military assembly in 1998. In 1999 Kpeto was
    charged with slandering the honor of the army and transferred to the
    civil prison of Lome to await a civil trial.
        Since newspapers and television are relatively expensive, radio is
    the most important medium of mass communication. In addition to two
    Government-owned stations including Radio Lome, there are more than 20
    private radio stations in the country. Two of these, Radio Avenir and
    Galaxy FM, are associated with the ruling party.
        Prior to the adoption of the 1998 Press Code, the Government did
    not permit private radio stations to broadcast news programming. Some
    private radio stations began in 1999 to broadcast some domestic news,
    but they offered little of the political commentary and criticism of
    the Government that is widespread in the print media. However, Radio
    France International is heard 24 hours a day through an FM repeater and
    Africa Numero-1 also has an FM repeater in Lome. In 1999 a private
    station, Kanal FM, became a foreign affiliate and carries several hours
    of news, music, and commentary daily.
        The government-owned and controlled Television Togo is the only
    television station in Lome and in most of the country. In 1999 a small
    private television station began local broadcasts in Aneho with limited
    programming.
        The Constitution mandates equal access to state media; however, the
    official media heavily slanted their content in favor of the President
    and the Government. The High Authority for Audio-Visual and
    Communications (HAAC) is charged with providing equal access to state
    media as mandated by the Constitution. Although it is nominally
    independent, in practice it operates as an arm of the Government. It is
    dominated by Eyadema supporters and has not increased opposition access
    to the Government-controlled media. An NGO, the Togolese Media
    Observatory (OTM), was established in November 1999 with the purpose to
    protect press freedom and to improve the professionalism of
    journalists. OTM's board and membership include both government and
    private journalists. During the year, it met regularly to discuss
    journalistic ethics and professional standards.
        There were no reports that the Government restricted access to the
    Internet. There are about 15 Internet service providers in the country.
    Most Internet users are businesses rather than households. Access to
    the Internet and fax machines also is possible through many small
    stores and cafes in Lome and other cities.
        At the country's sole university, academic freedom is constrained
    by concern among professors about potential harassment by the
    Government or antiopposition militants and the lack of a faculty-
    elected rector. Teachers' salaries and students' stipends rarely are
    paid on time. University faculty remained on strike over this issue
    until January, forcing classes to begin late and almost causing the
    cancellation of the school year. Opposition student groups reportedly
    are intimidated by an informer system that has led in the past to
    Government persecution. The only officially tolerated student groups,
    Haut Conseil des Movements Etudiants and Union General des Etudiants et
    Stagiares du Togo, are pro-Eyadema. An independent student organization
    (CEUB) has had longstanding unofficial recognition, and its elected
    representatives have participated on university committees. However, in
    February students complained that board members bribed by the
    Government selected the newly elected CEUB president. On February 17,
    in response students demonstrated in protest of the selection of the
    president; government security forces dispersed the demonstrators with
    truncheons and tear gas; some students suffered cuts and bruises. There
    were credible reports that the Government used paid agitators to
    disrupt student demonstrations and provide a pretext for security
    forces to disperse demonstrators and arrest students. One Government
    agitator was killed on the university campus in March during a
    demonstration (see Section 1.a.), and CEUB leader Lorempo Lamboni went
    into hiding after being charged by the Government with responsibility
    for the events leading to this death; Lamboni remained in hiding at
    year's end. On March 8, several student opposition leaders were
    sentenced to 18-month jail terms for inciting riots on the campus of
    the University of Benin. During the year, some students fled into self-
    imposed exile in Ghana before they could be arrested.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides that citizens are free to assemble; however, the Government
    restricts this right in practice. Although opposition political parties
    sometimes were able to hold public meetings in Lome, authorities
    systematically interfered with the freedom of political opponents
    attempting to assemble in the central and northern regions. Government
    officials prohibited, and security forces forcibly dispersed, some
    public demonstrations critical of the Government.
        On January 12, security forces using tear gas and truncheons
    forcibly dispersed a UFC march held in Lome to protest the January 13
    Liberation Day holiday. There were credible reports that the Government
    used paid agitators to disrupt student demonstrations and provide a
    pretext for security forces to disperse demonstrators and arrest
    students. For example, on March 27, a student demonstration on the
    university campus was dispersed and a demonstrator was killed (see
    Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). On June 20, the Government banned all
    demonstrations prior to the OAU summit in early July. On July 6,
    immediately prior to the opening of the OAU ministerial meeting in
    Lome, security forces forcibly dispersed a UFC rally of approximately
    200 persons that violated the government ban on demonstrations during
    this period; security forces beat several demonstrators. The
    demonstrators were seeking release of seven UFC members arrested in
    February (see Section 1.d.).
        In December 1999, police arrested student union leaders and
    detained them for several days following a riot allegedly caused when
    security forces dispersed a student gathering at a Lome high school.
    Officials told the arrested students that they would be held
    responsible and rearrested for any demonstrations that occurred
    subsequently in Lome. They were released within a few days of their
    arrests and given 18-month suspended sentences.
        In late August 1999, in Kara authorization was denied to organizers
    of an information meeting on the July 29 Framework Agreement on
    Democratic Transition in Togo; the organizers were arrested (see
    Section 1.c.); however, they were not charged and were released within
    a few days.
        Under the Constitution, citizens have the right to organize
    associations and political parties; however, the Government restricted
    this right in practice. While political parties are able to elect
    officers and register, few opposition party offices and no pro-
    opposition newspapers operate in most towns in the central and northern
    regions.
        There are many nongovernmental organizations (NGO's); they are
    required to register with the Government.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
        New religious organizations are required to register with the
    Ministry of Interior, and scores of applications await adjudication;
    however, these groups appear to practice their faiths without
    hindrance. In the early 1990's, a number of new religious groups began
    to seek recognition. Cases of individuals who used religion as a cover
    for other activities also increased. At the same time, advocates for
    religious freedom demanded more tolerance and protection for persons of
    all faiths. At the urging of the Togolese Association for the Defense
    of Religious Liberty (ATDLR), which was founded in 1991, the Government
    adopted a more liberal approach to religious freedom; however, the
    Government concluded that the rise of cults and dubious religious
    associations was a problem. In 1995, the last year for which statistics
    are available, the Government recognized only 71 of the 198 groups that
    applied for official recognition during that year. It is believed that
    the others continued to operate in a clandestine fashion. These
    unregistered groups are mostly little known groups within the major
    religions.
        The Constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties
    based on religion and states explicitly that ``no political party
    should identify itself with a region, an ethnic group, or a religion,''
    and this occurs in practice.
        In January, for the second year in a row, the Catholic Church
    declined an invitation to participate in a ``Day of National
    Liberation'' service organized by the Government. The Catholic Church
    stated that it is inappropriate to hold a worship service in a
    government building. In 1999 the Government criticized the church for
    ``not contributing to national reconciliation'' but took no further
    action. In addition, under the leadership of the Archbishop of Lome,
    the Catholic Church continued to refrain from delivering political
    sermons praising President Eyadema.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, the Government restricts these rights in practice.
    Armed security checkpoints and arbitrary searches of vehicles and
    individuals are common, and government security forces searched cars
    throughout the country. The lack of discipline of some soldiers manning
    roadblocks and their actions, such as frequent demands for bribes
    before allowing citizens to pass, impeded free movement within the
    country. In June the Government also declared that no old-model cars
    would be allowed on the roads during the July OAU summit. Downtown
    areas of Lome were blocked to all but official vehicles during the week
    of the Summit.
        The Government eased its strict documentation requirements for
    citizens who apply for a new passport or a renewal. In the previous
    year, applicants were asked to provide an airline ticket, business
    documents, an invitation letter, a parental authorization letter (even
    for adults), proof of study grant for students, and a husband's
    permission for a married woman (see Section 5) in addition to normal
    identity papers. In 1997 the Government transferred the Passport Office
    from the police to the Gendarmerie, which falls under the Defense
    Ministry. The Government maintains that its intent was to take passport
    issuance away from corrupt police officials. Strict passport
    application requirements and a shortage of blank passports prevented or
    significantly hindered some citizens' travel abroad. However, in
    January a new machine-readable passport was introduced; delays for
    passports are a result of 2 years' deferred demand and the
    centralization of the passport-issuing authority. A national identity
    card can also be used for travel to other member countries of the
    Economic Community of West African States.
        There is no law that provides for granting refugee or asylee status
    in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
        The Government provides first asylum. The Government cooperates
    with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and routinely
    accepts the decision of the UNHCR office located in Lome in determining
    refugee status. The UNHCR estimated at year's end that the country
    hosts 11,208 refugees from Ghana. Another 11,000 Ghanaian refugees live
    in villages in the northern part of the country and are not assisted by
    UNHCR. The UNHCR also estimated that 1,058 Togolese refugees still
    remained outside the country at year's end.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
    Government peacefully; however, the Government restricts this right in
    practice. In the June 1998 presidential election, as in virtually all
    previous elections since Eyadema seized power in 1967, the Government
    prevented citizens from exercising this right effectively. The Interior
    Ministry declared Eyadema the winner with 52 percent of the vote in the
    1998 election; however, serious irregularities in the Government's
    conduct of the election strongly favored the incumbent and appear to
    have affected the outcome materially.
        Although the Government did not obstruct the functioning of
    political opponents openly, the President used the strength of the
    military and his government allies to intimidate and harass citizens
    and opposition groups. The Government and the State remained highly
    centralized. President Eyadema's national Government appointed the
    officials and controlled the budgets of all subnational government
    entities including prefectures and municipalities, and influenced the
    selection of traditional chiefs.
        The second multiparty legislative elections of Eyadema's 33-year
    rule were held on March 21, 1999. However, the opposition boycotted the
    election, in which the ruling party won 79 of the 81 seats in the
    National Assembly. The two remaining seats went to candidates from
    little-known independent parties. The legislative elections were marred
    by procedural problems and significant fraud, particularly
    misrepresentation of voter turnout.
        The opposition set several conditions before it would take part in
    the 1999 legislative elections. Chief among them was a settlement of
    the dispute over the seriously flawed June 1998 presidential election
    in which the vote count was stopped and President Eyadema declared the
    winner by the Interior Minister. Under international pressure, the
    Government began preliminary discussions with the opposition which,
    according to an agreement reached in December 1998, were to be followed
    by formal negotiations, in the presence of international facilitators.
    When the parties disagreed over UFC insistence that formal negotiations
    occur outside of the country, the Government scheduled a first round of
    legislative elections on March 7, 1999 and a runoff on March 21, 1999.
    The Government argued that the mandate of the outgoing legislature
    expired in March 1999 and that elections had to be held to avoid a
    constitutional vacuum. When the opposition did not register candidates,
    the Government proposed a 2-week postponement; however, the opposition
    parties maintained their position in favor of a boycott. The elections
    proceeded and virtually the only candidates to run were those from the
    RPT.
        In February 1999, the Council of Ministers passed a decree
    requiring security forces to vote 3 days before the general population,
    and some 15,000 military, gendarmes, police, customs officials, and
    firemen voted on March 18, 1999. Opposition party members of the
    National Electoral Commission stated that the special voting procedures
    for security forces violated the Electoral Code because they occurred
    before the end of campaigning, and that the vote count occurred 72
    hours after the vote instead of immediately afterwards. According to
    the Government, about 65 percent of the population participated in the
    legislative elections while the opposition stated that the figure could
    not be more than 10 percent. The progovernment National Electoral
    Commission, absent the commission's opposition party members (who also
    boycotted the process), reported that turnout reached about 37 percent
    in the opposition stronghold of Ave, and as much as 95 percent in Kozah
    prefecture in the north, where the ruling party has greater support.
    The opposition took no part in the revision of voter rolls, the
    distribution of voter cards, the monitoring of the vote, and the
    counting of the ballots. National election observer organizations did
    not participate, and international observation was sporadic.
        The Government invited a few international observers to comment on
    the organization and management of the election; however, there were no
    independent observers present when the military voted on March 18,
    1999. Even though RPT candidates ran unopposed in most districts, there
    were reports of intimidation and evidence of fraud to boost statistics
    on voter participation in what were essentially one-party elections.
    For example, in Tchaoudjo, where voting started at 6 a.m., polling
    place officials did not allow delegates of an independent party to
    participate in the supervision work until 9 a.m.; these delegates
    watched ballot boxes being stuffed. In Agou independent party delegates
    claimed that they saw individuals voting more than 10 times. Foreign
    diplomats observed voting at close to 200 polling stations, mainly in
    and around Lome, but also in Yoto prefecture. Turnout was below the
    levels reflected in official results for most of these locations.
        On April 9, 1999, the Constitutional Court confirmed that of the
    2,412,027 registered voters, 1,592,661 voted, for a turnout of 66
    percent. The court rejected a dozen complaints and annulled the results
    in two districts; however, new elections were never held in these
    districts and the districts remained unrepresented at year's end.
        The National Assembly has little authority or influence on
    President Eyadema and has limited influence on the Government. Aside
    from controlling its own programs and activities and its ability to
    request amendments, the National Assembly largely endorses the
    proposals of the President and the Government.
        After the 1999 legislative election, the Government announced that
    it would continue to pursue dialog with the opposition. In May 1999, 2
    months after the election, President Eyadema nominated a new Prime
    Minister, Eugene Koffi Adoboli, a former U.N. official who was not a
    member of the ruling party. In August the National Assembly unanimously
    passed a no-confidence vote against Adoboli and his 14-month-old
    Government; he resigned 2 days later. On August 29, the President
    appointed the former president of the National Assembly, Agbeyome
    Kodjo, a former Interior Minister and RPT supporter as the new prime
    minister. In September the National Assembly, in a secret ballot with
    just one candidate running, voted to elect former National Assembly
    first Vice President Fambare Natchaba to replace Kodjo as president of
    the National Assembly. The vote was close, 51-23, but most observers
    agreed that this was due more to a dislike of Natchaba than to a rebuke
    of the President's apparent choice for the job since the President's
    party controls all but two seats in the National Assembly.
        In June 1999, the RPT and opposition parties met in Paris, in the
    presence of facilitators representing France, Germany, the European
    Union, and La Francophonie, to agree on security measures for formal
    negotiations in Lome. In July 1999, the Government and the opposition
    began a dialog, and on July 29, 1999, all sides signed an accord called
    the ``Lome Framework Agreement,'' which included a pledge by President
    Eyadema that he would respect the Constitution and not seek another
    term as president after his current one expires in 2003. The accord
    also called for the negotiation of a legal status for opposition
    leaders, as well as for former heads of state (such as their immunity
    from prosecution for acts in office), although at year's end only the
    former had been considered. In addition the accord addressed the rights
    and duties of political parties and the media, the safe return of
    refugees, and the security of all citizens. The accord also contained a
    provision for compensating victims of political violence. The President
    also agreed to dissolve the National Assembly in March and hold new
    legislative elections, which would be supervised by an independent
    national election commission and which would use the single-ballot
    method to protect against some of the abuses of past elections.
    However, the March date passed without presidential action, and new
    legislative elections had yet to be held at year's end.
        As called for in the Lome Framework Agreement, a Joint
    Implementation Committee (JIC) began meeting on August 10, 1999 to
    implement the agreement's provisions. In December 1999, the JIC sent
    new Electoral Code legislation to the Government establishing the new
    CENI. On April 5, the President signed into law a new Electoral Code
    that established the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), which is
    composed of 10 members of the President's RPT party and 10 members of
    the opposition. Most opposition parties accepted the new Electoral
    Code. On July 22, the CENI selected Artheme Ahoomey-Zunu, a member of
    the opposition Pan-African Patriotic Convergence Party CPP (CCC PPP) to
    be its president. At year's end, the CENI was working with the
    Government to develop a budget and then to seek funding from the donor
    community for new legislative elections, tentatively projected for
    2001.
        In 1998 the National Assembly voted on a decentralization plan, but
    the plan's implementation has been slow. Administratively, the prefect,
    nominated by the Interior Minister, is the primary representative of
    the central government in each of the 30 prefecture. Some Government
    agencies have representatives in the five regions.
        There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
    politics or government; however, women were underrepresented in
    government and politics. Although many women are members of political
    parties, there were only 2 female ministers in the Government and 5
    female members in the 81-member National Assembly. There are no legal
    restrictions on the participation of members of ethnic minorities in
    the government; however, members of southern ethnic groups were
    underrepresented in government and politics. However, no ethnic group,
    including the President's, was overrepresented conspicuously in the
    Cabinet.

    Section 4. Government Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are several domestic private human rights groups, including
    the Togolese Human Rights League (LTDH), the Center of Observation and
    Promotion of the Rule of Law (COPED), the African Center for Democracy,
    Human Rights, and Protection of Detainees (CADEPROD), and the Togolese
    Association for the Defense and Protection of Human Rights (ATDPDH). In
    general the Government allows groups to investigate alleged violations
    of human rights; however, the Government occasionally threatened or
    hindered the activities of human rights activists, and was inconsistent
    in following up on investigations of abuses. Years of government
    threats and intimidation of human rights leaders, combined with a lack
    of results from human rights initiatives, have led some human rights
    monitors to end their public activities. A Minister for the Promotion
    of Democracy and Rule of Law was appointed in 1998. In 1999 he promoted
    initiatives to establish a human rights resource center and develop a
    civic education curriculum for schools; however, in August the separate
    ministry was abolished, and human rights issues were transferred to the
    Ministry of Justice. At year's end, there was no further action on
    these problems.
        In November a joint U.N./OAU commission visited the country and
    Benin to investigate allegations that there were hundreds of
    extrajudicial killings during the period of the 1998 presidential
    elections. Many of the allegations were made in a May 1999 AI report.
    The Government vigorously disputed the report's findings and threatened
    to sue AI. In criticizing AI, the Government also noted that no
    journalist or foreign observer who monitored the June 1998 election
    reported bodies washing ashore; however, the newspaper L'Aurore in its
    August 13, 1998 edition, mentioned some bodies washing up on the
    Togolese and Beninese shores. The Government stated that the UFC and
    CDPA opposition parties directed the AI report, a charge denied by
    those groups and by AI. At the time, the Government also alleged that
    the ATDPDH collaborated with AI. The three-person U.N./OAU commission
    of inquiry met with the President and members of his cabinet, as well
    as with fishermen and farmers in the country and in Benin. Under the
    terms of the inquiry, the Government pledged not to retaliate against
    the witnesses. The commission is scheduled to release the results of
    its investigation in early 2001(see Section 1.a.).
        AI/Togo regained its official status with the Government during the
    year and operates within the country.
        In April 1999, the Ministry for the Promotion of Democracy and the
    Rule of Law, headed by Harry Octavianus Olympio, opened an information
    and documentation center on human rights. However, in June the
    President fired Olympio and accused him of staging his own attempted
    killing. He was not replaced and, at year's end, the position of
    Minister for the Promotion of Democracy and the Rule of Law was
    absorbed into the Ministry of Justice.
        On July 31 and August 1, Kofi Messa Devotsu of the LTDH was
    questioned and threatened with arrest by the Minister of the Interior
    after the LTDH published a report on July 20 critical of human rights
    in the country (see Section 2.a.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnic
    group, regional or family origin, sex, religion, social or economic
    status, or personal, political, or other convictions; however, the
    Government does not provide effective redress for discrimination
    complaints. Discrimination against women and ethnic minorities remained
    a problem. Members of President Eyadema's Kabye ethnic group and other
    northern ethnic groups dominate much of the public sector, especially
    the military.
        Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Although
    mechanisms for redress exist within both the traditional extended
    family and formal judicial structures, the police rarely intervene in
    domestic violence cases. Wife beating has been estimated to affect
    approximately 10 percent of married women.
        Despite a constitutional declaration of equality under the law,
    women continue to experience discrimination, especially in education,
    pension benefits, and inheritance as a consequence of traditional law.
    A husband legally may restrict his wife's freedom to work or control
    her earnings. The Government requires that a married woman have her
    husband's permission to apply for a passport (see Section 2.d.). In
    urban areas, women and girls dominate market activities and commerce.
    However, harsh economic conditions in rural areas, where most of the
    population lives, leave women with little time for activities other
    than domestic and agricultural fieldwork. Under traditional law, which
    applies to the vast majority of women, a wife has no maintenance rights
    in the event of divorce or separation and no inheritance rights upon
    the death of her husband. Polygyny is practiced.
        There is a Ministry of Feminine Promotion and Social Protection,
    which, along with independent women's groups and related NGO's,
    campaigns actively to inform women of their rights.
        There is some trafficking in young women for the purpose of forced
    prostitution or for forced labor as domestic servants (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.), but the Government reportedly exercised more vigilance
    at border crossings to counter such trafficking.
        Children.--Although the Constitution and family code laws provide
    for the protection of children's rights, in practice government
    programs often suffer from a lack of money, materials, and enforcement.
    Although the law protects children, there are many practices that
    demonstrate a pattern of discrimination against children, especially
    girls. The Government provides free education in state schools. School
    attendance is compulsory for both boys and girls until the age of 15.
    Approximately 61 percent of children aged 6 to 15 years attend school,
    mostly boys. In the age group of 6 to 15 years, approximately 89
    percent of boys and 66 percent of girls start primary school; however,
    only approximately 39 percent of boys and 13 percent of girls reach
    secondary school. Approximately 3 percent of boys and 0.6 percent of
    girls reach the university level. Literacy rates are 57 percent for
    adult men and 31 percent for adult women. About one-third of the
    national budget is spent on education.
        Orphans and other needy children receive some aid from extended
    families or private organizations but less from the State. There are
    social programs to provide free health care for poor children. There
    are few juvenile courts, and children are jailed with adults (see
    Section 1.c.). In rural areas, traditionally the best food is reserved
    for adults, principally the father.
        Female genital mutilation which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, continues to be practiced. The most commonly
    practiced form of FGM is excision, which usually is performed on girls
    a few months after birth. A 1995 survey concluded that approximately 12
    percent of all girls and women have undergone FGM; it is practiced by
    Christians and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions, and
    it is prevalent in Muslim communities. Most of the larger ethnic groups
    do not practice FGM. However, among the practicing groups rates range
    from 40 to 98 percent.
        In theory women and girls are protected from FGM by the
    Constitution, and in 1998 the Government enacted a law prohibiting the
    practice with penalties for practitioners ranging from 2 months to 5
    years imprisonment and substantial fines. There was one arrest, the
    first under the law, in 1998. Both the father of the victim and the
    practitioner were found guilty on June 28, sentenced to a year in
    prison, and fined $175 (CFA 100,000). Both were released after serving
    2 months in jail. However, the law rarely is prosecuted because most
    FGM cases occur in rural areas where neither the victims nor police
    know the law. Traditional customs often supersede the legal systems
    among certain ethnic groups.
        The Government continued to sponsor seminars to educate and
    campaign against FGM. Several NGO's, with international assistance,
    organized educational campaigns to inform women of their rights and to
    care for the victims of FGM.
        There are confirmed reports of trafficking in children,
    particularly girls, for the purpose of forced labor, which amounts at
    times to slavery (see Sections (6.c. and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
    accessibility to public or private facilities for the disabled.
    Although the Constitution nominally obliges the Government to aid
    disabled persons and shelter them from social injustice, the Government
    provides only limited assistance in practice. There is no overt state
    discrimination against disabled persons and some hold Government
    positions. However, the disabled have no meaningful recourse against
    private sector or societal discrimination, and there is discrimination
    against the disabled in practice.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's population of
    more than 4 million includes members of some 40 ethnic groups that
    generally speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated
    regionally in rural areas. Major ethnic groups include the Ewe (between
    20 and 25 percent of the population), the Kabye (between 10 and 15
    percent), the Kotokoli (between 10 and 15 percent), the Moba (between
    10 to 15 percent), and the Mina (about 5 percent). The Ewe and Mina are
    the largest ethnic groups in the southern region, where abundant
    rainfall and access to the sea have been conducive to farming and
    trade; the Kabye are the largest group in the drier, landlocked, less
    populous, and less prosperous northern region.
        Although prohibited by law, societal discrimination on the basis of
    ethnicity is practiced routinely by members of all ethnic groups. In
    particular discrimination against southerners by northerners and
    against northerners by southerners is evident in private sector hiring
    and buying patterns, in patterns of de facto ethnic segregation in
    urban neighborhoods, and in the relative paucity of marriages across
    the north-south ethnic divide. There are no effective impediments to
    the extension of such discrimination into the public sector, where the
    centralization of the State allows little scope for regional or ethnic
    autonomy, except through the circumscribed authority of traditional
    rulers and dispute resolution systems.
        The relative predominance in private sector commerce and
    professions by members of southern ethnic groups, and the relative
    predominance of the public sector and especially the security forces by
    members of President Eyadema's Kabye group and other northern groups,
    are sources of political tension. Political parties tend to have
    readily identifiable ethnic and regional bases: The RPT party is more
    represented among northern ethnic groups than among southern groups,
    while the reverse is true of the UFC and CAR opposition parties.
        In previous years, north-south tensions repeatedly have erupted
    into violence of a clearly interethnic character, although there were
    no reports of such violence during the year. Majority ethnic group
    members in each region have harassed and attacked members of ethnic
    groups originating from the other region, forcing them back to their
    home region. In addition due to the congruence of political divisions
    and ethnic and regional divisions, human rights abuses motivated by
    politics at times carried ethnic and regional overtones (see Section
    3).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides most
    workers with the right to join unions and the right to strike; however,
    security forces, including firemen and policemen, do not have these
    rights; government health care workers may join unions but may not
    strike. The Constitution also prohibits discrimination against workers
    for reasons of sex, origin, beliefs, or opinions. The work force in the
    formal sector is small, involving approximately 20 percent of the total
    work force of whom from 60 to 70 percent are union members or
    supporters.
        There are several major trade union federations. These include the
    National Confederation of Togolese Workers (CNTT)--which is closely
    associated with the Government, the Labor Federation of Togolese
    Workers (CSTT), the National Union of Independent Syndicates (UNSIT),
    and the Union of Free Trade Unions.
        There is no specific law prohibiting retribution against strikers.
        On January 28, the Government arrested two trade union officials,
    Gbikpi Benissan, Secretary-General of the National Union of Independent
    Trade Unions of Togo (UNSIT) and Allagah-Kodegui, Secretary-General of
    the Democratic Organization of African Workers'' Trade Union (ODSTA).
    On January 29, an arrest warrant was issued for Beliki Akouete,
    Secretary-General of the Workers'' Trade Union Confederation of Togo
    (CSTT) and Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Organization of
    African Workers'' Trade Union (ODSTA). The Government arrested the two
    high-ranking trade union officials for ``spreading false information
    and libel,'' both of which are penalized specifically under the Code of
    Press and Communications, and not for any trade union activities. On
    February 4, the Government released the two trade union officials and
    withdrew the arrest warrant against Akouete; the judicial proceedings
    against the three persons were dropped.
        Teachers' salaries and students' stipends rarely are paid on time.
    University faculty remained on strike over this issue until January
    (see Section 2.a.).
        Federations and unions are free to associate with international
    labor groups. The CNTT and the UNSIT are affiliates of the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The CSTT is an
    affiliate of the World Confederation of Labor.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
    nominally provides workers with the right to organize and bargain
    collectively; however, the Government limits collective bargaining to
    producing a single nationwide agreement that must be negotiated and
    endorsed by representatives of the Government as well as of labor
    unions and employers. All formal sector employees are covered by a
    collective bargaining agreement. This agreement sets nationwide wage
    standards for all formal sector employees. The Government participates
    in this process both as a labor-management mediator and as the largest
    employer in the formal sector, managing numerous state-owned firms that
    monopolize many sectors of the formal economy. Individual groups in the
    formal sector can attempt through sector-specific or firm-specific
    collective bargaining to negotiate agreements more favorable to labor,
    but this option rarely is used.
        The Labor Code prohibits antiunion discrimination. The Ministry of
    Labor is charged with resolving labor-related complaints, but it does
    not always do so effectively.
        A 1989 law allows the establishment of export processing zones
    (EPZ's). Many companies have EPZ status, and more than 30 are in
    operation. The EPZ law provides exemptions from some provisions of the
    Labor Code, notably the regulations on hiring and firing. Employees of
    EPZ firms do not enjoy the same protection against antiunion
    discrimination as do other workers. In practice unions do not have free
    access to EPZ's or freedom to organize workers. During the year, the
    Government did not change the 1974 Labor Code to end the prohibition
    against foreign nationals performing administrative or management
    functions in trade unions.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law does not
    specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor, including that performed
    by children, and children sometimes are subjected to forced labor,
    primarily as domestic servants. The Government acknowledged that there
    is international trafficking in children, particularly girls, who are
    sold into various forms of indentured and exploitative servitude, which
    amounts at times to slavery (see Section 6.d. and 6.f.). There also is
    some trafficking in young women for the purpose of forced prostitution
    or for forced labor as domestic servants (see Sections (6.d. and 6.f.).
        In rural areas, parents sometimes put young children into domestic
    work in other households in exchange for sums as low as the equivalent
    of $25 to $35 (CFA 15,000 to 20,000).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits the employment of children under
    the age of 14 in any enterprise. Some types of industrial and technical
    employment require a minimum age of 18. Inspectors from the Ministry of
    Labor enforce these age requirements but only in the formal sector in
    urban areas. In both urban and rural areas, particularly in farming and
    petty trading, very young children traditionally assist in their
    families' work. Under the Constitution, school is mandatory for both
    sexes until the age of 15, but this requirement is not enforced
    strictly (see Section 5). The law does not prohibit forced and bonded
    labor by children, and children are trafficked for forced labor (see
    Section 6.c. and 6.f.). On September 19, the Government ratified ILO
    Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor. Although the
    Government ratified the convention, few resources were allotted for
    implementation and, at year's end, enforcement was weak. The Ministry
    of Social Affairs, Promotion of Women, and Protection of Children was
    assigned responsibility for implementation.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum
    wages for different categories, ranging from unskilled labor through
    professional positions. Less than the official minimum wage often is
    paid in practice, mostly to less-skilled workers. Official monthly
    minimum wages range from approximately $20 to $33 (CFA 14,700 to
    23,100) per month. Many workers cannot maintain a decent standard of
    living for themselves and their families at the official minimum wages,
    and many must supplement their incomes through second jobs or
    subsistence farming. The Ministry of Labor is ostensibly responsible
    for enforcement of the minimum wage system but does not enforce the law
    in practice. The Labor Code, which regulates labor practices, requires
    equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex; however, this provision
    generally is observed only in the formal sector.
        Working hours of all employees in any enterprise, except for those
    in the agricultural sector, normally must not exceed 72 hours per week;
    at least one 24-hour rest period per week is compulsory, and workers
    must receive 30 days of paid leave each year. The law requires overtime
    compensation, and there are restrictions on excessive overtime work.
    However, the Ministry of Labor's enforcement is weak, and employers
    often ignore these provisions.
        A technical consulting committee in the Ministry of Labor sets
    workplace health and safety standards. It may levy penalties on
    employers who do not meet the standards, and employees ostensibly have
    the right to complain to labor inspectors of unhealthy or unsafe
    conditions without penalty. In practice the Ministry's enforcement of
    the various provisions of the Labor Code is limited. Large enterprises
    are obliged by law to provide medical services for their employees and
    usually attempt to respect occupational health and safety rules, but
    smaller firms often do not.
        Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from unsafe
    conditions without fear of losing their jobs; however, in practice some
    reportedly cannot do so.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons, and trafficking is a problem. The country remained a source
    and transit point for trafficking in persons. There were 425 victims
    returned to the country during the year; NGO's provide some support for
    victims. One woman, who returned from Gabon after 5 years as a victim
    of trafficking, filed a suit during the year against a Gabonese
    schoolteacher living in Togo, who she accused of trafficking in
    children to work in Gabon; however, by year's end, there was no
    progress in the case.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution or
    nonconsensual labor as domestic servants exists.
        Children are trafficked to indentured and exploitative servitude,
    which amounts at times to slavery. Children often are trafficked to
    other West and Central African countries, especially Gabon and Nigeria,
    to the Middle East, or to Asia. In countries such as Cote d'Ivoire or
    Gabon, these children are extensively exploited. They are fed poorly,
    crudely clothed, and inadequately cared for, and are neither educated
    nor permitted to learn a trade. Children sometimes are trafficked
    abroad by parents misled into allowing them to depart under false
    pretenses. In 1999 authorities intercepted 750 children and arrested 21
    traffickers at the borders. During the year, the Government intercepted
    425 children. A local NGO focusing on trafficking issues estimated that
    85 percent of traffickers in the country are women. For example, in
    1999 two Ghanaian women took six children, ages 6 to 14, from the town
    of Tsevie to Cote d'Ivoire where they were to be resold for $350 to
    $530 (CFA 225,000 to 350,000) to work on plantations or as house
    servants. In 1999 police caught Beninese traffickers who were taking 39
    children, including some as young as 2 years of age, from Benin to Cote
    d'Ivoire overland through the country.
        During the year, the Government conducted public awareness
    campaigns, with the help of the U.N. Children's Fund and NGO's such as
    WAO-Afrique. WAO-Afrique obtained additional funding from a foreign
    private company to support its awareness campaigns against child
    trafficking and forced labor.
        The country is a source and transit point for child traffickers.
    There are credible reports of Nigerian women and children trafficked
    through the country to Europe (particularly Italy and the Netherlands)
    to work in forced prostitution. Since the law regarding trafficking is
    vague and imprecise, persons arrested or detained by government
    security forces for alleged trafficking ultimately are released for
    lack of evidence. The Government does not provide assistance for
    victims; however, an NGO (Terre des Hommes) assisted recovered children
    until their parents or next-of-kin could be notified. There is also a
    government funded Social Center for Abandoned Children.
                                   __________

                                     UGANDA

        President Yoweri Museveni, elected to a 5-year term in 1996 under
    the 1995 Constitution, continued to dominate the Government. He has
    ruled since 1986 through the National Resistance Movement,
    legislatively reorganized and renamed as ``The Movement'' in 1995. The
    Constitution provides for a 281-member unicameral parliament and an
    autonomous, independently elected president. The 1996 presidential and
    parliamentary elections were peaceful and orderly, but election
    conditions, including restrictions on political party activities, led
    to a flawed election process. The Constitution formally extended the
    one-party movement form of government for 5 years and severely
    restricted political activities. In June a national referendum on the
    role of political parties resulted in the indefinite extension of the
    Movement form of government. The referendum process was flawed by
    restrictions on political party activities and unequal funding. The
    Parliament acted with continued independence and assertiveness during
    the year, although Movement supporters remained in control of the
    legislative branch. Parliamentarians were elected to 5-year terms in
    1996. The judiciary generally is independent, but is understaffed and
    weak; the President has extensive legal powers.
        The Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) is the key security force.
    The Constitution provides for civilian control of the UPDF, with the
    President designated as commander in chief. The UPDF remained active
    due to the continued instability in the north and west and because of
    the country's involvement in the conflict in the neighboring Democratic
    Republic of the Congo (DRC). UPDF soldiers and members of local defense
    units (LDU's) assist the police in rural areas, although the LDU's
    continued to operate without a legal mandate; LDU's operate under the
    authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Internal Security
    Organization (ISO) remained under the direct authority of the
    President. Although the ISO primarily is an intelligence-gathering
    body, its operatives occasionally detained civilians. The Directorate
    of Military Intelligence (DMI), under UPDF control, also detained
    civilians suspected of rebel and terrorist activity. The police are
    organized as a national force under the authority of the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs. The UPDF, police, LDU's, and the DMI all committed
    serious human rights abuses.
        The economy grew at a rate of approximately 5 percent during the
    year. Annual gross domestic product (GDP) remained at $330 per capita.
    Foreign economic assistance provides approximately 50 percent of
    government revenues. The agriculturally based economy continued to rely
    on coffee as its chief export. Foreign investment remained at
    approximately 4 percent of GDP amid chronic corruption, a troubled
    macroeconomic reform process, and continuing concerns about regional
    security in the wake of the country's intervention in the DRC. The pace
    of the privatization process increased due to the Government's
    privatization of the telecommunications system and a major parastatal,
    the Kakira Sugar Works; the Government began preparations to privatize
    all remaining parastatals. The financial sector strengthened due to
    improved lending practices and more stringent supervision by the
    central bank.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and, although there
    were improvements in several areas, there continued to be numerous,
    serious problems. Movement domination of the political process limited
    the right of citizens to change their government. Security forces used
    excessive force, at times resulting in death, and committed or failed
    to prevent some extrajudicial killings of suspected rebels and
    civilians. Police, LDU, and DMI forces regularly beat and sometimes
    tortured suspects and other persons, often to force confessions. A
    highly publicized 1999 inquiry into police corruption uncovered
    numerous serious abuses committed by senior officers and resulted in
    the arrest of several officers on charges of extortion. There were a
    number of cases in which the Government detained and charged UPDF and
    LDU members for human rights abuses. Prison conditions remained harsh
    and life-threatening. Members of the security forces sometimes
    arbitrarily arrested and detained civilians. Authorities used
    incommunicado detention. Despite measures to improve the discipline and
    training of security forces, and despite the punishment of some
    security force officials guilty of abuses, abuses by the security
    forces at times resulted in deaths and remained a problem throughout
    the country. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Poor
    judicial administration, lack of resources, a large case backlog, and
    lengthy trial delays circumscribed due process and the right to a fair
    trial. The UPDF at times infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The
    Government generally respected freedom of speech and of the press;
    however, there were some instances in which restrictions continued. The
    Government restricted freedom of assembly and association, and the
    constitutional restrictions on political activity effectively continued
    to limit these rights further; however, political parties operated with
    fewer restrictions than in previous years. There were some limits on
    freedom of movement. The Movement Secretariat, supported with
    government funds, oversaw internal organizational activity, strategy,
    and mobilization, and following the June referendum, the Government
    continued its Movement political education courses. Domestic violence
    against women, rape, and abuse of children remained serious problems.
    Discrimination against women and the disabled persisted. The Government
    worked with nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to combat the
    practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), which occurred on a
    limited basis. Violence against ethnic minorities was a problem. There
    were some limits on worker rights. Forced labor, including by children,
    occurred, and child labor was common, mostly in the informal sector.
    There were reports of trafficking in persons. Vigilante justice also
    was a problem.
        Insurgent forces committed numerous serious abuses. The Allied
    Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group active in the west, killed,
    tortured, maimed, and abducted many persons, including children. The
    Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony and supported by the
    Government of Sudan, operated in the north from bases in southern
    Sudan. LRA attacks increased during the year, and the LRA continued to
    kill and abduct civilians, including children.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of politically motivated killings by government
    forces; however, members of the security forces and the police
    committed extrajudicial killings. In the course of official operations,
    police, UPDF, LDU, and DMI personnel sometimes used excessive force,
    resulting in deaths (see Section 1.g.). On January 19, UDPF soldiers
    killed two LRA rebels wounded in an unsuccessful attack on the Paloga
    trading center, Gulu district. By year's end, there were no reports
    that any actions were taken against the officer who ordered the
    killings. On January 28, UPDF and police in the Kampala suburb of
    Kabalagala killed six persons after they allegedly robbed bus
    passengers of money and property and shot the driver. At year's end,
    there were no reports that any actions were taken against the UPDF and
    police officers involved.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security
    officials mistreated Muslims or that Muslims suspected of being ADF
    rebel collaborators or involved in terrorist activities died as a
    result of torture by DMI officials.
        There were allegations of human rights violations during fighting
    between UPDF and Rwandan army troops in Kisangani, DRC, in May and
    June, which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, over 1,700 persons
    injured (see Section 1.c.), and 60,000 displaced persons (see Section
    2.d.). The most severe of these clashes occurred from June 5 to 11,
    during which time both forces shelled the city with artillery and
    mortar fire, destroying homes and much of the city's infrastructure.
    Credible sources from the DRC claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops
    raped many women and shot persons during extensive fighting in the
    city. Humanitarian organizations reported that at least 400 Congolese
    civilians were killed during the fighting. Many persons died from
    injuries because they were unable to get medical attention;
    transportation to hospitals often was unavailable during the fighting.
    Many displaced persons remained at a camp outside of the city for
    several months because they feared to return to their homes. There was
    widespread reporting throughout the year of killings and other human
    rights abuses by both pro-DRC and anti-DRC government forces, including
    the UPDF, in the conflict in the DRC. There were reports that both
    Ugandan and Rwandan forces used landmines during the fighting in
    Kisangani; however, there were no reports of any deaths or injuries as
    a result of such landmines.
        Verification of these reports was extremely difficult, particularly
    those emanating from remote areas and those affected by active combat,
    primarily in eastern DRC. Independent observers often found access
    difficult due to hazardous security conditions and frequent impediments
    imposed by authorities. Both pro- and anti-DRC Government forces used
    propaganda disseminated via local media extensively, including
    accusations of abuse by opposing forces, further complicating efforts
    to obtain accurate information regarding such events.
        On November 8, there were reports from the DRC that UPDF soldiers
    allegedly shot and killed nine persons at a wedding party in the
    village of Kikere, near Butembo, North Kivu Province, DRC; the soldiers
    believed the village to be sympathetic to the Mai Mai. The attack
    reportedly followed violent clashes between UPDF and Mai Mai forces in
    the surrounding area. The soldiers also allegedly set fire to houses in
    the village; 11 persons burned to death within the houses.
        Throughout the year in the Ituri district in Orientale Province of
    the DRC, an area dominated by UPDF and UPDF-supported forces, fighting
    continued between members of the Lendu and Hema tribes, which
    reportedly killed thousands of persons and displaced tens of thousands
    of others. This fighting reportedly arose from a dispute about land use
    and also reportedly was manipulated by UPDF troops who charged the
    tribes fees in order to provide protection to their members. The
    Government arrested and detained two senior commanders for their
    actions during this conflict.
        On May 19, an independent judicial commission of inquiry into
    corruption in the police force that began operating in 1999 submitted
    its report to the Minister of Internal Affairs. During the course of
    the investigation, the commission uncovered incidents of killings,
    brutality, theft, and robbery by police in general, and by the Criminal
    Investigations Department (CID) in particular. The commission's
    proceedings were open to the public and received extensive press
    coverage. The report was not made public officially by year's end,
    although several newspapers carried stories about the report.
        Harsh conditions, some intentional mistreatment, and lack of
    adequate medical treatment caused many deaths in prison (see Section
    1.c.).
        Government cases against two UPDF soldiers accused of killing five
    youths in Fort Portal, Kabarole district, in 1999, still were pending
    at year's end. The 2 soldiers were on remand in Katojo prison facing
    murder charges; the 12 other soldiers involved in the incident were
    investigated and cleared of wrongdoing. At year's end, there was no
    action taken in a May 1999 case in which a police officer shot and
    killed an unarmed youth. A UPDF inquiry into an August 1999 case in
    which UPDF soldiers killed two rebel suspects in Lira was ongoing at
    year's end. There was no investigation nor action taken in a September
    1999 case in which UPDF troops opened fire on members of two Karamojong
    clans that were engaged in a gun battle which resulted in the deaths of
    hundreds of Karamojong warriors. There was no investigation into or
    action taken into two cases in July and October 1999 in which police
    beat to death prisoners in their custody.
        Police continued investigations into the January 1998 death in
    police custody of a 25-year-old suspected thief and the August 1998
    incident in which a prison official in Masaka beat to death a suspect
    on remand for defaulting on tax payments; however, it appeared unlikely
    that the cases will be closed. In February 1999, the Uganda Human
    Rights Commission (UHRC) referred for prosecution the case of three
    police officers accused of killing four robbery suspects in 1998;
    however, the Directorate for Public Prosecution's investigation was
    ongoing, and there were no prosecutions in connection with this
    incident by year's end. The LDU commander arrested in 1999 for the
    August 1998 death while in custody of two civilians in Kyankwanzi
    remained in detention awaiting trial at year's end. One police officer
    was committed to trial before the High Court for the June 1998 incident
    in which police fired on students at the Kabalega secondary school,
    killing one student. The case also was pending before the UHRC;
    however, the UHRC was scheduled to take up the case against after it is
    reviewed by the High Court.
        Investigations into the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and
    Stephan Baryakaijika were completed, and the governmentsponsored UHRC
    heard the cases. In February the UHRC handed the cases over to the
    courts for prosecution; however, no action had taken place by year's
    end (see Section 1.c.). It was discovered during the year that the
    suspect arrested for the 1997 killing of Modesta Kabaranga, a leading
    organizer for the Democratic Party, was released in 1997; no additional
    action has taken place.
        Vigilante justice was a problem (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
    Authorities rarely prosecuted persons engaged in mob violence, which
    frequently resulted in death. Most mob attacks resulted from petty
    crimes. There were numerous instances in which mobs beat to death or
    doused with petrol and then burned to death petty theft suspects.
        Ritual murders of children remained a problem during the year (see
    Section 5).
        Between February and July, raids by Karamojong warriors on
    neighboring districts in the northeast resulted in approximately 100
    deaths. The raids were precipitated by drought during the year;
    however, the raids may have exacerbated ethnic tensions in the
    northeast (see Section 5).
        The rebel ADF committed at least 210 extrajudicial killings,
    including killings of children (see Section 1.g.). LRA attacks
    increased during the year, and the LRA was responsible for the killing
    of approximately 175 civilians, including children (see Section 1.g.).
    On June 12, LRA rebels shot Kitgum Resident District Commissioner J.B.
    Ochaya while he was traveling near Gulu; he died on July 5. The rebels
    reportedly killed seven other persons in separate incidents at the same
    site. On October 1, LRA rebels shot and killed Father Raffale Di Bari
    of the Comboni Missionary Fathers outside of Kitgum. A nun and several
    children who were traveling with Di Bari were injured.
        There were no credible reports that UNRF-II, USF/A, the Citizens
    Army for Multiparty Politics (CAMP), or Rwandan Hutu rebels were
    responsible for the death of civilians during the year (see Section
    1.g.).
        Unlike in previous years, there were no urban bombings in Kampala
    and other cities during the year; however, on October 11, 9 persons
    were killed and more than 40 were wounded in separate grenade attacks
    on 2 discos in Gulu. In October in a suburb of Kampala, there was a
    drive-by grenade attack. It was unknown whether there was a motive or
    if there were any injuries or deaths. It was unknown who was
    responsible for any of the attacks.
        The LRA and the ADF reportedly used landmines. There were several
    incidents during the year in which civilians were killed by landmines
    placed by rebels. For example, on January 21, a landmine explosion
    killed a man at Opidi, Koch, west of Gulu Town; the LRA allegedly
    planted the landmine. Several children also were killed or injured
    after stepping on landmines.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
    motivated disappearances due to action by government forces. A number
    of Muslims, believed to be missing in 1999, were released (see Section
    1.d.).
        ADF and LRA rebels abducted civilians. Both the ADF and the LRA
    abducted civilians for training as guerrillas; most victims were
    children and young adults. NGO's estimated that the ADF abducted over
    441 persons, including children. The LRA abducted approximately 700
    persons, including young girls abducted as sex and labor slaves (see
    Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). The ADF allegedly abducted approximately
    30 Ugandan children during the year, in addition to an unknown number
    of Congolese children. An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 persons have been
    abducted by the ADF since 1986 and the LRA since 1987 (see Sections 5
    and 6.c.). While some later escaped or were rescued, UNICEF estimated
    that 5,106 children abducted by the LRA since 1987 remain missing, an
    estimated 100 to 200 children abducted by the LRA during the year
    remained unaccounted for, and approximately 30 children abducted by the
    ADF remained missing at year's end (see Section 1.g.). NGO's estimated
    that since 1996 the ADF has abducted approximately 200 Ugandan
    children, and an unknown number of Congolese children, approximately
    100 of these children remained unaccounted for at year's end. There
    have been reports in past years that Karamojong warriors have abducted
    children for similar reasons, and observers believe that some of these
    children still are being held.
        Reportedly persons whom rebel, Rwandan, or Ugandan forces allegedly
    detained sometimes were transferred to Rwanda or Uganda.
        There were reports from the DRC that UPDF and Rwandan troops, in
    addition to RCD rebels, reportedly abducted many young women from the
    villages they raided. These night raids on villages became so frequent
    that in many parts of the Kivu Provinces peasants slept in their
    fields.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits ``any form of torture, cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;'' however, security
    forces commonly beat and sometimes tortured criminal suspects, often to
    force confessions. Although UPDF forces in the north on occasion beat
    and abused civilians in the previous year, there were no reports of
    such abuse during the year.
        On February 18, a police constable in Kayunga, Mukono district,
    allegedly tortured two civilians and demanded money in order to release
    them from jail. In March a police constable was arrested. The case was
    under investigation by the Mukono district police, and the constable
    remained in detention at year's end on charges of unlawfully detaining
    civilians and disobeying orders (see Section 1.d.).
        Police at times harassed or beat journalists and opposition
    activists (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 3). On March 31, police and
    military police used batons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and live
    ammunition to disperse an unauthorized rally in Mbarara (see Section
    2.b.). Although there were reports of injuries, no one was killed. On
    April 21, police in Mbale beat Ahmed Washaki, an official of the Uganda
    People's Congress (UPC), and locked him in a toilet for allegedly
    campaigning against the referendum on political systems (see Section
    1.d.). On June 25, police beat and arrested 11 Makerere University
    students after they disrupted a referendum rally held by the President.
    They subsequently were charged with misconduct and alarming the
    President and released on bail. On October 12, the charges of
    misconduct were dropped; however, their trial for alarming the
    President was ongoing at year's end (see Section 1.d.). On September
    16, police violently dispersed a meeting of the Uganda Young Democrats
    in Gulu, which resulted in several injuries (see Section 2.b.).
        In February businessman Charles Mpunga accused Major Kakooza
    Mutale, a presidential adviser on political affairs, of detaining and
    torturing him at Mbuya military barracks in January. In July the UHRC
    tribunal ruled that there was enough evidence to proceed with a case
    against Mutale; the UHRC charged and found him guilty of torture and
    illegal imprisonment. Mutale appealed the ruling to the High Court,
    claiming that the UHRC lacked jurisdiction. His case still was pending
    at year's end, and the UHRC was waiting for the High Court's ruling
    before penalizing Mutale.
        On March 18, the UPDF arrested the UPDF reserve force commander for
    Tororo district for torturing civilians and beating two police officers
    on March 16. The commander remained in detention pending a courtmartial
    at year's end. On August 3, the UHRC tribunal summoned the commanding
    officer of the UPDF presidential protection unit, Major Dick Bugingo,
    on charges that he tortured Sergeant Godfrey Mubiru in March. Bugingo's
    case was ongoing at year's end.
        Fighting between UPDF and Rwandan army troops in Kisangani, DRC, in
    May and June resulted in over 400 civilian deaths and over 1,700
    wounded (see Section 1.a.). There were reports from the DRC that UPDF
    and Rwandan soldiers allegedly raped women during extensive fighting in
    Kisangani in May and June (see Section 1.a.). There were reports that
    both UPDF and Rwandan forces used landmines during the fighting in
    Kisangani (see Section 1.a.). There were reports that UPDF officers and
    soldiers also were involved in the first half of the year in violence
    between the Hema and Lendu tribes in northeastern DRC that resulted in
    the deaths of thousands of Congolese civilians (see Section 1.a.). The
    Government arrested and detained two senior commanders for their
    actions during this conflict.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security
    officials mistreated Muslims or that Muslims suspected of being ADF
    rebel collaborators or involved in terrorist activities died as a
    result of torture by DMI officials.
        LDU's, which frequently lack training, often mistreat prisoners and
    detainees. For example, on July 21, police in Arua stopped a mob from
    lynching an LDU member after the LDU member hit a suspect with a baton.
        The Government investigated some cases of abuse, and tried and
    punished some offenders. In 1999 the Government launched a Judicial
    Commission of Inquiry into police corruption. The Commission probed a
    wide range of police abuses, including abuses committed by senior
    police officials. The inquiry resulted in the arrests of several police
    officers on charges of abuse, rape, extortion, and robbery, including a
    police officer accused of raping a 16yearold girl. The Commission
    presented its report to the Minister of Internal Affairs on May 19;
    however, the report had not been made public by year's end (see Section
    1.a.). In February 1999, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative
    (FHRI), an independent local human rights organization, began an
    investigation into allegations that two policemen, Moses Lutaya and
    Ephraim Magala, were tortured by their superiors during the same month
    for stealing bananas while on duty. In February 1999, FHRI found that
    the two were tortured under the orders of the Mpigi district police
    commander. Lutaya and Magala subsequently were compensated by the Mpigi
    district administration with approximately $750 (1.26 million
    shillings) and were reinstated in their jobs. The senior officers were
    transferred; however, no additional action was taken against them.
        The police Human Rights Desk, established in 1998, received 630 new
    complaints, including allegations of excessive force, torture, assault,
    rape, and murder. Of these cases, 600 were resolved or were referred to
    the criminal or police disciplinary courts, some resulting in
    disciplinary actions, including reductions in rank, fines, halted
    promotions, and dismissals. A total of 30 cases were pending at year's
    end.
        In conjunction with the UHRC, the police force continued a training
    program for police officials to foster respect for internationally
    recognized human rights standards. The UHRC and NGO's conducted similar
    programs with UPDF officials throughout the year.
        On June 29, Kandida Lakony was released from Luzira Prison after
    serving her sentence for giving false information regarding a newspaper
    photograph (see Section 2.a.). The photograph depicted a naked woman
    being shaved forcefully by a group of men in military uniform; Lakony
    had claimed that she was the woman in the photograph and that UPDF
    soldiers in Gulu were responsible.
        There was no investigation nor action taken in the 1999 case in
    which the badly mutilated body of Patrick Ocan was found after he had
    been seen in UPDF custody. There was no investigation nor action taken
    in the October 1999 case in which police beat a man while in custody in
    Buwenge, Jinja District; the man died after being released the
    following day.
        There were no reported developments nor action taken in the
    February 1999 case in which two teenaged girls reportedly were raped by
    two LDU personnel at Kabujogera police post in Fort Portal. The accused
    were arrested pending a police investigation. There were no reported
    developments nor action taken in the August 1999 case in which an LDU
    member shot and wounded a businessman in Kisenyi, a suburb of Fort
    Portal. The LDU member reportedly was apprehended and detained by the
    UPDF.
        In January the Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence, Noble
    Mayombo, settled out of court a 1998 case in which Peter Ongodia
    charged that Mayombo illegally ordered his arrest and torture.
        In June the UHRC tribunal ruled that the former Permanent Secretary
    for Defense, Benjamin Mbonye, and Captain Sulait Mwesigye were
    responsible for the 1997 arrest and torture of a Corporal Sam Muwonge.
    The tribunal's assessment of damages was pending at year's end. The
    investigations into the 1997 deaths by torture of Paul Kollo and
    Stephan Baryakaijika were completed, and the cases were heard by the
    UHRC (see Section 1.a.). The investigation into the 1997 torture of
    Corporal Twasha Kaushera was abandoned by the UHRC after it failed to
    locate Kaushera.
        There were numerous instances in which mobs attacked suspected
    thieves and other offenders caught in the commission of crimes (see
    Section 1.a.). Often motivated by widespread distrust of the justice
    system, these mobs engaged in stonings, beatings, and other forms of
    mistreatment, such as tying suspects' wrists and ankles together behind
    their backs, stripping suspects of their clothes and parading them
    through the streets, or forcing suspects to hop painfully on the sides
    of their ankles. Vigilantes also have stripped prostitutes who dress
    ``indecently'' or ``provocatively.''
        The ADF continued to maim civilians, loot, and burn private homes.
    The LRA and the ADF reportedly used landmines, which caused some deaths
    and injuries (see Section 1.a.). The LRA engaged in looting and
    destruction of private property. The ADF and LRA also abducted children
    to be guerrillas; and the LRA in particular tortured children by
    beating them, forcing them to witness atrocities, forcing them to march
    until they collapsed, and denying them adequate food, water, or shelter
    (see Section 1.g.).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no urban bombings in
    Kampala and other cities; however, on October 11, there were 2 grenade
    attacks on separate discos in Gulu, which resulted in more than 40
    injuries (see Section 1.a.).
        Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Conditions
    for the estimated 5,000 inmates in local police cells and in the 162
    local prisons particularly were bad. Authority over the local prison
    system, formerly operated by the Ministry of Local Government, was
    scheduled to be transferred in 1998 to the state-funded and operated
    prison system, run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The transfer
    had not taken place by year's end due to funding problems and lack of
    enabling legislation. Both civilian and military prisons have high
    mortality rates from overcrowding, malnutrition, diseases spread by
    unsanitary conditions, and HIV/AIDS.
        No accurate estimates are available on the number of deaths in
    detention due to the harsh conditions and lack of medical care,
    although many such deaths have occurred; however, NGO's estimated that
    the mortality rate in the central prison system improved. The UHRC
    reported severely inadequate medical services, seriously unhygienic
    conditions, and a situation of ``semi-starvation'' among prisoners in
    many prisons. In March prisoners from Kanungu local administration
    prison in Rukungiri and suspects from Bushenyi police station were
    forced to exhume the bodies of persons killed in a massacre committed
    by a religious cult (see Sections 2.c. and 6.c.). Most prisoners did
    not have proper protective clothing. In May there were reports that
    prison authorities in Lira tortured four prisoners. On May 24, an UHRC
    investigator visited the prison and confirmed the abuse. The
    investigator also received complaints from female prisoners that they
    had been tortured by prison authorities. The UHRC tribunal is scheduled
    to begin hearings on the case in March 2001.
        There were no developments in the investigation into the June 1999
    death of Matia Kiwanuka Mulama, an inmate of Buikwe prison in the
    eastern part of the country, who reportedly was found dead after having
    been tortured by the chief warden.
        The harsh conditions largely resulted from the Government's
    seriously inadequate funding of prison facilities. Most of the prisons
    grow maize, millet, and vegetables, although the UHRC accused prison
    farms of overworking inmates. Prisoners received only $.0006 (1
    shilling) per day for their labor, a rate established in the early
    1960's (see Section 6.c.). Prison conditions come closest to meeting
    minimum international standards in Kampala, where prisons provide
    medical care, running water, and sanitation; however, these prisons
    also are among the most overcrowded. By one estimate, the country's
    prisons--all of which predate independence in 1962--hold about three
    times their maximum planned capacity. Although the law provides for
    access to prisoners by their families, ignorance of this right and fear
    of prison authorities often limit family visits. The UHRC reported that
    it had received allegations that officers in charge of police cells
    sometimes demanded bribes to allow visits.
        In May the President signed the Community Service Act, designed to
    reduce prison congestion by allowing minor offenders to do community
    service instead of being imprisoned; however, implementation of the act
    had not begun by year's end due to insufficient funding. On July 13,
    President Museveni pardoned and released 522 prisoners from Luzira
    prison on humanitarian grounds.
        Women have segregated wings with female staff in most, but not all,
    prisons. According to human rights advocates, rape generally is not a
    problem, although female prisoners also suffered from severely
    substandard conditions. Due to lack of space in juvenile facilities,
    juveniles often were kept in prisons with adults. The central prison
    system maintained one juvenile prison and four lower security remand
    homes. School facilities and health clinics in all 5 institutions are
    defunct; prisoners as young as age 12 perform manual labor from dawn
    until dusk. Severe overcrowding also is a problem at juvenile detention
    facilities and in women's wings. The remand home in Kampala, designed
    for 45 inmates, holds 120 children.
        The central prison system continued to work with NGO's and the
    donor community to improve prison buildings, water and sanitation
    systems, food, and uniforms. Progress has been marginal.
        Government agencies have sponsored or participated in numerous
    conferences on the justice system and prison conditions, and worked
    closely with international and domestic human rights organizations on
    prison reform efforts. There were reports that mortality rates
    decreased following these activities.
        Media access to prisons remained limited, but the Government
    permitted full access to prisons by the International Committee of the
    Red Cross (ICRC) and local NGO's, principally the UHRC, the Foundation
    for Human Rights Initiative, and the Uganda Prisoners' Aid Foundation.
    Since 1997 UHRC has carried out numerous prison visits and reported on
    its findings publicly. Prison authorities required advance notification
    of visits, a process that often was subject to administrative delays.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Members of the security
    forces at times arrested and detained citizens arbitrarily. According
    to the Constitution, a suspect must be charged within 48 hours of
    arrest and be brought to trial or released on bail within 120 days (360
    days for a capital offense). If the case has been committed to the
    court before the expiration of this period, the Constitution does not
    limit pretrial detention. The Constitution also provides that detainees
    should be informed immediately of the reasons for their detention;
    however, in practice the authorities enforced none of these procedural
    protections. Some laws conflict with the Constitution, for example, the
    Public Order and Security Act of 1967 (the Detention Order), which
    provides for unlimited detention without charge; however, these laws
    never have been invoked formally by the Government. Legal and human
    rights groups, including the UHRC, sharply criticized the excessive
    length of detention without trial--in many cases amounting to several
    years--for alleged offenses under other laws, which both violated the
    constitutional rights of the detainees and contributed substantially to
    prison overcrowding.
        Arbitrary arrest is a problem. In March a police constable was
    arrested after he allegedly tortured two civilians and the case was
    under investigation at year's end (see Section 1.c.). In July the UHRC
    tribunal ruled that there was enough evidence to proceed with a case
    against Major Kakooza Mutale; he was charged with torture and illegal
    imprisonment after he allegedly detained and tortured a businessman at
    Mbuya military barracks in January (see Section 1.c.).
        Arbitrary mass arrests known as ``panda gari'' remained a problem.
    On January 16, over 5,000 persons were arrested and detained for 24
    hours during a joint operation conducted by mobile police and the UPDF
    in Gulu municipality. UPDF deserters were transferred to the military
    justice system, and 30 youths without identification papers were
    transferred to the police for prosecution.
        Authorities arrested several religious leaders and church members
    during the year for incidents including killings, defilement, rape,
    abduction, theft, and unlawful assembly (see Section 2.c.). Their cases
    were in various stages of prosecution at year's end.
        Police at times harassed and detained journalists and opposition
    activists (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 3). On April 21, police in
    Mbale beat Ahmed Washaki, an official of the Uganda People's Congress
    (UPC), and locked him in a toilet for allegedly campaigning against the
    referendum on political systems (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). On May
    23, two Monitor reporters were briefly detained and questioned by the
    police after writing stories that speculated about government links to
    the Kanungu cult massacre (see Section 2.a.). On June 25, police beat
    and arrested 11 Makerere University students after they disrupted a
    referendum rally held by the President. They subsequently were charged
    with misconduct and alarming the President and were released on bail.
    On October 12, the charges of misconduct were dropped; however, their
    trial for alarming the President was ongoing at year's end (see Section
    1.d.).
        The rearrest of Muslim suspects following either their release on
    bail or acquittal was not a problem during the year. On March 15,
    authorities released 56 members of the Islamic Tabliq group who were
    arrested in 1995 on treason charges (see Section 2.c.). In June
    authorities released 28 members of the Islamic Tabliq group who had
    been rearrested in 1999 after an acquittal on murder charges. Another 2
    suspects were released on November 6; however, the remaining 38
    suspects chose to stand trial. They maintained that they were innocent
    of the charges.
        The UPDF detained LRA child soldiers at Gulu military barracks for
    several months. There were reports that the military used the children
    to help find LRA landmines and arms caches (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        Although they have no legal authority to make arrests, LDU's
    continued to arrest citizens on a regular basis.
        Pretrial detainees comprise nearly three-fourths of the prison
    population. The average time in pretrial detention is between 2 to 3
    years. An estimated 14,000 of the approximately 20,000 persons being
    held in the central prisons and in the local government-run prisons are
    pretrial detainees. Congestion and delays in the legal system have
    resulted in an increasing number of detainees each year; however, the
    number of criminal cases pending before the High Court decreased from
    1,500 in 1999 to 143 cases during the year. A census of the central
    prison population conducted in 1999 indicated that at least onesixth of
    the inmates were being detained beyond constitutional limits. The UHRC
    heard several cases during the year brought by prisoners challenging
    the length of their detention, and it was investigating a complaint
    from prisoners in Bugungu in Mukono district at year's end. On February
    22, the Director of Public Prosecutions released a murder suspect who
    had spent 15 years on remand in Kumi district after withdrawing the
    charges against him. In February the Government reached an out-of-court
    settlement with Rajab Juma Rembe, who was detained in Lubiri barracks
    for 3 years in the early 1990's; in October Rembe received
    approximately $5,600 (10 million shillings) as compensation. On May 29,
    four suspects who had been held in Bushenyi local administration prison
    for over a year were released for lack of evidence.
        In November 1999, more than 400 prisoners held on charges of
    treason without trial since at least 1997 staged a protest at Luzira
    prison in Kampala. The prisoners refused to return to their cells until
    they received assurances from the director of public prosecutions that
    their cases would be brought to court; all 400 were released by year's
    end.
        In 1999 the Human Rights and Peace Center Prisons Project reported
    that 31 Congolese and Sudanese refugees were arrested in March 1997 on
    suspicion of aiding West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels and detained
    without charge (see Section 2.d.). There were unconfirmed reports that
    authorities released the group in 1999.
        There were no reported detentions of civilians in military
    barracks, and following pressure from local NGO's and media, the
    Government closed all unofficial, unregistered places of remand in
    1999. There were reports that the DMI ordered prisoners held
    incommunicado in police station cells.
        The Constitution does not prohibit forced exile; however, the
    Government does not use exile as a means of political control. In
    January the President signed an amnesty law covering all current and
    former rebels; the amnesty was extended for 6 months in July. Some
    former rebels returned to the country during the year to take advantage
    of the amnesty. Under the terms of the amnesty act, the Government
    released some persons convicted of treason and other suspects; however,
    by year's end the Government made only made limited progress in
    implementing provisions in the act related to the repatriation and
    resettlement of former rebels.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the President has extensive legal
    powers that influence the exercise of this independence. The President
    nominates, for the approval of Parliament, members of the Judicial
    Service Commission, which makes recommendations on appointments to the
    High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The lower
    courts remained understaffed and weak.
        The highest court is the Supreme Court, followed by (in descending
    order) the Court of Appeal (which also functions as the Constitutional
    Court for cases of first instance involving constitutional issues), the
    High Court, the Chief Magistrate's Court, and local council (LC) level
    3 (subcounty) courts, LC level 2 (parish) courts, and LC level 1
    (village) courts. A minimum of six justices may sit on the Supreme
    Court and the Court of Appeal or Constitutional Court. In addition
    there are a few specialized courts that deal with industrial and other
    matters. The Industrial Court (IC), which arbitrates labor disputes, is
    parallel structurally to the chief magistrate's court. There also is a
    military court system.
        Although once considered a useful innovation, the LC courts often
    are thought to be sources of injustice due to such factors as bribery
    and male dominance in rural areas. The LC courts have authority to
    settle civil disputes, including land ownership and payment of debts,
    and criminal cases involving children. These courts, often the only
    ones available to villagers, frequently exceed their authority by
    hearing criminal cases, including murder and rape. LC court decisions
    may be appealed to magistrate's courts, but often there are no records
    made at the village level, and many defendants are not aware of their
    right to appeal.
        The civilian judicial system contains procedural safeguards,
    including the granting of bail and the right of appeal to higher
    courts; however, an inadequate system of judicial administration and a
    lack of resources, resulting in a serious backlog of cases, have
    circumscribed the right to a fair trial for many years. The courts,
    like other branches of government, were impaired by a 4-year civil
    service hiring freeze, which was relaxed only somewhat in 1998. As a
    result, criminal cases may take 2 or more years to reach the courts.
    The case backlog in the High Court, which had increased every year
    since 1993, was eliminated largely by year's end. Attorneys working in
    the Office of the Public Prosecutor can be assigned several new cases
    each day. Some courts continued to observe the constitutionally
    prescribed limits on pretrial detention, but that practice was not
    widespread. All nonmilitary trials are public.
        Many defendants cannot afford legal representation. The
    Constitution requires that the Government provide an attorney for
    indigent defendants accused of capital offenses, but there is rarely
    enough money to retain adequate counsel. The Uganda Law Society
    operates legal aid clinics in four regional offices, although its
    services declined due to limited funding. It assists military
    defendants as well as civilians. The local chapter of Federacion
    Internacional de Abogadas (FIDA) and the Foundation for Human Rights
    Initiative also practice public-interest law from offices in Kampala.
    In 1999 the Law Development Center established a legal aid clinic to
    address cases involving children and those accused of petty crimes. A
    public defense service also was established in 1999, but it did not
    receive any government funding. It relied solely on donor support.
        The military court system does not assure the right to a fair
    trial. Although the accused has the right to retain legal counsel,
    military defense attorneys often are untrained and may be assigned by
    the military command, which also appoints the prosecutor and the
    adjudicating officer. The sentence passed by a military court, which
    can include the death penalty, may be appealed to the High Command but
    not to the High or Supreme Courts. A court-martial appeals process was
    established in 1997.
        The Government continued to arrest and charge persons for treason,
    especially captured rebel fighters, in numbers greater than the
    judicial system could manage. In the past, numerous human rights abuses
    were committed in connection with treason cases, including political
    detention, detention without charge, detention in unregistered and
    unofficial places of remand, and mistreatment, including torture. There
    were reports that at times such abuses continued during the year. At
    year's end, prison officials put the number of those on remand on the
    charge of treason at 226, none of whom were children. Detainees
    included members of the Islamic Tabliq group suspected of supporting
    ADF rebels. The Government released treason convicts and suspects under
    the terms of an amnesty act signed by the President in January (see
    Section 1.d.). In November 1999, more than 400 prisoners held without
    trial since at least 1997 held a protest at Luzira prison; all 400 were
    released by year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        There is one political prisoner. Bright Gabula Africa, whose death
    sentence for treason (plotting an armed coup) was upheld by the Supreme
    Court in 1995, remained imprisoned pending the outcome of his appeal to
    the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, a largely
    autonomous constitutional body that recommends whether presidential
    clemency powers should be exercised in a given case.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
    privacy, which the Government generally observes; however, there were
    some exceptions. The law requires that police have search warrants
    before entering private homes or offices, and the police generally
    observed this law in practice. Unlike in the previous year, there were
    no reports that the UPDF invaded private homes without warrants. LDU's
    arrested citizens without authority. The police sometimes searched
    vehicles without prior warrants. Prison officials routinely censored
    prisoners' mail.
        The Government required that employees in the President's office
    register their political affiliation in writing (see Section 3).
        Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued,
    there were no reports during the year that government forces used
    threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the
    conflict.
        Hundreds of thousands of persons remain internally displaced as a
    result of rebel activity and raids by Karamojong warriors (see Sections
    1.g. and 2.d.).
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the Sudan
    People's Liberation Army (SPLA), supported by UPDF forces, forcibly
    recruited Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda for service in Sudan.
        Female members of the police force are required to obtain
    permission from the police Inspector General before marrying. Male
    police officers are not subject to the same restriction (see Section
    5).
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Reports of violations of humanitarian law
    increased in the north, and remained a problem in the west. While the
    number of reported violations by the Government decreased during the
    year, such violations by the LRA increased. In the north, government
    forces continued their policy of maintaining so-called protected
    villages with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of protecting
    civilians and denying support to the LRA. Although substantial NGO and
    donor community assistance has improved the overall conditions in the
    villages, conditions still remain poor. The Government failed to
    provide adequate security to the villages, which were the targets of
    rebel attacks.
        There were reports that civilians were killed and injured during
    fights between UPDF forces and rebels. On June 6, several persons were
    killed during a battle between UPDF forces and LRA rebels near Okina
    and Laguti.
        LRA attacks increased during the year, and there were numerous
    incidents of attacks on villages and displaced camps in which villagers
    were killed, injured, raped, or abducted (see Section 2.d.). In the
    north, forces of the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, continued to attack
    civilian targets, as well as refugee camps. During the year, attacks by
    the LRA resulted in approximately 175 deaths and numerous injuries and
    the destruction of homes and property. On March 5, LRA rebels attacked
    Padibe displaced camp in Kitgum, killing 12 persons, wounding 30, and
    burning 800 huts. On March 12, LRA rebels attacked Cwero protected
    village in Gulu and abducted 10 persons. On August 16, LRA rebels again
    attacked Cwero protected village, abducting one person. No new
    incidents of mutilation were reported.
        The LRA abducted approximately 700 civilians, many of whom later
    were released. The LRA continued to abduct children and, at clandestine
    bases, terrorized them into virtual slavery as guards, concubines, and
    soldiers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). In addition to being beaten,
    raped, and forced to march until exhausted, abducted children were
    forced to participate in the killing of other children who attempted to
    escape. NGO's estimated the number of abducted children still held
    captive by the LRA at 1,500; other estimates vary widely (see Sections
    1.b. and 6.f.).
        In the west and southwest, the ADF continued to attack civilian
    targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of
    deaths, injuries, and abductions. The ADF killed at least 210 persons
    and abducted an estimated 30 children during the year (see Sections
    1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). Since 1996 the ADF has abducted
    approximately 200 children, approximately half of whom remained missing
    at year's end.
        Due to insecurity in northern areas of the country, the UHRC
    suspended its investigation into a 1998 incident in which UPDF forces,
    while combating suspected LRA rebels, reportedly killed 30 Acholi
    children abducted by the LRA in Ogok village, Kitgum district.
        In January the President signed a 6-month blanket amnesty for rebel
    fighters. The amnesty was renewed for 6 months in July; however, by
    year's end, the Government only had begun to implement provisions in
    the amnesty act related to the repatriation and resettlement of former
    rebels.
        There were no reports of new attacks by the WNBF, USF/A, CAMP, or
    Rwandan Hutu rebels (see Section 1.b.).
        At year's end, approximately 610,000 citizens remained displaced
    internally by violence in the north, west, and northeast, according to
    the U.N. Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (see
    Section 2.d.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respected these rights; however, there were instances in which the
    Government infringed on these rights. Police at times harassed
    journalists by holding them at police stations for several hours of
    questioning. On May 23, two Monitor reporters were briefly detained and
    questioned by the police after writing stories that speculated about
    government links to the Kanungu cult massacre (see Section 1.d.). In
    December the Government temporarily banned the regular opinion columns
    of four journalists with the government-owned New Vision newspaper due
    to past commentary critical of the Government; the columns of three of
    the journalists were reinstated 3 weeks later. The fourth journalist
    transferred to another paper.
        Three editors of the Monitor newspaper were arrested in 1999 and
    charged with sedition and publication of false news in connection with
    a case in which a woman, Kandida Lakony, claimed to have been abused by
    the UPDF (see Section 1.c.). The editors were released and their case
    was pending before the courts at year's end.
        The New Vision, a government-funded daily newspaper with a daily
    circulation of 35,000 (and up to 10 readers sharing each copy), and the
    government-controlled Radio Uganda, continued to play major roles in
    the media. These news sources were of a fairly high quality and
    sometimes included reporting critical of the Government.
        The media generally are free and outspoken, with widespread
    availability of privately owned publications. The independent Monitor
    newspaper, with a daily circulation of 22,000, consistently was
    critical of the Government. The East African, a Nairobi, Kenya-based
    weekly publication that provides extensive reporting on the country,
    continued to circulate without government hindrance.
        The Government controls one television station and Radio Uganda,
    the radio station with the largest audience. At year's end, there were
    more than 19 radio stations throughout the country. There were five
    local television stations and more than a dozen private television
    stations available via satellite. The number of independent media
    broadcast sources increased during the year. Several independent media
    outlets broadcast daily political talk shows in several languages,
    often very critical of the Government and individual officials,
    including the President. High-ranking officials often participated in
    these programs and debated issues with political opponents. There was
    no censorship of these programs.
        On February 21, two journalists from the Voice of Toro radio
    station were arrested and charged with publishing false news stemming
    from an erroneous report of a rebel attack on February 15. On October
    26, the Chief Magistrate's Court in Fort Portal dismissed the case due
    to lack of evidence.
        Newspaper, radio, and television coverage, in particular coverage
    by state-owned media, of the June referendum favored Movement
    activities. Activities by opposition parties and efforts to promote the
    multiparty system received minimal coverage by any media (see Section
    3).
        The Press and Media Law, which took effect in 1995, requires
    journalists to be licensed and to meet certain standards, including
    holding a university degree. The law provides for a Media Council that
    can suspend newspapers and deny access to state information. Government
    officials have not enforced the law since its enactment.
        Uncensored Internet access is widely available in major cities
    through three commercial service providers, although the cost for
    connectivity is prohibitive for all but the most affluent
    noninstitutional users. There also are over a dozen cyber cafes in
    Kampala and other cities, and several NGO's offer Internet access.
        A considerable degree of academic freedom exists at the two public
    and six private universities. Students and faculty have sponsored wide-
    ranging political debates in open forums on campus.
        Political education and military science courses known as ``Chaka
    Mchaka'' were suspended prior to the June referendum on political
    systems but resumed in August. These courses are criticized as
    indoctrination in Movement political philosophy. There continued to be
    reports that the techniques used in some of the courses included
    intimidation and physical and mental abuse. There also were reports
    that some instructors demanded payment for the courses, and unconfirmed
    reports that persons were coerced to take them, sometimes at gunpoint.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for some degree of freedom of assembly for non-political
    groups; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The
    Constitution bans political parties from holding national conventions,
    issuing platforms, endorsing candidates, or opening branch offices
    outside the capital, and on several occasions police disrupted or
    prevented political demonstrations and other events; although the ban
    was intended to be replaced following the referendum, new legislation
    that would regulate political party activities had not been enacted by
    year's end. The Constitution also forbids other activities that would
    interfere with the Movement system, an elastic provision that the
    Government, in the past, has interpreted adversely to the detriment of
    political groups' interests. Permits are not required; however, groups
    are required to notify the police prior to public gatherings. Police
    denied permission to hold public rallies to several non-Movement groups
    during the year.
        In February police in Bushenyi dispersed a seminar organized by the
    Free Movement, a political pressure group. On March 3, police in
    Kampala stopped a rally to campaign for a federal political system. On
    March 31, police and military police forcibly dispersed a rally in
    Mbarara held by Nasser Sebaggala, a candidate in the next presidential
    election (see Section 1.c.). On April 1, Sebaggala held another rally
    without police intervention to protest the referendum and to campaign.
    In April Sebaggala was banned from holding further rallies in accord
    with regulations banning all presidential campaign rallies until
    legislation governing the presidential elections was promulgated, which
    occurred on December 13 (see Section 3). On April 21, police beat and
    detained an UPC official for holding an unauthorized rally against the
    referendum on political systems (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 3). On
    June 3, police in Gulu prevented a meeting of the Uganda Youth
    Congress, the youth wing of the Uganda People's Congress. On June 25,
    police beat and arrested 11 Makerere University students after they
    disrupted a referendum rally held by the President. They subsequently
    were charged with misconduct and alarming the President and released on
    bail. Their case was ongoing at year's end (see Section 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On June 27, police in Tororo stopped a referendum rally organized by
    advocates for a multiparty system. On July 15, police in Kampala
    stopped a rally organized by an UPC official. On August 4, police in
    Kampala dispersed a seminar convened by the youth wing of the National
    Democrat's Forum. On September 6, police in Kampala stopped a rally
    organized by the Democratic Party (see Section 1.c.). On September 16,
    police violently dispersed a meeting of the Uganda Young Democrats in
    Gulu, which resulted in several injuries (see Section 1.c.).
        In the wake of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten
    Commandments of God killings, local officials on several occasions
    dispersed meetings of religious groups (see Section 2.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice. NGO's are required to
    register with the Nongovernmental Organizations Board, which includes
    representation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as other
    ministries. The Government generally approved NGO registrations. On May
    26, the Government registered the Uganda National NGO Forum, a broad
    consortium of domestic and international NGO's that had been refused
    registration for several years.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, the Government forcibly disbanded several religious groups.
    Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that security
    officials harassed or detained Muslims. There is no state religion.
    Religious groups, like other nongovernmental organizations, must
    register with the Government. There were no reports that the Government
    refused to grant registration to any religious groups. Permits were
    necessary for the construction of facilities, including religious
    facilities. There were no reports that the Government refused to grant
    such permits to any religious organization. Mosques operated freely,
    Koranic schools were common, and Muslims occupied positions of
    authority in local and central government. Prisoners were given the
    opportunity to pray on the day appropriate to their faith. Muslim
    prisoners usually were released from work duties during the month of
    Ramadan.
        Following the March 16 murders of more than 500 Movement for the
    Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God followers and the discovery
    of mass graves of approximately 500 other persons on properties in
    Kanungu belonging to the group, the Government launched investigations
    of numerous religious groups. Three groups were disbanded forcibly, and
    one religious leader was arrested. On March 29, former Rukungiri
    assistant resident district commissioner (ARDC) Rev. Francis Mutazindwa
    was arrested for failing to act on information about the activities of
    the Kanungu cult while he was the ARDC. He was released on bond on
    April 29, pending further investigation. In December the Government
    began an investigation into the killings; the investigation is
    scheduled for completion in June 2001.
        In early April, following allegations that the church allowed
    youths to engage in sexual relationships, the deputy resident district
    commissioner closed the Revival Pentecostal Church in Nseko village,
    Kasangati. In mid-April police in Kasese district banned the activities
    of a church group based in Hima public school, Busongora. On May 19,
    the Bushenyi resident district commissioner ordered the closure of the
    Church of the Servants of the Eucharistic Hearts of Jesus and Mary,
    which allegedly was operating in the guise of a vocational school.
        On May 2, five members of the Kisaaba Redeemed Church in Kayunga,
    Mukono district, were arrested and charged with causing the death of a
    church member whom they denied medical treatment. Two remained in
    detention in Njeru prison at year's end; the other members were
    released. The case still was pending at year's end. On May 30, five
    members of the Mulungiomu Full Gospel Church in Luweero were arrested
    after reportedly telling their followers to fast and sell their
    property, the same message that had preceded the killings in Kanungu.
    At year's end, the five remained in custody at Luzira prison pending
    trial. On July 18, Wilson Bushara, leader of the World Last Message
    Warning Church, and 17 followers were arrested and charged with
    defilement, rape, abduction, and theft. On November 23, the Director of
    Public Prosecutions ordered that Bushara and his followers be
    transferred from the Buganda Magistrates' Court to Luweero where the
    offenses allegedly were committed. Their cases were pending before the
    Luweero district Magistrates' Court at year's end. On August 22,
    Patrick Bitungwabariho, a leader of the Movement for the Restoration of
    the Ten Commandments of God, appeared before court in Rukungiri
    district on charges of participating in an unlawful assembly, being
    idle and disorderly, and child neglect. Bitungwabariho remained in
    detention, and his case was ongoing at year's end.
        In the wake of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten
    Commandments of God killings, local officials on several occasions
    dispersed meetings of religious groups. On March 12, security officials
    in Mbale dispersed hundreds of persons who had gathered for an
    evangelistic event organized by the
        Seventh-Day Adventist Church. On March 19, police in Kikinzi,
    Rukungiri district, dispersed a Seventh-Day Adventist Church baptism on
    the grounds that the church had not sought permission from the
    authorities to hold the event; however, there are no legal requirements
    that authorities must approve such church events. On March 28, police
    in Mukono dispersed a meeting of over 200 adherents of the Universal
    Apostolic Church for the Restless on the grounds that the church had
    not sought permission from the authorities to hold the event. On April
    1, police dispersed an alleged cult gathering in Kikandwa, Mubende
    district, on suspicion that Movement for the Restoration of the Ten
    Commandments of God leader Joseph Kibwetere was hiding within the
    crowd.
        Complaints by Muslim groups of government bias lessened during the
    year; however, the backlash from the death of over 1,000 citizens at
    the hands of a religious cult resulted in negative public attitudes
    towards fringe Christian groups and the Government's forcible
    disbanding of some groups. In 1998 approximately 100 Muslim men were
    detained and some were tortured, on suspicion that they supported rebel
    groups. Many of those detained were released (see Section 1.b.). There
    was no clear indication that religion was the sole factor in their
    arrests. The release of 53 Tabliq treason suspects in March and 28 in
    June resolved the issue of the whereabouts of unaccounted Muslim
    prisoners (see Section 1.d.).
        Some local governments have restricted the hours of operations of
    religious organizations that are viewed as cults, for example,
    prohibiting nighttime prayer meetings. The Government largely has
    ignored calls for these churches to be shut down and their followers
    returned to mainstream churches.
        There were reports from numerous human rights groups in the DRC
    that Rwandan troops, as well as various rebel factions, targeted
    Catholic clergy, both to intimidate the local population and in revenge
    for the Church's perceived role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. There
    also were reports from the DRC that some UPDF troops may have targeted
    clergy as well.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice,
    although there were some limits. Some local officials reportedly
    demanded payment of fees for permission to change a place of residence.
    A married woman must obtain her husband's written permission on her
    passport application if children are traveling on her passport (see
    Section 5).
        Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued,
    there were no reports during the year that government forces used
    threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the
    conflict.
        Increased attacks by LRA rebels and Karamojong warriors have caused
    many Acholis to leave their homes for urban centers, displaced camps,
    and villages guarded by the UPDF (see Section 1.g.). It was estimated
    that approximately half of Gulu's population was in displacement camps
    or protected villages due to such attacks. At year's end, approximately
    610,000 citizens remained displaced internally by violence in the
    north, west, and northeast.
        There were no laws that provide for the granting of refugee and
    asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
    however, the Government does grant such status in practice. The
    Government cooperated with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and with other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. As it has done repeatedly in past years, the Government
    continued to provide first asylum as well as land for temporary
    resettlement to citizens from neighboring countries, extending this
    practice to approximately 214,000 refugees during the year. Over 90
    percent of the refugees in the country are from southern Sudan; there
    also are small numbers of refugees from the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi.
        The Government failed to maintain adequate security in refugee
    camps during the year; large-scale attacks by rebel groups on some
    camps were reported (see Section 1.g.). For example, on July 24, LRA
    rebels attacked the Mongula refugee camp in Adjumani district killing 1
    Sudanese refugee and abducting 30 others. On August 9, LRA rebels
    attacked Acholi-pii refugee camp in Kitgum killing three Sudanese
    refugees and abducting two others. On August 16, LRA rebels again
    attacked Acholi-pii, killing three refugees and abducting a child. On
    September 3, ADF rebels attacked Kyangwali Sudanese refugee
    resettlement camp in Buhaguzi county, Hoima district killing a woman
    and her child.
        Unlike the previous year, there were no reports of the forced
    return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Movement domination of the Government and the political process,
    and some restrictive constitutional provisions, limited citizens'
    effective exercise of the right to change their government. The
    President dominates the Government, and Movement supporters remained in
    control of the Parliament, although the legislature continued to
    conduct business in an independent and assertive manner during the
    year. The 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were peaceful
    and orderly, but election conditions, including restrictions on
    political party activities, led to a flawed election process. In June a
    national referendum on the role of political parties resulted in the
    indefinite extension of the Movement form of government. The referendum
    process was flawed by restrictions on political party activities and
    unequal funding.
        The Government maintained, at government expense, the Movement
    Secretariat, an organization that roughly parallels government
    institutions and is limited to those professing support for the
    Movement. Political education and military science courses known as
    Chaka Mchaka were suspended prior to the June referendum on political
    systems, but they resumed in August (see Section 2.a.). The Government
    prohibited some non-Movement political gatherings, required that
    employees in the President's office register their political
    affiliation in writing (see Section 1.f.), and broke up numerous
    political meetings not sanctioned by the Movement (see Section 2.b.).
    The Constitution bans political parties from holding national
    conventions, issuing platforms, endorsing candidates, or opening
    offices outside of the capital. A June referendum resulted in the
    indefinite continuation of these restrictions.
        Newspaper, radio, and television coverage, in particular coverage
    by state-owned media, of the June referendum favored Movement
    activities. Activities by opposition parties and efforts to promote
    multiparty system received minimal coverage in any media (see Section
    2.d.).
        On November 28, the Parliament passed the Presidential Elections
    Bill, which governs the presidential election process; on December 13,
    the President signed the law. The law permits election campaigns to
    commence after the Electoral Commission has approved a candidate's
    nomination. The nomination review process was scheduled for January
    2001.
        Authorities at times harassed and arrested opposition politicians
    (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). On April 21, police in Mbale beat and
    detained a UPC official for holding an unauthorized rally against the
    referendum on political systems (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
        Universal suffrage is accorded to adults 18 years of age and older.
    The Constitution does not provide the right to vote to prisoners, and
    prisoners were not permitted to vote in the 1998 local government
    elections or in the June referendum.
        The Constitution reserves 10 seats in Parliament for members of the
    UPDF, 5 seats for representatives of persons with disabilities, 5 seats
    for youth representatives, and 3 seats for representatives of organized
    labor. Individual parliamentarians who claim non-Movement party
    affiliation participate fully in the legislature.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
    they play an influential role in national affairs. The Government used
    quotas in an aggressive effort to place women in positions of
    authority. Women continued to make strong contributions in Parliament
    and inside the Movement. The Vice President is a woman, as are 5
    ministers and 12 junior ministers in the President's 60-member Cabinet.
    In addition 39 of the nation's 45 districts selected a woman to fill a
    National Assembly seat reserved for women by the provisions of the
    Constitution. By-elections for female parliamentarians have not yet
    been held in six districts created in 1997. Women additionally won 6
    nonreserved seats for the 281-member Parliament in the 1996 election.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Numerous human rights groups are active. Among them are: The
    Foundation for Human Rights Initiative; a chapter of FIDA; the
    Prisoners' Aid Foundation, which monitors prison conditions; the
    National Organization for Civic Education and Election Monitoring,
    which deals with problems related to civil society and political
    rights; Human Rights Focus, based in the northern town of Gulu; the
    National Association of Women's Organizations of Uganda (NAWOU), an
    umbrella group; the International Federation of Human Rights; and the
    Human Rights and Peace Center, based at Makerere University. These
    groups operate without government restriction, investigating and
    publishing their findings on human rights cases. Hurinet, a human
    rights network and an umbrella organization for nine human rights
    organizations active in the country, also continued to be active.
        The Uganda National NGO Forum, a broad consortium of domestic and
    international NGO's that has been refused registration for several
    years, was registered on May 26 (see Section 2.b.).
        The Government allowed visits by international human rights NGO's,
    including Amnesty International and the ICRC. The Government also
    cooperated fully with the UNHCR.
        Government officials generally were cooperative and responsive to
    NGO views. They frequently attended conferences and seminars hosted by
    NGO's on social problems. The Government continued to cooperate with
    NGO's on legal and prison reforms.
        The Constitution established the UHRC as a permanent independent
    body with quasi-judicial powers. Under the Constitution, the UHRC may
    subpoena information and order the release of detainees and the payment
    of compensation for abuses. The UHRC continued to pursue suspected
    human rights abusers, including high-level officials in the Government
    and military, and expanded its operations by opening a second branch
    office in Soroti district in September. The UHRC Human Rights Tribunal
    continued to function, and the headquarters received 1,108 complaints
    during the year, including some against senior government leaders and
    military and police officials; the Soroti office received 123
    complaints and the Gulu office received 312. Of the 1,108 complaints
    received at headquarters, 654 were resolved; 202 were referred to the
    criminal courts; 344 were referred to other bodies, such as the
    Inspector General of Police, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of
    Public Service; 27 were dismissed because they occurred before 1995; 33
    were found not to be human rights violations; and 48 were resolved
    through mediation and intervention. At year's end, 59 cases remained
    under investigation, and 395 still were pending review. Of the 123
    complaints received at the Soroti office, 16 were resolved, 27 were
    dismissed, and 80 were under investigation at year's end. The UHRC does
    not have the power to intervene in cases pending before a court. The
    UHRC inspected numerous detention facilities and publicly reported on
    its findings; on March 9, the UHRC released its 1998 report. The report
    cited abuses by security organs and condemned police corruption and
    inefficiency; it noted instances of denial of the right to assembly,
    and criticized involvement in the DRC. The President appoints the
    UHRC's eight-member board.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors;
    however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively in matters
    of locally or culturally accepted discrimination against women,
    children, people with disabilities, or certain ethnic groups. Race was
    not a factor in national politics. The continued instability in the
    north led to violations of the rights of some Acholi, an ethnic group
    that comprises a significant part of the population. Most violations of
    Acholi rights resulted from LRA actions.
        Women.--Violence against women, including rape, remained common.
    According to U.N. statistics, 31 percent of women have experienced
    domestic violence. There were no laws that specifically protect women
    from battery or spousal rape, although there is a general law
    concerning assault. Some men of the Karamojong ethnic group in the
    northeastern section of the country continued their cultural practice
    of claiming unmarried women as wives by raping them. Between February
    and July, Karamojong warriors raped approximately 20 women during raids
    on neighboring districts in the northeast.
        The Government continued trying to implement the Children's
    Statute, which provides extensive protection for families and children;
    however, implementation proved exceedingly difficult due to manpower
    and judicial constraints, and in reality, little was done to enforce
    the statute's provisions. Law enforcement officials, reflecting general
    public opinion, continued to view wife beating as a husband's
    prerogative and rarely intervened in cases of domestic violence. Women
    remained more likely to sue for divorce than to file assault charges
    against their husbands. These problems continued to receive increasing
    public attention. Numerous women's rights NGO's sponsored conferences,
    empowerment sessions, and training programs throughout the country. On
    September 1, the Court of Appeal upheld the death sentence imposed by
    the High Court on the husband and brotherinlaw of Renu Joshi, who was
    murdered in 1997.
        Traditional and widespread societal discrimination against women
    continued, especially in rural areas, despite constitutional provisions
    to the contrary. Many customary laws discriminate against women in the
    areas of adoption, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In most areas,
    women may not own or inherit property, nor retain custody of their
    children under local customary law. Divorce law requires women wanting
    to prove adultery to meet stricter evidentiary standards. Polygyny is
    legal under both customary and Islamic law, and a wife has no legal
    status to prevent her husband from marrying another woman. In some
    ethnic groups, men also may ``inherit'' the widows of their deceased
    brothers. Women do most of the agricultural work but own only 7 percent
    of the agricultural land. There are limits on a married woman's ability
    to travel abroad with her children (see Section 2.d.).
        Unlike their male counterparts, female members of the police force
    are required to obtain permission from the police Inspector General
    before marrying (see Section 1.f.).
        There are active women's rights groups, including FIDA, Action for
    Development, the National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), Akina
    Mama Wa Afrika, the Forum for Women in Democracy, and NAWOU, which
    promote greater awareness of the rights of women and children. FIDA is
    in the final year of a 3year project to draft proposed reforms of
    outdated and discriminatory laws, and the NAWJ continued to disseminate
    its guidebook on women's rights and options concerning domestic
    violence to women throughout the country.
        Although prostitution is illegal, it is known to exist; however,
    there are no credible statistics available on the incidence.
        An undetermined number of women were victims of abduction and rape
    by rebel forces (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).
        Children.--Although it has devoted only limited funds to children's
    welfare, the Government demonstrated a commitment to improving
    children's welfare, particularly through its continuation of the
    Universal Primary Education (UPE) program. The program provides free
    education through the seventh grade for a maximum of four children per
    family, two girls and two boys; however, education is not compulsory.
    Key components of the UPE program include eliminating compulsory
    uniform requirements, providing free textbooks, eliminating fees
    imposed by schools, and the payment of Primary Leaving Examination
    (PLE) fees by the Government. Although some provisions had not yet been
    implemented fully by year's end, the UPE had increased funding for
    education, provided additional skills training for teachers, and
    reduced the textbook to student ratio. Strained finances, instability
    in some areas, infrastructure problems, and inadequate teacher training
    have prevented full implementation. Although the UPE program makes
    education more accessible financially, parents still must pay for
    school supplies and some school costs. Approximately 93 percent of
    primary school-age children are enrolled in school. Since the
    implementation of UPE, primary school enrollment has increased from 2.9
    million in 1996 to 6.5 million in 1999. Girls and boys theoretically
    have equal access to education, and lower grades are divided almost
    evenly by sex; however, the proportion of girls in higher school grades
    remains low since families traditionally have favored boys when making
    financially related educational decisions. Boys also are more likely to
    finish primary school and perform better on the PLE. In June the
    Government launched a national plan to promote the education of girls.
    Only 51 percent of adult women are literate compared with 75 percent of
    adult men. Parents' inability to afford schooling has correlated highly
    with the occurrence of child labor in rural areas (see Section 6.d.).
        The Government has not yet implemented effectively the 1996
    Children's Statute, which outlines broad protections for children.
    Government efforts to enforce the statute's provisions were hampered by
    the large proportion of the population that is below 18, manpower and
    fiscal constraints on the judiciary, and cultural norms. The law
    stipulates parents' responsibilities and provides extensive protection
    for children in a wide variety of areas, including financial support,
    foster care placement, adoption, determination of parentage, and
    treatment of children charged with offenses. It also includes concise
    provisions on the rights of the child, including a provision that a
    child shall not be made to work or take part in any activity, whether
    for pay or not, that is likely to injure the child's health, education,
    or mental, physical, or moral development. However, the Government has
    been unable to enforce prohibitions on child labor, particularly in the
    informal sector (see Section 6.d.).
        Estimates placed the number of orphaned children (children missing
    either parent are considered orphans) at up to 1.7 million. This large
    number of orphans resulted from previous civil wars, the internal
    displacement of persons, and HIV/AIDS.
        Ritual murders of children remained a problem during the year (see
    Section 5). For example, on August 17, police arrested Peter Ssempugu
    on suspicion that he beheaded a 15-year-old girl in Busiro County,
    Mpigi district, on July 20. In December a 13-year-old girl reportedly
    escaped after she was drugged and abducted for a ritual sacrifice.
        Child abuse remained a serious problem, particularly the rape of
    young girls (known locally as ``defilement''). Only a small fraction of
    these incidents is reported, especially when the perpetrator is a
    family member, neighbor, or teacher--as is often the case. During the
    year, there were 4,209 reported cases of defilement, an increase from
    2,637 in the previous year; 2,410 of the cases were investigated, and
    2,317 arrests resulted from such investigations. Increasing numbers of
    accusations reached the courts, although neither conviction nor
    punishment was common. Cases were reported frequently in newspapers,
    but a payment to the girl's parents often ended the matter. Despite
    these obstacles, an increasing number of cases were being prosecuted.
    While defilement carries a maximum sentence of death, that punishment
    has never been meted out to a convicted rapist. Defilement applies to
    all cases of sexual contact outside of marriage involving girls younger
    than 18 years of age, regardless of consent or the age of the
    perpetrator. The marriage of young girls by parental arrangement is
    common, especially in rural areas.
        Most schools use corporal punishment, although in 1997 the
    Government banned the beating of secondary school students. There were
    no developments in the June 1999 case of Peter Masanja, who died after
    a beating by the Kakungulu Memorial Islamic Institute's director,
    Hamidulah Llukwago. The Government has not released details of the
    investigation of a 1996 case in which a teacher in Masaka beat to death
    a 15-year-old student. It is unknown if the investigation has been
    completed; however, it is likely that it has been suspended.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced by the Sabiny tribe, located in the
    highly rural Kapchorwa district in the east, and by the Pokot tribe
    (also known as the Upe), which spans the remote northeastern border
    with Kenya. There are approximately 10,000 Sabiny and approximately
    20,000 Upe who live in the country. Among the Sabiny, initiation
    ceremonies involving FGM have been carried out every 2 years. Such a
    ceremony was held in 1998, and an NGO based in Kapchorwa registered 965
    females who were subjected to FGM during that year. In December there
    were reports that approximately 121 Pokot girls and 621 Sabiny women
    and girls, a decrease of 223 from 1998, had been circumcised during the
    biannual ceremony. An international human rights NGO offered cattle,
    goats, and money for scholarships to Sabiny parents who do not allow
    their daughters to be circumcised during this year's ceremony. There is
    no law against the practice, but the Government and women's groups
    working with the U.N. Population Fund continued to carry out programs
    to combat the practice through education. These programs have received
    strong government support and some support from local leaders. The
    programs emphasize close cooperation with traditional authority figures
    and peer counseling. Significant press attention to these ongoing
    efforts brought public attention to the problem throughout the year.
        The Children's Statute provides that children with disabilities be
    treated and given necessary special facilities--a provision hampered in
    execution by inadequate funding.
        The legal recruitment age for military service is 18 years;
    however, in practice, some recruiters have allowed 17-year-olds to
    enlist.
        The UPDF detained LRA child soldiers at Gulu military barracks for
    several months. There were reports that the military used the children
    to help find LRA landmines and arms caches (see Sections 1.d. and
    6.c.).
        There were reports from the DRC that UPDF and Rwandan troops, in
    addition to RCD rebels, reportedly abducted many young women from the
    villages they raided. These night raids on villages became so frequent
    that in many parts of the Kivu Provinces peasants slept in their
    fields.
        The ADF and LRA abducted many children, using them as guards,
    laborers, soldiers, and, in the case of the LRA, for forced sex (see
    Sections 1.g., 6.c., and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides that persons
    with disabilities have ``a right to respect and human dignity'' and
    requires that authorities take appropriate measures ``to ensure that
    they realize their full mental and physical potential;'' however,
    despite this provision, there was no statutory requirement for
    government services or facilities, such as accessibility of buildings
    for the disabled. Most buildings have one story, but in larger towns
    with multistory buildings, there often are no elevators; even where
    they do exist, they rarely are reliable. Widespread discrimination by
    society and employers limits job and educational opportunities for
    those with physical disabilities. In 1998 the Government appointed a
    Minister of State for Disabled Persons. A Department for Disabled
    Persons also exists under the Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social
    Development; however, these bodies and positions have little funding to
    undertake or support any initiatives.
        Religious Minorities.--There are amicable relations between the
    various religious communities, and no religious group actively impinges
    upon the right of others to worship. However, the backlash from the
    death of over 1,000 citizens at the hands of a religious group resulted
    in negative public attitudes towards fringe Christian groups. Some
    officials of ``mainstream'' Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religious
    organizations have called for the closure of Christian churches that
    are viewed as cults.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Civil strife in the north led
    to the violation of the rights of members of the Acholi tribe, which is
    largely resident in the northern districts of Gulu and Kitgum. Both
    government forces and the LRA rebels--who themselves largely are
    Acholi--committed abuses. LRA fighters in particular were implicated in
    the killing and kidnaping of Acholi tribe members (see Section 1.g.),
    while the UPDF record in the north continued to improve markedly.
    Abuses were inflicted upon members of the Bakonjo tribe in the west at
    the hands of ADF rebels, including ethnic Bakonjo.
        Between February and July, raids by Karamojong warriors on
    neighboring districts in the northeast resulted in approximately 100
    deaths. The raids may have exacerbated ethnic tensions in the northeast
    (see Section 1.a.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of every person to join workers' associations or trade unions,
    and the law allows unionization if a majority of the work force
    supports it; however, in practice the Government respects the right to
    form unions, although it has not responded yet to a 1997 application
    for registration by the Uganda Allied Teachers' Union. Since 1993 the
    right to form unions has extended to civil servants. However, many
    ``essential'' government employees are not permitted to form unions;
    these include police, army, permanent secretaries in the ministries,
    heads of departments and state-owned enterprises, school principals,
    and other management-level officials. The Government has failed to
    enforce the rights of some employees to join unions in newly privatized
    industries and factories. Organized labor has three reserved
    parliamentary seats.
        The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), the largest labor
    federation, includes 17 unions and is independent of the Government and
    political parties. Among its members are medical workers, including
    doctors, and the civil service union. The NOTU's influence on the
    overall economy remains small, since about 90 percent of the work force
    are peasant farmers. Even in areas in which cash crops are significant,
    unionization has remained practically nonexistent. NOTU membership has
    declined steadily from some 500,000 in the 1970's to about 100,000.
        The Constitution confirms the right to strike; however, government
    policy requires that labor and management make ``every effort'' to
    reconcile labor disputes before resorting to strike action. This
    directive presents unions with a complicated set of restrictions. If
    reconciliation does not appear to be possible, labor must submit its
    grievances and notice to strike to the Minister of Labor, who usually
    delegates the dispute to the Industrial Court (IC). In previous years,
    in the absence of verdicts from the IC, the Minister of Labor generally
    did not permit strikes, on the basis that ``every effort'' had not been
    exhausted. Frustrated laborers often went on strike anyway, protesting
    credibly that they were not paid a wage adequate to live on.
        On January 24, 3,000 workers at Century Bottling Company went on
    strike over nonpayment of salaries and poor working conditions. They
    returned to work the following day after reaching an agreement with
    management. On January 25, employees of Ugma Engineering Corporation
    went on strike over nonpayment of salaries but ended their strike after
    management agreed to pay them. On February 10, clearing and forwarding
    agents in Malaba, the main entry point for goods from Kenya, went on
    strike in protest against corruption on the part of customs officials.
    They returned to work the following day after senior revenue authority
    officials promised to address their concerns.
        Labor unions freely exercised the right to affiliate with and
    participate in regional and international labor organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, specifying
    that a workplace may be unionized if a majority of the employees
    supports doing so; however, true collective bargaining takes place only
    in the small private sector of the modern economy. In the modern
    sector, the Government is by far the largest employer (civil service
    and state-owned enterprises), and it dominates the bargaining process.
    The Government has adopted a tripartite (government-employers-labor)
    cooperative approach to setting wages and resolving labor disputes.
    Both the Government and employers may refer disputes to the IC. The law
    does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers; however, there
    were no reported incidents of government harassment of union officials.
    Unionization continued to be blocked effectively by some industries,
    especially in the textile, hotel, and construction sectors. Labor
    organizers complained that laws requiring a minimum of 1,000 persons in
    order to form a union hindered their activities. The Government took
    only limited action on organized labor complaints, but pointed out that
    the refusal to allow unionization is a constitutional violation. On
    February 14, 21 workers of the Nytil Picfare textile factory were
    dismissed in connection with a strike earlier in the month designed to
    unionize the work force and raise salaries. The Ministry of Labor
    subsequently entered into negotiations with Nytil Picfare to resolve
    the issue; however, the company went into receivership and negotiations
    were suspended.
        In 1999 the Uganda Textile, Garments, Leather, and Allied Union
    filed a complaint against the Government with the International Labor
    Organization (ILO) for failure to support the attempts of workers in
    the textile sector to exercise their right to freedom of association.
    The complaint still was pending at year's end.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or bonded labor, including forced or bonded labor by children;
    however, a lack of resources prevented the Government from enforcing
    this prohibition effectively. There was strong evidence that prison
    officials hired out prisoners to work on private farms and construction
    sites, where often they were overworked. Throughout the country, prison
    officials routinely augmented their meager pay with crops grown by
    prisoners on the prison grounds. Male prisoners performed arduous
    physical labor while female prisoners produced marketable handicrafts
    such as woven basketry. Juvenile prisoners perform manual labor, often
    12 hours per day (see Section 1.c.). Compensation, when paid, generally
    was very low, although the law demands that pretrial detainees must
    receive back pay for all work that they have performed once they are
    released (see Section 1.c.).
        The UPDF detained LRA child soldiers at Gulu military barracks for
    several months. There were reports that the military used the children
    to help find LRA landmines and arms caches (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
        Both the ADF and the LRA abducted civilians for training as
    guerrillas; most victims were children and young adults, whom the ADF
    and LRA terrorized into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, soldiers,
    and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves (see Sections 1.b., 1.g.,
    and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits employers from hiring workers below the
    age of 18; however, child labor is common, especially in the informal
    sector. The Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development is
    charged with enforcing the law on child labor, but it has limited
    financial means to do so. Part of the problem is demographic, because
    half of the population is under 18 years of age. School fees have made
    it impossible for some parents--particularly poor farmers, the majority
    of the population--to provide their children with an education in spite
    of the Government's UPE program (see Section 5). As a result, there is
    an incentive to leave school and go into agricultural or domestic work
    in order to help meet expenses or perform the work of absent or infirm
    parents, a common situation throughout the country. The problem is
    acute particularly among the large orphan population. Nevertheless,
    according to the Ministry of Education, 93 percent of primary school
    age children are enrolled in school.
        Most working children are employed in the informal sector, often on
    the subsistence farms of extended family members or as domestic
    servants. In urban areas, children peddle small items on the streets,
    are involved in the commercial sex industry (particularly in border
    towns and in Kampala), or beg for money. Although adults do most tea
    harvesting, some children were employed in this sector as well. Some of
    the country's orphans engage in labor activities.
        It is estimated that 60 percent of all land-based trade in the
    country is informal. Smuggling is one of the larger informal
    industries, and employs large numbers of child laborers at the borders
    with Kenya and Tanzania. Children walk back and forth across the
    unguarded borders, transporting small amounts of fuel, sugar, coffee,
    or other commodities.
        Government efforts to decrease the incidence of child labor were
    boosted by a $1.5 million grant in 1998 from the ILO's International
    Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC). The IPEC program was
    launched in 1999, and, by the end of the year, it had launched projects
    to eliminate child labor in the sugar and rice-growing industries as
    well as a public awareness campaign. Government officials acknowledged
    that for the IPEC to be implemented, continued judicial and law
    enforcement reform were needed. The Ministry of Gender, Labor, and
    Social Development established a National Steering Committee on Child
    Labor and a Child Labor Unit to develop a national policy to eliminate
    child labor; however, such a policy was not developed by year's end.
        The law does not prohibit the worst forms of child labor, nor does
    the Government have a mechanism to address this problem. However,
    several human rights NGO's began programs aimed at removing children
    from hazardous work. No reports about the efficacy of these efforts
    were available at year's end. In October consultants working for the
    Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development reviewed four labor
    laws and created draft legislation consistent with ILO Convention 182;
    however, no action had been taken on the legislation by year's end.
        The recruitment age for military service is 18 years; however, in
    practice, some recruiters have allowed 17-year-olds to enlist (see
    Section 5).
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, a
    lack of resources prevented the Government from enforcing this
    prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The ADF and LRA abducted
    children and terrorized them into virtual slavery as guards, laborers,
    soldiers, and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum legal wage is $3.50
    (6,000 shillings) per month, a rate set in the early 1960's. This wage
    is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. Wages continued to be determined through negotiation between
    individuals and their employers, unions, and proprietors, or through
    negotiation within the boards of directors at state-owned industries.
    Salaries usually are augmented by other benefits such as housing and
    transport allowances, which often are equal to base wages. The Ministry
    of Labor's salary scale for civil servants starts with unskilled labor
    at $44 (75,000 shillings) per month, up to supervisors at $350 (600,000
    shillings) per month, plus modest increases for years worked. All
    include provisions for paid overtime. The higher end of this wage scale
    would provide minimal standards of living for a worker and family, but
    most civil servants have great difficulty earning enough money to pay
    their children's school costs. Many civil servants and their dependents
    work in second jobs, grow their own food, or seek other ways to
    supplement their incomes. In industries that employ workers on an
    hourly basis, the normal workweek was 40 hours. Although there was no
    legal maximum workweek, a time-and-a-half rate was paid for each
    additional hour worked. Many industries pay workers by piecework, which
    avoids overtime and circumvents the prohibition on child labor. Many
    companies employ workers as ``casual laborers'' or ``contract workers''
    in order to avoid providing benefits.
        The condition of employee housing on the tea and sugar plantations
    at the major state-owned corporations, and within military and police
    barracks, was substandard. Sanitation and water facilities often are
    lacking.
        Building codes often are not enforced. Some structures have tripled
    in height above the original foundations, leading local engineers to
    express reservations about the structural integrity of these
    workplaces. Factories generally are sound, but machinery almost always
    lacks safeguards.
        Vestiges of occupational health and safety legislation are
    contained in the outdated Factories Act of 1954 and the Employment
    Decree of 1975. In September the Government enacted the Workers'
    Compensation Act, which replaced legislation dating to 1964. The act
    significantly increased compensation, based on monthly salaries, for
    workers injured or killed at work. The Ministry of Labor's Department
    of Occupational Health is responsible for enforcement of occupational
    safety regulations; however, in practice inspections are rare, due
    primarily to lack of vehicles and funding for inspection trips. There
    were fatal accidents at several construction projects at a rate of
    approximately one per month. The limited occupational safety
    regulations under the Workers' Compensation Act do not protect workers
    who refuse to perform dangerous work from being fired, although strong
    unions in certain dangerous industries protect such workers.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons; however, there were reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country. There is strong evidence that
    prison officials hired out prisoners to work on private farms and
    construction sites, where they often were overworked (see Section
    6.c.).
        Molo Songolo, a South African child rights organization, reported
    that children were trafficked from the country to South Africa during
    the year; however, the credibility of the report is unknown. The
    children allegedly were abducted or bought from their parents by
    organized gangs from Nigeria, DRC, and Angola.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that the SPLA,
    supported by UPDF forces, forcibly recruited Sudanese refugees in
    northern Uganda for service in Sudan.
        Both the ADF and the LRA abducted civilians for training as
    guerrillas; most victims were children and young adults whom the ADF
    and LRA terrorized into virtual slavery as guards, laborers, soldiers,
    and, in the case of the LRA, as sex slaves (see Sections 1.g., 5, and
    6.c.). As many as 1,500 Ugandan children abducted by the LRA were held
    in the southern part of Sudan; the Government of Sudan actively
    supports the LRA. In past years, the LRA also reportedly sold and
    traded some children, mostly girls, or provided them as gifts to arms
    dealers in Sudan.
        In December 1999, in Nairobi, Kenya, the Governments of Sudan and
    Uganda signed an accord agreeing, among other things, to cease
    supporting rebel groups and to return abductees. The Sudanese
    Government returned a number of LRA captives who had previously escaped
    LRA captivity during the year; however, the Sudanese Government did not
    free any abductees still held captive by the LRA.
        The CID is mandated to combat trafficking. The CID did not keep
    records on the magnitude of the problem, and it was unknown if its
    efforts have been effective.
                                   __________

                                     ZAMBIA

        Zambia is a republic governed by a president and a unicameral
    national assembly. After two decades of one-party rule, free and fair
    multiparty elections in November 1991 resulted in the victory of the
    Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the election of President
    Frederick J.T. Chiluba, a former trade unionist. In November 1996
    elections, President Chiluba was reelected, and his party won 131 of
    150 seats in the National Assembly. Constitutional amendments enacted
    in May 1996 disqualified the former President, Kenneth Kaunda, the main
    opposition leader, from seeking the presidency, prompting his United
    National Independence Party (UNIP) to boycott the elections. The MMD's
    use of government resources, including the state-owned media, put the
    fairness of the elections into question, although, despite some voting
    irregularities, there was no evidence of substantial or widespread vote
    rigging or vote counting fraud. The Constitution mandates an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
    provision in practice; however, the judicial system is hampered by lack
    of resources and inefficiency.
        The police, divided into regular and paramilitary units operating
    under the Ministry of Home Affairs, have primary responsibility for
    maintaining law and order. Police action was politicized in the
    delivery of authorizations for public gatherings. The Zambia
    Intelligence Security Service, under the Office of the President, is
    responsible for intelligence and internal security. Police continued to
    commit numerous, and at times serious, human rights abuses.
        The Government continued its free market economic reform program
    including privatization of the large copper parastatal. However,
    negative economic performance, including stagnation and increasing
    inflation continued. Balance of payments support by foreign donors has
    resumed as a result of greater government attention to governance
    issues and the privatization of the mines. Approximately 80 percent of
    all citizens live in extreme poverty.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor; although
    the Government took steps to address some human rights problems,
    serious abuses continued in several areas. Citizens'' right to change
    their government was restricted in the 1996 national elections, the
    last time national elections were held. Police committed an
    extrajudicial killing. Police officers routinely beat and otherwise
    abused criminal suspects and detainees. The lack of professionalism,
    investigatory skill, and discipline in the police force remain serious
    problems, and officers who commit such abuses do so with impunity.
    Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. A government
    commission of inquiry, established in 1998 to investigate the alleged
    torture during detention of suspects in a 1997 coup attempt, completed
    its work in June and submitted its report to President Chiluba;
    however, the results of the investigation were not released to the
    public by year's end. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, and long
    delays in trials remain problems. Police infringed on citizens''
    privacy rights. The Government's record on press freedom was mixed. The
    Government infringed on freedom of the press and continued to control
    two of the country's three daily newspapers. The Government restricted
    freedom of assembly and association and in a few instances limited
    freedom of movement. Human rights and civic organizations and political
    parties continued to complain of government harassment. Violence
    against women remained widespread. Women continued to experience
    discrimination in both law and fact, including the denial of widows'
    inheritance rights. Child abuse is a problem. Discrimination against
    the disabled is a problem. Child labor is a problem in rural
    subsistence occupations and some urban occupations. There were reports
    of trafficking in persons.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government officials during the year;
    however, police committed an extrajudicial killing. In November, Kelvin
    Mushabati and Geoffrey Michelo died of suffocation after a police
    officer threw a tear gas canister into their prison cell. The police
    officer who was responsible for the killing was charged with murder; he
    remained in detention pending a trial at year's end.
        The conflict in Angola periodically led to armed attacks within the
    country's territory, which resulted in civilian deaths; at least one of
    these armed attacks was perpetrated by Angolan government soldiers. On
    April 25, Angolan government soldiers reportedly killed two civilians
    during a confrontation with Zambian troops inside Zambian territory.
        A large number of prison inmates died due to illness and harsh
    conditions (see Section 1.c.).
        On September 8, a High Court judge sentenced a Mazabuka police
    officer to three years in prison with hard labor and fined two other
    officers for the 1999 death of Bernard Chinkuli in police custody.
        In March 1999, Khondwani Musukwa died in police custody, apparently
    as a result of torture. No action was taken against the officers
    responsible for his death by year's end. In July 1999, Sailas Mabvuto
    Lungu reportedly was beaten to death by a police constable who
    suspected him of driving a stolen vehicle. The officer was in detention
    and awaiting trial at year's end. In August 1999, a pregnant woman died
    in police custody, reportedly as a result of police abuse. No action
    was taken against the officers responsible for her death by year's end.
        In May 1998, seven police officers of Mindolo police station in
    Kitwe were arrested in connection with the death in custody of Steward
    Mwantende. The police officers were arrested, tried, and in April were
    acquitted.
        In August an official inquiry into the 1998 death in detention of
    Bertha Mungazila was opened. On September 7, the inquiry was completed;
    a coroner determined that Mungazila died as a result of torture and
    called on the Inspector General of Police to arrest the officers on
    duty at the time of her arrest. On September 12, a docket against the
    three officers was opened, and the three were arraigned on manslaughter
    charges within 24 hours; the trial began in October and was ongoing at
    year's end.
        On November 3, 1999, four gunmen shot and killed Wezi Kaunda, the
    son of former President Kenneth Kaunda, during an apparent car-jacking
    in Lusaka. The Government permitted forensic specialists and a team of
    advisors from Scotland Yard to participate in an investigation in
    response to a request from the Kaunda family. Two suspects were
    arrested. During their trial, one of the suspects claimed that the MMD
    was responsible for the killing; however, a letter reportedly written
    by the suspect alleged that several UNIP officials were responsible.
    The trial was ongoing at year's end.
        In August three civilians reportedly were killed by Congolese
    rebels who had crossed into the country to steal food.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances. However, there were reports that UNITA rebels abducted
    persons, particularly young persons, for forced labor in Angola (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.)
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police
    regularly used excessive force when apprehending, interrogating, and
    detaining criminal suspects or illegal immigrants. In most instances,
    detaining officers beat suspects and generally were not disciplined or
    arrested for such acts.
        In January police arrested Shadreck Selemani on suspicion of
    involvement in the theft of roofing materials. Selemani was held
    without charge for 2 days, during which time police beat him
    repeatedly.
        In April Hendrix Mbumwai was held without charge by officers at the
    Los Angeles police station for 6 days, during which time police beat
    him.
        On August 30, police were deployed to the University of Zambia in
    response to demonstrations on the previous day that resulted in
    injuries and damage to private property. Police severely beat a number
    of students and forced them to roll in mud and sewer water and to jump
    around. At least 13 students were injured; 11 required medical
    treatment for their injuries. Although a local non-governmental
    organization (NGO) alleged that police raped five female students
    during the deployment, no female students claimed sexual abuse by
    police in the incident. Although only a small portion of the student
    population participated in the August 29 demonstrations, the police
    actions were directed against the entire student body. No action was
    taken against the officers responsible for the abuses by year's end.
        In November two detainees died of suffocation when a police officer
    threw a tear gas canister into their cell (see Section 1.a.).
        In September 1999, Dave Wanjeke, a retired soldier, was held
    without charge and tortured in police custody. In February a judge of
    the High Court criticized the Government for abusing Wanjeke's rights;
    however, there was no further action taken on this case by year's end.
        In September 1999, officers of the Emmasdale police station beat
    Benson Mwale repeatedly on the buttocks; subsequently, he required
    medical attention for severe lacerations. In September 1999, a file on
    the incident was opened by the Permanent Human Rights Commission
    (PHRC). A police spokesman stated that it would punish all officers
    involved in the incident. Later in September 1999, a ``docket of
    complaint against police'' was opened to investigate the matter. This
    docket allows the public to raise complaints against a police officer
    so that legal procedures can be initiated. The investigation was
    ongoing at year's end.
        There was no further action on the case of Cedrick Phiri, who was
    beaten by police while he was detained overnight in June 1999.
        There was no further action on the case of the young man who was
    detained and beaten in police custody at the Woodlands Police Station
    in Lusaka in March 1999.
        In response to pressure from the PHRC, foreign governments, NGO's,
    and other human rights organizations, in May 1998, the Government
    agreed to initiate an independent inquiry into the torture claims of
    seven persons detained during the October 1997 coup attempt. (Early in
    1998, one of the alleged torturers had been promoted.) In August 1998,
    the Government established a commission of inquiry made up of treason
    trial judge Japhet Banda and Lusaka principal resident magistrate
    Gertrude Chawatama. The torture inquiry began after the treason trial
    concluded on September 17, 1999. The commission completed its work and
    submitted a report to President Chiluba on June 21. By year's end the
    report had not been publicly released, and the President had not
    responded to the report.
        In 1999 the Government promised to institute measures to monitor
    and reform police operations to ensure that civil liberties are
    protected. It further directed the police, prisons, and immigration
    departments to intensify human rights training among their officers,
    which has been part of their basic training since 1997. Although the
    training of new recruits continued during the year, there was greater
    training within the police force. The Government took no action on its
    statements in 1998 that it would amend the Police Act to provide for
    the establishment of a police authority to which members of the public
    could channel complaints pertaining to police harassment and abuse.
        The lawsuit filed in 1999 by Dean Mung'omba claiming torture during
    detention in 1997 was ongoing at year's end.
        Police corruption is also a problem. There were a handful of
    unconfirmed reports that police would release prisoners in exchange for
    bribes of between $65 and $95 (200,000 to 300,000 kwacha). Citizens in
    private debt disputes often are detained by police in exchange for a
    portion of the payment owed (see Section 1.d.). Police sometimes
    committed extortion at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) or required
    document processing ``fees'' or gas money in order to commence
    investigations. In July the Inspector General of Police instructed
    police throughout the country to reduce roadblocks by half in an effort
    to reduce the opportunity for corruption, and there was a reduction in
    the number of roadblocks by year's end. Police action was politicized
    in the delivery of authorizations for public meetings (see Section
    2.b.).
        The police investigate instances of police use of excessive force
    and have disciplined officers found to have committed human rights
    abuses. Such investigations generally are prolonged, and outcomes are
    not readily apparent. Middle ranking and senior officers are enrolled
    in human rights training seminars at the police academy. A number of
    police officers are the subject of internal investigations and
    prosecutions. Authorities arrested some police officers on such
    criminal charges as murder and robbery. For example, in November one
    police officer was arrested and charged with killing two persons (see
    Section 1.a.). Senior government officials acknowledge the problem of
    police abuse and have requested foreign donor assistance in the form of
    training for the police. In May the Government announced its intention
    to create a national forensic laboratory to provide the police with
    resources for professional investigations. In 1999 the High Court
    issued a decision banning corporal punishment in the country. The court
    system undertook efforts to ensure that this ban was upheld during the
    year. In April the Chief Administrator of the High Court publicly
    reminded magistrates of their obligation to uphold the ban on corporal
    punishment and held a meeting with prison officials to reinforce the
    ban. During the year, one magistrate attempted to sentence a defendant
    to corporal punishment, but the chief administrator of the High Court
    prevented the implementation of the sentence.
        Groups of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
    (UNITA) deserters have entered the country and seized food and goods by
    force from villages. On at least two occasions, they have forced young
    men and women to accompany them back to Angola (see Section 6.f.).
        Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. According to
    official statistics, prisons designed to hold 6,000 prisoners held over
    12,000. This severe overcrowding, combined with poor sanitation,
    inadequate medical facilities, meager food supplies, and lack of
    potable water resulted in serious outbreaks of dysentery and other
    diseases, including tuberculosis. In a report submitted to Parliament
    in 1996, the Commissioner of Prisons said that 975 prisoners had died
    in prison between January 1991 and December 1995 due to illness and
    harsh conditions. The death rate of prison inmates remained about the
    same during the year. The Commissioner of Prisons has submitted no
    further such reports since 1996. In March 1999, the Commissioner of
    Prisons attributed the serious overcrowding in prisons to the slow pace
    at which the courts dispose of cases. The commissioner noted that some
    cases have been pending since 1991.
        In March 1999, the Magistrates and Judges'' Association of Zambia
    expressed its intention to undertake efforts to release all eligible
    detainees on bail in order to reduce prison congestion. According to
    the Association, Kamwala Remand Prison in Lusaka contained 636 inmates,
    although it had been designed to hold only 200.
        In July 1999, the PHRC announced that it would employ prison
    inspectors to ensure that inmates are kept in habitable environments.
    The PHRC submitted a request to the Ministry of Finance for funds to
    support the creation of prison inspector positions, but did not receive
    funding by year's end.
        The Government generally permits prison visits by both domestic and
    international monitors and by resident foreign diplomats. Provincial
    human rights committees periodically inspect prison conditions. A
    number of foreign diplomats conducted prison visits during the year;
    however, there were no visits by international monitors at year's end.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention are problems. Criminal suspects often are arrested on the
    basis of flimsy evidence or uncorroborated accusations. Unlike in
    previous years, there were no reports that family members or associates
    of criminal suspects were detained, interrogated, and physically abused
    by the authorities in attempts to identify or locate suspects during
    the year. In criminal cases, the law requires that a detainee be
    charged and brought before a magistrate within 24 hours. Attorneys and
    family members are allowed access to pretrial detainees. In practice
    the authorities hold most detainees for more than 1 month from
    commission of an offense to first appearance before a magistrate. In
    many cases, an additional period of 6 months elapses before a
    magistrate commits the defendant to the High Court for trial. Following
    committal, preparation of the magistrate court record for transmittal
    to the High Court takes months, or in some cases as long as a year.
    Once a case reaches the High Court for trial, court proceedings last an
    average of 6 months. Part of the reason for this delay is a shortage in
    the number of professional magistrates: out of 72 potential positions,
    only 22 are filled.
        Pretrial detention often is prolonged. Approximately 2,000 of
    12,000 detainees were awaiting trial on criminal charges in 1999.
    Approximately 1,288 of 2,251 detainees were awaiting trial in the
    Lusaka region by year's end. In some cases defendants have been
    awaiting trial for as long as 4 years. There was some progress in
    holding trials; in past years, some defendants had waited as long as 10
    years for their trials. These long delays were a result of inadequate
    resources, inefficiency, lack of trained personnel, and broad rules of
    procedure that give wide latitude to prosecutors and defense attorneys
    to request adjournments. The High Court Commissioner can release
    detainees if police fail to bring the case to trial, although that did
    not occur in any case during the year.
        Although there is a functioning bail system, overcrowded prisons
    reflect in part the large number of detainees charged with serious
    offenses for which bail is not granted. These include treason, murder,
    aggravated robbery, and violations of narcotics laws. There were no
    cases of constitutional bail. Indigent detainees and defendants rarely
    have the means to post bail. The Government's legal aid office is
    responsible for providing legal aid representation for indigent
    detainees and defendants in criminal or civil cases. In practice few
    receive assistance. The office had 9 attorneys and a budget of $183,000
    (576,000,000 kwacha) during the year to cover the entire country.
        Police stations frequently become ``debt collection centers,''
    where police officers acting upon unofficial complaints detain debtors
    without charge, indefinitely, until they pay the complainants. In
    return the police receive a percentage of the payments (see Section
    1.c.). A police constable was convicted and sentenced to 3 years''
    imprisonment with hard labor for abuse of office in one such case. The
    conviction, handed down in January, was in response to events that
    occurred in 1996.
        A prominent elections NGO reported that four opposition cadres were
    arrested in January for shouting anti-MMD slogans during an election
    campaign. The arrests reportedly were ordered by a deputy minister. The
    four were held for a few hours and charged with conduct likely to cause
    a breach of the peace. The case was still pending at year's end.
        In January presidential candidate Anderson Mazoka was arrested and
    detained on charges of holding an illegal meeting after he obtained a
    permit to convene an informal dinner (see Section 2.b.).
        On July 15, a Member of Parliament (M.P.) was arrested for unlawful
    assembly relating to a meeting held with constituents in his home a
    month earlier; he was released without charge (see Section 2.b.).
        On August 30, police detained approximately 300 students at a
    stadium following a demonstration the previous day (see Section 1.c.).
    The students were released after 24 hours in detention.
        In February Alfred Zulu, a prominent human rights activist was
    detained and charged with financial fraud. Some observers alleged that
    Zulu was targeted because of his human rights activities; however,
    there was no evidence to support these allegations (see Section 4).
        May 1999, Donald Phiri was taken into police custody during an
    unauthorized police search for weapons at his father's home. The search
    allegedly was intended to locate arms. Phiri's father complained that
    he was unable to determine his son's whereabouts for several days after
    he was taken into custody. Phiri was charged with murder in September
    1999; the case was ongoing at year's end.
        In August 1999, Imasiku Mutangelwa, the leader of a small
    organization known as the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF), was sought by
    police for questioning after he made statements supporting a separatist
    rebellion in Namibia. Later the same month, Mutangelwa sought asylum in
    the residence of the South African High Commissioner, but his request
    was denied. Mutangelwa subsequently was arrested and charged with
    belonging to an unlawful society. The case against him was referred by
    the Magistrate's Court to the High Court, but had not yet been heard by
    year's end.
        The authorities held in detention pending deportation approximately
    300 illegal immigrants, principally from neighboring countries. Because
    the immigration authorities lack funds for deportation, illegal
    immigrants sometimes are kept in prison for extended periods, sometimes
    for more than 5 years. There were 199 illegal immigrants being held in
    detention in Lusaka by year's end.
        The 1996 case involving the indefinite incarceration of three
    newspaper reporters on charges of contempt of the House remains
    pending. Although the High Court quashed the sentences, the Government
    has appealed the case, seeking to reinstate the detention of the
    reporters. The appeal still is pending, although two of the three
    reporters have died (See Section 2.a.).
        The Government does not use exile for political purposes; however,
    it has used deportation and the threat of deportation for political
    purposes against persons whose claims to citizenship it has refused to
    recognize. In January the Government deported Majid Ticklay after he
    wrote a letter that was published in the Post publicly urging the Asian
    community to unite behind one political party (see Section 3).
        During the year, a number of citizens remained in self-imposed
    political exile in foreign countries, including: Liberal Progressive
    Front President Dr. Roger Chongwe, in Australia; Zambia Democratic
    Congress General Secretary Azwell Banda, in South Africa; former editor
    of the defunct newspaper, Confidential, Reverend Steward Mwila, in
    South Africa; and former President Kaunda's daughter, Catherine Mwanza,
    in South Africa.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected this
    provision in practice; however, the judicial system is hampered by lack
    of resources and inefficiency. The President nominates and the National
    Assembly confirms the Chief Justice and other members of the Supreme
    Court.
        The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction for all legal and
    constitutional disputes. The High Court, which holds regular sessions
    in all nine provincial capitals, has authority to hear criminal and
    civil cases and appeals from lower courts. Magistrate courts have
    original jurisdiction in some criminal and civil cases, while local, or
    customary, courts handle most civil and petty criminal cases in rural
    areas.
        Local courts employ the principles of customary law, which vary
    widely throughout the country. Lawyers are barred from participating,
    and there are few formal rules of procedure. Presiding judges, who are
    usually prominent local citizens, have great power to invoke customary
    law, render judgments regarding marriages, divorces, inheritances,
    other civil proceedings, and rule on minor criminal matters. Judgments
    often are not in accordance with the Penal Code. For example, they tend
    to discriminate against women in matters of inheritance (see Section
    5).
        Trials in magistrate courts are public, and defendants have the
    opportunity to confront their accusers and present witnesses. However,
    many defendants are too poor to retain a lawyer, and the poor state of
    the Government's legal aid department means that many citizens entitled
    to legal aid find that it is unavailable. Courts are congested and
    there are long delays in trials while the accused are in custody. The
    Magistrates and Judges'' Association made an effort to expedite the
    process of court appearances during the year by setting up a fast-track
    court that could quickly hear minor, uncomplicated cases.
        Courts continued to act independently and at times made statements
    critical of the State. In February a judge of the High Court criticized
    the Government for abusing the rights of retired soldier Dave Wanjeke.
    Wanjeke was held without charge and tortured in police custody in
    September 1999 (see Section 1.c.).
        In August the National Assembly passed a bill that amends the State
    Proceedings Act. The act currently provides that once leave to apply
    for a judicial review has been granted, there is a stay on any
    decisions by State or public officers relating to the matter. The
    amendment would not allow the start of any judicial review process to
    act as a stay on the Government's decision. Opposition parties, NGO's,
    civil society, and some members of government have expressed concern
    that the amendment would remove citizens' legal recourse in the event
    of abuse by the Government. President Chiluba did not sign the bill,
    which lapsed at year's end.
        Appeals in the cases of 59 military personnel detained during a
    1997-98 state of emergency and later sentenced to death for involvement
    in an attempted coup were ongoing at year's end.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for respect for privacy and
    the inviolability of the home; however, the authorities did not always
    respect these rights in practice. The law requires a warrant before
    police may enter a home, unless a state of emergency is in place.
    Police routinely ignored this requirement and often arrested alleged
    criminals at their homes without first having obtained an arrest
    warrant. The Constitution grants the Drug Enforcement Commission and
    the Zambian Intelligence Security Service authority to wiretap
    telephones for probable cause. In 1996 the Inspector General of Police
    admitted in open court that he had ordered the illegal wiretaps of the
    telephones at the offices of the Post, an independent daily newspaper.
    The case still was pending at year's end. There were no confirmed
    reports of wiretaps during the year; however, the opposition alleged
    that the Government wiretapped their telephones.
        In March Oswald Mutapa, a retired Assistant Commissioner of Police,
    was evicted from his house in March on orders from the Inspector
    General of Police. The eviction took place in spite of a court order
    barring eviction until a legal dispute between Mutapa and the
    Government was resolved. In June Mutapa won the court case and returned
    to his house.
        Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that police
    detained and abused relatives and associates of suspects during the
    year.
        In May 1999, police raided the home of the president of the World
    Baptist Evangelical Association, Reverend Bwanali Phiri, without a
    warrant (see Section 1.d.). The police took Phiri's son and two tenants
    into custody. Phiri's tenants were released, but Phiri was detained for
    4 months without charge, then charged with murder. The case still is
    pending (see Section 1.d.).
        Roundups of suspected illegal aliens in the home or workplace
    continued. According to the Government's Commissioner for Refugees,
    immigration officials are empowered under the law to conduct these
    roundups without a warrant.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While the Constitution provides
    for freedom of expression and of the press, the Penal Code lists
    various prohibited activities that may be interpreted broadly to
    restrict these freedoms, and the Government infringed on press freedom.
    Overall, the Government's record on press freedom was mixed during the
    year. Over the past several years, in response to headlines and stories
    of alleged corrupt practices on the part of government officials, the
    Government, accused officials, and other individuals have brought
    numerous libel actions against the Post newspaper. There are currently
    more than 80 cases filed over the course of the last 5 years waiting to
    be adjudicated. The number of pending libel cases did not increase
    during the year, because the journalists involved in most of them have
    left the Post.
        The law includes provisions for investigative tribunals to call as
    witnesses journalists and media managers who print allegations of
    parliamentary misconduct. Failure to cooperate with a tribunal may
    result in charges of contempt punishable by up to 6 months in jail.
    This has been criticized by the media as a clear infringement on press
    freedom and a means for parliamentarians to bypass the clogged court
    system in dealing with libel suits against the media.
        In April a correspondent for the privately owned weekly newspaper
    Monitor received a series of anonymous, threatening telephone calls
    after he published a story that stated Intelligence Chief Xavier Chungu
    had been named in a U.N. report on UNITA sanctions violations.
        There were reports of warnings by the Minister of Information
    against the media throughout the year. The press reported in February
    that the Minister warned of ``drastic action'' against the Zambian
    Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and the Inter-African Network for
    Human Rights and Development (AFRONET), and in May warned of action
    against radio stations labeled as ``political'' (see Section 4).
        In August a Radio Phoenix reporter was detained and beaten by
    members of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) while
    investigating reports of extortion by MMD cadres at the central market.
    Police conducted an investigation and arrested those suspected of
    assaulting the reporter. In response to pressure from MMD officials,
    the suspects were released in August, and the case was not resumed by
    year's end.
        In September espionage charges against 12 members of the editorial
    staff of the Independent Post newspaper were dropped. The editor still
    was required to appear in court in connection with a 1999 story
    pointing out deficiencies in the country's military preparedness in
    relation to Angola; the High Court acquitted him on December 21 (see
    Section 1.e.).
        A government appeal of a National Assembly case initiated against
    three journalists in 1996 remains pending (see Section 1.d.).
        A number of privately owned newspapers question government actions
    and policies, and these circulate without government interference. For
    the last 4 years, the leading private daily, the Post, has had an
    Internet home page that has attracted over 15,000 readers per month.
    The government-controlled Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail, two of
    the most widely circulated newspapers, also have home pages established
    in April 1996.
        The Government owns the sole television station, the Zambia
    National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). In addition to the
    government-controlled radio station, there are three church-related
    stations and one private commercial station. In February a UNESCO-
    funded community radio station began operations in the town of
    Mazabuka.
        The Government exercised considerable influence over the
    government-owned media, which continued to follow the government line
    on important issues. On January 24, a radio talk show on the privately
    owned Radio Phoenix was cancelled under government pressure. The talk
    show resumed in February, with no reports of interference.
        The only commercial radio station rebroadcasts Voice of America
    (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and South African
    Broadcasting Corporation items. Multichoice, based in South Africa,
    provides satellite and analog wireless subscribers with television
    services. These services provide broadcasts of Cable News Network, BBC
    World Sky Television, and South African Broadcasting Corporation Africa
    News. They also provide three BBC, one Radio France International, and
    VOA radio news broadcasts. Neither of the services provides local news
    coverage. A second wireless service, CASAT, began operations in
    December 1997. In 1998 Trinity Broadcasting Network, a foreign-based
    church-related television network, began 24-hour transmission from a
    rented studio at the ZNBC complex.
        Contrary to its 1991 campaign promises to privatize government-
    owned mass media, the Government has declined to privatize the state-
    owned and government-controlled Times of Zambia, the Zambia Daily Mail,
    and the ZNBC radio and television stations. Opposition political
    parties complain that government control of these media bodies
    effectively limits their access to such means of mass communication.
        Academic freedom is respected. University professors are permitted
    to lecture freely, conduct research, and publish their work. Late in
    1999, the Government passed the University Act, which gave greater
    power to the Minister of Education to supervise universities. An
    injunction against the act which was issued by the High Court in
    October was dissolved at the end of 1999, and the President signed the
    act into effect. Although the act gives the university council a
    mandate to address faculty concerns, the Minister of Education makes
    appointments to the council; some academics have criticized this
    provision.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
    restricted this right in practice. The law requires rally organizers to
    notify the police 7 days in advance of a rally. The police may advise
    the organizers that the time or venue is inopportune. In practice the
    police did not interfere with most peaceful rallies whose leaders
    followed the prior notification rule and that could be described as
    politically neutral or favorable to the Government or MMD; however,
    authorities sometimes denied permission to proceed with or cancelled
    rallies planned by the political opposition, particularly during by-
    election campaigns. For example, UNIP was issued a permit to carry out
    a demonstration in support of striking doctors in January. The permit
    later was cancelled by police. No reason was given for the
    cancellation.
        The Public Order Act frequently was used to prevent activities by
    opposition political parties. In June the UPND was denied permission to
    hold rallies in three areas because a deputy minister would be touring
    those areas during the same period. The Government also denied the UPND
    a series of permits during the Sesheke by-election in July, again
    because several highlevel government officials, including the
    President, would be in the area at the same time.
        Government officials publicly warned of potential ``drastic
    action'' against two NGO's, AFRONET and the Zambia Independent
    Monitoring Team (ZIMT) after those two organizations criticized the
    Government's handling of the health sector and an ongoing doctors'
    strike (see Sections 4 and 6.a.). In January authorities arrested and
    detained a United Party for National Development (UPND) presidential
    candidate, Anderson Mazoka, on charges of holding an illegal meeting.
    Mazoka had obtained a permit to convene an informal dinner for 200
    persons but police were instructed to arrest Mazoka when he addressed
    the attendees.
        On July 15, the UPND M.P. for Mazabuka was arrested for unlawful
    assembly; the arrest related to a meeting held with constituents in his
    home a month earlier. The M.P. was subsequently released without
    charge.
        On August 30, police were deployed to the University of Zambia one
    day after a student demonstration that resulted in injuries and
    property damage; police abused and detained students, including many
    who were not involved in the demonstration (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, at
    times the Government restricted this right. All organizations must
    apply formally for registration to the Registrar of Societies. In most
    cases, authorities routinely approved these applications. In 1999 the
    Government denied the application of a group of former servicemen who
    wanted to form an association. The Government argued that an
    organization for former servicemen already existed and did not permit
    the servicemen to register. There are currently 36 political parties
    and dozens of NGO's registered. The Government threatened to take
    action against those organizations that did not submit annual reports
    to the registrar of societies. In June 1999, the Ministry of Home
    Affairs deregistered more than 20 NGO's that did not comply with the
    reporting requirement. The NGO's that complied with the requirement,
    including those that frequently criticized the Government, were
    permitted to register.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Although
    a 1996 amendment to the Constitution declared the country a Christian
    nation, the Government respects the right of all faiths to worship
    freely in practice. There are governmental controls that require the
    registration of religious groups. The Government approves all
    applications for registration from religious groups without
    discrimination. There were no reports that the Government rejected any
    religious groups that attempted to register or obtain licenses.
        Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of complaints by
    the Muslim community of discrimination based on the Constitution's
    ``Christian nation'' provision during the year.
        In December 1996, the Government established an office for
    religious affairs at the level of deputy minister in the President's
    Office at State House. The office is responsible for dealing with
    issues that pertain to religion and worship, and to the promotion of
    state-church understanding and interfaith dialog.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
    the right to move freely throughout the country, to reside in any part
    of the country, and to depart and return to the country without
    restriction; however, there were instances in which authorities limited
    freedom of movement. Police roadblocks to control criminal activity
    continued, and police sometimes extorted money and goods from motorists
    (see Section 1.c.). However, in July the Inspector General of Police
    instructed police throughout the country to reduce roadblocks by half
    to facilitate travel within the country and reduce opportunities for
    corruption. The number of roadblocks throughout the country was reduced
    during the year; however, police continued to extort money from
    motorists.
        Resident doctors engaged in a strike over working conditions and
    the general state of health care in the country reportedly were barred
    from leaving the country in February. Some doctors subsequently were
    able to seek employment outside the country (see Section 6.a.).
        The conflict in Angola resulted in large numbers of internally
    displaced persons (IDP's) in March, mainly consisting of inhabitants
    from the Chavuma District, which borders Angola; however, most of the
    IDP's returned to their residences within 2 months.
        The law does not contain provisions for the granting of refugee or
    asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, in practice the
    Government complies with the provisions of these documents. The U.N.
    High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were
    approximately 250,000 refugees, mainly Angolans, in the country at
    year's end. On December 4, approximately 300 Zimbabwean and 3,000
    Congolese soldiers entered the country to escape fighting in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Most of the Congolese soldiers
    returned to the DRC; however, 117 refused to return to the DRC and were
    seeking asylum in the country at year's end. The Government cooperated
    with the UNHCR in processing applications for refugee status.
        The Government provided first asylum to approximately 35,000 new
    refugees from Angola during the year, including former UNITA soldiers
    and their families. On December 1, the Government and the UNHCR began
    transferring approximately 265 Angolan former combatants and their
    families to the Eastern Province, which is farther from the Angolan
    border. In September approximately 3,000 refugees left the Mwange
    refugee camp for the DRC; however, the majority of them returned to
    Zambia by year's end. In November and December, approximately 25,000
    Congolese refugees entered the country. The authorities held in
    detention pending deportation approximately 300 illegal immigrants,
    principally from neighboring countries. Because the immigration
    authorities lack funds for deportation, illegal immigrants sometimes
    are kept in prison for extended periods, sometimes for more than 5
    years. In December the Government disarmed and repatriated more than
    3,000 soldiers from the DRC who had entered the country. In December
    the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) requested that
    the Government provide access to the detained soldiers; however, the
    Government did not grant access to the ICTR before the majority of the
    refugees had returned to the DRC.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens voted in national multiparty elections in November 1996;
    however, constitutional amendments barred the best known opposition
    candidate, former president and UNIP leader, Kenneth Kaunda, and his
    deputy, senior chief Inyambo Yeta, from running for the presidency,
    thereby restricting the right of citizens to change their government.
    The amendments enacted in 1996 require both parents of presidential
    candidates to be citizens by birth and disqualify tribal chiefs from
    running for the presidency unless they resign their chieftainship.
        UNIP boycotted the 1996 elections and destroyed many party members'
    voter registration cards. Eleven political parties contested the
    presidential and National Assembly elections in 1996. The Government
    deregistered 14 opposition splinter parties for noncompliance with
    registration procedures. Approximately 50 percent of eligible voters
    registered. Of this total, almost 70 percent cast ballots. Although the
    MMD's use of government resources during campaigns, including the
    state-owned media, probably did not affect the final outcome, the
    elections' fairness nevertheless called into question. The Government's
    failure to implement a transparent voter registration process raised
    doubts among opposition parties about the Government's willingness to
    have an open electoral process. The next presidential election is
    scheduled for late 2001.
        A series of parliamentary by-elections held during the year were
    viewed by local election observers as generally representative of the
    will of the electorate; however, there were some irregularities.
    Opposition parties won a number of these by-elections. However, during
    parliamentary by-election campaigns, the MMD frequently was accused of
    using government resources to support MMD candidates. For example, in
    July the MMD used a police vehicle to transport party members during a
    campaign.
        Under the Constitution, the President wields broad authority. The
    National Assembly ratifies major appointments and theoretically has
    broad powers, but the overwhelming majority held by the MMD effectively
    precludes independent action by the legislature and limits its ability
    to provide a check on executive authority. In July the MMD expelled
    Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Ben Mwila for gross
    insubordination when he began campaigning for the presidency before the
    President himself had designated a successor. Mwila subsequently formed
    a new political party, the Republican Party. During the year,
    Parliament took steps to strengthen itself and to improve
    responsiveness to citizen concerns, although an initial attempt at a
    structured parliamentary reform program failed to garner adequate
    support from members of Parliament.
        The number of women in politics and government is increasing but
    remains small, and women are underrepresented in government. In October
    the PHRC chairperson stated that less than 10 percent of women are
    involved in the political and decision-making process. There are 14
    female members in the 150-seat Parliament; 2 of these are ministers,
    and 3 are deputy ministers. In August former ambassador Gwendoline
    Konie established a political party and announced her candidacy for
    president, making her the first woman to run for that office.
        Minorities are underrepresented in government and politics. There
    are three ethnic Asians (one is a minister) and one mixed race
    (African-European) minister.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights and civic rights organizations generally operated
    without serious government hindrance; however, in previous years the
    ZIMT, ZIMA, AFRONET, and the Foundation for Electoral Process claimed
    that official harassment, including blocking their bank accounts,
    occurred. There were reports in February that the Minister of
    Information warned of ``drastic action'' against the ZIMA and AFRONET,
    accusing the organizations of being agents of foreign sponsors (see
    Section 2.a.). It also was reported in February that a senior member of
    the MMD had threatened AFRONET and the ZIMA, and the MMD chairperson
    for information and publicly warned that the Government would withdraw
    recognition of NGO's that it deemed ``reckless and irresponsible.''
        In February Alfred Zulu, a prominent human rights activist, was
    detained and charged with financial fraud. Some observers alleged that
    Zulu was targeted because of his human rights activities; however,
    there was no evidence to support these allegations (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government continued to be receptive to criticism from human
    rights and civic organizations in general, but on occasion, government
    officials criticized efforts by human rights monitors to have
    international balance of payments support conditioned on positive human
    rights developments in the country and accused monitors of trying to
    undermine Government activities.
        Some police and immigration officers complained that the local NGO
    Legal Resources Foundation protects criminals because of its work
    defending accused persons.
        Some domestic human rights organizations, including the Law
    Association of Zambia, Women for Change, the Catholic Commission for
    Justice and Peace, and the Zambia Civic Education Association have
    continued to press for a transparent democratic electoral system. Human
    rights, development and election NGO's monitored the by-elections
    throughout the year and organized civic education activities focused on
    improving voter participation and information.
        The Government generally did not interfere with inquiries or visits
    by international human rights organizations. For example, in July Human
    Rights Watch visited the country to observe the meeting of a
    consultative group of international donors.
        In May 1997, the Government established an autonomous Permanent
    Human Rights Commission, the PHRC. A Supreme Court justice chairs the
    Commission; other members are drawn from throughout society and include
    the former head of the Foundation for Democratic Processes and a
    University of Zambia lecturer on human rights. The Commission
    interceded on behalf of persons whose rights it believed were denied by
    the Government. The Commission oversees human rights committees in all
    provincial capitals. The Commission spoke out on behalf of other
    detainees and prisoners, and the Government responded by releasing
    seriously ill prisoners in 1997 and 1998 at the Commission's request.
    The PHRC requested but did not receive funding to hire prison
    inspectors; until it obtains funding, its provincial committees are
    conducting periodic prison inspections. The Government further
    responded to the Commission's recommendation by establishing in 1998 an
    inquiry to investigate torture claims by detainees. The inquiry was
    completed in June with a report submitted to President Chiluba; the
    report was not released publicly by year's end (see Section 1.c.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, tribe,
    sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinion, color, or
    creed. Constitutional amendments barring native-born citizens of
    partial or full foreign ancestry from the presidency appear to violate
    the prohibition on discrimination based on place of origin. These
    amendments also prohibit traditional chiefs, who are accorded authority
    and privileges as chiefs, from running for political office unless they
    resign their chieftainships. A legal challenge to these amendments in
    1996 was unsuccessful.
        Women.--Violence against women remained a serious problem. Wife
    beating and rape were widespread. According to official statistics,
    over 4,700 rape cases were reported to the police between 1991 and
    1998. Of these, approximately 30 percent resulted in conviction and 5
    percent in acquittal. The remainder either were dismissed or remain
    unresolved. The courts normally sentence defendants convicted of rape
    to hard labor. Since many rape cases were not reported to the police,
    the actual number is considered to be much higher. Domestic assault is
    a criminal offense. Although the police established a Victim Support
    Unit (VSU) in 1997 to attend to the problem of domestic assault, in
    practice police often are reluctant to pursue reports of wife beating,
    preferring instead to broker a reconciliation. The Government and NGO's
    expressed continued concern about violence against women, and the media
    devoted considerable publicity to it during the year. The VSU handles
    problems of wife beating, mistreatment of widows by the deceased
    husband's relatives, and ``property grabbing.''
        In two separate incidents in January and February, young women
    reportedly were abducted by UNITA soldiers for forced labor in Angola
    (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Both the Constitution and the law entitle women to equality with
    men in most areas; however, in practice, women are disadvantaged
    severely in formal employment and education compared with men. Married
    women who are employed often suffer from discriminatory conditions of
    service. Women have little independent access to credit facilities; in
    most cases, they remain dependent on their husbands who are required to
    co-sign for loans. As a result, few women own their own homes. However,
    some small financial institutions reportedly now allow women to sign
    independently for loans.
        Customary law and practice also place women in a subordinate status
    with respect to property, inheritance, and marriage, despite
    constitutional and legislative protections. Polygyny is permitted if
    the wife first agrees to it at the time of her wedding. Under the
    traditional customs prevalent in most ethnic groups, all rights to
    inherit property rest with the deceased man's family. The 1989
    Intestate Succession Act was designed to provide women with a share of
    the joint estate. Under the act, the children of the deceased man
    equally share 50 percent; the widow receives 20 percent; the parents
    receive 20 percent; and other relatives receive 10 percent. A 1996
    ``reform'' of the act places the widow's share at 20 percent, to be
    divided equally with any other women who can prove a marital
    relationship with the deceased man, thus granting inheritance rights to
    other wives, mistresses, and concubines.
        In practice, ``property grabbing'' by the relatives of the deceased
    man remains rampant, particularly when local customary courts have
    jurisdiction. These courts often use a different law, the Local Courts
    Act, to distribute inheritances without reference to the percentages
    mandated by the Intestate Succession Act. Ignorance of the law on the
    part of victims is also a problem. As a result, many widows receive
    little or nothing from the estate. The fines that the Intestate
    Succession Act mandates for property grabbing are extremely low. An
    M.P. participating in an April workshop on the Intestate Succession Act
    noted that the act has failed to address increased cases of property
    grabbing and therefore needs to be reviewed. In November the President
    strongly criticized the practice during a public ceremony.
        In March a Lusaka magistrate's court convicted and remanded to
    custody the administrator of a deceased man's estate who evicted the
    decedent's widow and her baby 2 days after the decedent's burial.
        Children.--The Government seeks to improve the welfare of children,
    but scarce resources and ineffective implementation of social programs
    continue to affect the welfare of children adversely. The Ministry of
    Sport, Youth and Child Development, Ministry of Education, Ministry of
    Labor, and Ministry of Community Development and Social Services have
    responsibilities for improving child welfare. Education is neither
    compulsory nor free. The number of children enrolled in public schools
    at the primary levels reportedly has declined over the past few years.
    Lack of adequate educational facilities and scarcity of educational
    materials are problems. Some areas have established community schools
    that are free but have fewer resources than public schools and require
    contributions from parents. The number of girls and boys in primary
    school is approximately equal; however, fewer girls attend secondary
    school. Due to poverty, both rural and urban children often work in the
    informal sector to help families make ends meet (see Section 6.d.). The
    number of street children in Lusaka increased from 35,000 in 1991 to
    90,000 in 1998, partly because of the growing number of parents who
    have died from AIDS. Approximately 75 percent of all households are
    caring for at least one orphan and, as a result, these children face
    greater risks of child abuse, sexual abuse, and child labor; 7 percent
    of households are headed by children due to the death of both parents.
    The Government instituted programs to increase public awareness of HIV/
    AIDS and was attempting to address the problem of child labor by
    establishing a child labor unit with awareness programs during the
    year. Child abuse was believed to be fairly common, but no statistics
    were available.
        The Labor Ministry and the Ministry of Development are cooperating
    in the establishment of a child labor office to address the problem of
    street children; in May the Government established the Child Labor
    Working Group. There are laws that criminalize child prostitution,
    pornography, and sexual exploitation of children under the age of 21.
    Laws against child prostitution are not effectively enforced; however,
    cases of child pornography and sexual exploitation are generally
    effectively enforced.
        People with Disabilities.--Persons with disabilities face
    significant societal discrimination in employment and education. The
    Government has taken steps to ameliorate their hardships, including
    establishing a national trust fund to provide loans to the disabled to
    help them start businesses, but its efforts are limited by scarce
    resources. The Government has not legislated or otherwise mandated
    accessibility to public buildings and services for the disabled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of citizens to form trade unions, and approximately 60 percent of
    the 300,000 formal sector workers are unionized. Eighteen of the
    country's 19 large national unions, organized by industry or
    profession, are affiliated with the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
    (ZCTU). The ZCTU is operated democratically and, like its constituent
    unions, is independent of any political party and the Government. The
    Mineworker's Union of Zambia and four other unions broke away from the
    ZCTU and established a rival umbrella organization in 1994. Four of
    them, including the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, since have rejoined
    the ZCTU, leaving only the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers
    and the Primary Teachers Union of Zambia outside the Congress.
        The 1993 Industrial and Labor Relations Act (ILRA) reestablished
    the ``one union, one industry'' principle. A 1997 amendment to the act
    allows for multiplicity of trade unions as well as federations of trade
    unions. The Bankers Union of Zambia, although registered with the
    Government in 1993, has been unable to operate because the employers
    recognize the existing Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers. In
    1993 the Ndola High Court ordered the Government to register the
    Secondary School Teachers Union of Zambia (SSTUZ). The Government
    continues to argue that the Zambia National Teachers Union (ZNUT)
    represents secondary school teachers and has delayed recognition of the
    new secondary school teachers union administratively. The SSTUZ sued
    the Government over its nonregistration, prompting the Government to
    register it in 1997. However, most teachers still belong to the ZNUT.
    ZNUT lost some bargaining power when some members switched to separate
    unions for primary and secondary school teachers; however, these unions
    experienced difficulty gaining attention from the Government. Unions
    reportedly have experienced increasing fragmentation due to a shrinking
    formal sector and 1993 changes in labor laws that have decreased
    unions'' leverage. Only 11 percent of the eligible workforce was
    employed in the formal sector during the year.
        All workers have the right to strike, except those engaged in
    essential services. In addition to the Zambia Defense Force, the
    judiciary, the police, the prison service, and the Intelligence
    Security Service, the ILRA defines as essential services power,
    medical, water, sewerage, fire fighting, and certain mining occupations
    essential to safety. It permits strikes only after all other legal
    recourse has been exhausted. The result is that there has not been a
    legal strike since 1993. The ILRA prohibits employers from retribution
    against employees engaged in legal union activities. Workers engaged in
    illegal strikes do not enjoy this protection.
        In December 1999, 250 resident doctors stopped work, citing
    extremely poor working conditions and poor conditions of service. The
    Government initially suspended the striking doctors, but later decided
    to retire those who had not yet returned to work voluntarily. Over the
    course of several months, the majority decided to return to work or
    sought work outside the country.
        By a majority vote of its members, a union may decide on
    affiliation with the ZCTU or with trade unions or organizations outside
    the country. The ZCTU is a member of the International Confederation of
    Tree Trade Unions, and a Zambian citizen currently holds the presidency
    of that body. Labor leaders travel without restrictions to
    international conferences and to visit counterparts abroad.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Employers and
    unions in each industry negotiate collective bargaining agreements
    through joint councils in which there is no government involvement.
    Civil servants and teachers, as public officials, negotiate directly
    with the Government. Collective disputes are referred first to
    conciliation. If conciliation fails to resolve the dispute, the parties
    may refer the case to the Industrial Relations Court, or, in the case
    of employees, vote to strike. In practice the industry joint councils
    function effectively as collective bargaining units.
        The ILRA prohibits discrimination by employers against union
    members and organizers. An employee who believes that he has been
    penalized for union activities may, after exhausting any existing
    administrative channels for relief, file a complaint with the
    Industrial Relations Court. This court has the power to order
    appropriate redress for the aggrieved worker. The complainant may
    appeal a judgment of the Industrial Relations Court to the Supreme
    Court. In practice the Court often orders employers to reinstate
    workers found to have been victims of discrimination. This Court, like
    other courts, has inadequate resources to address all of the cases
    before it in a timely manner.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude; however, it authorizes the
    Government to call upon citizens to perform labor in specific
    instances, for example, during national emergencies or disasters.
    Moreover, the Government can require citizens to perform labor that is
    associated with traditional civil or communal obligations, as when all
    members of a village are called upon to assist in preparing for a visit
    by a traditional leader or other dignitary.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is not permitted, and in
    practice the labor authorities generally enforce the legal
    proscriptions when cases violating the law are brought to their
    attention (see Section 6.d.). However, there were reports that UNITA
    rebels abducted persons, particularly young persons, for forced labor
    in Angola (see Section 6.f.)
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children is 16
    years. The Labor Commissioner effectively enforces this law in the
    industrial relations sector although, because of high adult
    unemployment, there is no demand for child labor in the formal sector.
    Child labor is most concentrated in the hotel and catering industries,
    construction, farming, transportation, prostitution, and household
    work. The law is not enforced for those who work in subsistence
    agriculture, domestic service, and informal sectors, where children
    under the age of 16 often are employed. In urban areas, children
    commonly engage in street vending. The ILO estimated that 564,000
    children were in the work force during the year. Approximately 85
    percent of those children are engaged in the worst forms of child
    labor, including street begging and prostitution. The Government has
    not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor; the
    Government had formulated but not approved an action plan by year's
    end. At present, acute family poverty levels and economic factors
    result in child labor. The problem has been compounded by the HIV/AIDs
    epidemic which has produced a growing number of orphans.
        In May the Government established an interministerial working
    group, the National Steering Committee of the National Country Program
    on Child Labor, to coordinate efforts at addressing the root causes of
    child labor.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is not permitted, and the
    authorities enforce legal proscriptions if violations are brought to
    their attention; however, while in general forced or bonded labor is
    not a problem, there were reports that UNITA rebels abducted young
    persons for labor in Angola (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for
    nonunionized workers is set at $0.02 (70.30 kwacha) per hour. Based on
    a 48-hour workweek, the legal maximum for nonunionized workers, a
    worker earning the minimum wage would receive $28 (90,000 kwacha) per
    month. The minimum wage covers nonunionized workers in categories such
    as general workers, cleaners, office orderlies, and watchmen. The
    minimum wage is insufficient to provide a worker and family with a
    decent standard of living, and most minimum wage earners supplement
    their incomes through second jobs, subsistence farming, or reliance on
    the extended family.
        With respect to unionized workers, wage scales and maximum workweek
    limits are established through collective bargaining. In practice
    almost all unionized workers receive salaries considerably higher than
    the nonunionized minimum wage. The minimum workweek for full-time
    employment is 40 hours and is, in practice, the normal workweek. The
    law requires 2 days of annual leave per month of service.
        The law also regulates minimum health standards in industry, and
    the Department of Mines is responsible for enforcement. Factory safety
    is handled by the Inspector of Factories under the Minister of Labor,
    but staffing problems chronically limit enforcement effectiveness.
    There are no legislative provisions to protect a worker who refuses to
    work on grounds of inadequate safety.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking
    of children under the age of 18, but there are no other laws
    prohibiting trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons is
    not a significant problem in the country, although there have been some
    reports of trafficking. In 1999 a foreign citizen was arrested for
    allegedly trying to take four young women out of the country to work as
    prostitutes. The foreign citizen was charged, but acquitted. UNITA
    deserters have abducted citizens and forced them to accompany them back
    to Angola. Two such incidents were reported in January and February in
    Western Province. Upon return to Angola, UNITA rebels forced young men
    to herd cattle which were stolen in cross border raids, and forced
    young women into labor or prostitution.
                                   __________

                                    ZIMBABWE

        Zimbabwe is a republic in which President Robert Mugabe and his
    Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) have
    dominated the executive and legislative branches of the Government and
    have restricted political choice since independence in 1980. Although
    the Constitution allows for multiple parties, opposition parties have
    been subject both to financial restrictions, which were relaxed only
    partially in 1998, and to significant intimidation and violence by the
    ruling party and government security forces. Parliamentary elections
    were held in June and were preceded by a government-sanctioned campaign
    of violence directed towards supporters and potential supporters of the
    opposition. Although most election observers agreed that the voting
    process itself generally was peaceful, there were irregularities, and
    an estimated 15 percent of voters were turned away at the polls for
    various technical reasons. During the year, the country's first viable
    opposition party emerged, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and
    won 57 out of 120 seats in the June parliamentary elections. The
    judiciary is generally independent, but the Government often refuses to
    abide by court decisions, frequently questions the authority of sitting
    judges, and threatens their removal.
        The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) are responsible for maintaining
    law and order. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force under the
    Defense Ministry are responsible for external security. The Central
    Intelligence Organization (CIO) under the Minister of State for
    National Security in the President's Office is responsible for internal
    and external security but does not have powers of arrest. Members of
    the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        Of a population of approximately 12 million, nearly half live by
    subsistence agriculture and about 75 percent rely directly or
    indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood; however, there are also
    substantial mining, manufacturing, and service sectors. The country has
    abundant arable land, minerals, good infrastructure, an educated and
    disciplined work force, and a strong ecotourism sector. Its chief
    sources of hard currency are exports of tobacco, gold, ferroalloys,
    nickel, tourism, and remittances from citizens working in other
    countries. The nonfarm economy continued to be dominated by state-owned
    monopolies and suffered from mismanagement and poor governance,
    including government corruption, and from large fiscal deficits
    exacerbated by the Government's military operations since 1998 in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These conditions continued to
    contribute to accelerating price inflation, rapid currency
    depreciation, high real interest rates, and high unemployment. The
    formal sector unemployment rate exceeds 60 percent. During the year,
    per capita gross domestic product fell to $392, and according to
    government estimates, 70 percent of the population lives in poverty.
    The Government continued to face growing pressure from urban labor
    groups and rural low-income groups as the standard of living dropped.
    Widespread strikes and opposition from private businesses as well as
    labor largely frustrated government efforts to impose new taxes.
    International experts estimated that HIV/AIDS infects one-fourth of the
    adult population, killed at least 150,000 persons in the past year, and
    has created an estimated 900,000 orphans since the late 1980's.
        The Government's poor human rights record worsened significantly
    during the year, and it committed serious abuses. The Government
    provided logistical and material support to ZANU-PF members, who
    orchestrated a campaign of political violence and intimidation that
    claimed the lives of more than 31 persons. Government supporters and
    war veterans, with material support from the Government, occupied
    commercial farms, and in some cases killed, tortured, beat, abused, and
    threatened farm owners and other persons believed to be sympathetic to
    the opposition. Security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    persons. There were unconfirmed reports of politically motivated
    disappearances. Prison conditions remained harsh, and life threatening.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pretrial detention remained
    problems. The judiciary is generally independent, but the Government
    often refuses to abide by court decisions, and frequently questions the
    authority of sitting judges, and threatens their removal. Infringements
    on citizens'' privacy continued. The Government embarked on a
    farreaching ``fast-track'' resettlement program whereby privately owned
    farms, which are mostly white-owned, were threatened with seizure
    without fair compensation. The Government continued to restrict press
    freedom, enforce restrictive laws against, and intimidate journalists,
    and monopolize radio broadcasting. In September the Supreme Court ruled
    that the Government's monopoly on broadcasting was unconstitutional.
    Journalists also practiced self-censorship, and the Government
    continued to restrict academic freedom. The Government restricted
    freedom of assembly. Security forces repeatedly used force to disperse
    nonviolent public meetings and demonstrations. Although the Government
    generally respected religious freedom, its retention of the colonial-
    era Witchcraft Suppression Law reportedly was viewed as restrictive by
    some practitioners of traditional indigenous religions. The Government
    at times restricted freedom of movement, including erecting roadblocks
    around communal farming areas. The political process remained heavily
    tilted in favor of the ruling party, and widespread irregularities,
    fraud, and intimidation marred the June parliamentary elections. The
    Government criticized nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) of
    launching opposition political activity. Domestic violence against
    women remained widespread, and discrimination against women and the
    disabled remained problems. Abuse of children, including incidents of
    female genital mutilation (FGM), remained a problem. There were
    continuing reports of ritual murders associated with traditional
    religious practices. The President and his Government exacerbated
    widespread resentment of the economically prominent white minority. The
    Government violated worker rights. Child labor is a problem, and the
    traditional practice of offering young girls as compensatory payment in
    interfamily disputes persisted. There were reports that persons were
    trafficked from the country to South Africa for forced prostitution and
    forced labor.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports that security forces committed extrajudicial
    killings; however, in some cases army and police units provided
    transportation and other logistical support to perpetrators of
    political violence and knowingly permitted their activities.
        On July 9, at a soccer match in Harare, 12 persons were trampled to
    death after police fired tear gas into stands where opposition
    supporters were waving MDC banners and chanting antigovernment slogans.
    Five others were critically injured, one of whom later died from
    injuries. By year's end, human rights organizations were supporting
    individual legal cases against the ZRP for using excessive force in the
    incident; however, the cases had not been tried by year's end.
        In September 1999, Notice Zhakata reportedly died at Norton
    Hospital of injuries inflicted on him by police at the Kadoma police
    station, where he was detained following an arrest. According to press
    reports, police initially denied responsibility for the death, and the
    Government had not taken any action in the case by year's end.
        In late 1999, allegations surfaced that members of the armed forces
    were training Burundian Hutu militias in the DRC to conduct attacks on
    Burundian and Congolese civilians in addition to military targets. The
    Ministry of Defense denied these reports, and no credible information
    has been found to verify them.
        There were no new developments in the late 1998 case of a police
    officer who fired into a crowd of persons protesting fuel price
    increases in Mutare, killing one woman. There also were no developments
    in the February 1998 gasoline bombing case in which ZANU-PF supporters
    attacked independent Member of Parliament (M.P.) Margaret Dongo with a
    gasoline bomb at a by-election in Chitungwiza.
        Police killed eight persons during January 1998 food riots. The
    Government conducted investigations into these cases, and private legal
    actions were instituted against the police. At year's end, those cases
    still were proceeding through the courts, and police investigations
    were ongoing at year's end. In March 1999, a magistrate court issued an
    opinion in the case of a 12-year-old girl, Kudzi Ndlovu, who was shot
    in Gweru during the riot on January 20, 1998. The judge concluded that
    her death resulted from a collapse in police command and inadequate
    riot control procedures by the officers on the scene; however, due to
    the confusing and conflicting evidence about the police response in
    this case, the judge was unable to find any individual officer liable
    for this death. The magistrate court recommended that further ``private
    investigations'' be undertaken to assist the Attorney General in
    determining liability in the case. At year's end, there were no further
    developments in the case.
        The Attorney General continued to decline to prosecute the mayor of
    Chitungwiza, Joseph Macheka, for shooting to death one man and injuring
    two others who allegedly attempted to rob Macheka's liquor store during
    the January 1998 food riots. The Attorney General determined that
    Macheka was acting in self-defense and therefore, that prosecution was
    not in the public interest; the case was dropped in 1999. Legal and
    human rights critics accused the Attorney General of being influenced
    by political pressure.
        In July 1999, the ZRP's Criminal Investigation Division reportedly
    identified an unnamed official of both the ZANU-PF and the Government
    as the subject of an investigation into three ritual killings committed
    in 1997 (see Section 5). There was no further information available on
    the case at year's end.
        By year's end, the Government still had not responded formally to a
    1999 report by the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) and the Catholic
    Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) on atrocities committed during
    the 1982-87 Matabeleland crisis, despite the March 1999 release of a
    shortened version that was made available in local languages and
    mounting pressure from civic groups, political parties, and churches.
    The LRF and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights subsequently subpoenaed
    the Government in January to release the findings of two commissions
    that investigated the Matabeleland massacres; however, the
    AttorneyGeneral claimed that the documents were missing. In July the
    LRF petitioned the Supreme Court to force the Government to release the
    findings; the Court ruled that the President could be sued in court but
    had not heard the merits of the case by year's end. An estimated
    10,000-20,000 persons died in the Matabeleland uprising and subsequent
    Government pacification campaign.
        In the five-month period before the June parliamentary elections,
    31 deaths were reported officially as a result of political violence,
    perpetrated mainly by supporters of the ruling party. On April 15, in
    Buhera district, a group of men in a ZANU-PF vehicle pulled in front of
    a vehicle driven by MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai's campaign manager and
    eight other passengers, and forced the vehicle to stop. The men beat
    the driver and passengers with rifle butts and then set the car on
    fire. The driver and one passenger died in the attack, and two other
    passengers were reportedly hospitalized. Police later arrested two
    persons implicated in the attack, but they were released after a brief
    detention without explanation. There were no other arrests or court
    action in the case.
        There were reports that in March ZANU-PF supporters killed persons
    during a campaign of violence in Mberengwa district (see Section 1.c.).
        On April 17, a group of war veterans abducted MDC organizer and
    commercial farmer David Stevens from his farm and took him to their
    base in Murewa, where they beat him badly, and then shot and killed
    him. On September 22, after receiving an anonymous tip, police arrested
    a Marondera war veteran and charged him with murder. The suspect was
    released on bail pending a court hearing; however, the Attorney-General
    later withdrew the charges due to a lack of evidence, even though the
    suspect had been apprehended with the murder weapon and had been
    identified by a number of witnesses.
        In late April in Kariba, residents of the town observed persons
    believed to be ZANU-PF supporters throwing the bodies of Luckson
    Kanyurira and another MDC supporter out of their vehicle onto the main
    street of the town. The incident followed several days of clashes
    between opposing political party members. No one was arrested or
    charged in the case by year's end.
        On May 13, in Chipinge district, five persons beat to death Alex
    Chisasa, an army sergeant in civilian clothing. The killing occurred
    after Chisasa reportedly criticized publicly ZANU-PF's political
    strategy.
        On May 17 in Mudzi district, youths allegedly supporting ZANU-PF
    beat to death Mationa Mashaya and his son, who were local supporters of
    the United Parties opposition group. The suspects beat to death the
    senior Mashaya in the presence of his wife, and then entered the home
    of Mashaya's eldest son, Onias, dragged him outside, and severely beat
    him, breaking both his hands. Onias died the following day from his
    injuries. No arrests were made in the case by year's end.
        In June Mandishona Mutyanda, MDC ward chairman for the Kwekwe
    district, died of severe head injuries after being assaulted in a
    suburb of Kwekwe by suspected ZANU-PF supporters. No one had been
    arrested or charged in the case by year's end.
        In March 1999, police instituted a system of roadblocks to
    apprehend suspected criminals, known as ``Operation Hokoyo,'' that
    continued to be implemented periodically during the year.
        Groups composed of war veterans tortured MDC members throughout the
    June election campaign. One person died from such torture (see Section
    1.c.).
        Six white commercial farmers were killed during the year in
    violence arising from land seizures (see Section 1.f.). For example, on
    December 13, three men armed with rifles killed white farmer Henry
    Elsworth and seriously injured his son in an ambush attack outside his
    farm gate. Press reports indicated that robbery did not appear to be
    the motive for the killing and that Elsworth had received numerous
    death threats during the year.
        During the year at least five farm workers were killed in political
    violence; however, exact figures were not known. Three of the five were
    found hanged, and the police recorded their causes of death as
    suicides.
        Harsh prison conditions and a high incidence of HIV/AIDS are widely
    acknowledged to have contributed to a large number of deaths in prison;
    the Zimbabwe Prison Service documented that 1,051 prisoners died of
    HIV/AIDS-related causes during the past 3 years (see Section 1.c.).
        There were continuing reports of ritual murders and killings of
    children for body parts which were associated with traditional
    religious practices. In July 1999, Faber Chidarikire, a ZANU-PF
    official and mayor, was charged with the murder of a girl in 1987 (see
    Section 5).
        b. Disappearance.--There were unconfirmed reports of numerous
    politically motivated disappearances perpetuated by ZANU-PF supporters
    during the year, especially in the rural areas where most organized
    groups are loyal to the Government and there are few opposition
    organizations. Domestic human rights organizations believe that there
    were disappearances in rural areas that were not reported due to fear
    of retribution by pro-government factions.
        On June 19, Patrick Nabanyama, a local MDC official and polling
    agent for Bulawayo South M.P. David Coltart, was abducted by suspected
    ZANU-PF supporters from his home. On October 10, ten war veterans,
    including the chairman of the National Liberation War Veterans
    Association in Bulawayo, reportedly were detained for the kidnaping and
    remained in detention pending a trial at year's end. By year's end,
    Nabanyama had not been found.
        In June war veterans beat and abducted a journalist for The
    Independent newpaper, a foreign journalist, and her cameraman, in
    Mutoko district. The police rescued the kidnaped journalists within a
    few hours of the abduction; no charges had been filed or arrests made
    in the case by year's end.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and cruel and inhuman
    treatment; however, security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise
    abused persons.
        The ZRP showed poor training in criminal apprehension and
    interrogation, and there were unconfirmed reports of human rights
    abuses by the CIO.
        There continued to be reports of police using excessive force in
    apprehending and detaining criminal suspects.
        Security forces were involved in incidents of political violence,
    including instances of soldiers beating civilians in areas where
    persons voted for the opposition, such as Harare suburbs and Kwekwe.
    Two cases arising from beatings by soldiers following the Government's
    referendum defeat in February went to court. On June 28, army soldiers
    reportedly beat an MDC M.P. and MDC members at a political rally that
    had been authorized by police authorities (see Section 2.b.).
    Reportedly the victims were beaten with rifle butts and five were
    hospitalized for injuries. There were also reports that police fired
    tear gas into homes during the suppression of riots in October.
        There were at least 8 politically motivated rapes reportedly
    perpetrated during the year.
        On July 9 at a soccer match in Harare, five persons were injured
    and 12 persons were killed, after police fired tear gas into the stands
    during a soccer match (see Section 1.a.).
        On October 9, police reportedly used tear gas on MDC supporters who
    were gathered at an airport for the arrival of MDC leader Morgan
    Tsvangirai.
        Security forces repeatedly used force to disperse nonviolent
    demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). On October 12, police reportedly
    beat students with batons and used tear gas to break up a peaceful
    student rally (see Section 2.b.). On October 16, during food riots,
    security forces and police used excessive force to disperse
    demonstrators. Police officers, supported by army units, fired tear gas
    into crowds, and the army used helicopters to drop tear gas canisters
    over neighborhoods. Security forces reportedly beat an opposition M.P.
    and four journalists. There also were reports that journalists were
    whipped and beaten by security forces (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a.,
    and 2.b.).
        There were reports during the year that Government forces allegedly
    used landmines in the DRC; there was no further information available
    on the extent of injuries resulting from these landmines.
        The Government generally has not pursued actively past allegations
    of torture and has not prosecuted CIO or ZRP officers for such abuses.
        In September 1999, Notice Zhakata reportedly died at Norton
    Hospital of physical abuse inflicted by police at the Kadoma police
    station while he was detained there (see Section 1.a.).
        In March 1999, the Chitungwiza police arrested, detained for 6
    months and allegedly tortured a married couple, Joyce and Shupikai
    Karimazondo, and another person, John Mita, in response to allegations
    by a neighbor that they had killed their young domestic worker for
    ritual purposes (see Sections 2.c. and 5). In September, the
    Karimazondos and Mita were released, and the murder charge was dropped
    after the domestic worker was located alive and unharmed. The
    Magistrate Court declined the Karimazondos'' defense counsel's
    application to have the State prosecute the investigating officers for
    misconduct and unlawful detention. Mita stated that he was suing the
    Government for unlawful detention. A local organization that treats
    torture victims, the Amani Trust, began investigating these
    allegations. At year's end, these investigations and legal challenges
    still were proceeding. No further information on the case was available
    at year's end.
        In January 1999, in Harare, three men, one of whom later was
    identified as a police officer, reportedly assaulted Isodore Zindoga,
    deputy secretary general of the Zimbabwe Confederation of Trade Unions
    (ZCTU). There was no further information available on the case at
    year's end.
        In January 1999, the military police detained and subsequently
    tortured and beat two journalists, Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto (see
    Section 2.a.). The journalists'' suit for their alleged mistreatment
    still was pending at year's end.
        In June 1999, CIO officer Richard Mutswiri Mutiti reportedly filed
    a suit with the High Court alleging that four other CIO officials had
    beaten and kicked him, doused him with a flammable petroleum
    distillate, and threatened to burn him, while detaining him without
    warrant at the Harare Central Police Station in June 1998. A CIO
    disciplinary committee reportedly recommended the firing of the four
    officials in 1998, and one reportedly resigned soon thereafter; the
    High Court was scheduled to hear the cases of the remaining three
    officers in January 2001.
        A consortium of human rights lawyers and NGO's pursued legal
    actions in 40 cases on behalf of persons who alleged that they had been
    injured by state officials during the 1998 food riots (see Section
    1.d.). Twenty of those cases were resolved in favor of the claimants,
    and in one case, the army paid compensation to the victim. In the other
    20 cases, the ZRP stated that it did not have the funds to pay damages.
    In six cases, the court ruled in favor of the police. Three other cases
    were withdrawn due to a lack of evidence, and three plaintiffs died
    before their cases could be heard. At year's end, six cases still were
    pending; of those cases, two claimants reportedly had left the country,
    and the remaining four could not be located.
        Government supporters beat suspected opposition members, commercial
    farmers, and farm laborers; on June 5, an international team of medical
    experts on a fact-finding mission found evidence of systematic physical
    and psychological torture by government supporters. Human rights groups
    have reported that war veterans and other ruling party supporters set
    up torture chambers in government-funded offices to brutalize
    opposition supporters. The names of MDC M.P. David Coltart and other
    MDC members and supporters were reportedly included on a death list
    that was circulated among ZANU-PF supporters.
        Persons perceived as supporting the opposition, including teachers,
    civil servants, health workers, and laborers in the manufacturing
    sector, were singled out for assault or intimidation. In most cases the
    national police did not halt acts of political intimidation or
    violence, arrest the perpetrators, or vigorously investigate political
    crimes. On April 15, a group of men driving a ZANU-PF vehicle stopped
    another vehicle with MDC members and beat the driver and passengers,
    killing two persons (see Section 1.a.). On April 17, a group of war
    veterans beat a commercial farmer, who was also a MDC organizer, and
    subsequently shot him to death (see Section 1.a.). On May 13, a gang
    beat to death an army sergeant after he reportedly criticized the ZANU-
    PF party (see Section 1.a.). The Zimbabwe Election Support Network, a
    grouping of human rights organizations, reported that on May 16, in
    Manicaland, Eomonn Oliver, the production manager of Border Timbers
    International, was grabbed by a group wearing ZANU-PF shirts when he
    arrived at work. They beat him and forced him to sit in a pool of mud
    in front of his workers and chant ZANU-PF slogans. On May 17, a group
    of youths who allegedly were ZANU-PF supporters beat to death a
    supporter of an opposition group and his son (see Section 1.a.). In
    June an MDC ward chairman died of injuries after he was beaten by
    suspected ZANU-PF supporters (see Section 1.a.).
        In a number of rural areas, war veterans and other ZANU-PF
    supporters conducted ``pungwes,'' or forced nightly political
    gatherings. Hundreds of villagers were rounded up, driven to remote
    areas, and forced to chant ZANU-PF slogans or denounce the opposition
    until the next morning.
        There were confirmed reports that in Budirio, a suburb of Harare,
    war veteran groups frequently used a medical clinic belonging to
    National Liberation War Veterans Association leader and M.P., Dr.
    Chenjerai Hunzvi, to torture members of the MDC. At least one person,
    Chipunza, died from injuries sustained during torture there, and
    another six testified to a human rights group that they were tortured
    at this clinic. Authorities arrested 46 war veterans, but they were
    released on bail, and they are unlikely to be tried due to President
    Mugabe's decree pardoning perpetrators of political violence between
    January and July (see Sections 1.e. and 3).
        Government supporters raped suspected opposition supporters. The
    attacks targeted female farm workers and health workers (see Section
    5).
        In March a group of ZANU-PF supporters allegedly tortured MDC
    members in Bulawayo before a rally addressed by President Mugabe. In
    August police arrested two war veterans suspected of participating in
    the torture; however, charges against them were dropped as a result of
    a presidential amnesty (see Section 1.e.).
        The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a coalition of the nine
    largest human rights organizations in the country, reported that in
    March ZANU-PF supporters in Mberengwa district abducted a local nurse
    and a teacher at night and forced them to a remote camp where other
    opposition members were being held. The two were stripped and forced to
    climb trees and jump from a height of three meters. They were beaten
    with electrical cords and sticks and threatened with firearms.
    Authorities arrested four suspects and held them on charges of
    malicious damage to property, public violence, kidnaping, and murder.
    As a result of a presidential amnesty, charges against three of the
    suspects were dropped, but the fourth suspect remained in custody for
    murder at year's end (see Section 1.e.).
        On April 1, there were violent clashes between MDC and ruling party
    supporters that resulted in at least 12 injuries. ZANU-PF supporters
    reportedly beat passers-by. Police used tear gas to disperse the groups
    (see Section 2.b.). War veterans threw stones at unarmed opposition
    members and bystanders and injured several persons. Police did not
    intervene immediately, allowing war veterans to severely beat
    bystanders.
        In June there were at least 200 reported attacks on schools by
    ruling party supporters. Teachers were dragged from classrooms, beaten,
    and stripped naked in front of their students. Health care workers also
    were targeted for assault, and nurses were raped.
        In June war veterans beat and abducted a journalist for The
    Independent newpaper, a foreign journalist, and her cameraman, in
    Mutoko district. The police rescued the kidnaped journalists within a
    few hours of the abduction; no charges had been filed or arrests made
    in the case by year's end.
        On July 16, war veterans beat Standard journalist Cengetayi Zvanya
    at a news conference at ZANU-PF headquarters; the war veterans detained
    Zvanya for two hours and then released him.
        In July the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an umbrella
    organization of approximately 100 NGO's, called for an inquiry into the
    political violence, and a number of other human rights organizations
    released reports on the political violence associated with the June
    parliamentary elections during the year.
        In August it was reported that war veterans abducted and sexually
    abused 10 schoolchildren (see Section 5).
        On October 6, President Mugabe issued a presidential decree
    granting a general amnesty for politically motivated crimes that
    occurred between January 1 and July 31 (see Section 1.e.). The amnesty
    protects nearly all the agents of the political violence campaign and
    effectively prevents any criminal prosecutions against them.
        Prison conditions remained harsh. Extreme overcrowding, shortages
    of clothing, and poor sanitary conditions persist. Overcrowding and
    poor sanitation aggravated outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, and HIV/
    AIDS-related illnesses among the 21,133 prisoners in the country during
    the year. Government prison service authorities reviewed overcrowding
    in prisons during a 1998 workshop and concluded that exposure to HIV/
    AIDS was a major cause of a large number of deaths in detention, and
    prison authorities called for more research to address this growing
    problem; some authorities argued for the early release of such
    terminally ill prisoners. There has been a significant increase in the
    number of women incarcerated, primarily due to harsh economic
    conditions. Female prisoners are held in separate cellblocks from male
    prisoners. There are an estimated 2,000 women in prison, increasingly
    for crimes of prostitution, embezzlement, fraud, petty theft, and
    abandonment of infants. Many incarcerated women are obliged to raise
    their very young children in prison if they have no one to care for
    them while they are detained. The Government established a successful
    community service sentencing program to try to alleviate prison
    overcrowding. The Legal Resource Foundation, in cooperation with the
    prison service, has established a human rights training program for
    prison officials. Officials who mistreat prisoners are punished
    routinely. Juveniles generally are held separately from adults;
    however, a local NGO reported that occasionally juveniles, particularly
    juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 years, are held with adult
    prisoners for brief periods of time.
        The Government permits international human rights monitors to visit
    prisons; however, government procedures and requirements make it very
    difficult to do so. Permission is required from the Commissioner of
    Prisons and the Minister of Justice, which sometimes can take a month
    or longer to obtain or may not be granted. A local NGO that deals with
    prisoners'' issues was granted access on a number of occasions during
    the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, some laws
    effectively weaken this prohibition and security forces arbitrarily
    arrested and detained persons repeatedly.
        The law requires that police inform an arrested person of the
    charges against him before he is taken into custody. Warrants of arrest
    issued by the courts are required except in cases of serious crimes or
    where there is the risk of evidence disappearing. The Ministry of Home
    Affairs paid $400,000 (Z$4.5 million) in damages for wrongful arrest
    cases in 1996, the last year for which statistics were available.
        Although a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is required
    within 48 hours of an arrest (or 96 hours over a weekend), the law
    often is disregarded if a person does not have legal representation. A
    1992 amendment to the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act
    substantially reduced the power of magistrates to grant bail without
    the consent of the Attorney General or his agents. However, in
    practice, a circular issued by the Attorney General giving a general
    authority to grant bail has lessened the negative impact of the rule.
    High Court judges grant bail independently.
        Two laws dating from the British colonial era, the Official Secrets
    Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), grant the Government
    a wide range of legal powers. LOMA gives extensive powers to the
    police, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the President to prosecute
    persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined.
        In 1997 the Government proposed new legislation called the Public
    Order and Security Bill (POSB) to replace the LOMA. The original POSB
    was less restrictive than the LOMA only in some respects. During the
    following 2 years, the Parliament significantly amended the POSB to
    reflect the concerns of human rights and legal organizations, which had
    protested the Government's original draft as insufficiently liberal.
    Although the amended version that the Parliament sent to President
    Mugabe for his signature was similar to the LOMA in including vague
    definitions of political and security crimes, harsh penalties for
    failure to report the acts of others, and restrictions on freedom of
    assembly, speech, and association, President Mugabe declined to sign
    it, and returned it to the Parliament in early June 1999 for further
    consultation and possible amendment. There was no further action on the
    POSB in Parliament during the year (see Section 2.a.).
        On April 26, police detained an Associated Press photographer for 4
    days without charge in connection with the April 22 bombing of the
    offices of the independent Daily News (see Section 2.a.).
        On May 21, police arrested 20 MDC supporters who were preparing for
    a political rally (see Section 2.b.).
        On October 8, police detained three parliamentarians from the
    opposition MDC for allegedly inflammatory statements made at a
    political rally. The M.P.'s were detained for two nights and released
    when the Attorney-General declined to prosecute them (see Sections
    1.e., 2.a., and 2.b.). On October 9, police dispersed a demonstration
    protesting the arrest of the three parliamentarians (see Section 2.b.).
        During food riots on October 16, police detained at least 70
    persons (see Section 1.c.).
        In January 1999, military and civilian police detained and
    physically abused two journalists from The Standard and charged them
    with violating Section 50 of the LOMA (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
        In a landmark decision in April, the Supreme Court ruled that the
    section of the LOMA under which the journalists were arrested was
    unconstitutional. However, at year's end the journalists'' suit for
    their alleged mistreatment had not been concluded (see Section 2.a.).
        At the end of 1999, the Government reportedly was holding about 80
    foreigners in Harare Remand Prison who had been there for between 2
    months and 1 year without having been charged formally. Many of these
    detainees reportedly were persons from the DRC claiming to fear
    persecution by the Government of the DRC, which the Government of
    Zimbabwe was supporting militarily against insurgent forces.
        In June 1999, a CIO officer filed a suit alleging that other CIO
    officials had detained him without warrant in June 1998 (see Section
    1.c.).
        On July 2, 1999, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum released a
    follow-up report to its 1998 report on the January 1998 food riots. The
    report noted that the police claimed that a total of 3,000 persons were
    arrested during the 3 days of rioting and 2 days of clean-up. The
    overwhelming majority of those arrested were released within a 2-week
    period; the Rights Forum concluded that 70 percent of those arrested
    could not be convicted because of lack of credible charges or flawed
    arrests by the police and army. Its report also claimed that some
    persons were victims of uneven justice. For example, those arrested
    first received harsh sentences or were in remand without trial. Those
    arrested later were released quickly, because the system was
    overwhelmed.
        There were no developments in the case of the Reverend Ndabaningi
    Sithole, a former opposition M.P. and longtime rival of President
    Mugabe, who was convicted and sentenced in December 1997 to 2 years''
    imprisonment under the LOMA for conspiring to assassinate President
    Mugabe in 1995. In January 1998, Sithole filed an appeal, and the
    sentencing judge called for a pardon. Sithole died in December while
    receiving medical treatment outside of the country.
        Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. Detainees spend an
    average of 6 months incarcerated before their trials because of a
    critical shortage of magistrates and court interpreters.
        The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
    not use forced exile; however, a number of persons left the country to
    escape repression and remained in self-imposed exile at year's end.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and in practice the judiciary remained largely
    independent; however, the Government increasingly refused to abide by
    judicial decisions. In addition numerous government officials,
    including the Justice Minister and the Minister for Information and
    Publicity, repeatedly called for the resignation of Supreme Court
    justices.
        The Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990 created a unitary
    court system, consisting of headmen's courts, chiefs' courts,
    magistrates' courts, the High Court, and the Supreme Court. With this
    restructuring, civil and customary law cases may be heard at all levels
    of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court.
        Judges are appointed for life, and the Constitution provides that
    they can be removed from the bench only for gross misconduct, and that
    they cannot be discharged or transferred for political reasons;
    however, judges were threatened with removal at times by the
    Government. Magistrates, who are part of the civil service rather than
    the judiciary, hear the vast majority of cases and sometimes are
    subject to political pressure. Military courts deal with disciplinary
    or courtmartial proceedings. Police courts, which can sentence a police
    officer to confinement in a camp or demotion, handle disciplinary and
    misconduct cases. Trials in both these latter courts meet
    internationally accepted standards for fair trials; defendants in these
    courts have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. All levels of the
    judiciary often make rulings disliked by the Government.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the
    judiciary rigorously enforces this right. Every defendant has the right
    to a lawyer of his choosing. However, well over 90 percent of
    defendants in magistrates' courts do not have legal representation. In
    criminal cases, an indigent defendant may apply to have the Government
    provide an attorney, but this is rarely done and rarely granted.
    However, in capital cases the Government provides an attorney for all
    defendants unable to afford one. Litigants in civil cases can request
    legal assistance from the NGO Legal Resources Foundation. The
    government-established Citizens Advice Bureau was eliminated due to
    budget constraints in 1997. All litigants are represented in the High
    Court. The Supreme Court has instructed magistrates to ensure that
    unrepresented defendants fully understand their rights and to weigh any
    mitigating circumstances in criminal cases, whether or not the accused
    presents them as part of his defense.
        The right to appeal exists in all cases and is automatic in cases
    in which the death penalty is imposed. Trials are open to the public
    except in certain security cases. Defendants enjoy a presumption of
    innocence and the right to present witnesses and question witnesses
    against them. Defendants and their attorneys generally have access to
    government-held evidence relevant to their cases. The legal system does
    not discriminate against women or minorities. However, some High Court
    judges imposed lenient sentences in some cases of rape and child sexual
    abuse, and local women's and legal organizations challenged these
    decisions.
        In April and May, the Government failed to abide by two High Court
    rulings requiring that police officials remove war veterans and other
    squatters trespassing on commercial farms. On May 17, the High Court
    ordered an end to the occupation of 500 farms by war veterans and other
    ZANU-PF supporters; however, the order was not implemented. In May the
    High Court also brought contempt of court proceedings against National
    Liberation War Veterans Association leader Chenjerai Hunzvi for failing
    to remove his followers from occupied farm properties. Hunzvi, along
    with the Government, had been ordered in April to remove thousands of
    squatters from 1,000 occupied farms. Hunzvi was found guilty of
    contempt of court and received a commuted 3month prison sentence;
    however, both Hunzvi and the Government continued to ignore the court
    orders at year's end. In August and September, police removed
    approximately 100 squatters and war veterans from farms near Harare;
    however, the Government stopped the expulsions after the police actions
    were publicized, and approximately 1,000 farms remained occupied at
    year's end.
        Members of the ruling party and the Government were increasingly
    dissatisfied with the judiciary, whose rulings often went against ZANU-
    PF and the Government. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the
    President could be sued in court after the LRF sued the Government to
    release a report of two commissions that investigated the Matabeleland
    massacres (see Section 1.a.). On November 1, the Minister of State for
    Information and Publicity called for the resignation of the Supreme
    Court Chief Justice for issuing too many rulings against the
    Government.
        On November 10, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the
    Government's land resettlement policy violated constitutional rights to
    property and protection from arbitrary search and entry, and ordered a
    halt to the occupations (see Section 1.f.). On November 29, the Justice
    Minister warned the courts not to oppose the Government's land program
    (see Section 1.f.). On December 21, the Supreme Court ruled that the
    Government's land acquisition program was unconstitutional, that the
    Government had persistently violated the rule of law with its land
    program, and that the political and civil rights of farmers had been
    routinely denied.
        In November war veterans raided the Supreme Court building to
    protest the Court's rulings against the Government's land resettlement
    policies. In December war veterans threatened to attack justices in
    their homes if they did not resign within 2 weeks; no such attacks
    occurred.
        The Government continued routinely to delay payment of court costs
    or judgments awarded against it. For example, the CIO continued its
    refusal to pay damages awarded by the High Court to a former opposition
    party official whom CIO agents had tortured in 1990.
        On October 6, President Mugabe issued a presidential decree
    granting a general amnesty for politically motivated crimes that
    occurred between January 1 and July 31. The pardon excluded the
    offenses of murder, robbery, rape, sexual assault, theft, and
    possession of arms, but did not exclude the charges of common assault
    and assault with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm. The pardon
    permitted the immediate release of prisoners convicted of the latter
    two offenses. The amnesty protects nearly all the agents of the
    political violence campaign and effectively prevents any criminal
    prosecutions against them. The amnesty was widely criticized by
    domestic and international human rights groups. Amnesty International
    expressed concern that it would encourage further violence in the run-
    up to the presidential elections in 2002.
        The Government repeatedly has amended the Constitution in response
    to judicial rulings protective of human rights. For example, Amendment
    11 (1992) changed the Constitution to allow corporal punishment of
    minors after the Supreme Court ruled that caning of minors constituted
    cruel and inhuman punishment. Amendment 14 (1996), which denies both
    men and women the right to confer automatic residency on their foreign
    spouses, was passed in response to a 1994 Supreme Court ruling
    declaring that women should have the same rights as men to confer
    residency and citizenship on their spouses (see Section 2.d.).
    Amendments to the Constitution are not ratified by the public but are
    subject only to the ZANU-PF-dominated Parliament's approval.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits arbitrary interference with
    these rights; however, the Government restricted these rights in
    practice. The Government sometimes monitors private correspondence and
    telephones, particularly international communications. In April
    Parliament passed the Postal and Telecommunications Bill that permits
    the Government to monitor and intercept e-mails entering and leaving
    the country (see Section 2.a.).
        On September 14 and September 15, police raided MDC party
    headquarters, detained MDC officials, and removed documents (see
    Section 3).
        On October 4, police searched the homes of an independent radio
    station's co-owners and others associated with the station (see Section
    2.a.).
        In October rising prices of essential commodities, including fuel
    and food, sparked riots in many of Harare's suburbs. Police conducted
    house to house searches, beat residents, severely in some cases, and
    warned them not to engage in further demonstrations, despite the fact
    that many of those threatened had not participated in the riots. On
    October 17, approximately 50 riot police entered the home of opposition
    M.P. Justin Mutendadzamera, accused him of fanning the riots, and
    severely beat him and his wife with batons on their buttocks and arms
    (see Section 1.c.).
        About one-half of the country's most productive land is owned and
    farmed by about 4,000 families belonging to the country's white
    minority. The need for land reform is accepted almost universally;
    however, there are problems with implementation of the 1992 Land
    Acquisition Act (Land Act). Under the Land Act, farmers whose lands
    have been designated for acquisition and redistribution by the State
    may appeal only the amount of compensation, not the initial decision to
    acquire their farms. Shortly after the February referendum that
    defeated the new constitution that would have permitted land seizures,
    war veterans, with Government support, began occupying commercial
    farms, and assaulted and intimidated farm workers and the predominately
    white farm owners. Approximately 1,600 farms were visited or occupied
    in the period prior to the June elections, and about 1,000 of those
    farms remained occupied at year's end.
        On April 9, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment permitting
    the seizure of land without compensation. In May President Mugabe,
    using extraordinary presidential powers, amended the Land Act to bring
    it into conformity with this amendment. In early June, the Government
    marked 841 farms for compulsory acquisition, giving those farm owners 1
    month to appeal. After the June elections, the Government began a
    ``fasttrack'' resettlement program in an effort to quickly settle the
    land problem. The Government designated an additional 2,000 farms for
    seizure. Under the Government's plan, farm owners would be compensated
    over a 5-year period for improvements made to the land but not for the
    property itself. Although no farms were seized officially or their
    owners evicted by the Government, portions of approximately 1,000
    commercial farms continued to be occupied by war veterans, ZANU-PF
    supporters, and other squatters at year's end, many of whom built homes
    and planted crops on the land they occupied. In November the Supreme
    Court ruled that the land occupations violated constitutional private
    property rights and protection from arbitrary search and entry (see
    Section 1.e.) and issued a consent decree whereby the Government and
    the CFU agreed that the Government would halt its land resettlement
    activities and evict squatters from occupied land; however, the
    Government had not complied with the agreement by year's end (see
    Section 1.e.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression but allows for legislation to limit this freedom
    in the ``interest of defense, public safety, public order, state
    economic interests, public morality, and public health,'' and the
    Government restricted this right in practice. Security forces
    arbitrarily detained journalists, disobeyed court orders to release
    journalists, and refused to investigate or punish security force
    members who tortured journalists and opposition members. Journalists
    practice self-censorship.
        The Government restricted freedom of speech, particularly by
    opposition members and supporters. During the February referendum,
    eight NCA members, including two prominent MDC members, were arrested
    for violating sections of the Electoral Act that prohibit campaigning
    within 100 meters of a polling station. On February 15, a magistrate
    dismissed the case after the eight NCA members proved they were not
    within 100 meters of the polling station (see Section 2.b.).
        On April 1, police fired tear gas on NCA members during a peace
    march (see Section 2.b.). In July police officers fired tear gas into
    the stands during a soccer match after opposition supporters began
    waving MDC banners and chanting slogans. Thirteen persons were trampled
    to death in the incident (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b). On October 8,
    three MDC M.P.'s were arrested and charged with making inflammatory
    statements at a political rally (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
        Sections 44 and 50 of the LOMA criminalize and allow the Government
    to suppress the publication of any ``subversive'' statement or ``a
    false story capable of causing alarm and despondency.'' An extremely
    broad Official Secrets Act makes it a crime to divulge any information
    acquired in the course of official duties. In addition antidefamation
    laws criminalize libel of both public and private persons alike.
        Several major daily newspapers and one local-language tabloid
    belong to the Mass Media Trust (MMT), a holding company heavily
    influenced by the ruling party. Until April 1999, the Government,
    through the MMT, controlled the only two daily newspapers at the time,
    the Chronicle and the Herald. The news coverage in these newspapers
    generally focused on the activities of government officials, neglected
    opposition parties and other antigovernment groups, and also neglected
    events or information that reflected adversely on the Government. The
    governmentcontrolled media never criticized President Mugabe. In
    addition, the Minister of Information and Publicity in the President's
    Office controls the Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency wire service.
        The independent press grew substantially during the year in
    relation to the MMT-owned press. Independent newspapers that appeared
    regularly and had more than 3,000 subscribers were relatively few: one
    daily (The Daily News), three weeklies (The Financial Gazette, the
    Independent, and The Standard), and three monthlies. In 1998 a new
    privately owned consortium, Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ),
    which was 60 percent foreign-owned in 1998 but only 40 percent foreign-
    owned by the end of 1999, launched five weeklies in 1999 tailored to
    community-level readership. Three of the ANZ weekly newspapers closed
    in 1999 due to financial problems arising from limited advertising
    revenue; two remained open at year's end. In April 1999, the ANZ
    launched the country's first independent daily newspaper, The Daily
    News, which has the nation's largest circulation. The circulation of
    The Daily News grew significantly before the parliamentary elections,
    and the readership of the government-controlled The Herald fell
    rapidly. The major independent newspapers continued to monitor
    government policies and open their pages to opposition critics, but
    most of them also continued to exercise some self-censorship in
    reporting due to growing government intimidation of the press and the
    continuing prospect of prosecution under criminal libel laws.
        The Government increasingly tolerated private media criticism of
    official corruption, as a number of widely publicized reports on
    malfeasance in government parastatals and ministries, notably the
    National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, appeared in both independent and MMT-
    owned newspapers. The Government did not prosecute any journalists or
    newspapers in connection with these reports; in past years, government
    prosecutions for criminal libel in connection with reporting of
    government corruption had resulted in the closure of some newspapers.
    However, in other respects the Government was increasingly intolerant
    of freedom of the press, including reports perceived to be critical of
    the military, and reports on the country's involvement in the DRC.
        On February 23, authorities arrested the publisher of the
    independent newspaper, The Standard, and two of its journalists on
    charges of criminal defamation after The Standard published an article
    accusing the Government of printing the draft constitution without
    incorporating all of the public's views before the final adoption.
    Authorities also arrested a former editor and a reporter in connection
    with the article from The Standard.
        In August Bernard Masara confessed to the editorial staff of The
    Daily News that he had been hired by the CIO to kill the editor. Masara
    had not been arrested or charged by year's end.
        During the October 16-18 food riots in Harare, security forces
    reportedly beat seven journalists, when they attempted to enter a
    restricted area (see Section 1.c.).
        In February 1999, in Harare an army sergeant based at Cranborne
    Barracks reportedly seized and publicly burned 16 copies of The
    Standard; the sergeant also reportedly threatened to kill the vendor if
    he continued to sell the newspaper. The lead story in the burned issue
    concerned the construction of a new mansion for President Mugabe. In
    late February, a police spokesperson stated that the police would
    charge the sergeant with malicious injury to property.
        In January 1999, military and civilian police detained, tortured,
    beat, and otherwise abused two journalists from The Standard, Mark
    Chavunduka and Ray Choto, who reported in a story that 23 army officers
    were arrested in connection with an planned military coup. On January
    19, the Government charged the two journalists under Section 50 of the
    LOMA with ``publishing a false story capable of causing alarm or
    despondency.'' The two journalists subsequently filed suit against
    members of the security forces for damages to compensate them for the
    torture and illegal detention, and challenged the constitutionality of
    the LOMA (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In a landmark decision in April,
    the Supreme Court ruled that the section of the LOMA under which the
    journalists were arrested was unconstitutional. However, the
    journalists'' suit for their mistreatment still was pending at year's
    end.
        Supporters of the ruling party and war veterans harassed,
    intimidated, and abused journalists considered to be sympathetic to the
    opposition. On April 6, a Daily News journalist, photographer, and a
    driver, were detained for 2 hours by ZANU-PF supporters and war
    veterans on a farm outside Harare. They were threatened with death for
    allegedly supporting the opposition MDC and supporting white commercial
    farmers. The youths, armed with iron bars and golf clubs, forced them
    to remove their shoes, sit on the ground, and chant pro-ZANU-PF
    slogans, in view of the police. The youths took the journalists'' two
    cameras, national identity cards, and government-issued press cards. On
    July 22, Chengetai Zvauya, a reporter for The Standard, was detained
    and assaulted by war veterans at ZANU-PF headquarters. The war veterans
    claimed they attacked Zvauya because the independent press subjects
    them to unfair coverage.
        On April 1, war veterans reportedly singled out journalists for
    attack during a counter-demonstration against a NCA peace march; at
    least one journalist was injured (see Section 2.b.).
        On April 19, Geoff Nyarota, the editor of The Daily News, received
    a letter from an unknown organization threatening him if the newspaper
    did not desist from publishing articles critical of the Government and
    President Mugabe in particular. On April 22, a bomb exploded in an art
    gallery directly below the offices of The Daily News. On April 26, an
    Associated Press photographer was arrested in connection with the
    bombing. He was released on May 2; no charges were filed against him.
        In June war veterans beat and abducted a journalist for The
    Independent newpaper, a foreign journalist, and her cameraman, in
    Mutoko district. The police rescued the kidnaped journalists within a
    few hours of the abduction; no charges had been filed or arrests made
    in the case by year's end.
        On July 16, war veterans beat Standard journalist Cengetayi Zvanya
    at a news conference at ZANU-PF headquarters; the war veterans detained
    Zvanya for two hours and then released him.
        Books and films are subject to review by the Zimbabwe Board of
    Censors. During the year, the Board banned at least 10 films.
        Radio remained the most important medium of public communication,
    especially for the majority of the population living in rural areas.
    The Government continued to control all domestic radio broadcasting
    stations through the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
    (ZBC), supervised by the Minister of Information and Publicity in the
    President's Office. There were credible reports that the Minister
    routinely reviewed ZBC news and repeatedly excised reports on the
    activities of groups and organizations opposed to or critical of the
    Government, including antigovernment demonstrations and the ZCTU. In
    December 1999, the ZBC, reportedly at the order of the Minister,
    stopped broadcasting a popular phone-in talk show in which citizens
    increasingly had voiced criticism of the Government.
        On September 22, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
    Government's broadcasting monopoly. Immediately after the ruling,
    Information Minister Jonathan Moyo insisted that no private radio
    stations would be allowed to go on the air until the Government had
    drafted the necessary regulatory framework governing the entry and
    participation of private broadcasters in this sector. Despite Moyo's
    statement, Capital Radio, a private radio station, began broadcasting
    after the Supreme Court decision. On October 4, police shut down
    Capital Radio and seized its equipment, despite the issuance of a High
    Court decision earlier in the day barring the seizure. The police also
    searched the homes of the station's co-owners and others associated
    with the company, including an MDC M.P. On October 5, the High Court
    ordered the return of all equipment and the cancellation of the arrest
    warrants, and directed the Government to issue a license to Capital
    Radio within 10 days. The Government returned most of Capital Radio's
    equipment but did not issue a license to Capital Radio. On October 5,
    President Mugabe issued by decree temporary commercial broadcasting
    regulations that give the Minister of Information and Publicity the
    ultimate power to issue and deny broadcasting licenses. The Government
    claimed that the new broadcasting regulations rendered the court order
    non-binding. The Committee to Protect Journalists criticized the
    Government's action. Capital Radio is drafting an appeal to the Supreme
    Court that asserts that the temporary regulations are unconstitutional
    and requests a license in the absence of a fair hearing by the
    regulatory commission. On October 20, a legal committee of Parliament,
    in a non-binding resolution, declared the new regulations
    unconstitutional. By year's end, Capital Radio was awaiting
    Parliament's final report on the regulations before proceeding with a
    Supreme Court appeal in which it alleged that the regulations are
    discriminatory.
        The Government appeared effectively to control, although the State
    no longer owned, all domestic television broadcasting stations. The
    ZBC, under the supervision of the Minister of Information and
    Publicity, owns and operates television broadcasting facilities.
    Following a Supreme Court ruling in September 1999 that the
    Government's monopoly on telecommunications was unconstitutional
    because it interfered with the right to freedom of expression, the
    Government for the first time granted a broadcasting license to private
    television station, Joy Television (Joy TV). However, President
    Mugabe's nephew, Leo Mugabe, reportedly has financial ties to Joy TV ,
    and the ZBC reportedly exercises editorial control over Joy TV's
    programming. Joy TV remained the only privately licensed television
    station, and it remained restricted to broadcasting on an available
    channel leased from the ZBC; creation of an independent transmission
    facility remained restricted under the Broadcasting Act. Joy TV is not
    permitted to broadcast local news or current affairs programming;
    however, it does broadcast BBC news reports. International television
    broadcasts were available freely through private cable and satellite
    firms.
        The NCA accused the governmentinfluenced newspaper The Chronicle
    and the ZBC of refusing to publish previously accepted advertising from
    the NCA about its proposed constitutional process due to government
    orders to ban the NCA from disseminating its alternative message on the
    constitutional process. After the NCA took the ZBC to court in
    February, the judge ordered ZBC to carry the NCA's advertisements; the
    ZBC responded by carrying the advertisements in late night timeslots
    that had few listeners.
        The Government does not restrict access to the Internet. During the
    year, there were many privately owned domestic Internet service
    providers. However, in April Parliament passed legislation that would
    permit the Government to monitor all international e-mail messages
    entering and leaving the country. It is unknown to what extent the
    security services have used this authority to intercept e-mail
    communication.
        The Government restricts academic freedom. The University of
    Zimbabwe (UZ) Amendment Act and the National Council for Higher
    Education Act restricts the independence of universities, making them
    subject to government influence, and extending the disciplinary powers
    of the university authorities against staff and students. The Ministry
    of Higher Education and Technology controls the UZ and appoints its
    Chancellor and Vice Chancellors; since 1998 the Ministry also has
    appointed the Dean of Faculty, previously elected by the faculty, and
    most members of the University Council, which previously consisted
    largely of faculty members. The 1998 expansion of the Government's
    control of the UZ, which was a subject of student protests in 1998, was
    cited as a subject of concern to the faculty in a parliamentary
    committee report in June 1999. During the year, a number of students
    were expelled, and faculty members were forced to take leave without
    pay for belonging to the MDC.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly; however, the Government resticted
    this right in practice. The Government enforced laws that restrict this
    right, including the LOMA, and repeatedly used force to break up
    nonviolent demonstrations by its critics. Permits are not required for
    meetings; however, the police continued to require that groups obtain
    permits for marches or demonstrations despite the 1994 Supreme Court
    ruling that struck down the part of LOMA requiring permits. Most groups
    that conducted marches did not seek permits because of the Supreme
    Court ruling.
        During the February referendum, eight NCA members, including two
    prominent MDC members, were arrested for violating sections of the
    Electoral Act that prohibit campaigning within 100 meters of a polling
    station. On February 15, a magistrate court dismissed the case, ruling
    that the NCA members were not within 100 meters of the polling station
    and that the application of the act to a national referendum violated
    the constitutional right of free assembly (see Section 2.a.).
        On April 1, war veterans and riot police violently disrupted a
    peace march in central Harare organized by the NCA. The war veterans,
    in addition to young government supporters marched from ZANU-PF
    headquarters in a counter-demonstration and attacked the NCA marchers
    with stones, crowbars, and pickaxe handles, while police fired tear gas
    into the crowd. The attackers also reportedly chased the marchers into
    neighboring shops and beat them. At least 12 persons, including one
    British journalist, were seriously injured. The war veterans reportedly
    singled out journalists for attack, and a number of innocent bystanders
    were injured as well. The police ultimately disarmed the war veterans
    and other attackers, but did not arrest or charge them. Five NCA
    marchers were arrested for disobeying police orders to disperse. The
    Minister of Home Affairs blamed the NCA marchers for organizing a
    demonstration at the same time and place as the war veterans.
        On May 7, several thousand MDC supporters attended a rally at
    Mucheke Stadium in Masvingo, despite threats of violence from ZANU-PF
    supporters. According to press reports, many persons were turned away
    by the police, who broke up groups larger than five persons and sealed
    off all roads leading into Masvingo.
        On May 13, a peaceful NCA rally was disrupted by police and
    approximately 50 war veterans. The war veterans reportedly attacked
    those attending the rally with clubs, iron bars and stones.
        On June 28, MDC members reportedly were beaten by soldiers at a
    political rally that had been authorized by the police (see Section
    1.c.).
        In July police fired tear gas into the stands during a soccer match
    after opposition supporters began chanting slogans and waving banners
    (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 2.a.).
        On October 8, three MDC M.P.'s were arrested and charged with
    making inflammatory statements at a political rally (see Sections 1.d.
    and 2.a.). On October 9, police used tear gas and baton sticks to break
    up a peaceful demonstration of approximately 1,500 MDC supporters in
    Harare who had gathered outside the magistrate's court to protest the
    arrest of the three MDC parliamentarians (see Section 1.d.). At least
    seven demonstrators were injured by the police.
        On October 12, riot police broke up a student rally outside the
    University of Zimbabwe campus where a MDC M.P. was scheduled to speak.
    Police and security guards reportedly beat many of the students with
    batons and used tear gas (see Section 1.c.).
        Between October 16 and 18, security forces and police beat and used
    tear gas on demonstrators during food riots (see Section 1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association for political
    and nonpolitical organizations, including a broad spectrum of economic,
    social, and professional groups, and the Government generally respected
    this right in practice. However, ZANU-PF supporters, supplied with
    government vehicles and money, killed, tortured, beat and abused those
    perceived to be political opponents (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        The formation of unions and political parties is not restricted.
        Organizations generally are free of governmental interference as
    long as their activities are viewed as nonpolitical. The Supreme Court
    ruled unconstitutional sections of the 1995 Private Voluntary
    Organizations (PVO) Act, which had allowed the Government to suspend
    the executive bodies of organizations (see Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, a law that reportedly criminalizes both purporting to practice
    witchcraft and accusing persons of practicing witchcraft reportedly was
    viewed as restrictive by some practitioners of indigenous religions.
    There is no state religion. The Government generally recognizes all
    religions.
        The Government does not require religious institutions to be
    registered; however, religious organizations that run schools or
    medical facilities must register those specific institutions with the
    appropriate ministry involved in regulating those areas.
        Witchcraft--widely understood to encompass attempts to harm others
    not only by magic but also by covert means of established efficacy such
    as poisons--traditionally has been a common explanation for diseases of
    which the causes were unknown. Although traditional indigenous
    religions generally include or accommodate belief in the efficacy of
    witchcraft, they generally approve of harmful witchcraft only for
    defensive or retaliatory purposes and purport to offer protection
    against it. In recent years, interest in healing through traditional
    religion and through prayer reportedly has increased as HIV/AIDS has
    infected an estimated one-quarter of the adult population, and
    affordable science-based medicines effective in treating HIV/AIDS have
    remained unavailable.
        The 1890 Witchcraft Suppression Act (WSA) reportedly criminalizes
    purporting to practice witchcraft, accusing persons of practicing
    witchcraft, hunting witches, and soliciting persons to name witches;
    penalties reportedly include imprisonment for as much as 7 years. The
    law reportedly defines witchcraft as the practice of sorcery, without
    reference to the consequences intended by the practitioner. Since 1997
    the Zimbabwe National African Traditional Healers' Association
    (ZINATHA) has proposed amendments to the 1890 law that would redefine
    witchcraft in terms of intent to cause harm including illness, injury,
    or death; however, such legislation reportedly has been opposed by
    mainstream Christian churches. The existing WSA also generally was
    supported by human rights groups; the Act has been used since
    independence primarily to protect persons, primarily women, who have
    been accused falsely of causing harm to persons or crops in rural areas
    where traditional religious practices are strong.
        There is some tension between the Government and the indigenous
    African churches because of the latter's opposition to Western medical
    practices that result in the reduction of avoidable childhood diseases
    and deaths in those communities. Some members of the indigenous
    churches believe in healing through prayer only and refuse to have
    their children vaccinated. The Ministry of Health has had limited
    success in vaccinating children in these religious communities against
    communicable childhood diseases. Human rights activists also have
    criticized these indigenous churches for their nctioning of marriages
    for underage girls.
        President Mugabe has expressed skepticism about the increasing
    membership in evangelical and indigenous churches and has indicated
    that he believes they could be subversive.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, the Government at times restricted these rights in
    practice.
        On April 27, the police invoked the LOMA to set up roadblocks
    around the country to prevent the busing of political party supporters
    between districts. Permission was granted to bus supporters only to
    those rallies at which the leaders of political parties were scheduled
    to speak. The police commissioner characterized the action as a measure
    to prevent political violence; however, enforcement was limited to MDC
    supporters, which effectively limited the opposition's ability to
    campaign in ZANU-PF strongholds (see Section 3).
        On May 7, police sealed off all roads leading into Masvingo, where
    the MDC was holding a political rally (see Section 2.b.).
        In May the Government ordered 26,000 British nationals with dual
    citizenship to surrender their Zimbabwe passports after President
    Mugabe declared them ``enemies of the state.''
        The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Women and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally has
    cooperated with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The
    Government generally provides first asylum; however, according to
    UNHCR, while 1,460 asylum seekers were granted refugee status in 1999,
    at least 34 persons were denied first asylum during the year. At year's
    end, there were reportedly 3,560 refugees from more than 20 countries;
    the largest groups consisted of 130 Congolese (DRC), 103 Rwandans, 102
    Burundians, and 45 Angolans.
        There were reports that foreign farm workers were threatened with
    deportation if they voted against the ZANU-PF party in the June
    parliamentary elections (see Section 3).
        In late May, two Cuban doctors who were working in the country and
    seeking asylum at two foreign diplomatic missions were arrested and
    detained at several different prisons, where security personnel tried
    to force them to sign deportation documents. After several days, they
    were flown to South Africa accompanied by security personnel who then
    attempted to return them to Cuba. After hearing the doctors''
    protestations, the airline pilot refused to board them, and the two
    were returned to Zimbabwe and detained again. The authorities denied
    UNHCR representatives access to the doctors for several days, and
    refused to provide bedding, blankets, adequate food, or proper
    sanitation to the asylum-seekers. The asylum seekers were released on
    July 5 to the UNHCR after being held for 6 weeks. There were no other
    reports that the Government attempted to forcibly return persons to a
    country where they feared persecution.
        Some employers reportedly take advantage of illegal refugees for
    inexpensive labor (see Section 6.e.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Although citizens have the legal right to change their Government
    democratically, in practice the political process continued to be
    tilted heavily in favor of President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party,
    which have ruled continuously since independence in 1980.
        Parliamentary elections were held in June amid widespread voter
    intimidation by the Government and ZANU-PF supporters, violence, and
    reports of vote-rigging and other irregularities. Although the election
    day generally was peaceful, the process leading up to it was neither
    free nor fair. The newly formed opposition MDC captured 57 out of the
    120 popularly elected seats. Thirty additional seats are reserved for
    presidential and tribal chief appointees, who are ZANU-PF supporters,
    which gave ZANU-PF a total of 92 seats. In the period before the June
    parliamentary elections, the Government, backed by security forces,
    implemented a systematic campaign of intimidation and physical violence
    against opposition supporters (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In April
    the Government invoked LOMA to bar the transportation of political
    supporters across constituencies (see Section 2.d.). Police also used
    LOMA to restrict public gatherings (see Section 2.b.). In many
    districts, the campaign backfired, resulting in additional votes for
    the opposition, but in others, voters stayed away from the polls out of
    fear of retribution. For example, there were reports that farm workers
    of non-Zimbabwean heritage were threatened with deportation if they
    voted against the ruling party (see Section 2.d.). There are
    institutional problems with the management and supervision of
    elections, and the overlapping mandates of the Electoral Supervisory
    Commission, the Ministry of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs, and
    the Registrar-General's Office. Although the Ministry of Justice
    technically administers the Electoral Act, the Registrar General's
    Office falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs. With an insufficient
    budget and an overburdened staff seconded from the Ministry of Justice,
    the Electoral Supervisory Commission lacks the institutional capacity
    to oversee all of the country's polling stations. Commissioners also
    lack authority to order the correction of irregularities. Despite an
    attempt to computerize the voters' roll, it contains a very large
    number of redundancies and errors, including misspellings, multiple
    entries, and names of deceased persons. These irregularities were
    highlighted during the June parliamentary elections; many votes for the
    ruling party were recorded as cast by deceased persons. International
    observers cited the need to establish an independent electoral
    commission. The Government legalized immense powers in the President
    through the Electoral Act, which institutionalized gerrymandering and
    fraudulent voters'' rolls. The Government invoked the act shortly
    before the June elections to redraw constituent boundaries in its favor
    and raise bureaucratic barriers to voter registration. Although most
    election observers agreed that the voting process itself generally was
    peaceful 15 percent of voters were prevented from voting on election
    day on technical grounds or due to incomplete or inaccurate voters''
    rolls. Electoral officers did not operate in an open and transparent
    manner.
        In August the Supreme Court nullified on procedural grounds
    approximately 6,000 absentee ballots sent in by troops stationed in the
    DRC. The ruling llowed widespread reports that the ballots had been
    distributed by ZANU-PF to districts in which it faced narrow defeat by
    MDC candidates.
        In April Vice-President Msika announced that civil servants would
    not be permitted to act as election monitors in the parliamentary
    elections because they sympathized with the opposition. Civil servants
    have been the Government's traditional source for domestic election
    monitors. The MDC accused the Government of replacing the civil
    servants with its own supporters. International election observers were
    repeatedly denied accreditation by the Government, and most were not
    accredited until the last few days before the election due to frequent
    changes in the accreditation rules by the Government. On June 14, the
    Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) challenged in the High Court
    sections of the amended Electoral Act that reduces ESC authority to
    accredit international electoral monitors.
        The ruling party's candidates continued to benefit from the ruling
    party's control of the state-owned firms that dominate the country's
    economy, from its control of the state-monopolized broadcast media (see
    Section 2.a.), and from its monopoly on overt state grants for
    political campaigns. In 1998 the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional
    provisions of the Political Parties Finance Act (PPFA) that allocated
    state grants among political parties in proportion to the parties'
    seats already in the Parliament. In response the Government amended the
    PPFA later in 1998 to allocate campaign grants among parties in
    proportion to votes received in the last general election, with a
    minimum requirement of 5 percent. The Government was required to
    publish the amount of financing the MDC was entitled to receive
    according to its June election showing by August 24; however, it had
    not done so by year's end. The Government claimed that the MDC failed
    to submit its funding request by the deadline in June and that it is
    not entitled to state funds. In October the High Court ruled that ZANU-
    PF is not authorized to spend the MDC share until the matter is
    resolved.
        In July the MDC filed a petition with the High Court to challenge
    the electoral results in 37 parliamentary constituencies, stating that
    there was sufficient evidence of intimidation, vote-rigging, and other
    irregularities to warrant the overturning of results in those
    constituencies. In October the High Court scheduled consideration of
    the petition for January 2001. On December 8, President Mugabe amended
    the Electoral Act to prohibit the nullification of the election of any
    M.P.
        On September 14 and September 15, police raided MDC party
    headquarters, detained some MDC officials (see Section 1.d.), and
    removed documents. On September 16, the High Court ruled that the
    search of the offices and seizure of documents was illegal, and the
    police returned the seized documents. In addition to the raid on MDC
    headquarters, police frequently harassed individual MDC members after
    the June elections.
        The 16 constitutional amendments since 1980 have increased greatly
    Mugabe's power relative to the legislature. Originally a prime minister
    elected by the Parliament, he has become a directly elected president.
    Constitutional Amendment 9 authorizes the President to declare
    unilaterally a state of public emergency for a period of up to 14 days.
    Amendment 10 grants the President sole power to dissolve Parliament and
    to appoint or remove a vice president and any minister or deputy
    minister. Amendment 10 also allowed the President to appoint 20 of the
    150 Members of Parliament (M.P.'s), including 12 nonconstituency M.P.'s
    and 8 provincial governors who sit in Parliament. The President also
    exerts great influence on the process by which the country's chiefs
    (traditional rulers) select 10 of their number to sit as M.P.'s. All 30
    of these M.P.'s have been consistently ZANU-PF members.
        The legislature, which traditionally has been subordinate to the
    executive branch, has a viable opposition that subjected the Government
    to calls for accountability and transparency. Parliamentary question
    time is being used to force debate and disclosure. For example, in
    September, Finance Minister Simba Makoni was forced to disclose during
    question time that the Government had spent $200 million (Z$9 billion)
    on its deployment of 12,000 troops in the DRC over the past 2 years,
    which sparked widespread criticism from the opposition and wider debate
    about the country's involvement in the DRC. In October the MDC brought
    a motion to Parliament to impeach President Mugabe for violating the
    Constitution and gross misconduct. In November the Speaker of
    Parliament appointed a special committee composed of eight ZANU-PF
    members and four MDC members to consider the charges outlined in the
    motion; the committee had not held hearings or released its findings by
    year's end.
        Since late 1997, the NCA has advocated the creation of a new
    constitution that would reduce the power of the presidency and offer
    greater protection for civil liberties. In May 1999, the President
    established the Constitutional Commission (CC), whose 400 members he
    appointed, to review the current Constitution and prepare a new draft
    to be submitted to a national referendum. The NCA was openly critical
    of the CC, asserting that it was a government-controlled entity whose
    product would not reflect the will of the populace. On December 11,
    1999, the CC released a draft constitution that would maintain a strong
    presidency. In a nationwide referendum in February voters defeated the
    new draft constitution.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Fifteen of
    the 150 M.P.'s are female, including the Deputy Speaker of Parliament,
    1 minister, and 1 deputy minister; in the previous parliament there
    were 20 female M.P.'s. Women participate in politics without legal
    restriction; however, according to local women's groups, husbands--
    particularly in rural areas--commonly direct their wives to vote for
    the husband's preferred candidates. In December 1999, the ZANU-PF
    congress decided that women would be allotted one out of every three
    party positions. At the ZANU-PF congress in December, 50 new positions
    reserved for women were added to the party's 180-member Central
    Committee, which is one of the party's most powerful organs. All major
    ethnic groups are represented in Parliament and in the Government;
    however, most members of the Government and the Parliament, as well as
    most ZANU-PF officials, are affiliated with the Shona ethnic group,
    which makes up a majority of the population (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Although the Government permits local civic and human rights groups
    to operate, it monitors their activities closely. National groups that
    promote human rights include the Amani Trust, the Catholic Commission
    for Justice and Peace (CCJP), the Legal Resources Foundation, Zimbabwe
    Lawyers for Human Rights,the Bulawayo Legal Projects Centre (BLPC), the
    NCA, the Southern African Foundation of the Disabled, the Child and the
    Law Project, the Musasa Project, the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers
    Association, the Association of Zimbabwe Journalists, the Women's
    Action Group, Women and Law in Southern Africa, Women in Law and
    Development in Africa, Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network,
    Women and AIDS Support Network, and the Human Rights Research and
    Documentation Trust of Southern Africa.
        These NGO's worked on human rights and democracy issues including
    lobbying for revision of the Public Order and Security Bill, increasing
    poor women's access to the courts, raising awareness of the abuse of
    children, eliminating irregularities in voter rolls, preserving the
    independence of the judiciary, and eliminating torture, arbitrary
    detention and restrictions on freedom of the press and assembly. The
    Foundation for Democracy in Zimbabwe (FODEZI) was established in July
    1997 as a watchdog organization to support independent candidates. The
    Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum was formed in 1998 to help provide
    legal and psycho-social assistance to the victims of the food riots in
    January 1998. It has taken the lead in coordinating reports on human
    rights violations and abuses in the period prior to and following the
    June elections.
        During the year, tensions increased between the Government and
    civil society. In various public statements throughout the year, the
    Government accused NGO's of launching opposition political activity and
    threatened to clamp down on NGO's which do not comply with the PVO Act.
        In a case brought by a women's NGO, the Supreme Court ruled
    unconstitutional those sections of the 1995 Private Voluntary
    Organizations (PVO) Act, which had empowered the Minister of Social
    Welfare, Labor, and Public Service to suspend the executive body or
    ``any member of the executive committee of an organization and to
    appoint persons to manage the affairs of the organization for a
    specified time.'' Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, several new
    NGO's set up their organizations as ``associations'' connected with
    established NGO's so that their executive bodies would not be subject
    to government interference.
        Amnesty International, Transparency International, and the
    International Committee of the Red Cross operate in the country. The
    Government generally does not discourage representatives of
    international human rights groups from visiting the country.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that ``every person in Zimbabwe'' is
    entitled to fundamental rights whatever his race, tribe, place of
    origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex; however, domestic
    violence and discrimination against women, abuse of children, and
    discrimination against the disabled remained problems. There were
    continuing reports of ritual murders associated with traditional
    religious practices. The President and his Government attempted to
    exacerbate resentment of the economically prominent white minority.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women, especially wife beating,
    is common and crosses all racial and economic lines. It extends
    throughout the country and at times results in death. According to
    Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), domestic violence
    accounted for more than 60 percent of murder cases tried in the Harare
    High Court in 1998. The Musasa Project, a women's rights organization,
    established the country's first shelter for victims of domestic
    violence in Harare in 1997; it can accommodate up to 20 women at a
    time. The Musasa Project provided services to an estimated 3,147
    clients at its Harare office in 1999, 61 percent of whom were female
    victims of domestic violence; 40 percent of those who were assisted
    were minors, victims of rape or incest. The Musasa Project reports that
    54 percent of the women counseled for domestic violence have sexually
    transmitted diseases, including many with HIV/AIDS.
        There continued to be reports of rape, incest, and sexual abuse of
    women. Although the Harare press reported a slight decrease in the
    number of reported rape cases during the year, the Musasa Project
    believes that the actual number increased because of an increase in the
    number of divorced women and women escaping spousal abuse. At least
    eight cases of politically-motivated rape were reported in the pre-
    election period; human rights groups estimate that the actual number of
    politically-motivated rape may be closer to 800, including incidents of
    gang rapes of young girls and elderly women and rapes of female farm
    workers and health care workers (see Section 1.c.). Women face many
    obstacles in filing reports of rape. Many police stations are not
    prepared to handle properly the investigation of such cases. In
    addition, women are reluctant to file reports because of the social
    stigma of rape. Women's groups believe the actual number of rapes is
    underreported greatly. When cases go to court, lengthy sentences for
    rape and wife beating generally are imposed. However, a ``binding
    over'' order (an order to appear in court to respond to an accusation
    of violent behavior) is issued based only on actual physical abuse and
    not on threats of violence. Courts also do not have the power to oust
    an abusive spouse from a matrimonial home. Systemic problems and lack
    of education often mean that police do not respond to women's reports
    or requests for assistance. The Ministry of Justice is considering
    draft legislation that would increase the penalties for sexual abuse,
    including rape of a spouse.
        Since independence the Government has enacted major laws aimed at
    enhancing women's rights and countering certain traditional practices
    that discriminate against women. However, women remain disadvantaged in
    society. Illiteracy, economic dependency, and prevailing social norms
    prevent rural women in particular from combating societal
    discrimination. Despite legal prohibitions, women still are vulnerable
    to entrenched customary practices, including the practice of pledging a
    young woman to marriage with a partner not of her choosing, and the
    custom of forcing a widow to marry her late husband's brother.
        The Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA) and the Matrimonial Causes Act
    recognize women's right to own property independently of their husbands
    or fathers. While unmarried women may own property in their own names,
    women married under customary law are not allowed to own property
    jointly with their husbands. The Administration of Estates Amendment
    Act, which came into effect in October 1997, removed inheritance laws
    unfavorable to widows. Women's groups regard the act as a major step
    toward ending the unfair and unequal distribution of inherited assets
    for women. The President signed the new Inheritance Amendment into law
    in 1998; however, in February the Supreme Court upheld a magistrate
    court decision that, under customary ethnic law, a man's claim to
    family inheritance takes precedence over a woman's, regardless of the
    woman's age or seniority in the family. The Court cited Section 23 of
    the Constitution, which allows discrimination against women under
    customary law. Divorce and maintenance laws are favorable to women, but
    women generally lack awareness of their rights under the law.
        Although labor legislation prohibits discrimination in employment
    on the basis of gender, women are concentrated in the lower echelons of
    the work force and commonly face sexual harassment in the workplace.
    Research conducted by the Training and Research Support Centre (a
    Harare-based NGO) revealed that one in three working women at all
    levels were subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace, as defined
    by Zimbabwean legal experts. The 1996-1997 study was based on
    questionnaires from 528 working women.
        In August 1998, the Government denied a petition by women's groups
    that one-third of land redistributed under the land reform program be
    distributed to households headed by women, which reportedly make up
    one-third of all rural households. At a press conference in 1999,
    Joseph Msika, Vice-President and Minister of State in charge of
    resettlement, reportedly stated, ``I would have my head cut off if I
    gave women land.'' Nevertheless, during the September 1999 land
    conference, women's rights organizations lobbied the Government to
    recognize women as a special group to be considered in the Government's
    resettlement program. The Women Land Lobby Group (WLLG) criticized the
    Government for not taking into consideration the needs of women as an
    economically disadvantaged group in its ``fast-track'' resettlement
    program (see Section 1.f.). The WLLG is lobbying the Ministry of Lands,
    Agriculture & Rural Resettlement for greater consideration.
        Several active women's rights groups, including WILDAF, the Musasa
    Project, the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers' Association, the Women's Action
    Group, and the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Center and Network concentrate
    on improving women's knowledge of their legal rights, increasing their
    economic power, and combating domestic violence. Groups that focus on
    the problems of protection of women against domestic violence and
    sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS included the Women and AIDS Support
    Network and Musasa Project.
        During the July cabinet restructuring, the cabinet level position
    of Minister of State for Gender Affairs in the Office of the President
    was eliminated; however, the Government created a new Ministry of Youth
    Development, Gender and Employment. The Government gives qualified
    women access to training in the military and national service. Although
    there have been recent advances for women, they continue to occupy
    mainly administrative positions.
        There were reports that women were trafficked from the country to
    South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section
    6.f.).
        Children.--The Government continued to demonstrate its strong
    commitment to children's rights and welfare through a system of primary
    health care and education overseen by the Ministry of Health and Child
    Welfare. The Children's Protection and Adoption Act, the Guardianship
    of Minors Act, and the Deceased Person's Maintenance Act protect the
    legal rights of minor children; however, the Government has not
    enforced these acts. While there is no compulsory education, the
    country has made considerable progress in providing education for
    children, and overall primary school attendance has increased by more
    than 4,000 percent since independence. About 93 percent of children
    reached grade 5. However, with the reintroduction of school fees in
    urban schools and rural secondary schools, enrollment has declined.
    School fees have risen sharply due to high inflation, resulting in the
    inability of many families to afford to send all of their children to
    school. The 1998 U.N. Development Program's Human Development Report
    noted that in most regions of the country, fewer girls than boys attend
    secondary schools. If a family is unable to pay tuition costs, it is
    most often female children who leave school. The literacy rate for
    women and girls over the age of 15 is estimated to be 80 percent while
    the male rate is about 90 percent. However, budget cuts and the lack of
    adequate attention to HIV/AIDS prevention are eroding the Government's
    capacity to address children's needs in these areas. International
    experts estimated that HIV/AIDS infects one-fourth of the adult
    population and killed more than 150,000 persons during 1999; it is
    estimated that the number of deaths during the year was equal to or
    higher than in 1999.Deaths from HIV/AIDS created hundreds of thousands
    of orphans. There were an estimated 150,000 orphans in 1995, 900,000 in
    1999, and 1 million during the year. This rapidly growing problem is
    expected to put a tremendous strain on both formal and traditional
    social systems. At the household level, there is an increased burden on
    the extended family, which has traditional responsibility for caring
    for orphans. Many grandparents are left to care for the young, and in
    some cases children or adolescents are heading families. Many orphans
    are sent to foster homes, where they often become victims of sexual
    abuse. At the provincial and national levels, the governments are
    saddled with increasing demands for community orphan projects,
    orphanages, health care, and school fees.
        The number of street children, with the related problems of theft,
    street violence, drug use, and violent death, also is increasing. There
    were an estimated 12,000 homeless street children in the country in
    1999, many of them the children of former Mozambican refugees or AIDS
    orphans. The number of incidents of child abuse, including incest (long
    a taboo), infanticide, child abandonment, and rape is increasing. It is
    not known whether the statistics reflect the fact that more cases are
    occurring or only that more are being reported. There are reports of
    child labor, including reports of an increased number of girls engaged
    in prostitution (see Section 6.d.). The Ministry of Justice's
    Vulnerable Witnesses Committee established victim-friendly courts (VFC)
    in 1997 to improve the judicial system's handling of child victims of
    rape and sexual abuse. According to the Musasa Project, 39 percent of
    the 3,000 persons whom it assisted at its Harare office in 1998 were
    victims of child abuse. There was a large volume of rape cases in the
    Harare VFC, which led to calls by children's rights' advocates to
    establish additional courts in surrounding areas. The criminal justice
    system has special provisions for dealing with juvenile offenders.
        In August it was reported that war veterans abducted and sexually
    abused 10 schoolchildren. The case reportedly was under investigation,
    although there was no further information available at year's end (see
    Section 1.c.).
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, rarely is performed in the country. However,
    according to press reports, the initiation rites practiced by the small
    Remba ethnic group in Midlands Province include infibulation, the most
    extreme form of FGM.
        The traditional practice of offering a young girl as compensatory
    payment in interfamily disputes continued during the year.
        Indigenous African churches that combine elements of established
    Christian beliefs with some beliefs based on traditional African
    culture and religion generally accept and promote polygyny and the
    marriage of girls at young ages; they also generally approve of healing
    only through prayer and oppose science-based medicine including the
    vaccination of children.
        There were continuing reports that children were killed for body
    parts by persons practicing healing rituals associated with traditional
    religions. Body parts from children reportedly were considered the most
    efficacious for some such purposes.
        There were reports that children were trafficked from the country
    to South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section
    6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--President Mugabe appointed a disability
    activist to Parliament in 1995 to represent the needs of the disabled.
    The Disabled Persons Act of 1992 specifically prohibits discrimination
    against persons with disabilities in employment, admission to public
    places, or provision of services and is viewed by advocates of the
    disabled as model legislation. However, in practice, the lack of
    resources for training and education severely hampers the ability of
    disabled persons to compete for scarce jobs. The act stipulates that
    government buildings should be accessible to disabled persons; however,
    implementation of this policy has been slow. A local NGO was working on
    auditing the act and implementing the law during the year. NGO's were
    lobbying to include albinos in the definition of ``disabled'' under the
    act. Disabled persons face particularly harsh customary discrimination.
    According to traditional belief, persons with disabilities are
    considered bewitched, and reports of disabled children being hidden
    when visitors arrive are common.
        Religious Minorities.--There are generally amicable relations among
    the various religious communities. The Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and
    Buddhist religious communities are relatively small and generally not
    in competition with Christian denominations for converts. Catholic
    Church officials say they welcome interfaith dialog with Muslims but
    believe some of the evangelical churches are hostile to Islam.
        There are at least four umbrella religious organizations primarily
    focused on interdenominational dialog among Christians, and some
    intrareligious activities. However, Muslims are not represented in any
    of these organizations, and there is no vehicle for formal Christian-
    Muslim dialog. Muslims have complained of discrimination by private
    employers who refuse to allow them sufficient time to worship at their
    mosques on Fridays.
        During the February constitutional referendum, more than 150
    priests and ministers under the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe
    (EFZ) lobbied for Christianity to be enshrined in the new constitution
    as the country's sole national religion. That position was rejected,
    primarily because its opponents argued that Christianity had brought
    about colonization in Africa.
        There were reports of growing tensions between mainline Christian
    churches and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions. Leaders
    of the Christian churches reportedly opposed the repeal or modification
    of the Witchcraft Suppression Act sought by practitioners of
    traditional indigenous religions (see Section 2.c.). Several leaders of
    Christian churches reportedly denounced a perceived increase in
    ``satanism'' in the country; acts of satanism allegedly included
    drinking human blood and eating human flesh.
        There were continuing reports of ritual murders associated with
    traditional religious practices, although the Government actively
    enforces the law against all kinds of murder including ritual murders.
    Gordon Chavanduka, chairman of ZINATHA, the national association of
    traditional healers, reportedly stated that black-market demand for
    human body parts used in making potions has increased greatly in recent
    years. Some observers suggested that this development may be associated
    with the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country, and the lack of affordable
    science-based medicines for treating infected persons (see Section
    2.c.). Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that persons
    killed children for body parts for healing rituals associated with
    traditional religions. In July 1999, Faber Chidarikire, a ZANU-PF
    official and mayor of the northern town of Chinhoyi, was charged with
    murdering a 13-year-old girl in 1987, but he was released on bail after
    intervention by the Attorney General; there were reports that
    Chidarikire cut off the girl's ear and excised her genitals. In 1995 an
    examination of a severed head found in Chidarikire's car in 1994
    indicated that it had been severed with a blade, not in a car accident
    as Chidarikire had maintained.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to Government
    statistics, the Shona ethnic group makes up 82 percent of the
    population, Ndebele 15 percent, whites less than 1 percent, and other
    ethnic groups 2 percent. There have been tensions both between the
    African majority and the white minority, between the Shona majority and
    the Ndebele minority, and among the various Shona subgroups.
        During the 1960's and 1970's, elements of the white minority
    rebelled against British rule and established and maintained a racially
    discriminatory apartheid regime, which was dismantled in 1980 only
    after armed insurgencies by the armed wings of ZANU and the Zimbabwe
    African People's Union (ZAPU), and economic sanctions by the
    international community. The white community remains economically
    privileged; despite government efforts at land reform, white farmers
    continued to own one-half of the country's most productive land and
    most of its major businesses at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
        Government services are provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The
    Government has sought to expand and improve the previously ``whites
    only'' infrastructure in urban areas to provide health and social
    services to all citizens, and all schools and churches are integrated
    legally. However, social interaction between Africans and whites
    remained uncommon. Racial tensions have subsided since independence and
    remain low despite the Government's ongoing attempts to blame whites
    for the country's economic problems. On many occasions, especially
    during the campaign to amend the draft constitution, President Mugabe,
    members of his Government, and the state-controlled media attempted to
    reignite resentment of the white minority. President Mugabe accused the
    white minority of having too close ties to their ancestral countries,
    and has criticized other governments for trying to interfere with the
    ``continuing liberation struggle.'' During the year, the Government
    embarked on a far-reaching ``fast-track'' resettlement program whereby
    privately-owned farms, which are mostly white-owned, were designated
    for seizure with no clear means for providing compensation. Government
    supporters and war veterans assaulted commercial farmers in their homes
    and on their property (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In a nationally
    televised address before the June election, Mugabe called white farmers
    ``enemies of the state.'' On October 15, Matabeleland North Governor
    Obert Mpofu accused whites of using black citizens in an attempt to
    remove Mugabe's Government and warned of violence if whites continued
    to frustrate the ``fast-track'' resettlement effort (see Section 1.f.).
    On October 25, President Mugabe threatened to revoke his Government's
    policy of reconciliation with whites that was adopted in 1980 after the
    MDC tabled a motion in Parliament to impeach him. The President
    threatened to arrest white M.P.'s David Coltart and Michael Auret for
    drafting the impeachment motion.
        During the 1980's the Shona-dominated Government suppressed a brief
    Ndebele insurgency with a 5-year pacification campaign that killed an
    estimated 10,000-20,000 Ndebele civilians in Matabeleland, the region
    in which the Ndebele are concentrated. Although relations between the
    Shona and the Ndebele subequently have improved, the disproportionate
    number of Shona speaking teachers and headmasters in Matabeleland
    schools remained a sensitive issue. Members of the Ndebele community
    continued to criticize the Government's unequal distribution of
    national resources and the Government's failure to compensate victims
    of the 1980's Matabeleland killings.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1985 Labor Relations Act (LRA)
    provides private sector workers with freedom of association and the
    right to elect their own representatives, publish newsletters, set
    programs and policies that reflect the political and economic interests
    of labor, and form or join unions without prior authorization. The LRA
    allows for the existence of multiple unions per industry, provided that
    each is registered with the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and
    Social Welfare (MPSLSW). While the Government can deregister individual
    unions, the High Court has ruled that the LRA does not give the
    Minister the power to suspend or deregister the national umbrella labor
    confederation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The
    Parliament did not consider the Labor Relations Amendment Bill (LRAB)
    again during the year.
        Approximately 25 percent of the formal sector work force
    (approximately 400,000 workers) belongs to the 31 unions that form the
    ZCTU. ZCTU officers are elected by delegates of affiliated trade unions
    at congresses held every 5 years; the ZCTU postponed its next congress
    until February 2001. While the Government encouraged the ZCTU's
    formation, anticipating that it would form the labor arm of ZANU-PF, it
    no longer controls the ZCTU; most of the leadership of the opposition
    MDC party came from the ZCTU. The Government and the ZCTU often have
    clashed sharply on economic policy, particularly the Economic
    Structural Adjustment Program that was implemented in 1990. The
    Government usually has not consulted either the ZCTU or employers
    before implementing policy decisions that affect the workplace. This
    lack of consultation has often resulted in reactions that disrupted
    labor relations, thereby promoting uncertainty and some strikes.
        The 1992 Labor Relations Amendment Act (LRAA) specifies that
    workers may establish independent worker committees, which exist side
    by side with unions in each plant. Worker committees also must be
    registered with the MPSLSW, which is free to refuse registration. ZCTU
    officials believe that the formation of worker committees was an
    attempt to dilute union authority, because the worker committees are
    comprised of union and nonunion workers. However, the ineffectiveness
    of worker committees demonstrated the need for the experienced worker
    representation of the established trade unions.
        It is virtually impossible to conduct legal collective job action.
    There is no right to strike in the Constitution. The 1985 LRA, the 1992
    LRAA, and the LRAB 2000 do not include mention of this issue.
    ``Essential'' employees are prohibited by law from striking, and the
    Government defines all public sector workers as ``essential.'' Managers
    also are prohibited from striking, and in various industries, the
    Government defines most employees as managers; the Government also
    considers some private sector workers, such as those in the health
    sector, as essential workers. For the remaining nonessential employees
    legally to conduct a strike, over 50 percent of the company's employees
    must vote in favor of the action. Many employees are afraid to do so,
    for fear of management reprisals. However, if a majority vote is
    obtained, the dispute is referred to the concerned government agency
    for resolution. Only if the government-appointed arbitrator determines
    that a resolution is not possible is the right to strike granted. These
    governmentimposed delays prevent most employees and their unions from
    ever declaring legal strikes. However, illegal strikes or work
    stoppages have occurred within individual companies, and occasionally,
    in entire industries.
        There were minimal labor actions, such as strikes and stayaways,
    during the year. With the volatile political environment and the
    economic crisis, labor and management united in calls to address
    fundamental economic and political governance issues. In a nationwide
    stay-away on August 2, in which 80 percent of workers reportedly
    participated, the ZCTU instructed workers not to report to their jobs
    to protest the political violence and farm invasions that occurred
    before the parliamentary elections (see Sections 1.f. and 3).
        There were efforts to organize nationwide strikes by security guard
    service employees and mining sector employees; however, they failed
    because of disagreements between workers and unions, and workers
    returned to work without reaching new labor agreements in either
    sector. On August 14, after a breakdown in contract negotiations, the
    Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe went on strike, closing almost half
    of the 40 mines in the country for 2 weeks until the union ended the
    strike and reentered negotiations.
        During the year, workers from individual companies seeking pay
    increases called spot strikes because of the decrease in the value of
    their salaries due to inflation and currency devaluation; however,
    these strikes were sporadic and not formally sanctioned by either
    individual unions or the ZCTU.
        The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has
    criticized the labor laws for giving ``wide scope to the authorities to
    declare that a given enterprise or industry constitutes an essential
    service, and then impose a ban (on strikes) on it.'' The authority to
    reclassify a previously nonessential service as essential was not used
    during the year. In previous years, President Mugabe has issued blanket
    bans on strikes in the country in both the public and private sectors,
    and he issued a 6-month ban on all collective job actions from November
    1998 to May 1999; the ban expired in May 1999. The President did not
    issue any blanket bans on strikes during the year, but government
    officials stressed that the Government reserves the right to reimpose
    the ban at its discretion.
        The ZCTU was critical of violence during the year directed at
    agricultural workers who live and work on commercial farms, many of
    whom are members of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers
    Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), which is affiliated with the ZCTU. On May
    8, a group of 20 armed ZANU-PF supporters beat workers at a workers
    compound and forced them to attend a political rally (see Section
    1.c.). There were reports of violence and isolated incidents of war
    veterans threatening workers for alleged MDC support.
        There are several pending ILO cases that allege violent police
    intervention against union demonstrators and inadequate investigation
    of assaults and arson against trade unionists.
        The LRA allows for the formation of multiple national federations.
    A second umbrella labor organization, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade
    Unions (ZFTU), was launched in October 1996 with the stated purpose of
    providing an alternative to the ZCTU, and states that its goal is to
    work in collaboration with the Government, and it is openly critical of
    the ZCTU. The ZFTU's leadership and membership remained unclear, with
    key personnel changing regularly. Most observers believe that the ZFTU
    has close ties with the ZANU-PF ruling party. The ZFTU largely was
    inactive, except for occasional public statements criticizing ZCTU
    activities, and generally was not considered a viable labor
    organization.
        Public servants and their associations, the Public Service
    Association (PSA), the Zimbabwe Teachers Association (ZIMTA), and the
    Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZINA) are not covered by the provisions of
    the LRA. Instead, their conditions of employment are provided for under
    the Constitution. Although civil servants constitutionally are barred
    from forming unions, in 1995 the ZIMTA stated its intention to
    affiliate with the ZCTU and the PSA. In 1998 the PSA affiliated itself
    with the ZCTU. During the year, a new organization, the Civil Service
    Employees Association, was formed as an umbrella organization for civil
    service employees, and requested affiliation with the ZCTU at year's
    end. This request remained pending with the ZCTU leadership at year's
    end. All public servants are deemed essential and are prohibited from
    striking.
        The ZCTU and its officials are free to associate with international
    labor organizations and do so actively. The ZCTU is affiliated with the
    ICFTU and the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The LRA
    provides workers with the right to organize. As originally written,
    this act was silent on the right to bargain collectively. However, the
    1992 LRAA permits unions to bargain collectively over wages. Worker
    committees, which by law are not organizationally part of the unions or
    the ZCTU, are empowered to negotiate with the management of a
    particular plant on the conditions of labor and codes of conduct in the
    workplace, except for wages. Unions, employers, and individual workers
    have the right to take their grievances to the Government's Labor
    Relations Tribunal (LRT) for final adjudication. The LRT maintained a
    huge backlog of cases again during the year, with 3,383 cases pending
    by year's end, some of which have been awaiting a hearing for years.
    The backlog is attributed to staffing shortages; only one out of six
    LRT judgeships were filled by year's end.
        Collective bargaining wage negotiations take place on an industry-
    wide basis between the relevant union and employer organizations
    sitting on joint employment boards or councils. Collective bargaining
    agreements apply to all workers in an industry, not just union members.
    Over 80 percent of all industries are unionized. From April to July
    each year workers and employees negotiate salary increases and other
    benefits in their respective National Employment Councils (NEC's).
    These bodies submit their agreements to the Registrar in the MPSLSW for
    approval. The Government retains the power to veto agreements that it
    believes would harm the economy. However, it does not involve itself
    directly in labor negotiations unless requested to do so by one of the
    parties. When no trade union represents a specific sector,
    representatives of the organized workers, such as the professional
    associations, meet with the employer associations, under the mediation
    of labor officers from the MPSLSW. Although companies offered wage
    increases that did not keep up with inflation during the year, workers
    and unions accepted the increases offered because of the economic
    crisis.
        Public sector wages are determined by the Salary Service Department
    of the MPSLSW, subject to the approval of an independent Public Service
    Commission (PSC). Each year PSC officials meet with PSA representatives
    to review wages and benefits. These reviews result in a recommendation
    that is forwarded to the MPSLSW. The Minister is not required by law to
    accept the recommendation and usually proposes a wages and benefits
    package that is less than the recommendation, resulting in yearly
    industrial protest actions by civil servants.
        Employees in positions designated as managerial are excluded from
    union membership and thus from the collective bargaining process. The
    ZCTU stated that the definition of manager in the 1992 LRAA was overly
    broad and criticized the Government and private sector for using it to
    exclude managers from the collective bargaining process.
        The LRA prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against
    union members. Complaints of such discrimination are referred to labor
    relations officers and may subsequently be adjudicated by the LRT. Such
    complaints are handled under the mechanism for resolving cases
    involving ``unfair labor practices.'' The determining authority may
    direct that workers fired due to antiunion discrimination should be
    reinstated, although this has yet to be utilized in practice.
        The LRAA streamlined the procedure for adjudicating disputes by
    strengthening the LRT. Labor relations officers hear a dispute; their
    decision may be appealed to regional labor relations officers, after
    which the LRT may hear the case. Ultimately, it may be appealed to the
    Supreme Court. However, with only one of six LRT judgeships appointed
    by year's end, cases from as early as 1993 remained pending with the
    LRT at year's end.
        The Export Processing Zones Act states the LRA shall not apply to
    workers in export processing zones (EPZ's). The ZCTU has negotiated
    directly with EPZ employers to allow some unions in the EPZ, although
    their number and level of activity remain low.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, the law is not
    enforced in practice. The traditional practice of offering a young girl
    as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes continued in rural
    areas (see Section 5), and there were reports that persons,
    particularly women and children, were trafficked from the country to
    South Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law bans the employment of children under the age of
    15 and restricts employment of those between the ages of 12 and 17 to
    light work during school holidays for periods not exceeding 6 hours per
    day. Light work is defined as work not likely to prejudice a child's
    education, health, safety, rest, or social, physical, or mental
    development. All hazardous employment, overtime, and night shift work
    is banned for those under the age of 18. However, there is little to no
    enforcement of these laws. Although schooling is not compulsory, over
    90 percent of children attend school through grade 5 (see Section 5).
        Child labor is common. Children work in the agricultural sector,
    and there were reports that children worked as domestics and as car-
    watchers on the streets. Child labor in the formal agricultural sector,
    such as on tea and coffee plantations, reportedly involves children
    working in the fields after school during the planting and harvesting
    seasons and full-time during school holidays. Long hours are common.
    Children often work alongside their parents, and their working
    conditions approximate those of adults. While some form of child labor
    on large commercial farms is widespread, agricultural organizations
    maintain that the labor performed is not exploitative, involuntary,
    contrary to law, or outside of cultural norms that allow children to
    engage in field work with their families. On some farms where children
    attend boarding schools, school schedules and calendars are tailored to
    allow children to work in the fields during busy farming periods. These
    children work in ``earn and learn'' schools, where a percentage of
    their wages are applied to their school fees and books. Economic
    hardship makes this arrangement a necessity for children from very poor
    families.
        The rate of HIV/AIDS infection in the country has reached about 25
    percent among the adult population, and the rate of infection appeared
    to be accelerating. As a result, more children worked in the informal
    sector to fill the income gap left by ill or deceased relatives. The
    number of children in adoptive homes or living on the streets increased
    rapidly.
        The unemployment rate continues to grow, decreasing the number of
    children employed in the formal sector. The incidence of children
    working in the informal sector has increased, however, as families,
    often headed by children need a source of income. Many children sell
    simple wares on the streets. In addition, police have reported an
    increasing number of girls under 17 engaged in prostitution. The
    deteriorating economy also is forcing more children to work. Although
    child labor in the agricultural, domestic, and informal sectors
    increasingly is discussed, the Government and NGO's have been unable to
    gather concrete data on the number of cases.
        In November 1999, Parliament ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
    worst forms of child labor, and during the year, it was incorporated
    into the Child Adoption and Protection Bill, which had not been
    implemented by year's end. In September, the Government released the
    results of an ILO-funded study on child labor in the country. The worst
    forms of child labor, such as child sweatshops and child prostitution,
    are not widely practiced in the country. The police frequently enforce
    laws against child prostitution.
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, the
    traditional practice of offering a young girl as compensatory payment
    in interfamily disputes continued (see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and there
    were reports that children were trafficked from the country to South
    Africa for forced prostitution and forced labor (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The maximum legal workweek is 54
    hours, and the law prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour rest period per
    week. Working conditions are regulated by the Government on an
    industry-specific basis. The Constitution empowers the PSC to set
    conditions of employment in the public sector. The Government
    eliminated a national minimum wage as part of the Economic Structural
    Adjustment Program of 1990, with the exception of agricultural and
    domestic workers. Government regulations for each of the 22 industrial
    sectors continue to specify minimum wages, hours, holidays, and
    required safety measures. In recent years, in an effort to opt out of
    the wage bargaining system, the Government mandated wage parameters for
    industries. Due to an ineffective monitoring system, many agricultural
    and domestic workers are remunerated below the minimum wage. The
    minimum wage for agricultural workers is $24 (Zim $1650) per month, and
    for domestic workers is $41 (Zim $2900).
        Minimum wages in the formal sector changed continuously as a result
    of multiple increases in salaries to offset the inflation rate. In
    almost all cases, however, wage increases did not keep pace with
    inflation, devaluations, and the increases in the prices of petroleum
    products and basic food staples. A major goal of the ZCTU during the
    year was to encourage Government to again establish a national minimum
    wage but it did not reach an agreement with the Government by year's
    end. The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for
    a worker and his family, and at least 70 percent of the population
    reportedly lives below the poverty line.
        In April civil servants were granted 60 to 90 percent pay raises,
    with the lowest paid positions receiving the largest percentage raises.
    While broadly viewed as an effort by the Government to buy the votes of
    the civil servants in the elections, these raises were also viewed as
    necessary by the ZCTU because of the traditionally low level of civil
    servant salaries. In October the Ministry of Public Service, Labor, and
    Social Welfare (MPSLSW) announced a new regulation prohibiting civil
    servants from engaging in any for-profit enterprises. The Government
    alleged that many workers were operating their own for-profit
    enterprises instead of attending to official duties during the workday
    as the reason for the regulation; however, many civil servants
    contested that they needed to do so to earn a livable wage.
        According to the ZCTU, some employers take advantage of illegal
    refugees for inexpensive labor. Because the job market is worse in
    neighboring countries such as Malawi and Mozambique, the refugees are
    willing to risk arrest and work for wages below the legal minimums (see
    Section 2.d.).
        Many of the basic legal protections do not apply to the vast
    majority of farm, mine, and domestic workers. Health and safety
    standards are determined only on an industry-specific basis. Despite
    the lack of general standards, the National Social Security Authority's
    (NSSA) statistics from 1999 show a decrease in the number of
    occupational injuries and deaths. There were 139 fatal job accidents
    reported during 1999, a decrease from 1998, and 12,000 occupational
    injuries were reported in 1999. In theory, labor relations officers
    from the MPSLSW are assigned to monitor developments in each plant to
    ensure that government minimum wage policy and occupational health and
    safety regulations are observed. In practice these offices are
    understaffed, cannot afford to inspect routinely workplaces, and must
    rely on voluntary compliance and reporting by employers.
        The Government designated the Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council
    (ZOSHC) to regulate safe work conditions. The ZOSHC is a quasi-
    governmental, advisory body comprised of six representatives each from
    the Government, employers, and trade unions. The National Director of
    the ZOSHC is responsible for enforcing worker safety regulations. The
    director reports weekly to the MPSLSW on actions taken. Budgetary
    restraints and staffing shortages, as well as its status as an advisory
    council, have made the council ineffective. The NSSA continues to
    experience difficulty monitoring the thousands of work sites across the
    country; however, it has begun to enforce safety standards more
    vigorously, by closing down shops and factories in non-compliance.
    Although workers have a legal right to remove themselves from dangerous
    work situations without jeopardy to continued employment, in practice
    they risk the loss of their livelihood if they do so, and this
    situation worsened during the year.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no laws that
    specifically address trafficking in persons, common law prohibits
    abduction and forced labor; however, there were reports that persons
    were trafficked from the country to South Africa for forced
    prostitution and forced labor. The Government has taken no actions to
    address the problem of trafficking in persons.

                           EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                                  ----------

                                   AUSTRALIA

        Australia is a constitutional democracy with a federal
    parliamentary form of government in which citizens periodically choose
    their representatives in free and fair multiparty elections. The
    Government respects the constitutional provisions for an independent
    judiciary in practice.
        Federal and State police are under the firm control of the civilian
    authorities and carry out their functions in accordance with the law.
    There were occasional reports that police committed abuses.
        A highly developed market-based economy, which includes
    manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and services, provides most
    citizens with a high per capita income. A wide range of government
    programs offers assistance for disadvantaged citizens.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
    and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
    individual instances of abuse. There were occasional reports that
    police beat or otherwise abused persons. The Government administers
    many programs to improve the socioeconomic conditions of Aborigines and
    Torres Straits Islanders, who together form about 2 percent of the
    population, and to address longstanding discrimination against them.
    Societal violence and discrimination against women are problems that
    are being addressed actively. There were some instances of forced
    labor, and trafficking in women is a limited but growing problem, which
    the Government is taking steps to address. Leaders in the ethnic and
    immigrant communities expressed concern that increased numbers of
    illegal immigrants and violence at migrant detention centers contribute
    to instances of vilification of immigrants and minorities.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings by government officials. However, 85
    persons died in prisons, police custody, or during police attempts to
    detain them (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits all such practices; however, there were
    occasional reports that police mistreated suspects in custody.
    Indigenous groups charge that police harassment of indigenous people is
    pervasive and that racial discrimination among police and prison
    custodians persists. Amnesty International reported several incidents
    that involved such abuses. State and territorial police forces have
    internal affairs units that investigate allegations of abuse and report
    to a civilian ombudsman.
        In 1999 the total number of deaths in custody fell by 8 to 85. Of
    these, 26 deaths occurred in police custody or during attempts by
    police to detain suspects. The remainder occurred in prison custody. Of
    the total deaths in custody, 29 persons died from hanging. Nineteen
    persons died of natural causes. Eight died as a result of injuries
    sustained while fleeing police during high-speed pursuit. Another eight
    died of other injuries. The police shot and killed six persons. Three
    persons died from self-inflicted gunshot wounds. Eleven persons died as
    a result of drug overdoses. One person died from unspecified causes.
    There were no juvenile deaths in custody during 1999. However, in
    February, a 15-year-old Aboriginal boy committed suicide in a Darwin
    detention center while serving a mandatory 28-day sentence for property
    offenses. In all cases where deadly force is used, the circumstances of
    the case are reviewed and police have been sanctioned in cases where
    abuses have been found to occur. There were no cases during the year
    for which police were disciplined for the unjustified use of force.
        Aboriginal adults represent 1.6 percent of the adult population but
    constituted approximately 20 percent of the total prison population,
    according to a March report by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
    During 1999 Aborigines accounted for 19 (roughly 22 percent) of the 85
    deaths in custody. Six died in police custody or during attempts by
    police to detain them. Of the six, three died from hanging; one died of
    natural causes; and two died from injuries. Thirteen died in prison. Of
    the 13 who died in prison, 3 died from hanging; 7 died of natural
    causes; 2 died from injuries; and 1 died from a drug overdose.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        At several points during the year, there were allegations that
    staff at Woomera immigration detention center were aware of and did
    nothing to stop a male detainee from offering his 13-year-old son to
    other detainees for sex. In December a South Australia state government
    inquiry found no evidence to support these allegations; it also found
    no evidence that the boy had been sexually abused.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
    prohibition.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        There is a well-developed system of federal and state courts, with
    the High Court at its apex. Almost all criminal trials are conducted by
    courts established under state and territorial legislation. The Federal
    Court and the High Court have very limited roles to play.
        The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
    judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
        When trials are conducted in local courts, magistrates sit alone.
    In higher courts, namely the state district or county courts and the
    state or territorial supreme courts, trials are usually conducted
    before a judge and jury. The jury decides on the facts and on a verdict
    after a trial conducted by a judge.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices; government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although there is no bill of
    rights, in two decisions the High Court has indicated that freedom of
    political discourse is implied in the Constitution. The Government
    respects these rights in practice. An independent press, an effective
    judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combine to
    ensure freedom of speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
    association is codified in the Workplace Relations Act of 1996. While
    the right to peaceful assembly is not codified in law, citizens
    exercise it without government restriction.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Constitution prohibits the adoption of a state religion. Minority
    religions are given equal rights to land, status, and building of
    places of worship.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government encourages immigration by skilled migrants, family
    members, and refugees.
        The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There is no provision
    for first asylum. In April 1999, the Government offered temporary safe
    haven to 4,000 Kosovar refugees. On September 1, 1999, 550 East
    Timorese were given similar temporary protection. In November 1999, the
    Government changed its policy on undocumented migrants and asylum
    seekers. Previously those who claimed a fear of persecution if returned
    to their country of origin were either issued or denied protection
    visas, providing for full residence and employment rights, with no
    intermediate measures. With the change in policy, undocumented arrivals
    are issued a temporary protection visa valid for 3 years only. This
    visa does not provide for application for family reunification and
    limits access to public benefits to medical assistance only. After 3
    years, a case is reviewed, at which point a full protection visa is
    issued if the person is still unable to return home.
        Under the Migration Reform Act of 1994, asylum seekers who arrive
    at the border without prior authorization to enter the country are
    automatically detained but may be released from detention if they meet
    certain criteria--including age, ill-health, and experiences of torture
    or other trauma. The majority of asylum seekers are detained for the
    sometimes prolonged asylum adjudication process. The large number of
    asylum seekers entering the country in 1999 and during the year slowed
    the processing of protection claims while the Department of Immigration
    and Multicultural Affairs acquired additional staff and resources.
    Previously a primary decision on an application for refugee status
    could be made in an average of 6 weeks; however, the increased workload
    initially raised the average time for the primary decision to 16 weeks.
    By year's end, the average time for a primary decision had fallen.
    Those who obtained a positive primary decision were released
    immediately from detention; those who continued to pursue their cases
    remain detained until their cases were resolved or they were returned
    to their country of origin. As a result, a small number of asylum
    seekers are detained for years, while their cases are reviewed and
    appealed. The Government's 2000-01 budget, which assumes an 18-week
    period for processing claims, includes financial incentives to the
    Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to process claims
    more quickly in order to reduce the amount of time protection seekers
    are held in detention. The detention policy has led to extensive
    litigation initiated by human rights and refugee advocacy groups, which
    charge that the sometimes-lengthy detentions violate the human rights
    of the asylum seekers. The U.N. Human Rights Committee stated in April
    1997 that Australia had violated the rights of a boat person by
    detaining him for more than 4 years while his applications to remain in
    the country were being considered. The Human Rights Committee stated
    that his detention was arbitrary and in violation of the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In an April 1997 report to
    Parliament, the federally funded but independent Australian Human
    Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) also criticized the
    Government's treatment of asylum seekers as breaching international
    treaty obligations. However, in 1999, the HREOC acknowledged that
    conditions in detention centers had improved since its 1997 report.
    During the year, there were two major disturbances at the Woomera
    detention center by detainees who alleged that they were being held in
    unsatisfactory conditions. The first of the disturbances was
    nonviolent, and was resolved peacefully after the Government pledged
    increased attention to the detainees' requests. However, the second
    disturbance became violent when some of the detainees set fire to
    several buildings at the detention center. Security guards used water
    cannon to restore order. The Government refused to negotiate with the
    leaders of the second disturbance, on the grounds that they had used
    violence. The Government maintains that the detainees' fundamental
    human rights are protected, and that their demands, for items such as
    satellite television, are excessive; human rights groups allege that
    detainees are abused and beaten by the guards at Woomera, but have not
    provided evidence of such mistreatment. Late in the year, the federal
    government launched an inquiry to determine whether detainees at
    Woomera had access to complaint mechanisms such as the government
    ombudsman and HREOC if they felt that they were being mistreated. At
    several points during the year, there were allegations that staff at
    Woomera were aware of and did nothing to stop a male detainee from
    offering his 13-year-old son to other detainees for sex. In December a
    South Australia state government inquiry found no evidence to support
    these allegations; it also found no evidence that the boy had been
    abused sexually.
        During the year, some Kosovar Albanians, who had been allowed to
    enter the country on a temporary basis while facing danger in Kosovo,
    were returned to Kosovo after the UNHCR, determined that it was safe
    for them to return. However, some claimed that they still feared for
    their safety and were returned involuntarily. Prior to their departure,
    these persons were given an opportunity to apply for protection under
    Australian law; some sought and were granted such protection. Others
    were granted extensions of their stay for family or health reasons.
        In 2000-01, the Government planned to accept 76,000 migrants, with
    an additional 12,000 admitted under the humanitarian program. This
    figure was to include 2,000 places for those persons already in the
    country who were granted refugee status. As in 1997-98 and 1998-99, the
    humanitarian program continues to give priority to the former
    Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Africa. Persons admitted under the
    humanitarian program have immediate access to a wide range of
    government welfare and health benefits, including income support,
    English education, and translating and interpreting services. In 1998-
    99, the Government spent approximately $4.9 million (A$7.9 million) on
    resettlement services for refugees. An additional $3.25 million (A$5
    million) was spent on other forms of refugee assistance.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage and mandatory voting. In October 1998, voters
    elected the Liberal-National Party coalition to a second 3-year term of
    office. On November 6, 1999, voters rejected a referendum to amend the
    Constitution to become a republic.
        There are no legal impediments that prevent women and indigenous
    people from holding public office; however, women are underrepresented
    in government and politics. Approximately 25 percent of federal
    parliamentarians are women, an increase from 22 percent in the last
    Parliament. Both the Government and the opposition have declared their
    intent to increase the numbers of women elected to public office.
        The deleterious effects of poor educational achievement and a
    generally inferior socioeconomic status have contributed significantly
    to the underrepresentation of Aboriginals among political leaders. One
    Aboriginal was elected to the Federal Senate in the October 1998
    elections; there were no Aboriginals in the previous Parliament.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Human rights groups, of which there are a large number, operate
    without government restriction (and in some instances with government
    funding), investigating and publishing their findings on human rights
    cases. Government officials cooperate and respond to their views. The
    most significant of these is the federally funded but independent Human
    Rights and Employment Opportunity Commission (HREOC). Overall
    complaints of discrimination filed with the HREOC dropped from 1,659 in
    1998-99 to 1,317 in 1999-00, a 26 percent reduction. Approximately 43
    percent of all cases are declined because they do not fall under
    HREOC's jurisdiction and/or no discrimination has been shown, 37
    percent are resolved through conciliation, 12 percent are withdrawn
    before action can be taken, and 8 percent are referred for further
    action.
        In July the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that Australia
    should do more to secure for indigenous Australians a stronger role in
    decisionmaking over their traditional lands and natural resources. The
    Committee urged Australia to do more to provide remedy to members of
    the ``Stolen Generation'' (see Section 5). The Committee also
    recommended review of mandatory sentencing policies (see Section 5) and
    mandatory detention of illegal arrivals (see Section 2.d.). The
    Government responded that many of the recommendations were neither
    necessary nor desirable and reiterated its belief that mandatory
    detention of illegal arrivals was consistent with its treaty
    obligations.
        In March the International Labor Organization's (ILO's) Committee
    on Freedom of Association made a series of recommendations regarding
    the country's labor laws, especially the Workplace Relations Act of
    1996 and the Trade Practices Act (see Sections 6.a. and 6.b.). The
    Government stated in response to the recommendations that the ILO's
    comments ``reflect an inadequate understanding of Australian law,'' and
    stated that the ILO failed to understand the domestic role that certain
    labor laws played. The Government rejected all of the ILO's
    recommendations.
        In August the Government announced the results of a review of its
    cooperation with U.N. human rights treaty committees. While maintaining
    its commitment to involvement with the committees, the Government, as a
    result of the review, decided to limit visits by such committees to
    cases where a ``compelling reason'' exists for the visit. In addition,
    the Government stated that it would not delay removal of unsuccessful
    asylum seekers who appealed to one of the U.N. Human Rights mechanisms;
    previously, such persons had been allowed to remain pending the
    resolution of the appeal of their cases to such U.N. bodies.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The law prohibits discrimination based on these factors, and the
    Government and an independent judiciary vigorously enforce the
    prohibition.
        From July 1998 to June 1999, 37 cases of assault against gays and
    lesbians were reported in the state of New South Wales (NSW). According
    to a recent study by the Australian Institute of Criminology, 37
    murders of homosexual men were found to be hate crimes in NSW between
    1989 and 1999.
        Women.--Social analysts and commentators estimate that domestic
    violence may affect as many as one family in three or four. Wife
    beating is particularly prevalent in certain Aboriginal communities.
    The Government recognizes that domestic violence and economic
    discrimination are serious problems and the statutorily independent Sex
    Discrimination Commissioner actively addresses these and other areas of
    discrimination. A 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) study
    found that 111,000 women who were married or in a common-law
    relationship had experienced an incident of violence by their partner
    in the previous 12-month period. Almost one in four women who have been
    married or in a common-law relationship have experienced violence by a
    partner at some time during the relationship, according to the ABS
    study.
        Trafficking in East Asian women for the sex trade is a growing
    problem (see Sections 6.c and 6.f.).
        Women have equal status under the law, and the law provides for pay
    equity. There are highly organized and effective private and public
    women's rights organizations at the federal, state, and local levels. A
    federal-level Office of the Status of Women monitors women's rights.
    The federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner receives complaints and
    attempts to resolve those that are deemed valid. According to
    government statistics, sex discrimination complaints fell by 8 percent
    between 1999 and this year; 325 new cases were filed during the year.
    Of these 83 percent were filed by women and 79 percent were employment
    related. In July the Australian Bureau of Statistics estimated that the
    ratio of female to male full-time average hourly earnings was 83
    percent. However, a study released by the Australian Institute of
    Management in May was more pessimistic; it found that women were paid
    only 66 percent of their male counterparts' wages. This study also
    found that there were fewer female board members in both large and
    small companies than the previous year. Some members of opposition
    political parties have attributed the difference to changes in
    workplace laws, such as the 1996 Workplace Relations Act, which relies
    on the use of individual employment contracts that are negotiated
    privately and thus do not necessarily foster equal pay outcomes. Other
    commentators have suggested that an ``old boy's network'' can make it
    difficult for women to negotiate salaries equal to those of their male
    counterparts.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its publicly funded systems of
    education and medical care. The Government provides a minimum benefit
    of approximately 11.5 percent of the cost of childcare for each child
    to all parents, which increases to as much as 68 percent per child for
    the lowest income families.
        The federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission receives
    complaints regarding children and attempts to resolve those it finds
    valid. Similarly, the six states and two territories investigate
    complaints of neglect or child abuse and institute practical measures
    aimed at protecting the child when such complaints prove founded. The
    Government has enacted strict legislation aimed at restricting the
    trade in, and possession of, child pornography, and which further
    allows suspected pedophiles to be tried in Australia regardless of
    where the crime was committed. There is no societal pattern of abuse.
        The Government and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
    have responded promptly to the problem of a small number of children
    who have been smuggled into the country, generally for the sex trade
    (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The NGO End Child Prostitution,
    Pornography and Trafficking (ECPAT) has conducted an aggressive public
    education campaign to raise awareness of the issue and offer strategies
    to combat trafficking in children. ECPAT successfully lobbied the
    Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to conduct
    police checks of unaccompanied children entering the country to verify
    that they are not part of a trafficking operation (see Section 6.f.).
    In August, the Department of Family and Community Services released its
    ``plan of action'' against the commercial sexual exploitation of
    children, which was designed to provide the basis for the development
    of a coordinated governmental response to this issue.
        In the past, the occurrence of female genital mutilation (FGM),
    which is widely criticized by international health experts as damaging
    to both physical and psychological health, was insignificant. However,
    in recent years small numbers of girls from immigrant communities in
    which FGM is practiced have been mutilated. The Government has
    implemented a national educational program on FGM, which is intended to
    combat the practice in a community health context. The program is
    designed to prevent FGM, to assist women and girls who already have
    been subjected to it, and to promote a consistent approach to the issue
    nationwide. The Government also has allocated funds for the development
    of state and territory legislation to combat FGM. All states and
    territories except Queensland and Western Australia have enacted
    legislation against FGM. Western Australia is developing legislation
    but had not passed it at year's end; Queensland has determined that its
    existing legislation on assault covered FGM. In all States and
    Territories where FGM legislation existed, it was a crime either to
    perform FGM or to remove a child from the jurisdiction to have FGM
    performed. Punishment for these crimes can include up to 7 years in
    prison.
        In 1992 the High Court ruled that the right to consent to the
    sterilization of a minor is not within the ordinary scope of parents'
    or guardians' powers, except in limited circumstances. The High Court
    ruled that the decision to undertake sterilization procedures should be
    made by an independent body. The Government made the Family Courts the
    arbiters in such cases. In 1998 the Government made it illegal for a
    physician to conduct sterilization of a minor without authorization
    from the Family Court. Physicians who performed such procedures without
    court authorization were subject to both criminal and civil action.
        People with Disabilities.--Legislation prohibits discrimination
    against disabled persons in employment, education, or other state
    services. The Disability Discrimination Commissioner promotes
    compliance with federal laws that prohibit discrimination against
    disabled persons. The Commissioner also promotes energetic
    implementation and enforcement of state laws that require equal access
    and otherwise protect the rights of disabled persons. On July 21, 1999,
    the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found that a private
    primary school had violated the federal Disability Discrimination Act
    when it refused to enroll a 7-year-old girl with spina bifida in its
    kindergarten program. An appeal of the ruling by the school was
    dismissed on May 18 by a federal court, and the girl was awarded
    financial compensation.
        No federal legislation mandates the uniform provision of
    accessibility for the disabled. It is lawful to deny employment or
    services to those with disabilities if there are reasonable grounds for
    believing that the disabled person would be unable to carry out the
    work or would require the employer or service provider to furnish
    services or facilities that could not be provided reasonably.
        During the year, 445 complaints of discrimination due to disability
    were filed with the HREOC, representing a 13 percent reduction in
    complaints compared with 1999. Of these 44 percent were employment
    related and 32 percent concerned the provision of goods and services.
        Indigenous People.--The Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits
    discrimination on grounds of race, color, descent, or national or
    ethnic origin. The Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs, in conjunction with
    the elected Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Commission (ATSIC),
    has the main responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and
    monitoring all governmental efforts to improve the quality of life of
    indigenous people. A wide variety of government initiatives and
    programs seek to improve all aspects of Aboriginal and Torres Straits
    Islander life. In 2000-01 the Government plans to spend approximately
    $1.2 billion (A$2.3 billion) on indigenous-specific programs in areas
    such as health, housing, education, and employment. Spending on
        indigenous-specific programs is the highest on record in real terms
    and amounts to $11,440 (A$22,000) per indigenous household (in addition
    to other nonindigenous-specific federal and state assistance programs
    to which indigenous persons may be entitled).
        However, in practice indigenous Australians continue to experience
    significantly higher rates of imprisonment, inferior access to medical
    and educational institutions, greatly reduced life expectancy rates,
    elevated levels of unemployment, and general discrimination, which
    contribute to a feeling of powerlessness.
        According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC),
    indigenous people were imprisoned nationally at 11 times the rate of
    nonindigenous people in 1998. The AIC reports that the incarceration
    rate among indigenous youth was 18.5 times that of the nonindigenous
    youth population. Over 45 percent of Aboriginal men between the ages of
    20 and 30 years have been arrested at some time in their lives. Human
    rights observers claim that socioeconomic conditions give rise to the
    common precursors of indigenous crime, for example, unemployment,
    homelessness, and boredom.
        During the year, considerable controversy arose over the mandatory
    sentencing policies of the Northern Territory and Western Australia.
    These policies set automatic prison terms for multiple convictions of
    certain crimes. For example, in the Northern Territory, adults (17
    years of age or over) convicted of property crimes of any magnitude
    must serve 14 days for the first offense, 90 days for the second
    offense, and not less than 1 year for the third offense. Juveniles (15
    to 16 years of age) may be placed in a diversionary program for their
    first property-related offense, or, if they refuse or do not qualify,
    may face a 28-day sentence for a second offense. Judges must impose
    jail sentences on juveniles for a third property offense of any
    magnitude, even for petty theft. In March 11 juveniles were being held
    in detention; the Northern Territory reported that 31 percent of the
    juvenile repeat offenders convicted between March 1997 and December
    1999 received mandatory minimum sentences of 28 days. It was not clear
    how many of those offenders received a mandatory sentence more than
    once. Human rights groups and international bodies such as the U.N.
    Human Rights Committee have criticized the mandatory sentencing
    policies, which they allege have resulted in prison terms for
    relatively minor crimes and indirectly target Aboriginals. In
    particular juvenile offenses subject to mandatory sentences were
    criticized widely after the death in February of an Aboriginal boy
    serving an automatically imposed sentence in the Northern Territory.
    Western Australia agreed to reform the system as it applies to
    juveniles in order to put more juvenile offenders into rehabilitation
    programs. On July 29, the U.N. Human Rights Committee issued an
    assessment of the country's human rights record, which was highly
    critical of mandatory sentencing. Despite the domestic and
    international pressure, the federal Government decided not to interfere
    in what it considered to be the states' prerogative, arguing that the
    laws were passed by democratically elected governments after full
    political debate, making it inappropriate for the federal government to
    intervene.
        Indigenous groups charge that police harassment of indigenous
    people, including juveniles, is pervasive and that racial
    discrimination among police and prison custodians persists. A human
    rights delegation that visited in 1996 alleged a pattern of
    mistreatment and arbitrary arrests occurring against a backdrop of
    systematic discrimination. Most of the juveniles interviewed complained
    about violence occurring after apprehension and during questioning
    about alleged offenses. In November 1998, the Queensland Government
    launched an inquiry after it was discovered that an 11-year-old
    Aboriginal boy had been held for 3 days in an adult detention center
    because no youth facility was available in that remote part of the
    state. Indigenous people believed that police systematically mistreat
    them; however, there are no government statistics to confirm this
    perception.
        The average life expectancy of an indigenous person is 20 years
    less than that of a nonindigenous person. The infant mortality rate for
    indigenous children is 2 times that of nonindigenous children. The
    maternal mortality rate for indigenous women has declined to 4 times
    that of nonindigenous women. The rates of tuberculosis and hepatitis A
    and B among indigenous people are 1.5 times that of nonindigenous
    people. The rate of leprosy among indigenous people is 4 times that of
    nonindigenous people. According to the Commonwealth Department of
    Education, Training and Youth Affairs, indigenous youth are 2.5 times
    more likely than nonindigenous youth to leave school before completing
    high school. According to the 1996 census, only about 2 percent of
    indigenous people reported having a bachelor's degree as compared with
    11 percent of other citizens. According to a study by the Australian
    Bureau of Statistics, indigenous unemployment was 17.6 percent in
    February, down from a high of 27.8 percent in 1994. This figure
    compared with an unemployment rate of 7.3 percent in February for
    nonindigenous workers.
        Government programs, including a $390 million (A$750 million)
    indigenous land fund and a ``Federal Social Justice Package,'' aim at
    reducing the challenges faced by indigenous Australians. In July 1998,
    after a compromise with its opponents, the Government was able to pass
    amendments to the 1993 Native Title Act. The ATSIC stated that the
    amended act provided gains for Aboriginal people but still contains
    ``substantial pain'' for native title claimants. Aboriginal leaders
    were pleased by the removal of the time limit for lodging native title
    claims but expressed deep concern about the weakening of Aboriginal
    rights to negotiate with non-Aboriginal leaseholders over the
    development of rural property. Aboriginal groups continue to express
    concern that the amended act limits the future ability of Aboriginal
    people to protect their property rights. At present, 14.25 percent of
    Australian land is owned or controlled by Aboriginal people according
    to the Australian Surveying and Land Information Group. In March the
    U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
    expressed serious concern that the Government's Native Title amendments
    would allow the states and territories to pass legislation containing
    provisions ``reducing further the protection of native title
    claimants.'' The CERD declared ``unsatisfactory'' the Government's
    response to concerns about the Native Title regime expressed in 1999.
    The Government responded that the laws were passed after full debate in
    a democratically elected legislature and that the states have a
    sovereign right to determine land use policy.
        On August 26, 1999, the Government, in identical motions passed by
    both Houses of the Federal Parliament, expressed public regret for past
    mistreatment of the Aboriginal minority; however, the government-
    sponsored motion of reconciliation was criticized by many Aboriginal
    leaders as not going far enough. Prime Minister Howard acknowledged the
    ``most blemished chapter in our national history'' and submitted a
    seven-point motion to Parliament. Howard proposed that Parliament
    express ``its deep and sincere regret'' that Aborigines had ``suffered
    injustices under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt
    and trauma that many indigenous people continue to feel.'' However,
    both Aboriginal and opposition leaders stated that only a full apology
    would be sufficient. The Government also continued to oppose an
    official apology in the specific case of the ``Stolen Generation'' of
    Aboriginal children, who were taken from their parents by the
    Government from 1910 to the early 1970's and raised by foster parents
    and orphanages. The Government's position remains that the present
    generation has no responsibility to apologize for the wrongs of a
    previous generation. In April material alleged to be a draft of a
    government report appeared in the media; it appeared to minimize the
    number of Aboriginal children taken from their families as part of the
    ``Stolen Generation'' and generated considerable concern on the part of
    Aboriginal leaders and others. The Government disavowed the material.
    In August a Federal court ruled against two claims by members of the
    ``Stolen Generation'' for government compensation by stating that the
    two could not prove sufficiently that they had been taken without their
    parents' consent. However, the presiding judge stressed that the ruling
    does not settle the question of compensation for ``stolen'' children as
    a whole. The ATSIC has proposed the Government establish a Reparations
    Tribunal to avoid costly future legal battles.
        Following the 1997 publication of HREOC's landmark report on the
    ``Stolen Generation'' entitled ``Bringing Them Home,'' the federal
    government allocated $32.75 million (A$63 million) over 4 years to a
    comprehensive package of initiatives to facilitate family reunion and
    assist persons to cope with the trauma of separation. As of June 30,
    total spending on these programs had reached $10.7 million (A$20.5
    million).
        Following the October 1998 reelection of the Government, Prime
    Minister Howard gave Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Minister
    Philip Ruddock additional duties with regard to Aboriginal Australians
    by making him the Minister assisting the Prime Minister for
    Reconciliation. In his victory speech following reelection, Howard said
    that he would make reconciliation with Aboriginals one of his second
    term priorities. However, in February Howard stated that reconciliation
    was not achievable in the timeline set, because it is such a difficult
    issue. In June 1999, the Council on Aboriginal Reconciliation released
    its draft document of reconciliation for public comment and discussion.
    In 1991 Parliament created the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation to
    foster the reconciliation process in the country. The Council held its
    culminating national event, Corroboree 2000, in May, at which time it
    released a ``Document of Reconciliation'', which the Council intended
    to serve as a national blueprint for healing between indigenous
    citizens and the wider community. The final report was released in
    December, and it included recommendations that the federal and state
    governments set performance benchmarks and timelines for overcoming
    Aboriginal disadvantage and enact legislation to further the principles
    of legislation; that Parliament prepare legislation providing for a
    referenda on deleting a constitutional amendment on racial criteria for
    voting; and that Parliament add a new section to the Constitution
    making racial discrimination unlawful. The report also recommended that
    appropriate recognition be given to the Aboriginal people and Torres
    Strait Islanders as the original inhabitants of the land. The Council's
    mandate expired at the end of the year under legislation passed in
    1990. The Council is scheduled to be replaced by a government-funded
    independent foundation, Reconciliation Australia, which is to continue
    its work.
        In July the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that Australia
    should do more to secure for indigenous citizens a stronger role in
    decisionmaking over their traditional lands and natural resources, and
    urged it to do more to provide a remedy for members of the ``Stolen
    Generation'' (see Section 4).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although Asians make up less
    than 5 percent of the population, they account for 40 percent of recent
    immigrants. Public opinion surveys indicated concern with the numbers
    of immigrants arriving in the country. In a 1997 Newspoll, 64 percent
    of citizens thought that the total number of migrants was ``too high,''
    although in the same poll 78 percent thought that multiculturalism has
    been good for the country. In a February Morgan Poll, 15 percent of
    citizens listed immigration as one of the three most important issues
    for the Government to address. In a survey published in 1996 by the
    Chinese-language newspaper Sing Tao, more than half the respondents
    said that they had been abused verbally or physically in the previous 2
    months. Leaders in the ethnic and immigrant communities expressed
    concern that increased numbers of illegal arrivals, as well as violence
    at migrant detention centers, contributed to a few incidents of
    vilification of immigrants and minorities. However, according to the
    Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, during the financial
    year ending June 30, the number of racial discrimination complaints
    fell 62 percent from the previous year. During the year, 325 such cases
    were filed, 37 percent of which involved employment or the ability to
    join a union; 19 percent of which involved provision of goods,
    services, and facilities; and 19 percent of which involved ``racial
    hatred.'' Nonnative speakers of English filed 55 percent of the
    complaints and Aboriginals and Torres Straits islanders filed 21
    percent of the complaints.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law and practice provide workers,
    including public servants, freedom of association domestically and
    internationally. Approximately 32 percent of the work force is
    unionized.
        Unions carry out their functions free from government or political
    control, but most local affiliates belong to state branches of the
    Australian Labor Party (ALP). Union members must make up at least 50
    percent of the delegates to ALP conferences, but unions do not
    participate or vote as a bloc.
        The 1996 Workplace Relations Act significantly restricted the right
    of workers to take industrial action by confining it to the period of
    bargaining, where it remains a protected action. In April 1999, a union
    in federal court successfully challenged this provision. In its
    decision, the court refused to grant an injunction against the union
    for taking industrial action outside of a bargaining period because it
    was in support of maintaining existing wages and conditions.
    Legislation that went into force in 1994 for the first time legalized
    what had always been a de facto right to strike.
        In March the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association recommended
    substantial changes to the Workplace Relations Act and the Trade
    Practices Act following an examination of complaints of antiunion
    discrimination raised by Australian and international trade unions over
    the Government's role in a 1998 labor dispute involving stevedores.
    Specifically, the ILO recommended that the Government amend the
    Workplace Relations Act to eliminate the linkage between restrictions
    on strike action and legal provisions on interference with trade and
    commerce. The ILO also criticized the Government's use of serving
    defense force personnel as replacement workers in the 1998 strike. The
    Government stated in response to the recommendations that the ILO's
    comments ``reflect an inadequate understanding of Australian law.'' The
    Government rejected all of the ILO's recommendations.
        Laws and regulations prohibit retribution against strikers and
    labor leaders, and they are effectively enforced. In practice employers
    tend to avoid legal remedies, e.g., secondary boycott injunctions, that
    are available to them in order to preserve a long-term relationship
    with their unions.
        During the year, the most notable industrial action was taken by
    iron ore miners in the Pilbara region of Western Australia against the
    multinational resources company BHP. A series of rolling strikes over a
    period of several months was taken against the company for its refusal
    to negotiate a collective agreement with workers in the mines, but
    rather to introduce individual contracts into the workplace. The unions
    eventually achieved a court injunction against BHP offering any further
    individual contracts on the grounds that the action breached industrial
    legislation. This forced the company to the bargaining table until the
    full case could be heard. The case is before the Federal Court and is
    yet to be concluded. Meanwhile, the negotiations have stalled on the
    issue of union involvement in the workplace. As in past years, there
    were many other strikes during the year.
        Unions freely may form and join federations or confederations, and
    they actively participate in international bodies. However, in March
    the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association also recommended that the
    Government take measures, including amending legislation, to ensure
    that in the future trade union organizations are entitled to maintain
    contacts with international trade union organizations and to
    participate in their legitimate activities. The Government rejected
    this recommendation.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law and
    practice provide workers with the right to organize and bargain
    collectively, and the law protects them from antiunion discrimination.
    However, in Western Australia, the 1997 Labour Relations Legislation
    Amendment Act amended several pieces of legislation, stripping workers
    of some protections against discrimination for trade union activities.
    Although workers cannot be fired for belonging to a union, the law
    permits individual employment contracts that override awards systems
    established through collective bargaining, and imposes complicated
    prestrike ballot requirements.
        The Workplace Relations Act contains curbs on union power,
    restrictions on strikes, and a new unfair-dismissal system. Several
    unions are considering challenging the law on the grounds that it
    violates the right to assembly provided for in several ILO conventions
    that Australia has signed. The primary curb on union power is the
    abolition of closed shops and union demarcations. Although unions are
    weakened, this provision could create many small and competing unions
    at individual worksites. The restrictions on strikes include heavy
    fines for labor unrest during the life of an agreement and tougher
    secondary-boycott provisions. The new unfair-dismissal system further
    limits redress and compensation claims by employees.
        The negotiation of contracts covering wages and working conditions
    is gradually shifting from the centralized system of the past.
    Previously legislation provided for the negotiation of simpler
    ``enterprise agreements,'' which were negotiated by individual
    companies with their workers or with the relevant union(s). The federal
    and state governments administered centralized minimum-wage awards and
    provided quasi-judicial arbitration, supplemented by industry-wide or
    company-by-company collective bargaining. The Workplace Relations Act
    also provides for the negotiation of Australian Workplace Agreements
    (AWA's) between employers and individual workers. These agreements are
    subject to far fewer government regulations than the awards. At present
    the AWA's are required to be roughly equivalent to basic working
    conditions in the award that would apply to the sector to which the
    firm belongs. In March the ILO recommended that the Government amend
    legislation so that workplace agreements do not undermine the right to
    bargain collectively; the Government rejected this recommendation.
        There are no export processing zones. The Darwin Trade Development
    Zone, Northern Territory, attempts to increase exports via a
    geographically defined free trade zone. In practice the Darwin
    initiative is focused almost exclusively on its Asian neighbors to the
    north and west.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there are
    no laws prohibiting it, forced labor, including forced and bonded labor
    by children, generally is not practiced; however, there were instances
    of such abuses. Trafficking in persons, particularly in women (but also
    children) for the sex trade, is a limited but growing problem (see
    Sections 5 and 6.f.). As a result of the discovery in April 1999 of
    children in several clothing sweatshops in Sydney and Melbourne, the
    Attorney General's Department is studying existing laws and considering
    whether new legislation would strengthen the Government's ability to
    combat the problem. Most cases of abuses in the past few years have
    involved members of ethnic communities from nations where child labor
    is not uncommon. The smuggling of children for work in the sex industry
    appears to be a limited but growing problem (see Sections 5, 6.d., and
    6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--There is no federally mandated minimum age of employment,
    but state-imposed compulsory educational requirements, monitored and
    enforced by state educational authorities, effectively prevent most
    children from joining the work force until they are 15 or 16 years of
    age. Federal and state governments monitor and enforce a network of
    laws, which vary from state to state, governing the minimum school-
    leaving age, the minimum age to claim unemployment benefits, and the
    minimum age to engage in specified occupations.
        The law does not explicitly prohibit forced and bonded labor by
    children, but such practices generally are not known to occur, although
    there were instances of such abuses (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number of children,
    mainly from Asia, are entering the country as sex workers. The numbers
    of children involved is unknown. Under the laws of the various states
    it is illegal for an adult to have sex with a minor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Although a formal minimum wage
    exists, it has not been relevant in wage agreements since the 1960's.
    Instead, 80 percent of workers are covered by differing minimum wage
    rates for individual trades and professions, all of which are
    sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family.
        Most workers are employees of incorporated organizations. For them
    a complex body of government regulations, as well as decisions of
    applicable federal or state industrial relations commissions, prescribe
    a 40-hour or shorter workweek, paid vacations, sick leave, and other
    benefits. The minimum standards for wages, working hours, and
    conditions are set by a series of ``awards'' (basic contracts for
    individual industries). Some awards specify that workers must have a 24
    or 48 hour rest break each week while others specify only the number of
    days off per number of days worked.
        Federal or state safety laws apply to every workplace.
        The 1991 Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment)
    Act provides federal employees with the legal right to cease work if
    they believe that particular work activities pose an immediate threat
    to individual health or safety. Most states and territories have laws
    that grant similar rights to their employees. At a minimum, private
    sector employees have recourse to state health and safety commissions,
    which will investigate complaints and demand remedial action.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--though there is no specific provision
    in the law to prohibit trafficking in persons, legislation enacted in
    late 1999 targets criminal practices associated with trafficking;
    trafficking in persons, particularly in East Asian women for the sex
    trade, is a limited but growing problem.
        On September 21, 1999 the Criminal Code Amendment (Slavery and
    Sexual Servitude) Act came into force. The act modernizes the country's
    slavery laws, contains new offenses directed at slavery, sexual
    servitude, and deceptive recruiting, and addresses the growing and
    lucrative trade in persons for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The
    act provides for penalties of up to 25 years' imprisonment and is part
    of a federal, state, and territory package of legislation. There have
    not yet been any prosecutions under this legislation.
        Under the act, conduct that amounts to slavery, or exercising a
    power of ownership over another person, carries a maximum penalty of 25
    years' imprisonment. Where a person is engaged to provide sexual
    services and who, because of force or threats, is not free to cease or
    to leave, those responsible face penalties of up to 15 years'
    imprisonment, or 19 years if the victim is under age 18. A person who
    deceptively induces another person to provide sexual services faces a
    penalty of up to 7 years imprisonment, or 9 years if the victim is
    under age 18.
        Another government initiative was the 1994 Child Sex Tourism Act,
    which provides for the investigation and prosecution of citizens who
    travel overseas and engage in illegal sexual conduct with children.
        Prostitution is legal in many areas of the country. In these
    locations, state and local governments inspect brothels to prevent
    mistreatment of the workers and to assure compliance with health
    regulations. There have been some instances of women being forced to
    work as sex workers in the country by organized crime groups. There are
    some reports of women working in the sex industry becoming mired in
    debt or being physically forced to keep working, and some of these
    women are under pressure to accept poor working conditions, especially
    if their immigration status is irregular. However, the available
    evidence suggests that these cases are not widespread.
        The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) has
    determined that women and children from Thailand, the Philippines,
    Malaysia, China, Indonesia, and South Korea have been trafficked into
    the country for purposes of prostitution. The high profit potential,
    combined with the difficulty of detection and previously low penalties
    when prosecuted, have contributed to the spread of groups engaged in
    these activities.
        While the numbers of women being brought into the country are
    relatively small (in the hundreds per year), some have been subjected
    to what is essentially indentured sexual servitude. Some women working
    in the sex industry were not aware prior to entering the country that
    this was the kind of work they would be doing. Investigations in past
    years by DIMA have found women locked in safe houses with barred
    windows, with no access to medical care or the outside world. These
    women have been lured either by the idea that they would be waitresses
    in restaurants or, in some cases, coerced to come by criminal elements
    operating in their home countries.
        Anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number of children,
    mainly from Asia, are entering the country as sex workers. The numbers
    of children involved is unknown. Under the laws of the various states,
    it is illegal for an adult to have sex with a minor.
        There also has been evidence, much of it anecdotal, of a growing
    problem of trafficking in women to work in sweatshops in textile,
    clothing, and footwear industries as well as in service industries,
    sometimes as bonded labor.
                                   __________

                                     BRUNEI

        Brunei Darussalam, a small, wealthy monarchy located on the north
    coast of Borneo, is a sultanate ruled by the same family for 600 years.
    The 1959 Constitution provided for the first delegation of political
    power by the late Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin to an appointed council of
    state, but in 1962 the then Sultan invoked an article of the
    Constitution that allowed him to assume emergency powers for 2 years.
    These powers have been regularly renewed, most recently in July. In
    August the Foreign Minister confirmed that a review of the Constitution
    had been submitted to the Sultan for approval, and that ``an element of
    an election'' was in this report. Although not all the articles of the
    Constitution are suspended, the state of emergency places few limits on
    the Sultan's power. The Sultan also serves as Prime Minister, Minister
    of Defense, Minister of Finance, chancellor of the national university,
    superintendent general of the Royal Brunei Police Force, and leader of
    the Islamic faith.
        The police force, which has responsibility for internal security,
    reports to the Prime Minister's office, which includes an Internal
    Security Department, and is firmly under the control of civil
    authorities.
        Brunei's large oil and natural gas reserves, coupled with its small
    population, give it a very high per capita gross national product. The
    worldwide recovery in oil prices that began in 1998 has helped restore
    the country's cash flow; however, the economy still continued to feel
    the effects of the Amedeo Corporation's collapse. The corporation,
    which was owned by the Sultan's brother Jefri, is being liquidated to
    pay debts amounting to more than $6 billion.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' human rights in
    several areas; however, its record was poor in other areas,
    particularly with regard to civil liberties, and problems remain. In
    practice citizens do not have the right to change their government, and
    they generally avoid political activity of any kind. Nor,
    constitutional provisions notwithstanding, do they genuinely exercise
    the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. Other human
    rights problems continued, including restriction of religious freedom
    and discrimination against women. Despite government efforts,
    occasional societal violence against women remains a problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings.
        In June 1998, an assistant superintendent of police was arrested
    and charged with the manslaughter of a Bangladeshi national. The police
    official allegedly used police premises to interrogate the Bangladeshi
    national over a personal business matter. During the interrogation, the
    police official allegedly beat and kicked the victim, who subsequently
    died of internal injuries. The police superintendent was convicted of a
    reduced charge of causing hurt, since pathologists could not conclude
    that the beating directly caused the victim's death. He was sentenced
    to 12 months in jail and ordered to pay $12,050 (B$20,000) to the
    deceased's family in compensation. The superintendent was dismissed
    from the police service.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There were no reports of police mistreatment of prisoners.
    Any report of police mistreatment of prisoners would be investigated as
    a violation of the law. In 1988 caning became mandatory punishment for
    42 drug-related and other criminal offenses and for vandalism. Since
    then, sentences of caning have been handed down and carried out in the
    presence of a doctor who monitors implementation and has the authority
    to interrupt and postpone the punishment for medical reasons. Caning
    generally is included as part of the sentencing in 80 percent of
    criminal convictions. Many convicted persons reportedly prefer caning
    to lengthy incarceration.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is no
    overcrowding; however, there is a growing prison population, and a new
    facility to supplement the 60-year-old prison was completed in 1998.
    Prisoners receive regular medical checkups. Remand cells at police
    stations are Spartan.
        Human rights monitors are not known to have requested prison
    visits; foreign diplomats have visited prisoners. Family members also
    can visit prisoners and bring food.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for a
    prompt judicial determination of the validity of an arrest. However,
    those provisions, like the Constitution itself, may be superseded,
    either partially or wholly, through invocation of the emergency powers.
    The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the Government to detain
    suspects without trial for renewable 2-year periods. The Government
    occasionally has used the ISA to detain persons suspected of
    antigovernment activity; however, information on the detainees is
    published only after they are released. In 1997 two former rebel
    leaders were pardoned and released, after undergoing ``religious
    indoctrination'' and swearing loyalty to the Sultan (see Section 1.e.).
    Muhamad Yasin Abdul Rahman, age 76, who played a pivotal role in the
    abortive 1962 rebellion, was detained without trial for 12 years from
    1962 to 1973, when he escaped from prison to live in exile in Malaysia.
    He returned to the country in 1997 and immediately was arrested and
    detained once more without trial. In 1999 he was released from
    detention after swearing an oath of loyalty to the Sultan and admitting
    his political ``crimes.''
        In 1998 authorities arrested several citizens under the ISA for
    distributing defamatory letters containing allegations about the royal
    family and senior government officials connected with the collapse of
    the Amedeo Group, a large holding company headed by the former Finance
    Minister and Sultan's brother, Prince Jefri. The Government warned
    citizens that it would take action against anyone involved in such
    activities. There were no known arrests for publishing or distributing
    antigovernment literature during the year.
        Under normal circumstances, a magistrate must endorse a warrant for
    arrest. Warrants are issued without this endorsement on rare occasions,
    such as when police are unable to obtain the endorsement in time to
    prevent the flight of a suspect. Police officers have broad powers to
    make arrests, without warrants, of persons caught in the physical act
    of committing a crime.
        Under the colonial-era Banishment Act of 1918, any person deemed to
    be a threat to the safety, peace, or welfare of Brunei, may be forcibly
    exiled either permanently or temporarily by the Sultan. Since
    independence, there have been no cases of banishment of citizens.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution does not
    specifically provide for an independent judiciary. However, in 1996 in
    a landmark legal decision, the appellate-level High Court ruled that
    the court has powers independent of the prosecution and ordered a
    discharge in a car theft case under review, which amounted to an
    acquittal under the Criminal Procedure Code. So far the Government has
    not challenged the court's finding that magistrates have the legal
    power to discharge and acquit a defendant, even when the prosecution
    does not request the discharge.
        The judicial system consists of five levels of courts, with final
    recourse in civil cases available through the Privy Council in London.
    In 1995 Brunei terminated appeal to the Privy Council in criminal
    cases. Procedural safeguards include the right to defense counsel, the
    right to an interpreter, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to
    confront accusers. There were no known instances of government
    interference with the judiciary and no trials of political opponents.
        The civil law, based on English common law, provides citizens with
    a fair and efficient judicial process. Shari'a (Islamic law) supersedes
    civil law in some areas, including divorce, inheritance, and some
    sexual crimes. Shari'a law is not applied to non-Muslims.
        At present there are no known political prisoners (see Section
    1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--Although the law permits government intrusion into the
    privacy of individual persons, families, or homes, this rarely happens.
    There were no reports of mail having been tampered with during the
    year. The Government at times prevents the importation of foreign
    newspapers and magazines (see Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While there are no laws
    restricting freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the Government
    used its authority to protect public safety, morals, health, and
    domestic security to restrict these freedoms. Editions of foreign
    newspapers or magazines with articles that are found objectionable,
    embarrassing, or critical of the Sultan, royal family, or government
    are not allowed into the country. Magazine articles with a Christian
    theme reportedly are censored. However, the growing use of fax
    machines, the Internet, and access to satellite transmissions make it
    increasingly difficult to keep such material from entering. The
    country's largest circulation daily newspaper, the Borneo Bulletin,
    appears to practice self-censorship in its choice of topics to avoid
    angering the Government, but it has instituted a new feature of letters
    to the editor, by which citizens some by name and some anonymously
    criticize the Government's handling of certain social, economic, and
    environmental issues. In 1997 the newspaper expanded its letters column
    to reflect the increase in letters. In July 1999, a second daily
    English-language newspaper, the News Express, began publication. It
    also features a letters page where citizens and residents express their
    views and complaints, often about government services and,
    increasingly, about government policy. The newspapers' willingness to
    publish these expressions of opinion represents a modest extension of
    press freedom. The Government on occasion has been responsive to public
    opinion on some issues concerning social or environmental problems. The
    Internal Security Department reportedly no longer tries to obtain the
    names of people who complained to the newspapers about government
    services.
        Although the only television station is government-owned, three
    Malaysian television channels are also received locally. Two satellite
    television networks are available, which offer a total of 28 different
    channels, including the Cable News Network, the British Broadcasting
    Corporation World News, and several entertainment and sports channels.
        The Government's tolerance of political criticism has not been
    tested recently because there is no organized opposition. Moreover,
    citizens generally make almost no criticism of the Government. In the
    past, the Government has not hesitated to arrest those who attempted to
    propagate unwelcome political views.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom to
    assemble for political purposes has not been tested seriously in recent
    years.
        Following a 1967 ban on political parties, the Government allowed
    two parties to form in 1985 and 1986. It disbanded one of the parties
    in 1988. Political parties are allowed but they are not to engage in
    ``activities that endanger people.'' Membership is open to all
    citizens, except civil servants and security force personnel, who
    together make up 60 percent of all employed citizens.
        The remaining party, the Brunei Solidarity National Party (PPKB),
    which was inactive for several years, held an assembly in February
    1995, April 1998, and again in February 2000 (attended by about 30
    persons), reportedly with the consent of the Government. Following the
    1998 General Assembly, party leaders expressed support for the
    Government's determination to investigate the Amedeo crisis, but the
    party appeared to be largely inactive. In October 1998, the Prime
    Minister's Office rebuked PPKB President Haji Mohamed Hatta over an
    interview he gave to a regional newsmagazine. The Prime Minister's
    Office described Hatta's portrayal of Brunei as ``irresponsible,
    untrue, inaccurate, misleading, and embarrassing.'' The PPKB reportedly
    continues to be subject to internal disagreements.
        The activities of international service organizations such as
    Rotary, Kiwanis, and the Lions continued to be constrained by the
    Government, which in 1995 reminded local leaders of these organizations
    that Muslims may not be members.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution states that, ``The
    religion of Brunei Darussalam shall be the Muslim religion according to
    the Shafeite sect of that religion: Provided that all other religions
    may be practiced in peace and harmony by the person professing them in
    any part of Brunei Darussalam.'' However, the Government only partially
    respects these rights, as it routinely restricts the practice of non-
    Islamic religions. The Government sporadically voiced alarm about
    ``outsiders'' preaching radical Islamic fundamentalist or unorthodox
    beliefs. Citizens deemed to have been influenced by such preaching
    (usually students returning from overseas study) have been ``shown the
    error of their ways'' in study seminars organized by mainstream Islamic
    religious leaders. The Government seems more concerned about these so-
    called Islamic ``opportunists'' than unwelcome political views.
    Moreover, the Government does not hesitate to investigate and to use
    its internal security apparatus against persons whom it considers
    purveyors of radical Islam.
        In 1991 the Government began to reinforce the legitimacy of the
    hereditary monarchy and the observance of traditional and Muslim values
    by reasserting a national ideology known as the Malayhu Islam Beraja
    (MIB) or ``Malay Muslim monarchy,'' the genesis of which reportedly
    dates to the 15th century. The Government in 1993 participated in
    issuing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which affirms the right of all
    persons to a wide range of human rights, including freedom of religion.
    Despite this and constitutional provisions providing for the full and
    unconstrained exercise of religious freedom, the Government routinely
    restricts the practice of non-Muslim religions by: Prohibiting
    proselytizing; occasionally denying entry to foreign clergy or
    particular priests, bishops, or ministers; banning the importation of
    religious teaching materials or scriptures such as the Bible; and
    ignoring requests to expand, repair, or build new churches, temples,
    and shrines. However, in February 1998, the Government allowed the
    Catholic Church to establish the first apostolic prefecture in the
    country and to install a Bruneian of Chinese origin as the country's
    first apostolic prefect. This development constituted a modest step in
    the direction of improved religious freedom, but as yet there is no
    broad trend toward increased religious freedom.
        In September 1998, officials of the Islamic Propagation Center
    confiscated gold and other precious Buddhist and Christian icons from a
    number of goldsmiths in the capital, stating that the open display of
    these items ``offended local sensitivities.'' The confiscations were
    made under the Undesirable Publications Act, which gives the Government
    wide-ranging powers. Several days later, the goldsmiths were informed
    that they could recover their property from the Ministry of Home
    Affairs. The Government also routinely censors magazine articles on
    other faiths, blacking out or removing photographs of crucifixes and
    other Christian religious symbols.
        Since July 1998, the authorities sporadically have conducted raids
    on clubs frequented by foreign residents and foreign workers in order
    to confiscate alcohol and foodstuffs that were not prepared in
    accordance with ``halal'' requirements (the Islamic requirements for
    the slaughter of animals and the prohibition on inclusion of pork
    products in any food). These actions continue and are regarded by the
    majority of citizens as upholding Islam. In July the Government briefly
    detained for questioning local members of a small Islamic group after
    the group's members in Malaysia reportedly were involved in an arms
    theft.
        The Ministry of Education also restricted the teaching of the
    history of religion or other courses on religion in non-Islamic schools
    while requiring courses on Islam or the MIB in all schools. Only the
    Bandar Seri Begawan international schools are exempt from these
    restrictions.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the movement of
    former political prisoners during the first year of their release.
    Otherwise the Government generally does not restrict the freedom of
    movement of its citizens, visitors, and permanent residents. Government
    employees, both citizens and foreigners working on a contractual basis,
    must apply for approval to go abroad; it is routinely granted.
        No legal provision exists for granting temporary refuge, first
    asylum, or refugee status to those seeking such refuge or asylum. Under
    the law, persons arriving without valid entry documents and means of
    support are considered illegal immigrants and are refused entry. There
    were no reported cases of individuals seeking temporary refuge during
    the year.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens are unable to change their government; Brunei is a
    monarchy and there are no established democratic processes. Under the
    continuing state of emergency, there is no parliament, and political
    authority and control rests with the ruling monarch. Individuals may
    seek to express their views or to influence government decisions and
    policies by writing letters to a local newspaper or by petitioning the
    Sultan or handing him letters when he appears in public.
        A form of popular representation lies in a traditional system of
    village chiefs who, since 1992, are elected by secret ballot by all
    adults. These leaders communicate constituents' wishes through a
    variety of channels, including periodic meetings chaired by the Home
    Affairs Minister, with several officials appointed by the Sultan. In
    1996 the Sultan officiated at the first General Assembly of the
    ``mukim'' (a group of villages) and village consultative council. Over
    1,000 village chiefs from 150 villages and 35 mukim participated as
    delegates. The delegates were elected from among individual villagers,
    and the Government described the Assembly as ``a grass roots level
    political system.'' However, the Sultan appoints all the council's
    advisers. The Government insists that ordinary citizens actually use
    these councils to present their grievances and to obtain redress.
        The Sultan has an appointed Cabinet, the members of which serve as
    his principal advisors.
        The lack of representative democratic government seriously limits
    the role of both men and women in government and politics; however,
    women are making progress. In 1997 the Sultan's sister, Princess Masna,
    became the second ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
    and for the first time two women were appointed as permanent
    secretaries, one in the Ministry of Education and the other in the
    Ministry Culture, Youth, and Sports. The first female High Court judge
    was appointed in 1999, and in 2000 a woman was named acting director of
    the Anticorruption Bureau.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        No government or private organizations deal specifically with the
    protection of human rights. However, in 1997, for the first time, the
    Government entered into a human rights dialog with a foreign embassy
    and that dialog continues. There were no known allegations of abuses or
    requests to visit by international human rights groups.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Except for religion (see Section 2.c.), the Constitution does not
    contain specific provisions prohibiting discrimination based on the
    factors listed above.
        Women.--The extent to which spousal abuse may occur and go
    unreported is not known. In response to a perception that domestic
    violence was rising, in 1994 a special unit was established within the
    police department to investigate domestic violence complaints. Female
    officers staff the unit. Since 1995 a hot line has been in service for
    abused spouses and the public to report domestic violence. During 1999
    approximately 10 women and their children stayed at a women's shelter
    run by the Social Affairs Services unit of the Ministry of Culture. The
    Social Affairs Services unit provides counseling for women and their
    spouses. In August 1999, a photograph of a man accused of stabbing his
    wife and assaulting one of his children was published in a daily
    newspaper, a new development in the country, where privacy generally is
    guarded closely. While Islamic courts usually discourage divorce in
    domestic violence cases, there appears to be a movement away from
    encouraging wives to reconcile with flagrantly abusive spouses. Islamic
    religious authorities recognize wife beating as grounds for divorce.
        In 1999 the police recorded 91 cases of domestic abuse compared
    with 72 in 1998. The police also recorded 10 cases of rape and 10
    molestations. The criminal penalty for a minor domestic assault is 1 to
    2 weeks in jail and a fine. An assault resulting in serious injury
    would be punished by caning and a longer jail sentence. In September
    two members of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces were sentenced to 4 years'
    imprisonment and three strokes of the cane for the attempted
    molestation and sodomy of a 20-year-old deaf girl. In October 1999, a
    man convicted of assaulting his former wife with a knife and a piece of
    wood on three separate occasions, received three concurrent sentences
    of 2 years and 6 months in prison and three strokes of the cane. He
    also received a 6-month prison sentence for assaulting his 7-year-old
    daughter. Also in 1999, a man impersonating a religious inspector who
    raped and extorted money from a woman he found in a compromising
    situation with her boyfriend was sentenced to 12 years in prison and 6
    strokes of the cane.
        One area of apparent abuse involves female domestic servants. While
    the level of violence in society is low, beating of servants--or
    refusing them the right to leave the house on days off, sometimes on
    grounds that they ``might encounter the wrong company"--is less
    socially unacceptable behavior. Since most female domestics are foreign
    workers who are highly dependent on their employers, those subject to
    abuse may be unwilling or unable to bring complaints, either to the
    authorities or to their governments' embassies. However, when such
    complaints are brought, the Government generally is quick to
    investigate allegations of abuse and impose fines and punishment as
    warranted.
        In accordance with Koranic precepts, women are denied equal status
    with men in a number of important areas such as divorce, inheritance,
    and custody of children. Under the Brunei Nationality Act, citizenship
    is transmitted through males only. Female citizens who are married to
    foreigners or bear children by foreign fathers cannot transmit
    citizenship to their children, even when such children are born in the
    country. This has resulted in the creation of a sizable population of
    stateless children, estimated at more than 5,000 residents, who are
    entitled to live in the country and to be documented for travel by the
    Government, but who cannot enjoy the full privileges of citizenship,
    including the right to own land.
        Although men are eligible for permanent positions in government
    service whether or not they hold university degrees, women who do not
    have university degrees are eligible to hold government positions only
    on a month-to-month basis. While recent changes eliminated some
    previous inequities, women in month-to-month positions continue to
    receive slightly less annual leave and fewer allowances than their male
    and female counterparts in permanent positions.
        There are no separate pay scales for men and women, and in recent
    years there has been a major influx of women into the work force. Women
    serve in a wide variety of capacities in the armed forces, although
    they are not permitted to serve in combat. The number of female
    university graduates is increasing, and nearly two-thirds of Brunei
    University's entering class is female.
        Religious authorities strongly encourage Muslim women to wear the
    tudong, a traditional head covering, and many women do so. However,
    some Muslim women do not, and there is no official pressure on non-
    Muslim women to do so. All female students in government-operated
    schools are required to wear the tudong; students in nongovernment
    schools are encouraged to wear it.
        In July 1999, a new Married Women's Law came into effect, improving
    significantly the rights of non-Muslim married women with respect to
    maintenance, property, and domestic violence. In November 1999, changes
    to the Islamic Family Law (in the section on Women's Position in
    Marriage and Divorce) came into effect and are expected to improve the
    marital rights of Muslim women.
        Children.--No statistics are published regarding the welfare of
    children. The strong commitment to family values within society, the
    high standard of living, and government funding for children's welfare
    provides most children a healthy and nurturing environment. Education
    is free, compulsory, and universal for 9 years. With a few exceptions
    involving small villages in extremely remote areas, nutritional
    standards are high, and poverty is almost unknown. There were 5
    reported cases of child abuse in 1999. In 1996 the High Court convicted
    a father of child abuse. The Chief Justice sentenced him to 20 years in
    prison and ordered him caned with 20 strokes of the rattan for causing
    the death of his 3-year-old daughter and grievous hurt to another 2 of
    his children.
        People with Disabilities.--No legislation mandating accessibility
    or other assistance for disabled persons has been passed. The
    Government is attempting to provide educational services for children
    with disabilities, although these efforts are not yet adequate to
    address the situation. Teachers are still being trained to deal with
    disabled children, and some children have no educational opportunities.
    A special facility with trained educators is needed to accommodate the
    disabled children who cannot be assimilated into normal classrooms, and
    the Ministry of Education is studying the problem.
        Indigenous People.--The 6 percent of the population that is
    composed of indigenous people long has been integrated into society,
    and enjoys the same rights as other citizens.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Some members of non-Malay
    minorities, such as ethnic Chinese, including those born and raised in
    the country, are not automatically accorded citizenship and its
    attendant rights, and must travel abroad as stateless persons. Brunei's
    colonial-era naturalization laws are widely viewed as out of date and
    in need of reform.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are legal but must be
    registered with the Government. The three registered trade unions--one
    passive and two generally inactive--are all in the oil sector and have
    a total membership amounting to less than 5 percent of that industry's
    work force. All workers, including civil servants other than those
    serving in the military and police, may form or join trade unions.
    Unions are independent of the Government.
        The 1962 Trade Unions Act permits the formation of trade union
    federations but forbids affiliation with international labor
    organizations. An individual contract is required between an employer
    and each employee, but legal trade union activities cannot be deemed to
    violate employee contracts. Local legal experts interpret this
    provision as conferring the right to strike, but there have been no
    strikes. Brunei is not a member of the International Labor
    Organization.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Government
    has not prevented the legal registration of trade unions, nor has it
    dissolved any. The Government did not interfere with lawful union
    activity. It is illegal to refuse employment or discriminate against an
    employee on the basis of membership or nonmembership in a trade union.
    While unions are legal and easy to register, conditions are not
    conducive to the development of trade unions. There is little interest
    on the part of workers in forming trade unions, and existing unions are
    not very active. The law is silent on collective bargaining, and it
    occurs in only a few industries. There are few industries of the kind
    in which unions have traditionally developed. Also cultural tradition
    favors consensus over confrontation. Wage and benefit packages are
    based on market conditions and tend to be generous.
        There is a free trade zone in Muara Port, known as the Muara Export
    Zone (MEZ), established in May 1994.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor including forced and bonded labor by children, and there
    are no known cases of forced labor.
        In 1997 a foreign beauty contest winner brought suit in a foreign
    court against members of the Brunei royal family alleging that she and
    six other women were brought to Brunei in 1996 and subsequently held
    against their will for purposes of sexual exploitation. A statement by
    the royal family called the case ``frivolous and groundless.'' The
    Sultan's sovereign immunity was recognized, and the court accepted
    Prince Jefri's claim of immunity. The case was closed formally in
    December 1999.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1954 Labor Enactment Laws prohibits the employment of
    children below the age of 16. Education is free, compulsory, and
    universal through grade nine. Parental consent and approval by the
    Labor Commission is required for those below the age of 18. Female
    minors under age 18 may not work at night or on offshore oil platforms.
    The Department of Labor (DOL), which is a part of the Ministry of Home
    Affairs, effectively enforces laws on the employment of children. There
    were no reports of violations of the child labor laws. Forced and
    bonded labor by children is prohibited and it is not practiced (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Skilled labor is in short
    supply, and market forces enable most citizens to command good
    salaries. There is no minimum wage. The standard workweek is Monday
    through Thursday and Saturday, with Friday and Sunday off, allowing for
    two 24-hour rest periods each week. Overtime is paid for work in excess
    of 48 hours a week, and double time is paid for work performed on legal
    holidays. Occupational health and safety standards are established by
    government regulations. The DOL inspects working conditions on a
    routine basis and in response to complaints. The DOL generally enforces
    labor regulations effectively. However, in the unskilled labor sector
    enforcement is lax, especially for foreign laborers (see Section 5).
    The DOL is empowered to close any workplace where health, safety, or
    working conditions are unsatisfactory, and it has done so in the past.
    The law permits a worker to leave a hazardous job site without
    jeopardizing his employment, but in practice this is unlikely to
    happen.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Law for the Protection of Women and
    Girls prohibits trafficking whether or not for the purpose of
    prostitution. There are occasional reports of women entering the
    country for purposes of prostitution (which is illegal), but they
    usually are deported swiftly.
                                   __________

                                     BURMA

        Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military
    regime. Repressive military governments dominated by members of the
    majority Burman ethnic group have ruled the ethnically Burman central
    regions and some ethnic-minority areas continuously since 1962, when a
    coup led by General Ne Win overthrew an elected civilian government.
    Since September 1988, when the armed forces brutally suppressed massive
    pro-democracy demonstrations, a junta composed of senior military
    officers has ruled by decree, without a constitution or legislature.
    Originally called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),
    the junta reorganized itself and changed its name to the State Peace
    and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. The Government is headed by
    armed forces commander Senior General Than Shwe, although Ne Win, who
    retired from public office during the 1988 pro-democracy
    demonstrations, may continue to wield informal influence. In 1990 the
    junta permitted a relatively free election for a parliament to which it
    had promised to transfer power. Voters overwhelmingly supported anti-
    government parties with the National League for Democracy (NLD),
    winning more than 60 percent of the popular vote and 80 percent of the
    parliamentary seats. Throughout the 1990's, the junta systematically
    violated human rights in the country to suppress the prodemocracy
    movement, including the NLD, and to thwart repeated efforts by the
    representatives elected in 1990 to convene. Instead, the junta convened
    a government-controlled ``National Convention'' intended to approve a
    constitution that would ensure a dominant role for the armed forces.
    Since 1995 the NLD has declined to participate in this National
    Convention, perceiving both its composition and its agenda to be
    tightly controlled by the junta. More than a dozen armed ethnic groups
    continued to rule or to exercise some governmental functions in
    peripheral ethnic minority areas under various cease-fire agreements
    negotiated with the junta between 1989 and 1995. The judiciary is not
    independent of the junta.
        Since 1988 the junta has more than doubled the size of the armed
    forces, from about 175,000 to more than 400,000 men, and has increased
    the Government's military presence throughout the country, especially
    in ethnic minority areas. The Government reinforces its firm military
    rule with a pervasive security apparatus led by the military
    intelligence organization, the Directorate of Defense Services
    Intelligence (DDSI). Control is buttressed by arbitrary restrictions on
    citizens' contacts with foreigners, surveillance of government
    employees and private citizens, harassment of political activists,
    intimidation, arrest, detention, and physical abuse. The Government
    justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain order and
    national unity. Members of the security forces committed numerous,
    serious human rights abuses.
        Burma is a poor country with a population said by its Government to
    number about 50 million. Average annual per capita income is estimated
    to be about $300. More than 3 decades of military rule and
    mismanagement have resulted in widespread poverty. Primarily an
    agricultural economy, the country also has substantial mineral,
    fishing, and timber resources. From 1988 to 1995, the Government partly
    liberalized the economy, reversing the economic contraction of the
    1980's. However, economic growth has slowed since the mid-1990's, as
    the junta has retreated from economic liberalization. Extensive state
    influence over the economy, corruption, and poor infrastructure remain
    problems.
        The Government's extremely poor human rights record and
    longstanding severe repression of its citizens continued during the
    year. Citizens continued to live subject at any time and without appeal
    to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal dictates of the military regime.
    Citizens did not have the right to change their government. There
    continued to be credible reports, particularly in ethnic minority
    areas, that security forces committed serious human rights abuses,
    including extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances continued,
    and members of the security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise abused
    prisoners and detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh and life
    threatening, but have improved slightly in some prisons after the
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed access to
    prisons in May 1999. Arbitrary arrest and detention for expression of
    dissenting political views continued to be a common practice. The
    Government held Aung San Suu Kyi incommunicado twice in September,
    following attempts to travel beyond the bounds of Rangoon City and to
    Mandalay. At year's end, the Government continued to hold Aung San Suu
    Kyi in detention; it also held 48 members-elect of parliament and more
    than 1,000 NLD supporters under detention, all as part of a government
    effort to prevent the parliament elected in 1990 from convening. Since
    1962 thousands of persons have been arrested, detained, or imprisoned
    for political reasons; more than 1,800 political prisoners remained
    imprisoned at year's end. The judiciary is not independent, and there
    is no effective rule of law. During the year, the Government
    intensified its campaign to eliminate independent lawyers by
    arbitrarily arresting and sentencing them on fabricated charges. The
    Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights, and
    security forces continued to monitor citizens' movements and
    communications systematically, to search homes without warrants, and to
    relocate persons forcibly without just compensation or due process.
    During the year, those persons suspected of or charged with
    prodemocratic political activity were subjected to regular surveillance
    and harassment. Security forces continued to use excessive force to
    violate international humanitarian law in internal conflicts against
    ethnic insurgencies. The regime forcibly relocated large ethnic
    minority populations in order to deprive armed ethnic groups of
    civilian bases of support.
        The SPDC continued to restrict severely freedom of speech, press,
    assembly, and association. It has pressured many thousands of members
    to resign from the NLD and closed party offices nationwide. Since 1990
    the junta frequently prevented the NLD and other prodemocracy parties
    from conducting normal political activities. The junta recognizes the
    NLD as a legal entity; however, it refuses to accept the legal
    political status of key NLD party leaders, particularly the party's
    general secretary and 1991 Nobel laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, and
    restricts her activities severely through security measures and
    threats. The Government imposed some restrictions on certain religious
    minorities. The junta continued to restrict freedom of movement and, in
    particular, foreign travel by female citizens; the junta also continued
    to restrict Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom to leave her residence or to
    receive visitors. In September Aung San Suu Kyi, actions that placed
    under house arrest when she attempted to visit an NLD party office on
    the outskirts of Rangoon, and again when she attempted to travel by
    train to Mandalay.
        During the year, the SPDC intensified its systematic use of
    coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right to change their
    government. In September 1998, the NLD leadership organized a 10-member
    Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) to act on behalf
    of the parliament. The junta responded by forcing several elected
    representatives to resign from the parliament, by detaining dozens of
    other elected representatives, and by pressuring constituents to sign
    statements of no confidence. One member of the CRPP also was jailed,
    and the other members of the committee were placed in detention during
    the latter part of the year. However, late in the year, with
    encouragement from U.N. Special Representative Ismail Razali, the
    Government opened contacts with Aung San Suu Kyi, which appeared to
    produce some relaxation in the restrictions on the NLD. Six of the
    NLD's 9 central committee members and 80 NLD supporters were released
    from detention, and press attacks on the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi
    ceased. In addition the NLD was able to resume some normal activities
    of a political party.
        The junta restricted freedom of religion; it maintained its
    institutionalized control over Buddhist clergy and restricted efforts
    by some Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political freedom.
    The Government also coercively promoted Buddhism over other religions
    in some ethnic minority areas and imposed restrictions on certain
    religious minorities.
        The Government did not allow domestic human rights organizations to
    exist and remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its human
    rights record. Violence and societal discrimination against women
    remained problems, as did discrimination against religious and ethnic
    minorities. The Government continued to restrict worker rights, ban
    unions, and use forced labor for public works and for the support of
    military garrisons. Forced labor, including forced child labor, remains
    a serious problem. The forced use of citizens as porters by the army--
    with attendant mistreatment, illness, and sometimes death-remained a
    common practice. In November the International Labor Organization (ILO)
    Governing Body judged that the Government had not taken effective
    action to deal with the ``widespread and systematic'' use of forced
    labor in the country and, for the first time in its history, called on
    all ILO members to apply sanctions to Burma. Child labor also is a
    problem and varies in severity depending on the country's region.
    Trafficking in persons, particularly in women and girls to Thailand and
    China, mostly for the purposes of prostitution, remained widespread.
        Ethnic insurgent forces committed numerous abuses, including
    killings, rapes, forced labor, and the forced use of civilians as
    porters.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There continued to
    be many credible reports of extrajudicial killings by soldiers of
    noncombatant civilians, particularly in areas of ethnic insurgencies
    (see Section 1.g.).
        There were credible reports that army soldiers shot and killed at
    least 73 unarmed ethnic Shan villagers in several repeated incidents in
    Kun-Hing township, Shan State (see Section 1.g.). There were reports
    that soldiers raped and killed women and killed persons who sought to
    prevent such rapes. For example, according to local reports, on January
    11, a patrol of approximately 85 SPDC troops from the 102nd Infantry
    Battalion led by Captain Saw Hpyu beat to death 3 men and gang raped,
    then shot and killed, 2 women along the banks of the Nam Paang river, a
    tributary of the Salween river, in Kun-Hing township. On January 17,
    SPDC troops from Kun-Hing town, from the 246th Infantry Battalion led
    by Commander Than Oo, shot and killed four displaced farmers who were
    returning from their farm. In both the January 11 and 17 incidents, the
    victims were farmers whom the SLORC had relocated forcibly to the area,
    and reportedly were being interrogated about the whereabouts of nearby
    Shan soldiers. In addition there were numerous other reports of SPDC
    soldiers killing forcibly displaced persons who were unable to help
    locate Shan soldiers. There were reports in February that troops raped
    and killed three women in Shan State, and in June that soldiers in Shan
    State killed a man who tried to intervene when the soldiers raped his
    sister (see Section 1.c.). On April 2, troops from the army's 246th
    Light Infantry Division reportedly shot and killed four farmers, and on
    April 7 troops from the 72nd Infantry Battalion shot and killed three
    farmers; both incidents occurred in Kun-Hing township, Shan State.
        Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused deaths among those
    impressed as military porters. According to reports, porters who no
    longer can work often either are abandoned without medical care or
    assistance, or executed. Credible reports indicate that 14 porters
    recruited to work for the military forces in Karen State died between
    April and June, as a result of mistreatment, exhaustion, and
    malnutrition (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.). There was one unconfirmed
    report of extrajudicial killing by police and fire brigade officials
    who reportedly marched a group of drug addicts out of Hpakant in
    Sagaing Division in mid-1999, causing some to die on the road. However,
    no eyewitness evidence regarding this alleged incident ever has
    appeared.
        As in previous years, some inmates died in prisons and labor camps,
    or shortly after being released from them, due to torture or to denial
    of adequate medical care and harsh conditions (see Section 1.c.).
        The military Government also killed persons for political reasons.
    For example, according to the Chin Human Rights Organization, a local
    nongovernmental organization (NGO), on June 26, the Commander of the
    266th Light Infantry Battalion killed Zo Thang, a monitor for the NGO,
    as well as two associates, in Bung Khua village, Chin State (see
    Section 4). This alleged incident could not be confirmed.
        During the year, the Karen National Union (KNU) killed a group of
    three soldiers when they returned to their homes for leave in Karen
    State, where such soldiers apparently are vulnerable. The local army
    contingent retaliated against another nearby village by killing a
    handful of persons, including women and children.
        Some insurgent groups also committed killings. In 1999, near Three
    Pagoda's Pass in the eastern part of the country, soldiers of the KNU
    reportedly captured and killed 10 immigration officials. During the
    year, in Kayah State, elements of the Karenni National Progressive
    Party (KNPP), an insurgent group, reportedly killed several persons,
    including a monk and a mother of five (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
        b. Disappearance.--Throughout the country, as in previous years,
    private citizens and political activists continued to ``disappear'' for
    periods ranging from several hours to several weeks or more; many
    persons never have reappeared. DDSI officials usually apprehend
    individuals for questioning without the knowledge of their family
    members. In many, although not all cases, the DDSI releases them soon
    afterward. Such action usually is intended to prevent free political
    expression or assembly (see Section 2.a.). The army also continued to
    seize numerous persons for porterage or related duties, often without
    the knowledge of their family members (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.). The
    whereabouts of those persons seized by army units to serve as porters,
    as well as of prisoners transferred for labor or porterage duties,
    often remained unknown.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Members of the security forces tortured, beat, and
    otherwise abused prisoners and detainees. The Government routinely
    subjected detainees to harsh interrogation techniques designed to
    intimidate and disorient. The most common forms of mistreatment were
    sleep and food deprivation coupled with around-the-clock questioning
    under bright lights; some detainees also were kicked and beaten. During
    the year, there were credible firsthand reports that, during
    interrogations, officials place metal rods between prisoners' fingers
    and squeeze them in an attempt to injure the prisoners' hands; hot wax
    also is poured on the prisoners' backs. There continued to be credible
    reports that prisoners were forced to squat or assume stressful,
    uncomfortable, or painful positions for lengthy periods. In August
    1999, a military intelligence team placed NLD youth member Thein Lwin
    in detention. Authorities subsequently tortured Thein Lwin for 9 months
    without ever charging him with a crime.
        In late August, during the first 2 days of a 9-day political
    standoff, security forces refused to permit local residents to
    distribute food, water, or medicine to Aung San Suu Kyi and a number of
    her NLD colleagues; they also interfered with several subsequent
    provision deliveries and did not allow Aung San Suu Kyi access to her
    doctor. Aung San Suu Kyi later was placed under house arrest (see
    Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 3). Police sometimes beat NLD members during
    confrontations.
        In September five prison guards and a trustee inmate beat James
    Mawdsley with sticks; Mawdsley, a British political prisoner who was
    confined in Keng Tung until October, suffered a broken nose and two
    black eyes (see Section 1.e.).
        According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, on June 26, the
    266th Light Infantry Battalion reportedly forced a 29-year-old Chin
    farmer, a woman named Pi Sai Sung, to walk 28 miles with rags stuffed
    in her mouth and wearing only a bra and underwear. The army reportedly
    abused her in this manner because Pi Sai allegedly had had a
    relationship with a human rights field monitor whom the battalion
    killed that same day (see Section 4). However, the events of this
    alleged incident could not be confirmed.
        There continued to be many credible reports that security forces
    subjected ordinary citizens to harassment and physical abuse. The
    military forces routinely confiscate property, cash, and food, and use
    coercive and abusive recruitment methods to procure porters. Those
    persons forced into porterage or other labor faced extremely difficult
    conditions, and beatings and mistreatment that sometimes resulted in
    death (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 6.c.). For example, the military
    requires all Rohingya farmers from a village in Northern Rakhine State
    to provide 10 days of labor a month to the military. If they arrive
    late for their duty, the local major makes them roll down a bramble-
    covered hill as punishment. Numerous other Rohingya men say that all of
    the men from their village must work every 2 weeks as porters to carry
    food and ammunition to military camps near Bangladesh. The men describe
    the trek as quite dangerous, particularly when the soldiers beat them
    with bamboo canes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
        For decades successive military regimes have applied a strategy of
    forced relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking autonomy;
    these forcible relocations continue, particularly alongside the Thai
    border. Thousands of villagers continue to flee or be driven from their
    homes, where they come to struggle in makeshift forest shelters without
    adequate food, security, or basic medical care--frequently in heavily
    mined areas. In a December 1999 Karen Human Rights Group report, Karen
    villagers said that the army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
    (DKBA), an armed ethnic group allied with the Government, frequently
    enter villages together, demanding money, food, and other favors. Those
    persons unable to deliver may be killed, beaten, subjected to forced
    labor, or raped (see Sections 1.a., 1.g., 2.d., and 6.c.). There are
    numerous reports that SPDC troops loot and confiscate property and
    possessions from forcibly relocated persons, or persons who are away
    from their homes; these materials often are used for military
    construction.
        Throughout the year, the NLD reported numerous complaints of
    extensive government mistreatment and exploitation of Kun Gyan Kone
    farmers, particularly those unable to meet government quotas (due to
    low rice yields). According to the NLD, many farmers were forced to
    sell their crops, land, and cattle for less than the market rate; some
    persons were detained, and the Government seized the property of others
    (see Section 1.d.).
        There were frequent reports that army soldiers and other army
    personnel raped women who were members of ethnic minorities, especially
    in Shan, Karenni, and Karen States. For example, according to
    www.Shanland.org, a web site organized by Shan human rights and news
    organizations, on February 23, three SPDC soldiers raped two women who
    were catching fish in a stream near Ta Khoi village. On March 13, SPDC
    troops allegedly gang raped and beat to death three women who were
    collecting firewood in the forest near the road from Murng-Ton to
    Murng-Sart township, Shan State. On March 29, a Light Infantry
    Battalion captain reportedly raped a displaced Shan woman at Naa Kawng
    Mu village, Murng Harng tract, Murng-Ton township, and threatened to
    imprison the village leaders who came to complain about it. On June 29,
    another Light Infantry Division captain allegedly raped a woman and
    shot and killed her brother who tried to intervene, at a rice farm in
    Lai-Kha township, Shan State. None of the incidents in these
    www.Shanland.org reports could be confirmed. There were many similar
    reports throughout the year.
        Members of insurgent forces also reportedly raped civilians.
        Prison conditions generally remained harsh and life threatening.
    The Government's Department of Prisons operates many facilities,
    including several labor camps. Prisoners are permitted to receive
    medicine and food from their families during 15-minute visits once
    every 2 weeks. Throughout the year, the Government transferred many
    prisoners--including NLD members--from Insein prison to prisons and
    labor camps far from Rangoon, where conditions are much harsher. There
    also were credible reports that at least a few prisoners long have been
    denied adequate medical care. Some of these prisoners died as a result.
    In July 1999, NLD member-elect of parliament Kyaw Min died of hepatitis
    contracted in prison. He had been detained from 1996 to 1998 without
    trial and was released to his family just prior to his death. Tun Zaw
    Zaw, a NLD youth leader who was released on December 31, 1999, also
    lost his sight while under detention and was detained again on
    September 14 and, again, on September 21. At year's end, he remained in
    detention in Insein Prison. In Thauntha township of Mandalay Division,
    the authorities arrested U Aung Kyaw, U Maung Nyo, U Nyo Hla, and U
    Htay Gyi for sending a letter of appeal regarding the Government's
    commandeering of private vehicles. U Aung Kyaw's request for medical
    attention was denied, and on April 30, he died of hypertension after 5
    days in jail.
        International monitoring of prisons began in May 1999, when the
    ICRC was allowed unrestricted access to all prisoners in all prisons,
    detention centers, and labor camps. Visits by the ICRC to labor camps
    began in March, and it visited six labor camps by year's end. In
    response to ICRC recommendations, the Government provided some
    prisoners with an opportunity for exercise, better food, reading
    material, and improved medical care. As of September, the ICRC had
    visited more than 35,000 prisoners in at least 30 prisons, including
    more than 1,800 political prisoners (see Section 1.e.). The ICRC also
    has begun tackling the problem of the roughly 36,000 persons in forced
    labor camps. The Government allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional
    services, such as providing medications, delivering letters to and from
    prisoners, and providing support for family visits to prisoners.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There is no provision in
    the law for judicial determination of the legality of detention, and
    the SPDC routinely used arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention.
    For example, Aung San Suu Kyi was held incommunicado twice in
    September, following her attempt to visit NLD party workers on the
    outskirts of Rangoon and her attempt to travel by train to Mandalay
    (see Sections 2.b., 2.d., and 3). Prior to being charged, detainees
    rarely have access to legal counsel or their families and political
    detainees have no opportunity to obtain release on bail. Even after
    being charged, detainees rarely have the benefit of counsel. Some
    political detainees are held incommunicado for long periods. Moreover,
    Section 10a of the Penal Code allows the authorities to extend
    sentences arbitrarily, and some political prisoners were not released
    after completing their sentences. In Mandalay 11 prisoners sentenced
    for political reasons--including Zaw Min, Ne Win, U Tin Aye Yu, U Tin
    Myint, U Tin Aye, U Khin Maung Thant, U Zarni Aung, U Thein Than Oo, U
    Kyaw Sein Maung, U Naing Myint, U Htay Nyunt--have completed their
    terms, but have not been released. Countrywide, at least 30 prisoners
    in 7 different prisons are held in similar circumstances.
        Authorities continued to detain some private citizens and political
    activists continued to ``disappear'' temporarily at the hands of
    security forces (see Section 1.b.).
        The Government repeatedly detained and deported foreign journalists
    (see Section 2.a.).
        Throughout the year, the Government continued its campaign of
    detention and intimidation against the NLD. Between April and May the
    authorities arrested scores of NLD members-elect of parliament and
    sentenced four of them to periods of between 2 and 15 years in prison.
    Than Lwin, Kyaw Shwe, Nyein Maung, and Tin Aung Lay, the four elected
    members who were held, were detained for fabricating accusations
    against township organizations, instigating threats to peace and
    stability by spreading rumors to mislead the public, and illegally
    organizing villagers. In addition U Aye Tha Aung, who represented four
    large ethnic groups in the CRPP, was arrested in April and sentenced,
    in secret, to 21 years in prison for ``trying to destroy the unity of
    the nationalities.'' Following local party elections for the NLD's
    youth and women's organizations in April, all 38 of the newly elected
    party officials were arrested and sentenced to periods in prison
    ranging from 6 months to 40 years. In addition on May 27, the NLD
    headquarter's two elderly landladies, Daw Khin Nu and Daw Chaw, were
    arrested for disturbing the peace and spent several weeks in Insein
    prison. Also in May in Taung-Dwin-Gyi township, Magwe Division, police
    detained 25 NLD youth members and transferred them to Thayet prison
    without their families' knowledge. These youth members were released,
    but only after their parents agreed to prevent their children from
    communicating with the NLD offices. On September 27, police detained
    83-year-old member-elect U Maung Maung Gyi, the senior leader at NLD
    headquarters, for 12 hours in order to ensure that he did not organize
    any celebration of the NLD's 12th anniversary.
        At year's end, the Government continued to detain without charge 48
    members-elect of parliament in 1990. Most were NLD members and most had
    been detained since September 1998, just before the NLD formed the
    CRPP. Other members-elect of parliament were released during the year.
    However, there were credible reports that many of these members-elect
    were released only after they agreed to resign from parliament, to
    withdraw their support from the CRPP, or otherwise to restrict their
    political activities.
        Throughout the year, the NLD brought complaints about extensive
    government mistreatment and exploitation of Kun Gyan Kone farmers;
    numerous farmers were held in custody for failing to meet rice quotas
    (see Section 1.c.). For example, in Karen State, armed KNPP units
    threaten farmers with death for nonpayment of taxes. If the farmer
    pays, the army then imprisons him for 3 years for ``unlawful
    association.'' According to the Karen Human Rights Group, in March army
    troops burned at least nine villages in Dweh Loh township, just
    southwest of the town of Papun, and then planted landmines in them.
        Since 1988, when the SPDC refused to recognize the results of the
    elections and pressured successful candidates to resign, some
    candidates, as well as thousands of political activists, went into
    forced exile rather than face threats.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
    of the military junta. The junta appoints justices to the Supreme Court
    which, in turn, appoints lower court judges with the approval of the
    junta. These courts then adjudicate cases under decrees promulgated by
    the junta that effectively have the force of law.
        The court system, as inherited from the United Kingdom and
    subsequently restructured, comprises courts at the township, district,
    state, and national levels.
        Throughout the year, the Government continued to rule by decree and
    was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair
    public trials or any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era
    legal system formally were in place, the court system and its operation
    remained seriously flawed, particularly in the handling of political
    cases. Unprofessional behavior by some court officials, the misuse of
    overly broad laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950, the
    Unlawful Associations Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on
    Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Destructionists--and the
    manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to deprive
    citizens of the right to a fair trial and the rule of law. Pervasive
    corruption further serves to undermine the impartiality of the justice
    system.
        Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public
    trial and to be represented by a defense attorney, generally were
    respected in criminal cases, but not in political cases that the
    Government deemed especially sensitive. In criminal cases, defense
    attorneys generally are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses;
    however, their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to obtain
    the shortest possible sentence for their clients. Most court
    proceedings are open to the public. However, in political cases, trials
    are not open to the public. In political cases, defense attorneys
    appear to serve no purpose other than to perpetuate the pretense of a
    fair trial, since reliable reports indicate that senior military
    authorities dictate verdicts, regardless of the evidence or the law. In
    one case, Chein Poh, a 77-year-old highly respected and nonpolitical
    lawyer, was sentenced to 14 years in prison for allegedly distributing
    articles from foreign newspapers and magazines with antigovernment
    annotations (see Section 2.a.). Although the Government was not able to
    prove its case against him, he was given two consecutive 7-year
    sentences for the same activity. However, his actual offense was the
    fact that he is a neighbor of U Tin Oo, the vicechairman of the NLD. In
    October, following an appeal by U.N. Special Representative Razali,
    authorities released from prison U Chein Poh and five other elderly
    prisoners.
        U Chein Poh's arrest and conviction may have been part of an
    extensive government campaign to eliminate the remaining independent
    lawyers in the country who might provide advice and counsel to the NLD.
    During the year, the Government arrested and sentenced under fabricated
    charges nearly every lawyer with any perceived connection with the NLD.
    Cases include that of U Soe Han, a prominent NLD lawyer who was charged
    with having failed to inform the Government that he planned to stay
    overnight at his mother's house (see Section 1.f.). Authorities
    released U Soe Han following his wife's death. However, they rearrested
    U Soe Han in September and sentenced him, along with several other
    prominent individuals, to 21 years in prison for sending a letter to
    Senior General Than Shwe and Secretary One Khin Nyunt that urged the
    Government to release political prisoners and start a dialog with the
    NLD. Altogether, the Government jailed more than 40 lawyers during the
    year. In 1999 two prodemocracy activists were sentenced to long prison
    terms for actions that elsewhere would have been deemed innocuous.
    After two arrests in 1997 and 1998, and imprisonment for 90 days of a
    5-year prison sentence for illegal entry, a British citizen, James
    Mawdsley, was arrested for a third time in August 1999, and sentenced
    to a total of 17 years in Keng Tung prison. On October 19, he was
    released, shortly after the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
    informed the Government that Mawdsley's detention violated
    international standards of human rights (see Section 1.c.). In
    September 1999, Rachel Goldwyn, a foreign citizen, was arrested after
    chaining herself to a lamppost in downtown Rangoon and singing a
    prodemocracy song. She was convicted of sedition and sentenced to 7
    years' imprisonment, but was released on appeal and left the country in
    November 1999.
        During the year, the Government allowed two visits by U.N. Special
    Envoy to Burma, Ismail Razali (see Section 4). In late December,
    shortly before an expected return Razali (scheduled for January 2001),
    the Government released several political prisoners from the list of
    aged prisoners presented by Razali during his first and second visit.
    Late in the year, the Government released 6 of the NLD's 9 central
    committee members and 80 NLD supporters from detention.
        Opposition political parties have attempted to use the courts to
    enforce their political rights, thus far without success. In 1999 the
    Supreme Court dismissed suits brought by members of the NLD's central
    executive committee (CEC) against SPDC Secretary One, and Lt. Gen. Khin
    Nyunt, the chief of military intelligence. The suits alleged that the
    military intelligence apparatus violated the rights of private
    individuals in connection with the detention of NLD members elected to
    parliament in 1990. The NLD CEC members also filed suit against other
    senior government officials for libel, fraud, and intimidation in
    connection with government-organized petitions of ``no confidence'' in
    NLD members-elect of parliament (see Sections 1.d. and 3). The hearing
    on these cases was closed to the public and, in both cases, the Supreme
    Court's verdict went against the NLD. On April 27, the Supreme Court
    dismissed an appeal by the NLD against the SPDC for illegally detaining
    and libeling memberselect of parliament. The Supreme Court ruled that a
    case could not proceed against a government official--in this case head
    of military intelligence Lt. General Khin Nyunt--if the Head of State
    did not grant permission. In September lawyers for the NLD began a suit
    against General Than Shwe and the Chairman of the Election Commission
    for failing to fulfill commitments made in regard to the transition to
    democracy.
        The ICRC estimated that there were 1,800 political prisoners in the
    country as of July, and during the year the ICRC completed visits to
    almost all of them. In addition some political prisoners remained in
    custody despite having completed their sentences (see Section 1.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The military Government continued to interfere
    extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of citizens. Through its
    pervasive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the
    Government systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and
    closely monitored the activities of many citizens, particularly those
    known to be active politically. The law requires that any person who
    spends the night at a place other than his registered domicile inform
    the police in advance, and that any household that hosts a person not
    domiciled there maintain and submit to the police a guest list.
    Moreover, police routinely enter and search homes at night without
    warrants to enforce compliance with this requirement.
        In May U Soe Han, a lawyer for the NLD, was detained under this
    law, as a result of having spent the night of May 27 (the tenth
    anniversary of the 1990 general election) at his mother's house (see
    Section 1.e.). Security personnel also commonly searched private
    premises and other property without warrants in other contexts.
        Government employees generally are required to obtain advance
    permission before meeting with foreigners.
        Government employees generally are prohibited from joining or
    supporting political parties; however, this proscription is applied
    selectively. In the case of the Government's own mass mobilization
    organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, the
    Government has used coercion and intimidation to induce many persons,
    including nearly all public sector employees, both to join the union
    and to attend meetings called to criticize the NLD and NLD members-
    elect of parliament (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
        Government officials, including senior officials, continued
    repeatedly to make statements in the state-monopolized domestic media
    warning parents that authorities could hold them responsible for any
    political offenses committed by their children. The Government's
    intelligence services also monitor the movements of foreigners and
    question citizens about conversations with foreigners. In addition, in
    July 1998, the Government officially banned marriages between female
    citizens and foreigners; however, this ban has not been enforced.
        Telephone service also is controlled tightly. Security personnel
    regularly screen private correspondence and telephone calls. Government
    authorities continued generally to prevent citizens from subscribing
    directly to foreign publications or satellite television (see Section
    2.a.). In addition the Government licenses and rations all electronic
    communication devices, which are monitored closely. A decree
    promulgated by the junta in 1996 has made possession of an unregistered
    telephone, facsimile machine, or computer modem punishable by
    imprisonment (see Section 2.a.). In April an Indonesian citizen, Irawan
    Sidaria, and two local technicians were arrested under this statute for
    having installed an Inmarsat satellite telephone unit at the Asia Plaza
    Hotel in Rangoon. The communication equipment, which provided 10
    telephone lines for oversea calls, had not been licensed by the state-
    owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications. In June Myanmar Posts and
    Telecommunications also announced that users of nonregistered cordless
    telephones in the country would face up to 3 years imprisonment or a
    fine of about $75 (30,000 Kyat), or both.
        During late 1998 and early 1999, the Government refused to allow
    Aung San Suu Kyi's terminally ill husband, Michael Aris, to travel from
    Britain to visit his wife in Rangoon. The Government stated that if
    Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to see her British husband, she could leave the
    country to visit him in the United Kingdom. The Government also
    announced that it would allow the prodemocracy leader to reenter the
    country only if it judged her visit to be nonpolitical. At about the
    same time, state-owned media and billboards and government-organized
    mass rallies called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be expelled.
        Weak private property rights and poor land ownership records
    facilitate involuntary relocations of persons by the State. The law
    does not permit private ownership of land; it recognizes only different
    categories of land use rights, many of which are not freely
    transferable. Postcolonial land laws also have revived the precolonial
    tradition that private rights to land are contingent upon the land
    being put to productive use.
        To make way for commercial or public construction and, in some
    cases, for reasons of internal security and political control, the SPDC
    has relocated forcibly citizens to ``new towns.'' Prevalent during the
    early 1990's, this practice has become much more restrictive. Persons
    relocated to new towns generally suffer from greatly reduced
    infrastructure support, and residents targeted for displacement
    generally are given no option but to move, usually on short notice (see
    Section 2.d.).
        In rural areas the military Government frequently forcibly
    relocated ethnic minority villages. This practice was particularly
    widespread in the Shan, Kayah, and Karen States and in areas of Mon
    State and Pegu Division. In these areas, thousands of villagers were
    displaced from their traditional villages and herded into secure
    settlements in strategic areas. These forced relocations often are
    accompanied by demands for forced labor to build infrastructure for
    both villagers and army units and often have generated large refugee
    flows to neighboring countries and/or to parts of the country not
    controlled by the Government (see Sections 1.c., 2.c., 2.d., 5, and
    6.c.). In some areas, the junta has replaced the original ethnic
    settlements with settlements of Burmans. This was the case in Arakan
    State in 1999 and during the year, where the Government forcibly
    relocated several largely Muslim villages, and resettled the area with
    Buddhist Burmans, who were forced to move from Dagon Township in
    Rangoon Division. In other areas, army units forced or attempted to
    force ethnic Karen to relocate to areas controlled by the DKBA (see
    Section 5).
        Military units also have routinely confiscated livestock, fuel,
    food supplies, alcoholic drinks, or money. This abuse has become
    widespread since 1997, when the junta, intent upon continuing its
    military buildup despite mounting financial problems, ordered its
    regional commanders to meet their logistical needs locally rather than
    rely on the central authorities. As a result, regional commanders have
    increased their use of forced contributions of food, labor, and
    building materials throughout the country (see Sections 1.c., 5, and
    6.c.).
        Both army and insurgent units have used forced conscription.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Since independence in 1948, the army has battled a
    series of diverse ethnic insurgencies. These ethnic insurgent groups
    have sought to gain greater autonomy or, in some cases, independence
    from the ethnic Burman-dominated State. Since 1989 15 such groups have
    concluded cease-fire agreements with the Government. Under these
    agreements, these groups have retained their own armed forces and
    perform some governmental functions within specified territories
    inhabited chiefly by members of their ethnic groups. However, other
    groups remain in active revolt. The KNU has continued to conduct
    insurgent operations in areas with significant Karen populations in the
    eastern and southern regions of the country, including not only Karen
    State, but also Mon State, Tenasserim Division, and Pegu Division. In
    Kayah State, the KNPP has resumed fighting against the Government since
    the breakdown of a cease-fire negotiated in 1995.
        In central and southern Shan State, military forces continued to
    engage the Shan State Army (SSA). The military maintained a program of
    forced relocation of villagers in that region and there were credible
    reports of army killings, rapes, and other atrocities.
        On January 30, in Kaeng-Kham village, Kun-Hing township, Shan
    State, SPDC troops reportedly shot and killed 19 unarmed villagers aged
    15 to 57 years. The villagers previously had been resettled forcibly,
    but on January 18, Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Aye, Commander of the army's
    246th Infantry Battalion, reportedly told the villagers that the
    Government had decided that for a fee they would be permitted to
    resettle in their old village. The 66th army Infantry Battalion led by
    Captain Zaw Thein, which later encountered the villagers, confronted
    then later shot and killed the 19 persons who chose to pay a fee. The
    villagers reportedly were killed because they were found in a ``free-
    fire'' zone; the safe-conduct passes were not recognized. On February
    12, 80 to 90 SPDC troops led by Captain Hla Khin, again from the 246th
    Infantry Battalion, reportedly killed 20 villagers in Kun Pu tract,
    Kun-Hing township and 5 other villagers, at a different place. The
    villagers also were among those who the SLORC had displaced forcibly in
    1996 and 1997. It is believed that these massacres were intended to
    terrorize and intimidate the villagers so that they would either go to
    relocation sites or flee to Thailand.
        According to an April report available at www.Shanland.org, on
    March 27, in Murng-Kerng town, Shan State, a group of SPDC troops from
    the 514th Light Infantry Battalion reportedly shot and killed 13
    relocated farmers (8 men and 5 women) who were clearing a plot of land
    for growing rice. The same battalion reportedly raped and killed three
    women in Kai-See township, Shan State. Neither incident could be
    independently verified or confirmed.
        In May the army's 246th Light Infantry Division and its 524th Light
    Infantry Division reportedly killed a total of 73 Shan villagers,
    including women and children, in 2 separate incidents in Kun-Hing
    township, Shan State (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.). On August 2, the
    army's 520th Light Infantry Battalion shot and killed a family of six
    at their rice farm in Murng-Pan township, Shan State. Numerous similar
    army killings of civilians occurred throughout the year.
        Other active insurgent groups include the Chin National Front, the
    Naga National Council, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and the
    Arakan National Organization.
        Some antigovernment insurgent groups also committed serious abuses.
    Some KNU units killed civilians, in one case by blowing up a passenger
    bus with a landmine. During the year, KNPP elements reportedly killed a
    Buddhist monk, Sayador U Bandarkawthala, in Demawso township, Kayah
    State. They also were accused of gang raping and killing Ma Nyunt Tin,
    a mother of five children, in the vicinity of Soe Hlar village, Kayah
    State. SSA insurgents reportedly committed retaliatory killings, rapes,
    and other atrocities against civilians. There were credible reports
    that some insurgents used women and children as porters (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.d.). According to an unconfirmed August report available at
    www.Shanland.org, on June 2, five displaced persons from Loi-Lem
    township reportedly were killed by a landmine blast, planted by members
    of the United Wa State Army in Murng-Ton township, Shan State. At least
    one Karen insurgent group calling itself God's Army, which has split
    from the KNU and operated from a base inside the country near the
    border with Thailand, was led by child soldiers (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.d.).
        On January 24, 10 armed God's Army members seized the provincial
    hospital in Ratchaburi, Thailand, taking several hundred persons
    hostage; the next day, Thai security forces killed all 10 terrorists
    while retaking the hospital. In September 1999, five young armed Karen
    (of the same group) seized the Burmese embassy in Thailand and held
    persons of several nationalities hostage.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law allows the Government to
    restrict freedom of speech and of the press and, in practice, the junta
    continued to restrict these freedoms severely and systematically. The
    Government continued to arrest, detain, convict, and imprison many
    persons for expressing political opinions critical of the junta, and
    for distributing or possessing publications in which such opinions were
    expressed (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.). Security services also
    monitored and harassed persons believed to hold such political
    opinions. Many more persons refrained from speaking out due to fear of
    arrest, interrogation, and other forms of intimidation.
        Legal restrictions on freedom of speech, already severe since the
    early 1960's, have intensified since 1996, when the junta issued a
    decree prohibiting speeches or statements that ``undermine national
    stability,'' as well as with the drafting of alternative constitutions.
    In all regions of the country, the military Government continued to use
    force to prohibit virtually all public speech critical of it by all
    persons, including persons elected to parliament in 1990, and by
    leaders of political parties. The Government has pursued this policy
    consistently since 1990, with one exception--from late 1995 to December
    1996, the Government allowed weekly speeches by NLD leaders in front of
    Aung San Suu Kyi's residence in Rangoon.
        Many prominent writers and journalists remain in prison. In 1999
    novelist Maung Tha Ya fled the country and identified 20 prominent
    writers who then were in prison. These included novelist and journalist
    San San Nweh, who was imprisoned in 1994 for a 10-year-term for passing
    information about human rights violations to international reporters
    and U.N. observers. Government censorship boards forbade publication or
    distribution of works authored by those in prison, although the
    Government allowed former political prisoners, Ma Thida, and U Sein
    Myint (also known as U Moe Thu), to write several magazine articles
    following their release from prison.
        On May 26, the junta announced that security forces had seized
    ``inflammatory'' leaflets, stickers, and calendars bearing the monk
    association's seal, and arrested Zaw Min Oo in the Bago Division. These
    published sheets allegedly were to be distributed within religious
    associations. In September the junta also sentenced Chein Poh, a highly
    respected, 77-year-old lawyer in Rangoon for allegedly distributing
    foreign publications with antiregime annotations written on the back.
    Although the regime presented no credible evidence to prove the charge,
    Chein Poh was sentenced to 14 years in prison (see Section 1.e.).
    Between April and June, the junta arrested an additional 11 persons for
    distributing antijunta leaflets and allegedly planning attacks on
    government buildings.
        The Government did not permit Aung San Suu Kyi to communicate with
    the outside world during the initial period of her house arrest.
    However, after November she was permitted to meet with selected members
    of the NLD's Central Executive Committee, U.N. Special Representative
    Ismail Razali, and representatives of the European Union, among others
    (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., 2.d., and 3).
        The Government owns and controls all daily newspapers and domestic
    radio and television broadcasting facilities. These official media
    remained propaganda organs of the junta and normally did not report
    opposing views except to criticize them. The one, partial exception was
    the Myanmar Times, an expensive English-language weekly newspaper
    targeted at the foreign community in Rangoon that was launched in
    February, and which occasionally reported on criticism of the
    Government's policies by the U.N. and other organizations.
        All privately owned publications remained subject to prepublication
    censorship by state censorship boards. Due in part to the time required
    to obtain the approval of the censors, private news periodicals
    generally are published monthly or less often. However, since 1996, the
    Government has given transferable waivers of prepublication censorship
    for weekly periodicals. As a result, weekly tabloids have proliferated;
    however, they remain subject in principle to censorship and generally
    do not report domestic political news. Most in fact are published by
    government departments. Government control encourages self-censorship.
        Imported publications remained subject in principle to
    predistribution censorship by state censorship boards, and possession
    of publications not approved by the state censorship boards remained a
    serious offense. Cases involving prodemocracy literature were punished
    regularly by imprisonment. The Government also restricted the legal
    importation of foreign news periodicals and discouraged subscriptions
    to foreign periodicals. However, a limited selection of foreign
    newspapers could be purchased at hotels and bookstores in Rangoon (see
    Section 1.f.). Prior to August these foreign newspapers and magazines
    also were censored regularly at the airport on arrival; subsequently,
    the Government's policy ceased to be enforced.
        Since 1997 the Government has issued few visas to foreign
    journalists and has held fewer than a handful of press conferences on
    political subjects. Several journalists who entered the country as
    tourists were detained and deported by the Government.
        Due to widespread poverty, limited literacy, and poor
    infrastructure, radio remained the most important medium of mass
    communication. News periodicals rarely circulated outside urban areas,
    and most villages lacked access to electrical power, except from
    generators or batteries. The junta continued to monopolize and to
    control the content of all domestic radio broadcasting tightly. Foreign
    radio broadcasts, such as those of the British Broadcasting
    Corporation, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the Norway-based
    Democratic Voice of Burma, remained the principal sources of uncensored
    information; however, individuals were arrested for listening to these
    services. In December 1999, U Than Chaun, the owner of a coffee shop in
    Shwe-Goo Township of Kachin State was arrested and sentenced to 2
    years' imprisonment with hard labor for having the radio in his coffee
    shop tuned to Voice of America.
        The Government also continued to monopolize and to control tightly
    all domestic television broadcasting, offering only a government
    channel and an armed forces channel. In addition the Government
    continued to restrict the reception of foreign satellite television
    broadcasts through laws that made the operation of an unlicensed
    satellite television receiver a crime punishable by up to 3 years in
    prison (see Section 1.f.). The Television and Video Law makes it a
    criminal offense to publish, distribute, or possess a videotape not
    approved by a state censorship board. In 1996 the junta issued an
    amendment to that law that stiffened the penalties for distributing
    uncensored videos.
        The junta continued to restrict access to electronic media severely
    and systematically. Under a decree promulgated by the junta in 1996,
    all computers, software, and associated telecommunications devices are
    subject to government registration, and possession of unregistered
    equipment is punishable by imprisonment (see Section 1.f.).
        The Ministry of Defense continued to operate the country's only
    known Internet server and has begun to offer Internet services
    selectively to a small number of customers. However, in December 1999,
    military intelligence arrested Col. Khin Maung Lwin, who managed the
    Defense Ministry's Internet operations, and charged him with violating
    the Official Secrets Act. One email service, which is government-owned,
    is available. In December 1999, military intelligence officials closed
    down several private email services and computer training schools. The
    country's first cybercafe opened in Rangoon in 1999 but did not offer
    patrons direct access to the Internet.
        The Government continued to restrict academic freedom severely.
    University teachers and professors remain subject to the same
    restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and
    publications as other government employees. The Ministry of Higher
    Education routinely warns teachers against criticism of the Government.
    It also instructs them not to discuss politics while at work; prohibits
    them from joining or supporting political parties or engaging in
    political activity; and requires them to obtain advance ministerial
    approval for meetings with foreigners. Like all government employees,
    professors and teachers have been coerced into joining and
    participating in the activities of the Union Solidarity and Development
    Association (USDA), the Government's mass mobilization organization.
    Teachers at all levels also continued to be held responsible for the
    political activities of their students.
        In June and July, the Government reopened the remainder of the
    institutions of higher education that were closed in 1996, following
    widespread student demonstrations. This completed a process that began
    in August 1997, when primary and secondary schools reopened. With this
    latest action, all graduate and undergraduate schools have reopened.
    However, the Government has taken a number of special measures to limit
    the possibility of student unrest. Campuses have been moved to
    relatively remote areas, teachers and students have been warned that
    disturbances would be dealt with severely, and on-campus dormitories
    have been closed. This has disrupted university life severely. There is
    evidence that many students have decided to continue with self-study,
    because the universities have deteriorated to such an extent during the
    time that they were closed and have become so inaccessible.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
    restricts freedom of assembly severely. It officially prohibits
    unauthorized outdoor assemblies of more than five persons; however,
    that ordinance is not enforced consistently. The 10 existing political
    parties also are required legally to request permission from the
    Government to hold meetings of their members; nevertheless, meetings
    occurred without government permission.
        The military junta continued its systematic decade-long use of
    coercion and intimidation to prevent the parliament elected in 1990
    from convening (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 3).
        The Government severely restricts freedom of association,
    particularly in regard to members of the main opposition political
    party, the NLD. While the Government has allowed the NLD to celebrate
    certain key party events with public gatherings at Aung San Suu Kyi's
    residence or the national NLD party headquarters in Rangoon, it has
    restricted the size of the gatherings and the individuals who were
    allowed to attend. For example on September 26, the NLD's 12th
    anniversary, junta forces blocked all traffic from roads surrounding
    NLD headquarters, with a heavy military intelligence and riot police
    presence for two blocks on either side of the building. It also has
    prevented NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi from traveling to
    party meetings outside of Rangoon, stopping her four times in 1998 and
    once during the year.
        As in previous years, there were incidents during which security
    forces publicly beat NLD members as they attempted peaceably to
    assemble or attend meetings. On April 30, the security forces also
    detained 37 NLD members from Taun-Dwin-Gyi township, Magwe Division,
    for holding a party meeting.
        Throughout the year, government authorities in various parts of the
    country used force to prevent prodemocracy demonstrations or punish
    participants in them. Authorities detained or arrested and in many
    cases convicted and imprisoned persons suspected of planning such
    demonstrations (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). On September 21, NLD
    members gathered at Rangoon train station to see Aung San Suu Kyi off
    on her proposed trip to Mandalay; however, police arrested them and at
    year's end, they still were in custody. Approximately 100 NLD members
    were arrested at the time (see Sections 2.d. and 3).
        In 1999 the Government sometimes interfered with religious groups'
    assemblies or other outdoor gatherings; however, there were no credible
    reports of such activity during the year (see Section 2.c.).
        Since 1998, when the NLD's national leadership first organized the
    CRPP, the Government's campaign against the NLD has intensified. This
    campaign initially involved mass rallies and government-organized
    ``recall'' movements against members-elect of parliament. This was
    followed by direct pressure on individual NLD members. Throughout the
    year, government media published hundreds of reports from localities
    across the country that stated that NLD members had ``voluntarily
    resigned'' from the party in groups ranging in size from fewer than 10
    to more than 1,000 persons. By year's end, the reported number of NLD
    members who voluntarily resigned numbered in the tens of thousands.
        These resignations from the NLD generally were coerced, according
    to the persons concerned. In some townships, authorities pressured NLD
    officers to resign, and then declared the local party organizations
    defunct due to a lack of recognized officers. In other localities, NLD
    officials who refused to resign from the party were arrested or
    imprisoned on fabricated charges, and/or recall motions were mounted
    against them. For example, U Tun Win, member-elect from Min Don
    township of Magwe Division, was forced to resign as a member of the
    NLD, and was sent to prison for 3 years for illegally possessing
    foreign videotapes found at his son's video rental store (see Section
    2.a.).
        Outside the capital, government pressure was particularly intense.
    In some cases, members-elect of parliament were required to register at
    police stations twice per day.
        In general the right of association existed only for organizations,
    including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted by law
    and duly registered with the Government, such as the Forest Reserve
    Environment Development and Conservation Association. The one exception
    to this general rule was the USDA, which the Government has attempted
    to develop as a nationwide political organization. Few secular
    nonprofit organizations exist, and those that do exist take special
    care to act in accordance with government policy. This group included
    nominally apolitical organizations such as the Myanmar Red Cross and
    the Myanmar Medical Association. Only 10 political parties are legally
    in existence, and most of those are moribund.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Most adherents of all religions duly
    registered with the authorities generally enjoyed freedom to worship as
    they chose; however, the Government imposed some restrictions on
    certain religious minorities. In addition in practice the Government
    systematically restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human
    rights and political freedom, and coercively promoted Buddhism over
    other religions in some ethnic minority areas.
        The most recent constitution, promulgated in 1974, permitted both
    legislative and administrative restrictions on religious freedom,
    stating that ``the national races shall enjoy the freedom to profess
    their religion . . . provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom
    does not offend the laws or the public interest.'' The Government
    requires religious organizations, like all organizations, to register
    with it. Although there is a government directive exempting ``genuine''
    religious organizations from registration, in practice only registered
    organizations can buy or sell property or open bank accounts, which
    induces most religious organizations to register. Religious
    organizations register with the Ministry of Home Affairs with the
    endorsement of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The State also
    provides some utilities, such as electricity, at preferential rates to
    recognized organizations.
        The Government routinely monitored religious meetings, like all
    assemblies; and it subjected religious publications, like all
    publications, to censorship and control.
        There is no official state religion; however, the Government
    continued to show preference for Theravada Buddhism, the majority
    religion. State-controlled news media frequently depict junta members
    paying homage to Buddhist monks, making donations at pagodas throughout
    the country, officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or
    maintain pagodas, and organizing ostensibly voluntary ``people's
    donations'' of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or
    refurbish Buddhist religious shrines throughout the country. State-
    owned newspapers routinely featured, as front-page banner slogans,
    quotations from the Buddhist scriptures. Buddhist doctrine remained
    part of the state-mandated curriculum in all elementary schools;
    however, individual children could opt out of instruction in Buddhism.
    The Government also funded the construction of the International
    Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Rangoon, which opened in
    December 1998; its stated purpose is ``to share Myanmar's knowledge of
    Buddhism with the people of the world.''
        The Government also has attempted to control the Buddhist clergy,
    although the clergy have resisted this control. In October 1990, the
    military junta promulgated Order 6/90, which prohibits any organization
    of Buddhist clergy other than nine state-recognized monastic orders,
    which submit to the authority of a state-sponsored State Clergy
    Coordination Committee (``Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee''--SMNC). It
    also issued Order 7/90, which authorizes military commanders to try
    Buddhist clergy before military tribunals for ``activities inconsistent
    with and detrimental to Buddhism,'' and Order 20/90 which imposes on
    Buddhist clergy a code of conduct that is enforced by criminal
    penalties. These edicts remain in effect. The junta also has subjected
    the Buddhist clergy (``sangha'') to special restrictions on freedom of
    expression and association and, since 1995, has prohibited the
    ordination as clergy of any member of a political party.
        In 1999 the senior abbots of five monasteries around Mandalay
    protested a new order by the regional military command that forbade
    Buddhist clergy to leave their township of residence without first
    surrendering their identity cards and obtaining written permission from
    local authorities. Persons other than Buddhist clergy generally were
    not subject to such severe restrictions on movement (see Section 2.d.).
    In addition more than 100 monks have been imprisoned during the 1990's
    for supporting democracy and human rights; however, about half of these
    have been released, while others have died in prison.
        Christian and Islamic groups continued to have difficulties in
    obtaining permission to build new churches and mosques, particularly on
    prominent sites. In parts of Chin State, authorities reportedly have
    not authorized the construction of any new churches since 1997. The
    Government reportedly also has denied permission for churches to be
    built along main roads in cities such as Myitkina, the capital of
    Kachin State. In Arakan State in April, authorities reportedly detained
    12 Muslim elders for failing to demolish 3 mosques in Dodine village.
    In other areas of the country, Christian and Muslim groups that have
    sought to build small churches or mosques on side streets or in other
    inconspicuous locations usually have been able to gain official
    approval, despite a time-consuming bureaucracy.
        There also were credible reports that government officials and
    security forces compelled both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to
    contribute money, food, and uncompensated labor to build, renovate, or
    maintain Buddhist shrines or monuments. The Government calls these
    contributions voluntary donations (see Section 6.c.). There also were
    reports of forced labor being used to dismantle temples and
    monasteries. For example, on July 27, army troops from the 246th
    Infantry Division reportedly forced 54 men to dismantle several temples
    and monasteries in the forced relocation areas in Kun-Hing township; on
    August 10, the same troops again conscripted 87 workers from the same
    town, and forced them to build a shelter for the lumber and tin sheets
    taken from the dismantled monasteries.
        Since 1990 government authorities and security forces have promoted
    Buddhism over Christianity among the Chin ethnic minority of the
    western part of the country. Since 1990 government authorities and
    security forces, with assistance from monks of the Hill Regions
    Buddhist Missions, coercively have sought to induce Chins to convert to
    Theravada Buddhism and to prevent Christian Chins from proselytizing.
    This campaign, reportedly accompanied by other efforts to ``Burmanize''
    the Chin, has involved a large increase in military units stationed in
    Chin State and other predominately Chin areas, state-sponsored
    immigration of Buddhist Burman monks from other regions, and
    construction of Buddhist monasteries and shrines in Chin communities
    with few or no Buddhists, often by means of forced ``donations'' of
    money or labor (see Section 6.c.). Government authorities repeatedly
    prohibited Christian clergy from proselytizing and beat those who
    refused to stop preaching. There also were reports of forced
    conversion.
        Since the early 1990's, security forces have torn down or forced
    villagers to tear down crosses that had been erected outside Chin
    Christian villages; these crosses often have been replaced with
    pagodas, sometimes built with forced labor. In parts of Chin State,
    authorities reportedly have not authorized the construction of any new
    churches since 1997.
        For several years, there have been reports that the Government
    sought to induce members of the Naga ethnic group in Sagaing Division
    to convert from Christianity to Buddhism by means similar to those used
    to convert members of the Chin to Buddhism. In August 1999, the first
    mass exodus of Naga religious refugees from the country occurred, as
    more than 1,000 Christians of the Naga ethnic group, from 8 different
    villages, fled the country to India. These Naga claimed that the army
    and Buddhist monks tried to convert them forcibly to Buddhism and
    closed and desecrated churches in their villages.
        Religious groups of all faiths were able to establish and maintain
    links with coreligionists in other countries and travel abroad for
    religious purposes. However, the Government closely monitored these
    activities. Foreign religious representatives usually were allowed
    visas only for short stays but in some cases were permitted to preach
    to congregations.
        The Government has not permitted permanent foreign missionary
    establishments since the mid-1960's, when it expelled nearly all
    foreign missionaries and nationalized all private schools and
    hospitals. However, some elderly nuns and priests working in the
    country since before independence in 1948 have been allowed to continue
    their work.
        Religious publications, like secular ones, remained subject to
    censorship. Translations of the Bible and the Koran into indigenous
    languages could not be imported or printed legally, although this ban
    is not enforced in many areas. According to the Chin Freedom Coalition,
    in early 1999, in Tamu township, Sagaing Division, military authorities
    confiscated 16,000 copies of the Bible printed outside the country in
    the Chin, Kachin, and Karen languages; these Bibles reportedly remained
    confiscated at year's end.
        Religious affiliation sometimes is indicated on government-issued
    identification cards that citizens and permanent residents of the
    country are required to carry at all times. There appear to be no
    consistent criteria governing whether a person's religion is indicated
    on his or her identification card. Nationals also are required to
    indicate their religions on some official application forms, such as
    passports.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts freedom of
    movement. Except for limitations in areas of insurgent activity, most
    citizens could travel freely within the country, but were required to
    notify their local government of their whereabouts (see Section 1.f.).
    Urban and rural residents also are subject to arbitrary relocation.
        The freedom of movement of opposition political leaders also has
    been curtailed strictly. Since ostensibly freeing NLD general secretary
    Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 1995, the junta has allowed her
    to travel outside the capital only once, on a visit to a monastery. On
    August 24, she was prevented from traveling to an NLD party meeting in
    Kungyangon, in the near vicinity of Rangoon, resulting in a 9-day
    roadside standoff, during which time she was denied access to her
    political followers. The standoff ended on September 2, when police
    took Aung San Suu Kyi and her companions into custody and detained them
    incommunicado at Aung San Suu Kyi's Rangoon residence until September
    14. On September 21, the military Government again prevented her from
    traveling by train to Mandalay and again detained her incommunicado in
    her house (see Sections 2.b. and 3). The SPDC similarly detained on
    both occasions other leaders of the NLD, including the Vice Chairman of
    the NLD, U Tin Oo. Since 1996 security forces also have restricted
    public movement along the street in front of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's
    residence.
        The Government carefully scrutinizes prospective travel abroad.
    This facilitates rampant corruption, as many applicants are forced to
    pay large bribes (sometimes as high as $3,000, about 1.2 million Kyat;
    the equivalent of 10 years' salary for the average citizen) to obtain
    passports. The official board that reviews passport applications has
    denied passports on political grounds. All college graduates who
    obtained a passport (except for certain government employees) are
    required to pay a special education clearance fee to reimburse the
    Government for the cost of their education. In February the Government
    issued new regulations on overseas employment passports that ultimately
    made it harder for citizens to travel overseas. Citizens who had
    emigrated legally generally were allowed to return to visit relatives.
    Some who had lived abroad illegally and had acquired foreign
    citizenship also were able to return.
        Those residents unable to meet the restrictive provisions of the
    citizenship law, such as ethnic Chinese, Arakanese, Muslims, and
    others, must obtain prior permission to travel. Since the mid-1990's,
    the Government also has restricted the issuance of passports to female
    citizens (see Section 5). In addition the Government prohibits foreign
    diplomats and foreign employees of U.N. agencies based in Rangoon from
    traveling outside the capital without advance permission.
        Restrictions on foreign travelers have been eased as part of an
    effort to promote tourism. Burmese embassies now issue tourist visas,
    valid for 1 month, within 24 hours of application. However, select
    categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates,
    journalists, and political figures are denied entry visas regularly
    unless traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the
    Government and for purposes approved by the Government. The Government
    also has detained and deported several journalists.
        There is a large number of internally displaced persons (IDP's) in
    the country. NGO's estimate that there could be as many as 1 million
    minority group members who the SPDC has moved forcibly from their
    villages and districts and who now live near or along the Thai border.
    NGO's also estimate that an additional 1 million IDP's also might exist
    in various other locations throughout the country; however, it is very
    difficult to confirm specific numbers of IDP's.
        For decades successive military regimes have applied a strategy of
    forced relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking autonomy;
    these forcible relocations continue, particularly alongside the Thai
    border. Thousands of villagers continue to flee or be driven from their
    homes and face numerous abuses (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.g., 2.d.,
    and 6.d.). For example, according to a March www.Shanland.org report
    and other secondary sources, on January 27, SPDC troops from the 520th
    Light Infantry Battalion led by Captain Than Maung, reportedly forced
    120 households in Ho Phaai Long village, Ho Phaai Long tract, MurngPan
    township, Shan State, to relocate; in the process, troops arrested many
    villagers, looted houses, and raped numerous women. However, this
    incident could not be independently confirmed.
        Repressive government policies and the military's brutal treatment
    of ethnic insurgencies has produced hundreds of thousands of refugees
    who now primarily reside in Thailand, India, and Bangladesh. There are
    about 150,000 persons in refugee camps on Burma's borders. Of these, at
    least 122,000 Karen, Mon, and Karenni resided in refugee camps in
    Thailand. In addition there were tens of thousands of Shan refugees
    whom the Thai Government did not confine to camps. On the country's
    western border, 20,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps in
    Bangladesh (see Section 5).
        The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons from
    abroad to resettle or seek safe haven and has no policy to grant
    asylum. There were no reports that persons formally sought asylum in
    the country during the year. There also were no reports of the forced
    return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change their Government
        Despite the overwhelming desire that citizens demonstrated in the
    1990 elections for a return to democracy, the regime continued to deny
    them the right to change their government.
        The military junta has waged a decade-long campaign of coercion and
    intimidation to prevent the parliament elected in 1990 from convening
    (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 3.). Measures included detaining
    over 200 members-elect as ``state guests'' in 1998. Of these, at least
    45 remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        Since 1962 active duty military officers have occupied most
    important positions in both the central Government and in local
    governments. Since 1988 all state power has been held by a military
    junta. All members of the junta have been military officers on active
    duty, and the junta has placed military or recently retired military
    officers in most key senior level positions in all ministries. By
    year's end, only 13 of the 41 government Ministers were civilians.
        Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the military
    junta refused to implement the election results and disqualified,
    detained, or imprisoned many successful candidates. Many other members-
    elect of parliament fled the country (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
        Rather than accept the will of citizenry as expressed in the 1990
    election, the junta convened a national convention in 1993 to draw up
    principles for a new constitution. The junta handpicked most delegates,
    and carefully orchestrated the proceedings; even limited opposition
    views were ignored. The junta tasked the convention with drafting a new
    constitution designed to provide a dominant role for the military
    services in the country's future political structure. In 1995 the NLD
    withdrew from the convention and demanded a revision in working
    procedures so as to allow debate and meaningful participation by all
    parties in formulation of a new constitution. Two days after its
    withdrawal, the NLD was expelled formally. In March 1996, the national
    convention adjourned. It has not reconvened.
        A final draft constitution never has emerged from the national
    convention. However, at the instigation of the Government, the
    convention has adopted several provisions that, if incorporated in the
    constitution, would ensure the large-scale involvement of the military
    services in all levels of government. These provisions include
    reserving 25 percent of seats in the parliament for members appointed
    by the military services and reserving key government posts for
    military personnel as well. Other provisions prohibited, among other
    things, anyone who has received any type of assistance from a foreign
    source or who is ``under acknowledgment of allegiance'' to a foreigner
    from participating in the Government. These provisions apparently were
    designed to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi, who was married to a British
    citizen.
        During the year, the military junta intensified its systematic use
    of coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right to change their
    government. In September 1998, the NLD leadership organized a CRPP on
    the basis of written delegations of authority from a majority of the
    surviving members-elect of the 1990 parliament, in view of the junta's
    continued use of force to prevent the whole parliament from convening.
    That committee was empowered by those members-elect to act on behalf of
    the parliament until the parliament was convened. In retaliation the
    junta has launched a sustained and systematic campaign to destroy the
    NLD without formally banning it; authorities have pressured many
    thousands of NLD members and local officials to resign and closed party
    offices throughout the country. Military intelligence officials also
    detained over 200 memberselect of parliament, at least 45 of whom
    remain in detention; many were held without being charged formally (see
    Section 1.d.). Others have been released, but only after agreeing
    either to resign from the parliament or to accept their recall by
    government-managed referendums. Among its other coercive tactics, the
    Government compels citizens to participate in meetings that criticize
    NLD memberselect or call for the dissolution of the NLD (see Section
    2.b.).
        The junta's nationwide campaign in which local authorities
    pressured constituents to sign statements of no confidence in NLD
    representatives elected from their districts in 1990 appeared to have
    been cut back considerably during the year. In prior years, a majority
    of eligible voters in a number of townships had signed petitions
    expressing no confidence in NLD members-elect of parliament. These
    petitions were presented to local Multiparty Democracy General Election
    Commissions in formal ceremonies staged at mass rallies widely
    publicized by state-owned media. Both the CRPP in public statements and
    the NLD in lawsuits it filed to protest these activities (see Section
    1.e.) credibly alleged that the Government and USDA officials generally
    obtained signature of these petitions and participation in these mass
    rallies by systematic coercion and intimidation (see Section 1.e.).
    However, in contrast with previous years, very few, if any, members-
    elect of parliament were recalled during the year.
        As a result of these measures, the Government's Multiparty
    Democracy General Election Commission announced in October 1999, that
    of 392 NLD members elected to parliament in 1990, only 92 remained both
    NLD members and members-elect of parliament. As for the rest, 105 had
    resigned their parliamentary status, 139 had been disqualified by the
    commission, 27 had resigned from the NLD, and 31 had died.
        In contrast with these figures, the CRPP claimed in September to
    enjoy the support of 433 of the 485 members-elect of parliament.
        Late in the year, with encouragement from U.N. Special
    Representative Ismail Razali (see Section 4), the Government initiated
    a dialog with Aung San Suu Kyi, which appeared to produce some
    relaxation in the restrictions on the NLD. In addition the NLD was able
    to resume some normal activities, and press attacks on the NLD and Aung
    San Suu Kyi ceased. However, by year's end, the dialog had not produced
    tangible results.
        Women and minorities were underrepresented in the Government and
    the top ranks of government services. They also were excluded from
    military leadership. There were no female members of the SPDC,
    ministers, or Supreme Court judges.
        Members of certain minority groups also were denied full
    citizenship and a role in government and politics (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not allow domestic human rights organizations
    to exist, and it remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its
    human rights record. Approximately 15 nonpolitical, humanitarian,
    international NGO's continued project work. A few others established a
    provisional presence while undertaking the protracted negotiations
    necessary to set up permanent operations in the country.
        The military persecuted some human rights workers during the year.
    For example, according to the Chin Human Rights Organization, on June
    26, the Commander of the 266th Light Infantry Battalion murdered Zo
    Thang, a field monitor for the NGO, as well as two associates, in Bung
    Khua village, Chin State (see Section 1.a.). The Chin Human Rights
    Organization's mandate is to document human rights violations committed
    by the military junta in Chin State and the northwestern part of the
    country. The same battalion reportedly also arrested Pi Sai Sung, a 29-
    year-old Chin farmer whom the SPDC accused of being a sexual
    acquaintance of the killed human rights officer, and abused her (see
    Section 1.c.).
        The Government continued to refuse to meet with representatives of
    the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which repeatedly has
    criticized the Government's human rights record, and continued to deny
    the UNHRC Special Rapporteur for Burma, Rajsoomer Lallah, entry into
    the country. In his report to the UNHRC, issued on October 26, Lallah
    criticized the human rights violations committed against ethnic
    minorities as a result of the SPDC's policy of forcible relocations and
    its continued recourse to forced labor (see Sections 2.d., 5, and
    6.c.). During the year, the Government allowed two visits by U.N.
    Special Envoy to Burma, Tan Sri Dato Razali Bin Ismail (see Sections
    1.e. and 3).
        The Government's restriction on travel by foreign journalists, NGO
    staff, U.N. agency staff, and diplomats; its monitoring of the
    movements of such foreigners; its frequent interrogation of citizens
    about contacts with foreigners; its restrictions on the freedom of
    expression and association of citizens; and its practice of arresting
    citizens who passed information about government human rights abuses to
    foreigners all impeded efforts to collect or investigate information
    about human rights abuses. Reports of abuses, especially those
    committed in prisons or ethnic minority areas, often emerged months or
    years after the abuses allegedly were committed and seldom could be
    verified with certainty.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The military junta continued to rule by decree and was not bound by
    any constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse,
    appears to be relatively infrequent. Married couples often live in
    households with extended families, where social pressure tends to
    protect the wife from abuse.
        In general women traditionally have enjoyed a high social and
    economic status and have exercised most of the same basic rights as
    men. Consistent with traditional culture, women keep their names after
    marriage and often control family finances. However, women remained
    underrepresented in most traditional male occupations, and women
    continued to be barred effectively from a few professions, including
    the military officer corps. The burden of poverty, which is
    particularly widespread in rural areas, also fell disproportionately on
    women.
        Women do not receive consistently equal pay for equal work. Women
    legally were entitled to receive up to 26 weeks of maternity benefits;
    however, in practice these benefits often were not accorded to women.
    In an effort to combat trafficking in women, the Government also has
    begun to discourage women from marrying foreigners and to restrict
    foreign travel by women. However, it has not enforced these
    restrictions consistently (see Sections 2.d. and 6.f.).
        Prostitution is becoming an increasingly overt problem,
    particularly in some of Rangoon's ``new towns,'' which are populated
    chiefly by poor families forcibly relocated from older areas of the
    capital. The Government and at least one international NGO operate
    schools and other rehabilitation programs for former prostitutes.
        Trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution also is a
    serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
        There are no independent women's rights organizations. The National
    Committee for Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Social Welfare is
    charged with safeguarding women's interests. The Myanmar Maternal and
    Child Welfare Association, a government-controlled agency, provided
    assistance to mothers. A professional society for businesswomen, the
    Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs' Association, which was formed in 1995,
    provided loans to new businesses and made charitable donations.
        Children.--The Government continued to neglect the education of
    children, allocating a minimal level of resources to public education.
    In response to this neglect, private institutions have begun to emerge,
    despite an official monopoly on education. Government expenditures for
    all civilian education for 1998-99 were equivalent to less than 1
    percent of recorded gross domestic product (GDP) during the year and
    have declined by more than 70 percent in real terms since 1990.
    According to government studies conducted with U.N. assistance, only 37
    percent of children finished fourth grade in urban areas and only 22
    percent did so in rural areas. Rates of school attendance and
    educational attainment decreased during the 1990's, largely due to
    increasing formal and informal school fees as the junta diverted
    expenditures from health and education to the armed forces. Teachers'
    salaries were far below subsistence wages. Increasingly, only
    relatively prosperous families could afford to send their children to
    school, even at the primary level. In some areas in the center of the
    country, where few families could afford unofficial payments to
    teachers, teachers generally no longer came to work and schools no
    longer functioned.
        Children also suffered greatly from the junta's severe and
    worsening neglect of health care.
        Private health care facilities increasingly became the provider of
    choice for the relatively prosperous. The junta has cut government
    expenditures on public health care even more sharply than it cut
    spending for education. Government expenditures for civilian health
    care in 1998-99 were equivalent to only 0.3 percent of GDP. Government
    studies sponsored by U.N. agencies in 1997 found that, on average, 131
    of 1,000 children died before reaching the age of 5 years, and that
    only 1 of 20 births in rural areas was attended by a doctor. Those same
    studies indicated that, of children under 3 years old, 37 percent were
    malnourished, and 13 percent were severely malnourished. The World
    Health Organization considers the country's health care system to be
    extremely poor.
        Child prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose of
    forced prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to
    Thailand--continued to be a major problem (see Section 6.f.). While
    legislation criminalizing child prostitution and child pornography
    exists, it is enforced poorly. Reports from Thailand indicated that the
    rising incidence of HIV infection there has increased the demand for
    supposedly ``safer'' younger prostitutes, many of whom come from Burma.
        The army conscripts children as young as the age of 14, especially
    orphans and street children. These children are deployed to training
    camps where they support the military combat forces. In combat areas,
    the military forces continued to force children to labor as porters,
    and often subjected them to beatings (see Sections 1.g., 6.c., and
    6.d.).
        Religious Minorities.--The great majority of the country's
    population follows Theravada Buddhism. However, there are minorities of
    Christians (mostly Baptists, as well as some Catholics and Anglicans),
    Muslims (mostly Sunni), Hindus, and practitioners of traditional
    Chinese and indigenous religions. There also are social tensions
    between the Buddhist majority and the Christian and Muslim minorities,
    largely due to government preference in practice (although not in law)
    for non-Buddhists during the period of British colonial rule and for
    Buddhists since independence.
        Non-Buddhists are discriminated against at upper levels of the
    public sector. Only one non-Buddhist served in the Government at the
    ministerial level, and the same person, a brigadier general, is the
    only non-Buddhist known to have held flag rank in the armed forces
    during the 1990's. The Government actively discourages Muslims from
    entering military service, and Christian or Muslim military officers
    who aspire to promotion beyond the middle ranks are encouraged by their
    superiors to convert to Buddhism.
        Members of the Muslim Rohingya minority in Arakan State, on the
    country's western coast, continued to experience severe legal,
    economic, and social discrimination. The Government denies citizenship
    status to most Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors allegedly
    did not reside in the country at the start of British colonial rule in
    1824, as required by the country's highly restrictive citizenship law.
    In 1991, and again in 1997 and 1998, tens of thousands of Rohingya fled
    from Arakan State into Bangladesh following anti-Muslim violence
    alleged (although not proven) to have involved government troops. Most
    of those refugees since have returned, although 20,000 reportedly still
    remain in Bangladesh. Rohingyas who have returned to Arakan complained
    of government restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in
    economic activity. In addition government authorities in Arakan State
    reportedly have compelled Muslims to build Buddhist pagodas as part of
    the country's forced labor program and provide porterage, and have
    confiscated land and produce, restricted freedom of movement, and
    engaged in other abuses (see Sections 1.c., 2.d., and 6.c.). In
    addition, because the Government reserves secondary education for
    citizens only, Rohingya do not have access to state run schools beyond
    primary education, and are unable to obtain most civil service
    positions.
        There are credible reports that anti-Islamic booklets were
    distributed throughout the country by the USDA in 1999. In addition in
    March 1999 and April 2000, the Government forcibly relocated about 200
    Buddhist slum dwellers from Dagon township in Rangoon to Arakan State;
    this had the dual effect of helping to eliminate slums in Rangoon,
    while increasing the population of Buddhist citizens in Arakan State.
    According to credible reports, during the year in Rakhine State, the
    Government opened several ``model villages'' for Buddhist families
    relocated from other areas. The Rohingyas already residing in the area
    have had their land seized without compensation and were forced to
    engage in construction and maintenance, including requisitioning food
    supplies. In addition the Muslim Rohingyas often are forced to build
    Buddhist pagodas for the new arrivals (see Sections 2.c., 2.d., and
    6.c.).
        Since 1994, when the progovernment DKBA was organized, there has
    been armed conflict between the DKBA and the Christian-led KNU. This
    armed conflict between two nongovernmental Karen organizations has had
    strong religious overtones. During the mid-1990's, it reportedly was
    common DKBA practice to torture Christian villagers and kill them if
    they refused to convert to Buddhism. DKBA treatment of Christians
    reportedly improved substantially after the DKBA settled down to
    administering the regions that it had conquered. According to one
    report, in February a DKBA unit ordered villagers in Khwet Phoe village
    to destroy a local mosque after arresting and executing five villagers
    for supporting the KNU. In April residents of Kaw Kyaik village in
    Karen State protested an order from DKBA units to destroy the local
    mosque.
        In June the authorities claimed in an unconfirmed report that 28
    Karenni National Progressive Party insurgents shot and wounded a
    Catholic priest, Father Abe Lei, and took 4 other persons hostage on
    June 17. At year's end, there was no available information on what had
    happened to the hostages.
        People with Disabilities.--In principle official assistance to the
    disabled includes twothirds of pay for up to 1 year of a temporary
    disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent disability; however, in
    practice assistance is extremely limited. There is no law mandating
    accessibility to buildings, public transportation, or government
    facilities. While there are several small-scale organizations to assist
    the disabled, most disabled persons must rely on their families to
    provide for their welfare. Disabled veterans receive available benefits
    on a priority basis. Because of landmine detonations, there is a high
    rate of amputee injuries.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Wide-ranging governmental and
    societal discrimination against minorities persists.
        Animosities between the country's many ethnic minorities and the
    Burman majority, which has dominated the Government and the armed
    forces since independence, continued to fuel active insurgencies that
    resulted in many killings and other serious abuses. Some frequently
    reported abuses included killings, beatings, and rapes of Chin, Karen,
    Karenni, and Shan by mostly Burman army soldiers (see Sections 1.a.,
    1.c., and 1.g.). During the 1990's, the junta has sought to pacify
    these ethnic groups by means of negotiated cease-fires, grants of
    limited autonomy, and promises of development assistance.
        The Government continued to discriminate systematically against
    non-Burmans. National identity cards and passports generally denoted
    the ethnicity of non-Burmans either explicitly or through the use of a
    personal title in the ethnic minority language rather than Burmese.
    Ethnic minority areas that were remote from active insurgent
    operations, such as the large Karen areas of Irrawaddy Division,
    experienced tighter controls on personal movement, including more
    frequent military checkpoints, closer monitoring by military
    intelligence, and larger military garrisons and hence more informal
    taxes, than comparable Burman areas.
        Ethnic minority groups generally had their own primary languages.
    However, throughout all parts of the country controlled by the
    Government, including ethnic minority areas, Burmese remained the sole
    language of instruction in all state schools. Even in ethnic minority
    areas, primary and secondary state schools did not offer any
    instruction in the local ethnic minority language even as a second
    language. There were very few domestic publications in indigenous
    minority languages. In some ethnic minority areas such as Chin State,
    there continued to be many reports that the army offered financial and
    career incentives for Burman soldiers to marry Chin women, teach them
    Burmese, and convert them to Buddhism. Throughout the 1990's, there
    were many credible reports that the junta resettled groups of Burmans
    in various ethnic minority areas. Visible evidence of this resettlement
    can be seen along the Heho-Nyaungshwe road in Shan State and along the
    Mandalay-Mogok road as it heads into Shan State.
        The ethnic minority populations continued to complain that the
    Government has not addressed their concerns adequately. Economic
    development among minorities has continued to lag, leaving many persons
    living at below subsistence levels.
        There are ethnic tensions between Burmans and nonindigenous ethnic
    populations including Indians, many of whom are Muslims, and a rapidly
    growing population of Chinese, mostly recent immigrants from Yunnan
    province who increasingly dominate the economy of the northern part of
    the country. Both groups have tended to be more commercially oriented
    and hence more prosperous and economically powerful than Burmans, and
    their members commonly have discriminated based on ethnicity in hiring,
    buying, and selling.
        Since only persons who can prove long familial links to the country
    are accorded full citizenship, nonindigenous ethnic populations (such
    as Chinese and Indians) are denied full citizenship and are excluded
    from government positions. Persons without full citizenship face
    restrictions in domestic travel (see Section 2.d.). They also are
    barred from certain advanced university programs in medicine and
    technological fields.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1926 Trade Unions Act, which
    remained in effect, permits the formation of trade unions only with the
    prior consent of the Government; however, free trade unions do not
    exist in the country, and the junta has dissolved even the government-
    controlled union that existed before 1988.
        There were no strikes during the year. The last reported strike was
    in December 1997, when workers in a foreign-owned textile factory in
    Pegu staged a successful 4-day strike.
        Because of its longstanding violation of ILO Convention 87 on
    freedom of association, the 1998 ILO conference cited the Government
    for its continued failure to implement that convention and criticized
    both the lack of progress and the absence of cooperation on the part of
    the Government. In response the Government issued a press release in
    June 1999, stating that it would ``cease participation in activities
    connected with Convention 87,'' a step tantamount to withdrawal from
    the Convention.
        The Government also forbids seamen who found work on foreign
    vessels through its Seafarers' Employment Control Division from
    contacting or participating in any activities of the International
    Transport Workers' Federation.
        No unions in the country are affiliated internationally.
        In 1989 the U.S. suspended the country's eligibility for trade
    concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences program until
    steps are taken to afford its labor force internationally recognized
    worker rights.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not
    have the right to organize and bargain collectively. The Government's
    Central Arbitration Board, which once provided a means for settling
    major labor disputes, exists in name but, in practice, has been dormant
    since 1988. Township-level labor supervisory committees exist to
    address minor labor concerns.
        The Government unilaterally sets wages in the public sector. In the
    private sector, market forces generally set wages. However, the
    Government has pressured joint ventures not to pay salaries greater
    than those of ministers or other senior employees. Some joint ventures
    circumvented this with supplemental pay or special incentive systems.
    Foreign firms generally set wages near those of the domestic private
    sector but followed the example of joint ventures in awarding
    supplemental wages and benefits.
        There are no export processing zones (EPZ's). However, there are
    special military-owned industrial parks, such as Pyin-Ma-Bin near
    Rangoon, which attract foreign investors by offering cheaper labor than
    is available elsewhere. Another example is the 2,000-acre Hlaingthaya
    Industrial Zone in Rangoon; at least four companies are known to export
    operate on its premises (see Section 6.c.). These are tantamount to
    EPZ's in many respects.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
    labor remains a widespread and serious problem. Although the Penal Code
    provides for the punishment of persons who impose forced labor on
    others, there are no known cases of the application of this provision.
    Throughout the country, international observers have confirmed that the
    Government routinely forces citizens to work on construction and
    maintenance projects. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and
    bonded labor by children, and forced labor by children occurs.
        During the year, the International Labor Organization took several
    unprecedented steps to address the ``widespread and systematic use'' of
    forced labor in the country. On February 28, the Director General of
    the ILO issued a report to the ILO's Governing Body that concluded that
    the Government had ignored the recommendations of the ILO Commission of
    Inquiry regarding forced labor. In June the ILO Conference suspended
    Burma, barring it from receiving ILO technical assistance or attending
    ILO meetings, due to the Government's ``flagrant and persistent failure
    to comply'' with Convention 29 on forced labor. It also passed a
    resolution that called upon the ILO Governing Body to recommend to the
    ILO's members that they review their relations with Burma and take
    appropriate measures to ensure that those relations do not perpetuate
    the system of forced labor, if the Government failed to take effective
    action to amend its practices by November. The Government did not take
    the required actions and, on November 16, the ILO Governing Body, for
    the first time in its history, voted to apply these ``Article 33''
    sanctions. In addition to requesting that members review their
    relations with Burma, these sanctions also require the ILO to advise
    international organizations working in the country to reconsider any
    cooperation that they may be engaged with in Burma and to cease any
    activity that could have the effect of abetting the practice of forced
    or compulsory labor.
        The ILO Conference's action followed an exhaustive 1998 report by
    an ILO Special Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor in Burma, which
    concluded, based on 6,000 pages of documentation, that there was
    abundant evidence of pervasive use of forced labor in the country. The
    Special Commission of Inquiry found that women, children, and the
    elderly were required to perform forced labor; that porters often were
    sent into dangerous military situations, rarely received medical
    treatment, and almost never were compensated; that forced laborers
    frequently were beaten; and that some women performing forced labor
    were raped or otherwise abused sexually by soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
        Many detailed credible reports indicate that in recent years,
    especially in areas inhabited chiefly by members of the Chin, Karen,
    Karenni, and Shan ethnic groups, army units have increased their use of
    forced labor for logistical support purposes, including to build,
    repair, or maintain army camps and roads to them, as well as to plant
    crops, cut or gather wood, cook, clean, launder, weave baskets, fetch
    water for army units and--in the case of young women--to provide sexual
    services to soldiers. The number of reports of this practice has
    increased since 1997, when the junta required regional military
    commanders to become more self-sufficient (see Sections 1.f. and 1.g.).
        Authorities continued to impose forced labor chiefly, although not
    exclusively, on rural populations, and imposed forced labor quotas on
    villages, households, or persons directly or through village headmen.
    Government authorities often allowed households or persons to
    substitute money or food for contributions of labor for infrastructure
    projects, but widespread rural poverty obliged most households to
    contribute labor. The State allocated funds to regional and local
    authorities to pay wages to at least some of the civilians on whom it
    imposed labor obligations; however, these wages were set at levels
    below the prevailing wage, and reports indicated that local authorities
    commonly did not disburse allocated funds to workers. Especially in
    ethnic minority areas, the army often deployed soldiers to guard
    persons engaged in forced labor; there also were reports that soldiers
    often beat and occasionally killed workers (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.). Government troops also force villagers to eradicate opium poppy
    fields, after which the government seeks recognition internationally
    for its counternarcotics efforts.
        There are many examples of forced labor. Since the end of 1999,
    thousands of persons from 19 villages have been working daily to build
    the Mandalay-Lashio road. Farmers reportedly are fined $1.25 (500 Kyat)
    if they cannot provide labor. Private transport agencies also are
    forced to contribute either a car or $6.25 to $12.5 (2,500 Kyat to
    5,000 Kyat) per month. Starting in January, USDA members (acting under
    the authority of the SPDC) forced the town residents to sweep and clean
    the roads and streets in Ta-Khi-Laek town every Saturday. One person
    from each house was required to work or pay $2.25 (100 Baht in Thai
    money) to the USDA. Starting in February residents from the townships
    of Monywa, Kane, Min-Kin, and Kalewa in Sagaing Division were compelled
    to construct a new road along the Chindwin River from Monywa to Kalewa.
    Since May several villages in Mawleik Township of Sagaing Division were
    forced to provide labor for the repair of the Thet-Ke-Kyin-Homalin
    highway and of bridges along the way. Households that cannot provide
    labor are forced to pay $0.75 to $6.75 (300 Kyat to 2,700 Kyat) per
    household.
        There also were reports that the Government used forced labor to
    construct infrastructure to support tourism. In 1999 government
    officials used forced labor to build the approach road to the new
    international airport in Mandalay. Officials reportedly went door-to-
    door in villages outside Mandalay, ordering each household to
    contribute either $0.75 (300 Kyat) or one person's labor to the
    project. Most households contributed labor. Government officials also
    used forced labor to prepare the historic city of Mrauk-Oo in Arakan
    State for expected tourist and important visitor arrivals. According to
    credible sources, in February the SPDC announced plans to develop the
    Karen hill town of Than Daung Gyi as a tourist ``hill resort.''
    Immediately after the announcement, new army battalions moved in, land
    was confiscated from the town's residents and surrounding villages, and
    persons started doing forced labor on a road to the hot springs at Ker
    Weh.
        In addition since late 1998, the Government has used large amounts
    of forced labor on a project to double the country's cultivated land by
    developing 22 million acres of wetlands and virgin lands. This involved
    the establishment of ``labor villages'' to help private entrepreneurs,
    including foreign investors, to develop these wetlands. In December
    1998, government authorities instructed each village tract from 8
    townships in Sagaing Division to provide 2 villagers to work on 500
    acres of land per township for a project to reclaim about 4,000 acres
    of virgin land. In addition each household was required to give about
    $0.50 (200 Kyat) to the authorities to buy food for workers on the
    project. In 1999 officials of the military's northwest command forced
    villagers in Sagaing Division's Yinmarbin Township to provide
    uncompensated labor or else pay more than $2.50 (1,000 Kyat) per person
    to reclaim 2,000 acres of fallow land. Authorities in another township
    in Sagaing Division reportedly forced villagers to clear 1,000 acres of
    land or pay a fine of more than $8.75 (3,500 Kyat) per household.
    Authorities in Irrawaddy Division ordered residents of a village both
    to clear over 100 acres of land as part of a wetlands reclamation
    project, and to pay for equipment needed to clear the land.
        There also were credible reports that government officials and
    security forces compelled both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to
    contribute money, food, and uncompensated labor to build, renovate, or
    maintain Buddhist shrines or monuments. For example, in Wuntho Township
    of Sagaing Division, the authorities forced villagers from eight Ma-
    Gyi-Bin village tracts to provide labor for building a 108-foot pagoda.
    If a household cannot provide labor, then that household is obliged to
    provide $3.50 (1,400 Kyat) plus a 2.2 pounds of rice for each worker
    that it could not provide. Five townships (Katha, Ingaw, Banmauk,
    HtiGyan, and Pin-Le-Bu) in the same area also were forced to transport
    500,000 bricks each for the pagoda. Similarly, in Twantay township,
    Rangoon Division, authorities forced villagers to guard the ancient
    Danoke Pagoda, which has been under renovation, and to gather wood,
    fetch water, and perform other tasks for soldiers involved in the
    project. In Bogalay township, Irrawaddy Division, authorities forced
    villagers to construct 32 miles of road between Pe-Chaung village and
    Kadone village for the use of Buddhist pilgrims. This work reportedly
    was done at the request of the Pe-Chaung monastery. In a predominantly
    Islamic Maungdaw District in Arakan State, authorities required
    villagers to build a Buddhist pagoda in Dail Fara (see Section 2.c.).
        There also were reports that forced labor was used to dismantle
    temples and monasteries (see Section 2.c.).
        The army continued to force citizens--including women and
    children--to work as porters in military actions against ethnic
    insurgents. This practice continued to lead to mistreatment, illness,
    and death (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). Both the 1999 report of
    the ILO's Director General and reports by NGO's including Amnesty
    International described dozens of cases of forced porterage. According
    to local reports, in Northern Rakhine State all of the men and boys of
    a village (between the ages of 7 and 35) contribute 10 days per month
    of labor to the military. Reportedly local villages must supply males
    every 2 weeks to serve as porters and to carry food and ammunition
    toward the border with Bangladesh to military camps. Rohingyas claim
    that their group is the only one in the area whose members are forced
    to serve as porters for the army, and that the nearby model villages
    that are populated by Buddhist Burmans from the cities are exempt from
    portering, forced labor, and forced contributions of foodstuffs (see
    Sections 2.d. and 5).
        Parents routinely called upon their children to help fulfill their
    households' forced labor obligations, without government opposition
    (see Section 6.d.).
        There were numerous, detailed, and credible reports that forced
    labor, including forced child labor, was used directly in growing and
    harvesting some crops, chiefly for army units.
        Widespread forced labor, including forced child labor, continued to
    contribute materially to the construction and maintenance not only of
    irrigation facilities important to the cultivation of some export crops
    including rice, but also of roads and some railroads important for the
    transportation of exports to ports. Forced labor, including forced
    child labor, has contributed materially to the construction of
    industrial parks subsequently used largely to produce manufactured
    exports including garments. According to two eyewitness accounts,
    forced labor was used to develop the Hlaingthaya Industrial Zone in
    Rangoon (see Section 6.b.). There have been many credible reports that
    forced labor, including forced child labor, has been used widely since
    1998 to clear and drain virgin lands and wetlands for the cultivation
    of crops many of which, according to public descriptions of the
    Government's economic plans, are intended largely for export.
        In July 1998, the ILO Commission of Inquiry reported that forced
    labor had been used to dig and cultivate shrimp farms, particularly in
    Rakhine State and Sagaing Division.
        The Ministry of Home Affairs also operates forced prison labor
    camps for porterage, quarries, agriculture, livestock farms, roads and
    infrastructure, and other activities. Reportedly inmates sent to labor
    camps have sentences that range from 6 months to 10 years, and most are
    nonviolent offenders. The Government's use of prison labor reportedly
    has increased significantly in recent years. Reportedly, the prison
    labor camp system is the main recruiting ground for the military's most
    severely mistreated forced laborers (such as porters who die en route
    and civilians who are sent into mine fields). The ICRC reports that the
    mortality rate of prisoners in labor camps is much too high (see
    Section 1.c.).
        The authorities reportedly round up street children, provide them
    with military training, and forcibly conscript them (see Sections 5 and
    6.d.).
        Trafficking in women and girls to neighboring countries for the
    purpose of forced prostitution remained a serious problem (see Sections
    5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Although the law sets a minimum age of 13 for the
    employment of children, in practice the law is not enforced. In the
    past few years, child labor has become increasingly prevalent and
    visible. Working children are highly visible in cities, mostly working
    for small or family enterprises, and in family agricultural activities
    in the countryside. Children working in the urban informal sector in
    Rangoon and Mandalay often start work at young ages. Children are hired
    at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of work. In the urban
    informal sector, child workers are found mostly in food processing,
    selling, refuse collecting, light manufacturing, and as tea shop
    attendants. According to government statistics, 6 percent of urban
    children work, but only 4 percent of those earn wages. Despite a
    compulsory education law, almost 50 percent of children never enroll in
    school, and only 40 percent of them complete the 5-year primary school
    course (see Section 5).
        The law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
    children; while bonded labor is not practiced, forced labor by children
    occurs. The military Government not only tolerates child labor, but
    also uses children as porters in infrastructure development and in
    providing other services to military forces (see section 6.c.). There
    have been several reports that the authorities often round up orphans
    and street children in Rangoon and other cities and then give them
    military training (see Section 6.c.). In combat areas, children have
    been forced to serve as porters, where beatings and other mistreatment
    reportedly occur.
        Households tend to satisfy forced labor quotas by sending their
    least productive workers (usually children), and government authorities
    have accepted such workers in satisfaction of those quotas. Children
    often have been seen building or repairing roads and irrigation
    facilities. In recent years, there have been growing numbers of reports
    that military units in various ethnic minority areas either forced
    children to perform support services, such as fetching water, cleaning,
    cutting bamboo, or cultivating food crops, or allowed households or
    villages to use children to satisfy army orders to perform such
    services (see Sections 1.f. and 6.c.).
        Trafficking in girls to neighboring countries for the purpose of
    forced prostitution remained a serious problem (see Sections 5 and
    6.f.).
        There are credible reports that insurgents also used women and
    children as porters. Some former KNU troops known as God's Army
    reportedly are led by child soldiers.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Only government employees and
    employees of a few traditional industries were covered by minimum wage
    provisions. The minimum daily wage for salaried public employees is
    $0.25 (100 Kyats) for what is in effect a 6-hour workday. Various
    subsidies and allowances supplement this sum. Neither the minimum wage
    nor the higher wages earned even by senior government officials
    provides a worker and family with a decent standard of living. Low and
    falling real wages in the public sector have fostered widespread
    corruption. In the private sector, urban laborers earn about $0.50 per
    day (200 Kyat), while rural agricultural workers earn about half that
    rate. Some private sector workers earn substantially more; a skilled
    factory worker earns about $12 per day (4,800 Kyat).
        Surplus labor conditions, a poor economy, and lack of protection by
    the Government continue to dictate substandard conditions for workers.
    The 1964 Law on Fundamental Workers Rights and the 1951 Factories Act
    regulate working conditions. There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-
    hour workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6-day and a 44-
    hour workweek for private and state enterprise employees, with overtime
    paid for additional work. The law also allows for a 24-hour rest period
    per week, and workers have 21 paid holidays per year. However, in
    practice such provisions benefited only a small portion of the
    country's labor force, since most of the labor force was engaged in
    rural agriculture.
        Numerous health and safety regulations exist, but in practice the
    Government has not made the necessary resources available to enforce
    the regulations. Although workers may in principle remove themselves
    from hazardous conditions, in practice many workers cannot expect to
    retain their jobs if they do so.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are laws--including laws
    against abduction--that prohibit some aspects of trafficking in
    persons, no law is known specifically to prohibit trafficking, and
    trafficking in women and children is a severe problem.
        Burma is a source country for thousands of women and young girls
    who are trafficked into the commercial sex industries of neighboring
    countries. There are reliable reports that many women and children in
    border areas, where the Government's control is limited, were forced or
    lured into working as prostitutes in Thailand and China. In fact,
    trafficking and exploitation near the Thailand border sometimes is
    condoned by local government officials. It is unknown how many young
    women have been induced or coerced into working as prostitutes, but a
    common practice is to lure young women to Thailand with promises of
    employment as a waitress, domestic servant, or factory worker.
    Occasionally European and Asian prostitutes can be found in Mong La in
    Special Region 4 of Shan State.
        Child prostitution of girls, especially from the Shan ethnic
    minority sent or lured to Thailand, continued to be a major problem.
        Government efforts to stop trafficking in young women are limited
    and relatively ineffective, despite sporadic arrests. There are
    regulations forbidding girls under age 25 from crossing the border
    unless accompanied by a guardian. In recent years the Government has
    made it difficult for women to obtain passports or marry foreigners in
    order to reduce the outflow of women both as victims of trafficking and
    for other reasons (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). However, most citizens
    who were forced or lured into prostitution crossed the border into
    Thailand without passports. There also is evidence of fraud. It is
    illegal to leave the country without government authorization. The
    Government has adopted the Bangkok Accord and Plan of Action Against
    Trafficking; there also is an interagency task force on trafficking.
        A number of NGO's offer poverty alleviation and education programs
    designed to counter trafficking.
                                   __________

                                    CAMBODIA

        Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy. Political stability,
    achieved through the coalition government formed following the 1998
    national elections, generally continued through year's end. Hun Sen of
    the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) is Prime Minister, Prince Norodom
    Ranariddh of the National United Front for a Neutral, Peaceful,
    Cooperative, and Independent Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) is President of the
    National Assembly, and Chea Sim of the CPP is President of the Senate.
    King Norodom Sihanouk remains the Constitutional monarch and Head of
    State. Most power lies within the executive branch and, although its
    influence continues to grow within the coalition structure, the
    National Assembly does not provide a significant check to executive
    power. The Khmer Rouge no longer is a political or military threat, but
    one other antigovernment group led a violent attack against the
    Government during the year. The judiciary is not independent; it
    frequently is subject to legislative and executive influence, and
    suffers from corruption.
        The National Police, an agency of the Ministry of Interior, have
    primary responsibility for internal security, but the Royal Cambodian
    Armed Forces (RCAF), including the military police, also have domestic
    security responsibilities. Government efforts to improve police and
    RCAF performance and to demobilize the military forces remained
    hampered by budgetary limitations. Members of the security forces
    committed numerous documented human rights abuses.
        Cambodia is a poor country. It has a market economy in which
    approximately 80 percent of the population of 11.7 million engage in
    subsistence farming, with rice as the principal crop. Economic
    deprivation and poor health characterize life for most citizens. Annual
    per capita gross domestic product is approximately $280. Average life
    expectancy is only approximately 50 years. Foreign aid is an important
    component of national income. The economy grew at a modest rate of 4.5
    percent during the year. The country still has difficulty in attracting
    foreign investment and mobilizing domestic savings to support economic
    development.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. The
    military forces and police were responsible for several extrajudicial
    killings and failed to stop lethal violence by citizens against
    criminal suspects; the Government rarely prosecuted the perpetrators of
    such killings, and impunity remains a problem. There was one confirmed
    report of a politically motivated killing but, unlike past years, the
    Government arrested the suspected perpetrator. There were credible
    reports that members of the security forces tortured, beat, and
    otherwise abused persons in custody, often to extract confessions.
    Prison conditions remained harsh, and the Government continued to use
    arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention. Courts prosecuted
    some members of the security forces for human rights abuses; however,
    impunity for many who commit human rights abuses remained a serious
    problem. National and local government officials generally lacked the
    political will and financial resources to act effectively against
    members of the security forces suspected of responsibility for human
    rights abuses. Democratic institutions, especially the judiciary,
    remained weak. The judiciary is subject to influence by the executive
    branch and is marred by inefficiency, a lack of training, a shortage of
    resources, and widespread corruption related to low wages. Politically
    related crimes rarely were prosecuted. Citizens without defense counsel
    often effectively were denied the right to a fair trial. Societal
    discrimination against women remained a problem. Domestic violence
    against women and abuse of children are common. Discrimination against
    the disabled is a problem. The ethnic Vietnamese minority continued to
    face widespread discrimination by the Khmer majority, and this enmity
    was exploited by the political opposition.
        Trade unions have become more numerous and active; the Government
    eased the process of union registration and improved Labor Law
    enforcement. However, enforcement of the Labor Law and regulations,
    including protections for workers' rights to organize, remained a
    problem. Forced labor in the commercial sex industry also is a problem.
        Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a serious problem.
        Mob violence, although none was ethnically directed, resulted in
    some vigilante-style killings. Land mines killed or wounded more than
    700 persons.
        Government efforts to bring senior Khmer Rouge leaders to justice
    for genocide and war crimes committed from 1975 through 1979 were
    ongoing underway at year's end.
        Prison conditions improved in some locations and there was
    increased resolution of land disputes during the year. The Government
    took disciplinary action against corrupt judges and prosecutors.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The military forces
    and police committed several extrajudicial killings that were
    nonpolitical in nature. Mob violence also resulted in several killings
    during the year. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) reported
    that there was at least one killing by a local government official that
    was at least in part politically motivated.
        In May in Kratie province at least three persons were killed by
    soldiers after attending a gathering at a military base; they were
    found dead in shallow graves, blindfolded and with their hands tied
    behind their backs. Domestic human rights groups alleged that the
    victims were disgruntled former soldiers or part of an antigovernment
    group, the Khmer Serei (Free Khmer), who had been deceived into
    surrendering to government forces. The Government claimed that the
    victims were bandits, but did not arrest any suspects in connection
    with the killings by year's end.
        Police or military forces acquiesced in or failed to prevent mob
    violence against suspected criminals, which resulted in killings. On
    July 21, an angry mob beat Song Veasna to death after he was arrested
    in Phnom Penh for stealing a motorcycle. The mob then poured gasoline
    over his body and set it on fire. At least one policeman was injured
    trying to stop the mob, but the Government took no action to arrest the
    perpetrators. On August 19, Rin Bros, an alleged serial rapist had his
    genitals cut off and was beaten to death after an angry mob overpowered
    police and forcibly removed him from police custody in Battambang
    province. The Government took no action to arrest the perpetrators.
        There was one report of ethnically motivated killings in April,
    when ethnic Vietnamese fisherman killed three government officials (see
    Section 5).
        On June 3, Pak Choeun and his wife, Doung Meas, were killed while
    staying in a shelter at their rice field in Kampot province. The
    FUNCINPEC party had recently nominated Pak Choeun as a candidate for
    the upcoming commune elections. After investigation, the Government
    arrested the chief of the local commune, who subsequently confessed to
    planning the crimes in part because of the political competition the
    victim would bring in the commune election.
        On November 24, a violent attack occurred against several
    government installations during which at least four persons were killed
    and over 1 dozen were injured (see Section 1.d.). The Cambodian Freedom
    Fighters (CFF), an antigovernment insurgency group, claimed
    responsibility for the attack. The Government subsequently arrested
    several persons with alleged ties to the CFF. At year's end, the
    Government's investigation into the CFF organization continued.
        The Government has not prosecuted most of those responsible for the
    numerous political or extrajudicial killings committed during the term
    of the previous government (from 1993 to 1998), and reported by the
    UNCHR in 1997 and 1998.
        Through November 747 civilians and military personnel were killed
    or wounded by land mines deployed by the Khmer Rouge or various
    government forces during previous conflicts. The number of such
    casualties declined by approximately 22 percent from 1999.
        Former Khmer Rouge officials Ta Mok and Kiang Kek Iev (``Duch''),
    accused of mass killings and other crimes, remained in jail. Government
    efforts continued to bring these and other senior Khmer Rouge officials
    to justice for their alleged crimes committed from 1975 through 1979
    (see Section 1.e.).
        In October the appeal of a life sentence meted out in 1999 to Nuon
    Paet, a former Khmer Rouge commander, for his role in the 1994 train
    ambush in Kampot province that resulted in the deaths of 3 foreigners
    and at least 13 citizens was denied, and he remains in custody. In
    January Chhouk Rin, another former Khmer Rouge commander allegedly
    involved in the ambush, was arrested, but he was acquitted after trial
    in July based on an amnesty provision in the law under which he was
    charged. Sam Bith, an RCAF officer also charged for his role in the
    ambush, had not been arrested by year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances. One local human rights nongovernmental organization
    (NGO) reported that the whereabouts of five persons were unknown
    following their detention during the year by local police or security
    officials in several provinces. By year's end, all remained missing,
    and government and NGO efforts to establish their whereabouts
    continued.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and physical abuse of
    prisoners; however, torture, beatings, and other forms of physical
    mistreatment of persons held in police or military custody continued to
    be a serious problem. The problem is compounded further by a climate of
    impunity, whereby perpetrators of torture and abuse frequently are
    protected from prosecution or disciplinary action by local government
    authorities, despite some central government efforts to curtail or
    eliminate violations of prisoners' rights and to address problems of
    accountability.
        There were credible reports that military and police officials used
    physical and psychological torture and severely beat criminal
    detainees, particularly during interrogation.
        According to the UNCHR, the municipal police in Phnom Penh beat or
    tortured persons routinely, although less frequently than during
    previous years. Dozens of detainees interviewed in several provinces
    reported regular beatings in police custody. One domestic human rights
    NGO received 24 formal complaints of torture and recorded 118 other
    cases of new physical assaults through year's end. There were no known
    reports of mistreatment at the Youth Rehabilitation Center during the
    year.
        There were credible reports that local authorities harassed members
    of the opposition party (see Section 2.b.). Police also injured two
    workers in labor demonstrations (see Section 6.a.).
        Prison conditions remained harsh, and government efforts to improve
    prison conditions and implement new regulations were hampered by lack
    of funds and weak enforcement. However, conditions continued to improve
    due to construction and renovation of some prison buildings, the timely
    disbursement of monthly government allocations for food and operating
    costs, and the implementation of new prison regulations that require
    the application of international standards of detention. Human rights
    organizations cited a number of serious problems, including
    overcrowding, health problems, food and water shortages, malnutrition,
    and poor security. Use of shackles and the practice of holding
    prisoners in small, dark cells continued in some prisons after escape
    attempts. Government ration allowances for purchasing prisoners' food
    remain inadequate, exacerbating their malnutrition.
        The Government continued to allow international and domestic human
    rights groups to visit prisons and prisoners and to provide human
    rights training to prison guards. However, NGO's reported occasional
    limited cooperation from provincial authorities (see Section 4).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government
    continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. A penal code
    drafted by the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia in 1992 remains
    in effect, as does the 1993 Criminal Procedure Law. The Criminal
    Procedure Law provides for adequate protection for criminal suspects;
    however, in practice the Government sometimes ignored these provisions.
    One human rights NGO recorded 35 complaints of unlawful detention and
    arrest by police, military, or local government authorities during the
    year. In November in the immediate aftermath of an attack by an armed
    antigovernment insurgent group, the Government detained dozens of
    persons without a warrant; most were released without charge within
    hours (see Section 1.a.).
        Although lengthy detention without charge is illegal, suspects
    often are held by authorities for long periods before being charged or
    brought to trial or released. According to an August report by a
    domestic human rights NGO, at least 28 persons had been detained before
    trial in excess of the 6-month statutory maximum in Banteay Meanchey
    province, and some had been in prison up to 17 months. According to the
    UNCHR, such prolonged detention largely is a result of a growing prison
    population and the limited capacity of the court system. Accused
    persons legally are entitled to a lawyer; however, in practice they
    often have limited access to legal representation. Prisoners are held
    routinely for several days before gaining access to a lawyer or family
    members. Although there is a bail system, many prisoners, particularly
    those without legal representation, often have no opportunity to seek
    release on bail.
        There are no political detainees.
        The Government does not use forced exile, and no persons were in
    self-imposed exile during the year.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the Government does not respect this
    provision in practice. The courts are subject to influence by the
    executive, and there is widespread corruption among judges, virtually
    none of whom receives a living wage.
        The court system consists of lower courts, an appeals court, and a
    Supreme Court. The Constitution also mandates a Constitutional Council,
    which is empowered to review the Constitutionality of laws, and a
    Supreme Council of Magistracy, which appoints, oversees, and
    disciplines judges. The composition of both of these bodies is viewed
    widely as biased toward the CPP, resulting in complaints by other
    political parties of its institutional dominance. There is a separate
    military court system.
        Trials are public. Defendants have the right to be present and to
    consult with an attorney, to confront and question witnesses against
    them, and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf.
    However, trials typically are perfunctory, and extensive
    crossexamination usually does not take place. The serious shortage of
    attorneys--especially outside Phnom Penhremains a significant
    impediment to broader implementation of the right to counsel in
    practice. Persons without the means to secure defense counsel often are
    effectively denied the right to a fair trial. The introduction in 1998
    into the legal system of newly trained lawyers, who often received
    supplemental training by NGO's, continued to result in significant
    improvements for those defendants provided with counsel, including a
    reduced pretrial detention period and improved access to bail.
        Defendants also are entitled by law to the presumption of innocence
    and the right of appeal. However, because of pervasive corruption,
    defendants often are expected to bribe the judge for a favorable
    verdict, thereby effectively eliminating the presumption of innocence.
    Citizens' rights to appeal sometimes are limited by the logistical
    difficulties in transferring prisoners from provincial prisons to the
    appeals court. Many appeals thus are heard in the absence of the
    defendant.
        A serious lack of resources and poor training contribute to
    corruption and inefficiency in the judicial branch, and in practice the
    Government does not ensure due process. For example, judges often have
    no legal training and often lack copies of the laws upon which they are
    expected to rule. As a result of these weaknesses, citizens often
    effectively were denied a fair trial in jurisdictions without regular
    access to defense lawyers or international judicial assistance
    programs. In April, citing deficiencies in the judicial system, the
    King signed a royal decree that established a judicial reform council
    to develop and implement judicial reform measures. In the first action
    of its kind, the Supreme Council of Magistracy investigated a number of
    complaints against court officials and took disciplinary action against
    five judges and one prosecutor during the year.
        The courts often pressure victims of crimes to accept small cash
    settlements from the accused instead of seeking prosecution. When a
    case does make its way to court, a judge sometimes determines the
    verdict before the case is heard, often on the basis of a bribe paid by
    the accuser or the defendant. Sworn, written statements from witnesses
    and the accused usually are the extent of evidence presented in trials.
    Such statements by the accused sometimes are coerced through beatings
    or threats from investigation officials, and illiterate defendants
    often are not informed of the content of written confessions that they
    are forced to sign. In cases involving military personnel, military
    officers often exert pressure on judges to have the defendant released
    without a trial.
        Legislation enacted in August 1999 removed official immunity for
    crimes committed by government authorities and has resulted in some
    successful prosecutions of police and military officials for their
    crimes. Nevertheless, court delays or corrupt practices often allow
    those accused of crimes to flee or otherwise escape prosecution,
    effectively leading to impunity for some government officials who
    commit crimes. The courts prosecuted some members of the security
    forces for human rights abuses, but immunity for those who commit human
    rights abuses remains a problem. Both national and local government
    officials generally continued to lack the political will and financial
    resources to act effectively against military or security officials
    suspected of being responsible for human rights abuses.
        There is ongoing cooperation between the Government, foreign
    government donors, and NGO's to improve the legal system, although some
    assistance programs in this area suspended in 1997 have not resumed.
        The military court system suffers from deficiencies similar to
    those of the civilian court system. Moreover, the legal distinction
    between the military and civil courts often is ignored in practice;
    several persons arrested for crimes that appear to have no connection
    with military offenses have been detained for trial by the military
    court.
        The Government and the United Nations continued working during the
    year to create a special tribunal to achieve credible justice and
    determine accountability for crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge
    regime in a fashion consistent with the Constitution and international
    standards of justice. After a series of negotiations and diplomatic
    initiatives, the Government and the U.N. reached agreement in principle
    in July on a legal and judicial framework to bring senior Khmer Rouge
    leaders to justice. The Government thereafter revised pending
    legislation creating the tribunal and completed consultations with the
    National Assembly's legislative commission in November. The draft law
    awaited National Assembly action and the King's signature at year's
    end. Ta Mok and Kiang Kek Iev (``Duch''), former officials of the Khmer
    Rouge regime, remained in legal pretrial detention at year's end.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution contains provisions protecting the
    privacy of residence and correspondence and includes a provision
    against illegal search; however, the police routinely conducted
    warrantless searches and seizures. There were no reports that the
    Government monitored private electronic communications.
        Citizens generally were free to live where they wished; however,
    there were continued reports of land disputes between residents, local
    authorities, business persons, and military officials, although their
    frequency decreased substantially from the previous year. Since the
    forced collectivization during Khmer Rouge rule and the return of
    thousands of refugees, land ownership is often unclear, and adequate
    land titles do not exist. Moreover, with the end of the Khmer Rouge
    insurgency, the rush to gain possession of former Khmer Rouge lands on
    or near potentially lucrative crossborder trade routes exacerbated the
    land ownership problem caused by lack of documentation.
        In response to the prevalence of land disputes, several provinces
    created land-dispute settlement committees chaired by one of the deputy
    provincial governors; representatives of local NGO's and the military
    forces frequently attended committee meetings. These committees
    successfully resolved numerous land disputes during the year although
    some encountered occasional difficulties in resolving disputes
    involving military officials. The Government drafted a land law with
    the help of international organizations and NGO's; however, at year's
    end, it had not been passed by the National Assembly.
        In January the Banteay Meanchey provincial court unsuccessfully
    attempted to mediate a land dispute that had arisen in 1999 after local
    military officials and other persons claimed legal title to land in the
    town of Poipet on the border with Thailand. After some of the 800
    resident families refused offers of compensation, and refused to remove
    their houses, the court ordered their eviction, and local security
    forces occupied the land and destroyed the houses. More than half were
    relocated to a nearby village; however, others continued to protest
    their eviction in a makeshift camp near the National Assembly in Phnom
    Penh at year's end.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression, press, and publication, and the Government
    generally respects these rights in practice; however, there continued
    to be some problems. The Constitution implicitly limits free speech by
    requiring that speech not adversely affect public security. The
    Constitution also declares that the King is ``inviolable.'' The Press
    Law provides journalists with a number of rights, including a
    prohibition on prepublication censorship and protection from
    imprisonment for expressing opinion. However, the Press Law also
    includes a vaguely worded prohibition on publishing articles that
    affect national security and political stability. There were no reports
    that journalists practiced selfcensorship. There were a large number of
    news items critical of the Government and included frequent
    vituperative personalized criticism of the Prime Minister, the
    President of the National Assembly, and other senior officials.
        Although limited in circulation, newspapers are a primary source of
    news and expression of political opinion. All major political parties
    have reasonable and regular access to the print media. The press
    remained somewhat partisan, but the only major newspapers that received
    substantial financial support from a political party were a few
    opposition newspapers. The number of Khmer-language newspapers remained
    roughly the same as the previous year. There are approximately 16
    Khmerlanguage newspapers published regularly. Of these, 11 are
    considered to be progovernment journals, 4 are considered to support
    the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and one is considered to be
    antimonarchy. In addition there is one Frenchlanguage daily, one
    Englishlanguage daily, and two other English newspapers published
    regularly. Many of the Khmerlanguage newspapers frequently publish
    articles translated from the English-language newspapers.
        Most newspapers criticize the Government frequently, and Prime
    Minister Hun Sen and National Assembly President Prince Ranariddh
    frequently came under strong attack by opposition newspapers. There
    were instances of government intimidation or retribution against
    newspapers for reporting critical of the Government. In February the
    Ministry of Information warned two opposition newspapers, the Voice of
    Khmer Youth and the Khmer Conscience, that they would be suspended for
    publishing articles critical of the King and for inciting hatred
    against ethnic Vietnamese. In both cases, the newspapers avoided
    suspension after the editors published apologies consistent with the
    requirements of the Press Law. In April the Government suspended a
    weekly newspaper, Cambodia News Bulletin, for 30 days due to its
    ``systematic defamation'' in publishing a series of articles critical
    of government corruption and mismanagement. In July the same newspaper
    was suspended for republishing an article first published in the South
    China Morning Post (SCMP), a Hong Kong SAR (Peoples' Republic of China)
    newspaper. The article erroneously reported that a possible successor
    to the throne was not the King's own son. The SCMP editor later
    apologized and corrected the error. In October the Government suspended
    a newspaper, Bakorng, for 30 days due to its publication of an article
    critical of the royal family and impugning the King's intelligence.
        In May the Government confiscated issues of the country's first
    pornographic magazine, Angkor Thom Sophakmogkol (Big Angkor Happiness),
    and declared it an indecent publication.
        In November the Ministry of Information approved a subdecree that
    specified professional requirements for new newspaper and magazine
    publishers, and introduced a mandatory licensing system requiring
    newspapers to renew their licenses annually and magazines to renew
    their licenses every 2 years. The subdecree was criticized by some
    journalists as a potential limitation on press freedom and as an
    invitation to self-censorship; by year's end, however, there were no
    reports that the subdecree was implemented inappropriately.
        The Government, the military forces, and political parties
    continued to dominate the broadcast media. The governmentsponsored
    television network broadcast live telecasts of National Assembly
    sessions at the initiative of Prince Ranariddh, the National Assembly
    president. According to a report by the UNCHR, the procedures for
    licensing and allocation of radio and television frequencies to the
    media were not impartial.
        In March the Government banned the radio broadcast of the playing
    of three songs that it claimed degraded women. In April the Government
    announced a ban on television programs that featured what it claimed
    were provocatively dressed women; however, no licenses were affected by
    the announcement by year's end.
        National radio and television stations regularly broadcast some
    human rights, social action, public health, and civil society
    programming produced by domestic NGO's.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government generally
    respected this right in practice. Numerous groups assembled peacefully,
    including workers protesting labor conditions or wages, political
    opposition activists supporting a tribunal for former senior leaders of
    the Khmer Rouge regime or criticizing flood relief efforts, students
    protesting border encroachments, prison guards rallying to demand
    higher wages, moto-taxi drivers protesting high gasoline prices, and
    various groups protesting land seizures, all without incident. On
    occasion, counterdemonstrations by other citizens who supported the
    Government disrupted the protests and sometimes resulted in scuffles
    that caused minor injuries to some participants.
        In June the national Government stated that local officials were
    responsible for the resolution of land disputes, effectively ending
    nearly all land-dispute protests at the National Assembly.
        The Government requires a permit to be obtained in advance of a
    march or demonstration. The Government often did not issue a requested
    permit, or took no action on a permit application; however, these
    actions had no practical effect since most such assemblies were held
    anyway. There were no incidents in which security forces disrupted or
    ended marches or demonstrations.
        In May disaffected members of the SRP and local police destroyed a
    memorial structure that the SRP had erected illegally in front of the
    National Assembly. In August, following diplomatic intervention, the
    structure was reestablished at an alternate site.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice. By year's end,
    the National Assembly had not debated or acted on a revised draft NGO
    law, which retained some registration and reporting requirements for
    domestic NGO's and associations but eliminated many provisions from
    earlier drafts that were previously opposed by the NGO community.
        The Government does not coerce or forbid membership in political
    organizations.
        There were some reports of local government interference with
    offices of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and a group of disaffected
    members of the opposition SRP caused minor damage to the home of SRP
    leader Sam Rainsy's in April.
        The UNCHR and domestic human rights organizations reported that
    generally members of the SRP conducted their activities freely and
    without government interference throughout the country; however, there
    were some cases in which members of the SRP complained of being
    harassed by local officials. In March charges were dismissed against
    two persons with ties to the SRP arrested for their roles in the 1998
    rocket attack against the Prime Minister's motorcade, and they were
    released from custody. A third suspect, Sok Yoeun, fled the country in
    1999 and remained in prison in Thailand pending extradition.
        Membership in the Khmer Rouge, which previously conducted an armed
    insurgency against the Government, is illegal.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
    Constitution also prohibits discrimination based on religion, and
    minority religions experience little or no official discrimination.
    Buddhism is the state religion and over 95 percent of the population is
    Buddhist. Most of the remainder is made up of ethnic Cham Muslims, who
    generally are well integrated into society.
        The law requires all religious groups, including Buddhists, to
    submit applications to the Ministry of Cults and Religious Affairs in
    order to construct places of worship and to conduct religious
    activities. Religious groups have not encountered significant
    difficulties in obtaining approvals for construction of places of
    worship, but some Muslim and Christian groups report delays by some
    local officials in acknowledging that official permission has been
    granted to conduct religious meetings in homes. Such religious meetings
    generally take place unimpeded despite delay or inaction at the local
    level, and no significant constraints on religious assembly have been
    reported.
        Foreign missionary groups generally operate freely throughout the
    country and have not encountered significant difficulties in performing
    their work. However, there reportedly are some constraints on
    evangelizing by Christians at the local levelespecially in areas of new
    Christian religious activitybut these generally are resolved
    satisfactorily by intervention with provincial or central government
    authorities. Government officials have expressed appreciation for the
    work of many foreign religious groups in providing much needed
    assistance in education, rural development, and training. At the same
    time, government officials also have expressed some concern about
    foreign groups using the guise of religion to become involved in
    illegal or political affairs.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict
    domestic or international travel, although the presence of land mines
    and bandits makes travel in some areas of the country dangerous.
        Monks may move internally without restriction.
        All refugee camps at the border with Thailand were closed during
    1999 after all Cambodian refugees returned. There were no reports of
    refugees being forced by Thai authorities to return to Cambodia
    involuntarily, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR), nor were there any reports of persecution or discrimination
    against those who returned from any country. Internally displaced
    persons also were allowed to resettle in other areas of the country.
        The Government allows noncitizens to apply to the UNHCR for refugee
    status. The Government continued to cooperate with the UNHCR and other
    humanitarian organizations to prepare for and assist in the
    resettlement of the refugees who returned from Thailand. The
    resettlement process largely was completed during the year, and UNHCR
    closed its provincial offices. The Government has not formulated a
    policy regarding asylees or first asylum, and it did not provide asylum
    during the year.
        There were no reports that the Government forced persons to return
    to a country where they feared persecution. However, the Government
    deported to Vietnam some Vietnamese citizens who were arrested for
    planning armed attacks against the government of Vietnam.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
        to Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and most citizens exercised this right by
    participating in the 1998 national elections. Suffrage is universal and
    voluntary for all citizens at the age of 18. In July 1998, in the first
    national elections since 1993, the CPP won a plurality of votes.
    However, the electoral campaign and its aftermath were marred by
    protests, voter intimidation, and partisan violence, some of it
    government-directed. Despite such incidents, the formation of the new
    Government reflected the will of the electorate. Most international and
    observer groups certified the election as acceptable.
        The coalition Government formed in late 1998 between the CPP and
    FUNCINPEC, the two parties that won the largest number of votes and
    National Assembly seats in the 1998 election, renewed political
    stability. The coalition agreement provided for roughly equal power
    sharing between the parties, with Hun Sen of the CPP as Prime Minister
    and Prince Ranariddh of FUNCINPEC as president of the National
    Assembly. The coalition agreement also provided for the creation of a
    Senate, which was formed in March 1999 with Chea Sim of the CPP as
    president. The Senate's function is to review and provide advice on the
    laws passed by the National Assembly; the National Assembly retains
    final authority over whether to modify legislation based on the
    Senate's recommendations.
        Although growing in influence, the legislature remained weak in
    comparison with the executive branch. The coalition Government
    appointed the provincial governors and their deputies, who generally
    are divided between the CPP and FUNCINPEC parties, as well as district
    officials. Commune-level officials were appointed by the previous
    government; most of these officials are appointees from the previous
    regimes, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the State of Cambodia.
    Elections for new commune councils were not held during the year as
    planned, but are expected to be held in early 2002. The Government
    completed drafts of the communal election law and commune
    administration law during the year, but the National Assembly had not
    debated and enacted the laws by year's end; the election law requires a
    preparatory period of at least 11 months between passage of the law and
    the date of the commune election.
        Traditional cultural practices inhibit the role of women in
    government, and women are underrepresented in government and politics.
    However, women took an active part in the 1998 national election. There
    are 10 women among the 122 members of the National Assembly, 8 women
    among the 61 members of the Senate, and 3 female state secretaries in
    the Cabinet, which includes a Ministry of Women's and Veterans affairs.
    There are several members of ethnic and religious minorities in the
    Cabinet and the National Assembly (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of
        Human Rights
        The large domestic and international human rights community
    remained active and engaged in diverse activities. Numerous human
    rights organizations and the UNCHR conducted monitoring activities and
    human rights training for provincial officials, military officers,
    villagers, the legal community, and other groups. These organizations
    operated relatively freely throughout the country. There are
    approximately 40 NGO's involved in human rights activities, but only a
    small portion were involved actively in organizing training programs or
    investigating abuses. The Government generally cooperated with human
    rights workers in performing their investigations, but some domestic
    NGO's reported occasional limited cooperation from some provincial
    authorities in conducting inspections of prison conditions.
        In April, following widespread media criticism that a local human
    rights NGO was harboring illegal workers from Vietnam, the Government
    stated that the NGO should be held responsible for the subsequent
    disappearance of the illegal workers. One staff member of the NGO was
    detained briefly and questioned by police, but the Government took no
    official action against the NGO or its members (see Section 5).
        In September 1999, the Government and the UNCHR agreed to an
    extension until March 2002 of the UNCHR's activities in the country,
    although a formal memorandum of understanding had not been signed by
    year's end. The UNCHR maintains a head office in Phnom Penh and has six
    provincial offices. The position of the U.N. Special Representative for
    Human Rights was vacant much of the year; the newly appointed
    representative made his first trip to the country in November and met
    with government representatives at all levels, as well as with
    representatives of political parties and NGO's.
        The government-established Cambodian Human Rights Committee in 1999
    published the results of only a few of its investigations of the human
    rights abuses that had been reported by the UNCHR in previous years.
    The committee, which was established in 1998, also is charged with
    improving the administration of justice and drafting a law to establish
    an independent permanent national human rights commission. By year's
    end, the commission had not been established.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
        Disability, Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    color, language, religious beliefs, or political views. Although the
    Government does not engage in discrimination systematically, it
    sometimes fails to protect these rights in practice.
        Women.--Domestic and international NGO workers report that violence
    against women, including rape and domestic violence, is common.
    Although accurate statistics are not available, one local NGO reported
    138 incidents of rape and domestic abuse through October. Authorities
    normally decline to become involved in domestic disputes, and the
    victims frequently are reluctant to complain. Rape is unlawful, as is
    assault. Spousal rape and domestic abuse are not recognized as separate
    crimes.
        Prostitution and trafficking in women are serious problems (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Due in part to budgetary limitations, the
    Government has not enforced effectively a 1996 law against prostitution
    and trafficking in women although the Government devoted greater
    attention to the problem during the past year and initiated several
    prosecutions. Despite sporadic government crackdowns on brothel
    operators in Phnom Penh, prostitution continues to flourish. A survey
    by a local human rights NGO found that 40 percent of women and girls
    who work as prostitutes do so voluntarily, while 60 percent have been
    forced to work as prostitutes or have been deceived into prostitution.
    The NGO also estimated that there are up to 55,000 sex workers in the
    country. At year's end, the Government had begun preparation of
    legislation to decriminalize and regulate prostitution as part of a
    package of legal measures designed to address the problem of sexual
    trafficking of women and children (see Section 6.f.).
        On March 29, a Poipet brothel owner was sentenced to 12 years in
    prison for the 1998 beating death of a prostitute; this was regarded
    widely as the first successful prosecution of a crime against a sex
    worker.
        The Constitution contains explicit language providing for equal
    rights for women, equal pay for equal work, and equal status in
    marriage. In practice women have equal property rights with men, have
    the same status in bringing divorce proceedings, and have equal access
    to education and some jobs. However, cultural traditions continue to
    limit the ability of women to reach senior positions in business and
    other areas.
        According to NGO reports, women comprise 52 percent of the
    population, 60 percent of agricultural workers, 85 percent of the
    business work force, 70 percent of the industrial work force, and 60
    percent of all service sector workers. Women often are concentrated in
    lowpaying jobs in these sectors and largely are excluded from
    management positions.
        There are a large number of active women's NGO's that train poor
    women and widows and address social problems such as spousal abuse,
    prostitution, and trafficking. An active women's media center NGO
    produces and broadcasts programming on women's issues. NGO's provide
    shelters from women in crisis.
        Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, and
    ensuring the welfare of children is a specific goal in the Government's
    political program. The Government relies on international aid to fund
    most social welfare programs targeted at children, resulting in only a
    modest flow of funds to ameliorate problems that affect children.
        Children are affected adversely by an inadequate educational
    system. Education is free and compulsory through grade 9; however, many
    children leave school to help their families in subsistence
    agriculture. Despite an extensive government school construction
    program, schools are overcrowded and lack sufficient equipment. Less
    than 5 percent of primary school teachers have completed high school.
    The Government does not deny girls equal access to education but in
    practice families with limited resources often give priority to
    educating boys.
        Children frequently suffer from malnutrition and the inadequacy of
    the health care system. Infant mortality was reported most recently at
    89.4 per thousand, and 12 percent of children do not live to the age of
    5 years. Child mortality from preventable diseases is high.
        Child abuse is believed to be common, although there are no
    statistics available on the extent of the problem. Poverty and domestic
    violence often drive children to live on the streets; domestic NGO's
    estimate there are more than 10,000 street children in Phnom Penh
    alone, who are easy targets for sexual abuse and exploitation.
        Although sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 15 is
    illegal, child prostitution and trafficking in children were common
    (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). In July 1999, the Government adopted a
    5year plan against child sexual exploitation that emphasizes prevention
    through information and protection through law enforcement. To combat
    sex tourism, the Government during the year prosecuted at least three
    cases in which foreigners were charged with pornography violations or
    pedophilia.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not require that
    buildings or government services be accessible to the disabled.
    According to the Government, approximately 1 in 250 citizens is missing
    at least one limb. This statistic reflects the continuing effects of
    land mine detonations. Programs administered by various NGO's have
    brought about substantial improvements in the treatment and
    rehabilitation of amputees. However, amputees face considerable
    societal discrimination, particularly in obtaining skilled employment.
        Religious Minorities.--Muslims are the largest religious minority
    and experience little or no discrimination in practice; however,
    occasional tensions were reported in past years among the various
    branches of Islam; these groups receive monetary support from groups in
    Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, or Indonesia depending on the tenets of
    the particular branch.
        The small Christian community has not experienced serious or
    systematic discrimination; however, occasional tensions were reported
    when Christian evangelists attempted to remove Buddhist images or
    religious items in private homes. Christian missionary groups have not
    encountered significant difficulties in performing their work.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of Chinese and
    Vietnamese ethnicity long have constituted the largest ethnic
    minorities. Ethnic Chinese citizens are well accepted in society.
    However, fear and animosity continue among many Khmer citizens toward
    ethnic Vietnamese, who are seen as a threat to the Cambodian nation and
    culture. The rights of minorities under the 1996 nationality law are
    not explicit; constitutional protections are extended only to ``Khmer
    people,'' that is, Cambodians.
        Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of ethnic violence
    supported by opposition politicians, during which ethnic Vietnamese
    citizens or residents were killed. Nonetheless, political opposition
    and student groups continued to make strong anti-Vietnamese statements
    during the year; they complained of political control, border
    encroachments, and other problems for which they held ethnic Vietnamese
    persons responsible.
        In March a domestic human rights NGO was criticized in the local
    Khmer press for sheltering, and then release of 34 illegal Vietnamese
    residents who had been working in a Phnom Penh garment factory (see
    Section 4).
        On March 27, more than 200 demonstrators in Phnom Penh demanded the
    eviction of 500 ethnic Vietnamese persons living as squatters inside
    the compound of a Buddhist temple. The demonstration was fueled by the
    injury of a monk during an earlier rock-throwing clash at the temple;
    monks from the temple claimed that the Vietnamese squatters insulted
    Buddhism by conducting prostitution, karaoke, and gambling on the
    temple premises. In April the squatters left the compound peacefully
    after the Government arranged for most of them to live on land in
    nearby Kandal province.
        On April 12, a group of over 20 ethnic Vietnamese fisherman killed
    3 government fisheries officials in Kandal province and wounded 3
    others during a late-night government raid on illegal fishing practices
    on the Tonle Sap river. The Government subsequently arrested three
    Vietnamese fisherman for the crimes, and their cases are under
    prosecution.
        On June 28, a hand grenade exploded under a house located in an
    ethnic Vietnamese area but caused no damage or injuries. Police
    speculated that the incident could have been the result of a personal
    dispute or could have been an attempt to frighten the ethnic Vietnamese
    residents in the area. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports
    of persons killed or injured in antiVietnamese violence.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1997 Labor Law provides workers
    with the right to form professional organizations of their own
    choosing, without prior authorization, and all workers are free to join
    the trade union of their choice; however, the Government's enforcement
    of these rights was uneven. In the wake of 1999 union complaints that
    the procedures for registration were burdensome, the Government took
    additional steps to ease registration procedures during the year.
    Membership in trade unions or employee associations is not compulsory,
    and workers are free to withdraw from such organizations; however, the
    Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth
    Rehabilitation (MOSALVY) has accepted the charter of at least one union
    that requires workers to obtain permission before they may withdraw.
    The Labor Law does not apply to civil servants, including teachers,
    judges, military personnel, or household servants. Personnel working in
    air and maritime transportation are not fully subject to the law, but
    are free to form unions.
        Most workers are subsistence rice farmers and have little knowledge
    of trade unions. Only a small fraction (estimated at less than 1
    percent) of the labor force is unionized, and the trade union movement,
    still in its infancy, is very weak. Unions are highly concentrated in
    the garment and footwear industries, where approximately 5 to 10
    percent of the 100,000 to 120,000 workers are union members. Although
    there is an expanding service sector, most urban workers are engaged in
    small-scale commerce, self-employed skilled labor, or unskilled day
    labor. The Labor Law requires unions and employer organizations to file
    a charter and lists of officers with the MOSALVY. The Ministry has
    registered 114 factory unions and 5 national labor federations since
    the Labor Law went into effect in 1997, including 57 unions during the
    year. Although all unions collect dues from members, none have been
    able to operate without outside sources of support. None of the unions
    has the capacity to negotiate with management as equals.
        One labor federation maintains an affiliation with the opposition
    SRP. Three other registered labor federations have historical ties to
    the Government or individuals within the Government. One major labor
    federation and several unaffiliated factory unions are completely
    independent.
        During the year, the Government issued regulations clarifying the
    Labor Law in a number of areas pertaining to freedom of association.
    The new regulations included procedures for the registration of labor
    unions with their registration materials that eliminated the
    requirement for union leaders to obtain ``letters of no criminal
    record'' prior to registration. The Government also improved election
    procedures for workers' representatives on the tripartite labor
    advisory committee.
        Despite these advances, the Government's enforcement of provisions
    that protect the right of association was weak. The Government's
    enforcement efforts were hampered by a lack of resources, little
    knowledge of the law by factory managers, and a lack of qualified labor
    inspectors. Unions also suffer from a lack or resources, training, and
    experience. There were a number of credible complaints about antiunion
    harassment by employers, including the dismissal of union leaders
    during the year. In at least one case, a factory defied a MOSALVY order
    to reinstate dismissed union leaders. The Government never has
    prosecuted or punished an employer for antiunion activity. The MOSALVY
    often finds in favor of employees, but rarely uses its legal authority
    to penalize employers who defy its orders. The MOSALVY often advises
    employees in such situations to sue in court, which labor unions claim
    is unnecessary, costly, and ineffective.
        The Labor Law provides for the right to strike and protects
    strikers from reprisal. There were 76 strikes during the year, the vast
    majority of which took place without the 7-day prior notice required by
    law. The Government allowed all strikes and demonstrations, including
    widespread garment industry strikes in June, in which demonstrators
    caused property damage at several locations. Two workers suffered
    injuries at the hands of the police during violent labor demonstrations
    during the year, but police intervention generally was minimal and
    restrained, even in cases in which striking workers caused property
    damage. There have been several credible reports of workers being
    dismissed on spurious grounds after organizing or participating in
    strikes. In some cases, strikers have been pressured by employers to
    accept compensation and leave their employment.
        Unions may affiliate freely, but the law does not address
    explicitly their right to affiliate internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law
    provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively; however,
    the Government's enforcement of these rights was uneven. Wages are set
    by market forces, except for civil servants, for whom wages are set by
    the Government.
        Since passage of the Labor Law in 1997, there has been confusion
    over the overlapping roles of labor unions and elected shop stewards.
    The Labor Law provides unions the right to negotiate with management
    over wages and working conditions and allows unions to nominate
    candidates for shop steward positions. However, the law provides shop
    stewards the right to represent the union to the company director and
    to sign collective bargaining agreements. Legal ambiguities also exist
    in the process for unions to nominate shop stewards. In practice most
    factories elected shop stewards before a union was present in the
    enterprise; thus, for most of the year, unions had no legally
    enforceable right to negotiate with management in situations in which
    there were nonunion shop stewards present in the enterprise. In
    addition the law specifically protects elected shop stewards from
    dismissal without permission from the MOSALVY, but grants no such
    protection to elected union leaders. However, in November the MOSALVY
    issued a new declaration that gave trade unions roles that are
    comparable to those of shop stewards and extended protection from
    dismissal to certain union officers within an enterprise.
        Very little collective bargaining takes place. There are only two
    collective bargaining agreements registered with the Government. In
    addition to difficulties in defining the bargaining unit, collective
    bargaining is inhibited by the weak capacity and inexperience of
    unions.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition on Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Law
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced labor by
    children; however, the Government does not enforce its provisions
    adequately. Involuntary overtime remained widespread. Workers faced
    fines, dismissal, or loss of premium pay if they refused to work
    overtime.
        Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a serious problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        There were no reports of bonded labor during the year.
        Conditions in the commercial sex industry indicate both forced
    labor and the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.). Although there
    are no comprehensive surveys of the country's commercial sex industry,
    it thrives openly; many commercial sex workers are under the age of 18.
    An NGO survey in 1995 of prostitution indicated that 31 percent of
    female prostitutes were between the ages of 12 and 17 years. Up to half
    the girls involved were sold into prostitution by their families, then
    forced to work as prostitutes. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO) reported that many rural families allow their daughters to travel
    to cities for jobs described as honest and well paid, but which in
    reality lead to exploitative and slaverylike situations. There have
    also been reports of children who were kidnaped and forced to work in
    the illegal sex trade (see Sections 6.b. and 6.f.). Officials of the
    Government took action in February to rescue underage or trafficked
    women from prostitution, but do not do so consistently.
        The Law on the Exploitation and Sale of Humans establishes a jail
    sentence of 15 to 20 years for any person convicted of trafficking in
    persons under the age of 15 (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Law establishes 15 years as the minimum age for
    employment, and 18 as the minimum age for hazardous work. The law
    permits children between 12 and 15 to engage in ``light work'' that is
    not hazardous to their health and that does not affect school
    attendance. The Labor Advisory Committee is responsible for defining
    what constitutes work that is hazardous to the health, safety, and
    morality of adolescents, as well as consulting with the Ministry to
    determine which types of employment and working conditions constitute
    ``light work.'' However, the committee has not yet done so for any
    industry.
        The Ministry is hampered by inadequate resources, staff, and
    training. Law enforcement agencies have sufficient authority to combat
    child prostitution, but do not do so in a sustained, consistent manner.
    Some observers note that existing regulations do not address the
    problem of child labor in the informal sector adequately.
        Children under 15 account for over half the population. About 17
    percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 work. More than half
    of these are over the age of 14, and 89 percent are engaged in
    agriculture. Only 4 percent of working children are engaged in
    industrial work, including brick factories and rubber plantations.
        In October a British Broadcasting Corporation television
    documentary drew great attention to what in fact were exaggerated
    allegations of widespread child labor in the garment industry. Several
    employees at one factory claimed to have misrepresented their ages by
    presenting inaccurate Government-issued documents in order to meet the
    factory's minimum age standard of 18 years of age. In fact child labor
    is not prevalent in the industry; however, there are instances of young
    workers who misrepresent their ages to gain employment in factories,
    including the garment factories. Most garment factories have policies
    that set the age of employment above the legal minimum of 15 years. The
    most serious child labor problems are in the informal sector.
        The ILO's IPEC (International Program for the Elimination of Child
    Labor) reported in 1999 that more than 15 percent of prostitutes were
    from 9 to 15 years of age, and that 78 percent of these girls were
    Vietnamese; the remainder were citizens.
        With assistance from the ILO, the MOSALVY established a child labor
    unit to investigate and suppress child labor. In 1997 the Government,
    in conjunction with the ILO and NGO's, also approved a national action
    plan on child labor. In 1992 the Government ratified ILO Convention 105
    (abolition of child labor) and Convention 138 (minimum age), and the
    Ministry has disseminated information about its content to employers.
    The MOSALVY had not defined worst forms of child labor, but the
    Ministry was preparing a report at year's end on the content of ILO
    Convention 182 for eventual submission to the National Assembly. It
    conducted four workshops to educate legislators on the matter. The
    Government worked with the ILO on a strategy for implementing
    Convention 182, which would include defining the worst forms of child
    labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law requires the
    MOSALVY to establish minimum wages based on recommendations by the
    Labor Advisory Committee. The minimum wage varies regionally.
    Responding to unprecedented pressure from the labor movement, the
    Ministry formally exercised its minimum wage authority for the first
    time in July, when it approved a $45 per month minimum wage; however,
    it applied only to the garment and footwear sector. It defines a month
    as 26 8-hour days, after training. Garment factories almost universally
    observe the minimum wage, or pay higher wages. There is no minimum wage
    for any other industry.
        Typically, garment workers earn relatively high wages, between $45
    and $100 per month. However, prevailing monthly wages in the garment
    sector and many other professions are insufficient to provide a worker
    and family with a decent standard of living. Civil service salaries
    also are far below market levels, requiring government officials to
    secure outside sources of income.
        The Labor Law provides for a standard legal workweek of 48 hours,
    not to exceed 8 hours per day. The law stipulates timeand-one-half for
    overtime, and double time if overtime occurs at night, on Sunday, or on
    a holiday. The Government does not enforce these standards effectively.
    Despite reminders from the Government concerning hours of work, workers
    in many garment factories complain that overtime is excessive or
    involuntary, or that they are required to work 7 days per week.
        Some factories do not pay the legally mandated premiums for
    overtime (150 percent) and night or holiday work (200 percent)
    properly, and there is legal ambiguity over which hours constitute
    night work. Another common complaint is that management violates the
    law by paying the overtime rate only for the salary component of
    workers' pay, leaving piece rates unchanged regardless of the number of
    hours worked.
        Regulations on working hours outside the garment industry very
    rarely are enforced.
        The Labor Law states that the workplace should have health and
    safety standards adequate to ensure workers' wellbeing. The Government
    enforces existing standards inconsistently, in part because it lacks
    staff, equipment, and training. Labor inspection workers also are paid
    poorly. Work related injury and health problems are common. Conditions
    in smallscale factories and cottage industries are generally poor and
    often do not meet international standards. The Government has issued
    several instructions on workplace standards, and more detailed
    regulations await approval by the labor advisory committee before they
    may be promulgated. Penalties are specified in the Labor Law, but there
    are no specific provisions to protect workers who complain about unsafe
    or unhealthy conditions. Workers who remove themselves from unsafe
    working conditions risk loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The 1996 Law on the Exploitation and
    Sale of Humans establishes a jail sentence of 15 to 20 years for any
    person convicted of trafficking in persons under the age of 15;
    however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively due in
    part to budget limitations and a lack of implementing regulations. The
    country is a source, destination, and transit country for the
    trafficking in persons.
        Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
    prostitution remained a serious problem. Although prosecutions of
    traffickers increased, and the Government devoted greater attention to
    trafficking during the year, prosecution of traffickers has been rare.
        Surveys conducted by domestic NGO's in 1995 indicated that from 40
    to 50 percent of young women who were trafficked were victimized by a
    close relative or friend of the family for money or on promises of a
    better life. Poverty and ignorance in villages is a major factor in
    contributing to the trafficking problem. One international NGO
    estimated that 30,000 Cambodian women were trafficked to neighboring
    countries.
        The ILO's IPEC (International Program for the Elimination of Child
    Labor) reported in 1999 that more than 15 percent of prostitutes were
    from 9 to 15 years of age, and that 78 percent of these girls were
    Vietnamese; the remainder were Cambodians.
        On August 13, police raided a hotel and freed seven Romanian and
    Moldovan women who allegedly were trafficked into the country's sex
    trade. The proprietor of the hotel initially was arrested for illegally
    detaining the women; however, the court subsequently declined to
    prosecute and released the suspect.
        On August 30, 2 Taiwan residents and 6 Cambodians were arrested for
    human trafficking after a raid on a Phnom Penh hotel found 20 Cambodian
    women who police suspected were to be sent to Taiwan as sex workers
    under the guise of marrying men from Taiwan. There were unconfirmed
    press reports that women were lured from Cambodia to work in the sex
    industry in other Asian countries.
        In March the Government inaugurated a program jointly administered
    by the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the International Organization
    for Migration to train about 2,000 government officials in legal and
    socio-economic issues related to trafficking and migration problems.
        Child prostitution and trafficking in children were common. There
    were reliable reports that children were lured from or kidnaped in some
    provinces and forced into the illegal sex trade, both in Cambodia and
    abroad. Other children were smuggled into Thailand to become beggars.
        In July 1999, the Government adopted a 5-year plan against child
    sexual exploitation that emphasized prevention through information and
    protection through law enforcement. In September 1999, the Prime
    Minister instructed the Cabinet to develop additional measures to fight
    trafficking of women and children, including speedy promulgation of
    subdecrees and signing bilateral extradition treaties to bring
    traffickers to justice.
        In April the Government and a group of international NGO's
    announced a program to train police, prosecutors and judges to more
    effectively enforce the laws protecting children, especially the laws
    against sexual exploitation of children through trafficking and
    otherwise. This program was designed as part of the Government's 5-year
    plan.
        The increase in the number of foreign tourists during the year
    raised concerns of government and NGO officials that the tourist-driven
    child sex trade also would increase. The Government prosecuted at least
    three cases during the year in which foreigners were charged with child
    pornography or indecent acts against minors.
                                   __________

                                     CHINA

        The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in
    which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount source of
    power. At the national and regional levels, Party members hold almost
    all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority
    rests with members of the Politburo. Leaders stress the need to
    maintain stability and social order and are committed to perpetuating
    the rule of the CCP and its hierarchy. Citizens lack both the freedom
    peacefully to express organized opposition to the Party-led political
    system and the right to change their national leaders or form of
    Government. Socialism continues to provide the theoretical underpinning
    of Chinese politics, but Marxist ideology has given way to economic
    pragmatism in recent years, and economic decentralization has increased
    the authority of regional officials. The Party's authority rests
    primarily on the Government's ability to maintain social stability,
    appeals to nationalism and patriotism, Party control of personnel,
    media, and the security apparatus, and the continued improvement in the
    living standards of most of the country's almost 1.3 billion citizens.
    The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
    practice the Government and the CCP, at both the central and local
    levels, frequently interfere in the judicial process, and the Party and
    the Government direct verdicts in many high-profile political cases.
        The security apparatus is made up of the Ministries of State
    Security and Public Security, the People's Armed Police, the People's
    Liberation Army, and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal
    systems. Security policy and personnel were responsible for numerous
    human rights abuses.
        The country is making a gradual transition from a centrally planned
    to a market-based economy. Although state-owned industry remains
    dominant in key sectors, the Government has privatized many small and
    medium state-owned enterprises (SOE's) and allowed private
    entrepreneurs increasing scope for economic activity. The country has
    large industrial and agricultural sectors and is a leading producer of
    coal, steel, textiles, and grains. Major exports include electronic
    goods, toys, apparel, and plastics. Trade and foreign investment are
    helping to modernize an already rapidly growing economy. The official
    gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate through the third quarter of
    the year was just over 8 percent--a decrease from the double-digit
    growth rates of the early 1990's, but slightly above the 1999 figure.
    Increased growth during the year was largely the result of foreign
    trade, continued heavy infrastructure investment, and a small increase
    in domestic demand.
        The economy faces growing problems, including state enterprise
    reform, unemployment, underemployment, and regional economic
    disparities. Rural unemployment and underemployment combined are
    estimated to be over 30 percent. Tens of millions of persons have left
    their homes in rural areas in search of better jobs and living
    conditions in the cities; demographers estimate that between 80 and 130
    million persons make up this ``floating population,'' with many major
    cities counting 1 million or more such persons. Urban areas also are
    coping with millions of state workers idled on partial wages or
    unemployed as a result of industrial reforms. In the industrial sector,
    continued downsizing in state-owned enterprises prompted 2 million
    layoffs in the first half of the year, bringing the total number of
    jobless urban residents to over 20 million in an urban workforce of
    about 240 million. The number of job-seeking migrant workers from rural
    areas adds significantly to this total. Industrial workers throughout
    the country continued to organize sporadically to protest layoffs and
    to demand the payment of overdue wages and benefits. However, rising
    living standards, greater independence for entrepreneurs, and the
    expansion of the nonstate sector have increased workers' employment
    options and have markedly reduced state control over citizens' daily
    lives. In 1999 a constitutional amendment officially recognized the
    role of the private sector in the economy, and private firms now
    contribute 30 to 40 percent of yearly GDP growth. The total number of
    citizens living in absolute poverty continues to decline; estimates
    range from the official figure of 42 million to the World Bank figure
    of 150 million. However, the income gap between coastal and interior
    regions, and between urban and rural areas, is wide and growing. Urban
    per capita income for 1999 was $705 (an increase of 8 percent over the
    previous year), but rural per capita income was $266 (an increase of
    only 2 percent over the previous year).
        The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it
    continued to commit numerous serious abuses. The Government intensified
    crackdowns on religion and in Tibet, intensified its harsh treatment of
    political dissent, and suppressed any person or group perceived to
    threaten the Government. However, despite these efforts, many Chinese
    had more individual choice, greater access to information, and expanded
    economic opportunity. Nonetheless by year's end, thousands of
    unregistered religious institutions either had been either closed or
    destroyed, hundreds of Falun Gong leaders had been imprisoned, and
    thousands of Falun Gong practitioners remained in detention or were
    sentenced to reeducation-through-labor camps or incarcerated in mental
    institutions. Various sources report that approximately 100 or more
    Falun Gong practitioners died as a result of torture and mistreatment
    in custody. Controls on religious practice and freedom of expression
    also were intensified in Tibet and remained tight in Xinjiang. Only a
    handful of political dissidents remained active publicly. The
    Government's respect for religious freedom deteriorated markedly during
    the year, as the Government conducted crackdowns against underground
    Christian groups and Tibetan Buddhists and destroyed many houses of
    worship. The Government significantly intensified its campaign against
    the Falun Gong movement, which it accused in October of being a
    reactionary organization, as well as against ``cults'' in general. A
    number of qigong groups were banned. The Government continued to commit
    widespread and welldocumented human rights abuses in violation of
    internationally accepted norms. These abuses stemmed from the
    authorities' extremely limited tolerance of public dissent aimed at the
    Government, fear of unrest, and the limited scope or inadequate
    implementation of laws protecting basic freedoms. The Constitution and
    laws provide for fundamental human rights; however, these protections
    often are ignored in practice. Abuses included instances of
    extrajudicial killings, the use of torture, forced confessions,
    arbitrary arrest and detention, the mistreatment of prisoners, lengthy
    incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. In May the U.N.
    Committee Against Torture issued a report critical of continuing
    serious incidents of torture, especially involving national minorities.
    Prison conditions at most facilities remained harsh. In many cases,
    particularly in sensitive political cases, the judicial system denies
    criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and due process because
    authorities attach higher priority to maintaining public order and
    suppressing political opposition than to enforcing legal norms. The
    Government infringed on citizen's privacy rights. The Government
    maintained tight restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press and
    increased its efforts to control the Internet; self-censorship by
    journalists continued. The Government severely restricted freedom of
    assembly and continued to restrict freedom of association. The
    Government continued to restrict freedom of religion and intensified
    controls on some unregistered churches. The Government continued to
    restrict freedom of movement. Citizens do not have the right peacefully
    to change their Government. The Government does not permit independent
    domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to monitor publicly
    human rights conditions. Violence against women (including coercive
    family planning practices--which sometimes include forced abortion and
    forced sterilization); prostitution; discrimination against women;
    trafficking in women and children; abuse of children; and
    discrimination against the disabled and minorities are all problems.
    Particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in Tibet and
    Xinjiang. The Government continued to restrict tightly worker rights,
    and forced labor in prison facilities remained a serious problem. Child
    labor exists and appears to be a growing problem in rural areas as
    adult workers leave for better employment opportunities in urban areas.
    Trafficking in persons is a serious problem.
        Since December 1998, the authorities severely punished, on charges
    of subversion, at least 25 core leaders of the China Democracy Party
    (CDP). During the year, the crackdown on the China Democratic Party
    continued with the arrest or sentencing of Liu Shizun, Dai Xuezhong,
    Zhu Zhengming, Chen Zhonghe, Xiao Shichang, Li Guotao and others.
    During the year, the Government also used laws against subversion and
    endangering state security to threaten, arrest and imprison a wide
    range of political dissidents and activists, including former
    Government officials, nongovernmental organization (NGO) founders and
    activists, activists for artistic freedom, and independent advocates
    for legal reform.
        Although the Government denies that it holds political or religious
    prisoners and argues that all those in prison are legitimately serving
    sentences for crimes under the law, an unknown number of persons,
    estimated at several thousand, are detained in violation of
    international human rights instruments for peacefully expressing their
    political, religious, or social views. Persons detained at times during
    the year included political activists; leaders of unregistered
    religious groups; journalists; authors; intellectuals; labor leaders;
    and members of the Falun Gong movement, among others. Some minority
    groups, particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under
    increasing pressure as the Government clamped down on dissent and
    ``separatist'' activities. In Tibet the Government carried out a severe
    and wide-ranging crackdown on Tibetan religious practices, which showed
    some signs of moderation at year's end, and continued its ``patriotic
    education campaign'' aimed at controlling the monasteries and expelling
    supporters of the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang authorities maintained tight
    restrictions on fundamental freedoms in an effort to control
    independence groups.
        The authorities released a few political prisoners before their
    terms were over, notably Liu Wensheng, Chen Lantao, Li Wangyang, Zhang
    Jingsheng, Yu Zhijian, and Lin Hai. However, at year's end several
    thousand others--including Bishop An Shuxin, Chen Longde, Han
    Chunsheng, Li Bifeng, Liu Jingsheng, Qin Yongmin, Shen Liangqing, Zha
    Jianguo, Wang Youcai, Pastor Xu Yongze, Fang Jue, Xu Wenli, Yang
    Qinheng, Zhang Lin, Zhang Shanguang, Zhao Changqing, Zhou Yongjun,
    Ngawang Choephel, Abbot Chadrel Rinpoche, Jigme Sangpo, and Ngawang
    Sangrol (see Tibet addendum)--remained imprisoned or under other forms
    of detention for the peaceful expression of their political, social, or
    religious views. Some of those who completed their sentences and were
    released from prison were kept under surveillance and prevented from
    taking employment or otherwise resuming normal lives. There were also
    reports of the increasing surveillance of dissidents.
        Unapproved religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic
    groups and members of nontraditional religious groups, continued to
    experience varying degrees of official interference, repression, and
    persecution. The Government continued to enforce 1994 State Council
    regulations requiring all places of religious activity to register with
    the Government and come under the supervision of official,
    ``patriotic'' religious organizations. There were significant
    differences from region to region, and even locality to locality, in
    the attitudes of government officials toward religion. In some areas,
    authorities guided by national policy made strong efforts to control
    the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches;
    religious services were broken up and church leaders or adherents were
    harassed, and, at times, fined, detained, beaten, and tortured; many
    houses of worship also were destroyed. In November and December,
    authorities in and around the coastal city of Wenzhou, Zhejiang
    Province, razed or confiscated hundreds of churches or places of
    worship. At year's end, some religious adherents remained in prison
    because of their religious activities. House church groups in the
    northeast reported more detentions and arrests than in recent years,
    and authorities in Henan cracked down on underground Protestant
    churches. Several Protestant house church groups were banned. In many
    regions with high concentrations of Catholics, relations between the
    Government and the underground church loyal to the Vatican remained
    tense. In other regions, registered and unregistered churches were
    treated similarly by the authorities and reported little or no day-to-
    day interference in their activities. The number of religious adherents
    in many churches, both registered and unregistered, continued to grow
    at a rapid pace. The situation in Tibet was particularly poor, as the
    Government intensified and expanded its campaign aimed at lamas, monks,
    and nuns with sympathies to the Dalai Lama.
        The Government strictly regulates the establishment and management
    of publications, controls the broadcast media, censors foreign
    television broadcasts, and at times jams radio signals from abroad.
    During the year, several publications were shut down or disciplined for
    publishing material deemed objectionable by the Government, and
    journalists, authors, and researchers were harassed, detained, and
    arrested by the authorities. Despite the continued expansion of the
    Internet in the country, the Government increased its efforts to
    monitor and control content on the Internet. Several new regulations
    regarding the Internet were issued, and many web sites, including
    politically sensitive web sites and foreign news web sites, were shut
    down or blocked by the authorities.
        During the year, the Government worked to make progress towards
    correcting systemic weaknesses in the judicial system and making the
    system more accountable to public scrutiny. New regulations aimed at
    making the Supreme People's Court and the Procuratorate and the police
    more professional and accountable went into effect. Senior officials
    openly acknowledged abuses such as using torture to extort confessions
    and admitted that extorting favors from suspects and nepotism remained
    serious problems. However, new regulations and policies passed in the
    past few years have not brought the country's criminal procedures into
    full compliance with international standards, and the law routinely is
    violated in the cases of political dissidents and religious leaders and
    adherents. The judiciary is not independent.
        Despite intensified suppression of organized dissent, some positive
    trends continued. Social groups with economic resources at their
    disposal continued to play an increasing role in community life. As
    many as 15 million persons had access to the Internet at year's end,
    although the Government increased its attempts to control the content
    of material available on the Internet. Most average citizens went about
    their daily lives without significant interference from the Government,
    enjoying looser economic controls, increased access to outside sources
    of information, greater room for individual choice, and more diversity
    in cultural life. However, the authorities were quick to suppress any
    person or group, whether religious, political, or social, that they
    perceived to be a threat to government power or to national stability,
    and citizens who sought to express openly dissenting political and
    religious views continued to live in an environment filled with
    repression.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The official press
    reported a number of extrajudicial killings, but no nationwide
    statistics are available. During the year, deaths in custody due to
    police use of torture to coerce confessions from criminal suspects
    continued to be a problem. For example, in Xinjiang Abduhelil Abdumijit
    was tortured to death in custody, according to foreign press reports.
    The deaths in custody of Falun Gong practitioners were a significant
    new development. Various sources report that approximately 100 or more
    Falun Gong adherents died during the year in police custody; many of
    their bodies reportedly bore signs of severe beatings or torture, or
    were cremated before relatives could examine them (see Section 1.c.).
    For example, in March Zhang Zhenggang was detained by police in Jiangsu
    and beaten into a coma. Zhang died 5 days later, and family members
    were not allowed to examine his body prior to cremation. In April Li
    Huixi, a Falun Gong follower in Shouguang City, Shandong, reportedly
    was beaten to death by public security officers while in custody. Li's
    body was cremated without an autopsy before his family was informed of
    his death. Falun Gong practitioner Li Zaiji died on July 7 while
    serving a sentence in a reform-through-labor camp in Jinlin. Although
    the official cause of death was listed as dysentery, family members who
    examined his body reported numerous wounds and bandages. During the
    year, several members of underground house churches reportedly also
    died while in custody, sometimes after being beaten by prison
    authorities. According to press reports, Liu Haitao was arrested at an
    underground Protestant church in Henan on September 4 and died in
    October in the Xiayi County Detention Center after being beaten and
    denied medical treatment.
        According to press reports, in June, more than 2,300 inmates at the
    Shangrao labor camp staged a protest over forced overtime labor. After
    prison officials called in over 500 armed police to suppress the
    strike, a riot occurred. Three persons were killed, and over 70 were
    injured in the incident (see Section 1.c.).
        There continued to be numerous executions carried out after summary
    trials. Such trials can occur under circumstances where the lack of due
    process protections borders on extrajudicial killing.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no new reports of disappearances.
    However, the Government still has not provided a comprehensive,
    credible accounting of those missing or detained in connection with the
    suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, police and other
    elements of the security apparatus employ torture and degrading
    treatment in dealing with some detainees and prisoners. Senior
    officials acknowledge that torture and coerced confessions are chronic
    problems but have not taken sufficient measures to end these practices.
    Former detainees and the press credibly reported that officials used
    electric shocks, prolonged periods of solitary confinement,
    incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles, and other forms of abuse
    against some detained men and women. During the year, there were
    numerous credible reports of abuse of Falun Gong practitioners by the
    police and other security personnel, including police involvement in
    beatings, detention under extremely harsh conditions, and torture
    (including by electric shock and by having hands and feet shackled and
    linked with crossed steel chains). Persons detained pending trial were
    particularly at risk during pretrial detention due to systemic
    weaknesses in the legal system or lack of implementation of the revised
    Criminal Procedure Law. Reports of torture increase during periodic
    ``strike hard'' campaigns in which police are encouraged to achieve
    quick results against crime. According to Amnesty International, during
    campaigns against prostitution, female migrant laborers may be detained
    and subjected to rape and abuse in custody.
        During the year, deaths in custody due to police use of torture to
    coerce confessions from criminal suspects continued to be a problem.
    Human rights monitors reported a number of unconfirmed but credible
    cases of torture. According to one report, Li Lusong of Lanxian County,
    Shanxi Province, went to local party officials to complain about the
    dilapidated facilities at the village primary school. Li was kicked and
    beaten by the police. He later posted comments critical of corruption.
    After he posted the comments, local police detained him and used a stun
    gun and pliers to pull out his tongue and cut it off with a knife. In
    December 1999, the Peoples' Daily reported that a suspect died in
    police custody in Anhui Province after refusing to admit to being a
    thief. Various sources report that approximately 100 or more Falun Gong
    adherents died during the year while in police custody. Many of their
    bodies reportedly bore signs of severe beatings or torture, and
    statements by released Falun Gong detainees regularly attest to
    mistreatment. Many of the bodies of Falun Gong practitioners who died
    in police custody were cremated before relatives could examine them.
        The Government has stated that ``the Chinese judiciary deals with
    every complaint of torture promptly after it is filed, and those found
    guilty are punished according to law.'' The press has reported that
    such punishments were carried out. In April the newspaper Liaoning
    Daily reported that several policemen were punished for ``extorting
    confessions with torture and causing fatal consequences.'' On April 5,
    the China Prosecutorial Report reported cases of forced confessions in
    Kunming. On April 16, the newspaper Legal Daily reported that the
    Guizhou Provincial Higher People's Court sentenced one police officer
    from Zunyi City to death and another to life imprisonment in connection
    with the killing of murder suspect Xiong Xianlu in 1998; Xiong was
    tortured to death. Reports such as these created the impression that
    torture remained a widespread problem. As part of its campaign to
    address police abuse, the Government in 1998 for the first time
    published national torture statistics, along with 99 case studies, in a
    volume entitled ``The Law Against Extorting a Confession by Torture.''
    The book, which was published by the Supreme People's Procuratorate,
    stated that 126 persons had died during police interrogation in 1993
    and 115 in 1994. Most cases of torture are believed to go unreported.
        Police also beat persons being arrested and persons in detention.
    Dissident Cai Guihua reported that he was beaten by police while being
    arrested prior to the June 4 anniversary of the Tianamen Square
    massacre (see Section 1.d.). Eyewitnesses have reported frequent abuse
    of Falun Gong protesters as they were being detained.
        In May the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued a report
    expressing concern about continuing allegations of serious incidents of
    torture, especially involving Tibetans and other national minorities.
    It recommended that the country incorporate a definition of torture
    into its domestic law in full compliance with international standards,
    abolish all forms of administrative detention (Including reeducation-
    through-labor), investigate promptly all allegations of torture, and
    provide training courses on international human rights standards for
    police, among other things (see Section 4).
        In late 1999, according to credible reports, the Government started
    confining some Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals. At year's
    end, according to Falun Gong, hundreds of practitioners were confined
    to mental hospitals. Authorities also confined other persons accused of
    nonviolent political crimes and other offenses to mental hospitals. In
    mid-December labor activist Cao Maobing was detained and admitted
    against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yancheng, Jiangsu
    Province, where he reportedly also was forced to take medication
    against his will (see Section 6.a.). In December 1999, authorities in
    Henan Province committed Xue Jifeng to a mental hospital after he
    attempted to establish an independent labor union to support workers
    harmed in a financial fraud. He was held until June (see Section 6.a.).
    Wang Wanxing, who protested in Tiananmen Square in 1992, continued to
    be held in a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts of Beijing. Another
    labor dissident, Wang Miaogen from Shanghai, disappeared in 1999, and
    some observers believe that he is being held in a psychiatric hospital.
    During the year, reports began to surface in the press about a woman
    who was detained by Guangzhou police and sent to a psychiatric hospital
    in June 1999 because she appeared upset after having had her luggage
    stolen, and she lacked an identity card. The woman, who was not
    identified, was raped repeatedly by male inmates at the psychiatric
    hospital before her husband was able to secure her release
    approximately 24 hours later. At the couple's insistence, police
    investigated the rapes, but vital evidence was destroyed prior to the
    investigation, and only one of the accused had been tried to date (see
    Section 1.d.). The woman's attempt to win damages was rejected by one
    court.
        There were reports during the year that police sometimes used
    excessive force to break up demonstrations. In May up to 2,000 unpaid
    workers reportedly protested at their factory and at local government
    offices in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province; the demonstration eventually
    was dispersed violently by the police. Dozens were reported to be
    injured, and three persons were arrested (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.).
    Activist Cai Guihua reportedly was beaten and roughed up by the police
    on May 31 and June 3.
        Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and
    common criminals generally are harsh and frequently degrading.
    Conditions in administrative detention facilities (including
    reeducation-through-labor camps and custody and repatriation centers
    (see Section 1.d.) are reportedly similar to those in prisons.
    Prisoners and detainees often are kept in overcrowded conditions with
    poor sanitation, and their food is often inadequate and of poor
    quality. Many detainees reportedly rely on supplemental food and
    medicines provided by relatives; however, some prominent dissidents
    reportedly are not allowed to receive supplemental food or medicine
    from relatives. According to released political prisoners, it is
    standard practice for political prisoners to be segregated from each
    other and placed with common criminals. There are credible reports that
    common criminals have beaten political prisoners at the instigation of
    guards. Guards in custody and repatriation centers reportedly rely on
    ``cell bosses'' to maintain order; these individuals frequently beat
    other detainees and have been known to steal their possessions.
    However, prominent political prisoners sometimes receive better
    treatment. The 1994 Prison Law was designed in part to improve
    treatment of detainees and increase respect for their legal rights. The
    Government's stated goal is to convert one-half of the nation's prisons
    and 150 reeducation-through-labor camps into ``modernized, civilized''
    facilities by the year 2010. According to credible sources, persons
    held in new ``model'' prisons receive better treatment than those held
    in other prison facilities. (For prison conditions in Tibet, see Tibet
    addendum.)
        Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners continues to be a
    serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the
    right to prompt medical treatment if they become ill. Nutritional and
    health conditions can be grim. At year's end, political prisoners who
    reportedly had difficulties in obtaining medical treatment, despite
    repeated appeals on their behalf by their families and the
    international community, included Xu Wenli, Gao Hongmin, Qin Yongmin,
    Wang Youcai, Chadrel Rinpoche, Chen Lantao (who was released in April),
    Chen Longde, Chen Meng, Fang Jue, Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Liu
    Jingsheng, Ngawang Sangdrol, Wang Guoqi, and Zhang Shanguang. Yu
    Dongyue, who defaced the portrait of Mao Zedong in Tiananmen Square
    during the 1989 student protests, reportedly is suffering severe mental
    illness from repeated beatings and mistreatment in a Hunan prison. Zhou
    Yongjun (the first chair of the Federation of Autonomous Student
    Unions), is serving a 3-year reeducation-through-labor sentence after
    returning to China from New York in 1998 and is reportedly suffering
    from rhinitis and fever. Ngawang Choephel, who is serving an 18-year
    sentence for espionage, reportedly suffers from liver, lung, and
    stomach ailments, and possibly tuberculosis. Labor activist Zhang
    Shanguang, serving a 10-year sentence for disclosing news of labor
    demonstrations to Radio Free Asia, was not permitted to see family
    members regularly in spite of suffering from serious tuberculosis.
    According to credible reports, Fang Jue is in very poor health. Xu
    Wenli, who tested positive for hepatitis B during a prison hospital
    examination, was denied treatment for the disease in 1999 despite
    repeated pleas by his family. He was said to be in poor health in
    November. Xu also reportedly was in need of dental care. An Fuxing, a
    China Democracy Party member and veteran of the Tiananmen prodemocracy
    movement, contracted hepatitis B at Liaoyuan prison and died from the
    illness in April. Hua Di, a Stanford researcher, whose 15-year prison
    sentence on charges of providing missile program secrets to persons
    abroad was overturned in mid-March, was reconvicted on November 23 and
    sentenced to 10 years in prison. He is suffering from cancer and was
    denied release on medical parole in April. Prison officials in Xinjiang
    have not allowed family members of businesswoman and prominent Uighur
    activist Rebiya Kadeer to visit or to bring her medicine for heart
    disease since her arrest on August 11, 1999. She is said to be in poor
    health, suffering from painful feet, blurred vision, and impaired
    hearing. There are also allegations that she had been abused
    physically. Officials reportedly have denied repeated requests for her
    to be hospitalized.
        According to one credible report in 1998, there have been instances
    in which women in reeducation-through-labor camps found to be pregnant
    while serving sentences were forced to submit to abortions (see Section
    1.f.).
        Forced labor in prison is common. According to press reports, in
    June more than 2,300 inmates at the Shangrao labor camp staged a strike
    to protest against forced overtime for the intensive labor of ore
    milling. After camp officials called in over 500 armed police to
    suppress the strike, a riot occurred. Three persons were killed and
    more than 70 were wounded in the incident (see also Sections 1.a. and
    6.c.). Persons may be detained without trial in custody and
    repatriation centers, in order to ``protect urban social order.'' Until
    they are repatriated, those detained may be required to pay for the
    cost of their detention and repatriation by performing forced labor
    while in detention.
        The Government does not permit the independent monitoring of
    prisons or reeducation-through-labor camps, and prisoners remain
    largely inaccessible to international human rights organizations. Talks
    with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on an
    agreement for ICRC access to prisons remain stalled. After a 1year
    suspension of unofficial dialog between a prominent businessman and
    human rights monitor and the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry resumed
    providing information regarding prisoners in March. The monitor was
    invited to visit the country 3 times during the year and received
    information regarding more than 20 prisoners, most of whom had been
    released prior to the completion of their original sentences. Prison
    visits with family members and others are monitored closely.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
    detention remain serious problems. The law permits the authorities in
    some circumstances to detain persons without arresting or charging
    them, and persons may be sentenced administratively to up to 3 years in
    reeducation-through-labor camps and other similar facilities without a
    trial. Because the Government tightly controls information, it is
    impossible accurately to determine the total number of persons
    subjected to new or continued arbitrary arrest or detention. The
    Government reported in 1999 that prosecutors had censured police
    officers 70,992 times in 1998 for detentions that exceeded the legal
    time limit. According to estimates, thousands of persons remain
    incarcerated, charged with other criminal offenses, detained but not
    charged, or sentenced to reeducation-through-labor. Although the crime
    of being a ``counterrevolutionary'' was removed from the Criminal Code
    in 1997, by year's end 2000 as many as 1,000 persons remained in prison
    for the crime, and another 600 were serving sentences under the State
    Security Law, which covers the same crimes as the repealed section on
    ``counterrevolution.'' Official government statistics report that there
    are some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps. It has
    been estimated that as many as 1.7 million persons per year were
    detained in a form of administrative detention known as custody and
    repatriation before 1996; the number of persons subject to this form of
    detention reportedly has been growing since that time (see Section
    1.c.).
        Wang Wanxing, who protested in Tiananmen Square in 1992, continued
    to be held in a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts of Beijing (see
    Section 1.c.). In mid-December, labor activist Cao Maobing was detained
    and admitted against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yancheng,
    Jiangsu Province, where he reportedly also was forced to take
    medication against his will (see Section 6.a.); he remained in the
    facility at year's end. According to reliable reports, the Government
    confined hundreds of Falun Gong adherents to psychiatric hospitals.
        The Criminal Procedure Law, which was amended in 1997, abolished an
    often criticized form of pretrial detention known as ``shelter and
    investigation'' that allowed police to detain suspects for extended
    periods without charge. Nonetheless in some cases police still can
    detain unilaterally a person for up to 37 days before releasing him or
    formally placing him under arrest. Once a suspect is arrested, the
    revised law allows police and prosecutors to detain him for months
    before trial while a case is being ``further investigated.'' Under the
    revised Criminal Procedure Law, detained criminal suspects, defendants,
    their legal representatives, and close relatives are entitled to apply
    for a guarantor to enable the suspect or defendant to await trial out
    of custody. In practice the police, who have sole discretion in such
    cases, usually do not agree. Few suspects are released on bail or put
    in another noncustodial detention pending trial.
        The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that authorities must notify
    a detainee's family or work unit of his detention within 24 hours.
    However, in practice timely notification remains a serious problem,
    especially in sensitive political cases. Under a sweeping exception,
    officials need not provide notification if it would ``hinder the
    investigation'' of a case. In January 1999, Che Hongnian, who had been
    held incommunicado for nearly 3 months, was sentenced to 3 years of
    labor in Shandong Province, apparently for writing a letter asking how
    to contact a human rights organization in Hong Kong. His appeal was
    denied 2 months later. Police continue to hold individuals without
    granting access to family or a lawyer, and trials continue to be
    conducted in secret (see Section 1.e.).
        A major flaw of the new Criminal Procedure Law is that it does not
    address the reeducation-through-labor system, which permits authorities
    to sentence detainees administratively without trial to terms of 1 to 3
    years in labor camps. Local Labor Reeducation Committees, which
    determine the term of detention, may extend an inmate's sentence for an
    additional year. According to the latest available official statistics,
    there were some 230,000 persons in reeducation-through-labor camps in
    1997. Defendants legally are entitled to challenge reeducation-through-
    labor sentences under the Administrative Litigation Law. Persons can
    gain a reduction in, or suspension of, their sentences after appeal,
    but appeals usually are not successful because of problems such as
    short appeal times and inadequate legal counsel, which weaken the
    effectiveness of the law in preventing or reversing arbitrary
    decisions. There have been cases of individuals successfully appealing
    their reeducation sentences through the courts, although the exact
    number of successful cases is unknown. Persons sentenced to
    reeducationthrough-labor during the year included activist Yao
    Zhenxiang.
        The new Criminal Procedure Law also does not address custody and
    repatriation, which allows the authorities to detain persons
    administratively without trial to ``protect urban social order.''
    Persons who may be detained under this provision include the homeless,
    the unemployed, petty criminals, and those without permission to live
    or work in urban areas; such persons may be returned to the locality in
    which they are registered. If the location to which they are to be
    repatriated cannot be determined, or if they cannot be repatriated for
    financial reasons, such persons may be sent to ``resettlement farms.''
    Those unable to work may be sent to ``welfare centers.'' Until they are
    repatriated, those detained may be held in custody and repatriation
    centers and may be required to pay for the cost of their detention and
    repatriation by performing forced labor while in detention. Relatives
    and friends of detainees in these centers reportedly are often able to
    secure a detainee's release by paying a fee. Provincial regulations on
    custody and repatriation in some cases have expanded the categories of
    persons who may be detained. In Beijing, for example, those who may be
    detained specifically include the mentally ill and mentally disabled,
    and ``those who should be taken into custody according to Government
    regulations.'' Many other persons are detained in similar forms of
    administrative detention, known as custody and education (for
    prostitutes and their clients) and custody and training (for minors who
    have committed crimes). Persons reportedly may be detained for long
    periods under these provisions, particularly if they cannot afford to
    pay for their release (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.d., 5, 6.c.,
    6.d., and 6.f.).
        By one estimate, more than 1.7 million persons per year are
    detained under custody and repatriation or similar regulations.
    According to the NGO Human Rights in China, the reasons for such
    detentions rarely are made clear to detainees. There are reports that
    persons with documentation allowing them to live or work in urban areas
    have been detained illegally under these provisions; but, because they
    are not entitled to a trial, they have little recourse if the detaining
    officials cannot be persuaded to allow their release. Some reportedly
    are forced to confess that they were living and working without permits
    in the urban area in which they were detained, despite having the
    appropriate documentation; in some cases, such documentation reportedly
    is destroyed.
        In theory the Administrative Litigation Law of 1989 permits a
    detainee to challenge the legality of administrative detention, but the
    lack of timely access to legal counsel inhibits the effective use of
    this law. Persons serving sentences in the criminal justice system can
    request release under Article 75 of the Criminal Procedure Law or
    appeal to the Procuratorate but have no recourse to the courts to
    challenge the legality or length of criminal detention. There are
    documented cases in which local officials and business leaders
    illegally conspired to use detention as a means of exerting pressure in
    commercial disputes involving foreign businessmen. There also have been
    cases in which foreign businessmen had their passports confiscated
    during such disputes.
        A campaign initiated by the Government in 1998 to eliminate the
    China Democracy Party (CDP), a would-be opposition party, broadened and
    intensified during 1999 and continued throughout the year. This
    campaign has resulted in the arrest, detention, or confinement of
    scores of persons. Since December 1998, at least 25 core leaders of the
    CDP have been sentenced to long prison terms on subversion or other
    charges. In what some experts have described as an attempt by
    authorities to tarnish the public image of the democracy movement,
    during the year Chinese officials accused a number of democracy
    activists of soliciting prostitutes, distributing pornographic videos,
    petty theft, or other crimes unrelated to their political activities.
    On January 3 in Changsha, Tong Shidong, and Liao Shihua were sentenced
    to 10 and 6 years in prison, respectively, on charges of subversion.
    Both were members of the CDP; Tong, a professor, was accused of
    founding a branch of the CDP at Hunan University. In February CDP
    cofounder Xu Wenli's assistant, Liu Shizun, was sentenced to 6 years
    for subversion. Also in February, the second highest ranking member of
    the Shanghai branch of the CDP, Dai Xuezhong (who was arrested in
    January), was sentenced to 3 years in prison for allegedly hiring three
    persons to commit an assault with a knife. During the trial, Dai was
    not allowed to testify in his own defense. In August Dai's brother was
    sentenced to 3 years' reeducation-through-labor after he publicly
    protested Dai Xuezhong's sentence. In April a court in Hangzhou
    sentenced CDP activist Zhu Zhengming to 10 years in prison for
    subversion. In July after a 90 minute trial, Chen Zhonghe, founder of
    the Hubei branch of the CDP, and Xiao Shichang were sentenced to 7
    years and 5+ years in prison respectively on subversion charges. In
    early July, Liu Xianbin, a leading member of the CDP, was arrested in
    Beijing. In late September, Nie Minzhi, an elderly CDP member from
    Zhejiang Province, was reportedly detained and sentenced
    administratively to 1 year in a reeducation-through-labor camp. In
    early December, CDP activists Wang Zechen and Wang Wenjiang reportedly
    were sentenced in Anshan to 6 years and 4 years in prison,
    respectively, on charges of subverting state power. The two were
    arrested in June 1999 and tried in November.
        During the year, the authorities also used laws on subversion,
    endangering state security, and common crimes to arrest and imprison a
    wide range of political dissidents, activists, and others; some were
    affiliated with the CDP. Shanghai dissidents Li Guotao, Cai Guihua, Yao
    Zhenxiang, Fu Shenping, and Dai Xuewu were taken into custody on many
    occasions throughout the year. Prior to the June 4 anniversary of the
    Tiananmen Square massacre, Li Guotao was rearrested in Shanghai and
    charged with spreading reactionary publications, instigating
    disturbances, and disturbing the social order (apparently in connection
    with a letter he and others sent to the Mayor of Shanghai, protesting
    the arrest of dissident Dai Xuewu and requesting his release); on June
    28 he was sentenced to 3 years' reeducation-through-labor for demanding
    the release of CDP members. Dai Xuewu, the brother of imprisoned
    dissident Dai Xuezhong, also was arrested in Shanghai prior to the June
    4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre and charged with the
    theft of a cell phone; in August he was sentenced without a trial to 3
    years of reeducation-through-labor. Prior to the June 4 anniversary of
    the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, police in some cities also took
    steps to prevent planned commemorations. In Shanghai police reportedly
    detained five leading activists from May 31 to June 5, including Cai
    Guihua, Li Guotao, Dai Xuewu, and Fu Shenping. The police reportedly
    beat and roughed up Cai Guihua on May 31 and June 3. In Xian police
    reportedly harassed dissidents planning to commemorate the June 4
    anniversary and detained two persons. Press reports stated that police
    in Beijing also detained three democracy activists and a Protestant
    activist on June 4. On June 4, graduate student Jiang Xulin reportedly
    was arrested after putting up a poster on the campus of Beijing
    University that urged an investigation into the Tiananmen Square
    massacre and asked that political prisoners be released and victims'
    families be compensated. Also on June 4, police arrested Shen Zhidao, a
    supporter of the CDP, in Tiananmen Square while he attempted to
    commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He unfurled several
    banners bearing slogans in the Square prior to being arrested. In
    August Chinese police in Jiangsu arrested Shen Chang, the leader of a
    qigong group, and charged him with organizing gatherings aimed at
    disturbing social order and tax evasion (see Section 2.c.). In
    September a court in Hebei sentenced the cofounder of the environmental
    NGO China Development Union, Qi Yanchen, to 4 years in prison for
    subversion for writing that China would have to introduce political
    reform in order to avoid widespread social unrest. The article at issue
    appeared in the prodemocracy e-mail newsletter VIP Reference (see
    Sections 1.f. and 2.a.). However, in January Song Yongyi, a visiting
    librarian and academic researcher from Dickinson College, whom
    authorities detained in August 1999 and charged with ``the purchase and
    illegal provision of intelligence to persons outside China,'' was
    released from prison and allowed to return to his home overseas in
    January (See Section 2.a.).
        Other dissidents also were detained, for varying periods, during
    the year. From January 12 to January 14, police detained and questioned
    dissident Yao Zhenxiang in Shanghai; he was not charged. According to
    press reports, on January 23 and 24, police detained Yao and several
    other dissidents (including Li Guotao, Wang Jianhua, Cai Guihua, and
    Zhou Qibing) to prevent them from attending another dissident's trial.
        In early April, a crackdown on dissidents in Shanghai began. As of
    early October, authorities imprisoned the following Shanghai dissidents
    (some more than once before being sentenced to longer terms): Dai
    Xuezhong (scheduled for release in 2002); Yao Zhenxiang (scheduled for
    release in 2002); Dai Xuewu (scheduled for release in 2003); and Li
    Guotao (scheduled for release in 2003).
        Police sometimes detained relatives of dissidents (see Section
    1.f.).
        Persons critical of official corruption or malfeasance also
    frequently were threatened, detained, or imprisoned. Ma Wenlin, a 58-
    year-old lawyer in Shaanxi who had organized 5,000 peasants to urge
    authorities to reduce taxes and to punish village cadres who were
    guilty of beating villagers, remained in prison on charges of
    disrupting social order; a court sentenced him to 5 years in prison in
    November 1999. In March a court sentenced Ma Zhe, a poet and advocate
    for artistic freedom, to 5 years' imprisonment for attempting to
    overthrow Communist Party power. In April a court sentenced An Jun,
    organizer of an independent NGO critical of official corruption, to 4
    years' imprisonment for subversion.
        Minority activists continued to be targets of the police. In March
    a court sentenced Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer to 8 years in
    prison for passing ``state intelligence'' information to foreigners.
    The ``state intelligence'' she was accused of attempting to pass
    consisted of newspaper articles published in the official press and a
    list of individuals whose cases had been handled by judicial organs.
    Police arrested Kadeer, her son, and her secretary while they were on
    their way to meet a visiting foreign delegation in August 1999.
    Authorities administratively sentenced Kadeer's son and secretary to 2-
    and 3-year terms respectively, in November 1999. In November they
    denied Kadeer's appeal (see Section 5).
        Local authorities used the Government's anticult campaign to detain
    and arrest large numbers of religious practitioners (see Section 2.c.);
    house church groups in the northeast reported more detentions and
    arrests than in recent years. For example, in August police arrested
    130 members of a house church in Fangcheng, Henan Province, after they
    met with 3 foreign members of a Protestant fellowship. According to
    reports, 85 church members were charged with ``using an illegal cult to
    obstruct justice.''
        Journalists also were detained or threatened during the year, often
    for reporting on subjects that met with the Government's or the local
    authorities' disapproval (see Section 2.a.). In July Zhuhai police
    arrested five journalists, including two from Hong Kong and two from
    Macau, who were attempting to report on peasant protests against a land
    redevelopment scheme. In August local police arrested Ma Xiaoming, a
    Shaanxi television station reporter who had reported on a case
    involving 12,000 peasants who brought a lawsuit against their township
    government. Ma was arrested to prevent him from meeting with a foreign
    newspaper reporter.
        During the year, there were press reports about a woman who was
    detained by Guangzhou police in June 1999 on the specious grounds of
    lacking identity documents and sent to a psychiatric hospital, where
    she was repeatedly raped by male patients before her release about 24
    hours later. At her insistence, police investigated the rapes, but
    vital evidence was destroyed prior to the investigation and only one of
    the accused had been tried. The woman's attempt to win damages has been
    rejected by one court (see Section 1.c.).
        The State Compensation Law provides a legal basis for citizens to
    recover damages for illegal detentions. Although many citizens remain
    unaware of this 1995 law, there is evidence that it is having a
    growing, if still limited, impact. Throughout the year, the official
    press published numerous articles to raise public awareness of recent
    laws meant to enhance the protection of citizens' rights, including the
    Criminal Procedure Law, the State Compensation Law, the Administrative
    Procedure Law, and others. Many citizens have used the State
    Compensation Law during the year to sue for damages.
        There were no reports that the Government forcibly exiled citizens;
    however, the Government continued to refuse reentry to the country to
    citizens who were dissidents and activists. The Government's refusal to
    permit some former reeducation-through-labor camp inmates to return to
    their homes constitutes a form of internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that the
    courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power
    independently; however, in practice the judiciary is subject to policy
    guidance from both the Government and the Communist Party, whose
    leaders use a variety of means to direct courts on verdicts and
    sentences in politically sensitive cases. At both the central and local
    levels, the Government and particularly the CCP frequently interfere in
    the findings of the judicial system and dictate court decisions.
    Corruption and conflicts of interest also affect judicial
    decisionmaking. Judges are appointed by the people's congresses at the
    corresponding level of the judicial structure, which can result in
    local politicians exerting undue influence over the judges they
    appoint. During a 1998 conference at a Beijing university, according to
    informed sources, one expert estimated that more than 70 percent of
    commercial cases in lower courts were decided according to the wishes
    of local officials rather than the law. State-run media have published
    numerous articles calling for an end to such ``local protectionism''
    and for the development of a judiciary independent of interference by
    officials.
        The Supreme People's Court (SPC) stands at the apex of the court
    system, followed in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and
    basic people's courts. There are special courts for handling military,
    maritime, and railway transport cases.
        Corruption and inefficiency in the judicial system are endemic. The
    Government continued a self-proclaimed ``unprecedented internal
    shakeup'' of the judiciary, designed to combat corruption and improve
    efficiency, which began in 1998. In February the SPC issued new
    regulations tightening conflict of interest guidelines for judges.
    Judges who violate prohibitions against accepting money or other gifts
    from litigants or who privately meet with litigants may be found guilty
    of malpractice under the new regulations. Other regulations banned
    former judges from trying cases in their old courtrooms. Likewise the
    Procuratorate announced 10 new rules designed to minimize corruption in
    and to foster cost-consciousness among the procuratorates. The
    Procuratorate also announced it would select candidates for some 7,200
    vacancies through a system of national examinations. In August the SPC
    announced it would open 12 leading prosecutorial posts for competition.
    In an attempt to reduce pretrial corruption, early in the year Beijing
    courts set up a new office to handle pretrial procedures previously
    handled by judges. Under the new system, parties would have more
    difficulty influencing judges because they would no longer have advance
    notice of who the judge in the case would be. The SPC also implemented
    a self-examination and responsibility system to hold presidents of
    higher people's courts responsible for the actions of their
    subordinates. In 1999 authorities sanctioned 10 presidents of higher
    people's courts for acts of corruption by their subordinates. During
    the year, 1,450 court employees were punished for misconduct. In 1999,
    according to the SPC, 15,748 government officials and businesspersons
    were sentenced for corruption. Two officials at the ministerial level,
    65 at the prefecture or department level, and 367 persons holding posts
    at the county or division level also were sentenced for corruption. The
    Procurator General told the National People's Congress in March that,
    although procurator abuses were down 60.2 percent in 1999, 544
    procuratorial officials were disciplined, and 55 were convicted on
    criminal charges.
        Corruption among the police also is a problem. One overseas human
    rights group reported in 1999 that there had been some 9,000 reported
    cases of mishandling of justice discovered in 1998 and that 1,200
    police officers had been charged with criminal offenses. Authorities
    continued a nationwide crackdown on police corruption and abuses.
    Government statistics released in 1999 showed that in 1998 corruption
    prosecutions increased 10 percent, to over 40,000 investigations and
    26,000 indictments of officials. In late 1999, National People's
    Congress (NPC) Standing Committee Chairman Li Peng issued a warning on
    police corruption. Several high-ranking Party officials also were
    prosecuted on corruption charges during the year.
        The Government also took steps to correct systemic weaknesses in
    the judicial system and to make it more transparent and accountable to
    public scrutiny. The law requires that all trials be held in public;
    however, in practice, many trials are not. In 1999 the Supreme People's
    Court issued regulations requiring all trials to be open to the public,
    except for those involving state secrets, personal privacy, or minors;
    divorce cases in which both parties request a closed trial; and cases
    involving commercial secrets. Several courts reportedly opened their
    proceedings to the public. Under the new regulations, ``foreigners with
    valid identification'' are to be allowed the same access to trials as
    citizens. However, requests by at least one foreign mission to send an
    observer to politically sensitive trials consistently have been ignored
    by the Government. Moreover none of the numerous trials involving
    political dissidents were open to the general public. The legal
    exception for cases involving state secrets, privacy, and minors has
    been used to keep such proceedings closed to the public and closed even
    to family members in some sensitive cases (see Section 1.d.).
        However, since 1998 many trials have been broadcast, and court
    proceedings have become a regular television feature. In July courts in
    Shanghai become the first to publish verdicts on the Internet.
    According to official statistics, the courts nationwide heard 539,000
    criminal cases in 1999, an increase of 12.27 percent over 1998, and
    sentenced more than 600,000 offenders, up 14.02 percent from 1999. The
    Supreme People's Court released statistics showing that courts at all
    levels acquitted 5,878 defendants in 1999 due either to lack of
    evidence or to a conclusion that the charges filed did not amount to a
    crime.
        The first Lawyers' Law, designed to professionalize the legal
    profession, took effect in 1996. Subsequently the Ministry of Justice
    drafted relevant regulations to standardize professional performance,
    lawyer-client relations, and the administration of lawyers and law
    firms. The regulations also granted lawyers formal permission to
    establish law firms, set educational requirements for legal
    practitioners, encouraged free legal services for the general public,
    and provided for the disciplining of lawyers. Government officials
    state that there are insufficient lawyers to meet the country's growing
    needs. In March 1999 Justice Minister Gao Changli stated that the
    country had over 110,000 lawyers. According to official reports, there
    were some 9,000 law offices as of 1999. The Justice Ministry set a
    target of 150,000 lawyers, 30,000 notaries, and 40,000 grassroots legal
    service centers by 2000. According to the All-China Lawyers
    Association, the country fell short of that goal. Notaries have much
    more power than their counterparts in the West, and Justice Ministry
    officials announced in September that the country would change its
    system of notaries within 10 years so that notaries would no longer be
    Government employees, would have to have a bachelor's degree, and would
    be required to take 40 hours of professional training each year.
        Lawyers are organizing private law firms that are self-regulating
    and do not have their personnel or budgets determined directly by the
    State. More than 60 legal aid organizations (many of which handle both
    criminal and civil cases, including those stemming from disputes over
    compensation to workers) have been established around the country, and
    the Ministry of Justice has established a nationwide legal services hot
    line. Beijing and other city police departments have set up hot lines
    for citizens to complain about police misconduct. In March Beijing
    authorities claimed that their hot line received nearly 120 calls per
    day. However, neither prosecutors nor judges are required to have law
    degrees or legal experience, and qualification standards traditionally
    have been low. Only 9 percent of judges had received higher education,
    and many are not well versed in the law. During the year, the
    authorities undertook additional efforts to improve the training and
    professionalism of judges and lawyers. After July 1, in a effort to
    distance judges from prosecutors, judges in Beijing shed their military
    style uniforms, including epaulets and caps, in favor of robes or
    suits. The National People's Congress also approved separate draft
    amendments to the 1995 laws on judges and prosecutors in July. One
    amendment requires judicial or prosecutorial appointees to be law
    school graduates who have practiced law for at least 2 years, or
    postgraduates who have practiced law for at least 1 year. Another
    required heads of courts and procuratorates, members of judicial
    committees of courts and procuratorates, and heads of judicial panels
    to have passed relevant examinations.
        Police and prosecutorial officials often ignore the due process
    provisions of the law and of the Constitution. For example, police and
    prosecutors can subject prisoners to severe psychological pressure to
    confess, and coerced confessions frequently are introduced as evidence.
    In March the top prosecutor, Procurator General Han Zhubin, admitted
    that abuses such as using torture to extort confessions, extorting
    favors from suspects, and nepotism remained serious problems. In May
    1998 he also acknowledged that some prosecutors used interrogation
    rooms like ``prison cells'' to hold suspects beyond the legal detention
    period. In 1999 Han's office received 812,821 complaints; 342,017 were
    related to prosecutors. The Criminal Procedure Law forbids the use of
    torture to obtain confessions, but one weakness of the law is that it
    does not expressly bar the introduction of coerced confessions as
    evidence. For example, Zhuo Xiaojun is being held in Fuzhou; after a
    confession extracted under torture and a prolonged trial with many
    irregularities, he was sentenced to death for two murders committed 10
    years ago. Traditionally defendants who failed to show the correct
    attitude by confessing their crimes received harsher sentences. The
    conviction rate in criminal cases is over 90 percent, and trials
    generally are little more than sentencing hearings. In practice
    criminal defendants only are assigned an attorney once a case has been
    brought to court; some observers have noted that at this point, it is
    too late for an attorney to assist a client in a meaningful way, since
    the verdict often has been decided already. The best that a defense
    attorney generally can do for a client is to get a sentence mitigated.
    In most politically sensitive trials, the courts handed down guilty
    verdicts immediately following proceedings that rarely lasted more than
    several hours. There is an appeals process, but appeals rarely reverse
    verdicts.
        The revised Criminal Procedure Law was designed to address many of
    these deficiencies and give defense lawyers a greater ability to argue
    their clients' cases. It abolishes a form of pretrial detention called
    ``shelter and investigation,'' puts limits on nonjudicial
    determinations of guilt, and establishes a more transparent,
    adversarial trial process. It also provides for earlier and greater
    access for defendants to legal counsel and the abolition of a
    regulation that allowed summary trials in certain cases involving the
    death penalty. The amended law gives most suspects the right to seek
    legal counsel shortly after their initial detention and interrogation.
    However, police often use loopholes in the law to circumvent a
    defendant's right to seek counsel, and political activists in
    particular still have significant problems obtaining competent legal
    representation of their own choosing. In some cases, defendants and
    lawyers in politically sensitive cases reportedly have not been allowed
    to speak during trials. The amended Criminal Procedure law still falls
    short of international standards in many respects. For example, it has
    insufficient safeguards against the use of evidence gathered through
    illegal means such as torture. Its appeals process fails to provide
    sufficient avenue for review, and there are inadequate remedies for
    violations of defendants' rights. Despite the abolition of shelter and
    investigation, in some cases police still unilaterally can detain a
    person for up to 37 days before releasing him or formally placing him
    under arrest. Once a suspect is arrested, the revised law allows police
    and prosecutors to detain him for months before trial while a case is
    being ``further investigated.'' Few suspects are released on bail
    pending trial. Also, in ``state secrets'' cases, the revised Criminal
    Procedure Law authorizes officials to deny suspects access to a lawyer
    while their cases are being investigated. The definition of state
    secrets is broad and vague, and subject to independent interpretation
    by police, prosecutors, and judges, throughout the different stages in
    a criminal case. Uncertainty regarding the scope and application of
    this statute has created concern about a detainee's right to legal
    assistance.
        The new Criminal Procedure Law also does not address certain
    shortcomings in the legal system. Under the law, there is no right to
    remain silent, no right against double jeopardy, and no law of
    evidence. The mechanism that allows defendants to confront their
    accusers is inadequate; according to one expert, only 1 percent to 5
    percent of trials involve witnesses.
        While the new Criminal Procedure Law represents some improvement
    over past practice, despite its flaws, anecdotal evidence indicates
    that its implementation remains uneven and far from complete,
    especially in politically sensitive cases. Differing interpretations of
    the law taken by different judicial and police departments have
    contributed to contradictory and incomplete implementation. The Supreme
    People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of
    Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of
    Justice, and the Legal Work Committee of the National People's Congress
    in 1998 issued supplementary implementing regulations to address some
    of these weaknesses. During the year, the Government continued its
    efforts to educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and especially the
    public on the provisions of this and other new laws. In 1999 the
    Ministry of Justice announced that 500,000 ministry officials would
    undergo training over the next 3 years as part of ``a massive effort to
    improve the quality of all judicial workers in the country.'' Also in
    1999, the President of the Supreme People's Court announced that all
    senior judges in the nation's courts would attend training courses
    within the next 3 years, with an emphasis on new laws and regulations.
        Trials continue to be conducted in secret. In July 1999, Wang
    Yingzheng, a 19-year-old activist in Jiangsu Province, was tried in
    secret for writing an article criticizing official corruption. Wang's
    family was not notified of the trial until several weeks afterward. In
    June 1999 labor activist He Chaohui also was tried in a closed
    courtroom in Hunan. According to Amnesty International, two sisters who
    owned a bookstore were sentenced to prison terms in January for
    distributing Falun Gong literature. The sisters reportedly were
    arrested in July 1999, held incommunicado for 3 months, and tried in
    secret (see Section 2.c.).
        Defendants frequently have found it difficult to find an attorney
    willing to handle sensitive political cases. Government-employed
    lawyers still depend on official work units for employment, housing,
    and other benefits, and therefore many may be reluctant to represent
    politically sensitive defendants. In January 1999 dissident Wang Ce was
    tried and defended himself, reportedly because lawyers recommended by
    the court refused to take his case. In February he was sentenced to 4
    years in prison. In December 1998, authorities blocked attempts by
    prominent dissidents Wang Youcai and Qin Yongmin to hire lawyers of
    their own choosing. There were no new reports of the Government
    revoking the licenses of lawyers representing political defendants, as
    it sometimes has done in the past. However, Liu Jian, a criminal
    defense attorney, reportedly was detained in July 1998 after most of
    the witnesses he had called refused to testify at the trial of a local
    official charged with taking bribes; Liu was charged with ``illegally
    obtaining evidence'' and was detained for 5 months. Liu reportedly was
    held incommunicado for 10 days and was beaten and tortured in detention
    in an effort to force a confession. He eventually pled guilty in
    exchange for a light sentence, but his criminal record prevents him
    from practicing law.
        Lawyers who try to defend their clients aggressively continue to
    have problems with police and prosecutors, leading to complaints and
    threats of harassment by law enforcement officials. Lawyers'
    professional associations have called for better protection of lawyers
    and their legitimate role in the adversarial process.
        The lack of due process is particularly egregious in death penalty
    cases. There are 65 capital offenses in the law. They include financial
    crimes such as counterfeiting currency, embezzlement, and corruption.
    During the year, several mid- or high level officials were sentenced to
    death for embezzlement or corruption; one, Hu Changqing, vice governor
    of Jiangxi Province, was executed in February. The trial of 11
    officials in the Xiamen corruption scandal was conducted in secret.
    Seven of the officials were sentenced to death, and four were sentenced
    to life in prison. Persons may be sentenced to death for other property
    crimes as well; among those reportedly executed during the year was a
    man from Yunnan Province, convicted of setting a forest fire. A higher
    court nominally reviews all death sentences, but the time between
    arrest and execution is sometimes days or less, and reviews
    consistently result in the confirmation of sentences. Minors and
    pregnant women are expressly exempt from the death sentence, and only
    those theft cases involving banks or museums warrant capital
    punishment. Amnesty International (AI), in a report issued in January
    1999, said the group independently recorded 2,701 persons sentenced to
    death in 1998, with 1,769 executions confirmed. AI stated that its
    figure for executions was based on public reports and represented only
    a fraction of death sentences and executions. AI believes that actual
    figures were higher because not all death penalties or executions are
    reported, and the authorities can manipulate such information. The
    number of executions that were reported in the Xinjiang Uighur
    Autonomous Region was particularly high; according to AI, scores of
    Uighurs, many of whom were reportedly political prisoners, were
    sentenced to death and executed in Xinjiang since 1997. The Government
    regards the number of death sentences it carries out as a state secret.
    However, in March the President of the SPC told the NPC that, in 1999,
    the Court had heard 5,768 appeals, including appeals to death
    sentences, an increase of 23.43 percent over 1998. The Central
    Commission of Political Science and Law announced on October 16 that
    515 persons were executed nationwide between early September and
    October 15.
        Persons can also receive long prison sentences for financial crimes
    after very short trials; according to a press report, on May 30,
    businessman Mou Qizhong was sentenced to life in prison for foreign
    exchange fraud after a 1day trial in November 1999.
        The shortcomings of the justice system have begun to spur public
    debate among lawyers, law professors, and jurists, and some have
    continued to press for legal reform. During the year, scholars wrote
    numerous articles focused on the absence of legal provisions
    specifically guaranteeing a suspect's right to remain silent as one of
    the main reasons for legal abuses. Under the law, a suspect has the
    duty to ``answer truthfully,'' whether or not the answer is self-
    incriminatory. One article explained that under existing laws, suspects
    are often coerced into ``truthfully'' admitting their guilt, resulting
    in forced confessions becoming more common. Some legal experts called
    for a system of supervision during investigations, including the right
    to have a lawyer present during interrogation, as the only way to
    protect suspects from torture and forced confessions. Others called for
    the creation of new regulations setting out the right of the accused to
    remain silent and a system of accountability for judicial personnel.
    Major newspapers and legal journals throughout the year called for the
    introduction of a British or American system of discovery, the
    abolition of coerced confessions, a legal presumption of innocence, an
    independent judiciary, and improved administrative laws giving citizens
    more recourse against the Government. In April the Beijing newspaper
    Legal Daily published an article on torture that concluded the practice
    was due to police officials not having adequate legal or human rights
    training and holding antiquated ideas about a presumption of guilt. In
    July Shanghai lawyers publicly called for the establishment of the
    right of the accused to remain silent in a criminal investigation.
        There are signs that citizens are beginning to use the court system
    and the new legal remedies available to them to protect their rights
    and seek redress for a variety of government abuses; a growing number
    are using legal recourse against government malfeasance. The Beijing
    Higher People's Court released statistics in April stating that when
    citizens sued the Government, citizen plaintiffs won in 23 percent of
    cases (832 of 3,632) from 1990-1999. In addition a large percentage of
    such cases are settled out of court. The term ``administrative
    omission'' refers to cases in which government organizations do not
    respond or delay response to applications lodged by citizens. According
    to statistics by the SPC, the number of administrative omission
    lawsuits filed by individuals against Government organizations
    increased by 7.6 times between 1990 and 1998. However, while some
    plaintiffs have successfully filed suit against the Government,
    decisions of any kind in favor of dissidents remain rare. In particular
    appeals of prison sentences by dissidents rarely are granted. In 1999
    appeals by Lin Hai, Lai Jingbao, and Fang Jue all were denied.
        In recent years, credible reports have alleged that organs from
    some executed prisoners were removed, sold, and transplanted. Officials
    have confirmed that executed prisoners are among the sources of organs
    for transplants but maintain that consent is required from prisoners or
    their relatives before organs are removed. There is no national law
    governing organ donations, but a Ministry of Health directive
    explicitly states that buying and selling human organs and tissues is
    not allowed. The courts traditionally issue several death sentences
    before the annual lunar New Year holiday and other holidays. According
    to Hong Kong press reports, these executions have increased the demand
    for organs from executed prisoners. More than 40 wealthy individuals in
    need of transplants reportedly traveled to a hospital in Guangzhou and
    paid up to $300,000 (RMB 2.5 million) each for livers harvested from
    executed criminals. There are no reliable statistics on how many organ
    transplants occur each year using organs from executed prisoners, but,
    according to press reports, hundreds of persons from other Asian
    countries who are unable to obtain transplants at home travel to the
    country each year for organ transplants. Recipients report paying
    various amounts for the transplants, and some have reported that
    treatment may be terminated or delayed for a lack of funds or a delay
    in payment.
        Government officials deny holding any political prisoners,
    asserting that authorities detain persons not for their political or
    religious views, but because they violate the law. However, the
    authorities continued to confine citizens for political and religious
    reasons. It is estimated that thousands of political prisoners remain
    incarcerated, some in prisons and others in labor camps.
        The 1997 amended Criminal Code replaced ``counterrevolutionary''
    offenses, which often, in the past, had been used against the
    Government's political opponents, with loosely defined provisions
    barring ``crimes endangering state security.'' At year's end, there
    were as many as 1,000 individuals in prisons serving sentences for
    ``counterrevolution'' crimes. Persons detained for such offenses
    included Hu Shigen, Kang Yuchun, Yu Zhijian, Yang Lianzi, Zhang
    Jingsheng (released in June), and Sun Xiongying. Several foreign
    governments urged the Government to review the cases of those charged
    with counterrevolution, since the crime was no longer on the books, and
    release those who had been jailed for nonviolent offenses under the old
    statute. Officials have indicated that a case-by-case review of appeals
    filed by individual prisoners is possible under the law, and there is
    one known case of a successful appeal. However, the Government
    indicated that it would neither initiate a broad review of cases nor
    grant a general amnesty, arguing that ``crimes'' covered by the Law on
    Counterrevolution still are considered crimes under the State Security
    Law. According to the Government, 600 persons were imprisoned under the
    State Security Law in 1998-99. Those charged with counterrevolutionary
    crimes continue to serve their sentences.
        The authorities sentence persons administratively without trial to
    terms of 1 to 3 years in reeducation-through-labor camps. According to
    international press reports, some 230,000 persons are serving sentences
    in reeducation-through-labor camps. By one estimate, 1.7 million
    persons per year may also be detained under custody and repatriation or
    similar regulations, which allow ``undesirable'' persons in urban areas
    to be detained administratively or returned to their registered place
    of residence (see Section 1.d.). Defendants legally are entitled to
    challenge reeducationthrough-labor sentences under the Administrative
    Litigation Law. Persons can gain a reduction in, or suspension of,
    their sentences after appeal, but appeals usually are not successful
    because of problems such as short appeal times and inadequate legal
    counsel that weaken the effectiveness of the law in preventing or
    reversing arbitrary decisions.
        Amnesty International has identified 211 cases of persons who
    remain imprisoned or on medical parole for activities related to the
    1989 Tiananmen protests alone; other NGO's estimate as many as 2,000
    persons remain in prison for their actions at that time.
        The Government released some political prisoners early. Software
    businessman Lin Hai, jailed for Internet subversion, was released in
    September 1999; June 4 activist Chen Lantao was paroled 7 years early
    in April; Zhao Fengping also was released in April; Tiananmen Square
    activist Liu Wensheng was released from a prison in northern Gansu in
    August; and Yu Zhijian, who defaced the portrait of Mao Zedong in
    Tiananmen Square during the 1989 student protests, was released in
    September; Cai Guihua was released in January, detained several times
    during the year, and paroled in December; and Xu Guoxing was released
    during the year. Yue Dongyue, who also defaced Mao's portrait, had his
    sentence reduced during the year from 20 years to 18 years. However,
    many others, including Chadrel Rinpoche, Fan Zhongliang, Han Chunsheng,
    Li Bifeng, Jigme Sangpo, Ngawang Choephel, Ngawang Sangdrol, Qin
    Yongmin, Shen Liangqing, Zha Jianguo, Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli, Xu Yongze,
    Yang Qinheng, Zhang Lin, Zhang Shanguang, Zhao Changqing, and Zhou
    Yongjun remained imprisoned or under other forms of detention during
    the year. Political prisoners generally benefit from parole and
    sentence reduction at significantly lower rates than ordinary
    prisoners. In addition authorities summarily tried and sentenced
    political dissidents to long prison terms.
        Criminal punishments can include ``deprivation of political
    rights'' for a fixed period after release from prison, during which the
    individual is denied rights of free speech and association. Former
    prisoners also can find their status in society, ability to find
    employment, freedom to travel, and access to residence permits and
    social services severely restricted. Economic reforms and social
    changes have ameliorated these problems for nonpolitical prisoners in
    recent years. However, former political prisoners and their families
    still frequently are subjected to police surveillance, telephone
    wiretaps, searches, and other forms of harassment, especially when
    prominent foreigners visit the country. They also may encounter
    difficulty in obtaining or keeping employment and housing (see Section
    1.f. and 2.d.).
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home,
    Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the ``freedom and privacy
    of correspondence of citizens are protected by law.'' Despite legal
    protections, authorities often do not respect the privacy of citizens
    in practice. Although the law requires warrants before law enforcement
    officials can search premises, this provision frequently has been
    ignored; moreover, the Public Security Bureau and the procuratorate can
    issue search warrants on their own authority. Authorities often monitor
    telephone conversations, fax transmissions, e-mail, and Internet
    communications of citizens, foreign visitors, businessmen, diplomats,
    and journalists, as well as dissidents, activists, and others. The
    security services routinely monitor and enter the residences and
    offices of foreigners and persons dealing with foreigners to gain
    access to computers, telephones, and fax machines. All major hotels
    have a sizable internal security presence. Authorities also open and
    censor domestic and international mail. Han Chunsheng, a Voice of
    America (VOA) listener who allegedly sent over 20 letters critical of
    the Government to a VOA mailbox, remains in prison on an 8-year
    sentence for counterrevolutionary incitement and propaganda. Government
    security organs monitor and sometimes restrict contact between
    foreigners and citizens.
        In urban areas, many persons still depend on government-linked work
    units for housing, healthcare, permission to have a child, approval to
    apply for a passport, and other aspects of ordinary life. However, the
    work unit and the neighborhood committee, which originally were charged
    with monitoring activities and attitudes, have become less important as
    means of social or political control; government interference in daily
    personal and family life continues to decline for the average citizen.
    A growing number of residents in cities are buying their own
    apartments, further weakening the work unit. In some cities, the system
    of government-linked housing is being rapidly dismantled.
        Some dissidents are under heavy surveillance and routinely have
    their telephone calls with foreign journalists and diplomats monitored.
    The authorities blocked some dissidents from meeting with foreigners,
    particularly during politically sensitive periods. On April 1, the
    Government prevented Ding Zilin, an organizer of relatives of victims
    of the Tiananmen massacre, from meeting with the widow of noted author
    Edgar Snow after learning that Mrs. Snow wished to donate money to Ding
    Zilin's organization. Ding was also prevented from leaving her home to
    meet Mrs. Snow; on April 2, security agents filmed Mrs. Snow's visit to
    her husband's tomb nearby. On April 3, Su Bingxian, an elderly
    intermediary who had agreed to convey Mrs. Snow's donation to Ding
    Zilin, was detained outside of Ding's apartment and held for 1 day. In
    June the authorities also reportedly surrounded Ding Zilin's apartment
    on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre to prevent persons
    from joining her to commemorate it. Police ordered the sister of one
    jailed dissident not to meet with a foreign diplomat on the eve of a
    high level foreign official's visit to China. Although the authorities
    released Bao Tong, a former Zhao Ziyang aide in 1997, they continue to
    monitor his activities closely with constant surveillance, at times
    preventing him from meeting with others and interfering with his
    telephone service. Officials threatened Bao when he questioned
    Communist Party policy or complained about invasions of his personal
    freedom. Other dissidents also have reported harassment by the
    authorities. Dissidents in Shanghai have been warned not to meet with
    certain persons, talk to reporters, or write or fax articles. Such
    harassment appears to be common among Tiananmen-era activists.
    Authorities also harassed and monitored the activities of relatives of
    dissidents. For example, security personnel keep close watch on
    relatives of prominent dissidents, particularly during sensitive
    periods. Dissidents and their family members routinely are warned not
    to speak with the foreign press. Security personnel followed Wei
    Xiaotao, the brother of Wei Jingsheng, to meetings with Western
    reporters and diplomats on numerous occasions.
        Government harassment prevents Tiananmen Square massacre-era
    activist Tang Yuanjun and other present and former dissidents and their
    relatives from obtaining and keeping steady employment. The Government
    continued to freeze bank accounts kept by Ding Zilin containing funds
    to help the families of Tiananmen massacre victims, an action
    criticized by dissidents within the country and human rights
    organizations abroad. In January officials detained Lu Wenhe, who had
    traveled from abroad carrying $25,000 (RMB 200,000) intended for Ding
    Zilin's fund, for 3 days and confiscated the money. By year's end, the
    money had not been returned. In July 1999, public security officials
    forced Li Ling, another activist, to withdraw $25,000 (RMB 200,000)
    from a bank account in her name that had been sent to her from abroad;
    the money, which was intended to help victims of the Tiananmen Square
    massacre and their families, was confiscated. The money had not been
    returned by year's end. Police sometimes detained the relatives of
    dissidents (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
        There is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs and
    major state projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam and environmental/
    reforestation projects, include forced relocation of persons.
        The authorities continue to systematically jam VOA radio
    broadcasts, but the effectiveness of this interference varies
    considerably by region, with audible signals of the VOA and other
    short-wave broadcasters reaching most parts of the country (see Section
    2.a.). Government jamming of Radio Free Asia (RFA) appears to be more
    effective (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government continued to encourage the expansion of the
    Internet; however, it also increased monitoring of the Internet during
    the year and placed restrictions on information available on the
    Internet. The Government introduced new regulations during the year
    that restricted citizens' right to privacy on the Internet, and
    monitored e-mail transmissions. Other regulations, which came into
    effect in 1997, provide for fines and other unspecified punishments to
    deal with violators. Internet control regulations are reissued
    occasionally. Enforcement generally drops off after a few months. The
    latest iteration of Internet regulations, issued on October 1,
    continues to prohibit a broad range of activities that can be
    interpreted as subversion or slandering the state (see Section 2.a.).
    During the year, the Government attempted to block e-mail from overseas
    Internet service providers used by dissident groups. There have been
    reports that the Government is attempting to develop an e-mail
    filtration system to block antigovernment e-mail messages from entering
    the country. The Government also blocked access to politically
    sensitive web sites at various times (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government continued to implement comprehensive and often
    intrusive family planning policies. The State Family Planning
    Commission (SFPC) formulates and implements policies with assistance
    from the Family Planning Association, which has 83 million members in
    1.02 million branches nationwide. Officials have predicted that the
    population will reach almost 1.6 billion in the year 2030 if current
    birth rates continue. Most demographers estimate fertility at 2.0 to
    2.3 births per woman (although the official figure is 1.8), indicating
    that the ``one-child policy'' is not applied uniformly to couples. A
    strict one-child policy applies in the cities but not in the
    countryside, where 70 percent of citizens live. According to one senior
    family planning official, only 60 million of the country's 300 million
    children under age 14 are from single-child families. Couples in urban
    areas are affected most by family planning guidelines, seldom receiving
    permission to have more than one child, although urban couples who
    themselves were only children may have two children. In general
    economic development and other factors such as small houses and high
    education expenses have reached a level where couples in major urban
    centers often voluntarily limit their families to one child. There were
    reports that, due to the success of the one-child policy in urban
    areas, the Government was beginning to relax its policies in the
    cities. In May 1999, the official press reported that although couples
    in Beijing were still limited to one child, effective October 1, 1999,
    they would no longer be required to obtain a family planning
    certificate before having their child. At year's end, the effect of
    this change was unknown. Such policies reportedly also have been
    adopted in some other areas. In Shanghai, Zhejiang Province, and parts
    of Guizhou Province, couples who met certain criteria were reportedly
    allowed to have a child without government permission. It is illegal
    for unmarried women to bear children, and unmarried women cannot get
    permission to have a child. In order to delay childbearing, the
    Marriage Law sets the minimum age at marriage for women at 20 years,
    and for men at 22 years; marrying 2 or more years later is encouraged.
        Outside the cities, exceptions to the ``one-child policy'' are
    becoming the norm. The average number of children per family in rural
    areas is slightly over two. Although rules can vary somewhat by
    Province, in rural areas, couples generally are allowed to have a
    second child if the first is a girl, an exception that takes into
    account both the demands of farm labor and the traditional preference
    for boys. Families whose first child is disabled also are allowed to
    have another child. Ethnic minorities, such as Muslim Uighurs and
    Tibetans, are subject to less stringent population controls. Minorities
    in some rural areas are permitted to have as many as four children, but
    authorities increasingly are pressuring minorities to limit births. AI
    reports that, while members of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang are
    allowed to have 2 children in urban areas and 3 in rural areas, there
    has in fact been pressure for them to have only one. In remote areas,
    such as rural Tibet, there are no effective limits, but Tibetan
    government employees and Party members are encouraged to have only one
    child.
        Population control policy relies on education, propaganda, and
    economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures, including
    psychological pressure and economic penalties. For example, all workers
    at a factory or other work unit might lose a bonus if one worker has a
    child without permission. The national family planning policy is
    implemented through provincial and local regulations. According to
    local regulations in at least one province, women who do not qualify
    for a Family Planning Certificate that allows them to have a child must
    use an intrauterine device (IUD) or implant. The regulations further
    require that women who use an IUD undergo quarterly exams to ensure
    that it remains properly in place. If a couple has two children, those
    regulations require that either the man or woman undergo sterilization.
    According to a credible report, the number of couples undergoing
    sterilization procedures after giving birth to two children increased
    significantly in at least one inland Province. Rewards for couples who
    adhere to family planning policies include monthly stipends and
    preferential medical and educational benefits. Disciplinary measures
    against those who violate policies can include fines (sometimes called
    a ``fee for unplanned birth'' or a ``social compensation fee''),
    withholding of social services, higher tuition costs when the child
    goes to school, demotion, and other administrative punishments that
    sometimes result in loss of employment. Fines for giving birth without
    authorization vary, but they can be a formidable disincentive.
    According to the State Family Planning Commission (SFPC) 1996 Family
    Planning Manual, over 24 million fines were assessed between 1985 and
    1993 for children born outside family planning rules. In Quanzhou,
    Fujian Province, the fine for violating birth quotas is three times a
    couple's annual salary, to be paid over a 12 to 13 year period. In
    Shanghai the fine is also three times the combined annual salary of the
    parents. In Zhejiang Province, violators are assessed a fine of 20
    percent of the parents' salary paid over 5 years. According to Guizhou
    provincial family planning regulations published in July 1998, families
    who exceed birth quotas are to be fined two to five times the per
    capita annual income of residents of their local area. The regulations
    also stipulate that government employees in Guizhou who have too many
    children face the loss of their jobs. In many provinces, penalties for
    excess births in an area also can be levied against local officials and
    the mother's work unit, thus creating multiple sources of pressure. In
    Guizhou, for example, regulations state that officials in an area in
    which birth targets are not met cannot be promoted in that year. Unpaid
    fines sometimes have resulted in confiscation or destruction of homes
    and personal property by local authorities. In June 1999 Anhui Province
    promulgated amended family planning rules that stated that each couple
    ``is encouraged'' to have only one child, that second births are
    ``strictly controlled,'' and that ``unplanned births are forbidden.''
    Women of childbearing age are required periodically to undergo
    pregnancy tests, and couples are required to ``practice effective
    contraceptive measures.'' Couples already having a child are required
    to adopt long-term birth control measures. In the cases of families
    that already have two children, one of the parents ``is encouraged to
    undergo sterilization.'' In addition the rules state that ``unplanned
    pregnancies must be aborted immediately.''
        However, over the past few years, authorities have initiated
    experiments to relax family planning targets in several counties. The
    integration of family planning with poverty alleviation and education
    efforts is one sign of this trend. Experimental relaxed targets in Yi
    Chun County, Shanxi Province, Chude in Hubei Province, and Longshen in
    the Gaunxi Autonomous Region have met and sometimes exceeded the
    official target and also have produced a more normal sex ratio at birth
    than in other areas. In Yicheng County, couples who have observed the
    rule of not marrying early and waiting 3 years to have their first
    child are permitted to have a second child after age 30. According to a
    foreign press report, over the past few years more than 600 counties
    covering about half the country's population have adopted more liberal
    policies in seeking to maintain low birth rates; Zhejiang Province
    reportedly has abandoned ``birth quotas'' of county-by-county
    permissible births each year, and other countries have set up
    ``whispering rooms'' in family planning offices where women can talk
    privately with doctors about their birth control options. Other
    jurisdictions, such as Minglan village in Yandu County, have reportedly
    followed the earlier example of Beijing and other cities, abolishing
    birth permits and allowing couples to decide on their own when to have
    a baby. Beijing reportedly encourages local officials to initiate and
    fund their own projects on family planning.
        Penalties for family planning violators, including high fines, have
    led to widespread underreporting of rural births, making population
    statistics unreliable. By some estimates, official statistics may
    underreport the annual number of births by as much as 25 percent. Local
    officials, caught between pressures from superiors to show declining
    birth rates and from local citizens to allow them to have more than one
    child, frequently make false reports. For example, in July the Yunnan
    Ribao reported a local doctor in Xuanwei falsely had reported 700
    births of twins in order to account for families having multiple
    children. In April the government-sponsored Chinese Academy of Social
    Sciences issued a book showing discrepancies in birth figures.
    According to that book, in 1998 the State Statistics Bureau reported
    19.91 million births in China, while the State Family Planning Agency
    maintained there were only 13.83 million births, a difference of more
    than 30 percent.
        Central government policy formally prohibits the use of force to
    compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization; however, intense
    pressure to meet family planning targets set by the Government has
    resulted in documented instances in which family planning officials
    have used coercion, including forced abortion and sterilization, to
    meet government goals. During an unauthorized pregnancy, a woman often
    is paid multiple visits by family planning workers and pressured to
    terminate the pregnancy. According to a senior family planning
    official, 10 million persons are sterilized each year and not all
    voluntarily. In 1998 a former Fujian Province local family planning
    official stated that local authorities in a Fujian town systematically
    used coercive measures such as forced abortion and sterilization,
    detention, and the destruction of property to enforce birth quotas.
    After the Fujian allegations were made public, the SFPC sent a team led
    by a senior official to investigate the charges. In a meeting with
    foreign diplomats, the senior official did not deny that abuses may
    have occurred but insisted that coercion was not the norm, nor
    government policy, nor sanctioned by central authorities in Beijing.
    There were reports that, after the central government's investigation,
    local officials in Fujian scaled back the intensity of their family
    planning enforcement efforts. Senior officials repeatedly have said
    that the Government ``made it a principle to ban coercion at any
    level.'' They acknowledge that problems persist and insist on the
    Government's determination to address such problems. The SFPC has
    issued circulars nationwide prohibiting family planning officials from
    coercing women to undergo abortions or sterilization against their
    will. Under the State Compensation Law, citizens also can sue officials
    who exceed their authority in implementing family planning policy, and
    in a few instances, individuals have exercised this right.
        Corruption related to family planning fines is a widespread
    problem. In 1999 the press reported that one city in Henan Province had
    punished 879 Party members and government officials for corruption in
    family planning.
        In late 1998, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) on an
    experimental basis launched a 4-year pilot project in 32 counties to
    address family planning and reproductive health issues solely through
    the use of voluntary measures, emphasizing education, improved
    reproductive health services, and economic development. The SFPC worked
    closely with the UNFPA to prepare informational materials and to
    provide training for officials and the general public in the project
    counties. Although it was still too early for an overall assessment of
    this program, visits to selected counties by foreign diplomats indicate
    that progress in implementing the program has been mixed. Some counties
    have made appreciable progress in implementing the program, while
    others have made relatively little. Notably, some counties have
    informed the general public about the UNFPA program and have eliminated
    the system of strict, government-assigned birth quotas (allowing
    couples to choose without authorization when to have their first
    child); other counties have not yet done so, or have only begun to do
    so. In Sichuan Province a couple can legally have a second child
    without applying for permission if they meet all the requirements;
    however, regulations and implementation vary from town to town. The
    Government has welcomed foreign delegations to inspect the UNFPA
    project counties. Although access to these areas has varied from
    province to province, foreign diplomats visited several counties during
    the year.
        Regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex
    of the fetus, but because of the traditional preference for male
    children, particularly in rural areas, many families have used
    ultrasound to identify female fetuses and terminate pregnancies. The
    use of ultrasound for this purpose is prohibited specifically by the
    Maternal and Child Health Care Law, which came into effect in 1995 and
    mandates punishment of medical practitioners who violate the provision.
    According to the SFPC, a handful of doctors have been charged under
    this law. Government statistics put the national ratio of male to
    female births at 114 to 100; the World Health Organization estimates
    the ratio to be 117 to 100. The statistical norm is 106 male births to
    100 female births. These skewed statistics reflect both the
    underreporting of female births so that parents can keep trying to
    conceive a boy, and the abuse of sonograms leading to the termination
    of pregnancies based on the sex of the fetus. Female infanticide,
    abandonment, or the neglect of baby girls that results in lower female
    survival rates are also factors (see Section 5). The staterun media is
    paying increasing attention to unbalanced birth ratios, and the
    societal problems, such as trafficking in women, which they cause (see
    Section 6.f.). In the cities, the traditional preference for sons is
    changing; in the rural areas the practice continues. In July the
    Liaoshen Evening News reported that in a township of Liaoyang County,
    Liaoning Province, the male to female sex ratio was 306/100 for second
    children born between 1992 and 1999. After operating for 7 years, an
    illegal sex determination clinic was exposed when an outraged citizen
    called the Liaoyang City mayor's hot line.
        There reportedly have been instances in which pregnant prisoners in
    reeducationthroughlabor camps were forced to submit to abortions (see
    Section 1.c.).
        The Maternal and Child Health Care Law requires premarital and
    prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute
    infectious diseases or certain mental illnesses (not including mental
    retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating genetic
    diseases. The Ministry of Health implements the law, which recommends
    abortion or sterilization in some cases, based on medical advice. The
    law also provides for obtaining a second opinion and states that
    patients or their guardians must give written consent for such
    procedures (see Section 5). At least five provincial governments have
    implemented local regulations seeking to prevent persons with severe
    mental disabilities from having children. In August 1998 the Government
    issued an ``explanation'' to provincial governments clarifying that no
    sterilization of persons with genetic conditions could be performed
    without their signed consent.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution states that
    freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights to be enjoyed
    by all citizens; however, the Government restricts these rights in
    practice. During the year, the Government maintained tight restrictions
    on freedom of speech and of the press. The Government interprets the
    Communist Party's ``leading role,'' as mandated in the preamble to the
    Constitution, as circumscribing these rights. The Government does not
    permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticisms of senior leaders or
    opinions that directly challenge Communist Party rule. The Party and
    Government continue to control many--and, on occasion, all--print and
    broadcast media tightly and use them to propagate the current
    ideological line. According to official statistics, in 1998 the country
    had 2,053 newspapers, and 7,999 magazines and trade publications. It
    also published 7.24 billion copies of books representing 7,999 titles.
    All media employees are under explicit, public orders to follow CCP
    directives, and ``guide public opinion,'' as directed by political
    authorities. Both formal and informal guidelines continue to require
    journalists to avoid coverage of many politically sensitive topics. The
    State Security Law forbids journalists from divulging ``state
    secrets.'' These public orders, guidelines, and statutes greatly
    restrict the freedom of broadcast journalists and newspapers to report
    the news and lead to a high degree of self-censorship.
        The Government's harsh propaganda campaign against the Falun Gong,
    begun in 1999, continued and intensified during the year. There were
    also smaller propaganda campaigns against superstition.
        The Government strictly regulates the establishment and management
    of publications. As in previous years, the Government continued to
    close down publications and punish journalists for printing material
    deemed too sensitive. Newspaper editors may be suspended and sent to
    the Propaganda Bureau for ``rectification,'' after which they can
    generally return to work in the publishing industry. With the
    Government's consent and even open support, the press continued to
    publish stories related to citizen's rights, legal reform, official
    corruption, and official misconduct and gross abuses, particularly by
    law enforcement officials. However, newspapers cannot report on
    corruption without government and Party approval, and publishers
    published such material at their own risk. Senior officials issued a
    new call for tighter controls on the media and related fields in the
    period preceding the country's entry into the World Trade Organization.
    According to Western press reports, in August Jiang Zemin, at the
    annual leaders conference in Beidaihe, reportedly indicated that more
    media organizations, including web sites, would be asked to undergo
    government-controlled mergers in order to ensure control by Party and
    government censors. Jiang indicated the existing ban on new permits for
    magazines and publishing houses would stay in place and that
    authorities would place tighter controls on freelance contributors to
    newspapers, magazines, and web sites, as well as freelance production
    houses for television units. At year's end, it was not clear that such
    policies had been effectively implemented.
        Journalists were harassed, detained, and threatened during the
    year, often for reporting on subjects that met with the Government's or
    local authorities' disapproval, including corruption. In January the
    editor in chief of Southern Weekend, a newspaper known for its daring
    investigative reporting and critical editorials, was reassigned by
    Communist Party officials. After his departure, the newspaper's content
    reportedly became less critical of the Government than it had been
    previously. In March the government newspaper Weekly was shut down by
    the authorities after it published sensitive information regarding
    military strategy against Taiwan. In September Qi Yanchen was convicted
    in Hebei of subversion for writing an article for the prodemocracy e-
    mail newsletter VIP Reference. In July Zhuhai police arrested five
    journalists, including two from Hong Kong and two from Macau, who were
    attempting to cover peasant protests against a land redevelopment
    scheme. In August local police arrested Ma Xiaoming, a Shaanxi
    television station reporter who had reported on a case involving 12,000
    peasants who brought a lawsuit against their township government. Ma
    was arrested to prevent him from meeting with a foreign newspaper
    reporter. On August 11, poet and editor of the literary journal
    Tendency, Huang Beiling (also known by his pen name of Bei Ling), was
    arrested in Beijing and charged with illegal publishing. Authorities
    also seized several hundred copies of the most recent edition of
    Tendency, which the authorities stated has ``political problems.''
    Huang's brother and sometime partner in Tendency, Huang Feng, was
    detained on August 18, possibly in connection with his efforts to
    obtain his brother's release. Huang Beiling was released on August 25,
    and returned to his home abroad. According to the local press, in
    November several persons accused of printing and distributing Falun
    Gong literature were arrested in Chaoyan, Liaoning Province.
        In January, according to one report, the Government announced that
    it had closed down 27 newspapers, some for violations of press
    regulations or printing fabricated or sensational stories. In June
    authorities reportedly issued a new directive that required the media
    to uphold the party line and in July demoted or fired about 12 editors
    of publishing houses for ignoring the directive.
        In April 1999, journalist Gao Qinrong reportedly was sentenced to
    13 years in prison after writing a story that appeared in 1998 on
    corruption in connection with the construction of an irrigation system
    in Shanxi Province.
        The publishing industry consists of three kinds of book businesses:
    about 500 government-sanctioned publishing houses, smaller independent
    publishers that cooperate with official publishing houses to put out
    more daring publications, and an underground press. The 500 government-
    approved publishing houses are the only organizations legally permitted
    to print books. The Government exerts control by issuing a limited
    number of publishing licenses, which are required for each edition of a
    book. A Party member at each publishing house monitors the content of
    the house's publications and uses the allocation of promotions, cars,
    travel, and other perks to encourage editors to exercise ``proper''
    judgment about publications. Overt intervention by the State
    Publications Administration and Party Propaganda Bureau is strictly
    post-publication. Independent publishers take advantage of a loophole
    in the law to sign contracts with Government publishing houses to
    publish politically sensitive works. These works generally are not
    subjected to the same multilayered review process as official
    publications of the publishing houses.
        Underground printing houses, which are growing in number, publish
    the books that are the most popular with the public. These underground
    printing houses are the main targets of a campaign initiated at the end
    of 1998 to stop all illegal publications (including pornography and
    pirated computer software and audiovisual products), which has had the
    effect of restricting the availability of politically sensitive books.
    Many street vendors who sell sensitive works apparently have a tacit
    understanding with the authorities that they will look the other way
    when the vendors sell other illegal (i.e. pornographic or pirated)
    publications if the vendors do not sell politically sensitive books.
    Many pirated works are printed by police- or militaryaffiliated
    organizations, which often are not targeted for investigation. While
    government efforts have made it somewhat more difficult to find these
    books, they still are available. Pirated software, music compact discs,
    and video compact discs also are available widely and openly.
        In January Li Zhe and Wang Huimin, two distribution managers at
    Beijing's wholesale book market, were arrested for editing and
    publishing a book which exposed official corruption. In June the
    Beijing Publishing Group announced its decision to cancel its plans to
    publish of novel ``Waiting,'' by Ha Jin, a Chinese author living
    abroad. The book, which won foreign literary awards, was criticized
    publicly by a Beijing university professor as unpatriotic and for
    casting the country and its citizens in a bad light. Poet Bei Ling and
    Director of the PEN American Center Michael Roberts claim that there
    has been a tightening of the publishing rules during the year, that 15
    publishing houses were closed and that a popular sexually explicit book
    was banned.
        In early August, customs officials seized thousands of copies of a
    book being manufactured in the country by a foreign publishing company
    for publication abroad. The book contained photographs of world
    leaders, including the Dalai Lama. The Government claimed that its ban
    on politically sensitive works extended to items bound for export. Soon
    after this incident, 10,000 copies of a book of Tibetan art, published
    by the same foreign publisher for publication abroad, were seized as
    well. In early September, the books with the offending photograph of
    the Dalai Lama were released.
        Some dissidents continued to speak out despite the Government's
    restrictions on freedom of speech. In late March, just prior to the
    annual meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, former
    CCP member Bao Tong issued a letter criticizing the country's human
    rights policies. Prior to the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen
    Square massacre, Li Guotao was rearrested in Shanghai and charged with
    spreading reactionary publications, instigating disturbances, and
    disturbing the social order (apparently in connection with a letter he
    and others sent to the mayor of Shanghai protesting the arrest of
    dissident Dai Xuewu and requesting his release). On June 28 he was
    sentenced to 3 years' reeducation-through-labor for demanding the
    release of CDP members.
        Several groups actively commemorated the June 4 anniversary of the
    Tiananmen massacre. On May 29, nine dissidents in Liaoning jointly
    wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin, urging the authorities to reverse the
    verdict on the June 4 incident. On May 31, a group of 108 surviving
    victims and family members of victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre
    released a letter through a human rights organization based outside of
    the country that demanded that Li Peng be prosecuted for his actions in
    relation to the massacre. According to the Information Center for Human
    Rights and Democracy, on June 1, Liu Xiaobo appealed for the release of
    political prisoners and apologies to the families of the victims of the
    Tiananmen Square massacre. On June 4, 50 dissidents in Chongqing,
    Henan, and Hebei staged a 24hour hunger strike to commemorate the
    massacre. In an open letter to Jiang Zemin, Tiananmen massacre victims'
    family rights activist Ding Zilin requested the return of funds
    earmarked for her group that were seized by police in January. However,
    the Government continued to threaten, arrest and imprison persons
    expressing their freedom of speech and press. In January 20-year old
    democracy activist Wang Yingzheng was found guilty of attempting to
    overthrow state power and sentenced to 4 years in prison for writing an
    open letter to Jiang Zemin denouncing corruption in China's ruling
    class. Also in January, Wang Hansheng and his wife, Xu Xianglan, were
    sentenced to 6 and 8 years in prison respectively for printing Falun
    Gong books and posters. In his March letter, Bao Tong noted heavy
    surveillance and interference with his privacy as a result of his
    continued activism (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.); he also noted that his
    freedom of speech has been threatened by the authorities. Police
    sometimes detained relatives of dissidents (see Section 1.f.). In May
    ads and other programs featuring the popular Taiwanese singer Ah Mei
    (Chang Huei-Mei) were banned, after she sang at the inauguration of the
    new Taiwanese President, Chen Shui-Bian. In July government film
    censors blacklisted popular actor-director Jian Wen because his Cannes
    Film Festival award winning film ``Demons at the Doorstep'' was judged
    to be unpatriotic in its depiction of the Japanese occupation. In
    October Beijing authorities criticized the award of the Nobel Prize for
    Literature to Gao Xingjian, an exile who is a French citizen and gave
    no indication they would lift a ban on his works.
        The Government kept tight control over the foreign press during the
    year and continued efforts to prevent foreign media ``interference'' in
    internal affairs. The authorities continued to jam, with varying
    degrees of success, Chinese- and Tibetanlanguage broadcasts of the
    Voice of America and Radio Free Asia (RFA). English-language broadcasts
    on VOA generally are not jammed, unless they immediately follow
    Chinese-language broadcasts, in which case portions of English-language
    broadcasts may be jammed. In the absence of an independent press,
    overseas broadcasts such as VOA, BBC, RFA, and Radio France
    International have a large audience, including activists, ordinary
    citizens, and even government officials. In May 1999 the press reported
    that Shanghai authorities had issued a notice that restricted pager
    services and Internet service providers, among others, from
    transmitting ``political information'' or information that could harm
    social stability.
        There are no privately owned television or radio stations, and all
    programming must be approved by the Government. Commercial program
    producers are seeking to expand the limits of broadcast content.
        Despite tighter government control of the press, information about
    the nation and the world continued to flow into the country at an
    increasing rate. Residents in Guangdong and other southern Provinces
    have wide access to Hong Kong television programs and newspapers.
    Throughout the country, a lively tabloid sector is flourishing. Radio
    talk shows remain popular, and, while avoiding the most politically
    sensitive subjects, they provide opportunities for citizens to air
    grievances about public issues. Despite licensing requirements and
    other restrictions, a small but rapidly growing segment of the
    population has access to the Internet. Most of the population has the
    means to own and use short-wave radios. The Government does not place
    restrictions on their use.
        During the year, the Government continued to encourage expansion of
    the Internet and other communications infrastructure and put more
    official information online, and the number of sites increased from 25
    to 2,400; however, the Government increased monitoring of the Internet
    during the year and placed restrictions on information available on the
    Internet. Internet use is expanding exponentially, creating a
    potentially powerful channel of information to the computer literate.
    It is estimated that nearly 15 million persons were connected to the
    Internet as of year's end, but estimates vary, with some considerably
    higher. However, increasing regulations, controls, and restrictions on
    the Internet by the Government during the year has led to self-
    censorship, and had a chilling effect. In recent months a number of
    prodemocracy web sites were closed, Internet cafes were shut down, and
    web site operators were arrested. However, the number of web sites and
    Internet cafes grew dramatically during the year, and on some bulletin
    boards and web sites, frank discussions of the need for political
    reform took place.
        In early January, press reports stated that authorities in Shanghai
    ordered corporate Internet users to register with the police ``to
    strengthen the protection and safety of computers and information.'' On
    January 26, the Government issued the Computer Information Systems
    Internet Secrecy Administrative Regulations, which criminalized the
    posting and dissemination of ``state secrets'' on the Internet.
    However, the definition of ``state secrets'' remains vague. The new
    regulations also stated that operators of Internet chat rooms could be
    held liable for their content, and that web sites are required to
    submit to examination and approval by government secrecy offices. A
    November press report indicated that separate regulations on allowable
    content for Internet bulletin boards and chat rooms were also
    published. Another press report noted that additional regulations on
    bulletin boards were published on December 5.
        Internet control regulations are reissued occasionally. Enforcement
    of such regulations generally wanes after a few months. Regulations
    issued on October 1 continued to prohibit a broad range of activities
    that could be interpreted as subversion or as slandering the state.
    There is no effective enforcement of 1997 State Council regulations
    requiring those involved in international networking to apply for
    licenses and provide details regarding the scope and nature of their
    activities. The State Council also promulgated a comprehensive list of
    prohibited Internet activities, including using the Internet to
    ``incite the overthrow of the Government or the Socialist system'' and
    ``incite division of the country, harming national unification.'' The
    regulations, which came into effect in December 1997, provide for fines
    and other unspecified punishments to deal with violators.
        On September 26, new regulations on Measures for Managing Internet
    Content Provision were passed. The new regulations seem to be a
    codification of existing regulations and govern who can own Internet
    businesses, what can be published on the Internet, and who has
    oversight over Internet businesses; they also require all Internet
    content providers to be licensed and give such businesses 60 days to
    provide information about the businesses to the Ministry of Information
    Industry to obtain licenses. The regulations reportedly require
    Internet content providers to keep files of what they post and who
    reads it for 60 days, and ban subversive information (including
    endangering state secrets or national security), information that
    advocates cults and superstition, that is harmful to the country's
    reputation, or that is harmful to reunification efforts. The
    regulations also reportedly included requirements that Internet service
    providers ``record the times that users log on to the Internet, users'
    account numbers, Internet addresses or domain names, and the telephone
    numbers dial in from'' and defined illegal content to include news or
    information that is harmful to the country's reputation, disrupts
    social stability, disrupts efforts at reunification, or that advocates
    cults and superstition. Some observers view the new regulations at
    least in part as an attempt to shift the burden of policing the
    Internet to the Internet service providers rather than the authorities.
        The Government has specially trained police units to monitor and
    increase control of Internet content and access. In July the state
    press announced the establishment of an Internet police force in
    central Anhui Province, stating that similar police forces would be
    established in 20 other provinces. According to various sources, such
    Internet police forces were set up in 20 provinces. During 1999 central
    authorities and public security police in 16 provinces began work on
    strengthening the administration of Internet cafes, which had been
    required to register in 1999. Internet cafes also are required to
    curtail access to information on the Internet that is prohibited by law
    or regulation, and to monitor and report on customers who use the
    terminals. There are frequent reports of raids and crackdowns on
    Internet cafes; according to press reports, during 1 week in early
    February, 127 unregistered Internet cafes were shut down in Shanghai.
        In 1999 one human rights group reported a national police directive
    ordering special police units to monitor Internet bulletin boards for
    ``reactionary'' notices. According to the directive, if such a posting
    were discovered, police were to contact the bulletin board service to
    seek assistance in tracing the message. Bulletin boards that did not
    stop such ``seditious'' messages from being posted would be shut down.
    A spokesman for the Government denied the existence of any such
    directive. However, some bulletin boards were shut down in 1999.
    Content on some bulletin boards has been removed, sometimes on a daily
    basis. In May 1999 the press reported that Shanghai authorities issued
    a notice that restricted pager services and Internet access providers,
    among others, from transmitting ``political information'' or
    information that could harm social stability. In October 1999, the
    Government issued State Council Order Number 273, which required firms
    using encryption products or equipment with encryption technology to
    register with the Government by January 31, 2000. The order provided
    that after the initial registration, firms using encryption technology
    would be required to provide the names, phone numbers, and e-mail
    addresses of all persons using such technology. In addition the order
    limited the import or sale of foreign encryption technology. At year's
    end, these regulations had not been enforced. In 1999 the Government
    announced the creation of a new committee charged with ``protecting
    government and commercial confidential files on the Internet,
    identifying net users, and defining rights and responsibilities;''
    however, there was no evidence that action was taken by this committee
    during the year.
        The authorities also arrested dissidents for information
    disseminated through the Internet. In August authorities shut down the
    New Culture Forum, a prodemocracy web site, and sought Xin Wenming, the
    site's webmaster. Also in August, authorities moved against the
    nation's largest online bookstore, Jinqi Xishu, as well, for allegedly
    selling publications through ``improper channels.'' Also in August,
    police in Nanchong arrested an Internet cafe owner for publishing
    ``counterrevolutionary'' articles on public bulletin boards. In
    September the cofounder of the environmental NGO China Development
    Union, Qi Yanchen, was sentenced in Hebei to a 4 years in prison for
    subversion for writing that China would have to introduce political
    reform in order to avoid widespread social unrest. The article at issue
    appeared in the prodemocracy e-mail newsletter VIP Reference. As with
    similar crackdowns against prodemocracy or religious dissidents,
    authorities frequently charge persons who maintain Internet sites with
    social crimes. For example, Huang Qi, founder of the prodemocracy web
    site New Culture Forumin Sichuan Province, was arrested immediately
    before the June 4 commemoration of the Tiananmen massacre for posting
    information about the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. He was charged
    with operating an unregistered Internet site and spreading pornography.
    In August Huang's web site reportedly was closed down. Shanghai writer
    and Revival Movement activist Wang Yiliang was sentenced to 2 years'
    reeducation through labor for allegedly downloading pictures of nude
    women.
        Authorities have at various times blocked politically ``sensitive''
    web sites, including those of dissident groups and some major foreign
    news organizations, such as the Voice Of America (VOA), the Washington
    Post, the New York Times, and the British Broadcasting Corporation
    (BBC). On June 4, the web site of the South China Morning Post was
    blocked temporarily. Also on June 4, police reportedly cut the
    telephone line of dissident Ding Zilin, to prevent her from
    participating in an Internet telecast to Hong Kong commemorating the
    June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. The Government
    specifically targeted web pages run by Falun Gong followers as part of
    its crackdown against the group. Nonetheless a number of human rights
    web pages continue to be accessible. The Government's efforts to block
    content and control usage have had only limited success because
    sophisticated users can bypass site blocking, and, more importantly,
    the number of Internet sites providing outside information and news
    grew so rapidly. Moreover censorship of the Internet appears to be
    applied inconsistently, although some Internet service providers
    practice self-censorship to avoid running afoul of very broadly worded
    regulations.
        By year's end, the Government had not promulgated any regulations
    governing news provided by Internet content providers. However, the
    Propaganda Department issued warnings to some providers who carry
    foreign media reports. One representative of a Western Internet content
    provider operating in the country stated that, while his organization
    will not completely stop using foreign media reports, it will focus on
    international and entertainment news when relaying foreign media
    reports, rather than on domestic affairs. However, web sites are
    restricted in their ability to post foreign news stories. In October
    1999 new rules restricted Chinese news sites from creating links to
    foreign news sites. The links disappeared temporarily but were back in
    December 1999. During the year, such links sometimes were blocked and
    sometimes were available. In January the Government issued regulations
    requiring any commercial web site with a cyber news service to first
    get approval from the Information Office before being allowed to apply
    for a business license. According to official media reports, the China
    Finance Information Network, a web site based in Wuhan, was fined and
    temporarily closed in May for carrying a report that authorities
    claimed was false. The story, regarding corruption on the part of the
    vice governor of Hubei Province, was from The Sun, a Hong-Kong based
    newspaper. On November 7, regulations were published that require web
    sites to use news from state controlled media, to obtain approval
    before posting news from foreign news sources, and to follow strict
    editorial conditions before generating their own news items. Other
    regulations were set up punishing persons who store, process, or
    retrieve information deemed to be ``state secrets'' from international
    computer networks. The regulations require any company or individual
    running a chat room, news group, or electronic bulletin board to get
    approval from the State Bureau of Secrecy. In spite of new regulations,
    dissident groups, including Falun Gong, increasingly used sophisticated
    methods to bypass Internet site blocks and to publish online magazines
    posing as bulk e-mail. News articles from foreign Chinese-language
    newspapers such as Singapore's United Morning News often are carried on
    web sites, and hundreds of newspapers have web sites.
        E-mail and e-mail publications are more difficult to block,
    although the Government attempts to do so, at times, by blocking e-mail
    from all overseas Internet service providers used by dissident groups.
    There have been reports that the Government is trying to develop an e-
    mail filtration system to block antigovernment messages from entering
    the country; a project on such a system at Shenzhen University in
    Guangdong reportedly is sponsored by the Ministry of Education. Human
    Rights Watch reported that in May 1999 the Ministry of Labor and Social
    Security (MOLSS) installed monitoring devices at the facilities of
    Internet service providers that can track individual e-mail accounts.
    The authorities also target some e-mail users and read their e-mail.
    According to a press report, police have installed monitoring equipment
    on the servers of the country's major Internet service providers.
    However, activists use a wide range of antifiltering countermeasures.
    Dissident groups abroad use e-mail to send publications and disseminate
    information to readers in China, and a small but growing number of
    activists within the country communicate this way as well. Email to
    certain addresses overseas is blocked but the blocking is easily
    overcome by sophisticated Internet users. Dissident electronic journals
    and web sites from overseas also use various measures to avoid
    blocking. Citizens who supply large numbers of e-mail addresses to
    organizations abroad have been prosecuted. The authorities generally do
    not prosecute citizens who receive dissident e-mail publications, but
    forwarding such messages to others is illegal. When a dissident is
    harassed or detained, activists using e-mail, faxes, telephones, and
    pagers can spread the word quickly to colleagues around the country and
    to the international community.
        Despite the restrictions on the Internet, and the fact that direct
    attacks on the Government and references to sensitive matters such as
    the Tiananmen massacre and the Government's handling of Falun Gong are
    not allowed, information and discussion on other topics, such as the
    environment and corruption, can be very pointed. Participants in
    Internet forums regularly express politically unacceptable views,
    including contributors to state-run web pages, and those run by the
    People's Daily.
        The Government does not fully respect academic freedom and
    continues to impose ideological controls on political discourse at
    colleges, universities, and research institutes. Scholars and
    researchers report varying degrees of control regarding the issues that
    they may examine and the conclusions that they may draw. Censorship of
    written material comes at the time of publication, or when
    intellectuals and scholars, anticipating that books or papers on
    political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published,
    exercise selfcensorship. In areas such as economic policy or legal
    reform, there generally was greater official tolerance for comment and
    debate; however liberal scholars and intellectuals from many
    disciplines were under greater pressure from the Government during the
    year. Early in the year, Liu Junning was dismissed from the Chinese
    Academy of Social Sciences. Liu and another liberal scholar publicly
    had criticized national leaders or policies. Attacks against Liu and
    another liberal scholar, including a speech by Jiang Zemin, were
    published in government newspapers in early April, and according to
    press reports, publications were prohibited from publishing works of
    some of the scholars. Many other liberal scholars also reportedly were
    criticized by the authorities. Some observers believed that this action
    was meant to send a message to other leading intellectuals as to the
    limits of allowable discourse and would have a chilling effect. There
    have been reports that liberal intellectuals have been more circumspect
    in articulating unorthodox ideas since this incident and have engaged
    in a heightened degree of self-censorship. When Yu Jie, a well-known
    essayist and liberal social commentator, arrived to take up a post at
    the Chinese Modern Language Institute (a branch of the China Writer's
    Association) in the fall, he was told that the offer had been
    rescinded. Yu reportedly has had difficulty recently getting his works
    published, and publishers reportedly have been ordered not to publish
    further editions of his previous works. According to a news report,
    economist and author He Qinglian was forced out of her job as a
    columnist with a paper in Shenzhen because of her pointed comments on
    corruption and inequity in the economy.
        Early in the year, the Government also ordered university groups to
    obtain permission before inviting outside speakers. In March a
    longstanding Chinese language program run by a foreign university was
    required to alter its curriculum to eliminate certain items deemed
    politically sensitive and material that ``portrayed the country in a
    bad light'' as a condition for the program's renewal. On June 4,
    Beijing University student Jiang Xulin was detained for publicly
    displaying an essay urging the Chinese Communist Party to reassess the
    1989 Tiananmen massacre.
        The Government continues to use political attitudes as criteria for
    selecting persons for Government-sponsored study abroad but does not
    impose such restrictions on privately sponsored students (who
    constitute the majority of students who study abroad).
        Researchers residing abroad also have been subject to sanctions
    from the authorities when their work does not meet with official
    approval. On January 29 Song Yongyi, a librarian and academic
    researcher from Dickinson College who had been arrested in August 1999
    and charged with ``the purchase and illegal provision of intelligence
    to persons outside China,'' was released from prison. Song, an expert
    on the Cultural Revolution, had traveled to the country to collect
    materials such as newspaper articles, books, and other publicly
    available information regarding that period, as he had on several
    previous occasions. His detention raised concerns about a possible
    chilling effect on other Chinese researchers, whether resident in the
    country or abroad. There also was concern that collaborative research
    with foreigners may become more difficult. In 1999 Hua Di, a Stanford
    researcher, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for providing missile
    program secrets to persons abroad; his conviction was overturned in
    midMarch (see Section 1.c.). Hua was reconvicted on November 23 and
    sentenced to 10 years in prison.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
    severely restricts this right in practice. The Constitution stipulates
    that such activities may not challenge ``Party leadership'' or infringe
    upon the ``interests of the State.'' Protests against the political
    system or national leaders are prohibited. Authorities deny permits and
    quickly move to suppress demonstrations involving the expression of
    dissenting political views.
        At times police used excessive force against demonstrators.
    Demonstrations with political or social themes often were broken up
    quickly and violently. The number of persons who participate in
    demonstrations is often difficult to verify, and estimates of the
    numbers of participants vary. Hong Kong-based human rights groups
    allege that 1,200 persons were detained between June 18 and June 25
    during protests and public demonstrations by Falun Gong practitioners
    in 9 provinces. Falun Gong attempted to organize gatherings on
    Tiananmen Square throughout the year, especially on special
    anniversaries; such protests were often broken up violently by the
    police and security forces. In July Falun Gong practitioners attempted
    to unfurl banners or shout slogans to mark the first anniversary of the
    banning of Falun Gong. At that time, diplomats and journalists
    witnessed several hundred Falun Gong practitioners being arrested and
    several persons being beaten. Authorities prevented some demonstrations
    with possible political overtones from taking place or dispersed those
    underway, and in at least one city, Shenyang, local government
    officials banned public demonstrations effective July 20, although
    demonstrations continued to take place. In May due to concerns about
    large gatherings taking place around the June 4 anniversary of the
    Tiananmen Square massacre, the authorities banned a planned memorial
    march for a university student who had been raped and killed.
    Authorities also broke up a June 4 gathering of 30 persons at Beijing
    University that was held to commemorate the Tianamen massacre's victims
    and arrested two participants. Other small gatherings of dissidents
    planned on and around the June 4 anniversary were broken up in Beijing
    and Xian (see Section 1.d.).
        In many cases, the authorities dealt with economic demonstrations
    more leniently (see Section 6.a.), but some economic demonstrations
    were also dispersed with the use of force. In February mine workers in
    Liaoning Province clashed with police and military officers for 3 days
    after the closure of a mine was announced; the miners, although given a
    severance package, were owed 18 months' wages (see Section 6.a.). The
    area was briefly placed under martial law. In May up to 2,000 unpaid
    workers reportedly protested at their factory and at local government
    offices in Liaoyang, Liaoning Province; the demonstration was
    eventually forcibly broken up by the police. Dozens were reported
    injured, and three persons were arrested (see Sections 1.c. and 6.a.).
    In June a Hong Kong human rights group reported that in Yantou village,
    Zhejiang Province, 20 residents and 5 policemen were injured when
    police clashed with village residents over plans to demolish 200 homes.
    According to Western press reports, in July 100 villagers were hurt, 40
    policemen were injured, and 1 policemen was killed in clashes between
    security forces and villagers over a water project in drought-stricken
    Anqui City in Shandong. Also in July, there were press reports that
    police beat 5 villagers in Xian protesting against the local
    Government's failure to compensate them for requisitioned land. In
    August credible reports indicated that 1 person was killed and
    approximately 100 were injured as thousands of farmers in Fengcheng
    City, Jiangxi Province, clashed with police in week-long riots sparked
    by anger over high taxes.
        Despite restrictions in Beijing and elsewhere, the number of
    demonstrations nationwide continued to grow. According to a Public
    Security Ministry report, in 1999 more than 100,000 demonstrations took
    place, up from 60,000 in 1998. Demonstrations related to economic
    grievances and official corruption were common, and demonstrations
    related to family planning continued. Some demonstrations included
    thousands of protesters. Authorities handled many protests with
    restraint, especially those concerned with economic issues. According
    to a Hong Kongbased human rights organization, 500 workers in Fuzhou
    demonstrated in July in front of provincial government buildings to
    protest plans to close their factory. Also in July, 200 peasants in
    Yinxi town, Anhui, protested Government orders to tear down their homes
    to build an airfield. In May hundreds of university students in Beijing
    protested Beijing University's handling of the killing of a female
    student.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government restricts this right in practice. Communist Party policy and
    government regulations require that all professional, social, and
    economic organizations officially register with, and be approved by,
    the Government. Ostensibly aimed at restricting secret societies and
    criminal gangs, these regulations also prevent the formation of truly
    autonomous political, human rights, religious, environmental, labor,
    and youth organizations that directly challenge government authority.
    Since November 1999, all concerts, sports events, exercise classes or
    other meetings of more than 200 persons must be approved by Public
    Security authorities. According to Human Rights Watch, in November
    1999, An Jun, an attorney who formed an organization called
    ``Corruption Watch'' to expose local corruption, was put on trial. In
    April he was sentenced to 4 years in prison on charges of inciting the
    overthrow of the Government. An had attempted to register the
    organization legally with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but it was
    banned.
        There are no laws or regulations that specifically govern the
    formation of political parties. The Government moved decisively, using
    detentions and prison terms, to eliminate the CDP, which activists
    around the country had tried since 1998 to organize into the country's
    first opposition political party (see Section 1.d.).
        According to Government statistics, by the end of 1998, there were
    1,500 national-level, quasi-nongovernmental organizations, 165,000
    social organizations, and 700,000 nonprofit organizations registered
    with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Although these organizations all
    came under some degree of government control, they were able to develop
    their own agendas. Many had support from foreign NGO's. Some sought
    advocacy roles in less controversial public interest areas such as
    women's issues, the environment, and consumer rights. In October 1998
    the Government promulgated a revised and more complete set of
    regulations on the registration of NGO's. The new rules require that
    all NGO's reregister under the revised regulations, a process that may
    be used to further restrict the numbers and types of NGO's. Regulations
    stipulate that local-level NGO's must have an official office and at
    least $3,600 (30,000 RMB) in funds. National-level groups must have at
    least $12,000 (100,000 RMB). Applications must be vetted by the
    Government, which has 2 months in which to grant approval. Once
    established, groups are required to submit to regular oversight and
    ``obey the Constitution, laws, and national policies.'' They must not
    ``violate the four cardinal principles, damage national unity, or upset
    ethnic harmony.'' Violators (groups that disobey guidelines or
    unregistered groups that continue to operate) may face administrative
    punishment or criminal charges. It is difficult to estimate how many
    groups may have been discouraged from organizing NGO's due to the new
    regulations. However, preexisting groups report little or no additional
    interference by the Government since the new regulations came into
    effect.
        During the year, poet Ma Zhe was charged with subversion and
    sentenced to 5 years in prison for setting up the ``Cultural Revival
    Movement,'' which advocated the end of Communist Party control over
    artists and their cultural and literary works. In July Kong Youping,
    the would-be founder of the ``China Youth Association,'' was arrested
    and charged with subversion.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religious belief and the freedom not to believe; however, the
    Government seeks to restrict religious practice to government-
    sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship and to
    control the growth and scope of the activity of religious groups. There
    are five officially recognized religions--Buddhism, Taoism, Islam,
    Protestantism, and Catholicism. For each faith, there is a government-
    affiliated association to monitor and supervise its activities.
    Membership in religions is growing rapidly; however, while the
    Government generally does not seek to suppress this growth outright, it
    tries to control and regulate religious groups to prevent the rise of
    groups or sources of authority outside the control of the Government
    and the Chinese Communist Party. The Criminal Law states that
    government officials who deprive citizens of religious freedom may be
    sentenced to up to 2 years in prison in serious cases. However, there
    are no known cases of persons being punished under this statute.
        During the year, the Government's respect for religious freedom
    continued to deteriorate. The Government intensified its harsh
    crackdown against the Falun Gong movement and extended its actions to
    ``cults'' in general. In some regions, the atmosphere created by the
    nationwide campaigns against cults and superstition had spillover
    effects on other unofficial faiths. Various sources report that
    approximately 100 or more Falun Gong adherents died during the year
    while in police custody; many of their bodies reportedly bore signs of
    severe beatings or torture, or were cremated before relatives could
    examine them (see Section 1.c.). A number of qigong (a traditional
    Chinese health regimen with mystical overtones) and Protestant house
    church groups were banned. House church groups in northeastern China
    reported more detentions and arrests than in recent years (see Section
    1.d.), and in some areas officials destroyed hundreds of unregistered
    houses of worship. In many regions with high concentrations of
    Catholics, relations between the Government and the underground church
    loyal to the Vatican remained tense. The situation in Tibet was
    particularly poor, as the Government intensified and expanded its
    ``patriotic education'' campaign aimed at neutralizing lamas, monks,
    and nuns with sympathies to the Dalai Lama (see Tibet addendum).
    Apolitical religious activities that had been tolerated in the past in
    Tibet were more tightly restricted during the year and in some cases
    were not permitted. Regulations restricting Muslims' religious
    activity, teaching, and places of worship continued to be tight in
    Xinjiang, and the Government dealt harshly with Muslim religious
    leaders who engaged in political speech and activities that the
    authorities deemed separatist.
        The state arrogates to itself the right to recognize and thus to
    allow to operate particular religious groups and spiritual movements.
    The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) is responsible for
    monitoring and judging the legitimacy of religious activity. The RAB
    and the Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), both of
    which are staffed by officials rather than religious adherents, provide
    policy ``guidance and supervision'' over implementation of government
    regulations on religious activity, as well as the role of foreigners in
    religious activity. During a 1999 speech, President Jiang Zemin noted
    the Party's policy on freedom of religious belief but also called for
    stronger leadership over religious work and intensified management of
    religious affairs. He added that ``we should energetically give
    guidance to religion so that it will keep in line with the socialist
    society and serve ethnic unity, social stability, and modernization.''
        The Government continued and, in some areas, intensified a national
    campaign to enforce 1994 State Council regulations and subsequent
    provincial regulations that require all places of worship to register
    with government religious affairs bureaus and to come under the
    supervision of official ``patriotic'' religious organizations. The
    Government officially permits only those Christian churches affiliated
    with either the Catholic Patriotic Association/Catholic Bishops
    Conference or the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement/Chinese
    Christian Council to operate openly. There are six requirements for the
    registration and establishment of venues for religious activity:
    Possession of a meeting place; citizens who are religious believers and
    who regularly take part in religious activity; qualified leaders and an
    organized governing board; a minimum number of followers; a set of
    operating rules; and a legal source of income. There are reports that
    despite the rapidly growing religious population, it is difficult for
    new places of worship to be registered even among the five officially
    recognized faiths.
        At the end of 1997, the Government reported that there were more
    than 85,000 approved venues for religious activities. Some groups
    registered voluntarily, some registered under pressure, while
    authorities refused to register others. Unofficial groups claimed that
    authorities often refuse them registration without explanation. The
    Government contends that these refusals were mainly the result of
    inadequate facilities and meeting spaces. Many religious groups have
    been reluctant to comply with the regulations out of principled
    opposition to state control of religion or due to fear of adverse
    consequences if they reveal, as required, the names and addresses of
    church leaders and members. In some areas, efforts to register
    unauthorized groups are carried out by religious leaders and civil
    affairs officials. In other regions, police and RAB officials performed
    registration concurrently with other law enforcement actions. Police
    closed scores of ``underground'' mosques, temples, seminaries, Catholic
    churches, and Protestant ``house churches,'' including many with
    significant memberships, properties, financial resources, and networks.
    Some were destroyed; others were confiscated by authorities for other
    uses. It has been estimated that approximately 450 churches and temples
    were closed, destroyed, or confiscated for other uses during the weeks
    prior to December 25 in Wenzhou, and as many as 1,200 churches and
    temples were closed, destroyed, or confiscated by authorities for other
    uses in surrounding areas of Zhejiang Province during that same time.
    Leaders of unauthorized groups are often the targets of harassment,
    interrogations, detention, and physical abuse.
        In some areas there are reports of harassment of churches by local
    RAB officials which is attributed, at least in part, to financial
    issues. For example, although regulations require local authorities to
    provide land to church groups, some local officials may try to avoid
    doing so by denying registration, thus avoiding the requirement to
    provide land. Official churches also may face harassment if local
    authorities wish to acquire the land on which a church is located. In
    addition to refusing to register churches, there are also reports that
    RAB officials have requested illegal ``donations'' from churches in
    their jurisdictions as a means of raising extra revenue.
        There is significant variation in how the authorities deal with
    unregistered religious groups. In certain regions, Government
    supervision of religious activity is minimal, and in some parts of the
    country, registered and unregistered churches are treated similarly by
    authorities, existing openly side by side. Coexistence and cooperation
    between official and unofficial churches in such areas, both Catholic
    and Protestant, is close enough to blur the line between the two. In
    these areas, many congregants worship in both types of churches.
    However, in some areas relations between the two churches remain
    hostile. In other regions, particularly where considerable unofficial
    and official religious activity takes place, such as in Zhejiang,
    Guangxi, Shanghai, and Chongqing, local regulations call for strict
    government oversight of religion and authorities have cracked down on
    unregistered churches and their members. The relationship between
    unregistered and registered churches can be tense in such areas. During
    the year, some unregistered religious groups were subjected to
    increased restrictions, and, in some cases, intimidation, harassment,
    and detention. Some house church members asserted that authorities
    continued efforts to register house churches and to harass those who
    resist, especially in Henan and Shandong Provinces. Throughout the
    year, the Government moved swiftly against houses of worship outside
    its control that grew too large or espoused beliefs that it considered
    threatening to ``state security.''
        The law does not prohibit religious believers from holding public
    office; however, most influential positions in government are reserved
    for Party members, and Communist Party officials state that Party
    membership and religious belief are incompatible. This has a
    disproportionate effect in such minority-inhabited areas as Xinjiang
    and Tibet. Party membership also is required for almost all high-level
    positions in government and in state-owned businesses and
    organizations. The Communist Party reportedly issued a circular in 1997
    ordering Party members not to adhere to religious beliefs. This
    followed a 1995 document circulated to Party organizations at the
    provincial level ordering the expulsion of Party members who belonged
    to any religious organization, whether open or clandestine. There were
    reports that the Government issued a circular in early 1999 to remind
    Party cadres that religion was incompatible with Party membership, a
    theme reflected in authoritative media. President and CCP General
    Secretary Jiang Zemin stated in a September 1999 speech that ``Party
    members of all ethnic groups must have a firm faith in socialism and
    communism, cannot believe in religion, cannot take part in or organize
    religious activities, and cannot take part in feudal superstitious
    activities.'' On March 11, the Party's flagship newspaper, the People's
    Daily, published a commentary on religious affairs work. The article
    urged all Party members to ``promote atheist thought in a positive way
    and persist in educating the masses of various ethnic groups with the
    Marxist perspective on religion.'' While the commentary also called on
    the Party to protect ``citizens' freedom of religious belief,'' it
    warned that ``hostile forces outside (China's) borders and separatist
    forces are taking advantage of ethnicity and religion to bring about
    political infiltration and the separation of the motherland.'' Muslims
    allegedly have been fired from government posts for praying during
    working hours. The ``Routine Service Regulations'' of the People's
    Liberation Army (PLA) state explicitly that servicemen ``may not take
    part in religious or superstitious activities.'' Party and PLA military
    personnel were expelled for adhering to the Falun Gong movement; there
    is no available information indicating whether Party or PLA military
    personnel were expelled for associating with other religious or
    spiritual/mystical groups. However, according to government officials,
    in certain localities as many as 20 to 25 percent of Communist Party
    officials engage in some kind of religious activity. Most officials who
    practice a religion are Buddhist or practice a folk religion. Religious
    figures, who are not members of the CCP, are included in national and
    local government organizations, usually to represent their constituency
    on cultural and educational matters. The National People's Congress
    includes several religious leaders, including Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai, a
    Tibetan ``living Buddha,'' who is a vice chairman of the Standing
    Committee of the NPC. Religious groups also are represented in the
    Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a forum for
    ``multiparty'' cooperation and consultation led by the Chinese
    Communist Party, which advises the Government on policy.
        The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious
    organizations to maintain international contacts that do not entail
    ``foreign control.'' What constitutes ``control'' is not defined.
    Regulations enacted in 1994 and expanded in September codified many
    existing rules involving foreigners, including a ban on proselytizing
    by foreigners, but for the most part foreign nationals are allowed to
    preach to foreigners, bring in religious materials for personal use,
    and preach to citizens at churches, mosques, and temples at the
    invitation of registered religious organizations. Collective religious
    activities of foreigners also are required to take place at officially
    registered places of worship or approved temporary locations.
    Foreigners are not permitted to conduct missionary activities, but
    foreign Christians teach English and other languages on college
    campuses with minimum interference from authorities as long as their
    proselytizing is low key. There were reports in early 1999 that the
    Government issued a circular to tighten control over foreign missionary
    activity in the country. However, there was no evidence of further
    tightening during the year. On March 25, police raided a house church
    service in Jilin and confiscated the Bible and camera of a foreigner
    who was in attendance. The foreign Christian subsequently was fined,
    and one local official described the house church service as a
    ``heretical religious activity.''
        According to an official government white paper, there are over 200
    million religious adherents, 3,000 religious organizations, 300,000
    clergy, and 74 religious colleges. Official religious organizations
    administer local Bible schools, 54 Catholic and Protestant seminaries,
    9 institutes to train imams and Islamic scholars, and institutes to
    train Buddhist monks. Students who attend these institutes must
    demonstrate ``political reliability,'' and all graduates must pass an
    examination on their theological and political knowledge to qualify for
    the clergy. The Government permitted limited numbers of Catholic and
    Protestant seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go
    abroad for additional religious studies. In most cases, funding for
    these training programs is provided by foreign organizations. Both
    official and unofficial Christian churches have problems training
    adequate numbers of clergy to meet the needs of their growing
    congregations. However, due to government prohibitions, unofficial
    churches have particularly significant problems training clergy or
    sending students to study overseas, and many clergy receive only
    limited and inadequate preparation. Members of the underground Catholic
    Church, especially clergy wishing to further their studies abroad,
    found it difficult to obtain passports and other necessary travel
    documents (see Section 2.d.).
        Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Government has
    restored or replaced some churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries
    damaged or destroyed between 1966 and 1976, and allowed the reopening
    of some seminaries. Implementation of this policy has varied from
    locality to locality. However, there are far fewer temples, churches,
    or mosques than existed 50 years ago (before the Revolution), despite
    the recent increase in the number of religious believers. The
    difficulty in registering new places of worship, along with the
    decrease in places of worship, has led to crowding in many existing
    places of worship.
        Approximately 8 percent of the population are Buddhist,
    approximately 1.6 percent are Muslim, and an estimated 0.4 percent
    belong to the official Patriotic Catholic Church. An estimated 0.4 to
    0.8 percent belong to the unofficial Vaticanaffiliated Catholic Church,
    an estimated 0.8 percent to 1.2 percent are registered Protestants, and
    perhaps 2.4 to 6.5 percent worship in house churches that are
    independent of Government control. There are no available estimates of
    the number of Taoists. However, according to a 1997 Government
    publication, there are over 10,000 Taoist monks and nuns and over 1,000
    Taoist temples.
        Traditional folk religion (worship of local gods, heroes, and
    ancestors) of a majority of the population has experienced a revival in
    recent years and is tolerated to varying degrees as a loose affiliate
    of Taoism, or as an ethnic minority cultural practice; however, many
    manifestations of folk religion are officially considered to be
    ``feudal superstition,'' and local authorities have destroyed thousands
    of local shrines.
        Buddhists make up the largest body of organized religious
    believers. The Government estimates that there are more than 100
    million Buddhists in the country, most of whom are from the dominant
    Han ethnic group. However, it is difficult to estimate accurately the
    number of Buddhists because they do not have congregational memberships
    and often do not participate in public ceremonies. The Government
    reports that there are 13,000 Buddhist temples and monasteries and more
    than 200,000 nuns and monks. In some areas, local Governments enforced
    strictly regulations on places of worship, particularly on illegally
    constructed Buddhist temples and shrines. In 1998 a senior provincial
    party official stated that goals for the coming year were to ``tighten
    management of places of religious activities, properly handle issues
    concerning the indiscriminate establishment of temples and the setting
    up of outdoor Buddha statues, and crack down on heretical religious
    organizations and illegal religious activities.''
        Tibetan Buddhists outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) have
    more freedom to practice their religion than those in the TAR, although
    significant restrictions remain. The number of monks outside the TAR is
    substantial and growing--as is the number of teaching monks with
    advanced education--and the reconstruction of monasteries continues.
    However, restrictions remain, especially at those monasteries with
    close ties to foreign organizations. Monks who study abroad are often
    prevented from returning to their home monasteries outside of the TAR.
    There continue to be reports of monks and nuns outside of the TAR who
    have left monasteries and nunneries to avoid the patriotic education
    campaigns, which force them to choose between signing oaths with
    political content or possibly suffering serious consequences if they
    refuse to do so. (A discussion of government restrictions on Tibetan
    Buddhism in the TAR can be found in the Tibet addendum to this report.)
        In the past, official tolerance for religions considered
    traditionally Chinese, such as Buddhism and Taoism, has been greater
    than that for Christianity. However, as these non-Western faiths have
    grown rapidly in recent years, there are signs of greater government
    concern and new restrictions, especially on syncretic sects.
        According to government figures, there are 20 million Muslims,
    35,000 Islamic places of worship, and more than 45,000 imams
    nationwide. The Government has stated that there are 10 colleges
    conducting Islamic higher education and 2 other Islamic schools in
    Xinjiang operating with government support. In some areas where ethnic
    unrest has occurred, particularly among Central Asian Muslims (and
    especially the Uighurs) in Xinjiang, officials continue to restrict the
    building of mosques and the religious education of youths under the age
    of 18.
        Regulations restricting Muslims' religious activity, teaching, and
    places of worship continued to be tight in Xinjiang, and the Government
    dealt harshly with Muslim adherents who engaged in political speech and
    activities that the authorities deemed separatist. AI reported that
    Jelil Turdi, an ethnic Uighur from Xinjiang, who had been living in
    Kyrgyzstan for 3 years, was deported back to China for allegedly
    separatist activities. In October Wang Lequan, secretary of the
    Xinjiang Party Committee reminded Party members that ``cadres at all
    levels should adhere consciously to Marxist atheism. Do not believe in
    religion, do not take part in religious activities.'' Provincial-level
    Communist Party and government officials repeatedly called for stronger
    management of religious affairs and for the separation of religion from
    administrative matters. For example, the official Xinjiang Legal Daily
    reported that in recent years a township in Bay (Baicheng) County had
    found cases of ``religious interference'' in judicial, marriage, and
    family planning matters. In response the authorities began conducting
    monthly political study sessions for religious personnel. In addition
    they required every mosque to record the numbers and names of those
    attending each day's activities. The official Xinjiang Daily reported
    that Yining County early in the year reviewed the activities of 420
    mosques and implemented a system of linking ethnic cadres to mosques in
    order to improve vigilance against ``illegal religious activities.''
    The authorities also initiated a campaign to discourage overt religious
    attire such as veils and to discourage religious marriage ceremonies.
    There were numerous official media reports that the authorities
    confiscated ``illegal religious publications'' in Xinjiang. According
    to a July report of the International Coalition for Religious Freedom,
    since April 1996, only one publisher, the Xinjiang People's Publication
    House, has been allowed to print Muslim literature in Xinjiang. Human
    Rights Watch also reported a tightening of control over the teaching
    materials, curricula, and leadership of mosques and religious schools
    in 1999. HRW also reported that six imams from Hotan City and Karakash
    County were detained toward the end of 1999 in part for non-compliance
    with religious regulations and for failing to teach government policy
    at religious meetings.
        Religious/ethnic tensions began to rise in September in Shandong
    Province when a non-Muslim merchant improperly labeled meat as being
    fit for consumption by observant Muslims. Disputes and insults between
    Muslims and non-Muslims followed, leading to angry demonstrations that
    led to a clash with police. In mid-December, according to an official
    press report, police clashed in Yangxin County with Muslim Hui, who
    were protesting a lack of respect for their religion. The police killed
    6 Hui and injured 19; 13 police officers also were injured. According
    to foreign press reports, the Hui casualties occurred when police fired
    on the crowd of protesters after they refused to disperse. Following a
    central government and Party investigation, the Shandong provincial
    authorities fired the Yangxin County party secretary, the head of the
    Yangxin County government, and the chief of the county's Public
    Security Bureau.
        In some areas, particularly in areas traditionally populated by the
    non-Central Asian Hui ethnic group, there is substantial religious
    building construction and renovation. Some young Uighur Muslims study
    outside the country in Muslim religious schools.
        The Government permits, and in some cases subsidizes, Muslim
    citizens who make the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. According to
    government statistics, more than 45,000 Muslims have made the
    pilgrimage in recent years--5,000 in 1998. However, there have been
    nongovernmental reports that fewer persons have made the pilgrimage
    since 1998; according to some estimates, less than 2,500 persons went
    in 1999 and 2000. There are many more Muslims in the country with the
    means and desire to participate in the hajj than are allowed to do so,
    leading to official corruption in granting permission to participate in
    the pilgrimage. There are conflicting reports as to the ability of
    Uighur Muslims to go on pilgrimage.
        The Government takes some steps designed to show respect for the
    country's Muslims, such as offering congratulations on major Islamic
    holidays. However, government sensitivity to concerns of the Muslim
    community is limited. In 1998 a Qing dynasty mosque, which was the
    center of Muslim life in Chengdu, was destroyed in the city's Muslim
    quarter to make way for a boulevard near an expanded city square,
    despite strong opposition from the city's Muslim population. The
    construction of a new mosque over a complex of retail establishments
    further offended the community. At the end of 1999, no construction
    upon the site of the Qing dynasty mosque had yet occurred; the imam, or
    leader, of the mosque that was demolished was ordered to leave Chengdu
    and has been forbidden to engage in religious work. The new officially
    sanctioned mosque over the retail complex has been attended only
    lightly since its opening.
        The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church claims a
    membership far larger than the 5 million persons registered with the
    official Catholic Church. Precise figures are difficult to determine,
    but Vatican officials have estimated that there are as many as 10
    million adherents. According to official figures, the Government-
    approved Catholic Church has 69 bishops, 5,000 clergy, and about 5,000
    churches and meeting houses. There are 60,000 baptisms each year. The
    Government so far has refused to establish diplomatic relations with
    the Holy See, and there is no Vatican representative in the country.
    The Government's refusal to allow the official Catholic church to
    recognize the authority of the Papacy in matters of faith and morals
    has led many Catholics to refuse to join the official Catholic church
    on the grounds that this refusal denies one of the fundamental tenets
    of their faith.
        In January bishops of the official Catholic Church, without
    consulting the Holy See, consecrated 5 new official church bishops on
    the same day that the Pope consecrated 12 new Roman Catholic bishops in
    Rome. This was also the day on which the Pope historically consecrates
    bishops chosen for special recognition. Some bishops of the official
    church reportedly refused to attend the Beijing ceremony, which was
    seen as a deliberate affront to the Vatican. In June a new bishop was
    ordained in Hangzhou by several bishops, including one of those
    ordained in January. On the October 1st anniversary of the founding of
    the People's Republic, the Vatican canonized 120 saints with ties to
    China, 86 of whom had been killed during the Boxer Rebellion. The
    state-run media sharply criticized the canonizations. These incidents
    and the tensions between the Government and the Vatican have caused
    leadership problems for the official Catholic Church. Some bishops in
    the official Catholic Church are not recognized by the Holy See,
    although many have been recognized privately. Some church members and
    other clerics within the official Catholic Church have indicated that
    they are unwilling to accept the authority of bishops ordained without
    Vatican approval.
        The Party's Central Committee issued a document on August 16, 1999,
    calling on the authorities to tighten control of the official Catholic
    Church and to eliminate the underground Catholic Church if it does not
    accede to Government control. There are many longstanding vacancies in
    the official Catholic administration, particularly among bishops, and
    there are reports that the RAB and the official church patriotic
    association are pressuring the church to fill the vacancies quickly. In
    recent months, there has been increasing pressure by the Chinese
    Catholic Patriotic Association, the Religious Affairs Bureau, and
    police authorities on the underground church to join the official
    church.
        The Government maintains that there are between 10 and 15 million
    registered Protestants, 18,000 clergy, over 12,000 churches, and some
    25,000 meeting places. According to foreign experts, perhaps 30 million
    persons worship in house churches that are independent of Government
    control, although estimates by some house church groups range as high
    as 80 million. There are reports of divisions within both the official
    Protestant church and the house church movement over issues of
    doctrine; in both the official and unofficial Protestant churches,
    there are groups with conservative views and groups with more
    unorthodox views.
        The ongoing growth of unofficial Christian churches continued to
    cause concern among many government and Communist Party officials who
    perceive unregulated religious gatherings as a potential challenge to
    their authority, a threat to public order, and an alternative to
    Socialist thought. Both Catholic and Protestant underground churches
    came under increasing pressure during the year. Authorities in some
    areas continued a concerted effort to crack down on the activities of
    unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches. In some areas, security
    authorities used threats, demolition of buildings, extortion of
    ``fines,'' interrogation, detention (sometimes prolonged), and at times
    beatings and torture to harass unofficial Christian religious figures
    and followers. In April the Fujian Provincial Government convened a
    meeting of religious affairs workers in order to exhort them to
    ``ensure stability in religious circles and lead religious circles in
    making new and greater contributions to socialist material and
    spiritual civilization.'' At the meeting, a provincial leader also
    called on all religious affairs workers to ``firmly establish a Marxist
    outlook on religion.'' Implementing regulations, provincial work
    reports, and other government and party documents continued to exhort
    officials to enforce vigorously government policy regarding
    unregistered churches. Since 1998 Guangdong Province has had highly
    restrictive religious regulations. In 1999 Zhejiang Province also
    promulgated religious affairs regulations that stipulated that
    ``illegal'' property and income would be confiscated from those who:
    ``1) preside over or organize religious activities at places other than
    those for religious activities or at places not approved by a religious
    affairs department; 2) do missionary work outside the premises of a
    place of religious activity; and 3) sponsor religious training
    activities without obtaining the approval of a religious affairs
    department at or above the county level.'' Regulations in Guangxi,
    Shanghai, and Chongqing also call for strict government oversight.
    Authorities particularly targeted unofficial religious groups in
    Beijing and the Provinces of Henan and Shandong, where there are
    rapidly growing numbers of unregistered Protestants, and in Hebei, a
    center of unregistered Catholics. However, during the year there were
    reports that small family churches, generally made up of family members
    and friends, which conduct activities similar to those of home Bible
    study groups, usually were tolerated by the authorities as long as they
    remained small and unobtrusive. Family churches reportedly encounter
    difficulties when their memberships become too large, when they arrange
    for the use of facilities for the specific purpose of conducting
    religious activities, or when they forge links with other unregistered
    groups.
        There were many religious detainees and prisoners. In some cases,
    public security officials have used prison or reformthrough-education
    sentences to enforce regulations. In Hebei, where perhaps half of the
    country's Catholics reside, friction between unofficial Catholics and
    local authorities continued. Hebei authorities have been known to force
    many underground priests and believers to make a choice of either
    joining the Patriotic Church or facing punishment such as fines, job
    loss, periodic detentions, and, in some cases, having their children
    barred from school. Some were forced into hiding. According to a Hong
    Kong human rights organization, on March 2, 15 members of the China
    Evangelistic Fellowship were arrested while holding a service in
    Nanwang City, Henan Province. Two of the group's leaders, Jiang
    Qinggang and Hao Huaiping, reportedly faced reeducation-through-labor
    sentences. The director of the Government's RAB had labeled the
    fellowship publicly as a ``cult'' at the end of 1999. There were
    reports in May that local authorities in Zhejiang Province had closed
    down seven Catholic churches because they failed to join the official
    Catholic Church. In May Father Jiang Shurang, an underground priest in
    Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 6 years in prison for illegally
    printing Bibles and other religious material. Roman Catholic Bishop
    Zeng Jingmu, released from a labor camp in 1998, was reportedly
    rearrested in Jiangxi on September 14 during the visit of a high-
    ranking foreign Cardinal; the Government denied those reports. The
    whereabouts of Roman Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin, whose followers report
    that he was arrested in 1997, remained unclear. Underground Catholic
    sources in Hebei claimed that he still was under detention, while the
    Government denied having taken ``any coercive measures'' against him.
    Reliable sources reported that Bishop An Shuxin, Bishop Zhang Weizhu,
    Father Cui Xing, and Father Wang Quanjun remained under detention in
    Hebei. Bishop Liu reportedly remained under house arrest in Zhejiang
    Province. According to a Freedom House report, in the last half of
    1999, four Catholic bishops reportedly were detained or arrested for
    refusing to join the official church or for conducting unauthorized
    services. The four were Bishop Jia Zhiguo, Bishop Xie Shiguang, Bishop
    Lin Xili, and Bishop Han Dingxiang. All of the bishops reportedly were
    arrested for refusing to join the official church or for conducting
    unauthorized services. On February 10 in Fujian Province, a large group
    of police arrested 80-year-old underground Catholic Bishop Yang Shudao.
    The Government has denied that the elderly bishop is being detained and
    has claimed that he is receiving medical treatment. According to
    several NGO's, a number of Catholic priests and lay leaders were beaten
    or otherwise abused during the year. Underground Catholic Bishop Joseph
    Fan Zhongliang of Shanghai remained under surveillance and often had
    his movements restricted.
        Some Protestant house church groups reported more frequent police
    raids of worship services and detentions than in previous years.
    According to the Jianghuai Morning Daily in Anhui Province, on April 9,
    police detained 47 members of the unregistered Full Scope Church, whose
    leader, Xu Yongze, was released from prison only in May, although his
    3-year sentence ended in March. Although he was released from a labor
    camp, it is unclear whether Xu remains subject to some restrictions.
    According to the newspaper, six church leaders were to face criminal
    charges for organizing an ``illegal sect,'' while eight others likely
    would receive ``administrative'' (usually meaning reeducation-through-
    labor) sentences. The Government's 1997 White Paper on Religious
    Freedom stated that Xu had violated the law by promoting a cult,
    preaching that the Apocalypse was near, and asking worshipers to wail
    in public spaces for several consecutive days. Group members deny these
    charges. Xu's colleagues Qin Baocai and Mu Sheng are believed to
    continue to serve reeducationthrough-labor sentences. Pastor Li Dexian
    was detained in April for 15 days, during which time he was forced into
    a crouch for 3 days, unable to sleep or use toilet facilities, with his
    wrists and ankles manacled together. Li also has been detained on other
    occasions and reports that in some instances he was beaten. According
    to credible reports, on May 16, 2000, seven house churches were raided
    in Guangdong Province. According to a press release of Christian
    Solidarity International, more than 10 house church leaders were
    arrested in the raids. Several house churches also were closed by the
    authorities. In May seven evangelical Christians were arrested in Henan
    for violating the ``Three Designates'' policy that limits religious
    services to specific venues, requires leaders to preach only within
    specific areas, and fixes the number of persons permitted to preach. In
    early August, police detained 31 members of an underground Protestant
    church in Hubei's Guangshui City. In Henan a week later, 12 members of
    an underground Protestant church were arrested. On August 23, police
    arrested 130 members of a house church headquartered in Fangcheng City,
    Henan Province, after they held services with 3 foreign members of a
    Protestant fellowship organization. Authorities stated that the
    Fangcheng church was a ``cult'' that had been banned. On August 25, the
    three foreign church members were released and deported; they reported
    being beaten while in custody. According to NGO reports, 85 of those
    arrested from the Fangcheng church were charged on August 25 with
    crimes such as ``using an illegal cult to obstruct justice.''
        Authorities also conducted demolition campaigns against
    unregistered places of worship. Beginning in early November, according
    to local press reports, officials in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, and
    surrounding areas began a campaign to close or destroy, sometimes with
    explosives, hundreds of unregistered Protestant churches and Buddhist
    and Taoist temples. Wenzhou has a long Christian history and reportedly
    counts several hundred thousand Christians among its population. It has
    been estimated that approximately 450 churches and temples were
    destroyed during the weeks prior to December 25 in Wenzhou, and as many
    as 1,200 churches and temples were closed or destroyed in surrounding
    areas of Zhejiang Province during that time. Officials stated that the
    places of worship that were closed and destroyed were targeted because
    they were unregistered and therefore illegal; however, according to
    some observers, many of the places of worship had attempted to comply
    with regulations regarding registration, but their paperwork had never
    been finalized by the RAB. According to some reports, the authorities
    carried out the campaign due to concern that there were too many
    unregistered places of worship in the Wenzhou and Luoyang areas, and
    that too many Party members were joining such groups. Authorities
    reportedly used criteria such as registration status and the degree of
    government control (measured by the existence of a Party-approved
    management committee and the participation of clergy in political study
    sessions) as criteria for targeting places of worship. Although the
    campaign appeared to have been carried out at the initiative of local
    religious affairs officials, central government authorities did not
    criticize the action or take any measures to reprimand those
    responsible. Two persons who tried to stop a demolition were arrested
    and sentenced to 2 years of reform-through-education. According to
    press reports, in 1999 more than 20 unregistered Catholic churches were
    demolished, some with explosives, by the authorities in Changle and
    other localities in Fujian Province. The churches were destroyed on the
    grounds that they had been built without the required permit or had
    been built with the wrong type of permit (such as with a permit for a
    building other than a church). Most of the churches reportedly were
    built by local congregations with the aid of remittances from relatives
    working abroad.
        The increase in the number of Christians has resulted in a
    corresponding increase in the demand for Bibles. During 1999 the
    Government approved the printing of more than 3 million Bibles, and
    there currently are more than 22 million Bibles in print. One printing
    company that is a joint venture with an overseas Christian organization
    printed over 2.3 million Bibles during 1999, including Bibles in
    Braille and minority dialects, such as Korean, Jingbo, Lisu, Lahu,
    Miao, and Yao. Although Bibles can be purchased at some bookstores,
    they are not readily available and cannot be ordered directly from
    publishing houses by individuals. However, they are available for
    purchase at most officially recognized churches, and many house church
    members buy their Bibles from churches without incident. Nonetheless,
    some underground Christians hesitate to buy Bibles at official churches
    because such transactions sometimes involve receipts that identify the
    purchaser. Foreign experts confirm reports of chronic shortages of
    Bibles, mostly due to logistical problems in disseminating Bibles to
    rural areas; the situation has, however, improved in recent years due
    to improved distribution channels, including through house churches.
    Customs officials continue to monitor for the ``smuggling'' of Bibles
    and other religious materials into the country. There have been
    credible reports that the authorities sometimes confiscate Bibles in
    raids on house churches.
        In recent years, some local authorities, especially in northeastern
    China, have subjected worship services of alien residents to increased
    surveillance and restrictions. In other areas, authorities have
    displayed increasing tolerance of religious practice by foreigners.
    Weekly services of the foreign Jewish community in Beijing have been
    held uninterrupted since 1995, and High Holy Day observances have been
    allowed for more than 15 years. The Shanghai Jewish community was
    allowed to hold services in an historic Shanghai synagogue, which had
    been restored as a museum. Local authorities indicated that the
    community could use the synagogue in the future for special occasions
    on a case-by-case basis.
        Religious groups that preach beliefs outside the bounds of
    officially approved doctrine (such as the coming of the Apocalypse, or
    holy war) or that have charismatic leaders often are singled out for
    particularly severe harassment. Police continued their efforts to close
    down an underground evangelical group called the ``Shouters,'' an
    offshoot of a pre-1949 indigenous Protestant group, which authorities
    deem to be an antigovernment, counterrevolutionary ``cult.'' Since the
    early 1980's, authorities repeatedly have detained, fined, or
    imprisoned its members. Many groups, especially those in house
    churches, reportedly are viewed by officials as ``cults.'' Some
    observers have attributed the unorthodox beliefs of some of these
    groups to undertrained clergy. Others acknowledge that some individuals
    may be exploiting the reemergence of interest in religion for personal
    gain. In October 1999, as part of its anti-Falun Gong crackdown, the
    Government passed a law outlawing ``cults.'' According to reports, the
    crackdown on the Falun Gong led to a tightening of controls on all
    nonofficially sanctioned beliefs. Recent regulations require all qigong
    groups to register with the Government. Those that did not were
    declared illegal.
        Since mid-1999 the Government has waged a severe political,
    propaganda, and police campaign against the Falun Gong spiritual
    movement; the campaign intensified significantly during the year. Falun
    Gong (or Wheel of the Law, also known as Falun Dafa) blends aspects of
    Taoism, Buddhism, and the meditation techniques of qigong (a
    traditional martial art) with the teachings of Li Hongzhi, who left the
    country in 1998. The Government estimates that there may be as many as
    2.1 million adherents of Falun Gong; Falun Gong followers estimate that
    there are as many as 100 million adherents worldwide. Some experts
    estimate that the true number of Falun Gong adherents lies in the tens
    of millions. Despite the mystical nature of some of Li's teachings,
    Falun Gong does not consider itself a religion and has no clergy or
    formal places of worship. In July 1999, 3 months after 10,000 Falun
    Gong adherents had demonstrated peacefully in front of the Zhongnanhai
    leadership compound in Beijing, the Government officially declared
    Falun Gong illegal and began a nationwide crackdown. Around the
    country, tens of thousands of practitioners were rounded up and
    detained for several days--often in open stadiums--under poor and
    overcrowded conditions, with inadequate food, water, and sanitary
    facilities. Practitioners who refused to renounce their beliefs were
    expelled from schools or fired from jobs. The China Education Daily
    reported that ``political thought and morality'' assessments of
    applicants to take university exams were expanded to include questions
    to determine whether applicants were members of Falun Gong. Some
    detainees were government officials and Communist Party members. A few
    high-ranking practitioners were forced to disavow their ties to Falun
    Gong on national television. Government officials who were
    practitioners were required to undergo anti-Falun Gong study sessions
    and were prohibited from Falun Gong activities; some were expelled from
    the Party for refusing to recant their beliefs. The authorities waged
    an intense propaganda campaign against the group, seized and destroyed
    Falun Gong literature, and attempted to shut down Falun Gong Internet
    web sites. Also in July 1999, the Government issued a warrant for the
    arrest of Falun Gong leader Li Hongzhi, who was charged with holding
    demonstrations without appropriate permits and disturbing public order.
    The Government requested INTERPOL's assistance in apprehending Li, who
    resides abroad, but INTERPOL declined to assist, on the grounds that
    the offense was not a crime recognized under the INTERPOL charter, and
    that the request was political in nature. Late in the year, President
    Jiang Zemin announced that the campaign against the Falun Gong was one
    of the ``three major political struggles'' of 1999. The crackdown on
    ``cults'' intensified in late 1999, with press reports stating that
    restrictions would be tightened on several ``cults'' and various
    Christian groups. In late October 1999, as part of the Government's
    anti-Falun Gong crackdown, the Standing Committee of the National
    People's Congress adopted a decision to ban ``cults,'' including Falun
    Gong, under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. Under the decision, cult
    members who ``disrupt public order'' or distribute publications can
    receive prison terms of 3 to 7 years. Cult leaders and recruiters can
    be sentenced to 7 years or more in prison.
        Although the vast majority of practitioners detained later were
    released, those identified by the Government as ``core leaders'' were
    singled out for particularly harsh treatment. On November 30, 1999,
    Vice Premier Li Lanqing stated that authorities detained over 35,000
    practitioners between July 22 and October 30 1999 (the Government later
    clarified Li's statement, noting that the figure represented the total
    number of confrontations of police with adherents and that many persons
    had multiple encounters with police). In August the Director of the
    Religious Affairs Bureau stated that 151 Falun Gong practitioners had
    been convicted of leaking state secrets, creating chaos, or other
    crimes. According to credible estimates, as many as 5,000 Falun Gong
    practitioners have been sentenced without trial to up to 3 years of
    reeducation through labor. Human rights organizations estimate that as
    many as 300 practitioners have been sentenced to prison terms of up to
    18 years for their involvement in Falun Gong. According to the Falun
    Gong, hundreds of its practitioners have been confined in mental
    hospitals.
        Police often used excessive force when detaining peaceful
    protesters, including some who were elderly or who were accompanied by
    small children. During the year, there were numerous credible reports
    of abuse of Falun Gong practitioners by the police and other security
    personnel, including police involvement in beatings, detention under
    extremely harsh conditions, and torture (including by electric shock
    and by having hands and feet shackled and linked with crossed steel
    chains) (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Various sources report that
    approximately 100 or more Falun Gong adherents died during the year
    while in police custody; many of their bodies reportedly bore signs of
    severe beatings and/or torture, or were cremated before relatives could
    examine them (see Section 1.c.). Gao Xianmin died in police custody on
    January 17, 2000. Credible reports indicate that Gao, who was detained
    with a group of fellow practitioners in Guangzhou on December 31, 1999,
    was tortured while in custody, including by having high-density salt
    water forced into his stomach. Police gave no explanation for his
    death. On February 17, 60-year-old Chen Zixiu was detained in Weihai,
    Shandong Province, as she attempted to travel to Beijing to join
    peaceful protests there. Over the next several days, her family
    received word from another detainee that Chen was being beaten. On
    February 21, local police informed the family that Chen had died.
    According to family members, her body was covered with bruises and her
    teeth and nose were broken. According to press reports, Zhou Zhichang,
    a practitioner imprisoned in Heilongjiang Province since September
    1999, died in custody in May 2000, after an 8-day hunger strike.
    Practitioners Li Zaiji and Wang Paisheng died in custody during the
    first 2 weeks of July, according to one NGO. One practitioner
    reportedly died after a feeding tube was mistakenly inserted into her
    lung rather than her stomach.
        Practitioners defied ongoing government efforts to prevent them
    from protesting in Beijing. Protests (by individuals or small groups of
    practitioners) at Tiananmen Square occurred almost daily.
    Demonstrations also continued around the country. Police quickly broke
    up demonstrations, often kicking and beating protestors, and detained
    them. Most protests were small and short-lived as expanded police units
    quickly detained anyone who admitted to being or appeared to be a
    practitioner. Hundreds of practitioners reportedly were arrested at
    Tiananmen Square in February during lunar New Year protests, forcing a
    brief closure of the Square. Large numbers were arrested while
    protesting on March 5 (opening of the National People's Congress),
    April 25 (the anniversary of the 1999 Zhongnanhai demonstration), and
    May 11 (reportedly Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi's birthday). Hundreds
    of Falun Gong practitioners were detained after peaceful protests in
    Tiananmen Square during the week of July 22, the anniversary of the
    Government's ban on the group. Despite a heavy security presence, on
    October 1, the anniversary of the founding of the PRC, hundreds, and
    perhaps more than 1,000, peacefully protesting practitioners were again
    arrested in Tiananmen Square, forcing a brief closure of the square.
    The press, in an unprecedented move, stated that the groups caused
    disturbances lasting 40 minutes. The Government later labeled Falun
    Gong a reactionary group attempting to subvert the State. On October
    26, another mass protest marking the anniversary of the passage of
    1999's Anti-cult Law was held at Tiananmen Square; more than 100 Falun
    Gong practitioners reportedly were detained. Many reportedly were
    beaten. Over the next few days, many more practitioners were arrested
    in Tiananmen Square. An estimated several hundred Falun Gong
    practitioners were also detained after protesting in Tiananmen Square
    over the 1999-2000 New Year holiday; many were beaten during their
    arrests.
        Authorities also briefly detained foreign practitioners (however,
    it remains unclear whether the authorities were aware that such persons
    were foreigners). For example, in February, a U.S. citizen practitioner
    was detained for 3 days. In November, another foreign citizen was
    sentenced to 3 years of reeducation through labor for Falun Gong
    activities. On November 23, Falun Gong practitioner and foreign
    resident Teng Chunyan was tried on charges of providing national
    security information to foreigners, reportedly for providing foreigners
    with information about the Government's campaign against Falun Gong. On
    December 12, she was sentenced to 3 years of reeducationthrough-labor.
    Several foreign reporters also were detained briefly on April 25, after
    having taken photographs of police detaining Falun Gong demonstrators
    on Tiananmen Square. Foreign tourists routinely had their film and
    videotape confiscated after recording (often inadvertently) Falun Gong
    detentions.
        According to credible reports, authorities have confined some
    practitioners to psychiatric hospitals. AI reported that, on January
    20, a Changguang Police Station spokesman confirmed that about 50
    ``extremist'' Falun Gong practitioners had been placed in a psychiatric
    hospital near Beijing and cited reports from Falun Gong practitioners
    that the practitioner's families were asked for fees to cover living
    expenses in the hospital.
        According to the local press, in November several persons accused
    of printing and distributing Falun Gong literature were arrested in
    Chaoyan, Liaoning Province. According to Amnesty International, two
    sisters, Li Xiaobing and Li Xaiomei, who owned a bookstore were
    sentenced on January 28 to 7 and 6 years in prison, respectively. They
    reportedly had been arrested in July 1999, just prior to the ban on
    Falun Gong, were held incommunicado without charge for 3 months, and
    were tried in secret. Many others have been arrested and sentenced to
    prison terms or terms of reeducation through labor for providing
    information about the crackdown on Falun Gong or abuses against Falun
    Gong practitioners to others, including the foreign media (see Sections
    1.f. and 2.a.).
        There have been reports that Falun Gong practitioners are no longer
    able to obtain passports.
        During the year, the authorities also continued a general crackdown
    on other groups considered to be ``cults,'' often using the October
    1999 decision to ban cults under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. The
    Zhong Gong qigong group, which reportedly had a following rivaling that
    of Falun Gong, was banned under the anti-cult application of the
    Criminal Law, and its leader, Zhang Hongbao, was charged with rape,
    forgery, and illegal crossing of boundaries. Zhong Gong practitioners
    deny the charges. Zhong Gong, like other qigong groups, teaches that
    the body's vital forces, or qi, can be harnessed for healing purposes
    and spiritual growth through meditation and spiritual exercises.
    According to a news report, a local Zhong Gong leader in Zhejiang
    Province, Chen Jilong, was convicted in January of illegally practicing
    medicine and was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Two leaders of other
    qigong groups also reportedly were arrested, and the Government banned
    the practice of qigong exercises on public or government property. This
    has created an atmosphere of uncertainty for many qigong practitioners,
    and there are reports that some qigong practitioners now fear
    practicing or teaching openly. There were reports that 14 unofficial
    Christian groups and a Buddhist organization (known as Guanyin Famin)
    were branded by the Government as ``evil sects,'' as well. In August
    police in Jiangsu arrested Shen Chang, the leader of a qigong group,
    and charged him with organizing gatherings aimed at disturbing social
    order and tax evasion.
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts freedom of
    movement within the country and restricts the freedom to change one's
    workplace or residence. The effectiveness of the Government's national
    household registration/identification card system, used to control and
    restrict the location of an individual's residence, remained in place
    but continued to erode, and the ability of most citizens to move around
    the country to live and work continued to improve. The Government
    places other restrictions on freedom of movement, and it toughened
    these restrictions during the year, especially before politically
    sensitive anniversaries and to forestall Falun Gong demonstrations. The
    ``floating population'' of economic migrants leaving their home areas
    to seek work elsewhere in the country is estimated to be between 80 and
    130 million (there are an estimated 3 million or more ``floaters'' in
    Shanghai alone). This group comprises not only migrant workers, but
    also includes a growing number of middle-class professionals attracted
    to large cities by hopes of better paying jobs in their fields. This
    itinerant population lacks official residence status, which is required
    for full access to social services and education. Unless such persons
    obtain resident status, they must pay a premium for these services.
    However, some cities, such as Beijing, are beginning to offer some
    social services free of charge. In August 1998, the Public Security
    Ministry issued revised regulations that allow persons from the
    countryside to apply for permanent residence in a city if: 1) they have
    investments or property in a city; 2) they are elderly and have
    children who live in a city; or 3) their spouses live in a city.
    Members of the ``floating'' population are subject to being detained,
    fined, and sent to custody and repatriation centers by the authorities,
    where they may be required to work off their fines. Many are
    ``repatriated,'' or sent back to the areas they came from by the
    authorities (see Section 1.d.).
        Prior to sensitive anniversaries, authorities in urban areas
    rounded up and detained ``undesirables,'' including the homeless, the
    unemployed, migrant workers, those without proper residence or work
    permits, petty criminals, prostitutes, and the mentally ill or
    disabled. These persons often were detained or expelled under custody
    and repatriation regulations or similar administrative regulations (see
    Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). There were reports of spot checks of
    identification documents, housing raids, and harassment of migrants at
    train and bus stations in Beijing during the year, particularly prior
    to October 1.
        Dissidents reported that the authorities restricted their freedom
    of movement during politically sensitive periods or while foreign
    dignitaries visited China (see Section 1.f.).
        As part of the crackdown on Falun Gong, authorities tried to
    prevent practitioners from traveling to Beijing, particularly in July
    and in October (see Section 2.c.).
        Under the ``staying at prison employment'' system applicable to
    recidivists incarcerated in reeducation-through-labor camps,
    authorities have denied certain inmates permission to return to their
    homes. Those inmates sentenced to a total of more than 5 years in
    reeducation-throughlabor camps on separate occasions also may lose
    their legal right to return home. For those assigned to camps far from
    their residences, this practice constitutes a form of internal exile.
    The number of prisoners subject to this restriction is unknown.
    Authorities reportedly have forced others to accept jobs in state
    enterprises where they can be monitored more closely after their
    release from prison or detention. Other released or paroled prisoners
    returned home but were not permitted freedom of movement. The
    authorities released Bao Tong, a former Zhao Ziyang aide in 1997, but
    continue to monitor his activities closely with constant surveillance,
    at times preventing him from meeting with others (see Sections 1.f. and
    2.a.). One Tianamen activist is not permitted to return to his home
    province even though he completed a 1-year sentence and was released in
    the early 1990's. Some individuals have also had their freedom of
    movement curtailed when their public appearance might be deemed
    politically sensitive. Former senior leader Zhao Ziyang remained under
    house arrest, and security around him was tightened routinely during
    sensitive periods, such as the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre
    and during the visits of important foreign leaders. Zhao was allowed to
    visit Sichuan briefly in June and has been allowed about one trip
    outside of Beijing per year.
        There is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs and
    major state projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam and environmental/
    reforestation projects, include forced relocation of persons.
        The Government permits legal emigration and foreign travel for most
    citizens. Passports are increasingly easy to get. The Government
    continued to use political attitudes as criteria for selecting persons
    for Governmentsponsored study abroad. The Government did not control
    privately sponsored students, who constitute the majority of citizens
    studying abroad; however, there were some reports that academics faced
    some travel restrictions around the year's sensitive anniversaries,
    especially June 4 (see Section 2.a.). Business travelers who wish to go
    abroad can obtain passports relatively easily. Permission for couples
    to travel abroad sometimes was conditioned on agreement to delay
    childbirth. Members of the underground Catholic Church, especially
    clergy wishing to further their studies abroad, found it difficult to
    obtain passports and other necessary travel documents (see Section
    2.c.). The Government continued efforts to attract back to the country
    persons who had studied overseas. Official media have stated in the
    past that persons who have joined foreign organizations hostile to
    China should quit them before returning home and refrain while abroad
    from activities that violate the country's laws. Some Falun Gong
    members reportedly had difficulty in obtaining passports during the
    year, but this does not appear to be a national policy.
        There also were instances when the authorities refused visas or
    entry on apparent political grounds. Some foreign academics with
    contacts with the dissident community also have been refused entry
    visas repeatedly. International observers and human rights
    organizations reported that they could substantiate claims that border
    control stations keep background records of certain individuals who are
    to be denied entry. Authorities have denied these reports.
        The Government does not provide first asylum. However, since the
    late 1980's, the Government has adopted a de facto policy of tolerance
    toward the small number of persons--fewer than 100 annually--from other
    nations who have registered with the Beijing office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as asylum seekers. The Government has
    permitted these persons to remain while the UNHCR makes determinations
    as to their status and--if the UNHCR determines that they are bona fide
    refugees--while they await resettlement in other countries. As yet
    there are no laws or regulations that authorize the authorities to
    grant refugee status, but the Government reportedly continued to draft
    working rules on granting such status. The Government cooperates with
    the UNHCR when dealing with the resettlement of ethnic Han Chinese or
    ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos also resident in the country;
    the Government is less cooperative when dealing with some other
    refugees.
        The Government has worked with Laos and Cambodia to facilitate the
    return of resettled individuals who have decided to return to their
    home countries. The Government denies having tightened its policy on
    accepting Vietnamese asylum seekers. Due to the stable situation in
    Vietnam with regard to ethnic Chinese and the increasingly porous
    border between the two countries, very few Vietnamese have sought
    resettlement in China in recent years.
        In January seven persons granted refugee status by the UNHCR in
    Russia were deported to China, where authorities then forcibly returned
    them to the DPRK. There have been no reported refoulements by the
    Chinese Government since the January incident. In April, according to
    press reports, a group of approximately 60 North Koreans were forcibly
    repatriated after they protested conditions in a Tumen city border
    guard holding facility; the protests reportedly became violent.
    According to various observers, the number of migrants forcibly
    returned to North Korea during the year was far higher than in 1999,
    and unconfirmed reports said that some returnees faced persecution,
    including fines, beatings, incarceration, and perhaps even execution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their Government
    peacefully and cannot freely choose or change the laws and officials
    that govern them. Citizens vote directly for local nongovernmental
    village committees and among party-reviewed candidates for delegate
    positions in town and township and county-level peoples' congresses.
    However, people's congress delegates at the provincial level are
    selected by county-level people's congresses, and in turn provincial-
    level people's congresses select delegates to the National People's
    Congress. Although the CCP vets all candidates at least to some degree,
    many county and provincial elections are competitive, with more
    candidates running than there are seats available.
        According to the Constitution, the National People's Congress is
    the highest organ of state power. Formally, it elects the President and
    Vice President, selects the Premier and vice premiers, and elects the
    Chairman of the State Central Military Commission. In practice the NPC
    Standing Committee oversees these elections and determines the agenda
    and procedure for the NPC under the direct authority of the Politburo
    Standing Committee. The NPC does not have the power to set policy or to
    remove Government or party leaders; however, in some instances its
    actions have affected economic policy.
        In general the election and agenda of people's congresses at all
    levels remain under the firm control of the Communist Party, the
    paramount source of political authority. A number of small
    ``democratic'' parties that date from before the Communist takeover in
    1949 play a minor consultative role and must pledge their allegiance to
    the Communist Party. The CCP retains a tight rein on political
    decisionmaking and forbids the creation of new political parties. The
    Government continued efforts to suppress the China Democracy Party, an
    organization that had attracted hundreds, perhaps thousands, of members
    nationwide since its founding in 1998. Public security authorities have
    arrested nearly all of its most important leaders. Scores of CDP
    members were detained in cities throughout the country in the period
    prior to the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre in 1999. The
    CDP's three best known leaders--Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli, and Qin Yongmin-
    were sentenced in December 1998 to prison terms of 13, 12, and 11 years
    respectively. Since December 1998, at least 25 core leaders of the CDP
    have been sentenced to long prison terms on subversion charges. In
    February Xu Wenli's assistant, Liu Shizun, was sentenced to 6 years for
    subversion. Also in February, Shanghai member of the CDP, Dai Xuezhong,
    was sentenced to 3 years in jail. In July after a 90-minute trial, Chen
    Zhonghe, founder of the Hubei branch of the CDP, and Xiao Shichang were
    sentenced to 7 years and 5+ years in prison respectively on subversion
    charges. In June Li Guotao was arrested in Shanghai; on June 28 he was
    sentenced to 3 years' reeducation through labor for demanding the
    release of CDP members. Shanghai dissidents Li Guotao, Cai Guihua, Yao
    Zhenxiang, Fu Shenping, and Dai Xuewu were taken into custody on many
    occasions throughout the year (see Section 1.d.). Prior to the June 4
    anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Li Guotao was rearrested
    in Shanghai and charged with spreading reactionary publications,
    instigating disturbances, and disturbing the social order (apparently
    in connection with a letter he and others sent to the Mayor of
    Shanghai, protesting the arrest of dissident Dai Xuewu and requesting
    his release); on June 28 he was sentenced to 3 years' reeducation
    through labor for demanding the release of CDP members. Dai Xuewu, the
    brother of imprisoned dissident Dai Xuezhong, also was arrested in
    Shanghai prior to the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square
    massacre and charged with the theft of a cell phone; in August he was
    sentenced without a trial to 3 years of reeducation through labor.
        Despite CCP control of the Government, limited democratic
    decisionmaking continued to grow as the local village committee
    elections program expanded. Under the 1987 Organic Law of the Village
    Committees, all of the country's approximately 1 million villages are
    expected to hold competitive, direct elections for subgovernment level
    local village committees. The NPC Standing Committee in November 1998
    passed a revised version of the law, which called for enhancements in
    the electoral process, including substantial improvements in the
    nominating process and the required use of voting booths. It also
    provided for improved transparency in village committee administration
    and appears to have boosted the authority of the village committees
    over communally owned properties. The revised law also explicitly
    transferred the power to nominate candidates to the villagers
    themselves, as opposed to village groups or party branches.
        Both the Government and foreign observers estimate that more than
    90 percent of villages have participated in elections for village
    committee members. However, all provinces and provincial level cities
    and regions have now held at least one village-level election.
    According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the majority of provinces
    have carried out at least three or four rounds of village elections.
    Foreign observers who have monitored local village committee elections,
    including the Carter Center and the International Republican Institute,
    have judged the elections they observed, on the whole, to have been
    fair. However, many villages have yet to hold truly competitive
    elections. The Government estimates that one-third of all elections
    have serious procedural flaws; some reballoting occurs when
    irregularities are significant. Approximately another third are judged
    to have satisfied central Government guidance and the law, which
    requires use of secret ballots to select candidates. Successful village
    committee elections have included the use of secret ballots to select
    candidates, campaigns by multiple candidates, platforms, and the use of
    secret ballots in the election itself. Some regions have experimented
    with a nominating process that gives this power completely to
    villagers, as opposed to village groups or party branches.
        Candidates favored by local authorities have been defeated in some
    elections, although in general the party dominates the local electoral
    process, and roughly 60 percent of the members elected to the village
    committees are Communist Party members. In many villages, villagers are
    given ballots with a space for write-in votes; in at least one case, a
    write-in candidate won. The final ballot is the culmination of an
    election process that includes government screening of candidates and
    an indirect vote that eliminates some candidates. Many observers
    caution that the village election system is not necessarily a precursor
    for democracy at higher levels of Government, and village elections--as
    currently practiced--do not threaten to undermine the implementation of
    unpopular central policies or to endanger the leading role of the
    Communist Party. The elected village committees are not part of the
    formal government structure and have no formal constitutional role. The
    powers of elected village committees vary from region to region. Most
    committees have the authority to mediate disputes between villagers,
    improve public order, and authorize small expenditures. The committees
    also carry out political work by serving as a channel of communication
    between villagers and the Government. The village committees have no
    power to tax, set fines or punishments independently, or hire or fire
    village enterprise managers.
        The 1998 revised Village Election Law authorized the establishment
    of ``villager's representative assemblies'' to oversee the performance
    of village committees. Such assemblies already existed for years in
    some provinces; in 1997, for example, an assembly in Zhaoxin county,
    Hebei Province, reportedly removed 54 allegedly corrupt or incompetent
    village committee members and vetoed 72 ``unreasonable'' development
    projects. Township authorities in several provinces have held
    experimental elections to select local executive officials. Citizens of
    Sichuan's Buyun township in December 1998 held the first such vote.
    Despite central government expressions of concern that this election
    violated constitutional provisions requiring that the local people's
    congresses elect executive officials, the central Government ultimately
    confirmed the vote. Another experimental township election during 1999,
    the ``two ballot'' vote in Guangdong Province's Dapeng township, which
    was explicitly authorized by the National People's Congress, allowed
    groups of 100 or more citizens to nominate candidates. A township-wide
    conference of local leaders from various institutes then voted to
    select one of those candidates. The local people's congress confirmed
    the decision in a pro forma vote, thereby satisfying constitutional
    requirements.
        The Government places no restrictions on the participation of women
    or minority groups in the political process; however, they are
    underrepresented in government and politics. Women freely exercise
    their right to vote in village committee elections, but only a small
    fraction of elected members are women. The Government and Party
    organizations include approximately 12 million female officials out of
    61 million Party members. Women constitute 21.83 percent of the
    National People's Congress. The 15th Party Congress elected 22 women to
    serve as members or alternates on the 193-person Central Committee, an
    increase over the total of the previous committee. However, women still
    hold few positions of significant influence at the highest rungs of the
    Party or government structure. One alternate member of the 22-member
    Politburo is a woman, and women hold 2 of 29 ministerial-level
    positions.
        Minorities constitute 14 percent of the National People's Congress,
    although they make up approximately 9 percent of the population. All of
    the country's 56 nationalities are represented in the NPC membership.
    The 15th Party Congress elected 38 members of ethnic minorities to
    serve as members or alternates on the Central Committee, an increase
    over the total of the previous committee. However, minorities hold few
    senior Party or government positions of significant influence.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not permit independent domestic nongovernmental
    organizations to monitor publicly human rights conditions, and there
    are no independent domestic NGO's that comment on human rights
    conditions. It is difficult to establish an NGO, and the Government
    tends to be suspicious of independent organizations; most existing
    NGO's are quasi-governmental in nature and are closely controlled by
    government agencies (see Section 2.b.). However, an informal network of
    dissidents in cities around the country has become a credible source of
    information about government actions taken against activists. The
    information is disseminated to the outside world through organizations
    such as the Hong Kongbased Information Center for Human Rights and
    Democracy and the New Yorkbased Human Rights in China. The press
    regularly prints articles about officials who exceed their authority
    and infringe on citizens' rights. However, the Government remains
    reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record by other
    nations or international organizations and criticizes reports by
    international human rights monitoring groups, maintaining that such
    reports are inaccurate and interfere with the country's internal
    affairs. The Government still maintains that there are legitimate,
    differing approaches to human rights based on each country's particular
    history, culture, social situation, and level of economic development.
    In 1993 the Government established the China Society for Human Rights,
    a ``nongovernmental'' organization whose mandate is not to monitor
    human rights conditions, but to defend the Government's views and human
    rights record.
        The Government has active human rights dialogs with a large number
    of countries, including Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada,
    Norway, Sweden, Brazil, and Japan, as well as the European Union (EU).
    However, these dialogs have not produced any fundamental improvements
    in the Government's human rights practices. In November the United
    States and China agreed in principle to resume the bilateral human
    rights dialog that was suspended by China in 1999. By year's end the
    dialog had not been scheduled yet. In recent years, the Government has
    expanded greatly the number and frequency of judicial and other types
    of legal exchanges with foreign countries.
        In May the U.N. Committee Against Torture issued a report
    expressing concern about continuing allegations of serious incidents of
    torture, especially involving Tibetans and other national minorities.
    It recommended that the country incorporate a definition of torture
    into its domestic law in full compliance with international standards,
    abolish all forms of administrative detention (including reeducation
    through labor), promptly investigate all allegations of torture and
    provide training courses on international human rights standards for
    police, among other things (see Section 1.c.). Government officials
    that appeared before the Committee stated that the country has done a
    great deal in recent years to address torture by officials but noted
    that problems remain in supervising the judicial system. On November
    20, the Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
    U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) that was designed to
    help the country comply with the terms of the International Covenant on
    Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
    Social, and Cultural Rights, which the Government has signed but not
    ratified. The MOU outlined the types of programs to further human
    rights that are to be implemented by the Government and the UNHCHR.
    Such programs are to include human rights education for judges,
    prosecutors, and police; other human rights education programs; the
    publication of reports; and fellowships for experts to study abroad.
    However, no agreement has yet been reached concerning a visit to the
    country by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, which has been under
    discussion since 1999.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        There are laws designed to protect women, children, the disabled,
    and minorities. However, in practice societal discrimination based on
    ethnicity, gender, and disability persists. The concept of a largely
    homogeneous Chinese society pervades the thinking of the Han majority.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem. Violence against women
    can be grounds for prosecution under the law, but there is no national
    law specifically targeting domestic violence, although proposed
    amendments to the 1980 Marriage Law are aimed in part at providing
    protection against spousal abuse. In recognition of the seriousness of
    spousal abuse, 13 provinces and provincial-level cities have passed
    legislation to address the problem. Sociologists note that there has
    been no detailed research on the extent of physical violence against
    women. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the reporting of
    domestic abuse is on the rise, particularly in urban areas, because
    greater attention has been focused on the problem. A July survey report
    by the All-China Women's Federation found that violence occurs in 30
    percent of families, with 80 percent of cases involving husbands
    abusing their wives. The survey implies that one in four married women
    suffers abuse. Actual figures may be higher because spousal abuse still
    goes largely unreported. According to experts, the percentage of
    households in which domestic abuse has occurred is higher in rural
    areas than in urban centers. The July survey found that domestic
    violence occurs at all socioeconomic levels. According to some experts,
    many women do not report domestic violence to the police because, even
    when appropriate legislation exists, local law enforcement authorities
    frequently choose not to interfere in what they regard as a family
    matter. Nonetheless in two recent cases in Liaoning Province, men were
    successfully prosecuted for severe cases of domestic violence. Despite
    an increasing awareness of the problem of domestic violence, there are
    no shelters for victims of domestic violence. Rape is illegal.
        Female infanticide, sex selective abortions, the abandonment of
    baby girls, and the neglect of baby girls remain problems due to the
    traditional preference for sons, and the family planning policy, which
    strictly limits urban couples to one child and rural couples to two.
    Regulations forbid the termination of pregnancies based on the sex of
    the fetus, but many families, especially in rural areas, have used
    ultrasound to identify female fetuses and terminate pregnancies. The
    use of ultrasound for this purpose is prohibited specifically by the
    Maternal and Child Health Care Law, which came into effect in 1995 and
    mandates punishment of medical practitioners who violate the provision.
    However, according to the SFPC, only a handful of doctors have been
    charged under this law. According to the latest available figures,
    compiled in 1994, the number of children abandoned each year is
    approximately 1.7 million, despite the fact that, under the law, child
    abandonment is punishable by a fine and a 5-year prison term. The vast
    majority of abandoned children eventually admitted to orphanages are
    female, although some are males who are either disabled or in poor
    health. Children put up for foreign adoption are almost exclusively
    girls. The neglect of baby girls that results in lower female survival
    rates are also factors. Female babies also suffer from a higher
    mortality rate than male babies, contrary to the worldwide trend. One
    study found the differential mortality rates to be highest in areas
    where women have a lower social status, where economic and medical
    conditions are poor, and where family planning regulations are strictly
    enforced (although the correlation for this factor was weak).
    Government statistics put the national ratio of male to female births
    at 114 to 100; the World Health Organization estimates the ratio to be
    117 to 100. The statistical norm is 106 male births to 100 female
    births. However, in July the Liaoshen Evening News reported that in a
    township of Liaoyang county, the male to female sex ratio was 306/100
    for second children born between 1992 and 1999. After operating for 7
    years, an illegal sex determination clinic was exposed when an outraged
    citizen called the Liaoyang City mayor's hot line. According to
    demographers in the country, currently there may be as many as 100
    million more men than women. The staterun media are paying increasing
    attention to unbalanced birth ratios, and the societal problems, such
    as trafficking in women, which they cause (see Section 6.f.). In the
    cities, the traditional preference for sons is changing; in the rural
    areas that preference continues.
        The authorities have enacted laws and conducted educational
    campaigns in an effort to eradicate the traditional preference for
    sons; however, this preference remains strong in rural China. A number
    of provinces have sought to reduce the perceived higher value of boys
    in providing old-age support for their parents by establishing or
    improving pensions and retirement homes.
        Central government policy formally prohibits the use of force to
    compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization; however, the
    intense pressure to meet family planning targets set by the Government
    has resulted in documented instances in which family planning officials
    have used coercion against women, including forced abortion and
    sterilization, to meet government goals.
        According to some estimates by experts, there are 4 to 10 million
    commercial sex workers in the country. The increased commercialization
    of sex and related trafficking in women has trapped thousands of women
    in a cycle of crime and exploitation, and left them vulnerable to
    disease and abuse. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, one in
    five massage parlors in the country is involved in prostitution, with
    the percentage higher in cities. Unsafe working conditions are rampant
    among the saunas, massage parlors, clubs, and hostess bars that have
    sprung up in large cities. According to one estimate, there are 70,000
    prostitutes in Beijing alone; other estimates have placed the number as
    high as 200,000 or more. Research indicates that up to 80 percent of
    prostitutes in some areas have hepatitis. In light of this and, in
    particular, of the growing threat of AIDS among sex workers, the U.N.
    Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
    Committee in December 1998 recommended that due attention be paid to
    health services for female prostitutes. Although the central Government
    and various provincial and local governments have attempted to crack
    down on the sex trade, there have been numerous credible reports in the
    media of complicity in prostitution by local officials. Thus far
    actions to crack down on this lucrative business, which involves
    organized crime groups and business persons as well as the police and
    the military, have been largely ineffective.
        A high female suicide rate is a serious problem. According to the
    World Bank, Harvard University, and the World Health Organization, some
    56 percent of the world's female suicides occur in China (about 500 per
    day). The World Bank estimated the suicide rate in the country to be
    three times the global average; among women, it was estimated to be
    nearly five times the global average. Research indicates that the low
    status of women, and social and economic pressures due to the rapid
    shift to a market economy are among the leading causes.
        There were credible reports of trafficking in persons, and the
    kidnaping of women for sale into prostitution or marriage is a serious
    problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        There is no statute that outlaws sexual harassment in the
    workplace, although there has been some discussion by legislators about
    the need for such legislation. The problem remains unaddressed in the
    legal system and often in society. There have been reports that due to
    the lack of legal protections and to women's increasing economic
    vulnerability, many victims of sexual harassment do not report it out
    of fear of losing their jobs. However, experts state that more women
    are raising their concerns about sexual harassment because of greater
    awareness of the problem.
        The Government has made gender equality a policy objective since
    1949. The Constitution states that ``women enjoy equal rights with men
    in all spheres of life.'' The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's
    Rights and Interests provides for equality in ownership of property,
    inheritance rights, and access to education. Women's economic and
    political influence has increased. Nonetheless female activists
    increasingly are concerned that the progress that has been made by
    women over the past 50 years is being eroded and that women's status in
    society regressed during the 1990's. They assert that the Government
    appears to have made the pursuit of gender equality a secondary
    priority as it focuses on economic reform and political stability.
    Social and familial pressure also has grown for women to resume their
    traditional roles as wives and mothers. A recent study of how women are
    portrayed in the media revealed that images of a woman's worth
    increasingly are linked to her ability to attract a wealthy husband and
    be a good mother.
        The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests was
    designed to assist in curbing gender-based discrimination. However,
    women continued to report that discrimination, sexual harassment,
    unfair dismissal, demotion, and wage discrepancies were significant
    problems. Efforts have been made by social organizations as well as the
    Government to educate women about their legal rights, and there is
    anecdotal evidence that women increasingly are using laws to protect
    their rights. For example, at Fudan University in Shanghai, the Women's
    Study Center with the support of Shanghai's labor union has established
    a hot line to inform workers, mainly women, of their legal rights.
    Nevertheless, women frequently encounter serious obstacles in getting
    laws enforced. According to legal experts, it is very hard to litigate
    a sex discrimination suit because the vague legal definition makes it
    difficult to quantify damages. As a result, very few cases are brought
    to court. Some observers also have noted that the agencies tasked with
    protecting women's rights tend to focus on maternity-related benefits
    and wrongful termination during maternity leave rather than sex
    discrimination or sexual harassment. The structure of the social system
    also prevents women from having a full range of options. Women who seek
    a divorce face the prospect of losing their housing since government
    work units allot housing to men when couples marry.
        Women have borne the brunt of the economic reform of stateowned
    enterprises. As the Government's plan to revamp state-owned enterprises
    is carried out, millions of workers have been laid off. Of those
    millions, a disproportionate percentage are women, many of whom do not
    have the skills or opportunities to find new jobs. A December 1998
    Asian Development Bank report noted that almost 70 percent of the 23
    million persons who could lose their jobs as a result of state-owned
    enterprise reform were women, even though they only constituted 36.4
    percent of the work force. A 1998 All-China Federation of Trade Unions
    (ACFTU) report estimated that 80 percent of those laid off from
    stateowned enterprises in Heilongjiang Province were women. Women
    between the ages of 35 and 50 were the most affected, and the least
    likely to be retrained. In addition female employees were more likely
    to be required to take pay cuts when a plant or company was in
    financial trouble. There have been reports that many women have been
    forced or persuaded into early retirement as well. Discriminatory
    hiring practices appear to be on the rise as unemployment rises.
    Increasingly companies discriminate by both sex and age, although such
    practices violate labor laws.
        Many employers prefer to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity
    leave and childcare and some even lower the effective retirement age
    for female workers to 40 years of age (the official retirement age for
    men is 60 years and for women 55 years). Lower retirement ages have the
    effect of reducing pensions, which generally are based on years worked.
        The law promises equal pay for equal work. According to a 1997
    World Bank report, women's salaries, on average, were 80 to 90 percent
    of the salaries of their male counterparts. However, a recent
    Government survey found that women were paid only 70 to 80 percent of
    what men received for the same work. Most women employed in industry
    work in lower skilled and lower paid jobs.
        According to official figures, in 1995 there were 145 million
    illiterate persons above the age of 15. Women made up approximately 70
    percent of this total. A 1998 Asian Development Bank report estimated
    that 25 percent of all women are semi-literate or illiterate, compared
    with 10 percent of men. The Government's ``Program for the Development
    of Chinese Women (1995-2000)'' set as one of its goals the elimination
    of illiteracy among young and middle-aged women by the end of the
    century. The main priority was to increase the literacy of rural women,
    80 percent of whom are wholly or partially illiterate. However, some
    women's advocates were skeptical that the Government's goal could be
    attained given the lack of resources.
        While the gap in the education levels of men and women is
    narrowing, men continue to constitute the majority of the relatively
    small percentage of the population that receives a university-level
    education. According to figures released by the All-China Women's
    Federation, at the end of 1997 women made up 36 percent of all
    university students, and 30 percent of all graduate students. However,
    educators in the large cities have reported that there is a trend
    toward greater gender balance in universities. Some academics have
    reported that in some departments women are beginning to outnumber
    men--even in some graduate schools. However, women with advanced
    degrees report an increase in discrimination in the hiring process as
    the job distribution system has opened up and become more competitive
    and market driven.
        Children.--The Constitution provides for 9 years of compulsory
    education for children (see Tibet addendum); however, in economically
    disadvantaged rural areas many children do not attend school for the
    required period, if at all. Public schools are not allowed to charge
    tuition, but, faced with revenue shortfalls since the central
    Government largely stopped subsidizing primary education in the early
    1990's, many schools have begun to charge mandatory fees. Such fees
    make it difficult for poorer families to send their children to school
    or send them to school on a regular basis. Some charity-financed
    schools have opened in recent years in rural areas, but not enough to
    meet the demand. Children of migrant workers in urban areas also often
    do not attend school, although they may be allowed to do so if they pay
    required school fees (which their parents generally cannot afford, and
    which are higher than for resident children). Some unlicensed schools
    that cater to migrant children and have lower school fees reportedly
    have opened in cities in recent years. However, the quality of these
    schools is uneven. Local municipalities do not provide them with
    supplies or financial support. Because the schools are not licensed,
    their graduates may not be admitted to high school. Many of these
    schools reportedly do not offer education beyond grade six, also making
    it difficult for migrant children to obtain further education. Migrant
    schools are in constant danger of being closed by the authorities. The
    government campaign for universal primary school enrollment by 2000
    (which was not met by year's end) has helped to increase enrollment in
    some areas; however, it also reportedly has led to school officials
    inflating the number of children actually enrolled.
        An extensive health care delivery system has led to improved child
    health and a sharp decline in infant mortality rates. According to 1997
    official figures, the infant mortality rate was 33 per 1,000 in 1996.
    According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), in 1995 the mortality
    rate for children under 5 years of age was 47 per 1,000 live births.
        The 1992 Law on the Protection of Juveniles forbids infanticide, as
    well as abandonment or mistreatment of children. The law also prohibits
    discrimination against disabled minors, emphasizes the importance of
    safety and morality, and codifies a variety of judicial protections for
    juvenile offenders. The physical abuse of children can be grounds for
    criminal prosecution.
        There were credible reports of female infanticide. The use of
    ultrasound tests to determine gender also results in decisions to
    terminate pregnancies of female fetuses, but no reliable statistics are
    available on the extent of the problem. One 1997 newspaper article
    quoted a doctor as saying that as many as 97.5 percent of pregnancies
    terminated in his hospital were of female fetuses. A 1997 World Health
    Organization paper reported that the national ratio of male to female
    births in 1994 was 117 to 100 (the worldwide statistical norm is 106 to
    100). However, in July the Liaoshen Evening News reported that in a
    township of Liaoyang County, the male to female sex ratio was 306/100
    for second children born between 1992 and 1999. Part of the statistical
    gap may be attributable to female infanticide, sex-selective
    termination of pregnancies, and abandonment or neglect of girls. The
    underreporting of female births by couples trying to evade family
    planning laws to try to have a son is another significant factor (see
    Section 1.f.).
        According to the latest available figures, compiled in 1994, the
    number of children abandoned each year is approximately 1.7 million,
    despite the fact that, under the law, child abandonment is punishable
    by a fine and a 5-year prison term. The vast majority of abandoned
    children eventually admitted to orphanages are female, although some
    are males who are either disabled or in poor health. Children put up
    for foreign adoption are almost exclusively girls. The treatment of
    children at these institutions varies from adequate to deplorable.
    There have been reports of children at some orphanages being restrained
    for long periods of time and denied basic care and food. Accurate
    determination of infant mortality rates in orphanages is difficult, but
    rates appear to be high at many, especially among new arrivals.
    However, conditions in some other orphanages appear to be adequate, if
    Spartan. Medical professionals frequently advise parents of disabled
    children to put the children into orphanages.
        According to several sources, orphanage workers in some facilities
    reserve basic medical care and even nutrition for children who are
    deemed to have the best chances for survival. Some sources report that
    children whose prospects of survival are determined to be poor are
    placed in rooms separate from other children and subjected to extreme
    neglect. Claims that government policies, as opposed to lack of
    resources, were to blame for the lack of care of children placed in
    orphanages could not be verified. However, Human Rights Watch reported
    in 1996 that many institutions, including those with the highest death
    rates, have budgets that provide for adequate wages, bonuses, and other
    personnel-related costs, but that budgets for children's food,
    clothing, and other necessities are low throughout the country. There
    was a report in 1998 that, at least in one orphanage, a new conference
    room was built while the facilities and care for orphans under the age
    of 2 remained abysmal. The mortality rate for children under the age of
    2 at this institution reportedly approached 100 percent, even for those
    infants who entered in fair health. Bureaucratic indifference and
    corruption on the part of orphanage administrators appear to be
    significant factors in such cases. Since the mid-1990's, foreigners
    were first banned and then subjected to far more restrictions in
    visiting orphanages than previously.
        In recent years, some privately run orphanages (not funded by the
    State) have started to operate, in which conditions may be generally
    better for children. In areas where such orphanages operate, some
    state-run orphanages have exhibited a willingness to learn from them
    and to adopt some of their more modern practices.
        The Government denies that children in orphanages are mistreated or
    refused medical care but acknowledges that the system often is unable
    to provide adequately for some children, especially those who are
    admitted with serious medical problems. In an effort to address this
    problem, in November 1998 the NPC adopted a revised adoption law making
    it easier for couples to adopt. The new law dropped a restriction that
    parents who adopt a child must be childless. It also allows for
    multiple adoptions and lowers the age at which couples are eligible to
    adopt. The Civil Affairs Ministry announced in 1997 that the
    Government's top social welfare priority for that year would be to
    improve conditions in orphanages, and there have been credible reports
    of new construction, renovation, and improved care in some areas. Over
    $30 million (248.4 million RMB) reportedly was allocated for this
    program. A Government white paper on women and children issued in 1997
    stated that the central Government had spent $25.7 million (212.8
    million RMB) between 1990 and 1994 to improve ``children's welfare
    institutions,'' the official term for orphanages. During the same
    period, local Governments apparently allocated almost $18 million (149
    million RMB) to these institutions.
        Children reportedly are detained administratively in custody and
    repatriation centers, either for minor crimes that they have committed
    or because they are homeless. Such children routinely are detained with
    adults and may be required to work (see Sections 1.d, 1.e., and 6.c.).
        Despite government efforts to prevent kidnaping and the buying and
    selling of children (sometimes for labor purposes), these problems
    persist in some rural areas (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Girls and
    women are trafficked and sold as brides, and boys may be trafficked to
    provide sons for couples unable to have one. On May 30, two persons
    convicted of trafficking in children were executed in Jiangxi Province,
    and one was executed in Guizhou Province.
        People with Disabilities.--In 1990 the Government adopted
    legislation that protects the rights of the country's disabled persons.
    According to the official press, all local governments subsequently
    drafted specific measures to implement the law. The press publicizes
    both the plight of the disabled and Government efforts to assist them.
    The Government, at times in conjunction with NGO's such as the Lions
    Club International, sponsors a wide range of preventive and
    rehabilitative programs, including efforts to reduce congenital birth
    defects, treat cataracts, and treat hearing disorders. The goal of many
    of these programs is to allow persons with disabilities to be
    integrated into the rest of society.
        However, reality for the disabled lags far behind legal dictates,
    and many do not receive or have access to special assistance or to
    programs designed to assist them. Misdiagnosis, inadequate medical
    care, pariah status, and abandonment remain common problems. According
    to reports, parents of disabled children often are persuaded by doctors
    to place their children in large government-run institutions, often far
    from their parents, and in which care is often substandard. Those
    parents who choose to keep such children at home generally face
    difficulty in getting adequate medical care, day care, and education
    for these children. In a 1998 speech, Vice Premier Li Lanqing noted
    that in the past decade, the Government had helped some 14 million
    disabled citizens solve their food and clothing problems. Nonetheless,
    government statistics show that almost one-quarter of the approximately
    60 million disabled persons live in extreme poverty. According to 1998
    government statistics, the unemployment rate for disabled persons is
    26.7 percent, a decrease from the past but still almost 10 times the
    official rate for the general population. The Government's new strategy
    is to integrate the disabled into the mainstream work force, but these
    efforts are running into a cultural legacy of discrimination and
    neglect. In the mid-1990's in Beijing and eight other cities, the
    Government began, on a trial basis, to require all companies and
    institutions to hire at least 1 percent of their workers from among the
    disabled. However, over a period of 2 years in Beijing, only 400
    disabled persons obtained jobs in this way; in Shanghai, over a period
    of 3 years, only 100 persons obtained jobs.
        Standards adopted in 1994 for making roads and buildings accessible
    to the disabled are subject to the 1990 Law on the Handicapped, which
    calls for their ``gradual'' implementation. Lax compliance with the law
    has resulted in only limited access to most buildings.
        Deng Pufang, son of the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, is a
    paraplegic who heads the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped and the
    China Disabled Persons' Federation (CDPF), Governmentaffiliated
    organizations tasked with assisting the disabled. In March 1998, this
    organization laid out a series of goals that it hoped to achieve by
    2000, including ensuring that all persons with disabilities have
    adequate food and clothing, providing rehabilitation services for 3
    million individuals, increasing to 80 percent the enrollment rate for
    disabled students, and reducing to 20 percent the unemployment rate for
    disabled workers; as of year's end, the goals had not been met.
        The Maternal and Child Health Care Law forbids the marriage of
    persons with certain specified contagious diseases or certain acute
    mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple
    is at risk of transmitting disabling congenital defects to their
    children, the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control
    or undergo sterilization. This law mandates premarital and prenatal
    examination for genetic or contagious diseases, but it specifies that
    medically advised termination of pregnancy or sterilization requires
    the signed consent of the patients or their guardians.
        In 1998 the Adoption Law was revised to loosen age restrictions on
    adoption. This change, which was intended to facilitate adoption, may
    have unintended consequences for children with special needs. In the
    past, individuals under the age of 35 could adopt only children with
    special needs. The minimum age for adopting a healthy child is now set
    at 30 instead of 35. Some observers worry that the law, which became
    effective in 1999, may eliminate the age-based incentive for the
    adoption of children with special needs.
        Persons in urban areas who are mentally ill or disabled and are
    found on city streets can be detained administratively under custody
    and repatriation regulations, ostensibly for their protection (see
    Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). The conditions under which they are held in
    such centers reportedly are poor and may include being forced to
    perform labor.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to 1995 government
    statistics, the total population of the country's 55 ethnic minorities
    was 108.46 million, or 8.98 percent of the total population. Most
    minority groups reside in areas they traditionally have inhabited, many
    of which are mountainous or remote. The Government's avowed policy on
    minorities calls for preferential treatment in marriage regulations,
    family planning, university admission, and employment. However, there
    have been reports that in some areas ethnic minorities have been
    subjected to pressure to limit births to the lower number allowed Han
    (see Section 1.f.). Programs have been established to provide
    lowinterest loans, subsidies, and special development funds for
    minority areas. Nonetheless, in practice, minorities face
    discrimination. Most of the minorities in border regions are less
    educated than the national average, and job discrimination in favor of
    Han migrants remains a serious problem. Racial discrimination is the
    source of deep resentment among minorities in some areas, such as
    Xinjiang and Tibet; however, the Government does not officially
    recognize racism against minorities or tension among different ethnic
    groups as problems. The media nonetheless often denounce racism and
    call for equal treatment.
        Official figures state that the Government invested $12.6 billion
    (104 billion RMB) in infrastructure development for minority areas
    during the period 1991 to 1995. The Ninth 5-Year Plan announced in 1996
    stated that the Government would raise this figure to $27.8 billion
    (230 billion RMB) for the period from 1996 to 2000. According to
    Government statistics, between 1991 and 1996, the economies in minority
    regions grew by nearly 11 percent annually, surpassing the national
    average in each year. Government development policies have helped
    improve minority living standards. However, real incomes in minority
    areas, especially for non-Han groups, remain well below those in other
    parts of the country, and minorities credibly claim that the majority
    Han Chinese have benefited disproportionately from government programs
    and economic growth. Many development programs have disrupted
    traditional living patterns of minority groups, including Tibetans and
    the Muslim Turkic majority (including Uighurs) of western Xinjiang. For
    example, there is evidence that official poverty alleviation programs
    and major state projects, such as building dams and environmental/
    reforestation projects, include the forced evacuation of persons (see
    Section 2.d.). Plans to develop tourism in Xinjiang also often have
    focused on marketing and investment opportunities but paid little
    attention to how minority cultures and the environment might be
    affected adversely. Since 1949 central government and economic policy
    have resulted in a significant migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang.
    According to a government white paper, in 1998 there were approximately
    8 million Uighurs, 2.5 million other ethnic minorities, and 6.4 million
    Han in Xinjiang, up from 300,000 Han in 1949.
        According to official government statistics, 15.34 million minority
    students attended schools between 1994 and 1996. A 1997 white paper
    stated that 98.2 percent of all schoolage children in the Guangxi
    Zhuang Autonomous Region were enrolled in schools in 1996. In many
    areas with a significant population of minorities, there are two-track
    school systems using either Mandarin or the local minority language.
    Students can choose to attend schools in either system. One
    acknowledged side effect of this policy, originally designed to protect
    and maintain minority cultures, has been the reinforcement of a
    segregated education system. Under this divided education system, those
    graduating from minority schools are at a disadvantage in competing for
    jobs in government and business, which require good Chinese-language
    skills. Graduates of these schools typically need a year or more of
    intensive Chinese before they can cope with course work at a Chinese-
    language university (see Tibet addendum).
        The Communist Party has an avowed policy of boosting minority
    representation in the Government and the Party. A September 1999
    government white paper reported that there were 2.7 million minority
    officials in the Government. According to government statistics, there
    were 163,000 minority officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
    Region. Minority officials constitute 23.3 percent of the region's
    total, exceeding the ratio of the minority population to Han Chinese in
    the region. Many members of minorities occupy local leadership
    positions, and a few have positions of influence at the national level.
    However, in most areas, ethnic minorities are shut out of positions of
    real political and decisionmaking power. In Xinjiang the job of county
    party secretary--the most important position in a county--typically is
    reserved for Han Chinese, even in counties that are close to 100
    percent Uighur. Many minorities resent Han officials holding key
    positions in minority autonomous regions.
        During the year, the Government decided to withdraw from
    consideration for World Bank funding a project to resettle some 58,000
    ethnic Han, Hui Muslim, and Tibetan farmers in a traditionally
    Mongolian and Tibetan area (Dulan county in Haixi Tibetan-Mongolian
    Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province) as part of a poverty
    alleviation program. In June 1999, the World Bank's Executive Board had
    approved the project with the condition that an independent inspection
    panel investigate whether the project was in compliance with World Bank
    standards. After the inspection panel concluded that bank standards
    were violated, the Government withdrew the Qinghai project from bank
    consideration and stated that it would finance the project
    domestically.
        Tensions between ethnic Han citizens and Uighurs in Xinjiang
    continued. Since 1996 the authorities have cracked down harshly on
    suspected Uighur nationalists and independent Muslim religious leaders.
    There were numerous reports during the year that Uighurs were being
    executed or sentenced to long prison terms for separatist activities.
    According to a February report by Human Rights Watch, the pace of
    executions and imposition of long prison terms for suspected
    separatists in Xinjiang increased during 1999, and there were more
    frequent public sentencing rallies during the year. In March a Xinjiang
    court sentenced Rebiya Kadeer, a prominent Uighur businesswoman and
    former member of the provincial-level Chinese People's Political
    Consultative Conference, to 8 years in prison on charges of ``passing
    state intelligence'' to foreigners; according to an official press
    report, the intelligence she was accused of passing included newspaper
    articles and a list of names of persons whose cases had been handled by
    the courts. During her trial, Kadeer was not allowed to speak to her
    lawyer, according to foreign press reports. In November according to
    foreign press reports, her appeal was rejected. Kadeer, her son, and
    her secretary were arrested while on their way to meet a visiting
    foreign delegation in August 1999. Kadeer's son and secretary were
    sentenced administratively to 2- and 3-year reeducation-through-labor
    terms, respectively, in November 1999. Kadeer is reported to be in poor
    health but has been unable to get adequate medical treatment. Many
    foreign observers believe Kadeer was singled out for her activism on
    behalf of Uighurs and for her husband's involvement with Uighur causes
    and Radio Free Asia in the United States. In April a Xinjiang court
    upheld a lower court in sentencing a Uighur man to 15 years in prison
    and sentencing 17 of his accomplices to prison terms ranging from 1 to
    14 years. The 18 were found to have possessed ``illegal publications
    and audio cassette tapes with reactionary contents'' and to have
    assembled with the intention of undermining national unity, according
    to the official media. In June a court in Xinjiang's capital handed
    down death sentences against four men found guilty of ``splitting the
    country, intentional manslaughter, robbery'' and other crimes,
    according to an official news report. Amnesty International reported
    that Zulikar Memet was executed secretly on June 21 for helping
    separatists. In July official media reported that the same court had
    ordered the execution of three ``national separatists'' who in 1997
    allegedly had established a ``Party of God'' and subsequently
    trafficked in explosive materials and engaged in murder, larceny,
    robbery, and rape. In August 1999 Amnesty International issued a report
    documenting 210 death sentences and 190 executions in Xinjiang since
    1997. According to AI, thousands of persons have been detained
    arbitrarily, including some for their suspected support of the
    separatist cause. AI reports that many Uighurs detained for political
    reasons in Xinjiang between 1990 and 1998 are believed still to be in
    custody. According to foreign press reports, Abdulhelil Abdumijit was
    tortured to death in custody.
        A campaign to stress ethnic unity and to condemn ``splittism'' and
    religious extremism that began in Xinjiang in 1997 continued. This
    campaign pervades the Chinese-language media and reaches into the
    region's school system. Authorities maintained tight control over
    ``separatist activities,'' announced tightened security and
    antiterrorist measures, and mounted campaigns to crack down on
    opposition during the year. Because the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
    Region government regularly lumps together those involved in ``ethnic
    separatism, illegal religious activities, and violent terrorism,'' it
    is often unclear whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or
    judicial punishments involve ethnic discrimination.
        Possession of separatist publications or audiovisual materials is
    not permitted, and, according to reports, possession of such materials
    has resulted in lengthy prison sentences. The author of a history of
    the Uighurs that was severely criticized by provincial-level and
    national authorities in the mid-1990s remains prohibited from
    publishing or from meeting with foreigners. A Uighurlanguage press
    exists in Xinjiang, but it has a very small circulation, and much of
    the population depends on market rumors for information. In general
    central authorities made it clear that they do not tolerate opposition
    to Communist Party rule and responded to unrest and terrorist incidents
    with force and heightened security measures.
        The education system provides Chinese-language instruction for Han
    students and Uighur-language instruction for Uighur students until
    fourth grade and then gradually switches to Chinese as the principal
    language of instruction. Graduation from the Uighur school system
    leaves Uighurs poorly educated, with an inadequate command of the
    Chinese language.
        According to some estimates, the migration of ethnic Han into
    Xinjiang in recent decades has caused the Han-Uighur ratio in the
    capital of Urumqi to shift from 20 to 80 to 80 to 20, and is a source
    of Uighur resentment. By some estimates, 250,000 Han have moved into
    the region annually in the last few years. Han control of the region's
    political and economic institutions also has been a factor in the
    growth of tension. The testing of nuclear weapons in Xinjiang until
    July 1996 was another source of serious contention because of
    continuing health concerns and environmental degradation. Although
    government policies have brought tangible economic improvements to
    Xinjiang, Uighurs maintain that Han receive a disproportionate share of
    the benefits. The majority of Uighurs are poor farmers, and 25 percent
    are illiterate.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for
    ``freedom of association;'' however, in practice this right is subject
    to the interests of the State and the leadership of the Communist
    Party, and true freedom of association does not exist. The Communist
    Party controls the country's sole officially recognized worker's
    organization, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).
    Attempts to form independent unions are suppressed swiftly. The 1992
    Trade Union Law gives the ACFTU effective control over the
    establishment and operations of all legal subsidiary labor
    organizations. The head of the ACFTU is a member of the Standing
    Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
        Independent labor unions are illegal. The Trade Union Law required
    that the establishment of unions at any level be submitted to a higher-
    level trade union organization for approval, and only approved
    registered unions are legal. The ACFTU subsumes under its authority 16
    industry-based and 31 provincial-level labor unions. They, in turn,
    have jurisdiction over roughly 590,000 ``grassroots'' labor unions
    nationwide. According to labor regulations, there can be only one
    ``grassroots'' union per enterprise, and only enterprises that have at
    least 25 employees may establish unions. In the past decade or more,
    numerous attempts were made to establish independent unions. Following
    the signing of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
    Cultural Rights in 1997, a number of labor activists have petitioned
    the Government to establish free trade unions, as allowed under the
    covenant. The Government had not approved the establishment of any
    independent unions by year's end.
        Under the country's planned economy, the ACFTU's main task has been
    to assure labor discipline, mobilize workers to achieve party
    objectives, including national economic development goals, and protect
    worker welfare and interests. However, in practice the majority of
    ACFTU-affiliated unions function primarily as social organizations,
    arranging recreational activities for workers, such as movie nights,
    picnics, and charity drives. In the face of rising unemployment, unions
    have played a more active role on behalf of unemployed workers, who
    have grown to over 20 million with the restructuring of state-owned
    enterprises. The ACFTU claims that, through mid-year, it had
    established over 4,000 job placement centers and more than 6,500
    professional training programs, benefiting over 3 million unemployed
    workers. Since 1999 the ACFTU has also contributed over $50 million
    (RMB 390 million) to displaced workers in difficult circumstances. Some
    categories of unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits
    for as many as 5 years, but many have not received their full
    entitlements, primarily because of funding problems in the social
    security system.
        The work force totals approximately 740 million persons, including
    roughly 540 million rural workers. The ACFTU claims 103 million
    members, over 90 percent of whom work in state-owned enterprises. The
    Trade Union Law allows workers to decide whether to join the unions in
    their enterprises, and there have been no reports of repercussions for
    the 5 percent of workers in the state-owned sector who have not joined.
    In recent years the ACFTU actively began recruiting workers in the
    private sector, including in township and village enterprises (TVE's),
    as well as in foreign joint ventures. The ACFTU has 5.5 million members
    in foreign-funded enterprises and over 2 million members in private
    (nonstate domestic) enterprises at year's end. However, the vast
    majority of enterprises in China's burgeoning private sector, which
    according to official statistics employs roughly 20 million workers, do
    not have a union. Approximately 10 percent of private firms have a
    Communist Party representative among the workforce, whose nominal task
    is to defend workers' interests. Military and security personnel are
    the only categories of workers who cannot join a union.
        The ACFTU has submitted to the Government draft amendments to the
    Trade Union Law, which would strengthen the right of private sector
    workers to form or join ACFTU-affiliated unions. These draft amendments
    are still under consideration. However, workers in many joint ventures
    and foreign-invested enterprises have some form of worker organization,
    even though they do not have unions. These organizations are not part
    of the ACFTU but usually have Communist Party members within their
    leadership. Like unions, the organizations work with management on
    labor issues but serve primarily to arrange social activities for
    workers. They do not engage in collective bargaining with management.
    According to members, these organizations have more flexible and direct
    dealings with enterprise management, since they are not subject to
    ACFTU strictures.
        There are roughly 540 million rural workers, the overwhelming
    majority of whom are not organized. Farmers do not have a union.
    However, farmers have written millions of letters to the central and
    local governments to express their views on working conditions, and
    government officials have been reasonably responsive. There are
    approximately 125 million agricultural workers in TVE's. The ACFTU has
    attempted in recent years to recruit TVE workers, but only 5.2 million
    had joined as of 1999. Although some TVE's have local branches of the
    ACFTU, most TVE managers maintain that an ACFTU presence is not
    feasible because their employees continue to be classified as
    ``farmers'' rather than ``workers.'' However, some Communist Party
    secretaries in TVE's take it upon themselves to establish union
    representation and then affiliate with the ACFTU.
        In 1999 migrant workers began to form semiautonomous ``village
    labor unions'' on the rural outskirts of some cities in order to
    represent their interests in new private sector industries. These
    nascent, loosely organized groups continued to operate, but they
    reportedly did not grow in size or scope. Local governments have not
    interfered in their activities, although these organizations have not
    yet been brought formally within the ACFTU. According to some domestic
    press reports, these village unions are effective, relatively
    independent, and cooperative with city governments.
        During the year, the Government continued its efforts to eliminate
    illegal union activity, including through detention or arrest of labor
    activists. In mid-December labor activist Cao Maobing was detained and
    admitted against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yancheng,
    Jiangsu Province, where he reportedly also was forced to take
    medication. At year's end, he remained at the facility. According to
    press reports, Cao led workers at a local silk factory in an effort to
    form an independent labor union after they concluded that the official
    ACFTU would not help them address their grievances. Workers' grievances
    included alleged corruption on the part of factory management, the
    nonpayment of promised worker subsidies, and unpaid pensions. In mid-
    November 1,800 of the workers reportedly began a strike. Cao was
    arrested soon after he spoke to Western reporters about efforts to set
    up an independent union; reportedly, he suffered from no apparent
    mental illness. According to a report by the General Secretary of the
    International Metalworkers Federation, near Funing, workers at textile
    factories, a brewery, and a fertilizer plant have attempted
    unsuccessfully to form independent unions. In December 1999,
    authorities in Henan Province committed Xue Jifeng to a mental hospital
    after he attempted to establish an independent labor union to support
    workers harmed in a financial fraud. He was held until June (see
    Section 1.d.). In May Zhang Shanguang, the founder of the short-lived
    Association to Protect the Rights and Interests of Laid-off Workers,
    lost an appeal against a 1998 10-year prison sentence for providing
    ``intelligence'' to foreigners. Zhang had informed a Radio Free Asia
    reporter about worker protests in Hunan Province. Labor activist Liao
    Shihua, originally arrested in 1999 on subversion charges after taking
    part in a workers' demonstration in Hunan, was sentenced in June to 6
    years in prison. Yue Tianxiang, Guo Xinmin, and Wang Fengshan, who
    established the ``China Workers Watch'' organization to defend workers'
    rights, were arrested in 1999 and sentenced to 10 years, 2 years, and 2
    years in prison, respectively, for subversion. Wang was released in
    August, but Yue and Guo remained in prison. He Chaohui, who was given a
    10-year prison sentence in 1999 for providing human rights
    organizations with information on worker protests, remained in prison.
    He had previously served 2 years in prison in the 1980's for illegal
    union activities and had more recently organized worker demonstrations
    in Hunan. In 1999 he was convicted for providing human rights
    organizations overseas with information on protests. Liu Jingsheng, who
    received a 15-year prison sentence in 1995 for attempting to organize
    independent labor unions, also remained in prison. Shanghai labor
    dissident Wang Miaogen disappeared in 1999, and some observers believe
    that he is being held in a psychiatric hospital.
        In June the Government released labor activists Li Wangyang and
    Zhang Jingsheng from prison. Li and Zhang were sentenced in 1989 to 13
    years in prison after they cofounded the ``Autonomous Federation of
    Workers'' and participated in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations.
    Zhang had earlier served a 4-year prison sentence for taking part in
    the 1979 Democracy Wall Movement. Li was released from prison on bail
    in 1996 but was reincarcerated in 1997.
        Neither the Constitution nor the labor law provides for the right
    to strike. The right to strike was removed from the Constitution in
    1982 on the grounds that the political system had eradicated problems
    between workers and enterprise owners. The Communist Party exerts
    strong control over organized labor. Strikes are not sanctioned
    officially, and workers virtually never act through unions to obtain
    concessions from management by means of work stoppages. Accurate
    statistics on strike incidents are not available. However, labor
    disputes have risen in recent years; according to the Labor Ministry,
    there were 8,150 labor disputes in 1992, and over 120,000 in 1999.
    During the year, there continued to be numerous demonstrations by
    workers and retired workers protesting unpaid wages, benefits,
    pensions, or unemployment stipends. Workers also protested continuing
    large-scale layoffs that have been prompted by industrial
    restructuring. Most demonstrations were short and nonviolent, with
    participation ranging as high as the thousands. Government authorities
    generally responded with minimal force and refrained from detaining
    large numbers of participants. However, in several cases,
    demonstrations disrupted access to railway lines or other public
    facilities and were suppressed by force. For example, in February mine
    workers in Liaoning Province clashed with police and military officers
    for 3 days after the closure of a mine was announced; the miners,
    although given a severance package, were owed 18 months' wages (see
    Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Workers were also angry over the alleged
    corruption of the factory bosses. The area was briefly placed under
    martial law. In May up to 2,000 unpaid workers reportedly protested at
    their factory and at local government offices in Liaoyang, Liaoning
    Province; the police eventually broke up the demonstration. Dozens were
    reported injured, and three persons were arrested. In December the
    Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that 2,000
    construction workers in Heilongjiang Province who had not been paid in
    2 years briefly blocked a railway line. In at least one city, Shenyang,
    local government officials banned public demonstrations effective July
    20 (see Section 2.b.), although demonstrations continued to take place.
    Authorities in some cases provided funds to alleviate wage or benefit
    arrearages in response to the demonstrations.
        The Labor and Trade Union laws give unions the role of mediators
    with management in cases of labor disputes. Under these laws, the
    formal dispute settlement procedure allows cases to be submitted first
    to an enterprise's mediation committee, whose chairman should be a
    union representative. If the dispute remains unresolved, or if either
    party chooses to bypass the mediation process, the case may then be
    submitted to a local arbitration committee, which should include
    representatives from the union, management, and local government. If no
    solution is reached at this level, the dispute may be submitted to the
    courts. Nationwide there are approximately 270,000 enterprise labor
    dispute mediation commissions and more than 3,100 labor dispute
    arbitration commissions set up under Ministry of Labor and Social
    Security auspices. There are 1,569,000 full- and part-time enterprise
    mediators and more than 17,000 labor arbitrators. The number of labor
    disputes has risen rapidly in recent years. According to statistics
    released during the year by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
    arbitration committees nationwide handled over 120,000 labor disputes
    in 1999, nearly double the 1998 figure and quadruple the 1995 number.
    According to a 1999 report of the International Confederation of Free
    Trade Unions (ICFTU), these mediation efforts are often preferential to
    employers and largely are ineffective in advocating worker rights.
        The country is a member of the International Labor Organization
    (ILO) and has ratified core ILO conventions prohibiting child labor and
    discrimination in remuneration for male and female workers. China has
    not ratified other core conventions regarding the right of association,
    the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition against
    compulsory labor. The Government has worked closely with the ILO for
    several years on programs in such areas as industrial relations,
    employment promotion, and occupational safety.
        The ICFTU brought a complaint against the Government to the ILO in
    1998, alleging the detention of trade unionists and violations of the
    right to organize. The Government denied the allegations in its
    official response to the ILO in March 1999. Later in 1999, the ILO's
    governing body found the response inadequate and requested the
    Government to provide additional information. The Government has not
    yet replied to the request.
        There are no legal provisions allowing for individual unions to
    affiliate with international labor organizations. However, the ACFTU
    has cultivated relations with international trade union organizations.
    According to the ACFTU, by mid-year it had established exchanges and
    cooperative relations with over 400 trade unions and international and
    regional trade organizations in over 130 countries and regions. Over
    the past year, roughly 60 official ACFTU delegations traveled overseas
    to meet and study with trade union counterparts. During the year, the
    ACFTU for the first time received a visit from the head of the ICFTU.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Law
    permits collective bargaining for workers in all types of enterprises.
    The law also provides for workers in all types of enterprises to sign
    individual as well as collective contracts. Collective contracts are to
    be worked out between ACFTU or worker representatives and management
    and specify such matters as working conditions, wage scales, and hours
    of work. Individual contracts which are to be drawn up in line with the
    terms of the collective contract. Collective contracts must be
    submitted to local government authorities for approval within 15 days.
    According to the ACFTU, 75 million workers in over 360,000 enterprises
    worked under contracts that were negotiated in this fashion as of mid-
    June 1999.
        In spite of these legal and procedural provisions for collective
    bargaining, workers in collective and state-owned enterprise have
    little real power to influence wage levels, although small number of
    workers with high level technical skills can negotiate effectively on
    salary and fringe benefits. MOLSS sets guidelines for determining the
    total wage bill for each collective or state-owned enterprise: 1) as a
    percentage of profits, 2) as a contract amount with the local labor
    bureau, 3) as a state-set amount for money-losing enterprises, or 4) as
    an enterprise-set amount subject to Labor Ministry review. Individual
    enterprises determine how to divide the total among workers, a decision
    usually made by the enterprise manager in consultation with the
    enterprise's Communist Party secretary and the ACFTU.
        Worker congresses, which are held once or twice a year, have been
    established in over 314,000 enterprises. ACFTU officials publicly have
    called for strengthening worker congresses--particularly on the sale
    and merger of enterprises. Enterprise employees or their
    representatives attend to examine enterprise policies and reform plans.
    Participants are supposed to be entitled to evaluate and, if necessary,
    dismiss enterprise managers. Unions, in consultation with management,
    are supposed to implement resolutions passed by the congresses.
    However, these rights have not been realized in practice. Many worker
    congresses are rubber stamps for deals predetermined by the manager,
    union representative, and Communist Party secretary. In smaller
    enterprises, the same person sometimes holds these three posts.
        The Trade Union Law prohibits antiunion discrimination and
    specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or
    terminated by enterprise management during their term of office. Given
    strict top-down control of organized labor activity, and Communist
    Party control of unions, instances of reprisals or discriminatory
    action by management against unions are uncommon. The Government
    ratified ILO Convention 100 on discrimination in 1990.
        Laws governing working conditions in special economic zones (SEZ's)
    are not significantly different from those in the rest of the country.
    Wages in the SEZ's and in the southeastern part of the country
    generally are higher than in some other parts of the country because
    high levels of investment have created a great demand for available
    labor. As in other areas of the country, officials have admitted that
    some foreign investors in the SEZ's are able to negotiate
    ``sweetheart'' deals with local partners that effectively bypass labor
    regulations. Some foreign businesses in the SEZ's have ACFTU-affiliated
    unions, and management reports positive relations with union
    representatives. One reason is that the ACFTU discourages strikes and
    work stoppages.
        c. Prohibition on Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and bonded labor, but forced labor is a serious problem,
    particularly in penal institutions. Some penal facilities contract with
    regular industries for prisoners to perform manufacturing and assembly
    work. Others operate their own companies. A 1999 directory of Chinese
    corporations published by a foreign business information company listed
    at least two correctional institutions as having business enterprises.
    Human rights advocates note government publications that document the
    export of products made with prison labor. Regulations bar the export
    of prison-made goods, but these regulations are not enforced
    effectively. In 1998 there were reports that soccer balls, manufactured
    for a foreign company, were produced for export by prisons in the
    Shanghai area. A request for investigation of the allegations was made
    to the Government in October 1998; there has been no response to date.
        In 1992 the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in products produced by prison
    labor. It also allows U.S. officials, with the approval of the
    Government, to visit prison production facilities to check specific
    allegations that prisoners in these facilities have produced goods
    exported to the U.S. A statement of cooperation (SOC) detailing
    specific procedures for implementation of the MOU was signed in 1994.
    Although the signing of the SOC initially helped foster a more
    productive relationship between U.S. diplomats and Chinese authorities,
    since 1997 Chinese authorities have permitted only one U.S. inspection
    of prison facilities. In April the Ministry of Justice met with U.S.
    Embassy officials to discuss prison labor after having declined to do
    so for 3 years. In September the Ministry permitted U.S. Embassy
    officers to visit the Dezhou Shengjian Machine Works in Shandong
    Province, a site that was the subject of a longstanding visit request.
    No evidence was found to support allegations that prison labor there
    had been used to produce items exported to the U.S. During the year,
    the Ministry of Justice made no response to seven requestsone dating
    back to 1992 and several dating back to 1994--for visits to sites
    suspected of exporting prison labor products to the United States. U.S.
    officials also renewed requests, some dating back to 1994, for the
    Ministry of Justice to investigate 10 other facilities suspected of
    exporting prison labor products. The Ministry of Justice did not
    respond to any of these additional requests during the year.
        In addition to prisons and reform-through-labor facilities, which
    hold inmates sentenced through judicial procedures, the Government also
    maintains a network of reeducation-through-labor camps, to which
    persons are sentenced, without judicial review, through administrative
    procedures (see Section 1.d.). Inmates of reeducationthroughlabor
    facilities generally are required to work, and there have been reports
    that products made in these facilities are exported. The Government has
    taken the position that the facilities are not prisons and has denied
    access to them under the 1992 prison labor MOU with the United States.
    Credible reports from international human rights organizations and the
    foreign press indicate that some persons in pretrial detention also are
    required to work. Inmates of custody and repatriation centers, who also
    have been detained administratively without trial, reportedly are
    required to perform labor while in detention, often to repay the cost
    of their detention. Most such inmates perform agricultural labor (see
    Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
        Most anecdotal reports conclude that working conditions in the
    penal system's light manufacturing factories are similar to those in
    other factories, but conditions on the penal system's farms and in
    mines can be very harsh. As in many workplaces, safety is a low
    priority. There are no available figures for deaths and injuries in
    prison industries.
        According to press reports, in June more than 2,300 inmates at the
    Shangrao labor camp staged a strike in protest against forced overtime
    doing the intensive labor of ore milling. After camp officials called
    in over 500 armed police to suppress the strike, a riot occurred. In
    the incident, 3 persons were killed and more than 70 were wounded (see
    also Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Trafficking in women, and the kidnaping and sale of women and
    children for forced prostitution, are serious problems (see Sections 5
    and 6.f.).
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by
    children, and the Government on balance is believed to enforce the
    prohibition effectively, except in regard to the problem of trafficking
    in children for forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) and of
    child labor in custody and repatriation centers (see Sections 1.d.,
    1.e., and 5). During the year, the media (including domestic media)
    reported several cases in which children were alleged to have been
    compelled to work (See section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Law specifies that, with a few strictly-
    supervised exceptions, ``no employing unit shall be allowed to recruit
    juveniles under the age of 16,'' 2 years older than the ILO standard
    age of 14 years for developing countries. The Labor Law specifies
    administrative review, fines, and revocation of business licenses of
    those businesses that illegally hire minors. The law also stipulates
    that children are to receive 9 years of compulsory education and that
    parents or guardians should provide for their subsistence. Laborers
    between the ages of 16 and 18 are referred to as ``juvenile workers,''
    and are prohibited from engaging in certain forms of physical work,
    including labor in mines. The Government adopted ILO Convention 138 on
    the minimum age of employment in 1999. The Government has not adopted
    ILO convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor. The Government
    also has not made a public statement on the eradication of such labor
    or established a national program with that objective.
        The Government maintains that the country does not have a
    significant child labor problem, although Government officials concede
    privately that isolated cases of illegal child labor exist. Of the
    country's approximately 300 million children, the number who are
    working in contravention of ILO conventions or the law is unclear.
    Since 1999 the ILO has attempted unsuccessfully to secure central
    government consent to conduct studies on the national scope of illegal
    child labor. Local experts on child labor estimate that the number is
    in the tens of thousands and that the overwhelming majority of children
    involved work voluntarily, with family encouragement. These experts say
    that working children are mostly from rural areas in the interior
    provinces, where lagging economic conditions in recent years have led
    families to seek additional sources of income. Rural teenagers, for
    example, have been attracted increasingly to work in urban factories,
    since wages there are higher than can be obtained in agricultural
    areas. Apart from agricultural work, child workers in rural areas
    appear to work primarily for TVE's. In urban areas, they may take up
    such jobs as car washers, garbage collectors, and street vendors. Some
    academics suspect that coal mines, which often operate far from urban
    centers and out of the purview of law enforcement officials, also
    occasionally employ children.
        Moreover a leading labor analyst states that the growing flow of
    adult workers from rural areas to urban areas in search of better
    paying jobs has created a shortage of labor in some rural industries,
    mines, and agriculture. This has led to increased child labor in these
    areas as children are recruited to fill these jobs. In July a Hong Kong
    newspaper reported that a factory in Fujian Province employed child
    laborers. In August the same newspaper reported that a foreign fast
    food chain had been issuing promotional items in Hong Kong that were
    produced with child labor by a company in Guangdong Province. The
    company stated that it previously had inspected the factory without
    finding evidence of child labor.
        Trafficking in children for purposes of labor is a problem. While
    there are no reliable estimates of the number of children trafficked
    for all purposes, those trafficked for purposes of labor are estimated
    to be the majority. Children trafficked to work usually are sent from
    poorer interior areas to relatively richer interior areas or large
    cities; traffickers reportedly often entice parents to relinquish their
    children with promises of large remittances that their children will be
    able to send back to them. Many such children work in small factories.
    Rising school tuition fees and declining rural incomes discourage many
    rural parents from keeping their children, especially girls, in school
    beyond the fourth grade and make such offers more attractive. The
    children's remittances, along with bribes paid by traffickers to
    authorities, have made investigation into the scope of the problem
    difficult. During the year, the media gave unprecedented coverage to
    illegal child labor cases, fueling concerns in nongovernment circles
    that child labor was a bigger problem than acknowledged by the
    Government. Media reports publicized a campaign against the trafficking
    of women and children that was launched in April by the Ministry of
    Public Security and the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), the
    government agency responsible for the enforcement of child labor
    legislation (see Section 6.f.). Also in April, a story about the rescue
    of 84 children who were taken from Guizhou Province and forced to work
    in a Zhejiang Province factory appeared on television. Newspapers and
    radio stations later reported on traffickers deceiving families and
    placing children in difficult working conditions.
        The ILO and UNICEF have begun cooperation with local government
    officials and the All-China Women's Federation to assist child victims
    of trafficking, some of whom were trafficked for forced labor purposes.
    In August the ILO launched a program with local Government officials in
    Yunnan Province to reenroll former child workers in school.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law codifies many of
    the general principles of labor reform, setting out provisions on
    employment, labor contracts, working hours, wages, skill development
    and training, social insurance, dispute resolution, legal
    responsibility, supervision, and inspection. There is no national
    minimum wage; the Labor Law allows local governments to determine their
    own standards on minimum wages. In general local governments set
    minimum wage levels higher than the levels they set for the local
    minimum standard income, but lower than the current wage level of the
    average worker. Minimum wages are usually sufficient to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family.
        Media reports note that in many industries, including textile and
    garment manufacturing, compulsory overtime is common, and that on
    occasion, there is no provision of extra pay for overtime. There are
    also media accounts of workers being prevented from leaving factory
    compounds without permission.
        The MOLSS has implemented a nationwide system to provide
    unemployment benefits to laid-off urban workers and basic living
    stipends to the poorest urban residents. There are 20 million laid off
    and unemployed workers in an urban workforce of about 240 million (see
    Section 6.a.). Unemployment benefits are set as a percentage of a
    worker's former salary. Basic living stipends supplement the difference
    between a poor person's income and the minimum standard income for the
    city where he lives. Each city government determines the minimum
    standard income on the basis of local economic conditions. In addition
    to the stipend, families living on less than the minimum standard
    income are eligible for subsidized food, medical services, housing, and
    funds to enable school-age children to complete compulsory education.
    In 1999 the Government raised both unemployment benefits and basic
    living stipends by 30 percent, despite reports that a number of cities
    had difficulty funding benefits and stipends even before the increase.
    While there were no additional increases during the year, these funding
    problems persisted, particularly in the poorer northeastern and
    interior provinces. The cities with the highest minimum standard
    incomes were Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing at $39 (RMB
    319), $38 (RMB 312), $34 (RMB 280), and $31 (RMB 260) per month,
    respectively. Less developed cities such as Hohhot (Inner Mongolia) and
    Nanchang (Jiangxi Province) raised minimum standard incomes to $17 (RMB
    143) and $16 (RMB 130) per month, respectively. However, many workers
    reportedly are not receiving the benefits they are entitled to, because
    the state-owned enterprises and governments are unable to contribute to
    the funds that pay them (see Section 6.a.).
        According to statistics published by the National Bureau of
    Statistics (NBS), the annual per capita income of urban residents in
    1999 was $705 (RMB 5,854), an increase of 8 percent in real terms from
    1998. The per capita income of rural residents was $266 (RMB 2,210), a
    real increase of 2 percent from the previous year. NBS figures for the
    first 9 months of the year indicated that urban incomes were growing by
    8.4 percent, while rural incomes were increasing by only 2.5 percent,
    widening the already large gap between the living standards of the 800
    million rural residents and those of urban workers. Economists have
    estimated the ratio between average urban incomes in southern coastal
    Provinces and rural incomes in interior Provinces at 12 to 1.
        The Government reduced the national standard workweek in 1995 from
    44 hours to 40 hours, excluding overtime. The Labor Law mandates a 24-
    hour rest period weekly and does not allow overtime work in excess of 3
    hours a day or 36 hours a month. It also sets forth a required scale of
    remuneration for overtime work. Enforcement of regulations governing
    overtime work varies according to region and type of enterprise.
        Occupational health and safety remain problems and are frequent
    themes of campaigns and posters in enterprises. The poor enforcement of
    occupational health and safety regulations continues to put workers'
    lives at risk. Working conditions in the private sector often are poor.
    Recognizing this, the Government continued during the year to cooperate
    with the ILO in organizing training programs for enterprises' health
    and safety officers as well as local government officials. The current
    work injury insurance system covers only 40 million of the country's
    200 million industrial workers. Every work unit must designate a health
    and safety officer, and the ILO has established a training program for
    these officials. Nonetheless there is a high rate of industrial
    accidents, with most of the accidents occurring in the mining sector.
    In 1998 President Jiang Zemin called for a concerted effort to improve
    occupational safety after industrial accidents reached an all-time high
    of 18,268 in 1997. According to official national statistics, the
    number of industrial accidents declined 16 percent from 1997 to 15,372
    in 1998 and fell another 14 percent to 13,258 in 1999. Compared with
    1998, deaths stemming from accidents in 1999 declined 14 percent to
    12,587, and the number of seriously injured workers fell 12 percent to
    4,936. However, in 1999 there were 96 industrial accidents in which 10
    or more people died, an increase of 16 percent over 1998. During the
    year the State Economic and Trade Commission said that the number of
    industrial deaths and injuries was still excessive and faulted poor
    safety supervision by business enterprises. Less than half of rural
    enterprises meet national dust and poison standards. Many factories
    that use harmful products, such as asbestos, not only fail to protect
    their workers against the ill effects of such products, but also do not
    inform them about the potential hazards.
        Industrial accident statistics for Shenzhen and Guangdong, which
    have been reported by the Chinese and foreign media, suggest that
    official national statistics may be understated. According to press
    reports in April, an investigation by the Workers Daily found that
    15,000 serious accidents occurred in Shenzhen's 9,582 factories in
    1999, of which 12,189 were handled by the local Labor Bureau. The
    investigation also found that on average 31 workers per day were
    injured in work-related accidents that left them permanently disabled,
    and 1 worker died as a result of a work-related accident every 4+ days.
    The China Machinery Daily reported in 1999 that there were over 20,000
    cases of industrial injuries per year in Guangdong. The same newspaper
    also reported that about 50,000 persons nationwide lose fingers yearly
    in industrial accidents.
        As in 1998, the overall improvement in industrial safety in 1999
    was due largely to a decrease in mine accidents, which in past years
    have accounted for more than half of all industrial accidents. Compared
    with 1998, the number of mine accidents declined 20 percent in 1999 to
    4,516 (representing one-third of all industrial accidents). While
    mining deaths fell 18 percent to 7,705 in 1999, that number still
    represented nearly two-thirds of all industrial deaths. The decline was
    primarily the result of a continuing national drive that, for both
    safety and economic reasons, has shut down approximately 36,000 small,
    unlicensed coal mines since 1998. The purpose of the drive has been
    two-fold: to reduce mine accidents and to lower the surplus supply of
    coal, which has driven down coal prices in recent years.
        Although the Constitution does not provide for the right to strike,
    the Trade Union Law explicitly recognizes the right of unions to
    ``suggest that staff and workers withdraw from sites of danger'' and
    participate in accident investigations. However, it is unclear to what
    extent workers actually can remove themselves from such dangerous
    situations without risking loss of employment. Private sector workers
    in particular fear the loss of their jobs if they complain about
    working conditions. Workers who are permanently disabled in work-
    related accidents generally are fired, leaving them without a means of
    support or often even a place to live. Workers who are injured, killed,
    or sickened on the job or who are exploited by their employers often
    have little effective recourse, being unable to afford the expense of
    legal remedies, and are not compensated. However, there are a very few
    private attorneys who specialize in such cases, and there are some
    legal aid organizations which can assist workers in such cases.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons and the
    abduction of women for trafficking (particularly within the country)
    are serious problems. The country is a source and a destination point
    for trafficking in persons. The purchase of women was criminalized in
    1991, with the enactment of the NPC Standing Committee's ``Decision
    Relating to the Severe Punishment of Criminal Elements Who Abduct and
    Kidnap Women and Children,'' which made abduction and sale separate
    offenses. The 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
    Interests also addressed the issue of trafficking in women. Individuals
    have been sentenced to death for their involvement in the trade in
    persons. Two persons reportedly were executed in May in Guangxi
    Province for drugging, raping, and selling three women. That same
    month, a man was executed in Guangdong Province for trafficking in
    women. On May 30, two persons convicted of trafficking in children were
    executed in Jiangxi Province and one was executed in Guizhou Province.
    In October four men in Jiangsu Province reportedly were executed for
    selling women, for between $180 and $480 each, into forced prostitution
    and pornographic exploitation. In November a man was sentenced to life
    in prison for smuggling more than 277 persons into other countries.
        According to some estimates by experts, there may be 4 to 10
    million commercial sex workers in the country, an unknown number of
    whom may have been trafficked (see Section 5). The increased
    commercialization of sex and related trafficking in women has trapped
    thousands of women in a cycle of crime and exploitation, and left them
    vulnerable to disease and abuse. According to one estimate, there are
    70,000 prostitutes in Beijing alone; other estimates have placed the
    number as high as 200,000 or more. According to the official Xinhua
    News Agency, one in five massage parlors in China is involved in
    prostitution, with the percentage higher in cities. Prostitutes can be
    found at many bars and clubs in urban areas.
        Women also are trafficked within or to China for the purpose of
    forced marriage, and it is estimated that the majority of women
    trafficked within the country are trafficked for this purpose. Some
    experts, including the CEDAW Committee, have suggested that the serious
    imbalance in sex ratios in some regions (see Section 1.f.) has created
    a situation in which the demand for marriageable women cannot be met by
    local brides, thus fueling the demand for abducted women. Others have
    suggested that the problem is exacerbated by the tendency for many
    village women to leave rural areas to seek employment, and by the
    tradition that requires that expensive betrothal gifts be given to
    women. The cost of betrothal gifts may exceed the price of a bride and
    thus makes purchasing a bride more attractive to poor rural families.
    Some families address the problem of a shortage of women by recruiting
    women in economically less advanced areas. Others seek help from
    criminal gangs, which either kidnap women or trick them by promising
    them jobs and an easier way of life and then transport them far from
    their home areas for delivery to buyers. Once in their new ``family,''
    these women are ``married'' and raped. Some accept their fate and join
    the new community; others struggle and are punished. According to
    reports, many of the kidnapings also occur in provinces where the male
    to female ratio is generally balanced. Guangdong Province also is a
    receiving point for women trafficked for the purposes of marriage.
        There were reports that women from Burma, Laos, North Korea,
    Vietnam, and Russia were trafficked into the country either to work in
    the sex trade or to be forced to marry Chinese men. Border guards
    reportedly are involved in trafficking in women from the Democratic
    People's Republic of Korea into China. Trafficking of North Korean
    women into the country to become brides or to work in the sex industry
    is reportedly widespread in the northeastern part of the country. Many
    such women, unable to speak Chinese, are virtual prisoners. Some if not
    many of the Korean women are sold against their will to rural men--in
    both ethnic Korean and ethnic Han areas--who have difficulty finding
    wives in their home villages. Others end up working as prostitutes.
    According to press reports, North Korean brides were sold for the
    equivalent of between $38 and $150. Women reportedly also were
    trafficked from Vietnam into China for purposes of forced marriage.
        According to press reports, trafficking victims have been detained
    by the authorities in custody and repatriation centers before being
    returned home (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
        Chinese women are being trafficked to other countries for work in a
    variety of forced labor situations, most commonly sweatshops and the
    sex industry. Reports indicated that women were trafficked to
    destinations including Malaysia, Burma, Taiwan, Australia, Japan, the
    United States, and Canada; most apparently were from impoverished
    areas. Most trafficked Chinese women in Malaysia are from the coastal
    areas of Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai. One prominent social worker
    estimates that there are thousands of Chinese women working as
    prostitutes in Malaysia. Ethnic Chinese gangs trafficked most of these
    women to Malaysia. Most Chinese women trafficked to Australia
    reportedly are from Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Guangzhou.
        Despite Government efforts to prevent kidnaping and the buying and
    selling of children, trafficking in children also is a problem,
    affecting all provinces (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). There are no
    reliable estimates of the number of children trafficked. Domestically
    most trafficked children are sold to couples unable to have children;
    in particular, boys are trafficked to couples unable to have a son.
    Children also are trafficked for labor purposes. Children trafficked to
    work usually are sent from poorer interior areas to relatively richer
    interior areas; traffickers reportedly often entice parents to
    relinquish their children with promises of large remittances that their
    children will be able to send back to them (see Section 6.d.). In mid-
    year, the Government emphasized the use of DNA technology to confirm
    parentage, and the Ministry of Public Security reportedly has invested
    millions of dollars to establish a national DNA databank. Since
    December 1998, the authorities also have reported an increase in the
    number of children being trafficked to other countries by alien
    smugglers for purposes of forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and
    6.c.).
        Alien smuggling rings also traffic persons to other countries,
    including Australia, Canada, Croatia, Japan, the United States, Italy,
    and other countries in Europe and around the world, to work in domestic
    service, restaurants, sweatshops, and other businesses. It has been
    estimated that as many as 100,000 persons leave the country each year
    in search of better economic opportunities. Most are from a few
    counties in Fujian Province, a relatively prosperous region by the
    country's standards. Authorities in Italy reported in 1999 that an
    estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese immigrants work in sweatshop
    conditions outside of Florence, with many children working alongside
    their parents in the production of scarves, purses, and counterfeit
    brand name products. Alien smuggling rings often have ties to organized
    crime and are international in scope, sometimes smuggling persons
    through third countries in order to facilitate their entry into the
    destination country. An NGO reported that traffickers frequently rely
    on the collusion or active involvement of officials. In late 1999,
    authorities in the U.S. and Canada began to find persons smuggled from
    China in shipping containers on cargo ships arriving from Hong Kong; in
    the first 3 weeks of the year alone, according to press reports, more
    than 100 persons had been found in shipping containers in ports on the
    west coast of Canada and the United States. In one case, 3 trafficked
    persons were found dead in one poorly provisioned and unsanitary
    shipping container; another 15 survived their ordeal, but 7 of the
    survivors required hospitalization. In January two Chinese nationals
    were charged with attempting to smuggle persons from China into the
    United States. According to press reports in December 1999, several
    Chinese were smuggled into the United States in a wellprovisioned cargo
    container. There were reports that the persons in the container may
    have paid between $30,000 and $50,000 (248,000 to 410,000 RMB) each for
    their passage. On June 19, customs officials in the United Kingdom,
    conducting a routine inspection, found the bodies of 58 Chinese men and
    women in the back of a Dutch tomato truck that had crossed the English
    Channel on a ferry from Belgium. Two persons were found alive near the
    rear door of the truck. The doors had been sealed, and although the
    truck was equipped with refrigeration units, they were not turned on,
    despite the high temperatures that day. It was not immediately clear
    whether the victims died due to a lack of air, or to the heat, or both.
    Most of the victims were from Fujian Province. British officials
    arrested the truck driver on charges of manslaughter and immigration
    law violations; two Chinese nationals in the UK also were arrested.
    Dutch officials arrested another two persons in connection with the
    case. Press reports indicated that trafficked persons traveling
    clandestinely on trucks from the European continent into England have
    long been a problem.
        Those trafficked by alien smugglers may pay high prices, reportedly
    up to $70,000 each, for their passage to other countries. Many
    trafficked persons find themselves working in situations akin to
    indentured servitude. Upon arrival, many traffickers reportedly forced
    trafficked persons to repay the smuggling charges by working in
    specified jobs for a set period of time. They often are forced to pay
    charges for living expenses out of their meager earnings, as well.
    Other smugglers threaten the families of trafficked persons with
    harming a trafficked person if the family does not pay the smuggling
    fees immediately, leaving the trafficked person to work to repay the
    debt the family has incurred on his or her behalf back home.
    Nonetheless many are able save money and send it home to relatives.
    Trafficked persons generally live and work under poor conditions, and
    they may be required to work long hours. Their movements often are
    restricted by the smuggling rings that trafficked them, and their
    travel documents, which are often fraudulent, frequently are
    confiscated. Victims of trafficking face threats of being turned in to
    the authorities as illegal immigrants and threats of retaliation
    against their families at home if they protest the situation in which
    they find themselves.
        Trafficked persons who are repatriated may face fines for illegal
    emigration upon their return; after a second repatriation, persons may
    be sentenced to a term in a reeducationthroughlabor camp. Alien
    smugglers are fined $6,000 (50,000 RMB) and may be sentenced to up to 3
    years in prison, although some have been sentenced to death.
        Although the central Government and various provincial and local
    governments have attempted to crack down on the sex trade and thus on
    one type of trafficking, there have been numerous credible reports in
    the media of complicity in prostitution by local officials. Thus far
    actions to stop this lucrative business, which involves organized crime
    groups and business persons as well as the police and the military,
    have been largely ineffective. However, in April the Ministry of Public
    Security, along with the All-China Women's Federation and other
    departments, launched a several-month-long campaign against trafficking
    in women and children. Official media reported that 110,000 women and
    13,000 children who had been trafficked were rescued during the
    campaign; some were trafficked for purposes of prostitution, and others
    for labor. According to press reports, at least eight persons convicted
    of trafficking women and children for prostitution were executed during
    the campaign. At least seven others were sentenced to long prison
    terms. The Government also established a national telephone hot line on
    abduction, as well as a national databank on victims and traffickers.
    Nongovernmental experts observed that the mid-year national campaign
    against trafficking focused primarily on the criminal aspects of the
    trafficking problem and less on the reintegration of victims into their
    communities, despite the involvement of the All-China Women's
    Federation.

                                   HONG KONG

        Hong Kong reverted from British to Chinese sovereignty on July 1,
    1997 (the handover). As a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the
    People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of
    autonomy except in defense and foreign affairs and remains a free
    society with legally protected rights. The Basic Law, approved in 1990
    by the PRC's National People's Congress (NPC), provides for fundamental
    rights and serves as a ``mini-constitution.'' A chief executive,
    selected by a 400-person selection committee that was chosen by a
    China-appointed preparatory committee, wields executive power. The
    legislature (known as the Legislative Council) is composed of directly
    and indirectly elected members. On September 10, the second Legislative
    Council was elected, for a 4-year term. Twenty-four seats were elected
    on a geographic basis through universal suffrage, 30 seats through
    functional (occupational) constituencies, and 6 seats through indirect
    election. Human rights groups and democracy advocates complained that
    the elections for functional constituency and election committee seats
    are undemocratic since only 180,000 voters were eligible to elect the
    30 legislators elected by functional constituencies and the 6
    legislators elected indirectly, while over 3 million persons were
    eligible to vote for 24 legislators elected by geographical
    constituencies. However, no parties boycotted the elections.
    Prodemocracy candidates won 17 of the 24 seats elected on a geographic
    basis (including one in a December by-election) and 22 seats overall.
    The power of the legislature is curtailed substantially by voting
    procedures that require separate majorities among both geographically
    and functionally elected legislators for bills introduced by individual
    legislators and by Basic Law prohibitions against the legislature's
    initiating legislation affecting public expenditures, political
    structure, or government operations. In addition the Basic Law
    stipulates that legislators only may initiate legislation affecting
    government policy with the prior approval of the Chief Executive.
    ``Government policy'' in practice is defined very broadly. By law and
    tradition, the judiciary is independent and the Basic Law vests Hong
    Kong's highest court with the power of final adjudication; however,
    under the Basic Law, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power of
    final interpretation of the Basic Law. The Government's controversial
    1999 request to the Chinese Government to seek such an interpretation
    resulted in an NPC Standing Committee interpretation which effectively
    overturned a ruling by the Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong's highest
    court, raising questions about the potential future independence and
    ultimate authority of Hong Kong's judiciary.
        A well-organized police force under the firm control of local
    civilian authorities maintains public order. Individual members of the
    police sometimes used excessive force. The 4,000 Chinese troops sent to
    Hong Kong in 1997 to replace the British military garrison have
    maintained a low profile and have not performed police functions.
        Hong Kong is a major international trade and finance center. It is
    the principal gateway for trade and investment with China. A thriving
    free market economy operates with limited government interference. The
    economy, which provides residents a high standard of living, is in the
    midst of a strong recovery from the 1997-98 international financial
    crisis. Per capita gross domestic product is $23,523 (HK$183,483).
        The Government generally respected the human rights of residents,
    and the law and judiciary generally provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. Human rights problems that existed
    both before and after the handover include: Limitations on residents'
    ability to change their government and limitations on the power of the
    legislature to affect government policies; reports of police use of
    excessive force; some degree of media self-censorship; violence and
    discrimination against women; discrimination against the disabled and
    ethnic minorities; intimidation of foreign domestic servants; and
    trafficking in persons for the purposes of forced labor and forced
    prostitution. Despite the ban on the Falun Gong in mainland China, the
    Falun Gong remained legally registered and generally free to continue
    its activities in Hong Kong.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        There was one reported instance of death of a detainee in police
    custody during the year. It was certified as a death by natural causes.
    At the end of 1999, there were two investigations of deaths in police
    custody that remained outstanding. Inquests held during the year
    concluded that the deceased in one of the cases had committed suicide,
    and that the deceased in the other case died as a result of natural
    causes.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other abuse by the police;
    however, there were reports that police at times used excessive force
    against persons in custody. The law stipulates punishment for those who
    violate these prohibitions, and disciplinary action can range from
    warnings to dismissal. Criminal proceedings may be undertaken
    independently of the disciplinary process. Allegations of excessive use
    of force are investigated by the Complaints against Police Office,
    whose work is monitored and reviewed by the Independent Police
    Complaints Council (IPCC), a body composed of public members appointed
    by the Chief Executive.
        Although excessive use of force by police is not widespread, there
    are occasional complaints of force being used during interrogations to
    coerce information or confessions. In the first 8 months of the year,
    the Complaints against Police Office received 697 complaints of assault
    by the police. Of the
        209 cases in which investigations were completed and endorsed by
    the IPCC, 175 were withdrawn, 27 were deemed ``not pursuable,'' 5 were
    judged to be false, and 2 were judged ``unsubstantiated.'' The
    remainder (488 cases) were pending investigation at year's end. In 1999
    of the 1,098 assault allegations received, one was substantiated, and
    the incident was noted in the concerned officer's record. Human rights
    groups have called for a more independent monitoring body, noting long
    delays in hearing some allegations, the large difference between the
    number of complaints received and the few that are substantiated, the
    light punishment that police officers received when complaints are
    found to be substantiated, and the unwillingness of some witnesses to
    pursue complaints for fear of retribution. In May the U.N. Committee
    against Torture expressed concern over the ``lawful authority'' defense
    of, and the lack of prosecutions under, the Crimes (Torture) Ordinance.
    In 1999 the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that police
    responsibility for investigation of police misconduct undermines the
    credibility of IPCC investigations and called on the Government to
    reconsider its approach.
        In a June protest against the Government's right of abode (see
    Section 1.e.) policies, the police were accused of using excessive
    force when they used pepper spray and hit demonstrators when removing
    them from the entrance to the main government office building. As
    recommended by the Complaints against Police Office, two police
    officers received verbal warnings for their actions.
        During the year, two police officers were sentenced to 7- and 9-
    months' imprisonment respectively for accepting bribes to provide a
    journalist with information between mid-1997 and November 1999 (see
    Section 2.a.).
        Although conditions vary among facilities, prison conditions
    conform to international standards.
        In early June, 35 persons were injured during riots at a low-
    security drug treatment center for prisoners. After rioting broke out
    among the prisoners, more than 200 police and security officials were
    called in to restore order. Twenty-two inmates and 13 security officers
    were injured; some of them required hospitalization.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    Local justices of the peace regularly inspect prisons, but these visits
    rarely are unannounced, and justices of the peace speak with prisoners
    in the presence of Correctional Services Department staff. Human rights
    monitors have called for revisions to the inspection system.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Common law, precedents
    previously in force, and the Basic Law provide substantial and
    effective legal protection against arbitrary arrest or detention.
    Suspects must be charged within 48 hours or released. The average
    length of preconviction incarceration does not exceed 80 days.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary has remained
    independent since the handover, underpinned by the Basic Law's
    provision that Hong Kong's common law tradition be maintained. Under
    the Basic Law, the courts may interpret on their own provisions of the
    Basic Law that are within the limits of the autonomy of the region. The
    courts may also interpret other provisions of the Basic Law that touch
    on Central Government responsibilities or on the relationship between
    the Central Authorities and the SAR, but before making final judgments
    on these matters, which are unappealable, the courts must seek an
    interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee
    of the National People's Congress. (In the controversial 1999 ``right
    of abode case,'' the Government, not the court, sought an
    interpretation from the Standing Committee.) When the Standing
    Committee makes an interpretation of the Basic Law provisions
    concerned, the courts, in applying those provisions, ``shall follow the
    interpretation of the Standing Committee.'' Judgments previously
    rendered shall not be affected. The National People's Congress vehicle
    for interpretation is its Committee for the Basic Law, composed of six
    mainland and six Hong Kong members. The Hong Kong members are nominated
    by the Chief Executive, the President of the Legislative Council, and
    the Chief Justice. Human rights and lawyers' organizations long have
    expressed concern that these exceptions to the Court of Final Appeal's
    power of final adjudication and this interpretation mechanism could be
    used to limit the independence of the judiciary or could degrade the
    courts' authority. In the controversial 1999 right of abode case the
    Government, which had lost the case in the Court of Final Appeal, Hong
    Kong's highest court, asked the court to clarify its decision. After
    the clarification, which did not fundamentally alter the court's
    decision, the Government sought an interpretation of the Basic Law
    provisions at issue in the case from the NPC Standing Committee. The
    NPC's interpretation effectively overturned the ruling by the Court of
    Final Appeal, and raised questions about the potential future
    independence and ultimate authority of Hong Kong's judiciary. During
    the year, the Chief Justice called upon the Government to explain and
    defend the principle of judicial independence, and the head of the bar
    association called the Government's 1999 appeal to the NPC to reverse a
    court ruling ``a Damocles sword'' hanging over the court. Since the
    controversy, the Government has expressed its intention to make
    recourse to the NPC interpretation mechanism a rare and exceptional
    act.
        The Court of Final Appeal is Hong Kong's supreme judicial body. An
    independent commission nominates judges; the Chief Executive is
    required to appoint those nominated, subject to endorsement by the
    legislature. Nomination procedures ensure that commission members
    nominated by the private bar have a virtual veto on the nominations.
    Legal experts complained that the commission's selection process is
    opaque. In November legislators requested that the process be made
    transparent. The Government responded that privacy concerns prevented
    opening the process to the public. The Basic Law provides that, with
    the exception of the Chief Justice and the Chief Judge of the High
    Court, who are prohibited from residing outside of Hong Kong,
    foreigners may serve on Hong Kong's courts. Approximately 40 percent of
    Hong Kong's judges are expatriates from other common law jurisdictions.
    Judges have security of tenure until retirement age (either 60 or 65,
    depending on date of appointment).
        Beneath the Court of Final Appeal is the High Court, composed of
    the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. Lower judicial
    bodies include the District Court (which has limited jurisdiction in
    civil and criminal matters), the magistrates courts (which exercise
    jurisdiction over a wide range of criminal offenses), the Coroner's
    Court, the Juvenile Court, the Lands Tribunal, the Labor Tribunal, the
    Small Claims Tribunal, and the Obscene Articles Tribunal.
        The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and this is
    respected in practice. Trials are by jury, and the judiciary provides
    citizens with a fair and efficient judicial process.
        Human rights activists remain concerned that the legal system may
    favor those closely aligned with China or with powerful local
    institutions. In particular, concerns were raised by two 1998 Justice
    Department decisions, in which the Government decided not to prosecute
    the New China News Agency for alleged violations of the Privacy
    Ordinance (see Section 1.f.) or to prosecute a prominent newspaper
    editor with close ties to Beijing who was accused of fraud.
        In 1998 the Provisional Legislature passed the controversial
    Adaptation of Laws (Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance, which replaced
    the word ``Crown'' in Hong Kong legislation with the word ``State'' in
    hundreds of existing laws. Critics expressed concern that this change
    would place the Chinese government organs above the law, since laws
    that previously did not apply to the Crown would now not apply to the
    (Chinese) State, including Central Government organs stationed in Hong
    Kong. Since 1998 51 laws have been amended to encompass the State
    specifically.
        According to the Basic Law, English may be used as an official
    language by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. For
    historical reasons and because of the courts' reliance on common law
    precedents, almost all civil cases and most criminal cases are heard in
    English. In recent years, however, the Government has developed a
    bilingual legal system. It has increased the number of officers in the
    Legal Aid Department proficient in Chinese and extended the use of
    bilingual prosecution documents and indictments. All laws are now
    bilingual, with the English and Chinese texts being equally authentic.
    All courts and tribunals may operate in either Chinese or English.
    Judges, witnesses, the parties themselves, and legal representatives
    each decide which language to use at any point in the proceedings. In
    May 55 percent of cases at the lowest level of the court system were
    conducted in Chinese.
        Some human rights groups have expressed concern that the Government
    has not protected vigorously enough the interests of Hong Kong
    residents arrested in mainland China. The issue is complicated by the
    absence of an agreement allowing Hong Kong officials access to Hong
    Kong citizens arrested or detained in mainland China. To address this
    concern, public security authorities from Beijing and Hong Kong signed
    an agreement in October under which, beginning January 1, 2001, each
    side was to notify the other of certain categories of detentions of
    each other's residents.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law provides for the right of privacy, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. Interception of
    communications is conducted under the Telecommunications Ordinance and
    the Post Office Ordinance, which require authorization for interception
    operations at the highest levels of government. For example, wiretaps
    continued to be approved by the Chief Executive's office; a court
    issued warrant is not required. According to a September 1999 press
    report, the Government eavesdropped on private telephone conversations
    of more than 100 persons daily. The Government has refused to reveal
    how often the Chief Executive uses his powers to authorize telephone
    wiretaps and interception of private mail.
        For more than 20 years, the Independent Commission Against
    Corruption was vested with powers, including the right to authorize
    searches and detain suspects, which normally are exercised only by a
    judicial officer. Amendments to ordinances governing the Commission
    took effect in 1997, depriving the Commission of the independent
    authority to issue arrest or search warrants. However, the Commission
    still does not apply the presumption of innocence in corruption cases,
    and criminal convictions are obtained by regarding any excessive,
    unexplainable assets held by civil servants as ill-gotten until proven
    otherwise.
        In 1996 the Government established the Office of the Privacy
    Commissioner for Personal Data (PCO) under the Personal Data (Privacy)
    Ordinance (PDPO) to prevent misuse and disclosure of data such as
    medical and credit records. The ordinance also prohibits matching sets
    of personal data without the consent of the subject individual or the
    commissioner, although some government departments were exempted in
    order to combat social welfare abuse and tax evasion. Some violations
    of the PDPO constitute criminal offenses. In other cases, an injured
    party may seek compensation through civil proceedings. If the PCO
    believes that violations may continue or be repeated, it may issue
    enforcement notices to direct remedial measures. From the end of 1996
    when the PDPO took effect through the end of September, the PCO had
    received 1,628 complaints. Since 1996 of the 1,525 completed
    investigations, the PCO found violations of the PDPO in 116 cases,
    resulting in 13 cases referred to the Department of Justice and the
    police for prosecution consideration, the issuance of 22 enforcement
    notices and 81 warning notices. Of the 13 cases referred to the
    Department of Justice and the police, the Government as of October had
    decided to prosecute 1 case and not to prosecute in 10 cases.
    Investigation continues in the remaining 2 cases.
        Under the Adaptation of Laws (Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance,
    passed in 1998 by the Provisional Legislature, the Personal Data
    Privacy Ordinance is not applicable to the PRC government organs in
    Hong Kong. The Government is still considering whether PDPO should
    apply to Chinese government organs. In June 1999, the High Court
    dismissed a legislator's civil suit over the failure of the then-New
    China News Agency (NCNA) to respond within the PDPO-specified time
    frame to the legislator's request for information about her in the
    agency's files, because the NCNA Director named in the suit was not in
    Hong Kong at the time the incident occurred. In October the Director of
    the NCNA, now known as the Liaison Office, Jiang Enzhu, served the
    legislator a writ requiring the legislator to pay his court costs, as
    is allowed under Hong Kong law. If unable to pay and forced to declare
    bankruptcy, the prodemocracy legislator--under the Basic Law--would
    lose her legislative seat.
        In February the Hong Kong Telecommunications Authority issued
    guidelines requiring paging services to configure their systems so that
    Hong Kong-origin messages, including messages barred for transmission
    in places outside Hong Kong, including the mainland, could be
    transmitted in Hong Kong only. In October 1999, it was discovered that
    PRC censorship of Falun Gong-related information temporarily affected
    Hong Kong users of a major local paging service, China Motion Telecom,
    because the service used mainland-located transmission centers. The
    mainland-based employees of the company would not transmit messages
    regarding Falun Gong, even for Hong Kong customers, because of an
    alleged PRC instruction that any messages related to Falun Gong not be
    broadcast. Under scrutiny from the Government and pressure from the
    wider community, the company found a technical solution to the problem
    and as a result ended mainland-based censorship for customers whose
    service was limited to Hong Kong. However, the company insisted, and
    the Hong Kong Telecommunications Authority agreed, that the company
    must follow mainland laws (including censorship rules) for customers
    whose paging service extended to the mainland. Hong Kong customers with
    China-wide (rather than Hong-Kong-only) service remain unable to
    receive messages relating to Falun Gong when they are on the mainland.
        In early June, He Zhiming, a deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs
    Department of the Central Government's Liaison Office, warned
    businessmen at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce not to do business with
    Taiwan firms that supported Taiwan independence. He noted that doing
    business with such firms posed a risk, and that those who violated the
    warning would suffer the consequences. The SAR Government quickly
    issued a statement rejecting the comments and reiterating its
    commitment to free trade. The SAR Government's statement noted that
    Chief Executive C.H.Tung had contacted the Director of the Liaison
    Office, Jiang Enzhu, after these comments were made, and he had
    indicated that the Liaison Office would continue to operate according
    to the Basic Law and would not interfere with the SAR's commercial
    activities. Nonetheless, many observers were deeply concerned by the
    incident, which followed soon after comments in April by Liaison Office
    officials to the press about how the media should report on Taiwan (see
    Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom
    of speech, of the press, and of publication, and there was no apparent
    change in the tradition of respect for these freedoms by the Government
    after the handover; however, some journalists and news media continue
    to practice a degree of self-censorship, particularly in mainland-
    related reporting. Senior government officials regularly made
    statements in support of these freedoms. Overall, the media has been
    outspoken in defending civil liberties. Reporting on the September
    Legislative Council elections generally was regarded as fair and
    balanced. However, there are certain laws that potentially allow limits
    on some speech and press freedoms. The Telecommunications Ordinance
    grants the Government wide-ranging powers to ban messages whenever it
    ``considers that the public interest so requires.'' The Public Order
    Ordinance enables the Government to ban a demonstration on national
    security grounds, including as a factor whether it advocates
    independence for Tibet or Taiwan. In practice this situation has not
    arisen and only 2 demonstrations--out of more than 7,000 since the
    handover--have been disallowed (see Section 2.b.). In November 1999,
    the U.N. Human Rights Committee expressed concern that the offenses of
    treason and sedition under the Crimes Ordinance are defined in overly
    broad terms, thus endangering freedom of expression. The Basic Law
    requires that the Government enact legislation prohibiting ``treason,
    secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's
    Government, or theft of state secrets,'' but no such legislation has
    yet been proposed.
        Newspapers publish a wide variety of opinions, including opinions
    on Taiwan, Tibet, PRC leadership dynamics, Communist Party corruption,
    and human rights. Persons speak freely to the media, and many use the
    media to voice their views. Political debate is vigorous, and numerous
    viewpoints, including stories and opinions critical of the SAR and
    Chinese Governments and statements by leading Chinese dissidents and
    proindependence Taiwan activists, are provided in the mass media, in
    public forums, and by political groups. International media
    organizations operate freely. Sixteen major daily newspapers, 4
    commercial television stations (broadcast and cable) and 2 commercial
    radio stations function with virtually no government control.
        Foreign reporters need no special visas or government-issued press
    cards. Many local reporters continue to enter China to cover sensitive
    stories related to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the mainland. China still
    requires journalists--both foreign and those from Hong Kong--to apply
    for permission to make reporting trips to the mainland. Those who
    bypass official channels--which many feel they must do to get the
    stories they want--risk violating Chinese regulations. At least one
    publication whose owner offended China's leadership several years ago
    subsequently has been unable to get official permission for its
    reporters to cover events on the mainland.
        There is a widespread impression among both journalists and the
    public that it is prudent for the press to engage in a degree of self-
    censorship. The pressures on journalists to self-censor usually are
    subtle and indirect. There are no reports of direct orders to refrain
    from covering a certain issue, but there is a widely shared perception
    of a need for special care toward topics of particular sensitivity to
    China or Hong Kong's powerful business interests, such as leadership
    dynamics, military activity, Taiwanese or Tibetan independence, or
    powerful businessmen's relations with the mainland Government, although
    numerous articles on these subjects continue to appear in print and in
    the broadcast media. Chinese-language journalists report a pervasive,
    if tacit, understanding that editors expect those reporting on China to
    be particularly certain of their facts and careful in their wording.
    Another source of pressure comes from the belief by some publishers and
    editors that advertising revenues or their business interests in China
    could suffer if they were seen to be too antagonistic to China or
    powerful local interests. One publication that offended the leadership
    of the mainland government several years ago experienced an advertising
    slump from August to October 1999 when several property developers
    significantly reduced their advertisements in the newspaper. Executives
    at two companies reportedly acknowledged that they were wary at the
    time of advertising in that publication given perceived SAR
    administration displeasure with the newspaper. On December 10,
    International Human Rights Day, four newspapers printed Falun Gong
    advertisements protesting Chinese government persecution of its
    members. Three newspapers refused to print the advertisement; one based
    its refusal on the grounds that the advertisement was ``defamatory of
    the Central Government.''
        In what many observers saw as an example of media self-censorship,
    the South China Morning Post (SCMP) in November demoted its long-time
    China observer Willy Lo-Lap Lam from the position of editor of the
    newspaper's China coverage to a position as an associate editor on
    mainland politics. Lam resigned rather than accept the change in
    responsibilities and claimed the newspaper's management had begun to
    ``tone down'' his column on China to avoid ``exasperating'' unnamed
    persons. The editor in chief denied the charges and attributed the
    change to a restructuring of China coverage for which different
    management skills were required. However, the incident followed a
    published letter to the editor from the newspaper's owner, who
    lambasted a Lam column that claimed a group of Hong Kong
    businesspersons (including the newspaper's owner) had been offered
    commercial advantages by Chinese leaders in return for supporting SAR
    Chief Executive C.H. Tung for a second term. A previous editor of the
    SCMP also described pressures from the ownership to fire Lam and others
    in the period before the handover, pressures that he only partially
    succeeded in resisting.
        During the year, the SCMP's new English-language competitor, the
    Hong Kong iMail, brought back a satirical comic strip, which had been
    dropped abruptly by the SCMP in 1995 after it implicated then-PRC
    Premier Li Peng in the sale of organs from executed prisoners.
        Since the 1999 controversy over the reassignment of the outspoken
    head of the government-owned Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) after
    RTHK produced a program in which a prominent but unofficial Taiwan
    representative endorsed then-Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's
    controversial ``two-states'' policy, RTHK has continued to air views
    and news critical of the SAR and Chinese Governments, and continues to
    be criticized for this from supporters of the mainland Government. Some
    human rights groups have expressed concern that RTHK is dropping some
    of its more political programming in favor of softer cultural fare. The
    head of RTHK has acknowledged publicly ``pressures'' on RTHK for the
    last decade, but has been circumspect when asked to describe the
    pressures or to state whether such pressures continue. In general,
    however, there has been no discernible shift in RTHK's independent
    editorial stance since 1999's controversy. Debate continues over the
    desirability of the proposed privatization of RTHK.
        At an April 12 public seminar, a senior deputy director of the
    Central People's Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong (formerly
    called the New China News Agency or Xinhua) stated that the Hong Kong
    media should not report views that advocate Taiwan independence as
    normal news. Arguing that even an objective report would have a bias,
    the official claimed that the Hong Kong media had the responsibility to
    uphold the integrity and sovereignty of the country. He claimed that
    this is not an issue of freedom of the press. He also stated that Hong
    Kong should expedite the drafting of antisubversion laws required by
    Article 23 of the Basic Law in order to define the difference between
    reporting on the issue of Taiwan independence and advocating
    independence (in order to make it clear what kind of reporting on
    Taiwan was permitted). The official's remarks created a furor among
    politicians, human rights activists, and the media, and renewed
    concerns over the drafting of the antisubversion law required by the
    Basic Law. Some saw the official's remarks regarding Taiwan as a
    warning to the press not to advocate independence for Taiwan. Acting
    Chief Executive Anson Chan issued a statement affirming freedom of the
    press under the Basic Law and restated the Government's position that
    the timetable and content of antisubversion legislation had yet to be
    decided. Prodemocracy legislators made clear their disagreement with
    the Chinese official's comments. Media and journalist organizations
    similarly objected to the official's remarks, stressing that news
    should not be influenced by government policies. Numerous newspaper
    editorials rejected the ``advice'' of the Chinese government official.
    Following the incident, there was no apparent diminution in Hong Kong
    media reporting on Taiwan, including of proindependence views. However,
    later in April, an Internet company's local affiliate blocked its chat
    room users from discussing certain politically sensitive topics.
    Phrases like ``Taiwan independence'' and ``Tibet independence'' were
    scrambled (English letters were replaced with asterisks, and Chinese
    characters were scrambled) when they were typed in chat rooms at the
    portal. Messages including those terms posted on the site's bulletin
    boards quickly were deleted. The Internet company is partly owned by
    the NCNA, the official PRC news agency (as well as by a foreign media
    company); the portal is registered in Hong Kong and has approximately 1
    million registered users. The local affiliate company's chairman stated
    to the press that ``there are certain areas that are considered
    sensitive in every market. Freedom of speech is not absolute.'' A
    spokesman for the company was quoted as saying the company wanted users
    to exercise self-discipline. After the media reports, the practices in
    question appeared to stop. In August a businessman and advisor to the
    central Government criticized the SCMP for reporting too little ``good
    news'' and too much ``bad news.'' On October 27, Chinese President
    Jiang Zemin accused the Hong Kong media of naivete and low journalistic
    standards after a series of questions from journalists about whether he
    supported another term for Chief Executive C.H. Tung. President Jiang
    also cautioned journalists that they would be held accountable if their
    reports were not accurate enough. In November several major newspapers
    found that they were not invited to cover the festivities for the 20th
    anniversary of the Shenzhen special economic zone. Several reporters
    who tried to attend were detained for not having the appropriate
    credentials. On December 20, Chinese President Jiang warned the
    residents of Macau and Hong Kong against using their freedom to oppose
    the state and stated in remarks interpreted to include Hong Kong's news
    media that Macau's news media should value press freedom but also
    consider its social responsibilities.
        In 1999 in response to a growing number of complaints about
    tabloid-style journalism, which encouraged intrusive reporting by the
    press, the Law Reform Commission (an independent commission appointed
    by the Government in the 1980's) suggested that a Press Council with
    the power to reprimand or fine a publication found to be ``in serious
    breach of the Privacy Code'' should be appointed by the Government.
    Public reaction included concerns by journalists, legal experts, human
    rights activists, and others that such a body could be used to restrict
    press freedom. The Government indicated its preference that the media
    should regulate itself. Many (but not all) major newspapers and news
    associations established an industry watchdog, the Hong Kong Press
    Council, which began its work in September. Some critics complained
    that not all newspapers, including those with the most invasion of
    privacy complaints against them (the Oriental Daily, the Apple Daily,
    and the Sun), had agreed to participate in the voluntary organization.
    Others expressed concern that even this nonstatutory organization could
    potentially be abused to restrict press freedoms. In the first 10 weeks
    of the new organization's work, it received around a dozen complaints.
    Some readers, reportedly including victims of sex crimes, claimed
    intrusion of privacy, while others complained of exaggerated,
    inaccurate, or graphic reporting.
        In November a lawyer sued two radio talk show hosts for defamation,
    and the Court of Final Appeal ordered a retrial when it ruled that the
    trial judge in a lower court had misdirected a jury in a way that could
    endanger freedom of speech. In so doing, the Court effectively
    overturned a 150-year old guideline for defamation cases and called for
    a more generous approach toward the defense of fair comment by ruling
    that honest remarks, even those made with malice, could still be
    construed as fair comments.
        During the year, a reporter for a Chinese-language newspaper was
    sentenced to 10 years in prison for bribing police officers for
    information. The two police officers were sentenced to 7- and 9-months'
    imprisonment respectively for accepting bribes from mid-1997 to
    November 1999 (see Section 1.c).
        It is illegal to desecrate a PRC or Hong Kong flag or emblem
    publicly and willfully. In December 1999, the Court of Final Appeal
    ruled unanimously that flag-desecration laws did not violate the Basic
    Law (or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
    subsumed therein) and reinstated the sentences of two persons accused
    of desecrating the Hong Kong and Chinese flags during a peaceful
    demonstration in 1998. The two had received the equivalent of 12months'
    probation. In another flag desecration case pending at year's end, the
    Government charged a prominent local activist with three counts of
    desecrating the Hong Kong flag by publicly and willfully defiling it; a
    trial is scheduled for January 2001, and a verdict is expected shortly
    thereafter. During the year, the authorities reportedly took no action
    in response to an Internet website that invited site visitors to press
    a key to activate a virtual on-line desecration of the Chinese national
    flag.
        Falun Gong publications again were displayed prominently at the
    annual Hong Kong International Book Fair. However, after some Hong Kong
    publishing houses owned by mainland Chinese interests declined to
    continue publishing Falun Gong materials after the movement was banned
    on the mainland in July 1999 (see Section 2.c.), the group shifted its
    publishing to companies based abroad. Some bookstores continued to
    offer Falun Gong materials for sale, but bookstores operated by Chinese
    enterprises that removed Falun Gong books from their shelves in the
    wake of the July 1999 ban on the movement, continued to refuse to carry
    Falun Gong publications.
        The founder of the Information Center for Human Rights and
    Democracy Movements in China (which issues press releases on human
    rights-related strikes, demonstrations, and arrests in China), who
    complained in November 1999 that he was receiving almost 1,000
    harassing phone calls and faxes each day from security agents in China,
    reported that the harassment continued through April. After that, his
    fax machine continued to receive a daily deluge of nuisance faxes, but
    the attacks on his phone and pager stopped. The nuisance faxes
    continued for several more months before they, too, ceased.
        The code requiring government departments to release information to
    the public unless there is a valid reason to withhold it remained
    effective. A department may withhold ``sensitive'' information in such
    areas as defense, security, external affairs, or law enforcement.
    Guidelines for access to information are provided to the public on an
    Internet web page.
        The Basic Law provides for academic freedom, and the Government
    generally respects that freedom in practice. There is independent
    research, a wide range of opinions, and lively debate on campuses.
    However, in July a Hong Kong University-based pollster and sometime
    political commentator publicly alleged that Chief Executive Tung Chee-
    Hwa had, beginning 18 months earlier, pressured him to stop conducting
    polls on the Chief Executive's declining popularity. Specifically, the
    pollster alleged that an assistant to the Chief Executive in January
    1999 complained about the polls to a University Vice Chancellor, who in
    turn had sent a deputy to speak to the pollster. Although the pollster
    never stopped his polls, including those on the Chief Executive's
    popularity, he claimed that he had altered or not asked some questions
    in his surveys as a result of the pressure. The Chief Executive, his
    assistant, and university officials denied the allegations. The media,
    opposition parties, human rights and democracy advocates, and student
    groups were quick to respond to the allegations. The controversy
    continued for over 2 months, when an independent commission was
    established by the University to investigate the matter. The commission
    concluded that the allegations of pressure on the pollster were
    credible and that the Chief Executive's assistant and the university
    Vice Chancellor had not been ``truthful'' in their testimonies. No
    evidence that the Chief Executive himself was the origin of the
    pressure came to light. The two university officials at the center of
    the controversy resigned. However, the Chief Executive's aide remained
    in his position despite calls by opposition parties and student groups
    for his removal.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Basic Law
    provides for freedom of assembly and this right is practiced without
    significant hindrance. Article 23 of the Basic Law provides that Hong
    Kong shall enact laws to prohibit subversion, secession, treason, and
    sedition against the Chinese Government. The process of developing this
    legislation continues with no indication of when such laws may be
    enacted. Amendments to the Crime Ordinance, passed by the prehandover
    Legislative Council in 1997, narrowed the definition of treason and
    sedition to include a ``proven intention of causing violence or
    creating public disorder or a public disturbance.'' However, the
    amendments stipulate that the Government must name the date when the
    change is to take effect, and the Government has chosen not to enact
    the amendments until comprehensive legislation dealing with all
    ``Article 23 crimes'' is developed. In the interim, preexisting
    provisions in the Crime Ordinance dealing with treason and sedition
    continue to apply.
        A revised Public Order Ordinance, which was passed by the
    Provisional Legislature and took effect in 1997, reintroduced the
    concept of the notice of no objection for public processions and
    empowered police to object to demonstrations on national security
    grounds as well as to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Under
    the law, demonstration organizers must notify the police of their
    intention to demonstrate 1 week in advance (shorter notice is accepted
    when the Commissioner of Police is satisfied that earlier notice could
    not have been given) for a march involving more than 30 persons and for
    an assembly of more than 50 persons. The police must give a clear reply
    within 48 hours if it objects, but otherwise no reply indicates no
    objection. In practice, demonstrators can assume ``no objection'' if
    they are not notified otherwise by 48 hours in advance of the planned
    demonstration. The national security provision has never been invoked.
    Appeals of a denial to demonstrate may be made to a statutory appeals
    board comprising members from different sectors of society. No public
    official is on the board. Both the board's proceedings and the police's
    exercise of power are subject to judicial review.
        Since the handover, there have been over 7,000 demonstrations--an
    average of over 5 per day, which is higher than prehandover rates.
    Approximately half of these demonstrations required notification. The
    police have objected to five demonstrations, three of which went ahead
    after the demonstration organizers altered their plans. Of the
    remaining two cases, one involved an environmental group's plan to
    block city-center traffic with garbage trucks to urge the Government to
    open more recycling centers. That event eventually took place at a
    different venue. The other involved right of abode protesters who
    wished to continue protests in front of Government offices for 10 days
    immediately following clashes there between police and protesters
    reacting to the Court of Final Appeal's December 1999 verdict upholding
    the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law. The
    Appeals Board supported the police decision, as it did in the two other
    cases that had come before it.
        However, demonstrators, particularly labor activists, have
    complained that demonstrations often are limited to ``designated
    areas'' where they receive little public attention and that police
    sometimes outnumber demonstrators. A police order issued in September
    1998, while underlining that it is police ``policy to facilitate, as
    far as possible, all peaceful public order events,'' also stipulates
    that certain ``internationally protected persons'' are, in addition to
    security, entitled to ``protection of their dignity.'' Human rights
    activists remain concerned that the policy could lead to the use of
    police tactics that the IPCC had previously ruled were inappropriate.
        In addition to assemblies and marches on Hong Kong-related issues,
    groups continue to be free to demonstrate on issues of sensitivity in
    mainland China. On May 28, approximately 1,000 persons marched through
    central Hong Kong to commemorate the 11th anniversary of the June 4,
    1989, massacre in Tiananmen Square. On June 4, approximately 40,000
    demonstrators attended the annual candlelight vigil to commemorate the
    anniversary. Falun Gong practitioners regularly conduct public protests
    against the crackdown on fellow practitioners on the mainland,
    including directly in front of Hong Kong offices of the Central
    Government. However, the Falun Gong reports that some commercial
    establishments have refused to rent halls to the groups' practitioners.
    In a June protest against the Government's right of abode policies, the
    police were accused of using excessive force when they used pepper
    spray and struck demonstrators when removing them from the entrance to
    the main Government office building. As recommended by the police's
    internal disciplinary body, the Complaints against Police Office, two
    police officers received verbal warnings for their actions. A report on
    the alleged misuse of force was referred to the IPCC for further
    scrutiny.
        Student groups and human rights activists have criticized the
    Public Order Ordinance and have called for amendments to the law. Some
    also have demanded that it be repealed on the grounds that its
    provisions violated the right of assembly and the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Proposed amendments to
    the Public Order Ordinance include reducing the advance notification
    period, doing away with the notice of no objection, eliminating
    ``excessive'' criminal penalties of up to 5 years in prison, and
    requiring the police to obtain a court order in order to prohibit a
    demonstration. In what amounts to acts of civil disobedience, one group
    refuses to comply with the notification provisions, and it has made
    clear its intention to continue to do so until the law is revoked.
    Student and other protesters were arrested for investigation in
    connection with April and June demonstrations--over proposed tuition
    hikes and right of abode, respectively--in violation of the ordinance.
    All of the protestors were released immediately, and the Government did
    not prosecute. In December in a vote heatedly opposed by prodemocracy
    legislators, the Legislative Council supported the ordinance in its
    current form by a vote of 36 to 21. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in
    November 1999 noted its concern that the ordinance could be applied to
    restrict the right of assembly unduly, and it called on the Government
    to review the law and bring its terms into compliance with the ICCPR.
    The Court of Final Appeal has not yet had the opportunity to rule on
    the conformity of the ordinance with the ICCPR.
        The Basic Law provides for freedom of association, which is
    practiced without significant hindrance. Since the handover, no
    applications for registration have been denied. From January to
    November, the Societies Office of the police registered 1,275
    organizations. However, the ``Never Forget June 4 Organization,'' whose
    constitution calls for the end of one party rule in China, claims that
    the police have delayed the group's registration. The police state that
    the organization cannot be registered until it has been formally
    established. Human rights groups also have expressed concern that the
    amended Societies Ordinance, which like the amended Public Order
    ordinance was passed by the Provisional Legislature, could be used to
    restrict political activity. The Societies Ordinance requires that new
    societies must apply for registration within 1 month of establishment.
    The Government may refuse registration if it believes that the refusal
    is necessary in the interests of national security, public safety,
    public order, or the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
    The Government also may refuse to register a political body that
    receives support from a foreign political organization or a Taiwan-
    based political organization. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in
    November 1999 noted its concern that the ordinance could be applied to
    restrict unduly the right of association and called on the Government
    to review the law so as to ensure full protection of the right to
    freedom of association under the ICCPR.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law provides for freedom of
    religion, the Bill of Rights Ordinance prohibits religious
    discrimination, and the Government respects these provisions in
    practice. The Government at all levels protects religious freedom in
    full, and does not tolerate its abuse, either by government or private
    actors.
        The Government does not recognize a state religion but does grant
    public holidays to mark numerous special days on the traditional
    Chinese and Christian calendars, as well as Buddha's birthday.
        Religious groups are not required to register with the Government
    and are exempted specifically from the Societies Ordinance, which
    requires the registration of nongovernmental organizations. Catholics
    recognize the Pope as the head of the Catholic Church, unlike on the
    mainland. The spiritual movement widely known as Falun Gong, which does
    not consider itself a religion, is registered, practices freely, and
    holds regular public demonstrations against PRC policies. Despite
    complaints by PRC representatives and a stern warning from Chief
    Executive C.H. Tung not to violate Hong Kong law or act ``in any manner
    against the interests of China, Hong Kong, or 'one country, two
    systems,''' Falun Gong practitioners remained active, and organized
    public demonstrations outside PRC offices. Other traditional martial
    arts/meditation groups, known collectively as qigong groups, including
    Zhong Gong (which was banned in the PRC in late 1999), Xiang Gong, and
    Yan Xin Qigong, also are registered and practice freely in Hong Kong.
    Another group allegedly listed as an ``evil cult'' by the PRC, the
    Taiwan-based Guan Yin Method, is registered legally and practices
    freely.
        Although under the Basic Law the PRC Government has no say over
    religious practices in Hong Kong, its representatives in the SAR and
    the two PRC-owned newspapers have criticized some religious and other
    spiritual groups and individuals there. Hong Kong religious leaders
    also have noted that the Basic Law provision that calls for ties
    between local religious organizations and their mainland counterparts
    to be based on ``nonsubordination, noninterference and mutual respect''
    could be used to limit such ties. In April mainland authorities
    reportedly charged a Hong Kong religious leader with violating this
    noninterference clause by criticizing mainland religious policies. In
    September Hong Kong-based Chinese officials urged Hong Kong's Catholic
    Church to keep ``low key'' any celebrations of the October 1
    canonization by the Pope of 120 foreign missionaries and Chinese
    Catholics who had been martyred in China. The Hong Kong Catholic Church
    stated however, that it did not alter its fairly extensive plans to
    mark the occasion. The traditional ties of the Hong Kong Catholic
    Church to the Vatican have not precluded its contacts with the official
    Catholic Church in the PRC. However, it reportedly has had many
    contacts and exchanges with its mainland counterparts in the official
    church put on hold due to the current restrictive climate in the PRC
    for religious groups.
        In June 1999, the PRC Government, which has responsibility for the
    SAR's foreign affairs, blocked a proposed papal visit. The PRC
    Government reportedly considered the visit to be one of a head of state
    rather than one of a religious leader. When this news became public in
    August 1999, Hong Kong's Chief Executive reiterated the importance of
    religious freedom to Hong Kong and noted the ``unfortunate'' fact that
    the Pope could not visit Hong Kong because of foreign policy concerns.
        Although Falun Gong is free to practice, organize, and conduct
    public demonstrations, its practitioners expressed concern about
    pressure coming from mainland authorities and their supporters.
    Numerous articles critical of the group appeared in PRC-owned Hong Kong
    newspapers. In April a PRC State Council spokesman reportedly called a
    Hong Kong Falun Gong spokesman ``a tool used by Western powers to
    subvert the Central Government.'' A Falun Gong spokesman in Hong Kong
    responded that practitioners were undeterred by the PRC's unfounded
    criticisms, but the number of Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong is
    said to have dropped from approximately 1,000 to approximately 600
    since the mainland crackdown began in mid-1999. In a December speech in
    which he made clear his comments applied equally to Hong Kong and
    Macau, Jiang Zemin said the Macau Government should never allow anyone
    to stage any activities in Macau against the Central Government or to
    split the country. Some Hong Kong publishing houses owned by mainland
    Chinese interests declined to continue publishing Falun Gong materials
    after the movement was banned on the mainland in July 1999, and some
    bookstores operated by mainland enterprises removed Falun Gong books
    from their shelves (see Section 2.a.). In addition Falun Gong
    organizers have reported reluctance on the part of some hotels,
    cultural centers, and other venues to lend or lease space for Falun
    Gong exhibitions or other activities.
        In October 1999, it was discovered that PRC Government censorship
    of Falun Gong-related information temporarily affected Hong Kong users
    of a major local paging service because the service utilized mainland-
    located transmission centers. Mainland-based employees of the company
    refused to transmit messages regarding Falun Gong, even for Hong Kong
    customers, because of an alleged PRC Government instruction that any
    messages related to Falun Gong should not be broadcast. Under scrutiny
    from the Government and pressure from the wider community, the company
    found a technical solution to the problem and ceased censorship for
    customers whose service was limited to Hong Kong. However, the company
    insisted, and the Hong Kong Telecommunications Authority agreed, that
    the company must follow mainland laws (including censorship rules) for
    customers whose paging service extended to the mainland. Hong Kong
    customers with China-wide (rather than Hong Kong-only) service remained
    unable to receive messages relating to Falun Gong. The Hong Kong
    Telecommunications Authority issued amended guidelines in February
    requiring paging services to configure their systems to enable Hong
    Kong-origin paging messages, including those that would be barred for
    transmission in places outside Hong Kong, including the PRC, to be
    transmitted in Hong Kong (see Section 1.f.).
        d. Freedom of Movement, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
    Repatriation.--The Basic Law provides residents freedom of movement
    within Hong Kong, freedom of emigration, and freedom to enter and leave
    the territory, and the Government respects these rights in practice.
    Travel documents are obtained freely and easily, however, there are
    some limits on travel to the mainland (imposed by the mainland
    Government).
        As was the case before the handover, the Taiwan passport is not
    recognized as valid for visa endorsement purposes.
        In the past, several prominent overseas dissidents have been denied
    visas to enter Hong Kong.
        Chinese authorities do not permit a number of Hong Kong human
    rights activists and legislators to visit the mainland. Many Democratic
    Party legislators, for example, are not allowed to travel to the
    mainland. Political and human rights activists assert that the
    restriction on travel to the mainland on those who disagree with the
    Central Government's policies has a dampening effect on political
    debate, particularly among those with business interests on the
    mainland. However, one prominent labor and democracy activist,
    previously denied permission for many years, was allowed to enter the
    mainland to visit his ailing parent twice during the year.
        In early August, several persons who would likely be required to
    return to the mainland as a result of the 1999 right of abode decision
    set fire to a floor of an Immigration Department office, some
    reportedly also set themselves on fire. Fifty persons were injured in
    the incident; 2 died.
        The 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
    1967 Protocol does not extend to Hong Kong, and the SAR eliminated its
    first asylum policy in 1998. On a case-by-case basis, the Director of
    Immigration has discretion to grant refugee status or asylum in cases
    of exceptional humanitarian or compassionate need, but the Immigration
    Ordinance does not provide foreigners any right to have their asylum
    claim recognized. The general practice is to refer refugee and asylum
    claimants to a lawyer or to the office of the U.N. High Commissioner
    for Refugees (UNHCR). Those granted refugee status, as well as those
    awaiting UNHCR assessment of their status, receive a subsistence
    allowance from the UNHCR, but are allowed neither to seek employment
    nor enroll their children in local schools. Of the approximately 100
    persons receiving UNHCR support in late November, around 70 began to
    receive such support during the year. The UNHCR works with potential
    host country representatives in Hong Kong to resettle those designated
    as refugees. Government policy is to repatriate all illegal immigrants,
    including the approximately 23 per day that arrive from the mainland,
    as promptly as possible. However, human rights groups have complained
    of a few cases in which seekers of asylum or refugee status have been
    arrested for illegal immigration and incarcerated for periods of up to
    several months, but there were no reports of the forced return of
    persons to a country where they feared persecution.
        In February the Government terminated its Millport policy, under
    which Vietnamese asylum seekers intercepted in boats in Hong Kong
    waters were assisted in their voluntary departure from Hong Kong,
    because of evidence the policy was being abused by illegal immigrants
    who claimed passage through Hong Kong to other destinations. In June,
    in a move welcomed by human rights groups and the UNHCR, Hong Kong
    approved for permanent resettlement approximately 1,400 Vietnamese
    refugees and migrants. With this action the SAR Government closed the
    world's last remaining Vietnamese refugee camp (Pillar Point), and
    brought to an end the resettlement process that had handled more than
    220,000 Vietnamese who had landed in Hong Kong since 1975.
    Approximately 6 percent of the 1,400 persons approved for resettlement
    declined the Government's offer, and instead chose to retain their
    refugee status in order to continue to seek resettlement elsewhere.
    Since the closure of the Pillar Point camp the number of undocumented
    Vietnamese immigrants arriving in Hong Kong dropped to approximately 40
    per month.
        The case of 289 additional Vietnamese illegal immigrants who
    entered Hong Kong from China was under appeal at year's end.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Residents' right to change their government is limited by the Basic
    Law, which provides for the selection of the Chief Executive by an 800-
    person selection committee (which itself is appointed or indirectly
    elected), the direct election of less than half of Legislative Council
    members, and the inclusion of appointed members to the elected district
    councils. In addition while the approval of the Chief Executive, two-
    thirds of the legislature, and two-thirds of Hong Kong's National
    People's Congress delegates is required to place an amendment to the
    Basic Law originating in Hong Kong on the agenda of China's National
    People's Congress, it is the National People's Congress that has the
    power actually to amend the Basic Law, and procedures for amendment or
    interpretations that originate in the mainland are unclear.
        The government structure is two-tiered, and it consists of the
    Legislative Council and 18 district councils. (A third, middle tier,
    collectively known as the municipal councils, was abolished at the end
    of 1999.) C.H. Tung is Chief Executive.
        The Chief Executive was chosen prior to the handover by a 400-
    member selection committee, which in turn was chosen by a 150-member
    preparatory committee appointed by the Chinese Government. The Basic
    Law provides for elections for Chief Executive in 2002 and 2007, by a
    committee of 800 local residents. This committee is the same as the
    committee formed to select 6 legislators in September. It is composed
    of the 60 members of the Legislative Council, the 36 Hong Kong
    delegates to the National People's Congress, 40 representatives from
    religious groups, and 664 persons elected by the same 179,000 voters
    (some representing organizations; others voting as individuals) who
    chose the functional constituency representatives of the Legislative
    Council. The Government stated in October that it would not introduce
    legislation on election procedures of the Chief Executive until mid-
    2001. The Basic Law permits amendment of the Chief Executive selection
    process after 2007 by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council,
    with consent of the Chief Executive and the Standing Committee of the
    National People's Congress. The Basic Law states that ``the ultimate
    aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon
    nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in
    accordance with democratic procedures.''
        A provisional legislature, appointed by the same 400-member
    committee that appointed the Chief Executive, served from July 1, 1997,
    until June 30, 1998. Although the Provisional Legislature included 33
    of 34 legislators from the 1995 Legislative Council who sought
    inclusion, the Democratic Party and several independents declined to
    seek seats in what they deemed an illegitimate body, which they claimed
    lacked a legal foundation and transparency, and excluded groups,
    parties, and individuals critical of China. The Provisional Legislature
    repealed several laws that had been enacted by the elected Legislative
    Council to enhance civil and political rights, including: Amendments to
    the Bill of Rights Ordinance; the Employee Right to Representation,
    Consultation, and Collective Bargaining Ordinance; the 1997 Employment
    (Amendment) Ordinance, and the 1997 Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance
    (see Section 6.a.). A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
    Provisional Legislative Council was unsuccessful, and the repeals
    remain controversial, albeit without further legal challenge.
        Elections for Hong Kong's first and second posthandover Legislative
    Councils were held in May 1998 and in September, respectively. The
    Legislative Council elected in September is to serve a 4-year term. In
    the first election, 20 members were elected directly from geographic
    districts through universal suffrage, 30 from functional (occupational)
    constituencies, and 10 by votes of a committee of local elected
    officials. In the second, 24 members were elected directly from
    geographic districts through universal suffrage, 30 from functional
    constituencies, and 6 by votes of the 800-person Selection Committee
    which is composed of representatives of professions, district councils
    and religious groups, as well as local representatives to Chinese
    national political bodies, and Legislative Councilors. Prodemocracy
    candidates won 17 of the
        24 seats elected on a geographic basis (including 1 in a December
    by-election) and 22 seats overall.
        In both the 1998 and September elections, the functional
    constituencies were drawn more narrowly than the nine broad functional
    constituencies of the 1995 Legislative Council, and the total number of
    potential voters in functional constituencies was reduced from 1.15
    million in 1995 to 189,000 in 1998. Human rights groups contend that
    the election of functional constituency representatives by so few
    persons is fundamentally undemocratic. There was general acceptance of
    the geographic electoral districts (which include 3 million registered
    voters) proposed in 1997 by the Electoral Affairs Commission. A bill
    calling for an accelerated time line for direct election of all
    Legislative Council seats was defeated in the Legislative Council in
    1998.
        In December the Court of Final Appeal ended a century-old practice
    of excluding nonindigenous villagers from participating in rural
    elections. The Court unanimously found that the practice violated both
    the Bill of Rights and the Sex Discrimination Ordinances.
        The ability of the legislature to influence policy is limited
    substantially by Basic Law provisions that require separate majorities
    among members elected from geographical and functional constituencies
    in order to pass a bill introduced by an individual member and that
    prohibit the Legislative Council from putting forward bills that affect
    public expenditure, political structure, or government operations. The
    Chief Executive's written consent is required before bills affecting
    government policy may be introduced. Additionally, the Government has
    adopted a very broad definition of ``government policy'' in order to
    block private member bills, and the President of the Legislative
    Council has upheld the Government's position. A motion proposed by a
    prodemocracy legislator to repeal restrictions on private members'
    bills was rejected in January; however, the Legislative Council's
    degree of popular representation and outspokenness gives the Government
    cause to consider its views. In June when the Legislative Council
    passed a no-confidence motion against two senior housing officials, the
    more senior of the two resigned.
        The November 1999 elections for Hong Kong's District Councils--the
    sole remaining local government body after the abolition of the
    Municipal Councils--were free and fair; however, democratic legislators
    and human rights activists complained that the appointment of nearly
    one-quarter of District Councilors by the Chief Executive is an
    undemocratic procedure. According to the District Councils Ordinance
    enacted in March 1999, the District Councils are responsible for
    advising the government on matters affecting: (1) the well-being of
    district residents; (2) the provision and use of public facilities; and
    (3) the use of public funds allocated for local public works and
    community activities.
        An October 1999 motion in the Legislative Council calling for a
    referendum on the Government's proposal to abolish the Urban and
    Regional Councils, Hong Kong's mid-tier local government organs known
    collectively as the Municipal Councils, was defeated. However, in
    December 1999, the Legislative Council passed a controversial bill
    abolishing the Municipal Councils when their terms expired at the end
    of the year. The Councils had been the subject of widespread public
    criticism for their poor handling of the Avian Flu, the Red Tide, and
    other public health issues for which they were responsible. Legislators
    from the democratic parties and human rights activists protested the
    abolition of the councils, arguing that they were important to the
    development of party and democratic political leaders. The UN Human
    Rights Committee in November 1999 also expressed concern that the
    abolition of the municipal councils would ``diminish the opportunity of
    Hong Kong residents to take part in the conduct of public affairs.''
        Hong Kong sends 36 delegates to China's National People's Congress
    (NPC). These 36 individuals are an important group since placing
    proposed amendments to the Basic Law on the agenda of the NPC requires
    the approval of two-thirds of Hong Kong's NPC delegates. Hong Kong's
    NPC delegates also are members of the Election Committee that chose 10
    of the Legislature's 60 members in 1998 and 6 of the legislatures
    members during the year. Hong Kong's NPC delegates were selected to a
    5-year term in December 1997 by an NPC-appointed committee of 424
    residents. Politicians and human rights activists criticized the
    selection process as undemocratic and lacking transparency and noted
    that Central Government Liaison Office (formerly the New China News
    Agency) Director Jiang Enzhu, who is not a Hong Kong permanent
    resident, is one of Hong Kong's 36 delegates.
        Women are underrepresented in politics and in elective office, but
    larger numbers are seeking public office than ever before. Women hold
    10 of the 60 Legislative Council seats, and women make up between 5 and
    33 percent of membership in political parties. The President of the
    Legislative Council is a woman, as is the head of the civil service
    (the number two person in the Hong Kong Government). The Equal
    Opportunities Commission noted that women were a minority in Government
    advisory bodies. A report in May compiled by the Hong Kong Federation
    of Women stated that only between 16 to 22 percent of judges, Executive
    Council members, advisory board members or top civil servants are
    women. However, women are well represented at the highest levels of
    government. The Chief Secretary, Secretary for Security, Secretary for
    Justice, Treasure Secretary and Education Secretary are all women.
    Minorities are also represented in senior civil service positions.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Dozens of domestic and international nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's) operate freely (see Section 2.b.). These organizations have
    unrestricted and thriving contacts with the local community and with
    groups overseas. Government officials are generally receptive to, and
    respectful of, their views. Prominent human rights activists who focus
    on mainland China also operate freely and enjoy permanent resident
    status in Hong Kong.
        The 1988 Ombudsman Ordinance established the Office of the
    Ombudsman, which has wide powers to investigate and report on
    grievances from members of the public as a result of administrative
    actions of the executive branch and other designated public bodies.
    However, the credibility of the Ombudsman's independence is undermined
    by the fact that most of its staff is seconded from the Government,
    putting them in the position of investigating their former and future
    bosses. A proposal for the office to become independent of the
    Government in 2002 reportedly has received official approval. Another
    limitation is that the Ombudsman does not have oversight authority over
    the police, the Independent Commission against Corruption, the Equal
    Opportunities Commission, or the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for
    Personal Data. The Ombudsman may investigate complaints of
    noncompliance with the code on access to information by government
    departments, including the police and the Independent Commission
    against Corruption. With regard to election-related complaints, the
    Ombudsman only is empowered to investigate complaints made against the
    Registration and Electoral Office, not those made against the Electoral
    Affairs Commission. Thus, the Ombudsman's human rights role regarding
    liberty of persons, freedom from arbitrary and unlawful arrest and
    detention, equality, and related matters is limited considerably.
        The Ombudsman may publish investigation reports in which the
    identity of the complainant has been disguised. In addition to
    responding to public complaints, the Ombudsman may initiate
    investigations on his own. The Ombudsman may report to the Chief
    Executive if he believes that his recommendations to the organizations
    under his jurisdiction have not been acted upon or if there are serious
    violations; the Chief Executive is bound by law to present such reports
    to the legislature.
        Human rights groups have complained that Hong Kong does not have a
    human rights commission. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in November
    1999 expressed concern ``that there is no independent body established
    by law to investigate and monitor human rights violations in Hong Kong
    and the implementation of Covenant rights.'' In March visiting U.N.
    Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson urged Hong Kong to set up such
    a body.
        Under the Basic Law, the International Covenant on Civil and
    Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
    and Cultural Rights apply, with certain restrictions, to Hong Kong. The
    Chinese Government transmits Hong Kong's reports under these covenants,
    without editing, to the U.N. The reports are prepared without
    interference from the Chinese Government, but local NGO's have
    complained that they were not consulted fully enough on the contents of
    the reports. The Government and several domestic NGO's have testified
    before the U.N. Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. The
    hearings, including concerns of the Committee, have received widespread
    and balanced press coverage. In May Hong Kong sent representatives to
    attend, as part of China's delegation, hearings held by the U.N.
    Committee against Torture in Geneva on China's periodic report. In
    October Hong Kong's report under the International Convention on the
    Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was submitted to the
    U.N. in Geneva by the Chinese Government as part of China's periodic
    report. In November the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
    Rights considered Hong Kong's report under the International Covenant
    on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Basic Law provides that all Hong Kong residents shall be equal
    before the law. The Bill of Rights Ordinance, which provides for the
    incorporation into Hong Kong law of the International Covenant on Civil
    and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong, entitles Hong Kong
    residents to the civil and political rights recognized therein
    ``without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
    religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
    property, birth or other status.'' However, the ordinance binds only
    the Government, public authorities and persons acting on their behalf,
    that is, not private persons or entities. Three pieces of
    antidiscrimination legislation--the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
    (1995), the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (1995), and the Family
    Status Discrimination Ordinance (1997)--have made it illegal for any
    person or entity (public or private) to discriminate against anyone on
    the grounds of sex, marital status, pregnancy, disability, or family
    status, and prohibits behavior such as sexual harassment, harassment or
    vilification on the grounds of disability, and discriminatory
    advertising. An Equal Opportunities Commission was established in 1996
    to work toward the elimination of discrimination and to promote
    equality of opportunity with specific reference to gender, disability,
    and family status.
        Human rights groups have called for laws specifically targeting,
    among other problems, public or private discrimination based on race
    and age. The U.N. Human Rights Committee in November 1999 expressed
    concern ``that no legislative remedies are available to individuals in
    respect of discrimination on the grounds of race'' and called for
    legislation to ensure full compliance with the Covenant. A November
    survey identified strong societal prejudice against minority groups
    including mainland Chinese migrants. The Equal Opportunities Commission
    reported that the elderly are discriminated against in the allocation
    of public housing, but noted that it was powerless to help, because
    there is no legislation prohibiting age discrimination in Hong Kong.
        Although many rights activists generally consider the government's
    Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) an ally in the fight against
    discrimination, some have criticized the organization for passivity and
    for emphasizing conciliation instead of acting as a watchdog or
    pursuing court cases. In the first 8 months of the year, the Equal
    Opportunities Commission received 198 complaints of sex discrimination,
    83 of which involved pregnancy discrimination. As of the end of
    September, 5 cases were brought to court under the Sex Discrimination
    Ordinance and were pending resolution. In the first 8 months of the
    year, 191 complaints were filed under the Disability Discrimination
    Ordinance; 3 of these cases went to court. As of September, two cases
    were still pending while one case resulted in a ruling in favor of the
    plaintiffs. In the first 8 months of the year, 12 complaints were
    received under the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, which
    protects persons whose marital status changes, who have children, or
    who are responsible for caring for another family member, such as a
    child or elderly person, 11 of the 12 complaints were related to
    employment, but no cases had been filed by year's end.
        The Government's ``Code of Practice for Employers'' designed to
    prevent discrimination states that race, among other factors, should
    not be considered when hiring employees. However, it accepts that
    special circumstances exist, such as when the employee works or lives
    in the employer's home. The Government has undertaken a public
    education and awareness campaign to combat race discrimination with
    only limited effect.
        Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, particularly
    among new immigrants from the mainland. The only law that specifically
    protects battered women is the 1987 Domestic Violence Ordinance, which
    allows a woman to seek a 3-month injunction against her husband
    (extendable to 6 months). Domestic violence also may be prosecuted as
    common assault. The Government enforces the laws and prosecutes
    violators, but sentences generally are lenient. In 1999 472 cases of
    domestic violence were reported to the police, while in the first 6
    months of the year, 320 cases were reported. Cases of battered spouses
    reported to the Social Welfare Department from April 1999 to March
    increased 44 percent over the previous 12 months to 1,689 cases. Women
    tend not to seek help when subject to violence; cultural factors and
    inadequate information about available assistance and resources result
    in many cases of spousal abuse going unreported. In May the Government
    established an interdepartmental Working Group on Sexual Violence to
    ensure coordination of efforts among various departments and
    authorities in handling the problem of sexual violence. Also in May,
    the Government announced plans to establish a Women's Commission later
    in the year to address women's concerns in a comprehensive and
    systematic manner. The Government also funds programs such as family
    life education counseling, a hot line service, temporary housing, legal
    aid, and child protective services; it also has initiated public
    education and media programs.
        The Hong Kong Federation of Women's Centres asked the Government to
    prepare a comprehensive services plan especially for women from the
    mainland, with counseling and job-training to help them integrate. Hong
    Kong's Society for Community Organisation estimated that tens of
    thousands of women in Hong Kong, largely single women and widows from
    the mainland, are regularly subjected to the threat of violence, abuse,
    robbery, and sexual harassment by cohabitors. In November some 200
    women, including sex workers, domestic helpers, and members of 12
    womens groups, held an antiviolence-against-women rally, demanding
    greater Government protection for women, more assistance to victims,
    and a special court to handle such cases in a bid to preserve a woman's
    dignity.
        The general incidence of rape is low. There were 90 cases of rape
    reported to the police in 1998, 91 in 1999, and 49 in the first half of
    the year. However, underreporting is considered a serious problem.
    Amendments to the evidence bill and to the Crime Ordinance that would
    abolish the requirement of corroboration of evidence of sexual offense
    and would clarify that marital rape is a crime are under consideration.
        Prostitution is not illegal. However, there are laws against
    activities such as causing or procuring another to be a prostitute,
    living on the prostitution of others, and keeping a vice establishment.
    Many women working in the sex industry have been brought to Hong Kong
    under conditions resembling trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment is a problem. Many women tend not to seek help
    when subjected to sexual harassment, and it is underreported. Police
    statistics report 1,047 sexual harassment cases in 1999. Government and
    NGO surveys and statistics from a counseling hot line, however, suggest
    sexual harassment cases in fact total anywhere from 2+ to 10 times more
    than the number reported.
        Women face discrimination in employment, salary, welfare,
    inheritance, and promotion (see Section 6.e.). The EOC's task force on
    Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value is studying ways to implement this
    principle, including possible draft legislation. The press carries
    occasional stories of women alleging discrimination in the workplace in
    connection with pregnancies. The number of complaints to the EOC of
    dismissal after employees' return from maternity leave increased in
    1999. Official unemployment figures for the period from May through
    July were 5.7 percent for men and 4.2 percent for women. However, human
    rights organizations and unions assert that the statistics inaccurately
    record many unemployed women as housewives and that, in fact, the
    unemployment rate for women is actually higher than the unemployment
    rate for men. Women are entering professional fields, including
    medicine, in greater numbers. Nonetheless, in the medical profession
    there are few women in prestigious specialties such as surgery. Female
    judicial officers and judges make up only 18.8 percent of the
    judiciary. Women also are disproportionately represented in the lower
    echelons of the work force, holding positions such as retail sales
    assistants and office clerks. The Home Affairs Department this summer
    organized the Working Group of Web-Enabling Women to help less educated
    women enter the digital workforce. As a result of 1994 revisions to
    inheritance statutes, the law treats men and women equally in
    inheritance matters, although women still face discrimination based on
    traditional practices. Alimony is another problem, with one survey
    indicating that 80 percent of divorced women fail to receive money
    regularly from their former husbands. The November 1999 U.N. Human
    Rights Committee report expressed concern that differences exist
    between men's and women's earning levels, that women were
    underrepresented in public boards and public offices, and that there is
    customary discrimination against women in the inheritance of small
    homes in rural areas of the New Territories.
        Based on its 1999 study showing that the Education Department's
    allocation scheme for secondary school places clearly discriminated
    against girls, the EOC in July requested a judicial review of the
    scheme. Education officials acknowledge that the current system of
    secondary school place allocation discriminates against girls because
    boys and girls are ranked (and accepted) separately. The High Court's
    on the EOC's request for judicial review is pending. The November 1999
    U.N. Human Rights Committee report expressed concern that the
    educational system discriminates against girls in selection for
    secondary schools. In 1999 the number of female secondary student
    candidates accounted for 55.7 percent of the total who took university
    advanced-level examinations, and the number of female candidates who
    matriculated at universities accounted for between 52 and
        56 percent of all matriculating candidates. This is similar to
    earlier years.
        In the spring, the Government announced the establishment of a
    Women's Commission to promote and protect the interests and well being
    of women. The Commission, which had yet to begin operating as of year's
    end, reportedly plans to focus on provision of health services,
    childcare support, protecting women against violence, promotion of a
    women-friendly working environment and legal issues relating to women
    and the family.
        Children.--The Government is committed firmly to children's rights
    and welfare through well-funded systems of public education, medical
    care, and protective services. The Education Department is committed to
    providing schooling for children between 6 and 15 years of age and
    provides placement services for non-Chinese speaking children.
    Education is free and compulsory through grade nine. The Government
    supports programs for custody, protection, day care, foster care,
    shelters, small group homes, and assistance to families. The age of
    criminal responsibility for children is 7, although it must be proved
    that a child under the age of 14 understood the consequences of his or
    her actions. In May the Law Reform Commission recommended that the age
    of criminal responsibility be raised to 10, and stated that children
    between 10 and 14 should be presumed to be incapable of committing a
    crime unless that presumption can be rebutted by the prosecution. The
    Commission also recommended that the Administration carry out a general
    review of the juvenile justice system. In 1999 there were 108 youths
    under the age of 16 who were incarcerated, 48 who were in prison, 29
    who were in training centers, 27 who were in detention centers, and 4
    who were in drug addiction treatment centers. In April one youth died
    during an attempted escape from a detention center.
        Child abuse and exploitation are not widespread, but statistics
    indicate they are increasing. There is no specific laws dealing with
    child pornography, but child pornography is covered under other
    antipornography laws. A proposed bill on Prevention of Child
    Pornography and proposed amendments to the Crimes Bill before the
    Legislative Council since June 1999 would prohibit the printing,
    distribution, advertising, or possession of child pornography. The
    bills also would prohibit arranging or advertising of sexual offenses
    involving children under the age of 16. The Crimes (Amendment) Bill
    would also provide extraterritorial effect when either the perpetrator
    or the victim of a sexual offense involving a child or a person
    printing, distributing, advertising or possessing child pornography
    ``has a nexus with Hong Kong.''
        In the first 6 months of the year, 754 cases of child abuse were
    reported to the police; 327 involved physical abuse of victims below
    the age of 14, and 427 involved sexual abuse of victims below the age
    of 17. Child abuse cases newly registered with the Social Welfare
    Department totaled 328 through August and 575 for all of 1999. In 1995
    the police set up a child abuse investigation unit to improve the
    treatment of victims, and in 1996 legislation was passed making it
    easier for child victims to testify in court using an interviewing
    suite for recording statements. Legal penalties for mistreatment or
    neglect of minors also were increased substantially. A witness support
    program also was launched in 1996 to help child witnesses in need. A
    child witness information kit in Chinese, with books explaining legal
    and court proceedings, was published in 1996 to help reduce children's
    anxiety about testifying. In 1998 a Child Care Center Bill was passed
    to prevent unsuitable persons from providing child care services and to
    facilitate the formation of mutual help child care groups.
        People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against the physically
    and mentally disabled persists in employment, education, and the
    provision of some public services. The 1995 Disability
    Nondiscrimination Law called for improved building access and sanctions
    against those who discriminate. The Buildings Ordinance amended in 1997
    updated design requirements. However, despite inspections and
    occasional closure of noncompliant businesses, access to public
    buildings and transportation remains a serious problem for the
    disabled. Advocates for the disabled complained that limited access for
    the disabled at polling stations made voting in both the 1998 and in
    the September elections difficult because of accessibility problems.
    The Government has an integrated work extension program in sheltered
    workshops and expanded vocational assessment and training. No
    comprehensive statistics are available on the number of disabled
    persons in the work force, but a consortium of organizations
    representing disabled persons reported that about 700,000 residents are
    disabled, and about half are able to work. A 1997 survey by the EOC
    found that depending on the kind of disability, unemployment rates
    ranged from 20 to 50 percent. There are 5,259 disabled persons employed
    as civil servants of a total civil service work force of 185,868--about
    2.8 percent of all civil servants. During the first 8 months of the
    year, the Labor Department's Selective Placement Division found jobs
    for 1,359 of 2,463 disabled job seekers. Approximately 9,000 students
    in a school population of 955,000, or just under 1 percent, are
    disabled. In the 1999-2000 school year, there were 168 places in
    regular schools for the mildly disabled under the Integrated Education
    Program. In 1997 the Government started a special university admission
    scheme for the disabled.
        In the first 9 months of the year, three cases under the Disability
    Discrimination Ordinance were brought to court with EOC involvement.
    One case was resolved in September when the court ruled in favor of the
    three plaintiffs who had been given legal assistance by the EOC. The
    other two cases remained pending.
        In 1999 the Government formed the Guardianship Board under the
    Mental Health Ordinance to protect the interests of persons with mental
    disabilities or disorders, including dementia.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government has resisted
    recommendations by human rights groups, the U.N. Human Rights,
    legislators, and others that it enact specific antirace discrimination
    legislation. In June the Government blocked a proposed antirace
    discrimination bill put forward by a legislator. The Government
    proposes to combat discrimination through education, rather than by
    legislation. A government ``Code of Practice for Employers'' designed
    to prevent discrimination states that race should not be considered
    when hiring employees. Minorities, who make up approximately 5 percent
    of the population, are well represented in the civil service and many
    professions. However, there are regular allegations of racial
    discrimination in such areas as private sector employment, admission to
    public restaurants, placement in public schools, treatment in public
    hospitals, and acceptance to institutions of higher education. Foreign
    domestic workers, most of whom are from the Philippines, are
    particularly vulnerable to discrimination. In January an Indonesian
    Migrant Workers Union was established to unite Indonesian domestic
    helpers throughout Asia and to protect members from abuse and
    exploitation; approximately 41,000 Indonesian domestic helpers work in
    Hong Kong. Similar organizations work for the interests of Philippine
    domestic helpers, of whom there are approximately 170,000. According to
    organizations representing migrant workers, police intimidation of
    migrant workers is also a problem.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right of
    association and the right of workers to establish and join
    organizations of their own choosing. Trade unions must be registered
    under the Trade Unions Ordinance. The basic precondition for
    registration is a minimum of seven persons who serve in the same
    occupation. The Government does not discourage or impede the formation
    of unions. In 1999, 35 unions (comprising 33 employee unions and two
    mixed organizations of employees and employers) were registered under
    the Trade Unions Ordinance. During the year, 11 new unions (10 employee
    unions and one employee/employer mixed union) were registered. As of
    the end of August, the total number of registered trade unions was 632
    (588 employee, 25 employer, and 19 mixed). Over 20 percent of the
    approximately 3.3 million salaried employees and wage earners belong to
    a labor organization. Trade unions are independent of political parties
    and the Government.
        The Employment Ordinance includes provisions that protect against
    antiunion discrimination. Violation of the antiunion discrimination
    provisions is a criminal offense with a maximum fine of $12,800
    (HK$100,000). Employees who allege such discrimination have the right
    to have their cases heard by the Labor Relations Tribunal. The Tribunal
    may order reinstatement of the employee, subject to mutual consent of
    the employer and employee. If no such order is made, the Tribunal may
    award statutory entitlements (severance pay, etc.) and compensation.
    The maximum amount of compensation is $20,000 (HK$156,000). However,
    labor activists complain that complainants are discouraged by the Labor
    Relations Tribunal's tendency to push conciliation rather than issue
    orders. In 1999 the Labor Relations Division of the Labor Department
    handled 7 complaints of antiunion discrimination. During the first 8
    months of the year, there were 3 such complaints. Owing to insufficient
    evidence or unwillingness of employees to act as prosecution witnesses,
    no prosecution action has been taken against the employers concerned.
        Work stoppages and strikes are permitted. However, there are some
    restrictions on this right for civil servants. Through August 4 strikes
    were reported. There were 3 strikes during 1999, which resulted in 299
    lost workdays; in 1998 there were 8 strikes. Although there is no
    legislative prohibition of strikes, in practice, most workers must sign
    employment contracts that typically state that walking off the job is a
    breach of contract which can lead to summary dismissal.
        The Basic Law commits the SAR to 40 International Labor
    Organization (ILO) conventions, and the Government has amended labor
    legislation and taken administrative measures to comply (see Section
    6.b.).
        In October 1997, the Provisional Legislature promulgated the
    Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill. This
    bill permits the cross-industry affiliation of labor union federations
    and confederations and allows free association with overseas trade
    unions (although notification of the Labor Department within 1 month of
    affiliation is required).
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--In June 1997,
    the Legislative Council passed three laws that greatly expanded the
    collective bargaining powers of workers, protected them from summary
    dismissal for union activity, and permitted union activity on company
    premises and time. The new ordinances would have enabled full
    implementation of ILO Conventions 87 (which was ratified with
    reservations in 1963), 98, and 154. However, in October 1997, after
    consultation with the Labor Advisory Board, the Provisional Legislature
    repealed the 1997 Employee's Right to Representation, Consultation, and
    Collective Bargaining Ordinance and the 1997 Employment (Amendment)
    Ordinance, and amended the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance. The
    repeal removed the new legislation's statutory protection against
    summary dismissal for union activity; the Government argued that
    existing law already offered adequate protection against unfair
    dismissal arising from antiunion discrimination.
        The 1997 Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments)
    Bill removes the legal stipulation of trade unions' right to engage
    employers in collective bargaining; bans the use of union funds for
    political purposes; requires the Chief Executive's approval before
    unions can contribute funds to any trade union outside of Hong Kong;
    and restricts the appointment of persons from outside the enterprise or
    sector to union executive committees. The Hong Kong Confederation of
    Trade Unions promptly filed a complaint against the Hong Kong
    Government for violation of ILO Conventions 87, 98, and 154. In
    November 1999, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association concluded
    that the new labor ordinance breached conventions 87 and 98 and
    recommended that the Government take legislative action to remedy the
    situation. The Government provided the ILO progress reports in May 1999
    and January asserting that it was in compliance with all of the 40 ILO
    conventions that apply to Hong Kong. In January 1999, the Government
    blocked a legislator's attempt to introduce two bills on collective
    bargaining and antiunion discrimination on the grounds that they would
    affect government spending and operations and therefore fell outside
    the scope allowed for private member bills under the Basic Law (see
    Section 3).
        With the repeal of the short-lived collective bargaining
    legislation, the prehandover framework continued. There were no laws
    that stipulated collective bargaining on a mandatory basis. Wage rates
    in a few trades like tailoring and carpentry were determined
    collectively in accordance with established trade practices and customs
    rather than as a statutory mechanism. Collective bargaining is not
    practiced widely. Unions generally are not powerful enough to force
    management to engage in collective bargaining. The Government does not
    encourage it, since the Government itself does not engage in collective
    bargaining with civil servants' unions but merely ``consults'' with
    them.
        The Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor offers
    free, nonbinding conciliation services to employers and employees
    involved in disputes that may involve statutory benefits and protection
    in employment as well as arrears of wages, wages instead of notice, or
    severance pay. The Department of Labor takes a positive attitude
    towards the participation of trade unions in such dispute negotiations.
    In the first 8 months of the year, the Division handled 194 trade
    disputes and 19,667 claims, 61 percent of which were handled through
    conciliation. In 1999 the Division handled 290 disputes and 31,890
    claims, 61 percent of which were handled through conciliation. In 1998
    the Labor Relations Division handled 226 disputes and 24,231 claims, 60
    percent of which were handled through conciliation. Depending on the
    size of the claim, the remaining cases were referred to the Labour
    Tribunal or the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The use of forced
    labor is prohibited in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.
    Trafficking in persons for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
    problem; there were credible reports that local, foreign, and mainland
    Chinese sex workers sometimes labor under onerous conditions for
    organized criminals in exchange for protection or other assistance (see
    Sections 5 and 6.f.). The law does not specifically prohibit forced or
    bonded labor by children; however, there were no reports of such
    practices.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Employment of Children Regulations prohibit employment
    of children under the age of 15 in any industrial establishment.
    Children 13 and 14 years of age may be employed in certain
    nonindustrial establishments, subject to conditions aimed at ensuring a
    minimum of 9 years' education and protecting their safety, health, and
    welfare. To enforce compliance with the regulations, the Labor
    Department conducts regular workplace inspections. In the first 8
    months of the year, the Labor Department conducted 114,668 inspections,
    during which 2 violations of the Employment of Children Regulations
    were discovered. The Department issued 5 summonses, 3 of which resulted
    in convictions and fines. In 1999 the Labor Department conducted
    160,272 inspections during which 8 violations were discovered and 3
    summonses issued, each of which resulted in convictions and fines. In
    1998 the Labor Department conducted 156,634 inspections during which 10
    violations were discovered and 11 summonses issued, of which 10
    resulted in convictions and fines. Work hours for young persons 15 to
    17 years of age in the manufacturing sector remain limited to 8 hours
    per day and 48 hours per week between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. Overtime is
    prohibited for all persons under the age of 18 in industrial
    establishments. Employment in dangerous trades is prohibited for youths
    except 16- and 17-year-old males. While provisions against forced or
    bonded labor do not specifically refer to children, there were no
    reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no statutory minimum
    wage except for foreign domestic workers. Aside from a small number of
    trades where a uniform wage structure exists, wage levels customarily
    are fixed by individual agreement between employer and employee and are
    determined by supply and demand. Some employers provide workers with
    various kinds of allowances, free medical treatment, and free
    subsidized transport. The average wage generally provides a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. Two-income households are
    the norm.
        The minimum wage for foreign domestic workers is approximately $450
    (HK$3,500) per month. The law requires employers to provide foreign
    domestic workers with housing, worker's compensation insurance, travel
    allowances, and food or a food allowance in addition to the minimum
    wage, which together provide a decent standard of living for a foreign
    domestic worker. However, there have been credible reports of foreign
    domestic workers, who are subject to deportation if they are dismissed,
    and thus who are less likely to raise formal complaints, illegally
    being forced to accept less than the minimum wage and unacceptable
    living conditions. There also have been a number of cases of foreign
    domestic workers successfully taking their employers to court for
    mistreatment. The standard workweek is 48 hours.
        The Factory Inspectorate Division was restructured in 1996 as part
    of a government effort to strengthen its safety and health promotion
    and enforcement program. The division--part of a new occupational
    safety and health branch of the Labor Department--consists of four
    units: An operations division covering field services such as safety
    and health advice; a support services division responsible for
    technical support services; a planning and training division; and a
    legal services division charged with processing and conducting
    prosecutions.
        The Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance and its 27 sets
    of subsidiary regulations regulate safety and health conditions. In the
    first 8 months of the year, the Labor Department conducted 101,368
    inspections of industrial and nonindustrial workplaces and issued 2,412
    summonses (2,249 of which resulted in convictions with a total of $4.13
    million (HK$32 million) in fines). In 1999 the Labor Department
    conducted 121,414 inspections and issued 2,110 summonses (1,959 of
    which resulted in convictions with a total of $4.65 million (HK$36
    million) in fines). In 1998 the Labor Department conducted 89,846
    inspections and issued 3,181 summonses (2,912 of which resulted in
    convictions with a total of $7.6 million (HK$60 million) in fines).
    Worker safety and health has improved over the years, due in part to
    the transfer of many manufacturing jobs to factories in mainland China,
    but serious problems remain, particularly in the construction industry.
    In the first quarter of the year, there were 12,425 occupational
    accidents, of which 7,211 were classified as industrial accidents. Of
    the industrial accidents, 6 involved fatalities. In 1999 there were
    58,841 occupational accidents, of which 35,986 were classified as
    industrial accidents. Of the industrial accidents, 52 involved
    fatalities. Employers are required under the Employee's Compensation
    Ordinance to report any injuries sustained by their employees in work-
    related accidents. There is no specific legal provision allowing
    workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons is a problem,
    and Hong Kong is both a destination and a transit point for trafficked
    persons. Specific provisions in the Immigration Ordinance, the Crimes
    Ordinance, and other relevant laws enable law enforcement authorities
    to take action against trafficking in persons. The courts can impose
    heavy fines and prison sentences for such activities as arranging
    passage of unauthorized entrants into Hong Kong (up to $465,000 (HK$5
    million) and 14 years in prison), assisting unauthorized entrants to
    remain in Hong Kong (up to $64,500 (HK$500,000) and 10 years in
    prison), using or possessing a forged, false or unlawfully obtained
    travel document (up to $19,350 (HK$150,000) and 14 years in prison),
    and aiding and abetting any person to use such a document (up to
    $19,350 (HK$150,000) and 14 years in prison). In late 1999, authorities
    in the United States and Canada began to find persons smuggled from
    China in shipping containers on cargo ships arriving from Hong Kong; in
    the first 3 weeks of the year alone, according to press reports, more
    than 100 persons had been found in shipping containers in ports on the
    west coast of Canada and the United States. In one case, 3 trafficked
    persons were found dead in 1 poorly provisioned and unsanitary shipping
    container; another 15 survived their ordeal, but 7 of the survivors
    required hospitalization. Hong Kong officials pledged to and did
    increase attempts to stop such trafficking out of Hong Kong, and began
    an investigation into the incidents, resulting in the arrest of one
    Hong Kong resident. The Hong Kong authorities also investigated many
    other trafficking incidents during the year. In November 26 intending
    illegal immigrants discovered the previous month by Hong Kong
    authorities sealed in a cargo container bound for the United States
    were convicted of attempting to stow away and of remaining in Hong Kong
    after having entered unlawfully, with most sentenced to 18 months in
    jail. Several others were arrested in connection with organizing the
    alien smuggling operation. In December another 12 intending illegal
    immigrants were discovered in a shipping container and arrested.
    Subsequent raids on offices and apartments of persons connected with
    the operation resulted in 15 additional arrests, including the alleged
    boss of the alien-smuggling syndicate. These two cases of mainlanders
    discovered hiding in containers were the first such cases where the
    illegal immigrants were caught in Hong Kong, but the 12th and 13th this
    year involving suspected use of Hong Kong as a container transshipment
    point. Most of these cases came to light through the efforts of Hong
    Kong authorities who coordinated their efforts with authorities abroad.
    Shipping companies and terminal operators took steps to detect and stop
    such smuggling as well. While the Security Bureau has policy
    responsibility over migrant trafficking, the police, customs and
    immigration departments are responsible for enforcing laws that combat
    trafficking. In July an immigration officer who accepted money in
    exchange for helping mainland Chinese enter Hong Kong illegally was
    convicted for violating the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and
    sentenced to 4-years imprisonment.
        Hong Kong is a transit point for persons trafficked from China and
    other nations to third countries. These persons generally are
    trafficked by organized crime organizations, and are trafficked for
    purposes of forced labor, or debt bonded labor, or forced prostitution.
    Countries to which such persons are trafficked include the United
    States, Canada, Australia, and various Western European countries. Many
    trafficked persons agree to pay large sums for their transport, and are
    forced to work in conditions similar to indentured servitude in order
    to repay the cost of their passage. Their movements may be restricted
    and their travel documents may be confiscated. Often, trafficked
    persons live under poor conditions, and are threatened with deportation
    or harm to family members if they complain. Thousands of persons are
    caught in Hong Kong each year with forged travel documents, some at the
    airport and others elsewhere in the territory. It is presumed widely
    that thousands of other would-be illegal immigrants pass through the
    SAR each year. It is unknown how many of these persons are trafficked.
        Government figures report the number of applications for the entry
    of Vietnamese women for taking up residence to join local husbands in
    recent years are as follows: 1998, 67 applications approved, 3 refused;
    1999, 175 approved, 55 refused; this year (through September), 85
    approved, 47 refused. Cases where the claimed relationship as husband
    and wife does not satisfy immigration officers are as a policy
    rejected. However, it is not known how many women may be trafficked
    into Hong Kong as mail order brides without going through immigration
    procedures.
        Visitors who are found to be engaged in prostitution are prosecuted
    for the offence of ``breach of condition of stay under the Immigration
    Ordinance.'' In 1999 1,193 visitors from mainland China were so
    prosecuted. Through September 1,468 were prosecuted. The figure for
    1998 was 1,247. The Government reports that it rarely encounters cases
    where visitors were forced to practice prostitution against their will.
    The number of visitors from the former Soviet Union and Malaysia found
    by the authorities to be engaged in illegal prostitution is small: 2,
    1, and 12 from Russia, Uzbekistan, and Malaysia, respectively, in 1998.
    In 1999 and this year (through September), the numbers were 5, 2, and
    0, and 1, 3, and 4, respectively. The Government has no record of
    visitor prostitutes from Eastern Europe for the same period. The number
    of illegal visitors trafficked into the country for the purpose of
    prostitution is unknown.

                                     TIBET

        (This section of the report on China has been prepared pursuant to
    Section 536 (b) of Public Law 103-236. The United States recognizes the
    Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)--hereinafter referred to as ``Tibet''--to
    be part of the People's Republic of China. The preservation and
    development of Tibet's unique religious, cultural, and linguistic
    heritage and protection of its people's fundamental human rights
    continue to be of concern.)
                    respect for the integrity of the person
        The Chinese Government strictly controls access to and information
    about Tibet. Thus, it is difficult to determine accurately the scope of
    human rights abuses. However, according to credible reports, Chinese
    government authorities continued to commit numerous serious human
    rights abuses in Tibet, including instances of torture, arbitrary
    arrest, detention without public trial, and lengthy detention of
    Tibetan nationalists for peacefully expressing their political or
    religious views. Tight controls on religion and on other fundamental
    freedoms continued and intensified during the year, especially during
    spring and summer. There were political protests by Tibetans in a
    number of ethnic Tibetan areas, including outside of the TAR.
        The Government's record of respect for religious freedom in Tibet
    deteriorated as TAR authorities imposed new, severe restrictions on
    many traditional religious practices and public manifestations of
    belief in urban areas during the spring and summer. In the fall, after
    a new Party secretary assumed power, there were some signs of
    moderation in the intensity of the crackdown. Local authorities in many
    areas were not enforcing the new restrictions on lower-level government
    employees, students, and others. However, tight preexisting
    restrictions remained in place for higher-level cadres and government
    workers. Activities viewed as vehicles for political dissent are not
    tolerated at any time and are promptly and forcibly suppressed.
    Individuals accused of political activism faced ongoing and serious
    persecution during the year. There were reports of the imprisonment and
    torture or the abuse of monks and nuns accused of political activism,
    the death of prisoners, and the threatened closure of monasteries.
        The lack of independent access to prisoners or to prisons makes it
    difficult to assess the extent and severity of abuses and the number of
    Tibetan prisoners; however, there were numerous reports of detentions
    and other punishments meted out during the year. A large number of
    monks and nuns remain detained or imprisoned. A number of such cases
    were cited by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture in his report to
    the 56th session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in the spring.
        There are reports that those detained, including those who have
    been tried and those who have not, are frequently subjected to forced
    labor that is injurious to their health and, in some cases, life
    threatening. Forced labor is found in prisons, detention centers,
    reeducation-through-labor facilities, and at work sites where prisoners
    are used as work forces. Tibetans outside of detention settings at
    times engage in labor on public projects managed by local governments
    without remuneration in lieu of paying taxes in cash. Tibetans are
    reportedly discriminated against in employment in Chinese government
    manufacturing and other work sites. Other fundamental worker rights
    recognized by the International Labor Organization, including the right
    to organize and the right to bargain collectively, that are broadly
    denied in China are also denied in Tibet.
        According to reports, the rate at which Tibetan political prisoners
    are dying in detention, or soon after their release, demonstrably as a
    result of abuse while in detention, is increasing. According to the
    Tibet Information Network (TIN), female political prisoners,
    particularly those held at Lhasa's Drapchi prison, are at the greatest
    risk: since 1987, 1 in 27 died while in prison or soon after being
    released. Drapchi's male political prisoners died at a rate of about 1
    in 33 since 1987. Overall TIN reports a death rate of 1 in 50 for
    Tibetan political prisoners as of year's end.
        There are many credible reports that prisoners are tortured and
    mistreated. Authorities use electric shocks, suspension in painful
    positions, and other forms of torture or abuse. Several sources
    reported the mistreatment and beatings of nuns in prison, including 24-
    year-old Ngawang Sangdrol, who was imprisoned at age 13, released 9
    months later and resentenced at age 15; her prison sentence was
    extended for a third time in late 1998 to a total of 21 years for her
    involvement in demonstrations, most recently during May 1998. Ngawang
    Sangdrol reportedly has been beaten severely on multiple occasions
    because of repeated participation in protests at Drapchi prison; her
    health is poor and deteriorating, and she is not receiving adequate
    medical care, according to credible reports. There were credible
    reports that guards beat political prisoners at Drapchi prison after
    the protests in May 1998; some were beaten severely, including monk
    Thubten Kalsang and nun Phuntsog Nyidrol (who reportedly tried to
    shield Ngawang Sangdrol from beatings). In at least one cell block,
    prisoners reportedly were confined to their cells for 14 months after
    the incidents in May 1998. As a result of the May 1998 protests, 10
    prisoners also had their sentences extended for periods of 18 months to
    6 years. There are credible reports from a number of prisons that
    prisoners who resisted the political reeducation imposed by prison
    authorities, particularly demands to denounce the Dalai Lama and accept
    Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by the Government as the Panchen
    Lama, also were beaten. According to credible reports, punishments
    meted out to uncooperative prisoner leaders have resulted in hunger
    strikes among female prisoners on at least two occasions at Drapchi.
    Officials reportedly have resorted to lengthening periods of solitary
    confinement to isolate demonstrators. Authorities significantly
    increased prison capacity in Lhasa through the construction of
    additional cell blocks at Utritru prison and expansions at Drapchi
    prison.
        In February 1999 TIN and the foreign press reported increased use
    of military-style drills and exercises (often in either very hot or
    very cold weather) at Lhasa's Drapchi prison. Prison officials
    reportedly force prisoners to run barefoot, to stand motionless for
    extended periods, and to march for extended periods while shouting
    patriotic slogans. Prisoners who fall behind or who cannot remain still
    are beaten severely. Prisoners also were treated badly in other
    prisons.
        There were reported deaths and suicides of Tibetan prisoners.
    According to credible reports, Tashi Tsering, who attempted to raise
    the outlawed Tibetan flag with explosives tied around his waist during
    the National Minority Games in August, 1999, committed suicide in
    prison in February. Sonam Rinchen, a farmer, died in prison in January.
    He had been arrested for unfurling a Tibetan flag during a protest in
    1992 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. According to TIN, Shol Dawa,
    a 64-year-old political activist, died in Drapchi prison on November
    19; the circumstances of his death were not known, but he was said to
    be suffering from a kidney ailment, was in poor health, and had been
    subjected to mistreatment and beatings on several occasions in the last
    few years. He was reportedly serving a 9-year sentence for trying to
    compile a list of names of political prisoners to send out of Tibet and
    was convicted of ``espionage.'' Shol Dawa had been imprisoned a few
    times, starting in 1981. In October TIN published detailed information
    about the deaths of nine prisoners after the May 1998 protests at
    Drapchi prison. In June 1998, five nuns reportedly committed suicide
    together after weeks of severe mistreatment (including being forced to
    stand motionless in the hot sun on a daily basis over a period of
    several days, with cups of water on their heads and pieces of paper
    under their arms) following their participation in the prison protests.
    The nuns, all in their twenties, had been imprisoned for taking part in
    peaceful protests. All were near the end of their terms. At least three
    monks and a criminal prisoner also died in Drapchi during 1998.
        According to credible reports, Chadrel Rinpoche, who was accused of
    betraying state secrets while helping the Dalai Lama choose the 11th
    reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, has been held in a secret compound
    of a Sichuan prison where he is separated from other prisoners, denied
    all outside contacts, and restricted to his cell since his 1997
    sentence to 6 years' imprisonment after a trial that was closed to the
    public. In April the Government told a visiting foreign delegation that
    he is ``fine physically'' but gave no further details.
        Authorities reported that Ngawang Choephel, a Tibetan
    ethnomusicologist sentenced in 1996 to 18 years in prison on charges of
    espionage, was moved from the high security Powo Tramo prison in the
    TAR to another facility near Chengdu in Sichuan Province so that he
    could receive medical treatment. In August his mother, Sonam Deckyi,
    was allowed two 1-hour visits with her son in that Sichuan facility.
    She reported that he is very thin and that he has complained about
    pains in his torso. Also in August, he was said to be suffering from a
    variety of ailments, including digestive, urinary, kidney, and liver
    problems.
        While there was limited political violence in Tibet during the
    year, an explosion occurred in Lhasa on October 26. Some have suggested
    that the explosion, which occurred outside of the offices of the
    government department that controls neighborhood activities and
    grassroots organizations, was politically motivated; however, whether
    the explosion was politically motivated has not been determined, and
    the blast may well have been a result of construction activity.
        Legal safeguards for ethnic Tibetans detained or imprisoned are the
    same as those in the rest of China and are inadequate in design and
    implementation. According to TIN the length of the average sentence of
    Tibetan political prisoners is lengthening. For those currently
    incarcerated, the average sentence is 8 years, 8 months. Since 1987 the
    average sentence imposed on all political prisoners is 4 years, 9
    months.
        A majority of judges are ethnic Tibetans, but most have little or
    no legal training. Authorities are working to address this problem
    through increased legal education opportunities. Trials are brief and
    closed. Courts handle approximately 20 cases involving crimes against
    state security each year, for which maximum prison sentences are 15
    years for each count, not to exceed 20 years in total. Such cases
    mainly concern actions in support of Tibetan independence; such
    activities do not have to be violent to be illegal. A TIN report put
    the number of political prisoners in Tibet at 500 as of the end of
    1999. Reportedly 80 percent of female detainees are nuns, and
    approximately 66 percent of male prisoners are monks. Officials from
    the Justice and Prison Administration Bureaus told a foreign delegation
    in April that of the 2,200 prisoners currently serving sentences in the
    TAR (76 percent of whom were ethnic Tibetan, and 20 percent ethnic
    Han), 110 were incarcerated for ``endangering state security,''
    including approximately 30 nuns and 70 monks.
        Refugee and other accounts published by NGO's report on the use of
    forced labor in prisons and other detention facilities in Tibet.
    Prisoners, usually working under production quotas, are forced to work
    in agriculture and lumbering, where the work is described as demanding,
    and accidents are frequent. Typically, forced labor in detention is
    without remuneration. Chinese law mandates that prisoners can be
    required to work up to 12 hours per day, with one rest day every 2
    weeks (Article 53 of the Statute of Reform Through Labor). However,
    some refugees report that work requirements are more onerous that those
    set forth in the law. At Drapchi prison, male prisoners work in
    vegetable fields and in factories at the prison facilities. Female
    prisoners clean toilets and also are involved in tailoring, cleaning,
    or spinning and sorting wool to be used in the manufacture of carpets
    and sweaters. According to Human Rights Watch, some Tibetan prisoners
    are required to work beyond their terms of imprisonment. Prisoners in
    pretrial detention also are forced to work.
        Promotion of family planning remains an important goal for the
    authorities in Tibet, but family planning policies permit most ethnic
    Tibetans, as well as other minority groups, to have more children than
    Han Chinese (who are subject to the same limits as citizens in other
    areas of the country--generally one child for urban couples and two for
    some rural couples). Urban Tibetans are permitted to have two children,
    while those in rural areas often have three or more. In practice
    Tibetans working for the Government, especially Communist Party
    members, are pressured to limit themselves to one child.
        The Government tightly controls official visits, and delegation
    members usually have very few opportunities to meet local persons not
    previously approved by the local authorities. Foreigners, including
    international NGO personnel and foreign residents, were subject to
    travel restrictions during several periods over the summer, and many
    foreign groups reported increased restrictions on movements during the
    year. The Government also placed restrictions on the movement of
    Tibetans during sensitive anniversaries and events and increased
    control over border areas. In February up to 54 persons were detained
    by Chinese authorities as they tried to leave China and cross without
    proper travel documents into Nepal. Some were sentenced to prison terms
    of 2 to 3 years. Scores of ethnic Tibetans studying in India were
    similarly detained in the spring after entering China from Nepal,
    according to credible reports.
        Some foreign NGO's reported restrictions on their activities and,
    in some cases, threats of expulsion. One foreign NGO was shut down
    during the year, and its foreign staff expelled.
        Many staff members and teachers of the Gyatso Children's Home, a
    Lhasa orphanage that was closed by officials in September 1999,
    remained in detention, according to reliable reports. Authorities
    allege that the home's personnel were engaged in corrupt activity and
    were linked to persons who carried out ``acts of violence.'' Several of
    the more than 60 Tibetan children who lived at the home were left by
    officials to live on the streets. Others were sent to live with
    relatives or placed in local orphanages where conditions reportedly
    were extremely poor.
                              freedom of religion
        The Government maintains tight controls on religious practices and
    places of worship. While it allows a number of forms of religious
    activity in Tibet, the Government does not tolerate religious
    manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence or any expression of
    separatism, which it describes as ``splittism.'' The Government remains
    suspicious of Tibetan Buddhism in general because of its links to the
    Dalai Lama, and this suspicion also applies to Tibetan Buddhist
    religious activities or adherents who do not overtly demonstrate their
    patriotism for the State. The Government's record of respect for
    religious freedom deteriorated during the year as authorities imposed
    new, severe restrictions on many traditional religious practices and
    public manifestations of belief in the TAR's urban areas during the
    spring and summer. However, by autumn there were signs that authorities
    no longer were enforcing the new restrictions, and tensions abated
    somewhat. The Government harshly criticized the Dalai Lama's political
    activities and leadership of a governmentin-exile. The official press
    continued to criticize vehemently the ``Dalai clique'' and, in an
    attempt to discredit the Dali Lama and undermine the credibility of his
    religious authority, repeatedly described him as a separatist who was
    determined to split China. Both central government and local officials
    often insist that dialog with the Dalai Lama is essentially impossible
    and claim that his actions belie his repeated public assurances that he
    does not advocate independence for Tibet. Nonetheless the Government
    asserts that it is willing to hold talks with the Dalai Lama as long as
    he ceases his activities to divide the country and recognizes that
    Tibet is an inseparable part of China and that Taiwan is a province of
    China.
        The Government continued its ``patriotic education'' campaign aimed
    at enforcing compliance with government regulations and either cowing
    or weeding out monks and nuns who refuse to adopt the Party line and
    remain sympathetic to the Dalai Lama. The ``patriotic education''
    campaign also is intended to increase the Government's control over the
    Tibetan Buddhist establishment. The ``patriotic reeducation'' of monks
    and nuns, which began in 1996 in Lhasa area monasteries and in
    subsequent years was intensified and extended throughout Tibet and to
    monasteries outside of the TAR, continued but at a lower level of
    intensity. A new round of political education classes in monasteries
    began at the end of 1999 in Lhasa and in some smaller monasteries in
    more remote parts of the TAR. However, the current pattern of classes
    several times per week or per month seems less frequent than
    previously.
        Official ``work teams'' remain in some monasteries and periodically
    visit others. Topics for such required classes include relations
    between Tibetans and Han Chinese, Tibet's historical status as a part
    of China, and the role of the Dalai Lama in attempting to ``split'' the
    country. According to regulations posted at the entrances of many
    monasteries, monks are required to be ``patriotic,'' and authorities
    require monks to: Sign a declaration agreeing to reject independence
    for Tibet; reject Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai
    Lama as the 11th reincarnation of the Panchen Lama; reject and denounce
    the Dalai Lama; recognize the unity of China and Tibet; and not listen
    to the Voice of America. According to some reports, monks who refused
    these terms were expelled from their monasteries and were not permitted
    to return home to work; others have been detained. Others were forced
    to leave their monasteries after failing to pass exams on these topics
    or being found ``politically unqualified,'' and still others left
    ``voluntarily'' rather than denounce the Dalai Lama. Resistance to the
    campaigns has been intense, and the Government's efforts are resented
    deeply by monks, nuns, and lay Buddhists. Although there has been some
    reduction of patriotic education activities throughout the region as
    the objectives of increasing control over the monasteries and reducing
    the numbers of monks and nuns were achieved, religious activities in
    many monasteries and nunneries were disrupted severely, and monks and
    nuns have fled to India to escape the campaigns. Approximately 3,000
    Tibetans enter Nepal each year to escape conditions in Tibet, according
    to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; many of these refugees
    claim that they left because of the ``patriotic reeducation''
    campaigns. The ban on the public display of photographs of the Dalai
    Lama continued, and such pictures were not readily available except
    illegally in many parts of the TAR.
        Chinese authorities closely associate Buddhist monasteries with
    proindependence activism in Tibet. The Government has moved to curb the
    proliferation of monasteries, which it charges are a drain on local
    resources and a conduit for political infiltration by the Tibetan exile
    community. Chinese officials state that Tibet has more than 46,300
    Buddhist monks and nuns and approximately 1,787 monasteries, temples,
    and religious sites. These numbers apply only to the TAR; thousands of
    monks and nuns live in other Tibetan areas of China, including parts of
    Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces. Officials have used
    these same figures for several years, although there are credible
    reports that the numbers of monks and nuns have dropped significantly
    at many sites in the TAR, especially since the beginning of the
    ``patriotic education'' campaign. The Government states that there are
    no limits on the number of monks in major monasteries and that each
    monastery's democratic management committee decides on its own how many
    monks the monastery can support. However, these committees are
    government controlled; and in practice the Government generally imposes
    strict limits on the number of monks in major monasteries. Some
    monasteries reportedly have been required to decrease the number of
    monks associated with them. The Government has the right to disapprove
    any individual's application to take up religious orders, although it
    does not always exercise this right. According to a TIN report, in the
    area around Lhasa, the numbers of monks and nuns in monasteries and
    nunneries fell during the summer, as part of a drive to restrict
    religious observance; 30 monks were expelled from the Jokhang temple in
    July. At year's end, 120 monks, the official quota, remained at
    Jokhang. Although by regulation monks are prohibited from joining a
    monastery prior to the age of 18, many younger boys continue the
    tradition of entering monastic life. However, many young novices, who
    traditionally served as attendants to older monks while receiving a
    basic monastic education and awaiting formal ordination, have been
    expelled from monasteries in recent years for being underage; the fact
    that these novices were not regular members of the monasteries has
    allowed authorities to deny that there has been a significant decline
    in the numbers of monks.
        Most Tibetans practice Buddhism to some degree. This holds true for
    many ethnic Tibetan government officials and Communist Party members.
    Some 1,000 religious figures hold positions in local people's
    congresses and committees of the Chinese People's Political
    Consultative Conference. However, the Government continues to insist
    that party members and government employees adhere to the Party's code
    of atheism. A 3-year drive to promote atheism and science, first
    announced in January 1999, originally aimed at government workers,
    continued and was extended to more government offices and to schools.
    The drive was launched to promote economic progress, strengthen the
    struggle against separatism, and stem ``the Dalai clique's reactionary
    infiltration.'' Authorities threatened to terminate the employment of
    government employees whose children are studying in India (where the
    Dalai Lama's government-in-exile is located) if they did not bring the
    children back to Tibet, and authorities searched the homes of
    government workers for religious objects or pictures of the Dalai Lama.
        During the spring and summer, authorities in Lhasa and other areas
    imposed new, severe restrictions on religious activities, prohibiting
    government and Communist Party officials from going into monasteries,
    visiting the Jokhang temple, having altars in their homes,
    participating in religious activities during the Tibetan New Year, or
    placing new prayer flags on their roofs (a traditional practice during
    the Tibetan New Year). There were also credible reports that some
    government employees were forbidden to make donations to monks and nuns
    in Lhasa. In addition some government workers and Party members were
    told that they must withdraw their children from monasteries,
    nunneries, and exile schools in India and were threatened with the
    expulsion of their children from schools if the workers and Party
    members participated in forbidden religious practices. In some areas,
    private citizens also were prohibited from engaging in traditional New
    Year's activities such as placing prayer flags on the top of Bumpari (a
    mountain near Lhasa), burning incense, and making the traditional
    ``lingkor'' (pilgrimage circuit around the sacred sites of Lhasa)
    during the June festival of Sagadawa, the most important religious
    holiday in Tibetan Buddhism. A number of men in street clothes
    reportedly lined the lingkor route and attempted to film persons
    walking the traditional circuit. Government employees allegedly were
    threatened with dismissal if they made the lingkor. During spring and
    summer, some Tibet University students reportedly also were forbidden
    to visit monasteries or to have religious objects in their rooms. The
    homes of private citizens in Lhasa reportedly were searched for
    religious paintings (``thangkas''). However, enforcement of these
    restrictions reportedly relaxed slightly later in the year. According
    to TIN, in July 1999, new restrictions were imposed by the authorities
    to prevent celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday; in July these
    restrictions reportedly were enforced more stringently than in 1999.
    Reports indicate that Tibetans were forbidden to hold traditional
    incense-burning ceremonies anywhere in Lhasa, and that some places of
    worship were closed on the Dalai Lama's birthday.
        The Government continues to oversee the daily operations of major
    religious sites. The Government, which does not contribute to
    monasteries' regular operating funds, retains management control of the
    monasteries through the government-controlled democratic management
    committees and the local religious affairs bureaus. During 1999 the TAR
    Religious Affairs Bureau confirmed that its officers are members of the
    Communist Party, and that Party members are required to be atheists;
    however, it was not possible to confirm that members of the local
    religious affairs bureaus are atheists. Regulations restrict leadership
    of democratic management committees to ``patriotic and devoted'' monks
    and nuns and specify that the Government must approve all members of
    the committees. At some monasteries, government officials also sit on
    the committees. Despite these government efforts to control the
    Buddhist clergy and monasteries, antigovernment sentiment remains
    strong.
        In January the Karmapa, the highest ranking lama of Tibetan
    Buddhism's Karma Kargyu school, fled from Tibet to India after he
    reportedly had been denied access to Kargyu teachers or permission to
    study with them in India. Soon after officials closed Tsurphu
    monastery, the home of the Karmapa, to visitors. Many other persons,
    including lay persons, were questioned in connection with the Karmapa's
    flight. There were reports that several high ranking TAR officials were
    called to Beijing after the Karmapa left Tsurphu to account for their
    actions. According to TIN, authorities replaced monks on the monastic
    management committee at Tsurphu after the Karmapa's flight, while other
    monks were admonished to improve their ``political attitudes'' or face
    further ``patriotic education'' sessions. Other officials and monks at
    the monastery reportedly were under investigation by the authorities.
    On December 6, foreign officials were allowed to visit the Tsurphu
    monastery, where approximately 325 monks were said to be in residence.
    There were few other visitors at the time, even though December usually
    is a popular time for pilgrims to visit. According to reports, no new
    monks have been permitted to enter Tsurphu monastery since the Karmapa
    left; however, religious activity continued at the monastery. Officials
    reportedly are stationed at the monastery; according to some Western
    visitors, the atmosphere there is still tense, and monks are reluctant
    to talk to foreigners.
        The dramatic departure of the Karmapa added to tensions and
    increased the authorities' efforts to control monastic activity in the
    TAR. TIN reported that the Reting Monastery near Lhasa was closed to
    visitors in May after the arrest of eight monks for protesting the
    authorities' selection of 2-year-old Sonam Phuntsog in January as the
    seventh reincarnation of the Reting Rinpoche. During the summer,
    another young lama, the 7-year-old Pawo Rinpoche, reportedly was moved
    to Lhasa from Nenang monastery and was kept under house arrest. He is
    said to have returned to Nenang Monastery during the fall, where he
    remains under house arrest, with heavy security. He reportedly has been
    denied access to his religious tutors. The Pawo Rinpoche was recognized
    by the Karmapa and is one of the senior Karma Kargyu lamas remaining in
    Tibet. In December foreign officials were denied permission to visit
    Nenang Monastery.
        TIN reported that the Taglung Drag Monastery in Lhasa municipality
    was threatened with closure and its monks with expulsion if they
    refused to denounce the Dalai Lama after monks from the monastery
    shouted proindependence slogans in two separate incidents in March and
    August 1999. ``Patriotic education'' activities reportedly were
    increased, and 16 of 24 monks reportedly left the monastery in
    September 1999 rather than denounce the Dalai Lama.
        The flight of the Karmapa also has made the authorities pay more
    attention to illegal border crossings and tighten security on the
    borders with India and Nepal. As a result, greater numbers of Tibetans
    have been arrested trying to leave the TAR. According to credible
    reports, in May as many as 50 Tibetan students returning to Tibet from
    India were arrested at the Nepal-China border.
        The Government approved the selection of 2-year-old Sonam Phuntsog
    on January 16 as the seventh reincarnation of the Reting Rinpoche. A
    Tibetan government official stated that officials supervising religion
    should ensure that the boy ``loves the Communist Party of China, the
    Socialist country, and Tibetan Buddhism'' and that he help to
    ``preserve the unity of the Chinese nation.'' The Dalai Lama, who by
    tradition would approve the selection of important religious figures
    such as the Reting Rinpoche, did not recognize this choice; many of the
    monks at Reting Monastery reportedly did not accept the child as the
    Reting Rinpoche.
        The Panchen Lama is Tibetan Buddhism's second most prominent
    figure, after the Dalai Lama. The Government continued to insist that
    Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy it recognizes and enthroned in 1995, is the
    Panchen Lama's 11th reincarnation. The authorities tightly control all
    aspects of his life, and he has appeared publicly in Beijing and the
    TAR only on rare occasions. His public appearances were marked by a
    heavy security presence. At all other times, the authorities strictly
    limit access to the boy. Meanwhile repeated requests for access to
    Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th
    Panchen Lama, by high-level foreign government and private delegations,
    including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, to confirm his
    well-being and whereabouts have been denied. In October Chinese
    officials showed foreign officials two photographs purportedly
    depicting the boy. Government officials have claimed that the boy is
    being held for his own protection and that he lives in Tibet and
    attends classes as a ``normal schoolboy.'' The authorities also
    maintain that both boys are being well cared for and are receiving a
    good education. The vast majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize Gendun
    Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama. Tibetan monks have claimed that they
    were forced to sign statements pledging allegiance to the boy the
    Government selected as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The
    Communist Party also urged its members to support the ``official''
    Panchen Lama, and government authorities at both the regional and city
    levels had pictures of the boy printed for use in public and private
    religious displays.
        The ban on the public display of photographs of the Dalai Lama
    continued, and such pictures were not readily available except through
    illegal means. Some monasteries and many individuals displayed them
    privately. In the spring, Lhasa area neighborhood committees began
    sending teams to the homes of ordinary citizens to confiscate books
    about and pictures of the Dalai Lama. Similar restrictions are in
    effect in Tibetan areas outside the TAR; although a few shops still
    quietly sell the Dalai Lama's photograph, the vast majority of
    monasteries no longer display his photo. The Government banned pictures
    of Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama to be the
    11th reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. Portraits of Gyaltsen Norbu,
    the boy recognized by the Government to be the Panchen Lama, were on
    prominent display in some monasteries, as were sets of rules governing
    religious activity.
        The Government claims that since the end of the Cultural
    Revolution, it has contributed sums in excess of $40 million (300 to
    400 million RMB) toward the restoration of tens of thousands of
    Buddhist sites, many of which were destroyed before and during that
    period, in part to promote the development of tourism in Tibet.
    However, at most sites, restoration efforts are funded privately.
        There were reports of some Falun Gong practitioners among the Han
    minority in Tibet. In addition an official press report said that
    military authorities had become concerned over the practice by some
    soldiers of Zhong Gong, a qigong-based spiritual movement, prompting
    propaganda efforts aimed at eliminating the practice.
        In June 1998, the European Union issued a report based on the trip
    of its ambassadorial delegation to Tibet in May 1998. The report was
    highly critical of the Government's control of religious freedom and
    stated that ``the delegation was in no doubt that the authorities in
    the TAR exercise extremely tight control over the principal elements of
    Tibetan religion and culture.''
            economic development and protection of cultural heritage
        Tibet is roughly the size of Western Europe, having an area of
    approximately 1.2 million square kilometers. It has the smallest
    population of China's administrative regions with approximately 2.4
    million inhabitants.
        Tibetans, as one of China's 55 minority ethnic groups, receive
    preferential treatment in marriage and family planning policies, and,
    to a lesser extent, in university admissions and government employment.
    According to official government statistics, 74 percent of all
    government employees in Tibet are ethnic Tibetans. Nonetheless, many
    positions of real power are held by ethnic Han Chinese, and most key
    decisions in Tibet are made by ethnic Han. Although government
    regulations stipulate that government and legal documents are to be in
    Tibetan, in practice written communications by officials and government
    documents very frequently only are in Chinese. In the area of private
    sector employment, discrimination against Tibetans is widespread.
        The Central Government and other provinces of China heavily
    subsidize the Tibetan economy, which has grown by an average annual
    rate of over 10 percent for the last decade. Over 90 percent of Tibet's
    budget income comes from outside sources. Tibet also benefits from a
    wide variety of favorable economic and tax policies. However, these
    policies have attracted growing numbers of ethnic Han and Hui (Muslim)
    immigrants from other parts of China, who are competing with--and in
    some cases displacing--Tibetan enterprises and labor. Government
    development policies have helped raise the material living standards of
    many ethnic Tibetans, particularly by providing better transportation
    and communications facilities, but many of the benefits of development
    and the expanding commercial sector accrue primarily to Han Chinese.
    For example, in many areas of Lhasa, almost all small businesses are
    run by Han. Rapid economic growth, the expanding tourism industry, and
    the introduction of more modern cultural influences also have disrupted
    traditional living patterns and customs and threatened traditional
    Tibetan culture.
        The Dalai Lama, Tibetan experts, and others have expressed concern
    that development projects and other central Government policies adopted
    at a 1994 national work conference on Tibet and still in effect
    encourage a massive influx of Han Chinese into Tibet, which has the
    effect of overwhelming Tibet's traditional culture and diluting ethnic
    Tibetan demographic dominance. In recent years, freer movement of
    persons throughout China, governmentsponsored development, and the
    prospect of economic opportunity in Tibet have led to a substantial
    increase in the non-Tibetan population (including China's Muslim Hui
    minority as well as Han Chinese) in Lhasa and other urban areas. An
    increased number of immigrants from China's large transient population
    seek to take advantage of these new economic opportunities. Most of
    these migrants profess to be temporary residents, but small businesses
    run by ethnic Han and Hui citizens (mostly restaurants and retail
    shops) are becoming more numerous in almost all Tibetan towns and
    cities. Discrimination in employment reportedly is rampant; ethnic Han
    are hired preferentially for many jobs and receive greater pay for the
    same work. Ethnic Tibetans reportedly are fired discriminatorily from
    some jobs. In addition many jobs require proficiency in Chinese (which
    gives Han an advantage). Connections also reportedly work to the
    advantage of the ethnic Han (who tend to be in the higher ranking
    positions), and it is more difficult for Tibetans to get permits and
    loans to open businesses than it is for ethnic Han.
        In Lhasa, the Chinese cultural presence is obvious and widespread.
    Buildings are of Chinese architectural style, the Chinese language is
    widely spoken, and Chinese characters are used in most commercial and
    official communications. Lhasa had a population of 139,683 in 1998.
    Some observers have estimated that at least half and perhaps more of
    Lhasa's residents are Han Chinese; elsewhere in the TAR, the Han
    percentage of the population is significantly lower. In rural areas,
    the Han presence is often negligible. Chinese officials assert that 95
    percent of Tibet's officially registered population is Tibetan, with
    Han and other ethnic groups making up the remaining 5 percent. This
    figure does not include the large number of ``temporary'' Han
    residents, including military and paramilitary troops and their
    dependents, many of whom have lived in Tibet for years.
        There are reports that malnutrition among Tibetan children is
    widespread in many areas of the TAR. This is particularly true of rural
    areas and has resulted in high rates of stunted growth among children.
    Nutritional deficiency ailments, such as goiter (from a lack of
    iodine), night blindness (from a lack of Vitamin A), and rickets are
    said to be relatively common among children in some areas.
        Illiteracy and semiliteracy levels are high. According to official
    government statistics, 42 percent of persons in the TAR are illiterate
    or semiliterate. Illiteracy and semiliteracy rates are as high as 90
    percent in some areas. Chinese officials over the past few years have
    downgraded the use of Tibetan in education and in 1997 announced that
    they would begin teaching Chinese to Tibetan children starting in the
    first grade. The Government stated that this step was taken in order to
    make Tibetan children more competitive with their Han counterparts, and
    provide more educational and employment opportunities in the long run.
    Primary schools at the village level follow a Tibetan curriculum, but
    these schools usually have only two or three grades.
        Approximately 83 percent of eligible children attend primary
    school, according to official statistics, but most pupils end their
    formal education after graduating from village schools. According to
    local education officials, Tibetan is the main language of instruction
    in 60 percent of middle schools, especially in more remote areas,
    although there are special classes offering instruction in Chinese.
    NGO's maintain that this figure is high. Most, but not all, of the
    students in the Chinese classes are ethnic Han. Most of those who
    attend regional high schools continue to receive some of their
    education in Tibetan, but knowledge of Chinese is essential as most
    classes are in Chinese. Tibetan curriculum high schools exist in a few
    areas, primarily in Tibetan areas outside the TAR. Since the mid-
    1980's, the Government has allocated funds to enable Tibetan secondary
    students to study in schools elsewhere in China. According to
    government figures, there are 13,000 Tibetan students currently
    studying in some 100 schools in different parts of China. Knowledge of
    Chinese is usually necessary to receive a higher education, although
    some minority colleges allow for study of some subjects in Tibetan.
        Tibet University, which has 3,000 students, was established to
    train Tibetan teachers for the local educational system. Ethnic
    Tibetans resent the disproportionate Han representation in the student
    body and faculty. Tibetans, officially said to constitute approximately
    95 percent of the region's population, make up approximately 67 percent
    of Tibet University's student body and only 50 percent of the faculty.
    Although Tibetans are given admission preference, Han Chinese students
    frequently gain admission because they score higher on admission exams
    due to stronger Chinese-language skills and educational backgrounds.
    Authorities reportedly require professors, particularly those from
    Tibet University's Tibetan Language Department, which is viewed as a
    potential source of dissent, to attend political education sessions and
    limit course studies and materials in an effort to prevent
    ``separatist'' political and religious activity on campus. Many ancient
    or religious texts are banned from the curriculum for political
    reasons. The Tibetan Language Department, which was closed to new
    students in the fall of 1997, was reopened in 1998 after its curriculum
    had been purged of religious and ``separatist'' materials. According to
    TIN, 70 Han students were admitted to the Tibetan Language Department
    to prepare them to work as administrators in Tibet and Tibetan areas
    outside the TAR. This is the first time the university has enrolled
    such a group, and there are reports of tensions between Han students
    and ethnic Tibetans on campus.
        Prostitution is a growing problem in Tibet, as it is elsewhere in
    the country, according to experts working in the region. Hundreds of
    brothels operate openly in Lhasa; up to 10,000 commercial sex workers
    may be employed in Lhasa alone. Much of the prostitution occurs at
    sites owned by the Party, the Government, or the military. Most
    prostitutes in Tibet are ethnic Han women, mainly from Sichuan.
    However, a substantial number of ethnic Tibetans, mainly young girls
    from rural or nomadic areas, also work as prostitutes. The incidence of
    HIV/AIDS among prostitutes in Tibet is unknown but is believed to be
    relatively high.
        During the year, there were reports that TAR authorities were
    pressuring employers of ethnic Tibetans who were raised or educated in
    India to dismiss such employees, especially in the tourism industry.
    Lhasa tour agencies have been forced to dismiss ethnic Tibetan tour
    guides educated in India and Nepal. These guides were required to seek
    employment with the government's Tibet Tourism Bureau (TTB). Prior to
    gaining employment with the TTB, applicants must pass an examination on
    tourism and politics. Many, if not most, Tibetan tour guides educated
    abroad reportedly fail this exam. Tourist hotels and restaurants have
    been ``encouraged'' to dismiss ethnic Tibetan employees educated
    abroad, as well.
        In October 1999, the official news agency Xinhua reported that the
    Tibet Autonomous Regional Television opened a Tibetan-language
    satellite television channel. The channel broadcasts in Tibetan for 10
    hours each day, and reaches areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and
    Yunnan Provinces as well. There also are two bilingual channels, on
    which Tibetan language programs make up 15 percent of the total.
    According to an NGO report, radio broadcasts by the Oslo-based Voice of
    Tibet were blocked starting in January. The signals of the Tibetan
    language services of VOA and RFA suffer from the same jamming of their
    frequencies by Chinese authorities as the signals of their Chinese
    language services. However, Tibetans are able to listen to the
    broadcasts at least some of the time.
        The Internet has been open to the public since April 1999. At
    year's end, Lhasa had several Internet cafes, and estimates put the
    number of Internet users at several thousand.
        Despite the designation of dozens of buildings in the old section
    of Lhasa as protected cultural heritage sites, there were credible
    reports during the year that some traditional buildings were destroyed.
    However, most of the protected sites have been preserved.
        China's economic development policies, supported in Tibet by
    central government subsidies, are modernizing parts of Tibetan society
    and changing traditional Tibetan ways of life. Although the Government
    has made efforts in recent years to restore some of the physical
    structures and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture
    damaged or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, repressive social
    and political controls continue to limit the fundamental freedoms of
    ethnic Tibetans and risk undermining Tibet's unique cultural,
    religious, and linguistic heritage.
                                   __________

                                     TAIWAN

        The March victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
    presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian marked the first transition from
    one political party to another in Taiwan's history. The president
    appoints the premier, who heads the Executive Yuan (EY), or Cabinet.
    Constitutional amendments adopted in 1997 provided the Legislative Yuan
    (LY) with the authority to dismiss the Cabinet with a no-confidence
    vote. The previous ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) retains the majority
    in the LY, whose members were elected in a free and fair election in
    December 1998. In addition to the DPP and KMT, the People First Party
    and the New Party play significant roles in the LY. The Judicial Yuan
    (JY) is constitutionally independent of the other branches of the
    political system, but corruption and political influence remain serious
    problems. However, the new DPP Government made efforts to eliminate
    corruption and to diminish political influence over the judiciary.
        The National Police Administration (NPA) of the Ministry of
    Interior (MOI), the NPA's Criminal Investigation Bureau, and the
    Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Investigation Bureau are responsible for law
    enforcement relating to internal security. The police and security
    agencies are under effective civilian control. Some members of the
    police occasionally committed human rights abuses.
        Taiwan has a dynamic, export-oriented, free market economy.
    Liberalization of the economy diminished the dominant role that state-
    owned and party-run enterprises played in such major sectors as
    finance, transportation, utilities, shipbuilding, steel,
    telecommunications, and petrochemicals. As the economy evolved,
    services and capital- and technology-intensive industries have become
    the most important sectors. Major exports include computers, electronic
    equipment, machinery, and textiles. Citizens generally enjoy a high
    standard of living and an equitable income distribution.
        The authorities generally respect human rights; however, problems
    remain in some areas. Principal problems during the year included
    police abuse of detainees; prison overcrowding; political and personal
    pressures on the judiciary; some infringements on citizens' privacy;
    violence and discrimination against women; child prostitution and
    abuse; societal discrimination against Aborigines; restrictions on
    workers' freedom of association and on their ability to strike; and
    instances of trafficking in women and children. However, during the
    year, political and personal pressures on the judiciary decreased
    significantly.
        In his May 20 inaugural address, President Chen declared that
    Taiwan must include international human rights in its legal code and
    establish a national human rights committee.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Although the Constitution does not directly address the
    issues of torture and punishment, the Code of Criminal Procedure
    stipulates that no violence, threat, inducement, fraud, or other
    improper means shall be used against accused persons; however, there
    were credible reports that police occasionally physically abused
    persons in their custody.
        The law allows suspects to have attorneys present during
    interrogations, primarily to ensure that abuse does not take place (see
    Section 1.d.). The MOJ claims that each interrogation is recorded and
    that any allegation of mistreatment is investigated. Nonetheless
    lawyers and legal scholars note that abuses most often occur in local
    police stations where interrogations are not recorded and when
    attorneys often are not present. Informed observers note that police
    emphasize confessions by suspects as the principal investigative tool.
    Law enforcement agencies remain weak in scientific investigative
    skills; however, the NPA has made efforts to improve its investigative
    skills, upgrading its crime laboratory technology and training crime
    scene examiners. International observers also have noted that the
    judicial system sometimes has accepted confessions even when they
    contradict available physical evidence or logic. The NPA denies that
    police abuse suspects. It asserts that regulations forbid such abuse
    and that police who abuse suspects will be punished. The NPA
    implemented regulations in 1997 to protect further the rights of
    suspects during questioning, including forbidding the questioning of
    suspects at night and requiring audio or, whenever possible,
    videotaping of interrogations. Nevertheless there are credible reports
    that the physical abuse or the threat of abuse of prisoners is a
    recurring investigative technique. In one such case in April, in order
    to obtain a confession, police allegedly physically abused four youths
    who were suspected of robbing the residence of a prominent person. The
    head of the police station subsequently made a public apology to the
    youths when it was discovered that eight other individuals were
    responsible for the crime. Detainees who are abused physically have the
    right to sue the police for torture, and confessions shown to have been
    obtained through torture are inadmissible in court proceedings. In July
    the parents of the four youths filed suit against the police. In
    November the Taiwan High Court began a retrial of the ``Hsichih
    Trio''--three youths convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
    1992. The three claim that the police tortured them into confessing.
        The authorities state that they have made efforts to investigate,
    prosecute, and punish officials responsible for torture and other
    mistreatment. Although the basic responsibility for investigating
    mistreatment lies with prosecutors, the Control Yuan (CY), a coequal
    branch of the political system that investigates official misconduct,
    also investigates such cases. While the authorities state that respect
    for human rights is a part of basic police training, human rights
    groups assert that the measures the authorities have taken to protect
    human rights are inadequate to create an ethos of respect for human
    rights among police and security personnel. Women's and children's
    rights groups are active in monitoring police and judicial performance
    and periodically mount campaigns to correct abuses.
        Corporal punishment is forbidden under military law and strictly
    prohibited in practice. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has
    taken steps to address the occasional reports of physical abuse of
    military personnel by promulgating regulations specifying the
    appropriate treatment of lower ranking personnel and by conducting
    regular polls of servicemen and their families to discover any abuse.
    The authorities also have established a telephone hot line to report
    alleged abuses within the military. Reports of abuse are investigated
    and handled according to the law. In addition the MND has established
    practical training and curriculums for all military personnel who have
    contact with new recruits. Pressure from parents of recruits and a
    program to retain recruits also have contributed to an apparent
    reduction in abuses. In 1999 the MND established a committee for the
    protection of the rights of military personnel. Using the expertise of
    outside consultants, the committee handles personal problems of
    military personnel and is part of the MND's effort to promote
    ``humanitarian management'' within the military. In January the MND
    began quarterly evaluations of commanding officers' performance in
    preventing injuries to soldiers under their command. In August the MND
    issued a decree prohibiting officers from ``bullying'' new recruits,
    spelling out the proscribed behavior, and specifying stiff penalties
    for violations.
        Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
    However, overcrowding at the 49 prisons and overly long stays at the
    detention centers for illegal aliens remained problems, although the
    authorities have begun to address this latter problem (see Section
    2.d.). Despite an increase in facilities since 1997, the number of
    inmates detained at year's end exceeded capacity by 7,385. The primary
    reason for overcrowding has changed. The number of parolees dropped,
    and the number of inmates rose after a 1997 amendment to the Code of
    Criminal Procedure reversed a 1994 amendment that had allowed prisoners
    to be paroled after serving one-third, rather than one-half, of their
    sentences. On the other hand, the number of incarcerated drug users,
    which previously had been the fastest growing category of inmates,
    leveled off. In addition the Ministry of Justice has set up drug
    treatment facilities to reduce the number of addicts in the prison
    population.
        The authorities permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities generally observe
    this prohibition. Police legally may arrest without a warrant anyone
    they suspect of committing a crime for which the punishment would be
    imprisonment of 5 years or more and may question persons without a
    formal summons when circumstances are too urgent to report to a public
    prosecutor. However, immediately after detaining a suspect the
    authorities must apply to a prosecutor for a warrant to detain the
    arrestee for up to 24 hours and must give written notice to the
    detainee or a designated relative or friend, stating the reason for the
    arrest or questioning. Indicted persons may be released on bail at
    judicial discretion. In May the NPA ordered all police stations to
    prohibit the media from photographing persons under detention and to
    cease providing the names of detainees to the media. However, this
    order is not being observed in practice, as detainees frequently appear
    on television news programs.
        In 1997 an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure shifted the
    power of investigative detention from the prosecutors to the courts.
    Under the 1997 law prosecutors must apply to the courts within 24 hours
    after arrest for permission to continue detaining an arrestee. The
    duration of this pretrial detention is limited to 2 months, and the
    courts may approve a single extension of 2 months. Limits also were set
    for detention during trial. If a crime is punishable by less than 10
    years' imprisonment, then no more than 3 extensions of 2 months each
    may be granted during the trial and appellate proceedings. During the
    second appeal, only one extension may be granted. The authorities
    generally observe these procedures, and trials usually take place
    within 3 months of indictment.
        The revised Code of Criminal Procedure requires the police to
    inform a suspect during an interrogation of the specific charges in
    question, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the
    right to ask the police to investigate evidence that would be favorable
    to the suspect. If the charges are amended subsequently, the police
    must inform the suspect. The authorities generally respect a detainee's
    request to have a lawyer present during the investigation phase, but
    defense lawyers and human rights groups continue to complain that the
    rules do not provide adequate protection since suspects often do not
    have legal representation during police interrogation. A contributing
    factor is that there is no legal requirement that indigent persons be
    provided counsel during police interrogation, although such counsel is
    provided during trials. Informed observers report that the ``public
    defense counsels'' do not provide effective defense assistance. They
    typically do not appear until the final debate hearing of the trial,
    and they seldom spend a significant amount of time discussing the case
    with their clients.
        The authorities do not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, corruption and political influence
    remain serious problems. The new DPP Government made efforts to
    eliminate corruption and to diminish political influence.
        The Judicial Yuan (JY) is one of the five coequal branches of the
    political system. The JY is headed by a president and a vice president
    and also contains the 16-member Council of Grand Justices (CGJ), which
    interprets the Constitution as well as laws and ordinances. Subordinate
    JY organs include the Supreme Court, high courts, district courts, the
    Administrative Court, and the Committee on the Discipline of Public
    Functionaries. In 1999 the LY passed legislation adding an additional
    level to the Administrative Court to provide for judicial review.
        The law provides for the right of fair public trial, and this is
    generally respected in practice. Judges, rather than juries, decide
    cases; all judges are appointed by, and are responsible to, the JY. In
    a typical court case, parties and witnesses are interrogated by a
    single judge but not directly by a defense attorney or prosecutor. The
    judge may decline to hear witnesses or to consider evidence that a
    party wishes to submit if the judge considers it irrelevant; a refusal
    to hear evidence may be a factor in an appeal. Trials are public, but
    attendance at trials involving juveniles or potentially sensitive
    issues that might attract crowds may require court permission.
        A defendant has the right to an attorney. If the defendant is
    charged with committing a crime for which the penalty is 3 or more
    years' imprisonment or if the defendant is indigent, the judge may
    assign an attorney. Attorneys assigned to defendants generally assist
    during the investigative phase of a case and at trial, but generally
    are not present during police interrogations. Informed observers report
    that public defense counsels do not provide effective defense
    assistance (see Section 1.d.). A 1997 law states that a suspect may not
    be compelled to testify. The Code of Criminal Procedure states that a
    confession shall not be the sole evidence used to find a defendant
    guilty. Nonetheless informed observers note that convictions frequently
    result from a combination of a confession and circumstantial evidence
    of varying quality. However, in September a Taipei district court
    dropped drug trafficking charges against a suspect. The police were
    unable to present any evidence other than a confession and had failed
    to record the interrogation. Any convicted person has the right to
    appeal to the next higher court level. Persons sentenced to terms of
    imprisonment of 3 years or more may appeal beyond that level. The
    Supreme Court automatically reviews life imprisonment and death
    sentences. Under the law, prosecutors have the right to appeal verdicts
    of not guilty to the next higher court level.
        The LY passed legislation in 1997 revising procedures in the 1985
    ``Antihoodlum'' Law, which had departed from international standards of
    due process. The revised procedures require all witnesses to testify
    openly but provide procedures for their subsequent protection, ``in
    exceptional circumstances.'' In 1995 the Council of Grand Justices
    (CGJ) declared unconstitutional the administrative procedures that had
    been used to sentence hoodlums to reformatory education.
        In February opposition political parties charged the then-ruling
    KMT administration with interference in the judicial process when a
    court ordered the search of the residence of the former president of
    the LY in connection with a banking scandal. The case had been under
    investigation for more than a year, but the residence was not searched
    until shortly after the politician in question quit the KMT to support
    an opposition presidential candidate. The authorities asserted that new
    evidence had come to light that mandated the search.
        The JY took measures to reduce political influence on judges.
    Measures taken include: Judicial appointments and promotions are
    decided by secret ballot of an independent committee; judicial
    decisions no longer are subject to review by presiding judges, except
    in the case of decisions by ``assistant judges;'' distribution of cases
    is decided by the judges themselves; and judges and the President of
    the JY are prohibited from taking part in political activities. The new
    administration's anticorruption campaign also has reinforced the JY's
    efforts to eliminate judicial corruption. The JY's anticorruption
    department increased efforts to uncover possible corruption cases
    during the year and is more responsive to public complaints regarding
    judicial personnel. Measures from the 1999 National Judicial Reform
    Conference strengthened the supervision and evaluation of judge's
    performance. These factors have reduced the incidence of judicial
    misconduct; however, occasionally individual judges still are found to
    be involved in illegal activities. In September a judge in Tainan was
    arrested on suspicion of running a brothel since 1998 and using his
    position to protect the business from police scrutiny.
        In June the Shilin District Court in Taipei city and the Miaoli
    county courts adopted the new trial system in response to the JY
    President's 1999 judicial reform proposals. Serving as a potential
    model for the rest of the island, the defendant-oriented trial system
    will better protect the rights of the accused. Although the LY has yet
    to enact the JY President's proposed code of judicial conduct, the
    proposals have resulted in revised precepts for evaluation of judicial
    performance, and strengthened reviews of judges' financial disclosure
    reports.
        In 1999 the law was revised to create the position of law clerks.
    Working as assistants to judges, the law clerks are intended to improve
    judicial performance and the quality of decisions.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution and sections of the Criminal and
    Civil Codes contain provisions protecting privacy. A prosecutor or a
    judge must issue a warrant before a search, except when ``incidental to
    arrest.'' However, critics claim that the ``incidental to arrest''
    provision is not only unconstitutional but also often interpreted
    broadly by police to justify searches of locations other than actual
    arrest sites. According to the NPA, warrantless searches are allowed
    only in special circumstances, such as to arrest an escapee or if facts
    indicate a person is in the process of committing a crime. In any such
    case, the police must file a report with the prosecutor or court within
    24 hours. A policeman who carries out an illegal search may be sued for
    illegal entry and sentenced to up to 1 year in prison. Few defendants
    or their spouses have filed charges against policemen found to have
    obtained evidence illegally. Furthermore illegally obtained evidence is
    not excluded automatically from consideration by the court; instead,
    its admission is left to the discretion of the judge. Increasingly
    judges are excluding illegally obtained evidence, although in the past
    such evidence was admitted and frequently provided the basis for
    conviction. For example, in September a judge refused to admit evidence
    obtained through an illegal wiretap.
        In addition to criminal suspects, persons are subject to searches
    and identity checks by police in public places. Roadblocks to check
    vehicles randomly are conducted routinely. Pedestrians also are subject
    to identity checks. Such checks are based only on a section of the
    Police Administration Law, and police officers are given wide
    discretion.
        The wiretapping of telephones is a serious problem. The
    Telecommunication Law and Code of Criminal Procedure provide that
    judicial and security authorities may file a written request to a
    prosecutor's office to monitor telephone calls to collect evidence
    against a suspect involved in a major crime. The 1999
    Telecommunications Protection and Control Law sought to bring
    unauthorized wiretapping under control by imposing severe penalties.
    The Ministry of Justice maintains that there are many fewer
    applications for wiretaps under the new law because of the tighter
    regulations in force. According to the NPA, 3,377 police wiretaps were
    approved in the 12-month period after the new legislation took effect,
    compared with more than 15,000 telephones that were reportedly
    wiretapped in 1999. The law also regulates wiretapping by the
    intelligence services.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the authorities respect these
    rights in practice.
        Print media represent the full spectrum of views within society.
    However, some political influence still exists over the electronic
    media, particularly broadcast television stations. The ruling DPP is
    associated with Formosa TV (FTV), an island-wide broadcast television
    station based in Kaohsiung. The Government is the largest shareholder
    of Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), and the military is the largest
    shareholder of the Chinese Television System (CTS), although it does
    not appear to play any role in programming. The opposition KMT is the
    largest shareholder of China Television Company (CTV). A fifth island-
    wide broadcast station run by a nonprofit public television foundation
    under the Government Information Office (GIO) was inaugurated in 1998.
    However, the existence of approximately 100 cable television stations,
    some of which carry programming openly critical of the various
    political parties, including the ruling party, has diminished greatly
    the importance of political party influence over the broadcast
    television stations. Over 80 percent of households receive cable
    television, which includes local, privately financed channels, as well
    as many major international networks. Cable television call-in programs
    have given the public an additional means of expressing their views.
        Controls over radio stations were more limited than those over
    television stations and are being liberalized further. During the 12-
    month period ending in September, the GIO received 496 applications for
    radio broadcast frequencies. A total of 71 frequencies were made
    available, and 6 of these were apportioned; applications for the
    remaining frequencies are under review. However, many of the newly
    authorized radio stations have limited broadcast ranges, and
    approximately 40 of the available frequencies are in remote areas,
    leading critics to charge that the stations do not constitute a genuine
    counterweight to the authorities' monopoly on island-wide radio
    broadcasting.
        Observers noted that licensing requirements oblige prospective
    radio station owners to have more capital than actually is required to
    operate a station. This requirement inhibits individuals or groups from
    applying for radio station licenses. However, the GIO claims that the
    $1.5 million (NT$50 million) required capitalization is based upon
    consideration of actual business costs and notes that the required
    capitalization is reduced to $31,250 (NT$1 million) for radio stations
    serving remote areas or designated ethnic groups and civic
    organizations, or which promote local development. Reportedly over 100
    unlicensed ``underground'' radio stations, many associated with
    opposition parties, operate illegally.
        There is a vigorous and active free press. In 1999 the LY abolished
    the Publications Law, which had empowered the police to seize or ban
    printed material that was seditious, treasonous, sacrilegious,
    interfered with the lawful exercise of public functions, or violated
    public order or morals. There were no reports of censorship of the
    print media during the year, nor were there any seizures of materials
    on political grounds. The police sometimes seize pornographic materials
    in accordance with the Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sexual
    Trafficking Law. In October prosecutors searched the offices of a
    newspaper and homes of two of its reporters in connection with the leak
    of a confidential transcript concerning a National Security Bureau
    investigation. Critics charged that the searches violated press freedom
    and urged reforms that would require judicial approval before such
    searches could be undertaken. The Ministry of Justice maintained that
    such limits would cripple law enforcement efforts.
        The GIO requires that any publications imported from mainland China
    be sent to the GIO Publications Department for screening before sale or
    publication and still seeks to ban the importation of publications that
    advocate communism or the establishment of united front organizations,
    endanger public order or good morals, or violate regulations or laws.
    However, few local publishing companies observe this regulation, and
    substantial People's Republic of China-origin material is imported
    every year and is widely available at schools and in research
    institutes. Moreover, cable television systems broadcast uncensored
    television channels from mainland China.
        Among other restrictions regulating the media are those precluding
    persons previously convicted of sedition from owning, managing, or
    working in television and radio stations. DPP leaders, many of whom
    were convicted of sedition after the 1979 Kaohsiung incident,
    nevertheless are not affected because their rights were restored
    through presidential amnesties by the previous administration.
        There are few restrictions on academic freedom. The expression of
    dissenting political views is common.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly, and the authorities respect this
    right in practice. Permits are required for outdoor public meetings,
    and they are routinely granted.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; and the
    authorities respect this right in practice. The Civic Organization Law
    requires all civic organizations to register. No groups are known to
    experience any difficulty registering. Registered civic organizations
    may solicit donations from the public, contributors to them may take
    income tax deductions for their contributions, and the employees of
    such organizations are eligible to receive employment-linked benefits
    such as national health insurance coverage.
        Under the Civic Organization Law the Constitutional Court holds the
    power to dissolve political parties. Grounds for dissolution include
    objectives or actions that are deemed to jeopardize the existence of
    the ``Republic of China.'' The Constitutional Court heard no cases
    under this law during the year.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the authorities respect this right in practice. Religious
    organizations may register with the central authorities through their
    island-wide associations under either the Temple Management Law, the
    Civic Organizations Law, or the chapter of the Civil Code that governs
    foundations and associations. Registered organizations operate on a
    tax-free basis and are required to make annual reports of their
    financial operations. While individual places of worship may register
    with local authorities, many choose not to register and operate as the
    personal property of their leaders. In the past, concern over abuse of
    tax-free privileges or other financial misdeeds occasionally prompted
    the authorities to deny registration to new religions whose doctrines
    were not clear, but there were no reports that the authorities sought
    to suppress new religions during the year. In December the President
    granted a special amnesty to 19 conscientious objectors who had been
    imprisoned for refusing military service on religious grounds.
        d. Freedom of Movement, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
    Repatriation.--The authorities do not restrict freedom of internal
    travel. Foreign travel by passport holders is common.
        Nonresident Taiwan passport holders are usually issued ``overseas
    Chinese'' passports and must seek entry permits for travel to Taiwan.
    According to 1992 revisions to the National Security Law (NSL), entry
    permits may be refused only if there are facts sufficient to create a
    strong suspicion that a person is engaged in terrorism or violence.
    Reasons for entry and exit refusals must be given, and appeals may be
    made to a special board. No exit or entry permit refusals were reported
    during the year. In September, in connection with the trial of a
    political dissident who had returned to the island without obtaining
    clearance, a high court judge applied to the Council of Grand Justices
    for review of the law. In his application the judge questioned whether
    the NSL's requirement for nonresident passport holders to obtain
    permission to enter Taiwan violated constitutional provisions for
    freedom of movement. In 1993 new measures provided that holders of
    Taiwan passports who normally reside abroad may return and regain their
    household registration, a document required to vote or participate as a
    candidate in an election.
        Since 1987 Taiwan has relaxed substantially strictures against
    travel by residents to the Chinese mainland, and such travel is common.
    Relatively tight restrictions on the entry of Chinese from the mainland
    for national security reasons, which previously had been relaxed to
    permit cross-strait exchanges, were further relaxed in December when
    the LY passed legislation permitting mainland Chinese to visit for
    business, academic, or tourism purposes. The Government also revised
    regulations to permit PRC journalists to come to Taiwan for the first
    time ever.
        There is no law under which noncitizens may ask for asylum, and
    there were no applications for refugee status during the year. While
    the authorities have been reluctant to return to the mainland those who
    might suffer political persecution, they regularly deport to the
    mainland, under provisions of the Mainland Relations Act, mainlanders
    who illegally enter the island for economic reasons. There were no
    reports of forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.
        The detention centers for illegal immigrants continue to attract
    media attention. While recent expansion projects sought to relieve
    overcrowded conditions, some detention centers continued to be
    overcrowded, and inmates complained about overly long stays at the
    centers while waiting to be repatriated. The Bureau of Entry and Exit
    faults mainland Chinese authorities for delays in repatriation. In July
    the authorities began allowing some detained illegal aliens from
    mainland China to return to the mainland by airplane via Hong Kong at
    their own expense. In September the authorities began repatriating
    illegal alien mainland Chinese directly from the island of Matsu rather
    than taking them to detention centers on Taiwan.
        In 1999 the LY enacted the Entry, Exit, and Immigration Law, which
    provided strict sentencing guidelines for alien smuggling. Several
    cases have been brought before the courts under this new law (see
    Section 6.f.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully, and
    citizens exercise this right in practice. In March for the first time
    an opposition party candidate was elected President, winning a 39
    percent plurality in a 3-man race. Generally free and fair popular
    elections for the LY have taken place three times since 1992. In April
    the National Assembly (NA) voted to allow its term to expire without
    new elections. The NA determined that an election would be called in
    the event that the NA is needed to decide a presidential recall or to
    amend the Constitution. Most of the NA's functions were transferred to
    the LY. Corruption and vote buying, particularly in local elections,
    are problems that the new administration is seeking to address. Within
    its first 6 months in office, the Chen Administration had obtained
    convictions for corruption against one LY member and one former LY
    member. In addition, another former LY member and three local
    government officials are under investigation, and 215 persons were
    indicted on charges of vote buying. In October the Ministry of Justice
    Investigation Bureau was ordered to cease political intelligence
    gathering regarding politicians and political parties, and to
    concentrate on criminal matters.
        In the wake of its victory in the March presidential election, the
    ruling DPP grew to include some 350,000 members. The KMT remains the
    largest political party, with over 750,000 members reaffirming their
    membership in a registration drive following the March electoral
    defeat. It secured a working majority in the 1998 LY elections and now
    controls 112 of 220 seats. The runner-up in the presidential election,
    a KMT-maverick candidate, founded the People First Party, which has 17
    LY members. The New Party founded by breakaway KMT members in 1993 has
    9 seats in the LY and about 30,000 members.
        The KMT benefits from its ownership of a major television channel
    and of enterprises and business holdings estimated to be worth in
    excess of $6 billion, and from the fact that its members still hold
    many key positions throughout the bureaucracy and in local governments.
    The DPP's election victory notwithstanding, its ability to administer
    the island is facing a severe challenge. The lack of cooperation
    between the ruling and opposition parties in the LY has kept the new
    Administration from fully implementing its legislative agenda. In
    November the opposition parties formed an alliance in the LY and
    initiated a campaign to recall President Chen. While by year's end this
    effort had stalled, the opposition alliance since October has refused
    to work directly with the Premier.
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, and, while
    still underrepresented, their role in government and politics is
    increasing. In March a woman for the first time was elected vice
    president, and nine women are members of the Cabinet, including the
    Minister of Interior and the Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs
    Council. Two of 29 Control Yuan members are women. A number of women
    also hold important political party positions. Two of the 11 members of
    the DPP Central Standing Committee are women, as are 11 of the KMT's 31
    Central Standing Committee members.
        Aborigine representatives participate in most levels of the
    political system, partially through holding 8 reserved seats in the
    LY--half of which are elected by the plains Aborigines and half by
    mountain Aborigines. An Aborigine serves as Chairman of the Council of
    Aboriginal Affairs. The magistrate of Taitung County is an Aborigine
    first elected in 1993 and reelected in 1997.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The principal human rights organizations are the Chinese
    Association of Human Rights and the Taiwan Association for Human
    Rights. Both organizations operate freely, although coordination
    between the two is limited. Both organizations investigate human rights
    complaints, many of which come to public attention through the media
    and statements by lawmakers from all political parties. The authorities
    also permit representatives of international human rights organizations
    to visit and meet with citizens freely. Amnesty International maintains
    a Taipei office. Women's and children's human rights groups monitor
    police and judicial performance and campaign to correct abuses (see
    Section 1.c.).
        In his May 20 inaugural address, President Chen declared that
    Taiwan must include international human rights in its legal code and
    establish a national human rights committee.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equality of citizens before the law
    ``irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation.''
    Constitutional amendments enacted in 1997 also provide for the rights
    of disabled persons. While the authorities are committed to protecting
    these rights, discrimination against some groups continues.
        Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence and
    rape, remains a serious problem. Wife beating is especially widespread.
    In 1994 the DPP Women's Development Committee claimed that 35 percent
    of married women were victims of spousal abuse. The authorities fund
    domestic violence hot lines, which have handled some 17,000 cases over
    the past decade. The Ministry of Justice has taken steps to strengthen
    the protection of women and children against violence in accordance
    with the 1999 Domestic Violence and Protection Control Law. This law
    allows prosecutors to take the initiative in investigating complaints
    of domestic violence without waiting for a spouse to file a formal
    lawsuit. Although some cases are prosecuted, strong social pressure
    discourages abused women from reporting incidents to the police in
    order to avoid disgracing their families. Rape also remains a serious
    problem, and its victims are stigmatized socially. One expert estimates
    that 7,000 rapes occur annually--10 times the number reported to the
    police. In 1999 the LY passed legislation that permits the prosecution
    of the crime of rape without requiring the victim to press charges.
    According to a law passed in 1997, rape trials no longer are public
    unless the victim consents. The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes
    the punishment for rape as not less than 5 years' imprisonment, and
    those convicted usually are sentenced to from 5 to 10 years in prison.
    There were 2,042 cases of rape or sexual assault reported in 1999. A
    total of 627 persons were indicted for the crime of rape and 197 were
    convicted. Marital rape is a crime.
        In 1998 the LY passed legislation that required all city and county
    governments to set up domestic violence prevention and control centers.
    The centers provide victims with protection, shelter, legal counseling,
    and other services on a 24-hour basis. From July 1999 to October 2000
    the centers handled 34,904 cases of domestic violence. Under the law, a
    judicial order may be obtained to prohibit violators from approaching
    victims. The Ministry of Interior also provides assistance, such as
    financial assistance and shelter, to victims of rape or domestic
    violence. In 1999 the Ministry established a domestic violence
    prevention committee to implement a comprehensive program for the
    protection of women and children.
        Prostitution, including coerced prostitution and child
    prostitution, is also a problem (see Section 6.f.and 6.c.). The
    authorities are phasing out legalized prostitution; in 1999 the LY
    banned prostitution, but exempted prostitutes already registered with
    the authorities. Under the law, no new houses of prostitution may be
    registered. There have been reports of a growing trend of young women,
    often well educated, voluntarily entering into part-time prostitution
    to earn additional spending money. There also are credible reports of
    women being trafficked into the country for purposes of prostitution
    (see 6.c. and 6.f.).
        The law prohibits sex discrimination, and the LY in recent years
    has begun a systematic review and revision of those portions of the
    legal code relating to divorce, property, and child custody. As a
    result of legislation passed in 1998, many sections of the code that
    discriminated against women were eliminated. For example, women now are
    no longer required to adopt their husband's last name after marriage.
        There is no equal employment rights law, and enforcement of
    existing sex discrimination laws remains a problem, although the major
    city and county administrations have set up committees to accept
    complaints of sexual discrimination in the workplace. Labor laws
    provide for maternity leave, but employers do not always grant it.
    Women also complain of being forced to quit jobs due to marriage, age,
    or pregnancy. Women often complain of less frequent promotions and
    lower salaries than their male counterparts, although the Labor
    Standards Law prohibits gender-based differences in wages. According to
    the Council on Labor Affairs, salaries for women average 85 percent of
    those for men performing comparable jobs.
        Male spouses of female citizens now are treated the same as female
    spouses of male citizens. In 1999 the LY passed legislation permitting
    spouses of citizens to apply for permanent residency after residing in
    Taiwan for 5 years. However, the Citizenship Law continues to stipulate
    that the transmission of citizenship occurs exclusively through the
    father. A citizen mother with a foreign husband thus cannot apply for a
    Taiwan passport for her child. However, when such a child reaches age
    14, the child may apply.
        NGO's involved with women's issues include the Women Rescue
    Foundation and the Women Awakening Foundation, which help women victims
    of domestic violence; and the Garden of Hope, which helps rescue child
    prostitutes.
        Children.--The Constitution has provisions to protect children's
    rights, and the authorities are committed to supporting them. Education
    for children between 6 and 15 years of age is free and compulsory, and
    this rule is enforced. The percentage of school age children attending
    primary school is 99.92 percent, and those attending junior high school
    99.89 percent. Children also are provided health care under the
    national health insurance scheme.
        Child abuse is a significant problem. In the first 10 months after
    the Domestic Violence Control Law was passed in mid-1999, the Domestic
    Violence Protection Center received more than 900 applications for
    protection of children. The 1993 revision of the Child Welfare Act
    states that any persons discovering cases of child abuse or neglect
    must notify the police, social welfare, or child welfare authorities,
    that child welfare specialists must make such notification within 24
    hours, and that the authorities involved must issue an investigation
    report within 24 hours. Both the Ministry of Interior's Social Affairs
    Department and nongovernmental specialists assert that these
    requirements are followed. During the year, a senior member of a
    Buddhist academy was charged with sexually assaulting several novice
    monks who were children. In 1999 the LY passed legislation creating a
    Child Welfare Bureau in the Ministry of Interior to enhance efforts to
    protect child welfare. Financial subsidies are provided to low-income
    families with children in day care facilities and to local governments
    to promote child protection efforts.
        In 1999 the first juvenile court was established in Kaohsiung to
    handle criminal cases. Previously regular courts handled such cases.
    The new court includes 24 juvenile counselors. There are three juvenile
    detention centers on the island.
        Although no reliable statistics are available, child prostitution
    is a serious problem, particularly among Aborigine children (see
    Section 6.c. and 6.f.). Most child prostitutes range from 12 to 17
    years of age. The juvenile welfare law enables juvenile welfare bodies,
    prosecutors, and victims to apply to courts for termination of
    guardianship of parents and the appointment of qualified guardians if
    parents have forced their children into prostitution. If children are
    engaged in prostitution of their own free will, and the parents are
    incapable of providing safe custody, the courts may order competent
    authorities to provide counseling for not less than 6 months and not
    more than 2 years. However, legal loopholes and cultural barriers
    remain obstacles to enforcement. On occasion parents have sold a child
    into prostitution, a problem associated mostly with Aborigine families
    (see Section 6.c.).
        According to some reports, brothel owners, to prevent child
    prostitutes from escaping, use violence, drug addiction, and other
    forms of coercion. In 1995 the LY passed legislation providing for as
    much as 2 years' incarceration for customers of prostitutes under the
    age of 18. The legislation also requires the publication of the names
    of violators in newspapers. Under a plan adopted by the NPA, city and
    county authorities across the island have established police task
    forces to strengthen their efforts against child prostitution. During
    the first 7 months of the year, 379 persons were arrested for
    violations of the law, resulting in 66 convictions. In 1999 the LY
    amended the Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sex Trafficking Law to
    prohibit the media from running advertisements involving the sex trade
    and to impose penalties on citizens arrested abroad for having sex with
    minors (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Disabled Welfare Law was revised and
    strengthened in 1990. It prohibits discrimination against the disabled
    and sets minimum fines at approximately $2,400 (NT$73,800) for
    violators. Under these revisions, new public buildings, facilities, and
    transportation equipment must be accessible to the disabled, while
    existing public buildings were to be brought into conformity by 1995.
    Although new buildings appear to meet accessibility requirements, there
    does not as yet appear to be a substantial effort aimed at refitting
    older buildings to accommodate disabled people.
        A leading expert in the field estimates that the number of disabled
    is between 400,000 and 500,000--possibly as high as 700,000. One-third
    of the total are severely disabled and receive shelter or nursing care
    from the authorities. The Disabled Welfare Law requires large public
    and private organizations to hire disabled persons equal to 2 and 1
    percent of their work forces respectively. Organizations failing to do
    so must pay, for each disabled person not hired, the basic monthly
    salary (approximately $570 (NT$18,880)) into the Disabled Welfare Fund,
    which supports institutions involved in welfare for the disabled. Many
    organizations complain that it is difficult to find qualified disabled
    workers, and they appear to prefer to pay the fines involved.
        Indigenous People.--The island's only non-Chinese minority group
    consists of the Aboriginal descendants of Malayo-Polynesians already
    established when the first Chinese settlers arrived. According to the
    Council of Aboriginal Affairs, there were 381,000 Aborigines at the end
    of 1998. More than 70 percent are Christian, while the dominant Han
    Chinese are largely Buddhist or Taoist. The civil and political rights
    of Aborigines are protected fully under law. The NA amended the
    Constitution in 1992 and again in 1997 to upgrade the status of
    Aboriginal people, protect their right of political participation, and
    ensure their cultural, educational, and business development. In
    addition the authorities instituted social programs to help Aborigines
    assimilate into the dominant Chinese society. The cabinet-level Council
    of Aboriginal Affairs was established in 1996 to protect Aboriginal
    rights and interests. Critics have noted that its budget is quite
    small. As part of its efforts to preserve ethnic identities, the
    Ministry of Education now includes some Aboriginal-language classes in
    primary schools. Under 1998 legislation, the Ministry of Education
    subsidizes university education for Aborigines and works to preserve
    Aboriginal culture, history, and language through the establishment of
    Aboriginal studies centers.
        Although they face no official discrimination, Aborigines have had
    little impact, over the years, on major decisions affecting their
    lands, culture, traditions, and the allocation of their natural
    resources. In addition they complain that they are prevented from
    owning ancestral lands in mountain areas under the authorities'
    control, some of which have been designated as national parks or
    conservation areas. Land rights remain a crucial issue for Aborigines,
    along with social discrimination, educational underachievement, low
    economic status, and high rates of alcoholism. Some Aboriginal leaders
    have come to believe that only some form of autonomy can preserve their
    land rights, which constantly are threatened by Chinese developers who
    use connections and corruption to gain title to Aboriginal land.
    According to MOI statistics, only about 50 percent of Aborigine
    children complete elementary school. In the past, Aborigines were not
    allowed to use non-Chinese personal names on legal documents, but this
    rule was changed by legislation in 1996.
        The sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution by their parents
    also is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Although the JY ruled in 1995 that
    the right to organize trade unions is protected by the Constitution,
    legislation implementing this decision has not passed; teachers, civil
    servants, and defense industry workers still are not permitted to form
    labor unions. Even with this ruling, a number of laws and regulations
    limit the right of association. Labor unions may draw up their own
    rules and constitutions, but they must submit these to the authorities
    for review. Unions may be dissolved if they do not meet certification
    requirements or if their activities disturb public order. However,
    there were no instances of the authorities dissolving local labor
    groups or denying new unions certification.
        The Labor Union Law requires that union leaders be elected
    regularly by secret ballot, and, in recent years, workers have
    sometimes rejected ruling party or management-endorsed union slates.
    Under the new administration there has been no reported political
    interference in union affairs. Unions may form confederations, but no
    administrative district, including a city, county, or province, can
    have competing labor confederations.
        Under the previous administration the Council of Labor Affairs
    (CLA) recognized one island-wide labor federation, the KMT-associated
    Chinese Federation of Labor. The DPP administration significantly eased
    restrictions on the right of association by recognizing three new
    island-wide labor federations. In May the CLA recognized the Taiwan
    Confederation of Trade Unions (previously known as the National
    Federation of Industrial Unions). The Chinese Labor Unions Federation
    and the National Trade Union Confederation were established in July and
    August respectively. Nonetheless the percentage of workers who are
    labor union members has not increased in recent years due to the
    extremely low unemployment rate, higher wages, the shift from
    manufacturing to service industries, the small scale and poor
    organization of most unions, and past prosecution of labor activists by
    the authorities. As of March, some 2.9 million workers, approximately
    30 percent of the 9.7 million-person labor force, belonged to 3,785
    registered labor unions.
        The law governing labor disputes recognizes the right of unions to
    strike but imposes restrictions that make legal strikes difficult and
    seriously weaken collective bargaining. For example the authorities
    require mediation of labor/management disputes when they deem the
    disputes to be sufficiently serious or to involve ``unfair practices.''
    The law forbids both labor and management from disrupting the ``working
    order'' when either mediation or arbitration is in progress. The law
    mandates stiff penalties for violations of no-strike and no-retaliation
    clauses. Employers in the past sometimes ignored the law and dismissed
    or locked out workers without any legal action being taken against
    them, although no such cases were reported during the year. The CLA
    reported that from 1990-99, there were 34 strikes, of which 23 involved
    workers at bus companies seeking increased pay and reduced hours.
    Strikes threatened in late 1999 and in August by airport employees did
    not materialize because workers obtained satisfactory concessions from
    management. There were no strikes in 1999 and three strikes in 1998.
        In 1971 the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan in the
    International Labor Organization. The CFL is affiliated with the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The new federations
    are not internationally affiliated.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Except for the
    categories of workers noted in Section 6.a., the Labor Union Law and
    the Settlement of Labor Disputes Law give workers the right to organize
    and bargain collectively.
        Under the Labor Union Law, employers may not refuse employment to,
    dismiss, or otherwise unfairly treat workers because they are union
    members. However, in practice employers sometimes have dismissed union
    leaders without reasonable cause, or laid them off first during
    employee cutbacks, and observers point out that the law has no specific
    penalties for violations. Several union leaders of a container terminal
    company were laid off at the end of 1998 following a strike earlier in
    the year. According to the National Federation of Independent Trade
    Unionists, over 400 trade unionists and supporters have been fired
    since the labor movement began to expand after the 1987 lifting of
    martial law.
        The Collective Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining
    but does not make it mandatory. Since such agreements are used only in
    large-scale enterprises, and less than 5 percent of enterprises fall
    into this category, the proportion of workers covered remains small.
    Employers set wages generally in accordance with market conditions.
        Firms in export processing zones are subject to the same laws
    regarding treatment of labor unions as other firms and follow normal
    practices including collective bargaining agreements with their unions.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Standards
    Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of
    these practices, apart from forced prostitution (see Sections 5 and
    6.f.). The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and the
    authorities generally enforce this prohibition effectively. However,
    some parents of Aboriginal children sell them into prostitution, and
    the requirements of the law make prosecution difficult at times (see
    Section 5).
        In 1999 nine women who were forced to work as ``comfort women''
    (women who, during World War II, were forced to provide sex to soldiers
    of the Japanese Imperial Government) filed lawsuits in Japan seeking
    $100,000 (NT$3,000,000) and a formal apology from the Japanese
    Government. The case is before the courts.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Standards Law (LSL) prohibits forced and bonded
    child labor, and the authorities generally enforce this prohibition
    effectively, although the sale of Aboriginal children into prostitution
    remains a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). To protect children from
    the worst forms of exploitation, the authorities have enacted a Child
    Welfare Law, Juvenile Welfare Law, and Child and Juvenile Sexual
    Transaction Prevention Act to protect children from debt bondage,
    prostitution, pornographic performances, and other illicit activities
    specified in ILO Convention 182. The LSL stipulates age 15, after
    compulsory education required by law ends, as the minimum age for
    employment. County and city labor bureaus enforce minimum age laws.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The LSL mandates labor
    standards. The law is not well enforced in areas such as overtime work
    and pay or retirement payments. A 1996 amendment extended the LSL to
    all salaried employees. By the end of 1999, the LSL covered 5.7 million
    of Taiwan's 6.6 million salaried workers. The CLA conducts publicity
    campaigns to increase public awareness of the law and has set up
    telephone hot lines to accept complaints of LSL violations.
        The CLA did not increase the minimum monthly wage, which remained
    at $505 (NT$15,840). While sufficient in less expensive areas, this
    wage does not assure a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family in urban areas such as Taipei. However, the average
    manufacturing wage is more than double the legal minimum wage, and the
    average for service industry employees is even higher. In June the LY
    passed legislation to reduce working hours from 48 hours per week to 84
    hours in 2 weeks. In 1998 the public sector adopted a new system
    providing for a 5-day workweek every other week. According to a CLA
    survey, about one-third of private enterprises also have adopted that
    system.
        Because of an acute labor shortage (the unemployment rate remained
    at 2.7 percent in 1999), there has been a legal influx of foreign
    workers in the last several years. The law stipulates that foreign
    workers who are employed legally receive the same protection as local
    workers. However, in 1998 foreign domestic workers were exempted from
    the LSL, denying them the right to safeguards provided to citizens.
    Moreover authorities say that in many cases illegal foreign workers,
    many from Thailand and the Philippines, receive board and lodging from
    their employers, but no medical coverage, accident insurance, or other
    benefits enjoyed by citizens. Illegal foreign workers also are
    vulnerable to employer exploitation in the form of confiscation of
    passports, imposition of involuntary deductions from wages, and
    extension of working hours without overtime pay. In addition observers
    say that conditions in many small- and medium-sized factories that
    employ illegal foreign labor are dangerous, due to old and poorly
    maintained equipment. Observers have alleged that legal foreign workers
    are sometimes similarly exploited. The CLA has urged employers not to
    mistreat foreign workers, and employers are subject to the same
    penalties for mistreating foreign workers as for mistreating citizen
    workers. In November the CLA ended the practice of requiring foreign
    female workers to undergo pregnancy tests. In the past, those who
    tested positive were subject to immediate deportation. According to CLA
    statistics, there are 311,000 legal foreign workers, including
    approximately 140,000 workers from Thailand and 108,000 workers from
    the Philippines. In 1999 the CLA signed a labor agreement with Vietnam
    permitting its workers to obtain employment in Taiwan. The CLA has
    stated that its goal is to keep the number of foreign workers at the
    300,000 level. In June the authorities placed an indefinite ban on the
    entry of new Philippine blue-collar workers, insisting that the ban was
    due to the high rate at which Philippine workers left their jobs and
    the aggressive stance of the Philippine Representative Office in labor
    cases. The ban was lifted in December. Due to increased unemployment
    among blue-collar workers and Aborigines, the CLA announced on
    September 1 that it would reduce the foreign labor quota on major
    construction projects from 50 to 30 percent.
        The 1991 revised Occupational Safety and Health Law (OSHL) extended
    coverage to include workers in agriculture, fishing, and forestry
    industries and appeared to strengthen penalties for safety violations.
    It nevertheless still provides only minimal standards for working
    conditions and health and safety precautions. The OSHL gives workers
    the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
    jeopardy to continued employment.
        The 1993 Labor Inspection Law was designed to strengthen the
    enforcement of labor standards and health and safety regulations. It
    increased the number of enterprises and types of safety factors to be
    inspected; gave inspectors quasi-judicial powers; required
    preexamination of dangerous working places such as naphtha-cracking
    plants, pesticide factories, and firecracker factories; and raised
    penalties for violations. Critics allege that the CLA does not
    effectively enforce workplace laws and regulations because it employs
    too few inspectors. During the year, 33 new inspectors were added
    resulting in 256 inspectors available for the approximately 300,000
    enterprises covered by the OSHL. The inspection rate in 1999 was 8.2
    percent, down slightly from 8.3 percent in 1998. The CLA maintains that
    it has strengthened its safety checks at workplaces with a greater risk
    of worker injury and is offering training programs to help workers
    protect their rights. Since many enterprises are small, family-owned
    operations employing relatives unlikely to report violations, actual
    adherence to the hours, wage, and safety sections of various labor laws
    is hard to document but is believed to be minimal in these smaller
    enterprises. The CLA has established hot lines to receive complaints
    about OSHL violations.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no law specifically
    prohibiting trafficking; however, traffickers of persons for sexual
    purposes may be prosecuted under the Sexual Violation Offenses Act,
    which outlaws sexual transactions for profit. In addition in 1999 the
    LY enacted legislation which criminalized alien smuggling (see Section
    2.d.). The 1995 Statute for Prevention of Child and Juvenile Sexual
    Trafficking empowers the authorities to prosecute any person who
    intends to force a girl below the age of 18 to engage in sex or to sell
    or pawn her by other means. Nonetheless there are occasional reports of
    organized crime rings trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
    prostitution. The majority of cases involve women from mainland China,
    Thailand, or Cambodia. Criminal gangs in mainland China reportedly use
    deceptive measures to recruit and procure young women who are then
    funneled to Taiwan-based organized crime gangs who arrange sham
    marriages to enable them to obtain visas to enter Taiwan. The women
    then are forced into prostitution. The extent of the problem is
    difficult to determine; there have been 50,000 marriages between
    persons from mainland China and Taiwan since 1992, but less than 1
    percent are believed to involve the trafficking gangs. In September
    Cambodian police arrested two men from Taiwan for allegedly luring
    Cambodian women into fake marriages for purpose of trafficking them to
    Taiwan where they would be forced into prostitution. Observers have
    noted that light sentences for traffickers hamper police efforts to end
    this trade. Trafficking victims, if arrested for prostitution, also
    face light sentences, such as fines or deportation (see Sections 5 and
    6.c.).
        The sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution by their parents
    also is a problem. However, this practice is believed to have declined,
    at least in part due to intensive efforts on the part of social workers
    and NGO's to combat the practice. The NPA also coordinated the
    formation of police task forces in local jurisdictions to investigate
    and prevent the sale of Aboriginal girls into prostitution. From the
    beginning of 1998 through April 1999, 46 Aboriginal girls were found to
    be engaged in prostitution.
        Taiwan is a major transit point for persons from mainland China
    attempting to travel illegally to the United States and other
    countries. In 1999 the LY enacted the Entry, Exit, and Immigration Law,
    which provided for up to 3 years imprisonment and/or up to $30,000 (NT$
    1,000,000) fine for alien smuggling. Several cases have been brought
    before the courts under this new law.
                                   __________

                                   EAST TIMOR

        East Timor made significant progress in establishing its
    institutions of democracy and governance; however, during its first
    full year of independence from Indonesia, reconstruction and recovery
    from the September 1999 violence that ravaged the territory was a
    central focus of activity, and numerous problems remained. In a U.N.-
    administered consultation vote on August 30, 1999, an overwhelming
    majority of East Timorese voted against autonomy (and, in effect, for
    independence from Indonesia), and in early September 1999, the U.N.
    Secretary General declared the ballot results to be ``an accurate
    reflection of the will of the East Timorese people.'' As a result, in
    October 1999, the Government of Indonesia approved revocation of the
    1978 Indonesian parliamentary decree that annexed East Timor, allowing
    for the establishment of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East
    Timor (UNTAET), which is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to
    establish a democratic government in East Timor.
        UNTAET continued to govern East Timor, and the National
    Consultative Council (NCC) advised the Transitional Administrator. In
    July UNTAET established a new governing structure, the East Timor
    Transitional Administration (ETTA). With the addition in October of the
    Foreign Affairs portfolio, the ETTA cabinet consisted of nine
    ministries, four of which were headed by UNTAET officials and five of
    which were headed by East Timorese. UNTAET appointed members of the NCC
    and the cabinet in close consultation with the National Council of
    Timorese Resistance (CNRT), a political umbrella of proindependence
    parties. An UNTAET-appointed National Council (NC) replaced the NCC in
    late October. The NC is comprised entirely of East Timorese. In the
    latter part of the year, divisions within the CNRT complicated the
    political situation. Under UNTAET regulations, Indonesian law applies
    throughout East Timor, except in areas in which UNTAET specifically has
    repealed laws or superceded them with its own regulations.
        In February the Australian-led International Force in East Timor
    (INTERFET), which arrived in September 1999, transferred military
    authority to UNTAET Peacekeeping Forces (UN-PKF). The UN-PKF's role was
    to restore and preserve basic social order and prevent violence by pro-
    Indonesia militias operating inside East Timor. The UN-PKF was present
    in the eastern and central sectors of the territory but maintained an
    especially strong presence on the border, where, despite repeated
    assurances from the Government of Indonesia, crossborder Indonesian-
    military-supported militia incursions from Indonesia continued. Despite
    such sporadic militia incursions, the security situation in most of
    East Timor was stable throughout the year. In mid-January INTERFET
    transferred responsibility for internal security to the U.N. Civilian
    Police (CIVPOL). In July the first group of 50 East Timorese cadets
    graduated from the Police Academy and began working alongside CIVPOL,
    augmented by a police assistance group comprised of East Timorese who
    formerly were part of the Indonesian police forces. The former East
    Timorese guerrilla forces, Falintil, remained in the Aileu cantonment
    area. By midyear more than half of the estimated 1,500 Falintil
    personnel had returned to their home areas on ``leave,'' and a
    dissident commander known as ``L-7'' led a few dozen of his men out of
    the cantonment area in July. In August an UNTAET commissioned study
    recommended that Falintil become the core of a new East Timor Defense
    Force, and in September the ETTA cabinet approved the study's low-cost
    option for such a force. In the interim, the UN-PKF employed a number
    of Falintil personnel as advisors and guides. After an international
    donors conference in November, plans were underway to begin training a
    new defense force beginning in early 2001.
        East Timor is an extremely poor territory, with two-thirds to
    three-fourths of the population of 775,000 persons engaged in
    subsistence agriculture. The Asian Development Bank estimated the per
    capita gross domestic product (GDP) to be approximately $395. An
    estimated 70 to 80 percent of East Timor's infrastructure was damaged
    severely by the systematic scorched-earth campaign that Indonesian
    military and militia forces conducted in September 1999, as they
    withdrew from the territory. During the year, reconstruction proceeded
    slowly. By midyear the majority of the population had basic shelter and
    sufficient food supplies. Some commercial activity resumed, much of
    which served the large foreign presence in the territory. The rural
    agricultural economy began to recover, but unemployment remained high
    in the urban areas. Coffee remained the territory's only significant
    export, but falling world prices and a domestic export tax hindered its
    export. In October negotiations began with Australia over the revenue
    from the potentially lucrative Timor Gap oil and gas region, located in
    the waters between East Timor and Australia. However, the Timor Gap is
    not expected to be economically productive for 5 to 10 years. Property
    ownership disputes and the lack of a comprehensive commercial code
    hinder investment and related long-term development. Urban unemployment
    and wage and price inflation remain significant problems. Most
    observers believe that East Timor will remain heavily dependent on
    foreign assistance for the foreseeable future.
        UNTAET generally respected the human rights of East Timorese. The
    arrival of the INTERFET forces and withdrawal of Indonesian forces in
    September 1999 largely brought to an end the decadeslong pattern of
    serious human rights abuses by Indonesian authorities and their East
    Timorese allies; however, many serious problems remained. East Timorese
    Indonesia-backed militias based in West Timor, Indonesia, sometimes
    crossed into East Timor and threatened, robbed, attacked, and
    occasionally killed local villagers and peacekeeping forces. A U.N.
    peacekeeper was killed on July 24, and another was killed in August in
    clashes with militias inside East Timor. Six militia personnel were
    killed in clashes with the UN-PKF in the first 11 months of the year.
    There were isolated attacks and instances of harassment of returning
    refugees who were suspected of being former militia members, and CNRT-
    sponsored security groups sometimes were involved in such abuses. The
    vast majority of the prison population is composed of pretrial
    detainees, despite explicit protective regulations. On occasion the
    independence of the judiciary was questioned, and the judiciary's
    resources remained extremely inadequate. The CNRT benefited from its
    close relationship with UNTAET and at times allegedly misused its
    political influence for employment advantages. By November more than
    170,000 internally displaced persons (IDP's) had returned to East Timor
    from West Timor and other areas of Indonesia, but many others remained
    in West Timor. By year's end, most children had returned to school, but
    the educational infrastructure, which had not been fully rebuilt,
    suffered from inadequate facilities and educational materials. There
    were occasional attacks on Protestant churches, which had been closely
    associated with the prointegration cause. Muslims were subjected to
    harassment, and the mosque in Dili was attacked. Ethnic Chinese
    businessmen faced some extortion and harassment, and non-Portuguese
    speakers reported discrimination in government hiring. Local leaders
    sometimes forced suspected militia members returning from West Timor,
    Indonesia, to engage in compulsory labor.
        During the year, significant efforts were made to bring to justice
    those persons responsible for the most serious abuses committed during
    1999. UNTAET established a Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) to
    address the most recent and serious cases and concluded a memorandum of
    understanding with the Government of Indonesia on legal, judicial, and
    human rights cooperation. In October UNTAET issued an arrest warrant
    for a prominent militia leader and requested his extradition from
    Indonesia. On December 11, UNTAET filed indictments against those
    persons suspected of committing war crimes and related atrocities in
    1999. The Indonesian Government had not responded formally by year's
    end.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--The arrival of the
    INTERFET forces and withdrawal of Indonesian forces in September 1999,
    largely brought to an end the decades-long pattern of serious human
    rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, by Indonesian security
    forces. INTERFET members committed no extrajudicial killings during the
    year. However, East Timorese pro-Indonesia militias based in West
    Timor, Indonesia, which were armed and supported by elements of the
    Indonesian armed forces, crossed into East Timor and threatened,
    robbed, attacked, and sometimes killed local villagers and peacekeeping
    forces during the year. In addition violence against East Timorese
    former militias returning from West Timor occasionally was a problem
    (see Section 1.c.).
        During the year, there were reports that returning IDP's, alleged
    to have militia links, were killed. In January and February, two men
    were killed in Ermera district. While it is believed that these were
    retaliatory killings related to the two men's proautonomy sympathies,
    these two cases still were under investigation at year's end. In March
    militia members reportedly killed a villager near Maliana. In April
    Gabriel Alves, a suspected militia member, was beaten and kicked to
    death in Ulmera, Liquica. A suspect was arrested, but by year's end, no
    prosecutions had taken place.
        On July 24, approximately eight militia members shot and killed New
    Zealand U.N. peacekeeper Private Leonard William Manning and mutilated
    his corpse, near Suai, East Timor, where Manning's unit was patrolling
    the East/West Timor border area. On August 10, East Timorese militia
    members killed Nepalese U.N. peacekeeper Private Devi Ram Jaisi and
    wounded four other persons (see Section 1.c.). By year's end, UNTAET
    and the Government of Indonesia had been unable to capture the militia
    suspects in these incidents.
        UNTAET and the UN-PKF estimated that in September as many as 150
    armed militia members were operating inside East Timor. However, in
    response to the killings of U.N. personnel, the UNPKF liberalized its
    rules of engagement to permit peacekeepers to shoot at militia members
    who are perceived to be a threat to the UN-PKF. As of November,
    peacekeepers had shot and killed six suspected militia members
    operating within East Timor. By year's end, more than a dozen pro-
    Indonesia militia members, lacking support from the local population,
    had surrendered to the UN-PKF and UNTAET, and the UNPKF believes that
    most of the remaining militia members returned to West Timor.
        Elements of the Indonesian security forces (TNI) and prointegration
    East Timorese militias, armed and largely supported by the TNI, were
    responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings in East Timor
    throughout 1999, but especially after the results (an overwhelming vote
    for independence) of the August 30, 1999 consultation vote were
    announced (see Section 1.c.). During the year, UNTAET made significant
    efforts to bring to justice those persons responsible for the most
    serious abuses committed during 1999. UNTAET established a Serious
    Crimes Investigation Unit to address the most recent and serious cases.
    In April UNTAET concluded a memorandum of understanding with the
    Government of Indonesia on legal, judicial, and human rights
    cooperation. In October UNTAET issued a warrant for the arrest of
    Eurico Guterres, a militia member who allegedly was involved in the
    1999 mass violence in East Timor, and requested his extradition from
    Indonesia. At year's end, Guterres remained in Indonesia facing trial
    for causing a disturbance at a September 24 weapons handover ceremony
    presided over by Indonesian Vice President Soekarnoputri in Atambua,
    West Timor. He was being held on charges of illegal possession of
    weapons and instigating his followers to engage in illegal acts. On
    December 11, UNTAET filed indictments against those persons suspected
    of committing war crimes and related atrocities in 1999. The Indonesian
    Government (Attorney General's Office) had not taken a position or
    responded formally by year's end.
        During the year, UNTAET provided considerable assistance to
    Indonesian authorities investigating the atrocities committed in East
    Timor during 1999. In Indonesia the Commission for Investigation of
    Violations of Human Rights in East Timor (KPPHAM) conveyed its report
    of human rights violations in East Timor to the Indonesia Attorney
    General's office on January 31. The report built upon an earlier
    interim report that held Indonesian security forces responsible for the
    destruction and violence that followed the East Timor consultation vote
    on August 30, 1999. The KPP-HAM members recommended the investigation
    of more than 30 persons, including the commander of the security forces
    and other high-ranking TNI and police officers. The Indonesia Attorney
    General said that his office initially would prosecute five major cases
    arising from the 1999 violence in East Timor and for which pro-
    Indonesia militia groups backed by TNI forces allegedly were
    responsible. These cases included the April 6, 1999 massacre in
    Liquisa, in which at least 25 persons died; the April 17, 1999 killings
    at proindependence activist Manuel Carrascalao's house, in which at
    least 15 persons died; the September 5, 1999 attack on the compound of
    the Catholic Diocese in Dili; the September 6, 1999 massacre of at
    least 50 priests and IDP's at a church in Suai; and the September 21,
    1999 killing of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes. The cases did not
    include the September 26, 1999 attack on a humanitarian convoy near Los
    Palos by ``Team Alfa'' paramilitary personnel, in which Team Alfa
    members killed eight persons, including nuns and religious workers. The
    Indonesia Attorney General's office named a total of 23 suspects in
    September and October (one of whom, an East Timorese militia commander,
    militia members killed in early September). Those accused included
    several Indonesian army and police generals, but not then-Indonesian
    Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, former Indonesian Armed Forces
    intelligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, or other senior members of the
    Indonesian military leadership who were named as responsible parties in
    the KPP-HAM report. Progress on these cases was slow, and the number of
    suspects named small in comparison to the number of persons believed
    responsible.
        There also were efforts to hold persons accountable for killings of
    suspected militia members in 1999. For example, four suspected militia
    members reportedly were murdered in Bobonaro town on September 29,
    1999. A suspect was arrested during the year and investigation of this
    case was ongoing as of year's end.
        During the year, the U.N. began investigating the 1975 murders of
    five journalists in East Timor (see Section 2.a.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances during the year.
        There were numerous reports of abductions and disappearances in
    East Timor following the flight and forced relocation of more than
    250,000 East Timorese civilians in September 1999. In addition dozens
    of East Timorese prisoners, including political prisoners, previously
    held in Becora prison in Dili, reportedly were taken to West Timor in
    September 1999. By year's end, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
    had tracked down the vast majority of the former prisoners. Some had
    returned to East Timor, while others remained in West Timor.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--UNTAET regulations provide that all persons undertaking
    public duties or holding public office shall observe internationally
    recognized human rights standards, as reflected in the U.N. Convention
    Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment. In the early part of the year, there were isolated cases of
    local residents mistreating returning refugees who were suspected of
    being former militia members or militia sympathizers. Such mistreatment
    occasionally took the form of interrogations, stonings, beatings, and
    forced labor (see Section 6.c.). Irregular CNRT-sponsored security
    groups sometimes facilitated the abuse of such returning refugees, and
    CIVPOL and local UNTAET officials often permitted the CNRT security
    groups to screen returnees to determine if they had been associated
    with militias or Indonesian intelligence or had committed abuses. This
    screening usually occurred once the returnees had arrived back in their
    home areas. Those returnees that were suspected of having committed
    abuses sometimes were beaten during these sessions, at times severely.
    For example, in early February a CNRT investigation unit (which was
    questioning returnees about past militia affiliations) beat and stabbed
    a militia member in Liquica. However, the returning refugees generally
    were reintegrated without significant problems (see Section 2.d.).
        Throughout the year, pro-Indonesia militias clandestinely entered
    East Timor from West Timor and threatened, robbed, and sometimes beat
    and killed local villagers (see Sections 1.a. and 2.d.).
        Rivalries between members of the politically dominant CNRT and the
    small opposition group known as the Democratic Republic of East Timor
    (RDTL) occasionally led to intimidation and violence. Some members of
    the CNRT reportedly extorted protection money from businesses.
        There were numerous acts of rape and sexual abuse that TNIsupported
    militia groups perpetrated against displaced East Timorese women in
    1999, in addition to the widely reported rapes of women whom the
    Aitarak militia group kept as sex slaves in their Dili headquarters,
    also during 1999 (see Section 5). The Dili court indicted one militia
    member on a rape charge stemming from the September 1999 violence in
    Suai, and a Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (see Section 1.e.)
    special team established to address sexual violence was investigating
    numerous other rape cases. In 1999 the KPP stated that it received
    reports that the TNI and the militias raped 60 women in East Timor
    during the September 1999 wave of violence. Cases of East Timorese
    women whom Indonesian soldiers and civilian personnel allegedly raped
    in previous years remained unresolved.
        Prison conditions meet the basic food, sanitation and health
    requirements of prisons.
        UNTAET permits visits by independent human rights monitors to
    prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--UNTAET regulations,
    which are based on the U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
    explicitly preclude arbitrary arrest and detention, and require a
    hearing within 48 hours of arrest to review the lawfulness of the
    arrest and detention. UNTAET regulations provide the right to a trial
    without undue delay.
        Pretrial detention is allowed only for crimes carrying a sentence
    of over 1 year. In principle a judge must review pretrial detention
    every 30 days; however, in practice limited resources have hindered
    this review, and some persons remained in pretrial detention longer
    than stipulated. The maximum pretrial detention period is not to exceed
    6 months for suspects who are charged with crimes carrying a sentence
    of 5 years or less. In the case of a suspect who is charged with a
    crime carrying a sentence of more than 5 years, a court panel may
    extend the pretrial detention for an additional 3 months. For crimes
    with a sentence of over 10 years, a court panel may order additional
    pretrial detention beyond 9 months. Upon the expiration of the maximum
    detention period, a judge may order the release of a detainee.
    Throughout the year, roughly half of all detainees were overdue for
    review of their pretrial detention. UNTAET's general policy is to keep
    the prison population as low as possible. Consistent with this
    approach, during the year 236 detainees were released on bail upon
    review; however, charges against them were not dropped, and their legal
    status was uncertain. Ninety-seven percent of the total prison
    population, or 158 persons, were pretrial detainees at year's end. Of
    the pretrial detainees, three-quarters were charged with murder,
    manslaughter, rape, or other violent crimes that carried a sentence of
    over 10 years.
        In East Timor, arbitrary detention of persons suspected of
    proindependence sympathies by prointegration militia groups was a
    continuing problem in the months prior to and shortly after the
    September 1999 consultation. However, during the year, there were few
    reports that UNTAET officials arbitrarily detained persons. The one
    known exception occurred in September when a foreign reporter was
    arrested for ``offending the dignity'' of the CNRT president (see
    Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). There also were no confirmed reports of
    militia groups having committed such abuses in East Timor. While there
    were reports that Falintil members detained some persons in their
    cantonment area at Aileu, it was not clear whether the detainees were
    in ``protective custody'' (some suspected militia members ended up in
    Aileu after being driven from their home areas) or held against their
    will.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--UNTAET regulations--specifically
    the new Court Law--provide for the establishment of an independent
    judiciary in East Timor. Section two of the Court Law provides that
    judges perform their duties ``independently and impartially'' without
    ``improper influence.'' Similarly the new Prosecution Law requires that
    all public prosecutors discharge their duties impartially. These
    regulations generally were respected during the year; however, the
    independence of the judiciary occasionally was questioned. For example,
    following disturbances in Dili in late April, a judge reportedly issued
    arrest warrants at the request of CNRT officials. In September the Dili
    District Court ordered the arrest of a Japanese reporter for
    ``offending the dignity'' of CNRT President Xanana Gusmao--a crime
    under the Indonesian Criminal Law Code that the East Timor courts still
    were using during the year, despite Indonesia's revocation of the law.
    The reporter later was released, and UNTAET subsequently revoked the
    Indonesian statute used in the case (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). In
    March UNTAET created a civil law court system with 13 district courts
    and 1 national Court of Appeal. In June UNTAET established a public
    prosecutor's office. However, by year's end, only the Dili District
    Court and Court of Appeals were functioning. By December ETTA had made
    progress in creating a legal basis for the justice sector, but it still
    faced serious challenges in recruiting and training enough qualified
    judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. The judiciary's shortage of
    personnel largely accounts for UNTAET's inability to process criminal
    cases against most detained suspects within a reasonable time (see
    Section 1.d.).
        UNTAET established a special legal mechanism to prosecute those
    Indonesian and pro-Indonesian East Timorese persons responsible for the
    mass killings in 1999 and other serious human rights abuses. In March
    UNTAET established a special Serious Crimes Panel within the Dili
    District Court to serve as a de facto international tribunal for the
    1999 atrocities. The special panel--which is expected to consist of two
    international judges and one East Timorese judge--has exclusive and
    ``universal'' jurisdiction to adjudicate cases of genocide, war crimes,
    crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offenses, and torture that
    occurred between January 1 and October 25, 1999. In June UNTAET created
    a corresponding Serious Crimes Prosecution Division under the General
    Prosecutor. This unit then incorporated an internationally staffed
    Serious Crimes Investigation and Prosecution Unit that originally was
    created during the early part of the year under the office of Human
    Rights Affairs. UNTAET also adopted international definitions of
    genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and command
    responsibility into a criminal code for the Serious Crimes Panel. On
    December 11, UNTAET filed the first indictments against Indonesian and
    pro-Indonesia suspects. Those persons indicted included both
    Indonesians and East Timorese; as of year's end, some suspects were in
    detention in Dili while others were at large in Indonesia. UNTAET
    requested assistance from the Government of Indonesia in extraditing
    identified suspects at large in Indonesia; however, by year's end, the
    Government of Indonesia had refused to extradite suspects to East Timor
    or to allow UNTAET investigators to question suspects in Indonesia.
        The Transitional Authority's ability to employ fully this legal
    mechanism and to begin prosecutions by year's end was constrained
    severely by insufficient staff and funding and by procedural and
    organizational disputes within UNTAET. In particular, the UNTAET
    Serious Crimes Investigation Unit was understaffed and underfunded,
    limiting its ability to investigate the five priority incidents related
    to the 1999 atrocities.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--UNTAET allows for these rights, as provided by
    relevant U.N. human rights covenants. However, the CNRT receives
    material support and derives legitimacy from its close relations with
    UNTAET; other political entities do not enjoy such advantages (see
    Section 3). There were credible charges that the CNRT used its
    political position to influence the allocation of jobs in education,
    possibly including illegally adding names to payrolls.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--UNTAET regulations provide for the
    freedom of speech and press as stipulated in the U.N. International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There are two independent
    newspapers in the territory, published in several languages, whose
    editorials freely criticize UNTAET, the CNRT, and other political
    entities. One of the newspapers was founded during the year. While
    insufficient financial resources and facilities have constrained the
    development of independent print and broadcast media, there are no
    political or legal impediments to new entries to the media market. In
    September a foreign reporter was arrested for ``offending the dignity''
    of the CNRT president; he later was released (see Sections 1.d. and
    1.e.). In Indonesia no one was held accountable for the September 1999
    killing of Dutch journalist Sander Theones in Dili by assailants
    believed to have been members of the Indonesian Battalion 745. In
    September it was announced that the U.N. was investigating the October
    1975 murders of five Australia-based journalists in East Timor (see
    Section 1.a.).
        UNTAET operates one television and one radio station. The Catholic
    Church operates one radio station, and there are several small
    community radio stations that were founded during the year.
        Although the telecommunications infrastructure largely is
    underdeveloped, there are no legal or administrative restrictions on
    Internet access.
        UNTAET respects academic freedom. The University of East Timor
    reopened in a new location in November after the university's previous
    facilities were destroyed in September 1999.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--UNTAET allows for
    freedom of assembly, and this right exists in practice. Many peaceful
    demonstrations occurred throughout the year. Most demonstrations
    centered on complaints over allocation of jobs, salaries, severance pay
    issues, and admission of students to the university.
        UNTAET allows for the freedom of association, and strongly
    advocates for the freedom of political parties (see Section 3). Many
    NGO's were established during the year (see Section 4).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--UNTAET regulations provide for freedom of
    religion. Representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant
    churches, and the Islamic community, occupy appointed seats on the
    National Council. More than 90 percent of the population of East Timor
    is Roman Catholic. The relatively few Protestant churches in East Timor
    previously were identified with the Indonesian military forces and pro-
    Indonesia East Timorese. Accusations that Protestant clergymen were
    linked to pro-Indonesia East Timorese militias sometimes led to violent
    incidents. East Timor's small Muslim community consists of ethnic East
    Timorese as well as ethnic Malay migrants from other parts of
    Indonesia. The former group was well-integrated into East Timorese
    society, but the latter group experienced some harassment. Some Muslim
    groups at times were victims of harassment, and in December gangs
    attacked the main mosque in Dili. Local gangs attacked the main mosque
    in Dili on December 31, injuring three persons in the mosque. The
    mosque members' resistance to the gang's demand for a car apparently
    precipitated the violence. There were no arrests in cases related to
    religious violence or attacks against churches and mosques (see Section
    5). UNTAET's ability to respond to such attacks was hindered by
    insufficient prison space and judicial resources (see Sections 1.c. and
    1.e.).
        d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--UNTAET respects the rights of freedom of
    movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.
        Throughout the year, pro-Indonesia militias entered East Timor from
    West Timor and attacked, threatened, and sometimes killed local
    villagers (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The fear of such violence
    sometimes led East Timorese residents to abandon their villages
    temporarily. For example, in August militia members who penetrated East
    Timor as far as the Manufahi district, in the central sector, caused
    more than 1,000 local residents to flee their villages for fear of
    militia attacks.
        During the year, UNTAET worked closely with the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization
    for Migration (IOM) to provide for the repatriation of IDP's from West
    Timor to East Timor, including the provision of transportation,
    shelter, and food. Working in cooperation with NGO's, UNTAET, the IOM,
    and the UNHCR have resettled in East Timor an estimated 170,000 of the
    approximately 250,000 former residents who fled, or whom pro-Indonesia
    militia removed forcibly to West Timor and elsewhere, in September
    1999.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        In January 1999, the Government of Indonesia announced its
    willingness to consider broad-based autonomy or independence for East
    Timor, paving the way for a U.N.-sponsored agreement concluded between
    Indonesia and Portugal in May of that year. The agreement provided for
    the holding of a popular consultation on the issue of East Timorese
    independence, under the supervision of the U.N. Following the
    agreement, the U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in
    order to oversee the preparatory arrangements leading to, and
    implementation of, the referendum. After three postponements due to a
    fragile security situation, the referendum was held on August 30, 1999.
    Indonesian armed forces-backed militia groups attempted, through
    numerous killings, attacks, rapes, and other abuses to intimidate the
    East Timorese population into voting for autonomy (and, in effect,
    against independence), or to prevent them from voting at all;
    nevertheless, some 98 percent of registered voters cast their ballots,
    and 78.5 percent of the voters opposed the autonomy proposal. In early
    September 1999, the U.N. Secretary General declared that the ballot
    results were ``an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese
    people.'' However, in the period after the announcement of the results,
    incidents of mass killing, violence, and destruction were reported
    widely throughout the province (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.d., 4, and
    5). Indonesian security forces allowed armed militia groups that
    opposed independence for East Timor to intimidate and kill at will, and
    the Indonesian military and prointegration militias allegedly
    systematically forced the relocation of East Timorese refugees into
    West Timor, Indonesia, partly in order to undermine the legitimacy of
    the U.N. consultation. However, in October 1999, the Indonesian
    Parliament approved revocation of the 1978 parliamentary decree that
    annexed East Timor, allowing for the establishment of UNTAET. In late
    October 1999, UNTAET became responsible for maintaining a police and
    military apparatus in East Timor.
        UNTAET is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to establish a
    democratic government in East Timor. During the early part of the year,
    UNTAET governed East Timor, and the NCC advised the Transitional
    Administrator. The National Consultative Council consisted of 15
    members, including 4 UNTAET officials, 7 representatives of the CNRT, 3
    representatives of pro-Indonesia political groups, and 1 representative
    of the Roman Catholic Church. In July UNTAET established a new
    governing structure, the East Timor Transitional Administration. The
    ETTA cabinet consists of nine ministries after the addition in October
    of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. UNTAET officials head the ministries
    of Internal Security; Justice; Political, Constitutional and Electoral
    Affairs; and Finance. East Timorese head the ministries of: Internal
    Administration; Infrastructure; Economic Affairs; Foreign Affairs; and
    Social Affairs. UNTAET appointed members of the NCC and the cabinet in
    close consultation with the CNRT, a political umbrella of
    proindependence parties, which functioned as the main East Timorese
    political interlocutor for UNTAET.
        UNTAET responded positively to initial East Timorese criticism that
    it failed to integrate the views of East Timorese and their
    representatives sufficiently. An UNTAET-appointed 36-member National
    Council replaced the NCC in late October. The NC, a body of
    representatives appointed by UNTAET, also in close consultation with
    the CNRT, is responsible for exercising important policy decisions
    concerning East Timor's transition process. The NC is comprised
    entirely of East Timorese, representing the 13 districts, the CNRT,
    other political groups, and a variety of NGO, youth, and religious
    groups. In the latter part of the year, disagreement within the CNRT
    complicated the political situation. Following the CNRT Congress in
    August, the leaders of the two largest pre-Indonesian era parties,
    Fretilin and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), broke relations with
    the CNRT leadership and refused to participate in the CNRT-successor
    organization, the CNRT/National Congress.
        In December in his capacity as President of the CNRT, Xanana Gusmao
    presented to the NC a proposed timeline for the process leading to the
    election of a constituent assembly, the drafting and adoption of a
    constitution, and eventual independence. By year's end, UNTAET, the
    CNRT, and the NC, were overseeing the promulgation of East Timor's
    first constitution and subsequent government.
        Under UNTAET regulations, Indonesian law applies throughout East
    Timor except in areas where UNTAET specifically has repealed laws or
    superceded them with its own regulations.
        UNTAET advocates the freedom of political parties and adheres to
    the U.N. International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on
    Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, the CNRT receives
    material support and derives legitimacy from its close relations with
    UNTAET; other parties do not enjoy the same advantages. During the
    year, there were credible charges that the CNRT used its political
    position to influence the allocation of jobs (see Section 1.f.).
        UNTAET and the CNRT have made significant efforts to include women
    in appointed political bodies, and there are 13 women on the National
    Council; however, women remain underrepresented in the government and
    politics, especially at top leadership levels.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no restrictions on the right of persons to form NGO's.
    Numerous NGO's were established during the year, devoted to a wide
    variety of civil society issues.
        UNTAET adheres to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and
    actively has promoted investigation of human rights abuses occurring in
    East Timor. On October 15, 1999, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
    Rights appointed the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor
    (ICIET), which issued a report in January that made several
    recommendations, including that an international tribunal be
    established to prosecute those responsible for the mass abuses. UNTAET
    facilitated visits to East Timor of members of the KPP-HAM (see Section
    1.a.). Within UNTAET itself there is a Human Rights Unit and a Serious
    Crimes Investigation Unit to investigate past human rights violations
    and to bring the perpetrators of past abuses to justice (see Section
    1.e.). UNTAET also has engaged a special rapporteur to produce a
    comprehensive report on human rights abuses in East Timor since 1975.
    Nevertheless, resource constraints as well as procedural and
    organizational disputes within UNTAET have hampered progress on these
    investigations (see Section 1.e.).

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        UNTAET regulations prohibit all forms of discrimination.
    Nonetheless, violence against women is a problem, as is discrimination
    against women and religious and ethnic minorities.
        Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem in
    East Timor. It is alleged widely that TNI-backed militias raped
    numerous women during the September 1999 violence in East Timor, and
    kept many as sex slaves (see Section 1.c.). Kirsty Sword Gusmao, wife
    of East Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the
    international press in November that 33 pregnant East Timorese women
    returned to East Timor and claimed that they had been abducted and
    forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor, Indonesia.
    Rape is a punishable offense, as specified by Indonesian law. Few cases
    of rape have been prosecuted in the courts, although there was one
    indictment and numerous charges during the year (see Section 1.c.). The
    NGO FOKUPERS offers some assistance to women who have been victims of
    violence.
        Customary practices in East Timor discriminate against women. For
    example, in some regions or villages where traditional practices hold
    sway, women may not inherit or own property. More importantly women's
    groups are concerned that the CNRT is encouraging women to resolve rape
    and domestic violence cases through traditional rules, which usually
    provide only for compensation to be paid to the victim. UNTAET
    regulations implement the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All
    Forms of Discrimination Against Women; however, discrimination
    complaints were not a priority during the year, and no cases are known
    to have been reported.
        There were no reports of gender-based employment discrimination
    during the year. Women usually deferred to men when job opportunities
    arose at the village levels.
        East Timor Women against Violence (ETWAVE) is an East Timorese
    human rights NGO that advocates on behalf of women. FOKUPERS, a women's
    organization, has set up a women's and children's shelter for victims
    of domestic violence and incest.
        Children.--Primary education is compulsory and free; however, while
    the majority of children returned to school during the year after
    having fled their villages during the 1999 violence, a shortage of
    schools and educational materials still remained at year's end. The
    government is rebuilding and replacing the educational infrastructure
    destroyed by the Indonesian military and proIndonesia militias in
    September 1999. The government heavily relies on international aid in
    its efforts to rebuild educational infrastructure. The government has
    coordinated widespread inoculation programs and provided free medical
    care in many areas of the territory.
        People with Disabilities.--There are no reports of discrimination
    against disabled persons in employment, in education, or in the
    provision of other government services. However, UNTAET has not enacted
    legislation or otherwise mandated a provision of accessibility to
    buildings for the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--There were isolated instances of communal
    and sectarian violence during the year, although such incidents also
    have strong political and cultural undertones. Local, presumably Roman
    Catholic, residents attacked Protestant churches in East Timor, which
    had been associated closely with the pro-Indonesia cause, and Roman
    Catholics often accused Protestant clergymen of being linked to pro-
    Indonesia East Timorese militias. In June villagers burned three
    Protestant churches in Aileu district after a dispute between Catholic
    and Protestant youths.
        East Timor's small Muslim community consists of ethnic Timorese and
    ethnic Malay migrants from Indonesia. Ethnic East Timorese Muslims
    generally are wellintegrated into society, but ethnic Malay East
    Timorese Muslims are not integrated very well and experienced some
    societal harassment during the year. In the early months of the year, a
    group of approximately 250 ethnic Malay Muslims residing at the mosque
    compound in Dili were harassed by local youth gangs who were throwing
    stones at the mosque and surrounding structures. Such harassment
    appeared to have abated during the latter part of the year; however, on
    December 31, local gangs attacked the main mosque in Dili, injuring
    three persons. The mosque members' resistance to the gang's demand for
    a car reportedly precipitated the violence.
        There were no arrests in cases related to attacks on churches or
    mosques, largely because of insufficient resources (see Sections 1.c.,
    1.e., and 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Chinese businessmen have
    been subjected to extortion and harassment, sometimes from elements
    reportedly associated with the CNRT which accused the ethnic Chinese
    businessmen (who make up less than 1 percent of the population) of,
    among other things, financially backing rival groups. Local gangs have
    harassed Muslims who are ethnic Malays. In addition there have been
    tensions between the Makasai-speaking group of East Timorese origin
    located in the eastern part of the island and Tetum-speaking and other
    ethnic groups around Dili.
        The CNRT has proclaimed Portuguese the official language of East
    Timor, although only a small minority of the population speaks it. The
    majority of non-Portuguese speakers, especially members of the younger
    generation educated under the Indonesian system, complain that non-
    Portuguese speakers are discriminated against when political and civil
    service positions are filled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--UNTAET generally applies Indonesian
    labor statutes, with some modifications to suit local conditions.
    Indonesian law permits private sector workers to form worker
    organizations without prior authorization, and unions may draft their
    own constitution and rules and elect their representatives. No labor
    unions had been organized in East Timor by year's end. Workers in East
    Timor generally have little experience negotiating contracts, promoting
    worker rights, or engaging in collective bargaining and negotiations.
    As a result, dissatisfied workers or disappointed job applicants
    frequently resorted to strikes, demonstrations, and sometimes
    destruction of property. Disputes usually centered on demands for
    higher salaries or severance pay for jobs in which short-term contracts
    had expired. Without organized labor unions, many of these disputes
    were resolved through the arbitration of local NGO's or UNTAET.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--It is estimated
    that roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of East Timor's work force is
    in engaged in subsistence agriculture, and thus is not employed for
    pay. While collective bargaining is permitted, attempts to organize
    workers only were beginning by year's end.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Indonesian law still
    in effect in East Timor prohibits forced labor. However, during the
    year, local leaders informally required a number of returnees accused
    of involvement in the post-consultation destruction of September 1999
    to engage in compulsory labor as a means of punishing them for their
    alleged offenses (see Section 1.c.). Examples of such compulsory labor
    included repairing damaged structures and participating in clean-up
    operations. UNTAET tolerated this practice.
        Forced or bonded labor by children is not known to occur (see
    Section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Indonesian law prohibits children under the age of 15 from
    working more than 4 hours per day. UNTAET has not addressed this issue
    and numerous children in East Timor, especially in rural areas, work in
    the agricultural sector. Forced or bonded child labor is not known to
    occur.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage.
    Indonesian laws still in effect provide for minimum standards of worker
    health and safety, days off, and other standard benefits. There are no
    restrictions on the rights of workers to file complaints and seek
    redress.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Applicable Indonesian law prohibits the
    trafficking in women and children, whether for the purposes of
    prostitution or for forced labor; however, trafficking of women and
    children from Indonesia to East Timor is a problem.
        There were numerous international media reports that in 1999 over
    40 East Timorese children were flown from refugee camps in West Timor,
    Indonesia, for the domestic sex trade.
                                   __________

                                      FIJI

        Until May 19, the country was governed by a democratically elected
    Government; however, on that date, following a protest march against
    Indo-Fijian Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry's Government, armed
    indigenous Fijian supremacists led by George Speight, with the support
    of a number of rebel soldiers and hundreds of civilians, seized
    Parliament and took Chaudhry hostage along with several Members of
    Parliament. On May 29, President Ratu Mara was ousted in a nonviolent
    coup led by the military forces. Military commander Frank Bainimarama
    appointed himself Head of State, attempted to abrogate the
    Constitution, declared martial law, and began to rule by decree. After
    the May 19 takeover of Parliament, violent incidents occurred in many
    parts of the country. Roads were barricaded, public and private
    property was seized by rebel sympathizers, troops on Vanua Levu
    mutinied, Indo-Fijian settlements were terrorized by Ethnic Fijians,
    and IndoFijian businesses were looted and burned. In July a military-
    backed civilian interim administration was installed after lengthy
    negotiations between the military regime and the rebels, and a meeting
    of the ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs. In late July, the
    militarybacked civilian interim administration arrested the rebel
    leadership, charged the leaders with treason, and began to assert
    control over the country. A Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was
    endorsed by the Great Council of Chiefs in September and was asked to
    draft a new constitution. However, the CRC suspended its work in
    December following a High Court ruling that the CRC had no legal
    standing. In November the High Court ruled that the 1997 Constitution
    remained in force. The interim administration appealed this decision
    and requested a stay of the High Court's ruling. The Court of Appeal
    denied the request. The full Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear the
    appeal in February 2001.
        The 1997 Constitution was designed to promote greater political
    stability. Ethnicity remains a dominant factor in Fijian life and
    affects the country's politics, economy, and society. The population is
    a multiracial, multicultural mix, with indigenous Fijians comprising 51
    percent, Indo-Fijians (descendents of immigrants from the Indian
    subcontinent) approximately 42 percent, and Asians, Caucasians, and
    other Pacific Islanders making up the rest of the population of more
    than 775,000 persons. The ethnic division is illustrated by the
    contrast between the private and public sectors; IndoFijian families
    largely control most private businesses, while indigenous Fijians
    largely head the government ministries and the military forces. Prior
    to the May takeover of Parliament, the judiciary was independent;
    however, with the purported abrogation of the Constitution and other
    events, including the abolition of the Supreme Court, the status of the
    judiciary is uncertain.
        Until the military coup in late May, the Fiji Military Forces
    (FMF), a small professional force, came under the authority of the
    Ministry for Home Affairs, as did the police. The Fiji Intelligence
    Service was dissolved by the Cabinet in 1999, but its functions were
    absorbed by the Police Special Branch and by a new analytical unit that
    was established in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Police and military
    forces committed human rights abuses.
        Sugar and tourism are the mainstays of the economy, accounting for
    more than half of foreign exchange earnings. Investment is depressed
    due to continuing concerns over the resolution of land lease issues and
    political upheaval. Economic growth of approximately 7 percent was
    achieved in 1999 due to record numbers of tourists and a large sugar
    crop following 2 years of droughts and floods. However, the economy has
    suffered significantly as a result of the political turmoil. Targeted
    sanctions were imposed on the country by a number of states, and the
    key garment, sugar, and tourism sectors were affected adversely.
    Tourism remained depressed at year's end. The gross domestic product
    (GDP) has declined by an estimated 10 percent since 1999. Skilled
    workers and professionals have departed the country in large numbers.
    Health and education services in particular were affected.
        The Government's human rights record deteriorated during the year
    and is generally poor. With the ouster of a democratically elected
    Government, the purported abrogation of the Constitution in May, and
    the installation of a military-backed civilian interim administration
    in July, citizens lost the right peacefully to change their government.
    The Constitution contains provisions that reduce previous factors that
    abridged the right of citizens to change their government. However, it
    also maintained a partially ethnically based electoral system. A major
    human rights problem remains ethnically based discrimination. A number
    of government policies, including hiring practices, education policies,
    and land tenure preferences continue to provide protection for
    indigenous Fijian interests. Other human rights problems include
    several political and extrajudicial killings; occasional police and
    military abuse of detainees and suspects; informal and formal
    constraints on the freedom of speech and the press and selfcensorship;
    restrictions on freedom of assembly and movement; violence and
    discrimination against women; instances of abuse of children; racial
    discrimination and violence; reports of forced labor; and trafficking
    in persons.
        Ethnically motivated societal violence led to abuses, including
    looting and destruction of property.
        Rebel forces committed abuses, including killings and beatings.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
           From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--At least 16 persons
    died as a result of political turmoil arising from the takeover of
    Parliament on May 19 and culminating in the mutiny in Queen Elizabeth
    barracks on November 2 (see Section 1.c., 3, and 5). Throughout this
    period, a number of rebel supporters reportedly were beaten in
    detention, and five rebel soldiers implicated in the November 2 mutiny
    were beaten to death (see Section 1.c.). Two of the five rebels were
    not directly involved in the attack on the barracks, but were arrested
    elsewhere and subsequently killed. By year's end, no disciplinary
    action had been taken against the soldiers involved in these incidents.
        In July in Naboro prison, security officers killed one prisoner in
    quelling a violent uprising (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or
    Punishment
        Police and military personnel sometimes abuse detainees and
    suspects; the authorities have punished some of the offending officers,
    but these punishments have not deterred all police abuses. There were a
    number of reports that military and police authorities used excessive
    force when apprehending and interrogating suspects, and there continued
    to be incidents of abuse of persons after they were released on bail.
    The Police Department's Internal Affairs Unit is required to
    investigate complaints of police brutality. The law permits corporal
    punishment as a penalty for criminal acts but this provision seldom is
    invoked by the courts.
        On July 26, the military-backed civilian interim administration
    arrested the rebel leadership, including George Speight, and charged
    them with treason (see Section 1.d.). Two to three dozen rebels
    reportedly were injured while resisting arrest by the military forces;
    one reportedly was shot and injured. In early September, Varinava Tiko,
    a cousin of George Speight and the rebel who led the takeover of
    Korovou town, was admitted to a hospital after being interrogated by
    the military forces. He reportedly suffered a broken jaw and broken
    ribs. In August the Chief Magistrate stated publicly that he was
    concerned that military and prison officials abused rebel leader George
    Speight and his supporters following their arrests in July. At their
    first court appearance, a number of rebels bore visible signs of
    beatings.
        Concerns were raised regarding the police investigation of the
    takeover of Parliament in May. The Police Commissioner was placed on
    leave and subjected to a closed disciplinary hearing before the Chief
    Justice regarding alleged negligence and other misdeeds with respect to
    the May 19 rebel takeover of Parliament. He was reinstated after the
    review found that a number of accusations were unsubstantiated. A
    number of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued to express
    concerns about the Commissioner's alleged behavior during the takeover
    of Parliament and subsequent events as well as the manner in which he
    was ``cleared'' of any wrongdoing by the Chief Justice.
        In early July, Speight supporters burned and looted shops in
    Levuka. Also in July, the 50 Indo-Fijian families in a settlement at
    Tailevu reportedly were robbed and beaten by ethnic Fijians. Livestock,
    vehicles, and household items were stolen (see Section 5).
        On November 2, members of the Special Forces First Meridian
    Squadron (also known as the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit)
    mutinied at the Queen Elizabeth barracks in Suva. Approximately 50
    soldiers reportedly participated in the mutiny, and at least 8 soldiers
    were killed, 5 of them due to beatings in custody. Two of the rebel
    soldiers killed or wounded were not at the barracks when the mutiny
    occurred. By year's end, no disciplinary action had been taken against
    the soldiers involved in the beating deaths of the mutineers. By year's
    end, over 30 rebel First Meridian Squadron members were detained.
    International observers have not been granted access to the detained
    rebel soldiers, and family members have been granted only restricted
    access to them, after an initial period of being denied access (see
    Section 1.d.).
        Soon after the November mutiny, a relative of former Prime Minister
    Sitiveni Rabuka was forcibly taken from his car and beaten by soldiers.
    The victim was a member of the Fiji Military Forces and was suspected
    of having been part of the mutiny.
        On December 15, while free on bail, one of the rebels involved in
    the May takeover of Parliament was beaten severely and threatened with
    death by several soldiers. He suffered a broken arm and three broken
    ribs as a result of the attack. The military forces admitted to having
    detained the rebel briefly for spreading false rumors that had the
    potential to destabilize the country. By year's end, no disciplinary
    action had been taken against the soldiers involved in the incident.
        Former Prime Minister Chaudhry stated that he and his son were
    assaulted while being held hostage in Parliament by George Speight and
    his supporters. Chaudhry also stated that his life was threatened while
    he was held hostage.
        After the May 19 takeover of Parliament and subsequent military
    takeover, unrest developed in many parts of the country (see Sections
    1.a., 3, and 5). Much of the violence was directed at Indo-Fijian
    settlements; many such settlements, especially in rural areas, were
    terrorized (see Section 5). Some Indo-Fijian residents in the Muaniveni
    area reported that they went to the nearest police station to report
    the attacks, only to find that some of the police officers assisted the
    attackers. Indo-Fijian businesses also were looted and burned by mobs
    made up mainly of ethnic Fijians. On June 16, the home of the Permanent
    Secretary for Fijian Affairs was subjected to an attempted firebombing
    by unknown persons; the Permanent Secretary is the brother of Commander
    Frank Bainimarama. On July 11, supporters of George Speight seized the
    police station in Labasa on Vanua Levu; five police officers reportedly
    were beaten. The same day, the airport in Lomaloma in the Lau islands
    was occupied by supporters of George Speight. Following the July 26
    arrest of George Speight, two foreign pilots were held hostage briefly
    when their airplane was seized at the Savusavu airport on Vanua Levu.
    In June and July, several resorts were taken over and some foreign
    tourists were held hostage. On July 11, 45 resort guests were released;
    they had been held at the Turtle Bay resort after it was taken over by
    persons claiming indigenous rights to the land.
        There were reports of arbitrary arrests of persons by civil and
    military authorities, followed by beatings and release in remote
    places.
        Prison conditions do not meet minimum international standards, and
    conditions are extremely harsh, particularly at Suva and Naboro
    prisons. Food and sanitation in prisons are limited. The Government
    established a separate detention center on Nukulau island outside of
    Suva to hold George Speight and a number of his supporters, all of whom
    were charged with treason.
        A number of prison disturbances (some politically motivated) and
    escapes occurred during the year. In one incident in July at Naboro
    prison, 20 prison officials were held hostage by inmates. The Prison
    Department's Special Response Unit, reportedly with the aid of military
    forces, quelled the uprising, but 1 prisoner was killed by security
    officers, 15 were injured, and 9 prisoners escaped (see Section 1.a.).
    Many of the injured prisoners were hospitalized with serious wounds;
    some officers also were injured in the incident. Concerns exist that
    rules requiring the use of ``appropriate force'' to subdue prisoners
    were ignored.
        The Government permits visits to prisons, other than restricted
    Nukulau Island, by church groups, family members, and the Fiji Red
    Cross; however, the military-backed civilian interim administration has
    been less willing to allow the Fiji Red Cross access to prisoners since
    the November 2 mutiny (see Sections 1.a.). The International Committee
    of the Red Cross (ICRC), which established a permanent office in the
    country during the year, has been denied access to prisoners.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Law of Arrest and
    Detention provides that a person may be arrested only if police believe
    that a criminal law has been broken or is about to be broken; however,
    there were instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrested
    persons must be brought before a court without ``undue delay.'' This
    requirement normally is taken to mean within 24 hours, with 48 hours as
    the exception (such as when an arrest is made during a weekend). Under
    the Emergency Powers Decree presently in force, the police and military
    forces may detain individuals for up to 7 days before charges are
    brought. Rules governing detention are designed to ensure that suspects
    are questioned fairly. Detainees have the right to a judicial review of
    the grounds of their arrest; in urgent cases, detainees may apply to a
    judge at any time, whether he is sitting or not. Incommunicado and
    arbitrary detention, both illegal, occasionally occur.
        There were reports of arbitrary arrests and beatings during the
    year (see Section 1.d.). The military forces periodically ``release,''
    then immediately rearrest, persons in order to remain in nominal
    compliance with the Emergency Powers Decree.
        On July 26, the military-backed civilian interim administration
    arrested the rebel leadership, including George Speight, and charged
    them with treason. Hundreds of rebel supporters were arrested, charged
    with various offenses, but released. Treason charges also were dropped
    against four persons associated with the May 19 takeover of Parliament
    (see Section 1.e.). Several persons who reportedly were involved,
    including a number of chiefs, were not charged. Nine persons who were
    charged with treason remain under detention on Nukulau Island.
        The head of the Fiji Trade Union Congress, Diwan Shankar, was
    detained briefly by soldiers in June while traveling in the western
    part of the country (see Section 6.a.). He was not charged with any
    crime.
        In July hundreds of IndoFijians temporarily were held hostage by
    ethnic Fijians on Vanua Levu (see Section 5).
        In September the National Fire Authority Administrator was detained
    briefly but not charged by the military forces after holding a union
    meeting.
        Family members and international NGO's questioned the lengthy
    detainment without charge of persons allegedly involved in the November
    2 mutiny. More than 30 soldiers of the First Meridian Squadron remained
    in detention while their investigations continued at year's end. Access
    to these detainees by the ICRC is prohibited (see Section 1.c.). Family
    access is severely restricted, and the detainees have been moved
    repeatedly for security reasons.
        Exile is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution provided for
    an independent judiciary, and prior to the takeover of Parliament in
    May, the judiciary was independent; however, with the putative
    abrogation of the Constitution and subsequent events, including the
    abolition of the Supreme Court, the status of the judiciary is
    uncertain. The Supreme Court was abolished by decree. The independence
    of the High Court, in particular that of the Chief Justice, was
    questioned following the participation of the Chief Justice in the
    drafting of a number of the decrees issued by the militarybacked
    civilian interim administration. One of the decrees extended the time
    in office of the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice also was criticized
    for his role in ``interfering'' in a case brought by the deposed
    Chaudhry Government in Lautoka and for deciding to exclude the public
    and media from hearings regarding the conduct of the Police
    Commissioner. In October the Lautoka court rebuked the Chief Justice
    for attempting to move a case in which he was one of the accused to
    Suva and for attempting to select a judge to hear the case. A number of
    judges resigned. Fiji's Law Society met on several occasions and issued
    a number of critical statements regarding the status of the judiciary.
        The judicial structure is patterned on the British system. The
    principal courts are the magistrate courts, the High Court, the Court
    of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. However, in late May the Supreme
    Court was abolished by decree; the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and
    the magistrate courts continued to function.
        There are no special courts; military courts try members of the
    armed forces. Magistrate courts continue to try the large majority of
    cases. In addition to its jurisdiction in serious civil and criminal
    cases, the High Court is granted special interest jurisdiction on
    behalf of the public and is empowered to review alleged violations of
    individual rights in addition to its jurisdiction in serious civil and
    criminal cases.
        Defendants have the right to a public trial and to counsel. Trials
    in the High Court provide for the presence of assessors (citizens
    randomly selected to represent the community); cases in magistrate
    court do not. In litigation involving lesser complaints, a public legal
    advisor assists indigent persons in domestic or family law cases. The
    right of appeal exists but continues to be hampered by delays in the
    appeals process. Bail is granted freely, and most defendants do not
    experience pretrial detention. There is no provision for bail for the
    charge of treason.
        The Muanikau Accord between the rebels and the military regime,
    which led to the release of the hostages taken at Parliament in May,
    included an immunity decree for the rebels covering unspecified
    ``political crimes'' (see Section 3). However, on July 26, the
    military-backed civilian interim administration arrested the rebel
    leadership, including George Speight, and charged them with treason. In
    early October, the High Court ruled that the immunity decree did not
    apply to one rebel leader, who is accused of shooting two police
    officers and a foreign journalist. It is unclear whether other rebel
    leaders likewise may be found not to be immune from prosecution. In
    October the military-backed civilian interim administration stated its
    intention to prosecute those involved in the May 19 takeover of
    Parliament. However, treason charges against eight soldiers involved in
    the takeover of Parliament were dropped on October 11. A number of the
    soldiers released after treason charges were dropped on October 11 were
    involved in the November 2 mutiny. Five rebels were beaten to death
    following the mutiny (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Four others,
    including the former chief of the Fiji Intelligence Service, had their
    treason charges dismissed and were released in December. The soldiers
    who were not released reportedly are to be tried under military law.
        The law sometimes treats women differently from men. In some
    instances, there is a presumption of reduced competence and thus
    reduced responsibility for women. For example, only women can be
    charged with infanticide (if a man kills an infant the act is treated
    as murder, a more serious charge). A female defendant in an infanticide
    case is presumed to have diminished mental capacity, and sentences are
    reduced or suspended accordingly.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--In general the Government respects the privacy of the
    home; however, the Home Affairs Ministry has powers, within specific
    operational guidelines, to search persons and property, access private
    financial records, and monitor mail and telephones when a warrant is
    issued by the National Security Council. The military forces and police
    have similar capabilities. The Home Affairs Ministry conducts
    surveillance of persons whom it believes represent a security threat.
        A military curfew initially imposed countrywide in May ended in the
    capital in December. An all-day curfew was imposed briefly in Suva
    after the mutiny by rebel soldiers on November 2; it ended on November
    4. Military checkpoints continue to be manned countrywide and impromptu
    checkpoints occasionally are erected. All curfews had been lifted by
    year's end, and special passes for travel after curfew are no longer
    required (see Section 2.d.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech generally is
    respected; however, there were both informal and formal governmental
    constraints on freedom of speech and press. The Chaudhry Government was
    criticized for attempts to regulate the independent media, and there
    were credible reports of attempts by individual members of the Chaudhry
    Government and the military-backed interim civilian administration to
    pressure editors or otherwise interfere with the press. The former
    editor of the Fiji Times was denied a renewal of his work permit in
    April by the Chaudhry Government. One foreign television crew was
    prevented from transmiting a news story following the May 19 takeover
    of Parliament because of allegations that it altered certain photos.
    After the assumption of power by the military-backed civilian interim
    administration in July, a number of steps were taken to limit citizens'
    ability to speak publicly or privately about issues such as human
    rights and democracy; meetings and protests concerning such topics were
    canceled and otherwise limited by the authorities (see Section 2.b.).
        Political figures and private citizens can and do speak out against
    the Government. However, the Public Order Act and other laws prohibit
    actions that are likely to incite racial antagonism.
        Legislation pertaining to the press is contained in the Newspaper
    Registration Act and the Press Correction Act. Under the Newspaper
    Registration Act, all newspapers must be registered with the Government
    before they can publish. The Press Correction Act gives the Minister of
    Information sole discretionary power to order a newspaper to publish a
    ``correcting statement'' if, in the Minister's view, a false or
    distorted article is published; however, this provision has never been
    used. Should the newspaper refuse to publish the Minister's correction,
    it may be sued in court and, if found guilty, fined approximately $500
    (FJ$1,000). Individuals may be fined $150 (FJ$300) and imprisoned for 6
    months or both. The acts allow the Government to arrest anyone who
    publishes ``malicious'' material. This includes anything the Government
    considers false news that could create or foster public alarm or result
    in ``detriment to the public.''
        The media operate without prior censorship but with considerable
    self-censorship. Government ownership of shares in the Fiji Post
    newspaper and its links to the Fiji Sun newspaper through Fijian
    Holdings, an investment company on whose board a number of ministers
    have served, call into question the complete independence of the press.
    Newspapers occasionally print editorials critical of the Government and
    occasionally conduct investigative reporting. They widely report
    statements about the political situation by opposition figures and
    foreign governments. In addition the letters-to-the-editor columns of
    the two daily newspapers frequently carry political statements from a
    wide cross section of society, including members of the deposed precoup
    government. These letters are highly critical of the Government, its
    programs, and the Constitution. Criticism, albeit muted, of the once-
    sacrosanct traditional chiefly system is appearing more frequently.
    However, the Government still views negative comments about individual
    chiefs with disfavor.
        An active local organization, the Fiji Islands Media Association,
    is an affiliate of the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA). These
    associations provide training opportunities for journalists and have
    established a code of ethics for the media. The Fiji News Council
    strives to promote high journalistic standards, safeguard media
    independence, and resolve complaints from the public.
        In 1999 the Chaudhry Government bought one of the country's two
    daily newspapers, the Fiji Post, and announced that all government
    advertising and official statements would be published only in the Fiji
    Post. The Fiji Islands Media Association noted its concern about these
    developments and their effect on media freedom. However, the military-
    backed interim civilian administration has placed ads in all three
    daily newspapers.
        The country's television news production is owned and operated by
    Fiji One, the only national non-cable television station. A trust
    operating on behalf of the provincial governments owns 51 percent of
    Fiji One; the other 49 percent is owned by private individuals and
    interests. The Chaudhry Government commenced legal proceedings against
    Fiji One in an attempt to cancel its exclusive license. The company
    reached an out-of-court agreement with the Chaudhry Government agreeing
    to the early termination of its exclusive license. The television
    station was attacked in May by coup supporters following a broadcast
    that was perceived to be critical of George Speight. The lives of a
    number of reporters were threatened, and the station stopped
    broadcasting for a number of days as a result of extensive damage to
    its equipment. On October 20, several soldiers detained the executive
    director, the news director, and a journalist of the public radio
    station at the offices of the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation in Suva.
    Earlier in the month, the radio station had reported on tensions within
    the military forces, and the arresting soldiers reportedly asked the
    journalists for the names of their sources within the military forces.
    The authorities have accused the radio station of trying to destabilize
    the military-backed civilian interim administration. On October 21, the
    Fiji Sun reported that the Minister of Information sent a letter to
    Fiji Television asking that former Prime Minister Chaudhry not be
    interviewed on the ``Close Up'' program.
        Both the Chaudhry government and the military-backed civilian
    interim administration were forbidden to comment on politically
    sensitive issues such as the Constitution, land issues, and relations
    between communities, citing the need to respect the sovereignty of the
    State and noninterference in internal matters.
        Academic freedom generally is respected; however, government work
    permit stipulations and University of the South Pacific (USP) contract
    regulations effectively deter university employees from participating
    in domestic politics. The USP media center web site was temporarily
    closed in August by the university chancellor following the posting of
    an editorial considered too ``political'' by the head of the media
    center. Student groups organize freely.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997
    Constitution provided for the right to assemble for political purposes,
    subject to restrictions in the interest of public order; however, both
    the Chaudhry Government and the military-backed civilian interim
    administration restricted this right in practice. Permits for public
    gatherings had to be obtained from the district officer, and the
    Chaudhry Government did not always grant permits for large outdoor
    political meetings or demonstrations, particularly if the police
    advised of difficulties with the anticipated crowd size or their
    ability to assure public safety. Nevertheless, until May the Chaudhry
    Government routinely issued permits for rallies organized by political
    parties, religious groups, and groups opposed to government policies.
    Authorities allowed two protest marches against the elected Government
    to proceed, one in April and one in May, despite concerns about
    security. The April protest march, however, was one of the largest
    antigovernment protests in the country's history, with 2,000 marchers
    and up to 8,000 participants. On May 4, Home Affairs Minister Joji
    Uluinakauvadra announced that no further permits would be issued to
    groups protesting against the Government. According to press reports,
    the police and other authorities were ordered not to allow any such
    protests.
        The military-backed civilian interim administration also banned all
    requests for political rallies or marches, and a number of marches and
    other protests that called for the restoration of the 1997 Constitution
    and the reinstatement of the elected government were not allowed by the
    military forces or the interim administration, including a ``peace
    march'' organized by the son of one of the hostages that was to be held
    on June 12.
        An Emergency Powers Decree and a series of other decrees provide
    sweeping powers to the military and police forces to prevent all types
    of meetings and gatherings. For example, the militarybacked civilian
    interim administration announced on September 13 that all meetings,
    public or private, would require a special permit. Agendas of proposed
    meetings reportedly were required to be submitted to the military
    forces for review before the permits were to be issued, and no permits
    for events deemed political would be issued. However, meetings for some
    indigenous political parties were allowed.
        The military and police forces prevented a protest march in July
    that was scheduled to take place between Lautoka and Suva. The head of
    the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) was detained briefly in July by
    the military forces while on union business in Lautoka (see Section
    6.a.). He was released without being charged (see Section 1.d.). The
    executive meeting of the Fiji Public Service Association in August was
    disrupted by the military forces. In September the National Fire
    Authority Administrator was held briefly but not charged by the
    military forces after holding a union meeting. A private meeting of
    Indo-Fijian leaders in midSeptember was delayed due to a demand by the
    police and the military forces that they be allowed to attend. A youth
    rally for democracy scheduled to be held at Suva's Civic Center in mid-
    September did not take place after the military authorities informed
    organizers that they could not hold the meeting as Commander
    Bainimarama was ``out of the capital.'' A meeting organized by Fiji's
    Women's Rights Groups in December was canceled only hours before it was
    scheduled to have been held and after initial approval had been
    granted.
        The 1997 Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this provision in practice. Opposition
    parties operate largely without government interference. Political
    organizations operate and issue public statements. However, the deposed
    prime minister was accused of treason by political leaders associated
    with the militarybacked civilian interim administration for his
    activities to try to restore constitutional democracy.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The 1997 Constitution provides for
    religious freedom, and this provision was respected in practice by both
    the Chaudhry Government and the military-backed civilian interim
    administration. The Government does not restrict foreign clergy and
    missionary activity or other typical activities of religious
    organizations.
        However, the role of religion in the State continued to be a
    political issue. In the past, former Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka
    publicly indicated his willingness to consider making the country ``a
    Christian state;'' however, he helped to create the Constitution's
    compromise language. From September until its demise, a number of
    submissions were made to the Constitutional Review Commission calling
    for the country to be considered a Christian state. Several
    predominantly ethnic Fijian political parties that participated in the
    1999 general elections called for a Christian state and the
    reintroduction of measures to mandate respect for Christian values,
    such as a ban for all but essential services on Sunday (such a ban was
    introduced following the two 1987 coups, but it was lifted in 1995).
    Other parties, which are dominated by Indo-Fijians, do not support such
    actions and insist that church and State should remain separate. The
    president of the Methodist Church, the dominant religion particularly
    among ethnic Fijians, has stated that the church has no official role
    in politics. However, senior Methodist leaders, including a past church
    president, were candidates for office in the 1999 general elections.
    The Christian Democratic Party used the Methodist Church headquarters
    to hold the swearing-in ceremony for its candidates.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government generally does not
    restrict freedom of movement within the country or abroad; however, a
    military curfew was imposed countrywide from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. daily;
    it was removed in December in the capital area. An allday curfew was
    briefly imposed in Suva after the mutiny by rebel soldiers on November
    2; it was lifted on November 4. During periods when curfews were in
    effect, military checkpoints were located across the country, and
    special passes were required for travel after curfew. Access to Nukulau
    Island, located near Suva, was curtailed, since it is being used to
    detain individuals charged with treason.
        Citizens are free to emigrate. More than 50,000 have done so since
    the 1987 coups. There was a significant increase in the number of
    citizens who took steps to leave the country during the year. The
    Government does not restrict the return of citizens if they choose to
    do so and has encouraged those who left after the 1987 coups to return.
    Occasional detentions at the airport occur, but the courts have ordered
    redress where warranted.
        An internally displaced persons (IDP) camp was established in
    Lautoka, which houses over 300 Indo-Fijians from the Nausori area. As
    of December, over 400 displaced Indo-Fijians were housed in camps set
    up in Labasa and Western Viti Levu. The ICRC and the Fiji Red Cross
    visited the camps and provided assistance.
        The law includes provisions for providing refugee and asylum status
    in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
    office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
    humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. In the past, the
    Government has been reluctant to grant first asylum without assurances
    that the asylum seeker would be moved to a third country. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Until May 19, the country was governed by a democratically elected
    Government; however, citizens subsequently lost the right to change
    their government peacefully as a result of a military takeover, which
    followed the seizure of Parliament by indigenous Fijian supremacists.
        On May 19, following a protest march against Prime Minister
    Chaudhry's Government, armed indigenous Fijian supremacists led by
    George Speight, with the support of over 50 rebel soldiers and hundreds
    of civilians, seized Parliament and took Prime Minister Mahendra
    Chaudhry and members of parliament hostage. On May 29, President Ratu
    Mara was ousted in a nonviolent coup led by the military forces. On the
    same day, military commander Frank Bainimarama seized executive power
    and issued a number of decrees, including the purported abrogation of
    the 1997 Constitution and the implementation of emergency powers
    imposing martial law. Bainimarama then began to rule by decree. In July
    a military-backed civilian interim administration was installed after
    lengthy negotiations between the new military regime and the rebels,
    and a meeting of the ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs. With these
    events, citizens lost the right to change their government peacefully.
    The last of the hostages held in Parliament were released on July 13.
    In late July, the militarybacked civilian interim administration
    arrested the rebel leadership, including George Speight, despite an
    immunity decree and began to assert effective control over the country
    (see Section 1.e.).
        In October the military-backed civilian interim administration
    stated its intention to prosecute those involved in the takeover of
    Parliament on May 19. A number of persons have been charged with
    treason and other crimes. However, treason charges against eight
    soldiers involved in the takeover of Parliament were dropped on October
    11 (see Section 1.e.). A number of the soldiers released later were
    involved in the November 2 mutiny. Treason charges also were dropped in
    December against four others, including the former head of the Fiji
    Intelligence Service. The soldiers reportedly are to be tried under
    military law. The police force and the acting Police Commissioner were
    criticized for not charging high profile senior figures, particularly
    ethnic Fijian chiefs, who allegedly were involved in criminal acts.
    Media and public criticism has focused on what has been called ``two
    sets of laws,'' one for the elite Fijian community and another for
    other persons.
        From September until its demise later in the year, a Constitutional
    Review Commission endorsed by the militarybacked civilian interim
    administration was charged with drafting a new constitution. Its terms
    of reference, approved by the Great Council of Chiefs for the
    commission, would ensure ethnic Fijian political supremacy. A number of
    concerns were raised regarding the legitimacy, membership, and terms of
    reference of the Commission. There were no Indo-Fijian representatives
    on the Commission and its membership included a number of individuals
    closely associated with the ouster of the elected Government.
        The deposed ``People's Coalition'' government of former Prime
    Minister Chaudhry initiated a legal challenge to the putative
    abrogation of the Constitution and the removal of the elected
    Government. In November the High Court ruled that the 1997 Constitution
    remained in force and that the military-backed civilian interim
    administration had no legal basis. The decision was appealed by the
    interim administration, which asked for a stay of the High Court
    ruling. The Court of Appeal denied the request for a stay. The full
    Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear the appeal in February 2001.
    Former Prime Minister Chaudhry, the country's first Indo-Fijian Prime
    Minister, also began an international campaign to restore
    constitutional democracy.
        The Constitution, as amended in 1997, reduced the ethnically based
    factors that previously abridged the right of citizens to change their
    government. Under its provisions, the Prime Minister and the President
    can be of any race. It established a 71-member lower house with 25 open
    seats and 46 seats allocated to different ethnic communities. The open
    seats, which were unprecedented, were established by an electoral
    commission and apportioned into districts of approximately equal
    population. Of the 46 communal seats, 23 were allotted to indigenous
    Fijians, 19 to Indo-Fijians, 3 to ``general voters'' (for the most part
    Caucasians and East Asians), and 1 was alloted to the Rotumans (an
    ethnically distinct Polynesian group), roughly proportional to the
    different communities' representation in the population. The amended
    Constitution also contained an alternate vote system for elections to
    the lower house to replace the winner takes all system of the previous
    constitution. The Senate remained an appointed body--the President
    appoints 32 members, of which the Great Council of Chiefs nominates 14
    members, the Prime Minister nominates 9, the opposition leader
    nominates 8, and the Council of Rotuma nominates 1 member.
        Included in the 1997 Constitution was a strengthened bill of rights
    and a compact among the country's citizens to protect their respective
    rights and interests; however, the Constitution acknowledged that the
    paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests could not be subordinated to
    the interests of other communities. In July 1998, Parliament passed a
    new Emergency Powers Act that could be invoked if Parliament determined
    that there was a threat to the life of the nation. International media
    organizations criticized the law due to concerns that the Government
    could close or censor publications during times of crisis. The
    Emergency Powers Act was amended by decree by the military-backed
    civilian interim administration, which also invoked the amended act.
    The amended Emergency Powers Decree has been in force since May 29.
        The military-backed civilian interim administration, which had no
    cabinet representatives from the Indo-Fijian minority (44 percent of
    the population), stated that it intended to promulgate a new
    constitution that would protect the rights of ethnic Fijians, institute
    affirmative action for ethnic Fijians, and safeguard the property
    rights of ethnic Fijians. The interim administration also stated that
    it intended to hold elections by March 2002.
        Women in both the Fijian and Indian communities have functioned
    primarily in traditional roles, and are underrepresented in government
    and politics. However, until the takeover of Parliament in May, an
    increasing number of women were rising to prominent positions in
    politics and public service. The May 1999 elections resulted in an
    increased number of women elected to Parliament. Five women were
    members of the 27-member Cabinet, with 1 selected as Deputy Prime
    Minister. There is one female cabinet member in the military-backed
    civilian interim administration--the Minister for Women's Affairs.
    Women also play important roles in the chiefly system and can be chiefs
    in their own right. The former President's wife is one of the three
    highest ranking chiefs.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several new local nongovernmental organizations began campaigns
    that focus on human rights. These include the Citizens' Constitutional
    Forum and Fiji Blue. In addition women's rights' organizations, the
    labor movement, religious groups, and political parties have begun
    campaigns focused on human rights issues. The Fiji Red Cross was
    permitted access to the hostages held at Parliament and assisted
    communities throughout the country affected by the political turmoil.
    However, the military-backed civilian interim administration has been
    less willing to allow the Fiji Red Cross access to prisoners since the
    November 2 mutiny (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        There are also several small, foreign-based organizations that
    concentrate on local human rights causes, including the Coalition for
    Democracy in Fiji (with offices in New Zealand and Australia) and two
    United Kingdom-based groups, the International Fiji Movement and the
    Movement for Democracy in Fiji. There is little interaction between the
    Government and these groups.
        The ICRC established a permanent office in the country during the
    year.
        The Fiji Human Rights Commission, which was established by the
    Chaudhry Government, while still in place, ceased to function in
    practice. One commissioner resigned. The chair of the commission was
    accused of conflict of interest because of his marriage to a minister
    in the military-backed civilian administration. The Commission staff
    reportedly was denied permission by its chairman to investigate human
    rights abuses in the Muaniveni area--the site of a number of abuses
    against the Indo-Fijian community. A number of reports were compiled by
    the Citizens' Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Group
    documenting alleged human rights violations, mostly concerning crimes
    against rural Indo-Fijian settlements. These reports were submitted to
    the United Nations, the European Union, and the British Commonwealth.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The amended 1997 Constitution, prohibits discrimination on the
    basis of race, sex, place of origin, political opinion, color,
    religion, or creed, and contains specific affirmative action provisions
    for those disadvantaged as a result of such discrimination. In the
    compact included in the amended Constitution, there was a specific
    provision for affirmative action and ``social justice'' programs to
    secure effective equality of access to opportunities, amenities, and
    services for the Fijian and Rotuman people and for all disadvantaged
    citizens and groups.
        Women.--Reliable estimates indicate that 10 percent of women have
    been abused in some way, and this abuse is a major focus of the women's
    movement. Women are addressing the problem of domestic violence
    actively. Police have adopted a ``no drop'' rule, according to which
    they prosecute cases of domestic violence even when the victim does not
    wish to press charges. The traditional practice of ``reconciliation''
    between aggrieved parties is sometimes taken into account in mitigation
    of sentences.
        There is a small but active women's rights movement that has
    pressed for serious punishment for rape. Courts have imposed sentences
    that vary widely but generally are lenient. Women have sought to have
    all rape cases heard in the High Court where sentencing limits are
    higher.
        Suva, the capital, and Ba, Labasa, and Lautoka have established
    privately funded women's crisis centers; the centers offer counseling
    and assistance to women in cases of rape, domestic violence, and other
    problems, such as child support.
        Constitutional changes that came into effect in the 1997
    Constitution were designed to redress the imbalance in spousal and
    offspring rights between male and female citizens. Under the amended
    Constitution, male and female citizens enjoy equal rights in regard to
    the granting of residence for spouses, and registering and racially
    designating children in regard to electoral rolls and ethnic communal
    property.
        In general women in the ethnic Fijian community are more likely to
    rise to prominence in their own right than are women in the IndoFijian
    community. Women have full rights of property ownership and
    inheritance, and a number are successful entrepreneurs. Women generally
    are paid less than men, a discrepancy that is especially notable in the
    garment industry. Garment workers, most of whom are female and many of
    whom are Chinese laborers, are subject to wages that are considerably
    lower than in other sectors. A significant number of garment workers
    reside at their places of work. According to press reports, some
    garment workers supplement their low income through prostitution.
        Trafficking in persons, particularly women, is a problem (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
    welfare but has limited financial resources to carry out the
    commitment. In addition the legal system is at times unable to protect
    the rights of children, since children's testimony is inadmissible in
    court unless corroborated by an adult. Societal changes have undermined
    the traditional village and extended family-based structures;
    outgrowths of this evolution include increased child abuse and a
    growing number of homeless youths in urban centers.
        School is mandatory through the primary grades. NGO reports
    indicate that over 5,000 students dropped out of school following the
    political upheaval in the country beginning in May. Concerns over
    security and inability to pay school fees following loss of employment
    were cited as two reasons for the decrease in attendance.
        Corporal punishment is administered in some schools. The Ministry
    of Education has guidelines for the administration of such punishment
    by principals and head teachers. A number of incidents were reported
    during the year of alleged beatings of children at school. There is
    credible information that not all abuses are reported or punished.
        People with Disabilities.--Discrimination against the physically
    disabled in employment, education, and the provision of state services
    is illegal. However, there is no legislation or mandated provision for
    accessibility for the disabled. Several voluntary organizations promote
    greater attention to the needs of the disabled.
        Religious Minorities.--Police no longer are investigating reports
    of damage to a small number of Hindu temples in 1997. Religious leaders
    in the minority Muslim population continued to request the
    establishment of separate Islamic courts for their community.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The stated purpose of two
    military coups in 1987 was to ensure the political supremacy of
    indigenous Fijians and to protect their traditional way of life and
    communal control of land. To this end, the post-1987 coup government
    initiated a number of constitutional and other measures to ensure
    ethnic Fijian control of the executive and legislative branches. The
    Government also successfully raised the proportion of ethnic Fijians
    and Rotumans in the public service to 50 percent or higher at all
    levels, but most significantly at the senior level: Indo-Fijians
    represent only approximately 10 percent of the highest levels of the
    civil service. The 1997 Constitution sought to redress this imbalance
    by specifically noting that ``the composition of state services at all
    levels must be based on the principle of reflecting as closely as
    possible the ethnic composition of the population.'' George Speight,
    who led the May 19 takeover of Parliament, professed to be taking
    action on behalf of ethnic Fijians (see Section 3). The military-backed
    civilian interim administration continued to profess that it intends to
    ensure the political supremacy of indigenous Fijians and to protect
    their traditional way of life and communal control of land.
        Control of the land remains a highly sensitive issue. Ethnic
    Fijians hold, communally, over 80 percent of land, the State holds
    another 8 percent, and the remaining land is freehold. The British
    colonial administration instituted the present land ownership
    arrangements to protect the interests of indigenous Fijians whose
    traditional beliefs, cultural values, and selfidentity are tied to the
    land. Most cash crop farmers are Indo-Fijians, who lease land from the
    ethnic Fijian landowners through the Native Land Trust Board. Many
    IndoFijians, particularly farmers, believe that the absence of secure
    land tenure discriminates against them. A number of Agricultural
    Landlord and Tenant Agreement (ALTA) leases have expired and a large
    number are scheduled to expire in coming years. The uncertainty over
    future land tenure arrangements is a significant cause of tension
    between the ethnic Fijian and IndoFijian communities. A parliamentary
    select committee was established following the election of the Chaudhry
    Government to review agricultural land tenure agreement issues, but
    Parliament has not met since May. According to press reports, the
    Chaudhry Government was considered by many ethnic Fijians to be working
    in favor of Indo-Fijians, because it tried to get leases renewed
    without much of an increase in rent. On July 11, 45 resort guests were
    released; they had been held at the Turtle Bay resort after it was
    taken over by persons claiming indigenous rights to the land.
        Prior to the political upheaval that began in May, Indo-Fijians
    were subjected to occasional harassment based on race. There have been
    no credible allegations of government involvement in such incidents,
    which the police have investigated, sometimes resulting in arrests.
    Since the takeover of Parliament on May 19, violence against Indo-
    Fijians was perpetrated by ethnic Fijians. On May 19, over 160 stores
    were looted and 30 stores were burned in downtown Suva, most of them
    belonging to IndoFijians. Police arrested 275 persons for looting in
    connection with that day's events. In Suva on May 31, armed protesters
    supporting the rebels reportedly stoned cars, beat the motorists in
    them, and stole vehicles; the protesters appeared to target IndoFijians
    in the attacks. After the takeover of Parliament in May, Indo-Fijian
    settlements also were terrorized. IndoFijian businesses continued to be
    looted and burned through year's end. On June 11, Speight supporters
    set fire to and destroyed a bar owned by an Indo-Fijian. On the
    following day, the home of Indo-Fijian labor leader Diwan Shankar was
    firebombed, but suffered minimal damage (see Section 6.b.). An IDP camp
    was established in Lautoka; it houses more than 300 Indo-Fijians from
    the Nausori area. Additional camps were established in Labasa and
    Western Viti Levu by cane growers' unions. The ICRC and the Fiji Red
    Cross visited the camps and provided assistance.
        The Muaniveni and Baulevu areas near Nausori, in Naitasiri
    province, experienced a particularly high level of violence, including
    looting, arson, and physical intimidation, directed against Indo-
    Fijians. The attacks reportedly were carried out by persons with ties
    to George Speight. On June 19 and 20, 52 Indo-Fijian homes were
    attacked in Muaniveni. The IndoFijian families in the area reportedly
    left their homes at night to avoid the attackers. Some residents
    reported that they went to the nearest police station to report the
    attacks, only to find that some of the police officers had assisted the
    attackers. According to press reports, the police assisted ethnic
    Fijians in the area to steal crops, kill cattle, and transport items to
    supporters of George Speight in Suva. There were a number of arrests in
    connection with the attacks, and the police began an internal
    investigation into these complaints that confirmed these reports.
    Violence also was reported in the Dreketi and Rakiraki areas, including
    theft, looting, and arson. Soldiers dispatched to Vanua Levu to quell
    disturbances there reportedly killed one Speight supporter and arrested
    37 others in early August. In early July, Speight supporters burned and
    looted shops in Levuka. Also in July, the 50 Indo-Fijian families in a
    settlement at Tailevu reportedly were robbed and beaten by ethnic
    Fijians (see Section 1.c.). Livestock, vehicles, and household items
    were stolen. Hundreds of IndoFijians were held hostage temporarily on
    Vanua Levu in July (see Section 1.d). There continued to be credible
    reports of arson and looting of Indo-Fijian settlements in remote rural
    areas, and sporadic attacks on Indo-Fijians continued at year's end.
        The Chaudhry Government established a special police unit to
    investigate allegations of criminal activity within the Chinese
    community. It also focused particular attention on what it termed the
    ``expatriate'' business community and had announced its intention to
    review all immigration records relating to foreign workers. It
    intervened in a number of visa cases, refusing visas or renewals of
    work permits. In 1999 it called on private companies to ``localize''
    their hiring practices. The minority Chinese community complained about
    perceived government harassment in this regard, and the nation's
    employers' organization spoke against government interference.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law protects the right of workers
    to form and join unions, elect their own representatives, publicize
    their views on labor matters, and determine their own policies, and the
    authorities respect these rights in practice. However, the law permits
    restrictions to be applied in government employment and in the
    interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or
    public health, or to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons.
    An estimated 55 percent of the workforce is unionized.
        All unions must register with, but are not controlled by, the
    Government. The only central labor body is the Fiji Trade Union
    Congress (FTUC), which was associated closely with the opposition Fiji
    Labor Party until mid-1992; unions operate under its auspices. The FTUC
    subsequently adopted a more independent political stance. While certain
    unions remain ethnically based, both Indo-Fijians and ethnic Fijians
    hold leadership roles in the trade union movement. In the past, the
    FTUC participated, along with the employer's federation, in the
    Government's Tripartite Economic Strategies Committee; however, it has
    not been active since the seizure of Parliament on May 19.
        Strikes are legal, except in connection with union recognition
    disputes, and trade unions can conduct secret strike ballots without
    government supervision. There are credible reports that in July and
    August, following the takeover of the democratically elected
    Government, the military forces actively intervened to prevent union
    efforts to mobilize strike action in the sugar cane belt. The head of
    the FTUC and other union representatives have been briefly detained by
    the military authorities while on union business. The FTUC has
    coordinated closely with the international labor movement in the
    aftermath of the ouster of the elected Government. Representatives of
    Australian and New Zealand unions have visited Fiji to support the
    FTUC.
        Unions can affiliate internationally. The FTUC associates
    internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    recognizes the right to organize and bargain collectively. Employers
    are required to recognize a union if more than half of the employees in
    a workplace have joined it. Recognition is determined by union
    membership rather than by an election. The Government has the power to
    order recalcitrant employers to recognize unions and has done so. Key
    sectors of the economy, including sugar and tourism, are heavily
    organized. Following the 1992 return to accountable government, the
    Government lifted wage guidelines, and unrestricted collective
    bargaining on wages is now the norm.
        Wage negotiations generally are conducted on an individual company
    or enterprise basis, although industry wide negotiations are on the
    increase. The law specifically prohibits antiunion discrimination, but
    the law does not mandate that fired workers be reinstated.
        Export processing zones (EPZ's) are subject to the same laws as the
    rest of the country. However, the FTUC has been unsuccessful in
    obtaining collective bargaining agreements in EPZ's and claims that
    intimidation of workers by employers is widespread. The FTUC sees union
    recognition as the single issue that does not have effective legal
    recourse. The FTUC argues that because of alleged illegal and
    intimidating practices in EPZ's, including threats of loss of work for
    those active in organizing workers, unions are unfairly prevented from
    representing workers in the EPZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    specifically prohibits forced labor, including forced and bonded labor
    by children; however, trafficking in women is a problem (see Section
    6.f.), and there were media reports that a form of bonded labor may be
    practiced on a remote copra plantation on an outer island. Media
    reports also allege that working conditions in some garment factories
    may amount to bonded or forced labor and may include overcrowded
    factory housing and excessive work hours. Workers at a garment factory
    in Lami reportedly conducted a hunger strike in December to protest
    working conditions (see Section 6.e.).
        The Government enforces the prohibition against forced and bonded
    labor by children effectively.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age of Employment.--
    Children under the age of 12 may not be employed in any capacity.
    ``Children'' (under age 15) may only be employed outside school hours
    in family enterprises and not in the industrial sector. ``Young
    persons'' (ages 15 to 17) may be employed in certain occupations not
    involving heavy machinery and with specified hours and rest breaks.
    Enforcement by the Ministry of Labor and Industrial Relations generally
    is effective except for family members working on family farms or
    businesses and ``self-employed'' homeless youths. There has been an
    increase in self-employed school-aged youths in urban areas,
    particularly in those working as shoeshine boys. School is mandatory
    only through the primary grades. Children (under age 15) may be
    employed outside school hours only in certain occupations.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage. Certain sectors have minimum wages set by the Ministry for Labor
    and Industrial Relations, which enforces them effectively. The
    manifesto of the ousted ``People's Coalition'' government called for
    the establishment of a minimum wage. Minimum wage levels provide a
    sparse but adequate standard of living for a worker and family in all
    sectors except the garment sector. Wages are generally lower in the
    garment industry, which largely comprises female (mainly Chinese)
    workers; in the garment industry, the starting hourly wage is $0.36
    (FJ$0.72) for learners and $0.47 (FJ$0.94) for others. The wages are
    based on an assumption that garment workers are young adults or married
    women living at home and not supporting a household.
        Working conditions and employee contracts in garment factories vary
    widely, with conditions in some factories reportedly amounting to
    indentured servitude (see Section 6.c.). There are no regulations
    specifying maximum hours of work for adult males. Women can perform
    night work in factories and overtime but are prohibited from
    underground work in mines. Workers in some industries, notably
    transportation and shipping, complained of excessive hours of work.
    Indo-Fijians, who generally require a cash income to survive, are more
    vulnerable to pressure to work long hours than are ethnic Fijians. Many
    ethnic Fijians return to their villages rather than work what they
    consider excessive hours. Particularly in the garment industry, migrant
    workers (predominantly Chinese) are increasing in number and are a
    largely unregulated work force.
        There are workplace safety regulations, a Worker's Compensation
    Act, and an accident compensation plan. Government enforcement of
    safety standards under the direction of the Labor Ministry suffers from
    a lack of trained enforcement personnel and from lags in compensation
    hearings and rulings, but unions do a reasonable job of monitoring
    safety standards in organized workplaces. The International Labor
    Organization's (ILO) 1992 recommendations cited the need to improve
    working conditions, particularly in the garment industry. The
    Government, supported by the FTUC, passed occupational health and
    safety legislation, which came in to effect in 1997. The Government
    continues to work with the ILO (which maintains an office in Suva) to
    address problems concerning working conditions. By law an employee has
    the right to remove himself from a hazardous work site without
    jeopardizing his employment, but most fear the loss of their jobs if
    they do so.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
    address the subject of trafficking in persons, although laws against
    bonded and forced labor could be used to prosecute traffickers;
    trafficking in persons is a problem. There was an increase in the
    number of persons arriving in or transiting the country with altered or
    falsified travel documents. Nadi International Airport is a hub for
    travel in the Pacific and an increasing number of Asian nationals
    without appropriate travel papers were apprehended and deported during
    the year. The police believe that an organized Asian criminal network
    exists in the country that coordinates illegal trafficking in persons.
    There are unconfirmed reports that some laborers recruited from Asian
    countries, particularly in the garment sector, are held in conditions
    of forced labor (see Section 6.c.). There are also reports that Chinese
    women working in the garment sector may be involved in prostitution.
        There is no available information as to whether persons working in
    the sex industry are forced into prostitution.
                                   __________

                                   INDONESIA

        Indonesia made progress in some areas of its transition from a
    longentrenched authoritarian regime to a more pluralistic,
    representative democracy; however, the country also encountered
    significant setbacks in areas of democratic governance. In October
    1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid was elected in the country's first
    pluralistic elections, in a process judged free and fair by
    international monitors. The democratically-elected government faced
    enormous challenges because institutions required for a democratic
    system either do not exist or are at an early stage of development.
    Existing institutions, including the government bureaucracy and
    security establishment, often were obstacles to democratic development.
    When governmental authority changed hands from President B.J. Habibie
    to President Wahid the political system was revamped to provide for
    separation of powers, with an executive branch, a president, and an
    appointed cabinet that ultimately are accountable to a directly elected
    parliament. The Parliament (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly
    (MPR) were installed in October 1999, replacing the former DPR, which
    was elected in 1997, and the former MPR. In accordance with
    constitutional procedures, the new MPR elected, in a transparent
    balloting procedure, Wahid as President, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as
    Vice President in October 1999. The 500-member DPR, of which 462
    members were chosen in the 1999 elections (but which also includes 38
    unelected members of the military), became a forum for vigorous debate
    of government policy and practice during the year. The Parliament
    frequently challenged the authority and policies of the executive
    branch, and in mid-July formally exercised its right to summon
    President Wahid to respond to questions about his actions. The MPR,
    which consists of the Parliament, 130 elected regional representatives,
    and 65 appointed functional group representatives, held its first
    annual session in August; previously the MPR ordinarily had met every 5
    years to elect the President and Vice President and to consider other
    matters reserved for the MPR. Severe criticism of President Wahid's
    performance led the MPR in August to issue a decree mandating the
    President to cede additional authorities over daily governance to Vice
    President Megawati as stipulated in a subsequent presidential decree.
    This decision has not appeared to alter significantly the power
    relationship between the President and Vice President. During its
    August session, the MPR amended the 1945 Constitution to, among other
    changes, incorporate human rights protections modeled on the U.N.
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although human rights activists
    expressed concern that a constitutional amendment prohibiting
    retroactive application of laws could be used to shield past human
    rights violators from prosecution. The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, it remains subordinated to the
    executive and suffers from pervasive corruption.
        The 275,000-member armed forces (TNI) are under the supervision of
    a civilian defense minister but retain broad nonmilitary powers and an
    internal security role, and are not fully accountable to civilian
    authority. The military and police jointly occupy 38 appointed seats in
    the DPR reserved for the security forces, as well as 10 percent of the
    seats in provincial and district parliaments. During the first half of
    the year, political leaders considered phasing out reserved seats for
    the security forces in the DPR and MPR. The security forces agreed to
    relinquish their appointed seats in the national and regional
    legislatures in 2004, but the MPR adopted a decree during its August
    session that extended the security forces' presence in the MPR until
    the year 2009. In March President Wahid signed a decree abolishing the
    Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National
    Security (BAKORSTANAS), which had given the security forces wide
    discretion to detain and interrogate persons who were perceived as
    threats to national security. In July President Wahid signed a decree
    removing the national police force of 175,000 members from the
    supervision of the Minister of Defense and providing for civilian
    oversight. This step, in addition to the formal separation of the
    police from the armed forces in 1999, was intended to give the police
    primary responsibility for internal security. Notwithstanding these
    changes, the military continues to play a substantial internal security
    role in areas of conflict, such as Aceh, the Moluccas, and Irian Jaya.
    Both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights
    abuses throughout the year.
        The economy, which is market-based with a significant degree of
    government intervention, increased by approximately 3.5 percent during
    the year, following a more than 13 percent decline in real terms in
    1998 and no real growth in 1999. Industrial exports grew strongly,
    particularly in labor-intensive textile, electronics, wood products,
    and other light manufacturing industries based on the densely populated
    islands of Java and Bali. Underemployment remained high at
    approximately 19 million persons. Over 40 percent of the adult working
    population is employed in agriculture, which in Java, Bali, and
    southern Sulawesi primarily involves rice and other food crops but
    elsewhere concentrates on cash crops such as oil palm, rubber, coffee,
    tea, coconut, and spices. Per capita gross domestic product among the
    population of 211 million was $580 in 1999, well below the levels
    achieved before the severe economic downturn that began in July 1997.
    The downturn affected most severely the urban poor, particularly in
    Java, partly as a result of a wholesale shift in employment from the
    higher-paying formal sector to the less secure informal sector. The
    negative impact of the economic and financial downturn was smaller in
    less populated, natural resource-rich Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and
    Sumatra. Large disparities in the distribution of wealth and political
    power contributed to social tensions across the country and continued
    to create demands for greater regional autonomy. In response, the
    Government prepared for the implementation of two potentially
    significant 1999 laws providing for greater political and economic
    decentralization and for revenue sharing among the country's provinces
    and districts.
        The Government's human rights record was poor, and the overall
    human rights situation worsened during the year, despite the Wahid
    Government's efforts to continue the country's democratic transition
    and permit the exercise of basic freedoms. Security forces were
    responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate,
    shooting of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and
    arbitrary detention in Aceh, West Timor, Irian Jaya (also known as
    Papua or West Papua), the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and elsewhere in the
    country. TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence
    after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct
    ``sweeps'' which led to killing of civilians and property destruction.
    The Government and the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement members signed
    an agreement in May providing for a humanitarian pause in the fighting
    between them, beginning on June 2. During the pause, both sides agreed
    not to undertake offensive operations or maneuvers. Initially the
    humanitarian pause greatly reduced violence in Aceh, but by September
    violence had returned to roughly pre-pause levels. Army forces, police,
    and GAM members committed numerous extrajudicial killings. In Irian
    Jaya (Papua) police shot and killed persons involved in Papuan
    independence flag-raisings or demonstrations on a number of occasions,
    even when these demonstrations were nonviolent. There continued to be
    credible reports of the disappearance of dozens of civilians, including
    Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) activist, and
    Tengku Hashiruddin Daud, an Acehnese Member of Parliament. Both later
    were found dead with indications of torture. East Timorese
    prointegration militias resident in West Timor, armed and largely
    supported by the army, were responsible for numerous acts of violence
    in West Timor directed at local West Timorese residents and
    international aid workers, including the murder of three U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) officials in Atambua in September.
    The militias made repeated crossborder raids into East Timor, which
    resulted in the deaths of two U.N. Peacekeeping Force personnel. In
    West Timor, the militias attacked and threatened UNHCR and other
    humanitarian aid workers throughout the year, leading to the withdrawal
    of international aid workers on several occasions, intimidated East
    Timorese internally displaced persons (IDP's) and the local population
    in West Timor, and destroyed property belonging to international
    organizations. Twenty-four army personnel received jail sentences of 8
    to 10 years in May for the massacre of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh,
    West Aceh, in July 1999. However, the most senior military officer
    involved in the incident inexplicably disappeared after the
    convictions. In response to past abuses, joint civilianmilitary courts
    and various other investigative bodies are pursuing several other cases
    involving army and police officers, but aside from the Beutong Ateuh,
    West Aceh case, no other cases were brought to trial. Security forces
    systematically employed arbitrary arrest and detention without trial in
    Aceh. The Government has not prosecuted any persons in connection with
    the militia-related crimes in West or East Timor dating back to 1999,
    although the Attorney General in September and October named 23 persons
    as suspects in East Timor human rights cases (one of whom was killed in
    early September).
        Rapes and sexual exploitation by security forces continued to be a
    problem, particularly in West Timor. Prison conditions are harsh.
    Despite initial steps toward reform, the judiciary remains subordinate
    to the executive, suffers from corruption, and does not always ensure
    due process. Security forces infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The
    Government generally respects freedom of speech and the press; however,
    journalists continued to suffer intimidation and assaults. The
    Government places significant controls on freedom of assembly, but
    allowed most demonstrations to proceed without hindrance during the
    year, except in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Security forces sometimes resorted
    to excessive force in order to disrupt peaceful demonstrations. There
    were numerous credible reports that police assaulted persons detained
    in Irian Jaya after violent clashes, and police detained persons for
    organizing peaceful independence flagraisings. The Government generally
    respects freedom of association, although the Communist Party remains
    banned. The Government legally provides for religious freedom for five
    designated religions; unrecognized religions are subject to
    restrictions. The Government continues to restrict freedom of movement
    to a limited extent. Thousands of Acehnese residents fled their
    villages during conflicts between the security forces and separatists.
    The army, East Timorese militias in West Timor, and militant groups in
    Maluku also forced the relocation of hundreds of thousands of persons.
    In West Timor, the Government's failure to disarm and disband the East
    Timorese prointegration militias impeded the repatriation or
    resettlement of thousands of East Timorese IDP's.
        Domestic human rights organizations continued to play a significant
    role in advocating improved human rights conditions; however, the
    authorities continued to subject some NGO's to monitoring and
    interference, and in August in Jakarta, unknown persons allegedly
    kidnaped, held, and threatened a group of agrarian activists for 2
    weeks before releasing them. Violence and discrimination against women
    are widespread problems. Child abuse and child prostitution are
    problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM) persists in some areas.
    Discrimination against the disabled, and against indigenous, religious,
    and ethnic minorities also are widespread problems. Interreligious
    violence, particularly in the Moluccas, claimed over 3,000 lives, and
    thousands of Christians in Maluku were forced to convert to Islam.
    Discrimination against ethnic minorities continued. Attacks against
    houses of worship continued, and the lack of an effective government
    response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to
    allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents.
        During the year the Government ratified International Labor
    Organization (ILO) Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor,
    enacted a new law on trade unions, and continued to allow new trade
    unions to form and operate. Nonetheless, enforcement of labor standards
    remains inconsistent and weak in some areas. Millions of children work,
    often under poor conditions. Forced and bonded child labor remains a
    problem, although the Government continued to take steps during the
    year to remove children from fishing platforms, on which bonded child
    labor most commonly occurs. Trafficking of persons into and from the
    country for the purpose of prostitution and sometimes for forced labor
    is a problem.
        The Government was ineffective in deterring social, interethnic,
    and interreligious violence that accounted for the majority of deaths
    by violence during the year. Enforcement of the law against criminal
    violence deteriorated, resulting in religious groups purporting to
    uphold public morality, and mobs dispensing ``street justice'' operated
    with impunity.
        In Aceh dozens of lowlevel civil servants, police, and military
    personnel were murdered and abducted during the year. Private non-
    Acehnese residents also sometimes suffered attacks. It generally is
    believed that separatists carried out many of these, and other,
    killings. In Irian Jaya, mobs killed over 20 migrant settlers and
    wounded scores of others on October 6 and 7 after police opened fire on
    indigenous Papuans resisting the removal of Papuan independence flags.
    Unknown attackers killed two police members and a security guard in
    Abepura, Irian Jaya, on December 7, and two timber workers near the
    Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border on December 9. Police blamed both
    attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) although local human
    rights groups believe that groups with ties to the security forces were
    involved.
        The DPR enacted landmark legislation establishing a human rights
    court, and deliberated on and debated other draft legislation with
    human rights implications, such as a bill on broadcasting. In January
    President Wahid issued Presidential Decree No. 6, which repealed the
    ban (passed in 1967) on the practice of Chinese religion
    (Confucianism), beliefs, and customs. Ethnic Chinese celebrated New
    Year's openly for the first time in over 30 years.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Historically,
    politically-related extrajudicial killings have occurred most
    frequently in areas where separatist movements were active, such as
    Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, and security forces continued to
    employ harsh measures against separatist movements in these areas. In
    addition security forces killed unarmed demonstrators, and there also
    were numerous instances of reported extrajudicial killings by security
    forces in cases involving alleged common criminal activity.
        In Aceh army and police personnel committed many extrajudicial
    killings and used excessive force or directed force against
    noncombatants in an attempt to quell separatist movements; at times the
    police and army forces were responding to rebel attacks. On February 9,
    in Cot Merbo village, North Aceh, TNI troops shot and killed four
    Acehnese civilians, whom the military claimed were GAM guerillas. On
    March 10, police shot and killed two apparently unarmed men at a police
    checkpoint near Banda Aceh. Police later stated that the two men were
    members of GAM and were shot while fleeing the scene. According to a
    TNI spokesperson, on March 12, TNI troops shot and killed three armed
    separatists after they resisted arrest and fired shots at the troops in
    Bate Pila, North Aceh. On May 17, police shot and killed a civilian in
    Cunda, a village north of Lhokseumawe. According to police, he was shot
    after he attempted unsuccessfully to steal a police officer's revolver
    from his holster at a checkpoint. Other witnesses confirmed that the
    man fled the checkpoint; however, they denied that there was a struggle
    over the gun and instead claimed that the police chased and caught the
    man, and then executed him. On May 17 and 18, police killed eight
    villagers in Hagu Barat Laout, North Aceh. Police claimed that the
    eight villagers were armed separatist guerillas; local residents claim
    that all the victims were fishermen and that they were watching a
    soccer match when, without provocation, the police attacked. In
    November police and army troops attempting to prevent Acehnese from
    attending a rally calling for a referendum on Acehnese independence
    killed over 20 persons in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh (see
    Section 2.b.). On December 6, three Acehnese humanitarian workers with
    the NGO Rehabilitation Action For Torture Victims in Aceh (RATA) were
    killed at close range near Lhokseumawe (see Section 4). A survivor of
    the shooting said that a group of Acehnese government collaborators and
    plainclothes military personnel shot the victims. Police arrested 11
    persons, including 3 policemen and 4 soldiers, in connection with the
    RATA killings; they remained in detention at year's end. There were
    numerous other instances of excessive force by the military and police
    during the year that went unpunished.
        During the year there were numerous extrajudicial killings in Aceh
    that could not be clearly attributed to either the security forces or
    to the armed separatist movement, the Free Aceh Movement. According to
    domestic NGO's and press reports, 636 persons were killed in Aceh
    during the year, 494 of whom were civilians and 142 of whom were police
    or military members. On January 24, Tengku Nashiruddin Daud, an
    Acehnese representative to the DPR, disappeared in Medan, North
    Sumatra. His body was found outside Medan on January 25, and family
    members identified it on January 30. Nashiruddin had advocated strongly
    for the trial of military officers accused of human rights violations
    in Aceh; he also was opposed to an independent Aceh. Police had made no
    progress in identifying Nashiruddin's killers by year's end. The body
    of Sukardi, a volunteer with the Bamboo Thicket Institute, a local
    environmental and human rights organization based in Aceh, was found on
    February 1, after he was reported missing the day before. On April 6,
    unknown persons shot and killed a female doctoral candidate at Aceh's
    Syah Kuala University. On May 27, eight armed men abducted Sulaiman
    Ahmad, a TNI lieutenant colonel, and hanged him. On May 29, unknown
    persons shot and killed a TNI lieutenant in a videostore in Geudong,
    Aceh. On August 5, foreign-resident Acehnese NGO activist Jafar Siddiq
    Hamzah disappeared in Medan. His body was found on September 4, along
    with four other unidentified bodies southeast of Medan. All bodies had
    multiple stab wounds and bruises. Police had made no progress in
    identifying the perpetrators of the killings by year's end. On
    September 16, unknown persons shot and killed Tengku Safwan Idris,
    rector of the Ar-Raniry State Islamic Institute, at his home in Banda
    Aceh. Police investigated the murder but were unable to identify the
    perpetrators.
        In Irian Jaya (Papua) police shot and killed persons involved in
    largely peaceful Papuan independence flag-raisings or demonstrations on
    at least 6 occasions, injuring numerous persons and killing at least 33
    (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 5). For example, Police Mobile Brigade
    (Brimob) troops opened fire on a group of Papuans who were raising a
    Papuan Independence Flag in Sorong, Papua on the morning of August 22.
    Three Papuans were killed and at least 12 others were injured; 1
    policeman was injured. After the police failed to persuade the crowd to
    disperse peacefully heated arguments broke out between the Papuans and
    the police. Some sources allege that police then began firing their
    weapons; two other sources allege that members of the crowd began a
    scuffle and threw stones first. However, all sources agree that the
    police overreacted and began firing indiscriminately into the crowd.
    The incident was similar to a series of police reactions to flag-
    raisings over the past 2 years, although the number of victims was
    significantly higher in this case. On October 6, police killed six
    persons in Wamena, Papua, who resisted police efforts to take down
    Papuan flags. At least 20 other persons were injured (see Section 5).
    Police and Papuans clashed in Merauke on November 3 and 4. Reports
    indicate that 5 Papuans died of gunshot wounds and another Papuan died
    of stab wounds; police injured at least 17 other Papuans. The
    circumstances of the incident are unclear. According to police, Papuans
    injured several persons and damaged non-Papuan property during the
    incident (see Section 5). Police killed two Papuans during a clash in
    Fak Fak on December 1. Police and Papuans clashed again in Merauke on
    the morning of December 2, and police fired into a crowd, shooting and
    killing seven Papuans and injuring at least eight others. After a
    December 7 attack on a police station in Jayapura, police killed 3
    persons, and detained and beat over 100 others (see Section 5). On
    December 18, troops shot and killed four Papuans near Tiom, Papua,
    after the Papuans shot arrows at the soldiers, killing one soldier.
        East Timorese prointegration militias based in West Timor, who,
    according to credible reports, continued to be armed and supported by
    the army, committed numerous extrajudicial killings. On July 24,
    approximately eight militia members shot, killed, and mutilated a New
    Zealand U.N. peacekeeper near Suai, East Timor, where the U.N. unit was
    patrolling the East/West Timor border area. On July 30, East Timorese
    IDP's from TNI Battalion 744 killed Bernard Loddo, a resident of
    Kupang, West Timor. On August 10, East Timorese militias killed a
    Nepali U.N. peacekeeper and wounded three other peacekeepers and one
    East Timorese civilian near Suai. On September 6, a mob of East
    Timorese IDP's led by militia members attacked UNHCR offices in
    Atambua, West Timor and killed three international UNHCR staff members,
    then mutilated and burned their bodies. Security forces that were
    assigned to protect the UNHCR office failed to prevent the militia
    forces from attacking and left the area before the militia's second
    attack on the building, when the three UNHCR workers were killed. In
    December authorities began to process for trial six suspects linked to
    the attack; at year's end, authorities had not detained any other
    suspects.
        According to credible reports, security forces in the Maluku island
    chain, especially in the centrally located island of Ambon, were
    responsible for some of the shooting deaths that occurred during
    widespread riots and communal clashes throughout the year. Despite
    claims to the contrary, there was no credible evidence to suggest that
    the security forces as an institution supported one side or the other
    during the violence (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
        In March a foreign citizen disappeared while in the custody of
    immigration officials in East Kalimantan; the citizen continued to be
    presumed dead at year's end. Immigration officers detained him for
    overstaying his visa in November 1999. In March the foreigner was being
    transferred from Kalimantan to Jakarta on an inter-island ferry when he
    allegedly jumped overboard and drowned. Government officials waited
    over 2 weeks before informing his government of his disappearance. No
    disciplinary action was taken against the immigration personnel
    responsible for his disappearance and presumed death, and there were no
    developments in the case by year's end.
        The police on several occasions used deadly force to disperse
    demonstrators. For example, in Medan, North Sumatra on May 1, police
    shot and killed two students at Nommensen University after crowds took
    two police hostage and threw Molotov cocktails during a demonstration
    to protest the detention of another student. On June 14, in Pontianak,
    West Kalimantan, police shot and killed one student during a
    demonstration in front of the governor's office. On June 18, in Blitar,
    East Java, police shot and killed two persons involved in a long-
    running protest and land dispute at a plantation. On June 21, in
    Porsea, North Sumatra, police reportedly shot and killed one person
    during a clash with demonstrators. On July 20, in Muara Enim, South
    Sumatra, police shot and killed one person during a demonstration by
    farmers over land rights. On September 27, in Bondowoso, East Java,
    police killed five persons in a crowd that was demanding the release of
    a detainee in police custody.
        The police often employed deadly force in apprehending suspects or
    dealing with alleged criminals, many of whom were unarmed. During the
    year police shot and killed at least 15 Africans suspected of
    trafficking in narcotics. Other nationalities were not subjected to
    similar harsh treatment in narcotics or other criminal cases,
    suggesting that the killings were racially motivated. In response to
    criticisms that the methods used were unjustifiably harsh and amounted
    to execution without trial, police generally claimed that the suspects
    were fleeing, resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Complete
    statistics about the number of these cases were not released by year's
    end (see Section 5).
        The military or police rarely are held accountable for committing
    extrajudicial killings or using excessive force, and with the exception
    of the 24 soldiers who were convicted for the death of 58 civilians in
    Aceh in July 1999, no government personnel were held accountable during
    the year. However, during the year, the Government initiated and
    continued an unprecedented number of investigations into human rights
    cases in Aceh, East Timor, and other areas of the country.
        In July 1999, the Government appointed an independent commission
    (KPP Aceh) to investigate human rights violations in Aceh. In November
    1999, the Commission recommended that the Government investigate five
    cases of alleged human rights violations. On April 17, the trial of 24
    army personnel and a civilian, who all previously were convicted for
    the killing of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh in July 1999, began;
    however, none of the accused was above the rank of lieutenant colonel.
    During the trial, soldiers testified that they had killed civilians but
    argued that they were not guilty of murder because they were following
    their commanders' orders. The commander reportedly disappeared;
    however, NGO's reported a subsequent sighting of him in the company of
    other military officials. The trial ended in May when the 24 defendants
    received sentences of 8 to 10 years. By year's end, no one had been
    charged in the other four cases, which include: the May 1999 massacre
    at Krueng Geukey, North Aceh; the February 1999 attack on demonstrators
    that resulted in seven persons killed in Idi Cut, East Aceh; a series
    of killings and abductions at a detention facility in Pidie from 1997-
    98; and an August 1996 rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese women, by a
    soldier.
        There were no new developments during the year in the killings that
    occurred when security forces broke up a peaceful proindependence
    demonstration in Biak, Irian Jaya in 1998.
        The Commission for Investigation of Violations of Human Rights in
    East Timor (KPP-HAM) delivered its report of human rights violations in
    East Timor to the Attorney General's Office on January 31. The Attorney
    General said that his office would initially prosecute five major cases
    arising from the April 6, 1999 massacre in Liquisa; the April 17, 1999
    killings at independence leader Manuel Carrascalao's house; the
    September 5, 1999 attack on the compound of the Catholic Diocese in
    Dili; the September 6, 1999 massacre of priests and displaced persons
    at a church in Suai; and the September 21, 1999 killing of Dutch
    journalist Sander Thoenes. The Attorney General's Office named 23
    suspects in September and October (one of whom, an East Timorese
    militia commander, militia members killed in early September). Those
    accused included several army and police generals, but did not include
    then-Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, former Armed Forces
    intelligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, and other senior members of the
    military leadership who were named as responsible parties in the KPP-
    HAM report. Progress on these five cases was slow, and the number of
    suspects named was small in comparison to the number of persons
    believed responsible. Although Indonesian authorities were assisted
    greatly in their investigation by the U.N. Transitional Administration
    in East Timor (UNTAET), the Government did not cooperate fully in
    December when UNTAET requested similar support for its own
    investigations into the atrocities.
        In November the national police spokesman announced that the police
    would summon for questioning by military police 11 policemen who were
    suspected of involvement in the May 1998 shooting deaths of 4 students
    at Trisakti University in Jakarta; however, none of the 11 policemen
    had been questioned by year's end. In December the Parliament formed a
    special committee to conduct an investigation of the Trisakti killings.
        The police conducted an investigation of the July 27, 1996 attack
    on the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI),
    questioning the top army and police leadership at the time. A joint
    police/military team subsequently questioned witnesses and potential
    suspects, and by November had begun submitting cases to the Attorney
    General's Office for prosecution (see Section 1.b.).
        The East Java police reopened an investigation into the 1993 murder
    of labor activist Marsinah, questioning again over a dozen witnesses
    and previous suspects, including civilians and army and police
    personnel. In December the East Java police chief said Australian
    laboratory tests confirmed that Marsinah's blood had been found in the
    home of the owner of the factory where Marsinah worked and in a van
    believed to have transported her to the place where she was found.
    However, by year's end, there was no further action on the police
    investigation.
        In February the National Human Rights Commission (KOMNASHAM) formed
    a commission to investigate the September 1984 killing of scores of
    demonstrators by security forces at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. The
    commission questioned senior army and police officials, exhumed mass
    graves where victims were buried, and reported the investigation
    results, including names of 23 persons considered to be responsible for
    the killings, to the Attorney General in October (see Sections 1.c. and
    4).
        There were no new developments during the year in the shooting
    deaths of at least nine demonstrators at Atma Jaya University in
    November 1998.
        On March 14, President Wahid went on national television and asked
    for forgiveness for the 1965-67 massacre of suspected members of the
    banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and for the role of his
    organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, in the killings. In November researchers
    from the Indonesian Institute for the Study of the 1965-66 Massacre
    unearthed the remains of 24 persons in a forest near Wonosobo, Central
    Java. They are believed to have been killed in March 1966 because of
    their PKI affiliation.
        Citizens' attacks on other citizens caused the majority of killings
    during the year.
        In Aceh armed separatist groups killed many soldiers, police, civil
    servants, and local residents throughout the year. On January 1, a mob
    surrounded a TNI sergeant who was buying fish in a market in Simpang
    Tiga, Pidie, Aceh and stabbed him to death. According to press reports,
    on January 6, the bodies of two men who had been shot to death were
    found wrapped in separatist flags and left on a roadside in Muara Dua,
    North Aceh. On April 5, alleged GAM members killed four TNI personnel
    in an ambush near Lhokseumawe. GAM has claimed responsibility for a
    July 2 attack in Nissam district, North Aceh, in which assailants
    killed three Brimob members and wounded six others. On September 20,
    GAM forces attacked a police post in Pidie with a grenade launcher,
    killing three soldiers.
        On October 6 and 7, in Wamena, Irian Jaya, members of Papuan ``task
    forces'' (Satgas Papua--informal private security organizations of
    Papuan men and youths that ostensibly provide protection for Papuan
    tribal and other leaders and groups), and other Papuans armed with
    knives, spears, and arrows killed at least 24 non-Papuans, after
    security forces opened fire on and killed 2 task force members who
    resisted efforts to take down Papuan independence flags flying in the
    town. Unknown persons killed two police officers and a security guard
    in Abepura, Irian Jaya, on December 7, and two timber workers near the
    Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border on December 9. Police blamed both
    attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) (see Section 5). On
    December 16, Papuans reportedly attacked soldiers with traditional
    weapons near the town of Tiom, killing one soldier and injuring three
    others. The soldiers responded with gunfire.
        According to multiple sources, over 3,000 persons were killed,
    largely because of their religious identity, in North Maluku, Maluku,
    and Central Sulawesi provinces in the eastern part of the country. The
    fighting in all three provinces had political, economic, ethnic, and
    religious overtones (see Sections 2.c. and 5). While initial conflicts
    emerged over land tenure issues and the political and economic status
    of local residents versus migrants, in many cases the conflicts later
    evolved into highly-charged religious clashes. One of the major factors
    contributing to the continuation of violence in these islands was the
    failure to bring the perpetrators to justice (see Sections 2.c. and 5);
    another factor was the failure of the authorities to prevent armed
    militants from traveling in large groups to the Moluccas from Java.
        Interreligious fighting in the Moluccan island group, which began
    in Ambon in January 1999, spread to most major islands in the Moluccas
    during the year. Christian and Muslim groups used increasingly
    sophisticated weapons as the fighting continued, causing over 3,000
    deaths and destroying many churches, mosques, and, in some cases,
    entire towns. The level of violence intensified in late 1999 and in the
    early part of the year after Christian gangs and militia (and to a
    lesser extent, Muslim gangs and militia) attacked isolated villages in
    Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. During the first 6 months of
    the year, and following the December 1999 attacks by Christians, Muslim
    militias drove Christian populations away from many areas of North
    Maluku and Maluku provinces (see Section 2.d.). As IDP's fled to
    neighboring areas and islands, their resentment against those who had
    attacked them often sparked conflict in their new places of residence.
    In addition unverified reports of provocations and conspiracies fueled
    the continuous cycle of violence. The violence decreased in Ambon in
    late January, after security forces began enforcing a curfew and
    disarming civilians. At the same time, mutually-destructive fighting
    escalated in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku. By April there
    were some signs of reconciliation in Ambon after the provincial
    government established reconstruction programs and markets in border
    areas between Muslim and Christian communities. However, in late April,
    serious rioting broke out immediately following a visit by Vice
    President Megawati Soekarnoputri. There was a further upsurge in
    violence in midMay after boats filled with members of the Laskar Jihad,
    Muslim militants from Java, arrived in Ambon and other parts of the
    Moluccas (see Section 5). As many as 2,000 to 3,000 militants
    ultimately arrived via boat. Law and order continued to deteriorate
    steadily, and in late June, violent mobs stormed through Ambon city
    with little or no security force interference. There also were large-
    scale Muslim attacks against Christians in Halmahera in May and June.
    The level of violence decreased, particularly in North Maluku, after
    President Wahid declared a state of civil emergency in both provinces
    in late June (see Section 2.d.); the state of emergency still was in
    effect at year's end. However, violent interreligious clashes continued
    occasionally during the remainder of the year, especially in Ambon and
    neighboring islands in central Maluku.
        Beginning in late May, the area of Poso in Central Sulawesi, and
    numerous villages in the region experienced renewed religious riots and
    violence, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread destruction.
    Christian gangs from surrounding villages reportedly expelled Muslims
    from the town of Poso in retaliation for past hostilities, which
    included the burning of hundreds of Christians' houses in the preceding
    months (see Section 2.d.). In the most serious incident, Christian
    gangs killed over 100 unarmed Muslims in a small village outside Poso.
    In July the regional military commander announced that 211 persons had
    been confirmed dead in and around Poso; other estimates ranged as high
    as 500 fatalities. Both Christian and Muslim outsiders were accused of
    instigating the violence (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
        Over 30 persons were killed in a series of bombings in Jakarta and
    Medan during the year (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Ten persons died when
    a car-bomb exploded in the basement of the Jakarta Stock Exchange on
    September 13, two persons died in a car bomb incident near the gate of
    the Philippine Ambassador's residence, and several others were killed
    in bombings in Medan. Eighteen persons died in an apparently
    coordinated series of bombings at or near churches in nine cities on
    the night of December 24 (see Sections 1.c. and 5). Except for the case
    of the Stock Exchange bombing, no suspects had been apprehended by
    year's end.
        According to press reports, during the year 145 persons accused of
    committing crimes (usually theft or responsibility for vehicular
    accidents) were killed by mobs of persons on the scene of the alleged
    crimes in the most populous urban areas of Jakarta, West Java, East
    Java, and North Sumatra. Countrywide statistics were not available at
    year's end.
        In Kalimantan interethnic clashes resulted in killings on at least
    two occasions. In Kumai, Central Kalimantan, four persons died in
    fighting between indigenous Dayaks and Madurese migrants (originally
    from the island of Madura near Java) in July. In Pontianak, West
    Kalimantan, at least 11 persons died in fighting between ethnic Malay
    and Madurese in October. Sectarian violence between Dayaks and Madurese
    migrants erupted on December 16 in Central Kalimantan. According to
    official news agency reports, about 100 Dayaks attacked and burned
    approximately 20 migrant houses. The attacks were in reprisal for a
    number of unsolved killings of Dayaks, allegedly committed by Madurese.
    An estimated 50,000 Madurese who fled their homes during interethnic
    violence in 1999 (see Section 5) remained in IDP camps in West
    Kalimantan.
        During the year, there were a number of reports of killings of
    persons who practice traditional magic (``dukun santet'') (see Section
    5). In the Malang area of East Java, police reported to the press that
    unknown persons killed 10 persons suspected of being dukun santet.
    There also were reports of killings of dukun santets in West and
    Central Java. In February in West Java, police arrested 12 persons
    suspected of participating in the killing of 7 dukun santet. Police
    acknowledged in November that at least 20 villagers in the Cianjur area
    of West Java had been executed for allegedly practicing traditional
    magic. Police arrested 20 persons suspected of involvement in the
    killings in November. However, none of the cases had come to trial by
    year's end.
        b. Disappearance.--According to a report issued by the Committee
    for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), 843 persons
    still are missing as a result of military operations, land disputes,
    and political and religious activities over the past 20 years.
        In Aceh there continued to be credible reports of the disappearance
    of many civilians. KONTRAS reported in December that 53 cases of forced
    disappearance involving 69 persons had occurred between January 1 and
    the end of November. Three prominent Acehnese disappeared in Medan,
    North Sumatra: Member of Parliament, religious leader, and human rights
    activist Tengku Nashiruddin Daud in January; armed separatist spokesman
    Ismail Syahputra in June; and NGO activist Jafar Siddiq Hamzah in
    August. Nashiruddin's and Jafar's bodies later were found, bearing
    signs of torture (see Section 1.a.); Syahputra remained missing at
    year's end. NGO's allege that TNI forces or police personnel are
    responsible for many cases of civilian disappearances.
        There were no developments in the investigation into the causes of
    death or the identification of the remains of 32 bodies found floating
    around Biak, Irian Jaya in July 1998 after navy and police forces broke
    up a proindependence demonstration. Multiple reports claimed that many
    of the bodies were demonstrators who had been detained and then killed
    while in custody.
        There were no developments in the numerous disappearances of
    persons in East Timor in 1999 and in earlier years.
        Four members of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), an NGO based
    in Bandung, West Java that advocates for dispossessed farmers, claimed
    that they were kidnaped at gunpoint by unknown persons on August 14.
    Their alleged abduction came after police forcibly removed them from a
    demonstration and hunger strike that they were conducting inside the
    Parliament building in Jakarta. They claimed that after several days in
    solitary confinement they were driven to different locations and
    interrogated at length about their organization's activities, finances,
    and aims. They said that they were not tortured physically, but that
    their lives and those of their families and colleagues frequently were
    threatened. Their captors released them on August 27. Police opened an
    investigation into the kidnaping, but were unable to identify the
    perpetrators (see Sections 1.e. and 4).
        There were no developments in the case of 12 persons who
    disappeared (and are presumed dead) in Java during a series of
    kidnapings of opponents of the Soeharto regime carried out by Army
    Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in 1997 and 1998. However, the
    police conducted an investigation into the 1996 PDI incident in which
    16 persons disappeared, and submitted cases to the Attorney General's
    Office (see Section 1.a.). No new information emerged on the fate of
    the 16 missing persons by year's end.
        In Aceh armed separatists often abduct army members, police
    personnel, civil servants, and others, although they do not always
    acknowledge responsibility for these incidents. Militia groups are
    believed to have killed some civilians based on suspicions that they
    were collaborators or informants of the security forces.
        In Irian Jaya, the six plantation employees who were abducted in
    July 1999 near Arso remained missing.
        Kidnaping of children for ransom is a recent and reportedly growing
    phenomenon. In October a man was arrested for kidnaping three children
    from wealthy families living in the Jakarta area; one child was
    murdered after his parents failed to pay the ransom.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4
    years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a
    confession; however, in practice legal protections are both inadequate
    and widely ignored, and security forces continued to employ torture and
    other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were
    active security concerns, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Police often
    resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.
        In Aceh army and police officials routinely use excessive force and
    violence when investigating attacks by armed separatists. Police and
    army personnel also routinely respond to attacks on soldiers by
    engaging in indiscriminate violence against bystanders. For example, on
    March 18, Brimob units beat and otherwise abused at least 20 villagers
    in Gulampang Tiga, Pidie district, apparently while searching for a
    prominent GAM leader. In August after a soldier was shot in Idi
    Rayeuk's central market, troops fired indiscriminately, beat many
    bystanders, and burned over 60 market stalls. Soldiers beat or shot
    over 100 persons during the incident, including 3 children who were
    shot. An army commander later publicly apologized for the troops'
    actions; however, there were no reports of personnel being held
    accountable for the Idi Rayeuk incident. In October police allegedly
    shot 1 man and burned 150 market stalls after rebels attacked police in
    the regency of Pidie. Police denied responsibility for the shooting and
    burning.
        There were numerous credible reports that the army and police
    continued routinely to torture detainees in Aceh. For example, on
    August 27, police detained three local workers of the international NGO
    Oxfam, and beat them while they were detained. According to Amnesty
    International, police pulled out one worker's fingernails and burned
    him with cigarettes. Amnesty International also reported that on
    September 5, in Meukek subdistrict, Brimob detained Amrisaldin, a
    volunteer worker with the humanitarian organization SAVE Emergency for
    Aceh (SEFA). Police released Amrisaldin on September 6, after they
    reportedly punched him, kicked him, and slashed him with a knife.
    Police allegedly also threatened him with death and burned his pubic,
    chest, and armpit hair with matches. On September 19, in Banda Aceh,
    police arrested three leaders of the student NGO Aceh Referendum
    Information Center (SIRA) and beat them with rifle butts, cables, and
    belts while they were in custody (see Sections 1.d. and 4). Methods of
    torture documented in the past include beating, whipping, electric
    shock, and rape.
        There were numerous credible reports that police assaulted persons
    detained in Irian Jaya after violent clashes in Wamena in October,
    Merauke in November, and Jayapura in December. In the Jayapura case,
    police detained and beat, often severely, over 100 persons following an
    attack on a police station, including 19 persons between the ages of 7
    and 18. Two Papuan students died of injuries inflicted by the police,
    and a third student was shot and killed (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        On March 7, in an isolated area of North Aceh's Matangkuli
    subdistrict, a group of armed men in army fatigues raped 4 women and
    sexually molested 12 others; they also beat severely 6 men and robbed
    their families; no persons had been charged by year's end. The trial
    for the rape of Sumiati, an Acehnese woman allegedly raped by a TNI
    soldier, did not begin by year's end; Sumiati's rape case is one of
    five human rights trials that the special commission was scheduled to
    hear (see Section 1.a.). No charges were brought in the August 1999
    rape of nine Acehnese women in Kecamatan Tangse Selatan, Pidie
    district, for which TNI soldiers allegedly were responsible.
        There are allegations that prointegration East Timorese militias in
    West Timor are holding East Timorese women as ``sex slaves'' (see
    Section 5). In November 33 pregnant East Timorese women returned to
    East Timor and claimed that the TNI had abducted them and forced them
    to serve as their sex slaves in West Timor. No one was held accountable
    for the numerous acts of rape and sexual abuse that TNIsupported
    militia groups perpetrated against displaced East Timorese women in
    1999.
        On June 17, a mob of approximately 65 East Timorese IDP's assaulted
    UNHCR staff, including UNHCR West Timor Director Craig Sanders, at the
    Noelbaki camp near Kupang. One demonstrator smashed the windshield of
    the vehicle in which Sanders was riding with a machete. No UNHCR staff
    members were injured. Although the security forces were present, they
    did not intervene to prevent the violence. The army apprehended nine
    suspects and handed them over to the police, who promptly released them
    without taking any action.
        In January the Minister of State for Women's Empowerment said that
    the Government would follow up on the recommendations of the joint
    factfinding team (TGPF) that investigated the May 1998 civil unrest
    that struck Jakarta and other cities. The team's report, issued in
    November 1998, found evidence that some elements of the army may have
    been involved in provoking the violence, which included attacks against
    Sino-Indonesian women, and urged further investigation of the at least
    85 instances of violence against women that the team verified. However,
    no further investigations have taken place (see Section 5).
        There were instances in which security forces responded with
    brutality to peaceful demonstrations, although they usually allowed
    peaceful demonstrations to proceed without resorting to force. In
    January police wounded 13 persons, some with gunshots, when they
    forcibly dispersed persons protesting inadequate compensation for land
    acquired for a resort on Bintan Island near Singapore. In at least six
    instances in Irian Jaya during the year, police attempted to break up
    peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan independence
    flag, and when Papuans resisted, police responded with excessive force,
    killing and injuring demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.a., 2.b., and
    5).
        Security forces often responded forcefully when demonstrators
    wielded canes, threw stones or Molotov cocktails, or tried to break
    through police lines. Such responses occurred on several occasions
    during the year when demonstrators sought to approach former President
    Soeharto's residence to protest the Government's failure to bring him
    to justice for his actions while in office.
        KONTRAS reported that during the first 11 months of the year, the
    police were responsible for 872 serious human rights violations
    nationwide, the bulk of them in Aceh province. Police violations
    included 26 instances of forced disappearance, 140 extrajudicial
    killings, 408 cases of torture or inhumane treatment, and 298 arbitrary
    detentions. According to KONTRAS, joint police and military operations
    were responsible for an additional 64 violations, and the armed forces
    themselves were responsible for 21 violations.
        Police entered and caused property damage to the building housing
    the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Jakarta Legal Aid
    Society (LBH) on two occasions in which they pursued demonstrators who
    sought refuge in the LBH building. Police broke windows and damaged
    cars with rocks, nightsticks, and bullets during the incidents.
        In May a group of approximately 55 East Timorese persons ransacked
    the Jakarta office of the NGO People's Solidarity with East Timor
    (Solidamor), injuring two Solidamor staff members, one of whom required
    hospitalization. The attackers smashed office equipment, smeared blood
    on the porch, and stole approximately $2,400 (Rp. 22.8 million) in cash
    from the office. Police detained four of the attackers for 24 hours,
    but no attackers were charged.
        On July 1, a group of East Timorese IDP's vandalized several West
    Timorese schools approximately 12 miles outside Kupang, near Oesau.
    They reportedly were unhappy with the low school grades their children
    had received. Later the same day a group of East Timorese militia
    members wearing camouflage and ninja masks, armed with grenades and
    possibly automatic weapons, burned 16 buildings that housed over 40
    West Timorese families in Oesau. Local residents believe that the
    attackers were former soldiers from East Timorese territorial infantry
    battalions 744 and 745.
        On August 22, East Timorese militias beat and severely wounded two
    UNHCR staff members at the Naen camp near Kefamenanu, West Timor. The
    UNHCR staff had been invited to the camp to distribute shelter supplies
    when a machete-wielding man attacked them and a mob stoned them.
        A series of bombings occurred in Jakarta, Medan, and other cities
    during the year (see Section 1.a.). Targets included churches in Medan
    (see Section 5), the Attorney General's Office in Jakarta, the
    Philippines Ambassador's residence, the Malaysian Embassy, a bus near
    the building where former President Soeharto's corruption trial was
    held, the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the office of KONTRAS (see Section
    4), the Jakarta Governor's residence, and a Jakarta hotel. An
    apparently coordinated series of bombings at or near churches in 9
    cities on the night of December 24 killed 18 persons and wounded
    numerous others (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 5). Except for the case
    of the Stock Exchange bombing, no suspects were apprehended by year's
    end.
        In June the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) attacked and vandalized
    KOMNASHAM's office to protest the Commission's findings following an
    investigation of the 1984 Tanjung Priok killings (see Sections 1.a. and
    4). FPI members, who alleged that ``immoral'' activities were occurring
    within the establishments, openly ransacked restaurants and nightclubs
    in several neighborhoods of Jakarta, injuring patrons of the
    establishments in the process. No FPI members were investigated or
    charged, despite the fact that criminal trespass and vandalism are
    violations of the Criminal Code. Several Islamic groups threatened
    Western persons and conducted ``sweeping'' operations at hotels and
    other public venues in Solo, Central Java, in late October and early
    November to drive such persons out of the city. Police questioned
    members of Islamic groups about these threatening activities, but no
    further action was taken against the perpetrators.
        Prison conditions are harsh, with mistreatment and extortion of
    inmates by guards and violence among prisoners common. The incidence of
    mistreatment drops sharply once a prisoner is transferred from police
    or military custody into the civilian prison system or into the custody
    of the Attorney General. Credible sources report that criminal
    prisoners in some facilities are beaten routinely and systematically as
    punishment for infractions of prison rules and to extract information
    about other prisoners. Punishments have included the use of electric-
    shock batons and the stapling of the ears, nose, and lips. In June a
    dispute between prisoners led to rioting by hundreds of inmates at the
    Bulak Kapal Prison east of Jakarta. Prison guards shot and wounded five
    inmates, and prisoners stabbed two guards during the incident. Prison
    authorities acknowledged that overcrowding was a factor in the riot
    (the prison was built for 300 inmates but held 531 persons at the
    time). In July police questioned three prison guards at Jakarta-area
    prisons who were suspected of drug trafficking in the prisons. Former
    inmates at Jakarta's Cipinang Prison told the press in November that
    drug use among prisoners is common, and that inmates can obtain drugs,
    better treatment, and better conditions by bribing guards.
        The Government generally does not permit routine prison visits by
    human rights monitors, although some visits occasionally are permitted.
        The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to
    visit identified prisoners and detainees of concern during the year
    (see Section 4).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Criminal Procedures
    Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it
    lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms, and authorities routinely
    violate it. The code specifies that prisoners have the right to notify
    their families promptly and that warrants must be produced during an
    arrest except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is
    caught in the act of committing a crime. The law authorizes
    investigators to issue warrants to assist in their investigations or if
    sufficient evidence exists that a crime has been committed. However,
    authorities sometimes made arrests without warrants.
        The law presumes that defendants are innocent and permits bail.
    They or their families also may challenge the legality of their arrest
    and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for compensation if
    wrongfully detained. However, it virtually is impossible for detainees
    to invoke this procedure, or to receive compensation after being
    released without charge. In both military and civilian courts, appeals
    based on claims of improper arrest and detention rarely, if ever, are
    accepted. The Criminal Procedures Code also contains specific limits on
    periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must
    approve extensions, usually after 60 days.
        The authorities routinely approve extensions of periods of
    detention. In areas where active guerrilla movements exist, such as
    Aceh and Irian Jaya, there are many instances of persons being detained
    without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. Bail rarely is
    granted. The authorities frequently prevent access to defense counsel
    while suspects are being investigated and limit or prevent access to
    legal assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. Special
    laws on corruption, economic crimes, and narcotics are no under the
    Criminal Code.
        In March President Wahid abolished the Agency for Coordination of
    Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security (BAKORSTANAS),
    which had operated outside the legal code and had wide discretion to
    detain and interrogate persons who were perceived as threats to
    national security.
        Security forces frequently detained participants suspected of
    inciting demonstrations, although most were released after questioning
    (see Section 2.b.). In November police in East Kalimantan arrested
    Wuaya Kawilarang, a regional coordinator for the Indonesian Prosperity
    Trade Union (SBSI), for investigation of charges that he incited
    workers at a large oil and gas operation to violence. He remained in
    detention at year's end (see Section 6.b.).
        There are no reliable data on the number of arbitrary arrests or
    detentions without trial, particularly in Aceh and Irian Jaya, but
    there is ample evidence that arbitrary arrests and detention without
    trial are employed systematically in Aceh.
        During the year several Acehnese were detained pending trial on
    political charges. Police arrested Muhammad Nazar, the chairman of the
    Information Center for a Referendum in Aceh (SIRA), on November 20 on
    charges of inciting hatred (see Sections 1.a. and 4). He remained in
    detention at year's end.
        Police detained numerous persons in Irian Jaya after violent
    clashes in Wamena in October, Merauke in November, and Jayapura in
    December (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5). In March the regional police
    command for Irian Jaya investigated criminal charges against 16 leading
    members of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security
    of the state and public order, based on claims that they had organized
    a gathering of Papuan community leaders in February and a peaceful
    Papuan independence flag-raising on December 1, 1999. The investigation
    against some of the 16 persons later was dropped; however, in November
    police arrested the chairman, secretary general, and three other Papuan
    Presidium Council members on the same charges (see Sections 2.a. and
    5). On December 1, police arrested seven persons during a demonstration
    in front of a foreign embassy to draw attention to human rights
    violations in West Papua (Irian Jaya) and to press for an international
    dialog to resolve the Papuan issue. Four of the detainees remained in
    police custody at year's end. On December 15, police detained the
    director of the Institute of Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua
    (ELS-HAM Papua) for 22 hours (see Section 4). In mid-December, 17
    Papuan activists went on trial in Wamena on charges of endangering
    state security by promoting separatism. The trial was continuing at
    year's end.
        Several foreign tourists have been subject to arbitrary arrest and
    detention while traveling in Irian Jaya. In most cases, travelers who
    take photographs are accused of being journalists without proper
    journalist visas and are detained and deported. In one case, a person
    was held without formal charges for 2 weeks before being deported;
    although no formal charges were filed and he never was served with a
    deportation order, highranking government officials publicly alleged of
    espionage at the time of his deportation, although they later retracted
    these accusations. In December police arrested a foreign journalist who
    did not have the proper visa (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    independence of the judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary is
    subordinated to the executive and the military. Pursuant to a 1999 law,
    a gradual transfer of administrative and financial control over the
    judiciary from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court is taking
    place over a period of 5 years. However, judges currently are civil
    servants employed by the executive branch, which controls their
    assignments, pay, and promotion. Low salaries encourage widespread
    corruption, and judges are subject to considerable pressure from
    governmental authorities, who often exert influence over the outcome of
    numerous cases.
        A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and
    administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The right of
    appeal from a district court to a high court to the Supreme Court
    exists in all four systems. The Supreme Court does not consider factual
    aspects of a case, only the lower courts' application of the law. The
    Supreme Court theoretically is an equal branch in relation to the
    executive and legislative branches, but it does not have the right of
    judicial review over laws passed by Parliament.
        A panel of judges conducts trials at the district court level,
    which consists of posing questions, hearing evidence, deciding guilt or
    innocence, and assessing punishment. Initial judgments rarely are
    reversed in the appeals process, although sentences can be increased or
    reduced. Both the defense and the prosecution may appeal cases.
        In November the DPR enacted a law establishing a permanent human
    rights court. The law, mandated by the 1999 Human Rights Law (Law 39/
    99), creates four new district courts to adjudicate gross violations of
    human rights. The law requires that each of the five-member human
    rights courts include three human rights judges appointed to 5-year
    terms by the President upon nomination by the Supreme Court. Although
    cases are appealed to the standing High Court and Supreme Court, the
    law requires that those courts include three human rights judges on an
    ad hoc basis on the five-member panel when hearing human rights cases.
    The law provides for internationally-recognized definitions of
    genocide, crimes against humanity, and command responsibility as core
    elements of gross human rights violations. However, it does not include
    war crimes as defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions as a gross
    violation. The law strengthens the powers of the Attorney General, who
    is the sole investigating and prosecuting authority in cases of gross
    human rights violations, and who is empowered to appoint ad hoc
    investigators and prosecutors. The law also empowers the Attorney
    General (as well as the courts) to detain suspects or defendants for
    multiple fixed periods in cases of gross human rights violations.
    However, the law requires the extension of any detention of alleged
    violations to be approved by the human rights court. For gross human
    rights violations that occurred before the enactment of the law, the
    law allows the President, with the recommendation of the DPR, to create
    an ad hoc bench within one of the new human rights courts to hear cases
    associated with a particular offense.
        Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce
    witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which
    distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to
    court; in such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. State
    prosecutors are reluctant to use existing legal powers to plea bargain
    with defendants or witnesses, or to grant witnesses immunity from
    prosecution. As a result, witnesses generally are unwilling to testify
    against the authorities. The courts commonly allow forced confessions
    and limit the presentation of defense evidence. Defendants do not have
    the right to remain silent and can be compelled to testify against
    themselves.
        The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an
    attorney from the time of arrest, but not during the prearrest
    investigation period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons
    summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right
    to legal assistance even if information developed during testimony
    subsequently becomes the basis of an investigation of the witness. The
    law requires counsel to be appointed in capital punishment cases and
    those involving a prison sentence of 15 years or more. In cases
    involving potential sentences of 5 years or more, an attorney must be
    appointed if the defendant is indigent and requests counsel. In theory
    indigent defendants may obtain private legal assistance, such as that
    provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation. However, in practice
    defendants often are persuaded not to hire an attorney, or access to an
    attorney of their choice is impeded.
        In many cases, procedural protections, including those against
    confessions coerced by the security forces or police, are inadequate to
    ensure a fair trial. Corruption is a common feature of the legal
    system, and the payment of bribes can influence prosecution,
    conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases.
        Despite the beginning of the transfer of administrative and
    financial control over the judiciary from the Department of Justice to
    the Supreme Court, there were few signs of judicial independence. The
    Courts continued to be used to take action against, or deny legal
    remedy to, political activists and government critics.
        During the year, victims of human rights violations sought for the
    first time to use the courts to obtain redress. In July the People's
    Democratic Party sued former President Soeharto and 13 other former
    senior officials for damages associated with the imprisonment of party
    leaders, the banning of the party, and the destruction of its property.
    The suit still was being heard at year's end. In addition four members
    of the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) sued the police in Jakarta for
    forcibly removing them from a peaceful demonstration and hunger strike
    that they were conducting inside the Parliament building in Jakarta.
    After being forcibly removed, they later were kidnaped and threatened
    by unknown persons (see Sections 1.b. and 4). A district court
    dismissed the suit, but an appeal to the High Court still is pending.
        President Wahid released all remaining political prisoners from the
    Soeharto and Habibie eras in December 1999. No new persons were
    convicted on political charges during the year.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--Judicial warrants for searches are required except for
    cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption;
    however, security agencies regularly made forced or surreptitious
    entries into homes and offices. In August a person claiming to be a
    representative of an international organization entered the Jakarta
    office of an international NGO involved in media issues and took a
    laptop computer but no other valuables. Unknown persons also
    surreptitiously entered the residence of the NGO's director and made
    intimidating telephone calls to staff members. The circumstances of
    these incidents suggested that members of the security forces were
    involved. Security forces also commonly engage in surveillance of
    persons and residences and selective monitoring of local and
    international telephone calls without legal restraint.
        The Government and DPR discussed implementing the Law on Overcoming
    Dangerous Situations, which the DPR approved in September 1999 but
    which the President never signed. The law would allow the military to
    conduct search and seizure operations for weapons during a declared
    state of emergency without a warrant but would require that such
    searches be reported to the courts within 24 hours. In November the
    Cabinet decided to further postpone implementation of the law to permit
    additional discussion and possible amendments.
        Government security officials monitor the movements and activities
    of former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its front
    organizations, especially persons whom the Government believes were
    involved in the abortive 1965 coup. These persons and their relatives
    sometimes are subjected to surveillance, required check-ins, periodic
    indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside their city of
    residence. They also are required to have official permission to change
    their place of residence. The requirement that ``E.T.'' (``Ex-Tapol''
    or political prisoner) be stamped on the identification cards of these
    prisoners was ended officially in 1995, although in practice it
    continued to be used in many cases. At least some individuals who had
    E.T. stamped on their identity cards were able to have the stamp
    removed. This stamp has been used by the Government to monitor the
    activities of these persons, allowing the Government and prospective
    employers to identify alleged former PKI members, thereby subjecting
    them to official and unofficial discrimination. Even when the stamp has
    been removed, these former political prisoners continue to face
    discrimination and restrictions on employment.
        Under the government-sponsored transmigration program, large
    numbers of persons were moved voluntarily from overpopulated areas to
    more isolated and less developed areas (this program began during the
    Dutch colonial period and has been carried out more or less
    continuously since then). It also was used to resettle local
    populations within East Timor and Irian Jaya. However, the Government
    reduced its support after the economic downturn that began in mid-1997,
    and in December Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Alhilal Hamdi
    announced that since August the Government had stopped sending
    transmigrants between islands. He said that henceforth the Government
    only would support transmigration within the same province. Human
    rights monitors state that in general the transmigration program
    violates the rights of indigenous people and deceives some
    transmigrants into leaving their home villages without any means of
    return. Human rights activists also have claimed that a number of those
    resettled are persons who have been forced off lands that are coveted
    by developers who have collusive arrangements with the Government or
    security forces. Conditions at some relocation sites are life-
    threatening, with inadequate measures to protect the transmigrant
    population against diseases endemic to the sites. In June 68
    transmigrant families left their camp in Bonggo subdistrict, Irian
    Jaya, because of poor living and agricultural conditions, disease, and
    inadequate support from the Government. They told the Legal Aid Society
    in Jayapura, where they took refuge, that 39 families at the site were
    suffering from severe malnutrition, and that lack of health care
    facilities contributed to a high disease and mortality rate. Police
    detained several of the transmigrants briefly, calling them
    ``provocateurs'' when meeting with NGO's and the press to discuss their
    situation. Transmigrants and migrants outside of the Government's
    transmigration program received direct and indirect government support
    in the form of developmental assistance programs and contracts with the
    TNI or local government officials. This practice, particularly in Irian
    Jaya and parts of Kalimantan, led to resentment among indigenous
    populations, whose members believed that their rights were infringed
    upon and that they were being discriminated against in the disbursement
    of development funds to other newly arrived groups that they perceived
    to be their economic rivals (see Section 5).
        The Government used its authority, and at times intimidation, to
    appropriate land for development projects, particularly in areas
    claimed by indigenous people, and often without fair compensation (see
    Section 5).
        The Government prohibits the import of Chinese-language
    publications (see Sections 2.a. and 5).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The 1945 Constitution contains a
    general provision for freedom of expression that was strengthened by
    the MPR's amendment of the Constitution in August, and the 1999 law on
    human rights provides for substantive protection of press freedom (see
    Section 1.d.); however, journalists continued to suffer intimidation
    and assaults. The Alliance of Indonesian Journalists (AJI) revealed
    that police had assaulted journalists 105 times during the first 10
    months of year.
        In 1999 the Parliament enacted a press law that provides for
    freedom of the press, prohibits censorship, and prescribes penalties
    for anyone who violates these rights. However, the law requires the
    press to report events and opinions ``with respect to religious and
    moral norms of the public,'' and to adhere to the presumption of
    innocence. Press companies that violate this provision can be fined up
    to $55,000 (Rp. 500 million). Advertising that degrades the dignity of
    certain religions or creates disorder among diverse religions, is
    contrary to public morality, refers to addictive substances or displays
    cigarettes, is prohibited. The law established a Press Council to
    create and enforce a code of journalistic ethics. The Council consists
    of journalists nominated by journalist associations, representatives of
    press companies, and public figures nominated by journalists and press
    companies. President Wahid signed a decree in May that appointed
    members of the Council. The 1999 law replaced previous press laws that
    were viewed as being more restrictive of press freedom.
        On December 3, in Irian Jaya, police arrested a Swiss reporter,
    Oswald Iten, for photographing a clash between separatists and security
    forces in the province and detained him on suspicion of violating the
    country's immigration laws by reporting without a press visa (see
    Section 1.d.). Police threatened Iten with a 5year jail term. They
    released him on December 14.
        In September the Film Censor Board (LSF) issued a circular to
    television stations stating that recorded talk shows that discuss
    social and political topics must be reviewed by the Board before they
    are broadcast. Media figures and legal experts said that the circular
    had no legal standing because it conflicted with the 1999 Press Law,
    which forbids censorship of the press. Some observers called for the
    abolition of the LSF.
        During the year, the media often exercised press freedom with
    detailed and aggressive reporting on corruption, political protests,
    national unrest, the trials of former President Soeharto and members of
    his family, public debate between President Wahid and the DPR, and the
    DPR and MPR sessions. Domestic press and television coverage of West
    and East Timor highlighted the statements of government officials and
    prointegration leaders, and uncritically conveyed the government
    (prointegration) view on most issues, in many cases actively seeking to
    discredit UNTAET. However, the media did provide extensive coverage of
    the findings of the Attorney General in East Timor (see Sections 1.a,
    1.c., 4, and 5). UNTAET's versions of events and reports of abuses by
    the militias appeared occasionally.
        Since the abolition of the Department of Information in 1999, most
    editors believe that the Government no longer requires a license to
    publish a newspaper or magazine because there no longer is a
    controlling body to receive reports.
        The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12
    regional stations. Private commercial television networks, most with
    ownership by, or management ties to, former President Soeharto's
    family, continued to flourish. All are required to broadcast
    government-produced news, but they also broadcast news and public
    affairs programming independently. Television networks increased their
    news coverage during the year, including extensive coverage of the DPR
    and MPR sessions.
        Over 1,000 private radio broadcasting companies exist in addition
    to the Government's national radio network. They all were required to
    belong to the government-sponsored Association of Private Radio
    Stations in order to receive broadcast licenses. The Government radio
    station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), produces the program
    ``National News.'' Private radio stations and 53 regional government
    network affiliates relay the news programming throughout the country.
        Regulations issued by the Government in 1998 reduced the number of
    compulsory government RRI programming broadcasts from 14 to 4 per day.
    While private radio stations in the provinces generally adhered to the
    Government's requirement, many private radio stations in larger urban
    areas broadcast the RRI program only once per day. The regulations
    allowed stations to produce their own news programs, and many have done
    so. Candid live coverage of demonstrations and other breaking stories
    increased markedly during the year. Moreover, ``talk radio'' call-in
    programs regularly address timely political and socioeconomic issues.
        Foreign television and radio broadcasts are readily accessible.
    Satellite dishes and cable television networks have proliferated
    throughout the country, and there is unrestricted access to the
    Internet. The Government made no effort to restrict access to satellite
    programming and has proclaimed an ``open skies'' policy. Foreign
    periodicals circulate widely without censorship. The authorities have
    delayed distribution of publications by a day or more, although this is
    rare. The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language
    publications and music (see Sections 1.f. and 5). There are seven
    locally-published Chinese language newspapers. In November a new
    independent television station, Metro TV, began broadcasting 2 hours of
    news in Mandarin per day. The program was the first Chinese-language
    television broadcast in the country since 1965.
        The Government regulates access to the country by visiting and
    resident foreign correspondents, particularly to areas of unrest. It
    occasionally reminds the latter of its authority to deny requests for
    visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign
    journalists to travel to Aceh and Irian Jaya. In February in West
    Timor, police detained three Portuguese television journalists for 3
    days and harassed them before forcing them to leave the country. In
    June the Government lifted the ban on travel to the country of a
    foreignbased NGO representative and an international newsmagazine
    reporter.
        The Government requires a permit for the import of foreign
    publications and videotapes, which must be reviewed by government
    censors. Significant amounts of material bypass customs and censorship
    procedures.
        Most books by the prominent novelist and former political prisoner
    Pramoedya Ananta Toer remain banned, although some are in circulation.
    According to a study published in the newspaper Kompas, from 1969 to
    1998 the Government banned 199 books, approximately 50 percent for
    religious reasons, 30 percent for political reasons, and 20 percent for
    ideological reasons. However, bookshops--especially ``alternative
    bookstores'' at university campuses and cultural centers--openly sell
    many new and newly reprinted titles. The Government banned no
    additional books during the year; however, protests from Islamic groups
    prompted a publisher to remove books by the religious philosopher Anand
    Krishna from bookstores. Media and human rights NGO's criticized the
    calls to withdraw the books from circulation as a violation of freedom
    of expression.
        The 1999 law on crimes against the State (see Section 1.d.)
    prohibits persons from disseminating or developing the teachings of
    communism, or from seeking to eliminate or replace the state ideology
    of Pancasila in a way that causes harm to persons or property.
        In January police and TNI troops began rounding up youths in South
    Aceh and ordering them to take down proreferendum banners and to clean
    referendum graffiti off of streets and walls. The investigation against
    some of the 16 persons later was dropped. In Aceh security forces shot
    and wounded a youth in August who was suspected of displaying the Free
    Aceh Movement (GAM) flag on the country's independence day (August 17).
    In early December a police officer in Aceh announced a ban on the
    flying of the Free Aceh Movement flag, and said that the police would
    deal harshly with those who defied the ban.
        During the first 6 months of the year, the Government generally
    tolerated the flying of Papuan independence flags in Irian Jaya. In
    March the police investigated charges against 16 persons for crimes
    partly related to their support of a peaceful Papuan independence flag-
    raising on December 1, 1999. However, in late September new National
    Police Chief Suryo Bimantoro ordered all Papuan independence flags to
    be taken down, and police efforts to remove flags forcibly sparked
    violent clashes with Papuans (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 5). In
    November the regional police command for Irian Jaya revived criminal
    charges against five Papuan Presidium Council leaders for crimes
    against the security of the State and public order, based in part on
    evidence that they had organized a peaceful Papuan independence flag-
    raising.
        The law provides for academic freedom, and there are no significant
    constraints in practice on the activities of scholars. Political
    activity, open discussions, and blunt criticism of the Government at
    universities continued to flourish during the year.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government places
    significant controls on the exercise of this right. The Government
    promulgated regulations in 1995 that eliminated the permit requirements
    for some types of public meetings; however, a requirement to notify the
    police remained in effect for most other meetings, and in practice many
    public meetings were dispersed forcibly, sometimes with lethal force
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The vast majority of public gatherings
    and demonstrations, which have proliferated rapidly since President
    Soeharto's resignation in 1998, occurred without any official
    interference.
        The 1998 law on freedom of expression requires that demonstrators
    notify the police 3 days in advance and appoint someone accountable for
    every 100 demonstrators. The law restricts demonstrations near specific
    sites. Nevertheless, frequent demonstrations are held in Jakarta and
    around the country with or without official permission. The Government
    previously had invoked the law to detain and try demonstrators in
    Jakarta and elsewhere; however, no such trials occurred during the
    year. Participants in several demonstrations were killed and suffered
    injuries when security forces seeking to disperse crowds shot, beat,
    and kicked demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In November
    police and army troops who were attempting to prevent Acehnese from
    attending a rally in Banda Aceh calling for a referendum on Acehnese
    independence killed over 20 persons (see Section 1.a.). Police also
    broke up several peaceful demonstrations in Irian Jaya. In at least six
    instances, police broke up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans
    raised the Papuan independence flag and, after demonstrators resisted,
    killed and injured many demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.a.,
    and 5).
        In January police wounded 13 persons while forcibly dispersing
    persons who were protesting inadequate compensation for land that the
    Government appropriated for a resort on Bintan Island (see Section
    1.c.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
    Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right.
    The 1985 Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the adherence of all
    organizations, including recognized religions and associations, to the
    official ideology of Pancasila. This provision, which limits political
    activity, is widely perceived to be designed to inhibit the activities
    of groups that seek to engage in democratic political competition, to
    make Indonesia an Islamic state, to revive communism, or to reintroduce
    partisan ideological division into the country. It empowers the
    Government to disband any organization that it believes to be acting
    against Pancasila, and it requires prior government approval before any
    organization can accept funds from foreign donors.
        The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a
    regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more
    persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites.
    However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union
    meetings (see Section 6.a.).
        The 1999 Law on Crimes Against the State (see Sections 1.d. and
    2.a.) prohibits the formation of organizations that ``are known to or
    are properly suspected'' of embracing the teachings of Communism/
    Marxism/Leninism ``in all its forms and manifestations.''
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
    freedom for members of five out of six officially-recognized religions
    and belief in one supreme God, and the Government generally respects
    these provisions; however, there are some restrictions on certain types
    of religious activity, including unrecognized religions.
        Although the population is over 85 percent Muslim, the practice and
    teachings of five out of six officially-recognized religions generally
    are respected, and the Government actively promotes mutual tolerance
    and harmony among them. The law states that the Government ``embraces''
    Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and
    Confucianism. Presidential Decree 6/2000, promulgated in January,
    repealed the ban on the practice of Chinese religion (Confucianism),
    its beliefs, and its customs (Presidential Decree 14/1967). After the
    January passage of Presidential Decree 6/2000, Confucianists were
    permitted to celebrate publicly the Chinese New Year for the first time
    in over 30 years. A Ministry of Interior Circular (No. 477/805), issued
    in late March, permits Confucianism to be listed as a religion on
    marriage license applications, allowing Confucian marriages to be
    recognized and registered officially in the country. However, not all
    communities have implemented the new guidelines. While the law formally
    ``embraces'' only these religions, it explicitly states that other
    religions, including Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism are
    not forbidden. The Government permits the practice of the mystical,
    traditional beliefs of ``Aliran Kepercayaan.'' Some religious
    minorities, including the Baha'i and Rosicrucians, were given the
    freedom to organize in May when Presidential Decree 69/2000 revoked
    Presidential Decree 264/1962, which had restricted their activities.
    The MPR adopted a Human Rights Charter in 1998 that provides citizens
    the freedom to practice their religion without specifying any
    particular religion.
        A 1976 decision by the Attorney General, reinforced by a separate
    decision by the same office in 1978, banned Jehovah's Witnesses from
    practicing their faith. Open practice of the faith remains banned, and
    members report that they continue to experience difficulty registering
    marriages, enrolling children in school, and in other civil matters.
    Jehovah's Witnesses claim that Trinitarian Christians instigated the
    Government bans. Mainstream Christian leaders have influenced
    government policy to be biased against more conservative Christians.
        Members of the Bahai faith did not report problems during the year.
    The Government in some provinces has banned the messianic Islamic sect
    Darul Arqam; the Government also bans the AlMa'Unah school in some
    provinces. The Government closely monitors Islamic groups considered to
    be deviating from orthodox tenets, and in the past has dissolved some
    groups. Historically, the Government has tried to control Muslim groups
    whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic beliefs because of
    pressure by nongovernmental leaders of mainstream or conservative/
    traditional Muslim groups as well as the Government's concern for
    national unity. A proposal to implement Islamic law failed to gain the
    MPR approval in August. President Wahid voiced strong opposition to the
    proposal, arguing that its implementation would threaten national
    unity.
        The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all
    religious and secular organizations. Because the first tenet of
    Pancasila is belief in one supreme God, atheism is forbidden. Although
    individuals are not compelled to practice any particular faith, all
    citizens must be classified as members of one of the officially
    recognized religions. As this choice must be noted on official
    documents, such as the identification card, failure to identify a
    religion can make it impossible to obtain such documents. The
    Government strongly opposes Muslim groups that advocate establishing an
    Islamic state or acknowledging only Islamic law.
        President Wahid has continued to emphasize harmony, tolerance, and
    mutual respect among different religious communities. Other high-level
    officials continued to make public statements and emphasized by example
    the importance of respect for religious diversity. However, some lower
    level officials continued to show reluctance to facilitate and protect
    the rights of religious minorities.
        Religious violence and the lack of an effective government response
    to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations
    that officials were complicit in some of the incidents or, at a
    minimum, allowed them to occur with impunity. There were numerous
    instances of attacks on churches, mosques, temples, and other religious
    facilities during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 5). The most
    widespread interreligious violence occurred in the Moluccas, where well
    over 100 houses of worship were damaged or destroyed and thousands of
    persons were killed as Christians and Muslims engaged in mutually-
    destructive violence. On Keswuii and Teor Islands in Maluku, hundreds
    of Christians converted to Islam in November and December to save their
    lives (see Section 5). The Government continued to be reluctant to
    intervene in mob attacks on houses of worship and proved ineffective in
    controlling the violence in North Maluku and Maluku provinces; however,
    governmental efforts to respond to communal violence in the provinces
    of Sulawesi generally were more effective (see Section 5).
        In North Maluku and Maluku provinces, Christian sources alleged
    that elements of the security forces were biased against them. For
    example, predominantly Muslim units dispatched from Java and Sulawesi
    allegedly sided with Muslim vigilantes and used excessive force against
    Christians. In other instances, security forces appeared to be biased
    against Muslims. Muslims on Ambon claimed that members of the
    predominantly Christian police force sided with their coreligionists.
    However, there was no evidence to suggest that the security forces, as
    an institution, supported either. Some individuals and some units
    occasionally sided with their coreligionists, but their actions
    appeared to be random and contrary to orders. Some military troops were
    detained and interrogated for allegedly openly siding with militia in
    at least one episode on Haruku; however, there were no reports that
    such perpetrators ever were punished. Several hundred police officers
    have themselves been attacked and some even killed because of their
    religion; hundreds of police members and their families, and numerous
    other government officials, are among the country's IDP's.
        The Government formed a special interagency team to investigate the
    December 24 bombings on Christian churches, and an NGO has formed a
    joint fact-finding team with the Government to investigate the
    Christmas Eve church bombings (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
        According to many Christian officials, the anti-Christian sentiment
    behind the violence in the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and elsewhere is not
    new, but the impunity associated with such acts is. They claim that
    such impunity has contributed significantly to the attacks that have
    occurred since Soeharto resigned in May 1998. The Government did not
    investigate fully most cases of attacks on religious facilities that
    occurred during riots, and in other cases, did not investigate such
    incidents at all.
        A 1969 regulation provides that before a house of worship may be
    built, consent must be obtained from local residents living near the
    site, and a license must be obtained from the regional office of the
    Department of Religion. Some Christians claim that this regulation is
    used to prevent them from building churches and rebuilding damaged
    religious facilities. Despite these alleged problems, the building of
    churches continued.
        The law allows conversion between faiths, and such conversions do
    occur. Independent observers note that it has become increasingly
    difficult to obtain official recognition for interfaith marriages
    between Muslims and non-Muslims. Persons who are not members of one of
    the five accepted religions also have difficulty in obtaining official
    recognition of their marriages.
        The Government views proselytizing by recognized religions in areas
    heavily dominated by another recognized religion as potentially
    disruptive and discourages it. Foreign missionary activities are
    relatively unimpeded, although in Irian Jaya, and occasionally
    elsewhere, missionaries have experienced difficulties and delays in
    renewing residence permits. In addition visas allowing the entrance of
    new foreign clergy are difficult to obtain. Laws and decrees from the
    1970's limit the number of years that foreign missionaries may spend in
    the country; some extensions were granted in remote areas like Irian
    Jaya. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of
    the Social Organizations Law.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits the Government to bar
    persons from either entering or departing the country, and the
    Government continued to restrict freedom of movement to a limited
    extent. In 1999, according to Department of Justice information quoted
    in the press, the Government maintained a list of 3,665 foreigners who
    are barred from entering the country, and 417 citizens who are
    prohibited from leaving the country. Five prominent Papuan leaders who
    were barred from leaving the country in August 1999 (see Section 5)
    subsequently were allowed to travel abroad; however, some of them only
    were able to travel after foreign governments made high-level
    representations on their behalf.
        The Government also restricts movement by citizens and foreigners
    into and within parts of the country. The 1999 Law on Overcoming
    Dangerous Situations (see Section 1.f.) also would allow the military
    to limit land, air, or sea traffic, to prohibit migration into and out
    of areas, to order relocation of persons outside areas, and to order
    house arrest in a declared state of emergency. However, this law has
    not been signed by the President and still is under discussion in the
    DPR.
        The Government must approve the assignment of staff members of
    foreign institutions that implement technical cooperation programs,
    including NGO's, before they are allowed to enter the country. Foreign
    consultants and foreign assistance staff, particularly those working in
    sensitive parts of the country such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and the
    Moluccas, must be cleared by the Intelligence Coordination Agency
    (BAKIN) before their assignments can be approved by the State
    Secretariat (see Section 4).
        On June 23, President Wahid announced a ban on all travel to Maluku
    and North Maluku provinces; however, the ban was not enforced
    effectively. On June 26, the President declared a state of civil
    emergency for both provinces. The emergency decree, originally in place
    for 90 days, was extended indefinitely (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 2.c.,
    and 5).
        The Government requires that individuals obtain permits to work in
    certain areas, primarily to limit further population movement to
    crowded cities. Special permits are required to visit certain parts of
    Irian Jaya. Although former political prisoners associated with the
    abortive 1965 coup no longer are officially required to carry the stamp
    ``E.T.'' on their identity cards, in many cases, the stamps have not
    been eliminated in practice (see Section 1.f.). Among other
    restrictions, some former prisoners still are required to obtain
    permission from security and intelligence authorities to move.
        Following the August 30, 1999 consultation vote in East Timor,
    there was credible evidence that in a planned and orchestrated
    operation, the security forces forcibly removed or compelled to flee a
    substantial percentage of the 250,000 East Timorese who departed the
    territory at that time. Over 170,000 of these IDP's have returned to
    East Timor, but intimidation by East Timorese prointegration militia
    forces in the camps in West Timor continued to prevent many others from
    returning (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        All international assistance to the IDP's in West Timor was
    suspended following the September 6 attack on UNHCR personnel (see
    Sections 1.a. and 4). The Government's failure to disarm and disband
    the militias created security conditions unfavorable for the resumption
    of international assistance. There is evidence that TNI elements have
    supported the militias with supplies and training, although that
    support apparently declined toward year's end. The Government's
    disarmament campaign after the September 6 killings of 3 UNHCR workers
    in Atambua resulted in the surrender of 103 standard issue weapons. The
    TNI did not confiscate any weapons by force. Estimates of the number of
    standard issue weapons that were not surrendered range from 100 to over
    1,000. Only toward year's end did the Government begin to take steps to
    promote the voluntary and safe return of IDP's; for example, by
    agreeing to settle pension claims for some IDP's who requested
    repatriation, or resettlement in Indonesia. There is no evidence that
    the Government is returning forcibly or resettling East Timorese IDP's.
        Sectarian violence in the Moluccas has displaced nearly 500,000
    persons, which account for about half of the over 1 million IDP's in
    the country. North Maluku officials estimate that there are 197,000
    IDP's escaping the conflict in North Maluku, and the Diocese of Ambon
    estimates that conflicts in Maluku province have generated about
    289,000 IDP's.
        According to the Government's IDP statistics released in August,
    there were over 20,000 IDP's in North Sulawesi, most of them Christians
    from North Maluku and Maluku provinces. However, Christian sources
    claim that there are 60,000 to 100,000 Christian IDP's in North
    Sulawesi. Since the majority of these IDP's are housed in private
    residences instead of camps, the Government had not included them in
    its official data. By midNovember, several hundred Muslim IDP's had
    returned to their homes in North Maluku. The North Maluku provincial
    government announced in mid-November that it would return about 178,000
    IDP's currently in Ternate, Tidore, and parts of Halmahera to their
    places of origin before the Ramadan holiday began in the third week of
    December. However, very few returned by year's end due to Christian
    resistance in the areas where Muslim IDP's were going to return, and
    Muslim fears that they would have no means of making a livelihood and
    that Christians would attack them. The IDP's are almost all Muslims.
    Christian IDP leaders in North Sulawesi and Jakarta claim that the
    Government has not actively encouraged Christian IDP's, most of whom
    are in North Sulawesi, to return to their homes in Ternate and Tidore
    and other parts of North Maluku. As a result, there are no Christians
    in Ternate and Tidore, except for a few wealthy Sino-Indonesian
    Christians who were encouraged to return and international humanitarian
    aid workers.
        There were over 58,000 IDP's in Central Sulawesi, most of whom were
    Muslims from Poso, Central Sulawesi. Estimates suggest that 20 percent
    of the Muslim IDP's from Poso may have returned to the area. Most
    Muslim IDP's remain in camps or other temporary settlements. There were
    about 17,000 IDP's in South Sulawesi and over 100,000 in Southeast
    Sulawesi, most of whom were Muslims from East Timor and the Moluccas.
        The Government generally has encouraged and assisted foreign and
    domestic humanitarian aid to the Moluccas and Sulawesi (see Section 4).
    However, on occasion both Muslim and Christian groups have accused some
    foreign donors of partiality. The Government has not been particularly
    effective or helpful in promoting the voluntary and safe return or
    resettlement of the IDP's in these areas.
        In East Java, police forcibly evicted to other areas persons
    rumored to be practitioners of magic (see Section 1.a.).
        An estimated 50,000 Madurese who fled their homes during
    interethnic violence in 1999 remained in IDP camps in West Kalimantan
    and Madura (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        Throughout the year, tens of thousands of rural Acehnese
    temporarily fled their villages and became IDP's. In some cases, IDP's
    were fleeing security forces that were patrolling the area or otherwise
    intimidating them (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In other cases, armed
    separatists terrorized or coerced villagers into becoming IDP's, in
    part to create international attention and sympathy.
        Unrest in Irian Jaya caused numerous persons to leave their homes
    in Wamena and other areas. Many were migrants from other parts of the
    country and are believed to have returned to their original provinces.
    Several thousand Papuan refugees reside in camps in Papua New Guinea.
        While the law lacks provisions for dealing with refugees/asylees in
    accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
    Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government cooperates with the
    UNHCR, which maintains a regional office in Jakarta. There are a number
    of Iraqis in the country, some of whom requested and were granted
    refugee status by the UNHCR. In past years, the Government offered
    first asylum to over 125,000 Indochinese boat persons. The Galang
    Island camp was closed in 1996, and by the end of 1999 the last
    remaining asylum seekers had been repatriated or permitted to settle
    permanently in the country. The Government has not formulated a policy
    regarding asylum seekers, but in practice it has respected the
    principle of not returning asylum seekers to the countries from which
    they fled.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        In 1999 citizens for the first time successfully changed their
    government through an open, transparent democratic process, following
    decades of authoritarian rule. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
    is constitutionally the highest authority of the State. It meets every
    5 years in a ``General Session'' to elect the President and Vice
    President in separate secret ballots and to establish the ``Broad
    Guidelines of State Policy'' (GBHN), which is intended to serve as a
    policy plan for the Government. The MPR met in August in the first of
    its newly instituted ``Annual Sessions,'' to consider constitutional
    amendments and policy recommendations. The 695-member MPR consists of
    the 500 Members of the House of Representatives (DPR), 130 regional
    representatives, who are elected by provincial legislatures, and 65
    appointed representatives from functional and societal groups. The June
    7, 1999 general election, in which 48 political parties participated,
    was monitored by domestic and international observers and was widely
    considered open, fair, and free. In October 1999, the newly installed
    MPR chose Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati Soekarnoputri as
    Vice President in a transparent process, which was broadcast live on
    national television. The next round of general and presidential/vice
    presidential elections is scheduled for in 2004.
        The military's significant historical sociopolitical role is to be
    phased out gradually. Although the police and military formally were
    separated in July by presidential decree (reinforced in August by an
    MPR decree), the two institutions continue jointly to hold 38 unelected
    seats in the DPR and 10 percent of the seats in provincial and district
    parliaments, in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote.
    In addition to these appointed legislative positions, active-duty
    military and police officers also may run for election to government
    office but, in a significant departure from past practice, are expected
    to retire (except those appointed to legislative bodies) after they are
    elected. Retired officers occupy important positions at all levels of
    government and often retain strong ties to their former institutions.
    The military and police have agreed to relinquish their appointed seats
    in the DPR and regional legislatures by 2004, but an MPR decree passed
    in August allows them to retain seats in the MPR until ``not later than
    2009. In an apparent effort to blunt demands for an immediate end to
    their legislative positions, military and police legislators generally
    have sought to limit their involvement in matters deemed not to affect
    their core interests.
        The legislative branch, which had no independence during the
    Soeharto era, has moved forcefully to establish its independence from
    the executive branch. A number of constitutional changes, MPR decrees,
    and legal changes have enhanced legislative branch authorities, raising
    some concerns that the balance of power may have shifted too far from
    the executive branch. The legislative branch has demonstrated its
    independence through the DPR's aggressive pursuit of its government
    oversight function, as well as the MPR's success in August in forcing
    President Wahid to cede more authority over daily government management
    to Vice President Megawati because of perceived inefficiency and
    inconsistency in the Wahid Administration's implementation of policy.
    During the year, the DPR exercised its right to initiate legislation
    occasionally, mainly due to cumbersome procedures and a lack of
    expertise; however, it exercised considerable influence over the final
    content of bills introduced by the Government.
        The MPR is empowered to amend the Constitution and issue decrees,
    functions that it undertook in the first of its newly instituted
    ``Annual Sessions'' held in August. A key demand of the reform movement
    was an overhaul of the 1945 Constitution, which was perceived to have
    fostered the development of past authoritarian regimes. In the first
    amendment of the Constitution, the 1999 MPR passed curbs on executive
    power including a limit of two 5-year terms for the president and vice
    president. At the same time, the MPR empowered an ad hoc working
    committee to consider further amendments and to draft MPR decrees. This
    effort resulted in the passage of the second amendment to the
    Constitution during the ``Annual Session'' in August. Due to limited
    time and unresolved issues, the MPR did not produce the sweeping
    restructuring of state institutions many had hoped for, leaving in
    place inconsistencies resulting from the Constitution's blending of
    presidential and parliamentary characteristics. However, the second
    amendment did include many important changes, including provisions for
    protections of human rights modeled closely on the U.N. Universal
    Declaration of Human Rights, regional autonomy, and further separation
    of powers. The working committee is continuing deliberations on further
    constitutional reforms to be considered during the 2001 and 2002 annual
    MPR sessions.
        The remaining 92 percent of national and 90 percent of regional
    parliamentary seats that are not occupied by members of the military
    and police are filled through elections held every 5 years. All adult
    citizens, except active-duty members of the armed forces, persons in
    prison convicted of crimes punishable by over 5-years' incarceration,
    persons suffering from mental disorders, and persons deprived of voting
    rights by an irrevocable verdict of a court of justice, are eligible to
    vote. Members of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) may not
    run for office.
        International and domestic monitoring groups and the major
    political parties accepted the June 1999 parliamentary election as
    generally free and fair, notwithstanding many technical problems and
    irregularities, particularly in remote areas. The numerous technical
    problems, due to inadequate preparations and ambiguities in the
    regulations, included inadequate supplies of ballots and reporting
    forms, poor training of poll workers, confusion over procedures, and
    insufficient funds to pay poll workers. There were numerous, and in
    some cases credible, allegations of vote buying and scattered
    allegations of voter intimidation, particularly in rural areas. In some
    cases, alleged violations were referred to judicial authorities for
    legal action; however, in most cases, political parties reached
    informal solutions among themselves.
        The actions of some small party representatives on the General
    Election Commission (KPU) contributed to a significant delay in
    validating election results and led to a considerable loss of public
    faith in the impartiality and integrity of the KPU. In June the DPR
    amended the 1999 election laws to establish a new and more independent
    KPU, which currently is being formed through a transparent process that
    encourages public involvement. Some observers are concerned that the
    new KPU secretariat will remain administratively dependent upon the
    Ministry of Home Affairs.
        While there are no legal restrictions on the role of women in
    politics, they are underrepresented in government. The Vice President,
    Megawati Soekarnoputri, is a woman. Following the August Cabinet
    reshuffle, 2 of 26 ministers are women. However, there now are fewer
    women in the DPR and in the MPR than during the Soeharto era. Women
    represent less than 9 percent of DPR members, a decrease from 13
    percent during former President Soeharto's last term. Nonetheless, many
    women activists argue that the quality of female politicians has
    improved. Female Members of Parliament announced in mid-October the
    formation of a non-partisan women's caucus. Surveys have shown that
    while more than one-third of civil servants are women, less than 6
    percent are in positions of authority (see Section 5).

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Although still subjected to monitoring by and interference from the
    authorities, domestic human rights organizations were extremely active
    in advocating that the Government improve its human rights performance.
    They pressured the Government to investigate human rights abuses, acted
    as defense counsel in political trials, sought to offer assistance--and
    in some cases protection--to victims and witnesses of human rights
    abuses, and urged improvements in government policies and legislation.
        At times security force members killed, abused, and detained human
    rights activists and humanitarian workers, most frequently in areas
    with active insurgencies. For example, in early August Acehnese
    foreign-resident NGO activist Jafar Siddiq Hamzah disappeared in Medan.
    His body, which showed signs of torture, was found in early September
    (see Section 1.a.). On August 27, Brimob officers tortured three staff
    members of the international humanitarian organization Oxfam (see
    Section 1.c.). On September 5, police detained and beat a volunteer for
    Save Emergency for Aceh, a humanitarian organization (see Section
    1.c.). During the year, police arrested three leaders of a group that
    advocates for a referendum on Aceh's political status, beat them while
    in custody, and later detained the group's chairman (see Sections 1.c.
    and 1.d.). On December 6, three Acehnese humanitarian workers who were
    assisting torture victims were killed near Lhokseumawe (see Section
    1.a.).
        On December 15, police summoned the director of Papua's best-known
    human rights organization, the Institute for Human Rights Study and
    Advocacy in Papua (ELS-HAM), for questioning; police released him on
    December 16 after nearly 22 hours of questioning. The director was
    ordered to the station after ELSHAM held a press conference in which it
    accused the police of the extrajudicial killing of three persons on
    December 7 (see Section 1.a.).
        Four members of an NGO based in Bandung, West Java, that advocates
    on behalf of dispossessed farmers, claim that they were kidnaped on
    August 14 (see Sections 1.e. and 4). The office of the Committee for
    Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), based in Jakarta,
    was attacked during a series of bombings in various areas of the
    country (see Section 1.c.).
        Intimidation, threats, and violence toward NGO's escalated in West
    Timor as the year progressed, greatly hindering humanitarian
    operations. Intimidation by militias and outright attacks prevented
    numerous humanitarian organizations that sought to assist refugees in
    West Timor during the post-consultation period from delivering
    assistance, particularly around the IDP camps (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.).
        The Government must approve the assignment of staff members of
    foreign institutions that implement technical cooperation programs,
    including NGO's, before they are allowed to enter the country (see
    Sections 2.c. and 2.d.); some NGO's allege that the Government has used
    this requirement to restrict their activities, especially in sensitive
    areas.
        The Government generally considered outside investigations or
    foreign-based criticism of alleged human rights violations to be
    interference in the country's internal affairs. In addition security
    forces and intelligence agencies tended to viewed foreign NGO's and
    international organizations with suspicion and distrust, particularly
    those operating in conflict areas. Nevertheless, the Government
    generally encouraged and assisted foreign and domestic humanitarian aid
    to the Moluccas and Sulawesi, and to other areas. However, on occasion
    both Muslim and Christian groups accused some foreign donors of
    partiality (see Section 2.d.).
        The ICRC generally was allowed access to identified detainees by
    civilian and military officials at the central government level. In
    Aceh the ICRC maintained an office in Lhokseumawe and was allowed to
    visit known prisoners and others detained by security forces. The ICRC
    conducted humanitarian operations in Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku,
    North Maluku, and East and West Timor; however, the Government
    sometimes hindered ICRC's access to these areas and was slow in
    accrediting additional staff members.
        The government-appointed National Human Rights Commission
    (KOMNASHAM), in its 7th year of operation, continued actively to
    examine reported human rights violations and to demonstrate
    independence from the Government. During the year, Islamic and East
    Timorese groups physically attacked KOMNASHAM's Jakarta office because
    of controversy over some of the Commission's findings (see Section
    1.c.). Lacking enforcement powers, KOMNASHAM attempts to work within
    the system, sending teams to inquire into alleged human rights
    problems. It employs persuasion, publicity, and moral authority to
    highlight abuses, to recommend legal and regulatory changes, and to
    encourage corrective action. The Government appointed KOMNASHAM's
    original chairman, who then appointed the other 24 initial Commission
    members.
        The 1999 Human Rights Law (Law 39/1999) gave KOMNASHAM statutory
    authority and increased its membership to 35 members. Future members
    are required to serve 5-year terms and to be nominated by KOMNASHAM,
    confirmed by the Parliament, and approved by the President. The law
    gives KOMNASHAM subpoena powers and provides that disputes settled by
    written agreement through the Commission's mediation are enforceable in
    court. However, the law does not give KOMNASHAM the power to enforce
    its recommendations or to recommend government action. By year's end,
    the Commission had not appointed the new members authorized by the 1999
    law.
        In 1999 KOMNASHAM supported the work of the KPP-HAM and forwarded
    its findings to the Attorney General in late January. In February
    KOMNASHAM formed a commission to investigate the 1984 killing of Muslim
    demonstrators at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    In August KOMNASHAM opened an office in Ambon, Maluku province.
    Commission members conducted an investigation into human rights
    violations in Irian Jaya in October following an outbreak of violence
    in Wamena (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
        U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited the
    country from November 21 to 24. She addressed a KOMNASHAM conference on
    transitional justice and expressed U.N. support for training for
    prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers involved in Indonesia's East
    Timor tribunal, requested by the Attorney General. However, the
    Government did not agree to extend a memorandum of understanding on the
    status of UNHCHR's planned assistance to, and field office in,
    Indonesia. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
    program officer assigned to Jakarta completed his assignment in May and
    had not been replaced. At year's end, the office remained open and
    staffed with locals.
        In response to the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC's) adoption of
    Resolution 1319 after the September 6 killing of three UNHCR workers in
    West Timor (see Section 1.a.), the Government and various political
    leaders initially indicated that they would oppose the actions that the
    UNSC mission called for in the resolution. However, the Government
    later invited the UNSC mission to observe the situation in West Timor
    and to assess the Government's compliance with the resolution. The UNSC
    mission, consisting of permanent representatives from five member
    countries, visited West Timor and Jakarta from November 14 to 17.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution does not forbid explicitly discrimination based on
    gender, race, disability, language, or social status; however, it
    stipulates equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native
    and naturalized. An amendment to the Constitution adopted during the
    year introduces the possibility of affirmative action to achieve fair
    and equal treatment; however, some activists believe that because the
    amendment does not mention men or women specifically, it will not
    adequately protect women.
        The Guidelines of State Policy (legal statutes adopted by the MPR)
    explicitly state that women have the same rights, obligations, and
    opportunities as men. However, guidelines adopted in the past 20 years
    also state that women's participation in the development process must
    not conflict with their role in improving family welfare and the
    education of the younger generation. Marriage law designates that the
    man as the head of the family. The Constitution grants citizens the
    right to practice their individual religions and beliefs; however, the
    Government only recognizes six religions and imposes some restrictions
    on other religious activity, although some of these restrictions were
    lifted during the year (see Section 2.c.).
        Women.--Violence against women remains poorly documented. Women's
    rights NGO's estimate that only 15 percent of domestic violence
    incidents are reported. According to a legal aid organization involved
    in domestic violence issues, about 11 percent of rural women suffer
    some form of domestic violence. Experts on the subject agree that the
    number of incidents has risen since the onset of the country's economic
    downturn starting in mid-1997, which has been aggravated by social
    changes associated with rapid urbanization. The Government has
    acknowledged the problem of domestic violence in society; however,
    violence against women, especially when it occurs within the home,
    largely is perceived by the public to be a private matter and not
    within the purview of the Government.
        Rape is a punishable offense, and perpetrators have been arrested
    and sentenced for rape and attempted rape, but reliable statistics are
    unavailable. Women's rights activists believe that rape is
    underreported seriously due to the social stigma attached to victims.
    Some legal experts report that unless a woman immediately seeks an
    examination at a hospital that produces physical evidence of rape, she
    will be unable to bring charges successfully. A witness also is
    required in order to prosecute for rape, and only in rare cases can a
    witness be produced, according to legal experts. Some women reportedly
    fail to report rape to police because the police do not take their
    allegations seriously. The maximum prison sentence for rape is 12
    years, but observers claim that sentences usually are much shorter. Mob
    violence against accused rapists frequently is reported. An August 1999
    conference of forensic experts recommended the adoption of standard
    procedures be adopted for examining and taking statements from rape
    victims, in an effort to improve the successfulness of rape
    prosecutions. However, by year's end, no rape investigation standards
    were in place, nor were uniform procedures followed.
        Rape by a husband of a wife is not considered a crime under the
    law. Cultural norms dictate that problems between a husband and wife
    are private matters, and violence against women in the home rarely is
    reported. While police could bring assault charges against a husband
    for beating his wife, due to social attitudes they are unlikely to do
    so.
        The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination
    for trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
    prostitution and sometimes for forced labor (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.). It is widely alleged that TNIbacked militias raped numerous
    women during the 1999 violence in East Timor and kept many as sex
    slaves (see Section 1.c.). Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East
    Timorese independence leader Xanana Gusmao, reported to the
    international press in November that 33 pregnant East Timorese women
    returned to East Timor and claimed they had been abducted and forced to
    serve as sex slaves for the TNI in West Timor.
        Female domestic servants also are vulnerable to exploitation and
    abuse. In some cases, unscrupulous recruitment agencies have promised
    women employment as domestic servants overseas and then held them
    against their will for extended periods until jobs are found for them.
    Women working abroad as domestic servants often risk various forms of
    abuse, exploitation, and other cruel treatment. The Government has
    taken some steps to assist its citizens working abroad, but advocates
    charge that much more needs to be done (see Section 6.f.).
        Harassment is not a crime under the law, only ``indecent
    behavior.'' However, sexual harassment charges may damage a civil
    service career. The law reportedly only covers physical abuse, and
    requires two witnesses. Female job applicants and workers have
    complained of being victimized sexually by supervisors. Many groups
    criticized the 1997 Manpower Law for failing to address sexual
    harassment and violence against women in the workplace and for
    providing inadequate protection in areas of employment where women
    regularly suffer abuse, such as overseas employment and household
    service. As of year's end, the Manpower Law was undergoing extensive
    revisions.
        In 1998 the Government, in consultation with women's NGO's,
    established a National Commission on Violence against Women. The
    Commission's mandate is to improve and coordinate government and NGO
    efforts to combat violence against women and to provide assistance to
    victims. During the year, the Commission reported that violence against
    women resulting from the economic crisis continued to rise.
        In November 1999, a group of government officials and NGO
    representatives signed a declaration calling for the development of a
    joint strategy to end violence against women. The group drafted a 2001-
    2004 national action plan, which incorporates a ``zero tolerance''
    strategy of violence against women, creates safety mechanisms to
    protect women against violence, and establishes new legislation to
    penalize perpetrators of such violence. In February the Government
    signed the Protocol of the U.N. Convention for the Elimination of All
    Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). However, national
    legislation and implementing regulations to support the action plan
    have not yet been enacted. The Government provided technical support,
    but not funding, to establish and administer a women's crisis center in
    a leading public hospital in Jakarta. Foreign governments have funded
    some of these crisis center projects.
        The Government provides some counseling for abused women, and
    several private organizations assist women. Many of these organizations
    focus on reuniting the family rather than on providing protection to
    women. Many women rely on the extended family system for assistance in
    cases of domestic violence. Both public and private initiatives to
    assist female victims of violence were undertaken during the year.
    There are a small but growing number of women's crisis centers,
    including a drop-in center founded in Jakarta by the government-
    sponsored National Women's Organization (KOWANI) in 1996 and a crisis
    center for women in Yogyakarta that is administered by an NGO. Women's
    Partner (Mitra Perempuan), a crisis center for women that opened in
    1997, runs a 24-hour hotline and a temporary shelter for abused women.
    The hotline receives several calls each day from battered women. The
    National Commission reports a general increase in the number of female
    victims of violence seeking assistance from crisis centers, attributing
    the increase both to a growing awareness of services and to an increase
    in the incidence of violence against women. Some public hospitals in
    Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya have integrated crisis centers that
    assist and protect abused women and children. These centers are co-
    sponsored by the Government and the Women's Crisis Center (Pusat Krisis
    Perempuan). One of these centers, located in a Jakarta hospital,
    reported 30 cases of rape, 31 cases of domestic violence, and 37 cases
    of child abuse during a 4-month period during the year. Jakarta,
    Surabaya, and Yogyakarta police have opened ``women's desks'' in their
    precincts to assist rape and domestic violence victims and to
    investigate their cases.
        Under the Constitution, women are equal to and have the same
    rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice,
    women face some legal discrimination. Marriage law defines the man as
    the head of the family. Marriage law for Muslims, based on Shari'a
    (Islamic law), allows men to have up to four wives if the husband is
    able to provide equally for each of them. Court permission and consent
    of the first wife is required, but reportedly most women cannot refuse.
    Cabinet officials and military personnel customarily have been
    forbidden from taking second wives, although reportedly a few ministers
    in President Wahid's Cabinet have second wives. During the year,
    Government Regulation 10/1983, which stipulates that a male civil
    servant must receive the permission of his superior to take a second
    wife, came under considerable attack and renewed scrutiny. The Minister
    of State for Women's Empowerment, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, proposed
    that the regulation be revoked or modified, arguing that supervisors
    often use the regulation as leverage over subordinates and that the
    regulation is an embarrassment to women. She also asserted that many
    men avoid the regulation by establishing illicit relationships. Other
    women, including First Lady Sinta Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, opposed
    revoking the regulation, arguing that it protects women. Some women's
    groups urged the Government to ban polygyny altogether.
        In divorce cases, women often bear a heavier evidentiary burden
    than men in obtaining a divorce, especially in the Islamicbased family
    court system. Divorced women rarely receive alimony, and there is no
    enforcement of alimony payment. According to Shari'a, a divorced wife
    is entitled to only 3 months of alimony, and even alimony for this
    brief period is not always granted.
        The 1958 Citizenship Law states that children's citizenship is
    based only on the citizenship of the father. Children of citizen
    mothers and foreign fathers are considered foreigners and require visas
    to remain in the country until the age of 18, at which time they may
    apply for citizenship. They are prohibited from attending public
    schools and must attend private, international schools, which usually
    are more expensive. There were considerable efforts during the year to
    change the law, but the restrictions remained.
        Foreign women married to citizens also face difficulties. Their
    children are citizens and thus are not allowed to attend international
    schools unless they get special permission through the Ministry of
    Education. Such women usually are taxed as foreign heads of households,
    but they do not have property, business, or inheritance rights. There
    was much discussion about problems with the citizenship law, and NGO's
    and the Government appeared to agree that the law needed revision.
    However, by year's end, the Government had not taken any action to
    remedy these problems.
        Although some women (such as Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri)
    have a high degree of economic and social freedom and occupy important
    positions in both the public and private sectors, most women do not
    have such status and they constitute a disproportionately high
    percentage of the lower end of the socioeconomic and political scale
    (see Section 3). Surveys have shown that while more than one-third of
    civil servants are women, less than 6 percent are in positions of
    authority.
        Female workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages than
    men. Many female factory workers are hired as day laborers instead of
    as full-time permanent employees, and companies are not required to
    provide benefits, such as maternity leave, to day laborers. Women's
    rights activists report that there is a growing trend in manufacturing
    to hire women to do work in their homes for less than the minimum wage
    (see Section 6.e.).
        Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher
    than those for men. Women often are not given the extra benefits and
    salary that men are given when they are the heads of households, and in
    many cases do not receive employment benefits for their family members,
    such as medical insurance and income tax deductions. Income disparity
    between men and women diminishes significantly with higher educational
    achievement. Some women's activists believe that a growing number of
    professional women are advancing in a variety of fields, especially in
    the legal profession. However, no statistics are available to support
    this assertion. According to a study conducted during the year, only 20
    percent of top managers and affluent consumers in Jakarta are female.
        Law Number 21/1999 requires that the Government to formulate
    national policies to forbid and eliminate discrimination (including by
    gender) in the workplace. However, there were no implementing
    regulations in effect and discrimination continued in practice.
        Despite laws that provide women with a 3-month maternity leave, the
    Government acknowledged that pregnant women often are dismissed or
    replaced while on leave from their jobs. Some companies require women
    to sign statements that they do not intend to become pregnant. Labor
    laws mandate 2 days of menstrual leave per month for women, although
    this leave is not allowed in all cases.
        Women disproportionately suffer from illiteracy, poor health, and
    inadequate nutrition. The illiteracy rate among women is 17 percent,
    compared to 10 percent among men; the national illiteracy rate average
    for citizens over 15 years old is 12 percent, according to a UNICEF
    report. The Government is making efforts to reduce the high maternal
    mortality rate, which is 425 per 100,000 live births, according to
    official figures, and as high as 650 per 100,000, according to
    estimates from other sources. In Irian Jaya, the maternal mortality
    rates is 1,025 deaths per 100,000 and in Maluku 796 deaths per 100,000
    live births.
        During the year, hundreds of thousands of women and children were
    displaced by violent conflicts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North
    Maluku provinces, West Kalimantan, Irian Jaya (Papua), and Aceh (see
    Section 2.d.). In addition to those directly victimized by violence, a
    substantial number of those displaced suffered from nutritional
    deficiencies and other health problems.
        Women's advocacy groups remained active throughout the year.
    Numerous NGO-organized conferences and rallies concerned with women's
    issues were held, as well as some that were organized by academic
    institutions and government ministries.
        Children.--The Government has expressed a commitment to children's
    rights, education, and welfare, but insufficient resources prevent the
    implementation of such a commitment. With the abolition of the Ministry
    of Social Affairs in late 1999, there is no ministry that specifically
    addresses children's issues. In its draft budget for 2001, the
    Government proposed to allocate 4.7 percent of government expenditures
    to education, or 0.74 percent of the country's GDP. A 1979 law on
    children's welfare defines the responsibility of the State and parents
    to nurture and protect children. However, implementing regulations
    never have been promulgated, and the law's provisions on protection of
    children have yet to go into effect.
        The Government allocates only 8 percent of its human resources
    development budget to health care. Low-cost medical care is available,
    although access and availability sometimes are sporadic, especially in
    rural areas. The results of a Ministry of Health study conducted during
    the year on public health services concluded that over 40 percent of
    the country's public health centers had no attending physicians.
    According to a UNICEF report issued during the year, the percentage of
    women and children without access to health care ranged from 20 to 50
    percent, with the most limited access in rural areas and poorer
    provinces. Moreover, government spending on health care also has
    dropped in real terms due to the economic downturn. In some cases,
    women and children unable to pay medical bills have been detained by
    hospitals that maintained their own ``debtors' prisons.'' There also
    were reports of hospitals refusing treatment to children suffering from
    malnutrition, due to insufficient resources.
        According to a credible report from a local NGO, infant mortality
    rates nearly have doubled as a result of the economic downturn,
    increasing from 55 per 1,000 in 1995 to 100 per 1,000 deaths in 1998.
    According to UNICEF'S report, 7 percent of the country's children die
    before they are 5 years old and 5 percent die before their first
    birthdays. Almost 50 percent of children grow up in unhealthy or unsafe
    environments. The overall use of health care facilities by children has
    dropped significantly since the economic downturn began in mid-1997.
        Throughout the year, UNICEF continued to warn of a ``lost
    generation'' of youth as a result of the economic crisis. UNICEF
    estimates that 8 million preschool-age children were undernourished,
    which threatens the development of brain function. According to U.N.
    data, as many as 30 to 50 percent of the country's children under the
    age of 5 may be suffering from some form of malnutrition, an increase
    from 9.8 percent in 1995. One university source estimated that 20
    million children were malnourished, an increase from 8 million in 1997.
    Specifically, researchers have begun to document an increase in
    children suffering from deficiencies of Vitamin A, iron, and protein.
    According to a UNICEF study released during the year, many of the
    country's children suffer from ``hidden hunger'' or malnourishment.
        On an anecdotal level, the media frequently reported on instances
    of children dying from malnutrition or lack of treatment for the
    condition. Such reports were most frequent in Java, but also were
    reported in Sumatra and other regions.
        The Government estimates that by 2001, the country will have 40
    million school-aged children, about 19 percent of the country's
    population. A 1994 law increased mandatory education requirements from
    6 to 9 years (6 years of elementary education and 3 years of junior
    high education). However, the law has not been implemented fully, due
    to a lack of government enforcement, inadequate school facilities, and
    insufficient financial resources of families to support children's
    school fees. Official and unofficial fees for public education,
    including payments for registration, books, meals, transport, and
    uniforms have become prohibitively high for many families.
        According to ILO and UNICEF statistics, about 6.1 to 6.4 million
    children between the ages of 7 and 15 have dropped out of school since
    the economy plummeted in 1997. An academic source estimated in November
    that the current number of students not enrolled in school for that age
    group even was higher, about 6.8 million. According to Ministry of
    Education data, 11.7 million children through the age of 18 were not
    attending school in 1999, while the ILO estimated that 11.9 million
    school-aged children did not attend school during the year.
        Schooling for children in areas of conflict was disrupted severely
    during the year. Hundreds of thousands of children in Maluku and North
    Maluku provinces and in Central Sulawesi fled their homes to escape
    violence (see Section 2.d.), interrupting their education and exposing
    them to malnutrition, disease, and other hazards. NGO's and religious
    groups in Maluku province estimate that thousands of Muslim and
    Christian children between the ages of 12 and 17 have become child
    soldiers (see Sections 6.d.). Younger children between the ages of 7
    and 12 provide support services to the militias. Some of the children
    involved in fighting reportedly are from outside the province. In one
    incident, a 16-year-old from Java, who had joined the Laskar Jihad
    militia, was killed while fighting on Saparua Island, Maluku province.
        According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working
    children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic
    downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million in mid-1999.
    Children's advocates and labor analysts agree that the number of
    working children has increased significantly due to the downturn, but
    contend that the number of working children was higher than the
    Government's current estimate even before the downturn, and has
    increased significantly since 1997 (see Section 6.d.). The ILO
    estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked during the year,
    and World Vision, an international NGO, estimated that there were 6.5
    million children working in the country.
        According to a recent study, there are about 170,000 street
    children in 12 urban areas. Of these, about 20 percent are girls. At
    least 60 percent of the street children polled were not enrolled in
    school. There were about 13,000 street children in Jakarta. Medan,
    Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar (Ujung Pandang), and Yogyakarta are other
    cities with substantial populations of street children. Of the 1,600
    street children living in Yogyakarta, about 25 percent are girls.
    Almost all of them were victims of sexual abuse or were engaged in
    prostitution. Another NGO survey suggests that there are at least
    100,000 street children and 6 million abandoned children in the
    country.
        Street children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch
    cars, and otherwise attempt to earn money. Many street children work
    under hazardous conditions as scavengers, garbage pickers, and on
    fishing platforms and fishing boats. According to credible sources,
    there are hundreds, perhaps over 1,000 children working in hazardous
    conditions on fishing platforms off the east coast of North Sumatra
    (see Section 6.c.). Many thousands of children work in factories and
    fields (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
        A number of local and international NGO's work with street
    children. NGO's have criticized the Government for making inadequate
    efforts to help street children and working children. The Government is
    working in cooperation with the U.N. Development Program, UNICEF, the
    ILO, and with NGO's to create programs for street children and child
    laborers. One project includes the establishment of ``open houses'' in
    targeted areas to provide vocational training and basic education to
    street children. Open houses for street children have been established
    in several provinces.
        Another approach to the problem of street children is the National
    Program for Discipline and Clean Cities Decree. Under this program,
    street children are removed physically from cities by bus. Usually,
    they are taken outside the city and left there. Sometimes they are
    taken to ``holding houses'' where they first are interrogated and later
    released. NGO's criticize this practice as ineffective and inhumane.
        Child prostitution (see Section 6.f.) and other sexual abuses
    occur, but firm data are lacking. Police continue to uncover syndicates
    involved in trafficking girls to work in brothels on various islands or
    in other countries (see Section 6.f.). According to one 1998 NGO study,
    there were 406 cases of child abuse that year, 900 to 1,200 cases of
    child rape, and 40,000 to 70,000 cases of other sexual abuse against
    children.
        A separate criminal justice system for juveniles does not exist.
    Ordinary courts handle juvenile crime, and juveniles often are
    imprisoned with adult offenders. A Juvenile Justice Law was passed by
    Parliament in 1996 and was signed by President Soeharto in 1997. It
    defines juveniles as children between the ages of 8 and 18 and
    establishes a special court system and criminal code to handle juvenile
    cases; however, it has not been implemented yet.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health, is practiced in some parts of the country. No
    national legislation exists on FGM. Customary (adat) law has allowed
    for symbolic female circumcision and small-cut (mild) incisions of the
    clitoris, which would fall under the World Health Organization's
    (WHO's) type IV classification of FGM (this category includes pricking,
    piercing or incising of the clitoris). According to reports, FGM
    practices appear to be increasingly symbolic in nature (for example, a
    pinprick or the cutting of a ceremonial root). More invasive FGM
    practices--removal of the clitoral prepuce, partial removal of the
    sensitive tip of the clitoris, and even total removal--reportedly occur
    in Madura, South Sulawesi, and parts of East Java. However, there are
    no epidemiological reports on the frequency of these practices. Since
    FGM is not regulated, and religious leaders have taken no formal
    position, the method used often is left to the discretion of the local
    traditional practitioner. FGM usually occurs within the first year
    after birth, often on the 40th day, although it is done in some areas
    up to the age of 10. It is performed either at a hospital or,
    especially in rural areas, by the local traditional practitioner.
        Both government officials and NGO leaders familiar with FGM issues
    believe invasive FGM practices are on the decline. The Government
    included FGM as a gender issue in its National Action Plan to End
    Violence against Women, published in late November. FGM heads the
    Action Plan's list of religious teachings requiring investigation and
    modification. The Government and NGO's are directing awareness
    campaigns towards Muslim religious leaders and those directly involved
    in performing female circumcisions (such as traditional birth
    attendants), and towards society at large, to bring about an end to
    invasive practices.
        People with Disabilities.--Precise statistics on the number of
    disabled persons in the country are not available. In 1999 the U.N.
    estimated that about 5.43 percent of the population (about 10 million
    persons) were disabled, while the Government estimated that 3 percent
    of the population (6 million persons) were disabled. Families often
    hide disabled family members to avoid social stigma or embarrassment.
    Several provinces have established rehabilitation centers for the
    disabled. Authorities reportedly take disabled persons off the streets
    and bring them to these centers for job training. Nevertheless, many
    disabled citizens beg for a living.
        The Constitution requires that the Government provide care for
    orphans and the disabled; however, it does not specify the definition
    of the term ``care'', and the provision of education to all mentally
    and physically disabled children never has been inferred from the
    requirement. Regulations require the Government to establish and
    regulate a national curriculum for special education by stipulating
    that the community should provide special education services to its
    children.
        According to a UNICEF report during the year, there are about 2
    million disabled children between the ages of 10 and 14. Law No. 4/1997
    on Disability and Government Regulation No. 72 on Special Education
    stipulate that every disabled child has the right to access to all
    levels and types of education and rehabilitative treatment as
    necessary. However, this does not occur in practice. NGO's are the
    primary providers of education for the disabled. There are 1,084
    schools for the disabled; 680 are private and 404 are government-
    operated. Of the government schools, 165 are ``integrated,'' serving
    both regular and special education students. In Jakarta there are 98
    schools for the disabled, 2 of which are government-operated and 96 of
    which are private. The Government also runs three national schools for
    the visually and hearing impaired, and mentally disabled. These schools
    accept children from throughout the country.
        The 1997 Disability Law was designed to provide access to
    education, employment, and assistance for the disabled. It requires
    companies employing over 100 persons to give 1 percent of their
    positions to the disabled. However, the disabled face considerable
    discrimination in employment, although some factories have made special
    efforts to hire disabled workers. The law mandates accessibility to
    public facilities for the disabled; however, virtually no buildings or
    public transportation provide such accessibility in mind.
        President Wahid, who is visually impaired, and First Lady Sinta
    Nuriyah Abdurrahman Wahid, who has limited mobility from an automobile
    accident, are advocating improved services and opportunities for
    persons with disabilities. In September President Wahid acknowledged
    that discrimination exists in the country's tourism industry and that
    disabled persons receive neither appropriate services nor the
    opportunity to travel.
        Indigenous People.--The Government considers the term ``indigenous
    people'' to be a misnomer, because it considers all citizens except
    ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes
    the existence of several ``isolated communities,'' and their right to
    participate fully in political and social life. The Government
    estimates that the number of persons in isolated communities is 1.5
    million. This includes, but is not limited to, groups such as the Dayak
    population in Kalimantan, some of whom live in remote forest areas,
    indigenous communities located throughout Irian Jaya, and economically
    disadvantaged families living as sea nomads on boats near Riau in
    eastern Sumatra and near Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in southern Sulawesi.
    Critics maintain that the Government's approach is paternalistic and
    designed more to integrate indigenous people into society than to
    protect their traditional ways of life. Human rights monitors criticize
    the Government's transmigration program for violating the rights of
    indigenous people (see Section 1.f.) and for encouraging exploitation
    of natural resources upon which indigenous people depend for their
    livelihood.
        Sixty percent of the country's population of over 200 million lives
    in Java, which represents only 7 percent of the country's territory.
    The government-sponsored transmigration program seeks to resettle
    persons from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas
    outside Java (see Section 1.f). The majority of migrants are
    spontaneous migrants who are not part of the official program.
        Critics of transmigration claim that it often threatens indigenous
    cultures and sparks social envy. Some critics claim that transmigration
    has been used as a political tool to inject nonindigenous persons into
    certain areas to ``Indonesianize'' these areas, in part to preclude
    secessionist movements. In some areas, such as in certain parts of
    Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Kalimantan, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, relations
    between transmigrants and indigenous people are hostile. NGO's also
    report tensions between transmigrated Javanese and indigenous
    populations in the Mentawai Islands off the west coast of Sumatra.
    Indigenous groups often complain that they receive less government
    support and funding than transmigrants, and transmigrants complain that
    in some cases they are moved to areas with undesirable land and
    inadequate infrastructure. Transmigrants sometimes are settled on land
    of disputed ownership.
        Acute tensions continued in West Kalimantan between the indigenous
    Dayak and ethnic Malay peoples and the settlers from Madura, an island
    off the eastern coast of Java. At least 11 persons died in clashes
    between Malays and Madurese in October (see Section 1.a.). The Madurese
    community in West Kalimantan developed around an earlier group of
    transmigrants, although the majority of Madurese in the area are
    spontaneous immigrants. DayakMadurese violence in the Sambas region
    north of Pontianak prompted tens of thousands of Madurese to flee in
    1997 and 1999; an estimated 50,000 remain in camps in West Kalimantan
    (see Section 2.d.).
        Land disputes are a major source of tension throughout the country,
    particularly in many sparsely populated resourcerich areas
    traditionally inhabited by indigenous people. The tension often is
    expressed along racial/ethnic lines because developers frequently are
    ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Land disputes represent the largest
    category of complaints submitted to the National Human Rights
    Commission and a significant portion of the cases brought to legal aid
    foundations and other assistance organizations. According to a law
    derived from colonial era practices, all subsurface mineral resources
    belong to the Government. The Basic Agrarian Law states that land
    rights cannot be ``in conflict with national and state interests,''
    which provides the Government with a broad legal basis for land
    seizures. When disputes cannot be settled, the Government has the
    authority to define fair compensation for land.
        However, in practice compensation for the land often is minimal or
    even nonexistent. Decisions regarding development projects, resource-
    use concessions, and other economic activities generally are carried
    out without the participation or informed consent of the affected
    communities. When indigenous people clash with private sector
    development projects, the developers almost always prevail. There are
    numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by the
    military, and often by hired ``thugs,'' to acquire land for development
    projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people. Such
    intimidation has been used in Jakarta, other parts of Java, North
    Sumatra, Aceh, and other areas. Some NGO's that seek to aid these
    communities are subjected to verbal attacks, raids, and other forms of
    intimidation by government security forces. Throughout 1999 and during
    the year, NGO's have been more vocal and effective in lobbying for
    indigenous people's rights. According to credible sources in West
    Sumatra, large tracts of land in the province have been confiscated
    over the past several years by commercial plantation developers who
    paid bribes to the local governor. In some cases, NGO's report that
    farmers were evicted from the land without compensation to allow for
    new palm oil plantations staffed by Javanese transmigrants. Competition
    for land and resources remains acute in Sumatra.
        NGO's assert that violations of the rights of indigenous people are
    frequent in the mining and logging areas, and that violations stem from
    the Government's denial of ownership by indigenous people of ancestral
    land, erosion of indigenous groups' traditional social structure, and
    forced takeover of land. These problems are most prevalent in Irian
    Jaya and Kalimantan. In Central Kalimantan, NGO's report that local
    residents have suffered as a result of discontinued projects to convert
    peat land into agricultural land for rice cultivation. Vast tracts of
    land have been designated as transmigration areas. Tens of thousands of
    indigenous people have been forced to cease their traditional farming
    and forest-based livelihoods; many become poorly paid laborers on new
    agricultural projects.
        In Southeast Sulawesi, the Moronene people have been struggling for
    more than 40 years to secure government recognition of their claim to
    ancestral lands in what is now Rawa Aopa Watumohai National Park. The
    Government insists, most recently on the basis of the 1999 Forestry
    Law, that the Moronene people must resettle on land outside the park.
    In 1997 and 1998, security personnel acting on orders from the
    provincial government destroyed houses and crops in an effort to force
    the Moronene off their lands, but they refused to leave. In September
    they reached agreement with the local government that they would be
    allowed to remain on their lands until a court decided the merits of
    their claim. However, from November 23 to 25, approximately 70 security
    personnel sought to evict the Moronene from the park. The security
    team, which consisted of local police, Brimob members, and forest
    police and officials, reportedly destroyed 23 homes in the 3 villages
    of Hukaea-Laeya, Lampopola, and Lanowulu. At year's end, the Moronene
    still were living in Hukaea-Laeya village, but they feared further
    destruction of their settlements since the Government has not changed
    its position that they must leave.
        Bonded labor has become a problem for some Dayaks in East
    Kalimantan (see Section 6.c.). According to the ILO, on at least one
    project, a logging company established a company store in a remote
    area, where workers had to purchase necessities at inflated prices.
    Since the workers could not afford the prices, they bought the goods
    using vouchers representing future wages, thereby, according to the
    ILO, ``turning once independent and relatively well-off farmers into
    impoverished bonded laborers trapped in an ever-mounting cycle of
    debt.''
        Tensions with indigenous people in Irian Jaya, who refer to
    themselves as Papuans or West Papuans, continued. Papuans complain of
    racism, religious bias, paternalism, and condescension as constant
    impediments to better relations with non-Papuans, including members of
    the Government, the military, and the non-Papuan business community. A
    large percentage of the population of Irian Jaya consists of migrants,
    who are economically and politically dominant. Most civil servants in
    local governments in Irian Jaya and other isolated areas continue to
    come primarily from other parts of the country, rather than from the
    local indigenous population. Tensions between Papuans and migrants
    increased during the year, particularly after Papuans killed 24
    migrants in Wamena on October 6 and 7 after security forces opened fire
    on Papuans who resisted efforts to take down Papuan independence flags
    (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). The attack caused an exodus of several
    thousand migrants from the Wamena area and from Irian Jaya (see Section
    2.d.). Papuans and migrants clashed again in Merauke in early November
    and December and at the Abepura market area in Jayapura November 11 to
    13, resulting in injuries on both sides and the burning or looting of
    migrant shops. Unknown attackers killed two police and a security guard
    in Abepura, Irian Jaya, on December 7, and two timber workers near the
    Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border on December 9. Police blamed both
    attacks on the Free Papua Organization (OPM) (see Section 1.a.).
        During the year Papuans asserted themselves politically to a
    greater extent than in the past. Beginning in late 1999, Papuan
    political figures and traditional tribal organizations began forming
    Papuan ``task forces'' (Satgas Papua). In February Papuan community and
    tribal leaders organized a ``great consultation'' of Papuan leaders to
    set an agenda for self-government and designate a Papuan Presidium
    Council to speak on behalf of Papuans. The consultation's closing
    statement called for the holding of a congress comprised of the entire
    Papuan community. The congress was held from May 29 through June 4 in
    Jayapura, and involved more than 2,000 delegates from each of Irian
    Jaya's districts, other parts of the country, and the Papuan community
    overseas. Delegates approved a resolution rejecting the 1969 ``Act of
    Free Choice,'' which confirmed Irian Jaya's incorporation into
    Indonesia; called on the central Government, along with the U.N. and
    the U.S. and Dutch governments, to review the process by which the
    territory became a part of Indonesia and to recognize Papua's
    sovereignty since 1961; and mandated the Papuan Presidium Council to
    strive for international recognition and report back to the congress on
    December 1 on progress toward these goals. Presidium Council leaders
    traveled throughout the province to publicize the results of the
    congress, regularly met with government officials in Jakarta, and
    journeyed to other countries to advance the Papuan cause. On December
    1, Presidium leaders led a peaceful commemoration of the 1961
    declaration of independence by Papuan community leaders, then under
    Dutch rule. Presidium vice chairman Tom Beanal recounted the
    Presidium's efforts since the Papuan Congress to start a dialog with
    Jakarta, and appealed for calm. The day was observed peacefully in most
    parts of Irian Jaya.
        The Government initially responded to Papuan initiatives by
    welcoming the call for dialog and offering special autonomy within the
    context of a united Indonesia. President Wahid met several times with
    Papuan leaders and visited Irian Jaya on December 31, 1999 and January
    1, 2000, when he announced that the name of the province would be
    changed to Papua; however, the Government never introduced legislation
    to change the name. Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri visited the
    province in May and September. President Wahid provided $110,000 (Rp. 1
    billion) for the holding of the Papuan congress and indicated that he
    would open the congress, although ultimately he accepted his advisors'
    recommendation not to participate. After the congress, he met with
    Presidium Council leaders and reemphasized the Government's firm stance
    against Papuan independence, but said it was permissible to fly Papuan
    independence flags as long as they were smaller and flown below the
    Indonesian flag. However, during the August MPR session, legislators
    attacked Wahid's stance toward Papuans and demanded a tougher approach
    that rejected the flying of the independence flag, the use of the name
    ``Papua,'' and other perceived manifestations of proindependence
    sentiment. In late September new National Police Chief Suryo Bimantoro
    ordered all Papuan independence flags to be taken down. Police attempts
    to remove forcibly flags in Wamena on October 6, Fak Fank on December
    1, and Merauke on November 4 and December 2, sparked violent clashes
    with Satgas Papua members, resulting in many deaths and heightened
    tensions between Papuans and non-Papuan migrants (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.). After Papuans attacked a police station in Jayapura on December
    7, police shot and killed a student at a nearby dormitory and detained
    and beat more than 100 others, 2 of whom died as a result of the
    beatings. Police revived criminal charges against five leading members
    of the Papuan Presidium Council for crimes against the security of the
    State and public order in November (see Sections 1.e. and 2.a.). Police
    encouragement of the formation of migrant ``solidarity'' organizations,
    and the arming of some of those organizations by security forces, also
    has sharpened divisions between the two communities. Moreover, the
    creation of an armed ``Red and White Task Force'' (Satgas Merah Putih)
    in Papua, reportedly at the instigation of the army, has raised
    concerns that certain elements of the national security forces may be
    seeking to create an armed Papuan paramilitary force, modeled on East
    Timorese militias, to oppose Papuan independence efforts, and, to
    oppose specifically, the Satgas Papua groups, the vast majority of
    which are considered proindependence.
        Religious Minorities.--Closures and attacks on churches, temples,
    and other religious facilities, ranging from minor vandalism to arson,
    increased during the year, according to the Indonesian Christian
    Communications Forum (ICCF). The ICCF recorded 122 religiously-
    motivated attacks on Christian churches or other Christian facilities
    during the year. There are no available national estimates on the
    number of mosques that were damaged or destroyed during the year. The
    largest number of attacks on citizens and places of worship occurred in
    North Maluku, Maluku, and Central Sulawesi provinces in the eastern
    part of the country, causing more than 3,000 deaths, the displacement
    of nearly 500,000 persons, and damage to at least 81 churches and
    dozens of mosques (see Sections 1.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
        Attacks on places of worship reflect religious tensions, but other
    contributing factors include underlying socioeconomic and political
    tensions between poor Muslims and more affluent Sino-Indonesian
    Christians. Similarly, in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, economic
    tensions between native Christians and Muslims who migrated to these
    areas in recent decades were a significant factor in incidents of
    interreligious violence. Christian and Muslim communities in these
    provinces blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the
    violence.
        The Government failed to suppress or respond to most cases of
    violence and did not resolve fully the many cases of attacks on
    religious facilities and churches that occurred during riots; in other
    cases, the Government did not investigate such incidents at all (see
    Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
        Anti-Christian sermons and publications also increased, leading to
    concerns that societal support for religious tolerance was eroding. In
    the early part of the year, a movement known as the Islamic State of
    Indonesia (NII) emerged on university campuses in Java. There were
    sporadic reports from some neighborhoods of Jakarta that student
    followers of the NII movement set up roadblocks, checked identification
    cards, and harassed passing non-Muslims, in some cases forcing them to
    recite passages from the Koran. Similar incidents occurred in Makassar,
    South Sulawesi. Many of the country's religious minorities expressed
    growing concern over what they perceived to be increasing demands by
    certain Muslim groups to impose Shari'a law in the country; however,
    during the year, a proposal to implement Islamic law failed (see
    Section 2.c.).
        The Laskar Jihad (``holy war troops''), another Muslim group that
    was formed during the year, engaged in paramilitary training, and
    leaders of the group announced that they were planning to wage war on
    Christians in the Moluccas. The Government closed a conspicuous Laskar
    Jihad training camp south of Jakarta, but otherwise was reluctant to
    challenge the organization openly. Many of its recruits, some of whom
    were children (see Section 6.d.), were deployed to Maluku and North
    Maluku provinces beginning in late April, where they reportedly joined
    in fighting against Christians.
        President Wahid conceded in late December that hundreds of
    Christians on Keswui and Teor Islands in Maluku converted to Islam in
    November and December to save their lives. By year's end, only an
    estimated 165 converts had been able to leave the 2 islands. There also
    have been credible reports of forced conversions occurring in other
    parts of Maluku and North Maluku. Estimates range from over 3,500 to
    8,000 cases. While most documented cases involve Christians who
    converted to Islam, there have been reports of Muslims who were forced
    to convert to Christianity in Halmahera, North Maluku.
        Christian IDP's from Keswui and Teor who had undergone conversion
    said in media interviews that Muslim militants told Christians to
    convert to Islam or face probable death at the hands of Muslim
    militias. According to these sources, Christians were herded into
    mosques and converted to Islam en masse. Both male and female converts
    later were forced to undergo circumcision to prove that they were
    genuine Muslims, despite the fact that Muslim women in Maluku were not
    customarily circumcised. The victims suffered considerable pain and
    some developed infections as a result of the forced circumcisions.
        A number of bombings and bombing attempts primarily targeted
    against Christian facilities occurred throughout the year in North
    Sumatra, including one that exploded in May at a Protestant Church in
    Medan and injured at least 33 persons. The perpetrators of the attacks
    had not been identified by year's end. There were numerous theories for
    the attacks; there is no clear evidence that the bombings were
    religiously motivated. Bombs exploded almost simultaneously on the
    evening of December 24, in seven of the country's provinces, in or near
    nine churches where members were attending Christmas Eve services.
    Nineteen citizens died from the blasts, some of whom were Muslims
    guarding churches, and 84 persons were injured. The bombings appear to
    be the product of a concerted and synchronized effort to create discord
    between religious groups. However, the bombings are more likely driven
    by political interests than by religious hatred. The Government formed
    a special interagency team to investigate the bombings. The NGO
    Indonesian Forum for Peace (FID) formed a joint fact-finding team with
    the Government to investigate the bombings. A number of other bombings
    also occurred during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
        Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of
    Irian Jaya. Local sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries
    to win converts in the predominantly Christian province, as well as
    resentment of the arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants
    from other parts of the country, has in the past led to attacks on
    mosques in Irian Jaya. However, there were no reports of attacks on
    mosques in Irian Jaya during the year.
        During the year there were occasional reports of murders of persons
    who practice traditional magic (``dukun santets'') (see Section 1.a.)
    in East, Central, and West Java, including a January 18 attack in the
    Malang area of East Java on a woman suspected of being a shaman. The
    number of these killings is believed to have declined since 1998, when
    nearly 200 such persons were killed in East Java, and since 1999, when
    more than 30 dukun santet were killed in West Java.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government officially
    promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. Ethnic Chinese, which represent
    approximately 3 percent of the population--by far the largest
    nonindigenous minority group--historically have played a major role in
    the economy. In 1998 anti-Chinese sentiment led to serious and
    widespread attacks on Chinese-owned businesses. Despite the Wahid
    Government's commitment to reopen the investigation into these attacks,
    the Government has failed to pursue the 1999 recommendations of the
    joint fact-finding team (TGPF) that was commissioned to investigate the
    1998 attacks (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 4).
        Racially motivated attacks against Sino-Indonesians have dropped
    sharply since mid-1998, although Sino-Indonesians continued to report
    instances of discrimination and harassment. One Sino-Indonesian woman
    told the press that she was attacked by machete-wielding militants
    claiming to be members of the ``Commandos against Communism,'' who
    threatened to burn down her office building and murder her staff if
    they did not vacate the premises. When she later returned from a trip,
    she found that arsonists had burned down her office. She had been
    investigating the slaughter of Sino-Indonesians during the mid-1960's.
        An undetermined number of Sino-Indonesians remain abroad or away
    from their normal places of residence in the country. While many now
    reside in Singapore, there also are sizeable Sino-Indonesian
    populations in Australia and the U.S. Prominent Sino-Indonesians
    estimate that approximately half of the Sino-Indonesian men living
    abroad occasionally return to their homes for short visits to protect
    their remaining business interests, but most keep their families and
    the bulk of their capital offshore or in other parts of the country.
        With the revocation of Presidential Decree 14/1967 in January,
    Confucianism may be practiced in public and the law no longer forbids
    the celebration of the Chinese New Year in temples or public places
    (see Section 2.c.). As a result, Chinese New Year decorations were
    displayed prominently during the year and sold in public shopping areas
    in several major cities. The Chinese language now may be taught,
    spoken, and printed, and private instruction in Chinese no longer is
    prohibited. Some universities, including the University of Indonesia,
    offer Chinese-language instruction. A number of private institutions
    openly offer courses as well. Chinese-language publications in the
    country no longer are banned; however, customs regulations still
    prohibit the import of Chinese language publications and music (see
    Section 2.a.). State universities still have informal quotas that limit
    the enrollment of ethnic Chinese students.
        Authorities no longer are required to note a special code on the
    national identification card for citizens of Chinese extraction.
    However, some Sino-Indonesians have claimed that this practice
    continues.
        Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic Chinese have been denied the right to
    run businesses in rural areas; however, the Government does not
    restrict this right for Sino-Indonesians.
        Indigenous residents of Irian Jaya and various human rights groups
    charge that Papuans are underrepresented in the civil service in that
    province. The Government has made some efforts to recruit more civil
    servants in Irian Jaya, and there has been some increase in the number
    of civil servant trainees in this province, despite a ``no growth''
    policy in the civil service as a whole.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Private sector workers are by law
    free to form worker organizations without prior authorization, and
    unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect their
    representatives. In July the DPR enacted and in August President Wahid
    signed a new law on trade unions, which provides for ``notification''
    (registration) of unions at the factory, district, provincial, and
    national levels and allowed unions to form federations and
    confederations. Unions are required to have at least 10 members and
    must be open to all persons, without differentiating on the basis of
    political orientation, religion, ethnicity, national origin, or gender.
    Under the new law and previous registration regulations, more than 20
    new or previously unrecognized union federations have notified the
    Department of Manpower of their existence since 1998, and thousands of
    workplace-level units have registered with the Department of Manpower,
    although some unions have complained of difficulty in registering their
    workplace units.
        The Federation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI), which was
    formed by the merger (under the Government's direction) of existing
    labor organizations in 1973, is the oldest trade union organization.
    The head of the SPSI and many members of the executive council also are
    members of the Golkar political organization and its constituent
    functional groups. In August 1998, the SPSI leadership split over the
    issue of reforming the Federation's structure. Following the split, the
    Department of Manpower stated that it would no longer intervene in
    organizational disputes within trade unions or provide guidance to any
    unions.
        The new trade union law allows the Government to petition the
    courts to dissolve a union if its basis conflicts with Pancasila or the
    1945 constitution, or if a union's leaders or members, in the name of
    the union, commit crimes against the security of the State and are
    sentenced to at least 5 years in prison. Once a union is dissolved, its
    leaders and members may not form another union for at least 3 years
    after the original union's dissolution.
        The new trade union law does not address the adjudication of
    jurisdictional disputes among multiple unions in a workplace, and
    existing laws and regulations do not provide clear guidance on how
    jurisdictional disputes should be handled. Such ambiguity occasionally
    has led to clashes between unions in a workplace. In one instance in
    June in Medan, North Sumatra, workers from the Indonesian Prosperity
    Trade Union (SPSI) attacked the offices of the Metalworkers Union
    affiliated with the SBSI after SBSI workers staged a strike at a metal
    factory at which the SPSI Metalworkers Union also had representation.
    The SPSI workers damaged office equipment and injured several persons
    in the office.
        Since 1999 civil servants have not been required to belong to
    KORPRI, a nonunion association. Employees of several government
    departments announced that they would form their own employee
    associations, and union organizations began to seek members among civil
    servants. Unions also are seeking to organize stateowned enterprise
    (SOE) employees, defined to include those working in enterprises in
    which the State has at least 5percent ownership, although they have
    encountered some resistance from enterprise management, and the legal
    basis for registering unions in SOE's remains unclear. Teachers must
    belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically
    classified as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a welfare
    organization and does not appear to have engaged in trade union
    activities such as collective bargaining. Some groups of teachers have
    formed unofficial unions outside the PGRI. Other teachers have gone on
    strike for better wages and allowances, a rare and technically illegal
    action for teachers. Mandatory PGRI contributions are deducted
    automatically from teachers' salaries.
        The Government announced in 1995 its intention to relax a
    regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more
    persons of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites.
    However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union
    meetings. Permission routinely was given to the faction of the SPSI
    that retains strong links to the Golkar party leadership, but other
    labor organizations claim that local civilian and security officials
    often have discouraged or denied permission to hold gatherings. During
    the early part of the year, police repeatedly interrogated a foreign
    staff member of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity
    when he tried to renew his police clearance and work permit. Police
    objected to the staff member's observation of worker demonstrations and
    strikes. He eventually was able to renew his documents. In May police
    in Medan, North Sumatra, briefly detained two staff members of the
    Solidarity Center when they arrived to participate in a union workshop.
    The police stated that the staff workers had not obtained required
    letters from Jakarta police before traveling to Medan. The workshop was
    allowed to proceed in their absence.
        All organized workers except civil servants have the legal right to
    strike. State enterprise employees and teachers rarely exercise this
    right, but private sector strikes are frequent. Before a strike legally
    can occur in the private sector, the law requires intensive mediation
    by the Department of Manpower and prior notice of the intent to strike.
    However, no approval is required. In practice dispute settlement
    procedures rarely are followed, and formal notice of the intent to
    strike rarely is given, because Department of Manpower procedures are
    slow and have little credibility among workers. Therefore, sudden
    strikes usually result from longstanding grievances, attempts by
    employers to prevent the formation of union branches, or denial of
    legally mandated benefits or rights.
        Strikes frequently occurred during the year across a wide range of
    industries and occasionally were protracted. In addition to normal work
    stoppages, workers occasionally used unorthodox tactics, such as
    blocking Jakarta's airport toll road. Representatives of 4,700 footwear
    workers, who did not receive severance pay when their factory closed,
    staged a sit-in for several weeks in the national Parliament until the
    company paid the severances. Among the largest companies affected by
    such tactics were a manufacturing group in Surabaya, East Java; a
    cigarette manufacturer in Kediri, East Java; an oil and gas producer in
    Riau province in Sumatra; and natural gas and mining companies in East
    Kalimantan. Most strikes were conducted and resolved peacefully. In one
    prominent case, a major electronics manufacturing company fired (with
    the Government's permission) 900 striking workers at its Jakarta plant
    after a lengthy work stoppage. Some unions complained that strike
    leaders were singled out for layoffs when companies downsized. In
    several cases, most notably in Riau and East Kalimantan, workers
    damaged property and intimidated nonstriking workers, and there were
    disputes among different unions represented in the same company. In
    most cases, workers were not arrested for these actions, although
    police detained the SBSI regional coordinator in East Kalimantan in
    November for investigation of charges that he incited workers to
    violence. In at least two cases (at a glass manufacturing plant in
    Jakarta and at a major natural gas facility in East Kalimantan), police
    fired rubber bullets at workers who blocked roads and entry gates to
    company facilities and resisted orders to disperse. Groups claiming to
    represent labor also sometimes resorted to violence. In Surabaya groups
    of as many as 500 persons invaded industrial parks and looted factories
    in early May.
        The SPSI maintains international contacts but its only
    international trade union affiliation as a federation is with the
    Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade Union Council. Some of the
    SPSI's federated sectoral unions are members of international trade
    secretariats. The SBSI is affiliated with the World Confederation of
    Labor and some international trade union secretariats.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is provided for by law, and the Department of Manpower
    promotes it within the context of the national ideology, Pancasila.
    Until 1994 only recognized trade unions--the SPSI and its components--
    could engage legally in collective bargaining. By issuing new
    regulations on union registration and enacting the new trade union law,
    the Government allows for new workers' organizations that register with
    the Government to conclude legally binding agreements with employers.
    Under the union registration regulation signed in September 1999 (which
    was not repealed by the new trade union law), if there is more than one
    union represented in a company, a union or coalition of unions must
    have the support of a majority of workers in order to bargain or
    negotiate on their behalf.
        In companies without unions, the Government discourages workers
    from utilizing nongovernment outside assistance, for example, during
    consultations with employers over company regulations. Instead, the
    Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek its assistance and
    believes that its role is to protect workers. However, there are
    credible reports that for many companies, consultations are perfunctory
    at best and usually only occur with management-selected workers; there
    also are credible reports to the contrary from foreign companies.
    According to government statistics, approximately 80 percent of the
    factorylevel SPSI units have collective bargaining agreements. The
    degree to which these agreements are negotiated freely between unions
    and management without government interference varies. By regulation
    negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the
    Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration.
    Most negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period. Agreements
    are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
        According to NGO's involved in labor issues, in current practice
    the provisions of collective bargaining agreements rarely go beyond the
    legal minimum standards established by the Government, and the
    agreements often merely are presented to worker representatives for
    signature rather than negotiation. Although government regulations
    prohibit employers from discriminating against or harassing employees
    because of union membership, there are credible reports from union
    officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including
    firing workers, that is not prevented effectively or remedied in
    practice. Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against
    contact with union organizers. The SPSI documented 135 cases in which
    companies violated their workers' right to organize by intimidating,
    punishing, or firing SBSI members because of their affiliation with the
    union or because they attempted to organize SBSI units within their
    factories--a problem other labor organizations and activists have
    encountered in trying to form unions. In November police in East
    Kalimantan arrested Wuaya Kawilarang, a regional coordinator for the
    SBSI, for investigation of charges that he incited workers to violence.
    He remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
        Regional and national labor dispute resolution committees
    adjudicate charges of antiunion discrimination, and their decisions can
    be appealed to the State Administrative Court. However, due to adverse
    decisions many union members believe that the dispute resolution
    committees generally favor employers. As a result, workers frequently
    present their grievances directly to the National Human Rights
    Commission, Parliament, and NGO's. Administrative decisions in favor of
    dismissed workers usually are monetary awards; workers rarely are
    reinstated. The law requires that employers obtain the approval of the
    labor dispute resolution committee before firing workers, but the law
    often is ignored in practice. During the year, the ILO Committee of
    Experts expressed concern that the Government had delayed
    implementation of the Manpower Act No. 25 of 1997 until October 1. On
    October 3, the Government announced another year's delay to consider
    revisions to the law, which has been criticized by labor unions.
        Since 1996 unions affiliated with the SPSI have been able to
    collect union dues directly through payroll deductions (the
    ``checkoff'' system) rather than having the Department of Manpower
    collect dues and transfer them to the SPSI. Implementation of this
    system remains uneven, but labor observers generally believe that it
    has given more authority to factory-level union units where the
    checkoff system is practiced. Union officials at SPSI headquarters
    stated that not all local branches of the unions send a portion of dues
    collected to regional and central headquarters as provided in the
    SPSI's bylaws. Unions other than the SPSI have complained of
    difficulties in getting companies to set up a checkoff system for their
    members. In cases where the SPSI is not the only union in the factory,
    other unions occasionally have charged that companies automatically
    deduct union dues for the SPSI from workers affiliated with other
    unions.
        The police and the army continue to be involved in labor matters,
    although since the mid-1990's there has been a shift from open
    intervention and demonstrations of force by uniformed troops to less
    visible measures. On at least two occasions, security forces fired on
    striking workers (see Section 6.a.). However, the most common form of
    military involvement in labor matters, according to union and NGO
    representatives, is a longstanding pattern of collusion between police
    and military personnel and employers, which usually takes the form of
    intimidation of workers by security personnel in civilian dress. The
    military also employs baiting tactics: infiltrating workers' ranks and
    encouraging protests or worker actions, and sometimes attempting to
    provoke a violent worker action, to which the military then forcefully
    responds. Employer and union representatives also have complained about
    the ``invisible costs'' of corruption, which they and others estimate
    constitute up to 30 percent of a company's expenses.
        There are seven exporting processing zones (EPZs) in the country.
    Batam Island, near Singapore, is the largest. Labor law applies in
    EPZ's and in the rest of the country, although nongovernmental
    observers believe that in practice enforcement of laws in EPZ's is
    weaker than in other areas.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor, including forced and bonded labor by children, and the
    Government generally enforces this prohibition; however, forced and
    bonded labor by children remains a problem, and there also were
    instances of debt bondage of adults. In the past, NGO's estimated that
    as many as 3,000 children worked on fishing platforms, known as
    ``jermals,'' under inhumane and dangerous conditions. There are
    credible reports that hundreds, perhaps over 1,000, children still work
    on the jermals off the east coast of North Sumatra in conditions of
    bonded labor (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). Most are recruited from
    farming communities in inland regions of North Sumatra. Once they
    arrive at the work site, miles offshore, they are held as virtual
    prisoners and are not permitted to leave for at least 3 months or until
    a replacement worker can be found. The children receive average monthly
    wages of $5 to $14 (Rp. 45,000 to 120,000), well below the regional
    minimum wage. They live in isolation on the sea on platforms the size
    of basketball courts, work 12 to 20 hours per day in dangerous
    conditions, and sleep in the workspace with no access to sanitary
    facilities or schooling. There are reports of physical, verbal, and
    sexual abuse of such children.
        In November 1997, the Department of Manpower issued a circular
    letter with the force of law that prohibits the hiring of persons under
    the age of 14 on fishing platforms. In 1999 the Government stopped
    issuing permits to build new jermals, and announced plans to physically
    remove children from the jermals and provide them with educational and
    economic alternatives (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). NGO's advocating
    the removal of children from jermals estimate that there was a 50
    percent drop in the number of children working on jermals during the
    year. However, rehabilitation programs for children removed from
    jermals have documented little success, and NGO's are concerned that
    some of these children now engage in other forms of hazardous labor.
    Jermals operate under the paid protection of national naval vessels;
    reportedly, the navy has a financial interest in some jermals.
        In East Kalimantan a logging company reportedly traps Dayak
    laborers in a cycle of debt and turns them into bonded laborers (see
    Section 5).
        The country is a source, transit point, and destination for
    trafficking in women and children, sometimes for forced labor (see
    Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Labor law prohibits children under the age of 15 from
    working more than 4 hours per day, but an estimated 6 to 8 million
    children meet or exceed this daily limit. Government enforcement of
    child labor laws is weak or nonexistent. With the exception of children
    working on fishing platforms, there were no significant government
    efforts to strengthen enforcement during the year. The Government
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but does not enforce
    this provision effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of
    Child Labor on March 8, and President Wahid signed it into domestic law
    as Law No. 1/2000. Before the enactment of Law 1/2000, a Department of
    Manpower circular issued in 1997 had prohibited children from working
    in hazardous sectors, including maritime, plantation, construction,
    slaughterhouse, textile, leatherworking, entertainment, and
    manufacturing activities involving the use of hazardous materials and
    pollutants.
        Despite adoption of legislative and regulatory measures, most
    children continued to work in unregulated environments, including
    domestic work. Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor
    inspectors on child labor matters under the International Program on
    the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), enforcement is nonexistent.
    During the year, labor inspectors who had received the training had not
    removed any children from the workplace.
        The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who
    must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of
    Manpower issued a regulation on ``Protection of Children Forced to
    Work.'' This regulation legalized the employment of children under the
    age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families.
    It required parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work,
    limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the
    number of children working under its provisions. It did not set a
    minimum age for children in this category.
        In February 1999, after years of negative publicity, the Government
    launched an initiative to eliminate child labor on jermals off the
    coast of North Sumatra. By midyear, NGO's estimated that the number of
    children working on jermals had declined by as much as 50 percent (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). However, hundreds, and perhaps over 1,000
    children continue to work on the jermals, and active kidnaping or
    recruiting of such children continues.
        According to the Department of Manpower, the number of working
    children increased from approximately 2 million before the economic
    downturn began in 1997 to an estimated 2.5 million by mid-1999. The
    State Bureau of Statistics (BPS) stated that 1.9 million children
    through age 14 were working in 1998. The ILO and the NGO World Vision
    argued that official estimates were too low, citing the fact that
    between 11 and 12 million school-age children (up to age 18) were not
    attending school, and a large number likely were involved in some form
    of work. The ILO estimated that between 6 and 8 million children worked
    during the year. World Vision estimated that there were 6.5 million
    children working. Of these 6.5 million children, 4.1 million worked in
    the informal sector, and 2.4 million worked in the formal sectors.
    Other NGO's estimated that more than 10 percent of children worked more
    than 4 hours per day, and that over 35 percent of these children worked
    over 35 hours per week. Other NGO's estimate that 8.5 million school-
    age children are not enrolled in school and most are employed in the
    underground economy with no legal protection and poor compensation.
        It is estimated that more children work in the informal sector than
    the formal sector, selling newspapers, shining shoes, helping to park
    or watch cars, and otherwise earning money. Where children work in the
    formal sector, such work tends to fall between the informal and formal
    economies, including working alongside their parents in home
    enterprises and on plantations, and in family-owned shops and small
    factories, particularly those that are satellites of large industries.
    There are children working in large factories; however, the number is
    unknown, largely because documents verifying age are falsified easily.
    Some employers hire children because they are easier than adults to
    manage and less likely to organize or make demands on employers.
    Children working in factories usually work the same number of hours as
    adults. Children work in the rattan and wood furniture industries, the
    garment industry, the footwear industry, food processing, toy-making,
    and small mining operations, and other industries.
        In March six children between the ages of 12 and 14 fled from a
    chicken farm in Klaten, Central Java, where they had been forced to
    work from early morning to late at night without any pay for over 1
    month. The owners of the farm later were detained for questioning and
    put on trial. The case was settled out of court, but child labor
    advocates who worked on the case did not participate in the settlement
    decision.
        Other children, mostly girls, serve as live-in domestic servants.
    Many begin working when they are between 14 and 16 years old. Although
    accurate figures are unavailable, it is estimated that the number of
    child domestic workers is in the millions. Observers agree that this
    number began increasing in 1998 as a result of the economic downturn.
    One study conducted by Atma Jaya University in Jakarta estimated that
    there were at least 400,000 children under age 15 working as domestic
    servants in Jakarta alone. Most of them are not allowed to study or
    take academic courses. There are no regulations protecting domestic
    workers. These children work long hours, receive low pay, are on call
    24 hours per day, generally are unaware of their rights, and often are
    far from their families.
        Children are involved in a variety of hazardous work activities. In
    addition to those working on fishing platforms (see Section 6.c.),
    children perform piece work in small shoe factories (bengkels) where
    they are exposed to hazardous bleaches and glues. Thousands of other
    children work on rubber, sugarcane, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee
    plantations, often helping their parents meet stiff production quotas.
    Many companies employing adults condone the practice of children
    assisting their parents in the fields. Other children are employed in
    construction work, quarrying, gold and other types of mining, pearl
    diving, and forestry activities, many of which pose serious hazards.
    During the year, the ILO called on the Government to stop the
    employment of up to 3,000 children in Central Kalimantan in gold
    mining. The media reported the use of mercury in Central Kalimantan
    gold mining, underscoring the danger posed to these children.
        Some children work as scavengers in dumpsites. In the Bantar Gebang
    dumpsite in Bekasi (south of Jakarta), an NGO working with children
    there estimates that as many as 550 children ages 7 to 15 work at the
    dump to help their parents. About 74 percent of the children are under
    age 12. Children work long hours in extremely unsanitary conditions.
    Almost all of the children have health problems. In one survey, 84
    percent of the children suffered from minor infections. NGO's have
    ongoing programs to teach children to avoid hazardous waste such as
    syringes and other potentially toxic waste.
        It is believed that thousands of Muslim and Christian adolescent
    children in Maluku province have become soldiers and that younger
    children provide support services to the militas (see Section 5).
        The country is a source, destination, and transit point for
    trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the supervision of the
    National Wage Council establish minimum wages for regions and basic
    needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered
    sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of
    nutrition, clothing, and shelter. The Government increased the average
    minimum wage by 70 percent (when adjusted for inflation) between 1992
    and 1997. However, the high inflation rate in 1998 depressed sharply
    the purchasing power of the minimum wage. The minimum wage generally is
    not sufficient to meet the government-determined ``minimum living
    need'' for a single person, or a family. After the minimum wage
    increases in April, in Jakarta the monthly minimum wage is about $37
    (344,000 Rp), which is equal to 81 percent of the government-determined
    minimum living need for a single person, and down from 95 percent in
    1997. The average national minimum wage is about $24 per month (Rp.
    230,000), although wages in the most heavily populated urban areas
    (Jakarta area, West Java, East Java, and North Sumatra), are
    significantly higher. Nevertheless, enforcement of minimum wage and
    other labor regulations remains inadequate, and sanctions are light.
        Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a
    variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more
    modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and
    transportation. The law establishes 7- or 8-hour workdays and a 40-hour
    workweek, with one 30-minute rest period for every 4 hours of work.
        The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate
    is 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour and 2 times the
    hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to
    deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of
    Manpower and with the consent of the employee. Workers in industries
    that produce retail goods for export frequently work overtime to
    fulfill contract quotas. Observance of laws regulating benefits and
    labor standards varies between sectors and regions. Employer violations
    of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in strikes and
    employee protests. The Department of Manpower continues publicly to
    urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general, government
    enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.
        Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of
    industrial health and safety. Companies with more than 100 employees
    may obtain public recognition of their compliance with safety and
    health standards through a safety audit procedure. In the largely
    Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs function
    reasonably well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered
    companies outside the oil sector, the quality of occupational health
    and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement of health and
    safety standards is hampered severely by the limited number of
    qualified Department of Manpower inspectors, as well as by the low
    level of employee appreciation for sound health and safety practices.
    Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors are common. Workers
    are obligated to report hazardous working conditions. Employers are
    forbidden by law from retaliating against those who do report, but the
    law is not enforced effectively. As a result, workers who remove
    themselves from hazardous working conditions may risk loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a source, transit point,
    and destination for trafficking in women and children for the purpose
    of prostitution and sometimes for forced labor.
        Kirsty Sword-Gusmao, the wife of East Timorese independence leader
    Xanana Gusmao, reported to the international press in November that 33
    pregnant East Timorese women, who had returned to East Timor, claimed
    that they were abducted and forced to serve as sex slaves for the TNI
    in West Timor.
        There are credible reports of trafficking in girls and women and of
    temporary ``contract marriages'' with foreigners in certain areas, such
    as West Kalimantan and Sumatra, although the extent of this practice is
    unclear. Many such marriages are not considered legal, and the children
    born from them are considered born out of wedlock. According to one
    recent report, poor Sino-Indonesian parents from Sinkawang, West
    Kalimantan, who were desperate for money and believed that their
    daughters would have a better future, have sold thousands of their
    daughters into contract marriages to Taiwanese men. Some of the girls
    were as young as 14 years old. If such marriages fail, the women have
    no legal recourse. According to one source, there were as many as
    10,000 Sino-Indonesian women from Sinkawang living in Taiwan whose
    legal status was uncertain. Others enjoy successful marriages and their
    families at home prosper as a result of the relationship.
        Prostitution is widespread. Official statistics reported 75,106
    registered prostitutes in 1999, up from 72,000 in 1995. However, NGO's
    estimate that there are as many as 1.3 million prostitutes in the
    country, 30 percent of which may be under 16 years of age. A university
    professor estimates that about 150,000 children enter prostitution each
    year. The prevalence of child prostitutes appears to vary by region.
    According to a recent NGO study, about 15 percent of the prostitutes in
    parts of Central Java were between 16 and 20 years old. In a seminar
    held in Batam in August, researchers reported that 50 percent of more
    than 1,800 sex workers that they surveyed in 1998 were younger than 18
    years old. More recent estimates suggest that as many as 6,000 sex
    workers in Batam are under age 18. In September the ILO, in
    collaboration with the University of Indonesia's department of social
    welfare, published a preliminary study of trafficking trends in
    Jakarta, Batam (Sumatra), Medan (Sumatra), and Bali, which found that
    many girls entering prostitution after failed marriages that they had
    entered into when they were as young as 10 to 14.
        While not documented thoroughly, the sex trade is believed widely
    to have increased sharply as women hurt by the economic downturn sought
    means of support for their families. In addition NGO findings indicate
    a growing trend in child prostitution and sexual exploitation.
    Instances of families in rural areas of Java and Sumatra being forced
    by economic circumstances to ``sell'' their daughters to local men
    continued to be reported. An October NGO report found that trafficking
    in teenage girls from North Sumatra to Singapore and Malaysia was
    increasing. A growing number of children enter prostitution to help
    their families or to support drug habits. Other teenage prostitutes
    come from middle class families. Child prostitutes can earn $500 to
    $1,000 (about Rp. 4.7 to 9.4 million) per month, 10 to 20 times what an
    unskilled factory worker earns. The demand for young girls is
    increasing, as many clients seek young girls who are perceived to be
    less likely to carry HIV/AIDS.
        Police continue to uncover syndicates involved in trafficking young
    women and girls, many younger than age 18, to work in brothels on
    islands in Riau province, Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya (all in Java);
    Denpasar (Bali); Medan (Sumatra); Ambon (Maluku); Manado, Makassar, and
    Kendari (Sulawesi); and Jayapura, Sorong, and Merauke (Irian Jaya).
    Others are trafficked to Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and
    Australia. Many of the girls and women were hired under false
    pretenses. One tactic commonly employed is to offer young women in
    rural areas jobs as waitresses or hotel employees in distant regions,
    typically at island resorts. After the new recruits arrive at the site
    they learn that they have been recruited as sex workers. In some
    instances, women are held forcibly at brothels or are prevented from
    leaving an island. In other cases, the women have no option other than
    to accept the work because they lack money to travel and facing other
    economic pressures. There also have been cases of boys involved in
    prostitution, especially in popular tourist destinations such as Bali
    and Lombok; at times such boys have been victims of trafficking,
    although the incidence reportedly is low.
        A baby trafficking ring was uncovered in Medan in September. Four
    persons were arrested and three babies were confiscated as evidence.
    The babies allegedly were procured from lowincome families and were
    sold to wealthy infertile couples.
        Trafficking in children for forced labor, particularly onto
    ``jermals'' (fishing platforms) off the coast of North Sumatra, is a
    significant problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        Hundreds of thousands of women abroad work as domestic servants.
    According to Ministry of Manpower statistics, there were approximately
    1.5 million registered workers employed abroad from 1994 to 1999, and
    almost 70 percent of these workers were female. Host countries include
    Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Korea, and the Persian Gulf states.
    Although the percentage of the total is very low, in numerous cases,
    these women were subjected to conditions that amounted to trafficking.
    Recruiting agencies sometimes abuse and hold captive women recruited to
    work abroad as domestic servants, even before such women depart the
    country. The most common complaints among women working abroad are
    being underpaid or not paid at all; extreme working conditions and
    severe physical and sexual abuse also are common.
        The Government, in response to negative publicity and NGO efforts,
    took steps to improve conditions for female migrant workers in the
    country and to improve consular protection for those working abroad;
    however, many women remain vulnerable. In contrast to NGO assertions, a
    consortium of labor recruiters insists that accounts of severe abuse of
    female migrant workers are exceptions to the norm. Nevertheless, as a
    result of extensive lobbying efforts, in late October, the Ministry of
    Manpower and Transmigration announced that it would suspend for 2
    months the placement of migrant workers abroad, especially those
    working in the informal sector, including maids. However, on November
    7, President Wahid announced that the Government was lifting the
    temporary ban on the basis that the ban only served to encourage more
    illegal placements of female workers abroad.
        While there are laws designed to protect children from sexual
    abuse, prostitution, and incest, the Government has made no special
    enforcement efforts in these areas. Government efforts to combat the
    problem are sporadic, relatively small-scale, and of limited
    effectiveness. In response to public pressure, the Jakarta city
    government closed down brothels in the red-light district of Kramat
    Tunggak in North Jakarta. Meanwhile corrupt government officials, some
    of whom are involved in trafficking themselves, sometimes hinder
    enforcement efforts that compromise their financial interests.
    Moreover, NGO's allege that there still is considerable reluctance to
    acknowledge, both within society and the Government, that prostitution
    is a major industry.
        Muslim religious groups reacted to perceived government inaction
    against prostitution by attempting to combat the problem themselves.
    Muslim groups' raids on and destruction of brothels and other venues
    allegedly involved in prostitution, including massage parlors, karaoke
    bars, and nightclubs, increased in frequency and in degree of
    aggression during the year (see Section 1.c.). The actions of these
    religious vigilante groups merely has served to force prostitution
    further beyond the scrutiny of official control.
        Domestic NGO's lead in the efforts to monitor and prevent
    trafficking. At least a dozen NGO's generally are active in combating
    trafficking in persons. The Indonesian Women's Association for Justice
    (APIK) facilitates public awareness programs in Jakarta to sensitize
    young women to the dangers of trafficking. The Indonesian Child
    Advocacy Foundation (LAAI) and the City Social Worker Group (KKSP) work
    to eliminate child employment on jermal fishing platforms in North
    Sumatra. Mitra Perempuan operates a hotline to record abuse cases and
    help abused women. The Indonesian Child Welfare Foundation (YKAI)
    issues anecdotal reports on trafficking incidents. The child labor
    umbrella organization, JARAK (NGO Network for Action Programs to
    Eliminate Child Labor in Indonesia), has 63 organizational members in
    15 provinces and is involved in efforts to eliminate all aspects of
    child labor, including trafficking.
                                   __________

                                     JAPAN

        Japan is a parliamentary democracy based on the 1947 Constitution.
    Sovereignty is vested in the people, and the Emperor is defined as the
    symbol of state. Executive power is exercised by a cabinet, composed of
    a prime minister and ministers of state, which is responsible to the
    Diet, a two-house parliament. The Diet, elected by universal suffrage
    and secret ballot, designates the Prime Minister, who must be a member
    of that body. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Conservative Party,
    and the Komeito party formed the current Government in July. The
    judiciary is independent.
        The self defense forces are responsible for external security and
    have limited domestic security responsibilities. The well-organized and
    disciplined police force is firmly under the control of the civilian
    authorities. However, there continued to be credible reports that
    police committed some human rights abuses.
        The industrialized free market economy is highly efficient and
    competitive in world markets and provides residents with a high
    standard of living.
        The Government respects the human rights of its citizens; however,
    there are problems in some areas. There continued to be some credible
    reports that police and prison officials physically and psychologically
    abused prisoners and detainees. Officials sometimes are dismissed for
    such abuse but seldom are tried, convicted, and imprisoned. Violence
    against women and children, child prostitution, and trafficking in
    women are problems. Women, the Ainu (Japan's indigenous people), the
    Burakumin (a group whose members historically are treated as outcasts),
    and alien residents experience varying degrees of societal
    discrimination, some of it severe and longstanding. The Ministry of
    Justice handles complaints of discrimination. However, the Ministry's
    Human Rights Defense Bureau has a small staff and limited investigative
    or enforcement powers. The administrative system for combating human
    rights violations is weak. Many cases end up in court.
        The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Commission continued to work on
    a 5-year mandate to develop measures to educate citizens about the
    importance of respecting human rights. In July 1999, the Commission
    submitted a report calling for greater attention to human rights
    education, particularly at the municipal level. The report also cited a
    number of ongoing human rights problems, including sexual harassment,
    violence in the home, and discrimination against the elderly, the
    disabled, minorities, and foreigners. The panel is to submit
    recommendations on relief measures by 2002.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution provides for freedom from torture and
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and the Penal
    Code prohibits violence and cruelty toward suspects under criminal
    investigation; however, reports by several bar associations, human
    rights groups, and some prisoners indicate that police and prison
    officials sometimes used physical violence, including kicking and
    beating, as well as psychological intimidation, to obtain confessions
    from suspects in custody or to enforce discipline. There also were
    allegations of beatings of detainees by employees of private security
    companies that operate immigration detention facilities at Narita
    International airport. In 1998 the Supreme Court ordered the Kanagawa
    police to pay a $5,850 (700,000 yen) fine to a man who was beaten in
    custody. Internal police reports that alleged coverups of misconduct,
    corruption, and bullying shook public confidence in the police at the
    beginning of the year, and resulted in the establishment in March of
    the Council on the Reform of Police Systems, a six-person board of
    academic and other private sector experts, to consider new rules
    governing police conduct and duties, as well as changes to the overall
    law enforcement structure. In July the Council submitted its
    recommendations; the Diet incorporated some of the Council's
    recommendations into the Revised National Police Law passed in
    November. The new law allows individuals to lodge complaints against
    the police with national and local public safety commissions. These
    commissions may direct the police to conduct investigations.
        The Constitution and the Criminal Code include safeguards to ensure
    that no criminal suspect can be compelled to make a selfincriminating
    confession, nor convicted or punished in cases where the only evidence
    against him is the accused's own confession. The appellate courts have
    overturned some convictions in recent years on the grounds that they
    were obtained as a result of coerced confessions. In April, after
    another man admitted his guilt, prosecutors dismissed charges against a
    man held for over a year in police custody after having ``confessed''
    to fraud and theft charges. He had undergone intense questioning prior
    to confessing. In addition civil and criminal suits alleging abuse
    during interrogation and detention have been brought against some
    police and prosecution officials. About 90 percent of all criminal
    cases going to trial include confessions, reflecting the priority the
    judicial system places on admissions of guilt. The Government points
    out that the high percentage of confessions, like the high conviction
    rate, is reflective of a higher standard of evidence needed to bring
    about indictment in the Japanese system. In Japan confession is
    regarded as the first step in the rehabilitative process.
        Physical restraints, such as leather handcuffs, continue to be used
    as a form of punishment, and some prisoners have been forced to eat and
    relieve themselves unassisted while wearing these restraints. Ministry
    of Justice officials state that restraints are used inside prisons only
    when prisoners have been violent and pose a threat to themselves and
    others, or when there is concern that a prisoner might attempt to
    escape. In May the Osaka District Court awarded a prisoner $5,000
    (500,000 yen) in compensation for being confined in leather handcuffs
    for 3 days while he was being held in solitary confinement. The Court
    ruled that manacling the man after he attacked a warder was
    appropriate, but that the punishment's duration was too long.
        Prison conditions meet most minimum international standards;
    however, prisons in most areas of the country are not heated, and
    prisoners are given only minimal additional clothing to protect
    themselves against cold weather. There have been cases of frostbite
    among the prison population. In February a foreign national prisoner
    was hospitalized for frostbite while incarcerated at Fuchu prison. The
    Ministry of Justice requested a second year of funding in August as
    part of a 3-year plan to install heaters in prison buildings
    nationwide. Individual cells will remain unheated. Prisoners may not
    purchase or be given supplementary food. They are discouraged strongly
    from complaining about conditions. Prisoners face severe restrictions
    on the quantity of their incoming and outgoing correspondence. The
    authorities read letters to and from prisoners, and the letters may be
    censored, or, with a court order, confiscated. All visits with
    convicted prisoners are monitored; however, those whose cases are
    pending are allowed private access to their legal representatives.
    Prison officials claim that the ``no complaining'' policy is designed
    to keep family members from worrying about their loved ones. For the
    same reason, the Justice Ministry usually does not inform a condemned
    inmate's family prior to the person's execution. Human rights
    organizations report that lawyers also are not told of an execution
    until after the fact, and that death row prisoners are held for years
    in solitary confinement with little contact with anyone but prison
    guards. Parole may not be granted for any reason, including medical and
    humanitarian, prior to an inmate serving two-thirds of his or her
    sentence.
        In the past, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations and human
    rights groups have criticized the prison system, with its emphasis on
    strict discipline and obedience to numerous rules. Prison rules remain
    confidential. Wardens continue to have broad leeway in enforcing
    punishments selectively, including ``minor solitary confinement,''
    which may be imposed for a minimum of 1 and not more than 60 days and
    in which the prisoner is made to sit (for foreigners) or kneel (for
    Japanese) motionless in the middle of an empty cell.
        Conditions in immigration detention facilities meet most
    international standards.
        The Government restricts access to prisons and detention facilities
    by human rights groups.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Constitutional
    provisions for freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment generally
    are respected in practice. The law provides for judicial determination
    of the legality of detention. Persons may not be detained without
    charge, and prosecuting authorities must be prepared to demonstrate
    before trial that probable cause exists in order to detain the accused.
    Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a suspect may be held in police
    custody for up to 72 hours without judicial proceedings. A judge may
    extend preindictment custody based on a prosecutor's application by up
    to two consecutive 10-day periods. These extensions are sought and
    granted routinely. Under extraordinary circumstances, prosecutors may
    seek an additional 5-day extension, bringing the maximum period of
    preindictment custody to 25 days.
        In 1999 the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the section of
    the Criminal Procedure Code under which police and prosecutors have the
    power to control and may limit access by legal counsel when deemed
    necessary for the sake of an investigation. Counsel may not be present
    during interrogations at any time before or after indictment. As a
    court-appointed attorney is not approved until after indictment,
    suspects must rely on their own resources to hire an attorney before
    indictment, although local bar associations provide detainees with
    limited free counseling. Critics charge that access to counsel is
    limited both in duration and frequency; the Government denies that this
    is the case. An attorney is provided at government expense after
    indictment if the arrested person cannot afford one. In 1999
    presentencing bail was available in 15.6 percent of cases.
        Bar associations and human rights groups have criticized the use of
    a ``substitute prison system'' for prisoners awaiting court hearings.
    Although the law stipulates that suspects should be held in ``houses of
    detention'' between arrest and sentencing, a police detention facility
    may be substituted at the order of the court. This provision originally
    was added to cover a shortage of normal detention facilities. According
    to year-end Ministry of Justice data, normal detention facilities were
    filled to 66.2 percent of capacity in 1999. Critics charge that
    allowing suspects to be detained by the same authorities who
    interrogate them heightens the potential for abuse and coercion. The
    Government counters that cases sent to police detention facilities tend
    to be those where the facts are not in dispute. A 1997 Justice Ministry
    regulation permits detention house officials to limit the amount of
    documentation related to ongoing court cases retained by prisoners.
        The length of time before a suspect is brought to trial depends on
    the nature of the crime but rarely exceeds 3 months from the date of
    arrest; the average is 1 to 2 months. In one case an accused allegedly
    was held for 3 years.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
    free from executive branch interference. The Cabinet appoints judges
    for 10-year terms, which can be renewed until judges reach the age of
    65. Justices of the Supreme Court can serve until the age of 70 but
    face periodic review through popular referendums.
        There are several levels of courts, including high courts, district
    courts, family courts, and summary courts, with the Supreme Court
    serving as the highest judicial authority. Normally a trial begins at
    the district court level, and a verdict may be appealed to a higher
    court, and ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
        The Government respects in practice the constitutional provisions
    for the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal in
    all criminal cases. Although most criminal trials are completed within
    a reasonable length of time, cases may take several years to work their
    way through the trial and appeals process. For example, in the complex
    1995 case of the Aum Shinrikyo cult sarin gas attack on the Tokyo
    subway system, trials of seven senior members of the cult were still
    underway in district courts at year's end, although 193 trails stemming
    from the attack have been completed.
        There is no trial by jury. The defendant is informed of the charges
    upon arrest and is assured a public trial by an independent civilian
    court with defense counsel and the right of crossexamination. The
    Constitution provides defendants with the right not to be compelled to
    testify against themselves as well as to free and private access to
    counsel. However, the Government contends that the right to consult
    with attorneys is not an absolute one and can be restricted if such
    restriction is compatible with the spirit of the Constitution. Access
    is sometimes abridged in practice; for example the law allows
    prosecutors to control access to counsel before indictment, and there
    are allegations of coerced confessions (see Section 1.c.). Defendants
    are protected from the retroactive application of laws and have the
    right of access to incriminating evidence after a formal indictment has
    been made. However, the law does not require full disclosure by
    prosecutors, and material that the prosecution does not use in court
    may be suppressed. Critics claim that legal representatives of
    defendants do not always have access to all needed relevant material in
    the police record to prepare their defense. A defendant who is
    dissatisfied with the decision of a trial court of first instance may,
    within the period prescribed by law, appeal to a higher court.
        No guidelines mandate the acceptable quality of communications
    between judges, lawyers, and non-Japanese speaking defendants, although
    the Supreme Court publishes handbooks explaining the legal procedures
    and terms for court interpreters. In April the Supreme Court introduced
    a training system to help court interpreters understand complicated
    trial procedures. However, no standard licensing or qualification
    system for certifying court interpreters exists, and a trial may
    proceed even if the accused does not understand what is happening or
    being said. The Supreme Court's 1998 statistics show a chronic shortage
    of qualified court interpreters, particularly for non-English speaking
    defendants. Foreign prisoners frequently claim that police urge them to
    sign statements in Japanese that they cannot read, and that are not
    adequately translated.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution protects the right to privacy of
    family, home, and correspondence, and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Under the Constitution, each search or seizure must
    be based on a separate warrant issued by a judge. Standards for issuing
    such warrants exist to guard against arbitrary searches. In August the
    Diet enacted legislation, which allows law enforcement authorities to
    use wiretaps in certain criminal investigations, including suspected
    drug offenses, murder, and trafficking in persons. The legislation also
    stiffened penalties for the unauthorized use of wiretaps by police
    authorities. Under this legislation, wiretaps can only be used if law
    enforcement officials can demonstrate that all other investigative
    techniques have been ineffective.
        There were no new developments in the long-standing effort by
    groups representing the women and the disabled to obtain a government
    investigation, a formal apology, and compensation in the case of the
    several thousand disabled women who were sterilized without their
    consent between 1949 and 1992. A law that the Government revoked in
    1996 permitted doctors to sterilize persons with mental or physical
    disabilities or certain hereditary diseases without consent, after they
    had received the approval of committees appointed by local governments.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press.
        Academic freedom is protected. However, the Education Ministry's
    decision to order revisions to elementary, middle, and high school
    textbooks based on national curriculum guidelines remains a source of
    domestic and international controversy. In 1997 the Supreme Court ruled
    that state screening of textbooks did not violate the constitutional
    provisions for freedom of expression.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the Government
    respects these rights in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respected this right in
    practice. Following the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attacks, a 1995
    amendment to the Religious Corporation Law gave government authorities
    increased oversight of religious groups and required greater disclosure
    of financial assets by religious corporations. The amendment allows
    authorities to monitor more effectively the operations of registered
    religious corporations. The Government does not require that religious
    groups be licensed. However, to receive official recognition as a
    religious organization, which brings tax benefits and other advantages,
    a group must register with local or national authorities as a
    ``religious corporation.'' In practice almost all religious groups
    register.
        The only religion under active government surveillance is the Aum
    Shinrikyo cult. Aum Shinrikyo lost its legal status as a religious
    organization in 1996 following its sponsorship of terrorist attacks. In
    response to reports of increased cult fundraising and recruitment
    activities, local police and communities have taken measures against
    cult members and chapters, including denying residency permits and
    public school access to cult leader Asahara's children. In December
    1999, the Diet passed a set of bills that allow the authorities to more
    easily seize the group's assets, tighten surveillance against it, and
    force it to pay compensation to victims of its past crimes.
        Members of the Unification Church and Jehovah's Witnesses have
    alleged that police do not act in response to allegations of forced
    deprogramming of church members. They also claim that police do not
    enforce the laws against kidnaping when the victim is held by family
    members, asserting that Unification Church members are subjected to
    prolonged arbitrary detention by individuals, who are not charged by
    police.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have the right to travel freely
    both within the country and abroad, to change their place of residence,
    to emigrate, and to repatriate voluntarily. Citizenship may be
    forfeited by naturalization in a foreign country or by failure of
    persons born with dual nationality to elect Japanese citizenship at the
    required age.
        Revisions to the immigration law aimed at reducing visa overstays
    and smuggling of persons became effective in February. The new law
    imposes stiff penalties on persons illegally entering the country, and
    those deported are denied reentry for at least 5 years instead of the
    previous penalty of 1 year.
        Asylum and refugee policy is in accordance with the 1951 U.N.
    Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In
    recent years, the Government has granted asylum to those claiming fear
    of persecution in only a small number of cases. It believes that most
    persons seeking asylum in the country do so for economic reasons.
    During the year, approximately 300 persons in the country were either
    seeking asylum or accorded refugee status. As of year's end, the
    Government had recognized 22 refugee cases; 202 new asylum cases were
    pending. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
    most new applicants were from Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, and Iran.
    In addition approximately 10,400 Vietnamese nationals are permitted to
    reside in the country under special residence permits.
        The Government has shown flexibility in dealing with visa
    extensions for Chinese student dissidents, although it continues to be
    reluctant to grant permanent asylum. Burmese asylum applicants have
    complained that asylum cases can go on for years without a formal
    decision.
        The Government requires applicants to appear at an immigration
    office within 60 days of arrival or within 60 days of learning that
    they are likely to be persecuted in their home country. Individuals who
    do not present their applications within the 60day time frame due to
    extenuating circumstances may apply for an exception. An alien who is
    recognized as a refugee has access to educational facilities, public
    relief and aid, and social welfare benefits. An alien who is denied
    refugee status may appeal the decision to the Ministry of Justice.
    Rejected applicants also may take their cases to court if Ministry
    authorities do not recognize their objections. In an effort to make
    procedures clearer to applicants, the Government distributes a pamphlet
    in English, Chinese, and eight other languages to those interested in
    the asylum process.
        While the Government sometimes grants first asylum, there are no
    standard procedures established, and the Justice Ministry and the
    Foreign Affairs Ministry jointly decide upon such grants on a case-by-
    case basis. In 1998 the Justice Ministry began reversing an earlier
    decision to deny asylum to a group of Burmese prodemocracy students. In
    1999 another 40 to 50 persons denied asylum were granted special
    residency status renewable on a yearly basis as of year's end. During
    the reporting period, 12 Afghan nationals who had been denied asylum on
    first application were granted special resident status, and
    approximately 15 other persons had been granted this status for
    humanitarian reasons as well.
        There were no reports that persons were forced to return to a
    country where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government peacefully and
    are able to exercise this right in practice through frequent, free, and
    fair elections on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot. In
    1998 the Diet granted citizens living overseas the right to vote for
    candidates in national elections in races based on proportional
    representation. In 1999 the Diet extended these absentee voting
    privileges to fishermen and mariners.
        The country is a parliamentary democracy governed by the political
    party or parties able to form a majority in the lower house of its
    bicameral Diet. The Liberal Democratic Party, the Conservative Party,
    and the Komeito party formed the current Government in July.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government and politics, but they are underrepresented in both areas.
    In recent years there has been a slow increase in the number of women
    holding public office. As of December, women held 36 seats in the
    480member lower house of the Diet (7.5 percent), and 43 of the 252
    seats in the upper house (17.1 percent), the highest number since 1946.
    There are 2 women in the 19-member Cabinet. Two of the country's 47
    governors are women (in Osaka prefecture and in Kumamoto); both were
    elected during the year.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of local and international human rights organizations
    function freely, without governmental restrictions, investigating and
    publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials
    generally are cooperative and responsive to their views, although the
    Government restricts access to prisons and detention facilities by
    human rights groups (see Section 1.c.).
        The Justice Ministry's Human Rights Commission continued to work on
    a 5-year mandate to develop measures to educate citizens about the
    importance of respecting human rights. In July 1999, the Commission
    submitted a report that called for greater attention to human rights
    education, particularly at the municipal level, and cites a number of
    ongoing human rights problems, including sexual harassment, violence in
    the home, and discrimination against the elderly, the disabled,
    minorities, and foreigners. The panel is expected to submit
    recommendations on relief measures by 2002.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    creed, sex, social status, or family origin, and, in general, the
    Government respects these provisions.
        Women.--According to National Police Agency statistics, 2,060 rapes
    and 6,310 indecent assaults were reported through November. However, a
    government-sponsored poll showed that violence against women,
    particularly domestic violence, often goes unreported due to social and
    cultural concerns about shaming one's family or endangering the
    reputation of one's spouse or offspring. Husbands have been prosecuted
    for spousal rape; usually these cases involve a third party who
    assisted in the rape. The National Police Agency confirmed 7 cases of
    spousal rape through November. Typically women who are victims of
    domestic violence return to the home of their parents rather than file
    reports with the authorities. Therefore National Police Agency
    statistics on violence against women probably understate the magnitude
    of the problem. In the domestic violence survey conducted by the Prime
    Minister's Office released in February, 5 percent of wives said they
    had experienced ``life-threatening violence'' at least once. According
    to a survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in 1998, one in
    three women reported some form of physical abuse in the home. Frequent
    complaints by female commuters that they have been groped or otherwise
    molested on crowded trains led the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department
    to establish special molestation complaint offices at three Tokyo train
    stations in 1995. In December the Keio Electric Railway Company
    announced plans to introduce women-only rail cars on late night trains
    in the Tokyo area over the holiday season to deal with the problem of
    groping. A Keio spokesman stated that the company had received 351
    complaints about groping in the year ending March 31, an increase of
    100 complaints over the previous 12month period. Many local governments
    are responding positively to a need for confidential assistance by
    establishing special women's consultation departments in police and
    prefectural offices. A new antistalking law went into effect in
    November in response to rising complaints about women's lack of
    recourse in dealing with stalkers. Through December 26, the police
    arrested 20 persons under this new law.
        Trafficking in women is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        The Constitution and the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Law
    prohibit sexual discrimination and provide for individual dignity and
    the essential equality of the sexes in the family. However, sexual
    harassment in the workplace remains widespread. A 1997 survey by the
    Ministry of Labor reported that 62 percent of women claimed to have
    experienced at least one act of sexual harassment. A National Personnel
    Authority survey of female public servants conducted from July to
    September similarly found that 69.2 percent of all female respondents
    believe they have been subjected to acts that constitute sexual
    harassment. The National Personnel Authority established workplace
    rules in April 1999 in an effort to stop harassment in public servants'
    workplaces. New survey data indicates that the most severe forms of
    sexual harassment may be declining in government workplaces; female
    public servants who said that their bosses had pressured them into a
    sexual relationship dropped from 17 percent in 1997 to 2.2 percent. In
    April 1999, a revision to the 1997 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
    Law intended to address problems of sexual harassment and
    discrimination against women went into effect. The revised EEO Law
    includes measures to identify companies that fail to prevent sexual
    harassment, although it does not include punitive measures to enforce
    compliance. The new law's only penalty is that names of companies that
    practice sexual discrimination can be publicized. The Ministry of Labor
    does not enforce compliance through fines or other punitive penalties.
    However, since the 1999 revision, there was a 35 percent jump in
    consultations over workplace sexual harassment cases. Under a 1997
    revision to the Labor Standards Law an arbitration committee is allowed
    to initiate procedures to help ensure the rights of female workers at
    the worker's request, without first having to obtain approval from both
    management and the worker's union. A number of government entities
    continued to establish hot lines and designate ombudsmen to handle
    complaints of discrimination and sexual harassment.
        In August the former governor of Osaka, Isamu Yamada, was sentenced
    to an 18-month suspended prison term after pleading guilty in a
    criminal court to molesting a 21-year-old campaign worker. In a 1999
    civil suit, he was ordered to pay the campaign worker $107,000
    (11,235,000 yen), the largest award ever in the country in a sexual
    harassment suit. Women's groups viewed the result as a positive step
    forward in the effort to combat sexual harassment.
        The Labor Standards Law forbids wage discrimination against women.
    Under the revised EEO Law, women may work overtime shifts for the first
    time.
        Women make up 40 percent of the labor force, and women between the
    ages of 15 and 64 have a labor force participation rate of 51 percent.
    Although the Labor Standards and the EEO law prohibit wage
    discrimination against women, in 1999 female workers on average earned
    only 62 percent of average male earnings. Women age 20 to 24 earned 91
    percent of men's wages for this age group, but average earnings of
    women age 50 to 54 were only 54 percent of the earnings of men in this
    age cohort. Much of this disparity results from the ``two-track''
    personnel administration system found in most larger companies, under
    which new hires are put into one of two categories: Managerial track
    (those engaged in planning and decisionmaking jobs and with the
    potential to become top executives), or general track (those engaged in
    general office work). According to a 1998 survey by the Management and
    Coordination Agency, women held 9.2 percent of managerial positions. A
    1998 Labor Ministry survey found that over half of the companies with a
    two-track personnel system did not even consider women for managerial
    track positions. According to the Home Ministry, as of April 1999,
    women constituted 32 percent of all local government workers but held
    only 4 percent of top local government positions. Female workers have
    suffered disproportionately from the continued sluggishness of the
    economy. A 1999 Rengo labor union study reported that the number of
    nonworking women grew by 420,000 as many gave up looking for jobs due
    to the tight employment market.
        In addition to discrimination, the traditional male/female division
    of labor at home places disproportionate burdens on working women, who
    are still responsible for almost all child care and household duties.
        Women's and disabled person's advocacy groups continue to press for
    a government investigation into sterilization cases that were carried
    out between 1949 and 1992, a formal government apology and compensation
    (see Section 1.f.).
        In 1993 the government spokesperson publicly acknowledged and
    apologized for the former Imperial Government's involvement in the
    army's practice of forcing as many as 200,000 women (including Koreans,
    Filipinos, Chinese, Indonesians, Dutch, and Japanese) to provide sex to
    soldiers between 1932 and 1945. A 1999 U.N. Subcommission on Prevention
    of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities report included a
    recommendation that the Government provide state compensation to former
    ``comfort women'' and prosecute those responsible for setting up and
    operating ``comfort stations'' during World War II. The Government has
    been unwilling to pay direct compensation to individual victims, on the
    grounds that postwar treaties already settled all war claims.
        The ``Asian Women's Fund'' (AWF) was established in 1995 as a
    private, government-sponsored fund to ``extend atonement and support''
    to former ``comfort women.'' The AWF supports three types of projects:
    Payments to individual victims; medical and welfare assistance to
    individual comfort women; and funding projects to improve the general
    status of women and girls. Projects in the first category are funded by
    private donations, while the second and third types of projects are
    financed by the Government and administered by the AWF. As of December,
    the AWF had collected donations totaling approximately $4.6 million
    (486 million yen) and given lump-sum payments of almost $19,000 (2
    million yen) each and a letter of apology signed by the Prime Minister
    to more than 170 women. These women also received medical and welfare
    assistance from the AWF. In 1998 the AWF reached an agreement with a
    Dutch affiliate to start compensation payments to former Dutch comfort
    women. Government officials estimate that up to 100 Dutch women were
    forced to provide sexual services during World War II.
        The Government's refusal to pay direct compensation continues to
    draw international criticism. In December a coalition of NGO's held the
    Women's International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo, a 5day long mock
    trial designed to publicize the plight of former comfort women and the
    sentiment among many that the Government had not taken responsibility
    adequately for the abuses suffered by comfort women during World War
    II. In September, 15 former comfort women filed a class action lawsuit
    in a U.S. federal district court against the Japanese Government
    seeking compensation and an apology. At year's end, the case was
    pending. Similar lawsuits have been filed in other jurisdictions in
    previous years. In 1998 the Yamaguchi District Court ordered the
    Government to pay $2,542 (300,000 yen) in state compensation to three
    Korean former sex slaves for neglecting its constitutional duty to
    enact compensation legislation following the Government's 1993
    admission. However, the Court denied the plaintiffs' demand for an
    official government apology. This was the first court judgment rendered
    in favor of foreign war victims. Five other cases concerning former
    comfort women are pending in Tokyo District Court.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
    welfare, and in general, the rights of children are protected
    adequately. Boys and girls have equal access to health care and other
    public services. Education is free and compulsory through the lower
    secondary level (age 14). Education is available widely to students who
    meet minimum academic standards at the upper secondary level through
    the age of 18.
        Public attention also is focused increasingly on reports of
    frequent child abuse in the home. According to the National Police
    Agency, 44 children died of abuse or neglect, one less than in 1999.
    However, the number of child abuse cases increased 55 percent during
    the year. The police investigated 186 cases of child abuse during the
    year, in which 182 adults were arrested and 166 children put into state
    protection. Child protection centers also dealt with 12,411 cases of
    abuse, an increase of 60 percent over the previous year. A March 1999
    report by the Ministry of Health and Welfare warned that recent cuts in
    funding by local governments to centers handling child abuse cases was
    exacerbating the problem, particularly since caseloads at counseling
    centers nearly doubled from 1988 to 1996. However, in May the Diet's
    enactment of a law granting child welfare officials authority to
    prohibit abusive parents from meeting or communicating with their
    children raised public awareness of the problem of child abuse. The law
    also bans abuse under the guise of discipline and obliges teachers,
    doctors, and welfare officials to report any suspicious circumstances.
        Severe bullying (``ijime'') continued to be a societal concern, at
    elementary and junior high schools, bullying most often involves verbal
    abuse, with physical abuse occurring more often at the high school
    level. However, because many cases go unreported, it is difficult to
    determine the exact number. According to a 1998 Management and
    Coordination Agency study, one in three elementary and junior high
    school students has been bullied, but more than one-third of the
    victims did not report the bullying to anyone. An Education Ministry
    survey released in August reported 18,900 cases of student-on-student
    violence in public schools during the 1999-2000 academic year. In June
    a court ruling linked an elementary school boy's 1994 suicide to
    corporal punishment inflicted by his teacher apparently this was the
    first time a teacher has been held accountable for such action by the
    courts. Educators, lawyers, and members of the boy and teacher's
    families residing in the Hyogo region where the incident occurred set
    up committees on classroom discipline and hot lines designed to prevent
    similar violence in the future. In addition to compiling statistics on
    bullying and consulting with various groups concerned with children's
    welfare, the Ministry of Justice's Office of the Ombudsman for
    Children's Rights provides counseling services for children 18 years of
    age and younger who have been victims of bullying.
        Teachers also increasingly are becoming the targets of student
    violence. Education Ministry statistics for 1999 showed an 11.2 percent
    increase in assaults on teachers by students from the previous year.
        In previous years, both the Government and society in general
    appeared to take a lenient attitude toward teenage prostitution and
    dating for money (which may or may not have involved sexual
    activities). However, in 1999 the Diet passed a law, which went into
    effect late that year, banning sex with children under age 18 as well
    as the production, sale, or distribution of child pornography. The law
    has reduced the open availability of child pornography. The law was
    passed following heightened public attention to a growing problem of
    teenage prostitution and international criticism over Japan's lax laws
    on child pornography. And, whereas in 1998 INTERPOL estimated that 80
    percent of Internet sites with child pornography originated in Japan,
    by late 1999, after passage of the law, the police reported most of
    these locations had either disappeared entirely or were accessible only
    at random hours so as to avoid detection and arrest. Since April 1999,
    operators of pornographic home pages and suppliers of pornographic
    images have been required to register with local safety commissions and
    to ban offering such pages to persons under the age of 18. However,
    teenage prostitution and dating for money continued to be a societal
    concern. Through October the police arrested 508 persons for
    patronizing teenage prostitutes.
        Under juvenile law, juvenile suspects are tried in family court and
    have the right of appeal to an appellate court. Family court
    proceedings are not open to the public, a policy that has been
    criticized by family members of juvenile crime victims. The number of
    juveniles arrested and sent to prosecutors was down 6.3 percent in
    1999, according to the National Police Agency.
        During the year, the Tokyo prefectural government put into effect
    programs to protect the welfare of stateless children, whose births
    their illegal immigrant mothers refused to register for fear of
    forcible repatriation. Justice Ministry statistics showed 837 stateless
    minors under age 5 in 1999.
        People with Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
    to buildings for the disabled; however, 1994 legislation on
    construction standards for public facilities allows operators of
    hospitals, theaters, hotels, and similar enterprises to receive low-
    interest loans and tax breaks if they build wide entrances and
    elevators to accommodate those with disabilities. There are an
    estimated 2.9 million physically disabled and roughly 2 million
    mentally disabled persons. Although not generally subject to overt
    discrimination in employment, education, or in the provision of other
    state services, the disabled face limited access to public
    transportation, ``mainstream'' public education, and other facilities.
    In November the barrier free transportation law took effect requiring
    public transport systems to take measures to make their facilities more
    accessible to the disabled as well as the elderly. In January revisions
    to the Civil Code went into effect to enable persons with hearing
    problems or speech impediments to create valid wills; previously they
    could not because they cannot ``convey orally'' to a notary the
    contents of a will or affirm that the text the notary reads back to
    them is correct.
        The Deliberation Panel on the Employment of the Handicapped, which
    operates within the Ministry of Labor, has mandated since 1976 that
    private companies with 300 or more employees hire a fixed minimum
    proportion of disabled persons. The penalty for noncompliance is a
    fine. A 1998 cabinet directive ordered private companies to raise the
    proportion of physically disabled persons in their work force from 1.6
    to 1.8 percent and raised the percentage of disabled persons among
    civil servants from 2 to 2.1 percent.
        An amendment to the Law to Promote the Employment of the
    Handicapped to include the mentally disabled took effect in 1998. The
    amendment also loosened the licensing requirements for community
    support centers that promote employment for the disabled, and it
    introduced government subsidies for the employment of mentally disabled
    persons in part-time jobs.
        In 1995 the Headquarters for Promoting the Welfare of Disabled
    Persons, set up by the Prime Minister's Office, recommended that
    municipalities draw up formal plans for the care of disabled citizens
    by the end of March 1997. In 1996 the Ministry of Health and Welfare
    also instructed local governments to set numerical targets for the
    number of home help providers and care facilities allocated to the
    disabled. However, only one-third of the nation's municipalities have
    formal care plans for disabled citizens.
        Women's and disabled person's advocacy groups continue to press for
    a government investigation into sterilization cases that were carried
    out between 1949 and 1992, a formal government apology, and
    compensation (see Section 1.f.).
        Indigenous People.--The Ainu are a people descended from the first
    inhabitants of Japan. Under an 1899 law, the Government pursued a
    policy of forced assimilation, imposing mandatory Japaneselanguage
    education and denying the Ainu their right to continue traditional
    practices. The law also left the Ainu with control of only
    approximately 0.15 percent of their original land holdings.
        In 1997 the Sapporo District Court ruled that the Ainu were a
    minority aboriginal race, and later that year the Diet passed the Law
    to Promote Ainu Culture. The law officially recognized the Ainu as an
    ethnic minority and required all prefectural governments to develop
    basic programs for promoting Ainu culture and traditions. It canceled a
    series of previous laws that discriminated against the Ainu, including
    an 1899 law. However, the law stopped short of recognizing the Ainu as
    the indigenous people of Hokkaido and also failed to address whether
    they deserved special rights as a distinct ethnic group. The new law
    did not mandate civil rights protection for the Ainu. A nonbinding
    accompanying resolution referred to the Ainu as a legal Japanese
    minority. A 1998 report submitted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur to the
    16th U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations stated that the Ainu
    had never entered into a consensual juridical relationship with any
    state and stated that the lack of such an agreement deprived them of
    their rights. Many Ainu criticize the Law to Promote Ainu Culture for
    not advancing Ainu political rights and criticize the Government for
    not providing funds for noncultural activities that would improve Ainu
    living conditions or financial status.
        The Ainu continue to face societal discrimination while engaging in
    an uphill struggle against complete assimilation. An Ainulanguage
    newspaper was established in 1997. In 1998 a local Hokkaido radio
    station began broadcasting a weekly 15minute Ainu-language program.
    Also in 1998, the Japan Ainu Association, a nationwide organization of
    Ainu, was established to lobby the Government for economic assistance
    and greater social welfare benefits for Ainu throughout the country.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The homogeneous nature of
    Japanese society impedes the integration of minority groups. This
    historically has affected Burakumin, Koreans, and alien workers.
        The Burakumin (descendants of feudal era ``outcasts'' who practiced
    ``unclean'' professions such as butchering and undertaking), although
    not subject to governmental discrimination, are frequently victims of
    entrenched societal discrimination, including restricted access to
    housing and employment opportunities. They are estimated to number
    approximately 3 million, but most prefer to hide their identity. In a
    1993 government survey, 33 percent of Burakumin said that they suffered
    discrimination at some point during their lifetime, with 24 percent
    experiencing difficulties in marriage, 24 percent in daily life, and 21
    percent at their place of work. Beginning in 1969, the Government
    introduced with some success a number of social, economic, and legal
    programs designed to improve conditions for the Burakumin and hasten
    their assimilation into mainstream society. However, in recent years,
    some within the Burakumin community have questioned whether
    assimilation is an appropriate goal. When the basic legislation to
    provide funding for Burakumin programs expired in 1997, the Government
    enacted legislation effective for 5 years that retains 15 of the
    original 45 programs for Buraku communities.
        In 1997 the Buraku Liberation League rewrote its manifesto for the
    first time in 13 years, placing less emphasis on class struggle and
    more emphasis on civil rights, social welfare, and the environment. The
    new platform also replaced the term Burakumin (hamlet people) with
    Buraku Jumin (hamlet residents), to try to debunk the false concept
    that these people are a different race from other Japanese. The
    platform was adopted at a national convention.
        According to the Ministry of Justice, there were nearly 1.5 million
    legal foreign residents as of December 31, 1999, accounting for 1.23
    percent of the population. Of these approximately 636,500 were ethnic
    Koreans, followed by 294,200 Chinese, and 224,300 Brazilians. The
    number of Korean residents--a record low 40.9 percent of the foreign
    population in 1999--has been decreasing steadily as Korean nationals
    naturalize or marry Japanese, which allows their children to gain
    Japanese citizenship automatically. Despite improvements in legal
    safeguards against discrimination, Korean permanent residents (most of
    whom were born, raised, and educated in Japan) still are subject to
    various forms of deeply entrenched societal discrimination.
        Other foreigners also are subject to discrimination. There is a
    widespread perception that many crimes are committed by foreigners. In
    May the governor of Tokyo stated publicly that foreigners in the
    country might riot after an earthquake and warned that the country's
    self defense forces should be prepared. In December the Tokyo police
    admitted that as part of an anticrime effort, 700 posters, which
    ultimately were not used, had been issued to police stations to post in
    the Tokyo area that noted the increase in crime among foreigners,
    particularly among Chinese, and that urged citizens to call the police
    if they heard persons speaking Chinese. Justice Ministry officials in
    Toyama Prefecture ordered several shops to remove notices printed in
    English and Russian that warned persons they could not enter the stores
    if they did not understand Japanese on the grounds that the notices
    constituted racial discrimination.
        By law aliens with 5 years of continuous residence are eligible for
    naturalization and the simultaneous acquisition of citizenship rights,
    including the right to vote. However, in practice most eligible aliens
    choose not to apply for citizenship, in part due to fears that their
    cultural identity thereby would be lost. Obstacles to naturalization
    include broad discretion available to adjudicating officers and great
    emphasis on Japanese language ability. Naturalization procedures also
    require an extensive background check, including inquiries into the
    applicant's economic status and assimilation into Japanese society.
    Koreans are given the option of adopting a Japanese surname. The
    Government defends its naturalization procedures as being necessary to
    ensure the smooth assimilation of foreigners into Japanese society.
    Alien permanent residents may live abroad up to 4 or 5 years without
    losing their right to permanent residence the country.
        In 1995 the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not bar
    permanent foreign residents from voting in local elections. However,
    the Court also ruled that existing laws denying voting rights to
    foreign residents are not unconstitutional. In April and in August, the
    Supreme Court upheld Nagoya and Osaka High Court decisions rejecting
    appeals by Korean permanent residents demanding the right to vote in
    local elections. The courts have consistently ruled that limiting the
    vote to Japanese nationals is constitutional, but that the Diet could
    legislate suffrage for foreign residents. A ruling coalition proposal
    to submit such legislation for Diet approval was a major point of
    discussion during Korean President Kim Daejung's visit to Tokyo in
    September. However, at year's end the Government had not introduced the
    proposed legislation. In March 1999, the Osaka Prefectural Assembly
    passed a measure granting permanent residents local suffrage, becoming
    the third prefecture to pass such a bill.
        Under the School Education Law, students attending Chinese, Korean,
    or other non-Japanese schools are not eligible to take national
    university examinations. However, in August the Education Ministry
    announced that beginning in 2001, graduates of non-Japanese schools
    would be eligible to take national university examinations if they pass
    a state-run high school equivalency test. A number of local governments
    provide subsidies to Korean schools; the central Government does not
    subsidize any non-Japanese language schools.
        In April a revised law to end the practice of fingerprinting
    permanent foreign residents went into effect. Instead of
    fingerprinting, the Government established a family registry system
    that uses the resident's picture and signature and contains information
    on parents and spouses living in the country, a system similar to that
    used for Japanese nationals. All foreign residents still are required
    to carry alien registration certificates at all times, but the revised
    law reduces the penalties imposed on those found without documentation.
    The Government restored a Korean woman's permanent residency status 2
    days after the new law entered into effect, 14 years after she had lost
    it for refusing to be fingerprinted.
        In 1996 the Home Affairs Ministry reversed the long-held national
    policy of opposition to localities lifting the Japanese nationality
    requirement for public servants. However, the Ministry instructed local
    governments to restrict noncitizens' access to jobs that involved the
    exercise of public authority and formation of public opinion. The
    directive also required local governments to clearly state which jobs
    were closed to noncitizens. Some of the jobs considered off limits
    include tax collection, construction permit issuance, sanitation
    inspection, and firefighting.
        Several local governments already have changed their rules in
    response to the Government's new position. In 1999 the Hakodate
    municipal government began to allow foreign residents to take
    employment tests for all city jobs except firefighters. According to a
    1997 joint survey conducted by the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal
    Workers Union and the Korean Residents Association in Japan, 19.8
    percent of local governments still forbid the hiring of noncitizens.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of workers to associate freely in unions. Approximately 12
    million workers, 22 percent of all employees, belong to labor unions.
    Unions are free of government control and influence. Most unions are
    involved in political activity as well as labor relations, but they are
    not controlled by political parties. The Japanese Trade Union
    Confederation, which represents 7.6 million workers and was formed in
    1989 through the merger of several confederations, is the largest labor
    organization. There is no requirement for a single trade union
    structure, and there are no restrictions on who may be a union
    official. Members of the armed forces, police, and firefighters are not
    permitted to form unions or to strike. These restrictions have led to a
    long-running dispute before the International Labor Organization's
    (ILO) Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
    over the observance of ILO Convention 98 concerning the right to
    organize and bargain collectively. The Committee has observed that
    these public employees have a limited capacity to participate in the
    process of determining their wages and has asked the Government to
    consider any measures it could take to encourage negotiations with
    public employees.
        The right to strike, implicit in the Constitution, is exercised.
    During 1999 87,000 workdays involving 26,000 employees were lost to
    strikes. The law prohibits retribution against strikers and is enforced
    effectively. Public employees do not have the right to strike.
        Unions are free to affiliate internationally and are active in
    international bodies, most notably the International Confederation of
    Free Trade Unions, and maintain extensive international contacts.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides unions with the right to organize, bargain, and
    act collectively. These rights are exercised freely, and collective
    bargaining is practiced widely. The annual ``Spring Wage Offensive,''
    in which individual unions in each industry conduct negotiations
    simultaneously with their firms, involves nationwide participation.
    Management usually consults closely with its enterprise union. However,
    trade unions are independent of management and aggressively pursue the
    interests of their workers. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination,
    and adequate mechanisms exist for resolving cases that occur, including
    the reinstatement with back wages of any workers fired for union
    activities. However, the collective bargaining rights of public
    employees are limited. The Government determines the pay of government
    employees based on a recommendation by the independent National
    Personnel Authority.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    provides that no person shall be held in bondage of any kind.
    Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.
    Although children are not specified in the provision, this legal
    prohibition against forced or compulsory labor applies equally to
    adults and to children. Although in general forced or bonded labor does
    not occur, women are trafficked to Japan and coerced into prostitution
    (see Section 6.f.).
        In September a U.S. federal judge dismissed 13 lawsuits filed by
    former Allied prisoners of war against several Japanese companies
    seeking compensation for forced labor during World War II on the
    grounds that these claims were settled by the 1951 San Francisco Treaty
    of Peace with Japan barring war-related claims. The judge did not rule
    on whether similar suits filed by plaintiffs from China and South
    Korea, which were not signatories to the Treaty, could continue.
    Survivors and families of Chinese and Korean workers also continue to
    press claims for damages and compensation for their forced labor during
    the war, both in Japanese civil courts and in complaints to the ILO. In
    1999 the Tokyo High Court ordered the Kajima Corporation to settle with
    Chinese wartime laborers and their survivors for forced labor at the
    Hanaoka copper mine it operated during the war. On November 29, the
    Kajima Corporation agreed to establish a $4.6 million (500 million yen)
    fund to be administered by the Chinese Red Cross to compensate wartime
    workers. This was the first such settlement with Chinese forced to work
    in Japan during the war; however, the Kajima Corporation noted that the
    settlement did not represent an official acknowledgement of liability
    for events at the mine. An ILO committee has called on the Government
    to take additional measures to satisfy individual Chinese and Korean
    victims of forced labor during the war.
        The Asian Women's Fund continued to support former comfort women,
    who were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese troops during
    World War II (see Section 5).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution bans the exploitation of children. Both
    societal values and the rigorous enforcement of the Labor Standards Law
    protect children from exploitation in the workplace. The Government
    prohibits forced or bonded labor, including that performed by children
    and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        Child labor is virtually nonexistent. By law children under the age
    of 15 may not be employed, and those under age 18 may not be employed
    in dangerous or harmful jobs. The Labor Inspection Division of the
    Ministry of Labor, which vigorously enforces the Labor Standards Law,
    reports no violations. Society places an extremely high value on
    education, which is compulsory through the lower secondary (i.e., ninth
    grade) level. Enrollment levels for both boys and girls through the
    free and widely available upper secondary level (age 18) exceed 95
    percent.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are set on a
    regional (prefectural) and industry basis, with the input of tripartite
    (workers, employers, public interest) advisory councils. Employers
    covered by a minimum wage must post the concerned minimum wages, and
    compliance with minimum wages is considered widespread. Minimum wage
    rates, effective during the year, ranged from $53 (5,560 yen) per day
    in Tokyo and Osaka to $46 (4,795 yen) in Miyazaki, Aomori, Iwate, and
    Akita prefectures and are considered sufficient to provide a worker and
    family with a decent standard of living. The Labor Standards Law
    provides for a 40-hour workweek for most industries and mandates
    premium pay for hours worked over 40 in a week, or 8 in a day. However,
    labor unions frequently criticize the Government for failing to enforce
    maximum working hour regulations in smaller firms.
        The Immigration Bureau of the Justice Ministry estimated that, as
    of January 1, there were 251,697 foreign nationals residing illegally
    in the country. Illegal immigrants come primarily from South Korea, the
    Philippines, China, Thailand, and Malaysia.
        While many foreign illegal residents came in search of better
    paying manufacturing and construction jobs, these opportunities
    decreased during the economic slowdown. Thus more of the foreign
    workers are unemployed or marginally employed. Activist groups claim
    that employers exploit or discriminate against foreign workers, who
    often have little or no knowledge of the Japanese language or their
    legal rights. The Government has tried to reduce the inflow of illegal
    foreign workers by prosecuting employers. Recent revisions of the
    Immigration Law provide for penalties against employers of undocumented
    foreign workers. Suspected foreign workers also may be denied entry for
    passport, visa, and entry application irregularities. The August 1999
    revision to the immigration law also established penalties for illegal
    stays separate from existing injunctions against illegal entry. The
    Government continues to study the foreign worker issue, and several
    citizens' groups are working with illegal foreign workers to improve
    their access to information on worker rights.
        The Ministry of Labor effectively administers various laws and
    regulations governing occupational health and safety, principal among
    which is the 1972 Industrial Safety and Health Law. Standards are set
    by the Ministry of Labor and issued after consultation with the
    Standing Committee on Safety and Health of the Central Labor Standards
    Council. Labor inspectors have the authority to suspend unsafe
    operations immediately, and the law provides that workers may voice
    concerns over occupational safety and remove themselves from unsafe
    working conditions without jeopardizing their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law specifically prohibits
    trafficking, and there are provisions that could be used to combat it,
    the trafficking of persons, and particularly of women into the country
    for sexual purposes, is a problem. The Constitution prohibits holding
    persons in bondage; and in April 1999 the Law on Control and
    Improvement of Amusement Businesses was amended in order to supplement
    the Prostitution Prevention Act as an instrument against trafficking.
    The amended law sanctions employers rather than just sanctioning
    prostitute/victims and requires the Government to refuse to grant or to
    revoke the business license of anyone convicted of the ``crime of
    encouragement'' to engage in prostitution. The Penal Code contains
    articles that forbid the illegal arrest or confinement of another, as
    well as the kidnaping of another for profit. Labor and immigration laws
    also contain provisions relevant to trafficking victims. However,
    relatively few persons ever are prosecuted in connection with
    trafficking and forced sexual servitude; those who are prosecuted
    generally are prosecuted in connection with violations of immigration
    law. In May 1999 the Diet enacted a law intended to prevent all forms
    of sexual exploitation of children, whether trafficked or not, which
    imposes a 1- to 3-year sentence on anyone convicted of trading in
    children for the purpose of child prostitution or child pornography
    (see Section 5).
        In 1998 the U.N. Committee on Human Rights noted that ``traffic in
    women and insufficient protection for women subject to trafficking and
    slavery-like practices remain serious concerns.'' Japan is a
    destination country for trafficking in women for purposes of sexual
    exploitation. Brokers in source countries (e.g., the Philippines, the
    states of the former Soviet Union, and Thailand) recruit women and
    ``sell'' them to Japanese intermediaries, who in turn coerce them into
    the sex trade by subjecting them to excessive debts and seizing their
    passports. Agents, brokers, and employers involved in trafficking for
    the sex trade often have ties to organized crime. Reliable statistics
    on the number and origin of women trafficked to the country are
    unavailable, but a government-funded study released in August found
    that nearly twothirds of foreign women surveyed following arrests for
    immigration offenses stated that they were working in the sex industry
    under duress. Ministry of Justice statistics indicated that 1.5 percent
    of the 24,661 women deported in 1999 were deported as prostitutes
    (others who worked in the sex industry were deported for other
    reasons). According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 126,982
    foreign women who overstayed their visas in 1998; it is not known how
    many such women are involved in the sex industry or have been
    trafficked. Many women who are trafficked into the country,
    particularly from the Philippines, enter on entertainment visas. An
    estimated 40,000 women from the Philippines enter the country each year
    on such visas. ``Entertainers'' are not covered by the Labor Standards
    Law, and have no minimum wage protections; however, there are
    indications that they may be somewhat less vulnerable to abuse by
    employers than female migrant workers entering on other types of visas
    or illegally.
        During the year, Human Rights Watch published an extensive report
    on Thai women in Japan. According to the report, many Thai women are
    enticed to come to the country with offers of lucrative legitimate
    employment, only to be forced into the sex industry; many others
    reportedly know that they will work in the sex trade. The passports of
    the trafficked women usually are confiscated by their ``employers,''
    leaving them unable to escape their circumstances.
        The Government makes little effort to assist victims of trafficking
    for sexual purposes other than to house them temporarily in facilities
    established under the Antiprostitution Law, in detention centers for
    illegal immigrants, or through referrals to shelters run by NGO's;
    generally they are deported as illegal aliens. Women without
    documentation or sufficient funds to return to their country of origin
    may be detained for long periods. Several NGO's provide assistance to
    trafficking victims.
        In recent years there has been a surge in the smuggling of illegal
    immigrants from China. These illegal immigrants often are held in debt
    bondage to make them pay off the smugglers.
                                   __________

                                    KIRIBATI

        Kiribati is a constitutional republic with a popularly elected
    president and a legislative assembly, 40 members of which are elected
    by universal adult suffrage, and 2 of whom are members by virtue of
    their office. The country has a population of 87,000, which occupies 33
    small islands widely scattered across 1.365 million square miles of the
    central Pacific. The population is primarily Micronesian, with a
    significant component of Polynesian origin. The judiciary is
    independent.
        A police force of about 250 personnel is controlled effectively by
    civilian authority.
        Economic activity consists primarily of subsistence agriculture and
    fishing. The islands' isolation and meager resources, including poor
    soil and limited arable land, severely limit prospects for economic
    development.
        The Government generally respected citizens' human rights; however,
    in the traditional culture, women occupy a subordinate role and have
    limited job opportunities.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
    are forbidden by the Constitution; however, traditional practice
    permits corporal punishment for criminal acts and other transgressions.
    On some outer islands, the island councils occasionally order strokes
    with palm fronds to be administered for public drunkenness and other
    minor offenses, such as petty thievery.
        Prisons meet minimum international standards. There are separate
    facilities for men and women. Family members and church representatives
    are allowed access to prisoners.
        The question of monitoring prison conditions by local human rights
    groups has not arisen, and no policy concerning such monitoring has
    been formulated.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    respects these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
    free of governmental interference.
        The judiciary consists of a high court, magistrate courts, a court
    of appeal, and land courts. Litigants also have the right of appeal to
    the Privy Council in London.
        The right to a fair public trial is provided by law and observed in
    practice. The Constitution provides that an accused person be informed
    of the nature of the offense with which he is charged and be provided
    adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. The right to
    confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions is
    provided for in law. Procedural safeguards are based on English common
    law.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanctions.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice; however, there were some instances
    in which the Government limited these rights.
        In May a former president established the country's first private
    newspaper, which enabled the opposition to present views divergent from
    those in the government-owned newspaper. The sole radio station is
    government owned; it regularly broadcasts Radio Australia programming.
    An opposition attempt to operate a private radio station was blocked in
    1999 when the Government closed the station and fined the owners for
    attempting to import broadcasting equipment without a license. A
    foreign journalist remains barred from entering the country after
    cabinet officials stated in 1999 that the journalist's articles ``gave
    a bad impression of the country.'' Churches published newsletters and
    other periodicals. High costs limited the availability of foreign print
    media and Internet access, but there were no Government imposed
    limitations.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly and association, including the right
    to form or belong to associations for the advancement or protection of
    a group's interests, and the Government does not impose any
    restrictions on these rights in practice. A permit is required for a
    public gathering, but these are granted routinely.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        There were no reports of refugees. The Government has not
    formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens choose the Government in periodic free and open elections.
    The President is elected for a 4-year term and exercises executive
    authority. No less than three and no more than four presidential
    candidates are nominated by the elected Legislative Assembly from among
    its members. Under the Constitution, the President is limited to three
    terms.
        In free and fair elections, voters reelected President Teburoro
    Tito to a second term in November 1998, with 52.3 percent of the votes.
    Most of President Tito's cabinet ministers have served in the previous
    cabinet.
        Women are underrepresented in politics and government. Two women
    hold permanent secretary positions, and there is 1 in the 42-member
    Parliament.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no restrictions on the formation of local nongovernmental
    organizations that concern themselves with human rights, but none have
    been formed. There have been no reported allegations of human rights
    violations by the Government and no known requests for investigations.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    creed, national origin, or sex, and the Government generally observed
    this prohibition in practice. Society is fundamentally egalitarian and
    has no privileged class.
        Women.--Violence against women does not appear to be a major
    problem in this isolated, rural society. Rape is a crime, and the law
    is enforced when charges are brought to court, although it is suspected
    that prosecutions are relatively infrequent. Wife battering
    traditionally is addressed through communal pressure.
        The traditional culture, in which men are dominant, has impeded a
    more active role for women in the economy. However, women slowly are
    finding work in unskilled and semiskilled occupations. The Government
    has increased its hiring and promotions of women to some extent;
    however, women may not work at night except under specified
    circumstances (generally in service jobs such as hotel clerks).
    Statistics on the participation of women in the work force and on
    comparative wages were unavailable. Women have full rights of ownership
    and inheritance of property. Women have full and equal access to
    education.
        Children.--Within its limited financial resources, the Government
    makes adequate expenditures for child welfare. Primary education is
    compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12 years. The 40
    percent of primary school graduates who pass a national examination
    qualify to attend secondary school; a small fee is charged for
    matriculation at a secondary school.
        If child abuse exists, it is rare and has not become a source of
    societal concern.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence or complaint of
    discrimination in employment, education, or provision of other state
    services. Accessibility for the disabled has not been mandated.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Freedom of association is provided
    for in the Constitution. Workers are free to organize unions and choose
    their representatives. The Government does not control or restrict
    unions. Over 90 percent of the work force is occupied in fishing or
    subsistence farming, but the small wage sector has a relatively strong
    and effective trade union movement. In 1982 the seven registered trade
    unions merged to form the Kiribati Trade Union Congress (KTUC); which
    has approximately 2,500 members, mostly from the public service sector.
    The law provides for the right to strike. However, strikes are rare,
    the last one took place in 1980.
        Unions are free to affiliate internationally. The KTUC is
    affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is provided for under the Industrial Relations Code. The
    Government sets wages in the large public sector. However, in a few
    statutory bodies and government-owned companies, employees may
    negotiate wages and other conditions. In the private sector, individual
    employees also may negotiate wages with employers. In keeping with
    tradition, negotiations are generally nonconfrontational. There have
    been no reports of antiunion discrimination. However, mechanisms exist
    for resolving any such complaints.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not practiced. The
    prohibition does not specifically mention children, but forced and
    bonded labor by children is not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
    of 14. Primary education is compulsory for children between the ages of
    6 and 12. Children through the age of 15 are prohibited from industrial
    employment and employment aboard ships. Labor officers from the
    Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Employment generally enforce these
    laws effectively, given the rudimentary conditions of the economy and
    its industrial relations system. Children rarely are employed outside
    the traditional economy. Although not prohibited specifically, forced
    and bonded labor by children is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government has taken no
    concrete action to implement longstanding legislation authorizing the
    establishment of minimum wages. Income tends to be pooled within the
    extended family, and the standard income is adequate. There is no
    legislatively prescribed workweek. Workers in the public sector (80
    percent of the wage-earning work force) work 36.25 hours per week, with
    overtime pay for additional hours.
        Employment laws provide rudimentary health and safety standards for
    the workplace. For example, employers must provide an adequate supply
    of clean water for workers and ensure the existence of sanitary toilet
    facilities. Employers are liable for the expenses of workers injured on
    the job. The Government's ability to enforce employment laws is
    hampered by a lack of qualified personnel. Workers cannot remove
    themselves from hazardous work sites without risking loss of
    employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
    in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
    to, from, through, or within the country.
                                   __________

                     DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

        The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship
    under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung
    led the DPRK from its inception until his death in 1994. Since then his
    son Kim Jong Il has exercised unchallenged authority. Kim Jong Il was
    named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997. In September 1998,
    the Supreme People's Assembly reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman of
    the National Defense Commission and declared that position the
    ``highest office of state.'' The presidency was abolished leaving the
    late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only president. The titular Head of
    State is Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme
    People's Assembly. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continue to be the
    objects of intense personality cults. The regime emphasizes ``juche,''
    a national ideology of self-reliance. The judiciary is not independent.
        The Korean People's Army is the primary organization responsible
    for external security. It is assisted by a large military reserve force
    and several quasi-military organizations, including the Worker-Peasant
    Red Guards and the People's Security Force. These organizations assist
    the Ministry of Public Security and cadres of the KWP in maintaining
    internal security. Members of the security forces committed serious
    human rights abuses.
        The State directs all significant economic activity, and only
    government-controlled labor unions are permitted. Industry continued to
    operate at much-reduced capacity that reflects antiquated plant and
    equipment and a severe shortage of inputs. This decline is due in part
    to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and East European Communist
    governments and the consequent sharp decline in trade and aid. Efforts
    at recovery have been hampered by heavy military spending--which
    amounted to perhaps a quarter of gross domestic product before the
    economy went into decline and is probably now a larger share of
    national output. It also is held back by a lack of access to commercial
    lending stemming from the DPRK's default on its foreign debt and its
    inability to obtain loans from international financial institutions.
    Never food self-sufficient, the country relies on trade to supplement
    domestic production, which has been hobbled by disastrous agricultural
    policies. Since 1995 nearly annual droughts and floods have destroyed
    crops and ruined agricultural land, and hunger and malnutrition have
    been widespread. Famine has caused internal dislocation, widespread
    malnutrition, and approximately a million deaths from starvation and
    related diseases. Economic and political conditions have caused
    thousands of persons to flee their homes. The Government continued to
    seek international food aid, produce ``alternative foods,'' and take
    steps to boost production. It has supported the spread of farmers'
    markets to make up for the contraction of food supplied through the
    public distribution system. Food, clothing, and energy are rationed
    throughout the country. The U.N.'s World Food Program provides
    assistance to the elderly, children and mothers, and persons employed
    in flood damage recovery efforts.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it
    continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the
    right to change their government peacefully. There continued to be
    reports of extrajudicial killings and disappearances. Citizens are
    detained arbitrarily, and many are held as political prisoners; prison
    conditions are harsh. The constitutional provisions for an independent
    judiciary and fair trials are not implemented in practice. The regime
    subjects its citizens to rigid controls. The leadership perceives most
    international norms of human rights, especially individual rights, as
    illegitimate, alien, and subversive to the goals of the State and
    party. The Penal Code is draconian, stipulating capital punishment and
    confiscation of all assets for a wide variety of ``crimes against the
    revolution,'' including defection, attempted defection, slander of the
    policies of the party or State, listening to foreign broadcasts,
    writing ``reactionary'' letters, and possessing reactionary printed
    matter. The Government prohibits freedom of speech, the press,
    assembly, and association, and all forms of cultural and media
    activities are under the tight control of the party. Radios sold in
    North Korea receive North Korean radio broadcasts only; radios obtained
    abroad by the general public must be altered to work in a similar
    manner. Cable News Network (CNN) television is available in one
    Pyongyang hotel frequented by foreigners. Under these circumstances,
    little outside information reaches the public except that approved and
    disseminated by the Government. The Government restricts freedom of
    religion, citizens' movements, and worker rights. There were reports of
    trafficking in women and young girls among refugees and workers
    crossing the border into China.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Defectors and
    refugees report that the regime executes political prisoners, opponents
    of the regime, repatriated defectors, and others (reportedly including
    military officers suspected of espionage or of plotting against Kim
    Jong Il). Criminal law makes the death penalty mandatory for activities
    ``in collusion with imperialists'' aimed at ``suppressing the national
    liberation struggle.'' Some prisoners are sentenced to death for such
    ill-defined ``crimes'' as ``ideological divergence,'' ``opposing
    socialism,'' and other ``counterrevolutionary crimes.'' In some cases,
    executions reportedly were carried out at public meetings attended by
    workers, students, and school children. Executions also have been
    carried out before assembled inmates at places of detention. Border
    guards reportedly have orders to shoot-to-kill potential defectors (see
    Section 2.d.).
        Religious and human rights groups outside the country report that
    members of underground churches have been killed because of their
    religious beliefs and suspected contacts with overseas evangelical
    groups operating across the Chinese border (see Section 2.c.).
        In August 1998, a Reuters report stated that, following a March
    1998 coup attempt, authorities arrested several thousand members of the
    armed forces and executed many of them.
        Many prisoners reportedly have died from disease, starvation, or
    exposure (see Section 1.c.).
        According to unconfirmed press reports from Japan and the Republic
    of Korea in 1997, several senior party officials were executed publicly
    in September 1997. The Kyodo News Network reported that Seo Kwan Hui,
    Secretary of Agriculture for the KWP, and 17 other senior officials,
    including some from the army and from the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth
    League, were executed for corruption and working for South Korea. In
    1998 Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that among those executed were
    a four-star general who ran the Political Bureau of the Korean People's
    Army and Choe Hyon Tok, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of
    the Supreme People's Assembly. According to the AFP, seven persons in
    this group were executed by firing squad before thousands of
    spectators.
        In December a South Korean newsmagazine quoted a defector as
    stating that in 1999 in the city of Hyesan, on the border with China,
    the military had publicly executed 19 residents, secretly killed over
    20 persons, and imprisoned 600. The targets of the purge were frequent
    travelers to China and opium addicts.
        Another South Korean newsmagazine reported that there were at least
    20 public executions during 1997 either for economic offenses,
    including stealing cattle and electric wire, or for attempting to
    defect. Amnesty International (AI) reported in January 1997 that at
    least 23 persons had been executed publicly between 1970 and 1992 for
    offenses that reportedly included ``banditry'' and ``stealing rice from
    a train.'' Government officials reportedly told AI in 1995 that only
    one or two executions had taken place since 1985.
        North Korean officials informed AI in 1995 that Japanese citizens
    Cho Ho Pyong, his ethnic Japanese wife Koike Hideko, and their three
    young children were killed by the authorities in 1972 while attempting
    to leave the country. The authorities told AI that Cho escaped from a
    detention center where he was being held for spying and killed a guard
    in the escape.
        b. Disappearance.--The Government reportedly is responsible for
    cases of disappearance. According to defector reports, individuals
    suspected of political crimes often are taken from their homes by state
    security officials late at night and sent directly, without trial, to
    camps for political prisoners. There also have been reports of past
    DPRK involvement in the kidnaping abroad of South Koreans, Japanese,
    and other foreigners. In 1995 the Japanese press estimated that as many
    as 20 Japanese may have been kidnaped and detained in North Korea.
    According to Japanese government officials, these abductions took place
    between 1977 and 1983. In addition several suspected cases of
    kidnaping, hostage-taking, and other acts of violence apparently
    intended to intimidate ethnic Koreans living in China and Russia have
    been reported. There were unconfirmed reports that North Korean agents
    kidnaped a South Korean citizen, Reverend Dongshik Kim, in China and
    took him to North Korea in January. There is credible evidence that the
    DPRK Government may have been involved in the July 1995 abduction of a
    South Korean citizen working in China as a missionary. This missionary
    subsequently appeared publicly in North Korea and was portrayed as a
    defector. The DPRK denies that it has been involved in kidnapings.
        In November 1997, the South Korean Government arrested several
    alleged North Korean espionage agents. According to the South Korean
    Government's report on its investigation, those arrested claimed that
    three South Korean high school students, missing since 1978, had been
    kidnaped by the North Korean Government and trained as espionage
    agents. The three were identified as Kim Young Nam, who disappeared
    from Son Yu beach, and Yi Myong U and Hong Kyun Pyo, both of whom
    disappeared from Hong To island beach. According to those arrested,
    there were several other kidnapings in the late 1970's and early
    1980's.
        AI reports detail a number of cases of disappearances including
    that of Japanese citizen Shibata Kozo and his wife Shin Sung Suk, who
    left Japan in 1960 and resettled in North Korea. The authorities
    reportedly arrested Shibata in 1962 after he encouraged a demonstration
    by former Japanese residents protesting the poor treatment given them.
    In 1993 AI claimed that he was still in custody and in poor health and
    that there had been no word about his wife and three children since
    1965. In 1995 North Korean officials informed AI that Shibata Kozo, his
    wife, and children died in a train accident in early 1990, a few weeks
    after he was released from nearly 30 years in prison. However, AI
    reports that Shibata Kozo was still in custody at the time of the
    alleged accident.
        The cases of three ethnic Korean residents of Beijing, China (16,
    18, and 20 years of age), reported by AI in 1995 to have been taken to
    North Korea against their will, remained unresolved. The three were
    taken in apparent retaliation for criticism in the Japanese media of
    North Korean human rights violations made by their father, a former
    prisoner in North Korea. The North Korean authorities deny this
    allegation, claiming that the three brothers were deported to North
    Korea for breaking Chinese law and that they are now living with
    relatives.
        Numerous reports indicate that ordinary citizens are not allowed to
    mix with foreigners, and AI has reported that a number of North Koreans
    who maintained friendships with foreigners have disappeared. In at
    least one case, AI reported that a citizen who had disappeared was
    executed for maintaining a friendship with a Russian national.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--While there is no information on recent practices,
    credible reports indicate that prisoners are mistreated and that many
    have died from disease, starvation, or exposure.
        In 1998 a Polish newspaper reported the experiences of a woman who
    spent 10 years in a North Korean concentration camp before fleeing
    first to China and then to South Korea. The approximately 1,800 inmates
    in this particular camp typically worked 16 to 17 hours per day. The
    woman reported severe beatings, torture involving water forced into a
    victim's stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping on
    a board placed across the victim's abdomen, and chemical and biological
    warfare experiments allegedly conducted on inmates by the army. South
    Korean media reported that the DPRK State Security Agency manages the
    camps through use of forced labor, beatings, torture, and public
    executions.
        Prison conditions are harsh. International nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) and defector sources report that whole families,
    including children, are imprisoned together. ``Reeducation through
    labor'' is common punishment, consisting of forced labor, such as
    logging and tending crops, under harsh conditions. A small number of
    persons who claimed to have escaped from detention camps reported that
    starvation and executions are common. In one prison, clothing
    reportedly was issued only once in 3 years. AI reported the existence
    of ``punishment cells,'' too low to allow standing upright and too
    small for lying down flat, where prisoners are kept for up to several
    weeks for breaking prison rules. Visitors to North Korea reported that
    they observed prisoners being marched in leg irons, metal collars, or
    shackles.
        A former prison camp inmate who later defected to South Korea told
    the South Korean press that conditions in prison camps became more
    difficult as the food crisis worsened in the mid-1990's. With the food
    ration reduced to 2 ounces daily in 1996, 20 percent of the inmates in
    one camp died. Prisoners who tried to escape were publicly executed as
    a warning to others. Inmates were forced to find shelter in nearby
    mountains when authorities destroyed the camp's housing area in 1996 in
    anticipation of a visit by an international human rights group. The
    majority of prisoners in the camps were those who had contacted South
    Koreans, attempted to go to South Korea via China, those who studied
    abroad, and members of antigovernment groups.
        In 1999 credible witnesses reported that prisoners held on the
    basis of their religious beliefs were treated worse than other inmates
    were. One witness, a former prison guard, reported that those believing
    in God were regarded as insane, as the authorities taught that ``all
    religions are opiates.'' He recounted an instance in which a woman was
    kicked hard and left lying for days because a guard overheard her
    praying for a child who was beaten.
        The Government normally does not permit inspection of prisons by
    human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There are no
    restrictions on the ability of the Government to detain and imprison
    persons at will and to hold them incommunicado.
        Little information is available on criminal justice procedures and
    practices, and outside observation of the legal system has been limited
    to ``show trials'' for traffic violations and other minor offenses.
        Family members and other concerned persons find it virtually
    impossible to obtain information on charges against detained persons.
    Judicial review of detentions does not exist in law or in practice.
        Defectors claim that North Korea detains between 150,000 and
    200,000 persons for political reasons, sometimes along with their
    family members, in maximum security camps in remote areas. An October
    1992 report by two former inmates made reference to severe living
    conditions in what they called ``concentration camps.'' North Korean
    officials deny the existence of such prison camps but admit that there
    are ``education centers'' for persons who ``commit crimes by mistake.''
        In 1991 a North Korean defector who had been a ranking official in
    the DPRK Ministry of Public Security said that there were two types of
    detention areas. One consists of closed camps where conditions are
    extremely harsh and from which prisoners never emerge. In the other,
    prisoners can be ``rehabilitated.''
        One credible report lists a dozen political prisoner camps and
    approximately 30 forced labor and labor education camps in the DPRK. It
    is believed that some former high officials are imprisoned in the
    camps. Visitors formerly were allowed, but currently any form of
    communication with detainees, including visitors, is said to be
    prohibited.
        In mid-1999, an ethnic Korean with foreign citizenship was arrested
    for unauthorized contact with North Koreans. This person was detained
    for a month before being released.
        In May 1998, a foreigner of Korean descent was detained and held
    incommunicado for nearly 3 months before he was finally released. In
    September 1998, another foreigner of Korean descent was held
    incommunicado for more than a month for an unspecified ``violation of
    law'' before being released and expelled from the country.
        South Korean newspapers reported in 1997 that family members of
    North Korean defector Hwang Chang Yop, former head of the Juche
    Research Institute, and a senior advisor to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong
    Il, who defected to South Korea in that year, either were under house
    arrest or incarcerated in political prisons. However, visiting
    foreigners have seen some members of his family.
        In March 1999, North Korean officials in Thailand tried to detain a
    Bangkok-based North Korean diplomat, Hong Sun Gyong, and his family.
    Hong and his wife escaped from their abductors and then requested
    asylum. Their son was taken to Laos by North Korean officials but
    subsequently was allowed to rejoin his parents in Thailand.
        The Government is not reported to use forced exile. However, the
    Government routinely uses forced resettlement and has relocated many
    tens of thousands of persons from Pyongyang to the countryside.
    Although disabled veterans are treated extremely well, there are also
    reports that other physically disabled persons and those judged to be
    politically unreliable have been sent to internal exile. Often those
    relocated are selected on the basis of family background. Nonetheless,
    there is some evidence that class background is less important than in
    the past because of the regime's emphasis on the solidarity of the
    ``popular masses'' and united front efforts with overseas Koreans.
    According to unconfirmed September 1997 foreign press reports, some 500
    senior officials were sent into internal exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that
    courts are independent and that judicial proceedings are to be carried
    out in strict accordance with the law; however, an independent
    judiciary and individual rights do not exist. The Public Security
    Ministry dispenses with trials in political cases and refers defendants
    to the Ministry of State Security for imposition of punishment.
        The Constitution contains elaborate procedural protections, and it
    states that cases are heard in public, and that the accused has the
    right to a defense; hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated
    by law. When trials are held, lawyers are apparently assigned by the
    Government. Reports indicate that defense lawyers are not considered
    representatives of the accused; rather, they are expected to help the
    court by persuading the accused to confess guilt. Some reports note a
    distinction between those accused of political crimes and common
    criminals and state that the Government affords trials or lawyers only
    to the latter. The Government considers critics of the regime to be
    ``political criminals.''
        Numerous reports suggest that past political offenses have included
    such behavior as sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il Sung's picture,
    or (in the case of a professor reportedly sentenced to work as a
    laborer) noting in class that Kim Il Sung had received little formal
    education. The KWP has a special regulation protecting the images of
    Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required by this
    regulation to protect from damage any likeness of the two Kims.
    Beginning in the 1970's, the 10 Great Principles of Unique Ideology
    directed that anyone who tore or otherwise defaced a newspaper photo of
    either of the two Kims was a political criminal and punished as such.
    Defectors have reported families being punished because children had
    accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kim's. Families must
    display pictures of the two Kim's in their homes, and if local party
    officials found the family had neglected its photos, the punishment was
    to write self-criticism throughout an entire year (see Section 1.f.).
        A foreigner hired to work on foreign broadcasts for the regime was
    imprisoned for 1 year without trial for criticizing the quality of the
    regime's foreign propaganda. He then was imprisoned for 6 more years
    (with trial) shortly after his release for claiming in a private
    conversation that his original imprisonment was unjust. While AI has
    listed 58 political prisoners by name, the total number of political
    prisoners being held is much larger. Several defectors and former
    inmates reported that the total figure is approximately 150,000, while
    South Korean authorities said the total figure is about 200,000.
        The South Korean Ministry of National Unification reported to its
    National Assembly in October 1997 that North Korea held more than
    200,000 political prisoners in camps where many had frozen or starved
    to death, and that famine may have worsened conditions. The report went
    on to describe the camps as having no electricity or heating
    facilities. The report claimed that those who attempted to escape were
    executed immediately. Most camps are located in remote mountain or
    mining areas. Some reports indicated an increase in the number of
    political prisoners as North Koreans had begun to complain more openly
    about the failure of the Government's economic policies.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of
    person and residence and the privacy of correspondence; however, the
    Government does not respect these provisions in practice. The regime
    subjects its citizens to rigid controls. The state leadership perceives
    most international norms of human rights, and especially individual
    rights, as alien social concepts subversive to the goals of the State
    and party. The Government relies upon an extensive, multilevel system
    of informers to identify critics and potential troublemakers. Whole
    communities sometimes are subjected to massive security checks. The
    possession of ``reactionary material'' and listening to foreign
    broadcasts are both considered crimes that may subject the transgressor
    to harsh punishments. In some cases, entire families are punished for
    alleged political offenses committed by one member of the family. For
    example, defectors have reported families being punished because
    children had accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kims.
    Families must display pictures of the two Kims in their homes, and must
    keep them clean. Local party officials have conducted unannounced
    inspections once a month, and if the inspectors found the family had
    neglected its photos, the punishment was to write self-criticism
    throughout an entire year (see Section 1.e.).
        The Government monitors correspondence and telephones. Telephones
    essentially are restricted to domestic operation, although some
    international service is available on a very restricted basis.
        The Constitution provides for the right to petition. However, when
    an anonymous petition or complaint about state administration is
    submitted, the Ministries of State Security and Public Safety seek to
    identify the author through handwriting analysis. The suspected
    individual may be subjected to a thorough investigation and punishment.
        The regime justifies its dictatorship with arguments derived from
    concepts of collective consciousness and the superiority of the
    collective over the individual, appeals to nationalism, and citations
    of ``the juche idea.'' The authorities emphasize that the core concept
    of juche is ``the ability to act independently without regard to
    outside interference.'' Originally described as ``a creative
    application of Marxism-Leninism'' in the national context, juche is a
    malleable philosophy reinterpreted from time to time by the regime as
    its ideological needs change and used by the regime as a ``spiritual''
    underpinning for its rule.
        As defined by Kim Il Sung, juche is a quasi-mystical concept in
    which the collective will of the people is distilled into a supreme
    leader whose every act exemplifies the State and society's needs.
    Opposition to such a leader, or to the rules, regulations, and goals
    established by his regime is thus in itself opposition to the national
    interest. The regime therefore claims a social interest in identifying
    and isolating all opposition.
        Since the late 1950's, the regime has divided society into three
    main classes: ``Core,'' ``wavering,'' and ``hostile.'' These three
    classes are further subdivided into subcategories based on perceived
    loyalty to the Party and the leadership. Security ratings are assigned
    to each individual; according to some estimates, nearly half of the
    population is designated as either ``wavering'' or ``hostile.'' These
    loyalty ratings determine access to employment, higher education, place
    of residence, medical facilities, and certain stores. They also affect
    the severity of punishment in the case of legal infractions. While
    there are signs that this rigid system has been relaxed somewhat in
    recent years--for example, children of religious practitioners are no
    longer automatically barred from higher education--it remains a basic
    characteristic of KWP political control.
        Citizens with relatives who fled to South Korea at the time of the
    Korean War still appear to be classified as part of the ``hostile
    class'' in the DPRK's elaborate loyalty system. This subcategory alone
    encompasses a significant percentage of the population. One defector
    estimated that the class of those considered potentially hostile may
    comprise 25 to 30 percent of the population; others place the figure at
    closer to 20 percent. Members of this class are still subject to
    discrimination, although defectors report that their treatment has
    improved greatly in recent years.
        The authorities subject citizens of all age groups and occupations
    to intensive political and ideological indoctrination. Even after Kim
    Il Sung's death, his cult of personality and the glorification of his
    family and the official juche ideology remained omnipresent. The cult
    approaches the level of a state religion.
        The goal of indoctrination remains to ensure loyalty to the system
    and leadership, as well as conformity to the State's ideology and
    authority. The necessity for the intensification of such indoctrination
    repeatedly is stressed in the writings of Kim Jong Il, who attributes
    the collapse of the Soviet Union largely to insufficient ideological
    indoctrination, compounded by the entry of foreign influences.
        Indoctrination is carried out systematically, not only through the
    mass media, but also in schools and through worker and neighborhood
    associations. Kim Jong Il has stated that ideological education must
    take precedence over academic education in the nation's schools, and he
    has also called for the intensification of mandatory ideological study
    and discussion sessions for adult workers.
        Another aspect of the State's indoctrination system is the use of
    mass marches, rallies, and staged performances, sometimes involving
    hundreds of thousands of people. In September 1998, celebrations of the
    50th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK included hours of
    carefully choreographed demonstration of mass adulation of the
    leadership. In October similar celebrations of the 55th anniversary of
    the KWP reportedly involved upwards of 1 million persons.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
    for freedom of speech and the press, the Government prohibits the
    exercise of these rights in practice. The regime only permits
    activities that support its objectives. Articles of the Constitution
    that require citizens to follow ``Socialist norms of life'' and to obey
    a ``collective spirit'' take precedence over individual political or
    civil liberties.
        The Government strictly curtails freedom of expression. The
    authorities may punish persons for criticizing the regime or its
    policies by imprisonment or ``corrective labor.'' One defector reported
    in 1986 that a scientist, whose home was under surveillance through his
    radio set, was arrested and executed for statements that he made at
    home critical of Kim Il Sung. In another case, AI reports that a family
    formerly resident in Japan was sent to a ``reeducation-through-labor''
    center because one member of the family allegedly made remarks
    disparaging the Government.
        The Government attempts to control all information. It carefully
    manages the visits of Western journalists. In 1996 the Cable News
    Network was allowed to broadcast live, unedited coverage of the 2nd
    year memorial service for the death of Kim Il Sung. The regime recently
    allowed foreign journalists to report on the food situation. Foreign
    journalists also were allowed to report on the Korean Peninsula Energy
    Development Organization (KEDO) light-water reactor groundbreaking at
    Kumho in 1997. During the June 13 to 15 inter-Korean summit, and during
    the October visit of U.S. Secretary of State Albright, groups of
    foreign journalists were permitted to accompany official delegations
    and to file reports, although under strict state monitoring. Also, the
    presidents of 46 South Korean newspaper and broadcast organizations,
    led by the South Korean Minister of Culture and Tourism, traveled to
    the country in August and met with Kim Jong Il. Although more foreign
    journalists have been allowed into North Korea, the Government still
    maintains strict control over the movements of foreign visitors. For
    example, journalists accompanying a foreign minister from another
    country were not allowed to visit a department store or a train
    station; they were not allowed to talk to officials or to persons on
    the street. Those who arrived with cellular or satellite phones had
    them confiscated for the duration of their stay. Domestic media
    censorship is strictly enforced, and no deviation from the official
    government line is tolerated.
        The regime prohibits listening to foreign media broadcasts except
    by the political elite, and violators are subject to severe punishment.
    Radios and television sets receive only domestic programming; radios
    obtained from abroad must be submitted for alteration to operate in a
    similar manner. CNN television broadcasts are available in a Pyongyang
    hotel frequented by foreigners. Private telephone lines operate on an
    internal system that prevents making and receiving calls from outside
    the country. International phone lines are available under very
    restricted circumstances. There may be very limited Internet access in
    North Korea for government officials, according to recent reports.
        During the year, the DPRK defended threats and reiterated
    criticisms first made in late 1997 of the South Korean media for
    criticizing the North Korean leadership. The first instance was in
    response to a South Korean newspaper editorial, the second in reaction
    to a television drama about life in North Korea.
        The Government severely restricts academic freedom and controls
    artistic and academic works. Visitors report that one of the primary
    functions of plays, movies, operas, children's performances, and books
    is to contribute to the cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung and
    Kim Jong Il.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
    Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the Government does not
    respect this provision in practice. The Government prohibits any public
    meetings without authorization.
        Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the
    Government does not respect this provision in practice. There are no
    known organizations other than those created by the Government.
    Professional associations exist primarily as a means of government
    monitoring and control over the members of these organizations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for ``freedom of
    religious belief;'' however, in practice the Government discourages
    organized religious activity except that supervised by officially
    recognized groups. Genuine religious freedom does not exist. The
    Constitution also stipulates that religion ``should not be used for
    purposes of dragging in foreign powers or endangering public
    security.''
        Although in the past the Government has branded religiously active
    persons as ``counterrevolutionaries'' and killed or imprisoned them, in
    more recent times, it has allowed the formation of several government-
    sponsored religious organizations. These serve as interlocutors with
    foreign church groups and international aid organizations. Foreigners
    who have met with representatives of these organizations believe that
    some are genuinely religious but note that others appear to know little
    about religious dogma, liturgy, or teaching. A constitutional change in
    1992 deleted the clause about freedom of antireligious propaganda,
    authorized religious gatherings, and provided for ``the right to build
    buildings for religious use.''
        The number of religious believers is unknown but has been estimated
    by the media and religious groups at 10,000 Protestants, 10,000
    Buddhists, and 4,000 Catholics. There are also an undetermined number
    of persons belonging to underground Christian churches. In addition the
    Chondogyo Young Friends Party, a government-sponsored group based on a
    traditional Korean religious movement, still is in existence. There are
    300 Buddhist temples. Most of the temples are regarded as cultural
    relics, but in some of them religious activity is permitted. Two
    Protestant churches under lay leadership and a Roman Catholic church
    (without a priest) have been opened since 1988 in Pyongyang. Several
    schools for religious education exist. There are 3-year religious
    colleges for training Protestant and Buddhist clergy. A religious
    studies program also was established at Kim Il Sung University in 1989;
    its graduates usually go on to work in the foreign trade sector.
        There has been a limited revival of Buddhism with the translation
    and publication of Buddhist scriptures that had been carved on 80,000
    wooden blocks and kept at an historic temple. It is not known whether
    any Catholic priests, whose role is a fundamental element for the
    practice of the Catholic faith, remain in the country. Seoul Archbishop
    Nicholas Jin-Suk Cheong, appointed by the Pope as Apostolic
    Administrator of Pyongyang, was quoted in July as stating that while
    there were 50 priests in the country in the 1940's, it is not known if
    they are still alive. In November a delegation from the Vatican visited
    the country. Although some foreigners who have visited the DPRK over
    the years say that church activity appears staged, others believe that
    church services are genuine, although sermons contain both religious
    and political content supportive of the regime. The Government claims,
    and visitors confirm, that there are more than 500 authorized ``house
    churches.''
        Persons engaging in religious proselytizing may be arrested and are
    subject to harsh penalties, including imprisonment and prolonged
    detention without charge. The regime appears to have cracked down on
    unauthorized religious groups in recent years, especially persons who
    proselytize or who have ties to overseas evangelical groups operating
    across the border with China, as the Government appears concerned about
    religiously based South Korean relief and refugee assistance efforts
    along the northeast border with the People's Republic of China becoming
    entwined with more political goals, including overthrow of the regime.
    The food crisis apparently has heightened government concern about
    antiregime activity. An article in the Korean Workers Party newspaper
    in 1999 criticized ``imperialists and reactionaries'' for trying to use
    ideological and cultural infiltration, including religion, to destroy
    socialism from within. South Korean law requires all parties, including
    religious groups, travelling to North Korea or contacting North Koreans
    to request permission from the South Korean security agency. This
    requirement increases suspicions among North Korean officials about the
    intentions of such groups.
        There is no reliable information on the number of religious
    detainees or prisoners, but there have been unconfirmed reports that
    some of those detained in the country are detained because of their
    religion.
        Religious and human rights groups outside the country have provided
    numerous, unconfirmed reports that members of underground churches have
    been beaten, arrested, detained in prison camps, or killed because of
    their religious beliefs. One unconfirmed report stated that a dozen
    Christians have been executed since January 1999. According to another
    unconfirmed report, 23 Christians were executed between October 1999
    and April; some reportedly were executed under falsified criminal
    charges, and some reportedly were tortured prior to their executions. A
    religious nongovernmental organization quoted an unnamed South Korean
    pastor's claims that 400 Christians were executed in 1999. These
    reports could not be confirmed or disproved because of the
    effectiveness of the Government in barring outside observers.
    Nonetheless, the collective weight of anecdotal evidence of harsh
    treatment of unauthorized religious activity lends credence to such
    reports. The regime deals harshly with its critics and views religious
    believers belonging to underground congregations or with ties to
    evangelical groups in North China as opponents. Reports of executions,
    torture, and imprisonment of religious persons in the country continue
    to emerge.
        Little is known about the actual life of religious persons in the
    DPRK. Members of government-recognized religious groups do not appear
    to suffer discrimination; in fact some reports claim they have been
    mobilized by the regime. Persons whose parents were believers but who
    themselves are nonpracticing are able to rise to at least the midlevels
    of the bureaucracy. Such individuals, as a category, suffered broad
    discrimination in the past. Members of underground churches connected
    to border missionary activity appear to be regarded as subversive
    elements.
        The Government deals harshly with all opponents, including those
    engaging in religious practices deemed unacceptable to the regime. In
    April 1999, witnesses testified before the U.S. Congress on the
    treatment of persons held in prison camps through the early 1990's. The
    witnesses stated that prisoners held on the basis of their religious
    beliefs generally were treated worse than other inmates. One witness, a
    former prison guard, testified that those believing in God were
    regarded as insane, as the authorities taught that ``all religions are
    opium.'' He recounted an instance in which a woman was kicked
    repeatedly and left with her injuries unattended for days because a
    guard overheard her praying for a child who was being beaten. Because
    of the effectiveness of the Government in barring outside observers,
    such allegations could not be substantiated.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--In the past, the regime has controlled
    internal travel strictly, requiring a travel pass for any movement
    outside one's home village. These passes were granted only for official
    travel or attendance at a relative's wedding or funeral. Long delays in
    obtaining the necessary permit often resulted in denial of the right to
    travel even for these limited purposes. In recent years, it appears
    that the internal controls on travel have eased significantly. There
    are reports of the large-scale movement of people across the country in
    search of food. Only members of a very small elite have vehicles for
    personal use. The regime tightly controls access to civilian aircraft,
    trains, buses, food, and fuel.
        The regime limits foreign travel to officials and trusted artists,
    athletes, academics, and religious figures. It does not allow
    emigration. In recent years, there have been numerous reports of a
    steady increase in North Korean migrants arriving in China, Hong Kong,
    Vietnam, and other Asian countries. The regime reportedly retaliates
    against the relatives of some of those who manage to escape. According
    to the Penal Code, defection and attempted defection (including the
    attempt to gain entry to a foreign embassy for the purpose of seeking
    political asylum) are capital crimes. Refugees have stated that DPRK
    border guards have received orders to shoot-to-kill persons attempting
    to cross the border into China, although some border crossings for
    family visits and trade are permitted. Others have reported that some
    would-be refugees who have been involuntarily returned have been
    executed (see Section 1.a.). Following the collapse of European
    communism, the regime recalled several thousand students from overseas
    but in recent years again has allowed small numbers of students to
    study abroad. Nonetheless, in recent years substantial numbers of
    persons have fled to neighboring countries in search of food. Many
    return after securing food.
        The Chinese Government states that there are only a few hundred
    North Koreans in China; others estimate that there are tens of
    thousands. Most have crossed the border clandestinely in small groups
    to seek food, shelter, and work. In January China returned to the DPRK
    seven persons who had been granted refugee status by the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees in Russia in December 1999 but were forced
    back into China. How the DPRK authorities dealt with the seven is
    unknown.
        The Government strictly controls permission to reside in, or even
    enter, Pyongyang. This is a significant lever, since food, housing,
    health, and general living conditions are much better in Pyongyang than
    in the rest of the country.
        AI has reported serious human rights abuses involving North Korean
    workers and refugees living in Russia. There are about 6,000 DPRK
    workers in North Korean-run camps in the Russian Far East engaged in
    farming, mining, and construction. Conditions in these camps are harsh;
    food is scarce; and discipline is severe. In the past, there have been
    allegations that discipline includes physical torture such as placing
    wooden logs between the knees of offenders, after which they were
    forced to sit down, causing them excruciating pain. In recent years,
    offenders have been sent back to the DPRK for punishment due to the
    increased scrutiny that the labor camps have been under since Russian
    and foreign media began reporting on the conditions in these camps in
    the early 1990's.
        North Koreans in Russia comprise two groups: Those who were
    selected to work in Russia but refused to return to the DPRK and those
    who have fled into Russia from the DPRK. Until 1993 under a secret
    protocol, the DPRK Public Security Service reportedly was allowed to
    work inside Russia to track down workers who fled the camps. Since 1993
    many North Koreans have been engaged in business in the Russian Far
    East.
        Many North Koreans in Russia face severe hardships due to their
    lack of any identification. Workers arriving in Russia usually have
    their passport and other identification confiscated by North Korean
    border guards.
        The DPRK Government reportedly tried to prevent persons from
    staying in Russia by using diplomatic channels to influence Russian
    authorities and international organizations. In a number of cases,
    North Korean authorities reportedly told Russian authorities that a
    particular North Korean who had applied for asylum in Russia or
    elsewhere was a criminal offender in North Korea. An extradition treaty
    signed by both nations in 1957 requires that persons with criminal
    records be returned to their country.
        From 1959 to 1982, 93,000 Korean residents of Japan, including
    6,637 Japanese wives, voluntarily repatriated to North Korea. Despite
    DPRK assurances that the wives, more than a third of whom still had
    Japanese citizenship, would be allowed to visit Japan every 2 or 3
    years, none were permitted to do so until 1997. However, many have not
    been heard from, and their relatives and friends in Japan have been
    unsuccessful in their efforts to gain information about their condition
    and whereabouts.
        The DPRK and the Japanese Government held a series of bilateral
    meetings in Beijing in the second half of 1997, during which the DPRK
    agreed to allow some Japanese wives resident in North Korea to visit
    Japan. The first such visit occurred in November 1997 when 15 Japanese
    wives arrived for a 1-week visit. An additional 12 Japanese wives
    visited for a week in January and February 1998. However, in June 1999
    the DPRK cancelled a visit by Japanese wives to Japan, citing
    ``artificial hurdles and inhuman acts on the Japanese side.'' The
    visits resumed after the Japanese Government and the DPRK restarted
    normalization talks in April. A group of 16 Japanese wives visited
    Japan from September 12 to 16.
        Although the DPRK has permitted an increasing number of overseas
    Koreans to visit their relatives in North Korea over the past decade,
    most requests for such visits are still denied. From August 15-18, the
    DPRK and the Republic of Korea sent delegations of 100 members of
    separated families to each other's capitals for family reunion
    meetings. However, the meetings generally were of limited duration and
    certain topics were not allowed to be discussed. From November 30 to
    December 2, a second such reunion took place, and further reunions were
    scheduled for 2001. Many foreign visitors to the 1995 International
    Pyongyang Sports Festival reported that they were denied permission to
    visit or otherwise contact their relatives, even those who lived only a
    few miles from Pyongyang.
        Although more foreign journalists have been allowed into North
    Korea, the Government still maintains the strictest control over the
    movements of foreign visitors. For example, journalists accompanying a
    foreign minister from another country were not allowed to visit a
    department store or a train station; they were not allowed to talk to
    officials or to persons on the street. Those who arrived with cellular
    or satellite phones had them confiscated for the duration of their
    stay.
        Reports, primarily from refugees, indicate that the Government
    routinely uses forced resettlement, particularly for those deemed
    politically unreliable.
        Although the DPRK is a member of the United Nations, it does not
    participate in international refugee forums, and it is not in contact
    with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. There is no known policy
    or provision for first asylum.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have no right or mechanisms to change their leadership or
    government. The political system is completely dominated by the KWP,
    with Kim Il Sung's heir Kim Jong Il in full control. Very little
    reliable information is available on intraregime politics following Kim
    Il Sung's death. The legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA),
    which meets only a few days a year, serves only to rubber-stamp
    resolutions presented to it by the party leadership. In October 1997,
    Kim Jong Il acceded to the position of General Secretary of the Korean
    Worker's Party. In September 1998, the SPA reconfirmed Kim as the
    Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position
    the ``highest office of State.'' The presidency was abolished, leaving
    the late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only President. The titular head of
    state is Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme
    People's Assembly.
        In an effort to give the appearance of democracy, the DPRK has
    created several ``minority parties.'' Lacking grassroots organizations,
    they exist only as rosters of officials with token representation in
    the Supreme People's Assembly. Their primary purpose appears to be
    promoting government objectives abroad as touring parliamentarians.
    Free elections do not exist, and the regime has criticized the concept
    of free elections and competition among political parties as an
    artifact of capitalist decay.
        Elections to the Supreme People's Assembly and to provincial, city,
    and county assemblies are held irregularly. In July 1998, SPA elections
    were held for the first time since 1990. According to the government-
    controlled media, over 99 percent of the voters participated to elect
    100 percent of the candidates approved by the KWP. Results of previous
    SPA elections have produced virtually identical outcomes. The vast
    majority of the KWP's estimated 3 million members (in a population of
    23 million) work to implement decrees formulated by the Party's small
    elite.
        Few women have reached high levels of the Party or the Government.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not permit any independent domestic
    organizations to monitor human rights conditions or to comment on
    violations of such rights. Although a North Korean Human Rights
    Committee was established in 1992, it denies the existence of any human
    rights violations in North Korea. However, by offering international
    human rights organizations an identifiable official interlocutor, the
    Committee helped increase the ability of international human rights
    organizations to enter into two-way communication with the regime.
        Although the World Food Program has been given access to most
    counties in North Korea, it has been excluded from several dozen.
    Foreign aid workers and aid workers from international organizations,
    who provide substantial food aid, frequently are denied access to sites
    where this food is distributed, and thus are unable consistently to
    verify that the aid reaches its intended recipients. Many foreign NGO's
    report being charged large fees by Government officials to get visas
    for foreign staff, to set up offices, and to establish programs. There
    have been reports of abduction of ethnic Korean aid workers by
    government officials; some victims were required to pay a large fine to
    obtain their release.
        In April 1998, during the 54th meeting of the U.N. Commision on
    Human Rights, the North Korean delegation accused the international
    community of slandering the DPRK's human rights record, adding that the
    DPRK Government would not tolerate ``any attempt to hurt the
    sovereignty and dignity of the country under the pretext of human
    rights.''
        In 1996 a delegation from AI visited the DPRK and discussed legal
    reforms and prisoner cases with senior government officials. The
    Government has ignored requests for visits by other international human
    rights organizations, and none are known to have visited.
        In August 1997, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
    Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution
    criticizing the DPRK for its human rights practices. The DPRK
    subsequently announced that it would withdraw from the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), calling the resolution
    an attack on its sovereignty. In October 1997, the U.N. Human Rights
    Committee issued a statement criticizing the attempt by North Korea to
    withdraw from the ICCPR, noting that countries that had ratified the
    ICCPR could not withdraw from the covenant. In August 1998, the Human
    Rights Committee readopted a resolution urging the DPRK to improve its
    human rights record. In July for the first time in 16 years, the regime
    submitted a report on human rights to the U.N. Human Rights Committee.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution grants equal rights to all citizens. However, in
    practice the Government denies its citizens most fundamental human
    rights. There was pervasive discrimination on the basis of social
    status.
        Women.--There is no information available on violence against
    women.
        The Constitution states that ``women hold equal social status and
    rights with men.'' However, although women are represented
    proportionally in the labor force, few women have reached high levels
    of the party or the Government. In many small factories, the work force
    is predominantly female. Like men, working-age women must work. They
    are thus required to leave their preschool children in the care of
    elderly relatives or in state nurseries. However, according to the
    Constitution, women with large families are to work shorter hours.
    There were reports of trafficking in women and young girls among North
    Koreans crossing the border into China (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Children.--Social norms reflect traditional, family-centered values
    in which children are cherished. The State provides compulsory
    education for all children until the age of 15. Some children are
    denied educational opportunities and subjected to other punishments and
    disadvantages as a result of the loyalty classification system and the
    principle of ``collective retribution'' for the transgressions of their
    parents (see Section 1.f.).
        According to the World Food Program, the international community is
    feeding nearly every child under the age of 7 years. In some remote
    provinces, many persons over the age of 6 years reportedly appear to be
    suffering from long-term malnutrition. A nutrition survey carried out
    by UNICEF and the World Food Program in the aftermath of flood
    disasters found that 16 percent of children under 7 years of age
    suffered from acute malnutrition and that 62 percent suffered from
    stunted growth. In August 1997, a senior UNICEF official said that
    about 80,000 children were in immediate danger of dying from hunger and
    disease; 800,000 more were suffering from malnutrition to a serious but
    lesser degree.
        Like others in society, children are the objects of intense
    political indoctrination; even mathematics textbooks propound party
    dogma. In addition foreign visitors and academic sources report that
    children from an early age are subjected to several hours a week of
    mandatory military training and indoctrination at their schools. School
    children sometimes are sent to work in factories or in the fields for
    short periods to assist in completing special projects or in meeting
    production goals.
        In practice children do not enjoy any more civil liberties than
    adults. In June 1998, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child
    (UNCRC) released its concluding observations on a February 1996 report
    submitted by the DPRK, detailing its adherence to the International
    Convention on the Rights of the Child. The UNCRC found that the DPRK
    strategy, policies, and programs for children do not fully reflect the
    rights-based approach enshrined in the convention. The UNCRC also
    expressed concern over de facto discrimination against children with
    disabilities and at the insufficient measures taken by the state party
    to ensure that these children have effective access to health,
    education, and social services, and to facilitate their full
    integration into society.
        In the fall of 1998, the NGO's Doctors Without Borders (DWB) and
    Doctors of the World closed their offices in the country because the
    Government reportedly denied them access to a large population of sick
    and malnourished children. DWB officials said that they had evidence
    that orphaned and homeless children had been gathered into so-called
    ``9-27 camps.'' These camps reportedly were established under a
    September 27, 1995 order from Kim Jong Il to ``normalize'' the country.
    North Korean refugees who have escaped from the 9-27 camps into China
    have reported inhuman conditions.
        Information about societal or familial abuse of children is
    unavailable. There were reports of trafficking in young girls among
    North Koreans crossing the border into China (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--Traditional social norms condone
    discrimination against the physically disabled. Apart from disabled
    veterans, disabled persons almost never are seen within the city limits
    of Pyongyang, and several defectors and other former residents report
    that disabled persons are assigned to the rural areas routinely.
    According to one report, authorities check every 2 to 3 years in the
    capital for persons with deformities and relocate them to special
    facilities in the countryside. There are no legally mandated provisions
    for accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled.
    In an April 1998 statement, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the
    Child criticized ``de facto discrimination'' in the country against
    children with disabilities.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Nongovernmental labor unions do not
    exist. The KWP purports to represent the interests of all labor. There
    is a single labor organization, the General Federation of Trade Unions
    of Korea, which is affiliated with the formerly Soviet-controlled World
    Federation of Trade Unions. Operating under this umbrella, unions
    function on the classic ``Stalinist model,'' with responsibility for
    mobilizing workers behind production goals and for providing health,
    education, cultural, and welfare facilities. Unions do not have the
    right to strike.
        North Korea is not a member of, but has observer status with, the
    International Labor Organization.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have no
    right to organize or to bargain collectively. Government ministries set
    wages. The State assigns all jobs. Ideological purity is as important
    as professional competence in deciding who receives a particular job,
    and foreign companies that have established joint ventures report that
    all their employees must be hired from lists submitted by the KWP.
    Factory and farm workers are organized into councils, which do have an
    impact on management decisions.
        There is one free economic and trade zone (FETZ). The Korean
    Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) negotiated a separate
    protocol and service contracts for workers at the site of its light
    water reactor project. The government agency, which supplied the labor
    to KEDO, bargained effectively on the workers behalf (see Section
    6.e.).
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its report to the
    U.N. Human Rights Committee, the regime stated that its laws prohibit
    forced or compulsory labor. The Government frequently mobilizes the
    population for construction projects. Military conscripts routinely are
    used for this purpose as well. ``Reformatory labor'' and ``reeducation
    through labor'' are common punishments for political offenses. AI
    reports that forced labor, such as logging and tending crops, is common
    among prisoners. School children are assigned to factories or farms for
    short periods to help meet production goals (see Section 5).
        There are reports of the trafficking of North Korean women and
    young girls among North Koreans crossing the border into China. Many
    become brides, but some work in the sex industry. Many reportedly are
    held as virtual prisoners (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--According to the Constitution, the State prohibits work by
    children under the age of 16 years. As education is universal and
    mandatory until the age of 15, it is believed that this regulation is
    enforced. There is no prohibition on forced labor by children, and
    school children are assigned to factories or farms for short periods to
    help meet production goals (see Section 6.c.).
        There are reports of trafficking in young girls among North Koreans
    crossing into China, some to become brides and others forced to work in
    the sex industry (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No data is available on the
    minimum wage in state-owned industries. Until the recent food crisis,
    wages and rations appeared to be adequate to support workers and their
    families at a subsistence level. Wages are not the primary form of
    compensation since the State provides all educational and medical needs
    free of charge, while only token rent is charged. The minimum wage for
    workers in North Korea's FETZ is approximately $80 per month; in
    foreign-owned and joint venture enterprises outside the FETZ the
    minimum wage is reportedly close to $110 per month. It is not known
    what proportion of the foreign-paid wages go to the worker and what
    proportion remains with the State. KEDO, the international organization
    charged with implementation of a light-water reactor and other
    projects, has concluded a protocol and a related memorandum of
    understanding concerning wages and other working conditions for
    citizens who are to work on KEDO projects. Unskilled laborers receive
    about $110 per month while skilled laborers are paid slightly more
    depending on the nature of the work performed (see Section 6.b.).
        The Constitution states that all working-age citizens must work and
    ``strictly observe labor discipline and working hours.'' The Penal Code
    states that anyone who hampers the nation's industry, commerce, or
    transportation by intentionally failing to carry out a specific
    assignment ``while pretending to be functioning normally'' is subject
    to the death penalty; it also states that anyone who ``shoddily carries
    out'' an assigned duty is subject to no less than 5 years'
    imprisonment.
        Even persistent tardiness may be defined as ``anti-Socialist
    wrecking'' under these articles, although as a result of food shortages
    absenteeism reportedly has become widespread as more time must be spent
    finding food. A DPRK official described the labor force to an audience
    of foreign business executives by noting that ``there are no riots, no
    strikes, and no differences of opinion'' with management.
        In 1994 the authorities reportedly adopted new labor regulations
    for enterprises involving foreign investments. The regulations on labor
    contracts set out provisions on the employment and dismissal of
    workers, technical training, workhours, rest periods, remuneration,
    labor protection, social security, fines for violations of regulations,
    and settlement of disputes.
        The Constitution stipulates an 8-hour workday; however, several
    sources report that most laborers work from 12 to 16 hours daily when
    factories are operating. Some of this additional time may include
    mandatory study of the writings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The
    Constitution provides all citizens with a ``right to rest,'' including
    paid leave, holidays, and access to sanitariums and rest homes funded
    at public expense. Many worksites are hazardous, and the rate of
    industrial accidents is high. It is believed that workers do not have
    the right to remove themselves from hazardous working conditions
    without jeopardizing their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no known laws specifically
    addressing the problem of trafficking in persons.
        There have been reports of trafficking in women and young girls
    among North Koreans crossing the border into China. Some were sold by
    their families as wives to men in China. A network of smugglers
    reportedly facilitates this trafficking. Many such women, unable to
    speak Chinese, are held as virtual prisoners. Many end up working as
    prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
                                   __________

                               REPUBLIC OF KOREA

        The Republic of Korea is governed by a directly elected president
    and a unicameral legislature selected by both direct and proportional
    voting. Kim Dae-jung was elected President in a free and fair election
    in December 1997 and was inaugurated in February 1998. A free and fair
    National Assembly election was held in April. The Constitution provides
    for an independent judiciary, and in recent years, the judiciary has
    shown increasing independence; however, several scandals in 1999
    involving alleged illegal influence peddling and cronyism have damaged
    the image of prosecutors and judges.
        Responsibility for maintaining internal security lies with the
    National Intelligence Service (NIS)--formerly known as the National
    Security Planning Agency, the Korean National Police (KNP), and the
    Defense Security Command (DSC). Legislation enacted in 1993 restricts
    the NIS and the DSC from involvement in domestic politics and grants
    the NIS investigative authority only in cases involving terrorism,
    espionage, and international crime organizations. The Government
    revised this law in 1996 to allow the NIS to investigate members of
    domestic organizations that are viewed as supporting the government of
    the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea; DPRK). The
    statutory restrictions on the DSC remain in place. Some members of the
    security forces were responsible for occasional human rights abuses.
        Following a rebound in 1999 from the 1997-98 financial and economic
    crisis, the country's economic growth began to level off in 2000. Gross
    Domestic Product (GDP) increased by an estimated 9.3 percent in 2000,
    with 6 to 7 percent GDP growth estimated in the second half of the
    year. Underpinning this strong performance was the Government's
    continued commitment to a comprehensive financial and corporate
    restructuring plan. However, the country's economic growth was
    dependent on a narrow range of export products, and the still somewhat
    fragile financial system left the economy susceptible to unpredictable
    external conditions. Unemployment fell steadily from its 8.6 percent
    peak in February 1999 to 3.6 percent in November 2000.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, problems remain in some areas, although there were
    some improvements. Police abused detainees, although human rights
    groups reported that the number of such cases continued to decline. The
    Government continued to require released political prisoners to report
    regularly to the police under the Social Surveillance Law; however,
    during the year, it did not undertake independent investigations of the
    cases of some prisoners who were sentenced on charges believed to have
    been fabricated by previous governments. Some of these prisoners
    reportedly were subjected to torture to extract confessions and
    received trials that did not meet international standards of fairness.
    The use or threatened use of the National Security Law (NSL)--which
    forbids contacts with North Korea--continued to infringe upon citizen's
    civil liberties, including the right to freedom of expression. The
    President continued to urge that sections of the NSL be revised to
    protect human rights and make the law consistent with the new
    atmosphere of improved relations with North Korea and the Government's
    attempts to expand contacts with that country. In September 63 spies
    from the DPRK who had been released from prison returned voluntarily to
    that country. Domestic violence and rape and physical abuse remain
    serious problems, and there is insufficient legal recourse for dealing
    with them. Women also continued to face legal and societal
    discrimination. Ethnic minorities, very small in number, face legal and
    societal discrimination. Trafficking in persons is a problem; the
    country is considered a transit point for alien smugglers, including
    traffickers of primarily Asian women and children for the sex trade and
    domestic servitude.
        In July a revised child protection law went into effect, increasing
    the penalties for child abuse. In the first half of the year, the
    Government enacted laws authorizing the investigation of the arrests
    and so-called ``mysterious'' deaths of prodemocracy activists under
    previous military governments. Some of the activists were sentenced on
    charges believed to have been fabricated by previous governments.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or extrajudicial killings.
        To investigate and redress complaints that officials of past
    military governments had tortured and killed prodemocracy activists,
    the Government enacted the Special Act on the Investigation of
    Suspicious Deaths in May. In August a nineperson panel was commissioned
    to review cases such as the 1960 student uprising and the 1980 Kwangju
    civil uprising and to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the
    arrests and deaths of prodemocracy activists.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the mistreatment of suspects; the
    Government has ordered investigating authorities to protect the human
    rights of suspects, and allegations of abuse by authorities of those in
    custody for questioning continued to decline. Nonetheless, police
    sometimes abuse persons in custody. Prosecutors continued to place much
    emphasis on securing convictions through confessions. This focus is
    driven by cultural factors, with confession viewed as a necessary basis
    for the reform and rehabilitation of wrongdoers. While the Supreme
    Court has ruled that confessions obtained after suspects have been
    deprived of sleep during an interrogation cannot be used in court,
    there continued to be reports that police questioned suspects
    throughout the night. Credible sources also reported that in some cases
    police verbally or physically abused suspects (including beatings,
    threats, and sexual intimidation) in the course of arrest and police
    interrogation. However, human rights groups report that the number of
    such cases continued to declined during the year. In 1999 the Ministry
    of Justice (MOJ) announced that criminal suspects, who previously had
    been required to wear prison garb in court, would be allowed to wear
    street clothes until the court rendered a judgment.
        Police and security officials who abuse or harass suspects rarely
    are punished, and public concern over impunity of police who commit
    abuses appears to be growing. In a highly publicized case, in February
    a former police officer, Lee Kun-an, known as the ``torture cop'' for
    his abuse of suspects, was convicted of the illegal confinement and
    cruel punishment of a suspected North Korean spy and sentenced to 7
    years in prison. In February 1999, in a highly publicized case, several
    police officers were disciplined after it was discovered that they had
    shackled the feet and tied the hands of a 63-year-old man whom they had
    arrested for a traffic violation.
        Former detainees who claimed that officials of previous military
    governments had tortured them continued to request compensation.
    However, the Government has not provided an effective mechanism for
    redress, such as an independent body to investigate complaints of past
    human rights violations. To investigate and redress complaints that
    officials of past military governments had tortured detainees, the
    Government in January enacted the Act on the Restoration of the Honor
    of and Compensation for Persons Engaged in the Democratic Movement.
        Prison conditions are Spartan. Prison diets are adequate, but the
    facilities offer little protection against cold in the winter and heat
    in the summer. Some prisoners claim that these conditions damaged their
    health and that medical care was inadequate. Inmates occasionally
    criticized guards for using excessive force or needlessly putting
    prisoners in manacles.
        Inmate access to reading materials, telephones, and television
    broadcasts has improved significantly in recent years. Beginning in
    March, the MOJ allowed prisoners to receive four visitors per month,
    and model prisoners who had served more than one-third of their
    sentences were allowed unsupervised meetings with visitors. Model
    prisoners also are exempt from mail censorship and eligible for
    overnight leave. The MOJ also announced a law that prohibits searches
    of women inmates by male prison guards without prior permission from
    the warden. Also beginning during the year, pregnant inmates received
    prenatal care for the full term of their pregnancies.
        There is little independent monitoring of prison conditions,
    although representatives of human rights groups may visit certain
    prisoners at the discretion of the prison warden.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law is broadly
    outlined and open to interpretation. The National Security Law (NSL)
    defines espionage in broad terms and permits the authorities to detain
    and arrest persons who commit acts viewed as supporting North Korea,
    and thus perceived to be dangerous to the country. Authorities arrested
    not only persons accused of spying on behalf of North Korea, but also
    those who praised North Korea, its former leader Kim Il Sung, or North
    Korea's ``self-reliance'' (``juche'') political philosophy. Persons
    traveling to North Korea without authorization also have been arrested
    under the NSL, as have some who appeared to be expressing opposing
    political views peacefully. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has termed
    the NSL ``a major obstacle to the full realization of the rights
    enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
    Rights.'' President Kim Dae-jung, who himself was arrested and
    sentenced to death under the NSL, has acknowledged that the law has
    ``problematic areas,'' and enforcement of the law was loosened in light
    of the June NorthSouth Summit and recent improvements in relations
    between the two countries. According to MOJ data, during the year 130
    persons were arrested for NSL violations, and 50 remained in custody at
    year's end. The NSL arrest figure is nearly 60 percent lower than in
    1999.
        The NSL permits the imprisonment for up to 7 years of anyone who,
    ``with the knowledge that he might endanger the existence or security
    of the State or the basic order of free democracy, praised, encouraged,
    propagandized for, or sided with the activities of an antistate
    organization.'' The legal standard for knowledge that one might
    endanger the security of the State is vague. Consequently a number of
    persons have been arrested for what appeared to be the peaceful
    expression of opposing views, which the authorities considered proNorth
    Korean or antistate.
        In August 1998, Father Moon Kyu Hyun, a Roman Catholic priest, was
    arrested on charges of violating the NSL after he returned from North
    Korea. Although the Government had granted him permission to travel to
    North Korea in 1998, prosecutors alleged that Father Moon wrote in
    praise of Kim Il Sung in a North Korean visitors book and participated
    in a North Koreansponsored reunification festival in Panmunjom. The
    eight other priests who traveled with Father Moon were not arrested. In
    May Father Moon was sentenced to 2 years in prison and received a stay
    of execution of that sentence for 2 years. He filed an appeal.
        The Government's rationale for retaining the NSL has been that
    North Korea is trying actively to subvert the Government and society
    and that due to this special circumstance, some forms of expression
    must be limited to block the greater danger to freedom and democracy
    posed by North Korean totalitarianism. The effect sometimes is to
    relieve the Government of the burden of proof in a court of law that
    any particular speech or action in fact threatens the nation's
    security. For example, the Government has prosecuted citizens for
    unauthorized travel to North Korea (see Section 2.d.). Novelist Hwang
    Sokyong served 4 years of a 7-year sentence for making an unauthorized
    visit to North Korea. He was released in 1998 by a special presidential
    amnesty, and his civil rights were reinstated by a special March 1999
    amnesty.
        The Criminal Code requires warrants to be issued by judges in cases
    of arrest, detention, seizure, or search, except if the person is
    apprehended while committing a criminal act, or if a judge is not
    available and the authorities believe that the suspect may destroy
    evidence or escape capture if not quickly arrested. In such emergency
    cases, judges must issue arrest warrants within 48 hours after
    apprehension, or, if a court is not located in the same county, within
    72 hours. Police may detain suspects who voluntarily appear for
    questioning for up to 6 hours but must notify the suspects' families.
    The police generally respected these requirements.
        The standards for issuing warrants were tightened in 1997, but
    following complaints from prosecutors that the new system was
    administratively cumbersome, the National Assembly voted to ease
    standards for issuing warrants. Authorities normally must release
    suspects after 30 days unless an indictment is issued. Consequently,
    detainees are a relatively small percentage of the total prison
    population.
        The Constitution provides for the right to representation by an
    attorney and in May 1999, the MOJ announced that it would enforce a
    suspect's right to have a lawyer present during police interrogation.
    Beginning in January, individual police stations employed lawyers as
    legal advisors to aid in examining relevant legal clauses in charging
    suspects. There were no reports of access to legal counsel being
    denied.
        The MOJ announced in March that all prosecutors' offices have
    private rooms where suspects could consult with lawyers. There is a
    bail system, but human rights lawyers say that bail generally is not
    granted when detainees are charged with committing serious offenses.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and in recent years, the judiciary has shown
    increasing independence; however, several recent scandals involving
    alleged illegal influence peddling and cronyism have damaged the image
    of prosecutors and judges. The President appoints the Chief Justice and
    most justices of the Constitutional Court. Although judges do not
    receive life appointments, they cannot be fired or transferred for
    political reasons. Some district court judges, citing the recent
    conciliatory mood between North and South Korea, have ruled that
    contrary to prosecutors' assertions, activists' exchange of faxes with
    North Korean students or meetings with North Korean representatives in
    third countries were not, in themselves, sufficient grounds to convict
    them of violating the NSL.
        Local courts are presided over by judges who render verdicts in all
    cases. There is no trial by jury. Defendants can appeal a verdict to a
    district appeals court and to the Supreme Court. Constitutional
    challenges can be taken to the Constitutional Court, which was created
    in 1988.
        The Constitution provides defendants with a number of rights in
    criminal trials including the presumption of innocence, protection
    against self-incrimination, freedom from retroactive laws and double
    jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, and the right of appeal. When a
    person is detained physically, the initial trial must be completed
    within 6 months of arrest. These rights generally are observed. Trials
    are open to the public, but the judge may restrict attendance if he
    believes spectators may seek to disrupt the proceedings.
        Judges generally allow considerable scope for the examination of
    witnesses by both the prosecution and defense. Cases involving national
    security and criminal matters are tried by the same courts. Although
    convictions rarely are overturned, appeals often result in reduced
    sentences. Death sentences are appealed automatically.
        Human rights groups believe that many dissidents tried by past
    military governments during the 1970's and 1980's were sentenced to
    long prison terms on false charges of spying for North Korea.
    Furthermore, these persons reportedly had been held incommunicado for
    up to 60 days after their arrest, subjected to torture, forced to make
    ``confessions,'' and convicted after trials that did not conform to
    international standards for a fair trial. To investigate and redress
    complaints that officials of past military governments had tortured
    former detainees, in January the Government enacted the Act on the
    Restoration of the Honor of and Compensation for Persons Engaged in the
    Democratic Movement. In July 1998, the Government repealed the system
    by which ``ideological prisoners'' had to renounce their real or
    alleged beliefs and instituted a system by which prisoners had to sign
    a written promise to obey the law and pledge to recognize the Republic
    of Korea in order to be released from prison. A total of 56 were freed,
    but only 7 signed the pledge in the 1999 Independence Day amnesty.
    Although the new system was a significant step for the Government,
    human rights groups criticized the requirement of a promise to obey the
    law, including the NSL, as tantamount to forcing citizens to renounce
    their beliefs. However, on the occasion of a special presidential
    amnesty in March 1999, 17 longterm, unconverted prisoners, that is,
    persons who had refused to renounce allegiance to the DPRK and
    Communist beliefs, were released without having to renounce their
    beliefs or sign an oath of obedience. However, some released political
    prisoners were required to report their activities regularly to the
    police. According to the MOJ, no long-term unconverted prisoners
    remained incarcerated. On September 3, 63 North Korean spies, who had
    been released from South Korean prisons, were allowed to return to
    North Korea per their wishes.
        It is difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners
    because it is not clear whether particular persons were arrested for
    merely exercising the rights of free speech or association or whether
    they were detained for committing acts of violence or espionage. Some
    human rights monitors estimate the number of political prisoners at
    300. However, these monitors' definitions of political prisoner often
    include all persons imprisoned for politically motivated acts, without
    distinction as to whether the acts themselves included violence or
    other criminal behavior. The number of political prisoners and
    detainees as defined by international standards appears to number under
    200.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--In general the Government respects the integrity of
    the home and family. In the past, the security services conducted
    varying degrees of surveillance, including wiretaps of political
    dissidents. The 1995 Antiwiretap Law and the law to reform the NIS
    (then known as the National Security Planning Agency) were designed to
    curb government surveillance of civilians and largely appear to have
    succeeded. The Antiwiretap Law lays out broad conditions under which
    the monitoring of telephone calls, mail, and other forms of
    communication are legal. It requires government officials to secure a
    judge's permission before placing wiretaps, or, in the event of an
    emergency, soon after placing them, and it provides for jail terms for
    those who violate this law. Some human rights groups argue that a
    considerable amount of illegal wiretapping still is taking place, and
    they assert that the lack of an independent body to investigate whether
    police have employed illegal wiretaps hinders the effectiveness of the
    Antiwiretap Law.
        In 1998 several opposition lawmakers broke into the NIS (the then
    National Security Planning Agency) liaison office in the National
    Assembly building and removed documents that they claimed substantiated
    allegations that the office was being used by the NIS to conduct
    surveillance of National Assembly members. Several opposition
    legislators have alleged that they are under surveillance by the
    Government and that their homes, offices, and cellular telephones are
    tapped.
        The NSL forbids citizens from listening to North Korean radio in
    their homes or reading books published in North Korea if the Government
    determines that they are doing so to help North Korea. However, in
    October 1999, the Government legalized the viewing of North Korean
    satellite telecasts in private homes. Furthermore, the Government
    allowed the personal perusal of North Korean books, music, television
    programs, and movies as a means to promote understanding and
    reconciliation with North Korea.
        Student groups make credible claims that government informants are
    posted on university campuses.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--While most political discourse is
    unrestricted, under the NSL the Government limits the expression of
    ideas that authorities consider Communist or pro-North Korean. Broad
    interpretations of the NSL allow for restrictions on peaceful dissent.
        Although the Government has abandoned direct control over the news
    media, it continues to exercise indirect influence, and government
    officials vigorously lobby reporters and editors. The latent threats of
    tax investigations against companies and pressure on advertisers still
    are believed to induce newspapers and broadcasters to self-censor
    criticism of the Government in some cases. Moreover, while the
    Government's anticorruption campaign curtailed politicians' payments of
    money to reporters, it did not eliminate them. Nevertheless, press
    criticism of the Government is extensive in all fields, and authorities
    have not used repressive measures to stop media reporting. Many radio
    and television stations are state supported, but they maintain a
    considerable degree of editorial independence in their news coverage.
        Journalists allege that the libel laws are used to harass
    publications for articles that are unflattering but not necessarily
    untrue, and in the past some journalists have been arrested and jailed
    for libel.
        Prosecutors continued to indict dissidents under the NSL for
    producing, selling, or distributing pro-North Korean or proCommunist
    materials. Court precedents allow citizens to possess these kinds of
    publications for purely academic use, profit, or curiosity, but not
    with the intent of subverting the State. Prosecutors have wide
    discretion in determining motives for possessing or publishing such
    materials.
        There is wide reporting of North Korean issues and issues
    concerning NorthSouth relations.
        The Government Censorship Board, which screens movies for sex and
    violence, has followed more liberal guidelines in recent years and
    allowed the release of a broader range of films. The Government does
    not control access to the Internet, but it made some effort--largely
    ineffective--to control Internet pornography.
        The Government generally respected academic freedom, and no
    instances of prosecution for scholarly writing were reported during the
    year. However, student groups credibly report the presence of
    government informants on university campuses (see Section 1.f.).
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on
    Assembly and Demonstrations prohibits assemblies considered likely to
    undermine public order. The law requires that the police be notified in
    advance of demonstrations of all types, including political rallies,
    and the police must notify organizers if they consider the event
    impermissible under this law.
        In June more than 3,000 riot police forcibly dispersed about 1,000
    striking workers at the Lotte Hotel in Seoul. The workers were taken
    into detention; at least 33 were beaten and injured (see Section 6.a.).
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. There are no
    registration requirements. Associations operate freely, except those
    deemed by the Government to be seeking to overthrow the State.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens can move freely throughout
    the country; however, police may restrict the movements of some former
    prisoners. Foreign travel generally is unrestricted; however, the
    Government must approve travel to North Korea (see Section 1.d.). To
    obtain approval, potential visitors must demonstrate that their trip
    does not have a political purpose--that is, to praise North Korea or to
    criticize the South Korean Government. During the year, the Government
    actively promoted the expansion of contacts of all types between
    citizens and persons in North Korea. However, travelers to North Korea
    who do not receive government permission are likely to be arrested upon
    their return.
        In the past, the Government forbade some citizens convicted of
    politically related crimes from returning to the country, and some
    citizens still face sanctions if they return.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
    in assisting refugees. Government guidelines provide for offering
    temporary refuge in the case of a mass influx of asylum seekers.
    However, the issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during
    the year. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
    country where they had a fear of persecution.
        The Government ratified the International Convention Relating to
    the Status of Refugees in 1992; it went into effect in 1994, when
    provisions covering asylum seekers were included in the immigration
    law. Since 1994 54 individuals have sought asylum, but none so far has
    been granted asylum. According to the UNHCR, the Government's handling
    of asylum applications remains rigid. In 1999 the Government agreed to
    suspend temporarily exit orders for persons whose cases were under
    review by the UNHCR. The MOJ asserted that the asylum applicants did
    not qualify for refugee status under the refugee convention, failed to
    present evidence to back their claims, or made false statements on
    their applications.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage. The Constitution, as amended in 1987, provides for
    the direct election of the President and for a mixed system of direct
    and proportional election of legislators to the unicameral National
    Assembly. The President serves a single 5-year term and may not be
    reelected. The National Assembly's term is 4 years. All citizens 20
    years of age or older have the right to vote, and elections are held by
    secret ballot.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Because of
    cultural traditions and discrimination, women occupy few important
    positions in government. There is one woman in the Cabinet, the
    Minister of Environment. In the April National Assembly election, 16
    female legislators were elected to the 299seat National Assembly, one
    of them chairs a special committee on women's affairs.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        Several nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) are active in
    promoting human rights, and they operate without government
    restriction. Chief among these groups are the Lawyers for a Democratic
    Society, Sarangbang, the Human Rights Committee of the National Council
    of Churches in Korea, the Korean Bar Association, People's Solidarity
    for Participatory Democracy, and ``Mingahyup,'' an association of the
    families of political prisoners. These groups publish reports on human
    rights and make their views known both inside and outside the country.
    Government officials generally have been willing to meet with
    international human rights groups.
        In September the MOJ sent to the National Assembly a bill that
    would establish a human rights commission to investigate accusations of
    human rights violations. The President first mentioned this action as
    one of his 100 presidential policy pledges in February 1998.
        There is little independent monitoring of prison conditions,
    although representatives of human rights groups may visit certain
    prisoners at the discretion of the prison warden.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution and equal opportunity statutes forbid
    discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, or
    social status, and the Government respects these provisions. However,
    traditional attitudes limit opportunities for women and the disabled.
    Ethnic minorities are very small in number; they face both legal and
    societal discrimination.
        Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, and some women's
    rights groups maintain that such violence, including spousal abuse, has
    worsened with the recent decline of the economy. A 1997 survey found
    that 31.4 percent of households had experienced incidents of domestic
    violence during that year. In 1998 the Government enacted the
    Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection Act, which
    defines domestic violence as a serious crime. Authorities can order
    offenders to stay away from victims for up to 6 months and order them
    to be put on probation or to see court-designated counselors. The law
    also requires police to respond immediately to reports of domestic
    violence. Women's groups praised the law as a significant step in
    combating domestic violence. Several instances during the year of
    sexual harassment and attempted rapes allegedly committed by well-known
    men raised public awareness of these problems.
        Rape remained a serious problem, with 6,359 cases reported in 1999,
    according to MOJ statistics, the most recent available. Many rapes go
    unreported because of the stigma associated with being raped. Women's
    groups' activities have increased awareness of the importance of
    reporting and prosecuting rapes, as well as of offenses such as sexual
    harassment in the workplace. According to women's rights groups, cases
    involving sexual harassment or rape generally go unprosecuted, and
    perpetrators, if convicted, often receive very light sentences.
        A law was enacted to combat sexual harassment in the workplace, and
    went into effect in July 1999. Under the law, companies can be fined up
    to $2,500 (3 million won) for failing to take steps to prevent sexual
    harassment in the workplace or failing to punish an offender. The law
    also requires companies to establish in-house sexual harassment
    complaint centers and forbids firms from punishing employees for taking
    their complaints to outside organizations. In addition the Ministry of
    Education announced that the law's guidelines would apply at public
    schools and that teachers who make genderdiscriminatory remarks would
    be disciplined. As examples of such remarks, the Ministry cited
    statements that emphasized women's traditional roles in families,
    stressed men's leadership in society, and encouraged female students to
    work for good marriages instead of embarking on a career after
    graduation.
        The 1991 Family Law permits women to head a household, recognizes a
    wife's right to a portion of the couple's property, and allows a woman
    to maintain greater contact with her children after a divorce. Although
    the revisions help women who choose to divorce, including victims of
    domestic violence, the stigma of divorce remains strong, and there is
    little government or private assistance for divorced women. These
    factors, plus the fact that divorced women have limited employment
    opportunities and have difficulty remarrying, lead some women to stay
    in abusive situations. The Government has established some shelters for
    battered women and has increased the number of childcare facilities,
    giving women in abusive situations more options, but women's rights
    groups say that they fall far short of effectively dealing with the
    problem.
        The country's conservative traditions make women subordinate to men
    socially and economically. Despite the passage of equal employment
    opportunity legislation in 1987, few women work as company executives,
    and sexual discrimination in the workplace remains a problem. However,
    in January 1999 the National Assembly revised the 1987 Equal Employment
    Act to include tougher penalties to be imposed on companies that are
    found to discriminate against women in hiring and promotions. Under the
    revised law, the Presidential Commission on Women was granted the
    authority to investigate sexual discrimination cases in the workplace.
    A company found guilty of practicing sexual discrimination could be
    fined up to $4,200 (5 million won) and have its name published in the
    newspaper. The revised law also provides for a public fund to support
    victims in seeking legal redress. Nevertheless, some government
    agencies' preferential hiring of applicants with military service
    (nearly always men) points to continued legal barriers against women.
    In December 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that government
    agencies' preferential hiring practices for those who have performed
    military service discriminated against women and disabled persons and
    were unconstitutional. Women have full access to education, and social
    mores and attitudes are changing gradually. For example, the major
    political parties are making more efforts to recruit women; the
    Ministry of Women's Affairs continued its efforts to expand employment
    opportunities; and the military and service academies continued to
    expand opportunities for women.
        The Government provides an allowance of $417 (500,000 won) per
    month to 143 former ``comfort women'' (women who, during World War II,
    were forced to provide sex to soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army).
        The country is considered a transit point for traffickers of Asian
    women and children sold into the sex trade and domestic servitude (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
    rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public education.
    The Government provides high-quality elementary education to all
    children free of charge, and education is compulsory through the age of
    15. Most children obtain a good secondary education. High-quality
    health care is widely available to children.
        As public awareness of the problem of child abuse continues to
    grow, the number of reported cases has increased. According to one
    NGO's figures, 2,115 cases of child abuse were reported in 1999. The
    Seoul metropolitan government operates a children's counseling center
    that investigates reports of abuse, counsels families, and cares for
    runaway children. Until 1998 there was no specific law against child
    abuse; however, the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim
    Prevention Act, which defines domestic violence as a serious crime,
    allows a child to bring charges against a parent in cases of abuse.
    During the year, the Government enacted a revised child protection law
    that mandated the establishment of a child abuse hot line and the
    dispatch of trained personnel to take preliminary measures for the
    protection of an abused child. Under the revised law, the Government
    also is to establish new child welfare facilities for abused children.
    Revisions also included increased penalties for convicted child
    abusers, who would face up to 5 years in prison (compared with the
    previous 2 years) for child abuse.
        In July 1999, the Government's Commission on Youth Protection,
    exercising its mandate to ``regulate the circulation of harmful
    materials and substances and to protect youth from harmful
    entertainment establishments,'' revised the Youth Protection Law. Under
    the revised law, owners of entertainment establishments who hire minors
    under the age of 19 face prison terms of up to 10 years and a fine of
    $17,000 (20 million won) per minor hired. The law previously had
    provided for a prison term of 3 years and a fine of $23,000 (28 million
    won) no matter how many minors were hired. The Commission also
    announced that it was expanding the definition of ``entertainment
    establishment'' to include facilities, such as restaurants and cafes,
    where children sometimes were hired illegally as prostitutes.
        In July the Juvenile Sexual Protection Act took effect. It
    established the maximum imprisonment for the sale of the sexual
    services of persons under 19 years of age at 20 years. It also
    established prison terms for persons convicted of purchase of sexual
    services of youth under the age of 19 (see Section 6.f.).
        The traditional preference for male children continues, although it
    is less evident among couples under the age of 40. Although the law
    bans fetal testing except when a mother's life is in danger, when a
    hereditary disease would be transmitted, in cases of rape or incest,
    such testing and the subsequent termination of pregnancies with female
    fetuses frequently occur. The Government has expressed concern about
    the widening disparity between male and female birth rates.
        The country is considered a transit point for traffickers of Asian
    women and children sold into the sex trade and domestic servitude (see
    Sections 6.c., 6.d., and 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The law provides broad protections
    against discrimination against people with disabilities. Although
    measures aimed at creating opportunities for the disabled have been
    taken, public facilities for their everyday care and use remained
    inadequate. However, there is no legal discrimination against disabled
    persons in employment, education, or the provision of other state
    services.
        In 1995 the Government expanded job training programs, medical
    benefits, and welfare facilities for disabled citizens. Since 1991
    firms with over 300 employees have been required by law either to hire
    disabled workers or pay a fee. Surveys indicate that most companies
    either paid the fee or evaded the law, with one 1999 survey indicating
    that 9 out of 10 firms with more than 300 employees failed to meet the
    legally mandated 2 percent job quota for disabled workers. In the past,
    the Government increased the subsidies provided to companies that hire
    the disabled. Nonetheless, the hiring of the disabled remains
    significantly below target levels. The disabled make up less than 1
    percent of the work force. New public buildings are required to include
    facilities for the disabled, such as ramp access to entrances, a
    wheelchair lift, and special parking spaces. The Health and Welfare
    Ministry announced in 1995 that existing government buildings must be
    retrofitted with these facilities by 2005. As of 1998, 47.4 percent of
    public buildings and facilities had facilities for the disabled. In
    December 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that government agencies'
    preferential hiring practices for those who have performed military
    service discriminated against disabled persons and were
    unconstitutional.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is racially
    homogeneous, with no ethnic minorities of significant size. Except in
    cases of naturalization, citizenship is based on parentage, not place
    of birth, and persons must show their family genealogy as proof of
    citizenship. Thus, ethnic Chinese born and resident in Korea cannot
    automatically obtain citizenship or become public servants and may have
    difficulty being hired by some major corporations. Due to legal as well
    as societal discrimination, many ethnic Chinese have emigrated to other
    countries since the 1970's. There are approximately 20,000 ethnic
    Chinese, who represent 0.05 percent of the population. In June 1998,
    the Government passed legislation to allow a female citizen to transmit
    citizenship to her child regardless of the citizenship of the child's
    father. Amerasians face no legal discrimination, but informal
    discrimination is prevalent, making it more difficult for them to
    succeed in academia, business, or government.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides workers the
    right to associate freely, except for public sector employees. In 1998
    the Government passed legislation that, beginning in January 1999,
    allowed white-collar government workers to form workplace councils.
    Blue-collar workers in such government agencies as the postal service,
    railways, telecommunications, and the National Medical Center are
    allowed to organize unions. As few as two employees may form a union.
    Until 1997 the Trade Union Law specified that only one union was
    permitted at each workplace. However, labor law changes in 1997
    authorized the formation of competing unions starting in 2002. All
    unions are required to notify the authorities when formed or dissolved.
    According to 1999 figures, about 12.6 percent of workers belong to a
    union. There are approximately 5,560 trade unions.
        In the past, the Government did not grant formal recognition to
    labor federations that were not affiliated with the country's two
    legally recognized labor groupings--the Federation of Korean Trade
    Unions (FKTU) and the Independent Korean Federation of Clerical and
    Financial Workers. However, in the past several years, the Labor
    Ministry officially recognized some independent white-collar
    federations representing hospital workers, journalists, and office
    workers at construction firms and at government research institutes.
    The courts ruled in 1992 that affiliation with the FKTU was not
    required for registration as a legal labor federation. The legalization
    of the teachers' union paved the way for government recognition of the
    dissident Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in November 1999.
    In practice labor federations not formally recognized by the Labor
    Ministry have operated without government interference.
        Strikes are prohibited in government agencies, state-run
    enterprises, and defense industries. By law unions in enterprises
    determined to be of ``essential public interest,'' including public
    transportation, utilities, public health, banking, and
    telecommunications can be ordered to submit to government-ordered
    arbitration in lieu of striking. However, in practice the Government
    rarely imposes arbitration. The number of labor disputes has declined
    in recent years. According to Labor Ministry statistics, 198 strikes
    occurred in 1999, the last year for which complete data are available.
    The Labor Dispute Adjustment Act requires unions to notify the Labor
    Ministry of their intention to strike; it mandates a 10-day ``cooling-
    off period'' before a work stoppage legally may begin and 15 days in
    public interest sectors. Labor laws prohibit retribution against
    workers who have conducted a legal strike and allow workers to file
    complaints of unfair labor practices against employers. In recent
    years, the Government has cultivated a more neutral stance in labor
    disputes. In 1998 the National Assembly adopted a law that permits mass
    layoffs of workers in cases of corporate restructuring. The impending
    layoffs of thousands of workers led to strikes in the auto and banking
    industries.
        In August 1998, striking workers shut down the Hyundai Motors' auto
    plant in Ulsan; although the Government threatened to use police to
    remove the workers, labor and management settled their dispute
    peacefully. There were no reports that employer-hired squads assaulted
    workers during the year. In July a threatened bank workers' strike was
    averted, in contrast with a 1998 bank union strike in which strikers
    caused property damage.
        According to government figures, as of August, 49 persons had been
    arrested for allegedly instigating violent strikes or illegally
    disrupting business (a total of 129 were arrested and tried in 1999).
    In June more than 3,000 riot police forcefully dispersed approximately
    1,000 striking workers at a hotel strike in Seoul. Also in June, police
    dispersed a strike among workers at the National Health Insurance
    Corporation. Several union leaders were arrested in both strikes, and
    the violence in the hotel strike led to injuries to 33 strikers.
    Although there were several large general strikes, the Government did
    not punish union members for their participation in these strikes or
    other mass rallies. Workers fired by employers that were found guilty
    of unfair labor activities were reinstated.
        In December Seoul police violently dispersed demonstrations by
    striking union members at two banks. Most workers left voluntarily, but
    several who refused to disperse were injured in conflicts with police.
        The ban on teachers' unions was lifted in July 1999. Accordingly,
    the KCTU-affiliated Korean Teachers' Union (Chonkyojo) and the FKTU-
    affiliated Korean Union of Teachers and Educational Workers became
    legal. Although the two teachers unions have the right to bargain
    collectively with the Ministry of Education on wages or working
    condition--but not school curriculums--it is illegal for the unions to
    enter into collective action. In the April National Assembly election,
    several candidates from the KCTU-affiliated Democratic Labor Party made
    unsuccessful bids for assembly seats.
        Labor laws prohibiting political activities by unions were
    rescinded in 1997. Election laws that apply to other social
    organizations regulate unions. These regulations prohibit donations by
    unions (and other social organizations) to political parties. Some
    trade unionists have temporarily resigned from their union posts to run
    for office.
        The FKTU and KCTU are affiliated with the International
    Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Most of the FKTU's 20 constituent
    federations maintain affiliations with international trade
    secretariats, as does the KCTU Metalworkers Council.
        In 1998 the country was reinstated to the Overseas Private
    Investment Corporation's (OPIC) insurance programs, which had been
    suspended since 1991 on worker rights grounds.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution and the Trade Union Law provide for the right of workers
    to collective bargaining and collective action. This law also empowers
    workers to file complaints of unfair labor practices against employers
    who interfere with union organizing or practice discrimination against
    union members. Employers found guilty of unfair practices can be
    required to reinstate workers who were fired for union activities.
        Extensive collective bargaining is practiced, even with unions
    whose federations are not recognized legally by the Government. The
    labor laws do not extend the right to organize and bargain collectively
    to defense industry workers or to white-collar government employees,
    although the Government passed legislation to allow government workers
    to form workplace councils beginning in 1999, including workers at
    state or publicly run enterprises.
        There is no independent system of labor courts. The central and
    local labor commissions form a semiautonomous agency of the Labor
    Ministry that adjudicates disputes in accordance with the Labor Dispute
    Adjustment Law. Each labor commission is composed of equal numbers of
    representatives of labor and management, plus neutral experts who
    represent the ``public interest.'' Local labor commissions are
    empowered to decide on remedial measures in cases involving unfair
    labor practices and to mediate and, in some situations, arbitrate labor
    disputes. Arbitration can be made compulsory in sectors of the economy
    (for example, utilities and transportation) deemed essential to public
    welfare.
        In 1998 the Government established the Tripartite Commission, with
    representatives from labor, management, and the Government to deal with
    labor issues related to the economic downturn. The work of the
    Commission made it legal for companies to lay off workers due to
    economic hardship and authorized temporary manpower agencies. Disputes
    among labor, management, and government representatives led to the
    withdrawal of the KCTU representatives in September 1999.
        In the past, regulations forbade intervention in disputes by
    socalled third parties, such as labor federations not recognized by the
    Government. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to remove the ban on third-
    party intervention and allow nonrecognized federations to assist member
    unions involved in a strike. Under this provision, persons who assist
    trade unions or employers in a dispute or in the course of bargaining
    are required to register with the Ministry of Labor. Those who fail to
    do so may face a large fine or a maximum sentence of 3 years'
    imprisonment.
        Enterprises in the two export processing zones (EPZ's) had been
    designated by the Government as public interest enterprises. Workers in
    these enterprises, whose rights to organize formerly were restricted,
    gradually have been given the rights enjoyed by workers in other
    sectors of the economy. Labor organizations are permitted in EPZ's.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced and compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory labor by
    children, and it is not known to occur. The Constitution provides that
    no person shall be punished, placed under preventive restrictions, or
    subjected to involuntary labor, except as provided by law and through
    lawful procedures. The country is a transit point in trafficking in
    Asian women and children (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Standards Law prohibits the employment of
    persons under the age of 15 without a special employment certificate
    from the Labor Ministry. Because education is compulsory through middle
    school (about age 14), few special employment certificates are issued
    for full-time employment. Some children are allowed to hold part-time
    jobs such as selling newspapers. To obtain employment, children under
    age 18 must have written approval from their parents or guardians.
    Employers can require minors to work only a limited number of overtime
    hours and are prohibited from employing them at night without special
    permission from the Labor Ministry. Child labor laws and regulations
    are clear and usually enforced when violations are found, but the
    Government employs too few inspectors to carry out regular inspections.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces
    this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The Government has not defined
    Worst Forms of Child Abuse or hazardous work.
        The country is a transit point for trafficking in Asian women and
    children (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government implemented a
    minimum wage in 1988, and the minimum wage level is reviewed annually.
    Since September 1999, the minimum wage was approximately $1.45 (1,600
    won) per hour. Companies with fewer than 10 employees are exempt from
    this law. The FKTU and other labor organizations assert that the
    current minimum wage does not meet the basic requirements of urban
    workers. In fact workers earning the minimum wage would have difficulty
    in providing a decent standard of living for themselves and their
    families, despite fringe benefits, such as transportation expenses,
    with which companies normally supplement salaries (however, the money
    an average blue-collar worker takes home in overtime and bonuses
    significantly raises the total compensation package). According to the
    Ministry of Health and Welfare, 4.2 percent of the population lived
    below the poverty level as of July 1999.
        Amendments to the Labor Standards Law passed in 1989 brought the
    maximum regular workweek to 44 hours, with provision for overtime to be
    compensated at a higher wage. The law also provides for a 24-hour rest
    period each week. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to establish a
    flexible hours system, according to which employers could require
    laborers to work up to 48 hours during certain weeks without paying
    overtime, so long as average weekly hours for any given 2-week period
    did not exceed 44. If a union agreed to a further loosening of the
    rules, management could ask employees to work up to 56 hours in a given
    week. The legislation established a daily cap of 12 hours on the
    working day. Labor groups claim that the Government does not enforce
    adequately the maximum workweek provisions at small companies.
        Foreign workers, most of whom come from China, the Philippines,
    Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, often face difficult working
    conditions. In the early 1990's, the Government sought to ease the
    problems of illegal workers by creating a program that allowed about
    60,000 foreign workers to enter the country legally to work at
    established wages with legal safeguards. In September the Government
    announced that industrial trainees would be allowed to remain in the
    country for as long as 5 years. Previously, those entering the country
    on trainee visas could remain for 3 years.
        The Government reports that approximately 235,000 foreign workers
    reside in the country and that about 150,000 are illegal residents. It
    is difficult for illegal workers to seek relief for loss of pay or
    unsatisfactory living and working conditions because they face
    deportation. However, the Government has established counseling centers
    that hear complaints from illegal foreign workers about such problems
    as overdue wages and industrial accidents. The MOJ announced in March
    that it would suspend deportation proceedings for illegal residents
    awaiting back pay. The MOJ also announced that it would establish a
    human rights committee for foreign workers to address problems that
    some foreign workers face from primarily private sector employers.
    These workers have been subjected to beatings, forced detention,
    withheld wages, and seizure of passports. Finally, employers reported
    to have abused foreign workers would be subject to criminal charges and
    disadvantaged in the Government's allocation of jobs for overseas
    workers. Foreigners working as language teachers have complained that
    the language institutes that hired them frequently violated employment
    contracts, for which the legal system provided insufficient redress.
        The Government sets health and safety standards, but the accident
    rate is unusually high. However, this rate continued to decline
    gradually due to improved occupational safety programs and union
    pressure for better working conditions. The Labor Ministry still lacks
    enough inspectors to enforce the labor laws fully. The Industrial
    Safety and Health Law does not provide job security for workers who
    remove themselves from dangerous work environments.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Criminal Code states that, ``A
    person who kidnaps another by force or coercion for purposes of
    engaging in an indecent act or sexual intercourse, or for gain, shall
    be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year . . . this shall
    apply to a person who buys or sells a woman for purpose of
    prostitution.'' The Labor Standards Law prohibits employment of any
    person under 18 years of age in work that ``is detrimental to morality
    or health.''
        Trafficking in persons is a problem. Because of lax control of
    transit areas at international airports, the country is considered a
    transit point for alien smugglers, including traffickers of primarily
    Asian women and children for the sex trade and domestic servitude.
    Relatively small numbers of Korean economic migrants, seeking
    opportunities abroad, are believed to have become victims of
    traffickers as well (see Section 5). One travel agency was accused of
    visa fraud and the trafficking of women to a Western country for
    prostitution. There were several reports of the falsification of Korean
    documents by travel agencies; many cases involved the trafficking of
    citizens of China to Western countries.
        The Juvenile Sexual Protection Act enacted in July imposes lengthy
    prison terms for persons convicted of sexual crimes against minors (see
    Section 5).
        In May police arrested 5 persons for visa fraud for the purpose of
    trafficking in aliens; the group had reportedly recruited more than
    1,000 persons. In November police arrested Lim Il-kwon, a citizen
    convicted of past alien trafficking, on charges of document fraud. He
    admitted to the smuggling of women to Japan and Western countries for
    purposes of prostitution. Police believe that Lim was responsible for
    the trafficking of hundreds of persons. Police also arrested another
    suspected trafficker who admitted document fraud for international
    travel. All the suspects awaited trial at year's end.
        Most related arrests are made on charges of travel document fraud,
    not trafficking itself. There were no trafficking arrests during the
    year.
                                   __________

                                      LAOS

        The Lao People's Democratic Republic is an authoritarian,
    Communist, one-party state ruled by the Lao People's Revolutionary
    Party (LPRP). Although the 1991 Constitution outlines a system composed
    of executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in practice the LPRP
    continued to influence governance and the choice of leaders through its
    constitutional ``leading role'' at all levels. The 99-member National
    Assembly, elected in 1997 under a system of universal suffrage,
    selected the President and Prime Minister in 1998. The judiciary is
    subject to executive influence.
        The Ministry of Interior (MOI) maintains internal security but
    shares the function of state control with party and mass front (People
    Network) organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible
    for the monitoring and oversight of foreigners working in the country;
    its activities are augmented by other security organizations and
    surveillance systems. The MOI includes local police, security police
    (including border police), communication police, and other armed police
    units. The armed forces are responsible for external security but also
    have some domestic security responsibilities that include
    counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities. Civilian authorities
    generally maintain effective control over the security forces. There
    continue to be credible reports that some members of the security
    forces committed human rights abuses.
        Laos is an extremely poor country of 5.2 million persons.
        After the LPRP came to power in 1975, 10 percent of the population
    (at least 360,000 persons) fled the country to escape the Government's
    harsh political and economic policies. The economy is principally
    agricultural; 85 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence
    agriculture. Per capita gross domestic product is estimated to be $300
    per year. Since 1986 the Government largely has abandoned its Socialist
    economic policies, although in practice the operation of the state-
    owned banks and enterprises indicates a reluctance to discard old
    models. Most economic reforms have begun to move the country gradually
    from a moribund, centrally planned system to a marketoriented economy
    open to foreign investment with a growing legal framework, including
    laws to protect property rights.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor throughout the
    year, and there were a number of serious problems. Citizens do not have
    the right to change their government. During clashes with insurgents in
    the north, there were unconfirmed accusations that government troops
    deliberately killed noncombatant civilians. At times members of the
    security forces abused detainees and brutally beat suspected
    insurgents. Government troops razed one village in the north. Prison
    conditions are extremely harsh. Police used arbitrary arrest,
    detention, and intrusive surveillance. Lengthy pretrial detention is a
    problem. The judiciary is subject to executive influence, suffers from
    corruption, and does not ensure citizens' due process. The Government
    infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government restricts freedom
    of speech and imposes some restrictions on press freedom, assembly, and
    association. However, it permitted some access to the foreign press and
    the Internet. The Government restricts freedom of religion and arrested
    and detained approximately 95 Christians, and more than 25 members of
    religious communities remained in custody at the end of the year.
    Forced renunciation campaigns and church closings continued in some
    areas. The Government imposes some restrictions on freedom of movement.
    Some societal discrimination against women and minorities persists. The
    Government actively supported a policy of encouraging greater rights
    for women, children, disabled persons, and minorities. The Government
    restricts some worker rights. The Government continued to focus on the
    problem of trafficking in women and children.
        Several small-scale explosive devices were detonated in urban areas
    during the year, causing one death and dozens of injuries. No group
    claimed responsibility for these acts. Official statements initially
    downplayed the incidents, attributing them to personal quarrels and
    vendettas; some government officials later blamed ``foreign
    terrorists.''
        Organized Hmong insurgent groups were responsible for occasional
    clashes with government troops. These exchanges reportedly were brutal
    on both sides. The organized Hmong insurgent group, the Chao Fa, was
    responsible for the killing of more than 15 civilians in 4 incidents in
    Vientiane and Xieng Khouang provinces and in Saysomboune Special Zone.
    These incidents appeared to be acts of deliberate terror against
    citizens who do not support resistance to the Government.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    confirmed reports of politically motivated killings by government
    officials during the year. There continued to be isolated, unconfirmed
    reports of deaths at the hands of security forces in remote areas,
    usually in connection with personal disputes and the personal abuse of
    authority.
        In armed actions against insurgents, government troops burned down
    one village in the north in the first part of the year; accusations
    that government troops deliberately killed civilian noncombatants could
    not be confirmed (see Section 1.c.).
        In October security forces killed from three to five prisoners who
    had escaped from Phongsaly provincial jail; there was no evidence that
    the prisoners were armed or had threatened their pursuers. Some reports
    stated that the prisoners had already been recaptured.
        According to unconfirmed reports, in early May police from
    Phonesavanh, Xieng Khouang province, shot and killed two Hmong
    civilians visiting from another province who were out walking after the
    nighttime curfew. There is no additional evidence available about the
    case, including whether the Government gave compensation to the
    victims' families, the usual practice with accidental shootings in
    security zones.
        A series of bomb detonations in urban areas killed at least one
    bystander and injured dozens. No group claimed responsibility for these
    small-scale bombings. Official statements initially downplayed the
    incidents, attributing them to personal quarrels and vendettas; some
    government officials later blamed ``foreign terrorists,'' failing to
    acknowledge that the incidents may have been acts of terror by internal
    rivals for power and influence. Authorities arrested two suspects whom
    they later released.
        Attacks by armed groups on official and civilian travelers
    continued on a small scale in the central and north central regions.
    The attacks reportedly involved various factors including insurgency,
    clan rivalry, robbery, and reaction to encroaching development. The
    Government remained concerned about the safety of foreign tourists and
    aid workers in remote areas, although there were no confirmed attacks
    on foreigners during the year.
        In January Hmong insurgents attacked Xieng Khouang province's
    district capital town of Muang Khoune, killing 7 persons and burning
    down 17 structures. Credible reports indicated that Hmong insurgents
    attacked a village in Kasi district in July and killed five civilians.
    Other reports indicated that the Hmong insurgents shot and killed
    persons gathering food during February to April in the forest areas of
    Saysomboune Special Zone. There was no evidence that the deaths were
    intentional.
        In December Hmong insurgents attacked a village in Xieng Khouang
    province. They killed three civilians and destroyed houses.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances of Lao citizens; however, reports indicated that two
    U.S. citizens disappeared in April 1999 near the northwest border with
    Thailand. The two men, Michael Vang and Houa Ly, disappeared soon after
    reportedly entering the country. The matter remained under review by
    authorities at year's end, but there was no evidence that the
    Government either provided the promised investigative cooperation or
    conducted a serious unilateral investigation during the year.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or
    Punishment
        The Constitution and the Penal Code prohibit torture, and the
    Government generally respected these provisions in practice; however,
    on occasion, members of the security forces subjected detainees to
    abusive treatment. For example, early in the year, a few local police
    and prison officials in one southern province beat a number of
    religious detainees. In March 1998, Lao authorities, some wearing
    police uniforms, detained a foreign citizen and three family members in
    an unofficial detention center for 4 days. The Government did not file
    charges against the four persons. The officials reportedly kept the
    four persons in locked, windowless rooms and subjected them to long and
    arduous interrogation before releasing them. The Government offered no
    explanation for this treatment. There is no evidence that the
    Government has investigated the incident seriously, and no prosecution
    or punishment of the perpetrators is expected.
        The Government chose not to address numerous reports of massive
    human rights violations by government authorities that were made by
    groups outside the country. Most of these reports could not be
    confirmed through independent sources. However, there continue to be
    credible reports that some members of the security forces committed
    human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention and intimidation.
    There were credible reports that some members of the security forces
    burned down a Hmong village in the northern insurgency area and were
    responsible for nearly beating some villagers to death, and that other
    members abused citizens in the first half of the year during clashes
    with insurgents or armed individuals suspected to be insurgents. Some
    members of the security forces in Xieng Khouang and Saysomboune Special
    Zone threatened families and villages.
        A series of eight bombs exploded in Vientiane during the year,
    killing at least one and injuring dozens of persons. Authorities found
    as many as four other unexploded bombs in Vientiane and two others in
    southern provinces. Another bomb exploded in the south, with no
    injuries. The Vientiane Times reported official claims that the bombs
    were the result of business disputes and personal vendettas.
        Prison conditions generally are extremely harsh. Food rations are
    minimal, and most prisoners rely on their families for their
    subsistence. The Government discriminates in its treatment of
    prisoners, restricting the family visits of some and prohibiting visits
    to a few. Prison authorities use degrading treatment, solitary
    confinement, and incommunicado detention against perceived problem
    prisoners, especially suspected insurgents. On occasion authorities
    used incommunicado detention as an interrogation method; in isolated
    cases, this was life threatening. There are confirmed reports that a
    few jails place prisoners in leg chains, wooden stocks, or fixed hand
    manacles for extended periods. Medical facilities range from poor to
    nonexistent. Prison conditions for women are similar to those for men.
        Several international human rights groups continued their
    longstanding requests to the Government to move two political prisoners
    to a prison with better conditions, including more modern medical
    facilities (see Section 1.e.). At year's end, the Government continued
    to ignore these humanitarian pleas.
        The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
    conditions.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
    arrest warrants issued by the prosecutor, and the Constitution provides
    for procedural safeguards; however, in practice the Government does not
    respect these provisions, and arbitrary arrest and detention remain
    problems. Police sometimes use temporary arrest as a means of
    intimidation. Police exercise wide latitude in making arrests, relying
    on exceptions to the requirement for arrest warrants for those in the
    act of committing a crime or for ``urgent'' cases. The length of
    detention without a pretrial hearing or formal charges is
    unpredictable, and access to family or a lawyer is not assured. There
    is a functioning bail system, but its implementation is arbitrary. A
    statute of limitations applies to most crimes. Alleged violations of
    security laws have led to lengthy pretrial detentions without charge
    and minimal due process protection of those detained. Reports indicated
    that some students, teachers, and their associates who had staged
    protests in 1999 remained in detention without trial at year's end.
    These persons had peacefully advocated multiparty democracy and
    increased political freedom and had expressed hostility to the regime.
    Their detention without trial violates the 1year statutory limit.
        During the year, government authorities arrested and detained more
    than 95 Christians and their spiritual leaders, at times holding them
    in custody for months (see Section 2.c.) Those detained without trial
    at year's end for their religious activities include: One person in
    Phongsaly; two persons in Luang Namtha; two persons in Vientiane
    Municipality; and four persons in Savannakhet (see Section 2.c.). Eight
    lowland Lao men who returned from China have been detained without
    trial since 1997 (see Section 2.c.).
        Police sometimes administratively overrule court decisions, at
    times detaining a defendant exonerated by the court, in violation of
    the law (see Section 1.e.).
        Three former government officials detained in 1990 for advocating a
    multiparty system and criticizing restrictions on political liberties
    were not tried until 1992. One died in prison since that time. That
    same year, the court finally tried and handed down life sentences to
    three men detained since 1975 for crimes allegedly committed during
    their tenure as officials of the previous regime. One of these persons
    reportedly has died in prison.
        An estimated 100 to 200 persons, based on known cases, are in
    detention for suspicion of violations of national security. Most of
    these detainees are held without trial; one person has been detained
    since 1992.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    independence of the judiciary and the prosecutor's office; however,
    senior government and party officials wield influence over the courts,
    although likely to a lesser degree than in the past. Some corrupt
    members of the judiciary appear to act with impunity, leading many
    observers to conclude that persons can bribe judges with money. The
    National Assembly Standing Committee appoints judges; the executive
    appoints the Standing Committee.
        The People's Courts have three levels: District; municipal and
    provincial; and a Supreme Court. Decisions of both the lower courts and
    separate military courts are subject to review by the Supreme Court.
        The Constitution provides for open trials in which defendants have
    the right to defend themselves with the assistance of a lawyer or other
    person. The Constitution requires authorities to inform persons of
    their rights. The law states that defendants may have anyone represent
    them in preparing a written case and accompanying them at their trial,
    however, only the defendant may present oral arguments at a criminal
    trial. Due to lack of funds, most defendants do not have attorneys or
    trained representatives. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence;
    however, in practice lawyers face severe restrictions in criminal
    cases. Most trials are little more than direct examinations of the
    accused, although judges appear not to hold preconceived views of a
    trial's outcome. Defendants sometimes are not permitted to testify on
    their own behalf. Trials for alleged violations of some security laws
    and trials that involve state secrets, children under the age of 16, or
    certain types of family law are closed.
        Police sometimes administratively overrule court decisions, at
    times detaining a defendant exonerated by the court, in violation of
    the law.
        There are four known political prisoners. Two prisoners from the
    pre-1975 regime, Colonel Sing Chanthakoumane and Major Pang Thong
    Chokbengvoun, are serving life sentences after trials that did not
    appear to be conducted according to international standards. Two former
    government officials, Latsami Khamphoui and Feng Sakchittaphong, were
    detained in 1990 for advocating a multiparty system and criticizing
    restrictions on political liberties, and were not tried until 1992.
    They are serving 14year sentences based on their 1992 convictions.
        Because some political prisoners may have been arrested, tried, and
    convicted under security laws that prevent public court trials, there
    is no reliable method to ascertain accurately their total number. There
    have been no verifiable reports of other political prisoners in the
    last few years. International humanitarian organizations are not
    permitted to visit political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family,
        Home, or Correspondence.--The Government limits citizens' privacy
    rights, and the Government's surveillance network is vast. Security
    laws allow the Government to monitor individuals' private
    communications (including e-mail) and movements. The Government
    increased these elements of state control again during the year,
    especially in areas involving safety and security problems. However,
    some personal freedoms accorded to citizens expanded along with the
    liberalization of the economy.
        The Constitution prohibits unlawful searches and seizures; however,
    police at times disregarded constitutional requirements to safeguard
    citizens' privacy, especially in rural areas. By law security police
    may not authorize their own searches; they must have approval from a
    prosecutor or court. However, in practice police did not always obtain
    prior approval. The Penal Code generally protects privacy, including
    mail, telephone, and electronic correspondence. But as is the case with
    email monitoring, government security concerns prevail over such legal
    protections. In October the National Internet Control Committee
    promulgated highly restrictive regulations on Internet use (see Section
    2.a.).
        Ministry of Interior forces monitor citizens' activities; in
    addition a loose militia in both urban and rural areas has
    responsibility for maintaining public order and reporting ``bad
    elements'' to the police. Militia usually concern themselves more with
    petty crime and instances of moral turpitude than with political
    activism, although some rural militia may be used for security against
    insurgents. A sporadically active system of neighborhood and workplace
    committees plays a similar monitoring role.
        The Government permits the public sale of few leading foreign
    magazines and newspapers; however, minimal restrictions on publications
    mailed from overseas are enforced only loosely (see Section 2.a.). The
    Government allows citizens to marry foreigners but only with its prior
    approval. Although the Government routinely grants permission, the
    process is lengthy and burdensome. Marriages to foreigners without
    government approval may be annulled, with both parties subject to
    fines.
        The Government displaced internally hundreds of persons during the
    year, mainly as a result of organized infrastructure development
    programs. The Government provides compensation to displaced persons in
    the form of land and household supplies.
        Credible sources reported flexibility by the Government toward the
    disposition of infrastructure-related and other governmentplanned
    resettlements. One hydropower project resettlement village opened
    during the year, funded by investors. However, some local
    administrators forced highlander groups to resettle in lowland areas to
    control their use of farming methods that destroy forest areas in the
    pursuit of increased food security.
        There are two Internet service providers. In the second half of the
    year, the National Internet Control Committee in the Prime Minister's
    Office began a review of national telecommunications and Internet
    access procedures; it stated that it intends to monitor and control
    Internet communications more actively. Some Internet users reported
    that they received email warnings from the Government during the year.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
    restricts political speech and writing in practice. The Government also
    prohibits most criticism that it deems harmful to its reputation. The
    Penal Code forbids slandering the State, distorting party or state
    policies, inciting disorder, or propagating information or opinions
    that weaken the State. The Government showed limited tolerance of
    general criticisms of good governance or public service, and citizens
    who lodge legitimate complaints with government departments generally
    do not suffer reprisals. However, government concern about potential
    public violent displays of discontent over failed economic policies and
    concern over the series of terrorist bombings led to tighter control of
    the media. Newspapers did not report on investigations into the causes
    of any of the eight bombs that exploded in Vientiane from March through
    December. In July the Vientiane Times reported that officials had
    stated that the bombings were the result of business disputes or
    personal vendettas (see Section 1.c.).
        All domestic print and electronic media are state-owned and
    controlled. Local news in all media reflects government policy.
    Television talk shows and opinion articles refer only to differences in
    administrative approach. However, translations of foreign press reports
    generally are without bias, and access to Thai radio and television and
    foreign-based Internet servers is unhindered. Only a few other Asian
    and Western newspapers and magazines are available, through private
    outlets that have government permission to sell them.
        Authorities also prohibited the dissemination of materials deemed
    to be indecent, to undermine the national culture, or to be politically
    sensitive. Films and music recordings produced in government studios
    must be submitted for official censorship. However, in practice most
    foreign media are easily available. Government enforcement of
    restrictions on nightclub entertainment generally was lax during the
    year.
        Citizens have 24-hour access to Cable News Network and the British
    Broadcasting Corporation, among other international stations accessible
    via satellite television. The Government requires registration of
    receiving satellite dishes and a onetime licensing fee for their use,
    largely as a revenuegenerating scheme, but otherwise makes no effort to
    restrict their use.
        Foreign journalists must apply for special visas. Unfettered access
    to information sources and domestic travel unescorted by officials--
    hallmarks of a more liberal government attitude in previous years--
    declined during the year.
        The Government controls all domestic Internet servers, blocks
    access to those World Wide Web sites that are deemed pornographic or
    are critical of government institutions and policies, and monitors e-
    mail. In October the National Internet Control Committee promulgated
    highly restrictive regulations on Internet use by citizens. The
    regulations significantly curtailed freedom of expression and made
    ``disturbing the peace and happiness of the community and ``reporting
    misleading news'' criminal acts. However, the Government in the past
    has been limited in its ability to enforce such regulations.
        The Constitution provides for academic freedom; however, the
    Government restricts it, although it has relaxed its restrictions in
    certain areas. Lao and Western academic professionals conducting
    research in Laos may be subject to restrictions on travel and access to
    information and Penal Code restrictions on publication. As the sole
    employer of virtually all academic professionals, the Government
    exercises some control over their ability to travel on research or
    study grants. However, the Government, which once limited foreign
    travel by professors, actively seeks out these opportunities worldwide
    and approves virtually all such proposals.
        Credible reports indicate that some academically qualified ethnic
    minorities, including Hmong, are denied opportunities for foreign
    fellowships and study abroad based on the actions of some state and
    party officials whose discriminatory behavior goes unchecked. On rare
    occasions, the Government has denied government employees who were not
    party members permission to accept certain research or study grants,
    apparently because they had chosen not to join the LPRP.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government continues to
    restrict this right in practice. The Penal Code prohibits participation
    in an organization for the purpose of demonstrations, protest marches,
    or other acts that cause turmoil or social instability. Such acts are
    punishable by a prison term of from 1 to 5 years. If defendants are
    tried for political crimes against the State, they may face much longer
    sentences of up to 20 years or possible execution.
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to organize and
    join associations; however, the Government restricts this right in
    practice. The Government registers and controls all associations and
    prohibits associations that criticize it. Political groups other than
    mass front organizations approved by the LPRP are forbidden. Although
    the Government restricts many types of formal professional and social
    associations, in practice informal nonpolitical groups can meet without
    hindrance. Individuals who in 1997 formed the Foundation for Promoting
    Education, a private voluntary organization in Vientiane Municipality,
    were active during the year and awarded prizes for educational
    achievement and scholarships to needy students. The group is supported
    by private contributions and operates independently under its own
    charter; however, it reports to the Ministry of Education. The Buddhist
    Promotion Foundation is a semiprivate group founded in 1998 by the Lao
    Buddhist Fellowship Association, which reports to the National Front.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The
    Constitution prohibits ``all acts of creating division of religion or
    creating division among the people.'' The Party and Government appear
    to interpret this section narrowly, thus inhibiting religious practice
    by all persons, including the Buddhist majority and a large population
    of animists. Although official pronouncements accepted the existence of
    religion, they emphasized its potential to divide, distract, or
    destabilize.
        The Constitution notes that the State ``mobilizes and encourages''
    monks, novices, and priests of other religions to participate in
    activities ``beneficial to the nation and the people.'' The Department
    of Religious Affairs in the LPRP Lao National Front for Construction,
    an LPRP mass organization, is responsible for overseeing all religions.
        During the year, government authorities arrested and detained more
    than 95 Christians and their spiritual leaders, at times holding them
    in custody for months. In some isolated cases, prisoners were detained
    in prison with crude, one-leg, wood stocks or fixed hand manacles.
        In the following provinces, prisoners are serving 2 to 3-year
    prison terms for peaceful religious activities found under the Penal
    Code to be creating social turmoil: In Attapeu (6 jailed); in Houaphan
    (3 jailed); in Luang Prabang (3 jailed); in Oudomxay (2 jailed). In
    Oudomxay 3 other persons arrested for proselytizing, purportedly in
    coordination with foreigners, were sentenced to 15-year (1 jailed) and
    12-year sentences (2 jailed). The more severe sentences in Oudomxay
    were based on harsh Penal Code provisions for acts against the State.
        In Savannakhet province, a renunciation and churchclosing campaign
    that was begun in 1999 by district authorities, supported by police,
    military forces, and representatives of the national front continued
    into the second half of the year. For the first time, churches of
    longer standing were targeted. Only about 10 churches--less than half--
    remained open at year's end. Most practitioners who found that their
    local churches had been closed were able to move their activities to
    new places of worship. As in late 1999, in a few villages in which
    churches had been recently closed, security forces mobilized on Sundays
    to stop all large vehicles that carried multiple passengers during
    Sunday worship hours. These actions expressly prevented villagers from
    traveling to other places to conduct worship services. In July in
    Vientiane province, the Government began a similar renunciation and
    church-closing campaign that continued through year's end. District-
    level police, military, and national front authorities instructed
    Christians, especially Christians from the Khmu and Hmong ethnic
    groups, to renounce their faith or face arrest and imprisonment.
    Vientiane provincial authorities arbitrarily closed at least 1 dozen
    churches, including a church in a refugee returnee village agreed to at
    the time the village was established under U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) auspices. In Vientiane province, authorities targeted
    both Protestant and Catholic congregations.
        The Party controls the Buddhist clergy (Sangha) in an attempt to
    direct national culture. After 1975 the Government attempted to
    ``reform'' Buddhism and ceased to consider it the state religion,
    causing thousands of monks to flee abroad, where most still remain. The
    Government has only one semireligious holiday--Boun That Luang--also a
    major political and cultural celebration. However, the Government
    recognizes the popularity and cultural significance of Buddhist
    festivals, and many senior officials openly attend them. Buddhist
    clergy are featured prominently at important state and party functions.
    The Lao National Front directs the Lao Buddhist Fellowship Association,
    which adopted a new charter in April 1998. The Front continues to
    require monks to study Marxism-Leninism, to attend certain party
    meetings, and to combine with their teachings of Buddhism the party-
    state policies. In recent years, some individual temples have been
    permitted to receive support from Theravada Buddhist temples abroad, to
    expand the training of monks, and to focus more on traditional
    teachings.
        The authorities continued to be suspicious of parts of the
    religious community other than Buddhism, including some Christian
    groups, in part because these faiths do not share a similarly high
    degree of direction and incorporation into the government structure as
    is the case with Theravada Buddhism. Authorities especially appear to
    suspect those religious groups that gain support from foreign sources,
    aggressively proselytize among the poor or uneducated, or give targeted
    assistance to converts. The Government strictly prohibits foreigners
    from proselytizing, although it permits foreign nongovernmental
    organizations with religious affiliations to work in the country.
    Foreign persons caught distributing religious material may be arrested
    or deported. Although there is no prohibition against proselytizing by
    citizens, there was increased local government investigation and
    harassment of citizens who do so under the constitutional provision
    against creating division of religion.
        The Government's tolerance of religion varied by region. In general
    central government authorities appeared unable or unwilling to control
    or mitigate harsh measures that were taken by local or provincial
    authorities against the practices of members of minority religious
    denominations. Although there was almost complete freedom to worship
    among unregistered groups in a few areas, particularly in the largest
    cities, government authorities in many regions allowed properly
    registered religious groups to practice their faith only under
    circumscribed conditions. In other areas, such as Savannakhet, Luang
    Prabang, Phongsaly, Houaphanh, Oudomxay, and Attapeu, the authorities
    arrested and detained religious believers and their spiritual leaders
    without charges. In more isolated cases, provincial authorities
    instructed their officials to monitor and arrest persons who professed
    belief in Christianity, Islam, or the Baha'i faith. For example, there
    is clear evidence that in Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, and Vientiane
    provinces, the authorities continued to force some Christians to sign
    renunciations of their faith.
        Citizens in Luang Prabang continued to report that local
    authorities ordered them to stop their open practice of Christianity
    completely, under threat of arrest. The order appeared to apply only to
    new converts; believers of long standing were allowed to continue their
    beliefs but not to conduct worship or practice their faith openly.
    Local officials monitored Christians closely to ensure that they did
    not practice their religion and harassed and arrested some Christians
    who violated these policies.
        Although authorities generally tolerated diverse religious
    practices, in the southern Laos panhandle, a pattern of petty local
    harassment persists. Many converts must undergo a series of harsh
    government interviews; however, after overcoming that initial barrier,
    they generally are permitted to practice their new faith unhindered.
    Members of longestablished congregations had few problems in practicing
    their faith; however, some churches established a century ago continued
    to be subjected to harassment by local government officials in
    Savannakhet. Many groups of coreligionists seeking to assemble in a new
    location are thwarted in attempts to meet, practice, or celebrate major
    religious festivals.
        Some minority religious groups report that they were unable during
    the year to register new congregations or receive permission to
    establish new places of worship, including in Vientiane. Authorities
    sometimes advised new branches to join other religious groups with
    similar historical roots, despite clear differences between the groups'
    beliefs. Some groups did not submit applications to establish places of
    worship because they did not believe that their applications would be
    approved.
        The Roman Catholic Church is unable to operate effectively in the
    highlands and much of the north. However, it has an established
    presence in five of the most populous central and southern provinces,
    where Catholics are able to worship openly. There are three bishops: In
    Vientiane, Thakhek, and Pakse. The status of the Catholic Church in
    Luang Prabang center remains in doubt; there appears to be a
    congregation there but due to local obstructionism, worship services
    may not always be conducted readily.
        Over 250 Protestant congregations conduct services throughout the
    country. The Lao National Front has recognized two Protestant groups,
    the Lao Evangelical Church, the umbrella Protestant church, and the
    Seventh Day Adventist Church. The Front strongly encourages all other
    Protestant groups to become a part of the Lao Evangelical Church. The
    Government has granted permission to these approved denominations to
    have a total of four church buildings in the Vientiane area. In
    addition the Lao Evangelical Church has maintained church buildings in
    Savannakhet and Pakse.
        The Government permits major religious festivals of all established
    congregations without hindrance. Two mosques and two Baha'i centers
    operate openly in Vientiane municipality; two other Baha'i centers are
    located in Vientiane province and Pakse. Five Mahayana Buddhist pagodas
    are located in Vientiane, and others are found in larger cities and
    towns.
        Animists generally experience no interference by the Government in
    their religious practices, which vary extensively among the 48 to 69
    identified ethnic groups and tribes in the country.
        The Government does not permit the printing of religious texts or
    their distribution outside a congregation and restricts the import of
    foreign religious texts and artifacts. The Government requires and
    grants routinely its permission for formal links with coreligionists in
    other countries; however, in practice the line between formal and
    informal links is blurred, and relations generally are established
    without much difficulty.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Migration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights; however, the Government restricted some of these rights in
    practice. Citizens who travel across provincial borders are required to
    report to authorities upon their departure and arrival. In designated
    security zones, roadblocks and identity card checks are routine.
    Citizens who seek to travel abroad are required to apply for an exit
    visa; however, the Government grants such visas routinely. Foreigners
    are restricted from traveling to certain areas such as the Saysomboune
    Special Zone, an administrative area operated by the military forces,
    for safety and security reasons.
        During the year, security forces in at least one province set up
    roadblocks during Sunday worship hours, which prevented villagers from
    traveling to participate in religious worship services (see Section
    2.c.).
        Fear of insurgent attacks on civilians in vehicles traveling in the
    north-central areas impedes travel, especially along parts of Route 13,
    Route 7, and Route 1. Bandits operate in the same area (see Section
    1.a.). The Government attempts to ensure safety on these roads.
        Citizens are free to emigrate; exit visas are required, and the
    Government grants these routinely.
        Since 1980 more than 29,060 citizens who sought refugee status in
    Thailand, China, and other countries have returned to Laos for
    permanent resettlement under monitoring by the UNHCR. There were no new
    returnees during the year. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR to
    assist such returnees to reintegrate. Most are ethnic Hmong and other
    minorities. These returnees generally have been treated the same as
    other citizens.
        The Constitution provides for asylum and the protection of
    stateless persons under the law, but in practice, the Government does
    not provide first asylum. There were no known cases during the year of
    asylum seekers being returned to a country where they feared
    persecution.
        The Government has a longstanding policy of welcoming back
    virtually all those among the 10 percent of the population who fled
    after the change in government in 1975. Many have visited relatives,
    some have stayed and gained foreign resident status, and some have
    reclaimed citizenship successfully. A small group, tried in absentia in
    1975 for antigovernment activities, does not have the right of return.
        Eight Lowland Lao men who returned from China have been detained
    without trial since 1997, which is beyond the limit for investigative
    detention (see Section 1.d.).
        Some refugee returnees carry identification cards with distinctive
    markings, ostensibly for use by authorities. Such cards tend to
    reinforce a pattern of societal discrimination against the refugees.
    Authorities increasingly harassed religious minorities in refugee
    returnee villages, and local officials closed a Christian church in one
    such village. The Government had permitted use of the church building
    at the time that the refugees returned (see Section 2.c.).

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
    Constitution legitimizes only a single party, the Lao People's
    Revolutionary Party, which must approve all candidates for local and
    national elections. Candidates need not be LPRP members.
        The Constitution provides for a 99-member National Assembly,
    elected every 5 years in open, multiple-candidate, fairly tabulated
    elections, with voting by secret ballot and universal adult suffrage.
    The National Assembly chooses a standing committee apparently based on
    the previous standing committee's decision. Upon the committee's
    recommendation, the National Assembly elects or removes the President
    and Vice President. The standing committee also has powers over
    elections (including approval of candidates), supervision of
    administrative and judicial organizations, and the sole power to
    recommend presidential decrees. Activities of the standing committee
    are not fully transparent.
        The National Assembly, upon the President's recommendation, elects
    the Prime Minister and other Ministers in the Government.
        The National Assembly may consider and amend draft legislation but
    may not propose new laws. The Constitution gives the right to submit
    draft legislation to the National Assembly standing committee and the
    ruling executive structure.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
    women increased their representation in the National Assembly in 1997
    elections from 9 percent to 20 percent, as 20 of the 27 female
    candidates won seats. Four members of the 48-member LPRP Central
    Committee are women, 2 of whom are also members of the 7-member
    standing committee in the National Assembly. There are no women in the
    Politburo or the Council of Ministers.
        The proportions of ethnic minority members in the 99-member
    National Assembly: 10 Lao Soung (highland tribes) and 26 Lao Theung
    (midslope dwelling tribes)are consistent with their proportions in the
    general population. There are 10 Hmong in the National Assembly. Men of
    lowland Lao origin dominate the upper echelons of the Party and the
    Government. Nonetheless, the President, 2 Deputy Prime Ministers, 3
    Ministers, and 36 members of the National Assembly are believed to be
    members of ethnic minority groups.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no domestic nongovernmental human rights organizations,
    and the Government does not have a formal procedure for registration.
    Any organization wishing to investigate and publicly criticize the
    Government's human rights policies would face serious obstacles if it
    were permitted to operate at all. The Government cooperates on an
    uneven basis with international human rights organizations.
        A human rights unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA's)
    Department of International Treaties and Legal Affairs has
    responsibility for inquiry into allegations of human rights violations.
    This government unit rarely responds to inquiries regarding individual
    cases, but early in the year published in Lao language a partial
    compilation of international conventions on human rights.
        In 1998, at the invitation of the Government, the U.N. Special
    Rapporteur on Trafficking in Children visited various locations and
    made inquiries into possible incidents of child prostitution and child
    pornography.
        The Government maintains contacts with the International Committee
    of the Red Cross (ICRC); government officials received ICRC training on
    human rights law in 1998, and the Government is translating more
    international conventions with ICRC support. The Government permitted
    U.N. human rights observers to monitor the treatment of almost 30,000
    returned refugees in all parts of the country with minimal
    interference; however, it occasionally obstructs monitoring so that it
    cannot be conducted in accordance with international standards.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law for all
    citizens without regard to sex, social status, education, faith, or
    ethnicity. Although the Government sometimes has taken action when
    well-documented and obvious cases of discrimination came to the
    attention of high-level officials, the legal mechanism whereby a
    citizen may bring charges of discrimination against an individual or
    organization is neither widely developed nor widely understood among
    the general population.
        Women.--There are reports that domestic violence against women
    occurs, although it is not widespread. Sexual harassment and rape
    reportedly are rare. In cases of rape that are tried in court,
    defendants generally are convicted.
        Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
        The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, and the Lao
    Women's Union operates nationally to promote the position of women in
    society. Discrimination against women is not generalized; however,
    varying degrees of traditional culturally based discrimination persist,
    with greater discrimination practiced by some hill tribes. Many women
    occupy responsible positions in the civil service and private business,
    and in urban areas their incomes are often higher than those of men.
    The Family Code prohibits legal discrimination in marriage and
    inheritance.
        In the period from 1997 through 2000, the Government increased
    support for the position of women in society in development programs,
    some of which are designed to increase the participation of women in
    the political system.
        Children.--The level of support for education is exceedingly low.
    Government funding to provide fully for children's basic health and
    educational needs is inadequate. Education is compulsory through the
    fifth grade, but children from rural areas and poor urban families
    rarely comply with this requirement. There is a significant difference
    in the treatment of boys and girls in the educational system: Female
    literacy is 48 percent versus 70 percent for males. However, men and
    women attend the three universities in approximately equal numbers.
    Violence against children is prohibited by law, and violators are
    subject to stiff punishments. Reports of the physical abuse of children
    are rare. Trafficking in women and children is a problem (see Section
    6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--With donor assistance, the Government is
    implementing limited programs for the disabled, especially amputees.
    The law does not mandate accessibility to buildings or government
    services for disabled persons, but the Labor and Social Welfare
    Ministry began to establish regulations on building access and some
    sidewalk ramps in Vientiane during the year. The Lao National
    Commission for the Disabled (LNCD) is formulating a new draft law and
    other policies regarding the disabled, and the Lao Disabled Persons
    Association set up offices in Champassak and Xieng Khouang provinces to
    assist with rehabilitation, job skills training, and social integration
    of the disabled. The LNCD also hosted a regional conference on
    disabilities in Vientiane in November to promote leadership and
    organizational skills for disabled persons.
        Religious Minorities.--The enhanced status given to Buddhism in
    Luang Prabang--famed for its centuries-old Buddhist tradition and
    numerous templesapparently led some local officials there to act more
    harshly toward minority religions, particularly toward Christians and
    Baha'is, than in other areas of the country (see Section 2.c.).
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for
    equal rights for citizens of all minorities, and there is no legal
    discrimination against them. However, societal discrimination persists.
        Approximately half the population is ethnic Lao, also called
    ``lowland Lao.'' Most of the remainder is a mixture of diverse upland
    hill tribes whose members, if born in Laos, are Lao citizens. There are
    also ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese minorities, particularly in the
    towns. There is a small community of South Asian origin. The
    implementation in 1994 of the 1990 Law on Nationality provided a means
    for Vietnamese and Chinese minorities to normalize their Lao
    citizenship; a small number did so during the year. The Government
    encourages the preservation of minority cultures and traditions;
    however, due to their remote location and difficult access, minority
    tribes have little voice in government decisions affecting their lands
    and the allocation of natural resources.
        The Hmong are one of the largest and most prominent highland
    minority groups. Societal discrimination against the Hmong continues,
    although there are a number of Hmong officials in the senior ranks of
    the Government. In recent years, the Government focused some limited
    assistance projects in Hmong areas in order to overcome disparities in
    income along regional and ethnic lines. Some international observers
    claim that governmental policies aimed at assimilating the Hmong into
    larger societysuch as regional boarding schools--are not respectful of
    Hmong native culture; others see this approach as an escape from
    centuries of poverty.
        In the intensified Hmong insurgency in the north, government forces
    beat Hmong insurgents and treated them harshly in some Hmong villages
    (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In an unconfirmed report, a foreign
    newspaper in December recounted an alleged government soldier's account
    that security forces had shot to death a number of young Hmong men in
    Saysomboune Special Zone during the year.
        During the year, the Government continued to assist citizens,
    largely members of ethnic minorities, who returned to Laos after having
    fled in 1975. Central and local government officials worked with
    organizations such as the UNHCR to provide land and a sustainable level
    of economic security. Repatriated Hmong generally face no greater
    discrimination than those Hmong who remained. A number of Hmong
    returnees were forced to renounce their Christian faith, and one church
    in a returnee village was closed by authorities. Two U.N. observers who
    monitored repatriation efforts reported no significant human rights
    violations.
        Under the Constitution, aliens and stateless foreign citizens are
    protected by ``provisions of the laws'' but do not in practice enjoy
    rights provided for by the Constitution. During the year, there were
    isolated cases of persons of Lao ethnic background who, as citizens of
    other nations, suffered discrimination when arrested or detained and
    were denied due process, apparently on the basis of their Lao ethnic
    background.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the 1990 Labor Code and a 1995
    prime ministerial decree, labor unions can be formed in private
    enterprises as long as they operate within the framework of the
    officially sanctioned Federation of Lao Trade Unions (FLTU), which in
    turn is controlled by the LPRP. Most of the FLTU's 77,057 members work
    in the public sector.
        The State employs the majority of salaried workers, although this
    situation is changing as the Government reduces the number of its
    employees and privatizes state enterprises. Subsistence farmers
    comprise an estimated 85 percent of the work force.
        Strikes are not prohibited by law, but the Government's ban on
    subversive activities or destabilizing demonstrations (see Section
    2.b.) makes a strike unlikely, and none were reported during the year.
    However, the Labor Code does not prohibit temporary work stoppages.
        With advice from the International Labor Organization (ILO),
    including a foreign expert provided by the ILO to work with the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the Government in 1994 revised
    the Labor Code in an effort to clarify the rights and obligations of
    workers and employers. However, the ILO Committee of Experts cited the
    Government for its failure to submit reports required of member states.
        The FLTU is free to engage in contacts with foreign labor
    organizations, which during the year included the Association of
    Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Trade Union and the Asia-Pacific
    American Labor Alliance. The FLTU is a member of the World Federation
    of Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
    right to organize and bargain collectively. The Labor Code stipulates
    that disputes be resolved through workplace committees composed of
    employers, representatives of the local labor union, and
    representatives of the FLTU, with final authority residing in the
    Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Labor disputes are infrequent.
    The Government sets wages and salaries for government employees, while
    management sets wages and salaries for private business employees.
        The Labor Code stipulates that employers may not fire employees for
    conducting trade union activities, for lodging complaints against
    employers about labor law implementation, or for cooperating with
    officials on labor law implementation and labor disputes. Workplace
    committees are one mechanism used for resolving complaints.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
    prohibits forced labor except in time of war or national disaster,
    during which the State may conscript laborers; however, trafficking in
    women and children is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The Code also
    applies to children under the age of 15, and generally is enforced
    effectively; however, reports that children are being lured into other
    countries for sexual exploitation and slave labor continued, and
    increased over the previous year (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age.--for Employment
        Under the Labor Code, children under the age of 15 may not be
    recruited for employment. However, many children help their families on
    farms or in shops. The Labor Code accordingly provides that children
    may work for their families, provided that such children are not
    engaged in dangerous or difficult work. Such employment of children is
    common in urban shops, but rare in industrial enterprises. The
    Ministries of Interior and Justice are responsible for enforcing these
    provisions, but enforcement is ineffective due to a lack of inspectors
    and other resources. Education is compulsory through the fifth grade,
    but this requirement rarely is observed in the rural areas or among the
    urban poor. Some garment factories reportedly employ a very small
    number of underage girls. The Labor Code prohibits forced and bonded
    labor performed by children under age 15, and the law generally is
    enforced effectively; however, there were reports that children were
    lured into sexual exploitation and slavery abroad (see Sections 6.c.
    and 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a
    broad range of worker entitlements, including a workweek limited to 48
    hours (36 hours for employment in dangerous activities), safe working
    conditions, and higher compensation for dangerous work. The Code also
    provides for at least 1 day of rest per week. Employers are responsible
    for all expenses for a worker injured or killed on the job, a
    requirement generally fulfilled by employers in the formal economic
    sector. A section of the Labor Code mandates extensive employer
    responsibility for those disabled while at work. During the year, this
    law was enforced adequately. The daily minimum wage is $0.53 (4,000
    kip), which is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
    a worker and family. Most civil servants receive inadequate pay.
    However, few families in the wage economy depend on only one member for
    income. Some piecework employees, especially on construction sites,
    earn less than the minimum wage. Many persons are illegal immigrants,
    particularly from Vietnam, and are more vulnerable to exploitation by
    employers. Although workplace inspections reportedly have increased,
    the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare lacks the personnel and
    budgetary resources to enforce the Labor Code effectively. The Labor
    Code has no specific provision allowing workers to remove themselves
    from a dangerous situation without jeopardizing their employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prohibits abduction and
    trade in persons as well as the constraint, procuring, and prostitution
    of persons; however, trafficking in women and children is a problem.
    Laos is a source and transit country for trafficking in persons. The
    Government only recently has focused on the trafficking of persons
    across its borders. Although there is no reliable data available on the
    scope and severity of the problem, there are indications that the
    numbers are considerable. The Government has increased monitoring and
    educational programs provided by the Lao Women's Union and the Youth
    Union, both party-sanctioned organizations, designed to educate girls
    and young women about the schemes of recruiters for brothels and
    sweatshops in neighboring countries and elsewhere. In the past, the
    Government has prosecuted some persons for involvement in such
    recruiting activities. Recent evidence indicates an increase in arrests
    for procuring; however, this may not reflect a genuine government
    effort to address the problem. During the year, law enforcement
    agencies conducted a minimal number of raids on entertainment
    establishments accused of fostering prostitution.
        The Government remains concerned about Lao children being lured
    into sexual exploitation and slave labor in other countries, but the
    Government denied that there were any problems in the country that
    involve child prostitution. The National Commission for Mothers and
    Children, established in 1992 and chaired by the Foreign Minister,
    continues an active program with support from the U.N. Children's Fund.
    The Commission, working with the Lao Women's Union, Youth Union,
    Justice Ministry, and Labor Ministry, has conducted workshops around
    the country designed to make parents and teenagers aware of the dangers
    of HIV. At the Government's invitation, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
    Trafficking in Children visited in 1998 (see Section 4).
                                   __________

                                    MALAYSIA

        Malaysia is a federation of 13 states and 3 federal territories
    with a parliamentary system of government based on periodic multiparty
    elections in which the ruling National Front coalition has held power
    for more than 40 years. Opposition parties actively contest elections,
    but face significant obstacles in competing with the long-entrenched
    ruling coalition. However, in the November 1999 elections, opposition
    parties won roughly 25 percent of the seats in the Federal Parliament,
    and an opposition party also retained control of one state government
    and gained control of another. The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, government action, constitutional
    amendments, legislation, and other factors undermine judicial
    independence and strengthen executive influence over the judiciary. The
    impartiality of the judiciary continued to be a concern during the
    year, although the December appointments of a highly regarded new Chief
    Justice and Attorney General were viewed with optimism by most
    observers.
        The Royal Malaysian Police have primary responsibility for internal
    security matters. The police report to and are under the effective
    control of the Home Minister. Some members of the police committed
    human rights abuses.
        Malaysia is an advanced developing country with an estimated per
    capita gross domestic product of $3,640 and an unemployment rate of 3.0
    percent. Following nearly a decade of strong economic growth averaging
    over 8 percent annually, it was hit hard by the 1997 regional financial
    and economic crisis. After contracting by 7.5 percent in 1998, the
    economy began to recover in 1999, during which it posted a 5.8 percent
    growth rate. Analysts predicted a 7 to 8 percent growth for the year.
    During 1998 the Government adopted stimulative fiscal and monetary
    policies to promote economic recovery and established institutions to
    recapitalize distressed financial institutions and to remove
    nonperforming loans from the banking system. It also enacted selected
    capital controls to eliminate offshore trading in the local currency
    (ringgit) and to insulate the domestic economy from the effects of
    short-term, speculative capital flows. The Government takes an active
    role in the development of the export-oriented economy. Manufacturing
    accounts for 30.0 percent of GDP, services for 54.3 percent,
    agriculture for 9.4 percent, construction for 3.6 percent, and mining
    for 7.2 percent. Principal manufactured products include
    semiconductors, consumer electronics, electrical products, textiles,
    and apparel. Palm oil exports and production of natural rubber, cocoa,
    and tropical timber also are significant.
        The Government generally respected its citizens' rights in some
    areas; however, its record was poor in a number of other areas, and
    significant problems remain. Police committed a number of extrajudicial
    killings; however, authorities prosecuted the perpetrators in some of
    these cases. Police on occasion tortured, beat, or otherwise abused
    prisoners, detainees, and demonstrators. The former chief of police was
    sentenced to 2 months imprisonment for having beaten the handcuffed and
    blindfolded former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. In
    1999, an Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) delegation found that prison
    conditions were not in accord with international norms; the Government
    subsequently took some steps to improve prison conditions. Conditions
    in the detention facilities of illegal aliens continued to pose a
    threat to life and health, although marginal improvements in food and
    water rations were reported. The trial of a prominent human rights
    activist on charges arising from her criticisms of such conditions
    continued. Police continued to use several statutes to arrest and
    detain many persons without charge or trial. Prolonged pretrial
    detention is a serious problem. Detained criminal suspects often were
    denied access to legal counsel prior to being charged formally. Many
    observers expressed serious doubts about the independence and
    impartiality of the judiciary, especially in high-profile cases. Former
    Deputy Prime Minister Anwar was charged with corruption in 1998 for
    political reasons, and was convicted and sentenced to 6 years in prison
    in April 1999. In August he was convicted of sodomy and sentenced to 9
    years, to be served consecutively with the earlier 6-year sentence.
    Improper conduct by the police and prosecutors, along with many
    questionable rulings by the judge, denied Anwar a fair opportunity to
    defend himself. Anwar remained in prison at year's end, but he was
    transferred to a hospital in December to receive treatment for a
    slipped disk in his back. Politically motivated, selective prosecution
    continued to be a concern during the year. The courts continued to defy
    most of a 1999 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that a U.N.
    Special Rapporteur was immune from several libel suits. Authorities
    infringed on citizens' privacy rights in some instances.
        Government restrictions, pressure, and intimidation led to a high
    degree of press selfcensorship. The Government raided newsstands that
    sold an opposition party newspaper, limited its publication, and
    refused to renew the publication permits of several other political
    weeklies. Independent on-line newspapers operated without government
    interference. In 1999 a U.N. Special Rapporteur reported that the
    Government systematically curtailed freedom of expression. The
    Government did not respond to the report by year's end. Proliferating
    slander and libel suits threatened to stifle freedom of speech. The
    Government placed some restrictions on freedom of assembly and some
    peaceful gatherings. The Government continues to restrict significantly
    freedom of association. The Government continued to prohibit students
    from participating in some political activities. The Government places
    some restrictions on religious freedom, in particular the right of
    Muslims to practice teachings other than Sunni Islam. In addition the
    right of Muslims to change their religion was hindered by many
    practical obstacles. The Government continued to impose some
    restrictions on freedom of movement. Government policies create
    significant restrictions on opposition parties' ability to compete
    effectively with the ruling coalition. The Election Commission's lack
    of independence impedes it from effectively enforcing election results
    and monitoring elections. The Government continued to criticize harshly
    human rights NGO's, but also met with several such groups during the
    year. The Government established a National Human Rights Commission in
    April. Despite some limitations on its scope, the Commission
    established several human rights working groups, publicly supported the
    right of peaceful assembly in certain instances, and in December opened
    a public inquiry into alleged police misconduct during a November 5
    opposition gathering. Despite government efforts, societal violence and
    discrimination against women remain problems. Sexual abuse of children
    is a problem, although it is punished severely. Indigenous people face
    discrimination and often are exploited, especially in regard to land
    issues. Longstanding policies give preferences to ethnic Malays in many
    areas, and ethnic minorities face discrimination. Some restrictions on
    worker rights persist. Child labor persists, although the Government
    has taken vigorous action against it. The country is a source, transit,
    and destination country for trafficking in women and girls for the
    purpose of forced prostitution.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, police committed a number of
    extrajudicial killings. Police leadership continued efforts to curb
    such abuses during the year, including by inviting the U.N. Human
    Rights Commission to provide human rights training to police officers.
        At year's end, the press reported that the police had killed 49
    persons (in 27 separate incidents) during the course of apprehension.
    Press accounts suggested that police conduct was appropriate in a
    number of these incidents; however, several cases raised concerns.
        In January 1999, the Bar Council called on the police to implement
    a standard procedure to investigate every lethal shooting by police;
    however, the police did not implement such a procedure. By year's end
    the Government had not formed an independent commission to investigate
    police killings, as was recommended by a group of 119 domestic NGO's in
    February 1999. In October 1999, the Deputy Home Minister informed
    Parliament that police had shot and killed 387 persons over the past 5
    years.
        In April police shot and killed three suspected robbers in waters
    off Sabah state during an antipiracy campaign. In August police shot
    and killed three men in Sabah whom police suspected were on their way
    to commit a robbery. Also in August, police shot and killed a suspected
    arsonist who reportedly attacked them with a knife. In several
    incidents throughout the year, police shot and killed individuals who
    they claimed had ``run amok'' and threatened bystanders. At year's end,
    the results of any police internal investigations into these and other
    incidents of police extrajudicial killings during the year were not
    available.
        A Human Rights Watch report issued in August on the status of
    Burmese Rohingya illegal immigrants in the country documented
    allegations of deaths during the 1990's in illegal immigrant detention
    camps due to beatings and inhuman conditions such as inadequate food
    and medical care (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). The conditions in the
    camps remained a cause for concern; however, there were no reports of
    similar deaths during the year.
        There were developments in several cases of extrajudicial killings
    from previous years. The case of a policeman charged in 1999 with
    culpable homicide not amounting to murder for shooting a doctor seated
    in his car went to trial. In December the policeman was sentenced to 8
    years in prison by the sessions court for causing the death of the
    person. The policeman has appealed the decision to the High Court. In
    August a coroner ruled that four police officers and one civilian were
    culpable in the 1995 death of a youth in police custody. A negligence
    suit against the police regarding the death of a couple shot by police
    in 1998 in connection with the alleged kidnaping of the son of a state
    chief minister was to be heard in November, but it was postponed to a
    future date that had not been determined by year's end. In July
    testimony during a coroner's inquiry indicated that six men who were
    killed by police in a 1998 incident had been shot in the head at close
    range. In April the police announced that an inquiry would be made into
    the case of a 21-year-old who died in police custody in 1999. In May a
    woman filed suit against police for the death of her husband in police
    custody in 1999 and said publicly that her husband's death might be
    linked to his involvement with the opposition National Justice Party. A
    domestic worker who sued the government and the then-Inspector General
    of Police in 1992 over the death of her son in police custody in 1990
    was awarded a judgment of just over $10,000 (40,000 ringgit). In May
    two policemen convicted of injuring an Indonesian illegal immigrant who
    later died in police custody were sentenced to 3 years in prison.
        In June Acehnese leader Teauku Don Zulfari, exiled from Indonesia,
    was shot and killed in a Kuala Lumpur restaurant. The press speculated
    that the assailants were either gangsters or political rivals from
    Aceh.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        In late April, members of the Filipino terrorist group Abu Sayyef
    attacked a diving resort on the island of Sipadan, seizing several
    hostages of various nationalities. The group released all of the
    hostages but one, a Filipino national, who was being held in the
    Philippines at year's end.
        In early September, four armed Abu Sayyaf rebels kidnaped three
    Malaysian hostages at the Pasir Dive Resort on Pulau Pandanan in Sabah
    state. All three hostages had been released at year's end.
        In both instances, the Government made attempts to retrieve
    hostages and prevent further attacks.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--No constitutional provision or law specifically prohibits
    torture, although laws that prohibit ``committing grievous hurt''
    encompass torture; however, at times some police tortured, beat, and
    otherwise abused prisoners, detainees, and other citizens. The
    authorities investigated some police and other officials for such
    abuses; however, the Government does not release routinely information
    on the results of investigations, and whether those responsible are
    punished is not always known.
        Police sometimes abuse detainees. There were several press reports
    of persons who alleged police torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
    treatment while in custody. For example, in April a 16-year-old
    schoolboy sued the police, alleging that he was tortured after a
    February arrest in connection with an arson case. In October a
    suspected robber claimed that police had shot him in the eye during an
    interrogation. He reportedly then was ordered to tell doctors that he
    had been in an accident. In November a man claimed that police had
    squeezed his genitals with pliers in order to make him confess to a
    theft. All of the cases were under investigation at year's end.
        Police sometimes subjected criminal suspects and illegal alien
    detainees to physical and psychological torture during interrogation
    and detention. During the 1998 trial of former Deputy Prime Minister
    Anwar Ibrahim, senior police officers testified that the police had
    institutionalized techniques to subject some ``national security''
    detainees to coercive and abusive treatment. A senior police officer
    said that the police did not consider the legality of such tactics.
    However, the Government continued to require police to attend community
    relations and ethics courses to address public concerns over police
    misconduct. The results of such courses were unclear at year's end.
        In March former Inspector General of Police Tan Sri Rahim Noor was
    sentenced to 2 months in jail and ordered to pay the maximum fine of
    about $525 (2,000 ringgit) for ``causing hurt'' after pleading guilty
    to beating former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 while
    Anwar was blindfolded and handcuffed in police custody. The beating
    badly bruised Anwar's face, neck, and arms, and reportedly temporarily
    left him with impaired balance and unclear vision. Rahim said that
    Anwar had provoked him. Charges of attempted assault were reduced as
    part of a plea bargain. Rahim paid the fine, but his lawyers
    immediately appealed the sentence, and he remained on bail. The
    prosecution appealed the sentence, which it termed inadequate. In June
    a hearing of Rahim's appeal was postponed until September after his
    lawyers claimed that Rahim was ill. In September the court again
    rescheduled the hearing to November after the defense informed the
    judge that Rahim had been admitted to a hospital. The appeal was heard
    in November; Rahim's fine was waived, but the 2-month jail sentence was
    upheld. Rahim's lawyer's appealed the sentence to the Federal Court.
    Rahim will lose his pension if the sentence is not overturned.
        In 1999 Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad formed the Royal
    Commission of Inquiry after a long police internal investigation
    established that police had been responsible for the beating of Anwar,
    but failed to identify a culprit. The Commission found no members of
    the police besides Rahim culpable or complicit in the beating of Anwar
    or in the subsequent cover-up. In April 1999, the Malaysian Bar Council
    expressed concern that the Royal Commission had recommended that no
    action be taken against senior police officers who failed to report or
    arrest Rahim after the beating. Anwar's supporters continued to call on
    the Prime Minister, who oversaw the police as the Home Minister at the
    time of Anwar's arrest, to take responsibility for Anwar's beating. The
    Prime Minister had not responded by year's end.
        During the year, there was no response from the Government to
    charges that psychological pressures and threats of physical coercion
    had been used in previous years to obtain confessions in the
    politically sensitive trials of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
    Ibrahim. In July the case against fashion designer Mior Abdul Razak bin
    Yahya for fabricating evidence, was dismissed as ``not amounting to an
    acquittal,'' after being postponed four times. Mior had sworn in an
    affidavit that police had threatened and abused him after he was
    detained in September 1998, causing him to confess falsely to having
    had sexual relations with the former Deputy Prime Minister. In February
    Anwar's codefendant, Sukma Darmawan, testified that he had confessed
    falsely to a homosexual relationship with Anwar under police pressure
    in exchange for a promise that the would be free for such testimony.
    One other alleged homosexual partner of Anwar's gave a consistent
    description of the psychological and physical abuse used by police to
    force similar confessions from him.
        No government response was reported to the March 1999 police report
    filed by opposition activist Abdul Malek bin Hussin in which he accused
    police of torturing him in 1998 while he was under detention without
    charge under the Internal Security Act (see Section 1.d.). Malek
    alleged that police among other abuses, had beaten him unconscious and
    forced him to drink their urine.
        During the year, riot police several times forcibly dispersed
    peaceful demonstrators in Kuala Lumpur, using truncheons, water
    cannons, and tear gas (see Section 2.b.). In April the Legal Aid
    Centre, representing 48 persons arrested during street protests on
    April 15 to mark the first anniversary of Anwar Ibrahim's sentencing on
    corruption charges, called on the Government to probe allegations of
    police brutality during the protests. The Human Rights Commission
    announced in April that it would look into the allegations. Opposition
    activist Tian Chua claimed that police beat him in August after they
    detained him during a demonstration outside the courthouse where Anwar
    Ibrahim was being convicted and sentenced on sodomy charges. Tian
    reportedly suffered back injuries during the beating. He brought his
    case before the commission and announced that he intended to sue the
    Government.
        Logging companies reportedly used police force and intimidation to
    appropriate land from indigenous Iban and Penan communities in Sarawak
    (see Section 5).
        Criminal law prescribes caning as an additional punishment to
    imprisonment for those convicted of some nonviolent crimes such as
    narcotics possession, criminal breach of trust, and alien smuggling.
    Judges routinely include caning in sentences of those convicted of such
    crimes as kidnaping, rape, and robbery. Some state Islamic laws, which
    bind only Muslims (see Section 1.e.), also prescribe caning. The
    caning, which is carried out with a +-inch-thick wooden cane, commonly
    causes welts, and it sometimes causes scarring. Male criminals age 50
    and above and women are exempted from caning. According to the
    provisions of the Child Act passed in December, male children may be
    given up to 10 strokes of a ``light cane'' (see Section 5).
        Prison conditions are poor. The authorities in 1999 announced that
    changes would be made concerning prison conditions, in the wake of a
    1999 report by the IPU on the treatment in prison of then political
    prisoner Lim Guan Eng. The report found that the conditions of Lim's
    imprisonment did not comply with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules
    (Treatment of Prisoners) and the U.N. Body of Principles for the
    Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
    The report cited portions of the Minimum Rules that concern light,
    ventilation, and proper bedding, and Principle 6 of the Body of
    Principles, which prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
    treatment. However, the delegation that drafted this report did not
    visit Lim in prison, and therefore was unable to make direct
    observations. The Government stated that Lim was detained under the
    same conditions as other prisoners and in accordance with the colonial-
    era 1952 Prison Rules and the 1995 Prisons Act, which, the Government
    contended, met the standards of the U.N. Minimum Rules.
        Deputy Home Minister Ong Ka Ting told Parliament in 1999 that the
    Government had completed a review of prison rules and made amendments
    that would improve the management of prisoners. Ong said that the
    amendments would be promulgated after their approval by the Attorney
    General. Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawai announced in April that
    the Government had spent over $250,000 (1 million ringgit) during the
    year to provide every prisoner with a mattress, although this had not
    been confirmed by independent monitors by year's end. In August prison
    officials announced that a number of current prison rules would be
    reviewed. Officials stated that these changes would include allowing
    female prisoners to keep children with them until age 4 instead of the
    current restriction to age 3 and expanding visiting privileges.
        Prison overcrowding is a serious problem. In 1999 the Director
    General of Prisons said that the country's 35 prisons held 27,400
    prisoners; total designed capacity is 20,000. In March the Deputy Home
    Minister announced that eight more prisons, two juvenile reform
    schools, and a moral rehabilitation center would be built by 2005.
    ``Security'' prisoners (see Section 1.d.) were detained in a separate
    detention center.
        Credible reports by former prisoners indicated that guards at some
    prisons regularly beat prisoners convicted of criminal offenses.
        NGO's and former detainees have made credible allegations of
    inadequate food, poor medical care and sanitation, and abuse by guards
    in government camps for illegal immigrants. Conditions are considered
    to have improved with increased food and water rations, and vitamin B
    shots for detainees suffering from beri-beri. A Human Rights Watch
    report issued in August on the status of Burmese Rohingya illegal
    immigrants in the country documented allegations of deaths in the camps
    due to beatings and inhuman conditions during the 1990's (see Sections
    1.a. and 2.d.). There were no reports of similar deaths during the
    year. In July 1999, after 3 days without adequate supplies of water,
    192 illegal aliens escaped from the Lenggeng detention center.
    Testimony during the ongoing trial of nongovernmental organization
    (NGO) activist Irene Fernandez (see Section 2.a.) described inhuman
    conditions at illegal alien detention camps from 1993 to 1995. Former
    detainees from this period testified during the trial that they had
    been kicked, beaten with sticks and rubber hoses by camp policemen,
    refused medical treatment for their injuries, and subjected to severe
    punishments, including sexual abuse. Some physical abuse still occurs
    in the camps.
        The law provides that young boys and girls in remand (judicially
    approved detention) may be placed in prison. The local press reported
    in September that children as young as 10 years old were held in
    prisons for offenses such as petty theft or involvement in school
    fights. Although kept in a separate cell block, they reportedly mingled
    with adult prisoners during communal activities. The Prisons Department
    acknowledged that more than 200 juveniles between 14 and 21 years of
    age were being held in prisons, in particular at Sungai Buloh. A prison
    official claimed that the juvenile prisoners, 82 percent of whom were
    waiting for their cases to be heard, are kept separately from adult
    prisoners at all times. In September the Government identified 2,061
    juveniles held in 26 prisons throughout the country. The Minister in
    the Prime Minister's Office responsible for legal affairs said that he
    would review the rules governing custody of juveniles, claiming that
    the law did not provide for such imprisonment of minors. According to
    press reports in November, officials from the National Unity and Social
    Development Ministry expressed surprise that juvenile offenders still
    were being sent to prison, despite plans to relocate them to separate
    facilities.
        The Government has an agreement with the International Committee of
    the Red Cross (ICRC) that permits visits to certain categories of
    prisoners. The Government has not blocked or denied such visits.
    However, the ICRC did not visit prisons during the year. In August an
    ICRC representative arrived to open a regional facility in the country,
    but he had not received accreditation from the Government. Other NGO's
    and the media generally are not permitted to monitor prison conditions.
    Access to illegal alien detention camps is restricted.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police continued to use
    several statutes to arrest and detain many persons without charge or
    trial. Suspects in some crimes (called ``seizable offenses'') may be
    arrested without warrants; suspects in other crimes (``nonseizable
    offenses'') may be arrested only based on a warrant from a magistrate.
    Crimes characterized as bailable offenses permit suspects to present
    bail at the police station according to a schedule. Bail is not
    available for nonbailable offenses and sometimes also is denied in
    other circumstances, for example, great risk of flight. Police may hold
    suspects for 24 hours without charge. Police may request a magistrate
    to extend the period of remand without charge for up to 2 weeks. After
    this extension, the police, if they wish to hold the suspect, must
    charge him and seek an order of detention from a magistrate. In some
    cases, police have released suspects under remand and quickly
    rearrested them on new but similar charges. However, in general police
    practice is in accord with legal provisions concerning detention.
        Police may deny prisoners under remand access to legal counsel and
    routinely they do so. During this period of remand, police also may
    question suspects without giving them access to counsel. Police justify
    this practice as necessary to prevent interference in ongoing
    investigations. Judicial decisions have upheld this practice.
    Defendants' advocates claimed that the lack of access to counsel
    seriously weakened defendants' legal rights.
        Crowded, understaffed courts and the legal safeguards and appeals
    available to the accused often result in lengthy pretrial detention,
    sometimes lasting several years. In 1998 the Prison's Director General
    stated that roughly half of the prison population consisted of
    prisoners who had not yet been sentenced. Most such prisoners either
    have been convicted and are awaiting sentence or are in the midst of
    their trials. In April a government minister acknowledged that a
    prisoner had been held for more than 8 years pending trial.
        Three laws permit the Government to detain suspects without
    judicial review or the filing of formal charges: the 1960 Internal
    Security Act (ISA); the 1969 Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of
    Crime) Ordinance, and the 1985 Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive
    Measures). Enacted more than 40 years ago when there was an active
    Communist insurgency, the ISA empowers the police to hold for up to 60
    days any person who may act ``in a manner prejudicial to the security
    of Malaysia.'' The Home Minister may authorize further detention for
    periods of up to 2 years. Those released before the end of their
    detention period are subject to ``imposed restricted conditions'' for
    the remainder of their detention periods. These conditions limited
    their rights to freedom of speech, association, and travel outside the
    country.
        According to the Government, the goal of the ISA is to control
    internal subversion. According to a prominent local human rights NGO,
    as of November 30, there had been 76 detentions under the ISA during
    the year. In addition, according to the NGO's statistics through June,
    836 persons had been detained under the Dangerous Drug Act and, as of
    August 31, 418 persons were being detained under the Emergency
    Ordinance.
        The ISA often is used against what the Government considers
    nonpolitical crimes, including those against ostensibly ``deviant''
    Muslim groups. The Government states that deviant groups pose a danger
    to national security because of their radical beliefs. The ISA, and the
    threat of invoking the ISA, also are used to intimidate and restrict
    political dissent. For example, in 1998 the police detained Anwar
    Ibrahim and 27 of his followers under the ISA after a series of largely
    peaceful antigovernment demonstrations. The Government claimed that the
    demonstrations threatened national security (see Sections 1.e. and
    2.b.). The 29 members of the Al-Ma'unah sect arrested in June initially
    were detained under the ISA.
        Security authorities sometimes wait several days after detention
    before informing an ISA detainee's family. Even when there are no
    formal charges, the authorities must inform detainees of the
    accusations against them and permit them to appeal to an advisory board
    for review every 6 months. However, advisory board decisions and
    recommendations are not binding on the Home Minister, are not public,
    and often are not shown to the detainee. In the past, some ISA
    detainees have refused to participate in the review process under these
    circumstances.
        Amendments to the ISA in 1997 sharply circumscribed judicial review
    of ISA detentions. Although the Bar Council has in the past asserted
    that detentions under the ISA should be subject to judicial review on
    both procedural and substantive grounds, the courts have not concurred
    with this interpretation, and they review ISA detentions only on
    technical grounds. Detainees freed on technical grounds nearly always
    are detained again immediately.
        In May 1999, the Government announced new procedures for ISA
    detention. According to press reports, the new amendments stipulated
    that senior police officials must concur with ISA detentions. The then-
    Deputy Minister in the then Prime Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim
    Ali claimed that the amended procedures would help prevent misuse of
    the ISA. The details were not reported.
        In early August, the Government charged 29 members of the Al-
    Ma'unah sect, who were arrested for the early June raids on two army
    depots, after previous remandings had expired. The group was charged
    under Section 121 of the Penal Code with ``waging or attempting to wage
    or abetting the waging of war'' against the King. Also in August, the
    Government detained under the ISA at least 33 additional Al-Ma'unah
    members solely for their membership in the group. In December six
    members of the first group were convicted and sentenced to 10 years in
    prison. The remaining members (of both groups) remained in custody at
    year's end. In March police in Sarawak detained two persons under the
    ISA for allegedly dealing illegally in firearms (see Sections 1.e. and
    2.c.).
        Opposition leaders and human rights organizations continued to call
    on the Government to repeal the ISA and other legislation that deprived
    persons of the right to defend themselves in court. For example, in
    August 70 opposition parties and nongovernmental groups signed a
    memorandum calling for the repeal of the ISA. However, during the year,
    a number of ruling coalition politicians and government officials
    stated that the ISA still was necessary and would not be repealed. In
    February the Deputy Home Minister said in Parliament that the ISA is
    useful in maintaining the peace, but it would not be misused. In July
    the Prime Minister said ``the ISA is a legitimate law of the country,
    and although we do not like using it, we have the right to use it
    against persons whose actions can jeopardize the country's security.''
        Under the 1969 Emergency Ordinance, which was instituted after
    intercommunal riots in that year, the Home Minister may issue a
    detention order for up to 2 years against a person if he deems it
    necessary to protect public order, or for the ``suppression of
    violence, or the prevention of crimes involving violence.'' In fact the
    Government has used the Emergency Ordinance for other reasons. In
    September press reports quoted a police official as saying that 328
    persons were detained under the ordinance during the year.
        Provisions of the 1985 Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive
    Measures) give the Government specific power to detain suspected drug
    traffickers without trial. Such suspects may be held for up to 39 days
    before the Home Minister must issue a detention order. Once the
    Ministry has issued an order, the detainee is entitled to a hearing
    before a court. In some instances, the judge may order the detainee's
    release. Suspects may be held without charge for successive 2-year
    intervals with periodic review by an advisory board, whose opinion is
    binding on the Home Minister. However, the review process contained
    none of the procedural rights that a defendant would have in a court
    proceeding. The police frequently detained suspected narcotics
    traffickers under the Special Preventive Measures after the traffickers
    are acquitted of formal charges--often as they leave the courtroom.
    Between January and September, 1,259 persons were detained under this
    measure. The Government detained over 1,300 persons under this law in
    1999.
        Immigration laws are used to detain possible illegal aliens without
    trial or hearing. The detainees are not accorded any administrative or
    legal hearings and are released only after their employers prove their
    legal status. Those who were able to produce legal documents normally
    are released immediately; those who were unable to prove their legal
    status often were held for extended periods before deportation. Illegal
    aliens were kept in detention centers that are separate from prisons
    (see Section 1.c.).
        Law enforcement authorities also used the Restricted Residence Act
    to restrict movements of criminal suspects for an extended period. The
    act allows the Home Ministry to place criminal suspects under
    restricted residence in a remote district away from their homes for 2
    years. The Ministry is authorized to issue the banishment orders
    without any judicial or administrative hearings. Human rights activists
    have questioned the need for this law, which was passed more than 60
    years ago (during British sovereignty) under very different
    circumstances, and they have called for its repeal. The Government has
    continued to justify the act as a necessary tool and has used it in the
    recent past, primarily to combat vice and gambling offenses. In July
    1999, the Terengganu state chief of police warned publicly that
    operators of illegal gambling machines would be banished under the act
    if they did not cease their activities. In August 1999, Director
    General of the Anticorruption Agency (ACA) Datuk Ahmad Zaki Husin
    proposed using the act to banish officials suspected of corruption.
    After the Bar Council expressed concerns over the proposal, Zaki
    clarified that the Restricted Residence Act might be used only for
    ``syndicated graft.'' Also in August 1999, the Deputy Prime Minister
    warned ``get-rich-quick'' scheme operators that they might face
    banishment under the act. The Government has not disclosed how many
    persons were subject to the Restricted Residence Act and no accurate
    estimate was available. In April the Deputy Home Minister said in
    Parliament that during 1999 there were 93 persons held in prison
    waiting to be placed under restricted residence, and 17 of these
    persons were released from prison into restricted residence. In
    September the Selangor state government stated that it might use the
    Restricted Residence Act to banish those responsible for the increase
    in illegal video and gaming outlets in Selnagor.
        In 1998 the Attorney General stated that the Government had
    expedited hearings on the cases of 44 prisoners held ``at the pleasure
    of the Sovereign'' for inordinate periods, often well exceeding the
    maximum sentences for their original crimes. In one case, a prisoner
    had been held for 37 years. Most such ``forgotten prisoners'' committed
    their crimes as minors or while of unsound mind. The Government has not
    released the findings of the hearings held on these cases, or indicated
    whether any of the 44 prisoners have been released.
        Section 396 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows the detention of
    a person whose testimony as a material witness is necessary in a
    criminal case, if that person is likely to abscond.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, since 1988 government action,
    constitutional amendments, legislation restricting judicial review, and
    other factors steadily have eroded judicial independence and
    strengthened executive influence over the judiciary. A number of high-
    profile cases continued to cast doubts on judicial impartiality and
    independence, and raised questions of arbitrary verdicts, selective
    prosecution, and preferential treatment of some litigants and lawyers.
    Members of the bar, NGO's, and other observers (including those who
    attended a 1999 Commonwealth Law Conference held in the country)
    continued to express serious concern about the deterioration of the
    independence and overall fairness of the judiciary. In December a new
    Chief Justice and Attorney General were sworn into office. Most
    observers were optimistic that these appointments will help restore the
    health and credibility of the judiciary. Immediately after taking his
    position, the new Chief Justice made public remarks regarding the
    importance of restoring public trust in the judiciary.
        High courts have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases
    involving serious crimes and most civil cases. Civil suits involving
    automobile accidents and landlord-tenant disputes are heard by sessions
    courts. Juvenile courts try offenders under age 18. The Special Court
    tries cases against the King and sultans. The Court of Appeal has
    appellate jurisdiction over high court and sessions court decisions.
    The Federal Court, the country's highest court, hears appeals of court
    of appeal decisions.
        Islamic religious laws administered by state authorities through
    Islamic courts bind ethnic Malays and other Muslims in some matters. In
    1997 the Government announced that it would harmonize Islamic law at
    the federal level and appoint an Islamic law federal attorney general.
    However, the Government has not been able to obtain the necessary
    agreement of all the states and the proposal has not been implemented,
    though it is still under discussion.
        Indigenous people in Sarawak and Sabah also have a system of
    customary law to resolve matters such as land disputes between tribes.
        Penghulu (village head) courts may adjudicate minor civil matters,
    but these are rarely used.
        The military has a separate system of courts.
        The secular legal system is based on English common law. Trials are
    public, although judges may order restrictions on press coverage. For
    example, in the corruption trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar,
    the judge often restricted press coverage of defense testimony and
    remarks that might embarrass senior government leaders. However, the
    judge generally did not restrict press coverage of testimony and
    remarks that might embarrass Anwar.
        Defendants have the right to counsel, bail is sometimes available,
    and strict rules of evidence apply in court. Witnesses are subject to
    cross-examination. The defense in both ordinary criminal cases and
    special security cases is not entitled to a statement of evidence
    before the trial. In general, limited pretrial discovery in criminal
    cases hobble defendants' ability to defend themselves.
        Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and may appeal court
    decisions to higher courts. In criminal cases, defendants also may
    appeal for clemency to the King or local state rulers as appropriate. A
    single judge hears each criminal trial. There are no jury trials.
        A 1997 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code that may erode
    defendants' presumption of innocence continued to concern lawyers.
    Before the 1997 amendment, the prosecution was required to prove its
    case beyond a reasonable doubt or the defendant would receive a summary
    dismissal without having to present the defense case. Now, the
    prosecution only needs to prove a legally sufficient uless disproved
    case, and the defense must be called. In August 1999, a man was
    convicted of murder after electing to enter a no defense. The judge
    ruled that the prosecution had proven a legally sufficient case and,
    when the man chose to offer no defense, the judge convicted him and
    sentenced him to death.
        In 1998 Parliament passed amendments to the 1964 Courts of
    Judicature Act that limited the rights of defendants to appeal in some
    circumstances. The Government stated that these amendments would
    expedite the hearing of cases in the upper courts. The president of the
    Bar Association said in 1998 that the amendments imposed too many
    restrictions on appeals.
        The Attorney General may restrict the right to a fair trial in
    criminal cases by invoking the 1975 Essential (Security Cases)
    Regulations. These regulations governing trial procedure normally apply
    only in firearm cases. In cases tried under these regulations, the
    standards for accepting selfincriminating statements by defendants as
    evidence are less stringent than in normal criminal cases. Also, the
    authorities may hold the accused for an unspecified time before making
    formal charges. The Attorney General has the authority to invoke these
    regulations in other criminal cases if the Government determines that
    the crime involves national security considerations, but such cases are
    rare. However, the Essential Regulations were invoked in September at
    the beginning of the trial of the 29 members of the Al-Ma'unah sect
    accused of carrying out arms thefts at 2 army posts in July. Defense
    lawyers argued that the use of the Essential Regulations was
    unconstitutional, since no certificate of emergency declaring a
    national emergency had been issued. The judge ruled that the Attorney
    General has the discretion to opt to use the Essential Regulations, if
    he sees fit to do so (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
        Even when the Essential Regulations are not invoked, defendants and
    defense lawyers lack legal protections against interference. For
    example, during a trial police may call and interrogate witnesses who
    have given testimony not helpful to the prosecution. Human rights
    advocates accused police of using this tactic to intimidate witnesses.
    One instance of this practice led the Bar Council in July 1999 to issue
    a statement of concern. Police also have used raids and document
    seizures to harass defendants. Selective prosecution that is,
    prosecution based on political rather than legal considerations, is a
    serious problem in the legal system. According to the law, the decision
    to prosecute a case rests solely with the Attorney General. In August
    1999, the former Chief Justice publicly reminded magistrates and judges
    not to question the Attorney General's sole discretion to prosecute.
    Opposition leaders and some NGO's made credible accusations of
    political interference in the judicial process. In April 1999 the Prime
    Minister publicly denied that he interfered in the decisions of the
    Attorney General. In February the Minister in the Prime Minister's
    Department responsible for legal affairs stated in Parliament that the
    Attorney General does not practice selective prosecution.
        In practice the Attorney General uses his power to prosecute
    selectively. In May 1999, the Attorney General warned that those
    accusing the Government of selective prosecution could be charged with
    sedition or criminal defamation. The Bar Council criticized the
    Attorney General's statement and stated that it showed ``a lack of
    respect or understanding of the concept of democracy and the rule of
    law.'' No one was charged with sedition or criminal defamation on such
    grounds during the year.
        Contempt of court charges also have restricted the ability of
    defendants and their attorneys to defend themselves. Attorney Zainur
    Zakaria, after raising a legal issue on behalf of his client Anwar
    Ibrahim, was charged with contempt in 1998. Zainur lost his appeal in
    September but was granted a stay of execution of the 3month sentence
    pending his appeal to the Federal Court, the country's highest court.
    The Bar Council expressed concern over Zainur's case and other contempt
    of court cases several times in recent years and in March 1999, it
    prepared a draft Contempt of Courts Act to provide explicitly what
    would constitute contempt. The Chief Justice said in April 1999 that
    there was no need for a Contempt of Courts Act because judges do not
    abuse their power. In August 1999, former Deputy Minister in the Prime
    Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the Government would
    study the Bar Council's draft; however, the Government had not passed
    or considered such a bill by year's end. In September senior government
    officials participated in a Bar Council seminar on contempt of court
    provisions.
        Following a number of high-profile corruption cases, the Government
    amended the Anticorruption Act in 1997. The law gives the Attorney
    General powers that impinge on the presumption of innocence and
    requires accused persons to prove that they acquired their monetary and
    other assets legally.
        Islamic courts do not give equal weight to the testimony of women.
    Many NGO's have complained that women do not receive fair treatment
    from Islamic courts, especially in matters of divorce.
        In August, a judge ruled that U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
    Independence of Judges and Lawyers Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, because of
    his status as a U.N. Special Rapporteur, was immune from one of four
    libel suits pending against him in Malaysia. The judge explicitly
    stated that his ruling did not affect any of the other suits pending
    against Param. The suits stem from a longstanding and complex series of
    events. In 1997 Param and former Malaysian Bar Council secretary
    general Tommy Thomas were sued by several large companies, prominent
    businessmen, and a prominent lawyer for libel for an article, in an
    international legal journal. The article alleged that certain
    plaintiffs and their lawyers enjoyed improper preferential treatment in
    the courts. In judgments that widely were thought to be politically
    motivated and improperly influenced by favoritism, the courts had
    rejected Param's claim of immunity. In April 1999, the International
    Court of Justice (ICJ) had ruled that because of his status as a U.N.
    Special Rapporteur, Param was immune from the suits. The following
    month the Prime Minister said that the Government would abide by the
    ICJ's decision; however, in October 1999, a court defied the ICJ and
    ruled that Param would have to defend himself. Similar decisions were
    handed down in the other three suits. The U.N. expressed its regret
    over the court's decisions, and in December 1999, asked the Government
    to reimburse it for legal expenses. Param appealed the rulings, leading
    to the August decision. The other 3 libel suits against Param were
    still pending at year's end.
        The libel case against Tommy Thomas was settled in October 1998
    after he issued a written apology through his lawyers. However, he then
    issued a statement that the settlement was initiated by his insurance
    company over his objections. Subsequently Thomas issued a second
    statement retracting his earlier one. However, the judge cited him for
    contempt of court. He was convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 6 months
    in prison. The appeal of his conviction was still pending at year's
    end.
        In June the High Court granted an order preventing the Malaysian
    Bar Council from holding an extraordinary meeting to discuss a motion
    calling for an investigation into alleged improper conduct by the Chief
    Justice. In 1994 the Chief Justice was accused of accepting vacation
    travel, from a lawyer who had matters pending before the court. The
    High Court stated that the allegations against the Chief Justice had
    not been verified.
        The cases against former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and
    some of his associates, and against Irene Fernandez (see Section 2.a.),
    have raised questions about judicial independence and impartiality.
    Nonetheless, the Courts did not rule exclusively in favor of the
    Government. In August a court convicted and fined a Member of
    Parliament (M.P.) from the ruling coalition government more than $2,600
    (10,000 ringgit) on a contempt charge. The M.P. filed an appeal; if the
    conviction stands, he would lose his seat.
        Former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is a political prisoner.
    In September 1998, after a political conflict, Prime Minister Mahathir
    Mohammad removed Anwar as Deputy Prime Minister. Later the same month,
    after a large and mostly peaceful demonstration in which he called for
    Mahathir's resignation, Anwar was detained for alleged corruption and
    sodomy. The Government was motivated primarily by its desire to remove
    Anwar from political prominence following the significant manifestation
    of popular support for the reform movement that Anwar began after his
    removal. While in detention, Anwar was beaten by the former Inspector
    General of Police Rahim Noor (see Section 1.c.).
        For several days, Anwar was denied medical treatment for the
    injuries that he received at the hands of Rahim. Presumably to avoid
    bringing a visibly injured Anwar to court, police changed Anwar's
    status to ``detention without charge'' under the Internal Security Act.
    Anwar's status subsequently was changed again to ``criminal
    detention.'' Anwar later was tried and convicted on four counts of
    corruption. He was sentenced to 6 years in prison for corruption in
    April 1999. In April Anwar's appeal of the conviction and sentence was
    denied by the Court of Appeals. He has appealed to the Federal Court,
    the country's highest court. At year's end, Anwar's appeal of this
    conviction still was pending. At the request of his lawyers in
    November, the appeal was postponed because Anwar was in the hospital
    being treated for a slipped disk in his back. No date has yet been set
    to hear the appeal.
        During Anwar's corruption trial, the judge made several
    questionable rulings that greatly limited Anwar's ability to defend
    himself against what some individuals believe were politically
    motivated charges. For example, the judge sentenced one of Anwar's
    attorneys to 3 months' imprisonment for contempt after the attorney
    raised in court charges of prosecutorial misconduct. The judge greatly
    restricted the scope of Anwar's defense (on occasions during the trial,
    the judge explicitly said that he did not care if there was a
    conspiracy to bring down Anwar) and tolerated improper activities by
    the police and prosecutors. The judge allowed prosecutors to amend the
    charges in the middle of the trial, which is permitted under the law
    but in this case clearly was unfair to Anwar. Anwar was denied the
    ability to rebut evidence of sexual misconduct presented by prosecution
    witnesses when the judge, at the end of the prosecution's case, allowed
    prosecutors to amend the charges, and then expunged the record of all
    evidence of sexual misconduct. Since his arrest, Anwar has been denied
    bail on questionable legal grounds.
        On August 8, Anwar was convicted on a separate charge of sodomy and
    sentenced to 9 years in prison, to be served consecutively with the
    6year sentence that Anwar received for corruption. Once he completes
    his 15 years in prison, he would be disqualified from holding any
    public office for 5 years. His adopted brother, Sukma Damarawan, a
    codefendent in the case, was sentenced to 6 years in prison and four
    strokes of the cane, but he remains free on bail. Lawyers for both
    immediately filed appeals. At the beginning of the sodomy trial,
    prosecutors changed the dates of the alleged acts of sodomy, allegedly
    because the defense had discovered that the apartment building where
    the sodomy allegedly took place had not been completed by the original
    dates. Despite testimony detailing how police had coerced a confession
    from an alleged homosexual partner, on July 26 1999, the judge ruled
    that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this
    confession had been voluntary. A few days later, another witness
    admitted that police had coached part of his testimony. On August 18,
    1999, the lead police investigator materially contradicted his
    testimony (in order to make it consistent with the amended dates of the
    alleged offense); on the next day, the judge ruled that the policeman
    had not lied. In April the judge ruled that the Prime Minister, who was
    called by the defense in an attempt to prove a political conspiracy
    against Anwar, would not be required to testify. Defense attorneys
    maintained that they were not permitted by the judge to call a number
    of desired witnesses. The defense claimed that the judge exerted such
    pressure during the summer to bring the trial to an early conclusion.
        Anwar's conviction and sentence were criticized strongly by
    opposition parties, human rights groups, and a number of foreign
    governments and international human rights organizations. For example,
    the Malaysian Bar Council criticized the trial, citing irregularities
    in the evidence, and characterized the sentence as ``manifestly
    excessive and harsh.'' Anwar remained in prison at year's end, but he
    was transferred to a hospital in December to receive treatment for a
    slipped disk in his back. He is permitted to receive visits from only
    his family and lawyers. According to the law, Anwar is a ``common
    criminal'' rather than a political prisoner, and therefore does not
    have the right to receive visits from international human rights
    organizations.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights; however,
    authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights in some cases.
    Provisions in the security legislation (see Section 1.d.) allow the
    police to enter and search without a warrant the homes of persons
    suspected of threatening national security. Police also may confiscate
    evidence under these acts. In some cases each year, police use this
    legal authority to search homes and offices, seize books and papers,
    monitor conversations, and take persons into custody without a warrant.
        The law permits the Home Ministry to place criminal suspects under
    restricted residence in a remote district away from their homes for a
    2-year period (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government bans membership in unregistered political parties
    and in unregistered organizations (see Section 2.b.).
        A clause in the 1997 Anticorruption Act empowers the Attorney
    General to authorize the interception of mail and the wiretapping of
    telephones. Such information would be admissible as evidence in a
    corruption trial.
        Certain religious issues pose significant obstacles to marriage
    between Muslims and adherents of other religions (see Section 2.c.).
        Muslim couples must take premarital courses. In previous years,
    women's activists complained that the courses, as implemented,
    perpetuated gender discrimination by misinforming women of their rights
    in marriage (see Section 5). However, there were no reports during the
    year of such misinformation regarding marriage rights.
        Two state governments sought to restrict Muslim women's dress
    during the year (see Section 5).
        Singaporean newspapers and magazines may not circulate in the
    country (see Section 2.a.), despite being easily available on the
    Internet.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, some important legal
    limitations exist, and the Government restricts freedom of expression
    and intimidates most of the print and electronic media into practicing
    selfcensorship.
        The Constitution provides that freedom of speech may be restricted
    by legislation ``in the interest of security (or) public order.'' For
    example, the Sedition Act prohibits public comment on issues defined as
    sensitive, such as racial and religious matters. In practice the
    Sedition Act, the Official Secrets Act, criminal defamation laws, and
    some other laws have been used to restrict or intimidate dissenting
    political speech.
        In February 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
    and Expression issued a report stating that freedom of opinion was
    curtailed systematically in Malaysia. The Special Rapporteur stated
    that the Internal Security Act, the Sedition Act, and the Printing
    Presses and Publications Act were used to suppress or repress
    expression and curb peaceful assembly. He further stated that
    defamation laws ``appear to be having a very chilling effect.'' The
    Government stated that the Special Rapporteur's report was ``baseless
    and distorted.''
        The Prime Minister and other senior officials continued to ascribe
    seditious or treasonous motives to critics of government policies.
    Although many persons still criticized the Government publicly, the
    Government's statements made many persons more cautious about
    exercising their rights of free speech. For example, in November the
    Home Affairs Ministry issued several warnings to a Chinese language
    daily newspaper, the China Press, about reporting on controversial
    issues, specifically the Vision School and the Education Fund.
        In August 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi
    warned that political parties that raised sensitive issues and caused
    an ``undesirable situation'' would be charged under the Sedition Act.
    However, government and ruling party officials sometimes made
    statements on sensitive racial and religious issues with no
    repercussions. For example, on the same day that the Deputy Prime
    Minister threatened to invoke the Sedition Act, he stated that voting
    for the opposition would be ``disastrous'' for ethnic Malays.
        Two prominent figures were charged under sedition statutes during
    the year. In January the Government charged attorney and opposition
    politician Karpal Singh with sedition for statements he made in court
    during his legal defense of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim,
    first time that a lawyer was charged with sedition for statements made
    in court. Karpal's case came to trial in July, but it was postponed
    until May 2001. Also in January, opposition politician Marina Yusoff
    was charged with sedition for comments that she made about racial
    violence in 1969 while campaigning for Parliament in 1999. Her case was
    postponed several times; it was being heard at year's end. Both Karpal
    and Marina were charged under Section 4(1)(b) of the Sedition Act of
    1948, which carries a maximum fine of just over $1,300 (5,000 ringgit),
    or 3 years' imprisonment, or both.
        Again in January, the editor and printer of Harakah, the newspaper
    of the opposition Islamic party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), were
    charged with sedition in connection with an August 1999 Harakah article
    that quoted an opposition politician's comments on the confession of
    Sukma Darawaman, Anwar Ibrahim's codefendant in Anwar's sodomy trial.
    The printer pleaded guilty in May and was fined slightly over $1,000
    (4,000 ringgit). The editor's case is scheduled to be heard in 2001,
    although no formal date has been set.
        In September 1999 an offical of the United Malays National
    Organization (UMNO), the dominant component of the ruling National
    Front coalition, lodged a police report charging the chief minister of
    the opposition-controlled state of Kelantan with sedition. The chief
    minister allegedly had said that the state's populace no longer held
    the royal family in high regard. Police announced that they had
    questioned 10 members of the opposition Islamic party about this case.
    There were no reports of further developments by year's end.
        In March the Melaka state government announced that it had
    terminated the contracts of an undetermined number of panel doctors,
    architects, and lawyers, and blacklisted contractors who allegedly were
    aligned with opposition parties. The state government also closed
    accounts in banks where the staff were accused of criticizing the
    Government. In July the Penang state government also blacklisted
    contractors for their alleged involvement in antigovernment activities,
    such as supporting or funding opposition parties. Opposition parties
    and NGO's criticized these actions as discriminatory, claiming that
    such steps were inconsistent with the demands of a democratic society.
        In March 1999, the Prime Minister said that slanderous statements
    had become a ``security problem'' and claimed that some statements
    advocated violence and assassination. Police later claimed that they
    were monitoring all slanderous statements, including news reports that
    amounted to incitement. It was unclear from the Prime Minister's and
    police officials' statements whether security concerns were confined to
    advocating violence or whether these concerns also encompassed
    legitimate criticism of the Government.
        UMNO formed a legal panel in March 1999 to identify slanderous and
    libelous statements and to take legal action against them. The panel
    subsequently sued several government critics for public statements and
    statements reported in the press. Fromer Deputy Minister in the Prime
    Minister's Department Datuk Ibrahim Ali, the chairman of the panel,
    warned that those who made allegations against the Government or the
    ruling party also might face prosecution for criminal defamation. In a
    separate statement in May 1999, Datuk Ibrahim Ali said that the ruling
    party had identified 40 to 50 individuals from the opposition and
    academia who often mad defamatory statements. He reportedly said that
    UMNO wanted to ensure that the critics did not get away ``scot free.''
    Government opponents accused the Government of using the panel to
    stifle legitimate dissent. In June 1999, UMNO secretary general Tan Sri
    Khalil Yaakob said that the panel had countered opposition slander
    successfully.
        During 2000, many government officials, opposition figures, and
    private citizens filed multimillion-dollar lawsuits for libel and
    slander. In May 1999, the Bar Council stated that the proliferation of
    multimillion-dollar libel and slander lawsuits ``would end up stifling
    the freedom of speech.'' In July the Federal Court upheld a judgment of
    over $250,000 (1 million ringgit) against a freelance journalist who
    had been sued for libel by a wealthy businessman in 1994. In September
    the Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by a Asian Edition Wall Street
    Journal correspondent against the rejection of his application to amend
    his statement of defense in a more than $10 million (40 million
    ringgit) libel suit against him. A different panel of judges also
    struck down (with costs) the correspondent's application for a stay of
    the suits against him that were pending in a lower court. Also in
    September, the New Straits Times made a public apology to a prominent
    opposition party leader for two caricatures published in the newspaper
    in 1999. The Minister in the Prime Minister's Department responsible
    for legal affairs told reporters in September that the Government would
    review the law of defamation in response to public concern over libel
    awards which, he noted, frequently exceeded damages handed down in
    personal injury cases.
        The Official Secrets Act (OSA) also restricts freedom of
    expression. In the past, The Bar Council and other NGO's have called
    for a review of certain provisions of the OSA that grant considerable
    discretion to the authorities. Opposition leaders historically have
    accused the Government of using the OSA to cover up corruption. In
    January Ezam Nor, former Anwar aide and youth chief of the opposition
    group National Justice Party, was charged under the OSA with disclosing
    to reporters secret AntiCorruption Agency (ACA) reports. Ezam stated
    publicly in August 1999 that Anwar had stored abroad documents that
    corroborated charges of corruption against senior government leaders.
    Ezam claimed that the reports showed that the ACA was not pursuing
    corruption cases against senior government officials. Ezam's case went
    to trial in August, but it was postponed until February 2001. In March
    a government official stated in Parliament that only six persons have
    been arrested under the OSA since its inception in 1972, and he claimed
    that this statistic proved that the Government does not use the OSA to
    silence critics.
        The 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Act limits press
    freedom. Under the act, domestic and foreign publications must apply
    annually to the Government for a permit. The act was amended in 1987 to
    make the publication of ``malicious news'' a punishable offense,
    expanded the Government's power to ban or restrict publications, and
    prohibited court challenges to suspension or revocation of publication
    permits. Government power over license renewal and other policies
    create an atmosphere that inhibits independent or investigative
    journalism and resulted in extensive self-censorship. In April the
    Deputy Home Minister stated in Parliament that from 1996 through March,
    action had been taken under the Act against 164 publishers. In May the
    Deputy Prime Minister stated in Parliament that the act has ``served
    its purpose'' of preserving harmony and promoting coexistence in a
    multiracial country. In August the Minister in the Prime Minister's
    Department responsible for legal affairs said that the act would not be
    repealed, even if a national press council were established to regulate
    the media.
        The English and Malay mainstream press provide generally laudatory,
    uncritical coverage of government officials and policies, and usually
    give only limited and selective coverage to political views of the
    opposition or political rivals. Editorial opinion almost always
    reflects government positions on domestic and international issues.
    Chinese-language newspapers are much freer in reporting and commenting
    on sensitive political and social issues, but they are not immune to
    government pressure. However, self-censorship and biased reporting in
    the print media was not uniform and the English-, Malay-, and Chinese-
    language press all, at times, provided balanced reporting on sensitive
    issues.
        The Government often conveyed its displeasure with press reporting
    directly to a newspaper's board of directors or chief editors. In
    addition leading political figures in the ruling coalition, or
    companies controlled by them, own most major newspapers, thus limiting
    the range of views. At times the susceptibility of the press to
    government pressure has a direct and public impact on operations. For
    example, in January the group editor in chief of a local press
    conglomerate was removed after its flagship newspaper, the New Straits
    Times, carried several articles that reportedly angered the UMNO
    Supreme Council. However, the individual was appointed in September as
    chairman of Bernama, the national news agency.
        By World Press Freedom Day on May 3, 950 journalists had signed a
    petition, initiated a year earlier, calling for the repeal of the
    Printing Presses and Publications Act and the formation of an
    independent media council to regulate the press. The petition stated
    that government controls on the press had resulted in self-censorship
    and diminished the credibility of the mainstream press. The Bar Council
    issued a statement in 1999 supporting the journalists' petition.
    Although in response the Deputy Prime Minister reaffirmed his intention
    to look into the idea of a media council, no action had been taken by
    year's end.
        The Center for Independent Journalism, which was founded in May,
    issued a statement after a seminar in September on press freedom, that
    cited selfcensorship as the biggest obstacle to press freedom in the
    country. It identified the Printing Presses and Publications Act and
    fear of lawsuits as the primary causes of selfcensorship.
        The Government continued to prosecute human rights activist Irene
    Fernandez under the Printing Presses and Publications Act for charges
    that she made in 1995 of mistreatment of detainees at illegal alien
    detention centers. Fernandez's supporters accuse the Government of
    purposely prolonging the trial, the longest in the country's history,
    to harass Fernandez. As of year's end, the trial continued.
        The Government also sometimes directly restricts the dissemination
    of information that it deems embarrassing or prejudicial to national
    interests. The Government continued its policy of not allowing public
    disclosure of air pollution index-readings. In July the Minister for
    Science, Technology, and Environment Datuk Seri Law Hieng Ding
    reiterated that the Government would not release air pollution index-
    readings due to fear that they would affect the tourism industry
    negatively. In February 1999, the Government forbade all state health
    departments from commenting on the outbreak of a deadly virus. The
    Government later restricted reporters' access to sites of the outbreak.
    However, the issue was reported widely.
        Publications of opposition parties, social action groups, unions,
    and other private groups actively covered opposition parties and
    frequently printed views critical of government policies. However, the
    Government retained significant influence over these publications by
    requiring annual renewal of publishing permits and limiting circulation
    only to members of the relevant organization. Several times in 1999,
    senior government leaders publicly warned the publishers of Harakah,
    the Islamic opposition party's newspaper not to print ``slanderous''
    remarks and to limit distribution to party members. Harakah also was
    the target of several ruling party-sponsored libel suits. In December
    1999, the Home Ministry issued a letter to Harakah's publisher asking
    him to explain why Harakah should not be banned for violating the terms
    of the publishing permit. Acting on a Home Ministry directive, police
    officers raided newsstands that distributed Harakah to the public and
    confiscated many copies. Harakah stated that he would abide by the Home
    Ministry directive and the newspaper generally no longer is sold
    openly. The circulation of Harakah rivals that of mainstream
    newspapers. Harakah was the only major Malay and English language media
    forum for opposition views. In March, the Government stipulated that
    Harakah published only twice a month instead of twice a week. The
    Government failed to renew publication permits for several political
    weeklies, such as Ekslusif and Detik, and a teen magazine, Al-Wasilah.
    The Government stated that the permits of Detik and Ekslusif were not
    renewed because of their ``imbalanced reporting.''
        For most of the year, there were two exclusively on-line
    newspapers, although one of these was forced to shut down in December
    due to financial difficulties. Most major newspapers have an on-line
    edition. For example, Detik now publishes an on-line Internet edition.
    Exclusively on-line newspapers do not require publication permits;
    however, the Government denies their reporters press accreditation to
    cover government functions and ministers' press conferences, and
    refuses their admission into government buildings. During the year,
    readership of online newspapers increased markedly.
        Printers, who also must have their permits renewed annually, were
    often reluctant to print publications were critical of the Government.
        Both legal magazines (those with publishing permits) and illegal,
    that is lacking publishing permits, publications frequently printed
    criticism of the Government. In May 1999, police seized over a thousand
    copies of illegal antigovernment magazines at a printing company and
    charged the company owner with violating the Printing Presses and
    Publications Act.
        Isolated instances of violence against journalists occurred during
    the year. A news photographer reportedly was assaulted during an August
    demonstration staged by the UMNO youth wing against an ethnic Chinese
    group accused of questioning special Malay rights and privileges.
        The foreign press continued to be a target of government criticism
    for allegedly biased reporting. In February 1999, several government
    ministries announced plans to boycott three foreign publications that
    they claimed criticized the Government overzealously. In his August
    Independence Day speech, the Prime Minister stated the foreign media
    ``have succeeded in discrediting us and encouraging and supporting all
    acts by any groups, including criminals, which could undermine our
    country.''
        The electronic media is restricted more tightly than the print
    media. Radio and television are almost uniformly laudatory of the
    Government. News on the opposition is restricted tightly and reported
    in a biased fashion. In July 1999, the Deputy Information Minister
    stated candidly that government television and radio channels would not
    broadcast the views of opposition parties. He said that opposition
    parties were welcome to use private news stations or apply for
    broadcasting licenses of their own. In fact the two private television
    stations have close ties to the ruling coalition and are unlikely to
    provide a forum for the opposition parties, and it is unlikely that the
    Government would grant the opposition a broadcasting license. In April
    the Deputy Information Minister stated that the opposition only would
    be allowed access to government media if the opposition ``has anything
    specific or good to say.'' The Government has not approved a
    longstanding license application for a state radio station in the
    oppositioncontrolled state of Kelantan. Every other state has such a
    station.
        A government censorship board censors films for profanity, nudity,
    sex, violence, and certain political and religious content. Television
    stations censor programming in line with government guidelines. The
    Government bans certain books for political and religious reasons or
    because of sexual or profane content. Some foreign newspapers and
    magazines are banned (see Section 1.f.) and, infrequently, foreign
    magazines or newspapers are censored, most often for sexual content.
    However, the increased prevalence of the Internet is undermining such
    restrictions. The Government maintains a ``blacklist'' of local and
    foreign performers, politicians, and religious leaders who may not
    appear on television or radio broadcasts.
        The Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA), which came into force
    on April 1, 1999, requires certain Internet and other network service
    providers to obtain a license under the CMA. In December the Government
    stated that it did not intend to impose controls on Internet use, but
    it would punish the ``misuse'' of information technology under the CMA,
    which, while prohibiting censorship, provides for ``legal action
    against those who post defamatory and false information on the
    Internet.'' The Government has not used licensing provisions under the
    CMA to interfere with Internet access or to restrict Internet content.
        Police detained four persons under the ISA in 1998 for ``cyber
    rumor-mongering.'' Police accused the four of spreading false reports
    of rioting and potential violence against Chinese Malaysians via the
    Internet. The four later were charged under a section of the Penal Code
    that prohibits statements that cause fear or alarm. One of the four was
    acquitted in April for lack of evidence. The other three cases still
    were pending at year's end. During the year, government officials made
    several contradictory comments about the desirability of censoring the
    Internet. In September the Deputy Home Affairs Minister announced that
    his ministry was drafting a new law that would allow legal action to be
    taken against those believed to be responsible for spreading
    ``misleading information'' and pornography via the Internet. However,
    in the same month, the Information Minister said that the Government
    had no plans to censor the Internet. The Minister in the Prime
    Minister's Department responsible for legal affairs stated in September
    that, while the Internet would not be censored, users remained subject
    to the law, and anyone who defamed another over the Internet or made
    seditious comments still could legal face action.
        The Government generally restricts remarks or publications that
    might incite racial or religious disharmony; it also attempts to
    restrict the content of sermons at government-affiliated mosques. Some
    state governments ban certain Muslim clergymen from delivering sermons
    (see Section 2.c.).
        In December 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir said that the Government
    should find ways to prevent the opposition from ``spreading lies'' at
    mosques. Also in December 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah
    instructed the Religious Affairs Department to conduct background
    checks on religious speakers.
        Throughout the year, government officials and ruling coalition
    politicians complained that opposition Islamic party members were
    giving political sermons in mosques around the country. In January the
    Prime Minister's office announced that all state religious councils had
    been instructed to keep a closer watch on the use of mosques for
    political purposes. In March a government minister stated that Friday
    sermons at mosques were being monitored to prevent the spread of
    ``slander and lies.'' Selangor state government officials announced
    that they were investigating mosque committee members with links to the
    opposition, and Johor state government officials said that they had
    identified several ``political'' religious leaders who had criticized
    the Government. Selangor officials threatened to expel opposition
    sympathizers from mosque committees, and in Johor state, officials
    threatened ``stern action.'' In May 24 members of the opposition
    Islamic party were banned by the Selangor state government from giving
    speeches in all mosques, government buildings, and prayer places in the
    state.
        In the past, the Government generally had respected academic
    freedom in the areas of teaching and publication. Academics are
    sometimes publicly critical of the Government. However, there is self-
    censorship among public university academics whose career advancement
    and funding depend on the Government. In October the Education Ministry
    submitted the results of its inquiry into several teachers in Malacca
    who allegedly promoted antigovernment feelings by assigning political
    topics in a debate competition. The Teaching Service Commission was to
    determine whether these teachers should be dismissed; the inquiry was
    ongoing at year's end. Private institution academics also practiced
    self-censorship due to fear that the Government may revoke licenses for
    their institutions. Legislation also imposed limitations on student
    associations and student and faculty political activity (see Section
    2.b.). A university vice chancellor must approve campus demonstrations.
        The Government remained intolerant of teachers and students who
    expressed dissenting views. Throughout the year, senior government
    officials stated that teachers who opposed the Government and students
    who took part in antigovernment activities would face disciplinary
    actions, including dismissal and expulsion. In September the Minister
    in the Prime Minister's Department responsible for legal affairs warned
    that teachers who ``poisoned the minds of school children'' with
    political views during class faced the possibility of being charged
    under the Sedition Act and the Penal Code, and that students should not
    be involved in partisan politics. He asked the police to file a report
    on three teachers. In August 1999, an Education Ministry official said
    that a disciplinary panel had received reports from several states
    concerning teachers who had ``incited'' their students against the
    Government. In September 1999, an Education Ministry official said that
    the Ministry had ``acted against'' several teachers involved in
    antigovernment activities.
        The Government has long stated that students should be apolitical
    and used that assertion as a basis for denying opposition parties
    access to student forums. According to student leaders, students who
    sign antigovernment petitions sometimes are expelled or fined. In fact
    the Government enforces this policy selectively; however, it does not
    refrain from spreading government views on political issues among
    students and teachers. In September the head of an Islamic student
    group was summoned for questioning by University of Malaya authorities
    for organizing a demonstration against a Western singing group.
        In February 1999, the University of Malaya declined to renew the
    contract of Professor Chandra Muzaffar. Chandra, a well-known supporter
    of political reform and long-time government critic, charged that the
    university had fired him for political reasons. The university stated
    that it had declined to renew Chandra's contract for economic and
    personnel reasons. In June 1999, the High Court agreed to hear
    Chandra's application to reverse the university's decision. His case
    went to court in March but judgment had not been announced at year's
    end.
        In 1997 the Government prohibited academics from making any public
    statements or publishing any writings on the country's air pollution
    crisis. Academics and others openly protested this order. The gag order
    remained in effect.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
    places significant restrictions on this right. These rights may be
    limited in the interest of security and public order, and the 1967
    Police Act requires police permits for all public assemblies except for
    workers on picket lines. The decision to grant a permit theoretically
    rests with the district police chief; however, in practice senior
    police officials and political leaders influence the grant or denial of
    some permits. Police grant permits routinely to government and ruling
    coalition supporters; however, they use a more restrictive policy with
    government critics, although the police have granted permits for many
    opposition meetings. In March the Government renewed a ban on outdoor
    public rallies in the capital that involve more than five persons.
        Opposition leaders frequently alleged that police issue permits for
    public assemblies in an unfair manner that discriminates against the
    opposition. Various state and local police departments rebutted these
    allegations by providing statistics that indicated that most requests
    for permits are granted; however, in certain sensitive cases political
    considerations clearly led to the denial of permits. For example, in
    August police denied a permit to the National Justice Party to hold a
    rally at a large stadium in Kuala Lumpur. In response the National
    Justice Party organized and held a large public demonstration on
    November 5. The Government denied the permit for this demonstration as
    well, and police blocked roads leading to the private property on which
    it was to take place. As a result, participants demonstrated on the
    roadways nearby. The police used repressive, sometimes violent, means
    to block the demonstration and to arrest participants. There were
    reports that peaceful demonstrators were teargassed, struck with
    batons, and locked in police trucks for several hours in the afternoon
    sun. In December the National Human Rights Commission opened an inquiry
    into the police response to this demonstration and took testimony in
    public hearings. Opposition politicians noted that regulations that
    required that political meetings be held indoors if no permit is
    obtained make it difficult to hold large meetings, especially in rural
    areas. Police reaction to opposition rallies that ignored the
    requirement for a permit or were held after the Government denied a
    permit varied. Opposition politicians noted that ruling coalition
    parties frequently assembled without the requisite permits. For
    example, in August a youth group of the dominant Malay Party held a
    noisy assembly outside a Chinese assembly hall during a period of
    public tension over public comments that a Chinese association had made
    concerning special Malay rights (see Section 2.c.).
        At the April, September, November, and other, smaller pro-Anwar
    opposition demonstrations in 1999, police arrested hundreds of
    demonstrators, including many peaceful demonstrators. Many of these
    demonstrators later were acquitted, a handful were convicted, sentences
    ranging from 1 to 3 months and a fine, and some cases still were
    pending at year's end. Among those arrested were many opposition party
    leaders. Police detained them under the Police Act for allegedly
    participating in an illegal assembly and under the Penal Code for
    allegedly causing a riot. All were released on bail, and they still
    were awaiting trial at year's end. In December seven members of the
    opposition were arrested and charged with rioting for stopping and
    directing to the local police headquarters a number of buses that they
    suspected were carrying unregistered voters to the polls during the
    November by-election in Lunas. All subsequently were released and were
    awaiting trial at year's end.
        In April the police mounted an operation to prevent citizens from
    participating in a Kuala Lumpur demonstration called by the opposition
    to commemorate the 1-year anniversary of Anwar Ibrahim's 1999
    conviction on corruption charges. Police set up roadblocks and
    monitored bus stations, train stations, and airports to turn back
    suspected opposition supporters. Despite these efforts, a small crowd
    of roughly 100 persons gathered on April 15 in Kuala Lumpur. The police
    dispersed the group as it moved between several locations, in some
    instances by using water cannons. Roughly half of the group was
    arrested; Amnesty International reported that many were assaulted while
    in police custody (see Section 1.c.). In the days before the April 15
    demonstration, police arrested several opposition figures. One such
    person, Tian Chua, was arrested on the day after the demonstration,
    along with his lawyer (who was released shortly afterwards). All of
    those arrested were released on bail, and they awaited trial at year's
    end.
        On August 8, a crowd of several hundred opposition supporters
    gathered outside the courthouse in downtown Kuala Lumpur at which the
    verdict in Anwar Ibrahim's sodomy trial was being announced. The
    Government declared that the gathering was illegal and warned the
    public not to attend, despite the Human Rights Commission's pleas to
    respect the right to peaceful assembly outside the courthouse. Three
    members of the commission observed the demonstration and police
    conduct. Several days later, the commission issued a statement
    declaring that in general police conduct had been professional and
    considerate of the demonstrators. Opposition leader Tian Chua and
    several others claimed that they were beaten at a police station after
    being detained by police outside the courthouse.
        In a meeting with the Human Rights Commission to discuss the August
    8 demonstration, a public assembly observer team that represented a
    coalition of seven NGO's recommended a series of reforms to improve
    police handling of peaceful assemblies. The observers presented
    photographs taken on the scene as evidence of overly aggressive
    behavior by the police. The commission stated that it would study the
    documents and pictures.
        There were several smaller demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur during
    the year. For example, a demonstration was held in January when Anwar
    Ibrahim's sodomy trial resumed after a several month break and a second
    took place in March at the National Mosque to protest government
    restrictions on the opposition newspaper Harakah. In each case, the
    police arrested some of the demonstrators and quickly broke up the
    gatherings.
        In February 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
    criticized the Government's use of various laws to curb peaceful
    assembly (see Section 2.a.).
        In July 1999, five social activists were arrested for illegal
    assembly when they tried to prevent police from demolishing a squatter
    settlement. The case still was pending at year's end.
        In April 4 of the over 50 Islamic opposition party members who were
    arrested in 1997 when they demonstrated in protest of an Israeli team's
    participation at an international cricket championship were ordered to
    testify in their own defense. In November each of the 4 was given a
    sentence of either 1 month in jail or a fine of $400 (15,000 ringgit).
    Three chose jail time and one chose to pay the fine. The three serving
    jail time were released in early December after serving abbreviated
    sentences. Charges against the others were dropped in 1999.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
    the Government places significant restrictions on this right. Certain
    statutes limited this right. Under the 1966 Societies Act, only
    registered, approved organizations of seven or more persons may
    function. The Government sometimes refuses to register organizations or
    may impose conditions when allowing a society to register. For example,
    the Government did not allow AI to set up a branch as an NGO. However,
    AI incorporated itself, and it was able to function much like an NGO.
    The Government prohibits the Communist Party and affiliated
    organizations (see Section 1.f.). The Government also has the power to
    revoke the registration of an existing society for violations of the
    act, a power that it has enforced selectively against political
    opposition groups. This threat of possible deregistration inhibits
    political activism.
        To avoid the burdensome requirements of the Societies Act, many
    NGO's register as companies under the Companies Act or as businesses
    under the Registration of Businesses Act. Amendments to the Companies
    Act passed in 1998 empowered the Registrar of Companies to refuse
    registration of a proposed company if he is satisfied that the company
    is likely to be used for any purpose prejudicial to national security
    or the public interest. The Registrar also may cancel the registration
    of an existing company and disband it on the same grounds. Opposition
    parties and NGO activists claim that the sweeping powers granted to the
    Registrar of Companies were designed to stifle criticism. The
    Government denied such charges and stated that financial irregularities
    were the amendments' main target. However, later police statements
    threateningly alluded to the status of certain NGO's under the
    Companies or Societies Acts. In 1999 the Deputy Home Minister notified
    Parliament that the Government had revoked the registration of 981
    societies under the Societies Act since 1966. No human rights NGO has
    had its registration revoked in recent years.
        In August the High Court heard an appeal from the Socialist Party
    of Malaysia, whose application to form a new political party had been
    rejected in February 1999 by the Registrar of Societies. The Registrar
    stated that information on the application form was incomplete.
    Supporters of the Socialist Party claimed that the denial was motivated
    politically and filed an appeal. The case still was pending at year's
    end.
        The Bar Council continues to be the target of government criticism
    in some instances; however, in others the Government attempted to
    collaborate with the council. In March 1999, former Deputy Minister
    Datuk Ibrahm Ali said that the Bar Council should not question the
    appointment of judges. In May 1999, Ali said that the Bar Council
    should stop meddling in government affairs. In June 1999, government
    leaders threatened to pass legislation making the Attorney General the
    head of the Bar Council. However, the Minister in the Prime Minister's
    Department, Rais Yatim, spoke at a Bar Council seminar in September on
    contempt-of-court procedures. In the past, the Government has
    threatened to expand legally the membership of the Bar Council to
    include government lawyers and legal professors. Some members of the
    Council feared that such a measure would dilute the Council's
    independence. No such measures had been implemented by year's end.
        The Universities and University Colleges Act also restricted
    freedom of association. This act mandates university approval for
    student associations and prohibits student associations, as well as
    faculty members, from engaging in political activity. However, there
    were no reports that students were suspended during the year, as had
    occurred in the past. Restrictions are not enforced as vigorously on
    students who participate in political activities in support of the
    ruling coalition. A university vice chancellor must approve campus
    demonstrations. Many students, NGO's, and opposition political parties
    called for the repeal or amendment of the act. A number of ruling
    coalition organizations and politicians also supported reexamination of
    the act, but the Government stated that the act still is necessary.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion; however, the Government places some restrictions on this
    right. Islam is the official religion; however, the practice of Islamic
    beliefs other than Sunni Islam is restricted severely. Religious
    minorities, which include large Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and Sikh
    communities, generally worship freely, although with some restrictions.
    Government funds support an Islamic religious establishment, and it is
    official policy to ``infuse Islamic values'' into the administration of
    the country. The Government imposed Islamic religious law (Shari'a) on
    Muslims only in some matters and it does not impose Shari'a beyond the
    Muslim community. Adherence to Islam is considered intrinsic to Malay
    ethnic identity and therefore Islamic religious laws administered by
    state authorities through Islamic courts bind all ethnic Malays (and
    other Muslims) in some matters. The Government also grants funds to
    non-Islamic religions, but to a more limited degree.
        According to 1991 government census figures, the principal
    religions are: Islam (59 percent of the population, the majority of
    whom are Sunni); Buddhism (18 percent); Christianity (8 percent);
    Hinduism (6 percent); and Confucianism, Taoism, or other religions that
    originated in China (5 percent).
        For Muslims, particularly ethnic Malays, the right to leave the
    Islamic faith and adhere to another religion is a controversial
    question. The legal process of conversion is unclear; in law and in
    practice, it is very difficult for Muslims to change religions. In
    March 1999, the country's highest court ruled that secular courts have
    no jurisdiction to hear applications by Muslims to change religions.
    According to the ruling, the religious conversion of Muslims is solely
    the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts. The state of Perlis enacted a law
    that stipulated that Muslims found guilty of apostasy by a Shari'a
    court are to be sent to ``faith rehabilitation centers.'' Such a bill
    also has been proposed at the highest level of the Government. Leaders
    of the opposition Islamic Party have said that the penalty for apostasy
    should be death.
        In 1998 the Government stated that ``apostates'', that is those who
    wish to leave or have left Islam for another religion, would not face
    government punishment as long as they did not defame Islam after their
    conversion. However, a senior government official stated in September
    that a faith rehabilitation bill was being prepared that could provide
    up to a year detention in a faith rehabilitation center for Muslims
    found guilty of apostasy. Subsequently the Prime Minister stated that
    the proposed federal and Perlis state bills, both of which aroused
    considerable controversy, were under further study.
        The Government generally respects non-Muslims' right of worship;
    however, state governments carefully control the building of nonMuslim
    places of worship and the allocation of land for nonMuslim cemeteries.
    Approvals for such permits sometimes were granted very slowly. In July
    1999, the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity,
    Hinduism, and Sikhism (MCCBCHS), an NGO representing minority
    religions, claimed that the guidelines required an area to have at
    least 2,000 to 5,000 adherents of a particular non-Muslim faith for a
    non-Muslim place of worship to be approved. No such requirement exists
    for Muslim places of worship. The group also argued that, under the
    guidelines, the state Islamic council must approve the establishment of
    all nonMuslim places of worship. In August after years of complaints by
    non-Islamic religious organizations about the need for Islamic
    authorities in each state to approve construction of non-Islamic
    religious institutions, the Minister of Housing and Local Government
    announced that such approval no longer would be required. According to
    press reports, the new guidelines permit a non-Islamic house of worship
    to be built in every 0.5 hectare for the use of 2,600 worshippers, or a
    house of worship for every 5,000 worshippers regardless of the size of
    the area.
        During the controversy over the proposed new guidelines on
    nonMuslim places of worship, the MCCBCHS and the Federal Territory
    Counseling and Service Center separately urged the Prime Minister to
    create a national non-Muslim religious council. Such a council was not
    established by year's end.
        In December 1999, the press reported that the new administrators of
    the state of Terengganu, the opposition Islamic party PAS, planned to
    introduce a special tax on non-Muslims. Non-Muslims expressed strong
    opposition to this proposal. State government leaders said that the
    press had distorted their plans. No special tax was imposed by year's
    end.
        The proselytizing of Muslims by members of other religions is
    prohibited strictly; persons proselytizing non-Muslims face no
    obstacles. The Government discouraged, and in practical terms forbids,
    the circulation in peninsular Malaysia of Malaylanguage translations of
    the Bible and distribution of Christian tapes and printed materials in
    Malay. However, Malaylanguage Christian materials can be found. Some
    states have laws that prohibited the use of Malay-language religious
    terms by Christians, but the authorities do not always enforce them
    actively. The distribution of Malay-language Christian materials faced
    few restrictions in east Malaysia. Most visas for foreign Christian
    clergy are approved. Beginning in March, non-Muslim representatives now
    sit on the immigration committee that approves such visa requests.
        The Government opposes what it considers to be deviant
    interpretations of Islam, maintaining that the ``deviant'' groups'
    extreme views endanger national security. In the past, the Government
    imposed restrictions on certain Islamic groups, primarily the small
    number of Shi'a. The Government continues to monitor the activities of
    the Shi'a minority, including those of 55 religious groups believed to
    be involved in deviant Islamic teachings. In August the Deputy Prime
    Minister stated that the Government had identified 44 extremist Islamic
    groups which, according to him, claimed to possess mystical powers of
    invincibility. In November the Shari'a high court in the state of
    Kelantan sentenced four persons to 3 years in jail for disregarding a
    lower court order to ``repent'' their allegedly heretical Islamic
    beliefs and ``return to the true teachings of Islam.'' The high court
    rejected their argument that Shari'a law had no jurisdiction over them
    because they had ceased to be Muslims.
        The Government periodically detains members of what it considers
    Islamic deviant sects without trial or charge under the ISA. After
    release, such detainees are subject to restrictions on their movement
    and residence. For example, in July the Government detained under the
    Internal Security Act at least 33 members of the Al-Ma'unah sect who
    reportedly were not suspected of involvement in the early July arms
    thefts. They remained under ISA detention at year's end (see Sections
    1.d. and 1.e.).
        The Government generally restricts remarks or publications that
    might incite racial or religious disharmony. This includes some
    statements and publications critical of particular religions,
    especially Islam. The Government also restricts the content of sermons
    at mosques. The Government periodically warns against those who deliver
    sermons in mosques for ``political ends'' and, occasionally, state
    governments banned certain Muslim clergymen from delivering sermons at
    mosques. In July 1999, the Negeri Sembilan state government banned a
    state religious department officer from preaching sermons because the
    officer allegedly had given a political speech during one of his
    sermons. In February 1999, the state of Selangor lifted a ban on a
    former mufti (the highest state Muslim leader) of Selangor. He
    allegedly had called the Prime Minister an apostate (see Section 2.a.).
    Throughout the year, the Government spoke out against what it
    considered the political use of mosques by the opposition Islamic Party
    PAS and several state governments, which are responsible for oversight
    of local religious matters, barred some opposition religious figures
    from speaking in mosques (see Section 2.a.).
        After the November 1999 national elections, the Government
    significantly expanded efforts to restrict the activities of the
    Islamic opposition party at mosques. Several states announced measures
    including banning opposition-affiliated imams from speaking at mosques,
    more vigorously enforcing existing restrictions on the content of
    sermons, replacing mosque leaders and governing committees thought to
    be sympathetic to the opposition, and threatening to close unauthorized
    mosques with ties to the opposition. The Government justified such
    measures as necessary to oppose the ``politicization of religion'' by
    the opposition.
        In December 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir said that ways should be
    found to prevent the opposition from ``spreading lies'' at mosques.
    Also in December 1999, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi
    directed the religious affairs department to conduct background checks
    on religious speakers to find out whether the speakers disseminated
    ``wrongful information'' that may have influenced civil servants to
    stop supporting the Government. Also in December 1999, Selangor state
    government officials announced that they were investigating mosque
    committee members with links to the opposition. Officials threatened to
    expel opposition sympathizers from mosque committees. At year's end, no
    action had been taken. Also in December 1999, Johor state officials
    said that they had identified several ``political'' religious leaders
    who had criticized the Government. The state government threatened
    ``stern action,'' but at year's end, no action had been taken. In
    October the Chief Minister of Kelantan, who is also the spiritual
    adviser for the opposition Islamic party PAS, was banned from speaking
    at a mosque in Selangor. The Chief Minister spoke despite the ban and
    vowed that he would continue to speak wherever he was invited. He was
    warned of prosecution if he defied the ban again. The mosque officers
    who allegedly allowed him to speak were not prosecuted, but they were
    required to attend a counseling session.
        For Muslim children, religious education according to a government-
    approved curriculum is compulsory. There are no restrictions on home
    instruction.
        In July 1999, the Government announced a plan to take control of
    state religious schools. (Under the Constitution religion is a matter
    for state governments.) The chief minister of the opposition-controlled
    state of Kelantan rejected the plan. In response, former federal
    Education Minister Datuk Seri Najib said that the Government would find
    a way to take over Kelantan's religious schools. In October 1999, the
    Government announced that religious schools could choose to be
    incorporated wholly or partially into the federal school system
    beginning this year; however, at year's end, the plan had not yet been
    implemented, and its implications were unclear.
        In June the Government announced that all Muslim civil servants
    must attend religious classes, but only classes in Islam would be held.
    In addition only teachers approved by the Government would be employed.
        In January 1999, the Selangor state government announced the
    formation of a government interreligious consultative council that
    included representatives of all major religions. The council's stated
    objectives were to prevent interreligious conflict, to promote
    interreligious understanding, and to address moral and social problems
    jointly.
        The Government has a comprehensive system of preferences for ethnic
    Malays and members of a few other groups known collectively as
    ``bumiputras,'' most of whom are Muslim (see Section 5).
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally have the right to
    travel, live, and work where they please; however, the Government
    restricts these rights in some circumstances. The East Malaysian states
    of Sabah and Sarawak have the right to control immigration and to
    require citizens from peninsular West Malaysia and foreigners to
    present passports or national identity cards for entry. In 1998 the
    Court of Appeal ruled that Sabah and Sarawak, despite their autonomy,
    still are bound by the federal Constitution in all matters. Thus, the
    court voided Sabah's expulsion of a West Malaysian attorney who had
    been involved in several lawsuits against the state government. In May
    1999, the Sabah state government filed an appeal of the ruling, which
    is still pending. The federal Government regulates the internal
    movement of provisionally released ISA detainees (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government also uses the Restricted Residence Act to limit
    movements of those suspected of some criminal activities (see Section
    1.d.).
        The Government generally does not restrict emigration.
        Citizens must apply for the Government's permission to travel to
    Israel. Travel to Jerusalem for a religious purpose is allowed
    explicitly.
        The Government has not ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government
    rejected customary international law in this area. The Government does
    not recognize the principle of first asylum; however, it sometimes
    grants temporary refuge to asylum seekers. In September 1999, Foreign
    Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar said that ``we allow people for
    temporary stay and when that stay is over they have to go back. We have
    never granted anybody refugee status.'' The Government continues to
    refuse to acknowledge that any Indonesian illegal aliens, including
    Acehnese, have a claim to refugee status. The Government has not made a
    concerted attempt to find and detain illegal Acehnese or other
    Indonesians; however, at least two refugees recognized by the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were deported to Indonesia during the
    year. In 1998 the Government forcibly returned several hundred
    Acehnese, despite representations from the UNHCR and the international
    community and evidence that the Acehnese might face persecution upon
    return to Indonesia.
        A Human Rights Watch report published in August on the condition of
    illegal Burmese Rohingyas in the country stated that they can be
    subject to arrest and detention in immigration camps. In the report,
    former detainees made detailed allegations of deaths in these camps due
    to beatings and inhuman conditions in the 1990's (see Sections 1.a. and
    1.c.). The conditions in the camps remained a cause for concern;
    however, there were no reports of similar deaths during the year. After
    the Human Rights Watch report was released, the Muslim Youth Movement
    of Malaysia (ABIM) declared the report ``untrue.'' One Abim official, a
    self-exiled Rohingya, described the Government's treatment of the
    Rohingyas as ``humane.'' The Malaysian Human Rights Commission
    currently is investigating allegations made in the Human Rights Watch
    report, and it defended the Government's handling of refugee claimants
    and illegal immigrants in general. UNHCR officials stated that
    approximately 10,000 Rohingyas in the country are de facto stateless
    persons; however, the vast majority do not qualify for refugee status
    under international law. In 1999 the UNHCR received 1,473 applications
    for refugee status from Rohingya asylum seekers and granted refugee
    status in only 43 cases.
        The Government did not restrict the access of undetained asylum
    seekers to the UNHCR office and cooperated in the resettlement of some
    refugees. However, the Government only infrequently granted the UNHCR
    and other humanitarian organizations access to detained aliens. There
    were some forced expulsions of asylum seekers and refugees.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        By law citizens have the right to change their government through
    periodic elections; however, while votes generally are recorded
    accurately, there are some irregularities that affect the fairness of
    elections, and in practice opposition parties are unable to compete on
    equal terms with the governing coalition (which has held power at the
    national level since 1957) because of significant restrictions on
    campaigning, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.
    Nevertheless opposition candidates campaign actively, with some success
    in state and national elections. In the November 1999 elections, the
    opposition roughly doubled its strength to 25 percent of federal
    parliamentary seats and an opposition party retained control of the
    Kelantan state government (the opposition won control of one state
    government in the 1995 elections) and took over the state government of
    Terengganu. In December the opposition won a seat in the Kedah state
    assembly in a tightly contested by-election.
        Malaysia has a parliamentary system of government. National
    elections are required at least every 5 years and have been held
    regularly since independence in 1957. The Malay-based United Malay
    National Organization party dominates the ruling National Front
    coalition, which has ruled the country continuously since independence.
    Since 1969 the National Front coalition always has maintained at least
    a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which enabled the Government to
    amend the Constitution at will. Over the years, power increasingly has
    been concentrated in the executive branch, and the Prime Minister.
        The lack of equal access to the media was the most serious problem
    encountered by the opposition in the November 1999 elections (see
    Section 2.a.). Government officials frankly stated that government
    television and radio would not carry reporting on the opposition. The
    country's two private television stations also had virtually no
    impartial reporting on the opposition. The mainstream English-language
    and Malay-language newspapers also carried biased coverage of domestic
    politics. In addition opposition parties encountered difficulties in
    placing paid advertisements in newspapers; however, a few opposition
    advertisements did appear, after editing by the newspapers, in English-
    and Chinese- language newspapers. On-line newspapers and political
    websites, which tend to express an independent perspective, grew in
    popularity during the year.
        Opposition leaders credibly claimed that the Election Commission,
    which is responsible for holding and monitoring elections, did not
    carry out its duties impartially. The Election Commission is nominally
    independent, but perceived widely by the opposition to be under the
    control of the Government. In June 1999, Deputy Prime Minister and Home
    Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi said that there was no need to
    consult the opposition on the appointment of a new election commission
    chairman. Opposition leaders said that Prime Minister Mahathir's remark
    that same month that the Government would ``not entertain'' an
    opposition demand for a long campaign period in upcoming elections
    demonstrated the lack of independence of the Election Commission (the
    Commission has the sole power to set the length of the campaign
    period). After the 1999 elections, several government officials
    publicly disputed opposition claims that the Election Commission was
    biased. Some members of the ruling coalition charged that individual
    Commission officials supported opposition candidates. The results of
    the election were released officially in January.
        Opposition complaints of irregularities by election officials and
    allegations of other election fraud during the 1999 campaign were not
    substantiated during the year, and according to most observers, there
    was no evidence that the conduct of election officers significantly
    affected the results of the elections. Opposition leaders also
    complained that local government officials who served as election
    officers were not always neutral. For example, in July 1999, the
    opposition National Justice Party filed a complaint with the Election
    Commission, accusing a district officer in the State of Perak of
    participating in an UMNO party event. The Election Commission later
    announced that it completed its investigation, but it did not reveal
    its findings. The Government did not permit international monitoring or
    adequately allow for domestic NGO monitoring efforts during the
    elections. (The last time that foreign observers monitored elections
    was in 1990.)
        Opposition parties and some NGO's also alleged that defective
    voting rolls led to some fraudulent votes. In the Sabah state elections
    in March 1999, opposition leaders accused the ruling coalition of
    employing ``phantom'' voters (illegal aliens and other fraudulently
    documented voters). NGO's analysis of the voting roll used in the
    national elections also revealed irregularities, such as dead persons
    on the rolls, multiple voters registered under single identity card
    numbers, and other anomalies; however, according to most observers,
    there is no evidence that these irregularities significantly affected
    the results in more than a handful of races. The Government did not
    respond to postelection calls by an election-monitoring NGO for a
    national reregistration exercise to produce a clean electoral roll.
        ``Postal votes,'' or absentee ballots by police and military
    personnel and their spouses, also are a concern. The Government, citing
    security concerns, does not allow party agents to monitor absentee
    ballot boxes placed on military and police installations. Opposition
    parties questioned the rationale for such security restrictions.
    Opposition parties and NGO's have raised credible allegations of
    improper manipulation of postal votes, including statements by former
    military personnel that their ballots were filled out by others or
    under the eye of commanding officers. For the November 1999 elections,
    the Election Commission changed some procedures to allow better
    monitoring by Election Commission officers. Opposition parties
    continued to call for monitoring of postal votes by party agents.
    Election Commission officials estimated before the November election
    that roughly 235,000 postal votes would be cast. No count of the actual
    number of postal votes was published by year's end.
        The anonymity of balloting also is a potential concern. Ballots are
    marked with a serial number that could be matched against a voter's
    name. While there is no evidence that the Government ever has traced
    individual votes, some opposition leaders have alleged that the
    potential to do so has a chilling effect on some voters, particularly
    civil servants.
        Gerrymandering diluted the votes of some citizens. The Constitution
    states that parliamentary constituencies should have roughly equal
    numbers of eligible voters, although the same section states that
    greater weight should be given to rural constituencies. In practice
    these guidelines often are ignored. For example, in Sabah
    constituencies are weighted strongly against the state's large
    Christian population. Nationwide, the constitutional provision giving
    greater weight to rural constituencies greatly dilutes the voting power
    of urban residents. The single member, winner-take-all system also
    diminishes the political power of the minority groups. Because of the
    changing dynamics of ethnic politics, ethnic gerrymandering of
    parliamentary constituencies, used against the opposition in the past,
    is believed to no longer be as great an advantage to the ruling
    coalition.
        Other government measures hamper the opposition's ability to
    compete with the incumbent ruling coalition. For example, the
    Government on several occasions issued public warnings to civil
    servants, including teachers (see Section 2.a.) not to support the
    opposition. Students face certain restrictions on political activity
    (see Section 2.b.). Government leaders routinely and openly threatened
    to suspend the allocation of federal funds beyond the constitutionally
    mandated minimum to constituencies that elected opposition
    representatives. Ruling coalition Members of Parliament received a
    government allocation totaling in aggregate roughly $25 million (95
    million ringgit). Opposition Members of Parliament receive no such
    funds. In July 1999, a government minister told Parliament that the
    money only was given to ruling coalition Members of Parliament because
    it came from the Government.
        The opposition has complained in the past about restrictions on
    public assemblies during the campaign period (see Section 2.b.).
    However, in the period prior to the November 1999 elections, police did
    not implement restrictions vigorously, and the opposition held many
    large rallies. The opposition also has stated that the short official
    campaign period gives an advantage to the incumbent ruling coalition.
    However, de facto campaigning began long before the elections, and
    there is little evidence that the short official campaign period had
    much practical effect.
        In August 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir stated that the ruling
    coalition's failure to win a two-thirds majority in Parliament in 1969
    had resulted in widespread rioting and said that if a ``weak
    government'' were elected, ``the peace of the country could not be
    guaranteed.'' Opposition leaders complained that these statements were
    a threat to instigate violence if the ruling coalition should lose the
    two-thirds majority in the upcoming elections. Opposition leader Lim
    Kit Siang called on the Government to pledge to accept the results of
    the upcoming election. The Government did not respond.
        Prime Minister Mahathir said in June 1999 that he expected the
    November 1999 elections to be ``the dirtiest ever.'' For different
    reasons, the opposition expressed similar fears. The Government did not
    respond to the opposition's call for an election code to ensure that
    these elections would be free, fair, and clean. A group of NGO's formed
    an independent elections watch organization. The Election Commission
    stated that the NGO's were free to do so, but the organization was
    accorded no special privileges. (The law does not provide for
    monitoring of polling stations except by political party agents.) In
    June 1999, the Government publicly rejected the idea of foreign
    observers. The Government also rejected opposition calls for foreign
    observers in Sabah state elections in March. After the election, the
    Prime Minister continued to allege that the opposition engaged in
    unfair tactics, including slander.
        Under the electoral law, unsuccessful candidates may appeal
    election results to special election courts in instances of alleged
    fraud, vote tampering, or other infractions of electoral rules. After
    the November 1999 elections, 21 petitions were filed by losing
    candidates from both the ruling and opposition coalitions. According to
    the Elections Commission, all petitions were dismissed. In March the
    High Court ruled that the Election Commission and returning officers
    may not be named as ``necessary parties'' in petitions filed with
    election courts by unsuccessful candidates. In April the Cabinet
    approved the creation of an election appellate court to provide an
    additional opportunity to seek redress for unsuccessful candidates
    whose election petitions were denied by election courts. Also in April,
    the Cabinet approved the creation of an Election Appellate Court to
    provide an additional opportunity to seek redress for unsuccessful
    candidates whose election petitions were denied by election courts. All
    remaining election appeals from the 1999 Sabah state elections in which
    opposition parties filed objections to the results of 17 of 48 seats
    were dismissed by election courts or withdrawn by the parties during
    the year.
        In the past, within the ruling UMNO party, there had been active
    political debate. ``No-contest'' rules for leadership positions and
    generally increased intolerance of dissent limited but did not
    eliminate UMNO's role as a vehicle for public debate. However, after
    the removal of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar in 1998, intolerance of
    dissent within UMNO increased, and an extraordinary UMNO Assembly in
    1998 approved a series of measures designed to limit independent
    grassroots initiatives. During the year, there were no contests for the
    top two leadership positions in UMNO. At the UMNO General Assembly in
    May, 3 vice president slots and 25 elected seats on the Supreme Council
    were contested vigorously, with a number of candidates known not to be
    favored by party leaders. It had been announced before the General
    Assembly that there would be no contest for the party president and
    deputy president, positions held respectively by Prime Minister
    Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah.
        Over the years, Parliament's function as a deliberative body has
    deteriorated. Legislation proposed by the Government rarely is amended
    or rejected. Legislation proposed by the opposition never is given
    serious consideration; however, during the 1999 elections, the
    opposition increased the number of seats it held. Opposition
    opportunities to hold legislation up to public scrutiny have
    diminished. The Parliament in 1995 amended its rules to strengthen the
    power of the Speaker and curb parliamentary procedures heavily used by
    the opposition. The amendments empowered the Speaker to ban members he
    considered unruly for up to 10 days, imposed limits on deputies'
    ability to pose supplementary questions and revisit nongermane issues,
    and established restrictions on the tabling of questions of public
    importance. Further measures in 1997 and 1998 limited members'
    opportunities to question and debate government policies even more
    severely. Nonetheless, government officials often faced sharp
    questioning in Parliament, although this was not always reported in
    detail in the mainstream press.
        State assemblies also limited debate. After the 1969 intercommunal
    riots, the Government abolished elected local government in favor of
    municipal committees and village chiefs appointed by state governments.
    Some politicians and NGO activists have advocated reintroduction of
    local government. Even some ruling party municipal officials have noted
    that local bodies are simply ``rubber stamps'' for the Government.
        Women face no legal limits on participation in government and
    politics; however, they remain underrepresented in government and
    politics due to social and other factors. At year's end, 2 of 28
    cabinet ministers were women. Women hold 20 of 193 seats in the elected
    lower house of Parliament, and they hold 19 of 69 seats in the
    appointed upper house. In May Datuk Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz assumed the
    post of Central Bank Governor. She is the first woman to be appointed
    to the post. On December 19, the King announced the appointment of
    Ainum Mohamed Saaid as the new Attorney General, the first woman to
    hold this position. Ainum is to serve as the Government's top legal
    advisor and as the Public Prosecutor, with wide discretionary powers
    for a 2-year term beginning on January 1, 2001. In 1998 the Minister of
    National Unity and Social Development stated that the country would not
    achieve its goal of 30 percent female representation in the Government
    by 2005. The Minister stated that the 1998 rate of participation
    (defined as the percentage of female representatives in Parliament and
    in state assemblies) was 6 to 7 percent. The Islamic opposition party
    does not allow female candidates to stand as candidates for the lower
    house; however, the Party has one female senator. In the past, it has
    supported female candidates of other parties.
        Ethnic minorities are represented in cabinet-level positions in
    Government, as well as in senior civil service positions. Nevertheless,
    the political dominance of the Malay majority means in practice that
    ethnic Malays hold the most powerful senior leadership positions. Non-
    Malays fill 9 of the 26 cabinet posts and 14 of 28 deputy minister
    positions. An ethnic Chinese leader of a component party of the ruling
    coalition holds executive power in the state of Penang.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of NGO's, including the Bar Council and other public
    interest groups, devoted considerable attention to human rights. The
    Government generally tolerates their activities but often does not
    respond to their inquiries or press statements. However, Government
    officials met with NGO's on several occasions during the year. The
    results of these meetings were not made public. Government officials
    harshly criticize domestic NGO's for collaborating with foreigners,
    including international human rights organizations. However, at year's
    end, no group had been banned or decertified. In the past, public
    apathy and racial divisions (non-Malays had dominated most human rights
    NGO's) limited the effectiveness of NGO's. However, public discontent
    over the 1998 removal of and subsequent imprisonment of Deputy Prime
    Minister Anwar encouraged some NGO's to speak out against the
    Government, and it has led to the increased involvement of ethnic
    Malays in NGO activity.
        In 1998 the Government amended the Companies Act to grant the
    Registrar of Companies wide powers to block or disband organizations
    deemed prejudicial to national security or the national interest. In
    May 1999, the Government announced that it was planning to table
    amendments to the Registration of Businesses Act to enable the
    Government to track the activities and movements of organizations
    registered under the act (see Section 2.b.).
        The Government generally does not allow international human rights
    organizations to form branches; however, it generally does not restrict
    access by representatives of international human right organizations.
    AI has registered itself as a private company. A February 1999 report
    issued by the IPU on prison conditions (see Section 1.c.) noted that,
    while the Government welcomed the December 1998 investigative mission,
    the IPU delegation was not able to make important appointments and was
    not allowed to meet privately with Lim Guan Eng. Several foreign human
    rights observers have attended sessions of Anwar's two trials.
        Government officials reacted sharply to a report entitled ``Justice
    in Jeopardy: Malaysia in 2000,'' which was issued early in the year by
    the International Bar Association, the Centre for the Independence of
    Judges, and lawyers from the International Commission of Jurists, the
    Commonwealth Lawyers Association, and the International Lawyers Union.
    The report was the result of the findings of a three-man team that
    spent 10 days in Malaysia in April 1999. The report concluded that
    ``the extremely powerful Executive in Malaysia has not acted with due
    regard for the essential elements of a free and democratic society
    based on the rule of law.''
        In early April, the Government announced that former Deputy Prime
    Minister Musa Hitam would head the National Human Rights Commission
    provided for in legislation passed by Parliament in July 1999. Twelve
    other members also were named, including retired jurists, consumer
    activists, and academics. The commission's functions and powers include
    promoting awareness of human rights, helping the Government to draft
    laws and regulations concerning human rights, advising the Government
    on acceding to human rights treaties, inquiring into human rights
    complaints, inspecting places of detention, and hearing witnesses and
    receiving evidence on human rights questions. The legislation that
    created the commission defines human rights as ``the fundamental
    liberties provided for'' in the federal Constitution and restricts the
    application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to those
    provisions consistent with the Constitution. In 1999 prior to the
    commission's creation, opposition leaders and NGO's, including the Bar
    Council, criticized the definition of human rights as too narrow. They
    also were skeptical of the Government's pledges that it would be
    independent. In May the commission announced four working groups: One
    to promote human rights awareness and education; a second to advise and
    assist the Government in formulating legislation and procedures; a
    third to make recommendations to the Government on accession to
    treaties and other international human rights instruments; and a fourth
    to investigate complaints of human rights violations. The commission
    received its first complaint in April from three NGO members in Penang,
    who claimed that they were mistreated by police after being arrested
    during a rentcontrol protest in February. Later in April, the
    commission announced that it would investigate reports of abuse
    received by demonstrators detained during the April 15 demonstration in
    support of Anwar Ibrahim (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). In early August,
    Musa Hitam publicly supported the right of citizens to assemble
    peacefully outside the courthouse at which the verdict in Anwar
    Ibrahim's sodomy trial was to be announced (see Section 2.b.). (Police
    did not interfere with three members of the commission who observed the
    demonstrations outside the courthouse on August 8.) During the year,
    the Commission met with human rights NGO's, government ministries,
    representatives from the ruling, and opposition parties, and
    recommended that human rights issues and problems be incorporated into
    school curriculums. The commission also met several times with senior
    police officials, who agreed to allow the commission to provide human
    rights training to the police. However, the commission is not empowered
    to inquire into allegations relating to ongoing court cases. In
    December the Human Rights Commission opened an inquiry into and took
    public testimony about allegations of police misconduct during a
    November 5 rally organized by the opposition. It also must cease its
    inquiry if an allegation under investigation becomes a subject matter
    of a court.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal protection under the law and
    prohibits discrimination against citizens based on religion, race,
    descent, or place of birth; however, discrimination based on some
    factors persists. For example, government policies give preferences to
    ethnic Malays in housing, home ownership, the awarding of government
    contracts, educational scholarships, and other areas. Although neither
    the Constitution nor laws explicitly prohibit discrimination based on
    sex or disabilities, the Government has attempted to eliminate
    discrimination against women and promote greater public acceptance of
    the disabled.
        Women.--Violence against women remains a problem, although
    statistics indicated that the problem has decreased during the year.
    Reports of rape are common in the press and among women's rights groups
    and NGO's, although the Government has not released comprehensive
    statistics. In December 1999, a women's NGO issued a report that stated
    that the incidence of rape had increased 48 percent in the 5year period
    from 1993 to 1998 more than 50 percent of rape victims are under age
    16. Statistics from the Royal Malaysian Police show 1,217 reported
    cases of rape during the year. Many hospitals have set up crisis
    centers where victims of rape and domestic abuse can make reports
    without going to a police station. NGO's and political parties also
    cooperate in providing counseling for rape victims. Nonetheless,
    cultural attitudes and a perceived lack of sympathy from the largely
    male police force lead many victims not to report rapes. According to
    an NGO study involving 417 court files from 7 state capitals and Kuala
    Lumpur, even when alleged rape is reported, only one of five cases is
    heard in court. Only half of the court cases resulted in a rape
    conviction. Some rapists receive heavy punishments, including caning,
    but women's groups complain that some rapists receive inadequate
    punishments. Section 376 of the Penal Code stated that a convicted
    rapist shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than 5
    years and not more than 20 years.
        Spousal abuse has drawn considerable government, NGO, and press
    attention. Awareness of the severity and prevalence of this problem is
    growing and may be leading to a decrease in its incidence. In 1990 the
    only national survey ever conducted on battered women showed that 1.8
    million women (approximately 39 percent of respondents) above the age
    of 15 had been beaten physically by their husbands or boyfriends. A
    local women's NGO and a well-known social marketing company conducted
    the survey using a nationally representative random sampling of adults
    residing in peninsular Malaysia in 1989. However, statistics released
    at year's end by the Royal Malaysian Police show that 3,468 cases of
    domestic violence were reported during the year, which represents
    nearly a 10 percent decrease in the number of reported cases compared
    to 1999 (3,806).
        The 1996 Domestic Violence Act addresses violence against women in
    the home. However, women's groups criticized the act as inadequate and
    called for amendments to strengthen it. In their view, the act fails to
    protect women in immediate danger by requiring separate reports of
    abuse to be filed with both the Welfare Department and the police. This
    requirement causes delay in the issuance of a restraining order against
    the perpetrator. Women's rights activists also highlighted the fact
    that because the act is a part of the Penal Code, legal protection for
    victims is limited to cases in which visible evidence of physical
    injury is present, despite its interpretation to include sexual and
    psychological abuse. In April the Government announced that the
    Domestic Violence Act would be reviewed to determine weaknesses in the
    law and eliminate legal loopholes; however, the Government had taken no
    action by year's end.
        Although the Government, NGO's, and political parties have formed
    shelters and offer other assistance to battered spouses, activists
    asserted that support mechanisms remain inadequate. Police responses to
    complaints of domestic violence were more professional and sensitive
    than in previous years, but problems remained and cultural attitudes
    are still an impediment.
        Domestic violence complaints are rare in Islamic law (Shari'a)
    courts (six cases in 1997). Some Shari'a experts have urged Muslim
    women to become more aware of the provisions of Shari'a that prohibit
    spousal abuse and provide for divorces on grounds of physical cruelty.
    Nonetheless, Shari'a generally (each state has a separate code)
    prohibits wives from disobeying lawful orders of their husbands. These
    provisions often present an obstacle to women pursuing claims,
    including charges of abuse, against their husbands.
        Spousal rape is not a crime. Theoretically a man who raped his wife
    could face charges of assault; however, women's rights activists claim
    that no man has been convicted in such circumstances.
        A 1998 International Labor Organization (ILO) study estimated that
    there were roughly 40,000 to 140,000 prostitutes in the country. The
    Government strongly disputed this estimate, and the police stated that
    they would investigate NGO's that might have provided the information
    that formed the basis of the study. However, from January through
    August alone, the Royal Malaysian police arrested 2,338 foreign
    prostitutes (see Section 6.f.). Sex tourism is not legal, and the level
    of such activity is not high.
        A women's rights NGO stated in 1998 that the economic downturn had
    forced more local women into prostitution. In February 1999, the press
    reported a 1998 study by the national population and family development
    board that showed that the economic downturn had decreased the demand
    for prostitution.
        The same women's rights NGO cited government statistics showing an
    upturn in the number of arrests for prostitution. A government source
    substantiated this claim by noting that the increase in arrests was due
    to more vigorous enforcement. Police also believed that the increasing
    number of arrests was a result of greater numbers of women being
    brought to the country from countries of the former Soviet Union (see
    Section 6.f.).
        Malaysia is a source, transit, and destination country for
    trafficking in women for purposes of prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        In August 1999, the Ministry of Human Resources issued a Code of
    Practice on the Prevention and Eradication of Sexual Harassment in the
    Workplace. Women's groups noted the code's detailed definition of
    sexual harassment and attempted to raise public awareness of the
    problem, but they criticized the fact that adherence to the code is
    voluntary and not legally binding. The Code of Practice has no legal
    effect and earlier plans for a sexual harassment law apparently have
    been abandoned. Women's rights activists claimed that a law on sexual
    harassment would be more effective than a code of practice. In the
    first year following the issuance of the code, the Human Resources
    Minister asked women's groups and labor unions to give the code ``a
    chance to work.'' He advocated voluntary compliance by employers and
    advised unions to incorporate policies against sexual harassment into
    their collective labor agreements. The Malaysian Employers Federation
    has criticized publicly any attempt to legislate against sexual
    harassment in the workplace, arguing that governmentimposed policies
    would unduly restrict the management of labor relations.
        Since the code was introduced in August 1999, the number of
    reported incidents of sexual harassment has risen. The Labor Department
    reported that since the initiation of the code, it received two to
    three reports of sexual harassment per week. This was a large increase
    over 1998, during which the Ministry of Human Resources received only 6
    reports of sexual harassment cases in the first 6 months of that year,
    and only a total of about 30 since 1996. However, there are still many
    cultural obstacles to women who try to pursue sexual harassment
    charges.
        Despite increased public awareness of the problem of sexual
    harassment in the workplace, the Government acknowledged in August that
    the reluctance of employers to adopt the code may force it to enact
    additional legislation regarding sexual harassment. A year after it was
    enacted, only 99 companies in the country had adopted the code. A
    coalition of 64 women's rights groups compiled a memorandum with over
    12,000 signatures proposing that the Government make the code legally
    binding. Upon receipt of the memorandum, the Human Resources Minister
    stated that his Ministry would form a committee to include women's
    rights activists, employers, union representatives, and ministry
    officials to study the request. The Government made no decision on
    whether to enact legislation against sexual harassment by year's end.
        Women continue to be the victims of legal discrimination. The
    cultural and religious traditions of the major ethnic groups also
    heavily influence the condition of women in society. In family and
    religious matters, Muslim women are subject to Shari'a. Polygyny is
    allowed and practiced to a limited degree. Islamic inheritance law
    varies by state, but it generally favors male offspring and relatives.
    However, one state, Negeri Sembilan, provides for matrilineal
    inheritance. The number of women obtaining divorces under the
    provisions of Shari'a that allow for divorce without the husband's
    consent, while small, is increasing steadily.
        In August the Deputy Prime Minister announced that mothers may now
    sign official documents on behalf of their minor children, a
    significant change from past government policy, under which only a
    father's signature legally was recognized on official documentation.
    The Government publicized the decision as an attempt to eliminate
    sexual discrimination in government policies. Women's rights activists
    pointed out that the decision recognized women's equality with men
    under the law. The policy change is likely to confer the largest
    benefit on single mothers who are estranged from their husbands. In
    announcing the change, the Deputy Prime Minister stated that existing
    legislation did not require amendment; only administrative procedure
    would change. This administrative change was implemented in December.
        There were complaints about the treatment of women by Islamic
    courts. A 1998 report on women and the law published by a coalition of
    women's NGO's defined two basic problems: prejudicial interpretation of
    Islamic family law against women; and the lack of uniformity in the
    implementation of family laws among the various states. An April 1999
    press report described complaints by NGO's and women's groups of rude
    and insensitive treatment by staff and officers of Islamic courts. In
    May 1999, the women's wing of UMNO stated that it would act to help
    accelerate and improve the handling of women's problems by Islamic
    courts.
        Muslim couples are required to take premarital courses. In previous
    years, women's activists claimed that in some instances the courses, as
    implemented, perpetuated gender discrimination by misinforming women of
    their rights in marriage. There were no reports during the year of such
    misinformation regarding marriage rights.
        State governments in Kelantan and Terrengganu, which are controlled
    by the Islamic opposition party, made efforts to restrict Muslim
    women's dress during the year. In March the Terrengganu state
    government introduced a dress code for government employees and workers
    on business premises. Terrengganu's executive counselor in charge of
    women's and non-Muslim's affairs claimed that the dress code was
    designed to protect the image of Muslim women and promote Islam as a
    way of life. Several women's NGO's criticized the state government's
    decision as depriving women of personal choice. One Muslim women's NGO
    criticized the new requirement, stating that forced compliance with a
    state-mandated dress code is not consistent with the values of the
    Koran.
        On March 23, Muslim women working in food stalls and video rental
    stores in Kelantan were fined about $8 (30 ringgit) for not wearing a
    head covering. The maximum fine for individual offenders is about $66
    (250 ringgit), and the state government warned that employers with
    repeat offenders may lose their operating licenses.
        Non-Muslim women are subject to civil (secular) law. Changes in the
    Civil Marriage and Divorce Act in the early 1980's increased the
    protection of married women's rights, especially those married under
    customary rites. The Guardianship of Women's and Infants Act was
    amended in July 1999 to give mothers equal parental rights. Four states
    extended the provisions of the amended bill to Muslim mothers. Women's
    groups urged all states to do the same. In June 1999, the Land and
    Cooperative Development Ministry announced that it was considering
    amending the Group Settlement Act to give wives of settlers a stake in
    the land awarded to their husbands. The Group Settlement Act had not
    been amended by year's end.
        Government policy supports women's rights and the Government has
    undertaken a number of initiatives to promote equality for women.
    Specifically the Government promotes the full and equal participation
    of women in education and the work force. Women are represented in
    growing numbers in the professions, but women's groups argue that the
    level of participation is still disproportionately low. In the
    scientific and medical fields, women make up more than half of all
    university graduates and the total representation of women at
    universities increased from 29 percent in 1970 to one-half of the
    student population in recent years. According to statistics released in
    June in the Government's Economic Report 2000-2001, which is published
    by the Ministry of Finance, women constitute 44 percent of the labor
    force. The proportion of women in the civil service has risen from
    roughly 33 percent in 1990 to roughly 41 percent and women occupy some
    high-ranking civil service positions. In April 1999, Malaysian Trade
    Union Congress President Zainal Rampak urged trade unions to fulfill
    the ILO policy of filling 30 percent of leadership positions with
    women; however, current statistics were not disclosed.
        Children.--The Government has demonstrated a commitment to
    children's rights and welfare; it spends roughly 20 percent of the
    national budget on education. The Government provides free education
    for children through the age of 15. Although primary education is
    deemed compulsory by the Government, there is no legal requirement or
    enforcement mechanism governing school attendance. Actual attendance at
    primary school is 96 percent. Secondary school attendance is 82
    percent. A variety of programs provide low cost health care for most
    children. An office in the Ministry of National Unity and Social
    Development oversees children's issues.
        In December Parliament passed the Child Act of 2000. The Act
    incorporates the 1989 principles of the U.N. Convention of the Rights
    of the Child, which the Government ratified in 1995. The act stipulates
    heavier punishments for child abuse, molestation, neglect, and
    abandonment. It also mandates the formation of a children's court,
    which, the Government stated, would better protect the interests of
    children. The bill allows caning, but this punishment is limited to
    male children, who may receive a maximum of 10 strokes with a ``light
    cane.'' The new law repealed three other laws governing child
    prostitution, child abuse, and delinquency, including the Women and
    Girls Protection Act, the Juvenile Courts Act, and the Child Protection
    Act.
        The Government recognizes that sexual exploitation of children and
    incest are problems. Incest in particular is a problem in rural areas.
    Child abuse receives wide coverage in the press. The Government sternly
    prosecutes cases of child abuse, and child molesters receive heavy jail
    sentences and caning. However, under the Evidence Act, the testimony of
    children is accepted only if there is corroborating evidence. This
    poses special problems for molestation cases in which the child victim
    is the only witness. Some judges and others have recommended that the
    Evidence Act be amended to accept the evidence of children and that
    courts implement special procedures to hear the testimony of children.
    The Ministry of National Unity and Social Development reported that in
    1997 there were 1,117 reported cases of child abuse, while from January
    through August 1998 there were 600 cases. In August 1999, a physician
    who studies child abuse acknowledged publicly that sexual abuse of
    children occurred in the country.
        Statutory rape occurs and is prosecuted. However, Islamic law
    provisions that consider a Muslim girl an adult after she has had her
    first menstruation sometimes complicate prosecution of statutory rape.
    Such a girl may be charged with ``khalwat'' or ``close proximity'' (the
    charge usually used to prosecute premarital or extramarital sexual
    relations), even if she is under the age of 18 and her partner is an
    adult. Thus, Shari'a sometimes punishes the victims of statutory rape.
    Moreover, Shari'a courts sometimes are more lenient with males who are
    charged with ``close proximity.'' However, in many cases Muslim men are
    charged and punished for statutory rape under secular law.
        Female genital mutilation (FGM) is condemned widely by
    international health experts as damaging to both physical and
    psychological health. According to a well known women's NGO activist,
    some girls in provincial areas are subject to varying forms of FGM.
    Some Malay girls receive a tiny ritual cut to the clitoris or
    participate in a ceremony where a blade is brought close to the
    clitoris. Almost all Malay women, including Muslim women's activists,
    do not believe that this constitutes mutilation or reduces a woman's
    future capacity for sexual pleasure.
        Child prostitution exists. However, child prostitutes often are
    treated as delinquents rather than victims. In 1998 the Minister of
    National Unity and Social Development stated that 150 to 160 underage
    girls are detained each year for involvement in immoral activities and
    sent to rehabilitation centers. Authorities prosecute traffickers in
    child prostitution vigorously. Statistics for apprehension of
    traffickers are not available (see Section 6.f.).
        Child labor occurs in certain areas of the country (see Section
    6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--The Government does not discriminate
    against physically disabled persons in employment, education, and
    provision of other state services. However, few public facilities are
    adapted to the needs of the disabled, and the Government has not
    mandated accessibility to transportation or public buildings for the
    disabled. In August 1999, former Minister of National Unity and Social
    Development Zaleha said that only 10 percent of residential and
    commercial buildings were ``disabled-friendly.'' In September 1999,
    Zaleha announced a cabinet decision to require that 10 percent of
    houses in all new housing projects be disabled friendly. In December
    1999, Zaleha reportedly said that ``all buildings'' would be made
    accessible to the disabled within 2 years.
        The Government increased efforts to address the needs of persons
    with disabilities during the year. In October the Ministry of Housing
    and Local Government announced that the uniform building by-laws of
    1984 would be amended to ensure that all newly constructed buildings
    include a full range of facilities for the disabled, including special
    parking lots, elevators, and restrooms. In November the Human Resources
    Ministry announced plans to draft a code of ethics for employers by
    2001 to address the needs of the disabled including additional
    employment opportunities, job discrimination, and disabled-friendly
    work environments. In addition the 2001 federal budget includes several
    provisions to ease financial burdens on disabled citizens and improve
    work, education, and training opportunities. In November the Human
    Rights Commission recommended amending the Constitution's
    antidiscrimination provision to include legal protection for people
    with disabilities.
        Special education schools exist, but they are not sufficient to
    meet the needs of the disabled population. The Government and the
    general public are becoming more sensitive to the needs of the
    physically disabled. The Government has undertaken many initiatives to
    promote public acceptance of the disabled, to make public facilities
    more accessible to disabled persons, and to increase budgetary
    allotments for programs aimed at aiding them. Provisions for the
    disabled in the 2001 budget include several allowances for tax relief
    for working spouses of disabled persons, full exemption for all medical
    fees at government hospitals, and full exemption on fees for travel
    documents. All equipment designed specifically for use by disabled
    persons would also be exempt from all import duties and sales taxes.
    Recognizing that public transportation is not disabled-friendly, the
    Government is reducing the excise duty for disabled persons on locally
    made cars and motorcycles by 50 percent.
        In August 1999, an NGO representing the disabled stated that the
    disabled make up 7 percent of the population. The NGO urged the
    Government to increase its support for the disabled. Disabled persons
    do not enjoy explicit legal protection against discrimination.
        Indigenous People.--Indigenous groups and persons that is the
    descendants of the original inhabitants of peninsular Malaysia and the
    Borneo states) generally enjoy the same constitutional rights as the
    rest of the population. However, in practice federal laws pertaining to
    indigenous people vest almost total power in the minister responsible
    for indigenous people (the Minister of National Unity and Social
    Development during the year) to protect, control, and otherwise decide
    issues concerning them. As a result, indigenous people, particularly in
    peninsular Malaysia, have very little ability to participate in
    decisions.
        Under the 1954 Aboriginal People's Act (amended in 1974),
    indigenous people in peninsular Malaysia (known as Orang Asli), who had
    been granted land on a group basis, had no right to own land on an
    individual basis or to receive titles to land. The Social Development
    Ministry announced in 1996 that state governments, which make decisions
    affecting land rights, had agreed to issue titles to Orang Asli.
    Amendments were drafted to enable Orang Asli to hold titles on an
    individual basis. Finance Minister Tun Daim Zainuddin announced in May
    1999 that a total of 314,715 acres of land would be reserved for Orang
    Asli. The Government urged the states to follow up on Daim's
    announcement. The leader of a leading Orang Asli NGO welcomed the
    announcement, but urged the Government to proceed quickly. The NGO
    pointed out that the total area of land actually reserved for Orang
    Asli had declined, not increased, since 1990.
        Surveying and transfer of title apparently has proceeded very
    slowly; however, during the year a number of Orang Asli received land
    titles, and several state governments announced that land was being set
    aside for Orang Asli. The 2001 federal budget provides for a $26
    million (100 million ringgit) allotment to the Orang Asli community to
    eradicate poverty, improve education and social welfare, and improve
    infrastructure of resettlement villages. In addition National Unity and
    Social Development Minister Siti Zaharah Sulaiman announced in November
    a ``stay in school'' program to address the increasing number of school
    drop-outs in the Orang Asli community. The Government allocated $1.2
    million (4.8 million ringgit) for the project.
        The uncertainty surrounding Orang Asli land ownership makes them
    vulnerable to exploitation. There were many reports of Orang Asli who
    were cheated, misled, or otherwise exploited by land developers. In
    some cases, the Orang Asli have sued. In the state of Pahang, about 200
    Orang Asli held a protest demonstration in September over land
    disputes. The state government said that it would give serious
    attention to their complaints.
        Although state law recognizes the right of indigenous people to
    land under ``native customary rights,'' in the eastern part of the
    country, the definition and extent of these lands are in dispute.
    Indigenous people in the state of Sarawak continued to protest the
    alleged encroachment by state and private logging and plantation
    companies onto land that they consider to be theirs because of
    customary rights. Laws allowing condemnation and purchase of land did
    not require more than perfunctory notifications in newspapers to which
    indigenous people may have no access. The result was that many
    indigenous people were deprived of their traditional lands with little
    or no legal recourse. In May the Sarawak state assembly passed
    amendments to the state land code that the state government said would
    increase the rights of indigenous people to exert control over their
    traditional lands. A group of NGO's disputed the government's
    characterization of the legislation and stated that it would in fact
    further diminish the ability of indigenous peoples to defend their
    rights on land issues. Indigenous people displaced by the Bakun Dam
    project in Sarawak continue to protest the lack of transparency in the
    resettlement process, inadequate compensation for their lands and
    homes, and destruction of their traditional way of life. However, the
    state government dismissed these complaints, claiming that only the
    older generation have reservations about the resettlement program.
        In November the Human Rights Commission received complaints from
    three different groups representing the indigenous Iban and Penan
    peoples in Sarawak. The indigenous groups alleged that they were being
    victimized by logging companies illegally encroaching on their lands.
    One Penan group submitted a report of written testimonies entitled,
    ``Not Development, but Theft,'' detailing how logging companies use
    police force and intimidation to appropriate land from indigenous
    communities. The Human Rights Commission pledged to investigate the
    matter with the state government of Sarawak and the indigenous
    communities. The commission also announced its intention to inquire
    about the use of police force by the logging companies (see Section
    1.c.).
        The Orang Asli, who number roughly 100,000, are the poorest group
    in the country; however, according to government officials, Orang Asli
    gradually are attaining comparable levels of standards of living as
    other citizens, and the percentage of Orang Asli who lead nomadic
    lifestyles has dropped to less than 40 percent. Government development
    projects for the Orang Asli are announced from time to time. However,
    according to press reports, the head of an NGO working with Orang Asli
    said in May that school dropout rates among Orang Asli had increased
    markedly over previous years, and the percentage of Orang Asli living
    below the poverty line was increasing as well. Several NGO's complained
    that Orang Asli were compensated inadequately after they were displaced
    by a dam project in the state of Selangor.
        The trial of a group of Iban tribesmen charged with the 1999 murder
    in Sarawak of four Chinese workers who worked for a company that was
    encroaching on their land to establish a palm oil plantation continued.
    The case still was pending in court at year's end.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government implements
    extensive preferential programs designed to boost the economic position
    of the Malay majority, which remains poorer on average than the Chinese
    minority. Such preferential programs and policies limit opportunities
    for nonMalays in higher education, government employment, business
    permits and licenses, and ownership of land. According to the
    Government, these programs have been instrumental in ensuring ethnic
    harmony and political stability. Ethnic Indian Malaysians continued to
    lag behind in the country's economic development. The Chinese minority
    does not benefit from the preferential policies that benefit ethnic
    Malays.
        Public questioning of the preference rights of ethnic Malays is a
    sensitive issue. Senior UMNO officials have warned non-Malays against
    ``playing with fire.'' In August a group of youth members of UMNO
    became unruly at a rally held outside a Chinese assembly hall in the
    wake of public comments by a Chinese association that allegedly
    questioned the granting of special rights and privileges for Malays.
    Some of the demonstrators threatened to burn down the hall. Chinese
    groups in the ruling coalition demanded action against the
    perpetrators. The Government had taken no action by year's end.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--By law most workers have the right to
    engage in trade union activity, but less than 10 percent of the work
    force is represented by one of the country's 544 trade unions.
    Exceptions include certain limited categories of workers labeled
    ``confidential'' and ``managerial and executive,'' as well as defense
    and police officials. Within certain limitations, unions may organize
    workplaces, bargain collectively with employers, and associate with
    national federations. No legal barrier prevents foreign workers from
    joining a trade union; however, the Immigration Department places
    conditions on foreign workers' permits that effectively bars them from
    joining a trade union (see Section 6.e.).
        The Trade Unions Act prohibits interfering with, restraining, or
    coercing a worker in the exercise of the right to form trade unions or
    in participating in lawful trade union activities. However, the act
    restricts a union to representing workers in a ``particular
    establishment, trade, occupation, or industry or within any similar
    trades, occupations, or industries,'' contrary to International Labor
    Organization (ILO) guidelines. The Director General of Trade Unions may
    refuse to register a trade union and, in some circumstances, may also
    withdraw the registration of a trade union. When registration has been
    refused, withdrawn, or canceled, a trade union is considered an
    unlawful association. The Government justifies its overall labor
    policies by positing that a ``social compact'' exists wherein the
    Government, employer, and worker are part of an overall effort to
    create jobs, train workers, boost productivity and profitability, and
    ultimately provide the resources necessary to fund human resource
    development and a national social safety net. Trade unions from
    different industries may join in national congresses, but the
    congresses must register as societies under the Societies Act (see
    Section 2.b.).
        In January 1999, the Trade Unions Department reported that in 1998
    it had issued notices to 206 trade unions threatening them with
    deregistration for failing to submit reports of their accounts. A
    leading trade union leader said that he was ``puzzled'' by the Trade
    Union's Department statement and would seek further clarification. Also
    in February 1999, the Human Resources Minister said publicly that union
    members' complaints against union leaders were increasing, and the
    Human Resources Minister said that the Government would amend the Trade
    Unions Act to make all principal officers of a union liable if the
    union commits any wrongdoing (now only the secretary general is
    liable). There were no reports that these amendments were adopted
    during the year. Some trade unionists claimed that unions that defy
    government policies face more intense scrutiny, potentially leading to
    deregistration. However, there were no reports that unions were
    deregistered.
        In September 1999, Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) leader
    Zainal Rampak complained about delays in registering new unions, and
    said that new unions often faced delays of several years in
    registering. Zainal called on the Government to amend the Industrial
    Relations Act to allow automatic union recognition. In February Zainal
    said that approximately 100 unions had not been recognized by their
    employers, despite provisions under the Industrial Relations Act that
    require an employer to recognize a union within 21 days.
        The MTUC continued to call on the Government to ratify ILO
    Convention 87, which provides for the freedom to join a union; at
    year's end, the Government still had not done so.
        Government policy inhibits the formation of national unions in the
    electronics sector; the Government believes that enterpriselevel unions
    are more appropriate for this sector. In 1997 the MTUC dropped its
    longstanding objection to this practice, stating that it would be
    better for the workers to have the in-house unions ``than none at
    all.'' In February the Minister for Human Resources said that employers
    should not obstruct the formation of in-house unions. In November MTUC
    secretary general G. Rajasekaran expressed disappointment that 150,000
    electronics workers were still unable to organize. At that time, only
    eight in-house unions had been formed, according to the MTUC.
    Collective bargaining agreements are limited in those companies
    designated as ``pioneer status.'' According to the ILO, the Government
    has been promising to repeal this statute since 1994.
        Even in-house unions sometimes face difficulties. For example, in
    1999 an electronics company was picketed by workers several times
    during the year. Workers called on the company to end litigation and
    conclude a collective bargaining agreement that has been pending for 10
    years. Workers claimed that the company had refused to meet union
    officials, even though the Department of Trade Unions recognized the
    union.
        Unions maintain independence both from the Government and from
    political parties, but individual union members may belong to political
    parties. Although union officers by law may not hold principal offices
    in political parties, individual trade union leaders have served in
    Parliament. Trade unions are free to associate with national labor
    congresses, which exercise many of the responsibilities of national
    labor unions, although they cannot bargain for local unions. In l997
    longtime labor leader Zainal Rampak joined the ruling party, and in
    1998 he was appointed to the Senate. Some union leaders are concerned
    that the MTUC, under Zainal's leadership, is losing its independence.
        Although strikes are legal, the right to strike is restricted
    severely. The law contains a list of ``essential services'' in which
    unions must give advance notice of any industrial action. The list
    includes sectors not normally deemed essential under ILO definitions.
        The 1967 Industrial Relations Act requires the parties to notify
    the Ministry of Human Resources that a dispute exists before any
    industrial action (strike or lockout) may be taken. The Ministry's
    Industrial Relations Department then may become involved actively in
    conciliation efforts. If conciliation fails to achieve settlement, the
    Minister has the power to refer the dispute to the Industrial Court.
    Strikes or lockouts are prohibited while the dispute is before the
    Industrial Court. The Industrial Relations Act prohibits employers from
    taking retribution against a worker for participating in the lawful
    activities of a trade union. Where a strike is legal, these provisions
    would prohibit employer retribution against strikers and leaders.
    Although some trade unions questioned their effectiveness, it is not
    possible to assess fully whether these provisions are being enforced
    effectively, given the limited number of cases of alleged retribution.
        Strikes were extremely rare. In January 1999, the Deputy Human
    Resources Minister said that the (1997 and 1998) economic downturn was
    ``not affecting industrial harmony'' and noted that the country still
    seldom had strikes.
        In June 130 employees of a cooking oil refinery in Johor staged a
    peaceful picket line to protest a deadlock in negotiations over a new
    collective bargaining agreement. Also in June, after a wildcat strike
    in which employees accused a Tawainese textile firm of refusing to
    recognize the union and of mistreating workers, several thousand
    workers were fired. The employer reinstated the workers after further
    protests.
        There are two national labor organizations. The MTUC is a
    federation of mainly private sector unions. The Congress of Unions of
    Employees in the Public and Civil Service (CUEPACS) is a federation of
    civil servant and teacher unions. Although the law grants public
    servants the right to organize at the level of ministries and
    departments, the Government has not responded to ILO requests for
    specific information on the numbers and categories of civil servant
    employees covered or details regarding the collective bargaining
    agreements reached. There are three national joint councils
    representing management and professional civil servants, technical
    employees, and nontechnical workers. In May 1999, various trade unions
    representing port workers announced plans to form a federation,
    potentially including 12,000 workers. There were no reports of further
    developments, and at year's end the federation was awaiting recognition
    by the federal Registrar of Trade Unions. In February the Government
    approved the establishment of a federation of airline unions that would
    represent about 20,000 employees in the aviation industry.
        In February the Minister of Human Resources said that the Ministry
    was considering extending the Workmen's Compensation Act to include
    both local and foreign domestic workers. Foreign domestic workers
    presently have no protection under the act.
        Enterprise unions can associate with international labor bodies and
    do so.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
    the legal right to organize and bargain collectively, and collective
    bargaining is widespread in those sectors where labor is organized. The
    law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union
    members and organizers. Charges of discrimination may be filed with the
    Ministry of Human Resources or the Industrial Court. Critics say that
    the Industrial Court is slow in adjudicating worker complaints when
    conciliation efforts by the Ministry of Human Resources fail. However,
    others point out that the Industrial Court almost always sides with the
    workers in disputes. In August 1999, the press reported an MTUC survey
    that indicated that employers often ignore Industrial Court judgments
    with impunity. In January the Minister of Human Resources said that
    more Industrial Court chairmen would be appointed to deal with a
    backlog of more than 100 cases and noted that the courts were so
    congested that new cases could not be scheduled until January 2001. An
    opposition politician said in March that the backlog of cases
    approached 5,000.
        The Government holds that issues of transfer, dismissal, and
    reinstatement are internal management prerogatives; therefore they are
    excluded from collective bargaining--against ILO standards. The
    Minister of Human Resources can suspend for up to 6 months any trade
    union that he deems is being used for purposes prejudicial to or
    incompatible with security or public order.
        Companies in free trade zones (FTZ's) must observe labor standards
    identical to those in the rest of the country. Many workers in FTZ
    companies are organized, especially in the textile and electrical
    products sectors. The ILO continues to object to legal restrictions on
    collective bargaining in ``pioneer industries.''
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and the Government generally
    enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women, and
    occasionally girls, for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem
    (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). In theory certain laws allow the use of
    imprisonment with compulsory labor as a punishment for persons who
    express views opposed to the established order or who participate in
    strikes. The constitutional prohibition renders these laws without
    effect.
        The constitutional prohibition also applies to forced and bonded
    labor by children. Forced and bonded child labor is rare, and there
    were no cases reported during the year.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The 1996 Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act
    prohibits the employment of children younger than the age of 14. The
    act permits some exceptions, such as light work in a family enterprise,
    work in public entertainment, work performed for the Government in a
    school or in training institutions, or work as an approved apprentice.
    In no case, may children work more than 6 hours per day, more than 6
    days per week, or at night.
        Child labor occurs in certain areas of the country. A 1993 joint
    report by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
    Asian and Pacific Regional Organization put the child work force at
    75,000. However, government officials maintain that this figure is
    outdated, since it was based on a nationwide survey of child labor
    undertaken in 1980, which estimated that more than 73,400 children
    between the ages of 10 and 14 were employed full time. There is no
    reliable recent estimate of the number of child workers. Most child
    laborers work informally in the plantation sector, helping their
    parents in the field. However, only adult members of the family receive
    a wage. In urban areas, child labor can be found in family food
    businesses, night markets, and small-scale industries. Government
    officials do not deny the existence of child labor in family
    businesses, but maintain that foreign workers largely have replaced
    child labor and that the Government vigorously enforces child labor
    provisions. In September the Government ratified the International
    Labor Convention 182 on the prohibition and elimination of the worst
    forms of child labor. Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited
    and generally is rare; however, occasional trafficking in girls for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
    wage, but the Wage Councils Act provides for a minimum wage in those
    sectors or regions of the country where a need exists. Under the law,
    workers in an industry who believe that they need the protection of a
    minimum wage may request that a wage council be established. However,
    few workers are covered by minimum wages set by wage councils, and the
    Government prefers to let market forces determine wage rates. Minimum
    wages set by wage councils generally do not provide a decent standard
    of living for a worker and family. However, prevailing wages, even in
    the sectors covered by wage councils, are higher than the minimum wages
    set by the wage councils and often do provide a decent living. In May
    the Human Resources Minister said that nonunion labor would be brought
    under the wage council system. In May 1999, former Human Resources
    Minister Datuk Lim Ah Lek said that the Government was not against a
    minimum wage, but that it was not ready to set the amount at $316
    (1,200 ringgit) per month (as proposed by some unions). In June Human
    Resources Minister Fong Chan Onn reiterated that the Government was not
    opposed to a minimum wage and said that his ministry wanted to discuss
    with the MTUC the manner in which the MTUC calculated its new proposal
    for a $237 (900 ringgit) per month minimum wage.
        Plantation workers generally receive either piecework or daily
    wages. Many NGO's and union officials proposed a monthly wage for
    plantation workers. In September a support committee representing
    80,000 rubber and palm oil workers from 300 plantations called on the
    Government to set up a special cabinet committee to expedite the
    implementation of a minimum monthly wage for plantation workers. A
    spokesperson for the group said such a wage should not be less than
    $197 (750 ringgit) per month. The Government had taken no action by
    year's end.
        Under the 1955 Employment Act, working hours may not exceed 8 hours
    per day or 48 hours per workweek of 6 days. Each workweek must include
    a 24-hour rest period. The act also sets overtime rates and mandates
    public holidays, annual leave, sick leave, and maternity allowances.
    The Labor Department of the Ministry of Human Resources enforces these
    standards, but a shortage of inspectors precludes strict enforcement.
    In May the Appeals Court ruled that a company must give proper
    notification to its workers when selling its business to another
    entity. The Appeals Court ruled that compelling an employee to work for
    a new employer without offering the option to terminate the labor
    contract amounted to a form of forced labor. The Appeals Court ordered
    the employers to compensate the workers for failing to give proper
    notification of sale as prescribed by the Employment Act.
        Legal and illegal foreign workers from Indonesia, the Philippines,
    Burma, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and other countries constitute
    about 20 percent of the work force. These workers, who occupy a wide
    range of menial jobs in the agricultural, industrial, and service
    sectors. Workers without labor permits have no legal protection under
    labor laws, and legal workers are prevented from joining trade unions
    by restrictions imposed by the Immigration Department on their work
    permits. The MTUC stated in December 1999 that foreign workers should
    be allowed to organize, but that one of the benefits of a minimum wage
    law would be to reduce the country's dependence on foreign workers. The
    Government states that it does not ``encourage'' foreign workers to
    join unions and that labor laws are adequate to protect foreign
    workers' interests.
        Significant numbers of contract workers, including numerous illegal
    immigrants, work on plantations and in other sectors. According to
    statistics from the National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW), 39
    percent of plantation workers are foreigners, with the vast majority
    from Indonesia and Bangladesh. Working conditions for these laborers
    compare poorly with those of direct-hire plantation workers, many of
    whom belong to the NUPW. Moreover, immigrant workers in the
    construction and other sectors, particularly if they are illegal
    aliens, generally do not have access to the system of labor
    adjudication. Government investigations into this problem have resulted
    in a number of steps to eliminate the abuse of contract labor. For
    example, besides expanding programs to regularize the status of
    immigrant workers, the Government investigates complaints of abuses,
    attempts to inform workers of their rights, encourages workers to come
    forward with their complaints, and warns employers to end abuses. Like
    other employers, labor contractors may be prosecuted for violating the
    labor laws.
        The local press reported several cases of abuse of foreign domestic
    workers. The majority of such cases involved Indonesian women. Foreign
    domestic workers have no protection under current labor laws. Some of
    the victims claimed that their employers subjected them to inhuman
    living conditions, withheld their salaries, and physically assaulted
    them. Two high-profile cases involved young Indonesian women who
    reportedly were raped multiple times by their employers. At year's end,
    no developments had been reported in these cases. Most cases of abuse
    of foreign workers are the subject of ongoing police investigations. In
    February the Government acknowledged the problem, and Minister of Human
    Resources Datuk Dr Fong Chan Onn announced that abused foreign domestic
    servants may be eligible for compensation under the 1952 Workmen's
    Compensation Act. The Cabinet commissioned a study of the issue to
    determine what measures for protection, compensation, and a legal
    course of action should be available to victims under the act. In
    October the local press reported four separate cases of physical abuse
    against foreign domestic workers that were settled when the accused
    offered compensation to the victim. Section 260 of the Criminal
    Procedure Code allows certain offenses to be ``compounded'' with the
    consent of the complainant, if the perpetrator compensates the victim.
    The Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council claimed that the
    settlement gave the public ``the overall impression that justice can be
    bought.'' A human rights NGO activist called the settlement a
    ``dangerous trend.''
        In 1993 Parliament adopted an Occupational Safety and Health Act
    (OSHA), which covers all sectors of the economy, except the maritime
    sector and the military. The act established a national Occupational
    Safety and Health Council, composed of workers, employers, and
    government representatives, to set policy and coordinate occupational
    safety and health measures. It requires employers to identify risks and
    take precautions, including providing safety training to workers, and
    compels companies that have more than 40 workers to establish joint
    management-employee safety committees. The act requires workers to use
    safety equipment and to cooperate with employers to create a safe,
    healthy workplace. Trade unions maintain that relatively few committees
    have been established and, even in cases where they exist, they meet
    infrequently and generally are ineffective. In September MTUC president
    Zainal Rampak called for a review of the three-shift system in the
    electronics industry, referring to a recent study that concluded that
    the system contributed to severe stress and workplace accidents among
    the industry's mainly female work force. During the year, government
    health and safety officials defended existing legislation, claiming
    that it provides adequate safeguards for conscientious employers and
    workers.
        Work-related accidents are especially high in the plantation
    sector. According to the Human Resources Ministry, 14 percent of all
    reported industrial accidents occurred on plantations. The number of
    work-related accidents on plantations rose 6 percent in 1999, and
    statistics from the first half of the year indicated an accident rate
    comparable with the 1999 figures.
        Employers or employees that violate the OSHA are subject to
    substantial fines or imprisonment for up to 5 years. There are no
    specific statutory or regulatory provisions that provide a right for
    workers to remove themselves from dangerous workplace conditions
    without arbitrary dismissal.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits slavery;
    however, this provision has not been invoked in cases of trafficking in
    persons, and trafficking in women, and occasionally girls, for the
    purpose of forced prostitution is a problem. The Penal Code includes
    special provisions related to trafficking for purposes of prostitution.
    Sections specifically target minors, prohibiting the sale or hire of
    anyone under 21 for purposes of prostitution. Another section prohibits
    the importing of any woman for purposes of prostitution. Punishment for
    these offenses includes a maximum 10 year prison term or a fine, to be
    determined at the discretion of the sentencing judge. In November local
    press reported that implementation of the Child Act 2000, which
    automatically repeals the 1973 Women and Girls Protection, creates a
    legal loophole that decriminalizes procuring. The specific offense of
    procurement had only been covered by the Women and Girls Protection
    Act. The press reported that the Ministry of National Unity and Social
    Development was working with the Attorney General's drafting department
    to close the loophole, but no developments were reported at year's end.
        Malaysia is a source, transit, and destination country for
    trafficking in women and girls for sexual exploitation. During the
    year, the Royal Malaysian Police arrested 3,607 foreign prostitutes,
    compared to 3,301 in 1999. Police believe that the increased number of
    arrests is a result of greater numbers of women being brought to the
    country from countries of the former Soviet Union. Most prostitutes in
    the country still come from neighboring Indonesia, the Philippines,
    Burma, Thailand, and China. These women often work as karaoke
    hostesses, ``guest relations officers,'' and masseuses. Malaysian women
    are trafficked for sexual purposes mostly to Singapore, Macau, Hong
    Kong, and Taiwan, but also to Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United
    States. According to police and Chinese community leaders, Malaysian
    women who are victims of traffickers are almost exclusively ethnic
    Chinese, though ethnic Malay and ethnic Indian women work as
    prostitutes domestically. Police and NGO's believe that Chinese
    criminal syndicates are behind most of the trafficking (both incoming
    and outgoing) of women of all nationalities. The Deputy Home Minister
    stated in 1997 that 4,200 Malaysian girls and young women were reported
    missing in 1997. Political parties and NGO's estimate that a portion of
    these women and girls were victims of traffickers. Authorities
    prosecute traffickers in child prostitution vigorously.
        A few government officials may provide counterfeit documents
    illicitly to traffickers (although no specific cases were reported),
    but the Government investigates and punishes those involved in such
    cases. The Government assists underage girls and has rescued some
    kidnaped women. Police often raid venues of prostitution. For example,
    Selangor state police stated that they raided 1,230 suspected ``vice
    dens'' during 1999. However, NGO's and women's rights activists
    complain that police have no coherent policy to protect victims of
    trafficking. Rather than prosecute traffickers, police generally arrest
    or deport individual women for prostitution. Statistics for
    apprehension of traffickers are not available. In 1998 the press quoted
    an anonymous police official as saying that the country had become a
    ``safe haven'' for traffickers. A police spokesman who was asked for
    official comment responded by questioning whether press reporting on
    trafficking in women was in the national interest.
        A local women's NGO is working with the Malaysian Bar Council on
    draft legislation specifically aimed at prosecuting traffickers and
    protecting victims.
                                   __________

                                MARSHALL ISLANDS

        The Republic of the Marshall Islands, a self-governing nation under
    the Compact of Free Association with the United States, is composed of
    29 atolls and 5 islands in the central Pacific, with a total land area
    of about 70 square miles. The approximately 51,000 inhabitants are of
    Micronesian origin and concentrated primarily on Majuro and Kwajalein
    atolls. The Constitution provides for free and fair elections and
    executive and legislative branches. The legislature consists of a 33-
    member Parliament (Nitijela), and a Council of Chiefs (Iroij), which
    serves a largely consultative function dealing with custom and
    traditional practice. The President is elected by majority Nitijela
    vote, and he appoints his Cabinet from its membership. The Constitution
    provides for an independent judiciary; however, past governments have
    attempted to influence the judiciary.
        Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is
    responsible for defense and national security, and the Marshall Islands
    has no external security force of its own. The national and local
    police forces have responsibility for internal security. These agencies
    honor constitutional and legal civil rights protections in executing
    their responsibilities.
        The economy depends mainly on transfer payments from the United
    States. Coconut oil and copra exports, a small amount of tourism,
    import and income taxes, and fishing licensing fees generate limited
    revenues.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
    with individual instances of abuse. There were occasional instances of
    denial of due process for detainees. Violence against women and child
    abuse are problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution expressly forbids such practices, and
    there were no reports that officials employed them. Security forces
    generally respect this prohibition.
        Prison conditions, while Spartan, meet minimum international
    standards.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    generally observes these prohibitions. Nonetheless, there were several
    reported cases of arbitrary detention lasting over 24 hours in which
    persons were denied their rights to be charged or released within the
    specified time, or to be informed of the charges against them.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, in the past, the Government has
    attempted to influence judicial matters through legislative or
    administrative means. A foreign national former high court judge who
    had had disagreements with the previous government was terminated
    prematurely by it in June 1999 but was appointed to the Supreme Court
    in May. In January, in his inaugural address, President Note pledged to
    protect the independence of the judiciary, following the past 4 years
    during which three chief justices resigned or were terminated by the
    Government. During the year, there have been no known incidents of
    executive pressure on the judiciary.
        The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court with appellate
    jurisdiction, a High Court with general jurisdiction in civil and
    criminal matters and appellate jurisdiction over subordinate courts at
    the district and community levels, and a Traditional Rights Court with
    jurisdiction in cases involving matters of customary law and
    traditional practice.
        The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the
    Government generally respects this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from such
    practices, government authorities respect these prohibitions, and
    violations are subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally honors
    these rights in practice. Unlike past years, when government influence
    led to occasional self-censorship by the media in areas of political or
    cultural sensitivity, there were no known instances of self-censorship
    during the year.
        There is a privately owned weekly newspaper with articles and
    opinions in both English and the Marshallese language.
        There is one radio station, which is government owned. In the past,
    live broadcasts of the legislative session were cut when remarks were
    critical of the Government; however, this did not occur under the Note
    Government. A cable television company broadcasts a variety of foreign
    news and entertainment programs and occasional videotaped local events.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        During the year, seeking to halt an alleged spate of illegal
    entries by Chinese and other foreign nationals, the Government launched
    an alien registration drive. In addition the Government is considering
    regulations that would reserve certain types of businesses for
    citizens.
        There are no recent reports of refugees. The Government has not
    formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
    periodic elections. The Nitijela (Parliament) and mayors are elected by
    secret ballot every 4 years with universal suffrage for citizens 18
    years of age and older. The most recent Nitijela election was held on
    November 15, 1999, and, in a record turnout, voters signaled
    dissatisfaction with the incumbent government by defeating five of the
    eight incumbent ministers seeking reelection. On January 3, President
    Kessai Note was selected unopposed by the Nitijela from among its 33
    members. The President subsequently selected 10 cabinet ministers from
    among the Nitijela members. Executive power is centralized in the
    President and his Cabinet. This group dominates the legislature as
    well. There are no restrictions on the formation of political parties.
    Political activity by foreigners is prohibited.
        There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
    government and politics. One woman was elected to the Nitijela in the
    1999 elections. Society is matrilineal, and those men and women who
    exercise traditional leadership and land ownership powers derive their
    rights either from their own positions in the family, or from
    relationships deriving from their mother's and sister's lineage.
    However, urbanization and the movement of the population away from the
    lands that they control is leading to a decline in the traditional
    authority exercised by women. Women's cultural responsibilities and
    traditionally passive roles are not seen to be managerial or executive
    in nature, and women remain underrepresented in Parliament and in
    senior government positions.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        While there are no official restrictions, no local nongovernmental
    human rights organizations have been formed. No international human
    rights organization has expressed interest or concern or visited the
    country.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
    race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
    or social origin, place of birth, family status or descent, and the
    Government generally respects these provisions.
        Women.--The Government identifies spousal abuse as common. Wife
    beating is not condoned in society, and most assaults occur while the
    assailant is under the influence of alcohol. The Government's health
    office provides counseling for reported spouse and child abuse cases,
    but advises that many cases go unreported. Assault is a criminal
    offense, but women involved in domestic violence are reluctant to
    prosecute spouses in the court system. Women's groups publicize women's
    issues and attempt to create a greater awareness of the rights of
    women. Violence against women outside the family occurs, and women in
    the urban centers would assume a risk by going out alone after dark.
        The inheritance of property and of traditional rank is matrilineal,
    with women occupying positions of importance within the traditional
    system. No instances of unequal pay for equal work or of sex-related
    job discrimination were reported. However, while women workers are very
    prevalent in the private sector, many of them are in low paying jobs
    with little hope of advancement.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare
    through its programs of health care and free education, but these have
    not been adequate to meet the needs of the country's sharply increasing
    population.
        It is estimated that up to 20 percent of elementary school age
    children do not attend school on a regular basis. The Government does
    not enforce the compulsory education law due to a lack of classrooms
    and teachers. The Government's enrollment report indicates that only
    two-thirds of those completing eighth grade attend high school. Of that
    number, 50 percent eventually graduate.
        Child abuse and neglect are criminal offenses; however, awareness
    of children's rights remains low among the general population. The law
    requires teachers, caregivers, and other persons to report instances of
    child abuse and exempts them from civil or criminal liability as a
    consequence of making such a report. However, there are few reports and
    few prosecutions. Child abuse and neglect are considered to be on the
    increase. Apparently contributing to the problem are the influences on
    family life and traditional values arising from increased urbanization,
    unemployment, population pressures, two-earner households, and the
    availability of alcohol and illegal gambling.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no apparent discrimination
    against disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision
    of other state services. There are no building codes, and there is no
    legislation mandating access for the disabled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of free association in general, and the Government interprets
    this right as allowing the existence of labor unions, although none has
    been formed to date. The Constitution does not provide for the right to
    strike, and the Government has not addressed this issue.
        In mid-October, there was a weeklong strike against the government-
    owned Air Marshall Islands. Although the Attorney General's Office has
    indicated that some of the strikers apparently were in violation of
    national labor laws, there has been no retaliation against any of the
    strikers. In December the airline managers were relieved of their
    duties.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
    legislation concerning collective bargaining or trade union
    organization. However, there are no impediments to the organization of
    trade unions or to collective bargaining. Wages in the cash economy are
    determined by market factors in accordance with the minimum wage and
    other laws.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits involuntary servitude, and there is no evidence of its
    practice. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded
    labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law does not prohibit the employment of children.
    Children typically are not employed in the wage economy, but some
    assist their families in fishing, agriculture, and other small-scale
    domestic enterprises. The law requires compulsory education for
    children from 6 to 14 years of age, but the Government does not enforce
    this law due to a lack of classrooms and teachers. There is no law or
    regulation setting a minimum age for employment of children.
        The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
    children, but such practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A government-specified minimum
    wage is established by law, and it is adequate to maintain a decent
    standard of living in this subsistence economy where extended families
    are expected to help less fortunate members. The minimum wage for all
    government and private sector employees is $2.00 per hour. (The U.S.
    dollar is the national currency.) The Ministry of Resources and
    Development oversees minimum wage regulations, and its oversight has
    been deemed adequate. Foreign employees and Marshallese trainees of
    private employers who have invested in or established a business in the
    country are exempt from minimum wage requirements. This exemption does
    not affect a significant segment of the work force.
        There is no legislation concerning maximum hours of work or
    occupational safety and health. Most businesses are closed, and people
    generally refrain from work on Sunday.
        A government labor office makes recommendations to the Nitijela on
    working conditions, such as the minimum wage, legal working hours and
    overtime payments, and occupational health and safety standards in
    accordance with International Labor Organization conventions. The
    office periodically convenes board meetings that are open to the
    public. No legislation specifically gives workers the right to remove
    themselves from situations that endanger their health or safety without
    jeopardy to their continued employment, and no legislation protects
    workers who file complaints about such conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no specific laws concerning
    trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                         FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

        The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is composed of 607 small
    islands extending over a large area of the central Pacific. Four
    states--Chuuk (formerly Truk), Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap--make up the
    federation. The population is estimated at 130,000, mostly of
    Micronesian origin. The four states were part of the Trust Territory of
    the Pacific Islands and were administered by the United States from
    1947 to 1986 pursuant to an agreement with the United Nations.
    Political legitimacy rests on the popular will expressed by a majority
    vote through elections in accordance with the Constitution. There are
    three branches of government: An executive branch led by a president
    who also serves as head of state; a unicameral legislature elected from
    the four constituent states; and an independent judicial system that
    applies criminal and civil laws and procedures that closely paralleling
    those of the United States. Traditional leaders retain considerable
    influence.
        Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is
    responsible for the islands' defense. The FSM has no security forces
    apart from national police, who operate under the office of the
    Secretary of Justice, and public safety officers, who operate under the
    authority of the attorney generals of the individual state governments.
        The economy depends heavily on transfer payments from the United
    States, fishing, tourism, and subsistence agriculture.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
    and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
    individual instances of abuse. Traditional customs distinguish between
    persons on the basis of social status and sex. There is growing
    evidence of increased spousal abuse and child neglect, and government
    agencies often ignore such problems due to the constraints imposed by
    traditional society. Neither the Government nor other organizations
    successfully have filled the role of the traditional extended family in
    protecting and supporting its members.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings. There was a suspicious death of a
    prisoner in custody early in the year, and a March 1999 prisoner
    suicide (see Section 1.c.). Both cases remain open but are not known to
    be under active investigation.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--There was no pattern of torture or other cruel, inhuman,
    or degrading treatment or punishment. In August two off-duty policemen
    reportedly beat a foreign national at a bar in Pohnpei. Both officers
    were dismissed from the police force, and the case was referred to the
    Attorney General for prosecution.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There was a
    suspicious death of a prisoner in custody early in the year, and a
    March 1999 suicide of a prisoner (see Section 1.a.). Both cases remain
    open but are not known to be under active investigation.
        No local organizations concern themselves solely with human rights,
    and the question of prison visits by human rights monitors did not
    arise during the year.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Legal procedures, for
    the most part patterned after U.S. law, provide for due process, which
    is carefully observed.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
        The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the
    President, with the advice and consent of the legislature.
        Public trial is provided for in the Bill of Rights, and trials are
    conducted fairly. Juveniles may have closed hearings. Despite these
    provisions, cultural resistance to litigation and incarceration as
    methods of maintaining public order has allowed some persons to act
    with impunity. Serious cases of sexual and other assault and even
    murder have not gone to trial, and suspects routinely are released
    indefinitely. Bail, even for major crimes, usually is set low.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such arbitrary interference, and in
    practice privacy rights are respected.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    these rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice. A
    new biweekly newspaper, Rohng En Pohnpei, published its first issue on
    November 30 in Pohnpei State.
        The national Government and the four states publish newsletters.
    Each of the four state governments controls a radio station that
    broadcasts primarily in the local language. One religious group
    operates a private radio station. The population of Pohnpei has
    increasing access to live satellite-televised information from around
    the world and tape-delayed broadcasts of programming by the major U.S.
    networks. However, none of the other three states has a television
    receiver station, and few residents have individual satellite dishes.
        There is an increasing level of open public discussion of social
    and governmental issues on various Internet sites. The Internet plays
    an important role in allowing citizens in the four states, as well as
    those residing outside the country, an opportunity to share views and
    opinions.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Bill of
    Rights provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    respects this right in practice. During political campaigns, citizens
    often question candidates at public meetings and social gatherings.
        The Bill of Rights provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government respects this right in practice. Formal associations are
    uncommon, but organizations for students and women exist.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The Bill
    of Rights forbids the establishment of a state religion and
    governmental restrictions on freedom of religion. Missionaries of many
    faiths work in the country without hindrance.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement within the country. It is silent on foreign travel,
    emigration, and repatriation, but in practice none of these are
    restricted.
        The three Vietnamese who fled a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    camp in Indonesia and sailed to Yap state in 1998 remain there. The
    Government has not found another country willing to accept them.
        The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum. To date there has never been a request for
    asylum in the country.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government. The Congress is
    elected by popular vote from each state; the Congress then chooses the
    President and Vice President from among its four at large senators by
    majority vote. State governors, state legislators, and municipal
    governments are elected by direct popular vote. Political campaigning
    is unrestricted. There are no established political parties, and
    political support generally is sought from family and allied clan
    groupings, as well as religious groups.
        There are no restrictions on the formation of political groups, but
    there have been no significant efforts to form political parties.
        Cultural factors in the male-dominated society have limited women's
    representation in government and politics. Although women hold midlevel
    positions at both the federal and state level, women are severely
    underrepresented in leadership roles at the highest government levels.
    The first woman to hold a national government cabinet position was
    appointed in 1999; she continues to serve as Public Defender.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There were no known requests for investigations of alleged human
    rights violations. While there are no official restrictions, no local
    groups concern themselves exclusively with human rights. However, there
    are groups that address problems concerning the rights of women and
    children.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Although the Constitution provides explicit protection against
    discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion, there is
    extensive societal discrimination, notably discrimination and violence
    against women. Government enforcement of these constitutional
    protections is weak.
        Women.--Most violence against women occurs in the family context.
    In the traditional Micronesian extended family unit, spouses and
    children were accorded strong protections from violence, abuse, and
    neglect. Such actions were deemed offenses against the family, not just
    the individuals within them, and were addressed by a complex system of
    familial sanctions. However, with increasing urbanization and
    monetarization of the economy, greater emphasis has been placed on the
    nuclear family, and the traditional methods of coping with family
    discord are breaking down. No government agency, including the police,
    has succeeded in replacing the extended family system or in addressing
    the problem of family violence directly.
        Incidents of spousal abuse, often of increasing severity, continue
    to rise. There are no laws against domestic abuse, and there are no
    governmental or private facilities to shelter and support women in
    abusive situations. Effective prosecution of such offenses is rare. In
    many cases, the victim decides against initiating legal charges because
    she is pressured by family, is fearful of further assault, or is
    convinced that the police will not involve themselves actively in what
    is seen as a private family problem. The number of cases of physical
    and sexual assaults against women outside the family context also is
    growing. Such assaults are perpetrated against both citizens and
    foreigners. Unmarried women sometimes are considered to have invited
    such violence by living or traveling alone.
        Women have equal rights under the law, and there are no cultural or
    institutional barriers to education and employment. Women receive equal
    pay for equal work and are well represented in the lower and middle
    ranks of government. Women are active and increasingly successful in
    private business and enterprises. A National Women's Advisory Council
    has existed since 1992, and several small nongovernmental groups are
    interested in women's issues, particularly those associated with
    spousal and family violence and abuse.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare
    through its programs of health care and education; however, these
    programs have been inadequate to meet the needs of the country's
    rapidly growing population, in an environment in which the extended
    family is breaking down. In November there were at least five suicides
    of youths in Pohnpei. Health officials and religious leaders have
    proposed starting peer support and family care groups to address the
    factors that may be leading to this increase in suicides.
        A compulsory education law requires that all children begin school
    at the age of 6. Children may leave school when they reach the age of
    14 or after completing the 8th grade, whichever comes first (see
    Section 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--Neither laws nor regulations mandate
    accessibility to public buildings and services for the disabled. The
    school system has established special education classes to address
    problems encountered by those who exhibit learning disabilities,
    although such classes are completely dependent on nongovernment
    funding. Some private businesses provide handicap parking spaces and
    ramps for wheelchair access.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law prohibits noncitizens
    from purchasing land, and the national Congress grants citizenship to
    non-Micronesians only in rare individual cases (an authority that was
    exercised during 1998, following a lapse of almost 20 years). However,
    for the most part, noncitizens share fully in the social and cultural
    life of the country.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Under the Bill of Rights, citizens
    have the right to form or join associations, and national government
    employees by law may form associations to ``present their views'' to
    the Government. However, for a variety of reasons, including the fact
    that most private sector employment is in small-scale family-owned
    business and that Micronesians are not accustomed to collective action.
    There are neither associations nor trade unions. The country is not a
    member of the International Labor Organization.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--No law deals
    specifically with trade unions or with the right to collective
    bargaining. Individual employers, the largest of which are the national
    and state governments, set wages. There were no reports of strikes,
    labor disputes, or collective bargaining agreements in the country's
    history.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    specifically prohibits involuntary servitude, and there is no evidence
    of its practice. Children are not cited specifically in this
    prohibition, but forced and bonded labor by children is not known to
    occur.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--There is no law establishing a minimum age for employment
    of children. While in practice there is no employment of children for
    wages, they often assist their families in subsistence farming
    activities. A compulsory education law requires all children to begin
    school at the age of 6. Children may leave school when they reach the
    age of 14 or after completing the 8th grade, whichever comes first.
    Neither the Constitution nor the law specifically prohibits forced and
    bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur
    (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The four state governments have
    established minimum wage rates for government workers. Pohnpei has a
    minimum hourly wage rate of $2.00 for government and $1.35 for private
    workers. The other three states have established minimum hourly rates
    only for government workers: $1.25 for Chuuk; $1.49 for Kosrae; and
    $0.80 for Yap. The minimum hourly wage for employment with the national
    Government is $1.68. These minimum wage structures and the wages
    customarily paid to skilled workers are sufficient to provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family. The minimum wage is
    enforced through the tax system, and this mechanism is believed to be
    effective.
        There are no laws regulating hours of work (although a 40-hour
    workweek is standard practice) or prescribing standards of occupational
    safety and health. A federal regulation requires that employers provide
    a safe workplace. The Department of Health has no enforcement
    capability; working conditions vary in practice.
        Two states permit foreign laborers to work in garment manufacturing
    enterprises. The foreign laborers are paid at a lower rate than
    citizens who work at the factories, work longer hours per day, and work
    a 6-day week in contrast to the 5-day week for citizens.
        There is no law for either the public or private sector that would
    permit workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
    without jeopardy to their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address
    the subject of trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports
    that persons were trafficked to, from, within or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    MONGOLIA

        Mongolia continued its transition from a highly centralized,
    Communist-led state to a full-fledged, multiparty, parliamentary
    democracy, although these gains still must be consolidated. The Prime
    Minister is nominated by the majority party and, with the agreement of
    the President, is approved by the State Great Hural (Parliament), the
    national legislature. In July the Mongolian People's Revolutionary
    Party (MPRP), which held power from 1921 to 1996, won a sweeping
    victory in the parliamentary elections, leaving only 4 of 76 seats to
    opposition members. The transition to the new Government occurred in
    accordance with constitutional procedures, and international observers
    characterized the elections as free and fair. There are 20 political
    parties, 3 of which hold seats in the Parliament. The judiciary is
    independent.
        Security forces are under civilian control, and, although he is a
    retired general, the Minister of Defense is a civilian. The national
    police have primary responsibility for law enforcement. The military
    forces are responsible for external security, although border security
    is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in
    peacetime. Reduced government spending continued to force downsizing of
    the military forces. The General Intelligence Agency (GIA), formerly
    the State Security Agency, is responsible for internal security; its
    head has ministerial status and reports directly to the Prime Minister.
    A parliamentary committee oversees the military forces, the police, and
    the GIA. Some members of the police on occasion committed human rights
    abuses.
        Despite reforms in the 1990's, the major economic entities remain
    under state control; however, the private sector produces over 70
    percent of the gross domestic product. The economy continued to expand
    and strengthen, and inflation stayed below 10 percent. Mongolia remains
    a poor country with a per capita income of approximately $450 per year.
    It relies heavily on foreign economic assistance. The mainstays of the
    economy continue to be copper production and other mining, livestock
    raising (which is done by a majority of the rural population), and
    related food-, wool-, and hide-processing industries, which meet both
    local needs and produce goods for export. A growing trade and small
    entrepreneurial sector in the cities provides basic consumer goods.
    Garment manufacture and minerals, especially copper, constitute the
    bulk of export earnings. Lack of transportation and other
    infrastructure, legal and regulatory deficiencies, petty corruption,
    and a small domestic market discourage foreign investment.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, problems remain in some areas. Members of the police
    at times beat prisoners and detainees. Pretrial detention and prison
    conditions are poor, and resulted in the deaths of prisoners in
    custody. Arbitrary arrest and detention are problems, as is corruption.
    There are restrictions on due process for persons arrested or suspected
    of crimes. Government attempts to enforce compliance by newspapers,
    magazines, television, and radio with moral strictures and tax laws
    were seen as an attempt to intimidate the media and have resulted in a
    degree of self-censorship by the press. During the year, lacking a
    legal framework to deal with refugees and responding to a bilateral
    agreement to return illegal immigrants to the country of origin, the
    authorities denied entry to some persons claiming refugee status.
    Official harassment of some religious groups seeking registration
    persisted. Domestic violence against women is a serious problem;
    however, efforts to assist victims increased during the year. Child
    abuse and child labor also are problems. There were some instances of
    forced labor, and some women seeking work overseas may have become
    victims of trafficking schemes. In December the Government passed
    legislation to establish a National Commission on Human Rights.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political killings; however, it is suspected that the murder
    of the Minister of Infrastructure in October 1998 was politically
    motivated. Although the investigation is ongoing, the inability to
    solve this case is a major problem for the Government.
        Approximately 100 prisoners died in custody during the year,
    largely due to disease and inadequate prison management (see Section
    1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Although the Constitution forbids torture and other abuse,
    and reports of such actions diminished, members of the police in rural
    areas occasionally beat prisoners and detainees, and unnecessary force
    in the arrest process is not uncommon. Reforms undertaken by the
    Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs upon Parliament's recommendation,
    following reports by international human rights observers, have changed
    significantly the way that accused persons and prisoners are treated.
    The Ministry's Department for the Enforcement of Court Decisions now
    monitors conditions; however, the new laws and procedures have not been
    publicized widely, especially in the countryside, and citizens are not
    aware always of their rights with respect to detention and arrest.
        Pretrial detention and prison facilities are poor--including
    insufficient food, heat, and medical care--and threaten the health and
    life of inmates. Different authorities administer the pretrial
    detention system and the prison system, which creates tensions between
    the two and limits management improvements. Many inmates entered prison
    already infected with tuberculosis or contracted it in prison. With the
    help of foreign donors, the prisons continued a 1997 program for
    surveying and treating tuberculosis among inmates, bringing the number
    of cases down to 890; the percentage of inmates who die of the disease
    has decreased by 50 percent. Approximately 100 prisoners died in
    custody, largely due to disease and mismanagement by the authorities;
    this also is a 50 percent decrease from 1999. Pretrial detention
    facilities, where suspects can be held for up to 36 months, often are
    worse than the prisons and contribute significantly to the tuberculosis
    problem. Although the number of inmates has remained fairly constant,
    the seriousness of crimes has increased. Overcrowding in both prisons
    and pretrial detention facilities is common; the detention center
    population exceeds capacity by approximately 25 percent, aggravating
    management, health, and funding problems. To address these problems
    under the continuing reform process, prison inmates in the capital were
    divided into smaller groups managed by trained personnel and provided
    health and hygiene instructions. During the year, families were given
    greater access to inmates, alleviating some of the hardship in
    obtaining food and clothing. In the capital foreign donor assistance
    improved women's and juvenile facilities. Improvements in detention and
    prison conditions outside of the capital are significantly less or
    nonexistent due to lack of funding.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    provides that no person shall be searched, arrested, detained, or
    deprived of liberty except by law, but these protections still have not
    been codified fully, and arbitrary arrest and detention are problems.
    Under the Criminal Procedures Code, police may arrest those caught
    committing or suspected of a crime and hold them for up to 72 hours
    before the decision is made to prosecute or release. A prosecutor must
    issue a warrant for incarceration of longer duration or when the actual
    crime was not witnessed. A detainee has the right to a defense attorney
    during this period and during any subsequent stage of the legal
    process. If a defendant cannot afford a private attorney, the State
    appoints an attorney. Detainees may be released on bail with the
    agreement of the prosecutor.
        Citizens are not always aware of their rights in regard to arrest
    and detention procedures (see Section 1.c.). In June a new amnesty law
    affected 1,000 inmates and detainees by reducing the sentences of
    inmates and releasing detainees held on insufficient evidence. The
    police may detain a suspect for up to 10 months, and the prosecutor can
    authorize up to an additional 26 months of pretrial detention. However,
    over the year, the number of suspects detained for more than 6 months
    has decreased. According to administrative regulation, if a person was
    wrongly charged with a crime, the State will restore the person's
    rights and reputation and compensate him.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the courts are independent in practice,
    although corruption is a concern.
        The court system consists of local courts, provincial courts, and
    the Supreme Court. The 17-member Supreme Court is at the apex of the
    judicial system, hearing appeals from lower courts and cases involving
    alleged misconduct by high-level officials. Local courts hear mostly
    routine criminal and civil cases; provincial courts hear more serious
    cases such as rape, murder, and grand larceny and also serve as the
    appeals court for lower court decisions. The Constitutional Court,
    separate from the criminal court system, has sole jurisdiction over
    constitutional questions. The General Council of Courts, an
    administrative body within the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs,
    nominates candidates for vacancies on both the Supreme and lower
    courts; the President has the power to approve or refuse such
    nominations. The Council also is charged with ensuring the rights of
    judges and providing for the independence of the judiciary. During the
    year, a human rights course became compulsory for the university law
    curriculum.
        All accused persons are provided due process, legal defense, and a
    public trial, although closed proceedings are permitted in cases
    involving state secrets, rape cases involving minors, and other cases
    provided by law. Defendants do not enjoy a presumption of innocence.
    Defendants may question witnesses and appeal decisions. There were few
    complaints about the legal system to the local office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), because most citizens still do
    not know about the organization. Complaints were usually about
    corruption in connection with civil and property cases that allegedly
    resulted in unfair court decisions. The UNHCHR staff referred these
    complaints to nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and the Ministry of
    Justice and Home Affairs.
        There were no reports of political prisoners. In a program that
    began in 1998, the State Rehabilitation Commission makes a one time
    payment to the families of those individuals who were persecuted from
    1922 through the 1960's. During the year, 1,901 persons received
    payments of from $500 to $1,000 (500,000 to 1 million tugrik) each
    under this program. More than 11,000 citizens were compensated in 1999.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that the State shall not
    interfere with the private beliefs and actions of citizens, and the
    Government generally respected these provisions in practice. The head
    of the GIA may, with the knowledge and consent of the Prime Minister,
    direct the monitoring and recording of telephone conversations. The
    extent of such monitoring is unknown. Police wiretaps must be approved
    by the Prosecutor's Office and are authorized for only 2 weeks at a
    time.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech, press, and expression, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice. An increasing variety of newspapers
    and other publications represent major political party viewpoints as
    well as independent views. The media law that went into effect in 1999
    bans censorship of public information and future legislation that would
    limit the freedom to publish and broadcast. This law also bars state
    ownership or financing of the media or media organizations. Nonetheless
    radio and television remain state-owned. The law took effect without
    agreement on regulations and procedures for the privatization of
    assets, and its implementation was difficult and controversial. Lack of
    access to information and of transparency in government continue to
    inhibit political dialog in the media, and led to media complaints.
        The new Government monitored all media for compliance with
    antiviolence, antipornography, antialcohol, and tax laws. While only
    two newspapers were closed as a result of the inspections, journalists
    saw it as an attempt at intimidation and control. The media practices
    self-censorship.
        All newspapers buy newsprint directly from private suppliers, and
    neither party-affiliated nor independent news media report difficulty
    securing an adequate supply. Due to transportation difficulties, uneven
    postal service, and fluctuations in the amount of newsprint available,
    access to a full range of publications is restricted in outlying
    regions.
        The court system places the burden of proof on the defendants in
    libel and slander cases, which stifles the free media.
        There are several television stations including a government-
    financed television station with countrywide broadcasting capability, a
    limited-operation international joint venture private television
    channel, a private television station, which does not broadcast
    nationwide, a local television station controlled by the Ulaanbaatar
    mayor's office, and several radio stations in Ulaanbaatar. State-owned
    radio is particularly important as the major source of news in the
    countryside, but the one independent radio station broadcasts widely
    and there are an increasing number of small local FM stations. The
    media presents opposition and government news. Many residents of the
    country have access to television, and Ulaanbaatar residents receive
    broadcasts from China, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France,
    Germany, the United States, and other countries by commercial satellite
    and cable television systems. An estimated 70 percent of households
    have television. The Internet is available, and there have been no
    government attempts to interfere with its use.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respected them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    conscience and religion, and the Government generally respected these
    provisions in practice; however, the law limits proselytizing, and some
    groups that sought to register have faced bureaucratic harassment. The
    Constitution explicitly recognizes the separation of church and state.
    The law regulating the relationship between church and state was passed
    in 1993 and amended in 1995. While the Ministry of Justice and Home
    Affairs is responsible for registrations, local assemblies have the
    authority to approve applications at the local level.
        Although there is no official state religion, traditionalists
    believe that Buddhism is the ``natural religion'' of the country. The
    Government has contributed to the restoration of several Buddhist
    sites. These are important religious, historical, and cultural centers.
    The Government does not subsidize the Buddhist religion otherwise.
        Under the provisions of the law, the Government may supervise and
    limit the numbers of both places of worship and clergy for organized
    religions, but there were no reports that it has done so. However,
    religious groups must register with the Ministry of Justice and Home
    Affairs. Some groups encountered harassment during the registration
    process, including random demands by midlevel city officials for
    financial contributions in return for securing legal status. Even when
    registration was completed, the same authorities threatened some
    religious groups with withdrawal of approval. The registration process
    is decentralized with several layers of bureaucracy, in which officials
    sometimes demand financial benefits in exchange for authorization. In
    addition registration in the capital may not be sufficient if a group
    intends to work in the countryside where local registration also is
    necessary. In general it appears that difficulties in registering
    primarily are the consequence of bureaucratic action by local officials
    and attempts to extort financial assistance for projects not funded by
    the city. Of the 260 temples and churches founded in the past 10 years,
    about 150 are registered, including 90 Buddhist, 40 Christian, and 4
    Baha'i, in addition to 1 Muslim mosque and other organizations.
        The law does not prohibit proselytizing, but limits it by
    forbidding use of incentives, pressure, or deceptive methods to
    introduce religion. With the opening of the country following the 1990
    democratic changes, religious groups began to arrive to provide
    humanitarian assistance and open new churches. Some friction between
    missionary groups and citizens developed because this assistance was
    mixed with proselytizing activities. Proselytizing by registered
    religious groups is allowed, although a Ministry of Education directive
    bans mixing foreign language or other training with religious teaching
    or instruction. The edict is enforced, particularly in the capital
    area. Contacts with coreligionists outside the country are allowed.
        There were no reports of religious detainees or prisoners. A report
    that in April a Christian in Bayan-Olgiy (a predominantly Muslim
    province) was imprisoned for distributing religious material was
    determined to be false.
        When draft amendments to the law that would have limited religious
    freedom were circulated by the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in
    1999, religious organizations, human rights groups, and foreign
    diplomatic mission protested, and the Government did not pursue the
    amendments.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    movement within the country as well as the right to travel and return
    without restriction, and the Government generally respected these
    rights in practice. Due to unusually harsh winter weather and drought
    conditions, an increased number of persons sought shelter in the
    capital. The authorities responded by raising bureaucratic obstacles to
    qualify for residency and social benefits in the capital.
        The country is not a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Regarding
    the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and it has no laws for
    granting refugee status. The Constitution contains a provision that
    addresses political asylum, but there are no implementing regulations.
    The issue of granting of first asylum did not arise during the year.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
    During the year, persons with a valid claim to refugee status were
    given safe passage to a third country. However, border control is
    governed by bilateral agreements, and some persons who were suspected
    of being illegal immigrants were denied entry.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government through periodic, free elections by secret ballot and
    universal suffrage. Presidential, parliamentary, and local elections
    are held separately. In July parliamentary elections brought the MPRP
    back into power. International observers deemed the elections generally
    free and fair, although there were some irregularities, and made
    recommendations to improve elections practices and procedures. The
    formation of the new Government highlighted constitutional questions
    concerning the President's relationship to Parliament and the
    Government, and the right of Members of Parliament to serve in the
    Government. Constitutional amendments meant to address these questions
    went into effect on July 15.
        There are 20 registered political parties; 3 are represented in the
    Parliament.
        Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of
    women or minorities in government and politics, women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. There are only 8 female
    members in the 76-member Parliament. There are no female ministers.
    Women and women's organizations are vocal in local and national
    politics and actively seek greater representation by women in
    government policymaking.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operate without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
    responsive to their views. A human rights course is a requirement in
    the university law curriculum.
        In December Parliament passed legislation establishing a National
    Commission on Human Rights to receive complaints from both citizens and
    foreign residents. The Commission will consist of three senior civil
    servants nominated by the President, the Supreme Court, and the
    Parliament for terms of 6 years.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that ``no person shall be discriminated
    against on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social
    origin, or status,'' and that ``men and women shall be equal in
    political, economic, social, cultural fields, and family.'' The
    Government generally enforced these provisions in practice.
        Women.--Rape and domestic abuse are illegal, and offenders can be
    prosecuted and corrected under assault laws after formal charges have
    been filed. There is no law specifically prohibiting spousal rape.
    Domestic violence against women is a serious problem. There are no
    reliable or exact statistics regarding the extent of such abuse but a
    wide range of qualified observers believe that it is common. After many
    years of government and societal denial, there is increasing public and
    media discussion of domestic violence, including spousal and child
    abuse. The large economic and societal changes underway have created
    new stresses on families, including loss of jobs, inflation, and
    lowered spending on social and educational programs. Some statistics
    show that over 70 percent of the cases of family abuse are related to
    alcohol abuse. The high rate of alcohol abuse has contributed to
    increased instances of family abuse and abandonment, and has added to
    the number of single-parent families, most of which are headed by
    women. Although women's groups advocate new statutes to cope with
    domestic violence, there is no known police or government intervention
    in cases involving violence against women beyond prosecution under
    existing assault laws after formal charges have been filed.
        The family law which went into effect in 1999 details rights and
    responsibilities regarding alimony and parents' rights, and is intended
    to bring about timely dispute settlement and avoid the causes of some
    domestic violence. The National Center Against Violence made progress
    in providing hot line services, shelters, and conducting training for
    police on how to deal with domestic violence cases and began to expand
    its work outside the capital.
        There are reports that some women and teens work in the sex trade
    in Asia and eastern Europe; an unknown number of them may have been
    trafficked (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        The Constitution provides men and women with equal rights in all
    areas and, both by law and in practice, women receive equal pay for
    equal work and have equal access to education. Women represent about
    half of the work force, and a significant number are the primary
    earners for their families. The law prohibits women from working in
    certain occupations that require heavy labor or exposure to chemicals
    that could affect infant and maternal health. The Government enforces
    these provisions. Many women occupy midlevel positions in government
    and the professions, and many are involved in the creation and
    management of new trading and manufacturing businesses.
        There is no separate government agency that oversees women's
    rights; however, there is a National Council to coordinate policy and
    women's interests among ministries and NGO's, and the Ministry of
    Social Welfare and Labor has added a Department for Women and Youth
    Issues. There are approximately 36 women's rights groups that concern
    themselves with such issues as maternal and child health, domestic
    violence and equal opportunity.
        Children.--Increased stress on the family structure and throughout
    society has had adverse effects on many children, and the Government
    has been unable to keep pace with the educational, health, and social
    needs of the most rapidly growing segment of its population, although
    it is committed to children's rights and welfare in principle. The
    Government provides children of both sexes with free, compulsory public
    education through the age of 16, although family economic needs and
    state budgetary difficulties make it difficult for some children to
    attend school. In addition there continues to be a severe shortage of
    teachers and teaching materials at all educational levels.
        The society has a long tradition of support for communal raising of
    children. The Government is more willing to admit the extent of the
    problem of orphaned children, but it lacks the resources to improve the
    welfare of children who have become the victims of larger societal and
    familial changes. NGO's continued to assist orphaned and abandoned
    children. Groups working in this field disagree on the number of street
    children; some report that the figure was 700 to 800, while others
    count all poor children who may or may not be homeless and estimate
    that it was as high as 3,000. Although evidence is limited, there are
    reports that female street children sometimes faced sexual abuse (see
    Section 6.d.). The Government provides only minimal support for the few
    shelters and orphanages that exist; those facilities must turn to
    private sources to sustain their activities.
        The family law, which took effect in 1999, stipulates the
    obligations regarding divorce, custody, and alimony to the benefit of
    the parent caring for children. It provides for more speedy resolution
    of divorce cases where the relevant agencies have determined that
    domestic violence is involved.
        There is growing awareness that child abuse, often associated with
    parental alcoholism, is a problem. In conjunction with efforts to
    counter violence against women, NGO's have begun to address the issue.
    The Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor has added a Department for
    Women and Youth Issues. Awareness of child labor as a problem is
    growing (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). The Government declared the year
    the Year of Supporting Child Development and established a National
    Committee for Children.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
    disabled persons in employment and education, and the Government
    provides benefits to the disabled according to the nature and severity
    of disability. Those who have been injured in industrial accidents have
    the right to be reemployed when ready to resume work. The Government
    also provides tax benefits to enterprises that hire the disabled, and
    some firms hire the disabled exclusively. There is no legislation
    mandating access for the disabled and, therefore, it is difficult for
    the disabled to participate fully in public life. Disabled citizens
    groups have demonstrated for higher government subsidies. Approximately
    30 NGO's participate in activities assisting the disabled.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution entitles all workers
    to form or join unions and professional organizations of their
    choosing. Union officials estimate that union membership dropped from
    450,000 persons in 1998 to 400,000 during the year, and was less than
    half of the workforce. Union membership decreased due to restructuring
    and privatization of former state enterprises and as increasing numbers
    of workers either became self-employed or began working at small,
    nonunionized firms. No arbitrary restrictions exist on who may be a
    union official; officers are elected by secret ballot.
        Union members have the right to strike. Those employed in essential
    services, which the Government defines as occupations critical for
    national defense and safety, including police, utility, and
    transportation workers, do not have the right to strike. During the
    year, there were approximately 50 strikes involving 4,500 workers.
        Most union members are affiliated with the Mongolian Trade Unions
    Confederation, but some are affiliated with the newer Association of
    Free Trades Unions. Both organizations have ties with international
    labor organizations and confederations in other countries.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The labor law,
    which went into effect in 1999, defines conditions and regulates
    relations between employers, employees, the trade unions, and the
    Government, making adjustments for the changes in the structure of the
    economy. The Government's role is limited to ensuring that the contract
    meets legal requirements as to hours and conditions of work. Wages and
    other employment issues are to be set between the employer, whether
    state or private, and the employee, with trade union input, if
    appropriate. The new labor law also streamlines the process for dealing
    with labor conflicts. The Labor Dispute Settlement Commission resolves
    disputes involving an individual; disputes involving groups are
    referred to intermediaries and arbitrators for reconciliation. If an
    employer fails to comply with a recommendation, employees may exercise
    their right to strike. The law protects the workers' right to
    participate in trade union activities without discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law specifically
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced labor by
    children; however, enforcement is intermittent. In November a foreign-
    owned garment factory was discovered to be requiring employees to work
    14-hour shifts 7 days a week, deducting unreasonable sums from
    paychecks for miscellaneous expenses, and requiring 16- to 18-year-old
    workers to work excessive hours (see Section 6.d.). Some members of the
    military forces in rural areas are required to help with the fall
    harvest. In many cases, prisoners work to support the detention
    facility in which they are held, and detained alcohol abusers and petty
    criminals sometimes are required, as part of their sentences, to
    perform menial tasks such as street sweeping.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law in general prohibits children under the age of 16
    from working, although those who are 14 or 15 years of age may work up
    to 30 hours per week with parental consent. Those under 18 years of age
    may not work at night, engage in arduous work, or work in hazardous
    occupations such as mining and construction. Enforcement of these
    prohibitions, as well as all other labor regulations, is the
    responsibility of state labor inspectors assigned to regional and local
    offices. These inspectors have the authority to compel immediate
    compliance with labor legislation, but enforcement is limited due to
    the small number of labor inspectors and the growing number of
    independent enterprises. In November a foreign-owned garment factory
    was found to be employing 16- to 18-year-old workers for periods in
    excess of the legal limits (see Section 6.c.). Due to increasing
    economic pressures, there are indications that fewer children are
    staying in school until age 18, especially in the countryside. These
    children most often herd family animals, but reports of children
    working in factories or mining coal have increased. The Government
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and generally attempts
    to enforce this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). Although evidence is
    limited, there are reports that female street children sometimes face
    sexual abuse (see Section 5). The Government is aware of this
    development and established a National Committee for Children to
    address this and other child welfare issues.
        In January the International Labor Organization (ILO) established a
    national office for the International Program on the Elimination of
    Child Labor. In October Parliament approved accession to the ILO
    Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
    Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage
    established for the year is under $18 (18,000 tugrik) per month. The
    minimum wage alone is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
    living for a worker and family. This level applies to both public and
    private sector workers and is enforced by the Ministry of Social
    Welfare and Labor. Virtually all civil servants earn more than this
    amount, and many in private businesses earn considerably more. Some
    employees receive housing benefits.
        The standard legal workweek is 40 hours, and there is a minimum
    rest period of 48 hours between workweeks. For those under 18 years of
    age, the workweek is 36 hours, and overtime work is not allowed.
    Overtime work is compensated at either double the standard hourly rate
    or by giving time off equal to the number of hours of overtime worked.
    Pregnant women and nursing mothers are prohibited by law from working
    overtime.
        Laws on labor, cooperatives, and enterprises set occupational
    health and safety standards, and the Ministry of Social Welfare and
    Labor provides enforcement. The near-total reliance on outmoded
    machinery and problems with maintenance and management lead to frequent
    industrial accidents, particularly in the mining, power, and
    construction sectors. Effective enforcement of occupational health and
    safety standards is inadequate; the labor monitoring unit's 86
    inspectors must inspect a growing number of enterprises throughout the
    country. According to the labor law, workers have the right to remove
    themselves from dangerous work situations and still retain their jobs.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in persons, and there is evidence that Mongolian women and
    teenagers are working in the sex trade in Asia and Eastern Europe and
    may have been the victims of trafficking rings. The country is both a
    source and transit point for trafficking. The problem has attracted
    increased attention, and debate on its legal and social aspects is
    underway.
                                   __________

                                     NAURU

        The Republic of Nauru, a small Pacific island with approximately
    10,500 inhabitants, gained independence in 1968, at which time it
    adopted a modified form of parliamentary democracy. Nauru has two
    levels of government, the unicameral Parliament and the Nauru Island
    Council (NIC). Parliamentary elections must be held at least
    triennially. The Parliament, consisting of 18 members from 14
    constituencies, is responsible for national and international matters.
    It elects the President, who is both Chief of State and Head of
    Government, from among its members. The NIC acts as the local
    government and is responsible for public services. The judiciary is
    independent.
        Nauru has no armed forces, although it does maintain a small police
    force (less than 100 members) under civilian control.
        The economy depends almost entirely on the country's declining
    phosphate deposits. Secondary reserves and residual mining may extend
    the productivity of its mines. The government-owned Nauru Phosphate
    Corporation (NPC) controls the mining industry. The Government places a
    large percentage of the NPC's earnings in long-term investments meant
    to support the citizenry after the phosphate reserves have been
    exhausted. The Governments of Nauru and Australia reached a $70.4
    million out-of-court settlement in 1993 for rehabilitation of the
    Nauruan lands damaged by Australian phosphate mining. Two new banks
    opened during the year. Media reports indicate that significant
    offshore deposits are associated with these new banking facilities. The
    Government is working with the Pacific Finance Technical Assistance
    Center (an International Monetary Fund facility based in Fiji) to
    update its banking regulations.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, police reportedly raided a televison station and
    confiscated a videotape in May. In the traditional culture, women
    occupy a subordinate role, with limits on their job opportunities.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits these practices, and the
    Government respects these prohibitions in practice.
        The Government attempts to provide internationally accepted minimum
    prison conditions within its limited financial means and in accordance
    with local living standards. However, prison conditions are basic, and
    food and sanitation are limited.
        There are no local human rights groups, and the question of visits
    to prisons by human rights monitors has not been raised. Visits by
    church groups and family members are permitted.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The constitutional
    prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention is honored. The
    police may hold a person for no more than 24 hours without a hearing
    before a magistrate.
        The Government does not practice forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent, and
    constitutional provisions for both a fair hearing and a public trial
    are respected. Defendants may have legal counsel, and a representative
    will be appointed when required ``in the interest of justice.''
    However, many cases never reach the formal legal process, since
    traditional reconciliation is used--usually by choice but sometimes
    under communal (not government) pressure. Contract workers from
    Kiribati and Tuvalu are employed predominantly in the mining sector and
    do not have recourse to effective communal assistance; they are
    particularly at a disadvantage in complaints against citizens. There
    are only two trained lawyers, and many persons are represented in court
    by ``pleaders,'' trained paralegals certified by the Government.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution generally prohibits these abuses.
    Searches not sanctioned by court order are prohibited, and there is no
    surveillance of individuals or of private communications. Citizenship
    and inheritance rights are traced through the female line. Marriage
    between women and foreign males may still draw social censure. The law
    extends the right of citizenship--subject to approval by the NIC--to
    both male and female spouses, provided that marital and residency
    requirements are met.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of expression. News and opinion circulate freely, rapidly, and
    widely by the press and word of mouth. The country has no regular print
    media. Occasional publications include the government bulletin. The
    sole radio station is owned and operated by the Government; it
    broadcasts Radio Australia and British Broadcasting Corporation news
    reports. Local television includes Nauru TV, which is government owned,
    as well as a privately owned sports network. Police raided Nauru TV in
    May and confiscated a videotape of the vote in Parliament in which the
    President was elected. The country's Director of Media, an Australian
    national, departed the country soon afterward.
        There are no prohibitions or restrictions on academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice. No permits are required for public meetings, and there are no
    limitations on private associations.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights for
    citizens, and the Government respects them in practice.
        Foreign workers must apply to their employers for permission to
    leave during the period of their contracts. They may break the contract
    and leave without permission but would lose their positions and often a
    sizable bond as a result. In most cases, foreign employees whose
    contracts are terminated by their employers must leave Nauru within 60
    days.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. No person in recent memory has applied for refugee
    status, and the Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
    refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have, and exercise, the right to change their government.
    Although there are no organized political parties, persons with diverse
    points of view run for and are elected to Parliament and to the NIC.
        Parliament elects the President. There was a change in government
    in April, the eighth change in government in the past 4 years. All the
    changeovers were peaceful and in accordance with the Constitution.
    Voting by secret ballot is compulsory for all citizens over the age of
    20 for parliamentary elections. There have been multiple candidates for
    all parliamentary seats during recent elections. The approximately
    3,000 guest workers have no voice in political decisions.
        There are no legal impediments to participation in politics by
    women; however women are underrepresented in government and politics.
    There are no female Members of Parliament.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no restrictions on establishing local groups that concern
    themselves specifically with human rights, but to date none has been
    formed. No allegations have been made by outside organizations of human
    rights violations in the country, nor have there been any requests for
    investigations.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Government policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    sex, religion, disability, language, or social status.
        Women.--The Government does not keep track of incidents of physical
    abuse against women. However, credible reports indicate that sporadic
    abuse, often aggravated by alcohol use, occurs. Families normally seek
    to reconcile such problems informally, and, if necessary, communally.
    The judiciary and the Government treat major incidents and unresolved
    family disputes seriously.
        Nauru law assures women the same freedoms and protections as men.
    The Government officially provides equal opportunities in education and
    employment, and women are free to own property and pursue private
    interests. However, in practice, societal pressures limit opportunities
    for women to exercise these rights fully. The Government has appointed
    a women's development officer to assist with the development of
    professional opportunities for women.
        Children.--The Government devotes considerable attention to the
    welfare of children, with particular stress on their health and
    educational needs. Education is compulsory until age 16. Child abuse
    statistics do not exist, but alcohol abuse sometimes leads to child
    neglect or abuse. The NIC treats child abuse as a serious communal
    matter. There were no reported cases of child abuse during the year.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no reported discrimination in
    employment, education, and the provision of state services to persons
    with disabilities. However, no legislation mandates access to public
    buildings and services for the disabled. The Government has assisted
    persons with disabilities by building access ramps to homes and
    workplaces and by purchasing office equipment adapted for persons with
    disabilities.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Nauruan Pacific island
    workers experience some discrimination. While guest workers are
    provided free housing, the shelters they are given often are maintained
    poorly and overcrowded. In the past, some guest workers alleged that
    the police rarely act on complaints they made against citizens.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of citizens to form and belong to trade unions or other
    associations. However, the country has virtually no labor laws, and
    there are no trade unions. Past efforts to form unions were discouraged
    officially. The transient nature of the mostly foreign work force and
    the relative prosperity of the citizenry also have served to hamper
    efforts to organize the labor force. The right to strike is neither
    protected, prohibited, nor limited by law. No strikes took place during
    the year. Nauru is not a member of the International Labor
    Organization. There are no prohibitions or limits on the right of
    unions to affiliate with international bodies.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While there are
    no legal impediments, collective bargaining does not take place. The
    private sector employs only about 1 percent of salaried workers. For
    government workers, public service regulations determine salaries,
    working hours, vacation periods, and other employment matters.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    forbids forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor
    by children, and the Government effectively enforces these
    prohibitions.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Education is compulsory until age 16; the law sets 17 as
    the minimum age of employment. The only two large employers, the
    Government and the NPC, honor this. Some children under the age of 17
    years work in the few, small, family-owned businesses. The Constitution
    prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and the Government
    enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages exist for office
    workers and manual laborers and provide an adequate, if modest,
    standard of living. Most families live in simple but adequate housing,
    and almost every family owns some sort of motor vehicle. The Government
    sets the minimum yearly wage administratively for the public sector.
    Since November 1992, that rate has been $6,562 ($A9,056) for those 21
    years of age or older. The rate is progressively lower for those under
    21 years of age. Employers determine wages for foreign contract workers
    based on market conditions and the consumer price index. Usually
    foreign workers and their families receive free housing, utilities,
    medical treatment, and often a food allowance. Some noncitizen contract
    workers have complained about conditions in company living compounds.
    By regulation the workweek for office workers is 36 hours and for
    manual laborers 40 hours in both the public and private sectors.
    Neither law nor regulations stipulate a weekly rest period; however,
    most workers observe Saturdays and Sundays as holidays.
        The Government sets health and safety standards. The NPC has an
    active safety program that includes an emphasis on worker education and
    the use of safety equipment such as helmets, safety shoes, and dust
    respirators. The NPC has a safety officer who is specifically
    responsible for improving safety standards and compliance throughout
    the company.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address
    trafficking; however, there were reports that Asian nationals were
    trafficked through the country en route to other destinations. The
    Government is investigating.
                                   __________

                                  NEW ZEALAND

        New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy, with executive authority
    vested in a 20-member cabinet led by the Prime Minister. The Governor-
    General is Head of State. The 120member Parliament is elected in a
    mixed member proportional representation system, with 6 seats reserved
    for members of the native Maori population. The judiciary is
    independent.
        The police and defense forces are responsible to civilian officials
    and are firmly controlled by them.
        New Zealand is an efficient producer of agricultural products and
    an exporter of wool, meat, and dairy products. Tourism, forestry,
    fishing, and manufacturing recently have become significant economic
    sectors. Disparities in wealth are small but increasing. Government
    social programs offer substantial benefits to disadvantaged persons.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
    and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
    individual instances of abuse. The Government has taken steps to
    address the problems of police abuse, overcrowded prisons, violence
    against women, and societal discrimination against the disabled,
    indigenous people, and Pacific islanders and Asians. Child abuse is a
    problem, and trafficking in persons is a small but growing problem.
        The Government generally respects the human rights of citizens
    living in its territories of Tokelau, Niue, and Cook Islands.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other forms of mistreatment,
    and the Government generally respects these prohibitions in practice.
        Police abuse declined slightly from 1999; however, there were
    instances of police abuse. During the year, 4.2 percent fewer
    complainants alleged misconduct by officers than during 199899. There
    were 11 cases of police misconduct that involved deaths, down from 21
    in 199798. In one such case, police in May fatally shot a Maori youth,
    leading public officials, including the Prime Minister, to urge better
    policeMaori relations. The officer, also of Maori descent, was found by
    an internal police investigation to have acted in selfdefense and was
    exonerated, which resulted in protest from the Maori community in the
    Taranaki region.
        Maori inmates constitute more than half the prison population, even
    though Maori are only 15 percent of the general population (see Section
    5). The Government sought to reduce the problem of Maori recidivism
    through Maori focus units, which integrate Maori values into the
    rehabilitation program.
        Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards;
    however, prison overcrowding is a significant and growing problem to
    which the Government is responding by building new prisons. As of
    September, the inmate population totaled 5,940, with prison bed
    capacity of about 6,000. The inmate population is projected to increase
    to about 6,040 by 2002. In September the female inmate population rose
    to over 320, exceeding the number of available beds in women's prisons.
    As a result, women were housed in men's prisons, and advocates for
    prison reform asserted that facilities for female inmates in those
    situations were inadequate. In 1999 the Government added 22 new beds
    for women at the main women's prison in Wellington. In July the new
    Auckland Central Remand Prison opened, with beds for 360 male inmates.
    Two other new prisons are scheduled to open in 2002 and 2003.
    Construction also began during the year to improve older prisons in
    Dunedin and Invercargill that would result in toilets replacing buckets
    at those prisons by mid2001.
        A highly publicized case of prisoner abuse was resolved in
    September when four inmates received substantial monetary compensation
    and an apology from the Government for an apparently isolated incident
    in 1993 in which they claimed that they were stripped and beaten in
    retaliation for attacking prison officers. A U.N. committee that
    considered the case stated that the prisoners were not tortured but
    that their treatment was cruel and degrading. Overall, assaults in
    prisons (mostly inmate on inmate) rose from 97 to 120 in 1999-2000;
    however, suicides declined from 8 to 6. Over 98 percent of prison
    officers are trained in suicide awareness.
        Special problems also exist concerning the treatment of youth
    offenders. As of 1998, 18 percent of the total inmate population was
    under the age of 20. Two special units for inmates under the age of 17
    and vulnerable 17 to 19-year-olds opened during the year. They offer a
    peer-based approach to transform behavior. In July the Government
    announced that it planned to build two new youth units and expand a
    third, increasing capacity for youth offenders by 142 beds by March
    2001.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
    these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
    judicial process.
        There is an impartial judiciary, with the right of appeal to the
    Privy Council in London, UK, although this option rarely is invoked.
    Within the country, the Court of Appeal is the highest appellate court,
    and it determines appeals from the High Court, which has original
    jurisdiction for major crimes and important civil claims. The High
    Court also handles appeals from lower courts and reviews administrative
    actions. Remaining original jurisdiction rests with 110 judges of the
    district courts. Special courts include: The Employment Court; family
    courts; youth courts; Maori Land Court; Maori Appellate Court; and the
    Environment Court.
        The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the judiciary
    implements this provision.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
    authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
    effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
    speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
    practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, and of academic freedom. There were no
    reported instances of restrictions of free speech as in 1999.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government provides first asylum and is a signatory to the 1951
    U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
    refugees. Under its own refugee quota, the Government accepts up to 750
    UNHCR-approved refugees per year.
        There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a
    valid claim to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
    peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
    periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
    suffrage. Parliamentarians are elected under a mixed-member
    proportional representation system, and general elections were held in
    November 1999.
        Women and minorities are accorded full opportunity to participate
    in political life, but are underrepresented in government. In the 120-
    member Parliament, 36 seats are held by women; 16 by Maori; 3 by
    members of Pacific Island origin; and 1 by a member of Asian heritage.
    The Executive Council has 26 ministers (20 within the Cabinet and 6
    outside the Cabinet) including 11 women (1 of whom is the Prime
    Minister), 4 Maori, and 1 Pacific Islander. The Cabinet has seven
    women, two Maori, and one Pacific Islander. The Prime Minister, the
    opposition leader, and the Chief Justice are women. In August Queen
    Elizabeth II of England, in her capacity as leader of the Commonwealth,
    appointed a new Governor General, also a woman, who is to take office
    in April 2001.
        Women are underrepresented in government in the dependent
    territories of the Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue. Of the 25 members
    of the Cook Islands Parliament, 2 are women. In Niue, 2 of 20 are
    women.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of domestic and international nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's) operate without government restriction,
    investigating allegations and publishing their findings on human rights
    cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive to the views
    of these human rights groups. The Human Rights Commission, a U.N.-
    accredited national human rights institution, investigates complaints
    of human rights violations and unlawful discrimination and acts as a
    conciliator. The Government also funds an independent race relations
    conciliator, who received complaints and acted as an ombudsman during
    the year.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The 1993 Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
    race, sex, religion, disability, and language, and the Government
    effectively enforces it.
        Women.--Violence against women is a problem that affects all
    socioeconomic groups. A 1997 government-sponsored academic survey
    indicated that 1 woman in 7 living with a male partner was abused
    physically or sexually by the partner in the previous 12 months, and 1
    in 16 women were likely to be sexually assaulted each year. Publicity
    about domestic violence increased significantly after government
    ministers pressured a women's refuge coordinator in August not to
    publicize statistics about Maori spousal and child abuse rates.
    According to a 1994 Public Health Commission study, Maori women between
    the ages of 15 and 24 were 7 times more likely than non-Maori women to
    be hospitalized as a result of domestic assault. According to
    government statistics, in 1998 5,056 men were prosecuted for domestic
    assault, and about 1,000 more faced less serious family violence
    charges. Maori men constituted 41 percent of men convicted of
    assaulting a woman and 43 percent of men convicted of assaulting a
    child. Disproportionately high rates of domestic abuse also were
    documented among Pacific Islander families.
        The law penalizes spousal rape. The Government convicted persons on
    this charge during the year. The National Collective of Rape Crisis
    groups, a private, nonprofit organization, claimed in 1998 that the
    majority of cases go unreported each year and that, of the cases that
    are reported to the police, only 10 to 15 percent result in
    convictions. The group reported that husbands and boyfriends committed
    about 25 percent of all sexual assaults.
        The 1996 Domestic Violence Act broadened the definition of violence
    to include psychological abuse, threats, intimidation, harassment, and
    allowing children to witness psychological abuse. It expanded
    intervention measures, such as the use of protection orders; education
    programs for men, women, and children; stronger police powers to arrest
    and detain offenders; improved access to legal services for women
    eligible for legal aid; and tougher penalties for breach of a
    protection order. The family court received 22,174 applications for
    protection orders under the act from 1996 through 1997.
        The Government's strategy to prevent family violence included a
    range of objectives, such as providing victim support, incorporating
    successful innovations and proven methods from family violence centers
    into the national family violence programs (that is, the promotion of
    ``best practice''), ensuring safety from violence, and implementing
    Maori-designed and delivered programs. The Government partially funded
    women's refuges, rape crisis centers, sexual abuse counseling, family
    violence networks, and violence prevention services.
        Prostitution is legal; however, organizing and recruiting women
    into prostitution is not. There were reports of abuse and the
    involuntary detention of women involved in prostitution during the year
    (see Section 6.f.). There were several credible reports that women were
    trafficked into the country and forced into prostitution (see Sections
    6.c. and 6.f.).
        While the law prohibits discrimination in employment and in rates
    of pay for equal or similar work, the Government acknowledged that in
    practice a gender earnings gap persists. Statistics for the second
    quarter of the year showed that women earned 86 percent of men's
    average ordinary hourly wage, up from 84.8 percent in 1999.
        Children.--The law provides specific safeguards for children's
    rights and protection. The Government demonstrates its commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care.
        Child abuse gained significant attention during the year,
    especially after the deaths of three toddlers were linked to physical
    abuse. Publicity rose after a report by the Children's Commissioner
    blamed the 1999 death of a 4-year-old child on state agencies that had
    returned him to an abusive home. In July a toddler was killed and a
    second child suffered brain damage as a result of abuse by family
    members. In August caretakers were tried and convicted for the May 1999
    and January 2000 beating deaths of a 6-year-old and a 3-year-old child.
    During 1998 and 1999, Child, Youth, and Family Services confirmed 1,660
    cases of physical abuse, 1,375 cases of sexual abuse, and 1,414 cases
    of severe emotional abuse of children. Preliminary statistics for 1999
    and 2000 showed little change in the prevalence of abuse. In 1997, the
    most recent year for which statistics are available, 12 children under
    age 15 died in assaults, including 7 who died from child battering. The
    Government reported that Maori children are four times as likely as
    non-Maori children to require hospital care for injuries resulting from
    deliberate harm. In August the Government instituted an expanded
    program of information sharing between court and health and child
    protection agencies to identify children at risk of abuse. Under the
    program, notifications to childprotection agencies of at-risk children
    increased by 30 percent in the first month. Applications to Family
    Court under the Domestic Violence Act included protection of more than
    33,000 children.
        There are a small number of documented cases of female genital
    mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international health
    experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. FGM
    traditionally is not practiced in the country, but cases have been
    documented in the Somali, Sudanese, and Ethiopian immigrant
    communities. The influx of persons from countries where FGM is
    prevalent has slowed. It is illegal to perform FGM or to remove a child
    from the country to carry out the procedure. To address FGM, the
    Government sponsored public awareness campaigns, a child protection
    network, and a special clinic at the country's largest women's
    hospital.
        Incidents of trafficking in children for sexual purposes also were
    documented during the year. The Government works with the NGO, ECPAT
    NZ, to combat trafficking in children and to develop legislation that
    would criminalize trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
        People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
    people with disabilities in employment, education, access to places and
    facilities and the provision of goods, services, and accommodation.
    Compliance with access laws, mandated by the Human Rights Act and the
    Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act, varies as business owners and
    others strive to make necessary adaptations. The Government has not
    complied fully with equal access laws prohibiting discrimination on the
    basis of disability in areas such as public transportation and public
    accommodation. In 1999 the Government granted itself a partial
    exemption from sections of the Human Rights Act that concern physical
    disability. The Government must comply by December 31, 2001 with laws
    and regulations relating to discrimination based on physical
    disability. The Human Rights Commission reported during the year that
    it received more complaints of discrimination based on disability than
    any other type of discrimination. The International Labor Organization
    (ILO) criticized the Government for not collecting adequate data on the
    employment of the disabled.
        Indigenous People.--Approximately 15 percent of the population
    claim at least one ancestor from the country's indigenous Maori or
    Moriori minorities. While the law prohibits discrimination against the
    indigenous population, the Government's Closing the Gaps report,
    released in May, noted the continuing disproportionate number of Maori
    included on the unemployment and welfare rolls, among the prison
    population, among school dropouts, in infant mortality statistics, and
    among single-parent households. For example, the official Maori
    unemployment rate (19 percent) is over three times that for nonMaori.
    Maori officials expressed concern over the Government's announcement in
    November that it would shift its Closing the Gaps strategy to address
    socio-economic disparities rather than race-based disparities. Maori
    inmates constitute more than half the prison population, even though
    Maori are only 15 percent of the general population. The Government
    addressed this problem through Maori focus units, which integrate Maori
    values into the rehabilitation program. A special program for Maori sex
    offenders, Kia Marama, halved the rate of recidivism among those who
    participated.
        Government policy recognizes a special role for indigenous people
    and their traditional values and customs, including cultural and
    environmental issues that have an effect on commercial development. The
    Ministry of Maori Development, in cooperation with several Maori NGO's,
    seeks to improve the status of indigenous people. A special tribunal
    continues to hear Maori tribal claims to land and other natural
    resources stemming from the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Pacific Islanders, who make up
    5 percent of the population, are not an indigenous people, but they
    experience difficulties similar to Maori. Asians, who make up under 5
    percent of the population, also experience discrimination. In August a
    citizen of Western ancestry was convicted of manslaughter for stabbing
    her Cambodian neighbor over 150 times. The judge ordered the lengthiest
    permissible sentence because of evidence that the killing was racially
    motivated. Pacific Islanders also are overrepresented in the prison
    system. They comprise only 5 percent of the general population but
    account for 10 percent of inmates.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish
    and join organizations of their own choosing. The principal labor
    organization is the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, a federation
    that includes unions representing various trades and locations. During
    the year, the Council of Trade Unions merged with the second-largest
    labor federation, the New Zealand Trade Union Federation. As a result,
    nearly all unionized workers are members of the Council of Trade
    Unions. A few small, independent labor unions also exist.
        Labor organization is rudimentary in the territory of Tokelau
    (population 1,500) and in the Freely Associated State of Niue
    (population 1,700). In the more developed Associated State of the Cook
    Islands (population 19,000), most workers in the public sector, the
    major employer, belong to the Cook Islands Workers' Association, an
    independent local union inspired by New Zealand models. Industrial
    relations in the Cook Islands are governed by a simplified version of
    older national legislation.
        The law protects unions from governmental interference, suspension,
    and dissolution. Unions do influence legislation and government policy.
    Some unions are affiliated with the Labor Party; others operate
    independently of political parties; all are free to support parties
    whose policies they favor. Unions often exercise the right to strike.
    Significant limitations on the right to strike were eliminated when the
    Employment Relations Act (ERA) replaced the Employment Contracts Act in
    October; unions are not limited to strikes related to the negotiation
    of a collective contract and can strike in pursuit of multiemployer
    contracts across an entire economic sector.
        In the 12 months that ended in June there were 31 work stoppages,
    involving approximately 10,400 workers and the loss of approximately
    $1.9 million ($NZ 4.6 million) in wages and salaries.
        Under the Police Act of 1958 and amendments, ``sworn police
    officers,'' that is, all uniformed and plainclothes police but
    excluding clerical and support staff, are barred from striking or
    taking any form of industrial action. However, police have freedom of
    association and the right to organize and to bargain collectively.
    Disputes that cannot be settled by negotiation between the Police
    Association and management are subject to compulsory, final-offer
    arbitration.
        The Freedom of Association Committee of the International Labor
    Organization (ILO) ruled in 1994 that the Employment Contracts Act of
    1991 does not promote collective bargaining and limits the right of
    freedom of association and the right to strike in a manner inconsistent
    with ILO conventions. The Government contends that the ERA, which
    replaced the Employment Contracts Act in October, is consistent with
    ILO conventions. Discussions with the ILO to confirm this understanding
    were in progress at year's end. Sympathy strikes, secondary strikes,
    and strikes over social or political causes are illegal. In June a
    brief strike was staged by the Council on Trade Unions that expressed
    political solidarity with Fijian unionists in reaction to the overthrow
    of the government of Fiji. The Minister of Labor, who also is the
    Attorney General, did not take any enforcement action against the
    strikers or the Council.
        Unions may affiliate internationally. The New Zealand Council of
    Trade Unions is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free
    Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
    provides for the right of workers to organize and contract
    collectively, and this right is observed in practice. During the year,
    the Government changed the law governing industrial relations
    significantly. It repealed the Employment Contracts Act of 1991 and
    replaced it with the Employment Relations Act (ERA) on October 2. The
    ERA promotes collective bargaining, strengthens unions, and requires
    that parties to an employment agreement bargain in good faith to
    achieve either a collective or individual employment agreement. The act
    also promotes mediation and attempts to reduce the need for judicial
    intervention. The law prohibits uniformed members of the armed forces
    from organizing unions and bargaining collectively.
        Unions represent fewer than 20 percent of all wage earners. Under
    the ERA, employment relationships are based on contracts. Individual
    employees and employers may choose to conduct negotiations for
    employment contracts on their own behalf, or they may authorize any
    other person or organization to do so on their behalf. Although
    choosing a union is entirely voluntary, unions have remained the most
    common agents used by workers to negotiate with employers. Employers
    must recognize a representative authorized by an employee or employees.
        The Government does not control mediation and arbitration
    procedures. The ERA strongly encourages mediation, and requires that
    the majority of employment disputes first proceed through mediation. It
    also establishes a Employment Relations Authority as an investigative
    body to establish the facts of an employment relationship dispute and
    to make a determination according to the merits of the case. The
    Authority replaces the previous Employment Tribunal. An employment
    court remains, with exclusive jurisdiction over employment matters.
    Appeals from the employment court to the court of appeal are possible.
    Firing an employee for union activities is grounds for a finding of
    unjustified dismissal and may result in reinstatement and financial
    compensation.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
    children; however, trafficking in women and children is a problem.
    Inspection and legal penalties ensure respect for the provisions. There
    were reports of the involuntary detention of women involved in
    prostitution, and the trafficking of women for prostitution (see
    Section 6.f.). In April the Government convicted and fined the
    operators of a factory in Auckland in which workers had been exploited;
    seven Thai women escaped slave labor conditions in October 1999 (see
    Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
    enforces this prohibition effectively; however, trafficking in children
    is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). Department of Labor
    inspectors effectively enforce a ban on the employment of children
    under the age of 15 years in manufacturing, mining, and forestry.
    Children under the age of 16 may not work between the hours of 10 p.m.
    and 6 a.m. In addition to explicit restrictions on the employment of
    children, compulsory education ensures that children under the minimum
    age for leaving school (16 years) are not employed during school hours.
    By law children enrolled in school may not be employed, even outside
    school hours, if such employment would interfere with their education.
        The Government announced that it would ratify ILO Convention 182
    but did not define the worst forms of child labor.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for a minimum
    3-week annual paid vacation and 11 paid public holidays. A 40-hour
    workweek is traditional. While the law does not provide specifically
    for a 24-hour rest period weekly, management and labor accept the
    practice, and it is the norm. The government-mandated hourly minimum
    wage of approximately $3.20 ($NZ 7.55) applies to workers 20 years of
    age and older. Combined with other regularly provided entitlements and
    welfare benefits for low-income earners, this wage generally is
    adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family. The minimum wage for younger workers is 60 percent of the adult
    minimum. A majority of the work force earns more than the minimum wage.
    The current youth minimum wage of approximately $1.90 ($NZ 4.55)
    applies to workers of ages 16 to 19. In December the Government
    announced minimum wage increases that would take effect in March 2001.
        An extensive body of law and regulations govern health and safety
    issues, notably the 1992 Health and Safety in Employment Act. Under
    this legislation, employers are obliged to provide a safe and healthy
    work environment, and employees are responsible for their own safety
    and health as well as ensuring that their actions do not harm others.
    As a result of union criticism, the act is under review by Parliament.
    Workers have the legal right to strike over health and safety issues.
    Unions, and members of the general public may file safety complaints on
    behalf of workers. Department of Labor inspectors enforce safety and
    health rules, and they have the power to shut down equipment if
    necessary. The Department of Labor standard is to investigate reports
    of unsafe or unhealthy working conditions within 24 hours of
    notification. Workers have the right to withdraw from a dangerous work
    situation without jeopardy to continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not address trafficking in
    persons specifically, and the applicable related crime, aiding and
    abetting the breach of immigration regulations carries relatively light
    penalties; however, prostitution is legal. Laws against child sexual
    exploitation and slavery carry penalties of up to 14 years in prison
    and recently have been used to prosecute citizens employing foreign
    prostitutes.
        Incidents of trafficking in children for sexual purposes also were
    documented during the year. The Government is working to develop
    legislation to criminalize trafficking and works with an NGO, ECPAT NZ,
    to combat trafficking in children, and a coalition in Auckland was
    established to provide information to persons at risk of being
    trafficked into the country. (see Section 5).
        Trafficking in women and children (particularly from Thailand) to
    work in the sex industry is a small but growing problem. There were
    several credible reports that women were trafficked into the country
    during the year. Domestic NGO's and the Human Rights Commission
    assisted six Thai women in repatriating to Thailand after they escaped
    forced work in the sex industry. One of the women sued in New Zealand
    to recover money that she had paid to traffickers; she claimed that the
    defendants had advertised the work as catering or agriculture. In
    October 1999, seven Thai women were freed from slave labor conditions
    in an Auckland factory (see Section 6.c.).
                                   __________

                                     PALAU

        Palau, an archipelago of more than 300 islands in the Western
    Pacific with a population of approximately 18,500 that formerly was a
    U.N. trusteeship administered by the United States, became an
    independent nation in free association with the United States on
    October 1, 1994. The democratically elected government is modeled after
    that of the United States. The Constitution provides for free and fair
    elections, and executive and legislative branches. The legislature, the
    Olbiil Era Kelulau, is composed of two equal houses, the 9-member
    Senate and the 16-member House of Delegates. The country is organized
    politically into 16 states. The judiciary is independent.
        Palau has no security forces other than local police and civilian
    law enforcement personnel, all are under the firm control of civil
    authorities. Palau also has a Marine Law Enforcement Division that
    patrols its borders with assistance from the Australian Government.
    Under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is responsible
    for the Republic of Palau's defense.
        With per capita gross domestic product of $7,510, Palau is a medium
    income country with a small, market-based economy largely sustained by
    transfer payments from the United States. The Government employs nearly
    half of the work force. Tourism and other service sectors account for
    most other paid employment. Tuna, harvested by foreign-operated fleets,
    is the dominant export. Several small-scale operations, employing
    foreign workers, assemble clothing from imported materials for export.
    Traditional subsistence agriculture and fishing is diminishing as
    people move to the city in search of employment. Also an increasing
    number of Chinese farmers operate vegetable farms that compete with
    indigenous farmers; most indigenous farmers work and sell what they
    produce from their own land.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Traditional
    customs sustain a value system that discriminates between persons on
    the basis of social status and sex. The loosening ties of the extended
    family and the increasing abuse of alcohol and other drugs are major
    contributing factors that lead to instances of domestic violence and
    child neglect. Societal discrimination against certain foreign workers,
    who account for nearly 30 percent of the population and 46 percent of
    the paid work force, is also a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
    no reports that officials employed them.
        Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
    Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The judiciary comprises the Supreme Court, the National Court, and
    the Court of Common Pleas. The President appoints judges to the Supreme
    Court and National Court from a list recommended by the Judicial
    Nominating Commission. Appointments are for life.
        The Government has an independent special prosecutor and an
    independent public defender system. The Constitution provides for the
    right to a fair trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces
    this right.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
    rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
    functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
    speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
    rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum, and government practice remains undefined.
    However, there were no reports of the forced expulsion of anyone having
    a valid claim to refugee status.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
    through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
    universal suffrage.
        There are no legal impediments to women participating in government
    and politics; however, women are severely underrepresented in
    government. As a result of the 1996 general elections, a woman gained a
    Senate seat for the first time. Women hold office in 10 of the 16 state
    legislatures, where they constitute 7 percent of the membership.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government has a history of openness to a variety of human
    rights groups without restriction. Government officials have met with
    representatives of these groups and foreign officials regarding the
    civil rights of foreign minority workers. Government officials
    generally are cooperative and responsive to their views. The Palau Red
    Cross Society opened its office in 1996; having satisfied all
    requirements, the Society has applications pending for full membership
    in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
    Societies.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex,
    race, place of origin, language, religion or belief, social status, or
    clan affiliation, and the Government generally respects these
    provisions.
        Women.--There are occasional incidents of violence against women,
    mainly domestic abuse. Alcohol and other drug abuse increasingly
    contribute to this problem. According to the Attorney General's office,
    the Government's Public Health Office, and women's groups, only a few
    such cases are reported to the authorities every year, but many more
    are believed to be unreported. Although assault is a criminal offense,
    women are reluctant to prosecute their spouses.
        The inheritance of property and of traditional rank is matrilineal,
    with women occupying positions of importance within the traditional
    system. Women serve by presidential appointment as bureau directors for
    women's interests, human resources, and clinical services. There were
    no reported instances of unequal pay for equal work or sex-related job
    discrimination.
        In 1993 local women's groups organized an annual women's conference
    that focuses on women's and children's issues including health,
    education, drug abuse, prostitution, and traditional customs and
    values. Each year government officials including the President, Vice
    President, ministers, and traditional chiefs have participated in the
    conference to discuss these issues. Women's group leaders and
    government officials agree that changes are needed to improve the
    country's educational system and to reduce drug use among youth.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. There is no societal pattern of abuse
    directed against children. Child prostitution is neither accepted
    within the culture nor practiced. There is no difference in the
    treatment of girls and boys in educational opportunities, or in the
    availability of scholarships to attend postsecondary education abroad.
    Girls and boys receive equal treatment in health care services.
        Child abuse is thought to be uncommon, and there have been few
    child abuse prosecutions. While children's rights generally are
    respected, there were reports of several instances of child neglect,
    which is a byproduct of the breakdown of the extended family.
        Government officials and representatives from nongovernmental
    organizations agree that changes are needed to improve the educational
    system and to reduce drug abuse among youth.
        People with Disabilities.--The National Code includes a Disabled
    Persons Antidiscrimination Act and a Handicapped Children Act. No
    instances of discrimination against the disabled were reported. In 1998
    a law requiring building access for the disabled was passed. The public
    schools have established special education programs to address problems
    encountered by those with disabilities.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Palauans are prohibited
    from purchasing land or obtaining citizenship. The rapid increase in
    the number of foreign workers, who now constitute nearly 30 percent of
    the population and 46 percent of the work force, is viewed negatively
    by a majority of citizens. Foreign residents are subject to some forms
    of discrimination and are targets of petty, and sometimes violent,
    crimes, as well as other random acts against person and property.
    Credible complaints are made by foreign residents that crimes against
    non-Palauans are not pursued or persecuted by authorities with the same
    vigor as crimes against citizens. Certain foreign nationals experience
    generalized discrimination in employment, pay, housing, education, and
    access to social services, although such discrimination is prohibited
    by law. While precise data is lacking, there continue to be anecdotal
    reports about abuse of workers' civil rights perpetrated against
    domestic helpers, bar girls, construction laborers, and other
    semiskilled workers, the majority of whom are from the Philippines,
    China, and Bangladesh. The most common abuses identified are
    misrepresentation of contract terms and conditions of employment,
    withholding of pay or benefits, and, sometimes, physical abuse. In a
    number of instances, local authorities have taken corrective action
    when alerted by social service and religious organizations to which
    foreign workers have turned for assistance. Nonetheless, foreign
    workers often are reluctant to seek legal redress for fear of losing
    their employment and, thus, permission to remain in the country.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
    right of all persons to assemble peacefully or to associate with others
    for any lawful purpose, including the right to organize and to bargain
    collectively. There are no active employee organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution does not provide for the right to strike, and the
    Government has not addressed this issue. There is no legislation
    concerning collective bargaining or trade union organizations, although
    there are no legal impediments to either. Wages in the cash economy are
    determined by market factors.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude except to punish crime. The
    law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children,
    but such practices are not known to occur. Instances were reported of
    foreign workers, especially domestic helpers and unskilled laborers,
    who were forced to do jobs different from those for which they were
    recruited. The freedom of foreign workers to leave employment
    situations not to their liking may be hindered by physical barriers or
    the withholding of passports and return tickets to their country of
    recruitment.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Constitution states that the Government shall protect
    children from exploitation, and children are protected by the general
    constitutional prohibition against forced and bonded labor (see Section
    6.c.). There is no minimum age for employment. Children typically are
    not employed in the wage economy, but some assist their families with
    fishing, agriculture, and other small-scale family enterprises. The law
    requires compulsory education for children between 6 and 17 years of
    age, and the Government generally enforces this law. By regulation no
    foreigner under the age of 21 may be admitted into the country for
    employment purposes.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In July 1998, Palau passed its
    first minimum wage law. The law sets the minimum wage at $2.50 per
    hour, effective January 1; foreign workers are exempt from the minimum
    wage law. This amount appears to be sufficient, given the level of
    economic development, to provide a worker and his family with a decent
    standard of living. Anecdotal evidence indicates that unskilled workers
    for commercial firms are paid only $1.50 to $2.00 per hour. However,
    foreign workers usually are provided, in addition to their wages, with
    basic accommodations and food at no or nominal cost. Although these
    wages are low, the country continues to attract large numbers of
    foreign workers from the Philippines, China, and Bangladesh. There are
    more than 6,000 foreign nationals with work permits in the country,
    two-thirds from the Philippines. Philippine-based illegal recruiters
    who falsified the workers' documents recruited a majority of the
    workers from the Philippines. These falsified documents eventually lead
    to problems between employers and employees. In 1998 the Philippines
    opened an embassy in Koror and informed the Government and the public
    about the Philippine Government recruiting office with responsibility
    for overseeing Philippine workers overseas and issuing overseas working
    permits. The Embassy has been working closely with the Government's
    Labor Division to resolve the problems created by the falsified
    documents, and has interceded in several cases involving allegations of
    worker abuse during the year, and also has assisted in the repatriation
    of several workers.
        As the number of foreign workers increases, there continue to be
    increasing numbers of reports of mistreatment of such workers by their
    employers. These incidents of alleged mistreatment are common knowledge
    among the general public but rarely are reported to law enforcement
    authorities by the foreign workers themselves due to fear of their
    employers. Some types of mistreatment that foreign workers consistently
    complain about are: Physical and verbal abuse; working overtime and on
    days off without pay; withholding monthly salary; deductions from
    salary for the amount of airfare; and substandard housing. Some workers
    also complained that they are not given enough food. The foreign
    workers most likely to be abused are those who work under contracts and
    earn between $100 and $300 a month as domestic helpers, construction
    workers, farmers, waitresses, beauticians, and hostesses in karaoke
    bars and massage parlors. Under the terms of their contracts, they also
    are to be provided room and board and air travel from their home
    country to Palau and back after the termination of their contracts. It
    generally is assumed that legislators specifically exempted contract
    workers in the 1998 minimum wage bill to ensure a continued supply of
    low cost labor in industries that the legislators often control.
        There is no legislation concerning maximum hours of work, although
    most businesses are closed on either Saturday or Sunday. The Division
    of Labor has established some regulations regarding conditions of
    employment for nonresident workers. The Division may inspect the
    conditions of the workplace and employer-provided housing on specific
    complaint of the employees, but actual enforcement is sporadic; working
    conditions vary in practice. No legislation specifically gives workers
    the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their
    health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment, and no
    legislation protects workers who file complaints about such conditions.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution prohibits trafficking
    in persons, and there are no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                PAPUA NEW GUINEA

        Papua New Guinea (PNG), which comprises some 1,000 tribes and over
    800 distinct languages in a population of about 4 million, has a
    federal parliamentary system, based on universal adult suffrage with
    periodic free and fair elections. The judiciary is independent.
        The Government has constitutional authority over the Defense Force
    (PNGDF), the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), and
    intelligence organizations. Members of the police force committed
    serious human rights abuses.
        The economy relies heavily on the export of minerals, hydrocarbons,
    tropical timber, and tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, and copra, and
    is sensitive to changes in world commodity prices. During the year, the
    national currency, the PNG kina, strengthened due in part to the
    Government's economic reforms. Later in the year, slack commodity
    prices and rising fuel costs undermined the kina's external value and
    slowed economic growth. Poor performance by the public health and
    education systems are among the country's most important challenges.
    Crime, especially in urban areas, is a growing problem. Approximately
    85 percent of the population resides in isolated villages and engages
    in subsistence and smallholder agriculture. For a majority of citizens,
    income and educational levels are low and infant and maternal mortality
    rates are high.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were serious problems in some areas. Police
    committed extrajudicial killings, beat suspects, and engaged in
    excessively punitive and violent raids. The Government on occasion
    investigated allegations of abuse and prosecuted those believed
    responsible. Prison conditions in several areas continued to be poor.
    Court understaffing reduced court sittings and increased pretrial
    detention periods for many persons. Police infringed on citizens'
    privacy rights. The Government continued to limit freedom of assembly
    in the form of marches or demonstrations, and imposed some restrictions
    on freedom of movement. Extensive violence and discrimination against
    women are problems, and abuse of children appears to be growing.
    Discrimination against the disabled persists, and violence between
    tribes remains a serious problem.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Several instances of
    killing by police were reported during the year. According to police
    reports, most occurred during gunfights with criminal suspects who were
    resisting arrest. However, in at least one case in Port Moresby, police
    beat a youth to death in front of bystanders. In another Port Moresby
    case, police apprehended an intoxicated man, and his corpse
    subsequently was discovered in an isolated area.
        All police shootings are investigated by the police department's
    internal affairs office and reviewed by a coroner's court. If the court
    finds that the shooting was unjustifiable or due to negligence, the
    police officers involved are tried. Families of persons killed or
    injured by police in such circumstances also may challenge the
    coroner's finding in the National Court, with the assistance of the
    Public Solicitor's Office. Cases of accidental shootings of bystanders
    by police during police operations also are investigated and reviewed
    by a coroner's court.
        No human right violations were reported in connection with military
    operations during the year. However, although four soldiers suspected
    of complicity in the killing of Bougainville Transitional Government
    Premier Theodore Miriung in 1996 were questioned by police in 1999, no
    arrests were made and no further progress has been reported.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel or
    degrading treatment or punishment; however, police often beat suspects
    during arrests and allowed members of the public to beat suspects as
    well. During the year, policemen in various localities were charged
    with raping female detainees.
        Prison conditions are poor. The prison system suffers from serious
    underfunding, which results in the deterioration of infrastructure and
    poor delivery of services. Three prisons in which conditions previously
    were described as ``life threatening'' remained closed because of
    unsanitary conditions; prisoners in some of those areas are confined in
    crowded conditions in police stations. Some prisons, particularly those
    in urban areas, are seriously overcrowded. Prison guards' living
    conditions are as poor as those of the prisoners. During the year,
    there were several prison escapes. Overcrowding is exacerbated in rural
    areas by infrequent court sessions and bail restrictions for certain
    crimes (see Section 1.d.).
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The courts generally
    enforce constitutional protections against arbitrary arrest and
    detention. In 1994 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional portions of
    the 1993 Internal Security Act which were inconsistent with due process
    provisions of the Constitution. Under 1993 amendments to the Bail Act
    and the Criminal Code, only National or Supreme Court judges may grant
    bail to persons charged with willful murder or aggravated robbery. In
    all other cases, the police or magistrates may grant bail. Suspects who
    are arrested have the right to legal counsel, to be informed of the
    charges against them, and to have their arrests subjected to judicial
    review.
        Due to limited police and judicial resources and a high crime rate,
    suspects often are held in pretrial detention for a long time,
    particularly in rural areas. Pretrial remand is subject to strict
    judicial review through continuing pretrial consultations, especially
    at the National Court level. However, cases frequently are delayed for
    months awaiting results of police investigations. Additionally circuit
    court sittings were infrequent because of a shortage of judges and
    budget difficulties, delaying both the trial process and the rendering
    of decisions. Some detainees have been held in jail for as long as 2
    years because of the shortage of judges. An increase in the number of
    full-time judges, which was granted in September, is expected to
    improve the situation.
        After Parliament named Sir Mekere Morauta Prime Minister in July
    1999, government departments issued orders preventing foreign advisers
    to the former government from leaving the country. To date the
    authorities have shown no legal basis for these actions, and they were
    dropped after court reviews.
        Exile is prohibited by the Constitution and is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the courts are independent of executive,
    legislative, and military authorities.
        The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal and has original
    jurisdiction on constitutional matters. The National Court hears most
    cases and appeals from the lower district courts established at the
    provincial level. There are also village courts headed by lay persons,
    who judge minor offenses under both customary and statutory law.
        The legal system is based on English common law. The Constitution
    provides for due process, including a public trial, and the court
    system generally enforces these provisions. Defendants have the right
    to an attorney. Legal counsel is provided by the Public Solicitor's
    office for those accused of ``serious offenses'' who are unable to
    afford counsel. Serious offenses are defined as charges for which a
    sentence of 2 years or more is the norm. Defendants and their attorneys
    may confront witnesses, present evidence, plead cases, and appeal
    convictions. The shortage of judges creates delays both in the process
    of trials and in the rendering of decisions (see Section 1.d.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The authorities generally respect citizens' privacy
    rights, although there were instances of abuse, such as police
    destruction of property in May (see Section 1.c.). In January a large
    force of heavily armed police searched the home of a man accused of a
    nonviolent offense. He protested to the court that the search
    procedures were politically inspired. The court agreed and found police
    methods excessive and contrary to constitutional protections of
    privacy.
        Although provisions in the Constitution require warrants, the
    police continued to conduct warrantless searches and raids.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for free
    speech, including freedom of the media, and the Government generally
    respects these freedoms in practice.
        The media provided independent coverage and analysis of major
    issues, including accusations of corruption and immoral behavior
    directed at leading political figures.
        The combined circulation of 2 daily English-language newspapers is
    less than 60,000. Two weekly newspapers, one in English and one in
    Pidgin (the national lingua franca), also are published. All freely
    express a variety of editorial viewpoints and report on controversial
    issues such as alleged abuses by police and security forces, cases of
    alleged corruption by government officials, and political opposition
    views. A Malaysian firm, which has invested heavily in the country's
    timber industry, owns one of the dailies; the newspaper publishes
    little on the controversial subjects of logging and forestry, but it is
    generally independent and unbiased on other issues.
        The television broadcasting company, EM-TV, is independent.
    Television reception is limited mostly to the capital and provincial
    centers. The government-owned National Broadcasting Corporation owns
    two radio networks whose effectiveness is limited by inadequate funding
    and deteriorating equipment. A privately owned radio network, NAU-FM,
    is popular in Port Moresby and is expanding to other areas of the
    country.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government limits this
    right in practice. Public demonstrations require police approval and
    14-days' notice. Police assert that they fear violence from unruly
    spectators and rarely give approval.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respects this right in practice. Associations that
    wish to open a bank account and conduct financial transactions are
    required to register for this purpose. The process of registration may
    be slowed by bureaucratic inefficiency, but there is no policy of
    denying registration. International affiliation of church and civic
    groups is permitted freely.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict
    freedom of movement within and outside the country. However, after
    taking office in 1999, the present Government, with no legal basis,
    prevented foreigners engaged as advisers by the previous government
    from leaving the country (see Section 1.d.). A reservation to the 1951
    U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees regarding the
    issuance of travel documents restricted the travel of some Irian Jayans
    residing in a refugee camp in the western part of the country.
        Movement within Bougainville is free for all groups. Internally
    displaced persons are free to return to their homes, and virtually all
    have done so. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR), there are very few persons who meet the criteria for refugee
    status. The Solomon Islands Red Cross reports that other
    Bougainvillians who sheltered there have been returning home and none
    remained under its care. Those remaining are employed professionals.
    The Government negotiated agreements with the Government of the Solomon
    Islands to establish the means for traditional border crossers in
    southern Bougainville and the northern Solomon Islands to pass easily
    between the two countries.
        Although a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status
    of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government has not enacted
    enabling legislation. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR, and has
    not forced any persons to return to countries where they feared
    persecution. The Government provides first asylum for approximately
    3,500 persons who fled from the neighboring Indonesian province of
    Irian Jaya (also known as Papua or West Papua). An equal number reside
    in informal, unrecognized camps adjacent to the border with Indonesia.
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR in assisting the Irian Jayans
    who live in the East Awin refugee camp in Western Province and has
    administered the camp since 1996, when the UNHCR office closed. The
    UNHCR began to reduce the scale of its operations in Western Province
    in 1999 and coordinates the voluntary return of refugees to their homes
    in Irian Jaya. However, late in the year there was an upsurge in the
    number of border crossers coming from Irian Jaya. The Government has a
    policy of limited integration for Irian Jayans with certain skills or
    other qualifications, who are accorded limited residency status and are
    permitted to leave the refugee settlement. During 1999 the Government
    distributed over 1,500 permissive residency certificates to Irian Jaya
    refugees. Irian Jayans who chose not to apply for permissive residency
    returned to Indonesia on a voluntary basis under the supervision of the
    Government and the UNHCR. Those who violate conditions of their
    residency can be repatriated. There were no known forced repatriations
    of Irian Jayans to Indonesia. Several thousand traditional border
    crossers live in the border area and move freely between the two
    countries. According to the UNHCR, 171 Irian Jayans from the East Awin
    refugee camp were repatriated to Indonesia's Irian Jaya Province under
    UNHCR auspices.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens freely exercise their right to change the government
    through direct elections with a secret ballot and universal adult
    suffrage. Voters elect a unicameral parliament with 109 members from
    all 19 provinces and the National Capital District. Any citizen can
    stand for election. Because of the high number of candidates for
    Parliament, some members have won election with less than 10 percent of
    the total votes cast.
        The most recent general election was held in June 1997. Of the 109
    seats in Parliament, 55 seats changed hands. A coalition government,
    led by Prime Minister Bill Skate, was formed following the election. In
    July 1999, faced with a threatened vote of no confidence, Prime
    Minister Skate resigned, and the Parliament subsequently elected Sir
    Mekere Morauta as Prime Minister.
        The law provides that a losing candidate may dispute the election
    of the winning candidate by filing a petition with the National Court.
    Such petitions may question actions of the candidate and his supporters
    or allege malfeasance by the election officials. The procedure is fair,
    but is time consuming and expensive both to initiate and to defend.
    Following the 1997 election, 88 such petitions were filed. The majority
    of complaints were made against winning candidates or their supporters.
    The court accepted 40 of the petitions for trial. Some of these cases
    still are undecided.
        Although there are no legal barriers to the participation of women
    in political life, they are underrepresented in government and
    politics. Two women were elected to the 109-member Parliament in the
    1997 elections.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no official barriers to the formation of human rights
    groups. The Government cooperates with human rights nongovernmental
    organizations (NGO's), but sometimes is slow in responding to their
    requests for information. The International and Community Rights
    Advocacy Forum, formed in 1993, concentrated on human rights and the
    environment.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal protection under the law
    irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, color,
    creed, religion, or sex. Despite these constitutional and other legal
    provisions, women often face discrimination.
        Extreme geographic diversity prevents any one tribe or clan from
    dominating the country. The democratically elected government, based on
    loose coalitions, consistently has avoided favoring any group.
    Skirmishes and conflicts tend to be based on disputes between clans
    over issues such as boundaries, land ownership, injuries, and insults
    suffered by one clan at the hands of another; they are not ethnically
    based. In the past, clan and tribal warfare was ritualized and fought
    with traditional weapons; the availability of firearms has made such
    conflicts deadlier.
        Women.--Violence against women, including domestic violence and
    gang rape, is a serious and prevalent problem. Traditional village
    mores, which served as deterrents, are weakening and are largely absent
    when youths move from their village to a larger town or to the capital.
    Although rape is punishable by imprisonment, and sentences are imposed
    when assailants are found guilty, few assailants are apprehended. The
    willingness of some communities to settle incidents of rape through
    material compensation rather than criminal prosecutions makes the crime
    difficult to combat. Domestic violence, such as wife beating, also is
    common and is a crime. However, since most communities view domestic
    violence as a private matter, and few victims press charges,
    prosecutions are rare.
        Violence committed against women by other women frequently stems
    from domestic disputes. In areas where polygyny is still customary, an
    increasing number of women have been charged with the murder of another
    of their husband's wives. According to one report, 65 percent of women
    in prison are there for attacking or killing another woman.
        The Constitution and laws have provisions for extensive rights for
    women dealing with family, marriage, and property issues. Some women
    have achieved senior positions in business, the professions, and civil
    service. However, traditional patterns of discrimination against women
    persist. Many women, even in urban areas, are considered second-class
    citizens. Village courts tend to impose jail terms on women found
    guilty of adultery, while penalizing men lightly or not at all.
    Circuit-riding National Court justices frequently annulled such village
    court sentences. In 1996 the Government approved amendments to the
    Village Courts Act requiring that orders for imprisonment be endorsed
    by a district court before they take effect. Polygyny and the custom of
    paying a bride price tend to reinforce the view that women are
    property.
        In addition to the purchase of women as brides, women also are
    sometimes given as compensation to settle disputes between clans. The
    courts have ruled that such settlements are a denial of the women's
    constitutional rights.
        According to statistics published in the U.N. Development Program's
    1999 report on human development, women are gaining rapidly on men in
    literacy and education. Adult literacy has risen to 73 percent of the
    population. Sixty-five percent of women are literate, trailing men by
    21 percent. There are 15 percent fewer girls in primary schools than
    boys. Maternal mortality levels remain relatively high at 930 deaths
    per 100,000 live births.
        There is an Office of Women's Affairs in the Office of Church and
    Family Services of the Ministry of Provincial Affairs.
        Children.--The Government did not dedicate significant resources to
    protecting the rights and welfare of children. Most programs to protect
    and develop youth and children are operated by NGO's and religious
    organizations. Many government programs are underfunded. In the past,
    children have been well cared for within the family and under
    traditional clan and village controls. However, preliminary, small-
    scale studies indicate that this situation has changed over the last
    decade, especially in areas where households have become isolated from
    the extended family support system and depend on the cash economy for a
    livelihood. According to a report prepared by the Government and
    UNICEF, the sexual abuse of children is believed to be prevalent.
    Because of the geographic isolation and remoteness of many villages,
    malnutrition and infant mortality rates are very high. More than 60 of
    every 1,000 children born do not survive their first year.
        People with Disabilities.--Through the National Board for the
    Disabled, the Government provides funds to a number of NGO's that
    provide services to the disabled. The Government does not provide
    programs or services directly. Services and health care for the
    disabled, except for those provided by the traditional clan and family
    system, do not exist in several of the country's provinces. There is no
    legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled. Disabled persons
    face discrimination in education, training, and employment. Most
    disabled persons do not find training or work outside the family
    structure.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The right to form and join labor
    unions is provided by law, subject to registration by the Department of
    Industrial Relations. The Government does not use registration to
    control unions. However, an unregistered union has no legal standing
    with the Department of Labor and Employment or before the courts and
    thus cannot operate effectively. About half of the 250,000 wage earners
    in the formal economy are organized and are members of approximately 50
    trade unions. Most of the unions representing private-sector workers
    are associated with the Trade Unions Congress. The Public Employees
    Association represents an estimated 23,000 persons employed by
    national, provincial, and municipal governments, or one-third of the
    public sector work force. Unions are independent of the Government and
    of political parties.
        There were no government efforts to hinder either public or private
    sector unions from exercising their right to strike. However, there
    were no noteworthy strikes during the year. In 1999 the courts ruled
    that both the union and the national airline had acted illegally during
    a strike that year. The airline complied with a court order to rehire
    mechanics who had been dismissed during the strike.
        Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right to engage in collective bargaining
    and to join industrial organizations. These rights are exercised
    freely. Under the law, the Government has discretionary power to cancel
    arbitration awards or declare wage agreements void when they are
    contrary to government policy. This law was criticized by the
    International Labor Organization in 1994. The law prohibits antiunion
    discrimination by employers against union leaders, members, and
    organizers. The Department of Industrial Relations and the courts are
    involved in dispute settlement. Wages above the minimum wage are set
    through negotiations between employers and employees or their
    respective industrial organizations.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    forbids slavery and all forms of forced, compulsory, or bonded labor,
    including that performed by children, and there were no reports of such
    practices.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Employment Act establishes the minimum working age as
    18. However, children between the ages of 11 and 18 may be employed in
    a family-related business or enterprise provided they have parental
    permission, a medical clearance, and a work permit from a labor office.
    This type of employment is rare, except in subsistence agriculture.
    Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited and is not known to
    occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages for the private
    sector are set by the Minimum Wage Board, a quasi-governmental body
    with labor and employer representatives. The Board made a determination
    in 1992, which is still valid, that reduced the minimum wage for newly
    hired urban workers to the level of the minimum wage for rural workers.
    Also in 1992, the national youth wage, for new entrants into the labor
    force between 16 and 21 years of age, was set at 75 percent of the
    adult minimum wage. The adult minimum wage of $9.87 (22.96 kina) per
    week does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
    family who live solely on the cash economy. The Minimum Wage Board
    reconvened in mid-year to review the current minimum wage and made no
    change. Although the Department of Labor and Employment and the courts
    attempt to enforce the minimum wage law, enforcement is not effective
    due to a lack of resources. Minimum wage levels, allowances, rest
    periods, holiday leave, and overtime are regulated by law. The law
    limits the workweek to 42 hours per week in urban areas and 44 hours
    per week in rural areas. The law provides for at least one rest period
    of 24 consecutive hours every week. Enforcement is lax.
        Enforcement of the Industrial Health and Safety Law and related
    regulations is the responsibility of the Department of Labor and
    Employment. The law requires that work sites be inspected on a regular
    basis. However, due to a shortage of inspectors, inspections take place
    only when requested by workers or unions. Workers' ability to remove
    themselves from hazardous working conditions varies by workplace.
    Unionized workers have some measure of protection in such situations.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit
    trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                  PHILIPPINES

        The Philippines is a democratic republic with an elected President,
    an elected bicameral legislature, and a functioning political party
    system. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The
    President from 1998 through year's end was Joseph Estrada. In November
    the House of Representatives sent to the Senate articles of impeachment
    of President Estrada, citing bribery and corruption and other
    violations of the Constitution. His trial in the Senate began on
    December 7 and continued at year's end. An organized Communist
    insurgent group operates in many regions of the country. A large Muslim
    separatist group operates mainly in parts of the south. Many armed
    clashes took place during the year; several involved serious human
    rights abuses by both sides. Negotiations between the Government and
    both insurgent groups were stalemated at year's end. The judiciary is
    independent, but suffers from inefficiency and corruption.
        The Department of National Defense (DND) directs the Armed Forces
    of the Philippines (AFP), and the Department of Interior and Local
    Government (DILG) has authority over the civilian Philippine National
    Police (PNP). The AFP, which has primary responsibility for
    counterinsurgency operations, also is involved in traditional law
    enforcement efforts, including the pursuit of kidnapers, whose actions
    are a chronic criminal problem. Some members of the security forces,
    including police, soldiers, and local civilian militias, committed
    human rights abuses, often during counterinsurgency operations.
        The Philippines has a market-based, mixed economy. Agriculture
    contributes about 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), but
    accounts for more than 40 percent of employment. Principal crops
    include corn, sugar, and rice, most of which are consumed domestically.
    Export crops include coconut products and fruits. Manufacturing,
    particularly electronics and electronic components, accounts for nearly
    twothirds of export receipts, although the rate of growth in
    electronics exports slowed considerably during the year. Annual per
    capita GDP was approximately $999. Income distribution is highly
    skewed: The richest 30 percent of families earned nearly two-thirds of
    national income, while the poorest 30 percent received only 9.3 percent
    of national income, according to the most recent (1997) Family Income
    and Expenditure Survey. Urban incomes averaged 2.43 times rural
    incomes. Overseas worker remittances, estimated at $6 billion per year,
    are a major source of foreign exchange.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of citizens;
    however, there were serious problems in some areas. Members of the
    security services were responsible for extrajudicial killings,
    disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Other
    physical abuse of suspects and detainees and police corruption remain
    problems. The Government's Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
    established under the 1987 Constitution, again described the PNP as the
    worst abuser of human rights. Police leaders at times appeared to
    sanction extrajudicial killings and brutality as expedient means of
    fighting crime. The Government took some steps to stop military and
    police abuses; however, such actions were not sufficiently effective.
    Government forces were responsible for disappearances. Prison
    conditions are harsh. The Government was ineffective in reforming law
    enforcement and legal institutions. The court system, with its poorly
    paid, overburdened judges and prosecutors, remained susceptible to
    corruption and to the influence of the wealthy and powerful and often
    failed to provide due process and equal justice for others. The courts
    were hindered by backlogs, limited resources, and a lack of judges.
    Long delays in trials were common. The authorities failed to prosecute
    many persons who broke the law, and some persons committed abuses with
    impunity. The Government at times infringed on citizens' privacy
    rights. The Government in some cases supported the forcible
    displacement of squatters from their illegal urban dwellings to make
    way for industrial and real estate development projects, often leading
    to disputes and human rights complaints.
        An estimated 5 to 6 million citizens living abroad effectively are
    disenfranchised because the Government has not enacted a system of
    absentee voting, as required by the Constitution. Some local military
    and police forces harassed human rights activists. The CHR, whose
    primary mission is to investigate complaints of human rights
    violations, expanded the local monitoring system; at mid-year there
    were more than 14,000 local human rights officers nationwide, up by
    more than 1,000 from 1999. Although this is an improvement, CHR
    monitoring and investigation remain inadequate.
        Violence and discrimination against women and abuse of children
    continued to be serious problems. Discrimination against indigenous
    people and Muslims persists. The law places restrictions on worker
    rights. Rural poverty is the major cause of the continuing child labor
    problem, which the Government has addressed only partially. Forced
    labor in the informal sector, the practice of using forced underage
    workers in domestic servitude, and forced child prostitution were
    problems. Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem.
        The New People's Army (NPA), the main Communist insurgent group,
    and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the main Muslim insurgent
    group, both committed serious human rights abuses, including
    extrajudicial killings, kidnapings, torture, and detentions. The NPA's
    use of children as armed combatants and noncombatants continued to
    increase significantly. Fighting between the AFP and the MILF resulted
    in the large-scale displacement of noncombatants. Various factions of
    the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) committed numerous kidnapings,
    prompting government rescue efforts and the consequent displacement of
    civilians.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police and military
    forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. The CHR investigated
    115 extrajudicial killings during the first half of the year, compared
    with 283 in all of 1999. The CHR includes killings by antigovernment
    insurgents in its investigations. The nongovernmental organization
    (NGO) Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) claimed that as of
    November 15, 91 civilians were killed for political reasons; 28 of
    these persons reportedly were victims of extrajudicial executions
    carried out by government forces.
        In combating criminal organizations, police personnel sometimes
    resorted to summary execution of suspects, or ``salvaging.'' Police
    spokesmen later reportedly claimed that these killings were an
    unavoidable result of the exchange of gunfire with suspects or of
    escape attempts. The CHR reported that members of the PNP were the
    alleged perpetrators of 27.5 percent of the human rights violations
    involving deaths that it investigated during the first 6 months of the
    year.
        To curtail police and military abuses, the Government, working with
    the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other
    international organizations, expanded human rights training programs
    during the year. The AFP requires human rights and humanitarian law
    training for all officers and enlisted personnel, including former Moro
    National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants and for the more than
    30,000 members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units
    (CAFGU's). CAFGU's were implicated in many past human rights abuses.
    The CHR also reviews and certifies the human rights records of AFP
    members being considered for promotion.
        In May a police cadet at the National Policy Academy died as a
    result of cadet hazing permitted by instructors. Six instructors were
    reprimanded and given 6-month suspensions (see Section 1.c.).
        Four police officers were charged with the June 7 killing of a
    motorcycle rider in Gapan, Nueva Ecjia. Reportedly the death was
    connected with illegal drug protection.
        On June 8 in Manila, police killed a Muslim scholar during an
    exchange of gunfire. Police stated that the victim was an MILF
    commander trained in the use of explosives and had fired first.
        On July 9, police arrested two Manila police officers who were in
    possession of the body of a pedicab driver who reportedly had resisted
    their extortion demands. Three witnesses to the forcible abduction by
    police later were reported missing.
        On July 17, Police officers shot and killed a murder suspect in
    Tupi, South Cotabato, after he had surrendered. Following an
    investigation, eight officers were charged with the killing.
        On October 4, a PNP officer shot and killed a handcuffed suspect
    who had been arrested for attempted homicide. Police stated that the
    suspect was carrying a concealed weapon.
        On November 17, a radio journalist in Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur
    was killed by gunmen. The journalist's radio broadcasts reportedly had
    angered the police, the military forces, the MILF, and other citizens,
    who had sued him for libel.
        On November 30, residents of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, found two
    headless bodies, one of which was wearing handcuffs traced to the PNP.
        On December 4, the mayor of Dona Remedios Trindad, Bulacan, was
    killed, together with two assistants. Four police officers were
    detained, but were not charged by year's end. Police have exonerated
    the NPA. Earlier in the year, the previous mayor was killed in another
    ambush; that case also remained unsolved at year's end.
        Reported killings by Communist insurgents during the year were
    numerous.
        In April the NPA claimed responsibility for the killing of a former
    AFP officer in Tarlac City. It stated that the killing was an
    ``execution'' for the killing of an NPA officer in 1980.
        In May the NPA admitted responsibility for the February 6 killing
    of the mayor of San Teodoro, Mindoro Oriental, a former intelligence
    officer in the AFP.
        No NPA killings from 1999 or earlier years were closed during the
    year. Like many extrajudicial killings, killings attributed to the NPA
    often remain unsolved, or are dismissed for lack of evidence.
        On June 5, MILF soldiers attempted to kill the mayor of Cabacan,
    North Cotabato. The mayor escaped but two of his bodyguards were
    killed.
        On June 15, the NPA attacked and killed seven AFP soldiers and one
    CAFGU in Maslong, Eastern Samar. The soldiers were investigating the
    killing of a farmer by suspected NPA rebels. A CHR investigation found
    that the bodies of some of the AFP soldiers had been mutilated.
        On June 21, NPA rebels attacked a police patrol in Tagbilaran,
    Bohol; they killed one police officer.
        An NPA attack on June 27 in Jones, Isabela, resulted in the killing
    of 13 AFP members on a medical mission. A female NPA member reportedly
    admitted responsibility during interrogation.
        On July 2, one AFP soldier and 7 NPA members, including 1 boy
    estimated to be 10 years of age, were killed in an encounter in Danao,
    Bohol.
        On July 5 in Antipolo, Rizal, the NPA killed a woman, calling their
    action an execution. The local NPA command stated that the victim was a
    police informant and was involved in trafficking in persons for the
    purpose of prostitution.
        On July 21 in Bulusan, Sorsogon, NPA members shot and killed a
    police officer in his home.
        On August 21, 17 AFP soldiers were killed in an attack in
    Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. On September 5, the Government filed
    murder charges against a former priest who was an NPA member.
        The AFP reported that three soldiers had been tortured and killed
    by the MILF in October in Maguindanao.
        In February the AFP discovered mass graves in Cagayan de Oro City.
    Officials believe that the more than 100 victims were killed by the NPA
    during the mid-1980's.
        b. Disappearance.--Government forces were responsible for
    disappearances. The CHR investigated 12 disappearances in the first
    half of the year, compared with 11 in all of 1999; the TFDP reported 12
    disappearances through November. The domestic NGO, Families of Victims
    of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), reported the disappearance of five
    suspected members of the MILF and six suspected members of the NPA.
    FIND reported that as of October, 1,678 cases of disappearance remained
    unsolved; some date back to the Marcos period that ended in 1986.
        The courts and the police have failed to address complaints of
    victims' families concerning numerous past disappearances. FIND and
    Amnesty International's Manila office continued to support the efforts
    of the victims' families' to press charges, but in most cases evidence
    and documentation are unavailable. Court inaction on these cases
    contributes to a climate of impunity that undermines confidence in the
    justice system.
        Three witnesses to a reported forcible abduction by police
    disappeared in July (see Section 1.a.).
        In November a public relations agent and his driver disappeared.
    The agent allegedly possessed information damaging to the President in
    connection with his impeachment by the House of Representatives.
        The ASG is a kidnap-for-ransom terrorist group that purports to
    seek an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. On March
    20, an ASG faction attacked an AFP detachment on Basilan Island,
    kidnaped a Catholic priest, a school principal, and 50 teachers and
    students. In April the captors killed six hostages, including the
    priest. After the eventual release of some hostages and the turnover of
    others to the MILF, investigations revealed that some of the victims
    had been tortured and mutilated (see Section 1.c.). Two of the teachers
    had been beheaded, and the priest had been shot in the back (see
    Section 1.g.).
        In April another ASG faction kidnaped 21 foreign tourists, foreign
    workers, and some citizens in Sabah, Malaysia, then transported them to
    Jolo Island in Sulu province. Unsuccessful rescue efforts by the
    military forces in May resulted in injuries to the hostages. According
    to one male hostage, a female hostage was raped by her captors. In July
    13 Filipino Christian evangelists who visited the site to pray for the
    hostages themselves were taken captive. Several journalists reporting
    on the situation also were captured and released. In September an
    unsuccessful AFP attack to free the hostages reportedly involved
    indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and numerous deaths and
    injuries to civilians (see Section 1.g.). All but one of the hostages
    were rescued or released, or had escaped from June through October.
    Several reportedly were released after payment of ransom. One hostage
    remained in custody at year's end. Another foreign hostage, kidnaped in
    August by a different ASG faction, also remained in custody at year's
    end.
        In November in Sumisip, Basilan, an ASG faction kidnaped a teacher
    and her four children. The captors abandoned two of the children, then
    released the others later in November following intervention by local
    officials.
        In February the NPA abducted a police officer in Tagbilaran, Bohol.
    He was released in December in Negros Oriental, suffering from a skin
    disease.
        In August the NPA reportedly abducted a man in San Fernando,
    Camarines Sur. A former NPA commander stated that the abduction may
    have involved the victim's past involvement with the NPA and that the
    victim may have been ``tried'' in an NPA ``people's court.''
        An AFP officer and a PNP inspector kidnaped by the NPA in July and
    October 1999 respectively still were being held in southern Luzon at
    year's end. There were reports that the NPA had ordered the killing of
    the AFP officer for ``crimes against the people.''
        Various factions of the ASG committed kidnapings for ransom. In
    September 3 ASG members were sentenced to life imprisonment for a 1992
    kidnaping.
        The MILF was responsible for disappearances.
        In February the AFP discovered mass graves in Cagayan de Oro
    province. Officials believe that they are the bodies of more than 100
    persons killed by the NPA during the mid-1980's.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading.--Treatment or
    Punishment
        The Constitution prohibits torture, and evidence obtained through
    its use is legally inadmissible in court; however, members of the
    security forces and police continued to use torture and otherwise abuse
    suspects and detainees. The CHR provides the police with human rights
    training, including primers on the rights of suspects. Such training
    became mandatory in 1995. However, police awareness of the rights of
    those in custody remains poor. Common forms of abuse during arrest and
    interrogation included striking detainees with clubs and threatening
    them with guns.
        In June the CHR issued an advisory concerning the treatment of
    suspects in police custody. It described the torture of suspects held
    in connection with bombings in Manila in May. Relatives of the suspects
    had complained that suspects were beaten and that one suspect had had
    his hands bound and his face covered with a plastic bag during
    interrogation. The PNP denied these allegations.
        Amnesty International reported that torture was widespread in the
    country.
        In July the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
    Government dismissed 136 cadets at the National Policy Academy for
    complicity in the fatal hazing of a fellow cadet in May (see Section
    1.a.). An investigation by the National Police Commission led to
    reports that instructors forced police recruits to engage in sex acts
    with each other and to perform other hazing rituals. Six instructors
    were reprimanded and given 6-month suspensions. The PNP investigated
    215 officers for human rights abuses during the year. Of these, 57 led
    to prosecutions. The PNP has dismissed 70 officers for human rights
    abuses since 1993.
        In July according to the CHR, PNP officers brutally beat members of
    a group that had assembled to protest the President's State of the
    Nation address (see Section 2.b.).
        Prison conditions are harsh. Provincial jails and prisons are
    overcrowded, have limited exercise and sanitary facilities, and provide
    prisoners with an inadequate diet. Administrators budget a daily
    subsistence allowance of about $0.60 (30 pesos). Prison inmates often
    depend on their families for food because of the insufficient
    subsistence allowance. Male and female inmates are held in separate
    facilities, overseen by guards of the same sex. The exception is the
    Bureau of Immigration and Deportation detention facility, which
    segregates male and female inmates; however, both are overseen by male
    guards. Children sometimes are held in facilities not fully segregated
    from adult male inmates. There were reports that guards abused
    prisoners. Female prisoners in particular are at risk of sexual
    assault.
        The CHR conducted a nationwide investigation of prison facilities
    early in the year. In July it issued an advisory opinion that cited
    inhuman conditions in jails and prisons in many parts of the country.
    It stated that the Manila city jail was unfit for human habitation,
    housing 3,400 inmates in facilities designed to hold 1,000 inmates.
    Such conditions, according to the CHR, contributed to violence among
    inmates. It also stated that 27 inmates at the Manila jail should have
    been confined at a psychiatric facility and that convicted prisoners
    are commingled with inmates awaiting trial.
        Official corruption is a serious problem in the prison system. Jail
    administrators reportedly delegate authority to maintain order to
    senior inmates. Some prominent prisoners and jailed celebrities receive
    preferential treatment. Favored inmates reportedly enjoy access to
    outside contacts, enabling them to trade in prostitution and drugs. In
    April the DILG Secretary ordered disciplinary action against prison
    personnel for having provided special treatment to 31 incarcerated
    former police officers. These prisoners, in exchange for cash payments
    to guards, reportedly were able to leave the facility almost at will.
        According to the penal authorities, there were 23,621 persons held
    in national and regional prisons. Many others were detained in local
    jails at the discretion of local law enforcement authorities without
    benefit of a trial.
        International monitoring groups and the ICRC are allowed free
    access to jails and prisons. There were no reports that prisoners died
    due to prison conditions or mistreatment during the year.
        The AFP reported that three soldiers had been tortured and killed
    by the MILF in October in Maguindanao (see Section 1.a.).
        In November NPA members shot and injured a sugar plantation union
    leader and a policeman in Tarlac City. Prior to the attack, the union
    leader had led a rally at the regional office of the Department of
    Agrarian Reform to protest the plantation owners' stock distribution
    plans (see Section 6.a.).
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    requires a judicial determination of probable cause before issuance of
    an arrest warrant and prohibits holding prisoners incommunicado or in
    secret places of detention; however, police in some cases arrested and
    detained citizens arbitrarily. The CHR investigated 87 cases of illegal
    arrest and detention during the first half of the year, compared with
    124 in 1999. The TFDP documented 669 politically motivated arrests by
    the Government. The Government denies that there are any political
    detainees.
        Detainees have the right to a judicial review of the legality of
    their detention and, except for offenses punishable by a life sentence
    or death (when evidence of guilt is strong), the right to bail.
    Authorities are required to file charges within 12 to 36 hours of
    arrests made without warrants, depending on the seriousness of the
    crime for which the arrest was made.
        In May a series of bomb detonations in Metro Manila killed one
    person and injured approximately 30 others (see Section 1.g). No person
    or group claimed responsibility. The PNP arrested 26 Muslim suspects,
    including one police officer, for one of the bombings. Only one person
    of those arrested was named in the search warrant. CHR investigators
    and private attorneys were refused immediate access to the detainees.
    In June police charged them with the illegal possession of firearms;
    their attorneys claimed that police had planted the evidence. They
    continued to be held without pretrial hearing 6 months following their
    arrests.
        Suspects in a shopping mall bombing in May were charged with
    illegal possession of firearms; their attorneys claimed that police had
    planted the evidence. They awaited trial at year's end. There were
    reported attempts by authorities to deny attorneys immediate access to
    their clients (see Section 1.g.).
        The NPA and MILF were responsible for a significant number of
    arbitrary arrests and detentions, often in connection with informal
    courts set up to try military personnel, police, local politicians, and
    civilians for ``crimes against the people'' (see Section 1.e.).
        Forced exile is illegal and is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, the judicial system suffers from
    corruption and inefficiency. Personal ties undermine the commitment of
    some government employees to ensuring due process and equal justice,
    resulting in impunity for those who commit offenses but are rich and
    influential.
        The national court system consists of four levels: Local and
    regional trial courts; a national Court of Appeals divided into 17
    divisions; a 15-member Supreme Court; and an informal local system for
    arbitrating or mediating certain problems outside the formal court
    system. The Sandiganbayan, the Government's anticorruption court, hears
    criminal cases of misconduct brought against senior officials. A
    Shari'a court system, with jurisdiction over domestic and contractual
    relations among Muslim citizens, operates in some Mindanao provinces.
        The Constitution provides that those accused of crimes be informed
    of the charges against them, have the right to counsel, and be provided
    a speedy and public trial. Defendants are presumed innocent and have
    the right to confront witnesses against them, to present evidence, and
    to appeal convictions. The authorities respect the right of defendants
    to be represented by a lawyer, although poverty often inhibits a
    defendant's access to effective legal representation. The public
    attorney's office is staffed by highly skilled and motivated defense
    lawyers, but the workload is great and resources are scarce.
        Legal experts inside and outside the justice system also criticize
    personal and professional relationships between some judges and
    individual or corporate litigants. Some lawyers act as ``case fixers,''
    gaining the favor of judges and other court officials and allegedly
    bribing some witnesses. It is illegal to settle criminal cases out of
    court, but the practice of reaching an ``amicable settlement'' is
    routine. Such settlements may result in impunity for wealthy or
    influential defendants.
        The pace of justice is slow. The court system is unable to assure
    detained persons expeditious trials. There is a widelyrecognized need
    for more prosecutors, judges, and courtrooms. Of 1,445 trial court
    judgeships nationwide, 685 remained vacant at year's end due to a lack
    of qualified applicants. Vacancies in provincial capitals are
    unattractive to many jurists. In addition judges' salaries often are
    considered too low in comparison with salaries in other opportunities.
    Low pay also renders some prosecutors susceptible to corruption.
        According to the Constitution, cases are to be resolved within set
    time limits once submitted for decision: 24 months for the Supreme
    Court; 12 months for the court of appeals; and 3 months for lower
    courts. There are no time limits for trials. Because of numerous
    technical delays and the frequent failure of judges and prosecutors to
    appear, trials can last many months.
        Officials in the Labor and Social Welfare Departments claim that
    prosecutors often fail to follow up on cases involving child labor
    violations (see Section 6.d.).
        Amnesty International criticized many of the court proceedings that
    resulted in death sentences, stating that the judicial system does not
    ensure the rights of defendants to due process and legal
    representation. At times defendants in such cases lacked attorneys to
    assist them when they were arrested, indicted, and brought to trial. By
    law the Supreme Court reviews all death sentences. During the year, the
    Court overturned several convictions and commuted several death
    sentences to life imprisonment. In December the President announced
    that he intended to commute the death sentences of more than 1,300
    prisoners; later in the month, the Government reverted to the policy of
    granting commutations on a casebycase basis.
        Indemnification claims for alleged human rights abuses during the
    Ferdinand Marcos era, which ended in 1986, remain unresolved.
        Although Shari'a courts do not have criminal jurisdiction, the MILF
    asserts that its Islamic law courts do. There were no reports of
    executions resulting from MILF court decisions during the year.
        The NPA continued to try military personnel, police, local
    politicians, and civilians in its informal courts for ``crimes against
    the people'' and to execute some of those whom it ``convicted.''
        The TFDP reported that the Government held at least 277 political
    prisoners at the end of October, compared with 160 held at the end of
    1999. The Government contends that prisoners whom NGO's claim were
    jailed for political reasons were in fact convicted of common crimes.
    Frequently political prisoners counted by the TFDP were convicted of
    the illegal possession of firearms. In fact the TFDP includes on its
    list of political prisoners two Communist rebels convicted of the 1989
    terrorist killing of a foreign military assistance officer. The TFDP
    asserts that the authorities deliberately ``criminalize'' cases
    involving political offenders in order to detract from public sympathy
    for political prisoners. There are differences of opinion even within
    the CHR; some members of the commission believe that certain persons
    are incarcerated for political reasons, but other members believe that
    the same persons are guilty of common crimes.
        The Government permits access to political prisoners by
    international humanitarian organizations.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides that a judge may issue
    search warrants on a finding of probable cause; however, while
    restrictions on search and seizure within private homes generally are
    respected, searches without warrants do occur. Judges have declared
    evidence obtained illegally to be inadmissible.
        In August the CHR stated that the PNP conducted random searches of
    persons for illegal firearms at checkpoints in Metro Manila in
    violations of citizens' privacy rights.
        The PNP conducted covert monitoring of persons who sought removal
    of the President. The PNP stated that it was monitoring for possible
    seditious acts. Persons critical of the President asserted that the
    Government conducted illegal wiretaps of the telephones of the
    political opposition.
        The forcible displacement of urban ``squatters'' to make room for
    infrastructure and commercial developments continued during the year.
    Squatters make up at least 30 percent of the country's urban
    population. The law provides certain protections for squatters;
    eviction is often difficult, especially because politicians generally
    recognize squatters' voting power. In many instances, the Government
    did not offer relocation sites to displaced families, as required by
    law. The NGO Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and
    Communities (ECDFC) reported 2 mass displacements due to government
    demolition of houses for economic purposes. Some 85 families were
    displaced in January in Saragani, Mindanao, and 200 families were
    displaced in September in Pasig City, Metro Manila. On July 10, a
    garbage landslide in heavy rain at the Payatas dumpsite in Quezon City
    resulted in the deaths of more than 230 persons.
        Armed clashes between the AFP and the MILF displaced an estimated
    750 thousand to 1 million persons in 203,000 families in 578
    communities in Mindanao (see Section 1.g.).
        The TFDP documented 50 community demolitions involving 15,662
    houses through November 15. Some involved military clashes in Mindanao.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Intensified AFP clashes with the main remaining
    Islamic insurgent group, the MILF, continued to inflict hardships on
    civilians. Most of the fighting took place in central Mindanao
    provinces and was related to the control of territory, a key issue in
    peace negotiations between the Government and the MILF. Displaced
    civilians feared being caught in the crossfire or becoming casualties
    of artillery exchanges or bombings near their areas of residence.
        In May a CHR investigation reported that both government troops and
    rebel groups were responsible for numerous violations of the rights of
    noncombatants, including women and children, during the intense
    fighting between the AFP and MILF that escalated sharply in March. The
    abuses included the killing of civilians due to indiscriminate bombing,
    torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners, and restrictions on the
    movement of civilians.
        In May gunfire from AFP helicopters used in counterinsurgency
    operations injured several civilians.
        In intense fighting in central Mindanao during April and May,
    government forces reportedly shot and killed 16 Muslims whom they
    suspected were MILF sympathizers. They also reportedly killed four
    noncombatants at a village in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. In August there
    were additional reports of unwarranted force, killings, and injuries to
    civilians.
        According to Amnesty International, indiscriminate bombing of the
    civilian population on Jolo Island during the Government's efforts in
    September and October to free foreign and Filipino hostages held by the
    terrorist ASG resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths (see Section
    1.b.). The Government initially refused to allow the CHR to
    investigate, citing security concerns. Three days after the rescue
    operation bagan, the Government reported that 4 noncombatants had been
    accidentally killed. There also were persistent but uncorroborated
    reports of summary executions and arbitrary arrests by the AFP. The
    CHR's investigators were neither able to confirm nor disprove these
    reports. The Government ordered a news blackout and cut communications
    and transportation links to Jolo in order to isolate the ASG
    terrorists. There has been no independent confirmation of government
    figures or AI claims; however, humanitarian workers who visited Jolo
    found no evidence of significant civilian casualities from the bombing.
        Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in the fighting
    between the AFP and the MILF. TFDP, acting of behalf of victims of the
    fighting, filed charges of human rights abuses with the CHR involving
    destruction of property and the treatment of refugees against both the
    AFP and the MILF.
        In October the AFP reported that in armed conflict with the MILF
    from May through July in central Mindanao, there were 477 deaths of
    noncombatants and a total of 922 casualties. Some of these persons were
    killed in crossfire between the forces or died fleeing the fighting. At
    least 242 persons, most of them children, died due to poor health
    conditions resulting from the military operations. Most died in 1 of
    the 436 evacuation centers, which were able to accommodate only
    slightly more than half the noncombatant refugees. Poor sanitation led
    to disease, and lack of food led to malnutrition. Water was
    insufficient and unsafe to drink. Many children developed diarrhea,
    dysentery, and respiratory ailments. Most of the children who died in
    the evacuation camps were under 2 years of age. Nearly 100,000
    noncombatants, mostly Muslims, remained in evacuation centers as of
    mid-October. In May the centers had held an estimated 700,000 persons.
        In October the Government reported that nearly 750,000 persons had
    been displaced in 14 provinces as a result of the AFP-MILF fighting.
    International and domestic NGO's estimated that the total number of
    displaced civilians was closer to 1 million. The ECDFC estimated that
    203,000 families in 578 communities in Mindanao were displaced during
    the year as a result of 42 separate incidents. Both the AFP and the
    MILF accused each other of targeting civilian populations and
    restricting civilian food supplies.
        In May a series of bomb detonations in Metro Manila killed 1 person
    and injured approximately 30 others. No person or group claimed
    responsibility. The PNP arrested 26 Muslim suspects, including one
    police officer, for one of the bombings.
        On July 22, 13 noncombatants were killed in 16 others were injured
    in an attack in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. Police and CHR investigators
    assigned responsibility to CAGFU members recently fired from their jobs
    at a plantation where the killings took place; a group of 20 armed
    persons had fired on the victims.
        Nearly 6,700 houses and 3 municipal halls were destroyed, as were
    31 places of worship and 42 schools in ASG operations. Late in the
    year, the military forces began to rebuild houses, schools, and
    mosques.
        On February 10, one civilian was killed and 19 others were injured
    in a bombing of a department store in Carmen, North Cotabato. Police
    blamed the MILF.
        On February 25, 41 civilians were killed and scores were injured in
    two bomb detonations in Ozamis City. Police blamed the MILF and CPP/
    NDF.
        On March 17, an MILF attack on the town of Kauswagan, Lanao del
    Norte, killed at least 29 noncombatants.
        On May 3, five bombs were detonated in General Santos City; the
    explosions killed 3 noncombatants and injured 10. The Government blamed
    the MILF.
        On May 6, 6 persons were killed and 37 wounded from the detonation
    of bombs in buses in Surigao City and Butuan, Agusan del Norte. The
    Government blamed the MILF.
        On May 23, three persons died in a bombing in General Santos City.
    A second bomb in the same city on June 24 killed two persons. Police
    arrested two MILF members for these actions in July.
        The Government placed responsibility on the MILF for mass killings
    on July 16 in Bumbaran, Lanao del Sur Province. Approximately 33
    civilians, all Christians, were forced by armed men into a Muslim
    prayer house in the early morning. After a nearby battle during the
    day, armed persons fired on the civilians in custody, killing 21 and
    injuring 9. The casualties included a pregnant woman and five children.
    After a subsequent investigation, the CHR stated that the perpetrators
    could have been non-MILF separatists posing as MILF members, and may
    have been renegade former members of the Moro National Liberation Front
    (MNLF) (see Section 5).
        An NPA attack on September 30 in Davao City killed six civilians,
    as well as an AFP soldier and three CAFGU's. On the same day on the
    border of Davao City and Daval del Norte, the NPA killed nine
    civilians. The National Democratic Front (NDF) claimed responsibility
    but blamed the government military forces for using the civilians as
    ``human shields.'' The NDF is the political arm of the Communist Party
    of the Philippines, while the NPA is the armed wing. In December two
    NPA members were charged with murder; charges against two others were
    dropped for lack of evidence.
        On September 23, 10 suspected MILF guerrillas killed 7 members of a
    family in Tangkal, Lanao del Norte.
        On September 25, 3 students were killed and 10 injured in a bomb
    blast in Kabacan, North Cotabato. The Government blamed the MILF.
        On November 7, MILF guerrillas who reportedly were assisting a
    kidnaping group attacked the prison in General Santos City. They killed
    1 inmate and injured 1 guard in the process of freeing 68 inmates.
        On November 9, a bomb detonated in a market in General Santos City,
    killing one person. The Government blamed the MILF.
        On December 6, according to an AFP report, MILF rebels killed three
    farmers by firing squad in Carmen, North Cotabato. The killing occurred
    as the AFP was attacking an MILF position elsewhere in Carmen.
        The PNP alleges that the MILF is responsible for five bomb
    detonations in a 2-hour period on December 30 in Metro Manila. The
    explosions killed 20 civilians, and 2 police officers were killed while
    attempting to defuse one of the bombs that exploded.
        In fighting between government forces and the Abu Sayyaf Group
    (ASG) medical and relief workers were denied access to affected areas
    because their safety could not be assured. AI reported that
    approximately 80,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes in
    September as the Government waged an all-out effort to free the
    hostages on Jolo (see Section 1.b.). In November the Government
    reported that more than 107,000 persons from 19,000 families had been
    displaced in Sulu.
        Conditions in the 21 evacuation centers were poor, leading to
    disease and deaths among those displaced in the fighting. In November
    the AFP reported that 6 civilians had died in the course of the armed
    conflict with the ASG on Jolo, and that 65 homes had been destroyed.
    Domestic NGO's believe that the figures are much higher.
        The ASG reportedly was responsible for detonating three grenades on
    May 18 in a market in Jolo. Seven persons were killed and three were
    injured.
        In a December attack in Lamitan, Basilan, suspected members of the
    ASG killed three persons and injured five others.
        On December 28 in Jolo, Sulu, armed persons believed to be ASG
    members killed a Catholic priest, his driver, and two other persons.
        Communist insurgencies such as the NPA intensified attacks on
    government forces, government offices, and private business facilities
    in Bukidnon province, Metro Manila, and other locations during the
    year. The NPA makes regular use of minors in its operations (see
    Section 5).
        In January an AFP chaplain was abducted by NPA guerrillas, some as
    young as 14, and held captive for nearly 2 weeks before being released.
        On March 2, a member of the Communist Revolutionary Proletarian
    Army (RPA) reportedly threw a hand grenade into a government office in
    Makati, Metro Manila.
        In March a 12-year old NPA rebel was captured by the AFP in Bontoc,
    Southern Leyte, during a raid in which the boy's parents (both NPA
    leaders) and 13-year-old sister were killed. The boy told authorities
    he had become an NPA fighter at age 9 and had since become a recruiter
    himself. He said that there were 20 minors15 boys and 5 girlsin his
    unit. The boy, who stated that he had taken part in at least 12
    ambushes, demonstrated adult proficiency as a soldier.
        In March a 12-year old boy escaped from the NPA and surrendered to
    the AFP in Kiamba, Sarangani. The boy reportedly told authorities that
    while in first grade, an NPA recruiter threatened to kill him if he did
    not join. He stated that he did not receive payments that the recruiter
    had promised, and was not given sufficient food while working as an
    errand boy in the mountains.
        On July 2, a 14-year old suspected NPA fighter was killed along
    with 7 NPA members in a clash with the AFP in Trinidad, Bohol. In
    December the AFP rescued a 10-year-old NPA member after a skirmish in
    Motiong, Western Samar.
        The PNP identified the Alex Boncayo Brigade, a Communist assassin
    group, as being responsible for the killing of a business executive on
    November 24 in Bacoor, Cavite.
        On December 2, the Communist insurgent group Rebolusyonaryong hukbo
    ng Bayan (RHB) accused the insurgent NPA of the execution of a high-
    ranking cadre in Mexico, Pampanga. The killing reportedly took place in
    the presence of the victim's wife, children, and neighbors. In a
    written statement, the RHB, which has broken away from the Communist
    Party of the Philippines (CPP), stated that the NPA wanted to
    ``exterminate genuine revolutionaries.'' Two days later, the NPA
    claimed responsibility for the killing and in a written statement
    stated that the RHB cadre had been executed for grave crimes against
    the revolutionary movement.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects this right in practice. In November a radio journalist in
    Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur was killed by gunmen. The journalist's
    radio broadcasts reportedly had angered the police, the military
    forces, the MILF, and other citizens, who had sued him for libel (see
    Section 1.a.).
        In April the mayor of Bacolod City ordered the closure of a local
    radio station for operating without a business permit. Radio
    journalists charged that the mayor's actual motive was to silence
    criticism of his administration. The station resumed operations several
    days later, and the city government filed libel charges against the
    journalists.
        The Philippine Press Institute is active in helping to investigate
    cases of harassment of journalists.
        In February a bomb exploded outside the gates of a Catholic-run
    radio station in Cotabato City, injuring seven persons. Police believe
    that the target was a Muslim broadcaster who had been ``sentenced to
    death'' by an MILF revolutionary court for blasphemy of Islam. One
    month later, the journalist survived an attack in which two of his
    bodyguards were killed. The MILF, which criticized the broadcaster,
    denied involvement but stated that individual MILF members could have
    been responsible for unauthorized actions. In December the radio
    station again was bombed by unknown persons; one person was injured.
        On December 25, a bomb exploded in the home of a radio broadcaster
    in General Santos City, injuring five persons. The broadcaster, a
    Muslim scholar, had received death threats for criticism of MILF
    guerrilla activities.
        ASG terrorists captured 16 journalists on Jolo during June and
    July. All were released after payment of ransom (see Sections 1.b. and
    1.g.).
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the
    Government generally respects these rights in practice. In July the PNP
    dispersed a peaceful assembly of persons protesting the President's
    State of the Nation address. The CHR stated that law enforcement agents
    had violently deprived activists of their right to conduct a public
    protest. PNP officers, according to the CHR, brutally beat protesters,
    including some who had been taken into custody or who posed no threat
    to officers. At least 10 persons were injured, and 36 persons were
    arbitrarily arrested and later released without charge.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
    However, in June the insurgent MILF accused the AFP of desecrating two
    mosques in Davao Oriental by using them as sleeping quarters.
        In July many Muslims complained of the Government's disrespect for
    Muslim religious practices when the President celebrated an AFP
    military victory by holding a pork and beer feast at the MILF's former
    headquarters at Camp Abubakar.
        In a September assault on the terrorist ASG to rescue foreign and
    Filipino hostages held on Jolo Island, military forces reportedly
    raided a mosque, tore pages from the Koran, and arrested eight Muslims
    for the illegal possession of firearms. The Catholic Bishops Conference
    of the Philippines strongly criticized the raid. The mayor of Jolo
    strenuously denied that the AFP had desecrated the mosque.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy the freedom to change
    their places of residence and employment. Travel abroad is limited only
    in rare circumstances, such as when a citizen's court case is pending.
    Government authorities discourage travel by vulnerable workers such as
    young women to areas where they face personal risk (see Section 6.f.).
    The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) seeks to limit
    departures for work abroad to only those persons whom the POEA
    certifies as qualified for the jobs. An estimated 5 to 6 million
    citizens work overseas and remit money home. Such remittances amount to
    nearly 10 percent of the gross national product.
        There is no comprehensive legislation that provides for granting
    refugee and asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951
    U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
    Protocol. The Refugee Unit in the Department of Justice determines
    which asylum seekers qualify as refugees; such determinations in
    practice serve to implement many of the basic provisions of the 1951
    U.N. Convention.
        The Government provides first asylum.
        The Government continued to allow approximately 1,800 asylum
    seekers from Vietnam to remain in the country. All had been ``screened
    out'' from refugee status. Most live on Palawan Island or in major
    urban areas. There is significant popular support, particularly from
    the Roman Catholic Church, for allowing permanent residency for those
    asylum seekers who do not wish to repatriate and are ineligible for
    resettlement in other countries. The Government continued to encourage
    voluntary repatriation of such asylum seekers. The Government has not
    ruled out forcible repatriation.
        There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
    where they feared persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
        to Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right through
    periodic elections that largely are free and fair and held on the basis
    of universal suffrage. However, Congress has yet to enact a system for
    absentee voting, which is required by the Constitution. This affects an
    estimated 5 to 6 million eligible voters, or about 10 percent of the
    electorate, most of whom are expatriates. The party of President
    Estrada continued to hold majorities in both the House of
    Representatives and the Senate.
        In October a group of citizens filed an impeachment complaint
    against the President. In November the House of Representatives sent
    articles of impeachment to the Senate, charging the President with
    bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust, and culpable
    violation of the Constitution. His trial began in December and
    continued through year's end.
        There are no restrictions in law or practice on participation by
    women and members of minorities in politics; however, women are
    underrepresented in government and politics. The Vice President is a
    woman. At year's end, there were two female cabinet-level officials.
    There are 4 women in the 22-member Senate, and 26 women in the 222-
    member House of Representatives. Three of the 15 members of the Supreme
    Court are women.
        Along with many other citizens, Muslims argue that the method of
    election of senators from a nationwide list favors the established
    political figures from the Manila area, to the disadvantage of Muslims.
    Election of senators by region would require a constitutional
    amendment; such an amendment is favored by many Muslims and members of
    other disadvantaged groups who are underrepresented in the national
    legislature. There are no Muslim senators or cabinet members. However,
    the House of Representatives has nine Muslim Members, including some
    elected from Christian majority districts. Muslims hold few senior
    government positions, and there is little or no effort to institute
    corrective measures.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
        of Human Rights
        A large, diverse group of human rights NGO's operated without
    government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
    human rights cases. Many government officials, including those of the
    CHR, are responsive to NGO views. Many domestic NGO's were critical of
    the Estrada administration's human rights record; these NGO's also had
    criticized previous presidents' human rights records.
        The Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, a leading NGO
    network, effectively monitors human rights problems and seeks redress
    through its contacts with government agencies, the Congress, and the
    CHR. Human rights activists continued to encounter minor harassment,
    mainly from police or military units or detachments based in the
    locality in which incidents took place.
        The CHR further augmented the system of barangay (neighborhood)
    human rights officers who process and coordinate human rights
    complaints, reporting to regional CHR offices. There were more than
    14,000 local human rights officers at mid-year, compared with
    approximately 13,000 at the end of 1999. The CHR expanded its regional
    operations during the year. At year's end, there were 14 regional and 6
    subregional offices, with more than 400 CHR officers in the field.
    Despite this increase, CHR monitoring and investigation remain
    inadequate.

    Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion,
        Disability, Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women, children,
    and members of minorities; however, implementation of constitutional
    protections at times is hindered by the lack of specific regulations
    and by budgetary constraints.
        Women.--Violence against women, particularly domestic violence,
    remains a serious societal problem. Rape is illegal and in certain
    cases punishable by death. Spousal rape and abuse also are illegal, but
    enforcement is ineffective. Women's advocates cite the lack of laws on
    domestic violence, double standards of morality, and a traditional
    societal reluctance to discuss private family affairs as some of the
    reasons for domestic violence. The absence of divorce under the law and
    limited job opportunities combine to limit the ability of both poor and
    wealthy women to escape destructive relationships.
        The PNP and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
    both maintain women's help desks to assist victims of violence against
    women and to encourage the reporting of crimes. Their role was
    strengthened further by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who
    until October 12 served concurrently as the secretary of the DSWD and
    continued to give women's issues a high public profile during the year.
    Many PNP stations included female officers. With the assistance of
    NGO's, additional male officers received gender sensitivity training to
    deal with victims of sexual crimes and domestic violence.
        In October a regional trial court in Davao City handed down the
    country's first conviction for marital rape. Rape continued to be a
    major problem; the number of rape cases reported to the police has
    risen by about 16 percent annually since 1992. The PNP reported that it
    investigated 3,145 cases of rape during the year; most of the alleged
    perpetrators were arrested. However, some women's groups stated that
    courts' imposition of death sentences for rape convictions might
    inhibit some victims from pressing charges. The number of prisoners
    awaiting execution for rape exceeds the number awaiting execution for
    murder.
        Many women suffer exposure to violence through their recruitment,
    often through deception, into prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Although
    illegal, prostitution remains widespread. A 1998 International Labor
    Organization (ILO) study estimated that 500,000 women are engaged in
    prostitution within the country. Most work independently or in small
    brothels rather than in prominent ``entertainment clubs.'' Penalties
    for the offense are light, but detained prostitutes are subjected to
    administrative indignities. There were reports of forced prostitution
    of children (see Section 6.c.). The Antivagrancy Act often is used by
    police officers as a pretext to extort money from prostitutes; those
    unable to pay may be subjected to sexual abuse. Hotel and travel
    industry leaders continued to refuse to honor their pledges to
    cooperate with a code endorsed by international tourism groups to stop
    sex tourism.
        Local officials condone a climate of impunity for those who exploit
    prostitutes--both the ``entertainment club'' owners and their patrons.
    Highly publicized official campaigns to close clubs and brothels fail
    to rescue young women from the abuse because the offending
    establishments usually are back in business a few days after such
    raids. The penalties for such actions are not considered sufficient to
    deter those who exploit prostitutes.
        The DSWD continued to provide temporary shelter and counseling to
    women trapped in prostitution, but officials believe that this helped
    only a small number of victims of illicit recruitment (see Section
    6.f.). DSWD officials noted that the number rescued failed to reflect
    the true extent of the prostitution problem since it reflected only
    those who obtained temporary shelter and counseling through the DSWD
    and local governments. NGO's argue that the Government first should
    address the abuses of dislocation and homelessness in order to address
    effectively the problem of women's exposure to the structural violence
    inherent in prostitution.
        Trafficking in women and children for forced prostitution and
    forced labor are problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        Sexual harassment in the workplace also continues to be a problem.
    It is thought to be widespread yet underreported due to victims' fear
    of losing their jobs. Harassment by managers in ``special economic
    zones'' (SEZ's) is thought to be a common practice. Most of the female
    employees in SEZ's are economic migrants who are required to work long
    hours and have no independent workers organization to assist with
    filing complaints. Women also are hired as contractual employees
    without benefits in the pressing and sewing industry. Many are
    subjected to long hours in inadequately ventilated facilities.
        In law but not always in practice, women have most of the rights
    and protections accorded to men. The Presidential Commission on the
    Role of Filipino Women seeks to coordinate programs for women, working
    closely with NGO's such as the 10 millionmember Presidential Council of
    Women in the Philippines. More women than men enter secondary and
    tertiary education. Unemployment rates for women are consistently
    higher than for men. Women's salaries averaged about 47 percent lower
    than their male counterparts'. Except for government service and jobs
    in government-owned or government-controlled corporations, women
    continued to face discrimination in employment.
        In this predominantly Roman Catholic nation, Church opposition to
    divorce is strong. Nonetheless, changes in the legal code have made
    marriage annulment fairly easy and increasingly common. However, the
    legal cost precluded this option for many women. The practice of
    ``unofficial divorce'' (permanent separation) was common among
    lowerincome couples. In such cases, the wife usually is left with the
    children, and the husband provides little or no financial support.
        Children.--Several government agencies have programs devoted to the
    education, welfare, and development of children. Nevertheless, children
    faced serious problems in their development. In April the NGO Helen
    Keller International reported that 30 to 40 percent of preschool
    children in the 4-province Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
    suffered from malnutrition. Most of the children were in villages in
    Maguinidanao, Lanao del Sur, and Tawi-Tawi provinces, the scene of
    heavy insurgent combat.
        Family poverty forces many children throughout the country to drop
    out of school; only about 65 percent of children complete the grade 6.
    This attrition rises with grade level. Public primary and secondary
    schools are free of tuition charges; however, poor families are unable
    to meet numerous peripheral costs for uniforms, school supplies, shoes,
    and transportation. The Asian Development Bank has expressed concern
    over an apparent growing inequity in educational opportunity as public
    spending per pupil declines. In the 1980's, public spending covered 80
    percent of the cost of elementary education; however, this share
    declined to only 69 percent by the mid-1990's.
        Widespread poverty forces many young children to work. The
    Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) worked with the ILO and NGO's
    to address the problem of child labor. According to UNICEF and ILO
    studies, some 2 million children were exposed to hazardous working
    environments such as in quarries, mines, and at docksides in order to
    earn their living (see Section 6.d.). Forced prostitution and
    trafficking in children for the purpose of forced prostitution are
    problems (see Sections 6.c., 6.d., 6.f.).
        Studies by the Government and international organizations indicate
    that there are at least 44,000 street children and possibly as many as
    100,000 nationwide. Welfare officials believe that the number is
    increasing as a result of widespread unemployment in rural areas. Many
    street children apparently are abandoned children engaged in scavenging
    or begging.
        The family court system that was instituted in 1998 has helped
    expedite juvenile and domestic relations cases and served to strengthen
    safeguards against the sale and trafficking of children abroad.
    Previously, less specialized courts had tended to regard children as
    extensions and property of the parents and to favor parental authority
    over the rights of a child.
        Greater public awareness eroded traditional reticence to report
    abuses against children. DSWD offices cared for children who were the
    victims of rape. The problem of foreign pedophiles continued to be
    reported in the press. The Government continued to prosecute accused
    pedophiles.
        In September the Government signed the Optional Protocol on the
    Convention on the Rights of the Child and on the Sale of Children,
    Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography. Despite government efforts
    at law enforcement and expanded children's programs, it is estimated
    that some 60,000 children are involved in the commercial sex industry.
    Most of these children were girls, and nearly all have dropped out of
    school. Children in the ``entertainment industry'' work long (10 to
    12), odd hours from evening until early morning. Typically they come
    from families with unemployed or irregularly employed parents.
        The NPA's use of children as armed combatants and noncombatants
    continued. According to UNICEF and AFP estimates, 3 percent of the more
    than 10,000 members of the NPA are boys and girls under the age of 18.
    However, from 20 to 25 percent of NPA new recruits reportedly are
    children. The NPA admits that members from 15 to 18 years of age are
    assigned to self-defense and noncombat duties and that in the event of
    ``enemy aggression or encroachment,'' weapons would be distributed to
    the oldest children first. In February the NPA announced that it would
    no longer accept recruits under the age of 18, based on instructions
    from the NDF (see Section 1.g.). The NDF instruction stated, however,
    that minors could still serve in noncombat positions.
        According the international NGO, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
    Soldiers, the MILF recruited children as young as 13 years of age to
    serve as reserve forces.
        On March 21, several government agencies, including the AFP and
    PNP, signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the handling and
    treatment of children involved in armed conflict. The MOA provides for
    the procedure to be followed from the time of rescue or surrender of
    the child until he or she is turned over to the DSWD for care and
    assistance. The MOA represents a shift in perspective, treating child
    insurgents as victims to be rescued and rehabilitated, rather than as
    enemies to be neutralized and prosecuted.
        As of October, the Government reported that 86 minors serving in
    the NPA had surrendered or been captured during the year. In November
    the PNP warned parents that the NPA was using false promises to lure
    minors to join.
        People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal physical
    access for the disabled to all public buildings and establishments and
    for ``the rehabilitation, self development, and self-reliance of
    disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of
    society.'' Advocates for the rights of the disabled contend that the
    law has been ineffective because implementing regulations have not been
    published, and because government programs are palliative rather than
    focused on reintegration. Reportedly only about 2 percent of an
    estimated 3.5 million disabled citizens received access to services.
        Indigenous People.--Indigenous people live throughout the country
    but primarily in the mountainous areas of northern and central Luzon
    and Mindanao. They account for about 18 percent of the national
    population. Although no specific laws discriminate against indigenous
    people, the remoteness of the areas that many inhabit and cultural bias
    prevent their full integration into society. Indigenous children suffer
    from lack of basic services, health, and education. Because they
    inhabit mountainous areas also favored by guerrillas, indigenous people
    suffer disproportionately from counterinsurgency operations.
        The 1997 Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which was intended to
    implement constitutional provisions to protect indigenous people,
    established a National Commission on Indigenous People, which is
    staffed by tribal members empowered to award certificates of title to
    lands claimed by over 12 million indigenous people in the country. It
    awards such ``ancestral domain lands'' on the basis of communal rather
    than individual ownership, impeding sale of the lands by tribal
    leaders. The law requires a process of ``informed'' consultation and
    written consent by the indigenous group to allow mining on tribal
    lands. The law also assigns the indigenous groups the responsibility to
    preserve forest, watershed, and biodiversity areas in their domains
    from inappropriate development. However, the Government has been slow
    to implement the legislation, since it faces strong opposition from
    mining and agribusiness interests.
        Other measures have affected indigenous communities in adverse
    ways. The 1995 Mining Act promoted mining operations, hydroelectric
    dams, and other large-scale projects that forced indigenous people to
    relocate and abandon farming and hunting land that they have used for
    generations.
        Indigenous people continued to face legal threats to their claims
    to ancestral lands from developers, mining interests, and local
    political interests. The Higaonon people in Mindanao continue to be
    deprived of portions of their ancestral land by a powerful local
    landowning family that forced their removal through a violent
    demolition conducted by the PNP and private security forces in 1997.
    The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines continues to express
    concern over the effects of existing and planned large-scale mining on
    the livelihood of the many indigenous people of Mindanao.
        Religious Minorities.--About 5 million Muslims, who constitute 7
    percent of the population, reside principally in Mindanao and nearby
    islands and are the largest single minority group in the country.
    Historically they have been alienated from the dominant Christian
    majority, and government efforts to integrate Muslims into the
    political and economic fabric of the country have met with only limited
    success. The national culture, with its emphasis on familial, tribal,
    and regional loyalties, creates informal barriers whereby access to
    jobs or resources is provided first to those of one's own family or
    group. Muslims continue to be underrepresented in senior civilian and
    military positions. Provinces in Mindanao that are predominantly Muslim
    lag behind the rest of the region in almost all aspects of
    socioeconomic development.
        Christian-Muslim relations were extremely strained during the year,
    due mainly to the intense fighting between the AFP and the insurgent
    MILF in Mindanao, hostage-taking by the terrorist ASG, and bombings in
    Mindanao and throughout the country. Brief, fruitless negotiations
    between the Government and the MILF were overshadowed by the military
    conflict. However, government efforts to reintegrate former Moro
    National Liberation Front (MNLF) insurgents into society continued with
    some success. The planned plebiscite for an expanded Autonomous Region
    of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) contemplated in the 1996 peace agreement
    between the Government and the MNLF again was postponed, as was a new
    election for ARMM officials.
        In June, following persistent reports that troops operating against
    Muslim separatists in Mindanao had desecrated mosques, the Secretary of
    National Defense ordered the AFP to refrain from such action. The DND
    issued codeofconduct instructions that included provisions that
    military offensives could not be begun during Muslim prayer hours
    ``unless absolutely required.''
        The Government placed responsibility on the MILF for mass killings
    on July 16 in Bumbaran, Lanao del Sur Province. Approximately 33
    civilians, all Christians, were forced by soldiers into a Muslim prayer
    house in the early morning. After a nearby battle during the day
    between the MILF and government forces, armed persons fired on the
    civilians in custody, killing 21 persons and injuring 9 others. The
    casualties included a pregnant woman and five children. After a
    subsequent investigation, the CHR stated that the perpetrators could
    have been non-MILF separatists posing as MILF members, and may have
    been renegade former members of the MNLF (see Section 1.g.).
        On August 27, unidentified persons attacked a vehicle and killed 12
    passengers, all Muslims, in Carmen, North Cotabato. The national
    Government blamed the MILF, but the provincial governor stated that
    those responsible may have been civilians seeking revenge on Muslims
    (see Section 1.g.).
        On December 28 in Jolo, Sulu, armed persons believed to be ASG
    members killed a Catholic priest, his driver, and two other persons
    (see Section 1.g.).

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and laws provide for
    the right of workers, including public employees, to form and join
    trade unions; however, while this right is exercised in practice,
    aspects of the public sector organization law restrict and discourage
    organizing. Trade unions are independent of the Government and
    generally free of political party control. Unions have the right to
    form or join federations or other labor groups.
        Although unions claimed to have organized about 12 percent of the
    total work force of 31 million, only about 540,000 workers, or about
    14.5 percent of union members, are covered by collective bargaining
    agreements. According to the DOLE Bureau of Labor Relations, the number
    of new union registrations has fallen continuously since 1995. The
    number of firms, primarily large employers, using ``contractual'' labor
    continued to grow.
        Subject to certain procedural restrictions, strikes in the private
    sector are legal. However, unions are required to provide strike
    notice, respect mandatory cooling-off periods, and obtain majority
    member approval before calling a strike. By law the reason for striking
    must be relevant to the labor contract or the law, and all means of
    reconciliation must be exhausted. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
    can intervene in some labor disputes by ``assuming jurisdiction'' and
    mandating a settlement if the Secretary decides that the industry
    involved in the strike is ``vital to national security.''
        In September port workers at the international container terminal
    in Manila struck in protest against illegal dismissals. One worker was
    killed, reportedly by company security guards, in violence that
    occurred when striking workers attempted to enter the company compound.
    The union reported that it observed nonunion workers at work in the
    compound. The strike ended when the National Labor Relations Commission
    (NLRC) issued a backtowork order.
        According the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
    (ICFTU), union officials can be dismissed and imprisoned for a maximum
    of 3 years for taking part in illegal strikes.
        Most strikes are legal. According to the ICFTU, union officials can
    be dismissed and imprisoned for a maximum of 3 years for taking part in
    illegal strikes. However, there are no recent reported cases in which
    this provision was enforced.
        Legislation that the ILO Committee of Experts criticized for
    placing undue restrictions on the right to strike in nonessential
    services remained unchanged. The Committee remained concerned by the
    imposition of penalties in cases where strikes were deemed illegal, by
    the restrictions on the right of government workers to strike, and by
    some restrictions on the right to organize and form a bargaining unit
    in conflict with ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association.
        The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) reported 60
    strikes during the year, compared with 58 strikes the previous year.
    There were 320,000 workdays lost to strikes, compared with 229,000 in
    1999. The average duration of strikes increased to 26 days during the
    year from 20 days in 1999.
        In March militant labor leaders who were conducting a religious
    service at a hotel against which they were striking were arrested when
    they refused police orders to disperse. Some protesters reportedly were
    injured, and 17 persons were arrested. In May 20 union members were
    arrested at the same hotel when police declared their picket line
    unlawful because it hindered the entrance of hotel guests.
        In November NPA members shot and injured a sugar plantation union
    leader and a policeman in Tarlac City. Prior to the attack, the union
    leader had led a rally at the regional office of the Department of
    Agrarian Reform to protest the plantation owners' stock distribution
    plans (see Section 1.c.).
        Longshoremen in Cebu returned to work without violent incidents
    during the year.
        There again were unpublished reports of routine management
    intimidation of union members.
        Unions have the right to affiliate with international trade union
    confederations and trade secretariats. Two of the largest trade union
    centers, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and the Federation
    of Free Workers, are affiliated with the ICFTU and the World
    Confederation of Labor, respectively.
        The ICFTU complained that a union can be registered only if it
    represents at least 20 percent of workers in a bargaining unit, and
    that the law requires what it considers to be an excessively high
    number of unions before a federation or national center can be formed.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
    Constitution provides for the right to organize and bargain
    collectively. The Labor Code provides for this right for employees both
    in the private sector and in governmentowned or controlled
    corporations. A similar right is afforded to most government workers,
    but senior employees, members of the military forces, and essential
    public service workers are not eligible.
        Allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with
    union activities are grounds for review as possible unfair labor
    practices before the quasi-judicial NLRC. However, unions often stated
    that widespread ignorance of basic standards and rights is a major
    obstacle to union organization. Before disputes reach the NLRC, the
    DOLE provides the services of the NCMB, which settles most of the
    unfair labor practice disputes raised as grounds for strikes before the
    strikes can be declared.
        An appeal submitted by the four Taiwanese companies located in
    export processing zones against orders for union elections to be held
    was still pending with the Labor Secretary. A total of 187 union
    officials were fined; there were no reports that these persons were
    reinstated.
        Labor law is uniform throughout the country, including the
    industrial zones, where tax benefits encourage the growth of export
    industries. However, local political leaders and officials who govern
    these special economic zones have tried to frustrate union organizing
    efforts by maintaining ``union free/strike free'' policies. A conflict
    over interpretation of the SEZ law's provisions for labor inspection
    has created further obstacles to enforcement of workers' rights to
    organize. Despite objections from the DOLE, SEZ local directors claim
    authority to conduct their own inspections as part of the zones'
    privileges intended by Congress. Hiring often is controlled tightly
    through ``SEZ labor centers,'' in which political ties to local figures
    play a role in gaining job eligibility. Despite sporadic labor unrest
    and some organizing efforts, union successes in the SEZ's have been few
    and marginal. Some mainstream unions avoid a major unionizing effort in
    the lowerwage SEZ industries, such as the garment industry. They
    consider it unpromising in view of both the organizers' restricted
    access to the closely guarded zones and the rapid turnover of the
    young, mainly female staff who work on shortterm contracts in the
    zones' many electronics and garment factories.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
    prohibited, including forced and bonded labor by children; however,
    despite the Government's generally effective prohibition of forced
    labor, there were some reports of forced or bonded labor by children,
    mainly in prostitution and other areas of the informal sector, as well
    as trafficking in women and children for forced prostitution. Over
    300,000 children 17 years of age or younger work as family domestic
    workers, for whom the minimum age is 15. Some recruiters reportedly
    bring girls between the ages of 13 and 17 to work in Manila or Cebu
    homes under terms that involve a ``loan'' advanced to their parents
    that the children are obliged to repay through their work. The DOLE
    continued to address the problem of underage workers in family work
    settings by prosecutions and fines of violators (see Sections 6.d. and
    6.f.). Some children reportedly worked to help their parents repay
    loans from planters. Trafficking in women and children for the purposes
    of prostitution and forced labor also are problems (see Section 6.f.).
        In July a 15-year-old worker reportedly escaped from a rice mill in
    Tayug, Pangasinan. The youth stated in an affidavit that he had been
    recruited by an employment agency and promised a job in Manila. Instead
    he was sent to the rice mill, where he was forced to work 12 hours per
    day, 7 days per week. The owner of the mill had been fined in January
    for employing eight minors (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
    of 15, except under the direct and sole responsibility of parents or
    guardians, or where employment in cinema, theater, radio, or television
    is essential to the integrity of the production. The Labor Code allows
    employment of those between the ages of 15 and 18 for such hours and
    periods of the day as are determined by the Secretary of Labor but
    forbids the employment of persons under 18 years of age in hazardous or
    dangerous work. However, a significant number of children are employed
    in the informal sector of the urban economy or as unpaid family workers
    in rural areas. According to a 1995 survey, there are at least 3.7
    million working children, approximately 2 million of whom are exposed
    to hazardous working environments.
        There are few child labor violations in the formal manufacturing
    sector. Most child labor is in the informal sector, most often in
    family settings, and the Government rarely if ever seeks to prosecute a
    poor family because they have a working child. However, children
    reportedly continue to be employed illegally on the docks of some
    Mindanao and Visayan ports. Working at a piece rate in the unloading of
    bulk cargo, the children earn far less than adults would demand for the
    same work even though they are exposed to harmful dust and chemicals in
    the ships' holds.
        Employment of children as divers in dangerous conditions on coral
    reef fishing vessels reportedly continued. The ILO-IPEC (International
    Program on the Elimination of Child Labor) project to address this
    question was ongoing at year's end.
        In Mindanao plantations growing bananas for export frequently used
    children as day laborers in trimming and fertilizing plants and
    clearing irrigation ditches.
        In October the Government ratified ILO Convention 182. The
    Government banned hazardous work by children in 1973, and in 1999 the
    DOLE issued an updated list of hazardous and deleterious work that is
    prohibited for persons under the age of 18. Legislation pending in the
    Congress would consolidate child labor laws and increase penalties for
    violations. The DOLE and other agencies continue to work closely with
    UNICEF and the ILO-IPEC to reduce violations of child labor laws.
        The DOLE works with domestic NGO's to educate communities on child
    labor and provides counseling and other activities for children. It
    uses fines and criminal prosecutions for child labor violations in the
    formal sector, such as manufacturing. During the year, it rescued 132
    child workers in 64 operations. The rescued children were working in
    factories, as domestic helpers, or as sex workers. In addition routine
    inspections through November revealed 31 establishments nationwide that
    employed a total of 50 children. About 35 of the minors rescued
    received back wages and other benefits from employers after
    intervention by the DOLE. Of the DOLE's 253 inspectors, only 22 have
    received training on child labor inspections.
        The DOLE reported that it had begun to investigate reports that
    more than 17,000 children were engaged in hazardous work in the
    Cordillera Administrative Region. Most of the children reportedly
    worked in the mining and quarrying industry under supervision of their
    parents.
        The DOLE continued to address the problem of underage workers in
    family work settings by prosecutions and fines of violators. The DOLE
    also works with NGO's and international organizations
        such as the UNICEF and ILO-IPEC to assist children to return to
    school. The DOLE also rescues child workers; the DSWD then assists them
    in obtaining social services.
        The Department of Education, Culture, and Sport participates in an
    interagency effort to return dropout children to school.
        In March the owner of a piggery and poultry farm in Bulacan was
    convicted of the violation of child labor laws.
        In March a massage parlor in Baguio City was found to be employing
    a minor. The mayor ordered the establishment closed.
        In June the DOLE and DSWD rescued 36 minors, mostly Muslims from
    Mindanao, from employment in a candle factory in Valenzuela City, Metro
    Manila. The raid was prompted by complaints filed by 62 other Muslims
    who had fled the factory earlier.
        In October a recruitment agency was raided by police, resulting in
    the rescue of 331 women and girls, some of them under the age of 21.
    The agency reportedly had been trafficking in women under 21 to work as
    entertainers in foreign countries, in violation of the law (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
        The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however,
    despite government enforcement efforts, there were reports of its use,
    mainly in the informal sector and prostitution (see Sections 6.c. and
    6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Tripartite regional wage boards
    set minimum wages. A round of wage increases was implemented in all
    regions of the country late in the year. The highest rates are in the
    National Capital Region (NCR) and the lowest in rural regions. The
    minimum daily wage for NCR nonagricultural workers is about $5.50 (250
    pesos), which does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
    and family. At this pay level, at least two family members would have
    to work full-time to support a family of six above the level of the
    Government's minimum daily cost of living for the Manila area. The
    lowest minimum wages are in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao,
    where the daily agricultural wage is approximately $2.90 (131 pesos).
    Large numbers of workers receive less than the minimum wage set for
    their area.
        Regional wage board orders cover all private sector workers except
    domestic servants and other persons employed in the personal service of
    another. Boards outside the NCR exempted some employers because of
    factors such as establishment size, industry sector, involvement with
    exports, financial distress, and level of capitalization. These
    exemptions excluded substantial additional numbers of workers from
    coverage under the law. Unions have filed complaints about the minimum
    wage exemption policies.
        Violation of minimum wage standards is common. Many firms hire
    employees at below the minimum apprentice rates, even if there is no
    approved training in their productionline work. DOLE officials estimate
    a 30 to 40 percent noncompliance rate with the minimum wage requirement
    and acknowledge that the shortage of inspectors makes the law difficult
    to enforce. In addition to fines, the Government also makes use of
    administrative procedures and moral suasion to encourage voluntary
    employer correction of violations.
        By law the standard legal workweek is 48 hours for most categories
    of industrial workers and 40 hours for government workers, with an 8-
    hour per day limit. An overtime rate of 125 percent of the hourly rate
    is mandated on ordinary days and 130 percent on rest days and holidays.
    The law mandates a full day of rest weekly. However, there is no legal
    limit on the number of overtime hours that an employer may require.
    Enforcement of work week hours is managed through periodic inspections
    by the DOLE.
        Several NGO's seek to protect the rights of the country's 5 to 6
    million overseas workers. The Government places financial sanctions and
    criminal charges on domestic recruiting agencies that are found guilty
    of unfair labor practices. Although the Philippine Overseas Employment
    Agency has registered and supervised domestic recruiters' practices
    successfully, the Government largely is unable to ensure workers'
    protection overseas. It seeks cooperation from receiving countries and
    proposes migrant worker rights conventions in international forums. The
    Government also provides assistance through its diplomatic missions in
    countries with substantial numbers of migrant workers. In May the
    President approved the establishment of a pension fund for overseas
    workers, special hospital and counseling services for the workers'
    families, and reintegration services, including housing and livelihood
    assistance.
        The law provides for a comprehensive set of occupational safety and
    health standards exists in the law. The DOLE has responsibility for
    policy formulation and review of these standards, but with fewer than
    300 inspectors nationwide, actual enforcement often is carried out by
    local authorities. DOLE officials acknowledge that their 253 inspectors
    are not adequate for the number of work sites in need of visits.
    Statistics on actual work-related accidents and illnesses are
    incomplete, as incidents (especially in agriculture) are underreported.
    Workers do not have a legally protected right to remove themselves from
    dangerous work situations without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit
    trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women and children is a
    serious problem. The Government used five laws against related illegal
    commerce to address trafficking. The Philippines is a source,
    destination, and a transit point for trafficking in persons. Of those
    persons trafficking through the country, many are from China, bound for
    Pacific island nations.
        Many women seek employment overseas and are particularly vulnerable
    to exploitation by unethical recruiters who promise attractive jobs or,
    in some cases, arrange marriages with foreign men. Some eventually work
    as prostitutes or suffer abuse by their foreign employers or husbands.
    Those recruited to work as maids, entertainers, or models overseas may
    be forced to participate in public shows or dances where nudity and the
    prospect of sex are the principal attractions to clients. Other persons
    knowingly accept questionable jobs to support parents, children, or
    siblings with their remittances. There were reports of forced
    prostitution of children (see Section 6.c.).
        In June the DOLE and DSWD rescued 36 minors, mostly Muslims from
    Mindanao, from employment in a candle factory in Valenzuela City, Metro
    Manila. The raid was prompted by complaints filed by 62 other Muslims
    who had fled the factory earlier (see Section 6.d.).
        In October a recruitment agency was raided by police, resulting in
    the rescue of 331 women and girls, some of them under the age of 21.
    The agency reportedly had been trafficking in women under 21 to work as
    entertainers in foreign countries, in violation of the law (see
    Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
        There were no prosecutions for trafficking in humans during the
    year; however, in August two women suspected of trafficking in children
    were charged with violations of the Passport Law.
        Within the country, child trafficking by illegal recruiters often
    brought children from poor rural areas to low-paying jobs in cities.
    Over 300,000 children 17 years of age and younger work as family
    domestic workers, for whom the minimum age is 15. Some recruiters
    reportedly bring girls between the ages of 13 and 17 to work in Manila
    or Cebu homes under terms that involve a ``loan'' advanced to their
    parents that the children are obliged to repay through their work. The
    DOLE continued to address the problem of underage workers in family
    work settings by prosecutions and fines of violators (see Section 6.c.
    and 6.d.).
        The DSWD, which is the lead agency in public assistance to victims
    of trafficking, continued to provide temporary shelter and counseling
    to women trapped in prostitution, but officials believe that this
    helped only a small number of victims of illicit recruitment (see
    Section 5). It also offered livelihood skills development and other
    services. DSWD officials noted that the number rescued failed to
    reflect the true extent of the prostitution problem since it reflected
    only those who obtained temporary shelter and counseling through the
    DSWD and local governments.
        The 1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act was enacted to
    provide the Government with greater financial resources and improved
    authority to combat such problems. However, NGO's believe that these
    measures have not been adequate since traffickers remain numerous and
    effective in luring women with promises of lucrative overseas
    contracts.
        The Government's NCRFW is the lead agency on women's issues,
    including trafficking. Its principal function is to coordinate the
    implementation of government programs on the integration of women in
    national development. It monitors compliance with laws on equal
    treatment and protection of women and serves as a clearinghouse for
    related information.
        In 1999 the Department of Foreign Affairs established an internal
    task force on trafficking in humans. Within the DOLE, the Bureau of
    Women's Affairs, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, and the
    Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) work on different
    aspects of the trafficking problem. The POEA, an attached agency of the
    DOLE, continued its efforts to end illegal recruiting. As of August, it
    had closed 125 firms for illegal recruitment. It also has raised the
    age, educational requirements, and professional standards for young
    women seeking jobs abroad and tried to discourage employment migration.
    Several Cabinet departments, presidential commissions, and legislators
    also are involved in vigorous public awareness campaigns.
        The CHR investigates violations of the rights of trafficking
    victims and establishes cases for prosecution. It conducts public
    information and sectoral education campaigns, and provides human rights
    training for other government agencies, including the PNP.
        The Government, in cooperation with the U.N. Center for
    International Crime Prevention and the U.N. Interregional Crime and
    Justice Research Institute, also is implementing a demonstration
    project in the country aimed at improving interagency coordination,
    strengthening law enforcement, and developing strategies to assist
    victims.
        In March a Manila meeting of the Asian Regional Initiative Against
    Trafficking (ARIAT) developed a Regional Plan of Action on trafficking
    in persons, especially in women and children. ARIAT was the first
    regional meeting to address all problems related to trafficking in
    persons. The Regional Action Plan includes strategies for combating
    trafficking from the AsiaPacific Region as well as to and within the
    region.
                                   __________

                                     SAMOA

        Samoa is a parliamentary democracy that incorporates certain
    traditional practices into its legislative system. The Constitution of
    this Pacific island country of approximately 170,000 persons provides
    for a head of state; a unicameral legislature composed of family heads,
    or ``matai,'' who are elected by universal suffrage; the protection of
    land rights and traditional titles; and other fundamental rights and
    freedoms. Executive authority is vested in the Head of State with the
    Government administered by the Cabinet, which consists of the Prime
    Minister and 12 ministers chosen by him. All laws passed by the
    Legislative Assembly need the approval of the Head of State, Malietoa
    Tanumafili II, who holds the position for life. The Legislative
    Assembly is to elect his successors for 5-year terms. The judiciary is
    independent.
        The country does not have a defense force. The small national
    police force is controlled by the Government but has little effect
    beyond Apia, the capital city. Enforcement of rules and security within
    individual villages is vested in the ``fono'' (Council of Matai), which
    settles most internal disputes. Judgments by the fono usually involve
    fines or, more rarely, banishment from the village.
        The country is poor with a market-based economy in which more than
    60 percent of the work force are employed in the agricultural sector.
    Fish, kava, and coconut products are the principal exports. The small
    industrial sector is dominated by a Japanese factory that assembles
    automotive electrical parts for export. The Government continues an
    effort to promote tourism. Per capita gross domestic product is $1,100
    per year. The country is heavily dependent on foreign aid and on
    remittances sent to family members by the more than 100,000 Samoans
    living overseas.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens. Principal human rights abuses arise from political
    discrimination against women and nonmatai, and violence against women
    and children. Societal pressures and customary law may interfere with
    the ability to conduct fair trials. Those who do not conform to
    accepted societal values may face pressure, threats, violence, and
    banishment. There are some restrictions on freedom of speech, press,
    and religion. An August Supreme Court ruling ordered government-
    controlled media to allow opposition parties access, and in July the
    Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may not be used to
    infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech, assembly, or
    association.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        Three persons were convicted and sentenced to death for the July
    1999 murder of Minister of Public Works Luaglau Levaula Kamu: The
    former Minister of Women's Affairs Luagalau Levaulu Kama; his son,
    Eletise Leafa Vitale; and the former Minister of Telecommunications,
    Toi Aokuso Cain. The Head of State commuted the death sentences to life
    in prison for all three.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
    reports that officials practiced them.
        Although jail conditions are fairly basic with respect to food and
    sanitation, they appear to meet minimum international standards, and
    there have been no reports of abuses in prisons. While there are human
    rights groups, the question of monitoring prison conditions by them has
    not arisen. Prison visits by family members and church representatives
    are permitted.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
    arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
    these prohibitions. However, villages are governed by customary law,
    and the fono may mete out banishment when deemed necessary. Banishment
    is one of the harshest forms of punishment in this collective society.
    Civil courts have overruled banishment orders. In July the Supreme
    Court ordered the reinstatement of 32 persons who were banished from a
    village for practicing a religion other than that traditionally
    practiced in the village (see Section 2.c.).
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
    practice.
        The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and this is
    honored by the official court system. However, many civil and criminal
    matters are not handled by courts but by village fono, which vary
    considerably both in their decisionmaking style and in the number of
    matai involved in the decisions. The 1990 Village Fono Act gives legal
    recognition to the decisions of the fono and provides for limited
    recourse of appeal to the Lands and Titles Courts and to the Supreme
    Court. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may
    not be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech,
    assembly, or association (see Section 2.c.).
        The judiciary consists of the magistrates' courts, the coroners'
    courts, and the Lands and Titles Court, with the High or Supreme Court
    at the apex of the system.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The law provides substantive and procedural safeguards
    from invasion of the home or seizure of property, including a
    requirement for search warrants, which are issued by the judicial
    branch. However, there is little or no privacy in villages. While
    village officials by law must have permission to enter homes, there can
    be substantial societal pressure to grant such permission.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
    respects these rights in practice. In August the Supreme Court
    overturned a 1997 ban by the then Prime Minister on coverage of the
    leader of the opposition on state-run radio and television stations. In
    practice the Government's ban largely had been symbolic, since
    opposition statements received prominent coverage in the private news
    media. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may
    not be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech,
    assembly, or association (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
        The Newspapers and Printers Act and the Defamation Act require
    journalists to reveal their sources in the event of a defamation suit
    against them. There has been no court case requiring that these acts be
    invoked.
        In February the Supreme Court dismissed a petition brought by
    government-owned Polynesian Airlines against the independent newspaper
    the Samoa Observer that asked the court to jail the newspaper's
    editors. In 1999 the Supreme Court had granted Polynesian Airlines an
    injunction to prevent the newspaper from publishing news about the
    company's expenses for senior staff, and the airline filed the petition
    in response to a subsequent editorial about the incident.
        Two English-language newspapers and a number of Samoan-language
    newspapers are printed regularly. The Government operates a radio
    station and the sole television station. There are two private radio
    stations, and a satellite-cable system is now available in parts of
    Apia. Television from American Samoa is readily available. Internet use
    is expanding rapidly, both as a news source, and as a means of two-way
    communication; there has been no government interference with its use.
        The Government respects academic freedom.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
    practice. In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may
    not be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech,
    assembly, or association (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion along with freedom of thought and conscience, and the
    Government generally respects these rights in practice; however, local
    officials at times infringe on these rights.
        The preamble to the Constitution acknowledges ``an Independent
    State based on Christian principles and Samoan custom and traditions.''
    Nevertheless, while Christianity is constitutionally favored, there is
    no official or state denomination.
        Although the Constitution grants each person the right to change
    religion or belief and to worship or teach religion alone or with
    others, in practice the matai often choose the religious denomination
    of the aiga (extended family). Despite the constitutional protection,
    village councils--in the name of maintaining social harmony within the
    village--sometimes banish or punish families that do not adhere to the
    prevailing religious belief in the village.
        In June the Supreme Court ordered the release of 42 Bible study
    group members, whom their village fono had ordered jailed because they
    violated a village law banning practice of any but the village
    majority's religion.
        In July the Supreme Court ruled that the Village Fono Act may not
    be used to infringe upon villagers' freedom of religion, speech,
    assembly, or association. The plaintiffs had complained that the
    village matai in Saipipi village had prohibited them from conducting
    Bible classes or church services on the village's communal land and
    limited the number of churches allowed in the village (see Section
    1.d.).
        Missionaries operate freely, either as part of one of the
    established churches, or by conducting independent revival meetings.
    The major denominations (for example, Congregational, Methodist,
    Catholic, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) that are
    present in the country also have missionaries. There is an independent
    Christian radio and television station.
        The Constitution provides freedom from unwanted religious
    indoctrination in schools but gives each denomination or religion the
    right to establish its own schools; these provisions are adhered to in
    practice. There are both religious and public schools; the public
    schools do not have religious instruction as part of their curriculum.
    There are pastoral schools in most villages to provide religious
    instruction following school hours.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    internal movement, but in practice some citizens have been banished
    either from village activities or completely from their villages. The
    Government actively supports emigration as a ``safety valve'' for
    pressures of a growing population, especially for potentially
    rebellious youths, and because it generates foreign income through
    remittances. There are an estimated 100,000 Samoans living abroad and
    their remittances make an important contribution to the national
    economy. The Government does not restrict foreign travel arbitrarily or
    the right of citizens to return from abroad.
        Samoa has not had any refugees or asylum seekers. It is a signatory
    to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees;
    however, the Government has not enacted enabling legislation or
    formulated a policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum.
    However, the authorities have indicated that they would conform to
    international norms if such cases should arise.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens have the right to change their government through direct,
    multiparty elections; however, women's political rights are restricted
    by the fact that few of them are matai. While all citizens above the
    age of 21 may vote, the right to run for 47 of the 49 seats in the
    Legislative Assembly remains the prerogative of the approximately
    25,000 matai, 95 percent of whom are men. The remaining two seats are
    reserved for citizens not of Samoan heritage. Matai continue to control
    local government through the village fono, which are open to them
    alone.
        The political process is more a function of personal leadership
    characteristics than of party. The Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP)
    has dominated the political process, winning five consecutive elections
    since 1982. The 1996 general elections again gave the HRPP a majority,
    but in 1998 ill health forced then-Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana
    to resign. The HRPP caucus selected former Deputy Prime Minister
    Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi as Acting Prime Minister. Tofilau died in
    March 1999, and Tuilaepa became Prime Minister. Although candidates are
    free to propose themselves for electoral office, in practice they
    require the approval of the village high chiefs. Those who ran in the
    1996 elections despite fono objections faced ostracism and even
    banishment from their village. Following the 1996 elections, there were
    multiple charges of fraud and bribery. Four elections subsequently were
    overturned by the Supreme Court, and by-elections were held.
        Elections are scheduled for April 2001, and Parliament is
    considering an amendment to the Elections Law, which would require
    anyone planning to run to have resided in the country continuously for
    3 years.
        There are no prohibitions on the formation of opposition parties,
    and there are a total of five political parties, two of which are
    represented in Parliament.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
    they occasionally reach high public office. The 12-member Cabinet has 1
    female member, and women hold 3 of the 49 seats in the Legislative
    Assembly.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A number of human rights groups operated without government
    restriction. Government officials usually are cooperative.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
    religion, disability, language, or social status. Society is
    homogeneous with no significant ethnic minorities. Politics and culture
    are the product of a heritage of chiefly privilege and power, and
    members of certain families have some advantages. While there is
    discrimination against women and nonmatai who only occasionally may
    reach high office, women (and particularly female matai) play an
    important role in society.
        Women.--While the law prohibits the abuse of women, social custom
    tolerates their physical abuse within the home. The role and rights of
    the village fono and tradition prevent police from interfering in
    instances of domestic violence, unless there is a complaint from the
    victim--which village custom strongly discourages. While police receive
    some complaints from abused women, domestic violence offenders
    typically are punished by village councils, but only if the abuse is
    considered extreme (i.e., visible signs of physical abuse). The village
    religious leader also may intervene in domestic disputes.
        The State punishes persons responsible for extreme assault cases,
    including by imprisonment.
        Many cases of rape still go unreported because tradition and custom
    discourage such reporting. Despite such discouragement, the authorities
    note a greater number of reported cases of rape, as women slowly become
    more forthcoming with the police. Rape cases that reach the courts are
    treated seriously. Convicted offenders often are given relatively stiff
    sentences of several years' imprisonment.
        The traditional subordinate role of women is changing, albeit
    slowly, especially in the more conservative parts of society. The
    Ministry of Women's Affairs oversees and helps secure the rights of
    women.
        Children.--The Government has made a strong commitment to the
    welfare of children through the implementation of various youth
    programs by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health.
    Education is free and compulsory through age 16. Law and tradition
    prohibit severe abuse of children, but tradition tolerates corporal
    punishment. The police have noted an increase in reported cases of
    child abuse, which was attributed to citizens becoming more aware of
    the need to report physical, emotional, and sexual abuse of children.
        Three behavior modification camps for expatriate children with
    emotional or behavior problems exist in the country. They are not
    supervised closely, but are not known to be abusive to the children in
    their care.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has passed no legislation
    pertaining to the status of disabled persons or regarding accessibility
    for the disabled. Tradition dictates that the family cares for a
    disabled person, and this custom is observed widely in practice.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers legally have unrestricted
    rights to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. There
    are two trade unions in the country. The Samoa National Union,
    organized in 1994, is a six-member association that includes workers
    from the three major banks. A second union represents members at the
    sole factory in the country. Both unions are independent of the
    Government and political parties. There are no laws specific to union
    activity. The Commissioner of Labor adjudicates any cases of
    retribution against strikers or union leaders on a case-by-case basis.
        The Public Service Association, which represents government workers
    (an increasingly important sector of the work force), also functions as
    a union. The Supreme Court has upheld the right of government workers
    to strike, subject to certain restrictions imposed principally for
    reasons of public safety. Workers in the private sector have the right
    to strike, but there were no strikes during the year. The Public
    Service Association freely maintains relations with international
    bodies and participates in bilateral exchanges.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While workers
    have the legal right to engage in collective bargaining, they seldom
    have practiced it, due to the novelty of union activity and the
    inexperience of union leaders. The Public Service Association engages
    in collective bargaining on behalf of government workers, including
    bargaining on wages. In June the Nurses Union successfully negotiated a
    modest pay increase.
        An advisory commission to the Minister of Labor sets minimum wages.
    Wages in the private sector are determined by competitive demand for
    the required skills. Any antiunion discrimination case would be
    reported to and adjudicated by the Commissioner of Labor. Arbitration
    and mediation procedures are in place to resolve labor disputes,
    although such disputes rarely arise.
        Labor law and practice in the one export processing zone are the
    same as in the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is
    prohibited by law, and the Government respects this prohibition in
    practice; however, in this collective society persons, including
    minors, frequently are called upon to work for their villages. Most
    persons do so willingly; however, the matai may compel those who do not
    (see Section 6.d.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Under the 1972 Labor and Employment Act (LEA), as amended,
    it is illegal to employ children under 15 years of age except in ``safe
    and light work.'' The Commissioner of Labor refers complaints about
    illegal child labor to the Attorney General for enforcement. Children
    frequently are seen vending goods and food on Apia street corners.
    Although the practice constitutes a violation of the LEA, local
    officials mostly tolerate and overlook it. There are no reports of
    bonded labor by children, but the LEA does not apply to service
    rendered to the matai, some of whom require children to work for the
    village, primarily on village farms (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The LEA established for the
    private sector a 40-hour workweek and an hourly minimum wage of $0.47
    (WS$ 1.40). This minimum wage suffices for a basic standard of living
    for worker and family when supplemented by the subsistence farming and
    fishing in which most families engage. The act provides that no worker
    should be required to work for more than 40 hours in any week.
        The act also establishes certain rudimentary safety and health
    standards, which the Attorney General is responsible for enforcing.
    However, independent observers report that the safety laws are not
    enforced strictly except when accidents highlight noncompliance. Many
    agricultural workers, among others, are inadequately protected from
    pesticides and other dangers to health. Government education programs
    are addressing these concerns. The act does not apply to service
    rendered to the matai. While the act does not specifically address the
    right of workers to remove themselves from a dangerous work situation,
    a report of such a case to the Commissioner of Labor would prompt an
    investigation, without jeopardy to continued employment. Government
    employees are covered under different and more stringent regulations,
    which are enforced adequately by the Public Service Commission.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
    persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to,
    from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                   SINGAPORE

        Singapore is a parliamentary republic in which politics is
    dominated overwhelmingly by the People's Action Party (PAP), which has
    held power uninterruptedly since Singapore gained autonomy from the
    United Kingdom in 1959. Opposition parties exist and regularly contest
    elections; however, the PAP holds 80 of 83 elected parliamentary seats
    (1 is vacant) and all ministerial positions. Elections take place at
    regular, constitutionally mandated intervals. The judiciary is
    efficient and constitutionally independent; however, there has been a
    perception that it reflects the views of the executive in politically
    sensitive cases as government leaders historically have utilized court
    proceedings, in particular defamation suits, against political
    opponents and critics.
        The police are responsible for routine security within the country
    and for the protection of the borders, including action against illegal
    immigrants and patrolling the island's territorial waters. The military
    forces are responsible for external defense. The Internal Security
    Department (ISD) in the Ministry of Home Affairs is authorized by the
    Internal Security Act (ISA) to counter such perceived threats to the
    nation's security as espionage, international terrorism, threats to
    racial and religious harmony, and subversion. The Government's use of
    the ISA to control what it considers serious security threats has
    decreased. The civilian Government maintains tight control over all
    security activities. There were reports that members of the security
    forces occasionally committed human rights abuses.
        Singapore has a free market economic system. Financial and business
    services industries, manufacturing of semiconductors and
    telecommunications equipment, and petroleum refining and petrochemical
    production are key sectors of the economy. The Government has
    liberalized broadly market access for telecommunications and financial
    services providers. Economic growth increased to an estimated 10.1
    percent during the year, improving on the 5.6 percent registered in
    1999. Per capita gross domestic product was estimated at $23,383.
    Wealth is distributed broadly and the unemployment rate is low.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were significant problems in some areas. The
    Government has wide powers to limit citizens' rights and to handicap
    political opposition. There were occasional instances of police abuse;
    however, the Government investigates and punishes those found guilty,
    and the media fully cover allegations of mistreatment. Caning, in
    addition to imprisonment, is a routine punishment for numerous
    offenses. The Government continues to rely on preventive detention to
    deal with espionage, organized crime, and narcotics. The authorities
    sometimes infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
        The Government did not change the wide array of laws and government
    practices, or the informal methods of government influence, that
    continue to restrict freedom of speech and the press significantly and
    limit other civil and political rights. Government intimidation and
    pressure to conform result in the practice of self-censorship among
    journalists. Government leaders historically have utilized court
    proceedings, in particular defamation suits, against political
    opponents and critics. These suits, which consistently have been
    decided in favor of government plaintiffs, have chilled political
    speech and action, and created a perception that the ruling party uses
    the judicial system for political purposes. While no new defamation
    suits were filed during the year, some opposition leaders remain at
    risk of bankruptcy because of efforts by ruling party members to
    collect damages awarded in previous years. In June an opposition party
    leader lost a legal appeal to forestall payment of damages stemming
    from a 1998 defamation lawsuit filed against him by PAP members. There
    was a moderate level of ongoing debate in newspapers and Internet chat
    groups on various public issues, and the Government established a
    Speakers' Corner in a public park to facilitate the ability of persons
    to speak in public on a range of issues. However, government
    restrictions on such persons still inhibited their ability to speak
    freely. The Government significantly restricts freedom of assembly and
    association. Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church are banned;
    however, freedom of religion otherwise generally is respected. There is
    some legal discrimination against women, which affects benefits for
    children and husbands in limited cases. The Government has moved
    actively to counter societal discrimination against women and
    minorities, but violence and some discrimination against women and
    reports of trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution
    persist. Foreign workers are vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, there were occasional
    instances of police mistreatment of detainees, and there were a few
    reports of police abuse during the year. The media report fully on
    allegations of police abuse of those arrested, and the Government takes
    action against abusers. The press reported that approximately 10 law
    enforcement officers were jailed for using excessive force on prisoners
    and suspects since 1995. In March a court disallowed the confession of
    a youth who had alleged that police beat him to force his confession to
    the sale of pirated video disks after a January 1999 arrest. The court
    ruled that it could not be certain that the admission was made
    voluntarily. In 1999 56 complaints of police abuse of detainees were
    filed, of which 7 were substantiated.
        The Penal Code mandates caning, in addition to imprisonment, as
    punishment for some 30 offenses involving the use of violence or threat
    of violence against a person, such as rape and robbery, and also for
    such nonviolent offenses as vandalism, drug trafficking, and violation
    of immigration laws. Caning is discretionary for convictions on other
    charges involving the use of criminal force, such as kidnaping, or
    voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Women, men over age 50 or under age
    16, and those determined unfit by a medical officer are exempted from
    punishment by caning. Although current statistics are not available,
    caning is a commonly administered punishment within the stipulations of
    the law. Prison conditions generally are good and meet minimum
    international standards.
        The Government does not allow human rights monitors to visit
    prisons.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides that,
    in most instances, arrests are to be carried out following the issuance
    of an authorized warrant; however, some laws provide for arrests
    without warrants. Those arrested must be charged before a magistrate
    within 48 hours. The great majority of those arrested are charged
    expeditiously and brought to trial. Those who face criminal charges are
    allowed counsel, and the Law Society of Singapore administers a
    criminal legal aid plan for those who cannot afford to hire an
    attorney. A functioning system of bail exists for persons who are
    charged. In death penalty cases, the Supreme Court appoints two
    attorneys for defendants who are unable to afford their own counsel.
        Some laws--the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law
    (Temporary Provisions) Act (CLA), the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), and
    the Undesirable Publications Act (UPA)--have provisions for arrest
    without warrant. The ISA historically is employed primarily against
    suspected Communist-related security threats. The CLA historically has
    been employed primarily against suspected organized crime (i.e., mainly
    secret society activities), and drug trafficking; however, it also has
    been used against suspected espionage activities. Opposition
    politicians have called for the abolition of the ISA, but the
    Government has rejected these calls, claiming that citizens accept the
    act as an element of the nation's security.
        The ISA and the CLA permit preventive detention without trial for
    the protection of public security or safety or the maintenance of
    public order. The ISA gives broad discretion to the Minister for Home
    Affairs to order detention without charges at the direction of the
    President, if the latter determines that a person poses a threat to
    national security. The initial detention may be for up to 2 years and
    may be renewed without limitation for additional periods up to 2 years
    at a time. Detainees have a right to be informed of the grounds for
    their detention and are entitled to counsel. However, they have no
    right to challenge the substantive basis for their detention through
    the courts. The ISA specifically excludes recourse to the normal
    judicial system for review of a detention order made under its
    authority. Instead detainees may make representations to an advisory
    board, headed by a Supreme Court justice, which reviews each detainee's
    case periodically and must make a recommendation to the President
    within 3 months of the initial detention. The President may concur with
    the advisory board's recommendation that a detainee be released prior
    to the expiration of the detention order but is not obligated to do so.
        No one was detained under the ISA from 1989 through 1996. Two
    persons were detained in 1997, and four in 1998, all for alleged
    espionage. As of August, only one of these persons remained in
    detention; four had been released by the end of 1998. There were no
    reports of any new detentions under the ISA during the year.
        The CLA comes up for renewal every 5 years; it was strengthened and
    extended for another 5 years in April 1999. Under its provisions, the
    Minister for Home Affairs may order preventive detention, with the
    concurrence of the Public Prosecutor, for an initial period of 1 year,
    and the President may extend detention for additional periods up to 1
    year at a time. The Minister must provide a written statement of the
    grounds for detention to the Criminal Law Advisory Committee (CLAC)
    within 28 days of making the order. The CLAC then reviews the case at a
    private hearing. CLAC rules require detainees to be notified of the
    grounds of their detention at least 10 days prior to the hearing. The
    detainee may represent himself or be represented by a lawyer. After the
    hearing, the Committee makes a written recommendation to the President,
    who may cancel, confirm, or amend the detention order. However, persons
    detained under the CLA may have recourse to the courts via an
    application of a writ of habeas corpus. Persons detained without trial
    under the CLA are entitled to counsel but only may challenge the
    substantive basis for their detention to the CLAC. The CLA is used
    almost exclusively in cases involving narcotics and secret criminal
    societies and has not been used for political purposes. According to
    official figures, less than 400 persons were detained under the
    provisions of the CLA through June, a decrease from the 450 persons
    detained at the end of 1998.
        Persons who allege mistreatment under detention may bring criminal
    charges against government officials who are alleged to have committed
    such acts; there were no reports during the year that persons were
    discouraged from making such accusations by fear of official
    retaliation (see Section 1.e.).
        Both the ISA and the CLA contain provisions that allow for such
    modified forms of detention as curfews, residence limitations,
    requirements to report regularly to the authorities, limitations on
    travel, or, in the case of the ISA, restrictions on political
    activities and association.
        The MDA permits detention without trial. Under the MDA, the
    director of the CNB also may commit--without trial--suspected drug
    abusers to a drug rehabilitation center for up to 3 years. At the end
    of 1998, almost 5,000 persons were detained under the provisions of the
    MDA for treatment and rehabilitation. Under the Intoxicating Substances
    Act, the CNB director may order the treatment for rehabilitation of a
    person believed to be an inhalant drug abuser for up to 6 months.
        The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects the
    prohibition in practice.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
    provision; however, laws that limit judicial review allow for some
    restrictions in practice. Some judicial officials, especially Supreme
    Court judges, have ties to the ruling party and its leaders. However,
    these ties generally do not appear to influence the judiciary's
    independence. The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court on the
    recommendation of the Prime Minister in consultation with the Chief
    Justice. The President also appoints subordinate court judges on the
    recommendation of the Chief Justice. The term of appointment is
    determined by the Legal Service Commission, of which the Chief Justice
    is the chairman. The 1989 constitutional amendments that eliminated
    judicial review of the objective grounds for detention under the ISA
    and subversion laws allow the Government to restrict, or even
    eliminate, judicial review in such cases and thereby restrict, on
    vaguely defined national security grounds, the scope of certain
    fundamental liberties provided for in the Constitution. Under the ISA
    and the CLA, the President and the Minister of Home Affairs have
    substantial de facto judicial power, which explicitly (in the case of
    the ISA) or implicitly (in the case of the CLA) excludes normal
    judicial review.
        Government leaders historically have used court proceedings, in
    particular defamation suits, against political opponents and critics
    (see Sections 2.a. and 3.). Both this practice and consistent awards in
    favor of government plaintiffs have raised questions about the
    relationship between the Government and the judiciary and led to a
    perception that the judiciary reflects the views of the executive in
    politically sensitive cases. Two cases from the most recent elections--
    defamation actions against Workers' Party (WP) politicians Tang Liang
    Hong and J.B. Jeyaretnam for statements they made during the campaign
    (see Sections 2.a. and 3)--perpetuated the perception of undue judicial
    sympathy for government plaintiffs.
        The judicial system has two levels of courts: The Supreme Court,
    which includes the High Court and the Court of Appeal; and the
    subordinate courts. Subordinate court judges and magistrates, as well
    as public prosecutors, are civil servants whose specific assignments
    are determined by the Legal Service Commission, which can decide on job
    transfers to any of several legal service departments. The subordinate
    courts handle the great majority of civil and criminal cases in the
    first instance. The High Court may hear any civil or criminal case,
    although it generally limits itself to civil matters involving
    substantial claims and criminal matters carrying the death penalty or
    imprisonment of more than 10 years. The Court of Appeal is the highest
    and final court of review for matters decided in the subordinate courts
    or the High Court. In addition the law provides for Islamic courts
    whose authority is limited to Islamic family law.
        If they wish, Supreme Court Justices may remain in office until the
    mandatory retirement age of 65, after which they may continue to serve
    at the Government's discretion for brief, renewable terms at full
    salary. The Constitution has a provision for the Prime Minister or the
    Chief Justice to convene a tribunal in order to remove a justice ``on
    the ground of misbehavior or inability...to properly discharge the
    functions'' of office, but it has never been used.
        The judicial system provides citizens with an efficient judicial
    process. In normal cases, the Criminal Procedures Code provides that a
    charge against a defendant must be read and explained to him as soon as
    it is framed by the prosecution or the magistrate. Defendants enjoy a
    presumption of innocence and the right of appeal, in most cases. They
    have the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by an
    attorney, to confront witnesses against them, to provide witnesses and
    evidence on their own behalf, and to review government-held evidence
    relevant to their cases. Trials are public and by judge. There are no
    jury trials.
        The Constitution extends these rights to all citizens. However,
    persons detained under the ISA or CLA are not entitled to a public
    trial. In addition proceedings of the advisory board under the ISA and
    CLA are not public (see Section 1.d.).
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Government generally respects the privacy of homes
    and families; however, it has a pervasive influence over civic and
    economic life and sometimes uses its wide discretionary powers to
    infringe on these rights. Normally, the police must have a warrant
    issued by a magistrate's court to conduct a search. However, they may
    search a person, home, or property without a warrant if they decide
    that such a search is necessary to preserve evidence. The Government
    has wide discretionary powers under the ISA, CLA, MDA, and UPA to
    conduct searches without a warrant if it determines that national
    security, public safety or order, or the public interest are at issue.
    Defendants may request judicial review of such searches.
        Divisions of the Government's law enforcement agencies, including
    the Internal Security Department and the Corrupt Practices
    Investigation Board, have wide networks for gathering information and
    highly sophisticated capabilities to monitor telephone and other
    private conversations and conduct surveillance. It is believed that the
    authorities routinely monitor telephone conversations and use of the
    Internet; however, there were no confirmed reports of such practices
    during the year. The law permits government monitoring of Internet use.
    In April 1999, the Ministry of Home Affairs probed the computers of
    200,000 customers of an Internet service provider (ISP) for evidence of
    a computer virus infection. After a public controversy, the Ministry
    announced in May 1999 that it would reject future requests to conduct
    such probes, and the National Information Technology Committee within
    the Ministry of Home Affairs developed guidelines for ISP conduct later
    that year. It is widely believed that the authorities routinely
    conducted surveillance on some opposition politicians and other
    government critics; however, no such reports were substantiated during
    the year.
        The Government is active in some areas normally considered private,
    in pursuit of what it considers the public interest. For example the
    Government continues to enforce ethnic ratios for publicly subsidized
    housing, where the majority of citizens live and own their own units,
    designed to achieve an ethnic mix more or less in proportion to that in
    the society at large.
        The Government does not permit the import of newspapers from
    Malaysia and bans or restricts the import of other publications (see
    Section 2.a.). However, it does not block Internet access to these
    publications.
        Malaysian and Indonesian television and radio programming may be
    received, but satellite dishes are banned, with few exceptions. The
    Government stated that it would review the restriction on satellite
    dishes in 2002 (see Section 2.a.).

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and expression but permits official restrictions on
    these rights, and in practice the Government significantly restricts
    freedom of speech and of the press. The Government's authoritarian
    style has fostered an atmosphere inimical to fully free speech and the
    press. Government intimidation and pressure to conform result in the
    practice of self-censorship among journalists; however, there was some
    limited progress towards greater openness during the year, including a
    moderate level of ongoing debate in newspapers and Internet chat groups
    on various public issues.
        Under the ISA, the Government may restrict or to place conditions
    on publications that incite violence, that counsel disobedience to the
    law, that might arouse tensions among the various segments of the
    population (races, religions, and language groups), or that might
    threaten national interests, national security, or public order. While
    the ISA rarely has been invoked recently, political opposition and
    criticism remain restricted by the Government's power to define these
    restrictive powers broadly. Occasional government references during
    controversies to speech that it considers ``out-of-bounds'' are
    understood to be implicit threats to invoke the ISA; however, these
    limits are not codified, and journalists and others generally believe
    that these limitations have shifted toward greater tolerance in recent
    years.
        Government leaders often have challenged publicly the legitimacy of
    political speech articulated outside what they call the ``Western
    model'' of journalism, in which the Government claims that the media
    report news from their perspective, rather than to act responsibly,
    which generally is understood to mean to support the goals of the
    elected leadership and preserve social and religious harmony. In
    addition strict defamation and press laws and the Government's
    demonstrated willingness to defend vigorously against what it considers
    personal attacks of officials, have led journalists sometimes to
    refrain from publishing items about issues such as alleged government
    corruption, nepotism, or a compliant judiciary.
        The Government strongly influences both the print and the
    electronic media. Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. (SPH), a private
    holding company with close ties to the Government, owns all general
    circulation newspapers in the four official languages--English,
    Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. The Government must approve, and can remove,
    the holders of SPH management shares, who have the power to appoint or
    dismiss all directors or staff. The Government also may remove citizens
    as stockholders. As a result, while newspapers print a large and
    diverse selection of articles from domestic and foreign sources, their
    editorials, coverage of domestic events, and coverage of sensitive
    foreign relations issues closely reflect government policies and the
    opinions of government leaders.
        However, columnists' opinions, editorials, and letters to the
    editor express a range of opinions on public issues. For example, there
    was an active and often critical public debate in the print media over
    the Government's decision in late June to link the salaries of
    government ministers to top private sector salaries. The importation of
    some publications is barred, although a wide range of international
    magazines and newspapers may be purchased uncensored; however,
    newspapers printed in Malaysia may not be imported (see Section 1.f.).
        Government leaders from time to time have used defamation lawsuits
    or the threat of such actions to discourage public criticism and
    intimidate opposition politicians and the press. There were no new
    defamation cases filed by ruling party figures during the year.
    Nevertheless, the unbroken success of government leaders' suits has
    fostered caution about political speech among the public and a culture
    of selfcensorship within the news media, and has demonstrated the
    danger of engaging in opposition politics. At year's end, Workers'
    Party (WP) secretary general J.B. Jeyaretnam, a nominated M.P.,
    remained in danger of bankruptcy due to failure to pay damages ordered
    against him in several individual law suits. A declaration of
    bankruptcy would result in the forfeiture of his parliamentary seat.
    The Prime Minister and foreign minister did not pursue collection of
    the judgments against Jeyaretnam during the year. However, the WP
    leader was declared bankrupt briefly in May until he made a payment to
    two plaintiffs; in June he lost his legal appeals to forestall payment
    to eight other plaintiffs. Both cases stemmed from an article in a WP
    publication that criticized the organizers of Tamil Week, an event that
    promoted the use of the Tamil language. In 1998 a court ruled that
    Jeyaretnam is responsible as the editor of the publication.
        In November Parliament amended the Public Entertainment Act. The
    revisions included changing the act's title to the Public Entertainment
    and Meetings Act (PEMA). Both before and after these revisions, a
    permit is required under the law for virtually any form of public
    speech or entertainment. After the revisions, permits no longer are
    required to hold a garden party. In September police denied a permit to
    an opposition MP to speak at a dinner that his party organized. The
    1999 convictions of Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General of the opposition
    Singapore Democratic Party, for giving two public speeches without a
    permit sparked widespread discussion in the press by the public and
    officials regarding the possibility for relaxing these restrictions.
    Chee had asserted that he had no alternative but to violate the act,
    since his earlier applications under the PEA either were refused or
    approved so late that the event had to be canceled.
        Members of an independent political discussion group proposed in a
    newspaper article the creation of free speech areas patterned after the
    ``Speakers' Corner'' found in Hyde Park, in London, England. After
    first refusing to consider this suggestion, the Government later
    decided to institute a Speakers' Corner; however, government
    restrictions on speakers still limited their abilities to speak freely.
    Prospective speakers, who must be citizens, must show their
    identification cards and register in advance with police, but need not
    obtain a public entertainment license (see Section 2.b.). Speakers must
    register their intention to speak 30 days in advance. A list of
    registered speakers is posted on a notice board outside the police
    station. While speech topics are not required to be declared in
    advance, the government regulations governing the Speakers' Corner
    state that, ``the speech should not be religious in nature and should
    not have the potential to cause feelings of enmity, ill will, or
    hostility between different racial or religious groups.'' A variety of
    persons, including politicians, social activists, and ordinary
    citizens, availed themselves of Speakers' Corner during the year.
        The government-linked holding company, Singapore International
    Media Pte Ltd., has a near monopoly on radio and television
    broadcasting. Subsidiaries operate all 4 broadcast television channels
    and 10 of the 15 domestic radio stations. Of the five remaining radio
    stations, four are owned by organizations with close government
    affiliation--two by the Singapore Armed Forces Reservists' Association
    (SAFRA) and two by the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Only one,
    the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, is completely
    independent of the Government. Some Malaysian and Indonesian television
    and radio programming can be received, but satellite dishes are banned,
    with few exceptions (see Section 1.f.).
        An increasing number of foreign media operations are located within
    the country. A 1990 law requires foreign publications that report on
    politics and current events in Southeast Asia to register and post a
    $141,000 (SD234,000) bond and name a person in the country to accept
    legal service. These requirements strengthen the Government's control
    over foreign media. Under amendments to the Newspaper and Printing
    Presses Act, the Government may limit the circulation of foreign
    publications that it determines interfere in domestic politics. Also,
    in 1999 the Government announced that foreign electronic media must
    meet the same reporting standards as foreign print media. However, this
    requirement has not been enforced. The weekly circulation of the Asian
    Wall Street Journal (AWSJ), Asiaweek, and the Far Eastern Economic
    Review (FEER), all foreign publications, is limited (or ``gazetted'').
    The fact that the Government gradually has raised the allowed weekly
    circulation of the FEER and Asiaweek corresponding more or less to
    actual demand allows the Government to maintain this aspect of control
    over the press while still maintaining the appearance of flexibility.
    The Government may ban the circulation of domestic and foreign
    publications under provisions of the ISA and the UPA (see Section
    1.f.).
        The authorities censor movies, television programs, video
    materials, computer games, and music. The Singapore Broadcasting
    Authority (SBA), established in 1994 to regulate and promote the
    broadcasting industry, develops censorship standards with the help of a
    citizen advisory panel. The ISA, the UPA, and the Films Act allow the
    ban, seizure, censorship, or restriction of written, visual, or musical
    materials if the SBA determines that they threaten the stability of the
    State, are pro-Communist, contravene moral norms, are pornographic,
    show excessive or gratuitous sex and violence, glamorize or promote
    drug use, or incite racial, religious, or linguistic animosities. Polls
    indicate that there is strong public support for continued censorship
    of sex and violence in films. There is a list of banned films, which is
    not made public. Certain films that might be barred from general
    release may be allowed limited showings, either censored or uncensored,
    with a special rating.
        The UPA was amended in 1998 to include compact discs, sound
    recordings, pictures, and computer-generated drawings, and to raise the
    fine for distribution or possession of banned publications. The list of
    banned English-language publications consists primarily of sexually
    oriented materials, but also includes some religious and political
    publications. The Films Act was amended in 1998 to ban political
    advertising using films or videos. The Government justified the ban as
    protecting politics from sensationalism, innuendo, and inaccuracy, but
    one effect was to restrict further an already limited range of what was
    deemed acceptable political discourse (see Section 3). Opposition
    politician Chee Soon Juan alleged in 1999 that prominent bookstores,
    pressured by the Government, refused to carry copies of a book he
    authored. He also alleged that, after his book was printed in Malaysia,
    the Government would not allow its import.
        Since 1996 the SBA has regulated access to material on the
    Internet, using a framework of web site licenses to encourage
    accountability and responsible use of the Internet. It also regulates
    Internet material by licensing Internet service providers who install
    ``proxy servers'' through which local users must route their Internet
    connections. Such services act as a filter for content that the
    Government considers objectionable and can block access to certain
    sites. While the Government does not consider regulation of the
    Internet to be censorship, the SBA directs service providers to block
    access to web pages that, in the Government's view, undermine public
    security, national defense, racial and religious harmony, and public
    morals. The SBA in 1996 ordered Internet service providers to block
    access to some sites, most or all of which the Government believed are
    pornographic; however, the list of blocked sites is difficult to verify
    since it is not a matter of public record. In 1997 the SBA announced a
    new Internet Code of Practice to further clarify what types of material
    were forbidden and specify the responsibilities of Internet providers.
    The SBA stated that it had no intention of monitoring Internet or
    electronic mail use but intended to block access to material that
    contained pornography or excessive violence or that incited racial or
    religious hatred (see Section 1.f.).
        All public institutions of higher education and political research
    institutions are linked closely to the Government. Although faculty
    members technically are not government employees, in practice they are
    subject to potential government influence. Academics speak and publish
    widely, and engage in debate on social and political issues. However,
    they are aware that public comments outside the classroom or academic
    publications that venture into the prohibited areas--criticism of
    political leaders or sensitive social and economic policies, or
    comments that might disturb ethnic or religious harmony or that appear
    to advocate partisan political views--could subject them to sanctions.
    Publications by local academics and members of research institutions
    rarely deviate substantially from government views.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    grants citizens the right of peaceful assembly but permits Parliament
    to impose restrictions ``as it considers necessary or expedient'' in
    the interest of security, and the Government restricts this right in
    practice. Assemblies of more than five persons in public, including
    political meetings and rallies, must have police permission.
    Spontaneous public gatherings or demonstrations virtually are unknown.
    The Government closely monitors political gatherings regardless of the
    number of persons present. Persons who wish to speak at a public
    function, excluding functions provided by or under the auspices of the
    Government, must obtain a public entertainment license from the police.
    Opposition politicians routinely experienced delays before being
    notified of the decision on their applications, although the Government
    claims that the delays come only when the applications were submitted
    late (see Section 2.a.). In May authorities denied approval for a forum
    on gays and lesbians, citing the illegality of homosexual acts. On
    December 31, police arrested and later charged 15 Falun Gong adherents
    for conducting protest without a permit; only 2 of those arrested were
    Singapore citizens. The 15 persons arrested had participated in an
    assembly of 60 Falun Gong members who sought to draw attention to the
    arrest and killing of Falun Gong members in China. The group had not
    sought a permit, asserting that police had not responded to their
    previous efforts to obtain permits.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association but permits
    Parliament to impose restrictions that ``it considers necessary or
    expedient'' in the interest of security, and the Government restricts
    this right in practice. Most associations, societies, clubs, religious
    groups, and other organizations with more than 10 members must be
    registered with the Government under the Societies Act. The Government
    denies registration to groups that it believes are likely to have been
    formed to assemble for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to
    public peace, welfare, or public order (see Section 2.c.). The
    Government has absolute discretion in applying this broad, vague
    language to register or dissolve societies. The Government prohibits
    organized political activities except by organizations registered as
    political parties. This prohibition limits opposition activities, and,
    along with other factors, contributes to restrict the scope of
    unofficial political expression and action (see Section 3). The
    prohibition affects the PAP less because of its long domination of the
    Government and its overwhelming parliamentary majority; the PAP is able
    to use nonpolitical organizations such as residential committees and
    neighborhood groups for political purposes far more extensively than
    can opposition political parties.
        There are few nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), apart from
    ostensibly nonpolitical organizations such as religious groups,
    ethnically-affiliated organizations, and providers of welfare services.
    The dominant role of the Government in almost every facet of life and
    the limiting effect of the law on the formation of publicly active
    organizations are, in large part, responsible for this situation.
    However, during 1999 a group of NGO's formed what they called ``the
    Working Committee'' as an umbrella group through which various NGO's
    could exchange information and cooperate to promote the development of
    civil society.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
    however, the Government bans some religious groups. The Constitution
    provides that every citizen or person in the country has a
    constitutional right to profess, practice, or propagate his religious
    belief so long as such activities do not breach any other laws relating
    to public order, public health, or morality.
        There is no state religion. However, all religious groups are
    subject to government scrutiny and must be registered legally under the
    Societies Act. The 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA),
    which was prompted by actions that the Government perceived as threats
    to religious harmony, including aggressive and ``insensitive''
    proselytizing and the ``mixing of religion and politics,'' made illegal
    what the Government deems to be the inappropriate involvement of
    religious groups and officials in political affairs. It gave the
    Government the power to restrict officials and members of religious
    groups and institutions from carrying out political activities,
    criticizing the Government, creating ``ill-will'' between religious
    groups or carrying out subversive activities. The act also prohibits
    judicial review of its enforcement or of any possible denial of rights
    arising from it.
        The Government plays an active, but limited, role in religious
    affairs. It does not tolerate speech or actions, including ostensibly
    religious speech or actions, that affect racial and religious harmony,
    and sometimes issues restraining orders barring persons from taking
    part in such activities. The Presidential Council for Religious Harmony
    must review such orders, and make recommendations to the President on
    whether to confirm, cancel, or alter a restraining order. The
    Presidential Council also examines all pending legislation to ensure
    that it is not disadvantageous to a particular group, reports to the
    Government on matters that affect any racial or religious community,
    and investigates complaints. The Government also attempts to ensure
    that citizens have ready access to religious organizations that are
    associated traditionally with their ethnic groups by assisting
    religious institutions to find space in publicly subsidized housing, in
    which the great majority of citizens live. The Government maintains a
    semiofficial relationship with the Muslim community through the Islamic
    Religious Council (MUIS), which was established under the
    Administration of Muslim Law Act. The MUIS advises the Government on
    the Muslim community's concerns and has some regulatory authority over
    Muslim religious matters. The Government facilitates financial
    assistance to build and maintain mosques.
        Under the Societies Act, the Government has banned meetings of
    Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church. The Government
    deregistered and banned Jehovah's Witnesses in 1972 on the grounds that
    its roughly 2,000 members refuse to perform military service (which is
    obligatory for all male citizens), salute the flag, or swear oaths of
    allegiance to the State. The Government regards such refusal as
    prejudicial to public welfare and order. While the Government has not
    outlawed the profession or propagation of the beliefs of Jehovah's
    Witnesses and does not arrest members merely for being believers, the
    result of deregistration has been to make meetings of Jehovah's
    Witnesses illegal. The Government also has banned all written materials
    published by the Jehovah's Witnesses' publishing affiliates, the
    International Bible Students Association and the Watch Tower Bible and
    Tract Society. In practice this has led to the confiscation of Bibles
    published by the group, even though publishing Bibles has not been
    outlawed.
        The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World
    Christianity, also known as the Unification Church, was dissolved in
    1982 by the Minister for Home Affairs. Missionaries, with the exception
    of members of Jehovah's Witnesses and representatives of the
    Unification Church, are permitted to work and to publish and distribute
    religious texts. However, while the Government does not prohibit
    evangelical activities in practice, it discourages activities that
    might upset the balance of intercommunal relations.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants citizens the
    right to move freely throughout the country; however, while the
    Government generally respects this right in practice, it limits it in a
    few respects. For example, citizens' choice of where to live may be
    limited by the Government's policy of assuring ethnic balance in
    publicly subsidized housing, in which the great majority of citizens
    live (see Section 1.f.). The Government requires all citizens and
    permanent residents over the age of 15 to register and to carry
    identification cards. The Government may refuse to issue a passport and
    has done so in the case of former ISA detainees. Under the ISA, a
    detainee's movement may be restricted, although this provision normally
    is a part of the process of relaxing the conditions of detention and
    has been used very seldom in recent years.
        The right of voluntary repatriation is extended to holders of
    national passports. The Government actively encourages citizens living
    overseas to return home or at least to maintain active ties with the
    country. A provision of law for the possible loss of citizenship by
    Singaporeans who reside outside the country for more than 10 years
    consecutively seldom is used.
        Male citizens who still have national service reserve obligations
    (normally until age 40 for enlisted men and age 50 for officers) must
    advise the Ministry of Defense if they plan to travel abroad for less
    than 6 months, and must receive an exit permit for trips over 6 months.
    Beginning at age 11, boys' passports are valid for up to 6 months'
    duration. Males who are eligible for national service must obtain an
    exit permit for travel abroad of more than 6 months, with the exception
    of travel to peninsular Malaysia on a restricted passport.
        The law stipulates that former members of the Communist Party of
    Malaya (CPM) residing outside the country must apply to the Government
    to be allowed to return. They must renounce communism, sever all
    organizational ties with the CPM, and pledge not to engage in
    activities prejudicial to the State's internal security. In addition
    the law requires them to submit to interview by the Internal Security
    Department and to any restrictive conditions imposed on them.
        The law does not include provision for granting refugee or asylee
    status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
    Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant
    first asylum. However, the authorities usually permit persons who make
    claims for asylum to have their status determined by the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for possible resettlement elsewhere.
    There were no reports that persons were returned forcibly to a country
    where they feared persecution. A 1998 government statement that
    migrants from countries in the region experiencing economic crisis
    would not be accorded refugee status is not known to have resulted in
    the return of any persons having a well-founded fear of persecution. A
    small number of ethnic Chinese persons from Indonesia often enter the
    country as visitors for temporary stays during episodes of racial or
    religious strife in that country.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
    government peacefully through democratic means. Opposition parties are
    free to contest elections, and the voting and votecounting systems are
    fair, accurate, and free from tampering; however, the PAP, which has
    held power continuously and overwhelmingly for over 3 decades, uses the
    Government's extensive powers to place formidable obstacles in the path
    of political opponents. The PAP has maintained its political dominance
    in part by developing genuine voter support through honest, effective
    administration and its strong record in bringing economic prosperity to
    the country, and in part by manipulating the electoral framework,
    intimidating organized political opposition, and circumscribing the
    bounds of legitimate political discourse and action. It attempts to
    intimidate the members of the opposition through the threat of libel
    suits and the subsequent loss of their political future, since large
    judgments in libel suits can lead to bankruptcy, and under the law
    bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in Parliament. The belief that
    the Government may directly or indirectly harm the employment prospects
    of opposition supporters curtails opposition political activity;
    however, there were few allegations of such retaliation. As a result of
    these and other factors, opposition parties have been unable to
    challenge seriously the PAP's domination of the political system since
    the late 1960's. The PAP claims that the lack of an effective
    opposition is due to disorganization, lack of leadership, and lack of
    persuasive alternative policies.
        Singapore has a parliamentary system in which the majority party in
    Parliament has the authority to constitute the Government, which is
    headed by a Prime Minister. Parliamentary elections may be called at
    any time but must be held no later than 5 years from the date a new
    parliament first sits. The PAP holds 80 of 83 elected seats; the
    opposition Singapore People's Party and the Workers' Party each held 1
    seat. One seat, won by the PAP in the 1997 election, is vacant. The
    Workers Party (WP) holds one ``nonconstituency'' seat based on a
    constitutional amendment that assures at least three opposition members
    in Parliament even if fewer than three actually are elected. In
    addition, the Government nominates and the President appoints
    ``prominent citizens'' to serve as nominated members of parliament
    (N.M.P.'s) for 2-year terms. Nine N.M.P.'s currently sit in Parliament.
    Nonconstituency members' and N.M.P.'s voting rights are restricted.
        The country's economic success and generally honest, effective
    government under the PAP has helped the PAP maintain voter support. The
    party has an extensive grassroots system and a carefully selected,
    highly disciplined membership, including M.P.'s who maintain close
    contact with their constituents, which is responsive to constituent
    needs and delivers effective government services. The recent
    development of governmentorganized and predominantly publicly-funded
    CDC's to promote community development and cohesion and to provide
    welfare and other assistance services, strengthens the PAP, which
    dominates these CDC's even in opposition-held constituencies. However,
    the PAP, which virtually is synonymous with the Government, has used
    the threat to withdraw benefits as a means of assuring popular support.
    For example, during the 1997 election campaign, the Prime Minister and
    other senior government officials pointedly warned voters that
    precincts that elected opposition candidates would have the lowest
    priority in government plans to upgrade public housing facilities. This
    threat heightened concerns among some observers about voters' genuine
    freedom to change their government.
        The PAP also maintains its complete control of the political
    process by other means, including patronage; strong political influence
    over the press and the courts; and restrictions on opposition political
    activities. Often these means are fully in keeping with the law and the
    normal prerogatives of government, but the overall effect (and, many
    argue, ultimate purpose) is to disadvantage and weaken the political
    opposition. The Government altered the boundaries of election districts
    in 1996, 3 months before the 1997 elections. Since 1988 it has changed
    74 of 83 singleseat constituencies into group representational
    constituencies (GRC's) of three, four, five, or six parliamentary
    seats, where the party with a plurality wins all the seats. According
    to the Constitution, such changes are permitted to ensure ethnic
    minority representation in Parliament, since each GRC candidate list
    must contain at least one Malay, Indian, or other ethnic minority
    candidate. However, these changes made it more difficult for opposition
    parties, all of which have very limited memberships, to fill
    multimember candidate lists, especially when one member must be an
    ethnic minority. The PAP does not suffer from this disadvantage.
        Although political parties legally are free to organize, they
    operate under the same limitations that apply to all organizations, and
    the authorities impose strict regulations on their constitutions,
    fundraising, and accountability. Government regulations hinder attempts
    by opposition parties to rent office space in government housing or to
    establish community foundations. In addition government influence
    extends in varying degrees to academic, community service, and other
    NGO's.
        A 1998 amendment to the Films Act that banned political films and
    recorded televised programs put opposition parties at a disadvantage.
    The ban, ostensibly to prevent the sensationalist or emotional effect
    that video or film productions could have on political issues, applied
    to the PAP as well as opposition parties. Nonetheless, it had the
    effect of denying opposition parties, which already receive far less
    coverage than does the PAP in the government-influenced press and
    media, a potential outlet for their political messages (see Section
    2.a.).
        The threat of civil libel or slander suits, which government
    leaders have used consistently against political opponents and critics,
    continued to have a stifling effect on the full expression of political
    opinion and to disadvantage the formal political opposition (see
    Section 2.a.). Large judgments in libel suits can lead to bankruptcy,
    and under the law bankrupt persons are ineligible to sit in Parliament.
    The Penal Code also provides for criminal defamation offenses; however,
    there were no reports that it was used for political purposes during
    the year.
        Following the 1997 elections, a group of senior PAP leaders sued
    defeated WP candidate Tang Liang Hong for defamation based on Tang's
    claims during and after the election. Tang fled the country citing
    death threats and remains abroad. The WP Secretary General and M.P.
    J.B. Jeyaretnam and another WP official remained at risk of bankruptcy
    due to ongoing efforts to collect on damages awarded in previous years
    (see Section 2.a.).
        The Government also sometimes uses parliamentary censure or the
    threat of censure to humiliate or intimidate opposition leaders.
        Government entities also have used libel or slander suits, and
    dismissal from positions in government-related entities, to intimidate
    prominent opposition politicians.
        The Government also has placed significant obstacles in the way of
    opposition political figures' candidacy for the presidency, a largely
    ceremonial position that nonetheless has significant budget oversight
    powers, as well as some powers over civil service appointments and
    internal security affairs. For example, opposition members are much
    less likely to be able to satisfy the requirement that they have
    experience in managing the financial affairs of a large institution,
    since many of the country's large institutions are government-run or
    linked to the government. In the 1999 presidential election, only the
    Government's candidate was ruled in compliance with all the legal
    requirements; therefore in accordance with the law, actual voting was
    canceled, and S.R. Nathan was declared the duly elected President.
    Opposition political figures have claimed that such strict compliance
    requirements weaken opposition parties.
        There is no legal bar to the participation of women in political
    life; however, women are underrepresented in government and politics.
    Women hold 4 of the 83 elected parliamentary seats and 2 of the 9
    N.M.P. seats. There are no female ministers.
        There is no restriction in law or practice against minorities
    voting or participating in politics; they actively participate in the
    political process and are well represented throughout the Government,
    except in some sensitive military positions. Malays make up about 15
    percent of the general population and hold about the same percentage of
    regularly elected seats in Parliament. Indians make up about 7 percent
    of the general population and hold about 10 percent of the regularly
    elected seats in Parliament. Minority representation in Parliament is,
    in part, the result of a legal requirement that candidate slates in
    every multi-seat constituency must have at least one minority
    representative.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no NGO's that actively and openly monitor alleged human
    rights violations. This situation is consistent with the general lack
    of NGO's and the Government's dominance of society. While the
    Government does not formally prohibit them, efforts by independent
    organizations to investigate and evaluate government human rights
    policies would face the same obstacles as those faced by opposition
    political parties.
        In the past, the Government denied that international organizations
    had any competence to look into human rights matters in the country
    and, for years, barred Amnesty International (AI) from visiting the
    country. However, in 1997 and 1999, the Government permitted both AI
    and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) to observe legal
    proceedings against two opposition politicians. The ICJ'S and AI'S
    criticisms of these cases were reported fully in the local press, and
    the Government responded vigorously in the press, alleging bias and
    citing alleged factual errors.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution states that all persons are equal before the law
    and entitled to the equal protection of the law, and the Government
    carries out these provisions in practice. The Constitution contains no
    explicit provision providing equal rights for women and minorities.
    Mindful of the country's history of intercommunal tension, the
    Government takes affirmative measures to ensure racial, ethnic,
    religious, and cultural nondiscrimination. Social, economic, and
    cultural benefits and facilities are available to all citizens
    regardless of race, religion, or sex.
        Women.--There is no evidence of any widespread practice of violence
    or abuse against women. The Penal Code and the Women's Charter protect
    women against domestic violence and sexual or physical harassment. A
    battered wife can obtain court orders barring the spouse from the home
    until the court is satisfied that he has ceased his aggressive
    behavior. Court orders for protection against violent family members
    have increased in recent years, partially because of a 1997 amendment
    to the Women's Charter Act that broadened the definition of violence to
    include intimidation, continual harassment, or restraint against one's
    will. The Penal Code prescribes mandatory caning and a minimum
    imprisonment of 2 years for conviction on a charge of ``outraging
    modesty'' that causes the victim fear of death or injury. The press
    gives fairly prominent coverage to instances of abuse or violence
    against women. There are several organizations that provide assistance
    to abused women. The Association of Women for Action and Research
    (AWARE) has a hotline that offers counseling and legal advice. The
    Family Protection Unit documents physical and psychological abuse, and
    provides counseling and legal services to abused women. In July 1999,
    the Council of Women's Organizations established a crisis center for
    abused persons. The Star shelter accepts children, women, and men, and
    can accommodate up to 30 persons.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a limited
    problem (see Section 6.f.).
        Women enjoy the same legal rights as men in most areas, including
    civil liberties, employment, commercial activity, and education. The
    Women's Charter, enacted in 1961, gives women, among other rights, the
    right to own property, conduct trade, and receive divorce settlements.
    Muslim women enjoy most of the rights and protections of the Women's
    Charter. For the most part, Muslim marriage law falls under the
    administration of the Muslim Law Act, which empowers the Shari'a court
    to oversee such matters. Those laws allow Muslim men to practice
    polygyny. Both men and women have the right to unilateral divorce;
    however, women face significant difficulties in initiating unilateral
    divorce proceedings, which often prevents them from pursuing
    proceedings.
        Women constitute 42 percent of the labor force and are well
    represented in many professions but hold few leadership positions in
    the private sector. They still hold the preponderance of lowwage jobs
    such as clerks and secretaries. The average salary of women is only 75
    percent of that of men (compared with 68 percent 10 years ago).
    Observers note that the wage differential is smaller in professional
    jobs, and attribute much of the overall wage disparity to average lower
    educational qualifications by women, and to fewer years of job
    experience by women due to family commitments, rather than
    discrimination.
        Some areas of discrimination remain. Children born overseas to
    female citizens are not granted citizenship automatically, while those
    of male citizens are. Female civil service employees who are married do
    not receive health benefits for their spouses and dependents as do male
    government employees. However, for the first time, beginning on January
    2, female citizens were able to sponsor their noncitizen husbands for
    citizenship.
        Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
    children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
    education and medical care. Access to public education and medical care
    is equal for all children in society. In October the Government enacted
    legislation that would make 6 years of education in public schools
    compulsory by 2003. Although school attendance has not been compulsory,
    virtually 100 percent of children are enrolled through grade 6 and the
    dropout rate for secondary school is low. The Children and Young
    Persons Act establishes protective services for orphaned, abused,
    disabled, or refractory children, and creates a juvenile court system.
    The Ministry of Community Development works closely with the National
    Council for Social Services to oversee children's welfare cases.
    Voluntary organizations operate most of the homes for children, while
    the Government funds up to 50 percent of all child costs, which include
    normal living expenses and overhead, as well as expenses for special
    schooling, health care, or supervisory needs.
        There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government implemented a
    comprehensive code on barrier-free accessibility in 1990, which
    established standards for facilities for the physically disabled in all
    new buildings and mandated the progressive upgrading of older
    structures. Although there is no legislation that addresses the issue
    of equal opportunities for the disabled in education or employment, the
    National Council of Social Services, in conjunction with various
    voluntary associations, provides an extensive job training and
    placement program for the disabled. Informal provisions in education
    have permitted university matriculation for visually impaired, deaf,
    and physically disabled students. The Government allows a $2,400
    (S$4,000) tax deduction for families with a disabled person. Press
    coverage of the activities and achievements of the disabled is
    extensive.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Malays constitute
    approximately 15 percent of the total population. The Constitution
    acknowledges them as ``the indigenous people of Singapore'' and charges
    the Government to support and promote their political, educational,
    religious, economic, social, cultural, and language interests. Ethnic
    Malays have not reached the educational or socioeconomic levels
    achieved by the ethnic Chinese majority, the ethnic Indian minority, or
    the Eurasian community. Malays remain underrepresented at the uppermost
    rungs of the corporate ladder, and, some have claimed, in certain
    sectors of government and the military, a reflection of their
    historically lower education and economic position, but also a result
    of employment discrimination. During 1999 there was great debate over
    the fact that advertisements often specify ethnicity and gender
    requirements or require fluent Mandarin speakers. The Government
    responded by issuing ``guidelines'' that called for eliminating
    language referring to age, gender, or ethnicity; restrictive language
    that referred to attributes relevant to a job, such as ``Chinese
    speaker'' or ``physically strong'' remains acceptable. These guidelines
    generally are obeyed.
        In November the Government reacted negatively to a draft proposal
    by a leading Malay/Muslim group that sought ``collective leadership''
    in that community. The group proposed broadened community participation
    in issues that affected Muslims. Government leaders stated that the
    proposal risked ethnic polarization and warned against attempting to
    implement it.
        A January 1999 revision in the Chinese language curriculum in the
    country's schools, which expanded opportunities for higher Chinese
    language ignited a longstanding debate over the perceived objective of
    creating a ``Chinese elite.'' The Government has taken steps to
    encourage greater educational achievement among Malay students as a key
    to economic advancement. The Government revised proposed compulsory
    legislation to address concerns of Malays that Islamic religious
    schools (madrasahs) would be adversely affected. The Government
    proposed to exempt madrasah students from compulsory attendance in
    national schools provided that the students meet minimum standards in
    core secular subjects such as science, mathematics and English.
        The Presidential Council on Minority Rights examines all pending
    bills to ensure that they are not disadvantageous to a particular
    group. It also reports to the Government on matters affecting any
    racial or religious community and investigates complaints.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides all
    citizens with the right to form associations, including trade unions;
    however, Parliament may impose restrictions based on security, public
    order, or morality grounds. The right of association is delimited by
    the Societies Act and by labor and education laws and regulations.
    Under these laws, any group consisting of 10 or more persons is
    required to register with the Government. The Trade Unions Act
    authorizes the formation of unions with broad rights, albeit with some
    narrow restrictions, such as prohibitions on the unionization of
    uniformed employees. According to government statistics, the national
    labor force comprises about 2 million workers, approximately 290,000 of
    whom are represented by 76 unions. Due primarily to mergers, the number
    of unions dropped slightly from 1999; however, the number of union
    members rose. Of the 76 unions, 67 (which represent virtually all of
    the union members), are affiliated with the National Trades Union
    Congress (NTUC), an umbrella organization that has a close relationship
    with the Government.
        The NTUC unabashedly acknowledges that its interests are closely
    linked with those of the ruling PAP, a relationship often described by
    both as ``symbiotic.'' For example, the NTUC secretary general (SG),
    Lim Boon Heng, a PAP M.P., is Minister without Portfolio and was
    formerly Second Minister for Trade and Industry. His predecessor, Ong
    Teng Cheong, the country's first elected President (1993-99) was
    simultaneously NTUC SG and Deputy Prime Minister. It is common for
    young PAP M.P.'s to be given leadership positions in the NTUC or a
    member union. NTUC policy prohibits union members who actively support
    opposition parties from holding office in affiliated unions. While the
    NTUC is financially independent of the PAP, with income generated by
    NTUC-owned businesses, the NTUC and the PAP share the same ideology and
    work closely with management in support of nonconfrontational labor
    relations.
        Workers, other than those in essential services, have the legal
    right to strike but rarely do so. No strikes have occurred since 1986.
    Most disagreements are resolved through informal consultations with the
    Ministry of Manpower. If conciliation fails, the disputing parties
    usually submit their case to the Industrial Arbitration Court, which
    has representatives from labor, management, and the Government. Besides
    these labor dispute mechanisms and the close working relationship and
    shared views among labor, management, and the Government, the
    maintenance of labor peace has been a product of high economic growth
    rates, regular wage increases, and a high degree of job mobility in a
    virtual full-employment economy. In addition the widely held view that
    labor conflict would undermine the country's economic competitiveness
    and attractiveness to investors, and a cultural aversion to
    confrontation help to maintain a harmonious labor situation.
        The NTUC is free to associate regionally and internationally.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
    bargaining is a normal part of labor-management relations in the
    industrial sector. Agreements between management and labor are renewed
    every 2 to 3 years, although wage increases are negotiated annually.
    Yearly guidelines on raises and bonus pay issued by the National Wages
    Council (NWC), a group composed of labor, management, and government
    representatives, serve as the starting point for bargaining agreements.
    In 1999, in response to the economic downturn, the Government adopted
    an NWC proposal in which, subject to negotiation in each enterprise, up
    to ten percent of salaries would be considered ``variable,'' allowing
    companies to eliminate that portion of pay if financial problems
    necessitated it.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor
    by children, and generally enforces this provision effectively. Under
    sections of the Destitute Persons Act, any indigent person may be
    required to reside in a welfare home and engage in suitable work. The
    International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the coercive
    terms of this act, which includes penal sanctions, as not in compliance
    with the ILO Convention on Forced Labor. The Government maintains that
    the act is social legislation that provides for the shelter, care, and
    protection of destitute persons, and that work programs are designed to
    reintegrate individuals into society.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Government enforces the Employment Act, which
    prohibits the employment of children under the age of 12. Although
    schooling is not compulsory, virtually 100 percent of school age
    children attend school (see Section 5). Restrictions on the employment
    of children between the ages of 12 and 17 are rigorous and enforced
    fully. Children under the age of 15 are prohibited from employment in
    any industrial undertakings. Exceptions include family enterprises;
    children may work in an industrial undertaking in which only members of
    the same family are employed. A child who is 12 years old or above may
    be engaged in ``light work suited to his capacity.'' A medical officer
    must certify suitability for such light work. Employers must notify the
    Commissioner of Labor within 30 days of hiring a child between the ages
    of 14 and 16 and must attach medical certification of fitness for
    employment. The incidence of children taking up permanent employment is
    low, and abuses are almost nonexistent. The Government prohibits forced
    and bonded labor by children and enforces this provision effectively
    (see Section 6.c.).
        Ministry of Manpower regulations prohibit night employment of
    children and restrict industrial work for children between the ages of
    14 and 16 to no more than 7 hours a day, including the hours spent in
    school. Children may not work on commercial vessels, with any machinery
    in motion, on live electrical apparatus lacking effective insulation,
    or in any underground job. The Minister of Manpower effectively
    enforces these laws and regulations.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There are no laws or regulations
    on minimum wages or unemployment compensation. However, the National
    Wages Council, a tripartite body consisting of Government, labor, and
    business, monitors the economy and makes annual recommendations to the
    Government concerning wage guidelines. The labor market offers good
    working conditions and relatively high wages, which provide a decent
    standard of living for a worker and family.
        The Employment Act sets the standard legal workweek at 44 hours and
    provides for 1 rest day each week.
        Because of a domestic labor shortage, approximately 600,000 foreign
    workers are employed legally, constituting about 30 percent of the
    total work force. There are no reliable estimates of the number of
    foreigners working illegally. Most foreign workers are unskilled
    laborers and household servants from other Asian countries. Foreign
    workers face no legal wage discrimination. However, they are
    concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs and often are required to work
    long hours. Most foreign construction workers live on-site in
    substandard conditions. Although the great majority of the more than
    100,000 maids (mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka)
    work under clearly outlined contracts, their low wages, their
    dependence on their employers for food and lodging, and the fact that
    they often live and work relatively isolated from the rest of society
    make them vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse. In 1998 Parliament
    passed an amendment to the Penal Code, in response to a reported
    increase in cases of maid abuse, which raised the punishment for
    confining or sexually or physically abusing a maid. The authorities
    have fined or imprisoned employers who have abused domestics, often
    with great publicity. Authorities described a sharp fall in
    substantiated cases of abuse of foreign domestics, from 157 cases in
    1997 to 82 cases in 1999, as evidence that the 1998 legal change and
    vigorous prosecutions had reduced the problem.
        Most maids work 6 days per week from very early morning until late
    in the evening. Many contracts allow only 1 day off per month.
    Contracts often stipulate that, even when she is ostensibly not
    working, a maid must remain on the premises except for official duties
    or on her day off. According to Ministry of Manpower Statistics, wages
    average around $250 per month (not including free room and board).
    Maids must often put aside most or all of their wages for the first
    several months of employment to reimburse their placement agents. Work
    permits for low-wage workers stipulate the cancellation of such permits
    if workers apply to marry or marry a citizen or permanent resident.
        Although many lower paid foreign workers not covered under the
    Employment Act are ineligible for the limited free legal assistance
    that is available to citizens, the Ministry of Manpower also offers
    mediation services for all employees, foreign or local. The Government
    allows complainants to seek legal redress.
        The Ministry of Manpower effectively enforces laws and regulations
    establishing working conditions and comprehensive occupational safety
    and health laws. Enforcement procedures, coupled with the promotion of
    educational and training programs, have been implemented to reduce the
    frequency of job-related accidents. While a worker has the right under
    the Employment Act to remove himself from a dangerous work situation,
    his right to continued employment depends upon an investigation of the
    circumstances by the Ministry of Manpower.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The three major laws that govern
    trafficking and prostitution are the Women's Charter, the Children and
    Young Person's Act, and the Penal Code. The laws make trafficking in
    women and children--whether or not it is related to prostitution--
    punishable by up to 5 years' imprisonment, a $5,800 (SD10,000) fine,
    and caning. The Penal Code covers trafficking and wrongful constraint
    of men.
        There is evidence that the country is a destination for trafficking
    in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily from Thailand and
    Malaysia. Police reportedly conduct raids about once a month in an
    effort to maintain some control over the situation.
        One local NGO offers sex workers counseling services; it is not
    empowered to provide protection.
                                   __________

                                SOLOMON ISLANDS

        Solomon Islands, with a population of approximately 450,000, is an
    archipelago stretching over 840 miles in the South Pacific. The
    Government is a modified parliamentary system consisting of a single-
    chamber legislative assembly of 50 members. Executive authority is
    vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister,
    elected by a majority vote of Parliament, selects his own Cabinet.
    Parliament was elected most recently in free and fair elections in
    August 1997. However, in 1998 tensions between two of the main ethnic
    groups in the country--the Malaitans and the Guadalcanalese--resulted
    in violence. Throughout 1999 Guadalcanalese militants forced thousands
    of Malaitans residing on Guadalcanal from their homes. Beginning in
    January, Malaitan militants stole large quantities of weapons from the
    police and actively began to combat the Guadalcanalese. The conflict
    continued to escalate, and on June 5, armed Malaitan militants,
    reportedly assisted by paramilitary police officers acting without
    authorization, took over Honiara, the capital. Following their takeover
    of the capital, the Malaitan militants forced the then-Prime Minister,
    Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, to resign, and Parliament chose a new Prime
    Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, under duress. A new government, known as
    the Coalition for National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace, was
    formed. The Government has sought to restore peace, but its success has
    been limited due to its weakness--both political and institutional--and
    the perception that its leaders are beholden to one of the conflicting
    parties. The judiciary is independent.
        A police force of approximately 900 persons under civilian control
    is responsible for law enforcement, internal security, and border
    security. Over the past year, the police force began to disintegrate
    and since the June takeover of Honiara by Malaitan militants, it has
    not functioned as an effective institution.
        About 75 percent of the population engage to some extent in
    subsistence farming and fishing and have little involvement in the cash
    economy. With the breakdown of law and order, the formal sector of the
    economy is on the brink of collapse. Commercial activities, which
    included some plantation production of copra, cocoa, and palm oil, one
    fish cannery, a gold mine on Guadalcanal, and small resort and diving
    enterprises, have ceased to operate; only the logging industry
    continued to operate. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 persons have fled
    their homes. Electricity and telecommunications services face severe
    difficulties, but continued to function.
        Basic individual rights are provided for in the Constitution, and
    until the eruption of armed conflict between Guadlacanalese and
    Malaitan militants, generally were respected by authorities, and were
    defended by an independent judiciary; however, the armed conflict
    between Malaitan and Guadalcanalese militants led to a serious
    deterioration of the human rights situation. Many current and former
    police officers, mostly believed to be from two national police units
    dominated by Malaitans, sided with armed Malaitan political groups, and
    police and militants from both sides committed numerous human rights
    abuses, including killings, abductions, torture, rape, forced
    displacement, looting, and the burning of homes. Militants prevented
    Red Cross officials and volunteers from taking food and medical
    supplies to rural clinics, leaving 60,000 persons in rural areas
    without access to medical care, nutritional supplements, and fuel.
    During the year, the successive governments failed to encourage any
    judicial or independent investigation of human rights abuses that had
    occurred during the violence, contributing to a climate of impunity. On
    October 15, representatives of the central Government, provincial
    governments, and the opposing armed militant groups signed a peace
    agreement, which, among other things, includes a general amnesty for
    members of the police who committed criminal acts in the course of the
    armed conflict after June 5. In accordance with the agreement, a team
    of international observers has been in the country since November to
    verify the relinquishing of weapons and to monitor implementation of
    the peace. At year's end, hundreds of weapons had not been
    relinquished, and a stable peace had not been secured.
        Violence and discrimination against women continued to be problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Since June 5, the
    police forces effectively have been disarmed and the service no longer
    functions on the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal. Amnesty
    International (AI) reports that according to the previous government,
    75 percent of the country's 897 police officers were Malaitan. Many
    Malaitan police officers participated in abuses committed by Malaitan
    militants. In 1998 and 1999, when the police were battling the
    Guadalcanalese militants, police officers were involved in
    extrajudicial killing and unwarranted use of lethal force against
    civilians. In September 1999, AI reported that several paramilitary
    police officers in a speedboat shot and injured a man near shore; they
    followed him onto the shore, dragged him back into the water, and
    reportedly beat him to death with a paddle. There also have been
    reports that police in some areas of Guadalcanal have declined to stop
    or investigate abuses by Guadalcanalese militants, have cooperated with
    them, or have fled from atacks by Guadalcanalese militants, in order to
    protect their own security. AI reported that displaced persons state
    that they fled their homes because they feared police operations as
    much as the activities of the Guadalcanalese armed groups.
        Both the Ulufa'alu and Sogavare Governments were unable to stop the
    violence, and did little to investigate or prosecute those responsible
    for killings and other abuses, contributing to an atmosphere of
    impunity. According to AI there is an apparent lack of accountability
    for police officers involved in killings, and only one police officer
    has been charged and convicted in connection with events during the
    conflict.
        There is no reliable estimate of the total number of civilians
    killed, missing or presumed dead as a result of attacks attributed to
    Malaitan and Guadalcanalese militants, although AI reported that at
    least 25 persons, including several civilians, were killed between
    early June and early July. In April unidentified gunmen entered a
    village south of Honiara's international airport and shot three
    persons, including a 7-year-old boy and a 20-year-old man, as they
    tried to flee. On April 21, a Guadalcanalese man reportedly was
    abducted by Malaitan militants in Honiara and taken to a nearby
    Malaitan militant camp, where he was beaten and hung by the ankles and
    wrists with wire. His body was reportedly found later in a Malaitan
    suburb of Honiara (see Section 1.c.). On May 5, the decapitated body of
    Davidson Mare was found in a marketplace in Honiara; Mare, a
    Guadalcanalese, is believed to have been killed by Malaitan militants.
    Four days later, the partial remains of a Malaitan man believed killed
    in retaliation for Mare's murder were found at a roadblock run by
    Guadalcanalese militants near Honiara. In late June, two Malaitan men
    were captured by Guadalcanalese militants outside Honiara.
    Subsequently, the men, who showed signs of beatings, were paraded
    through the captors' villages, killed, and buried. On July 10, Malaitan
    militants forced their way into Honiara's central hospital and murdered
    two Guadalcanalese militants who were being treated for wounds
    sustained in combat the previous day. On July 13, gunmen dressed in
    Malaitan militant or paramilitary police uniforms reportedly attacked a
    medical clinic in Visale, killing an elderly man and a teenage boy.
    Other victims died as a result of torture (see Section 1.c.).
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances due to the actions of government officials. However,
    many Malaitan police officers have joined the Malaitan militants and
    have participated in their activities. Since the violence began in
    1998, more than 50 persons have been abducted and possibly killed by
    militants. In early July, AI reports that Cathoic catechist Juan Bosco
    disappeared in Honiara after allegedly being abducted by Malaitan
    militants and taken to a Malaitan camp. Several persons reported seeing
    him brutally beaten. On July 4, Walter Tavai, a Guadalcanalese
    villager, reportedly was abducted from his home near Honiara by
    Malaitan militants and taken to a Malaitan militant camp. Witnesses
    state that he was beaten to death by militants at the camp; his body
    has not been found. In January the Government formed a Committee on
    Missing Persons. However, its work was hampered by the reluctance of
    witnesses to come forward and by the ongoing conflict. The Committee's
    final report and recommendations to the Government, submitted in April,
    were not made public.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--These practices are prohibited by law; however, there were
    numerous reports that police tortured and mistreated persons. Until
    June complaints of excessive use of force by police when making
    arrests, as well as other complaints about police behavior, were
    handled by an internal police department investigations office or by
    the courts. In 1998 the police opened a public complaints office in the
    capital. These offices ceased to function after June 5, as part of the
    general disintegration of the national police force.
        Throughout the year, there were numerous reports of acts of torture
    and mistreatment attributed to both Malaitan and Guadalcanalese
    militants, and to members of the police. Honiara residents told AI that
    it was common knowledge that abducted Malaitans had been taken to a
    camp widely known as a ``panel beating shop'' where they were beaten by
    Guadalcanalese militants. Malaitan encampments near Honiara, as well as
    in the former Guadalcanal provincial government headquarters, also
    reportedly are used for the torture of captured Guadalcanalese and the
    punishment of Malaitans. On April 21, a Guadalcanalese man reportedly
    was abducted by Malaitan militants in Honiara and taken to a nearby
    Malaitan militant camp, where he was beaten and hung by the ankles and
    wrists with wire. His body was later reportedly found in an Malaitan
    suburb of Honiara (see Section 1.a.). In June two Malaitan security
    guards reportedly were abducted by Guadalcanalese militants, beaten,
    paraded through Guadalcanalese villages, and killed near Honiara (see
    Section 1.a.).
        Many homes have been looted and burned by both Guadalcanalese and
    Malaitan militants during the conflict; at times police reportedly have
    assisted militants. Twenty homes were burned in Independence Valley,
    Honiara in late July, according to press reports. This followed the
    burning of homes in Matanikau and Tasahe areas of Honiara.
        Conditions in the only prison still in use during the year
    generally met minimum international standards, although for several
    months it was overcrowded. Following the outbreak of militant attacks,
    the rural prison in Guadalcanal was closed, and the prisoners were
    moved to the prison in Honiara for their safety. However, due to the
    influx of prisoners from the minimum-security prison and additional
    arrests due to the strife, the prison population exceeded the capacity
    of the prison. Several cells built for four persons held six, and a
    number of prisoners slept dormitory style on the floor of the covered
    inner courtyard of one of the prison buildings. The female wing of the
    prison was used for male prisoners, and the sole female prisoner was
    housed in the warden's conference room, next to the jail reception
    area. Malaitan militants closed the prison in Honiara on June 18
    following the escape of approximately 20 Guadalcanalese inmates and the
    subsequent release of all remaining prisoners by the Malaitans. Police
    made no move to recapture the inmates, some of whom reportedly joined
    the militants. A new prison complex, slated for completion in 1997, was
    to have provided separate facilities for short-, medium-, and long-term
    prisoners, as well as for juvenile offenders. It remained uncompleted
    at year's end due to a lack of funds. Prior to June, a government-
    appointed Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, composed of church and
    social leaders, recommended pardons for rehabilitated prisoners. At
    year's end, the prison was reopened.
        Prior to the closure of the prisons, the Government permitted
    prison visits by human rights monitors. An International Committee of
    the Red Cross (ICRC) team in Honiara monitored the prisons regularly,
    and in 1999 Amnesty International visited the prison as well. However,
    between June 15 and June 18, Malaitan militants refused to allow ICRC
    monitors into the prison in Honiara. Some prisoners later showed signs
    of beatings.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions in practice. However, the large number of
    cases before the courts has resulted in long delays before cases go to
    trial. This has meant that some prisoners have endured long periods of
    pretrial detention.
        Militants from both sides arbitrarily detained persons; it is not
    known how many persons were arbitrarily detained during the year.
        Exile is not practiced.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary and it is independent in practice, but the courts
    are hampered by a lack of resources and threats against the lives of
    judges and prosecutors.
        The judicial system consists of a High Court and magistrates'
    courts. Accused persons are entitled to counsel. However, in 1999, the
    public solicitor, who is charged with providing counsel to persons who
    cannot afford a private attorney, reported that due to limited
    resources, his office could accept only those cases in which persons
    faced serious charges or those involving the protection of children.
    The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality of
    arrests. Officials found to have violated civil liberties are subject
    to fines and jail sentences.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        Both the Ulufa'alu and Sogavare Governments have been unable to
    stop the violence, and have done little to investigate or prosecute
    those responsible for killings and other abuses, contributing to an
    atmosphere of impunity. According to AI there is an apparent lack of
    accountability for police officers involved in killings, and only one
    police officer has been charged and convicted in connection with events
    during the conflict.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--These rights are protected by law, and the Government
    generally respected these rights in practice. However, with the
    breakdown of law and order, there was widespread looting and burning of
    homes in rural Guadalcanal, including by police (see Section 1.c.).
        Militants from all sides motivated by resentment, retaliation, and
    criminal opportunism forced long-time inhabitants from their homes.
    Many of those forced out were not affiliated with the respective
    militant movements or even members of the combating ethnic groups.
        g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
    Internal Conflicts.--Since the ethnic conflict began in 1998, both
    Guadalcanalese and Malaitan militants have used excessive force and
    committed numerous abuses against civilians, at times aided by or
    permitted to function by the police. Since June Malaitan militants have
    blocked the free and safe passage of relief supplies, food, and fuel,
    as well as access by humanitarian organizations to Guadalcanal. Red
    Cross volunteers and relief workers have reported being threatened,
    harassed, even shot at by both Guadalcanalese and Malaitan militants.
        In June Malaitan militants in a police patrol boat used a heavy
    machine gun to support an attack on Guadalcanalese positions near
    Alligator Creek, killing perhaps six Guadalcanalese militants.
    Following this action, the militants used the weapon to fire
    indiscriminately on civilian targets near Teneru, far from the actual
    scene of the fighting. In July as many as 20 persons in paramilitary
    police uniforms attacked a rural medical clinic on Guadalcanal, killing
    an old man and a teenage boy, both noncombatants. Since the violent
    phase of the conflict on Guadalcanal began in 1998, some 30,000
    Malaitans, Guadalcanalese, and Western Province persons living on
    Guadalcanal have been displaced from their homes (see Section 2.d.).
        AI reports that Guadalcanalese militants included a number of child
    soldiers (see Sections 5, and 6.d.).
        In 1999 there were reports that police killed noncombatants while
    shooting indiscriminately at villages.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government generally respects
    the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and of the press.
    In September the Government ordered the national airline and the press
    not to report the kidnaping of a pilot, on the grounds that it might
    incite further violence or ethnic hatred. During the year, print and
    broadcast media continued to operate on a regular basis.
        The media comprise the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation
    (SIBC), a statutory body that comes directly under the Prime Minister's
    office and whose radio broadcasts are heard throughout the country; a
    privately owned FM radio station; and three privately owned weekly or
    semiweekly newspapers. Given the high rate of illiteracy, the SIBC is
    more influential than the print media. The Department of Information in
    the Prime Minister's office publishes a monthly newspaper, which is
    strongly progovernment. At least two nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's) publish periodic news journals; their environmental reporting
    frequently is critical of the Government's logging policy and foreign
    logging companies' practices. A private company transmits one
    Australian television channel to the country. The system incorporates
    occasional government press conferences in its program.
        During the year, militants threatened the print and broadcast media
    with increasing frequency; however, no journalists are known to have
    been killed or injured.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of assembly and the Government respects this
    right in practice. Demonstrators must obtain permits.
        The Constitution provides for the right of association, and, in the
    past, this right was respected; however, in February the Government
    formally outlawed the Malaitan militant groups; Guadalcanalese militant
    groups were outlawed in 1999. This ban was suspended in May.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government respects this provision in practice.
        In general the Government does not subsidize religion. Several
    schools and health services in the country were built by and continue
    to be operated by religious organizations. There are schools sponsored
    by Roman Catholics, the Church of Melanesia, the United Church
    (Methodist), the South Sea Evangelical Church, and Seventh-Day
    Adventists. Upon independence the Government recognized that it had
    neither the funds nor the personnel to take over these institutions and
    agreed to subsidize partially their operations. The Government also
    pays the salaries of most teachers and health staff in the national
    education system.
        All religious institutions are required to register with the
    Government; however, there is no evidence that registration has been
    denied to any group.
        The public school curriculum includes 30 minutes daily of religious
    instruction, the content of which is agreed upon by the Christian
    churches; students whose parents do not wish them to attend the class
    are excused. However, the Government does not subsidize church schools
    that do not align their curriculums with governmental criteria. There
    is mutual understanding between the Government and the churches but no
    formal memorandum of understanding. Although theoretically non-
    Christian religions can be taught in the schools, there is no such
    instruction at present.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on
    the movement of citizens within or out of the country. However, the
    militants have demanded that the people indigenous to each island be
    given authority to determine who may or may not enter their island.
    Native-born citizens may not be deprived of citizenship on any grounds.
        Since the violent phase of the conflict on Guadalcanal began in
    1998, an estimated 30,000 Malaitans, Guadalcanalese, and Western
    Province persons living on Guadacanal have been displaced from their
    homes as a result of armed conflict and intimidation; 3,000 or more
    have been dispaced since June. The U.N. estimated that in 1999 some
    15,000 to 20,000 Malaitans (one fifth of the population of Guadalcanal)
    were displaced, the majority of whom evacuated to Malaita, while as
    many as 12,000 Guadalcanalese fled their homes for other parts of that
    island. The Government provided very limited help to internally
    displaced persons, who generally relied on their extended families and
    subsistence farming for survival. The national Red Cross Society,
    funded by the European Union, provided some assistance.
        Police on Malaita reportedly are unable to offer protection to
    displaced Malaitans on the island since Malaitan militants raided a
    police armory in January and set up headquarters on the island.
    Malaitan militants reportedly have forced displaced Malaitan families
    to ``contribute'' money or food to support the militants. Telephone
    communication with Malaita has been cut off since Guadalcanalese
    militants destroyed a transmitter on May 18.
        Displaced persons on Guadalcanal also lack effective police
    protection, since most local police were evacuated as a result of
    Guadalcanalese militant raids in 1999.
        Although a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status
    of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government has not enacted
    domestic legislation or procedures for making formal refugee
    determinations. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Red Cross in determining
    refugee status, and has not returned persons to a country where they
    fear persecution.
        The Government provided first asylum to persons from Papua New
    Guinea's Bougainville Island, who fled the conflict that started there
    in 1989. Following the 1998 peace settlement, many have returned home.
    According to the UNHCR, there are less than 50 persons from
    Bougainville in the country who meet the criteria for refugee status.
    In September 1999, the Solomon Islands Red Cross reported that
    Bougainvillians sheltering in the country, who were not considered
    refugees, had been returning to Bougainville during 1999. Most of those
    who remained were employed professionals, and none were in Red Cross
    care shelters.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens had the right to change their government through periodic
    free and fair elections. Suffrage is universal for those 18 years of
    age and over. The Government is a modified parliamentary system
    consisting of a single-chamber legislative assembly of 50 members.
    Executive authority is vested in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.
    The Prime Minister, elected by a majority vote of Parliament, selects
    his own Cabinet. Since independence in 1978, there have been five
    parliamentary elections, most recently in August 1997, and several
    elections for provincial and local councils. On four occasions, changes
    of government resulted from either parliamentary votes of no confidence
    or the resignation of the Prime Minister. However, in 1998 tensions
    between two of the main ethnic groups in the country--the Malaitans and
    the Guadalcanalese--resulted in violence. Throughout 1999
    Guadalcanalese militants forced thousands of Malaitans residing on
    Guadalcanal from their homes. Beginning in January, Malaitan militants
    stole large quantities of weapons from the police and began to actively
    combat the Guadalcanalese. The conflict continued to escalate, and on
    June 5, armed Malaitan militants reportedly assisted by paramilitary
    police officers acting without authorization, took over Honiara, the
    capital. After the takeover, the Malaitan militants forced Prime
    Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu to resign. Parliament selected a new
    Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, under duress. A new government, the
    Coalition for National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace was formed
    after the new Prime Minister was selected. Since June the police have
    not operated as an effective force, and there is no governmental
    institution that can effectively address the ongoing violence.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Traditional
    male dominance has limited the role of women in government. Although 14
    women ran for Parliament in the 1997 elections, only 1, an incumbent,
    was elected.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no restrictions on the formation of local organizations
    to monitor and report on human rights. The Solomon Islands Development
    Trust has both development and human rights objectives. The ICRC has an
    office in Honiara, and an Amnesty International team visited the
    country in mid-August. The Government cooperated with human rights
    organizations to the best of its ability, and requested assistance from
    the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in formulating policies to
    restore peace and justice.
        Red Cross volunteers and relief workers have reported being
    threatened, harassed, even shot at, and prevented from carrying out
    relief work by both Guadalcanalese and Malaitan militants.
        There is a constitutionally provided ombudsman, with the power of
    subpoena, who can investigate complaints of official abuse,
    mistreatment, or unfair treatment. The Ombudsman's Office did not
    report any incidents involving interference with these rights. While
    the Ombudsman's Office has potentially far-ranging powers, it is
    limited by a shortage of resources.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides that no person--regardless of race, place
    of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or disability--shall be
    treated in a discriminatory manner in respect of access to public
    places. The Constitution further prohibits any laws that would have
    discriminatory effects and provides that no person should be treated in
    a discriminatory manner by anyone acting in an official capacity.
    Despite constitutional and legal protections, women remain the victims
    of discrimination in this tradition-based society. Unemployment is
    high, and there are limited job opportunities for the disabled.
        Women.--While actual statistics are scarce, incidents of wife
    beating and wife abuse appear to be common. In the rare cases that are
    reported, charges often are dropped by the women before the court
    appearance or are settled out of court. The magistrates' courts deal
    with physical abuse of women as with any other assault, although
    prosecutions are rare. In part due to the breakdown in law and order,
    and the lack of a police force after June, women and teenage girls in
    particular are vulnerable to abuse including rape, and many rapes have
    been reported since the ethnic conflict began in 1998.
        The law accords women equal legal rights. However, in this
    traditional society men are dominant, and women are limited to
    customary family roles. This situation has prevented women from taking
    more active roles in economic and political life. A shortage of jobs
    inhibits the entry of women into the work force. The majority of women
    are illiterate; this is attributed in large part to cultural barriers.
    The National Council of Women and other NGO's have attempted to make
    women more aware of their legal rights through seminars, workshops, and
    other activities. The Government's Women Development Division also
    addresses women's issues.
        Children.--Within the limits of its resources, the Government is
    committed to the welfare and protection of the rights of children.
    There is no compulsory education, and, according to some estimates,
    only 60 percent of school-age children have access to primary
    education; the percentages of those attending secondary and tertiary
    institutions are much smaller. Children are respected and protected
    within the traditional extended family system, in accordance with a
    family's financial resources and access to services. As a result,
    virtually no children are homeless or abandoned. Although some cases of
    child abuse are reported, there is no societal pattern of abuse. The
    Constitution grants children the same general rights and protection as
    adults. Existing laws are designed to protect children from sexual
    abuse, child labor, and neglect. According to AI, Guadalcanalese
    militants included a number of child soldiers (see Section 6.d.).
        People with Disabilities.--There is no law or national policy on
    the disabled, and no legislation mandates access for the disabled.
    Their protection and care are left to the traditional extended family
    and nongovernmental organizations. With high unemployment countrywide
    and few jobs available in the formal sector, most disabled persons,
    particularly those in rural areas, do not find work outside the family
    structure. The Solomon Islands Red Cross continued to conduct private
    fund-raising efforts to build a new national center for disabled
    children.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country is composed of over
    27 islands with approximately 70 language groups. In the precolonial
    era, these groups existed in a state of endemic warfare with one
    another, and even today many islanders see themselves first as members
    of a clan, next as inhabitants of their natal island, and only third as
    citizens of their nation. Over the past century, and particularly since
    World War II, many persons from the poor, heavily populated island of
    Malaita have settled on Guadalcanal, the island on which the capital of
    Honiara is located. The tensions and resentment between the
    Guadalcanalese and the Malaitans on Guadalcanal culminated in violence
    beginning in late 1998 (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.f., 1.g., and
    2.d.). In 1998 Guadalcanalese militants began a campaign of threats and
    intimidation against Malaitans on Guadalcanal. Scores of Malaitans have
    been killed and injured by Guadalcanalese militants. Since 1998
    approximately 30,000 persons, mainly Malaitans, have fled their homes
    as a result of the conflict. Civilians have been the victims of abuses
    by both sides; such abuses reportedly included abductions, torture,
    rape, forced resettlement, looting, and burning homes.
        Beginning in January, Malaitan militants began seizing weapons from
    the police; many police officers (who are largely Malaitans) joined the
    Malaitan militants. On June 5, Malaitan militants took over the capital
    of Honiara (which is largely populated by Malaitans), forced the Prime
    Minister to resign, and forced Parliament to choose another Prime
    Minister.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution implicitly
    recognizes the right of workers to form or join unions, to choose their
    own representatives, to determine and pursue their own views and
    policies, and to engage in political activities. The courts have
    confirmed these rights. Only about 10 to 15 percent of the population
    participate in the formal sector of the economy. Approximately 60 to 70
    percent of wage earners are organized (90 percent of employees in the
    public sector and about 50 percent of those in the private sector).
        The law permits strikes. Disputes are usually referred quickly to
    the Trade Disputes Panel (TDP) for arbitration, either before or during
    a strike. In practice the small percentage of the work force in formal
    employment means that employers have ample replacement workers if
    disputes are not resolved quickly. However, employees are protected
    from arbitrary dismissal or lockout while the TDP is deliberating.
    Since 1998 ethnic tensions and conflict on Guadalcanal, the most
    economically developed island in the country, seriously have disrupted
    economic activity and have resulted in the loss of many formal
    employment opportunities. Mainstays of the cash economy such as the
    Solomon Taiyo fish cannery and the country's only gold mine have closed
    as a result of the conflict. In June 1999, Solomon Islands Plantation
    Ltd. closed its facilities following attacks on its workers. About
    2,000 employees were evacuated. Militants have prevented the return of
    the work force, 60 percent of whom are Malaitan.
        Unions are free to affiliate internationally, and the largest trade
    union, the Solomon Islands' National Union of Workers, is affiliated
    with the World Federation of Trade Unions, the South Pacific Oceanic
    Council of Trade Unions, and the Commonwealth Trade Union Congress.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Trade
    Disputes Act of 1981 provides for the rights to organize and to bargain
    collectively, and unions exercise these rights frequently.
        Wages and conditions of employment are determined by collective
    bargaining. If a dispute between labor and management cannot be settled
    between the two sides, it is referred to the TDP for arbitration. The
    three-member TDP, composed of a chairman appointed by the judiciary, a
    labor representative, and a business representative, is independent and
    neutral.
        The law protects workers against antiunion activity, and there are
    no areas where union activity is officially discouraged.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced labor, including forced and bonded labor by children,
    and, except as part of a court sentence or order, this prohibition is
    observed.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law forbids labor by children under the age of 12,
    except light agricultural or domestic work performed in the company of
    parents. Children under age 15 are barred from work in industry or on
    ships; those under age 18 may not work underground or in mines. The
    Labor Division of the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry is
    responsible for enforcing child labor laws. Given low wages and high
    unemployment, there is little incentive to employ child labor.
        AI reports that the Guadalcanalese militant forces include
    children.
        Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited constitutionally
    and is not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage rate is $0.31
    per hour (1.50 Solomon Islands dollars) for all workers except those in
    the fishing and agricultural sectors, who receive $0.25 (1.25 Solomon
    Islands dollars). The legal minimum wage is not sufficient to support
    an urban family living entirely on the cash economy. However, most
    families are not dependent solely on wages for their livelihoods.
        The Labor Act of 1969, as amended, and the Employment Act of 1981,
    as well as other laws, regulate premium pay, sick leave, the right to
    paid vacations, and other conditions of service. The standard workweek
    is 45 hours and is limited to 6 days per week. There are provisions for
    premium pay for overtime and holiday work and for maternity leave.
        Malaria is endemic in the country and affects the health of many
    employees. Agricultural workers have a high risk of contracting
    malaria.
        Both an active labor movement and an independent judiciary ensure
    widespread enforcement of labor laws in major state and private
    enterprises. The Commissioner of Labor, the Public Prosecutor, and the
    police are responsible for enforcing labor laws; however, they usually
    react to complaints rather than routinely monitor adherence to the law.
    The extent to which the law is enforced in smaller establishments and
    in the subsistence sector is unclear. Safety and health laws appear to
    be adequate. The Safety at Work Act requires employers to provide a
    safe working environment and forbids retribution against an employee
    who seeks protection under labor regulations or removes himself from a
    hazardous job site.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not prohibit
    trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
    were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    THAILAND

        Thailand is a democratically governed constitutional monarchy that
    until 1992 had a history of military coups and powerful bureaucratic
    influences on political life. Since 1992 there have been five national
    multiparty elections, which transferred power to successive governments
    through peaceful, democratic processes. The King exerts strong informal
    influence but never has used his constitutionally mandated power to
    veto legislation or dissolve the elected House of Representatives.
    There is a bicameral Parliament. The coalition Government, led by Prime
    Minister Chuan Leekpai's Democrat Party, was formed in 1997. General
    elections were scheduled for January 2001. The judiciary is
    independent, but is subject to corruption.
        The security forces have wide-ranging legal powers, derived
    primarily from past militarily controlled administrations. Since 1992
    the armed forces have become increasingly professional and increasingly
    subject to civilian control. Their influence in politics has been
    diminishing. The Royal Thai Police have primary responsibility for
    internal security and law enforcement. Elements of both the armed
    forces and the police have a reputation for corruption. Some members of
    the security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
        Thailand is a newly industrializing country with a market-based
    economy and strong tradition of private enterprise, although state
    enterprises play a significant role in some sectors. A financial crisis
    that began in July 1997 led to a severe contraction in the economy
    lasting through early 1999. The economy resumed moderate growth in
    early 1999; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is estimated at 4
    percent for 2000. Annual per capita income, which peaked at $3,000 in
    1996, is approximately $2,000, although depreciation of the local
    currency during the crisis magnified the decline. Roughly 60 percent of
    the population remains rural and agricultural, although agriculture
    only accounts for approximately 10 percent of GDP. Rice and other
    agricultural and fisheries products are important exports, as are
    electrical goods, textiles, and automobiles. Government efforts to
    narrow the gap between urban and rural living standards have met with
    only mixed success, and the Government increasingly focused on
    education and investment promotion in poor areas to reduce disparities
    in income distribution. Even though government regulation generally
    provides protection for individual economic interests, including
    property rights, a lack of transparency in bureaucratic decisionmaking
    and a gap between regulation and enforcement sometimes leads to uneven
    treatment of some firms and institutions. Some areas of Government
    remain subject to corruption.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, significant problems remain in several areas. Police
    officers killed a number of criminal suspects while attempting to
    apprehend them and killed suspects in custody. The Government remained
    reluctant to prosecute vigorously those who committed such abuses,
    resulting in a climate of impunity.
        Police occasionally beat suspects, at times to coerce confessions.
    An ingrained culture of corruption persists in many parts of the
    civilian bureaucracy and in the security forces. Routine demands for
    bribes undermine the rule of law and permit the continuation of various
    illegal activities such as income tax evasion, illegal gambling, drug
    violations, goods smuggling, trafficking in persons, and prostitution.
    Enforcement of a broad range of laws and regulations by police
    continued to be noticeably lax.
        Conditions in prison and immigration detention facilities are poor
    due to severe overcrowding. However, conditions improved somewhat at
    the Bangkok Immigration Detention Center during the year. Lengthy
    pretrial detention and the prolonged detention of some aliens remain
    problems. The judiciary suffers from corruption and at times security
    forces infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The media practiced some
    self-censorship, and there were some restrictions on freedom of
    movement. The Government hindered the activity of some human rights
    groups.
        The 1997 Constitution increased legal protections for women and the
    disabled; however, some inequities in the law remain. Violence against
    women and societal discrimination against women are problems.
    Trafficking in women and children and forced prostitution are serious
    problems. Societal discrimination against hilltribes and religious and
    ethnic minorities persists.
        There were reports of forced labor and child labor.
        The 1997 Constitution contains provisions designed to combat
    corruption and increase government accountability, transparency, and
    public participation in the political process. The Government has
    adopted implementing legislation to bring government practice in line
    with these reforms over the last 3 years.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of politically motivated killings by government agents;
    however, legal organizations, reputable nongovernmental organizations
    (NGO's), and the press continued to report that some police officers
    used unwarranted lethal force in apprehending criminal suspects. Armed
    alleged drug traffickers in particular continued to confront and
    threaten police officers violently, and officers used deadly force
    during some arrest attempts. Police killed several criminal suspects
    while in custody. New procedures that regulate the investigation of
    deaths in custody went into place in June.
        Following the armed seizure of the Ratchaburi provincial hospital
    by 10 Burmese dissidents in January, military and police forces entered
    the hospital to free the more than 700 patients, staff, and visitors
    held as hostages and to secure the premises. In the raid, government
    forces killed the hostagetakers; no hostages were injured. In media
    reports after the incident, some hostages claimed that the Burmese
    gunmen had been apprehended and disarmed before the security forces
    killed them; no evidence corroborated this claim. The Government,
    including the Prime Minister, denied the claims and maintained that the
    Burmese were killed during the course of the raid. Despite calls by the
    press for an investigation, the Government conducted no public
    investigation, and no other evidence to corroborate claims of abuse was
    presented.
        In May 11 police officers were sentenced to life in prison or death
    for their roles in the 1994 killings of 4 Ministry of Interior (MOI)
    officials.
        The two senior police officers arrested in the June 1999 Nonthaburi
    abduction and killing of a suspected car thief remain free on bail, and
    the court case was still pending at year's end. The Department of
    Corrections exonerated the prison guards accused in the June 1999
    killings of three would-be escapees from Udon Thani provincial prison.
    The Department of Corrections also found no criminal behavior in the
    January 1998 killing of four prisoners escaping from Bangkok remand
    prison. Both cases are closed.
        Previously the Government investigated some extrajudicial killings;
    however, in the past, it prosecuted few police or military officers
    accused of such abuses. A senior prosecutor in 1999 stated that 99
    percent of all cases in which government officials were accused of
    extrajudicial killings were dropped on the basis of insufficient
    evidence. Senior prosecutors and legal associations claimed that most
    cases eventually were dismissed because regulations outlined in the
    Criminal Code required public prosecutors to rely exclusively upon the
    recommendations of the police when determining whether to bring a case
    for criminal prosecution. Initial inquiries were carried out by police
    officers, often the same units responsible for the killing. Credible
    sources reported that police investigators routinely determined that
    police took no wrongful action. Routine exoneration of police officers
    contributed to a climate of impunity that is a significant factor in
    preventing any major change in police behavior. It also discourages
    relatives of victims from pressing for prosecution. However, in June a
    new procedure for investigating suspicious deaths, including deaths
    occurring while the individual is in custody, took effect and is part
    of the amended Criminal Procedure Code. It requires, among other
    things, that the prosecutor, a forensic pathologist, and a local
    administrator participate in the investigation and that family members
    may have legal representation at the inquests.
        Families rarely take advantage of a provision in the law that
    allows them to bring personal lawsuits against police officers for
    criminal action during arrest. If pursued by the family, the case is
    handled by the same office--in some instances by the same prosecutor--
    who already has ruled that no criminal action occurred. There is no
    information available to determine how many cases are settled out of
    court. However, in cases in which suits are filed, the official charged
    often compensates the family of the deceased, and the lawsuit is
    waived.
        The Government continued to prosecute two cases of suspected
    extrajudicial killing from 1996. By year's end, the Attorney General
    had not yet decided whether to proceed with murder charges against the
    police officer implicated in the 1996 Supan Buri killing of six
    suspected drug dealers. The trial of the police officer charged in the
    1996 killing of farmer activist Joon Bhoonkhuntod was still in progress
    in December.
        In December 1999, The Court dismissed the murder charges in the
    1996 case of the suspected political killing of environmental protester
    Thong-in Kaewwattha.
        In November police intercepted and assaulted a vehicle in
    Kanchanaburi province that was commandeered by 9 Burmese persons who
    had been convicted of violent felonies in Thailand and were fleeing
    toward Burma. The escapees were armed, had critically wounded one
    prison official, and had taken hostages. In the course of rescuing the
    hostages, security forces killed all the escapees. One hostage was
    killed in the shooting.
        There were 11 killings of political canvassers during the election
    campaigns leading up to the January 2001 general election and March
    2001 Senate elections. All the victims worked for all political
    parties, and all the killings allegedly were politically motivated.
    Police arrested several persons in connection with the killings, and
    investigations continued at year's end. Legal organizations, reputable
    NGO's, and the press reported that some police officers used
    unwarranted lethal force in apprehending criminal suspects.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        As a result of a freedom of information request by the victims'
    families, the Government in May released the Defense Ministry's report
    on the military forces' suppression of political demonstrations in May
    1992. The report provided no new information on the whereabouts of the
    remaining 38 prodemocracy protesters still listed as missing. Most, if
    not all, are presumed by family members and NGO's to be dead.
        The results of a government investigation into the 1991
    disappearance of Labor Congress of Thailand president Thanong Po-an
    conducted by the House Justice and Human Rights Standing Committee have
    never been released to the public.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution and the Criminal Code forbid torture and
    cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, NGO's
    and legal organizations continue to report that some members of the
    police occasionally beat suspects in order to coerce confessions.
    Authorities also investigated police officers accused of raping and
    extorting sex from female suspects in detention.
        In January the Ministry of Defense reported that an Army Lieutenant
    was convicted of July 1999 sexual crimes against a group of Burmese
    refugee women, but the lieutenant received only a 1year suspended
    sentence.
        Some NGO's accused police of using excessive force in July when
    demonstrators engaged in a long-term protest against the Government
    attempted to enter Government House by force. This compound contains
    the Prime Minister's office. Other participants in the protest said
    that the police had acted professionally. The police also maintained
    that they acted with restraint to protect government property.
    Approximately 20 persons sustained minor injuries.
        Among junior police officers, corruption remains widespread. In
    September residents of Nakhon Si Thammarat rioted in response to
    frequent demands for bribes by traffic police. Police officials
    complain that low pay for members of police forces makes them
    susceptible to bribes.
        Some corrupt police and soldiers are involved in prostitution and
    trafficking in women and children (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
        Prison conditions are poor but in general they do not threaten the
    life or health of inmates. Already severe prison overcrowding worsened
    during the year. Sleeping accommodations and access to medical care
    remain areas of concern that require continued attention. Medical care
    in prisons is inadequate. To care for a total prison population of
    219,176 inmates in 168 prisons that have a total design capacity of
    100,000 prisoners, the Corrections Department employs only 17 full-time
    doctors and 7 full-time dentists.
        Prison authorities sometimes used solitary confinement to punish
    difficult prisoners. They also used heavy leg irons without apparent
    cause. Credible sources continued to report that prisoners captured in
    escape attempts were beaten severely.
        Poor conditions in Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center
    (IDC) improved somewhat during the year, but conditions in provincial
    detention centers remained very poor. There were no reports that
    detainees transferred to Bangkok arrived in a debilitated state as in
    1999. Immigration detention facilities are not administered by the
    Department of Corrections and are not subject to many of the
    regulations that govern the regular prison system. The number of long-
    term immigrant detainees declined due to a 1998 MOI policy that allows
    illegal immigrants arrested in border areas to be deported without
    first being sent to an immigration detention center, but some
    foreigners still face trial delays of up to 6 months. Despite the drop
    in the detainee population, overcrowding and shortages of food and
    water in the immigration detention centers remain significant problems.
    Early in the year, the Department of Corrections suspended plans to
    construct two additional prisons for women accused of drugrelated
    offenses.
        Access to prisons is not restricted, and the Government permits
    visits by human rights monitors and the Thai International Red Cross.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--With few exceptions,
    including crimes in progress, the law requires police officers making
    an arrest to have warrants, and authorities respect this provision in
    practice. Under the Constitution, persons must be informed of likely
    charges against them immediately after arrest and must be allowed to
    inform someone of their arrest. Detainees have a right to have a lawyer
    present during questioning, and the police generally respected this
    right in practice during the year. Foreign prisoners sometimes are
    forced to sign confessions without benefit of a competent translator.
        Police also are required to submit criminal cases to prosecutors
    for the filing of court charges within 48 hours of arrest. However,
    lawyers report that the police rarely bring their cases to court within
    this period since the Criminal Procedure Code allows an extension
    period of up to 3 days. Police also may seek court permission to hold
    suspects for additional periods (up to a maximum of 82 days for the
    most serious offenses) to carry out investigations. In addition laws
    and regulations place any offense for which the maximum penalty is less
    than 3 years under the jurisdiction of the district courts, which have
    special procedures. In these cases, police are required to submit cases
    to public prosecutors within 72 hours of arrest. There is a functioning
    bail system.
        The only legal basis for detention by the police without specific
    charges for long periods (up to 480 days) is the AntiCommunist
    Activities Act, which authorities did not invoke during the year. In
    March the Government approved legislation to abrogate this law (see
    Section 2.a.); the new legislation is to become effective in June 2001.
        Of more than 200,000 prison inmates, approximately 78,000 were
    charged with narcotics violations. Approximately 27 percent of the
    total prison population were pretrial detainees. Pretrial detainees
    usually are not segregated from the general prison population.
    According to one lawyers' association, pretrial detainees are held an
    average of 60 days.
        The Government does not use exile as a means of political control.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary; however, while the judiciary generally is
    regarded as independent, it is subject to corruption and has a
    reputation for venality.
        The civilian judicial system has three levels of courts: Courts of
    first instance; courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court. A separate
    military court hears criminal and civil cases pertaining to military
    personnel as well as those brought during periods of martial law. There
    is no right to appeal military court decisions. The Constitutional
    Court, charged with interpreting the Constitution, began operating in
    1998; the Court provides a mechanism to implement the Constitution
    fully. The courts became fully independent of the Ministry of Justice
    in August. Islamic (Shari'a) courts provide due process and hear only
    civil cases concerning members of the Muslim minority. Access to courts
    or administrative bodies to seek redress is provided for and respected.
        There is no trial by jury. Trials for misdemeanors are decided by a
    single judge, and more serious cases require two or more judges. While
    most trials are public, the court may order a trial closed. This is
    done most often in cases involving national security or the royal
    family. Career civil service judges preside over the courts. Judicial
    appointments and judicial bodies are not subject to parliamentary
    review.
        The Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence.
    Defendants tried in ordinary criminal courts enjoy a broad range of
    legal rights, including access to a lawyer of their choosing. A
    government program provides free legal advice to the poor, but indigent
    defendants are not provided with counsel at public expense
    automatically. Most free legal aid comes from private groups, including
    the Thai Lawyers Association and the Thai Women Lawyers Association.
        There were no reports of political prisoners. Sorayut
    Sakunnanasantisat, a Muslim mullah convicted of offenses against the
    monarchy and of violating national security for leading a political
    protest in 1990, was released from prison in December 1999.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the rights, and the
    Government generally respects them in practice. With few exceptions,
    including crimes in progress, the Constitution requires police to
    obtain a warrant from a court prior to conducting a search. However,
    the procedures for issuing warrants are not standardized, primarily
    because various laws such as the Criminal Procedure Code and internal
    government regulations, including those that apply to the police
    department, have not been amended to comply with the Constitution. The
    laws must be amended to comply with the Constitution by 2002.
        Lawyers' associations reported that police at times endorsed blank
    search warrants or used legitimate warrants to conduct intrusive
    searches outside the stated evidentiary domain. NGO's concerned with
    the welfare of highlanders reported that police and military units
    carried out several warrantless searches of villages for narcotics in
    northern provinces during the year. This type of operation is permitted
    under both the Constitution and the Narcotics Prevention and
    Suppression Act of 1976 in cases in which there is reasonable suspicion
    and an urgent search is deemed necessary. However, some academic groups
    claimed that the searches were arbitrary and violated the villagers'
    civil rights. The AntiCommunist Activities Act, which had allowed
    officials engaged in ``Communist suppression operations'' to conduct
    searches without warrants, was abrogated in March (see Section 1.d.).
        The Director of the Telephone Organization of Thailand resigned in
    June following disclosure of illegal wiretaps on the residential
    telephone of Wira Somkhwamkhit, an anticorruption activist (see Section
    4).
        Security services monitor persons who espouse extremist or highly
    controversial views, including foreign visitors.
        NGO's concerned with the welfare of women had reported in the past
    that hospital and district officials sometimes changed the
    identification of unwed expectant mothers from ``Miss'' to ``Mrs.,''
    although it is illegal to do so and despite the fact that the women
    possessed no marriage or divorce certificates. Lacking these documents,
    the women could encounter difficulties in obtaining official documents
    needed for some business and government transactions. In 1995 the MOI
    warned clerks against making such an error.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for, and
    citizens generally enjoy, a large measure of freedom of speech and of
    the press, and the Government generally respects these rights in
    practice. However, the Government may restrict these rights to preserve
    national security, maintain public order, preserve the rights of
    others, and protect public morals. In practice this rarely has been
    done. Laws that prohibit criticism of the royal family (lese majeste),
    threats to national security, or speech likely to incite disturbances
    or insult Buddhism remain in place under the Constitution.
        The Constitution makes it unlawful for the Government to censor,
    ban, license, or restrict print or broadcast media, except by specific
    legislation in times of crisis. While newspapers and periodicals
    practice some selfcensorship, especially with regard to the monarchy
    and national security problems, media criticism of political parties,
    public figures, and the Government is common and vigorous. Journalists
    generally are free to comment on governmental activities without fear
    of official reprisal.
        During the year, there were two cases of suspected intimidation of
    the press. In April the Editor in Chief of the Chiang Mai daily
    newspaper Pak Nua was shot and seriously wounded in an attempted
    murder, but recovered. Police arrested four soldiers, all of whom were
    detained without bail. One civilian suspect was not arrested. The
    editor believes that his repeated critical reporting on the local
    government led to the assault. His statements have implicated several
    local government officials. The case is under investigation. The
    Government and the Prime Minister strongly criticized the murder
    attempt.
        In August unknown persons detonated a bomb at the front gate of the
    home of the crime editor of the sensationalist Bangkok daily newspaper
    Khao Sod, causing only property damage. The editor wrote a daily column
    that used innuendo to combat both organization crime and police
    corruption. No one claimed responsibility for the bombing.
        Under the 1941 Printing and Advertisement Act, the Royal Thai
    Police Special Branch issued warnings to publications for various
    violations such as disturbing the peace, interfering with public
    safety, or offending public morals. The 1941 Act permits police closure
    of newspapers or printing presses in times of war or national
    emergency, but only with a court order. No such closures occurred
    during the year. Legislation was proposed in 1998 to revoke the act.
    The Juridical Council approved the revocation of the act, but final
    revocation awaits approval by the Council of State.
        An antipornography law allows police to restrict or confiscate
    printed publications and other materials deemed obscene; the
    interpretation generally is limited to hard-core pornographic material.
        Domestic publications continued to present a wide range of
    political and social commentary. Unless critical of the royal family or
    the monarchy, foreign and domestic books normally are not censored and
    circulate freely. Police have the authority to ban the importation of
    publications but generally do not exercise it. In March the Government
    set a date of June 2001 to abolish the 1952 AntiCommunist Activities
    Act, which had been created to counter the threat of Communism through
    media restriction.
        Radio and television stations enjoy the same constitutional
    protections of freedom of expression and speech as the print media. All
    radio and television stations are licensed by the Government, and most
    are operated under the direct or indirect oversight of the Government
    or the armed forces. Radio and television station profits are retained
    by organizations that control frequencies, such as government
    ministries, universities, and the military services. The military
    services retain 40 to 50 radio and television frequencies for national
    security purposes, despite civilian government assurance that the
    military services may use all broadcasting frequencies in the event of
    a national emergency without the need to own them.
        Radio stations must renew their licenses every year, and their
    signals are broadcast via government transmitters. They are required by
    law to broadcast government-produced newscasts twice daily, 30 minutes
    each in the morning and evening.
        There is one cable television network. It enjoys almost complete
    autonomy under the indirect oversight of the Mass Communications
    Authority of Thailand. In addition a wholly independent ultra-
    highfrequency television station (ITV) managed by a private consortium
    including the outspoken Nation Multimedia Group had operated since
    1996. In May it was purchased by another corporation affiliated with
    Thai Rak Thai Party leader Thaksin Shinawatra. One new 24hour,
    independent all news station, operated by former owners of ITV, began
    broadcasting exclusively on cable television in June.
        Programmers generally are free to determine the nature and content
    of television broadcasts. However, as with the print media, self-
    censorship exists. Stations occasionally censor or ``black out''
    portions of programming that they deem politically sensitive or
    pornographic. A censorship board exists in the Prime Minister's office,
    but it rarely restricts television or radio broadcasts.
        The Constitution calls for the liberalization of the broadcast
    media and the establishment of an independent National Broadcasting
    Commission (NBC) to oversee frequency management; it expects to be
    operational in April 2001. The seven Commission members are expected to
    be selected from four broad categories: Government, broadcasting,
    NGO's, and universities. The NBC is authorized to redistribute
    frequencies previously controlled by the Government to eligible
    organizations or individuals in the country. The media criticized the
    proposed implementation regulations, arguing that they contain broad
    censorship powers and allows the Government to retain a large number of
    its frequencies.
        Under the 1930 Film Act, theater owners and broadcasters must
    submit films that they plan to show to the film censorship board for
    review. The board may require that portions of the film be removed, or
    it may ban the film. Reasons for censoring films include violating
    moral and cultural norms and disturbing the public order and national
    security. Theater owners and broadcasters frequently censor films
    themselves before submitting them to the board. According to the office
    of the Film Censorship Board, 176 films were submitted for review in
    1999, the most recent year available. Two films were banned in 1999.
        Activity on the Internet remains unregulated.
        The Constitution provides for the right to engage in academic
    pursuits, and academic freedom is respected. The Ministry of Education
    edits public school textbooks. No textbooks were censored during the
    year.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
    generally respected this right in practice. Permits are not required
    for private meetings or gatherings unless held on public property or
    organized by foreign nationals; these are granted routinely.
        The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
    Government generally respected this right in practice. Private
    associations must register with the Government; such registration is
    approved routinely.
        In November in Ubon Ratchathani province, villagers allegedly paid
    by the Government's electric power authority violently dispersed a
    longstanding protest by the Assembly of the Poor and other persons at
    the Pak Mun dam. The villagers seriously injured 4 protesters and
    burned more than 500 temporary shelters. A police investigation was in
    progress at year's end (see Section 1.c.).
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is protected by law,
    and the Government generally respects this right in practice; however,
    it restricts the missionary activities of some groups. The Constitution
    requires that the monarch be a Buddhist. The state religion is in
    effect Therevada Buddhism; however, it is not designated as such.
        The Constitution requires the Government ``to patronize and protect
    Buddhism and other religions.'' The State subsidizes the activities of
    the three largest religious communities (Buddhist, Islamic, and
    Christian). Since mid1999 the Government has provided more than $49
    million (2 billion baht) to support Buddhist and Muslim institutes of
    higher education; to fund religious education programs in public and
    private schools; to provide daily allowances for monks and Muslim
    clerics who hold administrative and senior ecclesiastical posts; and to
    subsidize travel and health care for monks and Muslim clerics. This
    figure also includes an annual budget for the renovation and repair of
    Buddhist temples and Muslim mosques, the maintenance of historic
    Buddhist sites, and the daily upkeep of the Central Mosque in Pattani.
        The Government plays an active role in religious affairs. The
    Religious Affairs Department (RAD), which is located in the Ministry of
    Education, registers religious organizations. In order to be
    registered, a religious organization first must be accepted into an
    officially recognized ecclesiastical group. There were seven groups,
    including one for the Buddhist community, one for the Muslim community,
    one for the Catholic community, and for Protestant denominations.
    Government registration confers some benefits, including access to
    state subsidies, tax-exempt status, and preferential allocation of
    resident visas for organization officials. Although some activities of
    groups that have not been accepted into one of the existing recognized
    groups have been restricted, in general unregistered religious
    organizations operate freely. There were no reports of the extortion of
    unregistered groups by local officials during the year.
        Under the provisions of the Religious Organizations Act of 1969,
    the Department of Religious Affairs recognizes a new religion if a
    national census shows that it has at least 5,000 adherents, has a
    uniquely recognizable theology, and is not politically active. However,
    since 1984 the Government has maintained a policy of not recognizing
    any new religious faiths. This has restricted the activities of some
    groups that have not been accepted into one of the existing religious
    governing bodies on doctrinal or other grounds.
        Religious instruction is required in public schools at both the
    primary (grades 1 through 6) and secondary (grades 7 through 12)
    education levels. Students at the primary level are required to take 80
    hours of instruction per academic year in religious studies classes.
    Instruction is limited to Buddhism and Islam. During the year, some
    parts of the country with large Muslim student populations do not have
    Muslim studies courses. Muslim students in these schools generally were
    directed to school libraries to participate in Muslim self-study
    courses.
        National identity cards produced by the MOI included the religious
    affiliation of the holder. The change was implemented in 1999 in
    response to the demands of parliamentarians who wanted easier
    identification of persons who required Muslim burial. Persons who fail
    or choose not to indicate religious affiliation in their applications
    may be issued cards without religious information.
        The Government permitted foreign missionary groups to work freely
    throughout the country, although it also maintained policies that
    favored proselytizing by citizens.
        The number of foreign missionaries officially registered with the
    Government is limited to a quota that originally was established by the
    RAD in 1982. There were no reports that foreign missionaries were
    deported or harassed for working without registration, although the
    activities of Muslim professors and clerics were subjected
    disproportionately to scrutiny on national security grounds because of
    continued government concern about the potential resurgence of Muslim
    separatist activities in the south.
        Laws prohibiting speech likely to insult Buddhism remain in place
    under the 1997 Constitution. The police, who have legal authority under
    the Printing and Advertisement Act of 1941 to issue written warnings or
    orders suspending the publication or distribution of printed materials
    considered offensive to public morals, did not use it to restrict the
    publication or distribution of religious literature during the year.
    The act requires all theater owners and broadcasters to submit films
    scheduled for screening to a government film censorship board for
    review (see Section 2.a.).
        Muslim female civil servants are not permitted to wear headscarves
    when dressed in civil servant uniforms.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
    of citizens to change their residence or workplace, and authorities
    generally respect this right in practice; however, there were some
    exceptions. Longstanding written restrictions on the travel and
    domicile of certain Vietnamese resident aliens who immigrated to
    Thailand in 1945 and 1946, and Chinese who immigrated between 1953 and
    1961, remain in place. In addition other long-term noncitizen
    residents, including several hundred tribal people, officially are
    required to seek permission from local authorities or the army for
    foreign or domestic travel. In practice authorities rarely enforce
    these restrictive measures, and registered resident aliens move freely
    within the country.
        During the year, the Government permitted a total of 99,974
    Burmese, Cambodian, and Lao workers already in the country to hold
    manual labor jobs in 18 sectors. These persons were permitted to work
    and to move freely in 37 of the 76 provinces. The Government deported
    163,966 migrant workers and families during the year. However, NGO's
    reported that a large number of those deported later returned to the
    country.
        The country is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the
    Government continued to provide first asylum to small numbers of
    Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers pending their resettlement in other
    countries as well as to persons unable to meet the refugee definition
    pending arrangements to return them to their countries of origin.
        Along the border with Burma, the Government generally followed its
    policy of providing first asylum to new arrivals, referred to as
    displaced persons. Provincial screening committees determine
    eligibility to enter the refugee border camps based upon very narrow
    criteria, limited to those who flee actual fighting rather than on
    broader grounds of persecution on the basis of race, religion, ethnic
    group, social class, or political opinion. Consequently, several
    thousand asylum seekers from Burma, primarily of the Karen ethnic
    group, who resided in Thailand but previously were not acknowledged as
    refugees, were given refugee status during the year and were permitted
    to receive assistance and protection in designated refugee camps.
        The Government and the UNHCR do not extend displaced person status
    to the large number of the Shan ethnic minority members who have
    crossed the border into the country from Burma but who have not
    requested refugee status.
        In June and August, the Government repatriated 116 Burmese deemed
    ineligible for assistance in the camps. The UNHCR unsuccessfully
    appealed on behalf of those asylum seekers.
        Most of those returned to Burma in mid-year reportedly have
    returned to the camps.
        There is no legislation regarding the treatment of refugees.
    However, the Government has continued to permit the UNHCR to exercise
    its mandate with regard to small numbers of Vietnamese and Lao asylum
    seekers awaiting repatriation. The Government also upheld its 1998
    decision to allow the UNHCR to play a formal role in monitoring and
    providing protection to about 130,000 refugees from Burma, mostly
    ethnic minorities, in more than a dozen sites near the border with
    Burma. The UNHCR's previous mandate had been limited to a few hundred
    ethnic Burman students at the Burmese Center, formerly known as the
    Burmese Student Safe Area, located in Ratchaburi province. The
    Government continued to restrict access to the Center to those persons
    from Burma to whom the UNHCR had accorded refugee status.
        After the October 1999 takeover of the Embassy of Burma in Bangkok
    by Burmese dissidents, the Government accelerated the pace of third-
    country resettlement of Burmese students. Since then more than 1,200
    have been resettled in nine countries.
        The Government also continued to allow NGO's to provide food,
    medical services, housing, and other services to Burmese refugees near
    the border. Government officials periodically arrested Burmese outside
    designated camps as illegal aliens, including some recognized as
    ``persons of concern'' by the UNHCR.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to choose or
    change their government peacefully through free and fair elections
    based on universal suffrage. Voting is compulsory. Eligible voters who
    fail to exercise their voting responsibilities, except for those
    excused on reasonable grounds, are subject to the loss of certain
    rights, including the right to be a candidate in future elections.
    However, the Constitution prohibits Buddhist monks and nuns from
    seeking public office. Citizens last exercised this right in an
    election in 1996 that generally was viewed as free, but was marred by
    widespread vote buying, a recurrent problem. Peaceful transitions have
    marked all changes of government since 1992.
        The campaign for the January 2001 general election was free and
    fair, but was marred by alleged vote-buying. Monitoring by the Election
    Commission established by the Constitution lessened the most egregious
    offenses observed in past campaigns.
        The country is a democratically governed constitutional monarchy
    that until 1992 had a history of military coups and powerful
    bureaucratic influences on political life. Since 1992 there have been
    five national multiparty elections, which transferred power to
    successive governments through peaceful, democratic processes. The King
    exerts strong informal influence but has never has used his
    constitutionally mandated power to veto legislation or dissolve the
    elected House of Representatives. There is a bicameral Parliament. The
    coalition Government, led by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai's Democrat
    Party, was formed in 1997. General elections were scheduled for January
    2001.
        In August the first directly elected Senate took office. The Senate
    election required multiple rounds of voting for some districts because
    the Election Commission voided some results due to perceived
    irregularities such as evidence of vote-buying. The election provided a
    first test of new election laws. In October the Constitutional Court
    ruled that the Election Commission could disqualify a candidate whom
    the Commission finds guilty of electoral irregularities.
        While there are no legal restrictions on their political
    participation, women generally are underrepresented in national
    politics, especially at senior levels. There was essentially no change
    in the number of women assigned or elected to positions of leadership.
    There are 15 women among the 264 members of the House of
    Representatives; in the 200member Senate, 21 Senators are women.
        Of the Parliament elected in 1996, there were 22 women among the
    393 members of the House of Representatives. On average less than 10
    percent of Parliament members have been women; however, this figure has
    risen steadily. Following the resignation of one woman from the Cabinet
    to compete in the election for Bangkok Governor, there are two women in
    the 48member Cabinet. On average approximately 5 percent of Cabinet
    members in recent years have been women. Although over half of civil
    service employees are women, few hold senior positions.
        No laws prohibit the participation of ethnic minorities, but few
    hold positions of authority in national politics. Muslims from the
    south hold significant elected posts in the Government, although they
    continue to be underrepresented in local and provincial government
    positions, which are appointed by the central Government. There were 8
    Muslim Members of the Senate and 17 Muslim Members in the 1996
    Parliament, including Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        A wide variety of local, domestic, and international human rights
    organizations work on controversial problems without government
    restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
    rights cases freely. Government officials generally were cooperative
    and responsive to their views; however, at times the Government
    hindered the activity of a few human rights groups.
        Very few NGO's are accorded tax-exempt status, and this sometimes
    hampers the ability of domestic human rights organizations to secure
    adequate funding.
        The independent National Counter Corruption Commission began an
    investigation into the wiretap surveillance of the telephone of Wira
    Somkwamkhit, Chairman of the People's Rights Protection Group, an
    anticorruption NGO. Wira had been investigating corruption charges
    against thenDeputy Prime Minister Sanan Khrachonprasat, who was forced
    to resign after the Commission found that he had falsified financial
    statements.
        In reaction to the 1999 seizure of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok
    and the January seizure of the Ratchaburi Hospital by Burmese
    dissidents, the security forces stepped up enforcement against NGO's
    working with Burmese exiles. Some NGO's reported that authorities
    closed their offices, seized their property, and arrested several
    activists. In November and December, two foreign activists who worked
    with NGO's to help Burmese exile groups were denied entry into the
    country on the basis of the national interest clause of the Immigration
    Act.
        The Constitution mandates the establishment of a permanent 11member
    National Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The newly elected Senate had
    selected 9 of its 11 members by year's end from the list of 22 nominees
    made by the previous Senate. The Commission when operational would
    operate as a separate government entity to prepare an annual evaluation
    of the human rights situation for the National Assembly, propose
    policies and recommendations for amending laws to the National
    Assembly, promote measures to educate citizens on human rights, and
    investigate human rights abuses.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law without
    respect to race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status.
    In practice some discrimination exists, and government enforcement of
    equal protection statutes is uneven.
        Women.--Domestic abuse continues to be a serious problem affecting
    the welfare of many women; reliable reports indicate that domestic
    abuse occurs across all social classes. Specific laws concerning
    domestic violence have not been enacted. Spousal and child abuse are
    covered by assault provisions in the Criminal Code, but rules of
    evidence often make prosecuting such cases difficult. Police do not
    enforce laws against such violence vigorously, and domestic violence
    often goes unreported because many victims and authorities continue to
    regard domestic abuse as a private, not a legal, matter. NGO's
    supported programs designed to aid victims, including emergency
    hotlines, temporary shelters, counseling services, and a television
    program designed to increase awareness of domestic violence, HIV/AIDS,
    and other women's issues. The Government's ``one-stop'' crisis centers
    in state-run hospitals established to care for abused women and
    children continued operation but faced budget difficulties.
        Under the Criminal Code rape is illegal. However, a husband may not
    be prosecuted for spousal rape. In 1998 the Government proposed changes
    to the Criminal Code that would redefine the term rape to include
    marital rape. The proposed changes were pending at year's end.
        According to credible sources, rapes and domestic assaults are
    underreported, in part because law enforcement agencies are widely
    perceived to be incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice. Since
    1994 police have sought to change this perception and encourage women
    to report sexual crimes through the use of teams of female police
    officers that operate in metropolitan Bangkok police stations, with a
    total of 20 female investigators. The police expanded this program to
    three provinces by adding an additional 9 female officers.
        Prostitution is illegal but flourishes. It is culturally ingrained
    and often is protected by local officials with a commercial interest in
    it (see Sections 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.). Trafficking in women and
    children is a serious problem. Government and NGO estimates of the
    number of women and children engaged in prostitution vary widely. Many
    NGO's and government departments report a figure of 200,000 persons,
    which is considered a conservative estimate. This figure includes
    children under age 18 and foreigners. In border areas, there were
    reports that women were forced into prostitution, but the number of
    such cases is difficult to determine. The majority of prostitutes are
    not kept under physical constraint, but a large number labor under debt
    bondage (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The 1996 Prostitution Prevention
    and Suppression Act makes child prostitution illegal and states that
    customers who patronize child prostitutes are subject to criminal
    sanctions. Parents who allow a child to enter the trade also are
    subject to criminal sanctions, but prosecutions remained low. NGO's and
    government agencies provide shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration
    programs for children and women involved in the sex industry.
        The 1998 Labor Protection Law made sexual harassment illegal for
    the first time, but covers only persons working in the private sector.
    NGO's claim that the term is vague and that such ambiguity makes the
    prosecution of harassment claims difficult. No sexual harassment cases
    were prosecuted under the act during the year.
        The Constitution has six gender-related articles designed to
    provide women with equal rights and protections, but some inequalities
    in the law remain. A man may sue for divorce on the grounds that his
    wife committed adultery, but a woman faces the additional legal burden
    of proving that her husband has acknowledged publicly another women as
    his wife.
        Women have equal access to higher education, and more than half of
    university graduates each year are women. However, police and military
    academies (except for the nursing academy) do not accept female
    students, although a significant number of instructors at the military
    academies are women. Women constitute 44 percent of the labor force and
    hold an increasing share of professional positions, and government
    regulations require employers to pay equal wages and benefits for equal
    work regardless of gender. Women are able to own and manage businesses
    freely. Discrimination in hiring is common, and there is a significant
    gap between the average salaries earned by men and women because women
    are concentrated in lower-paying jobs. In practice women also receive
    lower pay for equal work in virtually all sectors of the economy.
        The Constitution includes an article that specifies that onethird
    of the members of the new National Human Rights Commission be women.
    The Women and Constitution Network, a league of 35 women's
    organizations, advocates for legal reforms to address legal inequities
    in the treatment of women. It continues to play an important role in
    securing the inclusion of gender equality clauses in legislation that
    create new government organizations mandated by the 1997 Constitution.
        Children.--In recent years, the Government took steps to promote
    the rights and welfare of children. The Constitution provides for the
    right of access to free public education through grade 12, and the
    Government mandates 9 years of compulsory education. An estimated 23
    percent of children complete grade 6, and 10 percent complete grade 12.
    The Government's 1997 Social Welfare Plan for Underprivileged People
    doubled the budget for children's programs for 1997-2001, compared with
    the previous 5year plan. Although special juvenile courts and detention
    centers exist in 29 provinces, children are tried in the same courts
    and detained with adults in the rest of the country.
        Child labor remains a problem, and some international
    organizations, government-funded research organizations, and news media
    continued to report on the large number of children leaving school for
    economic reasons (see Section 6.d.).
        The Criminal Code provides for the protection of children from
    abuse, and laws on rape and abandonment provide for harsher penalties
    if the victim is a child. However, as with domestic abuse, police are
    reluctant to investigate abuse cases, and rules of evidence make
    prosecution of child abuse cases difficult. In September legislation
    designed to protect witnesses, victims, and offenders under the age of
    18 came into effect. The new procedures allow children to give evidence
    on videotape and in private surroundings in the presence of a
    psychologist, psychiatrist, or other social worker. Persons charged
    with pedophilia would be charged under appropriate age of consent and
    prostitution laws. Victims' testimony is handled under the provisions
    of the Child Friendly Procedure Act.
        Child prostitution, including forced prostitution and trafficking
    in children, is a serious problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.). The
    Government, university researchers, and NGO's estimate that there are
    as many as 30,000 to 40,000 prostitutes under the age of 18.
        People with Disabilities.--The Government has enacted legislation
    designed to ensure access to public facilities and to prohibit
    employment and education discrimination against the disabled; however,
    it has not enforced these laws effectively. An estimated 110,000
    disabled children attend school, with 60,000 to 70,000 enrolled in
    about 4,000 regular public schools that have been equipped to
    accommodate students with physical disabilities. Nationwide, there are
    8 governmentoperated and 10 NGO-operated training centers for the
    disabled. However, with little education, very few disabled adults are
    able to find employment. Many of those who do find employment report
    being subjected to wage discrimination. The law requires that private
    firms hire 1 disabled person for every 200 other workers or contribute
    to a fund that benefits the disabled, but this provision has not been
    enforced since it came into effect in 1994. Some state enterprises
    maintain discriminatory hiring policies.
        The Constitution mandates access to public buildings for the
    disabled, but laws implementing the provisions have not yet been
    enacted. The 1999 regulation that makes compliance mandatory was not
    enforced during the year. Disabled persons who register with the
    Government are entitled to free medical examinations, wheelchairs, and
    crutches.
        Indigenous People.--In May the MOI redefined the category of hill
    tribe residents eligible for citizenship to include previously
    undocumented tribal people, now collectively called ``highlanders''.
    The new regulations also ease the requirement to establish citizenship.
    The new definition includes persons who formerly were defined either as
    indigenous or migrants. The new regulations also ease the requirement
    to establish citizenship by allowing a wider range of evidence and
    empowering local officials to decide cases. In August the Government
    agreed to grant citizenship to descendants of certain groups of
    resident aliens. Those without proper documentation, who account for
    approximately half the estimated 700,000 to 880,000 such persons, still
    face restrictions on their movement, may not own land, and are not
    protected by labor laws, including minimum wage requirements. They
    sometimes are denied adequate education and health care. Those residing
    in national parks or wildlife sanctuaries sometimes are subject to
    eviction. As noncitizen residents, they also are barred from
    participating in the political process.
        Societal discrimination, arising from widely held beliefs that hill
    tribe members are involved in drug trafficking and forms of
    environmental degradation, continued. In June and August, a group of
    villagers attacked a Hmong orchard that allegedly encroached into an
    environmentally protected area. Hill tribes occasionally were subjected
    to indiscriminate searches of villages for illegal drugs (see Section
    1.f.).
        Religious Minorities.--There were no reports of violence against
    members of religious minorities, but some societal discrimination
    remains. Muslims, who represent up to 10 percent of the country's
    population nationwide, and constitute the majority in four of the five
    southernmost provinces that border Malaysia, experienced some
    discrimination. The Government continued to address the problem by
    maintaining longstanding policies designed to integrate Muslim
    communities into society through developmental efforts and expanded
    educational opportunities.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Sino-Thai population is
    well integrated and does not face discrimination. However, about 50,000
    former Chinese soldiers and dependents of a Kuomintang army that fled
    China after the Communist takeover and approximately 45,000 Vietnamese
    immigrants who reside in five northeastern provinces live under a set
    of laws and regulations that restrict their movement, residence,
    education, and occupation; however, these laws rarely are enforced (see
    Section 2.d.). According to Government sources, over 22,600 children of
    Vietnamese immigrants and 6,209 children of Chinese Kuomintang
    immigrants from these groups have been naturalized.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The 1975 Labor Relations Act grants
    freedom of association to all private sector workers, who have the
    right to form and join unions of their choosing without prior
    authorization; to decide on the constitutions and rules of these
    associations and unions; to express their views without government or
    employer interference; to confederate with other unions; to receive
    protection from discrimination, dissolution, suspension, or termination
    by any outside authority because of union activities; and to have
    employee representation in direct negotiations with employers. However,
    no law explicitly protects workers from discrimination who have
    participated in organizing new unions that have not been registered
    officially. Union leaders reported that employers often discriminate
    against workers seeking to organize unions. During the year, employers
    used loopholes in the Labor Relations Act to fire union leaders prior
    to government certification of new unions. The Government had not
    amended this legislation by year's end.
        The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions criticized a
    draft revision of the Labor Relations Act, claiming that it restricted
    union rights. The Department of Labor's subsequent revision awaited
    presentation to the new Parliament at year's end.
        In February 1999, the Government enacted the State Enterprise Labor
    Relations Act (SELRA), which provides public sector employees in state
    enterprises the same workers' trade union rights to organize as exist
    in the private sector. SELRA prohibits lockouts by employers and
    strikes by state enterprise workers. It took effect in April 1999.
        Less than 2 percent of the total work force, but nearly 11 percent
    of industrial workers, are unionized. Cultural traditions,
    unfamiliarity with the concept of industrial relations, efforts by the
    Government to diminish union cohesiveness, and the share of total
    employment that is agricultural often are cited as reasons for low
    rates of labor organization.
        State enterprise unions do not have the right to join private
    sector federations. However, unofficial contacts between public and
    private sector unions continue, and the Government has not interfered
    with these relationships.
        The Government has the authority to restrict private sector strikes
    that would ``affect national security or cause severe negative
    repercussions for the population at large,'' although it seldom invokes
    this provision and did not do so during the year. Labor law also
    forbids strikes in ``essential services,'' defined much more broadly
    than in the International Labor Organization (ILO) criteria, and
    includes sectors such as telecommunications, electricity, water supply,
    and public transportation as essential services. No strikes were
    disapproved during the year.
        Some corrupt private sector union leaders have been exploited by
    politicians or employers, but public unions generally operate
    independently of the Government and other organizations. Internal
    conflicts, corruption, and a lack of influential leadership continued
    to weaken the labor movement.
        Unions are free to associate internationally with other trade
    organizations, and they maintain a wide variety of such affiliations.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor
    Relations Act recognizes the right of private sector workers to
    organize and bargain collectively and defines the mechanisms for such
    negotiations and for government-assisted conciliation and arbitration
    in cases under dispute. In practice genuine collective bargaining
    occurs only in a small fraction of workplaces and in most instances
    continues to be characterized by a lack of sophistication on the part
    of employee groups and autocratic attitudes on the part of employers.
    Wage increases for most workers come as a result of increases in the
    minimum wage, rather than as a result of collective bargaining. The
    process of setting minimum wages locally through provincial tripartite
    committees may further limit union influence; many of these provincial
    committees have excluded labor representatives and have placed factory
    managers on the wage committees to represent worker interests.
        The Government sets wages for both civil servants and state
    enterprise employees under SELRA. A system of labor courts created in
    1980 exercises judicial review over most aspects of labor law for the
    private sector. Workers also may seek redress for grievances through
    the Tripartite Labor Relations Committee. Redress of grievances for
    state-enterprise workers is handled by the State Enterprise Relations
    Committee. Labor leaders generally were satisfied with the treatment
    that their concerns received in these forums, although they complained
    that union leaders dismissed unjustly usually are awarded only monetary
    compensation.
        No separate labor legislation applies in the nine export processing
    zones, in which wages and working conditions often are better than
    national norms because of the preponderance of Western and Japan-based
    multinational firms.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
    prohibits forced or compulsory labor except in the case of national
    emergency, war, or martial law; however, while these provisions
    generally are enforced in the formal sector, forced labor in the
    informal sector remains a problem. The law specifically prohibits
    forced or bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). During the year,
    there were reports of sweatshops in which employers prevented workers
    from leaving the premises. There are no estimates of the number of such
    sweatshops, but the growing number of illegal aliens from Burma,
    Cambodia, and Laos increases the opportunities for such abuse.
    Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of prostitution also
    remains a serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--In 1998 the Government raised the legal minimum age for
    employment to 15 years. The law permits the employment of children
    between the ages of 15 and 18 only in ``light work,'' where the lifting
    of heavy loads and exposure to toxic materials or dangerous equipment
    or situations is restricted. The employment of children at night (from
    10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), or in places in which alcohol is served, is
    prohibited by law. Children, perhaps more than 1 million children
    nationwide, work on family farms. NGO's report that 2 to 4 percent of
    children between the ages of 6 and 14 work in urban employment and are
    at risk of labor abuse. Most underage workers in urban areas work in
    the service sector, primarily at gasoline stations and restaurants.
    Child labor is not evident in larger foreign-owned or Thai
    exportoriented factories. However, no comprehensive survey of child
    labor in smaller enterprises exists, since NGO's do not have access to
    shop house factories. The DOL employed 803 fulltime inspection officers
    during the year. Enforcement of child labor laws is not rigorous, and
    inspectors usually respond to specific public complaints, reports of
    absences by teachers, or reports in newspapers. Their inclination when
    dealing with violators is to negotiate promises of better future
    behavior, rather than to seek prosecution and punishment. The law
    prohibits all forms of child labor and implicitly includes forced or
    bonded labor by children (see Section 6.c.). The Government attempted
    to address the problem of child labor in 1998 by extending compulsory
    education from 6 to 9 years (see Section 5); however, the Primary
    Education Act has not been amended to implement this provision.
        The Government worked to define worst forms of child labor in ILO
    Convention 182 and indicated its readiness to ratify the Convention in
    January 2001.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage ranges from
    $3.30 to $4.12 (133 to 165 baht) per day, depending on the cost of
    living in various provinces. This wage is not adequate to provide a
    decent standard of living for a worker and family. With extended family
    members' financial contributions, the minimum wage provides the basis
    for a marginally adequate overall standard of living. However,
    nationwide, more than half of workers receive less than the minimum
    wage, especially in rural provinces. Despite encouragement of employees
    to report violations to labor inspectors, the enforcement of minimum-
    wage laws is mixed.
        Unskilled migrant workers as well as illegal aliens often work for
    wages that are significantly lower than the minimum wage. The minimum
    wage does not apply to undocumented hill tribe members, who also are
    not protected by other labor laws. The Ministry of Labor is responsible
    for ensuring that employers adhere to minimum wage requirements, but
    workers in rural provinces frequently are reported to receive less than
    the minimum wage.
        In 1998 the Government mandated a uniform maximum workweek of 48
    hours, with a limit on overtime of 35 hours per week. Employees engaged
    in ``dangerous'' work, such as in the chemical, mining, or other
    industries involving heavy machinery, may work a maximum of 35 hours
    per week. The petrochemical industry is excluded from these
    regulations.
        Work permits for immigrant laborers initially are granted for 1
    year, and routinely are extended for a second year. The Government
    deported 163,996 illegal workers during the year, most of them to
    Cambodia and Burma. The press criticized this program as ineffective,
    and NGO's reported that a large number of those deported return soon
    thereafter.
        Working conditions vary widely. The rate of injury from industrial
    accidents has remained relatively constant over the last 10 years at
    4.5 percent of the total work force. The MOL stated that the average
    annual rate of workrelated deaths was 15 per 100,000 workers.
    Occupational diseases rarely are diagnosed or compensated, and few
    doctors or clinics specialize in occupational diseases. In medium-sized
    and large factories, government health and safety standards often are
    applied, but enforcement of safety standards is lax. In the large
    informal sector, health and safety protections are substandard.
        Provisions of the Labor Protection Act include expanded protection
    for pregnant workers with prohibitions on working night shifts,
    overtime, or holidays, as well as for those working with dangerous
    machinery or on boats.
        The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare promulgates health and
    safety regulations regarding conditions of work. Labor inspectors are
    responsible for enforcement of health and safety regulations; the
    strictest penalty is 6 months' imprisonment. Provisions in the Labor
    Protection Law include the establishment of welfare committees, which
    include worker representatives, in factories employing over 50 persons.
    These committees are to set and review health and safety conditions in
    each factory. There is no law affording job protection to employees who
    remove themselves from dangerous work situations. Master Toy Works
    employees protested unsafe working conditions in April. In October the
    factory closed, and its 279 laid-off workers received the mandatory
    compensation of $750 (30,000 baht) each.
        Courts continued to hear witnesses' testimony in the case of the
    1993 Kader Toy Factory fire.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in women
    and children; however, the country is a source, transit place, and
    destination for trafficking in women and children for of a variety of
    purposes that include indentured servitude and forced labor and
    prostitution (see Section 5); such trafficking is a serious problem.
    Government and NGO estimates of the number of women and children
    engaged in prostitution vary widely. Many NGO's and government
    departments report a figure of 200,000 persons, which is considered a
    conservative estimate. This figure includes children under the age of
    18 and foreigners.
        The Government, university researchers, and NGO's estimate that
    there are as many as 30,000 to 40,000 prostitutes under the age of 18.
    The Prostitution Prevention and Suppression Act of 1996 made child
    prostitution illegal and provided for criminal punishments for those
    who use child prostitutes. Parents who allow a child to enter the trade
    also are punishable. The Government reported that it had convicted 36
    parents under this clause in the first half of the year. The 1997
    Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act
    increased the penalties for trafficking in women and children for the
    purposes of prostitution or slave labor, and provided for wide powers
    of search and assistance to victims. The authorities occasionally
    utilized these powers during the year, but the number of prosecutions
    remained minimal. A moneylaundering law became effective in August 1999
    and included provisions to enable authorities to confiscate the assets
    of persons convicted of trafficking or engaging in the business of
    prostitution. NGO's and government agencies continued to provide
    shelter, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for children and
    women involved in the sex industry during the year. However, there
    continue to be credible reports that some corrupt police, military, and
    government officials are involved in trafficking (see Sections 1.c., 5,
    and 6.c.). There were no reported arrests of officials for trafficking
    during the year.
        There were NGO reports of some women being forced into
    prostitution, usually in remote border areas but also in major cities.
    The accuracy of such reports and the numbers of persons involved are
    difficult to determine; however, coerced prostitution exists and is
    believed to involve women from hill tribes and women from neighboring
    countries. NGO's have reported that Burmese, Lao, Cambodian, and
    Chinese women continue to be trafficked, in some cases reportedly
    abducted, for prostitution. Vietnamese and Russian citizens also
    reportedly were trafficked to Thailand in smaller numbers. According to
    domestic NGO's, girls between the ages of 12 and 18 continued to be
    trafficked from Burma, southern China, and Laos to work in the
    commercial sex industry. Persons trafficked from China generally were
    in transit to other countries. Reportedly as many as 8,000 women were
    trafficked from Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet Republics for
    work in the sex industry in the country by year's end. This figure
    represents a substantial increase from 1999.
        Because foreign women frequently are unable to speak the Thai
    language and are considered illegal immigrants, these women are
    vulnerable to physical abuse and exploitation. Some women are lured
    into the country with promises of jobs as waitresses or domestic
    helpers, but are forced to work as prostitutes. Illegal immigrants have
    no rights to legal counsel or health care if arrested (see Section
    2.d.). The amnesty provisions available under UNHCR auspices do not
    apply to such women. In June 1999, a memorandum of understanding
    between the Government and several domestic NGO's provided for some
    detailed police procedures to ameliorate the problem of trafficked
    persons detained by the authorities. The agreement stated that the
    training of police officers would include instructions to treat such
    persons as victims of human trafficking rather than as illegal
    immigrant workers. Rather than being deported, they become the
    responsibility of the Public Welfare Department.
        The majority of prostitutes are not kept under physical constraint,
    but a large number work in debt bondage. Brothel procurers reportedly
    advance parents a substantial sum against their daughter's future
    earnings, frequently without the consent of the young woman involved.
    The women are then obligated to work in a brothel to repay the loan.
        Thai women also are trafficked to other countries to work in the
    sex trade. Many Thai women are enticed to work in Japan with offers of
    lucrative legitimate employment, only to be forced into the sex
    industry upon their arrival; many others reportedly know that they will
    work in the sex trade. However, since trafficked women virtually always
    are misled or lied to by the agents who convince them to leave
    Thailand, whether or not they understand the nature of the work in
    which they are to be engaged, they generally do not understand the
    debts that they will be forced to repay, the amount of time it will
    take to repay the debts, or the conditions of employment to which they
    will be subjected to upon arrival. According to Human Rights Watch, the
    passports of Thai women trafficked to work in ``dating'' bars usually
    are confiscated by their ``employers,'' who also demand repayment for
    the cost of their ``purchase.'' Typically they are charged $25,000 to
    $40,000 (3 million to 5 million yen; 1.1 million to 1.7 million baht);
    their living expenses and expenses for medical care (when provided by
    the employer) and other necessities, and ``fines'' for misbehavior are
    added on to the original ``debt'' over time. How the ``debt'' is
    calculated is left to employers; the process is not transparent, and
    employers reportedly often use the ``debt'' to coerce additional unpaid
    labor from trafficked women. Employers also may ``resell'' or threaten
    to ``resell'' troublesome women or women found to be HIV positive,
    thereby increasing the debt that they must repay and possibly worsening
    their working conditions. In order to repay the ``debts'' they incur,
    trafficked women often must work long hours (often with no days off)
    for several months, essentially without pay. Many women are not allowed
    to refuse clients, even those known to be physically abusive. Most Thai
    women trafficked into the sex trade have their movements strictly
    controlled by their ``employers'' while they work off their debt, and
    are threatened with reprisals, perhaps through members of organized
    criminal groups, to themselves or their families if they try to escape.
    Employers often isolate the women, subject them to constant
    surveillance, and use violence to punish them for disobedience. Most
    trafficked women also know that they are subject to arrest by Japanese
    authorities if found without their passports or other identification
    documents. Few speak Japanese well, making escape even more difficult.
                                   __________

                                     TONGA

        The Kingdom of Tonga consists of 169 small islands scattered over a
    wide area of the South Pacific. Most of the approximately 105,000
    inhabitants are Polynesian. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy in which
    political life is dominated by the King, the nobility, and a few
    prominent commoners. The judiciary is independent.
        The security apparatus is composed of the Tonga Defense Services
    (TDS) and a police force. The 430-man TDS force is responsible to and
    controlled by the Minister of Defense.
        The economy is based primarily on the cultivation of tropical and
    semitropical crops. Demand for imported goods and products has led to a
    substantial trade deficit. This deficit has been offset largely by
    remittances from Tongans employed abroad, overseas aid, and, to a
    lesser degree, tourism.
        The Government's human rights record was generally poor in several
    areas, and the principal human rights abuse remains severe restrictions
    on the right of citizens to change their government. A relatively small
    group of commoners vocally challenges the Constitution, arguing for a
    more representative and accountable government. At times the
    authorities infringed on freedom of speech and of the press. Some women
    suffer from domestic violence, and discrimination limits the
    opportunities available to women. There were some incidents of racial
    violence.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading
    punishment or other such treatment, and there were no reports of such
    practices. Prison conditions are Spartan but in accordance with local
    living standards. Church representatives and family members are
    permitted to visit prisoners. No nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
    attempted human rights monitoring visits to prisons, and the
    permissibility of such visits has not arisen.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    proscribes arbitrary arrest or detention and provides for the right to
    judicial determination of the legality of arrest; these provisions are
    observed in practice. There is no preventive detention, although there
    are no statutory limits to the length of time a suspect may be held
    prior to being charged. The law does not limit access by counsel and
    family members to detained persons.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary, whose top judges
    have been expatriates, is independent of the King and the executive
    branch.
        The court system consists of the Supreme Court (which has original
    jurisdiction over all major cases), the police magistrates' courts, a
    general court, a court martial for the TDS, a court tribunal for the
    police force, and a court of review for the Inland Revenue Department.
    In addition the Court of Appeals, as the appellate court of last
    resort, is the highest court. The King's Privy Council presides over
    cases relating to disputes over titles of nobility and estate
    boundaries. The King has the right to commute a death sentence in cases
    of murder or treason.
        The law provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the
    Government respects this in practice. A court may not summon anyone
    without providing the person a written indictment stating the offenses
    the person is accused of committing. Defendants are entitled to
    counsel, and lawyers have free access to defendants.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--By law and in practice, no one may enter or search the
    home of another or remove any item unless in possession of a warrant
    issued by a magistrate. Neither the State nor political organizations
    intrude arbitrarily into a person's private life.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, at times the authorities
    infringed on these rights.
        There are two weekly newspapers (one of which is government owned)
    and one privately owned national magazine. There is one privately owned
    television station, and in July a government-owned station began
    broadcasting. The Government owns one AM and one FM radio station.
    Three FM stations (one purely religious) are run privately. While there
    is generally little editorializing in the government-owned media,
    opposition opinion appears regularly alongside government statements
    and letters. A privately owned newspaper, Kele'a, openly criticized the
    Government without interference. Defamation suits brought by government
    officials and other individuals against media outlets for allowing
    interviewees to voice allegedly defamatory remarks--which are permitted
    in some circumstances under the law--may have the practical effect of
    limiting freedom of speech. However, the national media from time to
    time carries comments critical of government practices and policies,
    including some made by prominent citizens.
        Academic freedom is respected.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
    for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
    religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
    the Government respects them in practice.
        The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
    Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
    assisting refugees. No person in recent memory has applied for refugee
    status, and the Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
    refugees, asylees, or first asylum.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the ability to change their leaders or the
    system of government. The King and 33 hereditary nobles dominate
    political life. They assert authority largely through control of
    substantial landholdings and their dominant numbers in the Legislative
    Assembly (Parliament). While the Constitution allows the monarch broad
    powers, many of which do not require the legislative branch's
    endorsement, the King sometimes permits ``the system'' to operate
    without his guidance. The King appoints the Prime Minister and appoints
    and presides over the Privy Council (called the Cabinet when the King
    is not presiding), which makes major policy decisions. Currently the
    Cabinet is made up of nine ministers and two governors; it includes
    both nobles and commoners, who serve at the King's pleasure.
        The unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly, consists of
    the Cabinet, nine nobles elected by their peers, and nine people's
    representatives elected by the general population. The King appoints
    the Speaker from among the representatives of the nobles. In January
    the King appointed his son, Prince Ulukalala Lavaka Ata, as Prime
    Minister. The new Prime Minister also holds five other ministerial
    portfolios, including those of defense and foreign affairs.
        Cabinet members and nobles usually vote as a bloc; however, votes
    related to impeachment charges against a commoner member of the Cabinet
    demonstrated that nobles and people's representatives can override the
    Cabinet's wishes at times.
        In recent years, a number of persons both inside and outside the
    establishment have called for democratic change, usually emphasizing
    the importance of more government accountability. Very few challenge
    the retention of the monarchy; the King is greatly respected. A
    prodemocracy movement continued, although it currently lacks formal
    structure due to differences of views among its leaders. All nine
    current people's representatives advocate various degrees of democratic
    reform. Proposals for constitutional revision tend to center on the
    popular election of all parliamentarians, with the parliamentarians
    then selecting their speaker.
        Women are severely underrepresented in government and politics.
    There are no female Members of Parliament, although there have been in
    the past.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no legal barriers to the formation of local NGO's that
    concern themselves with human rights. Some local NGO's include among
    their interests human rights problems, although none undertakes
    investigations of alleged violations. No outside organizations are
    known to have made requests to investigate alleged human rights
    violations.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        Social, cultural, and economic facilities are available to all
    citizens regardless of race or religion. However, members of the
    hereditary nobility have substantial advantages. These include control
    over most of the land and a generally privileged status. Nonetheless,
    it is possible for commoners to rise to cabinet positions in government
    and to accumulate great wealth and status in the private sector.
        Women.--Domestic violence seldom is publicized, but it is a
    problem. Incidents of wife beating generally are addressed in
    traditional ways within families or by village elders. Such abuse is
    seldom reported to the police. Abused wives sometimes return to their
    families if mediation fails.
        The country is male dominated, and women generally occupy a
    subordinate role. For a woman to rise to a position of leadership, she
    usually needs to have the support of the nobility or to possess
    exceptional talent. The King's mother reigned for many years, and a
    royal princess is one of the country's most prominent businesspersons.
    Some female commoners hold senior leadership positions in business.
        Some village women, with help from NGO's, led local development
    projects.
        The Government has a women's unit in the Prime Minister's office.
    Although some NGO's initially viewed this unit with suspicion, it
    appeared to be functioning cooperatively with them. Many young,
    educated women still consider the unit to be ineffective. A government-
    sponsored National Council of Women is making positive contributions.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's human rights
    and welfare and provides commensurate funding for children's welfare
    within the context of the total resources available to the State. Child
    abuse, if it occurs, is rare and has not become a source of concern in
    a society where the extended family participates in child rearing.
        Education has been compulsory since 1882. Although it is sometimes
    criticized as being of poor quality, education is provided for all
    children through Form 6 (high school). Compliance rates are good.
        People with Disabilities.--No mandated provisions for accessibility
    to buildings and services for the disabled exist. There were no known
    complaints of discrimination in employment, education, or provision of
    other state services. The education of children with special needs has
    been a longstanding priority of the Queen.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In June a member of the royal
    family commented publicly on what he called the country's ``racially
    based land laws,'' and stated that a previous spate of violence against
    Chinese-owned shops was racially motivated. Late in the year, a local
    official announced that Chinese-owned stores were banned from his
    district on the western side of the country.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form unions
    under the 1964 Trade Union Act, but to date no unions have been formed,
    presumably because of the small size of the wage economy and the lack
    of a perceived need for unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Since no unions
    have been formed, collective bargaining is not practiced. There is no
    legislation permitting and protecting collective bargaining or the
    right to organize. Labor laws and regulations are enforced in all
    sectors of the economy, including in the two small export enhancement
    zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced labor including forced and bonded labor by children, and it is
    not practiced.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--Child labor is not used in the wage economy, although
    there is no legislation prohibiting it. The Government prohibits forced
    and bonded labor by children and enforces this prohibition effectively
    (see Section 6.c.).
        Education has been compulsory since 1882, and it is provided for
    all children through Form 6 (high school).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage law,
    although there are government guidelines for wage levels. Labor laws
    and regulations, enforced by the Ministry of Labor, Commerce, and
    Industry, limit the workweek to 40 hours. The Ministry of Labor
    enforced laws and regulations reasonably well in the wage sector of the
    economy, particularly on the main island of Tongatapu. Enforcement in
    agriculture and on the outer islands is limited by isolation.
        Industrial accidents are rare, since few industries exist that
    would expose workers to significant danger. Due to these factors,
    little or no work has been done on industrial safety standards.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically address
    trafficking; however, there were no reports that persons were
    trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                     TUVALU

        Tuvalu, with a population of approximately 10,000 primarily
    Polynesian persons, occupies a land area of a little more than 10
    square miles on 9 atolls in the central South Pacific. Independent
    since 1978, its Constitution provides for a Westminster-style
    parliamentary democracy. The Head of State is the British Queen,
    represented by the Governor General, who must be a Tuvaluan citizen.
    The judiciary is independent.
        A 32-member police constabulary, the only security force, is
    responsible to and effectively controlled by civilian authority.
        The primarily subsistence economy relies mainly on coconuts, taro,
    and fishing. With donor assistance, Tuvalu has developed a well-managed
    trust fund, which is supplemented by significant annual payments for
    use of its international telephone-dialing prefix. An agreement for use
    of the country's Internet address is expected to increase national
    revenues significantly. Remittances from Tuvaluans working abroad as
    well as the sale of postage stamps and of fishing licenses to foreign
    vessels provide additional foreign exchange. The country's isolation
    and meager natural resources limit the prospects for economic
    development.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens, and society is generally egalitarian; however, social
    behavior, as determined by custom and tradition, is considered as
    important as the law, is ensured by village elders, and leads to some
    discrimination. In the traditional culture of the islands, women occupy
    a subordinate role, with limits on their job opportunities.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading
    punishment, and there were no reported instances of such practices.
    Local hereditary elders exercise considerable traditional authority--
    including the seldom-invoked right to inflict corporal punishment for
    infringing customary rules, which can be at odds with the national law.
        Prison facilities consist of several holding cells at the back of
    the police station. There have been no serious crimes within the memory
    of local officials. It is rare for a prisoner to spend as long as a
    week in a cell; more commonly, a person is incarcerated overnight
    because of drunkenness. While prison conditions are somewhat Spartan as
    regards to food and sanitation, complaints seem to be minimal or
    nonexistent.
        Since there are no local human rights groups, the question of
    prison monitoring by them has not arisen. Visits by church groups and
    family members are permitted.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
    observes these prohibitions.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and it is free of governmental interference.
        The judicial system consists of the higher courts: the Privy
    Council, the Court of Appeal, and the High Court; and the lower courts:
    the senior and resident magistrates, the island courts, and the land
    courts. The Chief Justice, who is also Chief Justice of Nauru, sits on
    the High Court about once a year.
        The right to a fair public trial is ensured by law and observed in
    practice. The Constitution provides that accused persons must be
    informed of the nature of the offenses with which they are charged and
    be provided the time and facilities required to prepare a defense. The
    right to confront witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions
    is provided by law. Procedural safeguards are based on English common
    law. An independent people's lawyer is required by statute. The
    services of this public defender are available to all citizens without
    charge.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
    authorities generally respect such prohibitions, and violations are
    subject to effective legal sanction.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides these
    rights, and the Government respects these provisions and academic
    freedom in practice.
        The one radio station is under government control.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for freedom of assembly and association, and there are no
    significant restrictions in practice.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for this right,
    and the Government respects it in practice.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within the
    country and abroad. The Government does not restrict repatriation.
        The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. No
    person in recent memory has applied for refugee status, and the
    Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens freely and directly elect a 12-member unicameral
    Parliament whose normal term is 4 years. Each of the country's nine
    atolls is administered by a six-person council, also elected by
    universal suffrage to 4-year terms. The minimum voting age is 18 years.
        The Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister, elected by secret
    ballot from among the Members of Parliament, and up to four other
    ministers, appointed and removed from office by the Governor General
    with the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may appoint
    or dismiss the Governor General on behalf of the British monarch. The
    Prime Minister may be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no
    confidence. The Government of former Education Minister Ionatana has
    been in power since April 1999. There are no formal political parties.
        For cultural reasons, women are underrepresented in politics. At
    present there are no female Members of Parliament.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There have been no allegations of human rights violations by the
    Government and no known requests for investigations. While no known
    barriers block their establishment, there are no local nongovernmental
    organizations concerned with human rights.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
    creed, sex, or national origin, and the Government generally respects
    these prohibitions. However, the traditional culture has limited
    women's job opportunities.
        Women.--Violence against women is rare. If wife beating occurs, it
    is infrequent and has not become a source of societal concern.
        Women increasingly hold positions in the health and education
    sectors and also are more active politically.
        Children.--The Government is committed to children's human rights
    and welfare and provides commensurate funding for children's welfare
    within the context of its total available resources. Education is
    compulsory for children from 6 through 13 years of age. There are no
    reports of child abuse.
        In March a fire destroyed a girls' boarding school, with 17
    fatalities. A government investigation is underway to ensure that no
    negligence occurred, and the Government undertook to improve safety
    standards at schools.
        People with Disabilities.--Although there are no mandated
    accessibility provisions for the disabled, there are no known reports
    of discrimination in employment, education, or provision of other state
    services.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to organize unions
    and choose their own labor representatives, but most of the population
    lacks permanent employment and is engaged in subsistence activity. The
    law provides for the right to strike, but no strike has ever been
    recorded.
        In the public sector, civil servants, teachers, and nurses--who
    total less than 1,000 employees--are grouped into associations that do
    not have the status of unions. The only registered trade union, the
    Tuvalu Seamen's Union, has about 600 members, who work on foreign
    merchant vessels. Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The
    Seamen's Union is a member of the International Transportation Workers'
    Federation.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1978
    Industrial Relations Code provides for conciliation, arbitration, and
    settlement procedures in cases of labor disputes. Although there are
    provisions for collective bargaining, the practice in the private
    sector is for wages to be set by employers. For both the private and
    public sectors, the legal procedures for resolving labor disputes are
    seldom used; instead, the two sides normally engage in
    nonconfrontational deliberations in the local multipurpose meeting
    hall.
        Tuvalu is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1978 Employment
    Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and
    there have been no reports of either being practiced.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Employment Law prohibits children under the age of 14
    from working. Education is compulsory for children from 6 through 13
    years of age. The law also prohibits children under 15 years of age
    from industrial employment or work on any ship and stipulates that
    children under the age of 18 years are not allowed to enter into formal
    contracts, including work contracts. Children rarely are employed
    outside the traditional economy. The Government prohibits forced and
    bonded labor by children and enforces this prohibition effectively (see
    Section 6.c.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage, set
    administratively by the Government, is sufficient to allow a worker and
    family in the wage economy to maintain a decent standard of living. The
    present biweekly minimum wage in the public (government) sector is
    $67.60 ($A130). This rate applies regardless of sex and age. In most
    cases, the private sector adopts the same minimum wage rate.
        The Labor Office may specify the days and hours of work for workers
    in various industries. The workday by law is set at 8 hours. The
    majority of workers are outside the wage economy. The law provides for
    rudimentary health and safety standards. It requires employers to
    provide an adequate potable water supply, basic sanitary facilities,
    and medical care. Specific provisions of the law provide for the
    protection of female workers. The Ministry of Labor, Works, and
    Communications is responsible for the enforcement of these regulations,
    but it is able to provide only minimum enforcement.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits procurement within
    and across borders for purposes of prostitution, but does not
    specifically mention trafficking. However, there were no reports that
    persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    VANUATU

        Vanuatu, a small South Pacific island nation of approximately
    183,000 persons that was ruled jointly by Britain and France as the
    Condominium of New Hebrides prior to its independence in 1980, has a
    parliamentary form of government: The 52-member Parliament elects the
    Prime Minister, as the Head of the Government and the President who is
    the Head of State. The latter's powers are largely ceremonial, except
    when acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Political
    legitimacy is based on majority rule. The courts normally are
    independent of executive interference.
        The civilian authorities control the small police force and its
    paramilitary wing, the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF). Under current
    regulations, the police commissioner commands the entire force,
    including the VMF.
        Subsistence farming and fishing are the principal livelihood for
    more than 80 percent of the population. There is also some production
    of cash crops including copra, and cocoa, as well as cattle farming.
    The service sector provides most formal employment, primarily in
    government, tourism, and an offshore financial center, and represents
    the largest component of the country's gross domestic product.
        The Government generally respected the human rights of its
    citizens; however, there were problems in a few areas. Poor prison
    conditions, an extremely slow judicial process, and violence and
    discrimination against women were the major problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
    reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--Constitutional provisions against torture and cruel,
    inhuman, or degrading treatment usually are observed in practice and
    enforced by the courts.
        In November 1999, based on a lack of evidence, the presiding
    magistrate dismissed the case against 18 police officers charged with
    intentional assault of rioters in Port Vila in January 1998. At year's
    end, a Supreme Court review of the decision was pending.
        Prison conditions are poor. The central prison in Port Vila is
    dilapidated and not reliably secured. There are approximately 40
    prisoners, all men. Inmates are treated humanely, to the extent allowed
    by the meager resources of the prison service.
        The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
    prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and there were no reports of
    such arrests. Arrest is by warrant.
        The constitutional provision that suspects must be informed of the
    charges against them and given a speedy hearing before a judge is
    observed in practice.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
    independent judiciary, and the courts are normally free of military or
    executive interference. However, in 1996 the Government dismissed the
    foreign Chief Justice prior to the end of his appointment. In 1998 the
    Acting Chief Justice, who argued that his predecessor's dismissal
    constituted unconstitutional interference with the judiciary, sponsored
    a ``joint declaration'' of judges and magistrates on ``the basic
    principles on the independence of the judiciary'' to remind the
    executive branch of the principle of judicial independence. There were
    no reports of interference with the judiciary by the present
    Government.
        Magistrates' courts deal with most routine legal matters. There is
    also a Supreme Court, and above the Supreme Court an Appeals Court with
    three judges, two of whom are appointed by the President and chosen
    from among Supreme Court judges in other South Pacific nations as
    required.
        The judicial system is based on British law. The courts uphold
    constitutional provisions for a fair public trial, a presumption of
    innocence until guilt is proven, a prohibition against double jeopardy,
    a right of judicial determination of the validity of arrest or
    detention, and a right of appeal to an appellate court.
        Judges, prosecutors, and the police all complain about large
    backlogs of cases in the courts due to a lack of resources. For example
    most of the members of the VMF accused of kidnaping public officials in
    the course of a mutiny in 1996 still are awaiting trial. Procedures
    were changed during the year to allow the public prosecutor to present
    new cases to the magistrates more frequently, but the limited number of
    qualified judges and prosecutors remains a serious problem.
        There were no reports of political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--There were no reports of arbitrary interference with
    privacy, family, home, or correspondence.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respected these
    provisions in practice.
        The Government controls much of the country's media, including a
    weekly newspaper, one AM and one FM radio station, and a limited-
    service television station confined to the capital, Port Vila, which
    provides English and French news service three times a week. There is
    one independent newspaper published semiweekly and another weekly
    newspaper published by a political party.
        Throughout the year, both the government-owned and the independent
    press reported criticisms of political leaders freely and apparently
    without hindrance. Some individual politicians and their supporters are
    sensitive to public criticism and sometimes threatened the media, but
    without any apparent effect on press freedom. Correspondents for
    international media also are allowed to report without interference.
        The Government respects academic freedom. Vanuatu has three
    institutions of higher education--a teachers college, an agricultural
    school, and an annex of the University of the South Pacific.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
    provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the
    Government respects these rights in practice. Permits must be obtained
    to hold public demonstrations and rallies; they are granted routinely.
        The Government does not restrict the formation of political parties
    or other groups.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
    and the Government respected it in practice. Missionaries of various
    Christian denominations work without restriction. The 1995 Religious
    Bodies Act, which requires religious organizations to register with the
    Government, was never signed by the President and was never enforced,
    although some churches registered under the act voluntarily. Although
    the act has not been repealed by Parliament, and technically remains in
    force, it remains dormant and its constitutionality is in question.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--All citizens are free to travel
    internally and to leave and return to the country without restrictions.
        The Government has not formulated a policy regarding refugees,
    asylees, or first asylum. The issue of the provision of first asylum
    has never arisen.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        The Constitution provides for parliamentary elections every 4
    years, through which citizens can freely change their government.
    Parliamentary majorities have been unstable, with legislators spending
    much time and energy accumulating support for votes of confidence. The
    last national elections were held in March 1998. In November 1999,
    Barak Sope of the Melanesian Progressive Party assembled a
    parliamentary majority and formed the Government.
        Outside observers consider the 1998 elections to have been
    generally free and fair. A total of 216 candidates contested 52 seats.
    Voter turnout was 63.6 percent.
        Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Traditional
    attitudes, in which men are dominant and women frequently are limited
    to customary family roles, hamper women from taking a more active role
    in economic and political life. Six women, including the sole sitting
    female member, ran for Parliament in 1998; none were elected.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        There are no restrictions on the formation of local human rights
    organizations. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), such as the
    National Council of Women and the Family Health Association, include
    human rights education as part of their programs.
        A new Ombudsman's Act was passed by Parliament in November 1998 in
    the wake of parliamentary anger over vigorous investigations of
    corruption by the Ombudsman under the previous act. Among other
    provisions it requires that members of the Ombudsman's staff be
    appointed by the Public Service Commission rather than by the Ombudsman
    and that persons interviewed by the Ombudsman may have legal
    representation present at the interview.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution provides for fundamental rights and freedoms for
    all persons and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, place of
    origin, religious or traditional beliefs, political opinions, language,
    or sex; however, women remain victims of discrimination in this
    tradition-based society.
        Women.--Violence against women, particularly wife beating, is
    common, although no accurate statistics exist. Courts occasionally
    prosecute offenders using common law assault as a basis for
    prosecution, since there are no specific laws against wife beating.
    However, most cases of violence against women, including rape, go
    unreported because women, particularly in rural areas, are ignorant of
    their rights or fear further abuse. In addition police are frequently
    reluctant to intervene in what are considered to be domestic matters.
        While women have equal rights under the law, they are only slowly
    emerging from a traditional culture characterized by male dominance, a
    general reluctance to educate women, and a widespread belief that women
    should devote themselves primarily to childbearing. During the year, in
    the course of a downsizing in the public service, a disproportionate
    number of women's positions were abolished. Policies to guide the
    Department of Home Affairs in protecting and furthering the rights of
    women currently are being drafted under the Government's reform
    program.
        The majority of women enter into marriage through ``bride-price
    payment,'' a practice that encourages men to view women as property.
    Women also are inhibited by tradition from owning land, and at least
    one women's advocate believes this limitation underpins their secondary
    status. Many female leaders view village chiefs as a major obstacle to
    attaining social, political, and economic rights for women. Women
    interested in running for public office get encouragement and help from
    an NGO, Vanuatu Women in Politics (VANWIP). Four of the six women who
    ran for Parliament in the 1998 election ran under the VANWIP banner.
        Children.--Although the Government has made education a priority,
    access to education is limited, and school attendance is not
    compulsory. Children are protected within the traditional extended
    family system. Members of the extended family, particularly paternal
    uncles, play an active role in a child's development. As a result,
    virtually no children are homeless or abandoned. NGO's and law
    enforcement agencies report increased complaints of incest and rape of
    children, although no statistics are available.
        People with Disabilities.--There is no known governmental or
    national policy on the disabled and no legislation mandating access for
    them. Their protection and care is left to the traditional extended
    family and to voluntary NGO's. Due to high rates of unemployment, there
    are few jobs available for the disabled.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Most of the population is made
    up of Melanesians. Small minorities of Chinese, Fijians, Vietnamese,
    Tongans, and Europeans generally are concentrated in two towns and on a
    few plantations. Most of the land belongs to indigenous tribes that
    inhabit it, and it cannot be sold, although it sometimes is leased to
    others. However, within the limits of this system of land tenure, there
    were no reports of discrimination against noncitizens. There is no
    evidence to suggest a pattern of ethnic discrimination in the provision
    of the limited basic services that the Government provides.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
    right to organize unions.
        Approximately 25,000 persons participate in the formal economy as
    wage earners. There are five trade unions. The unions are grouped under
    an umbrella organization, the Vanuatu Council of Trade Unions (VCTU).
    The trade unions are independent of the Government.
        The high percentage of the population still engaged in subsistence
    agriculture and fishing deters extensive union activity. In addition
    membership in the Vanuatu Public Servants Union fell dramatically
    following the Government's wholesale dismissal of hundreds of full-time
    public servants during a protracted general strike in 1994. The Supreme
    Court in 1994 ruled that the union had not complied with its own rules
    when it undertook the general strike and declared the strike illegal.
    Combined union membership in the private and public sectors is
    approximately 1,000.
        The law prohibits retribution if a strike is legal. In the case of
    private-sector employees, violations would be referred to the Labor
    Department for conciliation and arbitration. In the public sector, the
    Public Service Commission would handle violations.
        In 1995 Parliament passed a law requiring unions to give 30 days'
    notice of intent to strike, with a list of the names of intending
    strikers.
        There was no significant strike activity during the year.
        Unions may not affiliate with international labor federations
    without government permission. The VCTU is a member of the
    International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions exercise
    the right to organize and bargain collectively. Labor unions negotiate
    wages and conditions directly with management. If the two sides cannot
    agree, the matter is referred to a three-member arbitration board
    appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs. The board consists of one
    representative from organized labor, one from management, and the
    senior magistrate of the magistrate's court. While a dispute is before
    the board, labor may not strike and management may not dismiss union
    employees. However, unions and management generally reach agreement on
    wages without having to refer the matter to arbitration. Complaints of
    antiunion discrimination are referred to the Commissioner of Labor.
    While the law does not require union recognition, once a union is
    recognized, it does prohibit antiunion discrimination.
        There are no export processing zones.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
    forced or compulsory labor, including forced and bonded labor by
    children, and there were no reports that either adults or children were
    subject to forced, bonded, or compulsory labor.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The law prohibits children under 12 years of age from
    working outside of family-owned agricultural production, where many
    children assist their parents. There were no reports of forced or
    bonded labor by children, which is prohibited by law (see Section
    6.c.). The employment of children from 12 to 18 years of age is
    restricted by occupational category and conditions of labor, that is,
    restrictions on employment in the shipping industry and on nighttime
    employment. The Labor Department effectively enforces these laws.
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A legislated minimum wage is
    enforced effectively by the Labor Department. Since 1995 it has been a
    flat rate of approximately $143 (16,000 vatu) per month for both urban
    and rural workers. The minimum wage does not support an urban family
    living entirely on the cash economy. Most families are not dependent
    solely on wages for their livelihoods.
        Various laws regulate benefits such as sick leave, annual
    vacations, and other conditions of employment, including a 44-hour
    maximum workweek, with at least one 24-hour rest period weekly. An
    Employment Act, enforced by the Labor Department, includes provisions
    for safety standards. However, the 1987 safety and health legislation
    is inadequate to protect workers engaged in logging, agriculture,
    construction, and manufacturing, and the single inspector attached to
    the Labor Department is hard pressed to enforce the act fully. Workers
    have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
    without jeopardy to their continued employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Constitution does not specifically
    prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that
    persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the country.
                                   __________

                                    VIETNAM

        The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party state, ruled and
    controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party (CPV). The CPV's
    constitutionally mandated leading role and the occupancy of all senior
    government positions by party members ensure the primacy of party
    Politburo guidelines and enable the Party to set the broad parameters
    of national policy. In recent years, the party has reduced gradually
    its formal involvement in government operations and allowed the
    Government to exercise significant discretion in implementing policy.
    The National Assembly remains subject to party direction; however, the
    Government made progress in strengthening the capacity of the 450-
    member National Assembly and in reforming the bureaucracy. The National
    Assembly, chosen in elections in which most candidates are approved by
    the Party (only about 85 percent of delegates are party members) played
    an increasingly independent role as a forum for local and provincial
    concerns and as a critic of local and national corruption and
    inefficiency. The Assembly was more active in revising legislation,
    criticizing officials' performance, screening ministerial and other
    senior candidate appointments, and dismissing senior officers. The
    judiciary remains subservient to the CPV and to external pressure and
    influence by the Government.
        The military services, including the border defense force, are
    responsible for defense against external threats. The military forces
    are assuming a less prominent role as the ultimate guarantor of
    internal security, which is primarily the responsibility of the
    Ministry of Public Security (MPS). However, in some remote areas, the
    military forces are the primary government agency, providing
    infrastructure and all public safety functions, including maintaining
    public order in the event of civil unrest. The Government continued to
    restrict significantly civil liberties on grounds of national security
    and societal stability. The MPS controls the police, a special national
    security investigative agency, and other units that maintain internal
    security. It enforces laws and regulations that significantly restrict
    individual liberties and violate other human rights. It also maintains
    a system of household registration and block wardens to monitor the
    population, concentrating on those suspected of engaging, or being
    likely to engage in, unauthorized political activities. However, this
    system has become less obvious and pervasive in its intrusion into most
    citizens' Daily lives. Members of the public security forces committed
    human rights abuses.
        Vietnam is a very poor country of 79 million persons undergoing
    transition from a centrally planned to a marketoriented economy.
    Estimated annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is $375,
    continuing an improving trend through the 1990's. While the Asian
    financial crisis caused a significant slowdown, with trade and foreign
    investment declining markedly, economic growth officially was estimated
    at 6.7 percent in 2000. Agriculture, primarily wet rice cultivation,
    employs 70 percent of the labor force, and accounts for 24 percent of
    total output. Industry and construction contribute 34 percent, while
    services account for 42 percent. Disbursed official development
    assistance in 1999 was $970 million, roughly 4 percent of GDP.
    Particularly in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, economic reforms have
    raised the standard of living and reduced party and governmental
    control over, and intrusion into, citizens' daily lives. Reforms have
    created a popular expectation in urban areas of continued social,
    legal, educational, and physical improvements. For many large rural
    populations close to larger cities, this is also true. However, many
    citizens in isolated rural areas, especially members of ethnic
    minorities in the northern uplands, central highlands, and the north
    central coastal regions continue to live in extreme poverty. Gains from
    agricultural reform in recent years have improved the lives of many
    farmers, but the rural poverty level is approximately 30 percent.
        The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
    was some measurable improvement in a few areas, serious problems
    remain. The Government continued to repress basic political and some
    religious freedoms and numerous abuses by the Government continue.
    Although the CPV continued its efforts to strengthen the mechanism for
    citizens to petition the Government with complaints, the Government
    continued to deny citizens the right to change their government. Prison
    conditions remain harsh, particularly in some isolated provinces.
    Police sometimes beat suspects during arrest and arbitrarily arrested
    and detained citizens, including detention for peaceful expression of
    political and religious views. The judiciary is not independent, and
    the Government denied some citizens the right to fair and expeditious
    trials. The Government continued to hold a number of political
    prisoners. Several political and religious prisoners were freed in two
    general amnesties during the yearjournalist and poet Nguyen Ngoc Tan,
    Catholic priest Mai Huu Nghi, and Hmong Protestant minister Vu Gian
    Thao in April and Cao Daiist Le Kim Bien and Protestant house church
    leader Nguyen Thi Thuy in September. The Government restricts citizens'
    privacy rights, although the trend toward reduced government
    interference in the daily lives of most citizens continued. The
    Government significantly restricts freedom of speech, the press,
    assembly, and association. The Government continued its longstanding
    policy of not tolerating most types of public dissent; however, it made
    exceptions in some instances. For example, a number of persons
    continued to circulate letters that were highly critical of senior
    leaders and called for political reform; these authors were subjected
    to close surveillance by public security forces. The Government allowed
    citizens somewhat greater freedom of expression and assembly to express
    grievances, including by delegates in the National Assembly, citizens
    in local forums with delegates, and small groups of protesters outside
    government offices. In Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and other cities,
    several ``sit-in'' demonstrations, some involving dozens of protesters
    camped in front of government buildings for weeks at a time, were
    permitted. In Ho Chi Minh City, the Government stopped such
    demonstrations late in the year. The Government prohibits independent
    political, labor, and social organizations; such organizations exist
    only under government control. The Government restricts freedom of
    religion and significantly restricts the operation of religious
    organizations other than those entities approved by the State.
    Dissident groups of Buddhists, Hoa Hao, and Protestants, in particular,
    faced harassment by authorities. In June a festival gathering of up to
    300,000 Hoa Hao in An Giang province took place with official
    permission, and in August an estimated 100,000 Roman Catholics attended
    the annual La Vang pilgrimage. The Government imposes some limits on
    freedom of movement. The Government does not permit local private human
    rights organizations to form or operate. Violence and societal
    discrimination against women remained problems. Child prostitution is a
    problem. Government and societal discrimination against some ethnic
    minorities is a continuing problem. The Government restricts worker
    rights, such as freedom of association, although the Government is
    cooperating with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and
    international donors to improve implementation of provisions of the
    Labor Law. Child labor is a problem. There were reports that children
    worked in exploitative situations and that prisons required inmates to
    work for little or no pay. Trafficking in women and children for the
    purpose of prostitution within the country and abroad continued to be
    serious problems, and there were reports of the trafficking of women to
    mainland China and Taiwan for arranged and forced marriages. The
    Government made efforts to combat these problems.

                            RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

    Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
            From:
        a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no known
    politically motivated killings. Little information was available on the
    extent of deaths in police custody or on official investigations into
    such incidents.
        There were no reports of deaths of inmates due to prison conditions
    during the year.
        b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
    disappearances.
        c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment.--The law prohibits physical abuse; however, police beat
    persons, including suspects during arrests, and also beat street
    children in their attempts to get them off the streets. There were no
    known reports of torture of detainees. Little information is available
    on the extent of police brutality during interrogations.
        Prison conditions are harsh. Conditions generally did not threaten
    the lives of prisoners. There were no reported differences in male and
    female death rates in prison. Overcrowding, insufficient diet, and poor
    sanitation remained serious problems. Prison guards sometimes treat
    prisoners badly and frequently beat them. Solitary confinement is a
    problem. Conditions in pretrial detention reportedly were particularly
    harsh, and there were credible reports that authorities sometimes
    denied inmates access to sunlight, exercise, and reading material. The
    pretrial detention system provides few amenities. Prisoners who await
    trial and remain ``under investigation'' sometimes experience harsher
    conditions than those convicted and sentenced. After trial, a prisoner
    is sent to a different location, and conditions often improve in
    instances in which a prisoner has money.
        Most prisoners had access to basic health care and, for those with
    money, to supplemental food and medicine. However, some political and
    other prisoners were denied visitation rights, and there were reports
    that some prisons required inmates to work for little or no pay (see
    Section 6.c.). Prisoners sentenced to hard labor complained that their
    diet and medical care were insufficient to sustain health, especially
    in remote, diseaseridden areas. There were credible reports that three
    political and religious prisoners with serious medical conditions are
    held under harsh conditions in remote prisons, such as Xuan Loc prison
    z30a in an isolated part of Dong Nai province, with limited medical
    care.
        The Government did not permit independent monitoring of its prison
    and detention system.
        d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
    to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily, including arrest and
    detention for the peaceful expression of their political and religious
    views. The Criminal Procedure Code provides for various rights of
    detainees, including time limits on pretrial detention and the right of
    the accused to have a lawyer present during interrogation; however, in
    practice the authorities often ignored these legal safeguards.
    Moreover, a directive on administrative detention gives security
    officials broad powers if they believe that a suspect is a threat to
    ``national security.''
        A revised Criminal Code came into effect on July 1 and with it a
    number of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to conform to the
    new code. The Criminal Procedure Code was amended to shorten the time
    for investigations and reinvestigation. It also places more strict
    limits (12 months) on the time allowed for the procuracy to end its
    investigation, and allows less time for the judge's panel to rule on a
    case. By shortening investigation and trial time, the procedure code
    also limits the time in which officials can interfere in the
    investigation process. Prior to formal charge, a detainee has a
    statutory right to contact with an attorney or to notify family
    members. However, in most cases, police inform family of the person's
    whereabouts.
        The Government continued to utilize its 1997 decree on
    ``administrative detention,'' which gives authorities extremely broad
    powers to place persons under surveillance and to monitor citizens
    closely. Government officials refer to this decree as the
    ``administrative probation'' decree. The decree allows the MPS to
    detain a person without trial. The regulations define administrative
    detention as an administrative penalty imposed on persons over the age
    of 18 who break the law and violate national security, as determined by
    the definition of crimes in the Criminal Code, but whose offenses are
    not yet at the level that warrants ``criminal responsibility.'' The
    detention can last from 6 months to 2 years; persons under
    administrative detention must live and work in designated places, and
    remain subject to the ``management and education of the local
    administration and people.'' The MPS is the lead agency in implementing
    the decree and uses these measures mainly against suspected political
    dissidents.
        To put someone on probation, the chairperson of a district people's
    committee first collects dossiers on the persons recommended for
    detention, then submits the dossiers to the chairperson of the
    Provincial People's Committee for a final decision. The district
    police, people's committees, wards, and townships all help collect
    information for the dossier. The dossier includes a person's curriculum
    vitae, his or her past criminal record, as well as any comments from
    the people's committee, the Fatherland Front, and the district police.
    The chairperson of the Provincial People's Committee uses the
    information to make a final decision on the detention. The Government
    claims that the decree's restriction on movement does not constitute a
    detention, but merely puts a person on probation; however, by limiting
    a person's movement to his or her residence, and allowing travel
    outside that area only with government approval, the measure
    effectively constitutes detention without the benefit of trial.
        The Supreme People's Procuracy approves the issuance of arrest
    warrants, but law enforcement officials appear able to arrest and
    incarcerate persons without presenting arrest warrants. Once arrested,
    detainees often are held for periods of up to 1 year without formal
    charges or trial. In general time spent in pretrial detention counts
    toward time served upon conviction and sentencing.
        The MPS prohibits contact between a detainee and his lawyer as long
    as the procurator's office is investigating the case, which may be up
    to 1 year. In April police in Dalat confiscated the computer and
    writing materials belonging to dissident writer Ha Sy Phu (Nguyen Xuan
    Tu). Ha was required to remain in his home during investigation,
    although he was not charged with any crime by year's end. He remained
    isolated from outside contact throughout this period.
        Persons arrested for the peaceful expression of views opposed to
    official policy were subject to charge under any one of several
    provisions in the Criminal Code that outlaw acts against the state.
        At year's end, 3 Cao Dai believers remain imprisoned. In March An
    Giang province police detained eight Hoa Hao believers and blocked
    roadways and waterways to forestall incidents in connection with the
    death anniversary of the group's founder (see Section 2.c.).
        Prisoners who are ``under investigation'' sometimes experience
    harsher conditions than those who have been convicted and sentenced to
    prison terms (see Section 1.c.). No official statistics are available
    on the percentage of the prison population that consists of pretrial
    detainees or the average period of time that such detainees have been
    held.
        It is difficult to determine the exact number of political
    detainees, in part because the Government usually does not publicize
    such arrests and because the Government does not consider these persons
    to be detained for political reasons.
        The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious
    dissidents by placing restrictions on the movements of some dissidents
    and by pressuring the supporters and family members of others. For the
    past 6 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the banned
    Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), has been at a pagoda in
    Quang Ngai province under conditions resembling administrative
    detention. From 1981 until 1994, he was held at another pagoda in that
    province. In March 1999 he was visited by senior UBCV leader Thich
    Quang Do for the first time in 18 years, but after 3 days of meetings
    both were held for questioning by police, and Thich Quang Do was
    escorted by police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City. Thich Huyen Quang
    has confirmed that he must request permission before leaving the pagoda
    and is not allowed to lead prayers or participate in worship activities
    as a monk. He is able to receive visits from sympathetic monks and lay
    person supporters relatively frequently. After meeting with him,
    visitors often are questioned by police. Thich Huyen Quang has called
    for the Government to recognize the UBCV. Government officials
    reportedly suggested that he move to Hanoi, where more modern medical
    facilities are available, but he has refused (see Section 2.c.).
        Dissident Nguyen Dan Que and his family members in Ho Chi Minh City
    continued to be questioned by police. Their telephone service continued
    to be suspended periodically, and the family's Internet account was cut
    off following the publication abroad of several of his writings
    critical of the Government.
        The Government does not use forced exile.
        e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
    independence of judges and jurors; however, in practice the Party
    controls the courts closely at all levels, selecting judges primarily
    for their political reliability. Constitutional safeguards are
    significantly lacking. Credible reports indicate that party officials,
    including top leaders, instruct courts how to rule on politically
    important cases. CPV and government officials may exert influence over
    court decisions by pressuring both the lay assessors and the judges who
    sit on a panel together to decide cases. The CPV has strong influence
    over high-profile cases, or in cases where a person is charged with
    challenging or harming the CPV or the State. The National Assembly
    votes for judicial candidates that are presented by the President for
    Supreme People's Court (SPC) president and Supreme People's Procurator.
    The National Assembly also controls the judiciary's budget, including
    judges' salaries, while the executive branch pays judges' salaries at
    the local level. By contrast the procuracy, also a separate branch that
    reports to the National Assembly, has a unified line of command and
    controls its own budget. The President appoints all other judges.
        The system of appointing judges and lay assessors also reflects the
    lack of judicial independence. Court panels at all levels include
    judges and lay assessors. However, while lay assessors help decide
    cases, they have no legal training. District and provincial people's
    councils appoint the lay assessors at the lower levels. The standing
    committee of the National Assembly appoints and discharges the SPC lay
    assessors. The Fatherland Front must approve candidates for SPC lay
    assessors. The President appoints the District People's Council and
    Provincial People's Council judges to 5year terms. The President also
    appoints SPC judges at the suggestion of the central selection council.
    The CPV's influence over the courts is amplified both because the
    people's councils appoint the lay assessors, and because the judges
    serve limited terms and are subject to review.
        The judiciary consists of the Supreme People's Court, the local
    people's courts, military tribunals, and other tribunals established by
    law. Each district throughout the country has a district people's
    court, which serves as the court of first instance for most domestic,
    civil, and criminal cases. Each province has a Provincial People's
    Court, which serves as the appellate forum for district court cases, as
    well as courts of first instance for other cases. The SPC is the
    highest court of appeal and review. The Ministry of Justice administers
    most district and provincial courts, and the National Assembly
    administers the SPC. The judiciary also includes military tribunals,
    economic courts, labor courts, and administrative courts that resolve
    disputes in those specialized fields. Administrative courts deal with
    complaints by citizens about official abuse and corruption. The
    economic and administrative courts have addressed few cases since their
    creation in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Local mass organizations, such
    as those under the Fatherland Front, are empowered to deal with minor
    breaches of law or disputes. In addition the CPV and Government have
    set up special committees to help resolve local disputes.
        The Supreme People's Procuracy has unchecked power to bring charges
    against the accused and serves as prosecutor during trials. A judging
    council, made up of a judge and one or more people's jurors (lay
    judges), determines guilt or innocence and also passes sentence on the
    convicted. The relevant people's council appoints people's jurors, who
    are required to have high moral standards but need not have legal
    training. The legal institutional framework and legal culture, which
    favor the procuracy over the judiciary and preserve a presumption of
    guilt in criminal cases, constitute a major obstacle to free and fair
    trials. Although the Constitution asserts that citizens are innocent
    until proven guilty, in practice this principle often is ignored. A
    Western legal expert who analyzed the court system during the year
    found that more than 95 percent of the persons who are charged with a
    crime are convicted.
        Many judges and other court officials lacked adequate legal
    training, and the Government conducted training programs to address
    this problem. A number of foreign governments and the United Nations
    Development Program provided assistance to the Government to strengthen
    rule of law and develop a more effective judiciary. However, the lack
    of openness in the judicial process and the continuing lack of
    independence of the judiciary undermined the Government's efforts to
    develop a fair, effective judicial system.
        The July Criminal Code amendments define crime more precisely than
    the 1999 code. The new code provides two or three levels of punishment
    for each crime, depending on the crime's seriousness and circumstances.
    The new code provides punishment brackets for a larger percentage of
    the crimes; less than 10 percent have no punishment bracket at all. The
    changes were intended to discourage abuse by law enforcement officials,
    allow courts to render verdicts and punishments more appropriate to the
    particular offense, hinder arbitrary sentencing by judicial panels, and
    allow crime to be punished more uniformly.
        There is a shortage of trained lawyers and judges and no
    independent bar association. At the Supreme Court level, there is a 10
    to 20 percent shortage of qualified judges; at the provincial level,
    the shortage ranges from 30 to 40 percent, according to a U.N.
    official. Low salaries hinder development of a trained judiciary. The
    few judges who have formal legal training often have studied abroad in
    countries with Socialist legal traditions and are slow to change. Young
    educated judges have little influence within the system.
        Although the Constitution provides for legal counsel for persons
    accused of criminal offenses, the scarcity of lawyers makes this
    provision impossible to enforce. With few qualified attorneys, the
    procurator often handles both the prosecution and the defense. With so
    few lawyers and so many defendants, legal counsel frequently is of
    little help to the defendant. Consistent with its Marxist-Leninist
    political system, the Government requires that the Vietnamese Bar
    Association be a subordinate part of the Vietnam Fatherland Front
    (VFF), the mass front organization controlled by the Communist Party.
    At the provincial level, the Bar Association is subordinate to
    representatives of the central Government, the VFF, the provincial
    people's council, and people's committee.
        Trials generally are open to the public; however, judicial
    authorities sometimes closed trials or strictly limited attendance in
    sensitive cases. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial
    and to have a lawyer. The defendant or the defense lawyer have the
    right to cross-examine witnesses. However, in political cases, there
    are credible reports that defendants are not allowed access to
    government evidence in advance of the trial, to cross-examine
    witnesses, or to challenge statements. Little information is available
    on the extent to which defendants and their lawyers have time to
    prepare for trials. Those convicted have the right to appeal.
        The December 1999 conviction of Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house
    church leader in Phu Tho province sentenced to 1 year in prison for
    ``interfering with an officer doing his duty,'' was upheld on appeal
    despite claims by her defense lawyer that she had been arrested for her
    religious activities. She was released in September in a national
    prisoner amnesty.
        The Government continued to imprison persons for the peaceful
    expression of dissenting religious and political views. There are no
    reliable estimates of the number of political prisoners, in part
    because the Government usually does not publicize such arrests, and
    sometimes conducts closed trials and sentencing sessions. Amnesty
    International stated that there are more than 20 prisoners sentenced
    for political reasons. Other sources estimated that as of October there
    were up to 150 political prisoners. However, many of the names included
    on these lists are difficult to verify. The number of confirmed
    political prisoners is much lower than the number publicized. For
    example, one prisoner released in April from Xuan Loc prison z30a in
    Dong Nai province circulated a list of 55 persons whom he described as
    political prisoners. While this report may be credible, there is not
    sufficient identification or information about these persons to confirm
    that they are in fact political prisoners. The Government claims that
    it does not hold any political and religious prisoners and that persons
    described as political prisoners were convicted of violating national
    security laws.
        A total of more than 15,000 prisoners reportedly were granted
    amnesty during the year or released from their sentences early for good
    behavior. In April journalist and poet Nguyen Ngoc Tan was released.
    Most of those released were common criminals. Among those believed to
    be imprisoned at year's end for peaceful political activities are:
    Political activists Nguyen Dinh Huy and Pham Hong Tho, Truong Van Thuc,
    Nguyen Chau Lan, Tran Van Be Cao, Tran Nguyen Hon, and Le Van Mong.
        No current information is available concerning imprisoned
    dissidents Nguyen Van Thuan and Le Duc Vaong who were arrested in 1998.
        The Government does not allow access by humanitarian organizations
    to political prisoners.
        f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
    Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
    home and correspondence; however, the Government restricts this right
    significantly. It operates a nationwide system of surveillance and
    control through household registration and block wardens who use
    informants to keep track of individuals' activities. The authorities
    continued to monitor citizens but with less vigor and thoroughness than
    in the past. The authorities largely focused on persons whom they
    regarded as having dissident views or views critical of the Government,
    or whom they suspected of involvement in unauthorized political or
    religious activities. Citizens formally are required to register with
    police when they leave home, remain in another location overnight, or
    when they change their residence (see Section 2.d.). However, these
    requirements rarely are enforced; many citizens move around the country
    to seek work or to visit family and friends without being monitored
    closely, and many families who sought employment moved to other
    locations without prior government permission. However, there were
    reports that some ``spontaneous migrant'' families have been unable to
    obtain household registration or residence permits in their new
    locations, causing them serious legal and administrative problems. In
    urban areas, most citizens were free to maintain contact and work with
    foreigners, but police questioned some individual citizens and families
    of citizens with extensive or close relations with foreigners. The
    Government also exerts control over citizens who work for foreign
    organizations by requiring that citizens be screened and hired through
    a government service bureau. However, many foreign organizations hire
    their own personnel and only ``register'' them with the service bureau.
        The Government opened and censored targeted persons' mail,
    confiscated packages, and monitored telephone, electronic mail, and
    facsimile transmissions. However, this practice appears sporadic and is
    not applied consistently. Citizens' membership in mass organizations
    remained voluntary, but often is important for career advancement.
    Membership in the CPV remains an aid to advancement in the Government
    or in state companies and is vital for promotion to senior levels of
    the Government. At the same time, diversification of the economy has
    made membership in CPVcontrolled mass organizations and the CPV less
    essential to financial and social advancement.
        Groups of protesters in Ho Chi Minh City claimed that local
    officials compensated them inadequately for land that the Government
    seized for various public purposes. The protesters had come from
    several Mekong Delta provinces and from Ho Chi Minh City.
        The Government continued to implement a family planning policy that
    urges all families to have no more than two children; this policy
    emphasizes exhortation rather than coercion. In principle the
    Government can deny promotions and salary increases to government
    employees with more than two children, and local regulations permit
    fines based on the cost of extra social services incurred by a larger
    family. These penalties rarely are enforced. There is anecdotal
    evidence that party members are more likely to be penalized than
    nonparty members.
        Foreign language periodicals are widely available in cities. The
    Government occasionally censors articles about the country in
    periodicals that are available for sale.
        The Government monitors e-mail, searching the text for sensitive
    key words, and regulates Internet content (see Section 2.a.).
        By law access to satellite television was limited to top officials,
    foreigners, luxury hotels, and the press. The law was not enforced
    uniformly, and some persons in urban and rural areas have access via
    home satellite equipment. The Government generally did not limit access
    to international radio; however, it jammed Radio Free Asia.

    Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
        a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
    freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government
    significantly restricts these freedoms, especially concerning political
    and religious subjects. Reporters and editors practice selfcensorship
    concerning sensitive subjects. A new press law, passed by the National
    Assembly in May 1999, provides for monetary damages to be paid by
    journalists to individuals or organizations who are harmed by
    reporting, regardless of whether the reports are true or false. This
    law poses a threat to investigative reporting. For example, in
    September the Capital Youth newspaper in Hanoi was sued by the Haiphong
    Agricultural Materials and Transport Company for harming its prestige
    with a series of investigative articles about the company's operations.
    The case had not gone to trial by year's end. Several media continued
    to test the limits of government press restriction by publishing
    articles that criticized actions by party and government officials;
    however, the freedom to criticize the Communist Party and its highest
    leadership remains restricted.
        Both the Constitution and the Criminal Code include broad national
    security and antidefamation provisions that the Government used to
    restrict such freedoms severely. The Party and Government tolerate
    public discussion and permit somewhat more criticism than in the past.
    In December 1999, the Government established a mechanism for citizens
    to petition the Government with complaints. Citizens could and did
    complain openly about inefficient government, administrative
    procedures, corruption, and economic policy. However, the Government
    imposed limits in these areas as well. Senior government and party
    leaders traveled to several provinces to try to resolve citizen
    complaints.
        The Government requires journalists to obtain approval from the
    Ministry of Culture and Information before providing any information to
    foreign journalists.
        Retired general and war hero Tran Do was expelled from the
    Communist Party in January 1999 after he refused to cease circulating
    writings critical of the party and the Government. Friends of Tran Do
    reported that they were able to visit him in his home, and police
    surveillance of him lessened by mid-year.
        The Government continued to prohibit free speech that strayed
    outside narrow limits to question the role of the party, criticize
    individual government leaders, promote pluralism or multiparty
    democracy, or question the regime's policies on sensitive matters such
    as human rights. The few persons who dared to speak out on these
    matters in recent years, such as Nguyen Dan Que and Thich Quang do,
    were subjected to periodic questioning and close monitoring by security
    officials. There continued to be an ambiguous line between what
    constituted private speech about sensitive matters, which the
    authorities would tolerate, and public speech in those areas, which
    they would not. Several authors whose works attracted official censure
    in past years continued to be denied permission to publish, to speak
    publicly, or to travel abroad. Security forces continue to harass
    novelist Duong Thu Huong intermittently, and authorities would not
    allow her to travel abroad. However, Huong is allowed to meet with some
    foreigners and Vietnamese colleagues. Some persons who express
    dissident opinions on religious or political issues also are not
    allowed to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
        The Party, the Government, and party-controlled mass organizations
    controlled all print and electronic media. The Government exercises
    oversight through the Ministry of Culture and Information, supplemented
    by pervasive party guidance and national security legislation
    sufficiently broad to ensure effective self-censorship in the domestic
    media. With apparent party approval, several newspapers published
    reports during the year on highlevel government corruption and
    mismanagement as well as sometimes-heated debate on economic policy.
    The Government occasionally censors articles about the country in
    foreign periodicals that are sold in the country. The Government
    generally did not limit access to international radio, except to Radio
    Free Asia, which it jammed (see Section l.f.). In July thousands of
    explicit comic books imported from Korea were destroyed by customs
    officials.
        Foreign journalists must be approved by the Foreign Ministry's
    Press Center and must be based in Hanoi. A visiting Western freelance
    journalist was detained and expelled in April after seeking to
    interview political dissident Nguyen Dan Que at his home in Ho Chi Minh
    City. The number of foreign staff allowed each foreign media
    organization is limited, and most Vietnamese staff who work for foreign
    media are provided by the Foreign Ministry. The Press Center monitors
    journalists' activities and decides on a case-by-case basis whether to
    approve their interview, photograph, film, or travel requests, all of
    which must be submitted 5 days in advance. The Government censored
    television footage and sometimes delayed export of footage by several
    days, such as during coverage in April of the 25th anniversary of the
    end of war.
        The Government allowed artists broader latitude than in past years
    in choosing the themes of their works, although artists are not allowed
    to exhibit works of art that censors regard as criticizing or
    ridiculing the Government or the Party. Many artists received
    permission to exhibit their works abroad, receiving exit permits to
    attend the exhibits and export permits to send their works out of the
    country.
        The Government allows access to the Internet; however, it owns and
    controls the country's only Internet access provider, Vietnam Data
    Communications. Five Internet service providers compete for
    subscribers. The Government postal department reports that there are
    82,000 Internet subscribers and an increasing number of cyber cafes in
    major cities. High prices for owning computers and Internet access
    limit home usage, and the Government keeps access fees high to
    discourage Internet use. However, in cyber cafes and universities,
    students and many other persons have wide access to the Internet,
    although much self-censorship keeps many customers away from sensitive
    sites of a political nature. The Government uses firewalls to block
    access to some sites operated by Vietnamese exile groups abroad.
    Vietnam Data Communications is authorized by the Government to monitor
    the sites that subscribers access. Police suspended telephone service
    and thus Internet access for Nguyen Dan Que in Ho Chi Minh City and
    Nguyen Thanh Giang in Hanoi after they circulated articles critical of
    the Government (see Section 1.d.), but they have continued to
    communicate with friends and supporters through cellular telephones.
        The French nongovernmental organization (NGO) Reporters Sans
    Frontieres, which monitors freedom of speech and treatment of the press
    worldwide, placed the country on its list of 20 countries that it
    deemed ``enemies of the Internet.''
        The Government permitted a more open flow of information within the
    country and into the country from abroad, including the university
    system. Foreign academic professionals temporarily working at
    universities can discuss nonpolitical issues widely and freely in the
    classroom. Government monitors regularly attended, without official
    notification, classes taught by foreigners and citizens. Academic
    publications usually reflected the views of the Party and the
    Government and exhibited greater freedom for differing views on
    nonpolitical subjects than for political ones.
        b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The right of
    assembly is restricted in law and practice, and the Government
    restricts and monitors all forms of public protest. Persons who wish to
    gather in a group are required to apply for a permit, which local
    authorities can issue or deny arbitrarily. However, persons routinely
    gather in informal groups without government interference. During the
    year, there were a number of protests (from 10 to 25 persons) outside
    government and party office buildings and the National Assembly hall.
    These protests, which technically were illegal, usually focused on
    local land compensation grievances, and the authorities generally
    allowed them to run their course without interference. The protesters
    claimed, among other grievances, that local officials had compensated
    them inadequately for land seized by local governments for various
    purposes (see Section 1.f.). One group of 30 protesters demonstrated
    peacefully in public in Hanoi outside the home of a senior CPV
    official. From March until November in Ho Chi Minh City, there were
    demonstrations of up to 125 protesters. In general the Government does
    not permit demonstrations that could be seen as having a political
    purpose. The Government was more tolerant than in the past of
    occasional demonstrations by citizens about specific grievances against
    local officials and tolerated extended demonstrations in some cases.
    Several ``sit-in'' demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City involved dozens
    of persons who remained on the sidewalks opposite government offices
    for weeks at a time. However, in midNovember, police removed these
    demonstrators and prohibited further demonstrations. On at least two
    occasions later in the year, police blocked attempts by protesters to
    reestablish themselves at that location. The Government allowed large
    gatherings of Roman Catholic and Hoa Hao religious believers for
    preapproved festivals (see Section 2.c.).
        The Government restricts freedom of association. With a few
    exceptions, the Government prohibits the establishment of private,
    independent organizations, insisting that persons work within
    established, party-controlled organizations, often under the aegis of
    the Fatherland Front. Citizens are prohibited from establishing
    independent organizations such as political parties, labor unions, and
    religious or veterans' organizations. Such organizations exist only
    under government control.
        c. Freedom of Religion.--Both the Constitution and government
    decrees provide for freedom of worship; however, the Government
    continued to restrict significantly those organized activities of
    religious groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and
    policies. The Government generally allowed persons to practice
    individual worship in the religion of their choice, and participation
    in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow
    significantly. However, government regulations control religious
    hierarchies and organized religious activities, in part because the
    Communist Party fears that organized religion may weaken its authority
    and influence by serving as political, social, and spiritual
    alternatives to the authority of the central Government.
        The Government requires religious groups to be registered and uses
    this process to control and monitor church organizations. Officially
    recognized religious organizations are able to operate openly, and they
    must consult with the Government about their religious operations,
    although not about their religious tenets of faith. In general
    religious organizations are confined to dealing specifically with
    spiritual and organizational matters. The Government holds conferences
    to discuss and publicize its religion decrees.
        Religious organizations must obtain government permission to hold
    training seminars, conventions, and celebrations outside the regular
    religious calendar, to build or remodel places of worship, to engage in
    charitable activities or operate religious schools, and to train,
    ordain, promote, or transfer clergy. Many of these restrictive powers
    lie principally with provincial or city people's committees, and local
    treatment of religious persons varied widely. In some areas such as Ho
    Chi Minh City, local officials allowed religious persons wide latitude
    in practicing their faith, including allowing some educational and
    humanitarian activities. However, in other areas such as the northwest
    provinces, local officials allowed believers little discretion in the
    practice of their faith. In general religious groups faced difficulty
    in obtaining teaching materials, expanding training facilities,
    publishing religious materials, and expanding the clergy in training in
    response to the increased demand from congregations.
        Buddhism is the dominant religious belief, and three-fourths of the
    population are at least nominally Buddhist.
        The Government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic,
    Protestant, Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious organizations. However, some
    Buddhists, Protestants, and Hoa Hao believers do not recognize or
    participate in the governmentapproved associations and thus are not
    considered legal by the authorities.
        For example, the Government requires all Buddhist monks to work
    under a party-controlled umbrella organization, the Central Buddhist
    Church of Vietnam. The Government opposed efforts by the non-
    government-sanctioned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) to
    operate independently, and tension between the Government and the UBCV
    continued. Several prominent UBCV monks, including Thich Quang Do, were
    released in wide-ranging government amnesties in September and October
    1998; however, the Government continued to harass members of the UBCV
    and prevent their conducting independent religious activities,
    particularly outside of their pagodas.
        The Government continued to isolate certain political and religious
    dissidents by placing restrictions on the movements of some dissidents
    and by pressuring the supporters and family members of others. For the
    past 6 years, Thich Huyen Quang, the Supreme Patriarch of the UBCV, has
    been held at a pagoda in Quang Ngai province under conditions
    resembling administrative detention. From 1981 until 1994, he was held
    at another pagoda in that province. In 1999 he was visited by senior
    UBCV leader Thich Quang Do for the first time in 18 years, but after 3
    days of meetings both were held for questioning by police, and Thich
    Quang Do was escorted by police to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City.
    Thich Huyen Quang has confirmed that he must request permission before
    leaving the pagoda and is not allowed to lead prayers or participate in
    worship activities as a monk. He is able to receive visits from
    sympathetic monks, sometimes several per week; UBCV monk Thich Khong
    Thanh visited in November 1999. After meeting with Thich Huyen Quang,
    visitors frequently are questioned by police. Thich Huyen Quang has
    called for the Government to recognize the UBCV. Local officials
    suggested that Thich Huyen Quang move to Hanoi where more modern
    medical facilities are available, but he refused. On July 5, the police
    and an official from the provincial committee for religion interrogated
    Quang concerning a letter that he wrote that criticized the Government
    and called on the Party and State to repent for their past mistakes.
    The letter was publicized on the Internet by the official information
    service of the UBCV based in France just before April 30, the 25th
    anniversary of national reunification.
        Buddhist monks in Hue complained that petitions to local
    authorities for permission to repair or renovate pagodas go unanswered.
        The local Catholic Church hierarchy remained frustrated by the
    Government's restrictions but has learned to accommodate itself to them
    for many years. A number of clergy reported a modest easing of
    government control over church activities in certain dioceses during
    the year. In some locales, local government officials allowed Catholic
    Church officials to participate in religious education and charitable
    activities. However, in many areas, officials strictly prohibited these
    activities. In recent years, the Government eased its efforts to
    control the Roman Catholic hierarchy by relaxing the requirements that
    all clergy belong to the government-controlled Catholic Patriotic
    Association. Few clergy actually belonged to this association.
        The degree of government control of church activities varied
    greatly among localities. In some areas, especially in the south,
    churches and religious groups operated kindergartens and engaged in a
    variety of humanitarian projects. A priest, Pham Minh Tri, and a lay
    brother, Mai Huu Nghi, belonging to the Congregation of the Mother
    Coredemptrix reportedly remain imprisoned.
        The Government allowed many bishops and priests to travel freely
    within their dioceses and allowed greater, but still restricted,
    freedom for travel outside these areas, particularly in many ethnic
    areas. The Government discourages priests as well as Buddhist monks
    from entering Son La, Lai Chau, and some other border provinces. Upon
    return from international travel during the year, citizens, including
    clergy, officially were required to surrender their passports; this law
    is enforced unevenly. Some persons who express dissident opinions on
    religious or political issues are not allowed to travel abroad (see
    Section 2.d.). Seminaries throughout the country have approximately 500
    students enrolled. The Government limits the Church to operating 6
    major seminaries and to recruit new seminarians only every 2 years. All
    students must be approved by the Government, both upon entering the
    seminary and prior to their ordination as priests. The Church believes
    that the number of graduating students is insufficient to support the
    growing Catholic population.
        The network of Tin Lanh (Good News) churches, originally founded by
    the Christian and Missionary Alliance early in the 20th century,
    generally operated with greater freedom than did the house churches.
    The roughly 300 Tin Lanh churches in the country are concentrated in
    the major cities, including Ho Chi Minh City, Danang, Hanoi, and
    lowland areas. Some 15 Tin Lanh churches in the northern provinces are
    the only officially recognized Protestant churches. At year's end, the
    Government and Protestant church leaders in the south were engaged in
    discussions that could lead to future official recognition for their
    churches.
        There were credible reports that up to a dozen Hmong Protestants
    continued to be imprisoned in Lai Chau and other northwestern provinces
    for religious reasons.
        More than half the country's Protestants belong to a large number
    of unregistered evangelical ``house churches'' that operate in members'
    homes or in rural villages, many of them in ethnic minority areas.
    Members of Protestant house churches, particularly in the northwestern
    provinces, continued to face severe restrictions on religious freedom.
    There were multiple reports that local police beat Protestants during
    detention or questioning in the central highlands and central coastal
    provinces. Credible reports from multiple sources stated that up to a
    dozen Hmong Protestants were imprisoned, primarily in Lai Chau
    province, for ``teaching religion illegally'' or ``abusing the rights
    of a citizen to cause social unrest.'' These included Va Sinh Giay,
    Vang Sua Giang, Phang A Dong, Ly A Cho, and Ma Van Chinh. A number of
    others were released during the year, including Vu Giang Thao, Sung Seo
    Chinh, Ho A Tong, and Giang A To, who were freed from prison in April.
    The Government also stated that Vang Gia Chua and Sinh Pay Pao were
    released (see Section 1.e.).
        Cao Daist Le Kim Bien was released in September in a prisoner
    amnesty. Bien's Cao Daist colleague Pham Cong Hien was released in
    October after completing a 2-year sentence. The two had been imprisoned
    since October 1998, when they requested to meet with visiting U.N.
    Special Rapporteur Amor.
        The December 1999 conviction of Nguyen Thi Thuy, a Protestant house
    church leader in Phu Tho province sentenced to 1 year in prison for
    ``interfering with an officer doing his duty,'' was upheld on appeal
    despite claims by her defense lawyer that she was arrested for her
    religious activities. She was released in the September national day
    amnesty, 1 month prior to the scheduled end of her sentence.
        Reports from believers indicated that Protestant church attendance
    grew substantially, especially among the house churches, despite
    continued government restrictions on proselytizing activities. The
    Government restricts Protestant congregations from cooperating on joint
    religious observances or other activities, although in some localities
    there was greater freedom to do so. Membership in house churches
    reportedly continued to grow.
        The Government conferred legal recognition on Cao Daism in 1997
    after a government-controlled committee wrote a new Cao Dai
    constitution and elected a new Cao Dai Executive Council. The
    governmentapproved Executive Council controls the affairs and manages
    the operations, the hierarchy, and clergy of the Cao Dai faith.
    However, numerous Cao Dai believers and clergy actively have challenged
    the edicts of the Executive Council, stating that they are not faithful
    to Cao Dai principles and tradition. Early in the year, the Executive
    Council and clergy came to an agreement on the modification of
    traditional rites that are performed during rituals for clerical
    promotion that had been banned by the Government. The compromise
    changed a part of the rite that the Government had deemed to be
    ``superstitious,'' but maintained enough ``spiritual direction'' in the
    rite to be acceptable to Cao Dai principles. Many Cao Dai followers and
    clergy initially objected to the tradition, but later accepted it. The
    agreement resulted in the promotion of several hundred clerics, the
    first promotions in more than 25 years. However, the Government has
    prohibited ordination into the Cao Dai priesthood since 1975, and
    continued to do so throughout the year. Three Cao Daists, Lam Thai The,
    Do Hoang Giam, and Van Hoa Vui, who were arrested several years ago,
    remain imprisoned in Xuan Loc prison in Dong Nai province.
        Hoa Hao followers are concentrated in the Mekong Delta,
    particularly in provinces such as An Giang, where the Hoa Hao were
    dominant as a political and religious force before 1975. The Hoa Hao
    faced restrictions on their religious and political activities after
    1975 because of their previous armed opposition to the Communist
    forces. After 1975 all administrative offices, places of worship, and
    social and cultural institutions connected to the faith were closed,
    thereby limiting public religious functions. However, believers
    continue to practice their religion at home. The lack of access to
    public gathering places contributed to the Hoa Hao community's
    isolation and fragmentation. In 1999 following official recognition of
    a Hoa Hao religious organization, up to 500,000 Hoa Hao believers
    gathered for a religious festival in An Giang province in the largest
    Hoa Hao gathering since 1975. The second of these traditional annual
    gatherings drew approximately 300,000 persons in June. The authorities
    continued to restrict the distribution of the sacred scriptures of the
    Hoa Hao, and believers say that a number of church leaders continue to
    be detained. Hoa Hao leader Me Minh Triet, who was arrested several
    years ago, remained in prison at year's end.
        In March police in An Giang arrested eight Hoa Hao believers for
    planning to organize a commemoration of the death anniversary of the
    group's founder. Police also placed Hoa Hao elder Ha Hai under house
    arrest in An Giang province and blocked roads and waterways to prevent
    large numbers of persons from gathering at the founder's ancestral home
    and pagoda for the anniversary. This anniversary had not yet been
    approved as an official anniversary or commemoration day by the
    Government or the Hoa Hao Council. Many Hoa Hao believers consider this
    to be an important date, and because of this and other disputes have
    refused to recognize the Hoa Hao Council. Of the eight persons
    arrested, three subsequently were released. The remaining five were
    tried in September and received prison terms of from 1 to 3 years. One
    of the three who were released, Vo Van Buu, also known as Nguyen Van
    Buu, was arrested again in June together with his wife, Mai Thi Dung.
    In September Buu was tried and sentence to 30 months in prison. Dung
    was tried and sentenced to 18 months' house arrest. Later in the
    September, Dung slashed her stomach in protest. She was hospitalized,
    then released the following day.
        A total of 13 other Hoa Hao followers were arrested in March in a
    separate incident unrelated to the founder's death anniversary. Eight
    of these persons subsequently were released. Three were tried in May
    and the other two were tried in June. All were convicted and received
    sentences of from 12 to 30 months' imprisonment.
        In May police in An Giang province also arrested Hoa Hao followers
    Le Huu Hoa. He remained in prison at year's end.
        In November five Hoa Haoists who reside in An Giang province were
    detained In Ho Chi Minh City for planning a demonstration there. Two of
    them, Ha Hai and Mai Thi Dung officially were under house arrest in An
    Giang province at the time. Three of the detainees subsequently were
    returned to An Giang province and released. Mai Thi Dung again was
    placed under house arrest in An Giang province. Ha Hai was returned to
    prison in An Giang province and awaited trial at year's end.
        In December Le Quang Liem, a Hoa Hao elder who resides in Ho Chi
    Minh City, organized a group of from 400 to 500 persons to march in
    procession to the Hoa Hao founder's ancestral home and pagoda in
    commemoration of the founder's birth anniversary. When police blocked
    the procession, a fight ensued and a number of Liem's group were
    injured. The police made no arrests.
        The Muslim Association of Vietnam was banned in 1975 but authorized
    again in 1992. It is the only official Muslim organization. Association
    leaders say that they are able to practice their faith, including daily
    prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to
    Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The Government no longer has a policy of
    restricting exit permits to prevent Muslims from making the hajj. Small
    numbers have been able to participate in the hajj each year.
        The Government does not favor a particular religion. In some
    respects, conditions for religious freedom improved over 1999. In many
    areas, religious activity and observance increased; however, at the
    same time, government restrictions remained. Worshipers in several
    Buddhist, Catholic, and Cao Dai centers of worship reported that they
    believed that undercover government observers attended worship services
    and monitored the activities of the congregation and the clergy.
    Protestant and Hoa Hao services occasionally were disrupted by local
    police.
        Operational and organizational restrictions on the hierarchies and
    clergy of most religious groups remain in place. While there were
    releases of some religious prisoners, detention and imprisonment of
    other persons for the illegal practice of their religion continued.
        In April 1999, the Government issued a new decree on religion that
    prescribes the rights and responsibilities of religious believers.
    Similar to the Government's 1991 decree on religion, the decree also
    states for the first time that no religious organization can reclaim
    lands or properties taken over by the State following the end of the
    1954 war against French rule and the 1975 Communist victory in the
    south. The decree also states that persons formerly detained or
    imprisoned must obtain special permission from the authorities before
    they may resume religious activities.
        There were credible reports in both 1999 and 2000 that Hmong
    Protestant Christians in several northwestern villages were forced to
    recant their faith. The Penal Code, as amended in 1997, established
    penalties for offenses that are defined only vaguely, including
    ``attempting to undermine national unity'' by promoting ``division
    between religious believers and nonbelievers.'' In some cases,
    particularly involving Hmong Protestants, when authorities charge
    persons with practicing religion illegally, they do so using provisions
    of the Penal Code that allow for jail terms up to 3 years for ``abusing
    freedom of speech, press, or religion.'' There were reports that
    officials fabricated evidence, and some of the provisions of the law
    used to convict religious prisoners contradict international covenants
    such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
        The Government bans and actively discourages participation in
    ``illegal'' religious groups, including the UBCV, Protestant house
    churches, and an unapproved Hoa Hao group. The Government restricts the
    number of clergy that the Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, and Cao Dai
    churches may train. Restrictions are placed on the numbers of Buddhist
    monks and Catholic seminarians. Protestants are not allowed to operate
    a seminary or to ordain new clergy.
        Police authorities routinely question persons who hold dissident
    religious or political views, such as UBCV monks and Hoa Hao leaders.
        The Government restricts and monitors all forms of public assembly,
    including assembly for religious activities. On some occasions, large
    religious gatherings have been allowed, such as the annual celebrations
    at La Vang. Within the past 2 years, the Hoa Hao also have been allowed
    to hold large public gatherings.
        Religious and organizational activities by UBCV monks are illegal,
    and all UBCV activities outside private temple worship are proscribed.
    In February a group of Hoa Hao believers led by Le Quang Liem
    established an association separate from the government-sanctioned Hoa
    Hao Committee. Their petitions to the Government for official
    recognition were unsuccessful. Protestant groups in central and
    southern provinces also petitioned for official recognition, but met
    with a favorable response from the Government. Serious discussions were
    underway at year's end regarding the drafting of a new charter that
    could lead to future official recognition.
        Most evangelical house churches do not attempt to register because
    they believe that their applications would be denied, and they want to
    avoid government control.
        The Government generally does not permit religious instruction in
    public schools. However, in some provinces, religious instruction is
    allowed outside regular classroom hours. Khmer Buddhists and Cham
    Muslims routinely hold religious (and language) instruction after
    regular school hours.
        The Government restricts persons who belong to dissident and
    unofficial religious groups from speaking about their beliefs. It
    officially requires all religious publishing to be done by government-
    approved publishing houses. Many Buddhist sacred scriptures, Bibles,
    and other religious texts and publications are printed by government-
    sanctioned organizations and allowed to be distributed to believers.
    The Government allows and in some cases encourages links with
    coreligionists in other countries when the religious groups are
    approved by the Government. The Government actively discourages
    contacts between the illegal UBCV and its foreign Buddhist supporters,
    and between illegal Protestants, such as the house churches, and their
    foreign supporters. Contacts between the Vatican and the domestic
    Catholic Church are permitted, and the Government maintains a regular,
    active dialog with the Vatican on a range of issues, including
    organizational activities, the prospect of establishing diplomatic
    relations, and a possible papal visit. The Government allows religious
    travel for some, but not all, religious persons; Muslims are able to
    undertake the hajj, and many Buddhist and Catholic Church officials
    also have been able to travel abroad. Persons who hold dissident
    religious opinions generally are not approved for foreign travel.
        The Government does not designate persons' religions on passports,
    although citizens' ``family books,'' which are household identification
    books, list religious and ethnic affiliation.
        The law prohibits foreign missionaries from operating in the
    country. Proselytizing by citizens is restricted to regularly scheduled
    religious services in recognized places of worship. Immigrants and
    noncitizens must comply with the law when practicing their religions.
    Catholic and Protestant foreigners exercise leadership in worship
    services that are reserved for foreigners.
        The Government's Office on Religious Affairs hosts periodic
    meetings to address religious issues according to governmentapproved
    agendas that bring together leaders of diverse religious traditions.
        Adherence to a religious faith generally does not disadvantage
    persons in civil, economic, and secular life, although it likely would
    prevent advancement to the highest government and military ranks.
    Avowed religious practice bars membership in the Communist Party,
    although anecdotal reports indicate that a handful of the 2 million
    Communist Party members are religious believers.
        The Government remained sensitive about international and
    nongovernmental organization investigations. In October 1998, U.N.
    Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance Amor visited Hanoi, Ho Chi
    Minh City, Hue, and Tay Ninh province. He met with government officials
    and representatives of the governmentsanctioned Central Buddhist
    Church, the Catholic Church, Cao Dai, a Protestant church, and the
    small Muslim community. However, security officials prevented Amor from
    meeting several senior representatives of the nongovernmentsanctioned
    UBCV, including Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, despite his
    repeated requests to do so.
        d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
    Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on
    freedom of movement. Most citizens enjoyed freedom of movement within
    the country; however, some local authorities required members of ethnic
    minority groups to obtain permission to travel outside certain highland
    areas. Officially, citizens had to obtain permission to change their
    residence (see Section 1.f.). In practice many persons continued to
    move without approval, especially migrant or itinerant laborers moving
    from rural areas to cities in search of work. However, moving without
    permission restricted their ability to obtain legal residence permits.
    Holders of foreign passports must register to stay in private homes. In
    practice visitors of Vietnamese origin from overseas do not appear to
    have problems with this requirement and are allowed to stay with family
    and friends. Other foreigners complain that they are not allowed to do
    so.
        The Government employs internal isolation to restrict the movement
    of political and religious dissidents (see Section 1.d.). The
    Government continued to use its 1997 decree on administrative detention
    to restrict where citizens live and work (see Section 1.f.).
        Foreigners generally are free to travel throughout the country,
    except in some areas restricted on grounds of national security. The
    Government retained the right to approve travel to border areas, to
    some areas in the central highlands, and to some islands, but in
    practice foreigners can travel to most border areas without prior
    approval. However, on several occasions, local police detained and
    fined foreigners whom police found had ventured too close to
    international borders and other sensitive military areas.
        Although the Government no longer required citizens traveling
    abroad to obtain exit or reentry visas, the Government sometimes
    prevents persons from traveling by refusing to issue passports to
    persons who wished to travel. Persons who depart the country using
    passports marked dinh cu or ``resettlement'' appear to need a reentry
    permit to return.
        Some persons who publicly or privately have expressed dissident
    opinions on religious or political issues are not allowed to travel
    abroad (see Section 2.c.).
        Citizens must demonstrate eligibility to emigrate to another
    country and show sponsorship abroad before the Government issues
    passports for emigration. Persons who emigrate under refugee status are
    required to have a letter of introduction from the Ministry of Public
    Security in order to obtain a passport. Citizens' access to passports
    sometimes was constrained by factors outside the law, such as bribery
    and corruption. Refugee and immigrant visa applicants sometimes
    encountered local officials who arbitrarily delayed or denied passports
    based on personal animosities or on the officials' perception that an
    applicant did not meet program criteria, or in order to extort a bribe.
        Because citizens who live overseas are considered a valuable
    potential source of foreign exchange and expertise for the country but
    also a potential security threat, the Government generally encourages
    them to visit but monitors many of them carefully.
        The United States continued to process immigrants and refugee
    applicants for admission and resettlement, including Amerasians, former
    reeducation camp detainees, and family reunification cases. There are
    some concerns that some members of minority ethnic groups, particularly
    nonethnic Vietnamese such as the Montagnards, may not have ready access
    to these programs. The Government denied passports for emigration to
    certain Montagnard applicants.
        The Government generally permits citizens who emigrate to return to
    visit, but it considers them Vietnamese citizens and therefore subject
    to the obligations of a Vietnamese citizen under the law, even if they
    have adopted another country's citizenship. The Government no longer
    requires reentry visas for citizens holding regular passports but who
    reside in another country. Holders of Vietnamese passports marked dinh
    cu or ``resettlement'' appear to need a reentry visa. However,
    emigrants are not permitted to use Vietnamese passports after they
    adopt other citizenship.
        Vietnam and the United States continued to work together on the
    Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees Program (ROVR) in
    processing the residual ROVR persons who had returned from refugee
    camps elsewhere in southeast Asia. This program is nearing completion.
        The Constitution allows consideration of asylum under certain
    circumstances for foreigners persecuted abroad. Otherwise, the country
    does not have provisions for the granting of asylum or refugee status
    in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
    to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
    cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
    other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no
    reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
    persecution.

    Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
            Change Their Government
        Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Party
    control over the selection of candidates in elections for the National
    Assembly, the presidency, the prime ministership, and local government
    undermines this right. All authority and political power is vested in
    the CPV; political opposition movements and other political parties are
    not tolerated. The CPV central committee is the supreme decisionmaking
    body in the nation, with the Politburo as the locus of policymaking. A
    standing board, consisting of the five most senior members of the
    Politburo, oversees daytoday implementation of leadership directives.
    Senior advisors to the Party, including the former party general
    secretary, President, and Prime Minister, also continue to exert
    significant influence on Politburo decisionmaking. The Government
    limited public debate and criticism to certain aspects of individual,
    state, or party performance determined by the CPV itself. No public
    challenge to the legitimacy of the oneparty State is permitted;
    however, there were isolated instances of unsanctioned letters from
    private citizens critical of the Government that circulated publicly
    (see Section 2.a.).
        Eligible citizens are required to vote in elections, although there
    is no penalty for not voting. Citizens elect the members of the
    National Assembly, ostensibly the main legislative body, but the Party
    must approve all candidates, most of whom are Party members. Most
    National Assembly members belong to the CPV; 15 percent do not. Three
    members of the assembly are selfnominated independents, not nominated
    by the partycontrolled Vietnam Fatherland Front, even though it
    approved their candidacies.
        The National Assembly, although subject to the control of the Party
    (all of its senior leaders are party members), played an increasingly
    independent role, as a forum for the expression of local and provincial
    concerns and as a critic of corruption and inefficiency. However, the
    National Assembly generally does not initiate legislation and may not
    pass legislation that the Party opposes. Party officials occupied most
    senior government and National Assembly positions and continued to have
    the final say on key issues. During the year, the National Assembly
    continued to engage in vigorous debate on economic, legal, and social
    issues, including a business enterprise law and a press law.
    Legislators questioned and criticized ministers in sessions broadcast
    live on television.
        The law provides the opportunity for equal participation in
    politics by women and minority groups; however, in practice they are
    underrepresented. Most of the top leaders are men. There is one woman
    in the Politburo. Women are better represented in the National
    Assembly, where more than onefourth of the 450 members are women. Women
    hold some important positions. The Vice President is a woman, as are
    several ministers and vice ministers.
        The President of the National Assembly, who is also a Politburo
    standing committee member, is a member of an ethnic minority.

    Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
            Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
            Rights
        The Government does not permit private, local human rights
    organizations to form or operate. It generally prohibits private
    citizens from contacting international human rights organizations,
    although some dissidents were able to do so despite opposition from the
    Government. The Government permitted the UNHCR and international
    visitors to monitor implementation of its repatriation commitments
    under the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) and carried on a limited
    dialog with foreign human rights organizations based outside the
    country.
        The Government generally was willing to discuss human rights
    problems bilaterally with some other governments if such discussions
    take place under the rubric of ``exchanges of ideas'' rather than as
    ``investigations.'' Several foreign governments held official talks
    during the year concerning human rights.

    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
            Language, or Social Status
        The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on gender,
    ethnicity, religion, or social class; however, enforcement of these
    prohibitions was uneven. Persons formerly interned in reeducation camps
    on the basis of pre-l975 association with the government of the former
    Republic of Vietnam continued to report varying levels of
    discrimination as they and their families sought access to housing,
    education, and employment. Some military veterans of the former
    Republic of Vietnam still face economic hardship as a result of
    employment restrictions and discrimination, but none are known to be
    incarcerated for their activities after 1975. These veterans and their
    families generally are unable to obtain employment with the Government.
    This prohibition is less restrictive than in past years because of the
    growth in private sector job opportunities.
        Women.--International NGO workers and many women reported that
    domestic violence against women was common. The law addresses the
    problem of domestic violence, and officials increasingly acknowledge
    the problem; however, authorities do not enforce the law effectively.
    Many divorces reportedly are due to domestic violence, but many women
    likely remain in abusive marriages rather than confront the stigma and
    economic uncertainty of divorce.
        Prostitution, although officially illegal, appears to be tolerated
    widely. Some women are forced to work as prostitutes. The Ho Chi Minh
    City people's committee recently has acknowledged that more than 10,000
    women in the city engaged in prostitution. Hanoi, the port cities of
    Danang and Haiphong, and smaller cities such as Can Tho and Nha Trang
    also have large numbers of women engaged in prostitution. There are
    reports that some exploiters in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls
    to heroin and forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money for
    drugs. Many more women are compelled to work as prostitutes because of
    poverty, a lack of other employment opportunities, or because they are
    victimized by false promises of lucrative work (see Section 6.f.). The
    Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union, as well as international and
    domestic NGO's, are engaged actively in education and rehabilitation
    programs to combat these abuses.
        Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, both
    domestically and internationally, is a serious problem (see Section
    6.f.). Women and girls are trafficked from southern delta and highland
    provinces to Cambodia, and from northern provinces into China. There
    are reports that some women from Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta
    who married men from Taiwan were forced into prostitution after their
    arrival in Taiwan. Women and girls frequently are misled by promises of
    wellpaying jobs in those places.
        While there is no legal discrimination, women face deeply ingrained
    societal discrimination. Despite extensive provisions in the
    Constitution, in legislation, and in regulations that mandate equal
    treatment, and although some women occupy high government posts, few
    women compete effectively for higher status positions. The Government
    has ratified ILO conventions on Equal Remuneration and Discrimination
    in Employment. The Constitution provides that women and men must
    receive equal pay for equal work; however, the Government does not
    enforce this provision. Very poor women, especially in rural areas but
    also in cities, perform menial work in construction, waste removal, and
    other jobs for extremely low wages. Despite the large body of
    legislation and regulations devoted to the protection of women's rights
    in marriage as well as in the workplace, and Labor Law provisions that
    call for preferential treatment of women, women do not always receive
    equal treatment. Nevertheless, women play an important role in the
    economy and are widely engaged in business and in social and
    educational institutions. Opportunities for young professional women
    have increased markedly, with greater numbers entering the civil
    service, universities, and the private sector.
        The party-controlled Women's Union has a broad agenda to promote
    women's rights, including political, economic, and legal equality, and
    protection from spousal abuse. The Women's Union operates micro-credit
    consumer finance programs and other programs to promote the advancement
    of women. International NGO's and other international organizations
    regard the union as effective, but they and Women's Union
    representatives believe that much time is required to overcome societal
    attitudes that relegate women to lower status than men. The Government
    also has a committee for the advancement of women, which coordinates
    intraministerial programs that affect women.
        Children.--International organizations reported that despite the
    Government's promotion of child protection and welfare, children
    increasingly were at risk of economic exploitation. While education is
    compulsory through the age of 14, the authorities did not enforce the
    requirement, especially in rural areas where government and family
    budgets for education are strained. Thousands of children work in
    exploitative child labor (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). These practices
    occur almost exclusively in private, small-scale, or family
    enterprises. The Government continued a nationwide immunization
    campaign, and the governmentcontrolled press regularly stressed the
    importance of health and education for all children. Reports from
    domestic sources indicate that responsible officials generally took
    these goals seriously but were constrained by severely limited budgets.
    According to the World Bank, despite growth in incomes over the past
    decade, severe malnutrition remains an entrenched problem; about 45
    percent of children under 5 years of age suffer from stunted growth.
        Widespread poverty contributed to continued child prostitution,
    especially of girls, but also some boys as well, in major cities. Many
    prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City are girls between the ages of 15 and
    17. One NGO advocate stated that some child prostitutes, such as those
    from abusive homes, are forced into prostitution for economic reasons,
    having few other choices available to them. There are reports that some
    exploiters in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young girls to heroin and
    forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money for drugs.
        Some children are trafficked domestically, and others are
    trafficked to foreign destinations for the purpose of forced
    prostitution. Although statistics are not reliable, children are
    trafficked from southern delta and highland provinces to Cambodia, and
    from northern provinces into China. Government agencies were engaged in
    combating these abuses, and municipal and NGO groups organized
    publicity campaigns to warn of predatory child sex abusers in resort
    areas (see Section 6.f.). The Vietnam Women's Union and Youth Union are
    especially active in drawing attention to these problems and helping
    with education programs to warn vulnerable families of the dangers of
    deception by those who would lure young women and children into
    prostitution. Press reports documented the conviction and imprisonment
    of some traffickers (see Section 6.f.).
        Street children are vulnerable to abuse and sometimes are slapped
    and harassed by police (see Section 1.c.).
        People with Disabilities.--Government provision of services to the
    disabled is limited, and the Government provides little official
    protection or effective support for the disabled. Government agencies
    responsible for services to the disabled worked with domestic and
    foreign groups to ``identify measures'' to provide protection, support,
    and physical access for the disabled. Implementation is hampered by
    limited budgets. The 1995 Labor Law requires the State to protect the
    rights and encourage the employment of the disabled. It includes
    provisions for preferential treatment of firms that recruit disabled
    persons for training or apprenticeship and a special levy on firms that
    do not employ disabled workers. It is uncertain whether the Government
    enforces these provisions. The Government permitted international
    groups to assist persons disabled by war or by subsequent accidents
    involving unexploded ordnance and has developed indigenous prosthetics-
    manufacturing capabilities. There are no laws mandating physical access
    to buildings.
        National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although the Government states
    that it is opposed to discrimination against ethnic minorities,
    societal discrimination against minorities is widespread. In addition
    there continued to be credible reports that local officials sometimes
    restricted ethnic minority access to some types of employment and
    educational opportunities. The Government continued to implement
    policies designed to narrow the gap in the standard of living between
    ethnic groups living in the highlands and richer lowland ethnic
    Vietnamese by granting preferential treatment to domestic and foreign
    companies that invest in highland areas. The stated goal of government
    resettlement policy in mountainous provinces is for disadvantaged
    minorities to relocate from inaccessible villages to locations where
    basic services are easier to provide; however, the effect of the policy
    sometimes has been to dilute the political and social solidarity of
    these groups. Moreover, large-scale government-sponsored as well as
    spontaneous migration of ethnic Vietnamese to the central highlands
    have diluted further the indigenous culture and traditional heritage of
    the minorities located there. The Government continued to repress some
    highland minorities, particularly the Hmong, for practicing their
    religion without official approval (see Section 2.c.).
        In August about 150 members of the Ede ethnic minority attacked a
    village of ethnic majority Vietnamese (Kinh) who had migrated into the
    area where they lived; the Ede injured four ethnic Vietnamese and
    destroyed several homes. The attack underscored increased tensions that
    have resulted from the migration of ethnic Vietnamese to areas that
    traditionally were populated by ethnic minorities.

    Section 6. Worker Rights
        a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are controlled by the
    Party and have only nominal independence; however, union leaders
    influence some key decisions, such as on health, safety, and minimum
    wage standards. Workers are not free to join or form unions of their
    choosing; such action requires approval from the local office of the
    Partycontrolled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), and any
    union that forms must affiliate with the VGCL. The VGCL is the umbrella
    organization under which all local trade unions must operate. It claims
    that it represents 95 percent of public sector workers and 90 percent
    of workers in state-owned enterprises. In 1999 the Government stated
    that trade unions had not fulfilled their role of protecting workers in
    foreigninvested companies, many of whom it claimed did not respect
    labor regulations. The VGCL asserted that authorities did not prosecute
    some violations of the Labor Law.
        About 500,000 union members work in the private sector, including
    foreignbased enterprises. The vast majority of the work force live in
    rural areas, is engaged in small-scale farming, and is not unionized.
        The 1994 Labor Law requires the federation of labor at the
    provincial level to establish unions within 6 months at all new
    enterprises with more than 10 employees as well as at existing
    enterprises that operate without trade unions. Management of those
    companies is required by law to accept and cooperate with those unions.
    In addition, while the Labor Law states that all enterprise level and
    professional trade unions are affiliated with the VGCL, in practice
    hundreds of unaffiliated ``labor associations'' have been organized in
    occupations such as those of taxi, motorcycle and cyclo drivers, cooks,
    and market porters. Foreign governments and international
    organizations, such as the ILO and other U.N. system organizations,
    provide technical assistance and training to the Ministry of Labor,
    Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the VGCL.
        The Labor Law provides for the right to strike under certain
    circumstances. The law requires that management and labor resolve labor
    disputes through the enterprise's own labor conciliation council.
    However, many labor organizations failed to establish labor
    conciliation councils. In the case of the absence of a labor
    conciliation council or if one fails to resolve a labor dispute, it is
    referred to the provincial labor arbitration council. If the council's
    decision is unsatisfactory to the union or if the province does not
    have an arbitration council, unions have the right to appeal to the
    provincial people's labor arbitration council. However, such councils
    do not exist in some provinces. Labor courts, a division of the
    people's courts, heard approximately 500 cases between their inception
    in mid-1996 and mid-1999; most cited wrongful dismissal and matters of
    labor discipline. Since 1995 the Labor Ministry has organized hundreds
    of training courses on the Labor Law for its staff and for managers of
    large enterprises. The ILO and the U.N. Development Program are
    cooperating on a large multiyear technical assistance program to
    strengthen Labor Law implementation.
        The government-controlled labor unions stipulate written procedures
    for managing labor disputes that permit unresolved disputes to be
    arbitrated before a court. Unions have the right to appeal a council
    decision to the provincial people's court and the right to strike.
        There were 72 strikes during the year. Approximately 450 strikes
    have been reported since 1993, primarily against foreign-owned or joint
    venture companies, but some involved state-owned and private firms. The
    majority took place in Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai province, and other
    southern provinces. Most strikes are symbolic and last 1 or 2 days.
    Strikes are caused by disputes over wages and related problems,
    including late payment of overtime pay and inappropriate labor
    discipline. Although most of the strikes did not follow an authorized
    conciliation and arbitration process, and thus were of questionable
    legitimacy, the Government tolerated the strikes and did not take
    action against the strikers. Although the VGCL or its affiliate unions
    did not sanction these strikes officially, many were supported
    unofficially at the local and provincial levels of the VGCL. The Labor
    Law prohibits retribution against strikers, and there were no credible
    reports of such retribution. In some cases, the Government disciplined
    employers for illegal practices that led to strikes.
        The Labor Law prohibits strikes at enterprises that serve the
    public and those considered by the Government to be important to the
    national economy and defense. A subsequent decree defined these
    enterprises to be those involved in: Electricity production; post and
    telecommunications; railway, maritime, and air transportation; banking;
    public works; and the oil and gas industry. The law also grants the
    Prime Minister the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to
    the national economy or public safety. Strikes are prohibited in 54
    occupational sectors and businesses.
        Individual unions legally are not free to affiliate with, join, or
    participate in, international labor bodies, and they do not do so in
    practice. However, the VGCL has relations with 95 labor organizations
    in 70 countries, and the VGCL's president traveled internationally,
    including to Western industrial countries, on labor matters.
        b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers must
    have the approval of the provincial or metropolitan branch of the VGCL
    in order to organize unions in their enterprises. The Labor Law
    provides that party-approved unions have the right to bargain
    collectively on behalf of workers. It also provides for collective
    labor agreements that cover employees and employers. Since 1999
    collective bargaining became more important. Many contracts were
    negotiated that ended the practice of annual renewal, and multiyear
    contracts have become more common despite initial resistance from
    foreign companies. Labor leaders became more active in supporting their
    workers by agreeing in 1999 to place more workplace issues in
    collective bargaining agreements. Issues previously not covered in
    contracts, such as work on Sundays, have been spelled out so that
    companies cannot order workers to work a seventh day. As the country
    transitions away from central planning, market forces play a much more
    important role in determining wages. The Labor Law prohibits antiunion
    discrimination on the part of employers against employees who seek to
    organize.
        The growing number of export processing zones and industrial zones
    are governed by the same labor laws as the rest of the country.
        c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Law
    prohibits all forms of forced and bonded labor, including such labor by
    children; however, there were reports that thousands of children work
    in exploitative situations (see Section 6.d.). Some women are forced
    into prostitution, and trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
    prostitution is a problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Children were
    trafficked both domestically and internationally and forced to work as
    prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). A study of child labor in Ho Chi
    Minh City found cases in which poor families had entered into ``verbal
    agreements'' with employers, who put the families' children to work;
    their salaries generally are sent to their parents.
        The Government denies the use of prison labor without compensation;
    however, prisoners routinely are required to work, producing food and
    other goods used in prisons for little or no pay. Officials state that
    juveniles in Education and Nourishment Centers, which function much as
    reform schools or juvenile detention centers do elsewhere, are assigned
    work for ``educational purposes'' that does not generate income.
        Late in 1999, the Government issued an ordinance requiring all
    adult citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 for men and between 18 and
    35 for women to perform 10 days of annual public labor. However, the
    ordinance permits citizens to excuse themselves from this obligation by
    finding a substitute or paying a fee. While some have alleged that such
    laborers were recruited to construct the Ho Chi Minh Highway, the
    Government issued a decree in October that gives the force of law to
    its existing policy that all labor on this project must be voluntary
    and paid. Foreign diplomats urged labor officials to consult with ILO
    experts as to whether the ordinance and its implementation constitute
    forced labor under internationally recognized standards. There is a
    long local tradition under which persons living along floodprone levees
    voluntarily help to build or repair the ubiquitous and centuriesold
    flood control system.
        d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
    Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits most child labor but allows
    exceptions for certain types of work. It sets the minimum age for
    employment at 18 years of age, but enterprises may hire children
    between the ages of 15 and 18 if the firm obtains special permission
    from their parents and the MOLISA. However, a widelypublicized MOLISA
    survey found that about 40,000 children between the ages of 8 and 14
    years of age worked part-time or full-time in violation of the Labor
    Law. That estimate may be low, since most of these children worked in
    the informal sector. An employer must ensure that young workers do not
    undertake hazardous work or work that would harm their physical or
    mental development. Prohibited occupations are specified in the Labor
    Law. Children may work a maximum of 7 hours per day and 42 hours per
    week and must receive special health care. Restrictions on working in
    hazardous operations apply to persons under the age of 18. However,
    authorities do not have sufficient resources to enforce these
    regulations; international donor assistance targets this problem.
        The Labor Law permits children to register at trade training
    centers, a form of vocational training, from the age of 13.
        There were no reports that state-owned enterprises or companies
    with foreign investors used child labor.
        In rural areas, children work primarily on family farms and in
    other agricultural activities. They can begin working as young as 6
    years of age and are expected to work as adults by the time they are 15
    years of age. In urban areas, children also may work in family-owned
    small businesses. Compulsory education laws are not enforced
    effectively in rural areas, where children are needed to work in
    agriculture. However, the culture's strong emphasis on education leads
    parents who can send children to school to do so, rather than allow
    them to work. Many urban schools operate two sessions, allowing
    children to attend classes and to work.
        In 1997 the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) announced that children
    below the age of 16 faced increased risk of economic exploitation. In
    1997 UNICEF cited evidence of children working in gold mines and as
    domestic servants, or working up to 14 hours per day in hazardous
    conditions for meager pay or no pay. The ILO stated that some street
    children both in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi participate in night
    education courses.
        Government officials have the power to fine and, in cases of
    Criminal Code violations, prosecute employers who violate child Labor
    Laws. While the Government commits insufficient resources to enforce
    laws providing for children's labor safety, especially for children
    working in mines and as domestic servants, it has detected cases of
    child exploitation, removed the children from the exploitative
    situations and disciplined the employers. In a 1999 case in which
    children were working in a private sector gold mine, the Government
    prosecuted and convicted those responsible.
        In November The Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on Worst
    Forms of Child Labor.
        The Labor Law prohibits force and bonded labor by children;
    however, thousands of children work in exploitative situations, and
    children were trafficked both domestically and internationally for the
    purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
        e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Law requires the
    Government to set a minimum wage, which is adjusted for inflation and
    other economic changes. The official monthly minimum wage for foreign-
    investment joint ventures is $45 (637,650 dong) in Hanoi and Ho Chi
    Minh City, and $40 (566,800 dong) elsewhere. The Government can exempt
    temporarily certain joint ventures from paying the minimum wage during
    the first months of an enterprise's operations, or if the enterprise is
    located in a very remote area, but the minimum wage in these cases can
    be no lower than $30 (425,100 dong). Stateowned enterprises
    consistently pay above the official monthly minimum wage of $13
    (180,000 dong). These minimum wages are inadequate to provide a worker
    and family with a decent standard of living. A decreasing number of
    workers receive government-subsidized housing. However, many workers
    receive bonuses and supplement incomes by engaging in second-job
    entrepreneurial activities, and households often include more than one
    wage earner. The Government enforces the minimum wage only at foreign
    and major Vietnamese firms. A recent ILO study found that minimum wage
    requirements are well applied in all sectors, with the exception of
    smaller private sector enterprises.
        In October 1999, the Government reduced the length of the workweek
    for government employees and employees of companies in the state sector
    from 48 hours to 40 hours. The Government encourages the private
    business sector and foreign and international organizations that employ
    Vietnamese workers to reduce the number of hours in the work week but
    has not made mandatory.
        The Labor Law sets working hours at a maximum of 8 hours per day,
    with a mandatory 24-hour break each week. Additional hours require
    overtime pay at 1.5 times the regular wage and 2 times the regular wage
    on holidays. The law limits compulsory overtime to 4 hours per week and
    200 hours per year. Annual leave with full pay for various types of
    work also is prescribed by the law. The ILO has pointed out that the
    limit of 200 hours a year of overtime work is too low, and that workers
    and employers should have the right to agree to a greater amount of
    overtime work. It is uncertain how well the Government enforces these
    provisions.
        According to the law, a female employee who is to be married, is
    pregnant, is on maternity leave, or is raising a child under 1 year of
    age cannot be dismissed unless the enterprise is closed. Female
    employees who are at least 7 months pregnant or are raising a child
    under 1 year of age cannot work overtime, at night, or in distant
    locations.
        The Labor Law requires the Government to promulgate rules and
    regulations that ensure worker safety. The Ministry of Labor, in
    coordination with local people's committees and labor unions, is
    charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice enforcement is
    inadequate because of the Ministry's inadequate funding and a shortage
    of trained enforcement personnel. The VGCL reported that there are 300
    labor inspectors in the country but that at least 600 are needed. There
    is growing evidence that workers, through labor unions, have been
    effective in improving working conditions. In 1994 the Government
    ratified ILO Convention 155 on occupational safety and health.
        Some foreign companies with operations in the country have
    established independent monitoring of problems at their factories. In
    some instances, they used NGO's and other nonprofit organizations to
    monitor workplace conditions and report abuses to the Ministry of
    Labor.
        The Labor Code provides that workers may remove themselves from
    hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
        f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code prescribes harsh
    punishment for persons convicted of trafficking in women and children;
    however, some women are forced to work as prostitutes, and trafficking
    in women and children for the purpose of forced prostitution, both
    domestically and internationally, is a serious problem. The Government,
    international NGO's, and the press reported an increase in recent years
    in trafficking in women. Women and girls are trafficked from the Mekong
    Delta and highland provinces into Cambodia and from northern provinces
    into China. There are reports that some women from Ho Chi Minh City and
    the Mekong Delta who married men from Taiwan were forced into
    prostitution after their arrival in Taiwan. Women and girls are misled
    by promises of well-paying jobs in those places.
        Prostitution, although officially illegal, is tolerated widely. The
    Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee recently acknowledged that more
    than 10,000 women in the city engage in prostitution. Hanoi and the
    port cities of Danang and Haiphong also have large numbers of women
    engaged in prostitution. There are reports that some persons in Ho Chi
    Minh City addicted young girls to heroin, then forced them to work as
    prostitutes to earn money to support their drug addiction. Many more
    women are compelled to work as prostitutes because of poverty, a lack
    of other employment opportunities, or because they are victimized by
    false promises of lucrative work. The government-affiliated Vietnam
    Women's Union and Youth Union, as well as international and domestic
    NGO's, are engaged actively in education and rehabilitation programs to
    combat these abuses.
        The Government is working with international NGO's to supplement
    law enforcement measures and is cooperating with other national
    governments to prevent trafficking. In September it signed an agreement
    with the government of Australia stating a mutual commitment to combat
    trafficking in women and children.
        Organized groups, including duplicitous job recruiters, lure poor,
    often rural, women with promises of jobs or marriage and force them to
    work as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Press and NGO reports
    noted that some women were kidnaped and transported to China and other
    countries against their will, where they were sold into forced
    marriages. The Government and the Vietnam Women's Union addressed this
    problem by a program of public information to warn women and girls of
    these dangers and by repatriation programs to help female returnees.
    The Government also increased its efforts to prosecute traffickers.
        There is reported trafficking in women to the Macau Special
    Administrative Region of China with the assistance of organizations in
    China that are ostensibly marriage service bureaus, international labor
    organizations, and travel agencies. After arrival women can be forced
    into conditions similar to indentured servitude; some may be forced
    into prostitution.
        Children also are trafficked domestically and overseas to work as
    prostitutes. MOLISA, the Vietnamese Committee for the Protection and
    Care of Children, and the Vietnam Women's Union were engaged in efforts
    to combat this abuse. One NGO advocate has estimated that the average
    age of trafficked girls was between 15 and 17 years; many were
    trafficked to Cambodia and China.
        Some traffickers have been convicted and imprisoned. The Vietnam
    Women's Union and Youth Union's programs, as well as state-owned media,
    publicized the problem. Women's Union advocacy and rehabilitation
    efforts help women and girls who have been trafficked.